Eisenhower and the Cold War Arms Race: ‘Open Skies’ and the Military-Industrial Complex 9780755623716, 9781350159143

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ACK NOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe a tremendous thanks to a number of people with regard to the writing of this book, and it is a pleasure to acknowledge them here. Firstly, Professor Gerard (Jerry) DeGroot, who supervised my doctoral studies at the University of St Andrews, provided a great deal of advice and encouragement throughout the process. I am also indebted to my PhD examiners – Stephen Tyre and Simon Ball – for providing a thorough critique of my thesis. Further afield, I would like to thank Jon Taylor of the University of Missouri and Sydney Soderberg of Salina in Kansas for their help in obtaining additional valuable research from the Eisenhower and Truman Presidential Libraries. Friends and colleagues read the book in various stages, but I would especially like to thank my good friend and neighbour, Lynda Brady, who proofread a number of drafts and made some very helpful suggestions that improved the style and direction of my work. My thanks also go to my copy-editor, Audrey Daly, who did a splendid job on the final version of the manuscript and offered valuable suggestions for honing my conclusion. In the preparation of this book, I had the pleasure of undertaking research at a number of libraries in America and Britain, and my thanks go to the various teams of librarians and archivists at these establishments. At the Eisenhower Library, I would like to thank David Haight and Chalsea Millner; Shari Stone at the Truman Library, and intern staff at the John F. Kennedy Library. In New York, at the Rockefeller Archives Center, I am very grateful to

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Amy Fitch, who supported me very efficiently and uncovered some truly amazing information on Nelson Rockefeller and the Quantico panel. I am grateful to Lady Avon for permission to conduct research in the Papers of Lord Avon (Anthony Eden) in the Special Collections library at the University of Birmingham. My thanks also go to the staff at the National Archives in Kew and the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College London. During my time in Abilene, I had the great pleasure of staying with Jay and Adrian Potter and their family – they were wonderful hosts and provided a very comfortable home away from home. On a more personal level, I owe an enormous debt to my husband Paul. He has been immensely supportive and patient throughout my work and has made my life a very happy one. I dedicate this book to him.

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ABBR EVIATIONS

AEC AP APP AST BNSP CENTO CIA CPD DCI DDEL EDC FBI GDP GNP GOP HST ICBM IGY IRBM JCS JFKL LBJL MIT

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Atomic Energy Commission Avon Papers at Birmingham University American Presidency Project Austrian State Treaty Basic National Security Policy Central Treaty Organisation Central Intelligence Agency Committee on the Present Danger Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas European Defence Community Federal Bureau of Investigation Gross Domestic Product Gross National Product Old Party Guard Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri Intercontinental Ballistic Missile International Geophysical Year Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Joint Chiefs of Staff John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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A BBREVIATIONS

NATO NIE NSC ODM PCG PPS PRC RAC SAC SAC SACEUR SALT SEATO SHAPE SSP TCP UMT UN US USAF USIA USSR WADC WEU

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North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Intelligence Estimates National Security Council Office of Defense Mobilization Planning Co-ordination Group Planning Policy Staff People’s Republic of China Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York Strategic Air Command Science Advisory Committee Supreme Allied Commander Europe Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty South East Asia Treaty Organisation Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe Special Studies Project Technological Capabilities Panel Universal Military Training United Nations United States United States Air Force United States Information Agency Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics Wright Air Development Command Western European Union

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PR EFACE

Nikita Khrushchev was of the view that President Dwight D. Eisenhower delegated the responsibilities of foreign policy to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and almost always relied on his recommendations. Among Western historians writing during the 1960s and prior to the availability of the vast quantity of archival documents, this was not an uncommon interpretation of Eisenhower as president. Since the late 1970s, however, this view has been subject to considerable challenge. Extensive reading of archival sources opened at the Eisenhower Library from the mid-1970s led historian Fred I. Greenstein to conclude that ‘Eisenhower was politically astute and informed, actively engaged in putting his personal stamp on public policy, and applied a carefully thought-out conception of leadership to the conduct of his presidency.’1 Since publication of his article, ‘Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence’, Greenstein has by no means been alone in this view of America’s 34th president. Works providing a more positive and complimentary appraisal of Eisenhower’s years in office have been prolific, to the extent that Eisenhower revisionists are now, as Richard Immerman claims, ‘a dime a dozen’.2 As revisionists have argued, Eisenhower exercised a much greater level of influence on policy making than early historians of this subject were prepared to accept. This argument can certainly be applied to the case of ‘Open Skies’, a proposal that Eisenhower made to the Soviet Union at the Geneva summit in July 1955 for the exchange of military blueprints

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and implementation of a system of mutual aerial inspection of US and Soviet territory. In the pursuit of this initiative, Eisenhower was very much ‘his own man’, as this book will show. My interest in Eisenhower’s Open Skies initiative began during my PhD studies at the University of St Andrews. The literature on the Eisenhower presidency is extensive and scholars will be only too familiar with the voluminous quantity of archival records in America, other Western countries and the former Soviet Union that cover this period. Yet I have been struck by the fact that relatively few works dedicated to the subject of Open Skies have emerged even though Eisenhower pursued this plan throughout most of his years in office. I hope this book will raise the profile of this initiative and contribute to our understanding of what John S.D. Eisenhower once described as ‘one of the most newsworthy events of Dad’s eight years in the White House’.3 This book will also seek to build on the revisionist themes and accounts pertaining to Eisenhower’s presidency. One of the earliest books dedicated to the subject of Open Skies is Walt W. Rostow’s Open Skies – A Review of Eisenhower’s Proposal of July 21 1955. Rostow had been chairman of the first gathering of a lobby group that comprised intelligence specialists, academics, policy analysts and military staff. This group became known as the Quantico panel. It had been convened by Nelson Rockefeller, a presidential aide, in June 1955. With the Geneva summit on the horizon, the panel was charged with assessing aspects of psychological warfare but, going beyond its original remit, its members drafted a series of proposals for the government to make to the Soviet Union at the summit. One of these proposals was Open Skies. Rostow claims that this initiative was ‘certainly, in part, a political and psychological act. It was meant to be, and it was both praised and criticised as such.’4 In May 1955, the Soviets had announced their latest disarmament proposals. These had gone some way towards addressing the gap that had emerged in this field between the East and West from 1946. The United States was under pressure to respond to these proposals and Geneva, according to Rostow, provided the perfect opportunity to test the sincerity of the Soviet Union towards world peace. Soviet rejection of Open Skies, along with a number of measures put forward by

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America for easing tensions, would signal the fact that the Soviets were not interested in pursuing peace. More important, it would also indicate the need, as Rostow argues, ‘for a much more energetic US military and foreign policy, including enlarged assistance to developing countries’.5 Eisenhower’s failure to take this course of action, Rostow feels, contributed to the gathering crises of the late 1950s and beyond, including the Cuban missile crisis. As a member of the Quantico panel, Rostow no doubt reflected the general sentiment of this group and its subsequent gatherings. While Rostow does not question Eisenhower’s commitment towards disarmament, his argument that Open Skies was proposed in circumstances touched by a need for the United States to achieve at Geneva a positive political and psychological result has influenced debate about Eisenhower’s motives and his attitude towards the Soviet Union and the Cold War. Notwithstanding the emergence of a revisionist interpretation of the study of Eisenhower’s presidential years, Rostow’s line of argument is by no means sui generis. In James J. Marquardt article, ‘Transparency and Security Competition: Open Skies and America’s Cold War Statecraft, 1948 – 1960’, he argues that far from being a mechanism to abate international tensions and improve relations, Open Skies formed an important part of US strategy to prosecute and win the Cold War. Another illuminating account of this initiative is an article by David Tal, ‘Eisenhower’s Disarmament Dilemma: From Chance for Peace to the Open Skies Proposal’. Tal questions Eisenhower’s commitment to negotiating with the Soviet Union, arguing that he eventually agreed to meet with the Russians in July 1955 because of European pressure and a change of heart on the part of the British government. While some scholars have argued that Open Skies may have been a wellintentioned proposal, albeit unrealistic for the purpose of reducing international tensions, such interpretations constitute a minority view among works on this subject. They include ‘A Cold Warrior Seeks Peace: Eisenhower’s Strategy for Nuclear Disarmament’ in Diplomatic History (1980) by Thomas Soapes, ‘America’s Search for a Technological Solution to the Arms Race’ in Diplomatic History (1997) by Jeremy Suri, and ‘Trust and Missed Opportunities in International Relations’ Political Psychology (1997) by Deborah Welch Larson.

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Moreover, with the emergence of what Saki Dockrill has described as a post-revisionist stage in the historiography of the Eisenhower administration, recent studies have not only reaffirmed Rostow’s earlier thesis but they have gone further by claiming that Eisenhower had no interest in any form of disarmament and the promotion of international peace and co-operation.6 Such works include Total Cold War – Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence, Kansas, 2007) by Kenneth Osgood; ‘Co-operation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1950s’, in World Politics (1990) by Matthew Evangelista; and ‘Open Skies and Closed Minds – American Disarmament Policy at the Geneva Summit’ by John Prados, in Bischof and Dockrill, eds, Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955 (2000). This book will present a different interpretation and, I hope, fascinating account of Open Skies. This initiative was neither a transient measure nor was it intended to be a calculated plan to undermine the Soviet Union, either in the short or long term. Eisenhower was serious about implementing a system of mutual aerial inspection with the Kremlin. He was no doubt one of those officials of the mid-1950s whom Rostow has described as ‘authentically frustrated and alarmed by [their] inability to penetrate the closed society of the USSR and establish with reasonable precision the scale and momentum of the Soviet program to develop nuclear delivery capabilities’. But Eisenhower’s aim to reach beyond the perimeters of the Eastern bloc had less to do with propaganda or with preventing a surprise attack by the Soviets. Eisenhower was never dismissive of the possibility of the Soviet Union launching such an attack on the US. Nevertheless, he always doubted whether Soviet capabilities and intentions could live up to the speculation of America’s Cold Warriors, even under Josef Stalin’s regime. Furthermore, my intention is to show that Open Skies was central to Eisenhower’s defence strategy, which became known as the New Look. This strategy, which was approved by the president in October 1953, emphasised the importance of nuclear weapons, psychological warfare, covert operations, alliances and negotiations in enabling the US to gain the initiative in the Cold War. A number of works on the New Look have emerged since Eisenhower left office in January 1961.

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They include the work of Douglas Kinnard entitled President Eisenhower and Strategy Management (1977), an article by Samuel F. Wells, ‘The Origins of Massive Retaliation’ in Political Science Quarterly (1981), and David Alan Rosenberg, ‘The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy’ in The National Security – Its Theory and Practice 1945–1960 (1986). These provide fascinating accounts of the strategic, technical and diplomatic aspects of nuclear weapons, but they do not aspire to be comprehensive studies of the New Look. More sophisticated analyses have emerged in recent years, which seek to present a thorough formulation of this strategy and the American government’s efforts to implement it at various levels. An illuminating and persuasive account includes Saki Dockrill’s Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61 (1996). Another example is contained in two chapters by John Lewis Gaddis in his book Strategies of Containment – A Critical Appraisal of Post-War American National Security Policy (1982). My work does not aim to present a study of the New Look. Rather, it will seek to demonstrate that successful implementation of this strategy was crucially dependent on the United States obtaining an accurate picture of Soviet capabilities. The links between the New Look and Open Skies cannot be disputed. My work is chiefly concerned with American perceptions of the Cold War stand-off and the perceived threat of Soviet communism to Western security and interests. It will focus on the seemingly interminable debates that took place within and beyond the elite circles of the White House and Capitol Hill about America’s military requirements. This analysis will show the extent to which the military and many other elements of American political life became disillusioned with the New Look and why it became essential for Eisenhower to implement Open Skies in order to safeguard the military and economic integrity of the United States. Helen Bury St Abbs

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INTRODUCTION

On 21 July 1955, heads of government representatives of the United States (US), the Soviet Union, Britain and France met at the Palais de Nations in Geneva. This gathering was one of a number of meetings held between 18 and 23 July aimed at what President Dwight D. Eisenhower called ‘some real easing of tensions’ between the West and the Soviet bloc.1 The Geneva summit was the first meeting to be held between British, Soviet and American leaders since the Potsdam conference in July 1945. The principal agenda item for the meeting of 21 July was disarmament. Marshal Nikolai Bulganin, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, who was chairing the meeting, invited the American president to address the delegations. Having summarised his country’s existing position on disarmament, Eisenhower then ‘quickly and partially extemporaneously’ proceeded to lay before the gathering a new proposal.2 Addressing the Soviet delegation directly, he announced that he had been ‘searching [his] heart and mind’ for something that ‘could convince those present of the sincerity’ of the United States towards the problem of disarmament. In pursuit of this quest, Eisenhower suggested that the US and the Soviet Union agree to implement ‘very quickly’ the exchange of a complete blueprint of the military establishments of their respective countries. He then proposed that the US and the Soviet Union implement a system of mutual aerial inspection. As the president explained: We to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study; you

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to provide exactly the same facilities for us . . . and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack.3 The Soviets were stunned by Eisenhower’s offer. Eventually, Bulganin declared that the president’s proposal had real merit and advised that the Soviet Union ‘would give it complete and sympathetic study at once’.4 Nikita Khrushchev, first secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was ‘100 per cent negative’ about Eisenhower’s proposal.5 During an adjournment of the heads of government meeting, whilst delegates had gathered at a buffet, Eisenhower tried to persuade Khrushchev of the benefits of his idea. The first secretary refused to budge, claiming that the president’s idea to exchange military information and allow overflights in both Russia and the US ‘was nothing more than a bald espionage plot against the USSR’. He then claimed that Eisenhower’s proposal was ‘impractical and primarily a propaganda move’.6 According to a later account by the president to a National Security Council (NSC) meeting, Khrushchev stated to a group of delegates the following day that there were always people at a conference who made proposals ‘in the full knowledge that [these] would be turned down, only to gain a propaganda advantage’. Looking the first secretary directly in the eye, Eisenhower replied, ‘Take me up on my proposal.’ Trying to bluff his way out of the conversation, Khrushchev said his generalisation did not extend to the president’s proposal.7 For Eisenhower, these incidents revealed that the Soviet delegation was divided over his proposal; some members, including Bulganin, appeared to consider mutual aerial inspection and the exchange of military blueprints sympathetically and as a serious measure for reducing global tensions. In the immediate aftermath of Geneva, mutual aerial inspection, or Open Skies as it became known after the summit, was hailed as a great success by many commentators in the Western press. As the British newspaper, The Times, reported on 23 July 1955: . . . the Russian people themselves will long remember [Eisenhower’s] offer on Thursday, a striking development of a

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broader American proposal of 1952, to hand over to the Russians the plans of all American military installations, and allow Russian airplanes to fly over the US to take photographs if the Soviet government would give like facilities to the US. The offer is a genuine bid for confidence, all the stronger in coming from a responsible soldier.8 However, the Soviet Union later rejected this plan. Following a foreign ministers’ conference at Geneva during October and November 1955, little agreement was reached between the East and the West on principal areas of disagreement such as disarmament and Germany. The ‘spirit of Geneva’, which had represented the first real thaw in East-West relations since the start of the Cold War, was now in danger of dissipating.9 Eisenhower began to reassess his options for relaxing tensions with the Soviet Union. Running parallel to these considerations was the acceleration of the military industry in his own country, about which he had serious misgivings. In his endeavours to reduce tensions, Eisenhower did not abandon Open Skies despite the Soviets rejecting his offer. As he wrote in his diary on 20 November 1957: The so-called ‘Open Skies’ plan revealed a desire to let one nation see what the other nation is doing in armament. In a sense, this plan is a means of ‘opening doors’ and ‘opening hearts’. It is not just a gesture towards peace. It could be a means towards peace. To effectuate this plan is not to abandon the normal processes of contact or communication between governments, but merely to recognise their limitations.10 This book will explore the links between mutual aerial inspection and Eisenhower’s New Look defence strategy, which became known as the New Look. This strategy aimed to place America’s economic solvency ahead of its military strength.11 Throughout his presidency, Eisenhower endeavoured to contain his country’s armaments bill and, in turn, the rising military establishment in America, which he later referred to as a military-industrial complex. A review of Eisenhower’s public papers and private communications reveals his frequent use of

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the phrase ‘garrison state’ to express his concerns about the consequences of uncontrolled military expenditures. At a press conference not long after becoming president, he described the task that lay ahead in ensuring America’s national security, on the one hand, and its liberty on the other: We don’t want to become a garrison state. We want to remain free. Our plans and programs have to conform to a free people, which means essentially a free economy. That is the problem that, frankly, this Administration meets on, discusses, works on every day of its life.12 Acquisition of a reliable picture of Soviet capabilities was crucial to the military and economic security of America over the long term. Eisenhower regarded aerial inspection as a valuable opportunity for obtaining the intelligence he needed on the Soviet Union to quell exaggerated estimates about Russian force levels and thus contain the costs of defending his country. This book will examine Open Skies in the context of wider debates relating to defence strategy and the military build-up in the US between 1945 and 1961. Rather than treat mutual aerial inspection as an isolated measure, an attempt to gain a propaganda advantage over the Soviets, the following chapters will show that Open Skies lay at the heart of Eisenhower’s Cold War strategy. There is no reason to question Eisenhower’s commitment towards negotiating with the Soviet Union as part of his efforts to ease tensions and lay the foundations for the resolution of the principal areas of disagreement with the East. Negotiations were a crucial part of the New Look and this subject will be an important theme of this book. In order to create the conditions in which disarmament agreements, incorporating aerial inspection, could ultimately be established, Eisenhower knew that he needed to build up a degree of trust with the Soviets. Alliances with non-communist countries also formed part of the administration’s defence strategy. Such unions, particularly those formed with Western European nations, would strengthen Eisenhower’s hand in dealing with Moscow, minimising the risk of the Soviet Union undermining Western unity and creating the position of

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strength he needed to conduct meaningful negotiations. This book will examine these aspects of the New Look. The importance Eisenhower attached to both negotiations and alliances is clear in his approach to the Geneva summit of July 1955. Many US government officials did not dismiss the propaganda value of Open Skies. For them, mutual aerial inspection and the exchange of military blueprints was a tool for testing the insincerity of the Soviet Union towards global peace, transparency and freedom. The Soviet rejection of this plan merely proved the West correct in its belief that Soviet foreign policy had an aggressive intent, geared as it was towards gaining the initiative in the Cold War through force and subversion. However, studies that are confined to an assessment of this aspect of Eisenhower’s proposal run the risk of lending themselves to a narrow interpretation of mutual aerial inspection, both in conceptual and practical terms. This book provides a ‘long context’ to the development of Open Skies and its aftermath. Its background is necessary in order to appreciate the military and political context in which aerial inspection evolved and was supported by Eisenhower throughout his presidency. The chapters that follow will thus demonstrate the importance of mutual aerial inspection to Eisenhower’s overall defence strategy and his determination to rein in the militaryindustrial complex. In order to present mutual aerial inspection in this light, it is necessary to examine the background to the rise of the armaments industry after 1945, Eisenhower’s efforts to ease tensions between the US and the Soviet Union, and the resistance he encountered from his military staff, elected officials, certain journalists and many other elements of American political life as he sought to control demands for inflated defence budgets and the consequent military build-up. The background provided in this book will also take into account Eisenhower’s views on war, including nuclear war, and the Soviet Union. These views were formed to a very large extent before Eisenhower entered the White House and his experiences as president reinforced his concerns regarding the pernicious effects of a powerful military industry. This background is essential in understanding his approach to the Cold War, the defence of America and his determination to

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pursue the New Look. His unwavering belief that the Soviet Union had neither the ability (confirmed later by aerial reconnaissance) nor the propensity to attack the US or directly challenge its interest made him desirous, albeit cautious, of negotiating with the Kremlin and of controlling the military-industrial complex in his own country. Few studies on Open Skies have examined Eisenhower’s proposal beyond July 1955.13 As this book will show, an examination of this initiative is necessary in order to consider its impact on national security policy during his most turbulent years in office when demands to abandon the New Look and overturn the fiscal constraints imposed by the administration were becoming increasingly vocal and unrestrained. With aerial inspection being the only reliable means by which Eisenhower could obtain an accurate picture of Soviet military capabilities, Open Skies remained a central part of Eisenhower’s Cold War strategy. Armed with this intelligence, he was in a stronger position to confront the fear, indeed paranoia, of Soviet communism that gripped the US from the late 1940s and which threatened to undermine his attempts to control military expenditures and balance the budget. The foundations of America’s military-industrial complex were laid to a large extent during the Second World War. For a country that had withdrawn from world affairs after 1919, had a peace movement with an estimated 12 million members by the early 1930s and whose Congress had passed a permanent Neutrality Act in 1937, America’s transformation to a military superpower by 1945 was remarkable.14 During the Second World War the US had developed the capacity to turn out almost 100,000 planes a year and 30,000 tanks. In 1943, its factories produced $37.5 billion worth of armaments compared to $13.9 billion in Russia, $11.1 billion in Britain and $13.8 billion in Germany.15 Towards the end of the war, America had also developed the atomic bomb. The Manhattan Project was established in 1942 and oversaw construction of the new weapon at an estimated cost of $2 billion.16 The project brought together the skills and expertise of America and Europe’s leading scientists. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki completed the defeat of Japan in August 1945, demonstrating America’s unassailable military might in the new global order.

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As relations between the US and the Soviet Union began to deteriorate after 1945, many in America believed a build-up of military strength was needed to confront Soviet communism and the likelihood of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. In August 1949, the Soviet Union tested an atomic bomb, signalling an end to America’s monopoly. US officials raised concerns that the Soviets would, in time, be able to increase their nuclear forces and long-range air force to a level that a surprise attack on America would be militarily decisive. Chapter One will examine the background to the rise of military-industrial complex after 1945, which became the largest military build-up during a peacetime period. This build-up was fuelled by the demands of officials for increases in both nuclear and conventional weapons. But as a result of this build-up, there was a risk of America becoming a garrison state. The literature on this period of the Cold War is extensive, leading scholars to debate whether or not America was at risk of becoming this. The most thorough development of the concept came from Harold Lasswell, a sociologist based at Yale University. In a series of influential articles, Lasswell warned that under conditions of continual crisis and perpetual preparedness for total war, every aspect of life would eventually come under the control of military authorities.17 This study, as Chapter One will show, is important in understanding the problems Eisenhower would have to confront with regard to his military staff and the difficulties he would encounter later in trying to negotiate a system of mutual aerial inspection with the Russians. Military expenditures in the US increased substantially between 1949 and 1953, from $13.5 billion to $49.6 billion.18 This sharp increase set a trend in American post-war defence spending. After 1952, military expenditures remained in excess of $40 billion. These increases were merely a symptom of the problems Eisenhower faced as fear and suspicion of the Soviet Union became immutable. Chapter Two examines the New Look and the ways in which this strategy embraced not only a military response towards the perceived threat of communism but also covered non-military measures such as psychological warfare, covert operations, alliances and negotiations. Using a range of sources from the Eisenhower Presidential Library, Chapter Two will also show that a fraught relationship emerged

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between the president and his military staff, as the former proceeded to reduce defence spending from January 1953. Running parallel with Eisenhower’s early efforts to curb the military-industrial complex was his desire to develop initiatives aimed at uncovering information on Soviet force levels. In November 1954, he approved the development of U2 reconnaissance planes. High altitude flights over the Soviet Union became of prime importance in diffusing claims relating to accelerated Soviet long-range bomber and missile programmes. These claims were generated in the main by the military, intelligence specialists and elected officials. As a result, the reconnaissance flights that Eisenhower authorised from July 1956 did succeed to a degree in placing limits on defence spending. In a clear departure from the policies pursued by Harry S. Truman, the Eisenhower administration entered into a series of negotiations with the Soviet Union from the summer of 1953, which culminated with the heads of government meeting in July 1955. Chapter Three will examine the background to the Geneva summit and the evolution of Open Skies. This analysis will show that while Eisenhower did not expect concrete results from his first meeting with the Soviet leadership, there was a willingness on the part of both America and the Soviet Union to start the ball of negotiation rolling. Eisenhower clearly recognised that a relaxation in tensions between the West and the East was essential in order to control demands in America for increased military budgets. This chapter will also focus on Nelson Rockefeller and the Quantico panel. This analysis will show how lobby groups sought to influence foreign policy during the early Cold War period. With the benefit of access to material held at the Rockefeller Archives Center, one gains a clear impression of the fear felt by many – both government and non-government officials – about the consequences for the US of the balance of power changing in favour of the Soviets. Through its advocacy of larger defence budgets, the Quantico panel added to the general climate of fear of communism. Chapter Four will assess Eisenhower’s attempts to implement a system of mutual aerial inspection with the Soviet Union after the Geneva summit. This analysis will focus on negotiations at the United Nations Disarmament Commission sub-committee and early

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attempts by the Eisenhower administration to undertake reconnaissance activity aimed at establishing an accurate picture of Soviet military capabilities. Implementation of Open Skies was essential as Eisenhower faced growing challenges, particularly from the military, to cuts in the defence budget and the New Look. Central to the military’s approach was fear of the growing military strength of the Soviet Union, which could prove fatal to America’s attempts at minimising the threat of surprise attack and halting the spread of communism in Third World countries. Chapter Five will return to Nelson Rockefeller and his continuing efforts to support increases in defence budgets. The second gathering at Quantico saw the launch of a thorough critique of massive retaliation, which brought Rockefeller into conflict with many members of the government. His public advocacy of a larger military build-up illustrates how growing support for expanding the military-industrial complex gripped many elements of political life in America. It also demonstrates the problems Eisenhower encountered in trying to control this situation. Chapters Six and Seven will examine Eisenhower’s continuing attempts to implement a system of mutual aerial inspection with the Russians after July 1955. This analysis is crucial in understanding how important Open Skies was in the context of Eisenhower’s defence strategy. During the latter years of the 1950s, particularly after Sputnik, challenges to the administration’s defence cuts and the New Look strategy continued to mount. A number of officials, including the military, remained unconvinced about the adequacy of massive retaliation in the face of growing Soviet military strength and technological advancement. Congressional Democrats, scientists, lobby groups and journalists also advocated a build-up of military capabilities. Many believed a so-called flexible response, which included increases in both nuclear and conventional forces, was essential to confront the perceived threat posed by Moscow. In order to deal with these challenges, Eisenhower needed reliable intelligence on the Soviet Union that could be placed in the public domain. Without this information, he was unable to control his military staff, political opponents and the hard-line anti-communists who contributed significantly to the general climate of fear, even hysteria, in

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the US. Eisenhower’s support for disarmament proposals at the United Nation (UN), which incorporated plans for mutual aerial inspection, and his repeated requests to the Kremlin leaders to reconsider their rejection of Open Skies, should be seen as part of his endeavours to arrest the ever-increasing demands for larger defence budgets. The Soviet Union, however, refused to accept Open Skies. Eisenhower’s misgivings, not least his regrets, with the rise of what Gerard DeGroot has described as a ‘technocratic monster’19 are particularly apparent in Eiserhower’s farewell address to the nation of 17 January 1961, wherein he cautioned: In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machine of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.20 This was the climate faced by John F. Kennedy when he entered the White House, but it was one he had helped to create and as president he made little attempt to control. In linking Eisenhower’s pursuit of Open Skies to his determination to control the military-industrial complex in America, this book will offer a different perspective on the study of mutual aerial inspection, in contrast to those works which claim that this initiative was a propaganda stunt. As such, this book will examine the foreign policy issues and domestic pressures that influenced Eisenhower’s desire to implement this initiative. James Ledbetter has defined the militaryindustrial complex as: . . . a network of public and private forces that combine a profit motive with the planning and implementation of strategic

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policy. The overlap between private military contractors and the federal government is usually presumed to include, in addition to the military itself, areas of both the executive branch . . . and the legislative branch.21 This book will examine the role played by the various forces included in Ledbetter’s definition in the rise of the military-industrial complex in America during the post-Second World War period. It will provide a detailed assessment of the nature of the military build-up between 1945 and 1961, taking account of the wider political issues relating to the development of US defence strategy. This analysis is important in understanding Eisenhower’s Cold War strategy and the extent to which this was shaped by domestic considerations. Eisenhower was sincere in pursuing détente with the Soviet Union. The underlying objective of his presidency was to safeguard the economic and military security of America over the long term, and this strategy was dependent on a relaxation of tensions between the East and the West. Mutual aerial inspection was crucial in the fulfilment of this objective.

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CHAPTER ONE IN THE SHADOW OF THE SPECIALISTS ON VIOLENCE – A MER ICAN FOR EIGN POLICY AND THE R ISE OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTR IAL COMPLEX, 1945–53

In 1941, Harold Lasswell published an essay entitled ‘The Garrison State’.1 According to Lasswell, a garrison state was characterised by ‘a world in which the specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society’. From this point of view, he continued, ‘the trend of our time is away from the dominance of the specialist on bargaining, who is the businessman, and towards the supremacy of the soldier’.2 Of particular note in the evolution of a garrison state was technological change. For Lasswell, this concerned the introduction of air power to military efforts, which made civilians as vulnerable to attack as military installations and personnel. The rise to power of a military elite in a garrison state was crucially dependent on a climate of long-term international tensions, where perpetual preparation for war became the dominant thrust of society. ‘With the socialization of danger as a permanent characteristic of modern violence, the nation becomes,’ Lasswell argued, ‘one unified technical enterprise.’ In a state of this nature, power would be highly centralised, economic production

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regularised and the rulers would use ‘war scares’ to ensure public obedience and internal control of the state.3 The end of the Second World War witnessed tremendous technological change in the shape of the atomic bomb, of which development had been made possible by the subordination of modern science and technology to military needs. It also meant that civilians were vulnerable to attack on a larger scale than ever before. The Cold War that followed consisted of two military superpowers preparing for total war. The conditions of continual crisis and perpetual preparedness ensured that the enormous scope accorded to the military elite in times of emergencies would acquire a degree of permanence during a so-called peacetime era. It also meant, as Lasswell argued, that ‘every aspect of life would eventually come under the control of the military authorities’.4 It should come as no surprise, therefore, that when Lasswell was postulating the likely candidates for transition to a world of garrison states, America would appear in his list alongside Japan, Germany and Russia. This chapter will examine the development of the military establishment in America between 1945 and 1953. It will explore the extent to which the US became a garrison state. This analysis is important in understanding the nature of change in America during the early Cold War period and the effects of the rise of the military-industrial complex on political life. It will also inform our understanding of the problems that Eisenhower would encounter from his military staff, elected officials, journalists, lobby groups and the American nation generally in his efforts to control defence budgets and the anti-communism that gripped the US from the early 1950s. As such, it will help to explain why it became essential for him to propose a system of mutual aerial inspection when he became president, and indeed why he encountered the difficulties that he did in trying to negotiate this initiative with the Soviets. As Chief of Staff of the US Army from 1945 to 1947 and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) of NATO forces from 1950 to 1952, Eisenhower had been part of the military establishment that demanded the mobilisation of the nation’s scientific, industrial and administrative efforts to defend the US against an implacably hostile enemy. By the early 1950s, however, he had developed serious misgivings about defence budgets and the potential for the military

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industry to damage irretrievably American values, institutions and way of life. The limits placed on the executive branch by Congressional officials and a change of administration in January 1953 checked the seemingly upward spiral in military expenditures. However, as the final part of this chapter will show, the military build-up had acquired a degree of permanence and acceptability on the part of the American nation. By 1949 relations between the US and the Soviet Union had deteriorated significantly. At the UN Atomic Energy Commission, the two powers failed to reach agreement on the control of atomic energy. At a foreign ministers’ conference held in the autumn of 1945, SovietAmerican differences persisted with regard to outstanding peace treaties and territorial disputes pertaining to Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The American Secretary of State, James Byrnes, believed that possession of the atomic bomb might make the Soviets ‘more manageable’ on the question of Europe and sought rather clumsily to use the new weapon as negotiating ammunition.5 However, the Soviet leader, Josef Stalin, refused to acknowledge that American success in the development of the atomic bomb had changed the balance of world power. ‘[The West] certainly hardened their line against us, but we had to consolidate our conquests,’ the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, later recalled. ‘We made our own socialist Germany out of our part of Germany, and restored order in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia, where the situations were fluid.’6 Stalin remained resolute in his demands that the new governments of Poland, Romania and Bulgaria be favourable to the Soviet Union. He also refused to renounce claims to the trusteeship of the former colony of Tripolitania and gave no commitment to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran.7 This episode merely served to exacerbate the growing tensions between America and the Soviet Union during the immediate post-war period. President Harry S. Truman became doubtful about the prospects of achieving peaceful negotiations with the Soviets, believing their actions in Eastern Europe and the Middle East represented a ‘high-handed outrage’.8 The Berlin crisis of 1948, resulting in a blockade of West Berlin transport routes, led to a heightening of tensions between the East

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and the West. It also raised alarm bells in Washington about the inadequacy of America’s preparedness for war with the Soviet Union.9 The crisis highlighted unresolved questions relating to strategy and use of the atomic bomb. The decision to despatch American bombers to bases in Europe within range of the Soviet Union established, as Gregg Herken argues, the practice of nuclear deterrence in advance of its theory for US defence planners.10 Moreover, after the end of the Second World War, the Russians had maintained a large army, which many in Washington believed was capable of overrunning Europe.11 In August 1949, the Soviet Union tested an atomic bomb, signalling an end to America’s monopoly. Many officials believed that this had up until then served as an effective restraint to a full-scale Soviet attack on Western Europe. The Soviet bomb left America in deep shock. As Paul Nitze, deputy director of the Planning Policy Staff (PPS), later recalled: ‘With this one event, the threat posed by the Soviet Union acquired a new, more ominous and dangerous dimension.’12 The Americans had not expected the Soviet Union to master nuclear technology as early as it did. After all, the Soviets had taken about the same length of time as the US to build an atomic bomb, a feat many, including President Harry S. Truman, did not believe possible. As Gordon Arneson, the secretary of state’s atomic energy adviser, argued: ‘We still assumed that our vaunted industrial capacity and organisation could not possibly be duplicated in performance by the Soviet Union, peopled as it was by wild-eyed bomb-throwing Bolsheviks and peasants, all thumbs.’13 Speculation began to mount about Soviet bomb-making capabilities; serving as a prime example of the growing tendency on the part of intelligence staff to make assumptions about Soviet capabilities, a report produced by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1950 claimed that the Soviet Union would have 200 atomic bombs by mid-1954. The report also estimated that in the event of a war with Russia, up to 60 per cent of these bombs would be on target and ‘would seriously damage the US’. Without ‘superior aggregate military strength’, the report argued, a policy of containment against the Soviet Union was ‘no more than a policy of bluff’.14 The government’s reaction to the breaking of America’s nuclear monopoly is important in understanding the future course of US

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defence policy. Truman’s immediate response was to approve a number of quantitive and qualitative improvements to America’s nuclear arsenal. Production of nuclear weapons and long-range bombers increased. By early 1949, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) had available 60 B-29s and B-50s adapted for nuclear weapons, compared with 30 in the previous year. During 1950, the number of nuclear capable aircraft increased to 250.15 As a result of the government’s growing reliance on strategic nuclear retaliation for defence and deterrence, the United States Air Force (USAF) controlled from the early 1940s over 40 per cent of the defence budget and would continue to do so throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.16 From 1950, plans got under way to develop atomic bombs small and light enough to be used by fighter aircraft and naval carrier planes, forming the basis of America’s tactical atomic force.17 Developments in atomic weapons and strategic air power would help to lay the foundations of a vast and powerful military industry in America. In 1949, the government revived a number of programmes for the development of medium- and long-range bombers and missiles. The urgency that began to surround the work on missiles, particularly after 1949, was based on assumptions concerning Soviet progress in developing such technology. The Soviets had initiated their programme for intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) development in 1947 and, according to the CIA, had not experienced the delays that the US did over issues pertaining to the weight and suitability of warheads. Many, including politicians and military officials, believed that American missile development had been surpassed by the Soviets.18 This belief persisted throughout the 1950s and would have significant implications for defence policy. As fears grew that America’s strength was declining in the face of Soviet military achievements, the US was forced to undertake, as Marc Trachtenberg has argued, ‘an extraordinary build-up of military strength, which acted like an acid, gradually eating away at all those constraints that had kept the US from escalating [a war] at the end of 1950’.19 Feasibility studies started in 1949 by the RAND Corporation and completed in the autumn of 1950 confirmed the ‘military worth’ of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).20 As a result, a number of programmes, including the Atlas project, were reactivated. Between

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fiscal years 1951 and 1954, spending on the ICBM programme grew from $0.5 million to $14 million per year.21 By 1955, expenditure on all missile programmes totalled $1,501 million, compared to $58 million in 1947.22 In turn, the military industry in America flourished. By 1952, all three services (the army, navy and air force) had begun to develop nuclear missile programmes, thereby underpinning an arms industry of immense proportion. It is in this context that the military-industrial complex became a predominant force in American political life, a ‘Frankenstein monster’, which, according to British Vice-Admiral Eric Longley-Cook, the US was increasingly unable to control.23 The Soviet bomb also stimulated the next phase of the nuclear arms race. As Lewis Strauss, a member of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), noted: ‘The time has come for a quantum leap in our planning . . . we should make an intensive effort to get ahead with the super [bomb].’24 Still reeling from the shock of the Soviet Union having become a nuclear power, Truman appointed a special committee of the National Security Council (NSC) to investigate the possibility of building the hydrogen bomb, a weapon of immense destructive capability using fusion not fission. This committee comprised a number of AEC members including its chairman, David Lilienthal; Gordon Dean, one of the group’s original commissioners; Louis Johnson, secretary of defence; and Robert LeBaron, chief adviser to the defence secretary on atomic energy. Representing the secretary of state were Paul Nitze and Gordon Arneson. Politicians and scientists alike were divided over whether America should construct such a monstrous weapon. Edward Teller, one of the few scientists at Los Alamos who was conducting feasibility studies on the hydrogen bomb, supported further research and development aimed at testing a fusion reaction. Robert Oppenheimer, a nuclear physicist who had headed research into the development of America’s first atomic bomb, opposed the development, fearing that the arms race with the Soviet Union would get out of control.25 Lilienthal and Charles Bohlen, US ambassador to the Soviet Union, also voiced their concerns. Urging the government to reconsider its increasing reliance on atomic weaponry, George Kennan, a former diplomat based at the

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US Embassy in Moscow and author of the ‘Long Telegram’, argued: ‘I fear that the atomic weapon will impede understanding of the things that are important to a clean, clear policy and will carry us toward the misuse and dissipation of our national strength.’26 It was, however, the advocates of the hydrogen bomb who won the day. At a brief meeting of the committee held at the end of January 1950, Truman’s one question, ‘Can the Russians do it?’ was met unequivocally in the affirmative. ‘In that case,’ the president reportedly said, ‘we have no choice. We’ll go ahead.’27 The administration was correct to assume that the Soviets would construct a hydrogen bomb; no sooner had the Soviet Union tested its first atomic weapon than its leading nuclear scientist, Igor Kurchatov, was finalising basic plans for a workable thermonuclear bomb.28 The various developments in military hardware allowed America to maintain a lead in the arms race.29 However, the Soviet Union’s atomic bomb raised new dilemmas for the US government. Many officials, including General Leslie Groves, former director of the Manhattan Project, and James Forrestal, secretary of defence, had considered the period of America’s nuclear monopoly as the only time when the US could have pursued a strong stance towards the Soviet Union.30 Nonetheless, atomic diplomacy had proved largely ineffectual. It had not altered Soviet behaviour over Central and Eastern Europe and, in the aftermath of the Berlin crisis, it had had no effect on the position taken by the Soviets in subsequent negotiations aimed at restoring access to the city, despite the creation of new air bases in England and Germany. Even Truman was prone to acknowledging the limitations of the bomb. When his budget director, Harold Smith, reminded the president that he had ‘the atomic bomb up [his] sleeve’, Truman replied, ‘Yes, but I am not sure it can ever be used.’31 In anticipation of a build-up of Soviet nuclear forces, concerns were raised about the adequacy of US strategic planning, especially with regard to the ability of the American bomber force to penetrate Soviet air defences and deliver all bombs on cities and key industrial targets.32 Generals Vandenberg and Curtis LeMay believed an ‘atomic blitz’ would prove decisive in a war with the Soviet Union. However, other military staff began to question the wisdom of a heavy reliance

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on atomic weapons in winning a major war. As early as the autumn of 1948, senior officials, including Forrestal and General Omar Bradley, expressed doubts about whether an air-atomic strategy alone would prove decisive in a war with the Soviet Union. As Forrestal maintained: ‘I do not believe that air power alone can win a war any more than an army or naval power can win a war, and I do not believe in the theory that an atomic offensive will extinguish in a week the will to fight.’ He believed that victory would require both a longer time and the waging of conventional war on land and at sea. ‘Then, and only then, can the tremendous striking power of air be applied in a decisive – and I repeat decisive – manner.’33 As America began to drift towards an increasing reliance on nuclear weapons, army staff, including Major General Alfred Gruenther, chairman of the joint strategic planning committee, warned against putting all of America’s eggs in one basket.34 Now that America’s chief deterrent to a Soviet invasion had been undermined, the US had to consider alternative methods for dealing with the enemy. The limitations of nuclear weapons were clear but the irony of the Cold War arms race meant that the US could not afford to relax its activities, nor could it allow the Soviet Union to gain a lead. These dilemmas were summarised later by Secretary of State, Dean Acheson: In our later review we were strongly persuaded towards increased conventional capability. But I could not overcome two stubborn facts: that our delaying research would not delay Soviet research, contrary to an initial hope I had briefly entertained; and that the American people would not tolerate a policy of delaying nuclear research in so vital a matter.35 As America laid plans for improving its nuclear arsenal, the Truman administration also mounted a major overhaul of national security policy. This exercise was led by Paul Nitze, who in January 1950 had become director of the PPS. In this role, he was assisted by James Lay, executive secretary of the NSC. United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, more commonly known as NSC 68, was completed during the late spring of

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1950. It recommended a military build-up of vast proportions, to a level previously unknown in peacetime America. In an attempt to justify such a build-up, the report argued that the Kremlin’s ‘possession of atomic weapons puts new power behind its design, and increases the jeopardy to our system’. Moscow’s ‘excessive strength’, coupled with its atomic capability, would allow it in the event of war to overrun Western Europe, launch air attacks against Britain and attack selected targets with atomic bombs.36 Moreover, so the report claimed, the ‘Soviet Union [was] widening the gap between its preparedness for war and the unpreparedness of the free world for war’. As a result, the military situation of the US was ‘becoming dangerously inadequate’. NSC 68 did not underestimate the consequences of a Soviet atomic capability and it recommended ‘substantially increased general air, ground, and sea strength’. To support such a capability, an intensification in ‘efforts in the fields of intelligence and research and development’ were also required. The report’s recommendations were based not only on a rapid and increased military effort but a diversified one at that, to the point where America was ‘militarily not so heavily dependent on atomic weapons’.37 NSC 68 therefore stressed the need for conventional forces to ‘defeat local Soviet moves with local action’. An atomic capability was important in deterring a full-scale Russian attack on the West. But by the early 1950s, it was becoming increasingly clear that such weapons could not be relied upon to deter a conventional attack on Western Europe or deal with an accidental outbreak of conventional war in a critical area.38 The ability to fight a limited war would be crucial to the security and preservation of the non-communist world, whether or not the US had a nuclear monopoly or strategic edge. The requirement for conventional forces on the scale recommended by NSC 68 would set the tone for future debates concerning national security policy, laying the basis for future challenges to Eisenhower’s defence strategy, as Chapters Five and Six will show. The language of NSC 68 is interesting; at times it is passionate, moralistic and persuasive, at others it is blunt and militant in tone. The reader is left in no doubt about ‘the Kremlin design’ for world domination, ‘an evil design’ to expand Soviet power and influence,

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violently and ruthlessly if necessary. America, on the other hand, is painted as a benign leader, the protector and preserver of the institutions of a free society. The report’s authors were inclined to believe that the Soviet threat was as real as it was devastating. Moreover, it was drawing closer than ever. In 1949, Nitze had been of the view that an attack by the Russians was more likely once Stalin’s three fiveyear plans were in place. Announced in February 1946, these plans were devoted to building up the Soviet military establishment ‘to deal with any eventuality’. As Nitze argued, ‘from the context it was clear that “any eventuality” meant a war with the United States. That speech, I concluded, could be interpreted as a delayed declaration of war against us.’39 Now, according to NSC 68, the Soviet threat was drawing closer. Pentagon planners aimed to complete the development of a full warfighting force by 1954 – the date identified in NSC 68 as the ‘year of maximum danger’. This was the point at which the Soviet Union was expected to have atomic weapons and delivery aircraft in sufficient numbers to threaten extensive damage to the US. Following China’s intervention in Korea in late 1950, US planners urged completion of the build-up within two years instead of four. The year of maximum danger was effectively moved back from 1954 to 1952.40 Defence planning thus set the tone for continual crisis and perpetual preparedness. Nitze and Acheson singled out Western Europe as an area of vital interest to the US and the free world. Consequently, the implementation of NSC 68 implied the rapid and permanent rearmament of Western Europe. As part of its commitment towards the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in April 1949, the US pledged to support European security arrangements in return for a European commitment to organise itself for both external defence and internal stability. In the autumn of 1950, Acheson visited Europe with the aim of putting together a military plan for the treaty, fearing the alliance would become a paper tiger without a security arrangement for Western Europe. As Acheson later argued: Our studies in Washington earlier in the year [1950], leading to the hydrogen bomb decision and NSC-68, had convinced us

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that a far greater defence effort on both sides of the Atlantic than either side had previously contemplated would be necessary . . . the obvious threat that had led the Europeans to want the North Atlantic Treaty was the threat of Soviet military power already greatly superior to anything Western Europe alone could produce.41 NSC 68 did not set out the costs of the recommended military build-up. It merely pointed out that ‘budgetary considerations will need to be subordinated to the stark fact that our very independence as a nation may be at stake’.42 Assuming that military forces could be assembled quickly enough to deter Soviet aggression by the year of maximum danger, such forces would then have to be sustained indefinitely at a high level of preparedness. The price tag for the initial build-up (which included capital investments in new bases, production facilities and weapons) would be huge. Added to this was the annual cost of maintaining and upgrading the new forces in being. As Nitze and his team set to work on estimating the cost of rearmament, the figure of $50 billion soon emerged, with some estimates proposing figures as much as $25 billion a year for military assistance to European allies, as much as $3.6 billion by 1954 for civilian defence and $155 million a year for foreign propaganda. This level of expenditure represented almost a quadrupling of the current defence budget set at $13.5 billion.43 Following its completion, NSC 68 was circulated to various officials within the State and Defense Departments. More senior officials seemed prepared to accept the report’s recommendations. Presidential aide Charles Murphy remarked: ‘What I read scared me so much that the next day I didn’t go into the office at all. It seemed to me to establish an altogether convincing case that we had to spend more on defence.’44 Even the Treasury was prepared to adopt a more relaxed view about defence spending, arguing that additional resources would not do the nation any harm. Two members of the Council of Economic Advisers, John Clark and Leon Keyserling, even spoke of deliberate federal deficits in order to stimulate economic growth.45 By September, Truman had approved the report, but his administration faced a gargantuan

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task in gaining acceptance from Congress and the American people for this quantum leap in defence spending. In June 1950, North Korean communist forces crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea, sparking the war in Korea. With the fall of Seoul two days later, Truman needed troops on the ground to fight communist forces. On 30 June, the first contingent of US forces arrived in Korea. The European Recovery Program, commonly known as the Marshall Plan, was expected to draw to a close the following year and the government needed to raise financial and military resources to defend Western Europe against communist infiltration. As a result, defence expenditures rose sharply; the president sought an emergency request for an increase in the defence budget of $10.6 billion. This request and three additional supplements took military expenditures from $13.5 billion to $48.2 billion by fiscal year 1951. However, not all of these funds were destined for Korea. As Jerry Sanders has shown, of the $10.6 billion requested, $6 billion was allocated for Europe.46 Truman sent four army divisions to join the two already serving as occupying forces in Europe. These decisions were significant not least for introducing marked increases in defence budgets during a peacetime period – increases that would become, within a short period of time, the norm. After 1952, such expenditures remained in excess of $40 billion and looked set to become a permanent fixture of US federal spending.47 Up until 1950, Truman had exercised tight control over the defence budget, fearing the inflationary effects of high spending and tax cuts. He had been determined not to increase the budget by more than $14 billion per annum.48 However, as fears of the Soviet Union mounted and America’s commitments abroad grew, it became impossible to contain expenditures. As Truman argued in his special message to Congress of July 1950, ‘we must recognize that it will be necessary for a number of years to support continuing defense expenditures, including assistance to other nations, at a higher level than we had previously planned.’49 Rising military expenditures also resulted in the partial implementation of NSC 68, which effectively laid the foundations for America’s post-war internationalist foreign policy. While new policy had the support of a number of senior officials, including

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Truman and Acheson, others were not convinced about the future course of US foreign policy. Incisively, as the Cold War unfolded, some officials recognised the dangers that national security policy posed to American society. As Edward R. Barrett, assistant secretary of state for public affairs, argued, ‘we are going to run into vast opposition among informed people to a huge arms race. We will be warned that we are heading towards a garrison state.’50 Barrett was not a lone voice in expressing concerns about defence policy. Even before the arms race was fully under way, a writer for the New York Times had argued: ‘In seeking security we must be careful that we do not lose freedom. For there can be a trend – given the threat of the atomic bomb – to increase military power in all fields more and more to such a degree that the ultimate end would be the “garrison state”.’51 At this point it is useful to consider the main arguments that have emerged on the military build-up in America from late 1949. Some political scientists have debated the ‘unwarranted influence’ of the military-industrial complex.52 As James Ledbetter argues, ‘it is a mistake to speak of the [military-industrial complex] in the past tense . . . the terms of Eisenhower’s troubling critique have been used for decades to analyze the tension between democracy and military strength.’53 Many commentators have concluded that America’s military and political elite have exaggerated or even manufactured threats to national security so as to maintain high levels of military spending.54 Others have questioned whether the US became a garrison state from the late 1940s. The main points of Lasswell’s thesis have already been highlighted. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in his third article on the garrison state, published in 1962, he argued that the prospects of a weakening of the expectations of violence were bleak. While Lasswell did not single out America specifically, it was clear that the various ‘preconditions’ of a garrison state outcome applied to the US as much as they did the Soviet Union. Such preconditions included the ‘explosive growth of modern science and technology’ and the ‘connections of these developments with the military arena’, coupled with the expectation that the state would resort to ‘extreme measures of coercion’ in dealing with external and internal challengers. Moreover, society would experience ‘withdrawals of identification

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with politics’ – in other words, public apathy and a general lack of willingness to fight for the preservation of the traditional autonomy of the nation.55 Not all scholars or critics on the Cold War arms race support Lasswell’s viewpoints, however. In Aaron Friedberg’s article, ‘Why Didn’t the US Become a Garrison State?’, he argues that, in spite of the dramatic changes in the strategic environment that characterised the Cold War, America was not transformed into a garrison state after 1945. ‘Even in the presence of a compelling external threat,’ Friedberg claims, ‘the openness of American political institutions to interest group pressures and the content of American ideology combined to place very real limits on the power of the state over society and the economy.’56 As a result, Friedberg argues that the existence of these limits eased the US towards a particular kind of military posture. In the long term, America was able to withstand the course of an extended competition with the Soviet Union without doing irreparable internal injury. According to Friedberg, Lasswell’s gloomy predictions did not come to fruition, at least insofar as the US was concerned.57 Writing in the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War and the demise of Soviet communism, it was perhaps not difficult for him to claim, with a degree of equanimity and the benefit of hindsight, that the US could and did apply various checks and balances. These ensured that freedom and individual liberties were not severely circumscribed and automatically subservient to state and military imperatives. What had emerged by the end of the first full decade of the Cold War, Friedberg argues, was not a garrison state but a ‘contract state’, which could be differentiated from the former by virtue of the fact that resources and manpower required for national security policy were substantially less than Lasswell envisaged and certainly far less than what became the norm in the same period in the Soviet Union. As the Cold War progressed, US defence spending, either per capita or as a percentage of national income, actually fell.58 For Friedberg, a key characteristic of the contract state was its ‘constrained extractive scale’ – in other words it did not tax and conscript excessively or even more heavily than it did. Furthermore,

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government intervention in economic production was limited, with state activity concentrated on research and the acquisition of arms rather than directing overall national economic development. Finally, the US government relied on contracts to harness private resources for national purposes. Friedberg argues that the most basic explanation as to why America became a contract state and not a garrison state after 1945 was because Cold War policy was based on deterrence through well-trained, large and diverse forces. From the 1940s, the US relied on a strategy of nuclear deterrence, maintained by technologically sophisticated forces-in-being. Reliance on nuclear weapons made Pentagon planners comfortable with a lower level of conventional capabilities than they might otherwise have been able to accept. American strategy was therefore capital intensive rather than labour intensive – it stressed, as Friedberg argues, quality over quantity and technology over manpower. The notion of the US undertaking full-scale preparations for fighting and winning an extended war fought with conventional and nuclear weapons never truly took hold in America. As a result of the nuclear stalemate that had been reached by the end of the 1950s, preparations for a conventional war with the Soviets might not only be pointless, but dangerous. Thus, Friedberg argues: In a war that lasted for months or years rather than minutes or hours, victory would go to the side that could best draw on its reserves of human and material strength. Serious preparations for either nuclear warfighting or nuclear stalemate would therefore have to include steps aimed at supporting the rapid and sustained mobilisation of manpower and industry.59 The resources needed to fight such a war would be extensive and would also require an intrusive role for the state. Such a scenario, which many believed went against the American constitution and democratic heritage, was as impractical as it was unacceptable. The limits placed on defence spending and the rejection of universal military service acted as ‘constraints on extraction’ by the state during the early Cold War period. ‘The single most important reason for the American movement

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towards a strategy of deterrence was that either of the two alternatives would cost a good deal more money,’ Friedberg maintains.60 As the US government concentrated on procuring arms and research during the early decade of the Cold War, it did not facilitate the expansion of state-owned institutions and laboratories, thereby restricting the scope of state activities. Apart from a brief upsurge during the Korean War, purchases in armaments via private industry, and patterns for procurement of research, remained, according to Friedberg, quite stable. Through its actions, the contract state created what amounted to a private arsenal system in which weapons were developed and produced at public expense. With its heavy dependence on privately owned institutions, the state was able to satisfy at least the minimal requirements of American capitalist ideology; the result was not free enterprise but it was certainly closer to that ideal than the most obvious alternative, namely, government ownership of the means of production.61 Friedberg’s work focuses on the administrations of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower. He recognises that a rapid expansion in the military establishment took place – the largest during an ostensibly peacetime era. He also acknowledges that government policy towards the procurement of arms allowed certain interests to benefit from the continuation and expansion of the military-industrial complex. However, the puzzling question for Friedberg is why the military establishment was not as big or as strong as it could have been. In his later work, In the Shadow of the Garrison State (2000), Friedberg reaffirms his earlier thesis, arguing that America achieved its goals of deterring, containing and, ultimately, outlasting the Soviet Union, ‘without at the same time transforming itself into a garrison state’.62 He attributes this feat to the basic structure of American governmental institutions – ‘weak’ state structures set against the interests and relative strength of various groups (both within the government itself and in society at large). A long-standing mistrust and suspicion of state power allowed sufficient accumulation of military strength without the nation’s turning into ‘an armed camp’. Moreover, ideas and ideology proved potent weapons in limiting state power and constraining the actions of American government officials.63

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Ledbetter argues that Friedberg’s thesis has become increasingly difficult to justify in the post 9/11 era. Indeed, he argues: A kind of pattern has emerged in which martial power has been used to violate civil liberties. During wartime (declared and undeclared), the executive is often given considerable leeway to detain individuals, from the curfews and roundups of Asian Americans during World War II to the creation of a large detention camp at Guantanamo Bay following the attacks of 9/11. After a certain period, the detentions are challenged and critical aspects of them are deemed unconstitutional, as portions of the 2006 Military Commissions Act were found to be.64 So too with the early Cold War period, certain aspects of Friedberg’s work require further exploration. The discussion below will focus on three areas relating to debates on the garrison state thesis. These are the nature of the armaments industry, the degree of influence exercised by the ‘specialists on violence’, and ideas and ideology. This analysis is necessary in order to understand the broader and long-term implications of national security policy. It will also show that the US was at real risk of becoming a garrison state – more so than Friedberg perhaps is willing to acknowledge. As such, elements of Lasswell’s work can be validated. The military-industrial complex that mushroomed after 1949 was significant not just in terms of scale but for the political and ideological debates surrounding US military force requirements. These debates were apparent by the early 1950s and by the end of the decade they had intensified significantly. Governmental institutions and traditions allowed checks and balances to be applied to prevent the seemingly upward rise in military expenditures. However, the most powerful brake would come in January 1953 with a change in administration. The rise in military expenditures between 1949 and 1952 has been noted, suffice to add here that by 1953 such expenditures accounted for approximately 15 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) compared to less than 5 per cent only five years earlier.65 The increase in defence budgets led to a near doubling of the federal budget, one of the

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most rapid rises in the modern history of federal spending. National security accounted for nearly two-thirds of all spending.66 Friedberg argues that military purchases, including research, via the private sector helped restrict the scope of state activities and thus uphold a ‘general commitment to the view . . . of a natural predominance of private enterprise’.67 Yet this arrangement gave rise to a powerful private armaments industry with a vested interest in the expansion of defence budgets. Like the Second World War, the Cold War became very lucrative for a number of contractors. As federal investment in the weapons industry increased, particularly after 1939, private industry flourished. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, nearly 80 per cent of aerospace sales went to the government.68 Government work was concentrated in the hands of a relatively few but increasingly influential contractors who had much to gain from the alarmism sowed by the military and the CIA. These included the Convair Corporation, Lockheed, Douglas and Boeing. From the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, all four contractors were consistently awarded contracts by the Department of Defense relating to the research, production and procurement of missiles.69 Other regular and familiar names included General Electric, Bell Aircraft and Martin. Convair remained the lead manufacturer for the Atlas ICBM programme throughout the 1950s.70 It was, therefore, in the interests of arms manufacturers to exaggerate the Soviet threat and advocate enlarged budgets. As such, contractors exerted influence on military staff and ambitious elected officials. Missouri Senator Stuart Symington, for example, maintained a close association throughout the 1950s with the vice-president of Convair, Thomas Lamphier. Lamphier had been an aid to Symington when he was air force secretary during the late 1940s. In the mid-1950s, the senator refused to accept CIA estimates relating to Soviet force levels and worked with his former aide to produce alternative figures concerning the number of Soviet ICBMs. At one stage, Symington argued the case publicly that the US needed to deploy ballistic missiles quickly, knowing that the administration could turn only to the Convair Atlas.71 The dependency of contractors on Congressmen to present the case for larger defence budgets demonstrates the more insidious interplay of forces that encouraged the expansion of the military-industrial complex.

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Alongside the interdependence of contractors and the military was the growing importance of academic and research institutions in supporting national security priorities. The requirements of the military and government staff impacted on the national curriculum as the armed services increasingly required specialist research and developmental support. The rise of the military industry revolved around not just a question of greater force levels, but more advanced capabilities based on cutting-edge technology and, inevitably, close association with the scientific sectors. The development of missiles provides a case in point, as had the atomic bomb less than ten years earlier. America witnessed the rise of the inseparable relationship between scientific technology and weapons development. A fledgling arrangement in 1940, the links between university laboratories and the research and development of armaments was becoming an all too common feature of the Cold War. In return for military contracts, an increasing number of universities and research centres, including for example, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Stanford and Caltech, redesigned their teaching and research priorities to support national defence requirements.72 By 1960 spending on research and development (R&D) had reached $5.5 billion per year, accounting for approximately 80 per cent of federal R&D budgets throughout the 1950s.73 As Stuart W. Leslie has shown, at the end of the Second World War, MIT was the nation’s largest non-defence contractor, with 75 separate contracts worth $117 million, far ahead of second place Caltech ($83 million) and third place Harvard ($31 million). MIT held that lead throughout the Cold War, often with three times the contracts of the second-ranked school and still ahead of some large defence-oriented corporations. The overlaps and interconnections between the military, industry and the technological-scientific sectors meant that the military establishment increasingly resembled ‘one unified technical enterprise’, free, in the main, from government audit and scrutiny.74 Lasswell argues that as military technology continued to develop, the garrison state would call for the specialists on violence – that is, technologically sophisticated military personnel – to be in control of society. ‘In a garrison state,’ he continues, ‘the specialist on violence is

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at the helm, and organized economic and social life is systematically subordinated to the fighting forces. This means that the predominating influence is in the hands of men who specialize in violence.’75 As the Cold War unfolded, the US military was more than prepared to take an aggressive line towards the Soviet Union. In doing so, they sought a greater say in the formulation of policy and control of resources. During the Berlin crisis, senior military staff, including General George Kenney, first commander of Strategic Air Command, and his successor, Curtis LeMay, had questioned President Truman’s refusal to bomb Soviet troops manning the blockade.76 In the wake of the crisis, the military demanded larger defence budgets that would increase America’s bomber force and stockpile of nuclear weapons.77 They also began to challenge the ‘custody’ of such weapons and demanded authorisation for their use, as part and parcel of US strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. This issue was brought to the fore when Forrestal proposed the transfer of American bombers to bases in Britain that would be within striking distance of the East as a possible counter-move to Soviet provocation.78 Writing towards the end of the 1950s, Walter Millis claimed, ‘it is reasonable to suggest that military considerations were dominant in this period and that military men necessarily exercised an authority over diplomatic, political and fiscal policy not normally accorded to them’.79 The insouciance of the military set in motion the kind of pressure Eisenhower would face when he became president, as military officials and other sectors within and outside the government demanded that a more aggressive line be taken towards the Soviet Union. The services were not, of course, a lone voice in demanding larger defence budgets and a tougher stance towards the Soviet Union.80 As the foregoing discussion has shown, from the late 1940s, civilian officials based in the State and Defense Departments, the CIA and PPS were increasingly supportive of hard-line policies aimed at containing Soviet communism. Indeed, NSC 68 had been made possible by a formidable array of senior executive staff who were supported by the higher echelons of government. The alarmism contained in new national security policy was reflective of a growing and virulent anticommunism that was beginning to grip the nation. This sentiment transcended the civilian and military sectors of the US government

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and contributed towards the momentum for increasing America’s defences in preparation for a future military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Intelligence estimates on Soviet capabilities were not immune to the alarmism sowed by military staff. In the absence of international controls on armaments, the US could not predict with sufficient accuracy the scale of Soviet bomb-making facilities and hence the size of its nuclear arsenal. Intelligence specialists tended to exaggerate Soviet capabilities and thus the threat posed by the Soviets. The approach taken by the military, politicians and intelligence specialists was no doubt fuelled by a lack of reliable information on Soviet military capabilities. From the close of the Second World War, Moscow had conducted its military and atomic activities amid great secrecy for fear that Soviet success would intensify the growing East-West divide and accelerate the arms race.81 The need for information on Soviet capabilities became acute, especially after August 1949 when the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb. However, the tendency to make assumptions about Soviet capabilities precluded any rational approach towards estimating force levels. They also precluded the formation of balanced judgements about Moscow’s intentions. It is clear, therefore, that the specialists on violence were not confined to military circles. The position taken by civilian officials is underlined by their reluctance to initiate meaningful negotiations with the Soviet Union. Absent from the debates was a readiness to reach agreement with Moscow on key outstanding issues, such as the control of armaments and Germany. Instead emphasis was placed on building up military forces. Consequently, at the UN Disarmament Commission, negotiations between the East and the West over the control of atomic energy remained at a deadlock. Endless debates over inspection and a reduction in arms proved fruitless, with no compromise reached between the Soviet Union and the US.82 In 1949, negotiations between the East and the West aimed at restoring Austrian sovereignty, and neutrality broke down.83 As the Austrian question remained in a state of uncertainty, Soviet and Western occupation forces remained in the country. Face-to-face talks between the foreign ministers of the US, Russia, France and Britain would not resume until February 1954. This situation, not surprisingly, led to a prolonged period of heightened

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international tensions. As Dmitrii Shepilov, a former secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union and editor in chief of Pravda, later remarked: ‘NATO’s principal objectives were to prepare for an imperialist war against the socialist countries and suppress all national liberation movements.’84 The hard-line anti-communist sentiment extended beyond government circles. It also transcended party political lines. Nowhere was this combination more visible than in the formation of a lobby group calling itself the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD). The CPD was formed in the autumn of 1950 and claimed to be a non-partisan and independent group of private citizens that had been established because of a ‘deep conviction that the United States and its democratic way of life [was] gravely threatened by Soviet aggression’.85 One of the group’s founding members was James Conant, president of Harvard University. Other leading members included Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institute of Washington, Tracy S. Voorhees, former under-secretary of the US Army, and William Clayton, former secretary of commerce and assistant secretary of state. Also prominent among the CPD’s membership was Robert Patterson, former secretary of war, who would later give a number of radio addresses on behalf of the group. From early 1951, membership of the group expanded and it attracted representatives from industry, the military, heads of communication services, the press, radio, newspapers and financiers – in short, a cross-section of the kinds of opinion shapers who would dominate future non-state actors involved in the assessment of the nation’s defence needs. Although claiming to be independent of government influence, many of the CPD’s leading members had close links with senior officials.86 The nationwide propaganda campaign carried out by the group between 1951 and 1952 supported the objectives of the Truman administration for enhancing the nation’s defence. The similarities between NSC 68 and the arguments espoused by the CPD are striking and not coincidental. In short, the CPD provided the necessary ‘war scares’ to ensure support for national security policy. As Patterson claimed in March 1951: ‘The fact is that if Soviet Russia were to overrun Western Europe, the United States would soon be in a condition

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helplessly inferior in everything it takes to carry on a war.’87 A Third World War could be averted, the CPD argued, if the military strength of America and Western Europe was radically improved to resist an allout attack by the Soviet Union. Voorhees argued that such an attack could be prevented through ‘the creation and presence in Europe of substantial US forces as a hard core around which a joint army of the various nations could be created’.88 In January 1951, the CPD began its campaign to influence public and political opinion into supporting the rearmament of Western Europe. In public statements, radio broadcasts and in testimony before Congress, its members argued that a permanent army of at least 3.5 million men would be required, covering not only Europe but also the Far East, with a strategic reserve back home. In addition, an expansion in the equipment and supplies programme was necessary, underpinned by an increase in taxes and a sharp reduction in nondefence spending.89 To support these measures, the CPD resurrected an argument made by the government in 1947 and 1948 for universal military training (UMT) of all 18-year-old males. This proposal and increased foreign aid for Europe would become the central objectives of the CPD’s campaign for strengthening the West against what they regarded as an increasingly formidable Soviet bloc. The most effective area of the CPD’s campaign was its lobbying of Congress. Friedberg presents a picture of a House of Representatives and Senate that were suspicious of the growth of executive power and reluctant to capitulate to the demands of the administration for additional resources to support defence strategy. It was anti-statism, Friedberg argues, that served to control military expenditures, thereby preventing the rise of a garrison state. However, a close examination of the activities of the CPD reveals a Congress that was prepared to endorse the fierce anti-communist sentiments of a lobby group whose links with the administration did not go unnoticed by many elected officials. In the summer of 1951, with the Marshall Plan expected to draw to a close by the end of the year, the CPD set in motion an argument for an expanded and integrated military and economic programme for Europe.90 As Truman sought an appropriation of $8.5 billion, the CPD began lobbying the House and the Senate. In a letter

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to all representatives, Voorhees argued: ‘We are fully aware . . . that the economic strength of the free world is not only an essential component of military strength but is also the first line of defence against communist subversion from within.’91 He and Paul Hoffman, fellow CPD member and president of the Ford Foundation, testified before the House Committee the case for the creation of a single administrative agency. Impressed by the lengthy and detailed testimony given by its members, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, James P. Richards, asked Voorhees and his colleagues to draft a bill for the House incorporating the recommendations provided in testimony to the House Committee. The CPD readily accepted this offer. The proposed bill was completed during the summer of 1951. Following protracted Congressional hearings and public debates, the Mutual Security Act was adopted in the autumn of 1951. The new legislation replaced the European Co-operation Act (that had overseen the Marshall Plan) with the Mutual Security Agency, whose director was responsible for co-ordinating and supervising all foreign aid programmes – military and economic. Such programmes became an important part of the non-military aspect of US national security policy during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. From the early to mid-1950s, they provided military assistance for the allies and economic support for developing countries. The final appropriation for foreign and military aid under the new mutual security framework for fiscal year 1952 was $7.3 billion. This amount was less than Truman had requested but it was almost twice the amount of aid proposed under the Marshall Plan.92 With the mutual security bill approved, the CPD agreed to conclude its work. The group ceased its operations in December 1952. The CPD played an important role in nurturing political support for the military build-up of the early 1950s. Whether commissioned by the government or established on an independent basis, lobby groups were dominated by hard-line anti-communists who believed the Soviet Union now possessed the capability and desire to inflict a surprise nuclear attack on the US. As such, the CPD advocated a strengthening of America’s military forces, both nuclear and conventional, along with foreign aid, that would ensure America’s supremacy in the arms race.

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Building on their previous experience of political lobbying, the group’s leading members set a pattern for the involvement of citizens groups in the foreign policy debates of the Cold War era.93 However, not all such groups would enjoy the same level of success and influence as the CPD did. Nor were they inclined to support government policy, as the following chapters will show. The Quantico panel and the Special Studies Project, established by Nelson Rockefeller, would not enjoy immediate success. Their efforts threatened to undermine the fiscal constraints that Eisenhower sought to restore from January 1953. During its lifetime the CPD repeatedly asserted that it was a nonpartisan group. The core membership of the group was dominated by Republicans, who were effectively supporting the foreign policy platform of a Democratic government. The blurring of party political lines on the foreign policy front was evident from as early as 1947. In that year, aid to Greece and Turkey, embodying the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan of the following year, had enjoyed wide bipartisan support.94 Cross-party agreement on the implementation of NSC 68 was more difficult to achieve although the so-called isolationist wing in Congress, led by Robert Taft, did not oppose intervention in Korea. Calls for a large-scale build-up of conventional weaponry, premised largely on UMT, came under a greater degree of attack. Nevertheless, NSC 68 marshalled support from many Republicans. The liberal internationalist foreign policy of the early 1950s and beyond cut across both of the main political parties in America, ushering in the 1960s calls across the spectrum for a ‘flexible response’ to Cold War threats. It would also become the bedrock upon which future challenges to government defence policy would be made. It is evident, therefore, that ideology and ideas were powerful forces during the Cold War, but in ways that Friedberg tends to downplay. What predominated from the late 1940s was not anti-statism but a virulent anti-communism that pervaded all areas of American political life and encouraged a burgeoning national security bureaucracy. The comprehensive rearmament programme that took place had broader implications for defence policy. It laid the foundations for a permanent armaments industry in America – the largest during a so-called peacetime era. Communist activities, including developments in China

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during 1948 and the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union, had raised fears in America about the dangers of Moscow to the security of the West. The huge military build-up had been assisted by the propaganda campaign waged by the CPD. This programme was also accepted by the American people, who were as yet unaware of the interplay of forces and influences that resulted in expanded budgets. A Gallup poll carried out in April 1951 showed 72 per cent of Americans in favour of the CPD’s campaign to reintroduce UMT.95 Rearmament became a fact of life premised on the fear that the US would be vulnerable to a surprise attack if the Soviet threat were ignored. Acceptability was crucial to secure a permanent military industry and, as a result, America was drawn irreversibly into both Europe and into a scientific technological arms race with the Soviet Union. The American people paid the price of rearmament. Tax rates had been cut in 1945 and 1948. However, after 1950, such reductions became more difficult to achieve. After the start of the Korean War taxes were raised, providing almost $5 billion in annual revenues. Congress approved further increases followed by controls on public spending. During 1950, one-third of the national income was consumed by taxes compared to an overall average of 12 per cent between 1946 and 1949.96 The average tax rate for the bottom income bracket (including average income earners) rose from 16 per cent in 1948 to 20 per cent in 1951. Federal taxes as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) grew from 7.6 per cent in 1941 to 20.4 per cent in 1945, falling to 14.4 per cent in 1950. By 1952 the tax burden had returned to 19 per cent of GDP, just 1.9 per cent less than the wartime high rate of 20.9 per cent in 1944.97 The Truman administration had been fully behind efforts to reintroduce a peacetime draft. Between 1945 and 1951, four attempts were made to resurrect universal military service and training of all 18-year-old males for a period of approximately 27 months. That Congress rejected all requests demonstrates, as Friedberg has argued, that checks and balances were applied to the executive branch during the early Cold War period. However, efforts to diversify and enlarge America’s forces in response to the Soviet threat were also indicative of

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the administration’s propensity to expand the military establishment. A build-up of conventional forces on the scale desired would have added considerably to the defence budget, pushing America ever more closely towards a garrison state. NSC 68 had demonstrated the importance of conventional forces to national security strategy. This measure was, to a degree, fulfilled through the deployment of additional troops to Europe. The Mutual Security Agency had also provided economic aid to the Continent. In view of the government’s concerns about the limitations of nuclear weapons and its efforts to reintroduce UMT, it can be argued that officials had rejected, at least in theory, a heavy reliance on nuclear deterrence. A security strategy centred on nuclear deterrence would be restored from the autumn of 1953. Continuities are apparent from debates surrounding American Cold War strategy. Emerging from the discussions of the government and Congress of 1950 and 1951 was a broader definition of US foreign policy interests that needed to be defended by a range of forces, not just nuclear. In the early 1950s, a build-up in conventional forces and foreign aid were essential for fighting local or limited wars. Nuclear weapons could not fill this gap. Some ten years later, major debates amongst politicians, government officials and certain sectors of the military focused on the very same issues. Massive retaliation, the cornerstone of Eisenhower’s defence strategy that relied heavily on nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet attack, came under increasing challenge during the late 1950s, as elected officials and lobby groups took up the mantle of trying to resurrect the primacy of conventional weaponry and foreign aid in fighting limited wars. During the 1950s, Nitze and Acheson criticised government policy for its primary reliance on nuclear weaponry.98 Although by the late 1950s the battlefield had moved from Europe to the developing world, the principles and methods for confronting Soviet communism had not changed, as Chapters Four and Five will show. Acceptability, combined with permanence, meant that the government could not retreat from its new militarised approach and the trend towards ever-larger defence budgets. The American public, now alerted to the so-called dangers posed by the Soviet Union, was unlikely to be placated by a reversion to pre-1950s policies. Disarmament was

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futile and negotiations on the control of atomic energy at the UN Disarmament Commission had, by June 1952, reached another impasse. Senator Joseph McCarthy had also begun making numerous claims about the mass infiltration of communists in government departments, the media and the army, culminating later in a climate of near hysteria about communism. In this atmosphere, it became more difficult to rein in the armaments industry. In a relatively short space of time, the trend had become irreversible. In the autumn of 1952, Truman approved NSC 141. This was the administration’s last review of national security policy. This policy aimed to accelerate the build-up of military forces at an estimated cost of $20 billion.99 Government officials argued that measures were needed to enhance local forces of resistance in the Middle and Far East as well as in Europe, to strengthen the continental defences of the US against air attack, and to initiate a large-scale civil defence programme.100 New policy was considered at a time when the Korean War was taking its toll. Overall, the war resulted in 54,000 US deaths and 100,000 casualties (the combined dead and wounded for the People’s Republic of China and Korea exceeded 2.5 million). War debts amounted to a staggering $81 billion. The federal budget for fiscal year 1953 was estimated at $85 billion.101 It seemed that from the summer of 1950 Truman had abandoned his fiscal conservatism and attempts to restrain military expenditures. The military build-up was financed increasingly by budget deficits; by early 1952, the administration had run deficits of more than $13 billion.102 The risk of America becoming a garrison state during this period was very real. There was one man who was not impressed with the state of the federal budget and the Truman administration’s handling of foreign affairs. That man was General Dwight D. Eisenhower. In January 1952 when President Truman submitted his budget to Congress, which called for spending nearly $65 billion on defence, Eisenhower noted in his diary: ‘Now I am afraid we are risking damage from the other horn of the dilemma – that is, the danger of internal deterioration through the annual expenditure of unconscionable sums on a program of indefinite duration, extending far into the future.’103 Eisenhower was by no means an isolationist. As the first SACEUR of NATO forces, he had

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supported the deployment of US troops to Western Europe and the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance. However, he always regarded the troops to Europe package as a temporary measure whilst America’s allies undertook to organise a security union for Western Europe and thereby help meet the cost of defending the Continent against a communist attack. As he stated at one NSC meeting in October 1953, the deployment of US divisions in Europe had been at the outset ‘an emergency measure not intended to last indefinitely’.104 Eisenhower was no less an anti-communist than Truman. During one of his less charitable moods, he once described Moscow as the same old ‘whore’ who had patched her dress but still needed to be ‘put on a back alley’.105 His distrust of the men in the Kremlin was deeprooted. Nevertheless, Eisenhower knew he had to seek some kind of modus vivendi with the Soviets, an easing of mutual distrust. He was well aware of the potential dangers of America expanding its commitments abroad and running the risk of overextending itself. This would explain why he strongly supported between 1953 and 1954 efforts to establish a supranational defence effort for Western Europe and why, in the summer of 1954, he endorsed a negotiated settlement over Vietnam rather than military intervention. Eisenhower did not oppose measures aimed at strengthening America’s armed forces where the need dictated. In early 1946, he recommended that a permanent regular army should comprise 886,000 men, as opposed to the army board’s plan of only 562,000 men, a figure Eisenhower felt was too low.106 Between 1946 and 1948, he urged Truman to consider increasing the defence budget to $15 billion per annum, and at one time lamented the ‘neglect of [US] armed forces, dating from the end of hostilities in 1945’.107 However, by the early 1950s, Eisenhower could see military expenditures getting out of control and recognised the potential for the military industry to damage irretrievably American values, institutions and way of life. As he recorded in his diary prior to his election to the presidency: The purpose of America is to defend a way of life rather than merely to defend property, territory, homes or lives. As a consequence of this purpose, everything done to develop a defense

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against the external threat . . . must be weighed and gauged in the light of [its] probable long-term, internal, effect.108 His frequent use of the term garrison state signified his concern with the consequences of high military expenditures and the rise of the armaments industry for the American nation. ‘The theory of defense against aggressive threat must comprehend more than simple selfpreservation,’ Eisenhower noted in 1951. ‘The security of spiritual and cultural values,’ he continued, ‘including national and individual freedom, human rights and the history of our nation and civilisation are included.’109 There can be little doubt that his early thoughts along these lines were a precursor to his later warning about a militaryindustrial complex. In conclusion, it can be argued that the conditions necessary for the establishment of a garrison state were clearly apparent in American political life after 1945. International relations were characterised by a situation of continual crisis and perpetual preparedness that allowed the ‘specialists on violence’ to determine the course of foreign policy and encourage the subordination of various elements of American political, economic and social life to military needs. The distrust that arose between America and the Soviet Union precluded opportunities to negotiate on outstanding wartime issues and those emerging after August 1945. Talks aimed at instituting arrangements for the international control of atomic energy broke down, resulting in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Had Truman built up a balanced and comprehensive profile of his opponent, which made a clear distinction between Soviet capabilities and actual intentions, the door to negotiations could have been left open. In a climate of reduced tensions, arms control agreements may have been possible. Instead, by January 1953, American foreign policy was geared towards preparation of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union, with the clear risk of the US becoming a garrison state. These were the problems Eisenhower inherited from January 1953. As president, he was determined to introduce economies, balance the budget and lower taxes. He needed a defence strategy that would help to achieve these objectives and provide for non-military measures to address the perceived threat of Soviet communism. The

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New Look defence strategy that emerged from the autumn of 1953 restored the primacy of nuclear deterrence and addressed Eisenhower’s immediate concerns with regard to the federal budget. His efforts to contain the entrenched anti-communism and paranoia that had taken hold of America would prove more difficult, however. In time, the New Look would be necessary to help control the military-industrial complex, as the following chapters will show.

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CHAPTER T WO EISENHOWER AND THE NEW LOOK

In November 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower won the presidential election by a landslide, taking 55 per cent of the popular vote.1 The election passed both the presidency and the two Houses of Congress to the Republicans – it was the first time the party had won both the executive and legislative branches since 1928. The outcome of the election was a personal victory for Eisenhower and a vindication of the Republican Party, which had lost the previous five elections to the Democrats. Eisenhower was 62 years old, almost completely bald and he had the makings of a double chin. Yet his broad and infectious grin and flashing blue eyes that missed nothing gave America the assurance it needed in a strong leader. There was an air of utter confidence about him. In his inaugural address of January 1953, devoted exclusively to foreign policy, Eisenhower declared: We stand ready to engage with any and all others in joint effort to remove the causes of mutual fear and distrust among nations, so as to make possible a drastic reduction of armaments. The sole requisites for undertaking such efforts are that – in their purpose – they be aimed logically and honestly toward secure peace for all.2 A number of issues both on the domestic and foreign policy fronts had persuaded Eisenhower to consider seeking the presidency from

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early 1952. It was clear that his main opponent for the Republican nomination would be Senator Robert Taft, a well-known isolationist who had led calls in the Senate and across America for the removal of troops from Europe.3 For Eisenhower, this platform was too alarming to contemplate. In April 1952, he resigned as SACEUR and became a full-time candidate for the presidential nomination. After his election, Eisenhower refused to withdraw troops from Europe in the immediate term. ‘Bringing back our divisions in an abrupt way,’ he argued, ‘would not improve Europe’s morale but completely destroy it.’ Speaking with ‘great emphasis’ at a NSC meeting, he pointed out that US troops had ‘done marvels in restoring Europe’s faith in itself’.4 National security policy was in need of a major overhaul in order to control military expenditures and ease international tensions. In the autumn of 1953, the new administration launched its defence strategy, which became known as the New Look. Although associated in the main with the concept of massive retaliatory striking power – that is the implied threat of nuclear weapons against potential aggressors – Eisenhower’s strategy contained a number of other measures for handling the Soviet Union. Nuclear weapons were central to the New Look, but the new defence policy also emphasised the importance of alliances, psychological warfare, covert action, and negotiation with the Soviet Union. These elements were incorporated into the administration’s basic national security policy (NSC 162), which was adopted in October 1953.5 At the heart of the New Look lay Eisenhower’s thinking on national security. He believed the task of defending the nation involved not only territory, homes and lives, but also the preservation of a way of life based on American values and institutions, including representative government.6 He feared that, as a result of unbearably high military expenditures that extended indefinitely into the future, American values would come under increased threat and the nation would resemble what he would often refer to as a garrison state. This chapter will examine the aims and effects of the New Look on US foreign and military policy during the early years of Eisenhower’s first term in office leading up to the Geneva summit of July 1955. The New Look represented in many respects a significant departure from Truman’s strategy of containment. As the new president reduced

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conventional forces, economies were achieved and by 1955 defence expenditures had reduced substantially. Eisenhower’s strategy also relied on building up as accurate a picture as possible of Soviet capabilities. This intelligence would expose the strengths as well as the limitations of Soviet forces. One way of achieving this was aerial reconnaissance. This chapter will examine the links between the New Look and aerial inspection, showing how this covert activity would become crucial to the successful implementation of Eisenhower’s defence strategy. More accurate information on the Soviet Union would also help Eisenhower to confront the growing challenges he faced in implementing the New Look. From its inception, certain sectors of the military, especially the army and navy, were critical of this strategy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the New Look exposed key strategic weaknesses, particularly with regard to America’s ability to fight limited wars and combat aggression in the developing world. A review of NSC minutes and related memoranda reveals profound divisions between the president and his military advisers. This analysis will set the tone for the challenges that would be mounted by the military, politicians and lobby groups during Eisenhower’s second term in office when the president was accused of placing fiscal security ahead of the country’s military security. In early March 1953, Josef Stalin died. A triumvirate consisting of Georgi Malenkov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, Lavrenti Beria, chief of secret police and Vyacheslav Molotov, foreign minister, assumed power. The death of the ruler of the world’s second most powerful country and America’s main adversary was of immense significance for Washington. The administration had much on which to speculate, not least the transfer of power. What, for example, would Stalin’s death mean for the future of Soviet communism? Were there possibilities for reducing world tensions now, or would the new men in the Kremlin follow their predecessor’s line? The first indication of the Soviet Union’s new mood arose on 15 March 1953 when Malenkov told the Supreme Soviet of the USSR that there was no existing dispute between Russia and America that ‘cannot be decided by peaceful means, on the basis of mutual understanding’.7

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Malenkov’s statement was followed by a number of gestures that seemed to indicate a departure from the Stalin era and a readiness to ease tensions between the East and the West.8 These included the easing of travel restrictions of foreign diplomats and the granting of exit visas to Soviet women married to American journalists and forces personnel. The Soviets were also able to reach agreement with the West to appoint Dag Hammarskjold as the new secretary general of the UN. White House officials regarded Stalin’s death as marking the end of an era. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, suggested turning to ‘ways and means of ending the peril represented by the Soviet Union’. This, he said, ‘could be done by inducing the disintegration of Soviet power . . . If we keep our pressure on, psychological or otherwise,’ he continued, ‘we may either force a collapse of the Kremlin regime or else transform the Soviet orbit from a union of satellites dedicated to aggression, into a coalition for defense only.’9 The administration was, however, ill prepared in its response to Stalin’s death, much to Eisenhower’s consternation.10 As the president reminded his cabinet two days after the Soviet leader’s death: Ever since 1946, I know that all the so-called experts have been yapping about what would happen when Stalin dies and what we, as a nation, should do about it. Well, he’s dead. And you turn the files of our government inside out – in vain – looking for plans laid. We have no plans. We are not even sure what difference his death makes.11 In formulating a response to events of early March, Eisenhower commissioned a team of consultants, government speechwriters and psychological warfare experts to prepare a ‘plan for peace’. The psychological warriors, led by C.D. Jackson, a presidential adviser, urged the government to issue a ‘plain indictment’ of the Soviet regime which incorporated a number of fanciful proposals.12 One such proposal was the offer by the US government of a $100,000 reward to the first Soviet MIG pilot who defected to the West.13 Proposals of this type were hastily withdrawn. Eisenhower was not prepared to entertain offers that would simply play into the hands of

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the Soviet propaganda mill and mock Western capitalism for ‘trying to bury its freedom-lovers’.14 What eventually emerged was a speech delivered by the president to the American Society of Newspaper Editors at the Statler Hotel in Washington on 16 April 1953. Eisenhower called it, The Chance for Peace. Welcoming the Soviet Union’s recent statements on the need for peace, he invited the new Moscow leadership to back up their words with deeds. Reflecting current sources of world tension, such deeds included the release of prisoners of war held since 1945, Soviet agreement to an Austrian State Treaty, the conclusion of an honourable armistice in Korea, Indochina and Malaya, agreement to a free and united Germany and the full independence of Eastern European nations. A number of historians have argued that Eisenhower’s speech was, no matter how eloquently put, propaganda.15 Eisenhower knew his demands would be unacceptable to the Soviets. Nevertheless, he did not intend merely to list the deeds incumbent on Moscow that would demonstrate its peaceful intentions. According to Emmet John Hughes, the president’s speechwriter, Eisenhower was anxious for the US to offer ‘a direction towards reducing tensions and improve the chances of peace’.16 He declared a willingness to conclude an arms limitation agreement and accept international control of atomic energy aimed at ensuring the prohibition of nuclear weapons, supervised by a system of inspection co-ordinated by the United Nations. Moreover, Eisenhower was keen to convey publicly his frustrations with the worldwide struggle between the East and the West. Thus, he declared: ‘The worst to be feared and the best to be expected can be simply stated. The worst is about war. The best would be this: a life of perpetual fear and tension; a burden of arms draining the wealth and labor of all peoples.’17 The most notable aspect of Eisenhower’s speech, however, was his warning about the dangers and the cost of the armaments race – a subject that would remain fundamental to his thinking on the Cold War and its impact on America: Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world

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in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities.18 This part of Eisenhower’s speech was not propaganda or rhetoric. Rather, it reflected the deep-rooted concerns Eisenhower held about the cost of the military build-up in America following the end of the Second World War. By January 1953, military expenditures accounted for over 60 per cent of the total federal budget.19 The cost of the nation’s defence had increased by 300 per cent in the past two and a half years. During the election campaign, Eisenhower had pledged to lower taxes, halt the spread of ‘big government’ and balance the budget. He was equally specific about where the budget cuts would come from: ‘The big spending is, of course, the $60 billion we pay for national security. Here is where the largest savings can be made.’20 Once elected, Eisenhower was determined to fulfil his campaign promises. His chief goal was to balance the budget and clear the $14 billion deficit left by the Truman administration. Eisenhower was unable to achieve a balanced budget during his first year in office, despite heavy cuts in defence. However, 1954 proved to be a more successful year. As a result of an $11 billion reduction in federal expenditures, the budget was brought closer into balance and a tax cut of $7.4 billion was achieved.21 This was, up until then, the largest tax reduction to have taken place in American history. Eisenhower’s raison d’être was driven not simply by campaign pledges or a self-determination to resolve budgetary problems. The president’s quest to reduce defence expenditures reflected the immense importance he attached to the economic solvency of the nation. He regarded military expenditures as the biggest threat to the economic health of the nation. As Eisenhower noted in 1951: I personally think we are pursuing certain programs merely because they sound efficient; we are afraid not to do them. Yet they are expensive and are driving us (along with a lot of political expenditures) straight toward inflation of an uncontrollable

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character. Wouldn’t the monster in the Kremlin rejoice to see us admit insolvency?22 For Eisenhower, military and economic strength were mutually dependent. As he argued at a press conference in April 1953, ‘if these two [variables] are allowed to proceed in disregard for the other, you then create a situation of either doubtful military strength, or of such precarious economic strength that your military position is in constant jeopardy.’23 In view of the ‘vital importance of a sound US economy’, the president insisted that all expenditures proposed be evaluated by the National Security Council on the basis of the effect these would have on the economy.24 In line with this objective, Eisenhower designated the budget director and Ttreasury secretary as permanent members of the NSC. Eisenhower’s views on war, including nuclear war, influenced his endeavours to strike a balance between the nation’s economic solvency and its security needs. He once decried war as ‘the most stupid and tragic human ventures’.25 The development of weaponry meant that modern wars had become, the president argued, ‘total and not in any sense limited warfare’.26 Indeed, it was impossible to think in terms of winners and losers. As he remarked in June 1954: ‘I repeat, there is no victory in any war except through our imaginations, through our dedication and through our work to avoid it.’27 By the time he entered the White House, Eisenhower had developed an acute and systematic body of thought on nuclear war, which he sought to translate into policy. Military forces had become expensive liabilities for democratic countries after 1945. A heavy reliance on these capabilities in the nuclear age was fatal. As he argued at one NSC meeting, ‘every single nation, including the United States, which entered into [nuclear] war as a free nation would come out of it as a dictatorship. This would be the price of survival.’28 The defence of representative government and America’s powerful and competitive capitalist economy required a broad range of measures beyond traditional military strength. Eisenhower’s defence strategy would bear all the hallmarks of this thinking. To these views should be added Eisenhower’s thoughts on the Soviet Union. Unlike many of his wartime colleagues, he had been able to

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gain a more intimate knowledge of the Soviet Union towards the closing months of the Second World War. He visited the Soviet Union in August 1945 and struck up a close friendship with Marshal Georgi Zhukov, chief of general staff and later minister of defence. During this visit and his many conversations with Zhukov in the months following the end of the war, Eisenhower was left with the clear impression that the domestic situation of the Soviet Union was rather desperate. In a memorandum to General Lucius Clay, former military commander in Berlin, of November 1945, Eisenhower reported that during a ‘personal conference’ with Zhukov, the Soviet marshal had said that the Soviet Union would ‘never place itself in the position of begging but that he could tell me with the utmost frankness that the standard of living in Russia today is deplorably low’. It was also Zhukov’s conviction ‘that even the present standard in Germany was at least as high as it is in Russia’. The greatest challenge facing the Soviet government and nation was to make ‘speedy and effective progress in raising their standards before the situation became really desperate’.29 As a result of Eisenhower’s generally favourable contact with leading Soviet military men and in recognition of their ‘contribut[ing] mightily to the winning of the war’, he was disposed to consider the Soviets as a ‘naturally friendly race’.30 At a national sports parade in Moscow in August 1945, Eisenhower talked to Stalin at length about the post-war reconstruction of the Soviet Union. Eisenhower was left convinced that what the Soviet leader wanted above all else was to get his country back on its feet and ‘raise the standard of living of the Russian people, which [had] been seriously damaged by war’. The Soviet leader desired positive relations with America, repeating ‘several times that it was necessary for Russia to remain friends with the United States’.31 Eisenhower’s personal experiences of the Soviet Union were by no means ephemeral. In April 1953, following Stalin’s death, Eisenhower recalled the conversations he had had with the Soviet leader in 1945 about Russia’s domestic plight. He continued to believe that the Soviet Union’s main priorities were the raising of living standards and the availability of ‘essential things’ such as ‘homes and food and technical help’. As Eisenhower argued: ‘Hell, those boys have to think in material terms. It’s all they believe in.’32

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Like many of his generation and background, Eisenhower had, by the late 1940s, revised his opinion of the Soviet Union. Towards the end of 1947, he believed the men in the Kremlin were ‘determined to pursue without pause the old communistic doctrine of world domination’.33 He formed this view mainly as a result of the Soviet Union’s refusal to facilitate free elections in countries such as Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary following the end of the Second World War.34 Stalin’s actions had denied the people of Eastern and Central Europe the freedom to choose their government – freedom that Eisenhower had fought to preserve. Soviet activity in Greece, Turkey, Iran and Germany also confirmed Eisenhower’s suspicions about Russian ambitions to ‘communize’ the world, leading him to abandon his hope for friendly co-operation with the Soviets and instead to predict an inevitable conflict between the Soviet Union and the US.35 Despite his regrets that US foreign policy after 1945 could not embrace a strengthening of ties with the Soviet Union, Eisenhower never believed the Soviets would attack the US, even after 1949. As he once said to Robert Cutler, special assistant to the president for national security affairs, ‘You know all these fellows (NSC members) worry so damn much about what we’ll do when the Russians attack. Well, I don’t believe for a second they will ever attack.’36 As such, Eisenhower refused to get carried away by the near hysteria generated by the anti-communist sentiment that swept America during the early years of the Cold War and during his own presidency. He sought instead to maintain a balanced perspective of the Russian threat. Thus, in a letter to Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, Eisenhower argued, ‘These communists are not early Christian martyrs. The men in the Kremlin are avid for power and are ruthlessly ambitious. I cannot see them starting a war merely for the opportunity that such a conflict might offer their successors to spread their doctrine.’37 Eisenhower always believed that the threat from Moscow was subtler, that the Soviets would use subversive and political tactics as a way of bringing certain countries under their control and influence. In a letter to General George Sloan in March 1952, Eisenhower claimed that the Soviets would advance ‘year by year, month by month [their] iron curtain by outwardly peaceful means . . . the hope of the Soviets

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is to attack each nation separately, beginning with the weaker ones’.38 Eisenhower did not modify his views after January 1953. Thus, he argued: ‘Now, everything points to the fact that Russia is not seeking a general war and will not for a long, long time, if ever. Everything is shifting to economic warfare, to propaganda, and to a sort of peaceful infiltration.’39 The New Look therefore had to be flexible enough to deal with Moscow’s tactics. In this approach, Eisenhower had the support of John Foster Dulles, his secretary of state. With ‘his lawyer’s mind’, Dulles could sometimes be rigid and doctrinaire in his dealings with the Soviets.40 On other occasions, he could be accommodating. Privately, he was not unsympathetic to the Soviet dislike of inspection and control, recognising that such procedures would reduce their secrecy.41 Equally, he was not afraid to show his exasperation with them where the need arose. Thus, at the end of foreign ministers’ talks in Berlin in February 1954, he argued: It is unfortunate . . . that during the conference, you have not made a single concrete contribution to the easing of world tensions which you claim is of paramount importance but which we know cannot be accomplished just by words. Deeds are needed.42 After the Second World War, Dulles had worked as an adviser to Arthur Vandenberg and helped draft the preamble to the United Nations Charter. Between 1946 and 1950, he was a US delegate to the UN General Assembly. Dulles had been highly critical of Truman’s policy of containment, believing instead that a strategy of ‘liberation’ would deal more effectively with Soviet expansionist policies in Eastern and Central Europe. By the time of his appointment as secretary of state in January 1953, Dulles was an important actor in the field of foreign affairs. As secretary of state he developed a somewhat formidable reputation, acquiring a considerable degree of autonomy in the exercise of foreign affairs. This should not infer that Eisenhower was not in control of foreign policy. Dulles worked closely with Eisenhower, keeping him regularly apprised of developments in this field. Eisenhower remained the principal architect of policy. Yet Dulles was able to exert

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his influence, often persuading the president to modify the timing or even the approach towards achieving his goals. Eisenhower and his secretary of state were, as Sherman Adams once remarked, ‘in a real sense a team’.43 Dulles remained a firm supporter of the New Look even though towards the end of the 1950s he began to share the views of many officials that defence strategy needed to move away from a heavy reliance on nuclear weapons and provide for an increase in the level of conventional forces. However, he recognised that a change of policy along these lines would result in a significant increase in military expenditures.44 Dulles knew that the New Look had to strike an effective balance between military and non-military measures in order to bring about the eventual disintegration of the Soviet regime. This attitude would explain his support for propaganda warfare and policies aimed at achieving a ‘rollback’ of Soviet influence in Eastern and Central Europe. In May 1953, Eisenhower ordered the formation of Project Solarium. This exercise involved a fundamental review of national security policy. Three separate study groups were established, charged with examining alternative courses for national security policy. These options were continuing the Truman administration’s policy of containment; a strategy of deterrence which involved drawing clear lines around the periphery of the communist world, with the implied threat of nuclear retaliation against those who crossed the line; and a policy of military, economic and covert force designed to achieve ‘liberation’ by reducing and ultimately eliminating Soviet control over its existing spheres of influence. The three studies were presented to Eisenhower and the NSC on 16 July 1953, and became the basis for development of a new defence strategy. Over the next few months the administration debated the contours of a policy that would meet the Soviet threat and at the same time reduce the economic burden of defence. The result was NSC 162/2, a top-secret policy paper on ‘Basic National Security Policy’, which Eisenhower approved at the end of October 1953. A chief component of the New Look was nuclear weapons. Their role was to deter an attack on the US and its allies by means of massive retaliatory power. The men in the Kremlin had to be left in no doubt

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that if they engaged in aggressive action, they risked retaliation from the West on a scale that would endanger, if not destroy, the Soviet regime. To make deterrence work, the Soviet leaders had to be convinced that the US capacity to retaliate could not be destroyed by a decisive surprise nuclear attack. Thus, the US had to ensure it possessed a sufficient retaliatory force that would survive such an attack and be in a position to impose unacceptable damage on Russia by a second strike. As a result, Eisenhower expanded the US nuclear stockpile and delivery capabilities to the extent he felt necessary in order to deter Soviet aggression. The New Look also implied a willingness to respond to threats or provocation that was not always in proportion to Moscow’s original actions. Indeed, at first glance, it risked escalating a small or local conflict to global war. As Dulles declared in a speech to the Council of Foreign Relations in January 1954: ‘The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing.’ Such an approach, the secretary continued, would allow the US and its allies to shape ‘our military establishment to fit what is our policy, instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy’s many choices’.45 In order to present a credible strategy, the US had to appear willing to use nuclear weapons whenever its interests were threatened. One way of achieving this was to integrate them with other weapons in the American arsenal and consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view. The administration transferred large numbers of weapons to the military and in 1956 Eisenhower approved procedures that enabled the service chiefs to gain, following a declaration of ‘defence emergency’, custody of nuclear weapons from civilian hands. The New Look was, in many respects, different from the defence policies that had been pursued by the Truman administration. While the latter had sought, through NSC 68, to move away from exclusive reliance on nuclear weapons, Eisenhower placed heavy, but not sole, emphasis on strategic nuclear deterrence. He also refused to plan the defence of the nation around a scenario of the ‘year of maximum danger’, believing such an approach would encourage officials to accelerate America’s defences and allow a reactionary build-up of military force.46

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After April 1953, national intelligence estimates (NIEs) prepared by the CIA, detailing Russia’s estimated force levels, dropped references to a theoretical date for D-Day readiness. A principal objective of Eisenhower and his Treasury secretary, George Humphrey, was to ‘consider ways and means of meeting a threat which will be with us over a very long time’, a suitable posture of defence that ‘would square with what the country could afford to pay for’.47 Thus, the administration aimed to plan the deployment of appropriate forces and their related costs on a rational basis over the longer term. Anxious to avoid the high costs associated with rearming the country in the shortest possible time, Eisenhower also warned that the public might be prepared to make sacrifices voluntarily for a year or two, maybe even three, but ‘no eloquence would sell this proposition to the American people for the indefinite future.’48 Eisenhower’s thinking was by no means removed from public opinion: a Gallup poll conducted during July 1953 noted the issues of greatest concern to Americans. In order of importance these were: an end to the war in Korea; tax reductions; economy in government; and a balanced budget.49 More fundamentally, the New Look reflected Eisenhower’s broader aims for the Cold War and the military situation of the US. The importance of nuclear weapons related not simply to Eisenhower’s drive to achieve economies in defence expenditures. The prime objective of massive retaliatory power, or massive retaliation as it became more commonly known, was to deter Moscow from taking action or creating the conditions which would push the US to react by means of military force. The threat of massive retaliation of America’s nuclear forces was designed not merely to deter the Kremlin from launching an attack on the US mainland or on its allies in Western Europe – actions that would, without a shred of doubt, signify global war. It was also intended to deter the Soviets from taking action that would precipitate local or limited wars. As far as Eisenhower was concerned, such conflicts would escalate to global war, where nuclear weapons would almost certainly be used. Thus, in response to claims at one NSC meeting that mutual deterrence (of US and Soviet nuclear forces) provided an ‘umbrella’ that made it possible to fight limited wars without the danger of nuclear escalation, the president

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interjected: ‘Actually, the umbrella would be the lightning rod. Each small war makes global war more likely.’ Given such a scenario, a build-up of conventional forces was both unnecessary and costly. The president maintained that any movement away from massive retaliation might weaken strategic deterrence and actually precipitate Soviet aggression. It would also lead, Eisenhower argued, to the establishment of a ‘garrison state’.50 Successful deterrence also reflected Eisenhower’s desire to limit America’s responsibilities and military liabilities around the globe. After the end of the Second World War, he believed America had an important role to play in world affairs, including leadership of the free world. However, he also recognised the dangers of the ‘United States picking up the entire world on its shoulders and attempting to carry the whole to prosperity and happiness’.51 As he argued in a letter to his friend, Kenyon Ashe Joyce in 1947, ‘such a conception would imply the capabilities to compete with regimented labor all over the world and expect our people to progressively accept voluntarily a constant lowering of standards of living in order to meet the competition that this implies.’52 The defence policies of the Truman administration certainly had the potential for the US to overextend itself. Eisenhower was all too aware of the dangers of this approach, both for America’s economic well-being and way of life. Intervention in all four corners of the globe required expanding conventional forces that would, as Eisenhower argued repeatedly during his presidency, either lead to a reduction in nuclear weapons or a budget increase that would result in the establishment of a garrison state. The debates surrounding the development of the New Look, leading to adoption by the administration of NSC 162/2, are contained in the minutes of NSC meetings held during the autumn of 1953. These discussions demonstrate Eisenhower’s determination to give equal weighting to economic and military security and to plan expenditures for the long haul. They also reveal the concerns of the military staff with new defence policy. Such concerns related, in the main, to budget cuts and massive retaliation. The debates of NSC members were accompanied by two alternative lines of thinking on the requirements for new national security policy. ‘Side A’ regarded the threat

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to America as ‘the basic Soviet hostility to the United States and the Soviet’s formidable military power’. While acknowledging that a sound US economy was essential, Side A believed the nation had to meet its security needs first. ‘Side B’, on the other hand, regarded the situation as a dual threat, which embraced the external threat of Soviet power and the internal threat of a weakened economy and the consequent change in ‘our way of life’. Side B argued that America had to strike a ‘proper balance between the risks arising from these two threats’.53 The minutes of NSC meetings show that the military staff supported Side A. As the new secretary of defence, Charles Wilson, argued: ‘If we ever go to the American people and tell them that we are putting a balanced budget ahead of national defence, it would be a terrible day.’54 The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) went further, claiming that the government should do what is necessary ‘even if the result was to change the American way of life’.55 Reductions in defence expenditures were, not surprisingly, subject to heavy attack by Wilson and his staff, including Wilfred McNeil, assistant secretary of defence, Admiral Arthur Radford, chairman of the JSC and Matthew Ridgeway, chief of staff of the army. Thus, at one NSC meeting in October 1953, they argued that since there had been no significant change in basic national security policy and no change in the seriousness of the Soviet threat, they could offer no reductions in the level of combat forces.56 Instead, the JCS submitted figures for increasing the defence budget for fiscal year 1955 to, according to Treasury estimates, $48 billion.57 The estimates provided by the military included a substantial increase in conventional forces. Humphrey, Cutler and Joseph Dodge, special assistant to the president and chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, supported ‘Side B’. They questioned the arguments of the military, stating that with the end of the Korean War such force levels should be reduced, not increased. Wilson replied that the redeployment of troops in Korea could not happen overnight and the estimates, as proposed, had to take such logistical factors into account. Consequently, it would be ‘very tough’, he argued, to make any real progress towards achieving lower defence costs, and tougher still to reduce the armed services ‘from a level of 3.5 million to 3 million men and still maintain reasonable security for our country’.58

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The position adopted by senior military staff reflected their reservations with massive retaliation. According to the minutes of the NSC meetings, council members raised a number of questions relating to the circumstances in which the JCS could plan on the use of atomic weapons and whether such weapons should henceforth be considered in the same light as conventional forces. Eisenhower maintained that NSC 162/2 gave clear answers to such questions and the military now had a firm basis on which to plan the use of atomic bombs should the Soviets provoke the West. He referred to the situation of Korea and the possible resumption of hostilities as one example. However, the discussions at NSC meetings reveal more fundamental concerns. These extended to the military’s reluctance to accept massive retaliation as America’s national strategy. The military, in particular the army and navy, preferred instead ‘a reasonable balance of military capabilities’.59 There were, as Wilson and Admiral Robert Carney, commander in chief of US naval forces, argued, other measures to be emphasised besides retaliatory striking power. As though echoing his predecessor’s line, Carney insisted: ‘It is unwise to put all our eggs in one basket of striking power.’60 The military’s concerns with massive retaliation were by no means transitory. Their doubts about a heavy reliance on nuclear weapons to deter and, failing this scenario, win a war against the Soviets, small or large, continued throughout the remainder of Eisenhower’s presidency. Such doubts gave rise to what can be described as a fraught relationship between the president and his senior military officials. As the 1950s progressed, the tensions between Eisenhower and his armed services intensified as the latter demanded more resources for both conventional and nuclear weapons. The arguments espoused by the JCS reflected the strategic and wider global changes that were taking place from the early to mid-1950s. A number of officials within the Truman administration had expressed concerns over the size of the Soviet Union’s army. Many, including Paul Nitze and Dean Acheson, believed this force was capable of overrunning Western Europe. This led, as Chapter One has shown, to a major deployment of ground troops in Europe. After January 1953, many officials, including Wilson and the JCS, were reluctant

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to withdraw troops, fearing such a move would affect the morale of Western European nations and encourage the Soviets to assert their influence in these countries. The requirement for conventional forces began to assume a greater level of significance for other reasons. By the early 1950s, a number of countries in Africa and Asia had gained independence from British, French and Dutch imperial rule, including for example India, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Libya, Cambodia and Indonesia. Not all colonial countries, however, were thought capable of maintaining the political, economic and military strength the imperial nations and the US believed was essential in gaining independence. Many countries, particularly those in Southeast Asia, turned to communism in their determination for independence and to aid their post-colonial development, often with the help of China or the Soviet Union. The military argued that conventional forces were essential to confront communist infiltration in countries such as Laos and Vietnam. It is clear from the minutes of NSC meetings that Eisenhower, Dulles and Humphrey supported Side B with regard to national security policy. Side A, the president believed, had the potential to lead to both general mobilisation and ‘out-and-out regimentation’ – a scenario that was too alarming to contemplate. The best that could be achieved, Eisenhower maintained, was ‘a respectable posture of defense. We cannot hope for a perfect defense. Accordingly we cannot stretch out more.’61 It was a statement he made repeatedly during his presidency. In his determination to reduce military expenditures, Eisenhower insisted that Wilson and McNeil revise their draft estimates for fiscal year 1955. He remained supremely confident about his strategy, despite challenges emerging from Congressional Democrats, certain journalists, lobby groups and intelligence specialists. As he once remarked, ‘deterring war was even more important than winning a war. No deterrent to war could compare in importance with this retaliatory striking power.’62 In view of the importance Eisenhower attached to the financial health of the nation, it should come as no surprise that the introductory paragraph of the final version of NSC 162/2 stated that in order to meet the Soviet threat, America should ‘avoid seriously weakening the US economy or undermining our fundamental values and institutions’.63

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The New Look achieved the economies that Eisenhower sought. The defence budget was reduced from $49.6 billion in 1953 to $41.7 billion in 1956.64 Savings were made as a result of cuts to the Mutual Security Program during fiscal years 1954 and 1955. However, the main cuts were achieved through a reduction in conventional forces. Of the $4.8 billion cut that Eisenhower made to the defence budget for fiscal year 1955, $4.1 billion came from the army.65 The number of US military personnel was reduced from 3.55 million in 1953 to 2.8 million three years later and to 2.4 million by 1960.66 To meet the requirements of the New Look, the nuclear stockpile grew from approximately 1,000 in 1953 to 2,110 in 1955.67 Eisenhower’s strategy restored the centrality of nuclear deterrence. The Solarium exercise also revealed the existence of a military that believed the dominant thrust of society should be preparation for total war. These officials believed Eisenhower was taking unnecessary risks in reducing defence budgets and military forces. By late 1953, the arms race had entered a new phase. Both the US and the Soviet Union had mastered thermonuclear weapons, the testing of which heightened anxiety around the world.68 At this time aircraft were the only means by which the Soviets could launch a nuclear strike against the US. American intelligence specialists estimated that the Soviet bomber force consisted of 1,000 TU-4 medium-range propeller aircraft, comparable to the US B-29. The CIA claimed that this force posed a serious threat to the US, even though, as Eisenhower pointed out, such aircraft were capable only of ‘oneway strikes’ and did not have the capability to return to the Soviet Union.69 Yet intelligence staff believed the Soviets would introduce and deploy 180 heavy bombers with a much longer range and 120 medium-range jet bombers by mid-1958.70 Intelligence estimates of Soviet delivery capabilities increased significantly following the successful Soviet hydrogen bomb test in 1953. National intelligence estimates relating to the deployment of TU-4 aircraft for the year 1954 were larger compared to those compiled in 1953 relating to their projected deployment for the year 1957. These reports also predicted that the Soviets would deploy new bomber aircraft more rapidly than previously estimated. In June 1954, NIE 11–5-54 projected the Soviet

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medium-range jet bomber force (the TU-39 ‘Badger’) would number approximately 120 (not 50 as had been estimated a year earlier) and 600 in 1959.71 Recent improvements in the Soviet Union’s arsenal, particularly with regard to delivery capabilities, reinforced concerns about the future ability of the Soviet Union to launch a surprise nuclear attack on America. A report to the NSC of June 1953 estimated the US casualties resulting from a Soviet nuclear attack to be in the region of 9 million. It also predicted that the number would increase to 12.5 million in 1955. As Peter Roman has shown, Eisenhower was given three reports in 1956. These reports highlighted how the estimates of the casualties resulting from a Soviet nuclear attack had increased to ‘mind-numbing’ levels; 65 per cent of the population would be killed or injured, with at least 50 million people killed instantly.72 The production of estimates purporting to show the Soviets as having a greater number of long-range bombers compared to the US led to claims of a ‘bomber gap’, as Chapter Three will show. The military’s demand for greater resources to strengthen America’s nuclear forces also prompted fears about a missile gap favouring the Soviet Union. At one NSC meeting in July 1954, Donald Quarles, assistant secretary of defence, recommended accelerating early warning defence systems, including ‘air-to-air rockets with atomic warheads’. This recommendation was made on the basis that the Soviets were likely to have by July 1957 missile capabilities, including ICBMs. Consequently ‘the question of whether [the Russians] should or should not attack [America] at that time depending upon the state of development of their armaments and ours’ would be left, as far as NSC members were concerned, in Soviet hands. The view was expressed that the administration could not afford to leave such a decision in the hands of the Kremlin in the (mistaken) belief that the Soviet Union was likely to acquire such capabilities in advance of the US.73 For many military staff, including Quarles, Wilson and Radford, the New Look’s fiscal constraints had given the Soviet Union an opportunity to gain ground and perhaps even to move ahead of the US.74 Such ‘war scares’ continued throughout Eisenhower’s presidency. During 1954 the development of medium- and long-range missiles was given further impetus when the US government was informed

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by the AEC that the accuracy of such delivery capabilities was less of a concern since a hydrogen bomb could land two or three miles away from its aiming point and still destroy its intended targets.75 A CIA report of 1953 claimed that the Soviet Union was already ahead of the US in rocketry, having moved on to the ICBM while the US continued to prioritise the building of the slower and more vulnerable strategic bomber. The report, based on interviews with German rocket scientists who had recently returned from the Soviet Union, estimated that the Soviets would have operational ballistic missiles as early as 1955, or by 1957 at the latest. Lee DuBridge, chairman of SAC, warned Eisenhower that the US was now more vulnerable than ever to a devastating surprise attack.76 A perceived imbalance of Soviet and US nuclear forces provoked a deeper questioning about the effectiveness of America’s defence strategy. The potential for the Soviet Union to surpass the US in air power and defences raised concerns about America’s ability to rely on such weapons to support important foreign policy objectives once Soviet nuclear forces could retaliate against the West.77 Would America’s nuclear deterrent remain credible in the face of growing Soviet capabilities? Would Soviet capabilities negate US forces, allowing Moscow to conduct limited aggression in Western Europe and the developing world? The Committee on the Present Danger had posed similar questions, as Chapter One has shown. The breaking of America’s nuclear monopoly in August 1949 had prompted the Truman administration to launch a review of national security policy. The outcome of this exercise was a comprehensive rearmament programme. By the mid-1950s, such questions risked undermining Eisenhower’s economic objectives and defence strategy. It also risked pushing America towards a garrison state. Despite the various claims made concerning Soviet military strength, Eisenhower continued to express doubt that the Soviet Union was moving towards war. As he remarked to James Hagerty, his press secretary, following a change of leadership in the Kremlin in February 1955: You know, if you’re in the military and you know about these terrible destructive weapons, it tends to make you more pacifistic

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than you normally have been. In most countries the influence of the military is more conservative, and so while I do not know for sure, I would not be surprised if the army influence would be just that within the Soviet Union. They are not ready for war and they know it. They also know if they go to war, they’re going to end up losing everything they have. That also tends to make people more conservative.78 Massive retaliation certainly seems to have had a restraining influence on communist aggression, including limited or piecemeal activity. In the case of Korea, it had helped to bring about the armistice in July 1953. The Chinese communists also backed down during the two Quemoy-Matsu crises of the mid and late-1950s, when Dulles threatened the use of nuclear weapons. Nikita Khrushchev also found that he could not get his own way over Berlin in 1958, all too aware of the fact that the US had superior retaliatory striking power. All of these crises had the potential to escalate to general war. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that Eisenhower’s defence strategy was not limited to massive retaliation. The New Look also relied on psychological warfare, negotiations and covert activities – measures that would prove crucial in helping the US to gain the initiative in the Cold War. None of these was dependent on an increase in conventional forces for their effective implementation. Eisenhower recognised the importance Moscow attached to political and non-military tactics in the Cold War struggle. He believed the US needed to be geared up to the challenges that this presented. The New Look had to invest in psychological warfare. As the president once noted, this approach could range ‘from the singing of a beautiful hymn up to the most extraordinary kind of political sabotage’.79 In practice, the administration ruled out very little in the form of psychological warfare; speeches, ‘soft words’ propaganda and radio bulletins were all part and parcel of the strategy designed to increase the difficulty under which the Soviet Union operated.80 One notable example of psychological warfare was Dulles’ liberation strategy for Eastern Europe. This programme was aimed initially at supporting independence movements in Hungary and East Germany, with the view

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to targeting thereafter the remaining Eastern bloc countries. Balloons regularly dropped leaflets promoting the constitutional rights of the citizens and generally denigrating interference by Moscow.81 In February 1953, C.D. Jackson was appointed special assistant to the president with responsibility for psychological warfare. He established Radio Free Europe, whose broadcasts were aimed at promoting American values, objectives and way of life. They also sought to ‘talk persuasively to Eastern Europeans about their own problems and aspirations’.82 In April 1953, he had arranged for Eisenhower’s Chance for Peace speech to be broadcast hourly on this radio channel. He also oversaw the distribution of some 3 million copies of this speech across Europe, Latin America and India. Moreover, the Chinese were not immune to the administration’s efforts of making communist rule in China more difficult. One move included the removal of the US 7th Fleet from the Taiwan Strait, thereby provoking Chiang Kai-Shek to attack the mainland. Another act was to continue withholding diplomatic recognition from Peking and to oppose Chinese seating in the UN. The effects of the administration’s psychological warfare strategy are difficult to measure. During early 1955 Dulles believed a ‘rollback’ of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe was possible, as suspicions emerged that the Soviet Union had overextended its commitments in the Eastern bloc and was facing renewed economic problems.83 As the administration continued its attempts to mould public opinion and encourage internal change behind the iron curtain, more information campaigns followed which highlighted the success of Western capitalism, the high standards of living in the US and the economic recovery that Western Europe was now enjoying. Through propaganda, the US also sought to sabotage Moscow’s attempts to create a ‘satellite army’, an Eastern bloc counterpart to the European Defence Community (EDC).84 ‘What all of these tactics had in common,’ John Lewis Gaddis has argued, ‘was a desire to score points – to make the United States look good, and to embarrass or discredit the other side’.85 The US did not, however, succeed in breaking Moscow’s grip on its satellites. Gaddis also argues that Eisenhower and Dulles believed the struggle between the US and Russia was driven by ideological factors. Their focus on the ideological roots of Soviet behaviour had a number

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of effects, one of which was to place greater stress on Soviet intentions than on capabilities. According to the works of Marx, Lenin and Stalin, Soviet intentions were, as Dulles argued, already implicit in Soviet ideology. The writings of these three communist giants had not preached, so the secretary of state claimed, ‘primary reliance upon open war against the West’. Thus, as Gaddis argues, ‘Armed with this knowledge, the West could afford to ignore those Soviet capabilities not likely to be used.’86 Soviet military capabilities did not determine America’s response to the perceived threat of Soviet communism. It would be erroneous to suggest, however, that knowledge of Soviet capabilities was irrelevant or even subordinate to intentions. Knowledge of Soviet capabilities was crucial to Eisenhower’s Cold War strategy. The president’s efforts to uncover as accurate a picture as possible of the extent of Soviet force levels is linked to a further element of the New Look, and one closely related to psychological warfare, namely covert operations. In 1954, the NSC defined covert operations as ‘all activities . . . so planned and executed that any US government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered, the US government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.’87 The budget for covert operations increased from $4.7 million in 1949 to $82 million in 1952. Concomitantly, the number of staff devoted to such activities grew from 302 to 2,812 (with an additional 3,142 involved as overseas ‘contract personnel’), thus signifying the growing importance the US government attached to covert operations during the early years of the Cold War. Eisenhower continued this trend, employing covert action on a broader scale than his predecessor.88 A number of studies that have examined covert operations in the context of the New Look focus on CIA activities with regard to the overthrow of two foreign governments, namely Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954.89 Other studies have referred to the guerrilla and paramilitary operations against communist China and North Vietnam from northern Burma and Laos, as well as certain domestic activities such as mail and telecommunications surveillance, the infiltration of student, academic, journalistic and cultural organisations, and the payment of subsidies to publishers and foundations.90 It should be

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remembered that covert operations extended to aerial reconnaissance. Eisenhower’s support of this activity was long-standing. Aerial photography had assisted the general and his staff in the planning of the Allied landings in North Africa during 1942 and 1943.91 As early as 1946, Eisenhower had urged Bernard Baruch to incorporate a system of inspection in US proposals for disarmament and the control of atomic energy, in an attempt to establish, by lawful means, the extent of Soviet bomb-making facilities.92 As president, he also supported covert efforts to penetrate Soviet airspace in order to find out what lay inside the perimeters of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As far as aerial reconnaissance was concerned, Eisenhower was more than content to build on the efforts of his predecessor. Indeed, his support for Open Skies can be traced to this activity. He was sceptical about the accuracy of NIEs, believing these provided much of the basis for the scaremongering associated with the bomber and missile gaps.93 He also complained that intelligence estimates failed to make a clear distinction between Soviet capabilities and actual intentions.94 As a result, there was no clear or balanced perspective concerning the so-called Soviet threat. As Eisenhower remarked to C.D. Jackson, without this there would be no ‘intellectual analysis of these grave problems’ and instead a ‘hysterical fear . . . [and] a screaming support of a position already taken’ would continue to prevail.95 The president regarded the overflights of Soviet territory as a reliable way of building up knowledge of Soviet capabilities. Such operations were given further attention as a result of a major study commissioned by the government in the autumn of 1954. This study was carried out by a group of scientists, academics, military and technical personnel and intelligence specialists, which became known as the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP). Led by James Killian, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the panel was given responsibility for assessing national security issues, including growing concerns among military staff and White House officials about the dangers of a surprise nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. Reporting to an overall committee of the panel were three project teams. These were responsible for investigating continental defence, striking power and intelligence capabilities.

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The NSC considered the panel’s report, ‘Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack’, in February 1955. Its conclusions set out a timetable comparing various phases of the US military position with that of the Soviet Union. This section stressed that America’s defences over a tenyear period could be vulnerable to surprise attack by the Soviet Union. The report therefore recommended, inter alia, the implementation of early distance warning and anti-ballistic missile systems. Amid fears that the Soviet Union was already ahead of the US in missile development, the panel also recommended that the president assign the ‘highest national priority’ to the construction of ICBMs and an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) force. In the autumn of 1955, Eisenhower approved a crash effort to build two US Air Force ICBMs, Atlas and Titan, at an estimated cost of $1 billion, and two IRBMs, the US Army’s Jupiter and the US Air Force’s Thor.96 Robert Cutler estimated that the measures recommended by the panel would cost in the region of $45 billion.97 The panel also recognised the urgent need for improving intelligence capabilities. Thus, the report argued: With good intelligence we can avoid wasting our resources by arming for the wrong danger at the wrong time. Beyond this, in the broadest sense, intelligence underlies our estimate of the enemy and therefore helps to guide our political strategy.98 Project three study group, responsible for intelligence, argued that satellites should become the most reliable means of intelligence in the future. In the immediate term, however, two reports recommended the continuation of high altitude aircraft. During the course of their work, members of the project team had expressed support for the Lockheed CL-282 design, a lightweight unarmed plane that was later designated the U2. In a memorandum to CIA director Allen Dulles of 5 November 1954, Edwin Land, a member of the project team and founder of the Polaroid Corporation, singled out this aircraft for undertaking ‘a unique opportunity for comprehensive intelligence’ on the Soviet Union.99 At a meeting in November 1954, Land informed Eisenhower that the U2 would be safe

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from Soviet jet interceptors and some 20,000 feet above the range of current Soviet surface-to-air missiles. As Killian recalled, Eisenhower showed ‘immediate enthusiasm’ for the U2.100 Eisenhower, Dulles and Killian agreed that the aircraft ‘should be handled in an unconventional way so that it would not become entangled in the bureaucracy of the Defense Department or troubled by rivalries among the services’.101 Eisenhower authorised the production of 30 such aircraft at a cost of approximately $35 million. Responsibility for the coordination of all missions was placed in the hands of the CIA.102 On 26 November, Richard Bissell, special assistant for planning and co-ordination at the CIA, was placed in overall charge of the flights. Lockheed became responsible for the design, mock up, building, secret testing and field maintenance of the CL-282. These arrangements made it feasible for the CIA to take over from the work of Lockheed, leaving the US Air Force to provide the pilots and technical assistance as and when necessary. The Lockheed Corporation delivered the CL-282 aircraft on time and the first flights over the Soviet Union, under the code name Project Aquatone, began in July 1956. For Eisenhower, the conclusions of the TCP study were doubleedged. The report had called for a substantial build-up of defensive and offensive capabilities, including missiles, thereby adding to the nation’s financial and military liabilities. Such advice threatened to undermine the fiscal stringency that Eisenhower had introduced. But Killian’s advice also reinforced the need for improving America’s intelligence on Russian capabilities, with aerial reconnaissance singled out as the most effective way to acquire information on modern delivery systems, such as planes, submarines and ICBMs. In the absence of a disarmament agreement with the Soviets, as pressures to build up America’s military-industrial complex grew, and fear and suspicion of Russian intentions failed to dissipate, aerial inspection was the only means by which Eisenhower could acquire reliable intelligence on the Soviet Union. Moreover, inspection was certainly cheaper than massive rearmament to meet a phantom threat. Without this information, a respectable posture of defence was impossible to maintain. So long as the overall deterrent appeared plausible, Eisenhower refused to support demands for overwhelming numerical superiority in bomber aircraft

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and missiles. ‘There comes a time,’ the president told a press conference in March 1955, ‘when a lead is not significant in the defensive arrangements of a country. If you get enough of a particular weapon, I doubt that it is particularly important to have a lot more of it.’103 However, in order to make his argument credible and rebuff challenges from his military staff, Eisenhower needed a picture of Soviet force levels that revealed its strengths as well as its limitations. In Killian’s memoirs, referring to the president’s predicament, he recalled: By being comprehensively informed, the panel emphasised, we can better resolve internal differences about our security and we can better cope with those fantasies about our weaknesses and the enemy’s superiority that occur occasionally among the military or the politicians.104 Eisenhower’s enthusiasm for the U2, though risky, paved the way for his later support of Open Skies. A fourth element of the New Look was negotiations. NSC 162/2 stated: ‘The US must also keep open the possibility of negotiating with the USSR and Communist China acceptable and enforceable agreements.’ Such agreements, the report continued, could be ‘limited to individual issues now outstanding or involving a general settlement of major issues, including the control of armaments’. Eisenhower was willing to negotiate with the Soviet Union. As Gaddis argues, ‘there is no reason to question the president’s sincerity towards negotiation given that he stressed this point with such frequency and spontaneity.’105 Eisenhower knew he had to negotiate since his economic and military strategies relied on an easing of international tensions and the building of trust with his Soviet counterparts. As he remarked at a press conference: You don’t promote the cause of peace by talking only to people with whom you agree. That is merely a yes-man performance. You have got to meet face to face the people with whom you disagree at times, to determine whether or not there is a way of working out the differences and reaching a better understanding.106

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After Eisenhower’s Chance for Peace speech, the West entered into a series of negotiations with the Soviet Union with the view to arranging a foreign ministers’ meeting of the ‘big four’, comprising Britain, France, the US and the Soviet Union. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the future of Germany and Austria. The foreign ministers had not met since 1952, and negotiations on issues such as the Austrian State Treaty and disarmament had effectively come to a standstill.107 Diplomatic relations between the US and the Soviet Union had reached an all-time low. The meeting of the foreign ministers in January 1954 represented a decisive breakthrough in this impasse. However, any optimism proved short-lived; negotiations at Berlin did not result in immediate success. The four powers failed to reach agreement on peace treaties relating to Austria and Germany. The Soviets appeared unwilling to compromise on the former. While Dulles supported Austrian neutrality, Molotov was not yet prepared to evacuate the country for the price of a neutral Austria. The Soviet foreign minister would not consider the withdrawal of troops from Austria until a German peace treaty was concluded.108 Talks broke down on the German question and Dulles was clearly frustrated by what he regarded as intransigence on the part of the Soviet Union and its refusal to consider the reunification of Germany and free elections.109 The gathering at Geneva held two months later yielded more positive results. Representatives of the four powers were forced to accept that no agreement was possible on the reunification of Korea. However, towards the end of July, after three months of negotiations, French and Vietminh representatives signed a ceasefire agreement ending hostilities in Vietnam, the principal area of conflict in Indochina. During the autumn of 1954, American diplomacy in Europe focused largely on ratification by the signatory countries of the European Defence Community (EDC). From April 1953 to February 1955 the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, made numerous appeals to Eisenhower for a heads of government meeting with the Soviet Union. The president resisted his pleas. In April 1955, Churchill retired and was succeeded by his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. This political change of leadership gave rise to renewed calls from Britain for the US to initiate talks

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with the Russian leaders. A general election was expected in May. In an effort to improve his chances of electoral success, the new prime minister urged Eisenhower to agree to a meeting with the Soviets. The president now ‘saw no way out’ and agreed to Eden’s request.110 At this time, the French Prime Minister, Edgar Faure, also began to exert pressure on Washington to convene talks with the Soviets.111 These events have attracted argument that Eisenhower was opposed to a meeting with the Soviet leaders in July 1955 and eventually accepted the idea of high-level talks because of pressure from America’s Western European allies.112 Recent works have also claimed that Eisenhower had no interest in détente and the pursuit of international peace. As Kenneth Osgood argues: ‘Few senior officials in Washington wanted a summit with the Kremlin’s new leadership. Most believed that the meeting would accomplish nothing except grist for the communist propaganda mill. For two years Eisenhower resisted international pressure for a face-to-face meeting with the post-Stalin leadership.’113 Eisenhower’s reasons for meeting with the Soviet leaders in the summer of 1955 were, however, more complex and should not be explained by allied pressure or a change of leadership in Britain. It was the conclusion of a security union for Western Europe that eventually paved the way for summit talks. The Geneva summit represented an important step towards implementing two areas of the New Look, namely alliances and negotiations. Alliances were important to US national security policy for a number of reasons. As NSC 162/2 stated: ‘Progressive loss to the Soviet bloc of [non-communist] states would so isolate the United States and alter the world balance as to endanger the capacity of America to win in the event of general war or maintain an adequate defence without undermining its fundamental institutions.’ Alliances also ensured that allied countries would help provide the manpower reserves and economic resources needed to deal with limited aggression in Western Europe. America could not, NSC 162/2 argued, ‘meet its defence needs, even at exorbitant cost, without the support of allies’.114 The US also needed overseas bases on which to station mediumrange bombers. Air bases had been established in Britain and West Germany after the Berlin crisis of 1948. From the early to mid-1950s, air bases were also established in Turkey, Greece and South Korea.

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A way of strengthening the Western alliance lay with the creation of a European army, into which national contingents would be integrated at the level of the smallest possible unit. As proposed, there would not be a German army but German battalions distributed among European brigades. This alliance became known as the European Defence Community. The EDC treaty was signed in May 1952 but required ratification by the signatory countries in order for it to come into force. These countries included Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, West Germany and Italy. In 1951, Britain declared that it would not become a member of the EDC but instead a partner, and agreed to give its moral and political support towards ratification. Overall, these arrangements were intended to strengthen the military integration of Europe, including West Germany, and thus present a formidable deterrent to Soviet advances. The importance the US government attached to the issue of Western European unity is underlined in correspondence from Dulles to Eisenhower in January 1954: ‘We are about to have important meetings at Berlin with representatives of the Soviet Union, the UK and France. Also a decision is near on the creation of the EDC as a hard and dependable core to the NATO. The fate of Europe hangs in the balance and our fate is closely related.’115 Eisenhower regarded the EDC as a purely defensive establishment. In March 1952, in a letter to his wartime colleague, George Whitney, he argued that there was ‘no recourse for the free world . . . but to develop a security situation which Russia must respect, which it will not attack’.116 Thus, the rearmament of Western Europe was intended to deter an attack or advance by the Soviet Union. Once this goal had been achieved, the president claimed that it would be possible to negotiate on a practical basis the development of a plan of co-existence in the world. ‘With proper safeguards,’ he argued, ‘this could, and certainly should, be accompanied by a program of gradual disarmament.’117 More important, he believed a security union for Western Europe would provide the ‘position of strength’ needed to negotiate in earnest with the Soviets. As far as high-level talks with the Soviets were concerned, timing was of the essence. The road to achieving such a union was not a smooth one. The support of Britain and France was crucial. However, both countries

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were distracted by colonial concerns and domestic crises. Between 1952 and 1955, France witnessed a high degree of political instability, as government after government of the Fourth Republic collapsed within relatively short spaces of time. During this period six governments were established and, for various reasons, were subsequently overturned. The latter government formed in January 1955 and headed by Edgar Faure ended in March 1956. Moreover, France continued to experience difficulties in resisting the communist-led Vietminh forces in North Vietnam.118 In the spring of 1954, the French military position had deteriorated significantly; at Bien Dien Phu, a French unit was defeated, resulting in the deaths of approximately 100,000 men. This was a humiliating loss for France and led to the complete withdrawal of French troops from Vietnam. On 21 July, after three months of negotiation, French and Vietminh representatives signed a ceasefire agreement ending hostilities.119 Ratification of the EDC in France proved difficult for other reasons. The French Parliament refused to accept West German rearmament. Having suffered three invasions in 70 years, France opposed the rearmament of its neighbour.120 However, the US regarded West Germany’s inclusion in a security union as essential in strengthening European security. Yet the support of France was also critical given its large population and land mass. The French also resented Britain’s refusal to contribute military aid towards the community and thus sacrifice its sovereignty.121 Moreover, by August 1954, public support for the EDC had declined from 42 per cent in 1951 to 31 per cent, with 36 per cent opposed. An increasing number of French politicians preferred to negotiate with Moscow rather than facilitate the rearmament of the Germans.122 Britain was also having to come to terms with the disintegration of its empire and consequent loss of world power status. Nevertheless, Churchill recognised the importance of Britain playing a dominant role in European affairs.123 Moreover, his participation at summit talks was a way of improving his country’s standing in post-war global affairs. Churchill regarded a summit as a way of restoring Britain’s status in the world. ‘The final objective of Churchill’s life-long policies was,’ as Klaus Larres argues, ‘to increase the influence of his country or, at

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least, preserve it and avoid its further discrimination.’124 Inclusion at talks with the Soviets aimed at ending the Cold War would enhance Britain’s reputation, guaranteeing it a place at the top table alongside America and the Soviet Union. It would also enhance Churchill’s own prestige as a hero and only survivor of the ‘Big Three’. No doubt the end of the Second World War and the halcyon images of Potsdam continued to encourage his romantic, if misguided, view of Britain’s might in the world. As he stated in a letter to Eisenhower in April 1953, ‘there will . . . be a strong movement here for a meeting between the Heads of States and Government. How do you stand about this? In my opinion the best would be that the three victorious Powers, who separated at Potsdam, should come together again.’125 However, in the absence of the EDC, the president refused to entertain such requests, arguing that it was primarily a ‘growing and combined strength’ in the West that was responsible for a change in the Russian attitude.126 In August 1954, the French Assembly refused to ratify the EDC. Dulles and Anthony Eden set in motion the necessary steps to procuring an alternative, which was West Germany’s admission to NATO. The outcome of negotiations between Britain, the US, France, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and West Germany was the London and Paris Agreements, which were concluded in October 1954. These agreements led to the creation of the Western European Union (WEU), which replaced the EDC but without a supranational European army, and to the restoration of West German sovereignty and its admission to NATO. Eden also promised that Britain would maintain military forces in Europe, including four RAF squadrons in Germany.127 Like the EDC, the Paris Agreements required ratification by the signatory states and this was eventually achieved in the spring of 1955. On 11 April 1955, Churchill stepped down from office and was succeeded by his foreign secretary. By this time the Western European nations, including France, had ratified the Paris Agreements. The prospect of the West Germans entering NATO prompted the Soviets to initiate bilateral negotiations with the Austrians over the Austrian State Treaty. Talks resulted in a major concession on the part of the Soviet Union – that Austrian neutrality could be armed.128 The conclusion of the treaty was now possible. Reflecting on this breakthrough in Cold

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War relations, Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs: ‘This news brought considerable relief to the Western powers . . . and to most of the world it was interpreted as a deed auguring well for melting the Soviet ice that had frozen fruitful negotiations between East and West.’129 Faced with a general election at the end of May, Eden urged Eisenhower to agree to a meeting with the new Soviet leadership, believing such a step would improve his party’s prospects of re-election. While expressing surprise at Eden’s change of heart, Eisenhower did agree to consider his request.130 Following a foreign ministers’ conference in Paris, an invitation was made to the Soviet Union to attend summit talks, which the Soviets eagerly accepted on 26 May. Both the venue (Geneva) and the date (July) of the conference were finalised in mid-June. The New Look went beyond establishing military measures for confronting Soviet communism, and this represented a departure from the heavy reliance the Truman administration had placed on rearmament. Psychological warfare, covert operations, alliances and negotiations played important and enduring roles in US national security policy during Eisenhower’s years in office. Yet Eisenhower’s strategy was not aimed solely at dealing with the threats posed by communism. The New Look was intended to safeguard America’s economic health in the face of growing demands for higher defence budgets, the rapid technological advancements of weaponry in the nuclear age and continuing claims relating to Soviet force levels. At the root of Eisenhower’s approach was his recognition that an economically crippled country could not resist the communist onslaught, no matter how well armed it might be. The importance Eisenhower attached to America’s economic solvency should not be underestimated, and he deliberately and consciously framed his strategy around this central objective. His determination to reduce military expenditures and press ahead with implementing the New Look from the autumn of 1953 aroused the concerns and suspicions of his military staff. Their demands for larger defence budgets would intensify as the decade progressed. The military’s resistance to the New Look provided a background to anguished debates about US defence strategy. These debates were not confined to military circles. The Geneva summit would become the next test of Eisenhower’s

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defence strategy. Chapter Three will examine the background to the summit and the evolution of Open Skies. While many Americans pinned their hopes on a relaxation of tensions between the East and the West, there were others, both within and outside government circles, who were inclined to take a more jaundiced view of the Soviet Union. Refusing to believe that the Soviets would offer substantial concessions at the summit, these Cold Warriors aimed to prepare the US for the next phase of the East-West stand-off.

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CHAPTER THR EE EISENHOWER , ROCKEFELLER AND THE EVOLUTION OF OPEN SKIES

At a meeting of Congressional leaders held on 12 July 1955, President Eisenhower stated that it was important, from the outset, to convince world opinion that the US was going to the Geneva summit with the serious intention of making progress towards peace with the Soviet Union. ‘We agreed to hold the meeting,’ the president said, ‘but on terms that we should not seek answers but would seek new approaches towards the solution to our problems, perhaps thus infusing a new spirit.’1 This statement would seem to sum up Eisenhower’s overall expectations of summit talks. To be sure, he did not expect ‘a miracle’ at the meeting, though he wished, as he informed Winston Churchill, ‘to inch a little closer to the dream that has been yours for these many years’.2 As preparations for the summit got under way, Eisenhower remained conscious of opinion both at home and abroad. As Stephen Ambrose argues, ‘anticipation of the first summit conference since Yalta and Potsdam . . . added to a feeling of near-euphoria millions of Americans enjoyed in 1955’.3 If there was a risk of the Soviets turning the meeting into a ‘psychological world-wide victory’, the president had to be prepared to inform the American people very clearly about a lack of commitment on the part of the Russians towards seeking international

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peace.4 Concomitantly, he could not afford to let such a grand occasion end in failure. Talks that achieved token or insubstantial results or encouraged further acrimony between the US and the Soviet Union would have serious, indeed fatal, repercussions for Eisenhower’s defence strategy. A failure in negotiations on principal issues, such as disarmament, Germany and trade, would serve to underline the insincerity of the Soviets and undermine the president’s efforts to control military expenditures. As the first heads of government meeting since Potsdam drew closer, a plan emerged within the US government that had the potential to ease international tensions, break the ongoing impasse in disarmament negotiations and provide a solution to Eisenhower’s rising concerns about the growth of the military industry in America. This was the ‘Open Skies’ initiative, a system of mutual aerial inspection of US and Soviet armaments, including ground and air forces, military installations and production facilities.5 This proposal was formulated by a group of scholars, military and intelligence specialists, policy analysts and journalists. Led by Nelson Rockefeller, this group became known as the Quantico panel. Rockefeller became an avid supporter of Open Skies and during the weeks leading up to the summit he sought to persuade various members of the administration, including the president, of the merits of mutual aerial inspection, both as a credible inspection system linked to disarmament and, more importantly, as a way of testing the sincerity of the Soviets towards world peace. This chapter will examine the background to the Geneva summit and the evolution of Open Skies. The first part will assess the US government’s expectations of top-level talks and its perceptions of the economic and military situation of the Soviet Union. This analysis will show that while Eisenhower did not expect concrete results from his first meeting with the Soviet leadership, there was a willingness on the part of both the US and the Soviet Union to start the ball of negotiation rolling. It was against this background that Eisenhower proposed a system of mutual aerial inspection and the exchange of military blueprints. The second part of this chapter will review the work of the Quantico panel. In Open Skies – Eisenhower’s Proposal of July 21, 1955, Walt Rostow concentrates his analysis of the panel to a large extent

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on its role in the development of mutual aerial inspection. Granted, this idea was fundamental to the panel’s earlier deliberations but it was developed in the context of argument that America was losing its lead in the arms race with the Soviet Union, and an important theme running through the discussions at Quantico concerned America’s military and technological position in the Cold War. Thus, the report of June 1955 urged the government with its NATO allies to undertake ‘maximum efforts’ to prevent a Soviet three- to five-year lead in military technology by 1965.6 Like many of their generation and professional background, the panel members were staunch anticommunists who believed the Soviet Union posed a serious threat to American security. Consumed by fear of monolithic communism and America’s decline in the face of growing Soviet military strength, the Quantico group mounted a comprehensive critique of the administration’s defence policies, claiming that the psychological implications of the Soviet Union achieving a technological breakthrough over the US would be significant. A deeper analysis of the panel and the evolution of Open Skies also reveals that Eisenhower and Rockefeller held very different views concerning the value of this initiative. These differences reflected their disparate attitudes towards Soviet communism and the waging of the Cold War. This chapter will conclude with an examination of the principal outcomes of the Geneva summit. The Soviet Union had welcomed the agreements reached at the Geneva conference of July 1954 in respect of Indochina. These agreements had, albeit temporarily, put an end to hostilities in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. France undertook to withdraw its forces from the whole of Indochina, and international commissions for the supervision and implementation of the agreements were set up. The agreements also prohibited the introduction of fresh foreign troops, military personnel, armaments and munitions, and the building of foreign military bases in all the Indochina states. Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos agreed to refrain from joining any military alliances or blocs.7 The Soviets considered the decisions taken at Geneva to be ‘of great significance’. Moreover, they argued that the agreements had created favourable conditions for the settlement of other areas of outstanding international unease, such as the arms race, the banning of atomic

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weapons and the ‘organizing [of] collective security in Europe’.8 A statement issued by the Soviet Union thus declared: The results of the Geneva conference confirm the conviction of the Soviet government that there are no international differences at the present time that could not be settled through negotiations and agreements designed to strengthen international security, to weaken international tension and to secure the peaceful co-existence of states, irrespective of their social systems.9 Less than 12 months after the Geneva conference of July 1954 the Soviet Union had signed a treaty with Austria which committed the country to permanent neutrality. Austria could not participate in military alliances or allow foreign military bases to be established on its territory. Senior figures within the Soviet government considered the settlement of the Austrian question as ‘another notable result of the steps that were being taken by the Soviet Union to relax international tensions’. The Austrian State Treaty was evidence of the ‘extensive opportunities’ for resolving international problems by negotiation.10 Following a foreign ministers’ meeting of May 1955 the Soviet government declared itself in favour of a summit and contended that such a meeting should have ‘no definite agenda’. This approach, Molotov argued, would enable the heads of government to bring up any issue they believed should be discussed. For their part, the Soviets were interested in discussing collective security in Europe, arms reduction measures and the banning of nuclear weapons.11 While the Soviet enthusiasm for summit talks cannot be doubted, questions may be raised as to their motives. Did they genuinely seek peace or did the growing thaw in East-West relations merely provide a ‘breathing spell’ while they took stock of the rearmament of West Germany and sought to resolve a range of internal problems besetting the Soviet Union? The US government deliberated such matters at length during the weeks leading up to the summit. An indication of the Soviet Union’s economic situation was made available during the spring of 1955 when the US government received reports from Charles Bohlen, US ambassador to Moscow, which claimed that the Soviets

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were seeking a relaxation in world tensions because the burden of modern armaments was proving too much for an ‘already overstrained Soviet economy’. Bohlen counselled that the US could approach talks with a ‘great advantage on [its] side faced with an adversary considerably less sure of himself than in the past’. He urged the government not to give the Soviets the impression that ‘all the future roads are blocked and that all the doors are locked’.12 Moreover, at a meeting between Dulles, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany, Livingston Merchant, assistant secretary of state for European affairs, and Herbert Blankenhorn, permanent representative on the North Atlantic Council in June 1955, it was noted that agricultural production in the Soviet Union was failing and living standards had not improved as expected. The Eastern European satellite countries, having been ‘squeezed and exploited’, were now thought to be economic liabilities rather than assets, prompting Dulles to argue that a ‘rollback’ of Soviet power in Eastern Europe was possible. Adenauer agreed that the difficulties the Russians faced could now force them to reach agreements with the West, and a summit could thus offer genuine opportunities for tackling key areas of world tension.13 Notwithstanding such difficulties, the Soviets were eager to project an image of a stable and powerful Russia. Thus, at a reception of US Embassy officials in Moscow during early July 1955, Nikita Khrushchev claimed the Soviet economy was performing successfully and warned his guests that they would be quite wrong to think that they would be negotiating with a Soviet Union ‘with its legs broken’.14 That Russia’s internal problems imposed a degree of caution on the direction of foreign policy cannot be ruled out. In February 1955, Nikolai Bulganin replaced Malenkov as chairman of the Council of Ministers and Khrushchev became first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He also took Malenkov’s important post of chairman of the Presidium. This change of leadership was relatively trouble-free, but to Western eyes it could signify political instability within the Soviet Union. In the short term, however, the downfall of Malenkov enabled Khrushchev to consolidate his hold on power.15 Despite adopting in the wake of Stalin’s death a hard-line approach

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towards the West, he began to advocate after February 1955 a conciliatory line in favour of ‘peaceful co-existence’ with the West.16 Privately, Khrushchev had not been enamoured of Stalin’s foreign policy. Years later he claimed that the Berlin blockade had been a mistake. The late Soviet leader had launched this effort, Khrushchev argued, ‘without gauging our possibilities realistically. He didn’t think it through properly.’17 Khrushchev even believed that the strengthening of Western European unity was the result of Soviet miscalculation. Stalin and Molotov had prevaricated on issues relating to German reunification and Austrian neutrality, thereby allowing the West to progress with the rearmament of Germany.18 Like Malenkov, the new Soviet secretary also recognised that a relaxation of tensions was necessary in order to allow the regime to devote more attention to the production of consumer goods.19 More important, Khrushchev’s elevation meant that he was able to exercise immense influence over Soviet foreign policy, placing limits on Molotov’s more uncompromising attitude towards the West. Not all US officials, however, appreciated this difference.20 The Soviet leaders also knew that their country was inferior to the US in the number and quality of nuclear weapons and in the means of delivering them. According to a joint estimate produced by the State Department and the CIA in July 1953, the West would retain ‘a substantial absolute advantage in capabilities for atomic warfare . . . for the next fifteen years’.21 Attempts to catch up with the US, to achieve nuclear parity, were vigorously pursued but the Soviets could not maintain the pace. They turned increasingly to the developing world to establish diplomatic and economic ties. The signing and ratification of the Paris Agreements was regarded by many ‘as a fresh aggravation’ of tension in Europe.22 Nevertheless, the new Soviet leaders had no reason to suppose that the West was planning an armed attack on the East. It was against this background that they announced on 10 May 1955, at the UN Disarmament Commission, revised proposals for disarmament. These proposals called for a two-stage plan that did not insist on an outright ban on the production of nuclear weapons until commencement of the second stage of the disarmament process, by which time

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the signatory countries would have been required to reduce their conventional armaments by 50 per cent. The Soviets also agreed to the establishment of an international arms control authority that would oversee reductions in the level of conventional forces of the US, the Soviet Union and China, and substantial reductions in the case of Britain and France. A self-prohibition clause on the use of nuclear weapons during the first stage, except in the case of authorisation by the UN Security Council, effectively put this measure in place at the earlier stage of the disarmament process, a position upon which the Soviet Union had always insisted.23 Soviet proposals did not provide for aerial surveys, only ground inspections to ensure compliance. This arrangement, as Eisenhower explained to Khrushchev at Geneva, had already proved unworkable during the Korean armistice negotiations. A tripartite working group comprising representatives of Britain, the US and France pointed out that the Western powers could thus explore the Soviet Union’s sincerity in accepting ‘an effective system of inspection and control’ of armaments.24 While Soviet proposals did not by any means eliminate the differences that had existed between America and the Soviet Union since 1946, they certainly helped, as J.P. Morray has argued, to narrow the gap between the positions taken by each country in the field of disarmament.25 In 1952, talks at the UN Disarmament Commission had reached a standstill as fundamental differences persisted between the two blocs over the problem of inspection and control. John Foster Dulles was encouraged by the Soviet Union’s latest disarmament proposals. At a NSC meeting in May 1955, he stated that the issue of ‘disarmament needed to be pushed on’.26 The development of US plans was already under way. Led by the newly appointed special assistant to the president for disarmament, Harold Stassen, the government completed in June 1955 a comprehensive draft review of disarmament and inspection. These measures proposed a freeze by all nations on the production of arms, along with a requirement to disclose details of their existing armaments and submit these to independent verification. This stage of the disarmament process, based on earlier proposals to the UN Disarmament Commission, involved both aerial and ground inspection. Stassen’s report emphasised the

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‘absolute necessity of effective inspection in any treaty, the role of aerial inspection and of scientific instruments and photography in such a system’.27 This measure, which would be given further clarity by Nelson Rockefeller and the Quantico panel, laid the basis for Open Skies. Many officials were sceptical, believing a ‘freeze’ on the production of nuclear weapons would effectively safeguard US superiority. This scenario, the Defense Department and JCS warned, would hardly be welcomed by the Soviets when they themselves had only recently announced a willingness to commit to a substantial reduction in their conventional forces.28 In a meeting with Stassen on 20 May 1955, Dulles was particularly critical, arguing that the Soviets would never accept such a state of affairs.29 New proposals for reducing armaments, though prompting renewed efforts at negotiation, risked resurrecting Soviet mistrust of Western objectives. From 1953 to early 1955, Eisenhower had consistently taken the line that ‘fruitful negotiations’ with the Soviet Union would not be possible until a security union for Western Europe had been achieved. By the early spring of 1955, all the signatory countries had ratified the Paris Agreements (see Chapter Two). But what did the president expect to achieve at the summit? Did he believe the Soviets would co-operate in seeking peace? Eisenhower adopted an overall cautious approach towards summit talks. Both he and Dulles were in agreement that such a meeting should be of an exploratory nature only.30 Thus, the heads of government would agree on the main areas of international tension, leaving responsibility for the development of appropriate solutions to their foreign ministers, the United Nations and related working groups. There was nothing particularly novel about this approach. Winston Churchill once commented that during the Second World War all ‘principal meetings’ had been attended by heads of government representatives and their foreign ministers. The latter were expected to do the work leaving the former to express the mood.31 During a news conference of 31 May 1955, Eisenhower stated: I think I have explained a number of times that our conception of a Big Four conference will be, let us say, a testing of temperaments or atmosphere, a discussion of problems in general, and an

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attempt to determine methods and procedures that might work in the attempt to solve specific problems.32 Eisenhower’s caution may be linked to the ‘passionate eagerness’ that some European countries were displaying towards a meeting of the big four. At foreign ministers’ meetings held during early May 1955, British, French and West German representatives were inclined to believe that such a parley could ‘produce some kind of miracle’.33 It is also possible that Eisenhower continued not to trust the position of the Soviets generally. According to the Under-Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover Jr, the president had once remarked that Soviet moves, such as the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, were merely a shift in tactics and did not represent a fundamental change in communist motives or objectives.34 Nevertheless, at a NSC meeting on 7 July 1955, amid early preparations for the Geneva summit, Eisenhower argued that while he and Dulles were ‘not so naïve as to think that the Soviets [had] suddenly changed from devils to angels’, they were not prepared to enter into face-to-face talks with the Russians on the basis of refusing to recognise any change in Soviet policy.35 In support of this line, Treasury Secretary George Humphrey observed that if the US delegation could not go to talks with open minds then ‘they might as well stay home’.36 It is clear, therefore, that Eisenhower did not expect any miracles at his first meeting with the Soviet leadership. But he knew he had to negotiate with them. His defence strategy depended on it. At the back of Eisenhower’s mind was the burden of the arms race. As he stated at a press conference in March 1955: The massive resources required for modern armaments, the huge diversion of materials and of energy, the heavy burdens of taxation, the demands for years of service of vast numbers of men, the unprecedented destructive power of new weapons and the international tensions which powerful armaments aggravate, have been of deep concern to me for many years.37 Eisenhower had already been alerted to the problems the Soviet economy was experiencing. He did not want the US to face the same

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difficulties as a result of uncontrolled military expenditures. It was for this reason he supported Open Skies. Not all officials, however, were prepared to approach the summit ‘with hope, and not with false expectations’.38 Nelson Rockefeller believed negotiation with the Soviet Union would weaken America’s overall position in the arms race. Extant literature on the Quantico panel focuses on the group’s role in formulating Open Skies.39 To be sure, this initiative was a significant aspect of the panel’s work but from the outset the group was intent on developing a wider remit. The panel made an important contribution in challenging government defence policy and in doing so it provided a fresh round of ‘war scares’. The panel recommended a substantial build-up of armaments so that the US was able to maintain its military and technological lead over the Soviet Union. The discussion below will reappraise the role of the panel in light of the demands it tried to make on the Eisenhower administration for substantial increases in military expenditures and economic aid programmes around the world. This analysis will be preceded by a brief background on Rockefeller’s appointment as special assistant to President Eisenhower and the formation of the Quantico panel. In November 1954, Rockefeller was appointed to the post of special assistant to the president for psychological warfare. Although woolly in its description, the role was essentially concerned with winning hearts and minds in the Cold War without fighting a hot one. Rockefeller’s predecessor, C.D. Jackson, had taken an active line in disseminating propaganda, particularly radio broadcasts. In April 1953, he had arranged for Eisenhower’s Chance for Peace speech to be broadcast hourly on every Radio Free Europe channel.40 He also oversaw the distribution of some 3 million copies of this speech across Europe, Latin America and India. Rockefeller was very enthusiastic about his appointment. The requirement to develop ‘co-ordinated plans and preparations for non-military warfare’ reflected his view that the Cold War had to be fought on many fronts, not all of them military. Thus, he argued in a report to President Truman in 1950, ‘defense, in and of itself, is not enough . . . there must be a positive force as well’.41 In March 1955, the Planning Co-ordination Group (PCG) was formed to assist with the development of both overt and covert national

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security programmes. This arrangement required close liaison with the CIA and the formulation of the agency’s major operations. Rockefeller was appointed chairman of this group and in early May 1955 he agreed to undertake a major study on the assessment of Soviet vulnerabilities. He was assisted by William Kintner, a former US Army colonel whose background was in military intelligence. Before joining the NSC planning board, Kintner had worked for the CIA between 1950 and 1952 as chief planner of covert operations. Rockefeller’s team was also joined by Brigadier General Theodore (Ted) Parker who, immediately prior to his appointment to the PCG, had been on active military duty with a particularly sensitive assignment – that of overseeing the deployment of Nike anti-aircraft missiles in North America. Not wishing to leave this prestigious command position, he was, however, finally persuaded to become the PCG’s chief of staff. A few weeks later, following the Soviet Union’s acceptance of an invitation from the West to attend the summit scheduled for July, Parker suggested to Rockefeller the formation of a panel comprising ‘outstanding experts . . . to devise an overall conference plan’. In a memorandum setting out his proposal in detail, Parker argued that recent concessions on the part of the Soviet Union to ‘prove’ its peaceful intentions were superficial. ‘The Soviet leadership,’ he continued, ‘[was] riding full steam ahead on its program to attain parity in the nuclear-air delivery field,’ a tactic that would in the next few years allow the Soviets to become ‘a much stronger military protagonist in much better control of [their] domestic situation.’ Parker also counselled that the Soviet Union would come to conferences with ‘many vulnerabilities’, and the Geneva summit should set in motion the guidelines for exposing and exploiting these vulnerabilities.42 These themes would remain central to the panel that Parker and Rockefeller subsequently formed. Rockefeller was attracted to Parker’s suggestion for a number of reasons. It provided a degree of variety and challenge to his work, facets that suited his personality and the boundless energy he would often display towards his pet projects.43 The panel would also assist Rockefeller to progress his PCG work. More important, it presented him with the opportunity to preside over the development of foreign

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policy outside his remit and, in turn, assert his views in this field. With the forthcoming summit, his timing was perfect. Indeed, by the time the letters of invitation had been sent to the panel members, it was clearly the summit that Rockefeller was contemplating. As he stated in a draft of his letter to Walt Rostow, ‘the anticipated meeting of the Big Four powers makes this an opportune time to seek the benefit of your thinking’.44 There was, however, opposition to the formation of the Quantico panel, as it became known. According to C.D. Jackson, various members of the State Department, including Bob Bowie, director of the policy planning staff, and Herbert Hoover, tried to stop the meetings from going ahead. As a result, they got off to a ‘gloomy start’.45 John Foster Dulles was also uneasy about Rockefeller’s latest venture and urged the president to get his special assistant to clarify the purpose of the group. He resented Rockefeller’s propensity to interfere in foreign affairs. Complaining to Sherman Adams, Dulles noted that Rockefeller seemed ‘to be building up a big staff . . . he’s got them down there at Quantico and nobody knows what they’re doing’.46 However, after giving the president and the secretary of state assurances that the proposed panel had nothing to do with the summit and was concerned only with progressing PCG activity, Rockefeller finally got Eisenhower’s approval and the panel was convened on 5 June 1955. At Rockefeller’s request, Rostow chaired the meetings. C.D. Jackson was a member of the panel and, according to his account of the formation of the group and events leading up to the Geneva summit, was influential in guiding its members through the course of their deliberations.47 The group comprised the following: Frederick Dunn, Director, CENIS; Walt Rostow, CENIS; Ellis A. Johnson, Director, Operations Research Office; Max Millikan, CENIS; Philip Mosely, Director, Russian Institute; George Pettee, Deputy Director, Operations Research Office; Stefan Possony, Air Intelligence Specialist; Hans Speier, RAND Corporation; Paul Linebarger, School of Advanced International Studies and Charles A.H. Thomson, Brookings Institution. When interviewed at a later date by Hugh Morrow, Rockefeller’s former press officer, Rockefeller claimed that Parker had been largely responsible for the selection of panel

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members.48 Rockefeller subsequently approved the shortlist, believing that Parker’s choice comprised ‘outstanding experts in significant areas’.49 The final choice included a cross-section of individuals whose professional background had connections with the advancement of the military industry in America. Military and technical expertise was provided in a range of reports prepared by Pettee, Possony and Johnson. The remainder of the panel, based in their respective academic institutions and foundations, had devoted many years to the study of the Soviet Union and communism. The group bore, in many respects, striking similarities to the Committee on the Present Danger. Each member of the panel took responsibility for producing a particular section of the final report, and they met on a daily basis as a group to discuss one another’s work. The group drew on a range of technical studies that had been prepared for its daily sessions. Panel members also had clearance to reports of the Defense Department and other agencies concerned with national security. Meetings were also held with officials from the Defense and State Departments, the CIA and United States Information Agency (USIA), many of whom offered their advice on specific areas such as Germany, disarmament and European security. After the first day of meetings, Rockefeller returned to Washington but he kept in close contact with Rostow and Parker throughout the remainder of the week, returning to Quantico with Jackson on 9 June for the panel’s final presentation. Harold Stassen, Andrew Goodpaster, staff secretary at the White House, and Allen Dulles, director of the CIA (DCI), also attended this session. Dulles was correct to feel misled over Rockefeller’s actions. According to C.D. Jackson’s account, Rockefeller and Rostow had, from the very start, steered the panel’s discussions towards Geneva and, by the start of the third day, a series of proposals intended for the summit was taking shape.50 By the end of the week the panel produced a summary of its findings entitled, ‘Report of the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel’, which provided the government with a comprehensive set of proposals for the handling of the Soviet Union at the forthcoming summit. It was also clear that the panel was not prepared to give the Soviets very much in the way of the benefit of the doubt, notwithstanding their recent peace moves. A number of events were called to

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mind; the US atomic monopoly had been broken, the Korean War had ended in virtual stalemate and in August 1953 the Soviet Union had exploded a hydrogen device. More worryingly, the Soviets were also starting to show an unhealthy interest in the developing world. Thus, it was noted that the Soviet Union was closing the gap in economic competition with the US and progress here had enabled the Soviets to solve their own trade problems at the expense of Western efforts. As Rostow claimed, ‘the Soviets have had a considerable measure of success in their effort to associate themselves with the aspirations of such nations as India and Burma’, assisted by a lack of US policy in this area over the past five years.51 These issues would remain central to the Quantico panel. The panel’s final report contained a number of recommendations pertaining to the Geneva summit. These covered a broad spectrum of foreign policy issues, ranging from the abolition of the Berlin toll blockade, the free interchange of persons and information between the US and the Soviet Union, the promotion of increased trade links between the East and West, free elections in Germany, further exploration of peaceful uses of atomic energy and, of course, disarmament and aerial inspection. There was nothing particularly novel about these proposals. Most, in some form or another, whether through the foreign ministers’ meetings, the tripartite sessions established at the beginning of 1955 between Britain, France and the US, or the NSC, were already under consideration by the White House. Even Stassen’s work was pushing the administration to seek a ‘workable, satisfactory inspection method’.52 What did represent a departure from Eisenhower’s thinking, however, was the rationale adopted by the panel. It is clear from the minutes of the various meetings held between 5 and 10 June that the group had serious misgivings about the Soviet Union’s growing military strength and, as it was inclined to believe, the relative decline of America. The panel exhibited doubts about the Soviet Union’s interest in détente, arguing that their recent actions were merely a clever design to buy time, to weaken Western alliances and ‘to build up a future position of greater strength based on atomic parity with the US, from which

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a more effective political offensive might be launched’.53 Thus, the panel’s report of June 1955 claimed: Because of the character of the arms race and the nature of our enemy, we run the risk of his achieving a technical break-through which would give him an advantage he would be prepared to exploit by initiating an attack on the US . . . we must continue to hold the military balance of power in our favor.54 This assertion is particularly telling. Despite recent actions on the part of the Soviet Union, which had contributed towards an improvement in relations between the West and the Eastern bloc, distrust of Moscow remained entrenched. The panel believed the Soviet Union was capable of launching a surprise attack against America. This situation was possible once the Soviets had caught up with and surpassed US technological and military strength.55 By June 1955, concern was growing that the Soviets were on the brink of achieving this feat. This view was given credence by a study undertaken by Ellis Johnson on US and Soviet technical and military capabilities entitled ‘The Comparative Military Technology of the US and the USSR’. This study outlined the ‘leads’ and ‘lags’ as of the mid-1940s and mid-1950s for types of aircraft, ordnance, tanks, electronics and the number of scientific and technical personnel. Overall, the study purported to demonstrate a significant narrowing of Soviet lags, where they had existed, and the considerable post-war build-up of highly trained Soviet scientists and engineers.56 As Rostow later argued: ‘Johnson’s exposition impressed us with the notion that the US enjoyed, as of mid-1955, a net military advantage that was narrowing and would prove transient if current trends continued.’57 Johnson’s report claimed that with regard to the scientific and technological development of certain jet aircraft and bombers, the US lagged behind the Soviet Union by approximately three and a half to five years, depending on the type and specific quality of aircraft. The report also argued that the Soviets had now caught up with the US heavy bomber force.58 In making these assertions, the panel was, in effect, perpetuating distortions about Soviet capabilities. Concerns

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about a ‘bomber gap’ had been apparent in Washington in 1955. In May, the Department of Defense issued an official release stating: The Soviets have recently elected to expose some new aircraft developments in air parade formation over Moscow. These observations establish a new basis for our estimate of Soviet production of the heavy jet bomber and . . . the medium bomber . . . this knowledge is evidence of the modern technology of the Soviet aircraft industry and advances which are being made to them.59 The group claimed that the Soviets were ahead of the US in the development and operational capabilities of aircraft.60 Such claims were bogus, however. According to a report entitled United States Defense Policies 1957, the US had held clear superiority in 1955 in the capability to deliver nuclear weapons over long distances; the B-36 long-range heavy bomber, a few hundred of which were still in the Science Advisory Committee (SAC) inventory, was capable of carrying a 10,000-pound bomb load at a distance of some 10,000 nautical miles. Added to the B-36 was the new B-47 medium bomber, then being delivered in substantial numbers to SAC. In contrast, Soviet aircraft in operation in 1955 were still largely based on the ageing TU-4, whose low speed and payloads rendered this type of aircraft a ‘low grade’ threat. The Soviet government had commissioned the development of new high performance strategic jet bombers, the TU-95 and the Miasishchev M-4 turbojet heavy bombers. However, in the mid-1950s none of these aircraft were operational.61 In mid-1955, however, the panel held contrary views regarding America’s relative strength in the world. Accordingly, its members argued that the US would play into the hands of the Soviet Union if it approached the summit with the primary intention of easing EastWest relations. There was a real risk that America would slacken its lead in the arms race, a belief made all the more credible by recent cuts in military expenditures. The Soviets on the other hand would buy the time they needed to achieve nuclear parity, resolve their agricultural difficulties and build up their economic strength. As Rostow argued in a letter to Rockefeller of 10 June 1955, ‘the one impression which stands out in my mind is the unanimous belief of the Panel members

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that the US now enjoys a significant but transitory period of overall strength vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc.’62 Consequently all possible efforts had to be made to ensure that the US continued to hold the military balance of power in its favour. This was the ethos that drove Nelson Rockefeller and the Quantico panel. It influenced the development of the panel’s proposals for the handling of the Soviet Union at Geneva and its views about America’s future position in the world order. The proposals that emerged had been based on a strategy aimed at testing Soviet intentions and their desire for a relaxation in world tensions. This idea had come about following a letter Rockefeller had received (via Dillon Anderson) from Joseph E. Johnson, director of the Carnegie Institute for Peace, towards the end of May 1955. Johnson suggested that, ‘it might be possible to plan a whole system of carefully phrased questions designed to try to expose true Russian attitudes on major issues.’ Such questions, Johnson continued, could be asked not only by the president and Dulles in formal settings but also by other members of staff in more or less casual conversations and during social events. ‘I have in mind,’ he concluded, ‘the way someone like Reston keeps asking questions in different ways of different people and is therefore enabled to build up a pretty accurate picture.’63 Rockefeller was clearly taken with this idea, describing it in his response to Johnson as a ‘most ingenious suggestion’ and one that he was studying with a view to its immediate implementation.64 Rockefeller had been keen to meet Johnson to discuss his thoughts in further detail. However, commitments on the part of the latter meant that this discussion did not take place until mid-July. Nevertheless, Johnson’s suggestion clearly impacted on the panel’s deliberations. According to the panel’s report, the various proposals made had been based on a ‘continuum of acceptability’, each one sincere but representing ‘a spectrum of degree of difficulty for the Soviet Union to accept unless its intentions were, indeed, pacific’. Thus, it was expected that the Soviets would respond favourably to proposals for expanded trade and increased cultural East-West contact but there was no guarantee that they would make concessions on issues relating to Germany and disarmament.65 The panel took this approach a stage further: at its session on 8 June, the group agreed to apply two approaches to test the Soviet Union’s

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desire for peace. First, the US should make proposals at Geneva which the Soviet Union was not likely to accept ‘so as to test their upper limit’, and second, ‘reasonable proposals’ should also be made ‘to get as much as [the US] can’.66 As Rostow later claimed, if it was subsequently established at the summit that the Soviet Union was ‘interested in co-operation only at the lower range, that fact should be a signal for a much more energetic US military and foreign policy’.67 In early June 1955, that signal had already been made. While the panel made various proposals and gestures ostensibly aimed at building bridges with the Soviets, Rockefeller and his team also called for a substantial build-up in Western defences. In a report prepared by Johnson, ‘Air Defense of the United States and Western Europe’, improved air defence systems for NATO, including medium-range bombers and ground-to-ground missiles, were demanded. Soviet rejection of ‘high level’ proposals would provide justification for this build-up and America’s position in the meantime would not be harmed.68 It was clear, therefore, that the panel was not interested in improving relations with the Soviets and of finding ways to end the Cold War. As far as these ‘specialists on violence’ were concerned, the Geneva summit was about safeguarding America’s technological and military lead in the Cold War – in short maintaining a situation of perpetual preparation for war. Measures relating to disarmament were treated with caution. Thus, in promoting a plan for gradual disarmament, the panel also argued for the retention of immediately usable nuclear weapons, a fully fledged air defence system using ground-to-air systems, and naval forces to defend against submarines and mines.69 This analysis begs the question why, when the panel was concerned primarily with maintaining America’s lead in the Cold War, its leader, Nelson Rockefeller, promoted Open Skies with considerable alacrity? Surely the president’s ‘dramatic peace intervention’ was in contradiction with the panel’s ethos? Both Eisenhower and Rockefeller were strong supporters of Open Skies. Both recognised the significant intelligence opportunities that mutual aerial inspection and the exchange of military blueprints would yield. But that is where the comparison ends. As will be shown below, the president and his special assistant held very different views about the value of Open Skies.

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Rockefeller’s support for this initiative can be traced to his vision for America in the post-second-world-war climate. Eisenhower once said, ‘Nelson is too used to borrowing brains instead of using his own.’70 There is merit in this statement. A lot of ‘his’ ideas were provided by others, mutual aerial inspection being a prime example. Even the seeds of the Special Studies Project had been sown by someone else. In November 1955, Bill Elliott, director of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), wrote to Rockefeller to suggest the formation of a national group whose membership was selected not necessarily by the president but by ‘some foundation’, which would allow its members to ‘rise above politics’.71 Moreover, a great many of the ideas Rockefeller adopted were generated via meetings and discussions. As Cary Reich has argued: Interminable brain storming sessions – the sort of intellectual sparring matches that most other men of action shunned like the plague – were, for Rockefeller, sources of endless stimulation and sustenance. What other men derived from reading, Rockefeller, with his dyslexia and his impatience with the written word, derived from discussion.72 He clearly was impatient with the written word. A review of various papers held at the Rockefeller Archives Center will leave the researcher at times frustrated since there is little material that was penned entirely by Rockefeller. The reports of the Quantico panel and those of other groups he subsequently established were drafted by others. The reports and substantive memoranda that do bear his signature were usually based on drafts put together by his staff, although he would always check documents before they were despatched. Rockefeller was not a reflective individual; he never maintained a diary or other journal, nor did he produce any memoirs. Indeed little exists in the form of records of meetings or conversations, and where they do, these are usually ad hoc notes or observations. Within the Special Assistant Series held at the archives, only one composite set of notes drafted by Rockefeller exists, namely the third Quantico panel meeting held in May 1956. Rockefeller was no intellectual and initiating ideas was not his forte.

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However, the researcher can benefit from a number of oral history interviews carried out in 1977. In these interviews Rockefeller provided, as the discussion below will show, his very candid but edifying views on the Cold War, the various presidents for whom he worked and the approach he believed America should have adopted towards Moscow. What these interviews also demonstrate, together with a number of his speeches and the records and memoirs of those who knew him well, was that Rockefeller held very strong and elevated beliefs about his country and the role it should play on the world stage. Like many of his generation and party, Rockefeller was, as Reich has argued, ‘militantly and stridently anti-communist’ to the extent that ‘his rhetoric made not only John F. Kennedy but Richard Nixon seem like mushy peaceniks in comparison’.73 Despite his extremely wealthy background, Rockefeller was not interested in a life of ease and the international ‘jet set’. Instead, he took his business ventures and politics seriously and from the earliest days of his career in government he developed, according to Frank Gervasi, ‘a deep concern with the destiny of his country – and his party’. Writing in the early 1960s, Gervasi went on to argue: What [Rockefeller] believes most is that America has not achieved its full potential in economic growth, prosperity and social well-being. He looks upon his country as a somnolent giant which must be roused to greater efforts to eliminate unemployment, modernise cities, wipe out bigotry and expand the area of peace between peoples at home and abroad.74 These beliefs influenced Rockefeller’s attitude towards the Cold War and the Soviet Union. Thus, the stance he took during 1955 and beyond reflected his concerns that if the administration did not improve the nation’s retaliatory forces and take an active line in the developing world, America would leave itself vulnerable to a surprise nuclear attack or, at the very least, the strengthening of communist influence in various former colonial powers. In a letter to Eisenhower of 5 December 1955 concerning his report, ‘Action Program for Free World Strength’, Rockefeller referred to the financially healthy position of the

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US, where not only had a balanced budget been achieved but surplus cash revenues of approximately $3 billion were expected. He argued, ‘never had the US been in a stronger position to lead the free world in the inventive and decisive programs essential to its strength’.75 From as early as 1955, Rockefeller believed America needed an integrated national strategy within which long-term military, economic, technological and ideological programmes could be developed and financed.76 It was this belief that inspired him to reconvene the Quantico panel in August 1955. He was clearly of the view that the scope of this work should go beyond the bounds of psychological warfare. Though his ideas may have seemed lofty and airy to some, they were entirely compatible with his vision of America as ‘the leading humanitarian, economic and military nation of the world . . . playing the dominant role of leadership’.77 However, his actions would later drive a wedge between him and Eisenhower and the Republican Party. Later in life he did not hold back in expressing what he regarded as the principal deficiencies of the Eisenhower administration: Here we were at the peak of American power and prestige in the world and [Eisenhower] symbolized this power because of his military achievements. Instead of following the concepts which Roosevelt tried to create in the United Nations and in an approach to a world structure of some kind with US leadership, we really went through a period of eight years of steady withdrawal from the world scene except for the Marshall Plan which built up the economies of Europe and Japan.78 The lack of ‘an overall, long range conceptual plan of the US role in the world’ was, as Rockefeller argued, ‘a tremendous opportunity lost and in my opinion this was tragic’. America’s ‘slow retreat’ from the world stage facilitated, in Rockefeller’s view, the Soviet military build-up and the US falling behind in the arms race, which was not helped either by the conservative fiscal policies exercised by George Humphrey.79 In spite of his staunch support for the Republican Party, but true to his underlying beliefs, Rockefeller considered President Truman one of America’s ‘better presidents . . . a strong, decisive leader’, and one

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who, in spite of his lack of experience, ‘was extraordinary’. In making this judgement, Rockefeller cited achievements such as the Marshall Plan and Point IV and thus Truman’s willingness to employ powerful economic tools at America’s disposal to rebuild Europe and Japan. In doing so the US had managed to halt the spread of communism and enhance American influence in these areas of the world.80 Rockefeller always believed the US could and should have continued such activity beyond Europe in order to consolidate America’s influence in Asia and the Far East. Rockefeller viewed summitry and diplomacy with cynicism, not least because such measures did not alter the Soviet Union’s basic position and ambitions in the world order. As he argued at one session of the second Quantico panel in August 1955, the drawing up of a ‘list of deeds’ for the purpose of easing tensions could quite possibly allow the Soviets to ‘fulfil these deeds without having made any concessions which altered their basic strength’.81 Rockefeller’s line on disarmament was no less accommodating. He believed a reduction in US forces would do damage abroad, not least by prompting a desire on the part of the Soviets to consider general war if they knew there was a possibility of achieving quick success without damage to the USSR. As Reich has argued, Rockefeller ‘was against disarmament, against nuclear test ban treaties. In the late 1950s, he made America’s defense inadequacies a national cause celebre, fomenting talk of a supposed missile gap. In the early 1960s, he was a prime instigator of the country’s fallout shelter mania.’82 Rockefeller maintained a deep-rooted fear that the Soviets would achieve a technological breakthrough in the Cold War, which they would use to their advantage either by initiating an attack on the US or by employing large-scale atomic blackmail against the US and its allies. Rockefeller’s support for Open Skies may at first appear complex. However, when taking account of his views on the US and the Cold War, it is clear that this idea was neither abstract nor paradoxical. In developing mutual aerial inspection, the panel had applied the same ‘continuum of acceptability’ test as it had to the rest of the proposals made. Thus, the report stated, ‘it is not at all inconceivable that [the Soviets] would accept some form of inspection system, although

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we would probably have to insist on a system unacceptable to them’. As the report continued to note, it was ‘almost certain that they will reject the free overflight proposal’.83 However, there is evidence that Rockefeller genuinely supported the idea, and propaganda considerations were not paramount. At the opening session of the second Quantico panel on 23 August 1955, he claimed mutual inspection ‘was a genuine proposal which we were and are completely willing to execute and which was, at the same time, attuned to the hopes and aspirations of people everywhere’.84 It should be noted that the panel’s proposal carried no provision for arms limitation. Rockefeller’s intentions were also clear from a conversation held with Arthur Radford on 18 July 1955, wherein the latter had expressed his support for mutual inspection ‘without any concurrent attempt to limit or reduce force or arms levels’. Both men agreed that such a system would ‘give the US a decided intelligence advantage’, and it was this factor that drove Rockefeller’s interest in Open Skies.85 As with the rest of the panel, Rockefeller did not expect the Soviet Union to accept the idea, in which case the tide of world opinion would rest with the US. However, if, by some miracle, the Soviets did accept it the US would gain highly significant information on Soviet military capabilities, not for the purposes of reducing arms or relaxing tensions but as a tool to enable America to maintain its lead in the Cold War. Taking Rockefeller’s logic to its conclusion, Nikolai Bulganin was probably correct when he argued that aerial inspection would result in a further intensification of the arms race. ‘Judge for yourself Mr. President: what would the military leaders of your country do if it were reported to them that the aerophotography showed that your neighbor had more airfields?’ the Soviet chairman prophesied in September 1955. ‘To be sure,’ he continued, ‘they would order an immediate increase in the number of their own airfields. Naturally, our military leaders would do the same in a similar case.’86 Rockefeller’s support for Open Skies was based, therefore, on the opportunities it afforded the US in maintaining a strategic and military edge over the Soviet Union. As such, it was central to the Quantico panel’s ethos. In practice, however, his approach to mutual aerial inspection had the potential to encourage the proliferation of arms

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and expansion of the military-industrial complex in America. This was the very situation that Eisenhower wished to avoid. As Chapter Two has shown, the president welcomed aerial inspection for very different reasons. He regarded this initiative as a means of obtaining valuable intelligence on Soviet capabilities that would help suppress demands for a military build-up in the US. Furthermore, Eisenhower believed a reduction in arms was possible once a system of aerial inspection had been agreed between the US and the Soviets.87 The president’s approach to Open Skies exemplified the different views he and Rockefeller held with regard to the Cold War and the Soviet Union, an aspect of their association that has been overlooked by historians. As the 1950s progressed, Rockefeller remained an active proponent of increases in military expenditures. Eisenhower, on the other hand, was determined to contain spending on defence. It is not surprising that he and his special assistant would eventually engage in a serious disagreement over national security policy, as Chapter Six will show. The Quantico panel concluded its activities on 10 June 1955. Its final report was circulated to Eisenhower, Dulles, the State and Defense Departments and the CIA. Jackson urged Dulles not to give the Quantico report ‘too automatic a brush off’.88 Despite its wide circulation, the report did not initially arouse much interest among senior officials. It took Rockefeller’s personal intervention to underline the efforts of the panel. He was aware that at the meeting of the NSC on 30 June the issue of inspection had been debated at length.89 Eisenhower had ordered Stassen to develop ‘methods of inspection which would be deemed feasible’ and which ‘would be acceptable on a reciprocal basis to the US’.90 Armed with a two-page memorandum, Rockefeller met Eisenhower on 6 July to discuss the panel’s recommendations, including its mutual aerial inspection proposal. According to Rostow’s account of this meeting, Eisenhower called Dulles to say that ‘he had just heard of an idea that might open a tiny gate in the disarmament fence’.91 He then suggested that two groups be established to ‘study and plan for immediate starting of inspection of each other’s armaments . . . to determine the utility of inspection systems . . . we open up ours; they do likewise for us’. Dulles replied that he and Stassen were already working on the idea. At a meeting he had had with Stassen only a few days earlier, the secretary advised that he and Stassen had

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discussed the possibility of reaching agreement with the Soviets about aerial inspection, indicating that if they ‘offered a certain amount of inspection, we should take them up on it’.92 Dulles’ response to Eisenhower’s enquiry and Stassen’s activities would seem to indicate that the Quantico panel was not the originator of the Open Skies initiative. There has been debate amongst historians as to who was responsible for devising this idea. In Open Skies, Rostow confirmed Rockefeller’s major role in formulating mutual aerial inspection. C.D. Jackson recalled that Rockefeller had not been averse to engaging ‘in a lot of conjecture as to who first thought of the Eisenhower Geneva bombshell on overflight inspection’.93 Saki Dockrill refers to an account by W.B. Ewald, who had assisted Eisenhower in the publication of his memoirs, Mandate for Change. This account suggests, according to Eisenhower’s initial drafts, that the president, and not Rockefeller, was the original author of Open Skies.94 Yet, in a letter to Rockefeller of 5 February 1963, John S.D. Eisenhower, who was assisting his father with the production of his memoirs, sought Rockefeller’s advice in compiling the section relating to Open Skies. ‘According to my understanding,’ John Eisenhower recalled in the letter, ‘the idea of mutual aerial inspection had been discussed extensively at the Quantico panel, under your chairmanship. It must have been there that we determined that any such mutual inspection would accrue to the net gain of the United States.’ Keen to elicit Rockefeller’s co-operation, Eisenhower stated at the end of the letter that Open Skies ‘was one of the most newsworthy events of Dad’s eight years in the White House and I think it is important that it be treated as well as possible’.95 In an oral history interview carried out in 1967, John S.D. Eisenhower recalled: The Open Skies idea was discussed at Quantico for the first time, to the best of my knowledge. But the fact is that Nelson Rockefeller pursued it, and I think Stassen was in favour of it also. But Rockefeller seemed more to have gotten the bone in his teeth and held onto it and wouldn’t let go.96 These accounts contradict the work of Harold Stassen and Marshall Houts. In Eisenhower: Turning the World Toward Peace, the writers claim that Stassen was the major author of this initiative, which was written

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in Paris on the basis of a progress report that he had presented to the NSC on 26 May 1955. Stephen Ambrose argues that both Stassen and Rockefeller believed the idea ‘had come to them, independently but almost simultaneously’.97 One should not infer from this that there had been any rivalry between the two men in the development of the idea. It is clear from reports and related memoranda held at the Rockefeller Archives Center that in the days leading up to 21 July 1955, Rockefeller and Stassen worked together on finalising the details of Eisenhower’s Open Skies proposal. With Stassen’s assistance, Rockefeller drafted a statement on this subject entitled, ‘Psychological Strategy at Geneva’. Both men briefed the president on this statement on 20 July.98 Less than a week after the summit, Stassen wrote to Rockefeller, praising him for his role ‘in such an important part in what everyone now recognises to have been a sound initiative at Geneva’.99 There is no doubt that in the weeks leading up to the summit the administration was focused on developing workable inspection proposals that desired reciprocity on the part of both the Soviet Union and America. According to a brief report entitled ‘Mutual Inspection for Peace’, it was Rockefeller who sought ‘authority to reintroduce the exchange of blueprints idea’ in conjunction with mutual aerial inspection.100 What he and the Quantico panel in effect promoted was an all-round intelligence package. By mid-July 1955 the US government had agreed, in consultation with its Western European allies, the substance of an agenda for the Geneva summit. The areas on which it was agreed that ‘progress could most fruitfully be attempted’ included Germany, European security and disarmament. In June, a tripartite working group comprising representatives of Britain, France, the US and West Germany was established to co-ordinate preparations for the meeting. This group suggested that the Western powers might also wish to discuss the future of the Soviet satellites and the activities of international communism. The report recognised those areas that the Soviet Union would most likely want to address. In addition to disarmament, these included the Far East and a world economic conference.101 Between 16 and 17 July, final talks were held between Harold MacMillan and Antoine Pinay to agree the agenda for the foreign ministers’ meetings at Geneva.102 Dulles assured Chancellor Adenauer that the Western powers would ‘conduct the

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meeting on a serious basis and not as propaganda’.103 In July, NSC 5524 was approved which set out the US government’s policy statement on the summit, including its handling of the Soviet Union. In his approach, Eisenhower could be accused of having failed to develop concrete proposals for serious negotiation at the forthcoming summit. That there was no clear agreement within the administration on the problem of disarmament or a realistic agenda for the meeting has attracted argument that the president was not serious about heads of government talks and the easing of international tensions.104 This approach, it can be argued, precluded the two blocs from engaging in meaningful negotiation aimed at resolving the main areas of conflict between the East and the West. However, as the foregoing discussion has shown, Eisenhower never believed that progress on such a scale could be achieved at one gathering of the two blocs, especially when a meeting of this significance had not taken place for ten years and a Cold War had emerged instead. He saw the summit as a way of testing temperaments, building trust and seeking new approaches to the solution of world problems. In a conversation with Bulganin, Khrushchev and Zhukov on 18 July 1955, Eisenhower stressed that the ‘most that could be expected [at Geneva] was the start of a process of negotiation and not any miracles or decisions on outstanding questions’. In that way, the president continued, ‘a new spirit might well be created which would greatly facilitate this process.’105 It should also be remembered that by July 1955 proposals for the reduction of armaments, although not yet finalised, were well advanced by the US government. At the summit itself, the heads of government agreed to refer the latest disarmament proposals of the Soviet Union and the US to the next foreign ministers’ conference. It was also agreed that the Soviets and the West would co-operate in developing an acceptable system of disarmament through the sub-committee of the UN Disarmament Commission. Their representatives at the subcommittee were instructed to take account of the views and proposals advanced at the summit, giving priority to the study of methods for effective international control, including inspection.106 As the date of the summit drew nearer, the US government began to give serious attention to the idea of mutual aerial inspection and

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the exchange of military blueprints. At a press conference on 6 July, Eisenhower hinted that he would make a specific proposal to the Soviets at Geneva. In mid-July, Dulles met with NATO countries to brief them on progress with preparations for the summit. According to a memorandum of conversation with the president, MacArthur, Merchant and Anderson prepared by Goodpaster, the secretary of state reported: It had been a very good meeting, and the countries had said they would be quite satisfied to have the US, the UK and France act as spokesmen, on the understanding that they would, of course, have full opportunity to participate in developing positions before any firm agreements were reached. The Secretary indicated there seemed to be a good deal of acceptance of the idea of inspection, and mentioned that the idea of ‘photographic inspection’ seemed to have a great deal of promise.107 Eisenhower consulted with Anthony Eden and Edgar Faure at a luncheon party in the president’s villa on 17 July. He advised that Stassen had been giving very extensive thought to the subject of disarmament and had reached the conclusion, in conjunction with his secretary of state, that the ‘very heart of any such arrangement lay in the efficacy of the inspection system’. Indeed, no disarmament proposal could be ‘disassociated from inspection’.108 Further talks were held with the British representatives on mutual aerial inspection and the exchange of military blueprints on 20 July. Eden and MacMillan were reported to be enthusiastic about the idea.109 The Geneva summit opened at the Palais des Nations on 18 July 1955. The first three days of the conference were devoted to the question of future European security and Germany. Eisenhower noted the overall congenial atmosphere at the summit, including the ‘obvious and unshakeable personal friendliness of the Soviet delegation’.110 Nevertheless, congeniality gave way to level-headed realism. By the end of the third day, the Soviet delegation made it clear that they were not prepared to support Western plans for the reunification of Germany, arguing that the Paris Agreements no longer made this

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a feasible proposition. Nor were the Soviets disposed to discuss the Eastern European satellites or the activities of international communism.111 In fact, they appeared to favour only the possibilities of increased cultural, technological and economic exchanges with the West – the lower end of the ‘continuum of acceptability’ as advanced by the Quantico panel. Disarmament was scheduled for discussion at the fifth session of heads of government talks on 21 July. Stassen and Rockefeller were asked to join the US delegation at Geneva. They had arrived in Paris on 16 July, at which point Rockefeller consulted various national security advisers, including Arthur Radford and Robert Anderson, deputy secretary of defence, about the merits of Open Skies. At a meeting held on the evening of 20 July at Eisenhower’s villa in Geneva, mutual aerial inspection was discussed at length. Livingston Merchant, Dillon Anderson, General Gruenther, Robert Anderson, Arthur Radford and Andrew Goodpaster, staff secretary to the president, also attended this meeting. Stassen gave a presentation to the US delegation about this proposal, which everyone present welcomed. Dulles spoke favourably about the idea, claiming that it ‘seemed to have a great deal of promise’. It was agreed that the president would present his Open Skies proposal to the heads of government the next day as a ‘specific, more or less spontaneous, suggestion’ following a ‘broad and basic’ introductory statement on disarmament.112 It is also possible that Eisenhower was encouraged to go ahead in presenting his Open Skies plan because of the initial reaction of the Soviet delegation. In addition to the rounds of formal meetings, he and Dulles had the opportunity to talk more openly with the Soviets at informal gatherings and evening dinners. On two occasions, both before and after heads of government talks on 21 July, Eisenhower met with his wartime friend, Georgi Zhukov. During the first conversation, the latter commented that the Soviet Union had ‘no need of war and were fed up to the teeth with war. Their main task was to improve their economy and raise the standard of living with their people.’ On the issue of armaments, Zhukov recognised that they were nothing more than a burden on the Soviet economy and felt that the two countries should work very seriously towards détente. Eisenhower inquired

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whether an inspection system, based on reciprocal overflights, would be politically possible. Zhukov replied that such a system would be entirely possible.113 Moreover, prior to the heads of government meeting, Dulles reported to Eisenhower that Bulganin appeared ‘quite ready’ to ‘permit the fullest inspection . . . on the basis of reciprocity’. The president replied that ‘this would indeed be a tremendous thing if it were carried through’.114 However, his optimism would be short-lived. At the heads of government meeting on 21 July 1955, Nikita Khrushchev disparaged Eisenhower’s proposal. He believed aerial inspection and the exchange of military blueprints would allow the Americans to quickly discover that his country was a nuclear paper tiger. At the meeting, Khrushchev gave Eisenhower assurances that the Soviet government would ‘study’ his proposal but he was not convinced as to the sincerity of the president’s plan. He castigated Zhukov for having indicated his earlier support for this initiative. ‘The enemy’s [military] power is greater,’ Khrushchev said. ‘Whoever has the greater potential is more interested in intelligence.’115 Open Skies was perhaps doomed from the outset. The US had more to gain from the initiative than the Soviets, who already had the means of knowing the location of virtually all American military installations. Overall, Eisenhower was disappointed with the outcome of negotiations. While he had been able to establish better relations with the Soviets, his hopes for telling ‘the American people on his return that something had been started on the question of substance’ were largely dashed.116 The Geneva summit did not necessarily deepen the thaw in Cold War relations. The two blocs remained bitterly divided over the issue of disarmament and inspection, as the following chapters will show. Germany would also remain a significant and, at times, potent source of international tensions. Nevertheless, face-to-face talks had provided some benefits. Both the East and Western delegations left Geneva believing war was unlikely to break out. Anthony Eden invited the Soviets on a state visit to Britain, which took place the following year. For Eisenhower, Geneva revealed who really was the voice behind the throne in the Soviet government. On his return to America, the president could only speak in positive terms about ‘the many new contacts’ that had been formed between the

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East and the West. He was, however, determined to pursue his Open Skies plan. In the aftermath of Geneva, he endeavoured to downplay its propaganda aspects. His approach was all the more imperative as he faced fresh and concerted challenges to his defence strategy. That the Soviet Union rejected Open Skies did not come as any great surprise for many members of the US delegation, particularly Rockefeller. The position taken by the Soviets was merely proof of their insincerity towards seeking a peaceful resolution of world problems. The outcome of Geneva signalled the need to push more aggressively for building up America’s defences and influence around the world. In this endeavour, Rockefeller was not a lone voice. Such arguments threatened to overturn the various fiscal measures that the administration had put in place to safeguard the economy and control the military build-up in the US. They also called into question the very basis of government defence policy and, in effect, the competence of an extremely popular president. By the mid-1950s, the seeds of challenge were ready to bloom and Eisenhower’s efforts to control the military-industrial complex became increasingly more difficult.

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CHAPTER FOUR THE AFTER M ATH OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT

In August 1955, the United Nations Disarmament Commission sub-committee was reconvened. Henry Cabot Lodge, the American ambassador to the UN, presented an outline plan for implementation of President Eisenhower’s Open Skies proposal. This plan set out the terms of reference and procedure for translating his concept into reality. After the Geneva summit, the Disarmament Commission became one of many channels through which Eisenhower attempted to implement Open Skies. He believed the exchange of military blueprints and aerial photography of Soviet bases and production facilities would yield significant information on the extent of military capabilities and technological advances. Indeed, mutual aerial inspection had the potential, as Eisenhower once argued, to lead to ‘the tearing down of the trend in the armaments build-up’.1 From the very start of the Cold War, the US had been denied the opportunity of this intelligence. The need to build up knowledge of Soviet forces had led to the president’s support for Open Skies and his authorisation of U2 flights in late 1954. This chapter is the first of four that will examine Eisenhower’s Open Skies policy after the Geneva summit. It will cover the period from August 1955 to Eisenhower’s re-election in late 1956, taking account of the continuing resistance of the military towards the New Look and the president’s efforts to establish a reliable picture of Soviet military

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capabilities. In the aftermath of the Geneva summit the pressure for increasing defence budgets mounted. Not convinced that the summit had yielded positive results, particularly in the field of disarmament, military staff continued to raise concerns about the growing military strength of the Soviet Union. These pressures drove Eisenhower to seek an agreement with the Soviet Union to implement a system of mutual aerial inspection. To the end of his presidency, he did not give up on this idea. Eisenhower’s support for Open Skies after July 1955 can be linked to his determination to control the armaments build-up in the US as his efforts to contain defence budgets and maintain a balanced perspective of the Soviet Union came under increasing attack from many sectors of American political life. In the autumn of 1955, Eisenhower began a personal correspondence with Nikolai Bulganin in an attempt to persuade the Soviets to review their refusal to adopt Open Skies. This correspondence continued throughout 1956 and 1957. From 1958, Eisenhower corresponded with Nikita Khrushchev, who had by then become the undisputed Soviet leader. This correspondence continued until April 1960. Few studies on Open Skies have explored Eisenhower’s offer beyond July 1955 and only one work dedicated to the Eisenhower-Bulganin and Khrushchev correspondence has emerged.2 No study has examined Open Skies in the context of the letters exchanged between the president and the Soviet leaders. This correspondence affirms the importance Eisenhower attached to mutual aerial inspection as part of his efforts to reduce tensions between America and the Soviet Union. In addition to this correspondence and negotiations at the UN, Eisenhower pursued covert activities to help establish the extent of Soviet military capabilities. This chapter will explore early developments relating to such activity, including the balloon programmes, earth satellites and U2 flights. The impact of these activities on the president’s fiscal and military policies will be assessed in Chapters Six and Seven. As the Geneva summit drew to a close, the heads of government agreed to convene a foreign ministers’ conference in the autumn of 1955. The purpose of this gathering was to continue negotiations on the main issues discussed by the leaders of the four powers, namely German unification, European security and disarmament. Eisenhower

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continued to place high hopes in negotiating with the Soviets. In a conversation with Marshal Zhukov on the final day of summit talks, he remarked that every effort had to be made to try to reconcile US-Soviet differences. ‘It would be a great pity,’ he continued, ‘if the [foreign ministers’] conference ended with only hope for friendlier relations.’ This, in Eisenhower’s opinion, ‘was not enough’.3 The reaction of the American press to the outcomes of the summit, including Open Skies, was mixed. As the New York Herald Tribune reported on 22 July: Both the Senate and the House, in an outburst of bipartisan acclaim, today welcomed president Eisenhower’s ‘Big Four’ proposal for exchanging complete military information as a bold but practical diplomatic move sure of proving America’s own peaceful intentions and certain of testing those of the Russians.4 Despatches by journalist James Reston were less complimentary. ‘The Big Four conference is declining fast,’ he wrote pessimistically. ‘What was advertised for weeks as a realistic, private discussion of conflicting national interests, and started this week as a determined demonstration of international chumminess, developed into a propaganda battle between the United States and Russia.’ After the heads of government meeting of 21 July, Reston accused Eisenhower of joining the ‘propaganda parade with a vengeance’.5 A number of Republican senators, including William Knowland, Styles Bridges and Eugene Millikin, did not approve of Eisenhower’s plan. They argued that mutual aerial inspection would result in a violation of US airspace by the Soviets. Senator Joseph McCarthy was openly hostile.6 Feelings on the summit were not entirely unfavourable, however. Among the US delegation to Geneva, positive noises were heard. In a letter to Paul Henri Spaak, the Belgian foreign minister, Dulles wrote: I feel that, on the whole, matters at Geneva went well. I had the feeling that the Western representatives had the initiative and that the Soviets were on the defensive. Also, I think that president Eisenhower’s proposal about aerial inspection did much to

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dissipate the myth which the Soviets had been seeking to create that we want war.7 Even Rostow recorded a positive note on the summit, although he was prone as ever to add his slant on such affairs. Thus, at an address to the Naval War College in August 1955, he stated, ‘The Geneva Conference of 1955 was, in many ways, a major American, and in the best sense, a psychological triumph . . . in the aftermath the United States appears to have resumed its leadership of the free world alliance and the communist tide seems to be checked.’8 The various disarmament proposals of the four governments, including Eisenhower’s Open Skies plan, were also referred to the UN Disarmament Commission, which was scheduled to convene in August. At a cabinet meeting on 22 July, chaired by Vice-President Richard Nixon, officials noted the ‘tremendous impact’ mutual aerial inspection had had on the Soviet leaders. Ambassador Lodge emphasised the need for helping this proposal to ‘stay alive through further international conferences’. In that way world opinion might become, Lodge argued, ‘so strong in support of it that Russia might have to accept it’.9 When the US delegation returned from Geneva, the government discussed tactics for pursuing Open Skies. At one NSC meeting during late July, Dulles urged that the president’s plan should not be followed up as ‘if it were a propaganda stunt’. Instead, he stressed the need for mutual aerial inspection to be handled seriously, and suggested that a specific note, setting out additional details of the plan, be sent to the Soviet Union. In the event of the Soviets rejecting Open Skies, Dulles indicated that the US should not ‘belabor’ the Soviets over their decision for at least a month.10 NSC members concurred with Dulles’ suggestion. Eisenhower reminded the meeting that the purpose of his plan was to ease international tensions and, as a result of an improved climate, a reduction of arms would become possible. This approach was confirmed in NSC 1513: If the Eisenhower aerial inspection and blueprint exchange proposal, with accompanying ground inspection, is accepted, and if such a system is proven to the US to be satisfactorily installed

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and operating, and assuming the political situation is reasonably stable, the United States would be prepared to begin a gradual reciprocal, safeguarded reduction of armaments, armed forces and military expenditures.11 Upon their return from Geneva, the Soviet leaders did debate the possibility of negotiating an agreement with the US for the exchange of military information and the introduction of mutual aerial inspection. Moreover, according to an intelligence report circulated by a member of the US delegation during the summit, the Soviet delegation was inclined to believe that based on the president’s performance at the heads of government meeting, Open Skies ‘was more than mere propaganda’.12 According to a later account by Anatoly Dobrynin, the Politbureau, persuaded by Khrushchev, considered accepting Open Skies in the belief that the US Congress would never allow Soviet planes to fly over American territory. This situation would place Eisenhower in a ‘very difficult position’, forcing him to withdraw from this initiative.13 Overall, the Soviets were buoyed up by the summit. In an address to the Supreme Soviet on 4 August 1955, Bulganin stressed that the ‘spirit of co-operation and the desire for mutual understanding’ that had been apparent at Geneva was ‘gratifying’.14 Less than two months later, Khrushchev announced during a speech in Bombay: No matter how much our enemies want our ruin, it is beyond their power. Therefore, no matter whether they want it or not, whether they like it or not, the socialist and the capitalist state have to live side by side on one planet.15 The Soviet position provided some hope that the possibility of future arms control negotiations had not been completely destroyed. In Soviet minds, Geneva had also revealed that the risk of nuclear confrontation with the West was unlikely, at least in the short to medium term. The ‘spirit of Geneva’ presented opportunities to negotiate on a wide range of international issues.16 However, for the Soviets, Open Skies was too much, too soon.

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Much as the Soviets respected Eisenhower, they distrusted US motives. As Bulganin argued in a letter to the president in the autumn of 1955, ‘I do not doubt that when you introduced your proposal for photographing from the air the territories of our two countries, you were guided by a legitimate desire to create confidence that neither of our two countries would be subject to attack by the other.’ Referring to the difficulties, however, of instituting aerial inspection in countries allied to the Soviet Union and the US, the Russian leader continued, ‘All this shows that the problem of aerial photography is not a question which, under present conditions, would lead to effective progress towards insuring security of states and successful accomplishment of disarmament.’17 As far as Bulganin was concerned, Open Skies had the potential to intensify the competition for arms between the US and Russia, resulting in a proliferation of weapons. Moreover, as he correctly pointed out, Eisenhower’s proposal contained no mention of the necessity to reduce arms and prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. This stance merely served to arouse the misgivings and suspicions of the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet chairman argued: Finally, it is impossible not to stop and think about what would happen if we occupy ourselves with the questions of aerial photography and the exchange of military information without taking effective measures for reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons.18 These issues remained central to the Soviet Union’s position on disarmament. Furthermore, Open Skies, as it stood, covered only US and Soviet territory, thus omitting US forces stationed on non-US territory in Britain, West Germany, France, Spain, Taiwan, Japan and many other nations. ‘Would the government of such states permit their sovereign territory to be photographed from the air by foreign aircraft?’ the Soviet chairman argued.19 Bulganin believed this matter opened up a big can of worms. Soviet rejection of Open Skies was confirmed by Molotov at the foreign ministers’ conference. The Soviet foreign minister reiterated

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the concerns previously expressed by the Soviets that mutual aerial inspection made no allowances for a reduction in arms on the part of the East and the West.20 Dulles, however, continued to defend the US government’s position. In a letter to the Yugoslav president, Marshal Josip Tito, of 12 November, he claimed mutual aerial inspection was never intended to be a ‘substitute for disarmament or the entire answer to control and inspection’. Instead he hoped, if accepted by the Soviets, that it would ‘help greatly to lessen suspicion’.21 With little agreement reached among the ministers over German unification and European security, the spirit of Geneva appeared to be wearing thin. The conference wound down in mid-November, with the Soviets refusing to consider proposals by the West for German unification. Dulles concluded that the Soviets did not in fact fear German rearmament or German military power. At a NSC meeting in November 1955, recounting his meetings at Geneva and citing examples of uneasiness in the satellite countries, Dulles argued that the Soviets were more anxious that any course of action leading to the termination of the East German government would unsettle the rest of the Eastern bloc countries – a situation the Soviet Union wished to avoid at all costs. With the Soviets content to see the continuation of two sovereign states in Germany, there was now little hope of achieving a ‘rollback’ of Soviet power in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite the Soviet Union’s rejecting Open Skies, Eisenhower continued to pursue this initiative using two options left open to him, one being the UN Disarmament Commission, the other personal negotiation. He also considered new technological developments that would yield intelligence on the Soviet Union from the sky. Circumstances in the US made implementation of a system of mutual aerial inspection imperative. Prior to the summit, military staff had expressed concerns with the course that government defence policy was taking. At a legislative leaders meeting in February 1955, Eisenhower defended the administration’s proposed decision to reduce army personnel in the wake of Matthew Ridgeway’s damning testimony in Congress. Ridgeway was the US Army chief of staff and in early 1955 he had let it be known not merely in administration circles but in testimony before Congress that reductions in the army would jeopardise national security.

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He argued that the administration’s defence policies constituted a crude reliance on nuclear weapons that would expose the country to a series of Koreas and leave the US unable to fulfil its NATO commitments.22 Reinforcing the thrust of the New Look, the president argued that if war should break out between the Soviet Union and the US, he could not envisage hostilities becoming ‘locked in a life and death struggle without using nuclear weapons’. Nuclear warfare required a strong retaliatory air force and expanded warning systems – measures designed to deter surprise attack. Military plans, Eisenhower argued, now had to be ‘based really on two things – one to destroy the enemy’s production and two, protect our own’. Ground forces to fight behind every ‘tree and bush’ were regarded as unnecessary.23 The JCS had raised a number of objections to the administration’s proposed disarmament plan completed in June 1955. At one NSC meeting, the joint chiefs argued that disarmament was not feasible until there was ‘concrete evidence of a revolutionary change in the ambitions and intentions of the Soviet regime’.24 The JCS therefore objected to any agreement that sought a ‘levelling-off’ of armaments, claiming such a state of affairs ‘would neither strengthen our negotiating position nor contribute to the resolution of political problems’.25 Eisenhower was disappointed with the attitude of his senior military staff. As Goodpaster noted at one meeting in July 1955: Referring to disarmament, the President indicated that it is not sufficient to say either that political issues must be solved first or that disarmament must be brought about first. He feels that there is merit in freezing the levels of armament, while concurrently seeking to settle certain political issues and going forward on a step by step basis in this manner.26 The JCS were also critical of mutual aerial inspection. Radford had only supported the idea on the basis that there were no concurrent agreements relating to arms limitation (see Chapter Three). He and his staff remained sceptical about the prospects of negotiating with the Soviet Union.27 As far as the JCS were concerned, the failure of highlevel talks to resolve major areas of world tension merely demonstrated

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intransigence on the part of the Soviets. As a result, the military continued to resist cuts in defence expenditures. Following the controversy surrounding the bomber gap and growing speculation about Soviet technological advancements, the services also demanded a greater level of resources to provide for effective retaliatory forces against a Soviet surprise attack. With reductions in conventional forces, the military budget was determined increasingly by the US Air Force, particularly SAC, and to a lesser extent the US Navy.28 At a meeting held in July 1956 to discuss the defence budget for fiscal year 1958, Wilson and McNeil presented a set of charts purporting to show how military costs were ‘increasing in every field’. On this basis, McNeil argued the case for a defence budget of $48.5 billion. Naturally, Eisenhower considered this request excessive, arguing that it was ‘a mistake to have allowed the $48.5 billion figure to be given any status’.29 Fear of a surprise attack by the Soviets pushed the military towards supporting a strategy of preparation for total war. However, this approach threatened to undermine Eisenhower’s attempts to contain expenditures and plan America’s defence for the long haul. The spectre of surprise attack by the Soviet Union had been raised by a number of think tanks including the RAND Corporation. In a major study carried out in 1954 entitled ‘Defending a Strategic Force After 1960’, it was argued: ‘We may conclude . . . that unless the Russians are desperate or bungling, they will attack if and only if . . . they can have a high confidence of eliminating the major part of the Strategic Air Command.’ Despite air force defence plans and recommendations for improving SAC’s defences, the report noted, ‘even . . . a rather modest total of inter-continental ballistic missile of the RAND type will put the Russians in this position’.30 Moreover, James Killian argued that based on new estimates of Soviet nuclear stockpiles and thermonuclear testing, the period in which the US would be in danger of possible defeat was now earlier than 1958.31 Fuelling such concerns was the military. In an article entitled ‘The Next Move is up to Congress’, John F. Loosbrock, managing editor of Air Force Magazine, argued: ‘What will happen if we let the Soviets beat us in this deadly race? Can we expect New York or Washington one day to go up in flames and violence without warning?’ Echoing the concerns of many,

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Loosbrock continued, ‘this may sound like fantasy, but no one can now say with the necessary assurance that the Soviets will not successfully develop the ICBM, or that, having done so, they would dare not use it.’ Alternatively, atomic blackmail could be the order of the day; the Soviets, sporting their ‘brand new ICBM shoulder holsters’ at the next summit conference, could start to call the shots over how America and its allies should co-operate in ‘relaxing tensions’.32 The issue of ballistic missile development deepened concerns about the ability of the Soviet Union to launch a surprise attack on the West. In fiscal year 1955 expenditures on missiles amounted to $161 million, and between fiscal years 1951 and 1954 spending on the ICBM programme had increased from $0.5 million to $14 million (see also Chapter One).33 At a NSC meeting in July 1957, it was noted that the nation had spent $11.8 billion on missile programmes. In an attempt to put the long-term costs of such weapons into perspective, the president noted that the cost of continuing such programmes from fiscal year 1957 to fiscal year 1963 ‘would amount to approximately $36.1 billion, for a grand total of $47 billion’.34 Despite the progress made on missile development between the early to mid-1950s, the Science Advisory Committee, formerly the Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee (SMEC), was of the view that the Soviet Union was likely to have matched or surpassed the US in this field as a result of the low priority accorded to such programmes in America from 1946 to 1953.35 The Soviets had in fact initiated their programme for ICBM development in 1947. Recognising the strategic importance of rockets as ‘an effective straitjacket for that noisy shopkeeper, Harry Truman’, Stalin ordered urgent work on long- and medium-range missiles, giving high priority also to the development of medium-range and intercontinental bombers.36 Ten years later, Soviet efforts were rewarded with the launch of the world’s first ICBM and artificial earth orbiting satellite. Although a number of missile programmes in the US had been started in the late 1940s, many of these had proved short-lived because of defence cutbacks in 1949.37 During the early 1950s, the size and weight of thermonuclear weapons had precluded the possibility of their delivery via a guided missile to a target some several thousand miles away. However, by 1953 warhead development meant that the ratio of

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yield to weight was significantly improved and the weight considerably reduced. It was now considered possible for thermonuclear weapons to be transported to enemy territory by long-range missiles. As a result, US missile programmes were accelerated amid concerns that the Soviet Union was now in the lead in mastering this technology.38 At a meeting with Wilson, Radford and Goodpaster in March 1956, Eisenhower refused to accept claims on the part of the JCS that the US military position had worsened over the previous three years compared to that of the Soviet Union. According to Goodpaster’s notes of the meeting, the ‘very dark picture’ painted by the joint chiefs suggested, as Eisenhower argued, that the US ‘should go to field conditions, declare an emergency, increase the military budget and even go to a garrison state’. The president continued to resist pressures from the military to increase the defence budget, arguing that higher than necessary outlays would ‘endanger our economy and thus weaken our country’s overall position’.39 Eisenhower did not accept claims that US military power was in an inferior position to that of the Soviet Union. His suspicions about the military’s tendency to exaggerate Soviet capabilities were confirmed at a special briefing in 1954 attended by military and top Defense Department officials. Staff in the intelligence branch of the CIA argued that the communists were neither ready nor able to resort to direct military action. As Ray Cline, chief of the Office of National Estimates at the CIA, later argued, ‘it was a pretty desperate move for the USSR to attack the US with their substantially inferior long range force.’ US radar tactical warning systems in Europe and Asia were good enough to preclude the possibility of the Soviet Union’s achieving a surprise attack.40 John Foster Dulles shared these views. In a meeting in August 1955 with Allen Dulles, Hoover, Ted Streibert, Rockefeller and Gordon Gray, assistant secretary of defence, the secretary of state referred to the inferior defence network of the Soviet Union, arguing that it was extremely difficult for the Russians ‘to match our military effort, especially when you think that they are carrying it on with an industrial base that is only a fourth or third the size of ours’. The production of large-scale armaments in Russia would require, as Dulles believed, ‘extra production out of slave labor’.41 Prior to the Geneva summit,

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Eisenhower and Dulles had received reports that the Soviets were seeking a relaxation in world tensions because the burden of modern armaments was proving too much for an already overstrained Soviet economy (see Chapter Three). During 1956, Dulles continued to receive reports that the Soviet Union ‘was over-extended’. Correspondence from Anthony Nutting, leader of the British delegation to the UN General Assembly, of May 1956 intimated that it seemed likely that the Russians might for economic reasons ‘reduce somewhat its armed forces’, leading Dulles to postulate that the Russians would have to ‘give at some point’.42 An economic survey for Europe of 1955 published by the UN Economic Commission for Europe seemed to echo Dulles’ views. The report stated that there had been at least a 12 per cent rise in Soviet military expenditures in 1955 and ‘real wages’ had been held down far below production increases in order to cover a sharp shift towards heavy industry and armaments.43 Such studies were double-edged. A continuing reduction in the living standards of Soviet citizens was likely to have serious repercussions for the credibility and viability of Soviet communism in the longer term. However, the emphasis placed on armaments production in the immediate future meant a rising strength in Soviet military power, fuelling the demands of the military and other Cold Warriors for larger defence budgets to confront such a force. As Rostow argued at an address to the Joint Committee on Disarmament at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in April 1956, the Soviet Union’s ‘maximum objective is to achieve, if possible, so clean-cut a technological superiority over the US that [it] could rationally envisage destruction of our deterrent power in a sudden blow’.44 Even Dulles did not dismiss the possibility that the Soviets might, in order to help mitigate their economic situation, reduce their armed forces and plough their resources into nuclear weapons in line with trends in modern military force planning, thereby creating a first strike capability aimed at the US.45 For Eisenhower, the internal difficulties facing the Soviets were a sign of the inherent weaknesses and the inevitable implosion of the communist system. Such difficulties, however, also sounded alarm bells closer to home. ‘We have today the picture of America,’ Eisenhower noted in a memorandum to Dulles, ‘with a constantly

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expanding economy, with everything moving forward on a higher level of prosperity than ever before.’ Here was America’s real strength and Eisenhower had no wish to jeopardise it, particularly when unnecessarily high defence expenditures had the potential to damage the economy irretrievably. Expounding his thoughts to his secretary of state, he argued, ‘If we, at such a time, cannot organise to protect and advance our own interests, and those of our friends, then I must say it becomes time to begin thinking of “despairing of the Republic”.’46 As the end of his first term approached, Eisenhower had not abandoned his belief that America’s overall strength was predicated as much on its economic security as it was on its military strength. As Goodpaster recorded in a meeting in December 1956: The president pointed out that our country is facing many heavy problems, and that inflation and tight money supply form one of the greatest of these. Military expenditures contribute to this problem, particularly since they are for ‘unproductive’ purposes. If labor puts on a drive for another round of substantial wage increases, we may find ourselves in serious trouble this coming year.47 In mid-1955, US gross national product (GNP) was estimated at $380 billion as compared to the Soviet estimate of $134 billion. American defence spending as a percentage of GNP was 11 per cent, compared with the Soviet figure of 19 per cent.48 Eisenhower had no wish to jeopardise America’s relatively healthy economic situation. In James Killian’s memoirs Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower – A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, he argues that Eisenhower was haunted throughout his presidency by the fear of the Soviet Union’s launching a surprise attack on the US. It can be argued, however, that Killian’s assertion misrepresents the causes and nature of fear in the Cold War. Throughout the remainder of his presidency, Eisenhower maintained a proportionate and rational sense of Soviet capabilities and intentions. As he remarked to James Hagerty, ‘I believe the existence today all points to the fact that Russia is less likely to attack the US than at any time within recent years.’49 Like his secretary of state, Eisenhower never subscribed to the view

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that a period of ‘peak danger’ existed in the near future by which America and its allies would find themselves vulnerable to attack if they did not maintain a substantial armament programme. And, like Eisenhower, Dulles believed that if an approximate status quo could be sustained over time, the West more than the communist world would benefit from it. As Gaddis argues, both men ‘accepted almost instinctively the possibility that continued Soviet-American competition, far from being an “abnormal” condition in international relations, could become a “normal” environment within which limited agreements acceptable to both sides might eventually evolve’. The transformation of an unstable post-war settlement gave way, under Eisenhower, to a post-war international system that, as Gaddis continues, ‘whatever else one may say about it, at least kept the peace’.50 However, a crucial aspect in maintaining the peace required a commitment to arms control and this, as with charity, had to begin at home. Eisenhower’s underlying concerns were more appropriately related to the growing armaments industry in America, the seemingly irreversible upward trend in military expenditures. To control this, he had to control the anti-communism of many within and outside Washington. The major task confronting the president during the remainder of the decade lay in convincing others of Soviet limitations, and his military staff were no exception. Thus, at one briefing with his military chiefs Admirals Radford and Arleigh Burke, chief of naval operations, General Maxwell Taylor, army chief of staff, and General Nathan Twining, air force chief of staff, Eisenhower argued, ‘it is the nature of our government that everyone, except for a thin layer at the top, is working, knowingly or unknowingly, to damage our economy.’51 The president frequently expressed his disappointment with the attitude of his military chiefs and their quest for more and more resources for their own service. Their failure to look at the security needs of the nation as a whole, he argued, had both military and economic implications. The net effect of the JCS approach was ‘to create burdens which could sap the strength of our own economic system’. Similarly, he continued, ‘there are great pressures on the military program from every particular element, and the catalytic factor provided by the press and Congress might make it explode.’52

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Eisenhower recognised that the situation of the military chiefs was more fundamental than inter-service rivalry. Matthew Ridgeway was not the only military chief of staff to express criticism outside administration circles of massive retaliation and Eisenhower’s handling of the Soviet Union. His successor, Maxwell Taylor, was also highly critical of the administration’s defence policy. Taylor’s discomfort with reliance on nuclear weapons is clear from the minutes of NSC meetings and various briefings with the president and the JCS. At one such briefing held at Taylor’s request, the army chief challenged the president about the way in which a war with the Soviet Union should be fought. In view of the tendency of thermonuclear capacity to deter both sides from a ‘big war’, any war that did occur was more likely to be a small war ‘arising step by step from smaller action’. The absorption of all available funds designed to fight nuclear war would, in Taylor’s view, leave the US considerably less flexible. He thus advocated more resources for mobile units to wage local or small wars.53 Eisenhower disagreed with Taylor’s argument. He did not believe it was either necessary or practical to ‘deploy and tie down [US] forces around the Soviet periphery in small wars’, arguing that it was very unlikely such forces could be moved during the early months of nuclear war.54 The services obviously stood to gain by increased budgets. However, their argument for more resources was also predicated on their virulent anti-communism and fear of a Soviet military or technological lead. Ridgeway and Taylor were not isolated voices. They were joined by a number of other senior military staff who believed a stronger stance had to be taken towards Moscow. During the late 1950s, Burke had also joined in the fray in expressing criticism of massive retaliation, and General Carl Spaatz, national commander of the civil air patrol, also publicly voiced his concern that Soviet strength was growing at the expense of the US. He predicted that the Soviet Union would secure the first ICBM and thus ‘win the world’.55 While consensus existed in military circles about the need for thousands of ballistic missiles to be deployed, Eisenhower believed only in their ‘great psychological importance’. Development was important but procurement in vast quantities was superfluous.56 Even Arthur Radford, whom Eisenhower credited with having a more unified sense of military

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planning, did not shirk from expressing reservations with certain aspects of national security. Publicly, he made a number of speeches defending the administration’s defence policies, even in retirement.57 Privately, however, Radford urged the president not to freeze out conventional forces for fighting limited conflicts, believing a situation of mutual deterrence would create the conditions for possible escalation of an initially small conflict into general war. The military’s demands for larger defence budgets and a diversification of America’s war-making effort encouraged the expansion of the military-industrial complex and, in turn, a symbiotic relationship between the military and private industry. By the mid-1950s, the ‘unwarranted influence’ of this relationship had not gone unnoticed by Eisenhower. As he argued at one meeting in December 1954 with Charles Wilson and the JCS: We must have a dynamic industrial base. But the industrial base must never dominate our military establishment, nor should it be the other way around. And this is extremely important – and I’m not sure anyone else can see down the road far enough at this stage – if the military and our industrial leaders ever team up, they can dictate the whole country.58 Eisenhower frequently expressed his concerns with the way the munitions industry tried to exert political pressure on the military and Congress. His views sometimes found their way into the public domain. Thus, the New York Times noted that the president had made the claim that ‘political and financial influences rather than military considerations alone were playing an unwarranted part in the defence debate’.59 Eisenhower’s concerns only grew as the decade progressed. As disarmament negotiations got under way at the UN Disarmament Commission sub-committee in the autumn of 1955, Radford’s reservations had not dissipated. At a special NSC briefing in February 1956, which had been convened to consider Stassen’s latest proposals relating to aerial inspection, the admiral claimed the Soviets would use the next 12 to 18 months merely to buy time whilst negotiations were ongoing to implement a disarmament and inspection agreement. Echoing the

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feelings of many within and outside Washington, he argued, ‘for about a year and a half . . . the Russians will have built up all elements of power to approach parity with our own, building vast fleets of large bombers designed for one purpose – for the long range delivery of nuclear weapons.’60 Reflecting his wider concerns over America’s position in the Cold War, Radford continued, ‘it [is] the view of the Joint Chiefs that we cannot have an effective system of armed limitations and maintain the safety of the US vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.’ The admiral did not modify his views in this field during the remainder of his time in office. The difficulties Eisenhower encountered from his military staff over the nation’s defence needs are clearly apparent. A solution to these problems remained aerial inspection. The intelligence gained from this initiative would reveal the true extent of the Soviet Union’s capabilities (including its limitations) and intentions. Bluff could then be matched against reality. If Eisenhower could minimise the risk of surprise attack, he could also begin grappling with the spiralling costs and infrastructure associated with deterrence. Knowledge of the enemy’s capabilities would contain fear of surprise attack and the costs required for America’s defences. His thoughts were echoed in a speech given by John Foster Dulles to the UN General Assembly in September 1955: Long experience makes it apparent that when there is a sense of insecurity, when there is an ominous unknown, then arms seem needed, and limitation of armament becomes virtually unobtainable. Reductions of armament occur when fear is dissipated, when knowledge replaces exaggerated speculation, and when in consequence arms seem less needed.61 It was against this background that Eisenhower continued to pursue proposals for a system of mutual aerial inspection and undertook reconnaissance activities. Ground inspection could not always prove reliable or comprehensive in an age when both the US and the Soviet Union were working on increasing the numbers and quality of light jet bombers, new jet fighters and missiles. Aerial inspection provided

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a more efficient way of ascertaining the scale of forces, the quality of aircraft, bases and equipment. This led, as Chapter Two has shown, to Eisenhower’s decision to authorise development of U2 flights in November 1954. It also led to his support for Open Skies, which attempted to ‘legalise’ overflights of Soviet territory. In the autumn of 1955, the UN Disarmament Commission was convened. With the help of Nelson Rockefeller, Stassen presented a detailed version of Open Skies, based on Eisenhower’s proposal at Geneva. This plan also included Soviet proposals for ground observers. Thus, the US urged all countries concerned to give priority to the implementation of ‘such confidence measures as President Eisenhower’s plan for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection, and Marshal Bulganin’s plan for establishing control posts at strategic centres’.62 The Soviet delegation to the UN, however, rejected US proposals. Distrust bred concerns in the Soviet camp that Open Skies was, as Khrushchev originally claimed, nothing more than a ‘bald espionage plot against the USSR’.63 The Soviets continued to insist that inspection should form the last stage of any disarmament agreement. In March 1956, a disarmament conference in London was convened. The parties to this gathering included Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the US. Western delegates proposed a ‘test strip’ plan, covering the inspection and reporting of territory of not less than 20,000 square miles in the US and the Soviet Union within which the feasibility of inspections systems could be tested. This ‘test strip’ proposal was tabled at the UN sub-committee on 21 March 1956. Proposals for a ‘technical exchange mission’ (of information and facilities) were also put forward. The Soviets expressed several reservations with the position of the West. They did not consider that aerial inspection constituted disarmament. Therefore, in the current atmosphere of mistrust, such measures could be incorporated only at the last stage of a disarmament agreement. Furthermore, a number of political issues, the Soviets argued, needed to be settled in advance of any such agreement – in that way international tensions would be reduced. During a conversation with Charles Bohlen, Khrushchev professed his fear that the US would call off disarmament arrangements once sufficient photographs

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had been taken of the Soviet Union.64 Until there was confidence, the Soviets would not accept Open Skies ahead of arrangements to disarm. The Soviet Union instead focused on reducing manpower and conventional weapons, proposing from 31 December 1956 a three-month freeze on non-nuclear armaments, armed forces and military budgets. On this issue, along with proposals relating to the inspection of armaments possessed by Germany, a ‘significant rapprochement between the US and Soviet positions’ was noted.65 The outcomes of negotiations were referred to the UN Disarmament Commission for further study. The US was not, however, prepared to alter its position on aerial inspection and control. Eisenhower was of the view that every arms reduction arrangement had to have an inspection system for verification purposes. What he had in mind, as he reiterated to Stassen and Dulles, was a sequence that in the first instance exchanged blueprints, then an inspection system to verify this information, followed by an agreement to make certain reductions in forces. An inspection system would then verify such reductions, and so on.66 Thus, in a letter to Bulganin he implored, ‘In general, my feeling is that disarmament should be sought primarily, though not exclusively, in terms of limitations of armaments rather than men. The former are more subject to supervision, regulation and control than the latter.’ The Soviet chairman, however, remained unmoved by the president’s arguments.67 This situation led to yet another impasse in negotiations at the UN Disarmament Commission, for which the US was largely blamed. Neutral countries and many of those allied to the West, including France, urged Stassen to consider a ‘progressively applied system’ of aerial inspection tied in with disarmament. Only then could there be hope that the Soviet position would bend.68 Soviet distrust could also be traced to long-standing tensions between East and West over disarmament and missed opportunities for co-operation during the early months of the Cold War. The secrecy surrounding the development of the first atomic bomb had left a legacy of mutual suspicion between the two blocs. The Baruch Plan of 1946 – America’s attempt to formulate an agreement for the control of atomic energy and its development for peaceful purposes – had reinforced this state of affairs (see Chapter One). As the stalemate in

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negotiations between the West and the Soviet bloc continued, the US began to place increasing emphasis on inspection to detect violations of agreements. This stance did little to mollify the Soviets, many of whom regarded such a measure as a thinly veiled attempt to spy on the Soviet Union. As a result, little headway was achieved. By the mid-1950s, the prospects for reaching mutually acceptable agreements remained bleak. A review of memoranda and related records shows Eisenhower to be generally supportive of efforts to secure the international control of atomic energy and weapons. Indeed, he appeared genuinely committed to disarmament and peace. Even Rockefeller once noted during a NSC meeting: ‘Disarmament – the president thinks it is one of the most important jobs to be undertaken in the government.’69 Eisenhower had high expectations for the newly formed post of special assistant for disarmament. In a memorandum to Rockefeller about his appointment, Stassen wrote: ‘It is a difficult task and so much is at stake, and President Eisenhower is so deeply devoted to the objective of peace, that I have an abiding faith that a solution can be found.’70 In August 1955, Stassen became Lodge’s deputy at the UN. That same month Eisenhower instructed Stassen to establish a special committee to deal with disarmament problems. This group comprised senior representatives of the State and Defense Departments, the JCS, the CIA, the United States Information Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission. Stassen was responsible for co-ordinating disarmament issues between the above departments. He was also charged to develop a ‘sound disarmament agreement with effective safeguards’. As part of this remit, priority was given to an ‘early agreement on and implementation of . . . such confidence building measures as the exchange of military blueprints, mutual aerial inspection and the establishment of ground control posts at strategic centers’.71 As Eisenhower reminded his special assistant, ‘you are well aware of my extreme interest in this entire matter and of its inseparable relationship to the prospects of future peace and security’.72 By March 1956, the committee had developed proposals for the London disarmament conference including the ‘test strip’ plan. The committee was also the means through which Congress was apprised of government policy on disarmament.

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In testimony given to the Senate disarmament sub-committee in January 1956, Stassen argued: ‘If no agreements are reached, the prospects of what the world will face ten years from now in the whole build up of these tremendous destructive weapons and methods of delivery and the capacity of annihilation that would then be involved, is to say the least not a very happy picture.’73 Developments at the United Nations saw a rise generally in the public profile of Open Skies. A number of newspapers, journals and popularist magazines featured articles and commentary on the subject.74 Some of the coverage helped clarify the purpose of mutual aerial inspection and the exchange of military blueprints with the Soviet Union. A 16-page article in Toledo Blade Pictorial explained: ‘So far as is known, you have no reason to distrust your neighbor. The fence between your yards is for privacy, not because either of you fears the other.’ But, so the article continued, ‘if you had any reason to suspect what your neighbor was doing on the other side of the fence, you could go to the second floor, look at his yard and satisfy your doubts. In much the same way, the Soviet Union and the United States might satisfy their doubts about each other through aerial inspections.’ Pictorial proceeded to present a generally matter-of-fact commentary on Open Skies but towards the end of the article a somewhat judicious tone was adopted, carrying the warning that ‘One-sided disarmament – or disarmament without inspection – would actually increase the danger of war.’75 Other contributions, however, adopted a more cynical line on Eisenhower’s ‘beautiful propaganda weapon’. An article from the New York Daily News reported somewhat derisively that Open Skies had ‘set the Soviet thugs back on their tin ears, and they’ve never yet got over it. Every time it is brought up again they hem, haw, weasel, and blush prettily.’76 Opinion polls covering the Eisenhower’s Open Skies plan do not appear to have been carried out during the mid to late 1950s. It is therefore difficult to assess public understanding of and support for this initiative. As concerns emerged about the growing strength of the Soviet Union, publicity on Open Skies remained generally pessimistic. Time magazine reported: ‘For the first time, US officials admitted to “guarded optimism” over the possibility of reaching nuclear agreement

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with the Russians. That there was cause for any optimism at all was surprising.’77 As anti-communism in America intensified, possibilities for public acceptance of confidence-building measures waned. A Gallup poll conducted in September 1955 found that 82 per cent of Americans believed, via Russian radio, that claims that the Soviet Union wanted to end the Cold War was in fact propaganda.78 On 29 July 1955, Eisenhower announced that the US would undertake to orbit a satellite in connection with the International Geophysical Year (IGY) – a project estimated to last approximately 18 months, starting in July 1957, in which scientists would collaborate on a worldwide basis to advance knowledge of the earth and its environment. The US Navy had proposed the development of a satellite as early as 1946, although until 1954 the Joint Research and Development Board’s committee for guided missiles rejected the proposal, believing it to be of insufficient military value. Development of Project Vanguard, the US civilian satellite programme, was turned over to the National Science Foundation as the chief US liaison with the IGY. Although reliant on missile launchings (the project was based on a US Navy booster), the satellite, Eisenhower insisted, was to be a civilian project for scientific purposes. He was anxious to ‘de-emphasise’ the military’s role in this work.79 Eisenhower was enthusiastic about satellites, no doubt recognising their potential to undertake aerial reconnaissance. Towards the end of his second term in office, he authorised the development of a reconnaissance satellite, confident in the knowledge that there would be no accusations on the part of the Soviets regarding a US violation of airspace.80 Space was immune to such claims of territorial ownership – a principle confirmed when the Soviets launched and orbited Sputnik around the earth. As preparations got under way on satellite development, the administration authorised a series of balloon flights over the Northern hemisphere. These programmes had started in 1950. Equipped with cameras and transmitters, and flying at staggered altitudes of between 50,000 and 100,000 feet, the balloon programmes were intended, ostensibly, to obtain meteorological data relating to weather forecasting and to improve ways of providing early indications of severe weather warnings. Many balloon flights were aimed

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at the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In March 1956, after initiating a ‘stepped-up programme of launchings’, Eisenhower suspended an exercise codenamed ‘Moby Dick’, following protests from the Soviet Union. The Kremlin believed the US government was deliberately directing ‘propaganda balloons’ towards the Eastern bloc.81 In July 1958, the balloon programme was reinstated, officially for the purpose of assisting the IGY project. This, however, was largely a cover plan.82 Balloons were increasingly used for reconnaissance purposes. Strict control over the timing and co-ordination of programmes was maintained. Eisenhower also insisted, as with satellites and U2 planes, that all operations associated with the balloons, including information obtained from flights, were co-ordinated by the secretary of state and the DCI. At times, the balloon flights were able to produce ‘excellent results’ and when used in conjunction with images obtained via the U2, they helped confirm the construction of atomic energy facilities in the Urals and the Tyura Tam regions of the Soviet Union.83 In July 1958, within weeks of the balloon programme resuming, the president terminated all flights after a balloon fell to earth in Poland. However, this activity provides another example of the extent to which the administration was prepared to go in order to improve its intelligence on the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. It also demonstrates Eisenhower’s inclination to marginalise the role of the military in such operations. He clearly did not trust his military staff with what could be potentially crucial information on the Soviet Union. The most infamous reconnaissance system Eisenhower decided to employ was the U2. Frustrated by the latest deadlock in negotiations at the UN, and Bulganin’s rebuffs, the president authorised in the summer of 1956 covert flights over the Soviet Union using these high altitude planes. Reconnaissance aircraft had been subject to a number of refinements from the early 1950s so that they could achieve higher altitudes and avoid interception by Soviet bombers. The reconnaissance systems branch at the Wright Air Development Command (WADC), based in Ohio, began designing aircraft that could reach higher altitudes in excess of 45,000 feet – the maximum altitude a Soviet fighter aircraft could reach at that time. By July 1955, improvements to lens

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and camera equipment meant that focal lengths of 180 inches were possible at altitudes above 68,000 feet.84 There has been debate over how effective the intelligence gained from these flights was, and therefore how helpful it was in judging Soviet capabilities and their likely future development. In his article, ‘A Golden Nuclear Age? The Balance Before Parity’, Richard Betts argues that total coverage of the Soviet Union, and thus high confidence about its force levels, did not exist until the advent of satellite surveillance after 1960.85 The U2 had its limitations; it could not cover the entire Soviet interior and between early 1958 and April 1960 few deep-penetration flights were mounted. Moreover, during the late 1950s, numerous tests using F-102 and F-104 fighters were carried out to test the vulnerability of the U2 against Soviet interception. While intelligence reports concluded that interception of the U2 by the Soviet defensive fighters was unlikely over the next few years, many such planes were detected by radar and forced to withdraw from Soviet airspace.86 James C. Dick, on the other hand, considers the role of the U2 was significant and the coverage achieved should not be underestimated. In his article, ‘The Strategic Arms Race, 1957–61: Who Opened a Missile Gap?’, Dick points out that on a clear day flights could capture ‘4,000 paired pictures of a 125-mile-wide, 2,174-mile-long strip of the Soviet Union’. The photographs were usually of ‘startling resolution and clarity’.87 According to protests registered by the Soviet Union about reconnaissance flights in July 1956, ‘intruder planes’ managed to cover East Germany, Poland, Vilnius, Minsk, Brest and Kaliningrad, penetrating up to 320 kilometres into Soviet territory.88 Later flights covered Bulgaria, the Caucasus, the Afghan border and prime ICBM targets such as those in the Urals and Tyura Tam. The photographs showed where suspected Soviet missile launch sites were located, their physical size and shape, test ranges and the location of radar installations.89 Christopher Andrew argues that until the Cold War, American presidents rarely showed much enthusiasm for intelligence services and covert action. Indeed, the US was the last major power to acquire either a professional foreign intelligence service or code-breaking

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agency. Since the 1950s, the US intelligence community, despite its late beginnings, has been the most technically advanced in the world. ‘The more sophisticated it has become,’ Andrew claims, ‘the higher presidential expectations have risen.’90 The CIA was created in 1947 and the Truman administration had intended to establish an intelligence confederation that would co-ordinate, evaluate and disseminate intelligence, but not to collect it. Nor was the agency ever supposed to engage in spying, the sponsoring of coups, influencing foreign elections and/or conducting any other kind of subversive operations.91 But with the onset of the Cold War, the CIA quickly took on a life of its own, gaining over time an increased level of autonomy, funding and jurisdiction. The requirement for intelligence on the Soviet Union, its allies and suspected communist subversion, using more sophisticated methods, became of supreme importance to the US government. By the early 1950s, the CIA was actively involved in subversive activities. More important, the agency had also taken on increased responsibility for the collection of intelligence – a role that had previously been the exclusive domain of the services.92 By the mid-1950s, the CIA was involved in all activities associated with the so-called ‘intelligence cycle’.93 As aerial reconnaissance became the most reliable means by which to gather intelligence on Soviet military hardware and intentions, including evidence of an impending attack on the US or its allies, Eisenhower encouraged the CIA to take an active role in the planning, collection, evaluation and reporting of intelligence. This method of intelligence gathering had its strengths. But it also had its limitations. Eisenhower was able to contain expenditures, though only to a certain extent. The CIA and the military continued to produce pessimistic evaluations of Soviet capabilities, which Congress and certain sectors of the media used to great effect when challenging the administration’s handling of defence policy.94 As the discussion below and in Chapter Six will show, at the root of Eisenhower’s intelligence failure was not miscalculation or misperception, but an inability to use to full effect the intelligence gained – that is, to make far-reaching decisions on military strategy and being able to do so openly and in a climate of reduced risk and criticism.

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Alongside the above efforts, Eisenhower corresponded with Nikolai Bulganin throughout 1956 in an attempt to persuade the Soviet chairman to adopt Open Skies. ‘Consider, Mr Chairman,’ he implored, ‘what a vast change would be effected not only in our relations but throughout the entire world if there were prompt measures’ for the ‘opening of our countries to mutual inspection’.95 The Soviet leadership remained unmoved. In his response, Bulganin maintained: It seems to us that in the present international situation and, moreover, under conditions of a completely unrestricted armaments race, the carrying out of such flights would not fail to free the peoples from the fear of new war, but on the contrary would intensify that fear and mutual suspicion.96 While Eisenhower welcomed the Soviet Union’s announcement to reduce its armed forces, he did not believe this measure went far enough ‘to eliminate the fear, and the vast cost, generated by nuclear armaments’.97 His regret that so little progress had been made in the field of disarmament and mutual aerial inspection was clear in his final letter to Bulganin of 1956. Thus, he argued, ‘You will be sure that our government will continue its efforts . . . it will be my neverending purpose to seek a stable foundation for a just and durable peace in the mutual interest of all nations.’98 The correspondence between Eisenhower and Bulganin (and later Khrushchev) is significant for a number of reasons. The basis for the Soviet Union’s refusal to accept Open Skies, or any form of aerial inspection in advance of an agreement to reduce arms, is clear from the negotiations that took place at the UN Disarmament Commission. Yet the letters are able to add a personal slant on this subject, demonstrating the depths of distrust that each country felt towards the other, alongside their conflicting priorities for seeking to address areas of outstanding disagreement. As such, the letters reveal, more often than not, a general sense of frustration on the part of the leaders concerning the prosecution of the Cold War. Inevitably, the correspondence betrays a tendency for one country to blame the other for the state of international relations. As Eisenhower wrote in a letter to Khrushchev

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in February 1958: ‘I begin to wonder, Mr Chairman, whether we shall get anywhere by continuing to write speeches to each other?’99 There was another reason for Soviet rejection of aerial inspection. The opening up of the Soviet Union to reciprocal overflights and the exchange of blueprints would expose its military shortcomings. The Soviets feared that the Americans would attack if they became aware of just how weak the Soviet Union was compared to the US. As Nikita Khrushchev’s son, Sergei, remarked during a television interview on the Cold War during the mid-1990s: My father understood that very well; that’s why he rejected the programme of the Open Sky – not because he was trying to hide his troops, but he was scared that the Americans would realise how weak the Soviet Union was indeed, and then the Americans were going to come to the conclusion that now is the time to take over.100 The Soviets felt compelled to strengthen its military capabilities. As Bulganin argued in March 1954 at the party group of the Supreme Soviet, ‘we would commit an irreparable error if we did not strengthen our armed forces. Very many facts indicate that the imperialist forces headed by the US are openly conducting a policy of the preparation of a new war against us.’101 The West’s drive to rearm West Germany, the failure to negotiate an end to the Korean War and massive retaliation may account for Bulganin’s pessimistic attitude during early 1954. However, and as we have seen, there were limits to the Soviet Union’s ability to increase military forces. At the time of Stalin’s death, the Soviet economy was in a terrible state and the standard of living was deplorably low. Not only did Khrushchev want to pursue a new approach towards the West but he also desired to embark on a major series of welfare reforms such as house-building programmes, improvements in the social security system and education, and increases in pensions.102 The price tag for these measures would be considerable. Disarmament could, therefore, seem an attractive option, allowing the Soviet regime to divert its energies from heavy to light industry and the production of consumer goods. However, like Bulganin, Khrushchev

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was deeply distrustful of the West, especially the US military. He endorsed a defence programme that would provide a sufficient deterrent against attack, knowing that the leaders of the Western powers would not risk war with the Soviet Union so long as it had a few nuclear missiles. This approach would not, by any stretch, guarantee parity with the US. But then, Eisenhower’s Open Skies plan would not, as far as the Soviet leaders were concerned, guarantee disarmament – it would merely reveal their country’s limitations. Consequently, mutual aerial inspection remained off-limits. Open Skies provides a pertinent example of the fundamental differences that persisted between the Soviet Union and America after July 1955. These differences would continue to exist throughout the duration of the Cold War. The heads of government meeting had got the adversaries around the negotiating table, yet distrust between the two blocs remained entrenched and this affected the decisions the Soviet Union made after July 1955 with regard to Open Skies. While the Soviets wanted to agree a disarmament plan ahead of inspection, the US did not. And while Eisenhower saw mutual aerial inspection as a way of easing international tensions, leading to a reduction in armaments, Nikita Khrushchev regarded this as espionage. Against this background, acceptance of Open Skies remained in doubt and this had important repercussions for Eisenhower’s defence strategy. Without reliable intelligence on the Soviet Union, the president could not suppress demands for larger defence budgets. After July, however, the challenges he faced took on a more fundamental stance. A more rigorous questioning of massive retaliation took root during this period, the origins of which can be traced to Nelson Rockefeller’s second gathering at Quantico. This group advanced a comprehensive critique of government defence policy that would prove influential in the medium and long term. This subject will be examined in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER FIVE THE CHALLENGE TO M ASSIVE R ETALIATION

In the autumn of 1955, Nelson Rockefeller reconvened the Quantico panel. This group pushed more aggressively for building up America’s defences and influence around the world, putting, as Walt Rostow later claimed, the price tags on the military and foreign aid programmes outlined in its report of June 1955.1 The panel’s second report recommended the need for additional government expenditures of $18 billion over the next six years in order to build up America’s military, technological and economic strength around the world.2 Fearing ‘communist tactics of subversion, economic penetration, insidious propaganda and political agitation’, the panel argued that ambitious foreign aid programmes in Southeast Asia in order to prevent newly independent countries, and potentially unstable ones in particular, from falling prey to communist domination were required.3 The panel thus recommended that the US should ‘greatly increase the flow of investment resources to . . . Japan, South Asia and South East Asia’. The government could not, the panel argued, rely on benign packages alone to counter threats in these regions. Echoing the views held by many government officials, the group advocated a greater capability to deal with limited war.4 Its repudiation of massive retaliation, the cornerstone of Eisenhower’s military strategy, was complete. This chapter will examine the role of the Quantico panel after the Geneva summit. Extant literature covering the challenges to massive

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retaliation has focused on the role of intellectuals, Congressmen, politicians and military officials.5 An examination of Rockefeller’s second gathering helps demonstrate the extent to which dissatisfaction with the New Look pervaded Capitol Hill and embraced an intellectual-technological elite. In the process, the panel was able to establish important links with elected officials and military staff. These links allowed certain members of the panel to play an influential role in defining and delivering the foreign policy agenda of the Kennedy administration. This analysis, as the final two chapters will show, raises important questions concerning the state-private network. Moreover, an examination of the activities of a lobby group provides another dimension to the various forces at work that endeavoured to influence foreign policy and encourage the expansion of the military-industrial complex in America. The Quantico panel added to the growing pressures on the Eisenhower administration to increase defence budgets. Rockefeller’s campaign did not end with the dissolution of the panel in March 1956. At this meeting, he agreed to form the Special Studies Project (SSP) in an effort to gain ‘top level political support for a sustained program of US leadership and initiative designed to insure the survival of the free world’.6 Away from the White House, Rockefeller’s new project would amount to another, but this time very public, challenge of government defence policy. Finally, an examination of the panel also demonstrates the bipartisan nature of the liberal internationalist foreign policy pursued by America during the post-1945 period, a theme raised in Chapter One. Rockefeller had welcomed President Eisenhower’s proposal at the summit for the exchange of military blueprints and implementation of a system of mutual aerial inspection, regarding this decision as a personal achievement.7 For him, it had demonstrated publicly America’s ‘sincere desire for peace with security’. Conscious of the fact that Eisenhower’s plan would be the subject of ‘vigorous study’ at the UN Disarmament Committee from the autumn of 1955, Rockefeller continued to show great interest in Open Skies. During early August, he approved a detailed plan by his staff for taking Eisenhower’s proposal forward on the basis that there would be, at least initially, no requirement for the limitation or reduction of armaments.8 Such actions were strictly

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beyond his remit but, in his inimitable style, Rockefeller ‘plunged into the task of salesmanship with verve’.9 This aroused the wrath of John Foster Dulles. Referring specifically to Rockefeller’s activities in the weeks leading up to the summit, Dulles had warned Eisenhower’s special assistant to refrain from furnishing the president with advice on foreign affairs, arguing that he was not ‘disposed to be Secretary of State under these conditions’.10 Harold Stassen was to remain the key government spokesman on disarmament and co-ordinator of a plan for Open Skies. Nevertheless, Rockefeller’s interest in foreign affairs did not diminish. He reconvened the Quantico panel ostensibly on the basis of probing the ‘psychological aspects of US strategy’ in the wake of the summit.11 But he was also concerned that the administration should not get carried away by the ‘spirit of Geneva’. In the spring of 1955, the report of the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) had been completed and its chairman, James Killian, had been urging Eisenhower to adopt many of its recommendations, including urgent work on the development of the ICBM. The TCP report claimed that the Soviet Union had now developed weapons and delivery capabilities that placed the US in danger of surprise attack and possible defeat. As Killian argued: ‘There was a growing realisation that thermonuclear weapons in the hands of the Soviets posed a threat of terrible dimensions that required urgent efforts to construct new defenses, to give greater emphasis to the deterrence of war, and to seek arms limitation.’12 Demands grew for building up America’s defences, including missile development, and the Quantico panel resurrected its campaign along these lines. A number of government officials, some of whom had attended the panel’s sessions in June as guest speakers, spoke in approving terms of Rockefeller’s efforts. They included Richard Bissell, deputy director of the CIA, and Ted Streibert, director of the US Information Agency.13 More interestingly, Rostow contacted Kintner in late July to advise him of a recent meeting he had had with James Killian at MIT. According to Rostow, Killian was very supportive of the Quantico effort and fully endorsed the idea that a new group be formed to take the panel’s arguments forward. Killian believed ‘that the consideration given his report [would] be strengthened by such an outside follow-up committee’. Rostow suggested

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that Rockefeller spend some time with Killian to discuss ‘the interrelationship of the two efforts’ as he believed that Rockefeller’s hands would ‘be strengthened by Killian giving this idea full support’.14 The ‘I’ll scratch your back’ tactic may not always have been uppermost in the minds of these men but collectively they would chip away at the foundations of government policy and fuel the impetus for a more sustained and public questioning of its ability to deal with the communist threat. Dunn, Speier and Thomson did not participate in the second gathering. They were replaced by William Webster, New England Electric System; Henry Kissinger, Harvard University; Colonel George Lincoln, US Military Academy; Stacy May, consulting economist; and Major Frederick Anderson of USAF, who became the panel’s chairman. Rockefeller took a more active part in the second panel compared with the first, attending most sessions and contributing towards discussions. From the very beginning, the group exhibited concern that the administration could get carried away by a willingness to embark on a series of measures aimed at continuing an easing of tensions between the West and the Soviet Union. The foreign ministers of Britain, France, the US and the Soviet Union were preparing for their conference in the autumn, with the view to getting the ball rolling for the implementation of decisions agreed by the heads of government at Geneva. In the meantime, in a recent speech, which Rockefeller had found particularly irksome, John Foster Dulles had announced that the US would pursue, albeit within carefully controlled limits, a policy of ‘reciprocating the present Soviet attitude and demeanor, and of according the Soviet leaders a certain relaxation which they want’. While Dulles also stated that the government was not so foolish as to think the Soviets would rule out a resumption of their previous aggressive behaviour and tactics, it was not inclined either to discourage an ‘irreversible trend’ on the part of the Soviets towards accommodation with the West.15 At the panel’s fourth session on 26 August, it was apparent that one repercussion of the ‘spirit of Geneva’ would be pressure to reduce US military forces as part of the government’s renewed attempts to negotiate on the issue of disarmament. This measure was unacceptable to the panel. It was also unacceptable to the military officials who

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were present for part of the time at the panel’s meetings.16 Consensus emerged during discussions that a reduction in force levels would harm America’s position, allowing the Soviets to revert to their previous tactics. As Max Millikan argued, ‘the most dangerous possibility is that we will erect conditions, the acceptance of which will lessen tensions but will not affect the Soviet military potential.’17 In early August, the Soviets had rejected Open Skies as ‘unrealistic’.18 As far as the panel was concerned, Soviet rejection answered important questions regarding their sincerity towards a relaxation of world tensions, and it by no means held the panel back from advancing a more aggressive platform. The panel resumed its meetings towards the end of September 1955. By this time Rostow had also withdrawn.19 In June the panel had argued that the Soviet Union was expected to surpass the US in military technology in the very near future and, by 1965, the Soviets would have at least a two-year lead unless the US took drastic action. The second Quantico panel revisited this theme. Its members had not altered their position on the Cold War in any way. Indeed their principal premise remained that America should in all future negotiations with the Soviet Union seek to maintain conditions which resulted in a strategic balance favouring the US along with a modification of Soviet intentions. The form of co-operation the government appeared to be taking, and manifest in Dulles’ recent speech, was neither possible nor desirable.20 As the panel’s initial sessions got under way, the principal topics of discussion included the military and financial aspects of fighting the Cold War. Inevitably, talks were absorbed by concerns about ‘lead’ and ‘lag’ times with respect to Soviet and US military capabilities. In an appendix to the main report entitled ‘Summary of the World Situation at the End of 1955’, it was argued that in the field of guided missiles there was evidence to indicate the probability that the Soviet Union was ‘well ahead’ of the West in the development and production of weapons with ranges of about 700 miles, and the possibility that the Soviets were also a year or two ahead in the development of intermediate and intercontinental missiles. The report also claimed that surface-to-air missiles had been installed around Moscow and other cities. Taken as a whole, it was concluded that the Soviet Union’s

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military programme appeared ‘to be a balanced, well-thought-out one which will give them, in not over three years, an offensive capability to inflict massive and possibly permanent crippling damage on the United States’.21 The panel did attempt to pick up again on mutual aerial inspection and the exchange of military blueprints. Its earlier scepticism had not dissipated; Open Skies remained relevant only as an ‘effort to elicit an indication of Soviet goodwill’.22 Rockefeller, however, remained enthusiastic about the idea. In August 1955, he wrote to John Foster Dulles, Arthur Radford and Charles Wilson about the possibility of promoting reciprocal overflights between the US and the Soviet Union for the commercial sector.23 In the autumn of 1955, he supported an exhibition on aerial inspection at the United Nations headquarters to coincide with talks at the Disarmament Commission. This exhibition ran from 15 November to 20 December 1955. The second panel gave greater attention to budgetary issues. As the gathering embarked on a more comprehensive statement of future US military requirements, it became possible to equate these to costs and, ultimately, the size of the defence budget the panel believed was necessary to prevent the Soviets from achieving military parity. Concern over the level of the US defence budget was fuelled by claims that the Soviet budget, then estimated at $23 billion per year, was rising. Measured in purely economic terms, and taking into account claims that the Soviet Union could mobilise without collapse as much as 40 per cent of its total annual production for military outlays in the current climate, the panel argued that the Soviets could support a military budget in the region of $50 billion without suffering intolerable economic strains. The US defence budget held at approximately $42 billion per annum was considered ‘below the threshold for defense equality with the USSR’. A budget of at least $48 billion per annum was recommended.24 According to the Quantico panel, increases in military expenditures amounting to $18 billion over a six-year period from 1956 to 1961 were required to improve the deterrent capabilities of Western Europe and North America against the threat of massive nuclear attack by the Soviets and to build up America’s ground forces.25

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The panel believed the nation could support these additional costs without adverse impact on the economy. On the basis of ‘independent estimates’, the group argued that there would be a $3 billion cash surplus during 1956 and at least $6 billion in fiscal year 1957, based on present tax rates and national expenditures. Thus, the panel’s report, ‘Action Program for Free World Strength’, concluded, ‘it clearly appears possible to undertake these programs and still achieve the president’s campaign pledge of a balanced cash budget.’26 Furthermore, the group argued that with projected cash surpluses totalling $59 billion between fiscal years 1956 to 1961, and the proposed additional military expenditures estimated at $18 billion, the total surplus margin would amount to approximately $40–41 billion.27 The panel’s financial report did not disclose the sources of independent estimates. Confident that their proposals would not weaken the economic strength of the nation, its members argued: ‘Currently expressed fears that any appreciable increase in federal outlays might undermine the sound growth basis of our economy . . . are completely unwarranted.’ Critical, therefore, of the administration’s recent budget reductions, the panel urged the government to accept ‘a level of security expenditure somewhat above that now going ahead and contemplated for the future’, deploring the fact that not only were military decisions heavily influenced by fiscal policies, but they were also made by economists rather than military decision-makers – a situation which, in the eyes of the panel, presented the ‘greatest single threat to US security’.28 One can detect from the panel’s stance a strong association with the principal tenets of Harold Lasswell’s garrison state thesis. Indeed, Rockefeller’s group provides a powerful example of the specialists on violence in action who were determined to place all matters military at the helm of society. Thus, as Rostow and Millikan argued: In short, a minimum requirement for American policy over the next decade is that we create the conditions under which the nation is prepared to maintain a (probably) expanded military budget in the field of atomic weapons, means of delivery, the means of defense, and that the government so organise itself that first rate creative talents are steadily at work on the series of scientific and technological breakthroughs on which the arms race in modern weapons so largely depends.

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The coercive aspects of policy implementation was, arguably, clear when Rostow and Millikan argued: ‘If [military policy] is to be supported by the citizens of the US and the free world, it must be explained with greater coherence and in greater detail than has yet been done.’29 The panel’s arguments were also portentous of a speech that John F. Kennedy would make in the US Senate in August 1958. The senator from Massachusetts decried the willingness of the Eisenhower administration to place fiscal security ahead of national security. As Kennedy lamented: ‘We tailored our strategy and military requirements to fit our budget – instead of fitting our budget to our military requirements and strategy.’30 The senator continued to castigate the president for what he believed was Eisenhower’s short-sighted approach in linking the assessment of America’s military strength to the country’s economic requirements. However, Kennedy’s speech attracted attention because of the claims he made about the emergence of a potential ‘missile gap’ between the US and the Soviet Union. In mid-1955, claims abounded about the existence of a bomber gap favouring the Soviet Union, and it did not take long for the so-called missile gap to start raising its ugly head. Congressional Democrats pounced on such claims, regarding these as an opportunity to exploit so-called weaknesses in government defence policy. In the spring of 1955, the Democrat Senator Henry Jackson led inquiries in the congressional sub-committee on military applications (part of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy) on US progress with regard to the development of intermediate and long-range missiles. Supported by Clinton Anderson, a Democrat senator from New Mexico, Jackson’s findings indicated that, despite the acceleration in US programmes, the Soviet Union was likely to be ahead of America in the race for the ICBM. As the sub-committee noted: ‘If the Soviets started their effort much earlier than we did – which may well be the case – and if they assigned it overriding priority from the very outset, it is entirely possible, indeed probable, that they will achieve the ICBM well ahead of us.’31 Believing that the question of war and peace depended on which nation acquired the ICBM first, the sub-committee was of the view that should this feat be achieved by the Soviets, effective retaliation

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would be rendered impossible. The Soviets would not hesitate to use such a weapon against US cities, industry and SAC bases.32 Jackson and Anderson put forward a number of recommendations for ensuring the Soviets did not acquire this weapon in advance of the US, including the creation of both a separate budget and department dedicated to the fast-track development of long-range ballistic missiles. Eisenhower rejected these recommendations, arguing that structural changes relating to the work on the ICBM would, if anything, hinder progress. No other programme, the president advised, was receiving ‘so urgent and emphatic a directive’.33 As Chapter Two has shown, from the very beginning of his time in office, Eisenhower sought to balance the budget by reducing federal expenditures, especially in the area of defence. Once a balanced budget had been achieved, the president aimed to reduce taxes. Taxes were reduced during fiscal years 1954 and 1955. However, the substantial increases in military expenditures that the Quantico panel recommended threatened to undo Eisenhower’s determination to achieve a balanced budget. The panel believed their proposals were affordable and would not prevent a balanced budget from being achieved. Nevertheless, their estimates were based on current tax rates and national expenditure, which Eisenhower wanted to reduce or, at the very least, contain. More important, acceptance of the Quantico panel’s recommendations would mean more than foregoing tax cuts. Increases in defence expenditures fuelled the military-industrial complex, consigning the nation to a garrison state. Not surprisingly, differences as fundamental as these would later drive a wedge between Eisenhower and Rockefeller. An area of increasing preoccupation to the panel concerned economic aid for the developing world. Its first report of June 1955 had recommended that the US should ‘greatly increase the flow of investment resources to . . . Japan, South Asia and South East Asia’. Alongside foreign aid packages, military intervention to prevent communist expansion was not ruled out, with South Vietnam singled out as the most vulnerable to a potential communist takeover.34 Economic aid and the developing world was a subject dear to the hearts of many panel members, particularly Walt Rostow and Max Millikan.

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They regarded such intervention as vital, not only in eliminating poverty and hunger in these regions but also in preventing former colonial countries from turning to communism. The creation of strong, healthy countries, capable of maintaining their independence and resisting insurgency, was, in Rostow’s and Millikan’s view, the only way to stop communist expansion in Asia.35 Economic development in the Third World remained an important part of Rostow’s foreign policy outlook. It formed the basis of his first challenge to the Eisenhower administration when he advocated in July 1954 the creation of a ‘world economic plan’. As its title implies, this plan called for a vastly expanded aid policy in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The president subsequently rejected Rostow’s proposals, which angered the professor.36 In his testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations in the US Senate in February 1958, Rostow argued that America’s responsibilities lay in assisting ‘new nations’ to build modern economies and political stability away from the influence of Moscow. To achieve this, he argued, required ‘an American economic development effort larger in scale, greater in continuity, with criteria for lending vastly less ambiguous than our present program’.37 In time, his stance would attract the support of John F. Kennedy. It would also later inform Rostow’s judgements about the future of Vietnam. In the meantime, however, it was the Quantico panel that would take up the mantle of challenging the Eisenhower administration. Rockefeller did not underestimate the significance of the developing world, regarding this issue as the ‘biggest vacuum in the history of the world’.38 In November 1950, Truman had appointed him as chairman of the International Development Advisory Board (IDAB), a 12-month assignment with responsibility for investigating the development of economic aid programmes for the developing world. The board was authorised under the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950 and Truman asked the group to examine the recommendations put forward by the Point IV programme. This programme was aimed at ‘building the strength of the free world and increasing the ties of friendship between the economically more prosperous nations and the two thirds of the world living in low economic circumstances’. This experience no doubt impressed upon Rockefeller the likelihood

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that the battlefield in the Cold War would move beyond Europe. An improvement in the living standards and well-being of the peoples in such regions, he contended, was ‘a vital part of [US] defense mobilisation’. In his report to Truman of March 1951 Rockefeller argued: The issue really is one of economic development versus economic subversion. Soviet imperialism is seeking to chop off country after country, to leave the US in isolation. Our economic policy must seek to strengthen the ties of co-operation which band free peoples together.39 Rockefeller believed the defeat of communism had an economic dimension as well as a military one. ‘The more deeply the members of the board explored the relationship of economic development to defense, the more impressed they became with how inseparable they are,’ he concluded in an effort to persuade the president to expand such aid in Asia, Africa and Latin America.40 Rockefeller was of the view that the Cold War had to be fought on non-military fronts, that it was as much a battle for hearts and minds as it was for zones of containments. In David Milne’s work, America’s Rasputin – Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War, he maintains: ‘One day Rostow would advocate military steps that held the potential to precipitate nuclear war, the next he worked on establishing an expansive US aid policy to combat world poverty.’41 It can be argued that this character reference can easily be applied to Nelson Rockefeller, notwithstanding his and Rostow’s party political differences. It is also important to recognise that the panel was asserting an internationalism that took America beyond the confines of its Atlanticist bonds and towards limitless global activism. The unquestioned belief in America’s ascendancy in the free world and divine right to repulse communism in all corners of the globe was particularly evident in recommendations made in the panel’s second report. These recommendations laid the foundations for a fundamental questioning of the Eisenhower administration’s foreign policy. They are significant because they helped to inform the development and execution of foreign policy during the Kennedy and Johnson presidential years and

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indeed the remainder of the Cold War. The report recommended an expansion of the free world by increasing America’s capability to deter and deal with limited war.42 The first panel had by no means overlooked this aspect of military strategy. For the second gathering, this issue was paramount. The Soviet Union was starting to become very active in the developing world, where countries such as Laos, Vietnam and India were struggling economically, lacked modern infrastructure and had new and/or weak political regimes. Concern thus mounted that such countries would turn to communism, finding MarxistLeninist doctrine – relating to the equal distribution of wealth and the elimination of poverty – initially appealing. In June 1954, a communist regime under Ho Chi Minh had taken control of North Vietnam. Under the Geneva Accords, nationwide reunification elections were promised by 1956. However, there were concerns, according to a CIA report, that Ho would win the scheduled elections in the South and so they were cancelled.43 The panel argued that communist infiltration and domination of Southeast Asia would weaken the influence of the West and result in a shift in the balance of power. It thus advocated a vastly expanded programme of economic and technological aid amounting to $2 billion per annum, which would assist in meeting the ‘aspirations of the people . . . by helping them to plan and implement measures for self-government’.44 The panel concluded that such measures were of a very long-term nature and should become a permanent part of US foreign policy. As Rostow and Millikan later argued, ‘a much expanded program of American participation in the economic development of the so-called underdeveloped areas can and should be one of the most important means for furthering the purposes of US foreign policy’.45 The panel’s commitment to the developing world was thus never in doubt. What did start to occupy the thoughts of its members, however, was a growing belief that economic and related aid was not the only measure available to the US for dealing with Soviet tactics. In a report originally drafted by Rostow for discussion by the panel’s policy sub-committee, it was argued that even though free elections and the creation of a more vigorous regime in South Vietnam were necessary, there were doubts about whether such actions were enough to prevent

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absorption of this area by the communists in North Vietnam. Thus, it was argued, ‘admittedly these steps leave open to question, basic to confidence in the survival of South Vietnam, whether that region can defend itself with US political support or whether direct US military support, or assurance thereof in case of need, will be essential’.46 At the peak of the fighting at Dien Bien Phu, the US had considered direct military action in Vietnam. According to Georges Bidault, Dulles had at one point asked the French foreign minister whether he would like the US to give them two atomic bombs.47 It was not moral support, however, that directly concerned the panel. Led by George Lincoln, and supported by George Pettee and Henry Kissinger, argument was made that ‘the US should get rid of the concepts of massive retaliation’.48 Eisenhower’s defence strategy was designed to deter a first strike nuclear attack by the Soviets, an action which would initiate an all-out nuclear confrontation – in short Third World War. However, such an attack was considered unlikely unless, as the panel argued, Western military power dwindled to a comparative level which allowed the Russians a high possibility of success without significant damage to the Soviet Union. Measures such as improved air defence would provide an effective deterrent for NATO and North America in the event of a first strike by the Soviets. But where did this scenario leave arrangements for small-scale, limited wars designed to deter or fight insurgency, where direct confrontation between the East and the West was not likely to be risked but whose interests were, according to the panel, at stake? How could nuclear weapons serve political purposes beyond deterrence? These arguments were, as Chapters One and Two have shown, hardly novel. Like the CPD, the Quantico panel recommended a build-up of conventional forces, ‘a strong, mobile ready force of appropriate composition, with arrangements for its employment in all likely areas’.49 The build-up of such a capability was not considered at odds with the panel’s vision for combating world poverty, as the focus of America’s Cold War moved from Europe to the developing world towards the end of the 1950s. Only five years earlier the CPD had supported measures for a more interventionist policy on the part of the US in Western Europe. Now the Quantico panel was asserting a similar line, only this time in areas where the former colonial powers were gradually

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withdrawing their rule. The panel’s proposals relating to limited war also echoed those of military staff who had voiced their criticism during debates leading to the formulation of NSC 162 during the autumn of 1953. Government policy did not dismiss the strategic significance of areas such as Formosa and Indochina. It even recognised the need for military action in the event of US and allied interests being subject to attack. However, the administration believed the principle of collective security through the United Nations should be upheld where trouble erupted in these areas. As Chapter Two has shown, what NSC 162 did not support, alongside its intention to reduce military assistance over the medium- to long-term period in Western Europe, was the build-up of US conventional forces to fight the free world cause in regions marked by unrest and resentment against the West and where ‘racial feeling, anti-colonialism, rising nationalism, popular demand for rapid social and economic progress’ were strong.50 The US government gave financial and military aid to the French in the war against the Vietminh. It even considered direct military intervention during the Dien Bien Phu debacle. But Eisenhower’s strategy could not in principle, and for financial reasons alone, support military action in every area threatened by communist insurgency. The government continued to rely on a strong security posture based on adequate offensive retaliatory and defensive strength in order to minimise the risk of Soviet aggression. However, as far as safeguarding and furthering American interests in the developing world were concerned, massive retaliatory striking power had, from the panel’s point of view, significant limitations. As Rostow argued in an oral history interview with Ted Gittenger in 1981: There was a good deal of thought in that period about the inadequacies of the so-called Eisenhower great equation, that is to say, a preponderant reliance on the nuclear threat. And a great many people were saying that in a world which the Soviets shared with us, thermonuclear weapons was not a very satisfactory stance and counseled a building up of our conventional forces.51 The panel’s recommendation to establish expansive foreign aid policies and greater measures to deal with limited war did not, however, stand

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in contrast to the approach of Harry Truman. Indeed there are clear continuities in this respect. As Chapter One has shown, NSC 68 had initiated a significant build-up of conventional forces – troops on the ground – in order to halt the spread of communism in Western Europe. The Quantico panel effectively sought to resurrect a broader definition of US foreign policy interests and an enlarged military force designed to sustain such interests. Massive retaliation represented much more than a cost-cutting exercise. Sandwiched between NSC 68 and John F. Kennedy’s ‘flexible response’ to the Cold War, it was an aberration, a retraction from the global activism that had been initiated by the Truman administration. During Eisenhower’S election campaign of 1952, he had pledged to end the Korean War and with it the conviction that America was duty bound to intervene in any part of the globe in order to arrest the spread of communism. However, to the specialists on violence in the military and in certain political circles, and to the research and development sectors supporting the growth of the US military industry, Eisenhower’s strategy was unacceptable. As the 1950s progressed, critics of massive retaliation sought to mobilise America’s great power base again and, as one of many manifestos advocating this course of action, the Quantico panel reports received considerable support across these fields. Rockefeller’s gatherings were, in many respects, a product of their time but, like their supporters, their attempt to assert a grand vision for America was resisted by the administration. In the meantime, Eisenhower’s political opponents would remain highly critical of massive retaliation. Kennedy and Texan Senator Lyndon B. Johnson argued that the US could no longer rely on using nuclear weapons to support its foreign policy objectives once Soviet missiles could retaliate against America.52 Without a limited war capability, the US might be forced to sit back and watch the Soviets conduct limited aggression in areas of key strategic interest to the West. As Chapter Two has shown, Eisenhower was in no doubt that a limited war in Europe, the Middle and Far East would escalate to nuclear war. He refused to expand conventional forces, arguing that such a move would result in a significant increase in defence budgets. More to the point, the likelihood of small wars escalating to nuclear war merely rendered

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conventional forces irrelevant. Gaddis has argued that the need for restrained military spending to preserve American economic liberty was ‘probably the most persistent single theme of Eisenhower’s public and private utterances while in the White House’.53 In Rostow’s eyes, Eisenhower failed to respond proactively to the rising importance of the developing world and the role of economic aid. There were missed opportunities in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, and ‘his administration’, claimed the professor, ‘responded in the second term defensively to crises that arose and gradually moved towards a wider approach. But it was usually in the face of some external pressure.’54 The possibility that the American people would not countenance an increased level of commitment and, in turn, sacrifice, did not appear to have concerned the panel. Its members believed the answer to such issues lay in one further recommendation of its report. Echoing government reports from as early as 1946 and the activities of the CPD, this recommendation concerned the need to explain ‘to the people of the United States the gravity of the world situation, and spelling out what is required to overcome its dangers’. As early as March 1955 Rockefeller had urged the president to make a speech to the American people and the world informing them of the seriousness of the world situation. Eisenhower was doubtful about this suggestion. Enthusiasm for this idea did not recede, however. By June 1955, Rostow had also jumped on the bandwagon, urging Rockefeller to persuade Eisenhower to go to the country and explain the dangers, as well as the opportunities. Ever the optimist, Rostow believed that exposure of the Soviet Union’s true intentions would result in a general acceptance of a greater military commitment around the world. Thus, he argued: ‘I have not the slightest doubt that the American people would respond to the challenge and possibilities of winning the Cold War, if the choices were defined.’55 Rockefeller concurred and this idea would become central to his later activities following his departure from government. Whether or not the American people would have bought into the Quantico panel’s recommendations will never be known. In December 1955, armed with the group’s final report and a supplementary

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memorandum entitled ‘Action Program for Free World Strength’, Rockefeller urged Eisenhower to take a hard look at ‘where we stand in light of Soviet tactics and intentions’.56 To his immense disappointment, the president refused to implement the panel’s recommendations. Had Rockefeller been able to present his case some five years earlier, he might have encountered a more receptive president. But, whereas Truman had been prepared to support a more interventionist foreign policy and assert America’s great power base around the world, Eisenhower was not. The difficulties Rockefeller experienced in trying to garner support for his stance and that of the panel’s had less to do with personality clashes with Dulles, Hoover and Bowie than with his rigorous questioning of government defence policy, which threatened to undermine the president’s financial and military planning. Moreover, Eisenhower did not support Rockefeller because he did not believe the gap between US and Soviet military capabilities was narrowing.57 He was even less inclined to support the group’s position on the developing world. As far as the future prosecution of the Cold War was concerned, Eisenhower and Rockefeller were poles apart and the Quantico exercise brought this painfully to light. In December 1955 Rockefeller resigned from the government. Shortly afterwards, he met Rostow for lunch at the faculty club of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. According to Rostow’s later account, Rockefeller informed him that the president ‘clearly indicated that he would not act to implement the Quantico II budget recommendations’.58 The press was quick to note a ‘split’ between Rockefeller and Eisenhower. Under the headline ‘Foreign Aid vs. Old Fight, New Casualty’, an article from the US News and World Report commented on Rockefeller having ‘lost out in his fight’ to secure a larger and more ambitious ‘foreign-assistance program’.59 The report went on to note that Rockefeller had a number of important allies, including Harold Stassen and Richard Nixon, but that he had also encountered strong opposition from the ‘budget balancers’, amongst them George Humphrey and John Hollister, under-secretary of foreign assistance operations. ‘Mr Rockefeller and his allies,’ the report continued, ‘also wanted spending to be bigger, although no specific amounts have been mentioned, and more flexible, with ample unobligated funds to meet

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emergencies wherever they might arise.’ In a somewhat prophetic tone, the report concluded: ‘Now Mr Rockefeller is returning to New York, where there is always work for a Rockefeller to do. But the controversy in which he was a central figure continues and may continue for years to come.’60 In a similar vein, the Washington Post also reported a rift between Rockefeller and Eisenhower’s treasury team. The former special assistant’s pleas for ‘giving overriding priority to meeting the double challenge of the enormous progress of the Kremlin’s arms program and . . . political offensive in the Middle and Far East’ failed to cut any ice with the administration.61 Pulling no punches, reporters Joseph and Stewart Alsop warned: The decision to neglect this double challenge is a fateful decision. The new theme song seems to be a revised version of the old hymn, ‘Look Only to Lady Luck, She Will Carry Us Through’. Maybe Lady Luck really will carry us through, as every sensible person must pray. But if Rockefeller’s factually justified forebodings prove correct, as is also possible, his departure from the government will later be remembered in the way men now remember the departure of British officials in the 1930s, who got into hot water by insisting that it was dangerous to neglect the challenge of Adolf Hitler.62 Rockefeller’s departure certainly signalled a fundamental difference of opinion between him and the administration. The press was also inclined to raise questions over the wisdom of government defence policy and to portray the Soviet Union as an implacable enemy. Publicly, Rockefeller supported Eisenhower’s re-election in 1956. Friends and colleagues later urged the former special assistant to switch parties in order to improve his chances of being elected governor of New York. However, he refused. Rockefeller remained a committed Republican, but he would also launch in the same year as Eisenhower’s re-election the Special Studies Project (SSP), his overarching report on America’s medium- to long-term objectives on both the domestic and foreign policy fronts. Away from Washington, Rockefeller’s new project would

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also amount to another, but this time very public, challenge of government defence policy. The idea of ‘going public’ with the Quantico panel’s findings had gathered strong momentum by early 1956. Not surprisingly, the report had evoked a particularly favourable reaction from staff at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE). As Colonel Edward Rowny, deputy secretary of the general staff at SHAPE in New York commented, ‘I can only hope that the type of thinking in the report has received top level approval and that Mr Rockefeller’s departure from government does not mean that these ideas must be given up.’63 Writing to Rockefeller in late October 1955, Ellis Johnson advised of the very encouraging responses he had received from Gruenther and Lauris Norstad, air deputy to the SACEUR, concerning the panel’s proposals for improved air defence of NATO. As a result, he urged Rockefeller to recommend to the president Nike B missile systems for the transatlantic community. In going public with his views, Rockefeller believed wholeheartedly that the American people and politicians had to be roused into taking some kind of action before it was too late. In a report prepared by Kintner in January 1956 entitled ‘What is to be Done?’, it was argued that the inability of the West to cope with the growing threat of communism had led to confusion among America’s political leaders and to political apathy. What was urgently required to address this situation was ‘a plan of action designed to motivate leaders both in this and other countries of the Free World to devote time and energy to putting the Free World principles into action’.64 At a meeting with Kintner, Parker and Roy Livermore on 18 January, Rockefeller supported the idea of the formation of a group whose objective would be to gain ‘top level political support for a sustained program of US leadership and initiative designed to insure the survival of the free world’.65 As argument grew for this line of action, a sense of urgency also prevailed. As Frank Barnett, director of research at the Richardson Foundation in New York, argued in a letter to Rockefeller of early March, ‘it is of course imperative that a crash program be launched immediately outside of government’.66 Like Rockefeller, he feared a major communist advance in the Cold War.

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Thus, in an address to the military industrial conference in February 1956 on ‘National Survival in the Nuclear Age’, Barnett argued: It is . . . supremely important for this nation to win the contest of science and engineering with our Soviet opponents. If, at any stage of the race, the communists precede us through the ‘thought barriers’ of technical advance, we may expect no mercy. The Kremlin will not scruple to blackmail us into ‘peaceful coalition’ in the world Soviet state.67 Before convening the Special Studies Project (SSP), Rockefeller organised one final gathering of the Quantico panel. This meeting took place in May 1956. Rockefeller used this reunion as a sounding board on which to inform the basis and scope of his next project. According to his notes of the meeting, the panel revisited the usual themes and concerns, including the military situation, economic issues and the developing world, political and psychological warfare and the impact of the Geneva summit on Soviet objectives. However, discussion also focused on the need to review American society at large and its long-term national goals. As Charles Thomson argued, the group’s appraisal had to incorporate ‘a wider recognition of common goals throughout society – goals that will be reflected in the lives of individual citizens’.68 On the foreign affairs front, the panel embarked on equally ambitious plans. The US, it was argued, had to build a ‘world consensus’, which went beyond placing the Soviets on the defensive in Europe and Asia.69 Hailed as the great success story in recent American history, the panel advocated a Marshall Plan for Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, along with encouraging democratic evolution in the ‘new’ countries of these regions. As part of a long-term programme for sustained economic growth in the free world, the group believed the US should offer to provide substantial capital funding of between $10 billion to $12 billion in the form of grants and loans to the developing world.70 Additionally, the American people had to be prepared to back limited wars in these regions, where for political reasons

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it would be impossible to use the full force of atomic air power. It was clear, therefore, that the scope of challenge and global responsibility of the US had widened considerably. Believing the executive branch to be ‘the weak link in understanding the problems’, it was now time for Rockefeller to launch his most comprehensive project away from Washington and the constraints of bureaucracy and the requirements for secrecy. In doing so, he insisted that his new ‘think group’ should be a bipartisan effort. He would be able to select, as he claimed, the best brains across the political spectrum.71 This support would give his efforts greater sustenance and credibility, and with the group’s findings subsequently placed in the public domain, pressure to respond by way of an expanded military budget would become relentless. Rockefeller’s liberal republicanism sat more than comfortably with the democratic sympathies of Rostow, Millikan, Possony and later Kennedy. The Quantico panel played an important role in shaping American Cold War foreign policy. Granted, the Eisenhower administration dismissed its recommendations and so, in the immediate term, Rockefeller’s efforts failed to make an impact on government policy. In the medium to long term, however, the panel’s arguments proved influential. It can be argued that the origins of the Kennedy administration’s ‘flexible response’ can be traced to the work of this group. As Rostow once remarked, the Quantico panel had ‘laid out a pre-Kennedy military and foreign policy’.72 The panel had mounted a comprehensive critique of massive retaliation which had attracted the support of military staff and politicians. From this point, a number of the panel’s members were able to nurture their connections with key politicians and thus promote their views through the policy-making process. Walt Rostow provides one such example. From 1956, he formed a close association with Kennedy and was influential in reinforcing the senator’s views on economic aid and limited warfare, as the following chapters will show. The SSP would become a public platform for defining and giving legitimacy to the various military and foreign policies that would be adopted by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. As 1955 drew to a close, Rockefeller’s mission for the US began to take on a broader level of responsibility and intervention around

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the world. Such a role reflected his grand vision for America and its potential power in the world order, and this was clearly evident in the Special Studies Project that he would launch in October 1956. Rockefeller never intended to undermine the Republican Party, however. He supported and was, in turn, supported by a group of men who were of the view that co-existence with the Soviet Union and atomic stalemate would facilitate an ultimate communist victory, and this fear, as Chapters Six and Seven will show, transcended party politics. The growing, bipartisan challenge to the Eisenhower administration threatened not only to overturn the various fiscal measures that had been put in place to safeguard the economy and control the military build-up in the US, but it also called into question the very basis of the administration’s policies and, in effect, the competence of an extremely popular president. By the late 1950s, the seeds of challenge had well and truly bloomed and Eisenhower’s efforts to control the militaryindustrial complex became increasingly more difficult. In 1956 the presidential election campaign got under way and Congress became more agitated as the press speculated on Soviet technological advances. The Democrats embarked on a public campaign to highlight the alleged deficiencies of US military programmes and the emergence of a missile gap. They were more than willing to overstate the dangers facing America, and it was a stance they maintained up to and during the 1960 presidential election campaign. Not letting such an opportunity slip through the net, Jackson voiced concern about claims pertaining to the imminence of Russian development of the world’s first 1,500-mile missile. Accordingly, he argued, ‘the political effect of such a breakthrough would be so devastating’.73 Furthermore, he demanded that development of the ICBM should be placed on a wartime footing, similar to the urgency that had been accorded the Manhattan Project.74 The press fuelled concerns about the growing military strength of the Soviet Union. Thus, Joseph Alsop claimed in an article in the Washington Post in January 1956, ‘One indicator of the general trend [in Soviet air-atomic lead] is the Soviet progress with the ICBM . . . Soviet output is now far ahead of American output in three of the four categories of combat aircraft and long-range jet bombers.’ According to this maverick journalist, SAC, on the other hand, was

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losing its ‘predominant strength that [had] been the heart and center of the free world’s defense for the last decade’.75 Furthermore, early discussions on the defence budget for fiscal 1958 became fractious, as the military chiefs tried to insist on a budget in excess of $40 billion. Thanks to the U2 flights, Eisenhower was able to exercise caution and insisted only on modest increases to the defence budget. The difficulties presented by the military and opposition would not go away, however. As the presidential election approached, the Democrats were determined to exploit fears about the growing military strength of the Soviet Union compared to the US. After November 1956, having lost a second consecutive election to the Republicans, the opposition did not let matters rest pertaining to the Soviet Union and the New Look. The parameters and influence of the Quantico panel clearly went beyond the articulation of mutual aerial inspection. Like many of their generation, the panel members were staunch anti-communists and were immensely suspicious of Soviet motives and the ‘spirit of Geneva’. A slackening of US efforts in the arms race could, as the panel believed, result in devastating surprise attack on the US or in the Soviet Union’s subjecting the West to atomic blackmail. The balance of power thus had to be maintained in America’s favour. This was the ethos that drove the Quantico panel and its protagonist, Nelson Rockefeller. The significance of the group’s efforts thus lay in the broad challenge that it mounted to the military and foreign policies of the Eisenhower administration. It added to the growing pressures on the administration to increase defence budgets and expand the militaryindustrial complex.

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CHAPTER SIX SPUTNIK, MISSILES AND OPEN SKIES

In November 1956, Eisenhower won the presidential election by another landslide. The margin of victory was almost double that of 1952, with the Democrats carrying only seven southern states.1 The US public remained confident with Eisenhower and his ability to lead the nation. Indeed, the result was a ringing endorsement from the American people of Eisenhower’s handling of domestic issues, the economy and, above all, the security of the nation. As he declared at his inauguration in January 1957: We seek peace, knowing that peace is the climate of freedom. And now, as in no other age, we seek it because we have been warned, by the power of modern weapons, that peace may be the only climate possible for human life itself. Yet this peace we seek cannot be born of fear alone: it must be rooted in the lives of nations.2 Yet, Eisenhower’s second term in office would prove in many ways more turbulent than his first. The Soviet technological and space achievements of 1957 gave rise to a heightened level of anti-communism in the US. Demands for accelerating military programmes became relentless. Building on the themes developed in Chapter Five, this chapter will examine

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Eisenhower’s handling of the reaction in America to Soviet military successes, in particular his continuing attempts to institute a system of mutual aerial inspection with the Soviet Union. When attempts to implement this plan were again reaching an impasse, Eisenhower continued to authorise the highly risky U2 flights over the Eastern bloc. The intelligence gained from these flights by no means provided a complete picture of Russian capabilities. Nevertheless, it was enough to apply the brakes at certain times and in certain quarters in the military build-up. The pressure to open up the Soviet Union to inspection and therefore knowledge about its capabilities grew significantly during the late 1950s. This period witnessed increased challenges to the administration over its handling of the perceived Soviet threat. The entrenched anti-communism displayed by many within the government, military and the American nation at large continued to raise doubts about the adequacy of the Eisenhower administration’s defence policies. There remained widespread discontent with massive retaliation. Feeding such discontent was the military but it was also clear that fear of communism prevailed in many sectors of the press and Congress. Lobby groups also became actively involved in this challenge. Sputnik, the world’s first man-made earth-orbiting satellite, was launched by the Soviet Union in October 1957. This event afforded unprecedented opportunity for savage political attack on Eisenhower, whose reputation and popularity had hitherto been untarnished.3 As Chapter Five indicated, Nelson Rockefeller did not withdraw from politics after December 1955. Building on the various themes developed in previous chapters, in particular those relating to lobby groups and their role in influencing US foreign and military policy, this chapter will examine the work of the Special Studies Project (SSP) and its impact on political opinion during the late 1950s. Between 1958 and 1960, this group published a series of reports that set out a number of recommendations for addressing America’s domestic situation and foreign policy over the next 15 years. As this analysis will show, Rockefeller’s role in the rise of the military-industrial complex in America during the late 1950s remains crucial. But in his public tirade against the administration, Rockefeller took political risks that would, ultimately, thwart his own ambitions for high office.

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In July 1955, the Soviet Union had announced that it would develop a space satellite. This announcement was followed closely by a US pledge to launch a satellite as part of its contribution to the International Geophysical Year (see Chapter Five). Soviet efforts paid off when, on 4 October, Sputnik was launched. The prospect of using earth-orbiting satellites for scientific research, weather forecasting and espionage was long-standing, yet the impact of Soviet achievements on America was dramatic. Newspaper editorials castigated the administration for failing to anticipate Soviet activities and allowing the communists to make a significant headway in the missile race.4 Anticommunism reached new heights; former British minister of health, Aneurin Bevan, was in the US in the autumn of 1957 and found the country obsessed with communism and hopeless about any easing of tensions with the Soviet Union. As he later recorded, ‘when on top of that came the Sputniks, there was a state of mind in the United States, which I am bound to say frankly, frightened me.’5 But Sputnik set an important precedent – it established the principle of freedom of international space and this issue would have implications for Eisenhower’s endeavours to acquire information on Soviet capabilities. The Soviets were not shy in boasting of their achievements and of socialism’s superiority over capitalism. In January 1958, Nikita Khrushchev, still savouring the moment, chuckled that the Soviet Union had ‘outstripped the leading capitalist country – the United States – in the field of scientific and technical progress’. In April, he added: ‘It is the US which is now intent on catching up with the Soviet Union . . . ’6 Sputnik had followed an earlier Soviet feat. In August 1957, the Soviets conducted the world’s first successful flight test of an ICBM. These technological achievements provided the Soviet Union with a newfound sense of confidence. A year before, Khrushchev had been able to declare that war with the West was no longer ‘fatalistically inevitable’.7 After October 1957, the Soviet leader even began proclaiming the idea of peaceful co-existence with the West. It seemed less likely that the West would attack the Soviet Union and its allies. Publicly, Khrushchev remained buoyed up by his country’s successes. In an article published in International Affairs in February 1958, he claimed with reference to the first Sputnik that:

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It is hardly necessary to prove at length that their launching has enhanced the moral and political influence and the role of the Soviet Union in present-day international relations. It has taken the ground from under the feet of malicious propaganda regarding the alleged economic and cultural backwardness of our country. It showed the world the Soviet Union as it really is.8 Eager to extol the virtues of his country, the Soviet leader continued: ‘All this underlines the strength of the Soviet Union, its scientific and technical potential, its growing role as an advanced industrial country, and, hence, as a factor in present-day international relations.’9 Nor was Khrushchev above taunting the Americans. As he warned William R. Hearst in an interview in November 1957: ‘I also want to tell you, Mr Hearst, that in the creation of new types of weapons we have outstripped your country. We now possess the absolute weapon, perfect in every respect and created in a short period of time. I am not saying this to intimidate, there is no need for that. I am simply stating a fact.’10 In the wake of Sputnik, Khrushchev boasted that the Soviet Union had ICBMs capable of reaching ‘any part of the globe’. Many US officials were inclined to believe, almost without question, that the Soviet Union had a strategic and ballistic missile capability.11 However, the Soviet leader was bluffing. Moreover, the Soviet space and technological achievements had their limitations. As William Taubman has shown, the Semyorka rocket that lifted Sputnik into orbit was not an operational weapon. To supply it with all too flammable fuel, a factory would have to be built at every launch site. To guide the Semyorka to its destination, radio guidance points would have to be placed ‘every 500 kilometres along the way’. Moreover, Taubman argues, each launch site cost half a billion rubles, far more than Khrushchev was prepared to pay. As he later admitted, the new weapon ‘represented only a symbolic counter threat to the United States’.12 It was not until the early 1960s that the first Soviet ICBMs actually became operational.13 Yet the launching of the world’s first artificial earth satellite by America’s major adversary vindicated the arguments of a number of lobby groups such as the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) and the Quantico panel. Their warnings, so these groups claimed, about

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Soviet military and technological potential had gone unheeded. At the time of Sputnik, Nelson Rockefeller’s SSP had been under way for just under one year and was near to completing its first report, entitled ‘International Security: The Military Aspect’. The post-war period had witnessed greater collaboration than ever before between non-profit foundations and universities across America. Often acting as a bridge between the needs of government and the intellectual talent of the college campus, foundation funding supported new, policy-based research. Notable examples included the Ford Foundation, which provided $1 million in grants for national security programmes to Harvard, and the Carnegie Corporation, whose financial contributions totalled $1.5 million during the 1950s for schools such as MIT, Princeton and the universities of Chicago, Illinois and Wisconsin.14 Jeremy Suri has argued that foundations were not simply extensions of government authority – indeed they did not always follow Washington’s lead. Thus, he argues: ‘Like many citizens of the United States and Western Europe, foundation leaders felt a sincere commitment to anti-communism, and they supported the construction of a common international Cold War culture that they associated with freedom and democracy.’15 The Rockefeller Foundation represented no exception to this trend, and this was particularly evident with the work of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, a subsidiary of the foundation, which in the autumn of 1956 established the SSP. The project, however, did not involve the sponsoring of any university. Driven by Nelson Rockefeller, the SSP comprised an overall panel of approximately 30 private citizens. This panel was supported by six sub-panels and these were responsible for co-ordinating studies on a range of problems and opportunities confronting America over the course of the next ten to fifteen years in areas such as military and foreign policy, education, economic and social policy, and democracy. Under the title ‘America at Mid-Century’, the project aimed to provide the ‘conceptual framework on which the consideration of policy might be based, to sketch longer-term trends and to outline alternative means of coping with them’.16 This work culminated with the publication in 1961 of Prospect for America, a compilation of the project’s reports which covered a number of subjects including foreign economic

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aid, international security, foreign policy, education and democracy. The SSP was, to date, the largest gathering of its kind. The project was directed by Henry Kissinger and comprised ‘leaders from many walks of life and of many shades of opinion’.17 Dean Rusk, a future secretary of state, was appointed to head panel I, The Mid-Century Challenge to US Foreign Policy. Kissinger directed panel II, International Security: The Military Aspect, which included Edward Teller, a physicist who had played an active role in the development of the US hydrogen bomb and was now professor of physics at the University of California; James B. Fisk, executive vice-president of Bell Telephone Laboratories; and James McCormack, a retired major general of USAF. The overall panel also included General Lucius Clay, former commander-in-chief of US forces in Europe; Oveta Culp Hobby, former secretary of health, education and welfare; James Killian, former chairman of the Technological Capabilities Panel and scientific adviser to Eisenhower; and Henry R. Luce, editor-in-chief of Time and Life magazines. Rockefeller chaired the project’s planning committee until his resignation in May 1958.18 The SSP also included a number of former members of the Quantico gatherings, including Ellis Johnson, Max Millikan, Philip Mosely and George Lincoln. Walt Rostow became a consultant to the SSP. His report, co-authored with Millikan and entitled ‘An American Policy for the Next Decade’, was used as a preliminary paper at the first meeting of the overall panel in November 1956.19 Regarded as ‘thoughtful and searching’ and providing ‘important stage-setting for all panels’, this paper argued: The maximum objective (of Moscow) is to achieve, if possible, so clear cut a technological superiority over the US that the Soviets could rationally envisage destruction of our deterrent power in a sudden blow, thus removing the US from the area of world power and permitting the Soviets to proceed to consolidate the world-wide hegemony that would then be theirs.20 As far as Rostow and Millikan were concerned, little had changed since Quantico. Rockefeller certainly regarded the project as a continuation

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of the Quantico panel, suggesting, albeit jocularly, in a letter to Millikan that ‘perhaps we should call it Q IV’.21 While the SSP aimed to advance a broader picture of the challenges facing America over the medium- to long-term period, a blueprint for change, it was also clear that defence and security issues lay at the heart of this mission for ensuring the US remained ‘the strongest nation of a world in ferment’.22 From January 1958, the SSP began publishing a series of reports. The group argued that America was falling behind the Soviet Union in the arms race and leaving itself vulnerable to a surprise attack by the Soviets. Consummating Rockefeller’s earlier studies, the SSP argued: Thus it appears that the United States is rapidly losing its lead over the USSR in the military race. For perhaps the next two years, we will still possess a superiority in strategic striking power . . . but our position a year or two hence depends on decisions that must be taken immediately. Unless present trends are reversed, the world balance of power will shift in favour of the Soviet bloc.23 Building on the work of the Quantico panel, the SSP attacked reductions in defence spending and the state of America’s strategic retaliatory forces. The group claimed that an annual increase of $3 billion in the defence budget was necessary for the ‘next several fiscal years’ to address an emerging imbalance in military strength favouring the Soviet Union. Based on various assumptions and calculations about economic growth and tax increases, the group contended that the American economy could sustain this increase which would fund a build-up of operational missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS), and various proposals aimed at strengthening the Strategic Air Command (SAC), such as dispersion tactics to protect squadrons and reduce alert times.24 Panel II was, to a very large extent, dominated by the personality of Edward Teller. Once described as ‘the most dangerous scientist in the US’ on account of his being ‘almost hysterical on the subject of . . . arms limitations of any kind’, Teller maintained a staunch anti-communist

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stance and was not averse to exerting pressure on other members of the panel to follow an uncompromising line on government defence policy.25 Writing to Kissinger in September 1957 concerning the draft reports prepared by the panel’s director, Teller claimed that he had found these to be ‘too moderate’, and urged Kissinger to use the earlier manuscripts penned by himself. ‘In particular,’ Teller argued, ‘we are underplaying the immediate danger which arises from the fact that the Russians have caught up with us in military strength, now superior to the US.’ Teller’s stance on disarmament was equally forceful. Thus he claimed: ‘The problem of peace cannot be solved by disarmament. The Second World War has not been brought about by an armament race. It has been brought about by a disarmament race.’26 Pressured by Teller, the panel ‘explicitly avoid[ed] any indirect argument against the weapons themselves, or in favor of disarmament’.27 It would be wrong, however, to deduce that Henry Kissinger had been bullied into adopting a more aggressive line. Indeed, he needed little encouragement in this respect. Playing a very active role in both panels I and II, he was in a position to exert considerable influence over the development of proposals relating to security and military strategy. As Suri has argued: Kissinger differed from the most respected practitioners of containment policy . . . who counseled for patience and threats of massive force to combat communist adversaries. These men assumed that time was on the side of the US, that Washington could wait for a more promising moment to negotiate. Kissinger fundamentally disagreed.28 Believing America’s strength relative to that of the Soviet Union was in decline, Kissinger argued that Americans ‘never fully understood that while our absolute power was growing, our relative position was bound to decline as the Soviet Union recovered from World War II’.29 Like his colleagues on both sides of the political fence, Kissinger recognised the limitations of strategic nuclear weapons. ‘The US nuclear arsenal,’ he argued, ‘is no better than the willingness to use it . . . if we do not wish to doom ourselves to impotence in the atomic

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stalemate or near stalemate just around the corner, it may be well to develop alternative programmes.’30 One solution to this problem was an increase in conventional forces to confront the dangers arising from ‘limited war and concealed or obscure war’. Kissinger also recognised another option for resisting aggression – the use of nuclear weapons confined not necessarily to the context of massive retaliation but to limited wars as well.31 More interesting, was Kissinger’s attitude towards military alliances. He recognised the importance of NATO as part of US strategy to defend Western Europe. In general, however, he viewed alliances with suspicion. A system of alliances had, as Kissinger argued at one meeting of panel I in December 1958, a tendency ‘to inhibit action by any of its members and effective leadership in dealing with crises’. Massive retaliation had to give way to ‘a more flexible system of alliances and armaments, adjusted to local conditions, permitting limited and localised application of force to resist aggression and international nuisance’.32 This more flexible system would allow Washington to develop the ability to fight on its own terms, serving first and foremost its own interests. The similarities between Kissinger’s flexible system and Donald Rumsfeld’s ‘coalitions of the willing’ for fighting limited wars should not go unnoticed.33 The alliance strategy pursued by president George W. Bush and his first defence secretary had enabled America to launch its war against terror and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 largely on its own terms and in the face of widespread international opposition. Support for mobile forces ‘tailored to the gamut of possible limited war’ was never in doubt. As the report of panel I, which was completed in December 1959, argued: ‘The answering strategy of the West, and of the US in particular, must be similarly composed of diverse elements . . . combined with defense measures adequate to meet the whole spectrum of possible threats.’34 The report of panel II, published earlier in January 1958, claimed that ‘flexible alliance arrangements can provide local forces to deter or check aggression. They can strengthen the local will to resist.’35 Like the Quantico panel, the SSP was asserting an internationalism that would enable America to maintain its leadership of the free world and check global communism. Tactics

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had to be adapted to confront the new and evolving threats of the Cold War. These challenges required, as Rockefeller, Kissinger, Rusk and their colleagues across the political spectrum argued, flexibility, dynamic leadership and, above all, an increase in military budgets. The publication of International Security: The Military Aspect on 6 January 1958 was timely. Taking full advantage of the near hysteria created by Sputnik, the panel brought forward publication of the report.36 Further studies, including Foreign Economic Policy for the Twentieth Century and Pursuit of Excellence: Education and the Future of America, emerged during 1958, and in March 1961, Prospect for America, a compilation of all the reports of the SSP, was published. Media and political reaction to Rockefeller’s studies should not go unnoticed. The reports became headline news, as well as bestsellers. The New York Times boomed, ‘Arms Rise Urged Lest Reds Seize Lead in Two Years’, and the Washington Post headline ran: ‘US Must Act Fast or Lose Arms Race, Study Group Warns’. International Security was debated on editorial pages throughout the nation, and in the halls of Congress. The Times also devoted a full page to a summary of the SSP’s principal arguments – a rare honour, as Cary Reich argues, for a ‘private, nongovernment document’.37 Rockefeller made television appearances on the Today Show, calling for additional military expenditures on longrange missiles.38 By the end of the first week of publication of the report, he claimed to have been overwhelmed by demands for further copies. Doubleday publishers went back to press to print 400,000 more copies.39 By early 1958 concerns that the US was at risk of falling behind the Soviet Union in the arms race were widespread in America. Many believed that their country was vulnerable to a surprise attack by the Russians. In the autumn of 1958, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson asked Rockfeller to appear before his Preparedness Sub-committee. Summing up his inquiries in January 1958, Johnson asserted that the Soviet Union was ahead of the US in ballistic missile development and called for a crash $3 billion a year programme to stave off disaster – a similar figure to that recommended by the SSP.40 Johnson supported the group’s recommendations for accelerated research and development programmes for early warning and

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anti-missile defence systems and advanced reconnaissance measures. The SSP provided ‘a clear and vigorous conception of the role of force in meeting and reducing the threat of aggression’.41 Eisenhower refused, however, to react to the claims outlined in Rockefeller’s reports and the publicity they subsequently generated. Rockefeller’s group paid very scant attention to the idea of mutual aerial inspection. It was considered only in the context of efforts aimed at minimising surprise attack and, even then, panel II was sceptical as to the suitability of aerial inspection in ‘reducing the element of surprise’. Evolving technology meant that ‘no noticeable mobilisation’ was required of the enemy should it decide to launch a crippling blow against the West.42 Under such circumstances, the panel argued, ‘even a foolproof inspection system will tell largely what is already known: that the opponent possesses the capability to launch a devastating attack on very short notice and with a minimum of warning’. Inevitably, the panel’s brief deliberations ended on a particularly negative note: ‘Much as we would like to be more optimistic, we cannot see how present vigilance could be reduced or insecurity be removed by any aerial inspection system now in prospect.’43 The men who had originally conceived Open Skies were now emphatically dismissive of this initiative. It was, in the eyes of Rockefeller, Teller, Lincoln and Johnson, irrelevant to the future prosecution of the Cold War. Notwithstanding its stance, the SSP was by no means cut off from the otherwise insulated and elite circles of Capitol Hill and the Pentagon. A close examination of the group reveals important interconnections, continuities and shared ideas between its members and politicians and the military. That Rockefeller’s group included retired military staff, industrialists and economists simply demonstrates the various forces at work that sought to expand the military-industrial complex in America. A number of the SSP’s members had close and long-standing links with the foreign policy establishment. In their various roles, they had supported the development of America’s postwar liberal internationalist foreign policy – a global course that was supported increasingly by economic aid and military force. Many, including Dean Rusk, Lucius Clay and James McCormack, had championed programmes such as the Marshall Plan and the Mutual Security

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Agency. They had also supported the stationing of troops in Western Europe that was aimed at deterring an invasion by the Soviets. These programmes enabled America to maintain its leadership of the free world and check the spread of communism. Clay had served as military governor of the US Army during the Second World War and in 1945 became commander-in-chief of US forces in Europe. In 1948, he co-ordinated the Berlin airlift. While Rockefeller’s gatherings did not directly impact on the decision-making process of the Eisenhower administration, one can detect their influence in the medium to long term. The SSP set out a comprehensive foreign policy agenda, one that rejected massive retaliation and advocated a flexible response to the threat of Soviet communism in Western Europe, the Third World and across the globe. Many of the recommendations put forward by the SSP such as more ICBMs, mobile forces capable of fighting limited wars, a strengthening of NATO, and foreign economic aid, formed important elements of the Kennedy administration’s foreign policy. Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow, who were strong advocates of this agenda, served under Kennedy as secretary of state and deputy special assistant for national security affairs respectively. Henry Kissinger served as an occasional consultant to both the National Security Council and the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1961 to 1963. Joseph Johnson and Philip Mosely headed think tanks that would continue to advise the White House after January 1961. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, whose staff included Max Millikan, James Killian and Ellis Johnson, provided the Kennedy administration with consultancy on foreign economic aid. This is not to say that Kennedy’s views on the Cold War and the means of waging it were driven by the work of the SSP and the arguments advanced by its members. His belief that foreign economic aid for Third World countries should form an integral part of the nation’s defence strategy was long-standing. Moreover, his statements concerning the need for an enlarged second strike nuclear capability were motivated as much by an opportunity to exploit an alleged weakness in government defence policy for political gain as they were by lobby groups.44 It can also be argued that Rockefeller’s group was arguing for

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a militaristic response towards the Soviet Union that was almost universal in mainstream politics at the time. Nevertheless, the influence of the SSP in shaping the future of American foreign policy should not go unnoticed. Rostow furnished Kennedy with a considerable amount of advice and information on foreign aid from the mid to late 1950s and there was a clear convergence of views between the senator and Rockefeller, as the following chapter will show. An examination of the SSP raises important issues relating to the state-private network, namely: who runs whom? That the SSP was able to penetrate the walls of a ‘power elite’ demonstrates that the state was not entirely insulated from external pressures and influences – indeed it relied on such forces to help define and give legitimacy to the policy agenda. Likewise, private groups sought political support for their ideas which, in turn, enabled them to nurture their views through the policy-making process. What emerged was a symbiotic relationship between the state and the private network – an ideologically driven network that played a crucial role in defining and delivering the foreign policy agenda of the Kennedy administration. The SSP (and its predecessor groups) bore striking resemblance to another group that had been convened at this time, although this one had President Eisenhower’s blessing. Initially chaired by H. Rowan Gaither and since that time known as the Gaither Committee, the Security Resources Panel had been formed to assess a shelter-building proposal put forward by the Federal Civilian Defense Administration (FCDA).45 Like the Quantico panel, the committee moved beyond its original remit and set about examining a whole range of defence problems facing the country. It included former members of the Quantico panel such as William Webster and George Lincoln. And, like the SSP, it also comprised men on both sides of the political divide who advocated the strongest military response to the Soviet Union. Its conclusions were not, however, welcomed by the Eisenhower administration. While not a senior member of the Security Resources Panel, Paul Nitze took an active role in drafting the group’s report, and in true Nitze style, the document warned that the threat on the part of the Soviet Union to Western security was likely to become critical by 1959 or early 1960, as the gap between US and Soviet deterrent capabilities

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widened. As Fred Kaplan has shown, many of the recommendations of the Gaither group were taken from Albert Wohlstetter’s influential R-290 report for RAND.46 Nevertheless, Gaither and his team went further than Wohlstetter and recommended various improvements to America’s second-strike capability, including a significant increase in missile production (for IRBMs, an increase from 60 to 240, and ICBMs from 80 to 600). The overall price tag was considerable; recommendations to strengthen deterrent and offensive capabilities were estimated to cost a total of $19 billion over the next five years, from 1959 to 1963, while civilian defence, which included proposals for a nationwide fallout shelter programme, was expected to total $25 billion. Based on various assumptions and calculations about economic growth and tax increases, the Gaither Committee’s report contended that the US economy could sustain these proposed measures.47 The most striking similarity between the Gaither Committee and Rockefeller’s gatherings concerned limited warfare. Presenting an indirect but clear challenge to massive retaliation, the committee believed the US and its allies needed forces to conduct ‘limited military operations’, thereby providing ‘greater mobility’. Recovery of America’s retaliatory capability would lead to a nuclear balance, leaving local aggression as the most likely form of warfare. Voicing concern over the possibility that small wars could be allowed ‘to grow into big ones’, the Gaither Committee recommended that a study be carried out at national level ‘to develop current doctrine on when and how nuclear weapons can contribute to limited operations’.48 Eisenhower refused to accept the committee’s underlying argument about America’s position in the Cold War and concerns over its growing vulnerability. He accused Gaither and his team of exaggerating the Soviet threat. He was also of the firm belief that the SAC was stronger than the committee indicated and that bases overseas provided considerable capacity for dispersion in the event of war.49 Furthermore, with the free world holding the periphery around the Soviet Union, the West could pose a threat from a multitude of points. The Soviets, on the other hand, had no such advantage in their ability to encircle and threaten the US.50 Like Rockefeller, Robert Sprague, an industrialist and expert on defence, urged the president to make a speech to the

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nation warning of the so-called grave dangers to America’s security. An address was made but Eisenhower did not in any way endorse the committee’s findings. Thus, he declared: It is my conviction, supported by trusted scientific and military advisers, that, although the Soviets are obviously ahead of us in satellite development, as of today, the overall military strength of the free world is distinctly greater than that of the communist countries. Reinforcing the need for a rational and affordable defence posture, Eisenhower continued: ‘It misses the whole point to say that we must now increase our expenditure . . . on military hardware and defence.’ Determined not to ‘try to ride off in all directions at once,’ he urged ‘selectivity in national expenditures of all kinds. We cannot have both what we must have and what we would like to have.’51 To his critics, however, Eisenhower did not appreciate the growing military prowess of the Soviet Union; he was, in their eyes, greatly underestimating the gravity of the Soviet threat. As Sprague later explained at the Jackson Senate Committee hearings that had been convened in 1958: I believe . . . that the danger is more serious than the President has expressed himself to the American public. I do not know whether he feels this or whether he does not. But I do not believe that the concern that I personally feel has as yet been expressed by the President to the American public. This is a complicated matter.52 Sprague’s concerns can be attributed to a large extent to his belief that in the event of a Soviet attack, and with tactical warning only, not enough SAC bombers would get off the ground fully loaded in time to deliver a devastating second-strike blow. This situation rendered massive retaliation impractical, if not futile. He remonstrated with the president, who refused to get carried away by the report’s conclusions.53 The impact of the report should also be seen in the context of mounting criticism of government defence policy that was starting

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to seep beyond certain military circles. The findings of the Gaither Committee, although a classified report, were leaked to the press, much to Eisenhower’s annoyance. In December 1957, the Washington Post ran the following headline: ‘Enormous arms outlay is held vital to survival’. As the story continued, ‘The still top-secret Gaither report portrays a US in the greatest danger in its history’.54 The New York Times had run a similar headline only a week before, detailing a dinner held at the home of William Foster, Sprague’s deputy, attended by other fellow committee members, including Nitze, CBS president, Frank Stanton, and Roswell Gilpatric, a former under-secretary of the US Air Force and member of panel II of the SSP. The purpose of the gathering, as Kaplan argues, was ‘to figure out some way of breaking through the apparent indifference and apathy that the administration was thus far displaying towards the government report’.55 The Committee’s members disgruntled with the government’s reaction to their efforts, did little to stop top-secret issues relating to national defence from creeping into the public domain. Already exploiting the fallout associated with Sputnik, the Democrats pounced on the Gaither report’s findings, accusing the administration of complacency and of neglecting the nation’s security by refusing to sanction higher defence spending. Many Democrat senators, including Johnson, Kennedy, Symington and Jackson, demanded that the president release the report to the public.56 The Gaither report also fuelled growing argument that a missile gap favouring the Soviet Union was emerging. As Symington claimed, ‘In three years, the Russians will prove to us that they have 300 ICBMs. Let that be on record.’57 The Democrats did not let the issue of the missile gap rest – indeed it remained a principal means by which to attack the Eisenhower administration throughout the remainder of the 1950s. Eisenhower refused to overreact to Sputnik, the Gaither report and public criticism. He sanctioned only a modest increase in the defence budget during 1958, from a ceiling of $38 billion to $39.5 billion.58 At a NSC meeting in April, in what was becoming a frequently stated adage but firmly rooted principle, Eisenhower argued, ‘too much [defence] could reduce the United States to being a garrison state or ruin the free economy of the nation’.59 However, what some may have

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regarded as prudence, or even indifference, on the part of the president can be explained to a large extent on the U2. In the summer of 1957, seven overflights of the Soviet Union and two of the People’s Republic of China were undertaken. These flights substantially added, as Jeffrey Richelson argues, to the US intelligence community’s knowledge of not only military exercises and troop movements but also nuclear activities ranging from uranium mining to reactor construction to test preparations.60 Overflights showed a space launch facility at Tyura Tam, an anti-ballistic missile radar test site at Sary Shagan and nuclear installations at Omsk and Novosibirsk. From November 1957, US intelligence officials claimed there was evidence that the Soviets might launch something, i.e. missiles, from Tyura Tam. This region remained of high importance throughout the remainder of the decade, with several U2 missions conducted there.61 U2 flights carried out in 1958 managed to identify further intelligence on the Soviet nuclear infrastructure. From images obtained on the Urals region, it was possible for CIA analysts to map out the electric power distribution system, which supplied three of the Soviet Union’s most important facilities for producing fissile material: a U-235 production plant at Sverdlovsk; a plutonium reactor at Chelyabinsk; and an unidentified complex near Nizhnyaya Tura.62 Further flights revealed the existence of a second launch complex under construction at Tyura Tam, but as late as March 1959, intelligence reports from the U2 flights could find no information to confirm Khrushchev’s claims that the Soviet Union was in serial production of ballistic missiles, or whether any such missiles were even deployed.63 Moreover, at a meeting with the president, Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell, General Twining and Robert Cutler, James Killian claimed that ‘in all our observations, we have seen only one actual Bison’.64 This information, as Stephen Ambrose argues, ‘was basic, priceless knowledge’.65 Added to the intelligence gathered from the U2 flights was information acquired on the test firing of Soviet ICBMs. Following the installation of radar near Samsun in Turkey, which tracked such firings from the main Soviet test centre at Kasputin Yar, it became possible for the US government to monitor Soviet test launches. As James Dick has shown, between August 1957 and April 1959 there were no more

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than 12 or 13 successful Soviet ICBM tests, none of which travelled further than 3,700 miles. There were, in fact, none at all between April 1958 and March 1959.66 Dick attributes the suspension of the tests during this period to problems with the design of the Soviet IBCM, which was so large as to make it too cumbersome. Soviet testing resumed in the course of 1959 but of 24 launchings, only 1 went the full 5,000-mile intercontinental range. Thus, while the Soviet Union had made a substantial technological breakthrough in 1957, it had been unable or unwilling to exploit this to the full during 1958 and not until 1959 did the Soviets step up the competition again, by which time any advantage they had achieved had dissipated.67 Even Sputnik, which the Eisenhower administration knew was a stunt, a ‘nice technical trick’, revealed that the Soviet Union had continued its large thrust missile programme because it was unable to miniaturise its H-bombs.68 The US had abandoned its programmes to produce large thrust missiles some years previously. This, together with evidence gathered by U2 flights, led Dick to conclude that ‘under Eisenhower’s stewardship America responded more than adequately to a perceived threat that proved in actuality to be more mythical than real’.69 Possession of new intelligence on the Soviet Union had important consequences for the US administration. Firstly, it reinforced Eisenhower’s own suspicions of Soviet limitations, and those of his closest staff, including John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, Charles Wilson and Andrew Goodpaster. Even Richard Bissell, who previously had been more than prepared to accept a worst-case scenario, recognised the limitations of Soviet military hardware. Secondly, intelligence estimates, upon which many relied to justify defence expenditures, were substantially affected. In July 1958, Allen Dulles advised Eisenhower of the need to ‘scale down drastically’ the estimate of Soviet Bison and Bears, and to ‘retard’ by six months to one year the dates on which the Soviets were estimated to have an operational ICBM capability.70 Later, the military chiefs, acknowledging that the Soviets possessed only 100–115 bombers, also pointed out that no hard intelligence on any ICBM launching sites in the Soviet Union had yet been obtained.71 In the autumn of 1961, the Soviet Union was discovered to have only

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four operational SS-6 missiles, with another twenty SS-7 and SS-8 sites under construction.72 The U2 flights also affected defence expenditures. Both the SSP and the Gaither Committee had called for substantial increases in defence. Both groups had received considerable support from the military, particularly the USAF. The president, however, was determined to keep the defence budget for fiscal year 1959 at no more than $42.5 billion.73 Moreover, he specifically ruled out a substantial increase in the defence budget for fiscal year 1960, which called for only a modest acceleration of missile and SAC dispersal programmes, and a reduction in conventional forces, the savings from which would help to resource the amount needed for expanded activities. Requests for augmentation which pushed the defence budget substantially over the $40 billion mark showed, as far as the president was concerned, ‘a lack of responsibility’. Speaking in strong terms, Eisenhower lamented, ‘we have not freed ourselves from existing systems and organisations. We continually find ourselves prisoners of free-wheeling activities that have been going on for a number of years in each of the (military) services.’74 The U2 photographs, as Ambrose has argued, ‘undoubtedly saved the American taxpayer more money than any other government initiative of the 1950s’.75 The U2 flights took place as attempts at negotiating a system of mutual aerial inspection with the Soviet Union remained stagnant. Eisenhower’s hopes had been raised in late 1956 by Bulganin’s willingness to reconsider aerial inspection. However, by early 1958, much to the president’s regret, no agreement had been reached. Urging Bulganin to exploit the more positive outcomes of diplomatic activity in recent years, he wrote, ‘I also renew my proposal that we begin progressively to take measures to guarantee against the possibility of surprise attack.’ Recalling mutual aerial inspection specifically, the president continued, ‘we began to discuss this at our personal meeting two and a half years ago, but nothing has happened, although there is open a wide range of choices as to where to begin.’76 Eisenhower continued to correspond with the Soviet leaders but from February 1958 his letters to Bulganin and Khrushchev reveal a near breakdown

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in communication. The president accused the latter of seeking to sour relations between the two countries and to misrepresent the US. Thus, Eisenhower argued: I deplore the constantly mounting accusations within the Soviet Union that the United States is a nation ruled by aggressive warminded imperialists. Mr Khrushchev’s speech of January 22 is an outstanding example of such charges and indeed they are to be found in your February 1 note. What is the explanation of such charges? They seem to fly in the face of established history.77 In his next letter to Khrushchev and Bulganin, Eisenhower was critical about the Soviet Union’s general attitude towards the resolution of world problems. Yet he implored them to demonstrate their country’s ‘peace loving’ stance and co-operate on a number of measures aimed at reducing international tensions. One such measure was the monitoring of nuclear weapons tests by the UN, in which the Soviet Union was invited to participate from March 1957.78 The other ‘outstanding proposal’ was Open Skies. As Eisenhower reminded the Soviet leaders: You will recall Mr Chairman, my ‘Open Skies’ proposal made . . . at Geneva in 1955. You will also recall my proposals for the international use of outer space for peaceful purposes emphasised in my recent correspondence with Chairman Bulganin. These proposals await Soviet acceptance.79 In another letter to the Soviet Union of late April 1958, Eisenhower sought to apply further pressure on Khrushchev and Bulganin to adopt Open Skies as ‘one of many proposals put forward by the US to reduce tension’.80 The Soviet leaders, however, remained unmoved. Criticism of the position taken by the Soviet leadership during this period should be restrained. From July 1956, the Soviet Union had registered numerous protests about violation of its airspace by American aircraft. Such protests continued throughout 1958. It is interesting to note the contents of the Soviet’s reaction to the U2 flights. In one letter sent by the Soviet government to the US State

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Department during early March, concerns were raised that such violations were taking place at a time when the Soviet Union and the US were negotiating arrangements for a summit meeting. The Soviets warned that such violations risked jeopardising such a meeting, which could otherwise ‘contribute to an improvement of relations and the strengthening of trust’.81 Moreover, the Soviets warned of the ‘genuinely catastrophic consequences’ for world peace should an American plane carrying thermonuclear weapons be shot down. Imploring the US government to cease such activity, the Soviets intimated that they would have no choice but to ‘make this matter public or subject it to discussion in the UN’.82 Public knowledge of the U2 was the last thing that Eisenhower wanted. He was always very uncomfortable with these flights. As well as violating the sovereign territory of another country, such action was provocative, serious enough to spark war. As he once remarked to Allen Dulles, ‘if we were on the receiving end the reaction would be drastic’.83 Naturally, he worried about what impact disclosure of U2 activity would have on public opinion at home, and at one point he contemplated terminating the entire programme knowing that detection was unlikely to be avoided especially in the Urals region.84 Not surprisingly, Eisenhower’s attempts at convincing the Soviet Union that America’s intentions were indeed genuine were met with fierce scepticism by the Kremlin. With the prospect of negotiating a system of mutual aerial inspection looking very bleak, espionage remained the only option for getting the intelligence that the president needed. But such an act could have blown up in his face at any time, as it eventually did in June 1960. In his correspondence to Khrushchev and Bulganin, Eisenhower deplored their refusal to consider Open Skies. Yet from the Soviet point of view US efforts to reduce tensions seemed unconvincing. The American government refused to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, apply a ‘freeze’ on their production and negotiate a disarmament plan ahead of an inspection system. Furthermore, as Bulganin noted in his letter to the president of 22 April 1958, the ‘intensive construction of newer and newer military bases which, according to the candid admission of certain political and military figures of the US and other

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countries belonging to NATO, are designed for inflicting an atomic blow against the Soviet Union’ served to ‘increase international tension and suspicion among nations’.85 For the Soviet Union, the U2 flights merely confirmed that Eisenhower’s Open Skies proposal had been all along legalised spying. Distrust between the two blocs remained entrenched. The extent of awareness within government and military circles of reconnaissance activity and its outcomes remains unknown. Naturally, many within the CIA under Richard Bissell, director of the U2 programme, were aware of the U2 flights, including those based overseas, as were the JCS and other senior USAF staff such as Curtis LeMay and Thomas Power, commander of Air Research and Development Command.86 Dick has argued that certain members of the Armed Services Committee and the Defense Appropriations Sub-committee were informed of the existence of the U2, and certain journals, including for example, Missiles and Rockets and The Nation also intimated knowledge of the programme.87 Nevertheless, as Ambrose has argued, the entire U2 programme was very tightly controlled by Eisenhower.88 All missions were personally authorised by him. In other words, the reconnaissance flights were not common knowledge. The sheer irony of this situation, made all the more painful by the method used to gather such intelligence, meant that Eisenhower could not make public the results of the U2 flights. He could not inform his cabinet or the NSC, nor could he call a press conference, make an address to Congress or the nation. The task of convincing others of Soviet force levels and the prospects of negotiating a reduction in arms would continue to prove difficult as the ‘ominous unknown’ remained the rule for the majority.89 Uncertainty continued to breed alarm. Whether or not they were aware of the U2, there were many in the government and the military who continued to question the adequacy of military programmes. Belief persisted that the Soviets were ahead of the US in missile development. Sputnik had heightened fears, and indeed embarrassment, for which the U2 flights could not always compensate. Pressure to accelerate military programmes continued. Generals LeMay and Power frequently spoke of the need to deploy thousands of long-range

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bombers.90 Even the higher echelons of the government were sometimes caught up in the state of national fear and dismay. At a meeting in November 1957, Vice-President Richard Nixon, the departmental secretaries and Sherman Adams agreed to urge the president to accelerate IRBM programmes. The new Secretary of Defence, Neil McElroy, argued the case for additional squadrons of Jupiter and Thor missiles, to be placed on the European continent by the end of 1958. John Foster Dulles, inclined towards a more conservative programme, recalled: ‘It seemed to be felt that other factors were controlling and there was an irresistible pressure to accelerate the program and demonstrate our capability as rapidly as possible.’91 Under pressure himself, Eisenhower created the post of special assistant to the president for science and technology, which had specific responsibility for advising the president on scientific and technological matters as well as overseeing progress on missile and satellite development. He appointed James Killian to this position. In October 1958 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was formed to develop America’s space programmes. However, Eisenhower drew a line at pressure to place a man on the moon, an undertaking his successor would commit the nation to at an estimated cost in 1961 of $10 billion.92 It would be erroneous to claim that Eisenhower was not uncomfortable with the possibility of a Soviet lead in weapons and space development. At one meeting with Killian, Scientist George Kistiakowsky and Goodpaster in February 1958, he stressed the importance of selecting the ‘phases of activity in which we should undertake to compete with the Soviets and to beat them’. But, he cautioned, ‘we should not try to excel in everything.’ As though taking a leaf out of Khrushchev’s book, he continued, ‘psychological as well as technical considerations are important – at times appearances are as significant as the reality, if not more so.’93 A US lead in certain programmes or phases of activity would also help quell demand in some quarters of the military for increasing defence expenditures. In effect, what Eisenhower stressed was the need for a reasonable posture of defence. Once again, in an attempt to urge a degree of equanimity in respect of defence planning, he argued: ‘Until an enemy has enough operational capability to destroy most of our bases simultaneously

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and thus prevent retaliation by us our deterrent remains effective. We would make a mistake to credit him with total capabilities.’94 Aerial reconnaissance, as a means of gathering intelligence on the Soviet Union, was of supreme importance to the Eisenhower administration. However, its impact on the policy-making process was limited. While defence budgets were to a degree brought under control, the intelligence gained on Soviet capabilities could not precipitate fundamental changes to military policy. Disquiet continued to revolve around massive retaliation. Throughout the remainder of Maxwell Taylor’s time as army chief of staff, he continued to question Eisenhower’s defence policies. For him, massive retaliation resulted in an ‘atomic overkill capability’, which left the US lacking the necessary flexibility to fight communism in areas beyond Europe, particularly in the developing world.95 His challenge culminated with his resignation in July 1959 and publication the following year of his book, The Uncertain Trumpet. Taylor’s book went beyond criticising military strategy. He also claimed that investment in the military to fight communism was woefully inadequate, and called for a considerably increased budget of between $50 and $55 billion for the next five years.96 His thesis reflected growing argument for a more ‘flexible response’ to the Cold War, which incorporated, as far as its advocates were concerned, a balance of nuclear and conventional forces, with more foreign aid programmes. Taylor became a close friend of both Robert and John F. Kennedy. In October 1962, the latter appointed Taylor chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By mid-1958, certain government officials had also begun to exhibit doubts about the efficacy of massive retaliation, including those who had supported this strategy from its inception. During a review of national security policy, Dulles remarked that massive retaliatory striking power ‘was running its course as the principal element’ in the US military arsenal.97 America, he argued, had to be in a position to fight defensive wars, which did not involve the total defeat of the enemy – in short, limited wars. As the principal architect of massive retaliation, the secretary’s stance represented a remarkable volte-face. To Eisenhower’s immense annoyance, Dulles now argued that a fundamental change had to be considered, even if it meant undermining the administration’s strict fiscal policies.

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Robert Cutler’s misgivings with massive retaliation were founded on similar lines to those of Dulles. The special assistant for national security affairs argued at one NSC meeting in May 1958 that the credibility of the government’s defence policy was declining. ‘The US should not,’ Cutler argued, ‘waste resources in building up superfluous deterrent capabilities at the expense of other necessary capabilities and national goals.’ Accordingly, the US had to have a ‘flexible capability’. Amid intense debates surrounding the review of defence policy, Eisenhower defended massive retaliation and refused to increase conventional forces, arguing such a move would result in unacceptably high tax increases and adversely affect strategic deterrence.98 The president approved NSC 5801/1 in July 1958. This basic national security policy retained massive retaliation but left the issue of fighting limited wars under review. Dulles finally backed away from supporting a policy of flexible response due, primarily, to economies and because, like Cutler, he had been unable to come up with a viable alternative strategy. This episode reveals that discomfort with massive retaliation, a strategy aimed at confronting Soviet communism and its recent technological and space achievements, was now permeating the non-military sectors of the administration. It also demonstrates the consistency, and indeed strength of character, of the president. One consequence of the continuation in US military policy, and indeed of massive retaliation, was the development of missile programmes. The momentum for developing ballistic missiles gathered pace from the mid-1950s. In November 1955, Charles Wilson approved the formation of the Defense Ballistic Missile Committee and ordered organisational changes in the military services to handle the development of the ICBM and IRBM programmes. Concurrently, he approved a programme of four types of missiles – two of intercontinental range, the Atlas and the Titan, and two of 1,500-mile intermediate range, subsequently called the Jupiter and Thor. The Jupiter weapons system was to have the capability of being launched either from land or sea.99 The missile committee reviewed the service approaches for accelerating the development of the ballistic missile programme. In December, Wilson presented Eisenhower and the cabinet with a new organisational structure and plan for the four-missile

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programme. The president subsequently assigned the highest priority to the ICBM programme and requested that the secretary of defense report on any delays to the new weapons system.100 The following year, Wilson approved plans drawn up by the US Navy for achieving an ‘optimum submarine IRBM capability’. In a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy, Charles Thomas, Wilson confirmed his requirement. ‘I desire,’ the secretary advised, ‘that the Navy carry out an orderly program to achieve a submarine Polaris capability at an early a date as feasible without excessive expenditure of funds for minor time advantage.’101 Eisenhower would not approve the development of Polaris until early 1958. By late 1956, the funding and programmatic requirements for missile development were in place. During 1957 numerous tests were carried out in respect of medium- and long-range missiles and shortrange surface-to-surface missiles. During June, partial successes of Jupiter missile firings were recorded. A malfunctioning of booster engines prevented the required speed from being achieved and allowing ignition of the missile ramjet engines.102 Tests carried out during the latter half of 1957 proved more successful. In October, the army successfully fired Jupiter missiles, many of which attained a 1,100 nautical mile range. All major missions were completed. Further successes were recorded; Bomarc (US Air Force) and Triton (US Navy) tests were completed, with the former attaining 45 nautical mile range and an altitude of 1,500 feet.103 Test firings carried out in December in respect of the Atlas proved partially successful. A greater degree of success was recorded in respect of the ICBM and IRBM programmes during 1958. In November, flight tests of Thor and two Atlas missiles were completed satisfactorily. From May 1958, attempts were made to launch satellites under the direction of Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Defense Department but these were not successful. The price tag for the development of missile programmes was considerable. In June 1957, the Defense Department estimated the total cost of programmes from fiscal year 1957 to 1963 at $36.1 billion. Taking account of expenditure on missile programmes for fiscal year 1956 and prior years, and $4.2 billion in 1957, the total estimated cost

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amounted to $47.4 billion.104 These figures did not include Polaris. Missile development risked pushing the boundaries of defence spending, as NSC 68 had done during the previous decade. Nevertheless, for many officials, such expenditure was seen as essential. ‘There would be the greatest repercussions on the national security and on the cohesion of the free world,’ the NSC noted in August 1955, ‘should the USSR achieve an operational capability with ICBM substantially in advance of the US.’105 The military build-up in America during the late 1950s attracted attention in the media. In January 1956, Time magazine ran an article entitled ‘Missiles Away’. Referring to the ICBM as the ‘No. 1 crash program of the US’, this article set out a detailed summary of the development of this ‘glamorous’ weapon.106 Guided missiles were not new. Their military importance, the article continued, first became apparent during the latter years of the Second World War, when German V-2s, speeding many times as fast as the sound of their coming, hit London. By the mid to late 1950s, the ‘nightmare of the missile men’ came in the form of the Soviets who were, it was claimed, developing a 5,000-mile guided missile at an ‘impressive rate’. Time compared the cost of the ICBM to a B-52 bomber. After its ‘enormous development costs’, each missile would cost approximately $1 million compared to the cost of a heavy bomber at $8 million. The magazine also sought to underline the military importance of missiles. As General LeMay argued: ‘We must put more time and money into development of these birds. Missiles are another step in the evolution of war. We will use them as we get them and we will get them when they are effective and reliable.’107 On a more chilling note, the article concluded with a reminder of the horrors of thermonuclear war and the potential for this to be brought about by simple accident. Thus, it was noted: . . . perhaps when the great nations are armed to the teeth with long-range missiles and nervously watching each other, some quick mistake will be made. An innocent meteor may be mistaken for an invading missile. There will be no time to check or debate, and the decision to fire ‘in retaliation’ will be made by some low-ranking officer.108

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An article published in US News and World Report in March 1956 was inclined to be more dramatic in tone, posing questions such as, ‘Are we still ahead in Air Power?’ and ‘Are the Soviets Overtaking Us?’ The article warned that the Soviet Union was ‘now closing the quality gap’ and made various erroneous statements concerning the size of the Soviet air force compared to that of the US.109 The Russians, it was claimed, had more Bisons than the US had B-52s, and thousands more new jet fighters. On the ICBM front, Nathan Twining presented a more positive picture of US strength, commenting that the US Air Force was now on schedule with regard to development of this weapon. Furthermore, he argued that by the time the Soviet Union had a bomber force ‘large enough and effective enough to wage a global war, our defenses will be formidable’. But, Twining warned, US programmes were dependent on getting the resources needed to meet planned schedules. ‘If these resources are not made available,’ he argued, ‘we could easily drop behind.’ Twining was of the view that the ‘Communists could catch up’ if they continued their rapid pace of development. Under these circumstances, it was imperative for the US to ‘speed up’ development of the ICBM.110 These publications became a forum through which the military establishment could exhibit its unfiltered and, very often, hard-line views. They also illustrate the competitive nature of the race for the most technologically advanced weapons. Such publicity can only have reinforced in the minds of Americans the absolute need for a military build-up on the scale that was taking place in the US. A Gallup poll carried out in June 1958 claimed that 74 per cent of Americans did not believe that spending on defence should be reduced.111 Information on the expansion of the US Air Force also began to arrive on the desk of Nikita Khrushchev. This intelligence did nothing to dispel his fears that the US could contemplate an attack on Moscow.112 Yet, it was a situation he had, unwittingly or otherwise, helped to create. By 1958 it was clear that opportunities for agreement of a disarmament plan and Open Skies were declining. Sputnik had created intense panic in the US. For the vast majority of Americans it merely served to underline the insincerity of the Soviets towards an easing of international tensions. The Kremlin remained suspicious of US attempts to

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implement a system of mutual aerial inspection, believing this initiative would simply enable the US government to establish its knowledge base of Soviet military capabilities and then recoil from further negotiations aimed at a reduction in armaments. Their suspicions were intensified by the U2 overflight. Despite this situation, Eisenhower did not abandon his aim of persuading the Soviets to agree to such a plan. It would be wrong, indeed naïve, to argue that he believed he could achieve an end to the Cold War. Further crises, such as Berlin, were just around the corner. Open Skies was geared primarily towards containing the military build-up in his own country. This link will be explored further in the following chapter as Eisenhower sought to grapple not only with the ongoing demands of the military but also with an increasingly belligerent Congress.

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CHAPTER SEVEN EISENHOWER’S FINAL STRUGGLE

The misgivings of the US military towards cuts in the defence budget and the New Look have been clearly documented. From early 1956, a number of Congressional Democrats also began to voice their criticism of government defence policy, particularly with regard to ballistic missile development. In his efforts to contain defence budgets, President Eisenhower had been correct to recognise the ‘catalytic factor’ associated with the Congress.1 During his second term in office, he faced mounting criticism from the Democratic Party over the New Look, which served to place further pressure on the administration to abandon its fiscal conservatism. As Saki Dockrill argues: During his early years, president Eisenhower probably wanted to stabilise American defence expenditures at a higher level than either the American public and the Republican Old Guard desired. On the other hand, during his final years in office, the reverse was the case: Congress was willing to spend more on defence, and particularly on the expansion of the United States strategic nuclear deterrence, than Eisenhower thought desirable.2 This chapter will assess the role of elected officials in the rise of the military-industrial complex and the development of Cold War strategy

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from early 1958 to January 1961. This analysis provides the final piece of the jigsaw in the challenge that was mounted against Eisenhower’s New Look defence strategy. This aspect of the Cold War arms race will be examined in the context of the ongoing military and political debates concerning America’s national security requirements. As such, it will demonstrate the convergence of views between the military, politicians and the private network. Congressional Democrats promoted claims of a so-called missile gap favouring the Soviet Union. They also sought to use Third World issues for political gain, and their criticism of government defence policy paved the way for adoption by the later Kennedy administration of a ‘flexible response’ to the Cold War. However, on the political front, such criticism was not confined to the Democratic Party. Fear of communism transcended party politics. From the very start, Nelson Rockefeller’s challenge had had a bipartisan appeal. During the latter years of the 1950s, John F. Kennedy drew inspiration from Rockefeller’s studies and argued the case for more expansive aid packages in the developing world. Rockefeller’s ongoing crusade against what he regarded as inadequate defence budgets would drive his decision to seek elected office, but it would also lead to a rift between him and the official Republican Party line, as this chapter will show. The final part of this chapter will examine Eisenhower’s continuing efforts to implement Open Skies. His difficulties in achieving this plan can be attributed to both internal and external factors. From 1958, the president faced formidable pressure to accelerate America’s military programmes. The thaw in East-West relations was turning frosty as disputes emerged between the US and the Soviet Union over Berlin and the Far East. The Soviet leaders continued to distrust Eisenhower’s attempts at promoting an easing of tensions and they remained alarmed at the scale of the military build-up in America. Eisenhower’s final struggle to calm the arms race and encourage talks with the Russians would have disastrous results. During a review of national security policy in the spring of 1958, Eisenhower refused to abandon the New Look defence strategy, despite the fact that many members of his administration had become disenchanted with this strategy (see Chapter Six). Reluctantly, Neil

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McElroy, Nathan Twining and Robert Cutler continued to ensure that America and its key interests were defended by means of nuclear retaliatory striking power. Senior military and CIA staff were to a degree reassured, thanks to the U2 flights over the Eastern bloc, that Soviet military power lagged behind the US. However, Eisenhower was unable to silence those critics outside his administration. In 1956, a number of Democrat senators, including Henry Jackson, Lyndon B. Johnson, John F. Kennedy and Stuart Symington, began challenging the adequacy of government defence policy. They were especially critical of ballistic missile programmes, claiming that inefficiency, duplication and service rivalries were impeding their rate of development compared to the Soviet programme.3 As the decade progressed, the Democratic Party did not relax its criticism of the Republican administration. In the mid-term Congressional election of 1958, the Republicans suffered serious losses and, as a result, Eisenhower faced a Democratic-controlled Congress that was intent on using the ‘missile gap’ and other perceived weaknesses in US defence strategy for political gain. The Senate Armed Services Committee had been established in 1947 as a single, bipartisan committee in the US Senate responsible for national defence. By the mid-1950s, the committee had become a forceful voice in the Senate for a strong national defence. As a result, this group and its sub-committees were more than prepared to express their criticism of government defence policy. In 1956, Senator Symington had chaired a sub-committee on the air force that held extensive hearings about the adequacy of SAC and the role of limited war. Symington’s group issued a report claiming that Eisenhower’s defence policies were allowing US air power to decline relative to that of the Soviet Union. It also argued that the US should be prepared for both limited and unlimited wars.4 Congressional intervention in defence matters led to several legislative-executive conflicts, a notable example being Senator Richard Russell’s proposed amendment to the Military Construction Act of 1959 that required authorisation of missiles, aircraft and naval vessels prior to appropriations. The Senate’s probing and increasingly adversarial style was particularly evident with the work of the Preparedness Investigating Sub-committee. This group had been established in the autumn of

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1957 under the chairmanship of Senator Johnson following the launch of Sputnik. Johnson’s sub-committee conducted a thorough inquiry into all aspects of the nation’s missile and satellite programmes. He was especially concerned to investigate the effectiveness of America’s military readiness and retaliatory striking force. The group raised concerns that a dangerous missile gap exposed the US to a Soviet nuclear attack.5 Johnson’s hearings continued during 1958 and were resumed in early 1959. By this time relations between the US and the Soviet Union were beginning to deteriorate over the issue of Berlin. On 10 November 1958, Khrushchev made a speech at the Moscow Sports Parade. He declared his intention to withdraw the Soviet mission from West Berlin and to have British, French and American missions expelled from East Berlin. He expressed his readiness to have all Soviet responsibility for overseeing the checkpoints pass to the East Germans. As far as Khrushchev was concerned it would then be up to the East Germans what they did with the access routes to the city. The Soviet leader was, in effect, threatening the expulsion of Western military personnel from Berlin. His actions were tantamount to a withdrawal from the Potsdam agreement of July 1945. This agreement placed obligations on the Soviet Union to safeguard access routes for the Western powers to West Berlin. Many in the West, including Britain, France and the US, expected some form of blockade to result.6 Eisenhower did not see any need for a major response to Khrushchev’s speech. After all, the Soviet leader did not give any clear indication as to when he wanted these changes to take effect. However, in November tensions began to rise when Soviet military personnel insisted on inspecting three US army trucks that were trying to leave West Berlin via the Babelsberg checkpoint. The commanding officer of the contingent refused to allow the inspection to go ahead and the stand-off was broken eight hours later when a platoon of US army trucks arrived at the scene. Once the Soviets realised that the US Army was prepared to use force to safeguard access for a minor convoy, they released the men and their trucks. On 27 November 1958, Khrushchev followed up his political offensive with a note to the French, British and US governments clarifying his requirements on the future of Berlin. The note,

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which was regarded as an ultimatum, gave the Western powers six months to agree to a Berlin settlement. It also reflected Khrushchev’s concerns regarding the increasingly assertive style of the West German government which was seeking to acquire nuclear weapons from the US government.7 The deployment of these weapons alongside the periphery of the Soviet bloc threatened to unsettle the balance of power in Europe. Thus, he argued: The Soviet Union . . . can no longer tolerate this state of affairs. For the occupation regime in West Berlin to continue would be tantamount to recognising something like a privileged position for the NATO countries, a privileged position for which, of course, there is no justification.8 While the Soviet leader appeared determined not to tolerate any longer ‘a situation in West Berlin which is detrimental to the [Soviet Union’s] legitimate interest’, he also suggested the convening of talks between the East and the West aimed at ‘normalizing the situation in Berlin’.9 In May 1959, the foreign ministers met in Geneva and were accompanied by representatives of the two German states. Khrushchev’s ultimatum, however, began to lose much of its force as the six months’ deadline for settling the dispute was continuously extended. The reaction of US officials to Khrushchev’s actions over Berlin makes interesting reading. Congressional hearings on the subjects of the missile gap and America’s preparedness for war continued. Hearings also began on the Berlin situation. Johnson’s sub-committee sought detailed testimony from the JCS on enemy capabilities. General Twining gave the group assurances that the US Air Force was four times the size of that of the Soviet Union. He also admitted that he had previously fought for more bombers, having been concerned over the Soviet capability to build long-range bombers (known as Bisons and Bears). However, it was now apparent, the chairman of the JCS advised, that the Russians had not built these aircraft at the rate previously estimated and they probably only possessed 100–115 heavy bombers.10 Moreover, he stressed to Johnson and Symington that ‘missiles are only as good as their launching site. We have not as

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yet obtained any hard evidence on any launching sites in the Soviet Union.’11 The senators remained unconvinced by Twining’s testimony concerning America’s capability to respond to a Soviet attack or threat of attack. Symington decried the administration for terminating certain military exercises involving an airborne alert of SAC, blaming the state of the budget for this ‘deplorable’ gap in US defence planning. He supported Johnson in recommending to Congress an increase in the military budget of $3.5 billion annually – the same figure promoted by Rockefeller’s Special Studies Project.12 On the subject of Berlin, Johnson was equally scathing. Summing up his inquiries, he argued that the administration was ‘not doing enough, fast enough or thoroughly enough to keep the nation strong’.13 In their testimony to Congress, the JCS defended the administration’s policies. Secretary McElroy gave assurances that there was no evidence to indicate that Soviet ballistic missile development was ahead of US programmes.14 The JCS resented the nature of the hearings, with Twining seeking legal advice as to their constitutional basis. In a conversation with the president in March 1959, Twining expressed his displeasure at the idea of the Joint Chiefs of Staff being called to testify before Senator Johnson’s committee. Eisenhower agreed and instructed him to caution the JCS that the military was a tool and not a policy-making body. As he reminded Twining, constitutionally the JCS were required to advise only the president and the secretary of state. Thus, the JCS had to be prepared to refuse to answer questions relating to military planning which were not Congressional prerogatives.15 Behind the scenes, however, the military expressed their concerns that the administration was ‘not going far enough in responding to the Berlin crisis’.16 In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, General Taylor urged Eisenhower to increase the level of army forces in Europe by over 10,000 men. The president refused, believing Taylor’s stance was an excuse for avoiding his programmed cut of 30,000 personnel.17 The JCS recommended the preparation of a military convoy from West Germany along the autobahn corridor through East Germany to West Germany as a way of demonstrating the continuing Western allied commitment to the divided city. John Foster Dulles, however,

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believed the military was acting too hastily in advocating a military reaction to Khrushchev.18 Eisenhower too stressed the need to avoid ‘over-reacting’ to the situation of Berlin. In one meeting with the JCS, he argued the US would merely give the Soviets ammunition. Eisenhower was of the view that Khrushchev sought only to unnerve the US and urged his military staff to address this issue in terms ‘not of six months, but of forty years’. He suspected the Soviets would like America to ‘go frantic every time they stir up difficulties’ in areas such as Iraq and Iran. Once again, he stressed the need for the US to defend its programme of deterrence based on ‘our air power, our missiles, our allies’, and questioned the efficacy of any crash military measures in addressing the Berlin issue.19 Military officials were determined to prevent the Soviets from gaining the initiative in the Cold War. But it is also clear that politicians played a role in exerting pressure on the administration to pursue a militaristic response to the Soviet Union. Theirs was not a campaign carried out behind closed doors. Elected officials were able to express their opinion about spending levels and policy direction in the Senate and to the press. Many made the life of senior military officials uncomfortable for a time but their stance struck a definite chord with the JCS and several members of Eisenhower’s cabinet. It can be argued that Johnson, Symington and their supporters sought to inflate and distort military issues for political gain. Yet one cannot discount the possibility that they too were caught up in the fear and panic of Soviet communism that was almost universal towards the end of the 1950s. As Johnson declared after Sputnik, ‘the Russians have beaten us at our own game – daring scientific advances in the nuclear age.’20 The activities of Senator John F. Kennedy should not go unnoticed. In the Senate, to the media and across university campuses in America, Kennedy decried the unnecessary fiscal stringency of the government. Pressured by the US Air Force and reporter Joseph Alsop, he led from late 1957 a very active and public campaign about an alleged missile gap favouring the Soviet Union. Arguing that such a gap would exist from 1960, the senator claimed: ‘we are rapidly approaching that dangerous period which General Gavin and others have called the “gap”, or the “missile lag period”.’ Quoting Gavin, Kennedy continued: ‘our

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own offensive and defensive missile capabilities will lag so far behind those of the Soviets as to place us in a position of great peril.’21 Questions may be raised about Kennedy’s motives in propagating an alleged missile gap. Did he believe sincerely that such a gap would exist from the early 1960s and, if so, would this leave America vulnerable to a surprise attack by the Soviets? It should be remembered that as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kennedy had access to testimony given by various administration officials concerning military programmes and intelligence estimates. In one closed Congressional hearing held in January 1959, McElroy and Twining gave a ‘remarkably candid summary’ of NIE 11–4-58 and US military capabilities.22 Twining made no effort to downplay the Soviet threat. He even recognised that US forces had ‘deficiencies’. Nevertheless, his views on America’s overall military strength were unequivocal; ‘nuclear retaliatory forces,’ he argued, ‘continue to provide the United States with a margin of advantage which, if exploited effectively in conjunction with other military operations, would permit the United States and its allies to prevail in general war.’23 In response to questions from Kennedy regarding intelligence estimates and missile production, Twining stressed the strengths of America’s ‘collective defense’. As the chairman of the JCS explained: . . . we will have IRBMs in Europe – consider what we have to attack Russia with – that are better than ICBMs. Look at the 15 bombers sitting on the border, and the Matador missiles and the Navy equipment. We are surrounding them. The only thing they can hit us with is the ICBM in the missile field, and we can hit them with all kinds of missiles.24 While some committee members felt reassured by this briefing and expressed support for the administration, Kennedy remained unconvinced. During the 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy resurrected many of the claims that he had made in 1958 concerning America’s military position vis-à-vis that of the Soviet Union. Thus, in one speech he argued that the US was ‘going to be faced with a missile gap which

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will make the difficulties of negotiating with the Soviet Union and the Chinese in the 1960s extremely difficult’.25 His speech demonstrated his enthusiasm, as Christopher Preble argues, ‘for continuing to criticize a popular president’.26 It can also be argued that Kennedy, in grooming himself for the presidency, exploited the fears surrounding Soviet technological achievements and the myth of the missile gap for political gain. Any assessment of Kennedy’s role in generating claims of a missile gap should not, however, overlook his underlying concerns with the New Look. He believed that this strategy did not adequately safeguard the nation’s security. Later, in defending his stance on the gap, Kennedy claimed to have been ‘a patriotic and misguided man’.27 From the mid-1950s, he had opposed cuts in military budgets, believing that lower defence costs were detrimental to the very survival of America. Reflecting the feelings of a number of elected officials and military personnel, Kennedy also believed that a heavy reliance on nuclear weapons threatened to undermine the nation’s ability to conduct future wars, especially limited wars. It should come as no surprise that a crucial element of Kennedy’s campaign for improving the nation’s defences was the need to increase conventional forces. In his criticism of the Republican government, Kennedy also began to claim the existence of an ‘economic gap’. From early 1958, he took on the mantle of condemning the amount the government was devoting to foreign economic aid. The economic gap was, for Kennedy, a significant concern in Asia where ‘policies have been spasmodic and episodic, in reflex to sudden crises and intermittent pressures’.28 In this pursuit, the senator was assisted by Walt Rostow – no sympathiser of the view that budgets should take precedence over security. From 1957, Rostow furnished Kennedy with a considerable amount of advice on foreign aid issues, which enabled the senator to challenge government policy in this area, particularly over the case of aid to India. As the MIT professor recalled: ‘Our dialogue expanded out over the whole field of foreign and military policy and to the domestic scene. He requested my regular support as he sought the Democratic nomination and the presidency.’29 In early 1958, just after Kennedy’s first meeting with Rostow, he sought congressional approval for increased economic aid for India,

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citing problems with Nehru’s second ‘five year plan’ and the risk of communist infiltration. Rostow provided the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with advice on this subject. In answer to Kennedy’s question about whether he believed the level of assistance the government was proposing to give to India was sufficient or not, Rostow replied: ‘I believe the present aid program, which amounts to about $290 million this year, is grossly inadequate.’ In a clear ‘put up job’, as Rostow himself later described this episode, Kennedy eventually managed to secure additional aid for India. In this venture, he was also supported by John Sherman Cooper, a Republican senator from Kentucky. As David Milne argues, ‘The young senator had achieved a significant legislative triumph and, with Rostow’s assistance, had carved a niche as a passionate advocate of Third World development.’30 A Democrat and staunch supporter of aid for the developing world, Rostow continued to provide political and related advice to Kennedy. During their third meeting in August 1958, Rostow and Kennedy discussed military matters, including the missile gap. This discussion, as Rostow later claimed, ‘laid the basis for much future work in the campaign and beyond’. With a convergence of interests ‘over the whole field of foreign and military policy,’ he recalled, ‘I concluded in 1958 that [Kennedy] would make a first rate president.’31 By June 1960, he was writing key campaign speeches for Kennedy and a ‘consolidated military position paper’. As Rostow advised, there was nothing ‘more likely to swing the voters than the conviction that the Republicans have endangered the nation’s security’.32 At the time he began advising Kennedy, Rostow was also assisting Nelson Rockefeller and the SSP. Rostow took an active part in drafting the report of sub-panel VI, The Future of Democracy. His position in helping Rockefeller on the one hand, and advising Kennedy on the other, was not unusual. Indeed, it is a clear indication of the way in which the military and foreign aid issues of the day, predicated on fear of monolithic communism, transcended party political lines. As Dean Rusk once argued in a letter to John Foster Dulles, ‘If foreign policy is made a partisan issue, any Administration is almost bound to lose politically.’33 The Quantico panel had demonstrated the strength of feeling towards the defence of the free world by men across the

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political spectrum. On a much larger and public scale, the SSP represented the next example of how political boundaries could become increasingly blurred, perhaps understandably where America’s safety was believed to be at stake. Kennedy also drew inspiration from Rockefeller’s studies. During 1958 there was a brief exchange of correspondence between the diehard Republican and the self-styled liberal. In one reply to Rockefeller in April of that year, Kennedy thanked Rockefeller for complimenting him on his recent speech on India and the resolution introduced for additional aid in that part of Asia. Reflecting their mutual interest in this subject, Kennedy wrote, ‘It is most reassuring to know that your own familiarity with and experience in Asian countries confirm the position I have taken with regard to assistance to India.’34 The senator also expressed his wish to meet with Rockefeller. It is not known, however, whether any such meeting took place. Later, in a speech during the presidential election campaign, Kennedy praised Rockefeller’s SSP and other ‘bipartisan reports’ for giving warning about growing Soviet strength in the face of a declining US force. Quoting an extract from the project’s report, Kennedy declared, ‘The power of these communist states, particularly the USSR, has been growing both absolutely and relatively to the US until today it constitutes a grave threat.’35 Rockefeller had attacked, with little restraint and in the most public way possible, the Republican administration and its national security policies. His challenge did not end with publication of the SSP’s reports. In the summer of 1958, he decided to seek elected office, the governorship of New York. Like Kennedy, Rockefeller also had aspirations for the presidency. His entry into electoral politics was by no means an imprudent step in the direction of the White House. After all, governorship of the ‘big state’ had proved the ideal launch pad for Grover Cleveland and two Roosevelts. In what became a successful year for the Democratic Party in the mid-term elections of 1958, Rockefeller beat Averell Harriman by just over half a million votes in the gubernatorial election. His victory had not been expected – indeed the odds had been clearly against him. The Republican Party did not oppose his nomination. Nevertheless its support was lukewarm. As Joe Alex Morris has argued, ‘If the odds had been in favor

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of a Republican victory, Rockefeller’s path would unquestionably have been rougher.’36 In a state with strong liberal ties, Rockefeller’s stance was not entirely out of place. In fact it was, as some columnists and publishers in New York claimed, closer to New Deal than to Republican philosophy. The New York Post had been a supporter of Harriman but during the campaign it switched allegiances. Referring to the ‘high-priced publicity ballyhoo’ surrounding Rockefeller’s election campaign, the right-wing magazine, National Review, no doubt gave comfort to Republican and Democrat voters alike when it argued, ‘Nowhere does Rockefeller speak up for Republican principles of the free, non-statist society. His position seems to be that Republicans can do a superior job of implementing a Democratic philosophy of government.’37 Nonetheless, Rockefeller had now proved he knew how to get votes. He served as governor of New York State until 1974, being successfully re-elected in 1962, 1966 and 1970. Following his election as governor, Rockefeller decided to seek the presidential nomination on the Republican ticket. By the end of 1959, however, he had withdrawn from the race, having been informed by aides that he had very little chance of gaining the nomination against Richard Nixon. By mid-1960, Rockefeller was reconsidering his political future and indicated to Eisenhower his desire to be a presidential candidate. The governor did not, however, forego his stance on national security. In a speech at the New York Executive Chamber in June 1960, he made a stinging attack on the administration, arguing: The future development of our foreign policy must begin with the fact that our position in the world is dramatically weaker today than fifteen years ago . . . the blame for this can be placed on no one party, on no one administration. The fact is that world upheaval, exploited by communism, now challenges America and the world more gravely than at any time in our history.38 Rockefeller’s calls during the presidential election campaign for a limited war deterrent, more ICBMs, larger foreign aid programmes and a much larger defence budget infuriated the administration.

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Vice-President Nixon was also singled out for attack. Rockefeller’s position was anomalous, not the behaviour of a committed Republican with ambitions for high office. His stance not only created a divided Republican platform in 1960, but fell, like a pile of juicy plums, into the lap of John F. Kennedy. To outward appearances, Rockefeller could be regarded as a troublemaker, an ambitious man seeking to steal the limelight and initiative from Republicans and Democrats alike in the not too insignificant matter of the nation’s security. Yet Rockefeller was also taking serious risks. As his own lawyer, John E. Lockwood, had counselled earlier in reference to a letter Rockefeller had sent to Eisenhower concerning the administration’s proposed budget for fiscal year 1958, ‘the method you use in presenting it may injure your case . . . in a way I would expect the president not to like it’.39 To be sure, Eisenhower was not impressed. Later, referring to Rockefeller’s stance on national security, the president warned that in order to ‘get some kind of blessing for the [presidential] nomination’, he would be expected to adopt ‘a reasoned and positive approach on defense spending . . . instead of jumping on everybody’.40 However, Eisenhower’s entreaties did not succeed in calming Rockefeller. The governor’s stance reflected his deep-rooted beliefs about America’s role in the world order, its leadership of the free world and destroyer of world communism. Strength was essential for ‘the forces of freedom and the unity and common efforts of free peoples’. Thus, he argued in June 1960, ‘I believe our national defense needs great strengthening to meet the physical danger in which America lives. This danger has to be made completely clear to the people whose freedom – and lives – are at stake.’41 Very little had changed since Quantico. Rockefeller’s position would account for his attack on the Republican Party throughout 1960 and on its nominee, Richard Nixon. As he argued on the campaign trail, ‘I have reiterated my firm conviction that the people of this country are entitled to receive from the vice president no less than a clear, candid statement of his views on the emerging problems that challenge as never before the security . . . of the American people.’42

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Of course, to those hawks in the Republican camp Rockefeller’s position was not altogether anomalous. He continued to receive support from Henry Kissinger and Emmet John Hughes, who became his speechwriters during the campaign, and also Henry R. Luce, editor-in-chief of Time and Life magazines, C.D. Jackson and Edward Teller. Senator Barry Goldwater, who would become the Republican presidential nominee in 1964, also argued that ‘the Republican Party must determinedly maintain the most powerful military power in the world and that we must be able to use this power’.43 To mainstream Republicans, however, Rockefeller was a controversial figure. Nixon was, by far, the wilier politician. A member of the administration, he was keen to underline his separation from his Republican colleague, arguing, ‘There is no deterrent gap in America’s defenses and will not be in 1961, 1962, 1963 or the foreseeable future.’44 Politically, Rockefeller was the loser. As though emphasising his isolation, the New York Herald Tribune wrote in December 1960: ‘The Tribune feels Nelson Rockefeller’s advisers should not have allowed Rockefeller to disassociate himself from Ike as such action does not win delegates.’45 Governor Rockefeller and many like him no doubt raised questions as to the administration’s ability to handle the nation’s defence. Yet military and technological progress during this period was not inconsequential. It should be remembered that when Eisenhower left office in January 1961, SAC had 538 B-52s, 1,292 B-47s and 19 B-58 bombers, plus 1,094 tankers. Twelve Atlas ICBMs had been deployed in the US; there were 60 Thor IRBMs in Britain; and 30 Jupiter IRBMs were being deployed to Turkey. Between 1958 and 1960, the US nuclear stockpile had tripled in size, expanding from approximately 6,000 to 18,000 weapons.46 These advances were remarkable during a so-called peacetime period, but they were not enough to quell demand in all quarters. The increasingly rapid rate at which new weapons were becoming obsolete seemed to require cutting-edge technology, supported by the millions allocated for research and development. In 1958 James Killian had warned the president of the need in the near future to abandon some of the ‘first generation’ ballistic missiles, which he believed would become unreliable. Based on their more

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advanced warheads, guidance and propellant systems, the Titan and Minuteman ICBMs were hailed as the new ‘greatly improved’ missiles. A crash programme to develop these weapons was recommended. By November 1960, construction of over 650 additional Atlas, Titan and Minuteman missiles had been authorised with the aim of securing the deployment of the latter weapon by 1963.47 Then there was Polaris. This submarine-based weapons system was estimated to cost $25 million per missile, making a large build-up of this force very painful indeed for the American taxpayer.48 Construction of 14 Polaris submarines, each of which was armed with 16 missiles, was subsequently authorised. The first such submarine, the USS. George Washington, was deployed in November 1960. By this time, the US had also successfully launched 26 satellites and 2 space probes, compared to Soviet efforts of 6 and 2.49 A special report published in GRIT journal in October 1960 seemed to sum up the scale of the military build-up. ‘The largest and most expensive element of the executive branch of our government, the Department of Defense, is so vast and complicated in all its structures that it may appear sometimes to the average citizen to defy complete understanding,’ the article claimed. It also noted the substantial forces assigned to Europe and the Far East, with mutual assistance programmes affecting more than 40 countries of the ‘Free World’, as well as the Department of defense’s string of close military relations with NATO and other allies in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and North America. On a lighter note, GRIT mused that ‘Department of Defense activities circle the globe’.50 The military build-up in America was significant and it was not only the services that stood to gain. Well-known contractors continued to flourish during this period. They included Convair, Chrysler, Douglas Aircraft, Lockheed, Boeing and Bell Aircraft, all of whom had a vested interest in guided missile development. During 1957, big names such as Boeing, Douglas and General Dynamics brought in more than $1 billion each in annual revenue. In the same year, IBM had revenues of $734 million and General Motors approximately $10.8 billion.51 A confidential report to the government prepared by the General Accounting Office of January 1960, which examined the management

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of the Air Force Ballistic Missile Program, referred to the ‘phenomenal growth’ between 1950 and 1958 of contractors such as Convair, Sperry and the Rame-Wooldridge Corporation.52 The report also claimed that the higher level of salaries paid by arms manufacturers, compared to industrial organisations and the government, adversely affected the government’s ability to establish an in-house capability which was considered ‘essential to effective program management’.53 As a result of this situation, contractors were guaranteed a ‘lion’s share’ of government defence spending and the private arms industry mushroomed. It was noted that the investments in one contractor, Rame-Wooldridge, increased from $65,000 to $16 million within five years ‘with knowhow and capability acquired at government expense’. It is not known if the various recommendations outlined in the report were implemented, but the study certainly demonstrates the ‘privileged position’ arms manufacturers occupied in the military industry.54 As Gerard DeGroot argues, ‘the military-industrial complex took control of American life . . . the weapons industry was an octopus whose tentacles held politicians, academics, and financiers in a steely grip as fear bred fear and contracts begat contracts.’55 However, it is as well to remember that the growth of the militaryindustrial complex during this period might have been a lot worse had Eisenhower not exercised the level of control that he did over the military. Believing himself to be the first president to have stressed economy and prudence in recent years, he refused to endorse many programmes and developments supported by the military.56 A case in point was a meeting between Eisenhower and Killian in March 1958. Reporting the results of his analysis of defence proposals for budget augmentation, Killian advised that the services were seeking increases totalling $10 billion. At this point, the president lost his patience, complaining that this was the type of thing which to him showed a lack of responsibility, and that he found it hard to retain confidence in the heads of services when they produced proposals of this nature. These proposals included, amongst others, development of anti-missile programmes, radio telescope, sonar equipment and air-to-surface missiles. Only when these had been scaled down to $1.6 billion (after prolonged discussion with the Defense Department),

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would Eisenhower support certain increases.57 Confiding his experience to Donald Quarles, deputy secretary of defence, Killian said he had never seen the president ‘so angry’. Eisenhower had other reasons to be angry about the nature of the military build-up. In 1959, it was clear that he was becoming increasingly frustrated by the disloyalty and, at times, outright insubordination of his military staff. As James Ledbetter has shown, this frustration could take many forms. In one instance, in late 1959, the administration had decided to stop developing the B-70 bomber as a replacement for the B-52, feeling that by the time the plane actually became available in the mid to late-1960s, advances in Soviet antiaircraft weapons would eliminate its high altitude advantage. This change of policy was denounced by Senator Clair Engle, a Democrat from California, and in January 1960, Air Force Chief of Staff, Thomas White, announced that he would testify before a congressional committee in support of restoration of the programme.58 Yet to Eisenhower it was not only the military that was setting the tone of public debate over national security and policy direction. The rise of the militaryindustrial complex was the result of the combined activities of several elements of American political life. Eisenhower’s recognition of this formidable faction is clear from the record of a discussion between him, Killian and Edwin Land, owner of the Polaroid corporation, in February 1959: The President next commented on the way irresponsible officials and demagogues are leaking security information and presenting a misleading picture of our security situation to our people. Some of our senators in particular seem to be doing this. In turn, the munitions makers are making tremendous efforts towards getting more contracts and in fact seem to be exerting undue influence over the Senators.59 There can be little doubt that the combined activities of senators, the military, private industry and the research and development sectors would influence the tone and content of Eisenhower’s farewell address.

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Moderation could prevail while Eisenhower maintained a degree of fiscal stringency. But the reconnaissance flights also created dilemmas for the government. Failure to obtain concrete information on Soviet missile sites and ICBM deployment methods continued to breed uncertainty and fear. Resumption of successful ICBM tests to a range of 3,500 nautical miles in 1959 led intelligence analysts to claim that the Soviets were in fact making progress in missile development and were likely to achieve a first operational capability with ten ICBMs in either 1959 or 1960.60 Moreover, in conversations with Richard Nixon and Averell Harriman, Nikita Khrushchev claimed that a recent ICBM shot to a distance of 7,000 kilometres deviated only 1.4 kilometres to the right of the target and was in error by only 1.7 kilometres in distance. The CIA was not entirely dismissive of Khrushchev’s claim, citing evidence of ‘good Soviet missile accuracy at medium ranges’ and of ICBM test shots reaching the general target area.61 Eisenhower discounted the capability of the Soviets to build many launch sites within a year. Nevertheless, he continued to authorise U2 flights over the Soviet Union in an attempt to obtain intelligence on Soviet ballistic missile capability. He was wary of the Kremlin’s reaction to such activity, arguing during one meeting in January 1958 that ‘the impact on our foreign position and our efforts in foreign relations would be tremendous’.62 In early February 1959, Eisenhower came under pressure from McElroy and the JCS to authorise further U2 flights over the Soviet Union. The secretary pointed out that in recent congressional investigations he had been successful in ‘blunting’ much of the attack on ICBM development. However, Congress, he continued, was continually raising concerns over the criteria employed by the Defense Department in estimating Soviet capabilities. McElroy stressed that the military was not aware of any launching platforms in the Soviet Union. Reluctantly, Eisenhower approved further overflights but not ‘an extensive program’ for fear of aggravating Moscow. He referred to the impending crisis over Berlin. As the 27 May deadline approached, ‘it would be most unwise,’ Eisenhower argued, ‘to have world tensions exacerbated by our pursuit of a program of extensive reconnaissance flights over the territory of the Soviet Union.’63

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In April 1959, Eisenhower refused to sanction further U2 flights. In a meeting with McElroy and Richard Bissell, he reiterated his concerns about the political costs involved should a plane be detected or lost. Furthermore, the president argued that the US now had the power to destroy the Soviets without the need for detailed targeting.64 Yet the need to calm the alarmism and fear associated with perceived Soviet strength was never further from his mind. He agreed with McElroy and Bissell on the requirement for further information on the Russians, arguing ‘this need is highlighted by the distortions several senators are making of our military position relative to that of the Soviets, and they are helped in their “demagoguery” by our uncertainties as to Soviet programs.’65 By July, Eisenhower had changed his mind and he began authorising further U2 flights over the Soviet Union. By this time, he had also approved plans for the development of an advanced aircraft to replace the U2.66 These incidents are important in revealing a strong desire on the part of the administration for information on the East in order to quell the increasing alarmism sowed by Congress and private industry. In January 1958, Eisenhower approved an outline plan for development of a reconnaissance satellite project, codenamed Corona. The satellite was aimed at acquiring intelligence on the status of the Soviet ICBM programme, including progress on the construction of launch sites. There was no international agreement prohibiting the use of outer space for military purposes. But, as the CIA pointed out, the Soviets would more than likely regard a US reconnaissance satellite as a violation of their security and a challenge to their prestige. If, however, the US offered, before implementing its programme, to co-operate with the Soviet Union as part of a multilateral inspection system, world reaction would be generally favourable. The principle of Open Skies had not disappeared. However, the CIA counselled that the Soviets would probably not accept this proposal.67 Further advice from the CIA anticipated the ‘availability of a large [Soviet] missile force by 1961–1962’. The administration considered that acquisition of more concrete intelligence was becoming increasingly more urgent.68 Twelve flights of the Corona satellite were planned for 1959, with a

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further eight missions in 1960. Costs of the programme escalated from an original figure of $24 million to $61.7 million.69 As with the U2, ‘major efforts’ were undertaken to limit the number of persons knowledgeable about the Corona programme and its successors. Access to information was restricted on a ‘must know basis related to major national security needs’.70 Elaborate cover stories were invented in an attempt to conceal the true purpose of the satellite. Ostensibly, the programme was intended for research and development and the study of environmental conditions. Another story claimed that satellites would contribute ‘to the broad purpose . . . of achievement of a man-in-space flight’.71 While enthusiastic about new opportunities for gaining additional information on the Soviet Union, Eisenhower wished to maintain at all costs the secrecy of the project. Advice from intelligence staff indicated that the Soviets would stage a strong campaign of protest. Moreover, Eisenhower was all too aware of the Kremlin’s interest in a summit. In February 1959, a little over a year after the president gave his approval, test launches began from Vandenberg air force base in California. But it was not until August 1960 that a camera-equipped Corona satellite was successfully launched, photographing targets in the Soviet Union and returning its images back to earth via a film capsule. However, this intelligence came too late in the day to affect the government’s defence planning and quell opposition to Eisenhower’s policies. The Kennedy administration would become the main beneficiaries of this mission and later successful launches. There was another facet to the rise of the military-industrial complex during the 1950s. The military, and those with a vested interest in making this a permanent feature of life, had a profound influence on the American psyche at large. Not only did the military and the industrial machine become a fact of life, but an unquestioned one at that. The more sinister aspect of this situation meant that the security of the nation took precedence over liberty. To challenge calls for a build-up in military forces was to arouse suspicions or claims of disloyalty, even complacency. It threatened to blur the distinction between a free nation and a garrison state. In an address in Washington in January 1956,

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Rear Admiral Henry Rickover asked whether the Soviet Union was a serious threat to the survival of the US. ‘If the answer to that is yes,’ Rickover argued, ‘then we must ask ourselves this second question: Is the nation doing all that it can and all that it should to turn back that threat?’ In a no holds barred attempt to prick the conscience of Americans, he continued, ‘If the answer to that is no, then I submit that something is wrong with us and that we are in trouble.’72 Leading the political chorus of disapproval was John F. Kennedy. In a radio interview with Dick Boyle in March 1959 the senator argued: I am convinced that every American who can be fully informed as to the facts today will agree to an additional investment in our national security now rather than risk his survival, and his children’s survival in the years ahead . . . I am calling, in short, for an investment in peace. Like any investment it will be a gamble with our money. But the alternative is to gamble with our lives.73 The growth of the military-industrial complex was a self-fulfilling prophecy. Few Americans questioned such change; in opinion polls carried out across the nation, results demonstrated strong support for higher levels of defence spending. In September 1955, one such poll highlighted that 74 per cent of Americans believed spending on defence should be as high as it was, with only 16 per cent of the view that such expenditure should be reduced. The same poll also showed that 82 per cent of Americans believed Russian radio claims about the Soviet Union wanting to end the Cold War and seek peace were propaganda. Only 8 per cent believed such claims were sincere.74 In a later opinion poll, 39 per cent of Americans thought Russia would change its past policy and make real peace with the US within the next few years. However, in the wake of Sputnik, this figure dropped to 28 per cent, and whilst 60 per cent had previously believed that the US could ‘reach agreement with the Russians on major issues at Geneva’, this figure too had dropped, to 45 per cent.75 The more disconcerting, even sinister, consequence of the predominance of the military industry was the potential for the emergence of

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an imbalance between security and liberty in the nation at large. The more extreme effects of anti-communism had already loomed large during Senator Joseph McCarthy’s campaign to identify and harass suspected communists in various government departments, Congress, the media and universities. Eisenhower was fully aware of these dangers and in his farewell address to the nation of January 1961 he did not hold back his concerns. Thus, he argued: ‘We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.’76 The Soviet position on mutual aerial inspection remained unchanged. Citing America’s categoric rejection of all proposals for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and, more interestingly, the very noticeable military build-up in America, Bulganin argued that mutual aerial inspection would probably increase international tension and suspicion between the East and the West. Far from building trust and liquidating the Cold War, the Soviet chairman argued that Open Skies ‘would play into the hands of forces which are attempting to find a pretext to engulf humanity in a destructive atomic war’.77 The desirability of reaching an agreement with the Soviets remained, however, an important aspect in Eisenhower’s personal dealings with Bulganin and Khrushchev. The president was unable to achieve any headway with Khrushchev during the Soviet premier’s visit to the US in September 1959. In their private discussions, Khrushchev argued that Western inspection proposals were a cover for intelligence gathering. ‘You can’t allow other people in your bedroom,’ he bellowed. Reiterating a long-time Soviet adage, Khrushchev argued that trust had to precede inspection and, as a preliminary towards building bridges, he demanded the dismantling of US military forces, including the ‘ring of US bases around the Soviet Union’.78 This requirement, though impossible in the political climate of the late 1950s, should not have come as any great surprise to the US administration. Bulganin had previously raised with Eisenhower his suspicions about the scale of the military build-up in America. In November 1960, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Vassily

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Kuznetsov, informed the US ambassador, Llewellyn Thompson, that he was ‘disturbed’ by some of John Kennedy’s campaign remarks which indicated that his first actions as president would be to increase military expenditures and build up the military establishment in America to one of clear superiority over the Soviet Union.79 Yet there were limits to Moscow’s rectitude. In July 1959, the first Soviet ICBM – the R7 – went into service at two launch facilities at Plesetsk. The Soviet Union finally had the ability to launch a nuclear missile attack, though this force was tiny in comparison with the US. Moreover, on 27 January 1959, Khrushchev made a speech to the Soviet nation wherein he claimed that serial production of ICBM rockets had now been organised. Many in America interpreted this statement, quite incorrectly, to mean that the Soviet Union was in serial production of such weapons. Nevertheless, press reports caused quite a stir in the US.80 Despite Soviet rebuffs, the US continued to press for an inspection system at the UN Disarmament Commission. By 1958, the original ‘test strip’ proposal for aerial inspection had been extended to include the continental US, Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, and Canada, all territory of the Arctic Circle of the Soviet Union, Denmark, Greenland and Europe. In principle the Soviets did not object to such proposals; the crucial matter that remained outstanding was agreement to disarm. NATO also supported the ‘test zones’.81 To an extent, discussions on aerial inspection were hijacked by negotiations between the West and the Soviet Union on the suspension of nuclear testing. But it was the shooting down of a U2 plane over the Sverdlovsk region in the Ural Mountains that destroyed the prospects for improved relations between Moscow and Washington. The pilot, Gary Powers, survived but was captured by Soviet officials and subjected to detailed interrogation. Khrushchev was incensed. The US administration did not help itself when an elaborate cover plan for the incident was foiled. For Eisenhower, this could not have come at a more inopportune moment. The long-awaited four-power summit of June 1960 took place amid bitter recriminations. Not surprisingly, very little progress was achieved on the subjects of disarmament, aerial inspection and Berlin.

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Eisenhower was determined to justify his position on Open Skies. In a speech to the UN General Assembly in August 1960, no doubt underlining the risks and indiscretion of recent U2 activity, he declared: Intelligence activities inevitably lead to accidents and tensions. They must be replaced by open methods and by inspection. It was these considerations that led to my Open Skies proposal of 1955. Unfortunately, international agreement on Open Skies has not yet been reached.82 By the close of 1960, despite Eisenhower’s personal entreaties to Bulganin and Khrushchev and his various diplomatic efforts since July 1955, Open Skies had not come to fruition. His disappointment at not having fully tackled the ‘permanent armaments industry of vast proportions’ was clear in his farewell address to the nation of 17 January 1961 and this should be highlighted again: In the councils of government we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. Additionally, but not ironically, Eisenhower’s warning extended to domination of the nation’s scholars by federal government, and equally the danger that public policy could itself become ‘the captive of a scientific-technological elite’. Eisenhower’s successor paid little heed to this advice. In November 1960, John F. Kennedy won the US presidential election by an extremely narrow margin. He moved quickly to implement a strategy of flexible response, promising more ICBMs, achievements in space and a ‘strengthening of America’s ability to deter and confine limited wars’.83 Such capabilities included larger conventional and counter-guerrilla

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forces, based on additional resources (such as helicopters) for the army, an accelerated capacity to mobilise army reserve units and an expansion of Marine Corps strength. As a result, military expenditures rose roughly by 15 per cent, from $43 billion in fiscal year 1961 to $49 billion by 1964.84 Kennedy had laid the foundations for a new defence strategy that prepared the country for confronting a wider range of perceived threats. It would also lead to a disastrous war in Vietnam. In Eisenhower’s efforts to reduce tensions with the Soviet Union, he regarded mutual aerial inspection as crucial in controlling the armaments build-up in his own country. Of this trend, he had serious misgivings. At the time he left the White House in January 1961, military budgets exceeded $40 billion annually. Had the nation known the true extent of Soviet capabilities during this period, serious questions would have been raised about the need for expenditures on this scale. In any event, he did question demand for accelerating the military build-up in the US, certainly beyond what he considered was a respectable posture of defence. His own sense of Soviet limitations, confirmed by the intelligence he was able to obtain on the Soviet Union, for which he took significant risks, allowed him to assert restraint over the military and members of his cabinet. Indeed, the military budget could quite easily have reached the $50 billion mark had Eisenhower not exercised the restraint that he did. His chief difficulties, however, lay in convincing many within and beyond the White House of American military superiority. After October 1957, this task became relentless. In combination, the military, munitions industry, Congress and the private network of foundations, scholars and policy analysts comprised a formidable faction – the specialists in violence that threatened to push America towards conditions that resembled Harold Lasswell’s conception of a garrison state. They created the state of mind in the United States for a permanent armaments and scientifictechnological industry – a military-industrial complex. To the end of his presidency, Eisenhower did not give up on the idea of implementing Open Skies with the Soviet Union as a tool in his struggle to control this monster that threatened to engulf American liberties and values.

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CONCLUSION

Since the late 1970s, with the availability of presidential records, judgements about Eisenhower’s presidency have become more benign. However, over the last decade, the tide of revisionism has been to a degree checked by certain works which have attempted to revive uncomplimentary narratives of a president who was more interested in making proposals for their propaganda value and impact on public opinion at home than in easing international tensions, and whose sincerity towards negotiating with the Soviets is open to considerable doubt.1 Open Skies has not escaped this post-revisionist assault. For Kenneth Osgood, the Geneva summit simply ‘presented a great opportunity for psychological warfare’.2 Eisenhower’s desire to negotiate a system of mutual aerial inspection with the Soviets was driven by his determination to control the military-industrial complex in America. Acquisition of a reliable picture of Soviet capabilities was, as far as the president was concerned, crucial to the economic and military security of America over the long term. This analysis is important in understanding the development of Eisenhower’s Cold War strategy and the extent to which this was shaped by both foreign policy and domestic issues. An examination of Open Skies clearly needs to take account of two main points relevant to US foreign and military policy of the 1950s. Firstly, mutual aerial inspection was significant for Eisenhower’s defence strategy before and after the Geneva summit. Before becoming president, Eisenhower had grown aware of the dangers of uncontrolled military expenditures, for the economy and, ultimately, the American way of life. From the earliest months of his presidency, he made clear

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both publicly and in private to his colleagues his thoughts on this matter. The New Look was carefully and deliberately framed to protect the US economy through maintenance of an adequate but also affordable posture of defence. This strategy was aimed at deterring the Soviet Union from initiating an attack on the US and its allies. Eisenhower avoided the ‘crash planning’ approach of his predecessor who, after the spring of 1950, had been inclined to mobilise all military resources at America’s disposal to the extent that military expenditures quadrupled within 18 months, threatening the rise of a garrison state. After 1951, defence budgets exceeding $40 billion annually became the norm. In an attempt to contain the budget, Eisenhower reduced conventional forces and the Mutual Security Program. His military posture relied heavily, but not exclusively, on massive retaliatory striking power. This approach became, however, difficult to maintain. At the root of the military’s reservations with the New Look were defence cuts and a reliance on nuclear weapons. Such weapons, the army argued, were not appropriate in dealing with small or limited conflicts. As Chapter One has shown, the ability to fight limited wars was seen by some as critical to the security and preservation of the non-communist world, whether or not the US had a nuclear monopoly or strategic edge. This issue dominated the thinking of the Truman administration and influenced defence policy accordingly. The flexibility or otherwise of Eisenhower’s strategy might have been put to the test had a negotiated settlement not been possible in the case of Vietnam in the summer of 1954. At that time, Eisenhower conceded that ground forces would have been necessary had the US intervened in this conflict. Nevertheless, he also believed that Vietnam was not really a worthwhile struggle in which to become involved. The military was not alone in expressing doubts about the wisdom and flexibility of the New Look. Lobby groups and non-government organisations such as the RAND Corporation, the Quantico panel, the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) and the Special Studies Project (SSP), joined in the fray with the intention of placing their aggressive stamp on foreign affairs. With their single-minded sense of purpose, public denouncements and use of the media (as in the case of the SSP),

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the stance of such groups can, at best, be described as disconcerting. These groups sought to consign Americans to higher levels of taxation, justified by dissemination of the most pessimistic (indeed distorted) assumptions of Soviet communism. It is also clear just how vitally important the intelligence-gathering function was to the Eisenhower administration. Like his predecessor, Eisenhower was prepared to use all available means to improve information on the Soviet Union and its allies. Such action included espionage, sabotage, influencing the outcomes of elections and undermining non-democratic regimes through related covert activity. For the US government, such measures were crucial in containing the spread of communism in Western Europe, the Middle East and the developing world. But it was during Eisenhower’s presidency that aerial reconnaissance became, arguably, the primary means by which the government could obtain reliable intelligence on Soviet military hardware. Before and after Geneva, Eisenhower authorised various covert activities for this purpose. But the impact of aerial reconnaissance on the policymaking process was limited. All covert operations are inherently risky and have the potential to go awry, with disastrous consequences for national security policy. Eisenhower knew the U2 overflights were especially provocative to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the extent to which he could report on and develop a seemingly viable strategy for dealing with an adversary (crucial elements of the intelligence cycle) based on such intelligence findings was severely constrained by virtue of the nature of this form of intelligence gathering. The U2 flights had to remain secret and so Eisenhower could not reveal what he in fact knew about Soviet capabilities. The president’s ability to take decisive and far-reaching action as far as military strategy was concerned was therefore limited. The intelligence obtained via the U2 overflights did allow Eisenhower to control military expenditures – but only to a certain extent. After 1957, at a time of a heightened fear of Soviet communism, such expenditures were at risk of becoming out of control to the detriment of the US economy and taxpayers, as they had done under Truman. Yet Eisenhower continued to exercise caution. Between fiscal years 1958 and 1960, he authorised only modest increases in

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the defence budgets, confident in the knowledge that Soviet capabilities were, especially in the field of long-range bombers, jet fighters and missiles, substantially inferior compared to the US. Ambrose has argued that aerial inspection was a key theme of Eisenhower’s presidency.3 This book argues that it was also integral to the New Look. The analysis presented connects Open Skies with Eisenhower’s defence strategy and the rise of the military-industrial complex. This approach ensures that an examination of aerial inspection is not detached from the wider debates relating to American Cold War strategy between 1945 and 1961. It also ensures that the connections between mutual aerial inspection and the U2 programme are not overlooked; Open Skies would have given Eisenhower the knowledge he had already obtained through the U2 flights but on a legal basis, thereby allowing him to use this intelligence to confront his Congressional, military and media critics on government defence policy and budgetary cuts. Secondly, while Eisenhower wanted to acquire information on the Soviet Union, he of course preferred to do so in a climate of improved relations, where a mutual reduction of armaments was possible. On the diplomatic front, Eisenhower’s options for pursuing mutual aerial inspection after Geneva were through the UN Disarmament Commission and personal negotiations with the Russian leaders. Throughout his presidency, negotiations remained a vital element of his defence policy, and at no time did he deliberately or unnecessarily preclude talks with the Russians. Unlike his successor, Eisenhower did not rush into high-level talks with the Soviets. Before such a meeting was possible, not only was a fundamental review of national security policy necessary, but so too was a review of the Western alliance system. He saw a strengthening of the Western European union, especially through EDC, as an essential prerequisite for a summit. The New Look relied on alliances to ensure that allies assumed their share of the defence burden and that a system of overseas bases encircling the Soviet Union would help to contain communism. In the absence of a Western European security union, which included the rearmament of West Germany, Eisenhower feared the Soviets would seek to undermine the unity of the West. Prior to March 1955, possibilities of a summit looked doubtful, much to Winston

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Churchill’s consternation. The president was aware of the repercussions for US defence policy should talks between heads of government end in disaster. By late spring, both blocs wanted to negotiate. The Soviets were feeling the strain of trying to maintain a heavy armaments base. Eisenhower too had to address the situation of the arms industry in his own country. While the Soviets wanted to agree a disarmament plan ahead of inspection, the US did not. And while Eisenhower saw mutual aerial inspection as a way of easing international tensions, leading to a reduction in armaments, Moscow regarded this as espionage. Fundamental differences continued to exist between the Soviet Union and the US over the issue of armaments reductions – a legacy of the Truman administration. Neither side, however, was willing to make substantial concessions. Had that been possible, Open Skies might have succeeded. One should be reminded, however, of Bulganin’s thoughts to Eisenhower of September 1955 on Open Skies. In this correspondence he expressed concern that knowledge of each country’s military forces would result in a proliferation of arms. Then, in 1958, Bulganin specifically referred to the significant military build-up that had taken place in America in recent years, and argued that aerial inspection was likely to increase international tensions and suspicions among nations. The Soviets feared the consequences of exposure of their inferior military forces. US military programmes were, to a large extent, a reaction to Soviet activities and premier Khrushchev’s bluffs. Distrust between the two blocs remained immutable. In his article, ‘Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Re-appraisal’, Richard Immerman examines the work of Robert McMahon and his assessment (published in 1984) of Eisenhower’s policies in the developing world.4 McMahon accused revisionists of focusing too much on the policy-making process of Eisenhower’s presidential years, leading them to neglect the objectives and consequences of these policies. Thus he argues: ‘For those interested in examining the goals and results of American diplomacy during the 1950s, the preoccupation with the decision-making process appears at best peripheral.’5 If President Eisenhower is judged only by results, by what he achieved or did not achieve, then his record in office could be deemed rather

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poor. After all, he failed to gain agreement with the Soviet Union on Open Skies, no major arms reduction plan was achieved and the 1960 summit of the Big Four ended on unsatisfactory terms (Eisenhower’s decision to authorise a U2 flight shortly before the meeting was to take place showed poor judgement on his part). It can also be argued that by the late 1950s the downward trend in defence expenditures was no longer sustainable. Moreover, there were occasions when the president did buckle under the pressure of his military staff, scientists and other officials – the creation of NASA being one example. On the other hand, if objectives (along with failure to achieve those objectives) are assessed, the study of Open Skies makes sense – not only is it directly relevant to developing our understanding of Eisenhower’s Cold War strategy, but one also gains a clear picture of the obstacles and opposition the president faced in implementing policy. At this juncture, it is also necessary to underline a point made in the final chapter, that the dominance of the military-industrial complex might have been a lot worse had Eisenhower not exercised the level of control that he did over the military. This issue should not be neglected. Eisenhower faced constant demands from the military, scientists and officials to accelerate military programmes and forces. He also had to confront the criticism launched by the opposition and various sectors of the press over defence policy and budgetary cuts, along with the aspersions cast towards massive retaliation by even his most stalwart of colleagues. In resisting such demands, Eisenhower displayed not only a remarkable level of caution and tenacity, but strength of character as well. His actions in containing the militaryindustrial complex should be regarded as an achievement. As Stephen Ambrose argues: [Eisenhower] refused to bend to the pressure, refused to initiate a fallout shelter program, refused to expand conventional and nuclear forces, refused to panic . . . It is doubtful if any other man could have done what Eisenhower did. The demands for shelters, for more bombers, for more bombs, more research and development of missiles and satellites was nearly irresistible . . . But Eisenhower said no, and he kept saying no to the end of his term.6

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It should also be remembered that Eisenhower was, as Ambrose argues, ‘fighting virtually a one-man battle on holding down the costs of defence. The JCS would not support him; neither would his new secretary of defence, Tom Gates; nor would [John] McCone.’7 Even the Republican leaders ‘tried to convince him that the JCS were not out of line in expressing their own views’.8 As a result of Eisenhower’s tenacity, Americans were able to enjoy the benefits of tax cuts. The 1950s, although marked by a recession during 1957–8, was a decade of relative economic prosperity. The downturn did not deepen, as many feared it would. Eisenhower’s approach to policy was a manifestation of the deep-rooted and finely tuned beliefs he held about his country, its strengths and weaknesses, and the problems posed by the international situation. By the time Eisenhower entered the White House in January 1953, he had developed highly perceptive views about the nature of war and the purpose of national security. These views were undoubtedly the products of his wartime experiences and his distinguished military career, buttressed by his supreme self-confidence and sharp and introspective mind. But they allowed him to draw his own conclusions about the threats that America faced during the Cold War and the measures he believed were necessary to confront these threats. In August 1960, a camera-equipped Corona satellite was successfully placed in orbit. It photographed a number of targets in the Soviet Union and returned its images back to earth the next day via a film capsule that was ejected from the satellite and recovered in the air near Hawaii.9 The satellite was able to orbit the entire Soviet Union, at times passing only 116 miles above the vast terrain. The camera resolution was far superior to that of the U2. Further successful satellite missions were carried out in December 1960, and July and August 1961. The latter mission revealed that the Soviet Union had only four operational ICBMs.10 In March 1961, the US had approximately 50 ICBMs and 120 IRBMs.11 The intelligence obtained from Corona confirmed once and for all that there was in fact no missile gap, at least not one favouring the Soviet Union. More important, it also gave Eisenhower what he had tried to achieve through Open Skies, namely full knowledge of Soviet capabilities, which had been legally obtained.

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As a result, Eisenhower was vindicated, as he knew he would be. But this intelligence came too late for him. Comprehensive knowledge of Soviet capabilities was not enough to stop a military-industrial complex, which by this stage had grown out of control. In his Chance for Peace speech of April 1953, Eisenhower had argued: Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities.12 Is it fanciful to consider the possibility that had US and Soviet officials accepted the implications of this speech, Eisenhower would have been able to stop the military-industrial complex? His entreaty has as much relevance today as it did during the Cold War and it is this for which he should be remembered.

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NOTES

Preface 1. Greenstein, Fred I., ‘Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence’, Political Science Quarterly, 94 (Winter 1979–1980), p. 577. 2. Immerman, Richard, ‘Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Re-appraisal’, Diplomatic History (Spring 1990), p. 319. 3. Letter from John S.D. Eisenhower to Rockefeller, 5 February 1963, folder 509, box 60, NAR-RG4, Special Assistant to the President sub-series, RAC. 4. Rostow, Walt, Open Skies – A Review of Eisenhower’s Proposal of July 21 1955 (Austin, Texas, 1982), p. 78. 5. Ibid, p. 12. 6. Dockrill, Saki, ‘Feature Review – Dealing with Soviet Power and Influence: Eisenhower’s Management of US National Security’, Diplomatic History (Spring 2000), pp. 345–352.

Introduction 1. Eisenhower, Dwight, Mandate for Change – The White House Years, 1953–1957 (London, 1963), pp. 520–522. 2. Dockrill, Saki, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61 (London, 1996), p. 144. 3. Statement on Disarmament presented at the Geneva Summit, 21 July 1955, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 713–716. For a detailed account of the meeting of 21 July 1955, see FRUS 1955–1957, V, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, pp. 439–456.

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4. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 522. 5. Memorandum of conversation at the buffet, 21 July 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, V, p. 456. 6. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 28 July 1955, NSC Series (AW file), box 7, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter DDEL). 7. Ibid. 8. The Times, 23 July 1955, AP20/19, Avon Papers, Birmingham University. 9. The phrase, ‘the spirit of Geneva’ was used by a number of US newspapers, including the Washington Post and the New York Times, in the weeks leading up to the summit in an attempt to give a positive spin to heads of government talks. 10. DDE Diary, 20 November 1957, ACW Diary Series (AW file), box 5, DDEL. 11. Report to the National Security Council, ‘Basic National Security Policy’ (NSC 162/2), 30 October 1953, NSC Series (AW files), box 5, DDEL. 12. News Conference, 14 May 1953, American Presidency Project, www.americanpresidency.org 13. See, for example, Marquardt, James, ‘Transparency and Security Competition’, pp. 55–87, and Tal, David, ‘The Secretary of State versus the Secretary of Peace: The Dulles-Stassen Controversy and US Disarmament Policy, 1955– 1958, Journal of Contemporary History, 1(4) (2006), pp. 721–740. 14. Overy, Richard, The Road to War (London, 2009), p. 358. 15. Leffler, Martin, A Preponderance of Power (Stanford, California 1992), p. 2. 16. DeGroot, Gerard, The Bomb – A History of Hell on Earth (New York, 2005), p. 72. 17. A collection of Lasswell’s essays on the garrison state is contained in Essays on the Garrison State – Harold Lasswell (New Brunswick, 1997), edited by Jay Stanley. 18. Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61, Appendix 4, p. 284. 19. DeGroot, Gerard, Dark Side of the Moon – The Magnificent Madness of the American Lunar Quest (New York, 2006), p. 124. 20. Eisenhower, Farewell radio and television address to the American people, 17 January 1961, American Presidency Project. 21. Ledbetter, James, Unwarranted Influence – Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Military-Industrial Complex (New Haven, 2011), p. 6.

Chapter 1 In the Shadow of the Specialists on Violence – American Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Military-Industrial Complex, 1945–53 1. This article, entitled ‘Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State versus the Civilian State’, was originally published in the American Journal of Sociology,

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2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8.

9.

10. 11.

12. 13. 14.

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46 (January 1941), pp. 455–468. A collection of Lasswell’s essays on the garrison state is contained in Essays on the Garrison State – Harold Lasswell (New Brunswick, 1997), edited by Jay Stanley. Ibid, p. 456. Lasswell, Harold, ‘The Garrison State’, originally published in The American Journal of Sociology, 46 (January 1941), pp. 455–468. Lasswell, Harold, ‘The Universal Peril: Perpetual Crisis and the GarrisonPrison State’, in Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein and R.M. MacIver, eds, Perspectives on a Troubled Decade: Science, Philosophy and Religion, 1939–1949 (New York, 1950), p. 325. Szilard, Leo, ‘Reminiscences’, in Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, eds, Perspectives in American History, II (Boston, 1983), pp. 126–138. Resis, Albert, Molotov Remembers – Inside Kremlin Politics – Conversations with Felix Chuev (Chicago, 1993), p. 59. Holloway, David, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, 1984), p. 86. Memorandum from President Truman to Secretary of State, James Byrnes, 5 January 1946, box 60, Rose A. Conway Papers (President’s Secretary’s files), Harry S. Truman Library (hereafter HSTL). Between 27 July and 10 October 1948, the Berlin food relief programme took place. A ‘propaganda scheme disguised as charity’, the programme provided 5.5 million parcels of food for East German residents. The programme also divided Western governments and occupation officials and helped to prevent a unified policy at a time when tensions dominated East-West relations. Telegram to Lord Salisbury, 27 September 1953, FO 371/CS13/01/77, National Archives, Kew. Herken, Gregg, The Winning Weapon – The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945–1950 (New Jersey, 1982), pp. 252–257. By the late 1940s, the Soviet Union had an army of approximately 2.8 million men, compared to the US whose armed forces had shrunk from 12.5 million in June 1945 to approximately 1.5 million in June 1947. See Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 21; and Pollard, Robert, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950 (New York, 1985), pp. 20–23. Nitze, Paul, From Hiroshima to Glasnost – At the Center of Decision (New York, 1989), p. 82. Arneson, Gordon, ‘The H-Bomb Decision’, Foreign Service Journal, May 1969, p. 28. ‘Estimates of the Effects of the Soviet Possession of Atomic Weapons – Report to the President’, 6 April 1950, NSC-68 folder, NSC file, President’s Secretary’s files, HSTL.

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15. Rosenberg, David, ‘The Origins of Overkill – Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy 1945–1960’, International Security, 7 (Spring 1983), pp. 19–20. 16. Hooks, Gregory, ‘The Rise of the Pentagon and US State Building: The Defense Program as Industrial Policy’, 96, The American Journal of Sociology (September 1990), p. 373. 17. Lemmer, Alfred, ‘The Air Force and Strategic Deterrence’, Office of the Air Force History, Washington DC, pp. 14–15. 18. Davies and Harris, ‘RAND’s Role in the Evolution of Balloon and Satellite Observation Systems and Related U.S. Space Technology’, September 1988, The RAND Corporation. 19. Trachtenberg, Marc, ‘A Wasting Asset and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949–1954’, International Security, 13 (Winter 1988–1989), p. 37. 20. Wohlstetter, Albert, ‘Outline of a Study for the Plans Analysis Section’, 10 May 1951, The RAND Corporation. 21. ‘Ballistic Missiles – A History’ (author unknown), January 1960, White House Office, Alphabetical Series, box 18, DDEL. 22. ‘Supplement to Chronology of Significant Events in the United States – Long-Range Ballistic Missile Program’, Department of Defense, April 1957, White House Office, Alphabetical Series, box 18, DDEL. 23. Longley-Cook, ‘Where Are We Going?’, is quoted from Peter Hennessy, The Secret State – Whitehall and the Cold War (London, 2003), p. 28. 24. Holloway, David, Stalin and the Bomb – The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 (New Haven, 1994), p. 300. 25. Thompson, Nicholas, The Hawk and the Dove – Paul Nitze, George Kennan and the History of the Cold War (New York, 2009), pp. 102–104. 26. Memorandum to the State Department, 20 January 1950, FRUS 1950, I, General: The United Nations, p. 22. In February 1946, Kennan had been asked by the State Department to analyse a speech Stalin had given at the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow. In his response, which became known as the ‘long telegram’, Kennan warned that the Soviet Union was a ‘political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure’. Telegram from George Kennan to George C. Marshall (‘Long Telegram’), 22 February 1946, box 5, Harry S. Truman Administration File, George Elsey Papers, HSTL. See also ‘Sources of Soviet Conduct’, Foreign Affairs, 25:1/4, 1946–1947, pp. 565–582. Kennan’s position on Russia would change over the next few years as he argued the case for the destruction of

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27. 28. 29.

30.

31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41. 42.

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all nuclear weapons. For the remainder of the Cold War he was regarded in the US as a leading expert on Soviet affairs. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, p. 91. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 202–203. In fact, the Soviet Union was the first nation to develop a deliverable bomb which, as Gerard DeGroot argues, ‘though it was not a bona fide hydrogen bomb, it was a significant step in that direction which left America in deep shock.’ See DeGroot, The Bomb, pp. 179–181. Nevertheless, the US maintained a lead over the Soviet Union in the production of hydrogen bombs throughout the 1950s. Memorandum of Conversation, FRUS 1946, I, General: The United Nations, pp. 1197–1203. For a discussion of support for a preventive war against the Soviet Union, see Trachtenberg, ‘A Wasting Asset’, pp. 14–21. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 156. From 1949 the Soviet Union took a more conscious effort in defending its airspace. US aircraft approaching Soviet borders were frequently attacked. In April 1950, Soviet fighters shot down US Navy aircraft over the Baltic Sea. The following year planes were shot down in Vladivostock and northern Japan. As the Russians improved the radar systems along their borders and air defence units pursued a more aggressive stance towards US and allied aircraft, photographic reconnaissance of the USSR became more risky. Entry for 27 October 1948, The Forrestal Diaries, eds, Millis, Walter and Duffield, E.S. (New York, 1951), p. 514. Ibid, pp. 504–505. Acheson, Dean, Present at the Creation – My Years at the State Department (London, 1969), p. 349. Report to the National Security Council (or NSC 68), 12 April 1950, HSTL. Ibid. For an examination of concerns raised by government officials during the late 1940s and early 1950s about the limitations of nuclear weapons, see Jerald Combs, ‘The Compromise that Never Was: George Kennan, Paul Nitze and the Issue of Conventional Deterrence in Europe, 1949–1952’, Diplomatic History, 15 (Summer 1991), pp. 361–86. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, p. 78. ‘Soviet Intentions and Capabilities’, 20 February 1950, box 4, President’s Secretary’s files, HSTL. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 397. Report to the National Security Council (or NSC 68), 12 April 1950, HSTL.

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43. Dockrill, Saki, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61 (Hampshire, 1996), Appendix four, p. 284; and Casey, Steven, ‘Selling NSC-68: The Truman Administration, Public Opinion and the Politics of Mobilisation, 1950–1951’, Diplomatic History, 29 (September 2005), pp. 658–661. 44. Charles Murphy oral history, cited in Sanders, Jerry, Peddlers of Crisis – The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (Boston, 1983), p. 23. 45. Friedberg, Aaron, In the Shadow of the Garrison State – America’s AntiStatism and Its Cold War Strategy (Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 106–107. 46. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, p. 54. 47. Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61, Appendix four, p. 284. 48. Ambrose, Stephen, Eisenhower – Soldier, General of the Army and PresidentElect, 1890–1952, Vol. I (London, 1983), p. 503. 49. Truman, Special Message to the Congress on Military Aid, 1 June 1950, American Presidency Project. 50. Memorandum for the State Department, FRUS 1950, I, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, pp. 225–226. 51. ‘Secretary of Defense Takes Office in an Era of International Uncertainty’, 21 September 1947, New York Times. 52. See, for example, Ledbetter, James, Unwarranted Influence – Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Military-Industrial Complex; and Ungar, Sheldon, ‘Moral Panics, The Military-Industrial Complex, and the Arms Race’, The Sociological Quarterly, 31, (Summer 1990), pp. 165–185. 53. Ledbetter, Unwarranted Influence, p. 14. 54. See, for example, Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis; Paterson, Thomas, ‘Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and Congress: The Truman Years’, Diplomatic History, 3 (Winter 1979), pp. 3–4; and Hossein-Zaden, The Political Economy of US Militarism (New York, 2006). 55. Lasswell, Harold, ‘The Garrison State Hypothesis Today’, in Samuel P. Huntington, ed., Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York, 1962), pp. 191–208. 56. Friedberg, Aaron, ‘Why Didn’t the United States Become a Garrison State?’, International Security, 16 (Spring 1992), p. 110. 57. As Lasswell argued: ‘The patterns of control are continually transformed as new activities require more prompt and refined means of linkage with established and emerging operations … Far from relaxing garrison-police conditions, such possibilities confirm the importance of eternal vigilance as

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58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78.

79.

80.

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the price of maintaining established elites in power.’ Stanley, ed., in Essays on the Garrison State – Harold Lasswell, p. 93. Friedberg, ‘Why Didn’t the United States Become a Garrison State?’, p. 113. Ibid, p. 121. Ibid, p. 122. Ibid. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State, p. 340. Friedberg also claims that US military spending during the Cold War was not only justified but also morally correct. Between 2003 and 2005, Friedberg served in the Bush administration as deputy assistant for national security affairs and director of policy planning to Vice-President Dick Cheney. Ibid, p. 12. Ledbetter, Unwarranted Influence, p. 206. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State, p. 84. Ledbetter, Unwarranted Influence, p. 58. Shonfield, Andrew, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (New York, 1968), pp. 298–99. Hooks, ‘The Rise of the Pentagon and US State Building’, pp. 376–378. Guided Missiles Summary (by Project, Service and Contractor), 18 April 1957, White House Office, Alphabetical Series, box 18, DDEL. Ibid. Roman, Peter, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap (New York, 1995), pp. 128–130. Leslie, John, The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993), p. 14. Ibid, 1. Lasswell, ‘The Garrison State’, in Stanley, ed., Essays on the Garrison State – Harold Lasswell, p. 61. Lasswell, ‘Sino-Japanese Crisis’, in Stanley, ed., Essays on the Garrison State – Harold Lasswell, p. 43. Herken, The Winning Weapon, p. 258. Millis and Duffield, The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 505–511. Herken, The Winning Weapon, pp. 254–255. In June 1948, 60 B-29 bombers were sent to bases in England and Germany. The establishment of new bases in Europe did not involve the transfer of atomic bombs. Control of such weapons remained in civilian hands. Millis, Walter, Arms and the State: A Study in American Military History (New York, 1958), cited in Hooks, ‘The Rise of the Pentagon and US State Building’, p. 370. Cold War historiography includes a rich collection of narratives chronicling the role played by elected officials, foundations, scholars, lobby groups and

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81. 82.

83. 84. 85. 86.

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the press in advocating increased spending on defence. See, for example, Drew, Nelson, ‘Expecting the Approach of Danger: The Missile Gap as a study of Executive-Congressional Competition in Building Consensus of National Security Issues’, Presidential Quarterly Studies, 19 (1989), pp. 321– 325; Preble, Christopher, ‘Whoever Believed in the Missile Gap?: John F. Kennedy and the Politics of National Security,’ Presidential Studies Quarterly, 33 (December 2003), pp. 801–826; Kaplan, Fred, The Wizards of Armageddon (California, 1983); Leffler, Martin, A Preponderance of Power – National Security, The Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stanford, California, 1992); Osgood, Kenneth, Total Cold War – Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Kansas, 2007); Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap; Gaddis, John Lewis, We Now Know – Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997); and Bowie, Robert, and Immerman, Richard, Waging Peace – How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York, 1998). Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 202. The World Council of Peace – Documents and Papers on Disarmament 1945–1955, Official Statements Pertaining to Disarmament Negotiations between the Great Powers, The Bulletin of the World Council of Peace, Vienna 1956. The Soviet Union and the US continued to approach the issue of control of atomic energy with conflicting priorities. The former country, which did not have the bomb, took the position that atomic weapons should first of all be banned, nations disarmed and then efforts made to address the problem of control. The US, on the other hand, advocated keeping their weapons and the freedom to use them until their system of control and inspection was adopted. In May 1948, with negotiations at a deadlock, the UN Atomic Energy Commission voted 9 to 2 to adjourn indefinitely. Bischof, Gurter ‘The Making of the Austrian Treaty and the Road to Geneva’, in Bischof and Dockrill eds, Cold War Respect (Baton Roige, 2000) pp. 117–159. Shepilov, Dmitrii, The Kremlin’s Scholar – A Memoir of Soviet Politics under Stalin and Khrushchev (Yale University Press, 2007), p. 156. Committee on the Present Danger, ‘Objectives’, 5 April 1951, box 92, William Clayton Papers, HSTL. During the planning of NSC 68, Voorhees had been under-secretary of the army and a member of the NSC group that put the new policy into practice. It was this group upon which he and Nitze jointly served that drafted NSC 68. Voorhees had also penned a separate, confidential report to Acheson in April 1950, advocating a large standing army and the garrison of at least 1 million troops in Europe. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, 91. Moreover, in a meeting with Conant in March 1950, Nitze outlined the main objectives of NSC 68, then in draft form. Conant expressed concern about the ambitious nature of the

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87. 88. 89. 90.

91. 92. 93.

94. 95.

96. 97.

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defence goals proposed in the report, namely the rollback of Soviet rule in Eastern and Central Europe. More important, the Harvard president argued that it was in America’s long-term security interests to consider alternatives to atomic weapons and urged Nitze and his colleagues to stop wasting resources on new and costly weapons such as the hydrogen bomb. Instead, Conant believed an economically strong Europe was necessary, defended by 1 million troops on the ground. Hershberg, James, James B. Conant – Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age (New York, 1993), p. 473. Radio address by Patterson, ‘The Defense Line of Freedom’, box 92, William L. Clayton Papers, HSTL. Letter from Voorhees to Woodrow Wirsig, 25 January 1950, William Clayton Papers, box 5, HSTL. Letter from Voorhees to members of the Committee on the Present Danger, 12 December 1950, William Clayton Papers, box 5, HSTL. ‘The answer,’ Voorhees argued in a letter to CPD members, ‘is to aid Europe with arms and assist it to produce its own arms…By far the largest appropriation will have an essentially military objective to supplement Europe’s own capacity to rearm itself.’ 2 May 1951, Subject: Study of Foreign Aid, box 92, William Clayton Papers, HSTL. Letter from Voorhees to Representative George Meader, 17 May 1951, box 92, William Clayton Papers, HSTL. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, p. 109. Bush, Conant and Clayton had been involved in the formation in 1940 of another non-government organisation called the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. They lobbied Capitol Hill and the public for US intervention in the Second World War and the defence of Europe. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, pp. 77–81. Memorandum to members of the Committee on the Present Danger, 23 March 1951, box 92, William L. Clayton Papers, HSTL. As Samuel Huntington notes, during the first 15 years of the post-war period public opinion polls revealed strong support for maintaining or increasing military budgets, even when government policy called for reductions. See Huntington, Samuel, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York, 1961), pp. 234–251. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, p. 86. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington D.C., National Defense Budget Authority, Fiscal Years 1945–2002, based on Department of Defense data; and US Department of the Treasury, History of the US Tax System, www.ustreas.gov. See also Truman’s radio and television address to

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98. 99.

100. 101.

102. 103.

104. 105.

106. 107. 108. 109.

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the American people of 15 December 1950, wherein the president explained, ‘We have put restrictions on credit buying. We have increased taxes. And I hope that the Congress will enact an excess profits tax at this session. Still further taxes will be needed. We cannot escape paying the cost of our military program.’ See, for example, ‘The Illusion of Disengagement’, Foreign Affairs, 36 (April 1958), pp. 371–382. NSC 141 had not included details relating to the cost of proposed new programmes, but the Eisenhower administration estimated them to be in the region of $20 billion. See minutes of the NSC meeting, 7 October 1953, NSC Series (AW files), box 4, DDEL. Memorandum from James S. Lay to the National Security Council, 6 February 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, II, National Security Affairs, pp. 223–234. Offner, Arnold, ‘Presidential Addresses: Another Such Victory – President Truman, American Foreign Policy and the Cold War’, Diplomatic History, 23 (Spring 1999), pp. 127–155. Pach, Chester, and Richardson, Elmo, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower (Lawrence, Kansas, 1991), p. 53. Gaddis, John Lewis, Strategies of Containment – A Critical Appraisal of PostWar American National Security Policy (Oxford and New York, 1982), p. 171; and Entry for 22 January 1952, The Eisenhower Diaries, ed. Ferrell, Robert (New York, 1981), p. 212. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 7 October 1953, NSC Series (AW file), box 4, DDEL. Eisenhower was commenting on the so-called Soviet ‘New Look’ – Moscow’s attempts to present a more conciliatory attitude towards the West following Stalin’s death in March 1953 (see Chapter Two). The president’s comments were made at the three-power Bermuda Conference held in December 1953, in the presence of British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, his Private Secretary, John Colville, Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, and Evelyn Shuckburgh of the British Foreign Office. For an account of the meeting, see James Hagerty Papers, International Meetings Series (AW file), box 1, DDEL; and Colville, John, Fringes of Power – Downing Street Diaries 1939–1955, ed., John Charmley (London, 1985), p. 683. Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, US Army: ‘Study on Permanent Peacetime Army’, 9 January 1946, Eisenhower Mss 638, p. 742. Entry for 8 January 1949, The Eisenhower Diaries, ed. Ferrell, p. 153. Entry for 22 January 1952, The Eisenhower Diaries, ed. Ferrell, p. 210. Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist, p. 328, quoting a letter from Eisenhower to Gabriel Stilian, 23 August 1951, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower 12: 448.

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Chapter 2 Eisenhower and the New Look 1. Eisenhower got 33,936,234 votes to Adlai Stevenson’s 27,314,992 (55.1 per cent to 44 per cent). Eisenhower received 442 electoral votes to Stevenson’s 89. See Ambrose, Stephen, Eisenhower – Soldier, General of the Army and PresidentElect, 1890–1952, p. 571. 2. Eisenhower’s Inaugural Address, 20 January 1953, American Presidency Project. 3. Eden, Lynn, ‘Capitalist Conflict and the State: The Making of United States Military Policy in 1948’, in Bright, Charles, and Harding, Sarah, eds, Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory (Michigan, 1984), pp. 233–261. 4. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 7 October 1953, NSC Series (AW file), box 4, DDEL. 5. Report to the National Security Council, 162/2, 30 October 1953, NSC Series (AW files), box 5, DDEL. 6. Entry for 22 January 1952, The Eisenhower Diaries, ed. Ferrell, p. 210; and Immerman, Richard, ‘Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Re-appraisal’, pp. 319–342. 7. Ambrose, Stephen, Eisenhower – Soldier and President (London, 2003), p. 333. 8. New scholarship suggests, as Jonathan Haslam shows (Russia’s Cold War, pp. 133–163), that the Soviet leadership was divided on the question of negotiating with the US and its allies. These divisions would account for the uneven character of the Soviet peace offensive in the two years after Stalin’s death. From March 1953, Malenkov stressed the importance of bringing about a relaxation of tensions in order to divert the country’s resources from heavy to light industry. Such a move would reduce the likelihood of war and allow the regime to devote more attention to the production of consumer goods. Another faction of the leadership, led by Molotov, advocated negotiations with the West only to bring about a breathing spell while the regime weathered the succession. As Molotov recalled later: ‘Stalin led the cause for the downfall of imperialism and the advent of communism. We needed peace. But according to American plans, two hundred of our cities would be subject to simultaneous atomic bombing.’ (Resis, Molotov Remembers, p. 63). At a plenum of the Central Committee on 29–31 January 1955, Malenkov was forced out of office, roundly condemned for having counter-posed the progress of heavy industry to the pace of light industry in order to satisfy the interests of consumers. This was alleged to be ‘anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist’ and ‘right opportunist’. 9. Memorandum of discussion, 31 March 1953, NSC Series (AW files), box 3, DDEL.

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10. ‘Operation Kremlin Cracks’, Report to the president, 16 February 1953, Administration Series, C.D. Jackson (AW files), box 22, DDEL. 11. Hughes, Emmett John The Ordeal of Power – A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years (New York, 1981), p. 101. 12. Ibid, p. 103. See also Walt Rostow, Europe After Stalin – Eisenhower’s Three Decisions of March 11 1953 (Austin, Texas, 1982), pp. 35–44. 13. Hughes, The Ordeal of Power, p. 100. 14. Rostow, Europe After Stalin, p. 38. 15. See, for example, Ambrose, Eisenhower – Soldier and President, p. 334; Osgood, Total Cold War, pp. 57–63; Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, pp. 120–121; and Rostow, Europe After Stalin, 3ff. 16. Hughes, The Ordeal of Power, p. 103. 17. Eisenhower, Chance for Peace speech, 16 April 1953, American Presidency Project. 18. Ibid. 19. Ledbetter, Unwarranted Influence, p. 256. 20. Ambrose, Eisenhower – Soldier, General of the Army and President-Elect, 1890– 1952, p. 568. 21. Ambrose, Eisenhower – Soldier and President, pp. 328–331, 358. 22. Entry for 18 October 1951, The Eisenhower Diaries, ed. Ferrell, p. 201. 23. Eisenhower, Press Conference, 30 April 1953, American Presidency Project. 24. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 7 October 1953, NSC Series (AW files), box 4, DDEL. 25. D’Este, Carlo, Eisenhower – Allied Supreme Commander (London, 2002), p. 3. 26. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 25 March 1954, NSC Series (AW files), box 6, DDEL. 27. Entry for 19 June 1954, The Diary of James C. Hagerty, ed. Ferrell (Indiana, 1983), p. 69. 28. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 25 March 1954, NSC Series (AW files), box 6, DDEL. 29. Memorandum from Eisenhower to Clay, 8 November 1945, Eisenhower Mss. (468), 521, DDEL. 30. Memorandum from Eisenhower to Brigadier General Paul W. Thompson, 8 August 1945, Eisenhower Mss (247), 257, DDEL. 31. Eisenhower, Dwight, Crusade in Europe (New York, 1948), p. 469. 32. Hughes, The Ordeal of Power, p. 107. 33. Memorandum from Eisenhower to Henry Maitland Wilson, 30 October 1947, Eisenhower Mss (1832), 2020–2022, DDEL. 34. Entries for 26 May 1946 and September 16 1947, The Eisenhower Diaries, ed. Ferrell, pp. 136 and 143.

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35. Ibid, p. 143. 36. Immerman, ‘Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Re-appraisal’, p. 332. 37. Ibid, p. 333. 38. Ibid. 39. Entry for 13 December 1954, The Diary of James C. Hagerty, ed. Ferrell, p. 134. 40. As Eisenhower once confided to General Goodpaster: ‘I sense a difference with JFD [John Foster Dulles] (in the approach to the Soviets). His is a lawyer’s mind. He consistently adheres to a very logical explanation of these difficulties in which we find ourselves with the Soviets and in doing so – with his lawyer’s mind – he shows the steps and actions that are bad on their part; and we seek to show that we are doing the decent and just thing. Of course, we have got to have a concern and respect for fact and reiteration of official position, but we are likewise trying to “seek friends and influence people”.’ Diary entry, January 24, 1958, DDE Diary Series (AW file), DDEL. 41. DDE Diary Series (AW file), box 5, DDEL. 42. Speech by Dulles, Berlin Conference, 18 February 1954, C.D. Jackson Papers, DDEL. 43. Adams, Sherman, First Hand Report – The Inside Story of the Eisenhower Administration (London, 1961), p. 46. 44. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, pp. 74–79. 45. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 147. 46. Statement of the National Security Council, 25 September 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, II, National Security Affairs, p. 477. 47. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 7 October 1953, NSC Series (AW files), box 4, DDEL. 48. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 29 October 1953, NSC Series (AW files), box 4, DDEL. 49. Minutes of the NSC meeting, October 1953, NSC Series (AW files), box 4, DDEL. 50. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, p. 76; and Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 165–175. 51. Letter from Eisenhower to Kenyon Ashe Joyce, 7 March 1947, Eisenhower Mss 1359, 1567–1568, DDEL. 52. Ibid. 53. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 7 October 1953, NSC Series (AW Files), box 4, DDEL. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid.

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56. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 13 October 1953, NSC Series (AW files), box 4, DDEL. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 29 October 1953, NSC Series (AW files), box 4, DDEL. 60. Ibid. 61. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 7 October 1953, NSC Series, (AW files), box 4, DDEL. 62. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 29 October 1953, NSC Series (AW files), box 4, DDEL. 63. A Report to the NSC (NSC 162/2), 30 October 1953, DDEL. 64. Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61, Appendix four, p. 284. 65. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 166. 66. Tal, David, ‘Eisenhower’s Disarmament Dilemma: From Chance for Peace to the Open Skies Proposal’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 12 (June 2001), p. 180. 67. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, p. 22. By the end of the decade, the number of nuclear weapons had increased to 18,000. As David Rosenberg argues (p. 23), ‘No subsequent administration found it necessary to authorize any further expansion of nuclear production facilities to meet weapons requirements.’ 68. In November 1952, the US tested a thermonuclear device nicknamed ‘Mike’, which had a yield of 10.4 megatons. In August 1953, the Soviets tested a device and although this was not nearly as powerful as Mike, it was a deliverable bomb. See DeGroot, The Bomb, pp. 179–181. 69. Record of a meeting with the president, 16 January 1954, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 68, DDEL. 70. Basic National Security Policy, 140/1, FRUS 1952–1954, II, National Security Affairs, pp. 488–510. 71. Memorandum from James Lay to the NSC, 11 October 1954, ‘Summary Statement of Existing Basic National Security Policy’, FRUS 1952–1954, II, National Security Affairs, pp. 725, 755. 72. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, p. 25. 73. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 29 July 1954, NSC Series (AW file), box 6, DDEL. 74. Memorandum of conference with the president, 18 May 1956, Diary Series, box 15, DDEL. 75. ‘Chronology of Significant Events in the US Long Range Ballistic Missile Program’, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Alphabetical Series, box 18, DDEL.

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76. Herken, Gregg, Cardinal Choices – Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI (Stanford, California, 2000), p. 86. 77. Report of Military Applications Sub-committee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 15 August 1955, White House Office, 1952–1961, Subject Series, box 4, DDEL. 78. Entry for 8 February 1955, The Diary of James C. Hagerty, ed. Ferrell, p. 186. 79. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 157. 80. ‘Operation Kremlin Cracks’, Report by C.D. Jackson for the president, 21 February 1955, Administration Series: CDJ (AW files), box 22, DDEL. 81. Memorandum to the president, ‘Post-Berlin Thoughts on the Current Soviet Psyche’, 22 February 1954, Administration Series: CJD (AW File), box 22, DDEL. 82. Rostow, Europe After Stalin, p. 40. 83. FRUS 1955–1957, V, The Austrian State Treaty and the Geneva Summit 1955, p. 184. 84. ‘Operation Kremlin Cracks’, Report by C.D. Jackson for the president, 21 February 1955, Administration Series: CDJ (AW files), box 22, DDEL. 85. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 157. 86. Ibid, p. 139. 87. NSC 5412, ‘Covert Operations’, 15 March 1954, White House files: Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, box 7, DDEL. 88. Ibid, p. 159. 89. Divine, Robert, Eisenhower and the Cold War (Oxford and London, 1981), p. 73–79. 90. See, for example, Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 157–159; and Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61, pp. 150–153. 91. Babington-Smith, Frances, Evidence in Camera (London, 1947), p. 153. 92. In his correspondence with Bernard Baruch, Eisenhower insisted that methods of effective international control be tested and proved before the US entered into any agreements with the Soviet Union. ‘An essential primary step,’ he argued, ‘is to establish, and prove in operation, a system of free and complete inspection.’ Memorandum from Eisenhower to Baruch, 14 June 1946, Ambrose, Eisenhower – Soldier, General of the Army and President-Elect, 1890–1952, pp. 521, 445. 93. DDE Diary, 8 February 1956, Diary Series, box 12, DDEL. 94. Ambrose, Stephen, Ike’s Spies – Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Mississippi, 1981), p. 252. 95. Memorandum to C.D. Jackson, 31 December 1953, Papers as President of the United States, 1953–1961, (AW file) DDE Diary Series, box 4, DDEL. 96. Killian, James, Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower – A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977), pp. 72–76.

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97. Dams, Richard, ‘James Killian, The Technological Capabilities Panel and the Emergence of Eisenhower’s Scientific-Technological Elite’, Diplomatic History (Winter 2000), p. 72. 98. Killian, Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower, p. 80. 99. Memorandum, ‘A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence’, to the Director of Central Intelligence, 5 November 1954, www.archives.gov. 100. Herken, Cardinal Choices, p. 90. 101. Killian, Sputniks, Scientists and Eisenhower, p. 82. The exact date of the meeting cannot be determined, but it occurred during the first half of November 1954. 102. Herken, Cardinal Choices, p. 90. 103. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 187. 104. Killian, Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower, p. 80. 105. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 159. 106. Eisenhower, Press Conference, 30 January 1957, American Presidency Project. 107. Following a breakdown of talks between the East and the West in 1949, the Austrian question remained in a state of uncertainty and Soviet and Western occupation forces remained in the country. After 1949, the Soviets stalled negotiations on an Austrian treaty, preferring to adopt a ‘wait and see’ policy on the future of Germany. Not only did the Soviets fear a unified and rearmed Germany, they also dreaded a similar fate in Austria. An Austrian treaty would create a strategic vacuum in Central Europe that might be assimilated in the NATO bloc. Likewise, Pentagon planners advised Truman not to sign a treaty unless an Austrian army was in place, capable of defending itself against Soviet aggression. 108. Bischof, ‘The Making of the Austrian Treaty and the Road to Geneva’, pp. 117–159. 109. FRUS 1955–1957, V, The Austrian State Treaty and the Geneva Summit 1955, p. 301. 110. Eisenhower’s Disarmament Dilemma (p. 187): ‘It was Churchill’s lobbying that produced the positive result. Eisenhower tried to evade the prime minister’s pressures, and as long as Eden objected to the summit meeting idea, Eisenhower could stand firm.’ With Eden’s change of heart, however, it became ‘no longer possible to avoid the meeting’. 111. French Embassy to the Department of State, Telegram 487, 22 March 1955, FRUS, V, 1955–1957, p. 134. 112. See, for example, Rostow, Open Skies, p. xi and pp. 23–25; Varsori, ‘British Policy Aims at Geneva’ and Bischof, ‘The Making of the Austrian State Treaty and the Road to Geneva’ in Bischof and Dockrill, eds, Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955, pp. 90–95 and pp. 117–54; and Tal, ‘Eisenhower’s Disarmament Dilemma’, p. 187.

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113. Osgood, Total Cold War – Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad, p. 189. See also Mastny, Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood, eds, The Cold War After Stalin’s Death – A Missed Opportunity for Peace (Lanham, 2006). The Cold War After Stalin’s Death, pp. 3–27; Haslam, Jonathan, Russia’s Cold War, pp. 135 and 158–60; Evangelista, Matthew, ‘Co-operation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1950s’, World Politics, 42 (1990), pp. 502– 528. Although some works acknowledge that Eisenhower was not dismissive per se of face-to-face talks with the Russians in a bid to reduce world tensions, such analyses have tended to account for Eisenhower’s reversal of policy by reference to the Soviet Union’s changing position on the Austrian State Treaty from the spring of 1955. See, for example, Larson, Deborah Welch, Anatomy of Mistrust – US-Soviet Relations during the Cold War (New York, 1997), pp. 39–71, and Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, pp. 116–118. 114. Report to the National Security Council, 162/2, 30 October 1953, NSC Series (AW files), box 5, DDEL. 115. Memorandum to the president from John Foster Dulles, 20 January 1954, Dulles-Herter Series, box 2, DDEL. 116. Ambrose (ed.), Letter to George Whitney, 26 March 1952, The Papers of D.D. Eisenhower. 117. Ibid. 118. The Indochina war, which had begun in 1946, had always been, at root, a colonial war. With the end of the Second World War and the occupation by Japanese forces in Vietnam, the Vietminh resisted a French return to power. Conflict was inevitable as the French refused to negotiate Vietminh demands for full sovereignty. By the early 1950s, however, the war mirrored the Cold War divide, as a rise in Chinese support for the Vietminh was matched by spiralling American assistance for the French. 119. Costigliola, Frank, France and the United States – The Cold Alliance, 1940– 1990 (New York, 1992), pp. 91–96. 120. Telegram from the Secretary of State, 4 February 1953, International Meetings Series (AW file), box 1, DDEL. 121. Cogan, Charles, Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends (London, 1994), p. 78. 122. Costigliola, France and the United States, p. 95. 123. Churchill to Eden, 18 November 1953, PREM 11/618, PM/53/20, The National Archives, Kew. 124. Larres, Klaus, Churchill’s Cold War – The Politics of Personal Diplomacy, (New Haven, 2002), p. 385. 125. Letter from Churchill to Eisenhower, 22 April 1953, International Meetings Series, AWF, box 2, DDEL. 126. Boyle, Peter, The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence 1953–1955 (London, 1990), p. 39.

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127. Letter from Eden to Dulles, 13 September 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954, V, pp. 1184–1185. 128. Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Naftali, Timothy, Khrushchev’s Cold War – The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York, 2006), pp. 26–27. 129. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 506. 130. Boyle, The Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955–1957 (London, 2005), pp. 81–83.

Chapter 3 Eisenhower, Rockefeller and the Evolution of Open Skies 1. Notes on a Bipartisan Conference, 12 July 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, pp. 306–308. 2. Letter from Eisenhower to Churchill, 15 July 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, p. 336. 3. Ambrose, Eisenhower – Soldier and President, p. 400. 4. Memorandum of Conversation, 5 July 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, p. 236; and Notes on a Bipartisan Conference, 12 July 1955, ibid, p. 307. 5. Rostow, Open Skies, pp. 30–31. 6. ‘Defence Report’, 28 Sept. 1955, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 89, DDEL. 7. Short, Anthony, The Origins of the Vietnam War (London and New York, 1989), pp. 85–92. 8. Ibid, p. 54. Dulles had not initially welcomed the inclusion of the Indochina issue on the conference agenda, especially as this meant the participation of the People’s Republic of China (who continued to supply considerable quantities of war material and military advisers to the Vietminh). Dulles later acknowledged that the French had to return to Paris after the February meetings ‘with something to show on Indochina’ – the alternative being that the Laniel government would have collapsed and been replaced by a government which might have been placed under pressure to end the war in Indochina on any terms. 9. Statement by the Soviet government on the Geneva conference in Pravda, 23 July 1954, cited in Hanak, Harry, Soviet Foreign Policy Since the Death of Stalin (London, 1972), p. 53. The Geneva Accords also stipulated future reunification of Vietnam based on free, democratic elections. Had nationwide elections taken place in 1956 – as promised by the Accords – then it is likely that the communist leader of North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, would have won this election, as the CIA predicted at the time. 10. History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1945–1970, Russian text edited by Gromyko Ponomaryov and Khvostov (Moscow, 1975), p. 258. 11. USSR Foreign Policy Archives, Record of a Conversation on 14 May 1955 between Molotov, Dulles, MacMillan and Pinay, cited in History of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 260.

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12. Memorandum from Bohlen to the secretary of state, 8 July 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, pp. 283–285. During a conversation with Georgi Zhukov, Bohlen was ‘very much struck by [the] great emphasis’ that he placed on disarmament, which the US ambassador believed reflected what may have been the real concern of the Soviet government at this time. Telegram from Bohlen to Dulles, 10 June 1955, International Series, box 49, DDEL. 13. Memorandum of Conversation, State Department, 13 June 1955, ibid., pp. 226–227. Officially, Malenkov’s removal from office in February 1955 was attributed to his ‘guilt and responsibility’ for a failure in Soviet agriculture. Soviet farms could not produce enough to feed the country adequately. See Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, p. 15. 14. Telegram from the embassy in the Soviet Union to the State Department (W. Walmsley Jr.,), 4 July 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, pp. 258–259. 15. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, p. 21. 16. Hanak, Soviet Foreign Policy Since the Death of Stalin, p. 62. 17. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, p. 24. 18. Ibid. 19. The relationship between Soviet domestic pressures and foreign policy is examined in Holloway’s Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 320–363, and Constantine Pleshakov’s Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996), pp. 138–209. 20. While Bohlen regarded Khrushchev as ‘not especially bright’, Dulles believed he was ‘a fellow to watch’. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, p. 25. 21. ‘Probable Long Term Development of the Soviet Bloc and Western Power Positions’, SE-46, 8 July 1953, FRUS 1952–54, VIII, pp. 1196–1205. 22. History of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 259. 23. The World Council of Peace, Documents and Papers on Disarmament 1945–1955, Official Statements Pertaining to Disarmament Negotiations between the Great Powers, The Bulletin of the World Council of Peace, Vienna 1956. The Soviets had always argued the case for the outright ban of nuclear weapons. They believed the Baruch Plan, the US government’s early proposals for the control of atomic energy, was really ‘the Pentagon’s plan’. As Andrei Gromyko, permanent Soviet representative to the UN and later deputy foreign minister, claimed later, the Baruch Plan ‘boiled down to making sure that the US retained the monopoly on nuclear weapons. The intention was that the USSR and the rest of the world should to a significant extent place their security in Washington’s hands. The USSR found this unacceptable.’ See Gromyko, Andrei, Memories (London, 1989), p. 138. 24. Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61, p. 141.

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25. Morray, Joseph P., From Yalta to Disarmament – Cold War Debate (New York Press, 1961), p. 231. 26. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 19 May 1955, NSC Series (AW files), box 6, DDEL. 27. ‘Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament’, White House Office for the Special Assistant for NSC Affairs, Special Assistant Series, box 4, DDEL. Volumes I and II of the report were declassified in July 2004. See also ‘Memorandum – Disarmament Negotiations’. 28. Memorandum for the president, ‘Progress Report on the Control of Armaments by the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament’, 28 June 1955, White House Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–61, Alphabetical Series, box 11, DDEL; and White House Office: Office of the Special Assistant for NSC Affairs, box 4, DDEL. 29. Memorandum of conversation with Mr Stassen, JFD General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, box 1, DDEL. 30. Telegram from the State Department (Hoover) to Dulles , 8 May 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, pp. 172–73. 31. ‘Message for Ambassador’, from Churchill to Lord Salisbury, 12 July 1953, FO 800/760, Avon Papers. 32. News conference, 31 May 1955, American Presidency Project. At a news conference on 18 May 1955, Eisenhower attempted to define his ‘cautious’ approach. While arguing that the US would be approaching ‘this thing’ from a stronger position than ever before, citing the completion of the Austrian State Treaty and the increased unity of Western Europe as contributing towards this, he also explained that he and Dulles would not be ‘less vigilant’ and the opportunities to ‘lower the burden of armaments…would not be any the less intensive’. 33. Telegram from Dulles to the State Department, 9 May 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, p. 174. Dulles did later acknowledge that the British Foreign Secretary, Harold MacMillan, was at times more realistic about what could actually be achieved at the summit. He also recognised the need to avoid the risk of unwarranted hopes and expectations on the part of the Western world. 34. Telegram from the State Department (Hoover) to Dulles, 8 May 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, p. 173. 35. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 7 July 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, pp. 269–273. 36. Ibid. 37. Press statement regarding disarmament and the appointment of special assistant, Harold Stassen, 19 March 1955, American Presidency Project. 38. Notes on a Bipartisan Conference, 12 July 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, p. 306.

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39. Prados, John, ‘Open Skies and Closed Minds’, in Bischoff and Dockrill, eds, Cold War Respite, pp. 215–232; and Marquardt, ‘Transparency and Security Competition’, pp. 55–87. 40. Rostow, Europe After Stalin, pp. 46–60. 41. Reich, Cary, The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller – Worlds to Conquer 1908–1958 (New York, 1996), p. 554. 42. Memorandum from General Parker to Rockefeller, ‘Meeting at the Summit’, 18 May 1955, folder 534, box 65, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 43. As Rostow once acknowledged, ‘when Rockefeller decided an idea was sound and deserved advocacy, he plunged into the task of salesmanship with verve.’ This behaviour irritated many officials, including Dulles, Hoover and Wilson. Rostow, Open Skies, p. 41. 44. Draft letter from Rockefeller to Rostow, 25 May 1955, folder 530, box 65, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 45. Jackson, Log – From Quantico to Geneva, June and July 1955, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 68, DDEL. 46. Adams, First Hand Report, p. 82. 47. Jackson’s account of the Quantico panel sessions held between 5 and 10 June 1955 is contained in his Log – From Quantico to Geneva, June and July 1955, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 68, DDEL. 48. Nelson A. Rockefeller, oral history, 14 July 1977, folder 2 (13), box 1; Memorandum from Bill Elliott to Nelson Rockefeller, June 15 1955, subject: ‘Membership of Advisory Panels’, Declassified Files – Special Assistant to the President, 1954–1955, folder 19, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 49. Ibid. 50. Minutes of the eighth session of the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel, 8 June 1955, folder 530, box 65, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 51. Notes of a discussion on General-Brigadier Parker’s paper, ‘Problem Area: Economic’, 7 June 1955, folder 745, box 97, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 52. ‘Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament’, White House Office: Special Assistant Series, box 4, DDEL. 53. Minutes of the eighth session, Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel, 8 June 1955, folder 530, box 65, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 54. ‘Defence Report’, 28 Sept. 1955, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 89, DDEL. 55. Ibid. 56. ‘The Comparative Military Technology of the US and the USSR’, report by Dr. E.A. Johnson, Annex A, Report of the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel, 10 June 1955, folder 530, box 65, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 57. Rostow, Open Skies, p. 29.

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58. ‘The Comparative Military Technology of the US and the USSR’, report by Dr. E.A. Johnson. 59. Bloomfield, Lincoln, et al, Khrushchev and the Arms Race (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1966), pp. 38 and 94. 60. Stewart Alsop ran two articles in the New York Herald Tribune on 16 May and 27 May 1955 about an alleged ‘bomber gap’, basing such claims on a release issued by the Department of Defense on 13 May 1955. 61. Bloomfield, Khrushchev and the Arms Race, p. 38. In his article, ‘A Nuclear Golden Age? The Balance Before Parity’, International Security (Winter 1986–1987), Richard Betts (p. 7) highlights the doubts that existed about the reliability of Soviet first-strike capability, describing the TU-4 force as ‘rickety’. He also points out that ‘the JCS noted Soviet operational inhibitions (lack of crew training and proper equipment, and vulnerability to interceptors). These technical uncertainties were recognised as overwhelming constraints on Soviet options.’ 62. Letter from Rostow to Rockefeller, 17 June 1955, box 31, Administration Series (Rockefeller), DDEL. 63. Letter from Joseph E. Johnson to Dillon Anderson, 23 May 1955, subsequently passed to Rockefeller who responded to Johnson on 6 June 1955, folder 16, box 1, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 64. Letter from Rockefeller to Johnson, 6 June 1955, folder 16, box 1, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 65. ‘Report of the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel’, 10 June 1955, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 87, DDEL. 66. Minutes of the eighth session, Quantico Panel I, 8 June 1955, folder 530, box 65, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 67. Rostow, Open Skies, p. 12. 68. ‘Air Defense of the United States and Western Europe’, report to the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel, by Dr. E. Johnson, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 89, DDEL. 69. ‘Free World Defense’, Annex C, Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel, 4 (NAR Personal), folder 503, box 59, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 70. Reich, Worlds to Conquer, p. 650. 71. Letter from W. Elliott to Rockefeller, 17 November 1955, folder 730, box 97, Nelson A. Papers, RAC. Elliott was a firm believer in the adoption of forceful measures against adversaries and was thus critical of what he regarded as excessive US acceptance of Soviet expansion in Europe and Asia. Thus, ‘Psychologically,’ he lamented, ‘we have lost far more through weakness than we shall ever get through placating timid allies.’ Elliott rejected the view that peace and prosperity could be achieved gradually through

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72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83.

84. 85.

86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93.

243

agreements and related diplomatic efforts and instead believed that they had to ‘be won, that is, through strength’. Letter from Elliott to Paul Nitze, Policy Planning Staff, US State Department, 11 December 1950, in Suri, Jeremy, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge, Massachusetts 2007), p. 112. Reich, Worlds to Conquer, p. 523. Reich, Worlds to Conquer, p. xvii. Gervasi, Frank, The Real Rockefeller (New York, 1964), pp. 21–22. Letter from Rockefeller to Eisenhower, 5 December 1955, folder 628, box 82, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. Memorandum from Rockefeller to the secretary of defense, 9 August 1955, folder 547, box 68, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. Nelson A. Rockefeller, oral history, 4 October 1977, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC, p. 6. Ibid, p. 8. Ibid. Ibid, pp. 21–22. Fourth session of Quantico Panel II, 26 August 1955, folder 547, box 68, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. Reich, Worlds to Conquer, p. 141. Appendix B to the ‘Report of the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel’, Proposals to Test Soviet Willingness – To Make Concessions and to Improve the US Position, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 87, DDEL. Rockefeller’s opening remarks to Quantico Panel II, 23 August 1955, folder 547, box 68, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. Memorandum for the Record, Subject – Admiral Radford’s views on Proposal for Inspection without Limitation of Arms, 18 July 1955, folder 541, box 66, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. Letter from Nikolai A. Bulganin to President Eisenhower, 19 September 1955, International Series (AW files), box 2, DDEL. Letter from Eisenhower to Bulganin, 1 March 1956, International Series (AW files), box 4, DDEL. Letter to Dulles, 13 June 1955, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 49, DDEL. Rostow, Open Skies, pp. 45 and 129–131. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 30 June 1955, NSC Series (AW files), box 6, DDEL. Telephone record by Dulles, 6 July 1955, Rostow, Open Skies, p. 46. Memorandum of conversation with Mr Stassen, 2 July 1955, JFD: General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, box 1, DDEL. C.D. Jackson Log, From Quantico to Geneva June – July 1955, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 68, DDEL.

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94. Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61, p. 144. 95. Letter from John S.D. Eisenhower to Rockefeller, 5 February 1963, folder 509, box 60, NAR-RG4, Special Assistant to the President sub-series, RAC. 96. John S.D. Eisenhower, oral history, 28 February 1967, DDEL, p. 121. 97. Ambrose, Eiserhower – Soldier and President, p. 430. 98. ‘Chronology of Mutual Inspection Proposal’ (undated), folder 534, box 65, NAR-RG4, Special Assistant to the President sub-series, RAC. 99. Rostow, Open Skies, letter from Stassen to Rockefeller, 27 July 1955, Appendix L, p. 184. 100. Foreign Affairs 81, ‘Mutual Inspection for Peace’, folder 509, box, 60, NAR-RG4, Special Assistant to the President sub-series, RAC. 101. In his speech at San Francisco on 22 June 1955, Vyacheslav Molotov suggested the formation of a world economic conference sponsored by the United Nations to develop international trade. See Report of the Paris Working Group, 15 July 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, pp. 325–331. 102. The foreign ministers also agreed on proposals for the handling of subjects by the Western heads of government, although it was recognised that these could be subject to change based on their daily meetings with Molotov. It was also agreed that after the opening discussion, the latter would meet in the afternoons and the foreign ministers in the mornings. 103. Telegram from the delegation at the Paris Working Group to the State Department, 11 July 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, p. 318. 104. See, for example, Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61, pp. 141–142; Haslam, Russia’s Cold War, pp. 158–159; and Evangelista, ‘Co-operation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1950s’, pp. 518–525. 105. Memorandum of an afternoon meeting, 18 July 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, p. 371. 106. Directive by heads of government to the United Nations – Disarmament, 22 July 1955, International Meetings Series, Box no. 2, DDEL. The date of the sub-committee was scheduled for 29 August 1955 in New York. 107. Memorandum of conversation with the President, 22 July 1955, JFD: General Correspondence and Memorandum Series, box 1, DDEL. 108. Memorandum of conversation at the tripartite luncheon, 17 July 1955, International Meetings Series, box 2, DDEL. 109. Memorandum of conversation, 20 July 1955, International Meetings Series, box 2, DDEL. 110. Personal Comments for Legislative Leaders, from the President to the Acting Secretary of State (unsigned), 20 July 1955, International Meetings Series, box 2, DDEL.

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111. Proposal of the Soviet Delegation – General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe, 20 July 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, pp. 516–524. 112. Memorandum for the record – meeting at the president’s villa, 20 July 1955, prepared by Dillon Anderson, FRUS 1955–57, V, p. 427. Certain contemporaneous accounts have referred to the decision to present the Open Skies proposal at the meeting on 21 July as ‘impromptu’ or ‘more or less extemporaneous’. According to Merchant’s account of the meeting of 20 July, no argument was raised against presenting Open Skies per se. The question most seriously debated was whether it should be included in a ‘comprehensive statement by the President on disarmament…or whether he should confine his speech to putting forward the “Open Skies” proposal’. Merchant’s recollections are supported by Dillon Anderson’s account of the discussion of Open Skies on 20 July 1955. See FRUS 1955–57, V, p. 425. In a telegram to Herbert Hoover of 21 July, Dulles was conscious that no consultation had been carried out with Congressional leaders on the Open Skies proposal. He was keen, therefore, for Hoover to give the impression in Washington that this was not premeditated or prearranged. See Telegram from Dulles to Hoover, 21 July 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, p. 435. 113. Memorandum of conversation between the US and USSR, 20 July 1955, International Meetings Series, box 2, DDEL. 114. Memorandum of conversation, Palais des Nations, 21 July 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, p. 443. 115. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, p. 46. 116. Memorandum of conversation with Marshal Zhukov, 23 July 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, p. 489.

Chapter 4 The Aftermath of the Geneva Summit 1. Memorandum of a special meeting of the NSC, 7 February 1956, White House Office: Office of the special assistant for NSC affairs, box 4, DDEL. 2. See, for example, Marquardt, ‘Transparency and Security Competition’, pp. 55–87; Tal, David, ‘The Secretary of State versus the Secretary of Peace: The Dulles-Stassen Controversy and US Disarmament Policy, 1955–1958; and Plischke, Elmer, ‘Eisenhower’s “Correspondence Diplomacy” with the Kremlin – Case Study in Summit Diplomatics’, The Journal of Politics, 30 (February 1968), pp. 137–159. 3. Memorandum of conversation, 23 July 1955, JFD Papers – General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, box 3, DDEL.

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246 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13.

14.

15. 16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

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Rostow, Open Skies, p. 57. Ibid, p. 59. ‘Russians Play it Smart at Geneva’, Washington Post, 23 July 1955. Letter to Spaak, 8 August 1955, JFD Papers – Chronological Series, box 12, DDEL. Address by Rostow, ‘The Challenge Facing the US’, August 1955, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 89, DDEL. Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, 22 July 1955, JFD Papers – General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, box 3, DDEL. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 28 July 1955, NSC Series (AW file), box 7, DDEL. Annex to NSC Action No. 1513, 1 March 1956, White House Office, Special Assistant Series, box 4, DDEL. Intelligence bulletin, ‘Soviet delegation’s reaction to president’s inspection proposals’, 22 July 1955, Declassified Files, folder 19, box 1, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. Typed transcript of interview with Anatoly Dobrynin, Cold War Television Documentary Archive, 28/45, June 1996, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College London (hereafter KCL). Draft letter from Bulganin to Eisenhower, 16 September 1955 on the results of the Geneva Conference, Document 332, Revelations from the Russian Archives, Library of Congress, Washington DC, 1997, eds, Koenker, Diane, and Bachman, Ronald, pp. 740–742. Extract from Khrushchev’s speech in Bombay, 26 November 1955, Soviet Foreign Policy Since the Death of Stalin, cited in Hanak, p. 70. The relationship between Soviet domestic pressures and foreign policy is examined in Holloway’s Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 320–363, and Pleshakov’s Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev, pp. 138–209. Letter from Bulganin to Eisenhower, 19 September 1955, Dulles-Herter series, box 6, DDEL. Letter from Nikolai A. Bulganin to President Eisenhower, 19 September 1955, International Series (AW files), DDEL. Ibid. Telegram from the delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings to the Department of State, 12 November 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, pp. 757–758. Letter from Dulles to Marshal Tito, 12 November 1955, JFD Chronological Series, box 12, DDEL. ‘Notes for Questions or Comment’, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL. Entry for 1 February 1955, The Diary of James C. Hagerty, ed. Ferrell, p. 183.

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24. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 19 May 1955, NSC Series (AW file), box 6, DDEL. 25. Memorandum for the president, Progress Report on the Control of Armaments by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, 23 July 1955, White House Office, Alphabetical Series, box 11, DDEL. 26. Memorandum of conference with the president (Goodpaster and Taylor), 6 July 1955, ACW Diary Series: DDEL, Eisenhower’s Papers as President of the US, 1953–1961 (AW file), box 5, DDEL. 27. Memorandum for Mr Anderson, ‘First Look at the Fundamentals of the Stassen Plan’, 9 June 1955, White House Office, Special Assistant Series, box 4, DDEL. 28. The shift in emphasis in military requirements is helped by the following breakdown by service: Fiscal Year 54 ($) Fiscal Year 55 ($) Army 12.9 Army 8.8 Navy/Marines 11.2 Navy/Marines 9.7 Air Force 15.6 Air Force 16.4 Source: Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 452. 29. Memorandum of conference with the president, 31 July 1956, White House Office: Subject Series, Department of Defense sub-series, box 2, DDEL. 30. This study led by Albert Wohlstetter of the RAND Corporation helped to persuade the government to convene a special panel looking into the issue of surprise attack. This group became the Technological Capabilities Panel. 31. Letter from James Killian to Arthur Fleming, 14 May 1956, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary, box 16, DDEL. 32. Air Force Magazine, February 1956, Pre-Presidential Papers, box 539, John F. Kennedy Library (hereafter JFKL). 33. ‘Long Range Ballistic Missiles – A History’, June 1957 (author unknown), White House Office, Subject Series, box 5, DDEL. 34. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 3 July 1955, NSC Series (AW file), box 9, DDEL. 35. ‘Chronology of Significant Events in the US Long-Range Ballistic Missile Program’, White House Office, Alphabetical Series, box 18, DDEL. 36. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, pp. 65–70. 37. ‘Long-Range Ballistic Missile – A History’ (undated), White House Office, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL. 38. ‘Chronology of Significant Events in the US Long-Range Ballistic Missile Program’, White House Office, Alphabetical Series, box 18, DDEL.

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39. Memorandum of conference with the president, Diary Series (AW files), 5 April 1956, box 15, DDEL. 40. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies, p. 254. 41. Memorandum of conversation, 11 August 1955, folder 547, box 68, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 42. Memorandum of telephone conversation with Governor Stassen, 21 May 1956, JFD Papers, Subject Series, box 4, DDEL. 43. Report of the Economic Commission for Europe, February 1956, JFD Papers, Subject Series, box 4, DDEL. 44. Speech by Rostow, 9 April 1956, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 89, DDEL. 45. Memorandum of conference with the president, 27 December 1955, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL. 46. Memorandum to Dulles, 5 December 1955, Duller-Herter Series, box 6, DDEL. 47. Memorandum of conference with the president, 20 December 1956, White House Office, Department of Defense sub-series, box 2, DDEL. 48. ‘Defense Expenditures and Gross National Products of the USA and USSR 1944–1955’, Report by the Quantico panel, August 1955, Declassified Files, folder 27, box 1, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. The panel argued that the proportion of Soviet defence expenditures to GNP in dollar terms ‘is about twice that in ruble terms because Soviet defence expenditures are converted at 5.5 rubles to 1 dollar while the GNP is converted at 10.5 rubles to 1 dollar’. 49. Entry for 13 December 1954, The Diary of James C. Hagerty, ed. Ferrell, p. 134. 50. Gaddis, John Lewis, ‘The Unexpected John Foster Dulles: Nuclear Weapons, Communism and the Russians’, in Richard Immerman, ed., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War (Princeton, New Jersey, 1990), pp. 76–77. 51. Memorandum of conference with the president, 2 April 1956, Diary Series (AW files), box 15, DDEL. 52. Ibid. 53. Memorandum of conference with the president, 24 May 1956, Diary Series (AW files), box 15, DDEL. 54. Ibid. 55. Memorandum of conversation with the president, 5 April 1956, DDE Diary Series, box 15, DDEL. At this meeting, Eisenhower referred to Spaatz’s recent statement, noting, ‘Someone should talk to General Spaatz and give him a well-rounded and comprehensive picture of just what our strength is.’

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56. Rosenberg, David, ‘The Origins of Overkill – Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy 1945–1960’, p. 45. 57. Speech to the Republican Platform Convention, Admiral Radford, 19 July 1960, RG4 NAR Personal, folder 302, box 25, RAC. 58. Stassen, Harold, and Houts, Marshall, Eisenhower: Turning the World Towards Peace (Minnesota, 1990), pp. 236–237. 59. ‘Munitions Inquiry’, 4 June 1959, New York Times. The Times was reporting the outcome of a meeting between Eisenhower and legislative leaders about defence appropriations, at which the former refused to accept an additional $85 million that had been allocated for the Atlas missile programme. 60. Memorandum of Special Meeting of the NSC, 7 February 1956, White House Office: Office of the Special Assistant for NSC Affairs, box 4, DDEL. 61. Statement by John Foster Dulles before the special sub-committee on disarmament of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 29 February 1956, Harold Stassen records 1955–1958, box 4, DDEL. In this speech, Dulles referred to an earlier one he had given to the UN General Assembly in the autumn of 1955. 62. United Nations General Assembly, Tenth Session, First Committee, 12 December 1955, Administration Series (AW file), box 24, DDEL. 63. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 28 July 1955, NSC Series (AW file), box 7, DDEL. 64. Memorandum for Governor Adams, 23 April 1956, Disarmament – Harold Stassen Records, 1955–1958, box 4, DDEL. 65. Ibid. 66. Memorandum of conference with the president, 21 November 1956, White House Office, Alphabetical Series, box 11, DDEL. 67. Letter to Marshal Bulganin, 1 March 1956, Disarmament – Harold Stassen Records, 1955–1958, box 4, DDEL. 68. Department of State telegram, 26 April 1956, Office of the special assistant for NSC affairs, subject Subseries, box 4, DDEL. 69. Rockefeller’s notes, NSC meeting, 10 February 1955, folder 540, box 66, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 70. Memorandum from Stassen to Rockefeller, 29 March 1955, folder 540, box 66, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 71. Memorandum, ‘Draft of Proposed Instructions to Deputy Representative of the US on the US Disarmament Commission Sub-Committee’, 9 March 1956, Disarmament – Harold Stassen Records, 1955–1958, box 4, DDEL. 72. Memorandum from Eisenhower to Harold Stassen, 5 August 1955, White House Office: Special Assistant Series, box 4, DDEL.

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73. Statement to the Senate Disarmament Sub-Committee Hearing by Harold Stassen, 25 January 1956, Disarmament – Harold Stassen Records, 1955– 1958, box 4, DDEL. 74. See, for example, ‘Aerial Inspection for Peace – There Goes that Damned Skywriter Again’, New York Times, 7 December 1955; ‘Judgements and Prophecies’, Time, 1 August 1955; and ‘America Offers to Cut Forces by 400,000 – She Plans an “Open Skies” Test’, Evening Standard, 5 April 1955. 75. ‘Open Sky Plan’, Toledo Blade Pictorial, 26 February 1956, pp. 16–32. 76. ‘Keep Needling ’Em, Cabot’, New York Daily News, 7 December 1955. 77. Time, ‘Disarmament: Pieces in the Sky’, 13 May 1957. 78. Gallup Poll, September 1955, RG 4 NAR Personal, folder 628, box 70, RAC. 79. Memorandum for the president, ‘Earth Satellite’, 7 October 1957, White House Office, Alphabetical Series, box 6, DDEL; and Kistiakowsky, George, A Scientist at the White House – The Private Diary of President Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1976), xxxi, pp. 68–69. 80. Memorandum for the Record, 12 February 1959, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Alphabetical Series, box 8, DDEL. 81. Meeting in the president’s office, 27 December 1955, White House Office, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL. A summary account of the Moby Dick programme is provided by Paul Worthman, former planner with the Air Force Research Center at the Pentagon, in Rostow’s Open Skies, note 3, pp. 189–191. 82. Memorandum regarding High Altitude Balloon Reconnaissance Programme, 8 July 1958, White House Office, Alphabetical Series, box 7, DDEL. 83. Rostow, Open Skies, p. 192. 84. Ibid, pp. 56–62. 85. Betts, Richard, ‘A Nuclear Golden Age? The Balance Before Parity’, pp. 3–33. 86. Intelligence Briefing Notes (Sensitive – (1–7), Intelligence Matters (II), U2 Vulnerability Tests – declassified 2/12/03, box 14, DDEL. 87. Dick, James, ‘The Strategic Arms Race, 1957–61: Who Opened a Missile Gap’, The Journal of Politics, 34 (November 1972), p. 1073. 88. ‘Soviet Note no. 23’, 10 July 1956, White House Office, subject series, box 4, DDEL; Memorandum of conference with the president, 17 January 1958, subject series, box 4, DDEL. 89. ‘ICBM – POLYYARNY URAL AREA’, 31 March 1959, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL.

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90. Andrew, Christopher, For the President’s Eyes Only – Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York, 1996), p. 2. 91. Zegard, Amy, Flawed by Design – The Evolution of the CIA, JCS and NSC (Stanford, California, 2009), p. 163. 92. Ibid. 93. The intelligence cycle, first coined by the RAND Corporation, is an approach used by intelligence specialists for the acquisition of data and comprises four key steps: planning (the identification of subjects of interest); collection (and submission of information); analysis (and synthesis of data); and dissemination and reporting of results. The final element of the cycle involves the development of policy or a plan of action, depending on the accuracy or depth of information gained. 94. Betts, Richard, ‘Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable’, World Politics, 31 (October, 1978), pp. 61–67. 95. Letter from Eisenhower to Bulganin, 28 January 1956, International Series, box 51, DDEL. 96. Letter from Bulganin to Eisenhower, 1 February 1956, International Series, box 51, DDEL. 97. Letter from Eisenhower to Bulganin, 4 August 1956, Disarmament – Harold Stassen Records, box 5, DDEL. 98. Letter from Eisenhower to Bulganin, 31 December 1956, International Series, box 51, DDEL. 99. Letter from Eisenhower to Khrushchev, 15 February 1958, DDEP 14: 573. 100. Typed transcript of interview with Sergei Khrushchev, Cold War Television Documentary Archive, 28/58, February 1997, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, KCL. 101. Freedman, Lawrence, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York, 2003), p. 140. 102. Filtzer, Donald, The Khrushchev Era – De-Stalinisation and the Limits of Reform in the USSR, 1953–1964 (Hampshire, 1993), pp. 32–37.

Chapter 5 The Challenge to Massive Retaliation 1. Walt Rostow, oral history, JFKL, p. 33. 2. ‘Defence Report’, 28 Sept. 1955, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 89, DDEL. 3. Minutes of the third session, Quantico panel, 6 June 1955, folder 530, box 65, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 4. ‘Defense Report’, Quantico panel II, 28 September 1955, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 89, DDEL. 5. See, for example, Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, pp. 63–111; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 165–197; Dockrill, Eisenhower’s

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6.

7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

16. 17. 18. 19.

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New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61, pp. 65–71 and 200–202; Huntington, The Common Defense, pp. 218–51; Wells, Samuel, ‘The Origins of Massive Retaliation’, Political Science Quarterly, 96 (Spring 1981), pp. 31–52; and Rosenberg, ‘The Origins of Overkill’, pp. 3–65. Kintner’s notes of a meeting with Rockefeller, Parker and Livermore, 19 January 1956; Memorandum for the record, 18 January 1956, folder 730, box 97, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. John D. Eisenhower, oral history, DDEL, p. 119. Memorandum from Parker to Rockefeller, ‘Spelling out of the Mutual Inspection System’, 28 July 1955, RG 4 NAR, Personal, folder 541, box 66, RAC. Rostow, Open Skies, p. 41. Memorandum of conversation, 12 July 1955, JFD: Subject Series, box 7, DDEL. ‘Psychological implications of Geneva for US Information Programs’, 4 August 1955, RG 4 NAR, Personal, folder 530, box 66, RAC. Killian, Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower, p. 71. Memorandum from Pettee to Rockefeller, 19 July 1955, RG 4 NAR Personal, folder 542, box 66, DDEL. Office memorandum from Kintner to Rockefeller, 29 July 1955, folder 547, box 68, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. Killian had been due to attend the next NSC Planning Board meeting which was to be devoted to further discussion of his report. ‘US Post-Geneva Policy’, prepared by Dulles, August 1955, folder 539, box 66, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. In his memorandum of 9 August 1955, ‘Psychological implications of Geneva for US Information Programs’, Rockefeller claimed that the ‘morale of the captive peoples [of the Soviet bloc] has probably deteriorated as an aftermath of Geneva’ and they had been ‘sold down the river’ by Western leaders. Though not explicit, it is implied in the minutes of the fourth session of the Quantico panel that Radford was in attendance. Minutes of the Fourth Session, Quantico panel II, 26 August 1955, folder 547, box 68, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. Pravda, 10 August 1955, p. 7, cited in Gromyko Ponomaryov, and Khvostov, History of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 290. In Open Skies, Rostow comments that participation in the Quantico II panel required higher clearances because it dealt with certain sensitive military issues. He believed his clearance was refused on the grounds that he was judged ‘controversial’, part and parcel of a general harassing campaign against Rockefeller by the State Department.

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20. Minutes of the seventh session, Quantico panel II, 27 September 1955, RG 4, Declassified files – Special Assistant to the President, 1954–1955, folder 19, box 1, RAC. 21. ‘Summary of the World Situation at the End of 1955’, Quantico panel II, folder 503, box 59, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 22. Second Session, 25 August 1955, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 89, DDEL. 23. Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, DCI and JCS, 10 August 1955, RG 4, Declassified files – Special Assistant to the President, 1954–1955, folder 19, box 1, RAC. 24. Eighth Session, Quantico panel II, 28 September 1955, folder 553, box 70, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC; ‘Defense Report’, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 89, DDEL. 25. ‘Defense Report’, 28 September 1955, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 89, DDEL. 26. ‘Action Program for the Free World Strength’, November 1955, RG 4 NAR, Personal, folder 503, box 59, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 27. Ibid. 28. ‘Defense Report’, 28 September 1955, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 89, DDEL. 29. ‘An American Policy for the Next Decade’, by Rostow and Millikan, April 1956, RG4 NAR Personal, folder 751, box 97, RAC. 30. Congressional Record, Speech of John F. Kennedy in the Senate of the United States, 14 August 1958, Pre-Presidential Papers, box 1030, JFKL. 31. Report of the Sub-committee of Military Applications, ‘Findings and Recommendations concerning the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile’, 30 June 1955, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, subject series, box 4, DDEL. 32. Congressional sub-committee on military applications hearings, May 1955, Office of the Staff Secretary, subject series, box 6, 1955. 33. Letter from President Eisenhower to Clinton P. Anderson, 13 September 1955, Office of the Staff Secretary, subject series, box 4, DDEL. 34. ‘Free World Defense’, Annex C, Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel, 4 (NAR Personal), folder 503, box 59, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 35. Annex A: ‘Summary of the World Situation at the End of 1955’ (undated), RG4 NAR, Personal, folder 503, box 59, RAC; and Agenda for May 19 Meeting of the Quantico panel, 1956, RG4 NAR, Personal, folder 752, box 97, RAC. 36. Milne, David, America’s Rasputin – Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War (New York, 2008), pp. 52–54. 37. Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 27 February 1958, Prepresidential Papers, box 565, JFKL. 38. Letter from NAR to Tom Dewey, 6 February 1956, folder 26, box 4, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC.

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39. Summary of a report to the president by the International Development Advisory Board, March 1951, folder 178, box 26, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. The IDAB had recommended doubling the amount of private investment from its then current level of $700 million a year. Truman had, in principle, been supportive of IDAB plans. However, as a result of the Korean War and NSC 68, funding was not approved. 40. Ibid. 41. Milne, America’s Rasputin, p. 95. 42. Annex 2: ‘Free World Defense’, Report of the Quantico panel II, October 1955, RG4 NAR, Personal, folder 503, box 59, RAC. 43. Milne, America’s Rasputin, p. 51. 44. ‘Action Program for Free World Strength’, Report of the Quantico panel II, October 1955, RG4 NAR, Personal, folder 503, box 59, RAC. 45. ‘American Policy for the Next Decade’, Rostow and Millikan, April 1956, RG4 NAR, Personal, folder 751, box 97, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 46. Draft Paper no. 1: ‘A post-Geneva Estimate of Soviet Intentions’, 22 September 1955, RG4 NAR, Personal, folder 547, box 60, RAC. 47. Short, The Origins of the Vietnam War, p. 140. 48. Minutes of the second meeting, Quantico panel II, 25 September 1955, folder 19, box 1, Nelson A. Rockefeller, Papers, RAC. 49. ‘Report on Psychological Aspects of US Strategy’, box 89, C.D. Jackson Papers, DDEL. 50. A Report to the National Security Council, NSC Policy 162/2, 30 October 1953, DDEL, p. 14. 51. Walt R. Rostow, oral history, 9 January 1981, Lyndon B. Johnson Library (hereafter LBJL). 52. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, pp. 131–133. 53. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 132. 54. Walt R. Rostow, oral history, 9 January 1981, LBJL. 55. Letter from Rostow to Rockefeller, 17 June 1955, box 31, Administration Series (Rockefeller), DDEL. 56. Letter from Rockefeller to President Eisenhower, 5 December 1955, folder 628, box 82, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 57. In his article, ‘Expecting the Approach of Danger: The Missile Gap as a study of Executive-Congressional Competition in Building Consensus of National Security Issues’, Presidential Quarterly Studies, 19 (1989), S. Nelson Drew (pp. 321 and 335) found ‘no fewer than 50 instances’ in which Eisenhower either dismissed or refuted the existence of a missile gap between the US and the Soviet Union. 58. Reich, Worlds To Conquer, p. 631. 59. ‘The Man … Nelson Rockefeller … The News … A Plan that Lost’, 30 December 1955, US News and World Report, pp. 73–74.

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60. Ibid. 61. ‘Matter of Fact…Casualty Rockefeller’, by Joseph and Stewart Alsop, 26 December 1955, Washington Post and Times Herald. 62. Ibid. 63. Letter from Colonel E. Rowny to Ellis Johnson, 25 January 1956, folder 739, box 97, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 64. ‘What is to be Done?’, report by William Kintner, folder 737, box 97, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 65. Kintner’s notes of a meeting with Rockefeller, Parker and Livermore, 19 January 1956; Memorandum for the record, 18 January 1956, RG4 NAR, Personal, folder 730, box 97, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 66. Letter from Barnett to Rockefeller, 1 March 1956, RG4 NAR, Personal, folder 731, box 97, RAC. 67. Speech by Frank Barnett on ‘National Survival in the Nuclear Age’, February 1956, RG4 NAR, Personal, folder 731, box 97, Nelson A. Rockefeller Paper, RAC. 68. Notes of the Quantico panel III meeting, 19 May 1956, folder 741, box 97, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. The Special Studies Project would incorporate studies covering foreign and military aid, education, democracy, and welfare and social policy. 69. Ibid. 70. ‘Draft outline of agenda for 19 May meeting of the Quantico Panel – Checklist of Major Topics covered in the Rostow-Millikan Paper’, folder 752, box 97, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 71. Letter from Rockefeller to Bayless Manning, 18 January 1956, RG4 NAR, folder 734, box 97, RAC. 72. Walt Rostow, oral history, JFKL, pp. 8–9. 73. ‘Russians Will Have 1,500-Mile Missile In ’56, Jackson Says’, Washington Post, 18 April 1956, White House Office (Carroll et al), Department of Defense sub-series, box 6, DDEL. 74. Transcript of Senate Armed Services sub-committee, 16 April 1956, Charles Wilson and Senator Jackson, White House Office (Carroll et al), Department of Defense sub-series, box 6, DDEL. 75. Washington Post, ‘The Decline of SAC’, 6 January 1956, JFKL.

Chapter 6 Sputnik, Missiles and Open Skies 1. Eisenhower won 35,581,003 to 25,738,765 votes for Adlai Stevenson, Ambrose, Eisenhower – Soldier and President, p. 480. 2. Second Inaugural Address, 21 January 1957, The American Presidency Project.

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3. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, p. 202. Andrew shows that Eisenhower enjoyed throughout his two terms in office ‘an extraordinary level of public support, averaging a 64 per cent approval rating in the monthly Gallup polls’. 4. An article in the New York Times argued: ‘The military missiles program has been subjected to recent curtailments in expenditures and developments, and the satellite program, conducted at bargain-basement rates as a purely scientific experiment, reveals an unexpected naiveté in Washington.’ See ‘Democratic Fact Sheet’, 1 November 1957, National Defense-Missiles (24 October 1957–3 January 1958), Legislative Assistant Background file (1953–1960), Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. 5. Foot, Michael, Aneurin Bevan – A Biography, Volume II, 1945–1960 (London, 1960), p. 591. 6. Taubman, William, Khrushchev – The Man – His Era (London, 2003), p. 378. 7. At the twentieth party congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956, Khrushchev made a fierce attack on Stalin at a secret session of the meeting. He described, in considerable detail, Stalin’s purge of the party in the 1930s and criticised in vehement terms the late secretary general’s leadership in the war with Germany. However, as Holloway points out (Stalin and the Bomb), Khrushchev’s rejection was only partial. He did not question the policy of collectivisation, or the dominant role of the party in Soviet society, though he rejected the idea that war was inevitable. ‘Either peaceful co-existence or the most destructive war in history,’ he declared, ‘there is no third way.’ Supported by other leaders of the Soviet presidium, this stance represented a significant departure from previous Soviet thinking relating to the inevitability of wars when imperialism was an ‘all-embracing world system’. Nevertheless, with the existence of a socialist world system to prevent aggression, war was not, Khrushchev declared, ‘fatalistically inevitable’. 8. Extract from an article published in International Affairs (Moscow) in February 1958 on the significance of the first Sputnik, cited in Hanak, Soviet Foreign Policy Since the Death of Stalin, p. 85. 9. Ibid. 10. Extract from an interview given by Khrushchev, 22 November 1957, Speeches and Interviews on World Problems, 1957, pp. 316–317, cited in Hanak, ibid, p. 87. 11. Memorandum of conversation with the president, 28 October 1957, White House Office: Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL. 12. Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 378–379. 13. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 66.

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14. Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century, p. 121. 15. Ibid. 16. Letter from Nelson Rockefeller to Joe Jackson, 31 October 1956, folder 8, box 1, V4A RBF, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 17. Memorandum for the record, 18 Jan. 1956, box 97, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 18. Laurance S. Rockefeller, Nelson’s brother, became chairman of the SSP after 26 May 1958. 19. ‘An American Policy for the Next Decade (The National Interest)’, April 1956, V4A RFB, SSP2, folder 18, box 2, RAC. 20. Ibid, RG4 NAR, folder 751, box 97, RAC. 21. Letter from Rockefeller to Millikan, 31 October 1956, V4A RBF, Special Studies Project, folder 94, box 8, RAC. Rostow also likened the SSP to a ‘large scale, public version of Quantico II’, see Reich, Worlds to Conquer, p. 650. 22. Letter from Rockefeller to Johnson, 31 October 1956, V4A RBF, Special Studies Project, folder 8, box 1, RAC. 23. The Rockefeller Brothers Fund, The Rockefeller Panel Reports – Prospect for America (New York, 1961), p. 108. 24. ‘Action Program for the Free World Strength’, Nov. 1955, box 59, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 25. Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House – The Private Diary of President Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology p. 228. In a conversation with Kistiakowsky in January 1960, Trevor Gardner, a former assistant secretary of USAF for research and development, confessed to being horrified by Teller’s attitude towards disarmament and the banning of nuclear tests. Both men believed that Teller, who envisaged the future as an everintensifying arms race but refused to consider what its ultimate outcome would be, was ‘acting paranoic’ over the Soviet Union. 26. Letter from Edward Teller to Henry Kissinger, 18 September 1957, folder 147, box 13, SSP 2, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 27. Letter from August Heckscher to Edward Teller, 2 October 1959, folder 148, box 13, V4A – RBF, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 28. Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century, p. 161. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid, p. 141. 31. Sub-panel II, Summary of minutes of a meeting held on 4 December 1957, V4A RBF, Special Studies Project, RAC. 32. Sub-panel I, Summary of minutes of Second Meeting, 16 December 1956, V4A RBF, folder 99, box 8, Special Studies Project, RAC.

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33. Testimony of the US Secretary of Defense before the House Armed Services Committee regarding Iraq, 18 September 2002, US Department of Defense, speeches, www.defense.gov 34. The Rockefeller Panel Reports – Prospect for America, p. 48. 35. Ibid, p. 128. 36. Letter from Rockefeller to Rusk, 2 December 1957, V4A RBF, Special Studies Project, folder 13, box 1, RAC. 37. Reich, Worlds to Conquer, p. 665. 38. Oral history interview with Nelson Rockefeller, Series Q, 14 July 1977, RAC. 39. Letter from Rockfeller to Rusk, 21 Jan. 1958, V4 A – RBF, Special Studies Project 2, box 1, RAC. 40. Reich, Worlds to Conquer, p. 667. 41. Report of sub-panel II, 4 Dec. 1957, Special Studies Project, V4A – RFB, box 17, RAC. 42. The Rockefeller Panel Reports – Prospect for America, p. 144. 43. Ibid, p. 145. 44. Preble, Christopher, ‘Whoever Believed in the Missile Gap?: John F. Kennedy and the Politics of National Security’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 33 (December 2003), pp. 801–806. 45. Robert Sprague, an industrialist and expert on continental defence, and William C. Foster, former deputy director of defense under Truman, became responsible for directing the study. After a bout of illness, Gaither rejoined the group as a member of the advisory panel just prior to completion of its report in November 1957. The Gaither Committee included former members of the Quantico panel such as William Webster and George Lincoln. 46. Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, p. 144. 47. Report of the Security Resources Panel, ‘Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age’, 7 November 1957, NSC Series, box 9, DDEL. 48. Ibid. 49. Memorandum of conference with the president, 31 October 1957, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary, Department of Defense subseries, box 2, DDEL. 50. Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 149–151. 51. Eisenhower’s Radio and Television Address to the Nation, 7 November 1957, The American Presidency Project. 52. Halperin, Morton, ‘The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process’, World Politics, 13 (April 1961), p. 375. 53. Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 149–151. 54. Ibid, p. 153. 55. Ibid, p. 152.

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56. Halperin, ‘The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process’, pp. 378–382. 57. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, p. 132. 58. Ibid, p. 119. The above figures exclude expenditures on foreign aid and so appear lower compared to other figures relating to military expenditures quoted in this book. 59. Minutes of the NSC meeting, 24 April 1958, NSC Series (AW files), box 7, DDEL. 60. Richelson, Jeffrey, Spying on the Bomb – American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York, 2006), p. 116. 61. Memorandum for the record, 26 October 1957, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL. 62. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, p. 121. 63. Report: Critical Need for (deleted) Collection – ICBM Target – The Urals and Tyura Tam, 31 March 1959, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL. 64. Memorandum of conference with the president, 16 January 1958, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL. 65. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies, pp. 276–277. 66. Dick, ‘The Strategic Arms Race’ 1957–61, Journal of Politics, 34 (November 1972) pp. 1063–1065. According to a memorandum of conference with the president of 17 January 1958, it was noted that with regard to the Soviet ICBM position ‘long-range missile tests have been extremely few and there [had] been none for quite a time’. White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, box 4, DDEL. 67. Dick, ‘The Strategic Arms Race’, p. 1065. 68. Editorial note from The Diary of James C. Hagerty, ed., Ferrell, p. 6. 69. Killian, Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower, p. 10; and Dick, ‘The Strategic Arms Race’, p. 1065. 70. Memorandum of conference with the president, 17 June 1958, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary, 1952–1961, box 4, DDEL. 71. Memorandum of conference with the president, 10 February 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary (Twining), box 4, DDEL. 72. Preble, ‘Whoever Believed in the Missile Gap?’, p. 42; and DeGroot, The Bomb, p. 256. 73. Memorandum of conference with the president, 12 November 1958, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary, box 4, DDEL. 74. Ibid. 75. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies, p. 275. 76. Letter from Eisenhower to Bulganin, 12 January 1958, Disarmament (Harold Stassen Records, 1955–1958), box 2, DDEL.

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77. Letter from Eisenhower to Khrushchev, 15 February 1958, DDEP, XIX: 574. On 22 January 1958, Khrushchev delivered a speech in Minsk wherein he expressed his readiness to embark on improved relations with the West. But he could not resist attacking the US imperialists and referred to the differences between the US and the Soviet Union as a matter of ‘polemics’. See Medvedev, Roy, Khrushchev – A Biography (New York, 1983), p. 141. 78. On 24 March 1957, Britain and the US jointly declared that they would continue publicly to announce their tests well in advance of their occurrence with information as to their location and general timing. Furthermore, both countries declared that they would be willing to register with the UN advance notice of their intention to conduct future nuclear tests and to permit limited international observation of such tests if the Soviet Union would do the same. 79. Letter from Eisenhower to Khrushchev, 8 April 1958, DDEP XIX: 639. 80. Letter from Bulganin to Eisenhower, 28 April 1958, International Series, box 51, DDEL. 81. ‘Aide-Memoire’, 5 March 1958, Washington, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL. 82. Ibid. 83. Memorandum for the record, 19 July 1956, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL. 84. Memorandum of conversation with the president, 22 December 1958, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL. 85. Letter from Bulganin to Eisenhower, 22 April 1958, International Series, box 51, DDEL. 86. Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, p. 133. 87. Dick, ‘The Strategic Arms Race’, p. 1068. 88. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies, pp. 273–276. 89. Statement by John Foster Dulles before the special sub-committee on disarmament of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 29 February 1956, Harold Stassen records 1955–1958, box 4, DDEL. 90. Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61, p. 188. 91. Memorandum of conversation, 27 November 1957, JFD: General Correspondence and Memorandum Series, box 1, DDEL. 92. DeGroot, Dark Side of the Moon, p. 142. 93. Memorandum of conference with the president, 6 February 1958, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Department of Defense sub-series, box 6, DDEL. 94. Ibid.

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95. Memorandum of Conference with the President, 24 May 1956, Diary Series, box 15, DDEL. 96. ‘Questions Concerning General Taylor’s Book’, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Alphabetical Series, box 5, DDEL. 97. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, pp. 76–82. 98. Ibid. 99. Ballistic Missile – A History, January 1960, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Alphabetical Series, box 18, DDEL. 100. Ibid. 101. Memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy, 8 December 1956, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Alphabetical Series, box 18, DDEL. 102. Staff Notes No. 139, 29 June 1957, Diary Series (AW files), box 25, DDEL. 103. Staff Notes, 23 October 1957, Diary Series (AW files), box 25, DDEL. 104. Memorandum for Cutler from the Department of Defense (Charles Haskins), Subject: Missiles, 27 June 1957, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Alphabetical Series, box 18, DDEL. 105. Proposed NSC Action – The ICBM Program, 30 August 1955, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL. 106. ‘Missiles Away’, Time, 30 January 1956. 107. Ibid. 108. Ibid. 109. ‘Who Really Is Ahead In Arms Race, US or Russia? Twining and Quarles, Two Top Men, Give the Answers’, 2 March 1956, US News and World Report. 110. Ibid. 111. ‘American Public Opinion on International Issues’, June 1958, Administration Series (N. Rockefeller folders), box 31, DDEL. 112. Typed transcript of interview with Sergei Khrushchev, Cold War Television Documentary Archive, 28/58, February 1997, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, KCL.

Chapter 7 Eisenhower’s Final Struggle 1. Memorandum of Special Meeting of the NSC, 7 February 1956, White House Office: Office of the Special Assistant for NSC Affairs, box 4, DDEL. 2. Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61, p. 5.

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3. Congressional Record – Senate (1956), box 1030, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. 4. Congressional Record, Vol. 102 (1956), Library of Congress (hereafter LOC), pp. 2805–7. 5. Congressional Record, Vol. 105 (1959), LOC, pp. 3501–4. 6. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, pp. 198–200. 7. Typed transcript of interview with Oleg Troyanovski, Cold War Television Documentary Archive, 29/28, March 1996, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, KCL. 8. Extract from the Note to the Governments of the United States, Britain and France on the Question of Berlin, 27 November 1958 (Moscow), cited in Hanak, Soviet Foreign Policy Since the Death of Stalin, p. 106. 9. Ibid, p. 110. 10. Memorandum of conversation with the president, 10 February 1959, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary (Carroll et al), Department of Defense sub-series, box 4, DDEL. 11. Ibid. 12. Congressional Record – Senate (1958), box 1032, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. 13. Congressional Record, Vol. 105 (1959), pp. 3514–3516. 14. Ibid, pp. 3501–3504. 15. Memorandum of conference with the president, 9 March 1959, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary (Carroll et al), Department of Defense sub-series, box 4, DDEL. 16. Ibid. 17. Memorandum for the record, 12 February 1959, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary (Carroll et al), Department of Defense sub-series, box 4, DDEL. 18. Telephone conversation, Dulles and McElroy, 17 November 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, VIII, pp. 81 and 84–85. 19. Memorandum of conference with the president, 9 March 1959, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary (Carroll et al), Department of Defense sub-series, box 4, DDEL. 20. Ledbetter, Unwarranted Influence, p. 89. 21. Speech by John F. Kennedy, ‘The Challenge Abroad’, October 1958, box 1030, Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL. 22. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, p. 130. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid, p. 131. 25. Preble, ‘Whoever believed in the Missile Gap?’, p. 811.

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26. Ibid. 27. Ibid, p. 801. 28. Speech by John F. Kennedy to the Fifth National Conference on International Economic and Social Development, 26 February 1958, box 565, PrePresidential Papers, JFKL. 29. Milne, America’s Rasputin, p. 56. 30. Ibid, p. 58. 31. Walt Rostow, oral history, JFKL, pp. 8–9. 32. Milne, America’s Rasputin, p. 69. 33. Schoenbaum, Thomas, Waging Peace and War – Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy and Johnson Years (New York, 1988), p. 244. 34. Letter from John F. Kennedy to Nelson Rockefeller, 21 April 1958, box 524, Pre-Presidential Papers, Correspondence, JFKL. 35. Speech by John F. Kennedy, ‘Defense Action Needed Now’, August 1960, box 539, Pre-presidential files, JFKL. 36. Morris, Joe Alex, Nelson Rockefeller – A Biography (New York, 1960), p. 319. 37. Ibid, p. 318. 38. Statement by the Governor, State of New York Executive Chamber, Albany, 8 June 1960, folder 303, box 25, NAR – Personal, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 39. Memorandum from John E. Lockwood to Nelson Rockefeller, 28 October 1957, folder 40, box 6, Series J1 – Politics, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 40. Donovan, Frank, Confidential Secretary – Ann Whitman’s Twenty Years with Eisenhower and Rockefeller (New York, 1988), p. 168. 41. Statement by the Governor, 8 June 1960, folder 303, box 25, NAR – Personal, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 42. Campaign statement by Rockefeller, 31 May 1960, folder 308, box 26, Series G, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 43. Speech by Goldwater to the Republican convention, 19 July 1960, folder 304, box 25, Series J1 – Politics, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 44. Memorandum from Emmet J. Hughes to Nelson Rockefeller, ‘Nixon’s Speeches as at July 1960’, 31 July 1960, folder 308, box 26, Series G, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 45. New York Herald Tribune, 27 December 1960, folder 302, box 25, Series J1 – Politics, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. 46. Dick, ‘The Strategic Arms Race, 1957–61’, p. 66. 47. Ibid. 48. Memorandum for James Killian from the Ballistic Missiles Panel, 4 March 1958, Administration Series (AW file), box 23, DDEL.

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49. DeGroot, Dark Side of the Moon, p. 120. 50. ‘Vast Department of Defense Runs Huge Military Operation’, GRIT Special Report, 30 October 1960. 51. Ledbetter, Unwarranted Influence, p. 94. 52. General Accounting Office Report, Administrative Management of the Air Force Ballistic Missile Program, January 1960, White House Office, Subject Series, box 5, DDEL. 53. The report noted that in the case of Rame-Wooldridge certain staff and key employees ‘were paid salaries ranging as high as $60,000 per year’ during 1959/60. 54. Ibid. 55. DeGroot, Dark Side of the Moon, p. 87. 56. Memorandum of conference with the president, 18 November 1959, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary (Carroll et al), Department of Defense sub-series, box 4, DDEL. 57. Memorandum of conference with the president, 21 March 1958, White House Office, Subject Series, box 6, DDEL. 58. Ledbetter, Unwarranted Influence, p. 100. 59. Memorandum of conference with the president, 10 February 1959, White House Office (Carroll et al), Subject Series, box 4, DDEL. 60. Memorandum for the president – subject: ‘Military Power Claims of the USSR’, 18 August 1959, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary 1952–1961, Alphabetical Series, box 8, DDEL. 61. Ibid. 62. Memorandum for the record, 21 January 1958, White House Office (Carroll et al), Subject Series, box 3, DDEL. 63. Memorandum for the record, 12 February 1959, White House Office, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL. 64. Memorandum of conference with the president, 7 April 1959, White House Office (Carroll et al), box 4, DDEL. 65. Ibid. 66. Memorandum of conference with the president, 8 July 1959, White House Office, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL. 67. Special National Intelligence Estimate – Implications of Certain US Earth Satellite Programs, CIA, 29 July 1958, National Archives, Internet. 68. Supplement to the Corona project, 7 July 1959, White House Office, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL. 69. Project Corona, 11 March 1959, White House Office, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL. 70. Memorandum from the president, 26 August 1960, National Archives, www.archives.gov.

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71. Ibid. 72. Speech by rear admiral H.G. Rickover, US Navy, 12 January 1956, PrePresidential Papers, box 539, JFKL. 73. Interview with Dick Boyle, 10 March 1959, Pre-Presidential Papers, box 1029, JFKL. 74. Gallup poll conducted in September 1955, folder 628, box 70, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, RAC. In his work, The Common Defense: Strategic Problems in National Politics, Samuel P. Huntington points out that during the first 15 years of the post-war period, public opinion polls revealed strong support for maintaining or increasing military budgets even when government policy called for reductions. Only once in nine such surveys did expressed pubic support for universal military service drop below 65 per cent (pp. 234–51). 75. Memorandum to the secretary of state, 4 June 1958, box 4, Administration Series, DDEL. 76. American Presidency Project, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the Nation, 17 January 1961, APP. 77. Letter from Bulganin to Eisenhower, 22 April 1958, International Series, box 51, DDEL. 78. ‘Major Themes of Khrushchev’s Public and Private Statements and US Counter-Argument’ (Talking Paper), Washington, September 1959, International Series, box 51, DDEL. 79. ‘Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the President’, White House Office, Alphabetical Series, box 4, DDEL. 80. Memorandum for the president – Comments on Reported Khrushchev Statement on Series Production of ICBMs, 28 January 1959, White House Office, Alphabetical Series, box 7, DDEL. 81. Memorandum to the president from Harold Stassen, 14 January 1958, Administration Series (AW file), box 35, DDEL. 82. Speech by Eisenhower to the 15th UN General Assembly, 23 August 1960, C.D. Jackson Papers, box 68, DDEL. 83. Rostow, Walt, The Diffusion of Power 1957–1972 (New York, 1972), pp. 171–175. 84. Ibid.

Conclusion 1. See, for example, Marquardt, ‘Transparency and Security Competition’, pp. 55–86, and Evangelista, ‘Co-operation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1950s’, pp. 502–528. 2. Osgood, Total Cold War, p. 190.

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3. Ambrose, Eisenhower – Soldier, General of the Army and President- Elect, 1890– 1952, Vol. I, p. 431. 4. Immerman, ‘Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Re-appraisal’, pp. 320–322. 5. McMahon, Robert, ‘Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism’, quoted from Immerman, ibid, p. 320. 6. Ambrose, Eisenhower – The President, Vol. II, p. 435. In his conclusion, Ambrose is critical of Eisenhower for his failure to make greater efforts to control the arms race (p. 621). 7. Ambrose, Eisenhower – Soldier and President, p. 523. McCone succeeded Lewis Strauss as head of the AEC in June 1958. 8. Ibid. 9. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, pp. 128–135. 10. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 66. 11. Licklider, Roy, ‘The Missile Gap Controversy’, Political Science Quarterly, 85 (December 1970), p. 610. 12. Eisenhower, Chance for Peace speech, 16 April 1953, American Presidency Project.

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Lemmer, Afred, ‘The Air Force and Strategic Deterrence’, Office of the Air Force History, Washington, pp. 14–15. Licklider, Roy, ‘The Missile Gap Controversy’, Political Science Quarterly, 85 (December 1970), pp. 600–615. Marquardt, James, ‘Transparency and Security Competition: Open Skies and America’s Cold War Statecraft, 1948–1960’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 9 (Winter 2007), pp. 55–87. Marshall, Charles Burton, ‘Making Foreign Policy on the New Frontier’, Annals of the American Academy of Politics and Social Science, 342 (July 1962), pp. 138–146. Offner, Arnold, ‘Presidential Addresses: Another Such Victory – President Truman, American Foreign Policy and the Cold War’, Diplomatic History, 23 (Spring 1999), pp. 127–155. Paterson, Thomas, ‘Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and Congress: The Truman Years’, Diplomatic History, 3 (Winter 1979), pp. 1–23. Plischke, Elmer, ‘Eisenhower’s “Correspondence Diplomacy” with the Kremlin – Case Study in Summit Diplomatics’, The Journal of Politics, 30 (February 1968), pp. 137–159. Prados, John, ‘Open Skies and Closed Minds’–American Disarmamer Policy at the Geneva Summit, in Gunter Bischof and Saki Dockrill, eds, Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955 (Baton Rouge, 2000), pp. 215–233. Preble, Christopher, ‘Whoever Believed in the Missile Gap?: John F. Kennedy and the Politics of National Security,’ Presidential Studies Quarterly, 33 (December 2003), pp. 801–826. Rosenberg, David Alan, ‘US Nuclear Stockpile, 1945–1950’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 38 (October 1982), pp. 1–34. Rosenberg, David Alan, ‘The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945 – 1960’, International Security, 7 (Spring 1983), pp. 3–71. Rosenberg, J. Philip, ‘Presidential Beliefs and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Continuity during the Cold War Era’, Political Psychology, 7 (1986), pp. 733–749. Soapes, Thomas, ‘A Cold Warrior Seeks Peace: Eisenhower’s Strategy for Nuclear Disarmament’, Diplomatic History, 4 (January 1980), pp. 295–305. Suri, Jeremy, ‘America’s Search for a Technological Solution to the Arms Race: The Surprise Attack Conference of 1958 and a Challenge for “Eisenhower Revisionists”’, Diplomatic History, 21 (Summer 1997), pp. 417–451. Tal, David, ‘Eisenhower’s Disarmament Dilemma: From Chance for Peace to the Open Skies Proposal’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 12 (June 2001), pp. 175–196. Tal, David, ‘The Secretary of State versus the Secretary of Peace: The DullesStassen Controversy and US Disarmament Policy, 1955–1958’, Journal of Contemporary History, 41 (October 2006), pp. 721–740. Tonelson, Alan, ‘Nitze’s World – SALT and Beyond’, Foreign Policy, 35 (Summer 1979), pp. 74–90.

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Books Alperovitz, Gar, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1995). Ambrose, Stephen, Ike’s Spies – Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Mississippi, 1981). Ambrose, Stephen, Eisenhower – Soldier, General of the Army and President-Elect, 1890–1952, Vol. I (London, 1983). Ambrose, Stephen, Eisenhower – The President, Vol. II (New York, 1984). Ambrose, Stephen, Eisenhower – Soldier and President (London, 2003). Andrew, Christopher, For the President’s Eyes Only – Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York, 1996). Babington-Smith, Frances, Evidence in Camera – Photographic Intelligence in World War II (London, 1947). Bischof, Gunter and Dockrill, Saki, eds, Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955 (Baton Rouge, 2000). Bloomfield, Lincoln, et al, Khrushchev and the Arms Race – Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament 1954–1964 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966). Bowie, Robert, and Immerman, Richard, Waging Peace – How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York, 1998). Boyle, The Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence 1955–1957 (Chapel Hill, 2005). Bundy, McGeorge, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988). Charmley, John, Churchill – The End of Glory: A Political Biography (London, 1993). Childs, Marquis, Eisenhower: Captive Hero – A Critical Appraisal of the General and the President (New Haven, 1958). Cogan, Charles, Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends (London, 1994). Costigliola, Frank, France and the United States – The Cold War Alliance 1940– 1990 (New York 1992). DeGroot, Gerard, The Bomb – A History of Hell on Earth (New York, 2005).

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DeGroot, Gerard, Dark Side of the Moon – The Magnificent Madness of the American Lunar Quest (New York, 2006). D’Este, Carlo, Eisenhower – Allied Supreme Commander (London, 2002). Divine, Robert, Eisenhower and the Cold War (Oxford and London, 1981). Dockrill, Saki, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61 (Hampshire, 1996). Dupree, A. Hunter, Science in the Federal Government – A History of Policies and Activities to 1940 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957). Fensch, Thomas, Top Secret: The CIA and the U2 Program 1954–1974 (The Woodlands, Texas, 2001). Filtzer, Donald, The Khrushchev Era – De-Stalinisation and the Limits of Reform in the USSR, 1953–1964 (MacMillan, 1993). Foot, Michael, Aneurin Bevan – A Biography, Volume II 1945–1960 (London, 1960). Freedman, Lawrence, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York, 2003). Friedberg, Aaron L., In the Shadow of the Garrison State – America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Strategy (Princeton, 2000). Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Naftali, Timothy, Khrushchev’s Cold War – The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York, 2006). Gaddis, John Lewis, Strategies of Containment – A Critical Appraisal of Post-War American National Security Policy (Oxford and New York, 1982). Gaddis, John Lewis, We Now Know - Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997). Gervasi, Frank, The Real Rockefeller (London, 1964). Gromyko, Ponomaryov and Khvostov, History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945–1970 (Moscow, 1973). Hanak, Harry, Soviet Foreign Policy Since the Death of Stalin (London, 1972). Haslam, Jonathan, Russia’s Cold War – From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven, 2011). Hennessy, Peter, The Secret State – Whitehall and the Cold War (London, 2003). Herken, Gregg, The Winning Weapon – The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945– 1950 (Princeton, New Jersey, 1982). Herken, Gregg, Cardinal Choices – Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI (Stanford, California, 2000). Hershberg, James, James B. Conant – Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age (New York, 1993). Holloway, David, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, 1984). Holloway, David, Stalin and the Bomb – The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939– 1956 (New Haven, 1994). Hossein-Zaden, Ismael, The Political Economy of US Militarism (New York, 2006). Huntington, Samuel P., The Common Defense: Strategic Problems in National Politics (New York, 1961). Kaplan, Fred, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, California, 1983).

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Rostow, Walt, Europe After Stalin – Eisenhower’s Three Decisions of March 11 1953 (Austin, Texas, 1982). Sanders, Jerry, Peddlers of Crisis – The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (Boston, Massachusetts, 1983). Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980). Schilling, Hammond & Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New York, 1962). Schoenbaum, Thomas, Waging Peace and War – Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy and Johnson Years (New York, 1988). Shonfield, Andrew, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (New York, 1968). Short, Anthony, The Origins of the Vietnam War (London and New York, 1989). Stanley, Jay, ed., Essays on the Garrison State – Harold Lasswell (New Brunswick, 1997). Stassen, Harold & Houts, Marshall, Eisenhower: Turning the World Toward Peace (Minnesota, 1990). Suri, Jeremy, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2007). Szilard, Leo, ‘Reminiscences’, in Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, eds, Perspectives in American History, II (Boston, 1983). Taubman, William, Khrushchev – The Man – His Era (London, 2003). Thompson, Nicholas, The Hawk and the Dove – Paul Nitze, George Kennan and the History of the Cold War (New York, 2009). Zegard, Amy, Flawed by Design – The Evolution of the CIA, JCS and NSC (Stanford, California, 2009).

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INDEX

Acheson, Dean, 19, 21, 24, 38, 58 Adams, Sherman, 53, 88, 181 Adenauer, Konrad, 81, 102 Aerial Reconnaissance (see also the U2), 1, 6, 45, 66, 68, 129, 132, 182, 215 Africa, 59, 66, 145–146, 155, 202 Air Force Ballistic Missile Program, 203 Air Force Magazine, 116 Air Research and Development Command, 180 Alaska, 210 Aleutian Islands, 210 Alsop, Joseph, 153, 157, 194 Alsop, Stewart, 153 America at Mid-Century, 163 Anderson, Clinton, 143 Anderson, Dillon, 93, 104–105 Anderson, Frederick, 139 Armed Services Committee, 180, 190 Arneson, Gordon, 15, 17 Ashe, Kenyon, 56 Asia, 59, 98, 118, 136, 144–147, 151, 155, 196, 198, 202 Austria, 70, 80 Austrian State Treaty, 47, 70, 74, 80, 85 Barnett, Frank, 154–155 Barrett, Edward, 24 Baruch Plan, The, 126

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Baruch, Bernard, 66 Belgium, 72, 74 Bell Aircraft, 29, 202 Bell Telephone Laboratories, 164 Beria, Lavrenti, 45 Berlin, 14, 18, 31, 50, 52, 63, 70–72, 82, 90, 170, 187, 189, 191–194, 205, 210 Bevan, Aneurin, 161 Bidault, Georges, 148 Bissell, Richard, 68, 138, 175–176, 180, 206 Blankenhorn, Herbert, 81 Boeing, 29, 202 Bohlen, Charles, 17, 81, 125 Bomber Gap, 61, 92, 116, 143 Bowie, Bob, 88, 152 Bradley, Omar, 19 Brest, 131 Bridges, Styles, 110 British Empire, 73 Bulganin, Nikolai attitude towards Open Skies, 99, 106, 177, 209, 211, 217 concern over US military capabilities, 194, 209 correspondence with Eisenhower, 109, 113, 125, 133–134, 177–179, 209 disarmament, 125 Geneva summit, 1–2, 103, 112, 116

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278

EISENHOWER

AND THE

Bulgaria, 14, 51, 131 Burke, Arleigh, 121–122 Burma, 65, 90 Bush, George W., 167 Bush, Vannevar, 33 Byrnes, James, 14 Cambodia, 59, 79 Canada, 74, 210 Capitol Hill, 137, 169 Carnegie Corporation, 163 Carnegie Institute for Peace, 93 Carnegie Institute of Washington, 33 Carney, Robert, 58 Central Intelligence Agency, 15–16, 29–30, 55, 60, 62, 65, 68, 82, 87–88, 100, 118, 127, 132, 138, 147, 175, 180, 190, 205–206 Chance for Peace Speech, 47–48, 220 Chelyabinsk, 175 Chiang Kai-Shek, 64 Chicago University, 163 China, 21, 36, 39, 59, 64–65, 69, 83, 175 Chrysler, 202 Churchill, Winston, 70, 73–74, 77, 84, 217 Clark, John, 22 Clay, Lucius, 50, 164, 169–170 Cleveland, Grover, 198 Cline, Ray, 118 Committee on Foreign Relations, 145 Committee on the Present Danger, 33–37, 62, 89, 148, 151 Conant, James, 33 Congress, 6, 23, 34, 36–39, 43, 112, 114, 116, 121, 123, 127, 132, 157, 160, 168, 180, 187–188, 190, 193, 205–206, 209, 212 Convair Corporation, 29 Corona Satellite, 206–207, 219 Council of Foreign Relations, 54 Covert Operations, 7, 65–66, 75, 87, 215 Cutler, Robert, 51, 57, 67, 175, 183, 190

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COLD WAR A RMS R ACE Dean, Gordon, 17, 19, 58, 164, 169–170, 197 Defence Budgets, 5, 8–10, 13, 23, 28–29, 31, 38, 60, 75, 109, 119, 123, 135, 137, 150, 158, 182, 188–189, 214–215 Defense Appropriations Sub-committee, 180 Defense Ballistic Missile Committee, 183 Defense Department, 68, 84, 89, 118, 184, 203, 205 Democratic Party, 188–190, 198 Denmark, 210 Dien Bien Phu, 148–149 Disarmament, 1, 3–4, 8, 10, 32, 38–39, 66, 68, 70, 72, 78, 82–83, 89–90, 93–94, 98, 100, 102–106, 108–109, 111, 113–115, 119, 123, 125–128, 133–135, 137–139, 141, 166, 170, 179, 186, 210, 216–217 Dobrynin, Anatoly, 112 Dodge, Joseph, 57 Doubleday, 168 Douglas, 29, 202 DuBridge, Lee, 62 Dulles, Allen, 67, 89, 119, 175–176, 179 Dulles, John Foster background, 52–53 disarmament, 83, 124 Eastern Europe, 63–65, 81, 193 European Defence Community, 74 expresses doubts about massive retaliation, 182–183 foreign ministers’ conference 1954, 70, 72 Geneva summit, 102, 104 opposition to the Quantico panel, 88 relations with Nelson Rockefeller, 139, 141, 152 speech to the UN General Assembly, 124 support for Open Skies, 100, 105, 110–111, 114

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INDEX support for the New Look, 52–53, 59, 63 views on Soviet military capabiliies, 118–119, 176 views on the Soviet Union, 46, 84–85, 114, 119, 121, 139 Dunn, Frederick, 88, 139 East Germany, 63, 131, 193 Eden, Anthony, 70–71, 74–75, 104, 106 Eisenhower, Dwight D. aerial reconnaissance, 9, 66–68, 175–177 appearance, 43 attitude towards the Soviet Union, 4, 40, 50–52, 84–85, 110, 119–120 Chance for Peace speech, 47–48, 220 as Chief of Staff, 13 correspondence with Bulganin, 109, 113, 125, 133–134, 177–179, 209 correspondence with Khrushchev, 109, 113, 133–134, 177 creation of NASA, 218 farewell address to the nation, 10, 204, 209 Geneva summit, 1–2, 8, 77, 85, 103–106, 109 International Geophysical Year and satellites, 129–130, 206–207, 219 military-industrial complex, 5, 8–11, 24, 62, 121, 173, 201–203, 213, 216, 218 negotiations with the Soviet Union, 8–9, 69–70, 78, 84–85, 103, 216 relations with John Foster Dulles, 52–53, 182–183 relations with military staff, 57–58, 114–116, 118, 122–124, 130, 182, 193–194, 200, 204 relations with Nelson Rockefeller, 79, 94, 97, 100, 144, 152–153, 199–200 relations with the Democrats, 144, 173, 188, 190–191

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279

as SACEUR, 13, 44 Security Resources Panel,171–173 Special Studies Project, 169–170 support for covert operations, 9, 64–66, 176–178, 205–207 support for European Defence Community, 71–72, 74 support for the New Look, 3–5, 44–45, 53–56, 58–60, 75, 182, 189 support for Open Skies, 3–4, 6, 9–10, 68–69, 78, 86, 105–109, 114, 125–126, 135, 148–149, 211, 213, 215, 217 on Stalin’s death, 46 U2 flights, 8, 67–69, 108–109, 125, 130–131, 160, 175–180, 205–207, 210, 215 views on military expenditures, 7, 39–41, 48–49, 59–60, 174, 213, 215 views on nuclear war, 49 views on the US economy, 4, 41, 48–49, 56, 59–60, 62, 119–120 wins 1952 presidential election, 43–44 wins 1956 presidential election, 159 Eisenhower, John S.D., 101 Elliott, Bill, 95 Engle, Clair, 204 European Co-operation Act, 35 European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), 23, 34–36, 97–98, 155, 169 Far East, 34, 39, 98, 102, 150, 153, 189, 202 Faure, Edgar, 71, 73, 104 Federal Civilian Defense Administration, 171 Fisk, James, 164 Flexible Response, 9, 36, 150, 156, 170, 182–183, 189, 211 Ford Foundation, 35, 163 Foreign Economic Assistance Act, 145

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280

EISENHOWER

AND THE

Foreign Economic Policy for the Twentieth Century, 168 Foreign Ministers’ Conference, 3, 14, 75, 103, 109, 113 Forrestal, James, 18–19, 31 Foster, William, 174 France, 1, 32, 70, 72–74, 79, 83, 90, 102, 104, 113, 125–126, 139, 191 Friedberg, Aaron, 25–29, 34, 36–37 Gaither, H. Rowan, 171–172 Gallup polls, 37, 55, 128–129, 187, 208 Garrison state, 4, 7, 12–13, 24–28, 30, 34, 38–39, 41, 44, 56, 62, 118, 142, 144, 174, 207, 212, 214 Gates, Tom, 219 General Dynamics, 202 General Electric, 29 General Motors, 202 Geneva Accords, 147 Geneva summit, 1, 5, 8, 44, 71, 75, 77–79, 85, 87–88, 90, 94, 102, 104, 106, 108–109, 111, 113, 115, 117–119, 121, 123, 125, 127, 129, 131, 133, 135–136, 155, 213 Germany, 3, 6, 13–14, 18, 32, 47, 50–51, 63, 70–74, 78, 80–82, 89–90, 93, 102, 104, 106, 113–114, 126, 131, 134, 193, 216 Gilpatric, Roswell, 174 Gittenger, Ted, 149 Goodpaster, Andrew, 89, 104–105, 115, 118, 120, 176, 181 Gray, Gordon, 118 Greece, 36, 51, 71 Greenland, 210 GRIT, 202 Groves, Leslie, 18 Gruenther, Alfred, 19, 105, 154 Guatemala, 65 Hagerty, James, 62, 120 Hammarskjold, Dag, 46 Harriman, Averell, 198–199, 205

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COLD WAR A RMS R ACE Harvard University, 33, 139 Hearst, William J., 162 Hiroshima, 6 Ho Chi Minh, 147 Hobby, Oveta Culp, 164 Hoffman, Paul, 35 Hollister, John, 152 Hoover, Herbert Jr., 85, 88, 118, 152 House Foreign Affairs Committee, 35 Hughes, Emmet John, 47, 201 Humphrey, George, 55, 57, 59, 85, 97, 152 Hungary, 14, 51, 63 IBM, 202 Illinois University, 163 India, 59, 64, 86, 90, 147, 196–198 Indochina, 47, 70, 79, 149 Intercontinental ballistic missiles, 16, 165 Intermediate range ballistic missiles, 67, 183 International Affairs, 161 International Development Advisory Board, 145 International Geophysical Year, 129–130 International Security: The Military Aspect, 163–164, 168 Iran, 14, 51, 65, 194 Iraq, 167, 194 Jackson, C.D , 46, 64, 66, 86, 88–89, 101, 201 Jackson, Henry, 143–144, 157, 173–174, 190 Japan, 6, 13, 97–98, 113, 136, 144 Johnson, Ellis, 88–89, 91, 154, 164, 168, 170 Johnson, Joseph E., 93 Johnson, Louis, 17 Johnson, Lyndon B., 146, 150, 156, 174, 190–194 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 45, 57–58, 87, 115, 118, 121–123, 127, 180, 192–195, 205, 219

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INDEX Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 143 Joint Research and Development Board, 129 Kaliningrad, 131 Kasputin Yar, 175 Kennan, George, 17 Kennedy, John F., 10, 96, 143, 145, 150, 156, 170–171, 174, 182, 189–190, 194–198, 200, 207–208, 210–212 Kennedy, Robert, 182 Keyserling, Leon, 22 Khrushchev, Nikita attitude toward Open Skies, 2, 106, 112, 125, 135, 210 attitude towards the West and the United States, 161–162, 186 becomes first secretary of the Communist Party, 81 Berlin, 63, 82, 191–192, 194 claims concerning Soviet missile capabilities, 161–162, 175, 205, 210, 217 correspondence with Eisenhower, 109, 133–134, 177–179 Geneva summit, 2, 83, 103, 106 London Disarmament Conference, 125–126 Soviet economy, 81, 134 Soviet space and missile achievements, 161–162 visit to the US, 209 Khrushchev, Sergei, 134 Killian, James, 66, 68–69, 116, 120, 138–139, 164, 170, 175, 181, 201, 203–204 Kintner, William, 87, 138, 154 Kissinger, Henry, 139, 148, 164, 166–168, 170, 201 Kistiakowsky, George, 181 Knowland, William, 110 Korean War, 27, 37, 39, 57, 90, 134, 150 Kurchatov, Igor, 18 Kuznetsov, Vassily, 210

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281

Lamphier, Thomas, 29 Land, Edwin, 19, 62, 67, 73, 183, 204 Laos, 59, 65, 79, 147 Lasswell, Harold, 7, 12–13, 24–25, 28, 30, 142, 212 Latin America, 64, 86, 145–146, 151, 155 LeBaron, Robert, 17 LeMay, Curtis, 18, 31 Life, 164, 201 Lilienthal, David, 17 Lincoln, George, 139, 148, 164, 169, 171 Linebarger, Paul, 88 Livermore, Roy, 154 Lockheed, 29, 67–68, 202 Lockwood, John, 200 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 108, 111, 127 London and Paris Agreements, 74 Longley-Cook, Eric, 17 Loosbrock, John, 116 Los Alamos, 17 Luce, Henry, 164, 201 Luxembourg, 72 MacArthur, Douglas, 104 MacMillan, Harold, 102, 104 Malenkov, Georgi, 45–46, 81–82 Manhattan Project, 6, 18, 157 Martin, 29 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 30, 66, 119, 152, 170 Massive retaliation, 9, 38, 55–56, 58, 63, 122, 134–137, 139, 141, 143, 145, 147–151, 153, 155–157, 160, 167, 170, 172–173, 182–183, 218 May, Stacy, 139 McCarthy, Joseph, 39, 110, 209 McCone, John, 219 McCormack, James, 164, 169 McElroy, Neil, 181, 190, 193, 195, 205–206 McNeil, Wilfred, 57, 59, 116 Merchant, Livinston, 81, 104–105 Mid-Century Challenge to US Foreign Policy, The, 164

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282

EISENHOWER

AND THE

COLD WAR A RMS R ACE

Middle East, 14, 151, 155, 202, 215 Millikan, Max, 88, 140, 142–145, 147, 156, 164–165, 170 Millikin, Eugene, 110 Minsk, 131 Missile Gap, 61, 98, 131, 143, 157, 174, 189–192, 194–197, 219 Missiles and Rockets, 180 Moby Dick, 130 Molotov, Vyacheslav, 14, 45, 70, 80, 82, 113 Montgomery, Bernard, 51 Mosely, Phillip, 88, 164, 170 Murphy, Charles, 22 Mutual Security Act, 35 Mutual Security Agency, 35, 38

NSC 68, 19–23, 31, 33, 36, 38, 54, 150, 185 NSC 141, 39 NSC 1513, 111–112 NSC 5524, 103 NSC 162, 44, 53, 56, 58–59, 69, 71, 149 Nutting, Anthony, 119

Nagasaki, 6 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 181 National Review, The, 199 National Security Council, 2, 17, 40, 44–45, 49, 53, 55–59, 61, 65, 67, 83, 85, 90, 100, 102, 111, 114–115, 117, 122–123, 170, 174, 183 Netherlands, 72, 74 New Look, The, 3–7, 9, 42–45, 47, 49, 51–57, 59–61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 75, 108, 115, 137, 158, 188–189, 196, 214, 216 New York Herald Tribune, The, 110, 201 New York Post, The, 199 New York Times, The, 24, 123, 128, 168, 174 Nitze, Paul, 15, 17, 19, 21–22, 38, 58, 171, 174 Nixon, Richard, 96, 111, 152, 181, 199–201, 205 Nizhnyaya Tura, 175 Norstad, Lauris, 154 North Africa, 66 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 21–22, 40, 81 North Vietnam, 65, 73, 147–148 Novosibirsk, 175

Parker, Ted, 87–89, 154 Patterson, Robert, 33 Pentagon, 21, 26, 169 Pettee, George, 88–89, 148 Pinay, Antoine, 102 Planning Co-ordination Group, 86–88 Planning Policy Staff, 15 Point IV Programme, 145 Poland, 14, 51, 130–131 Polaris missiles, 184–185, 202 Possony, Stefan, 88–89, 156 Potsdam Conference, 1, 74, 77, 191 Power, Thomas, 180 Powers, Gary, 210 Pravda, 33 Preparedness Investigating Sub-committee, 190 Preparedness Sub-committee, 168 Princeton University, 163 Project Aquatone, 68 Project Solarium, 53 Project Vanguard, see also Satellites, 129 Prospect for America, 163, 168 Psychological Warfare, 7, 44, 46, 63–65, 75, 86, 97, 155, 213 Pursuit of Excellence: Education and the Future of America, 168

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Office for Defense Mobilization, 95 Omsk, 175 Open Skies, 2–6, 8–9, 76, 78, 84, 86, 100–101, 105–106, 109–112, 125–126, 128, 133, 135, 169, 178, 180, 186, 206, 209, 212, 216–218 Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 17

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INDEX Quantico panel I, 78–79, 84, 86, 88, 93, 95, 98, 101–102 Quantico panel II, 97, 139, 141, 144, 150, 152, 154 Quantico panel III, 95, 111, 154–158 Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel Report, 88, 90 Quarles, Donald, 61, 204 Quemoy-Matsu, 63 Radford, Arthur, 57, 61, 99, 105, 115, 118, 121–124, 141 Radio Free Europe, 64, 86 Rame-Wooldridge Corporation, 203 RAND Corporation, 16, 88, 116, 214 Republican Party, 43, 97, 157, 189, 198, 200–201 Reston, James, 93, 110 Richards, James P. , 35 Richardson Foundation, 154 Rickover, Henry, 208 Ridgeway, Matthew, 57, 114, 122 Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 163 Rockefeller Foundation, 163 Rockefeller, Nelson appointment to the post of special assistant to the president, 86 attitude towards the Soviet Union, 86, 90–91, 93, 96 elected as governor of New York State, 198–199 foreign aid, 98, 146 formation of the Quantico panel, 8, 36, 78–79, 86–88 formulation of Open Skies, 84, 86, 94, 98–101, 125 Quantico panel I, 78–79, 84, 86, 88, 93, 95, 98, 101–102 Quantico panel II, 97, 136, 139, 141, 144, 150, 152, 154 Quantico panel III, 95, 154–158 relations with Eisenhower, 100, 152–153, 200 relations with John F. Kennedy, 189, 198

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resignation from the government, 152 seeks presidential nomination, 199 Special Studies Project, 157, 160, 163–165, 168–171, 193 support for Open Skies, 94–95, 98–100, 102, 105, 125, 137, 141 Rostow, Walt attitude toward the Geneva summit, 90, 111 attitude toward military budgets, 94, 136 attitude toward Open Skies, 78, 101 foreign aid for the Third World, 144–147, 196–197 Quantico panel I, 1, 88–90, 156 relations with John F. Kennedy, 171, 196–197 Special Studies Project, 164–165 views on Eisenhower, 145, 151 views on massive retaliation, 149 views on the Soviet Union, 90, 92, 94, 119, 142 withdrawal from Quantico panel II, 140 Rowny, Edward, 154 Romania, 51 Rumsfeld, Donald, 167 Rusk, Dean, 164, 168–170, 197 Russell, Richard, 190 Samsun, 175 Sary Shagan, 175 Science Advisory Committee, 117 Security Resources Panel, 171–173 Senate Armed Services Committee, 190 Senate Disarmament sub-committee, 128 Smith, Harold, 18 South Korea, 23, 71 South Vietnam, 144, 147–148 Soviet Union, 1–3, 5–6, 10–11, 14–15, 18, 32, 44–45, 60–61, 79–81, 83, 89–91, 102, 105, 112–113, 125–128, 130–132, 134, 139, 147, 161, 172, 175, 178, 186, 190, 192, 206, 208, 210, 217–219

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284

EISENHOWER

AND THE

Spaak, Paul Henri, 110 Spaatz, Carl, 122 Spain, 113 Special Studies Project, 36, 95, 137, 153, 155, 157, 160, 163–165, 167–171, 174, 177, 193, 197–198, 214 Speier, Hans, 88, 139 Sperry, 203 Sprague, Robert, 172–174 Sputnik, 9, 120, 129, 159–163, 165, 167–169, 171, 173–177, 179–181, 183, 185–187, 191, 194, 208 Stalin, Josef, 14, 21, 45–46, 50–51, 65, 71, 82, 117, 134 Stanton, Frank, 174 Stassen, Harold, 83–84, 89–90, 100–102, 104–105, 123, 125–128, 138, 152 State Department, 82, 88 Strategic Air Command, 16, 116, 165 Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee, 117 Streibert, Ted, 118, 138 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), 154 Sverdlovsk, 175, 210 Symington, Stuart, 29, 174, 190, 192–194 Taft, Robert, 36, 44 Taiwan, 64, 113 Taxation, 85, 215 Taylor, Maxwell, 121–122, 182, 193 Technological Capabilities Panel, 58, 66, 138, 162, 164, 214 Teller, Edward, 17, 164–166, 169, 201 The Nation, 180 Thomas, Charles, 29, 180, 184, 204 Thompson, Llewellyn, 210 Thomson, Charles, 88, 139, 155 Time magazine, 128, 185 Times, The, 2 Tito, Josip, 114 Today Show, 168 Toledo Blade Pictorial, 128 Truman Doctrine, 36

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COLD WAR A RMS R ACE Truman, Harry S. , 8, 14–19, 22–24, 27, 31, 33–37, 39–40, 86, 97–98, 117, 145, 150, 152 Twining, Nathan, 121, 175, 186, 190, 192–193, 195 U2, 8, 67–69, 108–109, 125, 130–131, 158, 160, 175–180, 187, 190, 205–207, 210–211, 215–216, 218–219 U2 shot down, 210 UN Economic Commission for Europe, 119 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, 14, 127 United Nations Disarmament Commission, 8, 108 United Nations General Assembly, 52, 119, 124, 211 United Nations Security Council, 2, 17, 49, 83, 170 United States Air Force, 16–17, 67–68, 115–116, 177, 186, 192, 194, 203 United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 171 United States atomic bomb, 6–7, 13–15 United States Information Agency, 89, 127 United States Navy, 16–17, 45, 58, 116, 129, 184, 195 United States News and World Report, 186 United States Senate, 34, 44, 110, 128, 143, 145, 173, 190, 194–195, 197 Universal Military Service, 26, 34, 37 University of California, 164 Urals, 130–131, 175, 179 USSR (see also the Soviet Union), 2, 45, 69, 91, 98, 118, 125, 141, 165, 185, 198 Vandenberg, Arthur, 52 Vietminh, 70, 73, 149 Vietnam, 40, 59, 65, 70, 73, 79, 144–148, 212, 214

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INDEX Vilnius, 131 Voorhees, Tracy S, 33–35 Washington Post, The, 153, 157, 166, 174 Webster, William, 139, 171 West Germany, 71–74, 80–81, 102, 113, 134, 193, 216 Western Europe, 7, 15, 20–23, 33–34, 40, 55, 58, 62, 64, 71–72, 84, 94, 141, 148–150, 163, 167, 170, 215 Western European Union, 74, 216

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White, Thomas, 204 Whitney, George, 72 Wilson, Charles, 57–59, 61, 116, 118, 123, 141, 176, 183–184 Wisconsin University, 163 Wolstetter, Albert, 172 Wright Air Development Command, 130 Yalta Conference, 77 Zhukov, Georgi, 50, 103, 106, 110

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