Educating for Durable Solutions: Histories of Schooling in Kenya’s Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps 9781350133297, 9781350133327, 9781350133303

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Educating for Durable Solutions

Also available from Bloomsbury Education and Disability in the Global South, edited by Nidhi Singal, Paul Lynch, Shruti Taneja Johansson Educational Transitions in Post-Revolutionary Spaces, by Tavis D. Jules and Teresa Barton Issues and Challenges of Immigration in Early Childhood in the USA, by Wilma Robles-Melendez and Wayne Driscoll Transnational Perspectives on Democracy, Citizenship, Human Rights and Peace Education, edited by Mary Drinkwater, Fazal Rizvi, Karen Edge

Educating for Durable Solutions Histories of Schooling in Kenya’s Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps Christine Monaghan

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA 29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2021 Copyright © Christine Monaghan, 2021 Christine Monaghan has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgments on p. ix constitute an extension of this copyright page. Cover design: Charlotte James Cover image: Somali girls study English in Dadaab, the worlds biggest refugee camp August 14, 2009 in Dadaab, Kenya. (© journalturk/iStock) All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Monaghan, Christine (Lecturer in international education), author. Title: Educating for Durable Solutions: Histories of Schooling in Kenya’s Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps / Christine Monaghan. Description: New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020047644 | ISBN 9781350133297 (hardback) | ISBN 9781350133310 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Refugees–Education–Kenya. | Refugee camps–Kenya. Classification: LCC LC3738.K4 M66 2021 | DDC 371.826/914096762–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020047644 ISBN: HB: 978-1-3501-3329-7 ePDF: 978-1-3501-3330-3 eBook: 978-1-3501-3331-0 Typeset by Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd. To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

Table of Contents List of Map Foreword, Carol Anne Spreen (New York University, USA) Acknowledgments Abbreviations

vi vii ix xi

Prologue

1

1 2

5

3 4 5 6

For the State, Not by the State Asking Why and How: A Historical Turn in Refugee Education Research From Emergency Education to Education in Emergencies (1992–2002) Education Guidelines, Standards, Priorities, and Strategies (2003–12) Critical Junctures Driving Forward with the Rearview Mirror

Notes Bibliography Index

15 33 67 95 109 127 161 174

Map

Map 1  Kenya: Map No. 4187 Rev. 3, December 2011, United Nations.

Foreword It has been almost two decades since the late Katarina Tomasevski, the first UN Special Rapporteur for Education, published Education Denied: Costs and Remedies. In that now-classic volume and numerous other publications, Tomasevski documented the widespread violation by governments throughout the world of the right to education; she also provided a framework and practical recommendations for addressing those violations. These include naming and shaming parties, primarily governments, that fail to uphold their obligation to provide education; evaluating education not simply in terms of access, but rather whether it is acceptable, available, and adaptable to the numerous and varied needs of children throughout the world; and continuing to highlight the imperative of realizing the right to education. As she succinctly states, “the right to education is a multiplier. It enhances all other rights when guaranteed and forecloses the enjoyment of most, if not all, when denied.” Several scholars and practitioners have since taken up the campaign to ensure that all children have access to education, dedicating their work to identifying who or what is keeping children out of school and attempting to remove those barriers. Chrissie is one of them. I have watched this project from inception to completion and had many conversations with Chrissie about the shifting landscape of refugee education. In recent years, questions and ideas about how to improve UNHCR’s refugee education programming through, for example, better, more reliable government funding, have given way to issues of the expanding role of forprofit actors in education service provision for refugees and the potential damaging, long-term consequences. It is often hard to know such practices are happening and at what scale because accessing camps is difficult. That Chrissie was able to travel throughout Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps as well as refugee settlements in northern Uganda while conducting research for her dissertation and later for consultancies and positions as a human rights researcher has allowed her

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Foreword

to help put a spotlight on what might otherwise remain largely unknown outside of UN and INGO circles. That she has taken an historical approach to documenting what has happened to refugee education over time, globally and in Dadaab and Kakuma camps, significantly strengthens this effort. As she shows, much of what is currently depicted as new, innovative, even radical in refugee education, including the UNHCR’s partnership with the World Bank to integrate refugee children in government schools, was actually common practice in the 1970s before the World Bank, through Structural Adjustment Programs, curtailed refugees’ access to education by removing them from government schools. While this account provides a well-researched and thoughtful critique of thirty years of policies and practices of refugee education, its most important contribution is bringing forward rich and compelling stories of how refugees and several dedicated UN and INGO staff members have successfully advocated for meaningful changes. The actions and voices of individuals are not commonly depicted in education policy research, but they can be seen and heard in the following pages. I will not describe them here, but rather let you read them for yourself. Carol Anne Spreen, PhD New York University

Acknowledgments I wish to express my deep gratitude to the many refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma, and to the community services, education, and program officers at the UNHCR and its partner agencies who shared with me their hopes, dreams, frustrations, and hardships, mostly with regards to refugee education but also their lived experiences in the camps or in the corridors or conference rooms of the UNHCR offices in Geneva and Nairobi. I would also like to thank the team at the UNHCR archives for compiling hundreds of documents over the course of my visits there. I was very fortunate to have been hosted by the Lutheran World Federation while I was in Kakuma, and by the UNHCR and UNICEF while I was in Dadaab. Many thanks to Ed, Sus, and Nati who helped me navigate Kakuma from the day I arrived; Saleem who made my first trip to Dadaab possible; Mohamed for his guidance on my second trip; Teresia and John for hosting me when I was in Kenya and always making me feel part of the family while in Nairobi; and to Magdaline for her wonderful company. The Curry Foundation, UVA’s Institute of the Humanities and Global Cultures, the Buffet Foundation, and the Virginia Foundation of the Humanities offered generous fellowship support. I am most grateful and appreciative for the ways my thinking has been stretched by senior scholars and colleagues at the University of Virginia, New York University, and the Comparative and International Education Society. I am also deeply grateful to colleagues at the Global Coalition to Protection Education from Attack, Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, and Crisis Action for your friendship and camaraderie. I wish to sincerely thank Genevieve for showing me how to navigate potentially unsafe places, and Kevin, Barb, and Steve for giving me a home at UVA. Thank you, thank you, thank you to Carol Anne for being my unwavering advocate, mentor, and friend.

x

Acknowledgments

Thank you Kathy for always supporting me; Larry for always saying “go for it”; Nancy and Jack for making so much possible; and Colleen, Catherine, Ciaran, Briggs, and Hannah for being there for life’s moments—big and small. Lastly, thank you Cameron for our life together and Claire and Baer for sharing it with us.

Abbreviations ADEO African Development and Emergency Organization BHER Borderless Higher Education for Refugees ECD Early Childhood Development EFA Education for All EiE Education in Emergencies EMIS Education Management Information System EU European Union GCE Global Citizenship Education GLOBE Global Learning Observation to Benefit the Environment GPE Global Partnership for Education INEE Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies INGOs International Nongovernmental Organization IRRES International Relief and Rehabilitation Services KCPE Kenyan Certificate of Primary Education KCSE Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education Ksh Kenyan Shillings LWF Lutheran World Federation MSF Médecins Sans Frontièrs NGOs Nongovernmental Organization NRC Norwegian Refugee Council PEP Peace Education Program PTAs Parent Teacher Associations RET Refugee Education Trust SMCs School Management Committees SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army UNDP United Nations Development Program UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

xii

UNHCR WTK WUSC YEP

Abbreviations

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Windle Trust Kenya World University Service of Canada Youth Education Pack

Prologue 2014

I spotted the building from fifteen kilometers away, rising up from the dusty, windswept plain. “What is that?” I asked Saleem, my fixer for the week. He was in the front seat of the Hilux truck, talking hurriedly on the phone in Somali. We were heading away from Ifo and toward Dagahaley by way of Ifo 2, the newest subcamp in Dadaab. “A school,” he said without pausing his conversation. “It’s two stories … how is that even possible here?” My question was not in reference to the logistical or practical challenges of construction, but rather to the twin anomalies the very existence of the building represented—its permanence and sheer size. Schooling had taken place under trees for years in Dadaab. While there were now many brick-and-mortar classrooms, the education sector always faced significant budgetary shortfalls. These were reflected in student-to-teacher ratios of 150:1, a chronic lack of textbooks for students, and many school buildings with crumbling walls, doors falling off hinges, and an acute shortage of desks. Yet, someone had marshaled the funds for this school. Saleem ended his call and turned toward the backseat to face me. “You know, it’s the biggest building in the camp and the only one that’s two stories,” he said. “We can go there?” I tried to phrase it as a question, though it sounded more like a statement. He checked his watch. “If you want to go there, we can go there but no more than fifteen minutes. It’s in Ifo 2—that’s where the security is bad—still bandits

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and the police don’t really have things under control.” Saleem indicated to the driver that we should make a left across the untracked expanse of land. As we drew closer the contrast sharpened between the school and the surrounding area—a new stucco building that towered over hundreds of dilapidated tents made of twisted branches and plastic sheeting. “Only fifteen minutes,” Saleem repeated as we climbed out of the truck. I quickly walked inside and into an open courtyard, craning my head upward to take in the breezeways connecting a dozen second-story classrooms. It looked almost identical to my suburban public high school in northern California. “Let’s go find the principal,” Saleem said, motioning me up the stairs and into a classroom at the top. “Just wait in here.” Turning to survey the room, I noticed a man sitting on an elevated office chair in front of a battered desk, typing on a laptop computer. “Hello,” I said, stepping forward. “My name is Chrissie Monaghan and I’m a researcher. I’m writing about the history of education in Dadaab and Kakuma. Are you a teacher or principal here?” “You said the history of education in Dadaab camp?” I nodded. Before I could explain further, he turned his laptop screen toward me. On the open Word document, he had typed “The Educationist: Education in Dadaab since 1994.” “You’re writing the history of education in Dadaab!” I exclaimed. I couldn’t help firing off questions in quick succession. What’s your name? Where are you from? How long have you been in the camp? How long have you worked in the school? He took each one in turn, calmly explaining that his name was Martin, he was from Uganda, and had been in the camp since 1993. He had first been a teacher, then a head teacher, and eventually a quality assurance officer. He had just started writing an hour before I walked in and was about to tell me more when Saleem returned. “I can’t find the principal,” he said. “And any way we should get going, we’ve been too long here.” “Wait we have to stay,” I said, recounting my brief exchange with Martin. In the time it took to do so, Martin had reached into his bag and found a handful of photos.

Prologue

3

“Take a look at these,” he said, “I was a young man then.” I gently accepted the dog-eared, sepia prints, eyeing a blackboard propped under an acacia tree, a group of preschool children sitting cross-legged on mats in a darkened room, Martin with a shovel in hand standing next to a partially constructed building. “The principal of this school is actually one of my former students. We were in the can schools then.” “Can schools?” “Someone from CARE had the idea. USAID had sent all of these supplies in large tin cans … like oil drums. There were thousands of them, so we cut them in half, pounded them out flat, and then used them to build school walls.” I began again with another series of questions. When did you build the can schools? How long did they last? What’s your role as a quality assurance officer? Would you be available to meet tomorrow for an interview? Before Martin could answer, Saleem intervened. “Yes—tomorrow,” he said. “I’ll make all the arrangements with you and send a taxi in the morning.” “Wait just one more question,” I said, as Saleem tried in vain to hasten me toward the door. “Why write the history of education in Dadaab?” He looked at his computer screen for a moment, considering his words, then looked back at me. “For years part of my job for the NGOs was putting together reports and newsletters about the development of education to share with donors and they always wrote the refugees out. Like the agencies were the ones deciding everything and taking the credit for everything. But so much of what happened was up to us—we helped to build the education system. And people should know.” As we walked down the stairs toward the truck, I thought suddenly of a quote that had struck me since first reading it the previous year: “The relationship between structure and agency is dialectical and history is the synthesis.”1 The irony was not lost upon me that I was lapsing into a cerebral reverie in the middle of Dadaab camp. The memory of the temperature-controlled classroom where a dozen other graduate students and I had dissected the meaning of these words commingled with the unrelenting heat and the taste of dust in my mouth. In that moment, the narrative I would tell took shape, one that reconstructs the ways in which individuals—refugees and a handful of program officers and policymakers—played a far more determinative role in developing and

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Educating for Durable Solutions

implementing the education program in Dadaab and Kakuma than has been acknowledged in UNHCR or NGO reports or scholarship on refugee education. Back in the truck, I scribbled my thoughts in a notebook before they were lost to the wind, the rumbling of the diesel motor or the interviews that awaited in the afternoon. I held the two-story school in sight for as long as I could, only shifting my gaze toward Dagahaley, just visible on the horizon, when the building eventually receded into the distance in the rearview mirror.

1

For the State, Not by the State Since the end of the Cold War, education has taken on new significance as a global policy priority. Political leaders and heads of multilateral and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) have declared with increasing frequency that universal access to basic schooling is a primary means of expanding and strengthening democratic, liberal institutions throughout the world.1 They have also deemed education as critical to decreasing poverty, promoting environmental sustainability, and mitigating or preventing the occurrence or recurrence of intractable armed conflicts.2 However, states3 mired in conflict as well as neighboring states offering refugee status to those displaced by conflict have more often than not been unable or unwilling to continue providing education services to conflict-affected populations.4 As a temporary, humanitarian response, an array of non-state actors, including bilateral aid agencies, multilateral organizations, international and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private businesses, have mobilized to fill this void. However, protracted conflicts strain the conceptual and practical capabilities of these organizations to provide longterm, sustainable education services. This has been particularly challenging for refugees residing in camps for indeterminate lengths of time in countries of asylum.5 After all, free and compulsory basic education is legally and normatively considered the responsibility of states; moreover, states have historically provided formal education to children as a means of cultivating national citizenship through assimilation into an imagined community.6 Nation-building and state-building are foundational to the project of universal access to basic schooling.7 As a consequence, policymakers and program officers at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN agency mandated to protect and assist refugees, have struggled to answer

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Educating for Durable Solutions

real and immediate questions stemming from such a puzzle—that is, how to deliver education for the state, but not by the state. These questions include: What curriculum and language of instruction should be utilized? Who should teach? How many grade levels should be offered? How much funding should be allocated to education? And how might that funding be secured? The UNHCR has tried to answer these questions through the publication of policy briefs, the implementation of multi-year education strategies, and a range of partnership initiatives. However, institutional and ideational challenges constrain these efforts. First and foremost, UNHCR’s founding statute stipulates that the UNHCR must fund all of its operational costs—98 percent of its total budget—from bilateral organizations or the private sector for discrete oneyear cycles.8 This means funding for UNHCR’s refugee education program is dependent upon donor states or private organizations, which have tended to view education as secondary to refugees’ basic needs. Additionally, under UNHCR’s founding mandate, three durable solutions are available to refugees: thirdcountry resettlement, local integration, or repatriation to refugees’ country of origin.9 For nearly three decades, there have been restrictions on third-country resettlement and on local integration in host countries, and armed conflicts in countries of origin continue for years. Eighty percent of refugees are in a protracted situation,10 and in many countries of asylum, refugees are restricted from seeking wage-earning employment or moving freely outside of camps or settlements.11 As a result, the three durable solutions are increasingly untenable. Yet until recently,12 the UNHCR framed education as both a durable solution and critical to achieving durable solutions. What might explain this? Today there exist conceptual frameworks, best practices, minimum standards, and policy precedents that position education as a lifesaving and protective service and a “fourth pillar” of humanitarian aid; they are leveraged by UN and INGO staff to advocate for education service provision for refugees. However, in the early 1990s when many camps were rapidly established throughout the world in response to large influxes of refugees following the end of the Cold War, such documents, tools, and frameworks did not exist. Answers to questions of curriculum, language of instruction, and funding differed from one camp to the next as they were contingent upon UN and INGO staff and refugees’ interests and ability to seize upon advocacy opportunities. Nevertheless, the UNHCR

For the State, Not by the State

7

and its INGO partners have developed, implemented, and changed refugee education policies and programs. Educating for Durable Solutions tells this story, with a particular focus on Kenya’s Dadaab and Kakuma camps over a twenty-year period, from 1992, when they were founded,13 to 2012, when the UNHCR significantly changed its approach to refugee education. To date, scholars have captured only a sliver of the development of UNHCR’s global policies and programs for refugee education, and even less of the ways they have been implemented over time in particular camp settings. Why has a contemporary account of UNHCR’s development and implementation of policies and programs for refugee education been so narrowly drawn? There are three reasons. One is simply the research design of many of the studies that have been conducted. UNHCR and INGOs have commissioned a number of qualitative case studies and reports to determine the education needs of populations residing in camps and to assess where a particular camp stands relative to UNHCR’s benchmark goals for education. Typically, these studies are retrospective, assessing the effects of the education program by asking and answering “what” questions (e.g. what are program impacts?) rather than “why” or “how” questions (e.g. why was this program implemented in the first place?). The second reason is the difficulty of fitting refugee education into the larger story of globalization and global governance in the post-Cold War era. Globalization refers to the “intensification of [national] economic integration” and the “increasing volume and rapidity of flows of people, ideas, and culture across traditional territorial borders of the nation state.”14 Yet global governance—the political integration of transnational actors, such as UN agencies, for the purpose of negotiating responses to problems that affect more than one state or region—has not kept pace.15 The expanse of protracted conflict that began in the 1990s has led to a meteoric rise in the number of people crossing state borders in search of asylum. To craft a new narrative that relocates refugee education at the crossroads of national, international, and global policymaking requires thinking historically, rather than with a presentist orientation. It also requires asking why and how questions, in addition to what questions, about the placement of refugee education within a shifting configuration of national and international social, political, and economic institutions and global policy priorities.

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The final reason is linked closely to the preceding two—that is, the challenge of employing new conceptual and methodological tools capable of understanding and explaining developments, shifts, and changes over time to refugee education policies and programs. In this account, I utilize an historical approach to refugee education research. Such an approach is particularly suitable as historians, and social scientists using historical methods, ask why and how change happens. Most significantly, history allows us to ask literally, rather than rhetorically, why changes to refugee education policies and programs over several decades haven’t occasioned more significant changes to the challenges of refugee education. I do not ask whether certain education policies or programs have worked in Dadaab and Kakuma. Instead, I document the range of education policies and programs in these two camps since they were founded, trace why and how global policies and programs for refugee education reflect predominate ideas and institutions at particular moments in time, and consider how UN and INGO staff as well as refugees exercised their own agency to implement certain policies and programs for refugee education rather than others. I ask and answer three interrelated questions: Why and how were education policies and programs developed and implemented in Dadaab and Kakuma between 1992 and 2012? Why and how did changes to policies and programs occur? How did these changes impact the lived educational experiences of refugee students, their families, and teachers? Why Dadaab and Kakuma? Established around 1992, both camps currently host refugees fleeing ongoing or recurring conflicts from a number of states in Eastern and Central Africa. Dadaab was originally composed of about 90,000 women and girls from Somalia,16 and Kakuma about 20,000 refugees, many of them unaccompanied male youths.17 By 2012, when I first began this research, the camps had grown exponentially; at about 500,00018 and 190,00019 refugees respectively, Dadaab and Kakuma were the two largest refugee camps in the world.20 They have been well profiled in American media, especially Kakuma as the destination sought by the Lost Boys of Sudan.21 They are also well known among scholars and practitioners, as a number of education programs were piloted in both camps, including Environmental Education, the Women Victims against Violence Project, and Peace Education. Kakuma is one of the most researched camps in the world; in 2016, the UNHCR even published a Visitor’s Guide to the camp.22

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The contemporary education histories of Dadaab and Kakuma are more similar than different; however, their differences are revealing. A narrative reconstruction of the education history of either camp would on its own shed light on the myriad challenges of refugee education. The root causes of these challenges come into sharp focus when these narratives are considered comparatively and placed within the broader institutional context of the UNHCR and the ideational landscape of the post-Cold War era. Some of the challenges are already known. Education receives only 2 percent of humanitarian funding.23 While globally, 9 percent of primary school-aged children and 16 percent of secondary school-aged youth are out of school, for refugees these figures stand at 37 percent and 76 percent, respectively.24 Only 3 percent of refugees are enrolled in higher education, compared to 37 percent globally.25 In many camp schools, student-to-teacher ratios average more than 70 to 1.26 In Dadaab and Kakuma, some of these figures are worse. For example, across both camps, about 50 percent of primary school-aged children remain out of school;27 in Kakuma, student-to-teacher ratios average more than 200 to 1.28 Despite small, albeit noted gains,29 these figures have remained consistent for more than three decades. Primarily, this account explains continuity in the challenges of refugee education, despite significant changes to policies and programs at UNHCR Headquarters, UNHCR’s Branch Office in Nairobi, and in Dadaab and Kakuma field offices. I draw three overarching conclusions that I explore in detail in subsequent chapters. First, the state is still the dominant form of subjectivity. As a result, non-state actors like the UNHCR might initiate changes to global education policy, but ultimately change happens through the state. Second, ideas matter. Ideas about the responsibility of states to provide funding for refugee education and the purposes of education in refugee situations act as advocacy tools that can be leveraged to loosen and at times even change constraints imposed by prevailing ideas and institutions. Finally, UNHCR and partner INGOs have advocated for conservative rather than radical changes to refugee education— real transformation requires a seismic shift. These conclusions go against the grain of conventional thinking in the fields of international development studies in education with a focus on globalization and education and Education in Emergencies (EiE). Scholars of globalization and education argue that the territorialized nation state is no longer the primary unit of political organization,30 and that states now mediate

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Educating for Durable Solutions

rather than regulate the demands of non-state actors, including multinational corporations, multilateral organizations, and private philanthropic organizations.31 They have shown through their scholarship how non-state actors have exerted considerable influence on the financing and content of formal education, and how education is increasingly considered a private commodity that prepares individual workers to access global labor markets, rather than a public good that prepares citizens to participate in the social and political institutions of nation states. Considering the erosion of the nation state a fait accompli, these scholars have made repeated calls for “paradigmpuncturing” theories and methods that “advance ways of seeing and studying education policies transnationally.”32 In contrast, Educating for Durable Solutions shows that in transnational spaces such as refugee camps, nation states determinatively shape the financing and content of education—albeit with the guiding force of an invisible hand. Bilateral organizations fund approximately 90 percent of UNHCR’s annual operating costs;33 this was set forth in UNHCR’s founding statute, specifically to prevent the ability of a non-state actor to operate with the same autonomy of nation states. Since around 2010, the UNHCR has looked to private philanthropic organizations and businesses to make up for budget shortfalls, albeit with limited success. In no sector is this felt more acutely than education; it is one of the first services for which funding is restricted or cut altogether during budget crises. In terms of what is actually taught, program officers with UNHCR and its INGO partners, in consultation with refugees, have chosen between the national curriculum and language of instruction of the host state or the state of origin. In Dadaab and Kakuma, the Kenyan national curriculum has been taught in camp schools since 1994, with English as the primary language of instruction. However, the Government of Kenya confines refugees to the camps, preventing them from legally integrating or seeking wage-earning employment in Kenya.34 In sum, UNHCR’s global education policies and programs are state-centric in concept and practice. The theories and methods utilized in this account advance ways of seeing and analyzing the nation state and its role in shaping education policies and programs in transnational spaces. In the field of EiE, the dizzying array of non-state actors involved in prescribing and implementing education programming in conflict-affected

For the State, Not by the State

11

and refugee contexts has often eclipsed the state as a unit of analysis. In refugee camps, this constellation of institutions assumes particular significance as the UNHCR works with implementing INGO, NGO, and private sector partners to deliver services, including food, water, shelter, healthcare, and education. Yet, host states exert considerable influence in how these services are provided. For example, they can prohibit camp schools;35 refuse to grant accreditation to camp schools through the Ministry of Education;36 and refuse to recognize refugees’ academic credentials from their home country.37 Why has the nation state been obscured in EiE scholarship? Established in the late 1990s primarily as a field of practice, the initial research and advocacy agenda was intended to deepen conceptual and practical knowledge of “best practices” of education service delivery in emergencies. A subsequent wave of evidence-based research conducted in conflict-affected states or states recovering from conflict asked whether or not particular education policies or programs worked; researchers often utilized single or comparative case studies to draw conclusions and make recommendations to policymakers. Scholarship seeking to build or advance theory or analyze the relationship between state and non-state actors in education policy or provision in conflict-affected and refugee contexts has remained limited. In Chapter 2, I integrate these two distinct bodies of literature and describe UNHCR’s key organizational features. I also provide a comprehensive overview of how historical approaches to refugee education research allow researchers to ask new and important questions, including why specific policies and programs have been implemented; why and how policies, programs, and the field of EiE have changed over time; and why and how policy and programmatic changes have often not occasioned lasting changes to the challenges of refugee education. I also describe my approach to conducting research in Dadaab and Kakuma and at the UNHCR archives. In Chapters 3 and 4, I chronologically reconstruct the contemporary education histories of Dadaab and Kakuma. I include a short summary at the end of each chapter to highlight some of the most significant changes to refugee education that occurred globally and in Dadaab and Kakuma during the period of time surveyed. Chapter 3 shows how, during the 1990s, universal education was increasingly conceptualized as a global policy priority and as a basic service central to UNHCR’s mandate to protect and assist refugees in

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exile, and also how public declarations to provide universal access to education often substituted for direct action, particularly for refugees. Many school-aged children in Dadaab and Kakuma remained out of school; those in attendance, especially in the early years, learned under trees without textbooks or writing materials, unsure whether their schooling would lead to opportunities for secondary education or employment. In the absence of today’s growing canon of “Best Practices,” “Minimum Standards,” or “Education Guidelines,” UNHCR’s community services officers were tasked with liaising with UNHCR’s implementing partners in the camps to establish schools, make decisions about curriculum, hire and train teachers, and manage the disbursement of funds for education from one year to the next. More often than not, UNHCR’s implementing partners in Dadaab and Kakuma had limited interest or experience in education service delivery. However, refugees—community leaders, parents, teachers, and students— advocated and mobilized for education. In both camps, they ultimately decided on the Kenyan national curriculum, constructed the first school buildings, and successfully lobbied the UNHCR to establish secondary schools and make incremental increases to the stipend wages paid to refugee teachers. Chapter 4 continues tracing continuity in the challenges of refugee education in Dadaab and Kakuma throughout the 2000s. Despite the deployment of UNHCR education officers to both camps, the founding of the Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), and later the founding of the Global Education Cluster, the same number of school-aged children in Dadaab and Kakuma remained out of school. The majority of those in attendance continued without textbooks or other learning materials, still unsure whether their schooling would lead to further opportunities. On the one hand, the number of students in grade 8 earning passing scores on the exam required to matriculate to secondary school far exceeded the limited number of places available in the secondary schools the UNHCR had established in Dadaab and Kakuma. On the other, most secondary school graduates were only able to find employment as teachers in the very schools where they had once been students. Beyond teaching there are a limited number of jobs inside the camps with the UNHCR or the UNHCR’s implementing partners. These graduates comprise over 50 percent of the teaching staff in both Dadaab and Kakuma,38 earning wages far below the handful of Kenyan teachers employed by the

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UNHCR in camp schools. Incidentally, in the continued absence of durable solutions, one of the purposes of education in Dadaab and Kakuma has been to provide an increasingly educated teaching workforce. In Chapter 5 I analyze the education narrative of Dadaab and Kakuma drawn in the preceding two chapters for critical junctures—“moments when outcomes during significant transitions establish distinct trajectories.”39 These moments include initial decisions over curriculum, language of instruction, and near-exclusive emphasis on the provision of primary education made when the two camps were founded in 1992; the piloting of the Peace Education Program in Dadaab and Kakuma in 1998;40 the founding of INEE in 2000; the 2006 “emergency” in Dadaab; the 2011 “emergency” in Dadaab; and the publication of UNHCR’s Refugee Education: A Global Review in 2011,41 and subsequently UNHCR’s Education Strategy 2012–2016 in 2012.42 Each reveals how and why change happens—the dialectic between structure and agency. Chapter 6 provides an update on recent developments in refugee education between 2013 and 2020, globally and in Dadaab and Kakuma camps, explores the book’s overarching conclusions and attendant implications for future research, and makes specific recommendations for refugee education policy. Ultimately, this account seeks to ask and answer a crucial question: What is refugee education for? The agencies that fund and provide education in camps have maintained that refugee education plays a vital role in post-conflict statebuilding and nation-building—the only thing refugees will carry with them. Yet when I asked refugees about the purpose of education, their answers alluded to something more intangible—becoming informed and contributory members of their communities in Dadaab and Kakuma, feeling a sense of accomplishment, and experiencing important milestones such as graduation. “I don’t know what I will be able to do with this or how far I’ll go,” one student said. “I just focus on getting to the next level. With education you can be somebody here.”43 In the following pages, I explain the challenges of refugee education and tell stories of why refugee education matters.

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Asking Why and How: A Historical Turn in Refugee Education Research Refugee camps are places without history.1 Despite the rise of global and transnational histories, the discipline, like the institution of education, is a state-centric enterprise.2 Although a handful of historians have contributed to our understanding of forced migration and mass displacement,3 there are very few historical reconstructions of camps,4 despite some hosting refugees for decades. In addition, social scientists focused on refugee studies seldom “think historically” when examining legal norms, institutional practices, or refugees’ experiences.5 Calls for historians to write histories of refugees encourage an approach that “integrates ‘history from below’”—that is, focused on or sourced by refugees—“with other domains, including the history of geopolitics, law, and humanitarian assistance.”6 However, little has been said about how historians might need to approach their craft differently to write refugee histories. Archival research, historians’ primary means of gathering information about the past, cannot be relied upon in the same way when it comes to refugee history. For example, there are no dedicated camp archives. Instead, records are kept at the UNHCR archives in Geneva, but the quality and number of documents and materials vary widely from one refugee situation to the next. Newspapers, another source historians often draw upon, in the absence of or to complement archival research, are also in limited supply. Kakuma is a rare exception; Kanere News, established in the late 1990s by Ethiopian refugees, is the first fully independent refugee-run news source dedicated to issues in the camp.7 For refugee situations occurring since the 1950s, oral histories—of refugees and UN and INGO staff—offer much to historians seeking to fill gaps in the historical record. Historians increasingly acknowledge that oral history, “an in-depth account of personal experience and reflections,”8 is an important tool in

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studying the recent past.9 And millions of refugees who have lived for years and in some cases decades in camps and settlements throughout the world have witnessed or participated in events that are not yet documented—the comings and goings of people and organizations, the rise and fall of ideas and emotions, the expanse or contraction of infrastructure and livelihood opportunities. There are near endless possibilities to write social, cultural, intellectual, economic, political, and geographic histories of refugees. Some of these histories could be very useful to policymakers seeking to improve refugee assistane and protection. Many historians and policymakers alike would scoff at this notion, the former taking exception to “presentism,” and the latter to perceived limits on making predictions for the future based upon what happened in the past. However, until the second half of the twentieth century, policymakers widely regarded history as central to improving government institutions.10 Around the 1950s, social scientists, particularly political scientists and sociologists, began claiming their approach to policy analysis, based on quantitative data and behavioral models, was more rigorous and accurate when it came to assessing the efficacy of new policies.11 At the same time, historians started to place less value on historical research intended to contribute to policymaking,12 so much so that many historians argued that history should be disinterested, neutral, and scientific, and derided “presentism”—the use of history to address contemporary issues, whether local, national, or international.13 By the 1970s, historians and history were seldom considered important to policy analysis and decision-makers. The “cultural turn” in history that occurred in the 1980s broadened and deepened interpretations of the history of international relations, offering explanations of how culture helped to shape individual and collective foreign policy decisions.14 However, these detailed “thick descriptions” of what happened in the past did little to draw history back into the policymaking arena. It was not until the late 1990s and 2000s that historical methods were again utilized with policymaking in mind. This was in part occasioned as scholars from multiple disciplines, seeking to understand and explain leaders’ decision-making processes, and by extension opportunities and constraints for institutional and organizational change, made “historical turns” in their respective disciplines.15

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Those who have continued to advocate for the use of history to address the present emphasize its role in capturing and explaining change.16 Where the social sciences ask questions of “what works,” historians ask why and how change happens. Some historians have also argued that lessons and insights from the past are “deeply involved in policymaking,”17 but historians and the discipline of history remain on the periphery. “There are no royalties, no permission forms, little consultative shepherding, not even a thank you,”18 quipped one historian. More recently, policymakers and scholars have acknowledged that during the policymaking process, history can provide context or background to current or former policies and programs, identify major paradigmatic shifts in policy that have happened over time, helping make clear competing narratives about policy “successes” or “failures,” and filling gaps in institutional memory—especially where there is frequent staff turnover.19 Histories of refugee education can help to shed light on each of these areas. They can also help to explain persistent challenges to education in and across refugee contexts and increase our knowledge of why an array of policies and programs for refugee education have not worked to effectively address these challenges. Considering these histories through what political scientists call critical junctures analysis—a method that identifies when individual actors or groups make contingent choices that establish a new status quo—offers even more insight into the conditions under which changes to refugee education happened in the past and potentially reveal what broader changes might be necessary to ensure better outcomes in the future. In this chapter, I begin by providing a brief overview of Constructivism, a theory of political science that draws heavily on historical reconstruction; I then situate critical junctures analysis within Constructivism. I discuss both in some depth as they give context to many of the arguments and recommendations I make about the centrality of the nation state in transnational spaces such as refugee camps and help to make clear the importance to future policymaking of the history of refugee education in Dadaab and Kakuma described in Chapters 3 and 4. I then review and integrate Education in Emergencies EiE and international development studies in education literatures, initiating a mutually beneficial cross-disciplinary dialogue between them. I also include a brief discussion of UNHCR’s mandate, how it is organized, and how it operates;

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doing so provides useful context for many of the challenges of the agency’s refugee education program as well as some of the recommendations I make in Chapter 6. I conclude with a review of my process of conducting research in Dadaab and Kakuma and reconstructing the camps’ education histories.

Theory and Method Constructivism and Critical Junctures Analysis Constructivism challenges the basic premises of Realism, which has predominated theorizing in international relations, a subfield of political science, since the discipline’s inception.20 Constructivists take a different starting point than Realists by historicizing the international system of sovereign states, showing why and how the system formed and has changed over time.21 Given the changing past, Constructivists argue, change is also possible in the future— changes that help to harmonize states’ interests and lessen armed conflict.22 Much Constructivist research also seeks to understand and explain how nonstate actors, such as UN agencies, have influenced and could potentially change the international system of nation states,23 and how ideas become normative or institutionalized.24 Offering explanations for why and how certain education policies and programs are chosen over others in protracted refugee situations directly aligns with Constructivist research agendas. So too does Constructivist scholars’ interest in bridging the division between explanatory knowledge and practical knowledge that is critical to policymaking.25 Explanatory knowledge, most often produced by scholars, is necessarily backward looking, “since we can only explain what has already occurred, although there is hope that with good explanations we can predict the future.”26 Policymakers and practitioners, in contrast, need “knowledge about what to do, which is necessarily forward looking, since it is about how we should act in the future.”27 Constructivist research designs seek to provide knowledge that bridges this divide by answering three questions: How and why have policy and program choices been made in the past? What works and on what scale? And what goals should we pursue?

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At first glance, it might appear that inquiries of “what works” fall into the same category as assessments and reports that evaluate the impact of education interventions relative to benchmarks that measure increases or decreases in access to education or access to quality education in refugee settings. However, the benchmark of “what works” and what constitutes “quality education” measures education interventions relative to substantively different metrics. For example, refugee education might be assessed in camps or refugees’ home, host, or third countries of resettlement relative to conflict mitigation or perpetuation; increased employment or livelihood opportunities; or the strengthening or erosion of human rights. The third question is closely related to the second. Because Realism assumes that “international politics is a realm condemned to eternal conflict … the future cannot be any different from the past.”28 Formal education is by implication a static institution in Realist theories, one that merely reflects or transmits “knowledge” that maintains the international system of sovereign nation states and subsequently the chronic occurrence and recurrence of armed conflict and forced migration. In Constructivist theories, formal education is a dynamic institution that reflects, but can also refract or play a role in transforming the international system. For scholars of EiE, questions of what goals should be pursued in and through refugee education are critical.29 By relying heavily on historical reconstruction and analysis to explain problems or puzzles of the present by showing how and when ideas become normative,30 Constructivist accounts most often utilize a narrative format, defined as a “sequencing of fragmented or discreet events that are read retroactively, as a single entity.”31 Narratives do not provide “law like statements,”32 but rather explain the context or structure in which agents develop and implement certain policies and programs over others. Scholars taking a Constructivist approach often perform a “two-step” in which they analyze their narrative reconstructions for critical junctures that determine the subsequent range of choices and actual possibilities available to policymakers and practitioners for the purpose of helping to inform future policy or programming decisions.33 This process requires considering “what happened in the context of what could have happened.”34 In recent years, scholars have debated what constitutes “critical junctures.” While there is broad consensus among them that “history matters” in making

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sense of the present, the challenge is analyzing history and determining how an event that might appear to be a period of transition or incremental change is in fact a critical juncture.35 Generally, critical junctures are characterized by a situation in which predominate economic, cultural, ideological, or institutional forces are significantly relaxed for a short period with two main consequences: the range of plausible choices open to individual actors expands substantially and the consequences of their decisions have lasting impact. Agency and individual choice are important in these moments; “groups and individuals are not merely spectators as conditions change but rather strategic actors capable of acting on openings provided by such shifting, contextual conditions.”36 In other words, critical junctures are “when willful actors shape outcomes … and demonstrate the power of agency by revealing how longterm development patterns can hinge on decisions of the past.”37 With the basic tenets of Constructivism and critical junctures analysis now established, I transition to a review of relevant literature.

Literature—Bridging the Gap Considering EiE and international development studies in education literatures individually and collectively, along with select UNHCR scholarship, historicizes and contextualizes refugee education in the post-Cold War era, setting the stage for what we will learn happened to the education programs in Dadaab and Kakuma, given what could have happened. As both a field of research and a field of practice, EiE literature deals directly with the challenges of service delivery in situations of armed conflict, but seldom critically addresses these challenges within broader institutional contexts of nonstate actors such as the UNHCR developing education policy or providing education programming. International development studies in education literature explores how non-state actors have developed and diffused global education policies throughout the world since the end of the Cold War, but few studies examine the implications of these policies on EiE. Most of the studies across the literatures surveyed point to many of the immense practical and conceptual constraints of refugee education. I endeavor to establish some of the remaining gaps, particularly how broad ideas about global education

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policy and EiE were shaped from “above,” that is by UN agencies and INGOs, and from “below,” by refugees.

Education in Emergencies Although refugee education is foundational to the field of EiE, historical methods have rarely been used to understand it.38 In 1999 and 2000, a handful of practitioners who had worked in camps throughout the world convened with other practitioners who had worked in conflict and post-conflict settings to establish what would become the Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). Also in 2000, at a strategy session held at the Second Education for All (EFA) Forum in Dakar, Senegal, participants concluded that multiple emergencies occurring throughout the 1990s, including intrastate wars throughout sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, and Central and Southeast Asia, had impeded the realization of basic, universal education for all—a global policy priority set forth ten years prior at the first World Conference on Education for All in Jomtien, Thailand. EiE thus became central to achieving EFA—a claim that education and community services officers under the employ of UNHCR, UNESCO, and UNICEF, the three UN agencies providing education in emergency situations, could and did utilize when advocating for education to be included in emergency responses.39 However, to justify their requests, these same officers sought narrowly oriented studies that focused on making a case for education policies or programs, rather than studies that critiqued the agencies that were developing policy or implementing programs or that explored challenges of refugee education.40 A subsequent wave of critical and empirical research offered different understandings of the ways in which education was far from protective and in many cases had contributed to or exacerbated conflict.41 Although it was apparent that new theoretical and methodological approaches were needed to explain the complex and dynamic relationship between education and conflict,42 resultant research focused little on refugee education. Indeed, since the founding of INEE, “the field of refugee education has been subsumed into the broader field of education in emergencies.”43 In addition, with few notable exceptions,44 the majority of studies that did examine refugee education were commissioned by UN agencies or INGOs.45

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These publications describe particular programs or initiatives, for example, the International Rescue Committee’s (IRC) Healing Classroom Initiative,46 or the UNHCR’s Peace Education Program,47 and include suggestive findings of the impact on participants of different programs. They also highlight the ways in which refugee education provides children and youth a sense of normalcy and routine; psychosocial support; life skills for their immediate environment (e.g., landmine awareness, prevention of HIV/AIDS); protection from recruitment into armed groups; and knowledge or skills necessary for post-conflict state-building and nation-building—the same discourse utilized throughout EiE publications.48 In making a case for refugee education by commonly highlighting positive program impact, the UN and its partner agencies have seldom made clear the practical and conceptual constraints they face in providing educational services in camp settings. However, a few studies describe and analyze specific challenges in the content, structure, and provisioning of education in refugee camps. Waters and Leblanc identify inherent paradoxes of refugee education, including the challenge of non-state actors such as the UNHCR in determining curriculum and pedagogy and the ways in which traditional purposes of schooling, especially economic development and the cultivation of citizenship, simply do not exist in refugee camps.49 As they succinctly argue: Schooling is a prerequisite for effective participation in the modern world of nation-states. Refugees, by definition stateless, are therefore outside both the modern economy and modern society. Creating education systems for refugees is always embedded in this paradox, which is the root cause of why it is difficult to implement or, in Anderson’s term, to “imagine” such programs.50

While the authors offer thumbnail sketches of these paradoxes across five refugee situations (Afghanistan, Thailand, Tanzania, Somalia, and Malawi), Oh and van der Stouwe provide an in-depth case study of education programming in seven camps serving primarily Karen refugees along the Thai-Burmese border.51 They focus particularly on how the UNHCR and its partner NGOs facilitate inclusion or exclusion of a large number of schoolaged children in the camps through policy choices regarding curriculum and language of instruction,52 and a lack of special education programming for disabled refugee children that renders many without opportunities to access

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formal schooling. While illustrative of some of the nuances and complexities of refugee education in camp settings, the study does not shed similar light on why or how the UNHCR and its partner NGOs make particular decisions that result in inclusion or exclusion to, in, and through education in camps. A brief study conducted by these same scholars at the same sites examines educational change over the twenty-year period since the camps were founded.53 They conclude “after years of trial, error, and practice, educational services are now provided in a relatively effective and efficient manner.”54 However, what those changes were and again how and why they came about remain unexamined. Dryden-Peterson helps shed light on these unanswered questions in several studies that examine UNHCR’s education policies and programs. In the first, she periodizes key shifts between the Second World War and 2016 in the stated purposes of refugee education and how it is provided, drawing on archival research at the UNHCR archives and key informant interviews with UNHCR and UNICEF policymakers. She finds that, despite discursive and normative change over time, tension persists because refugees “are both within and outside nation states.”55 In two recent studies, Dryden-Peterson and a handful of other researchers explore UNHCR’s “radical shift” in 2012 to integrate refugees into national education systems and 2016 shift to a focus on what they term transnationalism, an additional possibility to UNHCR’s three durable solutions.56 One of the studies focuses specifically on the impacts of these changes to education programming in Kakuma.57 They conclude that for Kakuma youth, policymakers’ intentions of facilitating sociocultural integration in Kenya through education are limited due to the absence of a clear policy vision for transforming Kenya’s political and social context “such as legal restrictions on refugees’ livelihoods, widespread xenophobia, or the quality of education.”58 I further discuss UNHCR’s policy changes in Chapters 4 and 5, and the implication of these studies’ findings in Chapter 6.

International Development Studies in Education Scholars in the field of international development studies in education with a focus on globalization and education examine the conditions under which education policies move from one locale to another,59 why and how global education policies are developed,60 and the ways in which non-state actors

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are both cause and effect of the diffusion of global education policies.61 This literature is vast yet only tangentially touches upon the ways in which “emergency situations” have facilitated the expanse of global education policies.62 Significant here is not so much what has, but rather what has not been said—that is, the opening of new spaces for education policy formation and transfer beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s was concomitant with the expanse of protracted civil wars that typify conflict in the post–Cold War era. Consequently, the role and influence of UN agencies, INGOs, and NGOs in education policymaking and education service delivery expanded dramatically in contexts of protracted conflict, particularly in refugee camps and settlements. This account strengthens the nascent relationship drawn between globalization and education and refugee education by detailing the ways in which the UNHCR is central to the expanse of global education policies and the provisioning of educational services by non-state actors.63 A handful of recent studies have attempted to situate refugee education within broader accounts of global migration propelled by globalization. Bartlett and Ghaffar-Kucher take a wide-ranging approach to the study of schooling and migration, seeking to collapse what they argue is an overstated distinction between immigrants and refugees as “ethnographic attention to the lived experience of mobile people reveals the permeability of these categories.”64 They further argue that anthropological concepts and a transnational lens are necessary in studies of “the new social and cultural formations that emerge from the expanded flow of goods, people, and ideas between countries in a globalized world.”65 Their claims echo those made by Robertson, who advocates for “paradigm puncturing” theories and methods in the field of globalization and education that “advance ways of seeing and studying education policies transnationally.”66 However, through ethnographic research conducted in refugee camps in Thailand, Banki in Barlett and Ghaffer-Kucher demonstrates the continued relevance of the distinction between immigrants and refugees by considering the ways in which mass repatriation negatively impacts educational services, via diminished goods, labor, and capital directed to the education sector for populations left behind in protracted refugee situations.67 She also clearly articulates one of the central challenges of refugee education, stating:

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In the context of education the lack of incentives stems from the uncertainty of the resolution of protracted refugee situations, making it difficult to develop original and creative ways to think about what students should learn and how they might put it to use in the future. Simply put, neither external education planners nor refugees themselves (as students or planners) know where they will be in the future, making systemic and curriculum design very difficult.68

The ethnographic approach taken, similar to descriptive case studies widely utilized in EiE scholarship, asks and answers “what” questions through detailed description. For example, Banki concludes her analysis by stating that, “over the course of protracted refugee situations, education is shaped by negotiations among camp administrators, humanitarian agencies, the host country, the international refugee regime, and refugees.”69 Yet her ethnography does not reveal what those negotiations were, why and how they took shape, and changes that did or did not occur to refugee education as a result. In addition, several accounts have focused on the widening role played by the World Bank in financing and providing education in “developing” states, most notably under the auspices of EFA as a global policy priority.70 Yet these large organizations often partner with much smaller INGOs and NGOs to actually provide and manage educational services. That a host of UNHCR’s implementing partners were moved to the front lines of education service delivery in camps, the majority of which are located in “developing” states is a particularly important, largely untold story in wider accounts of globalization and education as well as EiE and UNHCR scholarship. So too is the much more recent story of the expanse of private, for-profit organizations, such as Pearson Education, in education service provision in refugee settings.71 Some scholars and practitioners have called for and celebrated partnerships with these actors.72 However, others have cautioned against the predatory practices they have exhibited in developing and post-conflict states, and argued that access to quality education sharply declines when governments cede education service provision to businesses and in doing so commodify a public good.73 This transition assumes even more complicated dimensions in refugee settings, where until recently governments had largely ceded education service provision for refugees to the UNHCR.

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UNHCR UNHCR’s core mandate is “to provide, on a non-political and humanitarian basis, international protection to refugees and seek permanent solutions for them.”74 The founding statute stipulates that only administrative expenditures are financed by the general United Nations budget; all operational costs are raised through voluntary contributions from donor states and funding is only allocated in one-year cycles.75 “This dependence continues to be the most significant means through which states are able to control the scope of the UNHCR’s work.”76 Since the agency was founded seventy years ago, the geopolitical landscape has changed dramatically. UNHCR initially worked toward third-country resettlement as a preferred durable solution, and throughout the 1960s and 1970s prioritized local integration.77 However, by the 1980s, following large refugee movements catalyzed by protracted wars of decolonization across Africa and Central and Southeast Asia, the UNHCR was administering long-term assistance to more than ten million refugees.78 In 1985 UNHCR’s Executive Committee passed a Conclusion that emphasized repatriation over resettlement or local integration.79 The Conclusion was a sweeping response to efforts undertaken throughout the early 1980s by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to invest funds in host states to induce the inclusion of refugees into countries’ development strategies.80 This move would have transitioned financial support away from the UNHCR to the UNDP and reduced the scope of UNHCR’s operations and budget.81 To guarantee and legitimize its continued relevance and even existence, the UNHCR claimed that its new purpose was to provide assistance and protection to refugees throughout temporary asylum and also to provide programs that facilitated repatriation.82 Yet despite declarations to host states that refugees were a temporary problem and would voluntarily repatriate to their home countries, in 1986 the UNHCR revised its institutional mandate to include the provision of long-term assistance and rights-based advocacy to refugees.83 At the same time the UNHCR was reframing the scope of its work, many host states were also changing their approach to refugee asylum. Although camps—often known as “settlements”—had housed refugees in countries

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of asylum since the end of the Second World War, until the 1980s refugees had been able to exercise a high degree of economic self-sufficiency through farming, hunting, the establishment of small businesses, and even wage-labor employment. However, host states were increasingly subject to structural adjustment programs mandated by the World Bank, which slashed government spending on social services.84 Consequently, they became reluctant to support the integration of refugees, who had often been offered those same services.85 Had the UNDP succeeded in including refugees in host states’ development programs, the agency might have incentivized host states to continue providing services to refugees and increased opportunities for local integration. Instead, by the end of the Cold War, many states had chosen to cede altogether refugee service provision to the UNHCR, and continued granting asylum to refugees only under the condition that refugees be restricted to camps.86 At the same time, a growing number of INGOs assumed progressively greater responsibilities in providing assistance to refugees, and donor governments channeled more official funds through INGOs to these high-profile relief programs.87 The UNHCR found it increasingly difficult to fully fund its expanding budget, and struggled to respond to the massive expanse of refugees following the end of the Cold War who now required costly care and maintenance operations in camps.88 Restrictive encampment policies and UNHCR’s budgetary shortfalls impacted refugees’ access to formal education. In settlements, refugees had generally attended local primary and secondary schools. Yet, once restricted to camps, refugees were with few exceptions prohibited from attending schools in surrounding communities.89 Throughout the 1990s, hundreds of camps were established as a consequence of chronic or recurrent intrastate conflicts. In these protracted refugee situations, the UNHCR came to operate as a surrogate state with minimal or no oversight or assistance provided by host states.90 In addition to providing food, water, shelter, and healthcare, the UNHCR also assumed responsibility for providing basic education for refugees in a parallel education system to that of the host country.91 Yet many senior policymakers and program officers within the UNHCR questioned whether education services were included in UNHCR’s mandate to “protect and assist” refugees, and further argued that educational services were not lifesaving and therefore should be the first line-item cut when budgets were restricted. “Do you want them to eat or go to school?” quipped a senior-level administrator.

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Faced with a growing number of responsibilities, a large increase in the number of refugees under its care and protection, and challenges funding its operations, the UNHCR began to again frame differently the significance and scope of its work. Protracted refugee situations were presented as urgent matters of international peace and security, and the UNHCR succeeded in situating refugee movements as central elements in numerous UN Security Council Resolutions.92 Camps were frequently described in UNHCR publications as places where high levels of violence occur, particularly between refugees and host communities.93 Research commissioned by UNHCR’s Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit documented a range of security issues in refugee situations, including attacks by rebel governments; rape and sexual abuse; armed robbery, arbitrary arrest, and forced conscription; trafficking of women and children; arms trafficking; drug smuggling; and recruitment of child soldiers.94 In some cases, such as camps in Zaire hosting Rwandan refugees, this resulted in the release of targeted funds intended to mitigate or stabilize these “emergency” situations. However, donor support usually waned the longer camps were in existence and host governments would occasionally cite UNHCR’s reports as evidence that “refugees are a source of insecurity … legitimating their exclusion or forcible repatriation from countries of asylum.”95 A handful of UNHCR program officers devised the terms “education for repatriation” and “education for durable solutions” in response to host states’ restrictive asylum policies and threats of refoulement.96 Framing education in these ways served to highlight its role as a protective, life-saving service and thus progressively align education with UNHCR’s core mandate. However, for refugees trapped in protracted situations, the education policies and programs implemented in camps under the guise of “education for repatriation” seldom aligned with refugees’ needs, especially the millions for whom “the end of their exile is nowhere in sight.”97 Ultimately, UNHCR scholarship offers historical context for why and how the agency has come to operate as a surrogate state as well as the constraints it faces in doing so because of how states continue to control the scope of the work of the UNHCR, a non-state actor, in transnational spaces. These constraints are particularly evident when considering the conceptual and practical challenges of providing education to refugees in protracted situations.

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When considered collectively, descriptive case studies, ethnographies, and institutional histories across EiE and International Development Studies in Education literatures, and scholarship that provides background to the UNHCR, reveal the numerous, interrelated challenges of refugee education in protracted situations. These include the ways in which states constrain the UNHCR from effectively functioning as a surrogate state; how attempts to loosen these constraints have in turn shaped and constrained UNHCR’s provisioning of educational services in camps; how basic education via EFA became a global policy priority central to state-building and nation-building; and yet how education in the transnational spaces of refugee camps is necessarily for wholly different purposes. What historical reconstruction can make known that previous studies have not are the ways different actors at different moments in time endeavored to navigate and change some of these challenges, why they were in some cases successful, and how changes to global policies for refugee education did or did not impact education programming in camps and vice versa.

Research Process Oral History and Archival Research To reconstruct the education histories of Dadaab and Kakuma, I conducted oral histories with refugee teachers and students in both camps, interviews with current and former UNHCR policymakers, and archival research at the UNHCR archives in Geneva, Switzerland. At the time I was conducting research in the camps, Dadaab was home to 500,000 refugees; 95 percent were Somali, with a small number of Burundians, Ugandans, Ethiopians, and Eritreans.98 Kakuma had swelled to 190,000 refugees from more than ten countries throughout Eastern and Central Africa.99 In Dadaab, there were approximately 10,000 third-generation refugees born to parents who were also born there.100 In Kakuma, this number was reported to be approximately 6000.101 There were five sub-camps in Dadaab,102 and four zones in Kakuma.103 From end to end, Dadaab is about thirty kilometers and Kakuma is about ten kilometers.

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My research experience in each camp reflects a number of their differences. In Kakuma, I traveled around by motorbike taxis and also walked every day to the marketplace in Kakuma 1 to have lunch at one of the many Ethiopian restaurants owned and operated by refugees. Navigating Dadaab was different. In 2011, Al Shabaab104 infiltrated Dadaab and has maintained a steady presence there, raiding the homes and businesses of community leaders, detonating a number of bombs in heavily trafficked marketplaces, and kidnapping or killing several aid workers.105 As a result, the majority of INGOs conducted their operations from their compounds and no longer sent international staff into the camp. When coordinating my research with the UNHCR, I was provided a handful of independent “fixers” from whom to choose. The fixer I worked with had previously been a UNHCR staff member in Dadaab for more than a decade; he arranged the four armed-guards the UNHCR mandated to accompany any aid worker, journalist, or researcher when traveling throughout the camp and accompanied me from interview to interview. I spent approximately one month in Kakuma, between May and June 2014, and one week in Dadaab in July 2014, given the issues with security. The interviews I conducted varied in length, from fifteen minutes to over four hours, depending upon a variety of factors; these included security at the site of the interview, length of time participants had spent in the camps—generally the longer the tenure, the longer the interview—and time participants were able to allocate for the interview, as many interviews were conducted in schools during the school day. Traditional oral histories that focus on participants’ life experiences often take several hours. My questions focused on participants’ experiences with education throughout their time in the camps; as such, many interviews were shorter, though occasionally participants did recount stories from their lives before Dadaab or Kakuma. I generally began by asking participants to describe their time in camp schools as a student or teacher or administrator; I also asked questions regarding changes to curriculum or education programming that they had witnessed over time, trying to hone in on precise dates of changes and what and who caused them; finally, I asked about participants’ aspirations for their own education or education in the camps more broadly. In Kakuma, I visited and conducted oral histories with teachers, administrators, and students at all twenty-six primary schools, six secondary

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schools, the vocational school, and the higher education learning center. I conducted approximately eighty interviews with individuals and ten interviews with groups composed of between three and six people. I also conducted oral histories with the current Education Officers at UNHCR and the implementing partner for education, Lutheran World Federation (LWF). I conducted about four to six interviews per day, visiting schools that were within ten to fifteen minutes by motorbike taxi; the month I spent in the camp allowed for a leisurely pace and in some cases follow-up interviews. In total, I gathered oral histories from 120 teachers, students, administrators, and education officers in Kakuma. In Dadaab, I conducted oral histories with teachers, students, and administrators in primary and secondary schools and vocational and higher education programs in each of the five sub-camps and also conducted oral histories with education officers at all implementing partners involved in education service provision. Because of the limited number of days I had in the camp, I conducted about fifteen interviews per day, beginning at 7 a.m. and concluding past 7 p.m. It took about twenty minutes to drive between subcamps, but the schools I visited within the sub-camps were typically separated by less than one mile. In total, I gathered oral histories from sixty-seven teachers, students, administrators, and education officers in Dadaab. Finally, I also conducted twenty interviews throughout 2014, in-person or by Skype, with current and former UNHCR and INGO senior and mid-level community services, education, protection, and program officers. These lasted between one and six hours. Questions included asking participants to describe significant moments they had witnessed or experienced that impacted or changed refugee education policies or programs, globally and in Kakuma and Dadaab, and what policies or programs had been proposed and discussed but never implemented and why. I also spent three weeks in UNHCR’s archives in Geneva, Switzerland, in 2014, and reviewed approximately 1000 memorandums, policy briefings, mission reports, white papers, curricular materials, and meeting minutes. The majority of these had been drafted and circulated within UNHCR’s education unit. However, more than 200 documents came from UNHCR’s Finance, Fundraising, and Executive Management Committee Units, which offered insight into the internal workings of UNHCR’s Headquarters, particularly

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where the Education Unit is situated relative to other units. Units are prioritized differently depending on their proximity to UNHCR’s core mandate to protect. Between 1992 and 2012, the Education Unit was relocated to different units, including the Division of Program Support and Management; Division of Emergency, Security, and Supply; and finally to the Division of International Protection; each move impacted UNHCR’s education policies and programs, particularly in terms of the financial and human resources devoted to education.

Narrative With hundreds of hours of interviews and thousands of pages of documents in hand, I proceeded to reconstruct the educational histories of both camps. I did so by chronologically ordering the events described in these documents and transcripts, reviewing and analyzing this chronology for emergent themes, and further coding and ordering the events within each year.106 Narrative strands quickly appeared as developments at UNHCR’s headquarters in Geneva were considered alongside developments occurring at the same time in Dadaab or Kakuma camps. For example, the publication in 1996 of Graça Machel’s seminal report The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children107 led to the establishment of a funding stream at UNHCR that was subsequently utilized by officers at UNHCR headquarters to pilot peace education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma.108 In order to protect the privacy of individuals, I changed some names and identifying details. In terms of how I determined whether to include or exclude events or draw connections between them, I made interpretive choices based upon careful, critical sensitivity to the information gathered. Another historian might have looked at the same information and made different interpretive choices that placed different relative onus on events or people. Such is the purview of historians to frame and reframe understandings of the past.109

3

From Emergency Education to Education in Emergencies (1992–2002) 1992: The Founding of Dadaab and Kakuma “I was not that big when I was in the army—I was still small,” said Samuel.1 “In Sudan, I had been an army officer with an SPLA faction. Then I had a problem with my eyes because of operating a machine gun. So I was released for treatment with all of the minors who came here. That was February 17, 1992. There was nothing when we came here. It was bare, without people. Without anything.”2 Samuel was one of 12,000 unaccompanied minors, mostly boys, the UNHCR transported ninety kilometers from hastily established camps in the small town of Lokichogio to Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya’s Great Rift Valley. “Kakuma means ‘nowhere’ in Swahili,” said a former UNHCR program officer. “And it was not so much a camp then, more a long, narrow expanse of land” between the forked Tarach River.3 Some of the refugees who arrived to Kakuma had been orphaned during the Second Sudanese Civil War; others had been child soldiers, forced or voluntarily conscripted by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). The war was an ongoing series of internecine conflicts between the central government and the SPLA who sought to establish an autonomous southern Sudan.4 Many had first walked more than 1000 miles east, from Sudan to refugee camps in Ethiopia in 1991. When war broke out in Ethiopia later that same year, they walked another 500 miles southwest to Kenya, arriving in Lokichogio in early 1992. Most were fleeing conflict or escaping forced recruitment into the SPLA. A few, like Samuel, had been released by the SPLA to seek medical treatment for injuries sustained while fighting.

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UNHCR was overwhelmed in 1992 with the arrival of an average of 900 refugees daily in Kenya.5 In a report submitted to UNHCR Headquarters in February, a UNHCR social services officer wrote: While the number of refugees has increased tenfold, [UNHCR] staff and facilities have not increased with corresponding rapidity … Influxes into camps and the lack of food and water as well as other facilities have caused malnutrition and innumerable deaths. Lack of staff to coordinate and put things in place has compounded the problems. Inexperienced staff have been deployed with very few senior staff to supervise and give direction. Forgery of documents, alleged bribery, and corruption have increased difficulties.6

By December of that year, more than 427,000 refugees were hosted in twelve camps, mainly in the semi-arid desert regions of the Rift Valley, which borders Sudan, and the North Eastern Province, which borders Somalia. The UNHCR officer’s report was primarily referring to Liboi and Ifo camps; both were established in 1991, and by the beginning of 1992 they were providing asylum to more than 50,000 Somali refugees, the majority of them women and children.7 Because of the comparative security offered further inland, UNHCR established two additional camps adjacent to Ifo in 1992— Hagadera in March and Dagahely in June.8 These three sub-camps comprised the Dadaab camp complex, which was designed to host approximately 90,000 people—just half the number of refugees UNHCR had registered by the end of the year.9 “It was ad hoc as more and more people came across and there was no thought given to the layout of the camp,” a former UNHCR community services officer recalled. “I think there was a failure reading the context … there was no indication that Somalia was a political situation that would be solved. There was every indication that this would be long term. And yet the planning was ‘let’s see what happens tomorrow’.”10 Following the end of the Cold War, the UNHCR was not alone in approaching its operations with an optimism that belied the rapid escalation of conflict throughout the world beginning in 1991. A senior policymaker at UNHCR explained, “Fukayama had declared the end of history. Massive repatriation operations had just been completed for Afghans, Mozambicans, and Cambodians. We thought the new conflicts were temporary, instability

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before the stable order fully took hold.”11 By the middle of 1992, it had become clear to senior staff at UNHCR’s Branch Office in Nairobi that the refugee situation in Kenya required mobilizing implementing partners to assist with camp management and service provision. In Dadaab, UNHCR contracted with the INGO CARE to provide all basic services. In Kakuma, the UNHCR partnered with several INGOs, including the IRC, Médecins Sans Frontièrs (MSF), and Radda Barnen, the Swedish section of Save the Children International.12 More than 50 percent of refugees in Dadaab and 70 percent in Kakuma were school-aged children.13 However, “initially it was very much a focus on water, sanitation, and health. At that point, there was very little attention to the education sector. It was much more ‘if there is time,’” said a former UNHCR community services officer.14 Many within the UNHCR also viewed education in the camps as a potential “pull factor” into Kenya. Education was highly valued by refugees and not widely accessible in Somalia or Sudan. “There were a lot of high-level officers at that time who were philosophically opposed to education because they argued refugees would come for education,” said a former UNESCO program officer. “Which completely overlooked the fact that there were wars going on.”15 A UNHCR report makes clear these concerns. “The main thrust of assistance was to stem the tide of the refugee influx and if education [was] to be provided it had to be organized in such a way that it did not create the conditions for asylum-seeking.”16 Yet many program officers argued that refugees were demanding education and reported that educational activities “should be initiated as soon as possible.”17 This debate played out in a series of reports published by officers from UNHCR’s Protection and Community Services units. One report recommended that “educational programs should be organized in the camps … the Branch Office is developing a comprehensive educational system for the new caseload.”18 However, another report circulated three months later indicated that the Branch Office was “no longer contemplating the development of a comprehensive education program as had been stated in the cabled clearance of the program, but only to support those educational activities which had already been started.”19 These activities included a limited number of scholarships for vocational training through the DAFI program,20 and the distribution of reading materials in the camps.

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1992: Formal Education Programming The matter of education in the camps was not officially settled, but by May, CARE had begun converting a former UNHCR compound in Dadaab into a school; by July, International Relief and Rehabilitation Services (IRRES) was officially contracted as the implementing partner for education in Kakuma.21 Neither organization had much experience providing or managing education programming. In both camps, refugees had already organized classes for school-aged children and were holding lessons each morning under acacia trees. Under one tree, an Ethiopian teacher might deliver lessons in Amharic while under the next in Arabic and then another still in English. Refugees who had attained the highest level of education in their home countries were the teachers. “I was eighteen years old when I arrived,” said Al Nuur, among the first teachers in Dadaab. “I had gone to secondary school in Somalia. There were no classrooms or textbooks in the camp at that time. It was the people who were learned who were handling the learners. At the beginning, it was one teacher to two hundred students. It was emergency education.”22

1992: Choosing Curriculum and Language of Instruction When CARE and IRRES began to formalize education programming in the camps, questions of language of instruction and which curriculum to implement were discussed at length in a series of consultations with refugee communities in Dadaab and Kakuma. UNHCR’s 1992 Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees did not offer a clear answer.23 UNHCR’s previous policy guidelines for education, issued in 1988, focused heavily on post-primary education and outlined selection criteria for awarding scholarships to refugees to attend universities in countries of asylum.24 However, the 1992 Guidelines departed significantly from the previous policy and emphasized implementing primary education. If the situation was thought to be temporary, the refugees’ home curriculum and language of instruction should be used to help facilitate repatriation. If the duration of asylum was expected to be longer, then a “mixed curriculum that faces both ways and incorporates lessons from refugees’ home and host countries

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should be utilized.” Finally, the 1992 Guidelines recommended that, if the situation was long-term, the host country’s national curriculum should be implemented.25 Thus, from a policy standpoint, the choice of curriculum and anticipated duration of exile were closely linked. Of course, no one knew for sure how long refugees would remain in Dadaab and Kakuma camps and speculation varied. Leaders from the refugee community indicated to CARE that schools should follow a Somali curriculum and that the language of instruction should be a combination of Somali and English. In Kakuma, refugees advocated strongly for the Kenyan curriculum with English as the language of instruction. UNHCR consulted with the Kenyan ministry of education, but beyond stating that it would be easiest to acquire the Kenyan curriculum and that the UNHCR would have to register the schools in Kenya if students were to receive certification of primary and secondary school completion, the ministry remained uninvolved. While community services officers considered possibilities for vocational education programming and accelerated learning courses in both camps, they were not widely supported in the Nairobi Branch Office, as these programs were not included in the 1992 Guidelines. And so it was that CARE took up the task of acquiring curricular materials from Somalia, while IRRES ordered copies of the Kenyan curriculum. Ultimately, CARE was unable to get hold of the Somali curriculum and UNESCO was contracted to write a mixed curriculum, which covered grades 1–4, using a handful of rescued Somali textbooks and inputs from Somali teachers.

1992: Incentive Wages An education mission conducted in Dadaab and Kakuma by an officer from UNHCR Headquarters in May 1992, prior to the start of formal schooling activities, recommended that “the structures constructed to house schools be simple, temporary ones; that the teaching staff for the camp schools be recruited from the refugee communities; and that ‘incentive wages’ rather than ‘salaries’ should be offered to encourage refugees to teach.”26 Regardless of their qualifications, all refugee teachers received the same “incentive” of 500 Ksh per month. Equivalent to $15, incentive wages were the source of “a

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lot of conflict between the implementing partners and the refugees,” according to a former refugee teacher in Dadaab.27 The 1992 Guidelines stipulated that refugee teachers should be given “incentives,” in cash or in kind, not formal salaries, “since they receive relief assistance for helping their communities … also because of the constraints of humanitarian funding.”28 These twin rationales—that refugee teachers were not “real” teachers because they lacked formal certification and that they were not in need of “salaries” because their needs were met by the UNHCR—were used time and again by UNHCR and implementing partner staff members when negotiating with refugees who regularly advocated for increases in pay. Reports indicating that low wages led to substantial teacher turnover also maintained that “the concept of salary should [nevertheless] be avoided since this leads to comparisons with home or host country levels … which is simply not sustainable.”29

1992: Increasing Girls’ Enrollment In July and August, CARE and IRRES began five-day teacher-training courses that covered basic content, lesson planning, and behavior management. Formal schooling commenced in both camps in September in split-shift sessions, morning and afternoon, to accommodate more learners; classes were still held under trees. In Dadaab, reports showed that about a quarter of school-aged children residing in the camp enrolled in school, while in Kakuma the number was closer to half.30 Boys outnumbered girls in the schools in both camps “at least ten to one,” recalled a former teacher. “Girls were generally prohibited from attending by parents who wanted them to remain in the home—there was a lot of cultural interference back then.”31 This included early marriage, expectations regarding the roles and responsibilities that girls and women fulfill in households, such as cooking, cleaning, child-rearing, and general perceptions that women ought not participate in public life. Girls were also expected to collect firewood, a scarce commodity, from outside of the camps. However, when venturing out to do so, they were often attacked or sexually assaulted by members of the host community as well as refugees.32 A former UNHCR community services officer said, “We would tell the male community leaders, you have to stop sending women and

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girls to collect firewood. Or at least do not send them without a male family member. For the most part, they shrugged and said it was women’s work.”33 The following year, in October 1993, the UNHCR would launch the Women Victims of Violence Project, a non-formal, community-based education program intended to address sexual violence in the camp and Somalia.34 The project provided support groups for women and girls to meet and discuss their experiences, offered counseling for victims by a professional rape counselor—a Somali woman—and also livelihood and skills training. The same program would also be implemented in Kakuma in 1995. However, according to a former UNHCR program officer: Implementing the project in Kakuma was a prime example of education as a commodity and box checking on the part of the UNHCR. While sexual assault was a very well-known and documented problem in Dadaab, this was just not the case in Kakuma. It’s not that rape never happened in the camp, but at that time there were simply not many women and girls—it was still mostly unaccompanied male youth. Yet money was directed to the program.35

1992: Primary Schooling and ECD In Kakuma, many of the unaccompanied boys did not enroll in school but instead worked by collecting firewood or transporting bags of food from distribution centers to refugees’ homes. Samuel explained, “it was also a challenge because we had to support ourselves—we had no parents to cook meals or do any of the work of taking care of a household. We were just living together in groups of ten or so.”36 In addition, while the majority of students were going to school for the first time, those who had previously completed some primary education in their home countries had to decide whether to start over in lower primary school or forego schooling altogether. Upper primary, grades 5–8, and secondary were not offered. Many chose not to enroll. A former UNHCR community services officer said: The schooling provided consisted solely of lower primary classes, reflecting EFA goals, which emphasized basic primary education. So that’s what UNHCR offered—the absolute minimum. Education was a box to check

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off on the form submitted to HQ. Primary education—available? Tick. Yes. That’s it. And because it was an add-on, there were no UNHCR education officers. It fell to community services to liaise with the implementing partners. I fought for education, but I wasn’t an educationist.37

In Dadaab, Al Alrahman, an Islamic organization, also provided structured schooling in the form of madrassas or “doksis” in Somali. A former teacher explained that the doksis “had very good foundations—every student had schoolbooks and they offered a midday meal. This alone was enough to attract many children. They also provided early childhood development (ECD) programming.”38 In Kakuma, refugees organized their own ECD schools. They built rudimentary shelters out of mud bricks. One ECD teacher said, “the ECD schools were built even before the primary schools. We never taught under trees. We were just ladies from the community who were not trained. But UNHCR provided some small incentive wage and also thread and cotton so we could sew our own puppets for the lessons we would teach. We also provided porridge for the students every day.”39 Materials for school buildings and textbooks, teachers’ texts, notebooks, pens and pencils, and chalkboards were not provided as readily for primary school programs. Meals were not provided at all. Of school building materials, Samuel recalled that “it took some months, but they eventually supplied us with some plastic sheeting so we built temporary structures. Because we didn’t have textbooks in the early years, we just depended on what the teacher said. Whatever they wrote on the board is what we wrote.”40

1993: PTAs, SMCs, and Teacher Strikes In early 1993, CARE and IRRES had started to distribute textbooks and notebooks to students and additional construction materials, including wood posts and chicken wire to parents who were taking charge of building the schools. The agencies asked parents to form Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) in Dadaab and School Management Committees (SMCs) in Kakuma. Al Nuur explained, “these parent groups became very influential—they

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were the go between from agencies to the community.”41 In Kakuma, SMCs organized the construction of the ECD schools. In Dadaab, parents held weekly meetings with teachers to review students’ progress and any issues teachers might be having. Incentive wages were discussed frequently. In February, with parents’ support, teachers met with CARE to demand an increase in wages. When CARE did not take action, the teachers went on strike. “The strike lasted for months,” a former teacher said. “All the schools closed down. It completely paralyzed the school system. Most teachers and parents supported it. After it had lasted for two months, the incentive was raised to 1500 Ksh.”42 In Kakuma, SMCs also met regularly with teachers. However, “the involvement was not the same because it was a children’s camp,” a former UNHCR community services officer said. “There were so many boys who wanted to go to school and the Ethiopians were willing to teach. But schools were opening faster than IRRES could hire teachers.”43 By the end of the year, there were nineteen primary schools that enrolled 14,000 students, out of a population of 30,000 refugees. Comparatively there were eight primary schools for a population of almost 200,000 in Dadaab. “The majority of us who came to Kakuma wanted education,” Samuel said. “That was one of the biggest problems in Sudan. There were no quality services for people in the south, no education infrastructure. In the north there was far greater access. There was so much willingness among us that we should go to school.”44

1993: The Lost Boys, Black Hawk Down, and Repatriation The story of the “Lost Boys,” as this group of Sudanese minors in Kakuma came to be known, increasingly gained media attention. Kakuma was often portrayed in the media as a “Never-Land” where the “Lost Boys” were under the care and protection of the UNHCR, living together in makeshift families and going to school. Seldom reported were the large number of out-of-school youth and challenging conditions in the camp. It was also widely reported in multiple news articles that refugee teachers had said to students “education is your mother and your father,” and also that education was the reason for their flight from Sudan.45 However, a former UNHCR community services had a different take:

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I don’t buy that. There was a war going on. They were fleeing conscription. They would have been cannon fodder otherwise. It’s not doing them justice saying they only came for education. However, the press helped with a little more funding for the school program in Kakuma. But in Dadaab, the press wasn’t good, especially after Mogadishu. Implementing the education program was difficult there.46

In stark contrast to the Never Never Land of Kakuma, the American media portrayed Dadaab as a veritable wasteland. After Somali militia and civilian armed fighters shot down two US Black Hawk helicopters in Mogadishu in October 1993, the media often represented Somalia as a country that was hostile to “American” or “Western” ways of life.47 After that event, humanitarian and development aid from the United States and its European allies intended for Somalia or Somali refugees came under intense scrutiny. According to a former UNESCO program officer, “because there was such a public outcry in the United States after ‘Black Hawk Down,’ Americans weren’t going to openly support programming in Dadaab—education programming, or any program at all actually.”48 Ongoing discussion that Somali refugees were almost on the verge of repatriation also made providing and managing education programming difficult. Reports published by UNHCR Headquarters stated that “the large number of spontaneous returns is a clear indication that voluntary repatriation on a massive scale can be expected to take place. Now that the refugee emergency is over, priority is being given to repatriation so that refugees can rebuild their countries.”49 More than 40,000 Ethiopians and 50,000 Somalis repatriated in 1993. However, almost 400,000 refugees remained in Kenya at the end of the year; the vast majority resided in Dadaab and Kakuma.50 UNHCR reports from that period state that education would become a priority service in order to support repatriation. A former UNHCR community services officer recalled the situation differently. “Those were not the discussions we were having internally. In the Nairobi office, every excuse was given why education should not be prioritized. You can just tell from the staffing situation. In what at the time was the biggest refugee situation in the world, there was not a single education specialist.”51 The same officer explained reports from the time showing a sharp increase in student enrollment. “It was

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donor driven. It just meant more kids were packed into a classroom. Still so many students came every day, especially in Kakuma. They were there from the day term started until the day it ended. And then many would go straight back across the border to fight for the SPLA, coming back when school began again.”52 There was much less back-and-forth movement across the border in Dadaab. A former UNHCR protection officer said, “the security situation was much worse. And because the majority were women and children—they weren’t combatants.”53 According to Al Nuur, schools held different significance in Dadaab and refugees used schools for multiple purposes. By day they were for the learners, but in the afternoons and evenings they were safe meeting places for communities and also places to pass the time. There was no market then, so the only interesting place was the school. CARE provided lamps in the evenings, so we would go and study and adults would gather to tell stories in the courtyard. Schools were the center of the community.54

Community services officers frequently cited these examples to senior operations officers at the UNHCR Branch Office in Nairobi. “We argued all the time, kicking and screaming that education programming is protective, keeping kids from going back across the border in Sudan and giving kids and everyone from the community places to gather in Dadaab,” a former officer said. “We said there need to be more funds and resources to provide more classes, extend school years hours, train teachers, provide options for all the adolescents who were out of school. Yet the answer was the same—we are providing basic education. Case closed.”55 While UNHCR policymakers remained unmoved, in the summer of 1993 the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), UNHCR’s implementing partner for camp management in Kakuma, invited the NGO Don Bosco to implement a vocational education program. One of the founders of the program said, “by the end of the year, we were running classes out of a mud house at the edge of the camp. Eighty students were learning carpentry, masonry—the basic trades.”56 Two years had passed since the founding of the camps. During that time, CARE and IRRES had developed and implemented primary school programs

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for grades 1–8. At the start of 1994, there were fourteen primary schools in Dadaab and approximately 9000 students enrolled in classes—about 5 percent of the 180,000 refugees that then resided in the camp.57 In Kakuma, 16,000 were enrolled in school—about 40 percent of the camp’s growing population, that had by then reached more than 35,000.58 CARE and IRRES had hired and trained teachers, and classes were taking place in temporary shelters made of plastic sheeting and mud bricks. In Dadaab, some schools had corrugated sheet roofs and cement floors.59 Some classrooms also had a handful of roughhewn desks or benches, though most students sat on the floor. A former refugee student said, “this made writing difficult. Especially when classes were crowded and there was no surface to write on because the classroom was full from wall to wall with students. Still, I tried to learn as much as I could, so I could go back home and be somebody.”60 The sentiment was widely shared. However, in the first months of the year, conditions were deteriorating in Somalia and Sudan. In Somalia, peace talks had failed between warring clans.61 In Sudan, the SPLA had splintered along tribal lines—Nuer and Dinka—setting off new waves of violence against these groups in southern Sudan and also in Kakuma.62

1994: Implementing Partners and Education for Peace In January, UNHCR Headquarter’s education unit, composed of a senior education officer, a DAFI scholarship officer, and two assistants, participated in a series of meetings over the course of four days with UNESCO education officers. In response to the number of conflicts and subsequent refugee crises that had occurred in the preceding years, it was decided that these two organizations, along with UNICEF, would revise a previously established UN and INGO Working Group on Refugee Education. Education officers from UNESCO and UNICEF were to meet every two months in Geneva with UNHCR’s senior education officer and make arrangements for joint activities in the field. In Dadaab, this partnership led to teacher trainings by UNESCO and CARE and new printing and distribution of copies of the mixed Somali curriculum UNESCO had previously written.

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Similar initiatives were not undertaken in Kakuma. Reports from that time indicate growing challenges with IRRES as the implementing partner for education. They [IRRES] have refused to share records with the Nairobi Branch Office that account for how education funds are being spent. They are running a program where there is a shortage of textbooks and blackboards, classes are being held only between 8am and 11am, and new teachers are not receiving training. Finally, while alleged, there are indications that IRRES has purposely burned down the warehouse storing textbooks and other supplies to cover up theft of materials that presumably were sold for profit in Loki or Lodwar.63

In May, UNHCR asked IRRES to cease its work in Kakuma, and the Branch Office began considering new implementing partners for education.64 When selecting an implementing partner in any sector, UNHCR prioritized NGOs that were able to at least partially fundraise the cost of their operations. The Branch Office first approached the IRC and Radda Barnen regarding their interest in managing the education program in Kakuma. At the time, the IRC was managing medical services and providing rehabilitation programs to disabled adults and youth, while Radda Barnen was responsible for several social services, primarily foster care arrangements, to unaccompanied minors. A former UNHCR program officer said: IRC was willing to do it, but they wouldn’t bring their own funding. Radda Barnen said they were only interested in working with unaccompanied minors, not in education, and did not want to offer any secondary school programs. However, we thought they could bring in funding from Save the Children International. After some back and forth, Radda Barnen agreed, but it was a shaky beginning.65

According to UNHCR’s former senior education officer, “it was hoped that Radda Barnen would bring the education program in Kakuma up to the standards in Dadaab, where the program was well managed by CARE.”66 That Dadaab’s education program was comparatively stronger than Kakuma’s was a belief shared widely by UNHCR staff. Reports often mentioned there were greater challenges in implementing the education program in Dadaab and that

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far fewer students were enrolled in camp schools. However, these same reports noted that CARE employed an education officer in each of Dadaab’s three sub-camps and that a campaign organized by community services officers was significantly increasing enrollment. In addition, UNESCO’s in-service training and support to Somali teachers were leading to improvements in the quality of instruction, as teachers were “now planning and delivering lessons rather than just writing text on the board that students would copy.”67 UNESCO’s teaching materials also “incorporated elements of education for peace” that were potentially “of interest to UNHCR, UNESCO, and UNICEF to develop for future programming in camps settings.”68 Their interest was in part driven by unrest in Kakuma. Throughout the year, violent clashes had erupted frequently between Nuer and Dinka youth. A former UNHCR protection officer said: Word would reach the camp of a raid carried out against one or the other group in southern Sudan and groups would carry out reprisals in Kakuma. The SPLA also maintained a presence in the camp. There was an SPLA officer appointed to manage Kakuma and SPLA generals were known to be traveling back and forth between Sudan and Kakuma.69

In the late summer, thousands of refugee youth from both communities rioted and destroyed recently constructed food distribution centers. The same former program officer said, “the UNHCR’s interpretation was that the riot was being motivated by the SPLA so they could keep food aid from the camp going across the border. A different viewpoint shared by staff from the partner agencies was that the kids had nothing to do and no voice. “Unless they were engaged, they had nothing to lose.”70 The fall school term began in Kakuma under the management of Radda Barnen. The organization had distributed new student and teacher textbooks and built classrooms—four poles arranged in a rectangle connected by plastic sheeting with a roof made of palm fronds. Radda Barnen had also arranged for students enrolled in the Don Bosco vocational program to build desks and benches and assist with the construction of new classrooms. A handful of Kenyan national teachers were hired to teach newly added upper primary courses for grades 5–8, particularly Swahili courses, which were part of the Kenyan national curriculum. Samuel explained, “Swahili was disastrous for us.

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We had grown up speaking Arabic, had been studying in the camp in English, and now we had to learn Swahili, which was a real challenge.”71

1995: Changing Global Landscape, Changing Curricula and Programs Despite incremental improvements across both camps, including in the distribution of school materials, teacher training, and school infrastructure, education funding remained precarious. UNHCR reports explained this funding shortfall as a result of “donor fatigue for Somalia as well as the shifting of funding priorities towards Central Africa to more than one million Rwandan refugees.”72 A former Radda Barnen program officer described the changing humanitarian landscape: The Rwandan genocide and resulting crisis in Zaire changed the whole humanitarian field, including emergency education. Inside the UNHCR, there was serious dialogue about what emergency operations were and were not doing. 40,000 people had died of cholera in the camps for Rwandese refugees in the first month. There was a real push for Minimum Standards in all sectors.73

In early 1995, a handful of unofficial minimum standards for the education sector were introduced in the Revised Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees.74 The new Guidelines recommended class sizes of no more than forty students and that all education programs should be provided at minimum with temporary shelter, writing materials, and blackboards. The Revised Guidelines advised practitioners to utilize refugee education to meet “psychosocial needs after trauma and to convey life-saving skills for survival, including landmine awareness, peace education, and environmental awareness.”75 Similar to the 1992 Guidelines, it was recommended that the curricula offered in camp schools match the “durable solution” that was envisioned as most viable— curriculum of the home country for temporary asylum, mixed curriculum for medium-term, and curriculum of the host country for long-term situations. In Dadaab, refugees and UNHCR and implementing partner staff increasingly saw the situation as long-term. Al Nuur said, “PTAs had begun

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discussing implementing the Kenyan curriculum. Some parents said their children would never go home and needed to be able to sit for the Kenyan national exams that might lead to opportunities for secondary schooling. Other parents argued that Somali history and culture would be lost.”76 In a series of meetings with CARE, refugees and staff decided that in lower primary, children would still use the UNESCO mixed curriculum and receive instruction in Somali; in upper primary, they would utilize the Kenyan curriculum taught in English and Swahili. Implementation was gradual and began with CARE hiring a handful of Kenyan national teachers and facilitating in-service training for current teachers. By the fall of 1995, the Kenyan national curriculum and the Women Victims against Violence program were implemented in both camps. With partial funding from UNESCO, the Environmental Education program was also introduced in Dadaab and Kakuma as part of the science curriculum. Designed to minimize the environmental impact of refugees on surrounding communities, the curriculum included hands-on, place-based modules, including, for example, modules focused on energy conservation, sustainable shelter, and local laws and traditions of natural resource use. The program was also intended to address conflict between refugees and host communities over firewood. An environmental education officer stationed in the Branch Office oversaw the supplemental environmental education training for teachers. A former community services officer said: The training had the benefit of strengthening the quality of teaching all around because it wasn’t just pedagogy, but content that focused on students. Teachers were given a chance to practice taking students outside, using the environment as a classroom, or bringing rocks, soil, or other natural resources into the classroom and letting students get tactile feeling for them. Then teachers started to apply these approaches in their other subjects.77

1995–6: Education Officers, the Machel Report With the addition of supplemental curricula came dedicated education officers. The environmental education officer post was the first post specifically devoted to education in the Branch Office. It had been decided at a regional

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education workshop in March 1995 that job descriptions for community services officers should clearly include education functions and that the position title should be “Community Services/Education Officer.”78 A former UNHCR program officer said, “while education had fallen to community services for a long time, there was no real incentive for community services to focus on education, in addition to all the other things they were tasked with. So education had to become part of what people were hired to do and what they were held accountable for.”79 Beginning in 1996, a CARE community services officer took up a post as an education officer. Martin, the former teacher writing his own history of education in Dadaab, said: This forged a very strong link between Community Services and Education. The can schools are an example of why this link was important. We needed more schools built but we didn’t have the materials. However, there was a community services officer who had a stock of USAID tins and told the education officer he could use them if he wanted. So the education officer met with parents and they came up with a plan to cut the tins and hammer them flat so they could be used as sheeting for school walls. CARE provided some timber so all the new schools were made of USAID cans and many of the simple four post sheet schools were eventually replaced by the can schools as well.80

In July of that year, at a meeting held at UNHCR Headquarters, participants from UNHCR, UNESCO, UNICEF, and several INGOs reflected on the changing nature of humanitarian work. The meeting report signaled a decisive shift from the early 1990s regarding the scope of UNHCR’s operations, concluding that, “the initial euphoria generated by the end of the Cold War has dissipated and given way to a more sober appreciation of constraints imposed upon multilateral action: a lack of consensus regarding the protection of civilians in countries affected by armed conflict and the limited capacity of UNHCR in relation to the responsibilities it has been asked to assume.”81 One month later, UNICEF published the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children,82 alternately known as the Machel Report, so named for the report’s author Graça Machel. The report examined the ways children and youth had been mobilized, sensitized, and traumatized across multiple conflicts in the preceding five years since the end of the Cold War, such as the Bosnia and Yugoslav wars and the Rwandan genocide, and concluded that international

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organizations must undertake activities that strengthen the protection of children and youth. The report also identifies education as a primary protective activity in conflict-affected states and in refugee camps. According to a former UNHCR education officer, “the report advanced the notion that child protection was a core responsibility of the UNHCR.”83

1997: Peace Education In early 1997, in response to the Machel Report, the UNHCR set up a Children’s Trust Fund administered by the senior coordinator for refugee children. A former UNHCR program officer stated, “the coordinator, who saw education as a fundamental right for children, suddenly had more of an impact because there was funding behind the post.” The Fund was intended to strategically reorient protection and programming for children and adolescents and support pilot projects that would address critical protection concerns and promote peace.84 UNHCR’s Peace Education Program was one of the first projects supported by the Fund. Dadaab and Kakuma were selected as the pilot sites. In May, the Branch Office hired two peace education officers to develop the program. “One was an education specialist, the other was a peace specialist,” a former UNHCR program officer said. “From the UNHCR’s standpoint, put the two together, you have ‘Peace Education.’ But the peace specialist had absolutely no field experience—didn’t last more than a month.”85 The peace education officer who remained spent several weeks in each camp, holding focus group interviews with a range of groups within the refugee community to discuss if a peace education program should be implemented, and if so, how the program might be structured. A program officer said: Over the course of those meetings, refugees would say that it’s not enough that our kids just learn this, we need to learn this for ourselves. In Kakuma, they would refer to the eight refugees who had died the previous year in clashes between Nuer and Dinka and in Dadaab to the large number of women who reported being raped in the camp. So we developed a community program as well.86

The school-based Peace Education Program was composed of a series of activities covering fourteen concept areas arranged in a “spiral curriculum”

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where new lessons built upon those of the previous weeks. UNHCR hired and trained forty peace education teachers in each camp. “The pedagogy was student centered and experiential,” remarked a former program officer. “It didn’t require reading or writing, but rather facilitation skills. Like the Environmental Education teacher training had done, this helped improve the quality of instruction in the camp because teachers utilized these approaches in the other classes they taught.”87 Initially, it was thought the school program would be implemented in the regular curriculum as part of civics or social studies. However, “we decided we needed to be able to call it Peace Education so kids knew what they were learning,” a program officer said. “There was a subject called pastoral care and it was a single period once a week where kids did absolutely nothing. And so we said, well, this is the best substitute for pastoral care you could get. And that’s where we wound up putting it.”88 In Dadaab, CARE scheduled peace education for mid-morning on Thursdays—the same time previously allocated to pastoral care. However in Kakuma, the new implementing partner for education, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), relocated pastoral care and subsequently peace education to first period Monday morning. “It would seem as though LWF made a conscious effort to put Peace Education where it would be least effective,” said a former program officer. “That was often when school assembly was held, so students would usually miss first period.”89 Nevertheless, 42,000 students across the two camps participated in the program the pilot year.90 In addition, the Peace Education Program “really strengthened the quality of teaching in the camps, and we also got more access to information about the education sector itself,” a UNHCR community services officer said. “It was no longer just statistics or quarterly reports from the implementing partners delivered to the Branch Office, because over the course of several months the peace education officer regularly visited all the camp schools. It became difficult to pretend issues were not there.”91

1997: Funding, Management Structure That UNHCR appointed LWF as the implementing partner for education in Kakuma in mid-1997 “came down to UNHCR’s growing concerns over

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funding,” a former program officer said.92 In 1994, when UNHCR had approached both IRC and Radda Barnen to take over from IRRES, Radda Barnen was ultimately selected because of the financial and human resources it could direct to the education program in Kakuma. When Radda Barnen indicated in early 1997 it did not want its contract renewed, the IRC, which had begun to offer supplemental education programming for disabled youth, had again submitted a proposal to the UNHCR. “However, LWF came with some of its own funding and IRC couldn’t match those resources,” a former community services officer said. “LWF had no education specialist and was primarily responsible for food distribution. But all of the sudden it became the provider of education. And it was really not in a position to do that.”93 Around the same time, UNHCR’s Inspection and Evaluation unit conducted a Review of UNHCR’s Implementing Arrangements.94 The internally circulated report found that in the past decade, the number of UNHCR’s partners had quadrupled and that partners were managing approximately $500 million disbursed annually by the UNHCR. However, the report concluded that “despite their decisive importance, the attention dedicated to implementing arrangements was limited” and that selection of implementing partners was “decentralized, ad-hoc, and passive—with the UNCHR waiting for partners to come to them.”95 The report and its findings were one of the outcomes of a comprehensive review of UNHCR’s management structure, entitled “Project Delphi,” that the agency had undertaken in the preceding eighteen months. Following the conclusion of Delphi, the UNHCR instituted a new policy of decentralized decision-making. UNHCR Headquarters would set global policy priorities and issue guidelines and standards for each unit; Branch and sub-offices would be given greater authority in holding implementing partners accountable. In addition, heads of office would be given complete discretion over the annual budget allocated to their operation. A former UNHCR program officer explained the challenges that arose from this new arrangement. “It came down to who could fight for their service or unit in budget meetings over one big pot of money. And because there were no education officers at the country level in Kenya or anywhere else, there was nobody to fight for education.”96

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The new management structure also made it difficult to address many of the conclusions and recommendations in UNHCR’s 1997 Review of Education Activities. The Review concluded: 1. Staff at all levels are unclear about the purpose, objectives, and coverage of refugee education programs; 2. UNHCR’s focus on primary education precludes a large number of adolescents from receiving any educational programming; 3. UNHCR’s average annual per pupil expenditure of $21–$28 in camp schools is insufficient to provide any degree of quality programming.97 Recommendations included increasing per pupil expenditure to a minimum of $40 dollars, developing minimum standards for all types of refugee education as part of the new management system, and shifting refugee education discourse from “primary education” to “basic education.” A former UNHCR community services officer described the distinction: While primary education was in some countries cut off in Grade Six and very inflexible, nothing but standard education programming, we could argue that basic education went up to Grade 8. Basic education was also a term utilized in EFA, but it had previously been made synonymous with primary education. Because one of the goals of EFA was basic literacy and numeracy, we reasoned we could advocate for accelerated learning programs or remedial courses for out of school adolescents.98

When compared to camp schools throughout the world, those in Dadaab and Kakuma were doing comparatively well per the Review’s recommendations. For the 1997–8 academic year, the UNHCR spent $41 dollars per pupil; a handful of community services officers and the environmental education and peace education officers were strong advocates for education; and while limited, there was supplemental and vocational education programming for adolescents.99 Don Bosco, the vocational program in Kakuma, had expanded its enrollment capacity every year since 1993 when it had first begun offering classes. In the summer of 1997, the program had moved from its original mud house school building into a large vocational training center that included several workshops for woodworking, masonry, carpentry, electrical wiring and repair, and auto mechanics. In Dadaab, a Kenyan national teacher provided

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tutoring to a handful of students to help them independently prepare for the Kenyan Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE).100

1998: Influx, Secondary School However, by 1998, problems loomed. In Kakuma, despite financial commitments made when LWF assumed responsibility for the education sector, the organization announced that it would not be able to match the funding previously provided by Radda Barnen. In addition, in late 1997, to ease overcrowding in Dadaab, UNHCR had transferred several thousand Somali refugees to Kakuma. No arrangements were made to expand capacity in camp schools or help facilitate the transition from the Somali to the Kenyan curriculum for the Somali students in lower primary. A former teacher said, “they were just enrolled in the schools, though many didn’t speak English and our classrooms became very crowded.”101 Suad was one of several hundred incoming students. When she arrived in Kakuma in 1998, she attended classes under trees: We came in the middle of the term and it was hard because we didn’t know English at the time—only Somali. And we were in the shade then but in Kakuma there is lots of dust. So sometimes I could not concentrate. I could not even see the teacher in front of me. Some days it would start raining and then it was very hard to learn. There were eighty students going to school under the tree, but I was one of only seven girls.102

Around the same time, parents and students began demanding UNHCR provide secondary schools in the camps. The students who had begun in 1992 were approaching the end of grade 8. A former UNHCR community services officer said, “the students wanted to sit for the KCPE and go to secondary school. Parents argued that it would have been pointless for their children to attend classes all these years if they couldn’t continue.”103 Another program officer described issues compounding the situation. “There was real unrest— teachers in both camps were organizing to increase incentive wages and resources were also stretched to the limit because there was another budget crisis at headquarters.”104 However, the Branch Office allocated funding from

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the Children’s Trust; constructed from cement blocks, Ifo Secondary School in Dadaab and Kakuma Secondary School opened in the fall of 1998.105 Throughout the year, several staff at UNHCR Headquarters had advocated for the agency to include secondary schooling in its global policies for refugee education. A former education officer said, “the High Commissioner at the time had a particular interest in refugee education and eventually became angry about the neglect of education in her program. So she asked one of the assistant education officers to prepare a concept paper on the establishment of an independent Refugee Education Trust.”106 However, the director of the Division of Operational Support was simultaneously making budget cuts to respond to the financial crisis; in June, the director abolished the post of the senior education officer. “What a signal to send to the international community about the UNHCR’s stance on education in emergencies,” the same education officer said.107 By August, three assistant education officers remained at Headquarters. They were responsible for making education available to more than 5 million school-age refugees throughout the world.

1998: Financial Crisis, More Pilot Programs, Dadaab and the Kenyan Curriculum The financial crisis—a shortfall of $400 million—and subsequent cuts were the result of what the UNHCR increasingly recognized as long-term care and maintenance programs with no solutions in sight and shrinking donor support. The majority of UNHCR’s operations were funded by fifteen bilateral agencies, though contributions fluctuated from year to year depending on the priorities of the donor governments.108 UNHCR’s senior leadership considered a number of possibilities for expanding the donor base, including through outreach to corporate and philanthropic donors. However, they worried about maintaining the credibility of UNHCR’s operations and demonstrating to new and existing donors that programming was cost-effective and had valid objectives.109 These concerns negatively impacted education programming. A former education officer said, “nobody wants to fund ‘soft’ operations, like education. You build a school, take a photo, show the donors, and everyone

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is happy. You train teachers and improve the quality of instruction and that’s invisible. Every single year we had to try and make education new and exciting. That’s just not how education works.”110 In Dadaab and Kakuma, budget cuts halted the construction of thirtyfour schools and the maintenance of several others. Yet, blackboards were crumbling and several of the mud brick walls had holes large enough so students could walk in and out as they would a doorway. Textbooks and other school materials were also shared among a growing number of students. A former student described the situation as “a strain on everything. There was one book for every ten learners, maybe two or three desks for one hundred students in a class. We used to get into fights over these things.”111 Nevertheless, the two camps continued to serve as pilot sites for socalled new and exciting education programming. “The GLOBE program provided the opportunity for the photo op that year,” said an education officer.112 The Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment Program (GLOBE) was developed by then vice president of the United States Al Gore. The same officer said, “the High Commissioner was trying to strengthen the relationship between UNHCR and the United States to secure additional funding. In a meeting between the High Commissioner and the Vice President, it was decided it would be a good idea to pilot GLOBE in Kakuma—the constant guinea pig for any pilot in the 1990s.”113 GLOBE required that students collect and analyze water and soil samples, enter the data on a computer, and then email that data so it could be published on GLOBE’s website. “These were camps with no electricity and the staff at UNHCR barely had access to the internet,” said the officer. “UNHCR funds were allocated to LWF for GLOBE, but there was never an actual program, so staff at LWF just pocketed the money. But sure enough, photos were posted of children collecting samples.”114 In Dadaab, just before the end of the year, PTAs approached CARE and asked that the Kenyan curriculum be fully adopted across all grade levels. “CARE was initially reluctant because the mixed curriculum textbooks had just been reprinted by UNESCO and were about to be distributed, but the parents were adamant,” said a former teacher. “Ultimately CARE agreed, though for some years after, most teachers were teaching the Somali curriculum because they didn’t know how to teach the Kenyan curriculum.”115

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1998–9: Development Programming or Humanitarian Aid? The education unit at UNHCR Headquarters and education programs in camps were significantly strained in 1998. However, the publication that year of Rapid Educational Response in Complex Emergencies: Some Lessons from Recent Experience,116 by UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNESCO, furthered the development of the nascent field of education in emergencies. The first publication to synthesize “best practices,” Rapid Educational Response, was a “how to guide” as well as an advocacy tool for community services and education officers that made a case for emergency education as a protective and lifesaving service, “especially in refugee situations.”117 In 1999, UNICEF’s Education in Emergencies and for Reconstruction: A Developmental Approach118 catalyzed new discussions and debates among members of the UN and INGO Working Group on Refugee Education about how to conceptualize education in emergencies. Rapid Educational Response proposed a “humanitarian aid” model during emergencies while Education in Emergencies advocated for a “development” model that included planning before, during, and after emergencies. Dadaab and Kakuma’s education programs, along with that of several other camps throughout the world, were situated squarely between these two models. In both camps, programming was becoming long-term by expanding to include secondary schooling and supplementary courses such as Peace Education and vocational training. However, funding continued to occur in one-year cycles and was often disbursed with only a few months left to spend it. A former education officer reflected on this issue and its impacts on the Peace Education Program, which had been renewed and also expanded in 1999 to include refugee settlements in Uganda and Liberia. “In 1998, we had more money than was necessarily needed, but every dollar was spent because otherwise the second year we would have only been granted the amount spent from the $500,000 given the first year.”119 This was also true of UNHCR’s General Program funding. The same education officer explained: Let’s say you give an officer $1 Million USD for the first year to run the operation in their sector, but he only manages to spend $750,000. Doesn’t matter what the reasons are—maybe it was given mid-year so it couldn’t all be spent in time—a very common problem. Next year, when the officer has sorted out those problems and really needs the money, he’s given $750,000.

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Everybody is incentivized to spend every single dollar, regardless of how. The notion of single-year “emergency” General Program funding simply doesn’t work because it can’t encompass recurring costs, like teachers’ salaries or capital works that take a long time to plan.120

1999: Kiswahili, Corruption, Resettlement, and Relocation By 1999, school construction had resumed in both camps. These new schools were composed of four or five buildings, each divided into as many classrooms and arranged in a rectangular compound enclosed by a large fence. In Dadaab, there were also significant changes throughout the year. CARE increased refugee teachers’ incentive wages from 1500 to 2000 Ksh.121 UNHCR also brought on Windle Trust Kenya (WTK) as an implementing partner under CARE’s management to provide English language courses to newly settled francophone refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, CARE opened Unity Primary School for grades 6–8 and officially registered the school with the Kenyan Ministry of Education. “Unity was the first registered school in the camp, and the only exam center,” Martin said. “This meant that the learners would prepare to sit for the KCPE at the end of Grade 8 from the moment they started there in Grade 6.”122 Former students said, “from the beginning, Unity was the place to be. It was the center of everything. There was an exam at the end of Grade 5 to go to Unity. However, anyone who passed could go—there were not quotas.” However, the same former students recounted challenges at Unity. “The first year, the student to teacher ratio was at least 100 to 1 and there were lots of dropouts because people were failing Kiswahili. There was also not a single textbook in the school, so we were just copying from the blackboard.”123 There were also challenges with textbooks in Kakuma. During a large regional workshop for refugee education in Tanzania, a UNHCR operations officer noticed a large discrepancy in the cost per textbook reported by LWF and CARE. The officer said, “it happened that I had both partners’ accounting sheets side by side, which hadn’t happened previously for no other reason than you had two different officers from the Nairobi Branch Office coordinating with the implementing partners for education, one for LWF and the other for CARE. They never talked with one another or compared notes.”124 The officer

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noticed that, for the same textbooks, LWF had reported costs substantially higher than those reported by CARE. “This caused a furor and as it was being investigated, it was discovered there were all sorts of things being overcharged with kickbacks going straight into the pockets of LWF staff. Turned out there had been a huge problem with textbook distribution for years, despite so much money going into textbooks.”125 When the investigation concluded months later, there were minimal consequences and LWF remained the implementing partner for education. However, demographic changes in the camp were underway. In the first months of the year, the US State Department announced that more than 12,000 “Lost Boys’ would resettle to the United States in the next two years.126 “After that it was no longer a children’s camp in the way it had been since 1992,” a UNHCR community services officer said. “There were about 40,000 refugees in Kakuma at the time, mostly Sudanese but some Somali and Ethiopians. Once resettlement started, the UNHCR began transferring Congolese, Ugandans, and Burundians to the camp.”127 These different groups had lived in a range of camps and brought with them new approaches to living in Kakuma. Many received remittances from relatives in their home countries or abroad. A former program officer said, “there had been a small market in Kakuma but suddenly there were shops, restaurants, even taxis to get you from Kakuma 1 to the end of the new extension, Kakuma 2—all of these business were operated by refugees.”128 As Kakuma’s informal economy grew, so too did tensions between refugees and the Turkana people of the host community. What had started as conflicts over firewood and water turned to conflicts over what was a clear disparity in access to goods and services. “Many refugees were now living much better than the Turkana,” a protection officer said. “UNHCR’s conflict mitigation strategy was to offer Peace Education courses to the Turkana as well as allow a number of school-aged Turkana to attend camp schools.”129 As the end of the year approached, the director of UNHCR’s recently established regional office in Nairobi initiated discussions with the peace education officer working in the Branch Office regarding establishing a regional peace education officer post. The peace education officer explained, “I had to say to him, we can’t do that. We don’t even have an education officer. So within a couple of months he got an education officer—the first education officer in the UNHCR system who was not based in HQ. We couldn’t believe it.”130

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2000–1: Education for All, Education in Emergencies, INEE Discussions were also underway in Geneva that led to the re-establishment of the senior education officer post by early 2000. In April, when the Second Education for All Forum was held in Dakar, Senegal, UNHCR’s education unit advocated strongly for the inclusion of emergency education services in the outcome document, the Dakar Framework for Action.131 The Framework replaced the Jomtien Declaration, signed ten years before at the first Education for All Conference. A former UNHCR education officer recalled: At Dakar, there was a high-level meeting of about seventy people, including several education ministers from around the world, pulled together by a handful of officers working on education in emergencies—one each from the World Bank, Norwegian Refugee Council, UNESCO, UNICEF, and UNHCR. And after several rounds of discussion, these officers secured commitments that were subsequently inserted into the Dakar Declaration that all parties present would do everything possible to provide education in crisis and to conduct educational programs in such a way as to lead to peace. So in one phrase we had the authority to work on education in crisis and conflict but the crucial thing emerging from the meeting was that the ministers called upon UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNESCO to convene a process of networking for education in emergencies.132

Following the Dakar Forum, UNHCR’s newly appointed senior education officer organized a bilateral agreement between UNHCR and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) to supply “seconded” NRC education officers to refugee camps throughout the world, including Dadaab and Kakuma. “Because of the relationship between a handful of Senior education officers at different agencies, a lot was pushed through in a short period of time,” a former UNHCR program officer said. “The secondment arrangement was one example. These officers were helping keep education going because UNHCR wasn’t really allocating funding to education officers and NRC was filling the gap.”133 The NRC officers seconded to Dadaab and Kakuma helped to facilitate both preand in-service teacher trainings, oversaw textbook distribution, and managed the construction of additional school buildings in both camps, including two new secondary school schools in Dadaab—one in Dagahaley and the other in Hagadera.134 “I remember things really improved that year,” Al Nuur said.

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“It seemed as though every child had a textbook and was learning inside a classroom.”135 In November 2000, UNHCR hosted a two-day meeting in Geneva focused on education in emergencies. At the meeting, representatives from UNHCR, UNESCO, and UNICEF founded the Network for Education in Emergencies. In early 2001, the name was changed to the Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). UNHCR’s senior education officer added the word interagency to denote the collaborative design and intent of the network. “Before INEE, you had education officers for different NGOs and UN agencies working in remote, isolated places like Dadaab and Kakuma, almost alone,” a former UNHCR education officer said. “But from late 2000 onward, they were connected via the INEE website, an online platform where they could share information and ideas and establish a community of practice.”136 The groundswell of support for education in emergencies and UNHCR’s education program was short-lived. By the middle of 2001, UNHCR’s senior education officer “was on the way out and nobody knew if the post would be filled,” the same former UNHCR education officer said.137 In the months prior to leaving, the senior education officer commissioned a comprehensive review of the Peace Education Program, which found that participants had developed a range of conflict resolution skills that helped to diffuse conflict between different groups within the same camp and between refugees and the host communities.138 Arrangements were also made to relocate the Peace Education Program from UNHCR to UNESCO, because the grant supporting the program from the Children’s Trust would not be renewed. “This [renewal] was incredible,” remarked a former program officer, “because one of the officers at UNESCO who had long been a supporter of Peace Education literally hovered outside the bathroom to talk to the person with the means of bringing the program over. That officer said yes and secured another two years of UNESCO funding.”139

2001: Private Funding, More Teacher Strikes The UNHCR also secured from private donors two more years of funding for the Refugee Education Trust. In the year 2000, the Trust was established as an

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independent Swiss NGO, affiliated with, but not managed by, the UNHCR. Money from the Trust had continued to support the expansion of secondary and postgraduate education in Dadaab, Kakuma, and several other camps throughout the world. “Even though there were a lot of people at HQ saying we don’t have the mandate for secondary education—just basic education— they couldn’t argue with independent funding from private donors,” a former UNHCR program officer said.140 In Dadaab and Kakuma, several hundred students were enrolled in secondary schools “though there were so many challenges then,” a former refugee student at Kakuma Secondary School stated. “Because there was only one secondary school for the whole camp, many of us had to walk very far every day and there were no school meals—we remained with hunger most days. There was also a high turnover rate amongst teachers and that year they decided to strike.”141 While throughout the 1990s teachers had organized strikes in Dadaab every year or two to raise incentive wages, strikes had seldom occurred in Kakuma. A former teacher explained, “the chairman of the teachers had a meeting with all the head teachers and presented demands to LWF and UNHCR and explained our incentive hadn’t been raised in a number of years. When they refused we already had support from all of the primary and secondary schools to strike.”142 However, not all teachers were on-board, as the ECD teachers elected not to participate. “The chairman approached us and asked ‘why shouldn’t you join us? If something good will come, you will be there.’ However we told them we had no reason for striking,” a former ECD teacher said.143 All schools closed except for ECD schools. “I supported the teachers, but I also was mad because I endured a lot to be at school and every day that passed was one more day of being idle and not advancing,” a former student said.144 After two weeks, the incentive was raised by 500 Ksh per month and classes resumed.

2002: Budget Cuts, Education Quality, Toolkits In early 2002, cuts were again made to financial and human resources for education programming at UNHCR Headquarters. The newly appointed high commissioner did not share his predecessor’s interest in refugee education, and the post for an officer to oversee the Refugee Education Trust

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was abolished. Under new management and operating in an office outside of UNHCR Headquarters, the Trust continued field operations by shifting its focus to conduct pre- and in-service training with refugee teachers; however, the partnership with UNHCR was terminated. By the middle of 2002, the Trust was no longer financially supporting secondary education in camps. This and other changes to education programming were partly the result of the newly appointed senior education officer, who had previously held several posts at UNHCR, including as a senior protect officer and a head of sub-office, but had a limited background in education. At UNESCO, changes to senior staff members also resulted in cuts to the special funding that had supported the Peace Education Program. “Basically the officers who had been strong advocates for education were having knives thrown at their programs and this all happened around the same time,”145 an education officer said. In Dadaab and Kakuma, UNHCR’s Peace Education and Environmental Education programming formally concluded at the end of spring term. Questions remained open throughout the summer and into the fall term as to whether an NGO might take responsibility for continuing to financially support these supplemental programs. Despite these challenges, in late 2002, when the new 2003 Education Sector Policy and Guidelines were issued, they represented many of the conceptual and practical developments in the field of education in emergencies that had taken shape in the preceding two years.146 Whereas the 1995 Revised Guidelines had focused almost exclusively on access to primary education, the 2003 Policy and Guidelines emphasized universal access to “Basic Education” that covered grades 1–8. In addition, the document included the provisioning of secondary education in camps as well as supplemental programming for adolescents, stating that, “secondary schooling is an essential motivating factor for primary students and also provides a cadre of educated persons to become school teachers, health workers, and administrators.”147 Increasing emphasis was also placed on the quality of education provided in camp schools; guidelines aimed at promoting quality included “in-service training, instructional time of a minimum of twenty-five hours per week for core subjects, and certification of school exams recognized by the host or home government.”148 Finally, the new policy stated, “UNHCR will deploy an emergency education coordinator to support rapid educational response.”149 An education officer explained,

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“the 2003 Guidelines were subject to a whole committee of staff throughout different units at UNHCR and it was really a struggle to get things included like ‘basic’ rather than ‘primary’ ed. But in the end some real gains were made.”150 Gains were also made in the field of Education in Emergencies, with the 2002 publication by Save the Children of Education in Emergencies: A Tool Kit for Starting and Managing Education in Emergencies,151 and a 1000-page Guidebook for Planning Education in Emergencies and Reconstruction published by UNESCO.152 “The collective knowledge of the field and the direction it took rested in the hands of a core group of mostly practitioners who had spent the ‘90s working on providing education in manmade and natural disasters throughout the world,”153 an education consultant said. “There were fourteen people at the time who were contributing to the UNESCO volume and we were all on a train traveling to Paris for the initial consult. Someone made a joke that if the train wrecked, Emergency Education would basically stop, but it wasn’t completely a joke.”154 As for the direction of education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma, refugee students, parents, and teachers advocated throughout the year for increased access to primary and secondary school and improvements to the quality of instruction. In late 2002, teachers organized another strike in Kakuma; schools again closed for two weeks and reopened when wages were increased by another 500 Ksh per month. In Dadaab, secondary school students organized a strike to protest the quality of teachers. “They demanded that CARE employ more Kenyan teachers who had degrees in education and could teach Swahili, especially as many would sit for the KCSE155 the following year,” Martin said. “It took time, but by December, a handful of Kenyan teachers were brought on to teach the upper level secondary school courses.”156 In both camps, girls were also enrolling in lower primary school and advancing to upper primary and secondary school in greater numbers. Suad recalled: Female teachers had started coming and talking to the community and encouraging parents to send their girls to school. That was the first year I had a female teacher. The school I had started at under the tree was now an actual school building with several classrooms, called Horseed Primary. I would go into the staffroom and see male, male, male and I would say “madame, why can’t you become the head teacher” and she would laugh and say maybe you will be the first head teacher here someday. I couldn’t think that far, all I

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could do was focus on getting to secondary—it was a competition between me and my four brothers. We would wake up at four am and start reading with a torch. Imagine you are just in grade 4 and you wake up so early in the morning because you want to be number one, because becoming number one is the only guarantee to advancing. But my teacher would encourage me throughout the day when I grew tired. She would say ‘you have a bright future.’ And I would say, ‘how can I have a bright future in this camp under the hot sun?’157

Chapter Summary Between 1992 and 2002, there were several changes to refugee education programming, globally and in Dadaab and Kakuma. Globally, the UNHCR developed education guidelines and contributed to a growing canon of best practices and minimum standards for education in emergencies; the UNHCR also played a large role in the founding in 2000 of the Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies. In addition, beginning in the late 1990s, the agency hired dedicated education officers at UNHCR Headquarters and in regional and camp offices. In Dadaab and Kakuma, the UNHCR and implementing partners, in coordination with refugees, established primary schools, initially under trees and eventually in brick-and-mortar classrooms. Refugees successfully advocated for the teaching of the Kenyan national curriculum in Kakuma and a mixed Somali-Kenyan curriculum in Dadaab, though later refugees in Dadaab advocated for and succeeded in replacing the SomaliKenyan curriculum with the Kenyan national curriculum. Refugees also secured the establishment of secondary schools in both camps and increased monthly wages for refugee teachers.

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Education Guidelines, Standards, Priorities, and Strategies (2003–12) 2003: Expansion in Dadaab and Kakuma Between 1992 and 2002, Dadaab and Kakuma had sprawled outward, temporary shelters made of plastic sheets replaced by semi-permanent mud brick or permanent concrete slab homes and buildings. Throughout the 1990s, many of Dadaab’s residents had relocated to Kakuma and a limited number had repatriated or resettled to another country. At the start of 2003, approximately 130,000 refugees resided in Dadaab’s three sub-camps,1 several thousand less than when the camp was initially founded. While still comprised almost exclusively of Somali refugees, in the later 1990s and early 2000s, men and boys fled Somalia in far greater numbers and now nearly matched women and girls.2 In Kakuma, there were about 80,000 refugees, nearly double the camps’ population throughout the 1990s.3 Initially a children’s camp for Sudanese youth, Kakuma had become almost cosmopolitan in composition, as the UNHCR had settled refugees from several other countries throughout East and Central Africa as well as Somali refugees relocated from Dadaab. Both camps had vibrant centers of commerce and activity that were full of refugee owned and operated markets, shops, and restaurants. In 2003, approximately 24,000 students were enrolled in camp schools in Dadaab and 28,000 were enrolled in schools in Kakuma.4 In Dadaab, boys outnumbered girls in primary school classrooms five to one while this figure was four to one in Kakuma. For secondary school, boys outnumbered girls ten to one across both camps.5 Student-to-classroom ratios were about 70 to 1 in Dadaab and 100 to 1 in Kakuma, and across both camps there were about 75 students per teacher.6 Results on the KCPE exams that

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qualified students to matriculate to secondary school averaged slightly higher in Kakuma—about 220 out of a possible 500; in Dadaab the average score was 210.7 A score of 250 was needed to qualify for secondary school.8 In Kakuma, approximately 20 percent of students who took the exam earned qualifying marks, while approximately 13 percent earned qualifying marks for secondary school matriculation in Dadaab.9 An evaluation of UNHCR’s refugee education program conducted across 72 camps throughout the world concluded that to improve education access and quality in Dadaab, an additional 350 teachers were required, while an additional 260 were needed in Kakuma.10 In comparison, the average number of additional teachers recommended for the other camps included in the report was twenty per camp.11 With education programming firmly established, community services and education officers now focused on increasing enrollment, particularly for girls, improving exam scores, and hiring and training more teachers by drawing upon the conceptual and policy frameworks, guidelines, and minimum standards for refugee education that had developed over the course of the preceding ten years. They also did so as part of a growing network of education in emergency practitioners connected via INEE’s forums and in-person meetings. These concepts, frameworks, and forums simply did not exist in the early 1990s, had been emergent in the late 1990s, and were evolving by the early 2000s—a process that would continue, and increasingly guide the work of their successors.

2003: Higher Education and Refugee Teachers In 2003, LWF hired Samuel to teach at his former primary school in Kakuma. “I was not a trained teacher,” he stated. “But I had sat for the KCSE in November 2002 and found myself back where I started.”12 Samuel was one of approximately 150 students from Kakuma Secondary School’s first graduating class, wondering if there would be opportunities to pursue higher education. “We hoped we might go to university—there was talk of possible scholarships, but we were waiting and seeing,” he said.13 Windle Trust Kenya, the NGO providing accelerated English language courses to refugees in Dadaab since the late 1990s, had begun offering a handful of bursaries for Dadaab’s secondary school graduates to attend colleges and universities in Kenya, the UK, and

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Canada. However, they had not yet extended programming to Kakuma. “Opportunities for scholarships were very few and you had to have the highest marks on the KCSE,” said a former student who had been among the first recipients of a Windle Trust scholarship. “Most secondary school leavers got jobs with the NGOs in the camp as incentive staff.”14 Many became teachers. The infusion of refugees who had completed their entire academic career in camp schools into the teaching workforce helped to improve education quality, according to several former students. “They were really increasing the level of instruction, helping as much as they could and making it better for us than it had been for them,” a former student said. “They would spend time with us after school, answering our questions. With the other teachers, you had to book an appointment and they would give you five minutes or less.”15 However, students still faced many of the same challenges, especially limited textbooks and overcrowded classrooms. Another former student said that The first two years in secondary school, we were without textbooks for science class. So there were five of us who would pool our money—two shillings each and we would rent the textbook from a boy in the camp whose parents could afford to buy them. It cost 10 shillings for two days and we would take turns copying around the clock.16

2003: SPHERE Since 1998, UNHCR had published mid-year and annual reports for all country operations; in 2003, for the first time these reports included information regarding how UNHCR was faring on meeting minimum standards. This new reporting feature was one of several outcomes of a handful of in-person meetings of INEE’s steering committee members. Another outcome was aligning the standards with those of SPHERE—an internationally recognized set of common principles and minimum standards for protection and assistance across several sectors of service delivery in humanitarian crises and natural disasters.17 In early 2002, SPHERE’s directors were considering developing guidance on education in emergencies. In the preceding two years, working groups with representatives from UN agencies and INGOs had identified and defined metrics and guidance notes across categories: protection; access and

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learning environment; teaching and learning; teachers and other education personnel; and education policy and coordination. A working group member said that “the inclusion of education in the SPHERE Handbook brought people together and also gave UNHCR a set of global standards that it could begin to measure and work towards.”18 Following the publication of the SPHERE Handbook with guidance on education standards, UNHCR’s initial reports tracking country operations tended to identify the ways in which minimum standards were not observed in camp schools. According to a former UNHCR program officer, “it was a deliberate decision to report on what wasn’t happening rather than making sweeping claims about so-called successes in reports.”19 While UNHCR’s previous Kenya country updates had made declarations such as “enrollment numbers remained high,” “forty-nine new classrooms constructed,” or “the education sector provided employment for 826 refugee and 66 Kenyan teachers,” there was a marked shift in 2003. For example, that year’s Global Report on Kenya Operations documented a 10 percent gap between identified needs and the available budget in the education sector.20 The report also concluded that “in Dadaab, the UNHCR could not address the need for the construction of 385 additional classrooms to meet the minimum standards of one classroom for fifty students,”21 while in Kakuma “the textbook to student ratio of 1:8 and desk to student ratio of 1:5 did not constitute a proper learning environment.”22 A former UNHCR program officer explained that “it was hoped that changes in reporting along with the new SPHERE guidance would help advocacy efforts for increased resources to be directed to education. Nothing changed immediately though.”23

2003–4: Education and Protection Other efforts to strengthen advocacy for education in emergencies were also underway. In March of 2003, Carl Triplehorn and Susan Nicolai published The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict.24 Their article articulated more concretely than previous publications the ways in which education is lifesaving and protective—physically, psychosocially, and cognitively—for children and adolescents who constitute a particularly vulnerable group in

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times of war. Their conclusions were a call to action, primarily for recognition by humanitarian and development agencies that child protection is integral to emergency education activities, and also for in-depth, empirical research on education interventions that enhance the protection of children. However, a former program officer remarked that “while the paper really resonated with the community of practitioners working together closely at the time to develop the field, a research agenda didn’t catch on. The sentiment was the paper had already said what needed be said.”25 Still, in the final months of 2003 and into early 2004, debates continued among staff at UNHCR Headquarters regarding if and how UNHCR’s operations, including education, did or did not guarantee refugees’ security and protection in protracted refugee situations. A term coined in the year 2000 by UNHCR’s Head of Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, members of UNHCR’s senior management team were increasingly focused on protracted refugee situations. A series of reports published by UNHCR’s Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit detailed the ways in which protracted refugee situations were “incubators for future problems … festering crises that can nurture instability and conflict with large, disaffected populations relying on subsistence level handouts, who are prime targets for recruitment into armed groups.”26 Children and youth in protracted refugee situations “were among those at highest risk of military recruitment.”27 Education, the reports concluded, was among the most effective means of providing protection and preventing further conflict. Questions of how refugee education mitigated or alternately facilitated conflict were not new. Throughout the 1990s in Kakuma, community services officers had documented how the SPLA had mobilized Sudanese youth in the camp and how youth would leave Kakuma to go and fight with the SPLA in Sudan when the school term ended and return the day the new term began. In Dadaab, initiatives to enroll girls in school, and specific programs such as UNHCR’s Women Victims against Violence Project, had been implemented to help prevent violence that was known to disproportionately impact women and girls. However, when framed within wider contexts of the compounding challenges of protracted refugee situations, members of UNHCR’s senior management team paid increasing attention to issues of conflict and violence as well as military recruitment of youth in the camps.

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For Suad, the Somali student in Kakuma who competed with her brothers to be number one in the class, education was protective in precisely the ways community services and education officers endeavored to demonstrate. Suad recalled that In 2004, I was going to finish number one in my class and had been offered a scholarship to attend secondary at a boarding school outside of the camp. But my Dad wanted me to marry the next year when I turned fourteen. It was my mom who saved me. She said let her finish her studies. Basically, I would be forced to marry or I could do well in school. So I promised my Dad—I said please give me this chance. I promise I will work hard and pay the dowry you would get. My Dad accepted this.28

The NGO Jesuit Refugee Services had awarded Suad, along with a handful of other girls in Kakuma, scholarships to attend boarding schools across Kenya. However, by 2004, girls would be able to attend boarding school in the camp. In October 2002, the actress Angelina Jolie, UNHCR’s Goodwill Ambassador, had visited Kakuma and reported being overcome by the number of out-ofschool girls she saw and interviewed. “On this trip, my concern has become the plight of refugee women and particularly girls. In the camp, thousands of girls are out of school because of both early and forced marriage,” she stated in a press release.29 Shortly afterwards, Jolie contributed $200,000 to UNHCR’s operations in Kakuma, earmarking $50,000 of her donation to build a boarding school for “vulnerable” girls in the camp.30 By the spring of 2003, construction had commenced on “Angelina Jolie Primary Boarding School.” A total of 150 girls were enrolled when the school opened the following year.31 “It was a protection center—a boarding school for those girls who were facing female genital mutilation or early marriage or who had been orphaned,” the head teacher of Angelina Jolie said. “LWF had started doing child protection in addition to being the implementing partner for education, so their education officer and child protection officer worked together to identify children to place in the school.”32

2004–5: Enrollment Efforts, Overcrowding In 2004, Windle Trust Kenya had also started distributing sanitary pads to girls. Community service officers had found that many girls without access

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to these resources remained at home during their monthly periods. Similar outreach efforts were undertaken in Dadaab to help facilitate girls’ increased enrollment and attendance in school. In both camps, girls were outnumbered by boys five to one in primary school and ten to one in secondary school. By early 2005, enrollment figures in Dadaab’s primary schools, for girls as well as boys, had significantly improved compared to previous years. “We had a primary supervisor for education employed by CARE that year who would just walk through the blocks and recruit students,” said Al Nuur, who had been one of the first teachers in Dadaab and was by then a head teacher at a primary school in Ifo. “He would talk to parents, talk to children who were out of school when classes were in session. He was a one-man campaign to get kids in school. And it worked. All schools were crowded—150 learners to one teacher.”33 In 2005, FilmAid, an NGO that uses film to disseminate key informational messages to refugees and provide psychological relief through screening Hollywood movies or cartoons, also helped boost enrollment in Dadaab camp schools through a school awareness raising campaign. FilmAid had operated in Kakuma since 2001 and now offered nightly screenings in both camps. “Everyone from the community came out to watch,” a former student said. “They would start setting up the screen on the truck just before sunset and people would gather and gather. Didn’t matter whether it was short documentary films with informational messages or shows intended for children.”34 By mid-2005, almost 40 percent of school-aged children in Dadaab were enrolled in school,35 an improvement of about 10 percent from the preceding year. However, UNHCR did not build any additional classrooms to accommodate increased enrollment or hire any additional teachers. Overcrowding was a sticking point for refugee teachers, who had already renewed discussions about striking to increase their incentive wages. Martin, who by 2005 had been promoted to head teacher of Unity Primary School in Dagahaley, said that “teachers felt proud of the work they were doing and how so many refugee families were bringing their kids to school, but they said we should be paid to do this job.” He further explained that “the Education Coordinator for CARE came to one of the meetings teachers had organized and said to the crowd ‘I hear you so called teachers think you deserve higher

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pay.’ The strike which, hadn’t been certain, began right then, lasting for two weeks until wages were increased by 500 shillings. To suggest we weren’t real teachers. People felt belittled.”36 Parents also decided to stage protests outside of UNHCR and CARE’s field compounds in Dadaab’s sub-camps. “Parents and even children really took the lead,” a former teacher said. “They would hold signs that read ‘Donimeyno,’ which is Somali for ‘we don’t agree.’”37 Later that year, in the hopes of further increasing female enrollment and also reducing the student-to-teacher ratio, CARE attempted to open an allgirls primary school in Ifo. “Parents were very opposed,” Martin said. “They had tried telling CARE and UNHCR ‘no,’ but after a couple of days they just went to the school and took all of the girls home. They said ‘you will serve our students wherever they are with the boys. This is our culture and you don’t do things special for the girls.’”38 A former teacher explained further that “in some ways, the status of girls and women was changing in the camp. Parents were more willing to allow girls to go to school, but observance of Islamic traditions dictated that girls shouldn’t really be without boys in public—and schools were public.”39 In contrast, agencies’ efforts to increase girls’ access to schools in Kakuma were widely supported by refugees of different national and tribal groups. LWF and other NGOs such as Windle Trust had also focused on expanding girls’ enrollment in camp schools, particularly helping girls matriculate to secondary school, and had achieved measured, incremental improvements. A teacher said that “when Angelina Jolie opened, there was a general excitement throughout the camp about what the school represented—a chance for girls to get an education but especially some of the most vulnerable girls. Boys sometimes talked about wanting their own school, but they didn’t really seem to begrudge girls the opportunity.”40

2005-2007: Secondary School Enrollment and National Exams Beginning in late 2005, LWF and CARE also initiated activities to raise students’ exam scores on the KCPE and KCSE. Since students had begun taking the KCPE in 1998, passage rates and average scores across both camps had generally remained the same each year. In 2005 only 9 students in Kakuma,

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out of 284 who took the exam, earned marks on the KCSE that qualified them to attend college or university.41 Out of those 284 students, 26 girls took the exam and only 1 passed.42 In Dadaab, 7 students out of 230 who took the exam passed; none were girls.43 “Since students had first been sitting for the exams, you either performed or you dropped out—nobody really paid attention,” a former teacher said.44 Prior to the start of the 2006 school year, both LWF and CARE hired Kenyan national teachers, deploying one or two in each of the camps’ primary or secondary schools to teach the upper level classes and improve the quality of instruction. In addition, in both camps as a means to try and further increase girls’ matriculation to secondary school, the minimum required KCPE score was set to 180, while for boys the score remained 250. Implementing partners’ efforts yielded improvements to students’ KCPE scores in Dadaab and Kakuma. For the 2007 school year, passage rates rose from 13 to over 25 percent in Dadaab and from 20 to over 30 percent in Kakuma. About 440 students, 80 of them girls, enrolled in Kakuma Secondary School, where UNHCR had built additional classrooms and hired several more teachers to accommodate the increased number of students.45 In contrast, once all 360 places had been filled in Dadaab’s secondary schools, UNHCR and CARE changed the minimum qualifying score from 250 to 260 for boys; the minimum KCPE score of 180 required for girls remained unchanged. “That excluded about sixty learners,” Martin said. “They were really devastated, though a number took Grade 8 again the following year and sat for the KCPE again to try and earn a higher score so they could go to secondary.”46 In 2007 when KCPE exam scores were returned to Dadaab’s students, more than 400 had scored over 260.47 Still, each secondary school maintained an enrollment capacity of 120. Martin said that “CARE announced they would change the minimum score from 260 to 265. So elders from the communities met and agreed there was a need for additional secondary schools for those who had earned a score of 250, and they established community secondary schools.” Refugees reached an agreement with UNHCR and CARE that the community secondary schools would be run out of two or three classrooms at a primary school in each sub-camp. “Communities hired teachers and paid their salaries and also made classroom and school repairs. Each school had about sixty students enrolled. They were managed as well, if not better, than the UNHCR secondary schools.”48

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2006: Rapid Education Response and Priority Operation in Dadaab Beginning in 2006, a series of emergencies resulted in increased funding for education programming in Dadaab. In the first months of that year, an average of 250 Somali refugees crossed the Kenya border each day, fleeing intensifying conflict in south and central Somalia.49 Similar to influxes in the early 1990s, the majority of incoming refugees were women and girls; more than half were under the age of 18.50 The arrival of approximately 25,000 refugees by September of that year strained the capacity of UNHCR and CARE to provide emergency shelter or other basic services.51 Issues with service delivery were compounded two months later when heavy rains flooded Ifo and Dagahaley sub-camps.52 More than 12,000 refugees lost their mud-brick shelters to floods, and UNHCR’s main supply route from the town of Garissa to Dadaab was cut off when the road was subsumed underwater.53 “The situation was dire,” a program officer said. “There were thousands of newly arrived refugees as well as thousands of established refugees who had just lost their homes, and no way to get supplies in.”54 The UNHCR air dropped more than 200 tons of relief supplies and temporarily relocated 10,000 refugees to higher ground at a new sub-camp named Ifo 2, located between Ifo and Dagahaley.55 Despite the floods, “we still took the KCPE and KCSE exams scheduled for late November,” a former student said. “Schools closed for one week and some learning materials were swept away. But then we came back—we had lessons in water and we did our exams in water.”56 Prior to the floods, Dadaab was already under consideration for selection as a “priority operation” by a task force composed of representatives from several different UNHCR Bureaus, including the Africa and East Africa Regional Bureaus. The newly hired senior education officer had assembled the task force. “We looked at school enrollment rates, number of refugees residing in the camp, how long the camps had been there, and opportunities for durable solutions,”57 said a former UNHCR education officer. The same officer added that

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The idea in identifying priority operations was to help develop a strategy for working with education because there were some guidelines, but there wasn’t a strategy. While previous efforts undertaken to prioritize refugee education had targeted the entire sector, this approach prioritized particular camps as sites where the education sector would be given priority. Rather than spreading resources thinly, it was thought this would be a way to have a bigger impact in a limited number of camps to show what increased funding and resources could do for education.58

Priority operations, including Dadaab, received additional funding for education as well as seconded NRC education officers, deployed on a rotating basis to the camps for a period of three to six months. Kakuma was not selected as a priority operation. A former education officer said that “in part, the ‘emergency’ in Dadaab resulted in the camp’s selection. Overall, Dadaab’s figures were worse than Kakuma’s in terms of enrollment and exam scores—so that’s where focus was directed.”59 In Dadaab, also as part of the operation’s priority status, NRC initiated the Youth Education Pack (YEP) for the 2009 fall term, enrolling 150 students in a one-year vocational and life skills training program.60 YEP was specifically designed to target out-of-school youth and prepare them to return to formal schooling or help them to acquire skills, like mechanics and carpentry, that would allow them to start their own small business or gain employment in the camp. “There were no vocational programs in the camp before YEP,” Martin remarked. “Though it was slow to catch-on. The Somalis in the camp are generally entrepreneurial and have great knowledge of how to start and manage their own businesses. There were even questions raised of why this program was needed.”61

2007: The Education Cluster The newly established Education Cluster also chose Kenya as a rollout country to pilot their operations. The Interagency Standing Committee, a forum for coordination, policy development, and decision-making between UN agencies and INGOs, had initiated the so-called Cluster Approach to humanitarian responses in 2005.62 The Cluster Approach aimed to strengthen partnerships between UN agencies and INGOs and improve field-level coordination in

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specific sectors by placing responsibility for leadership and coordination of these issues with a specific operational agency. Education was not included in the first round of Clusters. However, a former UNHCR education officer said that “INEE had strong backing from its institutional members—Save the Children, UNICEF, IRC and they said this is outrageous—there must be an education cluster. It took a year, but in November 2006 an education cluster was established with UNICEF and Save the Children as joint leaders.”63 By early 2007, the Education Cluster was composed of an advisory group that included UNESCO, the World Food Program, UNHCR, the IRC, ChildFund International, and INEE’s Secretariat. As one of its first activities, the Cluster undertook a mapping exercise designed to identify gaps and capacities in education preparedness and response at global and country levels.64 They found that lack of funding was a primary concern and that the Education Cluster was one of the least funded Clusters across multiple countries and humanitarian appeals. An education officer said that “UNHCR was entering year two of a ‘financial crisis’ and the same old arguments were coming up—so you want us to cut food and water so kids can go to school. The budget for education was relatively small compared to many other sectors, but at the mention of any crisis it was more exposed than other sectors.”65 As a means of minimizing an anticipated budget shortfall, UNHCR’s education unit, in coordination with the fundraising unit, began actively fundraising among private sector donors.

2007–9: Education Strategy, Corporation Funding in Dadaab Throughout this time, UNHCR also drafted and published its first Education Strategy.66 The three-year strategy, covering years 2007 to 2009, took as its overall goal a 30 percent increase—10 percent per year—in school enrollment rates across all camps throughout the world.67 This overall goal aimed to address an enrollment gap identified in a 2005 report, which found that at least one-third of refugee children and adolescents in camps were out of school.68 “While there had been several revised guidelines for education, the most recent issued in 2003, there had never been an overall plan or strategy with specifically stated objectives, benchmarks, and timelines,” remarked a former UNHCR education officer.69 The 2007–09 Education Strategy explicitly aligned with UNHCR’s

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Agenda for Protection,70 Overall Strategic Objectives,71 Global Priority Issues for Children,72 as well as EFA and Millennium Development Goals, and identified a number of challenges, including lack of trained teachers, overcrowded classrooms, and poor construction and maintenance of school buildings.73 Shortly after the launch of the 2007–09 Strategy, Nike Inc. and Microsoft entered a partnership arrangement with the UNHCR and launched the ninemillion campaign through the website ninemillion.org, to “give more than 9 million children living in refugee camps better access to education, sport, and technology.”74 The ninemillion campaign was already active in Venezuela, Panama, and other countries, however in partnering with UNHCR, Nike Inc. endeavored to “build UNHCR’s capacity to increase access to quality protective services through education and sports for refugee children with a special emphasis on girls, by increasing direct investment and product donations as well as strengthening the capacity of community organizations to design, implement, and monitor children’s programming.”75 Nike also donated approximately $500,000 to education programming in Dadaab.76 That same year, Microsoft built an “Information Technology Center” in Ifo with thirty-six computers that was intended to “provide basic education for school children and IT skills training to older refugees.”77 In 2009, the Nike grant was utilized to construct approximately forty additional classrooms and hire and fund the incentive wages of approximately sixty refugee teachers in schools throughout Dadaab’s three sub-camps, and to incorporate into UNHCR’s formal education program the three community secondary schools established by refugees in 2007.78 A former UNHCR education officer said that “through Nike’s ninemillion.org website, anyone could go and make donations to priority countries or operations, so individual donations were also reaching operations like Dadaab. There was a spiral upwards—more strategies with fundraising. Also the NRC secondments increased operations. So things started to get better.”79

2007–8: Repatriation from and Relocation to Kakuma This three-year period was markedly different in Kakuma. Beginning in late 2007, UNHCR undertook a large-scale voluntary repatriation operation to Sudan for the 70,000 refugees residing in the camp.80 The Second

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Sudanese Civil War had formally ended in January 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.81 The agreement specified broad principles of governance and power-sharing between the SPLA and the government in Khartoum and also formally established 2011 as the year in which a referendum would be held that would determine whether the region of southern Sudan would remain part of Sudan or gain its independence.82 The repatriation operation had begun slowly with several hundred refugees electing to return to Sudan in 2005 and 2006. However, in 2007 the UNHCR initiated information campaigns for refugees detailing the repatriation process and providing security updates from southern Sudan. By June of that year, several hundred refugees per month were returning to Sudan from Kakuma, transported by UNHCR busses and planes. Samuel, who had received a scholarship in 2004 to study social administration at Makarare University in Uganda, had returned to Sudan in 2006. “I was actually based in Lokichoggio, but worked for a development NGO as a field coordinator and was frequently in the field supervising programs in southern Sudan,” he said.83 That Samuel was able to leave the camp to pursue post-secondary education was rare but not prohibited by the Government of Kenya. The World University Service of Canada (WUSC) had since 2003 provided between five and ten scholarships per camp each year for refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma to formally resettle to Canada and acquire Canadian citizenship while pursuing a bachelor’s degree at a Canadian university.84 The students with the highest KCSE scores were selected. For those who did not receive a WUSC scholarship but still scored high enough on their KCSE exams to attend college or university, they were only able to do so through remittances from wealthy family members outside of the camp or through private, informal philanthropic arrangements. Volunteers affiliated with church groups or NGOs visiting the camp for several weeks had, on occasion, sponsored the continued studies of refugees whom they met during their trip. Samuel had been one of them. However, unlike the WUSC students whose scholarships came with formal resettlement, Kenya’s de facto encampment policies still applied to privately sponsored refugee students; upon completion of their bachelors’ degrees, they were not able to locally integrate to Kenya or other countries where they studied. The majority returned to the camps and took up incentive jobs—their degrees qualified them for positions as secondary

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school teachers or head teachers at one of the camps’ primary schools, where they earned the same incentive wages as other teachers. However, many, like Samuel, decided to repatriate and utilized their degrees to gain employment, at full salary, often with humanitarian or development NGOs in Sudan or Somalia. By early 2008, the UNHCR expanded its repatriation operation in Kakuma; several thousand Sudanese refugees were leaving each month for southern Sudan, and the UNHCR began closing camp schools. “For a short time, there were plenty of desks, textbooks, maybe twenty or thirty learners in a class,” a former teacher said.85 By the end of the summer, approximately 40,000 refugees remained in Kakuma, including 5,000 Sudanese who chose to forego voluntary repatriation.86 The same teacher said that “I had spoken with family in Sudan and heard the situation in our region was not good, so I decided to stay. However, UNHCR passed a policy for the 2008 fall term that Sudanese could no longer be employed as teachers or incentive workers, so for a time I was not working.”87 The UNHCR also implemented a policy enacted for the Sudanese students who had not left the camp. Those who had sat for the KCPE in November 2008 were unable to enroll in secondary school, regardless of whether or not they had earned a qualifying score. In addition, those in grade 8 were not allowed to sit for the KCPE that year. Approximately 400 of the 460 students who passed the KCPE exam in 2008 were Sudanese; none were eligible to matriculate to Kakuma Secondary.88 A former student said that “if you were Sudanese in primary or upper secondary, you could stay on but others really struggled. For me, I would have gone to secondary but instead was idle the whole year, re-reading my Grade 8 books to pass the time.”89 The UNHCR also significantly reduced or cut entirely several implementing partners’ budgets. A former UNHCR program officer remarked that “UNHCR was directing almost all funds to the repatriation operation and only providing services for the other nationalities in the camp. Some agencies pulled out, others consolidated or reduced their activities.”90 By the end of 2009, only eight primary schools and one secondary school remained open in the camp. However, at the same time, several thousand Congolese fleeing renewed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had arrived in Kakuma, and the UNHCR was in the processing of transferring more than 12,000 Somali

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refugees from Dadaab.91 “When the Somalis came, they comprised more than half of the population at Don Bosco,” the head teacher said. “However, many didn’t finish the full course of studies. They either got jobs with family businesses or started their own business and figured it out as they went along.”92 Somali refugees quickly established businesses in the camp. Car taxis driven by Somali refugees now competed with motorbike taxis driven by Sudanese and Congolese, and Somali restaurants opened next to Ethiopian restaurants. Somalis strung between homes electrical wires fed by generators that provided cable TV; for a small fee, refugees could pay to “get on the grid.” In May 2007, several Somali refugees also established Kismayo Primary, a private primary school. “The Somalis bought the school that had been closed down after the Sudanese repatriation from the UNHCR for a small fee. Except for the religious teachers who were Somali, all the teachers were Kenyan nationals,” a Congolese refugee teacher said. “You didn’t have to be Somali to attend though it was for the most part only Somalis who could afford to pay the school fees— 500 Ksh per month that paid the full salaries of the Kenyan teachers. It was not easy, but I managed to send my children. It was the best primary school in the camp.”93 In 2008, LWF hired several Congolese refugee teachers. “This was a big step up,” a former teacher said. “Almost all of those hired as teachers had completed or were attending university in the Congo before they came.”94 That spring, LWF also contracted with Kenya’s Musinde Muliro University, a forprofit private university, to provide a distance teaching certification course for refugee teachers. A former program officer said that “by that time, all primary school teachers had completed secondary school either in the camp or in their home country so they could qualify for the Musinde Muliro certificate. The lecturer would come from the university and teach in the evenings and during breaks between terms.”95 Suad was one of the teachers enrolled in the course. She recalled that “when I returned to Kakuma after completing secondary, I was hired to teach in my old school, Horseed Primary. I saw there were still very few girls in the school, so I would go into the community and talk with the parents. They would say their daughters could come if they were in my classroom or with another female teacher.” In the spring of that year, Windle Trust had also begun offering supplemental remedial classes for girls on the weekends in primary schools throughout the camp. “Little by little parents

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were saying ok and more and more girls wanted to come,” Suad said. “We really tried to encourage them to set their sights on the KCPE and then secondary and even beyond.”96

2009: Continued Influx and Dadaab Education Strategy By the spring of 2009, funds for all operations in Dadaab were precariously low. Since the beginning of the year, 20,000 Somalis had been settled in Ifo, Dagahaley, or Hagadera.97 The three sub-camps were already collectively sheltering more than 260,000 refugees. UNHCR staff expected that several thousand more would arrive in the coming months due to intensifying conflict in the Somali capital of Mogadishu and its surrounding regions and prolonged drought throughout the entire country.98 By the end of the summer, an additional 30,000 Somalis were registered at a rate of 6400 refugees per month.99 The newly arrived school-aged refugees were integrated into existing schools. Many adopted a split-shift system to accommodate populations that doubled, and in some cases tripled. “We held classes from 8 to 11 for the first ninety or so learners and then from 12:30 to 3:30 for the next ninety learners,” a former teacher said. “It was especially difficult in the lower primary classes because many children were coming to school for the first time. Some were older but regardless of age they started there.”100 The influx made it challenging to achieve many of the goals set in Dadaab’s 2009–11 Education Sector Strategy.101 As a follow-up to UNHCR’s 2007–09 Education Strategy, CARE, in consultation with PTAs, community leaders, and teachers, identified six camp-specific strategic objectives. These included targeted increases in the capacity of secondary schools, improvement in the quantity, quality, and motivation of teachers, increases in girls’ access to education as well as vocational training and scholarship opportunities, and decreases to the number of out-of-school youth.102 To realize the 2009 goals, the Strategy called for an additional 237 teachers, 5500 textbooks, 126 classroom renovations, and US$79,000,000 beyond the approved education budget.103 The call for increased human and financial resources went unanswered, as more Somali refugees continued to arrive. By the end of the year, more than 300,000 resided in Dadaab.104 Heavy rains and then flooding accompanied

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their arrival, replacing the drought, which had spurred refugees to seek asylum in Dadaab throughout the preceding year. As staff with the UNHCR and its implementing partners hastily built flood walls from sandbags, relocated an additional 10,000 refugees from Dadaab to Kakuma, and continued registering new arrivals, classes continued much as they always had.

2010: New Global Education Strategy, New Implementing Partners in Dadaab For UNHCR’s education unit, 2010 began with the launch of a new 2010–12 Education Strategy.105 Reports indicated that little progress had been made in meeting UNHCR’s 2007–09 Education Strategy’s overall goal of a 30 percent increase in school enrollment by 2009. At the end of that year, more than one-third of primary school-aged children and two-thirds of secondary school-aged youth remained out of school across camps throughout the world.106 The 2010–12 Education Strategy set a more modest target of a 10 percent enrollment increase by the end of 2012, and focused on a set of streamlined objectives, including increased access and enrollment, improved quality, and enhanced protection.107 “While enrollment figures had remained more or less static for years despite the strategy, there was reason to be cautiously optimistic,” remarked a UNHCR program officer.108 Between 2007 and 2009, the global education budget had shown small improvements compared to previous years.109 “Though education was still one of the least funded sectors overall, funding for education was proportionately higher than it had ever been. It was something to build on,” the same officer said.110 At the start of the 2010 school year, Windle Trust replaced CARE as the implementing partner for secondary education in Dadaab. A program officer explained that “CARE was one of the largest implementing partners in the camp—they were overwhelmed by their involvement in almost every activity and overstretched with the influx. So UNHCR decided Windle Trust would assume responsibility for secondary education.”111 By the fall of that year, Windle Trust had formally registered all six secondary schools with the Kenyan Ministry of Education. Martin, who had recently been hired by CARE as a quality assurance officer for Ifo’s schools, said that “Windle had a good working relationship with the Ministry. By getting the schools registered, all could serve as exam centers

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for the KCSE and the Ministry would also deploy quality assurance officers to help with monitoring and evaluation.”112 Teachers welcomed the additional assistance, as they had recently been tasked with completing multiple forms tracking weekly and monthly enrollment, attendance, number of books, number of desks, and several other metrics as part of the new Education Management Information System (EMIS) that UNHCR had implemented in Dadaab. “EMIS was implemented first in the priority operations to help identify trends and changes and determine where the education programs were relative to the goals of the [2010–12] Education Strategy,” a UNHCR program officer explained. However, many teachers felt encumbered by the new reporting requirements. “The forms took a long time to fill out and were yet another thing to do at the end of the day,” a former teacher said.113 Amidst changes to implementing partner arrangements and the introduction of the new information management system, the Borderless Higher Education for Refugees (BHER) program was established in Dadaab. The outcome of a series of workshops attended by representatives from a number of different universities, UN agencies, and INGOs, BHER was structured as a two-year program that combined in-person and online courses leading to accredited diplomas in teaching as well as community health, development, business, and natural sciences.114 Courses would be taught at a newly constructed learning center in Dadaab Town, a small outpost adjacent to the camp, and funded by a grant from the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development. “Several of the secondary school teachers employed by Windle Trust were amongst the first to enroll in the program,” Martin said. “Opportunities for scholarships were very limited but there was room for a couple hundred students through BHER and those participating were visible in the community. For primary and secondary school students, it really gave them something to work for.”115

2010–11: Education as a Priority Program, Education and Extremism in Dadaab There were also several changes underway at UNHCR Headquarters. Just before the end of the year, the Unit was moved from the Operational Solutions and Transitions Section to the Division of International Protection. A former

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UNHCR program officer said that “there had been maneuvering within the UNHCR to try and put education higher on the agenda of global policy priorities. And the thought was the only way this could be done was to make education less about service delivery and more about protection so that it would directly align with UNHCR’s core mandate.”116 The move resulted in a substantial increase in education funding that extended to the country level. In Kenya, UNHCR’s 2010 budget for Dadaab and Kakuma’s education programs had been US$2.4 million;117 the 2011 education budget was increased to US$4.1 million,118 an increase of nearly 70 percent. This new boon in funding was still not enough to keep pace with the influx of refugees in Dadaab. By April 2011, more than 30,000 Somalis had arrived to the camp and found that it was already holding 360,000 refugees— four times its maximum capacity.119 With nowhere to go in or outside of the camp, the newly arrived Somalis resided in temporary shelters surrounding Ifo, Dagahaley, and Hagadera. More than 1000 refugees continued arriving daily.120 Asylum-seekers fled widespread violence carried out by Al Shabaab.121 A militant Islamist organization affiliated with Al Queda, Al Shabaab sought to control crop-producing regions in central and southern Somalia as well as the capital of Mogadishu.122 Asylum-seekers also fled famine, which in the preceding year had spread throughout these regions—a direct outcome of Al Shabaab’s expulsion in early 2011 of humanitarian agencies that had been providing food and health aid in response to the ongoing drought.123 The majority of children arrived to Dadaab suffering from acute malnutrition.124 As with previous influxes, UNHCR and its implementing partners in Dadaab were strained beyond their capacity to respond to refugees’ emergent needs. Through coordination efforts initiated by the Education Cluster, UNHCR, UNICEF, and the World Food Program signed a memorandum of understanding to manage the emergency situation in the camp.125 The World Food Program set up temporary food distribution centers near the new settlements and rapidly scaled up its food distribution program. FilmAid offered daily screenings of films that provided information regarding registration and basic services available to refugees, including education. UNICEF set up seven temporary tent schools that offered lower primary classes to more than 10,000 children. However, tens of thousands more remained out of school. “The best recruiting place for Al Shabaab to go were

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the streets where all of the out of school kids passed time during school hours,” a UNICEF program officer said.126 By September, Kambioos was established as a fifth sub-camp in Dadaab and the UNHCR relocated 60,000 refugees temporarily sheltered outside of the camps’ formal boundaries to Kambioos and Ifo 2.127 These efforts to stabilize life in the camp were further challenged by a sharp rise in attacks targeting humanitarian staff. In October, in Ifo 2, gunmen kidnapped two field staff working for MSF by overtaking their vehicle.128 The gunmen shot the driver and forced him from the car before driving the MSF vehicle and two field staff across the Kenya-Somalia border to the town of Kismayo. Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for the kidnapping, as well as a bomb attack in Ifo, and a landmine explosion in Hagadera in December of that year that killed two Kenyan policemen.129 The Government of Kenya responded by detaching additional police to the camp, while the UNHCR and its implementing partners suspended all nonlifesaving operations.130 “The Kenyan national teachers stopped coming for one month,” Al Nuur said. “Schools still remained open in the hands of incentive teachers. We were determined not to stop classes even though Al Shabaab had basically infiltrated the camp and was targeting community leaders, a lot of them teachers, who they thought were working with the UNHCR and the police.”131 Several new implementing partners had just begun operations. These included the African Development and Emergency Organization (ADEO) in Ifo and Ifo 2 and LWF in Hagadera and Kambioos, both of which had replaced CARE as the implementing partner for primary education in those sub-camps. “Nobody really talked about the change when it happened,” Martin said. “However, CARE was again really stretched during the emergency and it was too big of a job for just one agency. In fact, that same change was made in several sectors.”132 A UNHCR program officer said that “there was a lot of emergency funding directed to Dadaab in 2011, which meant that UNHCR could partner with more agencies. Some took over or assisted with ongoing programs, others started new programs. For almost twenty years it had basically been UNCHR and CARE but by the end of the year there were thirty implementing partners in the camp.”133 It was not clear if or how these new implementing partner arrangements would make substantive changes to persistent challenges in Dadaab’s education programs.

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2011–12: Global Challenges to Refugee Education The magnitude of those challenges was brought into sharp focus just before the start of the new year with the publication of Refugee Education: A Global Review.134 Commissioned by the Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit at the UNHCR, the figures included in the comprehensive report “made clear that the UNHCR was not upholding its mandate to protect children,” a UNHCR program officer remarked.135 The Review detailed that across ninety-two camps throughout the world, approximately one-quarter of primary schoolaged children and two-thirds of secondary school-aged youth remained out of school.136 In addition, only 38 percent of requests for education funding were met each year and globally there were only two education officer positions.137 Prior to publication, the report had been presented at UNHCR’s annual Executive Committee meetings, attended by senior officers across all divisions as well as well the High Commissioner. However, a program officer said that Just before the presentation was made, there was a lot of unease expressed by the High Commissioner regarding the critical nature of the report. But a particularly influential officer in the Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit who was a big proponent of education struck a deal that the publication of the report would be delayed by one month and the presentation would go on—basically to slightly lessen the impact so the presentation and publication were not happening at the same time.138

The newly appointed senior education officer was among those attending the Executive Committee meeting when the report was presented. A UNHCR program officer said that “the new Officer had a vision, had been in the field of education with UNICEF for a number of years, and was very clear about the future direction the Education Unit would take. And now there was a report that could provide all of the evidence that was needed to push things forward.”139 The development of a new 2012–16 Global Education Strategy140 was quickly undertaken. “There were expectations as well as support from many at headquarters that the strategy be more than lofty goals,” remarked a program officer. “So the strategy addressed point by point issues that were raised in the report and provided mechanisms for achieving targeted goals.”141 These mechanisms included:

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1. Developing or strengthening partnerships with Ministries of Education in host states as well as strengthening collaboration with UNICEF; 2. Contracting with implementing partners that have proven experience with education service delivery and management; 3. Placing UNHCR staff with education expertise in Community Services and Program positions in regional offices and in operations with large education programs; 4. Implementing Education Management Information Systems in all camps; and 5. Incorporating information and communication technology to expand access to education, particularly tertiary and higher education.142 It would later be stated that the Global Education Strategy was a radical shift in UNHCR’s approach to education, one that for the first time acknowledged and sought to address the long-term nature of refugees’ exile through including refugees in national education systems, rather than isolating them in parallel systems in camps.

2012: Impacts of the 2012–16 Strategy in Dadaab and Kakuma That there was a significant increase in UNHCR’s global education budget for 2012 indicated the degree of support for education at UNHCR Headquarters. In Kenya, UNHCR’s education budget was approximately US$11.5 million, twice as much as the preceding year.143 In Dadaab and Kakuma, newly appointed UNHCR education officers in each sub-office worked with the implementing partners for education to develop multi-year education strategies specific to each camp. In Dadaab, increased funding was utilized to convert semipermanent can schools to permanent school buildings and to build several new schools in Ifo 2 and Kambioos. Painted murals proclaiming the importance of education adorned newly constructed exterior walls and were also hung inside classrooms. Phrases included, “Education is our only way out of poverty,” “Education sets every individual free. Embrace it,” and “If you wish to harvest peace, unity, democracy, and development, plant education.” UNHCR also utilized additional funds in Dadaab to increase incentive wages for refugee teachers to 10,000 Ksh and provide additional pre- and

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in-service teacher training and certification through a partnership arrangement with for-profit Mt. Kenya University. In Kakuma, LWF hired several additional Kenyan national teachers, provided funds for a computer lab and training center at Don Bosco, and increased incentive wages from 4750 to 5000 Ksh. “Many teachers were upset that their wages were half of what teachers were being paid in Dadaab,” remarked an education officer. “But even though the work was the same, the context between the two camps was different.”144 These differences included years of increased funding directed to Dadaab as a result of the camps’ status as a “priority operation,” as well as a far greater number of campaigns and strikes organized by teachers and PTAs that had incrementally increased teachers’ incentive wages. While “emergencies” facilitated increased education funding to Dadaab when compared to Kakuma, their lasting impact also impeded the development of the camp’s education programming. In 2012, there were twenty-two primary and six secondary schools across the camp.145 A total of 43 percent of primary school-aged children were enrolled in school while the enrollment rate at secondary schools was 12 percent of those eligible.146 However, of the 60 percent of primary school children out of school in Dadaab, 70 percent were girls.147 Passage rates on the KCSE exam remained less than 10 percent.148 The average KCPE score had risen to 240, though there still remained a considerable gap between girls’ average marks and passage rates. On the KCPE, girls averaged 170 and 10 percent who sat for the exam passed. That year, only two girls passed the KCSE.149

2012: Refugees on the Frontline of Service Delivery in Dadaab By the summer of 2012, though the emergency situation had stabilized in Dadaab, security problems persisted for refugees and humanitarian aid workers. The UNHCR and its implementing partners limited the number of staff deployed to the sub-camps each day and mandated field staff travel with armed security guards in convoys of three or more SUVs. Operations, including the education program, were increasingly managed directly by refugees. Thirty schools across the five sub-camps remained in the hands of refugee teachers, program managers, and quality assurance officers. Yet many

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teachers were still targeted by Al Shabaab. “I was attacked in the school after classes had ended for the day,” Al Nuur said. “Somebody came and wanted to take me out. There were two—one was waiting outside and the other entered. Some teachers tipped me off, so I jumped over the fence and ran.”150 Of the security situation and refugees’ increased responsibilities for management of field operations, Martin explained that “it was difficult. We were tasked with maintaining the structure, with keeping things running. All we could do was keep trying. ADEO did not work out in Ifo and Ifo 2 so they were replaced after just one year by Islamic Relief and that organization had its own challenges, especially in terms of paying teachers.”151 Nevertheless, by the fall of that year, Islamic Relief had marshaled the funds to break ground on a new, two-story primary school in Ifo 2. “They secured outside donor support. Basically, the school was a sign to the community in Ifo 2 that it would be given the same resources and attention as the other sub-camps in Dadaab.”152 Not long after, Al Nuur and his family were transferred to Kakuma for protection. Shortly after Al Nuur arrived in Kakuma, he was appointed as head teacher of Al Nuur Primary School in Kakuma III. “I served for a very short period of time as head teacher at a nearby primary school, but when they were preparing to open this school to accommodate the number of Somali refugees who had been transferred from Dadaab because of the overcrowding, the LWF education officer said ‘here is the school for you.’”153

2012: Returning to Kakuma During this time, thousands of refugees arrived from South Sudan. Established as an independent state following a referendum in January 2011, refugees’ hopes for a peaceful South Sudan were short-lived. The newly elected administration, led by President Salva Kiir, waged a fierce campaign against critics who accused the government of blatant corruption.154 Many had repatriated in 2007 and 2008, but were once again fleeing violence waged by groups that vied for control over territory and contested where the boundaries of the new state had been drawn.155 They returned to a Kakuma that in many respects had changed in the intervening years. Of the camp’s 100,000 residents,156 Somalis accounted for just over half of the total population, while the remaining refugees came

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from ten countries, including Burundi, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.157 Markets had grown, NGOs had come and gone, and several schools that had once been filled beyond capacity with students were closed and in disrepair, overridden with termites and filled with dust and sand. However, much remained the same as lessons carried on in thirteen primary schools and three secondary schools,158 taught by teachers with varying degrees of education and formal training and attended by students who still shared textbooks and when there were none simply copied what the teacher wrote on the blackboard. While KCSE exam scores and passage rates had declined even further since the Sudanese repatriated in 2007,159 improvements continued to be made on KCPE exams for boys as well as girls. A total of 718 students sat for the KCPE exam that year, including 163 girls. The average score was 260 and more than 50 percent of students earned passing marks that qualified them for secondary school.160 For the first time, a female student, from Angelina Jolie Primary Boarding School, earned the highest mark in the camp on the exam, scoring 379.161 In Horseed Primary School where Suad was the newly appointed head teacher, several hundred children, boys and girls, attended classes in newly built classrooms funded by the queen of Qatar, UNHCR’s newest funding partner for education. In the final months of that year, Suad had delegated management responsibilities of Horseed to the deputy head teacher and traveled to Qatar where she helped to announce the Educate a Child Initiative. With a multi-million-dollar grant and multi-year partnership with the UNHCR, the Initiative aimed to enroll 170,000 school-aged refugee children in primary school in camps throughout the world, including Dadaab and Kakuma.162 “Refugee children are forgotten children,” Suad said in her address to the audience. “Yet they deserve an education just as children in Canada, the United States, or Europe.”163

Chapter Summary Between 2003 and 2012, changes to refugee education continued. At UNHCR Headquarters, senior staff succeeded in making education one of the agency’s global policy priorities by moving education to the Division of

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International Protection; doing so resulted in substantial increases in funding for UNHCR’s education programs. In addition, in 2011, UNHCR developed and implemented its first multi-year global education strategy. In Dadaab and Kakuma, UNHCR and implementing partners began to offer higher education and vocational programming. An increasing number of refugees graduated from secondary and even higher education and began working as teachers in the same camp schools where they had previously been students.

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Critical Junctures Given the broad spectrum of events between 1992 and 2012, globally and in Dadaab and Kakuma camps, have there been any significant changes to the challenges of refugee education? Have these changes made any difference to the lived experiences of refugees? Analyzing Dadaab and Kakuma’s education histories for critical junctures offers insight to these questions. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, critical junctures are distinct from incremental change or periods of transition; they are swift moments when individual actors or groups make contingent choices that can establish a new status quo. In this chapter, I identify and analyze six distinct critical junctures in the narratives of the development of Dadaab and Kakuma’s education programs. At each of those moments, refugees or UNHCR staff recognized an opportunity to make changes to UNHCR’s education program and effectively did so, either through public or private advocacy. Different individuals or groups might have made different choices or not taken action at all. Had this been the case, the story in the preceding chapters would be different, as would the lived educational experiences of refugees. The first juncture includes initial decisions over curriculum, language of instruction, and near exclusive emphasis on the provision of primary education made when the two camps were founded in 1992. The second juncture was the piloting of the Peace Education Program in Dadaab and Kakuma in 1998; the third was the founding of INEE in 2000. The fourth critical juncture was the emergency in Dadaab in 2006 and the fifth Dadaab’s 2011 emergency. The final major juncture was the publication of UNHCR’s Refugee Education: A Global Review in 2011, and subsequently UNHCR’s 2012–16 Education Strategy. I consider each critical juncture and then analyze these moments within and comparatively across Dadaab and Kakuma.

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Critical Junctures in Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps 1992: Primary Education, Curriculum, and Language of Instruction Prior to the first World Conference on Education for All in 1990, UNHCR’s policy guidelines for education had focused heavily on post-primary education and outlined selection criteria for awarding scholarships for refugees to attend universities or vocational schools in countries of asylum. When resources were devoted to primary or secondary schooling for refugees, it was often to secure the inclusion of refugees in local schools near refugee settlements. However, EFA emphasized universal access to basic primary education for schoolaged children and over time provided an overarching policy framework for UNHCR’s community services and later education officers who developed and implemented education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma. Other options were considered, including accelerated learning programs and vocational courses; however, the global mandate set forth by EFA enabled staff to secure funding for refugee education, albeit on a limited basis, by providing primary schooling. Yet EFA did not provide a blueprint for the provision or management of education services in the camps nor did UNHCR’s 1992 Guidelines for Education Assistance.1 The Guidelines were suggestive rather than prescriptive; additionally, there were only a handful of individuals at the UNHCR who had experience or expertise in education available to participate in decisions regarding what should be taught, to who, and for how long—though “primary” schooling was widely considered to include grades 1–8. As discussed in Chapter 3, most UNHCR community services officers and other program planners considered the camps to be temporary and approached decisions over curriculum, teacher training, and school construction as such. Refugees in both camps exerted considerable influence in the decisionmaking process regarding what was taught and in what language precisely because there was no blueprint or precedent. In Kakuma, refugees advocated strongly for the Kenyan national curriculum with English as the primary language of instruction, while in Dadaab refugees initially advocated for the Somali curriculum taught in both English and Somali. Refugees’ decisions

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were primarily based on their perceptions of the duration of their exile as well as opportunities for further study or employment. The Sudanese in Kakuma envisioned staying in Kenya for a number of years and hoped to pursue higher education in Kenya or abroad; in contrast, the Somalis thought their stay would be more temporary and expressed less interest in higher education or employment opportunities beyond what was available in Somalia. Once the decision was made to develop and implement primary education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma, community services and education officers as well as refugees were effectively “locked into” that system, despite subsequent challenges. For the first several years of education programming in Kakuma, few refugee teachers were able to teach in English, the primary language of instruction of the Kenyan national curriculum. In addition, until a handful of Kenyan national teachers were hired in the late 1990s, there were no refugee teachers able to provide instruction for Swahili courses. The Somali curriculum in Dadaab, offered until the mid-1990s, allowed students to learn in Somali and Arabic, their primary languages; however, this curriculum did not allow them to earn certification of school achievement through sitting for national exams that qualified them for advanced study. When refugees decided to forego the Somali curriculum in favor of the Kenyan curriculum, they were able to do so with limited resistance from UNHCR and its implementing partner CARE, though students subsequently faced the same challenges with language of instruction as students in Kakuma. While the critical juncture had long passed, refugees in Dadaab demonstrated a considerable degree of agency when they successfully advocated for this change in the curriculum. Demographic and cultural differences between the two camps in part account for refugees’ comparatively expansive and lasting agency in Dadaab. Until the late 1990s, with the arrival of a large number of refugees from East and Central Africa, Kakuma was a “children’s camp.” While Dadaab was largely composed of women and children when it was founded, there were still a significantly greater number of adults in the camp who were active in PTAs and were far more influential in determining the structure and content of what was taught and providing school upkeep. Sudanese adolescents in Kakuma did not have the same ability to collectively mobilize and influence the education programming provided to them.

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Focusing almost exclusively on primary education in both camps resulted in the exclusion from camp schools of thousands of school-aged adolescent refugees. As described in Chapter 3, the consequences of their exclusion included years of idleness, restive behavior in the camps, including riots and the destruction of newly opened food distribution centers in Kakuma, and recruitment into armed groups. Community services and education officers acknowledged that accelerated learning programs and vocational education, in addition to primary education, would have better served the needs of adolescents and helped to curtail violence in the camps. However, with limited exception, such as the Don Bosco vocational program in Kakuma, these officers were tightly bound to the opportunities and constraints afforded by EFA. In sum, in 1992 when Dadaab and Kakuma were founded, EFA and lack of blueprint and precedent as well as a limited number UNHCR staff with a background in education allowed community services officers and refugees the chance to make decisions about curriculum and language of instruction for primary schooling. Once these decisions had been made, they constituted for many years the status quo of education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma.

1998: Peace Education Program In 1998, a peace education officer was contracted to develop and pilot UNHCR’s Peace Education Program in Dadaab and Kakuma to address clashes between refugees in the camp and between refugees and host communities. The officer was an educationist by training and had significant experience with other UN agencies in education service delivery in developing and humanitarian contexts. Because of experience with and knowledge of the UN system, the officer was able to capitalize on a window of opportunity by developing the Peace Education Program, implementing it widely across both camps, and utilizing teacher training from the Peace Education Program to strengthen the quality of teaching in Dadaab and Kakuma. In addition, by providing regular updates about what was happening in camp schools, the officer provided greater oversight to the education program, was able to uncover corruption in textbook distribution with UNHCR’s implementing partner in Kakuma, and advocate in the Nairobi Branch Office for increased attention to the camps’ education programs.

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The success of the Peace Education Program, measured by refugees’ enthusiastic reception and anecdotal reports from the camps that the program was mitigating violence, had unforeseen impacts at UNHCR’s Regional and Branch Offices in Nairobi. Foremost among them was the hiring of a fulltime education officer in 1998 by the director of the regional office—the first education officer in the UNHCR system who was not based at UNHCR HQ. Because the director had wanted to make the peace education officer a fulltime post but could not do so without first hiring an education officer, he leveraged the authority of his position to make a decision that impacted the education sector through the addition of personnel in what had long been a critically understaffed unit. This meant, in effect, that there was an officer to advocate for increased education funding for Dadaab and Kakuma and to supervise and coordinate UNHCR’s implementing partners for education in the camp—a task that had previously been one of many that had fallen to community services officers. Three interrelated events enabled this sweeping, decisive change. First, the Machel Report published in late 1996 had catalyzed increased attention and activity among senior management within the UNHCR toward the education sector, particularly the ways in which education generally and “peace education” specifically could potentially mitigate or protect against the impact of armed conflict on children. Second, the establishment in early 1997 of the “Children’s Trust Fund” made funding available for supplemental education programming, including peace education. The fund was administered by a senior coordinator for refugee children who incidentally saw education as a fundamental right for children and used his position to disperse the funds at his disposal toward UNHCR’s education program and secure additional funds. Finally, the UNHCR’s senior education officer was, like the peace education officer, an educationist and had a background in education policymaking and programming at the UNHCR and other UN Agencies. The senior education officer had initially conceptualized the Peace Education Program in 1996 though he had been unable to secure funding. When the Children’s Trust was established, funding could have gone to any number of other supplemental programs, but the senior education officer successfully directed part of the Trust toward Peace Education. In sum, increased support for education programming at UNHCR HQ and the Nairobi Branch Office allowed senior officers to utilize their

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decision-making authority to direct increased resources to education, including to the Peace Education Program and to hire an East Africa regional education officer. In 1999 the period of expansive maneuverability for individuals in support of education within the UNHCR ended as UNHCR experienced a significant funding shortfall that impacted operations across the organization. However, despite abolishing the senior education officer post and cutting funding for the Peace Education Program, the education officer post in Nairobi remained.

2000: INEE The founding of the Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies in late 2000 was a boon for the status of refugee education in the UNHCR. The agency’s recently appointed senior education officer capitalized on the moment by helping to found INEE and establish or strengthen partnerships between UN agencies, including UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNESCO, and between UNHCR and INGOs. INEE catalyzed a wave of evidence-based research regarding “best practices” and spurred efforts to develop minimum standards for education interventions in emergency contexts, including refugee situations. Officers from different organizations collaborated to produce and publish reports and other academic and practitioner-oriented literature that advanced this agenda, and that raised the profile of education in emergencies with seniorlevel decision-makers at UNHCR and with donor states. The senior education officer who helped to found INEE was an educationist by training and also had extensive experience with education service delivery in developing and humanitarian contexts with other UN agencies and notably with the UNHCR. For the time he held the post, the senior education officer was able to maximize his knowledge and experience of the UNHCR and UN system to direct increased resources to the education unit. By arranging to have initial and later regular INEE consultative meetings at UNHCR HQ in Geneva, education officers from UN agencies and INGOs were frequently brought together; this led to direct action across a range of education programs in refugee camps. Especially beneficial was the relationship between the Norwegian Refugee Council and the UNHCR, which resulted in a secondment arrangement that deployed education officers to Dadaab, Kakuma, and

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other camps. Secondments strengthened the camps’ education programs by providing oversight and helping to coordinate implementing partners, and also by assisting with teacher training. When the senior education officer resigned from the post in mid-2001, his successor did not have the same experience, expertise, or interest in education. As a result, the groundswell of status and support for the education unit at the UNHCR diminished. INEE meetings were no longer held at UNHCR HQ in Geneva, and the focus of practitioners and scholars within the network shifted away from refugee education to education in conflict-affected states. Subsequently, refugee education as a field in its own right with its own particular political and legal contexts and institutional arrangements was subsumed within the growing field of Education in Emergencies.2 Nevertheless, the guidelines, manuals, and concept papers put forward by INEE, along with EFA, guided the development and implementation of UNHCR’s strategies for refugee education throughout the 2000s.

2006: “Emergency” in Dadaab The 2006 “emergency” in Dadaab caused by a large influx of Somali refugees, coupled with flash floods that cut off supply routes into the camp resulted in Dadaab’s selection as a “priority” operation by senior staff at UNHCR HQ. The “emergency” facilitated increased funding and focus on Dadaab that had lasting implications for the camp’s education program long after the emergency ended. Dadaab’s selection as a priority operation immediately resulted in substantial increases in Dadaab’s education budget, the deployment of additional NRC education officers, and the addition of a vocational education program for outof-school youth that was implemented and managed by the NRC. In the longer term, institutional partners including Nike and Microsoft continued directing increased education funding to Dadaab and built new education infrastructure. Nike’s donation of US$500,000 was utilized to construct forty additional classrooms and fund incentive wages for an additional sixty refugee teachers in schools throughout Dadaab’s three subcamps, as well as to incorporate and fund the three community secondary schools into UNHCR’s formal education program. The “Information Technology Center” that Microsoft built in Dadaab offered refugees IT skills

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training, which many utilized to secure incentive jobs with the UNHCR and UNCHR’s implementing partners. Kakuma did not have an “emergency” of the same magnitude and was not selected as a priority operation. At the same time education funding for Dadaab increased, funding for Kakuma’s education program was substantially reduced and redirected to the repatriation operation for the camp’s Sudanese refugees. This resulted in the closure of several schools. In order to facilitate repatriation, UNHCR staff also prevented Sudanese youth who elected to remain in Kakuma from attending upper-level schooling, including 400 out of 460 students who passed the KCPE exam and were prevented from matriculating to Kakuma Secondary. In sharp contrast, the programs initiated in Dadaab due to the camp’s designation as a priority operation helped to expand education access for youth through increased capacity of secondary schools and the establishment of a vocational education program.

2011: “Emergency” in Dadaab The 2011 “emergency” in Dadaab caused by a rapid, mass influx of refugees who fled drought, famine, and widespread violence by Al Shabaab in Somalia brought a large number of NGOs into the camp. UNHCR brought on new implementing partners for education, coordinating and managing five partners, each with different capacities and experience in education service provision for refugees. Some partners utilized “emergency funding” in ways that seldom increased enrollment for refugee children and youth or enhanced the quality of teaching and learning. The construction of the two-story primary school in Ifo 2 is a prime example. Education programming was curtailed when Al Shabaab targeted NGO staff and in response the UNHCR and its implementing partners restricted the number of staff and Kenyan national teachers deployed to the sub-camps. Consequently, schools were managed directly by refugees who were still paid the same incentive wage, despite expansive responsibilities. In addition, in contrast to NGO staff and Kenyan national teachers, the targeting of refugee teachers by Al Shabaab did not lead to measures that enhanced their protection. Instead, many were simply relocated to Kakuma, some of the most experienced and qualified teachers among them, including Al Nuur. After

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the emergency had formally ended, many of the new agencies operating in the camp remained. So too did Al Shabaab. These new implementing partner arrangements and heightened challenges with security have and continue to constitute Dadaab’s status quo.

2011–12: UNHCR’s 2011 Global Review of Refugee Education and 2012–16 Global Education Strategy A handful of senior officers were able to facilitate three events in 2011 and 2012 that impacted UNHCR’s global education policy, and subsequently education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma. First, the senior officer in UNHCR’s Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit who commissioned the Review encouraged and supported the author to critically examine UNCHR’s policies and programs for education and publish her full, uncensored findings. The same senior officer arranged for the author to present these findings at UNHCR’s annual Executive Committee Meeting, attended by UNHCR’s senior management team. The report detailed a large number of out-of-school children across camps throughout the world as well as a dearth of human and financial resources allocated to UNHCR’s education program; the presentation of the report made clear to those in attendance that UNHCR was not upholding its mandate to protect refugee children. Second, at the same time the report was published, UNHCR’s newly appointed senior education officer was undertaking significant reforms to the education unit that, through “internal maneuvering,” had recently been relocated within UNHCR’s International Protection Unit. In terms of UNHCR’s organizational structure, this move directly aligned education with UNHCR’s mandate to protect. The new senior education officer was an educationist by training and had extensive experience developing education policies and programs at UNICEF. The senior education officer and the author of the Global Review subsequently collaborated to develop UNHCR’s 2012–16 Global Education Strategy. The 2012–16 Strategy was a marked departure from UNHCR’s approach to education service provision throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Education for repatriation had long been an explicit purpose of refugee education, based on an implicit assumption that refugees would return to the country of origin;

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programming had focused almost exclusively on primary schooling offered in parallel to schools in host countries. However, the 2012–16 Strategy “assumed a different future,”3 one likely to be long-term displacement in host countries. As such, the 2012–16 Strategy sought to achieve education for inclusion “within national systems where possible and appropriate and as guided by ongoing consultation with refugees.”4 The 2012–16 Strategy also focused on “access to quality education for refugees,” addressed point-by-point issues raised in the report, and prioritized refugees’ access to secondary and higher education.5 To oversee the development and implementation of the 2012–16 Strategy, the senior education officer secured funding for several new junior and mid-level education officers at UNHCR HQ as well as UNHCR regional, branch, and sub-camp offices by establishing several strategic partnerships, including with the Global Partnership for Education and the Education Child Initiative. Consequently, the newly appointed education officers worked with implementing partners in several camps to develop multi-year, camp-specific education strategies. In Dadaab, increased funding was utilized to convert semi-permanent can schools to permanent school buildings, build several new schools, increase incentive wages, and provide additional pre- and in-service teacher training. In Kakuma, LWF hired several Kenyan national teachers, increased incentive wages, and built a computer lab and training center.

Critical Junctures 1992–2012: Comparative Analysis Comparatively analyzing these six critical junctures offers insight regarding how changes have occurred to refugee education. First, senior education officers with expertise in education as well as several years of experience in the education sector at the UNHCR or other UN agencies have recognized opportunities for change and capitalized on them to strengthen UNHCR’s education program, or alternately make their own opportunities to the same effect. The development and implementation of the Peace Education Program in 1998, the founding of INEE in 2000, and the development and implementation of UNHCR’s 2012–16 Education Strategy were the direct result of the efforts of senior education officers who knew how to navigate and act upon UNHCR’s particular institutional arrangements. They propelled

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swift and decisive changes with lasting implications to refugee education at the global and camp level. The addition of junior and mid-level education officer posts was one of the most significant changes. A substantial increase in education officers has resulted in better oversight and coordination with UNHCR’s implementing partners in Dadaab, Kakuma, and other camps throughout the world and more people to advocate for the allocation of continued or increased levels of funding for education at UNHCR’s annual budget meetings. Considered differently, in 1992 there were approximately four UNHCR education officer positions, all of them located at UNHCR HQ. In 2012, there were approximately sixty education officer posts; eight at UNHCR HQ and the remainder at UNHCR Regional and Branch Offices as well as sub-camp offices throughout the world. Previously, community services officers would advocate for refugee education if they happened to have an interest in that sector. However, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, there were few personnel within UNHCR who could or would leverage their position to direct increased resources to refugee education. As a result, education in camps was seldom prioritized and the first-line item in the budget to be reduced or cut altogether during funding crises. Senior education officers with expertise and experience in education have also facilitated the development of conceptual and policy frameworks for refugee education, including several revisions to UNHCR’s Guidelines for Refugee Education in the years 1992, 1995, 1998, 2002, and 2007, and minimum standards for education programming in camps. Each guideline or minimum standard increasingly aligned education with UNHCR’s central mandate to “provide international protection to refugees” and offered benchmarks against which to measure and report on the education services UNHCR provided to refugee children and youth. Second, “emergency” situations in camps have attracted greater resources for all operations, including the education sector. While used to meet rapidly rising needs, increased funding and staffing levels can become the new status quo once the situation stabilizes. This was the case in 2006, when the emergency caused by an influx of refugees and flooding in Dadaab contributed to the camp’s selection as a “priority” education operation. In both the immediate and long-term, this resulted in substantial increases to the education sector budget, the deployment of additional seconded NRC education officers, the

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addition of a vocational education program implemented and managed by the NRC, and increases in education infrastructure with the construction of more classrooms and an IT skills center. This was also the case in 2011 when emergency funding, in response to another mass influx of refugees into Dadaab, resulted in many more NGOs operating in the camp than had previously. UNHCR partnered with five implementing partners for education, one for each sub-camp, where they had for almost twenty years only partnered with CARE to implement education across all five sub-camps. However, while emergencies can facilitate increased funding, personnel, and number of implementing partners for education, these increases have seldom kept pace with the education needs of refugees—neither newly arrived asylum seekers or refugees already residing in the camp. For this latter population, increased emergency funding did not reach their schools, but rather was distributed among a greater number of implementing partners to utilize at their discretion. For newly arrived refugees in Dadaab in 2011, the number of emergency tent schools was significantly less than what was required to accommodate the number of school-aged refugee children and youth. In addition, emergency tent schools offered only lower primary classes, excluding youth from attending. For example, the seven temporary tent schools set up by UNICEF in 2011 that offered lower primary classes enrolled 10,000 students. However, more than 50,000 school-aged children and youth arrived that year. At least 40,000 remained out of school; the majority were youth. Some eventually enrolled in upper primary or secondary school at established camp schools or alternately pursued vocational programming; however, the vast majority did not. In addition, for those children in tent schools, studentto-teacher ratios averaged 350 to 1 and there were no textbooks or other learning materials.6 Third, formal and informal working relationships within and between staff at UN agencies and INGOs with a mutual interest in strengthening education programming also make possible substantive changes to refugee education. In part, UNHCR’s senior education officers have helped to coordinate these relationships. For example, holding INEE meetings at UNHCR HQ that brought together officers from different organizations facilitated collaborative efforts in research and programming for refugee education, such as the publication of “Best Practices” and “Minimum Standards” or arrangements

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for seconded NRC officers. While the UNHCR has increasingly focused on refugee children, who constitute more than 50 percent of the world’s refugees,7 they are still a population whose basic needs, foremost among them education, are often deprioritized. As a former UNHCR education officer remarked, “donors often hesitate to direct funding to education because children don’t die immediately from a lack of it.” Partnership arrangements with agencies that have experience, expertise, and mandates specifically related to children, particularly child protection and children’s rights, can and have helped to address this gap. For example, during the 2011 emergency in Dadaab, UNHCR signed a memorandum of understanding with UNICEF to assist with programming for children in the camp, including education. Finally, refugees can determine or change the content, scope, and scale of education programming—also capitalizing on opportunities for change or making their own opportunities. When UNHCR founded Dadaab and Kakuma in 1992, refugees were the primary decision-makers over matters of curriculum and language of instruction; and a few years later in Dadaab, refugees successfully advocated for the implementation of the Kenyan curriculum. By choosing the national curriculum of Kenya, children and youth have been able to sit for the KCPE and KCSE, earn certification for academic achievement, and for a few matriculate to higher education programs—in the camp, region, or abroad. This choice also resulted in some initial and continuing challenges, including teaching and learning English and Swahili. For some Sudanese refugees, completing secondary school in the camps allowed them earn jobs when they repatriated in 2007 and 2008; many worked in the new government of South Sudan or with INGOs. Refugees in both camps have also made incremental changes; while not critical junctures, over time these changes have been decisive in shaping Dadaab and Kakuma’s education programs. First, the strikes teachers have organized in both camps, with support from PTAs and SMCs, have led to increases in teachers’ incentive wages. In Dadaab, PTAs also established and managed their own community secondary schools that were subsequently formally incorporated into UNHCR’s education program; doing so considerably expanded education opportunities for refugee youth. Since 2011 in Dadaab, refugees have directly managed education programming after the UNHCR and its implementing partners restricted or suspended altogether operations

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during the emergency. Finally, many refugees have taken their education from Dadaab and Kakuma’s camp schools and returned to those same schools as teachers—substantially improving the quality of instruction, which in turn has helped to increase passage rates on the KCPE and KCSE. Refugees’ role in determining, shaping, maintaining, and improving teaching and learning in Dadaab and Kakuma suggests that UNHCR and its implementing partners have effectively partnered with refugees to deliver education programming, although they seldom acknowledge this partnership as such. Instead, refugees are often represented as passive recipients of aid, unqualified for “salaried” jobs, regardless of their qualifications. Similarly, for refugees seeking to earn academic and professional credentials in camp schools, the UNHCR and its implementing partners have often viewed their achievements as things they will carry with them when they leave the camp. While this has been the case for some refugees who resettle to a third country or repatriate to their home country, for the majority, their journey is much shorter. They carry their credentials with them from one sub-camp or zone to another, growing from students in camp schools to members of the camps’ increasingly educated incentive-wage workforce. Recent developments, such as UNHCR’s 2012–16 Education Strategy, implicitly acknowledge this and endeavor to repurpose education to help refugees prepare for uncertain futures—most recently through models premised on education for inclusion and education for self-reliance. Do these shifts offer a break from the past? Is repurposing enough, or, regardless of what might be deemed practical or feasible, does refugee education need to be reimagined?

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Driving Forward with the Rearview Mirror Thirty or forty years from now, what will historians write about this moment in refugee education? Will the seemingly radical shifts in UNHCR’s education policy since 2012 substantively improve refugees’ access to quality education? Or will refugee education remain in a state of chronic crisis, beset by challenges despite changes? Considered differently, what does it take to break from the past? In this chapter, I update the narrative drawn in Chapters 3 and 4, describing and analyzing recent developments between 2013 and 2020, and offer recommendations to researchers and policymakers for future scholarship and practice. Since completing the research for events occurring between 1992 and 2012, I returned to Dadaab in 2015 as a research consultant for UNICEF, and in 2017, I also conducted research on education programming for South Sudanese refugees in several settlements in northern Uganda. My update and analysis are partially based on this work, as well as desk research utilizing a range of publicly available sources, including bi-weekly UNHCR updates of education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma, news articles, and INGO reports. My policy recommendations are based on my own and others’ research and also my experiences working as a human rights researcher, advocate, and campaigner.

Education for Self-Reliance and Inclusion? 2013–17 2013–14: Continued Influx into Kakuma; Preparations for Repatriation in Dadaab In 2013, more than 40,000 South Sudanese refugees fled to Kakuma.1 That year, the vice president of South Sudan, Riek Machar, founded the Sudan

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People’s Liberation Movement-In-Opposition (SPLM-IO), a political party as well as an armed group of anti-government forces.2 Civil war broke out on December 15 when President Kiir accused Vice President Machar of an attempted coup.3 In the following days, government forces and the SPLM-IO engaged in intense ground fighting in the capital city of Juba, which quickly spread to other areas of the country.4 By the end of the year, the UNHCR announced plans to expand the camp to accommodate up to 80,000 additional refugees.5 About 70 percent were under the age of eighteen; more than 5000 were “separated”—coming to the camp without parents.6 Samuel, the former child-soldier who had repatriated to South Sudan in 2007, had returned to Kakuma in 2014. When I came back to Kakuma, it was by bus rather than on foot. I had worked in the new government of South Sudan for fourteen months but resigned because of the bureaucracy and inadequacy of individuals and institution leaders, especially the minister, deputy minister, and secretary. I was vocal about all of this, and I was targeted as a result. They had my house set on fire and I lost three of my brothers, but I escaped with the rest of my family and came here.

Samuel took an incentive position as head teacher of a primary school, one of the two new schools established in Kakuma 4. The UNHCR and LWF struggled to provide emergency education to newly arrived children and adolescents. UNICEF donated several tents to serve as classrooms for the school, which offered grades 1 to 7,7 and LWF instituted a double shift system in an effort to provide more than 8000 newly registered students three to four hours of instruction per day.8 LWF also recruited and trained hundreds of new teachers.9 Huge gaps remained. First, many of the refugees who enrolled in the tent schools had completed grade 8 in South Sudan; however, LWF did not provide secondary classes or facilitate enrollment in the camp’s existing secondary schools.10 “I put eleven hundred students on the waiting list for Somali Bantu Secondary School in Kakuma 2,” Samuel said. “They’re just idle in the community and they’re angry. Some of them came here and asked if they could just come and study Class 7 because that’s the highest grade we have at the school. Just to have something to do.”11 Each month, the UNHCR

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reported shortfalls in meeting burgeoning needs, including “500 primary and 25 secondary school classrooms … and 465 primary and 24 secondary school teachers.”12 As for learning materials, Samuel said that “we have no textbooks. They’ve not been distributed yet. Also, all of the primary schools have a feeding program in the camp, except for this school. We are now going on seven months without one, which also makes learning very difficult.”13 In Dadaab, throughout 2013 and 2014 the European Union, in partnership with several INGOs, launched the “Support to Education for Refugees in Dadaab Programme,” aimed at “providing access to quality formal, nonformal, and vocational training opportunities.”14 In addition, organizations such as Microsoft and Vodafone introduced initiatives focused on expanding education access through online education.15 At the same time, the Government of Kenya began to undertake efforts to repatriate refugees to Somalia; it was not the first time they had tried to do so. Often during national elections, incumbent and aspiring politicians had pledged to address the growing national security threat that Dadaab represented, arguing the camp was a haven for Somali extremist and militants who entered the country under the guise of asylum. However, UNHCR and partner staff began taking seriously announcements of the camp’s impending closure following an attack on September 21, 2013,16 on Nairobi’s Westgate Shopping Mall. Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack, and the Government of Kenya alleged the group planned the attack in Dadaab.17 In November 2013, the governments of Somalia and Kenya and the UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement for the repatriation of Somali refugees.18 In response to the potential for imminent repatriation, the NRC, with funding from UNICEF, began implementing a four-month version of the Youth Education Pack intended to facilitate livelihood opportunities in Somalia. Students could choose several courses of study, including DSTV installation, barbering, photography, housecleaning, tailoring, henna tattoo artistry, and livestock production.19 Somali language was included as a component of each course.20 Although the program was primarily intended for Somali youth, many recently arrived South Sudanese were able to continue their education through YEP. In both Dadaab and Kakuma, the Government of Kenya refused to recognize academic credentials attained in South Sudan and transfer them to secondary schools in the camps.21 A South Sudanese youth explained that

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I had finished Form Four in South Sudan, but I couldn’t take the national exams because I had to run—this was right before I was going to sit for them. So when I came here and tried to enroll in secondary school so I could sit for the KCSE, they said “no—you have to get your education achievement verified in Nairobi.” But I can’t do this—I can’t leave the camp to do this and also I don’t have the money to pay for it. So I was really frustrated. And then I had the opportunity to do DSTV and then continue on and do a year-long electrical program course. I now have an opportunity I had given up on.22

For Somali youth, the courses offered did not necessarily align with livelihood opportunities in the pastoralist, agricultural, and coastal areas to which most refugees would repatriate in Somalia, but were better suited to Dadaab’s peri-urban environment.23 For some, this was a cause for concern.24 “I never learned how to support myself the way generations of my family did,” said one student, whose father, uncles, and grandfather had been fishermen. “I will have to make do and hopefully learn when I arrive.”25 Yet even as the UNHCR initiated a pilot project in late 2014 for voluntary repatriation to Somalia,26 others thought it much more important their education provide skills that would allow them to generate income in Dadaab. “We want skills for the camp so we can have employment here,” said a student in the DSTV program. “For Somalia? Maybe, but we won’t leave here for a long time. Some of us are from very different education backgrounds—some Standard 8, some Form 2, others no schooling. But we can work … we need to work.”27

2015–16: Education for Inclusion In 2015, the UNHCR formalized its collaboration with the Global Partnership for Education (GPE),28 a funding platform that coordinates the efforts of “developing countries, donors, international organizations, civil society, teacher organizations, the private sector, and foundations,” in order to strengthen education systems in developing countries.29 This partnership operationalized UNCHR’s decisive policy shift set forth in the 2012–16 Education Strategy toward the inclusion of refugee children and youth in formal national education sector plans, budgets, and programming. UNHCR’s partnership with GPE and revised focus on education for inclusion, rather than repatriation or durable solutions, were spurred by

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several refugee crises, foremost among them the mass migration of millions of refugees from Syria in the preceding years.30 The UNHCR simply did not have the financial or human resources to provide long-term care and assistance to a soaring number of refugees in so many situations throughout the world. Given UNHCR’s increasingly strained capacity, it is remarkable the agency announced the same year that it would prioritize refugees’ access to secondary, higher, and further education and that doing so “form[ed] an integral part of UNHCR’s mandate to protect and support the world’s refugees.”31 In the 1990s and even 2000s, such a turn would have been hard to imagine. As we saw in Dadaab and Kakuma, community services and education officers leveraged EFA to advocate for primary school in the camps; refugees’ access to secondary, vocational, and higher education had been limited due to the absence of a similar framework. What had occasioned such a change? In 2011, the UNHCR had reported on the ways in which limited access to post-primary education for refugees was detrimental to their welfare and livelihood opportunities.32 Beginning in 2012, this issue was brought into sharp focus when millions of Syrians sought asylum from a rapidly escalating civil war in neighboring Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan.33 The UNHCR struggled to meet Syrian refugees’ needs, including access to education for hundreds of thousands of youth.34 In addition, a handful of dedicated staff at UNHCR who had held their posts for several years were strong advocates for disrupting the status quo. “Staff in the Education Unit knew that only focusing on primary education would leave a huge protection gap for Syrian youth,” an officer said. “So many had fled because they had been at risk of forced recruitment in Syria, but without access to secondary or vocational education that could lead to livelihood opportunities, where would that leave them?”35 UNHCR’s new priorities were further bolstered in 2016, first by the establishment of Education Cannot Wait, a new funding mechanism for education in emergencies, and then with the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, a new global approach to refugee response.36 The Education Cannot Wait fund was launched in May 2016 at the first World Humanitarian Summit, following months of consultations with UN and INGO representatives. Hosted by UNICEF, the Education Cannot Wait fund sought to bridge the

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gap between humanitarian and development aid by providing multi-year funding for education in emergencies, and to increase funding for education in emergencies by securing new commitments, especially from privatesector businesses.37 A few months later, in September 2016, 193 Member States signed the New York Declaration, making numerous commitments to improve refugee protection, including by “provid[ing] quality primary and secondary education in safe learning environments for all refugee children, and to do so within a few months of the initial displacement.”38 To put into practice the New York Declaration, the UNHCR initiated and developed the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), and tailored it to several situations, including Kenya.39

2015–17: Private Sector Partnerships in Dadaab and Kakuma The Kenya CRRF impacted refugee education in Dadaab and Kakuma in two notable ways. First, UNHCR engaged with multiple new private sector organizations to implement education programming, including, for example, The Mastercard Foundation, Vodafone, Safaricom, and Pearson.40 Second, the UNHCR formalized its partnership with the World Bank, which offered loans to host communities to support development programming, including education, intended to complement UNHCR programs in both camps.41 Several initiatives in Dadaab and Kakuma camps reflected UNHCR’s new partnerships and global policy priorities. In Kakuma, this included, for example, the Teachers for Teachers Initiative, Instant Network Schools, and Accelerated Learning Programs. In 2015, UNHCR, in partnership with Teachers College at Columbia University, Finn Church Aid, and LWF, piloted the Teachers for Teachers initiative.42 Through this program, training teams of international and local staff lead in-person training sessions with between twenty and thirty refugee teachers focused on teaching techniques in emergency contexts.43 Teachers are also matched with coaches and mentors to provide ongoing support and feedback related to teaching in camp schools.44 In 2016, two Instant Network Schools went online in the camp.45 The Instant Network Schools offered children and youth access to tablets and e-readers that contained online reading and learning materials for primary, secondary, and vocational education and training.46

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That same year, funding from the European Commission supported the establishment of ten Accelerated Learning Programs, intended to address the high number of out-of-school newly arrived refugee youth.47 The Accelerated Programs condensed primary grades 1–8 into a three-year course; upon completion, students could sit for the KCPE and, if they passed, matriculate to one of the camp’s secondary schools.48 For students who had some or little schooling in South Sudan, the program allowed them to “catch-up” and fill a gap in their studies. However, because the Government of Kenya refused to recognize the academic credentials of South Sudanese refugees, the program was a step backward for students whose secondary schooling was interrupted in South Sudan. They were allowed to continue to Kakuma’s secondary schools only after repeating grades they had passed years ago. In contrast to Kakuma, Dadaab’s population was dwindling. In February 2016, the Government of Kenya notified the UNHCR that the camp would close in six months, and asked the UNHCR to expedite the relocation of more than 350,000 refugees residing in Dadaab’s five sub-camps.49 Between May and August 2016, about 65,000 refugees, half of them children,50 repatriated to Somalia, or were relocated to Kakuma or a newly established refugee settlement, Kalobeyei.51 Almost half of those to return were children, and they settled in central and south Somalia, where there was little education infrastructure and a large number of children were out of school.52 UNHCR and partner staff were concerned that existing schools lacked the capacity to enroll returnees, and that the Government of Somalia would not recognize education credentials attained in Dadaab.53 The Education Cluster recommended that plans for repatriation allow for children and youth to complete the school year and if eligible sit for the KCPE or KCSE before returning, or potentially sit for the KCPE in Somalia.54 However, any potential arrangements to do so were put on hold. In November 2016, the Government of Kenya announced that the closure of the camp would be delayed for an additional six months.55 In February 2017, that plan was upended when a Kenyan High Court judge ruled that closing Dadaab would be “illegal” and “discriminatory.”56 Still, by March 2017, Dadaab’s population had shrunk by almost 100,000 refugees—to about 250,000.57 That same month, the UNHCR closed Kambioos sub-camp, opened in 2011 during the influx.58 Somalia was experiencing drought and a looming famine—the same conditions that had,

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six years prior, driven more than 160,000 refugees to Dadaab. Nevertheless, returns continued and with the closure of the camp still anticipated, many Somalis did not seek asylum in Kenya, and instead fled to other parts of the country.59

2016–17: Education for Self-Reliance Throughout 2016 and 2017, the UNHCR had transferred several thousand Ethiopian and South Sudanese refugees from Dadaab to Kalobeyei settlement,60 established in 2015 about 25 miles northwest of Kakuma. In keeping with UNHCR’s new model, one that acknowledged the long-term nature of exile and that took a development rather than humanitarian approach to refugee protection and service provision, Kalobeyei was intended to transition refugee assistance from an aid-based model to a self-reliance model and integrate refugees into the host community by providing services that accommodated both populations.61 The UNHCR opened three primary schools in Kalobeyei, though far more school-aged children lived in the settlement and the surrounding host community than the schools could accommodate.62 Faced with limited educational facilities, refugees initiated informal primary and ECD schools.63 Some who had been transferred to Kalobeyei expressed disappointment with their living standards compared to Kakuma or Dadaab. As one refugee explained, “Dadaab is much better than here [Kalobeyei]. In Dadaab, we had school and established livelihoods. UNHCR and the Kenyan government said Kalobeyei is a better place … they promised jobs, education, security, good hospitals. But none of them are here.”64

2017–20: Education for Inclusion In 2017, I traveled throughout northern Uganda to conduct interviews with South Sudanese refugees, primarily regarding attacks on schools and hospitals in South Sudan by the SPLA and SPLM-IO. However, Uganda’s refugee policy had been hailed as exemplary and progressive—refugees were given small plots of land on which to build houses and grow crops, are allowed to work and move freely within the country, and are integrated in the country’s government

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schools—so I took the opportunity to explore what education for inclusion and integration meant in practice. In the schools I visited in several camps, including Bidi Bidi, Adjumani, and Rhino, I saw and heard about many of the same challenges with education that refugees faced in camp schools in Dadaab and Kakuma. These included high student-to-teacher ratios averaging about 100 to 1 packed into overcrowded classrooms and a limited number of textbooks. For most schools, this had also been the case before 2014, when tens of thousands of refugees had arrived from South Sudan. Northern Uganda, where most refugee settlements are located, is characterized by structural underdevelopment and poverty. The teachers I interviewed discussed how overcrowding had become worse and resources more stretched when refugee students doubled, and in some cases tripled school enrollment, and that the Education Ministry hadn’t hired any additional teachers or provided additional learning materials. The refugees I interviewed discussed hunger; according to several students and parents, their food rations had been cut, the schools did not have a feeding program, and the land they were given was unsuitable for crop growing. “We have exchanged hunger for peace here in Uganda,” said one refugee.65 One day, I entered a primary school in Rhino Refugee Camp that I thought was empty. The new term did not begin until the next day, but I wanted to see what the classrooms looked like compared to those I had seen in Dadaab and Kakuma. I was surprised to see four boys who looked to be about sixteen or seventeen years old, dressed in school uniforms. One boy stood at the blackboard working out a complex equation, while the other three boys looked on. I introduced myself and asked if they would take a few moments to speak with me. “We’re in Senior 1 and 2,” one of the boys said. “In South Sudan, the curriculum is different, but we have managed to keep up in the school here,” said another. When I asked about their experience in the secondary school, they each took turns explaining. The distance to get there is very far—we walked about ninety minutes. At first, they chased us away because we couldn’t pay the fees. But we just kept going back and eventually they let us stay. But because we don’t pay school fees, we don’t get any lunch.

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We are all living alone and cooking for ourselves—washing clothes, making food, getting hold of books—it’s all very difficult.

As I drove away from the school, I wondered if the four boys would have been better or worse off in Kakuma or Dadaab. It’s almost certain they would not have had access to secondary school in either camp. In Kakuma, they could have chosen to repeat several grades, starting with grade 7, sit for the KCPE and eventually matriculate to one of the camp’s secondary schools; in Dadaab, they could have made a similar choice, or enrolled in one of the YEP short courses. In the years that followed, they would have had expansive options in Kakuma. In 2018, the UNHCR and multiple partners continued to implement new education programming in the camp. In February, the UNHCR announced the planned opening in Kakuma of Turkana West University.66 Funded by UNHCR in partnership with Kenya’s Musinde Muliro University, Turkana West would enroll both refugees and the host community and offer courses such as mining, petroleum, and entrepreneurship intended to promote self-reliance.67 The Mastercard Foundation also began to offer condensed twoyear secondary education courses.68 In contrast, options would be limited in Dadaab. In 2018, primary and secondary schools began to close in the camp as the population dwindled. By the end of the year, almost 80,000 refugees had repatriated to Somalia.69 I have also wondered occasionally if and how the four South Sudanese boys, and so many other refugees I met, have been impacted by global developments in refugee education. In December 2018, the UNHCR put forward its new governing framework for refugee assistance, the Global Compact for Refugees.70 In follow-up to Member States’ commitments to the New York Declaration in 2016, the UNHCR, through the Global Compact, sought to redefine the relationship between refugees, host states, and donor states and promote four objectives, including easing pressure on host countries, enhancing refugee self-reliance, expanding access to third-country solutions, and supporting conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.71 UNHCR’s most recent education strategy, finalized in 2019, was intended to contribute directly to the Global Compact’s objectives and carry forward UNHCR’s recent policy of including refugees in national education systems.

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Building off the 2011 Global Review and the 2012–16 Education Strategy, the newest strategy, entitled Refugee Education 2030: A Strategy for Inclusion, aims to “promote equitable and sustainable inclusion in national education systems; foster safe, enabling environments that support learning for all students; and enable learners to use their education towards sustainable futures.”72 It’s not clear how Education 2030 has or will shape schooling in Dadaab, Kakuma, or other camps throughout the world. In early 2020, efforts to implement the strategy were severely hampered by the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in widespread closure of primary, secondary, and higher education institutions, including schools throughout Kenya.73 UNHCR has worked with the Government of Kenya, UNICEF, bilateral organizations, and other INGO and NGO partners to broadcast a radio education program on local and community radio stations in both Dadaab and Kakuma.74 In August 2019, months before the pandemic interrupted schooling for hundreds of millions of children, UNHCR published its latest report detailing the state of refugee education. Stepping Up: Refugee Education in Crisis was released just a few weeks before the launch of Education 2030, and begins with an appeal to businesses to invest in education to help close huge, persistent gaps in refugees’ access to quality education, with a new focus on increasing access to secondary education.75 Decades of advocacy, significant policy changes, and new and renewed partnerships have culminated in modest gains, noted in the report, in refugees’ access to education in recent years; these include a 1 percent increase in secondary school enrollment and 2 percent increases in both primary and higher education enrollment.76 Still, more than half of refugee children remain out of school,77 and the chronic crisis continues.

Making the Car While Driving It Since the founding of Dadaab and Kakuma camps, several events have shaped policies and programs for refugee education. Many of these changes are described in Education in Emergencies, International Development in Education, and UNHCR literatures. Considering them collectively makes clear the myriad conceptual and practical constraints that comprise the structural challenges of refugee education—ranging from UNHCR’s one-year funding

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cycle to the close coupling of education and the nation state. Reconstructing and analyzing the recent history of refugee education show how, over time, UNHCR and INGO staff and refugees navigated these challenges and exercised agency to positively change refugee education. Between 1992 and 2012, staff and refugees made contingent choices, deciding upon certain policies and programs rather than others. In twenty years, at the global level, staff at UNHCR HQ developed, strengthened, and expanded policy frameworks, strategies, and standards for refugee education; further aligned education with UNHCR’s core mandate to “provide international protection to refugees”; and dramatically changed the agency’s approach to education—from education for durable solutions to education for inclusion in host countries’ national education sector plans. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, UN and INGO staff leveraged EFA to advocate for primary school in camps; at the same time, this left large populations of refugee youth without access to secondary, vocational, or higher education. In Dadaab and Kakuma, students initially taught by other refugees under trees without any curriculum were eventually taught the Kenyan National Curriculum in semi-permanent and later permanent school buildings. PTAs and SMCs made decisions about curriculum and language of instruction and built school infrastructure. In Dadaab, refugee teachers went on strike and successfully increased their incentive wages. Supplemental education programming, such as Peace Education, was piloted in both camps because a UNHCR coordinator was able to access increased funds following the publication of the Machel Report which helped to make the case that education was protective in emergency situations. By the late 1990s, refugees had successfully advocated for the establishment of secondary schools in both camps and the UNHCR’s implementing partners employed Kenyan national teachers. Today, many refugee teachers in Dadaab and Kakuma are former students, completing K-12 and even higher education in camp schools. Nevertheless, challenges of refugee education have persisted, in Dadaab and Kakuma and globally. These include high numbers of out-of-school children and youth, lack of textbooks, overcrowded classrooms, high rates of attrition from lower primary to upper primary and then again from upper primary to secondary, as well as persistent questions regarding the purposes of refugee education—for durable solutions, inclusion, or self-reliance. Beyond resource

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constraints, why haven’t changes to refugee education policies and programs brought more significant change to these challenges? First, the state is still the dominant form of subjectivity with objective consequences for refugees. Many host states pass laws restricting refugees to camps and either allow or deny refugees access to education in camp schools. Donor states determine the scope of the UNHCR’s work by allocating or withholding funding to particular sectors or operations. And education curricula and certification are still state-centric in design. However, the predominate role of the state might and likely will change in the future, giving way to regional or other supra-state imagined communities. We have already witnessed the potential beginning of such an occurrence in the European Union (EU), where, for example, history curricula focuses on a shared past and promotes the idea of a common European identity,78 and the ERASMUS program allows EU students to attend any of more than 5000 universities across thirty-seven countries.79 In the meanwhile, transnational corporations, such as Mastercard, Pearson Education, and Vodafone, that have partnered with the UNHCR and other INGOs to implement a range of new refugee education initiatives, many with an emphasis on technology, claim to provide high-quality, low-cost, transferable education programming. This is a concerning trend, one that should not be equated with transnational refugee education, nor conflated with initiatives that would increase access to quality education for refugees. The expanse of private sector participation in education is highly contested. Critics argue that by seeking to fund and provide education in refugee contexts, these organizations profit from humanitarian crises and weaken public systems of education and the responsibility of states to provide schooling. In addition, partnering with these organizations could also undermine UNHCR’s aims to strengthen host countries’ education systems in exchange for including refugees. While often introduced as temporary, stop-gap measures in times of crisis, such as a mass influx of refugees, privatization has seldom been reversed. For example, some countries, such as Liberia, have privatized the majority of government schools,80 resulting in lower quality education that costs more per pupil.81 The second reason that challenges to refugee education have persisted is because normative ideas about refugees, education, and refugee education

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haven’t really changed, or changed enough to matter, despite appearances to the contrary. Xenophobia is on the rise,82 and many states have passed increasingly restrictive asylum policies and drastically reduced the number of refugees they will annually resettle.83 National education systems still closely hew toward assimilating citizens. Recent trends toward “global citizenship education,” championed by UNESCO and intended to equip students with global competencies to secure jobs in a global marketplace, overlook or exclude altogether consideration of refugee children and youth. And though potentially promising, UNHCR’s policy shift toward education for inclusion hinges on problematic partners, most notably the World Bank and more broadly private-sector businesses who have sought to play an increasing role in refugee education funding, service provision, and policymaking. The Bank has a long history of education service provision in developing countries and since the 1980s has been “the major intergovernmental agency funding education change initiatives around the world.”84 As previously discussed, also in the 1980s, the Bank’s structural adjustment programs were partially responsible for excluding refugees from accessing government services in countries where they had previously been integrated.85 Critics have charged that structural adjustment programs and the World Bank’s one-sizefits-all approach to analyzing and managing education have considerably eroded the notion that education is a public good and a key service that governments are legally obligated to provide. As a result, public schools in most low- and middle-income countries receive limited government funding, and provide students, many from marginalized communities, with low quality education. The majority of refugee-hosting countries are low- or middle-income and “already struggle to meet nationals’ needs.”86 For UNHCR’s policy shift toward inclusion to succeed in increasing refugees’ access to quality education, national education systems “would need to be of high quality.”87 Despite or perhaps because of all its efforts, the World Bank has never shown itself capable of increasing education quality.88 Neither have private-sector businesses. Coordinating networks such as the Global Business Coalition for Education, which committed in 2016 to “mobilize $100 million in financial and in-kind resources to support the Education Cannot Wait Fund,”89 claim to harness “the collective power of business and other stakeholders—and know-how to bring

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these voices together for positive change.”90 Yet businesses are driven by profit, and there are real “tensions between humanitarian aims and profit-oriented motivations for involvement in the sector.”91 The final reason is closely related to the first and second—UNHCR and partner INGOs have advocated for cautious and conservative rather than radical changes to refugee education. Although UNHCR’s 2012 policy shift to education for inclusion might seem radical, this was fairly common practice before the World Bank curtailed it almost four decades ago. And seeking to facilitate integration in host countries through inclusion in national education systems is not meaningful without “access to rights that would enable them to use education to create productive futures, such as the right to work, own property, or access social services.”92 Even if UNHCR’s approach were to significantly increase refugees’ access to quality primary and secondary education in host countries, how would such an education prepare them for “transnational futures with ‘transferable skills, knowledge, and capacities they could apply no matter where that future might be?’”93 Radical change requires bold thinking, creative strategies, and outspoken champions able to exert pressure on both donor and host states. Scholars, policymakers and practitioners, and refugees each have a role to play. Making a historical turn in refugee education research allows scholars to help map the car’s route while driving it. Little has been documented about the development and implementation of refugee education; it lives primarily in the memories of those who were part of it. Dadaab and Kakuma have rich education histories, as do countless other camps around the world. The more narratives we have of the history of education in different camps, the more we can understand why and how UNHCR and INGO staff and refugees made the choices they did in moments of contingency, whether about curriculum or supplemental education programming, or framing the purposes of education to justify its provisioning; why and how different actors in different camps made similar or different choices; and what different choices could lead to substantive changes. Comparative historical analysis of UNHCR’s education programming and that of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is a particularly rich area of research. UNRWA prioritized education-service provision from the outset,94 and UNRWA schools intentionally and incidentally provided opportunities

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for children and youth to preserve “Palestinian identity,”95 while also achieving “higher-than-average learning outcomes.”96 Why were the agencies’ approaches to refugee education so markedly different? Did UNHCR policymakers look to the UNRWA for guidance when developing refugee education policy and programming? And if not, then why? For research to contribute to positive education transformations for refugees, scholars also need to explicitly use knowledge gained from research in a range of forums to advocate for change.97 However, research dissemination is too often overlooked—shiny publications and reports sit on bookshelves, unread, or findings are published in journals, often many years after the research was conducted, that are accessible only to members of the academy who can conduct more research but who are not in positions to make or shape policies or programs for refugee education. In addition, in many circles, advocacy is also considered antithetical to the research process. Yet to silo research on refugee education is to make it more beneficial to other researchers or research donors than to the refugees who share their stories in the hopes that doing so will lead to meaningful changes. Scholars can reach wider audiences, including potentially decision-makers by advocating for concrete changes based on research in op-eds, media interviews, newsletter articles, podcasts, visuals, short videos, and even full-length films, as well as by publishing research in open access journals and translating research into different languages. The UNHCR should also amplify their ongoing advocacy to increase refugees’ access to quality education by developing and implementing a targeted, time-bound campaign that uses a range of creative tactics involving a wide array of actors—including partner INGOs, refugees, and high-level spokespeople, ranging from celebrities, to highly regarded politicians, to distinguished statespeople. Doing so would help to raise the profile of the refugee education crisis, reshape a narrative about why refugee education matters, and also help to push decision-makers to prioritize refugee education by seeking to pressure and incentivize donor and host states to uphold commitments made as signatories to the Global Compact. The UNHCR should also work with the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education to report on the implementation of the Global Compact, highlighting states’ good practices and naming and shaming states that fail to do so.

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Public campaigning for specific policies or programs is largely outside of UNHCR’s standard scope of practice, although the agency has begun to experiment with mass mobilization. In January 2019, for example, the UNHCR launched the “2 Billion Kilometres to Safety Campaign,” which called on people all over the world to run, walk, or cycle a cumulative total of 2 billion kilometers—a distance the UNHCR estimates is collectively covered each year by people forced to flee their homes until they reach the first point of safety.98 Recent history also offers helpful models, including, for example, the campaign to stop the use of child soldiers, and various campaigns to prevent the election of human rights abusers to the UN Human Rights Council.99 In keeping with best practices in campaigning for human rights, any campaign on refugee education advanced by the UNHCR should be premised on a thorough interrogation of what goals should be pursued in and through refugee education and the means of achieving them. UNHCR’s goals of refugees’ inclusion in national education systems for both primary and secondary education and helping refugees through education prepare for uncertain futures are arguably very positive steps for the agency compared to previous goals premised on education for durable solutions that focused on camp schools. However, for the reasons previously stated, UNHCR’s partnerships with the World Bank and the private sector undermine the agency’s ability to meet its goals. The UNHCR should examine alternative partnership arrangements with rights-based, non-profit organizations that seek to expand and strengthen the capacity of host states to provide high-quality government funded and managed schools.100 Partnering with the private sector to fund and provide education to refugees might seem to be a pragmatic approach, or perhaps even the only option when traditional donor states slash funding, or threaten to withhold funding as leverage for their own agendas.101 However, as part of its mandate and guiding principles, the UNHCR can be an outspoken advocate in its vision for and practice of refugee education. Part of this vision should include improving education provided in camps or settlements during periods of rapid influx. The UNHCR should develop emergency education strategies for protracted situations to better prepare education systems, be it national schools or parallel camp schools, to meet the needs of new and already enrolled students. Strategies might include plans for acquiring and distributing tent schools, textbooks, and other learning

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materials; accommodating youth in existing or temporarily established upper primary or secondary schools; and working with the host country’s Ministry of Education to ensure recognition of students’ credentials earned in home countries. UNESCO has already begun to develop a globally recognized qualifications passport for refugees and migrants to facilitate access to higher education throughout the world;102 this initiative should be extended to include secondary education. In the absence of concrete plans for scaling up emergency education and ensuring refugee youths’ academic qualifications are recognized in exile, millions of refugees throughout the world will continue to be unable to access education. Finally, the UNHCR should collaborate with refugees to develop a vision for the core elements of a transnational education program and explore opportunities for implementing such a program in future years. The exercise might not generate a substantially different approach, or, if it does, such an approach might not be practicable in the near future. However, refugees who have occupied transnational spaces for years and in many cases decades are best positioned to try and define and imagine an education for an unknowable future. For scholars, policymakers, practitioners, and refugees, the past is more than prologue. It might not seem surprising that there are persistent challenges to refugee education, despite multiple changes, but these challenges were not and are not inevitable. Indeed, this is one of the central revelations of history—that nothing is predetermined, that there is contingency.103 Ultimately, historical narratives of refugee education cannot provide comprehensive or definitive answers to what choices should be made; instead they show how individuals— community services and education officers and refugees—made decisions that were shaped by predominate ideas and institutional norms, used agency to loosen these constraints, and capitalized on opportunities for change. Stated differently, history can help us understand the present through a more holistic lens trained on the past and in so doing make it possible to go in a new or different direction in the future—something akin to driving forward with the help of the rearview mirror.

Notes Prologue 1 Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 11.

Chapter 1 1 See: Stephen J. Ball, Global Education Inc: New Policy Networks and the NeoLiberal Imaginary (New York: Routledge, 2012). 2 See: Mrc Sommers, Children, Education and War: Reaching Education for All (EFA) Objectives in Countries Affected by Conflict (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002). See also: Sobhi Tawil and Alexandra Harley, “EFA, Conflict and Terrorism,” Norrag News (2003): 43–7. 3 States are territorial, legally sovereign entities, constituted by institutions, like the legislature and judiciary that govern and represent the interests of citizens. See John M. Hobson, The State and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 4 See: Alan Smith, “Education in the Twenty-First Century: Conflict, Reconstruction and Reconciliation,” Compare 35, no. 4 (2005): 373–91. 5 See: Tony Waters and Kim LeBlanc, “Refugees and Education: Mass Public Schooling without a Nation-State,” Comparative Education Review 49, no. 2 (2005): 129–47. 6 Nations are communities bound by common languages and cultural practices and shared histories; however, these communities often transcend state boundaries or are not represented by the state in which they reside. See: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Brooklyn: Verso Books, 2006). See also: Lowell W. Barrington, “‘Nation’ and ‘nationalism’”: The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science,” PS: Political Science & Politics 30, no. 4 (1997): 712–16.

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7 See: Laurence Brockliss and Nicola Sheldon, eds., Mass Education and the Limits of State Building, c. 1870–1930 (New York: Springer, 2012). See also: Lynn Davie, “Learning for State-Building: Capacity Development, Education and Fragility,” Comparative Education 47, no. 2 (2011): 157–80. 8 See: Alexander Betts, Gil Loescher and James Milner, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection (New York: Routledge, 2013). 9 See: Gil Loescher, “The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests vs. Institutional Autonomy,” International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (2001): 33–56. 10 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines a protracted situation as one in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or more in a given host country. UNHCR, “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018” (Geneva: United Nations, 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf. 11 See: Amy Slaughter and Jeff Crisp, A Surrogate State?: The Role of UNHCR in Protracted Refugee Situations, UNHCR, Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 2009. 12 See: Sarah Dryden-Peterson, Elizabeth Adelman, Michelle J. Bellino, and Vidur Chopra, “The Purposes of Refugee Education: Policy and Practice of Including Refugees in National Education Systems,” Sociology of Education 92, no. 4 (2019): 346–66. 13 “Dadaab Refugee Complex—UNHCR Kenya,” UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/ ke/dadaab-refugee-complex (accessed November 26, 2019); “Kakuma Refugee Camp and Kalobeyei Integrated Settlement—UNHCR Kenya,” UNHCR, https:// www.unhcr.org/ke/kakuma-refugee-camp (accessed November 26, 2019). 14 Karen Mundy and Caroline Manion, “Globalization and Global Governance in Education,” in Globalization and Education: Integration and Contestation across Cultures, ed. Nelly Stromquist and Karen Monkman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 39–49: 39. 15 See: Thomas G. Weiss and Ramesh Thakur, Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010). 16 Cindy Horst, Transnational Nomads: How Somalis Cope with Refugee Life in the Dadaab Camps of Kenya, vol. 19 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007). 17 Bram J. Jansen, “The Accidental City: Violence, Economy and Humanitarianism in Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kenya,” PhD dissertation, Wageningen University, 2011. 18 UNHCR, “Global Report 2013-Kenya.” Geneva, 2014.

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19 Ibid. 20 The population of both camps has since been surpassed by Katupalong Refugee Camp in Cox’s Bazaar, Bangladesh, and Bidi Bidi Refugee Settlement in Northwestern Uganda. See: “World’s Largest Refugee Camps in 2018,” https:// www.raptim.org/largest-refugee-camps-in-2018/ (accessed December 1, 2019). 21 The Lost Boys of Sudan is the name given to over 20,000 displaced or orphaned boys during the second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005). A number of films, including God Grew Tired of Us, War Child, and most recently The Good Lie, and popular non-fiction books, including What Is the What and They Poured Fire on Us from the Sky offer accounts of the Lost Boys in Kakuma and upon resettlement to the United States. 22 See: “Kakuma Camp and Kalobeyei Settlement Visitors Guide,” UNHCR Nairobi, https://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/02/UNHCR-SubOffice-Kakuma-Visitors-Guide.pdf (accessed November 26, 2019). 23 “Education in Emergencies—A Neglected Priority,” Education Cannot Wait, https://www.educationcannotwait.org/the-situation/ (accessed November 26, 2019). 24 “Stepping Up: Refugee Education in Crisis,” UNHCR, pp. 37, 52, https://www. unhcr.org/steppingup/ (accessed November 26, 2019). 25 Ibid. 26 “Refugees,” Educate a Child, https://educateachild.org/explore/barriers-toeducation/refugees (accessed November 26, 2019). 27 “Kenya—Education,” UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/ke/education (accessed November 26, 2019). 28 “Education Dashboard,” UNHCR, p. 1, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/ download/58493 (accessed November 26, 2019). 29 See: UNHCR, “Stepping Up,” 6. 30 See: Andy Green, Education, Globalization and the Nation State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). See also: Nicholas C. Burbules and Carlos Alberto Torres, eds., Globalization and Education: Critical Perspectives (New York: Psychology Press, 2000). 31 See: Martin Carnoy and Diana Rhoten, “What Does Globalization Mean for Educational Change? A Comparative Approach,” Comparative Education Review 46, no. 1 (2002): 1–9. 32 Antoni Verger Mario Novelli and Hulya Kosar Altinyelken, “Global Education Policy and International Development: An Introductory Framework,” in Global Education Policy and International Development: New Agendas, Issues and

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Policies, ed. Antoni Verger, Mario Novelli and Hulya Kosar Altinyelken (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 3–32: 3. 33 Betts, Loescher and Milner, Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, 2008. 34 NA Kerubo, “Refugees’ Rights vs. Responsibilities: An Analysis of Kenya’s Refugee Encampment Policy,” University of Nairobi Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (2013). 35 For example, the Government of Bangladesh prohibits schools in camps hosting Rohingya refugees. See: “Bangladesh: Rohingya Refugee Students Expelled. Ensure Formal Education Is Available to All Children,” Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/01/bangladesh-rohingya-refugee-studentsexpelled (accessed November 25, 2019). 36 UNICEF, Curriculum, Accreditation, and Certification for Syrian Children in Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt (Amman: UNICEF MENA Regional Office, 2015). 37 See: Fares J. Karam, Christine Monaghan, and Paul J. Yoder, “‘The Students Do Not Know Why They Are Here’: Education Decision-Making for Syrian Refugees,” Globalisation, Societies and Education 15, no. 4 (2017): 448–63. 38 Dryden-Peterson et al., “The Purposes of Refugee Education.” 39 Paul A. David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” The American Economic Review (1985), 332. 40 UNHCR, Peace Education Program, Geneva, 1994. 41 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, Refugee Education: A Global Review (Geneva: UNHCR, 2011). 42 UNHCR, Education Strategy: 2012–2016 (Geneva, 2012). 43 In-person interview, Kakuma 1, June 1, 2014.

Chapter 2 1 Amy K. Levin, ed., Global Mobilities: Refugees, Exiles, and Immigrants in Museums and Archives (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2016). 2 See: Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation—State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences,” Global Networks 2, no. 4 (2002): 301–34. 3 See: Philip Marfleet, “Refugees and History: Why We Must Address the Past,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2007): 136–48. See also: Dawn Chatty and Philip Marfleet, “Conceptual Problems in Forced Migration,” Refugee Survey

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Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2013): 1–13; David Turton, “Conceptualising Forced Migration,” University of Oxford Refugee Studies Center, Working Paper No. 12 (2003); Jérôme Elie, “Histories of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies,” The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (2014): 23–35. Peter Gatrell, “Refugees—What’s Wrong with History?,” Journal of Refugee Studies 30, no. 2 (2016): 170–89. 4 See: Julie Peteet, Landscape of Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee Camps (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005). 5 Gatrell, “Refugees,” 173. 6 Ibid. 7 “Kanere: A Refugee Run Free Press in Kenya,” Forced Migration Review, https:// www.fmreview.org/young-and-out-of-place/kanere (accessed April 22, 2020). 8 “Principles and Best Practices,” Oral History Association, https://www. oralhistory.org/about/principles-and-practices-revised–2009/ (accessed August 29, 2019). 9 See: Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory (New York: Routledge, 2010). 10 See: Maris A. Vinovskis, History and Educational Policymaking (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 11 Catherine Haddon, Joe Devanny, Charles Forsdick, and Andrew Thompson, “What Is the Value of History in Policymaking,” Institute for Government, Arts and Humanities Research Council 22 (2015): 8–15. 12 Otis L. Graham, “The Uses and Misuses of History: Roles in Policymaking,” The Public Historian 5, no. 2 (1983): 5–19. 13 See: Howard Schonberger, “Purposes and Ends in History: Presentism and the New Left,” The History Teacher 7, no. 3 (1974): 448–58. See also: Alexander L. George, “Knowledge for Statecraft: The Challenge for Political Science and History,” International Security 22, no. 1 (1997): 44–52; Gregory T. Papanikos, “The Use of History as a Tool of Policy-Making,” In Fourth International Conference on History. Athens, Greece, 2006. 14 See: Peter Jackson, “Pierre Bourdieu, the ‘Cultural Turn’ and the Practice of International History,” Review of International Studies 34, no. 1 (2008): 155–81. 15 See: Orfeo Fioretos, “Historical Institutionalism in International Relations,” International Organization 65, no. 2 (2011): 367–99. See also: Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019); Deborah Welch Larson, “The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” Political Psychology 15 (1994): 17–33.

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16 See: Katherine Elizabeth Smith and Srinivasa Vittal Katikireddi, “A Glossary of Theories for Understanding Policymaking,” J Epidemiol Community Health 67, no. 2 (2013): 198–202. See also: James Mahoney, Erin Kimball, and Kendra L. Koivu, “The Logic of Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences,” Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 1 (2009): 114–46. 17 Graham, “The Uses and Misuses of History.” 18 Ibid. 19 See: Catherine Haddon, Joe Devanny, Charles Forsdick, and Andrew Thompson, “What Is the Value of History in Policymaking,” Institute for Government, Arts and Humanities Research Council 22 (2015): 8–15. 20 Realists assume that states’ interests and relations between sovereign states that comprise the international system are prima facie “given in nature” and therefore unchangeable. Realists also assume that sovereign states act only in their own self-interest and are in competition with one another over a finite amount of material resources; the international system of states is anarchic because there is no supra-state system of governance to mediate competition for resources between nation states; and states’ interests are to maximize the resources at its disposal for the purpose of competing with other states and to maintain its own sovereignty, or alternately stated, to survive. See: Brian C. Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998). 21 See: John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 139–74. 22 Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State Is Inevitable,” European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 4 (2003): 491–542. 23 Martha Finnemore, “International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy,” International Organization 47, no. 4 (1993): 565–97. 24 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–200. 25 Alexander Wendt, “Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design,” International Organization 55, no. 4 (2001): 1019–49. 26 Wendt, “Driving with the Rearview Mirror,” 1022. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid., 1048. 29 Karen Mundy and Sarah Dryden-Peterson, Educating Children in Conflict Zones: Research, Policy, and Practice for Systemic Change—a Tribute to Jackie Kirk (New York: Teachers College Press, 2015), 65.

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30 See: Finnemore Martha and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 4, no. 1 (2001): 391–416. 31 Michael Howlett and Jeremy Rayner, “Understanding the Historical Turn in the Policy Sciences: A Critique of Stochastic, Narrative, Path Dependency and Process-Sequencing Models of Policy-Making over Time,” Policy Sciences 39, no. 1 (2006): 2. 32 Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, eds., Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 2007), 36. 33 See: John G. Ikenberry, “History’s Heavy Hand: Institutions and the Politics of the State,” Unpublished Manuscript (1994). 34 Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, no. 3 (2007): 341–69, 347. 35 See: Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science,” Political Science: The State of the Discipline 3 (2002): 693–721. 36 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (2010): 1–37. 37 James Mahoney, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (2010): 1–37, 20. 38 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, Refugee Education: A Global Review (Geneva: UNHCR, 2011). 39 See: Pilar Aguilar and Gonzalo Retamal, “Rapid Educational Response in Complex Emergencies: A Discussion Document,” UNICEF, 1998. See also: Mary Joy Pigozzi, “Education in Emergencies and for Reconstruction: A Developmental Approach,” UNICEF, 1999. 40 See: Susan Nicolai and Carl Triplehorn, “The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict,” Network Paper: Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) 42 (2003): 1–36. See also: Margaret Sinclair, Planning Education in and after Emergencies (Paris: UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 2002). Marc Sommers, “The Education Imperative: Supporting Education in Emergencies,” Washington, DC: Academy for Educational Development, and New York: Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children. 41 See: Kenneth Bush and Diana Saltarelli, “The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Peace-Building Approach to Education,” UNICEF Innocenti Center (2000); See also: Dana Burde, Schools for Conflict or for Peace

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in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Lynn Davies, Education and Conflict: Complexity and Chaos (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2003); Lynn Davies, “Schools and War: Urgent Agendas for Comparative and International Education,” Compare 35, no. 4 (2005): 357–71; Lynn Davies, “Educating against Extremism: Towards a Critical Politicisation of Young People,” International Review of Education 55, no. 2–3 (2009): 183–203; Lynn Davies and Christopher Talbot, “Learning in Conflict and Postconflict Contexts,” Comparative Education Review 52, no. 4 (2008): 509–18; Tony Gallagher, Education in Divided Societies (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Elisabeth King. From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Jackie Kirk, “Education and Fragile States,” Globalisation, Societies and Education 5, no. 2 (2007): 181–200; Mieke TA Lopes Cardozo, “Sri Lanka: In Peace or in Pieces? A Critical Approach to Peace Education in Sri Lanka,” Research in Comparative and International Education 3, no. 1 (2008): 19–35; Tejendra J. Pherali, “Education and Conflict in Nepal: Possibilities for Reconstruction,” Globalisation, Societies and Education 9, no. 1 (2011): 135–54; Ritesh Shah, “Goodbye Conflict, Hello Development? Curriculum Reform in Timor-Leste,” International Journal of Educational Development 32, no. 1 (2012): 31–8; Alan Smith, “Education in the Twenty-First Century: Conflict, Reconstruction and Reconciliation,” Compare 35, no. 4 (2005): 373–91; Alan Smith and Tony Vaux, “Education, Conflict and International Development,” DfiD, 2003. 42 See: Mario Novelli and Mieke TA Lopes Cardozo, “Conflict, Education and the Global South: New Critical Directions,” International Journal of Educational Development 28, no. 4 (2008): 473–88. See also: Dana Burde, “Assessing Impact and Bridging Methodological Divides: Randomized Trials in Countries Affected by Conflict,” Comparative Education Review 56, no. 3 (2012): 448–73. 43 Dryden-Peterson, Global Review, 19. 44 See: Sarah Dryden-Peterson and Lucy Hovil, Local Integration as a Durable Solution: Refugees, Host Populations and Education in Uganda. Switzerland, UNHCR, 2003. See also: Marc Sommers. “Peace Education and Refugee Youth.” EPAU Working Paper (Geneva: UNHCR, 2001). 45 See: Lyndsay Bird, Surviving School: Education for Refugee Children from Rwanda 1994–1996, UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 2003. See also: Jeff Crisp, Christopher Talbot, and Daiana B. Cipollone, Learning for a Future: Refugee Education in Developing Countries (United Nations Publications, 2001). Dryden-Peterson and Hovil, Local integration; Kirk, “Education and

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Fragile States;” Jackie Kirk. “Certification Counts: Recognizing the Learning Attainments of Displaced and Refugee Students,” UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 2009; Jackie Kirk and Rebecca Winthrop. “IRC Healing Classrooms Initiative: An Initial Study in Ethiopia,” Unpublished Manuscript. International Rescue Committee, 2004; Claas Morlang and Sheri Watson, Tertiary Refugee Education Impact and Achievements: 15 Years of DAFI, UNHCR; Anna P. Obura, Never Again: Educational Reconstruction in Rwanda, UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 2003; Margaret Sinclair, “Education in Emergencies.” Learning for a Future: Refugee Education in Developing Countries, UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 2001; Sommers. “Peace Education,” Marc Sommers, “Islands of Education: Schooling, Civil War and the Southern Sudanese (1983–2004),” UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 2005. 46 Jackie Kirk, “IRC Healing Classrooms Initiative: A Follow-up Study in Afghanistan, Draft Report,” Unpublished report (New York: The International Rescue Committee, 2004). 47 Anna P. Obura, “Peace Education Programme in Dadaab and Kakuma, Kenya: Evaluation Summary,” (Geneva: UNHCR, 2002). 48 Margaret Sinclair, Jeff Crisp, Christopher Talbot, and Daiana B. Cipollone, “Learning for a Future: Refugee Education in Developing Countries,” Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit Health and Community Development Section United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2001). 49 Tony Waters and Kim LeBlanc, “Refugees and Education: Mass Public Schooling without a Nation-State,” Comparative Education Review 49, no. 2 (2005): 129–47. 50 Waters and Leblanc, “Mass Public Schooling,” 140. 51 Su‐Ann Oh and Marc van der Stouwe, “Education, Diversity, and Inclusion in Burmese Refugee Camps in Thailand,” Comparative Education Review 52, no. 4 (2008): 589–617. 52 The Burmese curriculum is taught in a particular dialect of the Karen language that many refugees don’t know or speak. 53 Marc Van der Stouwe and Su-Ann Oh, “Educational Change in a Protracted Refugee Context,” Forced Migration Review 30 (2008): 16. 54 Van der Stouwe and Oh, “Educational Change,” 29. 55 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, “Refugee Education: The Crossroads of Globalization,” Educational Researcher 45, no. 9 (2016): 473–82, 479. 56 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, Elizabeth Adelman, Michelle J. Bellino, and Vidur Chopra, “The Purposes of Refugee Education: Policy and Practice of Including

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Refugees in National Education Systems,” Sociology of Education 92, no. 4 (2019): 346–66. 57 Michelle J. Bellino and Sarah Dryden-Peterson, “Inclusion and Exclusion within a Policy of National Integration: Refugee Education in Kenya’s Kakuma Refugee Camp,” British Journal of Sociology of Education 40, no. 2 (2019): 222–38. 58 Ibid. 59 See: Neil Selwyn and Phillip Brown, “Education, Nation States and the Globalization of Information Networks,” Journal of Education Policy 15, no. 6 (2000): 661–82. See also: David Phillips and Kimberly Ochs, “Processes of Policy Borrowing in Education: Some Explanatory and Analytical Devices,” Comparative Education 39, no. 4 (2003): 451–61; Gita Steiner-Khamsi, ed., The Global Politics of Educational Borrowing and Lending (New York: Teachers College Press, 2004); Gita Steiner-Khamsi, “The Politics and Economics of Comparison,” Comparative Education Review 54, no. 3 (2010): 323–42. 60 See: Stephen Carney, “Negotiating Policy in an Age of Globalization: Exploring Educational ‘Policyscapes’ in Denmark, Nepal, and China,” Comparative Education Review 53, no. 1 (2009): 63–88. See also: Anja P. Jakobi, “Global Education Policy in the Making: International Organisations and Lifelong Learning,” Globalisation, Societies and Education 7, no. 4 (2009): 473–87; Fazal Rizvi and Bob Lingard, Globalizing Education Policy (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2013); Antoni Verger, Hulya K. Altinyelken, and Mario Novelli, eds., Global Education Policy and International Development: New Agendas, Issues and Policies (London: A&C Black, 2012). 61 See: Nicholas C. Burbules and Carlos Alberto Torres, eds., Globalization and Education: Critical Perspectives (Milton Park: Psychology Press, 2000). See also: Roger Dale, “Specifying Globalization Effects on National Policy: A Focus on the Mechanisms,” Journal of Education Policy 14, no. 1 (1999): 1–17; Stavros Moutsios, “Power, Politics and Transnational Policy-Making in Education,” Globalisation, Societies and Education 8, no. 1 (2010): 121–41; Karen Mundy, Education for All and the New Development Compact (Amsterdam: Springer Netherlands, 2006). 62 See: Zeena Zakharia and Francine Menashy, “Private Sector Engagement in Refugee Education,” Forced Migration Review 57 (2018): 40–1. See also: Francine Menashy and Zeena Zakharia, “Investing in the Crisis: Private Participation in the Education of Syrian Refugees.” Education International (2017); Hang Minh Le, “Private Encroachment through Crisis-Making: The Privatization of Education for Refugees,” Education Policy Analysis Archives 27 (2019): 126;

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Clara Fontdevila, Antoni Verger, and Adrián Zancajo, “Taking Advantage of Catastrophes: Education Privatization Reforms in Contexts of Emergency,” In Private Schools and School Choice in Compulsory Education (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2017), 223–44. 63 See: Lynn Davies and Christopher Talbot, “Learning in Conflict and Postconflict Contexts,” Comparative Education Review 52, no. 4 (2008): 509–18. See also: Jeremy Rappleye, “Reflections on Some Challenges Facing Resurgent Interest in South-South Transfer in Education: A Case for Re-conceptualization,” Journal of the Society for International Education 5, no. 1 (2008): 65–78; Jeremy Rappleye and Julia Paulson, “Educational Transfer in Situations Affected by Conflict: Towards a Common Research Endeavour,” Research in Comparative and International Education 2, no. 3 (2007); Christopher Talbot, Education in Conflict Emergencies in Light of the post-2015 MDGs and EFA Agendas, Norrag Working Paper 3, January 2013. 64 Lesley Bartlett and Ameena Ghaffar-Kucher, eds., Refugees, Immigrants, and Education in the Global South: Lives in Motion (New York: Routledge, 2013), 3. 65 Bartlett and Ghaffar-Kucher, Refugees, Immigrants, and Education, 10. 66 Verger et al., Global Education Policy. 67 Bartlett and Ghaffar-Kucher, Refugees, Immigrants, and Education, 110–54. 68 Ibid., 139. 69 Ibid. 70 See: Mark Bray and M.V. Mukundan, “Management and Governance for EFA: Is Decentralisation Really the Answer?,” Comparative Education Research Centre, Faculty of Education, University of Hong Kong. See also: David Coleman and Phillip W. Jones, United Nations and Education: Multilateralism, Development and Globalisation (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2004); Michael Crossley, Mark Bray, and Steve Packer, Education in Small States: Policies and Priorities (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2011); Phillip W. Jones, World Bank Financing of Education: Lending, Learning and Development (New York: Routledge, 2007); Jonathan Murphy, “The World Bank, INGOs, and Civil Society: Converging Agendas? The Case of Universal Basic Education in Niger,” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 16, no. 4 (2005): 353–74; Colette Chabbott. Constructing Education for Development: International Organizations and Education for All (New York: Routledge, 2013); Colette Chabbott and Francisco O. Ramirez, “Development and Education,” In Handbook of the Sociology of Education (New York: Springer US, 2000), 163–87; Coleman and Jones, United Nations and Education; Karen Mundy, “Educational

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Multilateralism in a Changing World Order: Unesco and the Limits of the Possible,” International Journal of Educational Development 19, no. 1 (1999): 27–52; Karen Mundy, Education for All and the New Development Compact (Amsterdam: Springer Netherlands, 2006); Karen Mundy, “Global Governance, Educational Change,” Comparative Education 43, no. 3 (2007): 339–57. 71 Zakharia and Menashy, “Private Sector Engagement.” 72 See: Rebecca Winthrop, Gib Bulloch, Pooja Bhatt, and Arthur Wood, “‘Investment in Global Education: A Strategic Imperative for Business’.” Washington, DC: Center for Universal Education at the Brookings Institution, Accenture Development Partnerships and the Global Business Coalition for Education (2013). See also: Maysa Jalbout, Opportunities for Accelerating Progress on Education for Syrian Children and Youth in Jordan (New York: Theirworld, A World at School and Global Business Coalition for Education, 2015). 73 See: Fazal Rizvi, “Privatization in Education: Trends and Consequences,” Education Research and Foresight Working Papers (2016). See also: D. Brent Edwards Jr. and Alexander Means, “Globalization, Privatization, Marginalization: Mapping and Assessing Connections and Consequences in/through Education,” Education Policy Analysis Archives, 27 (2019): 123; Salim Vally, “The Bait - and Switch and Echo Chamber of School Privatization in South Africa,” The Wiley Handbook of Global Educational Reform (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2018), 231. 74 United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 428 (V), “Statute of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,” 1950. 75 See: Gil Loescher. “UNHCR at Fifty: Refugee Protection and World Politics.” Problems of Protection. The UNHCR, Refugees and Human Rights (New York: Routledge, 2003), 3–18. 76 Niklaus Steiner, Mark Gibney, and Gil Loescher, eds., Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights (East Sussex: Psychology Press, 2003), 27. 77 See: Beth Elise Whitaker, Changing Opportunities: Refugees and Host Communities in Western Tanzania, Centre for Documentation and Research, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1999. See also: Barbara Harrell-Bond, “Are Refugee Camps Good for Children?,” In New Issues in Refugee Research: Working Paper, vol. 29. UN. High Commissioner for Refugees (2000). 78 See: Gil Loescher and James Milner, “The Missing Link: The Need for Comprehensive Engagement in Regions of Refugee Origin,” International Affairs 79, no. 3 (2003): 595–617.

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79 Bupinder S. Chimni, “From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable Solutions to Refugee Problems,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2004, p. 59. 80 See: Harrell-Bond, Refugee Camps Good?. See also: Whitaker, Changing Opportunities, 1999. 81 Jacob Stevens, “Prisons of the Stateless,” New Left Review 42 (2006): 53. 82 Gil Loescher, “The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests vs. Institutional Autonomy,” International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (2001): 33–56. 83 See: Gary Troeller, Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications, ed. James HS Milner and Edward Newman (Tokyo, New York and Paris: United Nations University Press, 2008). 84 See: Phillip W. Jones, “On World Bank Education Financing,” Comparative Education 33, no. 1 (1997): 117–30. 85 Ibid. 86 See: Harrell-Bond, Refugee Camps Good?. 87 See: Gil Loescher and James Milner, “The Long Road Home: Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa,” Survival 47, no. 2 (2005): 153–74. 88 Ibid. 89 Dryden-Peterson et al., “The Purposes of Refugee Education.” 90 Amy Slaughter, and Jeff Crisp, A Surrogate State?: The Role of UNHR in Protracted Refugee Situations (UNHCR, Geneva: Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 2009). 91 Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015). 92 See: Alexander Betts, Gil Loescher, and James Milner, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2013). 93 See: Jeff Crisp, A State of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Refugee-Populated Areas of Kenya, UNHCR, 1999. See also: Jeff Crisp, “A State of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Kenya’s Refugee Camps,” African Affairs 99, no. 397 (2000): 601–32; Bupinder S. Chimni, From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable Solutions to Refugee Problems, Centre for Documentation and Research, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1999; Whitaker, Changing Opportunities, 1999. 94 See: Crisp, State of Insecurity. 95 Crisp, State of Insecurity, p. 10.

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96 See: Betts, Loescher, and Milner, Politics and Practice. 97 Gil Loescher and James Milner, “Understanding the Challenge,” Forced Migration Review 33 (2009): 9–11, 37. 98 UNHCR. “Global Report 2013-Kenya.” Geneva, 2014, 2. 99 Andrej Mahecic, “Dadaab: World’s Biggest Refugee Camp 20 Years Old,” UNHCR, February 21, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?pag e=search&docid=4f437d839&query=third%20generation (accessed on April 22, 2020). 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 Dadaab’s five sub-camps are: Ifo 1 and 2, Dagahaley, Hagadera, and Kambioos. 103 Kakuma’s four zones are: Kakuma 1, 2, 3, and 4. 104 Andrej Mahecic, “Twin Blasts in Dadaab Raise Concern of Worsening Security,” UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4e f1ec326&query=Dadaab (accessed December 1, 2019). 105 Ibid. 106 Historical analysis and narrative reconstruction are akin to mapping plot points in a story and connecting those points with exposition. Each historian or narrator will make sense of events differently. In reviewing and analyzing my master chronology composed of data from archival research and oral interviews, I identified seven emergent themes that to me made sense in organizing my data and reconstructing a coherent narrative across place and time. The unit levels are as follows: 1) a broad idea related to state and non-state actors in the post-Cold War era; 2) a broad idea related to EiE; 3) institutional feature related to the UNHCR; 4) institutional feature related to UNHCR’s education unit; 5) institutional feature related to UNHCR Nairobi Branch Office; 6) institutional feature related to Dadaab camp; and 7) institutional feature related to Kakuma camp. I had a master chronology of events that was not organized by theme. I also had a chronology of events within each theme. Doing so allowed me to look across institution, idea, and time to see, for example, how ideational developments in the field of EiE corresponded with institutional developments at UNHCR HQ and in Dadaab or Kakuma camp. 107 Graça Machel, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, UNICEF, 1996. 108 Global Community Services/Education Workshop, October 26–November, UNHCR, 1997, 33. 109 See: Carlo Ginzburg, “Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian,” Critical Inquiry 18, no. 1 (1991): 79–92.

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Chapter 3 1 Name changed to protect privacy. 2 In-person interview, Kakuma 4, May 30, 2014. 3 Phone interview, Skype, September 21, 2014. 4 See: Millard Burr, “Quantifying Genocide in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, 1983–1998,” Conflict in the Nuba Mountains: From Genocide-byAttrition to the Contemporary Crisis in Sudan, 2014, 89. 5 UNHCR, Kenya Information Bulletin, UNHCR, 1993. 6 Marie Lobo, Kenya Social Services Mission January 20-February 16, 1992 (Geneva: UNHCR, 1992), 4, 7. 7 Nyrovia Whande, “Kenya: An Assessment of the Situation of Women and Children, August 8–September 7, 1991,” UNHCR, 1991. 8 UNHCR, Kenya Information Bulletin, 1993. 9 Ibid. 10 Phone interview, November 4, 2015. 11 In-person interview, Geneva, May 14, 2015. 12 CARE, IRC, MSF, and SAVE are major international humanitarian aid agencies delivering a broad range of emergency and long-term relief and international development projects in more than ninety countries throughout the world. 13 Kenneth Lutato, Kenya Education Mission (Geneva: UNHCR, 1992), 20. 14 Skype interview, August 3, 2014. 15 Skype interview, October 11, 2014. 16 Lutato, Kenya Education Mission, 20. 17 Lobo, Kenya Social Services Mission, 1992, 17. 18 Lutato, Kenya Education Mission, 1992, 14. 19 Nyrovia Whande, Registration and Needs Assessment of Southern Sudanese Minors (Geneva: UNHCR, 1992), 7. 20 The Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative Fund (DAFI) provides a limited number of scholarships for refugees to attend universities and polytechnic institutions. DAFI has distributed approximately thirty scholarships per year to refugees residing in Kenya since 1992. 21 Whande, Registration and Needs Assessment, 7. 22 In-person interview, Kakuma 3, June 2, 2014. 23 UNHCR, 1992 Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees, Geneva, 1992. 24 UNHCR, 1988 Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees, Geneva, 1988. 25 UNHCR, 1992 Guidelines, 18.

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26 Lutato, Kenya Education Mission, 16. 27 In-person interview, Dagahaley, July 2, 2014. 28 UNHCR, 1992 Guidelines, 43. 29 Margaret Sinclair, Education Mission to Tanzania and Kenya July 4–30 (Geneva: UNHCR, 1994), 8. 30 Sinclair, Education Mission, 22. 31 In-person interview, Hagadera, July 1, 2014. 32 Dominique Rabiller, Regional Education Workshop Report Nairobi March 6–10 (Geneva: UNHCR, 1994). 33 Skype interview, August 3, 2014. 34 Whande, Kenya: An Assessment, 1991, 3. 35 Phone interview, September 21, 2014. 36 Kakuma 4, May 30, 2014. 37 Skype interview, August 3, 2014. 38 In-person interview, Hagadera, July 1, 2014. 39 In-person interview, Kakuma 1, May 29, 2014. 40 In-person interview, Kakuma 4, May 30, 2014. 41 In-person interview, Kakuma 3, June 2, 2014. 42 Skype interview, August 3, 2014. 43 In-person interview, Kakuma 4, May 30, 2014. 44 Ibid. 45 See: Melinda B. Robins, “‘Lost Boys’ and the Promised Land US Newspaper Coverage of Sudanese Refugees,” Journalism 4, no. 1 (2003): 29–49. 46 Phone interview, December 1, 2014. 47 Commonly referred to as “Black Hawk Down,” on October 3, 1993, Somali militia and armed civilian fighters shot down two US Black Hawk helicopters. The subsequent operation to secure and recover the crews of both helicopters resulted in eighteen deaths, eighty wounded, and one helicopter pilot captured among the US raid party and rescue forces. See: Cori Elizabeth Dauber, “The Shot Seen’round the World: The Impact of the Images of Mogadishu on American Military Operations,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4, no. 4 (2001): 653–87. 48 Skype interview, October 11, 2014. 49 UNHCR, Repatriation of Somali in Cross-Border Operation, Geneva, 1994, 2. 50 UNHCR, Repatriation of Somali, 1. 51 Phone interview, December 1, 2014. 52 Ibid. 53 Skype interview, August 29, 2014.

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54 In-person interview, Kakuma 3, June 2, 2014. 55 Phone interview, December 1, 2014. 56 In-person interview, Kakuma 1, May 31, 2014. 57 Sinclair, Education Mission, 1994, 4. 58 Ibid. 59 Sinclair, Education Mission, 1994, 8. 60 In-person interview, Hagadera, July 1, 2014. 61 UNHCR, Kenya Information Bulletin, 1994. 62 Ibid. 63 Sinclair, Education Mission to Tanzania and Kenya July 4–30, 10. 64 Sinclair, Education Mission, 11. 65 Skype interview, September 21, 2014. 66 Sinclair, Education Mission, 14. 67 Margaret Sinclair, UNESCO Education Mission January 12–15 (Geneva: UNHCR, 1994), 27. 68 Dominique Rabiller, Regional Education Workshop, March 6–10 (Geneva: UNHCR, 1995), 17. 69 Skype interview, August 29, 2014. 70 Ibid. 71 In-person interview, Kakuma 4, May 30, 2014. 72 UNHCR, Kenya Information Bulletin. Geneva: 1995, 6. 73 Phone interview, September 17, 2014. 74 UNHCR, Revised Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees, 1995. 75 Ibid., 11. 76 In-person interview, Kakuma 3, June 2, 2014. 77 Skype interview, August 11, 2014. 78 Rabiller, Regional Education Workshop, 1995, 12. 79 Phone interview, September 21, 2014. 80 In-person interview, UNHCR Compound, Dadaab, July 4, 2014. 81 UNHCR, Global Representatives Meeting Report. Geneva: 1996, 3. 82 Graça Machel, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, UNICEF, 1996. 83 Skype interview, June 27, 2014. 84 UNHCR, Global Community Services/Education Workshop, October 26–November 1 (Geneva: UNHCR, 1997), 33. 85 Skype interview, October 12, 2014. 86 Skype interview, October 11, 2014. 87 Ibid.

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144 88 Skype interview, October 9, 2014. 89 Skype interview, October 12, 2014.

90 Margaret Sinclair, Education Mission to Kenya March 8–15 (Geneva: UNHCR, 1997), 20. 91 Phone interview, November 2, 2014. 92 Phone interview, December 1, 2014. 93 Skype interview, June 29, 2014. 94 UNHCR, Review of UNHCR’s Implementing Arrangements. Geneva, 1997. 95 Ibid., 33. 96 Skype interview, October 12, 2014. 97 UNHCR, Review of UNHCR’s Education Activities. Geneva: 1997, 52. 98 Skype interview, August 3, 2014. 99 UNHCR, Education Review, 1997, 32. 100 The Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) is a certificate awarded to students after completing the approved eight-year course in primary education in Kenya. The subjects examined include Math, English, Swahili, Social Studies, Science and Religious Studies (Christian/Islamic/Hindu), and Social Studies, including Kenyan History. 101 In-person interview, Kakuma 2, June 3, 2014. 102 In-person interview, Kakuma 1, June 4, 2014. 103 Skype interview, August 3, 2014. 104 Phone interview, December 1, 2014. 105 UNHCR, Country Report, Kenya. Geneva: 1998, 4. 106 Phone interview, July 6, 2014. 107 Ibid. 108 UNHCR, Global Appeal. Geneva: 1998, 7. 109 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Donor Relations and Mobilizing Resources. UNHCR, 1998, 3. 110 Phone interview, July 11, 2014. 111 In-person interview, Ifo I, Dadaab, July 2, 2014. 112 Phone interview, July 11, 2014. 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 115 In-person interview, Dagahaley, July 2, 2014. 116 Pilar Aguilar and Gonzalo Retamal, “Rapid Educational Response in Complex Emergencies: A Discussion Document,” International Bureau of Education, 1998.

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117 Aguilar and Retamal, Rapid Educational Response, 1998, 2. 118 Mary Joy Pigozzi, “Education in Emergencies and for Reconstruction: A Developmental Approach,” UNICEF, 1999. 119 Phone interview, July 6, 2014. 120 Ibid. 121 Equivalent to approximately US$30. Available at: http://www.oanda.com/ currency/historical-rates/ 122 In-person interview, July 4, 2014. 123 In-person interview, Ifo, July 2, 2014. 124 Ibid. 125 Skype interview, September 23, 2014. 126 See: Julianne Duncan, “Sudanese ‘Lost Boys’ in the United States: Adjustment after Six Months,” In United States Catholic Conference, Washington, DC: 2001. 127 Skype interview, August 3, 2014. 128 In-person interview, Nairobi, July 10, 2014. 129 Skype interview, August 29, 2014. 130 Skype interview, October 11, 2014. 131 UNESCO, The Dakar Framework for Action: Education for All: Meeting Our Collective Commitments: Including Six Regional Frameworks for Action (Paris: UNESCO, 2000), 19. 132 The exact phrasing found in the Dakar Framework (2000) states that all EFA partners are committed to “meet[ing] the needs of education systems affected by conflict, natural calamities and instability and conduct[ing] educational programs in ways that promote mutual understanding, peace and tolerance, and that help to prevent violence and conflict.” See: UNESCO, The Dakar Framework, 19. 133 Skype interview, June 27, 2014. 134 UNHCR, Global Report—Kenya. Geneva: 2001, 4. 135 In-person interview, Kakuma 3, June 2, 2014. 136 Skype interview, June 27, 2014. 137 Ibid. 138 Anna Obura, UNHCR Peace Education Programme in Dadaab and Kakuma, Kenya: Evaluation Summary (Geneva: UNHCR, 2002). 139 Skype interview, October 11, 2014. 140 Skype interview, October 12, 2014. 141 In-person interview, Kakuma 1, June 11, 2014. 142 In-person interview, Kakuma 2, June 12, 2014.

Notes

146

143 In-person interview, Kakuma 1, May 29, 2014. 144 In-person interview, Kakuma 1, June 11, 2014. 145 Phone interview, August 3, 2014. 146 UNHCR, 2003 Education Sector Policy Guidelines, Geneva: 2003. 147 UNHCR, Education Policy Guidelines, 19. 148 Ibid., 22. 149 Ibid., 9. 150 Phone interview, July 11, 2014. 151 Susan Nicolai, Education in Emergencies: A Tool Kit for Starting and Managing Education in Emergencies (London: Save the Children UK, 2002). 152 UNESCO, Guidebook for Planning Education in Emergencies and Reconstruction (Paris: UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 2002). 153 In-person interview, Geneva, Switzerland, May 17, 2014. 154 Ibid. 155 The Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) is a certificate awarded to students after completing the approved four-year course in secondary education in Kenya. The subjects examined include Math, English, Swahili, Biology, History, Religious Studies, and Chemistry or Physics. 156 In-person interview, July 4, 2014. 157 In-person interview, Kakuma 1, June 4, 2014.

Chapter 4 1 UNHCR Global Report-Kenya. Geneva: 2004, 6. 2 Ibid., 20. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., 19. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid., 20. 7 Ibid., 19. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 UNHCR, Global Education Evaluation, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (Geneva: UNHCR, 2003). 11 UNHCR, Global Education Evaluation, 15.

Notes

147

12 In-person interview, Kakuma 4, May 30, 2014. 13 Ibid. 14 In-person interview, Kakuma 1, May 31, 2014. 15 In-person interview, Kakuma 1, June 11, 2014. 16 In-person interview, Kakuma 2, May 30, 2014. 17 Sphere Association, The Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, first edition (Geneva: Sphere Association, 2000). 18 Phone interview, August 22, 2014. 19 Skype interview, October 12, 2014. 20 UNHCR, Global Report-Kenya, 2. 21 Ibid., 11. 22 Ibid. 23 Skype interview, October 12, 2014. 24 Susan Nicolai and Carl Triplehorn, The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict, Network Paper: Humanitarian Practice Network 42 (2003): 1–36. 25 Phone interview, December 1, 2014. 26 Jeff Crisp, “A State of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Kenya’s Refugee Camps,” African Affairs 99, no. 397 (2000), 632. 27 Jeff Crisp, “No Solution in Sight: The Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa,” Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, Working Paper No. 68 (2003), 12. 28 In-person interview, Kakuma 1, June 4, 2014. 29 Jonathan Clayton, Jolie Gives Refugee Girls a Shot at School in Kenya, UNHCR, October 14, 2002, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2002/10/3daae1974/ feature-jolie-gives-refugee-girls-shot-school-kenya.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 30 Ibid. 31 UNHCR, World Refugee Day Final Report, June 20, 2004. 32 In-person interview, Kakuma 1, May 28, 2014. 33 In-person interview, Kakuma 3, June 2, 2014. 34 In-person interview, Kakuma 2, May 30, 2014. 35 UNHCR, Global Report-Kenya. Geneva: 2005, 9. 36 In-person interview, July 4, 2014. 37 In-person interview, Hagadera, July 1, 2014. 38 In-person interview, July 4, 2014. 39 In-person interview, Dagahaley, July 2, 2014.

Notes

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40 In-person interview, Kakuma 2, June 17, 2014. 41 Kanere Refugee Press, End of Year Marks, 2005, Kanere, December 2005, 17. 42 Ibid., 18. 43 Ibid. 44 In-person interview, Dagahaley, July 2, 2014. 45 Ibid. 46 In-person interview, July 4, 2014. 47 UNHCR, Global Report-Kenya. Geneva: 2008, 12. 48 In-person interview, July 4, 2014. 49 Millicent Mutuli, “Refugees Arriving in Kenya amidst Fears of Renewed Fighting in Somalia,” UNHCR, September 15, 2006, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/ latest/2006/9/450ace3e4/refugees-arriving-kenya-amid-fears-renewed-fightingsomalia.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Emmanuel Nyabera, “Floods Cause Havoc in North-East Refugee Camp for Somalis,” UNHCR, November 13, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/ latest/2006/11/455891f62/floods-cause-havoc-north-east-kenya-refugee-campssomalis.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 53 Ibid. 54 In-person interview, Nairobi, July 10, 2014. 55 Jennifer Pagonis, “Kenya: Airlift to Flood-Affected Refugee Camps in Dadaab,” November 28, 2006, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/ briefing/2006/11/456c15f42/kenya-airlift-flood-affected-refugee-camps-dadaab. html (accessed December 1, 2019). 56 In-person interview, Dagahaley, Dadaab, July 2, 2014. 57 Phone interview, July 6, 2014. 58 Ibid. 59 In-person interview, Nairobi, July 10, 2014. 60 UNHCR, Country Operations Plan-Kenya. Geneva: 2009. 61 In-person interview, July 4, 2014. 62 The Cluster approach is designed to coordinate the humanitarian response in manmade and natural disasters of UN agencies, INGOs, and NGOs in each sector (e.g., water, health and sanitation, protection), in order to prevent duplication or overlap. Cluster members meet on a regular basis to share information and discuss operations. See: https://www.humanitarianresponse. info/en/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach. 63 Skype interview, June 27, 2014.

Notes

149

64 See: Leonora MacEwen Sulagna Choudhuri, and Lyndsay Bird, Education Sector Planning: Working to Mitigate the Risk of Violent Conflict, Paris: UNESCO, 2011. 65 Phone interview, August 3, 2014. 66 UNHCR, 2007–2009 Education Strategy, Geneva: 2007. 67 UNHCR, Education Strategy, 3. 68 Ibid. 69 Skype interview, June 27, 2014. 70 UNHCR, Agenda for Protection. Geneva: 2006. 71 UNHCR, Overall Strategic Objectives. Geneva: 2006. 72 UNHCR, Global Priority Issues for Children. Geneva: 2005. 73 UNHCR, Education Strategy, 4. 74 Ron Redmond, UNHCR and Business Partners Give Refugee Kids a Voice through NineMillion Campaign, UNHCR, January 24, 2007, https://www.unhcr.org/ partners/partners/45b8be852/unhcr-business-partners-give-refugee-kids-voicestrongninestrongmillionorg.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 UNHCR, Global Appeal 2009 Update. Geneva: 2008. 78 Ibid. 79 Skype interview, June 27, 2014. 80 David Mwagiru, UNHCR Resumes Repatriation of Sudanese From Kenya, UNHCR, November, 28, 2007, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/ latest/2006/11/4564600e4/unhcr-resumes-repatriation-sudanese-kenyaskakuma-camp.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 81 See: Edward Thomas, Against the Gathering Storm: Securing Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 2009). 82 Thomas, Against the Gathering, 2009. 83 In-person interview, Kakuma 4, May 30, 2014. 84 See: Robyn Plasterer, Transnational Philanthropy: Somali Youth in Canada and Kenya. Education Unit (Geneva: UNHCR, 2011). 85 In-person interview, Kakuma 2, June 1, 2014. 86 Kazuhiko Shimizu, UNHCR Resume Refugee Returns from Kenya to South Sudan, UNHCR, December 12, 2008, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/ latest/2008/12/4942790e4/unhcr-resumes-refugee-returns-kenya-south-sudan. html (accessed December 1, 2019). 87 Ibid. 88 Kanere Refugee Press, Exam Score Update, Kanere, January 2009.

Notes

150

89 In-person interview, Kakuma 2, June 7, 2014. 90 Skype interview, October 12, 2014. 91 UNHCR, Global Report-Kenya. Geneva: 2009, 4–6. 92 In-person interview, Kakuma 1, May 31, 2014. 93 In-person interview, Kakuma 1, June 17, 2014. 94 In-person interview, Kakuma 1, June 17, 2014. 95 Phone interview, July 19, 2014. 96 In-person interview, Kakuma 1, June 4, 2014. 97 Emmanuel Nyabera, Dadaab Camps under Severe Strain as Somalis Continue to Flee to Kenya, UNHCR, March 27, 2009, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/ latest/2009/3/49ccf5ad2/dadaab-camps-under-severe-strain-somalis-continueflee-kenya.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 98 Ibid. 99 Yusuf Hassan, UNHCR Chief Visits Dadaab-Draws Attention to Dramatic Somali Refugee Crisis, UNHCR, August 5, 2009, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/ latest/2009/8/4a7955db6/unhcr-chief-visits-dadaab-draws-attention-dramaticsomali-refugee-crisis.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 100 In-person interview, Ifo II, July 3, 2014. 101 CARE, Dadaab Education Sector Strategy 2009–2011. Geneva: 2009. 102 CARE, Dadaab Strategy, 4. 103 Ibid., 10. 104 Andy Needham, UNHCR Prepares for Possible Flooding in Dadaab Refugee Camps, UNHCR, November 6, 2009, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/ latest/2009/11/4af446a59/unhcr-prepares-possible-flooding-dadaab-refugeecamps-appeals-us28-million.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 105 UNHCR, 2010–2012 Education Sector Strategy. Geneva: 2010. 106 UNHCR, Education Strategy, 10. 107 Ibid., 15. 108 Skype interview, October 20, 2014. 109 UNHCR, Global Operations Update-Kenya. Geneva: 2009. 110 Skype interview, October 20, 2014. 111 Skype interview, October 27, 2014. 112 In-person interview, July 4, 2014. 113 In-person interview, Hagadera, July 1, 2014. 114 These included the African Virtual University, Kenyatta University in Nairobi, Windle Trust, York University, and the University of British Columbia. 115 In-person interview, July 4, 2014.

Notes

151

116 Phone interview, December 3, 2014. 117 UNHCR, Global Appeal-Kenya, 2011. Geneva: 2010. 118 UNHCR, Global Report-Kenya. Geneva: 2011. 119 Melissa Fleming, Number of Somali Refugees Grows Sharply in 2011, UNHCR, April 29, 2011, https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2011/4/4dba949d9/ number-somali-refugees-grows-sharply-2011.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 120 Ibid. 121 See: David Shinn, “Al-Shabaab Tries to Take Control in Somalia,” Foreign Police Institute 7 (2013): 203. 122 Shinn, “Al-Shabaab.” 123 Adrian Edwards, Disturbances at Kenya’s Dadaab Complex as Somali Influx Grows, UNHCR, July 1, 2011, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/ briefing/2011/7/4e0da1499/disturbances-kenyas-dadaab-complex-somali-influxgrows.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 124 Melissa Fleming, Staggering Malnutrition Rates as Quarter of Somalia Population Uprooted, UNHCR, July 5, 2011, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/ briefing/2011/7/4e12f1f36/staggering-malnutrition-rates-quarter-somaliapopulation-uprooted.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 125 UNHCR, Helping the Most Vulnerable in Dadaab, August 10, 2011, https://www. unhcr.org/tr/en/11328-helping-the-most-vulnerable-in-dadaab.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 126 In-person interview, Nairobi, July 18, 2014. 127 Greg Beals, As Somalis Stream into Kenya, UNHCR Races to Build a New Refugee Camp, UNHCR, August 3, 2011, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/ latest/2011/8/4e39583f9/somalis-stream-kenya-unhcr-races-fill-new-refugeecamp.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 128 Sonia Aguilar, Dadaab: Walking the Fine Line between Helping Refugees and Risking Lives, UNHCR, November 28, 2011, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/ latest/2011/11/4ed3bc316/dadaab-walking-fine-line-helping-refugees-riskinglives.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 129 Ibid. 130 UNHCR, UNHCR Alarmed over Recent Security Incidents in Dadaab, UNHCR, December 21, 2011, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2011/12/ 4ef1dddf9/unhcr-alarmed-recent-security-incidents-dadaab.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 131 In-person interview, Kakuma 3, June 2, 2014. 132 In-person interview, UNHCR Compound, July 4, 2014.

Notes

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133 Phone interview, December 3, 2014. 134 Dryden-Peterson, Global Review. 135 Phone interview, December 3, 2014. 136 Dryden-Peterson, Global Review, 5. 137 Dryden-Peterson, Global Review, 9. 138 Skype interview, December 15, 2014. 139 Phone interview, December 3, 2014. 140 UNHCR, 2012–2016 Education Strategy. Geneva: 2012. 141 Skype interview, October 20, 2014. 142 UNHCR, Education Strategy, 25. 143 UNHCR, Global Operations Update-Kenya. Geneva: 2012, 17. 144 In-person interview, Nairobi, July 16, 2014. 145 UNHCR, Global Operations Update-Kenya. Geneva: 2012, 12. 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid. 148 UNHCR, Global Operations Update-Kenya, 14. 149 Ibid. 150 In-person interview, Kakuma 3, June 2, 2014. 151 In-person interview, July 4, 2014. 152 Ibid. 153 In-person interview, Kakuma 3, June 2, 2014. 154 Douglas H. Johnson, “Briefing: The Crisis in South Sudan,” African Affairs 113, no. 451 (2014): 300–9. 155 Emmanuel Nyabera, Kakuma Camp Exceeds Its 100,000 Person Capacity, UNHCR, August 6, 2012, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2012/8/ 501fdb419/kakuma-camp-kenya-surpasses-its-100000-capacity.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 156 Ibid. 157 Ibid. 158 UNHCR, Global Operations Update-Kenya. Geneva: 2012, 11. 159 Ibid. 160 Ibid. 161 Kanere Refugee Press, Exam Score Update. Kanere, December 2012. 162 Charity Tooze, New Initiative to Enroll 172,000 Refugee Children in School, UNHCR, November 20, 2012, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/ latest/2012/11/50aba6d06/new-initiative-enroll-172000-refugee-children-school. html (accessed December 1, 2019). 163 Ibid.

Notes

153

Chapter 5 1 UNHCR, 1992 Guidelines. 2 Dryden-Peterson, Global Review, 11. 3 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, Elizabeth Adelman, Michelle J. Bellino, and Vidur Chopra, “The purposes of refugee education: policy and practice of including refugees in national education systems,” Sociology of Education 92, no. 4 (2019): 346–66. 4 UNHCR, 2012–2016 Education Strategy. 5 Ibid. 6 William Spindler, Back to School in the World’s Largest Refugee Camp, UNHCR, September 5, 2011, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2011/9/4e64e2ac9/ school-worlds-largest-refugee-camp.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 7 UNHCR, Global Trends Report. Geneva: 2012.

Chapter 6 1 Edith Honan, “UN Expands Refugee Camp in Kenya as South Sudan Conflict Rages,” Reuters, June 20, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudanrefugees-kenya-idUSKBN0P00TJ20150620 (accessed December 1, 2019). 2 “South Sudan Opposition Head Riek Machar Denies Coup Bid,” BBC, December 18, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25427619 (accessed December 1, 2019). 3 UNHCR, UNHCR Position on Returns to South Sudan, February 2014, https:// www.refworld.org/docid/52fa1ecd4.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 4 Ibid. 5 Honan, “UN Expands Refugee Camp in Kenya.” 6 “Children Need More Support at Kenya’s Kakuma Refugee Camp,” IRIN, May 19, 2014, https://www.refworld.org/docid/537b35c54.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 7 In-person interview, Kakuma 4, May 30, 2014. 8 UNHCR, Kakuma Camp Update, May 28–June 3, 2014, June 2014, https://reliefweb. int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/KakumaEmergencyUpdate3rdJune2014.pdf (accessed December 1, 2019). 9 Ibid. 10 In-person interview, Kakuma 4, May 30, 2014.

Notes

154 11 Ibid.

12 UNHCR, Kakuma Operational Update, August 7–13, 2014, August 2014, https:// reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/KakumaEmergencyUpdate7th13thAugust.pdf (accessed December 1, 2019). 13 In-person interview, Kakuma 4, May 30, 2014. 14 European Union, Dadaab: The EU Enhances Education Opportunities for Somali Children and Youth in Refugee Camps, April 12, 2013, https://reliefweb.int/report/ kenya/dadaab-eu-enhances-education-opportunities-somali-children-andyouth-refugee-camps (accessed December 1, 2019). 15 UNHCR, Dadaab Camp Update, April 16–May 15, 2013, May 2013, https:// reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/15%20May%202013%20Sitrep.pdf (accessed December 1, 2019). 16 Jeffrey Gettleman and Nicholas Kulish, “Gunmen Kill Dozens in Terror Attack at Kenyan Mall,” New York Times, September 21, 2013, https://www.nytimes. com/2013/09/22/world/africa/nairobi-mall-shooting.html 17 “Westgate Attack: MPs Call for Refugee Camp to Close,” BBC, September 30, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24339508 (accessed December 1, 2019). 18 UNHCR, “New Procedures Set for Somali Refugees to Return Home Voluntarily from Kenya,” November 11, 2013, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/ press/2013/11/528102b49/new-procedures-set-somali-refugees-return-homevoluntarily-kenya.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 19 Christine Monaghan and Elisabeth King, Youth Education Programming and Peacebuilding in Dadaab Refugee Camp: Results and Lessons Learned (Nairobi: UNICEF, 2015). 20 Ibid., 5. 21 Ibid., 11. 22 Ibid., 17. 23 Ibid., 3. 24 Ibid., 34. 25 In-person interview, Dadaab Town, October 14, 2015. 26 UNHCR, Voluntary Return and Reintegration of Somali Refugees from Kenya, 2015, https://www.unhcr.org/560b962f9.pdf (accessed December 1, 2019). 27 Monaghan and King, Youth Education Programming, 36. 28 UNHCR, UNHCR and GPE Agree on a Closer Collaboration to Ensure Children’s Education during Crisis, April 15, 2016, https://www.unhcr.org/news/

Notes

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press/2016/4/572a43b94/unhcr-and-gpe-agree-on-closer-collaboration-toensure-childrens-education.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 29 See: Global Partnership for Education, https://www.globalpartnership.org/ (accessed December 1, 2019). 30 See: Francine Menashy and Sarah Dryden-Peterson, “The Global Partnership for Education’s Evolving Support to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States,” International Journal of Educational Development 44 (2015): 82–94. See also: Sarah Dryden-Peterson, “Refugee Education: The Crossroads of Globalization,” Educational Researcher 45, no. 9 (2016): 473–82. 31 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement 2015, 2015, http://www.unhcr. org/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.htm (accessed December 1, 2019). 32 Dryden-Peterson, Global Review. 33 Dawn Chatty, “The Syrian Humanitarian Disaster: Understanding Perceptions and Aspirations in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey,” Global Policy 8 (2017): 25–32. 34 Shelly Culbertson and Louay Constant, Education of Syrian Refugee Children: Managing the Crisis in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2015). 35 In-person interview, New York, February 6, 2017. 36 UN General Assembly, “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.” Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on September 19, 2016. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 “Kenya,” Global Compact for Refugees Platform, http://www.globalcrrf.org/ crrf_country/kenya-2/ (accessed December 1, 2019). 40 UNHCR, Innovation: UNHCR and Vodafone Bring Tablet-Based Learning to 18,000 Somali Refugees, October 9, 2014, https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/ innovation-unhcr-and-vodafone-bring-tablet-based-learning-18000-somalirefugees (accessed December 1, 2019). 41 The World Bank, New Partnership at Work: UNHCR and the World Bank Group, October 4, 2017, https://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2017/10/28/new-partnershipat-work-unhcr-and-the-world-bank-group (accessed December 1, 2019). 42 UNHCR, Teacher Training Transforms Learning in Kenyan Camp Schools, September 18, 2017, https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/teacher-trainingtransforms-learning-kenyan-camp-schools (accessed December 1, 2019). 43 Ibid.

Notes

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44 Teachers College, Teacher Professional Development in a Refugee Context, https:// www.tc.columbia.edu/refugeeeducation/teachers-for-teachers-kakuma/ (accessed December 1, 2019). 45 Donated by the Vodafone Foundation, 13 Instant Network Schools had gone online in Dadaab in 2014. 46 UNHCR, Kakuma Operational Update, February 1–15, 2016, February 2016, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/KEN_SSD_ Update01to15February2016.pdf (accessed December 1, 2019). 47 European Commission’s Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, “Staying in School at Kakuma Refugee Camp,” October 4, 2016, https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/staying-school-kakumarefugee-camp (accessed December 1, 2019). 48 Ibid. 49 The Kenyan government claimed that the security situation in Somalia had stabilized, and that the camp continued to serve as a terrorist training ground for Al Shabaab militants. See: “Kenya Plans to Close the World’s Largest Refugee Camp,” AFP, March 26, 2019, https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Kenyaplans-to-close-world-biggest-refugee-camp-Dadaab/4552908-5043110-tuyrdhz/ index.html. 50 Global Education Cluster, Global Education Cluster Newsletter, Special Issue on Somalia, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/us2.campaignarchive1.com-Global%20Education%20Cluster%20Newsletter%20-%20Issue%20 No%2032.pdf (accessed December 1, 2019). 51 UNHCR, Kalobeyei Settlement, https://www.unhcr.org/ke/kalobeyei-settlement (accessed December 1, 2019). See also: Jennie Taylor and Boniface Karanja, Report on Joint Education Mission to Dadaab Refugee Camps, UNHCR, October 2016, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/report_on_joint_ education_mission_to_dadaab_refugee_camps_20160930.pdf (accessed December 1, 2019). 52 Somalia Education Cluster, Education across the Border: Closure of Dadaab Refugee Camp, 2016, 2016, http://educationcluster.net/wp-content/ uploads/2016/11/Somalia-Edu-Cluster_Education-Across-the-Border_Nov2016_FINAL.pdf (accessed December 1, 2019). 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 “Kenya Delays Dadaab Refugee Camo Closure by Six Months,” Al Jazeera, November 16, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/kenya-delays-

Notes

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dadaab-refugee-camp-closure-months-161116130647820.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 56 Jeffrey Gettleman, “Kenyan Court Blocks Plan to Close Dadaab Refugee Camp,” New York Times, February 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/world/ africa/kenyan-court-blocks-plan-to-close-dadaab-refugee-camp.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 57 European Commission’s Directorate for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Operations, Kenya-Dadaab Refugee Camp: ECHO Daily Flash of 10 April 2017, April 10, 2017, https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/kenyadadaab-refugee-camps-dg-echo-unhcr-echo-daily-flash-10-april-2017 (accessed December 1, 2019). 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 UNHCR, Kalobeyei Settlement, https://www.unhcr.org/ke/kalobeyei-settlement (accessed December 1, 2019). 62 Alexander Betts, Remco Geervliet, Claire MacPherson, Naohiko Omata, Cory Rodgers, and Olivier Sterck, Self-Reliance in Kalobeyei? Socio-Economic Outcomes for Refugees in North-West Kenya (Oxford: Refugee Studies Center, 2018). 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 In-person interview, Bidi Bidi Camp, September 18, 2017. 66 Caroline Opile, University for Refugees and Kenyans Set to Open in Kakuma, Northern Kenya, February 27, 2018, https://www.unhcr.org/ke/13435-universityrefugees-kenyans-set-open-kakuma-northern-kenya.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 67 Ibid. 68 See: M.W. Ngware, H. Boukary, P. Wekulo, M. Mutisya, K. Zikani, C.M.A. Otieno, and A.R.O. Riechi, Alternative Education and Return Pathways for Outof-School Youth. A Background Paper for the Secondary Education in Africa (SEA): Preparing Youth for the Future of Work. APHRC (Nairobi: African Population and Health Research Center, 2018). 69 UNHCR, Operational Update-Dadaab, Kenya January 2019, January 31, 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/unhcr-operational-update-dadaab-kenyajanuary-2019 (accessed December 1, 2019). 70 UNGA, “Global Compact on Refugees and Migrants,” December 17, 2018. 71 Ibid.

Notes

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72 UNHCR, Refugee Education 2030: A Strategy for Refugee Inclusion (Geneva: UNHCR, 2019). 73 UNHCR, Supporting Continued Access to Education during COVID-19: Emerging Promising Practices, April 2020, 7, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/5ea7eb134 (accessed April 22, 2020). 74 Ibid., 1. 75 UNHCR, “Stepping Up: Refugee Education in Crisis,” 2019. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Debora Hinderliter Ortloff, “Becoming European: A Framing Analysis of Three Countries’ Civics Education Curricula,” European Education 37, no. 4 (2005): 35–49. 79 “The Plus of Erasmus,” European Union, https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/ erasmus-plus/node_en (accessed April 24, 2020). 80 Steven Klees, “The Partnership Schools for Liberia: A Critical Analysis,” UNESCO IIEP, November 7, 2017, https://gemreportunesco.wordpress. com/2017/11/07/the-partnership-schools-for-liberia-a-critical-analysis/ (accessed December 1, 2019). 81 Ibid. 82 See: Besley, Tina AC, and Michael A. Peters, “The End of Neoliberal Globalization and the Rise of Authoritarian Populism,” In Teaching, Responsibility, and the Corruption of Youth (Brill Sense, 2019), 167–71. 83 Shabia Mantoo, Less than 5 Percent of Global Refugee Resettlement Needs Met Last Year, UNHCR, February 19, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/ briefing/2019/2/5c6bc9704/5-cent-global-refugee-resettlement-needs-met-year. html (accessed December 1, 2019). 84 See: Steven J. Klees, Joel Samoff, and Nelly P. Stromquist, eds., The World Bank and Education: Critiques and Alternatives, vol. 14 (New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2012). 85 See: Phillip W. Jones, “On World Bank Education Financing,” Comparative Education 33, no. 1 (1997): 117–30. 86 Dryden-Peterson, Sarah, Elizabeth Adelman, Michelle J. Bellino, and Vidur Chopra, “The Purposes of Refugee Education: Policy and Practice of Including Refugees in National Education Systems.” Sociology of Education 92, no. 4 (2019): 346–66. 87 Ibid. 88 See: Stephen P. Heyneman, “The History and Problems in the Making of Education Policy at the World Bank, 1960–2000,” in Global Trends in

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Educational Policy (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2005), 23–58. See also: Steven J. Klees, “World Bank and Education: Ideological Premises and Ideological Conclusions,” in Education Strategy in the Developing World: Revising the World Bank’s Education Policy (New York: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2012), 151–71; Karen Mundy and Francine Menashy, “The World Bank and Private Provision of Schooling: A Look through the Lens of Sociological Theories of Organizational Hypocrisy,” Comparative Education Review 58, no. 3 (2014): 401–27; Francine Menashy, “Interrogating an Omission: The Absence of a Rights-Based Approach to Education in World Bank Policy Discourse,” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 34, no. 5 (2013): 749–64; Karen Mundy and Francine Menashy, “The World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and Private Sector Participation in Basic Education: Examining the Education Sector Strategy 2020,” in Education strategy in the Developing World: Revising the World Bank’s Education Policy (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2012), 113–31. 89 “Progress Report,” The Global Business Coalition for Education, https:// gbc-education.org/global-business-coalition-for-educations-commitment-toeducation-in-emergencies-progress-report/ (accessed December 1, 2019). 90 “About Us,” The Global Business Coalition for Education, https://gbc-education. org/about-us/ (accessed December 1, 2019). 91 Francine Menashy and Zeena Zakharia, Investing in the Crisis: Private Participation in the Education of Syrian Refugees (Brussels: Education International, 2017). 92 Sarah Dryden-Peterson and Hovil Lucy, Refugees, Conflict and the Search for Belonging (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 93 Dryden-Peterson et al., “The Purposes of Refugee Education.” 94 George Dickerson, “Education for the Palestine Refugees: The UNRWA/ UNESCO Programme,” Journal of Palestine Studies 3, no. 3 (1974): 122–30. 95 Ghassan Shabaneh, “Education and Identity: The Role of UNRWA’s Education Programmes in the Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism,” Journal of Refugee Studies 25, no. 4 (2012): 491–513. 96 Husein Abdul-Hamid, Harry Patrinos, Joel Reyes, Jo Kelcey, and Andrea Diaz Varela, Learning in the Face of Adversity: The UNRWA Education Program for Palestine Refugees (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2015). 97 Jo Kelcey and Christine Monaghan, “Why We Should All Be ResearcherAdvocates,” NORRAG, May 31, 2018, https://www.norrag.org/why-we-should-

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all-be-researcher-advocates-by-jo-kelcey-and-christine-monaghan/ (accessed December 1, 2019). 98 UNHCR, “UNHCR’s New 2 Billion Kilometers to Safety Campaign Invites the Public to Step in Solidarity with Refugees,” January 8, 2019, https://www.unhcr. org/en-us/news/press/2019/1/5c331e284/unhcrs-new-2-billion-kilometressafety-campaign-invites-public-step-solidarity.html (accessed December 1, 2019). 99 Jo Becker, Campaigning for Justice: Human Rights Advocacy in Practice (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2012). 100 See: Nick Martlew, Creative Coalitions Handbook for Change (London: Crisis Action, 2017), https://crisisaction.org/handbook/download/ (accessed December 1, 2019). 101 Louis Charbonneau, Michelle Nichols, and Yara Bayoumy, “U.N. Chief Faced Funding Cut-Off, Fatwa Risk over Saudis: Sources,” Reuters, June 7, 2016, https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-saudi-un/u-n-chief-faced-fundingcut-off-fatwa-risk-over-saudis-sources-idUSKCN0YT2UT (accessed December 1, 2019). 102 See: UNESCO, “What You Need to Know about the UNESCO Qualifications Passport for Refugees and Migrants,” November 14, 2019, https://en.unesco.org/ news/what-you-need-know-about-unesco-qualifications-passport-refugees-andvulnerable-migrants. 103 Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954).

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Index Accelerated Learning Programs 114–15 Adjumani 117 African Development and Emergency Organization (ADEO) 87, 91 Al Alrahman (Islamic organization) 40 Al Nuur Primary School 91 Al Shabaab 30, 86–7, 91, 102–3, 111 asylum, countries of 5–7, 26–8, 34–6, 47, 64, 86, 96, 106, 111, 113, 116, 122 Bidi Bidi 117 Black Hawk Down 41–2, 142 n.47 Borderless Higher Education for Refugees (BHER) program 85 camp schools, yearly analysis. See also Dadaab refugee camps; Kakuma refugee camps cluster approach 77–8 higher education 68–9 refugee teachers 68–9 SPHERE 69–70 2003-Dadaab and Kakuma 67–8 2003–04: education and protection 70–2 2004–05:enrollment efforts, overcrowding 72–4 2005: secondary school enrollment and national exams 74–5 2006-education programming in Dadaab 76–7 2007–08: repatriation from and relocation to Kakuma 79–83 2007–09: education strategy, corporation funding in Dadaab 78–9 2009: continued influx and Dadaab education strategy 83–4 2010: new global education strategy, new implementing partners in Dadaab 84–5

2010–11: education as a priority program, education and extremism in Dadaab 85–7 2011–12: global challenges to refugee education 88–9 2012: impacts of the 2012–16 strategy in Dadaab and Kakuma 89–90 2012: refugees on the frontline of service delivery in Dadaab 90–1 2012: returning to Kakuma 91–2 CARE 3, 35–8, 40–1, 43–6, 48–9, 51, 56, 58–9, 64, 84, 87, 97 education in sub-camps 106 enrollment efforts (2004–05) 73–4 teacher hiring 75 Cold War 5–7, 9, 20, 24, 27, 34, 49 Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) 114 constructivism 17–18, 20 COVID-19 119 critical junctures 17–18, 20 1992–2012: comparative analysis 104–8 1998: Peace Education Program 98–100 2000: INEE 100–1 2006 and 2011: “Emergency” in Dadaab 101–3 Dadaab refugee camps. See also critical junctures; policy recommendations budget cuts (2002) 62–5 curriculum and language of instruction 36–7 education for all (2000–1) 60–1 EiE literature 20 financial crisis 55–6 five sub-camps 115 formal education programs (1992) 36 founding of education programs (1992) 33–5

Index girls’ enrollment 38–9 history of education 2–4 “humanitarian aid” model 57–8 implementing partner staff 47–8 incentive wages (1992–1993) 37–8, 40–1 Peace Education (1997) 50–1, 53 primary schooling and ECD 39–40 primary schools 1994 44 private funding (2001) 61–2 PTAs (1993) 40–1, 107, 120 quality of education (2002) 62–5 refugee education policy 7–13, 17–18 school construction (1999) 58–9 schooling under trees 1, 12, 36, 38, 40, 54, 120 secondary school (1998) 54–5 security situation 43 SMCs (1993) 40–1, 107, 120 Somali-Kenyan curriculum 63 student population (2017) 115 teacher strike (2001) 61–2 toolkits (2002) 62–5 UNHCR archives and oral history 29–31 vocational training 53 DAFI program 35, 44 Don Bosco 43, 46, 53, 82, 90, 98 DSTV program 111–12 Early Childhood Development (ECD) schools 40–1, 116 teachers 62 Educate a Child Initiative 92 Education Cannot Wait fund 113, 122 Education Cluster 77–8, 86, 115 Education for All (EFA) 21, 113 basic education policies 29, 53, 96, 98, 113, 120 challenges 79 global priority policy 25 goals 39–40 INEE and 101 second forum 21 Education Management Information System (EMIS) 85 EiE (Education in Emergencies) 9–10, 17, 19–21, 29, 140

175

community services 21–3 scholarship 11, 25 European Commission, funding 115 FilmAid 73, 86 Finn Church Aid 114 Global Citizenship Education (GCE) 122 Global Compact 118, 124 Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment Program (GLOBE) 56 Global Partnership for Education (GPE) 104 UNHCR’s partnership 112–13 Gore, Al 56 Ifo 2 1, 76, 87, 89, 91, 102 “Information Technology Center” 79, 101 in-service teacher training 60, 90, 104 Instant Network Schools 114 Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) 12–13, 21 education service delivery 78, 100–1 founding 95, 100–1, 104 meetings at UNHCR HQ 100, 106 2001 Forum 60–1 international development studies, education 23–5 International Nongovernmental Organization (INGOs) 5–7, 9, 21, 24–5, 27, 30, 35, 49, 69, 100, 121, 123–4 education cluster/programs 77, 106–7 radio education program 119 “Support to Education for Refugees in Dadaab Programme” 111 two year program 85 Working Group on Refugee Education 44 International Relief and Rehabilitation Services (IRRES) 36–8, 40–1, 43–5, 52 International Rescue Committee’s Healing Classroom Initiative (IRC) 22, 45, 52, 78 Islamic Relief 91

176 Jesuit Refugee Services 72 Jolie, Angelina 72 Kakuma refugee camps. See also critical junctures; policy recommendations American media portrayal 42 budget cuts 56 education in emergencies 61 education policies 8–9, 23 Environmental Education program 48 founding of education programs (1992) 7, 33–5 girls’ enrollment (1992) 38–9 history of education 2, 9 incentive wages (1992–1993) 37–8, 40–1 IRRES challenges with 45 Kenyan national curriculum 10, 37 LWF management 54 NRC education 60 Pastoral Care 51 peace education programming 32, 50, 63 primary schooling and ECD (1992) 39–40 PTAs (1993) 40–1, 107 Radda Barnen management 46, 52 research practice 20 schooling under trees 1, 12, 36, 38, 40, 54, 120 secondary School (1998) 55, 62 SMCs (1993) 40–1, 107 student demography and enrollment 43–4, 59, 62 student to teacher ratios 9, 58, 70, 74 Sudanese minors 41 teacher strike 64 teaching workforce 13 text books, challenges with 58 UNHCR archives and oral history 29–31 UNHCR’s implementing partners 12, 36 violent protests 46 vocational education program (Don Bosco) 43, 53 Kalobeyei, primary schools 116 aid-based model to a self-reliance model 116

Index Kambioos 87, 89, 115 Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) 64, 68–9, 74–6, 80, 85, 90, 92, 107–8, 112, 115 Kenyan Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) 54, 58, 67, 74–6, 81, 83, 90, 92, 102, 107–8, 115, 118 in Somalia 115 Kenyan curriculum 37, 48, 54–6, 65, 97, 107 Kiir, Salva (president of South Sudan) 91, 110 Lost Boys group 41, 59, 129 n.21 Lutheran World Federation (LWF) 31, 43, 51–2, 54, 56, 58–9, 62, 68, 74, 87, 91, 114 child protection service 72 double shift system 110 teacher hiring 75, 82, 90, 104 Machar, Reik (president) 109–10 Machel Report 48–50, 99, 120 Makarare University in Uganda 80 Mastercard Foundation 114, 118 Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) 35, 87 Microsoft 79, 101, 111 Musinde Muliro University 82, 118 New York Declaration 113–14, 118 Nike 79, 101 Nongovernmental Organization (NGOs) 3, 5, 22–5, 45, 61, 69, 74, 80–1, 92, 102, 106 Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) 100 budget and staff 105 seconded education officers 60, 77, 79, 101, 105, 107 UNICEF funding 111 vocational education program 106 Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) 40, 47, 56, 83, 90, 97, 107, 120 Peace Education Program 13, 22, 32, 50–1, 57, 61, 63, 95, 98–100, 104 policy recommendations preparations for repatriation in Dadaab 109–12 structural challenges 119–26

Index 2013–14: continued Influx into Kakuma 109–12 2015–16: education for inclusion 112–14 2015–17: private sector partnerships in Dadaab and Kakuma 114–16 2016–17: education for self-reliance 116 2017–20: education for inclusion 116–19 Queen of Qatar, as funding partner for education 92 Radda Barnen 35, 45–7, 52, 54 refugee education. See also policy recommendations challenges 120–4 student to teacher ratios 117 tent schools 110–11 Refugee Education Trust (RET) 55, 61–2 Rhino 117 Rwandan refugees 28, 47 Save the Children 78 Save the Children International 35, 45, 64, 78 School Management Committees (SMCs) 40–1, 107, 120 Second Education for All Forum 60 Second World War 23, 27 Senior Education Officers 60, 104–6 Somali refugees 34, 42, 54, 67, 76, 82–3, 91, 96, 101, 111, 116 UNHCR tripartite agreement 111 South Sudanese refugees 109, 111, 116, 118 academic credentials 115 repatriation 110 SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army) 33, 43, 46, 71, 80, 104, 114, 116 Sudanese Civil War 33, 80 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 80 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-InOpposition (SPLM-IO) 109–10, 116 teachers hiring and training 12, 48, 68

177

refugee 12, 29, 37–8, 41, 58, 63, 65, 68, 73, 79, 82, 89–90, 97, 101–2, 114, 120 Teachers College at Columbia University 114 Uganda 2, 57, 80, 109 refugee policy 116–17 UN (United Nation) 5–8, 15, 18, 21–2, 24, 44, 57, 61 Security Council Resolutions 28 UNDP (United Nations Development Program) 26–7 UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) 21, 35, 37, 42, 44–5, 48–9, 56–7, 60–1, 63–4 Advisory Group 78 global citizenship education 122 INEE partnership 100 in-service training to Somali teachers 46, 48 UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) 4, 89 annual budget meetings 105 annual Executive Committee Meeting 88, 103 archives in Geneva 15, 29, 31 bilateral agreement with NRC 60 budget cuts 62–4 Children’s Trust Fund 50 curriculum and language of instruction 22–5 demography of refugees 59 education in emergencies, meetings in Geneva 61 Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit 103 founding of camps at Dadaab and Kakuma 33–7 Guidelines for Refugee Education 105 implementing partners for education 45, 47, 90, 93, 98–9 incentive wages 38–9 INEE’s role 100 institutional arrangements 104–5 institutional partners 101–2 “Lost Boys” group 41–3 LWF’s appointment 51–2

178 Memorandum of Understanding with UNICEF 107 new partnerships and global policy priorities 114 new priorities 113–14 operations and budget 26–9, 32, 47, 49–50, 55–7 partnership with GPE 112–13 peace education 46, 51, 57, 63 post-Cold war era, education literature 20–1 primary schooling 39–40 private donors 61–2 Queen of Qatar, as funding partner for education 92 recent education strategy 108, 118–19 refugee education policies 5–13, 53 refugees’ access to quality education 122–4 secondary schooling 55 Somali refugees 54 2007–09 Education Strategy 78, 83 2010 budget for Dadaab and Kakuma 86 2010: New Global Education Strategy 84–5 2011 Global Review of Refugee Education 103–4

Index 2012–16 Education Strategy 95, 88, 103–4, 108 voluntary repatriation operation in Sudan 79–80 Windle Trust Kenya (WTK) as implementing partner 58 UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) 21, 23, 44, 46, 49, 57, 60–1, 78, 86–8, 100, 103, 106–7, 109–11, 113, 119 INEE partnership with 100 UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education 124 USAID 3, 49 Westgate Shopping Mall attack 2013 111 Windle Trust Kenya (WTK) 58, 68–9, 72, 74, 82, 84–5 Women Victims against Violence Project 8, 39, 48, 71 World Food Program 78, 86 World Humanitarian Summit 113 World University Service of Canada (WUSC) 80 Youth Education Pack (YEP) 77, 111

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