Education in the Age of Misinformation: Philosophical and Pedagogical Explorations 3031258703, 9783031258701

Citation preview

Education in the Age of Misinformation Philosophical and Pedagogical Explorations Edited by Lana Parker

Education in the Age of Misinformation

Lana Parker Editor

Education in the Age of Misinformation Philosophical and Pedagogical Explorations

Editor Lana Parker Faculty of Education University of Windsor Windsor, ON, Canada

ISBN 978-3-031-25870-1    ISBN 978-3-031-25871-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25871-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1 Education  in the Age of Misinformation: An Introduction  1 Lana Parker 2 Beyond  “Fake News”: Misinformation Studies for a Postdigital Era  9 Paul Cook 3 Methodological  Pluralism and the Pursuit of the Public Good 33 Peter Kelly and Susann Hofbauer 4 Digital  Existence and Its Impossible Education and Democracy 55 Steven Zhao 5 Adorno’s  Demand: Post-truth, the Alt-right, and the Need for Antifascist Education 79 Jonathan Turcotte-Summers 6 Witnessing  the Pathways of Misinformation, Hate, and Radicalization: A Pedagogic Response 97 Vik Joshi and Amra Sabic-El-Rayess

v

vi 

Contents

7 Pedagogical  Implications of the New Information Environment119 Lana Parker, Helen Liu, and Kristy Smith 8 Can  Truth Change? Philosophical Dialogue to Foster Pupils’ Reflection About (Mis)information143 Jelle De Schrijver and Eef Cornelissen 9 Transactions  of Online Literacy: Ethical Relationality, ICT, and Critical Reading Skills in the Post-Truth Era163 Joe Stouffer, Zahra Kasamali, Matteo Di Muro, Michelle Lam, and Ellen Watson 10 Critical  Citizenship Versus ‘High Individualism’ in Education187 Kirsten Locke, Frauke Meyer, and Lydia Bensky 11 What’s  in a Tweet? How Platform Features Facilitate and Constrain Civic Discourse and What It Means for Teaching Civic Media Literacy203 Ellen Middaugh, Mark Felton, and Henry Fan 12 Learning  About Disinformation Through Situated and Responsive Pedagogy: Bridging the Gap Between Students’ Digital and School Lives225 Sílvia Melo-Pfeifer and Helena Dedecek Gertz 13 Education  in the Age of Misinformation: An Afterword251 Lana Parker Index257

Notes on Contributors

Lydia Bensky  is Research Assistant in Critical Studies in Education at the Faculty of Education and a recent Bachelor of Arts graduate of Education and Anthropology. Her research interests lie in the intersections of gender, education, philosophy, and social justice. The most recent article she has worked on examines Aotearoa New Zealand’s Performance-Based Research Fund (PBRF) and its relationship with gender equity, diversity, and inclusion in academia. Paul Cook  is Professor of English at Indiana University Kokomo, where he teaches writing, rhetoric, and digital media. Eef Cornelissen  is a philosopher and researcher at ExploRatio in Odisee University College in Belgium. She studies the role philosophical dialogues can play in media literacy and citizenship education. Jelle De Schrijver  is a biologist with a PhD in Philosophy. He is Assistant Professor at Antwerp University (Belgium) where he teaches the didactics of Philosophy and History. At Odisee University College he coordinates the research group ExploRatio. This group focuses on critical thinking and dialogue in education. Matteo  Di Muro is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Curriculum and Pedagogy at Brandon University where he teaches courses on technology in education. Prior to entering academia, he was a mathematics and computer science teacher in Canada. He is currently completing his PhD at the University of Regina. vii

viii 

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Henry  Fan  is a senior undergraduate computer science student who applies andragogy in active learning environments. He has invested in cocreating conditions to empower learners to understand and solve problems that speak to their heart. Guiding students to develop critical consciousness around civic discourse and engagement is a meaningful step. Mark Felton  focuses his work on dialogue, argumentation, and evidencebased reasoning in schools and in public discourse. His research on deliberation explores how students learn to leverage productive dialogue to examine their own assumptions and arrive at more complex, nuanced, or accurate representations of the world around them. Helena Dedecek Gertz  is a doctoral candidate and research assistant at the University of Hamburg. Her project investigates the uses of media in migration pathways involving educational projects between Brazil and Germany. Her research interests include social inequality and diversity, transnational migration, and media literacy. She is an associate researcher in the Erasmus Plus project CoMMiTTEd (COVID, Migrants and Minorities in Teacher Education). Susann  Hofbauer  is PostDoc in Educational Research at the Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg, Germany. Her focus is educational research cultures, research governance, knowledge history, and policy in education. She is a spokesperson for the Commission for Science Studies of the German Educational Research Association. Vik  Joshi is a doctoral student at Columbia University (Teachers College)  in the Philosophy and Education Program. He served on the faculty of the Bard Prison Initiative, a college-in-prison programme, and currently teaches philosophy at Fordham University. He is the Director of Research and Strategic Partnerships at Reimagine Resilience. His areas of research include theorizing on radicalization, resilience, violence prevention, and mass incarceration. Zahra  Kasamali is an Assistant Professor at Brandon University’s Department of Curriculum and Pedagogy. Zahra received her doctorate in Secondary Education with a specialization in curriculum studies from the University of Alberta. Her scholarship interests include holistic education, global wisdom traditions, intersectional approaches to education that are connected to spiritual sensibilities, Indigenous pedagogy, Sufic sensibilities, and inclusive education.

  NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 

ix

Peter  Kelly  is Reader in Comparative Education at the University of Plymouth, UK. His research focus is education policy in Europe, and he is link convenor for Network 23: Education Policy and the Politics of Education of the European Educational Research Association. Michelle  Lam  is the Director of the Centre for Aboriginal and Rural Education Studies (CARES), an applied research institute in the Faculty of Education at Brandon University. Prior to entering academia, she was an English as an Additional Language teacher in Canada and abroad. She is interested in newcomer settlement, education for anti-racism, and rural equity. Helen  Liu  is a doctoral student in Education at York University. Her research interests include the critical examination of media, adolescent development, and the study of international students. Her current research involves critically assessing discrepancies between the promotion and recruitment of international secondary student programmes, and whether student experiences accurately reflect the standard that is advertised. Kirsten Locke  is an educational theorist and philosopher. Her teaching and research interests include key thinkers and themes in continental and feminist philosophy (such as Nietzsche, Lyotard, and Cixous; affect, the sublime, infancy) and the emergence of educational ideas more generally. She is interested in working at the intersections of feminist and critical philosophies to explore issues of gender and equity in education. Sílvia  Melo-Pfeifer  is a full Professor for French and Spanish Teacher Education at the University of Hamburg. Her main research areas are multilingual (teacher) education and teaching and the use of arts-based approaches in applied language studies. She coordinates the Erasmus Plus project CoMMiTTEd (COVID, Migrants and Minorities in Teacher Education). Frauke Meyer  is a senior lecturer in the Faculty of Education and Social Work at Waipapa Taumata Rau—the University of Auckland. Her research is concerned with school improvement, leadership, and interpersonal leadership practices. Additional research interests are teacher biases and their impact on equity in teaching and learning.

x 

Notes on Contributors

Ellen  Middaugh  focuses her research  on youth civic engagement and adaptations in civic behaviours and capacities that accompany technological changes associated with the internet and social media. She works with educators to create new curricular approaches to civic engagement that better align with youth everyday practices. Lana Parker  is Associate Professor of Language Education at the Faculty of Education at the University of Windsor. She spent over a decade as a classroom teacher and administrator in Canada. Lana’s nationally funded research integrates qualitative and philosophical methods to examine the sociopolitical shifts influencing how youth make meaning in online spaces. Her other research interests include relationality, educational ethics, and the prospects for responsive pedagogy. Amra Sabic-El-Rayess  is the Associate Professor of Practice at Columbia University (Teachers College) and the Executive Director of Reimagine Resilience. She is the author of the highly acclaimed memoir titled “The Cat I Never Named: A True Story of Love, War, and Survival” which tells the story of her survival during the Bosnian Genocide. Her interdisciplinary scholarship draws from economics, philosophy, sociology, and political science to address questions of radicalization, Islamophobia, violence prevention, and resilience. Kristy Smith  is a doctoral student at York University in Toronto, Canada. Her doctoral research investigates how drama teachers conceptualize and approach intimacy in the high school drama classroom. Other research interests include youth theatre; intimacy choreography; LGBTQ lives and representation; bisexuality; writing; and literacy learning about mis- and disinformation. Joe Stouffer  is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Curriculum and Pedagogy at Brandon University. Joe’s teaching and scholarship interests intersect among Early Years English Language Arts and the interplay between teachers’ epistemic beliefs and pedagogy in literacy. Jonathan Turcotte-Summers  is a doctoral student in the Department of Educational Studies at the University of British Columbia—on the traditional, ancestral, and unsurrendered territory of the Musqueam people. A former elementary school teacher, his current research focuses on fascism, antifascism, and the function of speech in post-secondary educational institutions.

  Notes on Contributors 

xi

Ellen Watson  is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Curriculum and Pedagogy at Brandon University where she teaches courses on science education. Ellen’s research foci centre on science education, physics education, and epistemic beliefs. Steven  Zhao is a PhD student at Simon Fraser University currently studying and researching the intersections between education, philosophy, and sociology. In particular, he is interested in examining the meaning of education and democracy in relation to understanding cultural evolution through systems and complexity theories.

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 2.3 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 9.1 Fig. 11.1 Fig. 11.2 Fig. 12.1 Fig. 12.2 Fig. 12.3 Fig. 12.4

Google Trends showing the rise of “fake news” as a worldwide search term from January 2004 to April 2022 15 Three types of information disorder (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017)18 The systems axis of misinformation studies as applied to the contemporary news media ecosystem in the US 26 Examples of thinking exercises 151 A framework for the transactions of online literacy 167 Engagement by user type 212 Post-Content Distribution 213 Students’ perceptions of their own consumption of FN 236 Students’ reactions to FN 237 Sources of FN, according to the students 238 Thematic scope of FN, according to students (items follow the order in the questionnaire) 239

xiii

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 9.1 Table 11.1 Table 11.2 Table 11.3 Table 11.4 Table 11.5 Table 12.1 Table 12.2 Table 12.3 Table 12.4

Three axes of misinformation studies: communication, motivation, and systems Selection of models and strategies for teaching evaluation of information Analytic scheme for coding type of User Analytic scheme for coding content type Post-content by topic Post-content by user type Differences in engagement (retweets, likes, replies) by topic, content, and user type Participants’ demographics Students’ justifications on the need (or not) to learn about FN Best place to get information about FN How to integrate FN at school?

24 178 209 210 215 216 216 235 240 241 241

xv

CHAPTER 1

Education in the Age of Misinformation: An Introduction Lana Parker

On June 23, 2016, one of the top Google search terms in the UK was the question “What is the EU?” (Selyukh, 2016). These Internet searches largely took place in the hours after the UK held a referendum on whether to part ways with the European Union. The stakes could not have been higher, yet it seems that the voting population had not really grasped information about Brexit clearly and did not, perhaps, recognize the effect this single decision would have on their daily realities. In the months and years to come, critics and scholars would argue that the entire premise of Brexit was built on lies and dissimulation (Hutton, 2021), with efforts to convince voters to vote to leave the European Union through massive mis- and disinformation social media campaigns (Höller, 2021). In 2016, the US election was subject to the same types of concerted social media efforts to control the flow of information to voters, with scholars and journalists uncovering evidence of Russian interference, bot accounts, and “troll factories” that churned out high levels of pro-Trump rhetoric (Guess & Lyons, 2020). The last few elections in Western democracies have been plagued by similar attempts to undermine the democratic process by

L. Parker (*) Faculty of Education,University of Windsor, Windsor, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Parker (ed.), Education in the Age of Misinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25871-8_1

1

2 

L. PARKER

sowing seeds of doubt on election outcomes, cultivating viral lies about politicians, and obscuring genuine issues with nonsensical conspiracy theories. As a result, concern with mis- and disinformation, its impact on democracies, and the repercussions for public discourse have become increasingly urgent. Since 2020, the issue of mis- and disinformation has also spilled into our daily lives as ongoing developments in the pandemic spurred competing accounts of reality and sowed deep mistrust among communities. Data about the emerging pandemic was understandably both sparse and subject to change over time as scientists gained new insights into the disease. Yet, the tendencies toward political polarization and the doubts planted by years of online information pollution created deep politicization in what should have been firmly apolitical healthcare decisions. Politicians argued from ideological positions about the individual choice and freedoms to mask and vaccinate, often discounting inconvenient data or science. Motta et al. (2020) studied the early media environment and found that differing news coverage influenced people’s perceptions about the virus: Some American media, particularly popular right-leaning outlets and pundits, spouted hoaxes and conspiracy theories behind the pandemic: Sean Hannity said the virus was a fraud by the “deep state” trying to spread panic, manipulate the economy, and suppress dissent; Rush Limbaugh suggested the virus was a plot hatched by the Chinese to harm the U.S. economy; and Fox Business anchor Trish Regan told viewers that the worry over coronavirus “is yet another attempt to impeach the president” …. (pp. 335–336)

The public, already primed for disagreement, sorted their decision-making about the pandemic along politically partisan lines. The virality of mis- and disinformation became so pronounced that in 2020 WHO Director-­ General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus announced, “We’re not just fighting an epidemic; we’re fighting an infodemic” (Zarocostas, 2020). The impact of the politically polarized infodemic has had life and death consequences: In the US, recent data revealed that people living in counties that enacted mask requirements, had vaccine uptake, and implemented social distancing had lower hospitalization and death rates from COVID than those living in counties that did not (Denworth, 2022). Despite the severity of the outcomes of its promulgation of mis- and disinformation—damaged democracies and social trust, deteriorating mental health, and even, as in the case of COVID-19, death—social media

1  EDUCATION IN THE AGE OF MISINFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION 

3

environments remain largely unregulated. Certainly, there have been calls to rein in Facebook or to pressure for Twitter to de-platform users who spread misinformation or hate. In 2022, in response to ongoing concerns, Twitter introduced a feature that would allow users to report misinformation. The company also moved to remove users who overtly and repeatedly spread harmful misinformation. Famously, both Facebook and Twitter banned Trump temporarily after the Capitol riot. Yet these ad hoc measures do not represent a comprehensive solution. They leave the ever-­ expanding universe of social media and its exponential influence on our lives largely unaddressed. And so it is that as the pioneers of a new technological landscape, we will be the generation of many trials and many errors, of unencumbered growth in the name of freedom and choice, and of limitless perversion of truth, belief, and faith in systems. The solution is not really, unilaterally, within the grasp of education, nor does it rest solely in the province of legislation. Instead, as ever, we require the twin registers of learning and practice, of policy that is thoughtful about documented and forecasted harms, and of discourse that comes to recognize the quagmire of capitalist incursions. We need much thoughtful debate and advocacy to build a new technological world that can render many of the benefits of freedom, choice, and community, with at least some mitigation of the toxic manipulations of greed, desire for power, and corruption. Framed in such a macro-social, political, and economic light, one might rightfully ask: Is this complex phenomenon really education’s purview? As noted throughout the collection, complicated information issues may arise due to the affordances of technology, but technology is also mostly peripheral to the problem. The central concern is that technology has been almost wholly subsumed by capitalism and by the drive for market and information (data) dominance. The charms of Myspace pages and the early days of joining Facebook to reconnect with old friends seem like naïve, halcyon days: if we were to reminisce about them to today’s youth they would roll their eyes in the same way some among us might have rolled our eyes at comparisons of punk rock to the golden age of music and Hollywood. Indeed, I think it is this nostalgic innocence that has allowed for corporate interests and profit motives to entirely (re)engineer social media into veiled data mining and advertising sites without much regulation. It is also notable that the trend for technology as a sector follows the same model for mergers and acquisitions as any other corporate interest: burgeoning “disruptor” technology is inevitably bought by one of the major companies and cannibalized into their data mining or profit

4 

L. PARKER

schemes. Amazon has reportedly purchased 128 companies across the categories of artificial intelligence, financial services, home services social commerce, cloud computing, media production, and more (Henry, n.d.). Google has purchased at least 232 companies, including Nest, Motorola, Fitbit, and, of course, YouTube (Cattlin, 2021). Meta purchased direct competitors in the networking space, WhatsApp and Instagram. The consolidation of technology continues apace, giving these companies unparalleled and unprecedented windows into our private worlds. Which brings us back to the question: Is this education’s purview? Well, the answer is both yes and no. In light of the landscape—characterized by change and uncertainty—the concerns presented by the new information environment must be addressed in a multidisciplinary fashion. Education is but one support in what will no doubt evolve to be a suite of laws, policies, and practices. So it is that this book, Education in the Age of Misinformation, seeks to explore the significance of the changing nature of youth life—in real life (IRL) and online—and the implications for education. The book pursues various philosophical, conceptual, and pedagogical inquiries into the shifting responsibilities of education in a time of hastened change. The explorations in the following chapters notably do not seek to provide solutions in any pat or instrumentalist way. None of the authors propose more technology as the answer to the problems created by neoliberal capitalist technology. Instead, what you will find in the collection are a range of investigations into the nature of knowing, evidence, information, and identity-formation. Authors take up the relationships between what it means to form beliefs and opinions in relation to a cluttered and manipulated information landscape, and what these closely held beliefs mean for the public sphere, democratic engagement, and participatory discourse. Some of the chapters in this collection are conceptual investigations of misinformation, while others add to the literature by drawing on empirical studies. Taken together, the collection explores the nature of misinformation (and disinformation), its implications for democracies, and the opportunities, challenges, and limitations of pedagogic response. The first two chapters examine the nature of knowing in different ways. In Chap. 2, Paul Cook sets the stage for the collection with his broad overview of misinformation and his concomitant call for a meta-disciplinary approach for “misinformation studies.” Cook suggests that amidst this epistemological complexity, wrought by the shifts in communication, motivation, and systems, there is a need to engage with the problem of misinformation

1  EDUCATION IN THE AGE OF MISINFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION 

5

through interdisciplinarity. In Chap. 3, Peter Kelly presents an analysis of the drive for evidence-based education policy in England and the slipperiness of what constitutes that evidence. Taking up Bourdieu’s and Isaiah Berlin’s rejection of methodological monism, Kelly argues for pluralism in education policymaking that allows for conflict but is rooted in deliberation and inflected with an attitude of humility. The next four chapters explore the implications of the age of misinformation for democracy. Steven Zhao, in Chap. 4, outlines a normative construct of democracy premised on endless adaptive growth and argues that current iterations of social media, which entail a kind of homophilous virality, are inherently incompatible with the contestations and growth propositions of democracy. Jonathan Turcotte-Summers takes up the issue of anti-fascist education through an application of Horkheimer and Adorno’s dialectical relation to the rise of the alt-right in Chap. 5. Usefully, Turcotte-Summers also explicitly ties the current online information environment to neoliberal capitalism and, amidst proliferating misinformation, to a growing tendency toward fascism. In Chap. 6, Vik Joshi and Amira Sabic-El-Rayess contemplate the relationship between misinformation and radicalization in youth. They apply the Educational Displacement and Ideological Replacement model of radicalization to better illustrate how, especially during the crisis of the pandemic, students become isolated within their online worlds. Lastly, they explore the potential for pedagogic innovation that might be considered in response. And in Chap. 7, Helen Liu, Kristy Smith, and I situate contemporary meaning-making in what we are calling “the new information environment.” In this chapter, drawing the literature and qualitative data from our recent study of students and teachers navigating misinformation, disinformation, and information abundance, we argue that the new information environment poses threats to democracy and that pedagogic responsiveness can be effective. We employ Dewey and Mouffe to explore the ties between education and democracy and to suggest particular discursive and meaning-making opportunities for the classroom. The final five chapters emphasize pedagogical responses, with many drawing on empirical studies to illuminate possibilities for teaching and learning. In Chap. 8, Jelle De Schrijver and Eef Cornelissen conduct a study exploring the use of philosophy with children (PwC) to investigate the usefulness of this approach in tackling epistemological questions, such as what constitutes knowing and can truth change. They outline how PwC can effectively induce students to think creatively and critically about

6 

L. PARKER

abstract and difficult concepts such as fact and truth. Joe Stouffer, Zahra, Kasamali, Matteo Muro, Michelle Lam, and Ellen Watson use their pilot study with teachers’ pedagogical implications of the online environment as a frame to bring together questions of ethical relationality, critical literacies, and online engagement in Chap. 9. They suggest that there is a pedagogical imperative to teaching at the intersection of the ethico-ontological, critical literacies, and ICT. In Chap. 10, Kirsten Locke, Frauke Meyer, and Lydia Bensky draw a connection between the pandemic, misinformation, and the contemporary emphasis on high individualism to paint a picture of the increasing tensions between individualism and collectivism, and the implications for citizenship education. Ellen Middaugh, Mark Felton, and Henry Fan, in Chap. 11, take a deep dive into one of the key platforms in today’s social media environment: Twitter. Through an analysis of issues relevant to youth, the authors trace the complexities inherent to the platform and offer educators insight into how to integrate Twitter as a means of critical analysis and deliberation of civic discourses. And finally, in Chap. 12, Helena Dedecek Gertz and Silvia Melo-Pfeifer draw on their empirical study of how students in Germany interact with “fake news” through an ever-expanding information environment. In particular, the authors are guided by the growing need to develop responsible social media use in a time of polarization, and the desire to establish teaching tools that can enhance critical engagement with misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation. One of the questions that readers may be left with as they consider the various perspectives presented in this collection is whether any pedagogical response will be sufficient to stem the tide of anti-democratic sentiment, discourse, and practice in the new information environment. For my part, I argue that education can do what it does in its most perfect iterations: offer a foundation for the development of critical skills against a backdrop of exposure to multiple perspectives. That is, it can only furnish students with opportunities to come up against conflict, to rehearse discursive tools in the spirit of deliberation, and to become conscious of their affective reactions to disagreement. It can shatter the silo of student online life cleaved from their IRL experiences by inviting student online worlds into the heart of the classroom. It can critically and consistently trouble the taken-for-granted and superficial appearances of neutral technologies, unmasking profit and power motives. Despite these rich educational opportunities and—I would argue—educational responsibilities, it has to be recognized that even effective study in schools is insufficient.

1  EDUCATION IN THE AGE OF MISINFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION 

7

More thorough legal, social, and political interventions need to be enacted to buttress the foundations that good, ethical, responsive pedagogy offers.

References Cattlin, R. (2021, August 26). Google’s biggest acquisitions: What does Google own? Forex.com. https://www.forex.com/enca/market-analysis/latest-research/ google-acquisition-history/ Denworth, L. (2022, July 18). People in Republican counties have higher death rates than those in Democratic counties. Scientific American. https://www. scientificamerican.com/article/people-­in-­republican-­counties-­have-­higher-deathrates-­than-­those-­in-­democratic-­counties/ Guess, A. M., & Lyons, B. A. (2020). Misinformation, disinformation, and online propaganda. In N. Persily & J. A. Tucker (Eds.), Social media and democracy (pp. 2–33). Cambridge University Press. Henry, Z. (n.d.). Amazon has acquired or invested in more companies than you think--at least 128 of them. INC. https://www.inc.com/magazine/201705/ zoe-­henry/will-­amazon-­buy-­you.html Höller, M. (2021). The human component in social media and fake news: The performance of UK opinion leaders on Twitter during the Brexit campaign. European Journal of English Studies, 25(1), 80–95. Hutton, W. (2021, June 27). The case for Brexit was built on lies: Five years later, deceit is routine in our politics. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian. com/commentisfree/2021/jun/27/case-­for-­brexit-­built-­on-­lies-­five-­years-­laterdeceit-­is-routine-­in-­our-­politics Motta, M., Stecula, D., & Farhart, C. (2020). How right-leaning media coverage of COVID-19 facilitated the spread of misinformation in the early stages of the pandemic in the U.S. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 53(2), 335–342. Selyukh, A. (2016, June 24). After Brexit vote, Britain asks Google: ‘What Is the EU?’ NPR. https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/06/24/480949383/britains-­google-­searches-­for-­what-­is-­the-­eu-­spikeafter-­b rexit-­v ote Zarocostas, J. (2020). How to fight an infodemic. The Lancet, 395(10225), 676.

CHAPTER 2

Beyond “Fake News”: Misinformation Studies for a Postdigital Era Paul Cook “Let us not talk falsely now. The hour is getting late.” Bob Dylan, “All Along the Watchtower”

We face an epistemological crisis that is vast in its scope, complex in its subtleties, and global in its reach. If we are going to truly move the needle on the problem of mis- and disinformation, it’s going to take a meta-­ disciplinary approach, one that can adequately account for the complexity of digital media and information ecosystems, the changing nature of institutions (including universities), the rapidly shifting dynamics of trust and authorship and how we evaluate information, and even the mercurial nature of our digital systems themselves. Like our physical environs, the postdigital media landscape has in the last three decades become polluted in ways that threaten the health and sustainability of our most essential infrastructures in government, science, technology, healthcare, education, and media (Phillips & Milner, 2021). In the absence of basic, shared assumptions about how the world works and factbased understandings of natural and social phenomena—supported by

P. Cook (*) Indiana University Kokomo, Kokomo, IN, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Parker (ed.), Education in the Age of Misinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25871-8_2

9

10 

P. COOK

research and guided by evidence-based best practices and sound interpretations—humanity is at a distinct disadvantage, rudderless on a sea of misinformation, conspiracy theories, propaganda, mis-framed and misleading contexts, motivated reasoning, cognitive dissonance, partisan talking points, bad memes, and other half-baked digital flotsam. For the academics, researchers, journalists, and others who work on what I propose in this chapter to call misinformation studies, the multitude of terms and frames for calling out misinformation in its various forms contributes to the richness of this area in ways that, for all its conceptual diversity and vitality, can be cumbersome for interdisciplinary work (Calo et al., 2021; Educause, 2019; Feerrar, 2019). Even within the relatively narrow confines of academia, research on problematic information cuts across disciplinary boundaries and pries open methodological siloes. Researchers in disciplines as far flung as biomedical informatics (Dunn et al., 2021), behavioral science (Molina et al., 2021), online education (Huang, 2021), media literacy (Hobbs & McGee, 2014), data science (boyd, 2017), history of education (Wineburg & McGrew, 2017), internet studies (Phillips & Milner, 2021), software studies (Bratton, 2015), and many others are part of the larger ecosystem of scholars and researchers engaged in studying misinformation and its polluting effects. Misinformation may be the multidisciplinary phenomenon of our era; it demands a meta-disciplinary response. This chapter adopts a zoomed-out perspective that brings these disparate fields and approaches together under the single meta-disciplinary heading of misinformation studies. First, I discuss the limitations of our current digital media literacy efforts and provide a brief history of what was and is still (stubbornly) called “fake news.” The idea is to show how the sheer complexity, diversity, and scale of misinformation have been reduced to an obsessive focus on the “fake news” frame (Phillips, 2020). Further, when it comes to potential solutions, neoliberalism places the onus on the individual (much as we do with climate change), which translates into fact-checking workshops, lists of trusted resources, library sessions on information literacy, and other one-offs (boyd, 2018; Zimdars, 2020). The second overarching goal of this chapter is to call for the meta-­ disciplinary study of misinformation, as well as to show how and why misinformation studies must function as a meta-discipline to meet the epistemological challenges of today.

2  BEYOND “FAKE NEWS”: MISINFORMATION STUDIES FOR A POSTDIGITAL… 

11

The Limits of Literacy: From Literacy to Ecology Citing 2017 as an especially active year for media literacy efforts, Bulger and Davison (2018) write that since the 2016 US presidential election, “[m]edia literacy has become a center of gravity for countering fake news, and a diverse array of stakeholders—from educators to legislators, philanthropists to technologists—have pushed significant resources toward media literacy programs” (p. 2). Fister (2021a) laments the fact that even after 50-plus years of media literacy, digital literacy, news literacy, civic literacy, and information literacy in the educational curricula of the US and the Global North, a significant number of people still reject “credible journalist institutions” while “embracing disinformation” in all its various and sundry forms. Why has all this media literacy failed to produce citizens who can adequately separate fact from fiction, truth from lies, reality from Donald Trump’s fraudulent claims about a “stolen” election, or the richly bogus mythology of QAnon adherents? The problem, Fister (2021b) charges, is that traditional approaches to media literacy have tended to treat students as naïve consumers of information who, if properly trained, can learn how to pick high-quality information sources for a particular task, not unlike a savvy shopper in the produce aisle. Caulfield’s (2019) SIFT technique, based on pioneering research on the efficacy of fact-checking and lateral reading by Wineburg and McGrew (2017), embodies this approach, as do other media literacy efforts aimed at making students more mindful consumers of information and news. SIFT, which stands for “Stop, Investigate the source, Find better coverage, and Trace the original context,” connotes the act of carefully picking through a range of information options to find the best in the bunch (Caulfield, 2019). Bulger and Davison (2018) note how at the center of media literacy education is an emphasis on strengthening the interpretive capacities of the individual information consumer; they write that “most trainings focus on individual responsibility, rather than the roles of the community, state, institutions, or developers of technologies” (p. 3). Mihailidis (2019) has also argued persuasively for enhancing the role of the community in media literacy curricula. Another drawback to fact-checking approaches is that “canned classroom situations don’t necessarily transfer to more complex realities,” and they often fail to consider the larger media ecology that surrounds and sustains the problem of fake news (Fister, 2021b). Cloud (2018) argues that fact-checking and debunking approaches miss the mark because they

12 

P. COOK

resort to a narrow version of empiricism (i.e., whether a given claim or headline is true or false) and thus not only fail to account for the lasting complexity of the story or issues but also miss an opportunity to embrace that complexity. Fact-checkers set up an epistemic baseline of “fact” versus “falsehood,” in other words, that remains “committed to debunking at the epistemic level” (Cloud, 2018, p. 57). This attitude has become amplified to something of a refrain in recent years in the scholarly literature on rethinking the role of media literacy (boyd, 2018; Mason & Metzger, 2012; Mihailidis, 2018; Stoddard, 2014; Zimdars, 2020). Mason et  al. (2018), in their review of recent approaches to media literacy, suggest that if “fake news is simply treated as an add-on to an existing media literacy curriculum, teachers will merely create exercises that will help students determine whether a particular story can be considered fake or not” (p. 7). A report released by Educause (2019) confirms this limitation and points to the ancillary nature of digital literacy in the curriculum: While many institutions have begun to pay more attention to digital literacies, that focus remains peripheral at most institutions, with such considerations often relegated to elective rather than core courses or to first-year programs, where they are often given short shrift… Most institutions do not have formal programs or requirements for cultivating digital literacy. Many faculty have yet to grasp the full importance of digital literacies, and some faculty themselves lack the kinds of digital literacies that colleges and ­universities need to teach. In general, academic departments have not yet taken “ownership” of digital literacies and have not yet developed scholarship that integrates this line of study into specific disciplines. Further work is needed to inculcate digital literacies across institutions and educational programs, while avoiding the potentially overwhelming proliferation of literacies … that are often siloed in meaning and by discipline.

Fact-checking efforts also tend to be trapped in time and isolated like a specimen on a slide. They are mere snapshots of far more elaborate, complex movements. In a postdigital environment, where our digital tools and interfaces have become ineluctably enmeshed in our lives such that we no longer see or even think of them, except perhaps in “emergency” situations where they are suddenly and conspicuously absent, the digital is all around us, continuously and osmotically influencing how we understand phenomena and orient ourselves to the world (Berry & Dieter, 2015). This ubiquity of the digital is what scholars mean by “postdigital,” not that we have moved beyond the digital, as if digital technologies and

2  BEYOND “FAKE NEWS”: MISINFORMATION STUDIES FOR A POSTDIGITAL… 

13

media were somehow a thing of the past. (For more on the postdigital, see Cramer, 2015, and Hodgson, 2019.) Canned classroom exercises in fact-checking, debunking, and source identification also tend to fall short of complex epistemological reality awaiting students outside the classroom (Bulger & Davison, 2018; Fister, 2021b; Phillips, 2020; Zimdars, 2020). How can we prepare students for a postdigital media landscape that is only getting more complex in terms of communication, motivation, and systems? Nichols and LeBlanc (2021) point out how challenges like “fake news” present “themselves as discrete problems, amenable to fixed, representational solutions (e.g., lateral reading, ideology critique, or counter-messaging),” when in fact they are “indivisible from the material, technical, and economic concerns that underwrite them” (p. 396). Zimdars (2020), like Cloud (2018), charges that “fact-checkers miss the point” because they tend to highlight “specific, incorrect bits of information rather than engaging with the complexities of truth and falsehood, how ‘knowledge functions in service of power,’ and ‘who gets to shape facts for public sense making’” (p. 367). To illustrate the complexity of the misinformation problem and why I believe a meta-disciplinary approach is needed, I now turn to a brief history of “fake news.”

A Brief History of “Fake News” The web has long been rife with rumors, hoaxes, parodies, satire, urban legends, pranking, trolling, and other online hijinks (Phillips & Milner, 2017). Before viral videos, deep fakes, TikTok rumors, and algorithmic manipulation, internet culture of the 1990s and early aughts (or “Web 1.0”) was already teeming with bulletin board users, newsgroup junkies, and chain emailers eagerly spreading information of questionable import and dubious veracity. Snopes.com has been referencing and archiving internet flotsam since 1994. All of this is to say that fakery and falsehoods are at least as old as the internet. Indeed, they are much older. What we now call “fake news” has been around for centuries (O’Connor & Weatherall, 2019; Soll, 2016). Merriam-Webster Dictionary traces the etymology of the phrase to the 1890s, noting that before then the adjective “fake” was seldom used. (The phrase “false news,” however, goes back to the sixteenth century to describe phony news reports.) Schudson and Zelizer (2017) note that as recently as the turn of the twentieth century, journalism textbooks

14 

P. COOK

recommended “strict accuracy about the ‘essential’ facts of a story while taking a tolerant attitude toward pure invention when it came to ‘non-­ essentials.’” Schudson (1978) argues that it was not until the 1920s— barely a century ago—that “objectivity” became the rallying cry for journalistic integrity that it is today. The 2016 presidential election made “fake news” a household phrase. Schudson and Zelizer (2017) describe the term as having “landed in the US lexicon in 2016 as if it had arrived from Mars in a flying saucer, without precedent, without lineage” (p. 1). In the immediate aftermath of an election that Politico called the “biggest upset in US history” (Goldmacher & Schreckinger, 2016), Trump’s defeat of Hillary Clinton was unexpected, and in the months leading up to the 2016 election, he led what many viewed as an unconventional campaign. With this background in mind, it makes sense that the furor over “fake news”—that is, fabricated stories on contemporary political events disguised as legitimate reportage and distributed with the intent to deceive— became a near-constant theme among corporate media and other news outlets in the weeks and months immediately following Trump’s historic win. The earliest reports were of Macedonian teenagers cranking out patently phony news stories to fuel their hard partying ways (Silverman & Alexander, 2016; Smith & Banic, 2016). But the focus soon shifted to homegrown creators fabricating propaganda and outright lies from the comfort of their suburban enclaves (Sydell, 2016), to “how could this happen?” research reports and think pieces on the fragility of our existing journalistic norms and the culpability of corporate media networks in squandering the trust of the American people (Hedges, 2016; Kavanagh & Rich, 2018). As 2016 dwindled to a close and the election post-­mortems piled up, the public learned about such nefarious disinformation campaigns as #Pizzagate, Cambridge Analytica, Russian dezinformatsiya, Twitter bots, and phony online newspapers. Fake news had entered the lexicon of ordinary Americans; by early 2017, as Trump prepared to take office, McNair (2018) notes that the term “had become ubiquitous in the globalized public sphere” (p. 6). In fact, 2017 might well be considered the year of “fake news,” and not only because Collins Dictionary announced it the official “Word of the Year.” In mid-2016, few ordinary Americans were aware of the term, as data from Google Trends that measures web searches suggest (see Fig. 2.1). And many who had heard of fake news associated it with satirical “news” sites like The Onion or TV shows such as The Colbert Report and

2  BEYOND “FAKE NEWS”: MISINFORMATION STUDIES FOR A POSTDIGITAL… 

15

Fig. 2.1  Google Trends showing the rise of “fake news” as a worldwide search term from January 2004 to April 2022

The Daily Show. But for all its sudden ubiquity in the months after the 2016 election, by early 2017 there was already a sense that “fake news” had jumped the shark and outlived its usefulness as a term. Writing in the Washington Post just a couple of months after the election, Sullivan (2017) noted presciently that even though “the term hasn’t been around long, its meaning already is lost.” In a widely shared article, boyd (2017) expressed a similar feeling, arguing that “no one can even agree on a definition of ‘fake news,’ even though a ridiculous number of words are being spent trying to define it.” Wardle (2017) hypothesized that “the reason we’re struggling with a replacement is because this is about more than news, it’s about the entire information ecosystem.” Calling it a “vague and ambiguous term,” Zuckerman (2017) stated that one of the problems with “fake news” is how it is used as a stand in “that spans everything from false balance (actual news that doesn’t deserve our attention), propaganda (weaponized speech designed to support one party over another), and dezinformatsiya (information designed to sow doubt and increase mistrust in institutions).”

16 

P. COOK

For boyd (2017), fake news had become little more than a convenient “frame … used to highlight every form of problematic content, including both blatantly and accidentally inaccurate information, salacious and fear-­ mongering headlines, hateful and incendiary rhetoric produced in blogs, and propaganda of all stripes (propagated by the state and other interests).” The real problem, boyd (2017) argued, was not so much the blatant “fake news”-as-disinformation that sucked all the oxygen out of the room—what Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) call the “‘Pope endorses Trump’-type news sites” (p. 17)—but factually true content presented in a biased or mis-framed way, thereby “encouraging folks to make dangerous conclusions that are not explicitly spelled out in the content itself.” Moreover, though many at the time were calling on Google and Facebook and other tech giants to take a larger role in staunching the fake news wound, boyd (2017) sought to problematize technocratic “Band Aid” solutions to what is, in essence, a cultural problem, “one … shaped by disconnects in values, relationships, and social fabric.” While “fake news” was enjoying its 15 minutes as the term du jour, it was already well on its way to becoming a parody of itself, thus further eroding its usefulness as a term. On January 11, 2017, at Trump’s first White House media event as president-elect, Jim Acosta of CNN, in what is now an infamous exchange, asked, “Mr. President-elect, can you give us a question?” Without missing a beat, Trump shot back, “No, I’m not going to give you a question. You’re fake news.” This exchange, which lasted all of ten seconds, would crystallize yet another dimension of the fake news phenomenon: “fake news” as a weaponized term used by politicians and others in positions of power to undermine and de-legitimize criticism of them.

Information Disorder By the end of 2017, there were clear signs that serious scholars and researchers were ready to move beyond “fake news.” When interviewed for a profile piece in November, Wardle refused to even utter the phrase, calling it instead “F-asterisk-asterisk-asterisk news” (Giuliani-Hoffman, 2017). Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) prefer the more capacious term “information disorder,” which, like Jack’s (2017) umbrella term “problematic information,” they argue more adequately captures the complexity of the current moment and the pollution spreading throughout our information ecosystems. Derakhshan and Wardle (2017) acknowledge that a

2  BEYOND “FAKE NEWS”: MISINFORMATION STUDIES FOR A POSTDIGITAL… 

17

“depressing aspect of the recent ‘fake news’ panic is … an absence of definitional rigor, which has resulted in a failure to recognize the diversity of mis- and dis-information, whether of form, motivation, or dissemination” (p. 6). The term “fake news,” Derakhshan and Wardle (2017) claim, “is woefully inadequate to describe the complex phenomena of mis- and dis-­ information” (p.  6). Angus et  al. (2021) call “fake news” a “disputed term,” arguing that “much of the focus on ‘fake news’ in its various forms remains superficial, spectacular, anecdotal, and conceptual.” “Information disorder,” on the other hand, provides a clearer, more complex, and more useful framework for diagnosing our current disease with our information environments. In a comprehensive report commissioned by the Council of Europe (Conseil de L’Europe), Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) provide a nuanced framework for exploring, analyzing, and reporting on the many permutations of information disorder. First, they distinguish between three types of information disorder: disinformation (i.e., information that is “false and deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization or country”); misinformation (information that is “false, but not created with the intention of causing harm”); and mal-information (information that is “based on reality, used to inflict harm on a person, organization, or country”) (p. 20). Figure 2.2 shows how mis-, dis-, and mal-information intersect with falseness, motive, and harmfulness, where disinformation occupies the intersection of falseness and harmful intent. At the next level of their framework, Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) call attention to the three elements of information disorder, identifying the agent, the message, and the interpreter. The agent suggests questions regarding who created, produced, and distributed the information; the message refers to the content of the text or visual itself: what kind of message it is, what format it takes (i.e., deep fake video, text-based article, TikTok rumor, etc.), and other distinguishing characteristics. The interpreter is the receiver of the message, which raises questions regarding how they interpreted it, what they did with the information (if anything), and what actions they took (if any) (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017, p. 22). Finally, Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) note the importance of considering what they call the three phases of information disorder, which call attention to some basic affordances of networked media, like the ability to re-post, re-make, and re-mix media across social media and the web. The phases of information disorder are creation (the message originates), production (the message becomes a media product), and distribution (the

18 

P. COOK

Fig. 2.2  Three types of information disorder (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017)

message is shared or made public) (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017, pp.  22-23). Altogether, the information disorder framework provides a precise heuristic for thinking about, analyzing, mapping, and (ideally) acting on the larger epistemological problem of problematic information.

Network Pollution, Network Climate Change, and Deep Memetic Frames What does the “Satanic Panic” of the 1970s and 1980s have in common with the John Podesta emails stolen by the Russian government and published by WikiLeaks just days before the 2016 US presidential election? Both events, irrespective of the fact that they are separated by over three decades, depend for their success on the same set of tropes and themes, or what Phillips and Milner (2021) call “deep memetic frames” (pp. 19-21), which are lenses that shape our view of the world by directing our

2  BEYOND “FAKE NEWS”: MISINFORMATION STUDIES FOR A POSTDIGITAL… 

19

attention to specific features and phenomena. They are “the paradigms through which we viscerally experience everyday life,” and like all memes, they spread from person to person, group to group via the “persistent churn of catalyzing and stabilizing forces” (Phillips & Milner, 2021, p. 20). Phillips and Milner (2021) pull apart the threads that catalyzed the Satanic Panic of the 1970s and 1980s, documenting how this widespread cultural panic was the result of a complex constellation of social, cultural, and political forces coupled with sweeping changes to the media ecosystem, or what they call “network climate change.” First, the Satanic Panics were based on subversion myths concerning fear of an internal enemy to Christianity (i.e., the anxiety concerning the enemy that lurks within), which in turn are connected to blood libel myths that date back centuries and fears about the Order of the Illuminati and its covert influences (Phillips & Milner, 2021, pp. 21-25). Second, they show how the widespread societal panic about Satanic influences were also connected to the rise of the counterculture in the 1960s and conservative anxieties concerning communist infiltration, as well as artifacts from popular culture ranging from Rosemary’s Baby to Dungeons & Dragons to heavy metal. The point of their sweeping analysis in this chapter is to suggest that we unduly constrain our examination of the overall problem when we limit our examination of polluted information to a single frame—a fake news story that goes viral, for example, or an individual fake news consumer— rather than accounting for the underlying narratives, tropes, folklores, values, emotions, and deep memetic frames that shape and sustain network pollution (motivations), as well as the complex ecologies in which digital media are created, shared, posted, and re-mixed (communications). Information pollution is a far more complex problem than the obsession with “fake news” would allow, a problem worsened by the fact that media literacy tends to limit us to the single frame—the fake news headline or viral TikTok video parroting false claims about election fraud. Further, Phillips and Milner (2021) connect the socio-cultural elements of misinformation (the deep mimetic frames) to major shifts in the media ecosystem (systems): specifically, the introduction of read/write media (i.e., initially, home video cameras, audio recording devices, photocopies, and later computers, YouTube, and smartphones), the professionalization of the Evangelical media ecosystem (e.g., Chick tracts, Pat Robertson, Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker), and the rise of the New Right as a powerful force in American politics in the closing decades of the twentieth century (pp. 36-44). “Polluted rivers spread sludge to other regions,”

20 

P. COOK

they write, “to other ecosystems, to other water tables. Polluted networks do the same” (Phillips & Milner, 2021, p. 44). More useful for our purposes, however, is their concept of deep mimetic frames, which illustrates just how much interdisciplinary knowledge and narrative framing one needs to be able to adequately understand the socio-cultural and political forces animating today’s flows of information pollution. In the next section, I make a case for why a meta-disciplinary approach to misinformation studies is needed in both higher education and K-12 schooling.

Discipline and Flourish Misinformation studies would take seriously the systems (both technical and cultural), motivations, and communications that enable the spread of polluted information. Focusing on the single fake news story or the individual consumer of information is necessary, to be sure, but it is not sufficient and may even be counterproductive (Phillips, 2020). In the same way, expecting to unlock the secrets of misinformation through the lens of a single academic discipline may produce stunning insights, but they are likely to remain wedded to the logics of recognition that shape that discipline, thereby limiting the scope of the investigation and the potential solutions. Instead, we must focus on the postdigital ecologies—the systems, motivations, and communications—that together give shape to the misinformation crisis. Taken together, these problems impacting our information ecologies today—and by extension, the critical capacity of citizens to productively engage in democratic society and institutions—are much bigger and more complex than any single existing academic discipline can usefully envelop or fully explore. To be sure, media studies, library science and information literacy, communication studies, data science, informatics, internet studies, and a vibrant diversity of other disciplines have provided a wealth of useful background, theories, and curricula; this cannot be overlooked, and indeed, these existing disciplines form the knowledge base and already suggest the broad contours of what might become a distinct meta-­ discipline like misinformation studies. This would be an overarching discipline that could harness the critical insights of existing disciplines to re-invigorate the general education curriculum in a way that takes seriously the postdigital challenges faced by students, the general public, and institutions of higher learning. Like rhetoric, which some consider to be the original meta-discipline (Fleming, 1998; Lambert, 2001), or cognitive

2  BEYOND “FAKE NEWS”: MISINFORMATION STUDIES FOR A POSTDIGITAL… 

21

science, this would be a discipline capable of containing multitudes, of harnessing the epistemological complexity of this moment in history into a coherent project, of re-invigorating student engagement in a time of pandemic-related burnout, and, perhaps most importantly, of re-­ articulating and re-invigorating the university’s role in addressing one of the signature epistemological problems of our time. By calling itself “misinformation studies,” this meta-discipline could capitalize on the public awareness of misinformation, disinformation, and the “fake news” phenomenon and the many diverse solutions that have already been launched; by self-consciously positioning itself as a meta-­ disciplinary response to information disorder, it could harness and extend the work that is already underway across diverse areas of the academy and elsewhere, including work in metaliteracy (Mackey & Jacobson, 2011) and critical literacy skills. Crucially, misinformation studies would be conceptually and methodologically heterogeneous, gathering the “best that has been thought and said” (Arnold, 1993) from diverse disciplines and academic fields, while holding fast to a core mission and vision: mapping the contours and boundaries of the postdigital information landscape and preparing students to be digital citizens of a world forever changed—and constantly changing—as a result of its increasingly complicated and inextricable relationship to digital media. Since the late nineteenth century and the rise of the German research university as a model for US colleges and universities to imitate, the intellectual engine of the university has been the individual academic discipline. Disciplines are effective precisely because they discipline their practitioners into approaches to knowledge and problem-solving. Leitch (2003) argues that “university professors in North America are disciplinary subjects… [and] the university is a disciplinary institution in a disciplinary society” (p. 56). Part of the larger epistemological problem we are seeing today vis-à-vis misinformation is that there is no single academic discipline whose sole purview is misinformation. And indeed, what I am suggesting in this chapter is that there is not likely a single discipline that can encompass and usefully intervene in such a large problem. Misinformation is akin to what Morton (2013) calls a “hyperobject”: an entity so enormously vast that it refuses traditional approaches and solutions (e.g., climate change). For the last two centuries, the individual academic discipline has been the dominant model of knowledge-production in the university; as such, academic disciplines have carved up the academic ecosystem into separate niches and specializations. Disciplines are,

22 

P. COOK

ultimately, strategies for organizing knowledge that delimit, demarcate, and assess available knowledge through careful attention to borders and boundaries in a process that Gieryn (1983) calls “boundary-work”: where the “intellectual ecosystem [is]…carved up into ‘separate’ institutional and professional niches … designed to achieve an apparent differentiation of goals, methods, capabilities, and substantive expertise” (p. 783). Fortunately, there is a historical precursor to what I am proposing. Writing across the Curriculum (WAC) and Writing in the Disciplines (WID) approaches to the teaching of writing developed in stature in the late twentieth century alongside major changes to both the university and the role of information in society. As Bazerman et  al. (2005) illustrate, what led to the establishment of WAC/WID programs across the landscape of higher education in the final quarter of the twentieth century was a set of institutional, socio-cultural, and economic exigencies: the rise of academic disciplines and the increased specialization of knowledge, major shifts in how writing was valued both inside the academy and outside, and the gradual realization among diverse stakeholders that a single course—in this case, first-year composition—was not sufficient to impart to students the robust, discipline-specific instruction they needed to master the specialized languages and specific ways of knowing of their individual academic discipline (pp. 15–17). The required first-year composition course, which first came onto the scene in the late nineteenth century, had itself been “created in response to the literacy crisis of 1875-1885”—that is, the realization that students at America’s elite institutions were generally not proficient writers (Bazerman et  al., 2005, p.  16). As the university transformed from the classical college of the nineteenth century, with its focus on Greek, Latin, and oratory, to the specialized research university of the twentieth, it became increasingly clear that the one-off, mostly decontextualized nature of the required composition course was not going to be effective. More was needed to prepare students for the complexities of writing not only in the academy and the disciplines but also for the world of work. As the American workplace became more specialized and the economy gradually shifted from one centered around farming and industrial manufacturing to increasingly specialized knowledge work, writing took on an increasingly central role in preparing students for the workplace, citizenship, and life after college (Beniger, 1986; Brandt, 2005). The increasing centrality of writing to both the university curriculum and changes in workplaces in the US over the course of the twentieth

2  BEYOND “FAKE NEWS”: MISINFORMATION STUDIES FOR A POSTDIGITAL… 

23

century led to sweeping changes in college curriculum, such that by the 1980s and 1990s, WAC/WID programs had transformed the college-­ level teaching of writing from a backwater concern of English departments to a university-wide behemoth (McLeod & Miraglia, 2001). The institutional success of WAC/WID is predicated on two critical assumptions that gradually moved into the mainstream in the last 50+ years: (1) writing is an essential skill for academic and professional advancement, regardless of one’s chosen major or specialization, and (2) writing cannot be taught as a generalizable skill in isolation, decontextualized from the content of a specific discipline, its genres, conventions, and audiences (Russell, 1990). We have reached, I believe, the same type of institutional and curricular watershed in terms of problematic information that WAC/WID reached some 50 years ago. Therefore, misinformation studies, like WAC/WID before it, must be inaugurated in the contemporary academy as a meta-­ discipline. It would gather up a vast array of critical approaches and literacies under a single heading, blending insights from diverse disciplines, and articulating evidence-based best practices for teaching the kinds of critical media literacies—of messages, platforms, interfaces, and systems—that are needed in the postdigital era. From Plato to the present day, the question of where writing (and rhetoric) “fits” into the larger constellation of knowledge-production has animated many robust debates. Similarly, as Fister (2021b) writes of information literacy, “It’s everywhere, and nowhere.” Fister (2021b) laments “the fact that information literacy has no specific place in the curriculum,” which, at least until WAC/WID came onto the scene, could also be said of discipline-specific writing instruction. What would a meta-discipline like misinformation studies look like? In Table  2.1, I have diagrammed three axes that together would form the epistemological and methodological basis for misinformation studies: communication, motivation, and systems. The communication axis, drawing from those disciplines that are concerned with human (and non-­ human) symbolic communication, the construction of (representational) meaning in signs and symbols, would examine how messages are created, shaped, distributed, received, and acted upon. Taking representation and signification as their primary targets, this axis privileges sight and sense-­ making, flow and function, creation and production, and the way that representation works in an age of digital abundance and epistemological overload (Mihailidis, 2018). The motivation axis would take up the age-­ old question of motivation as it relates to misinformation. What are the motivations—human, algorithmic, and otherwise—that flow through our

24 

P. COOK

Table 2.1  Three axes of misinformation studies: communication, motivation, and systems Communication

Motivation

Systems

Rhetoric Communication Writing studies Graphic design Art New media Marketing English Foreign languages Critical literacy

Psychology History Philosophy Sociology Anthropology Critical theory Neurobiology Artificial intelligence (AI) Business and economics Folklore studies

Network science Internet studies Computer science Media literacy Data science Information literacy Technology studies Healthcare Non-profits News literacy

polluted information environments? In what ways are the algorithms that shape what we see on the web produced by human factors and motivations (Noble, 2018)? The systems axis would examine the underlying structures—technical, material, and ephemeral—that make possible the postdigital age and that extend our understanding of media ecology to include not only communicative practices and social contexts but also the natural world and how our material systems impinge upon it at every turn.

Misinformation Studies in Action Cloud (2018), Zimdars (2020), Phillips (2020), Fister (2021b), Bulger and Davison (2018), and others caution about the limitations of our current media literacy efforts, including fact-checking and debunking (i.e., fighting misinformation with facts), and together gesture toward how misinformation studies might bring together disparate disciplinary lenses and investments to counter the scourge of misinformation. Phillips (2020) calls out the tendency of the “fake news” frame to draw our attention to the “veracity of the text itself” rather than “the social processes that facilitate the text’s spread, or how particular stories align with the interests and biases of those sharing” (p. 57). How many times have we run up against the limits of debunking by piling facts on top of facts? Using #Pizzagate as a case study, Phillips (2020) instead advocates for “folkloric framing,” explaining that a folkloric frame “doesn’t hinge on the veracity of a given claim. It hinges on the resonance of a claim, and the ways this resonance

2  BEYOND “FAKE NEWS”: MISINFORMATION STUDIES FOR A POSTDIGITAL… 

25

aligns with participants’ individual and collective standpoint” (pp. 60–61). In other words, folkloric framing asks not “is this text/headline/news story/meme true?” but rather “what makes this text resonate with this audience?” What are the values, investments, and perspectives that inhere in this text and what can this tell us about those who are sharing it? Phillips (2020) concludes by noting that #Pizzagate resonated with the intensity that it did because of the widespread belief among those on the right that the Clintons are totally and irredeemably corrupt: “#Pizzagate thus provided a perfect memetic vessel for the idea that [Hillary] Clinton wasn’t just up to no good, she was up to the worst kinds of crimes imaginable, a feminist Satan unto herself” (p. 61). In a similar vein, Zimdars (2020) writes, “Despite fake news being part of a complex problem involving the production, distribution, and reception of various kinds of information, the majority of current ‘solutions’ to fake news deal primarily with reception and with individuals” (p.  361). Rather than fact-checking, we should be frame-checking, Zimdars (2020) argues, borrowing a concept from Cloud (2018). Frame-checking encourages us to “understand how and why information is being framed in particular ways, how it’s being used, or what emotions it inspires or values it references” (Zimdars, 2020, p.  367), whereas fact-checking keeps our attention locked on the individual text itself. Again, this is precisely where a meta-disciplinary approach like misinformation studies could intervene to uncover how knowledge works in the service of power (motivation); how beliefs are culturally, technologically, and cognitively shaped and formed (systems); and how these ideas are spread and interpreted across vast spaces and diverse audiences (communication). Figure 2.3 provides an illustration of the systems axis of misinformation studies as applied to the contemporary news media ecosystem in the US. This illustrates the complexity and nuance required to understand how mainstream news media has changed in the last quarter century and why focusing solely on the singular artifact of misinformation will always come up short. Fister (2021b) argues that any information literacy curriculum must include “an understanding of information systems: the architectures, infrastructures, and fundamental belief systems that shape our information environment, including the fact that these systems are social, influenced by the biases and assumptions of the humans who create and use them.” I would simply add that we also need to consider communication and motivation as well as critically examine the frames that make misinformation possible and potent.

26 

P. COOK

funding of news organizations, decline of local news coverage and "news deserts" (White, 2021)

information overabundance / digital plenitude (Bolter, 2019)

loss of faith in traditional institutions (Kavanagh & Rich, 2018)

political and digital polarization (Barrett, Hendrix, & Sims, 2021)

disintermediation (Spikes, 2020)

Fig. 2.3  The systems axis of misinformation studies as applied to the contemporary news media ecosystem in the US

Making misinformation the primary focus of this new meta-discipline also offers several strategic advantages beyond a more robust, multidisciplinary analytic frame. First, there is the benefit of capitalizing on the recent upsurge in interest in fake news and misinformation in the public sphere. Second, misinformation studies can also harness the institutional and epistemological authority of disciplinarity and yet still bring together a wide variety of disciplines under its wing. Third, misinformation studies can help to move media literacy from an individual concern to a community concern by emphasizing the ways in which access to accurate, credible information is essential to building healthy coalitions between people and bridging communities in the interest civic and democratic engagement. Fifth, misinformation studies can provide a common vocabulary for talking about the flows of information in our world and its effects. Sixth, misinformation studies needn’t remain a meta-discipline confined to

2  BEYOND “FAKE NEWS”: MISINFORMATION STUDIES FOR A POSTDIGITAL… 

27

higher education; students in K-12 schools could benefit from such a meta-disciplinary approach in the same way they have already benefitted from WAC/WID pedagogies in areas like critical reading and critical literacy skills. Finally, all students (and faculty, too) would benefit from an approach that uses discipline-specific content and knowledge-making practices to explore how misinformation flows through that discipline, whether biology, marketing, or history. As the epigraph that opens this chapter suggests, the hour is getting late; we are running out of time. The global pandemic provides a grim case study of just how dependent we are on getting at “the truth” in various contexts and ensuring that it is widely disseminated. As if the pandemic wasn’t enough, other epistemic crises like climate denialism, fascism, Christian nationalism, and the rise of global ethno-nationalist regimes have revealed our vulnerabilities when evidence-based understandings of reality are threatened by political posturing, highly organized disinformation campaigns, pseudoscience, and the overwhelming glut of information—good, bad, and ugly—that now comprises the web and social media.

References Angus, D. et al. (2021). “Fake news” and other problematic information: Studying dissemination and discourse patterns. Panel presented at AoIR 2021: The 22nd Annual Conference of the Association of Internet Researchers. Virtual Event: AoIR: Retrieved from http://spir.aoir.org Arnold, M. (1993). Culture and anarchy. Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1869). Barrett, P., Hendrix, J., & Sims, G. (2021, Sept. 27). How tech platforms fuel US political polarization and what government can do about it. Brookings Institute, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/09/27/how-­tech-­platformsfuel-­u-­s-­political-polarization-­and-­what-­government-­can-­do-­about-­it/ Bazerman, C., et  al. (2005). Reference guide to writing across the curriculum. Parlor Press. Beniger, J. F. (1986). The control revolution: Technological and economic origins of the information society. Harvard University Press. Berry, D. M., & Dieter, M. (Eds.). (2015). Postdigital aesthetics: Art, computation, and design. Palgrave Macmillan. Bolter, J. D. (2019). The digital plenitude: The decline of elite culture and the rise of new media. MIT Press. boyd, d. (2017, March 27). Google and Facebook can’t just make fake news disappear. Data & Society: Points. [Blog]. Retrieved from https://points. datasociety.net/google-­and-­facebook-cant-­just-­make-­fake-­news-disappear48f4b4e5fbe8

28 

P. COOK

boyd, d. (2018, March 9). You think you want media literacy…do you? Data & Society: Points [Blog]. Retrieved from https://points.datasociety.net/ you-­think-­you-­want-­media-­literacy-­do-­you-­7cad6af18ec2 Brandt, D. (2005). Writing for a living: Literacy and the knowledge economy. Written Communication, 22(2), 166–197. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0741088305275218 Bratton, B. H. (2015). The stack: On software and sovereignty. MIT Press. Bulger, M., & Davison, P. (2018). The promises, challenges, and futures of media literacy. Journal of Media Literacy Education, 10(1), 1–21. Calo, R., Coward, C., Spiro, E. S., Starbird, K., & West, J. D. (2021, December 8). How do you solve a problem like misinformation? Sciences Advances, 7(50), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abn0481. Caulfield, M. (2019, June 19). SIFT (The four moves). Hapgood. [Blog]. Retrieved from https://hapgood.us/2019/06/19/sift-­the-­four-­moves/ Cloud, D. (2018). Reality bites: Rhetoric and the circulation of truth claims in US political culture. Ohio State University Press. Cramer, F. (2015). What is ‘post-digital’? In D.  M. Berry & M.  Dieter (Eds.), Postdigital aesthetics: Art, computation, and design (pp.  12–26). Palgrave Macmillan. Derakhshan, H. & Wardle, C. (2017, December 15-16). Information disorder: Definitions. Understanding and Addressing the Disinformation Ecosystem. https://firstdraftnews.org/articles/understanding-­disinformation/ Dunn, A. G., Steffens, M., Dyda, A. & Mandl, K. D. (2021). Knowing when to act: A call for an open misinformation library to guide actionable surveillance. Big Data & Society, Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1177/ 20539517211018788 Educause. (2019, July 29). 7 things you should know about digital literacies. Educause Learning Initiative. 3. https://library.educause.edu/ resources/2019/7/7-­things-­you-­should-­know-­about-­digital-­literacies Feerrar, J. (2019). Development of a framework for digital literacy. Reference Services Review. https://doi.org/10.1108/RSR-­01-­2019-­0002 Fister, B. (2021a, February 18). The librarian war against QAnon. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2021/02/how-­librarians-­canfight-­qanon/618047/ Fister, B. (2021b, February 3.) Lizard people in the library. Project Information Literacy Provocation Series. https://projectinfolit.org/pubs/provocation-­ series/essays/lizard-­people-­in-­the-­library.html Fleming, D. (1998). Rhetoric as a course of study. College English, 61(2), 169–191. Retrieved from. https://doi.org/10.2307/378878 Gieryn, T. F. (1983). Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-­ science: Strains and interests in professional ideologies of scientists. American Sociological Review, 48(6), 781–795. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095325

2  BEYOND “FAKE NEWS”: MISINFORMATION STUDIES FOR A POSTDIGITAL… 

29

Giuliani-Hoffman, F. (2017, November 3). “F*** news” should be replaced by these words, Claire Wardle says. CNN Business. Retrieved from https://money. cnn.com/2017/11/03/media/claire-­w ardle-­f ake-­n ews-­r eliable-­s ources-­ podcast/index.html Goldmacher, S. & Schreckinger, B. (2016, November 9). Trump pulls off biggest upset in US history. Politico.com. Retrieved from https://www.politico.com/ story/2016/11/election-­results-­2016-­clinton-­trump-­231070 Hedges, C. (2016, December 19). “Fake news” in America: Homegrown, and far from new. Truthdig.com. [Blog]. Retrieved from. https://www.truthdig.com/ articles/fake-­news-­in-­america-­homegrown-­and-­far-­from-­new/ Huang, T. (2021). A review of misinformation across disciplines: Implication for online education. 10.20944/preprints202108.0511.v2. Hobbs, R., & McGee, S. (2014). Teaching about propaganda: An examination of the historical roots of media literacy. Journal of Media Literacy, 6(2), 56–67. Hodgson, J. (2019). Post-digital rhetoric and the new aesthetic. Ohio State University Press. Jack, C. (2017, August 9). Lexicon of lies: Terms for problematic information. Data & society., https://datasociety.net/library/lexicon-­of-­lies/ Kavanagh, J., & Rich, M.  D. (2018). Truth decay: An initial exploration of the diminishing role of facts and analysis in American public life. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2314.html Lambert, G. (2001). Report to the academy (Re: the new conflict of the faculties). Davies Group. Leitch, V. B. (2003). Theory matters. Routledge. Mackey, T. P., & Jacobson, T. E. (2011). Reframing information literacy as a metaliteracy. College & Research Libraries, 72(1), 62–78. https://crl.acrl.org/ index.php/crl/article/view/16132 Mason, L. E., Krutka, D. G., & Stoddard, J. (2018). Media literacy, democracy, and the challenge of fake news. Journal of Media Literacy Education, 10(2), 1–10. https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/jmle/vol10/iss2/1/ Mason, L.  E., & Metzger, S. (2012). Reconceptualizing media literacy in the social studies: A pragmatist critique of the NCSS position statement on media literacy. Theory and Research in Social Education, 40(3), 436–455. https://doi. org/10.1080/00933104.2012.724630 McLeod, S., & Miraglia, E. (2001). Writing across the curriculum in a time of change. In S. McLeod, E. Miraglia, M. Soven, & C. Thaiss (Eds.), WAC for the new millennium: Strategies for continuing writing-across-the-curriculum programs. Urbana, IL. McNair, B. (2018). Fake news: Falsehood, fabrication, and fantasy in journalism. Routledge.

30 

P. COOK

Mihailidis, P. (2018). Fake news: Is media literacy a solution? Retrieved on April 14, 2022 from: https://www.wise-­qatar.org/fake-­news-­media-­literacysolution-­paul-­mihailidis/ Mihailidis, P. (2019). Civic media literacies: Re-imagining human connection in an age of digital abundance. Routledge. Molina, M. D., Sundar, S. S., Le, T., & Lee, D. (2021). “Fake news” is not simply false information: A concept explication and taxonomy of online content. American Behavioral Scientist, 65(2), 180–212. https://doi. org/10.1177/0002764219878224 Morton, T. (2013). Hyperobjects. University of Minnesota Press. Nichols, T. P., & LeBlanc, R. J. (2021). Media education and the limits of ‘literacy’: Ecological orientations to performative platforms. Curriculum Inquiry, 51(4), 389–412. https://doi.org/10.1080/03626784.2020.1865104 Noble, S. U. (2018). Algorithms of oppression: How search engines reinforce racism. New York University Press. O’Connor, C., & Weatherall, J.  O. (2019). The misinformation age: How false beliefs spread. Yale University Press. Phillips, W. (2020). You’re fake news: The problem with accusations of falsehood. In M. Zimdars & K. McLeod (Eds.), Fake news: Understanding media & misinformation in the digital age (pp. 55–64). MIT Press. Phillips, W., & Milner, R. M. (2017). The ambivalent internet: Mischief, oddity, & antagonism online. Polity. Phillips, W., & Milner, R. M. (2021). You are here: A field guide for navigating polarized speech, conspiracy theories, & our polluted media landscape. MIT Press. Russell, D. (1990). Writing across the curriculum in historical perspective: Toward a social interpretation. College English, 52(1), 52–73. Schudson, M. (1978). Discovering the news: A social history of American newspapers. Basic Books. Schudson, M. & Zelizer, B. (2017, December 15-16). Fake news in context. Understanding and Addressing the Disinformation Ecosystem. https://firstdraftnews.org/articles/understanding-­disinformation/ Silverman, C. & Alexander, L. (2016, November 3). How teens in the Balkans are duping Trump supporters with fake news. Buzzfeed News. https://tinyurl. com/53nha8p5 Smith, A. & Banic, V. (2016, December 8). Fake news: How a partying Macedonian teen earns thousands publishing lies. NBC News. https://tinyurl. com/5n887uvc Soll, J. (2016, December 18). The long and brutal history of fake news. Politico. https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/fake-­news-­history-­longviolent-­214535/ Spikes, M. (2020). Media landscape and economics. In Media literacy in the library: A guide for library practitioners (pp.  16-19). American Library

2  BEYOND “FAKE NEWS”: MISINFORMATION STUDIES FOR A POSTDIGITAL… 

31

Association & Institute of Museum and Library Services. https://www.ala. org/tools/sites/ala.org.tools/files/content/%21%20FINAL%20Media-­Lit_ Prac-­Guide_WEB_040521.pdf Sullivan, M. (2017, January 6). It’s time to retire the tainted term fake news. Washington Post., https://washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/its-­time-­to-­ retire-­the-­tainted-­term-­fake-­news/2017/01/06/a5a7516c-d375-­11e6-945a76f69a399dd5_story.html Stoddard, J. (2014). The need for media education in democratic education. Democracy & Education, 22(1), Article 4. Available at: http://democracyeducationjournal.org/hom/vol22/iss1/4. Sydell, L. (2016, November 23). We tracked down a fake-news creator in the suburbs: Here’s what we learned. NPR. https://tinyurl.com/3mak5r86. Wardle, C. (2017, February 16). Fake news. It’s complicated. First Draft News., https://firstdraftnews.com/fake-­news-­complicated/ Wardle, C. & Derakhshan, H. (2017, September 27). Information disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policymaking. https://rm.coe.int/information-­disorder-toward-­an-­interdisciplinary-frameworkfor-researc/168076277c. White, J. (Host). (2021, Oct. 18). What we lose when we lose local news. 1A [Audio podcast]. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2021/10/18/1047045650/ what-­we-­lose-­when-­we-­lose-­local-­news Wineburg, S. & McGrew, S. (2017). Lateral reading: Reading less and learning more when evaluating digital information. Working Paper No. 2017.A1. Palo Alto: Stanford History Education Group, Stanford University. https://papers. ssrn.com/sol13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3048994. Zimdars, M. (2020). Viral “fake news” lists and the limitations of labeling and fact-checking. In M. Zimdars & K. McLeod (Eds.), Fake news: Understanding media & misinformation in the digital age (pp. 361–372). MIT Press. Zuckerman, E. (2017, January 30). Stop saying fake news, it’s not helping. My Heart Is in Accra. http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2017/01/30/ stop-­saying-­fake-­news-­its-­not-­helping/

CHAPTER 3

Methodological Pluralism and the Pursuit of the Public Good Peter Kelly and Susann Hofbauer

Introduction In this chapter we critique the evidence movement in education. Yet we do not reject the research that underpins this movement. Like all social inquiries, this research is necessarily partial, fallible and contested. Its brokers mislead, however, when they present claims authoritatively, as universal and enduring truths. And research information becomes misinformation or disinformation when, for example, policy actors inadvertently or deliberately misrepresent claims, state claims with undue certainty or relate claims to areas where they are irrelevant, when they select evidence to defend their actions. We suggest this happens frequently because actors misunderstand or fail to acknowledge the limitations of social research and the inadequacies of specific methodologies and methods. We argue instead

P. Kelly (*) University of Plymouth, Plymouth, UK e-mail: [email protected] S. Hofbauer Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Parker (ed.), Education in the Age of Misinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25871-8_3

33

34 

P. KELLY AND S. HOFBAUER

for humility on the part of researchers and those seeking to learn from social inquiries that are often messy and incomplete and raise as many questions as they answer. Late modern societies are characterised by uncertainty (Bauman, 2000; Giddens, 1990), so the search for enduring and universal truths is hardly surprising. However, we  suggest that—better than stating simple, singular solutions with uncompromising certainty— education policymakers and practitioners should seek understanding through a compassion that appreciates the vulnerability of knowers and the contingency (in time and space; in cultures, contexts and circumstances), partiality and volatility of ideas. Using examples from the English context to challenge universalist accounts of evidence, our argument has three parts. We begin by considering the tendency for participants in political debates to appropriate and politicise evidence to suit and depoliticise rather than inform their arguments; in so doing, they ignore the status and limitations of evidence. We then consider, first, the difficulties of using evidence and, second, critiques of evidence and methodological monism. Finally, we call for better policymaker, practitioner and public understanding of the standing and imperfections of evidence and a recognition of the benefits to policymakers and practitioners of drawing on a methodologically plural research base.

Disinformation and Evidence For Bourdieu, liberal states maintain social unity by emphasising shared interests and rights and claiming to work for the public good (1989–1992/2014). This is contested by actors with differing—and sometimes incommensurate—interests, priorities and values. Those with the most resources to deploy in forwarding their interests have the greatest say over what constitutes a good life or good society and how these can be realised. Settlements of these negotiations, however fragile and temporary, represent the public good at a specific time, guiding state work whilst serving dominant interests (Arnholz & Hammersley, 2013). Such negotiations have played out simultaneously in polities across the world during the coronavirus pandemic, as administrations responded to a common crisis. Kelly and his colleagues (2021) report on public debates about the reopening of schools in England in early 2020, after the first lockdown. These saw considerable polarisation between the government and chief

3  METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND THE PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC GOOD 

35

executives of multi-academy trusts1 on the one hand, and teacher unions with the support of the British Medical Association on the other, each citing different evidence in support of their positions. Science, cultural tradition and the law appear enduring and non-­ partisan, and together form part of the taken-for-granted understandings and narratives, called doxa by Bourdieu, on which consensual settlements of the public good are built (where, for Bourdieu, illusio is the belief in such fictions). They provide a stable frame for decision-making, afford a sense of certainty and security and help states maintain public confidence (Fowler, 2020). Just as legal and scientific practitioners are characterised by their ‘interests in disinterestedness’ (Bourdieu, 1990, 110–11), so those doing state work are also trusted if they are believed to work for the welfare of all without bias or undue personal benefit. This affords a relationship between policymaking and research that is complex and contested. Policymakers use research to depoliticise debates by claiming the support of neutral evidence and rational argument, whilst their opponents contest this and accuse governments of politicising research by conscripting its authority and expertise selectively and interpreting it narrowly to defend their claims (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). In this respect, two phenomena arose in the mid-2010s; ‘fake news’ is a term used by populists to imply the construction of groundless narratives that malign their allies and benefit their critics, whilst ‘post-truth’ portrays populist challengers to the mainstream as giving their subjective opinions the same status as objective facts whilst ignoring wider debates (Davis, 2017). Yet some regard such definitions as moralising, since all knowledge claims privilege some individuals and groups, and all combine evidence and opinion (Fuller, 2018). Indeed, for Ozga (2020), science, like policy, is best understood as ‘socially constructed and as shaped at least in part by the contexts of its production and by the social relations in which it is embedded’ (Ozga, 2020: 54). As such, she points to the impermanence, fallibility and fluidity of scientific knowledge claims. And just as the public good is often regarded as singular, so the scientific frame used to justify public policy is presented as universal when it aligns with dominant interests, priorities and values. Demonstrating to the public that they are reliable, trustworthy and serve the welfare of all has long been a high priority for political administrations in England (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Policy interest in 1  These are trusts that operate across several state schools, each one directly funded by the Department for Education and independent of local authority control.

36 

P. KELLY AND S. HOFBAUER

the disinterested pursuit of student well-being through evidence-based school improvement, modelled on medicine, began in the mid-1990s (Hargreaves, 1996a, 1996b). Since then, politicians’ use of apparently impartial evidence in the form of selected data or research, to justify their arguments and seek public confidence for their policies, has gradually increased. Before 2009, for example, there was relatively little reporting of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) scores in the news media in England, and it was only after 2010 that policy was justified as a response to these comparative test results. However, this included policy instigated before publication, with PISA results appropriated by policymakers as evidence to justify their already established partisan agendas (Baird et al., 2011). And despite adopting a global governance role by providing explanations for national differences in PISA scores linked to policy recommendations (Sellar & Lingard, 2014), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which oversees PISA, remains largely excluded as a policy advocate in England (Grey, 2020). In any case, experience from the pandemic suggests that public confidence and trust decline with misleading or inappropriate research use in political debate and decision-making (Kelly et al., 2021), and that such evidence is regarded as disinformation if the purpose is to deliberately lead astray.

The Rise of the English Evidence Movement in Education The growing preoccupation with evidence-based and later evidence-­ informed policymaking and practice from the 1990s was clearly aligned with changes in the nature of teachers’ professionalism towards a ‘new public management’, which emphasised explicit measures of performance, output controls, market-type mechanisms and the introduction of competition (Hood, 1991). During this time, a number of not-for-profit non-­ state intermediaries arose to make evidence of what works and examples of best practice available to school leaders and teachers to help them improve their practice (Lawn & Furlong, 2010). These included the Evidence for Policy and Practice Information (EPPI) Centre,2 founded in 1993, and, from 2008, the Centre for the Use of Research and Evidence in Education (CUREE).3 The school effectiveness movement (as opposed to school 2 3

 https://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/cms/ [Accessed 01-03-2022]  http://www.curee.co.uk/ [Accessed 01-03-2022]

3  METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND THE PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC GOOD 

37

improvement which maintained a broader perspective) turned the focus of their research from understanding processes of teaching and learning to input-output evaluations of student outcomes. Beginning with David Reynolds in the 1980s and soon joined by Daniel Muijs, later head of research at Ofsted, the English schools’ inspection agency, and Peter Mortimore, they focussed on identifying the characteristics of effective schools where pupils progress further than might be expected from consideration of its intake (Mortimore, 1991), mainly using large-scale quantitative studies seeking statistical associations. In evaluating this movement, Chitty (1997) argues its weaknesses included failing to look at the broader policy context and placing too much emphasis on progressive school management as the dynamic of change, ignoring socio-economic status and offering no substantive detail on curriculum and pedagogy. The Teaching and Learning Research Programme (TLRP) included over 60 major projects involving more than 300 researchers and ran from 1999 to 2009. Managed by the Economic and Social Research Council, this initiative was established in direct response to Hargreaves’ call for educational research to gather evidence of what works, in what circumstances, for use by teachers (Hargreaves, 1996a, 1996b) and criticisms that too much educational research was small scale, irrelevant, inaccessible and of low quality (Parsons & Burkey, 2011). Over time, the broad interest in school improvement was replaced by a more specific focus on identifying the principles underpinning efficient and effective pedagogy (James & Pollard, 2011). Then, in 2010, education secretary, Michael Gove, announced the establishment of what would become the Education Endowment Foundation (EEF). This has become the biggest funder of education research in the UK, much of it going to non-university-based researchers (Gorard et al., 2017). The EEF, whose Teaching and Learning Toolkit4 has been available to schools since 2011, remains one of the most influential evidence brokers in England and offers services in research, reviews and consulting to provide ‘better’ knowledge of what works for ‘better’ decisions about how to improve practice. It aims, amongst other things, ‘to raise the attainment of 3-18 year-olds, particularly those facing disadvantage by: (a) supporting teachers and senior leaders by providing free, independent and evidence-based resources - summaries and practical tools - designed to improve practice and boost learning; (b) generating 4  https://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/evidence-summaries/teaching-learning-toolkit/ [Accessed 01-03-2022]

38 

P. KELLY AND S. HOFBAUER

evidence of what works to improve teaching and learning, funding rigorous trials of promising but untested programmes and approaches; and (c) supporting schools, as well as early years and post-16 settings, across the country in scaling evidence to achieve the maximum possible benefit for young people’ (EEF, 2020). Such developments also influenced international organisations like the OECD (Nordin & Sundberg, 2014). Under Tom Schuller, a British academic, their Centre for Educational Research and Innovation began promoting evidence-based policy research in education in the early 2000s. It was influenced by the TLRP’s work with researchers including Stephen Gorard that explored the use of randomised controlled trials in education (OECD, 2007).

Brokering a New Science of Education Motivated by these developments, a new science of education (Furlong & Whitty, 2017) emerged in England that promised to find evidence of what works in schools to raise student attainment, through the application of rigorous research, using methods taken from medicine including systematic reviews. Its influence on practice has now overtaken that of the traditional university-based education disciplines of history, philosophy and sociology. The new science of education replaces disciplinary notions that useful and persuasive ideas set in particular value positions can be tested and contested in argument and debate and thereby refined until a consensual position is reached. Instead, an emphasis on theorisation is replaced by a focus on methodological rigour, as historical and theoretical premises are ignored. As such, evidence of what works comprises two things. First, it consists of knowledge claims based on statistical descriptions and analyses of data, including those that follow from naturally arising comparisons and from contrivances such as randomised controlled trials. Here, their statistical grounding and distance from normative social theory allow claims to appear universal and impartial, even though statistical choices are informed by values and shaped by assumptions5 (Merry, 2016). A popular variant  Indeed, measurement systems constitute a form of power by incorporating without acknowledgement theories about social change in their design (Merry, 2016). Counting things requires finding a way to make them comparable, and in the process of translating the confusion of social life into neat categories, we inevitably strip it of context and meaning. This risks hiding or distorting as much as is revealed. 5

3  METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND THE PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC GOOD 

39

compares countries, depending on their aggregate international standardised student test scores, to allow the less successful to borrow policies from the more successful, notwithstanding that, for many countries, their distance from the mean or the stability of their results over time are not significant enough to warrant such comparisons, let alone infer that they can be explained by differences in schooling (Spiegelhalter, 2019). However, advocates of evidence-led approaches, whom Hammersley (2005) calls the evidence movement in education, have not rejected all disciplinary research traditions; recontextualised knowledge claims from cognitive psychology and neuroscience provide a second more biological indication of what works. But both here and for the aforementioned statistical analyses, it is mistaken to assume that the research process has verified claims. Instead, their inductive origins mean they should be regarded as provisional pending future falsification (Popper, 1959). The learning sciences (Furlong & Whitty, 2017) constitute an interdisciplinary field, informed by the new science of education, which focuses on learning in its widest sense. Here, mostly statistical, neuroscience and psychological research are combined to design improved learning environments. Examples are Guy Claxton’s Building Learning Power,6 based largely on neuroscience, and John Hattie’s Visible Learning,7 based on a synthesis of the findings of quantitative research studies underpinned by a Piagetian frame, whilst learning sciences approaches also underpin the marketing of pedagogical programmes and resources in England such as Ark Mastery Maths,8 which is broadly based on an analysis of pedagogical approaches used in countries where student standardised test performance is highest. As well as these commercial intermediaries, brokers such as those mentioned earlier make evidence of what works and examples of best practice available to school leaders and teachers to help them improve their practice. Together, these agencies provide a form of soft governance (Moos, 2009), shaping practice by bringing together researchers with policymakers, school leaders and practitioners. The Pupil Premium policy sits within this governance context (DFE, 2010). Children from groups identified at risk of underachievement bring additional funds, which schools must spend on raising their academic  https://www.buildinglearningpower.com/ [Accessed 01-03-2022]  https://visible-learning.org/ [Accessed 01-03-2022] 8  https://arkonline.org/ark-ventures/mathematics-mastery [Accessed 01-03-2022] 6 7

40 

P. KELLY AND S. HOFBAUER

attainment, largely through evidence-informed initiatives. Published performance data allows for school comparisons based on their success with disadvantaged students, and Ofsted is tasked with assessing their effectiveness in this. A particular inspection focus (Ofsted, 2019) is how schools use research evidence to inform interventions. Hence, this approach employs both hard governance coercion through high-stakes testing and inspection and softer governance in the form of information and advice to shape practice (Moos, 2009). Whilst evidence-informed practice in education, including the work of the EEF, has been the subject of numerous defences (including broadly supportive work from Gorard et  al., 2017; Higgins, 2016), it has also been challenged through a number of substantive critiques, and it is to these that we now turn.

Shortcomings with Evidence In England, where many of the most enthusiastic European advocates of research-informed policymaking and practice in education reside and almost all studies of evidence-use have taken place, little use is made of research evidence, and evaluations of its contribution towards improving policy and practice are unconvincing. Coldwell et al. (2017) confirm that the influence of research-informed approaches on schools is limited, and despite a growing demand for evidence amongst practitioners, ‘it has proven difficult to achieve [research] evidence informed practice at a system level and the debate about how to achieve this continues’ (Nelson & Campbell, 2017: 127). Gorard (2020: 17) summarises the current position thus: Much of education policy and practice takes place without concern for the growing evidence base. Despite admonitions and encouragement to take account of research, teachers and leaders still report that evidence is a minor factor in their decisions.

A number of commentators point to limitations in the selected research, and there is recognition that using research-generated knowledge in policymaking and practice is extremely difficult (Biesta, 2007, 2010; Cain, 2015; Hammersley, 2005, 2013). Some of this stems from unreasonable expectations that arise because evidence-informed education is modelled on medicine, which often concerns physical conditions and bodily

3  METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND THE PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC GOOD 

41

characteristics, whereas education as a cultural phenomenon is more slippery. Indeed, there is concern that the medical model underpinning research evidence-informed practice is inappropriate for education (Biesta, 2007, 2010; Hammersley, 2005, 2013), and by extension Philpott (2017) warns against uncritically assuming the superiority of medical models of professional learning or relying only on empirical evidence to inform practice. As such, Hemsley-Brown and Oplatka (2005) suggest that the barriers to research use in education are greater than in other contexts because of the ‘uncertain, ambiguous nature of teaching and schooling that makes it difficult for researchers to identify clear, valid principles and findings based on hard evidence’ (2005: 24). They conclude that research utilisation in social professions is likely to be lower than in healthcare. Bourdieu offers two critiques that are of relevance here. First, he regards models that take for granted the rational actions of participants as underpinned by a methodological individualism that inadequately accounts for the social constitution of human activity (Wacquant, 1989). These, he argues, mistake largely functional analytic models for reality and substitute an arbitrary interest for the messy and contingent ways of thinking and acting of real life. By stressing individual, conscious and rational decision-­ making, they ignore shared histories, the affordances and constraints of circumstance and the unconsidered, impulsive and sometimes irrational actions that together constitute social activity. As such, their methodological individualism prevents an analysis of relationships, both between individuals and between individuals and their environments. Second, Bourdieu rejects the broader aspirations of methodological monism, ‘to occupy a transcendent viewpoint … [and] attain a position of absolute knowledge and to speak with the voice of an authoritarian reason, as the sole possessor of the truth’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 119). Instead, he advocates a reflexive position that disdains the uncritical submission to a disciplinary doxa (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Wacquant, 1989). We will return to this second point later. Others identify specific limitations to the different elements of the new science of education. Their critiques are well established and only require brief mention here. Randomised control trials and systematic reviews, the primary methods used, have been identified as inadequate and insufficient (Wrigley, 2018) because of constraints on their use in educational settings. These include difficulties with double-blinding and control groups, and concerns that outcomes have to be easy to measure, meaning that more challenging aims are neglected. Wrigley also examines problems in

42 

P. KELLY AND S. HOFBAUER

combining individual trials through meta-analyses and cites Adrian Simpson’s (2017) mathematical scrutiny of EEF materials, which points out errors in comparing effect sizes. Policy borrowing studies are challenged on the grounds that the policies and practices of the successful are stripped from the cultures, contexts and circumstances in which they were developed and make sense, and cannot readily work in their new locations without the support these contingencies offer (Biesta, 2010; Cain, 2015; Hammersley, 2013; Steiner-Khamsi & Waldow, 2012). Judged by its own standards, cognitive psychology suffers a replication crisis that leaves it open to questions of rigour and reliability (Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2020), whilst neuroscience is blighted by educational misinterpretations that have produced a new and fruitful area of scholarship into neuro-myths (Torrijos-Muelas et al., 2021). Finally, and going back to the early days of the school effectiveness movement, statistical studies continue to be criticised for using crude and unsophisticated measures, paying inadequate attention to sampling, confusing association with simple, linear causality, ignoring complex webs of causal relations and drawing strong and direct conclusions from what are at best modest and incomplete findings (Goldstein & Woodhouse, 2000). In addition, misunderstandings about the neutrality and verifiability of evidence, mentioned earlier, lead policymakers and practitioners to give greater credence to claims than is warranted. This is mirrored in the way evidence-informed approaches construct teaching as a science or technology to the detriment of the craft of teaching; the current instalment of a longstanding debate about whether teaching is better described as an art or a science. Clearly there is a case for caution when using evidence to inform policymaking and practice. Indeed, as the following example shows, there are significant dangers in relying solely on the methodological monist approaches of the evidence movement.

Brokering Misinformation: Teaching Assistants and the Case of Tower Hamlets In its role of providing research brokerage for Pupil Premium use, the EEF draw largely on a body of research by Blatchford and Webster (including Blatchford et al., 2009), to assert that teaching assistants have a low impact on high cost (EEF, 2018), viewing impact purely in terms of academic advance on standardised tests. In the EEF’s online platform, the

3  METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND THE PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC GOOD 

43

Teaching and Learning Toolkit, much of the detail of research, useful in analysing its strengths and limitations, is available at one or two clicks removed from the main website. Perhaps many users do not access this; in any case, specialist knowledge is needed to ascertain how much confidence to place in the research. As a result, a large government study (Skipp & Hopwood, 2019) recently found that, three years after numbers peaked, secondary schools in particular are significantly reducing the number of support staff they employ because of concerns about their expense in relation to a relatively low return in student scores. Behind the EEFs assertion, the Deployment and Impact of Support Staff in School (DISS) claims that ‘the more support pupils received [from teaching assistants], the less progress they made, even after controlling for other factors that might be expected to explain the relationship such as pupils’ prior attainment, SEN status and income deprivation’ (Blatchford et al., 2009: 34). The amount of support given by teaching assistants was estimated by teachers, so may vary in reliability. What is actually recorded about the support provided by teaching assistants in this study is rather broad: whether support staff were present, working with the target group, interacting with students from that group and fully attending to them. Such categorisations miss a wealth of relevant detail about the specific roles teaching assistants take and the opportunities and constraints afforded them by their workplace contexts and circumstances. Finally, progress was ascertained over the course of the year using existing standardised attainment tests; it seems reasonable to ask whether these measures are sufficiently detailed and nuanced to capture the range of difficulties students may encounter or the small steps they might be expected to take. Nevertheless, whilst accepting their statistical rigour, the findings of this study should still be treated cautiously because teaching assistants may contribute to students’ experiences and development in ways which are simply not captured by the measures of success used. In the multilevel regression model used, data is aggregated into groups. These broad categories potentially hide a degree of variation and subtlety. For example, although an earlier stage of this study descriptively maps teaching assistant diversity, associations between the age, gender, ethnicity, experience and educational qualifications of teaching assistants and their effectiveness are not explored. Similarly, the range of students targeted is also descriptively profiled in terms of their age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status and attainment, and this is controlled for in terms of the progress expected, but the significance of each factor for the

44 

P. KELLY AND S. HOFBAUER

effectiveness of working with a teaching assistant is not ascertained. Nor is there an account of who benefits most from working with a teaching assistant depending on the kinds of needs they have and difficulties they are encountering. None of this is to question the veracity of the DISS research, but all research has limitations that should not be ignored. Without attention to detail, research findings can be read in simplistic ways by policymakers and practitioners, especially when brokers do nothing to prevent this; indeed, the research representations of intermediaries can promote such interpretations (Hofbauer et al., 2020). The DISS study raises many questions; its findings provide a starting point for further detailed research such as that seeking to understand better the dynamics of student support. But every teaching assistant, context and learner is different, and so their value is better judged in situ. There are broader reasons to be cautious about research, its repackaging and its use, despite claims to neutrality and rigour. All research is contingent on social practices that involve competing interests, and there are cases where the findings of researchers who design and then evaluate interventions are implausibly positive, of those undertaking commissioned research shaping their findings at the behest of the funders or to ensure future tenure, and of unwelcome findings going unpublished (Gorard et al., 2017). Meanwhile, research brokers have an interest in presenting research in ways that make it appealing to their clients and secure their standing as intermediaries, whilst politicians, policymakers, education officials, school leaders and teachers at times use research selectively to give themselves and their positions credibility. It is such factors together which may account for the misleading soundbite, ‘low impact for high cost’. With the dominance of the evidence movement, disciplinary research is marginalised. This includes studies on situated learning and distributed expertise from sociocultural perspectives with roots in Vygotskian psychology, which challenge notions of transfer (well-known contributions include Engeström et al., 1999 and Lave, 2011) and sociological perspectives that unpack power relations and account for why school success is closely associated with students’ socio-economic circumstances, including works informed by Bourdieu. In this regard, one established strand of qualitative research using a social lens, forgotten or ignored by the evidence movement, suggests that teaching assistants can be agents of inclusion for marginalised and socio-­ economically disadvantaged students in urban schools. As members of

3  METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND THE PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC GOOD 

45

both the local and school communities, they act as intermediaries, supporting and scaffolding the engagement of students in the social processes of schooling. Reviewing research on the effectiveness of teaching assistants over 15 years ago, Howes suggested that ‘support staff do extremely important work in the spaces left by the structures and formalities of schooling. Schools are sociocultural environments, in that they are social institutions affected by and affecting a variety of cultures and cultural issues. But these aspects of impact are more difficult to speak about, perhaps because most people still lack the language to reflect on the impact of … culture’ (2003: 149). Other studies suggest teaching assistants contribute to the diversification of the teaching workforce, as schools provide a route by which parents, particularly mothers with few formal qualifications, can gain secure skilled employment compatible with raising a family (Skipp & Hopwood, 2019). Woods and his colleagues (2013) argue this process played an instrumental role in improving education in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets between 1997 and 2010. Research by Hargreaves and Shirley (2009) found that many classroom assistants in Tower Hamlets came from the local community and so could understand and respond to the contextual nuances of the students they helped teach. As one school leader reported, ‘teachers couldn’t always communicate with the Bangladeshi kids … we started bringing in the mums, teaching them English and providing them with literacy and numeracy skills and making them teaching assistants’ (quoted in Woods et  al., 2013: 32). Many of these teaching assistants went on to train as teachers, providing an effective route for schools to diversify their teaching workforce. So, whilst in 1991 just 14% of Bangladeshi pupils achieved five or more GCSEs at grades A* to C compared with 37% of White pupils, by 2013, Bangladeshi pupils achieved slightly ahead of White pupils at 64% and 60.5%, respectively; this despite Bangladeshis being one of the most socio-economically deprived groups in England (DFE/Strand, 2015). In contrast to lower achieving groups, Ofsted (2004) reported that the Bangladeshi parents they interviewed were ambitious for their children, valued education highly and provided strong support, and Sunder and Uddin (2007) identified high numbers of Bangladeshi heritage teachers in schools serving largely Bangladeshi students. Such studies suggest that the welfare of communities is well-served by diverse and representative workforces in inclusive schools. However, with their focus on the public good of efficient, value-for-money investment in instrumental approaches that are broadly effective in consistently raising

46 

P. KELLY AND S. HOFBAUER

test scores, the evidence movement neither notices such processes nor registers their social implications, asserting instead partial and imperfect findings with an undue confidence that deliberately misleads.

The Pluralist Alternative We began this chapter by discussing how research evidence can mislead and misinform when claims are deliberately misrepresented, overstated or taken out of context, and the tendency of politicians to appropriate research in order to evidence their positions when negotiating the public good. These negotiations are complicated by the number and diversity of actors involved, both exacerbated by state disaggregation and privatisation, which increases the temptation for using research to bolster arguments. However, when research use is shown to be opportunistic, it can reduce public trust in those that use it. We do not doubt that successive governments in England and their inspection agency Ofsted have remained committed to reducing educational inequality as a public good, as the Pupil Premium, the broader intentions of the EEF and revisions to the Ofsted (2019) Education Inspection Framework demonstrate. Nor do we dismiss the contribution that the evidence movement can make to educational development. Rather, we suggest, policymakers and practitioners should be careful not to mislead and wary of being misled, and that evidence misuse can be countered by increasing public understanding of the status and limitations of evidence discussed earlier. Together with greater methodological pluralism, this would also help improve evidence use by policymakers and practitioners. Both would do better drawing on a philosophically, methodologically and theoretically diverse array of research to inform the richness and complexity of professional practice. This is not simply to advocate mixed method studies, and in any case there remains a clear need for decisions made by researchers about strategy and approach to be consistent with their underpinning assumptions. Ours is a plea for researcher brokers and users to critically engage with a diversity of studies set within a diversity of traditions and employing a diversity of methods. They should evaluate studies as they learn from them, cognisant of their assumptions, strengths, weaknesses and limitations. As such, the arguments presented here support a more pragmatic (Biesta & Burbules, 2003) and pluralist (Berlin, 1969) stance towards research-informed policymaking and practice. Pragmatists recognise the practical fallibility of research. Dewey, for instance, demands more modest

3  METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND THE PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC GOOD 

47

and realistic expectations of what research can tell us and opens up the possibility of ‘a different, less authoritarian and more democratic approach to the relationship between theory and practice, science and society, educational research and educational practice’ (Biesta & Burbules, 2003: 89). This relates to public trust. Earlier, we identified how research findings are affected by the values informing the research, the assumptions and arguments made and where, when, with whom, how and how well the research is conducted, and can even vary as a consequence of decision-making during the research process. Since researchers may well emphasise different values and make numerous assumptions and decisions in their work, it is no surprise that their findings and claims often differ and are sometimes contradictory. Consequently, unless we ignore these things, we are likely to trust research and have confidence in any claims made if (a) we buy into the values that underpin the research, (b) we find the assumptions reasonable and believable and the arguments persuasive, (c) we are assured that the research has been done well and that the researchers have reported honestly the process they engaged in including the decisions they made and why they made them and (d) they allow us to predict future events and resonate with rather than contradict our experience. Isaiah Berlin (1969, 2013) also acknowledges many ways of understanding the world and peoples’ places in it, each based on different and sometimes conflicting assumptions and beliefs. This leads people to have multiple interests, some set in incommensurate values, and identify many ways of leading a good life. Hence, he asserts, there are multiple public goods, constantly in negotiation with each other, which cannot be resolved to a single unity. Instead, we must learn to live with partiality and compromise, and allow people to coexist provided they don’t prevent others from following their own path. So, although there are also many forms that a good education can take, acknowledging many public goods means embracing multiculturalism and liberal tolerance whilst rejecting authoritarian singularity and majoritarianism. Similarly, Berlin (2013) is sceptical about the attainability of certain knowledge from a single standpoint and rejects methodological monism, taking ‘the view that the methods of inquiry appropriate for different subject matters may, and do, vary with differences in these subject matters’ (Gray, 1996: 48). Interestingly, Nietzsche (Sandywell, 2012) also regards all truth claims as contingent on and the product of a person’s perspective. His perspectivism attacks the idea of essential truth and seeks to destabilise the concept of universal morality. Each position privileges some values and makes assumptions,

48 

P. KELLY AND S. HOFBAUER

leading to many ways of gaining insights and informing what we do. No one perspective can faithfully capture material, human and social complexity. Whilst Berlin provides a benign account of the diversity of values, beliefs and associated ways of understanding and being in the world, Bourdieu considers how negotiations between these and their associated interests take place so that those of the dominant are both ascendant and accepted as fair and reasonable by the subjugated (Arnholz & Hammersley, 2013). Combining these viewpoints, and in a direct challenge to the methodological monism of the evidence movement that currently dominates, it follows that (a) no single social research tradition can adequately capture the complexities of our lives and the world in which we live, as the example of teaching assistants attests, (b) all research has limitations, some as a consequence of the methodological and theoretical frames used, and (c) decision-makers should therefore be reflexive (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Wacquant, 1989), drawing on a diversity of research, whilst taking account of the assumptions and value-positions of researchers and the contexts and methods of individual studies, when evaluating knowledge claims. Hence, as Biesta and Burbules (2003) indicate, it is important that decision-making at all levels involves dialogues that draw on multiple perspectives and, to maintain public trust, that this process is open and transparent to allow public scrutiny. It is on this basis that we argue for methodological pluralism in educational policymaking and practice. This accepts the possibility of many educational goods underpinned by a diversity of sometimes incommensurate values and beliefs. And it recognises many ways of understanding education, providing a good education and being a good teacher or student, whilst nevertheless promoting an understanding and tolerance of the diverse cultural values by which people live, and the willingness to compromise needed for coexistence. This is not moral relativism; political process allows for the mediation between values, the prioritisation of some over others and social agreement on what is and is not acceptable or desirable. Nor are the benefits of some worldviews over others and the inequalities each promotes ignored. Rather, a position of methodological pluralism in educational policymaking and practice acknowledges imperfection and accepts conflict, but encourages kindness in disagreement whenever possible by promoting deliberation, moderation and generosity. Given the messiness, insecurities and uncertainties of research and the impossibility of simple, singular, universal and enduring truths, it recommends we seek

3  METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND THE PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC GOOD 

49

understanding not from authority, adversary and criticism, but through a compassion that acknowledges the vulnerability of knowers and the fallibility of ideas, and yet appreciates the diversity of insights each can bring.

References Arnholz, J., & Hammersley, O. (2013). Transcended power of the state: The role of actors in Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology of the state. Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory, 14(1), 42–64. Baird, J.-A., Isaacs, T., Johnson, S., Stobart, G., Yu, G., Sprague, T., & Daugherty, R. (2011). Policy effects of PISA. Oxford University Centre for Educational Assessment. Berlin, I. (1969). Two concepts of liberty. In I. Berlin (Ed.), Four Essays on Liberty (pp. 118–172). Oxford University Press. Berlin, I. (2013). The pursuit of the ideal. In I. Berlin (Ed.), The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the history of ideas (pp.  1–20). Princeton University Press. Biesta, G. (2007). Why ‘what works’ won’t work: Evidence-based practice and the democratic deficit in educational research. Educational Theory, 57(1), 1–21. Biesta, G. (2010). Why ‘what works’ still won’t work: From evidence-based education to value-based education. Studies in the Philosophy of Education, 29, 491–503. Biesta, G., & Burbules, N. (2003). Pragmatism and Educational Research. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Blatchford, P., Bassett, P., Brown, P. Koutsoubou, M., Martin, C., Russell, A. & Webster, R. & Rubie-Davies, C. (2009). Deployment and Impact of Support Staff in Schools: The Impact of Support Staff in Schools (Results from Strand 2, Wave 2). Research Report No DCSF-RR148. London. Institute of Education Press. Bourdieu, P. (1989-92/2014). On the State: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1989–1992. Ed. Champagne, P., Lenoir, R., Poupeau, F. and Rivière, M.-C. Trans. Fernbach, D. Cambridge. Polity Press. Bourdieu, P. (1990). In other words. Polity Press. Bourdieu, P. (1997/2000). Pascalian Meditations. Stanford, CA.  Stanford University Press. Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. (1992). An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Polity Press. Cain, T. (2015). Teachers’ engagement with published research: addressing the knowledge problem. The Curriculum Journal, 26(3), 488–509. Chitty, C. (1997). The school effectiveness movement: origins, shortcomings and future possibilities. The Curriculum Journal, 8(1), 45–62.

50 

P. KELLY AND S. HOFBAUER

Coldwell, M., Greany, T., Higgins, S., Brown, C., Maxwell, B., Stiell, B., Stoll, L., Willis, B. & Burns, H. (2017). Evidence-informed teaching: an evaluation of progress in England. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ evidence-­informed-­teaching-­evaluation-­of-­progress-­in-­england. Davis, E. (2017). Post-Truth: Why we have reached peak bullshit and what we can do about it. Little, Brown. DFE. (2010). New endowment fund to turn around weakest schools and raise standards for disadvantaged pupils. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ new-­endowment-­fund-­to-­turn-­around-­weakest-­schools-­and-­raise-­standards-­ for-­disadvantaged-­pupils. DFE/Strand, S. (2015). Ethnicity, deprivation and educational achievement at age 16  in England: trends over time, Annex to compendium of evidence on ethnic minority resilience to the effects of deprivation on attainment. https://assets. publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/439867/RR439B-­Ethnic_minorities_and_attainment_the_ effects_of_poverty_annex.pdf.pdf. Eatwell, R., & Goodwin, M. (2018). National Populism: The revolt against liberal democracy. Pelican. EEF. (2018). Teaching assistants. https://educationendowmentfoundation.org. uk/pdf/generate/?u=https://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/pdf/ toolkit/?id=149&t=Teaching%20and%20Learning%20Toolkit&e=149&s=. EEF. (2020). Our mission. https://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/ about/history/. Engeström, Y., Miettinen, R., & Punamäki, R.-L. (Eds.). (1999). Learning in doing: Social, cognitive, and computational perspectives. Perspectives on Activity Theory. Cambridge University Press. Fowler, B. (2020). Pierre Bourdieu on social transformation, with particular reference to political and symbolic revolutions. Theory and Society, 49, 439–463. Fuller, S. (2018). Post-Truth: Knowledge as a power game. Anthem Press. Furlong, J., & Whitty, G. (2017). Knowledge traditions in the study of Education. In G. Whitty & J. Furlong (Eds.), Knowledge and the Study of Education: an international comparison (pp. 13–57). Symposium Books. Goldstein, H., & Woodhouse, G. (2000). School effectiveness research and Educational Policy. Oxford Review of Education, 26(3/4), 353–363. Gorard, S. (2020). The story so far about the use of research evidence. Research Intelligence, 144, 17. Gorard, S., See, B. H., & Siddiqui, N. (2017). The trials of evidence-based education: The promises, opportunities and problems of trials in education. Routledge. Gray, J. (1996). Isaiah Berlin: An interpretation of his thought. Princeton. Grey, S (2020). PISA, the media and the governance of education policy in England and Sweden. Doctoral Thesis. UCL.

3  METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND THE PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC GOOD 

51

Hammersley, M. (2005). Is the evidence-based practice movement doing more good than harm? Education & Policy, 1(1), 85–100. Hammersley, M. (2013). The myth of research-based policy and practice. Sage. Hargreaves, D. (1996a). Educational research and evidence-based educational practice: A response to critics. Research Intelligence, 58, 12–16. Hargreaves, D. (1996b). Teaching as a research-based profession: possibilities and prospects. Teacher Training Agency Annual Lecture. https://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/ c m s / P o r t a l s / 0 / P D F % 2 0 r e v i e w s % 2 0 a n d % 2 0 s u m m a r i e s / T TA % 2 0 Hargreaves%20lecture.pdf Hargreaves, A., & Shirley, D. (2009). The Fourth Way: The inspiring future for educational change. Corwin. Hemsley-Brown, J. V., & Oplatka, I. (2005). Bridging the Research-Practice Gap: Barriers and facilitators to research use among school Principals from England and Israel. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 18(5), 424–446. Higgins, S. (2016). Meta-synthesis and comparative meta-analysis of education research findings: Some risks and benefits. Review of Education, 4(1), 31–53. Hofbauer, S., Kelly, P., & Beck, A. (2020). Between inclusion and improvement: Evidence and the politics of teaching assistants in England. In D.  Kemethofer, J.  Reitinger, & K.  Soukup-Altrichter (Eds.), Vermessen? Zum Verhältnis von Bildungsforschung, Bildungspolitik und Bildungspraxis (pp. 211–223). Waxmann. Hood, C. (1991). A Public Management for all Seasons? Public Administration, 69(1), 3–19. Howes, A. (2003). Teaching reforms and the impact of paid adult support on participation and learning in mainstream schools. Support for Learning, 18(4), 147–153. James, M., & Pollard, A. (2011). TLRP’s ten principles for effective pedagogy: rationale, development, evidence, argument and impact. Research Papers in Education, 26(3), 275–328. Kelly, P., Hofbauer, S., & Gross, B. (2021). Renegotiating the public good: Responding to the first wave of Covid-19  in England, Germany and Italy. European Education Research Journal, 20(5), 584–609. Lave, J. (2011). Apprenticeship in Critical Ethnographic Practice. University of Chicago Press. Lawn, M., & Furlong, J. (2010). The disciplines of education in the UK: Between the ghost and the shadow. In J.  Furlong & M.  Lawn (Eds.), Disciplines of Education. Their role in the future of education research (pp. 1–12). Routledge. Lewandowsky, S., & Oberauer, K. (2020). Low replicability can support robust and efficient science. Nature Communications, 11(358), 1. https://www. nature.com/articles/s41467-­019-­14203-­0 Merry, S.  E. (2016). The Seductions of Quantification: Measuring human rights, gender violence, and sex trafficking. University of Chicago Press.

52 

P. KELLY AND S. HOFBAUER

Moos, L. (2009). Hard and Soft Governance: The journey from transnational agencies to school leadership. European Educational Research Journal, 8(3), 397–406. Mortimore, P. (1991). School effectiveness research: Which way at the crossroads?'. School Effectiveness and School Improvement, 2(3), 213–229. Nelson, J., & Campbell, C. (2017). Evidence-informed practice in education: Meanings and applications. Educational Research, 59(2), 127–135. Nordin, A., & Sundberg, D. (2014). Transnational policy flows in European education: The making and governing of knowledge in the educational policy field. Symposium Books. OECD. (2007). Evidence in Education: Linking Research and Policy. OECD Publishing. Ofsted (2004). Achievement of Bangladeshi heritage pupils. https://dera.ioe.ac. uk/4836/7/Achievement%20of%20Bangladeshi%20heritage%20pupils%20 (PDF%20format)_Redacted.pdf. Ofsted (2019). The education inspection framework, May 2019. https://assets. publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/801429/Education_inspection_framework.pdf. Ozga, J. (2020). Elites and Expertise: The changing material production of knowledge for policy. In G.  Fan & T.  Popkewitz (Eds.), Values, Governance, Globalization, and Methodology, Volume 1 (pp. 53–69). Springer Open. Parsons, D., & Burkey, S. (2011). Evaluation of the Teaching and Learning Research Programme (Second Phase): Final Report. HOST Policy Research. Philpott, C. (2017). Medical models for teachers’ learning; asking for a second opinion. Journal of Education for Teaching, 43(1), 20–31. Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2011). Public management reform, a comparative analysis: New public management, governance, and the neo-Weberian state (Third Edition). Oxford University Press. Popper, K. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Routledge. Sandywell, B. (2012). Perspectives, Philosophical and ‘Perspectivism’. Dictionary of Visual Discourse: A Dialectical Lexicon of Terms. London. Routledge, 458–459. Sellar, S., & Lingard, B. (2014). The OECD and the expansion of PISA: New global modes of governance in education. British Educational Research Journal, 40(6), 917–936. Simpson, A. (2017). The misdirection of public policy: Comparing and combining standardised effect sizes. Journal of Education Policy, 32(4), 450–466. Skipp, A., & Hopwood, V. (2019). Deployment of teaching assistants in schools.. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/812507/Deployment_of_teaching_assistants_ report.pdf. Spiegelhalter, D. (2019). The art of statistics: Learning from data. Pelican.

3  METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND THE PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC GOOD 

53

Steiner-Khamsi, G., & Waldow, F. (2012). World yearbook of education 2012: Policy borrowing and lending in education. Routledge. Sunder, D., & Uddin, L. (2007). A comparative analysis of Bangladeshi and Pakistani educational attainment in London secondary schools. InterActions: UCLA Journal of Education and Information Studies, 3(2), 1. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4586n5b7 Torrijos-Muelas, M., González-Víllora, S., & Bodoque-Osma, A. R. (2021). The Persistence of Neuromyths in the Educational Settings: A Systematic Review. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 1. https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/ fpsyg.2020.591923 Wacquant, L. (1989). Towards a reflexive sociology: A workshop with Pierre Bourdieu. Sociological Theory, 7(1), 26–63. Woods, D., Husbands, C., & Brown, C. (2013). Transforming education for all: The Tower Hamlets story. Tower Hamlets Council Communications Unit. Wrigley, T. (2018). The power of ‘evidence’: Reliable science or a set of blunt tools? British Educational Research Journal, 44(3), 359–376.

CHAPTER 4

Digital Existence and Its Impossible Education and Democracy Steven Zhao

Introduction In recent years, the dangers of social media have increasingly occupied worried scholarly and public discourses. Educationally, social media can be cautioned as pedagogical obstructions in need of regulation/prohibition or maintained as possibilities as some valuable tools for learning. However, the discourse currently lacks sufficient reflections upon the deeper meaning of social media and therefore, the role of education in responding to its implications. In this chapter, I argue that social media signals a digital humanity that renders liberal democracy impossible and by extension, its facilitative educational processes fundamentally negated. Specifically, I propose that digital networks forward an evolutionary direction that opposes the process of democracy as endless adaptive growths of our human traditions and intelligence. Without this adaptive force, a culture of misinformation is born and normalized whereby ideational proliferation

S. Zhao (*) Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Parker (ed.), Education in the Age of Misinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25871-8_4

55

56 

S. ZHAO

becomes largely unhinged from the counterbalances of a democratic sociality. Much of the concerned discourse attributes this issue as the symptom of echo chambers that can easily polarize and enclose beliefs into their distorted forms. However, I believe such digital landscapes mark a much deeper issue, one that is importantly existential in fragmenting the very criteria of human experience and sociality. For, misinformation occurs not only upon the basis of communicative dishonesty or misunderstanding, but that its perpetuation is contingent upon an already divided culture caught in the trance of its own relativistic confusion. In other words, the persistent fact of misinformation reflects the severe fragmentation of our epistemic and moral criteria whose irreconcilability fails to maintain the necessary line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ideas. Misinformation spreads upon the ease with which it is regarded as simply information, for its questionability no longer appears obvious without the common truths that existentially bind us together. Insofar as the digital future can increasingly facilitate this nature of fragmentation, it is important to discuss the meaning of a reconciled sociality that produces not distance and confusion but negotiation and growth. Considering this, I argue that such growth is facilitated by democracy as its equal freedom for different beliefs are constitutionally preserved as to negotiatively develop a shared ‘good’ of human intelligence and ethics. This development is essentially founded upon a perpetual tension of conflicts and reconciliation between different selves desiring recognition. Such an understanding, I believe, reveals important normative directions for education and democracy in midst of our transition into a digital existence. To elaborate upon such premises, I first provide a brief overview of the current discourse regarding social media as to emphasize relevant concerns and the limitations of its scope. Then, I provide an account of the human situation and liberal democracy as rooted in the process of evolving adaptive intelligence through fulfilling recognitive desires. I draw from John Russon’s (2004) interpretation of Hegelian recognitive intersubjectivity and Jerome Popp’s (2007) interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatic naturalism. Following this, I develop a brief account of social media as evolutionary processes of information to explore its principles of growing intelligence. Finally, I conclude that digital growth essentially negates democratic growth by virtue of the fragmentary nature of the former. This warrants an education towards a sustained existential tension in midst of digital ease. Ultimately, this discussion’s intention is to reflect upon the

4  DIGITAL EXISTENCE AND ITS IMPOSSIBLE EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY 

57

functional meaning of democracy, its potential future digital existence, and therefore, what education ought to philosophically mean in addressing its consequences.

Current Discourse and Deeper Meanings The topic of social media and digital communication networks harbours a long-standing discourse regarding its nature of impact upon our politics and culture. Although much of popular public perspectives are well primed with the cautionary suspicion of its consequences, scholarly investigations have revealed a more nuanced picture. Broadly, such investigations have largely reflected mixed conclusions regarding the risks and gains of its platforms. Much of such conclusions can be arguably categorized into two seemingly paradoxical effects, whereby social media can (1) reinforce communication enclosures and (2) increase exposure to diverse contents and people. With regard to communication enclosures, risks of this nature have been long anticipated in relation to the emergence of the Internet, particularly in terms of its ability to transcend geographical distances for communication. Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson (1996) have cautioned against cyberbalkanization that “can facilitate and strengthen fringe communities that have a common ideology but are dispersed geographically” (5). The convenient congregation of fringe groups “can further polarize their views or even ignite calls-to-action” (5). Similarly, Cass Sunstein (2017) writes that digital environments are opportune for building “enclave deliberation” (60), which are deliberations occurring within ideologically enclosed groups and spaces, whereby interaction is mostly confined to members of shared beliefs. Such deliberations can be both negative and positive. They are negative as clear risks for the necessary heterogeneous conditions for democratic engagements and yet, they are positive precisely for the same reason in providing the space for preserving unique voices and ideas. However, given the mechanisms of emerging digital enclosures, the benefit of preserving minority views through ideological insulation is the very conditions with which the “breeding ground for extremism” (71) becomes available. On the other hand, however, research has demonstrated the benefit of social media in exposing users to diverse contents and identities. This is importantly due to digital environments availing communication across weaker social ties composed of people whom the users do not frequently

58 

S. ZHAO

interact with and/or are not socially attached (Granovetter, 1973; Barberá, 2015). That is, weaker social ties are more likely to harbour those who hold different beliefs (in contrast to the user), such that the greater digital convenience of maintaining such connections also exposes users to a greater diversity of perspectives (Silver et al., 2019; Bakshy et al., 2012). By virtue of the ease of informational access, users engage with a greater diversity of both supportive and opposing contents whereby the latter is not necessarily avoided as the predominant user choice (Garrett, 2009). For the engagement of opposing perspectives can be effectively stimulated by social cues of weak ties. Specifically, users demonstrate consistent inclinations to engage in opposing contents if they are associated with the profiles and feeds of known online acquaintances (Messing & Westwood, 2014). Essentially, the general discourses of both public and scholarly concerns are importantly connected to exceptional powers of social media to both congregate and diversify. What is minimally addressed in the context of the current discourse, I believe, is a reflection upon the deeper meanings undergirding digitality, democracy, and education. Both public and scholarly discourses largely focus upon the dangers of social media without significant explorations into such dangers as symptoms of a deeper technological aetiology. For, the cautions of social media point not only to the risks of its platform but also to deeper digital principles for how we ought to exist as human beings as we increasingly transition to inhabit a virtual world. Given such a possibility, social media forecasts the nature of a virtual world as potentially governed by different laws and principles of human experience and ethics in manners that deviate from the democratic ideals of the ‘natural’ world. It is through such reflections that we can begin to explore the nature of its risks with regard to our future of democracy. However, the adequate assessment of such risks also depends upon the way we understand what democracy means to begin with. Insofar as concerns regarding democracy are importantly normative, its meaning can then be understood as revolving around certain functional principles for societies and their peoples. That is, discussing what democracy means is also discussing how a society ought to function and by extension, how its people ought to be as citizens. This naturally renders education an important subject insofar as schooling and curricula are precisely the process whereby ‘how people ought to be’ becomes conceived and enacted in theory, policy, and practice. Ultimately, it is by reflecting upon the meanings of digitality, democracy, and education that we can illuminate the

4  DIGITAL EXISTENCE AND ITS IMPOSSIBLE EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY 

59

degree to which their principles and conceptions to being human cohere towards a functional future. Through such considerations, I propose that the manner we examine such meanings is to be rooted in the notion of adaptive evolutionary growth as a fundamental normative ideal for our functional futures. Insofar as digital networks of social media operate to disseminate, generate, and reconstruct information on a broad scale, the framework for its assessed consequences renders evolutionary notions importantly applicable. Taken to its logical base, digital networks can constitute a virtualized evolution of collective intelligence as emergent communicative networks, online cultures, memes, and so forth. Emphasizing such evolving informational processes is centrally a democratic and educational issue as the digital powers to proliferate contents carry significant ideological weight in effecting how we interact and reconcile with each other as our civic and cultural futures. Therefore, the concern of this discussion is exploring whether our increasingly virtualized intelligence is indeed conducive (or not) to the functional state of democracy and education. For such an exploration to take place, we need to first understand what is meant by the ‘functional’ state of democracy and education. Naturally, this is a normative ideal that is conditional upon a conception of the human that can adequately justify its proposal. In other words, in order to examine the consequences of digital existence, we need to discuss what it means to be human and, therefore, what it means to be functionally democratic and educational through it. For, this reveals a normative parameter to functional existence such that its digital incarnation can then be appropriately explored as degrees of normative violation and/or compatibility. Insofar as this discussion is interested in the evolutionary process of intelligence, the meaning of the functional existence will be approached through the emphasis of adaptivity. Ultimately, this discussion aims to reflect upon the compatibility between the evolving forces of digital networks and democracy/education as functioning to sustain adaptivity. To do so, I will discuss an account of the human as to reveal proportional democratic and educational functions. This avails a normative parameter that can then examine the degree to which digital networks and intelligence facilitate or obstruct them as our future potential.

60 

S. ZHAO

Existential Tensions and Recognitive Desires The existential consideration of the human experience can reveal a certain kind of ‘tension.’ This tension is the simultaneous difference and sharedness that paradoxically constitute the relation between the individual self and others. The difference is rooted in the fact that the experience of the world is solely accessible through the egocentric phenomenology of one’s unique body and, therefore, its specific vantage point to living. We can say that reality as experienced and lived is in important ways, asymmetrical to oneself. For experience of reality is bound to the mattering and affordances of the living interests, pains, and movements of singular experiencers and actors. As John Russon (2004) states, “Each begins as a desiring self, which means it begins as the immediate sense of its own importance in that it automatically construes whatever it encounters as ‘for it’” (p. 88). This asymmetrical fact is also constituted by and contended with a sharedness with others. Namely, the singular self is not a given but developed and developing through depending on shared traditions of meanings and communities that precede and exceed our personal participation. We are pedagogically grown through families, schools, and other “educative” institutions that initiate us into shared traditions that “educate each of us into who each of us is…and articulate for us the parameters of our human world” (Russon, 2004, 70). As we inhabit and internalize such traditions, we are provided with the basic referential grounds that reveal who we are and ought to be in relation to the world. We bud as independent selves from a starting dependence on given traditions through learning within a familial microcosm of reality through an interactive and pedagogical structure between sociality and perception. This basic structure is the intersubjectivity between the self (i.e., infant), social other (i.e., proximate caregiver), shared empirical instances (i.e., occurrences or objects in observable reality that interest both parties), and shared mediating narratives that frame the relationship with social others and empirical instances as meaningful (i.e., beliefs and norms around how to interact with others in relation to shared environments) (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008). Through this structure, the world emerges as mattering affordances that we care about within purposive and practical relations. If the world emerges intersubjectively, this implies the initiating traditions as harbouring two educational functions. First, traditions reveal the world as mattering for us through internalized meanings as to what it is and how we ought to approach it. Second, insofar as intersubjectivity

4  DIGITAL EXISTENCE AND ITS IMPOSSIBLE EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY 

61

remains essential to meaning, it harbours a normative concern often addressed by and manifests as social customs, rules, and enculturating ethics. Traditions teach us not only what the world is, but also how we ought to approach others as to sustain a sociality necessary for emerging the shared world. This normative concern is where the initial existential situation of the tension to being human becomes significant. For the educational initiation into shared traditions is not simply a case of uniform conformity to authorities as much as intrinsically charged with ethical complexities with regard to the natural tension with the asymmetricity (difference) of self and intersubjectivity (sharedness) with others. Central to the ethics of reconciling the tensions is the intersubjective situation whereby the self can be recognized. By virtue of asymmetry, an incoherence arises whereby what is lived as oneself does not necessarily be parallel with what is lived with others despite the self primordially existing through such sharedness to begin with. Although the self develops through shared traditions, the self can never be a complete extension of them and therefore, rendering total conformity an existential impossibility. Insofar as traditions are broadly abstracted symbolic forms of beliefs, values, and norms, individual units of unique experiences cannot be completely represented (Honneth, 1995). Each self bears an unshareable vantage in the world that encounters unpredictable events that then generate unique meanings that progressively deviate from preliminary traditions. The existential tension, therefore, is one of potential incoherence between the exclusivity of the asymmetrical self and the shared traditions that initiates the self into a world. In other words, the shared traditions as the world do not cohere to what is already lived as my world. It is such a tension of incoherence that ultimately constitutes the desire for recognition, such that my world can be affirmed as the world. Concretely, “one seeks recognition of one’s existence” as to learn and trust that “one has a right to exist as the kind of person one is” (Huttunen & Heikkinen, 2004). The pursuit and fulfilment of recognitive desires is not, however, a direct social exchange of charitable attention between singular selves. Instead, it is a process involving negotiative creations and transformations of shared traditions whose norms of ethical dealings function to address such desires. Insofar as the self bears an intersubjective ‘baggage’ of one’s initiating traditions, the encounter of another is—in important ways—the mutual confrontation between different traditions themselves. To be recognitively fulfilled, then, implies the appropriate negotiative co-constructions of shared traditions that minimize the incoherence of asymmetrical livedness.

62 

S. ZHAO

That is, recognition is facilitated through mediating intersubjective traditions that coherently affirm the legitimacy of one’s personal existence. To be truly recognized is not just about being seen by the other, but it is also to inhabit a shared1 world of meanings and truths that affirm one’s personal world. Recognition persists as a “vital human need” (Huttunen & Heikkinen, 2004, p. 165) that arguably changes in its manners of desire as individuals mature. One’s lived world is first anchored within the traditions for their appropriate meanings during our developmental phases. Desires and wills are pedagogically funnelled as meaningful expressions through the parameters of given languages and meanings of traditions. Through such expressions, the person formatively becomes one who can be recognized and for whom recognition matters in the first place. In other words, recognitive desires for one’s asymmetric self are not entirely given insofar as the developmental dependence upon traditions does not yet expose the problematic situations of incoherence and tension. The child may have certain dispositions that become neglected, forgotten, or simply suppressed without the grasp of their absence as the caregiver(s) instil(s) certain rules and norms as the unquestioned Lebenswelt of living itself. Furthermore, by the nature of developmental dependency, the child remains relatively unexposed to a diversity of others and events. Therefore, one has not necessarily accrued sufficient unique experiences/meanings that render preliminary traditions inadequately representative of one’s personally lived world. In this sense, the asymmetrically different fact of self remains largely unarticulated and perhaps even unknown during the earlier developmental experience. This does not mean that the child does not have a separate sense of their private world(s). Rather, this independent sense of unique self becomes more conspicuously defined as part of maturation. Therefore, the initial situation of self points to a hidden asymmetry, as the initiating traditions have yet to fail in affirming what is personally lived. This presents a self whose concern for recognition as a unique livedness remains largely latent under an enmeshing dependence. With the maturation, however, a different and albeit more complex situation of recognition emerges. It is a situation of rising competitive struggles between selves that no longer participate in the given sharedness of initiating traditions. 1  This does not mean a sharedness of meanings/truths, however. It just means a sharedness whereby this world is also inhabited by the other, whether they share its meanings/ truths or not.

4  DIGITAL EXISTENCE AND ITS IMPOSSIBLE EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY 

63

Rather, selves begin to confront others whose traditions do not represent one’s livedness. One increasingly encounters different others/events outside of the family through maturation in manners that are exclusive to the self. This unfolds an increasingly unique lived world of experience and perspectives that reveals the asymmetricity of self. As one’s biographical trajectory is exclusive to one’s existential position in the world, the self naturally comes to diverge from their initiating traditions. As such, incoherence becomes generated between what is lived as my world and what is shared as the world that constitutes recognitive desire. Simultaneous to recognitive desire of one’s unique world is also the retained priority for intersubjective sharing with others as the world that is lived and known together. One desires to recognize the asymmetrical self and attune with others as a symmetrical reciprocity. The complex implication of ‘growing up’ is that one finds everyone to be in the same existential situation—a tension between needing both self-recognition and to be with others who also demand recognition for themselves. One now must contend with others whose traditions we do not necessarily share, whose role in relation to us is no longer authoritatively pedagogical to which we can rest in our dependency. Rather, others are those who demand our recognizing attention such that we are brought into a ‘struggle’ of negotiative ambiguity and possibly destructive conflicts. This struggle generates a logic of intersubjective ‘ethics’ consisting of both a risk of misrecognition and an opportunity for equal recognition. The risk is that as each self carries a distinct tradition of recognition, social encounters can entail a failure to mutually distribute recognition without sufficient shared understandings. Each self, then, becomes exposed as an asymmetricity whose lived world does not cohere with what is shared. This compels a mutual demand for recognition, whereby each self’s world wishes to be affirmed as the world in the eyes of others. As Russon (2004) writes, “In encountering the other desiring self…each encounters another that resists this definition by the first as ‘for it’ and insists, on the contrary, that the first is ‘for it’ instead” (p.  88). Ultimately, a Hegelian struggle arises with a competitive logic of some game (or violent ‘fights,’ at worst) to win as the existential authority of what living is. While victorious domination seemingly fulfils the recognitive desire, it falls short in sustaining the sociality that legitimizes recognition to begin with. Russon (2003) describes this as reproducing existential isolation: “What is…wrong with…domination is that they do not recognize the

64 

S. ZHAO

primacy of intersubjectivity…but try to instead establish the primacy of the single isolated subject, as if that subject were sufficient on its own to establish the significance of its own reality” (60). The victor’s recognitive desire may be pursued but is ultimately left unfulfilled without the other as recognized as a coordinative equal. For domination is to also remove others as the intersubjective ingredient to equally constitute shared traditions. It is through equal constitutions that recognition becomes legitimized through mutually preserving each other’s status as indeed a respectable and, therefore, a recognized source of recognition.

Liberal Democracy as the Adaptive Existential Opportunity Considering both recognitive desires and intersubjectivity, this means recognition is fulfilled so long it is mutually reciprocated. Such is the intersubjective logic of the necessary opportunity for equal recognition. This necessary equality points to a perpetual negotiation with others as the very condition to being in the world. The perpetuity is rooted in the exclusive positions of self that continuously generate idiosyncratic meanings that diverge from given traditions. Equal recognition, then, constitutes the constant reconciliation (of generating conflicts) between differing idiosyncrasies. Insofar as recognition is facilitated through shared traditions, reconciliation means (re)constructing their forms as to evenly affirm each self as indeed part of the world. This means social conflicts are justifiable under the commitment to endure the struggle of our existential tension. For it is by continuing the trials and errors of the ethics and conflicts between idiosyncratic worlds that shared commonality emerges as possible. This is not a struggle to which ought to be resolved, as this would imply the absence of conflicts and by extension, the denied recognition of the idiosyncrasies that generate them. Rather, it is a perpetual existential condition whereby equal recognition is distributed precisely as an endured struggle. As traditions settle into new forms through reconciliations and conflicts, idiosyncratic selves continuously emerge through entropic2 encounters in the world whereby different beliefs/norms develop that depart from such traditions. This repeats the cycle of emerging recognitive desires that attempt to then 2  I use the term ‘entropy’ as an emphasis on the intrinsic principle of reality towards disorder/chaos.

4  DIGITAL EXISTENCE AND ITS IMPOSSIBLE EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY 

65

regain the sense of affirmation in the shared world. On a broader scale, this presents a cycle of intergenerational evolution of collective traditions, as propelled by the unending existential tensions between recognitive desires and necessary sociality. Ultimately, reality’s entropic events perpetually generate idiosyncrasies that compel a sociality of evolving traditions cycling between conflict and reconciliation. It is at this point of the discussion that the functional notion of liberal democracy comes to be relevant. That is, the opportunity of perpetually evolving traditions points to the normative ground as the function of liberal democracy. For this discussion, I do not mean liberal democracy as systems of governance or political ideologies. Rather, I mean it as a fundamental relational and ethical association as discussed through John Dewey’s pragmatic naturalism and its contemporary interpretation(s). Specifically, democracy is an ethical structure of society that propels adaptive evolutionary processes towards the continuous developing of our understandings of and solutions to living. As Jerome Popp (2007) writes, Dewey understood democracy not as just a form of government, but it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. Democracy is a way of life, an attitude, or better still, a way of coming at life. It is living in ways that both use and develop intelligence. (85)

This evolutionary notion of growing intelligence as living is rooted in the pragmatism of adaptivity and utility through what Matthew Festenstein (2018) notes as a continuous ‘experimental inquiry.’ Traditions of truths and values are “contingent upon historical circumstances, [that] are responsive to the particular needs and conflicts of those circumstances” (para. 9). It is through the naturalistic consideration of what Popp (2007) discusses as ‘intelligence’ that founds the pragmatic meaning of liberal democracy as facilitating ‘growth.’ Democracy cannot be understood if not as a fundamental extension of and function in addressing the nature of human intelligence. This particular emphasis put upon the ‘human’ with regard to intelligence is due to its highly malleable nature. Different from other organisms, humans construct perceptual and symbolic meanings of the environment in manners that are not necessarily predetermined by a genetic heritage of accrued adaptive traits specialized to specific niches. We are not totally fixed to preset phenotypic tools and skills equipped at

66 

S. ZHAO

birth readied to continue our adaptive inhabitation. Rather, we are developmentally distinct with a lengthened dependency period of learning to adapt in response to the proximate demands of our environments as opposed to the distant niches of our genetic ancestors. As such, we adapt precisely by learning how to do so and changing our styles of adaptation responsively. In connection to previous discussions, we can understand learned adaptive responses and intelligence as the very crux of our traditions and their intersubjective ethics. That is, they represent how we see the world and each other that define the parameter of our appropriate actions and reactions. In other words, traditions can reflect vastly different meanings to being human in manners that challenge the very genotypic essence that ought to define our ‘nature.’ As we attempt to adapt and thrive within an environment, we might develop certain collective and individual belief systems, communicative symbols, or rituals in response to external demands. Such traditions might lead to behaviours and technologies in the form of tools and altered/artificialized environments with which lead to further (re)adaptations of traditions. Progressively, traditions become further altered to fit the demands of altering environments and vice versa, ultimately towards a feedback cycle of mutual adaptation. The situation of malleability and mutual adaptation points to a ‘naturalized ethics’ of having the ‘responsibility’ to reflexively direct our own evolution in sustainable ways. As Popp (2007) argues, “…our problem becomes one of managing this intelligence…We have taken evolution into our own hands and along with it, the responsibility for the welfare of the planet” (86). This reflexive management represents the fundamental process of evolving of human intelligence. For it constitutes not only adaptive responses but also the ongoing evaluation of such responses to ensure their adaptive realization. Essentially, it is to both adapt to the environments’ selective pressures and critically evaluate and ensure the criterion of such pressures is indeed conducive to our adaptation. This simultaneous process of formation/evaluation of intelligence is central to what Popp discusses as the Deweyan growth as a perpetual development. As he writes, “the development of our intelligence is subordinated only to itself…our reconstructions of experience should always…make further growth possible” (85). Adaptivity, in this sense, is not a chronically fixed fit to a niche, but is the situation whereby we can learn how to adapt, readapt our adaptations, and so forth, endlessly. For traditions might not fulfil certain niches of desires and demands, which

4  DIGITAL EXISTENCE AND ITS IMPOSSIBLE EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY 

67

compels their readapted forms. Such readaptations might then generate other unanticipated consequences that then demand further changes and ad infinitum. The naturalism of our intelligence translates into our existential situation and the function of liberal democracy. The malleability of intelligence renders idiosyncratic self to be possible, whereby we can develop unique adaptive meanings and identities as learnt through chance exposure to diversity. Idiosyncrasies introduce variations into prevailing adaptive patterns between traditions and niches. Such variations are the pooling of misinterpretations, reinterpretations, errors of bad/biased memories, and creative meanings of the shared world to which its adaptive system of previous traditions must contend. Insofar as such idiosyncrasies are intersubjectively founded upon tensions and conflicts of differences, their expressions implicate recognitive desires as the propelling force of variations. That is, variations occur through recognitive desires to ensure coherence between asymmetrical difference and symmetrical sharedness. Ultimately, given the malleability of intelligence and entropic reality, perpetual variational changes and growths of our traditions are intrinsic to our natural existence. Through such considerations, we can consider the function of liberal democracy as a relational and ethical association that enables such perpetual adaptivity to occur as the very point of existing with others. Central to such democratic function is the “faith in equality” (Dewey, 1987, p. 220), whereby “each individual shall have the chance and opportunity to contribute … and that the value of his contribution be decided by its place/function in the organized total of similar contributions” (220). Essentially, equal freedom and expression maintain both variations and a shared criterion (of traditions) to which such variations readapt towards further growth. This means democratic adaptivity depends upon freedom and equality operating in tandem. Freedom enables entropic events to generate unique individuals as inputting potential variations of adaptive patterns. Equality functions to root the value of such variations within the pragmatic regard of its adaptive potential for the concerning social group and niche. The adaptive function of democratic equal freedom, however, is not just facilitated by the fact of its institutional and legal structure—in the name of civil and public ‘rights.’ Just because individuals have the protected equal rights for freedom doesn’t necessarily mean that its role in continuing growth becomes realized. For such rights entails the

68 

S. ZHAO

protection from external possibilities of tyranny (for instance), but not the prescription of specific internal actions/beliefs. It might be more obvious that our freedom ought to be protected, but it isn’t obvious what we ought to do with it once we have it. Perhaps one might argue that the unclear utility of freedom is precisely the meaning of freedom to begin with, whereby its expressions are unanticipated because of unique self-­ determinations. Yet, insofar as the naturalistic and existential rendering of the human reveals to us a necessity for adaptive growth, equal freedom can not only be taken as a protected right, but it also ought to be grasped as imbued with an implicit responsibility to exercising it ‘correctly.’ This means that rights are not merely accountable by the state to sustain their legal features, but also the responsibility of its citizens to enact their point for growing intelligence. This is where education becomes a paramount point of reflection.

Education for Adaptive Growth The responsibility of the citizen to channel equal freedom towards growth is, I believe, precisely the significance of education. Public schooling can be understood as a state-mandated introduction to entropic forces of encountering diverse others and events that extend beyond the traditions of the family. The initial encounter of a ‘peer’ is also the confrontation and potential reconciliation of the issues and complexities of equal freedom. Different from the apparent authoritative powers and hierarchy of teachers/caregivers, the initiated student meets their ‘match’ without explicitly given structures of how to relate to one another and who one is through such relations. It is an exposure to another who is both dissimilar as carriers of traditions and similar as yet-to-be-determined participants in new shared traditions. As Dewey (1916) described, the function of the school is to “balance the various elements in the social environment, and to see to it that each individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of the social group in which he was born, and to come into living contact with a broader environment” (26). As previously discussed, insofar as the formation of traditions is contingent upon a tension between recognitive desire and necessity for sociality, how we learn to navigate and deal with such a tension harbours both a risk and an opportunity. This risk is the pursuit of unfulfilling recognition through a dominated other while the opportunity is rendering such unfulfillment as compelling a necessary equality. The initiation into schooling,

4  DIGITAL EXISTENCE AND ITS IMPOSSIBLE EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY 

69

in this sense, is the introduction of Hegelian conflicts as a pedagogical endeavour. For educational beginnings arguably congregate those who have yet to live and learn the consequences of such risks and opportunities. As such, equal freedom as a student is not fully realized by virtue of their status, who have yet to mature the capacity with which it can be exercised adequately. Instead, students are placed within an environment of quasi-freedom, with appropriate degrees of its expression to experimentally trial its meanings and outcomes. As Teemu Hanhela (2014) argues, “School represents a special ethical sphere between the family and the ‘real world,’ in which a person begins to grow towards ‘real’ social circumstances…towards a civil society” (383). Instances of such quasi-freedom can be observed in public arenas of mutual encounters through both explicit and implicit manners. Explicitly, students can establish relationships with others through scholastic collaborations, with teachers providing guidance for appropriate social and logistical practice. Increasingly, students are also exposed to a variety of social-emotional regulation lessons and discussions for building interpersonal and conflict-resolution skills (Armstrong & Armstrong, 2021). Implicitly, students are given the space to encounter each other in open environments such as recess, lunch times, activities based on sports and formal/informal play, and so on. All such activities usually occur on school grounds, thereby rendering their opportunities for expressed freedom as still implicitly bounded by the authorities and norms of conduct. Students are given the space to approach others and potentially fail at exercising equal freedom adequately—for instance, through bullying, miscommunications, immature/conflictual interactions such that the prevalent educational authorities can render such ‘failures’ as pedagogy itself. And it is through such pedagogical moments that risks towards competitive ethics can be learned as the grounds for the opportunity of intersubjective ethics. Insofar as the human situation is endless growth and change, democracy as equal freedom represents its functional realizability. If humans can learn to be different from each other and that they desire to be recognized for such differences, domination remains an intrinsic risk within our malleable intelligence. In other words, the adaptive power of malleable learning is also burdened with conflicts between differences. In this sense, education provides guided spaces to play out our conflicts, such that tyranny can be limited and channelled as lessons for relational equality that enables our adaptive growths. It is to be both free to encounter others and controlled as to direct such exercised freedom in manners without

70 

S. ZHAO

undermining such encounters. All such relationships can be understood as living opportunities for growing shared democratic intelligence. Education, therefore, is about forming the responsibility to commit to the equal rights of freedom as an endlessly endured tension—as cycles of conflicts, negotiations, and reconciliations between idiosyncratic worlds. For such endless tension is the existential condition of the naturalistic meaning to being human—constant growth and change of traditions and niches of adaptation as ends in themselves.

Digital Networks and the Impossibility of Democracy Now that I have discussed the general meaning of our naturalistic and existential situation, we can start to grasp the implications of digital networks. Directly put, I believe digital networks propel a distinct existential conception of the human and, by extension, forward an evolutionary trajectory no longer serving adaptive democratic growth. What I mean by digital networks is social networks facilitated by digital technology for accessing, creating, and sharing information through multiple mediums such as data, videos, texts, and experiences. A prominent form of digital network is social media. Although many of the issues threatening the foundations of democracy have been widely discussed to be facilitated by social media, its platform will not be the sole focus here. My discussion will focus on the wider functional principles of social media that enshrine digital interconnectivity instead of its risks solely as a platform. For it points to evolutionary trajectories of human meanings and traditions not exclusive to social media but demonstrative of a greater progression towards digitizing intelligence. To elaborate upon such greater technological progression, I will first explore the transmissive mechanisms of social media. There are two essential interplaying transmissive patterns of social media and, in important ways, digital networks—homophily3 and virality.4 The homophilous risk of social media is not only facilitated by the learning algorithms of user preferences and histories but also propelled by the motivations to which information is chosen by individuals and groups. 3  This can be understood as “a strong tendency [for individuals] to connect and bond with people who are like them” (Sunstein, 2017, p. 11). 4  I define this as digital contents achieving wide and rapid circulation throughout online networks.

4  DIGITAL EXISTENCE AND ITS IMPOSSIBLE EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY 

71

Research shows that online encounters with information and other people can be driven by “selective exposures” (Messing & Westwood, 2014). Individuals demonstrate strong preferences for affirmative information/ group association and an aversion to the opposition (Garrett, 2009). Unless persistently compelling reasons are available to enable the tolerance of aversion and the neglect of one’s preferences, the choices for affirmative contents/people remain probabilistically more prevalent. Of course, this does not mean that opposition is never encountered. Individuals can still experience “incidental exposures,” whereby encounters with certain things occur despite not having the intentions to have them (Ahmadi & Wohn, 2018). Yet, despite the counterbalancing opportunity of encountering opposition, individuals prevalently demonstrate “back-fire effects” whereby “people who are exposed to messages that conflict with their own attitudes are prone to counterargue…which accentuates perceived differences between groups and increases their commitment to preexisting beliefs” (Bail et al., 2018, p. 9217). Therefore, insofar as people have the digital ability to choose contents, the reinforcement of preexisting preferences becomes a predominant effect and risk of digital participation. The combined outcomes of selective exposure and back-fire effects do not only apply to individuals as consumers of information but also as disseminators5 of its spread. The process of dissemination distributes  activated patterns of selective exposure and back-fire effects of their recipients and so forth. Travelling contents can continuously attract users by virtue of its affirmative quality and isolate by virtue of its perceived opposition. Cumulatively, such mechanisms (along with algorithmic reconstructions) stimulate a clustering of digital contents/experiences (Tornberg, 2018). Once such contents reach sufficient popularity, it can reach viral momentum of exponential growths in speed and size of dissemination. Essentially, homophily jumpstarts virality through clustering affirming consumers and spreaders. In addition to clustering mechanisms, virality emerges through the self-­ adapting process towards popularity in the first place. That is, contents can become refashioned through individual/group consumption and spread (Del Vicario et  al., 2016). Digital contents are constantly and cumulatively re-interpreted through idiosyncratic commentaries, emphases, 5  Through acts such as sharing, liking, retweeting, presenting edited contents, and simply expressing one’s perspectives textually/visually.

72 

S. ZHAO

editing, and so forth. Such processes speciate digital contents whereby their starting forms can (re)produce into various alternated forms. Each travelling branch of speciated forms can also activate clustering mechanisms amongst consumers/spreaders, such that they continuously adapt through user modifications towards potential virality. Essentially, digital networks function upon an organizational principle of information, particularly for the formation of clustered contents as insulated experiences and virality as hastened contagion of spread (Walsh, 2020). The self-organizing principle of social media is not necessarily exclusive to its platform. Rather, it is a principle of the interconnecting mechanisms of digital networks and virtual culture rooted in user-oriented design/ interface (Norman & Draper, 1986). In sum, digital networks can be understood as facilitating the following processes—(1) increasing accessibility to information/experiences as defined by user preferences; (2) enabling the self-determined creation and sharing of digital contents with others, thereby facilitating clustering mechanisms as propelled by preferential popularity; (3) distributing the power to create/share amongst all users such that clustering potentials become evenly distributed. In other words, all users can viralize and activate clustering transmissions; (4) once clusters are formed, they increasingly attract affirmative consumers and spreaders in accordance with their preferentially selected contents; and (5) information and experiences increasingly take on homogeneous forms and their user/group representatives, eventually forging exclusive enclosures of niche groups and cultures. Essentially, digital niches can become increasingly idiosyncratic regarding traditions of communication, shared experiences, and beliefs. What can be importantly drawn from digital principles of growth and transmissions is a distinct evolutionary process of human intelligence in comparison to the more non-digital means (i.e., directly talking and bodily coordinating amongst one another or engaging with more ‘static’ media such as books and pictures). This distinction can be understood generally as constituted by, I believe, two interrelated elements—(1) radically enhanced transmission rates of contents and (2) reduced entropic elements through such transmissions. Such elements alter the evolutionary process of the growth and change of our traditions of adaptive intelligence in manners that can frame their democratic meaning as impossible. First, without limitations of spatial positioning (i.e., access contents regardless of where they are), communication of and between contents is no longer constrained by physical encounters. Naturally, transmission is

4  DIGITAL EXISTENCE AND ITS IMPOSSIBLE EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY 

73

comparatively slower through the actual physical body as a spatial medium to reach and communicate contents. Certain books, locations, events, and social others must be physically proximate for contents to be disseminated. Without such constraints, transmission rates accelerate, drastically speeding the process whereby niche clusters and traditions may be created and reinforced. What this entails within the context of adaptive growth is the greater rate of emerging variations whereby new patterns of intelligence and traditions can potentially respond to our reality. However, while variation is necessary for adaptivity, its digital mechanism is problematic for democratic growth. This leads to the second element, whereby entropic elements are significantly removed precisely because of digitally surpassed spatial limitations. What entropic elements introduce are inescapable confrontations of conflict that render their intersubjective reconciliations equally inevitable as preserved possibilities. Without digital networks, experience of reality is largely facilitated by exposure to occurrences and others with which we cannot control. Such exposures essentially function as a selective anchorage that pins unique worlds/traditions to mutual re-­ adaptive processes so as to grow their shared incarnations.

Fragmenting Intelligence and the Educational Imperative As discussed previously, our existential tension between recognitive desire and sociality ultimately propels our perpetual adaptivity. As each self desires the affirmation of their unique worlds and sociality with others, shared traditions become continuously adapted to ensure equal recognition. Its adaptivity remains perpetual insofar as unique worlds are generated by virtue of asymmetrical self-encountering to unavoidable entropic events. Each self inevitably contends with unexpected others, environments, and events and that such encounters are exclusive to one’s lived world. Because of this, one is constantly in existential tensions burdened with potential conflicts with risks of domination and reconciling opportunities for readapting shared traditions. This tension, however, is precisely the necessary situation for our endless growth. For the adaptive power of malleability is generating variations through inevitable exposures to unanticipated differences as the very fodder for growth. The issue with digital networks is that it takes the very distinct feature of our malleable intelligence and removes the counterbalancing entropy

74 

S. ZHAO

that ought to render it endless as adaptive growth. It is through the very existential tensions in our inescapable dealings with demanding others and environments that we necessarily channel our differences into readapted shared worlds. For our conflicts and reconciliations enact selective pressures that direct variations towards growth. Such is the function of democratic equality, whereby the individual liberty to vary from shared traditions is constitutionally protected from tyrannical potentials that can obstruct adaptive novelty. However, the democratic function of equality does not automatically lead to growth insofar as the successful reconciliation of differences of equal expressions is not given as much as learned. This illuminates the function of education, whereby students are initiated into experimental grounds to learn the commitment to enduring tensions of quality as to develop and mature them into growing shared intelligence. In contrast, however, digital networks forward an intelligence that continuously fragments into homogenous and unique niches. For they no longer channel unique variations to contribute to the readaptation of broader shared traditions. Rather, unique meanings stay within clustered enclosures, increasingly fragmenting away from each other as distinct digital worlds and cultures. This points to a dissolution of a feedback loop between mediating symbolic traditions and individual units of idiosyncratic variations necessary to constitute a collectively adaptive intelligence. What social media signals is not only the dangers of misinformation or polarization but also the digital facilitation of a risky evolutionary path of human intelligence and traditions.6 It is a path that exploits our malleability to specialize in producing highly speciated niches rather than also selectively pressuring such variations to adapt towards more collective and shared intelligence. Fundamentally, this is arguably legitimized upon a deeper narrative of what it means to being human as digital existence. What the virtual world affords are principles of communication and interpersonal ethics that circumvent around the existential tensions between recognitive desires and competitive others. Instead of the responsibility to endure such tensions as demanded by the democratic function of growth, principles of digital growth reify one’s asymmetrical livedness as the world with convenient curations of affirmative experiences and others. Insofar as entropic inevitability can be largely eliminated, virtual sociality no longer 6  The progressive embrace of digital networks as lived worlds can be illustrated by innovations such as Facebook’s Meta, essentially continuing principles of digital networks through holistic integrations of immersive technologies and experiences.

4  DIGITAL EXISTENCE AND ITS IMPOSSIBLE EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY 

75

has to constitute negotiations between differences but can run on algorithmic ease to congregate sameness. Virtual worlds enable a novel ethical strategy to redress the existential burdens to being human whilst avoiding the dangers of its conspicuously unsustainable form. That is, one can avoid the recognitive unfulfillment of isolating domination and yet simultaneously remove the burdening tension of reconciling differences. Instead, both recognition and intersubjectivity are fulfilled by virtue of gaining direct control over the content and population of one’s world. Ultimately, virtual worlds reflect an impossible democracy, whereby open platforms seemingly intending principles of free and equal accessibility negates its very function as endlessly growing intelligence. The rhetoric in justifying digital networks’ democratic value in promoting heterogeneity, therefore, largely misses the entropic necessity of the ‘natural’ world with which such heterogeneity must exist through to function as democratic growth. Insofar as digital humanity facilitates an impossible democracy, education’s facilitative function becomes potentially negated into irrelevance. Both explicit and implicit pedagogical opportunities to learn the endurance for existential tension become an avoidable burden rather than a necessary struggle. In the immediate sense, students can join/withdraw into virtual communities enclosed from public perspectives and riskily radicalize towards certain destructive ideals. Cases such as Dylann Roof and Brentan Tarrant are the unfortunate demonstrations of the increasing powers of online youth radicalization, whereby ideological enclosures are so readily accessible and immersive such that their insular environments normalize extremist views into acceptable facts (Flannery, 2021). Their outcomes represent a growing trend whereby the social isolation and conflicts of a young generation no longer necessitate effortful and educational interpersonal maintenance but can be resolved through finding belonging already tailored to one’s recognitive desires. In a cumulative sense, the democratic function of education can increasingly erode as progressing generations and innovations adopt more pervasive and immersive means of existing through digital networks. This feeds into the culture of misinformation, not only by the convenient access to fringe ideas but also by its accruing existential distance between users, the dissolution of the fundamental evaluative framework that anchors human intuition for discernment. In other words, the digitized humanity is one that risks banalizing relativism, powered not necessarily by the moral significance of diversity but by an epistemological confusion unable to truly assess the validity of

76 

S. ZHAO

its own ‘truths.’ At the logical end, all ideas and moral norms can be true and good insofar as sufficient digital spaces afford the possibility of their legitimacy by virtue of bypassing certain spatial limits of sociality. Information, then, becomes conflated as misinformation and vice versa upon the ease with which any truths are enshrinable as gospel and by extension, condemnable as false. News are as fake as they are real without obvious differences between the two, shifting their relevance as a crucial epistemic source to simply (and cynically) frivolous rhetoric weaponized to exploit power. In the face of such possibilities, it is of paramount importance for education to sustain and emphasize a pedagogy of existential struggle despite digital convenience and control. What this calls for is not only the introduction of perspectival diversity but—more important now than ever—an emphasis upon relational connections in the classroom and community. Such is not simply for the sake of learning interpersonal skills but for the existential induction into the necessary value of intersubjective tension to prepare for democratic citizenry. The weighty responsibility of educators, then, is to convince the student of the necessity of difficulties, the value of finding common grounds with another who is uncomfortably foreign, who might neglect or misunderstand us. For it is through such entropic risks that we can truly begin growing and adapting our intelligence, and it is by virtue of such adaptive growths that we can be human through and as education.

References Ahmadi, M., & Wohn, Y. (2018). The antecedents of incidental news exposure on social media. Social Media + Society, 4(2), 205630511877282. https://doi. org/10.1177/2056305118772827 Armstrong, D., & Armstrong, G. (2021). Educational trends exposed: How to be a critical consumer. Routledge. Bail, C.  A., Argyle, L.  P., Brown, T.  W., Bumpus, J.  P., Chen, H., Hunzaker, M. B. F., Lee, J., Mann, M., Merhout, F., & Volfovsky, A. (2018). Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences—PNAS, 115(37), 9216–9221. https:// doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1804840115 Bakshy, E., Rosenn, I., Marlow, C., & Adamic, L. (2012). The role of social networks in information diffusion. Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on World Wide Web, 519–528. https://doi.org/10.1145/2187836.2187907

4  DIGITAL EXISTENCE AND ITS IMPOSSIBLE EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY 

77

Barberá, P. (2015). How social media reduces mass political polarization: Evidence from Germany, Spain, and the US. American Political Science Association, 2015, 1–46. Del Vicario, M., Vivaldo, G., Bessi, A., Zollo, F., Scala, A., Caldarelli, G., & Quattrociocchi, W. (2016). Echo chambers: Emotional contagion and group polarization on Facebook. Scientific Reports, 6(1), 37825–37825. https://doi. org/10.1038/srep37825 Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and education: An introduction to the philosophy of education. Macmillan. Dewey, J. (1987). Democracy and educational administration. In J.-A. Boydston (Ed.), John Dewey: The later works, 1925–1953. Southern Illinois University Press. Festenstein, M. (2018). Dewey’s political philosophy. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-­political/ Flannery, M. E. (2021, July 6). How educators can prevent student radicalization. National Education Association. https://www.nea.org/advocating-­for-­ change/new-­from-­nea/how-­educators-­can-­prevent-­student-­radicalization Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2008). The phenomenological mind. Routledge. Garrett, R.  K. (2009). Echo chambers online?: Politically motivated selective exposure among Internet news users. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 14(2), 265–285. https://doi.org/10.1111/ j.1083-­6101.2009.01440.x Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. The American Journal of Sociology, 78(6), 1360–1380. https://doi.org/10.1086/225469 Hanhela, T. (2014). Axel Honneth’s idea of a drawn-out process of education. Pedagogy, Culture and Society, 22(3), 369–388. https://doi.org/10.108 0/14681366.2014.891642 Honneth, A. (1995). The struggle for recognition: The moral grammar of social conflicts; translated by Joel Anderson. Polity Press. Huttunen, R., & Heikkinen, H. L. T. (2004). Teaching and the dialectic of recognition. Pedagogy, Culture and Society, 12(2), 163–174. https://doi. org/10.1080/14681360400200194 Messing, S., & Westwood, S.  J. (2014). Selective exposure in the age of social media. Communication Research, 41(8), 1042–1063. https://doi. org/10.1177/0093650212466406 Norman, D. A., & Draper, S. W. (1986). User centered system design: New perspectives on human-computer interaction. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Popp, J. A. (2007). Evolution’s first philosopher: John Dewey and the continuity of nature. State University of New York Press. Russon, J. (2003). Human experience: Philosophy, neurosis, and the elements of everyday life. State University of New York Press. Russon, J. (2004). Reading Hegel’s phenomenology. Indiana University Press.

78 

S. ZHAO

Silver, L., Huang, C., & Taylor, K. (2019). In emerging economies, smartphone and social media users have broader social networks. Pew Research Center report. Sunstein, C. R. (2017). #Republic: Divided democracy in the age of social media. Princeton University Press. Tornberg, P. (2018). Echo chambers and viral misinformation: Modeling fake news as complex contagion. PLoS One, 13(9), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1371/ journal.pone.0203958 Van Alstyne, M., & Brynjolfsson, E. (1996). Electronic communities: Global village or cyberbalkans. In 17th International Conference on Information Systems (pp. 80–98). Wiley. Walsh, J. P. (2020). Social media and moral panics: Assessing the effects of technological change on societal reaction. International Journal of Cultural Studies, 23(6), 840–859. https://doi.org/10.1177/1367877920912257

CHAPTER 5

Adorno’s Demand: Post-truth, the Alt-right, and the Need for Antifascist Education Jonathan Turcotte-Summers

“The premier demand upon all education is that Auschwitz not happen again,” insists Theodor Adorno (2005a, p. 191). He continues: Its priority before any other requirement is such that I believe I need not and should not justify it. I cannot understand why it has been given so little concern until now.… Every debate about the ideals of education is trivial and inconsequential compared to this single ideal: never again Auschwitz.

In order to ensure that such atrocities indeed do not happen again, Adorno suggests that we must understand “the general subjective mechanisms” (p. 202) that made them possible in the first place. One of these mechanisms, as scholars of fascism routinely point out, is the rejection of truth— at least, as we commonly understand it. Such a mechanism is unlikely to be neutralized through the teaching of critical thinking and media literacy skills alone, as research tells us that young people are already less susceptible than their elders to unquestioningly accepting misinformation on the

J. Turcotte-Summers (*) University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Parker (ed.), Education in the Age of Misinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25871-8_5

79

80 

J. TURCOTTE-SUMMERS

internet (Brashier & Schacter, 2020). More is required, first, because fascism does not entail only the rejection of a particular truth, or its substitution with a preferable falsehood, but making the traditional concept of truth largely irrelevant. In addition, fascist movements do not come to power by simply duping their followers into some kind of false consciousness, but by appealing to their frustrated revolutionary desires. Consequently, I argue in this chapter that what is needed is an actively antifascist sort of education. Adorno was a leading member of the Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute for Social Research), better known as the Frankfurt School. Composed principally of Jewish scholars and forced to flee Nazi Germany for New York, fascism was obviously among the school’s primary political and theoretical preoccupations. However, since the immediacy of the phenomenon may have made it appear rather self-evident, these scholars were little concerned with attempting to define fascism, instead frequently using the term interchangeably with others such as authoritarianism and totalitarianism (Fischer, 2018). Similarly, it remains common today even among scholars of the subject to conflate fascism with dictatorship, despotism, autocracy, and tyranny. In contrast, Alexis de Tocqueville foresaw as early as 1831 that “[t]he kind of oppression with which democratic peoples are threatened will resemble nothing that had preceded it in the world … the old words despotism and tyranny are not suitable” (cited in Paxton, 2005, p. 4). While I have little interest in wading into the debate, newly revived in response to a rogues’ gallery of heads of state, over how to define fascism, I would like to point out three distinctions that I see between it and such notions as authoritarianism and dictatorship. First, the latter two terms are generally used to describe already-existing, top-down governing regimes, while fascism often refers also to the social movements that produce such regimes—a distinction vital to those of us who wish to oppose them before they gain enough momentum to seize state power. Second, authoritarianism and dictatorship do not necessarily imply the scapegoating of historically marginalized groups or their targeting for further domination and oppression, while fascist movements usually rely on these practices to whip up sadistic fervor among those designated the chosen people. Third, as mentioned above and as will be further explained below, authoritarians and dictators may seek to impose their own version of the truth in place of empirically demonstrable but inconvenient ones, while fascists strive to

5  ADORNO’S DEMAND: POST-TRUTH, THE ALT-RIGHT, AND THE NEED… 

81

impoverish and delegitimize commonly held ideas of truth itself, and usher in a “post-truth” era. As an example, Neil Postman (2006, p. xix) contrasts Orwell’s dystopian vision in Nineteen Eighty-Four with Huxley’s in Brave New World, “Orwell feared that the truth would be concealed from us. Huxley feared the truth would be drowned in a sea of irrelevance.” In this sense, I contend that what the antifascist Orwell described is actually a modern take on a traditionally authoritarian or dictatorial regime, while Huxley’s vision more closely corresponds to the twentieth-century development of fascism. And “drowning” is indeed an apt metaphor: what fascists desire is the death of truth as we know it.

Paving the Way to Fascism There was a certain consensus among members of the Frankfurt School that the emergence of fascism does not mark a significant break, but merely a transition, from a previous non-fascist state of affairs (Fischer, 2018). Similarly, fascism has long been understood in the Black radical intellectual tradition “not as some aberration from the march of progress, an unexpected right-wing turn, but a logical development of Western Civilization itself” (Kelley, 2000, p. 20). From this perspective, we would do well to acknowledge that, at present, our capitalist “liberal democracies” may not be as far from fascism as we would like to believe. Max Horkheimer, who served as director of the Frankfurt School, asserts that “[o]ne must thus go back to consider the tendencies within capitalism” (1989, p. 77). He continues: “whoever is not willing to talk about capitalism should also keep quiet about fascism” (p. 78). Consequently, in this section, I will briefly examine four interrelated ways in which contemporary capitalism has produced conditions conducive to the re-emergence of fascism: the exploitation of social media, the fracturing and proliferation of public spheres, the loss of faith in matters of fact, and the status anxiety produced by its inevitable crises.  In any society, the more powerful the ruling class, the greater its ability to control the available ideological apparatuses, from the education system to the mass media, and use them to suit its purposes. These purposes include the manufacturing of consent for its rule (Herman & Chomsky, 1988) and, under capitalism, the generation of profits. Needless to say, the pervasiveness of the internet, and particularly of social media platforms, has made it possible to communicate both truth and mistruth much more

82 

J. TURCOTTE-SUMMERS

quickly and directly, both to significantly larger audiences and more specifically targeted ones worldwide. Ultimately, under capitalist control, the algorithms driving these platforms urge users toward more and more outrageous and incendiary content, including “misinformation, hate speech, and even ethnic violence” (Hao, 2021, para. 23). While capital seeks to consolidate ownership of this media, the public that consumes and now also produces its content (and from whom a wealth of personal data is extracted) tends to become sectarianized and atomized into an ever-increasing number of ever-smaller factions, both through its engagement with new forms of media and through broader social and economic trends that have emerged during capitalism’s neoliberal phase. Those who have traditionally been marginalized in the bourgeois public sphere now find themselves with valuable spaces to congregate and make themselves heard online—regardless of whether they have been marginalized on the basis of, for example, their race or their overt racism. At the same time, those who occupied central positions in the old familiar order may also feel themselves marginalized and silenced by the fracturing of a widely shared sense of reality  and the multiplication of alternatives (Peters, 2022). As the internet exposes us to an overwhelming amount of largely commoditized speech (Vojak, 2017)—or worse, speech as a mere celebration of commoditized thought (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. xiv)—it has made more apparent than ever that the remedy for false or harmful statements may not simply be “more speech” (Whitney v. People of State of  California, 1927, para. 44). Furthermore, as well-intentioned critical scholars continue to upend historically dominant metanarratives and assert that actually all facts are socially constructed—that is, made-up or manu-­ fact-­ured rather than discovered in nature—this assertion is co-opted by bad-faith actors in order to legitimize their own malicious construction of deliberate mistruths and absurd conspiracy theories, which at its worst and most concentrated produces an effect that has been described as a “firehose of falsehood” (Paul & Matthews, 2016). Consequently, the danger no longer comes “from an excessive confidence in ideological arguments posturing as matters of fact … but from an excessive distrust of good matters of fact disguised as bad ideological biases.” Today, “dangerous extremists are using the very same argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our lives” (Latour, 2004, p.  227, emphasis in original). Critique, triumphant, “leaves behind its critical element to become a mere means in the service of … prevailing intellectual

5  ADORNO’S DEMAND: POST-TRUTH, THE ALT-RIGHT, AND THE NEED… 

83

trends” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. xv)—or, as we are now witnessing, anti-intellectual trends. This is especially apparent with such matters of life and death as climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. As early as 1923, Clara Zetkin (2017) argued that growing economic inequality combined with the heightened financial insecurity produced by crises like these are especially conducive to the emergence of fascism, as an anxious “middle class” fears it will be robbed of its privileged status and meager advantages over other workers. A century later, Clara Mattei (2022) has alleged that economists have “paved the way to fascism” with the invention of austerity politics. For the Frankfurt School, the potential for fascism lies partly in contemporary crises being given “a totalitarian solution in order to protect the capitalist relations of production and to secure the continued control of the ruling class.” However, the roots of fascism lie also in “culture … that defend[s] … the existing society while mystifying social relations of domination” (Kellner, 1984, pp. 95–96). An overwhelming proliferation of falsehood contributes to this culture of mystification.

From Truth to Power According to Horkheimer, “dualisms typical of the liberalistic era, such as individual and society, private and public life, law and morals, economy and politics,” are obscured with the advent of fascism (cited in Fischer, 2018, p. 808). To this list of dualisms, I would add that of truth and falsehood. In their quest for power, fascists seek to blur the traditional distinction between truth and falsehood with the aim of dismissing this distinction as unimportant or even impossible. Adorno states that “[t]he conversion of all questions of truth into questions of power … not only suppresses truth as in earlier despotic orders, but has attacked the very heart of the distinction between true and false” (2005b, p. 109). More recently, Jason Stanley (2018) has identified “unreality” as one of the key features of fascist politics, under which “reality itself is cast into doubt. We can’t agree on truth. Fascist politics replaces reasoned debate with fear and anger … truth with power … [and] the world with a person” (p. 47). This is done in part by “attacking and devaluing education, expertise, and language” (p. 34), as well as through “[r]egular and repeated obvious lying” (p. 47, emphasis added). Indeed, in Mein Kampf, Hitler accuses Jews of using a technique that he would go on to use himself, “the big lie,” in order to manipulate the credulous masses who could easily dismiss small lies but

84 

J. TURCOTTE-SUMMERS

“would not believe that others could have the impudence to distort the truth so infamously. Even though the facts which prove this to be so may be brought clearly to their minds, they will still doubt and waver” (1942, p. 134). Timothy Snyder (2017) proclaims that “[p]ost-truth is pre-fascism” (p. 37) and that “[t]o abandon facts is to abandon freedom. If nothing is true, then no one can criticize power” (p. 34). However, fascism is not nihilism, and while its adherents may not always be forthright about them, it does in fact have core beliefs, values, and its own conception of truth. It might be more accurate to say that truth to the fascist is, rather than the opposite of falsehood, that which can be proven to serve their drive for power. In employing what Mark Andrejevic (2020) calls “disorganized propaganda,” fascists’ goal “is not to replace one narrative with another, but to sow doubt that renders all narratives suspect” (p. 22). What matters is not that such propaganda is believed, but that “it preserves and fortifies power relations.” He adds that, in this context, “language has become purely operational: what matters is not the content of what it says, but what it can get done” (p. 26)—although Horkheimer (1989) reminds us that this has long been the case for the bourgeoisie under capitalism. If it is ultimately power and domination that fascists are after, it would appear that in this pursuit they might find the concept of mythology more useful and less troublesome than that of truth. Stanley (2018), for example, cites attempts “to displace truth” (p.  20) with “a pure mythic past tragically destroyed” to serve as the foundation of the fascist state (p. 13). This echoes Roger Griffin’s description of palingenetic ultra-nationalism serving as fascism’s “mythic core” (1991, p. 26). In her study of the political socialization of youth in Fascist Italy, Tracy Koon describes the Scuola di Mistica Fascista and suggests that manufacturing myths was “Mussolini’s greatest talent—perhaps his only genuine talent” (1985, p. 4). As Mussolini himself asserts, “We have created our myth. The myth is a faith, a passion. It is not necessary for it to be a reality… Our myth is the nation, our myth is the greatness of the nation! And to this myth … we subordinate everything” (cited in Stanley, 2018, p. 14). In their Dialectic of Enlightenment (2002), however, Horkheimer and his protégé Adorno problematize the facile distinction between truth and mythology. By enlightenment with a lowercase E, they refer not to a particular historical period, but broadly to “the advance of thought” aimed at disenchanting the world and dispelling myths (p. 1). “Enlightenment … is the philosophy which equates truth with the scientific system” (p. 66),

5  ADORNO’S DEMAND: POST-TRUTH, THE ALT-RIGHT, AND THE NEED… 

85

or with “classifying thought” (p.  10). This entails a positivistic fear of departing from concrete empirical facts, a “fear of social deviation” (p. xvi), “tabooing any thought which sets out negatively from the facts and from the prevailing modes of thought” (p. xvii). “Just as prohibition has always ensured the admission of the poisonous product” (p. xvi), enlightenment thus tends to relapse into the mythology which set it in motion in the first place; a mythology that can be described as an intimate engagement with “metaphysics and transcendence, nature and diversity” (Seymour, 2000, p.  303). “Myth is already enlightenment,” conclude Horkheimer and Adorno, “and enlightenment reverts to mythology” (2002, p. xviii). The roots of the fascist instrumentalization of critique, and indeed of all language and thought, can therefore be traced back beyond the social constructivist unsettling of science, and beyond even the global imposition of capitalist hegemony, to enlightenment’s assertion of dominance over mythology. In the following sections, I will examine the dialectical relationship described by Horkheimer and Adorno in the context of the contemporary “alt-right” as observed at post-secondary educational institutions in the United States and Canada. The term alternative right is widely acknowledged to have been coined by Paul Gottfried, a Jewish philosophy professor whose doctoral advisor was Herbert Marcuse and who also developed the term paleoconservative (Siegel, 2016). The phrase  was then  popularized in 2008 by white nationalist Richard Spencer—who, incidentally, wrote his master’s thesis on Adorno (Ross, 2016). It has come to refer to a far-right movement that has openly rejected the mainstream conservatism of its elders and has relied heavily on social media, online memes, and weaponized irony to promote its grievance “that ‘white identity’ is under attack by multicultural forces using ‘political correctness’ and ‘social justice’ to undermine white people and ‘their’ civilization” (Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d., para. 1). It has been noted that, “between summer 2016 and summer 2017, the alt-right in the United States was at the sharp edge of right-wing politics worldwide,” with a seemingly unique grasp on “how to build a relationship between online culture and politics” (Renton, 2021, pp. 121–122). As a far-right movement, it has presented as system-­loyal when the forms of oppression for which it advocates are advanced through institutional means, as illustrated by the 2016 presidential campaign of Donald Trump and the subsequent appointment of Steve Bannon as White House Chief Strategist. On the other hand, the altright has turned insurrectionary—and arguably fascist—when it perceives state hegemony “as having failed to advance the interests of white supremacy” (Shaw, 2020, p. 13).

86 

J. TURCOTTE-SUMMERS

Alt-right on Campus While key features of the movement have remained contested, several analysts of the alt-right cite a 2016 guide by one of its central figures, Andrew Anglin, editor of neo-Nazi website The Daily Stormer. Anglin identifies the alt-right as a mass, internet-based “reboot of the White [sic] nationalist movement,” with its core concept, often couched in opaque humor, being a genocide of white people overseen by Jews. He explains that the alt-right was formed by the convergence of a range of reactionary online subcultures, from the anonymous trolling fostered on the website 4chan to the misogynistic “Gamergate” harassment campaign, with Trump as the movement’s ultimate nexus. In fact, some observers use the terms “alt-right” and “Trumpism” interchangeably (Cole, 2019), while others suggest that the relationship between the two has been more symbiotic or strategic (Lyons, 2018), or emphasize the alt-right’s international character and origins in Europe’s New Right and Identitarian currents (Hermansson et al., 2020). Several conclude that it is a uniquely twenty-­first-­century variant of fascism, arguably made possible by social media, three decades of neoliberal alienation, and the perceived failures of establishment conservatism. Like traditional fascists, different alt-right figures and formations have at different moments emphasized different axes of oppression over others, but their rejection of the principle of social equality is unmistakable, as is their use of irony to provoke enemies and invoke plausible deniability. In the words of Jean-Paul Sartre (1976, p. 13), “they are amusing themselves, for it is their adversary who is obliged to use words responsibly,” while they reserve for themselves “the right to play” and “discredit the seriousness of their interlocutors. They delight in acting in bad faith.” Although most observers now consider the movement to be obsolete,  this fascistic alt-right essentially co-opted the liberal credo of “free speech” as its rallying cry and has been at the center of the most recent incarnation of the battle over freedom of expression since the beginning of the Trump presidency. They have made college and university campuses a key battleground, caricaturing them as bastions of a radicalism far beyond that of the 1960s. In reality, however, post-secondary institutions are generally governed not just by neoliberal economic pressures (e.g., efficiency,

5  ADORNO’S DEMAND: POST-TRUTH, THE ALT-RIGHT, AND THE NEED… 

87

accountability, self-promotion, and return on investment) but by longstanding conservative logics, and despite multiple well-publicized episodes of campus progressives taking their activism too far, it remains “far more common for professors on the left—especially those who publicly criticize racism, sexism, homophobia, or who support Palestine—to find themselves threatened, harassed, and even fired” (Wilson & Kamola, 2021, p. 15). It might even be argued that one of the functions of the post-secondary institution, as an ideological state apparatus, is to reproduce existing power relations. Conflicts over the right to speak there are nothing new, but perceived emergent threats to these power relations—including social media, the fracturing of the public sphere, and the limited gains made by historically marginalized groups— appear to have set the stage for a widespread, conservative moral panic over free speech on campus, as part of a broader “culture war” that has been waged since the 1980s by those who have historically advocated for censorship. This latest panic has been fueled not only by “spontaneous local outrage,” but also “by well-organized libertarian donors” (p. 16), sometimes in collaboration with governing political parties, as part of “a well-funded project to reproduce power, hierarchy, and exclusion” (p. 18). Part of this project has been to conflate freedom of expression with academic freedom and undermine academics’ own search for truth, offering the alt-right a vehicle by which to use the campus to platform high-profile personalities blatantly espousing, for example, the aforementioned racism, sexism, and homophobia—often claiming to be doing it simply to trigger liberals, or as an irreverent joke, “for the lulz.” Perhaps the most infamous example of this in the United States was a campus speaking tour by internet troll and former Breitbart editor Milo Yiannopoulos in early 2017, during which a Trump supporter shot a protester in the stomach at the University of Washington. Spencer had a similar speaking tour, and two white nationalists who had attended the deadly Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville were convicted for shooting at protesters after his appearance at the University of Florida. Other notable campus speaking events from the same year include the English Defense League’s Tommy Robinson at Columbia University and the American Enterprise Institute’s Charles Murray at Middlebury College. In Canada, there were attempts to bring white nationalist Faith Goldy to Wilfrid Laurier University and the University of Waterloo in 2018. And at my own institution, the University of British Columbia, one student group has attempted to host far-right figures Stefan Molyneux, Lauren Southern, and Andy Ngo, while another twice welcomed race war advocate Ricardo Duchesne.

88 

J. TURCOTTE-SUMMERS

The Myth of Free Speech In Horkheimer and Adorno’s framework, enlightenment thought involves the equation of truth with scientific rationality and strict empiricism, as well as discarding of meaning and disregard for distinctions. It demonstrates an approach to speech that “is ruled by equivalence” and “makes dissimilar things comparable” (2002, p. 4). According to such thought, the truthfulness of speech is judged not by the particularities of its content, but by being tested against reality and observed for results. In the example of the most recent “free speech” case, a general commitment to enlightenment thought routinely obliges the mainstream right to support as true speech that it perceives as having the effect of advancing its agenda, as the left must regularly oppose as untrue speech that appears to exacerbate oppressions or frustrate egalitarian efforts—which unfortunately in the terms of this debate frames it as simply being against freedom of expression. Meanwhile, the alt-rightists who have positioned themselves as the vanguard of the “free speech” brigade and as champions of enlightenment thought, often as part of an ostensible crusade to protect “Western civilization,” can simultaneously present themselves as the subversive, countercultural defenders of speech of all kinds, without concern for its truth value—to them, speech is the most inalienable of all rights, formidable beyond measure, and at the same time merely harmless words. In reality, the only desirable effect of speech for them, beyond causing “controversy” or “offense,” is usually to directly reinforce and improve their position within existing power relations. Rather than rejecting the enlightenment notion of truth altogether, they instead have a different, very specific expectation of what speech must be shown to do in order to be considered true. And when it no longer adequately does this, they will “loftily [indicate] by some phrase that the time for argument is past” (Sartre, 1976, p. 13) and turn to other, potentially more brutal means. Like the alt-right “free speech” activists, Horkheimer and Adorno condemn censorship in education, and in particular the self-censorship it compels. In fact, they allege that making the function of censors “entirely superfluous appears, despite all the benevolent reforms, to be the ambition of the educational system,” which “is preparing arid ground for the greedy acceptance of charlatanism and superstition” (2002, pp. xv–xvi). The

5  ADORNO’S DEMAND: POST-TRUTH, THE ALT-RIGHT, AND THE NEED… 

89

alt-­right’s condemnation of censorship, however, may constitute just such charlatanism, since this movement takes the enlightenment intolerance of difference and diversity to its extreme, and would gleefully have the state silence wide swaths of the population—at its most fascistic, permanently. For the alt-right, the truthfulness of speech lies in its power to deny speech to its many enemies: confusing them with whataboutism and “ironic misdirection” (May & Feldman, 2019, p. 28), cowing them into silence with threats of “doxxing” (the publishing of personal information) and  torrents of online harassment and abuse, or stifling conversation with noxious memes. In one illustrative episode, alt-right activists responded to a tweet by the then-Drexel University associate professor George Ciccariello-­ Maher, mocking “white genocide,” by cheering a supposed turning of the tide “in favor of censorship of people like Ciccariello” (Wendling, 2018, p. 75, emphasis in original). Richard Spencer himself, when asked during an interview if the alt-right even believes in free speech, replies, “No, of course not” (Holt, 2018). For the alt-right, asserting their freedom to oppress others might appear to constitute what Horkheimer and Adorno describe as a reversion from enlightenment thought back into mythology. Expressions of antisemitism, for example, are “an outlet for instincts and impulses that are forbidden in the course of ‘progress’ … a kind of revel within the sphere of the prohibited—a partaking of the forbidden fruit that is endowed with the aura of taboo” (Seymour, 2000, pp.  303–304). The antisemite “is allowed to indulge,” to gather with others “to celebrate the moment when authority lifts the ban; that moment alone makes them a collective, constituting the community of kindred spirits” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, pp.  151–152). The opportunity to indulge in the mythological might seem especially appealing at educational institutions widely seen to represent the epitome of enlightenment thinking. However, any genuine engagement with mythology—in the sense of metaphysics, transcendence, nature, and diversity as described above—is anathema to them. After all, fascists’ own “mythic terror springs from a horror of myth” (p. 22), so all they can do is play make-believe and perform “organized imitations of magical practices, the mimesis of mimesis” (p. 152).

90 

J. TURCOTTE-SUMMERS

Committing Antifascist Education An education that responds to Adorno’s demand and ensures Auschwitz does not happen again is necessarily, I contend, an antifascist one. What are some of the identifiable features of such an education? Adorno concludes his essay “Education After Auschwitz” by calling for one that does not just preach love but “devotes itself openly, without fear of offending any authorities, to this most important of problems. To do this education must transform itself into sociology” (2005a, p. 203)—in opposition to the former Conservative prime minister who infamously advised Canadians not to “commit sociology” (Fitzpatrick, 2013, para. 1). Adorno explains that education as sociology “must teach about the societal play of forces that operates beneath the surface of political forms, confronting nationalism and the dominance of the state, because, ‘in placing the right of the state over that of its members, the horror is potentially already posited’” (p.  203). Elsewhere, he contends that bourgeois institutions like the school socialize authoritarian, “potentially fascistic individual[s]” (Adorno et  al., 1950, p.  1, emphasis in original). An antifascist education must therefore also include a generally anti-authoritarian and autonomy-­ building component, and address “the rather barbaric history of the school, still latent within its structure, rules, and taboos” (Lewis, 2020, p. 11). While “Adorno might have successfully diagnosed the problem of the protofascist psychology,” Tyson Lewis argues that “he lacked a solution that would address the ways in which such psychology affects and is affected by embodied sensations and preconscious, habituated comportments” (2020, p. 16). For further insight into what an antifascist education might look like, Lewis turns to another affiliate of the Frankfurt School, Walter Benjamin, in whose work he perceives “a strong antifascist potentiality for democratic education” (p. 4). Compared to his colleagues, Benjamin responds to the “manipulativeness, hardness, and coldness” of fascism with an education that is “more embodied, innervative, and mimetic” (p. 5)—the latter being a term used consistently by Horkheimer and Adorno in reference to mythology, “the organic adaptation to otherness,” and immersion “in the ebb and flow of surrounding nature” (p. 148). Benjamin’s antifascist education appeals less to the critical reason of enlightenment than to “the body, bodily practices, perception, and a new notion of a diasporic connectivity to others (human and nonhuman)” (p. 16). It is embodied not only in the sense of "the temporal individual

5  ADORNO’S DEMAND: POST-TRUTH, THE ALT-RIGHT, AND THE NEED… 

91

body,” but also in that of a “collective body, or bodily collective, which is both agent and object of the human interaction with nature” (Hansen, 2004, p. 17). All told, such an education has the potential to fulfill, in a way that fascism cannot, the desire for an engagement with mythology in the sense of metaphysics, transcendence, nature, and diversity. It represents the potential “to re-enchant education with mystery” (Rocha, 2015, p. 52, emphasis in original)—that is, mystery in a positive sense, not as an absence or negation of something, but itself “a profound truth and an imposing reality” (p. 55). For those of us looking to re-mystify education, demystify social relations of domination, and counter fascism, it might be appealing to draw inspiration from the traditions of Indigenous peoples who have faced some of the most brutal of this domination and have fought to retain their ancient “mythologies”—that is, their connections to metaphysics, transcendence, nature, and diversity. However, for those of us who are not Indigenous, such an extractivist approach to knowledge is not only insufficient but also actively harmful; we are instead compelled to contribute to decolonial struggles. Scholars like W.  E. B.  Du Bois (1947) and Aimé Césaire (2000) have argued, contra Toqueville, that the violence carried out by fascists is actually much the same violence as has long been practiced against racialized peoples, whether within settler-colonies or in territories abroad. These colonizers have for centuries sought to legitimize their oppression of Indigenous peoples by portraying them as unenlightened, a portrayal against which many continue to push back to this day. David Graeber and David Wengrow go so far as to suggest that it was ironically the scathing “indigenous critique” of European society’s inequality, irrationality, and brutishness that prompted the start of the historical period known as the Enlightenment in the first place—in fact, “many key Enlightenment thinkers insisted that their ideals of individual liberty and political equality were inspired by Native American sources and examples” (2021, Chap. 2). It is from this perspective that we might consider Samuel Rocha’s call for “something like a second Enlightenment” (2015, pp. 60–61). Indigenous peoples tend to recognize the limits of the first Enlightenment’s legacy. So too do fascists, who take advantage of these limits for their own benefit. All of us who oppose fascism and value enlightenment thought must acknowledge these limits as well. “If enlightenment does not assimilate reflection on this regressive moment,” warn Horkheimer and Adorno, “it seals its own fate. By leaving consideration

92 

J. TURCOTTE-SUMMERS

of the destructive side of progress to its enemies, thought in its headlong rush into pragmatism is forfeiting its sublating character, and therefore its relation to truth” (2002, p. xvi). Education should foster a love of truth, of course, but not solely a positivistic vision of truth as purely scientific knowledge, and certainly not driven by a fear of what is foreign or unknown. Instead, an embodied education that also embraces the truth in mythology—an education that is itself as mysterious as the world—will better prepare us to confront together the contradictions of enlightenment, the continued injustices of colonialism and neocolonialism, and the present resurgence of fascism worldwide. While education is frequently conflated with schooling, and presented as a messianic cure-all for social ills, Adorno asserted decades ago that in this the role of the school is actually vital. “The pathos of the school today, its moral import, is that in the midst of the status quo it alone has the ability, if it is conscious of it, to work directly toward the debarbarization of humanity” (2005c, p. 190). Whether this was ever true is one question; whether it is still true in the twenty-first century is another.

References Adorno, T. W. (2005a). Education after Auschwitz. In Critical models: Interventions and catchwords (H. W. Pickford, trans.) (pp. 191–204). (Original work published 1969). Adorno, T.  W. (2005b). Minima Moralia (E.  F. N.  Jephcott, trans.). Verso. (Original work published 1951). Adorno, T.  W. (2005c). Taboos on the teaching vocation. In Critical models: Interventions and catchwords (H. W. Pickford, trans.) (pp. 177–190). (Original work published 1969). Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, J. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The authoritarian personality. Harper. Andrejevic, M. (2020). The political function of fake news: Disorganized propaganda in the era of automated media. In M. Zimdars & K. McLeod (Eds.), Fake news: Understanding media and misinformation in the digital age (pp. 19–28). h t t p s : / / d o i -­o r g . e u 1 . p r o x y. o p e n a t h e n s . n e t / 1 0 . 7 5 5 1 / m i t p r e s s / 11807.001.0001 Brashier, N. M., & Schacter, D. L. (2020). Aging in an era of fake news. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 29(3), 316–323. https://doi. org/10.1177/0963721420915872 Césaire, A. (2000). Discourse on colonialism (J. Pinkham, trans.). Monthly Review. (Original work published 1950).

5  ADORNO’S DEMAND: POST-TRUTH, THE ALT-RIGHT, AND THE NEED… 

93

Cole, M. (2019). Trump, the alt-right and public pedagogies of hate and for fascism: What is to be done? Routledge. Du Bois, W. E. B. (1947). The world and Africa. International Publishers. Fischer, L. (2018). The Frankfurt School and fascism. In B. Best, W. Bonefeld, & C. O’Kane (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of Frankfurt School critical theory (Vol. 2, pp. 799–815). SAGE. Fitzpatrick, M. (2013, April 25). Harper on terror arrests: Not a time for ‘sociology.’ CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/harper-­on-­terrorarrests-not-­a-­time-­for-­sociology-­1.1413502 Graeber, D., & Wengrow, D. (2021). The dawn of everything: A new history of humanity [ebook]. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Griffin, R. (1991). The nature of fascism. Routledge. Hansen, M. B. (2004). Room-for-play: Benjamin’s gamble with cinema. October, 109, 3–45. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3397658 Hao, K. (2021, October 5). The Facebook whistleblower says its algorithms are dangerous. Here’s why. MIT Technology Review. https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/10/05/1036519/facebook-­whistleblower-­frances-haugenalgorithms/ Herman, E. S., & Chomsky, N. (1988). Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media. Pantheon. Hermansson, P., Lawrence, D., Mulhall, J., & Murdoch, S. (2020). The international alt-right: Fascism for the 21st century? Routledge. Hitler, A. (1942). Mein Kampf (J. Murphy, trans.). Hurst and Blackett. (Original work published 1925). Horkheimer, M. (1989). The Jews and Europe (M. Ritter, trans.). In S. E. Bronner & D. MacKay Kellner (Eds.), Critical theory and society: A reader (pp. 77–94). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003059509 Horkheimer, M., & Adorno, T. W. (2002). Dialectic of enlightenment: Philosophical fragments (Edmund Jephcott, trans.). Stanford University Press. (Original work published 1947). Holt, J. (2018, May 23). Richard Spencer: The alt-right is not pro-free speech. Right Wing Watch. https://www.rightwingwatch.org/post/richard-spencerthe-alt-right-is-not-pro-free-speech/ Kelley, R.  D. G. (2000). A poetics of anticolonialism (J.  Pinkham, trans.). In A. Césaire (Ed.), Discourse on colonialism (pp. 7–28). Monthly Review. Koon, T.  H. (1985). Believe, obey, fight: Political socialization of youth in Fascist Italy, 1922–1943. University of North Carolina Press. Kellner, D. (1984). Herbert Marcuse and the crisis of Marxism. Macmillan. Latour, B. (2004). Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern. Critical Inquiry, 30(2), 225–248. https://doi. org/10.1086/421123

94 

J. TURCOTTE-SUMMERS

Lewis, T. (2020). Walter Benjamin’s antifascist education: From riddles to radio. SUNY Press. Lyons, M. N. (2018). Insurgent supremacists: The U.S. far right’s challenge to state and empire. Kersplebedeb. Mattei, C.  E. (2022). The capital order: How economists invented austerity and paved the way to fascism. University of Chicago Press. May, R., & Feldman, M. (2019). Understanding the alt-right: Ideologues, ‘lulz’ and hiding in plain sight. In M.  Fielitz & N.  Thurston (Eds.), Post-digital ­cultures of the far right: Online actions and offline consequences in Europe and the US (pp. 25–36). Transcript. https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839446706-­002 Paul, C., & Matthews, M. (2016). The Russian “firehose of falsehood” propaganda model: Why it might work and options to counter it. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html Paxton, R. O. (2005). The anatomy of fascism. Vintage. Postman, N. (2006). Amusing ourselves to death: Public discourse in the age of show business. Penguin. (Original work published 1985). Peters, M. A. (2022). Global public sphere or fragmentary, ever-diminishing publics? On Education, 14. https://www.oneducation.net/no-­ 14_september­2022/global-public-sphere-or-fragmentary-ever-diminishing-publics/ Renton, D. (2021). No free speech for fascists: Exploring ‘no platform’ in history, law and politics. Routledge. Rocha, S. D. (2015). Folk phenomenology: Education, study, and the human person. Pickwick. Ross, A. (2016, December 5). The Frankfurt School knew Trump was coming. The New  Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-­comment/ the-­frankfurt-­school-­knew-­trump-­was-­coming Sartre, J.-P. (1976). Anti-Semite and Jew (G. J. Becker, trans.). Schocken. (Original work published 1944). Seymour, D. (2000). Adorno and Horkheimer: Enlightenment and antisemitism. Journal of Jewish Studies, LI(2), 297–312. Siegel, J. (2016, November 29). The alt-right’s Jewish godfather. Tablet Magazine. https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/spencer-gottfriedalt-right Shaw, D. Z. (2020). Philosophy of antifascism: Punching Nazis and fighting white supremacy. Rowman & Littlefield. Snyder, T. (2017). On tyranny: Twenty lessons from the twentieth century. Tim Duggan. Southern Poverty Law Center. (n.d.). Alt-right. https://www.splcenter.org/ fighting-­hate/extremist-­files/ideology/alt-­right Stanley, J. (2018). How fascism works: The politics of us and them. Random House. Vojak, B. (2017). Fake news: The commoditization of internet speech. California Western International Law Journal, 48(1), 123–158.

5  ADORNO’S DEMAND: POST-TRUTH, THE ALT-RIGHT, AND THE NEED… 

95

Wendling, M. (2018). Alt-right: From 4chan to the White House. Pluto Press. Whitney v. People of State of California, 274 U.S. 357. (1927). https://www.law. cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/274/357 Wilson, R., & Kamola, I. (2021). Free speech and Koch money: Manufacturing a campus culture war. Pluto Press. Zetkin, C. (2017). Fighting fascism: How to struggle and how to win (M. Taber & J. Riddell, eds.). Haymarket. (Original work published 1923).

CHAPTER 6

Witnessing the Pathways of Misinformation, Hate, and Radicalization: A Pedagogic Response Vik Joshi and Amra Sabic-El-Rayess

Introduction Recent findings on risk indicators associated with youth radicalization in the United States, emergent from projects funded by the National Institute of Justice, offer two notable findings: (a) although the role of misinformation as a tool to catalyze ideologically motivated violence has scholarly acknowledgment, the process by which misinformation brings the youth to violent expression requires further research (Smith, 2021); and (b) there is a conspicuous gap in existing frameworks and models of radicalization that hinders our understanding of the role and impact of misinformation on student populations (Smith, 2021; Youngblood, 2020). This gap stems from a dearth of empirical evidence involving radicalized youth to help researchers understand misinformation within the broader process of radicalization. Motivated by the urgent need to examine a

V. Joshi (*) • A. Sabic-El-Rayess Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Parker (ed.), Education in the Age of Misinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25871-8_6

97

98 

V. JOSHI AND A. SABIC-EL-RAYESS

model—grounded in empirical research with formerly radicalized youth— that enables the exploration of the effects of misinformation on students, this chapter will: (1) offer an illustration of the Educational Displacement and Ideological Replacement model of radicalization (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2021) and (2) lay particular emphasis on the role misinformation plays in pushing a student along this pathway of radicalization. Before delving into the model, let’s consider the informational environment in which we find ourselves as the pandemic slowly recedes for certain countries and is still unfolding for many others. The pandemic has been a period that will be remembered by a salient phrase: social distancing. This distance led to the enclosure and, for many, isolation. Enforced social isolation, produced by the lack of connectivity between an individual and society, increases the likelihood of depression and anxiety-induced mental illnesses in adolescents and young adults (Loads et al., 2020). Prior research on loneliness confirms that social disconnect from others adversely impacts cognitive functioning and overall health (Harris et al., 2013; James et al., 2011). In this state of mind, students are particularly vulnerable to manipulation and influence from online content, without the mediating influence or the physical presence of an educator during the school day. In a 2020 report by the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention, educators have been identified, during the pandemic, as important stakeholders in raising awareness with regard to the risks of misinformation and playing an active role in amplifying protective factors against misinformation.1 However, the existing research spotlights not only the noticeable lack of knowledge on educational practices that can help promote this preventative power in educators but also the lack of responsive pedagogies that enhance such protective factors against radicalization, via misinformation, in students (Marone, 2020; Qureshi, 2020; Smith, 2018; Youngblood, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the urgency for this research. A 2020 report published by the Southern Poverty Law Center and the Polarization and Extremism Research and Innovation Lab (PERIL) has shown that 93% of people in households with school-age children reported that their children had engaged in distance learning since the outbreak of the pandemic. In addition, nearly 15 million college students in the United States switched to online learning. In a matter of months, high-school and 1  Since the publication of the report, the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention has been renamed the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3).

6  WITNESSING THE PATHWAYS OF MISINFORMATION, HATE… 

99

college students had drastically increased their time online and, in turn, their exposure to propaganda and manipulative content (Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention, 2020). The question repeatedly asked by educators during the pandemic was: What resources do we have to counter misinformation and its impact on our student populations (Smith & Parker, 2021)? In speaking to current programs that attempt to assist U.S. educators in relation to countering misinformation via anti-bias trainings, a study of 18 existing trainings in educational settings, across the United States, found that the foremost interventions today led to either short-term changes or, in some cases, an increase in biased speech and conduct by educators (Forscher et al., 2019; Calanchini et al., 2020). Organizations, such as the Southern Poverty Law Center’s Learning for Justice Initiative, acknowledge that no current professional development intervention on a wide range of biases exists for educators (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2020). Moreover, there are no existing professional development opportunities for educators that focus on protective factors against targeted misinformation. With this in mind, we will conclude this chapter by offering a brief description of a pedagogic innovation conceptualized and led by the authors. This pedagogic program is informed by the novel Educational Displacement and Ideological Replacement model of radicalization.

The Misinformation Environment and Education Before introducing the model of Educational Displacement and Ideological Replacement (henceforth, the Educational Displacement and Replacement model), it is imperative to offer a brief overview of the nature and role of misinformation as well as the digital environment in which the youth finds itself. Emerging from a global pandemic alongside the memory of the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 6 still in our collective memory, it is crucial to recognize that these manifestations of misinformation are different from those a decade ago. The speed with which misinformation spreads has vastly increased. Coupled with this acceleration in the distributive aspect of misinformation, the channels through which it can spread—considering innovations such as TikTok and breakaway social networks such as Parler—have changed what misinformation looks like today. To understand this, let’s consider an informative element, defined by Palomo (2021) as “any item

100 

V. JOSHI AND A. SABIC-EL-RAYESS

created with the aim of transmitting information (p. 1).” Such elements may include, but are not limited to, news articles, images, multimedia videos, or podcasts. Although text will remain a part of the information ecosystem, the rise of multi-sensory forms of informative elements has augmented the pace at which misinformation can not only move but also the way intended messages are conveyed. The consequence of this is the development of “codes” that serve as a language of mutual recognition, enabling manipulative actors to gain the trust of young viewers and consumers of content (Ekström & Westlund, 2019). With recognition and participation in a shared language comes a sense of belonging. Educational Displacement, which is caused by the absence of such a sense of belonging, creates fertile ground for radicalizing actors to replace the school as the space of learning and the educators within it. Prior to the pandemic, students were in school. During the pandemic, the students were, in a technical sense, “in school” but a click of a button would take them to another screen. As educators, staff, principals, parents, and community leaders, we were not prepared for the prospect of students being screen-bound for several hours each day. The migration of education, or “remote instruction” as it was aptly called, to the screen raised the daily possibility that a student would choose content that was not carefully prepared by an educator. While there has always been the prospect of students exploring online videos, articles, and podcasts after-school, the last few years have been a watershed moment in global public education in which the internet competed with the classroom in the same virtual space. This led, as the model below spotlights, to informal education outcompeting formal education.2 It is in the realm of the informal where misinformation thrives.

The Educational Displacement and Ideological Replacement Model Step 1 (Educational displacement): Opening the door to misinformation. The Educational Displacement and Replacement model of radicalization is a ten-step sequence that illustrates a pathway of radicalization 2  In this chapter, education will be framed as an effort—inclusive of individual and collective efforts—to acquire knowledge in schools as formal institutions (formal education) or in social environments where individuals experience and learn about the world outside of educational institutions (informal education).

6  WITNESSING THE PATHWAYS OF MISINFORMATION, HATE… 

101

(Sabic-El-­Rayess, 2021). At the heart of this model is an informal teacher or mentor who connects with students either online or in-person. This teacher influences and offers mentorship to prospective recruits using targeted misinformation. However, to understand the nature, medium, and pedagogic strategies deployed by such informal teachers, we need an account of the steps of the model itself. By offering a descriptive account of the first five steps of the Educational Displacement and Replacement model of radicalization, the role of misinformation and its impact within the process of radicalization becomes clear.3 The pathway of radicalization begins with Educational Displacement (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2021). This process displaces students from formal institutions in which experiences of invisibility initiate gradual alienation from the classroom environment—from teachers, staff, and peers. Experiences of invisibility manifest in distinct yet interconnected ways (Sapon-Shevin, 2017). Let’s consider three forms of invisibility. Students may not see themselves represented in the curriculum, the stories being read and taught in their classroom, or in the resources offered to support their learning. Sabic-El-Rayess (2021) shows that the curricular erasure generates a feeling of a lesser contribution, meaning, and value to society for the invisible relative to others. This is an invisibility of representation. The second form of invisibility is precipitated by neglecting their voice in the classroom. Opportunities for narration and critical reflection of a student’s personal life-story are vital experiences in the development of identity and self-understanding (Vaughn, 2021). The absence of these activities sends students the message that their stories don’t matter to the school, to the teacher, to the staff, and to their peers (Love, 2019). Consequently, this invisibility of voice silences students and erodes their sense of belonging in the classroom. Empirical work, using a sample of 762 college students, demonstrates that an active and engaged voice is an integral coping mechanism for students addressing grievances within classrooms and schools (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2012, 2014, 2016). However, this research also demonstrates that if students perceive their voices as 3  The authors have chosen to highlight the first five steps of the model as the role of the educator and educational staff, in terms of prevention, is far greater in preventing violent expression caused by the spread of misinformation. The second half of the pathway of radicalization within the Educational Displacement and Ideological Replacement model would necessitate a coordinated approach from stakeholders beyond educators and educational staff.

102 

V. JOSHI AND A. SABIC-EL-RAYESS

ineffective and unwelcome, they react by further disengaging and disconnecting from the formal education system. The third form of invisibility, precipitated by acts of bias, renders the student unrecognizable to those around them. Biases affect our ways of seeing (Veri et al., 2022). Our perception itself becomes mediated by pre-­ conceived assumptions that circumscribe students in, for example, racialized or gendered stereotypes. These biases inform attitudes toward the particular student. In response, such a student may realize that the manifestation of biased behavior and prejudicial attitudes are signs of a school culture in which they remain unseen (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2021). This is the invisibility of recognition. It is these forms of invisibility that constitute Educational Displacement. It is these forms of invisibility that open the door to the use of misinformation to push students further along the pathway of radicalization. Step 2 (Personal and associative grievances): Introducing misinformation. Radicalizing recruiters take advantage of educationally displaced students. This brings us to the next step on the pathway of radicalization: personal and associative grievances (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2021). To understand the development of personal and associative grievances, we will first treat them separately and then highlight the way in which they come together. Considering the account of Educational Displacement, we understand that forms of invisibility—of representation, voice, and recognition—ultimately coalesce into a general lack of belonging to the school. An absence of belonging is accompanied by feelings of exclusion that pushes the student out of the classroom (Tice et al., 2021). The question that follows a student who is slowly being educationally displaced is: who is displacing me? From this question emerges personal grievances. It is vital to recognize that a grievance can be understood as a real or imagined cause for complaint in response to unfair or prejudicial treatment (Carter, 2017). These radicalizing recruiters begin by gaining the trust of students by hearing them out regarding such grievances. After listening actively, they offer a storyline that blames a particular group for one’s grievances. On private message applications and groups within social media networks, the sharing of personal grievances is an important ritual in the radicalizing process (Hardy, 2018); however, it is the informal teachers’ tactical shift from discussions of personal grievances to associative grievances where misinformation plays a critical role. To “scale-up” a student’s personal grievance related to their treatment in school to an associated grievance requires an explanation of the causes

6  WITNESSING THE PATHWAYS OF MISINFORMATION, HATE… 

103

of the personal grievance itself. Simply put, the radicalizing recruiters recognize that educationally displaced students seek an explanatory account or narrative that will help them make sense of this personal grievance (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2021). Now, rather than exploring the student’s personal history or offering different perspectives on the situations that triggered educational displacement, the recruiters take three steps to change a personal grievance into an associated grievance. The first step is immediate validation. To deepen trust and offer a form of refuge to the educationally displaced students, informal teachers and mentors affirm the feelings of the student. This form of validation is manipulative as it is instrumentalized to bring the student closer to the alternative community outside of formal schooling. It is effective because it is often missing in the formal system. The second step is to misinform the student by projecting the cause of the grievance on a specific group of people. Whether seeded in real or imagined grievances, these radicalizing recruitment narratives, when successful, (1) effectuate behavioral and ideological change, (2) idealize imagined communities and moral frameworks, and (3) turn groups and communities they impact inward (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2020). This step also involves defining the other (Silva, 2017). The “other” is defined based on a distortion of the student’s retelling of their experiences to lay all the blame on a group that is framed as an enemy. This othering has two purposes: (a) to supply a simple and efficient causal explanation of their grievance; and (b) to set up the foundation for the leap to an associative grievance. The final step—following immediate validation and defining the other—is scripting the story of hate. To be told that there is a convenient explanation for your complicated grievance is insufficient to motivate an educationally displaced student to keep going on this pathway of radicalization. Therefore, the radicalizing teachers script a narrative that includes a reframed interpretation of history, reliance on certain sources for all information, and subscription to these “channels” of information—digital through forums, dashboards, and content-creators and in-person through meetings, workshops, and group study—to embed an ideology that requires harming the other owing to the associative grievances shared by every member in this newfound community. In other words, the radicalizing mentors provide carefully curated content, in-person or online (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2021).

104 

V. JOSHI AND A. SABIC-EL-RAYESS

When scripting the narrative to shift personal grievances to associative grievances, the three steps outlined above require further elaboration to understand the role and impact of misinformation. Crafting reframed interpretations of history is a crucial first step as they achieve two twinned aims. First, the student is inculcated in the “teachings” of the radicalizing group by learning that they are joining a movement that has a history behind it (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2020). This history of the radicalizing movement exposes them to particular leaders and figures who will serve as guides in their instruction. The recruiters who have brought the educationally displaced students into the community deploy the language of kinship to frame this community as not just a family, but the students’ only family (Coolsaet, 2019). Exclusion and isolation of the educationally displaced student are critical to the success of the radicalizing process. However, the isolation must be maintained and then followed by a form of radical inclusion into the alternative community such that all previous ties are severed and replaced by stronger, more trusted, and meaningful ones. The history of the radicalized community becomes the history of the person absorbed into the community. This history can be built on some accurate historical elements that are idealized, often calling for action to mirror that past—through behaviors, norms, beliefs, and practices (Sabic-­ El-­Rayess, 2021). Every past grievance is viewed through the ideological lens adopted by the student. The role of this reframed history must, therefore, be understood not only as a form of teaching but also as a form of acculturation to the episteme in the Foucauldian sense. When Foucault characterizes an episteme in any given historical moment, it is the episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge. Misinforming habits, utilized to script an alternative “reading” or interpretation of history, are deployed by radicalizing recruiters to bring forth an episteme that is self-sealing and self-contained (Dyrendal & Jolley, 2020). Self-sealing describes the way in which educationally displaced students are enclosed in the informational and ideological world of the radicalized community. Self-contained clarifies the fact that new information that would seem to invalidate or undermine the core script of the radicalized community is weaponized as further corroboration for the core script. Therefore, any new information that does not conform to the episteme of the radicalized community is made to align with the script. In a crude sense, modifying the adage of “all publicity is good publicity,” in these groups it is that all publicity can be scripted into good publicity.

6  WITNESSING THE PATHWAYS OF MISINFORMATION, HATE… 

105

The second step in the process of scaling-up personal grievances to group grievances is the elimination of all sources of information except for those deemed credible by the radicalized community. These sources constitute “curated content” perceived as superior and take a variety of forms— video series, podcasts, recorded lectures, specialized literature, and so on (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2016, 2021). However, what is made clear to the educationally displaced students in the grips of an interaction with a radicalizing teacher is that these sources of information are infallible, inviolable, and indispensable. Infallibility removes the need to preserve any form of critical distance or skepticism as a consumer of this content. The viewers, listeners, and readers are absolved of any responsibility to doubt what is being shared, even though the content will often disclose what narratives outside of this ideological informational environment are to be doubted. Inviolability confers upon the members of the radicalizing community a duty to protect the sanctity of these sources of misinformation from the sources of information outside of this enclosed informational environment. Therefore, it is not uncommon to see content that interprets or—using the parlance of social media—reacts to a video, piece of journalism, or individual post that infringes upon the script of hate (Palomo, 2021). These “reaction videos,” which are a sub-genre on video-sharing platforms, show the members of the radicalized community that their credible sources are comfortable engaging with content from anywhere in the information ecosystem. However, it becomes clear that a credibility deficit is placed on all sources of information that are placed outside of the information environment in which they are enclosed; all the sources within the boundary of their information environment are treated with a credibility excess (Fricker, 2007). Accompanying the construction of reframed interpretations of histories and the enclosure of members within a circle of “trusted” sources of information is the third element in this process: spotlighting referential grievances to mobilize local members. There are several examples that will illustrate this from contemporary society. Consider Neo-Nazis groups who share a hatred for Jews—alongside hatred toward members of the LGTBQ+ community—and a reverence toward Nazi ideology from twentieth-­century Germany (Hassan et al., 2018). The use of referential grievance manifests in the appearance of Neo-Nazi rallies and events across the world that use the Nazi regime as their common reference for the state they wish to realize through violent means. In India, we see the scripting

106 

V. JOSHI AND A. SABIC-EL-RAYESS

of a narrative of Hindutva that flattens the diverse and variegated history of the Indian subcontinent into a thin film of Hinduism as a political doctrine. Hindutva sympathizers and groups—inspired by this referential grievance—are mobilizing in spaces in Canada and the United States in accordance with the Hindutva script (de Souza & Hussain, 2021). Lastly, the most proximate example in recent memory in the United States itself is the “QAnon” conspiracy theorists who rallied around the antisemitic and xenophobic script of ideas of a “Deep State” that controls governments, the Catholic church, the media, and the banking system (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2021). Step 3 (Mentor refuge and deepening educational displacement): Misinforming as a mechanism of control. At this stage on the pathway to radicalization, we have seen the processes of Educational Displacement push students away from formal institutions of schooling to the informational world of radicalizing groups that wish to replace their outlook using targeted misinformation (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2021). They leverage personal and associated grievances to script and implant a narrative of hate with the aim of bringing these displaced young minds further on the pathway of radicalization. The next two steps on this pathway will be discussed together as the role of misinformation remains the same across both steps. The COVID-19 pandemic offers a helpful frame to understand mentor refuge. Educational Displacement precipitates the isolation, exclusion, and gradual departure of the student from the school community (Sabic-El-­ Rayess, 2021). However, the presence of the student in the classroom allows for ample opportunities to remedy or assuage the harms of biased attitudes and conduct against particular students. Furthermore, the physical presence of the student offers the possibility of face-to-face interactions which could lead to dialogues and shared moments of critical reflection (Smith & Parker, 2021). With the pandemic, the move to online instruction both removed the physical presence of the teacher and challenged students to choose between Zoom classes and the internet (Davies, 2021). Consequently, a student’s gaze may be looking toward the screen; however, what is in their field of vision (i.e., on their screen) is now outside of the teacher’s perceptual field. Research has repeatedly shown that algorithmic processes, such as the recommendations feature or scrolling to “refresh” a page on popular social media platforms, act as a form of curation. Radicalizing mentors, in a similar vein, initiate a few practices to offer educationally displaced students refuge prior to the curation of content.

6  WITNESSING THE PATHWAYS OF MISINFORMATION, HATE… 

107

Mentors who radicalize recognize, and have a vested interest in, deepening the Educational Displacement of students (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2021). This is because the radicalizing community gradually becomes the only family for these young minds, the only place where they will seek to learn—thereby replacing the school with these alternative spaces of learning and belonging. To diminish the influence of schools, teachers, and educators, these mentors leverage feelings of invisibility in the students by inviting them to private groups and gatherings. The ultimate goal is not to have a prospective member visit once, but to plant in them the seed that it would be wrong not to return. Considering this aim, misinformation takes on a new role aside from implanting their ideology through a script of hate. It becomes a control mechanism to retain and guide a recruit (Sabic-­ El-­Rayess, 2021). Step 4 (Curated content): Multimodal misinformation. The curation of content in radicalizing groups derives its methods and practices from education (Abbas, 2019). However, the key difference in its application is that these forms of radicalizing education—via curated content—are multimodal. Multimodality has been understood as the application of multiple literacies within one medium (Necaise et al., 2021). In the digital age, it is evident that radicalizing educational programs places great emphasis on the method of content delivery and the serialization of content for their consumers. Let’s break these elements down. The method of content delivery remains consistent with minor variations for larger productions or in-­ person events. For example, if a member of a radicalized community is accustomed to tuning in to a particular news broadcast, private online group, or podcast series, then this expectation is preserved by the content-­ creator. However, events such as in-person rallies, town-halls, or protests become events to demonstrate commitment and togetherness in service of their ideology’s aims (Necaise et al., 2021). When it comes to serialization, this aspect allows the creators of radicalizing content to script the narrative of hate on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis. The advantages of serialization include responding to news stories or current events to interpret them for the community, episodic segments where guests within this sealed informational ecosystem are invited to be in conversation with a fellow member of the community, and a deepening of the trust that they will be there for each member of the community through these channels of communication. The last aspect is particularly important as it deepens Educational Displacement by demonstrating loyalty and trust that was

108 

V. JOSHI AND A. SABIC-EL-RAYESS

perceived to be betrayed by the schooling staff and teachers for the student. Step 5 (Ideological transformation): Misinforming as the common curriculum. The fifth step on this pathway of radicalization, which marks the halfway point in the model, is ideological transformation (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2021). It is this step that requires a longer discussion as it pertains to the deleterious outcomes that targeted misinformation can achieve. To understand the student’s pathway to violent expression, it is vital that we explore the personal transformation that reconstructs a student’s worldview prior to acts of violence. This transformation involves ideological reframing that justifies and legitimizes violent actions. A recruit’s emotional engagement with personal and referential grievances undergirds ideological conversion (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2021; Sabic-El-Rayess & Marsick, 2021). This step in the model draws upon Mezirow’s (1991) transformative learning theory. In the health science context, this theory has helped us understand how people reconstruct their worldviews in the face of a health crisis (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2020). As part of this model, transformative learning causes behavioral and cognitive shifts in young students. These shifts emerge from the reconstruction and replacement of beliefs and ideas that shape their worldview. Learning is defined as an interactive process of interpretation, integration, and transformation of personal experiences. Drawing from Mezirow (1991), learning is the “process of using a prior interpretation to construe a new or revised interpretation of the meaning of one’s experience in order to guide future action (p.  12).” Transformative Learning Theory is a framework to examine and understand how students change (“transform”) through learning. It is vital to recognize that this transformation can be positive—overcoming a crisis—or negative—undergoing a process of radicalization. Within transformative learning theory, there are a few interconnected steps that outline the personal transformation experienced by an individual. Following a crisis or disorienting dilemma, the person in question attempts to make sense of this experience or a pattern of experiences using their pre-existing meaning schemes. Sabic-El-Rayess (2020, 2022) examines exposure to violence as a trigger to these disorienting dilemmas. Showing these disorienting dilemmas can undermine a sense of purpose, belonging, and recognition engendering powerful emotions that reframe affected individuals’ beliefs, norms, and values. How those emotional arousals are processed and managed particularly by the young individuals

6  WITNESSING THE PATHWAYS OF MISINFORMATION, HATE… 

109

and the adults in their proximity can propel either positive or negative ideological transformation. Meaning Schemes are the beliefs, value judgments, and feelings that inform one’s interpretations of an experience and serve as a frame of reference in clarifying personal meanings that emerge from such experiences (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2020). When a crisis or pattern of experiences, which could cause Educational Displacement, demonstrates the limitations of an individual’s existing framework for understanding experiences, individuals are open to new frameworks or outlooks. By exploring and assessing new experiences, via critical reflection, this individual has space to welcome a transformational change in their perspective with which they see the world. Radicalizing teachers and mentors seek to meet and sustain interactions with educationally displaced students precisely at this moment of openness to transformation triggered by a personal crisis. At this point, a description of the role of targeted misinformation coupled with the special nature of the teacher-student relationship will enrich our understanding of the achievement of ideological transformations in student populations. Teacher-student relationships involve both professional and personal aspects that constitute this form of interaction. In formal and informal settings, certain factors that determine this relationship remain common: individual personalities of the student and teacher, managing expectations of the student during a course of study, and negotiating the dynamics of the environment in which the student and teacher interact with each other (Keeley et al., 2006). One of the crucial differences that distinguish the teacher-student relationship between formal schooling environments and informal environments of radicalizing communities is: relationality. From the ways in which students are assessed, evaluated, and receive their degrees and credentials, it is no surprise that students are individuated in dominant modes of formal schooling in the United States and beyond at all levels of the educational journey. The institutional viewpoint sees each student as an individual that is coming together to engage in a process that may or may not be cooperative. For instance, when educational systems are corrupt and privilege students of certain ethnic, racial, or religious backgrounds over others, non-elite students disconnect, disengage, and distrust their teachers even if they remain enrolled (Sabic-El-­ Rayess & Heyneman, 2020). By contrast, the members of a radicalizing community may enter the community as an educationally displaced individual with personal and associative grievances, but the focus of the

110 

V. JOSHI AND A. SABIC-EL-RAYESS

radicalizing teachers and mentors is to place relationality at the forefront of their relationships moving forward in this alternative space. Students who develop and maintain close relationships with their teachers are more confident and motivated (Noddings, 2012). For students, who perceive their teachers as distant and neglectful, they withdraw from participation and engagement in the classroom (Creasey et al., 2009). It is as if radicalizing mentors are aware of the existing research on teacher-­ student relationships because they prioritize frequent contact with their prospective members to demonstrate interest in their growth in the movement (Sabic-El-Rayess, 2021). Research has shown that the higher the frequency of contact between students and teachers, advisors, and mentors in the schooling or college environment, the greater the development of the student’s learning outcomes (Kim & Sax, 2009). The other significant difference is the limits of the professionalized nature of teaching. Teachers will see their students when school is in session. Radicalizing mentors, who are freed from any such temporal constraints, can build practices to engage in-person or online at any time outside of school hours, presuming that the educationally displaced students are still attending school. During the pandemic, the loss of time when educationally displaced students may physically remain at school was eliminated entirely by the shift to online instruction. Instantaneously, radicalizing groups had a captive audience of high-school and college-aged students who were primed for distraction from Zoom classes (Blake-­ Turner, 2020). Further, there was very little oversight or the risk of punitive consequences for students who technically attended class but focused their time on other areas of the internet. The potential of misinformation—as a vehicle of transformative learning and the deepening of educational displacement—skyrocketed during the pandemic (Prasad, 2022). Misinformation, as we learned throughout the pandemic, has a variety of faces—be it fake news, propaganda, or conspiracy theories. The common element of these forms of misinformation has been labeled as “non-­ veracity” (De Ridder, 2021). Misinformation, by this understanding, is false or misleading information. Although there has been discussion of misinformation as being deliberately or unintentionally misleading, this chapter’s interest lies in the idea that misinformation is presented as both responding to and correcting the mainstream narratives by the perceived other. In academic settings, studies of misinformation have attempted to address this question on epistemological grounds (De Ridder, 2021, p. 3). These are worthy approaches and there is much work left to be done. In this chapter, the role of misinformation in the radicalizing process is, we

6  WITNESSING THE PATHWAYS OF MISINFORMATION, HATE… 

111

argue, a form of building relationality among prospective educationally displaced students. By centering the role of the epistemic environment in which misinformation is being spread, we wish to highlight the way educational environments cultivated by radicalizing mentors and teachers exploit the asymmetry between teacher and student to ideologically transform the students in question. What constitutes an epistemic environment? This can include the whole range of information sources that a person interacts with. The important distinction from the orthodox view of informational environments is to expand this beyond forms of media. Thus, the epistemic environments include the physical environs of the person—the home, neighborhood, workplaces, and recreational spaces—and the social environment—the people who form the person’s social circle and important social influences in their life (Blake-Turner, 2020). With this expanded view of the epistemic environment, the purpose of misinformation moves beyond merely misinforming and implanting an ideology in educationally displaced students. The mission is to use misinformation as the common curriculum around which members of the radicalizing community can build social cohesion. The lessons for educators, scholars, and students that emerge from this relational perspective on misinformation and education will be discussed in the concluding section.

Reimagining Resilience to Misinformation Through Social Connectedness: Our Pedagogic Response With this account of the relational nature of misinformation, the concluding section of this chapter will: (a) outline a pedagogic response that we are developing to address the issue of misinformation, education, and violent expression in student populations; and (b) offer closing remarks on the need for an embrace of multimodality in pedagogy and scholarship. Reimagine Resilience is an online training program designed for educators and education professionals to nurture resilience against, among other elements on the pathway of radicalization, misinformation as an integral capacity in their students.4 This professional development program draws  We would like to acknowledge the great efforts of Lauren Gonzalez, Tina Keswani, Brooke Tucker, Sophia Acquisto, Timon Hruschka, and Toomi Al-Dhahi in helping to build Reimagine Resilience. Further, we wish to recognize the Innovation Grant awarded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) supporting this effort housed at Teachers College, Columbia University. 4

112 

V. JOSHI AND A. SABIC-EL-RAYESS

from the Educational Displacement and Replacement model of radicalization. As described above, this model illustrates the ten phases—five of which are described in this chapter—that a student experiences on a pathway to violent expression. The program builds resilience to misinformation by offering a ten-part training that amplifies protective factors—such as social connectedness, non-violent problem solving, and forming cultures of prevention. Each training component advances prevention against every step on this pathway. When a student experiences Educational Displacement, they seek out alternative spaces and mentors to replace schools and educators (Sabic-El-­ Rayess, 2021). Emerging from the pandemic, we recognize that such alternative spaces have existed in unmonitored and expanding forums online where a student’s interactions and exposure to manipulative content have affected their educational journey. Educational Displacement involves displacement from the school environment that is not always physical yet translates into the feeling of invisibility when a student’s voice and story remain unrecognized in the physical or virtual classroom (Sabic-­ El-­Rayess, 2021). Considering this, educators have a vital role to play in the prevention of violent expression enabled by the spread of misinformation. To help build pedagogic responses in the classroom to misinformation, the program raises awareness of misinformation as a tool on the pathway of radicalization and seeks to counter this by building resilient educational environments in schools across the United States and beyond. There has been extensive work on critical media literacy as an approach to counter misinformation (Chang et al., 2020); however, the limitation of such a method is that it often positions the individual as the learner in this process. This individuation may frame the problem as an individual facing the internet, armed with its powerful algorithmic tools and the rise of digital programming that is made to look like news broadcasting, even though it is an independent content-creator. Regarding diasporic communities in the United States, the hegemony of the English language has yielded the removal of English-based misinformation on social media platforms while neglecting the identical content in other languages (Prasad, 2022). The rate of content creation suggests that the quality of content moderation

6  WITNESSING THE PATHWAYS OF MISINFORMATION, HATE… 

113

may improve but, as it stands, is no match against content generated daily. Therefore, the longer-term approach toward misinformation, described in this chapter, seeks to reframe preventative strategies to misinformation in terms of social connectedness and building richer forms of relational pedagogies in the classroom. From a perspective of social connectedness and relationality, these pedagogic responses to misinformation are still in development; however, a larger recommendation that we wish to highlight is the need to embrace multimodality in both pedagogy and scholarship. Multimodality has, arguably, become the standard for outlets of misinformation in the last decade (Necaise et al., 2021). Radicalizing mentors and teachers are continuing to develop and sustain forms of communication with educationally displaced youth that exploit multimodality as a bridge to grasp their attention. If a piece of misinformation can mirror the forms of entertainment that a young person consumes daily, then misinformation itself can be both a form of learning and entertainment simultaneously. Our pedagogic responses in the classroom ought to recognize the need to familiarize ourselves—across educational settings, be it formal or informal—with assignments and projects that celebrate the richness of multimodality to foster student expression and creativity. Similarly, the scholarship on questions of misinformation and its accompanying issues must embrace multimodal ways of engaging both academic communities and the greater public. For example, consider the recently published Descriptive Inquiry in Teacher Practice: Cultivating Practical Wisdom to Create Democratic Schools by Cara Furman and Cecelia Traugh (2021). This timely and prescient account, which details a helpful method to better understand our student’s needs and teach for dignity, offers prompts throughout the reader’s experience. The traditionally “flat” reading experience becomes dynamic by this thoughtful inclusion of reflective prompts. Moving beyond the realm of published text, consider the media literacy card game developed by faculty and students at the Media and Social Change Lab at Teachers College, Columbia University: Lamboozled! It is a deck-building card game, set in a fictional town populated by sheep called “Green Meadows,” where players must help the citizens of this town determine what news is true and what is not (Chang et al., 2020). Although it participates in the tradition of media literacy, the use of a game to address media literacy is a hallmark of multimodal scholarship. This game can be used in classrooms, libraries, or after-school programs. The lesson to be gleaned from such a project is that research will continue

114 

V. JOSHI AND A. SABIC-EL-RAYESS

to be indispensable to our vocation as scholars; however, the expressions of our scholarly findings ought to embrace multimodality as a way of communicating and building cohesion through activities and stories that center social connectedness. A lasting takeaway that has emerged from applying the Educational Displacement and Replacement model of radicalization to the question of misinformation is that people wish to belong. When it comes to students, this yearning for a sense of belonging is only amplified. Misinformation, exploited by radicalizing mentors and teachers, does seek to offer a sense of belonging to educationally displaced youth; however, it is pivotal to note that this belonging is conditional. It is an instrumental form of belonging with the goal of reeling in these prospective members deeper into their own educational displacement and, therefore, into these radicalizing communities. Our approach to misinformation, as a tool that deepens educational displacement and the replacement of the school with alternative spaces of learning, recognizes that it is values of participation, expression, intellectual and emotional wonder, and crafting one’s own life-­ story that have always been, and will remain, fundamental motivations for the yearning to learn, not merely as an individual but as a community of inquirers. After all, once students begin to tell their stories, they realize that all our stories have many characters and places and moments and memories that make us who we are. We realize that we do not need a reframed script interpreted for us when we are given the space and time in our education to write our own script.

References Abbas, T. (2019). Implementing ‘prevent’ in countering violent extremism in the UK. Critical Social Policy, 1–19. Blake-Turner, C. (2020). Fake news, relevant alternatives, and the degradation of our epistemic environment. Inquiry, 1–21. Calanchini, J., Lai, C., & Klauer, K. (2020). A process-level examination of changes in implicit preferences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 121, 796–818. Carter, J. D. (2017). Transform student grievance process into educational tool for student success. Student Affairs Today, 20(4), 1–3. Chang, Y.  K., Literat, I., Price, C., Eisman, J.  I., Gardner, J., Chapman, A., & Truss, A. (2020). News literacy education in a polarized political climate: How games can teach youth to spot misinformation. Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review.

6  WITNESSING THE PATHWAYS OF MISINFORMATION, HATE… 

115

Coolsaet, R. (2019). Radicalization: The origins and limits of a contested concept. In Radicalisation in Belgium and the Netherlands: Critical perspectives on violence and security (pp. 29–51). IB Tauris. Creasey, G., Jarvis, P., & Knapcik, E. (2009). A measure to assess student-­ instructor relationships. International Journal for the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning, 3(2). https://doi.org/10.20429/ijsotl.2009.030214 Davies, G. (2021). Radicalization and violent extremism in the Era of COVID-19. The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare, 4(1), 149–152. De Ridder, J. (2021). What’s so bad about misinformation? Inquiry, 1–23. De Souza, R., & Hussain, S.  A. (2021). “Howdy Modi!”: Mediatization, Hindutva, and long distance ethnonationalism. Journal of International and Intercultural Communication, 1–24. Dyrendal, A., & Jolley, D. (2020). Conspiracy theories in the classroom: Problems and potential solutions. Religion, 11(10), 494. Ekström, M., & Westlund, O. (2019). The dislocation of news journalism: A conceptual framework for the study of epistemologies of digital journalism. Media and Communication, 7(1), 259–270. Forscher, P. S., Lai, C. K., Axt, J. R., Ebersole, C. R., Herman, M., Devine, P. G., & Nosek, B. A. (2019). A meta-analysis of procedures to change implicit measures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 117(3), 522. Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press. Furman, C. E., & Traugh, C. E. (2021). Descriptive inquiry in teacher practice: Cultivating practical wisdom to create democratic schools. Teachers College Press. Hardy, K. (2018). Comparing theories of radicalisation with countering violent extremism policy. Harris, R. A., Qualter, P., & Robinson, S. J. (2013). Loneliness trajectories from middle childhood to pre-adolescence: Impact of perceived health and sleep disturbance. Journal of Adolescence, 36, 1295–1304. Hassan, G., Brouillette-Alarie, S., Alava, S., Frau-Meigs, D., Lavoie, L., Fetiu, A., et al. (2018). Exposure to extremist online content could lead to violent radicalization: A systematic review of empirical evidence. International Journal of Developmental Science, 12(1–2), 71–88. James, B.  D., Wilson, R.  S., Barnes, L.  L., & Bennett, D.  A. (2011). Late-life social activity and cognitive decline in old age. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 17(6), 998–1005. Keeley, J., Smith, D., & Buskist, W. (2006). The teacher behaviors checklist: Factor analysis of its utility for evaluating teaching. Teaching of Psychology, 33(2), 84–91. Kim, Y. K., & Sax, L. J. (2009). Student–faculty interaction in research universities: Differences by student gender, race, social class, and first-generation status. Research in Higher Education, 50(5), 437–459.

116 

V. JOSHI AND A. SABIC-EL-RAYESS

Loads, M., Chatburn, E., Higson-Sweeney, N., Reynolds, S., Shafran, R., Brigden, A., Linney, C., Crawley, E., Borwick, C., & McManus, M. (2020). Rapid systematic review: The impact of social isolation and loneliness on the mental health of children and adolescents in the context of COVID-19. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 59(11), 1218–1239. Love, B. L. (2019). We want to do more than survive: Abolitionist teaching and the pursuit of educational freedom. Beacon Press. Marone, F. (2020). Hate in the time of coronavirus: Exploring the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on violent extremism and terrorism in the West. Security Journal, 1–22. Mezirow, J. (1991). Transformative dimensions of adult learning. Jossey-Bass. Moskalenko, S., & McCauley, C. (2021). QAnon. Perspectives on Terrorism, 15(2), 142–146. Necaise, A., Williams, A., Vrzakova, H., & Amon, M. J. (2021, August). Regularity versus novelty of users’ multimodal comment patterns and dynamics as markers of social media radicalization. In Proceedings of the 32nd ACM Conference on Hypertext and Social Media (pp. 237–243). Noddings, N. (2012). The caring relation in teaching. Learning to Be Human: The Educational Legacy of John MacMurray, 38(6), 119–130. Office for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention. (2020). mitigate negative impact of social isolation to prevent violence. U.S.  Department of Homeland Security. Palomo, M. (2021). How disinformation kills: Philosophical challenges in the post-COVID society. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 43(2), 1–5. Prasad, A. (2022). Anti-science misinformation and conspiracies: COVID–19, post-truth, and science & technology studies (STS). Science, Technology and Society, 27(1), 88–112. Qureshi, A. (2020). Understanding domestic radicalization and terrorism. National Institute of Justice Journal, 1–12. Sabic-El-Rayess, A. (2012). Making of a voiceless youth: Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s higher education. Columbia University. Sabic-El-Rayess, A. (2014). Acting and reacting: Youth’s behavior in corrupt educational settings. Peabody Journal of Education, 89(1), 70–85. Sabic-El-Rayess, A. (2016). Merit matters: Student perceptions of faculty quality and reward. International Journal of Educational Development, 47, 1–19. Sabic-El-Rayess, A. (2020). Epistemological shifts in knowledge and education in Islam: A new perspective on the emergence of radicalization amongst Muslims. International Journal of Educational Development, 73, 102148. Sabic-El-Rayess, A. (2021). How do people radicalize? International Journal of Educational Development, 87, 102499. Sabic-El-Rayess, A., & Heyneman, S. P. (2020). Education and corruption. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Education.

6  WITNESSING THE PATHWAYS OF MISINFORMATION, HATE… 

117

Sabic-El-Rayess, A., & Marsick, V. J. (2021). Transformative learning and extremism. Actes de, 636. Sapon-Shevin, M. (2017). On the impossibility of learning “not to see”: Colorblindness, invisibility, and anti-bias education. International Critical Childhood Policy Studies Journal, 6(1), 38–51. Silva, D. M. (2017). The othering of Muslims: Discourses of radicalization in the New York Times, 1969–2014. Sociological Forum, 32(1), 138–161. Smith, A. (2018). How radicalization to terrorism occur in the United States: What research sponsored by the National Institute of Justice tells us. National Institute of Justice. Smith, A. (2021). Risk factors and indicators associated with radicalization to terrorism in the United States: What research sponsored by the National Institute of Justice tells us. Needs, Risk, and Threat Assessment Workshop, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Smith, K., & Parker, L. (2021). Reconfiguring literacies in the age of misinformation and disinformation. Journal of Language & Literacy Education, 17(2), 1–27. Southern Poverty Law Center. (2020). Critical practices for anti-bias education: Teacher leadership. Learning for Justice. https://www.learningforjustice.org/ professional-development/critical-­p ractices-­f or-­a ntibias-­e ducationteacher-­leadership Tice, D., Baumeister, R., Crawford, J., Allen, K. A., & Percy, A. (2021). Student belongingness in higher education: Lessons for professors from the COVID-19 pandemic. Journal of University Teaching and Learning Practice, 18(4), 2. Vaughn, M. (2021). Student agency in the classroom: Honoring student voice in the curriculum. Teachers College Press. Veri, M. J., Taylor, S., Eliason, M., Bolter, N. D., & van Olphen, J. (2022). ‘I can’t unsee what I’ve seen’: Doing Social Justice Pedagogy in the research methods classroom. Teaching in Higher Education, 1–17. Wilner, A., & Dubouloz, C. J. (2020). Radicalization as transformative learning: A theoretical and illustrative exploration. In Radicalization and counter-­ radicalization. Emerald Publishing Limited. Youngblood, M. (2020). Extremist ideology as a complex contagion: The spread of far-right radicalization in the United States between 2005 and 2017. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 49, 1–10.

CHAPTER 7

Pedagogical Implications of the New Information Environment Lana Parker, Helen Liu, and Kristy Smith

As the Internet has rapidly evolved into a global medium for accessing limitless sources of information, the social norms that govern political communication, knowledge creation and distribution, and activism have been impacted by these shifts within digital spaces. The widespread accessibility of global news can improve citizens’ knowledge and understanding of political information, regardless of whether an individual intentionally engages with specific information sources or comes across them incidentally via their engagement with other digital spaces (Lee & Xenos, 2019). However, the rapid changes that have occurred within digital spaces also pose new risks and concerns. Digital spaces now provide new opportunities for lies and deception through social media and hidden technologies that can appeal to emotion and subjective beliefs, potentially impacting an

L. Parker (*) Faculty of Education, University of Windsor, Windsor, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected] H. Liu • K. Smith York University, Toronto, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Parker (ed.), Education in the Age of Misinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25871-8_7

119

120 

L. PARKER ET AL.

individual’s political values and shaping their decision-making (Jandrić, 2018). In this chapter, we first describe what we are calling the new information environment for contemporary education. We focus our analyses on defining various components that impact how the information landscape has changed, including information abundance, misinformation, disinformation, and the material impacts of hidden technologies that influence digital consumer behaviour, such as algorithms, filter bubbles, and echo chambers. Second, drawing on Dewey and Mouffe, we articulate the possibilities and responsibilities of education and democracy. In the third section, we analyse the intersection of the new information environment, youth online life, and the implications for democracy, by drawing on the literature and on our recent empirical case study of high school students and teachers, students’ engagements with online information, and the implications for pedagogy. In the final section, we put our findings in conversation with contemporary literacy scholarship to demonstrate the immediate urgency of widespread mis- and disinformation, and conclude with a pedagogical call to action.

The New Information Environment This new information environment, defined as a “virtual meaning-making space characterized by information abundance, misinformation, and disinformation, and by the possibility to be both consumers and producers of information” (Smith & Parker, 2021, p. 4), is associated with the rise of social media spaces that are increasingly part of everyday life. A survey conducted by Auxier and Anderson (2021) revealed that approximately seven in ten American adults stated that they use some form of social media, with YouTube (81%) and Facebook (69%) continuing to dominate online engagement from the 1502 participants surveyed. Other platforms such as Instagram reported 40% engagement from American adults, while other social networking sites like Snapchat, Twitter, and WhatsApp followed with generally one-quarter reporting some form of use. This new information environment can play a substantial role in young adults’ development as political agents, as well as impact their decision-­ making processes. Edgerly et  al. (2018) revealed that individuals had higher levels of awareness and knowledge regarding events that had been shared extensively on social media platforms like Facebook. This can be exemplified by the Black Lives Matter movement that became a

7  PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 

121

recognizable, youth-led social movement that made substantial use of various social media platforms. The movement spread awareness about anti-black racism, dispersed information, mobilized communities, and “appl[ied] pressure to elected officials, and change[d] the conversation about fundamental societal issues” (Kahne et al., 2016, p. 2). The hashtag #BlackLivesMatter became a national message that represented the movement and fought for equality and justice for Black people, and individuals across the globe were able to stay updated and get involved with this fastpaced flow of information and events (Kahne et al., 2016). However, despite the potential positive impacts on political engagement, there are also many problems associated with social media platforms’ facilitation of an overwhelming quantity of unfiltered information. As these spaces are lacking the traditional forms of editorial gatekeeping, users in this new information environment are no longer merely limited to consuming content (Kruse et al., 2018), but become active producers and distributors of all types of information. As a result, misinformation and disinformation are rampant on these platforms, posing numerous risks and real-world consequences to users. Misinformation is defined as information that is false or inaccurate, while disinformation is the deliberate effort to intentionally expose and circulate misinformation (Swire-Thompson & Lazer, 2020). People can be particularly vulnerable when it comes to targeted disinformation that aims to alter facts for political or commercial reasons (Mason et al., 2018). Disinformation is designed to be appealing to audiences and often gains ‘viral’ spread or traction. Often, producers of disinformation trick consumers into clicking on “news” stories and websites to produce revenue (Dutton et al., 2017). These forms of readily available mis- and disinformation may impact key areas of public opinion and policy, as was the case with COVID-19 (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Cuan-Baltazar et  al., 2020; Gupta et  al., 2020; Tasnim et al., 2020). Studies have highlighted how susceptible the general public can be to mis- and disinformation, especially demographics that have strong beliefs in conspiracies or distrust towards politicians, government, or news outlets (Roozenbeek et  al., 2020). During the pandemic, even as many people turned to social media to access information about the virus, false information and conspiracy theories took hold on these platforms (Gupta et al., 2020). Conspiracy theories and disinformation regarding the virus had real-life impacts on society and public health, such as through the promotion of harmful health advice like ingesting bleach, and politically driven conspiracy theories about the origins of the

122 

L. PARKER ET AL.

virus (Roozenbeek et al., 2020). People began to form beliefs based on information that targeted marginalized communities, including theories regarding the effectiveness of masks and social distancing (Hornik et al., 2021; Roozenbeek et al., 2020). This disinformation played a major role in impacting the public health behaviours of people across the globe in the UK, Ireland, Spain, the USA, and Mexico, such as their willingness to get vaccinated against COVID-19 or obey public health recommendations and measures (Roozenbeek et al., 2020). The new information environment and the consequence of mis- and disinformation also have profound impacts on the political domain, and is especially influential for adults and young people’s development of political knowledge, beliefs, decision-making, and political action. In part, this is due to the widespread use of platforms such as Facebook and Twitter demonstrating the efficacy of social media as a tool to advance political agendas (Garimella et al., 2018; Lewandowsky et al., 2017; Munger et al., 2022). Various strategies and tactics like publishing fake news stories, utilizing imposter accounts, and distributing conspiracy-motivated propaganda all played a vital role in the  US’ 2016 election. For example, PolitiFact assessed that 70% of all statements made by Trump were determined to be false or predominantly false (Lewandowsky et al., 2017). His assumed popularity was enhanced through social media platforms, despite evidence that a large portion of pro-Trump propaganda originated from bots. Another factor that propelled pro-Trump messaging on social media was the lack of fact-checking mechanisms, as these platforms are “about visibility [and] popularity not facts” (KhosraviNik, 2018, p.  438). This means that whether information and news are false or have been purposefully fabricated to promote political motives, these forms of information continue to spread virally across the globe. Even when an individual takes it upon themselves to fact-check information that they consume, it can still be difficult for many to set aside their pre-existing attitudes, values, and political feelings. Furthermore, one major aspect of social media that differs from traditional forms of information is the way that these platforms view users subjectively, rather than as a collective (KhosraviNik, 2018). Social media intentionally caters to each individual user and is designed to display distinctive content through using manipulative digital technologies; sites like Facebook and Instagram are constructed to “induce habit-forming use with notifications and algorithms that offer decontextualized fragments of information” (Mason et  al., 2018, p.  6) and tailored representations of

7  PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 

123

information. KhosraviNik (2018) highlights how algorithmic data and analysis can form a basis of understanding about users, informed by information such as their sexual orientation, ethnicity, as well as political and religious views that may not be openly revealed to the public, based on their digital behaviours and interactions. These technologies can ultimately lead users to become confined in echo chambers; an environment that surrounds individuals with likeminded people and opinions that reflect and reinforce their existing beliefs, knowledge, and values, enabled by digital algorithms and online behaviour (Dutton et al., 2017; Laybats & Tredinnick, 2016). While echo chambers might be welcomed by users as tailored filters can introduce them to content that aligns with their interests, Dutton et al. (2017) discuss how echo chambers can also limit an individual’s access to more diverse and differing opinions, beliefs, and political information. Rather than “democratizing access to information” (Dutton et al., 2017, p.  4), social networks slowly develop into uniformed groups of like-­ minded users that congregate with each other in order to assimilate, confirm, or amplify their beliefs through online interactions (Choi et  al., 2020). This social practice can be defined as “confirmation bias” in which individuals are attracted to spaces where their pre-existing political beliefs, knowledge, and decisions are reaffirmed rather than challenged, thereby diminishing any opportunities to be exposed to diverse perspectives (Dutton et al., 2017). As a result, users are often exposed to politics in the new information environment, but in most cases, this exposure may be limited to sources that align with their beliefs and ideologies (Koc-­ Michalska & Lilleker, 2017). Kümpel (2020) highlights the ways in which individuals may also experience inequalities in their news exposure and engagement opportunities as a result of the manipulative technologies that are present within social media platforms. Since algorithmic data can customize users’ information landscapes and promote new content based on previous interactions, users who do not follow news providers or click on trending news posts may be limited in their exposure to political information when compared to other users who do engage in such activity. The impacts of echo chambers might explain why the social networks that users create on these platforms may have a greater impact on the ways individuals engage with politics. Researchers in this area have found that individuals’ social behaviours and networks on social media have emerged as significant factors in fostering public interest and exposure to political information (Bimber, 2017; Edgerly et al., 2018; Kahne & Bowyer, 2018;

124 

L. PARKER ET AL.

Kümpel, 2020). Posts from family, friends, celebrities, and influencers on social media are often featured more prominently on these platforms than on news providers. These social networks that individuals build therefore allow for a greater flow of political content, as friends and followers can share, recommend, or visibly engage with political information that others can see (Kümpel, 2020). These types of activities have a greater chance of influencing user engagement and subsequently have a direct influence on decision-making because these activities can encourage socially prompted behaviour, where individuals choose to learn about political events and feel compelled to participate politically because they see that others are engaging in political actions like voting, signing petitions, or joining organizations (Bimber, 2017; Kahne & Bowyer, 2018; Ohme, 2019). However, these interactions can also fuel radicalization and violent intent, as seen by the Capitol insurrection that occurred in Washington, DC, on 6 January 2021. This extremist movement began to take shape when a far-right activist posted a video on YouTube on Christmas day. The video encouraged people to rally on the day that Congress would formalize Joe Biden’s presidency to protest what they considered to be a stolen election (Heilweil & Ghaffary, 2021). This call to action immediately gained traction and spread rapidly across the US, with many pro-Trump, right-wing extremists collaborating to incite unrest and openly contest the democratic process. The violence and vandalism that took place during the insurrection were also glorified online. Rioters were shown donning war paint and animal pelts to portray themselves as patriotic warriors, live-­ streaming their illegal entry into capitol buildings, and proudly posing for photos to be shared online. Thus, the Capital riots demonstrate how interaction and engagement through online spaces can evolve into events in physical spaces with real-world impacts, including the potential for life-­ threatening violence, property damage, and lasting political repercussions.

Education and Democracy Political awareness during adolescence and young adulthood can reinforce and lead to future patterns of political behaviour and engagement (Kahne & Bowyer, 2018). In response to the rapid social, economic, technological, and political transformations he experienced, John Dewey (1997) proposed a philosophy of education that introduces students to the complexities of life and that supports the development of democracy

7  PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 

125

(Hansen, 2006). According to Dewey, a crucial aspect of education is the process of communication and exchange of shared knowledge, practices, and goals that are inherited from generation to generation (Feinberg & Torres, 2001). This process is fundamental, as it shapes standards of behaviour and social continuity within society and holds myriad sociopolitical consequences (Feinberg & Torres, 2001). Dewey’s traditional vision for education encompassed the fostering of knowledge and practices that emphasized the “experiential nature of learning” (Feinberg & Torres, 2001, p. 64) that was necessary to make informed decisions. This includes creating opportunities where students can participate in activities as a collective, engage in critical discussions to address public issues, hold leadership accountable, and communicate continuous shared goals (Hytten, 2017; Kahne et  al., 2016). The goal of education with respect to the collective and shared engagements was “making the individual a sharer or partner in the associated activity so that it feels its success as his success, its failure as his failure” (Dewey as cited in Feinberg & Torres, 2001). Through this goal, individuals are able to embrace the emotional aspects of engaging in a process of cooperation, and every individual is invested in achieving success or working towards a common goal (Feinberg & Torres, 2001; Hansen, 2006). Dewey’s vision of schooling emphasized how democracy was an essential way of life where individuals can share common interests and work through differences to solve issues and establish behaviours that will allow society to reach its fullest potential (Hytten, 2017). Democracy and education are irrevocably linked together, as the perpetuation of democracy is dependent on educated citizens that engage with real social developments and problems (Kahne et  al., 2016). In particular, public schooling was established to help foster these progressive directions by providing children from all backgrounds and economic statuses with the opportunity to share information and experiences, cultivate literacy skills, and decrease potential strife between social classes. The goal of this model of schooling was to ensure that students were taught to understand their own rights and freedoms, responsibilities to the general public, and identify the differences between oppression and the necessity of lawful authority, with the goal to ultimately self-govern and develop democratic beliefs and values (Rothstein & Jacobsen, 2006). Whereas Dewey furnishes a context for education’s role in a democracy, Mouffe (2004) provides a way of rendering that educational context more relevant and responsive to the challenges of the new information

126 

L. PARKER ET AL.

environment. Mouffe’s (2004) iteration of democracy does not foreground agreement. Rather, she writes that democracy is fostered in public places where “many conflicting views can be expressed and where there is the possibility to choose among legitimate alternative projects” (p. 42). Mouffe (2004) goes on to delineate a form of agonistic pluralism, with clear distinctions between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’. When referencing ‘the political’, Mouffe refers to elements of antagonism that are “inherent in all human society” (p. 45) and takes shape in various ways. Alternatively, ‘politics’ can be understood as the “practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order to organize human coexistence” (p.  45). Mouffe (2004) emphasizes that the political and politics are entangled as these practices and conditions that society establishes for human coexistence can always be in conflict or be impacted by an aspect of “the political”. For Mouffe, political conflict is not a negative act or an issue that should be overcome (Ruitenberg, 2009). Instead, ‘the political’ elements need to be acknowledged rather than suppressed, as frequent discourse is a crucial component of healthy political interaction and engagement (Ruitenberg, 2009). Mouffe (2004) highlighted that many goals within politics involve establishing a sense of unity in the face of struggle and adversity and as a result, it is often inevitable that an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality emerges within political discourse. The importance in democratic politics is not the act of conquering this us/them division, but rather understanding “the different way in which it is established” (p. 45). In Mouffe’s (2004) model of agonistic pluralism, the ‘other’ should not be seen as an opposition that needs to be abolished, but rather as an ‘adversary’ who may retain ideas and beliefs that are in conflict with ours, but who possesses the right to protect and defend them. Instead of advocating for the elimination of passions or to limit them into the private domain, Mouffe (2004) proposed to “mobilize those passions towards the promotion of democratic designs” (p. 46). We suggest that democracy in the modern era depends on the acknowledgement of conflict, where spaces are available to legitimatize such discourse and to have opportunities to discuss conflicting beliefs, values, and interests (Mouffe, 2004). Within a pluralist democracy, there needs to be a place for dissensus, wherein individuals can form distinct identities and select between varying real options. This process is what Mouffe (2004) defined as a “mixed-game” (p. 47), as it incorporates aspects of both collaboration and conflict. This approach has significant influence on how

7  PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 

127

students are educated, as this process can provide room for individuals to not only learn to disagree, but also see their opposition as adversaries in political conflicts rather than enemies (Ruitenberg, 2009). Having educational practices, policies, and discourses that are shaped by the goal of achieving ‘consensus’ can potentially foster a narrow, standardized view of what knowledge is considered to be, and does not introduce experiences that provide a distinct range of beliefs, values, and opinions that are reflective of a diverse democratic society (Fazzaro & Walter, 2002). Furthermore, this model of agonistic pluralism allows for schools to take a step back from normalizing notions of consensus (uniformity) as the ideal, or dissensus (differentiation) as a flawed, rationale in political discourse (Fazzaro & Walter, 2002).

Implications of the New Information Environment for Youth Life and Democracies Education has a duty to respond to the intersection of the new information environment and the prospect of deteriorating democracies. On the one hand, the ability to recognize the ‘truth’ is becoming more difficult in this post-truth political environment. Facts no longer hold the same value; and in most circumstances, by the time any form of facts are collected and organized, the “media moment has [already] passed” (Peters, 2017, p. 565). Widespread misinformation can also produce a level of scepticism towards legitimate sources of information. As a result, people become even more vulnerable to emotional manipulation, especially from political or economic motivations that lead to the weakening justification for collective decision-making (Chinn et al., 2021). On the other hand, taking up the Deweyian argument for the role of education in democracies and Mouffe’s affordances for deliberation and dissensus, we recognize that education cannot ignore the beliefs and identities that young people cultivate online. Since research has revealed that young adults are actively engaging with social media to learn and connect through political knowledge, values, and interests (Bimber, 2017; Edgerly et al., 2018; Kahne & Bowyer, 2018; Kümpel, 2020), it is crucial to explore whether contemporary education is fostering the in-real-life spaces for students to navigate the complex landscapes of the new information environment.

128 

L. PARKER ET AL.

Consequences of The New Information Environment for Young People While misinformation inheres to tangible risks and dangers for adults and the broader public, it is perhaps most damaging to youth who are spending a lot of time online and are simultaneously forming their values and identities. It is significant that young people are less likely to verify their information than adults (Nee, 2019), and that they are increasingly turning away from traditional news sources such as newspapers and cable TV news, and are instead looking towards “news” that is primarily circulated by entertainment companies that offer commentary, satire, or opinion pieces on current events (Marchi, 2012). Marchi’s study found that young people are becoming increasingly critical of the concept of ‘objectivity’, and instead prefer to access information sources that assert a politicized stance on the issues they report on. This phenomenon may offer insight into one of the ways in which young people find themselves embedded in echo chambers (Nee, 2019), thereby limiting the breadth of information sources that they engage with. Kahne and Middaugh (2012) acknowledge that young people are using social media platforms as a means of civic participation and activism, and while this emerging practice is certainly beneficial for engaging youth in political life, these peer-based and grassroots initiatives are not always founded on objective truth and fact: “participatory politics give youth independence from traditional keepers of information and political participation such as political parties, interest groups, textbook authors, and newspaper editors” (Kahne & Middaugh, 2012, p. 1). As future voters, it is integral to the health of democracy in North America that young people have access to a holistic education that accounts for the ways in which hidden technologies such as algorithms, filter bubbles, and echo chambers influence their developing beliefs and values. In the winter term of 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic was starting to become a prominent concern worldwide, the authors conducted a case study with a high school English class at a Toronto public school. The goal of the research was to learn about the ways in which high school students access information online, make decisions about which information sources they deem trustworthy, and how the pedagogical concerns posed by the new information environment were being taken up in literacy pedagogy. Teachers in our study consistently claimed that their students did not seem to have an understanding of how their online content is

7  PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 

129

increasingly curated based on data collected from their browsing histories, social media engagement, and patterns of digital behaviour. During an interview, one teacher shared that his students were accepting alarmist misinformation and disinformation about COVID-19 as truth, leading to palpable fear. Some of Mr Callaway’s (pseudonyms are used throughout) students had watched videos online that claimed COVID-19 was genetically engineered to attack—and therefore eliminate—Black people specifically. Some of his Black students were understandably terrified, and Mr Callaway had to help his students unpack this disinformation, observing that these videos looked aesthetically credible, and noting that “kids are highly influenced by things that might be visually compelling…it looks professional, and then they can be really influenced”. While discussions of the ramifications of frequent social media use on youth mental health have been well documented (Abi-Jaoude et al., 2020; Alonzo et al., 2021; Berryman et al., 2018), the particularities of the new information environment on young people’s mental wellbeing, and how emotional affect impacts young people’s understandings of and relationships to the world, must also be a continual point of concern for researchers, educators, and education policymakers. In an interview, Ms Brooks shared that in attempting to encourage students to question the information that they engage with more critically, she found herself facing resistance, and she speculated on some of the ways in which young people form emotional entanglements with information and peer relationships on social media platforms. She noted that students access information in casual ways that are almost ‘intimate’, which makes the information feel more real to them. Ms Brooks noted, as well, that students may be resistant to critically questioning information online when such information is accepted as truth by their peers. Questioning their peers’ perspectives could compromise a student’s social relationships, and also bring forth questions that call students’ identities and concepts of self into question— a deeply personal and emotional challenge during an already turbulent developmental time. This resistance once again highlights how vulnerable young people can be to echo chambers. Santos (2021) reinforces the notion that digital users are emotionally entwined with their information, and that their epistemic communities are built on a relationship of trust through active engagement with these social structures. These communities are also sustained through exclusion, where members within this community are encouraged to reject non-members’ input and instead favour their own knowledge, beliefs, and opinions. It comes as no surprise, then,

130 

L. PARKER ET AL.

that students would display resistance towards practices that encourage them to critically question or confront their epistemic communities, especially if doing so involves engagement with evidence that may conflict with perspectives that benefit and sustain these communities. However, as Mouffe (2004) emphasizes, this resistance can be productive. Teachers can take these moments as an opportunity to not discredit these students’ familiar knowledge bases—which could lead to defensive tendencies that fuel ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentalities—but to acknowledge that alternatives co-exist and engage in dissensus. Supporting students by providing opportunities to engage in critical discussions as a collective, and to develop stronger reasoning and critical analytical skills regarding the information they interact with, can potentially counteract ignorance that sustains their epistemic community (Feinberg & Torres, 2001). This can also allow students to further develop their emotional intelligence and practice empathy, as classrooms can encourage students to engage in collaborative processes that do not result in factual conclusions, but rather allow students to foster imagined responses that reflect a variety of identities, beliefs, and knowledge (Greenwood et al., 2019). This approach is powerful within the classroom, as it can potentially facilitate an environment for students to feel more comfortable voicing their opinions, acknowledging other forms of information, and feeling less resistant to reflecting on their modes of accessing epistemic information.

Radicalization, Incel Culture, and Threats to Democracy Digital spaces can operate as a way for young people to connect and develop communities around common interests or values, but there are also risks associated with the prevalence of unmeditated online forums, which serve as homes to misinformation and disinformation. One such risk stems from the increasing rates of radicalization amongst digital media consumers, which hold material dangers and consequences that extend beyond the anonymity of cyberspace. While algorithms may be useful for exposing digital users to content that interests them, over time, these technologies may trap users into echo chambers—some of which may operate with sinister intent (Dutton et al., 2017). Through curating social media users’ interactions with various news sources and ‘friends’ and/or ‘followers’ to narrow exposure to opposing

7  PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 

131

ideologies, the opportunities that users have to engage in debate and dissensus are reduced. The emotional affect of engaging in political life online is significant: anger is more likely to result in digital users purposefully seeking out information that confirms their beliefs, whereas anxiety is more likely to lead users to find information that challenges their beliefs (Wollebæk et al., 2019). Pervasive political polarization and the prevalence of extremist viewpoints on social media can, and do, result in various forms of violence. Klein (2021) conducted a study in which he analysed six hate crimes from 2019 that were preceded by social media diatribes, exposing the phenomenon of hate speech being framed as fear-­mongering, identity politics, or cultural paranoia. Since the posts he investigated did not ‘officially’ qualify as forms of hate speech, they went undetected by monitors. Klein’s study serves as one example of how unmediated political discourse online can serve as a catalyst for violence and radicalization. One particular concern for adolescent boys and young men is the growing prevalence of extreme misogyny fuelled by Men’s Rights Activist groups, as well as the burgeoning phenomena of “incel culture” (O’Malley et al., 2020). The term ‘incels’ refers to heterosexual men who consider themselves to be involuntarily celibate, and who have difficulties entering romantic or sexual relationships with women. Incels are typically considered to be between 18 and 25 years old (Tolentino, 2018), however, it is significant to note that these communities are not limited to private online spaces. Duggen and Smith (2013) identify that incels between the ages of 18–29 years old are most likely to use social media platforms and public virtual forums such as Reddit, thereby bringing anti-feminist and anti-­ female frameworks to a broader digital space. Since Reddit is a popular forum amongst young people, and operates as a space in which digital users look for information and build community with others, it is important to explore the operations of algorithms, filter bubbles, and echo chambers more deeply in order to equip young people with the skills and criticality necessary to utilize these platforms in constructive and healthy ways. When asked how much he knew about these hidden technologies, one student in our study, Felipe, claimed he had not been formally taught about them at school, and admitted to learning about them independently through Reddit. While we applaud Felipe for taking the initiative to seek information and knowledge about the complexities of hidden technologies himself, it is concerning that he had received no formal instruction about these technologies when they hold significant power over the content that young

132 

L. PARKER ET AL.

people are consuming and trusting for information. Other students we interviewed claimed that they received their news primarily through entertainment companies that cater to young consumers as their target audience: participants cited Buzzfeed, Vox, and following accounts such as 6ixBuzz on Twitter and Instagram. It is possible that these informal news sources became accessible and promoted to them based on algorithms that collect data on the other accounts that they follow, thereby narrowing the scope of what they know, and have the potential to know, about the world around them. While students in our study expressed some awareness that the content they receive online is targeted, they did not have a critical understanding of the ways in which these technologies operate, leaving them increasingly susceptible to interpreting misinformation and disinformation as truth. It is important for parents and educators to know that radicalization online does not begin with users searching for information about extremist and violent ideologies, or actively looking for radicalized digital communities to align themselves with. Schils and Verhage (2017) claim that instead, users typically express a general discontent with society, and subsequently search for information about dealing with their discontent or grievance about a particular issue. Schils and Verhage (2017) look to Fermin (2009) to explain how radical or violent extremist groups begin the process of recruitment from this initial search for information: These groups mainly target vulnerable individuals, who are susceptible to the simple worldview and clear identity that they have to offer. In general, radical and violent extremist movements seem to offer three things (Fermin, 2009): (1) an answer to existential life questions, (2) a political activist response to injustice, and (3) a sense of home and belonging. (p. 4)

Young people are particularly vulnerable to these forms of predatory recruitment processes, as they are at a stage in their life where identity formation, building relationships, and making decisions about their political allegiances compose a significant part of their personal development. It is also significant that young people are highly engaged in social media and digital life, and they use these platforms to find interest groups (Lacasa et al., 2016; Lacasa et al., 2017), join virtual communities (Harlan et al., 2014), and develop entirely distinct literacies through their online identities (Greenhow et al., 2019; Keefe & Copeland, 2011), rendering them increasingly susceptible to becoming entrenched in groups with sinister

7  PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 

133

intentions. These concerns have become particularly timely due to the increase in how much time young people have been spending online due to school closures, at-home learning, and stay-at-home orders. Another concern that arose in our study is that students are susceptible to becoming entrenched in these harmful digital communities through their use of social media and the Internet more broadly. Students in our study reported that they use significantly different processes to locate information depending on the purpose that information serves: if they are conducting research for a school assignment, they will be more mindful of verifying their information and utilize strategies they learned in class to do so, such as looking for websites that use more credible URLs like .org, .gov, and .edu, to ensure the source is reliable. However, when they are searching for information about current events, they are more likely to use social media applications such as Instagram and Twitter, or click on links sent to them by friends and family. One teacher we interviewed, Ms Atkins, shared that students primarily learn about current events on Instagram, and verify the truth of these Instagram posts on Twitter. She speculated that perhaps her students were more likely to trust information found on Twitter because it is one of the social media platforms more commonly used by adults, and therefore seems more trustworthy for accurate information than applications such as Instagram or Snapchat that are more popular amongst younger demographics. However, in the new information environment where hidden technologies hold unprecedented control over one’s experience searching for information online, adults are vulnerable to trusting misinformation and disinformation as well.

Steps Forward for Education and Curriculum Despite the real consequences of this new information environment in the age of misinformation, pedagogical progress remains slow. Though we would hasten to note that instrumentalist responses, such as one-off units in media literacy or embedded in Social Sciences are unlikely to produce an appropriate educational intervention, we can begin to think about how through curriculum, pedagogy, and policy, we might begin to cultivate spaces for democracy. First, education needs to respond to the myriad challenges discussed in this chapter by implementing a more focused and relevant literacy education that is institutionally supported and integrated into curricula across subject areas. In order to uphold the integrity of democracy and articulate

134 

L. PARKER ET AL.

the value of truth, critical, digital, and media literacies should be embedded across curricula at elementary and high school ages, so that students have curricular space to grapple in-real-life with their exposures to misand disinformation online. This kind of explicit teaching and learning, guaranteed through curricular language, ensures that access to literacy skills for the new information environment is not restricted to those with means. This is especially vital since the manipulative technologies that perpetuate mis- and disinformation can impact the development of critical literacies and influence long-term willingness to engage with political and social issues (Beam et al., 2018). Kahne et al. (2016) highlight how marginalized communities may suffer from inequitable knowledge opportunities, as data revealed that students whose parents possess higher socio-economic status are Caucasian, and are more academically successful, have a higher chance of accessing civic learning opportunities than their peers, ultimately contributing to stark inequalities and widening gaps in citizen engagement (Kahne & Middaugh, 2008, as cited in Kahne et al., 2016). This kind of curricular revision needs to be additionally bolstered through responsive pedagogies. Teaching in the age of misinformation is not merely about the inclusion and use of technological resources within the classroom, but also about understanding the purpose of such innovations and the opportunities to foster the necessary skills to navigate, share, create, and make meaning from these interactions. Kahne et  al. (2016) also demonstrate the importance of youth identities and social contexts for how they engage in civic life, noting that “cultural assumptions and biases may shape understandings and interpretations of civic issues” (p. 26). As each individual possesses vastly different backgrounds, pedagogy cannot disregard these diverse experiences, and must recognize the privilege, power, and inequity that exists and impacts students’ experiences at school. Insufficient reflection of these dynamics may perpetuate a lack of awareness and understanding in youth that will impact their political decisions and beliefs in the future. Barzilai and Chinn (2020) show how developing an individual’s own intellectual identity and agency can nurture their motivation and commitment to engage in truth-seeking practices, therefore linking the disconnect “between knowing the right thing to do and doing it” (p.  114). Along with this, adopting agonistic pluralism as a pedagogical framework can allow students to share and communicate conflicting beliefs, opinions, and values (Mouffe, 2004). Taking an instrumentalized and neutral

7  PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 

135

approach to ‘debate’ can lead to a standardized and narrow view that is not reflective of a diverse society. Teaching with an emphasis on agonistic pluralism and the prospects of dissensus can help students develop emotional intelligence and offer them more sophisticated strategies for discussing and evaluating disagreements (Mouffe, 2004). Furthermore, educators can begin thinking of various ways to engage their students in dialogue, as digital tools and media can be utilized to further expand students’ civic and political participation. Similar to the various social media platforms that students would engage with in their everyday lives, educators can create their own online communities in a more informal setting. These spaces allow students of differing beliefs to come together to engage in dissensus by discussing their opinions, debate their thinking, discuss controversial and political issues, and express or gain feedback of differing perspectives (Kahne et al., 2016). Kahne et al. (2016) shared an experience of a teacher who started an online discussion board for her classes that mirrored social media discussion forums. Students had the opportunity to share their contrasting perspectives and beliefs, comment on each other’s posts, and analyse issues or images that were found on various social media platforms. While engaging in these online forms of expression, students also had the opportunity to later reflect on other students’ controversial opinions and comments in smaller focus groups facilitated in person. This practice allowed students to understand and appreciate the real-world impact of their online interactions. Students can potentially face circumstances where they will have to confront peers who were offended by their online posts, be challenged, thoughtfully defend their opinions, and acknowledge the validity of differing perspectives. To cultivate democratic citizenship, students must have these meaningful opportunities and interactions that develop their empathy for others and broader social issues, as well as develop skills for independent responsibility, collaboration, problem-solving, and critical reflection (Dewey, 1997; Hytten, 2017). Parker (2020) also stressed the significance of recognizing affect within pedagogy, as emotions can be easily manipulated in the post-truth era, and youth are exposed to more complex interactions and hidden vulnerabilities daily. It is essential that education systems foster opportunities for youth to reflect and consider “meaning-making encounters between the self” (p.  617) and “grapple with the tensions between knowing and feeling” (p.  615) in order to understand how political beliefs, values, and knowledge may be shaped by these interactions.

136 

L. PARKER ET AL.

In addition to curriculum and pedagogy, education must respond to the current challenges through policy that foregrounds the value of education for democracy, rather than education for economic growth. This means a step away from the trends of recent decades that move education policy towards neoliberalism. Current neoliberal reformation of public education policy means that educational learning and goals are conducted through a market approach that prioritizes competitive individualism and achievement (Hamilton & Tett, 2021). These market principles and practices not only “reduce ethical and emotional complexity in favour of skills” (Parker, 2020, p. 613) in education, but also replace political principles of the citizen with “the sovereignty of the consumer” (Peters, 1995, p. 41). d’Agnese (2019) discusses how this neoliberal framing of education has fundamental impacts on both students and teachers, thereby transforming the educational relationships and dynamics within these spaces. d’Agnese (2019) notes that under neoliberalism, students are now engaging with each other in “a standardized arena” (p. 700), and are all aiming to achieve the same skills, knowledge, and goals that are necessary to ‘succeed’ within the twenty-first century. Apple (2017) highlights how the marketization of democracy, where this way of thinking becomes condensed into consumption principles and practices, leads to the decrease of socially responsive actions of the collective as “the world becomes a vast supermarket, one in which those with economic and cultural capital are advantaged” (Apple, 2017, p. 149). If education continues to prioritize career training, reduce students to their economic worth, and limit their critical agency, then “we can expect the further decline of social democracy” (Peters, 2017, p. 565) as students are lacking opportunities to engage with experiential and participatory democracy, therefore limiting their abilities to recognize differences, and express their creativity (d’Agnese, 2019). Education policy that is influenced by neoliberalism aims at standardization, and advocates narrow consensus about what qualifies as a life well lived, denies the complexity of students’ lived experience——IRL and online. It is incongruent and ineffective to pair neoliberal policy with stand-alone curriculum ‘digital literacies’ shifts and sporadic pedagogical moves. Instead, education policy must grapple with education’s core commitments towards democracy and justice; it must clearly place value on dissensus and complexity. These kinds of policies bolster curriculum and pedagogy and will hopefully foster the diverse discourses and ways of knowing that are foundational for a healthy democratic society (Mouffe, 2004; Ruitenberg, 2009).

7  PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 

137

References Abi-Jaoude, E., Naylor, K.  T., & Pignatiello, A. (2020). Smartphones, social media use and youth mental health. Canadian Medical Association Journal, 192(6), 136–141. Allcott, H., & Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(2), 211–236. https://doi. org/10.1257/jep.31.2.211 Alonzo, R., Hussain, J., Stranges, S., & Anderson, K. (2021). Interplay between social media use, sleep quality, and mental health in youth: A systematic review. Sleep Medicine Reviews, 56, 1–12. Apple, M. W. (2017). What is present and absent in critical analyses of neoliberalism in education. Peabody Journal of Education, 92(1), 148–153. https://doi. org/10.1080/0161956X.2016.1265344 Auxier, B., & Anderson, M. (2021) Social media use in 2021. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/04/07/social-­m ediause-­in-­2021/ Barzilai, S., & Chinn, C.  A. (2020). A review of educational responses to the “post-truth” condition: Four lenses on “post-truth” problems. Educational Psychologist, 55(3), 107–119. https://doi.org/10.1080/0046152 0.2020.1786388 Beam, M. A., Hmielowski, J. D., & Hutchens, M. J. (2018). Democratic digital inequalities: Threat and opportunity in online citizenship from motivation and ability. American Behavioral Scientist, 62(8), 1079–1096. https://doi. org/10.1177/0002764218764253 Berryman, C., Ferguson, C., & Negy, C. (2018). Social media use and mental health among young adults. Psychiatric Quarterly, 89(2), 307–314. Bimber, B. (2017). Three prompts for collective action in the context of digital media. Political Communication, 34(1), 6–20. https://doi.org/10.108 0/10584609.2016.1223772 Chinn, C. A., Barzilai, S., & Duncan, R. G. (2021). Education for a “post-truth” world: New directions for research and practice. Educational Researcher, 50(1), 51–60. https://doi.org/10.3102/0013189X20940683 Choi, D., Chun, S., Oh, H., & Han, J. (2020). Rumor propagation is amplified by echo chambers in social media. Scientific Reports, 10(1), 1–10. https://doi. org/10.1038/s41598-­019-­57272-­3 Cuan-Baltazar, J.  Y., Muñoz-Perez, M.  J., Robledo-Vega, C., Pérez-Zepeda, M. F., & Soto-Vega, E. (2020). Misinformation of COVID-19 on the internet: Infodemiology study. JMIR Public Health and Surveillance, 6(2), 1–9. https:// doi.org/10.2196/18444

138 

L. PARKER ET AL.

d’Agnese, V. (2019). Dewey and possibility: challenging neoliberalism in education. Educational Theory, 69(6), 693–717. https://doi.org/10.1111/ edth.12400 Dewey, J. (1997). Democracy and education. Free Press. Duggen, M., & Smith, A. (2013). 6% of online adults are reddit users. Pew Research Center, http://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2013/07/03/6-­ofonline-adults-­are-­reddit-­users/ Dutton, W. H., Reisdorf, B., Dubois, E., & Blank, G. (2017). Social shaping of the politics of internet search and networking: Moving beyond filter bubbles, echo chambers, and fake news. Quello Center Working Paper, 2944191, 1–26. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2944191 Edgerly, S., Thorson, K., & Wells, C. (2018). Young citizens, social media, and the dynamics of political learning in the US presidential primary election. American Behavioral Scientist, 62(8), 1042–1060. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0002764218764236 Fazzaro, C. J., & Walter, J. E. (2002). Schools for democracy: Lyotard, dissensus and education policy. International Journal of Leadership in Education, 5(1), 15–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/13603120110034375 Feinberg, W., & Torres, C.  A. (2001). Democracy and education: John Dewey and Paulo Freire. In J. Zajda (Ed.), Education and society (pp. 59–70). James Nicholas Publishers. Fermin, A. (2009). Islamitisch en Extreem-Rechtse Radicalisering in Nederland: Een Vergelijkend Literatuuronderzoek. Risbo Research Training Consultancy. Garimella, K., De Francisci Morales, G., Gionis, A., & Mathioudakis, M. (2018, April). Political discourse on social media: Echo chambers, gatekeepers, and the price of bipartisanship. In Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference (pp. 913-922). https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.01665.pdf Greenhow, C., Galvin, S. M., & Staudt Willet, K. B. (2019). What should be the role of social media in education? Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6(2), 178–185. https://doi.org/10.1177/2372732219865290 Greenwood, A., Lauren, B., Knott, J., & DeVoss, D. N. (2019). Dissensus, resistance, and ideology: Design thinking as a rhetorical methodology. Journal of Business and Technical Communication, 33(4), 400–424. https://doi. org/10.1177/1050651919854063 Gupta, L., Gasparyan, A. Y., Misra, D. P., Agarwal, V., Zimba, O., & Yessirkepov, M. (2020). Information and misinformation on COVID-19: A cross-sectional survey study. Journal of Korean Medical Science, 35(27). https://doi. org/10.3346/jkms.2020.35.e256 Hamilton, M., & Tett, L. (2021). Introduction: Resisting neoliberalism in education. In M. Hamilton & L. Tett (Eds.), Resisting neoliberalism in education: Local, national and transnational perspectives (pp. 1–10). Policy Press.

7  PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 

139

Hansen, D.  T. (2006). Introduction: Reading democracy and education. In D. T. Hansen (Ed.), John Dewey and our educational prospect: A critical engagement with Dewey's democracy and education (pp. 1–22). SUNY Press. Harlan, M.  A., Bruce, C., & Lupton, M. (2014). Creating and sharing: teens' information practices in digital communities. Information Research, 19, 1. Heilweil, R., & Ghaffary, S. (2021, January 8). How Trump’s internet built and broadcast the Capitol insurrection. Vox.. https://www.vox.com/ recode/22221285/trump-­online-­capitol-­riot-­far-­right-­parler-­twitter-­facebook Hornik, R., Kikut, A., Jesch, E., Woko, C., Siegel, L., & Kim, K. (2021). Association of COVID-19 misinformation with face mask wearing and social distancing in a nationally representative US sample. Health Communication, 36(1), 6–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/10410236.2020.1847437 Hytten, K. (2017). Democracy and education in the United States. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Education, 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1093/ acrefore/9780190264093.013.2 Jandrić, P. (2018). Post-truth and critical pedagogy of trust. In M.  A. Peters, S. Rider, M. Hyvönen, & T. Besley (Eds.), Post-truth, fake news: Viral modernity & higher education (pp. 101–112). Springer. Kahne, J., & Bowyer, B. (2018). The political significance of social media activity and social networks. Political Communication, 35(3), 470–493. https://doi. org/10.1080/10584609.2018.1426662 Kahne, J., Hodgin, E., & Eidman-Aadahl, E. (2016). Redesigning civic education for the digital age: Participatory politics and the pursuit of democratic engagement. Theory & Research in Social Education, 44(1), 1–35. https://doi.org/1 0.1080/00933104.2015.1132646 Kahne, J., & Middaugh, E. (2008). Democracy for some: The civic opportunity gap in high school. Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE). Kahne, J., & Middaugh, E. (2012). Digital media shapes youth participation in politics: Social media are changing how youth involve themselves in politics. Educators also must change how they prepare students to be involved citizens. Phi Delta Kappan, 94(3), 52–56. Keefe, E.  B., & Copeland, S.  R. (2011). What is Literacy? The Power of a Definition. Research and Practice for Persons with Severe Disabilities, 36(3–4), 92–99. KhosraviNik, M. (2018). Social media techno-discursive design, affective communication and contemporary politics. Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 11(4), 427–442. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40647-­018-­0226-­y Klein, A. (2021). Social Networks and the Challenge of Hate Disguised as Fear and Politics. Journal for Deradicalization, 56, 1–33.

140 

L. PARKER ET AL.

Koc-Michalska, K., & Lilleker, D. (2017). Digital politics: Mobilization, engagement, and participation. Political Communication, 34(1), 1–5. https://doi. org/10.1080/10584609.2016.1243178 Kruse, L. M., Norris, D. R., & Flinchum, J. R. (2018). Social media as a public sphere? Politics on social media. The Sociological Quarterly, 59(1), 62–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/00380253.2017.1383143 Kümpel, A. S. (2020). The Matthew Effect in social media news use: Assessing inequalities in news exposure and news engagement on social network sites (SNS). Journalism, 21(8), 1083–1098. Lacasa, P., de la Fuente, J., Garcia-Pernia, M., & Cortés, S. (2017). Teenagers, fandom and identity. Persona Studies, 3(2), 51–65. Lacasa, P., Zaballos, L. M., & de la Fuente Prieto, J. (2016). Fandom, music and personal relationships through media: How teenagers use social networks. IASPM Journal, 6(1), 44–67. Laybats, C., & Tredinnick, L. (2016). Post truth, information, and emotion. Business Information Review, 33(4), 204–206. https://doi. org/10.1177/0266382116680741 Lee, S., & Xenos, M. (2019). Social distraction? Social media use and political knowledge in two US Presidential elections. Computers in Human Behavior, 90, 18–25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2018.08.006 Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U.  K., & Cook, J. (2017). Beyond misinformation: Understanding and coping with the “post-truth” era. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 6(4), 353–369. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.jarmac.2017.07.008 Marchi, R. (2012). With Facebook, blogs, and fake news, teens reject journalistic “objectivity”. Journal of Communication Inquiry, 36(3), 246–262. Mason, L. E., Krutka, D., & Stoddard, J. (2018). Media literacy, democracy, and the challenge of fake news. Journal of Media Literacy Education, 10(2), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.23860/JMLE-2018-10-2-1. Mouffe, C. (2004). Pluralism, dissensus and democratic citizenship. In F. Inglis (Ed.), Education and the good society (pp. 42–53). Palgrave Macmillan. Munger, K., Egan, P.  J., Nagler, J., Ronen, J., & Tucker, J. (2022). Political knowledge and misinformation in the era of social media: Evidence from the 2015 UK election. British Journal of Political Science, 1-21, 1. https://doi. org/10.1017/S0007123420000198 Nee, R. C. (2019). Youthquakes in a post-truth era: Exploring social media news use and information verification actions among global teens and young adults. Journalism & Mass Communication Educator, 74(2), 171–184. Ohme, J. (2019). When digital natives enter the electorate: Political social media use among first-time voters and its effects on campaign participation. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 16(2), 119–136. https://doi.org/10.108 0/19331681.2019.1613279

7  PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 

141

O’Malley, R. L., Holt, K., & Holt, T. J. (2020). An exploration of the involuntary celibate (InCel) subculture online. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 1, 1–28. Parker, L. (2020). Literacy in the post-truth era: The significance of affect and the ethical encounter. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 53(6), 1–11. https:// doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2020.1803834 Peters, M. A. (1995). Radical democracy, the politics of difference, and education. In B.  Kanpol & P.  McLaren (Eds.), Critical multiculturalism: Uncommon voices in a common struggle. Bergin & Garvey. Peters, M. A. (2017). Education in a post-truth world. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 46(6), 563–566. https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2016.1264114 Roozenbeek, J., Schneider, C. R., Dryhurst, S., Kerr, J., Freeman, A. L., Recchia, G., Van Der Bles, A. M., & Van Der Linden, S. (2020). Susceptibility to misinformation about COVID-19 around the world. Royal Society Open Science, 7(10), 201199. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.201199 Rothstein, R., & Jacobsen, R. (2006). The goals of education. Phi Delta Kappan, 88(4), 264–272. https://doi.org/10.1177/003172170608800405 Ruitenberg, C.  W. (2009). Educating political adversaries: Chantal Mouffe and radical democratic citizenship education. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 28(3), 269–281. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-­008-­9122-­2 Santos, B.  R. (2021). Echo chambers, ignorance and domination. Social Epistemology, 35(2), 109–119. https://doi.org/10.1080/0269172 8.2020.1839590 Schils, N., & Verhage, A. (2017). Understanding how and why young people enter radical or violent extremist groups. International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 11(2), 1–18. Smith, K., & Parker, L. (2021). Reconfiguring literacies in the age of misinformation and disinformation. Journal of Language and Literacy Education, 17(2), 1–27. Swire-Thompson, B., & Lazer, D. (2020). Public health and online misinformation: Challenges and recommendations. Annual Review of Public Health, 41(1), 433–451. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-­publhealth-­040119094127 Tasnim, S., Hossain, M.  M., & Mazumder, H. (2020). Impact of rumors and misinformation on COVID-19 in social media. Journal of Preventive Medicine and Public Health, 53(3), 171–174. https://doi.org/10.3961/jpmph.20.094 Tolentino, J. (2018, May). The Rage of the Incels. The New Yorker. https://www. newyorker.com/culture/cultural-­comment/the-­rage-­of-­the-­incels Wollebæk, D., Karlsen, R., Steen-Johnsen, K., & Enjolras, B. (2019). Anger, Fear, and Echo Chambers: The Emotional Basis for Online Behavior. Social Media + Society. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305119829859

CHAPTER 8

Can Truth Change? Philosophical Dialogue to Foster Pupils’ Reflection About (Mis)information Jelle De Schrijver and Eef Cornelissen

Introduction: Media Literacy Education and Reflection About Knowledge Children grow up in a world characterised by an ever-increasing supply of digital information. They are literally only one click away from information and misinformation on just about any topic. Teaching minors to navigate this sea of (mis)information is the challenge. After all, they will need to paddle through these waves of information and (mis)leading ideas for most of their lives. Yet, when learning to navigate one must not only master the use of a compass, but one must also learn to understand the nature

J. De Schrijver (*) Antwerp University, Antwerp, Belgium Odisee University College, Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] E. Cornelissen Odisee University College, Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Parker (ed.), Education in the Age of Misinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25871-8_8

143

144 

J. DE SCHRIJVER AND E. CORNELISSEN

of the sea. That’s the focus of this chapter: we discuss how exploring the philosophical underpinnings of knowledge may scaffold pupils’ reflection about media and (fake) news. We will illustrate this approach with examples of learning materials used to stimulate reflection skills of 10- to 12-year-olds by focusing on the practice of philosophy with children. Already from a young age, Flemish children actively use online media and the internet (Vanwynsberghe et  al., 2022). Whereas many six-year-­ olds use a tablet computer, many eight-year-olds have their own smartphone. Ten to twelve-year-olds enter what is called ‘digital puberty’. This means that these children make their own social media profiles to find information and keep in touch with each other. Especially on social media, it is challenging for children to distinguish misinformation from information (Kozyreva et  al., 2020). Media literacy education is meant to help children orientate themselves in this (mis)information society (Valentine & Wukovitz, 2013). Sonia Livingstone defined media literacy as ‘the ability to access, analyse, evaluate and create messages across a variety of contexts’ (Livingstone, 2004). It covers not only the skill to find and access reliable information, but it also relates to the skill to analyse and evaluate media and the ability to create it (Livingstone, 2004). A wide range of practices have been developed to help primary and secondary school pupils find accurate information, spot misinformation and develop their media literacy skills (Potter, 2013). These tools to help pupils find reliable knowledge in media sources, function as compasses guiding pupils across the sea of (mis)information. Media literacy education is more than providing tips and tricks to differentiate ‘false’ from ‘true’. Media literacy teaching practices concurrently aim to elicit an understanding of how forms of media function, how they are used and which effects they have in our media society (Zwanenberg & Pardoen, 2010). Media literacy education cannot be successful without addressing children’s critical thinking skills. This idea surfaces in Silverblatt’s definition of media literacy as a critical thinking skill that enables audiences to develop independent judgements about media content (Silverblatt, 2008). In this approach, media literacy is first and foremost the competence to apply critical thinking skills to our primary source of information: the media. Thinking critically about media entails developing an understanding about the nature of knowledge and information. After all, reducing media literacy to a set of tips and tricks to find accurate information may lead pupils to adopt a schematic understanding of knowledge where

8  CAN TRUTH CHANGE? PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE TO FOSTER PUPILS’… 

145

information is either labelled ‘good’ or ‘bad’. An understanding of the mechanisms that determine the quality of information and an understanding of knowledge as such are as relevant. Studies in epistemology and philosophy of science can help point out what pupils (and their teachers) can find challenging in tackling these philosophical aspects of knowledge: 1) Knowledge can change: what scientists considered true today isn’t necessarily true tomorrow. This does not mean that scientific knowledge is completely volatile and relative. Yet, it does mean that changing ideas and progressive insight are fundamental to what makes science ‘science’ (Schwartz et al., 2004). The claim may seem self-evident, yet for children, a changing (or evolving) truth can be challenging and puzzling (Lederman, 2007). To help pupils gain insight in the idea that scientific knowledge changes over time, addressing (philosophical) concepts such as truth or trustworthiness is relevant. The challenge is to help pupils grasp the idea that a change of ideas (a change of what we consider to be true) is a stepping stone towards a sounder understanding of the world, rather than evidence of the inadequacy of science. 2) What some consider truth are considered lies by others. What people consider to be true and what people consider to be reliable information is—in part—dependent on the people themselves. In extreme situations, echo chambers may arise. These are social structures from which other relevant voices have been actively excluded from. In an echo chambers one has been conditioned to distrust information from ‘the other side’ (Nguyen, 2020). To help pupils cope with these challenges, it is relevant to help them develop an understanding of how (scientific) knowledge is developed through confronting perspectives. This doesn’t mean that ‘anything goes’. Yet, acknowledging that what we consider to be knowledge or information is the result of social and scientific processes where findings are discussed and interpreted, may help pupils to understand why some people are convinced of ideas that others completely disagree with (Longino, 2002). 3) A democratic society needs citizens to engage with a wide range of distinct beliefs and opinions which asks for a nuanced understanding of the social nature of knowledge (Mercier & Sperber, 2017). When information is just labelled in distinct categories such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ or ‘reliable’ and ‘unreliable’, this does not suit the social reality we live in, specifically the multiple perspectives a democratic society requires its citizens to engage with. The challenge is to help pupils

146 

J. DE SCHRIJVER AND E. CORNELISSEN

develop a nuanced understanding of the social nature of knowledge to help them understand the role information plays in democracies. To tackle these challenges, critical reflection about the complex relationships between media, knowledge and information is a key goal (Kellner & Share, 2007). Helping pupils to reflect about the nature of knowledge and information may help to attain it. This entails (i) focusing on the nature of knowledge and concepts such as ‘truth’ or ‘false’ to motivate pupils to critically reflect on the quality of media and information and (ii) allowing pupils to explore different perspectives on information to learn how to separate the meaning of words from reality and (iii) reflecting about the role of knowledge and information in democratic societies. Focusing on these philosophical aspects of knowledge is not only relevant for adults or high school pupils, but it can be relevant for primary school children as well. After all, a broad consensus emerges that media literacy is to be introduced from a young age (Rasi et al., 2019). As children encounter (mis)information, it is relevant to help them navigate and provide the tools to cope with it from a young age. Fortunately, a range of teaching tools from the field of ‘philosophy with children’ (PwC) can help to achieve this goal and help them reflect upon the nature of knowledge, truth and information. PwC is a teaching practice where children engage in philosophical dialogues, which will be described in further detail below. In this chapter we discuss how an exploration of the philosophical aspects of knowledge may help pupils reflect about information. First, we discuss how philosophy with children can play a key role in inducing reflection on media and information. Then, we demonstrate how the practice of PwC can spark dialogues about key concepts such as truth, information, opinion or facts. We illustrate this by providing samples of teaching materials developed in Belgium. Afterwards, we report on a study during which 12 groups of 10- to 12-year-olds were invited to engage in philosophical dialogues about truth and information. Excerpts from teacher interviews and examples of pupil dialogues will document how this teaching approach functions in primary school classes. Finally, we discuss challenges and opportunities of introducing philosophical dialogue to strengthen media literacy in primary schools.

8  CAN TRUTH CHANGE? PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE TO FOSTER PUPILS’… 

147

Philosophy with Children to Enhance Critical Reflection ‘Can a rabbit be a scientist?’ Sometimes surprisingly simple philosophical questions lead to inspiring reflections. That’s the focal point of PwC. The philosopher of pragmatism John Dewey can be regarded as one of its founders (Brenifier, 2004). At the beginning of the twentieth century, the pragmatist criticised education where only the teacher determines the learning content, and the pupil is regarded as a passive recipient. Dewey argued for a form of education in which the emphasis is placed on the learners and the latter can take responsibility for their own learning process (Dewey, 1997). It is in this vein that the American philosopher Matthew Lipman developed the methodology of philosophy for children in the 1960s (Lipman, 1988). Lipman regarded philosophy not only as an academic discipline but also as a form of dialogical thinking (Lipman, 2003). In this respect, philosophising refers to the ability to gain knowledge through logical thinking (Schjelderup, 2009). Central to PwC is the ambition to help pupils think critically and creatively. A focus on logic plays a central role in this process, for example, by exploring how to distinguish arguments from fallacies. This process takes place in a social context, a class for example, which is called the ‘community of inquiry’. In a philosophical dialogue, a group of children search for answers to philosophical questions under the guidance of a facilitator. The facilitator takes the ‘Socratic stance’ which means that he/she facilitates the dialogue and questions the participants’ ideas without participating in the dialogue or judging the participants’ ideas. Children are questioned about the coherence and relevance of arguments and about the (hidden) premises or consequences of their statements. A philosophical dialogue often starts after a philosophical problem is introduced with a stimulus that provokes reflection and dialogue (e.g., a story, image or experiment) (Lipman, 2003). The German philosopher and pedagogue Leonard Nelson further clarifies what happens during philosophical dialogues by introducing the concept ‘regressive abstraction’ (Nelson, 1994). Nelson points out that the concepts we use in everyday conversation are rather vague. When we use philosophical concepts such as ‘democracy’, ‘justice’, ‘truth’ or ‘culture’ we hardly ever have a clear and precise understanding of these ideas. Participation in philosophical dialogues allows one/us to explore what we mean with these words, which we use so often. Nelson calls this process

148 

J. DE SCHRIJVER AND E. CORNELISSEN

‘regressive abstraction’ as the facilitator’s questions allow one/us to explore and discuss the fundamental meaning of the concepts we use. For instance, when we think about the question of whether a person can be free, sooner or later someone will introduce the meaning of ‘freedom’ into the inquiry. When this happens, the dialogue has a chance to ‘regress’ to a different layer where the characteristics of a concept are discussed. In a philosophical dialogue, the ideas (and misconceptions) children hold are uncovered and examined. The questions asked by the facilitator encourage pupils to explore various points of view. The emphasis lies not on finding one final answer, but on collectively exploring a topic. While facilitating a philosophical dialogue, usually these rules apply (Rondhuis, 2005): (i) opinions are only allowed if they are supported with arguments, (ii) participants may respond to each other’s arguments, but not each to other’s opinions, (iii) statements and arguments must be understandable and accessible to everyone, (iv) Dogmas, irrational certainties and arguments based on external authorities are not allowed and (v) Reasoning must be structured consistently and systematically. Thus, the facilitator helps the learners to structure and clarify their ideas and assumptions (Brenifier, 2004). In recent decades, the impact of philosophical dialogue on young people’s behaviour has been investigated more systematically (Reznitskaya, 2005; Topping et  al., 2019; Ventista, 2018). Philosophy with children appears not only to stimulate young people’s curiosity and capacity for analysis, but also to permanently sharpen their social and discussion skills and reasoning ability (Lafortune et  al., 1999; Sigurdardottir & Nelson, 1999; Ventista, 2018). Because of these effects, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) considers philosophising an important tool in education (Droit, 1995; UNESCO, 2007). The use of philosophical dialogues may be promising to help pupils critically reflect about knowledge. Thus, pupils can come to an understanding of ideas, the relation of these ideas with reality and the ways this understanding can differ for different people (Lipman, 2003; Worley, 2016). Furthermore, by participating in the dialogue pupils explore different perspectives on knowledge, truth and information without necessarily aiming for consensus (Dunlop & De Schrijver, 2018). The dialogues do not necessarily aim for a shared consensus. Instead, dissensus—the absence of agreement—acts as an engine for dialogue, inspiring further inquiry.

8  CAN TRUTH CHANGE? PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE TO FOSTER PUPILS’… 

149

Philosophising About Media and Information in Primary Education ‘What is the difference between opinions and facts?’ or ‘Can truth change?’. Questions such as these allow pupils to explore the conceptual meaning of truth, lies, information and misinformation and can help them discuss the (power) structures underlying media and messages. Yet, for children, a question isn’t enough to spark a dialogue. What is necessary to explore the philosophical ideas is a rich context which the facilitator can provide as a stimulus. In these paragraphs we will describe how an adequate use of stimuli can invite pupils to participate in dialogues about knowledge and information. We will illustrate this approach with examples of learning materials that have been developed for primary school pupils. In PwC, a long tradition exists in the use of philosophical stories as interesting stimuli for critical thinking. (Lipman, 1988). A philosophical story contains characters who think about philosophical questions. These stories provide the children with a thinking model, as it were, containing example dialogues of characters with whom they can identify. In the philosophical conversation that follows the shared reading, the openness of the philosophical stories encourages the children to search for possible fallacies and underlying assumptions (Haynes & Murris, 2012). Story-based philosophising with children also stimulates children’s questioning and investigative attitudes (Lipman, 2003). They learn to distinguish message from messenger and to analyse arguments during philosophical conversations about the stories (Haynes, 2008). In the literature on PwC and media literacy, the following design principles for creating an intervention aimed at primary school pupils come to the surface: i. Develop a series of philosophical stories with a thinking model to invite pupils to reflect on concepts such as truth, trustworthiness and fallacies. ii. Provide thinking exercises that help pupils to question online sources of information such as Google or Tik Tok. iii. Develop thinking exercises that challenge pupils to explore complex issues that allow for different points of view (e.g., by using thought experiments or dilemmas). iv. Provide tools to help teachers facilitate philosophical dialogues.

150 

J. DE SCHRIJVER AND E. CORNELISSEN

These design principles guided the development of a teaching method called ‘Criticat’ (Cornelissen & De Schrijver, 2022). It is meant to stimulate reflection about media and information in pupils between the ages of 10 and 12. The method entails philosophical stories, thinking exercises and philosophical questions. In this method the ‘Criticat’ is a fictional philosopher-detective who serves as a role model to help pupils discuss fact and fiction. The teaching method contains 4 philosophical stories written by a professional storyteller, 40 philosophical questions, 12 thinking exercises and an instruction manual about PwC in the context of media literacy education. The stories function as catalysts for philosophical reflection about how we handle information and knowledge. Central themes include truth, lies and fallacies. Each story is followed by philosophical questions and thinking exercises that playfully challenge children to think about (mis)information.1 For instance, in the story ‘the magic ball’ an unknown object falls into a pond. All the characters (animals) look on in amazement at this phenomenon and each launches an explanation from their own perspective. The Criticat listens to the different explanations and highlights the thinking errors that the animals make. After the story, philosophical questions help the pupils to reflect on the reliability of knowledge and the validity of arguments. Do we all see the same thing when we look at the clouds? Where do thoughts come from? Is the colour green the same for everyone? Is there only one truth? Can you choose what you believe? Is there more than one truth? Is truth an invention? Do my thoughts determine what I see? How can we know what is true?

The thinking exercises consist of thought experiments such as ‘pill of truth’, dilemmas or classification exercises (see Fig. 8.1). In each exercise, pupils are asked to give arguments when they make choices. For instance, 1  The material is freely available on www.kritikat.be. The learning material has recently been translated into English.

8  CAN TRUTH CHANGE? PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE TO FOSTER PUPILS’… 

Fig. 8.1  Examples of thinking exercises

151

152 

J. DE SCHRIJVER AND E. CORNELISSEN

Fig. 8.1  (continued)

in one exercise pupils have to choose whether they would take a pill that enables them to read the mind of everyone they meet; this challenges them to reflect upon the social (dis)advantages of knowledge. In another exercise pupils need to evaluate claims and point out whether these are facts or opinions, this urges pupils to conceptually distinguish fact from opinion. In still another activity pupils categorise newspaper headlines as (potentially) false or true, compelling them to investigate claims and provide arguments for reliability. The interesting part in these exercises is when participants explain why they consider a certain claim as a fact or an opinion, a true or false claim. When pupils explain their train of thought, the teacher/facilitator helps children to uncover, explore and evaluate their ideas about truth, knowledge and information.

8  CAN TRUTH CHANGE? PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE TO FOSTER PUPILS’… 

153

Philosophical Dialogues About Truth and Information in the Primary School: Teachers’ Experiences The Criticat teaching method was introduced in 12 classes of 5th and 6th grade in Flanders and Brussels (10- to 12-year-olds in primary school). The classes have a group size of 10 to 25 pupils. The teacher is present while a trained facilitator carries out the Criticat teaching method with the pupils in the classroom. Each session lasts 2 hours and starts with listening to a story. Afterwards questions and thinking exercises challenge pupils to express their views. Based on interviews with teachers we probe how teachers experience the intervention and how they perceived the impact of the material on pupils’ thinking about (mis)information. The interviews are semi-structured: the criteria list provides an impetus to the conversations rather than a strict interview schedule. The qualitative data from the teacher interviews are written out, coded and analysed according to the principles of qualitative content analysis. This systematic classification process of these data allows themes and patterns to be identified (Mortelmans, 2013). Pupils participate actively in the dialogues. Here we give an example of such a dialogue. The dialogue is based on two pupil conversations that are brought together. We describe the facilitator’s actions in the last column. Teachers report that they were amazed by the quality of the arguments and ideas pupils phrased. They indicate that The teaching method helps uncover what and how children think. Further they observe how this teaching method helps children to think: They (pupils) learn to explain what they really think, a teacher responds. This is considered helpful, Thus, you know what their (pupils’) thinking errors are and where additional clarification is needed. The stories—for example the story of a ball that falls into a pond which every character in the story explains from its own perspective—help the pupils to think by providing a concrete situation: The pupils also referred to the story during the (philosophical) investigation. It stimulated them to take a stand and give their own examples which were then investigated by the group, a teacher says. The use of a character provides the children with a thinking model. The character Criticat is compelling. It invites children to think further, and: They (pupils) dare to experiment with ideas through the context that is created. With the help of the stories and the characters,

154 

J. DE SCHRIJVER AND E. CORNELISSEN

pupils can connect their ideas about information and truth with their own lives. Pupils think about their own statements from their lives online and deceptions from their own world, says another teacher. For example, children spontaneously give testimonies of online deception where they were misled with an edited photo while chatting and examined these testimonies during the philosophical dialogue. With regard to the dialogue facilitation, specific interventions of the facilitator are considered key to stimulate the enquiry: This form of questioning is important as children really start thinking and doubting what they knew. Questions such as ‘Why do you think so?’, ‘Who disagrees?’ or ‘Do you think this, or do you know it?’ challenge participants to question the ideas that are raised. This questioning style elicits reflection: They (pupils) are confronted with their own fallacies, and you plant seeds towards their understanding of their own online behaviour and fake news, a teacher notes. Another teacher adds that The questioning and paraphrasing through questions such as ‘do you mean that?’ supports the pupils to clearly articulate what they think. The observed effect of this dialogic approach and pupil reflection skills motivates teachers to integrate the philosophical dialogue method into their daily teaching practice. The participating teachers saw a lot of opportunities: I'm going to steal the idea of Criticat somewhat. How? (...) I have noticed that it pays to be more patient. Asking more questions does help them Facilitator Is there only one truth?

Introduce philosophical question

Pupil 1

Yes, of course. If there is more than one truth, it wouldn’t be true. When something is true, it is the only real explanation of what happens in the world. Facilitator Who thinks something else?

Ask for different perspectives.

Pupil 2

I don’t know, I think a painting in our living room is beautiful, but my brother thinks it is ugly. Facilitator Who disagrees?

Challenge the argument.

Pupil 3

I disagree. Saying that something is beautiful is not the same as saying something is real. Facilitator Why not? Pupil 3 If something is beautiful is personal, whether being true is what is it is, it is so for everybody, it is not personal.

Ask for arguments?

(continued)

8  CAN TRUTH CHANGE? PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE TO FOSTER PUPILS’… 

155

(continued) Facilitator Is there only one truth?

Introduce philosophical question

Facilitator Is truth something that exists independent of people?

Challenge the argument. Ask for proof.

Pupil 2

Yes, When I look at a field, and my father asks what I see, I see a horse and my brother sees a cloud. So, what we see depends on us. So, what we think and see and believe is perhaps always personal. Facilitator Can we know something without making an Challenge the interpretation? What do the others think? argument. Ask for proof. Ask for different perspectives. Pupil 3 I doubt it…every thought is a bit personal? Sometimes I think 2 and 2 is four, but that’s something in my head, isn’t it? And when everybody says 2 and 2 is 5, it could change. Pupil 5 I disagree. 2 and 2 is always 4. This is a mathematical law. Facilitator What do the others think? Can truth change? Ask for different perspectives. Challenge the argument. Pupil 3 No, if it can change is was not a truth. Pupil 4 Maybe there are different truths, like 2 and 2 is 4 will always stay the same, but a personal truth like my idea of a painting is personal and different from person to person.

think. I have seen that they can and do like it. Some teachers want to integrate the teaching method in different courses: I would integrate it into different subjects such as language and social skills, I would take a crosscurricular approach, so that they understand how important it is. After all: Learning to think is an important basis in life and you have to develop that, ideally in different subjects. Yet, facilitating a philosophical dialogue appears to be very challenging and thus requires adequate training. Some teachers indicate that they first want to learn more about the discussion method to learn how to guide the philosophical conversations. They express the fear that they might not be good enough facilitators to guide the dialogue about knowledge and truth. Other teachers indicate that the methodology is accessible, especially

156 

J. DE SCHRIJVER AND E. CORNELISSEN

the philosophical exercises. Many teachers say they learned at least one important thing while observing the Criticat sessions: I am going to ask more questions.

Discussion: Opportunities and Pitfalls of the Use of Philosophical Dialogues in Media Literacy Education The try-outs show that the teaching method has the potential to help 10to 12-year-olds engage in dialogues about philosophical concepts such as truth and information: teachers appreciate the teaching method and are eager to integrate it into their teaching practice. The approach can be called philosophical in two ways. First, it focuses on philosophical content, the philosophical underpinnings of knowledge and information: it allows pupils to discuss the nature of knowledge and reality. Second, it is philosophical in its didactic approach: it uses the method of (philosophical) dialogue and PwC to stimulate reflection about information and literacy. Both philosophical pathways have their value. First, the focus on epistemological underpinnings of knowledge allows that pupils discuss key ideas that surface in a context of media literacy education. It allows pupils to explore the meaning of ideas that are used so often, yet are rarely explored, like ‘knowledge’, ‘information’, ‘truth’ or ‘science’. By focusing on the meaning of these concepts, pupils learn to grasp the concept of ‘truth’ as a goal, rather than as an absolute and unchanging idea. When a participant in a philosophical dialogue answers science helps us find the truth. But tomorrow, a scientist can say that what we consider true today isn’t true anymore, he/she gradually comes to understand the philosophical ideas as human constructs, tools to help us describe reality. Participating in the dialogue can furthermore help pupils to explore how a person’s perspective can influence how they perceive information. For instance, when discussing the ‘magic ball’ story a pupil answers: when we look at a tree, we all see the same tree, yet to us it all looks different, because we are standing in different places. Second, the role of dialogue as a didactic approach leads pupils towards a questioning and reflective attitude, an approach that brings them to investigate ideas rather than take them at face value. A collective dialogue embodies a practice that mirrors how—in our society—knowledge and information are constructed: through dialogue and argumentation. Thus,

8  CAN TRUTH CHANGE? PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE TO FOSTER PUPILS’… 

157

it can help pupils develop a rich and valid understanding of knowledge and information. This dialogic approach helps to imitate in the classroom the agonistic practices (confrontation of ideas) leading to an understanding of the world where the strength of the argument determines whether an idea is accepted or isn’t. This approach mirrors Chantal Mouffe’s plea for reinstating agonism in democratic societies. Rather than aiming for (fake) consensus democratic societies should provide opportunities to disagree with each other, Mouffe claims (2013) as only through disagreements voices are heard and new ideas can surface. The philosophical dialogue may be a tool to help pupils learn how to disagree in a way that does not lead to toxic conflict. However, disagreement may remain under the surface owing to existing power structures in which youngsters from marginalised groups may not voice their disagreement for fear of backlash. To overcome this challenge, the facilitator’s role is to create a ‘safe and brave space’ for participants to feel more free to raise unpopular ideas. In this safe space, the ambition is to engage in dialogue rather than to find a ‘final answer’. Thus, pupils that might feel unheard may be invited to come to the fore. Obviously, this approach isn’t easy. Actively praising pupils who introduce a new idea and inviting students to provide arguments for it may be one of the tools a facilitator has to invite voices that are too easily ignored. One of the challenges of this teaching method is whether it can lead pupils to embrace relativism. To respond to this challenge, it is relevant to point out that in philosophical dialogues anyone can participate, meaning that every participant is equal. This doesn’t mean every claim is equal. In a philosophical dialogue, pupil answers and claims are discussed and evaluated based on the arguments participants provide. Equality at the level of pupil’s participation does not mean that every claim is as valid as another one. Whether this dialogic approach leads to relativism will—in our view— also depend on what is meant with the term ‘relativism’. If relativism means ‘anything goes’ or ‘anyone can have his own private idea of the “truth”’, an approach based on philosophical dialogue will not stimulate this form of naïve relativism (Andre, 1983). After all, the dialogic approach invites pupils to provide arguments for their ideas and come to a collective answer when presented with difficult questions. Yet, if relativism means that concepts such as truth or information can depend on the perspective/ positionality of the speaker, integrating philosophical dialogues in the classroom can lead pupils to embrace this richer and more contextualised understanding of relativism. This kind of relativism is not atypical in

158 

J. DE SCHRIJVER AND E. CORNELISSEN

contemporary epistemic theory. What we consider ‘true’ is the result of social processes, it is in a way constructed (Longino, 2002). A challenge related to relativism is how to help pupils cope with so-­ called echo chambers. The occurrence of echo chambers makes it harder to come to a shared understanding of reality. For example, if a pupil believes that vaccines are meant to control people and that academics are claiming the opposite for their personal career, more information about vaccine research will only confirm the pupils’ previous distrust towards science. To cope with this challenge, Nguyen suggests a Cartesian reboot of the individual epistemic belief systems (Nguyen, 2020), which asks for an adequate environment to do so. Simon Levin et al. (2021) formulates this as introducing diverse opinions in a group, as diversity challenges people to test their ideas. An approach based on philosophical dialogue may be such a safe (and brave) environment that allows exploring different ideas and potentially rebooting one’s epistemic belief system. In part, this is due to the Socratic stance of the facilitator. This implies he/she welcomes every idea that is well-motivated, even when it is uncommon or unfashionable. This non-judgemental position creates a space where different perspectives are welcomed. Obviously, assessing the impact of this teaching method needs further study. This exploratory study focuses foremost on the teacher’s impressions and the quality of the learning material. What we discussed above provides impressions of how this approach can elicit reflection. Assessing how this approach impacts pupils’ thinking and how it helps their media literacy skills is a subject for future study. Yet, thus far, we can formulate some guidelines on how to cope with media literacy based on the experiences with PwC: 1. Embody a questioning attitude to help pupils inquire into the nature of knowledge and information. 2. Create a safe and brave dialogue environment to help pupils exchange ideas and explore arguments. 3. Couple philosophical dialogues to already existing media literacy education practices. Philosophical reflection is complementary to other approaches. Assuredly, it can be useful for pupils to have rules of thumb to know where to find reliable information. In addition, reflecting about what we mean with ‘reliable’ can further help pupils develop a critical attitude.

8  CAN TRUTH CHANGE? PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE TO FOSTER PUPILS’… 

159

4. Use (philosophical) stories as models to help pupils take a critical attitude. The skills children acquire when analysing philosophical stories are similar to the skills we need to analyse news items, such as detecting fallacies and understanding the reliability of the message and messenger (Feuerstein, 1999). 5. Train teachers to facilitate philosophical dialogues. It will help them to cope with questions that have no definite answers. It might help to integrate the principles of ‘philosophy with children’ in the educational curriculum for teachers. The ancient Greek philosopher Socrates framed philosophy as the discipline to question and problematise everything that others take for granted. Thus, a philosophical approach to (mis)information is relevant for us to understand the challenges facing pupils when they are confronted with (social) media and information. But it is not only up to the scholars to delve into the philosophical inquiry. In this chapter we explored how even primary school pupils can participate in philosophical inquiries on misinformation. It may help them to develop a critical and questioning attitude towards (mis)information. This can enable them to respond adequately to the diversity of opinions and ideas they will encounter as citizens. This way we may realise what John Dewey once dreamed of: schools as micro-societies where pupils can experience what it is like to be a citizen (Dewey, 1997). Attention for shared inquiry and dialogue can help pupils deal with the diversity of opinions, ideas and media messages that surround us. This way, pupils will be better equipped to navigate the seas of knowledge and (mis)information that await them.

References Andre, J. (1983). Dealing with Naive Relativism in the Classroom. Metaphilosophy, 14(2), 179–182. Brenifier, O. (2004). A quick glance at the Lipman method. Diotime – l’Agora. Dewey, J. (1997). Democracy and education. The Free Press. Droit, R.-P. (1995). Philosophy and democracy in the world. UNESCO Publishing. Cornelissen, E., & De Schrijver, J. (2022). Kan waarheid een leugen zijn? Kinderen kritisch laten denken over media en (des)informatie met Kritikat. Tijdschrift voor jeugd en kinderrechten, 3, 188–202. Dunlop, L., & De Schrijver, J. (2018). Can a rabbit be a scientist? Stimulating philosophical dialogues in science classes. School Science review, 99(368), 35–44.

160 

J. DE SCHRIJVER AND E. CORNELISSEN

Feuerstein, M. (1999). Media Literacy in Support of Critical Thinking. Journal of Educational Media, 24(1), 43–54. Haynes, J., & Murris, K. (2012). Picturebooks, Pedagogy and Philosophy. Routledge. Haynes, J. (2008). Children as philosophers: Learning through enquiry and dialogue in the primary classroom. Routledge. Kellner, D., & Share, J. (2007). Critical media literacy is not an option. Learning Inquiry, 1, 59–69. Kozyreva, A., Lewandowsky, S., & Hertwig, R. (2020). Citizens versus the internet: Confronting digital challenges with cognitive tools. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 21(3), 103–156. Lederman, N. G. (2007). Nature of science: Past, present, and future. In S. Abell & N.  G. Lederman (Eds.), Handbook of Research on Science Education (pp. 831–880). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Levin, S. A., Milner, H. V., & Perrings, C. (2021). The dynamics of political polarization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118(50), 1–4. Lipman, M. (2003). Thinking in education. Cambridge University Press. Lipman, M. (1988). Philosophy goes to school. Temple University. Livingstone, S. (2004). What is media literacy? Intermedia, 32(3), 8–20. Longino, H. (2002). The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton University Press. Mercier, H., & Sperber, B. (2017). The enigma of reason. Penguin. Mortelmans, D. (2013). Handboek kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethoden. Acco. Mouffe, C. (2013). Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically. Verso. Nelson, L. (1994). De Socratische methode. Boom. Nguyen, C.  T. (2020). Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Episteme, 17(2), 141–161. Potter, W. J. (2013). Review of Literature on Media Literacy. Sociology Compass, 7(6), 417–435. Rasi, P., Vuojärvi, H., & Ruokamo, H. (2019). Media literacy education for all ages. Journal of Media Literacy Education, 11(2), 1–19. Reznitskaya, A. (2005). Empirical Research in Philosophy for Children: Limitations and New Directions. Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children, 17(4), 4–13. Rondhuis, N.  T. W. (2005). Philosophical Talent. Empirical investigations into philosophical features of adolescents' discourse. Veenman. Schjelderup, A. (2009). Learning science through philosophical dialogues. Farhang Journal, 22, 1. Schwartz, R., Lederman, R., & Crawford, B. (2004). Developing views of nature of science in an authentic context: an explicit approach to bridging the gap between nature of science and scientific inquiry. Science Teacher Education, 88(4), 611–645. Sigurdardottir, Y., & Nelson, B. (1999). Philosophy for Children on Top of the World. University Akureyri.

8  CAN TRUTH CHANGE? PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE TO FOSTER PUPILS’… 

161

Silverblatt, A. (2008). Media literacy: Keys to interpreting media messages. Praeger. Topping, K., Trickey, S., & Cleghorn, P. (2019). A Teacher’s guide to philosophy for children. Routledge. UNESCO. (2007). Philosophy: A School of Freedom. Teaching philosophy and learning to philosophize: status and prospects. UNESCO Publishing. Valentine, A., & Wukovitz, L. (2013). Using The Filter Bubble to Create a Teachable Moment. Pennsylvania Libraries. Research & Practice, 1(1), 24–34. Vanwynsberghe, H., Joris, G., Waeterloos, C., Anrijs, S., Vanden Abeele, M., Ponnet, K., De Wolf, R., Van Ouytsel, J., Van Damme, K., Vissenberg, J., D’Haenens, L., Zenner, E., Peters, E., De Pauw, S., Frissen, L., & Schreuer, C. (2022). Onderzoeksrapport Apestaartjaren: de digitale leefwereld van kinderen en jongeren. Mediaraven. Ventista, O. (2018). A literature review of empirical evidence on the effectiveness of Philosophy for Children. In E.  Duthie, F.  García Moriyón, & R.  Robles Loro (Eds.), Family resemblances: Current trends in Philosophy for Children (pp. 450–471). Anaya. Worley, P. (2016). Ariadne’s Clew Absence and presence in the facilitation of philosophical conversations. Journal of Philosophy in Schools, 3(2), 51–70. Zwanenberg, F., & Pardoen, J. (2010). Handboek Mediawijsheid op School. Stichting Mijn Kind Online.

CHAPTER 9

Transactions of Online Literacy: Ethical Relationality, ICT, and Critical Reading Skills in the Post-Truth Era Joe Stouffer, Zahra Kasamali, Matteo Di Muro, Michelle Lam, and Ellen Watson

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the deep and painful impacts of confrontational interactions as a result of living in the post-truth era, such as severed relationships and increasing distance between groups of people (Kasamali, 2021). What good is an individual lesson about misinformation in the face of a powerful algorithm, when students swirl in misinformation, echo chambers, and belonging predicated on sameness? The ways in which individuals construct their identity have shifted as new online literacies (Leu et al., 2013), such as those mediated by digital social media, coalesce into our real-life, offline literacies, and interactions (Gee, 2020). Increasingly, studies examine how digital media are resources for sharing interests (Knobel & Lankshear, 2016). Yet, digital communication

J. Stouffer (*) • Z. Kasamali • M. Di Muro • M. Lam • E. Watson Brandon University, Brandon, MB, Canada e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Parker (ed.), Education in the Age of Misinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25871-8_9

163

164 

J. STOUFFER ET AL.

has changed notions of alignment and relationality (Graham, 2016). Online interactions show the capacity to embolden unethical discourses which overlook relationship in online and real-life spaces. For example, fractured relationships are more frequently stemming from different online spaces that deploy misinformation to politicize or in other ways, polarize beliefs about vaccinations, climate change, civic protest, banning of topics in education, and many other issues. Early research on these social issues shows a deep relational impact, such as the recent Harris poll which highlighted over a third of Americans cutting ties over vaccine status during the global COVID-19 pandemic (Gerzema & Johnson, 2022). This chapter explores how teachers and, by extension, students in their classrooms, are impacted by questions about evaluating information, and the extent to which this is informed by ethical relationality, or sense of belonging, and conceptions of conflict. We explore the intersections between critical reading skills (Duke & Martin, 2019) and ethical relationality. This is guided by Dwayne Donald’s (2009, 2012, 2016, 2021) conceptions and practices of ethical relationality as espoused by Cree and Blackfoot philosophies. Ethical relationality is an “ecological understanding of organic connectivity that becomes readily apparent to us human beings when we honour the sacred ecology that supports all life and living” (Donald, 2016, p. 11). Consequently, ethical relationality is guided by sacred ecological philosophies that remind that all life forms are simultaneously connected through difference. Difference in this regard is necessary for life to go on, and is required to maintain relationships of trust, mutuality, balance, and reciprocity. Sacred ecological conceptions of difference instruct that different histories, memories, ways of knowing and being need not be assimilated or ignored. The key point to address here is that it is an ethical imperative that human beings live alongside other life forms, and ways of knowing and being. It is necessary to place these differences at the forefront if we seek to act on the basis of these relationships. These teachings emphasize that we have a responsibility to each other in creation and that our existence would not be possible without the natural environment. Sacred ecological conceptions of ethical relationality underscore that being fully human requires being accountable to all our relations and having a deep awareness of the implications surrounding individual and collective actions and decision-making. We contend that ecological understandings of organic connectivity can also support interactions in online places. Thus, we examine how information consumed online affects personal relationships, and conversely, how personal

9  TRANSACTIONS OF ONLINE LITERACY: ETHICAL RELATIONALITY, ICT… 

165

relationships impact how people engage with information online that they deem to be controversial and/or relationally jeopardizing. Our chapter discusses four questions starting from the point of view of teachers and teacher candidates: • How are online critical reading skills mediating ICT and social media use? • How is online critical reading informed or disrupted by relational ties? • How is ICT and social media use impacting the ethical responsibility of being with one another in relationships? • How do these intersections inform social practices of online literacy? Finally, we point to the need for a pedagogical response that includes re-­ examining individuals’ navigation of misinformation and the impacts on both online and ‘in real-life’ relationships.

Theoretical Framework We draw upon Leu and colleagues’ dual-level conceptualization of New Literacies (2013) to acknowledge work in this field examining both how social practices drive literacy practices (Street, 2003) and how new literacies, particularly those born through ICT usage, spur the reconfiguration and development of literacy practices and skills in response to ever-­ developing technologies (Leu et al., 2015). Leu et al. (2013) assert that the nature of literacy and theory in this domain are increasingly deictic as social practices and skills supporting online reading keep pace with technological advancement. With earlier work in new literacies by Street (2003) and the New London Group (1996) in mind, we also felt it pertinent to further explore the social practices that are emerging from online explorations and interactions in the context of an age of misinformation. While critical reading skills are imperative to navigate and synthesize meaning from the web, we wish to explore if and how ethical relationality may impact online reading in a time when the concept of “trueness” has been rendered more fluid by misinformation (Luke, 2019). It is our contention that the prioritization of teaching online reading skills must be accompanied by a focus on ethical relationality—both in impacting how readers engage information, think about relationship, and perceive difference as a source of conflict and as an outcome of their engagement.

166 

J. STOUFFER ET AL.

This work also draws upon foundational work of Rosenblatt (2019) in which she depicts reading acts as transactional events: Every reading act is an event, or a transaction involving a particular reading and particular pattern of signs, a text, and occurring at a particular time in a particular context. Instead of two fixed entities acting on one another, the reader and the text are two aspects of a total dynamic situation. The “meaning” does not reside readymade “in” the text or “in” the reader but happens or comes into being during the transaction between reader and text. (p. 455)

In Rosenblatt’s view, readers engage in these transactions through the choices they make before and as they read texts and construct meaning. Online reading offers readers additional choices unique to its nature such as search engines, embedded hyperlinks, a continuous availability of vast information, and readily global access to other humans, both known and strangers to us in real life. Rosenblatt refers to a ‘currency’ of sorts in a reader’s linguistic-experiential reservoir, which includes a reader’s cultural, social, and personal history and experiences with language and texts. To this transactional currency, we would add ethical relationality, not only in its influence on a reader’s construction of meaning but in its steering of choices readers make to select, interpret, and respond before, when and after reading online. As we will explore, among their choices, online readers consider potential relational costs alongside their interpretations of texts as factors within their transactions. We, therefore, frame our conceptualization of the nature of readers’ transactions as being intellectual, emotional, and socially informed.

An Intersecting Model of Transactions of Online Literacy We situate our discussion within a framework that views online critical reading skills, relational contexts, and ICT and social media use as intersecting, transactional elements (Fig. 9.1). “Instead of an interaction, such as billiard balls colliding, there has been a transaction, thought of rather in terms of reverberations, rapid oscillations, blendings, and mutual conditionings” (Rosenblatt, 2019, p. 454). We view cognition, skill teaching, and cognitive-centred approaches to literacy teaching and learning integrated within and defined by social/cultural contexts (Purcell-Gates et al., 2004).

9  TRANSACTIONS OF ONLINE LITERACY: ETHICAL RELATIONALITY, ICT… 

167

Fig. 9.1  A framework for the transactions of online literacy

A backdrop of individual personal beliefs, social-cultural contexts, personal positionality and identities, and misinformation grounds our consideration of influences on readers’ choices. It is at the intersection of these three transactional elements—online critical reading skills, relational contexts, and ICT and social media use—where online readers barter transactions among texts, themselves, and others. However, in an age of misinformation, we argue these online literacy transactions are becoming increasingly confrontational, emotionally driven, and complex to navigate and participate in while honouring care to self and others. Bringing together ethical relationality, online critical reading skills, and ICT and social media use is a unique approach, as fields of study tend to focus on one or two of these. However, as we show, the intersectional consideration of all three is important. Our relationships impact what we believe, how some social media algorithms deliver us information, and how we form allegiances. Thus, our focus needs to include both knowledge about what constitutes misinformation, literacy skills to critically

168 

J. STOUFFER ET AL.

analyse what we (and our students) read, acknowledgement of ethical relationality, and an understanding of the social practices that form dynamically within and around these spheres of influence. A Pilot Study on Relational Impacts of Misinformation To inform our inquiry of these ideas, we drew upon data from a pilot case study with pre- and in-service teachers aimed at examining the relational impacts of misinformation. After a brief presentation of Stop, Investigate, Find Resources, Trace Claims (SIFT), a lateral reading method used to evaluate online information by Caulfield (2019), we used focus group conversations (N=18) and an anonymous survey (N=16) to gather responses to questions about the intersections of digital misinformation and relational ties. A total of 18 participants across three focus groups agreed to include their data in the study. In our preliminary thematic analysis—conducted by Braun and Clarke (2006)—we noted that in their personal lives, participants are carrying relational stress, where relationships and disagreements were viewed as a source of anxiety which they seek to avoid, instead of the relationships around them being a source of strength and encouragement during difficult times. Additionally, many participants had already cut ties over differences of opinion, including comments such as: There is so much polarization, as you highlighted. And of course, I mean, for me, personally, I’ve seen the withering of certain relationships depending on one’s position.—Study Participant I also have been off of social media due to many of my friends getting into conflicts due to their opposing opinions.—Study Participant

Although this initiative was intended as a pilot study, it highlighted the need for further attention to all three areas of focus in this chapter. Findings from this study are woven throughout our unpacking of online critical reading, ICT use, and ethical relationality and their transactional intersections with one another. Online Critical Reading Critical reading skills have long been included among the important comprehension skills of skilled readers. Duke and Martin (2019) call for the

9  TRANSACTIONS OF ONLINE LITERACY: ETHICAL RELATIONALITY, ICT… 

169

cultivation of classroom readers who question and challenge as they read information texts: “Critique, particularly as they get older, rather than simply accepting any given source at face value. We want them to evaluate the credibility of sources, cross-check information, and bring a critical eye to how others have presented information” (p. 251). Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has transformed every aspect of daily life, from how we work to how we learn (Bates, 2019; Collin, 2014). The creation of the world wide web and social media have shaped the way in which our societies generate, share, and interact with information, affecting the way we think, work, and live. This is the digital landscape in which we all live. It is a daily occurrence for most of us to use the online web to facilitate our work, learning, and entertainment. We interact with vast stores of information online that is replete with benefits and possibilities for all manners of human learning and interaction (Zlatkin-Troitschanskaia, 2020). Unfortunately, this means that all manner of information is represented in virtual domains—including information that may not be factually correct, or even intentionally misleading. Researchers have been calling for several years now for better digital literacy amongst students (Breakstone et  al., 2018; Caulfield, 2016). The sense of urgency is great, as researchers have found that news media often provide incomplete and biased information, regardless of whether the topic is politics, science, or the economy (Maurer et al., 2018, p. 201). It is hardly surprising that online information can be conflicting, and information can be easily preselected in ways that collide with “fundamental human values and posing moral or ethical problems” (Zlatkin-­ Troitschanskaia, p. 1). The most common source of such information is from social media, an important pipeline where people interact with information that is filled with rumours, hoaxes, conspiracy theories, propaganda, fake news, and misinformation (Ciampaglia, 2018). Given that many internet users are not equipped with the skills to sift through this information, they are vulnerable to being misled or acquiring incorrect information, believing it to be true (Wineburg et al., 2018). Thus, how we teach our students to navigate these digital landscapes of information is critical not only to their future success, but to the long-term ability of our populace to have important debates about politics, science, and the urgent matters of the day, week, months, and years. As internet access becomes more accessible, and in many cases, preferable, to access information, schools are challenged to keep pace with their students’ digital literacies. In addition to the critical thinking that readers

170 

J. STOUFFER ET AL.

apply to printed texts, digital reading requires additional skills geared to navigate, evaluate, and engage with texts with online features (Coiro, 2020; Turner et al., 2019). Acknowledging the vastness of information and opinion that is now available globally, readers require additional critical reading skills more specific to research and comprehension of texts in online spaces. The nature of digital reading requires new skill sets to engage in digital inquiry, navigate, evaluate, and synthesize information (Nash, 2021). Additionally, online readers now share in the construction of texts they read based on the links they choose to follow and which texts they tend to read (Cho & Afflerback, 2015). It has been demonstrated that readers tend to seek out information on social media that aligns with their views (Schmidt et  al., 2017). Further complicating, social media, such as Facebook, uses algorithms to filter one’s newsfeed based on a reader’s history and presents items that the reader is most likely to click on (Mosseri, 2016). The propensity of readers to seek agreement coupled with social media’s subversive corralling towards ‘more of the same’ often narrows the reader’s exposure to alternate viewpoints and may steer them into ideological echo chambers.

The Shifting Nature of ‘Facts’ and Critical Reading I do many lessons with my kids so that they can practice fact checking and make choices if something can be true or not. I strongly feel that it’s important for them to learn.—Study Participant Even if you use the SIFT method, go to multiple sources, etc., well, that’s just science being science and I believe something opposite … None of the ‘facts’ are true.—Study Participant

In the post-truth era, the value and absoluteness of truth have come under fire in a shifting social and political landscape. The tumultuous United States’ presidency of Donald Trump saw the popularizing of the terms ‘fake news’ and ‘alternate facts’ as political tools which weaponized the undermining of the trustworthiness of media. Similarly, more rightwing outlets have taken up the Oprah Winfrey-popularized term “speaking your truth” which assumes one’s personal narrative and recollection can supplant an official record of events (Braw, 2022). This breakdown of trusted information sources has been cited as one of the “grand challenges of the 21st Century” (Gray, 2017). As the participant cited above pointed

9  TRANSACTIONS OF ONLINE LITERACY: ETHICAL RELATIONALITY, ICT… 

171

out, conspiracy beliefs are persistent, regardless of if one has the skills to verify sources. On a broader scale, critical literacy theory has long examined how language, text, discourse, and information make a difference and for whom (Luke, 2019), however: Conflict over what might count as science, and whether and how science and ideology, both classically defined, stand in relation to ‘truth’ arguably constitutes a threat to the social contract of liberal democracy. This era of radical skepticism, of intellectual and public heteroglossia and polysemy, while not historically unprecedented, raises central challenges which are at once epistemic and cognitive, political, and cultural—and, indeed, educational and pedagogical. (p. 359)

Online critical reading is challenging, as readers are often confronted by texts with ideological extremism, sensationalism, emotional appeals, and denials of facts buried within overwhelming amounts of information (Hobbs, 2017; Janks, 2018). It is not only difficult for readers to determine veracity, they must also do so within an environment where belonging can be predicated on ascribing to particular beliefs. In response, one theme that has been identified in future of the online information environment is the call to “elevate information literacy to be a primary goal of education” (Anderson & Rainie, 2017, p. 6). ICT Use In classrooms, we have unwritten rules of expectations for interactions and behaviours for students (Ward et al., 2021). Some of these rules might be made explicit; treat others as you wish to be treated, for example. However, in many cases, we expect students—especially older students—to operate with what is considered acceptable behaviour. Some of these expectations would include not shaming others, not using racist language, and allowing everyone’s voice to be heard. In an offline world, these are completely reasonable expectations and, in our experience, typically observed by students. However, the unwritten rules can often be blurred or ignored when moving online. Ward et al. (2021) discuss the ease with which hate and racist speech can be shared online. In their example, students in an online course shared anti-Asian statements on a class discussion board near the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. The instructor teaching this course had never

172 

J. STOUFFER ET AL.

experienced such racist sentiments in her offline courses. Yet, as Gin (2019) explains, students may act in a way online that might not be considered socially acceptable offline. According to Suler (2015) these students had fragmented their personalities, sharing racist sentiments because they were in an online space, possibly because they did not have to relate to those being hurt by these comments. In our study, participants voiced awareness that online spaces were spaces that held potential violence. For example, one participant said, It’s like playing chess against a pigeon, you know? You can show them all the arguments, you can show them all the proof. But no matter what you do, they’re going to knock over all the pieces and act [however] they want.

Although participants engaged with these spaces in different ways, their fears over the potential of relational harm were a common thread. They viewed these spaces as less than optimal for engaging with difference and protected themselves by distancing or going offline, limiting the amount of time spent on social media, or avoiding engagement in controversial topics. In some cases, participants distanced themselves from these conversations by pre-judging those with other opinions, not realizing that doing so forecloses conversation: You can’t fight with stupid. You can’t fight with people who aren’t willing to think or be open-minded, and I guess [the] same goes for me; I’m not open-­ minded to learning different things. I have my opinion and that’s my opinion.—Study Participant

Contrarily, some relationships online are impacted by disinhibition. Disinhibition on the internet “is seen as any behaviour that is characterized by an apparent reduction in concerns for self-preservation or the judgment of others” (Joinson, 2007, p. 75). Suler (2015) points to benign and toxic effects of disinhibition, from oversharing online, displays of great compassion for strangers to brazen declaration of extremist views. These behaviours do not occur in a vacuum. For example, one might choose a particular platform because its content may align with their needs or views and could engage in disinhibited acts within the security of confirming discourse in those spaces (Joinson, 2007).

9  TRANSACTIONS OF ONLINE LITERACY: ETHICAL RELATIONALITY, ICT… 

173

Effects of ICT Use on the Portrayal of Self(Ves) Suler (2015)—a clinical psychologist who studies how we perceive the internet—notes that we experience the digital realm as “an extension of our psyches, a space that reflects our personalities, beliefs, and lifestyles” (p. 22). Given how necessary information consumption via digital means and social media has become to our lives, we have chosen to investigate how this realm feeds into misinformation, and how it affects relationality with others around us. Jurgenson (2011) points to a false dichotomy between our lives in the offline and online worlds. Suler (2015) acknowledges that over time—in various ways—our offline and online personas are fragmented, and yet also intertwined. For example, an individual might interact differently online with people they know than with people they have never met, as described by this participant: If I was in my living room with some of my family members and they were [talking about something controversial] it would be like, let’s pull up information if we’re really going to get into it. But I feel like when it’s online, I just avoid everything.—Study Participant

It seems that various aspects of our various selves manifest between the online and offline realms and become realized in different ways depending on the context and realm they interact in. In a study exploring the correlation between authentic social media engagement and positive well-being, authors described the negative effects of online disingenuity, where “social media users often act as virtual curators of their online selves by staging or editing content they present to others” (Bailey et al., 2020). The information we internalize online can affect how we relate to one another online and offline, and this must be considered in initiatives aimed at improving critical literacy skills. Engaging in misinformation-fuelled disagreements online can impact real-life relationships, and individuals may vary levels of engagement based on these relational impacts. Ethical Relationality Considering the fragmentations of personas described in the sections above, there is a growing need for attention to the ethics of care within relationships both in online and IRL spaces. Ermine (2007) understands ethics on the basis of the relationship between action and responsibility:

174 

J. STOUFFER ET AL.

Ethics here is defined as the capacity to know what harms or enhances the well-being of sentient creatures—ethics entertains our personal capacity and our integrity to stand up for our cherished notions of good, responsibility, duty, obligations, etc. With our ethical standards in mind, we necessarily have to think about the transgression of those standards by others and how our actions may also infringe or violate the spaces of others. (p. 195)

Ermine’s words speak to the importance of reflecting upon the individual and collective responsibilities needed to maintain and recover relationships. Taking the time to learn from difference rather than regarding it as a problem to be resolved within the purview of various levels of relationships may help to support difficult conversations and knee-jerk responses to misinformation. Through this lens, we have the responsibility to live in ways that maintain integrity and support the flourishing of all living beings. This section of the chapter examines the relational impacts that intersect with online critical reading skills and ICT use. Specifically, we describe how misinformation impacts these ethical responsibilities of being with one another in relationships both online and IRL. As our study showed, one of the common ways of reacting to perceived relational stress was by avoiding the topic entirely or distancing oneself from the spaces where disagreements occurred. As one participant said, When it’s online, I just avoid everything—there’s no point getting in a fight with my cousin who’s [halfway across the country] over something that they’re not going to change their mindset on even if I gave them the proof.

One of the themes emerging from the study was that the type of relationship impacts participants’ willingness to engage in controversy. There were differences mentioned between family versus friends, close family members/distant family members, and online/in real life (IRL). The differences were not consistent, for example, for some participants, online spaces felt safer for them to share their true opinions: I play a lot of video games and I’ve found some communities of people from all over the world … you get to know each other very well … you still get to know them like you would any other friend.—Study Participant

whereas for others, online spaces felt potentially more antagonistic:

9  TRANSACTIONS OF ONLINE LITERACY: ETHICAL RELATIONALITY, ICT… 

175

I don’t normally share my opinion on certain things online just because it does lead to lots of friendship breakups, lots of fighting back and forth online, so I just choose not to share.—Study Participant

For some, close family members meant they could be themselves whereas others felt that disagreements with close family members negatively impacted their mental health. One participant summed this up by sharing: I think it depends on my relationship with the person. Normally, having a controversial conversation with them is not going to keep me up at night … That being said, though, it depends on my relationship. If it was with my mom, my boyfriend, my grandparents—if it was like something really, really controversial that we had different opinions on, it might. [cause anxiety]

There are many interrelated and compounding factors that dictate how someone may interact online. The way someone relates with others online is not only based on whether they think something is true but can be connected to their web of relations and the connections to those with whom they interact.

Ethics of Care: Do I Stay or Do I Go? As society becomes polarized through online discourses and the proliferation of misinformation, disagreements over social issues add significant and sometimes irreparable strain to relationships. The COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated the impacts of confrontational interactions as a result of living in the post-truth era, such as severed relationships and increasing distance between groups of people (Kasamali, 2021). For example, as one participant shared: I don’t want to lose friends or family, and worry that I will cause irrevocable splits, or that people will dislike me and cut me out of their life, or that I will hurt the people close to me and they will worry about me all the time.

Simply focusing on verifying online information or on ICT use without a corresponding social-emotional focus can leave students woefully unprepared to deal with relational conflict. Claiming boundaries for ourselves, or what Ermine (2007) labels “the contours of our sacred spaces” (p. 194) involves negotiating these boundaries in online groups and social media belongings. As a case in

176 

J. STOUFFER ET AL.

point: A recent U.S. poll showed that 33% of vaccinated Americans had ended relationships with others over their vaccination status (Gerzema & Johnson, 2022). Social media-fuelled polarization can lead to relational challenges regardless of whether one chooses to stay or to go. It is not only one-on-one relationships that are impacted, but community considerations are also a factor. For example: I live in a rural community that is very conservative and religious and there were often times I could not share my beliefs because I would be excluded from that community if I did.—Study Participant

An Intersectional Approach to Teaching Online Literacy We’ve articulated the need for critical literacy skills, ICT skills, and relational ethics. What does this mean in a classroom? Within this kind of ethos, we must be able to prepare students to engage with difficult knowledge (Britzman, 2012) and disagreements in ways that honour their relational contexts while at the same time building their ICT and online critical reading skills. Simply put, we must provide our students with the skills to navigate complexity with more options than routine avoidance.

Tools for ICT Critical Literacy According to Wineburg et al. (2021), it is vital that students are taught online evaluation strategies such as lateral reading methods and Civic Online Reasoning (COR) strategies to make accurate distinctions about the information they are consuming online. Lateral reading involves leaving the materials making a claim to evaluate these claims by searching the open web. Civic Online Reasoning strategies (McGrew et al., 2019) further confine lateral reading skills to specific questions and techniques that illuminate important aspects of information such as Who is behind the information? What is the evidence for the information? And what do other sources say? McGrew and colleagues go on to say, when using these methods, modelled and taught by competent teachers, students who were taught these skills improved their evaluation skills of online sources. Preparing students for the realities of the twenty-first-century media landscape requires that teachers receive basic interventions such as Professional Development (PD) to learn lateral reading and COR strategies (Wineburg et al., 2021). Moreover, teachers need PD to learn how to integrate these

9  TRANSACTIONS OF ONLINE LITERACY: ETHICAL RELATIONALITY, ICT… 

177

skills into their practice as well as time to plan with their colleagues in other subject areas (Breakstone et al., 2018). These teachers can model these strategies for students who evaluate information online. We must dispel the myths that students are experts at these tasks because they may be proficient at using social media to post about themselves or things that interest them. Furthermore, when faced with teaching students to be meticulous and aware of where the information they are consuming online is coming from, one-off lessons on this subject are insufficient: these strategies and ideas must be propped up across all subject areas and teachers (Breakstone et al., 2018). There are several existing models and strategies that can be disseminated in classrooms to assist students’ evaluation and navigation of online information. Table 9.1 introduces some of these models.

Educating with Relational Ethics of Care In addition to the tools described above, for evaluation of online education and ICT use, educators must extend these lessons to include the practice of ethical relationality. Relationality impacts beliefs, and those beliefs drive the way we understand information. As Delpit (1988) wrote, “We do not really see through our eyes or hear through our ears, but through our beliefs” (p. 297). Simply focusing on verifying online information or on ICT use without a corresponding social-emotional focus can leave students woefully unprepared to deal with relational conflict or to manage the emotional upheaval of disagreement (Donald, 2019). In other words, it is imperative that students are nurtured in ways that cultivate becoming fully human—that is, body, mind, and spirit. There are moves towards a more holistic pedagogy that includes efforts to courageously respond to ambiguity and participate in difficult conversations about difference (Kasamali, 2019). Such approaches support the notion that “to be alive is to dwell in tension” (Aoki, 1991, p. 162). To dwell in this tension well involves considering and grappling with the stressors caused by relational conflict. Pedagogies such as deep listening, body awareness, emotional regulation, trauma-informed practices, guidance from sacred ecology global wisdom traditions, spiritualities, and mindfulness practices have shown the potential for decreasing stress, improving mental health, and providing more grounded awareness whilst engaged in disagreements with others (Chambers, 1992; Koopman & Seliga, 2021; Mackenzie, 2015; Ragoonaden, 2015; Smith, 2014).

178 

J. STOUFFER ET AL.

Table 9.1  Selection of models and strategies for teaching evaluation of information Model

Resource

Civic online reasoning

https://cor.stanford. edu/curriculum/?tab =collections

SIFT method

Web literacy for student fact-checkers (Caulfield, 2017) Constructing meaning online (Nash, 2021) Connected Reading (Turner et al., 2019) Common sense media, ‘digital citizenship’

Explanation

A collection of lessons curated by Dr Sam Wineburg, founder and director of the Stanford history education group (SHEG). These collections include lessons on lateral reading skills for students and how to teach them effectively. Lessons and activities for students can be found in these collections, as well as assessments that can be used to gauge skills learned by students https://ctrl-­f.ca/en/ A free, 7-hour course that will teach you the resources/ lateral skills reading methods otherwise known as the SIFT method. Designed for teachers and students of grades 7 to 12 students, the course and activities would take approximately 7 hours to complete in class https://webliteracy. An open-source book by Mike Caulfield on pressbooks.com/ web literacy. This book is a precursor to the SIFT method resource found above and can provide a more in-depth look at the fundamentals of SIFT https://doi. Classroom strategies to build students’ skills or/10.1002/trtr.1980 in digital inquiry, navigation, evaluation, and synthesis of online information https://doi. Framework of connecting reading with ways org/10.1002/rrq.271 in which readers encounter, evaluate, and engage with digital texts https://www. commonsense.org/ education/ digital-­citizenship

Digital citizenship encompasses various online and offline skills, including the responsible and ethical use of technology for learning and general everyday use. This is a collection of various activities for K-12 students, covering topics related to digital citizenship such as media balance and well-being; news and media literacy; cyberbullying; relationships and communication online; digital footprint and digital identity; and privacy and security

9  TRANSACTIONS OF ONLINE LITERACY: ETHICAL RELATIONALITY, ICT… 

179

However, these listed pedagogies have yet to be specifically applied to teaching online critical reading skills and ICT competencies. Even though these pedagogies have been well documented to reduce stress and improve communication and safeguarding relationships, they can be ignored in the typical classroom in favour of a focus on intellectualized content (Purpel & McLaurin, 2004; Smith, 1999). As a result, we call for meaningful interweaving of ethical relationality when teaching ICT use and online critical reading skills—meaning the deep integration of the epistemological and ontological in classrooms. This lack of application might be due to the element of ambiguity and fluidity with these pedagogies. These pedagogies require the courageous practice of vulnerability which can invite feelings of anxiety, fear, and shame for many educators (Brown, 2021; Bullough, 2005; Holappa et al., 2021; Song, 2016). There are systemic barriers such as an overreliance on instructional approaches that bifurcate knowing and being which overlooks unity between subject areas and thus reduces affinity for enacting holistic pedagogies. Tendencies to position subject area specialization in individualistic ways, as a result of neoliberal value systems, may undercut opportunities that guide students to understand themselves and one another. As a practical example of the lack that these pedagogies could be used to address, in our study, many participants assumed that to have peaceful relationships, they must pursue sameness. I typically try to surround myself with people that are like-minded to me as I do not like conflict or confrontation. Hence the reasons why I am a lot more reluctant to share my beliefs outside of my circle.—Study Participant

Participants did not seem to have the skills to maintain relationships with those with whom they deeply disagreed over certain social issues.

Call to Action Digital misinformation, fracturing social issues, and poor relational ethics have created a powder keg that requires an intersectional approach to transactions of online literacy. We must address the emerging trend that our students—from middle school to undergraduate level—have trouble brokering their interpretations of the online information landscape (Wineburg et al., 2016) amidst relationships, both online and in real life.

180 

J. STOUFFER ET AL.

This is problematic for all of us, as we increasingly turn to the web and social media to become informed about the daily issues of concern, where misinformation can spread at alarming rates from which “no segment of the population is immune” (Wineburg et  al., 2021). According to the American Press Institute (2015), 69% of young people get their news online, intending to use this information for civic motivations or problem-­ solving needs. When engaging with online information, students are not necessarily consuming curated resources such as those they may encounter in textbooks at school; information found on the web often plays by different rules entirely (Wineburg et al., 2021). Furthermore, this problem is not necessarily limited only to our students. We all face such challenges when seeking information online: we must always contend with politically or financially motivated groups who seek to gain influence. It is wise to temper our expectations as to what can be achieved by short-term instructional investments, such as those suggested in Table 9.1, when faced with the reality that teenagers can spend over 7  hours in a single day online (Rideout & Robb, 2019). Anyone consuming information online is vulnerable to being deceived by the quickly changing information landscape (Steinmetz, 2018). However, in today’s world, students must also develop skills to maintain relationships (Bamford & Pollard, 2018; Meixi et al., 2022; Raider-­ Roth, 2005). Alongside the development of critical online reading skills that help form opinions in environments of disinformation (Breakstone et al., 2018), individuals must also be equipped with the skills to know how to maintain relationships with those around them while simultaneously disagreeing. Brown (2021) underscores that “we feel stressed when we evaluate environmental demand as beyond our ability to cope successfully. This includes elements of unpredictability, uncontrollability, and feeling overloaded” (p. 5). Stressful circumstances can elicit physiological and psychological responses that can make individuals question their capabilities in responding to stressors. Consequently, learners may wrestle with the cognitive assessments of their ability to handle the situation at hand. Responding to these insights, Jon Kabat- Zinn proposes that “mindful play, or no agenda, non-doing time” (Brown, 2021, p. 7) supports emotional regulation to prevent the snowballing of overwhelmed emotions. Facing and recognizing one’s emotional state in this regard can guide young people to make better decisions that do not avoid discord, but approach tenuous conversations with vulnerability and humility. In other words, supporting online critical reading skills and ICT competencies also

9  TRANSACTIONS OF ONLINE LITERACY: ETHICAL RELATIONALITY, ICT… 

181

necessitate accompanying strategies to mitigate the complexities of ontological experiences within relationships (Clandinin, 2013). In our view, the response should include an intersecting focus on critical literacy and lateral reading skills, as well as honouring the relational ethics and ties that bind us together as we interact with and make informed decisions based on this information. This form of relationality carefully attends to the historical, cultural, ecological, and spiritual social contexts from which a person or community understands and interprets the world (Donald, 2009). This could help our children and youth ethically navigate relationships and the challenges posed by misinformation and a culture of ‘alternative facts’ found online and refrain from espousing pejorative renderings of difference we call on education to urgently attend to the instruction our students receive towards building all skills informing transactions of online literacy.

References American Press Institute. (2015, March 16). How millennials get news: Inside the habits of America’s first digital generation, www.americanpressinstitute.org/ publications/reports/survey-­research/millennials-­new Anderson, J., & Rainie, L. (2017, October 19). The future of truth and misinformation online. Pew Research Center. https://pewresearch.org/internet/2017/10/19/the-­future-­of-­truth-­and-­misimormation-­online/ Aoki, T. (1991). Teaching as indwelling between two curriculum worlds. In T. Aoki (Ed.), Inspiring curriculum and pedagogy: Talks to teachers (pp. 7–10). Department of Secondary Education, University of Alberta. Bailey, E. R., Matz, S. C., Youyou, W., & Iyengar, S. S. (2020). Authentic self-­ expression on social media is associated with greater subjective well-being. Nature Communications, 11, 4889. https://doi.org/10.1038/ s41467-­020-­18539-­w Bamford, J., & Pollard, L. (2018). Developing relationality and student belonging: The need for building cosmopolitan engagement in undergraduate communities. London Review of Education, 16(2), 214–227. https://doi. org/10.18546/LRE.16.2.03 Bates, T. (2019). Teaching in a digital age: Guidelines for designing teaching and learning. https://opentextbc.ca/teachinginadigitalage/ Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77–101. https://doi.org/10.119 1/1478088706qp063oa

182 

J. STOUFFER ET AL.

Braw, E. (2022, February 18). Is “speaking your truth” the new alternative facts? Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/22/speaking-­yourtruth-alternative-­facts/ Breakstone, J., McGrew, S., Smith, M., Ortega, T., & Wineburg, S. (2018). Why we need a new approach to teaching digital literacy. Phi Delta Kappan, 99(6), 27–32. https://doi.org/10.1177/0031721718762419 Britzman, D.  P. (2012). Practice makes practice: A critical study of learning to teach. Suny Press. Brown, B. (2021). Atlas of the heart: Mapping meaningful connection and the language of human experience. Random House. Bullough, R. V. (2005). Teacher vulnerability and teachability: A case study of a mentor and two interns. Teacher Education Quarterly, 23–39. https://www. jstor.org/stable/23478720 Caulfield, M. (2016, December 19). Yes, digital literacy. But which one? [Weblog]. Hapgood. https://hapgood.us/2016/12/19/yes-­digital-­literacy-­but-whichone/ Caulfield, M. (2017). Web literacy for student fact-checkers.. https://webliteracy. pressbooks.com/. Caulfield, M. (2019, June 19). SIFT (the four moves) [Weblog]. Hapgood. https://hapgood.us/2019/06/19/sift-­the-­four-­moves/ Chambers, C. (1992, March 4–7). (Other) ways of speaking: Lesson from the Dene of Northern Canada. Paper presentation. Annual Conference of the Teachers of English to Speak of Other Languages. Cho, B.-Y., & Afflerback, P. (2015). Reading on the internet: Realizing and constructing potential texts. Journal of Adolescent & Adult Literacy, 58(6), 504–517. https://doi.org/10.1002/jaal.1004 Ciampaglia, G. (2018). The digital misinformation pipeline. In O.  Zlatkin-­ Troitschanskaia, G. Wittum, & A. Dengel (Eds.), Positive learning in the age of information: A blessing or a curse? (pp. 413–421). Springer VS. Clandinin, D. J. (2013). Engaging in narrative inquiry. Left Coast Press, Inc. Coiro, J. (2020). Towards a multifaceted heuristic of digital reading to inform assessment, research, practice, and policy. Reading Research Quarterly, 56(1), 9–31. https://doi.org/10.1002/rrq.302 Collin, S. (2014). Overview of the levels of ICT and information literacy skills in Canada’s preservice teachers. International Journal of Computers and Technology, 13(11), 5121–5125. https://doi.org/10.24297/ijct.v13i11.2781 Delpit, L. (1988). The silenced dialogue: Power and pedagogy in educating other people’s children. Harvard Educational Review, 58(3), 280–299. https://doi. org/10.17763/haer.58.3.c43481778r528qw4 Donald, D. (2009). The pedagogy of the fort: Curriculum, Aboriginal-Canadian relations and Indigenous métissage. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Alberta.

9  TRANSACTIONS OF ONLINE LITERACY: ETHICAL RELATIONALITY, ICT… 

183

Donald, D. (2012). Indigenous métissage: A decolonizing research sensibility. International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 25, 533–555. https://doi.org/10.1080/09518398.2011.55449 Donald, D. (2016). From what does ethical relationality flow? An Indian act in three artifacts. In J. Seidel & D. Jardine (Eds.), The ecological heart of teaching: Radical tales of refuge and renewal for classrooms and community (pp. 10–16). Peter Lang. Donald, D. (2019). Homo econumicus and forgetful curriculum: Remembering other ways to be a human being. In H. T. Tomlins-Janke, S. Styre, S. Lilley, & D.  Zinga (Eds.), Indigenous education: New directions in theory and practice (pp. 103–119). University of Alberta Press. Duke, N. K., & Martin, N. M. (2019). Best practices in informational text comprehension instruction. In L. M. Morrow & L. B. Gambrell (Eds.), Best practices in literacy instruction (6th ed., pp. 250–270). Dwayne, D. (2021). We need a new story: Walking and the wâhkôhtowin imagination. Journal of the Canadian Association for Curriculum Studies, 18(2), 53–63. https://doi.org/10.25071/1916-4467.40492 Ermine, W. (2007). The ethical space of engagement. Indigenous Law Journal, 6(1), 193–203. https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ilj/article/ view/27669 Gee, J. P. (2020). The new literacy studies. In J. Roswell & K. Pahl (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Literacy Studies, (pp. 35–48). Routledge. Gerzema, J., & Johnson, W. (2022). Vaccine wars puts family ties at risk. The Harris Poll Covid-19 Survey Wave 81 Newsletter. http://theharrispoll­8654532.hs-­sites.com/the-­insight-­wave-­81 Gin, K. (2019). Racialized aggressions and sense of belonging among Asian American college students. Institute for Asian American Studies Publications, 44. https://scholarworks.umb.edu/iaas_pubs/44 Graham, S. L. (2016). Relationality, friendship and identity in digital communication. In A.  Georgakopoulou & T.  Spilloti (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of language and digital communication (pp. 305–320). Routledge. Gray, R. (2017, March 1). Lies, propaganda and fake news: A challenge for our age. BBC.com. https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20170301-­lies-propagandaand-­fake-­news-­a-­grand-­challenge-­of-­our-­age Hobbs, R. (2017). Teaching and learning in a post-truth world. Educational Leadership, 75(3), 26–31. https://www.ascd.org/el/articles/teaching-andlearning-­in-­a-­post-­truth-­world Holappa, A., Lassila, E. T., Lutovac, S., & Uitto, M. (2021). Vulnerability as an emotional dimension in student teachers’ narrative identities told with self-­ portraits. Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, 1-14. https://doi. org/10.1080/00313831.2021.1939144

184 

J. STOUFFER ET AL.

Janks, H. (2018). Texts, identities, and ethics: Critical literacy in a post-truth world. Journal of Adolescent & Adult Literacy, 62(1), 95–99. https://doi. org/10.1002/jaal.761 Joinson, A. (2007). Disinhibition and the internet. In J.  Gackenbach (Ed.), Psychology and the internet (2nd ed., pp.  75–92). Elsevier Inc. https://doi. org/10.1016/B978-­012369425-­6/50023-­0 Jurgenson, N. (2011, September 13). Digital dualism and the fallacy of web objectivity. Cyborgology. http://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2011/09/13/ digital-­dualism-­and-­the-­fallacy-­of-­web-­objectivity/ Kasamali, Z. (2019). Reconsidering Difference: The curricular and pedagogical significance of holism. Doctoral dissertation, University of Alberta. https://doi. org/10.7939/r3-­0m0w-­te36. Kasamali, Z. (2021). “Throwing salt on wounds”: Covid-19 and a curriculum of embodiment. Prospects, 51(1), 103–116. Knobel, M., & Lankshear, C. (2016). Digital media and literacy development. In A. Georgakopoulou & T. Spilioti (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of language and digital communication (pp. 149–164). Routledge. Koopman, S., & Seliga, L. (2021). Teaching peace by using nonviolent communication for difficult conversations in the college classroom. Peace and Conflict Studies, 27(3), 1–31. Leu, D.  J., Forzani, E., Rhoads, C., Maykel, C., Kennedy, C., & Timbrell, N. (2015). The new literacies of online research and comprehension: Rethinking the reading achievement gap. Reading Research Quarterly, 50(1), 37–59. https://doi.org/10.1002/rrq.85 Leu, D. J., Kinzer, C. K., Coiro, J., Castek, J., & Henry, L. A. (2013). New literacies: A dual-level theory of the changing nature of literacy, instruction, and assessment. In D.  E. Alvermann, N.  J. Unrau, & R.  B. Ruddell (Eds.), Theoretical models and processes of reading (6th ed., pp.  1150–1181). International Reading Association. Luke, A. (2019). Regrouping critical literacy: Representation, facts, and reality. In D. E. Alvermann, N. J. Unrau, M. Sailors, & R. B. Ruddell (Eds.), Theoretical models and processes of reading (7th ed., pp. 349–361). Routledge. Mackenzie, E. (2015). Mindfulness training: A transdisciplinary approach to assessing efficacy in education. https://repository.upenn.edu/gse_pubs/403/ Maurer, M., Quiring, O., & Schemer, C. (2018). Media effects on positive and negative learning. In O.  Zlatkin-Troitschanskaia, G.  Wittum, & A.  Dengel (Eds.), Positive learning in the age of information: A blessing or a curse? (pp. 196–208). Springer VS. McGrew, Smith, M., Breakstone, J., Ortega, T., & Wineburg, S. (2019). Improving university students’ web savvy: An intervention study. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 89(3), 485–500. https://doi.org/10.1111/ bjep.12279

9  TRANSACTIONS OF ONLINE LITERACY: ETHICAL RELATIONALITY, ICT… 

185

Meixi, Moreno-Dulcey, F., Alcalá, L., Keyser, U., & Elliott-Groves, E. (2022). When learning is life giving: Redesigning schools with indigenous systems of relationality. AERA Open, 8. https://doi.org/10.1177/23328584211062587 Mosseri, A. (2016, June 29). Building a better news feed for you. Facebook Newsroom. https://newsroom.f.com/news/2016/06/building-­a-­betternews-­feed-­for-­you/ Nash, B. L. (2021). Constructing meaning online: Teaching critical reading in a post-truth era. The Reading Teacher, 74(6), 713–722. https://doi. org/10.1002/trtr.1980 New London Group. (1996). A pedagogy of multiliteracies: Designing social futures. Harvard Educational Review, 66(1), 60–92. https://doi. org/10.17763/haer.66.1.17370n67v22j160u Purcell-Gates, V., Jacobson, E., & Degener, S. (2004). Print literacy development: Uniting cognitive and social practice theories. Harvard University Press. Purpel, D. E., & McLaurin, W. M. (2004). Reflections on the moral and spiritual crisis in education. Lang. Ragoonaden, K. (2015). Mindful education and well-being. In K.  Ragoonaden (Ed.), Mindful teaching and learning: Developing a pedagogy of well-being (pp. 17–32). Lexington Books. Raider-Roth, M. (2005). Trusting what you know: Negotiating the relational context of classroom life. Teachers College Record, 107(4), 587–628. Rideout, V., & Robb, M. B. (2019). The common sense census: Media use by tweens and teens, 2019. Common Sense Media. https://www.commonsensemedia. o r g / r e s e a r c h / t h e -­c o m m o n -­s e n s e -­c e n s u s -­m e d i a -­u s e -­b y -­t w e e n s and-­teens-­2019 Rosenblatt, L.  M. (2019). The transactional theory of reading and writing. In D. E. Alvermann, N. J. Unrau, M. Sailors, & R. B. Ruddell (Eds.), Theoretical models and processes of reading (7th ed., pp. 451–484). Routledge. Schmidt, A. L., Fabiana, Z., Del Vicario, M., Bessi, A., Scala, A., Caldarelli, G., Stanley, H. E., & Quattrociocchi, W. (2017). Anatomy of news consumption on Facebook. PNAS. www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1617052114 Smith, D. G. (1999). Identity, self and other in the conduct of pedagogical action: An East/West inquiry. Counterpoints, 15, 11–25. https://www.jstor.org/stable/i40115722 Smith, D.  G. (2014). Teaching as the practice of wisdom. Bloomsbury Publishing USA. Song, J. (2016). Emotions and language teacher identity: Conflicts, vulnerability, and transformation. TESOL Quarterly, 50(3), 631–654. https://www.jstor. org/stable/44984706 Steinmetz, K. (2018, August 9). How your brain tricks you into believing fake news. TIME Magazine. https://time.com/5362183/the-­real-­fake-­news-­crisis/

186 

J. STOUFFER ET AL.

Street, B. (2003). What’s “new” in new literacies studies?: Critical approaches to literacy in theory and practice. Current Issues in Contempoary Education, 5(2), 77–91. https://www.tc.columbia.edu/cice/pdf/25734_5_2_Street.pdf Suler, J. (2015). Psychology of the digital age: Humans become electric. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CB09781316424070 Turner, K. H., Hicks, T., & Zucker, L. (2019). Connected reading: A framework for understanding how adolescents encounter, evaluate, and engage with texts in the digital age. Reading Research Quarterly, 55(2), 291–309. https://doi. org/10.1002/rrq.271 Ward, J., Watson, E., & van Kessel, C. (2021). Embracing the pivot: Engaging wahkotowin in building anti-racist learning communities. In J. Davis & C. Irish (Eds.), Lessons from the pivot: Higher education’s response to the pandemic (pp.  13–21). University of Mary Washington. https://scholar.umw.edu/ education/11/ Wineburg, S., Breakstone, J., McGrew, S., & Ortega, T. (2018). Why Google can’t save us—The challenges of our post-Gutenberg moment. In O. Zlatkin-­ Troitschanskaia, G. Wittum, & A. Dengel (Eds.), Positive learning in the age of information: A blessing or a curse? (pp. 221–228). Springer VS. Wineburg, S., Breakstone, J., McGrew, S., Smith, M., & Ortega, T. (2021, October 5). Lateral reading on the open internet. Papers.SSRN.com. https:// ssrn.com/abstract=3936112 Wineburg, S., McGrew, S., Breakstone, J., & Ortega, T. (2016). Evaluating information: The cornerstone of civic online reasoning. Stanford Digital Repository. http://purl.stanford.edu/fv751yt5934 Zlatkin-Troitschanskaia. (2020). Frontiers and advances in positive learning in the age of information (PLATO). Springer International Publishing AG.

CHAPTER 10

Critical Citizenship Versus ‘High Individualism’ in Education Kirsten Locke, Frauke Meyer, and Lydia Bensky

Introduction: The Age of Misinformation Is Driven by Individualism The CDC is advising the use of non-medical cloth face covering as an additional voluntary public health measure, the US president told reporters on Friday. “This is voluntary. I don’t think I’m going to be doing it.” (Donald Trump cited in Smith, 2020, para. 3) We live in a land of liberty, as you know, and it’s one of the great features of our lives that we don’t tend to impose those sorts of restrictions on people in this country.(Boris Johnson cited in McCormack, 2022, para. 2) Kiwis from all walks of life were resolute and determined—determined that this was a war we could eventually win, but only if we acted together. (Jacinda Ardern cited in Ainge Roy, 2020, para. 6, emphasis added)

K. Locke (*) • F. Meyer • L. Bensky Waipapa Taumata Rau/University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Parker (ed.), Education in the Age of Misinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25871-8_10

187

188 

K. LOCKE ET AL.

We begin with the voices of leaders of three modern democratic nation-­ states, the United States, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand, in the first half of 2020, just as the world was starting to tilt on its axis toward what we all know now to be the beginnings of a global health crisis in the form of the Coronavirus pandemic. Each quote is an illustration of the role of the individual citizen, as articulated by each democratically elected leader of these three nation-states, in the face of this global pandemic. The intention is not to cast Jacinda Ardern, the Prime Minister of New Zealand in 2020 (but no longer at time of publication in 2023), in an unquestionably virtuous position when compared to her fellow leaders, Donald Trump and Boris Johnson. Rather, the purpose of juxtaposing these opening quotes at the beginning of this chapter is to demonstrate the differing perspectives on the role of the individual citizen as articulated by the elected leader of these three countries. While the pandemic sets the context to these three statements, it is possible also to read an implicit positioning each leader articulates in relation to misinformation. Indeed, the strongest position that overtly challenges official scientific advice on the efficacy of mask-wearing comes from Donald Trump, and this position is an interesting distillation of Trump’s wider significance in pushing misinformation into the public arena. Further, going by the idea that the personality of the politician reveals the character of the office he or she occupies, the three quotes are illustrative of strains of liberal philosophy that have been inherited from the Western Enlightenment and modernity. Each statement frames the individual in a particular way—in overtly libertarian terms from Trump, to the individual with a series of rights and liberties from Johnson, to an individual with obligations toward a collective from Ardern. With the benefit of hindsight, readers will know that the pandemic responses in the US and in England would involve startling loss of life per capita that, arguably, deposed one leader and seriously compromised the political career of the other. Likewise, despite comparably very low rates of death per capita, at the time of writing this chapter (and before her resignation in 2023) Jacinda Ardern faced enormous societal unrest and strident protest from sections of her jurisdiction. Fueled by the importation of misinformation from the US and Canada specifically, protestors vehemently opposed government vaccination and mask-wearing mandates and in February 2022 began a 23-day occupation of the lawns outside Parliament Buildings in Wellington New Zealand that culminated in a series of violent clashes between anti-mandate and antivaccine

10  CRITICAL CITIZENSHIP VERSUS ‘HIGH INDIVIDUALISM’ IN EDUCATION 

189

protestors and police. In an age where misinformation thrives, the individual, it seems, is an intoxicating and powerful presence. This chapter begins from the starting premise that the global pandemic that began in 2020 is the apex moment that has helped define an age of misinformation that has reconfigured the nature and arrangement of the social and political landscape and the democratic ‘promise’ of societal cohesion. In our analysis, the global pandemic has made visible the role and importance of a robust compulsory education system that caters to all young people and ensures individualistic societal forces are mediated by obligations to the collective. While internationally there is increasing focus on research highlighting the significant disparities in quality of access to education in digital and ‘in person’ provision, we consider an even larger challenge is looming in a post-Covid-19 societal landscape that demands ever higher levels of individual and community responsibility to ensure social cohesion, positive health outcomes, and strengthening of the democratic society (Bazzi et al., 2020). The ability of young people to discern what is misinformation or disinformation is a central pillar to this future (Horn & Veermans, 2019), as is the engagement with the mass vaccination and health programs that have become a fixture in the immediate and foreseeable future. This critical discernment is especially urgent in the ‘infodemic’, described by the World Health Organization (2020) as “an over-abundance of information—some accurate and some not—that makes it hard for people to find trustworthy sources and reliable guidance when they need it” (para. 5). The overwhelming sea of information is not only difficult for young people to navigate, it has also contributed to the rise of the ‘post-truth’ era. Braun (2019) describes post-truth as an ordering device that aids in understanding certain aspects of reality while also obscuring other aspects. This ordering device is heavily reliant on personal belief and emotionality, allowing individuals to “interpret empirical findings against the social and political world as they see it” (Braun, 2019, p. 433) rather than employing a more rational and contextualized interpretation. It thus has a strong connection to individualism, “an institutionalized set of values that prioritizes autonomy, individual rights, freedom, and choice” (Lamb et  al., 2021, p.  2). Post-truth renews previous binaries such as “objective vs. subjective, rationality vs. irrationality, facts vs. values, true vs. false consciousness, ‘reactionary’ vs. ‘progressive’” (Braun, 2019, p.  432). This polarization instills an ‘us against them’ mentality that is harmful to the collective good of society, and that plays a role in issues of racism,

190 

K. LOCKE ET AL.

xenophobia, and the increasing distrust of professionals and academics. Braun (2019) links the rise of post-truth to “The attack on critical thinking” (p. 434), which capitalist forces have conducted via a decades-long assault on institutions that develop citizens’ critical thinking abilities. In particular, Braun (2019) points out that “societal self-reflection” (p. 434) has been impeded through the chronic under- or de-funding of the humanities and social sciences in education, which are often the vehicles through which critical thinking is taught (Horn & Veermans, 2019). What Braun’s (2019) observations indicate is that education for critical thinking is integral to the development of critical citizens, but that current Western education frameworks are ill-equipped to satisfactorily facilitate this. The value systems that underlie such frameworks play a significant role in the failure or success of critical citizenship education. To understand why the current education system is struggling to develop critical citizens—in a time when they are needed perhaps more than ever before— we must reflect on the value and meaning of ‘critical citizenship’, to understand how this has been supported, undermined, or transformed by differing philosophical ideas about the purpose of mass education, and examine the ethics at the heart of these perspectives.

Collectivism Versus Individualism The chapter explores two concepts that offer different poles of analysis of the philosophical notion of the nature and purpose of mass education that emphasizes first the importance of the collective, and then counters this analysis with the tendency toward viewing education in highly individualistic terms. The first is the political concept of ‘critical citizenship’ that draws on the philosophical paradigms of political liberalism, progressive educational theory from John Dewey (1916), and the wider critical tradition as espoused primarily by Hegel and Marx (Small, 1982) through to Nancy Fraser (2017) and Jürgen Habermas (1981). The second concept to be explored is the notion of what Simon Marginson (2020) calls ‘high individualism’ that the flagship democracies of the United Kingdom and the United States have pursued in politics and in the framing of their education systems, to sometimes devastating effect as evidenced by their pandemic responses. The point of bringing together these often-divergent philosophical coordinates is to chart the political distinction that schools’ traverse in ideas about civil society, the state, and individual criticality.

10  CRITICAL CITIZENSHIP VERSUS ‘HIGH INDIVIDUALISM’ IN EDUCATION 

191

As the primary state project that links democracy to enactments of citizenship, compulsory education has once again been placed in a pivotal position where societies choose whether they emphasize forms of individualism or collectivism in the education for their young to enable them to traverse a post-truth (Braun, 2019), post-pandemic landscape. This chapter traverses the theoretical coordinates of this educational terrain, and the pedagogical and ontological responsibilities, possibilities, and limits inherent in such a project. Democracy and critical citizenship are intricately intertwined, with critical citizens being acknowledged as an essential asset to democratic society (Geissel, 2008). Because of its interdependence with democracy, when exploring the concept of critical citizenship, it is necessary to examine the work of philosophers who were deeply concerned with democratic life. Dewey is one such thinker. Pragmatist philosopher John Dewey drew strong connections between education, democracy, and citizenship, believing that active participation in education was crucial for the development of democratic citizens and the (re)production of democratic society (Locke et al., 2017). To Dewey, democracy was more than a style of governance; it was “primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience” (Dewey, 1916, p. 87). This credence emphasized the idea of the collective, and thus Dewey believed the bedrock of education was not only “inquiry, [and] experimentation” but also “cooperation, and communicating with others” (Locke et al., 2017, p. 34). These foci allowed learners to operate under democratic ideals and master democratic practices, leading them to become citizens who understand and prioritize the needs of society. Dewey placed great importance on collective societal interests, stating that the “emphasis [in education] must be put upon whatever binds people together in cooperative human pursuits and results” (Dewey, 1916, p. 98). Education freed the capacities of individuals and facilitated their growth as human beings so they could then contribute positively to social objectives (Dewey, 1916). Education was thus the concern of society as a whole because it was born from and existed for collective social interests. However, Dewey (1916) also noted that the relationship between the individual and society was tenuous, stating that with “greater individualization … and a broader community of interest … it is a matter of deliberate effort to sustain and extend” (p. 87) the shared concerns and freedom of personal abilities which sit at the core of democracy. Dewey warned that isolation or exclusivity of the individualized view of the group—the protection and preservation of a group’s own interests

192 

K. LOCKE ET AL.

above others—would encourage anti-social attitudes, jeopardize the collective, and negatively impact democratic ideals and practices. “[I]solation makes for rigidity and formal institutionalizing of life, for static and selfish ideals within the group” (Dewey, 1916, p. 86). Dewey also notes that this separation and selfishness arise from overwhelming feelings which uneducated individuals may encounter when faced with situations for which they are unprepared. A society … must see to it that its members are educated … Otherwise, they will be overwhelmed by the changes in which they are caught and whose significance or connections they do not perceive. The result will be a confusion in which a few will appropriate to themselves the results of the blind and externally directed activities of others. (Dewey, 1916, p. 88)

According to Dewey, education provided a way for citizens to understand and perceive the significance of events, to think critically about what was occurring around them. This criticality was vital to avoid the unjust placement of negative emotions onto other members of the collective when an unexpected change was encountered. Developing critical citizenship within its members was therefore not just an asset to democracy but integral to its very function and success. Pélabay and Sénac (2019) explain that rising individualistic tendencies play a role in the positive or negative effect of citizenship, stating that “the value given to self-fulfillment and personal interests contributes to the decline of collective commitment to the general interest and the public good” (Pélabay & Sénac, 2019, pp. 408–409). This statement captures the tension between the individual and broader society, a conflict that has been the focus of many philosophers, including John Stuart Mill. Mill sought to combine liberal ideas of individual rights with aspects of utilitarianism, which were concerned with the happiness of the majority. The juxtaposition of these approaches can be seen in Mill’s ideas about the role and function of education. For Mill, education was necessary to develop the critical consciousness of citizens who lived with a representative government, as it meant that they had the ability to recognize detrimental legislation and protect their rights and freedoms (Gutek, 2014). Like Dewey, Mill believed that schooling should “foster individual intellectual initiative, especially the power of critical thinking” (Gutek, 2014, p. 228). The latter was particularly important for developing disinterested participants, individuals who, unmotivated by profit or personal gain, would be

10  CRITICAL CITIZENSHIP VERSUS ‘HIGH INDIVIDUALISM’ IN EDUCATION 

193

able to objectively evaluate issues in society and provide ideal solutions (Gutek, 2014). The creation of such individuals was so reliant on education that in Gutek’s (2014) discussion of Mill, the term “well-educated persons” (p. 228) is used as a synonym. The importance placed on disinterested participants is greatly connected to Mill’s distrust of the tyrannous majority, whom he believed would impose beliefs onto social groups with less mass. Disinterested participants, on the other hand, “would be concerned with the general good” (Gutek, 2014, p. 228). Having impartial, rational, and objective persons review societal issues was thus beneficial to the collective, of whom Mill shared equal concern with alongside that individual. Perhaps this is because Mill saw the two as inseparable. In his book On Liberty (Mill & Elshtain, 2003), he declares, “No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and often far beyond them” (p. 143). This is not to say that Mill believed in a consensus of thought within a collective. Indeed, under Mill’s view, “liberty and criticism were … useful to a society because they made it possible to express divergent opinions and test new ideas” (Gutek, 2014, p.  228). Truth would arise from this competition and aid the development of new social policies (Gutek, 2014), showcasing how individual thought could benefit the overall collective. Having citizens who were capable of such critical debates was essential to the progress of the collective. Like Mill, Hegel also supports the idea of civil society as a conflict zone in which individuals’ thoughts do battle (Small, 1982). However, in contrast to Mill’s concept of disinterested participants, Hegel sees these confrontations as motivated by individual interests. Hegel notes that ‘natural’ unity is only found within the family unit, while in a state unity must be developed throughout interactions in civic life (Small, 1982). Education often aids in the development of this larger unity, helping citizens “see themselves not as separate beings but as part of a whole” (Small, 1982, p. 208). Belonging to a unit, Hegel argues, is how meaning is given to individual freedom (Small, 1982), and like Dewey and Mill, he highlighted the symbiosis between individuals and the collective. In Small’s (1982) words, “In the true state the ‘man’ and the ‘citizen’ are united, and education is just the development of that unity” (p. 209). Marx develops this idea one step further by noting that the state is in actuality, an abstract notion, and asserting that what we conceive as ‘the state’ is really a skewed reflection of social life (Small, 1982). Thus, critiques of the state could be

194 

K. LOCKE ET AL.

seen as criticisms of day-to-day life, making critical citizenship not only politically relevant but also necessary to more thorough investigation of societal concepts of how life should or should not be lived. Critical citizenship, therefore, functions as a form of “social reason” (The General Council of the First International, 1964, as quoted in Small, 1982, p. 213) and can provoke significant societal change. Education for critical thought is thus imperative to society’s advancement; as Small (1982) states, “The future of education … cannot be separated from the future of society in general” (p. 212). Exploring past philosophical debates on the relationship between the individual and the collective is especially relevant now that many of the world’s flagship democracies live in a state of high individualism (Marginson, 2020). Marginson’s (2020) concept of ‘high individualism’ refers to an extreme form of individualism in which individual freedoms are not only paramount and prioritized over collective interests but also ultimately divorced from them. Covid-19 has revealed the prominence of high individualism, as “The relation between individual and social is highlighted in a pandemic, whose spread is modified by … social arrangements” (Marginson, 2020, p.  1393). Marginson (2020) explores the effects of different social arrangements by comparing Covid-19 outcomes in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) to those of East Asian countries like China, South Korea, and Vietnam. He finds that the UK and US, often seen as the forerunners of democratic ideals, faired far worse than East Asian nations, especially in terms of Covid-19-related deaths. Marginson (2020) suggests that these differences result from contrasting cultural ideas about social responsibility and the individual. While East Asian countries tend to position an individual within the broader sphere of the collective and thus acknowledge the importance of being socially minded, attitudes in the UK and the US see individuals as isolated units with “normative primacy over the social” (Marginson, 2020, p. 1393). Marginson (2020) posits that this approach has implications for education in general and higher education in particular. High individualism extends to institutions, and while Marginson (2020) is referring specifically to Higher Education, his observations extend to compulsory education institutions as well. Marginson notes that many universities in societies plagued by this anti-social outlook have reopened prematurely due to the financial interests of the tertiary education providers. This has resulted in an increase in infection and led to further pandemic-related deaths. The untimely reopening of universities can be seen as particularly

10  CRITICAL CITIZENSHIP VERSUS ‘HIGH INDIVIDUALISM’ IN EDUCATION 

195

problematic when the UK and the US are the “home of the globally dominant model of higher education” (Marginson, 2020, p. 1392). The decision to reopen models the prioritization of individual interests, both at a singular and a structural level, over collective good. As Marginson (2020) suggests, the troubling actions of universities during Covid-19 demand that we immediately evaluate the social practices of higher education and their dependence on individualistic thinking. Individualistic attitudes during Covid-19 do not only reveal concerning issues in higher education, but they also expose problems in compulsory schooling, particularly in disciplines related to health and wellbeing. Lamb et al. (2021) draw interesting parallels between the United States’ approach to the Covid-19 pandemic and its individualistic perspectives in sex education. They highlight that both topics are interests of public health which have been highly individualized, with the focus placed on personal protection rather than collective responsibility for health. Lamb et  al. (2021) note that “while individualism can certainly correspond to the set of values held by any given person … it is a quality that is reinforced by broader forces” (Lamb et al., 2021, p. 4). For example, during the pandemic, the US government emphasized the importance of individual actions such as mask-wearing, personal hygiene, and physically distancing in controlling the spread of the virus while failing to address broader collective issues such as increasing poverty and the spread of misinformation that were contributing to Covid-19’s prevalence (Lamb et al., 2021). The government’s approach follows the neoliberal belief “that individuals are responsible for their own outcomes” (Lamb et  al., 2021, p.  2), a notion that relies on willful blindness to systemic inequalities such as racism, sexism, and stratified social classes (Lamb et al., 2021). This sightlessness is also present in education systems, which so often fail to address the impact systemic issues have on students’ individual metrics such as testing and attendance scores. In an effort to restore social sight, Lamb et al. (2021) encourage a shift to a collectivist approach in both public health and education. Collectivism opposes neoliberal individualism; it encourages moral decision-making, ethics of care, and community awareness (Lamb et al., 2021). It also expects inherent care for the vulnerable in society, an expectation that could drastically improve the lives and wellbeing of those marginalized in the health and education sectors. The impact of Covid-19 thus provides an opportunity for Western societies to move toward a collective responsibility for shared outcomes and away from individualistic mentalities and behaviors. The question is, how do we achieve such a transition?

196 

K. LOCKE ET AL.

The Role of Education in Creating Critical Citizens Based on Collectivism The rise of misinformation, spread of conspiracy theories, and open display of racism and other hate rhetoric are fundamentally educational issues that directly implicate the role and purpose of compulsory-level school systems on local and global platforms (Edling & Mooney Simmie, 2020; Verma & Apple, 2021). Related to this premise is the heightened role that education plays in shaping citizens who have the ability to construct themselves as individuals that belong to, and have responsibilities toward, a wider community (Germani et al., 2020). We agree with what others that have argued long before us that the compulsory education sector has a responsibility in constituting young people as critical citizens who have the ability to critique the conditions of their existence while acknowledging the obligations they have toward each other as a collective (Dewey, 1916; Doğanay, 2012; Freire, 1968). In the last 20 years many countries have included citizenship education as a part of their compulsory curriculum. As Willemse et al. (2015) have noted this inclusion “can been seen as a response to societal changes, such as the rise of individualization and the emergence of a multicultural society or poignant events in society, such as 9/11” (see also Karsten et al., 2002; Veugelers, 2011; Geijsel et al., 2012; Ten Dam et al., 2011). The Covid-19 pandemic is now added to the list that brings citizenship education in the compulsory schooling sector again to the forefront. Citizenship education has been and is labelled with many different terms including civics, democratic, national, or political education. Historically, its purpose was to instill a common identity, patriotism, and loyalty to the nation (Green, 1997), which shifted to a more complex array of purposes linked to ‘being a good citizen’. The shift partly presented a recognition of the divisive nature of overly promoting national identities and of the need to prepare children and young people to live in diverse communities and societies. Furthermore, the arrival of cross-­ national governing boundaries such as the UN and EU pushed for education to promote the concept of supra-national citizenship. Citizenship thus evolved from fostering national values and an obedient population

10  CRITICAL CITIZENSHIP VERSUS ‘HIGH INDIVIDUALISM’ IN EDUCATION 

197

to promoting a wider set of shared values including tolerance, human rights, democracy, and social justice (Johnson & Morris, 2010). The next push in the purpose of citizenship education was the added demand to educate children and young people to be ‘critical’ citizens. The term ‘critical’ has, however, been seen in different connotations. It has been criticized as a ‘buzzword’ or “current popular term or slogan that lacks precise meaning” (Edelsky & Cherland, 2006, p. 18). Others argued that it carries the mere desire of states to ensure a competitive workforce that is innovative, independent, and creative (Johnson & Morris, 2010). We, alongside others, argue that ‘critical’ needs to be understood from the perspective of ‘critical pedagogy’ which demands active forms of citizenship and political engagement (see, e.g., Arthur et  al., 2008). Critical pedagogy is grounded in the critical theories of Theodor W.  Adorno, Jürgen Habermas, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse and strongly associated with the teachings of John Dewey and Paulo Freire. Freire’s teaching uses dialogue to create a critical consciousness aimed to encourage action against oppression. While there is a wide and diverse use of ‘critical pedagogy’, its common purpose is to view “education as a political act … transforming schools towards pursuing social justice … using education to engender social change and empower educational educators” (DeLeon, 2006, p. 2). One of the core aspects of ‘critical pedagogy’ is the focus on the social collective which is closely related to its strive for social justice. In relation to critical citizenship education, it highlights the need to educate children and young people about their position within a wider collective and their responsibilities within this collective. This position within the collective is not a notion to be taught to take to the outside world of the educational setting they are in, but is to be mirrored in the interaction and teaching of it. Freire’s pedagogy of dialogue positions teachers and students within a horizontal relationship of trust. It thus opposes the individualistic and competitive nature of learning of neo-liberalism that most Western schooling systems subscribe to, in which the individual goals supersede the goals of the collective and in which individual performance, independence, freedom, and autonomy is encouraged and celebrated (Faitar, 2006; Giroux, 2018). Collectivism moves the interests and goals of the collective above those of the individual, highlights the interdependencies of those within the collective, and encourages the building of trusting relationships. Critical citizenship education thus needs to aim to build a collective consciousness and a community of inquiry to discuss and reflect on social and

198 

K. LOCKE ET AL.

societal issues. As Fisher (2008) argued, this collective consciousness may support students to “build their capacity to become active and effective citizens” (p. 95). In the tradition of Freire’s teaching of critical citizenship education should build agency rather than be a reflection on attitudes, provided norms, knowledge, and skills. It should lead to collective action which can involve not only students, but also teachers, parents, and the wider school community. The wider school community can itself be the site of a more collectivist form of participatory democracy. Marginson (2020) notes that collectivism often has a greater presence in non-Western societies, but Faitar (2006) refines this by highlighting that while Western societies like the United States operate predominantly under individualism, collectivist values are still present and vitally important to many demographics within their populations, such as indigenous and immigrant communities. Children from collectivist cultures often already have a greater understanding and concern for the community, and when these students attend Western schools, they bring with them into the classroom a disposition that acknowledges the importance of community and the collective. However, it is evident that this frequently goes unnoticed or is actively disregarded. Learners from collectivist societies at times struggle to meld their collectivist upbringing and family life with the individualistic requirements of their schooling, and are often left having to choose which value system to honor (Faitar, 2006). Faitar (2006) reminds us that the oppositional binary of individualism versus collectivism reflects other insidious power dichotomies in society, with an individualistic stance often associated with higher-power, ‘masculine’ societal positions and collectivist with lower-power, ‘feminine’ ones. Again, this reveals individualism to be an ethno- and andro-centric perspective, making a collectivist and communal approach in ways that can resist the binary and zero-sum tendencies inherent to the bifurcation of individualism and collectivism, the most viable option for teaching positive critical citizenship. A complicating factor in the re-composition of critical citizenship education is that critical thinking, so often the basis of critical citizenship teachings, is frequently framed through an individualistic lens (Warren, 1988). Reframing critical thinking education toward a more collectivist approach requires us to have conversations about the detrimental power structures that have led to individualistic approaches of critical thinking. Warren (1988) reminds us that, like with any aspect of education, “Critical thinking does not occur in a vacuum; it always occurs within some

10  CRITICAL CITIZENSHIP VERSUS ‘HIGH INDIVIDUALISM’ IN EDUCATION 

199

conceptual framework” (p. 33). She notes that a “conceptual framework functions for an individual as a finite lens” (Warren, 1988, p. 32), setting the parameters of what an individual can ‘see’. Critical thinking education is thus highly contextual and Warren (1988) highlights that the patriarchal social structures prevalent in Western societies contribute to our perception of what critical thinking is or should be. This is problematic as “A patriarchal conceptual framework is biased … [and] the assumptions on which it is based and the conclusions it warrants produce false or faulty generalizations” (p. 38). How can citizens be educated to be genuinely critical of society if they view that society through a flawed lens? Warren (1988) believes critical thinking is a feminist issue and that, by addressing gender hierarchies currently embedded in critical thinking, a more ethical framework can be created, providing greater clarity of vision for citizens. The inversion of hierarchies could be achieved through a collectivist approach to critical thinking and critical citizenship education, but Warren (1988) encourages critical reflection on how the process of developing this collectivist approach and whether this undertaking itself subverts established power imbalances. If a collectivist approach is to be developed and utilized in education, it is essential to recognize that many indigenous and non-Western communities have practiced different forms of collectivism throughout their histories and into present-day life. As such, indigenous and non-Western perspectives are crucial in constructing a truly comprehensive collectivist framework for critical citizenship. This emphasis on collectivism, however, should not be misunderstood as a non-critical subordination to the thinking of a wider group, but an emphasis of compassion and empathy for the other and the realization that the reduction of inequities within a collective or society benefits the whole of society. Indeed, critical pedagogy, critical feminist thinking, and the vast number of tributaries in the critical ‘river’ all argue that critical consciousness does not merely stop at empathy and action, but instead instills agency and activism at the very core of what it means to teach and learn critical citizenship.

Conclusion The chapter identifies and explores the precarious and ‘thin’ line that education walks between the construction of individuals who can critically engage with society, while being part of a collective community that is directly impacted by individual action. To return to the opening quotes

200 

K. LOCKE ET AL.

that frame this chapter, the strains of liberal philosophy that have shaped modern Western societies offer differing perspectives on how to view the individual and the obligations these individuals have—or choose not to have if we are recalling the first quote—toward a collective view of society. Our analysis demonstrates the dangers of individualizing society and the institutions that are embedded in the values of society to the extent that personal responsibility toward the collective is erased, or at least seriously eroded. Further, the role of education to provide the tools and frameworks to be able to discern and critically evaluate information so that forms of misinformation cannot take root is an essential pillar to any conception of the purpose of education. We are living in a post-truth era where misinformation individualizes and separates students from the power of the collective. This chapter has provided the theoretical coordinates for a way to conceptualize a more robust and critical citizenship authentic education that acknowledges the fragility and contingency of life. The importance of critical citizenship education versus an individualistic education without an emphasis on morality, empathy, and specifically agency is reflected in a letter to educators from a concentration camp survivor: “My eyes saw what no man should witness: gas chambers built by learned engineers. … Children poisoned by educated physicians. … My request is: help your students become more human.” In this light, the stakes of education built on notions of democratic obligation to the collective remain impossibly high.

References Ainge Roy, E. (2020, 11 May). Ardern thanks ‘team of 5 million’ as New Zealand reopens schools and offices. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2020/may/11/ardern-­announces-­new-­zealand-­will-­reopen-­schoolsoffices-­and-­restaurants-­this-­week Arthur, J., Davies, I., & Hahn, C. (Eds.). (2008). Sage handbook of education for citizenship and democracy. Sage. Bazzi, S., Fiszbein, M., & Gebresilasse, M. (2020). Rugged individualism and collective (in)action during the COVID-19 pandemic. Journal of Public Economics, 195, 104357. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104357 Braun, K. (2019). Unpacking post-truth. Critical Policy Studies, 13(4), 432–436. https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2019.1673200 DeLeon, A. (2006). The time for action is now! Anarchist theory, critical pedagogy, and radical possibilities. Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies, 4(2), 72–94.

10  CRITICAL CITIZENSHIP VERSUS ‘HIGH INDIVIDUALISM’ IN EDUCATION 

201

Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and education: An introduction to the philosophy of education. Simon & Schuster. Doğanay, A. (2012). A curriculum framework for active democratic citizenship education. In M. Print & D. Lange (Eds.), Schools, curriculum and civic education for building democratic citizens (pp.  19–39). Sense Publishers. https:// doi.org/10.1007/978-­94-­6209-­167-­2_3 Edelsky, C., & Cherland, M.  R. (2006). A critical issue in critical literacy. In K.  Cooper & R.  White (Eds.), The practical critical educator (pp. 17–33). Springer. Edling, S. & Mooney Simmie, G. (2020). Democracy and teacher education: Dilemmas, challenges and possibilities. Routledge. https://www.routledge. com/Democracy-­a nd-­Teacher-­E ducation-­D ilemmas-­C hallenges-­a nd-­ Possibilities/Edling-­Mooney-­Simmie/p/book/9781138593251 Faitar, G.  M. (2006). Individualism versus collectivism in schools. College Quarterly, 9(4), 1–4. Fisher, R. (2008). Teaching thinking: Philosophical enquiry in the classroom (3rd ed.). Continuum. Fraser, N. (2017). From progressive neoliberalism to trump—And beyond. American Affairs, 1(4), 46–64. Freire, P. (1968). Pedagogy of the oppressed. Seabury Press. Geijsel, F., Ledoux, G., Reumerman, R., & Ten Dam, G. (2012). Citizenship in young people’s daily lives: Differences in citizenship competences of adolescents in The Netherlands. Journal of Youth Studies, 15(6), 711–729. Geissel, B. (2008). Reflections and findings on the critical citizen: Civic education—What for? European Journal of Political Research, 47(1), 34–63. https://10.1111/j.1475-­6765.2007.00714.x Germani, A., Buratta, L., Delvecchio, E., & Mazzeschi, C. (2020). Emerging adults and COVID-19: The role of individualism-collectivism on perceived risks and psychological maladjustment. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 17(10), 3497. https://doi.org/10.3390/ ijerph17103497 Giroux, H. A. (2018). Pedagogy and the politics of hope: Theory, culture, and schooling: A critical reader. Routledge. Green, A. (1997). Education, globalization and the nation state. Palgrave Macmillan. Gutek, G. (2014). Philosophical, ideological and theoretical perspectives on education (2nd ed.). Pearson Central Pub. Habermas, J. (1981). The theory of communicative action. Beacon Press. Horn, S., & Veermans, K. (2019). Critical thinking efficacy and transfer skills defend against ‘fake news’ at an international school in Finland. Journal of Research in International Education, 18(1), 23–41. https://doi. org/10.1177/1475240919830003

202 

K. LOCKE ET AL.

Johnson, L., & Morris, P. (2010). Towards a framework for critical citizenship education. The Curriculum Journal, 21(1), 77–96. https://doi. org/10.1080/09585170903560444 Karsten, S., Cogan, J. J., Grossman, D. L., Liu, M. H., & Pitiyanuwat, S. (2002). Citizenship education and the reparation of future teachers: A study. Asia Pacific Education Review, 3(2), 168–183. Lamb, S., Pagán-Ortiz, M., & Bonilla, S. (2021). How to provide sexual education: Lessons from a pandemic on masculinity, individualism, and the neoliberal agenda. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 18(8), 4144. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18084144 Locke, K., Gerlich, R., Godfery, M., Fraser, I., Robertson, G., & Roberts, A. (2017). The heart of the matter: A written presentation of the sixth annual Peter Fraser memorial lecture. Knowledge Cultures, 5(6), 25–44. https://doi. org/10.22381/KC5620173 Marginson, S. (2020). The relentless price of high individualism in the pandemic. Higher Education Research & Development, 39(7), 1392–1395. https://doi. org/10.1080/07294360.2020.1822297 McCormack, M. (2022, March 22). A pandemic in Boris Johnson’s ‘Land of Liberty’. History Workshop. https://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/apandemic-­in-­boris-­johnsons-­land-­of-­liberty/ Mill, J. S., & Elshtain, J. B. (2003). On liberty. Yale University Press. Pélabay, J., & Sénac, R. (2019). French critical citizenship: Between philosophical enthusiasm and political uncertainty. French Politics, 17(4), 407–432. Small, R. (1982). Marx and state education. History of Education, 11(3), 207–218. https://doi.org/10.1080/0046760820110305 Smith, D. (2020, April 4). ‘I’m not going to do it’: Trump rejects his own administration’s advice on masks. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2020/apr/03/im-­n ot-­g oing-­t o-­d o-­i t-­t rump-­r efutes-­h is-­o wnadministrations-­advice-­on-­masks Ten Dam, G., Geijsel, F., Reumerman, R., & Ledoux, G. (2011). Measuring citizenship competences of young people. European Journal of Education, 46, 354–372. Verma, R., & Apple, M. W. (2021). Disrupting hate in education: Teacher activists, democracy, and global pedagogies of interruption. Routledge. Veugelers, W. (2011). The moral and the political in global citizenship: Appreciating differences in education. Globalisation, Societies and Education, 9(3–4), 473–485. Warren, K.  J. (1988). Critical thinking and feminism. Informal Logic, 10(1), 10.22329/il.v10i1.2636. Willemse, T. M., Ten Dam, G., Geijsel, F., Van Wessum, L., & Volman, M. (2015). Fostering teachers’ professional development for citizenship education. Teaching and Teacher Education, 49, 118–127. World Health Organization. (2020). Novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) (situation report 13). World Health Organization. https://www.who.int/docs/default-­ source/coronaviruse/situation-­reports/20200202-­sitrep-­13-­ncov-­v3.pdf

CHAPTER 11

What’s in a Tweet? How Platform Features Facilitate and Constrain Civic Discourse and What It Means for Teaching Civic Media Literacy Ellen Middaugh, Mark Felton, and Henry Fan

Introduction Teaching for democracy in an age of misinformation requires a deep understanding of the information landscape for which we are teaching. Best practices in civic education from the early 2000s included attention to information and media literacy in the form of preparing students to follow and critically assess information about current events through discussions of journalistic standards, opinion versus reporting, or political bias and teaching youth to express public voice through letters to the editor or presentations at meetings (Gibson & Levine, 2003). In today’s media landscape, the way many people access, discuss, and express their views is through social media discourse, relying on news that is shared through

E. Middaugh (*) • M. Felton • H. Fan San José State University, San Jose, CA, USA e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 L. Parker (ed.), Education in the Age of Misinformation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25871-8_11

203

204 

E. MIDDAUGH ET AL.

social media platforms (Robb, 2020; Walker & Matsa, 2021). On one hand, scholars argue this opens up opportunities, in the form of allowing non-elites to share information important to them that may be ignored by broadcast media (Schofield-Clark & Marchi, 2017) and to access people and perspectives beyond our geographically local communities (Mundt et  al., 2018). On the other hand, the challenges to information quality and the spread of misinformation have been well-established (Alcott et al., 2019). Drawing on deliberative and participatory theories of democracy, we align with models of civic education that argue that educators should be preparing youth to make informed decisions about how they use social media to consume, share, comment on, and express their views on civic information (Kahne et al., 2016). Developing an understanding of civic issues and possibilities for civic action requires transmedia judgment—the ability to make sense of information distributed across media (Jenkins et al., 2006; Lan, 2013). Emerging educational adaptations include teaching digital media literacy skills of searching, evaluating, and producing media with reflection on ethical practices (Martens & Hobbs, 2015) and online civic reasoning using lateral validation to assess the quality of information and sources as well as their bias (McGrew et al., 2018). However, an under-attended aspect of educating for online information use is the role of platform features in shaping information quality. Just as it is helpful to know that we are likely to get different perspectives from the NY Times versus Wall Street Journal or that cable news has different regulations than network news, citizens today benefit from understanding how different platforms work to shape information and provide opportunities for quality control. Recent studies find differences between platforms (e.g., Twitter, Reddit, Facebook, YouTube) in impact on political knowledge and engagement (Lee et al., 2022) as well as detail and currency of information (Priya et al., 2019). Furthermore, the driving factors enabling the spread of misinformation, such as the presence of anger and fear words in “alternative influencer” content (Hiaeshutter-Rice et  al., 2021) and the presence of responses correcting or affirming misinformation in discussion threads (Buchanan et al., 2022) have been established as varying significantly by platform. Given a growing body of evidence that the challenges related to the spread of misinformation vary by platform, we argue that being a savvy consumer and producer of civic media requires understanding platform features that influence information quality. In this chapter, we focus in

11  WHAT’S IN A TWEET? HOW PLATFORM FEATURES FACILITATE… 

205

particular on Twitter and the study of Twitter discourse using N=900 tweets about youth-relevant issues—Immigration/DACA, COVID, and Environment/Plastic Pollution. We examine which kinds of users (e.g., celebrities, news organizations, individuals) and content (e.g., opinion, links to information, calls to action) are represented in these discourses. Additionally, we examine how user type, content type, and issue may interact to influence the overall level of engagement (likes/shares/retweets) with posts. We use these findings to discuss the potential of Twitter as a platform and Twitter discourse for youth to access, share, discuss and express themselves on civic issues. From there we will discuss how educators can support students to think critically and strategically when using Twitter and other social media for civic inquiry, action, and expression.

Twitter as a Space for Political Information, Dialogue, and Expression In this chapter, we focus on Twitter as a space for political information, dialogue, and expression. In the past decade, Twitter has been identified as a significant social media platform for activist movements (Jackson et al., 2020), news dissemination by journalists (Canter, 2015), and for political dialogue during significant electoral events (Hawthorne et  al., 2013). Thus, Twitter is considered to be an important platform specifically as a form of public square related to activism and political sphere. Our goal in this study is to gain better clarity on the potential for participation in Twitter discourse for youth civic inquiry and expression and how educators might use this information to better prepare youth to take advantage of and understand the limits of such participation in itself but also relative to other platforms. Twitter has been described as a micro-blogging platform that serves as both a news medium and a social network (Chadwick, 2017), blending conversations between people known to each other and wide public conversations with an undefined group of people (Rossi & Magnani, 2012). It is a large, mostly unmoderated platform that allows for many-to-many interaction. The platform will remove users who are flagged for threats of violence in some situations, but most moderation happens through users muting, blocking, or unfollowing other users to control what shows up in their feed. In terms of content capacity, Twitter’s 240-character limit

206 

E. MIDDAUGH ET AL.

restricts the immediate content available in a given post. However, embedding links to longer articles, videos that can be watched within the post, or threading a series of posts together allow for sharing more in-depth content to be presented if a user chooses to take the extra step of clicking to the next sources. The level of interactivity varies greatly, and the potential for Twitter to act as a space for information and electoral participation (duty-driven), expression and dialogue (deliberative and participatory), or critique and framing of alternative political realities (liberatory), depends significantly on how one uses it as a platform. Key elements of Twitter include the ability to “follow” someone and have their posts show up in a user’s feed. This can serve as a mechanism for shaping one’s feed to include posts from certain sources. When users “follow-back” the relationship becomes more reciprocal. Two people who follow each other can Direct Message (DM) enabling private dialogue. The @ function allows someone to direct a post at another user, either in an interactive, reciprocal conversation or, when directed at a public figure with a large following, a way of joining into a large, distributed public broadcast of views. Similarly, commenting on another users’ post can be more conversational in cases where someone is commenting on a post from a user with whom they have established a reciprocal relationship, or it can be an act of joining into a large public response to a public figure. Finally, hashtags (#) allow users to broadcast their posts as part of a larger public conversation with others who use the same #, and retweets (RTs) allow users to participate in the spread and amplification of posts to their networks (Bossner & Nagel, 2020; Altahmazi, 2020, and Rossi & Magnani, 2012 for useful descriptions of Twitter’s functionality). Rossi and Magnani (2012) have suggested that when studying Twitter for political discourse and participation, it is useful to distinguish between “network driven” and “topical” participation. Network-driven participation involves interactions with users who are connected to one another either through direct reciprocal following or through their second, third, fourth, etc. degree connections of people who follow each other. This type of participation creates more sustained relationships between users, which in turn, can encourage a greater degree of interactivity, reciprocity, and community norm-setting. This kind of participation is most likely to be seen among the most active Twitter users or those engaged in persistent political activism. In contrast, “topical” participation is marked by activity organized around a topic, in which users might engage with posts that are trending

11  WHAT’S IN A TWEET? HOW PLATFORM FEATURES FACILITATE… 

207

as breaking news or follow certain hashtags related to topics they care about. This kind of participation is more common among casual users and represents more “ephemeral networks” (Rossi et al., 2011). Research on topic-driven participation has included research on # activism, analyzing tweets that use explicitly activist #s (e.g., #EndFamilySeparation) and suggests this form of expression to allow users to engage in community affiliation around shared values with other users and contribute to a collective legitimization of socio-political claims. They suggest that this form of expression is associated with potential to instigate social and political change, and aligns with liberatory forms of engagement by using hashtags and posts to reframe issues and create an affiliative group that need not necessarily rely on individual leaders. Other studies have focused on a single event, such as Bossner and Nagel’s (2020) study of “dual screening” and the role of Twitter in allowing online communities to reflect on political agendas communicated through traditional media, in this case, a UK Television event, by analyzing the messages marked by #JeremyCorbyn and that included an @ (i.e., attempt to directly communicate with or receive direct communication). Within this kind of event, they found that elites tended to use Twitter as a broadcast tool, infrequently using the @function to engage with others, while regular citizens were most likely to respond, but least likely to be responded to. Furthermore, their content analysis of messages found that a minority (33.7%) of posts focused on policy, while the majority of posts included “meta-talk” (i.e., evaluation of politicians’ appearance, competence, the media setting, fact-checking, etc.). They also found that election-­ specific topics (e.g., Brexit) were more commonly shared by elites, while the average citizen was more likely to message about general topics (e.g., economy, immigration). Labonte and Rowlands (2021) also conducted a study of topical Twitter discourse, but focused on a specific issue—energy and electricity—and the #onpoli, which indicates connection to Ontario politics. Like Bossner and Nagel (2020), they found that the most engaged users on the topic were regular citizens (no affiliation), but were least likely to be retweeted, while news media and those traditionally empowered were most likely to be amplified. Williams et al. (2015) studied topical discourse around the issue of climate change focused on the extent to which Twitter might enable cross-cutting discourse and exchange of information. They found that within the tweets collected, 73% included links, suggesting sharing of information (though without checking what kind of information the links

208 

E. MIDDAUGH ET AL.

connected to), and that some hashtags (#climatechange, #climate vs. #climatereality) were used to convene people of similar views on climate change, while hashtags like #globalwarming and #agw included both climate activists and climate skeptics. When considering Twitter as a space for civic engagement, the literature to date suggests that topical engagement, which is the most common form for the regular user, may simply replicate the dynamics of traditional power structures in which elites drive the conversation, at least when connected to electoral politics. However, in this emerging body of literature, it also appears that these dynamics may vary by topic. Furthermore, in order to understand the potential of Twitter to foster civic discourse and civic engagement, it is useful to consider the initial framing of posts. For example, civic action is frequently prompted by recruitment and direct invitation (Schlozman et al., 2012). Understanding of civic issues requires access to information that can support mental elaboration about issues (Molina & Jennings, 2018). Tactics such as asking questions or using humor can encourage attention and engagement (Zhang & Pinto, 2021). The current study builds on this nascent area of research to focus on topical Twitter discourse related to three topics—Immigration, Plastic Pollution, and Coronavirus—with the goal of understanding what a less intensive, more typical user, might see and have the opportunity to engage with in terms of information and expression when an issue is not explicitly tethered to an electoral event or electoral discourse. Our study questions include: RQ1: Within topical issue-based political discourse, what kinds of users are represented in relation to institutional status or power (i.e., celebrities, influencers, news organizations, political parties, everyday citizens?) RQ2: What kinds of content (opinion, information, mobilization, etc.) are most common? RQ3: How do issue, content type, and user type influence the level of engagement (retweets, likes, comments)?

Methods Study Design This study used a descriptive comparative design to examine the relationship between user status, content type, topic, and likelihood of messages being amplified.

11  WHAT’S IN A TWEET? HOW PLATFORM FEATURES FACILITATE… 

209

Sample In order to gain greater understanding of content type, we adopted a “small data” approach (Labont & Rowlands, 2021), sampling a total of 900 tweets across three topics—Immigration/DACA, Environmentalism/ Plastic Pollution, and COVID-19. Using the Twitter API search function, we selected tweets with 20+ replies (thus examining Tweets that represent a minimum level of public discourse relevance), written in English. The topics were chosen to include “youth-relevant” issues and to include a mix of topics that included politically hot topic responses to current events and/or legislation (COVID-19 and DACA) and more ongoing less contentious topics (Plastic Pollution). Tweets were sampled using the following search terms and time frames: (a) COVID-19 or Corona: March 13–May 12, 2020, (b) DACA: Sept. 5, 2018–Nov. 4, 2018, and (c) Plastic Pollution: No start date to June 5, 2019. Coding To develop a tool for capturing the type of user (User) and content (Content) in tweets, data were coded iteratively by the authors until saturation was reached in coding categories. This process resulted in five categories of User (Table 11.1) and seven of Content (Table 11.2). One of the authors trained three raters using one-third of the dataset. Inter-rater reliability between each rater and the first author was calculated with another one-third of the dataset. Reliability reached .73, .74, and .79 (Cohen’s κ). Disagreements were resolved by discussion. Finally, once reliability was calculated, the remaining data (including the data originally

Table 11.1  Analytic scheme for coding type of User User

Definition

Celebrity Influencer General user Governmental agency (or NGO)

Post issued by an individual with more than 1 million followers Post issued by an individual with 10,000–1 million followers Post issued by an individual with fewer than 10,000 followers Post issued by the official site for a governmental or non-­ governmental agency. Individual politicians’ personal accounts not included. Post issued by a major news media outlet with more than 100,000 followers. Individual reporters’ personal accounts not included.

News Media Outlet

210 

E. MIDDAUGH ET AL.

Table 11.2  Analytic scheme for coding content type Content type

Definition

Question Topical claim Political claim

Genuine question (i.e., not rhetorical) posed about the issue Claim or argument about the issue Claim or argument that addresses how politicians, the government, government agencies, or companies are handling the issue Statement, anecdote, or status update that shares a personal experience related to the issue Call for followers to take a specific action(s) on the issue News or information about the issue (or links to news or information) without adding an explicit argument, critique, or call to action Memes, gifs, or other humor that make light of the issue, without making a clear point that falls into one of the other coding categories

Personal Anecdote Mobilization Information Humor

used for developing categories and training raters) were coded by the three raters. User. If the poster represented themselves as an individual, they were coded as Celebrity, if they had over 1 million followers; as an Influencer, if they had between 10,000 and 1 million followers; or as a General User, if they had fewer than 10,000 followers. If the user posted from an institutional account (i.e., an organization as a whole, rather than as an individual working within an organization), we captured whether the organization was a Governmental or Non-governmental Organization (e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Centers for Disease Control, World Health Organization) or an established News Media Outlet (e.g., BBC, FOX, The Guardian, Politico), provided that the media outlet had at least 100,000 followers. Although the numeric cut-offs points for individuals and news media were arbitrary, they allowed us to capture variations in user type. It is important to note for the purposes of this study, individual accounts of reporters or politicians were classified by their following to differentiate between tweets that have been through editorial review or sanctioned by an institution from those of individuals who are cultivating a following. Content. Tweets were also coded for content based on seven categories (Table 11.2.) These categories capture the function of tweets as communicative acts. While these categories are not conceptually exhaustive of all communicative acts on Twitter, they did account for the entirety of the data in our dataset. The categories are also not mutually exclusive. However, one code was assigned per tweet and raters followed rules based

11  WHAT’S IN A TWEET? HOW PLATFORM FEATURES FACILITATE… 

211

on the weight of evidence. Rhetorical questions that included explicit critiques of particular policies or actions, for example, were coded as political claims, not as questions. Informational posts urging followers to retweet, without calling for a specific action related to the issue, were coded as information and not mobilization. Rules for assigning codes were developed during the training phase of data analysis and added to a shared document made accessible to all raters. Analysis RQ1, which focused on which types of users most likely to have their content be posted, endorsed, shared, or replied to were analyzed using descriptive statistics and, due to the severe skewness of the data, median values were reported. To compare whether there were significant differences in engagement by user type, the Kruskal-Wallis test, a nonparametric significance test analogous to ANOVA was used. Follow-up tests for pairwise comparisons used the Bonferroni correction for Type 1 error. RQ2, which asked about the content of posts (opinion, information, mobilization, etc.), was analyzed using descriptive statistics (frequencies), and significant differences between post-content and topic and post-­ content and user type were analyzed using chi-square tests. RQ3, which asked about the role of issue, content, and user type in driving engagement, was analyzed using a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) due to the interdependent nature of the three dependent measures of engagement (likes, retweets, and comments). Dependent variables were highly skewed and adjusted by applying a log transformation prior to analysis.

Findings Who Drives the Conversation? User Type and Engagement The first question examined differences in engagement by user type. As seen in Fig. 11.1, Influencers generated the majority of original content (58.9%), followed by Celebrities (18.5%). Less common content generators were News Media (11.5%), General Users (9.5%), and Government/ NGO (1.6%). Moving beyond posts to other indicators of engagement, Kruskal-­ Wallis tests suggested significant differences based on user type in the

212 

E. MIDDAUGH ET AL.

Fig. 11.1  Engagement by user type

number of Retweets [H(4)=125.48, p