Egypt for the Egyptians!: the socio-political crisis in Egypt, 1878-1882 9780903729826

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Egypt for the Egyptians!

Egypt for the Egyptians! The Socio-political Crisis in Egypt 1878-1882

Alexander Scholch

Published for the Middle East Centre St Antony’s College Oxford Ithaca Press London 1981

St Antony's Middle East Monographs No. 14

translated from the German Agypten den Agyptern: Die politische und gesellschaftliche Krise den Jahre 1878-1881 in Agypten published by Atlantis Verlag Germany & Switzerland © Atlantis Verlag Dr Martin Hurlimann, Freiburg in Br

First English edition published in 1981 by Ithaca Press 13 Southwark Street London SE1 for The Middle East Centre St Antony's College Oxford ISBN O 903729 822 Printed in England by Anchor Press Ltd and bound by

Wm Brendon & Sons Ltd

both of Tiptree Essex

For my Mother,

and to the memory of my Father and my brother Karl

FOREWORD

Ever since Alexander Schdich's book was published in German in 1972, it has been recognized as a work of major importance on

one of the central themes of nineteenth-century history, the expansion of British economic and political power in the world, and its first clashes with the peoples over which it was exercised. It is therefore a pleasure to welcome this English translation, which will make it available to more readers. The book shows well how what seems to be a well known his-

torical theme can be illuminated by an author who is able to exploit hitherto unused materials, and who asks new questions of them. Until the last ten years, the best known books on the British occupation of Egypt were still Lord Cromer's Modern Egypt and Wilfrid Scawen Blunt's Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt, both of them primarily concerned from very

different points of view with British responsibilities, both seeing Egypt, inescapably, from outside, and later authors relied heavily on them. Egyptian historians of an earlier generation, with ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi‘i at their head, tried to describe the process from within, from the point of view of an Egypt the direction of whose life was deflected by the imposition of foreign control, but they lacked the documentation, and the categories of historical interpretation, which would enable them fully to explain what had happened.

Dr Sch6lch is the first historian to have made full use of the sources without which what happened in Egypt during the years leading up to the occupation cannot be understood: mat-

erials in the Egyptian archives, mainly collected in preparation for the trials of ‘Urabi and his associates, French and German as well as British consular reports, and a large number of contemporary memoirs and histories. He has used them in tne

first instance to cast light not on the motives for or the process of British intervention, but on the rapidly changing situation inside Egypt which made it possible. He sets his story clearly within a framework of social and economic change.

The cultivation on a large scale of cotton for export had by

villi FOREWORD the 1870s created two classes eager to ensure that the government would be of such a nature as to protect and advance their interests: those who owned or otherwise controlled cottonbearing land—the ruling family, the Turco-Circassian aristocracy of service around it, and the indigenous landowners, the ‘country notables', who formed part of the social but not the

political @lite; and those engaged in the export of cotton, the import of manufactured goods, and the financing of trade, most of them belonging to foreign or local Christian and Jewish communities.

Dr Schédlch distinguishes two phases in the struggle between

different powerful groups to control the government. In the first, ending in 1880, the main actors were the Khedive, accustomed to absolute power and trying to preserve it, the TurcoCircassian official @lite, and European interests articulated by the consuls. In this phase there was no genuine national movement: a group of Turco-Circassians temporarily out of power used the language of nationalism to criticize excessive European influence over the Khedive, some indigenous army officers expressed their own grievances but were so far untouched by more general national aspirations, and that was all. For a moment, the government of Riyad Pasha seemed to have achieved a kind of balance between the forces in presence, but beneath the surface something had changed. Foreign intervention in the process of government had brought about a change

in the composition of the political @lite: the army officers moved towards the centre of political life, and became increasingly the spokesmen for some kind of constitutional rule which would ensure that the government would concern itself with general national interests; the indigenous landowners also wanted a constitution, both to preserve their own interests and because they too had a certain view of what Egypt should

be; the ideas of both groups were articulated by ‘intellectuals' of the old kind and the new, ‘“ulama’ and journalists, powerless in themselves but capable of mobilizing popular support. The constitution was promulgated, the Chamber met, dominated by the landowners, and a new political order seemed to be emerging, one of moderate reform, not of revolution or. of

serious threats to essential European interests. Once more a balance seemed to have been reached, but it was too precarious to be maintained. The dominant coalition of forces was fragile:

FOREWORD ix different groups had different interests, and no stable leadership emerged. At the same time, there were other forces in the country which wished to upset the new order before it could be fully installed. The Khedive wanted to bring matters to a head, and to compel foreign intervention, for preference that of the Ottoman Sultan; some of the foreign consuls, merchants and officials wanted intervention by a European power. The crisis of authority inside Egypt tended to draw external powers in. The Sultan at first wavered, but finally came down on the side of the Khedive; the British government also seemed

to hesitate, but its instinct for power led it in the direction of armed intervention. The bombardment of Alexandria, which Dr Schd6lch shows to have been a deliberate act of British pol-

icy designed to precipitate a crisis at a favourable moment, set off a train of events which shattered the fragile coalition and polarized Egyptian society. On one side stood the Sultan, the Khedive, most of the Turco-Circassians, the foreign merchants and many of the large indigenous landowners; on the other were the army officers, most of the ‘umdas, many of the government officials, and the ‘ulama’, supported by a wave of popular feeling, aroused by appeals to patriotism within an Ottoman Islamic framework, and by the hope of an end to the

crushing indebtedness of the peasants. This coalition was not able to create an effective military resistance to the British invasion, but—as Dr Schd6lch shows in one of the most original parts of his book—it was able to maintain orderly administra-

tion, in the hands of a council of high officials: law and order did not collapse, foreign lives and property were not in danger, although in some places popular anger expressed itself against the Levantine money~lenders,the natural targets of

peasant hostility. *‘Urabi appears in this book as a reluctant and rather ineffective hero: never a dictator, not in control of the machinery of government, at times indecisive and at others stubborn, almost in spite of himself turned into a symbol of national

hopes. While in exile after the occupation, he lived on for a time in the minds of villagers, 'moving further and further from the earthly sphere into a world of heroes and magicians,

no longer a politician but a mythic symbol of liberation’, but he was almost forgotten before he died. Nevertheless, the failed movement with which his name is associated forms one of

x FOREWORD "the historical roots of contemporary Egyptian selfperception’, the second of what Egyptians today would regard

as their four national revolutions.

Oxford 1981 Albert Hourani

PREFACE

The present study was accepted as a doctoral dissertation by the University of Heidelberg in spring 1972 and published in the same year by Atlantis Verlag (Zurich and Freiburg i.Br.) with the title Agypten den Agyptern: Die politische und gesellschaftliche Krise der Jahre 1878-1882 in Agypten. After nine months of research in Cairo (1968-9), I wrote this thesis at St. Antony's College, Oxford, during the years 1969-71. I would like to express once more my sincere gratitude to Rudolf von Albertini (Zurich) and to Albert Hourani (Oxford) who assisted my work with their advice and support and with unfailing encouragement, and to Fritz Steppat (Berlin) who contributed to the improvement of the German manuscript immediately before

printing. My thanks are also due to all those who made possible the publication of this English edition, above all to INTER NATIONES (Bonn) who financed the translation, to Derek Hopwood, Anthony Nicholls and Robert Mabro of St. Antony's College, and to Susan and Jonathan Osmond.

The book has been translated into English without previous

alterations to the German text. For this reason, the bibliography has also been left as it stood in 1971. Only some of my own articles which have since appeared have been added. For financial reasons, however, the notes had to be drastically cut; of 1,576 notes, only 398 remain, mainly those giving the sources of quotations and of statements on particularly contro-

versial matters, as well as the biographical notices. It is not easy for an author to renounce the full presentation of his evidence; but here this seemed to be justified since in instances of doubt, the interested reader can always consult the more complete documentation in the original German edition. The fact that an English translation of the unrevised German

text is presented here needs to be explained, as this is not Just a case of indolence. Without doubt, I would not write this book today in the way I wrote it nearly ten years ago. Many passages seem to be capable of improvement. But I think

X1il PREFACE I may say that neither the reviews I have seen, nor relevant studies which have appeared since, compel me to correct essen-

tial statements or interpretations. I would like to take up one point, however. Two Middle East experts in East Germany, who reviewed my study rather kindly,

nevertheless criticized the fact that 'the theoretical penetration of the material is not fully satisfactory’ (M. Robbe), and that it had 'not always been undertaken with the necessary

consistency' (L. Rathmann). I readily accept this criticism, although I certainly do not mean the same thing by ‘theoretical penetration’ as these two reviewers. But after having taught the history of the Middle East in the nineteenth and twentieth

centuries for several years, I would be less hesitant today in embedding the Egyptian crisis dealt with in the overall development of the Middle East during that period of aggressive European expansion. (I have recently tried a more theoretical approach ina paper entitled 'The Formation of a Peripheral State: Egypt 1854-1882' which I prepared for a conference on nineteenth-century Egypt to be held under the auspices of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Aix-en-Provence in June 1979.)

In part, however, this is merely a problem of terminology or of point of view. I would also suggest that immersion in the wealth of documents, and the attempt to structure this period of crisis from inside, might have been less dangerous for the adequate reconstruction of details than an attempt to structure it from outside. Nevertheless, I regard this study, even though the explicit theoretical yield may not be overwhelming, as at least a contribution towards a comprehensive analysis of the development

of the Middle East. I also hope that it helps towards an understanding of that authentic Egypt which ‘Urabi embodied and for which I developed deep sympathies in the course of my research.

April 1979 Alexander Schdlch

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1 The Category of Rule 9 The Ruling Class ll The quasi-sovereign and his suzerain The autocrat and his advisory bodies Ll 13

THE STRUCTURE OF EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘SIL 9

The economic position ofruling the autocrat 18 The non-autonomous élite 21 The economic position of the dhawat 26

Minorities 36 Concluding Remarks 40 The Autochthonous Notables 28

The Situation of the Fallahin and the Role of the

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CRISIS OF 1878-82 Chapter One: THF DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL

Financial ruin 43 ORDER THROUGH EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 43

The Khedive's Loss of Power 43 The ‘European’ creditors' grip on Egypt 48 The government 54

Nubar's fall 63

Isma‘*il's Vain Attempt to Return to Power 63 Isma*‘il and the officers' demonstration:

Isma‘il and the Chamber of Delegates (1876-9) 73

Isma*‘il and the La’iha-Wataniya: the fall of

the 'European' government 85 The deposing of Isma‘*il 93 The Dhawat are Deprived of their Political and

Economic Power 99 government 99 The establishment of a new collaborationist

The press 108 La Jeune Egypte 112 and fallahin 114

The silencing of the intellectual opposition 104

Jamal al-Din ‘al-Afghani' 104

The end of privileges: reforms for creditors The suppression of the dhawat's opposition: the

120 AHilwan New Group Era? 130

Xiv CONTENTS

GROUPS 135 The Army The Year Beaconofofthe Qasr al-Nil135 135

Chapter Two: EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS — THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW ORDER BY AUTOCHTHONOUS SOCIAL

fallah officers 153 common aim 160

The army, Tawfigq, and the Riyad government 143

The alliance of the provincial notables with the Hukuma shuriya ‘adila: the enforcement of the

The Porte and the events in Egypt 172

of a popular hero188 177 Quo vadis? the People 194 Ahmad ‘Urabi al-Husaini al-Misri: the birth

The Provincial Notables as Representatives of The establishment of a new constitutional order

and the opposition of the control powers 194 The politics of the Chamber of Delegates 215

Chapter Three: THE LIQUIDATION OF THE NEW ORDER 226

The 'Circassian Conspiracy' 226

Egypt Faced by Military Intervention 231 The Sultan, Halim and the ‘Urabiyin 244

Egypt at War 258 Tawfiq or ‘Urabi? The Majlis al-‘Urfi 258 273

The Egyptians at war292 281 The bitter end An Unworthy Epilogue 303

NOTES 316 SOURCES 360

CONCLUSIONS 306

THE PRESIDENTS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 375 THE SESSIONS OF THE CHAMBER OF DELEGATES 375

NAMES OF PERSONS INDEX 376

SUBJECT INDEX 385 MAP: Lower Egypt 124 MAP: Egypt 251

INTRODUCTION

Until 1952, Egyptian historians, Fu’ad's court historiographers in particular, perceived and wrote the history of their country essentially as a dynastic history. Since the revolution of 23 July, the events of the preceding century and a half have been reinterpreted as the history of futile attempts of the Egyptian people, i.e. of its fallah majority, to overcome misery and oppression and to shake off the yoke of 'feudalism' and colonialism, and in ‘Umar Makram, Ahmad ‘Urabi, Sa‘d Zaghlul and Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir it found its leaders.

Stress is laid above all on the ‘'revolutions' with which the names of the three last-named leaders are connected: al-thawra al-‘urabiya, thawra 1919, thawra 23 yulyu. As the

events of 1952 are thus seen as the fulfilment of aspirations which had lasted for a hundred and fifty years, historical continuity and revolutionary legitimacy are beyond all doubt. The fall of the monarchy was regarded as the consummation of ‘Urabi's struggle which had foundered seventy years previously. Six months after the 1952 revolution, Muhammad Najib evoked ‘Urabi's spirit when he shouted to the crowd assembled in Midan al-Tahrir the same words which ‘Urabi had allegedly hurled against Khedive Tawfiq on 9 September 1881 in the Midan ‘Abdin

(which is to be seen from the Midan al-Tahrir): 'No, we are no longer slaves and from this day on we shall not be

inheritable!'! Since then, historical interest has centred upon the ‘great revolutions'. When the initial problem of legitimacy and continuity had been solved, a more thorough

analysis could be initiated. It preserved the pattern of the four ‘revolutions': 1798-1805, 1881-1882, 1919-1924, 1952. Leading Egyptian historians concluded that 'the revolution of

1952 is the result of an irresistible development of Egyptian history in particular and of Arab history in general'.? The endeavour to reinterpret national history did not immediately result in a systematic search of the archives — which

until then had been open above all to those ready to contribute to the glorification of the reigning dynasty —in order to

2 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS reconstruct a picture aS exact as possible of that 'great national ‘Urabi Revolution' with which we are here concerned.

The first two important studies’ of this event still had to be content with source material gathered from books, newspapers and official publications. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi‘i could pub-

lish his biography of ‘Urabi only after the revolution of 1952, as Farug had confiscated it shortly before.* More recent studies, however, still rely on al-Rafi‘i. Ahmad ‘Abd al-Rahim Mustafa’ made extensive use of the material in British and French archives only; he was mainly interested in the international aspects of the Egyptian crisis—inthe antithesis of nationalism and imperialism. Rif‘at al-Sa‘tid® merely tried to give a Marxist interpretation to the facts as they were known. A detailed and exhaustive Egyptian study of the origins and the character of the thawra al-‘urabiya, based on the material in the Egyptian archives, has still to be written. In Europe and the United States as well, no full study of this period going beyond a diplomatic or military history has been published. In 1962, this fact was pointed out by Robert L. Tignor who stimulated future research by publishing a survey of available source material.’ The few articles which have appeared since then, however, drew only to a very limited extent on untapped sources and thus were hardly able to enlarge our knowledge. The treasures of the Egyptian archives remained untouched, and no new questions were formulated by those who made use of the European documents. The present study intends

to fill this historiographical gap. The nine months which the author was able to spend in Cairo, however, were not sufficient to study all the relevant material kept in the Dar al-Kutub and the Dar al-Watha’iq. More exhaustive research was undertaken in the Public Record Office, in the French and German Foreign Ministries and in the libraries of Paris, London and Oxford. The formal aim of making use of new sources was, of course,

determined by the subject matter itself. It was not intended to make another contribution to diplomatic history, to the history of financial imperialism or to the history of the British Empire. Direct and indirect European intervention was taken into account as a challenge and a driving force without discussing the origins and aims of British, French, Austrian or German policy towards Egypt. In the present study, this intervention is understood as a catalyst for the internal develop-

INTRODUCTION 3 ment of Egypt.

It will be attempted to perceive the events of the years 1878-82 as a political and social crisis, to search —beyond the catalyst — for the internal roots of this crisis, to describe the aims of social groups pressing for reforms and to determine the character of changes they effected. In this sense we are only concerned with the Egyptian side of events, although the effects of European policies will not be underestimated. Accordingly, European archives were searched mainly for background information on Egyptian politics and society con-

tained in consular reports. The material of the Foreign Office proved to be the most useful. Because of a network of local consular agents, such as Mustafa Agha, the Shaikh al-Balad of Luxor who was well-known to every visitor to Upper Egypt, or the Cairene Vice-Consul Raphael Borg who had special sources of information through his leading role in Egyptian freemasonry, British representatives were generally better informed about

the affairs of the country than their colleagues. Among the European documents we thus looked for texts of laws and decrees,

for statistical information and protocols of meetings of various political bodies, for local newspapers or newspaper cuttings, for manifestos and memoranda by Egyptian politicians

aS political groups and for reports on conversations held between the consuls and Egyptian public figures. The information provided by the German and Austrian consuls was helpful as a control on the reports of the French and British consuls who

were more directly interfering in Egyptian politics. Apart from the Phare d'Alexandrie, no newspapers were con-

sulted in Cairo. What remains of the Egyptian press of that period has been used frequently by historians. There exist, moreover, published collections of articles by many contempor-

ary journalists.® The press of that time is anyway less important for its daily news than as a vehicle for the propagation of political and social ideas. We may be confident that from the material used, we have arrived at an accurate understanding of the political lines of the various papers. Very frequently, the two official gazettes will be cited, the Moniteur Egyptien and al-Waqa’i‘ al-Misriya. The Moniteur is quoted from the copies in the Dar al-Watha’iq which are arranged by subject. The material consulted in the Dar al-Watha’iq relates above

4 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS all to the period from January 1881 to September 1882, with which the name of *Urabi is linked. European authors variously

characterize these events as revolt, rebellion, insurrection, revolution or movement. In Egypt, the term al-thawra

al-‘urabiya is generally accepted. The use of a particular term depends, of course, on one's interpretation. Our choice can, only be made when we have established the real character of the events of those two years. It makes no sense, however, to name the whole period of

crises in Egypt, from the late 1870s to 1882, after ‘Urabi, as he only made his public appearance early in 1881. To restrict the investigation to a 'movement' of ‘Urabi would mean severely to restrict one's view and to misunderstand what was happening. It can only be asked what role ‘Urabi and his followers among

the officers really played during that period. It could be objected that an investigation of the Egyptian crisis should begin with the purchase of Isma‘il's Suez Canal Shares by the British government and the agreement on the establishment of the Caisse de la Dette Publique and of the Dual Control in 1876. But a detailed study of the events of these two or three years would not contribute very much to the understanding of the internal socio-political problems of Egypt, as they were above all characterized by endless financial negotiations and nearly inextricable financial problems, the effects of which Egyptian society did not yet fully feel. We start our investigation with the year 1878 when Egyptian society was becoming fully conscious of the situation and also

had the opportunity of reacting to it. We hope that the present study will contribute to the understanding of present-day Egypt by laying bare one of the historical roots of contemporary Egyptian self-perception. But shall

we be able to understand these events, set in the socio-

cultural environment of the Muslim East, in such a way that our

account will not be regarded as superficial or distorted? To surmount this difficulty, several authors regarded as helpful a long sojourn in Egypt, living in the country and with the country, becoming familiar with its geography and topography,

with its rhythm of life, with the ideas and lines of thought of its people, through permanent contacts and talks with members

of different professions and social classes. In this sense, our own experience has provided a concrete background, but it

INTRODUCTION 3) is to be feared that we are not yet sufficiently immersed in Egypt.

To avoid misunderstandings we could and should at least employ a clear and unequivocal terminology. This is, of

course, a general necessity for scholars: ‘'Terminological uncertainties have the same effect on research as fog has on shipping. They are the more dangerous as people are usually unaware of their existence'.? Unfortunately, it has to be said that many of the writings on nineteenth-century Egypt sail in this terminological fog. In most cases this is due to a thoughtless application of political terms which developed in the historical context of Europe and North America to the situ-

ation in Egypt.

But how can we understand and compare if we do not use terms to which we are accustomed? It makes no sense to shut our-

selves up in a hermeneutical circle. We have to find terms which up to a certain extent are transferable, and we have to avoid a terminology which only brings about misunderstandings and under- or over-estimation of historical phenomena. Landau,

for instance, exposed himself to this danger by representing various interest groups as parties and by precipitately speak-

ing of the introduction of ministerial responsibility, partly Owing to an uncritical acceptance of contemporary European

terminological usage, partly owing to over-interpretation.?? A direct transference of terms which denote specific Euro-

pean political ideas and institutions is often misleading. However, we do not want merely to describe the outward appearance Of political phenomena and the actual working of political

institutions, but to carry out an analysis. This will be done under the aspect of constitutionalism in the very general meaning of a ‘political structure characterized by division of power' with which Loewenstein uses the term.!! The leitmotiv of our discussion of the socio-political development will thus be the dichotomy of monopolized and divided exercise of power. Many authors' use of the term revolution in connection with the history of Egypt during the years 1878-82 is also somewhat

confusing. Whether, and in what respect, there was a revolution in the sense of a ‘historically significant, sudden break with tradition and with the past', a "far-reaching transformation of political, social or economic conditions ina relatively short time',’? can only be discussed at the end of

6 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS our study. The task is made more difficult by the fact that the term revolution generally is connected with the notion of success. Even more confused than the terminology of revolution is the

careless designation of various social and political phenomena aS nationalism, national movement or national party. Admitted-

ly it would be difficult to find an abstract definition of nationalism or of the nation which would be universally

accepted: 'There are as many definitions as authors'.!? Thus nation is a term which in Europe developed historically in the context of the process of secularization, while in the Arab and Muslim sphere, the religious factor played an important part. There was also no agreement among Arab thinkers about the geo-

graphical base. Moreover, the idea of the nation not only gained shape in the framework of movements of unification or

secession, but above all during the resistance to direct and indirect economic exploitation and political tutelage by European powers. An attempt must be made, therefore, to distinguish between different phenomena in the Egypt of those years which are often indiscriminately labelled 'nationalism': Isma‘il's striving for independence, his imperial dreams, his attempt to resist European intervention with the help of a

‘national party'; genuine Egyptian patriotism; the 'quasinational' ideas'* of a pan-Arab socio-cultural risorgimento; pan-Islamic thought based on the religious authority of the Sultan; secularist endeavours to strengthen the Ottoman Empire in the East as a whole against the European danger. These ideas often overlapped, and sometimes they were adopted at the same time by one and the same person. He who hopes to say everything by denoting all these hopes, aims and ideas as

nationalism, in reality will say nothing. Finally, the outline of this study needs to be explained. It was first thought necessary to present a detailed description of the ideological basis and of the socio-economic

structure of Egypt on the eve of the political and social crisis we are analysing. We have refrained, however, from beginning with a theoretical chapter on political order in

Islamic thought. On the one hand, there is no specific political philosophy, theory or ethics in Islam. We would thus have had to give a survey of Islamic philosophy (or rather theology)

on the basis of orientalist literature. On the other hand,

INTRODUCTION 7 such a chapter would have remained rather unconnected with the

main part of this study. As far as the system of government is concerned, the theological and philosophical discussion is confined to a reinterpretation of the classic Islamic principles of political order as they have been recalled since the midnineteenth century by referring to the ‘golden age' of the

first four caliphs. There is no absolute rule; rulers and ruled are both subject to the Shari‘a. As long as the stipulations of the Shari‘a are observed by the ruler, every Muslim

is obliged to obey him. This obligation ceases if the ruler disregards the Shari‘a; in this case he may be deposed. The subject's consent is needed for the ruler to take office. As the Shari‘a does not provide solutions for ail social and political problems which might arise, the ruler has to consult the learned and the noble (principle of shura). These principles correspond to the basic political principles of the European Middle Ages: the subordination of the

ruler to laws, his obligation to consult the 'meliores et maiores', the right to renounce allegiance to a ruler who breaks the law (the right of resistance).'°* While in Europe several radical breaks in political order had been based on completely different theoretical foundations, in the Islamic Rast it was now attempted to revive the classical principles and thus to reach an equal basis with nineteenth-century Kurope, since the decline of the Islamic East was attributed to the disregard of these principles andthe might and prosperity of Europe to adherence to them. These principles also formed the

theoretical basis of the struggle for political reform during the crisis which preceded the British occupation. It seems that more need not be said for our purpose. We could not, however, renounce a socio-economic Chapter, as

without such an introduction, change and continuity in the socio-political structure of Egypt during the years 1878 to 1882 could not be judged and evaluated appropriately. But this chapter had to remain relatively short. When we began to analyse the problems of the years of crisis, we had expected that the accounts left by those involved in the events would

have to be read very critically and sceptically. However, historical myths and misinterpretations have also been perpetuated

and even accentuated in recent studies. In the main part of the study, it seemed necessary, therefore, to present a rather

8 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS more detailed account of that period than was originally planned on the basis of the new material and of a critical evaluation of the traditional sources. This meant, unfortunately, that the introductory section had to be somewhat curtailed.

THE STRUCTURE OF EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘IL

THE CATEGORY OF RULE

The categories within which we attempt to understand the structure of Egyptian society in the 1860s and 1870s must be determined by the immediate aim of these introductory remarks,

but also, in some degree, by the subject of the study as a whole. The fundamental category will be that of rule. From

power. ,

this it follows that an essential structural characteristic of the society was the distinction between holders and subjects of The first concern will be the composition and function of

the ruling class, then a characterization of the sociopolitical role of an intermediary group between the ruling class and the majority of the population, the 'notables'. Finally mention must be made of the specific functions of the marginal and sub-groups of the society. The economic dimension in the acquisition and strengthening of ruling positions must also be taken into account. An eminent socio-economic position in Egypt was based above all on

large-scale agricultural production. The relatively unimportant processing industry (cotton-ginning and sugar production) was mainly in the hands of the large landowners but the buying and selling of the produce (particularly for the export market) was principally in the hands of European and Levantine traders, who at the same time controlled the import market. The exer-

cise of a function within the ruling class usually led to the acquisition of landed property, but this was not the only means by which wealth of this kind could be acquired and landed property — though itmight give social status and prestige ~— did

not itself signify membership of the ruling class. Thus class structure in a socio-economic sense was not identical with the political power structure. It will be seen that ethnic origin was a decisive determinant

of the composition of the ruling class. Criticism of this fact

10 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS became one of the driving forces in the move towards social change through the opening, extension or even replacement of

this class.

By ‘ruling class' is meant all those persons upon whom were conferred—in rotation, as it were—the most important posit-

ions of power. Within this group anyone could, in principle, undertake any task. Technical or occupational qualifications were not a requirement. Apart from the Viceroy, his family, and princes of other lines of the dynasty, the ruling class is seen to include court officials and personal confidants of the ruler, members of the Majlis Khususi (Privy Council), the most senior officials of the central administrative bodies (dawawin, majalis—ministries, state authorities, higher courts of law), the holders of positions in the military command and senior provincial and 'government' officials (mufattish, mudir,

muhafiz, ma’mur dabtiya). .

There is something to be said for Wittfogel's definition of "ruling class' as including not only the ruler, his court and 'ranking officials' but also '‘underlings'.’ He views the ‘state apparatus' from the standpoint of the 'common man', to whom holders of the most junior positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy—in this case, ‘umdas (village heads), sarrafs (taxcollectors) and katibs (scribes) — appeared as members of the

ruling class. No doubt the petty official himself felt that his position was infinitely superior to that of the ‘common

man', However, if the ruling class, in its present definition, is viewed from the standpoint of its members, the subordinate

officials appear auxiliaries or executive organs. This man-

ifested itself clearly in the fact that tax-collectors and scribes were organized in guilds just as were artisans, merchants and those in the service sector. It may also be assumed that a small ‘umda punished in public with the kurbaj (hippopotamus-hide whip) would hardly appear to the villagers a

representative of the ruling class. Promotion in the bureaucratic hierarchy was not based primarily on performance or experience; more decisive were the personal relationships with the dynasty, and-—closely connected

with this—ethnic origin. In so far as there was, from this point of view, no obstacle to subordinate officials, they were potential members of the ruling class. Officials who exercised their function on the basis of specific technical or admin-

EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘IL 11 istrative ability remained as a rule confined to subordinate positions. Exceptions to this rule will be discussed later. THE RULING CLASS

The quasi-sovereign and ‘his suzerain Before the intervention of European powers in the internal

affairs of the country caused the socio-political order to falter, the Khedive Isma‘il was absolute ruler over the Egyptians, i.e. his personal will was supreme command, and often tne first

and last instance, even in matters of life and death. . He was the fifth ruler* of a foreign dynasty which had established itself in Egypt in the wake of Napoleon's expedition. The status of its founder, Muhammad ‘Ali, had at

first been merely that of a Sultan's wali; but after his successful military actions against his suzerain, the Sultan, in 1831/2 and 1839 and after the Ottoman Empire had twice been saved only through the intervention of the European powers, Egypt was granted extensive autonomy (by the London Convention of 15 July 1840 and the Sultan's firmans of 13 February and 1 June 1841), and Muhammad ‘Ali's family hereditary rule, the succession by seniority. The Sultan, however, imposed various

conditions: the principles of the Hatt-i Serif of Gulhane of 1839 and the international treaties of the Porte were to apply to Egypt as well; all taxes had to be levied and coins minted in the Sultan's name; the Egyptian army must not exceed a peacetime strength, 18,000 men; generals (liwa and fariq) had to be nominated by the Sultan and a yearly tribute had to be

paid to the Porte. Under the first three successors of Muhammad ‘Ali this status of Egypt and its rulers within the Ottoman Empire remained essentially unchanged. However, during the first ten

years of his reign, Isma‘il worked to dismantle these restrictions and thus to extend his own powers. Rather than the kind of military action which Muhammad ‘Ali had employed, Isma‘il preferred diplomatic means as he understood them: money and

gifts to anyone who promised to support his plans in any way, above all to the Sultan himself.

First he paid the Sultan for a change in the regulations regarding succession to the throne, henceforth (firman of 27 May 1866) primogeniture replaced the principle of seniority.

12 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS At the same time he was permitted to maintain a peacetime army of 30,000 men, but his tribute to the Sultan was increased from 80,000 to 150,000 purses per year (about £681,500). The firman of 8 June 1867 bestowed on Isma‘il and his successors the Per-

Sian title of Khedive; he was thus recognized as ‘almost Sovereign’. The nature of his autonomy was made more precise:

he was expressly permitted to create all institutions which he considered necessary, to issue regulations and to make administrative agreements with foreign powers. The conclusion of

treaties remained the privilege of the Sultan. By the firman of 29 November 1869, Isma‘il had been denied the right to raise

foreign loans without the Porte's approval, but it was restored to him on 25 September 1872. A firman of 8 June 1873 confirmed

all these privileges and lifted the limitations on the strength of the army. Egyptian autonomy had reached a point only one step away from independence. The reasons why Isma‘il did not take this further step, and the conditions under which he would have been

prepared to do so, still have to be clarified. In the context of the Cretan uprising against Turkish rule, Greece had early in 1867 sought an alliance with Egypt against the Sultan, on the assumption that Isma‘il was striving for full independence from the Porte. The Greek Consul-General had made to the Foreign Minister, Raghib Pasna (himself born in

Greece), an official offer of ‘la collaboration des deux petites mais anciennes nations',’? but the Egyptian reaction had been negative. Isma‘il had explained to the Consul-General on 22 April 1867 that it was not his intention to break all ties with the Porte; he wanted to achieve his aims by negotiation rather than war. Tt would seem that Isma‘il was unwilling to suffer the fate of Muhammad ‘Ali who had been robbed of the fruits. of his military victory by the European powers. Egypt's independence would have appeared to them as the beginning of the end of the Ottoman Empire which they were endeavouring to preserve. However, Isma‘il hinted more than once at the circumstances under which he would not shrink from bringing about the break: should the Sultan attempt to depose him—Isma‘il explained to the Austrian Consul-General in1869—his response would be to proclaim Egypt's independence, European observers expected such a step on the occasion of

EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘SIL 13

the festivities for the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. [It seems that Isma‘il had actually come to an understanding on

this matter with Victor Emmanuel of Italy, but that the realization of the plan failed in the face of French opposition. The fact of this opposition was generally Known; nevertheless, it was believed that Isma‘il would sooner or later take the decisive step. A German participant in the festivities of 1869 wrote: 'The proclamation and realization of Egypt's independence', the conditions for which ‘are developing with the irresistibility of an organic structure, would seem to be essentially only a question of waiting for the most favourable moment!', *

The American officers whom Isma‘il had taken into his ser-

vice, and who arrived in Egypt early in 1870, were told that it was their task to help bring about the independence of the country, but the Khedive subsequently reconciled himself with the Sultan on the basis of the 1872 and 1873 firmans. The crisis of 1869-70 between Isma‘il and the Porte did not repeat

itself, and from 1875 he had other, financial, worries. When, in the weeks preceding his deposition in 1879, he became aware of the threat to him from the Porte, he began by

making preparations for military conflict with the Sultan, but in fact acquiesced soon afterwards. He probably saw very well that it would be useless to rise against the Sultan and the European powers and perhaps had also become sceptical about the

reliability of his army, in the light of the Abyssinian catastrophe of 1875-6. It is thus evident that Muhammad ‘Ali and—although less directly —Isma‘il wished tomake of Egypt a kingdom independent of the Porte, but both were impeded by Europe. Nevertheless, Isma‘il gained for his country a large measure of autonomy, and

only in times of crisis did it become clear that the Sultan was Egypt's overlord, as in 1879 and 1881-2. The autocrat and his advisory bodies

Thus, on the eve of the period of crisis no obstacles were put in the way of Isma‘il's internal rule by the Porte. Moreover, there was in the country itself no autonomous body, institution or social group which, on the basis of corporate rights, economic position or socio-political influence, could have controlled or limited the Khedive's rule, or which might

14 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS have been able to oppose his will. Even the advisory Chamber of Delegates (Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab) established in 1866, was

no exception in this respect. Disregarding the palace officials and their informal influence on the ruler, there was until 1866 only one body which

Isma‘il regularly consulted, the Majlis Khususi. This did not, though, consist of representatives of different social (professional or 'corporate') groups, but of personalities devoted to the ruler and enjoying his trust; in most instances they were at the same time heads of one or other of the administrative bodies. This Privy Council formed the inner circle of the ruling class, subject, in its composition, to continuous changes. The council deliberated upon all administrative problems, formulated recommendations and submitted them to the Khedive for his decision. It was, however, no means of communication with the subject

population, since its members were hardly familiar with local worries and needs. Isma‘il therefore supplemented the Majlis Khususi in 1866 with the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab. This did not mean that he was relinquishing any of his own power. Contemporary observers were probably right when they saw the establishment of the Chamber of Delegates against the background of doubts expressed in the European press in 1865-6 concerning the

Khedive's financial credibility. This measure as well as the temporary ‘'Egyptianization' of the upper ranks of the provin-

cial administration must also be seen in relation to Isma‘il's

efforts to free himself from the Porte. .

To the outside world Isma‘il presented the Chamber of

Delegates as the institutional crowning of his grandiose civilizing mission in Egypt. To turn Egypt into a respected partner of 'civilized' Europe had already been the aim of Sa‘id; Isma‘*‘il now fully developed this earlier policy. It found its symbolic expression in Egypt's participation in the Paris World Exhibition of 1867 and in the provision of a Sudanese battalion to fight with the French expeditionary corps in Mexico in the

years 1863-7.

This new civilizing act of convoking a Chamber of Delegates was also meant to give Egypt a special status among the Ottoman

territories. Even in Constantinople, Isma‘il wrote on 18 November 1866 to Nubar Pasha who was representing his inter-

ests in Paris: ‘ils ne peuvent et ne pourront jamais, jamais

EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘SIL 15

je dis . . . gouverner comme nous'.° In an ordinance of 22 October 1866 to his trusted Raghib Pasha, whom he appointed as the first president of the new body, the Khedive expressed his

satisfaction that the Egyptians already possessed sufficient maturity for such an institution, the blessings of which could be seen in all civilized countries. Meanwhile, Nubar tried in Paris to explain to the French Foreign Minister the difference between the setting up of the Chamber of Delegates and the Tunisian ‘constitution’ of 1860. According to Nubar not even

the Bey himself had thought through its implications, and still less had they been grasped by his subjects. The Egyptian Chamber in contrast had a solid' foundation: the village shaikhs were chosen by the people and merely confirmed in office by the government; and the most influential among them advised the mudirs on questions relating to public works. While the convocation of the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab was meant to ensure Egypt a place among the ‘'civilized' countries,

within Egypt it was intended as a 'civilizing' instrument. Nubar declared to the French Foreign Minister in December 1866

that ‘notre parlement est une école au moyen de laquelle le gouvernement, plus avancé gue la population, instruit et civilise cette population'.® The institution had thus been conceived as a means of communication from government to people as much as from people to government.

In the speech from the throne with which he opened the first session of the Chamber on 10 November 1866, Isma‘il drew on two

passages to proclaim the shura principle as the theoretical basis of the Chamber. No attempt was made to enlarge upon this general principle from the Qur’an.’ The assembly was in no way

considered an instrument for the division or limitation of power. The intellectuals, i.e. that small group which gave some articulation to the spirit of the time in journals and books, did not in any way contest Isma‘il's leadership on the road towards the modernization and civilization of Egypt; no criticism was heard, not even of the Khedive's financial policy. Rifa‘a Badawi Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi did not greet the Chamber as a means for limiting Isma‘il's absolute power; rather he saw both the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab and the Majlis Khususi

as instruments to lighten the burden of rule. In this connec-

tion he did not even refer—as Isma‘il himself had done—to the shura command in the passages of the Qur’an and the Hadith

16 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS usually cited. There was also no question of the delegates coming to Cairo in November 1866 with the intention of setting limits to Isma‘*‘il's absolute rule. Lady Duff Gordon spoke with the representatives of the southernmost provinces as they were on their way to the inaugural meeting of the Chamber on the

citadel; they were hardly in high spirits, she found. When she remarked that they would now participate in the government

of the country, they are said to have reprimanded her: ‘Who is there on the banks of the Nile who can say anything but "“hader" (ready), with both hands on the heads and a salaam to the ground

even to a Mudir; and thou talkest of speaking before Effendina!' The calling of the most eminent personalities of the provinces to the citadel is said to have reminded the population of the fate of the Mamelukes who in 1811 had been summoned by Muhammad ‘Ali to the same place, but had never returned. °

The following incident at the first meeting of the Chamber was recounted for many years afterwards, not only in the European colonies but also among the Egyptians: when the delegates were called upon to form three groups on the model of European parliaments —a ‘right’ to support the government, a 'left' to function as an opposition, and a moderate centre—all the del-

egates tried to take their place on the right; not one of them wanted to set himself against the government. All knew that it was extremely dangerous to make a bad impression on Isma‘il,

even if he was wanting to civilize the country. The choice of delegates was above all the responsibility of the mudirs who had to take into account on the one hand the government's instructions, and on the other hand the wishes of those provincial notables from whose ranks the members of the

Chamber were picked. The ‘election' took place in the office of the mudiriya, and it seems that, apart from those immediately concerned, hardly anybody took much notice of the event.

Even village shaikhs and provincial notables told Stuart late in 1882 that the delegates were simply nominated by the mudir. One member of the Chamber, however, described the electoral procedure as follows: The village Shaikhs write to the Mudir nominating one candidate each

for election to represent his district. The Mudir assembles the

Sheikhs, announces to them the number of votes for each candidate,

and invites them to declare which shall be elected. They usually

EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘SIL 17 name the candidate whom the Mudir has stated to have received most

votes. But the Mudir is not bound to endorse their choice. He often substitutes a protégé of his own, or he receives from the Government an intimation of the man he has to fix upon. The nominee of the Government is elected as a matter of course.’

De Malortie, whose usual informant was Sharif, gives the following description: Though in principle an elective body, it must be well understood

that the Moudirs had a word to say in the matter. Generally it fell to the most wealthy men of the province to represent their neighbours, and like the election of the Sheikhs by the Fellah,

and the Omdés by the Sheikhs, the election of the Notables was a mere matter of form. Such was the reluctance of many to undertake responsibilities which might lead to friction with the Moudir or possibly with the Government, that frequently compulsory nomination

had to be resorted to.!°

The Chamber of Delegates, composed of representatives of the indigenous land-owning and merchant families —the richest, most eminent, and agreeable to the government —was not an autonomous

body. The constituent law and the standing orders’! of the Chamber made the institution's character perfectly clear: it was conceived as a kind of second Privy Council whose members

were to inform the Khedive at first hand about provincial problems, and who in their turn were to make known his civilizing message in the provinces. True enough, the delegates were also allowed to give their approval to a number of tax increases; but Isma‘il did not by any means consider this approval necessary. The Mugabala law of 1871—the most important fiscal measure of his reign, both in extent and consequences — was worked out by the Majlis Khususi and sanctioned by the Khedive without the Chamber of Delegates being as much as informed. The Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab consisted of seventy-five delegates: three from Cairo, two from Alexandria, one from

Damietta and, according to the size of the population, one or two from each gqism (district) of the provinces. In accordance with the regulations of the constituent law they were to be elected for three years at a meeting of the village shaikhs or urban notables, in the mudiriya or muhafaza respectively. However, the ‘election' had to be confirmed by the Khedive. The Chamber was not granted any functional autonomy. It had rather

the status of a personal advisory body for the Khedive. The delegates were not supposed to bring up for discussion the affairs of either their home provinces or of the country as a whole: only problems submitted for consideration by the government could be discussed. It was not their place to

18 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS intervene bétween Isma‘il and his subjects; thus they were not allowed to accept petitions, this remaining a prerogative of the Khedive.

Until 1879 the Chamber did not try to overstep its designated area of activity. It was prevented from doing so by Isma‘il's Turco-Circassian confidants, whom he appointed to the presidency of the Chamber: Isma‘il Raghib, ‘Abd Allah “Izzat, A Bakr Ratib, Qasim Rasmi, Ja‘*far Mazhar, Ahmad Rashid, Hasan

Rasim. Raghib, for instance, was simultaneously Foreign Minister, Qasim Rasmi was Muhafiz of Cairo, Ja‘far Mazhar was member of the Majlis Khususi, and ‘Abd Allah ‘Izzat Commander-in-Chief of the army! Thus the Chamber in no sense developed into’ an

instrument for the division, limitation or control of power. The fact that the same problems and difficulties arose year after year for discussion indicates that the institution was hardly having sweeping practical success. It remained without the slightest influence on the government's or Isma‘il's finanCclal dealings: in fact, it had to accept that it was continually being presented with false budgets and statistics. After his reconciliation with the Sultan, Isma‘il lost all interest in the Chamber of Delegates: in 1872, 1874 and 1875 it was not even convened.

The economic position of the autocrat

Isma*il used his absolute political power in order to attain a unique economic position. He brought into his own or his fam-

ily's hands one fifth of the cultivated land of Egypt. It is

true that until 1878 there was no clear demarcation line between the state's and the ruler's property; but, with the progressive development of private landed property, especially since 1858, the Khedive saw it as advisable for him to secure

for himself clear titles of property, even if he still considered state land and the treasury fundamentally at his disposal. The treasury was also his privy purse and the Finance Minister his personal Paymaster. Muhammad ‘Ali, after the abolition of the iltizam system, had admittedly appropriated for himself and his family large

areas of state land, mainly uncultivated land not included in his new Land Register and villages abandoned by their inhabitants because of oppressive taxation and frequent recruitment for the army and the corvée. These estates were known as

EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘IL 19

jiftliks. Prince Ibrahim, a son of Prince Ahmad Rif‘at who was drowned

in 1858, in 1882 told Mr. Rowsell, the administrator of the state domains, that the Sultan had allowed Muhammad ‘Ali to appropriate 150,000 faddans as jiftliks. He was said to have assigned 30,000 faddans to each of his sons. In 1845 the various members of tne dynasty could claim to own 677,000 faddans

between them. According to an official register for the years 1847-8 to 1870-1,1* the numbers of faddans possessed by the

princes and their families by the end of this period were:

Sa*id 46,615 Halim 41,448 Ahmad Yakan- 33,438

Mustafa Fadil 20, /02 Ahmad Rif‘at 19,876 Ibrahim Yakan 11,006

Abbas 7,013

At the death of his father Ibrahim, Isma‘il owned about 15,000 faddans. From the time of his accession to the throne in 1863 until the summer of 1878 he had on his own admission managed to accumulate for himself and his family 917,046 faddans, excluding the Awgqaf land, about half of which was registered in his own name. First, he is said to have been allowed by the Sultan to take as his own private property 90,000 faddans of uncultiv-

ated land; but he had in fact taken from Turkish officials property already cultivated, giving them in exchange uncultiv-

ated land. The only choice these officials had been able to make was between this ‘exchange’ and Fazugli, the penal colony in Sudan. In Amin Sami's monumental collection of documents

there is a series of ordinances to the Finance Ministry, covering the first four years of Isma‘il's rule only, by which he transferred to himself and his family more than 150,000 faddans.

After the change in the order of succession (the substitution of primogeniture for seniority) Isma‘il exiled the two princes who according to the old system had been first in the line of succession, his brother Mustafa Fadil, and his uncle ‘Abd al-Halim (who was one year younger than Fadil) because

they had allegedly hatched a plot to overthrow him. As a matter of course he took over the major part of their landed property (20,702 and 41,448 faddans respectively). Halim's estates were among the best managed in Egypt. In 1876 Isma‘il

20 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS then appropriated the property of the 'Mufattish', Isma‘il Siddig, who was murdered on his orders and left behind as much as 30,000 faddans. Lady Duff Gordon spoke with one of the richest indigenous landowners, Badrawi, as he was on his way

into exile at Fazugli. His only ‘crime! apparently, had been that on his own admission he possessed 12,000 faddans of good land between Tanta and Samannud.

Isma‘il's vast sugar-cane plantations in Middle and Upper Egypt were acquired primarily through the appropriation of

fallahin land. These properties included fifty cane-grinding mills, fifteen sugar factories, two hundred and fifty miles of railway line and forty locomotives to transport the crop from

the fields to the factories. In addition, Isma‘il owned fifteen cotton factories and innumerable steam ploughs, tractors and steam pumps. His lands and factories represented not only the most important single factor in Egypt's agricultural production but also in the processing of agricultural produce. However, Isma‘il made use not only of the yield from his owr property, but also of the general tax revenue. Notwithstandinc the general growth of private landed property since 1858, the rulers of Egypt continued to regard the land as fundamentally their own private domain. Sa‘id used budget surpluses, for

instance, to buy real estate for his family. Isma‘il's behaviour in this respect can only be described as psychopathic: he not only drew money liberally from the treasury for himself anc

his relatives, but he also distributed tens of thousands of pounds on all sides as if he were giving autographs. If the treasury was empty, he would arrange foreign loans and tax

increases: for instance, on 1 July 1866 he simply informed the Finance Minister that he had ordered the Controller-General of the Provinces to levy an additional £500,000 in land tax. Given this background of Isma‘il's political and economic position it is evident that he held the only autonomous power

base in Egypt. Nevertheless, if we speak of a ruling class, it must be emphasized that those who belonged to this class held only derivative positions of power dependent on Isma‘il's good

will. In other words, they could lose their positions overnight together with the possessions which they had acquired through, or even independently of, them.

EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘IL 21 The non-autonomous ruling élite

The most significant feature of the ruling class on the eve of the crisis which began in 1876 was that it could still be defined largely in ethnic terms: it was composed predominantly of Turco-Circassians. However, part of this power-élite no longer consisted of immigrants from other Ottoman territories, but of people born in Egypt. Some of these Turco-Egyptians had Egyptian mothers or wives. In addition, early in 1870 the

language barriers were abolished: of the three official languages (Turkish, French and Arabic) the native language very soon gained the upper hand. Access to the centre of power was determined by origin, personal connections and relations with the dynasty. Egyptian members of the ruling class (such as Isma‘il Siddiq and ‘Ali Mubarak) were still very much exceptions. Their activity also remained confined to one specific branch of the administration for which, according to the Khedive, they showed special

aptitude; for instance, Isma‘il Siddigq, who had a reputation for his expertise in the invention of new taxes and dues and squeezing them out of the population, was confined to the financial sphere, and the engineer, ‘Ali Mubarak, to the spheres of public works and education. The duties of the Turco-Circassians, on the other hand,

often changed several times in one year: a pasha might, in the course of one or two years, be appointed to successive posts as Prefect of Police of the capital, Wakil (Under-Secretary of State) in the Finance Ministry, mudir of a province, president of a tribunal, and finally a commander in the army. The provinces might have up to five different governors in one year. A position of power was not allowed to become a personal power base. This rotating power-éGlite had a very marked consciousness of

its own superiority. Its Turco-Circassian majority felt that it had a vocation to rule, and was convinced that it alone could rule Egypt. This conviction later degenerated into a contempt of all fallahin upstarts. The sources for 1878-82 contain innumerable examples of this. The few cited here will

be seen later in their historical context.

When on 1 February 1881 the three fallah officers (Ahmad ‘Urabi, ‘Ali Fahmi, and ‘Abd al-‘Al) were to be brought before a court martial, the European and Turco-Circassian generals

22 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS assembled all the available Turco-Circassian officers in the War Ministry, and they mocked and insulted the fallahin on

their arrival. 'The Egyptians are children and must be treated like children .. . They cannot get on without me. These peasants want guidance’; it was with these words that Sharif Pasha expressed his anger in January 1882 over the fact that the indigenous landowners in the Chamber of Delegates dic not bow to his will (and to the pressure of the European powers).'? After the banishment of forty Turco-Circassian

officers in the spring of 1882, the Khedive's representative i Constantinople, Thabit Pasha, deplored the recent deviation from Muhammad ‘Ali's policy of not giving Egyptians senior pos

itions in the army or in the civil service, and urged a returr to that policy. When British troops had defeated ‘Urabi's arn it was only the British occupation of the country which prevented the establishment of a Turco-Circassian regime of terror The Turco-Circassians, however, constituted only a small fraction of the population. The 1882 census showed that, out of the 6,806,381 inhabitants of Egypt, only 31,774 were 'Egyptiens originaires des autres parties de l'empire ottoman' half of them living in Cairo (10,556) and Alexandria (5,169). This category also included natives of Syria and Arabia, however, and did not include Turco-Circassians born in Egypt, so

that little can be inferred from these numbers. On the basis

of official information, various contemporary observers calculated the number of Turco-Circassians in Egypt— still the mos important reservoir of the ruling class—as between ten and twenty thousand. Neither Muhammad ‘Ali nor Sa‘id and Isma‘il could base on

such a small personnel their ambitious programme of technical

development, Europeanization and 'civilization'. That is why even Muhammad ‘Ali, in the second half of his reign, had to admit Egyptians into the newly founded state schools (set up primarily for military requirements), and into the study missions to Europe; whereas originally they had been open-only to the sons of the Mamelukes (whom he himself had had

liguidated) and the sons of his Ottoman officials, Egyptians were now compulsorily recruited as they were for the army. Bu even those Egyptians who had been sent for study abroad only

rarely made their way into the ruling class. They became the experts, the 'technicians' of the administration, whereas the

EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘IL 23 decision-making positions continued to be reserved for the Turco-Circassians. Army commands were still more exclusively the preserve of Turco-Circassians, even if Muhammad ‘Ali's frequent and lengthy

wars had forced him to allow Egyptians to enter the ranks of the lower officers. In 1846 there were 517 'Arab'!* officers in the Egyptian army: 110 captains (yuzbasi) and 377 lieutenants (mulazim awwal and mulazim thani) in the infantry, and 9 captains and 21 lieutenants in the cavalry.'° ‘Abbas, who reduced Muhammad ‘Ali's army to the force of 18,000 men pre-

scribed by the Sultan, made of it a pretorian guard with a purely Turco-Circassian officer corps. However, Sa‘id, the ‘Soldier King', did not favour the Egyptians in the army. From 1855-6 he had allowed the sons of village notables (lammat awlad al-‘umad) to be recruited, and some of them rose to the rank of colonel (generals had to be appointed by the Sultan). Whatever Sa‘id's motives may have been, he did not thereby win

the ‘umdas' esteem. It seems that he had been led in part by his personal inclinations, that is his predilection for everything military —which often assumed tragicomic traits—and his

pederastic disposition. This fact was, of course, suppressed in most of the literature. Isma‘*il, in any case, reversed this policy of Sa‘id's. Only four days after his accession, on 22 January 1865, he ordered the Minister of War to allow all the sons of ‘umdas in the army to buy themselves out immediately and return to their homes if they so wished.’*® The Officer Corps regained its pronounced Turco-Circassian character under Isma‘il. The part of ‘Urabi's memoirs concerning Isma‘il's reign is significantly one long complaint about the renewed preference for 'Mameluke'’?’ officers and the privileges they enjoyed. The chapter ends with the following indictment: During the time of Isma‘il's despotic rule I suffered with all my patience and tenacity under his tyrannic and arbitrary repression. I remained lieutenant-colonel for nineteen years; I had to look on as junior officers, who had been under me in the times of Sa‘id Pasha and Isma‘*il Pasha, were promoted above me. Some of them rose to the

rank of colonel, some to that of brigadier-general and divisiongeneral, and not because they knew more than I did, or because of special skills, or because they had been particularly courageous in

battle, but because they were Mamelukes or Mamelukes' sons of the Khedive's family. The Khedive bestowed on them ranks, decorations,

beautiful slaves, extensive and fertile lands, and spacious houses; he gave them gifts of money and precious jewels sucked from the blood of the poor Egyptians and the sweat of their brows. ®

24 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS However, this account does not mean that, under Isma‘il, Egypt

ian officers-had in principle no chances of promotion. It is also worth mentioning that it was Isma‘il's particular policy to make Egyptian officers marry ‘beautiful slaves' from his harim, in order to bind them to the court. Nevertheless, “‘Urabi's complaint was certainly an expression of the general malaise which was taking hold amongst the Egyptian officers whe: Sa*‘id's successor no longer granted them special favour.

Such favour was bestowed by Isma‘il on a different social

group, the fathers of the 'awlad al-‘umad', the provincial notables, i.e. the rich indigenous land-owning andmerchant fam ilies whose representatives constituted the Majlis Shura

al-Nuwwab. In the late sixties and early seventies Isma‘il temporarily attempted to put into their hands the supervision of the fourteen provinces,’? not, however, that of the eight 'gouvernements'.??

It was not totally new to entrust to members of influential indigenous families tasks in the provincial administration. Muhammad ‘Ali, for example, had appointed ‘Ali al-Badrawi as Ma’mur Mudiriyat al-Gharbiya, and Khidr Abu Hashish as Wakil Mudiriyat al-Qalyubiya. Under Sa‘id many ‘umdas and great

landowners had again held positions in the district administrations. Some of them had even become mudirs: al-Sayyid Abaza was Mudir of Buhaira and Qalyubiya, Hasan Shari‘i of Dagqahliya and Giza, and Muhammad Sultan of Bani Suwaif. How-

exceptions. |

ever, native provincial governors had remained isolated At the zenith of his independence euphoria, which corres-

ponded with a nadir in his relations with the Porte, Isma‘il, for the first time, did put practically the whole of the provincial administration into the hands of Egyptian land-owning families. In 1869-70 he appointed wakils in the provinces six members of the Chamber of Delegates: Muhammad al-Sairafi in Minufiya, Hilal in Gharbiya, Ahmad Abaza in Buhaira, Muhammad

‘Afifi in Shargiya, and Ibrahim Shari‘i in Giza. Salim alShawaribi was appointed Ma’mur Dawahi Misr. Mahmud Sulaiman

(who entered the Chamber of Delegates only in 1881 however) became Wakil of Girga, and then of Asyut. Most striking, however, was the complete reshuffle among the

mudirs during those years; the Turco-Circassians were nearly all replaced by Egyptians. There had also been individual

EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘IL 25 provincial governors in the first years of Isma‘il's reign: Muhammad Sultan, Hasan Shari‘i, Muhammad Minshawi, Ayyub Jamal

al-Din, and Atrabi Abu al-‘Izz. In 1869-71 the following well known and influential provincial notables were also appointed mudirs: Muhammad al-Sairafi, Ahmad al-Sharif, Sulaiman Abaza, Ahmad Mustafa, Hilal, ‘Amir al-Zumr, ‘Umar Jami‘i, Sulaiman ‘Abd al-‘Al, Ahmad ‘Ali, al-Sayyid Abaza, Muhammad Hamadi, ‘Umar Ahmad, Muhammad al-Shawaribi, Muhammad ‘SAfifi and Hamid

Abu Satit. - Most of these personnel decisions were taken by Isma‘il during his stays in the Middle Egyptian provinces where he had

his sugar-cane plantations. In Minya he is said to have sought out Sultan Pasha and asked his opinion about which provinces were best suited to have Muhammad Hamadi and Ayyub Jamal al-Din

as mudirs. In 1871, however, the first Turco-Circassians were returned

as mudirs and by 1873 they occupied most of the posts. Signif-

icantly, this reversal coincided with the neglect of the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab in 1872, 1874 and 1875, as well as with the improved relations between Isma‘il and the Porte. But while the Chamber of Delegates was revived in the last years of Isma‘*‘il's reign (1876-9) the posts of governor continued to be the preserves of Turco-Circassians. Indigenous notables were

only rarely appointed as mudirs, and then only for a short time. District administration and subordinate positions in the provincial administration remained, admittedly, in native hands; in 1873, for instance, Isma‘il assigned posts in the qisms to several members of the Chamber of Delegates, but none in the mudiriyas. Recent authors have already remarked upon the assignment of

the highest positions in the provincial administration to indigenous notables, but they have forgotten to add that this was only a temporary measure. . However, authors then living in

Egypt were eye-witnesses of the reversal of this policy. Klunzinger writes: A few years ago an attempt was made to substitute native Egyptians for Turkish officials in all posts from mudir down to gendarme. But this

did not work for long; the new officials did not turn out to be sufficiently energetic; they had all sorts of other considerations; the administration of justice and security suffered; in fact, the natives themselves were soon those who complained most on this account; they had no respect for their own kind, a 'fellah', and so, after a short time the old system was revived and the Turks returned.7!

26 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS The economic position of the dhawat Thus on the eve of the intervention of the European powers which shook the Egyptian power structure, the ruling élite was composed of an overwhelming majority of Turco-Circassians, mostly with a military background, and a few Egyptian experts

and provincial notables. The members of this privileged rulinc class, who confronted the fallahin as mudirs, inspectors, generals, and as.senior Cairene officials, sojourning on their estates, were generally labelled 'dhawat' (‘eminent gentlemen') Second only to members of the ruling dynasty, they made up the most conspicuous land-owning group in the country. They had

achieved this mainly through their offices, above all through gifts of land from the rulers, less so through their own initiative in making use of their privileged position. By handing over large areas of land to senior officals and officers, the rulers pursued both economic and political aims: the land was to be cultivated intensively and its owners bound to their patrons by ties of gratitude. From 1829 land not cultivated — and therefore notincluded in the Land Register —was given todhawat as so-called ab‘adiyas.

On the condition that they made this land arable, and cultivated it, they at first had to pay no land tax. From 1840 Muhammad ‘Ali forced wealthy officials and officers to pay the tax arrears of those villages which had been deserted because

of frequent conscription and intolerable tax burdens. They had also to accept future responsibility for the financial obligations of these villages, receiving in exchange, free of tax, part of the land belonging to the villages, as so-called ‘uhda, which could be cultivated with corvée labour. In addition, many Officials received on retirement land (usya) instead of a pension.

Under Isma‘il, the distribution of ab‘adiyas took place either on special occasions, in graded lots to groups of officers and officials or to individuals in recognition of personal services, or without any particular reason as a sign of the Khedive's favour. Shortly after his accession, Isma‘il tried to win the loyalty of the Officer Corps by distributing at a military parade 500 faddans of unregistered land in the provinces of Gharbiya and Minufiya to each general, 200 to each colonel, and 150 to each lieutenent-colonel. When Isma‘il was abroad in 1869-70, Crown Prince Tawfiq, acting as regent,

EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘IL 27 distributed 15,000 faddans of neglected and abandoned land to government officials in lots of 30, 50, 80O:-and 100 faddans.

Isma‘il's most important personal gifts of land to his 'Mamelukes' and to some provincial notables took place in the

first third of his reign; in the second third he made his largest monetary gifts. After that he had very little more to give away. The most extensive ab‘adiyas which he handed over to his loyal followers encompassed areas of 1,000 faddans or

more (Isma‘il Raghib received an estate of this size three times; Ahmad Rashid, Ahmad Tal‘at, Muhammad Sharif, Muhammad

Hafiz, Isma‘il Siddig, and ‘Ali Dhu al-Figar at least once). The largest amounts of money were apparently given to Nubar Pasha (£15,000, then £20,000 to buy a house, and finally another £10,000). Riyad Pasha on one occasion received £3,000 and ‘Umar Lutfi £4,000 for the purchase of a house.

The palace kept detailed registers of the landed property of the dhawat. In the register cited above** are listed 145 persons with over 500 faddans, among them 42 with over 1,800. Some of the best known names which are encountered repeatedly

in this study appear in the list:

Isma‘*‘il Raghib 7,061

“Arif Fahmi 6,561

Sulaiman al-Faransawi 4,080

Isma*il Siddig 4,024

Muhammad Hafiz 3,807 ‘Ali Dhu al-Figar 3,689

Hasan Rasim 2,163

Muhammad Shakir 2,736

Ahmad Rashid 2,728

Muhammad Sharif 2,507 Isma*il Abu Jabal 2,491 Muhammad Mazhar 2,322

Nubar Pasha 2,193

Ahmad al-Daramalli 2,186

Muhammad Fadil 2,168

Ahmad Tal*at 2,128 ‘Abd al-Latif 2,050 Shahin Pasha 2,010

‘Abd Allah ‘Izzat 1,980 Muhammad Sultan 1,905 Muhammad Thabit 1,600

28 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS

‘Abd al-Qadir 1,574

Rifa‘a al-Tahtawi 1,546

Abu Bakr Ratib 1,316 ‘Abd al-Rahman Rushdi 1,303 Musa al-‘Aqqad 1,249 Muhammad Khusraw 1,200 Mustafa Riyad 1,119

Muhammad Ratib 1,100 Muhammad al-Minshawi . 1,030

Qasim Pasha 1 , O00 These figures refer to 1870 when the last entries were made

in the register. A number of personalities appearing later in this work then owned relatively little land, but acquired much more as they were promoted to senior posts (‘Umar Lutfi is in the register with only 723 faddans, Muhammad Zaki with 751, ‘Ali Mubarak with 163, ‘Uthmad Rifgqi with 143, and ‘Abd Allah

Fikri with 111). Isma‘il Siddiq, who according to the register owned 4,024 faddans, is said to have left about 30,000 faddans on his death in 1876, as mentioned above. Mahmud Sami, the

later Prime Minister, possessed according to this list only 150 faddans, but by 1882 had increased his holding to 1,705 faddans. However, he acquired his property not—as one might

think —at the time of his alliance with the army, but still under Isma‘il.** Muhammad Sultan had by 1882 enlarged his estates to 13,000 faddans of which 10,000 were in the Minya

area alone. From 1854 a tithe (‘usr) was levied from the dhawat land (including the jiftliks) which had hitherto been untaxed. Land was divided for tax purposes into two groups, “ushuriya and kharajiya. ‘Ushuri land (mainly owned by the dynasty and dhawat) was in 1881 taxed at an average rate of 52 PT per faddan (from 27 PT in Fayyum to 91 PT in Qalyubiya), and

kharaji (roughly equivalent to Fallah land) at an average rate of 128 PT (from 77 PT inIsnatol160O PT inMinufiya). For the 3,406,480 faddans of kharaji landatotal land tax of £4,387,762 was levied and for the 1,307,926 faddans of f‘ushuri land, £686,384 THE AUTOCHTHONOUS NOTABLES

Thus, while the top positions in all the branches of the administration, the occupants of which were members of what is

called here the 'ruling class', remained for the most part the preserve of a non-indigenous power-élite, there existed side by

EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘IL 29 Side with this an autochthonous social élite which is encoun-

tered in the literature in the various social spheres in the form of village notables, provincial notables, urban notables, and notables of Egypt. We have preserved the term 'notables' because of its wide diffusion in the English and French literature, although in German we would employ the term 'Honoratioren' as defined by Max Weber.*°

The 'Honoratioren'’ or ‘notables' were characterized as soc-

ial groups within their geographical unit (village, province, city, country) in that, owing to the character of their profesSional functions or on the basis of their relative prosperity, they could absent themselves temporarily at least from their affairs (agriculture, commerce or religious offices), and could, therefore, undertake certain duties in the sociopolitical arena without necessarily having to rely upon financial reward. Their economic and professional positions lent them high social prestige, and they were thus considered Suitable for the functions of representing and holding the confidence of the population. On a national level the indigenous notables often appeared together with representatives of the predominantly TurcoCircassian ruling class. Their common function was to represent the whole of Egyptian society on solemn occasions, such as the public reading of a firman or paying homage toanew ruler, Or in situations of emergency, and generally whenever the voice of the people was to be given a hearing. In such cases — besides the representatives of the dhawat (courtiers, members of the Majlis Khususi, senior officials, judges and officers), the following groups were also convened: the most eminent ‘ulama’, that is the Grand Qadi and the Grand Mufti (who was aHanafi), the senior Muftis of the Malakis, Shafi*tis and Hanbalis, the Shaikh of al-Azhar, the Shaikhs al-Bakri and al-Sadat, other muftis and respected teachers of

al-Azhar; representatives of the religious minorities, particularly the Coptic Patriarch and the Jewish Chief Rabbi; the leading merchants of Cairo; great landowners and members of

the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab staying in the capital. If there was enough time available, provincial notables were also called: for instance, other members of the Chamber of Delegates, and merchants, gadis and muftis from the coastal towns and provincial centres. Asthe social 6lite of the country, the

30 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS notables were thus called upon to represent the society at special occasions on an informal rather than an institutional basis. There follow some observations on individual categories

of notables.

Under Isma‘il, the political role of the ‘ulama’ was essentially confined to the ceremonial functions associated with acts of state. They had been able to preserve almost nothing of the political influence which they had exercised during what was for them a golden age, that is during the last decades of Mameluke rule, in the time of the French occupation, and in the early years of Muhammad ‘Ali's reign. After they had helped decisively to bring Muhammad ‘Ali to power, he had deprived them both of their economic position (most dramatically through the state take-over of the wagqf land controlled by them) and of

their political influence by playing off their leading representatives one against the other and by exiling some of them: they had never succeeded in recovering from this blow. Moreover, as intellectuals they became increasingly dispensable, as the number of experts trained in Europe or on the European

model steadily grew. :

Admittedly, the most eminent ‘ulama’ during Isma‘il's reign

continued to enjoy high social prestige because of their role in religious life, but they no longer exercised influence on the Khedive himself. They were largely dependent on him for

their positions, that is they had to be appointed or confirmed by him. Since they behaved loyally, and did not attempt to exercise any, opposition or claim any right to political control, some of them, thanks to Isma‘il's benevolence, once more in the capacity of awqaf managers, were able to become rich again as relatively prosperous landowners and merchants. The Qadi of Cairo (or Grand Qadi of Egypt) had originally been sent over from Constantinople by the Sultan for a year at

a time. In the early 1870s, however, Isma‘il came to an agreement with the Porte to pay the Turkish Qadi of Egypt a fixed monthly salary for him to remain in Constantinople. To replace him, the Khedive appointed as Grand Qadi ‘Abd al-Rahman Nafid

in February 1876; he held this position for more than fifteen years. The Grand Mufti (that is the Mufti of the Hanafis, the madhhab of the majority of the Turks and therefore also of the khedivial court), Shaikh Muhammad al-‘Abbasi al-Mahdi, was also a confidant of the Khedive who in 1871 appointed him as Shaikh

EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘*IL 31

al-Azhar; while fulfilling these functions he acquired considerable landed property. Shaikh ‘Ali al-Bakri, who together with the Shaikh al-Sadat, presided over the Sufi orders, and was at the same time Nagib al-Ashraf, enjoyed the special trust of Isma‘il who in 1864 gave his family 300 faddans of land; when he died on 21 October 1880 he left more than 1,000 faddans.

Tawfigq allowed al-Bakri's son, ‘Abd al-Bagi, to succeed his father only on condition that he combat those very Sufi prac-

tices, particularly the dusa, on which rested the public impact of the orders and consequently a large part of their influence. The Khedive had already promised ‘Abd al-Bagi's father important honours and magnificent substitute ceremonies if he under-

took to do something against the abuses of the Sufis' public appearances. Early in 1881 the new Shaikh al-Bakri did in fact send a circular to the Shaikhs of the individual orders, in which he forbade the dusa, self-flagellation and similar practices and commanded them to restrict the dhikrs to God's praise, and to arrange for the insane, whom the people venerated as saints, to be arrested by the police and committed to mental asylums. Isma*‘il showed himself to be a calculating patron of many ‘ulama’? —a policy which, in most cases, was to pay dividends.

When he learnt in 1863 that the Mufti of the Malikis, Shaikh Muhammad ‘Ullaish,lived in straitened circumstances he increased his income from 800 to 1,500 PT and, in 1871, he presented him with 100 faddans. In the same year he gave to the Mufti of the Supreme Court, Abu al-‘Ala’ al-Khalfawi, 120 faddans. Among Isma‘il's, and later on Tawfiq's followers were —apart from Shaikh al~Khalfawi-—Shaikh ‘Abd al-Rahman

al-Bahrawi, Mufti first of the Majlis Khususi and then of the Ministry of Justice, Shaikh ‘Ali al-Laithi,Isma‘il's court poet, and Shaikh ‘Abd al-Hadi Naja al-Abyari, the tutor of Isma*‘il's sons, whom Tawfiq appointed Mufti and Imam of the Ma‘iya.

Under Isma‘il, the most eminent ‘ulama’ found themselves evidently in a relatively good economic position, whether due to the Khedive's protection or to the advantages gained through office. Shaikh Muhammad ali-Sadat, for instance, possessed not

only urban real estate but also landed property. Shaikh Hasan al-‘Idwi, who had been teaching at the Azhar since 1828, and

32 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS who was to play an important role on the eve of the British occupation, had besides his Cairene property an estate of 1,000 faddans. Shaikh Muhammad al-Inbabi was already a rich and respected cloth-merchant with business connections in Manchester before he became Shaikh al-Azhar in 1881.

Thus, the holders of the most important religious positions depended on the ruler for their appointments and in part for

their property; Isma‘il controlled the ‘ulama’, not they him. Since as a group they were not autonomous even in the religious

field, they could hardly play a significant role on the political scene; and since they did not even claim such a role, many of them could bask in the splendour of the court or at

least enjoy the ruler's favour. While the most distinguished “‘ulama’ counted as notables of

Egypt in virtue of their functions in socio-religious life, the telling factor for merchants and great landowners was their economic position. Certainly many merchants owed their wealth to extensive landed property, as in the case of the ‘Aqqads and Hajins in Cairo or Amin al-Shamsi in Zagazig. Isma‘il had also successfully put the Cairene merchant notables under obligation to him: in 1865 he arranged for Mustafa ‘Inani to receive £2,000, in 1869 he handed over to Muhammad al-Siyufi 200 faddans and in 1871 he gave the Muwailihi brothers £1,300 so that

they could pay their debts. In so far as the provincial notables belonged to the large landowners of the highest category they had attained that

status mainly in the service of the rulers and through their favour. Under Muhammad ‘Ali it was practically impossible for them to acquire large estates in any other way. Among the families which became rich at that time were the Abazas, the Shawaribis and the Badrawis. After Sa‘id’s land law of 1858 had opened the way to the

acquisition of secure titles of ownership, families of ‘umdas in particular, which had held together and exercised the office over a long period of time, succeeded in uniting in their hands considerable territories. But in 1875, before the advantages of the Muqabala law had

had their full impact, only about a quarter of the land was in full private ownership. It was above all enriched ‘umdas who under Isma‘il received

posts in district and provincial administration, and were even

EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘IL 33 promoted to the rank of mudir. These posts brought with them new wealth in the form of landed property, once more through the ruler's favour. In 1870 Isma‘il had Muhammad al-Sairafi and al-Sayyid Abaza receive 500 faddans each. Mention has already been made of Muhammad Sultan's and Muhammad al-

Minshawi's ‘ushuri land. Thus in every province there were some influential and well-to-do families whose members controlled important ‘umda

posts, who played a significant part in the district and provincial administration, to whom even the position of mudir was temporarily entrusted, and who, together with the representatives of the respected merchant families of Cairo, Alexandria and Damietta, provided the leading members of the Chamber of

Delegates. These families included in Buhaira the Sairafis, Mahmuds and Wakils; in Gharbiya the Minshawis, Sharifs, and

Abu al-‘Izz; in Shargiya the Abazas and Shamsis; in Minufiya the Sha‘irs and ‘Abd al-Ghaffars; in Qalyubiya the Shawaribis and Abu Hashish; in Giza the Zumrs; in Minya the Sultans, Shari‘is and Sha‘rawis; in Asyut the Sulaimans; in Girga the Hamadis —to name but afew of the best known.

When they visited the provinces, the rulers honoured these families by allowing themselves to be entertained in their houses. Thus Tawfiq, on his journey through the country in 1880, visited Amin al-Shamsi, Sulaiman Abaza, ‘Ali Sha‘ir, Muhammad al-Minshawi, Muhammad Sultan and Sayyid al-Lawzi (a

member of the Chamber of Delegates and a merchant in Damietta).

These were really private visits, while official visits were paid to the mudirs. Besides these great landowners, grown rich through their de facto monopoly of ‘umda posts and through their offices in provincial administration, relatively prosperous merchants and the gadis and muftis of the provincial centres also counted as

provincial notables, the latter by virtue of their religious and jurisdictional functions. However, both these groups

played only a very small role in socio-political life, Not all the ‘umdas, however, counted as provincial notables Or were great landowners. Many of them had only a few faddans

of land to call their own. Just as there was strong social differentiation among the fallahin, who had no official posts, according to their circumstance—rural labourers without any property (especially in Upper Egypt), impoverished

34 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS small-holders with less than one faddan, an agricultural middle class with up to five faddans, and well-to-do large farmers — sc there were great differences among the ‘umdas according to their wealth. Their economic position depended too on the size and wealth of the village as a whole. The *‘umda was the 'factotum administratif'*® of the government. In larger places (Madina and Nahiya) the ‘umda hac

at his side, for the fulfilment of his tasks, several shaikhs (in extreme cases up to twenty) who were at the head of a quar-

ter (hara), a clan, or a hamlet belonging to the administrative zone of the locality (‘izba, kafr, naj‘ or nazla).*’ Under Isma‘*il a rudimentary poll seems to have taken place before the official nomination or confirmation of the ‘umdas and shaikhs. In 1866 Nubar Pasha told the French Foreign Min-

ister that Isma‘il had re-established the old right of the village communities to elect their own shaikhs. Likewise article 7 of the constituent law of 1866 presented as a fact the election of the shaikhs by the villagers, and various authors confirm this.*® Unfortunately, al-Rafiti's short account does not reveal what prompted the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab to decide

in 1869 that the village shaikhs should be nominated and their number fixed according to the wishes of the population. Evidently the authorities (i.e. the nazir al-gqism or the mudir) intervened only when they did not agree with the villagers'

choice. In a circular of the Minister of the Interior of September 1881 the provincial governors were again requested to intervene: La meilleure garantie du respect qui est dl a l'autorité reside dans je choix des personnes a qui l'exercice en est confie. Vous veillerez

donc constamment 4 ce que les Cheikhs El-Beled, appelés a ces fonctions par les voeux de leur concitoyens, soient toujours choisis parmi des hommes d'une honnéteté eprouvée et jouissant dans leur pays, soit part leur situation de fortune, soit part l'importance des interets agricoles ou commerciaux qu'ils y possedent, d'une influence legitime et incontestée.*?

Correspondingly, the ‘umdas and shaikhs were in general members

of the richest or one of the richest families of the locality. AS a consequence these offices passed in many cases from father

to son or at least remained in the same family. This created in many observers the impression that they were hereditary. In the 1870s the duties incumbent upon the ‘umdas were as

follows: they had to provide the tax offices with the information necessary for tax-assessment; they collected the taxes

EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘*IL 35

and gave the proceeds to the sarrafs; they fixed the quotas of men which each village had to contribute for corvée works or

for the army; they were responsible for public security and

the arbitration of disputes in their administrative areas; in many cases they provided accommodation for travellers and for

visiting state officials; and they were responsible for the publication of all relevant government decrees. For these services, however, they received neither payment _ nor any other form of compensation. Therefore, in the spring of 1882, two members of the Chamber of Delegates recalled that the ‘umdas and shaikhs were ‘until recently' at least granted a

reduction in their land tax. Since this concession had been abolished they should be paid a fixed salary like all other government officials.

Bearing this situation in mind, it is no wonder that the *‘umdas and shaikhs exploited their positions in order to secure economic advantages, and thus, so to speak, compensated themselves. For an appropriate sum they ‘overlooked! certain persons in their choice of able-bodied men for the corvée or as

recruits for the army; they took care that their fields came first when water was distributed, or made the villagers work them without pay; when assessing and collecting taxes they knew how to line their own pockets; they lent money to the

fallahin and took possession of their property if the fallahin were not able to repay them. It cannot be denied that the ‘umdas and shaikhs often used

the opportunities offered by their offices excessively to their own advantage and at the expense of other villagers, but one must beware of generalizing inthe style of Cromer and Dufferin, who maintained that one of the main tasks of British policy in Egypt was the liberation of the fallahin from the yoke of the

Shaikhs, as if the latter had been the real tyrants and oppressors. In fact their position was unenviable, as they had to see to it that full satisfaction was given to the increasingly intolerable and insatiable demands of Isma‘il. Lady Duff Gordon, whose accounts appear on the whole to be

reliable, drew a different picture of the shaikhs' situation in her second home, Upper Egypt. In March 1867 she wrote that prisons were overflowing with village shaikhs who had exacted

too little in taxes. Later she reported that the Mudir of Qina had had many village shaikhs beaten for the same reason—two of

36 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS them had not survived the ordeal. Further examples can be added. In October 1879 two collective petitions from the village shaikhs of the various districts of Fayyum were received by the Minister of the Interior, in which they complained about

the oppression of the population by tax officials of the mudiriya. The members of the Chamber of Delegates, to which only ‘umdas or former ‘umdas belonged (except for a few merchants from the larger towns) proved once more in every session

that they had at heart not only their own interests but also the well-being of the fallahin whom they represented. They acted—as far as they could-—as their representatives and in

their interests. The thesis of the village notables' tyranny, therefore, seems to be the result of one-sided observation. It was not the ‘umdas and shaikhs who exacted the excessive taxes

and ordered continual recruitment; they were really only the transmitters of orders from higher authorities. Thus it can be seen that the autochthonous notables of Egypt played an important social and economic role in the provinces,

but not in the political life of the capital. Through their representation in the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab and their employment in district and provincial administration they had reached the forecourt of power, but not yet its inner sanctuary — that

was still the preserve of officials and officers of TurcoCircassian origin. Many notables, however, did enjoy the same privileges and other economic advantages as members of the ruling class; their economic situation was comparable, but they occupied a lower grade in the power structure. They

formed a privileged social élite, but did not belong to the power-Glite. THE SITUATION OF THE FALLAHIN AND THE ROLE OF THE MINORITIES

In this brief account, as in reality, those subjected to power are not done justice. As fallahin they were the agricultural producers who provided the nation's wealth, as artisans, small retailers and employees in service trades they satisfied the

population's daily needs. Their sphere was that of the villages and town quarters; they formed a large number of social units, politically unaware and not organized or closely tied together. Their mobility—if we disregard compulsory moves — was minimal. The village or town quarter was their homeland:

‘Pour eux, le village est la patrie'.?°

EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘IL 37 The fallahin led a life bound, in the most literal sense, to the earth; they worked their pieces of land with their bare hands. The rhythm of their life was determined by the seasons and by the River Nile. With anxiety they watched the waterlevel rise and fall. Every year the catastrophe of a devas-

tating deluge or of too little flooding of the fertile land could once more overwhelm the village. Houses were made of mud

bricks; if the banks did not hold, whole villages melted away

like ice in the sun.

The village, 'cette ile qui cerne l'inondation annuelle', ?*? considered the bureaucratic power apparatus as a threat. The existence of the village depended on the Nile's uncertain blessings; but it was further put into question by the inevitable demands from Cairo. If the river spared it, the village looked towards the representatives of the mighty: how much tax would be demanded of the inhabitants of the village this year; how many men for the army; how many for the corvée—to dig

canals which did not irrigate the fields of their own village or to work on the estates of the ruler and of the dhawat? In 1880, according to the calculation of the Minister of Public Works, ‘Ali Mubarak, 39.5 million working days were required

merely for the ‘legal’ corvée, that is for the maintenance of canals and dams!

No wonder that the rule of the 'reactionary' ‘Abbas was a happy time for the fallahin. He did not wage any wars, he did not build or dig canals and he did not constantly raise new taxes. The period of Egypt's process of ‘civilization’ under Isma‘il was, on the other hand, a gloomy time for them. The tax burden became intolerable. It was no use taking flight temporarily from the tax collectors, nor using violence against them. One way out remained to abandon the villages completely. The deserted land was then given by the Khedive to his favourites. In this climate mahdistic saviours couldthrive; in 1865 the Mahdi Ahmad al-Tayyib, ‘the Good', called for a socio-religious rebellion in Upper Egypt, struggle against the Turks and orthodoxy, redistribution of property and destruction of religious knowledge, as taught in Cairo. The 'Turks', Isma‘il's governors and generals, organized an indescribable massacre. Whole

villages literally disappeared from the face of the earth, their inhabitants slaughtered or deported.

38 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS It seemed, therefore, more sensible for a village community

to withdraw into itself and express its individuality in a multiplicity of local values, usages and rites, foods, agricultural and manufactured products, 'saints', and forms of superstition, which represented in the countryside a stronger power than the orthodoxy of the Azhar. 'Ni la pauvreté ni la précarité n'affaiblissent la persistance d'une personnalité collective; Celle-ci .. .n'a nullement besoin d'organismes légeaux pour s'exprimer; Elle est avant tout refuge contre la légalité', 3? In this survey, it must be stressed again, it is not our intention to attempt a comprehensive analysis of Egyptian

society, but only to clarify the structure of rule with a few observations. Therefore it is impossible to describe exhautively the position of the various minorities. We can only give some indications of specific functions and of points of contact with the apparatus of power. The beduin—about 250,000 of them as counted in 1882 —must

here be disregarded. They formed an incompletely, integrated

minority enjoying certain special rights on the margin of Egyptian society. In so far as the families of former beduin Shaikhs had acquired extensive landed property (e.g. the Abazas and Shawaribis) they were indistinguishable from the over provincial notables. The most important religious minority within Egyptian society was that of the Copts. Their number was calculated around 1880 as approximately 300,000: but since the census in 1897 has a figure of 608,000, McCoan's assessment probably came

nearer to the truth; in 1877 he spoke of 500,000 Copts. They lived for the most part in Middle and Upper Egypt. Most Copts were — just as the Muslim majority of the popu-

lation—fallahin, artisans and small retailers. However, for many generations Coptic families initiated their sons into the secrets of the work of the accountant and the clerk so that in comparison with those who went to village mosque schools they were distinguished by specialized knowledge. Because of this

they were indispensable in the financial and judicial administration. The sarrafs were almost exclusively Copts, who also had a monopoly in the private sphere as accountants and scribes. In the 1860s and 1870s they had an equal share in the: rise

EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘IL 39 of the autochthonous village notables and experts: in 1866 seven Coptic ‘umdas and notables entered the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab, and by the end of the 1870s many of their financial

and judicial officials had moved up to senior positions in the appropriate ministries and in the Mixed Courts, although not

into the ruling class proper. Disregarding the functions adopted because of their special capabilities, it can be said that the Coptic minority had on the whole the same status as the Muslim majority. The Egyptian Jews formed only a small ethno-religious community concentrated in Cairo and Alexandria, and comprised by

the end of the 1870s about 20,000 persons. They were for the most part craftsmen, small retailers, jewellers, money-changers and, like other Levantines, usurers. There were some indigenous Jewish banks which carried out fairly extensive financial dealings with Isma‘il. Collectively, however, the Jews did not

play any significant role in Egypt's social or political and economic life. The Armenian colony was also numerically unimportant; by

the end of Isma‘il's rule it is said to have grown to about 10,000 people. The Armenians were mostly active as small merchants. However, some members of the colony, especially the Bughus-Nubar clan, played a significant role in Egyptian admin-

istration and policy throughout the nineteenth century. The Foreign Ministry was almost an Armenian monopoly: Bughus was in charge of it under Muhammad ‘Ali, ‘Artin under ‘Abbas,

Istifan under ‘Abbas and Sa‘id, Nubar under Isma‘il, and Tijran under Cromer. Thus the most prominent Armenians (immigrants

from the central Ottoman territories) counted as members of the ruling class. They formed in this respect an exception among the non-Muslim minorities. Like the Copts and the Jews, the Syrians also did not have entry to the power-@lite. McCoan estimated their number at 7,000 in 1877. They will be encountered mainly as journalists —the majority of the first important Egyptian newspapers being published by Christian Syrians — but most Syrians competed with

the Copts as lower grade officials and also with the Greeks as usurers. An ever more important and challenging role in the economic and then the political life of Egypt under Isma‘il was played by foreigners, especially by Europeans. In 1882 they numbered 90,886 (1.34% of the total population).

40 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS Like the ‘Egyptians originating from other parts of the Ottoman empire’ they lived predominantly in the cities and in the Delta provinces. More than half of them lived in Alexandria (49,693), another 21,650 in Cairo and 7,010 in Port Said; only 1,895 lived in Middle and Upper Egypt, dispersed over the various provinces. The largest colonies were the Greeks (37,031), the Italians (18,665), the French (15,716), the Austrian (8,022) and the British (6,118) subjects. The import and export trade lay almost exclusively in their hands. On the basis of the Capitulations they did not have to pay any business or building taxes. The Greeks played a special role in that many among them

also settled in rival areas as small retailers, publicans and— in increasing numbers, under Isma‘il—as financiers. The Levantines, especially these Greek ‘'usurers', became familiar

and hated figures in the lives of the fallahin. They were always present at the right moment as money-lenders. The Greek usurer — Lady Duff Gordon wrote — 'follows the Coptic tax-

gatherer like a vulture after the cow';*? he would lend money to the financially weak fallahin for the taxes they owed at an exorbitant rate of interest. In many cases such transactions ended for the debtor with the loss of his harvest or even his land. This development reached its climax after the establishment of the Mixed Courts; they became instruments of the Levantine financiers (protected by the European states), who appropriated for themselves the goods and chattels of many

fallahin. Before the courts began their work, the landed property of Europeans had been a negligible quantity; by 1887 it was as much as 225,181 faddans (not all belonging to Greeks and

other Levantine ‘userers' of course). In 1882 Stuart estimated that the Delta fallahin had to pay a larger sum of money in interest on their debts (£4 to 5 million) than in land tax! Appropriation of land through judgements of the Mixed Courts continued for a few more years after the occupation (22,047

Faddans in 1883; 18,148 in 1884; 17,828 in 1885; 12,969 in 1886). More will be said later about the importance of this factor in 1882. CONCLUDING REMARKS

A social history of Egypt in the nineteenth century has still to be written. We shall tread more safely only when a number

EGYPTIAN SOCIETY UNDER ISMA‘IL Al of historians and sociologists have brought to light the treas-

ures of the Egyptian archives. That the research is still in its infancy is shown by the fact that Amin Sami's voluminous edition of documents, produced several decades ago, has still not yet been properly exploited. The preceding remarks on the structure of Egyptian society under Isma‘*il should be seen against this background. What we have tried to stress —in contrast to the study by Ibrahim Abu Lughod mentioned elsewhere —is the fact that under Isma*‘il the autochthonous property-owning and educated élite

only exceptionally had access to the ruling class. The principal axiom and self-evident truth of the non-Egyptian majority

of this class, necessary for the defence of their position, was that fallahin could not rule. Thus the call for 'Egypt for the Egyptians’ was not only directed against European intervention, but aimed in equal measure at the arrogant exclusivity of the predominantly Turco-Circassian power-élite. The ‘umdas and the dhawat were not allies, as Abu Lughod insists, but rivals. The

notion that the ‘aristocracy’ in the 1870s, or at least in the final years of that decade, set visible limits to Isma‘il's absolute rule (al-Rafi‘i, Landau, Abu Lughod, Abdel Malek) is a legend. The Turco-Circassians of the ruling class could have had no possible personal interest in the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab. They

were not represented in it; neither did the Chamber represent their specific interests. Al-Rafi‘i, Sharif Pasha's panegyrist, praises him as the 'founder of constitutional order in Egypt'. In reality he was one of Isma‘il's most loyal followers. Someone who appears to grasp the character of his ‘constitutional’ convictions is Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, when she

writes: ‘he adopted liberal principles in the same spirit as a Florentine gentleman during the Renaissance might have patronized a new painter'.°%"

Undoubtedly there was a partial identity of interest, especially in the economic sector, which allows one to speak of a privileged class, including the Turco-Circassians and the native notables, but this did not lead to an identification of the power-@lite with the social élite. For many Turco-Circassians the members of the latter remained 'fallahin'. In the following account of the events during the crisis years before the British occupation special attention will be paid to the

42 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS changes in the structure of the Egyptian society characterized so far.

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CRISIS OF 18/8-82

CHAPTER ONE

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER THROUGH EUROPEAN INTERVENTION

THE KHEDIVE'S LOSS OF POWER

Financial ruin ‘c'est au temps de Said que le commencement de la débacle a eu

lieu!'! With this apologetic reflection, Nubar Pasha* tried retrospectively to free Isma‘il from the responsibility of leading Egypt to financial ruin in the 1860s and 1870s, and from the fact that his advisers —even Nubar—could not make him see reason. By ‘'débadcle' was meant the growth of the Egyptian

state debt from about £3.5 million at Sa‘*id's death to nearly £100 million at the end of Isma‘il's rule.* When Egypt could no longer meet the usurious demands of the European financiers,

the latter closed their eyes to the fact that Egypt was not an Eldorado but merely an irresponsibly governed country. The

tenacity with which creditors continued to press their claims led to the intervention of several European governments, to Isma*il's removal and finally to the British occupation of Egypt.

The immediate consequence of this 'débdcle’ was a convulsion

of the country's political order and the initiation of a process Of political and social reorientation which provoked a series of internal crises. On the one hand, the European intervention kindled latent conflicts and on the other hand, by transforming the socio-economic structure, instigated new conflicts. These conflicts became the occasion and pretext for the occupation.

44 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS This is not the occasion for an exhaustive discussion of the causes of this financial development, despite its grave consequences, nor shall we consider the personal responsibilities, of the banks, of Isma‘il or of his financial advisers, nor, finally, test the relevant theories of imperialism by this concrete instance. How far immense sums of money had been thrown

away or rather—at least in the long run—spent to Egypt's advantage will also be omitted. But it must be pointed out that the various loans represented only nominal values; of the £68.4 millions received between 1862 and 1873 less than two

thirds actually reached Isma‘il's hands. The question of responsibility for this policy and of the use of these sums appears almost irrelevant when the real beneficiaries of these transactions are considered. Egypt was shamelessly exploited by European financiers. In 1877 the Egyptian state expenses amounted to about £9.5 million; of this, £7.5 million was used to pay interest and, in relatively small amounts, to amortize European debts. From the remaining £2 million the tribute to

the Porte had still to be paid; thus little was left for other purposes. In 1878, £7.4 million of the £10.15 million budget was reserved for the service of loans, for tribute, and for the Civil list. Correspondingly, the government's expenditure on state schools —always modest — reached in those two years its lowest level during the reign of Isma‘il and Tawfig (£41,267 and £35,040).

Although Isma‘il's financial dealings with foreign bankers and bond-holders is not dealt with in detail here, mention must be made of internal transactions because of their important

role in the crises which are to be described here. Isma‘il did not simply run blindly into his own and Egypt's ruin. There were attempts at an extensive, radical and short term solution of Egypt's financial problems, while this still appeared possible; for instance the Muqabala project, a plan, both ingenious and lamentable, for the complete and expeditious

amortization of the state debt."

The project was conceived by the Majlis Khususi and submitted for confirmation to Isma‘il on 28 August 1871. The Khedive's advisers reckoned on the basis of the Finance Minis-—

ter's information, that half the income from the land tax was needed for payment of interest on the state debt (amounting at that time to £30 million). They contemplated, therefore, the

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 45

possibility of extinguishing the state debt by a once and for

all exertion of the total financial strength of all the landowners of the country. Thus in future it. would be possible to renounce the levy of half the land tax, because the payment of interest would no longer apply. They calculated that the state's debt could be extinguished in a short time if the landowners payed within six years a sum of six times their annual tax payment, in addition to their yearly contribution. The income from the land tax for 1871 was estimated to be £5.15

million; thus it was expected that about £31 millions would be obtained in addition, i.e. a sum corresponding to the amount of the debt to European creditors. The government's reciprocal measures foreseen by this law were considerable: La loi de la Moukabala .. . avait pour but de permettre aux contribu-

ables de racheter la moitié de leur impdt foncier ... Le contribuable pouvait verser au Trésor, dés la promulgation de la loi, la

totalité du prix de rachat. Dans ce cas un dégrévement de 50% sur son impdt foncier lui était immédiatement accordé ou bien il pouvait payer le prix de rachat en six annuités, période qui fut ensuite prolongée en douze annuités. Dans ce dernier cas, des dégrévements calculés a un taux de 8 et 1/3% sur les sommes en capital versées au Trésor devaient lui 6tre accordés au fur et a mesure des paiments successifs. Une fois Moukabala payée, le Gouvernement s'engagea a fixer le taux de L'impdt foncier en perpetuité a la moitié de celui

qui existait lors de la promulgation de.la loi. L'impdt ainsi réduit ‘ne pouvait 6tre augmenté sous aucune forme et pour aucun motif (Art. 3)'.°

As well as the reduction by half of the land tax in perpetuity and the solemn assurance to keep this tax in the future at the level of half the 1871 rate the offer was made to allow the kharaji land for which the Mugabala would be levied to pass

into the full possession of the taxpayer. On the demise of the project everyone felt superior to its authors, upon whom the Europeans heaped their criticism. But,

initially, the project did not fail to make an impression in Europe: in an Austrian publication we read that, ‘with this law the Egyptian statesmen join the line of the most astute financial politicians of our time'; they have stepped 'with resolution onto the path of progress.'® It is impossible to do more than conjecture how far the authors themselves believed in the possible success of their action or how sincere Isma‘il was when, on 30 August 1871, he

issued the decree to instigate the project. Participation in the plan was to be optional; the implicit (but illusory)

46 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS premiss for success was that all the payers of land tax would participate, with more or less enthusiasm, in the liberation of the country from a burden which had been imposed on it by its

rulers. Those who had seriously believed this were to experience a bitter disappointment. The project failed miserably. This was partly the result of Isma‘il's favouritism because, on his orders, numerous landowners came to enjoy the advantages of the Mugabala without having contributed their allotted ~ Share. Under the Mugabala scheme many paid no more than their

tax arrears, the current tax contribution or state debt dues and exchequer bonds. Others were so much in debt themselves

that they could not respond to the appeal. Others again preferred to acquire new land with the financial means they had at their disposal. The Mugqabala was paid principally by those who wanted to gain private ownership of the kharaji land, or by those whose title to possession was until then ambiguous. The failure of the project was indirectly admitted when in 1873 it was decided that the Mugqabala should be paid from then on in twelve instead of six annual instalments and when the payment was at last made compulsory in 1874. The Mugabala had

in practice become a new tax. Until its abrogation on 6 January 1880 it brought in a nominal sum of £16.5 million, but, in the context of the later indemnity paid to Mugabala creditors, only £9.5 million was recognized as true Mugabala payment.

During its operation the government had not fulfilled the obligation which it had undertaken, and had instead placed various new burdens on the landowners' shoulders. Moreover, it was planned to ievy a new income tax at the end of the operation. This is no proof, however, that the Muqabala law had been planned as a gigantic fraud from the very beginning. People may have been so intoxicated with the prospect of being freed from the weight of debts, that at the beginning they believed in the practicability of the operation, and were con-

vinced of the possibility of establishing 'a rare example of financial vitality', as the Majlis al-Khususi had written in their exposé for Isma‘il in 1871.7 But what could have instilled this confidence in the taxpayers of the country? Certainly not Isma‘il's assurances! They can hardly be reproached for having been shortsighted and

for not having taken advantage of their opportunity. To carry through the plan on a voluntary basis adequate political and

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 47

constitutional guarantees would have been needed. To enforce this plan by law both resolutely and uncompromisingly, and legally and honestly, Egypt lacked a responsible ruler. How could the taxpayers have been convinced that this was more than an insincere manoeuvre by Isma‘il and his advisers, in order to Open up new sources of money while the German-French war was

blocking access to the Parisian money market?

The socio-political climate of Egypt made a failure likely

even if the project was instigated in a spirit of sincerity. The result could hardly come as a surprise. Only a small nunm-

ber of privileged people really grasped the advantages of the Mugabala laws, and thought of taking advantage of them. They were the same people who later obstinately resisted the revocation of the law, both for their own economic advantage and for other reasons. For the general public the Muqabala was merely another tax appearing in the yearly budget as fixed sums. The

fallahin, for the time being, did not come to enjoy any noticeable tax reduction or full ownership rights in kharaji land. Instead of a grand idea the Muqabala was merely a flash in the pan.

In 1873 Isma‘il tried once more to exorcise one evil by contracting another through raising a foreign loan of £32 million. But in this way the financial ruin of the country was sealed: of this sum the Khedive received only £11 million in cash. Whatever desperate measures Isma‘il undertook after this — the issue of a compulsory internal loan of £5 million (Ruznama) in 1874 or, in 1875, the sale of his Suez Canal shares to England for £4 million—they provided mere drops in the ocean. Egypt was moving irresistibly towards the day when it would have to declare itself bankrupt. Kuropean creditors began to worry about their interest: the Cave and Outrey missions put them on the path of intervention. Egypt was a rich and flourishing country; if the Khedive did not succeed in meeting his financial obligations then the Europeans themselves had simply to intervene in the administration of the country and see that they received what was

rightly theirs. This they saw as self-evident. In May 1876 the Caisse de la Dette Publique was set up. But, since the British creditors were not satisfied with the agreed regulations, Messrs. Goschen and Joubert had to negotiate more

attractive conditions; and it had to be ensured that these

48 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS were adhered to. On 18 November 1876, therefore, the Dual Control was established. Its most important weapon consisted of the two Controllers-General, one to watch over the revenue

and the other the expenditure of the Egyptian state. Egypt was subjected to a ‘compulsory bankruptcy administration' or even a "veiled European colonial rule'. For a whole year it was attempted, albeit in vain, to satisfy

Europe's financial claims, at least as regards interest. The judgements of the Mixed Courts (which had begun work on 1 January 1876) rained down mercilessly on the Egyptian government, and completely took away its financial breath. The sum which,

especially with the help of the Mixed Courts, had then been extorted from the government on the basis of unfounded or insufficiently substantiated claims was estimated by Riyad

Pasha at £20 million.®? It is reported that Isma‘il, at an audience with a European concession hunter said to a servant, "Please shut that window, for if this gentleman catches cold it will cost me £10,000'.’° Officials remained unpaid and despite the fact that in 1874 the Nile was very low, collected under duress. The £2 million necessary for the May 1878 coupon (interests of the unified debt) were formally squeezed out of

the fallahin within the shortest possible time, in order to appease the creditors supported by the consuls. The land tax had to be collected in advance for the whole year, a practice which later greatly enraged the European Commission of Enquiry. In May 1878 it finally became evident that things could not

continue in this vein. First the rate of interest had to be

lowered, as moderate Europeans had already understood in 1877;

but it was clear that the creditors would agree on such a measure only after an intense scrutiny of Egypt's solvency. The creditors' grip on Egypt Aiming at a lower interest rate, Isma‘il himself had suggested in the autumn of 1877 the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry. The French Consul-General Baron des Michels had constantly warned against accepting such a commission on the

conditions laid down by the Khedive. He implied that the Khedive only intended to deceive the commissioners in each

mudiriya with falsified accounts and to alleviate his financial adifficulties by humanitarian appeals.

Finally, the debt commissioners took the initiative and, in

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 49

a letter of 9 January 1878, proposed to the Egyptian Finance Minister a comprehensive inquiry into Egypt's financial situation. The Khedive, however, would only allow them to

ascertain the real level of the state's income. Ignoring the objections raised by the commissioners against this move, he decreed on 27 January 1878 the setting up of a Commission Supérieure d'Enquéte whose task would be to establish the

state's budget deficit, to investigate abuses and irregularities in the raising of taxes, and to calculate in advance the revenue for 1878. The commission had the right to information from every administrative office. Its members would be nomin-

ated later; but it was well known that the Khedive intended to appoint as chairman Gordon Pasha, then Governor-General of Sudan.

But the Europeans were not satisfied with this. Again des Michels expressed this well: ‘Il semble de plus en plus certain que Son Altesse ne cédera qu'ad la force', he wrote to Paris.!! Ismatil, on the contrary, emphasized in a telegram of 26 February to the French Foreign Ministry his sincere determination 'de faire la lumiére compléte sur la situation financiére'. But he rejected any further demands in strong terms: 'Ce gue je n'ai pu accepter ce sont les prétensions des Commissaires qui tendent 4 créer une autorité supérieure 4a la mienne dans mon gouvernement, ce que je n'admettrai jamais'.}? Isma*‘il knew very well what it meant to give the Europeans even

a foot in the door. He did not want to sacrifice his power and Egypt's relative political independence to those who tried to snatch them so blatantly and so arrogantly. From an economic point of view Egypt had already in 1876 become a distant estate of European absentee landlords, although this was not fully realized in the country itself. A Commission of Enquiry on the creditors' conditions would reveal the Khedive's situation to

his subjects. By the middle of March 1878 Isma‘il was becoming resigned to

his fate and seemed prepared to accept it. In June des Michels gave Paris the news of the success of the fight of attrition against the Khedive: 'Sa force de résistance est brisée'.?+? Isma*‘il was in danger of being relegated to the fringes of Egyptian politics, which were increasingly dictated by Europe. Soon his only recourse would be to intrigue, conspiracy and

making work difficult for the new masters; this on the basis

o0 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS of his undiminished and effective personal influence in the country, and with the help of a circle of devoted followers.

Isma‘il knew that his authority was still effective. His policy was not, therefore, merely revenge; he aimed deliberately at the recovery of power. His 'Mamelukes', who were, with hin, losing control of the country, gathered conspiratorially arounc him as the force of opposition against European usurpation. Isma*‘il became in the spring of 1879 one of the central figures for the defence of Egypt's relative independence which he, however, certainly conceived as a ruler's independence. A Commission of Enquiry ‘with the widest powers', based on Furopean ideas was thus set up by decree on 30 March 1878. The enquiry would embrace all aspects of the financial situation

without, however, disregarding 'the legitimate rights' of the government. All officials, including ministers, were expected to give the commission the information required immediately.!"* Ferdinand de Lesseps was initially nominated president of the commission, but a few weeks later he had left the country. Leadership remained, consequently in the hands of the two vicepresidents, Sir Rivers Wilson and Riyad Pasha. The commission also included the four 'debt commissioners’ as well as a Frenct secretary. Riyad had been forced upon the commission by Isma‘il because

the ‘indigenous element' had to be represented; his brief was to ensure that the Khedive and his government were not

discredited. However, he turned out to be a collaborator, which was appreciated by Cromer; but it had been necessary to reassure him explicitly that he would be protected from Isma*il's revenge. Sharif Pasha!° finally refused on 3 June 1878 to appear per-

sonally in front of the commission. As Minister of Justice he was expected to give oral evidence concerning Egyptian finan-

cial law, but he was only prepared to give written answers to written questions. When the commission did not accept this he withdrew as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Justice because of his strong personal aversion and also in order to disclaim the continued usurpations of these commissioners and

to show his agreement with Isma‘il. But opposition was futile. Moreover, the Khedive, who originally refused to allow his property rights to be scrutinized, at last gave his permission to the estate managers to give evidence in front of the

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER ol

commission; but as before, he did not want to reveal in what way he had acquired his properties. The obstacles put repeatedly in the path of the commission made the Europeans more impatient and impertinent with their questions. Some former women slaves of ‘Abbas's mother complained personally to the commission about the government because it had confiscated some of their possessions and was not paying their pensions. On leaving the commissioners ' office, they were immediately arrested on the order of the

Prefect of Police. Wilson insisted that Isma‘il should dis-

miss him. Isma‘il complied with this request but appointed him Mudir of Shargiya. The Austrian Consul-General requested that "the Sword of Damocles of deposition' should be hung over

Isma‘il's head, otherwise there would be no end to the 'financial confusion'.!® For his part, the Khedive complained to the representatives of the powers about the commissioners, saying that they had developed a personal enmity against him and undermined the mod-

est remainder of his authority and prestige. He also complained that the commission was abrogating to itself the role of a judicial authority, and evidently wanted to impeach him: if he must be brought before a tribunal, let it not be one which he himself had instigated. The consuls showed Isma‘il no compassion, so he sought help

elsewhere. As Riyad had not satisfied the expectations placed in him, andas Sharif's resignation had proved to be an ineffective gesture, he remembered Nubar who, in the sixties and early seventies, had represented his interest vis-a-vis the powers, although he was not the man to master internal difficulties. He had spent too many years of his career in Europe, where he had been again living since March 1876; but he was perhaps in a position to keep the pack of European creditors and their arrogant representatives in Egypt at bay. Isma*‘il had already once recalled the Armenian, after having contemptuously rebutted him, in order to defend the Khedive's

specific interests in the replacement of consular jurisdiction

by the Mixed Courts. Later on, Isma‘il had dismissed him again when he had seemed to become too powerful or at least too presumptuous.

Now, however, he needed again precisely Nubar's diplomatic

ability. At the end of June, through his own son Husain (who

o2 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS sent Tijran Bey to Paris), the Khedive let Nubar know that he had again found favour with his master: he should free himself of the suspicion of having schemed against Isma‘il before being banished in 1876, and then he could have any position in the government which he might desire.

But Nubar considered that Isma‘il's time was running out. He was among those who had realized that the Khedive's power was extremely weak, and that he should stipulate conditions and not the Khedive: only if these conditions were met would he be

prepared to return to Egypt. Ina letter to Prince Husain he demanded guarantees that he would be spared new disappointments and a new 'expatriation forcée de mon pays'.’*’ Nubar laid down two fundamental requirements. The first was

of a personal nature, that his friend Wilson should become Min-

ister of Finance. The second was of a technical kind: before forming a new government it was necessary to agree on a new programme of reform and to guarantee its strict execution.

However, at last, Isma‘il asked the Armenian urgently to return

to Egypt. He arrived in Cairo on 15 August. At their first meeting the Khedive began by putting forward his complaints of European interference and the intention to deprive him and his

family of their private property. Nubar disappointed him bitterly. He confined himself to making clear to the Khedive that he had no other choice but to bow to the situation. Nubar had seen his chance to create Egyptian policies. The essential difference in accepting the office of Isma‘il's Grand Vizier rather than that of Governor-General of the powers would be that Europe was distant but Isma‘il was near! Isma‘il should no longer use him as a valet de chambre, and dismiss him according to his moods. When, in 1874, the German Kaiser asked Nubar why Isma‘il had dismissed him, his answer is reported to have

been: 'A cause de son pouvoir absolut et sans bornes';!8 this would have to change. Nubar had a programme for the solution of the immediate problems, a programme which he could carry out only with Europe's support. He hoped that the fundamental aims

of his policies, i.e. ‘la prospérité de notre pays et l'independance administrative, la liberté d'action de son Gouvernement',’? would not in consequence suffer any damage. Thus he would become the celebrated reformer, the saviour, indeed the

real creator of modern Egypt. In the face of his great work it would be forgotten on whom he had to rely. His biographers

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 53

record only Nubar's self-assessment when they extol his glowing patriotism as the main motive for his accession to the government in August 1878. Evidently even more glowing than his patriotism was the belief in his mission: ‘Vous pouvez d'tautant plus me croire’, he wrote one year later to von Kremer, 'que d'aprés moi, il n'y a plus d'Egypte ou du moins que l'Egypte ne

s'appartient plus'.?° On 20 August 1878 the Commission of Enquiry presented to the

Khedive an exhaustive intermediate report on its work.*! It recommended a large number of financial, administrative and political reforms which should be introduced even before the commissioners had finished their enquiry. These reforms would

objectively serve Egypt's 'progress' and, subjectively, the aim of changing the country into a properly administered, and consequently, profitable demesne of European creditors. Taxes would only be levied on the basis of well-ordered laws which would apply without distinction to all the country's inhabitants. The method of levying should be reformed immediately: taxes should be collected only on terms most favour-

able to the taxpayer, and never again in advance; taxcollectors should be subjected to a strict control; land taxes should be reassessed on the basis of a new land register; a considerable number of taxes with little profit but felt as oppressive by those concerned should be abolished, and indep-

endent, judicial authority should also be established for administrative and fiscal problems; a yearly budget should be published and water distribution and recruitment of soldiers and corvée workers should be freed from all arbitrary decision. These were the long term proposals for reform. But they could only be carried out in this form, and Egypt could only be brought under European control, if the Khedive's political and economic power were reduced to a minimum. The ‘principle

Of ministerial responsibility' was to be introduced; with this formula the Europeans concealed the fact that the guiding principles of policy must henceforth be determined by the con-

trolling powers and their collaborators to the exclusion of Isma*‘il. Moreover, half of the Khedivial family's land and their real estate, not burdened by mortgages, should pass into state ownership, in exchange for a civil list. Thus the Khedive would be deprived of political and economic power, and the public and private sectors would be separated. The country

34 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS should be able to carry on a political and economic existence | independent of the purely private interests of the ruling dynasty. Egypt should be transformed from being Isma‘il's private estate, ruined by financial mismanagement, into a profitable enterprise conducted according to European economic principles. The workers and employees, i.e. fallahin and officials, were thus reassured that they would be very much better off under the new administration even though its ultimate aim was the regular and timely payment of interests. The administration, however, would ensure that the fallahin only

paid taxes in a regular way and at a tolerable level. As for the officials, the first recommendation of the Commission of Enquiry had already aimed at a satisfactory settlement of thei) salary problem (but at the same time it was indicated that redundant officials had to be dismissed). A Khedivial decree of 12 May 1878—which seems not to have materialized except for

its publication in the Official Gazette—had ordered, as from 1 May, the regular payment of all those officials who drew their salaries directly from the Finance Ministry. In additior there should be a gradual payment of arrears. The 'European' government

Isma*‘il had recalled Nubar, his long-standing diplomatic 'spec-

ial representative' so that Nubar might at the last moment prevent Isma‘il's de facto dismissal by interceding between Isma*‘il and the powers. But with the consuls Nubar did nothinc but make fun of the Khedive, who he said had nothing more important to do than moan continually about the loss of his

da’iras. Instead of interceding, he proposed to Isma‘il a three-point programme which was identical with the three main demands of the Commission of Enquiry: the execution of judic-—

ial reforms for the protection of the population against the arbitrary will of the government; surrender of the Khedive's absolute power, and delimitation of ministerial responsibility; state acquisition of the Khedive's and his family's unmortgagec private property in exchange for a civil list. Nubar took a stance totally in favour of the commission's report. He succeeded in 'persuading' Isma‘il that it was best to accept this report and his own programme 'spontaneously'. If the Khedive could not bring himself to accept he and Wilson would leave Egypt on 27 August and surrender the regulation of the

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER QO

problems to the powers. . What was Isma‘il to do? For the moment he was at his wit's end. Should he challenge Europe, even risk a military intervention? The Porte's behaviour was uncertain; and he had no more money with which to bribe the Sultan and his advisers.

Would Egypt still be considered one of the 'civilized'" states if he were to insist on his absolute authority and force the creditors, directly or via the Sultan to undertake further and very grave measures? Might he not become contemptible as a common oriental despot and his pretences of civilization be derided as a Potemkin fraud? There was nothing left to him but

to put up with this degradation, to tolerate it for a while, and later to take revenge. He needed time in order to prepare his return to power. Let Nubar and Wilson guide the destiny of the country for a while; he, Isma‘il, would again make himself indispensable, again take control as the single stable point in chaos, as the only reliable authority. He would then have to be entreated to return. On 23 August the Khedive delivered in Wilson's presence a formal declaration composed by Nubar.** Naturally, he accepted the commission's conclusions and said that it was indeed he who had wanted this enguiry with the well-being of the country in mind, as 'mon pays n'est plus i'Afrique: nous faisons actuellement partie de l'Europe; il est donc naturel pour nous d'abandonner les errements anciens pour adopter un systéme nouveau adapté a4 notre état social', and that he had entrusted Nubar Pasha with the formation of a government and the execution of this reform programme.

If Isma‘il's 'dream of civilization and progress' (Kenny) had ever reached a verbal climax, it was certainly not in the affirmation that Egypt now formed a part of Europe, as that passage was repeatedly interpreted. Considering tne historical background, that sentence written by Nubar had all the appearance of biting sarcasm. The Khedive certainly succeeded in

reading the declaration as if he believed in it; he had a

talent for acting and adapting himself 'chameleonlike'’ to new Situations. But what must he have felit at that moment? The commission had never been his most ardent desire! His dream was an Afro-Egyptian empire with a '‘'civilized' core in Egypt, the two metropolises Alexandria and Cairo looking culturally and economically to Europe, but not an Egypt that had become so

56 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS Fatally enmeshed in Europe.

In accepting the Commission of Enquiry's requests, the consuls denied any direct pressure on the Khedive. But this had

certainly not been necessary. In practice it was Nubar and his friend Wilson who had become the dominant fiqures inthe commis-

sion after the early departure of de Lesseps, and who exercised,

as representatives, their 'power of persuasion’. Nubar, however, was concerned to avoid the impression that he had reached a position of power through the influence of Britain or Europe. One of his friends proclaimed proudly: ‘C'est un Egyptien qui a sauvé l1'Egypte'.?? In a rescript to Nubar Pasha of 28 August 1878 Isma‘il

attempted to elaborate the principle of so-called ministerial responsibility: Je veux vous confirmer Ma ferme détermination de mettre les régles de

notre administration en harmonie avec les principes qui régissent les administrations en Europe. Au lieu d'un pouvoir personnel, prin-. Cipe actuel du Gouvernement de l"Egypte, Je veux un pouvoir qui

imprime, il est vrai, une direction generale aux affaires, mais qui trouve son equilibre dans un Conseil des Ministres. En un mot, Je

veux dorénavant gouverner avec et par Mon Conseil des Ministres.

According to him all ‘important questions' should be discussed in the Council of Ministers whose majority decision would be Sanctioned by the Khedive. The appointment and dismissal of

senior officials, above all the provincial governors and prefects of police should follow agreement between the departmental minister concerned and the President of the Council of Ministers, and should be with the Khedive's approval. This new institution of the Council of Ministers, Isma‘il concluded,

'n'est pas en dehors'de moeurs et de nos idées, et est au contraire, conforme 4 un des préceptes de la loi sacrée'.?" Regarding constitutional law this rescript was a highly ambiguous document. According to the Dual Control powers it

formed the basis of a system of ‘ministerial responsibility'. This review was taken over semi-uncritically by most authors;

but it never appeared in Egyptian documents. In the declaration of 23 August the form used was ‘ministerial independence'. Nubar aspired to this and to nothing else. In the rescript of 28 August Isma‘il spoke simply of the necessity for ministerial solidarity whatever this might imply in

practice. It is true that in this document the word 'responSibility' is used, but not in a juridical or politicoinstitutional sense. "Le Conseil des Ministres siégera sous

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER O7

votre présidence, puisque Je vous ai donné la charge et la responsabilité de cette nouvelle organisation’. In other words Isma‘il wanted, if possible, to have very little to do with this new organization; he refused to assume responsibility for a failure, although time was what he wanted. According to constitutional law the government was not responsible to anyone, not to the Khedive, nor to the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab, nor to the people, as the delegates had suggested in

their reply to the speech from the throne only in 1879. In time they had thanked him not only for the convocation of the Chamber, but also for the establishment of a Council of Ministers. In fact, as the American Consul-General reported,

it was in reality an ‘irresponsible ministry in the interests of foreign creditors'.*°* So-called ministerial responsibility was the verbal fig leaf with which the control powers tried to cover the nakedness of this monstrous government of Europeans

and collaborators. Some Britons judged the rescript of 28 August to be Egypt's 'Magna Charta'?® or even a revolutionary constitution and thus as something which could be dismissed as

propaganda. |

There was no clarification of what rights remained to the Khedive after the formation of the ministry. He had not yet abdicated and he still wished to determine the general direction of Egyptian policy. Nubar, however, denied him access to the assembly of the Council of Ministers. Isma‘il should do no more than put his signature to their decisions for them to become law. But what should happen if the Khedive refused his Signature on the grounds that the decision did not agree with the general policy which he had in mind? Naturally the outcome of such a possibility was not considered. Of course Nubar could not maintain his position on the basis

of a few sheets of paper. If Isma‘il's authority were to conSist merely in reading out declarations put forward by the President of the Council of Ministers in speeches from the throne, then Nubar needed a real power behind him. He had no following among the ruling class or the autochthonous notables, nor was he likely to find any, should the reforms one day be realized. He was, therefore, building on unlimited support by the control powers, and especially that of Great Britain. On the other hand he needed to have at his disposal a group of able administrators who didnot shrink from the odium of collaboration.

58 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS Concerning the composition of the Council of Ministers, it was clear from the beginning that Nubar himself would take over the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice; Wilson would hold the Ministry of Finance and Riyad Pasha, Wilson's treasured collaborator in the Commission of Enquiry, the Ministry of the Interior, while Riyad's friend and protégé, ‘Ali Mubarak, would hold the Ministries of Education and Awqaf.*”’ But the final setting up of the government dragged on until the end of the year. When Nubar offered the Ministry of Finance to the Englishman Wilson, he had to expect that the French government

would also claim a ministerial chair. Therefore, Nubar left the position of Public Works Minister unoccupied, but he wanted

to give it to the Frenchman of his choice. In this matter he intended to prove his own independence to himself and the Egyptian public. Thus, he could perhaps avoid being slandered as a henchman for the Europeans. In France he was already considered an ‘'anglophile'; ‘so he was not alienating any sympathy by resisting pressure from the French government! The Anglo-

French rivalry would also prevent such a manoeuvre from , endangering his position. But Nubar failed in his attempt to prove a non-existent independence.

The inevitable official French claim to a share in the

government followed on 3 September. Nubar rejecred it out of hand: he had called Wilson into his government not as an Englishman but as a competent financial expert, and he was determined to form a national and not an international government. Thinking of France he declared to the French rep-

resentative that, 'si les Puissances croient devoir refuser cette liberté a l'Eaqypte, leur volonté est trop forte pour ne pas faire loi; je ne chercherai méme pas a la discuter un instant. Mais il faut gue nous soyons fixés avec la plus entiére précision';7°® the French government should submit

their point of view in writing; he would then study it and decide whether or not he could in those circumstances remain a

minister. Paris rejected this proposal. On 7 September Nubar gave way and announced that he’ intended to appoint as Minister of Public Works the Frenchman Cauvet (a

personal acquaintance of his and Directeur des Etudes a 1'Ecole Centrale); but he would withdraw the appointment should it be interpreted as a capitulation to French demands. A week later he made an official request to the French government that

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER o°9

M. Cauvet should be allowed to join the Egyptian government; but Paris had its own candidate and was not prepared to compromise. On 22 September Nubar resigned himself to. this and accepted M. de Bligniéres as Minister of Public Works and

Supervisor of ports and railways. But this the British government would not under any circumstances countenance. It is reported that Nubar exclaimed in despair: ‘J'ai fait un réve d'indépendance égyptienne: l1'Angleterre aujourd'hui, aussi bien que la France, me prouve que je m'étais trompé'.*? He could

not hope for anything more from this bargaining, either for his or for the public's satisfaction. When in mid-September, Italy also demanded a ministerial position and could not be persuaded

to abandon the request, Nubar lost all patience. At the end of October he told the Italian Consul-General that, if his government must occupy a ministry, for example the Ministry of

Justice, they should apply to London or Paris. Egyptian affairs were once more decided there. Whether through naivety or impudence, de Martino took the sarcasm at its face value and returned a little later with an alleged agreement with the western powers. Nubar, after consulting Wilson, had now to reject the Italian claim in spite of strongly-voiced threats to insist on immediate fulfilment of Egyptian financial oblig-

ations to Italian creditors.

The formation of the government could only be considered complete when the Moniteur Egyptien of 12 December had made known the spheres of competence of the ministries. Railways and ports, with the exception of Alexandria harbour which came under the Finance Ministry, were the concern of the Ministry of Public Works. For the War Ministry Isma‘il had managed to install one of his devoted 'Mamelukes', Ratib Pasha.?° Accord-

ing to official British documents, Nubar did not want to have Sharif in his government; but in any case Sharif would have refused to serve. Nubar had few supporters on whom he could draw; he could

certainly win over some European ‘'specialists' for collaboration but he did not have any following orany 'party' in Egypt, except, of course, the Armenians. Thus it is not surprising that he had recourse to nepotism. He entrusted his son Bughus with a leading position in the management of railways; Artin Bey became chief of the Khedive's cabinet andTijran Bey, Nubar's son-in-law, Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers.

60 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS The transfer of the Khedivial family's unmortgaged real

estate, like the formation of the cabinet, dragged on until the end of October. Isma‘il was unable to take the plunge and renounce his estate in the same way as he had renounced his political power, with at least some appearance of a magnanimous

gesture; on the contrary, he fought for every square foot. Instead of the expected 431,915 faddans,*! he and his family surrendered to the state in the decree of 26 October 1878 only 425,723 faddans and 16 groups of buildings. Nubar had allowed him to keep some parks and gardens around those palaces which remained in the hands of the Khedive's family. Some months

later Isma‘il protested that, although he had given up the land, this had not included its equipment and livestock. He wanted compensation of £300,000; but nobody was prepared to pay him this sum. Nubar set himself to work with great enthusiasm but he was much too optimistic where the economic situation of the country

was concerned. He put forward a theoretical and detailed plan

for the solution of the financial problems; this included lowering the interest on the state debt, increasing taxes on the ‘ushuri land, and the abolition of European tax privileges. But the 1878 budget could not be balanced. Against the planned expenditure of £10.15 million there was an expected revenue of £8.25 million and it was questionable whether even this lower figure would be realized.

In the spring, the last piastre was squeezed out of the population for the May coupon; coins flowing into the Caisse de la Dette Publique betrayed their previous use as simple Ornaments threaded together on a string. After the 1877 low Nile there followed a catastrophic flooding in 1878. In Upper Egypt a famine broke out which was at its most severe from September to December of that year. In the provinces of Girga, Qina and Isna probably more than 10,000 people starved todeath. In spring 1879 travellers passed through totally deserted villages. As one of the government inspectors reported, it was a question of ‘money famine’; with a little money there was no need to starve but the last piastres had gone into the pockets

of the creditors. Many people died of starvation especially in the neighbourhood of sugar factories; they were people who relied on wages which they had not received. But Wilson insisted that ‘Umar Lutfi,** the Mufattish of Upper Egypt, should

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 61

late in 1878 collect the taxes marked as ‘arrears’ in the lists of the Ministry of Finance. Lutfi talked of starvation; if Wilson insisted, he said, he would of course collect the sums requested, but then nobody should then investigate the methods employed in the collection. Thus the revenue remained well behind expectations. The government arranged a loan from Rothschild, a loan nominally of £8.5 million; but only £6 million was obtained. The Khedivial lands, now in state ownership, were mortgaged as security. This loan was needed mainly to pay the interest on the state

debt. Isma‘il's ruinous policy was being continued. ‘At this time,' Lord Cromer writes, 'the Egyptian Government lived from coupon to coupon'.?% Nubar, discouraged and disillusioned, admitted early in 1879: ‘Nous tournons dans un cercle vicieux — nous ne marchons pas'.?"*

The financial prospects for 1879 were no better. One of the few possibilities for increasing revenue was the increase of taxes on ‘ushuri land; this would hit mainly the privileged class who were still those most capable of paying. But for most of this land the Mugqabala was already paid in full or at least in part. The Mugabala law of 1871 had confirmed that in the case of full payment the state would renounce any additional tax burden. But provision had been made in case of need: "Si un @événement de force majeure, comme sécheresse trop grande

Ou une inondation trop forte, nécessitait des travaux imprévus au budget, il ne serait demandé qu'une avance temporaire aprés examen et délibération par le Conseil des Ministres, le Conseil des Finances et 1'Assemblée des Délégués', as was said in the letter of 28 August 1871 from the Majlis Khususi to Isma‘il.?> In view of the 1877 drought and the catastrophic flood of 1878 the -government believed that it was justified in requesting at least an advance tax payment from the landowners who had already enjoyed the advantages of the Mugqabala; but the Cham-

ber of Delegates had to be consulted on the subject. The Council of Ministers, therefore, decided to ask the Khedive to convoke the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab.

But even if the Chamber had no objections to such ‘advance payments’, the sums needed to satisfy the creditors could simply no longer be collected. Delegations of ‘umdas and shaikhs from various provinces came to the Finance Ministry and declared the

population no longer in a position to pay the taxes in full.

62 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS The decree of 12 May 1878 which had ordered the regular payment

of officials remained in the face of empty coffers an empty promise. In June 1879 official salaries were up to twenty months in arrears. Those who wished could be paid at least part of their emoluments in kind (foodstuffs, horses, etc.); Ahmad Shafiq reports that he requested books from the state printers. °° Wilson, de Bligniéres and Baring (Lord Cromer) met regularly, therefore, in order to find a way out of the dilemma and to construct a basis for discussion by the Council of Ministers. The reduction of interest rates on the national debt was envisaged as a cardinal point for every solution. Apart from these plans, the realization of which would take some time, there were discussions of immediate measures to reduce state expenditure. In the budget for 1878 there was one conspicuous item which, it was thought, could be drastically reduced: of the £3 million set aside for general administration (compared

with £7.15 million for debts, tribute and the civil list), the Ministry of War would receive £% million against the Ministry

of Education allocation of about £37,000. Here cuts were envisaged. The strength of the army was to be reduced from 90,479 soldiers and 2,609 officers to 36,247 soldiers and 993

officers. This was not of course the actual military strength. In fact, at the beginning of 1879 there were under arms only 15,000 men, 8,000 of whom it was intended to dismiss. Moreover, the majority of the military schools were to be closed. Wilson's aim was the total abolition of the navy and the reduction of the army to a police force of 7,000 men. The American head of the Army General Staff, General Stone, was convinced that it was more than purely financial arguments which perSuaded the 'European' government to take this step. He thought that their aim must have been 'to destroy the army and thus take power out of the hands of the Khedive'.?’ The troops would present no obstacle when these measures were undertaken. Nothing would have pleased the soldiers more

than to shed their uniforms and hurry back to their native villages. But how would the 1,600 officers who were to be dismissed from active service behave? For a long time they had had no payment; many of them were in debt, and some had

already sold their belongings in order to survive. In early July 1878 enraged officers had caused ‘tumultuous scenes' in the

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 63

Ministry of War because they had for 7 or 8 months received no payment. They succeeded in obtaining at least one month's pay outright. But now they were to be dismissed without even the comfort of the payment of their arrears. The government did not attribute any importance to warnings that they might offer resistance. Then, on 18 February 1879 Nubar and Wilson were insulted and physically attacked by demonstrating officers in front of the Ministry of Finance. The next day when, through

Isma‘il's personal intervention, order had been restored, the President of the Council of Ministers followed Isma‘il's request and sent in his personal resignation. ISMASIL'S VAIN ATTEMPT TO RETURN TO POWER

Isma‘il and the officers' demonstration: WNubar's fall After the establishment of the independent Council of Ministers on 28 August 1878 Isma‘il had been forced into the background of the political stage. From 18 February 1879 onwards he sud-

denly stood in the forefront again. In the February crisis and during the events which followed, he put himself at the spearhead of opposition against increasing European intervention and the annoyance of the 'European' government. He tried of course

to conceal his role vis-d-vis the consuls. The opposition activists were Isma‘il's trusted followers among the TurcoCircassians and those indigenous notables still in his favour. They feared the loss of their political and economic privileges; at the same time they did not want idly to watch Egypt Sink to the level of a European colony. They were given propaganda support by the anti-interventionist agitation of the

country's relatively new political press. In the spring and summer of 1878 Isma‘il was abandoned first

by Riyad and then by Nubar. Instead of defending his interests against the Europeans they had collaborated with them. But Sharif had remained faithful to him and to Egypt. He had neither appeared in front of the Commission of Enquiry nor did he want any contact with the 'European' Council of Ministers. The Khedive could count on the loyalty of nearly all the TurcoCircassians, as he could on Sharif. Under him they had for fifteen years held the highest state offices from which they were now in danger of being pushed out. No pressure was needed from Isma‘il to enlist them in the recovery of Egypt.

64 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS Shortly after the formation of the Nubar government, Raphael Borg had reported that Shahin Pasha—then Mufattish of Lower Egypt —was stirring up the merchants and ‘ulama’ of Cairo against the new order.*® Although convinced that the great majority of the population would support his reforms, Nubar warned Shahin that he was aware of his machinations. The new government had to realize it could not expect any support from the Khedive and his followers. But Nubar, with the support of Europe, felt secure enough as long as Isma‘il did not work actively against him. The British Consul~-General, Vivian, was asked by his government to warn the Khedive against such a course. On 14 December

1878 he declared officially to Isma‘il that he would be held responsible for the success or failure of the new order, Therefore, he should not attempt to put obstacles in the way of Nubar's government. Extremely angry, Isma‘il refused such a responsibility because he said he had surrendered his power and property and the government had been withdrawn from his

influence. In a conversation with the French representative Godeaux he compared his position with that of the British Queen: he could no more be held responsible than she could for

the cabinet's decisions. When, after the meeting of the Chamber of Delegates on 2

January 1879, the political scene was set in motion, this was immediately ascribed to Isma‘il's intrigues. The rumour circulated that he had secretly convoked leading members of the Chamber and signified that he would not be displeased if they offered resistance to growing European intervention. The Khedive denied such rumours, but declared that his situation

was nevertheless intolerable: on the one hand the Council of | Ministers ignored his views but on the other hand Britain and France made him personally responsible for everything. He

would at least have to require that the decree of 28 August 1872 should become effective; here he had a claim to ‘une direction générale aux affaires'. He also wanted to take part in the assembly of the Council of Ministers, to have his say and to co-operate in the instigation of policies. Vivian and Godeaux were prepared to advocate implementing

this demand since it corresponded with their own views. But Nubar and Wilson were resolutely against them. Isma‘il appeared on 18 February as the only guarantor of peace and

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 65

order; the relationship between the holders of power had to be reconsidered. Although the demonstration of 18 February 1879 is seen as one of the most notorious events of nineteenth-century Egyptian

history, most accounts of it are nevertheless remarkable for their lack of precision and uncertainty of interpretation. [In most accounts it is stated that 2,500 officers were dismissed from the army without receiving any payment of their arrears, and that this was why they defended themselves. First, the Officer Corps was to be reduced from about 2,600 to about 1,000 men. The other 1,600 officers were to be put on provisional retirement, during which time they would receive

only half pay. Between 300 and 600 officers took part in the Cairo demonstration; in this they were encouraged by Isma‘il. Their financial position was desperate; they were dismissed without hope of reinstatement or of employment in civil administration. For their fate they had the 'European' government to thank. However, it must be stressed that this was by no means a

unique situation in nineteenth-century Egyptian history. Since the formation of the Egyptian army, the officers had found themselves time and again without pay for long periods; in 1833 for instance they were owed between 10 and 11 months' pay;

at the end of Sa‘id's reign salaries of officials and officers were 12 to 24 months in arrears. There had already been, under Muhammad ‘Ali, revolts against innovations, bad treatment, insufficient care and poor pay, and these had been bloodily suppressed. Mass dismissals were also not unknown: for example by ‘Abbas immediately after his ascent to the throne, and by Sa‘id when travelling in the Sudan in 1856-7; fearing revolt during his absence he dismissed almost the entire army. Only some of the officers were reinstated on his return; Others were absorbed into civil administration and the rest had

to see what turned up. Frequently, the arrears due at the time of these mass dismissals were simply cancelled. Thus the extreme poverty of a number of officers was not a new phenomenon. When, under Sa‘id, they had awaited their pay for a long time in vain some officers even had to abandon their wives because they could no longer feed their families. Von Kremer quotes a satirical song which was circulating in Cairo

at that time:

66 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS The Egyptian troops Because of lack of payment Their tails hanging down Let their ears drop They separated from their wives. °? In February 1879 many officers were again on the verge of extreme poverty. They had not been paid for from 2 to 24 months, and did not know how they would live. Early that year many petitions were submitted to the ministers concerned; some were also submitted indirectly to the Chamber of Delegates. But they had no success. Instead of this, the economy measures which the government intended to pursue became known. Unrest in the army became worse, and was mainly directed against Nubar and Wilsonwho, it was feared, were preparing together to hand

Egypt over to Great Britain. It was generally believed that the reduction in the army's strength had been dictated to the ministers by Great Britain. How could the officers survive if they were to be sent home destitute? How could they pay their debts? They had been trained only as officers and they had no financial means to buy land or engage workers. Borg reports that these were themes discussed in the the guards' room of the “Abdin palace. The officers there openly declared their support for their dismissed colleagues should they defend themselves.

The ministers, however, did not take these reports

seriously. Isma‘il took the opportunity to inform the British representative that the situation was the result of Nubar's policy when he had decided to undermine the Khedive's authority. He, Isma‘il, could do nothing about the army's unrest so long as he was denied the right to co-operate in determining Egypt's

policy. Still, on 17 February, Wilson denied that there was dissatisfaction or a dangerous mood in the army. On 18 Feb-

ruary half an hour before the outbreak of the riot in front of the Finance Ministry, Riyad laughed when Vivian spoke of the

possibility of a military revolt. But Isma‘*‘il had seen his chance. When Shahin Pasha, a few

days before 18 February, discussed the situation with the Khedive, the latter is said to have remarked: ‘Pourguoi les

officiers restent-ils tranquilles?'*® Shahin then consulted his brother-in-law, Major Latif Salim. He, a son of one of Muhammad ‘Ali's generals and a teacher at the General Staff School and at the Army Engineering School, planned the demonstration. According to Borg's information the organizers

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 67

were received by the Khedive on the evening of 15 February; he

also said that about fifty officers had been married to Circas-

Sian female slaves from the palace. }

Shortly after the demonstration it became widely known, especially because Latif Salim boasted openly about his role in

it, that the demonstration had been enacted with Isma‘il's concurrence. But Amin Sa‘id, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi‘i and

others deny this. They are also silent on the report given by *‘Urabi in his memoirs: he says that on the eve of the demonstration he had come with three infantry regiments from Rosetta to Cairo where the units were to be dissolved. on 18 February he was sitting with a friend when they were informed of what had happened inside and outside the Finance Ministry. They sent out an officer to bring back information and on his return he reported that it was the Khedive who had instigated Shahin, "his willing instrument!', to organize ‘that childish demonstration’ because he wanted to overthrow the Nubar government; Shahin for his part had induced his brother-in-law Latif Salim to march to the Finance Ministry with his pupils, the mob and the officers ‘who had lost their heads because of hunger and poverty'.*} On 17 February 1879 a petition allegedly signed by 400-500

officers was circulating in the ‘Abbasiya Barracks. It contained four demands: (a) pay arrears should be settled; (b) dismissals should proceed according to the regulations of military law; (c) the dismissed officers should be given civil employment; (d) they should be treated honourably. This petition was taken to the Khedive, who referred the claimants to the government as the body competent to deal with their demands. The officers thereupon held a meeting in which Latif Salim made an impassioned speech encouraging his comrades to press their claims courageously and resolutely. They decided to act. On the morning of 18 February they streamed out of the ‘Abbasiya Barracks and the suburbs where many of them Lived to a meeting point in the town. They agreed to put their demands

initially to the Chamber of Delegates. For the first time it was in session in the town and not in the Citadel. A handful of officers, among them Latif Salim, Sa‘id Nasr and Hasan

Ra’fat, all of them teachers at military schools, were received by the President of the Chamber, Ahmad Rashid; but he declared

that the Majlis was not competent to deal with their claims.

68 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS The officers replied that the government had not so far responded to their petitions. The President of the Chamber then sent a leading member of the Majlis, ‘Abd al-Salam al-Muwailihi, ** to Nubar, and when some time later he had not returned, the officers became impatient and demanded that a deputation lead them to the War Ministry. The President then appointed ten delegates who accompanied the deputation of officers to the

demonstrators! rallying-point, ostensibly to march to the War Ministry. They passed the Finance Ministry. At that very moment Nubar Pasha was on the way to see Wilson to discuss ‘Abd al-Salam

al-Muwailihi's report. The officers stopped him, insulted and molested him, and pressed their demands for pay. The same thing happened to Wilson who was hurrying to bring help. Finally they were both trapped in the Finance Ministry where Riyad and ‘Ali Mubarak joined them. When the British and German Consuls-~General heard what had

happened they went immediately to the palace. The Khedive was prepared to go straight away with them to the scene. Once there he was able by appealing to their loyalty and promising to talk over their problems to persuade the demonstrators to

clear the ministry. Then he cleared the square in front of the ministry and neighbouring streets by using a battalion of the Guards Regiment led by ‘Ali Fahmi and under the high command of

the War Minister Ratib Pasha and of the Sartashrifati (Chief Court Official), ‘Abd al-Qadir Hilmi.**? There were several wounded, even some of those near the Khedive. Eight officers were arrested as ringleaders, among them Latif Salim and Sa‘id Nasr who had acted as spokesmen.

‘Urabi reports the course of this 'demonstration with scorn and contempt as being ‘outside the bounds of wisdom and reflection'. The participants had gone home enraged because when the situation was getting out of control the Khedive had ordered ‘Ali Fahmi to open fire on the demonstrators. Fortun-

ately the latter had ordered his soldiers to fire into the air. This led the angry officers to agree to see to it that Isma‘il be replaced by Tawfig;** the Khedive, however, had calmed them and had visited every regiment promising that he would take care of their rights and dismiss the government.*? After dispersing the demonstration Isma‘il went back to the *‘Abdin Palace where the European consuls arrived immediately to

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 69

congratulate him. The Khedive drew the following conclusions

from these events. If law and order were to be re-established and preserved, he must again take into his own hands the government; given a strong ruler, people would not allow themselves such excesses because it would be known that they would be ruthlessly punished. The following morning after recovering from the first shock Nubar and Wilson met de Bligniéres and the British and French representatives to decide on the steps to be taken. Nubar made

it clear that he could no longer carry the responsibility for public security, and asked the Consul-General to protect him

and his colleagues. First Vivian and Godeaux tried to clarify Isma‘il's intentions. He demanded Nubar's resignation as a first step on the way to normalizing the situation. The resignation was tendered and accepted on the same day, 19 February. For the time being the Khedive himself presided at the Council of Ministers. The treatment of the ‘ringleaders’ of the demonstration confirmed the supposition of most contemporary observers that the action had been planned more or less actively by Isma‘il and that it was meant to return him to power. The Khedive informed the British and French representatives that as the War Minister Ratib Pasha, who was his man in the government, had been fool-

ish enough to call to Cairo from the various garrisons in the country all the officers to be dismissed, and as they were now demanding the immunity of their comrades, he (the Khedive)

could not now treat the agitators as they really deserved, but would later bring them to account. The commission whose immediate aim had been to ‘investigate circumstances!’ (although the reality was a cover-up) became on the one hand a unique comedy,*® the record of which can be read

with delight, and on the other hand a tribunal which dealt with the accusations against the Nubar government. The five generals—the Turco-Circassians Ibrahim al-Fariq, Hasan Aflatun and Muhammad Mar‘ashli and the French Larmée and Jacquier —

questioned participants and eye witnesses who suddenly no longer remembered seeing or hearing anything; Nubar Pasha

withdrew even his initial statements for fear of his personal security. Latif Salim had only come across the demonstrators by chance and he had not signed the petition because his economic position allowed him to continue without pay; this was

70 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS one of the few truths uttered in the course of the enquiry. Sa‘id Nasr, who during the siege of the Finance Ministry is reported to have said to Wilson that he personally was not concerned about pay but only about the honour of the army, which had made Egypt what it was, insisted that like Latif Salim he

had been forced to act as an interpreter. (Evidently the officers knew that the butt of their demonstration would be Wilson and Nubar rather than the Minister of War, or why should they otherwise have needed an interpreter?) ‘Abd Allah ‘Izzat, who had carried the petition on 18 February, naturally claimed he had lost it. Nobody would admit to knowing who had written it; it must be supposed to have appeared suddenly and dis-

appeared just as abruptly. The five other officers arrested told similar stories, so that the Commission could find no culprit amongst them. Blame could be attached only to the ministers who wanted to abandon honourable officers of the Egyptian army to poverty and hopelessness. The report issued on 22 March was of no consequence to those

imprisoned; they had long since been set free. Prince Hasan, in his capacity as Generalissimo of the Egyptian army, had

expressed to the British Consul-General the official regret of the Khedive and army for what had happened. With this, Isma‘il considered the affair closed. On 26 and 27 March with the help of a £400,000 loan from Rothschild, the salaries were paid and

the officers, as planned, sent home. Only a few days later Isma‘*‘il was calling them back.

The Khedive had declared that his assumption of the presidency of the Council of Ministers had been only temporary, and that he wanted to come to an agreement with the powers on the fundamental reorganization of the government's structure. Therefore, a week after Nubar's dismissal, he approached the Consuls-General with the following proposals: Crown Prince Tawfiq was to be appointed Minister without Portfolio and President of the Council of Ministers; the fundamental principles of the 8 August 1878 rescript concerning the relationship between the Khedive and the Council of Ministers was to be ratified (but giving the Khedive the right to convene the

Council of Ministers at any time); all measures requiring his sanction were to be put before him by the appropriate minister, then discussed and decided upon under his own chairmanship in the Council of Ministers where he would accept amajority verdict.

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 71

The reference to the decree of 28 August of the previous

year was misleading. In reality, Isma‘il's proposals aimed at the abolition of the strict separation between the Khedive and Council of Ministers, and consequently at the abolition of that decree. The European ministers, therefore, refused to accept the proposals. They would at best allow that the Council of Ministers should meet informally when the Khedive so wished, that the Khedive could submit projects to the Council of Minis-

ters, and that the Council of Ministers must submit its own plans to the Khedive before a decision was taken. Moreover, they demanded consultation for the appointment of Egyptian ministers. On 1 March the two Consuls-General officially demanded Nubar's return to the government; a constitutional monarch must often accept ministers whom he does not personally

like. Isma‘il replied that this was understood but that, in such a case, the ministers ought to be those chosen by the people, whereas Nubar was the most unpopular politician in Egypt.

Since Isma‘il remained adamant on the question of Nubar's return, and Tawfiq warned of the serious consequences which the powers' insistence would entail, this demand was dropped and a different way of securing the predominance of Anglo-French influence on the Egyptian government was sought. On 9 March

representatives delivered an official declaration of the powers to Isma‘il: (1) the Khedive must on no account take part in the meetings of the Council of Ministers; (2) Prince Tawfig was to become President of the Council of Ministers; (3) both European ministers might, in conjunction, veto any measure of which they disapproved; (4) both powers withdrew their demand

for Nubar's return to the Council of Ministers; (5) the Khedive was made responsible for the observance of these rules.

Isma‘il thanked them for their conciliation with regard to Nubar and accepted the proposals. He reserved, however, for himself the right to convene the ministers either individually or collectively to inform them of his views on measures submitted to him for his sanction or of those with which he himself wished the Council of Ministers to be concerned. On 1O March 1879, by official letter, the Khedive appointed the Crown Prince President of the Council of Ministers, and entrusted him (a meaningless formal gesture) with the formation

of the government. Isma‘il would not take part in the

72 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS consultations of the Council of Ministers, but by the rescript of 28 August 1878 he had in no way wanted to divorce himself from his ministers. Therefore he wished to be informed before any decision was taken and he would also submit problems for

discussion if this seemed necessary. Finally Isma‘il included in this letter the joint right of veto of the European members of the government.*’ The formation of the government, which was protracted until 22 March was, however, no concern of Tawfig's; the fight for

nomination to ministerial chairs was enacted principally between the European ministers and the Khedive. Wilson and de Bligniéres retained their posts; for the time being nobody wished to undermine their positions. But the Khedive wanted to pass on to Riyad both ministries, Justice and Foreign Affairs, previously held by Nubar, and to put a man of his choice in

Riyad's place at the Minister of the Interior; the provinces must again feel the strength of his arm if he were to bear responsibility for public :-security. However, all the candid-

ates suggested by the Khedive for this position were rejected by the European ministers: Raghib Pasha’® was thought too old and apart from Greek, had no European language; as President of the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab, and as too obedient a 'Mameluke' of Isma‘il, Ahmad Rashid was suspect; Tawfiq was rejected Since his appointment would be tantamount to having the Khedive

himself at the Ministry of the Interior; Isma‘il dared not propose Sharif Pasha because the controlling powers would most

certainly raise objections. Eventually, since Wilson and de Bligniéres threatened to

resign if Riyad did not retain the Ministry of the Interior, Isma‘il capitulated under protest; the remaining posts would also be filled by whomsoever they desired. Tawfigq too was very

annoyed. He warned of unrest and intimated that he could | hardly remain President of the Council of Ministers under these conditions. But on the surface father andson again acquiesced. On 22 March, Isma‘il put his signature to the new list of ministers. Wilson, de Bligniéres, ‘Ali Mubarak and Riyad retained their former posts, Riyad acquiring also the Ministry of Justice. Hasan Aflatun,*? who on the same day was a coSignatory of the Commission of Enquiry's report into the events of 18 February, was appointed as War Minister, and Dhu alFigar°°® as Foreign Minister. These two 'Mamelukes' had not yet

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 73

offended the Europeans. The life of the second 'European' government was barely two weeks. Then the Khedive 'bowed! to the 'will of the nation' and dismissed the Council cf Ministers which had again been imposed on himself and Egypt. On 7 April 1879 he called Sharif Pasha to head a 'truly Egyptian' government.

Isma‘il and the Chamber of Delegates (1876-9) On 19 February Isma‘il had announced to the assembled consuls,

as his political philosophy, that an oriental country falls prey to anarchy if it does not feel continuously the strong hand of its ruler. On 7 April the Khedive informed the same consuls that he must submit to the autonomous will of the nation and appoint an Egyptian government. For al-Rafi‘i, this national will, as will be seen, was embodied above all in the Chamber of Delegates. According to him, since 1876 this Chamber had been a centre of opposition to Isma‘il's autocracy, and was now also in opposition to European encroachment on the country. These statements on the role of the Chamber need to be examined in an attempt to illuminate events of April 1879. For the overwhelming majority of the population, Isma‘il's ambition to civilize, and his unscrupulous exploitation by means of European businessmen and financiers, had only one immediate

consequence: the fiscal exploitation, which had long overstepped the bounds of economic reason. ThisS appeared as tax increases, new imposts and internal ‘'loans'. The ways in which (according to the report of the local French representative) the Ruznama of 1874 was applied in Damietta and neighbouring

provinces may well elucidate how the population participated in the country's progress. When the decree was issued, the mudirs called together the ‘umdas and commissioned them to redistribute the fixed sums demanded from each village. In Damietta, a commission of local merchants saw to it that a sufficent number

of people entered their names on the subscription list. A few weeks later an official came from Cairo to realize the sums subscribed; but since these had been proffered more or less unwillingly, a number of signatories had to be reminded with

the kurbaj of their duty. A reluctant shaikh was ordered to be nailed by one ear to the door of the diwan. The years 1866-79 became a golden age for the ‘usurers', but the darkest part of the nineteenth century for the fallahin.

74 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS Even the much extolled Mixed Courts worked to the detriment

of the indigenous population. It was not the fallahin who defended their 'rights' in front of these tribunals, but the foreigners and above all the Levantine 'usurers' who were generally protégés of European states. They triumphed over the natives, primarily because the latter lacked competent lawyers, and because they became enmeshed in the net of foreign legal

thinking and unfamiliar procedure. In this way the ‘usurers' could effortlessly deprive the fallahin of all their possessions, provided their fraudulent contracts had been concluded with sufficient skill. This was not an infrequent occurrence. In their first six years the three courts of primary jurisdiction decided on average 5,000 cases per year, and the appeal court 300 cases; about two thirds of these, it was calculated, had nothing to do with money-lenders. Thus about 10,000 cases had indeed affected money-lenders. Unfortunately we do not

know the percentage of verdicts in favour of ‘usurers' but, if we believe van Bemmelen, they were the overwhelming majority.

If this is true, it comes as no surprise that when news reached *‘Urabi, in the summer of 1882, of the destruction of the palace of the Mixed Court in Alexandria, he should cry, ‘Thanks be to Allah who has rid our country of them'.°*? The population, however, was at the mercy of Isma‘il's policy and its consequences. As Sarhank rightly complained, there existed neither independent bodies, which might have restrained the Khedive, nor a strong personality within his own circle who

might dare to advise him. Fear paralysed them all. The fate of the Finance Minister, Isma‘il Siddig, who had been considered unassailable, again showed the wisdom of silence. The Khedive had had him murdered because of his opposition during the negotiations with Joubert and Goschen in 1876. At the beginning of the same year the Foreign Minister, Nubar Pasha,

had been exiled for proffering critical advice, something that Isma‘*‘il considered intolerable interference in his personal affairs. No more could the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab decisively determine Egypt's policy, preventing financial ruin and thus

foreign intervention. Neither was the Majlis, in the last years of Isma‘il's rule, an autonomous centre of decision making.

As the Chamber had not met since March 1873, the Khedive

called the delegates to Tantaon 7 August 1876 for an extra-

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 79

ordinary meeting. They were to discuss the Muqabala problem. The European financial world considered that it endangered the

future of the Egyptian state income, and therefore had insisted that it be terminated by the decree of 7 May 1876. At the same time the government expressed its readiness either to reimburse Sums paid or to reduce taxes accordingly. But paradoxically, in the very same decree, income under the title of Mugqabala was

still included in the financial calculations. Isma‘il, however, gave no thought to a refund of this income. The delegates can hardly be blamed for being confounded by this policy. On the suggestion of ‘Uthman al-Harmil (an ‘umda from Gharbiya) ,“.a three-man deputation was sent to Cairo in order to

obtain a clearer picture of the overall financial situation and of the government's financial intentions; in the preceding meetings the Finance Minister had always proferred some

information, albeit sometimes faulty. The emissaries returned this time from the capital with the conviction that the government was not, at the moment, in a position to reim-

burse the £13 million ‘paid in' by that time. In the second and last sitting on 10 August, the Chamber pronounced itself in favour of the continuation of the Muqabala in agreement with Tsma‘*il.

It remains obscure what al-Rafi‘i means by dubbing the

delegates' behaviour 'opposition' and their decision

‘sacrifice’. It would have been a 'sacrifice' only if the French representative's report had been true, that the delegates had decided to continue to renounce all privileges, to pay the Mugqabala as an additional tax. But this was in no way required of them. The decree of 18 November 1876 (a result of Goschen's and Joubert's negotiations), which enforced the Mugqabala law, again determined, however, that the reduction of the land tax set at 8 1/3% of the Mugqabala instalments before 1886 could no longer be realized. Equally the land tax of those who paid their last instalment only after 18 November 1876 would not immediately be halved. In the meantime, until

1886, on this half of the land tax still to be paid, and on the amounts which should have been deducted from the tax quotas

because of the instalments already paid, only 5% interest was given.

In his speech from the throne which opened the regular session of 23 November 1876, Isma‘il flattered the delegates that

76 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS the continuation of the Mugabala was the result of their decision of 10 August. Thus he consoled them for the fact that for the time being no immediate advantages could be drawn from the payment of the Mugabala. No word of protest was raised

against this measure. In the course of this session al-Rafi‘i apprehends again the 'new spirit of opposition’ at work; but what he saw was a mirage. Horrible rumours of the fate of

Isma*il Siddiq were circulating at that time in Cairo; thus it is not surprising that the Chamber's reply to the Khedive's speech from the throne was 'over-polite', as the French Consul-

General rightly characterized it. Also the fact that the Chamber agreed in this. session to suspend the payment of interest on the Ruznama (9% ‘in perpetuity') does not really

constitute opposition. No more was the alleged new spirit to be seen during the extraordinary meetings of the Majlis convoked by the Khedive

for the end of April 1877. After the outbreak of the RussoTurkish war, the Sultan had demanded active support from Tsmaf‘il. The Khedive had answered that state expenditure had been fixed but that he could attempt to persuade the Chamber to

vote a special tax for setting up an Egyptian contribution. In fact, the delegates agreed on a general 10% increase of all taxes. Al-Rafiti sees here also impressive ‘national and constitutional' progress, as new taxes had previously been decreed without consulting the Majlis. This is, however, only half true, as the delegates had formerly been allowed to agree to tax increases, for example the raising by a sixth of the land tax in 1868, as al-Rafi‘i himself reports. The regular session of the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab, from 28 March to 27 June 1878, passed almost unnoticed. The European

consuls did not consider it worth reporting. Public interest was confined to the Commission of Enquiry, which had begun its proceedings. The Chamber, allegedly caught by the ‘spirit of

opposition' did not consider this commission a suitable target. As in November 1876, the delegates, in their answer to the speech from the throne, merely expressed the hope that the problem of the Egyptian state debt could be solved satisfactorily. The session did not in essence distinguish itself from those from 1866 onwards. Mention must be made, however, of an important action to which nine delegates of the Middle Egyptian provinces of Giza,

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER C7

Fayyum, Bani Suwaif, Minya and Asyut had committed themselves

during this session. The taxes for 1878 were just now being collected in advance to pay the May coupon. These delegates proved to be the true representatives of the interests of the people of their provinces; they united to find a way out from the merciless dilemma faced by the fallahin, who had either to

sell their still unripe crops at far too low a price to the merchants or to fall directly into the hands of the ‘usurers'. The ‘umdas wanted to obtain reasonable credit of up to £300,000, of which half would be applied to the payment of taxes in the province of Asyut and half to the other provinces named above. They needed,: and found, trustworthy guarantors for this aim. The Princes Muhammad Tawfigq, Husain Kamil and Hasan, as well as Muhammad Hafiz, Wakil of the Da’ira of the Khedive's mother, Shahin Pasha, Mufattish of Lower Egypt and ‘Umar Lutfi, Mufattish of Upper Egypt, had contracted this sum

from two indigenous banks. The delegates in their turn pledged themselves to see that the money was paid after the regular

sale of the harvest. But this was a private deal by particular delegates and not an action of the Chamber as a whole. Already, before the Majlis meeting of 28 March, Isma‘il had discovered another source of money. The notables of the country had been requested to contribute money for the Egyptian war-wounded. The mudirs and a special commission had been entrusted with putting the operation, which soon brought in more than £100,000, into practice. It was concluded on 28 Feb-

ruary with a feast at Tanta. It can therefore be stated that no significant change occurred in themes and results of the discussions in the Chamber of Delegates and also in their relations with the Khedive from 1866 to the opening of the new session on 2 January 1879. It

was not the concern of the delegates to contribute to ‘high politics’ or to control the Khedive's power, but, within the framework of their limited competence, to represent the finanCial, economic and cultural interests of their provinces. The delegates' political '‘apprenticeship', as Abdel Malek sees the period 1866-76, really lasted until 1879. The ‘liaison entre le mouvement national et le constitutionalisme '*” did not begin in 1876 but only in the spring of 1879, and even then only under specific conditions. In the four sessions of 1876-8 the delegates did not oppose the Khedive's financial

78 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS policy, or protest against the European intervention or fight for an extension of their constitutional rights. They discussed no theme which had not already been raised at previous sessions, and took no steps for which they could not quote some precedents from previous years.

That is not to say that the delegates may not have wished to end their ‘apprenticeship’ in order to become 'journeymen' and, as quickly as possible, also masters. Their political consciousness had perhaps developed accordingly, although a large number of them came only sporadically into touch with the cul-

tural life of the capital, and about five-sixths of the delegates entered the Chamber for the first time in 1876. In any case this consciousness did not manifest itself. But the delegates would anyway not have been in a position (something they seemed themselves not to believe) to obtain concessions from Isma‘il or to refuse money, even though they might have wanted to. On what power or authority could such actions have

been based? Sudan was geographically distant it is true, but it was all too close for those in Isma‘il's way; and some even died before reaching it, as was the fate of the Mufattish. Whatever Isma‘il granted his subjects, he granted graciously, not yielding to pressure from below. Nobody forced him to convoke the Majlis after all. After March 1873 it had fallen into oblivion. But then financial difficulties had become pressing and, after the establishment of the Caisse de la Dette Publigue, the Khedive again remembered the Chamber of Delegates. The Chamber could help in finding new sources of money, could

'legalize' the reduction of financial privileges and in case of need could intercede between him and his European creditors. All this could be done without Isma‘il offering anything in return, and without any demands being made of him. This, however, changed when the ‘European’ government rendered the Khedive powerless and he sought alliance with the delegates (as

with all the notables of the country). No direct order but merely the encouragement and approval of the Khedive was all that was necessary to set the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab on the road of opposition to the 'European' government when it met in Cairo on 2 January 1879. The convocation of the Chamber, as mentioned above, had been decided upon by

the Council of Ministers, as it was believed that because of the Mugqabala regulations it was only with the Chamber's agree-

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 79

ment that it would be possible to increase the ‘ushuri land tax (although the prepayment of taxes alone could have been asked

for). The Khedive took no initiative; he only did—as Vivian reported — what the government stipulated. He signed without comment all the laws and decrees which were submitted to him

for his signature. But Isma‘il now allied himself with the delegates to topple the political system which had been forced on him and Egypt. In the light of what we know of the background of events from March to June 1879, Borg's information is credible; according to him the Khedive called upon leading members of the Chamber to oppose the 'European' government.

If we except its president, Ahmad Rashid, one of Isma‘il's ‘Mamelukes', the two undisputed leaders of the Chamber were the Cairo delegates, Mahmud al-‘Attar and ‘Abd al-Salam al-

Muwailihi: the former was Sartujjar of the capital, the latter

a son of an earlier Sartujjar. It will be recalled that at the

beginning of September 1878 Shahin Pasha had contacted influential merchants of Cairo to invite them to oppose the NubarWilson regime. The central role was played by the Muwailihis, ‘Abd al-Salam and his brother Ibrahim;°? they were Isma‘il's

favourites, and also, as freemasons, they had contacts with Jamal al-Din ‘al-Afghani'. On 2 January 1879, Isma‘il opened the session of the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab°’* with his shortest speech from the throne so

far, in which he informed the delegates that their meeting was being held because of the ministers' intention to discuss with them some financial problems and questions concerning public works; the tenor of the Chamber's reply, read a few days later by ‘Abd al-Salam al-Muwailihi in the ‘Abdin Palace was sensational. "We, the delegates and representatives of the Egyptian

people, the defenders of its rights, and the promoters of its welfare which is at the same time the welfare of the government' thank the Khedive for the convocation of the Majlis which

"represents the basis of civilization and order' and, in fact, is 'the necessary means for the achievement of freedom (which

is the source of progress and advance), and the true driving force for the development of legal equality, which in its turn brings about the essence of justice and the spirit of equity'. Thanks were also expressed for establishing the Council of Ministers, which the Khedive had 'made responsible to the people'

80 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS On the one hand the ’reply was concerned with the welfare of the people (maslahat al-umma), the fatherland's advantage (manfa*at al-watan) andthe rights of the subjects (huqugq alra‘iya). On the other hand the Khedive himself was termed the leader on the path of progress and civilization which would

lead to a new era. The identity of interests was several times underlined; the duties of the delegates were identical with the Khedive's intentions. ‘Abd al-Salam concluded with 'long live the Khedive' and ‘long live freedom under his protection and care'. Freedom under such a protectorate could hardly live

a particularly fulfilled life! It must therefore be stressed as remarkable not only that the delegates considered themselves the defenders of freedom

and representatives of the people's rights and interests, but equally that they felt at one with the Khedive in their endeavours. We must not, however, read too much into such ceremonial documents, nor is it legitimate to consider a few

isolated sentences only. In the reply to the speech from the throne the central feature of the whole session was already explicit: the vehement opposition exercised by the delegates was in no way directed against the Khedive, but against the Council of Ministers in general and against Wilson and de

Bligniéres in particular. The delegates aligned themselves with the Khedive against the 'European' government. Their protests chiefly concerned

disregard of the allegedly traditional rights of the Chamber; but the extension of their competence and the enactment of the new constituent law promised by Isma‘il would still have needed to be fought for, if the Khedive's removal had not given a com-

pletely new direction to events. If Nubar had thought of winning the Chamber over to support his government against the Khedive he would have certainly

been disappointed: the opposition against foreign intervention took precedence. Moreover the European ministers and the Consuls-General would certainly not have granted a political voice to the Chamber. Like Nubar and Riyad they believed autocracy the most appropriate form of government in Egypt for their own aims. Differences of opinion (e.g. between Wilson and Vivian) were confined to the question of who should and could be the autocrat, Nubar or Isma‘il. How could they bring

the seventy-five delegates under their control? It was much

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 81

easier to bring pressure to bear and to reason with one person alone; but except for such rather practical considerations, their policy was also based on the conviction that the Orient must, at least for the foreseeable future, be ruled by ‘benevolent despots. The Chamber was thus convoked to 'legalize' a measure which

would provoke the displeasure of the great landowners; but it was offered nothing in return. Isma‘il, on the other hand, not only encouraged the delegates' attitude of opposition, but (as shall be seen) also made constitutional promises to gain their assistance for his return to power. The Chamber would thus have made a mistake had it decided to favour the government and go against the Khedive. The sittings of the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab were distinguished by their constant attacks on Nubar and the two European ministers, particularly Wilson. De Bligniéres at least submit-—

ted his projects to the Chamber for discussion. He put forward a plan for the reorganization of public works in Egypt, and asked the Chamber for its advice on specific questions. Appearing in person before the Chamber, with the help of a min-

isterial interpreter he discussed delegates" observations on his project. The Chamber came into conflict with de Bligniéres because he intended to introduce equal obligations for ‘everybody' under

the corvée. The fallahin living in ‘izbas and kafrs on ab‘adiyas had previously been exempted from corvée duties in order

to be completely at the disposal of their landlords. De Bligniéres wanted to eliminate this inequality even before a comprehensive reorganization of the corvée. He proposed that freedom from this obligation could be bought with a fixed sum. Such a proposal did not so much signify a new burden for the

fallahin in question but rather a burden for the great landowners for whom they worked, who would themselves have to buy

immunity for their labourers; therefore the delegates were against such a regulation. It also meant an additional financial burden for the people who would be affected by the planned increase of the ‘ushuri tax. De Bligniéres again explained his project to the Chamber on 3 February without being convinced by

delegates' objections. But the Majlis opposition was directed above all against Nubar and Wilson, who were by no means prepared to co-operate.

82 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS It seemed almost as though the Council of Ministers had convoked the Chamber only in order to create new enemies for

itself. Wilson had expected opposition to the planned tax increases but could not have assumed that this opposition would turn out to be less intense if he behaved uncompromisingly. On 5 January, on Mahmud al-‘Attar's suggestion, the del-

egates requested in a letter to the Minister of the Interior the immediate submission of the plans of the Ministries of Finance and Public Works. While de Bligniéres complied with the request, Wilson informed them that his plans were not yet formulated but that he would be pleased to discuss them in his ministry with a deputation from the Chamber. The Chamber dispatched five delegates on condition, as al-‘Attar insisted, that they were not authorized to speak in a way which would commit the Majlis and that this informal exchange of views did not exempt the minister from presenting his projects for discussion to the assembly as a whole. Despite repeated insistence, this meeting had not taken place three weeks after the beginning of the session, so the delegates themselves opened discussion on the financial problems as they saw them. The result was a striking survey of the pressing burden of taxes which the country had to bear, and a reguest to the Council of Ministers to provide relief from this burden. The delegates raised for discussion matters close to their own hearts and those with which their own experience had confronted them. In the grievances and proposals for relief which they expressed they showed themselves to be worthy spokesmen of the immediate interests of the people they represented. The merchants Mahmud al-‘Attar and ‘Abd al-Salam al-

Muwailihi requested the abolition of the trade tax in those cities in which the octroi was levied; five ‘umdas from the Delta wanted the abolition of these dues. Muhammad Radi (Bani Suwaif) and ‘Abd al-Shahid Butrus (Girga) reported the grievances against the compulsory levy of the Muqabala and requestec its suspension in the areas where it was not wanted. Ahmad Agha al-Sadigq (Aswan), Muhammad Sultan (Isma) and ‘Abd al-

Rahman ‘Arafah (Gharbiya) wanted a reduction of the tax on palr trees because the stock of date palms had diminished alarmingly

as a result of the high dues. Budaini al-Shari‘i (Minya), Ahmad al-Sirsi (Minufiya) and Bakhum Lutf Allah requested the

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 83

abolition of the suds, the 1868 increase of the land tax by one sixth; this was a special payment originally limited to four years, but it was still being levied. Hanna Yusuf (Minya) wanted the abolition of the riyy; this was a-10% increase in the land tax in the four provinces traversed by the Ibrahimiya Canal, which was in fact almost exclusively used to irrigate the Khedive's properties. Ibrahim Hasan Abu Laila and ‘Abd al-Shahid Butrus (Girga) demanded a reduction in the salt tax. Several delegates from the provinces of Girga, Qina and Isna

drew the attention of the Majlis to the situation of oil press owners in these provinces, who could no longer compete with importers of oil because of heavy taxes. Others demanded the

abolition of duties for the slaughter of cattle. Thus, aS in previous and subsequent sessions, the delegates were concerned with the basic problems of the population of their native provinces. The Egyptians knew, without a Commission of Enquiry, that they were paying too many and too high =: taxes; the Majlis pressed repeatedly for a fundamental tax reform. Wilson might have attempted to find a common ground

with the delegates on this problem, but it is questionable whether he would have been successful in the prevailing circumstances.

The general attack of the Chamber of Delegates on the 'European' government took place on 3 February. It was directed against a four-week-old decree which had come into existence after pressure from the two European ministers and despite

Nubar's opposition. It charged the still operative Enquiry Commission with the codification and revision of all laws and ordinances in the administrative and financial spheres. The Commission had also been entrusted with the preparation of new bills in these two spheres, which then had to be examined by the Council of Ministers, sanctioned by the Khedive, and published in the Moniteur Egyptien in order to become law. Mahmud al-‘Attar and ‘Abd al-Salam al-Muwailihi formulated a

protest which was directed not only against the fact that besides there being European members of the government there would be other Europeans who would even have the right to in-

itiate legislation, but also against neglect of the Majlis al-Nuwwab (significantly, the word 'Shura' was no longer used). The delegates' claim, included in the Chamber's reply to the speech from the throne, that they were defenders of the

84 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS people's rights and representatives of their interests now too on a concrete form: everything concerning the Egyptian people so requested al-Muwailihi and al-‘Attar, must be submitted

first to their representatives' scrutiny. Could the President of the Council of Ministers really have forgotten that the Egyptian people had representatives in Cairo? Could it have escaped him that he had been present at the opening of the Majlis itself? The offending decree, the delegates' spokesman stated, impinged on the ‘sacred rights' of the Chamber. The Khedive had always respected these; since the Chamber's found ation, he had submitted most important matters to it and had never taken decisions on them before he knew the will of the Chamber. Thus they confronted the autocrat Nubar with the

alleged constitutionalist Isma‘il! Nubar was required to answer these charges. Four days

later, he actually appeared before the Majlis but he would not talk of the matters at issue. The delegates had raised a fundamental question which must be discussed first in the Coun cil of Ministers and submitted to the Khedive. ‘Abd al-Salam retorted that the foundation of every progressive government and of every progressive monarchy is the participation of the

people's representatives in the discussion of such 'fundamental’ questions; since Nubar refused to discuss this point Mahmud al-‘Attar remarked that the’ Chamber hoped to obtain it rights if the question was submitted to the Khedive.°* Twelve days later Nubar had to resign. The demonstration of 18 February and Nubar's fall did not

interrupt the Chamber's sittings. The delegates continued to deal principally with tax problems; on 19 March, three days before the appointment of the Tawfig government, a memorandum

on this subject signed by forty-seven delegates was submitted to the Chamber. Since Wilson was again not prepared to appear before the Chamber to discuss this document, the delegates had

it sent on to the Minister of the Interior. This action reminded the government of the Chamber's existence and it was decided to adjourn the Chamber. It had been convened because of the planned increase in the ‘ushuri tax, but Wilson had refused any collaboration with them. It would

be difficult to find a plausible explanation of this puzzling and contradictory policy. Riyad Pasha was instructed to infon the delegates that the three-year sitting period had come to a

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 85

end and, therefore, that the Chamber must be dissolved. He was to be surprised!

Isma‘il and the La’iha-Wataniya: the fall of the ‘European’ government

Since Isma‘til had not succeeded at all in realizing his suggestions on the reshaping of the government, and since he had bowed under protest to European pressure, he was firmly determined to chase from the government the European ministers and

their collaborators, Wilson, de Bligniéres, Riyad and ‘Ali Mubarak, with the help of his Turco~-Circassian confidants and of the notables of the country. His confidants began to direct

against these ministers the latent dissatisfaction with the state of affairs felt by the dhawat, officers, officials, delegates, merchants and “ulama’ . Prince Tawfiq forecast dangerous disturbances in the country. On 24 March, Sharif Pasha composed a long memorandum

for Vivian in which he stated that people were 'a la veille de complications qui compromettront l'avenir de l'Egypte'.°° He ascribed the hopeless situation solely to Nubar's hatred and vindictiveness against the Khedive, saying that Nubar waged war

in public every day against Isma‘il; the experiment of an ‘international’ government had been condemned a priori to failure mainly because the two Europeans had considered themselves not as Egyptian but as British and French ministers, and would continue to do so; Nubar was a foreigner too and did not enjoy any esteem among the natives and the Egyptian ministers (Riyad and ‘Ali Mubarak) who were under the protection of these three

foreigners were also loathed by the people. Although their contempt for national feeling and the wounds inflicted on national dignity by this government had received the answer they deserved on 18 February, and although the ministers'

authority had become a chimera, they still kept their positions, with the exception of Nubar. To continue, Nubar's government had achieved a unique act of destruction: administrative expenditure had increased because ministries had been infested by an invasion of highly-paid Buropeans who had displaced the natives. The army had been almost completely disbanded, schools and welfare institutions

closed and the fallahin forced to sell the harvest in advance at a quarter of its value in order to meet tax demands. The

86 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS Council of Ministers had not listened to the warnings of the War Minister (the only just man!). If this government remaine in power Egypt would fall prey to anarchy; but this could onl be in England's interest if she really was toying with the ide of, at least, a temporary occupation of the Canal Zone; such an attempt would have as its consequence an extremely tough an bloody war.

What kind of government should take the place of the 'Euro-

pean’ one? Arbitrary rule, Sharif affirmed, must be abolished now and in the future. The Khedive should rule in agreement with a Council of Ministers composed of Egyptians, reliable, honourable and enjoying general respect. The ministers should be responsible to the Khedive, both individually and collectively; the powers could force foreign ministers on the country but, in the long run, only with military force. Would that be their aim? In this memorandum Sharif was speaking Isma‘il's language. By "honourable men’ he meant himself and a handful of other 'Mamelukes' of the Khedive. The Chamber of Delegates was not

even mentioned in connection with the new political order. Th ministers must be responsible not to the Chamber but to the Khedive! This, however, did not mean that Isma‘il renounced the Chamber's collaboration in bringing down the government. When, on 27 March, Riyad wanted to send the Majlis home with

courteous thanks for its work, ‘Abd al-Salam al-Muwailihi, Muhammad Radi, Budaini al-Shari‘i and Bakhum Lutf Allah, instea

of the usual empty polite words, heaped him with criticism. The delegates considered the words of thanks as completely out of place. The Chamber had been convoked to discuss current financial problems, but three months had passed without the delegates' wishes and requests being given one moment's attention. The Chamber demanded, therefore, a two-month exten

sion of the session for discussion of financial problems. ‘Ab al-Salam spoke of the responsibility of the Council of Ministers and of the obligation not to decide anything without the Chamber's participation. Riyad refused to recognize these claims which did not correspond in any way to the provisions o the Chamber's constituent law. ‘Abd al-Salam, however, inter-

preted the law differently; it was within the Majlis’ sphere of competence to check on the government's plans, to make resolutions, and to submit decisions to the Khedive. One copy

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 87

of the protocol of this meeting was sent to the palace and one to the Council of Ministers. On the same day Wilson submitted to the Khedive the draft of a decree postponing to 1 May the 1 April coupon because the

Caisse de la Dette Publique did not have at its disposal the requisite sum of money. But Isma‘il indignantly said that this was a veiled declaration of bankruptcy. Isma‘il, who had long sympathized with the idea of state bankruptcy to provide a drastic solution to the problem of debts, now adopted the statement of the Egyptian government's creditors that Egypt

could meet its obligations if it was ready to. Thus, if he dismissed the European ministers, he would also have this

powerful group on his side. In a petition to the Chamber (something not allowed under the law of 1866) French creditors had already complained on 27 January that the government had prevented the enforcement of Mixed Courts judgements against

itself. When it became known that Wilson, in his project for the solution of the financial problems submitted to the Khedive and the Commission of Enquiry on 18 March, envisaged the dec-

laration of insolvency of the Egyptian state, while at the same time the Khedive was promising to satisfy the creditors completely, the European ministers lost the backing even of the European colonies. Two days after the memorable session of the Majlis and Isma‘*‘il's outbreak of anger on 29 March, a petition from the Chamber of Delegates reached the Khedive. Contrary to histor-

ical fact it alleged that the Chamber had been concerned constantly since 1866 with all questions affecting the country, that the budget had been submitted to it every year, and that its decisions had been consistently sanctioned by the Khedive. Against all this ‘some ministers' of the present government had offended the Chamber's rights and ignored the delegates' views. Now they protested against Wilson's plans, against his intention to declare the state bankrupt and to annul the Mugabala. The petition was only partially correct when it stated that the rights acquired with the payment of the Mugqabala would, inthis way, be lost. There followed a week of hectic activity. Isma‘il had obviously, during the formation of the government, entrusted Shaikh al~Bakri with ensuring that 'the people' would request the resignation of the collaborating ministers (Riyad and ‘Ali

88 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS Mubarak). These attacks now became more violent. Al-Bakri is said to have won over Shaikh al-‘Idwi°®’ as the main preacher i the mosques against Riyad and the European ministers. ‘Fhe

Prefect of Police informed Riyad that his life was in danger. Tt had been known for some time that Isma‘il had a counter-

plan to set against Wilson's financial plan; his French private secretary, Barrot Pasha, seems to have been its author. Through his supporters, the Khedive organized the signing of the plan by those representatives of the social groups who had always been considered competent to speak for the whole population. The operation was in the hands of Sharif Pasha, Shahin Pasha, Shaikh al-Bakri, Raghib Pasha, Ratib Pasha and Ahmad Rashid Pasha. Ibrahim al-Muwailihi, Isma*‘il's intimate

friend, stressed his own role in these efforts of the Khedive to bring down the government by means of the 'people's voices' (bi-aswat al-umma). He says that he had personally fetched the Sulama’ and the notables of Alexandria, among others, so that they could also sign the papers.°® The meetings took place in the houses of Shaikh al-Bakri and Raghib Pasha. Raphael Borg, who was kept informed about these events, reassured the Britis! Consul-General that there was no reason to fear a revolt; those at the meetings there were no rebels, but the most influential and well-to-do notables of the country who were in continuous contact with the Khedive. On 2 April, the La’ihaWataniya, as the counterplan was called, was adopted in Raghib Pasha's house in the presence of Sharif Pasha, Shahin Pasha, Hasan Rasim,°? Ja‘*far Sadig,°® Shaikh ‘Ali al-Bakri, Shaikh al-Khalfawi and Shaikh al-~‘Idwi. All the contemporary sources agree in tone on the backgrounc

to the La’iha. Sarhank writes that the Khedive had convoked the notables of the country and requested them to submit a financial plan on the basis of which he could abolish the measures forced upon him.®' Although we would shrink from calling Ninet

as principal witness, his two substantially identical accounts should not be ignored.°®°* According to these, Isma‘*‘il ordered

his 'minions'®* to arrange a meeting of the notables of the country; he addressed them as ‘le coeur du pays, le grand parti national'®* and offered them constitutional advantages i they put their signatures to his financial plan and supported it. Together they should defend themselves against European intervention. But the Khedive's promises had not been honestli

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 89

meant. The French representative reported: ‘Il existe dans tout le pays’ un mouvement ayant pour objet d'appuyer et méme

de garantir les propositions financiéres du Vice-Roi, et qu'on demanderait par contre la modification du régime politique actuel'.®° The emphasis on the role of the Khedive does not mean that he would have had to exercise great pressure on the notables.

The La’iha gave expression to their interests. The large landowners among them could easily give full support to this action because Wilson intended to increase the taxation of the “‘ushuri land and because they feared that essential advantages of the Mugqabala would be lost. Giving their signatures meant,

for the ‘ulama’, a protest against the influence of infidels in Egypt and the endangering of Islam as a religion and a way of

life. The officials feared for their position as the government was inviting more and more Europeans into the country; Riyad could not prevent even some members of his own ministry

from signing the La’iha. For officers it was a duty to take a stand against the army's enemies. The Khedive had agreed to

extend the rights of the Chamber as an institution in order to be sure of the undivided and sincere support of all its

members. )

Thus the La’iha, when it was submitted to the representatives of the powers on 7 April 1879, carried the signature of

73 'fonctionnaires civils en service et en disponibilité' (dhawat), 93 senior officers, 60 ‘ulama’ from Cairo, Alexandria and Damietta, the Coptic Patriarch and the Jewish Chief Rabbi, 41 'négocients et notables' from Cairo and Damietta, as well as 60 members of the Majlis al-Nuwwab. °°

On 7 April Isma‘il invited the Consuls-General to the

palace. In the presence of Sharif, Shahin, Ratib, Raghib, ‘Ali al-Bakri, ‘Abd al-Salam al-Muwailihi, Muhammad Radi, Sayyid

al-Lawzi and others,®’ he reported the dissatisfaction of all classes of the population with the present government. As an expression of the views prevalent in the country, a project had been submitted to him which he asked the consuls to transmit to their governments. Since here the request had been made for a native government, Tawfiq had not wished to stand in the way of

the 'sentiment national’ and had resigned; Sharif Pasha had been entrusted with the formation of a new government.

After this the president-designate of the Council of

90 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS Ministers spoke. He attributed the country's dissatisfaction to Wilson's financial plan, and especially to the abolition of the Mugqabala and the declaration of insolvency which was seen

as a measure dishonouring the country. Besides, the nation sa in the treatment of the Chamber of Delegates an insult to its representatives. They were to be sent home without ever havin

been consulted. )

When the Austrian Consul-General asked whether the signat-

Ories of the plan were prepared to guarantee it with their own properties, the Khedive replied that there was no reason for that; there could be no more reliable guarantee than the deter: mination of the whole population, from the head of state to th Simplest subject, to undertake all the necessary sacrifices to avoid the indignity of national bankruptcy. The La?iha®® contained four separate documents: (1) an extract from the petition of 29 March from the Chamber of Del-

egates to the Khedive; (2) a petition of the notables of the country requesting reform of the. political order; (3) a solem declaration by the Khedive dated 5 April; (4) the financial counterplan itself. The notables alleged in their petition that they had examined Wilson's financial plan (only the Khedive could have give!

them a copy of it) and they had come to the conclusion that it offended Egypt's interests and honour; they had, therefore, prepared a counterplan based on the fact that Egypt was ina position to meet all its financial commitments. In their view the most important precondition for the success of this plan was that the Majlis al-Nuwwab should have the

same rights and authority in financial and internal policy as European parliaments had. Moreover, an electoral law should be derived based on European models. The President of the Counci. of Ministers would certainly have to be appointed, and the other ministers confirmed by the Khedive; but the Council of Ministers had to be responsible to the Chamber of Delegates on

all questions of internal and financial policy. In his declaration of 5 April, Isma‘il resolutely rejected the statement of Egypt's insolvency. He provided solemn assur-

ances that he had no intention to return to a system of 'personal rule' but he did not say anything about the extension of the rights of the Majlis in questions of financial and interna. policy. However, he agreed to govern ‘avec et par un Conseil

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 91

des Ministres réellement responsable devant la Chambre des Délégués'. The financial section of the La’iha emphasized primarily the

great injustice which would be created by the abolition of the Muqabala and by the proposals for compensation which were con-

Sidered totally insufficient. It was also argued that the government would draw advantages from the abolition of the Mugabala only after 1886, whereas through its continuation it could amortize a part of the state debt with the money which

would still come in until that date. Also, the La’iha envisaged a reduction to 5% of the rate of interest of the unified debt, and this measure, unilaterally decreased by the Khedive,

represented the starting point and the pretext for the diplomatic activity of the European governments which led to Isma*‘il's departure. In the financial part of the La’iha no proposals were made for tax reforms, which were envisaged in the Wilson plan, and also discussed by the Majlis al-Nuwwab. The delegates' demands

for the abolition of special taxes and of smaller dues were given no place in the La’iha. Contrary to the demands of the La’iha, the suspension of Mugabala had been allowed in the Chamber whenever this was in accordance with the wishes of the

taxpayers. If there was still room for doubt these facts confirm that the financial counterplan had not been worked out by the Majlis al-Nuwwab, as al-Rafi‘i would have people believe. Moreover, in the La’iha, in comparison to Wilson's plan, there

was neither provision for a civil list for the Khedive and his family nor for the equalization of the ‘ushuri land to the general land tax rates. The financial plan of the ‘notables’ contained nothing which would have damaged the material inter-

ests of the Khedive and of the privileged class. Wilson's plan, modified by the Commission of Enquiry, which was submitted one day later, on 8 April, proposed on the con-

trary a civil list for the Khedivial family of £300,000. °? In addition, a surtax of £150,000 was to be added to the overall ‘ushuri tax until the distinction between kharaji and “ushuri land was eliminated on completion of the new Land Registry. .The sums levied under the title of Ruznama were to

be considered as a special tax and cancelled from the list of State debts. The Muqabala was to be annulled, and all those who had gained tax reductions in this way would be compensated.

92 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS A large number of minor taxes and dues with a total annual yield of £400,000 were to be abolished. Tsma‘il, however, forestalled the European ministers and Com missioners. ‘Comme Chef d'Etat et comme Egyptien', he had the day before officially entrusted Sharif Pasha with the formation of a new cabinet, 'formé d'éléments véritablement égyptiens'. Tawfiq's resignation was considered as the resignation of the whole government, and, this without consulting the ministers. Isma*‘il considered it as 'un devoir sacré pour Moi de suivre l'opinion de Mon Pays'. The basis of co-operation between the Khedive and the new government would remain the decree of 28 August 1878, ‘qui devra é6tre rendu plus efficace encore par la responsabilité réelle des Ministres vis-a-vis d'une Chambre dont

le mode d'élection et les droits seront' réglés de fagon 4 répondre aux exigences de la situation intérieure et aux aspirations nationales'.’° Isma‘il nominated the 'veritably Egyptian’ government ina decree of 8 April: Sharif Pasha became President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Home and Foreign Affairs; Raghib Pasha, who had served Isma‘*il in the good old days as Finance Minister, accepted the position again; Shahin Pasha once more became Minister of War, Dhu al-Figar Minister of Justice, Thabit Pasha’! Minister of Education and Awqaf, Zaki Pasha’? Minister of Public Works, and ‘Umar Lutfi InspectorGeneral for Lower and Upper Egypt, with a seat and a vote in

the cabinet (in this position he was responsible for levying taxes in the whole country).

In a circular of 10 April, Sharif told the consuls that this cabinet was 'pénétré des sentiments du Pays et des vues du Chef de l'Etat'.’% The second part of this phrase was doubted by nobody; all the new ministers were intimates of the Khedive. As von Kremer stated, ‘oddly enough not one single Egyptian was to be found amongst them';’* all were Turco-Circassian from various parts of the Ottoman Empire.’° Thus, the list of ministers did not represent, as might have been expected, a cross-

section of the signatories of the La’iha: for instance, not a single member of the Chamber of Delegates had been nominated to the government. The 'Mamelukes' had preserved ranks! The

'Pasha system' and the ‘old order', so the European represent— atives feared, would now return. While the 'Mamelukes' took up their ministerial posts, those

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 93

Cairene merchants and ‘ulama’ who had taken a leading role in bringing about the change of government celebrated the success in their own way. On 8 April they met in Shaikh al-Bakri's house and continued to the ‘Abdin where the Khedive received the *ulama’ and the merchants separately. Shaikh al-Bakri and Shaikh al-Khalfawi thanked Isma‘il and praised his great act

'for fatherland and freedom’. On 9 April, al-Bakri gave a banquet in his house for the same people (among them the Coptic

Patriarch). The Khedive rewarded the faithful services of the Nagib al-Ashraf by a twenty-five-minute stay at the banquet! The merchants Ibrahim al-Muwailihi, Mahmud al-‘Attar and Muhammad al-Siyufi decorated their houses as though for the

feast-day of a popular saint. The reward of Ibrahim alMuwailihi was a head of department's post in the Finance Ministry of Raghib Pasha. The deposing of Isma‘il Isma*‘il now saw clearly that his action must be consolidated,

that the survival of his throne was at stake, and perhaps also Egypt's relative independence. Prior to their dismissal, the European ministers had recommended the Khedive's removal as the

only way to prevent a new crisis. But Isma‘il was determined to defend his re-acquired power with all the political, diplomatic and military means at his disposal. He had to satisfy the creditors and, at the same time, to reconcile the powers, put the Sultan on his side, and preserve the support of the notables.

First he put the army on red alert. ‘Urabi reports that, after the Commission of Enguiry had spread a 'veil' over the events of 18 February (report of 22 March, payment of salaries of 26 and 27 March), all officers from major upwards were called to the ‘Abdin, where the Khedive received them graciously. On this occasion ‘Urabi, Muhammad al-Nadi,’® and

‘Ali al-Rubi’’ were appointed Isma‘til's adjutants. 'A week

later' (probably after the European ministers' and their collaborators' dismissal), ‘Ali al-Rubi was appointed President of the District Tribunal of Mansura, Muhammad al-Nadi Commander of

the newly-founded 2nd Infantry Regiment in Alexandria, and ‘Urabi himself Commander of the new 4th Infantry Regiment. All

the dismissed officers were recalled, the military schools were re-opened, astart was made to increase drastically the army's

94 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS strength, and manoeuvres were held. The War Minister, Shahin

Pasha, devised a plan for the defence of the country, foreseeing among other things the closure of the Mediterranean harbours and of the Suez Canal with sunken boats etc., and also the flooding of low-lying areas behind the Mediterranean coast. On 10 April, Sharif Pasha informed the Chamber of Delegates

that they could continue in session. On 17 May, he submitted a draft constitution’® worked out with the help of his personal adviser and agent, the Pressburg lawyer and former member of the Austro-Hungarian Reichstat, Dr. Keller. This draft was discussed by a fifteen-member committee of the Chamber of Delegates under ‘Abd al-Salam al-Muwailihi's chairmanship. Also submitted to the committee was the draft of a new electoral law which the government communicated to the Chamber on 2 June.’? The draft of the constitution was remarkable in many ways but, Since the Majlis al-Nuwwab was dismissed on 6 July, before it

was through the debating stage, and since it was only resurrected by Sharif on his return to power in September 1881, it will be discussed in connection with those later events. When the members of the Commission of Enquiry and other

senior European officials (excluding the commissioners of the Caisse de la Dette Publique) had tendered their resignations, Isma*‘il tried to persuade the powers that he did not wish to throw off European financial control, but on the contrary he

desired, as was said in the La’iha, 'le controle le plus étendu sur l'administration financiére', based on the decree of 18 November 1876. Sharif, therefore, asked the French and British governments again each to nominate a Controller-General. However, on 22 April, Isma‘il decreed that the national

financial plan should be put into effect, regardless of the Wilson planas revised by the Commission of Enquiry. The next

day, in order to reassure the powers, he signed a decree envisaging the establishment of a Council of State on the model of the French Conseil d'Etat. This body should consist of the Prime Minister as president, two European vice-presidents,

eight advisers, and four officials of enquiry (two natives and two Europeans) and a general secretary. Its task would be to prepare bills, to give legal advice, and exercise a limited administrative jurisdiction. Sharif agreed that a Frenchman and an Englishman should be’ nominated as vice-presidents of the Council of State.

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 95

In a letter of 4 May, Isma‘il assured the British ConsulGeneral that the change of cabinet (he did not want to ascribe a greater importance to the changes) was due only to public pressure, and that he did not have hostile intentions towards the British government. Shaikh al-Bakri and Sharif explained the reason for the change. Al-Bakri visited Vivian on the same day (4 May) and por-

trayed himself as the leading spirit behind recent events. He told the British representative an impressive story, which Vivian evidently accepted at face value. Thousands of people had asked him to organize the resistance to the handing over of Egypt to the Europeans. The Khedive had only yielded to the representatives of the people who had made him swear on the Qur’an that from now on he would rule constitutionally, and who had threatened to remove him from office should he be tempted to break his oath. On 7 May Sharif Pasha compiled a long and detailed memorandum for Vivian of the sins committed by the 'European' government: The Nubar government had ignored the Khedive, and

disregarded the decree of 28 August 1878; it had shown contempt for the Khedive's and the War Minister's warnings of a revolt by the army (the officers had finally decided to help themselves); it had ignored the famine in Upper Egypt; it had recruited a large number of Europeans at excessive salaries;

it had levied half the taxes early in 1879 irrespective of the desperate economic state of the population; it had taxed tobacco growers. Furthermore the Chamber of Delegates had been treated with contempt by Wilson and de Bligniéres (although it was the government itself which had desired the Chamber's

convocation); the right of veto for European ministers had been introduced and the members of the government, disavowed on 18 February, had remained in office under European pressure; these ministers had shown increased enmity towards the Khedive; he dissolution of the Chamber of Delegates had been attempted at the very moment when Wilson's financial plan was to be dis-

cussed and finally, the intention had been to declare Egypt insolvent, and to abolish the Mugabala. All this had made a change of government necessary. No one wanted to get rid of the Europeans; their help was wanted, on Egyptian conditions, to regulate financial problems with more regard to the inter-

ests of the nation (or rather of the privileged class!).

96 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS The European powers, however, were shaping their policy

according to other criteria. The diplomatic activity which began in May and led to Isma‘il's removal was initiated by the German government. Bismarck evidently wanted to 'tie up' the Western powers in Egypt so that they would not be able to dir-

ect all their attention to the European stage. In the middle of May, the German Consul-General, supported by his Austrian

colleague, Saurma, protested against the unilateral modification of the financial agreement by the decree of 27 April. Saurma, at the same time, made a proposal for the solution of the ‘Egyptian guestion': the Khedive should be persuaded to abdicate in favour of his son.

In this situation Isma‘il tried all the more desperately to come to terms with the powers. He would concede anything but a re-entry of European ministers into the Egyptian government.

In the first half of June, however, there followed the formal British, French, Russian and Italian protests against the April decree. The Egyptian government proposed to submit this retrospectively to the powers for their approval, and then to re-proclaim it. Butthe European cabinets had already decided otherwise.

On 14 June the British representative, and a little later also his French colleague, advised the Khedive to abdicate in

favour of his son, in order to forestall his removal by the Sultan and the appointment of Halim as his successor. Tawfig had already ingratiated himself with the powers: on 11 June, for example, he had complained to Vivian about his father saying that the reinforcement of the army to 36,000 men was extravagant and that Isma‘il would not observe the decree of 28 August 1878. Sharif let it be understood that the Council of Ministers would put nothing in the way of Isma‘il's deposal, but on no account would it accept Halim as a successor, for

fear that Egypt would sink back to the status of a Turkish province. Muhammad ‘Abduh states that Sharif adopted this

attitude because of the pressure of a 'National-Liberal" party (al-hizb al-watani al-hurr) allegedly founded by Jamal al-Din. This party had been in contact with Tawfiq and aimed at replacing Isma‘il with the Crown Prince. °° On 19 June, the British and French governments made an

official request through their representatives for the Khedive's abdication and his departure from the country. If he

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 97

concurred, the two governments would guarantee him sufficient means and Tawfig's succession; but should the powers have to seek the aid of the Sultan in removing him he could not count on either. Similar advice soon followed from the German, Aus-

trian and Italian Consuls-General. But Isma‘il refused to take up a stance on this because he had himself put the case before the Sultan, and he was waiting for an answer. Now his fate was

in the hands of the Porte. In the meantime Isma‘il had tried to satisfy the creditors, secure the army for himself, and persuade the whole world, and above all the Sultan, that he enjoyed undiminished popularity

in the country. Shahin and ‘Umar Lutfi were sent out to the provinces immediately after the formation of the Sharif government to collect the money necessary for the payment of the May coupon. ‘Urabi writes that the government had received £500,000 from two local banks for which they were to consign 700,000 ardebs of grain from the provinces of Middle and Upper

Egypt. Thus it was a repetition of the previous year's transaction. A special commission in Cairo tried to obtain more cash, principally through the sale of state property. Shaikh al-Bakri had to secure the oath of allegiance for Isma*‘il from the ‘ulama’? and the merchants. Like Shahin Pasha, he too organized petitions demanding the continuation of the

Khedive's reign; officers of the Cairo and Alexandria garrison also had to sign. Le Phare d'Alexandrie, a mouthpiece for Isma‘il, stated on 26 June that more than 20,000 signatures had been collected for the petition to the Porte. ‘Abd al-Salam al-Muwailihi received an order to mobilize the Chamber of Delegates in support of the Khedive.

Isma*il had already tried in April to secure the loyalty of the Officer Corps. In spite of this, on 24 June, an artillery officer went in disguise to Raphael Borg and informed him that the officers would not oppose the removal of Isma‘il by the Sultan, and the nomination of Tawfigq as his successor. But the army would stand with the Khedive against a European army. The

Signatories of the La’iha were thus split into two camps: on one side the unconditional followers of Isma‘il, on the other the followers of Tawfigq. For Halim there was support in

Constantinople and also in Paris; in Cairo, with the exception of a few freemasons, nobody took his side, at least not overtly.

98 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS What decision would the Sultan make? On 13 April, Isma‘il's representative in Constantinople, Abraham (a brother-in-law of

Nubar), reported that up until then no official request for his deposal had been made by the powers to the Porte. But he had something very disquieting to report: Halim Pasha was visiting the palace daily, and often remained with the Sultan for hours on end. On 1 May, Isma‘il sent a memorandum to Abraham to be handed

over to the Grand Vizier. In it he accused the ministers who had been dismissed, among other things, of an anti-Turkish

attitude. The Grand Vizier (Khair al-Din al-Tunisi), in his answer, congratulated the Khedive on the successful ending of the veiled occupation of Egypt, and reassured him of the Sultan's government's support. The Khedive now wanted to underline his loyalty to the Empire. He asked Abraham to obtain an audience with the Sultan and to inform him that Nubar had wanted to extend the so-called ministerial responsibility to the whole Ottoman Empire! But Isma*‘il was mistaken in his belief that hypocritical submisSiveness could still save him. The Sultan had already decided on his deposition, and had found a more loyal candidate in Halim who also had the favour of Khair al-Din. It was only a question of imposing him upon the powers. Their candidate, however, had been and remained Tawfiq, who could be influenced more easily than Isma‘il or Halim.

Late in the evening of 24 June, it still seemed that the powers could only impose their will through force. From ConStantinople the French representative Tricou received the news that on the next day at noon Isma‘il would be removed and Halim named as his successor. Tricou arranged for the telegram to be taken to the Khedive whose private secretary returned the answer after midnight: namely that he would wait for Halim. During those hours he is reported to have ordered the reinforcement of the army to 150,000 men. Until three in the morning the British, German and French representatives together with

Sharif Pasha tried for the last time to secure Isma‘il's

abdication but the Khedive remained obstinate. Eventually, on 26 June, the Sultan gave in to the powers' pressure. Isma‘il and Tawfig received telegrams from the Grand Vizier ordering the replacement of the Khedive by the Crown Prince, which Sharif and Raghib immediately organized.

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 99

By the afternoon, the notables were already swearing allegiance in the Citadel to their new 27-year-old Khedive. On 30 June, Isma*il sailed into exile in Naples aboard his yacht Mahrusa. He was following now in the wake of Riyad and Nubar whom he

had driven into exile only a short time before. The two collaborators had already, after 18 February, been in fear for their lives and only under the explicit protection of the powers did they feel fairly safe from the Khedive's revenge. The British, French and German representatives gave several warnings against harming the two politicians, but when Isma‘il had returned to power, the protection of the Consuls-General was no longer sufficient and they felt increasingly uncomfortable. Eventually they preferred to accept Isma‘il's pressing advice and left Egypt, Riyad on 29 April, Nubar on 20 May. THE DHAWAT ARE DEPRIVED OF THEIR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER

The establishment of a new collaborationist government

Isma*il's removal was for the powers only the first step on the way to the re-establishment of their control. The 'national' government was still officiating and therefore, on 1 July, the consuls asked the new Khedive what steps he had taken towards changing the government. Tawfigq replied naively that he was

satisfied with the ministers; there were no better in Egypt. If that was the case, it was intimated, then the European administrators would simply have to return and a final break would have to be made with the events of the spring. Tawfiq understood. Next day, Sharif Pasha sent in his resignation but was immediately entrusted with the formation of a new government. ‘Vous connaissez la situation", the Khedive

wrote on 2 July, ‘la tdche est difficile'. As guidelines for future Egyptian policy he stipulated: Economie raisonée dans les dépenses de l'Etat; honnéteté et probité dans les services publics; introduction intelligente de reformes opportunes dans 1 ‘ordre judiciaire et administratif, tels sont les premiers remedes sur L'application desquels Je compte pour mettre le Pays a meme de reprendre son essor, de developper ses ressources Si fécondes et de faire honneur a ses engagements. °!

Apart from Sharif Pasha himself, who wanted continuing control

of the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, no one who had been particularly active at the end of March and beginning of April was included in the new government. However, all ministers were taken, like their predecessors, from the ruling

100 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS class; the Wakil of the Finance Ministry, Isma‘il Ayyub, °? became the head of this department; the Mudir of Minufiya, ‘Ali Ghalib/*? became Minister of War; the Cairo Prefect of Police, Mahmud Sami al-Barudi,®* was entrusted with the Ministries of Education and Awgqaf; the Muhafiz of Alexandria, Mustafa Fahmi,°®°* became Minister of Public Works, and Murad Hilmi,°°® President of the Cairene Mixed Court, Minister of

Justice. These new men were Sharif's acquaintances; he trusted them completely, although Tawfiq did to a lesser degree, and the

consuls not one bit. Naturally, they could suggest nothing against them personally as they were mostly unknown to them,

but, as they had not proved themselves to be collaborators, they were like the majority of the members of the March and April governments dismissed as 'nullités'. The only Egyptian politicians considered competent by the consuls, Nubar and Riyad, were in Europe; sooner or later they would have to be recalled. The new Council of Ministers could only be considered a transitional government. This also applied to Sharif himself, especially since Sharif's and Tawfiq's views did not coincide. It would be necessary to have a change of leadership of the government if 'a new beginning' was really to be made, that is if Nubar's policy was to continue. The Khedive had decided to avoid a collision course. He was convinced that there would be no peace for him during his reign if he set himself against Europe. Therefore he took the initiative and declared himself content with any Commission of Enquiry or Liquidation which the powers might set up; he would also accept Controllers-General. However, the two former European ministers should not be given any responsible positions, as this would considerably damage his own prestige. Tawfig made no secret of this attitude and on 31 July he declared in front of the notables in Tanta that he must now, above all, aim at obtaining the good will of the European powers.

Sharif tried rather to strengthen his position as representative of the ‘national coalition', and to gather behind himself the signatories of the La’iha by fulfilling Isma‘il's constitutional promises. In comparison to the inexperienced Khedive

he would shine out and be hailed not only as a patriotic, but

also as a liberal statesman. For this faithful knight of

Isma*il a constitution surely was nothing more than what it had

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 101

meant for his master, that is an attribute of civilization. In order to put this policy into practice, his rivals Nubar and Riyad had to remain outside the country. Thus, a formal prohibition of Nubar's return was immediately issued. But

Sharif's power was already stretched to its limits. Under the pressure of various consuls, Tawfiq soon revoked this prohibition, and Riyad was also called back from Europe. Tawfig could not and would not undertake his father's role as the standard-bearer of national opposition, or even remain

inactive. Thus Sharif preferred to resign and prepare for himself a fitting departure, rather than to stand by Tawfig and be Stamped as a lackey of the powers and thus have his political

future destroyed. It would be difficult to explain in another way the events which followed. On 6 July, Sharif sent the delegates home. On 17/ May, he had submitted to the Majlis al-Nuwwab the draft of a new con-

stituent law, and on 2 June, the draft of an electoral law which had since then been discussed by a fifteen-member constitutional commission. Now the delegates were informed that their discussions had proceeded too slowly. The Chamber's opposition of 27 March was not repeated; the Chamber dispersed without protest and without having voted upon the new constituent law

and the electoral law. The day before, a rescript by Tawfig to the Council of Ministers®’ had been published in al-Waqa’i* al-Misriya in which Tawfiq declared that the principles of the

Shura and ministerial responsibility were the basis of his policy, and he announced his intention of increasing the Chamber's rights. Things were happening in Cairo which nobody would understand. Finally Sharif's new government resigned on 17 August, the very day on which the Turkish emissaries, who had brought

Tawfig the impatiently-awaited firman of investiture,°® left Egypt again. ‘Only Allah knows'®? the reason for this resignation wrote Mahmud Fahmi. Sharif's step appeared incompre-

hensible, ‘without obvious reasons';?° but the speculations which began in public got to the heart of the matter. Sharif had submitted for the Khedive's approval the draft of a constitution which the latter rejected; or, the Khedive had not approved of the projected appointments of de Bligniéres and

Baring as Controllers-General. Either of these two facts might be the cause of the government's resignation.

102 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS Once the firman had established him securely, Tawfigq was

evidently determined not to let the reins slip out of his hands. Perhaps he hoped to return to the dynasty something of its former splendour by reconciling the powers and concentrat-—

ing in the court the internal exercise of power. In any case he dealt a blow to Sharif's constitutional aspirations. Nothing is known of the draft of a constitution he submitted to the Khedive (it may have been identical with the one he had submitted to the Chamber in May), apart from the fact that Tawfigq had described it with contempt as a 'décor de théatre', He did not want to hide behind unreal or illusory institutions. The Khedive abolished the principle of independence of the Council of Ministers announced the’previous year, and appointed a personal cabinet. He kept Mustafa Fahmi as Foreign Secretary and Mahmud Sami as Awqaf Minister. He also called to the other ministries 'experienced' Turco-Circassians. ‘Uthman Rifqi?’ became Minister of War, Muhammad Mar‘ashli?* Minister of Public

Works and Dhu al-Figar Minister of Justice. He recalled Riyad Pasha from Europe and appointed him Minister of the Interior. In the meantime he entrusted this post to his brother-in-law, Mansur Yakan, made Khalil Yakan Wakil at the Ministry of the

Interior, and his predecessor Haidar Yakan, a cousin of Mansur, Finance Minister. As Minister of Education, however, he appointed an Egyptian, ‘Ali Ibrahim,’* a member of the Mixed Court of Appeal in Alexandria. Although one can only speculate about the real reasons for Sharif's resignation, as far as the public was concerned he

left office a victim of the ruler's authoritarianism and the

pressure of the powers. He had once more proved himself for

the future as a liberal, patriotic statesman, and could retire for a while to his estates. The Khedive's behaviour and Sharif's resignation were certainly welcomed by the powers; but they did not appreciate the fact that Tawfiq threatened to become a miniature Isma‘il. An ‘independent' Council of Ministers had again to be established. Riyad Pasha was prepared to collaborate, and entered Egypt on 3 September. Originally it was intended that he should take over the Ministry of the Interior but the Khedive had already had some reason to complain of Riyad's excessive ambition while

he was still living in Europe. Tawfiq had revealed to the British representative that he had heard that Riyad wanted to

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 103

come back ‘in order to rule the country'. If he did not renounce this attitude he would be given no post at all. The Khedive had acted as his own lawyer, and he had person-

ally composed a rather feeble order of procedure for the cabinet's work which he proudly read out to Lascelles: on Thursdays and Saturdays the whole body would meet under his

chairmanship, every minister could put questions for discussion and would be responsible for carrying out those decisions relevant to him. But just as Tawfiq could not prevent de Bligniéres returning as Controller-General, he could also not prevent Riyad from assuming relative power. Tawfig's personal cabinet was short-

lived; he resigned himself quickly to his fate. He wrote on 21 September to Riyad?' that when he himself took on the chairmanship of the cabinet, he had only wanted to meet the require-

ments of the moment: in reality the formula ‘of the rescript of 28 August 1878, 'gouverner avec et par Mon Conseil des

Ministres', corresponded exactly to his ideas. On this basis Riyad was entrusted with the formation of a government. But Tawfiq reserved for himself a right that had been denied to

Isma‘il: he would take part in, and even preside over the meetings of the Council of Ministers whenever he thought it necessary. Riyad Pasha's list of ministers was immediately accepted. Mustafa Fahmi, ‘Uthman Rifgi, ‘Ali Ibrahim and Mahmud Sami were

confirmed in their offices, but Tawfiq's relatives and personal advisers, the Yakans, Dhu al-Figar and Muhammad Mar tashli -were

dropped. The Ministries of the Interior and Finance were taken over by Riyad himself; as Minister of Public Works he reappointed his comrade from the times of the 'European' government, ‘Ali Mubarak,and he promoted to the position of Minister of Justice the 25-year-old lawyer Husain Fakhri.?°® Now at last Nubar's work could be continued after the

‘annoying' interruption of almost half a year. The three central points of Riyad's government programme were the overcoming

of financial difficulties, the intensive development of public education and the reform of the indigenous courts. The second point was new in comparison with Nubar's programme of the previous year.

After Riyad's declaration of 7 October, made in the name of the Council of Ministers, that Isma‘il's decree of 22 April was

104 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS ‘sans effet', and after the issuing of the decree about the sphere of competence of the Controllers-General, the Control

was effectively re-established. Riyad's colleagues from the time of the Commission of Enquiry and the government of Nubar,

de Bligniéres and Baring, obtained 'rang et séances' (but only in an advisory position) in the Council of Ministers as Controllers-General and also far-reaching authority for supervision of the state finances. But, because Riyad was deeply concerned not to appear simply a lackey of Europe, he had ensured that the Khedive could decree: ‘pour le moment, les Controleurs Généraux ne prennent pas part a la direction des

services administratifs et financiers .. . se borneront

actuellement 4 communiquer, soit a Nous soit a nos Ministres, les observations auxgquelles leurs investigations auront donné

lieu'.?°

The silencing of the intellectual opposition Jamal al-Din ‘'al-Afghani' With the continuation of the Control and collaboration everything that had been achieved and celebrated in spring under

Isma*‘il's leadership was again lost. The privileged class, the officers and intellectuals of various kinds, had all profited for some time from the fact that the resistance to the 'European' government had found Khedivial patronage and had

been actively supported. The alliance with Isma‘il, however, had not always created reverence and love for the ruler. [In

fact, at that time, officers and intellectuals were contemplating tyrannicide. Isma‘il's removal, therefore, had not been accompanied by lamentation on the part of the nation; on the contrary, Tawfig's enthronement was hailed by all social groups, although expectations raised by the change of ruler differed greatly. The new Khedive was in general considered to

be a sincere and liberal reformer, but even if this had been true, to expect a great deal from him would have meant greatly overrating his scope for action in the face of European interference. With the establishment of Riyad's government, constitutional reforms and national self-determination, whatever substance was ascribed to these demands had been reduced

to the bounds of possibility. The fight had now to be led principally against Riyad; without the Khedive, but not necessarily against him, for who, after all, was Tawfiq?

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 105

Immediately after Sharif Pasha's resignation, and coinciding with the spread of disappointment in the Khedive, a press campaign was instigated against the new developments. Tawfigq replied, just as his father would have done, with a ban on newspapers and the expulsion of a man whom he rightly consid-

ered the mentor of the journalists concerned, Jamal al-Din. This is not the place to describe exhaustively the fortunes, philosophical and political views of Jamal al-Din ‘'al-Afghani' (who was in reality a Persian and a Shi‘ite). We can only give some indications of his role in Egypt in 1871-9, which in fact

even 'post-hagiographic' critical literature has not yet succeeded in fully elucidating. One reason for this is that Jamal al-Din 'made the headlines' only shortly before his arrest and expulsion (24 August 1879), partly because of this

event. Also, the written evidence of his political and philosophical ideas during those years is scant. An analysis of his views must be based almost exclusively on his writings after he had to leave Egypt. In 1869 Jamal al-Din made a short sojourn in Cairo. When he had to leave Constantinople in 1871 because an utterance considered heretical had unleashed a storm of anger against him, he returned to Egypt. It was due to Riyad Pasha that he was asked to spread his ideas on reform in Cairo, and that the Khedive ordered the unorthodox philosopher to be paid a monthly

Salary of 1,000 PT. Later, after his exile and, in fact, even after the British occupation of Egypt, Jamal al-Din still conSidered Riyad his protector, one to whom he could turn for help. In 1871, when Isma‘il appointed the reformer al-‘Abbasi as Shaikh al-Azhar, it was not difficult to persuade him that the critical philosopher was worthy of patronage. But Jamal al-Din did not teach for long at al-Azhar. The orthodox and conservative ‘ulama’, particularly the Shaikhs ‘Ullaish, al-Bahrawi

and al-Rifa‘i, rebelled against the innovator. It is reported that when Jamal al-Din gathered his pupils around him in his private house, among them his devoted follower Muhammad ‘Abduh

and the Shaikhs ‘Abd al-Karim Salman, Ibrahim al-Laqqani, Sa‘d Zaghlul and Ibrahim al-Hilbawi, stones were thrown through his windows.

This small group, denigrated as heretics, from whom, ‘Abd Allah al-Nadim writes, 'many believers turned away',’’ would

106 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS never have become so well Known had they not, in 1876, concen-

trated their activities on political and social affairs under the leadership of the Master, and this mainly in two spheres: the press and the Masonic movement. They were fighting against

European intervention, and, in the face of this, for internal reforms to strengthen Egypt, and for the unity of oriental countries. Until then freemasonry in Egypt had been solely the concern of Europeans, Levantines, and a few Europeanized members of the ruling class. In the lodges only European languages were spoken. When Halim Pasha tried to misuse this institution in 1867-8 for his own political and dynastic aims, the freemasons

temporarily forfeited Isma‘il's favour. But he took the lodges back under his protection after they had assured him that they would not meddle in the country's politics. Such an assurance was given to the government on 29 April 1873 by the official representative of Egyptian freemasons, the Grand Master of the Grand Orient National d'Egypte (al-Sharg al-A‘zam al-Watani

al-Misri), the Italian Zola. Jamal al-Din wanted to use this organization for his own ends. After the foundation of the first Arabic-speaking lodge he made an application to be admitted, and in 1876 he became a freemason. He also encouraged his disciples to become members. In 1878 he was elected President of the (English) Kawkab alSharg Lodge. It is said that Jamal al-Din was soon in dispute with established freemasonry because he wanted to turn the

lodges into cells of political agitation. The freemasons, however, did not agree with this policy. A five-member deputation of the Grand Orient National d'Egypte, under the leadership of the British Vice-Consul in Cairo, Rafael Borg, again reassured Tawfig in an audience of 17 August 1879 that the Egyptian freemasons had no political or religious ambitions and that they had at heart only the country's progress and civilization. Thereupon Tawfig assured him that he would extend to them the same protection and goodwill afforded

by his father. About the same time, according to information from the British Consul-General (which certainly came from Borg), Jamal al-Din was expelled from the lodge for openly denying the

existence of a higher being. Jamal al-Din himself later stated that the freemasons pledged to Halim had turned against him at

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 107

the very moment when he had advocated replacement of Isma‘il by

Tawfiq. With other followers of the Crown Prince, he had left the lodge (Kawkab al-Sharq) of which he had been the president

for two years. The responsibility for his exile lay with his enemies among the freemasons. The Phare d'Alexandrie of 2 September 1879 also implied that the true cause of expulsion of the 'prétendu philosophe afghan' had been rivalries within the masonic movement.

Whatever the truth may have been, the unwelcome political agitation and the accusation of heresy were the published reasons for Jamal al-Din's banishment from Egypt. Tawfiq told the British representative that he had fomented rebellion and

propagated nihilism. He was officially accused of secret plotting and spreading subversive doctrines to the detriment of the state and religion. A cloak and dagger operation of arrest and deportation was decided upon by the Council of Ministers, under the chairmanship of the Khedive, and in the presence of Mahmud Sami, who were both allegedly patrons of Jamal al-Din, and from whom the ambitious philosopher had great expectations. The allegation

that the decision was a request on the part of the British Consul-General appears to be a legend. According to Lascelles' report to London he had heard of the operation from the Khedive

only after it had taken place. It is likely, however, that for Tawfiq the supposed Afghan's political ambitions had become unnerving. Immediately before and after the change of Khedive, Jamal al-Din had cooperated

with Sharif. After the Khedive's rejection of Sharif's constitutional project and the government's resignation which followed, Tawfiq must have realized that his attempts at collaboration with the powers were endangered. It was probably also of account that Jamal al-Din's religious views (or what was heard of them) were extremely suspect to the Khedive, a conscientious orthodox Muslim.

In his:‘last years in Egypt the 'Master of the East" had not confined himself to teaching philosophy to young Azharites in

his own house but had also attracted into his circle intellectuals from completely different spheres, among them the two Christian Syrians Adib Ishag?® and Salim al-Nagqash’’ (who were active in Alexandrine theatre and were subsidized by Isma‘il) ; the 'Egyptian Moliére', the Cairene Jew Ya‘qub Sanu‘,’°® a sort

108 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS of court jester who mixed with the lower class and had therefore become embarrassing to the ruler; the Egyptian Bohemian ‘Abd Allah al-Nadim who was also often associated with Jamal

al-Din's disciples, although he did not consider himself one of them.

It must have been especially disturbing for the Azhar “ulama’ that Jamal al-Din was by the end teaching mainly in a café in the neighbourhood of the Opera. He was spending much of his time there, surrounded by ‘young Egypt', and Azhar rebels and casual visitors to the café ‘to whom he lays down such law as he deems expedient for the time’, The Times correspondent reported on 20 August 1879 after the Master had consented to give him an interview. For Jamal al-Din the principal law of the time was to fight against European intervention. Tawfig, not convinced that this law was valid, expelled the self-appointed maker of kings and ministers. The press

At the same time as the restless Persian was exiled, his Egyptian shadow, Muhammad ‘Abduh, was sent back to his native vil-

lage of Buhaira. The other disciples were initially left unmolested, but soon they too would attract the authorities' hostility because of the propagation of their and ‘Abduh's views in existing newspapers and the formation of new ones, in

which Jamal al-Din had encouraged them. -

Before 1876 there did not exist in Egypt a political Arabic press with any measure of independence. The only paper appear-

ing over a relatively long period (1866-72), the Wadi al-Nil, waS an organ commissioned and financed by Isma‘il for the

propagation of his political views. Ibrahim al-Muwailihi, although enjoying the Khedive's favour, had after two numbers to give up the periodical Nuzhat al-Afkar, which in 1869 he edited with Muhammad *‘Uthman Jalal, because Shahin Pasha had

suggested to the Khedive that the political character of the publication might harbour dangers. Le Progrés Egyptien was

occasionally described as the ‘opposition paper' of those years, but it was only published in French. An element which proved very important for the precipitous development of the press from 1876 onwards was Isma‘il's patronage of a group of young Christian intellectuals from Syria who, he hoped, would provide the impetus for an upsurge

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 109

in Egypt's cultural life. In December 1875 Salim Taqla obtained permission to publish a newspaper, provided that he did not

meddle with politics. In 1876, in collaboration with his brother, Bisharah, he founded al-Ahram, the oldest Egyptian

paper still in circulation.!°!

Jamal al-Din immediately recognized the chances offered by this initiative. His disciple Muhammad ‘Abduh started his

journalistic career with five articles published in this new paper during 1876'°* which provide an insight into the ideas of the group surrounding Jamal al-Din.

Subservience to Isma‘il for his efforts in favour of the

country's education and welfare was no more than exercise of a

duty. ‘Abduh recalled the country's past greatness and unprecedented level of civilization, which had been carried to new heights in the west and was now returning to its original home. He stressed the importance of literature and journalism for a nation's cultural, political and religious development. He criticized those ‘ulama® who closed their minds to Europe's modern science where its application was involved in the prosperity and superiority of European states. He who among lions

does not become a lion is destined to perish. However, for a more direct diffusion of its political creed, Jamal al-Din's circle needed its own organs of communication.

The Master, therefore, required those of his disciples with some literary education to publish newspapers themselves; his relationship with Riyad was useful in obtaining the requisite permits. In 1877 Adib Ishaq and Salim al-Naqqash founded the Misr and

in 1878 al-Tijara. The editorship of the Mir’at al-Sharq, first published in February 1879 by Salim al-‘Anhuri!°? with Isma*il's support, was taken over in April of the same year, after the founder's retirement, by Ibrahim al-Laqgani, one of Jamal al-Din's disciples. The philosopher also encouraged Ya‘qub Sanu* to edit the satirical paper Abu Naddara (1877) but,

after only fifteen issues, it was banned because of the criticisms of Egypt's social and political conditions which it contained. The editor was exiled with the agreement of the Italian Consul (Sanu‘* was an Italian protégé) but then the paper appeared in Paris and was smuggled into Egypt. The government was unsettled by this and directed the Customs officers to keep a careful watch, particularly on the mail from Syria.

110 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS Of the important new newspapers of those years mention should finally be made of al-Watan which was created in 1877 by the

Coptic teacher and mill-owner, Mikha’il ‘Abd al-Sayyid. This paper seems to have been formed by the initiative of the Coptic community itself. Early in 1879 the French Consul-General described al-Watan as the most important Arabic paper in Cairo.

It is thus striking that Egypt's relatively independent Arabic political press'®* was, in its initial phase from 1876-80, Carried on by members of non-Muslim minorities, marginal groups

of society which were in part even protégés of European states. That these papers could exist under Isma‘il must be ascribed

to the fact that in their choice and treatment of themes they followed to a large extent the general trend of politics. Whereas Ya‘qub Sanu‘'s socially critical and politically aggressive articles led to his exile, the contributions appearing in other papers which concentrated on progress and civilization and the checking of the 'European danger' could find the ruler's complete acceptance. Until the middle of 1878 the dominating theme in the press was the Russo-Turkish war and its consequences for the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. However, when Isma‘il had been deprived of power and the 'European' government formed, attention was focused primarily on the internal political scene where there was more scope for the journalists. By exposing past maladministration and praising reforms to be implemented, they could count on the support of Nubar, Wilson and de BligniéGéres. And if they criticized the new regime, the European intervention, and the rapidly mounting number of European officials in Egypt, Isma*il was certain to approve. From December 1878 until about April 1879 the main interest of the press was to support the Chamber of Delegates against the 'European' government. In the circumstances, this line

again had Isma‘il's agreement, but it brought the press into conflict with the Council of Ministers which at that time held the real power. The news of the imminent convocation of the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab was enthusiastically reported. 'A new epoch' will begin, announced al-Tijara; confidence that the delegates were conscious of their duties and of the people's rights (huqug al-umma) was assumed. Some had heard that the meeting of the Chamber might even be attended by newspaper correspondents;

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 1il

but this remained a rumour.’°°®

Al-Watan believed that, at last, the phrase ‘ministerial © responsibility’ might become meaningful: to whom after all had the ministers been responsible until now? The Chamber could cease to be an instrument of the government in the exploitation

of the fallahin and, it was to be hoped, the reforms promised but not implemented by Wilson could be put into effect and his

ruinous tax policies stopped. It was seen as a positive step, however, that under Wilson's influence the press and populace had acquired a greater freedom to express their opinions./°® Thus, judgement of the 'European' government was still,

first of all, ambivalent. However, as the European ministers persistently ignored the Chamber, they were violently attacked for their arrogant attitude and their intention to dismiss the majority of officers from active service. In a pragrammatic article!°®’ of 1 February 1879, al-Watan covered the Chamber against the charge of ineptitude and intellectual laziness and accused Wilson of arrogance and disregard

of the Egyptian people's representatives. He would do better to co-operate with the Chamber: the master of the house was certainly better acquainted with the situation than a stranger! Foreigners in Egypt were always a little blind, however intelligent they might be. Neither did de Bligniéres escape attack, the main criticism being that the European ministers behaved differently when in Egypt rather than in Europe. Was it not parliament which made laws there? Even if the Majlis had previously been a willing tool of the government (something certainly not admitted by the delegates), the situation had fundamentally changed and this change must be taken into account. Al-Watan and al-Tijara, which took the same line, were suspended for fifteen days because of these attacks. After Nubar's dismissal the Chamber's constitutional demands and the alliance between the notables and Isma‘il naturally found support. In a speech given in Alexandria and reproduced in Misr, Jamal al-Din hailed the Sharif government as the longed-for 'hukuma shuriya';/°°® although he had pleaded, as late as February, for an enlightened (mutanattis) and benevolent (rahim) despotism as a government befitting the times,!°?

in this he had curiously kept aloof from the discussion of the

Chamber's rights. ;

After Sharif's resignation and Jamal al-Din's banishment,

112 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS the latter's disciples initiated a press campaign against the new repressive policy which brought in August 1879 the onemonth suspension of the Mir’at al-Sharg and a warning to

al-Tijara in its wake. Early in September the Mir’at al-Sharg had again to cease publication, this time for five months. The paper was reproached with interfering in matters which did not concern it and publishing absurd news with no basis in fact. Since the press inspired by Jamal al-Din had now sided with

Sharif, both directly and indirectly, Riyad acted energetically against it after his 'seizure of power’. He issued warnings to Misr and al-Tijara and, at the beginning of November, he ordered a permanent prohibition of both papers. While Adib Ishag was sent by Sharif to Paris to continue his journalistic work, Salim al-Nagqgash wanted to begin anew in Egypt. Early in January 1880 there appeared as substitutes for the two prohibited newspapers al-Mahrusa and al-‘Asr al-Jadid. As a preventive measure, al-Mahrusa was suspended for fifteen days immediately after its first number. [In addition La Réforme, mouthpiece for Sharif Pasha, written in French, was twice cautioned. La Jeune Egypte

Finally a group of young Levantine intellectuals, calling themselves the 'Union de la Jeunesse Egyptienne' or 'Jam‘iyat Misr

al-Fatat', also stood in the way of Riyad's authoritarian government. This group had been established in Alexandria towards the end of Isma‘il's rule and obviously under Jamal al-Din's influence. Adib Ishaq and Salim al-Naqqash are named as front-line members (although Salim does not even mention the Union in his Misr li-1l Misriyin). ‘Abd Allah al-Nadim is also

said to have been connected for a time with this group, but to have soon turned his back on it, as he felt less than comfortable in a Levantine milieu and disapproved of the initial secretive character of the Union. Among the members, as Muhammad ‘Abduh remarks with contempt,

there was 'not one true Egyptian'; the group comprised, for the most part, young Levantine Jews.''° Other contemporary reports describe the members of the Union as the ‘jeunesse dorée' of Alexandria, from Levantine Christian and Jewish mer-

chant families and protégés of European states;'** ‘un certain nombre de jeunes gens d'Alexandrie, tous juifs, syriens,- grecs, chrétiens, etc. . . . pour la plupart protégés européens';'?!?

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 113

'six ou sept tétes chaudes dont un grec, un maltais et le reste des protégés étrangers';’'* 'plusieurs jeunes gens appartenant 3 de bonnes familles du pays, pour la plupart syriennes.'’'" As for the patron of this group, there are differing reports. By some they were supposed to be in touch with Sharif, who had supported Tawfiq's succession; by others its members were considered Halim's partisans. This contradiction might perhaps be

explained in this sense, that after the general disappointment about Tawfigq, the group had changed allegiance and turned to Halim. On the other hand Adib Ishaq remained faithful to

Sharif Pasha and to the Hilwan Group whichheled. Its leading members were, however, Isma‘il's 'Mamelukes'. This could well be the reason why the Union is sometimes even confused with the Hilwan Group.

In view of these various supposedly secret but in reality not secret circles, and considering that Abu Naddara should see Egypt as having at that moment three Khedives (one past, Isma*‘il, one present, Tawfiq, one future, Halim), and in view

of the often impenetrable political intrigues and power struggles which usually implied a political programme, but not one

that was necessarily adhered to, it is not surprising that completely misleading versions should also circulate about the "Union de la Jeunesse Egyptienne'., Early in September 1879 the Union came into the open with a

project of reform,!!* written in French, which was submitted to the Khedive by a delegation of members. They introduced themselves as a group of young people who had seen in Tawfig a reformer-Khedive and had expected great things from him. They wanted to work with him for a better Egypt. The pamphlet bore a striking similarity to the reports of the Commission of Enquiry whose analysis of the general situation in Egypt and proposals for reform were also to be found in the Union's project. Moreover, the project contained constitutional considerations and included further demands in the

spheres of education, political rights, freedom of the individual, of the press and of the people's representatives. These last were presented as le pouvoir representatif side by side with pouvoir executif, le pouvoir judiciaire and le pouvoir législatif (the legislative power to be exercised jointly by the Khedive and people's representatives). Further, the group was editing a bilingual newspaper,

114 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS La Jeune Egypte/Misr al-Fatat, in which it again demanded

internal, principally political, reforms. The French half was the original part of the paper which was translated into Arabic by Adib Ishaq. This underlines once more the fact that Misr al-Fatat was by no means an Arabo-Egyptian enterprise. Riyad was not interested in political philosophy and still

less in constitutional practice. At first he cautioned the newspaper and in the middle of November he prohibited it, whereupon the director, a certain M. Goussio, took him to

court but to no avail. In the last days of December the Union replied to these repressive measures with the distribution of a bilingual (French and Arabic) pamphlet in which the demand for freedom

of the press, already contained in the ‘projet de réformes', was raised in an even more pressing and fundamental form.!!§°

The new publication was, as far as its justification of the demand goes, a philosophical tract based on a classical European education. The second part, which contained a discussion of the freedom of the press from a legal point of view, resem-

bled a tract on constitutional law; at was as if the author was writing with a French juridical treatise at his elbow. La jeune Levante: what could ‘Abd Allah al-Nadim or Ahmad

‘Urabi have been looking for in a group like this? The distribution of the pamphlet on the freedom of the press was the last public activity of the young Levantines. It seems that in the spring of 1880 they, or at least some of them, were exiled from the country as supposed followers of Halim.

The end of privileges: reforms for creditors and fallahin The collaborationist regime had silenced its critics. Both Tawfiq and Riyad had seen their policies, of collaboration with the control powers and of internal reforms without constitutional experiment, endangered by the intellectuals, and had therefore muzzled them. Riyad now thought that he could get down to work, undisturbed. His programme was for the most part identified with the conclusions reached by the Commission of Enguiry, to which he

himself belonged. If subjectively he was carrying out a finance policy imposed by the powers and a reform programme dic-

tated by them, nevertheless, objectively, his measures were progressive.''’ The Controllers-General respected Riyad's

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 115

desire for independence and, through their behaviour, made it possible for him to consider the reforms his own work. 'The best hope of success lay in the Controllers submitting themselves to a self-denying ordinance. They would have to pull the strings behind the scenes, but appear on the stage as little as possible', Lord Cromer wrote.?!8 In the first phase, from October 1879 to March 1880, Riyad carried out with remarkable energy and resolution a radical tax

reform. In the central administration he had help, side by side with Europeans in the service of Egypt, from well known indigenous specialists, partly educated in Europe, to whom he

had assigned responsible positions in the ministries and in various committees of experts. '‘'Pashas' of the old school retained their positions as governors or were newly appointed to: them provided they were prepared unconditionally to carry

out Riyad's policy in the provinces. After taking over the business of government, Riyad first appealed to all senior central and provincial officials to support him with all their strength in implementing his reforms for the ‘bien général de notre chére patrie'. The patriotism which he evoked he understood in a very concrete sense as a

striving for the material welfare of the population. However, like Nubar one year earlier, Riyad found the government's treasury empty; but he was more successful in

overcoming the financial problem. Probably for the first time the tribute to the Porte was not paid in full. Since Ruznama funds were also low, state pensions could not be paid. In the Spring the government borrowed first £150,000 in order to pay a part of the pension arrears and later the Commission of Liquid-

ation released £350,000 to level the tribute arrears and £600,000 for pensions and salaries. Instead of the 6% interest on the unified debt due on 1 November, the creditors had to be satisfied with 4%. The Consuls-General gave their placet to

this; they envisaged anyway a reduction of the interest rate to 4% as well as the cancellation of all the Coupon arrears. It is true that in the middle of October 1879, in view of the government's cash shortage, an ultimatum was given requiring payment within two weeks of all taxes for the current year,

but, at the same time, a previously unheard of way of collecting taxes was ordered. The tax collectors were admonished to behave sympathetically towards the common people; but they

116 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS should show themselves firm and unyielding towards those who

had until then been privileged, the administrators of the da’iras, the notables and foreigners. Two petitions by shaikhs and ‘umdas from various districts of the Fayyum, in which a complaint had been made about the

arbitrary methods of the provinces' tax collectors, led Riyad to send a circular to the provincial governors, stating as a. principle that payment of taxes should not leave taxpayers below subsistence level. However, a further circular to the mudirs and provincial tax collectors, dated 15 October 1879, ordered that the year's taxes owed by the da’iras, notables and Europeans should be ruthlessly collected within fifteen days under the same method of threats (confiscation of land or sale of goods) which until then had been applied only to dilatory fallahin. On 7 February 1880, Riyad once more encouraged the mudirs Similarly and at the same time required them within a month to

collect the tax arrears for 1876 to 1878 (all arrears older than 1 January 1876 having been cancelled). Riyad had seen to it that the mudirs would have no difficulty with the notables. As far as the foreigners were concerned, the problem had been thoroughly examined; governors should not shrink from applying

drastic measures to them as well. In case of seizure of property, however, the consul concerned should be informed in advance and a representative of the consulate should be present

at the official proceedings. A decree of the Minister of the Interior (28 February 1880) abolished the privilege of choosing whether to pay the ‘ushuri tax to the mudiriya chest, directly to the Ministry of Finance or to the Caisse de la Dette Publique. Thenceforth all land

taxes, whether for kharaji or ‘ushuri land, had, in order to end confusion and abuse, to be paid to the sarraf of the place to which the land in question belonged. (Until then the “‘ushuri land was,inscribed only in the registers of the mudir-

iyas, and not in the tax lists of the village sarrafs.) Ina circular of the same day to the mudirs, in his capacity as Minister of Finance, Riyad insisted more urgently than ever

before that the land taxes had also to be levied, without exception, from the class ‘qu'on pourrait appeler privilégiée, je veux parler des Dairas, des grands propriétaires et des Européens'. At the same time a detailed description was given,

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 117

as a sort of deterrent, of the ways in which this class had been treated until then. Finally, on 28 March 1880, extensive rules of procedure were released, setting out ways of dealing with reluctant taxpayers (confiscation and sale of movable and immovable property).

But this repeal of the privileges of a small @lite applied not only to the methods of levying tax but also to the assessment of the tax to be paid. An attempt was made to rebalance tax contributions, to make them weigh more heavily on the privileged, while reducing the taxes and dues which burdened the economically weak. A beginning was made in a decree of 31 December 1879 which

abolished the obligation, introduced in 1873, of buying or paying for a certain amount of salt per head per year (in practice a capitation tax); however, the salt monopoly of the state was continued. In a decree of 17 January 1880 twenty-nine taxes, dues and charges, which were either unimportant to the treasury or even wholly unprofitable, and were felt to be oppressive by the population, were completely abolished, and the levying of-twenty-three more was reformed. A large proportion of these were anyway local and not country-wide. This measure corresponded to a recommendation of the Commission of

Enquiry, and it also satisfied the demands of the Chamber of Delegates, the Union de la Jeunesse Egyptienne and the Hilwan Group.

But just as important as the alleviation of the tax burden was the fact that every fallah was told exactly when he had to pay which contribution, and that taxes should be collected at the time most favourable to him. The collection of the land and date-palm taxes was therefore spread over the whole year

and it was established that the largest contributions should be collected after the harvest. The fallahin need no longer have recourse to the 'usurers'. The sums of money due each month in each province were determined in relation to the budget estimates based on the experience of previous years. These sums had to be broken down and each taxpayer to be informed, by way of an extract from the tax register, of the amount he was to pay. Moreover it was decreed that the Upper Egyptian custom of paying tax in kind should, because of abuses, be abolished; payment in cash was introduced. The shunas were advised not to accept any more grain or other farm products.

118 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS Thus, while tax relief was introduced for the common people,

further financial advantages were lost by the privileged class through the 'definitive' abolition of the Mugabala law (decree of 1 January 1880). Tax reductions were annulled, but the titles of ownership acquired through partial or full payment of the Mugabala remained legally valid. After the completion of the new Land Register, which was in course of preparation, those who had paid contributions under the title of the Muqa-

bala were to receive a corresponding compensation. In a letter to Tawfiq (25 December 1879), Riyad gave a detailed explanatior of this measure. His most important argument for ending this scheme was that an agrarian country like Egypt could not afforc thus to limit in perpetuity its most important source of revenue. Among his secondary reasons he stressed primarily that the Mugabala had in fact degenerated into an ordinary tax, and had therefore become unpopular.!?°

This argument, of course, did not refer to the class of privileged landowners. They had been able, with the help of the Muqabala, to secure questionable titles of ownership, or to redeem state bonds'?° or to buy what was in effect the remis-

sion of half their land taxes.!*! However, it was true that the Muqabala had been unpopular with the fallahin;**? in spring 1879 even in the Majlis al-Nuwwab a request was made for the

restoration of the voluntary basis of the Mugqabala. The overwhelming majority could in fact consider the removal of the scheme, as Riyad always maintained, as a further tax reduction while for many great landowners it meant a further loss of

privilege. This was not the end of the matter; on 18 January a surtax of £150,000 was added to the total amount of the ‘ushuri tax. Further, the decree of the previous year was confirmed in which all fallahin, regardless of where they lived and who their employers were, could be recruited into the corvée. As will be seen, those who were affected by these measures defended themselves against this loss of economic privileges. Riyad had not expected otherwise; he knew perfectly well that

he would bring on himself the pashas' hostility, or even their hatred, and he therefore tried to avoid anything that might lead to the dissatisfaction of the fallahin. Besides, he was intent on casting a veil over the fact of European control, even on appearing to attack it, if only symbolically. He

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 119

dismissed the director-general and inspector-general of customs, both Europeans, and filled the vacancies with Egyptians. The general directorship of the Land Register office, set up under General Stone on 10 August 1879, which was to prepare a new assessment of land taxes with the creation of a new Land Register, was taken over by a directorate under Muhammad Rustam, with Mahmud al-Falaki,'*? Rousseau and Colvin as additional members. Muhammad Rustam also presided over the commission which was entrusted, on 27 December 1879, with bringing together all decrees and ordinances concerning the land tax, with determining the tax levying procedure and

recording all inequalities and irregularities, as well as reporting on the progress of the new Land Register. The commission was to submit drafts for regulations to provide an

equitable distribution of taxes and for the protection of taxpayers against arbitrary action. Riyad did not want to base his measures only on the material and report provided by the Commission of Enquiry, but wanted once again to hear the views Of Egyptian experts and those affected. The commission, therefore, also included the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice, Butrus Ghali,!** and the two landowners Muhammad Sultan’*° and Sulaiman Abaza.'*® Riyad also put indigenous

experts at the head of other reform commissions, foreigners acting only as members. He formed within the Ministry of Finance a three-member committee under Wasif ‘Azmi!*’ for the

examination of tax complaints. ‘Ali Ibrahim, the Minister of Education, presided over a commission, the task of which was to make proposals for the reform and expansion of public education; ‘Abd Allah Fikri'!*® and Salim Pasha!*? were also members. Similarly, a study commission under the Minister of Justice, Husain Fakhri, was created to look into the indigenous courts. This commission comprised mainly Egyptian members of various tribunals (‘Abd al-Sami, Muhammad Qadri,/?° Ibrahim Khalil,Mahmud Hamdi) and ministerial officials (Butrus Ghali,

Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice; Kahil, Secretary to the Council of Ministers; Tijran,’*?! Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry). However, the commission which was entrusted (31 March 1880) with the preparation of the Law of Liquidation based on the report of the Commission of Enquiry (8 April 1879) was presided over by Wilson and had only one Egyptian member, Butrus Ghali. This commission was at the

120 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS centre of public interest, mainly because it had to provide a definitive decision of the Mugqabala problem, the question of compensation, which was the pretext for a general attack on the collaborationist government by Riyad's opponents, especially the so-called Hilwan Group. The suppression of the dhawat's opposition: the Hilwan Group

The representatives of the ruling class under Isma‘il had, witt the establishment of the ‘European’ government in August 1878,

been relegated to second place, had returned to their former positions in April 1879 and in September 1879 had again lost them upon the formation of Riyad's government. In only a very short time power had again slipped through their fingers. Ismatil's departure from Egypt marked the end of an epoch also

for each of them. Sharif Pasha, 'le chef de la coterie des vieux Turcs',’?** quickly appreciated the situation, took his chance as a constitutionalist, and ensured for himself a group of influential followers. In the autumn he made a new start,

this time as a patriot. The Turco-Circassians, now deprived of power, spent the summer on their estates or by the Mediterranean. What would their

political future be? In the autumn a striking number of Europeans and collaborating Egyptians were among those who took

over their positions. The new regime, after dispossessing the Turco-Circassians politically, threatened them with another, drastic reduction of their social and economic privileges. The measures already introduced or expected from the Riyad government did not allow room for doubt. Something had to be done.

Early in October, Sharif Pasha returned from his estate to Cairo. At the beginning of November an anonymous ‘Manifesto of the Egyptian National Party','’?* written in French and dated 4 November 1879, was circulated. In contrast to the two pam-

phlets of the 'Union de la Jeunesse Egyptienne' this was not a treatise on political philosophy, constitutional theory and public law: it simply threw down the gauntlet to European intervention and to Riyad, as its tool. Isma‘il's 'Mamelukes' protested against the loss of their political position and the threat to their social and economic standing; they claimed to speak for the whole population. Unfortunately only one witness, and a very unreliable one at

that, John Ninet,’** reports the genesis of this manifesto. He

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 121

claims to have been the author of its French translation from the Arabic. But there is much to suggest that the Arabic text had never been printed and distributed, even if it had ever existed.'°° Nobody apart from Ninet vouches for its existence. The 'National Party' obviously thought it more important to be listened to by the powers and their collaborators than by the

nation. , Ninet, unfortunately, was not able to make up his mind to

publish only one version of his ‘revelations’. In 1883 he

wrote that the manifesto of 9 November 1879 had been composed by Sultan Pasha, Sami Pasha,'*°® ‘Ali Bey Yamani,!?’ Isma‘til Pasha Yusri, ‘Uthman Pasha Lutfi!*® and Sharif Pasha, and that

6,000 copies had been distributed.!°° A year later he stated that on 4 November 1879 (and this was the correct date) 20,000 copies had been printed. The aim of the authors was to bring

down Riyad, ‘un vrai complot de dignitaires spécialistes'. The opponents of the prime minister were led by Sharif Pasha, Sultan Pasha, ‘Umar Pasha Lutfi and Raghib Pasha, 'que je

n'appellerai pas précisement des individualités nationalistes, sauf Sultan, né fellah, mais gui, tous éloignés des affaires, 4a l'exception de ce dernier, étaient impatients d'y rentrer.' To this end also they had sent Adib Ishaq to Paris to publish an Arabic newspaper financed by them and directed against Riyad.!*?

The greatest caution is thus required when dealing with Ninet's numerous contradictory reports and his propaganda pamphiets in favour of Halim, in which he, like his colleague Ya‘qub Sanu‘, wanted to establish his own sense of importance.

In spite of this, one or the other of the two versions he put forward is usually chosen and presented as a historical fact. Before going more deeply into the question of the instigators we must deal with the manifesto itself. The authors of the manifesto apologized at the beginning for having to remain anonymous 'parce que la forme de gouvernement

octroyée a l'Egypte, sans participation nationale, par les puissances . . . peut, d'un mot, sans procés, sans bruit, déporter, supprimer, ruiner dans leur familles, les patriotes que le parti national a reunis sous un drapeau unique.’ Martyrs would not, for the moment, further the cause. Therefore they appealed to the cabinets of the 'free and civilized world', and above all to Bismarck, to protect them through diplomatic

122 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS channels, from the Egyptian government, so that they might come

out into the open. The two great themes of the manifesto (set out here more

systematically than in the original) are foreign intervention and the Egyptian state debt. They did not bewail the demise of Isma‘il's regime; he had brought the country to the brink of a precipice, and had only called for the help of the ‘Egyptian National Party' at the hour of greatest need to save himself and his family. The present regime would in the same way. lead

the country to its ruin. Only the Egyptian nation itself, represented by the ‘National Party', could avert this, 'en suivant les phases historiques de la vie des nations européennes qui jouissent aujourd'hui des libertés auxquelles l'Egypte aspire' on the bases of the ‘principes mémes, auxquels 1'Europe doit sa grandeur.' The Riyad government did not represent Egyptian interests. The 'National Party': ne peut considérer le Gouvernement constitué par l'influence étrangére comme étant 1l'expression des voeux et des besoins du pays qu'on n'a

pas daigné consulter. Tel qu'il est, il n'a aucune attache vraiment égyptienne, sa base est arificielle. Les puissances seules ont concouru a sa formation. Le nation n'y est pour rien. Un Khedive régne au Caire, mais la direction supréme des affaires n'émane ni de lui ni de son ministére . .. La nation nilotique ne peut accepter un état de choses qui la livre, sans appel, a une tutelle dangéreuse pour son autonomie, et laisse l'exploitation de ses richesses a des éléments étrangers irresponsables, jouissant d'immunité et de priviléges

auxquels elle ne participe pas ... Le parti national répudie, pure-

ment et simplement, toute immixtion étrangére, sous forme de chefs d'administration principales, dont les émoluments somptueux absorbent

le plus clair des revenus publics.

Only in one particular situation might the principle of nonintervention in internal Egyptian affairs be abandoned: the powers should intervene to make possible the public activity of the ‘National Party'. Also, on no account would they be prepared to renounce the disinterested advice of European experts. As for the question of the state debt, the manifesto (like the financial plan of the previous April) rigorously declared that Egypt was solvent. Even if responsibility for the debt was not accepted, there was still a firm determination to repay it. But the means to this end ought to be different from those which the Riyad government in conjunction with the powers had decided upon. The following demands are made in the manifesto: (1) the whole administration to be put back into Egyptian hands;

DESTRUCTION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER 123

(2) all estates which Isma‘il, after ascending the throne, had appropriated for himself to pass into state ownership; (3) the direct mortgaging of state revenues (for example from railways

and former Khedivial estates) to be cancelled; (4) all debts of any sort to be unified, and the rate of interest of this one state debt to be fixed at 4% per year; (5) an international three-man commission appointed by the powers and confirmed

by the Egyptian government to supervise the service of debts but without authority to interfere in Egyptian administration. Three further programmatic pronouncements are interspersed

at various points of the manifesto: (1) the ‘National Party' is an enemy of extreme and violent measures; (2) it seeks to improve the lot of the 'masses' through a progressive educational system; (3) it demands the reform of and reductions in the tax system. In their attacks against Riyad's government the authors resurrected arguments and ideas from the campaign, led primarily by Sharif, against Nubar. In common with the spring finance plan the manifesto advocated the rejection of the bankruptcy declaration and a demand for a lowering of the

interest rate on the state debt, which then stood at 5%. In the La’iha which had been composed under Isma‘il's very eyes,

the interests of the dynasty had, naturally, been given particular consideration; but this was now no longer necessary and, moreover, not opportune. The general theme of the November manifesto was the uncompromising rejection of European involvement in Egyptian administration and politics.

Riyad was not at all in the dark as far as the ringleaders and authors were concerned. '‘'The suspected authors', writes Ninet, ‘went into a sort of self-retirement at Helwan, where

they remained for a while under strict surveillance.''*! For this reason Isma‘il's former 'Mamelukes' opposed to Riyad's collaborationist government appear in literature as the 'Hilwan

Society' (Jam‘iyat Hilwan). In this health resort (a sulphur spa) south-east of Cairo, which since 1876 had been connected by railway with the metropolis, they sought solitude rather than recovery, forat this time Hilwan was experiencing a depression. ‘'Helouan appeared in 1879 to be gradually return-

ing to the state of nature .. . No strangers were seen in

its dusty streets; building was suspended; the physician left a place in which patients were unknown, and the depth of

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“SEA 7 ‘a \N (hea SEE 5 & \oO > SEES an oe. a ee L § Xb \Y \ See Sabry's quotation from the original manuscript ('La

Genése', p. 173), where Shahin names ‘Abduh, as well as Sharif, ‘Umar Lutfi, Raghib and Sultan. ‘46 Muhammad Hafiz (1817-89), a Bosnian, formerly Isma‘til's tutor, minister and superintendent of various Da’iras of the Khedive's family, was authorized by the ex-Khedive to administer his daughter's goods. See Mubarak, Al-khitat, Vol. 9, pp. 66 £.; dZakhura, Vol. 2, pp. 322-6; Mujahid, No. 136. i1*7 Muhammad Nash’?at was actually a son-in-law and not a son

of Muhammad Hafiz, as ‘Urabi writes; see Zakhura, Vol. 2, p. 328.

148 Kashf al-sitar, pp. 148-50; these three pages do not

appear in the new edition of the memoirs. 149 Many contemporary authors only associated Shahin, 'Isma‘il's agent' (Sarhank, p. 373; M. Sharubim, Al-kafi fi tarikh Misr al-gqadim wa al-hadith, Vol, 4 (Bulag, 1900), p. 223) or Sharif (L'Egypte Nouvelle, p. 11) with the Hilwan Society.

19° See for example Broadley, pp. 49, 357; Malortie, pp. 197, 302; Blunt, Secret History, p. 149. *°' Ishaq, pp. 168-71. 152 Gendzier, for example, uses this expression (p. 44)! 123 Arabi Pacha, p. 165. 'S* William Gregory, An Autobiography (London, 1894), p. 380. ‘55 Ahmad Rif‘tat, a young French-educated Turk, later secretary of the cabinet council and press director under Mahmud

Sami, wrote about himself during the war: ‘Je ne suis l'agent de personne. Je ne suis qu'un fils d'orient, aimant avant tout Sa patrie et la verité, désirant voir mon pays d'accord avec l'Europe, et surtout avec la France, pour répandre partout les principes d‘'égalité et de liberté par l'échange des idées et

non par l'échange de boulets meurtriers'; Le Temps, 16 Aug. 1882, in WITU—Box 7, doss. 38; on Rif‘at see especially Broadley, particularly pp. 146-9, 204-17, 238-42, 501-7. ‘56 Broadley, pp. 204 f. 157 That they had also attacked Isma‘til in their manifesto

may have been a diversionary manoeuvre. ‘58 Text in MAE—pol.corr., Vol. 66 (Cairo, 24 May 1880).

153 Out of the leading thinkers, this action lacked: Ratib

Pasha, who had followed his master into exile in Naples; Ibrahim al~Muwailihi, who had feared Riyad's vengeance after the latter's return in the late summer of 1879 and who had therefore fled to Isma‘il (see Afshar/Mahdavi, facsimile 102); the aged Shaikh al-Bakri, who was soon to die.

340 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS 160 brahim Adham, a Kurd, Isma‘til's courtier, was in the end wakil of the Da’ira of one of the ex-Khedive's daughters. On him see Mubarak, Al-khitat, Vol. 9, p. 91 and Blunt, Gordon at Khartoum (London, #1912), pp. 551-61. ‘él Text in MAE—pol. corr., Vol. 66 (Cairo, 24 May 1880). 162 La Réforme, 17 May 1880. 163 La Réforme, 24 May 1880. te e.g. WTU-—Box 20, doss. 209.

165 See the articles from 25 Nov. 1880, 18 Dec. 1880 and

29 Jan. 1881, in Rida, Vol. 2, pp. 56-68; the saying quoted is on p. 64. 166 Mudhakkirat ‘Abduh, p. 86. 167 Two articles from 24 and 25 Dec. 1881’ in Rida, Vol. 2, pp. 197-205. '¢8 Malcolm H. Kerr, Islamic Reform (Berkeley, 1966), p. 134.

169 Three articles from April 1881 in Rida, Vol. 2, pp.

119-32.

170 Article from 19 June 1881, ibid., pp. 157-63. 171 Article from 31 Oct. 1880, ibid., pp. 52-54. 172 Supplement to Moniteur Egyptien, 18/19 July 1880;

al-Naqqash, Vol. 4, pp. 62-78; Dikritat wa tagrirat, pp. 300-24. 173

Cf. al-Naqqash, Vol. 4, p. 79 and Mudhakkirat ‘Abduh, pp. 68 £. 17" al-Naggqash, Vol. 3, pp. 23 f.

‘7° Blunt, Secret History, pp. 73, 74. Chapter Two: Egypt for the Egyptians

1 WLW. Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt (New York,

1884), p. 195.

2 ‘*Uthman Ghalib (1830-93) was a Circassian who had come to

Egypt with his father. He obtained his military training in

Cairo and Vienna, and was sent to France witha military mission by Isma‘il. He was a faithful Mameluke to the ruling house, which he served as an active officer, provincial governor and Cairo Prefect of Police. Even during the war of the summer of 1882 he remained loyal to Tawfigq, but for form's sake joined “‘Urabi's party. On him, see: Asaf, Vol. 1, pp. 247-51; Zakhura, Vol. 2, pp. 170-4; Zaki, pp. 98 £.; Mujahid, No. 286; Heyworth-Dunne, p. 306.

> Dye, p. 223. * Loring, p. 195. > ‘Abd al-‘Al was doubtless the most unattractive character of the 'Three Colonels'. Chaillé Long (The Three Prophets, p. 99) calls him ignorant and brutal, Broadley (p. 108) a braggart, ‘the personification of a bluff soldier’. He was first appointed colonel by Tawfiq. In 1881, after ‘Urabi himself, he was the leading mind of the ‘Urabists;. in 1882 he played absolutely no role in Cairo. In his garrison in Damietta he

NOTES: CHAPTER 2 341 was certainly the unbridled ruler. His regiment, however, did not appear on the stage of war. ‘Abd al-‘Al died in 1891 in exile in Ceylon. See also ‘Ashur, pp. 55-62 and al-Rafi‘i, Al-thawra al-‘urabiya, pp. 569 f. 6 Isma‘il Kamil had come to Egypt with his father. He was sent first to Vienna to study medicine, but then to Paris for a military education. Thereafter, until his death in 1893, he was either an active officer in the army or adjutant at the court. The fact that for a long time he had got on quite well with the ‘Urabists did not serve as a hindrance in getting appointed as a member of the court martial that was passing judgement on them. See Heyworth-Dunne, p. 306; Zaki, pp. 82 £.; Broadley, p. 333; Mujahid, No. 236. 7 *Ali Fahmi came from the province of Minufiya. With short breaks, he had served in thearmy since 1855. Isma‘il had married him to a slave from his harem, and in 1872 appointed him a colonel. Under Tawfig too ‘Ali Fahmi remained close to the court, as adjutant and commander of the guards regiment. After the defeat of the ‘Urabists he was banished to Ceylon, but was pardoned in 1901. He died in Cairo in 1911. See Broadley, pp. 106-8; Zaki, pp. 157 £.; Mujahid, No. 291; al-Rafi‘i, Al-thawra al-‘urabiya, pp. 569 £. ° Ahmad *Urabi (1841-1911) was born the son of a village shaikh in the Zagazig region. His forefathers had immigrated from Iraq. After attending the village mosque-school, Ahmad had been further instructed by an elder brother; amongst other things he had taught him arithmetic. Finally he studied at the Azhar. But after two years he returned to his village, without completing his studies. At the end of 1854 he was captivated by the 'lammat awlad al-umad'. Because he could read, write and do sums he soon obtained, through the protection of a relative in the Officer Corps of his unit, the post of company quarter-master for the 7th Company of the 4th Battalion in the lst Infantry Regiment. In 1858 he was already an officer. By 1860 he rose by a rapid series of promotions from lieutenant to lieutenant-colonel, which was extremely unusual for a fallah; but he then kept this rank for 19 years, until at the beginning of Tawfig's rule he became a colonel. ‘Urabi enjoyed the special goodwill of Sa‘id, whom he had accompanied to Medina in 1861 as adjutant. His most vivid memories of Sa‘id's time were of one of the ruler's speeches, in which he had practically prophesied the principle of 'Egypt for the Egyptians', and reading an Arabic history of Napoleon, which he learnt by heart.

During the years of Isma‘il's rule, which after all held nothing for 'fallah' officers, ‘Urabi felt himself the perman-

ent victim of Turco-Circassian despotism. After an argument with General Khusrawhewas discharged from the army. For a time he was unemployed, then he found an occupation in the civil service. At this time he married a slave from the Khedive's harem, a daughter of Prince Ilhami's wet-nurse. This

had the good effect of his being reinstated as lieutenantcolonel in the army. The fact that ‘Urabi's and Tawfiq's wives were 'milk-sisters' certainly contributed tothe fact that *Urabi was one of the first officers to be promoted by Tawfiq after his accession. He made him one of his adjutants and a Commander of the 4th Regiment, which was stationed in the ‘Abbasiya Barracks. Even after his re-entry to the army under Isma‘il the Turco-

Circassian tyranny still continued. In response ‘Urabi

342 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS developed a strong 'fallah' self-assurance, with which he also infected his comrades. His studies at the Azhar, his excellent knowledge of the Qur’an, and the call to be a successor to Husain, had led to his becoming known as Shaikh ‘Urabi; his conviction of a mission, and his unusual eloquence made him the natural spokesman for his comrades. , Apart from the Qur’an, we know little about the sources of his philosophical-political views. Amongst the books seized from his house, apart from technical military literature, the only important ones were the collected works of Shaikh ‘Ali Ibn Sulaiman al-Dimnati (1818-89, cf. Brockelmann, Geschichte der

arabischen Literatur, 2, supplementary vol., 1938, p. 737), and these in a strangely large quantity, as if he had set up as a delivery point for them. The total number of his books is given variously as 820, 844 and about 600 (WTU-—Bos 24, doss. 1 and 3; Box 39, doss. 176 and 179). European observers and those who conversed with ‘Urabi are largely unanimous in their judgement: he was considered upright, but impractical; he was called a dreamer. ‘Urabi's favourite topic of conversation with Europeans was the brotherhood of nations and of religions, and the struggle for humanity in this world. ‘C'est une sorte de prophéte et d'illuminé gui nage dans de théories trés Gélevées.' (Sienkiewicz: MAE—pol.corr., Vol. 72 (Cairo, 6 Feb. 1882); also Vol. 73, (Cairo, 20 Mar. 1882).) ‘He explained to me his liberal views, and went into his humanitarian, philosophical opinions on the brotherhood of nations.' (Von Kosjek: AA—Box 118, Cairo, 9 Feb. 1882.) See also Wallace, p. 68: ‘Universal brotherhood', 'philanthropic mysticism’, ‘international fraternity and religious toleration', "fraternal philanthropy'. On *‘Urabi's development, apart from the biographies mentioned above, by al-Khafif and al-Rafi‘i, cf. his autobiography in Kashf al-sitar, pp. 10-50 and in al-Hilal, 1 Dec. 1967 (+1901); also Mudhakkirat al-Nadim, part 2 (pp. 19-39); al-Nagqqash, Vol. 4, pp. 82 £.; Sarhank, p. 374; Sharubim, pp. 227 €£.; Zakhura, Vol. 1, pp. 99-124; Zaki, pp. 128-32; al-Rafi‘i, Al-thawra al-‘urabiya, pp. 87-94 and 556-62 (a collection of negative opinions); Ahmad ‘Abd al-Majid al-Fagi, Qissat Ahmad ‘Urabi (Cairo, 1966); Muhammad ‘Abd al-Majid al-Mar‘iy, Shakhsiyat majadaha al-mithag (Cairo, 1966). These biographies do diverge from one another; we have largely relied on ‘Urabi's own statements. 9 Arabic text in MTU—Awraq al-hadra al-khidiwiya, and in Sharubim, pp. 229 £.; very garbled English translation in FO 78, Vol. 3322 (Cairo, 28 Mar. 1881); French translation in MAE— pol. corr., Vol. 68 (Cairo, 4 Feb. 1881). “‘Urabi obviously swapped the contents of this petition in his memoirs for the demands made on 9 September 1881 in the ‘Abdin Square (Mudhakkirat ‘Urabi, Vol. 1, pp. 58 £.). The facts are given correctly again in his memoirs for October 1882 (Sabry, La Genése, pp. 249-52). 10 The words Turkish, Circassian and Mameluke are not used

in this petition.

11 WTU-—Box 8, doss. 53/IV/5 (Riyad to General Stone, 30 Jan. 1881).

12 Otherwise ‘Urabi claims again in this context, that to the officers in 1881 it was mainly a matter of the Maglis al-

Nuwwab, which was quite out of the question.

‘3 Kashf al-sitar, p. 157.

NOTES: CHAPTER 2 343 1% Muhammad ‘Ubaid, native of Kafr al-Zayyat, was always to be found in 1881/1882 onthe foremost front, when it was a question of active fighting or wielding arms. He was one of the few higher officers who fell in the war of the summer of 1882, namely in the battle of al-Tall al-Kabir. He was then a colonel and regimental commander. In the European sources he is always described as an unpredictable fanatic and a dangerous hot-head. During the trial it was repeatedly claimed that he had on several occasions threatened notables, when they had not wanted to join the ‘Urabists —‘Ubaid could no longer defend himself. His role is assessed by Anwar al-Jundi, Al-a‘lam al-alf (Cairo, 1957), p. 39; Zaki, pp. 179 f£.; al-Rafi‘i, Al-thawra al-‘Urabiya, pp. 570 £. 15 Ahmad Rashid Husni (1834-1905) came from the Caucasus.

He came to Egypt in 1849 to enter the Mafruza. In 1854 he was sent to France for two years for further military training. In 1867 he became fariq and commander of the guards regiment, in 1876 an adjutant to Isma‘il. In 1879 Tawfiq made him his senior adjutant. According to Ninet (Au Pays des Khédives (Paris, 1890), p. 11) he was brother-in-law to the Khedive. Nevertheless in 1882 he fought on the side of the ‘Urabists against the English. Like ‘Ali Fahmi he was wounded at alQassasin and thereby put out of action. With the defeat of the Egyptian army his career also came to an end. See HeyworthDunne, p. 326; Zaki, pp. 73-9; Mujahid, no. 225; Zaki Fahmi, pp. 239-63 (with documents).

16 A record of this meeting, prepared by Stone, is to be

found in WTU—Box 8, doss. 53/IV/5.

17 Ahmad Hamdi, d. 1922, was of Kurdish origin and a pupil of Egyptian military schools; see Mujahid, No. 223. 18 Text in MAE—pol. corr., Vol. 68 (Cairo, 4 Feb. 1881) and in FO 78, Vol. 3321 (Cairo, 2 Feb. 1881). 19 Private letter from General Stone, 7 Sept. 1882, in Cox, p. 167. 20 Ahmad Khairi (1824-86) came from the Crimea. His father was moved first to Turkey and then to Egypt. Here Ahmad attended the Khangqah military school, but also the Azhar. He was tutor to Prince Mansur, Haidar Yakan and also Tusun, later Lord Privy Seal to Isma‘il and Tawfiq, whose special trust he held. See Mujahid, No. 67 and Moberly Bell, Khedives and Pashas, pp. 187-91. 21 *Urabi claims the Khedive had announced that the officers should nominate a man of their choice for this post, and they had proposed Mahmud Sami on 2 February (Kashf al-sitar, p. 165). ‘Urabi confused this with the events of February 1882. The confusion had not yet occurred in his memoirs for October 1882 (Sabry, La Genése, p. 252). It must be stressed that Mahmud Sami was sought out by the Khedive for this post, and that there is no evidence, much less proof, that he had any contact at all with the officers before 1 February 1881. A1l-Nadim does write that Mahmud Sami had informed the ‘Urabists of their imminent arrest (Mudhakkirat al-Nadim, p. 45); ‘Urabi explains, however, aS against Blunt (Secret History, p. 372), that he had not known the new War Minister before 1 February. Mahmud Sami himself made the same assertion (al-Nagqqash, Vol. 7, p. 68). In the contemporary Anglo-French literature Mahmud Sami was almost everywhere described as an extremely ambitious intriguer, who worked only for one goal: his own 'greater honour'. He

344 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS was even charged with several murders in connection with a love-affair of his first wife. It was thought safe to assume that the reason for subsequent events was that it was the Awgaf Minister who gave the three colonels notice of the impending arrest (as if such notice would even have been necessary, given the nature of the 1 February action!). He is said to have hoped that through analliance with the ‘rebels' he could climb to higher positions, and even perhaps become Khedive. See e.g. E. Dicey, The Story of the Khedivate (London, 1902), pp. 255f.; Moberly Bell, Khedives and Pashas, pp. 74-7; Biovés, pp. 21 f.; Wallace, pp. @9-74; Malortie, pp. 209-14, 229 £. No doubt this extremely negative picture of Mahmud Sami needs

revising; we ourselves will attempt to make a contribution towards this in a later chapter. Quite rightly, allusion is made to the 'constitutional' conviction (al-Dasuqi, pp. 46-9) which is expressed in Mahmud Sami's political poetry (see ibid., pp. 79-88 and Al-majlis al-a‘la li-ri‘ayat al-funun wa al-adab: Mihrajan Mahmud Sami al-Barudi (Cairo, 1958), pp. 26-30). But one must nevertheless be careful not to go to the

other extreme. For al-Hadidi (Mahmud Sami al-Barudi, po. 77-80, 90, 104-6, 157 £.), Mahmud Sami had been a revolutionary since 1868, the first to call for armed resistance against tyranny in Egypt, who finally allied himself with the Egyptian army

officers in order to accomplish his revolutionary ends. AlHadidi does not mention at all the incontestable fact that at the same time, from 1863 to 1879, Mahmud Sami was one of Isma*il's closest confidants. The author rightly criticizes the ‘imperialist' literature which depicts Mahmud Sami as having only personal ambition, and even the wish to become Khedive himself: he accepts the contention that al~Barudi shared decisively in plotting the overthrow of *Uthman Rifqi and later of Riyad. In the end, on p. 158 he lets it be thought that in his earlier years Mahmud Sami could have

thought of sitting on the throne himself.

22 Yusuf Shuhdi (1840-99) was a former Mameluke of ‘Abbas,

who had sent him at the age of 14 to study medicine in Berlin; he had, however, obtained a military education there. He became a general in 1876. After the ‘Urabists' defeat Tawfigq appointed him to the Commission of Enquiry. Cf. Zaki, pp. 186 f£.; Mujahid, No. 176; Heyworth-Dunne, p. 307; Broadley, p. 154. 23 The translation of ‘Urabi's speech in FO 78, Vol. 3323 (Alexandria, 2 May 1881) obviously concurs with the text that al-Naqqash (Vol. 4, p. 105) reproduces. ‘Urabi himself accepted al-Naqgqash's account of the ceremony and text of Mahmud Sami's and Riyad's speeches, but found for himself another text

of the speeches (Kashf al-sitar, p. 176); for example, he

again wants to challenge the summoning of the Chamber of Delegates. 24 Muhammad Ra’uf (d. 1888), according to Broadley (p. 333) 'an Egyptian Berber', according to ‘Urabi (Mudhakkirat. ‘Urabi,

Vol. 2, p. 41) a Kurd, had so far been employed exclusively in the administration of Sudan. In 1874 he was promoted to general. We come across him in 1882 as a member of the Majlis al‘Urfi, and after the occupation as president of the court martial passing judgement on the ‘Urabists. See Zaki, pp. 107 £. and Mujahid, No. 305.

25 On Ismatil Sabri (b. 1835), graduate of the artillery school, adjutant to Isma‘il and Tawfigq, and colonel in artil-

NOTES: CHAPTER 2 345 lery during the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882, see Zaki, pp. 134 £. and Mujahid, No. 235.

28 Butler, p. 288. 27 Kashf al-sitar, pp. 224 f.; in conversation with Blunt, ‘Urabi suggested that the Khedive wished in this way to announce that he had nothing against the officers getting rid of Riyad (Secret History, pp. 372, 379 £.). It is on this con-

jecture, which “Urabi did not repeat in his memoirs, that Blunt bases his claim of Tawfigq's collusion and false game on 9 Sep-

tember (ibid., pp. lll, 115 f£.).

28 Compte Rendu de la Séance du Conseil des Ministres du 21 also in FO 78, Vol. 3323 (Alexandria, 22 Aug. 1881). *9 Mudhakkirat ‘Urabi, Vol. 1, pp. 59, 60, 66. 3° Princes ‘Uthman and Kamil were Blunt's guests in England

Aout 1881, in MAE—pol. corr., Vol. 69; text of the petition

in June 1882. As Blunt writes, they showed 'no love' for the ‘illegitimate’ heir to the throne, Tawfig, and supported the “‘Urabists during the war, even if not so involved as their sis-

ter Nazli Hanum Fadil and Prince Ibrahim, who hoped for the replacement of Tawfiq by Halim. See Blunt, Secret History, pp. 244-6; Ardern G. Hulme Beaman, Twenty Years in the Near Fast (London, 1898), pp. 45 £.; Ninet, Arabi Pacha, p. 220; Broadley, pp. 183 £.; al-Wagqa’i‘* al-Misriya, 6 Sept. 1882; WTU — Box 18, doss. 66 and 72. On Princess Nazli see Qallini Fahmi, pp. 123-5. During the war the ‘Urabists were supported by several princesses from the families of Isma‘il and Sa‘id; see especially Broadley, pp. 373-7.

3! Sabry translates the original, preserved at that time in

the Ministry of Justice in Cairo, in La Genése, p. 256. Broadley's version of this passage runs: ‘Immediately the better class and educated Egyptians became aware of these matters they all assembled in Cairo and held a meeting, at which it was decided that, to improve the then existing state of affairs, a council (Chamber of Deputies) should be appointed to watch over and preserve the lives, property, and rights of the Egyptian people, and to create just laws, according equal treatment and rights toevery one. Petitions were signed on all Sides praying that Cherif Pacha might be appointed Prime Minister, on the proposal of Sultan Pacha, acting in the name of the nation, and I, being favourably known to the people, was asked to represent them and pray for reforms.' This version was Originally published under the title 'Ahmed Arabi the Egyptian: Instructions to My Counsel' in The Nineteenth Century, 12 (1882) 969-96. Sabry calls it, obviously rightly, "déformée’ and 'mutilée'. 32 The Shari‘fis, descendants of Hawara Beduin, were the most influential native family of notables in Central Egypt, before the Sultans took away their positions. Muhammad Sultan owed his political and social rise to his friend Hasan al-Shari‘i. The Shari‘is, especially the three brothers Hasan, Ibrahim and Budaini, had exercised important functions in the provincial administration since the days of Sa‘id, and had been constant members of the Chamber of Delegates since 1866. All three brothers were arrested after the occupation; Hasan was soon released so that he could attend to the family affairs. See Mujahid, No. 556 (Hasan, 1827-92) and No. 218 (Ibrahim,

1839-99); Qallini Fahmi, pp. 65 £.; Mubarak, Al-khitat,Vol.

12, p. 45; al-Rafi‘i, ‘Asr Isma‘il, Vol. 2, pp. 84, 111, 150;

346 KGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS WTU— Box 7, doss. 7 and Box 10, doss. 91 and 113; FO 78, Vol. 3444 (Cairo, 30 Nov. 1882).

33 Blunt, Secret History, p. 376. One could get the impres-

sion from this presentation that ‘Abduh was also involved in the conspiracy to overthrow Riyad. But everything else the Imam says about himself, and that others report about him goes against such a hypothesis, especially what Blunt has to say about *Abduh in other places. It seems that Blunt did not properly understand or reproduce the temporal sequence of

events here. ‘Abduh's activity for a constitution can only be indirectly related to the period after 9 September. See also

Broadley, p. 230.

$4 Blunt himself has to admit, 'that it is impossible for one to have full confidence in regard to the details he records' (Secret History, p. 293). 35 Mahmud Fahmi (1839-94) came from the province of Bani

Suwaif. He was destined to attend one of the provincial

schools founded by Muhammad ‘Ali, and later the polytechnic. Under Sa‘id and Isma‘il he was mainly employed as a teacher at the military schools and as an officer-engineer. He came home from the Balkan War as a colonel. Even his European contemporaries were compelled to recognize in him a talented expert and an extraordinarily high-principled man. When they wanted to confiscate his property after the occupation, it had to be admitted that although he had been a minister he claimed no more than an extensive technical library, which included many European works, as his personal property. See Mahmud Fahmi,

pp. 211 f£. (autobiography) ; Zaki, pp. 183-5; al-Rafi‘i, ‘Asr Isma*il, Vol. 1, pp. 282 £. and Al-thawra al-‘urabiya, pp.

567 £.; Mujahid No. 156; WTU—Box 39, doss. 176; Broadley, pp. 318-20; Chaillé Long, The Three Prophets, p. 98; FO 78, Vol. 3435 (Cairo, 6 Feb. 1882); MAE—pol. corr., Vol. 72 (Cairo, 7 Feb. 1882). 9° Ninet, Arabi Pacha, pp. 38-40; more in 'Origin of the

National Party', p. 134; similarly, Blunt, Secret History,

pp. 110 £f., 115-17. 37 Tulbah *‘Ismat was at that time no more than a dismissed employee of the Da’ira Saniya. His comet-like ascent was rightly seen as a darker aspect of the politics of ‘Urabi, whose son-in-law he was to become (see J. Cattaui, Coup d'oeil sur la chronologie de la nation @gyptienne (Cairo/Paris, 1931), p. 385; Biovés, p. 36; Chaillé Long, The Three Prophets, p. 98). Although Tulbah had never had anything to do with the army, and could hardly read and write, ‘Urabi made him regimental commander on 9 September 1881, a general and pasha in spring 1882, and in the summer of 1882 Commandant of Alexandria and later of Kafr al-Dawwar. Together with ‘Urabi, Tulbah went

into English captivity. ‘He was at best a timorous mortal - »- »« He clung to Arabi like a weak child to a strong father, ' writes Broadley (p. 145). He died shortly after his return from exile in 1900. See also al-Rafi‘i, Al-thawra al-‘urabiya, pp. 586 £. and Mujahid, No. 272.

38 Al-Naqgash, Vol. 4, p. 90: the author wishes by this statement to free Sultan Pasha from later suspicion of conspiracy.

39 Translations of articles from al-Burhan, 7, 14 and 21

July and 18 Aug. 1881, in MAE—pol. corr., Vol. 69 (Alexandria, 28 Aug. 1881).

NOTES: CHAPTER 2 347 40 Text in FO 78, vol. 3324 (Cairo, 11 Sept. 1881) and in

Sharubim, p. 243. +1 Text in MTU—Al-bargiyat allati dubitat bi-manzil Ahmad Basha ‘Urabi bi-sadad al-thawra al-‘urabiya, and in Sharubinm,

pp. 243 £.; English translation of the letter to the British

consul from the ‘representatives of the Egyptian army', in FO 78, Vol. 3324 (Cairo, 10 Sept. 1881). +2 Al-Naqgqash (Vol. 4, p. 93) challenges this on two fur-

ther points: the ratification of the military commission's bill, and the dismissal of the Shaikh al-Azhar. The same list is to be found in Mahmud Fahmi, pp. 209 f.; Sarhank, p. 378; Mudhakkirat ‘Abduh, p. 130. Al-Nagqash (as also the newspaper al-Hijaz, 12 Sept. 1881) claims besides that ‘Urabi had warned

the British Consul that in case of European military intervention he could raise one million soldiers to defend the country. “‘Urabi omits from his memoirs the alleged challenges after the deposition of the Shaikh al-Azhar, but does accept those of the ratification of the military commission's bill, and the threat of a million Egyptian soldiers (Kashf al-sitar, pp. 236 f.). *3 *Urabi on the other hand reproduces a romantic dialogue

with the Khedive, Kashf al-sitar, pp. 236 £.; Blunt, Secret History, p. 38l. ** Kashf al-sitar, p. 243. *° Arabic text of the two declarations in al-Waqa’i* alMisriya, 17 Sept. 1881; ' French translation in AA—Box 117 16 Sept. :-1881— appendix I and ITI).

*® Sharif's letter, the Khedive's answer and the list of ministers are in Moniteur Egyptien, 14 Sept. 1881, in al-

Naqqash, Vol. 4, pp. 109-11 and in Fu’ad Karam, Al-nizarat wa al-wizarat al-misriya (Cairo, 1969), pp. 98-101. *7 Husain.Wasif (1857-1923) was a French-educated lawyer; see Zaki Fahmi, pp. 342-8; Mujahid, No. 562; Ninet, Arabi Pacha, p. 116. *® Texts of ‘Urabi's and Sharif's speeches in al-Waga’i‘

al-Misriya, 17 Sept. 1-81; a slightly variant text also in Kashf al-sitar, pp. 244-6.

*39 According to Muhammad ‘Abduh this document was drawn up

in Sultan Pasha's house by the spokesmen of the notables and officers (Mudhakkirat ‘Abduh, p. 134).

°° Ardbic texts’ of the written statement to Sharif and the petition to the Khedive are to be found in al-Naqqash, Vol. 4, pp. 112 £.; the wording of the addresses of Sultan and Sharif is reprinted in al-Wagqa’i‘* al-Misriya, 19 Sept. 1881; both petitions were mierely paraphrased there. See also Sharubim, pp. 250 £f. A French version of the petition to the Khedive appeared in L'Egypte, 21 Sept. 1881 (copies in AA—Box 117 and GFO—Egypt, 3, Vol. 2):

Comme l'organisation sociale des peuples ne peut se réaliser

que par la justice et la liberté et doit tendre a ce que chaque homme y trouve la garantie de ses biens et de sa personne, il faut qu'il soit libre dans sa pensée et dans ses actions, et avec cette liberté son bonheur est assuré. Il est certain que ces principes ne s'adaptent qu'ad un erreurs, des exactions et de la corruption; les nations Civilisées sont arrivées a un haut dégré de prospérité en gouvernement constitutionnel pondéré, mis a4 L'abri des

348 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS adoptant la forme constitutionnelle, la seule exemple de toute venalité. Elles ont dans leurs pays une assemblée dont les membres sont choisis parmi les plus intelligents de la nation gui sont chargés de représenter et de sauvegarder les droits du pays vis-a-vis du pouvoir exécutif, tout en facilitant a celui-ci l'exécution des actes é6manant du gouvernement. Dans ce but et pour ces motifs, comme il existait jadis en Egypte une chambre des délégués, comme les intentions de Son Altesse Notre Khédive sont bonnes et salutaires, et pour mettre notre patrie a l'abri des malheurs des temps, nous prenons la liberté de présenter la présente pétition a S.A. le Khédive et nous le sollicitons d'ordonner la Formation d'une chambre des députées de la nation égyptienne, a l'instar des parlements créés chez les peuples civilisés de l'Europe et ayant les mémes pouvoirs vis-a-vis du gouvernement, afin de consolider et de bien asseoir sur des bases durables les droits inéluctables du peuple. Par ce fait, nous aurons obtenu de S.A. le Khédive un don incomparable a toutes les autres graces, et son gouvernement deviendra un noble exemple 4 suivre par le monde, et il obtiendra des salutaires résultats qui proviennent de la~* justice et de la liberté. Certains que nos sollicitations seront conformes a4 la volonté de notre bien aimé souverain et que nos voeux seront réalisés, nous apposons nos cachets sur la présente pétition, >} Text in Moniteur Egytien, 5 Oct. 1881 and in al-Nagqash, Vol. 4, pp. 149 f£. °* Wording in al-Naqgash, Vol. 4, p. 147; ‘Urabi omits the sentence 'He who obeys the Khedive obeys the Sultan' (Kashf

al-sitar, pp. 253 £.)!

°3 Al-Naqqash, Vol. 4, pp. 147 £.; also mutilated in Kashf

al-sitar, pp. 254-6.

74 We have already encountered Muhammad ‘Ullaish, the Mufti Muhammad “‘Abduh. In the spring and summer of 1882 he was one

of the Malikiya, as a conservative opponent of Jamal al-Din and

of the most active agitators against the free-thinking aggressors and the collaborating Khedive, for which he was exiled for five years after the ‘Urabists' defeat. Shaikh ‘Ullaish's family came from Fez. He was born in 1802 near to the Azhar, at which he studied from 1817. He became Mufti of the Malikiya in Egypt in 1854. He was an unusually hard-working, quarrelsome and puritanical scholar. See Mubarak, Al-khitat, Vol. 4,

pp. 41-4 and Vol. 8, p. 74: also Zakhura, Vol. 2, pp. 196 f£f.

°° Kashf al-sitar, pp. 268 £. (this report is missing in

the newer edition); Mudhakkirat al-Nadim, p. 62. °& Abd Allah al-Nadim (1845-96), was called 'un des hommes les plus curieux, et en méme temps un des plus représentatifs

de cette @époche' by Delanoue when he met him (Gilbert Delanoue, 'SAbd Allah al-Nadim (1845-1896) —Les idées politiques et mor-

ales d'un journaliste égyptien', Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales

(Damascus), 17 (1961/2), p. 76). He was born in Alexandria, where his father had come in search of work from Shargiya. From 1855 to 1860 ‘Abd Allah profited from an education at the mosque of Ibrahim, the 'Azhar of Alexandria'. In 1861 he went

to Cairo. He was a telegraphist and found posts in Binha and in the habitual Qasr ‘Ali of Isma‘il's mother. During his stay in Cairo he frequented the Azhar and the city's literary circle.

NOTES: CHAPTER 2 349 After losing his post at the Qasr ‘Ali he took a situation for

a time as home-tutor with a well-to-do ‘umda in Dagahliya. Then he found financial backing from a shopkeeper in Mansura to open a small shop, selling handkerchiefs, fabrics, etc., which in the style of the times became a meeting-place for those with literary ambitions in the provincial town. But as a trader “Abd Allah was certainly unsuccessful. Soon he was wandering again through the Delta, asa 'poor poet’ in search of a patron. He found another temporary shelter in 1876 at Shahin Pasha's

'court' in Tanta, and a new source of income as a curator of the Da’ira of a friend of Shahin. During his time as a telegraphist in Cairo and again towards the end of Isma‘il's reign, ‘Abd Allah al-Nadim is said to have belonged to Jamal al-Din's circle of pupils (see especially ‘Ali al-Hadidi, ‘Abd Allah al-Nadim—khatib al-wataniya (Cairo, n.d.), pp. 42-6, 49, 65-8, 78). We would not want to deny that ‘Abd Allah may have met the philosopher; but we have thrown doubt elsewhere on the supposition that he can be called a follower of Jamal al-Din (see also Delanoue, pp. 81 £f.). At the beginning of 1879 al-Nadim returned to Alexandria. After a short acquaintance with the 'Young Egyptians' he founded the Jam‘iya Khairiya Islamiya on 18 April 1879, as well as a school supported by that society. Both undertakings attracted the approval and financial backing of Tawfiq and Riyad. The latter-also gave ‘Abd Allah permission to publish a newspaper, al+Tankit wa al-Tabkit, which appeared from 6 June 1881. Al-Nadim had previously collaborated on the papers of Adib Ishag and Salim al-Naqqash. Allegedly at the instigation of Riyad, he was suspended from the Jam‘iya in the summer of 1881. This obviously threw him into the arms of the ‘Urabists. On ‘Abd Allah al-Nadim, see: ‘Abd al-Fattah Nadim (ed.), Sulafat al-Nadim (Cairo, 71914), Vol. 1, pp. 3-23; Mudhakkirat al-Nadim pp. (1)-(47) and pp. 49~82; Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab Saqr and Fawzi Sa‘id Shahin, ‘Abd Allah al-Nadim (Cairo, n.d.); Najib Tawfiq, Al-ta’ir al-‘azim ‘Abd Allah al-Nadim (Cairo, 1957); Taimur, pp. 3-30; Ahmad Amin, pp. 202-48; Zaidan,

Mashahir al-sharg, Vol. 2, pp. 105-12; al-Rafi‘i, Al-thawra al-‘urabiya, pp. 572-9; Ibrahim ‘Abduh, A‘lam al-sihafa, pp. 125-9; Ashur, pp. 45-51; Hijazi, pp. 133-40. °7 The description of the points of view of the various organs of the press from September to December 1881 relies mainly on the extensive translations (up to ten articles from

one number), which are to be found in the European archives (FO 78, Vols. 3325, 3326; MAE—pol. corr., Vols. 69-71; AA—Box 117; GFO—Egypt 3, Vol. 1). One could raise many objections against the use of these sources; but on the other hand there exist only a very few examples of the originals. For example, to our knowledge there only exists asingle edition

of al-Hijaz in Cairo—a paper that came out up until its prohibition as an ‘Urabist organ.

°§ Hamza Fath Allah also supported them in the end; during the war in the summer of 1882 he joined the side of Tawfiq and

the English, and published the collaborationist paper al-I‘tidal in Alexandria. The Austrian representative said of one edition: 'The number under consideration mainly discussed the catastrophe’ of Alexandria and the blame that ‘Urabi and his followers bear for it. The article is strewn with sayings from the Qur’an about the just punishments looked forward to by those who rebelled against the rightful rulers, and specifically against the kind-hearted Khedive, who is so concerned for the Aidwel}~being TRAD).of©his“ subjects.' AA—Box 127 (Alexandria, 7

350 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS 59 See al-Naggqash, Vol. 4, pp. 94-6; Sharubim, pp. 253 £.; Kashf al-sitar, pp. 258-61; ‘Urabi took over al-Nagqqash's account and wording of the speech, although he altered its

sense. In ‘Abd al-‘Al's oath of allegiance he inserted the restriction: '. . . for so long as they (the Khedive and the

government) follow the path of the Law'. Al-Naqgqash attributed the enmity of ‘Abd al-‘Al towards the Muhafiz and the comman-

dants of the coastal artillery to the fact that they did not arrive at the station at the right time to receive him; ‘Urabi

claims that they were cut off because of ‘intrigues’. 6° In WTU—Box 8, doss. 53/IV/8.

61 But Number 19 was still called al-Tankit wa al-Tabkit. The newspaper thereafter still did not appear under the name Lisan al-Umma; rather, it was henceforth called al-Ta’if. The editorial office was moved from Alexandria to Cairo.

62 Face to face with official English representatives, out

of courtesy, “‘Urabi never expressed his fear of an English invasion. He understood,rather, always at some point to express a positive opinion of England. 63 Memorandum of 2 Nov. 1881 in FO 78, Vol. 3326.

6* Blunt, Secret History, p. 127. ®> On the history of the origins of this, see Blunt, Secret

History, pp.129-33; in another place ('The Egyptian Revolution', Nineteenth Century, 12 (1882), p. 333) Blunt writes that this programme was set out by him, and revised by ‘Abduh, ‘Urabi and Sulaiman Abaza.

66 Full text in Blunt, Secret History, pp. 383-5. It would

be carrying coals to Newcastle to explain fully once more how far this description contradicts that of Abdel Malek. The latter describes the 1879 'Manifeste du Parti National Egyptien' and the ‘Programme of the National Party of Egypt' — the work of a Turco-Circassian Pasha and the elaboration by Blunt of an interview with ‘Urabi respectively —as two manifestos of one of the national Parties (Idéologie et Renaissance Nationale, pp. 428-39). 67 Shaikh Muhammad al~‘Abbasi al-Mahdi (1827-97), had at the age of 21 already been appointed Grand Mufti by Ibrahim, and temporarily dismissed by ‘Abbas because he had kept quiet about a Fatwa demand by the ruler. In 1871 he was put at the head of the Azhar by Isma‘il. For further information, see: Mubarak, Al-khitat, Vol. 17, pp. 12 £.; 4ZGaidan, Mashahir al-sharq,

Vol. 2, pp. 210-13; Zahura, Vol. 2, p. 225; al-Rafi‘i, ‘Asr Isma*il, Vol. 1, pp. 279-82; Mujahid, No. 501; Taimur, pp. 67-80.

68 Shaikh Muhammad al-Inbabi (1824-96), the rival of al‘Abbasi, had to make room for him again in the office of Shaikh al-Azhar after the occupation, but soon dismissed him a second

time. For further information, see: Mubarak, Al-khitat, Vol. 8, pp. 87 £.; Zakhura, Vol. 2, pp. 194-6; Mujahid, No. 470; Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Literatur, Supplementary Vol. 2, p. 742. 69 Salama Ibrahim, born in Alexandria, General Inspector of the Ministry of Labour, was one of the most skilled Egyptian engineers of the time; see al-Rafi‘i, ‘“‘Asr Isma‘il, Vol. l, pp. 269-71.

NOTES: CHAPTER 2 351 70 Blunt, Secret History, pp. 116 f£. 71 Muhammad al-Shawaribi (1841-1913) was at that time the head of the numerous Shawaribi family from Qalyubiya. They were of the genus of provincial notables of beduin origin, who through Muhammad ‘Ali's and Isma‘il's favour had achieved extra-

ordinary wealth and influence. They held high positions, including that of mudir, in the provincial administration and were members of the Chamber of Delegates. They set the tone of the province. The region of Qalyub was virtually their private property; 4,000 out of 7,000 faddans of land, many houses, all the shops and the vegetable plots belonged to them. They also owned steam-pumps and a cotton-seed factory. Muhammad alShawaribi was also amongst the provincial notables who worked actively against ‘Urabi in the summer of 1882. According to Zaki Fahmi he gave shelter to Adib Ishaq and allowed al-Ahram

to be secretly distributed. After the occupation he belonged to the collaborators from the first hours (see Berque, L'Egypte, p. 120). On the Shawaribis see Mubarak, Al-khitat, Vol. 14, pp. 116-18 and Zaki Fahmi, pp. 289-99, 398-401. 72 List of the members of the Chamber of Delegates in al-

Rafi‘i, Al-thawra al-‘urabiya, pp 195-9; a quarter of these delegates, together with their families, were cited by name by

Baer (A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt (London, 1962), passim) in his description of the rise of the autochthonous class of landowners! 73° MAE—pol. corr., Vol. 71 (Cairo, 26 Dec. 1881). 7" BRA—Box 117 (Alexandria, 12 Dec. 1881).

75 French version in state archives, Vol. 41, No. 7774;

Arabic text in al-Naqgqash, Vol. 4, pp. 162 f£.

76 French version in state archives, Vol. 41, No. 7775; Arabic version in al-Rafi‘i, Al-thawra al-‘urabiya, pp. 203 f. 77 French version in Moniteur Egyptien, 30 Dec. 1881; Arabic text in al-Waqa’i‘* al-Misriya, 27 Dec. 1881. 78 French version in Moniteur Egyptien, 4 Jan. 1882; Arabic text in al-Waqa’i‘* al-Misriya, 31 Dec. 1881. 79 Mahmud Sulaiman (1841-1929) played a more important role only in later years. He came from the province of Asyut and had risen via the ‘umda's office to provincial wakil. He was amongst those provincial notables who no longer wanted anything to do with the ‘Urabists in the spring and summer of 1882. See Haikal, pp. 181-7; Mujahid, No. 209; Hijazi, pp. 100-4.

°° See especially al-Rafi‘i, ‘Asr Isma‘il, Vol. 2, p. 194; text ibid., pp. 195-200. 81 puplicated copies of the altered plan in French, in FO

78, Vol. 3434. $2 French version of the speech in Moniteur Egyptien, 7 Jan.

1882; Arabic text in al-Naqqash, Vol. 4, pp. 116 f£. 83 Blunt, Secret History, p. 137. ®°" State archives, Vol. 41, No. 7773 (Paris, 24 Dec. 1881-— from the English Ambassador to the English Foreign Minister).

8° Gambetta's draft and the final text of the joint note in

state archives, Vol. 41, Nos. 7776, 7783. 86 Malortie, p. 198.

302 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS © °7 Blunt, Secret History, pp. 143-5. 88 FO 78, Vol. 3434 (Cairo, 11 Jan. 1882).

6° Blunt, Secret History, p. 149. 9° Ibid., pp. 147 £. 9! FO 78, Vol. 3434 (Cairo, 23 Jan. 1882). 92 Minutes of the 2 Febuary 1882 sitting in Moniteur

Egyptien, 22 Feb. 1881. 9% French text in state archives, Vol. 41, No. 7812;

Arabic text in al-Naqgqash, Vol. 4, pp. 221-3. and in Karam,

pp. loo £.

°* SAli Sadiq studied machine-building and railway management in England from 1847 to 1853. After his return he was mainly employed in administering the Egyptian railways, but also as Muhafiz of Cairo and Prefect of Police in Alexandria. He died in 1890. See Heyworth-Dunne, p. 263. °° ‘Ali Fahmi Rifata was a son of the famous Rifa‘ta Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi and a close friend of ‘Abd Allah FPikri; see Hasan, 1965: p. 56 and Amin Fikri, especially pp. 144-55. °° Husain Fahmi, really kKt@tik Husain, who came from a family

related to Muhammad ‘Ali, was sent to Paris in 1844 to study management and then engineering science. After his return he was employed as government architect and in high posts in general administration. He died in 1891. See Mujahid, No. 246; Heyworth-Dunne, p. 257; Zaki, p. 89. The Wakil in the Awgqaf Ministry should not: be confused with the naval Wakil of the same name in the War Ministry. On this see Zaki, p. 118 and Mujahid, No. 247. 97 Ya‘qub Sami came from a Greek family from Constantinople, but was Muslim. He had a slave from Isma‘il's harem for wife, and raced through a purely military career. ‘In 1873 he became a colonel and adjutant to Prince Husain, then he was employed as section leader in the Ministry of Defence, where he rose to become Wakil. He was in no way a zealous follower of ‘Urabi right from the beginning. He was even slightly wounded by Muhammad ‘Ubaid's people in the Ministry of Defence on 1 February 1881. But he finally joined the side of the ‘Urabists, after his wife was badly mistreated by the palace eunychs in early summer 1882, because she—as Sami himself claims anyway —

was Said to have revealed palace secrets. His position as Wakil at the Ministry of Defence, and later as President of the Majlis al-‘“Urfi, cost him more than it benefited him. He had to run into debt in order to be able to play the role of a "civilized' grand seigneur, at which he almost surpassed Stone. After the occupation the faithful threw themselves on his relatively modest possessions (WTU—Box 36, doss. 151-4). Ya‘*qub Sami died in exile in Ceylon in 1900. See Broadley, pp. 146 f., 218-26, 398; Blunt, Secret History, p. 382; Fanny Stone, "Diary of an American girl in Cairo during the war of 1882', Century Magazine, 28 (1884), 299-301; al-Rafi‘i, Al-thawra

al-“urabiya, p. 589; Zaki, p. 187; Mujahid, No. 331. 9° The titles of the French works that were found in his library after the occupation appear to us to be symptomatic of

this (WTU—Box 27, doss. 41). NexttoLes Milles et Une Nuits Parisiennes and Les Mystéres du Sérail stand’ Les’ Classes Dirigeantes, Dictionnaire de la Politique and the collected works of Montesquieu—but also Don Quichotte, Voyages du

NOTES: CHAPTER 2 353 Gulliver and Robinson Crusoe. The titles sound like a parody of his fate in the years 1881-1900. That Mahmud Sami was not always motivated by pure patriotism is not only an allegation

of his enemies. His counsel also writes: 'He lacked the intense feeling, the wholly unselfish patriotism, and the heart-born qualities of Arabi .. . Arabi thought only of Egypt, Mahmoud Sami also thought of Egypt, it is true, but he thought a little of himself and his ambition as well' (Broadley, p. 283); ‘Il avait des ambitions indéterminées', said

Ibrahim al-Hilbawi later; ‘il etait intelligent, mais il avait

des ambitions', Ibrahim Sa‘id commented to Sabry (La Genése, p. 206).

9? Muhammad, Mahmud, Ahmad and ‘Abd Allah Siyufi were res-

pected Cairo merchants. Ahmad joined the Khedive's side during the war, that of the English; ‘Abd Allah became Sartujjar after the occupation and apparently even came to England on business; ' see Bergque, L'Egypte, p. 120, n. 43; cf. also Levernay, p. 178.

100 Arabic text in al-Rafi‘ti, ‘Asr Isma‘il, Vol. 2, pp. 201-6; English text in Blunt, Secret History, pp. 390-6. 101 Karl Loewenstein, Constitutional Model (Tubingen, 1959),

p. 13l: ‘(l) A differentiation between the various duties of the state and their assignment to different agents of the state Or bearers Of power ... (2) A systematic mechanism for co-

ordinating the various bearers of power ... (3) A...

planned mechanism for avoiding mutual blocking by the various

autonomous bearers of power ... (4) A... . method for the political situation . .. (5) The express recognition of certain spheres of individual self-determination ...'

peaceful adaptation of the basic order to a changed social and 102 This concept is borrowed from French constitutional law. ‘Lois organiques'’ lie somewhere between ordinary laws and a

constitution: they are 'constitution-like' laws.

+03 Text in al-Nagqash, Vol. 4, pp. 253-61 and in Jallad, Vol. 3, pp. 336-40. 10% At that time Isma‘il Muhammad was the leading engineer in the Ministry of Labour, Salama Pasha the Inspector-General of public works in the provinces, and Mahmud al-Falaki the Director of the Observatory.

105 Three conflicting sets of statistics are available on the number of European officials and the level of their Salaries. According to Cookson's figures, conveyed to the Foreign Office on 13 March 1882, there were then 1,325 Europeans serving the Egyptian state (FO 78, Vol. 3436). The largest contingents were Italians (338), French (320), English (295), Austrian (106), and Greek (103). These five groups made up 88 per cent of all the European officials. Around 68 per cent of these 1,162 Europeans had been appointed to their official positions since 1876, particularly in the years 1879 and 1880. According to these figures, the overwhelming majority received monthly salaries of up to £E30; only 33 people (including 23 English and French) earned £E100-350 a month. These figures are to a certain extent in line with those of

A. Colvin, Note on Egypt (Alexandria, 1882). According to him, 707 European officials earned between £60 and £180 a year, 53 between £720 and £1,500, 15 between £1,500 and £2,000, 13 between £2,000 and £3,000, and 2 between £3,000 and £4,000. The figures that Malet submitted to the Foreign Office on

354 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS ll September 1882 (FO 78, Vol. 3441) differ considerably from both the previous sets. According to him, on 1 January 1882 there were only 1,067 Europeans in Egyptian service, including 300 Italians, 244 French, 240 English, 104 Greeks and 80 Austrians. 504 Europeans had joined the Egyptian service before 1877, and 563 since then. Altogether they constituted

2 per cent of all state officials, but received 16 per cent of the salary outlay (about £E2 million). In this statement the number of native officials is given as 52,974; against this Wallace (p. 138) puts the number at 21,000 (excluding the unpayed village shaikhs). According to Wallace their salaries required £14 million a year. The European officials received about 4% per cent of the Egyptian treasury's income in 1881 (J.C. McCoan, The Egyptian Problem (London, 1884), p. 21). 79S FO 78, Vol. 3435 (Cairo, 27 Feb. 1882).

107 Blunt, Secret History, pp. 156, 159-61; see also

“‘Urabi's 'Memorandum of Reforms for Egypt', which he wrote in December 1882 for Lord Dufferin (reproduced in Blunt, Gordon at

Khartoum, pp. 33-7). On constitutional and other reforms, he suggested: government control of the banks, judicial reform (particularly the abolition of mixed courts of justice), opposition to slavery, tax reform, equality for foreigners, abolition of international administration, rearrangement of the problem of the national debt, improvement of the educational system.

108 Translation in FO 78, Vols. 3434, 3435 and 3436, and in

AA— Box 118 and 119.

103 L'Egypte Nouvelle, p. 7. Chapter Three: The Liguidation of the New Order

1 Hamid Amin, an Egyptian, had been sent to Berlin in 1853,

at the age of 15, to study pharmacy, but obtained a military education there. After his return he entered the army in which he attracted especial attention because of his knowledge of languages. After the occupation he was pensioned off. He exchanged his pension for 80 faddans of land, and thereafter devoted himself to agriculture. He died in 1916. See GZGaki, p.- 89; Mujahid, No. 241; Heyworth-Dunne, p. 307.

* Sulaiman Najati was sent to France in 1844 for military training. After his return in 1849 he was mainly employed in

military schools. After the defeat of the ‘Urabists he was arrested to begin with, but was able to ‘rehabilitate’ himself aS a member of the court martial. See Zaki, p. 149; Mujahid, No. 264; Heyworth-Dunne, p. 254; Broadley, p. 333; Moniteur Egyptien, 29 Sept. 1882. > Le Phare d'Alexandrie, 24 Apr. 1882.

MAE —pol. corr., Vol. 74 (Cairo, 6 May 1882). > FO 78, Vol. 3437 (Cairo, 7 May 1882). ® On the events of the evening of 9 May and the morning of 10 May, see AA—Box 119 (Cairo, 12 May 1882); MAE—pol. corr., Vol. 74 (Cairo, 10 May 1882); FO 78, Vol. 3437 (Cairo, 10 and ll May 1882).

’ 'A vrai dire, je puis le dire maintenant en connaissance

de cause, ces malheureux mots qui ne reposaient sur aucun

NOTES: CHAPTER 3 355 fondement sont a l'origine de la calamité qui s'abbattit sur

L'Egypte', wrote ‘Urabi some months later in his memoirs (Sabry, La Genése, pp. 261 £.). 8 Sayed Kamel, La conférence de Constantinople et la question é€gyptienne en 1882 (Paris, 1913), p. 120. 2 AA—Box 120 (Cairo, 19 May 1882). 10 WTU—Box 8, doss. 53/IV/7.

11 *Urabi handed over 51 of these petitions to his counsel Broadley. A list, with a summary of the contents of each individual paper can be found in FO 141, Vol. 156: see also

the full translations of two petitions in Broadley, pp. 172-5. Further letters, petitions, etc. from those days are to be found in WTU—Box 8, doss. 53/IV/2.

12 On the house of al-Bakri see especially Mubarak, Al-khitat, Vol. 3, pp. 121-35 and Zakhura, Vol. 2, pp. 217-24 and 224/1-222/XXXVI; see also Mujahid, No. 686 and Cromer,

Vol. 2, pp. 176 £. Whilst his father, ‘Ali al-Bakri, fought on

the side of Isma‘il against European intervention, as we have seen, ‘Abd al-Bagqi al-Bakri remained faithful to Tawfig, in the forefront against the ‘Urabists. See WTU—Box 19, doss. 113 and 122; also Malortie, pp. 315-17. ‘3 SAbd al-Khaliq al-Sadat, like the majority of the most eminent Islamic dignitaries, was on the Khedive's side (see WTU— Box 18, doss. 22 and Box 19, doss. 122; also Blunt, Secret History, pp. 233, 248). On him see Zakhura, Vol. 2, pp. 185-9; Cromer, Vol. 2, p. 178; Mujahid, No. 691. ‘4 According to Blunt (Secret History, p. 232) he was 'the religious Sheykh of one of the confraternities at Medina, whom he (the Sultan) had at Constantinople with him, and was in the habit of employing in his secret dealings with his Arabic speaking subjects, consulting him on all matters connected with his Pan-Islamic propaganda.' ‘S H. Adali, 'Documents pertaining to the Y1ldiz Collection of the Basbanlik Arsivi, Istanbul', P.M. Holt (ed.), Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt (London, 1968), pp. 55 £. 16 Text in Broadley, pp. 175-7. Muhammad al-‘Abbasi named on the other hand 11 signatories. The four most important of these were Shaikh ‘Ullaish, Shaikh al-‘Idwi, Shaikh al-Marsafi and Shaikh Yusuf al-Hanbali: WTU-—Box 20, doss. 187. The following refused to sign: the Mufti of Egypt, al-‘Abbasi, the Shaikh of al-Azhar, al-Inbabi, Shaikh al-Bakri, Shaikh al-Sadat and Shaikhs al-Bahrawi and al-Abyari; naturally the Qadi of Egypt also did not sign it: WTU-—Box 18, doss. 22; Box 19, doss. 113 and 122; Box 20, doss. 158. See also Blunt, Secret History, pp. 233, 245-250 (Sabunji's account). On Shaikh ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Bahrawi (1819-1904), one of the the leading conservative ‘ulama’ of his time, who enjoyed the goodwill of the dynasty and was devoted to them, see Mubarak,

Al-khitat, Vol. 15, p. 11; Mujahid, No. 428; on his role see also Osman Amin, Muhammad ‘Abduh (Washington, 1953), p. 11;

Shafiq, Vol. 1, p. 123; WTU-—Box 19, doss.117 and 122. On Shaikh ‘Abd al-Hadi Naja al-Abyari (1821-88), the court Imam and author of numerous learned treatises, and his role,

see Mubarak, Al-khitat, Vol. 8, p. 29; Zaidan, Mashahir alSharg, Vol. 2, pp. 181 f£.; al-Rafi‘ti, ‘Asr Isma‘il, Vol. lI, pp. 259 £.; Mujahid, No. 453; WTU-—Box 19, doss. 122; Broadley, p. 232; al-Fagqi, p. 54.

356 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS According to Sabunji, in those days Mahmud Sami, Muhammad *“Abduh and ‘Abd Allah al-Nadim were aiming at the declaration

of an Egyptian republic on the Swiss model. They were no more bothered about the Sultan than they were about the man in the moon—in fact they cursed him; in the meantime, however, they made use of him. They wanted to see their aim achieved before they died (Blunt, Secret History, pp. 260-3). We do not take this account altogether seriously. It is probable that Blunt and Sabunji themselves first threw the idea of a republic into the debate (see ibid., p. 246). Perhaps the three so-called ‘republicans' had mainly played with the idea of Egyptian independence during these nocturnal discussions (see also p. 191). But ‘Urabi quite certainly did not agree with such ideas. Sabunji does not mention him once in this connection. “‘Urabi continually reiterated his loyalty to the Amir alMu’minin, including a telegram on 7 July (in MTU—Al-bargiyat allati dubitat bi-manzil Ahmad Basha ‘Urabi bi-sadad al-thawra

al-‘urabiya); see also Broadley, p. 172. In these long nights all kinds of ideas were fermenting. It is quite possible that a decision was taken along the lines of the issues and deliberations Sabunji speaks of, to make Egypt into a second Switzerland as fast as possible. But this

Single, and often contradictory and in no way trustworthy, source cannot allow the conclusion that Mahmud Sami, or all the ‘Urabists together, wanted to erect a neutral republic, completely independent of the Porte, or that this was the real political goal in their lives. See al-Hadidi, Mahmud Sami, pp. 126 and 159; ‘Abd Allah al-Nadim, pp. 203-5; Shukri, pp. 211, 220. Ahmed (p. 26) changes the corresponding part of Blunt's Secret History to a note in Mahmud Sami's diary! This suggestion is completely unbelievable, when one considers that during the war the ‘Urabists did not depose Tawfiq and declare a republic, but waited for the Sultan to replace the traitors by Halim. See also al-Ta’if, 14 and 16 Aug. 1882; al-Hadidi, ‘Abd Allah al-Nadim, p. 221. ‘7 Text in GFO—IABq (Turkey) 102, Vol. 6 (Paris, 25 May

1878) and in B. Jerrold, Egypt for the Egyptians (London, 1880), pp. 78 f.

18 We can support Landau's thesis (Prolegomena, pp. 147-59) on the probability of a close alliance between Halim and the alleged secret society of fallah officers. Halim first became the ‘Urabists' candidate in 1882, after they knew that he was the Sultan's candidate. *9 Blunt (Secret History, p. 327) repeats the alleged wording of this telegram. His informant was certainly Muhammad *‘Abduh (see ibid., pp. ix £.). An Arabic version is to be found in Mudhakkirat ‘Abduh, p. 150.

*° FO 78, Vol. 3438 (Cairo, 15 June 1882). 21 AA—Box 122 (Alexandria, 15 June 1882).

*2 Ninet (Arabi Pacha, p. 135) speaks of him as 'maltais

renégat, ancien employé du transit égyptien, depuis longtemps domicilié en France’; according to ‘Urabi (Mudhakkirat ‘Urabi, Vol. 2, p. 42) he was 'Anglo-Maltese'. 23 Wording of the programme, and the Khedive's answer, in

Karam, pp. 116-18. ** See also ‘Urabi's ‘Memorandum of Reforms for Egypt! (Blunt, Gordon at Khartoum, pp. 33-7), in which he demands, in

NOTES: CHAPTER 3 357 addition to the ratification of the Bill of Chamber of February 1882, the constitutional regulation of the rights and duties of the ruler, the minister, civil service officials and the police. Only in the originals, i.e. in no other document, did he make the suggestion than an ‘oldest councillor' should mediate in case of conflict between the Ministerial Council and the Chamber.

2° Broadley, p. 473.

26 The Times, 16 Apr. 1879, p. 9. .

*7 Biovés, p. 132. 28 Stone, p. 289.

*9 George Young, Egypt (London, 1927), pp. 119 £.

3° Kusel, p. 199. 3+ Cromer, Vol. 1, p. 300. 32 400 men from the infantry and cavalry had surrounded the tion by Muhammad Sultan, Hasan al-Shari‘i, Sulaiman Abaza and even an adjutant of Tawfiq and Darwish Pasha, Tulbat ‘Ismat, “Urabi gave the order to withdraw the soldiers. One officer, Muhammad Munib, let himself be bribed by the Khedive, and stayed behind with 250 men as a bodyguard for the Khedive. 33 According to al-Naqqash (Vol. 5, p. 130) 70 notables took part in this assembly. This number is of course given again by “‘Urabi (Mudhakkirat ‘Urabi, Vol. 1, p. 192). According to ‘Umar Lutfi (FO 78, Vol. 3439—Portal Memorandum, 21 July 1882), Biovés (p. 233) and C. Royle (The Egyptian Campaigns, 1882 to 1885 (London, 1886), Vol. 1, p. 200), some 100 persons were gathered. According to the published minutes of the meeting, and according to al-Rafi‘i (Al-thawra al-‘urabiya, p. 431), 400 notables were present. All our information on this depends on the trustworthiness of al-Nagqqash's records.

palace, to prevent the Khedive from fleeing. After interven-

3* Latif Pasha was a naval officer. Under Ismatil he rose

to become Minister of the Navy and member of the Majlis Khususi. He died in 1884. See Mujahid, No. 131. 35 FO 78, Vol. 3439 (Tangiers, 25 July 1882). 36 Muhammad Sultan, Sulaiman Abaza, Hasan al-Shari‘ti (both the last two had become ministers in the meantime), ‘Abd alMajid al-Baitash, Ahmad al-Siyufi. Other prominent delegates, such as Muhammad al-Shawaribi, Ahmad ‘Abd al-Ghaffar and Mahmud

Sulaiman were opponents of the ‘Urabists. The leader of the Chamber in 1879, ‘Abd al-Salam al-Muwailihi, had stayed safely in Syria. °7 The eight delegates are only to be discovered by comparing the names of the approximately 250 signatories to the protocol of the second assembly of notables with the list of the 83 members of the Chamber. Three came from Buhaira, two from Minufiya, one each from Qalyubiya, Gharbiya and Minya.

38 10 of the highest Muslim dignitaries of Cairo were present, namely the Shaikh al-Azhar, the Grand Qadi of Egypt, al-~Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadat, al-Sayyid ‘Abd al-Khalig al-Sadat, al-Sayyid ‘Abd al-Bagi al-Bakri,’ the Muftis of the Hanafis, Malakis and Hanbalis, and the Muftis of the police prefecture

and the Awqaf Ministry; also 11 of the so-called ‘ulama’ of the Azhar; 12 judges from various lawcourts; 9 leading

308 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS representatives of the non-Muslim religious communities; 3 of the Khedive's cousins (Ibrahim and Ahmad Kamal, sons of Prince Ahmad, and Kamil Fadil, a son of Prince Mustafa Fadil); around

50 wakils and other ministerial or administrative officers; some 50 former high officials and other distinguished notables, including several members of the Yakan family; 33 merchants at the head of their shaikhdoms; 5 generals and 8 colonels. About three-quarters of those taking part were Cairo notables. The ll provinces were at any given time represented by their mudirs and 4-6 *‘umdas; the Qadi and Mufti of Giza had also come. 39 Ahmad Shukri (an Egyptian?) had been sent to France in 1855 to study law and administration. After his return in 1861 he entered government service and reached high positions,

especially in provincial administration. He died in 1891. See

Mujahid, No. 529 and Heyworth-Dunne, p. 327.

+0 Isma‘*il Haqgi was Turkish. He first pursued a purely military career in Egypt; in 1850 he was appointed general. From then until his pensioning off, as President of the Supreme Court in the autumn of 1879, his career was typical of a member of the ruling class. He died in 1883. See Zakhura, Vol, 2, pp. 201-7 and Zaki, pp. 45-9. +1 Ahmad Hasanain, the only native member of the court martial after the occupation, and whom Broadley (p. 333) ironically called ‘Lord High Admiral of the Nile Fleet', was a naval officer born in Gharbiya. He had been captain of ‘Abbas', Sa‘id's and Isma‘il's private ships. In 1863 he was promoted to colonel. He died in 1891. See Mubarak, Al-khitat,

Vol. 16, p. 61; Zaki, p. 117; Mujahid, No. 222. OO *2 Khalid was one of Muhammad ‘Ali's Mamelukes.. As a member

of the ruling class he had alternated between civil and military positions; on his career, see Zaki, pp. 89 f. and Mujahid,

No. 253.

+3 Al-Waqa’i‘ al-Misriya, 3 Aug. 1882. ** Ibrahim Tawfig (d. 1917) had been sent to France in 1855 to study. Under General Stone he belonged to the general staff. He was an intimate of Tawfiq, for whom amongst other things he is said to have mobilized the beduin (especially the Awlad ‘Ali). See Heyworth-Dunne, p. 327; Stone, p. 297; Broadley, p. 234; Mudhakkirat ‘Abduh, p. 150; Blunt, Gordon at Khartoum, pp. 555 f. *S Hasan Mazhar, Khurshid Tahir, Rashid Husni, Muhammad Rida.

+6 Muhammad Sharif, the President of the Ministerial Council and Foreign Minister, ‘Umar Lutfi, the War and Navy Minister, ‘Ali Mubarak, the Minister of Labour and Muhammad Zaki, the Awqaf Minister, had struggled through to Alexandria from Cairo or else from the interior of the country; Mustafa Riyad, the Minister of the Interior, had been called in from Genf; Ahmad Khairi became Minister of Education, ‘Ali Haidar Minister of Finance and Husain Fakhri Minister of Justice. They had all been members of Sharif's or Riyad's former governments. *7 Quotation from Anouar Abdel Malek, La pensée politique arabe contemporaine (Paris, 1970), p. 182. +8 Le Temps, 16 Aug. 1882,in WTU—Box 7, doss. 38. +9 Tagla, pp. 235-7.

NOTES: CHAPTER 3 359 °° FO 78, Vol. 3439 (Tangiers, 19 July 1882).

i Berque, L'Egypte, p. 105. °2 Royle, pp. 327, 331. °3 Ninet, Arabi Pacha, p. 261. >4 J.F. Maurice, Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt, preparedin the Intelligence Branch of the War Office (London, 1887), p. 99.

°3 The most eminent religious dignitaries of the capital city had kept out of it. Only three of the better known and

more important ‘ulama’ were judged to be rebels: Shaikhs *‘Ullaish, al-‘Idwi and al-Khalfawi.

°& AA—Box 126 (Alexandria, 26 July 1882). °?7 WTU-—Box 8, doss. 53/IV/7 (Sabunji to ‘Urabi). °8 According to Royle (p. 345), Mahmud Fahmi, who fell into

the hands of the English at Qassasin, was brought to Alexandria,

"and in return for a promise to spare his life, furnished full details of Arabi's plans and position, together with information implicating, it was said, many of the high officials surrounding the Khedive, not excluding even members of his Ministry.' We certainly found no confirmation of this assertion in the reports, but it could be true, when one considers how negatively Mahmud Fahmi represents his comrades and fellowsufferers in exile. °° Sultan Pasha received £10,000 from the Khedive's government (Moniteur Egyptien, 5 Oct. 1882) and 'the Insignia of the Order of Honorary Knight Commander of the most distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George' from the English government (FO 78, Vol. 3444, Cairo, 27 Nov. 1882) for his services —allegedly as compensation for the damage done to his property by the ‘'rebels'. 60 It was a matter of six of his sympathizers in the Chamber of Delegates (Isma‘*il Sulaiman, ‘Ali Hasan al-Sha‘rawi, Yusuf ‘Abd al-Shahid, Mahmud Sulaiman, ‘Abd al-Shahid Butrus and Ahmad ‘Ali) and eleven other ‘umdas and officials. Of the delegates from the Delta provinces who had worked with Sultan,

32).

‘Urabi names al-Sayyid al-Faqi, Ahmad ‘Abd al-Ghaffar and Muhammad al-Shawaribi (Mudhakkirat ‘Urabi, Vol. 2, pp. 17, 23,

*' Quotation from Biovés, p. 288.

6 “Abd al-‘Al (1891), Mahmud Fahmi (1894) and Ya‘tqub Sami

(1900) died there. The remaining exiles were allowed to return to Egypt in 1900 and 1901. Tulbah ‘Ismat died in 1900, Mahmud

Sami in 1904, ‘Ali Fahmi and Ahmad ‘Urabi in 1911. °° Ardern Hulme Beaman, The Dethronement of the Khedive (London, 1929), p. 28. Conclusions

:* —Broadley, p. 16. , Mudhakkirat ‘Urabi, Vol. 1, p. 115.

SOURCES

ARCHIVES

DAR AL-WATHA’IQ, CAIRO

Watha’iq al-thawra al-‘urabiya, 40 boxes:

Boxes 1-5: Telegrams on military, political and administrative matters from the time of war (July~Sept. 1882) Boxes 6 and 22: Protocol and other documents relating to the Commission of Enguiry (1882/3) Boxes 7-17: Dossiers on arrested ‘rebels' Boxes 18-20: Eyewitness reports of the incidents of the Box 21: Deliberations and decisions of the Majlis al-‘Urfi

‘rebellion'

Boxes 23 and 40: Documents on the ‘Ligue Patriotique Egyptienne' (1883) Boxes 23-37: Documents concerning the confiscation and sale of

the property of ‘rebels’ exiled to Ceylon

Makhtutat al-thawra al-‘urabiya (Copies of documents, excerpts from registers and from the Official Gazette)

Tagqrirat ‘an al-thawra al-‘urabiya, ,2 vols. (Taqrirat wa Shahadat mugaddama min kibar al-muwazzafin al-wataniyin wa al-ajanib ila lajnat al-tahqiq ‘an ma‘lumatihim fi alhawadith al-‘urabiya). These are copies of documents in Boxes 18-20 of Watha’iq al-thawra al-‘urabiya where, however, two important reports were not to be found. Al-bargiyat allati tabadalatha nizarat al-jihadiya bi sadad al-thawra al-‘urabiya (excerpts from registers) Al-bargiyat allati dubitat bi manzil Ahmad Basha ‘Urabi bi sadad al-thawra al-‘urabiya Awrag al-hadra al-khidiwiya bi sadad al~-thawra al-‘urabiya wa al-bargiyat allati dubitat lada al-muttahamin fiha Suwar tahgqigqat al-qumisyun wa murafa*at al-muhamin ‘an al-muttahamin fi al-thawra al-‘urabiya Al-hawadith al-yawmiya wa al-waga’i‘* al-harbiya fi al-thawra al-‘urabiya, vol. 2: Qararat al-Majlis al-‘Urfi ‘an jaridat al-Waga’i‘* al-Misriya Al-wagqa’i* al-harbiya fi al-thawra al-‘urabiya ‘an jaridat al-Waga’i‘* al-Misriya wa ba‘duha madhkur fi kitaba Misr li al-Misriyin wa Kashf ail-Sitar

Al-hawadith al-dakhiliya ‘an jaridat al-Waga’i‘ al-Misriya 1881-1882-1883 Al-hawadith al-dakhiliya fi al-thawra al-‘urabiya ‘an jaridat

al-Waga’i* al-Misriya sanat 1882. al-Waga’i* al-Misriya sanat 1882 Al-Wagqa’i* al-Misriya (arranged according to topics): Box 18

Taburru‘at al-ahali fi al-thawra al-‘urabiya ‘an jaridat (Majalis)

Bayanat ‘an al-jaish al-misri ibtida’an min sanat 1271 ila

sanat 1280 (excerpts from registers)

SOURCES 361 Daftar zimam atyan ‘ushuriya (dhawat)

Raqm al-sijill: 1343 (min 1264 ila 1287) European departments:

Mutafarrigat: Al-jaish 1809-1881 (one box, in French) Austrian archive (copies of reports on Egypt in various departments of the Household, Court and State Archives in Vienna): Boxes 98, 104-6, 109, 110, 115-29 (1887-82)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

F.O. 78, Turkey (Egypt): Vols. 2853-8 (1878) Vols. 2998-3005 (1879) Vols. 3140-4 (1880) Vols. 3321-6 (1881) Vols. 3434-45 (1882)

F.O. 141: |

Vols. 115, 116, 119, 120, 121, 125, 126, 128, 129, 138, 140, 144, 148, 149, 151, 154, 155, 156, 160, lol (1878-82) POLITICAL ARCHIVE OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BONN

1.A.B.g (Tiurkei) 102: Correspondence with consulate general in Alexandria, and with other missions and foreign cabinets, concerning internal Egyptian matters Agypten Ll

Correspondence with consulate general in Alexandria, and with other missions and foreign cabinets, concerning general

Egyptian affairs |

Agypten 2

The legal position of Egypt; June 1879-15 Jan. 1892, 2 vols. Agypten 3

The Egyptian Question; 1 Feb. 1881-5 Jan. 1883, 45 vols.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, PARIS

Correspondance politique, Egypte: vols. 56-74 (1875-82) Correspondance politique des consuls: Vol. 1 (Alexandrie, Le Caire, Port Said 1876-1880) Vol. 2 (Alexandrie, Port Said, Suez, Khartoum 1881) Vol. 3 (Alexandrie, Port Said, Suez, Khartoum 1882) COLLEGE DE FRANCE, PARIS

Aidi Greiss-Visconti: L'Egypte d'Orabi Pacha d'aprés des documents d'archives, 1955. These are copies of documents made in 1955 in the former ‘Abdin Archives; they concern the relations of Tawfiq with the Porte, the situation in Egypt during the war and the mission of Sultan Pasha. I am greatly indebted to Professor Jacques Berque who allowed me

access to his collection.

PUBLICATIONS

EDITED DOCUMENTS, OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS, PUBLICATIONS OF POLITICAL GROUPS, NEWSPAPERS

Afshar, Iraj and Mahdavi, Asghar (eds.), Documents inédits

362 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS concernant Seyyed Jamal-al-Din Afghani, Tehran, 1963 (text in Persian, facsimiles of documents in various languages)

Budget du gouvernement é@gyptien pour l'exercice 1881 (specimen

in the library of Dar al-Watha’iq) Gelat, Philippe, Répertoire de la législation et de l'adminis-— tration égyptiennes, 9 vols;, Alexandria, 1888-99 Guindi, Georges and Tagher, Jacques (eds.), Ismail d'aprés les documents officiels, Cairo, 1946 Jallad, Filib, Qamus al-idara wa al-gada’, 8 vols., Alexandria, 1890-6 (the Arabic edition is not guite identical with Gelat, Répertoire) Karam, Fu’ad, Al-nizarat wa al-wizarat al-misriya, Vol. l (1878-1953), Cairo, 1969 Lamba, Henri, Code administratif é@égyptien, Paris, 1911 La Liberté de la Presse, par l'Union de la Jeunesse Egyptienne, no place of publication, December 1879 (French and Arabic,

specimen in the Bibliothéque Nationale, Paris) Manifeste du Parti National Egyptien, Cairo, 4 Nov. 1879 (specimen in the Bibliothéque Nationale, Paris)

Ministére de l'Intérieur, Statistique de l'Egypte, Cairo, 1873 Ministére de l'Intérieur, Direction générale de la statistique (F. Amici Bey), Dictionnaire des villes, villages, hameaux, etc; de l'Egypte, Cairo, 1881 Ministére de l'Intérieur, Direction générale de la statistique, Décret, réglement et instructions relatives au recensement général de la population de 1'Egypte du 3 mai 1882, Cairo, 1881

Ministére de l'Intérieur, Direction du recensement, Recensement général de 1'Egypte,3 mai 1882, 2 vols;, Cairo, 1884

al-Naqqash, Salim Khalil, Misr li al-misriyin, Vols. 7-9,

Alexandria, 1884 Le Phare d'Alexandrie, 1879 Projet des réformes présenté a Son Altesse Tewfick I, Khédive d'Egypte, par 1'Union de la Jeunesse Egyptienne, Alexandria, September 1879 (specimen in the Bibliothéque Nationale, | Paris) al-Qism al~-Awwal, Dikritat wa tagqrirat wa ma yatba‘uhuma (1876Reformen im Verwaltungs- und Finanzwesen Egyptens, Vienna, 1872 Sami, Amin, Taqwim al-Nil, 6 vols., Cairo, 1913-36 al-Shinnawi, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Muhammad and Yahya, Jalal (eds.), Watha’ig wa nusus al-tarikh al-hadith wa al-mu‘asir, Alexandria, 1969 Das Staatsarchiv, Sammlung der officiellen Aktenstucke zur Geschichte der Gegenwart, Leipzig, Vol. 29 (1876), Vols.

80), Bulag, 1298 .

40-42 (1882-4) The Times, 1879

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Wallace, D. Mackenzie, Egypt and the Egyptian Question, London, 1883 Weigall, Arthur. E.B. Brome, A History of Events in Egypt from 1798 to 1914. Edinburgh, 1915 Wilson, C. Rivers, Chapters from My Official Life, London, 1916 Wright, L.C., United States Policy toward Egypt 1830-1914, New York, 1969 Young, George, Egypt, London, 1927 Zahran, Sa‘d, 'Al-ta‘alim al-libiraliya fi al-thawra alS‘urabiya', Al-Majalla, 108 (1965) Zaidan, Jurgi, Tarikh al-masuniya al-‘amm mundhu nash’atiha ila hadha al-yawm, Cairo, 1889; Mashahir al-sharg fi al-qarn al-tasi‘* ‘ashr, Cairo, Vol. l, 1902, Vol. 2, “1911

Zakhura, Ilyas, Mir’at al-‘asr fi tarikh wa rusum akabir rijal Misr, 3 vols., Cairo, 1897 Zaki, ‘Abd al-Rahman, A‘lam al-jaish wa al-bahriya fi Misr athna’ al-garn al-tasi* ‘ashr, n.p., 1947

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Alatas, Hussein, The Democracy of Islam, The Hague, 1956 Ansari, Zafer Ishaq, 'Contemporary Islam and nationalism, a case study of Egypt', Die Welt des Islams, VII (1961) Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening, New York, 1965 ('1938) Asad, Muhammad, The Principles of State and Government in Islam, Berkeley, 1961

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THE PRESIDENTS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

23 Aug. 1878-19 Feb. 1879 Nubar Pasha 19 Feb. 1879-10 Mar. 1879 Khedive Isma‘il 1O Mar. 1879- 7 Apr. 1879 Crown Prince Tawfig 7 Apr. 1879- 2 July 1879 Sharif Pasha (1) 2 July 1879-17 Aug. 1879 Sharif Pasha (2) 17 Aug. 1879-21 Sep. 1879 Khedive Tawfig 21 Sep. 1879- 9 Sep. 1881 Riyad Pasha 14 Sep. 1881~- 4 Feb. 1882 Sharif Pasha (3) 4 Feb. 1882-26 May 1882 Mahmud Sami al-Barudi 17 June 1882-21 Aug. 1882 Raghib Pasha 21 Aug. 1882-10 Jan. 1884 Sharif Pasha (4) 24 July 1882-14 Sep. 1882 Ya‘qub Sami‘ President of Majlis

al-‘Urfi

THE SESSIONS OF THE CHAMBER OF DELEGATES

25 Nov. 1866-24 Jan. 1867 16 Mar. 1868-23 May 1868 28 Jan. 1869-22 Mar. 1869 l Feb. 1870-31 Mar. 1870 10 June 1871- 6 Aug. 1871 26 Jan. 1873-24 Mar. 1873 7 Aug. 1876-10 Aug. 1876 23 Nov. 1876-15 Feb. 1877 30 Apr. 1877-16 May 1877 28 Mar. 1878-27 June 1878 2 Jan. 1879- 6 July 1879 26 Dec. 1881-26 Mar. 1882

NAMES OF PERSONS

Abaza, family, 32, 33, 38, 184, 337 Abaza, Ahmad, 24, 185, 193, 194, 218, 222, 223, 303 Abaza, al-Sayyid, 24, 25, 33 Abaza, Sulaiman, 25, 33, 119, 156-8, 165, 184, 191, 194-6, 222, 240, 241, 243, 254, 312, 357 ‘Abbas, 19, 23, 37, 39, 51, 65, 320, 321, 323, 324, 326, 344, 350, 358 ‘Abbas Hilmi, 223

al-‘Abbasi, Muhammad, 30, 105, 189-90, 211, 350, 355 ‘Abd al-‘Al, see Hilmi *Abd al-‘Al, Sulaiman, 25 “Abd Allah, Muhammad, 241 ‘Abd al-Ghaffar, Ahmad (delegate), 33, 216, 218-19, 274, 357, 359 ‘Abd al-Ghaffar, Ahmad (officer), 137, 138, 139, 145, 157, 162, 2/74 ‘Abd al-Halim, Prince, 160 “Abd al-Latif, see Latif Pasha ‘Abd al-Nasir, Gamal, 1 ‘Abd al-Rahim, Mustafa, 188 ‘Abd al-Rahman, 304 ‘Abd al-Samad, ‘Abd al-Qadir, 274 ‘Abd al-Sami, 119 ‘Abd al-Sayyid, Mikha’il, 110, 178 ‘Abd al-Shahid, Yusuf, 359 ‘Abduh, Muhammad, 96, 105, 108, 109, 112, 125, 131-3, 156,

157-8, 168, 172, 187, 202, 205, 223, 228, 237, 263, 264, 265, 270, 271, 272, 274, 275, 303, 325, 333, 346, 347, 348, 356

Abraham, 98

Abu al-‘Ata’, Muhammad, 189, 277

Abu Hashish, family, 33 Abu Hashish, Khidr, 24

Abu al-‘Izz, family, 33 Abu al-‘Izz, Atrabi, 25

Abu Laila, Ibrahim Hasan, 83 Abu Satit, Hamid, 25 al-Abyari, ‘Abd al-Hadi Naja, 31, 355 Adham, Ibrahim, 128, 275, 330, 340 al-Afghani, see Jamal al-Din SAfifi, Muhammad, 24, 25 Aflatun, Hasan, 69, 72, 149, 168, 208, 326 Ahmad, Prince, 128 Ahmad Rif‘at, Prince, 19, 160 Ahmad ‘'al-Tayyib', 37 Ahmad, ‘Umar, 25 SAkif, Khurshid, 140 ‘Akush, Mustafa, 263, 264, 330 ‘Ali Pasha, 173 ‘Ali, Ahmad, 25, 217, 218, 359 Amin, Hamid, 227, 354

Amin, Muhammad, 227

NAMES OF PERSONS 377 al-Anhuri, Salim, 109, 335 al-‘Agqad, family, 32, 248 al-‘Aqgad, Hasan Musa, 127, 129, 189, 248, 303 al-‘Aggad, Musa, 28 ‘Arafah, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 82 Artin, 39 Artin, Ya‘qub, 59, 191 As‘ad, Ahmad, 245, 249, 252, .256 al-‘*Attar, Mahmud, 79, 82, 83-4, 93, 193, 223 Ayyub, Ismail, 100, 164, 167, 230, 288, 330, 331 ‘Azmi, Wasif, 119, 218, 337 Badrawi, family, 20, 24, 32 Bahjat, Muhammad, 274 al-Bahrawi, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 31, 105, 355 al-Baitash, ‘Abd al-Majid, 217, 218, 357 al-Bakri, family, 355 al-Bakri, ‘Abd al-Bagi, 31, 241, 243, 355, 357 al-Bakri, ‘Ali, 29, 31, 87-8, 89, 93, 95, 97, 339 Barrot Pasha, 88 al-Barudi, Mahmud Sami, 28, 100, 102, 103, 107, 121, 125, 142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 150-2, 156, 157, 160, 165, 167, 168, 177, 182, 185, 187, 190, 207-10, 221, 223, 224, 234-5, 236, 238, 241, 244, 246, 248, 250, 253, 255, 262, 263, 274, 297-8, 301, 302, 304,. 310, 319, 331, 343-4, 356, 359 Basmi, Khurshid, 140 Bismarck, 96, 121

‘Asim, Husain, 330 |

de Bligniéres, 59, 62, 69, 72, 80, 81, 82, 85, 95, 101, 103, 104, 110, lll, 204, 222 Blum Pasha, 168, 191, 208 Blunt, W.S., 125, 134, 186-8, 190, 192-3, 202-5, 211, 221,

225, 237, 299, 302, 346, 356 Boinet, 222 Boleslawski, 163, 164 Borg, Raphael, 3, 64, 66, 79, 88, 97, 106, 129, 142, 252, 302 Bouteron, 191 Broadley, 155, 302 Bughus, 39, 320 Bughus, Nubar, 59 Butler, 150 Butrus, ‘Abd al-Shahid, 82, 83, 128, 194, 211, 217, 359

Caillard, 220 Caro, 248 , Cartwright, 254, 256, 257 Cauvet, 58 Cave, 47

Colvin, 119, 161-3, 185-6, 190, 192, 202-5, 218, 233, 237, 267 Cookson, 151, 163, 227, 229, 250 : Cromer, Lord (E. Baring), 39, 50, 62, 101, 104, 115, 135, 221, 259, 282

Danish, Isma‘il, 276 al-Daramalli, Ahmad, 27, 153, 189, 227, 330 al-Daramalli, Husain, 208, 262, 263, 265, 273, 274, 330 Darwish Pasha, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 261, 264, 266, 267, 285, 357 Darwish, ‘Abd al-Raziq, 303 Dhu al-Figar, ‘Ali, 27, 72, 92, 102, 103, 249, 326, 328, 330 al-Dimnati, ‘Ali Ibn Sulaiman, 342

378 ° EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS Domet de Vorges, 256

Dufferin, Lord, 257, 285 Dye, 136

Fadil, Prince Kamil, 345 Fadil, Prince Mustafa, 19, 155 Fadil, Princess Nazili Hanum, 345 Fadil, Prince ‘Uthman, 155, 345 Fahmi, ‘Ali, 21, 68, 125, 138, 139, 142, 144, 149, 152, 156, 160-2, 185, 226, 227, 229, 238-41, 274, 300, 302, 319, 334, Fahmi, ‘Arif, 27 Fadil, Muhammad, 27

341, 359 .

Fahmi, Hasan, 275 Fahmi, Husain (Ktictik Husain), 208, 273, 352

Fahmi, Husain, 276 ° | Fahmi, Husain, 303

Fahmi, Mahmud, 101, 156, 208, 209, 226, 227, 300, 302, 319, 346, 359 Fahmi, Mustafa, 100, 102, 103, 165, 167, 208, 209, 236, 332 Fakhri, Husain, 103, 119, 130, 333, 352, 358 al-Falaki, Isma‘il, 130, 336 al-Falaki, Mahmud, 119, 130, 217, 254, 336 Fanni, Muhammad, 129, 139, 303

al-Fagi, al-Sayyid, 359

Faraj, Ahmad, 140, 274 Farid Pasha, 184 Faruq, 2 Fath Allah, Hamza, 159, 178, 181, 312, 349 Fawzi, Ibrahim, 162, 189, 227, 229, 241, 262, 263, 273, 274, 280, 295, 304 Fawzi, ‘Uthman, 248, 303, 330

Fikri, ‘Abd Allah, 28, 119, 130, 195, 208, 209, 211, 218, 337 Fitzgerald, 191 Fu’ad, 1 Fu’ad, *Ali, 173, 196 Fu’ad, Mahmud, 230

Gambetta, 202, 222

Ghali, Butrus, 119, 130, 168, 191, 208, 210, 264, 273, 274, 295, 337 © Ghalib, ‘Ali, 100, 135, 184, 331 Ghalib, ‘Uthman, 136, 277, 278, 340 al-Gharyani, Sa‘id, 211

Gladstone, 187 Godeaux, 64, 69 Goldsmid, General, 15l, 190 Gordon Pasha, 49 Goschen, 47, 74, 75 Goussio, 114 Gregory, Sir William, 187, 225 Gregory, Lady, 229 Hafiz, Muhammad, 27, 77, 126, 130, 139, 330, 339

Haidar, Ibrahim, 149, 160, 162, 164, 188 al~Hajin, family, 32 al-Hajin, Mustafa, 241 Halim, 19, 96, 97, 98, 106, 113, 114, 121, 127, 172, 173, 192, 235, 245, 246-8, 254, 257, 298, 322, 332, 334, 356 Hamadi, family, 33 Hamadi, Muhammad, 25

NAMES OF PERSONS 379 Hamadi, Rashwan, 211 Hamdi, Ahmad, 141, 343

Hamdi, Isma‘il, 276 Hamdi, Mahmud, 119

Haqqi, Isma‘il (‘Abu Jabal'), 27, 274, 358 al-Harmil, ‘Uthman, 75 Hasan, Prince, 70, 77 Hasan, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 274

Hasan, Fudah, 157 Hasan, Muhammad, 149

Hasanain, Ahmad, 274, 358

Hilal, 24, 25

al-Hilbawi, Ibrahim, 105, 125, 131, 353 Hilmi, ‘Abd al-‘Al, 21, 125, 137-9, 142, 148-51, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170, 182, 226, 227, 229, 238, 239, 241 276-7, 291, 294, 295, 302, 319, 334, 340, 350, 359 Hilmi, ‘Abd al-Qadir, 28, 68, 153, 188, 209, 324, 330 Hilmi, Murad, 100, 332 Husain, Prince, 51-2, 77 Husni, Husain, 149 Husni, Rashid, 141, 229, 240, 241, 274, 300, 330, 343, 358 Ibrahim, 19, 282, 320, 324, 326, 350 Ibrahim, Prince, 19, 128, 345, 358 Ibrahim, Shaikh, 250 Tbrahim, General, 69, 140, 330 Tbrahim, ‘Ali, 102, 103, 119, 130, 168, 254, 333 Ibrahim, Salama, 191, 217, 350 al-‘*Idwi, Hasan, 31, 88, 248, 249, 263, 328, 355 *‘Iffat, Khalil, 276 Ilhami, Prince, 341 al-Inbabi, Muhammad, 32, 189, 350, 355 ‘Inani, Mustafa, 32, 183, 190 “Isa, ‘Ali, 140 Ishaq, Adib, 107, 109, 112,113,114, 121, 178, 195, 204, 223, 312, 333, 335, 349, 351 TIsma*‘il, 11-130, 135, 146, 148, 150, 166, 177, 179, 186, 187, 189, 195, 197, 199, 200, 224, 225, 228-31, 244, 247, 263, 303, 306-8, 311, 321-58 ‘Ismat, Tulbah, 157, 175, 176, 185, 188, 190, 226-9, 238, 240-2, 253, 266, 267, 296, 302, 319, 325, 346, 357, 359 ‘Izzat, ‘Abd Allah (Sirdar), 18, 27 ‘Izzat, *Abd Allah, 70 Jablin, Léon, 225 Jacquier, General, 69 Jad, Hasan, 274

Istifan, 39

Jalal, Muhammad, 241 Jalal, Muhammad ‘Uthman, 108

Jamal al-Din, al-Afghani, 79, 96, 104-8, 109, 111-12, 125, 131, 307, 308, 325, 333, 348, 349 Jamal- al-Din, Ayyub, 25 Jami‘i, ‘Umar, 25 Jamila, Princess, 324 Jibali, Sa‘dawi, 282 Joubert, 47, 74, 75 Kabwah, Ahmad, 265

Kahil, Mikha’il, 119, 168 Kamal Bey, 277

380 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS Kamal, Yusuf, 148, 149

Kamil, Isma‘il, 138, 228, 330, 341 Kamil, Khalil, 227, 228 Kamil, Muhammad, 147 Keller, 94 Khadr, Khadr, 141 Khair al-Din (al-Tunisi), 98 Khairi, Ahmad, 142, 150, 161, 164, 186, 253, 330, 334, 343, 358 al-Khalfawi, Abu al-‘Ala, 31, 88, 93 Khalid, General, 274, 330, 358 Khalil, Ibrahim, 119

Khalil, Muhammad, 131 Khulusi, Muhammad, 188

Khusraw, General, 138, 230, 330, 341 Khusraw, Muhammad, 28 von Kosjek, 194, 234, 237, 253-4 von Kremer, 53, 65, 92 de Kusel, 258

al-Laithi, ‘Ali, 31, 166 ) al-Laggani, Ibrahim, 105, 109, 125, 223, 303, 327

Larmée, General, 69, 140, 219 Lascelles, 103, 107 Latif Pasha, 27, 263, 330, 357 Lavison, Max, 229 al-Lawzi, Sayyid, 33, 89 de Lesseps, Ferdinand, 50, 56, 224, 300 Loriai, 192 Loring, 136, 137 Lutf Allah, Bakhum, 82, 86 Lutfi, Taha, 141, 161 Lutfi, “Umar, 27, 28, 60-1, 77, 92, 97, 121, 125, 126, 128, 223, 240, 243, 250, 252, 278, 312, 324, 330, 358 Mahjub, Ahmad, 184

Mahmud, Ahmad, 33, 166, 193, 210, 211, 223, 303 Makram, ‘Umar, 1

Malet, 142, 150, 154, 187, 192, 197, 202-5, 211, 220, 228, 229, 231-9, 242, 243, 245, 253 Mansi, Badawi, 274 Mansur, Shafig, 330 . Mar‘ashli, Muhammad, 69, 102, 103, 229, 330, 332 al-Marsafi, Shaikh, 355 de Martino, 59 Mazhar, Hasan, 188, 274, 358 Mazhar, Husain, 160, 188, 225, 228 Mazhar, Ja‘far, 18 Mazhar, Muhammad, 27 des Michels, 48, 49 Minshawi, family, 33, 166

Minshawi, Ahmad, 282 Minshawi, Muhammad,25, 28, 33, 194 Monge, 238

Mubarak, ‘Ali, 21, 28, 37, 58, 68, 72, 85, 88, 103, 130, 156,

168, 227, 230, 264-8, 288, 298, 322-3, 325 Muhammad ‘Ali, 11, 12, 13, 18-19, 22-4, 26, 30, 32, 39, 65, 140, 146, 186, 227, 241 248, 263, 279, 306, 307, 320, 322, 323, 326, 327, 328, 330, 331, 337, 338, 346, 351, 352 Muhammad ‘Aid, 227

Muhammad, Isma‘il, 217, 273 Muhammad, al-Sayyid, 227

NAMES OF PERSONS 381 Munib, Muhammad, 357

Mustafa, Agha, 3 Mustafa, Ahmad, 25

Mustafa, Muhammad, 241

Muwailihi, family, 32, 327 al-Muwailihi, ‘Abd al-Salaam, 68, 79-80, 82, 83-4, 86, 89, 94, 97, 166, 193, 197, 202, 204, 211, 217, 223, 240, 241, 257, 324, 357 al-Muwailihi, Ibrahim, 79, 88, 93, 108, 238, 333, 339 al-Nadim, ‘Abd Allah, 105, 108, 112, 114, 125, 133, 178, 181-5, 211, 223, 224, 250, 284, 286, 299, 348-9, 356 al-Nadi, Muhammad, 93, 325, 330 Nafid, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 30 NaSil, ‘Ali, 265 Najati, Sulaiman, 227, 354 Najati, Yusuf, 230 Najib, Muhammad, 1, 316 Najm al-Din, 140 al-Naqgash, Salim, 107, 109, 112,155, 157, 178, 185, 229, 334, 349 Nash’at, Ahmad, 191, 273, 304 Nash’at, Muhammad, 126, 130, 339 Nash’at,Mustafa, 304 Nashid, Ahmad, 277

Nasif, ‘Ali, 189 Nasif, Hifni, 125 Nasr, Sa‘id, 67, 68, 70, 326 Ninet, John, 88, 120-1, 123, 125, 127, 156, 157, 299, 300, 338 Nir, Ahmad, 274

Nizami, ‘Ali, 173, 175, 196

Nubar Pasha, 14, 15, 27, 34, 39, 43, 51-3, 54-72, 74, 80, 81, 83-5, 95, 98-101, 103, 110, 111, 123, 127, 130, 150, 191,

°318, 320, 338 Nu‘man, Khurshid, 137, 140, 141

Nur, Ahmad, 304

Outrey, 47 Pierre Bey, 301 von Ploetz, General, 140 Qadri Bey, 176, 249, 256 Qadri, Muhammad, 119, 167, 338 Radi, Muhammad, 82, 86, 89 Ra’fat, Hasan, 67, 227, 274

Ra’fat, Isma‘il, 276 Raghib, Isma‘il, 12, 15, 18, 27, 72, 88, 89, 92, 93, 98, 121, 126, 128, 129, 160, 253, 254, 259, 265, 304, 326, 328, 330

Raghib, ‘Ali Qabudan, 244, 245 Rahmi, ‘Umar, 230, 241 Ramadan, Hafiz, 273 Rasim, Hasan, 18, 27, 88, 328, 330 Rashid, Ahmad, 18, 27, 67, 72, 79, 88, 254, 259, 324, 330 Rasmi, Qasim, 18, 28 Ratib, Abu Bakr, 18, 28 Ratib, Ahmad, 176, 244, 249 Ratib, Muhammad, 28, 59, 68, 69, 88, 89, 128, 136, 138, 229-31, 323, 330, 339 Ra’uf, Muhammad, 149, 265, 274, 288, 295, 344

382 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS Rida, ‘Ali, 278, 330 Rida, Muhammad, 140, 161, 229, 240, 241, 274, 330, 358 Rifa‘fa, ‘Ali Fahmi, 208, 273, 274, 352 al-Rifa‘i, Shaikh, 105 Rif*‘at, Ahmad, 127, 174, 208, 256, 273, 274, 284, 303, 339 Rifgi, “‘Uthman, 28, 102, 103, 136-40, 143, 145, 147, 149, 230-2, 279, 332, 344 de Ring, 141, 142, 150, 154-5, 248 Riyad, Mustafa, 27, 28, 48, 50, 51, 58, 63, 66, 68, 72, 80, 84-9, 99-105, 112, 114-34, 135, 139, 140, 143-59, 161, 163, 175, 177, 184, 191, 192, 195, 278, 308, 309, 321, 333, 335-7, 344, 345, 346, 349, 358 Rothschild, 61, 70, 129, 222 Rousseau Bey, 119, 168, 208 Rowsell, 19

al-Rubi, ‘Ali, 93, 136, 209, 229, 241, 271, 273, 295, 303, 325, 331

Rushdi, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 28, 254, 277 Rushdi, Ibrahim, 277 Rustam, Muhammad, 119

al-Sabahi, Ahmad, 166

Sabri, Fath Allah, 223 Sabri, Isma‘il, 149, 188, 344 Sabunji, 187, 356 al-Sadat, Shaikh (Muhammad or ‘Abd al-Khaligq), 29, 31, 128, 241, 243, 355, 357 al-Sadig, Ahmad Agha, 82 Sadig, ‘Ali, 208, 219, 352 Sadiq, Ja‘far, 88, 273, 328, 330, 333 Sadiq, Mahmud, 304

Sa‘id, 14, 19, 20, 22, 23, 32, 39, 43, 65, 137, 148, 307, 309,

313, 320, 321, 323, 324, 326, 331, 337, 341, 345, 346, 358 Sa*id Pasha, 285, 299 Sa‘id, Ibrahim, 353 Sa*‘id, Muhammad, 303, 304 Sairafi, Muhammad, 24, 25, 33, 215, 276

Salim, Latif, 66-70, 157, 326 Salim, Salim, 119, 130, 338 . Salman, ‘Abd al-Karim, 105, 131

Salughli, Isma‘il, 182

Sami, Ibrahim, 273 Sami, Mahmud, see al-Barudi

Sami, Ya‘qub, 208, 226, 240-2, 249, 253, 262-4, 271, 273-5, 291, 292, 302, 319, 352, 359 Santerre des Boves, J., 129 Sanu‘, Ya‘*qub, 107, 109, 110, 121, 246-7, 334-5 Sagr, Husain, 270, 274, 303 Sarhank, Isma‘il, 74, 88, 301, 332 von Saurma, 96, 253-4 von Schaeffer, 219 Seymour, Admiral, 257-8, 261, 293 Shafiq, Ahmad, 62

Shahin Pasha, 27, 64, 66-7, 77, 79, 88, 89, 92, 93, 97, 108, 126, 128-30, 139, 233, 324, 330, 349 Shafir, ‘Ali, 33

Shakir, Muhammad, 27, 228, 276, 330 al-Shamakhi, Sa‘id, 241, 265

al-Shamsi, Amin, 32, 33, 166, 183-5, 194, 210, 217, 222, 241, 303 al-Shamsi, Hasan, 178, 182, 223, 279, 303

NAMES OF PERSONS 383 Sha‘rawi, family, 33 al-Sha‘rawi, ‘Ali Hasan, 359 al-Sharif, Ahmad, 25, 33 Sharif, Muhammad, 17, 22, 27, 41, 50, 51, 59, 63, 72, 73, 85-6, 88, 89, 92, 94-6, 98-102, 105, 111-13, 120, 121, 123, 125-30, 156-8, 164-74, 177, 178, 181, 182, 184, 191-5, 197, 201-7, 211, 212, 220, 226, 237-40, 243, 244, 278, 285, 312, 318, 322, 323, 328-33, 335, 347, 358

Shari‘i, family, 33, 345 al-Shari‘i, Budaini, 82, 86, 208 al-Shari‘i, Hasan, 24, 25, 156-8, 165, 194, 202, 208-11, 254, 357, 358 al-Shari‘i, Ibrahim, 24 Shaweribi, family, 32, 33, 38

al-Shawaribi, Muhammad, 25, 193, 207, 210, 215, 217, 351, 357, 359 al-Shawaribi, Salim, 24 Shawqi, Muhammad, 162, 188 Shuhdi, Yusuf, 144, 330, 344 Shukhri, Ahmad, 273, 358 Siddig, Isma‘il, 20, 21, 27, 28, 74, 76, 322 Siddiq, Mustafa, 304 Sidgi, Muhammad, 149 Sidgqi, Mustafa, 303, 304 Sienkiewicz, 181, 194, 202, 204, 211, 232, 233, 236, 238, 239, 243, 245

Siraj al-Din, Ibrahim, 178, 180, 181

al-Sirsi, Ahmad, 82 al-Siyufi, ‘Abd Allah, 353 al-Siyufi, Ahmad, 211, 265, 267, 268, 353, 357

al-Siyufi, Mahmud, 353 al-Siyufi, Muhammad, 32, 93, 241, 353 Stone, General, 62, 119, 140, 141, 161, 162, 220, 224, 257, 280, 358 Sulaiman Pasha, 27, 322, 332 Sulaiman, family, 33 Sulaiman, Isma‘il, 359 Sulaiman, Mahmud, 24, 196, 351, 357, 359

Sultan, Muhammad, 24, 25, 26, 28, 33, 82, 119, 121, 125, 126, 156, 157, 165, 168, 170, 171, 176, 177, 191, 194-6, 204, 205, 208, 211, 212, 215, 221, 223, 235-8, 240-3, 256, 275, 282, 297, 300, 301, 312, 337, 345, 346, 357, 359 al-Su‘udi, Murad, 241, 277 Tadrus, ‘Aryan, 191, 273 Tahir, Ahmad, 303 Tahir, Khurshid, 141, 229, 358 Tahir, Mahmud, 141 Tahir, Muhammad, 223, 303 Tahir, “*Uthman, 304

al-Tahtawi, 15, 28 Tal‘at, Ahmad, 27, 150, 176, 186, 253, 330 Tal*‘at, Mahmud, 230 Taqla, Bisharah, 109, 178, 179, 285, 312, 335 Taqla, Salim 109, 178, 312, 335 Tawfiq, 1, 26, 31, 33, 44, 68, 70-2, 77, 84, 85, 89, 92, 96-108, 113, 114, 118, 127, 130, 132-6, 140-51, 154, 156, 160-8, 170-5, 186, 189, 194, 195, 203, 207, 208, 223, 228-54, 257-62, 269, 271, 272, 278, 279, 281, 284-6, 296, 301, 307-9, 311, 313, 322, 324, 328, 330, 331, 336, 338, 340, 341, 343-5, 349, 355, 357, 358

384 EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS Tawfigq, Ibrahim, 276, 278, 358 Thabit, ‘Ali, 276 Thabit, Muhammad, 22, 27, 92, 128, 176, 232, 243, 245, 279, 285, 330 Tijran, 39, 52, 59, 119, 168, 191, 208, 338 Tricou, 98 Tusun, Prince, 343 al-Tutunji, Ibrahim Agha, 149 *‘Ubaid, Muhammad, 140, 241, 271, 274, 295, 343, 352 ‘Ullaish, Muhammad, 31, 105, 176, 189, 240, 249, 263, 282, 303, 348, 355 ‘Umar, Muhanna Yusuf, 241 ‘Umar, Salim, 240, 241

“‘Urabi, Ahmad, 1,4, 21, 23-4, 67, 68, 74, 93, 97, 114, 125, 130, 136-69, 172, 175, 177-93, 202, 203, 208-11, 220-32, 235, 237-50, 253-62, 265-72, 275-7, 280-9, 292-305, 309-13, 316, 319, 324-5, 327, 330, 333, 334, 341-7, 350-3, 355-7, 359 Valenti, 247

Vivian 64, 66, 69, 79, 80, 85, 95, 96

Wafa, al-Sayyid, 131 al-Wakil, Ibrahim, 33, 166, 193, 206, 207, 210, 223, 303 Wallace, 257 Wasif, Husain, 168, 347 al-Wazzan, Isma‘il, 321 Wilson, 50-2, 54-6, 58-63, 66, 68, 69, 72, 80-91, 95, 110, 111, 119, 127, 132 Yakan, family, 103, 331, 358 Yakan, Ahmad, 19, 223, 334 Yakan, Da’ud, 151, 153, 161, 164 Yakan, Haidar, 102, 164, 167, 330, 343, 358 Yakan, Ibrahim, 19 Yakan, Khalil, 102, 168, 208 Yakan, Mansur, 102, 223, 330, 343 Yamani, ‘Ali, 121, 338

Yawir, ‘Ali, 276 ; Yusri, Isma‘il, 121 Yusuf, Alfi, 141, 149 Yusuf, ‘Ali, 188, 274 Yusuf, Hanna, 83 Yusuf al-Hanbali, 355 Zafir, Muhammad, 244

Zaghlul, Sa‘d, 1, 105, 125, 131, 303, 332 Zainab Hanum, 248 Zaki, Ibrahim, 277

Zaki, Muhammad, 28, 92, 167, 191, 208, 330, 358

ZOla, S.A., LO6 Zuhndi, Isma‘il, 182 Zuhrab Bey, 301

al-Zumr, ‘Amir, 25, 33

SUBJECT INDEX

ab*adiya, 26, 27, 81 Alexandria, ‘massacre’ of, 250 Armenians, 39, 59, 320

class, @lite, dhawat, definition, 26; previleged class, definition, 36, 41; see also notables

Commission Supérieure d'Enguéte, 49-56, 58

Conseil d'Etat, 94, 202 constitutionalism, definition, 5 Copts, 38-9, 263-4 corvée, 37, 81, 118, 128, 133, 134, 221 division of powers, 167, 171-2

Europeans in Egypt, 39-40 European officials in Egypt, 218-221, 353-4 freemasonry, 106-7, 326

al-Jam‘iya al-Khairiya al-Islamiya, 125, 132, 349

Jam*iyat Hilwan, 123-7 Jam*iyat al-Magasid al-Khairiya, 223 JamSiyat Misr al~Fatat, 112-14 Jam*iyat Shubban al-Iskandariya, 223 Jews, 39°

jyiftlik, 18-19

Jihad, call to, 263, 283, 287-9 Joint Note, 8 Jan. 1881, 202-3 Joint Note, 25 May 1882, 239

khariji land, 28, 46 Law of Liquidation, 132 Ligue Patriotique Egyptienne, 303-4 al-Majlis al-Khususi, 14 Majlis (Shura) al-Nuwwab, 14-18, 25, 74-87, 94, 95, 192-208, 210-22, 235-9, 270, 351, 357 Manifesto of the Egytian National Party, 120-3 mercenaries, 279 ‘ministerial responsibility', 56-7, 201, 212 Mixed Courts (Tribunaux Mixtes), 39, 40, 48, 74, 133, 281 mudirs, autochthonous, 24-5 Mugabala, 44-7, 61, 75-6, 82, 87, 91, 118, 127-9, 132, 133, 218, 336

nation, Arab, 173-4 National Party, 120-7, 328-9; Programme, 187-8 notables, 28-36, 240-3, 262-5, 270-3

nationalism, definition, 6

Officer Corps, conflict in, 135-43

386 EGYPT. FOR THE EGYPTIANS ‘ officers, autochthonous, 23-24, 226-9; social situation, 63, 65-6, 135, 145-6, 152; ‘secret society' of, 325-6, 329

pan-Islamicism in press, 178, 179-81 press, 108-112, 178-82, 224-5, 335 Abu Naddara, 109, 113, 172, 334 al-Ahram, 109, 178, 179, 285, 335 al-‘*Asr al-Jadid, 112 al-Burhan, 159, 178, 179 l'Egypte, 181, 335 Egyptian Gazette, 279, 338 al-Fustat, 279 al-Hijaz, 178, 180, 181, 349 al-Iskandariya, 179 al-I*tidal, 349 La Jeune Egypte/Misr al-Fatat, 114 al-Mahrusa, 112, 178, 179, 225 Mir’at al-Sharg, 109, 112 Misr, 109, 111, 112, 178, 179, 333 Misr al-Qahira, 333 Moniteur Egyptien, 3, 225, 237 al-Mufid, 178, 180, 181, 225, 237, 279 Nuzhat al-Afkar, 108 Le Phare d'Alexandrie, 3, 97, 107, 129, 276 Le Progrés Egyptien, 108 La Réforme, 112, 129 Sada al-Ahram, 335

al-Safir, 279 al-Ta’if, 178, 211, 224, 225, 237, 284, 286, 350 al-Tankit wa al-Tabkit, 178, 181, 185, 349, 350 al-Tijara, 109, 110, lll, 112, 333

Wadi al-Nil, 108 al-Waga’i* al-Misriya, 3, 131 al-Watan, 110, 111, 178, 179, 335 provincial administration in summer 1882, 275-8 refugees in summer 1882, 279-80

republic, ideaof, 356

revolution, definition, 5-6 ruling class, definition, 9-1l, 21-2 ruznama, 47, 73, 76, 91, 115

sarraf, 38 shura, principle of, 7, 15, 131, 170, 172, 180, 196, 215

Syrians, 39 taxes, 82-3, 115-20 Tunisia, influence of French invasion of, 159, 173, 180, 186, 187, 203, 242, 244 Turco-Circassians in Egypt, 22-3

S‘uhda, 26 :

Sulama’, 302, 189-90, 359 *‘umdas, 32-6, 216-17, 320 Union de la Jeunesse Egyptienne, 112-14

S‘ushuri land, definition, 28 “ushuri land, surtax on, 91, 118, 128 ‘usurers', 40, 73, 117, 282

usya, 26

village shaikhs, 34-6, 319-20