Educating Competencies for Democracy (Dia-Logos) [New ed.] 9783631624722, 9783653036534, 3631624727

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Educating Competencies for Democracy

Dia-Logos Schriften zu Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences Herausgegeben von/Edited by Tadeusz Buksiński and Piotr W. Juchacz Advisory Board Karl-Otto Apel (Frankfurt am Main) Manuel Jiménez-Redondo (Valencia) Peter Kampits (Wien) Theodore Kisiel (Illinois) Hennadii Korzhov (Donetsk) Marek Kwiek (Poznań) George McLean (Washington) Evangelos Moutsopoulos (Athènes) Sergey Nizhnikov (Moscow) Ewa Nowak (Poznań)

Bd./vol. 16

Ewa Nowak Dawn E. Schrader Boris Zizek (eds.)

Educating

Competencies for Democracy

Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.

This publication was financially supported by the City of Konstanz and the Adam Mickiewicz University Pozna´n and the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung in Bonn.

ISSN 1619-005X ISBN 978-3-653-03653-4 (E-Book) DOI 10.3726/978-3-653-03653-4 ISBN 978-3-631-62472-2 (Print) © Peter Lang GmbH Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Frankfurt am Main 2013 All rights reserved. Peter Lang Edition is an Imprint of Peter Lang GmbH. Peter Lang – Frankfurt am Main · Berlin · Bruxelles · New York · Oxford · Warszawa · Wien All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems. www.peterlang.de

Contents Editorial Preface. Can Democracy Be Taught? .......................................................

VII

Horst Frank (Lord Mayor of Konstanz), Citizens of Konstanz as Beneficients of the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion .............................................

1

Part I The Cognitive Competencies in Research Kristin Prehn, Moral Judgment Competence. A Re-Evaluation of the Dual Aspect Theory Based on Recent Neuroscientific Research ...................................

9

Marcia Schillinger, Verifying the Dual-Aspect Theory: A Cross-Cultural Study on Learning Environment and Moral Judgment Competence .........................

23

Zhang Jing & Yang Shaogang, The Research and Development of the Moral Judgment Test in China ...................................................................................

47

Anna Laura Comunian, The Cross-Cultural Construct Validity of the Padua Moral Judgment Scale .....................................................................................

59

Patrícia Unger Raphael Bataglia & Marcia Schillinger, Moral Segmentation in Studies with the Moral Judgment Test in Brazil .........................................

71

Piotr Leśniewski, Ethics and Metaphysics. On Some Practical Aspects of Erotetic Rationality .........................................................................................

83

Klaus Helkama, Change in Moral Judgment in Medical School: The Role of Hierarchy .........................................................................................................

97

Anna Izabela Brzezińska, Tomasz Czub, Magdalena Czub, Radosław Kaczan, Konrad Piotrowski, Małgorzata Rękosiewicz, Postponed or Delayed Adulthood ? ........................................................................................

103

Aswati Hamzah & Khadijah Binti-Zon, Identification and Characterization of Malay Students’ Moral Reasoning Competencies ...........................................

127

Jutta H. Wester de Michelini, Discourse Ethics, Moral Argumentation, and Education for Civic Responsibility: A Qualitative Approach to Moral Judgment Test Applied to Young Political Scientists at a Public University in Argentina ....................................................................................................

147

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Part II Educating Competencies Matthias Scharlipp, Experiencing Freedom and Democracy at School: Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion .......................................................................

163

Nadja Groß, Application of the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion in French Class and Its Impact on Pupil Well-Being ...........................................

173

Anna Malitowska, How Philosophical Dialog with Children Improves the Moral Judgment and Discourse Competencies ...........................................................

185

Gerald Gilmore Taylor, Dilemmatic Logical Reasoning Competence in Adolescent Moral Reasoning and Development: A Pilot Training Program ......

203

Boris Zizek, Handling Probation-Seekers – With a New Image of Humanity Towards a Positive Education .........................................................................

219

Katherina Mouratidou, Promoting Students’ Moral Development through Physical Education ..........................................................................................

233

Wolfgang G. Weber & Christine Unterrainer, Democratic Education Potentials in Business Organizations ...............................................................................

249

Karolina M. Cern, Is a Construction of Life-Worlds Possible? .............................

265

Anne Ratzki, Can a School System Support or Hinder Education for Democracy? A Comparison Between the German and Swedish School System .........

279

Kay Hemmerling, Matthias Scharlipp, The Keys of Cognition: Insights into Moral and Democratic Education in Prison ....................................................

287

Part III Developing and Living Democracy Antanas Mockus, Morality Is Not Everything: Bogotà also Listened to the Voices of Law and Culture ..............................................................................

305

Thomas Wren, Civic Virtue Is Not Enough .........................................................

331

Bill Puka, Democratizing Democracy Education ...................................................

349

Neil Ferguson, The Universalization of Western Liberal Democracy and the End of Morality .......................................................................................................

367

Iuliana Lupu, Moral Competence and Dogmatic Religiosity ................................

379

Herbert Rätz, What Is the Morality of the Esoteric? Or: What Can You Still Belive in? ..........................................................................................................

391

Ewa Nowak, Democracy Begins in the Mind. Developing Democratic Personality

399

Contributors ..........................................................................................................

417

Editorial Preface Can Democracy Be Taught? Developing mental skills for participation in democracy has a long tradition dating back to the works of ancient Greeks. In both Plato’s Meno as well as in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, a set of cognitive skills need to be practiced and strengthened if an individual is to be a successful and virtuous citizen in the politeia as well as in a specific profession. Today, democratic pluralism and cultural diversity require moral discoursive efforts from every person, because by definition, no one should be excluded from democratic processes and legitimate participation in self-governance. To reach this democratic ideal of full and equal participation, it is imperative to foster moral and democratic skills in every individual through effective education. The focus of this book is on the development of moral judgment competence, discourse, and democratic behavior of the modern subject confronted with diverse and demanding social, institutional, and political contexts. Specifically, the book builds upon the work of Georg Lind, a contemporary German developmental psychologist, who joins the history of philosophers and psychologists who assert that education is the single most powerful factor in promoting moraldemocratic behavior and competencies. Drawing from Lawrence Kohlberg’s Just Community Approach (JCA) to moral education in USA and Europe in the 1970–80’s, Lind developed what is known as the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion (KMDD); a method of discourse and reasoning that is applied to various types of moral dilemmas, encouraging the moral reasoners to reflect upon and discuss cognitive and affective dimensions of moral problems. The Konstanz method can be applied to various educational contexts, and does not

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require the development of a Just Community, but may indeed lead to one. Lind notes that various methods and approaches have been tried in the history of moral education, but overall, educating for democracy involves teaching skills that contribute to understanding and practicing democratic ideals, such as fairness, due process, and respect for the dignity, rights, and autonomy of others. He developed his methodology with the end in mind, stating, “The worth of educational methods are not the methods themselves, but their effectiveness” (Lind, 2010). Lind’s fundamental view is that „the key democratic competence is discourse competence” (Lind, 2009). He states that democracy is a moral institution that has to essentially include the competence of confronting other people and other opinions, and such a confrontation must be oriented toward moral principles; “this is what the competence of solving problems and social conflicts in a rational way demands” (Lind, 2009). The KMDD, together with Kohlberg’s Just Community Approach (JCA), and John Gibbs’ EQUIP--a prevention program for adolescents, are current predominant socio-moral education interventions widely in use that focus specifically on the development of cognitive-moral competence, and within that, require discourse competencies. Lind’s approach differs from the American work in that “it explicitly addresses the sociopolitical dimensions of moral judgment and functioning” (Kohlberg, 1981, p. xv). Other American approaches to moral education focus on aspects of morality other than social-cognitive development, such as character education (Laming, 1993) and caring education (Noddings, 2003). Yet despite the inherent epistemic differences between all interventions, the areas such as virtue, character, and care are arguably included in the sociomoral developmental programs, though from different philosophical and educational perspectives than the others. The Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion presents learners with educative dilemmas (real-life experiences or real problems of fictitious persons) in order to evoke cognitive skills to reason about and resolve demanding social-moral conflicts in the real world. Four principles are crucial for the Konstanz method. The first relates to Dewey’s “learning by doing,” to Kohlberg’s educational principle of moral education through democratic self-governance, and to Habermas’ ideal

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speech situation, where the strongest force at work is the force of better argument (Habermas, 1990, pp. 88–89). Specifically, the first principle is that a true democratic experience must be created where everyone is a fully included, dialogical subject. That is, the autonomous participants enjoy mutual respect and feel free to express and discuss all arguments. They share two simple discourse rules -- the so-called “Ping-Pong“ Rule of true dialogue, and mutual-respect rule where each person’s voice is equally valued. Next, to facilitate students’ experience of an ideal democratic discourse situation, the KMDD-teacher must create a supportive learning environment. To be successful in that endeavor, the following are Lind’s three psychological principles of didactics: The constructivist principle: A supportive learning environment must be created through alternating phases of task. That is, moral dilemmas should challenge the cognitive structures and affect their growth, with opposing reasons brought in by discussants. Additionally, there must be phases of support through eye contact, affirmation, time for reflection, and other modes of support. This teaching method requires alternating phases of individual and collective reflection. Following their own feelings, participants, step by step, construct moral dilemmas on their own level of consciousness. Then they confront all perceived dilemmas with others during a collective reflection process, which calls forth a mutual co-construction of their moral thoughts and experiences. Participants articulate their moral emotions openly, deal with emotions and counter-arguments of their interlocutors, and present their own rationales under open questioning. The affect-regulation principle: The teacher undertakes the responsibility for affective regulation in participants. Following Lind’s precisely constructed discussion program, the teacher, through his or her own behavior, brings participants to the optimal level of emotional engagement to facilitate the learning processes within a 90 minute session. The principle of self-evaluation: Teachers reflect upon their own participation and didactic methods, and learn to increase their effectiveness by using self-evaluation instruments created by Lind for this purpose.

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Lind and his colleagues’ research demonstrate that applying all these principles may affect the development of cognitive skills efficiently at the level of r = 0.60 and higher (Lind, 1982–1984, 1985a, 1985b, 1985c, 1986, 1987–1992, 2000a, 2000b, 2002–2011). Studies repeatedly demonstrate that open and vivid interpersonal exchange of statements, arguments, and justifications, taking place in a supportive and challenging context, fosters discursive moral judgment and behavior in learners. This volume consists of studies and reviews of Lind’s Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion and his measurement instrument, the Moral Judgment Test, which have been contextualized by contributors from throughout the world who draw from Lind’s methods to advance moral democratic competencies. The authors report research at various levels of social engagement – schools, workplaces, governments, prisons, and communities – to describe how people can, and do develop democratic competencies that hold promise for creating interactions and institutions are just and fair. Contributors not only explore the stage-developmental theory, but adapt educational processes in a variety of research contexts for socio-moral, civic, and political education worldwide.

The contributions This volume represents just one of many possible perspectives to address the challenge of educating for democracy. The contributions herein were, in part, first presented at the retirement conference held in honor of Georg Lind’s lifelong investigations and inventions that forwarded the field of moral psychology, evaluation, and education. Most of contributors actively collaborated, and some still collaborate, with Georg Lind, as well as with Ewa Nowak -- one of the editors. Nowak was visiting KMDD-researcher of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation at the University of Konstanz (2008–2010), and co-organized the honorific conference. The international conference „Can Morality Be Taught?” was held in Konstanz, Germany in July 2009. To complete the representation of the sphere of influence of

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Lind’s lifelong work, a few other authors were invited to contribute to this volume. Those contributions document the collaborative work on the KMDD-research in the few subsequent years in order to contribute their results and experiences in democratic skills education. Combined, the essence and influence of Lind’s work is demonstrated by 28 contributions whose authors come from 15 countries. Each chapter in this volume discusses moral theory and didactics of developing democratic competencies. The collected work demonstrates interdisciplinarity, incorporating educational, philosophical, psychological, sociological and ethical perspectives. We begin with a contribution from Horst Frank, the Lord Mayor of Konstanz, who highlights the relevance of Georg Lind’s democratic education approach for the scientific and democratic life of Konstanz, Germany, which has been home to Lind’s intellectual and personal life throughout his career. Part I of the volume includes interdisciplinary research of the cognitive competencies for democracy that include the dual aspects of cognitive and affective personal morality, as well as Lind’s measurement instrument, the Moral Judgment Test. In the first chapters, Kristin Prehn re-evaluates Lind’s Dual-Aspect Theory by a neuroscientific approach. She shows that Lind`s concept of moral judgement competence is a fruitful heuristic for analyzing moral judgement by neuro-scientific methods. Then, Marcia Schillinger reports on tests of Lind’s Dual-Aspect Theory in a cross-cultural study. She focuses on the relationship of learning environment and moral competence development in higher eduaction. Next, Jing Zhang and Yang Shaogang make use of Lind’s MJT with regard to Chinese adolescents’ moral judgment competence. In contrast, Anna Laura Comunian utilizes the Padua Moral Judgement Scale which she coauthored, and reconstructs the process of its development. Continuing the cross-cultural investigation of moral judgment assessment, Patrícia Unger Raphael Bataglia and Marcia Schillinger report on their examination of a phenomenon discovered by analyzing Brazilian data by the MJT, which they call moral segmentation. Continuing the investigation of cognitive competence development, by utilizing the erotetic logic, Piotr

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Leśniewski demonstrates the precondition of logical competence for moral reasoning. Context and education play significant roles in developing moral competencies. Klaus Helkama examines the professional socialization in medical school and interprets a change of moral judgement against the background of the specific role of hierarchy in this institution. Anna Izabela Brzezińska, Tomasz Czub, Magdalena Czub, Radosław Kaczan, and Karolina Rękosiewicz focus the transition from late adolescence to early adulthood considering both the objective and the subjective perspective on it. They find that the completion of education plays a crucial role in this process. By explaining the unique characteristics of Malay students’ moral reasoning competencies, Aswati Hamzah and Khadijah Binti-Zon show that cultural factors have a strong impact on the moral competence. Likewise, using the results of an empirical study on the imaginations of female Political Science students regarding their responsibilities in a democratic society, Jutta H. Wester de Michelini unfolds a holistic and integral perspective for interpreting the results drawn by Lind’s Moral Judgment Test. While defining and measuring moral development is the main focus of Part I, Part II is concerned with the methodological question democratic competencies’ development in a variety of contexts. Most of the contributions present results and experiences of applications of Lind’s Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion (KMDD). This method has been successfully applied in different institutions, schools, disciplines, and in prison. For example, Matthias Scharlipp shows the focus of the KMDD on the consistency of thinking, speaking and acting. Nadja Groß applied Lind`s method in a French class, demonstrating that the KMDD focus on a democratic atmosphere increases wellbeing in the classroom and supports the teaching and learning processes. Anna Malitowska reflects on the aspect of the influence of philosophical dialog with children on moral judgement and discourse competencies development. Gerald Gilmore Taylor presents the results of a pilot intervention study teaching formal logic in comparison to perception development and its relationship to prosocial reasoning. In his contribution, Boris Zizek presents a new image of humanity, the moral subject as “probation-seeker,” and unfolds its general im-

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plications for professionalization which he describes as a positive education. Katherina Mouratidou examines how physical education classes promote moral competence that translates beyond sports. Wolfgang G. Weber and Christine Unterrainer focus on the democratic development in business organizations, while Karolina M. Cern reflects on the KMDD from the perspective of philosophy of law. She differentiates between ideal, real (lifeworlds-related), and semi-real moral discourse offered within the KMDD-sessions. On a broader scale, Anne Ratzki examines the impact of selective and integrative systems on education for democracy by comparing German and Swedish school systems. And when systems fail, Kay Hemmerling and Matthias Scharlipp discover the potentials of the KMDD in the context of rehabilitation, basing their work on their longitudinal experiments and evaluative measurements in German prisons. Part III demonstrates a set of research findings and experiences of democratic education. By using the example of Bogotà, Antanas Mockus focuses the inter-dependency of morality, law and culture. Thomas Wren unfolds the question why we need foundational civic virtues as modernity turns into globality. Bill Puka explains the need to democratize democracy education, and Neil Ferguson examines the relationship between liberal ideology and Kohlberg’s postconventional reasoning. In a different turn, Juliana Lupu analyzes the interaction of religiosity and education in the development of moral competence, while Herbert Rätz examines the influence of the esoteric in moral life, and the need to teach moral competencies and skills of moral discourse and self-determined reflection. What is democratic personality and how it works in the political context are questions examined by Ewa Nowak, based on the example of the unalienable democratic practice of voting. This volume, therefore, summarizes research that has been influenced by Georg Lind’s Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion (KMDD) and Moral Judgment Test (MJT), and its applicability in creating a new generation of theory and practice of democratic processes and moral principles in individuals that, in turn, may influence society to be more democratic. Although the chapters were written by au-

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thors as a tribute to Lind on the occasion of his retirement from the professoriate, and to honor his contributions to the field of moral psychology, they serve to stimulate further reflection and creativity on moral theory, evaluation, and practice. Ewa Nowak Dawn E. Schrader Boris Zizek

Acknowledgments The editors wish to thank several institutions for grants to the support this publication in various ways: the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in Bonn (Germany), the Adam Mickiewicz University (AMU) represented by its Vice-Rector Jacek Witkoś, by the Head of Department of Social Sciences Zbigniew Drozdowicz, by the former Director of the Institute of Philosophy Tadeusz Buksiński; the Peter Lang Publishing Company, represented by Piotr Juchacz and Łukasz Gałecki. Our special thanks go to the Lord Mayor of Konstanz Horst Frank. We also would like to express our gratitude to the following individuals for assisting with the English translations, since for most authors in this volume, English is not a first language: Kaitlin Atlas, Gosia Dereniowska, Jennifer Fischell, Jane Mermel, Jason Matzke, Anna Rąbalska, Gerald Gilmore Taylor, Agnieszka Vojta, and Thomas Wren.

References DiBiase, A.-M., Gibbs, J.C., Potter, G.B., & Blount, M (2012). Teaching adolescents to think and act responsibly: The EQUIP approach (2nd ed.). Champaign, IL: Research Press. Habermas, J. (1990). Moral consciousness and communicative action. Trans. Ch. Lenhardt & S.W. Nicholsen, introduced by T. McCarthy. Maldon, Cambridge: Polity Press. Kohlberg, L. (1987). Moralische Entwicklung und demokratische Erziehung [Moral development and democratic education]. In G. Lind & J. Raschert (Eds.), Moralische Urteilsfähigkeit [Moral judgment competence] (pp. 25–43). Beltz: Weinheim and Basel.

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Kohlberg, L. (1964). Development of moral character and moral ideology. In M.L. Hoffman & L.W. Hoffman (Eds.), Review of child development research, Vol. I (pp. 381–431). New York: Russel Sage Foundation. Kohlberg, L. (1981). Foreword. In G. Lind, H.A. Hartmann, & R. Wakenhut (Eds.). Moral judgment and social education. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. Lind, G. (1982). Experimental questionnaires: A new approach to personality research. In A. Kossakowski & K. Obuchowski (Eds.), Progress in the psychology of personality (pp. 132–144). Amsterdam: North-Holland. Lind, G. (1985a). The theory of moral-cognitive judgment: A socio-psychological assessment. In G. Lind, H.A. Hartmann & R. Wakenhut (Eds.), Moral development and the social environment. Studies in the philosophy and psychology of moral judgment and education (pp. 21–53). Chicago: Precedent. Lind, G. (1985b). Growth and regression in moral-cognitive development. In C. Harding (Ed.), Moral dilemmas. Philosophical and psychological issues in the development of moral reasoning (pp. 99–114). Chicago: Precedent. Lind, G. (1985c). Attitude change or cognitive-moral development? How to conceive of socialization at the university. In G. Lind, H.A. Hartmann, & R. Wakenhut (Eds.), Moral development and the social environment. Studies in the philosophy and psychology of moral judgment and education (pp. 173–192). Chicago: Precedent. Lind, G. (1986). Cultural differences in moral judgment? A study of West and East European university students. Behavioral Science Research, 20, 208–225. Lind, G. (1987). Moral competence and education in democratic society. In G. Zecha & P. Weingartner (Eds.), Conscience: An interdisciplinary approach (pp. 37–43). Dordrecht: Reidel. Lind, G. (1989). Measuring moral judgment: A review of The Measurement of Moral Judgment by Anne Colby and Lawrence Kohlberg. Human Development, 32, 388–397. Lind, G. & Althof, W. (1992). Does the Just Community program make a difference? Measuring and evaluating the effect of the DES project. Moral Education Forum, 17, 19–28. Lind, G. (2000a). Content and structure of moral judgment. Second, corrected edition. University of Konstanz: Doctoral Dissertation (Originally published 1984). Lind, G. (2000b). Moral regression in medical students and their learning environment. Revista Brasileira de Educacao Médica, 24(3), 24–33. Lind, G. (2002). Ist Moral lehrbar? Ergebnisse der modernen moralpsychologischen Forschung [Can morality be taught? Research findings from modern moral psychology]. 2nd Edition. Berlin: Logos-Verlag. Lind, G. (2003). Moral ist lehrbar. Ein Handbuch zu Theorie und Praxis moralischer und demokratischer Bildung [Morality can be taught. A handbook on theory and practice of moral and democratic education]. München: Oldenbourg.

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Lind, G. (2007). The Meaning and Measurement of Moral Judgment Competence: A Dual-Aspect Model. In D. Fasko & W. Willis (Eds.), Contemporary Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives on Moral Development and Education (pp. 185–220). Cresskill. NJ: Hampton Press. Lind, G., Sandberger, J.-U., & Bargel, T. (1985, 2010). Moral competence and democratic personality. In G. Lind, H.A. Hartmann, & R. Wakenhut (Eds.), Moral judgment and social education (pp. 55–78). Chicago: Transaction Publ. Lind, G. (2011). Moralerziehung [Moral education]. In E. Kiel & K. Zierer (Eds.), Basiswissen Unterrichtsgestaltug (pp. 39–50). Hohengehren: Baltmannsweiler Schneider Verlag.

Dedicated to Georg Lind, Ph.D. Professor for Psychology UNIVERSITY of KONSTANZ

Germany

Horst Frank, Lord Mayor of Konstanz

Citizens of Konstanz as Beneficients of the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion Abstract: Democracy, Lind claims, is an ambitious idea on how people can, and should, design and regulate their social life, an idea that touches both the realms of the theory of the state and of individual morality on a high level. And the core problem lies precisely at the point between ability and obligation because many people in this country have grown accustomed to a democratic government. People get the impression that democracy and its moral foundations are granted. The question of how we can enable people to live in a democratic way is one of the most important questions today. Keywords: democratic citizenship, democratic education

When Georg Lind (1984, 2000, 2002, 2009) began to develop what he calls his Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion 35 years ago, neither he nor anyone else could have imagined the international success he would gain as a teacher of moral and democratic competencies. Lind himself most likely sensed this development, because he set out his work on the basis of an already-existing yet controversial theory; that of Lawrence Kohlberg, even though this theory was much disputed in the scientific world and in the political sphere since its establishment in the 1960s. Lind nonetheless understood its importance right from the very start, and he almost directly tied his own theory up to it.

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Georg Lind became a widely acknowledged and globally renowned psychologist and teacher of democracy. He represents, in both research and lecture, the respective fields of experimental, educational and developmental psychology, with passion and emphasis. This volume presents and discusses research methods and findings that relate to Lind's conception of moral and democratic competencies. When Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory was imported to Europe at the end of the 1960’s, coming from the United States, another psychological theory was highly controversial. This was the cognitivedevelopmental approach given by the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget who stated that mental developmental history of individuals proceeds in certain phases crucial to the formation of cognitive structures. High quality education is needed to prevent devastating mistakes when young people intensively develop. Regarding young people as our personal and societal offspring, one will immediately acknowledge the importance of a developmental-cognitive approach in both familiar and public pedagogics. Piaget himself solely trusted empirical work, leaving aside the concrete social and political situation of his times. Nevertheless, teachers, school psychologists and educational theoreticians allude to his theory as a theoretical quarry to legitimate their respective plans for radically changing the various existing educational systems according to the zeitgeist of that time. Most of these plans were at least dubious, some even dangerous, in terms of democratic social policy. The “judgements” of Piaget’s and especially Kohlberg’s theory by politicians and scientists ranged from “socialist” to “conservative to the extreme,” depending on the respective political aims to which his critics were inclined. But there was one brave researcher standing firmly on Kohlberg’s side: his European disciple and associate Lind was not impressed by these attacks. From the very start, he had rejected the ideological trend of the critique on his teacher and friend and kept to their common line. Consequently, he was called as guest professor to universities in Germany, the USA, and Mexico. The government of Colombia, a country that had been severely plagued by the criminal civil war in connection with the international drug market, nominated him as the

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trainer and supervisor for a programme he had to first design and implement himself: he held classes for already established teachers in order to foster their moral and democratic skills and to enable them to install these within their pupils. As a result, the vast number of crimes committed could be reduced by almost 40% over the following years. But, more concretely, let us ask: what exactly was it that made Georg Lind so influential? Which of his decisions had the most profound impact on moral education in general, and which on how to teach and learn about democracy specifically? After working at Konstanz University since 1973, Lind finally became professor of educational psychology in 2001. In 2010, when he – most regrettably, one is forced to say – retired and retreated from his chair, he could look back upon a rather vivid and stirring career. Nevertheless, during all those long years, he followed his mission: further developing a theory for how to learn and teach morals and democracy. Democracy, Lind claims, is an ambitious idea on how people can, and should, design and regulate their social life, an idea that touches on the theories of democratic constitution and individual morality. And exactly at the point between ability and obligation, the core problem lies, because many people in this country have grown accustomed to a democratic government. People get the impression that democracy and its moral foundations can be taken for granted. In a democracy, power does not lie in the hands of a single or a few people, as was the case in former stages of political practice, when a king ruled his kingdom by himself or like a tyrant in a dictatorship. Nowadays, democracy is modulated by certain moral principles and procedures that were implemented in order to be instructive about how to cope with conflict. Politicians and judges, for example, are delegated and ordered to care for the interpretation and adherence to these principles. But they have to be legitimated for their task, e.g., by way of direct or indirect elections. They could not appropriate this power themselves or be assigned by a religious institution. There is no such thing as a “duty by the will of God” anymore. This primarily means that law and order are designed on the basis of universal moral principles by a free discourse of all members of a democratic society. They no longer rely on arbitrary decisions by a self-

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proclaimed bearer of power. Conflicts are not solved by means of might and brute force but with the help of democratically defined acts and by a discourse of free citizens. Seemingly, by and large the same is true for Germany as for other democracies. It appears that 65 years after overcoming the Nazi dictatorship and 20 years after the self-dissolution of the socialist states, we do not have to worry about the establishment of a soundly based democracy in Europe. A morally ideal democracy has universal acceptance, it appears. Very few people wish for an almighty monarch or tyrant as an alternative, a scientific fact established by the empirical research in democracy carried out by Lind. Additionally, as is shown by many more social analyses frequently cited in the media, there seems to be a high degree of consent, common in all cultures, in regard to the moral core principles of a democracy, including justice and respect toward human rights. But alas, we have to pay attention to the large gap between moral ideals on the one hand and morally founded action on the other. A person on their own often cannot judge how to apply the principles he or she relies on in certain situations. People tend to “forget” their principles, especially whenever they are in situations of emotional or temporal stress. They can be completely lost as soon as these principles seem to contradict themselves. The latter often is the case when, for example, a problem can only be solved by choosing one of two mutually exclusive paths of action. Here, the actor faces a dilemma: how can I make a decision that adheres to all of my personal and moral principles? They wish and will always wish to act morally, which indeed requires more than just moral ideals and values. They require the ability to apply these ideals and values even in, and especially in, situations alien to them, to apply their ideals and values consistently, but nonetheless adapt according to the respective situation. We are dealing here with the overall duty to enable ourselves to reconsider our moral principles, as well as the need to deeply consider how a dilemma of this kind can be solved in general and how to counsel, and possibly argue with, others on the solutions. We call such abilities moraldemocratic abilities or faculties. If democracy shall succeed, these

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faculties are of elementary importance for all those who participate in it. To participate in democracy means to take part in it actively. That is, to be a democratic actor oneself and to publicly live and represent democracy according to one’s own interpretation of it. By doing so, one makes oneself vulnerable, for it should be clear right from the beginning to every individual that one’s own judgments and opinions are not necessarily those of all other democrats. Consequently, our task as self-defined democrats is to try to democratically cope with this situation. Hence, the principle demand on us is the capability to criticise as well as to indulge criticism, in other words, to be able to utter criticism and to take criticism in a serious way. By each individual utterance we actively criticise all those who would never dare make such remarks. Utterances in any given circumstance could include many aspects: language usage, verbal behavior, clothing, appearance and body language, but, in particular, public behavior. The world today is indeed considerably tolerant, accepting a lot of things that were absolutely inconceivable 30 years ago. While that is not an achievement that emerged directly from the work of Kohlberg and Lind, nowadays most of us know how to handle difficult societal situations that emerge from contradiction without using brute force or even involving official institutions. The establishment of this fact in our society is one of the biggest achievements of Lind. To develop the faculties required for the solution of conflicts in a democratic way, one does not necessarily need to study with Lind in person. If not we ourselves (who partly had to learn the lesson in hostile circumstances) then at least our children and grandchildren have learned or will learn such abilities at school, as well as in their family lives. If this is the case, then they will have taken it from teachers and parents who themselves had learned it either from Lind or through his publications or through the media. And one must admit that this imparting really works. At this stage I would like to discuss the developments that can be noticed during the last years in Konstanz and which I personally think not only stand in for a certain understanding of democracy but – if only indirectly – are related to the research and teaching of Pro-

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fessor Lind over the last 30 years. I am talking specifically about the “citizens’ participation” in the political processes in Konstanz. For a number of years now, we have been applying the principle of a citizen-inclined community. ‘Citizen inclination’ in itself means a lot more than just ‘citizen participation’. In its modern sense, it refers to the fact that a constitutional democracy, social justice, and a sustainable future development can only be realized through the participation of all related parties. Superior and authoritarian thinking and acting do not lead to solutions anymore. Rather, they enforce potential conflicts. The challenges that we will be facing in connection with the plans for the future of our community demand strictly democratic attitudes and mutual respect toward the opinions of the respective others of all these parties, be they administration, politicians or the civil community. In Konstanz, we succeeded in getting many people engaged for the town and the common welfare. They deliver important contributions in support of the local administration when dealing with local and regional challenges. In Baden-Württemberg, at least 42% of all citizens are actively involved in public affairs, be it in a club or society, in occupying an honorary post or as a member of a political party. This figure is also represented in Constance, a fact of which we are very proud. To enhance and enlarge this commitment is our aim. In order to reach this goal, democratic mentors like Professor Lind are appreciated and necessary. Additionally, we want to follow his example in our political practice, with both his ideal and his practical intentions. I am convinced that this will lead to very positive results to the benefit of every citizen on the local, federal and European levels.

References Lind, G. (1985). Inhalt und Struktur des moralischen Urteilens [Content and structure of moral judgment]. Doctoral dissertation. Konstanz: Sonderforschungsbereich of the University of Konstanz. Lind, G. (2000). Ist Moral Lehrbar? [Can morality be taught?]. Berlin: Logos. Lind, G. (2009). Moral ist lehrbar [Morality can be taught]. 2nd supplemented edition. München: Oldenbourg.

Part I

The Cognitive Competencies in Research

Kristin Prehn

Moral Judgment Competence. A Re-Evaluation of the Dual Aspect Theory Based on Recent Neuroscientific Research Abstract: Lind’s Dual Aspect Theory of Morality suggests that moral decision making does not rely only on the internalized understanding of social norms that are represented as virtuous moral orientations, but also on the ability to apply them in a consistent and differentiated manner in varying social situations. In the following, I will first give a brief overview of current psychological models on morality. Second, I will introduce the neuroscientific approach to the study of morality, and, finally, I will present my own work comprising of a neuroimaging study on moral judgment using Georg Lind’s concept of moral judgment competence. Keywords: moral judgment competence, neural correlates, decision making, Georg Lind

Moral judgment is defined as the evaluation of one’s own or someone else’s behavior with respect to social norms and values considered to be virtuous by a culture or subculture, such as not stealing or being a honest citizen (definition adapted from Haidt, 2001, p. 817)1. __________________ 1 For the sake of simplicity, I will not distinguish here between dilemmatic moral judgment (i.e., choosing the lesser of two evils) and moral decision making or socionormative judgment (terms that refer to more simple tasks like the making of a decision whether a presented behavior is violating a social norm or not) and will use these terms synonymously. I will also not distinguish between moral and socioconventional judgments. In the literature (e.g., Blair, 1995; Nichols, 2002; Turiel, 1983), this distinction is used to differentiate cases where harm is caused to a person (= moral transgressions) from cases where only socio-conventional norms are violated

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Judging whether actions are good or bad (or rather, harmful for individuals or the society as a whole) is very central to everyday social life because it guides individuals’ behavior within a community. Therefore, exploring how humans think about “right” and “wrong” has been a recurring interest over the centuries in many disciplines including philosophy, arts, religion, or law studies (cf., Goodenough & Prehn, 2004; Prehn & Heekeren, 2009). Since the advent of new neuroscientific methods, questions about how moral judgments are made and which processes are involved have also triggered much research in cognitive neuroscience. Such key issues give rise to questions about the extent to which the processes involved are open to conscious deliberation and whether our moral sense is a product of education (i.e., the acquisition of knowledge on social norms and values) or rather a result of innate mechanisms activated during childhood. In particular, the issue whether moral judgments are caused by emotional or cognitive processes and whether emotional responses make moral judgments better or worse has caused much controversy and debate.

Psychological Models on Moral Judgment Psychological research on moral judgment has long been dominated by a developmental approach, investigating the maturation of moral reasoning and its underlying moral orientations and principles (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1965). In his empirical studies, Lawrence Kohlberg presented child and adolescent participants with moral dilemmas and asked the participants to argue why it could be justified to choose a certain action. In one of his best known dilemmas, for instance, a man has to decide if he should break into a drugstore to steal a medicine that would save the life of his dying wife. Based on how children and adolescents argued, Kohlberg established his widely cited six-stage model of the cognitive development of moral reasoning. Humans progress, he stated, through these six stages as their cognitive abilities mature and get to a __________________

(= conventional transgressions) without necessarily causing harm (e.g., spitting in a glass of vine at a dinner party.)

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more sophisticated understanding of social relationships. For instance, it is suggested that people on higher stages of moral reasoning come to see situations not only from their own perspective but also from the perspectives of all the other people involved in the conflict. Finally, moral reasoning is assumed to be based on abstract and universal principles of justice, on the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and on respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons (Kohlberg, 1969). The relevance of this theory can be seen in the idea that morality does not only rely on the acquisition of social knowledge and moral values, but also on the way individuals understand and think about social situations. This way of understanding qualitatively changes as a result of an active interaction of the individual and his or her social environment. Additionally, Kohlberg defined morality for the first time in terms of an ability, describing it as “the capacity to make decisions and judgments which are moral (i.e., based on internal moral principles) and to act in accordance with such judgments” (Kohlberg, 1964, p. 425). More recent theories and models question the assumption that moral judgment is primarily reached by rational reasoning and emphasize the role of intuitive feelings as well as automatic emotional responses (e.g., Blair, 1995; Haidt, 2001, 2003, 2007; Hauser, 2006; Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2009; Mikhail, 2007). The Social Intuitionist Model by Haidt (2001), for instance, posits that fast and automatic intuitions (like feelings or aesthetic judgments) are the primary source of moral judgments, whereas conscious deliberations are only used to construct post hoc justifications for judgments that have already occurred. Moral intuition is defined as the sudden appearance of a moral judgment in consciousness including a strong affective valence (good vs. bad, like vs. dislike). This would mean that rational reasoning is less relevant to moral judgment and behavior than Kohlberg’s theory suggests and implies that people often make moral judgments without weighing concerns such as fairness, law, human rights and abstract ethical values. Haidt describes the minor role of rational reasoning in moral judgment provocatively as the “rational tail of the emotional dog” and provided some striking examples of “moral dumbfounding” in which partici-

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pants were unable to generate adequate reasons for an intuitively given moral judgment. When presented with the case of consensual sex between adult siblings, for instance, almost everyone reports a strong emotional response and a feeling that it is wrong, even though he or she cannot articulate reasons for this opinion. While most people commonly agree upon moral orientations and intuitions that are held to be virtuous in their culture or subculture, it seems evident that some people sometimes are not able to decide or behave accordingly. Referring to Kohlberg’s notion of morality as an ability, Lind defines morality in a different theoretical framework as consisting of two inseparable, yet distinguishable aspects: (1) a person’s moral orientations and principles, and (2) a person’s competence to act accordingly. Following his Dual Aspect Theory, moral judgment competence is the ability to apply certain moral orientations in a consistent and differentiated manner in varying social situations. Thus, social norms and values represented as affect-laden moral orientations are linked by means of moral judgment competence with everyday behavior and decision making (Lind, 2008).

The Neuroscientific Approach Investigating Moral Judgment In recent years, cognitive neuroscientists have taken great advantage of methods that make it possible to identify and image brain regions associated with certain tasks (e.g., judging a behavior in terms of being good or bad), for instance, by using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). FMRI was first used in humans in 1991 (Belliveau et al., 1991). It measures cerebral changes of local hemoglobin oxygenation in response to a certain task. The execution of a task, such as deciding whether a presented behavior is violating a social norm, leads to increased neuronal activity in some brain regions preoccupied with processing of this task. Increased neuronal activity is accompanied by a depolarization of neuron membrane potentials. Maintaining and re-establishing these potentials in groups of neurons requires an increased supply of energy and oxygen. This, in turn, leads to an

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increase in blood flow and blood volume in the capillaries of the activated brain tissue (commonly referred to as “neurovascular coupling”) resulting in an increase of oxygenated hemoglobin which overcompensates both the actual supply of oxygen and a concomitant decrease in deoxyhemoglobin concentration in this brain region. The changes of the local blood flow and blood volume and the relative change of deoxyhemoglobin in the blood concentration determine the so-called blood-oxygen dependent (BOLD) signal which can be detected by an MRI scanner with a very powerful magnet (1.5 or 3.0 Tesla) due to the paramagnetic properties of deoxyhemoglobin. For a non-specialist faced with imaging data, however, it is important to know that the colorful pictures of brains “lighting up“ and showing a map of brain regions activated during a specific task are actually artifacts of extensive analysis and selective presentation. Most fMRI experiments are using subtraction logic pioneered by the Dutch physiologist Donders in reaction time experiments (see Donders, 1969, first published in 1868). This logic relies on the a priori assumption that one (cognitive) process can be added to a preexisting set of processes without affecting them and asserts that there are no interactions among the different components of a task. Although this assumption has not been validated in any physiological sense (cf., Friston et al., 1996), it is applied due to the fact that during the performance of a complex task (e.g., judging whether a behavior is violating a social norm) many if not all parts of the brain are activated to some degree. A way to identify brain regions which are specifically related to the moral judgment process is to compare neural activity during a moral judgment task with neural activity elicited by another judgment task, which shares all sub-processes with the moral judgment task but the moral component. In the laboratory where I conducted my neuroimaging studies (see Prehn et al., 2008), for instance, neural activity during a moral judgment task was compared with activity during a grammatical judgment task (for an example of such a task and material, see Table 1). During both tasks, the moral and the grammatical judgment task, participants had to read sentences on a screen, to judge whether the actions described are “correct” or not (morally or grammatically), and then respond as quickly and correctly with a button press. The grammatical judgment task, here, con-

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trols for visual input, language processing, decision making, and motor output. First Sentence (Intro)

Moral Judgment

Grammatical Judgment

A uses public transportation.

Nonviolation

He looks out of the window. [Er sieht aus dem Fenster.]

He looks out of the window. [Er sieht aus dem Fenster.]

[A fährt mit der S-Bahn.]

Violation

He smashes the window. [Er wirft das Fenster ein.]

He look out of the window. [Er sehen aus dem Fenster.]

Table 1. Examples of sentence material used in an fMRI study. During both tasks (moral and grammatical judgment) the first sentence of a trial introduced the participants to a specific situation. Half of the second sentences contained a violation of a social norm or grammatical rule. After the appearance of the second sentence, participants were instructed to decide whether the action described in the second sentence was a social norm violation or not, or whether the sentence was grammatically correct or incorrect.

To be able to interpret a certain pattern of brain activity as a response to a specific task, one also needs very clear hypotheses about the involved mental processes. These can be derived from psychological theories and hypotheses about the underlying neuronal mechanisms, for instance, resulting from lesion data or electro-physiology in monkeys (Henson, 2006). Moreover, as far as it is known to date, we cannot expect any complex representation such as morality to be located in a specific and distinct brain area (i.e., in “a moral centre”). Our current brain model is the interconnected networking model of information processing. Complex tasks, such as judging whether a presented behavior is wrong in regard to social norms or conventions or not, comprise numerous cognitive and emotional processes even when compared with a control task. These are represented by a distributed network of brain regions. Additionally, different complex tasks often show highly overlapping neural networks. For instance – and in contrast to common belief – even cognition and emotion are not subserved by separate and independent circuits.

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Having these limitations in mind, a number of neuroimaging studies have been conducted in recent years to discover which brain regions contribute to moral judgment. Although these studies used different tasks ranging from simple moral decisions (e.g., Heekeren et al., 2005; Heekeren, Wartenburger, Schmidt, Schwintowski, & Villringer, 2003; Moll et al., 2002; Moll, Eslinger, & Oliveira-Souza, 2001; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, & Grafman, 2002) to complex dilemmatic moral judgments (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Schaich Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006), the results are remarkably consistent and revealed a functional network of brain regions including the ventromedial prefrontal (VMPFC) and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), the temporal poles, the amygdala, the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and the posterior superior temporal sulcus (PSTS), that is, brain regions which are involved in emotional as well as in cognitive information processing (see Figure 1 and for reviews and an overview of the possible functions of these brain regions during moral judgment: Casebeer, 2003; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, & Eslinger, 2003; Prehn & Heekeren, 2009; Young & Koenigs, 2007).

Figure 1. A neural network involved in moral cognition.

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Kristin Prehn

An fMRI Study Investigating Individual Differences in Moral Judgment Competence The studies on the neural correlates of moral judgment revealed neural activity in brain regions associated with cognitive and emotional processing, probably reflecting mental representations of the depicted social situation, social norms retrieved from long-term memory, and a comparison process on whether a social norm has been violated or not. However, Lind’s Dual-Aspect Theory on Morality suggests that moral decision making does not only rely on the internalized understanding of social norms that are represented as virtuous moral orientations, but also on the ability to apply them in a consistent and differentiated manner in varying social situations. Thus, relating individual differences in moral judgment competence to brain imaging data may lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the neural mechanisms involved in moral judgment. To investigate the neural correlates of moral judgment competence, we scanned 23 female participants while they were presented with a moral and a grammatical judgment task (see Figure 1). The related neural activity during the moral judgment contrasted with the activity during the grammatical judgment, with individual scores in moral judgment competence being assessed with the Moral Judgment Test (MJT; Lind, 1998; Lind & Wakenhut, 1980). The MJT confronts a participant with two moral dilemmas. After presenting the short dilemma stories, the participant is required to indicate to which degree he or she agrees with the protagonist’s solution and is presented with six arguments in support of (proarguments) and six arguments rejecting (counter-arguments) it. The participant has to rate these arguments regarding their acceptability on a nine point rating scale ranging from –4 (highly unacceptable) to +4 (highly acceptable). Each argument represents a certain level of moral orientations according to the six Kohlbergian stages. The moral judgment competence score (C-score) is calculated as a person’s total response variation concerning the underlying moral orientations of the given arguments. A highly competent person (indicated by a high C-score close to 100) will consistently appreciate all arguments refer-

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ring to a certain socio-moral perspective, irrespective of whether these arguments are pro- or counter-arguments. In contrast, a person with low moral judgment competence will appreciate all arguments which support his or her own opinion, irrespective of whether these arguments are better or worse2. In line with the literature, our sample showed a distinct moral judgment competence; C-scores were normally distributed with a reasonably wide range (N = 23, M = 36.93, SD = 16.67). Contrasting activity during moral judgments with grammatical judgments, we found in line with the literature activation in the left VMPFC, the left OFC, the temporal poles, and the left PSTS. Moreover, we provided the first evidence that neural activity during moral judgment is modulated by individual differences in moral judgment competence: we found that C-scores were correlated with changes in BOLD activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, see Figure 2) during moral judgments, in contrast with grammatical judgments. During moral judgments, participants with comparably low moral judgment competence recruited the right DLPFC more than those with greater competence. Additionally, we investigated whether individual differences in moral judgment competence also modulate BOLD activity in the cerebral network engaged in moral judgment. We found no correlation of C-scores and BOLD responses in these regions. However, an additional median split analysis revealed greater activity in the left VMPFC and the left PSTS in participants with comparably low moral judgment competence, specifically during identification of social norm violations (Prehn et al., 2008). __________________

To my knowledge, the MJT is the only available test that provides a measure of moral judgment competence independently of a person’s moral orientation and thus differs from other instruments such as Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Interview (Colby et al., 1987), the Defining Issue Test (Rest, 1974), or the Sociomoral Reflection Measure (Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992), which rather assess individual moral attitudes. The MJT has proved to be a valid and reliable psychometric test. Translated in many languages, it also has been successfully used in scientific research (i.e., testing theoretical assumptions on moral development) and in evaluation of educational programs (Lind, 2006; 2008). 2

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Figure 2. Moral judgment competence reflected in BOLD responses in right DLPFC (see Prehn et al., 2008). (A) Covariation of C-scores with BOLD responses in right DLPFC during moral contrasted with grammatical judgments (p < .05, corrected). (B) Upper panel: Negative correlation of C-scores and BOLD responses in right DLPFC during moral judgments [r = -.45; p = .03; C-scores plotted against BOLD responses in arbitrary units (a.u.) with regression line]. Lower panel: No correlation of C-scores and BOLD responses in right DLPFC during grammatical judgments [r = -.04; p = .64].

Finding a specific neural activation reflecting a low moral judgment competence provides strong neuroscientific support for the Dual

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Aspect Theory by Lind. In the literature, greater neural activity in participants with lower ability in a certain cognitive task has been associated with compensation and an increased recruitment of mental resources (e.g., Rypma et al., 2006). As described earlier, moral judgment competence assessed with the MJT represents the ability to apply individual moral orientations in a consistent and differentiated manner in varying social situations. The increased activity in right DLPFC and left VMPFC/PSTS in participants with lower competence can thus be interpreted as higher processing demand due to a controlled application of moral orientations and an increased involvement of social cognitive and affective processes (such as mentalizing, estimating the value of possible outcomes of a behavior, and the experience of moral emotions) during the decision-making process (for extended discussion of the results regarding the brain regions involved see Prehn et al., 2008, 2009).

Conclusion In this article, I took a look at current psychological models on moral judgment from a neuroscientific point of view, specifically introducing neuroimaging as a powerful tool to investigate the underlying decision making processes in the human brain. My primary concern, however, was to show how the use of existing theoretical models can fruitfully enrich cognitive neuroscience and to advocate well-informed neuroscientific research working in line with current psychological methods and ideas. This approach offers benefits for both areas of research. In particular, the data presented strongly supports Lind’s Dual Aspect Theory, suggesting that morality should indeed be considered both as a capacity and in terms of individual differences. Notably, the right DLPFC seems to play a key role in linking moral orientations to everyday decision making and behavior. Thus, the question is not only which processes are involved in moral judgment, but also how competently a decision maker can integrate emotional responses with rational reasoning processes sensitive to the context of the particular social situation he or she faces (cf., Talmi & Frith, 2007).

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Acknowledgments I thank S. Myrda for encouragement, useful comments and discussions on earlier versions of this manuscript.

References Belliveau, J.W., Kennedy, D.N., McKinstry, R.C., Buchbinder, B.R., Weisskoff, R.M., Cohen, M.S., et al. (1991). Functional mapping of the human visual cortex by magnetic resonance imaging. Science, 254(5032), 716–719. Blair, R.J. (1995). A cognitive developmental approach to mortality: investigating the psychopath. Cognition, 57(1), 1–29. Casebeer, W.D. (2003). Moral cognition and its neural constituents. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4(10), 840–846. Colby, A., Kohlberg, L., Speicher, B., Hewer, A., Candee, D., Gibbs, J.C., et al. (1987). The measurement of moral judgment. New York: Cambridge University Press. Donders, F.C. (1969). On the speed of mental processes. Acta Psychologica, 30, 412–431. Friston, K.J., Price, C.J., Fletcher, P., Moore, C., Frackowiak, R.S., Dolan, R.J., et al. (1996). The trouble with cognitive subtraction. Neuroimage, 4(2), 97–104. Gibbs, J.C., Basinger, K.S., & Fuller, R. (1992). Moral maturity: Measuring the development of sociomoral reflection. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Goodenough, O.R., & Prehn, K. (2004). A neuroscientific approach to normative judgment in law and justice. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 359(1451), 1709–1726. Greene, J.D., Nystrom, L.E., Engell, A.D., Darley, J.M., & Cohen, J.D. (2004). The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. Neuron, 44(2), 389–400. Greene, J.D., Sommerville, R.B., Nystrom, L.E., Darley, J.M., & Cohen, J.D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293(5537), 2105–2108. Greene, J., & Haidt, J. (2002). How (and where) does moral judgment work? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(12), 517–523. Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814–834. Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. In R.J. Davidson, K.R. Scherer, & H.H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of affective sciences (pp. 852–870). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Haidt, J. (2007). The new synthesis in moral psychology. Science, 316(5827), 998–1002. Hauser, M.D. (2006). The liver and the moral organ. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 1(3), 214–220.

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Heekeren, H.R., Wartenburger, I., Schmidt, H., Prehn, K., Schwintowski, H., Villringer, A., et al. (2005). Influence of bodily harm on neural correlates of semantic and moral decision-making. Neuroimage, 24(3), 887–897. Heekeren, H.R., Wartenburger, I., Schmidt, H., Schwintowski, H., & Villringer, A. (2003). An fMRI study of simple ethical decision-making. Neuroreport, 14(9), 1215– 1219. Henson, R. (2006). Forward inference using functional neuroimaging: Dissociations versus associations. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(2), 64–69. Huebner, B., Dwyer, S., & Hauser, M. (2009). The role of emotion in moral psychology. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(1), 1–6. Kohlberg, L. (1964). Development of moral character and moral ideology. In M.L. Hoffman, & L.W. Hoffmann (Eds.), Review of child development research (pp. 381-431). New York: Russel Sage Foundation. Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In D.A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research (pp. 347–480). Chicago: Ran McNally. Lind, G. (1998). An introduction to the Moral Judgment Test (MJT). Unpublished manuscript. Konstanz. Retrieved from www.uni-konstanz.de/ag-moral/mut/mjt-intro.htm Lind, G. (2006). The Moral Judgment Test: Comments on Villegas de Posada's critique. Psychological Reports, 98(2), 580–584. Lind, G. (2008). The meaning and measurement of moral judgment competence – A Dual-Aspect Theory. In D. Fasko, & W. Willis (Eds.), Contemporary philosophical perspectives on moral development and education (pp. 185-220). Creskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Lind, G., & Wakenut, R.H. (1980). The assessment of moral judgment competence with a standardized questionnaire. Diagnostica, 26, 312–34. Mikhail, J. (2007). Universal moral grammar: Theory, evidence and the future. Trends in Cognitive Science, 11(4), 143–152. Moll, J., Eslinger, P.J., & Oliveira-Souza, R. (2001). Frontopolar and anterior temporal cortex activation in a moral judgment task: Preliminary functional MRI results in normal subjects. Arquivos de Neuro-Psiquiatria, 59(3-B), 657–664. Moll, J., Zahn, R., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Krueger, F., & Grafman, J. (2005). Opinion: The neural basis of human moral cognition. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6(10), 799–809. Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, R., & Eslinger, P.J. (2003). Morals and the human brain: A working model. Neuroreport, 14(3), 299–305. Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Bramati, I.E., & Grafman, J. (2002). Functional networks in emotional moral and nonmoral social judgments. Neuroimage, 16(3 Pt 1), 696– 703.

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Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Eslinger, P.J., Bramati, I.E., Mourão-Miranda, J., Andreiuolo, P.A., et al. (2002). The neural correlates of moral sensitivity: A functional magnetic resonance imaging investigation of basic and moral emotions. Journal of Neuroscience, 22(7), 2730–2736. Nichols, S. (2002). Norms with feeling: Towards a psychological account of moral judgment. Cognition, 84(2), 221–236. Piaget, J. (1965). The Moral Judgment of the Child. New York: Free Press. Prehn, K., & Heekeren, H.R. (2009). Moral judgment and the brain: A functional approach to the question of emotion and cognition in moral judgment integrating psychology, neuroscience and evolutionary biology. In J. Braeckman, J. De Schrijver, S. Vanneste, & J. Verplaetse (Eds.), The moral brain. Essays on the evolutionary and neuroscientific aspects of morality (pp. 129–154). Netherlands: Springer. Prehn, K., Wartenburger, I., Mériau, K., Scheibe, C., Goodenough, O.R., Villringer, A., et al. (2008). Individual differences in moral judgment competence influence neural correlates of socio-normative judgments. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 3(1), 33–46. Retreived from doi: 10.1093/scan/nsm037. Rest, J. (1974). Mannual for the Defining Issue Test: An objective test for moral judgment development. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press. Rypma, B., Berger, J.S., Prabhakaran, V., Bly, B.M., Kimberg, D.Y., Biswal, B.B., et al. (2006). Neural correlates of cognitive efficiency. Neuroimage, 33(3), 969–679. Retreived from doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.05.065. Schaich Borg, J., Hynes, C., Van Horn, J., Grafton, S., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2006). Consequences, action, and intention as factors in moral judgments: A fMRI investigation. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18(5), 803–817. Talmi, D., & Frith, C. (2007). Neurobiology: feeling right about doing right. Nature, 446(7138), 865–866. Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Young, L., & Koenigs, M. (2007). Investigating emotion in moral cognition: A review of evidence from functional neuroimaging and neuropsychology. British Medical Bulletin, 84, 69–79.

Marcia Schillinger

Verifying the Dual-Aspect Theory: A Cross-Cultural Study on Learning Environment and Moral Judgment Competence Abstract: This paper provides an overview of an extensive cross-cultural and crosssectional study on moral development and the effect of one’s learning environment among higher education students (Schillinger, 2006). The study was conducted during my time at the University of Konstanz in Germany as a member of Georg Lind’s research group. It was originally motivated by controversial findings from the DualAspect Theory (Lind, 2008) in cognitive-affective research with the Moral Judgment Test. The aim of the investigation was to contribute to some still unsettled questions concerning the cultural (and empirical) validation of the Dual-Aspect Theory. The central question is whether, and in what way, moral competence development can be fostered by the learning environment of higher education. Keywords: learning environment, moral competence, Dual-Aspect Theory, MJT

Introduction This paper provides an overview of the extensive cross-cultural and cross-sectional research on moral development and the effects of one’s learning environment among higher education students (Schillinger, 2006). The study was carried out during my time at the University of Konstanz in Germany as a member of Georg Lind’s research group. It was originally motivated by the controversial findings from the Dual-Aspect Theory (Lind, 2008) in its cognitiveaffective research with the Moral Judgment Test (MJT). The aim of the

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investigation was to contribute to some still unsettled questions concerning the cultural (and empirical) validation of the Dual-Aspect Theory. In addition, the goal was to find out whether and in what way moral competence development can be fostered by the learning environment of higher education and, in particular, by the opportunities of role-taking and guided reflection. The following two controversies that arose from the cognitiveaffective research were selected to be addressed in this paper: (1) contrary to affective approaches, is moral learning in adulthood possible, specifically through higher education? Lind’s (2002) Education Theory of Moral Development) considers the learning environment, and, in particular, students’ opportunities of role-taking and guided reflection in higher education (Sprinthall & Thies-Sprinthall, 1993) as powerful factors in promoting moral judgment and discourse competencies. (2) Contrary to Rest’s (1973) assumptions, is it possible to distinguish and measure the same behavior through both the MJT affective and cognitive aspects of morality and are those aspects predictable? Are those aspects culturally related? Decades of research within the framework of the Dual-Aspect Theory using the Moral Judgment Test (Lind, 2008) have shown that moral development and moral behavior are higher influenced by educational processes (Lind, 2000, 2002, 2004). Emerging from the DualAspect Theory, the author proposes the Education Theory of Moral Development, as opposed to socialization and maturational theories. It is considered to be an expansion on the cognitive development theory of Piaget and Kohlberg and it stresses the development of moral judgment (cognitive) competence. The history of research on higher education reflects a progressive shift away from an initially skeptical view of increasing awareness about the impact of post-secondary education on moral development. Research in the affective approach, limited to investigating changes of attitudes in students, failed to show the effects of university socialization on critical thinking, judgment ability and social responsibility (Feldman & Newcomb, 1970). The understanding of morality through affective approaches implies a limitation on the role of education. Accordingly, moral values and attitudes are brought about through social pressure and values transmission. Morality is not considered a

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competence and thus cannot be learned. It is questionable whether those beliefs are in agreement with a democratic society. The cognitive-developmental approach was able to see beyond the affective changes to demonstrate that higher education experience fosters students’ moral judgment competence. The paradigm change in cognitive psychology brought about different ways of understanding morality by introducing the assessment of both affective and cognitive aspects of personality. They are able to distinguish more than the affective changes, showing that university experience fosters students’ moral competencies. However, research in the cognitivedevelopmental approach had failed to produce a measure to differentiate the affective and cognitive aspects of moral development. The body of research in this area had been mostly limited to the use of instruments — such as Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Interview (MJI), and Rest’s Defining Issues Test (DIT) — that were not able to measure the affective and cognitive aspects of morality separately. A new instrument had to be developed to attend to those demands. This constitutes the background for the development of a Dual-Aspect Theory and the Moral Judgment Test (Lind, 2008). It rests on the growing awareness that Kohlberg’s theory presented some contradictions concerning the relation between his theoretical model and his measurement method (MJI). Lind’s (1985, 2000, 2008 and 2009) Dual-Aspect-Theory, a further development of the cognitive-development approach, proposes an alternative to these problems. He defends a cognitive-affective approach that originated from his critics on the empirical work of Kohlberg. His critics focus the following aspects: (a) moral affect and cognition can be measured as two different aspects of the same behavior, and (b) the role of education for the moral development should be adequately acknowledged. Furthermore, the Moral Judgment Test (MJT) represents an attempt to achieve coherence between theory and psychometrics. The author defends the position that a mature moral democratic behavior depends not only on moral ideals or orientations, but also and mostly on moral competence, which is defined as the competence to apply moral ideals consistently in real-life situations. According to this point of view, the solution of moral conflicts depends not only

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on values, but also on abilities (moral competence) which can be learned.

Moral Judgment Competence Lind developed his theoretical and empirical research based on a review of Kohlberg’s conceptualization of the relationship between moral ideals and moral action, as proposed in his definition of “moral judgment competence” and in his attempts to measure it. Kohlberg defined moral judgment competence as “the capacity to make decisions and judgments which are moral (i.e., based on internal principles) and to act in accordance to such judgments” (Kohlberg, 1964, p. 425). According to Lind (2004), this was a real “paradigm shift” in moral development. For the first time, morality was considered in terms of competence and not in terms of attitudes or values. Moral behavior is, thus, understood in terms of a subject’s internal, accepted moral principles rather than in terms of external standards and social norms. The affective, cognitive, and behavioral aspects are integrated into the definition. Moral competence embraces, in addition, the ability of reflective thinking and of producing rational discourse. The core concept of the Dual-Aspect Theory is derived from Piaget’s (1976) conclusion that each behavior has an affective and a cognitive aspect. Lind (2000) claims that they are inseparable — as they are at the same time both equally important, but distinct, aspects of the same behavior and, as such, need to be investigated. This statement contradicts Rest’s (1986) four-component model of moral behavior that recognizes four separate components but does not acknowledge that they can be separated within the same behavior. The Dual-Aspect Theory offers, thus, an alternative to the component model. Rest & al. (1997) criticized Lind’s stage consistency score and defended the superiority of the DIT in empirical demonstrations of the stage preference score. Lind defends his view that the DIT does not confront individuals with a moral task opposing counter-arguments in relation to a dilemma situation. In Lind’s Dual-Aspect Theory, the definition of affective and cognitive aspects of the moral behavior is

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in agreement with the work of Piaget and Kohlberg. The affective aspect of the moral behavior incorporates feelings that are related to moral principles or norms, behavior orientations, motivations, and justice ideals. Kohlberg’s (1964) six stages of moral development are characterized by moral affect or motives. The cognitive aspect of the moral behavior is, according to Kohlberg, understood as the structure of the moral behavior in relation to particular moral motives or principles. It is the structure of the judgment process, which is defined by Lind as moral judgment competence. Lind (2000) states that the connection between education and moral development was, in fact, first pointed out by Piaget (1973) and Kohlberg (1969). However, in their writings they were not explicit about the role of education in moral development. The cognitive theory emphasized moral behavior and cognitive processes, and, in particular, Kohlberg defended the importance of education programs for moral development. However, the maturational approach of Kohlberg and Piaget, conceiving development as having a logical, invariant sequence, underestimated the importance of education which aims fostering moral development. This question was also addressed by Rest (1988). According to him, “Cognitive development theory does not emphasize the impact of formal education nor lead us to look for a strong relationship between education and moral judgment.” Piaget (1973) emphasized cognitive disequilibrium as the major condition for structural change, and Kohlberg (1969) emphasized role taking as "the major condition for change in moral judgment” (1969, p. 185). Although Kohlberg and colleagues collected additional data in their studies about educational characteristics, those were analyzed only later. It was then that they pointed in the direction of the importance of education. Indicators of a consistent correlation between higher education and students´ changes can be found in works published in the late seventies, as reported on in Nucci & Pascarella’s review (1987), Pascarella (1989), Pascarella & Terenzini (1991), Nucci & Pascarella (1987), Gielen & Markoulis (1994), Lind (2000, 2003) and King & Mayhew (2002). The two most significant longitudinal studies for detecting the effects of college in particular on moral reasoning were undertaken by Lind who studied university students in Europe (Lind,

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2000a; Bargel & Peisert, 1982), by Rest (1986), and by Schlaefli, Rest, & Thoma (1985) in the United States. In their recent review, Pascarella & Terenzini (2005) concluded that student participation in college and university environments are, indeed, associated with increases in moral development levels.

Which Features of Higher Education Facilitate Moral Development? Pascarella & Terenzini (2005) concluded that, after decades of research, this question is still not satisfactorily answered. Studies by Rest & Narvaez (1991) and Mason & Gibbs (1993) suggest that a learning environment that offers challenges, stimulation and perspective taking is strongly connected with higher moral development levels among students. More recently, research results also indicate that moral judgment competence could be related to the quality of learning environment, in particular, to students’ opportunities for role-taking and guided reflection (Lind, 2003). However, further studies were necessary.

Role Taking and Guided Reflection Opportunities in the Learning Environment Based on the definition of moral judgment competence by Kohlberg (1964), Lind (1999) explains that individuals are morally competent ... to the degree to which they base their judgments on their moral values rather than on other considerations. Moral autonomy is more than just an orientation or an attitude, but it is a cognitive competence that develops and requires sophisticated instruction and long practice. (p. 5)

Nevertheless, the achievement of moral autonomy seems to be closely related to the quality of education received. Particularly in the learning process, moral autonomy is related to the opportunities of role-taking combined with guided reflection (Sprinthall & ThiesSprinthall, 1993; Reiman, 2000; Lind, 1996; Herberich, 1996). In Ger-

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man, the terms used for role-taking and guided reflection are “Verantwortungsübernahme” and “angeleitete Reflexion” which explicitly implies students taking responsibilities through active participation in different experimental and real-life settings, directly related to the syllabus content or not, along with a supportive and challenging process of reflection about those activities (Lind, 2001). This idea involves creating situations where students take responsibilities which involve moral-cognitive demands. This definition should not be confused with “role-playing.” Roletaking means more than being able to see the perspective of the other person. It entails active participating, decision making, and carrying out responsibility within opportunities created in the learning environment. Activities such as tutoring, mentoring, action research or community internship are examples of that.

A Favorable Learning Environment The challenge provided by the opportunities of role taking in itself seems not to be enough to stimulate moral-cognitive development. Students also need guided reflection, described as requiring adequate advice and help provided by professors, other more experienced students, peers, tutors or alike, to discuss the new role-taking experiences. In other words, students need feedback regarding their role-taking processes, discussions and reflections about successes and failures. In a way, it could be said that challenge should be followed by, or be side-by-side with “support,” in the form of competent advice and opportunities for reflection about problems related to the decision-making and learning process. In the present study the term Favorable Learning Environment will be used to refer to the combination of opportunities for role-taking and guided reflection.

Hypothesis The following hypotheses were formulated to investigate the previously proposed questions:

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Hypothesis 1: Moral learning in adulthood is possible. More specifically, a favorable learning environment in higher education fosters the development of moral judgment competence. Hypothesis 2: The affective and cognitive are both aspects of moral behavior and can be measured simultaneously, although independently from each other. Hypothesis 2a: Affective-cognitive parallelism: there is a positive correlation between affective and cognitive aspects of moral judgment. Hypothesis 2b: (in regard to the affective aspect): there is a positive correlation between the affective aspect of moral development and the hierarchical preference of moral stages. Hypothesis 2c: (in regard to the cognitive aspect): the measure of the cognitive aspects reflected by the MJT C-score is independent from the affective aspect.

Methodology Research Design

First-year students were compared to those in their final year, in seven competitive and non-competitive higher education institutions in São Paulo and Río de Janeiro, Brazil and in five universities in Germany and Switzerland. The students were drawn from three different fields of studies: psychology, business administration and medical school. Dependent Variables

1. Cognitive aspect: Moral judgment competence was measured by the Moral Judgment Test (MJT) and expressed by the C-score (Lind, 2008).

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2. Affective aspect: The Kohlbergian six stages of moral orientation were also measured by the Moral Judgment Test (MJT). Independent Variables

1. Learning environment: This variable was measured by the questionnaire for assessing opportunities for role-taking and guided reflection in the university (ORIGIN/u, Lind & Schillinger-Agati, 2002). 2. Culture: Brazilian (N = 618) and two German-speaking countries (n = 531). 3. Field of Study: Psychology (N = 362), business administration (N = 383) and medical school (N = 404). 4. Type of institution: Competitive and non-competitive institutions (for Brazil only). 5. Time for learning: Changes between the first and final year (eighth to eleventh semesters) of study. 6. Gender: The sample of undergraduates included 679 women and 469 men. In the present paper, only the partial analysis concerning the variables 1, 2, 5 and 6 is presented.

Measuring Instruments

1. Moral Judgment Test (MJT) (Lind, 2008), which assesses the ability of a subject to judge the arguments for and against the decision made by the protagonist, irrespective of the subject’s own opinion about that dilemma. In addition, it provides measures of the subject’s attitudes in regard to the six Kohlbergian stages of moral development. The MJT was used in its original German version for the German speaking subjects. The MJT version used in Brazil was translated and validated into Brazilian Portuguese by Bataglia (2001). 2. ORIGIN/u questionnaire: Opportunities for role-taking and guided reflection in college and university students (Lind & Schillinger-Agati, 2002).

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The ORIGIN/u questionnaire aims to assess reported levels of opportunities for role-taking (RT) and guided reflection (GR) in four different domains of learning environment: syllabus (S), semi-syllabus (SS), extra-syllabus (ES) and non-syllabus (NS). The ORIGIN/u was developed in Germany, adapted to Switzerland as well as translated and adapted to the Brazilian higher education reality. For the purposes of data analysis, the present author suggests that the learning environments be classified as favorable and unfavorable. Procedure

The participants filled out both questionnaires, the Moral Judgment Test (MJT) and the ORIGIN/u, in classrooms. The present author was herself in charge of the data collection in the three countries without needing the help of a translator, which is commonly one of the difficulties in a cross cultural research. Students were given a brief oral explanation about the research and were asked for their collaboration. In this way, the data collection achieved a high quality, with a return rate of around 90%. Participants

The sample consisted of 1149 participants from three areas of study: psychology (N = 362), business administration (N = 383) and medical school (N = 404), in the first (N = 719) and final (N = 430) years of their study. There were 618 participants from Brazil (from seven universities) and 531 participants from two German-speaking countries (Germany and Switzerland, five universities); 679 females and 469 males. Methodology and Code of Conduct

The methodology for research conduction and data handling fully respects the Ethic Guidelines for Research in Social and Educational Contexts (Bassey, 1995) and is in accordance with the ethical standards of the American Psychological Association.

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Results Moral learning in adulthood is possible through a favorable learning environment in higher education Results confirm hypothesis I that a favorable learning environment fosters moral judgment competence development in both cultures. Furthermore, findings reveal that the degree of involvement with the learning environment is an important factor to be considered. Only high-involvement in role-taking and guided reflection activities during the study years influences moral judgment competence. There is, in addition, a statistically significant interaction between opportunities for role-taking and guided reflection and years of study with moral judgment competence in both of the cultures analyzed. Students from an unfavorable learning environment not only did not increase their moral judgment competence levels as predicted, but in most cases decreased them. Not enough opportunities for role-taking and guided reflection led to regression of the moral competence levels in almost all groups investigated in both cultures. A particular situation among medical students was detected: Regression in their moral competence levels occurred dramatically in unfavorable learning environments. In addition, no increase in moral competence was observed among medical students who reported a favorable learning environment. Results from a two-factor analysis of variance show that the interaction between the variables years of study and learning environment is statistically significant: F(1.908) = 14.73, p = 0.00 with a moderate effect-size (r = 0.22). This means that there is a positive correlation between years of study and learning environment with moral judgment competence.

Moral judgment competence by culture, learning environment and years of study Hypothesis 1 is also confirmed when cultures are separately analyzed. The quality of the learning environment is more important

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than the length of study in Brazil and in German-speaking countries. In order to test a correlation between moral judgment competence and the variables of learning environment and years of study, a twofactor analysis of variance for each culture was conducted separately. Results show that the interaction between the variables of learning environment and years of study are, in both cultures, statistically significant with a moderate effect-size. In Brazil: F(1.492) = 6.12, p = 0.01, r = 0.19. In German-speaking countries: F(1.412) = 7.44, p = 0.01, r = 0.23. By contrast, the variable of years of education is not statistically significant and does not show any correlation with moral judgment competence (effect-sizes r = 0.04 and r = 0.03). It means that older students do not have higher levels of moral judgment competence if the variable learning environment is not controlled. Furthermore, no correlation was found between age and moral judgment competence.

Students in unfavorable learning environments show decreased moral judgment competence levels in their final year of study (in each culture investigated) Figure 1 shows a significant regression in moral judgment competence levels in the final years of study among students who reported an unfavorable learning environment. The absolute effect-sizes are very significant: 13 for German-speaking countries and 10.5 for Brazil.

Would favorable learning environments prevent regressions of moral judgment competence over the course of years? Figure 1 shows no regression in moral judgment competence among students who reported a favorable learning environment. It seems that opportunities for role-taking and guided reflection could either foster the development of moral judgment competence (as seen in German-speaking countries) or prevent the regression from taking place (as seen in Brazil). In other words, they would make moral competence levels remain constant.

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Figure 1. Moral judgment competence by culture, learning environment and year of study.

Affection and Cognition as Independent and Parallel Aspects of the Same Moral Behavior The Moral Judgment Test (MJT) was developed to simultaneously measure affective aspects independent from cognitive aspects of moral behavior. The affective aspect is reflected by the preference towards the six Kohlbergian stages of moral orientation. Lind (2000) defends the position that the MJT measures moral judgment competence from individuals independent from their moral orientations. Moral judgment competence reflects, thus, the way in which (consistent or not) personal moral principles (which are cognitively organized) are applied in moral judgment situations. Hypothesis 2 is confirmed in its three sub-hypotheses (a, b and c). Affection and cognition are independent and parallel aspects of the same behavior. Through the use of the MJT these aspects can be separately analyzed and the results are in agreement with the predictions of the dual-aspect theory and the education theory (Lind, 2002). The

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affective aspect can be separately measured through the MJT and the hierarchical preference of moral stages does not depend on culture or education. Hypothesis 2a: Affective-cognitive parallelism

As expected, the MJT’s index for moral judgment competence (Cscore) correlates with the subject’s attitudes towards each of the six stages of moral orientation: it correlates highly negatively with attitudes towards lower stages and highly positively with the higher stages (Figure 2). This means that students who have higher levels of competence in moral judgment (cognitive aspect) are the ones who prefer higher stages of moral development (affective aspect) for the solution of moral conflicts. In other words, the higher a student’s consistency in applying moral principles in dilemma situations, the higher their preference for higher stages of moral development will be and the lower their preference for the lower ones will be.

Figure 2. Correlation between moral judgment competence and stages of moral orientation (N = 1149).

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Hypothesis 2b: The affective aspect of morality Hypothesis 2b refers to the question of whether there is a positive correlation between the affective aspect of moral development and the hierarchical preference for moral stages. In Lind’s (2000) theory, the hierarchical preference for moral stages as defined by Rest (1973) is the indicator for the affective aspect of moral behavior (in the MJT). The moral attitudes towards the Kohlbergian stages are defined as the subject’s mean acceptance of all arguments of a specific stage. Higher stages should be more preferred than the lower ones. It is expected that the hierarchical preference remains the same irrespective of culture. Figure 3 depicts the hierarchical preference order for the Kohlbergian stages. It confirms the preference hierarchy postulate. The MJT has two dilemmas, and, for each dilemma, arguments in favor and against the respondent’s decision are presented. Each of the six Kohlbergian stage arguments (six pro and six con in each dilemma) should be rated in a –4 (I completely reject it) scale.

Figure 3. Means of preference for the Kohlbergian stages of moral orientation in the MJT (N = 1149).

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Figure 3 shows that the attitudes are ordered in a way where higher Stages (5 and 6) are most and lower stages are least preferred. In addition, the cognitive-development theory postulates that the preferences for each moral orientation (stage) are systematically correlated to form a quasi-simplex-structure (Kohlberg, 1963). This means, stage preference in each level correlates most highly with its neighbour levels. The correlation decreases as the levels are increasingly distant. Figure 4 demonstrates that this criterion is fulfilled through the use of the MJT. For instance, the correlation between Stages 2 and 3 is the highest found whereas the correlation between Stages 2 and 5 is the lowest. The stage order is in agreement with previous findings from Kohlberg and Lind (Lind, 2000).

Figure 4. Factor loadings of the six moral orientations, principled component analysis, varimax rotation (quasi-simplex-structure).

Figure 5 shows that the pattern of hierarchical preference of moral stages is similar for both cultures, in the way that higher, more complex Stages (5 and 6) are most, and lower Stages (1 and 2) are least preferred.

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However, some differences can be observed between both cultures: The large difference regarding particularly Stage 3 preferences could indicate cultural or social factors interfering with patterns of hierarchical preference and preference order as proposed by Rest (1973).

Figure 5. MJT affective aspect means of preference for the Kohlbergian stages of moral orientation by culture.

The present findings support the claim that the six Kohlbergian stages of moral orientation are not culture related. They reveal a general agreement among different cultures about a preference for cognitively higher moral principles, but show particular exceptions which should be further investigated. These results confirm the prognoses from the Dual-Aspect Theory and the Education Theory of Morality (Lind, 2002), that the affective aspect can be separately measured through the MJT.

Hypothesis 2c: The cognitive aspect of morality Hypothesis 2c deals with the assumption that the MJT C-score, or competence score, is a measure independent from the affective aspect.

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Results reflect different structural characteristics used to produce moral judgment. They reflect different degrees of moral judgment competence levels and, thus, confirm the predictions of the dualaspect theory. The C-scores from Brazilian students (C-score = 18.7; St. dev. = 14.2; N = 618) are different to those from German-speaking students (C-score = 30.1; St. dev. = 17.6; N = 531). As seen previously, the affective aspect given by moral orientations (Kohlbergian stages) follows a similar pattern for both cultures, with only few variations in regard to mean values for the hierarchical stage preference. The cognitive aspect seems, on the contrary, to be influenced by cultural differences. A deeper analysis shows that the Brazilian data should be understood with respect to its cultural characteristics and, in this particular case, the different profiles of students attending competitive and non-competitive universities. A comparison between these cultures is possible only when those factors are considered. The interaction between the variables culture and moral judgment competence can be analyzed through an analysis of variance. Results show that the effect of culture on moral judgment competence is statistically significant with large effect-sizes: F(1.1146) = 148.47, p = 0.0000, r = 0.34. Considering that the participants in both cultures had the same level of education, those results seem to point to the direction of cultural aspects affecting the development of moral competence. This does not mean, however, that the correlation found reflects only characteristics of different cultural or social systems. The question seems more related to which factors are responsible for the development of new competencies and whether this effect works independent from culture.

Moral Judgment Competence and Gender No gender differences were found in regard to moral development in both affective and cognitive aspects. This confirms the DualAspect Theory and Education Theory hypothesis that the hierarchical preference of moral stages and moral judgment competence do not depend on gender, if the variable education is controlled.

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Discussion and Conclusions This study defends the view that moral development is possible through higher education. However, higher education per se, or years of education alone, are necessary, although not sufficient to foster moral judgment competence. Moral judgment competence does not correlate with age nor does it correlate with years of study when the variable learning environment is not controlled. No gender differences were found. A favorable learning environment with high involvement in role-taking and guided reflection opportunities promotes moral cognitive development. Groups that have reported isolated attempts at role-taking and guided reflection activities which were also not shared by most student peers, showed no gains or regression of moral judgment competence levels. In opposition, an unfavorable learning environment leads to regression or stagnation of moral judgment competence. Therefore, results confirm that moral development does not follow an invariant upward and forward process as defended by Kohlberg (1984). An upward and forward development is possible under specific circumstances and with support from a favorable learning environment. Not only the general involvement in role-taking and guided reflection opportunities, but the continuity and intensity of those experiences seem to play an important role in fostering moral development. The present researcher is aware of the limitations of a crosssectional study when compared to a longitudinal one. It was, however, assumed that a comparison of results between first and final year students would be more adequate to test the study hypothesis. A longitudinal study would not feasible in a context of this research and would also present some other difficulties including, for example, those associated with controlling selection mechanisms responsible for students’ drop-out rate (Schwartzmann, 2004; Lind, 2001). Because affective and cognitive aspects can be measured independently using the MJT, it was able to test the hypothesis of whether there is a systematic empirical relationship between those two aspects, as predicted by Piaget (1976) and by the Dual-Aspect Theory (Lind, 2008). Indeed, both aspects correlate very highly with one an-

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other. The more students are consistent in their ability of using moral principles in their judgments (cognition), the more they prefer higher moral developmental stages (affect). The hierarchical preference of moral stages as defended by Rest (1973) is supported by the present study, but some particularities need to be mentioned. Indeed, higher Stages (5 and 6) are preferred comparatively to lower ones (1 and 2), but stage preference order does not remain exactly the same in both of the cultures which were the objects of this research. In particular, there is a great difference between attitudes related to Stage 3 between Brazilian- and Germanspeaking students. Those particularities could either be methodologically explained or they could indeed reveal the influence of social and education factors on the Kohlbergian stages of moral orientation. They reveal a general agreement between different cultures with regard to preference for cognitively higher moral principles, but show particular exceptions which should be further investigated. As verified in Hypothesis 2, moral judgment competence can be separately analyzed and reflects cultural and educational differences. The MJT provides a measurement of a cognitive structure, independent from conventional and cultural criteria. The moral cognitive aspect is measured independently of moral attitudes and values. Moral judgment competence takes into consideration how consistently a person applies internal, accepted, and cognitively organized moral principles when judging moral issues. It reveals the competence and ability of individuals to rely on moral principles to judge arguments that are both in agreement and, particularly, in disagreement with one’s own opinion. In other words, what is assessed is the core of democratic, conflict-solution competence. The present study suggests that students’ moral judgment competence does not simply unfold as a result of maturational processes alone. Moral development can be stimulated by higher education if educators know how to provide a favourable learning environment for it. This requires integration of academic and experiential learning achieved through high and consistent involvement with opportunities for role-taking and guided reflection at the university. This study

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relates evidence that moral development is a real and possible goal of higher education and that moral judgment competence should be considered as one of the core competencies to be developed among the students.

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Lind, G. (2009). Moral ist lehrbar [Morality can be taught]. 2nd supplemented edition. München: Oldenbourg. Lind, G., Hartmann, H.A., & Wakenhut, R. (Eds.) (1985, 2010). Moral development and the social environment. Studies in the psychology and philosophy of moral judgment and education. Chicago, IL: Precedent Publishing Inc. Mason, M.G., & Gibbs, J.D. (1993). Social perspective taking and moral judgment among college students. Journal of Adolescent Research, 8(1), 109–123. Nucci, L., & Pascarella, E.T. (1987). The influence of college on moral development. In J.C. Smart (Ed.), Higher education: Handbook of theory and research (pp. 271–326). New York: Agathon Press. Pascarella, E.T., & Terenzini, P. (1991). How college affects students: Findings and insights from twenty years of research. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Pascarella, E.T., & Terenzini, P. (2005). How college affects students: A third decade of research. Vol. 2. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Piaget, J. (1973). Das moralische Urteil beim Kinde. Zürich: Rascher. Piaget, J. (1976). The affective unconscious and the cognitive unconscious. In B. Inhelder, & H.H. Chapman (Eds.), Piaget and his school (pp. 63–71). New York: Springer. Piaget, J. (1981). Intelligence and affectivity: Their relation during childhood. Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews. Reiman, A.J. (2000). Promoting reflective practice within a cognitive-structural framework: theory, research and practice. In A.L. Comunian & U. Gielen (Eds.), International perspectives on human development (pp. 506–529). Lengerich: Pabst Science Publishers. Rest, J. (1973). The hierarchical nature of moral judgment: A study of patterns of comprehension and preference of moral stages. Journal of Personality, 41, 86–109. Rest, J. (1986). Moral development. Advances in research and theory. New York: Praeger. Rest, J. (1988). Why does college promote development in moral judgment? Journal of Moral Education, 17, 183–194. Rest, J.R., & Narvaez, D. (1991). The college experience and moral development. In W.M. Kurtines & J.L. Gewirtz (Eds.), Handbook of moral behavior and development (Vol. 2, pp. 229–245). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Rest, J., Thoma, S.J., & Edwards, J. (1997). Designing and validating a measure of moral judgment: Stage preferences and stage consistency approaches. Journal of Educational Psychology, 89, 5–28. Schillinger-Agati, M., & Lind, G. (2002). Learning environment at university level: ORIGIN/u (Questionnaire for assessing opportunities for role-taking and guided reflection at the University). Newly updated and validated versions. Paper presented at the 28th Annual Meeting of the AME (Association for Moral Education, Chicago). Schillinger-Agati, M. (2006). Learning environment and moral development: How university education fosters moral judgment competence in Brazil and two German-speaking countries. Aachen: Shaker.

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Schlaefli, A., Rest, J.R., & Thoma, S.J. (1985). Does moral education improve moral judgment? A meta-analysis of intervention studies using the Defining Issues Test. Review of Education Research, 55(3), 319–352. Schwartzman, S. (2004a). Educação: a nova geração de reformas [Education: The new reform generation]. In F. Gambiagi, J.G. Reis, & A. Urani (Eds.), Reformas no Brasil: Balanço e agenda (pp. 481–504). Río de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira. Schwartzman, S. (2004b). Equity, quality and relevance in higher education in Brazil. Anais da Academia Brasileira de Ciências, 26(1), 173–188. Sprinthall, N.A., Reiman, A.J., & Thies-Sprinthall, L. (1993). Role-taking and reflection: Promoting the conceptual and moral development of teachers. Learning and Individual Differences, 5(4), 283–299.

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Zhang Jing, Yang Shaogang

The Research and Development of the Moral Judgment Test in China Abstract: This presentation is based on looking back on research on moral cognition and moral judgment development in other countries, reflecting on the research in China in this field, and rationally analyzing the research findings and theoretical enlightenments of the Chinese moral judgment tests that were developed by Chinese scholars. Making use of Lind’s MJT to determine the developmental status of Chinese adolescents’ moral judgment competence and to affect this through education, should become an urgent and important task in present Chinese moral psychology. Keywords: moral cognition, moral judgment development in China, MJT, Lind

The Proposition During 1970, the German developmental psychologist Professor Georg Lind developed a research scale to test the children and adolescents’ moral judgment competence. This Moral Judgment Test (MJT) is based on Kohlberg’s earlier theory on moral development of cognition in children, but Lind’s notion of development can be understood in many ways. For over 30 years, the MJT has been used throughout more than 40 countries with over 200,000 participants in Europe, North and South America, Asia and Oceania, and encountered great success. In 2001, one of the authors of this article met with Georg Lind in an international conference for moral education in Canada and got the MJT that he chose to use in China. In recent years

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we have done some research and also supervised some researchers to make their own studies looking at moral and discourse competences. We have a preliminary understanding of the development of the Chinese children and adolescents’ moral judgment competence. Later, in July 2009, the author attended the international conference “Can Morality Be Taught” sponsored by Professor Georg Lind and Konstanz University in Germany. The academic communications of over 100 scholars across more than 30 countries left deep impressions on each attendee and also showed the international influences of MJT. Looking back on the research of moral cognition and moral judgment development in the other countries, reflecting on the research in China in this field, and rationally analyzing the research findings and theoretical enlightenments of the Chinese moral judgment tests that have been developed by Chinese scholars all make it clear: Utilizing Lind’s MJT to find the development status of the Chinese adolescents’ moral judgment competency and facilitating the further communications of the Chinese researchers of moral psychology and the scholars in the other countries should become an urgent and important task in present day Chinese moral psychology.

The Analysis of China’s Research on Moral Judgment China, a great oriental country with more than 5,000 years of civilization, has a long history of moral education with a psychological focus. Since the time of the Spring and Autumn Period (770–476 B.C.) and the Period of Warring States (475–221 B.C.), the various schools of thought and their derivatives during the period from pre-Qin times to the early years of the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.) that were generated and developed through contention of thought had several hundred years of debate in the vast expanse of the Chinese land. The dominant position of Confucianism had not been established until the Han Dynasty, during which the emporer of Han, Wu Di accepted the proposal of the Confucianist Dong Zhongshu: that only Confucianism should be respected, and all the other schools of thought be rejected. From that time on, moral instruction and rule training in accordance

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with Confucianism have become a kind of cultural tradition for Chinese moral education and psychological thought. Even to this day, most ideas of the ancient morality still have potential influences on Chinese and even Asian peoples’ development of thought processes. Looking back on the developmental history of research in China’s moral education, however, it is not difficult to see that, although China has a long history of instruction in moral education, it lacks the scientific spirit to explore the moral mind with the scientific methods of modern times. It was not until 1980s with the implementation of the reform and open policy in the Chinese society, that scholars in the academic world of China started to go from a preliminary introduction to and comments on the foreign theories and research to making their own indigenous studies for moral cognition. Of all the components in the psychological structure of morality, it should be said, the research of moral cognition, compared with that of moral affection, moral volition and moral behavior, is relatively more profound and abundant. Empirical research on moral judgment and reasoning, in particular, have obtained several positive results and findings. The authors of this article checked the Chinese network for journals with the title “moral judgment competence” and found 26 papers published and six dissertations for master degrees, of which seven papers were published during 1980–1999, and the others are the newly published articles in the past ten years. This shows that, in recent years, Chinese scholars have been paying more and more attention to the research in this field.

Early Research Phase The research in the 1980s and 1990s was based primarily on Piaget´s and Kohlberg’s theory, using Piaget’s method of dual-story to examine the variables of moral cognition such as the levels of moral development and responsibility. The first research study was completed by Li Boshu and his colleagues in 1982 and consisted of an investigation of over 2000 children aged five to 11 across the country’s 18 provinces entitled “The development of children’s moral judgment

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in our country” (Cai, 2005, pp. 152–154). They found that Chinese children’s development of moral judgment indeed goes through the process from objective judgment to subjective judgment as Piaget pointed out. In 1986, several psychologists in Hunan Province formed a cooperative group and explored the juveniles’ evaluative capacity of moral behavior (Cooperative Group, 1986, pp. 35–38). In 1992, Chen Huichang researched primary and secondary school students’ development of ideas on responsibility, labor and patriotism. Some scholars also performed cross-cultural research on children’s moral development within China, including Gu Haigen, Cen Guozhen & Li Boshu’s comparative research between Han majority and some minority children. In this period, there appeared some empirical research with Kohlberg’s theory as its basis. For example, in 1998 Kou Yu revised Gibbs’ Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form and White’s Moral Authority Scale (MAS) and did comparative research on the developmental levels of the moral judgment of Chinese adolescents. In addition, some Chinese psychologists performed expansive research on the relevant and influential factors for the development of moral cognition, such as Cen Guozhen & Li Boshu’s research of the impact of training on children’s moral judgment, and so on. In 1988, Chen Xinyin performed his first research on the development of and relevant factors for adolescents’ moral judgment by using Rest’s Defining Issue Test (DIT-1). He translated the DIT into English and examined its validity and reliability. It should be said that his article entitled “Defining Issue Test and its applications” is the first published paper to do the research on “moral judgment competence.” He also made a detailed introduction to the theoretical basis of DIT, as well as its construction and application through which the Chinese readers had an elementary understanding of “moral judgment competence,” and could make use of it for further research. In 1990, Gao Xuanzhu and her colleagues published an article entitled “Rightly treat children’s developmental potencies of moral characters: An investigation of children’s moral judgment competence” (Gao, 1990, p. 1). Its research subjects were kindergarten and primary school children aged three to nine and it used the methods of simple observation and experiment. In 1993, Liu Feng and his colleagues pub-

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lished their article entitled “A good way to enhance moral judgment competence: A classroom discussion of moral dilemmas” (Gu & Li, 1997; Guo, 1999; Liu, 1993) that proposed their suggestions to apply moral dilemmas to teaching practices. The first indigenous empirical research combining the foreign theories and practice with those of China started with Li Boshu & Gu Haigen’s research around the project “The adolescents’ moral judgment competence test and the model of moral development stages in Shanghai District.” The results were published in Shanghai Educational and Scientific Research in 1994 (Lu, 2005; Shen, 2006; Wang, 2002, pp. 34–35; Xiong, 2008, pp. 91–94; Xu, 2006; Yang, 2007) and in Psychological Science in 1997. There is no doubt that this article facilitated a large step forward in the theoretical and practical research on moral judgment competence in China. Additionally, Guo Benyu’s book Moral cognitive development and moral education: Kohlberg’s theory and practice (Guo, 1999), that was based on his doctorate dissertation, made a thorough and theoretical elaboration and comments in which he performed a detailed analysis of the earlier theoretical sources of DIT and its scoring method, and also outlined the relational contents of DIT. It made a comprehensive framework for later scholars who are interested in Kohlberg’s theory and DIT and, therefore, it has laid a confirming foundation for the future profound research.

Recent Research In the past ten years, Chinese scholars have made increasing research both theoretically and empirically on Western studies of moral judgment and moral cognition, and have made more and deeper achievements. For instance, Yang Shaogang and his students performed a series of theoretical and experimental research around DIT-1 and DIT-2, and published some important articles, such as “What is a moral person: A challenge of contemporary psychology to Kohlberg” (Yang, 2001). It included a theoretical critique of Kohlberg’s theory that it “only has some cool moral skeleton without lively flesh of morality,” and also commented generally on the research dynamics

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of North America’s moral psychology after Kohlberg’s death in 1987. Furthermore, Yang Shaogang and his students also made some commentary on and introduction to the new finding proposed by the research group in Minnesota University headed by Jim Rest and his followers. For example, in his article “DIT and Neo-Kohlbergian theory” (Yang, 2006) he made a comparison between DIT and Kohlberg’s original research method and pointed out their differences and commonalities, showing that the theoretical foundation of the DIT has been broken through some unjustified points in Kohlberg’s theory, and, thus, the neo-Kohlbergian theories were formed. During this period, Chinese scholars began to notice Georg Lind’s MJT. In 2002, for example, Zhao Zhanqiang, a master student in Hebei Normal University then, contacted Lind and was permitted to use MJT in China for the first time. In the year 2003, he finished his master thesis entitled “A correlational research on the volunteering service activities and moral development of senior high students.” In this thesis, he made a comparison between the students who seldom attend volunteering service and the students who often attend it, and he found there was no significant difference the study. It was not, however, a systematic and strict empirical research for Chinese children and adolescents using the MJT. In 2001, the author attended the 27th International Conference for Moral Education in Vancouver, Canada and met with Professor Lind. Two years later he got Lind’s copyright permission to do the research with the MJT in China, and supervised his student Wu Huihong to make the first systematic and profound empirical research with the MJT. There are 724 participants aged from 12–22, including 10 grades from junior and senior high schools and colleges and universities. It can be concluded from this research that, although the C-scores, compared with those of Western countries, were a little lower (the Cscores in high schools were 26.90, in Universities were 28.87), the developmental regularity of the moral judgment competence is the same as the other countries. That is, the C-scores among the students in different grades have significant differences and the general tendency is that the C-scores are strongly increasing. This means that education plays positive role for students’ moral development and that actively participating in the social and group activities help enhance students’

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moral judgment competence. The C-scores between male and female students, between key and non-key schools, between second and third year college students and fourth year undergraduate students have no significant differences, and therefore, one could infer that the factors such as intelligence and gender could not directly influence the students’ levels of moral development. In 2007, Wang Yunqiang, Guo Benyu & Wu Huihong used the MJT with 300 undergraduate students as their subjects to examine the influence of emotional status on students’ moral judgment competence. It found that (1) there is a significant grade difference in their C-scores, that is, the C-scores are increasing with the increase of their grades, such results are in conformity with Lind’s research predications; (2) the emotional statuses have significant influences on students’ moral judgment competence; the C-scores in joyful conditions are higher than those in sad conditions. The findings are just opposite of the conclusion in the other countries; and (3) the correlation between the task and the self has no significant impact on students’ moral judgment competence. In 2008, Zheng Xiaoning used the MJT to perform her research on criminals’ moral judgment competency who were in their term of imprisonment. The results showed that the average C-scores were 17.91, that is, most criminals’ moral judgment competencies were in the first and second stages (in lower stages). The C-scores of city criminals are significantly higher than rural criminals (t = –2.155, p = 0.032 < 0.05); the C-scores of the new criminals are significantly higher than the criminals who had been in prison for a long time. In the statistic analysis, the criminals were divided into six types: stealing, violence, raping, drugs, duty crime and others. Aside from the significant differences in C-scores between the violence and duty crimes groups (P = 0.025 < 0.05), the results of test for variance showed that the C-scores among other groups were not significantly different (F = 1.343, P = 0.245 > 0.05). Although the research had some problems in its sampling and design, as the findings demonstrated, and it was also never published, it was still able to reflect the general tendency of the criminals’ moral judgment competence and, therefore, has some positive significance.

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A Rational Reflection on the Moral Judgment Competence of Chinese Children and Adolescents To sum up, the Chinese scholars are continuously deepening and widening their research on moral judgment competence, and they have truly found some positive results. In recent years, we have seen that the research scope and participants with MJT have gradually expanded, while research angles and methods are increasing. However, more work still has to be done in the future research.

The Expansion of the Research Participants The MJT could be used for infants, primary school pupils, high school students and undergraduate students, as well as for the groups with emotional and behavioral disturbances and criminal groups and so on. Although the research methods of the Chinese scholars are quite different, that is, they use their own instrumentation to test the moral judgment competence, they have made their research in these groups mentioned above. For example, Lu Jianhua’s (2005) article “Do infants have moral judgment competence?” is the second article to study infants’ moral judgment competence following Yu Quansheng’s article in 1998 entitled “Cultivating infants’ moral judgment competence” (You, 1998). Articles using primary and secondary school students as the participants are comparatively more common. From Ni Wei’s (2001) article “A correlation research on the development of high school students tolerance style and their moral judgment capacities” to Xiong Wenfen’s (2008) paper “Moral education should not neglect the cultivation of high school students’ moral judgment competence,” they all show an increasing concern with the secondary school students’ moral judgment competence, though most of the articles are theoretical commentaries, not empirical research. Undergraduate students have also become a focus group for research, from Wang Xiaohong’s (2002) article in 2002 “My opinion of enhancing undergraduate students’ moral judgment competence” to Yang Jie’s (2007) paper “The role disintegration: An important linkage to

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cultivate undergraduates’ moral judgment competence.” In addition, Xu Jingjun’s master thesis (Xu, 2006) entitled “Research on moral judgment competence of children with emotional and behavioral disturbances and its influential factors,” and Zhang Zhijun’s article “A comparative research on the deaf-mute and normal adolescents’ moral judgment competence” (Zhang, 2007, 2005, 2001; Zhang & Chen, 2008) expand the research subjects to disabled people.

The Increasing of Research Angles The formation and development of moral judgment competence is concerned with many influential factors, and so the Chinese scholars are increasingly exploring the correlational factors that influence moral judgment competency, such as Wang Fang and Gu Haigen’s (2008) article “Research on the relation of adolescents’ sense of selfvalue, moral judgment and values,” the Wang Yunqiang et al. article “The impact of emotional status on undergraduates’ moral judgment competence,” Xiao Sanrong’s (2006) master thesis “Research on the influence of secondary school students’ personality traits, family environment on their moral judgment competence,” and Fu Huixin’s (2006) master thesis “A study of the influence of junior high school students’ moral judgment competence, sympathy on their tendency of helping behavior.” Some articles made theoretical reflections on the predicaments of moral judgment competence in real society, for example, Zhang Kuiming published his article in 2001 “A comment on moral judgment research in real life,” Zhang Dongling’s (2007) article entitled “A query of cultivating the educated’s moral choice capacity and moral judgment capacity,” Liu Tiane’s (2007) article “Raising the capacity of moral judgment and moral choice in the actual moral conflict.” Moreover, the research on how to put moral judgment theory into practice increases constantly, such as Fan Hongyu’s master thesis “Cultivating students’ moral judgment competence,” Cai Lei’s (2005) article “The practical application of discussion method in raising moral judgment competence,” Zhang Xushu’s (2005) paper entitled “Ingenious application of moral dilemma to facilitate students’ development of moral judgment competence,” and Shen

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Xiaomin’s (2006) article “Enhancing the competence of moral judgment and moral choice in dialogue and negotiation” and many others. Although most of the authors didn’t use Lind’s MJT as their instrument of measure, they also confirm that more and more Chinese scholars are becoming concerned with researching moral judgment competence.

With Abundant Research Methods Since the 1980s, a large scale introduction to Piaget, Kohlberg and the school of moral cognition has played a guiding role for Chinese scholars’ empirical research, and, thus, more and more researchers have begun to use the methods of cognitive evaluation in recent years. Specifically, the method of indirect stories are primarily used, while the questionnaire, inventory, and interview methods are used as auxiliary methods. Some researchers have also used simple experimentation. Zhuang Kangyi’s (2003) article, for instance, “Review of methods for assessing moral judgment,” makes a detailed comment on research methods of moral judgment competence. In particular, Yang Shaogang supervised his students to use MJT and DIT-2 in Jiangsu Province and Guangdong Province, testing the moral judgment competence of secondary school students and undergraduate students in universities. Wu Huihong’s master thesis “A new perspective of moral research: A theoretical and empirical research on MJT” and Sun Xiujuan’s (2007) master thesis “A psychological research on DIT-2,” for example, are the studies supervised by Dr. Yang with those two important research methods. In the past 30 years, the Chinese researchers have indeed acquired some advancements in the research of moral judgment and moral cognition, but it is obvious that, because of the late starting steps and some limitations in the educational institution and system, plenty of problems still exist. From the perspectives of methodology, validity, and research subjects, the research of moral judgment competence in China is too scattered and lacks systematic and consistent research. It has neither formed its own theoretical framework nor constituted its own particular research method and instruments. The

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theoretical research of moral judgment competence is usually quite shallow, research with profound thought and international implications is rare, and a support system for the understanding of empirical research in science is especially needed. Therefore, there is a long way to go if we want to make the research of moral judgment better serve school moral education and facilitate children’s and adolescents’ moral development.

References Cai, L. (2005). The practical application of discussion method in raising moral judgment competence. Professional Education of Hygiene, 14, 152–154. Cooperative Group of Moral Character in Hunan Province (1986). A study of juveniles’ evaluative capacity of moral behavior. Psychological Development and Education, 1, 35–38. Gao, X. (1990). Rightly treat children’s developmental potencies of moral characters: An investigation of children’s moral judgment competence. Parents Readings, 1. Gu, H., & Li, B. (1997). The making of the test for adolescents’ moral judgment competence in Shanghai district and its establishment of the norm. Psychological Science, 3. Guo, B. (1999). Moral cognitive development and moral education: Kohlberg’s theory and practice. Fuzhou: Fujian Education Press. Li, B., Wu, T., & Wu, F. (1982). Psychology. Beijing: People’s Education Press. Li, B. (1994). Some issues in the making of the test for moral judgment competence. Shanghai Educational and Scientific Research, 5. Liu, F. (1993). A good way to enhance moral judgment competence: A classroom discussion of moral dilemmas. Morality and Civilization, 6. Liu, T. (2007). Raising the capacity of moral judgment and moral choice in the actual moral conflict. Journal of Sichuan Professional and Technical Institute, 4, 58–60. Lu, J. (2005). Do infants have moral judgment competence? Family Education, 4. Ni, W. (2001). A correlation research on the development of high school students tolerance style and their moral judgment capacities. Journal of Nanjing Normal University, 2, 98–104. Shen, X. (2006). Enhancing the competence of moral judgment and moral choice in dialogue and negotiation. Prospect of Global Education, 8, 42–46. Wang, F., & Gu, H. (2008). Research on the relation of adolescents’ sense of self-value, moral judgment and values. The Chinese School Hygiene, 9.

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Wang, X. (2002). My opinion of enhancing undergraduate students’ moral judgment competence. Journal of Teacher´s College on Shanxi University, 2, 34–35. Xiong, W. (2008). Moral education should not neglect the cultivation of high school students’ moral judgment competence. Research and Curriculum, Textbooks and Instruction, 37, 91–94. Xu, J. (2006). Research on moral judgment competency of children with emotional and behavioral disturbances and its influential factors. Unpublished master thesis of East-China Normal University. Yang, J. (2007). The role disintegration: An important linkage to cultivate undergraduates. Academic Forum, 2. Yang, S. (2001). What is a moral person: A challenge of contemporary psychology to Kohlberg. Theory and Practice of Education, 23(4). Yang, S. (2006). Defining Issues Test and neo-Kohlbergian theory. Ideology, Theory and Education, 4. Yu, Q. (1998). Cultivating infants’ moral judgment competence. Family Education, 2. Zhang, D. (2007). A query of cultivating the educated’s ‘moral choice capacity’ and ‘moral judgment capacity‘. Contemporary Forum of Education, 3, 92–93. Zhang, K. (2001). A comment on moral judgment researches in real life. Prospect of Global Education, 6, 31–36. Zhang, X. (2005). Ingenious application of ‘moral dilemma’ to facilitate students’ development of moral judgment competence. Class Teachers, 1, 32–34. Zhang, Z., & Chen, B. (2008). A comparative research on the deaf-mute and normal adolescents’ moral judgment competence. Psychological Research, 1(5), 32–35. Zhuang, K. (2003). Review of methods for assessing moral judgment. Shanghai Research of Education, 9, 23–37.

Anna Laura Comunian

The Cross-Cultural Construct Validity of the Padua Moral Judgment Scale Abstract: Based in part on the work of Gibbs, we constructed a new scale of moral judgment development in Italy, called the Padua Moral Judgment Scale. As a first step, we administered to representative samples of Italian respondents the Social Reflection Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF) of Gibbs et al. (1992), a production measure of moral judgment with an open-answer format containing eleven short answer items. These items address seven sociomoral values (contract, truth, afiliation, life, property, law, and legal justice). Subsequently, we derived specific moral issues from the answers of large samples of Italian respondents in order to create an objective test. Keywords: The Padua Moral Judgment Scale, sociomoral values, personal attitudes

Introduction Kohlberg’s Stage Model Kohlberg (1958) modified and elaborated Piaget's work, thereby laying much of the groundwork for the current debate within psychology on the nature of moral development. Consistent with Piaget (1932/1965), he proposed that, based on their experiences, children develop structured ways of thinking about some aspects of moral concepts such as justice, rights, equality and human welfare. Expanding on Piaget's work, Kohlberg determined that the process of moral development was principally concerned with justice, and that it continued throughout an individual’s lifetime. Following Piaget’s constructivist requirements for a stage model, as described in his theory

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of cognitive development, each stage provides a new and necessary perspective that is more comprehensive and differentiated than its predecessors but nevertheless integrated with them. On the basis of his research, Kohlberg identified six stages of moral reasoning grouped into three major levels. Each level represents a fundamental shift in the sociomoral perspective of the individual.

Gibbs’ Four Stage Model In contrast to Kohlberg’s six stage model, Gibbs proposed a four stage model that distinguishes between standard and existential phases. According to this model, moral judgment proceeds from the immature Stages 1 and 2 to the more mature Stages 3 and 4. At the two mature stages people are able to appreciate the intangible bases of society and relationships. Stage 3 represents the level of moral maturity for people from traditional cultures not characterized by formal and elaborate legal mechanisms. After reaching Stage 4, people incorporate the highest form of moral or philosophical principles into their reasoning, representing not a stage but a deep reflective or existential phase. Gibbs et al. argued that the postconventional or so-called “principled” level should not be regarded as the exclusive definition of moral judgment maturity or even as a part of a standard sequence of stages. Gibbs regarded Stages 3 and 4 as already representing mature moral reasoning whereas Stages 1 and 2 are considered to represent immature or superficial moral judgment. At Stage 1, the person is assumed not to be able to understand the moral reasons for rules, has trouble with reciprocity if it requires taking more than one perspective at a time, and confuses moral justification with physical power. Individuals at Stage 2 have trouble understanding the ideal of mutuality in a relationship. Moreover, they tend to be self-centered, better at detecting how others are unfair to them or how others do not do things for them instead of seeing how unfair they are to others or how they do not do things for others. Stages 3 and 4, representing mature or profound moral judgment, are what define the cognitive-structural norm for any culture. Stage 3 thinking entails caring about the mutu-

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ality of relationships and the preciousness of human life. Stage 4 thinking entails respect for rights and responsibilities as the basis for society, and even for ideal society. Stage 4 societal morality expands rather than replaces Stage 3 interpersonal morality. Gibbs et al. (1992) developed the Social Reflection Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF), a production measure designed to empirically trace his notions of moral judgment. Unlike Kohlberg’s Model Judgment Interview, it is not based on moral dilemmas but rather is made up of 11 items with an open-answer format. It also contains 11 short-answer items that address seven sociomoral values: contract, truth, affiliation, life, property, law, and legal justice. The SRM-SF allows the identification of four stages and three mixed stages of moral judgment, which are hierarchically-ordered in all cultures. Gibbs did not include Stages 5 and 6 into this assessment procedure, due to the difficulty in assigning these two stages, already noticed by Kohlberg. The SRM-SF has been used in numerous cross-cultural studies, which have assessed moral judgment in twenty-three countries, making it possible to confirm the universality of moral values (Gibbs et al., 2007). The SRM-SF is a dilemma-free production measure founded on a series of assumptions, derived from Kohlberg’s theory and Gibbs’ revisions to this model. Its main principles are: structural wholeness, universality, and hierarchical integration. Despite some open-ended questions requiring further research, multi-method convergence is used for common moral values, basic moral judgment stage development, and related social perspective-taking across cultural groups.

The Padua Moral Judgment Scale Based in part on the work of Gibbs, we constructed a new scale of moral judgment development in Italy. As a first step, we administered to representative samples of Italian respondents the Social Reflection Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF) of Gibbs et al. (1992), a production measure of moral judgment with an open-answer format containing eleven short answer items. These items address seven sociomoral values (contract, truth, affiliation, life, property, law, and legal justice). Subsequently, we derived specific moral issues

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from the answers of large samples of Italian respondents in order to create an objective test. The construction of the new moral judgement scale took place in three phases. In the first phase, after having administered the Italian adaptation of the SRM-SF to representative samples of the Italian population, the content of the answers was analyzed. For each stage and mixed stage the contents were classified by frequency, and closed answer items were constructed from this information. Based on these data the first version of the questionnaire comprised 165 items. In the second phase, an exploratory factor analysis (with varimax rotation) was conducted on data collected from different Italian samples representative in terms of ages and years of education. Only statistically different items were considered for subsequent analysis. Based on this version of the questionnaire with 49 items, another exploratory factor analysis (with varimax rotation) was carried out. In the third phase, the questionnaire was reduced further to 28 items selected on the basis of the results of the previous factor analysis. The final form of the new scale, the Padua Moral Judgment Scale or PMJS, contains 28 items grouped into four parts, each composed of seven items in a closed-answer format. Each of the seven items represents a stage or mixed stage of the development of moral judgment. For each group of seven items, there are 2 open-ended questions. They invite the respondent to indicate the number of item(s) he agrees with most and the number of item(s) he agrees with least. Moreover, for each item, participants respond to a 4-point frequency scale ranging from 1: not at all, to 4: very much. The general instructions for the test are as follows: “Please read the statements below and express how much you agree or disagree with each one on the basis of your experience and beliefs.” Some examples of the items are as follows: “You keep promises to friends because otherwise you may lose them” (Stage 1); “You help your parents because children must do what their parents tell them” (Stage 1/2); “You do not take other people’s things because if you steal from others, they may steal from you” (Stage 2); “You tell the truth because otherwise you might regret it and feel bad” (Stage 2/3); ”You keep promises to friends because friendship ought to be sincere.” (Stage 3); ”You abide by the law because laws promote harmony and justice”

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(Stage 3/4); and “You tell the truth because it is a principle which governs relationships between people in society” (Stage 4). Previous studies employing the PMJS in Italy and elsewhere have shown that the stage structure underlying the test is stable and replicable in various samples (Comunian & Ronconi, 2006).

Present Research Our research seeks to explore the theoretical validity of the PMJS in terms of structured totality, invariant sequence, and hierarchical integration. On the basis of the first assumption, one can foresee that every stage forms a unitary structure. On the basis of the second one, we can expect an invariant stage sequence since respondents are expected to pass through every stage before arriving at the next highest level of moral judgment, without regressions to past stages. According to the last assumption, every stage represents the elaboration and integration of the previous ones (Kohlberg, 1984).

Study 1 The main aim was to evaluate the cross-cultural validity of the PMJS. This was done in three phases. The first phase was designed to confirm the measurement model of the PMJS in the 20 countries under investigation. In the second phase, we investigated differences across countries in factor structure. Finally, we applied Multigroup CFAs models (one for each stage and mixed stage) to determine whether structural differences would emerge between countries.

Sample The PMJS was administered to 4,971 research participants (mean age: 21.03 years) from twenty countries: Albania, Australia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, and Spain.

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Method As a first step we performed a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) employing the LISREL Version 8.71 software (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2004). The analysis was designed to test the proposed 7factor model representing 4 stages and 3 mixed stages. In a second step, we performed Multigroup CFAs of onedimensional structural equation models (one for each stage and mixed stage) to test configural invariance and metric invariance across cultures (using LISREL Version 8.71 software; see Jöreskog et al., cf.). In addition to assessing overall fit indices of the Multigroup CFAs models (on 4 items with 1 latent factor corresponding to the hypothesized stage or mixed stage), we used two comparative fit indices to statistically evaluate the difference between Configural Invariance (CI model) and Metric Invariance (MI model). In a third step, we applied a Hierarchical Cluster Analysis with Ward method on factor loadings of Multigroup CFAs models (one for each stage and mixed stage) to determine structural differences between the 20 countries. Two-cluster solutions were chosen for all stages and mixed stages.

Results First step: Fit indices of CFA (on 28 items of PMJS with 7 distinct, but correlated, latent factors corresponding to the hypothesized stages and mixed stages) were as follows: c2(329, N = 4,971) = 10,438.60, p < .001; CFI = .92; SRMR = .068; RMSEA = .079. No clear prevalence of stages over contents is evident. Sometimes stage is more relevant, sometimes content is more relevant; sometimes both have the same relevance. This finding confirms the measurement model of the PMJS in the countries under investigation. Second step: RMSEA and SRMR indices (appropriate for complex modes [Beauducel & Wittmann, 2005; Raykov & Marcoulides, 1998]) provided adequate support for the measurement model of PMJS:

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χ2 =22.45, df = 3, GFI = .9, CFI = .19, RMR = .114, RMSEA = .24.

The overall fit indices of Multigroup CFAs models were: cD2 = c2(MI model) - c2(CI model); p < .001 supported CI model. DCFI = CFI(MI model) – CFI(CI model); DCFI > \.01| supported CI model.

No differences across countries in factor structure emerged. Third Step: The results of a Cluster Analysis on factor loadings of Multigroup CFAs models are presented in Table 1. Stages

First Cluster

Second Cluster

1 1/2 2 2/3 3 3/4 4

10 13 13 12 19 19 18

10 7 7 8 1 1 2

Table 1. Cluster Analysis: Number of countries for first and second cluster.

The data suggest that structural differences among the countries are more apparent for the early stages of moral development. This can be observed in Table 1, where the number of countries in the second cluster tends to decrease with increasing stage level.

Study 2 Hypothesis. The fit of the model will be improved when stages and contents are simultaneously included in the statistical analysis. In this study we expected that the same results will not be obtained for all items: for some items, stage will load higher than content and for other items content will load higher than stage. Differences among

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countries may be expected because content may be culture-specific whereas stages are postulated to be invariant across cultures.

Method The current study applies confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to multitrait-multimethod data obtained with the help of the PMJS in different samples of respondents from Europe, North Africa, and Asia. With CFA we can define models that posit a priori trait factors (stages of development) and method factors (i.e., different contents). Furthermore, and we can test whether the model fits the data (Hoyle, 1995). Participants: Table 2 presents the description of the sample considered in Study 2. Participants were selected from 7 countries located in Europe, North Africa and Asia.

N

Gender (% Female)

Mean Age (in years)

Italy Spain Jordan Kuwait China Japan Pakistan

300 238 300 555 430 320 259

52.3 62.6 48.0 50.8 57.7 51.3 57.9

21.72 20.81 21.61 18.49 20.03 20.83 21.52

Total

2402

53.9

20.40

Country

Table 2. Sample characteristics for 7 countries.

Procedure For the total sample, three different models were tested: a) the Stage Model (SM); b) the Content Model (CM); and c) the combined Stage-Content Model (SCM). A comparison of the three tested models shows that the SCM Model including both stages and contents provides the best fit for the data.

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Results In Table 3, the results of the Stage Model (SM), the Content Model (CM), and the Stage-Content Model (SCM) are presented. Model

Chi-square

df

p

CFI

GFI

RMSEA

SM CM SCM

5681.19 6015.49 2224.98

329 329 280

< .001 < .001 < .001

.93 .93 .97

.86 .85 .94

.082 .085 .054

Table 3. Comparison of respective fits of the Stage Model (SM), the Content Model (CM), and the Stage-Content Model (SCM).

The fit of the Stage-Content Model has been successively evaluated within each country in order to determine the respective loadings of stage/mixed stage and specific content on each item. As may be seen in Table 4, the SCM presents an adequate fit in all the countries examined. Country

Chi-square

df

p

CFI

GFI

RMSEA

Italy Spain Jordan Kuwait China Japan Pakistan

590.52 525.48 690.59 694.23 651.88 572.85 513.11

280 280 280 280 280 280 280

< .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001

.94 .92 .93 .94 .95 .95 .97

.88 .86 .86 .92 .90 .89 .88

.061 .061 .070 .052 .056 .057 .057

Table 4. Fit of the SCM for 7 countries.

An examination of eigenvalues shows that there is no marked predominance of either stages or contents: in 10 cases the eigenvalues of the stages are higher and in 10 cases the eigenvalues of the contents are higher. A statistically significant difference emerged between the variables “stages” and “content” (Wilcoxon Test, z = .47; p = .64).

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We have examined qualitatively the loadings respectively for content and for stages. Content: A higher loading of content is found for Life (items 11, 17, 23), Friendship (items: 8, 22), and Truth (items: 7, 9) when compared to Society (item 2), Justice (item 16), and Family (item 19). Stages: There were higher stage loadings for Stage 1/2 (items: 3, 13, 21), Stage 2 (items: 5, 10, 27), and Stage 1 (items: 18, 24) than for stage 2/3 (item 4), and Stage 3 (item 26). These results indicate that the stage where each item is placed, is more relevant for lower stages but less so for the higher ones, where content proves more important. This result is found in all countries except one where a statistically significant difference exists between the eigenvalue of stage and content (Wilcoxon test, z = 2.53, p = .01). In particular, for 19 items the factor loading of content is greater and for 9 items, the factor loading of stage is greater. The fit of the model shows that when stages and contexts are both included, the same results will not be obtained for all items. For some items, stage loads more than content and for other items content loads more than stage. Some differences among countries were observed, suggesting that some items may have somewhat different emic meanings in some of the countries represented in the sample.

Conclusion The cross-cultural validation of the PMJS constitutes the basic purpose of our research project. The results provide evidence that by considering contents together with stages, a better model for the PMJS instrument emerges. The fit of this model is better than that of the other two models that consider either only the stages or only the contents. Comparisons between different countries point to a substantial convergence of the results. In Study 1, there was consistency in the theoretical model of moral judgment development for the countries examined. This indicated that the research participants examined in this study follow the same stage progression. The results further indicate that the PMJS ade-

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quately measures the theoretical construct of moral judgment development as characterized by Gibbs’ adaptation of Kohlbergian theory. The findings of Study 2 further support the universality model of the 4-stage model of moral judgment development. Particularly important in the findings is that hierarchic Confirmatory Factor Analyses of all the samples supported a unique general model. Moreover, the general validity of the stage model is our main concern. Although we need more comprehensive data to fully evaluate the effectiveness of a cross-cultural model analysis, the following suggestion can be made: In the study of moral development, it is necessary to integrate and synthesize the basic components of moral judgment development such as stages, mixed stages, and their progression with the emic and etic meanings of the test items. This point underlines a limit to the extent to which results of this study can be generalized to the processing of stage development, especially when the data is derived from cross-cultural studies. Since moral development stages are directly related to actions in everyday life contexts, the findings from cross-cultural analysis seem to be more relevant and usable when they are integrated with research and intervention in the real world. The cross-cultural validation of the PMJS constitutes the basic purpose project for future research. Future work will examine in more detail both the etic or universal and the emic or culture-specific meanings.

References Beauducel, A., & Wittmann, W.W. (2005). Simulation study on fit indexes in CFA based on data with slightly distorted simple structure. Structural Equation Modeling, 12, 41–75. Comunian, A.L. (2004). Construction of a scale for measuring development of moral judgment. Psychological Reports, 94, 613–618. Comunian, A.L., & Ronconi, L. (2006). Cross-cultural research on moral development. In A.L. Comunian & R. Roth (Eds.), International perspectives in psychology (pp. 61– 72). Aachen: Shaker. Gibbs, J.C. (2003). Moral development and reality: Beyond the theories of Kohlberg and Hoffman. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Gibbs, J.C., Basinger, K.S., & Fuller, D. (1992). Moral maturity: Measuring the development of sociomoral reflection. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

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Gibbs, J., Basinger, K.S., Grime, R.L., & Snarey, J.R. (2007). Moral judgment development across cultures: Revisiting Kohlberg’s universality claims. Developmental Review, 27(4), 443–500. Hoyle, R.H. (2005). Applications of structural equation modelling in clinical and health psychology research. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jöreskog, K.G., & Sorbom, D. (1995). Lisrel VIII: Analysis of linear structural relationships by maximum likelihood and least squares method. Mooreville: Scientific Software. Kohlberg, L. (1958). The development of modes of thinking and choices in the years from 10 to 16. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Chicago, U.S. Kohlberg, L. (1984). The psychology of moral development. Vol. 1: Essays on moral development. San Francisco: Harper & Row. Piaget, J. (1932/1965). The moral judgment of the child. London: Kegan & Paul. Power, F.C., Higgins, A., & Kohlberg, L. 1989. Lawrence Kohlberg’s approach to moral education. New York: Columbia University Press. Raykov, T., & Marcoulides, G. (2007). Equivalent structural equation models: A challenge and responsibility. Structural Equation Modeling, 14(4), 695–700.

Patrícia Unger Raphael Bataglia & Marcia Schillinger

Moral Segmentation in Studies with the Moral Judgment Test in Brazil Abstract: Analyzing Brazilian MJT data (Bataglia & Schillinger, 2002) separately in a retrospective study, we have noticed that all the samples had much better results in the Workers’ Dilemma than in the Doctor’s Dilemma (i.e., Mercy Killing Dilemma). This phenomenon has been called moral segmentation (Wakenhut, 1972). The purpose of the present paper is to present a history of our efforts at investigating the moral segmentation phenomenon in Brazil. Some possible hypotheses and explanations are presented below. Keywords: moral segmentation, moral judgment competence, MJT

Introduction Moral judgment competence is “the capacity to make decisions and judgments which are moral (i.e., based on internal principles) and to act in accordance with such judgments” (Kohlberg, 1964, p. 425; Lind, 2008; emphasis added). The Moral Judgment Test (MJT, Lind, 2008) is based on Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development. Lind’s main goal in elaborating the MJT was to provide a valid and objective instrument by which to measure results of moral education intervention processes. Results of such processes should be considered not in terms of improvement of moral judgments, but in terms of increase in the capacity to act in accordance with our own principles. In this way, the main construct of the MJT is moral judgment competence.

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The MJT has been widely used in many different countries after careful validation. It is composed of two dilemmas: the Workers’ Dilemma and the Doctor’s Dilemma. Both dilemmas elicit moral judgment competence; however, the Doctor’s Dilemma (Mercy Killing Dilemma) is slightly more demanding. Indeed, studies in different European countries have supported this: usually the C-score in the latter dilemma is slightly higher and stage 6 is preferred more clearly over stage 5 reasoning compared to the Workers’ Dilemma. The use of the Moral Judgment Test in Brazil had its beginning when it was validated for the Portuguese language by Patricia Bataglia in 1998 (Bataglia, 2001). It has been used since then in different research projects. One factor has particularly caught our attention: the low C-scores obtained by Brazilian participants in different samples. Hernandez & Moreno (2000) reported the same phenomenon analyzing Mexican results since 1995. They analyzed the two dilemmas separately and noticed that participants achieved very low scores on the Mercy Killing Dilemma. The same did not happen with the Workers’ Dilemma. Analyzing Brazilian data (Bataglia & Schillinger, 2002) separately in a retrospective study, we have noticed that all the samples had much better results in the Workers´ Dilemma than in the Mercy Killing Dilemma. This phenomenon has been called “moral segmentation” (Wakenhut, 1972). The purpose of the present paper is to present a history of our efforts in investigating the moral segmentation phenomenon in Brazil so far. Some possible hypotheses and explanations will be presented below.

Moral Segmentation The moral segmentation phenomenon was first identified by Krämer-Badoni and Wakenhut (1985). The authors emphasize the influence of “life-worlds” in moral judgment. In particular, we presume that conscripts within the military life-world judge situations which require moral judgment in a different way than do comparable groups who have not done military service. (KrämerBadoni & Wakenhut, 1985, p. 205)

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By “life-world,” Husserl (1962) means “a subjectively relative, historically and situationally prescribed horizon of experience” (KrämerBadoni & Wakenhut, 1985, p. 206). However, Krämer-Badoni and Wakenhut add that, in their opinion, life-worlds are based upon real and normative elements and consequently have a decisive influence on behavior. This means that certain social situations or structures can determine ways of interpreting reality. When studying the military life-world, the authors noticed that “in specifically military situations of conflict which permit or require moral evaluation, recruits will fall back on patterns of moral argumentations which reflect the restrictive structures of the military life-world” (p. 212). In countries such as Brazil, with shared negative experiences due to military dictatorship, we think that this kind of phenomenon occurs not only with those involved in a military world but with the population in general. In Bataglia’s (1996) investigation on moral development of psychology students, the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) in its form C has been used. It contains, among others, a dilemma about a military situation. Participants’ answers showed, in general, a preference for Stages 2 and 3. For the specific military dilemma, however, they chose Stage 4 arguments. The military life-world made all the answers fall back on patterns prescribed by the military structure. This study paved the way for our subsequent investigations. It suggests that segmentation could be related to life-worlds. The next question seemed to be whether life worlds could also influence answers given to the MJT dilemmas. As mentioned above, Bataglia and Schillinger (2002) conducted a small study to investigate the segmentation phenomenon and its possible relation to religious commitment in Brazil. The hypothesis that guided this research was that the Mercy Killing Dilemma touches a very sensitive theme for religious individuals. The same does not happen with the Workers’ Dilemma. It would be interesting to investigate if religious commitment was a determinant variable to explain moral segmentation phenomenon. Results presented in Table 1 reveal no significant difference between the two groups in the general score, but significant differences between the two dilemmas in segmented scores. For the purposes of

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that investigation, we defined the subjects as having a strong commitment to religion as those who: a) declared religious affiliation for a period longer than 15 years; b) declared to be extremely involved in church activities and c) had a leader position in those religious groups. Without commitment to religion (N = 54)

With strong commitment to religion (N = 55)

General score

15.62

12.33

Worker’s dilemma

40.3

33.22

Mercy killing dilemma

16.54

12.38

N = 109

Table 1. General score and segmented scores for the two groups: without commitment to religion and with commitment to religion (Bataglia & Schillinger, 2002).

Religious commitment could not be considered as a determinant criterion in this study. Schillinger (2006) analyzed MJT answers given by university students from two German-speaking countries and Brazil. Students also completed another questionnaire about the learning environment (ORIGIN-u), which included some questions about religious commitment, including the question: “How religious do you consider yourself to be?”. There was a statistically significant interaction between the variable religiosity and moral judgment competence (F(1.259) = 5.55, p < 0.02) among Brazilian participants. Brazilian students who consider themselves “very religious” had lower levels of moral judgment competence than those who reported being “nonreligious” (absolute effect-size = 4.1). This correlation was not found in Europe. However, we are aware of the limitations of these results. It was not the goal of that study to deeply investigate the relations between religiosity and moral judgment competence, but rather, to have preliminary data that would help us to determine the following steps of our research. Results achieved by both groups of students (Brazilian and German-speaking) confirm that segmentation is found only among the Brazilian sample. Table 2 presents results from the MJT for those

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participants. The C-score was calculated for both dilemmas and also separately for each dilemma. We present a general C-score for the Brazilian sample, including all students (N = 617). If we analyze students from competitive and non-competitive universities separately, it is observed that the C-scores from students from competitive universities in Brazil are similar to those of German students. The segmentation however, is observed irrespective of this or other variables analyzed (area of study, type of university, length of study, gender, age).

Brazil (N = 617) MJT

German-speaking (N = 531)

C-score

St. dev.

C-score

St. dev.

40

22.4

43.8

21.7

MJT Doctor´s Dilemma

25.5

20.9

47.1

24.7

MJT standard (2 dilemmas)

18.7

14.2

30.1

17.6

MJT Workers´ Dilemma

Table 2. MJT C-scores (for both dilemmas and for each dilemma in separate) from university students in Brazil and in German-speaking countries (Schillinger, 2006).

Another study testing differences between religious and nonreligious backgrounds was conducted by Haddad and Bataglia (2007). The authors compared the C-scores of students from the first to the third year of two different high schools. The first was a traditional Roman Catholic School and the second a secular school. Table 3 shows significant differences between means for Workers’s Dilemma and Mercy Killing Dilemma and between religious and non-religious groups. There was no difference between C-scores from the first to the last year of the study. Lind (2000) examines retrospectively results of three samples: German students, Italian students and Mexican students. He concluded that:

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Religiously oriented subjects suppress their autonomous moral judgment on dilemma contents, on which the church takes a strong stance. The segmentation phenomenon seems to indicate that internalized rules (super-ego) rather than external social pressure constrain the use of autonomous moral judgment. (Lind, 2000, p. 4)

Year of school

Religious background

Non-religious background

General C-score

Workers

Mercykilling

General C-score

Workers

Mercykilling

1

17.13

44.53

29.53

21.76

50.49

39.21

2

16.6

46.72

37.57

23.43

48.39

38.48

3

18.4

49.98

35.83

26.24

54.51

38.66

Table 3. Segmented scores for Workers´ Dilemma and Mercy Killing Dilemma for participants with religious and non-religious backgrounds.

In order to more deeply investigate the relationship between religiosity and moral judgment competence, Lupu (2009) conducted a study with 477 university students in Romania. She found that dogmatic religiosity has a negative effect on moral competence, as measured by the MJT: F(1.454) = 27.30; p < 0.001, r = 0.24. The variable religiosity (dogmatic and personal religiosity) was measured through a self-developed scale based on the “Religiosity Scale” by BoosNünning (1972).

Developing a New Dilemma for the MJT: The MJT-xt (Extended) Considering this context, Bataglia, Schillinger, and Lind (2003) decided to elaborate a new dilemma for the MJT in order to test the hypothesis about the influence of religion on the segmentation phenomenon in Brazil: If religion is a strong component for the segmentation of moral judgment competence, the C-score in this new dilemma should be at least as high as in the Workers’ Dilemma.

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This new dilemma should involve moral principles preferentially concerned about the value of life, but should not stand in conflict with church’s principles and teaching. We elected the Judge Steinberg’s Dilemma for this project. It was adapted from the dilemma presented below, used by Lind for dilemma discussion sections. The Portuguese, validated version of this dilemma can be requested from the authors. The secret service of a country in Europe has evidence that a terrorist group is planning a bomb attack on a much-used bus for the next day. They intend to kill two hundred people. The group is known for its cruelty and uncompromising policy. The secret service gets hold of a woman who is considered to be one of the top-leaders of the terrorist group. There is evidence that the woman participated in the planning of that attack. The police believe they could prevent the attack if they could make the woman speak. They interview the woman for quite some time. However, the woman totally refuses to cooperate. The secret service fears that the woman will not speak before it is to late to prevent the attack. Therefore, they ask the investigating judge to allow them to torture her to make the woman speak about the plans of her group. In this country, torture is not allowed by law. In spite of this, the judge gives permission to torture in order to prevent the bomb attack and to save the lives of many people.1

The validation process included two studies (2003; 2006). We first elaborated arguments against and in favor of Judge Steinberg’s decision and tested them with a sample of 60 students of different levels of education; college, high school, and 6th grade. The first empirical study showed the necessity of improvement of some arguments in accordance to Lind’s (2008) criteria: a) order of preference; b) correlation between neighboring stages higher than correlation between more distant stages and c) cognitive-affective parallelism. Bataglia, Schillinger, and Lind (2006) presented the new dilemma and the new MJT version is called MJT–xt “extended.” This version contains two standard dilemmas (Workers’ Dilemma and Doctor’s Dilemma) plus the extended Judge Steinberg’s Dilemma. The following is the graph describing the results of the 2006 validation process for three dilemma. ________________ 1

d-steinberg-torture-engl.wpd © by Georg Lind, University of Konstanz, Germany.

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Figure 1. Segmentation – analysis by dilemma.

Figure 2. Preference hierarchy by dilemma.

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Figure 3. Quasi-simplex structure – analysis for three dilemmas.

In Figure 1 we can observe that moral segmentation is present and that the judge dilemma has a C-score very close to Workers’ Dilemma. Figure 2 shows inversions in Doctor’s Dilemma and Workers’ Dilemma, but no significant inversion in Judge’s Steinberg’s Dilemma. Figure 3 shows that the cognitive-affective parallelism is a crescent with two minor inversions (Stages 5 and 6 and Stage 3 that is lower than Stages 1 and 2). Additionally, this version was considered valid and has been used in many studies in Brazil. In fact, the hypothesis that the correlations between Judge Steinberg’s Dilemma and Workers’ Dilemma would be positive was confirmed. In addition, both correlated negatively with the Doctor’s Dilemma. The study strongly suggests that religious life-worlds do have an influence on the moral segmentation phenomenon.

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Conclusion The research we are currently running is about the relationship that people establish with religion and how it is correlated with the MJT-xt results. One of us has validated a scale of beliefs (PCBS) from Duriez, Soenens, Hutsebaut (2005) and we are testing the correlation between orthodoxy religion and low results in MJTxt. Lupu (2009) concluded that dogmatic religiosity has a negative effect on moral competence. She measured this correlation with the “Religiosity Scale” by Boos-Nünning, as already mentioned, and concluded that people strongly committed to a religion had lower results in MJT. Religion implies an intrinsic orientation (Allport, 1950) that does not eliminate judgment or moral competence. Wulff (1991, 1997) affirmed that all possible attitudes towards religion can be summarized in two categories of analysis: inclusion or exclusion of transcendence and literal or symbolic interpretation. The author proposes that the two categories disposed in an orthogonal way define four kinds of attitudes: orthodoxy, relativism, external critic and second naïveté. Duriez, Soenens, & Hutsebaut (2005) investigated the relation between religiosity dimensions and moral competence. Results suggested that, although there are no intrinsic relations between religiosity and morality, the way people process religious contents and not religiosity itself, can predict the way they deal with moral issues. The field of moral competence is very complex and demands more research. These results call our attention to the importance of dedicating our efforts in order to understand the influence of lifeworlds and contexts in the development of moral competence.

References Allport, G.W. (1950). The individual and his religion. New York: Macmillan. Azevedo, T. de. (1981). A religião civil brasileira – um instrumento político. Petrópolis: Vozes. Bataglia, P. (1996). Um estudo sobre o juízo moral e a questão ética na prática do psicólogo. Master dissertation. São Paulo, USP, Brazil.

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Bataglia, P., Schillinger-Agati, M. et al. (2002). The development of moral competence and religious commitment in Brazil. Paper presented at the 28th Annual Meeting of the AME, Chicago. Bataglia, P., Schillinger-Agati, M., & Lind, G. (2003). Testing the segmentation hypothesis with an extended version of the MJT: Validation of the new “Judge” dilemma and comparison of its C-scores with the “euthanasia” dilemma. Paper presented at the 29th Annual Meeting of the AME, Cracow. Bataglia, P.U.R. (2001). A construção da competência moral e a formação do psicólogo. [The development of moral competence in Psychology students]. Doctoral dissertation. São Paulo, USP, Brazil. Boos-Nünning, U. (1972). Dimensionen der Religiosität. München: Kaiser. Duriez, B., Soenens, B., & Hutsebaut, D. (2005). Introducing the shortened Post-Critical Belief Scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 38, 851-857. Haddad, L.A., & Bataglia, P.U.R. (2007). A construção da competência moral em alunos do ensino médio – um estudo sobre a influência do ambienance escolar. Collaborative study. São Paulo: Uniban. Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail. A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Online accessible on: http://www.motherjones.com/files/ emotional_dog_and_rational_tail.pdf (retreived on June, 2012). Hoornaert, E. (1985). Formação do catolicismo brasileiro: 1500–1880. 2a ed. Petrópolis: Vozes. Kramer-Badoni, T., & Wakenhut, R. (1985). Morality and the military life-world. In Lind, G., Hartmann, H.A., & Wakenhut, R. (Eds.), Moral development and the social environment. Studies in the psychology and philosophy of moral judgment and education. Chicago: Precedent Publishing. Lind, G. (2000). Off limits. A cross-cultural study on possible causes of segmentation of moral judgment competence. Presentation at the AERA Conference, New Orleans. Lind, G. (2008). The meaning and measurement of moral judgment competence revisited. A Dual-Aspect Model. In D. Fasko & W. Willis (Eds.), Contemporary philosophical and psychological perspectives on moral development and education (pp. 185– 220). Cresskill: Hampton Press. Lind, G. (1995). Cultural fairness and the measurement of morality. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the AME, New York, November 1995. Lupu, I., & Lind, G. (2009). How do education processes and religiosity interact in the development of moral judgment competence? Poster presented at the conference of the Association for Moral Education in Utrecht, July 2009. Moreno, C., Mesa, J. Frishancho, S., Rangel, M., & Hernandez, R. (2000). Light And Shade: Understanding and/or misunderstanding moral development in Latinamerican contexts. Paper presented at the 26th Annual Meeting of the AME, Glasgow.

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Schillinger-Agati, M. (2006). Learning environment and moral development: How university education fosters moral judgment competence in Brazil and two German-speaking countries. Aachen: Shaker. Schillinger-Agati, M., & Lind, G. (2001). Moral competence, role-taking and higher education: a cross-cultural pilot study. Paper presented at the 27th Annual Meeting of the AME, Vancouver. Schillinger-Agati, M. (2001). Moral-cognitive education, higher education and learning environment: Questions about a cross-cultural research (Brazil-Germany). Paper presented at the 27th Annual Meeting of the AME, Vancouver. Schillinger-Agati, M. (2006). Moralentwicklung bei Medizinstudenten in Brasilien und Deutschland [Moral development of medical students in Brazil and Germany]. Presentation at the Meeting of the German Moral Researchers at Konstanz, January 2006. Wakenhut, R. (1982). Lebensweltliche Moral und moralische Segmentierung bei Unteroffizieren der Bundeswehr. In P. Klein (Ed.), Das strapazierte Rückgrat (pp. 309– 327). Unteroffiziere der Bundeswehr. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Wulff, D.M. (1997). Psychology of religion: Classic and contemporary views. New York: Wiley.

Piotr Leśniewski

Ethics and Metaphysics. On Some Practical Aspects of Erotetic Rationality Abstract: ‘How to live?’ continues to be one of the essential issues in various contemporary educational contexts (Putnam, 1996, p. 22). The following question establishes an attractive framework for how to answer it: Should one return to some kind of morality or instead should one discover an entirely new moral code? We need logical competence to ask such questions at all. Let me show the relevance of logical competencies for moral reasoning by utilizing the erotetic logic. Keywords: logical competence, erotetic logic, new moral code

Nothing is more simple than to be difficult1

1. Nietzsche or Aristotle? (MacIntyre, 1986, pp. 109–120, 256). Beyond any doubt this is a bizarre question, which is why it is also so gripping. Is there any solution to this problem? Has it only one unique solution? Or perhaps the question is ill-posed? MacIntyre was correct in saying that contemporary moral experience has a paradoxical character (1986, p. 68). In his brief discussion of the effectiveness of some social actions, McIntyre argues that protests became a distinctive moral feature of the modern age, but also that they cannot be effective rationally. (The expression ‘mock rationality’ is also used by him). Moral debates seem to be all together intractable. Thus the so________________ 1 Obviously,

it is the reverse of the beautiful phrase in A. Huxley (1947, p. 134).

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called central philosophical question, ‘How to live?’, remains one of the essential issues in various contemporary educational contexts (Putnam, 1996, p. 22). The next question establishes an attractive framework: Should one return to some kind of morality or rather should one discover an entirely new moral code? If one does not want to get stuck with riddles (some of which are called eternal philosophical questions) and wishes to go on living, what one really needs is (some version of) a non-trivial theory of being. It is my conjecture that a good theory of questions should be deployed in the background. But a good theory should be productive. For that reason an erotetic logic is suggested in this paper. The research rationale is based on two-valuedness of the applied calculi. The effectiveness of different modi operandi is simply connected with decision methods. 2. Let me begin with a standard situation from erotetic logic (for fundamental information on the logic of questions, see Harrah, 2002). Consider the following question: (Q) If Maggie read detective stories by Agatha Christie, then has she already read “Evil Under the Sun” and “Murder on the Links”?,

and five answers to the question: (A1) Maggie has read detective stories by Agatha Christie and she has already read “Evil Under the Sun” and “Murder on the Links.” (A2) Maggie has read detective stories by Agatha Christie and she has already read “Evil Under the Sun”, but she has not yet read “Murder on the Links.” (A3) Maggie has read detective stories by Agatha Christie, she has not yet read “Evil Under the Sun,” but she has already read “Murder on the Links.” (A4) Maggie has read detective stories by Agatha Christie but she has not yet read either “Evil Under the Sun” or “Murder on the Links.” (A5) Maggie does not read detective stories by Agatha Christie.

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For the sake of simplicity we are dealing with possible and justsufficient answers only2. Let's continue our work with the sentence: (S) Maggie has read detective stories by Agatha Christie.

and two following questions: (Q1) Has Maggie read “Evil Under the Sun”? (Q2) Has Maggie read “Murder on the Links”?

Examine the answers to Q1 and Q2: (Y1) Maggie has read “Evil Under the Sun”; (N1) Maggie has not read “Evil Under the Sun”; (Y2) Maggie has read “Murder on the Links”; (N2) Maggie has not read “Murder on the Links”.

Turn to four sets: (X1) {Y1, Y2}; (X2) {Y1, N2}; (X3) {N1, Y2}; (X4) {N1, N2}.

Each of these – together with the sentence S – entails one answer to Q, but this answer is not entailed by the sentence alone. For example, the set X3 (together with S) entails the answer A3 to Q. Clearly S alone does not entail A3. Of course, questions Q1 and Q2 are simpler than the question Q insofar as each of them has two answers – a positive one and the negative one. In addition, assume that the sentence S is true. Then Q has a true answer if and only if each of the questions Q1 and Q2 does. ________________

Such answers are called direct answers to a given question. See for example Wiśniewski (1995, pp. 42–43). 2

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3. Such situations of reducibility of questions (of erotetic reducibility, in other words) were introduced into erotetic semantics by Andrzej Wiśniewski and systematically investigated by the author (Wiśniewski, 1994; Leśniewski, 1997; Leśniewski & Wiśniewski, 2001)3. Let me emphasize that the non-reductionistic approach to questions is adopted here (Wiśniewski, 1995, p. 42). Following Gerhard Gentzen and Dana Scott, the concept of multiple-conclusion entailment (mc-entailment for short) is widely utilized within the framework of the inferential erotetic logic (IEL for short)4. Generally speaking, a set of declarative well-formed formulae X (d-wffs for short) mc-entails in the language L a set of d-wffs Y iff Y contains at least one true d-wffs if all the d-wffs in X are true (Shoesmith & Smiley, 1978). The relation of a (single-conclusion) entailment in L is defined in the standard way. Instead of saying that a set of d-wffs X mc-entails a set of d-wffs Y we simply write X╠ Y. A set made up of direct answers to the questions of a set Φ which contains exactly one direct answer to each question of Φ will be referred to as a µ(Φ)-set. A question Q is reducible to a non-empty set of questions Φ on the basis of a set of d-wffs X iff (i) for each A∈Q and for each question Qi ∈ Φ, X∪{A}╠ dQi , (ii) for each µ(Φ)-set Y there is B∈dQ such that X∪Y╞ B, but X non╞ B, (iii) no question in Φ has more direct answers than Q.

Thus we say that the question Q is reducible to a set of questions Φ on the basis of the set of d-wffs X iff (i) for any direct answer A to the question Q and for any question Qi from the set Φ, the set X together with the direct answer A mc-entails the set of direct answers to the question Qi; (ii) for any µ(Φ)-set there is a direct answer B to the question Q which is entailed by the µ(Φ)-set together with the set X, but the set X alone does not entail this direct answer; (iii) no question in the set Φ has more direct answers than the question Q. ________________

3 For fundamental concepts of erotetic semantics see for example Belnap & Steel (1976, pp. 108–138). 4 For a short comparison IEL with the interrogative model of inquiry see for example Wiśniewski (2004).

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If the question Q is reducible to a set of questions Φ on the basis of the set of d-wffs X, we write [R](Q, X, Φ). F, F1, F2, ... are metalinguistic variables representing sentences of L (Wiśniewski, 1995, p. 142). Let me demonstrate with some simple examples of the reducibility (one might ponder as well on questions from a suitable set Φ): (1) [R](?{F1 ∧ F2, ¬ (F1 ∧ F2)}, ∅, {?{F1, ¬F1}, ?{F2, ¬F2}}). (2) [R](?{F1 ⊃ F2, ¬ (F1 ∧ F2)}, ∅, {?{F1, ¬F1}, ?{F2, ¬F2}}). (3) [R](?{F1 ∧ F2, ¬ (F1 ∧ F2), ¬F1}, ∅, {?{F1, ¬F1}, ?{F2, ¬F2}}). (4) [R](?{F1 ∨ F2, ¬ (F1 ∨ F2)}, ∅, {?{F1, ¬F1}, ?{F2, ¬F2}}). (5) [R](?{F1 ∧ F2, F1 ∧ ¬F2}, {F1}, {?{F2, ¬F2}}). (6) [R](?{F1 ∧ F2, F1 ∧ ¬F2, ¬F1}, {F1}, {?{F2, ¬F2}}). (7) [R](?{F1 ∧ F2, F1 ∧ ¬F2, ¬F1 ∧ F2, ¬F1 ∧ ¬F2}, {F1}, {?{F2, ¬F2}}). (8) [R](?{F1, F2}, {F3 ⊃ F1, F3 ⊃ F2}, {?{F3, ¬F3}}). (9) [R](?{F1, ¬F1}, {F1 ∨ F2, ¬(F1 ∧ F2)}, {?{F1, F2}}). (10) [R](?{F3, F4}, {F1 ⊃ F3, F2 ⊃ F4, F1 ∨ F2}, {?{F1, F2}}).

4. Let us suppose that one must opt for the Second Old Commandment or for the Second New Commandment exclusively: (Old) “Never intentionally take innocent human life.” (Singer, 1994, p. 192) (New) “Take responsibility for the consequences of your decisions.” (p. 195)

One may ask whether this is a dilemma or just a Hobson’s choice. But we are curious about the erotetic reducibility. Cleary, I distinctly assume that these sentences – the old commandment and the new commandment – are parts of some versions of ‘the biggest answer’ to ‘the biggest question’: (Q*) How to live? (the central philosophical question) (cf., p. 194).

I presume that the question Q* is reducible to some sets of (casual) questions – call them Ψ – on the basis of some sentences. Evidently, I do not prejudge detailed forms of these questions and sentences

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since we are handling words and phrases of natural language here. We are not dealing with expressions of some formalized language. For example, one may suppose the famous Diamond’s question is an element of the set Ψ at least: (**) “Why are we unique in our strong preference for copulating in private?”5. (Diamond, 1993)

But even the irritating (and/or even controversial) issue: (***) “What on Earth is a community organizer?”

might as well be a part of Ψ (Kurtz, 2010, p. vii). Let us turn our attention to the Fifth Old Commandment and the Fifth New Commandment in Singer (1994) too, i.e. the sentences: (#) “Treat all human life as always more precious than any nonhuman life.” (p. 201) (##) “Do not discriminate on the basis of species.” (p. 202)

Singer (1994) states that there are two assumptions behind these commandments, namely: (P1) “We are responsible for what we intentionally do in a way that we are not responsible for what we deliberately fail to prevent.” (P2) “The lives of only members of our species are more worthy of protection than the lives of any other being.” (p. 221)

Singer (p. 221) frankly declares: “If we did nothing to the old ethic apart from abandoning these two assumptions, we would still have to construct an entirely new ethic. We could construct it differently from the ethic I have sketched out.” Such a completely different attitude towards an entirely new ethics is briefly sketched below. ________________ 5 The Diamond’s question is closely related to two beautiful paradoxes, viz.: (1) the paradox of concealed ovulation, and (2) the paradox of concealed copulation. See also Diamond (1998). For why-questions see Bromberger (1992).

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5. We say that a question Qj is equivalent to a question Qi if and only if dQj = dQi (Wiśniewski, 1995, p. 135). Let us focus on four questions from Principia Ethica by G. E. Moore (1959): (Q3) “What is good?” (Q4) “Which among existing things are good?” (Q5) “What sort of things are good, what are the things which, whether they are real or not, ought to be real?” (Q6) “What is real?” (Moore, cf., pp. 118–119).

Henceforth it is assumed that the terms metaphysics and ontology are synonyms. By an erotetic meta-ontological monism I mean the following: (M1) There is exactly one metaphysical question.

Consequently, an erotetic meta-ontological pluralism consists in the rejection of the foregoing opinion M. A sample register of classical metaphysical questions is given below: (1) What is there? [the classic completely generic metaphysical question] (Quine, 1960, pp. 22–23; Thomasson, 2009). (2) What does reality consist of? (Dummett, 2006, p. 1). (3) What is it to be an actual entity? [the fundamental metaphysical question] (Whitehead, 1985). (4) Is ‘exists’ a second-level predicate? (5) Is there at least one thing?

Just in case, let us call to mind the whole vexed question of what is going on from the Monty Python’s Flying Circus’ twelfth episode (“The Naked Ant”, aired January 4th, 1970, the second sketch: “Spectrum – Talking About Things”)6. ________________

After this whole vexed question the Spectrum host (Michael Palin) utters an extremely instructive sequence of questions: “Is there still time to confront it, let 6

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Undeniably, one could write down the question Q6 in that register. However, there are intensely engaging meta-ontological issues, namely – the queries: (M2) Do questions of metaphysics really have answers? (Manley, 2009, p. 1). (M3) Are ontological problems solvable?

6. Examine some questions of the formalized language. Let L0 be the first-order language (with identity) supplemented with two erotetic constants: “?”. The declarative well-formed formulae (d-wffs) of L0 are defined in the standard way. By the question of L0 I understand just an expression of the form: (&) ?{A1, …, An},

where n > 1 and A1, …, An are syntactically distinct sentences of L0. The concept of direct answer to a question (i.e., the possible and justsufficient answers to the question) is understood in the standard way. By a direct answer to a question of the form (&) we mean each of the sentences A1, …, An. Simple yes-no questions are expressions of the form: ?{A, ¬A}. Obviously, bowing to the celebrated Quinean slogan the following formulae are examples of simple yes-no ontological questions: (a) ?{∀x∀y(x = y), ¬∀x∀y(x = y)}, (b) ?{∃y∀x(x = y), ¬∃y∀x(x = y)}, (c) ?{∀x∃y(x = y), ¬∀x∃y(x = y)}, (d) ?{∃x∀y(x = y), ¬∃x∀y(x = y)}, (e) ?{∀y∃x(x = y), ¬∀y∃x(x = y)}, (f) ?{∃x∃y(x = y), ¬∃x∃y(x = y)}7. ________________

alone solve it, or is it too late? What are the figures, what are the facts, what do people mean when they talk about things?” 7 For this slogan see, e.g., Quine (1973, p. 204). For the sentence ∃x∃y ¬(x = y) see Boolos (1996, p. 261).

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If you accept the standard abbreviation: ($) ex(x) := ∃y(x = y) (Lopston, 2010, p. 84)

it results in such formulae: (A) ∀xex(x) := ∀x∃y(x = y), (B) ∃xex(x) := ∃x∃y(x = y), (C) ∀x¬ex(x) := ∀x¬∃y(x = y), (D) ∃x¬ex(x) := ∃x¬∃y(x = y)8.

7. The point regarding rationality is that we have a great many models of it. As I was saying, another one is proposed here: the theory of existence is tightly connected with classical (i.e., two-valued and at the same time extensional) logic. The rationale of the theory is a consequence of the truth-table decision method and the latter is identified with solvability (of a given problem)9. Therefore the phrase “to proceed rationally (to behave in rational way)” has a very precise meaning, to wit “to accept ontological theses.” Thus the saying “to proceed perfectly rationally (to behave in a perfectly rational way)” stands for “to accept all ontological theses.” By an ontological thesis I understand each propositional tautology (law) of classical sentential logic (classical zero order logic) written by means of signs from an alphabet of a particular language L210. A problem (expressed by the question) ?{A1, …, An} of the language L2 is solvable if and only if at least one sentence in the set {A1, …, An} is a propositional tautology of classical sentential logic (Needless to say that classical logic is what we play for. Deviant logics and extended logics are avoided). ________________

Some ontological questions were investigated in the paper Gan-Krzywoszyńska & Leśniewski (2009). 9 The truth-table decision method will be later restricted to the Sheffer’s stroke (NAND). 10 For the intuitive concept of propositional tautology see e.g., Rasiowa & Sikorski (1963, pp. 163–166). 8

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The encouragement to use this technique comes from Remarks on Colour by Wittgenstein, viz. the clause: “In philosophy we must always ask: How must we look at this problem in order for it to become solvable?” (Wittgenstein, 2004, p. 15). 8. According to the famous passage from Moore (1959) one needs to know the answers to Q4, Q5, and Q6 at the same time in order to reply to Q3. But my (a little bit stronger) suggestion is: (T) The question Q* is equivalent to the question Q6 (i.e., dQ* = dQ6).

Let us get rid of the Quinean slogan for a moment and relinquish the intricacies of contexts from the history of philosophy. Metaphysics (ontology) is understood here entirely as a theory of existence – in the very formal sense of the term theory (Béziau, 2005). At the moment the terms existence, being (the distributive meaning of the word “being”), Being (the collective meaning of the word “being”), entity, and so on, are synonyms in defiance of the old philosophical tradition. The concept of watered-down “being” is omitted (Bencivenga, 2002, p. 167). 9. Let L1 be the first-order language without identity but with one extra-logical symbol ex(x). The alphabet of L1 includes standard propositional connectives, i.e.: ¬ (the classical negation sign) and ∧ (the conjunction sign) at the very least. Consider two extensions of the vocabulary of L1. First we introduce a constant b (called also the first fundamental word suitably). The reading of the constant b as being is preferred. On the other hand, Being (or the Being), entity, Entity (or the Entity), existence, Existence (or The Existence), and so on are allowable as well. (S1) ex(b) [„Being exists.”]; (S2) ¬ex(b) [„Being does not exist.”]

Subsequently the second constant n is added to the vocabulary of L1. This constant is called the second fundamental word and the reading

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as nonbeing is favored. Thereby we arrived at the two following (meontological) theses: (S3) ex(n) [“Nonbeing exists.”]; (S4) ¬ex(n) [“Nonbeing does not exist.”]

The following four sentences are also interesting: (S5) ex(b)∧ex(n); (S6) ¬ex(b)∧ex(n); (S7) ex (b)∧¬ex (n); (S8) ¬ex(b)∧¬ex(n).

All the more, one might expect that two equations are obligatory, viz.: (E1) ex(n):= ¬ex(b), [“Nonbeing exists.” is equal to “It is not a case that being exists.”]; (E2) ¬ex(n):= ex(b). [“It is not a case that nonbeing exists.” is equal to “Being exists.”]

I do not insist on that. Each sentence of L1 containing b as the only extra-logical constant could be referred to as an ontological sentence. Hence each sentence of L1 with n as the unique extra-logical constant could be referred to as a meontological sentence. 10. Let L2 be the first-order language without identity but with one extra-logical symbol ex(x). The alphabet of L2 includes the unique standard propositional connective, i.e., ↑ (the Sheffer’s stroke sign). The only extra-logical constant in the vocabulary of L2 is the first fundamental word b. For the sake of simplicity the succeeding three abbreviations are established: (D1) ex(b) = ex(b)1;

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(D2) ex(b)↑ex(b) = ex(b)2. (D3) α↑α = α2, for any expression α.

Let me suggest that any propositional tautology of classical sentential logic is an ontological thesis of L2. By means of the truth-table decision method for the Sheffer’s stroke one easily verifies that the following expressions are ontological theses of L2: (T1) ex (b)1↑ex (b)2; (T2) ex (b)2↑(ex (b)2)2; (T3) ((ex (b)2)2↑ex (b)2; (T4) ex (b)1↑(((ex (b)2)2)2; (T5) (ex (b)1↑((ex (b)2)2)↑(ex (b)2)2.

References Belnap, N.D., & Steel, T.B. (1976). The logic of questions and answers. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. Benzivenga, E. (2002). Free logic. In D. Gabbay & F. Guenthner (Eds.), Handbook of philosophical logic. Vol. 5 (pp. 148–196). Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer. Béziau, J.-Y. (2005). From consequence operator to universal logic: A survey of general abstract logic. In L.-Y. Béziau (Ed.), Logica universalis. Towards a General Theory of Logic (pp. 3–17). Basel, Boston, Berlin: Birkhäuser. Boolos, G. (1996). The logic of probability. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bromberger, S. (1992). On what we know we don’t know: Explanation, theory, linguistics, and how questions shape them. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press & Stanford CSLI. Chalmers, D.J., Manley, D., & Wasserman, R. (Eds., 2009). Metametaphysics: New essays on the foundations of ontology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Diamond, J.M. (1993). The third chimpanzee: The evolution and future of the human animal. New York: Harper Perennial. Diamond, J.M. (1998). Why is sex fun? The evolution of human sexuality. New York: Basic Books. Gan-Krzywoszyńska K., & Leśniewski, P. (2009). On existence and some ontologies. Ruch Filozoficzny [Philosophical Movement], 66, 71–79. Harrah, D. (2002). The logic of questions. In D. Gabbay, & F. Guenthner (Eds.), Handbook of philosophical logic. Vol. 8 (pp. 1–60). Dordrecht–Boston–London: Kluwer.

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Huxley, A. (1947). The perennial philosophy. London: Chatto & Windus. Kołakowski, L. (2007). Why is there something rather than nothing? 23 Questions from great philosophers. Trans. A. Kołakowska. New York: Basic Books. Kurtz, S. (2010). Radical-in-chief: Barack Obama and the untold story of American socialism. New York: Threshold Editions. Leśniewski, P. (1997). Zagadnienie sprowadzalności w antyredukcjonistycznych teoriach pytań [The problem of reducibility of questions in non-reductionistic theories of questions]. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii UAM. Leśniewski, P., & Wiśniewski, A. (2001). Reducibility of questions to sets of questions: Some feasibility results. Logique & Analyse, 173–174–175, 93–111. Lopston, P. (2010). Reality: Fundamental topics in metaphysics. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. Manley, D. (2009). Introduction: A guided tour of metametaphysics. Meta-metaphysics (2009). Moore, G.E. (1959). Principia ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Putnam, H. (1996). Pragmatism: An open question. Cambridge: Blackwell. Quine, W.V. (1973). Word and object. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. Rasiowa, H., & Sikorski, R. (1963). The mathematics of metamathematics. Warszawa: PWN. Shoesmith, D.J., & Smiley, T.J. (1978). Multiple conclusion logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Singer, P. (1994). Rethinking life and death. The collapse of our traditional ethics. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin. Wiśniewski, A. (1994). On the reducibility of questions. Erkenntnis, 40(2), 265–284. Wiśniewski, A. (1995). The posing of questions: Logical foundations of erotetic inferences. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Wittgenstein, L. (2004). Bemerkungen über die Farben [Remarks on colour]. In G.E.M. Anscombe (Ed.), trans. L. McAlister & M. Schaettle. Oxford: Blackwell. Yablo, S. (2010). Must existence-questions have answers? In S. Yablo, Things: Papers on objects, events, and properties (pp. 296–313). New York: Oxford University Press.

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Klaus Helkama

Change in Moral Judgment in Medical School: The Role of Hierarchy Abstract: The medical profession is a strong profession, and physicians are the most typical of all traditional professions. Professional socialization in medical school involves adopting the value hierarchy of the medical profession, internalizing such norms as collegiality and professionalism. Social science and business students also participated in our research. In our study, we found several indications of the influence of the strong profession on our respondent: we observed a convergence of the instrumental value hierarchies of our students toward the general medical student hierarchy, and other phenomena. Keywords: medical education, instrumental values, altruistic values, moral judgment competence

The thorough review by Marcia Schillinger (2006; in this volume) shows that medical schools do not foster development of moral reasoning skills. The longitudinal study by Antti Uutela and myself (Helkama, Uutela et al., 2003) concurs in this respect with the results of a number of studies by Georg Lind and his colleagues. So it is appropriate here to reflect upon the issue of seeming regression in moral judgment competence from a broader social psychological perspective, buttressed with data from subsequent research. We started our longitudinal study of medical students in 1981, with the explicit aim of tracing the development of post-conventional reasoning. We measured moral judgement development using four written Kohlberg dilemmas, and value priorities by means of the Rokeach (1973) Value Survey. Finnish medical students represented

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an elite sample, both intellectually and presumably also from a moral point of view. Intellectually, only the best and the brightest were (and are) able to pass the entry exam of the medical faculty of the University of Helsinki. Morally, the choice of a physician’s career is, by definition, a commitment to serving altruistic ideals. The medical profession is a strong profession. The physicians are the most typical of all traditional professions. Professional socialization in medical school involves adopting the value hierarchy of the medical profession, internalizing such norms as collegiality and professionalism. Becoming a member of a strong profession also means giving up some of one’s personal freedom in exchange for the security that membership provides. In its emphasis on high standards of professionalism and skill, the medical profession is fairly hierarchical. High skill is admired and accords status. As the Finnish medical ethics textbook defines it: Professionalism could be seen as an implicit contract between the profession and the society: the profession commits itself to high ethical principles and the society guarantees the status of the profession. (Medical Ethics, 2005, p. 135)

In our study, we found several indications of the influence of the strong profession on our respondents. First, we observed a convergence of the instrumental value hierarchies of our students toward the general medical student hierarchy. First-year male students’ average value hierarchy was rather far removed from the average hierarchy of their male counterparts (rho = .62), as well as from that of Australian and English medical students. By the third year of study, the male students’ value priorities converged toward female students’ value priorities (rho = .92). The Finnish medical students as a group were quite similar to Australian and English medical students with regard to their instrumental value hierarchies (rhos .86 and .92, respectively). This convergence was true of instrumental values only (i.e., such “virtues” as honest, responsible, loving, forgiving). It did not touch what Rokeach (1973) called terminal values (e.g. equality, family security, self-respect). So, if the instrumental values, unlike the terminal ones, refer to qualities that characterize a good physician, the

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socialization into the medical profession involves adopting the profession’s virtues. If we use the terminology of the Schwartz (1992) value model, medical students stand out by the importance they attach to benevolence values. Our study involved two other fields of study: social science and business students. Compared with these two groups, medical students’ value hierarchy was characterized by their greater support for benevolence values. All values that were more important for medical students than for business or social science students in our study (Uutela, Helkama & Salminen, 1982) turned out to be benevolence values when later analyzed by means of the Schwartz (1992) value model. Our subsequent oral interviews with some of the longitudinal participants at their fifth year of study tended to support the idea of strong impact of the medical profession. The students were at the final stages of their studies, typically in hospital internship, when we interviewed them, giving them occupational dilemmas in addition to the standard Kohlberg dilemmas. The typical mode of reasoning was Stage 3, and the typical response to the medical dilemmas was to ask “a senior colleague for advice” (Helkama & Ikonen-Varila, 1996). The goal of our respondents was more to be a good member of the medical profession than an independent moral problem-solver. Thus, the Stage 3 good member of the medical profession perspective dominated and was transferred to general moral problems. To say that what we observed was regression in the moral reasoning competence is to advance a strong claim, which I am hesitant to make. On conceptual grounds alone, to argue that moral judgment competence declined in the course of medical studies is not a priori plausible, given that competence is something which is not easily lost. I would be inclined to a less radical interpretation: that the higher stage structures of moral judgment tend to become less readily accessible during medical socialization. However, to interpret the medical student lack-of-progress-inmoral-judgment phenomenon, I would like to go beyond the explanation that relies solely on lack of social perspective-taking opportunities, which Helkama et al. (2003) endorsed. The interpretation that

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now seems more plausible to me (and encompasses the lack of social perspective taking opportunities) invokes the notion of hierarchy. In hierarchical organizations, whether armies, industrial plants or universities, those who have power define what is right and what is wrong. It is remarkable that life-and-death occupations, such as military, firemen, and physicians tend to be hierarchically organized. Quick action requires clear division of responsibility. A person who occupies a low position in a hierarchical organization, is not supposed to think for himself. The more hierarchical the organization, the less you are supposed to exercise judgment, moral judgment included. Those who are up in the hierarchy think for you – you just obey. In other words, in a hierarchical social order, you refrain from taking the social perspective of others. This is put forth as a hypothesis to be examined in future studies. Meanwhile, we look at data from cross-cultural studies of moral judgment development. Directly comparable samples are rare in this research. Taking first-year university student data from Gielen and Markoulis’s (2001) review of the research done with the DIT represents the closest approximation for comparable samples. Their moral judgment data are arranged in Table 1 according to the Hofstede (2001) Power Distance dimension. Power distance refers to the extent to which the less powerful members of society expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. The data in Table 1 suggest that egalitarian social contexts stimulate growth of moral reasoning. Table 1 indicates that the more egalitarian the culture of a country, the higher first-year university students score on the DIT (rho = .69, p < .05). Ireland is a notable exception, probably understood in terms of the influence of the hierarchical Catholic church. If we add the Finnish data on freshmen’s p% scores from two samples (Pohjanheimo 1984) with an average p% score of 47.7, we get even stronger support for the hypothesis. Finland is, in Hofstede’s taxonomy, a low power distance country (PD score 33). Thus, taking Finnish data into account would raise the rho up to .91. The country individualism score is not related to p% score (rho = .00) but the GNP/capita is (rho = .60). Research with the Kohlberg moral judgment interview is also consistent

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with the egalitarianism hypothesis. Snarey’s (1985) review showed that the highest scoring group on the MJI were kibbutz founders. A kibbutz is a very egalitarian social environment. Country

p% score

PD score

Australia

43.8

36

USA

42.3

40

60

60

41.4

58

South Korea Taiwan Greece

40.3

60

Hong Kong

37.9

68

Ireland

34.1

28

Nigeria

30.0

77*

Kuwait

28.3

80**

Sudan

24.5

80**

Egypt

22.0

80**

Table 1. Average p% scores of university/college freshmen in different countries and country Power Distance (PD) scores (from Gielen & Markoulis, 2001, pp. 91–92, and Hofstede 2001, p. 87). *Hofstede’s score for West Africa; ** Hofstede’s score for Arab countries.

Helkama (2004, 2009) has suggested that morality has three main functions. They can be related to Schwartz’s (1992) value model. The problem-solving function relates to Schwartz’s Universalism values, which include justice. When values conflict, justice is used to solve the conflict. Therefore, justice has traditionally been regarded as the queen of virtues. The second function of morality is helping other people, related to the value called Benevolence in Schwartz’s model. The third function relates to Schwartz’s Conformity and Tradition values, which include self-discipline and conformity to the norms and traditions of the ingroup. Social environment regulates the interrelationships of the three functions. In egalitarian contexts, the problemsolving function is more salient than in hierarchical contexts, in which conformity to the ingroup norms predominates.

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The functional requirements of the medical profession presumably always make some degree of hierarchy inevitable, and in the early stages of medical socialization this hierarchy gives young physicians the kind of social support they need in their demanding job. The findings on the apparent downward change on the Kohlberg scale probably reflect this fact. The medical doctors in Kohlberg’s (1987) longitudinal sample did not show any regression and reached advanced levels of moral reasoning in their thirties. My guess is that, if we followed physicians long enough, we would find the same results.

References Gielen, U., & Markoulis, D. (2001). Preference for principled moral reasoning: A developmental and cross-cultural perspective. In L.L. Adler & U.P. Gielen (Eds.), Crosscultural topics in psychology (pp. 81–101). London: Praeger. Helkama, K. (2004). Values, role-taking and empathy in moral development. New Review of Social Psychology, 3, 103–111. Helkama, K. (2009). Moraalipsykologia: Hyvän ja pahan tällä puolen [Moral psychology: This side of good and evil]. Helsinki: Edita. Helkama, K., & Ikonen-Varila, M. (1996). Moral stages and principles of justice in real-life moral decision-making situations. Poster presented at the 14th Biennial ISSBD Conference, Quebec City, 12.–16. August. Helkama, K., Uutela, A., Pohjanheimo, E., Salminen, S., Koponen, A., & RantanenVäntsi, L. (2003). Moral reasoning and values in medical school: A longitudinal study in Finland. Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, 47, 399–411. Hostfstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences. 2nd ed. London: Sage. Pohjanheimo, E. (1984). Moral reasoning and moral values. Acta Psychologica Fennica, 10, 66–67. Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values. New York: Free Press. Schillinger, M. (2006). Learning environment and moral development: How university education fosters moral judgment competence in Brazil and two German-speaking countries. Aachen: Shaker. Schwartz, S.H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M.P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 1–65). San Diego: Academic Press. Uutela, A., Helkama, K., & Salminen, S. (1982). University students’ professional socialization, I (in Finnish). Research Reports (1) 1982. Department of Social Psychology, University of Helsinki.

Anna Izabela Brzezińska, Tomasz Czub, Magdalena Czub, Radosław Kaczan, Konrad Piotrowski, & Małgorzata Rękosiewicz

Postponed or Delayed Adulthood? Abstract: We present research findings concerning the transitional phase between late adolescence and early adulthood from the study conducted in the years 2010–2011. As demonstrated below, becoming adult in objective (taking on adult social roles – family and vocational ones) and the subjective sense (identity characteristics and identity status, feeling of being on-time or off-time) is closely related to the external factors around the individual as well as to her or his psychological profile. The completion of education seems to be crucial to enter adulthood. Following the analysis of our research findings, one can state, a delayed and/or postponed adulthood phenomena occurs in the research participants. Keywords: late adolescence, emerging adulthood, early adulthood, developmental tasks, life events, identity status, feeling of being on-time/off-time

Introduction In the last three decades the process of becoming an adult participant of social relationships strongly changed (Arnett, 1997, 2000; Byner, 2005; Brzezińska, Czub, Hejmanowski et al., 2012). This probably results from political, economical, demographic and socio-cultural transformations. Education and work market changes, as well as the growing need for well-trained professionals, which created a wide opportunity to choose one’s own path of development. In general, the direction of that changes is positively perceived. At the same time, young people receive less support from adults than they did two or three decades earlier. Moreover, the emphasis on their subjectivity, self-reliance and individualism is stronger then before.

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The lack of support at the time when people construct their life projects and verify their self-reliance and independence for the first time increases the likelihood of experiencing uncertainty and anxiety. It also raises the difficulty of clear self-definition and hinders making important life decisions (Luyckx, Schwarz et al., 2008; Brzezińska, Czub, Nowotnik, & Rękosiewicz, 2012). Perhaps for these reasons, some researchers identify groups that tend to avoid making commitments typical of adults (Côté, 2000). They call these individuals “childish adults” or “not fully adult people” with the neologisms like adultescents or kidults. According to Arnett (2000) and Furstenberg (2000), entering into adulthood takes the entire span of one’s third decade in life or, in a large number of people, it can take even longer. In this period, the traditional lifestyle of an adult is only one of many other lifestyles, so being adultescent or kidult contains a normative meaning, too. There are diverse ways of entering into adulthood and it is difficult to assess their relevance to social expectations a priori. However, it is worth keeping in mind that one of the main features of the current longer and longer transition into adulthood is that, from the perspective of the currently unstable socio-demographic criteria, nothing is absolutely normative or non-normative (Arnett, 2000). As some researchers note (e.g., Freund, Nikitin, & Ritter, 2009), progressive processes of de-standardization and individualization of life paths relate to young adults in a slightly different way than to those in middle age or late adulthood. The weakening of normative pressures on the developmental tasks of adulthood and the resulting opportunities for individual choice in the order and pace of their implementation, do not cause any significant postponement of the tasks of subsequent periods. Young people, however, feel a strong pressure that it is necessary to struggle with a variety of tasks at once. After all, in a short time of the early and the beginning of middle adulthood (20– 35/40 years old) they are supposed to complete the major stage of education, become independent of the family of origin, start professional and family life and, only shortly after, to make significant achievements in each of these areas. The phenomenon of accumulation of tasks, further exacerbated by putting aside or delaying the implementation of some of them, is known as a “rush hour” phenomenon (cf., 2009).

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Therefore, a rather paradoxical picture of this early stage of adulthood emerges. On the one hand, there are no clear normative pressures but, at the same time, it is permissible to postpone the implementation of tasks that are often enforced by objective conditions, such as the rules enforced in the labour market. On the other hand, the range of offers addressed to young people is evident, but there is a proviso that their “expiry date” will be passed soon; if not now, then eventually it will be too late for decision-making. This situation can be a source of serious difficulties and lead to a sense of confusion experienced by young people who receive contradictory information about themselves and their situation, which undoubtedly can also hinder becoming an adult and may cause a delay in making many important life decisions.

Transition into Adulthood: Objective Approach In Poland, as in numerous other countries, there is a clearly noticeable tendency to postpone a complete entrance into adulthood, defined as taking social roles typical of adulthood (see Lanz, Tagliabue, 2007; Macek, Bejček, & Vanickova, 2007; Sirsch, Dreher, Mayr, & Willinger, 2009). Young people are deciding later and later to establish a relatively stable relationships, to start a family, to give birth to the first and the subsequent children, to leave the family home, to start living independently and keeping their own household, and to get a steady job. It can be said that, compared with the situation several or dozens of years back, we are now dealing with longer and longer period of growing up to full adulthood. The main reason for taking up of adult roles later, including civic ones, may be the extension of the education period and the need of a few extra years to develop a career that allows a relative stability. This period is often called “emerging adulthood.” The author of this term, Jeffrey J. Arnett (2000), argues that emerging adulthood, namely the period beginning at the age of about 18 and continuing throughout the third decade of life (especially up to the age of about 25), is a completely new phase of development, located between late adoles-

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cence and early adulthood. The criterion for distinguishing these three periods of life is found in an analysis of the taking up of social roles typical of adulthood: in adolescence it is very rare, during early adulthood it is common, and in the transition period or emerging adulthood there is a great diversity in this respect. Leaving behind the relationships characteristic of childhood and adolescence, but not taking up adult social roles and the related obligations in more permanent way, a person in this transition period takes the time to get to know options of life activities and engage in intensive exploration, especially in the area of intimate relationships, professional work and ideology. Only in the second half of the third decade of life, and often at the end of it, do these people make relatively stable decisions and accept obligations in the way of intimate relationships (e.g., shared residence, remaining in a permanent intimate relationship, formalizing the relationship through marriage, parenthood) or professional life (e.g., the decision to engage in a specific trade, deciding on a company). The most commonly used objective measures, which are currently used by psychologists analyzing the process of entering into adulthood, are: (1) leaving the family house and keeping own household, (2) completing education, (3) establishing a lasting intimate relationship, including marriage, (4) having children, (5) taking up a steady, full-time professional activity (Fadjukoff, 2007).

Transition into Adulthood: Subjective Approach In the period of entering into adulthood, apart from the individual’s involvement in learning to fulfill family and professional roles according to social expectations, the crucial matter is to acquire beliefs about one’s own adulthood, which relates both to factors rooted in an individual’s environment (cultural and social) and to individual commitments (Côté, 1997; Brzezińska & Piotrowski, 2010a). In his studies Luyckx et al. (2008) focuses on how the psychological and contextual variables (education vs. professional work) differentiate those who perceive themselves as adults and those who do

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not. His findings reveal that the feeling of being adult is stronger among workers than among students, and the acquisition of adulthood is fostered by a strong sense of coherence. These results may indicate the pro-developmental function of taking up roles typical for adulthood (in this case ending education and starting professional work) and perceiving oneself as almost or fully adult. Arnett (2000) states that answer “yes” to the question: Do you feel that you have reached adulthood? is typical for people who decided to take up the adult roles of a particular culture. As Arnett (2000) pointed out, the reasons for appearance of a new developmental period, namely emerging adulthood, are rooted in the social and demographic changes. While describing it, he drew attention to the ages of 18 to 30, and especially to ages between 18 and 25, and to the impact of belonging to the middle and upper classes in developed or developing countries. These characteristics largely apply to students and, therefore, it is no surprise that research on emerging adulthood mainly comprises of this group. Studies comparing students and other social groups lead, in our view, to the need of introducing some significant limitations to the theory of emerging adulthood. A typical trait of emerging adulthood, exploration seems to be significantly lower among working people than among students, as Danielsen et al. (2000) and Luyckx et al. (2008) assume. At the same time, workers exhibit a stronger sense of maturity and confidence about the direction they want to go in their lives. Thus, not only do the workers meet the objective criterion of adulthood, but also their sense of adulthood and the development of identity indicate an advanced maturity. If, as Arnett (cf.) states, the period of emerging adulthood is a time of independence from typical social adulthood roles and a time of free exploration, then such differences should not occur or should be irrelevant. The authors of this paper propose to focus on the analysis of the educational status instead of applying age criterion in order to qualify whether people are or are not (emerging) adults. Our findings (Piotrowski & Brzezińska, 2011) suggest that there are fundamental differences between learners and people who have already completed their education. That is exactly the time when there are clearly articu-

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lated social expectations towards taking up social roles typical of adulthood. Then, we believe, one can usually talk about the beginning of the period of early adulthood in human development. Therefore, for some individuals, early adulthood can begin at the age of 18, and for other ones only at the age of 30 or later. It is important to note, whether or not an individual benefits from the psychosocial moratorium through continuing their education, especially full-time, it is assumed that this education (higher education) is the key area of the individual’s activity.

Personal Identity and Transition into Adulthood The most common definitions of identity emphasize that it is associated with a relatively fixed, existing in the memory, set of elements that an individual considers in defining it. These factors allow individuals to obtain the answers to basic identity questions, such as: Who am I? Who will I be? What do I aspire to? Identity is connected with one’s own self-definition, a complex set of personal attributes that is accessible to the individual, by means of which one is able to identify and to distinguish oneself from others. Therefore, identity is a cognitive construct, characterized by a clear hierarchy of concepts and schemes concerning one’s own person with varying degrees of generality. The basic mechanism of identity formation, according to the author of one of the currently most popular ideas in this area, James E. Marcia (1966, 1980), assumes sequential succession of two phases. The first one is characterized by the individual’s involvement in exploring the environment and experimenting with a variety of roles, lifestyles, thinking ways, and patterns of behavior in specific situations. As a result of extensive exploration, the individual gains knowledge of him- or herself, strengths and weaknesses depending on the circumstances, expectations, dreams, as well as on the environment and available lifestyles, possible educational paths and professional development, and a variety of activities. All in all, the exploration phase is associated with highly inconsistent behavior, a focus on the present

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and actions aimed at experimenting and learning, as well as testing oneself and the environment. The second stage of the identity formation consists in commitment making and deciding on ideas and/or areas of activity important for the individual’s personal needs, aspirations and life plans. This stage is characteristic of late adolescence and early adulthood. Making commitments is a natural consequence of the earlier phase – exploration. An individual, who has previously focused on the exploration and testing oneself as well as their environment, and has made preliminary decisions concerning his or her own person, now, in the second phase, on the basis of all knowledge accumulated so far, starts making conscious decisions on engaging the areas important to himor herself, crystallizes their outlook on life and, thus, obtains the answer to the question: Who am I? From this they are able to build up their personal identity step by step. In recent years, it has been noted that the personal identity develops in an intensive way and modifies itself under the influence of new tasks and roles taken up by an individual throughout their adulthood (Waterman, 1999; Bosma & Kunnen, 2001). The identity at any stage of life is not particularly fixed. It undergoes constant changes, is rebuilt and modified by new experiences (cf., Czub & Brzezińska; Czub et al., 2012). This opens up a wide field for research on the identity formation process during the stage of entering into adulthood and its relationship with both the objective and subjective indicators of adulthood.

Punctuality of Developmental Tasks and Transition into Adulthood The assumption of the existence of a biologically and socially structured order determining the sequence, time of occurrence, and implementation of the developmental tasks by people of certain ages is known as “normativity of developmental tasks implementation.” Normativity is most often recognized by indicating the age at which most people take up and implement the task. Adopting the criterion of frequency brings up the need to relate to other people at similar

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ages and to compare whether, how and when the individual performs the task to whether, how and when their peers do it. Thus, the implementation of development tasks in accordance to the normative order makes it possible for an outside observer and/or the individual to determine if they perform the task on time, or not. However, going beyond the frames defined by socially and biologically determined “developmental schedule” (cf., Settersten, 2003), and performing tasks out of the normatively assumed time results in adjudication of the lack of punctuality, which is manifested either in the form of social assessment of the task as precipitous or delayed or by a feeling of such acceleration or deceleration. Experiencing both biological and social pressures directs individual’s activity toward certain goals. Accepting these goals and implementing them give individuals a sense of achievement or punctuality, in other words, a sense of staying in harmony both with environmental expectations expressed directly and with internally felt pressures. This kind of sense results from comparing one’s life to the lives of peers and to culturally transmitted concepts of biography (see Habermas, 2007) or the culturally conditioned, so-called life script (Bernsten & Rubin, 2004). As in the case of adulthood, also in relation to the punctuality of life events and associated developmental tasks, one can speak of two different approaches. In the first one, researchers focus on the objective time of the event, such as the age at which a woman gives birth to the first child, firstly in order to compare it to previously established standards for the group (usually statistical) (Kokko, Pulkkinen, & Mesiainen, 2009), and then to look for the impact of the punctuality or its lack on individual’s functioning in other areas (Bell & Lee, 2006). Thus, for example, according to the study carried out in Finland (Koko et al., 2009, p. 358), giving birth to the first child before the age of 25 is associated with lower levels of education, lower occupational status, unstable career and alcohol abuse. However, we are more interested in the latter approach to punctuality, based on a subjective assessment. According to this approach, a researcher focuses on the feeling of the examined person as to whether, in their opinion, the tasks that are biologically and culturally assigned to the particular stage of life occurred on time or, maybe,

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too early or too late (see Brzezińska, Kaczan, & Rycielska, 2010; Brzezińska & Kaczan, 2011a). Following this subjective approach, Inge Seiffge-Krenke (2010) conducted her research by asking young Germans to assess the event timing of activites such as leaving family home, starting a full-time work and living together with a partner. Respondents rated, whether the event occurred: too early, on time or too late. On the basis of their responses, one group of “punctual” and two groups of “unpunctual” subjects were distinguished. There were significant differences between the groups as to the range and the number of completed development tasks. People who left home “on time” (according to their own opinions) in comparison to a group of “unpunctual” (consisting of people who still live with their parents, those who believe that they left their parents’ house too late or those who returned to the family home after the prior departure) presented more diverse experiences and established more relationships of close, or so-called romantic character. However, there was no difference between the groups of “punctual” and “unpunctual” subjects as far as the course of education and career was concerned. Our research conducted in the years 2010–2011 was directed at young people from the final stages of adolescence and early adulthood. On the one hand, we were interested in objective determinants of their life situation, such as: educational and occupational status, relationship with parents, marital and family status. On the other hand, we also focused on subjective determinants, such as: a sense of punctuality of their own developmental tasks implementation in comparison to their peers, the characteristics of personal identity as well as their sense of adulthood.

Research Study 1 Research problem. The aim of the study was to analyze the differences between individuals who are at different stages of development (late adolescence, emerging adulthood and early adulthood) in terms of the three criteria of adulthood, such as: taking up social roles, a feeling of being adult and identity dimensions.

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Subjects. Of a total number of 358 people at the age of 18–30, there were 115 male and 243 female respondents. They formed three stages: (1) late adolescence (142 people at the age of 18–20, including 61 male and 81 female respondents) – all members of this group were secondary school students, (2) emerging adulthood (109 people at the age of 21–28, including 30 male and 79 female respondents) – all members of this group were full-time higher education students, (3) early adulthood (107 people at the age of 21–30, including 24 male and 83 female respondents) – at the time of their study, no one in the group was a secondary school or university student, i.e., no one was continuing his or her school education. Methods. Two research methods were used in the study. The first one is the Subjective Adulthood Scale – it is a tool of our own authorship (Piotrowski, 2010), based on an approach which emphasizes adulthood as a subjective category (Côté, 1997). It consists of 14 statements rated on a 6-point scale, which consists of 3 subscales: sense of independence, sense of intimacy, and sense of being an adult. The second tool was the Dimensions of Identity Development Scale, created by researchers at the Catholic University of Leuven (Luyckx, Schwartz, Berzonsky et al., 2008) and adapted to Polish conditions (Brzezińska & Piotrowski, 2009, 2010b, 2011a). This tool allows measuring five dimensions of identity being a part of the Dual-Cycle Model in Identity Formation: exploration in breadth, commitment making, exploration in depth, identification with commitment and ruminative exploration. The questionnaire has been used in a number of Polish studies (review: Brzezińska & Piotrowski, 2011b), which confirmed its high validity and reliability. The tool consists of 25 statements rated on the 6point scale.

Research Findings (1) Social roles of adulthood versus development phase and gender. In terms of taking up typical adult roles, the youngest group (18–20year-old students) is homogeneous: they lived with their parents (96%), did not work (100%) and did not have children (100%). Slightly more than half of them (56%) were in an informal intimate relation-

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ship. In the period of emerging adulthood (21–28-years-old students), the only social role that was virtually not implemented was parenting (97% of respondents did not have children). Approximately half of the respondents had a partner (informal relationship), but no one was married. There was a strong diversity in the housing situation – the largest group was still living with their parents (40%), slightly fewer lived with their peers (38%), and the much less common situation was living alone (12%) or with a partner (10%). During the survey, just over 40% of respondents worked professionally. In early adulthood (those not studying at the age of 21–30), the vast majority of respondents were professionally active (84% of people were employed), however, there were few people with children (22%). In the case of these two roles, there was a high similarity between the respondents, whereas significant differences occurred as far as housing and marital status were concerned. More than a half of the respondents lived with a spouse/partner (51%), the remaining individuals were divided fairly evenly into three other categories: 20% with parents, 12% with peers and 17% alone. Compared to the previous two groups, there were fewer of those who did not have a partner (28%), but more (25%) of those who were married. Just as in adolescence and emerging adulthood, approximately 50% were in an informal relationship. The results showed that gender in any of the groups did not relate significantly to the number of performed social roles [F(1.358) = 0.68, p > 0.05], whereas there were significant differences between successive periods of development [F(2.358) = 126.35, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.42]. The difference between adolescence (M = 0,58; sd = 0,51) and emerging adulthood (M = 1,10; sd = 0,93) is much smaller than between emerging and early adulthood (M = 2,47; sd = 1,00). (2) Feeling of being adult, phase of development, and gender. People in adolescence and emerging adulthood obtained significantly lower results in a sense of self-reliance [F(2.358) = 4.34, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.02] and intimacy [F(2.358 ) = 6.21, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.03]. The sense of adulthood was the lowest during adolescence, and the highest during early adulthood [F(2.358) = 42.12, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.19]. This was a much stronger relationship (feeling of being adult and phase of de-

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velopment) than the one observed with regard to the self-reliance and intimacy. Gender differences occurred only in one case – women were characterized by higher scores in the area of intimacy. (3) Identity dimensions versus development phase and gender. The phase of development was clearly related to the level of the five examined dimensions of identity. In the case of exploration in breadth, the result was the highest in adolescence, a bit lower in emerging adulthood, the lowest in early adulthood [F(2.358) = 19.92, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.10]. A similar relationship was observed in the case of ruminative exploration [F(2.358) = 16.89, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.09], and in the case of exploration in depth [F(2.358) = 24.97, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.12] significant difference occurred between individuals in early adulthood (lower score) and the other two groups. In the case of commitment making, those of early adulthood scored higher than adolescents (emerging adults did not differ significantly from any of the remaining groups [F(2.358) = 4.92, p