298 4 43MB
English Pages 420 Year 1992
The Unraveling of the American Dream William Ophuls A. Stephen Boyan,
FOREWORD
BY
THOMAS
Jr.
E.
LOVEJOY
OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION
Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity Revisited
Digitized by the Internet Archive in
2010
http://www.archive.org/details/ecologypoliticsoOOophu
Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity Revisited The Unraveling of the American Dream
William Ophuls A. Stephen Boyan, Jr.
Foreword by Thomas E. Lovejoy of The Smithsonian Institution
a W. H. Freeman and Company
New York
Library of Congress Catologing-in-Publication Data
Ophuls,WiUiam, 1934Ecology and the
politics
A. Stephen Boyan, Jr.
;
of scarcity
revisited /
William Ophuls,
foreword by Thomas E. Lovejoy
cm.
p.
Includes bibhographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7167-2313-1 1. 1.
Environmental policy
2.
Environmental protection.
Boyan, A. Stephen, 1938-,
II.
Title.
HC79.E5054 1992 333.7'2—dc20
91-46535
CIP Copyright
No
©
1992 by W. H. Freeman and
part of this
Company
book may be reproduced by any mechanical, photographic, or
electronic process, or in the
form of a phonographic recording, nor may
it
stored in a retrieval system, transmitted, or otherwise copied for public or private use, without written permission
from the publisher.
Printed in the United States of America
1234567890
VB
998765432
be
To the posterity that has never done anything for us
Men
are qualified for civil liberty in exact proportion to their dis-
upon their own controlling power upon
position to put moral chains
cannot exist unless
a
appetites... Society
will
and appetite be
more
placed somewhere, and the
less
there must be without.
ordained in the eternal constitution
of things,
that
men
It is
of it there
is
within, the
of intemperate minds cannot be
free.
Their
passions forego their fetters.
Edmund Burke
Contents
List
of Text Boxes
Foreword
Acknowledgments Preface
Introduction
I Ecological Scarcity and the Limits to
Growth
1
The Science of Ecology
2 Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
3 Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution, the
Management of Technology, and an Overview of Ecological Scarcity
II
The Dilemmas of Scarcity
vm
4 The
Politics
of Scarcity
5 The American
PoHtical
Economy
Economics Equals
The American
Political
I:
Ecology Plus
Politics
Economy
II:
The Non-politics
of Laissez Faire
7 Ecological Scarcity and International Politics
III Learning to Live with Scarcity
» Toward
a Politics
of the Steady State
Afterword Suggested Readings
Index Biographical Sketches
List
1
Paradigms and
of Text Boxes
Political
Theories
2 Some Consequences of Destroying 3
Tropical Forests
Halting Population Growth
4 A Mere
49
A Ray of Hope?
Mariculture:
CJ
Agribusiness Biotechnology
36
46
Distribution Problem?
5
54 58
7 Ecological Farming
66
8
85
Environmental Effects of North Slope Oil Production
Can
We Meet Our Energy Demands
10 Nuclear 1 1 1
4
2
Safety:
with Coal?
The Big Gamble
86
93
Low-Level Nuclear Wastes
95
Safe Nuclear Power?
99
13 Home Energy
14 The
Savings
Multiplex Energy
104
Economy of the
Future
120
1{>
The Thermodynamic Economy
124
IG
Ecological Pollution Control
162
17 Bulldozer Technology Itt Alternative
Technology
164 176
H) The Pubhc-Goods Problem
196
20
200
Coercion
21 Taming
Leviathan: Macro-constraints and
Micro-freedoms
22 The 23
Ecological Contract
Determining the Optimal Level of Pollution
24 Marketmg
Pollution Rights
212 214 223 224
25
Technology Assessment
20
Assigning Prices to Environmental
27
Bhutan: Developing Sustainably
28 War
and Ecocide
2*) Planning Versus Design
226
Goods
228 263
272 288
Forevv^ord
The environmental handwriting is clearly on the wall, but bolder and more insistent than fourteen years ago when the earlier version of this book appeared. Ecological limits mean that it is virtually impossible for all of the 5.4 billion people on earth to achieve the high-consumption habits of U.S.
citizens. Yet
it
is
equally impossible for
embrace the hunter-gatherer societies.
of the 5.4 billion to
all
of the remaining pre-agricultural
life
way we
Obviously, something must change in the
collectively
environment.
relate to the
Will economic growth
crunch because
we
come
to a halt
by design or with
a
horrifying
have blithely allowed ourselves to overshoot the
planet's carrying capacity? Surely the
end
is
in sight for
economic growth
based on ever increasing consumption of fmite natural resources. polluted the clean
composition
—
We have
and water, thereby changing the atmospheric
air
a certain signal that
we
have already carried
this to the
planetary scale.
Perhaps there dismiss
In
and
an answer in the biological world
is
disdain. Individual organisms have
one the organism simply grows
resources. In the other, organisms
plexity of structure, and,
can serve
as a
There
is
model
by
larger
two
we
in size but rather in
analogy, behavior. Perhaps
growth
widespread longing for an escape from the environmental
it is
work, and because most suggestions
the ones at hand.
It
is
what technology can do
are
of such cosmic
scale
problems
solve
as to
to help. Every technological advance in efficient
the transition to a society in balance with
would be
Environmen-
nonetheless important not to dismiss cavalierly
use and conservation of natural resources will
so, it
fix.
close to impossible for any
that they are as likely to create other environmental
Even
com-
in complexity
for an ecologically sustainable society.
find that solution suspect because
single fix to
forms of growth.
and of necessity consumes more
do not grow
squeeze cage through some ingenious technological talists
so long tended to
distinct
its
make
it
easier to achieve
environment.
foolish to believe that advances in efficiency
conservation and any other marvelous surprises ecotechnology in store will in themselves solve the
and
may have
problem. Society faces not only the
current situation of human numbers and resource consumption but also
frightening rates of increase.
A
current annual addition of 100 million
human
people leads to projections of
many
population
billions larger
than present. To sustain such population growth with the same
set
of
beyond the reach of technological fixes, especially while society is undermining the environmental stability of the planet through myriad activities, the most monstrous of which is alteration of atmospheric composition and climatic stability. The serious question this book explores is whether our institutions, societal values, and economic and political assumptions are up to the resources seems
Or
adjustment.
we without
are
allow us to turn away from our
and
that
human
society currently has
the values and structures necessary for survival, the simple point there
is
no
we must bend our
choice, and that
will
dangerous inclination to bicker, dicker,
Although few would wager
fritter?
which
the structures and viewpoints
is
that
astonishing intellectual
capacity toward creating the conditions for change.
Not many
readers,
provides or with unstated) of
I
expect, will agree with every analysis this
human
societies
challenge. Nonetheless, the
must take place darkness. is
up
One
if
we
are to
how
and
sees only
is
hears, at least occasionally, the question
now more
will
Over
the centuries
been
reckoning. What
about the date. reality in
able
we
most
of whether democracy
the question explored here, and
is
democracy of complacency
certainly
fail.
widespread than ever in
itself by failing to face its greatest
society has
That
positive but guarded, because a
immediate horizons
be for democracy,
How
history, to
it
challenge.
Thomas Malthus must recognize
How much
that
would undermine
ironic
has
been
criticized
each time
by one means or another to postpone
really
(oft
they relate to the environmental
book presents exactly the kind of thinking that do more than stumble around in an ecopolitical
to the environmental challenge.
the answer
book
every insight into the workings and assumptions
its
better
it is
to
is
that
a final
Malthus was only wrong
accommodate
to an inevitable
advance rather than adjust painfully in retrospect.
How much
more sensible to learn how best to use and enjoy newly discovered ways to work within our resource capacities, rather than to grasp in desperation for room to maneuver after we have pushed ourselves to the ecological limits, or indeed beyond. This book challenges us to face the environmental music rather than
unwanted
political
change and
let
social
scarcity force us into
an era of
cacophony.
Thomas E. Lovejoy Assistant Secretary for External Affairs
Smithsonian Institution
January 1992
Acknowledgments
I
want
to give special thanks to Carol Beyers for her valuable research
assistance in the preparation
Parker, of the
Duke
text
also
wish to thank Sandy
Justin Boyan,
com-
and Paul Hertz, Chairman of the Biology Department
Barnard College, for
who
his contributions to
helped
me
prepare tables and calculations,
much
I
University PoHtical Science Department, for their valuable
ments on the at
of this manuscript.
UMBC Geography Department, Margaret McKeon, of the
appreciated support
as
I
Chapter
1
.
Thanks
also
go to
with mathematical formulas needed to as
well as to Kitty Boyan,
who
gave
me
worked on the manuscript. A. Stephen Boyan, Jr. January 1992
Preface
About
and
a century
a half ago,
Victor
Hugo
described the ethical
thought of his day and predicted what would one day become the most challenging task of ethics:
humans with the is a whole
In the relations of
animals, with the flowers, with the
objects of creation, there
great ethic scarcely seen as yet, but
which will eventually break through into the light and be the corollary and the complement to human ethics. Doubtless it was first necessary to civilize man in relation to his fellow men. With this one must begin and the various lawmakers of the human spirit have been right to neglect every other care for this one. That task is already much advanced and .
makes progress
But
daily.
it is
.
.
also necessary to civilize
to nature. There, everything remains to be
quoted
Pyrenees,
I
will
wanted
make
seem unable
in relation
Voyage, Alpes et
in Borrelli 1989, p. 39).
to revise Ecology
plain,
humans
done {En
we
and
the Politics of Scarcity because, as the text
are continuing to
doing
to stop
choices: business-as-usual
so.
is
we
degrade our environment, and
"We seem
to confront
becoming impossible and
an array of tragic intolerable, yet
all
the immediately available political alternatives appear unworkable, un-
downright repugnant." The prospect of ecological
palatable, or
thus forces us to consider our ethics. If relation to nature"
not simply
we need
to think
we
are to "civiUze
about the larger
world of problems but in
live in a
a
issues,
scarcity
humans in for "we do
highly problematical
world, an inherently anti-ecological society. This anti-ecological world will
not be healed by legislation. It
is
a
acts
of [mere] statesmanship or passage of piecemeal
world that
change" (Bookchin 1990,
The
is
direly in
need of far-reaching
prospect of ecological scarcity equally obliges us to consider the
eternal questions of political philosophy. Dr.
tion of readers in the connection
questions of poUtical philosophy. in the nature
Ophuls educated
between ecological
He
said that "the value
and quality of the questions
it raises,
they will be central for our era" and "until clearly in
structural
p. 83).
mind, the
.
.
.
answers
[to
for
we
I
a
genera-
scarcity
and the
of this book
am
lies
convinced that
have these questions
them and our predicament]
are
bound
— to elude us."
and
appreciate Dr. Ophuls's permitting
I
new
to raise these questions to a
me
to update his
book
generation of readers. For despite
the publication of a great deal of environmental literature,
two decades of
environmental activism, and billions of dollars spent on environmental programs, the "bottom line"
doing.
may be
It
to
without some fundamental changes, the planet will someday
suggests, but
not be
that
of the environment
that the condition
is
we need
do more than what we've been the future won't take the form that Chapter 8
continues to worsen. Clearly
a hospitable place for
human
habitation.
Yet although most environmental indicators are worsening, this
book not because
difficult for
me
good news
that are
I
despair,
it is
I
care for the fiiture.
also easy to
overlook the
emerging everywhere. Discouraging
human
population
news
that eight East Asian
is
but because
be optimistic, but
to
is
still
revised
I
as it
is
It is
bits
of
that the
good
increasing prodigiously worldwide, the
and Latin American countries reduced their
by more than 50% between 1960 and 1987. People even in poor countries are capable of changing their attitudes toward reproduction and their reproductive behavior. On another front, even though fertility rates
modern agricultural practices are still spreading throughout the world, the good news is that some farmers in almost every region are returning to organic or
and making
IPM methods and to the much money as they
use of biological pest controls
as
2)
is
that
meaningful steps
And
while the world continues to confuse "growth" with happiness and
measures growth by gross national product, the good news
many, France, and Norway,
among
Other good news is that industrial countries. As John paradigm
a
economic
Its
describes
vision
it,
occurring in
is
the conventional
of earthly paradise
where both recreation and work and where nature is a manicured garden.
cultured world of urban luxury,
high-tech and orderly,
nightmare
waking
is
about losing control
to the cold chill of
Ger-
that
analyses.
change in paradigm
McRuer
rooted in neoclassical economics.
is
other countries, are beginning to
figure natural resource depletion into their
is
the world
more energy, the will see in some utilities, businesses, and individuals are taking to increase the efficiency with which they use energy.
continues to use ever
Chapter
Though good news (as we
did before.
—fumbling
its
development
strategy
is
a
are Its
and
brown-out, angry customers, and missed
investment dollars. In a world driven by competition, the Convention,
whose
ethic
nations.
some
It
is
[stiU]
rational
humanism,
is
the paradigm of
drives politics, business,
extent, religion.
power
in
western
government, the media, and, to
Preface
xvii
Its
opponents are the "Greens." Their nirvana
self-sufficient
communities, which use
is
a
bucohc world of gentle,
simple but adequate technology
a
to coexist affectionately with nature. Their nightmare
nology's
power
to destroy their wild places
—of waking
is
about tech-
to a
world where
suburbs desecrate the meadows, where forests have turned to moonscapes,
where the song
and where the water
birds are gone,
is
befouled with
cancerous substances. Their world works by ethics, by cooperation, by beneficence.
McRuer observes tical,
Greens may be "wistful, imprac-
that although the
and in some ways hypocritical" (they may use
jet to the winter sunshine), they are the force
can prevail against
v^sdom, and thus nature,
natural
all
—
What
is
forever in wealth and
conservation laws of
that
interesting
even
that
is
"human
grow
humans are not gods" but systems (McRuer 1990, p. 5).
warn
that
The Greens "invoke
that society can
in bHss."
but
"doomsday
a
The Conventions assume
debate" about the planet's future. skill
fiiel-efficient cars
behind
as
are entangled in the fate
of
the debate continues and the
condition of the planet worsens, the Conventions themselves are begin-
ning to support the concept of "sustainable development." Advocates of sustainable
development
—
for example, the
Global Possible Conference (1984)
—
technological solutions (hopes that,
still
as
World Resources
Institute's
have high hopes for growth and
we
shall see, are at least in
some
respects a delusion) but also recognize that a stable birthrate, a highly efficient use
nature's
of energy with a
income
rather than
shift
to renewables,
capital
its
and
a reliance
(quoted in Corson, 1990,
(which Greens have traditionally identified
as
key aspects of
p.
on
322)
a "steady
state") are essential.
The fundamentals of
"sustainable
into the everyday decisions of there, they are
beginning to do
development" do not yet enter
most corporations, but
so.
and
again, here
For example, the chemical industry has
quietly asked for the help and cooperation of environmental scientists in
determining
how
best to reduce
its
toxic air emissions.
We
will see
how
some utility executives and state utility regulators are recognizing wdsdom of efficiency measures and a shift toward renewables. The Corporation has hired an environmental vice-president;
in
the
3M
12 years the
company has reduced its waste generation by over 50 percent and is still coming up with new ways to reduce pollution on- and off-site. Encouragingly, it has saved money in the process. The McDonald's Corporation is radically shifting the way it serves food, substituting recycled and recyclable materials for new styrofoam containers. The Borden chemical
company
has altered
procedures to reduce the organic chemicals in
its
waste water by 93%.
too has saved
It
The concept of
sustainable
root in the developing world.
money
development
And
its
in the process. is
even beginning to take
this despite the fact that industrial
countries are selling developing countries environmentally harmful products, such as pesticides,
and transferring their
own
Pohcy
Institute
environmental costs
by relocating industry there to avoid being
to those developing nations
subject to their
own
country's pollution controls.
The Environmental
and the National Wildlife Federation have published
a
booklet on environmentally responsible projects in the developing world.
They
include windbreak planting, watershed restoration, integrated pest
management, environmental reserves, habitat protection, energy efficiency and conservation, fish cultures, agroforestry even family planning in Zimbabwe. In Thailand, just one man launched a private nonprofit corporation whose efforts resulted in 70% of the population practicing birth control and led to a reduction of the birth rate in that country from
—
3.2%
1.6% in
to
just 15 years!
A
change in thinking takes time to be
Sometimes that action is tentative; sometimes outside pressure or events must push it forward; sometimes one energetic individual with a vision can do so. But when thought gets translated into the first action, each step makes the next step easier and translated into concrete action.
reinforces the previous shift in perspective.
Even more encouraging
is
the change in perspective
among young
people. In schools across the United States, environmental education
Among
courses are springing up.
the objectives of these courses
is
to
"web of life," to show them that "you can't do just one thing," and to involve them personally in planting, recycling, and cleaning up debris in their communities. The fact that teach youngsters such concepts
as
these courses are being taught
from elementary schools "on up"
among
suggests changing attitudes
those
who
the
today's educational elites.
teach these courses are often surprised
—how,
accept ecological concepts
at
how
itself
Moreover,
readily children
indeed, children will encourage their
parents to launch recycling programs or will educate their parents about
other environmental
come with
as
a
no
issues.
surprise at
all.
vague fear of the
One
Just as
worried
at
times that their elders
(Montagna 1991).
If this
is
so,
their elders are
and these children
adopting a change in paradigm, suggestions dismissed today unrealistic will, in
should
suggests that 10-year-olds today are vaguely
of environmental deterioration and worry that
polluting the world
this
today's 40- and 50-year-olds grew up
bomb and
would blow up the world, he fearful
observer has suggested that
are
as politically
some modified form, become tomorrow's political no longer be the nuisance of
imperatives. Environmental impact will
Preface
xix
generating required paperwork but will be an important underpinning for political decisions.
The point of
these examples
not to kindle
is
human
future will take care of itself or that all.
On
shoot
is
the contrary, the text
makes
already predetermined
—
it
that
a naive faith that the
some way will solve some ecological over-
skill in
clear that
human
suffering
is
bound
already
of our propensity to do too litde, too late. Rather, the point of these examples is to demonstrate that we are slowly learning that to increase because
all
our behavior has consequences. In
to
our fellow beings,
seem
as
we
learned that
though we get away with
us back."
Now we
it,
are learning that
our relations
civilizing ourselves in
when we
treat
people badly,
it
may
but in the long run, people will "get
when we
treat nature badly,
it
may
though we get away with it, but in the long run, nature also will get us back. Nature is beginning to get us back. The sun that has given us
seem
life is
as
now
giving us cancer.
The
rain that has given us drink
is
now
bearing poisons.
The examples ethic for
I
have mentioned show that some are learning an
our relationship to nature. In many quarters, the
humans in relation to nature has begun. Perhaps be more rear-guard actions against the planetary
task
the only
of civilizing
outcome
will
deterioration fueled by
the growth god. But despite the troubles about us, the new making progress daily, and I believe that all is not lost.
ethic
is
A. Stephen Boyan, Jr. January 1992
Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity Revisited
Introduction
The
reality
crisis can no longer be somewhat remote controversy among specialists
and gravity of the environmental
denied. What had been a
and the committed few over the et
1972
al.
common
vs.
Cole
et
al.
limits to
person during the energy
understand in our bones
that,
there might not always be
growth
crisis
(for
example,
home
1973) was brought
Meadows
forcefliUy to the
of 1973-1974.
We
began to
whatever the causes of this particular
enough material or energy
crisis,
to support even
much less the higher levels many aspire to. summer of 1988, with drought baking the soil from east to
current levels of consumption,
Again, in the
west, with 100° heat in cities across the country,
and with
coastal beaches
befouled by garbage, raw sewage, and medical wastes, Americans again had a sense
of foreboding about what we're doing to our planet.
example, seriously
which
asserts
any longer that ecological concern
after a brief pirouette in the
the newest
Nor
crisis.
are there
concerned with environmental designed to siphon
minority
interests.
tions
a
is
excesses of some
crisis is real,
most profound way
some of the most ardent
still
one, for
mere
its
fad,
place to
maintain that those
hoax
public support away from disadvantaged
Whatever the
and values in
many who
will cede
a
issues are perpetrating a political
money and
cause of environmentaUsm, the
media limelight
No
is
and
it
who
have espoused the
challenges our institu-
—^more profoundly even than
environmentalists are willing to admit. This
book
about that challenge.
theory and common sense have always told us that growth and unlimited population increases on a finite
Of course, both infinite material
INTRODUCTION planet are impossible. But has not
seemed
all
somehow, at least in
that pressing,
another could be found to say
problem we could
it
safely leave to
was not. Rather,
was, because bringing an end to
that
we make its
agonizing economic,
undeniable
reality,
country, the problem
who
said
said the latter,
— and
it it
was,
was
a
good thing material growth would demand
our grandchildren
that
despite
this
and for every expert
social,
and
a
political choices.
Thus,
the environmental crisis remains con-
troversial.
However, few really disagree with the ultimate implications. At least seven major studies concluded, in the 1970s, that population and material growth cannot continue forever on a finite planet and that conducting "business as usual" will fail to meet basic human needs (Corson, 1990, p. 15, citing Meadows et al. 1982). These studies called for a "steady-state" society characterized by frugality in the consumption of resources and by deliberate setting of limits to maintain the balance between humanity and nature. In the 1980s five more studies came to similar conclusions. Some, including the World Commission on Environment and Development, called for "sustainable development." Its report. Our Common Future (1987), was endorsed by the United Nations Environmental Program. Like the concept of a steady state, sustainable development requires stable population, high energy efficiency, a resource transition based on utilizing nature's "income" without depleting its "capital," and an economic and political transition. However, it allows for more growth than "steady state" advocates, and advocates of sustainable development are generally more optimistic about whether the necessary changes can be made. Looking at the studies as a whole, the major controversy concerns the time scale.
The
so-called optimists believe that (1) the current
not quite so bad as the doomsayers make out, (2) and technological ingenuity will keep the ecological wolf from the door indefinitely, and (3) there are many social negative-feedback mechanisms (such as the economic marketplace, the impact of media-propagated information on values, and the politisituation in general
continued
is
scientific
promote gradual human adjustment to becomes necessary. Thus, to put it crudely, business as usual can continue for the foreseeable future, and to look beyond that is borrowing trouble. The so-called pessimists believe, to the contrary, that (1) the situation is more urgent than most are willing to admit, (2) limits on our scientific and technological ingenuity and on our ability to apply it to the problems confronting us cal process
itself)
physical limits
that will
when and
if it
— Introduction
and
are already discernible,
which the optimists would
(3)
the negative-feedback mechanisms on
rely have already
begun
to
fail.
Thus time
is
and far-reaching action by the current generation is imperative to avoid overwhelming the earth's capacity to support us in dignity. Failure short,
to act
soon and
effectively
wars, plague, and famine political
could lead us into the apocalyptic collapse
—
predicted by the early demographer and economist Thomas Malthus, whose famous essay on the dangers
of overpopulation (1798) was the mental limits on
We
human
first
expHcit statement of the environ-
activity.
among the pessimists. Thus the first purpose of make clear the nature of the crisis and why it is pressing. The second and more important is to draw out in full measure the poHtical, social, and economic implications of the crisis, for even some of the more prominent environmentalists appear not to have understood their import. At least in their pubUc statements, they maintain that a this
count ourselves
book
is
to
sufficient quantity
of reform
—
fairly radical
radical
—would
reform, to be sure
rescue us from our ecological predicament.
To
changes are urged, the language used
political
and
is
often vague. Concrete
arrangements are rarely discussed, and
social
more
the extent that
really
fun-
damental changes in our way of life or our constitutional arrangements are, one could gather, virtually unthinkable. This book argues, to the contrary, that the external reality of
ground out from under our own making merely reformist policies of ecological
ecological scarcity has cut the
system,
poUtical
management
all
evitable for a
but
useless.
few decades
At at
best,
reforms can postpone the in-
the probable cost of increasing the
severity of the eventual day of reckoning. In brief, liberal as 1)
—
democracy
we know it that is, our theory or "paradigm" of poHtics (see Box is doomed by ecological scarcity; we need a completely new
—
poHtical philosophy and set of political institutions. Moreover,
it
ap-
pears that the basic principles of modern industrial civilization are also
incompatible with ecological scarcity and that the whole ideology of
modernity growing out of the Enlightenment, especially such central tenets as individualism, may no longer be viable. This conclusion
may
strike
many
as
extreme. Despite overwhelm-
ing historical evidence for the rapid mortality of structures,
tions that
we we
democracy, Political
tend to think of the inherit,
as eternal,
paradigms
set
all
merely
political
of political values and institu-
whether monarchy by divine right or immutable, and, above
are, in fact,
all, right.
They
liberal
are not.
extraordinarily fragile creations.
They
INTRODUCTION
|_ Paradigms and The
have
coherence.
Theories
institutions by which people govern themintellectual, emotional, moral, and practical of high degree
political theories
selves
Political
a
and
A poHtical society
is
arrangements, both explicit and
characterized by definite institutional tacit standards for political
behavior,
what makes politiought to treat authority constituted how cal power legitimate and members of society (especially how the norms of the political associa-
and widely shared understandings on such
tion are to be enforced). practices,
and beUefs
as
We
issues as
can speak of this ensemble of institutions,
the poHtical "paradigm" of the society
(WoHn
1968, 1969).
Because poHtical paradigms have the same kind of internal consistency as scientific theories, the process of political change is analogous to scientific change.
science
—aims
scientific
inquiry
—so-caUed normal
routine puzzle solving under the conceptual umbrella
at
of a fiindamental
famous
Most
scientific
theory or paradigm (Kuhn 1970), like the
DNA or double-helix model of gene replication in molecular
such basic (and partly metaphysical) theories are successful in solving the puzzles thrown up by nature, allowing normal science to make apparent progress, all is well. However, once the puz-
biology As long
as
M
zles
can no longer be solved and disturbing anomaHes
to incorporate tists
them
into
sharing this paradigm
resist all efforts
normal theory, then the community of scienis
ripe for revolution. Scientists begin to cast
around outside the firamework of the old paradigm for answers to the crucial anomalies; fi-om this episode of "extraordinary" science emerges a
new paradigm
another in
one regime replaces
a political revolution.
Putting
New
that overthrows the old, just as
this in poHtical
classes,
new economic
terms, every society undergoes stresses. relationships,
and new reHgious or
racial
patterns emerge. But political associations are conservative. RetooHng the paradigm is "unthinkable" and is Hkely to be resisted to the bitter
may of course
persist
long
after the conditions that
have vanished, but unhappy the people
made them
viable
who live during the long period
of decay or the swifter decHne into revolutionary turmoil. However, our predicament is not hopeless. We can adapt ourselves to ecological scarcity and preserve most of what is worth preserving in our current poHtical
— Introduction
end; before all
considers radical change, a political society will exhaust
it
possibilities for
reform by normal
politics
such reform, then the poHtical changed.
An
example
By
in England.
same
consciousness and assertiveness political
is,
reform within
set
of poHtical
among
its
"facts," rising political
non-eHtes, could not be accom-
paradigm of Czarist Russia. Reform
were unsuccessful, and the new
anomaly
that
is
the extension of suffiage to the working class
is
contrast, the
modated by the
—
more or less solved by paradigm carries on as before, slightly
basic constitutional structure. If the puzzle
efforts
political facts therefore constituted
that led to political crisis
and eventually revolution
as
an
the only
solution.
There and
are,
political
of course,
significant differences in the
communities respond to anomaly.
for the ability of the leaders of the scientific
pugned,
this
is
one of the most
First,
way
the scientific
although
community
characteristic responses
to be
it is
rare
im-
of the poHtical
impending crisis. As part of its effort to cope with change through normal politics ^provided the paradigm allows for it, whether by election or routinized coup d'etat it will throw one set of leaders association to
—
—
out in hopes that the next lot will solve the puzzle better. This successful.
fashion,
However,
and once
a
it is
genuine anomaly cannot be solved in clear that changes in leadership will
a solution, the political crisis.
community can no longer avoid
is
often
this
not produce
confironting
its
Second, for a great variety of reasons, poHtical communities are
much more long-suffering than scientific communities. Urdike scientists, who make radical efforts to replace a suspect theory as soon as possible,
members of a
political
for example, the disparity
community can
between the
tolerate gross anomalies
theoretical
and the actual
of American blacks during the century following the Civil generations.
However, when the
"facts" that constitute
status
—
War
anomaly
for
will
not go away and can no longer be ignored or borne, then revolutionary (but not necessarily violent) change
The
crisis
of ecological
becomes
inescapable.
scarcity constitutes just
such a gross and in-
eluctable poHtical anomaly.
and civilizational order. But we must not
and our options
are
concepts.
Events are pressing on
us,
To see clearly how and why these indeed forced on us, we must commence by examining basic
array of potentially tragic choices.
choices are
delay.
being rapidly and sharply eroded: Already we face an
INTRODUCTION
6
Ecology This work
an ecological critique of American
is
and
political institutions
What is this "ecology" upon which the Third New International Dictionary gives three
their underlying philosophy.*
argument
Webster's
rests?
meanings:
1.
A
branch of science concerned with the interrelationship of or-
ganisms and their environments. 2.
The
or pattern of relations between organisms and their
totality
environment. 3.
Human
ecology, [that
relationship specifically,
between
first
human community and
a
environment;
its
the study of the spatial and temporal interrelationships
between humans and
The
branch of sociology that studies the
a
is,]
economic, social, and
their
definition describes the
work of the
political organization.
who
professional ecologist,
and experimentation to understand the laws governing the interactions of organisms with their living and nonliving environment. The second definition indicates a more general use of the word—for example, one can speak as readily of "the ecology of
uses laboratory or field observation
community" as of "the ecology of a mountain pine." Thus one would indeed expect human ecology to concern itself with the totality of the relationship between a human community and its environment. a peasant
Unfortunately,
the second part of the third definition reveals, the
as
purview of human ecology has sense.
It
is
such
Meanwhile, they ecology to
and
science
a
embrace the
totality
and
in this sense that it
first
crisis is
society epitomizes the
shown
that
presumed little
to
modernity be
and ready will
of
is
their physical
use the is
word to the
life
number of advantages, such
as
of information. Also, American
in
no longer work
most
respects,
and
if it
can be
here, then modernity can be
we
shall see in
needed to make the argument apply
countries and internationally.
shall
global and civilizational in character,
in trouble elsewhere. Indeed, as
modification
fiall
create.
definition.
availability
modem way
we
clear that the reference
but beginning with the American case offers a familiarity to the reader
to
broaden the meaning of the term human
it is
the environmental
limited, so that at
ecology in the
environmentahsts wish
except where the context makes
Of course,
human
of people's relationships with
science of ecology described in the
*
been rather
science of
that
are trying to
living environment,
ecology,
in practice
no genuine
present there exists
Chapter
to other
7,
very
developed
Introduction
There
etymological justification for
is
root of the prefix eco
Thus ecology
human
its
The
which means "household."
oikos,
enough, the original meaning of
Interestingly
word
also derived
from
was "a science or
oikos,
art
house or household," whereas economy was "the
a
management of ensuring
broad use of the term.
the science or study of the household of the
is
its totality.
economics, a
of managing
word
the Greek
logically
race in
the term
is
this
community, or establishment with
a group,
a
view
to
maintenance or productiveness." Today economics has be-
come
"a social science that studies the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities." Thus, from the science of management of the human household in all its dimensions, economics has narrowed itself to an exclusive focus
—
ecology
the
or the problems of
—and
money economy
subsystem of
a particular
subsystem
treats this
though
as
it
were autonomous.
Of
course, professional ecologists are often equally guilty of the
narrowmindedness
comes
that
from
Indeed,
overspecialization.
economist and ecologist aUke are victims of the almost vicious degree of specialization characteristic
ecology
now
evolving
is
of the modern world. The science of human
an effort to bridge the gap between
specialties
and make possible the rational management of the whole human household. This effort wiU require us to become, in the general. offered
Its
by Paul
spirit is
Sears,
dean of American professional
It
may
as
the science of interrelation between
clear matters
effect, specialists in
well reflected in the redefinition of ecology
somewhat
to
ecologists:
modify the usual definition of ecology life
and environment. Actually,
way of approaching this vast field of experience by drawing upon the information available from whatever source it may come [Sears 1971].
a
To be human goal. Yet,
dividual
it
of
all
best
of the kind Sears envisions, we must in-
ecologists
tegrate the better part
it is
—
human knowledge
must be attempted.
clearly
an impossible
We
must hope that, although any inhuman ecology must fall short of the ideal, there wiU
work in body of works
complement each other and give us the way out of the environmental crisis. What follows is the work of one human ecologist and one political scientist who happen to be concerned principally with the political aspects of managing the human household and who therefore have drawn on ecology, other natural sciences, engineering and technology, emerge
a
global understanding
that
we need
to find our
the social sciences, and even the humanities to construct a ecological critique of the
American
political
economy.
human-
INTRODUCTION Politics
Much
of the ensuing argument will appear not to be about
as
usually defined
it is
man or woman in
by the
politics at all
the street or the academic
The difficulty arises in large part from a narrow definition of politics. The word is used to mean either the winning and losing of elections and other political battles, for which a more apspecialist in poUtics.
word
propriate
is
politicking,
or the organization and administration of
units of government, thereby excluding as
well as religion and
many
economic and
social
phenomena
other matters that were once considered part
and parcel of politics. This pinched understanding of politics impoverished, fi-agmented
view of
economy and
a
gap
is
the survival of the
political tasks are the provision
excessive
firom
like the
one between
The
basic
community; two of the
basic
ecology, with similarly perverse consequences.
problem
political
resulting
reality
academic specialization, which has created
reflects the
of food and other biological necessities
and the establishment of conditions favorable for reproduction. Neither of these can be accomplished except in the human household provided by nature, and
in this sense pofitics must rest
The model
for such a
ecological foundation.
comprehensive view can be found in the
poUtical theories of the classical world. Aristotle's Politics
on an
As any reader of Plato's Republic or politics was all-in-
knows, for the ancient philosophers
clusive: Religion, poetry, education,
and marriage were
just as
much
pohtical matters as war, the regulation of property, and the distribution of administrative office. Aristotle's famous description of the
human
as
the
"pohtical animal" graphicaUy conveys our uniqueness in being respon-
organizing our
sible for
without instinct
politics
own communal
would be
and natural
Aristode said that
life.
necessity; their
"government"
is
part of Creation; free of
government. Only humans
—
is
mortal necessities, gods need no
all
half beast, half
by
genetically given.
Likewise, the spontaneous, infallible right action of the gods as
men
either gods or beasts. Beasts are ruled
ordained artificial
—
god
struggle to govern
themselves with no certain guide and no assurance of success. For Aristode, as well as for Plato and other major political theorists, "politics"
community on
the earth, and it therefore government narrowly defined. Aristode asks how this political animal can design and create institutions that will assure the survival of the city of man and some measure of the good life
concerns
this struggle to live in
extends to
within
book:
it.
Is
many
It is
the
things besides
just such a broad conception
way we
organize our
of
politics that
communal
life
informs
this
and rule ourselves
compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws?
9
Introduction
Ecology run our
about to engulf economics and
is
For example, one definition of the term
academic
specialists
Woodhouse
politics in that
how we
be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives.
lives will
politics
that
is
prevalent
among
"the authoritative allocation of values." But
is
sleeping mats of the world should therefore be considered politics, for single thing
is
likely to
we Hke
than the reproductive
"authoritatively"
behavior of millions of anonymous
Thus, whether
human
beings.
or not, embracing the larger conception of
it
poUtics that characterized early poHtical theorists inevitable,
and
alone
this
no
determine the general world allocation of values
come more
the years to
in
as
(1972) points out, what happens in the beds and on the
human
the nature of the laws of
is
becoming
virtually
sufiicient justification for carefially delineating
is
ecology that our poHtics must hence-
forth reflect. Moreover, practically speaking, the cogency of many of the
arguments in the second half of
book depends largely on documented in the
this
existence of the kinds of ecological imperatives half.
the first
Thus, expanding our conception of politics to include these ecologi-
cal imperatives
an important
is
first
step
toward coming to terms with
ecological scarcity.
Scarcity
The
habitual condition of civilized people
never been available in such abundance
more often than
David
Hume
the
is
as
goods were
if all
much
as
However, without
wife."
"selfishness
exhaust people's wants;
free, as air
and water
any
earth's a
goods in
common
common
"as [do]
abundance of goods,
and the confined generosity of man, along with the scanty
provision nature has
made
for his wants," inevitably
produce
thus a system of justice that will restrain and regulate the is
are,
he or she wanted without harming others.
People would thus wiUingly share the
man and
as to
gone unmet. The momentous consequences, of which one of the utter inevitability of politics. The philosopher
argued that
person could get
one of scarcity. Goods have
not, even their basic needs have
existence of scarcity has
most important
is
a universal necessity
ment, whether
it
(Hume
takes the
democracy, therefore has
its
1739, III-2-11).
relative scarcity or
passions
of govern-
form of primitive tabu or parliamentary It
follows that assumptions about scarcity
any economic and
abundance of goods has
on the character of poHtical,
human
institution
origins in the necessity to distribute scarce
resources in an orderly fashion. are absolutely central to
The
conflict;
social,
political doctrine
a substantial
and economic
and
that the
and direct impact
institutions.
INTRODUCTION
10
This understanding, however, has been undermined over the past three centuries, during which abnormal abundance has shaped all our
and institutions. The philosophes of the Enlightenment, dazrapid progress of science and technology and the beginthe by zled nings of the Industrial Revolution, envisioned the elevation of the common person to the economic nobility as the frontiers of scarcity were gradually pushed back. The bonanza of the New World and other founts of virgin resources, the take-off and rapid-growth stages of
attitudes
science and technology, the availability of "free" ecological resources
and water to absorb the waste products of industrial and other, lesser factors allowed this process to unfold with apparent inexorability. Karl Marx, who documented and criticized the horrors and inhumanities of the Industrial Revolution, nevertheless celebrated its coming because the enormous productive forces un-
such
air
as
activities,
leashed by the bourgeois overthrow of feudalism could be used to abolish scarcity.
and
all
With
scarcity abolished, poverty, inequality, injustice,
the other flowers of evil rooted in scarcity
would simply wither
away; not even a state would be needed, he thought, because everything would be a free good, like Hume's
and water, that humans
air
could share together without conflict. Marx's Utopian assessment of the shared or
came
to be shared
possibilities
by almost
all
of material growth was
in the West,
though
in a less
extreme form and with considerable difference of opinion on how the march to Utopia should be organized. For example, the works of the political
philosopher John Locke and of the economist
men who
two
tion, are shot
gave bourgeois political
economy
its
Adam
Smith, the
flindamental direc-
through with the assumption that there
is
always going to
be more: more land in the colonies, more wealth to be dug from the ground, and so on. Thus virtually all the philosophies, values, and instituof modern society are the luxuriant fruit of an era of apparendy endless abundance. The return of scarcity in any guise therefore represents a serious challenge to the modern way of life. tions typical
Worse, scarcity appears to be returning in
form
that
we
call
ecological
overpopulation and famine
now
also
worry
(as
scarcity.
though
a
Instead
new and more of simple
daunting
Malthusian
that weren't enough),
we must
about shortages of the vast array of energy and mineral
resources necessary to keep the engines of industrial production running,
about pollution and other limits of tolerance in natural systems, about such physical constraints as the laws of thermodynamics, about complex
problems of planning and administration, and about
a host
of other
Introduction
11
factors
Malthus never dreamed
of separate but interacting
Ecological scarcity is thus an ensemble and constraints on human action, and it surpassing those presented to our ancestors
appears to pose problems far
by
scarcity in
The
its
classical
of.
limits
form.
nature and difficulty of the challenge
in the ironic fact that the very things infinite
—
abundance
air
and water
Hume
we
confront are apparent
used to
—have become
the state of goods that must
illustrate
scarce
political decisions. The profiindity of the challenge is also apparent in the economist Kenneth Boulding's use of the concept
be allocated by
"spaceman economy" to describe the consequences of ecological scarcity. According to Boulding, because our overpopulated globe is coming increasingly to resemble a spaceship of finite dimensions, with neither mines nor sewers, our welfare depends not upon increasing the rate of
consumption or the number of consumers; both of which are potentially but on the extent to which we can wring from minimum resources
fatal,
maximum
the
richness and amenity for a reasonable population.
perhaps even an affluent, hfe
v^th
a curious
is
parsimony"; in
possible, fact, "far
but
"it will
from
A good,
have to be combined
scarcity disappearing,
it
will
be the most dominant aspect of the society; every grain of sand will have to be treasured, and the waste and profligacy of our own day will seem so horrible that our descendants
v^dll
us" (Boulding 1966). There
of course, no
a society.
What
is
the invention of a to
meet the
is,
hardly be able to bear to think about
ultimately required by the
historical crisis
precedent for such
of ecological
scarcity
new mode of civilization, for nothing less seems
is
likely
challenge.
Theory
Political It is
not the aim of
this
civilization but rather to
book to prescribe the form of post-industrial document the existence of ecological scarcity,
show how it will come
to dominate our political life, and then make plain the inability of our current pohtical culture and machinery to cope with its
challenges.
From
this analysis, a
range of possible answers to the
v^ emerge. For example, if individuaHsm an era of ecological the
mas
scarcity,
communal end of the that confront us
—
steady
state.
shown
then the answer must
to
lie
somewhere toward
for example, the political price attached to
work
Yet although
crisis
be problematic in
poHtical spectrum. Also, certain general dilem-
tinued technological growth will be In brief, then, this
is
it
is
a
made
con-
expficit.
prologue to a political theory of the
stops well short of formulating a genuine
INTRODUCTION
12
political
theory of the steady state, it
issues that tial
is
directly
concerned with the great
have dominated traditional thought about politics. Our essen-
purpose
to
is
show how
political philosophy have
the perennial, but dormant, questions of
been revived by ecological scarcity. We shall see,
for example, that the political problems related to the task of environ-
mental management have to do primarily with the ends of
political
means needed to achieve from the ensuing analysis are
association, rather than with the political
agreed-upon goals. The questions essentially value questions: What
that arise
is
the
common interest? Under current
democracy a suitable and desirable vehicle for achieving it? What, indeed, is the good life for men and women? In other words, we confront the same kinds of questions that Aristotle,in common conditions,
liberal
is
with the other great theorists of environmental
crisis to
politics, asks.
We
are obliged
enlarge our conception of politics to
its
by the
classical
dimensions. To use a famous capsule description of politics, the questions
about who
gets what, when, how,
and why must be reexamined and
answered anew by our generation. Our goal in this book is to agenda for such a philosophical reexamination of our poUtics.
However, we do not approach
this task as
does a traditional political
philosopher. Past theorists seeking guidance for
grounded
human
shape of the desirable political order can be deduced, they have examined
human
happy and virtuous people.
approaches, and
or, like Aristotle,
behavior over time to see whether certain
kinds of political institutions are
cases,
action have
on revelation or induction. Either, like Plato, they some a priori metaphysical principle from which the
their ideas
have appealed to
a
set the
more
effective than others in
Of course, many
some have introduced other
theorists have
producing
mixed
these
considerations. In almost
however, humanity's linkage to nature has counted for Htde.
contrast, like Malthus,
and the
basic
we
start
all
By
with humanity's dependence on nature
human problems of biological
survival.
and social thinkers have acknowledged humanity's ultimate dependence on nature, and a few have devoted
To be
some
sure,
most
political
attention to the specific effects that environmental constraints
have had on people. In
slavery
Book One of The
and other ecological
scarcity
may be
Republic and
limits,
necessary for civilized
Rousseau
in
Politics,
Aristotle discusses
implying that because of them life.
Plato in
The Second Discourse
Book Two of The
also display a subtle
awareness of the impact the evolving process of getting one's daily
bread can have on social institutions. Nevertheless, with the major
exception of Malthus, political and social theorists have tended to take the biological existence of men and possible.
women
as
given. This
is
no longer
Introduction
13
Nor
is
it
environment.
possible any longer to ignore humanity's impact
Of course,
concern about
damage to human welfare also two thousand years ago, Plato
this
on
has a long history (Glacken 1956). in
the
impact and the consequent
Greece and Mencius
Over
China both
in
worried about the destruction of habitat caused by overgrazing and deforestation.
The
early Christian writer TertuUian called wars, plagues,
famines, and earthquakes blessings because they "serve to prune away the
human race" (Hardin 1969, p. 18), and Aristotle found the poverty caused by population growth to be the parent of
luxuriant growth of the
revolution and crime: "If reproduction... poverty its
is
no
restriction
is
imposed on the
rate
of
the inevitable result; and poverty produces, in
and wrong doing" (Barker 1952, p. 59). Clearly, of the environmental problems we face today have been with
turn, civic dissension
certain
human beings since the very beginning of civilization. The character of these problems, however, has changed markedly over the centuries. In ancient times, humanity's impact on the en-
vironment was
local; by the eighteenth century, worldwide effects were becoming apparent; writers of the nineteenth century remarked
on the extent of this impact and its cumulative effects; and observers in this century have focused on the acceleration of change. Accumulating quantitative impact has thus brought about
a qualitative
We are now
difference in our relation to the physical world:
the prime
agent of change in the biosphere and are capable of destroying the
environment
that
supports
us.
The
radically
different
conditions
prevailing today virtually force us to be ecological theorists, grounding
on the basic problems of human survival on a finite and vulnerable planet endowed with limited resources. A second contrast between this work and traditional poHtical theory our
is
analysis
that, again like
limits to
possible
Malthus, our effort throughout
and constraints on human action.
—
or, alternatively,
what we
We
are forced to
is
to identify the critical
wish to discover what
is
what
is
do
—
rather than
come last in this supposedly philosophinot because we disdain the eternal questions of value,
desirable. In other words, values cal analysis.
This
but because
is
a value-neutral
approach
is
called for
on very
practical
grounds.
*
As
will
society,
be explained
change so that world.
shortly, values
wiU be
crucial to creating a steady-state
but values that are widely accepted today
we
as
immutable may have
to
can either avert or endure harmfiil changes in the natural
INTRODUCTION
14
of
First
philosophical, ethical, and spiritual arguments
all,
seem
to
appeal only to the converted. Hard-headed scientists, technologists,
—
bureaucrats, and businesspeople
the
men
and
—do not
basic decisions that shape
our futures
to such arguments. If one
is
women who make much
often pay
the
attention
to argue constructively with the people
who
incarnate our cultural and poUtical norms, one must argue the case in their
and
own
terms. This requires that
a flindamentally empirical
or agnostic approach, putting aside the question of values,
scientific
least temporarily, to
that
one adopt
fmd
instead
what
is
at
possible given the natural laws
govern our planet. Second, one of the most important reasons for focusing on limits
and constraints
is
the nature of our predicament. Although the
species has never enjoyed total fi-eedom of choice, at
human
some times and
abundance of everything needed for the maintenance of hfe and the construction of culture has made the latitude of choice correspondingly large. By contrast, people cast adrift in a lifeboat with places a relative
short supplies,
many
say,
or the trapped inhabitants of a besieged town, face
painful dilemmas; if they wish to survive, they
stringent hmits
imposes
knowledge of
which
their behavior. Similarly,
come
circumstances
must do
on
certain type of social design
a
—
to resemble those
by
its
on those embarked. As our
of space
travelers,
we may
design to teU us a great deal about
this social
in other words, to plot the relatively
policies if we
expect
what we
narrow range within
the values and the moral requirements can
become our
must impose
very nature a spaceship
lie.
Nature's dictates
wish to survive.
Nevertheless, questions of value are inescapable. There being
—
—
no
that dominates
all agreed-upon prime value not even survival others, solving every problem of public and private morality neccessitates trade-offs between desired goods. To illustrate briefly, even if
ecologists could predict with absolute certainty that a continuation of
current trends would produce massive death and other catastrophes by A.D. 2000, people
doom shall
might
still
decide, in a spirit of profligate fataHsm, to
we number of possible to the lifeboat problem and an even larger number to the problem, so the outcome will be the result of a complex
posterity rather than forgo current enjoyment. Moreover,
not face totally forced choices. There are
solutions
spaceship interplay
between
limits
and
constraints,
a
our present and future
capacity to evade or manipulate limits, and our values. In brief, science
can only defme the limits to the contents.
hope
this
judgments
Where
book
political
science ends,
and
social vision;
wisdom
cannot prescribe
necessarily begins,
will help prepare the reader for
at that point.
it
making
and we
decisions and
Introducrion
15
The Steady
State
Many of those who examine that we are headed toward a must be refined basic,
our ecological predicament tend to agree
Although the concept one that has achieved a
steady-state society*
flirther, a steady-state society
is
long-term balance between the demands of
envirormient that supplies
population and the
a
wants. Implicit in this definition are the
its
preservation of a healthy biosphere, the careful husbanding of resources,
on consumption, long-term
self-imposed Umitations
goals
to
guide
short-term choices, and a general attitude of trusteeship toward future
income instead of managing the earth as we would a perpetual-yield forest, so that it continues to thrive and replenish itself "for as long as the grass shall grow and the sun shall shine." generations. Useful analogies include living off annual
eating up capital and
The rest of the book will help make these abstractions somewhat more concrete. For one thing, from an analysis of our current errors we can infer at least some aspects of the steady-state society, even though a full and systematic description is beyond our present abihty. However, it is
important to understand fi-om the outset that the exact nature of the
balance
and
as
at
any time depends on technological capacities and
social choice,
choices and capacities change, organic growth can occur. For
reason, the steady state
is
by no means
a state
of stagnation;
equilibrium affording ample scope for continued
a
it is
this
dynamic
artistic, intellectual,
moral, scientific, and spiritual grov^h.
human growth
Indeed, without substantial
in every dimension, the
steady-state society can never be realized. Devising an ecological technol-
ogy or
a
new
set
of pohtical institutions for the steady
part of the problem, for
core
its
is
ethical, moral,
and
state
spiritual.
is
the lesser
This idea
is
well expressed in a metaphor suggested by George Perkins Marsh, a
major figure
of the American conservation movement and
in the history
the greatest pioneer of human ecology after Malthus. Marsh's major (1864) depicts the earthly
abode
human
blazing in the hearth.
By
*
and
is
race as a heedless cottager tearing
for kindling in order to
Stationary-state society
inference, the
keep
a
what
a condition
men and women
is
in store for us.
Some
it is
not entirely suitable
believe that even steady-state
equilibrium or a sustainable society.
is
as a
The former
too
it
tends to
description of
static
and prefer
Advocates of a sustainable society beUeve that
"growth" can continue to occur but must conform to natural understood, however, steady-state
his fire
of a steady-state
equilibrium society are alternative terms.
of rigor mortis,
down
Hvely but evanescent
the traditional economic label for a state of zero growth. Because
imply
work
is
appropriate and
we
shall
limits.
Rightly
normally use
it.
INTRODUCTION
16
society
take excellent care to see that their earthly household was
would
knowing that posterity (if not they themselves) would Through frugahty and good stewardship, they would seek ways to be warm that would nevertheless allow them to pass the cotimproved if possible, but at all costs undamaged down to their tage children. The ultimate goal, then, is as much an ethical ideal (the good
preserved intact,
have use for
it.
—
—
stewardship enjoined by the BibHcal parable)
economic, and
We let
shall
us in Part
now
concrete set of political,
return to this point at the end of our analysis. Meanwhile, I
explore ecology and the ecological limits and constraints
beginning to press
examine the
as a
social arrangements.
down on
political challenges.
why we need not only new theology as well.
a
new
us.
Next, in Part
Perhaps then
we
theory of political
II,
shall
we
shall
go on
to
understand better
economy but probably
a
I Ecological Scarcity
and the Limits to
Growth
1 The
The Synthetic
Science of Ecology
Science
Ecology's synthetic nature distinguishes
branches of science.
On
the process of
in
life
it
from the more reductionist
the grandest scale, ecologists try to understand the context of the chemical, geological, and
meteorological environment by assembling the isolated knowledge of speciahsts into a single, ordered system. Indeed, the subject matter of
ecology
Hence
called the locale,
so large that simple experimentation
is
ecologists often
often not feasible.
is
conduct observational studies on
a ftinctional unit
ecosystem (the community of organisms living in
a specified
—
along with the nonbiological factors in the environment
water, rock, and so interactions
among
on all
—
that support
them,
as
air,
well as the ensemble of
these components).
Understanding the process of Hfe requires seeing ecosystems in
dynamic and
Contemporary ecosystems have developed undergoing both short-term changes and Ernest Haeckel, one of the founders of ecology, "the body of knowledge concerning the economy
historical terms.
from particular origins and long-term evolution.
defmed
this
science as
are
of nature," and Charles Elton described natural
animals"
history
[concerned with]
(Kormondy 1969,
his ecological
the
pp. vi-ix). In
reveal the general principles that
sociology
work
as "scientific
and economics of
sum, systems ecologists try to
govern the operation of the whole
system called the biosphere, the part of the planetary system that contains or influences Hfe.
19
CHAPTER
20
From
this description,
should be obvious that because humanity
it
inhabits the biosphere, ecology must also be concerned with
Today there can be no
activities.
human
1
valid distinction
human
between ecology and
ecology. Nevertheless, ecologists have until recently concerned
economy of nature in pristine environments relativehuman intervention. In this way they have succeeded in ly undefiled by discovering some of the general principles that govern the economy of nature. Using their findings, we shall give a synoptic overview of the basic themselves with the
However, our discussion
principles of ecology.
human
rather than
special relevance to
scientific
human
ecology. That
is,
is
framed in terms of
those things that have
action are emphasized in this description of
general ecological principles and of the basic structure of the natural life-support system of our planetary spaceship.
Interdependence and Emergent Properties
A fundamental principle of ecology sum of its
individual parts; that
is,
is
that an ecosystem
just as the properties
more than
is
the
of water are not
predictable from the individual properties of oxygen and hydrogen, so the
emergent properties of ecosystems
are not predictable solely
from the
properties of the living entities and nonliving matter of
which they
composed. Each ecosystem on Earth must be understood
in terms
interactions
of
its
components. This principle requires ecology
are
of the
to be a
synthetic and process-oriented science.
Flowing immediately from
this first principle
is
the fact of inter-
dependence. Every phenomenon within any ecosystem one chooses to
examine can be shown it.
Moreover, there are
a cause in the
to be related to every other
web of natural
phenomenon within
any simple relationships; every
rarely
interdependency.
effect
is
also
Of course, not all relation-
ships are equally important or equally sensitive,
and many
are indirect.
Certain kinds of important interrelationship are intuitively obvious even to the casual observer.
microbes can cause
who
are buried.
We aU know that there are
disease,
and
However, the
that
worms
casual observer
other interrelationships in nature,
predators and prey, that
inherit the bodies of those is
unaware of the numerous
many of critical importance. The num-
ber of living components alone and the variety and complexity of their couplings are bewildering. For example, no one has ever
made
a
com-
plete census of all the organisms that inhabit so simple an ecosystem as a
pond.
The
fact
of interrelationship
dichotomy between the
living
is
so pervasive that
it
bridges the classic
and the nonliving components of an
The
Science of Ecology
"The Hving and nonliving
ecosystem:
of nature
into the fabric
1971,
21
The
p. 10).
that
parts
of ecosystems are so interwoven
difficult to separate
them"
(E. P.
Odum
evolution of animals, for example, did not take place in a
environment
static physical
it is
which
to
Hfe then adapted. Rather, early
life
modified the physical environment, graduaUy transforming an extremely
one
inhospitable environment into today.
Both
and
air
soil are
tenance depends on the
suitable for the organisms
we know
the products of living systems, and their main-
work of minute
organisms. As a result of their
ordinary metabolic processes, tiny plants have respired the oxygen in our
atmosphere and created
them
humans
leave
with the
bre-^th
The
fact
out of rock and dead organic material. If we
soils
relatively undisturbed,
of Hfe, keep our
soils viable,
they will continue to supply us
and purify our waters.
of interdependence makes the concept of community one
of the most important in ecology. Diverse organisms
live
together and
engage in complex reciprocal interactions. The implications of are profound, for
they occupy.
this fact
people are inevitably major players in the communities
The
principle also shows that
many of our
practices are
misguided. For example, ecologists have often found that the most effective
and
safest
way of controlling
pest organism directly but to
naturally controlled within the stitute the
community. This
a so-called pest
is
not to attack the
modify the community so
that the pest
network of interdependencies
that
is
con-
gives rise to the catch phrases "Everything
is
connected to everything else" and "You can never do just one thing." Let us examine
some
specific
examples to see
why human
often produces unexpected and unintended effects
intervention
on ecosystems.
Unintended Consequences, the Price of Intervention Because every
effect
is
also a cause,
changing one factor in a well-adapted
and smoothly fiinctioning ecosystem
is
likely to unleash a
second-, third-, and fourth-order consequences. For example,
organism fi^om one ecosystem design) to another,
it
is
is
chain of
when
an
transferred (either unintentionally or by
likely at first to
"run amok," for the
new
ecosystem has no history of dealing with such an organism and therefore
no mechanism
becomes an "instant pathogen," like the measles that decimated Eskimos and South Sea Islanders following their first contacts with Western civilization. Examples of introduced pests the Japanese beede, Dutch elm blight, the gypsy moth, and the rabbit in Australia are also well known.
—
to control
its
spread.
It
—
Just as adding organisms to ecosystems spells danger, subtracting
may
cause the
whole web of interdependencies
them
in the ecosystem to
CHAPTER
22
unravel.
Many
different types
of
unregulated hunting and fishing, obvious, such
as noise)
human fire,
can have the
activities (habitat destruction,
poUution, and others that are
effect
1
of eliminating
a
less
key species in
an ecosystem, which in turn causes related components to decline or collapse. Insecticides, especially
what happens when we use to
be simple goals
DDT,
drastic
—when we
provide the
of
classic illustrations
measures to accomplish what appear
try to
do
one thing." In
"just
a
remote
jungle village in Borneo, health workers sprayed the walls of the villagers'
with
huts'
DDT
to control the mosquitoes that spread malaria. 7\nd
control the mosquitoes
it
did.
However, the
lizards that
of the huts inevitably absorbed large quantities of
coming in contact with and they
died. This
w^hich ate the
patroUed the walls
DDT
(both from
the sprayed waUs and from eating poisoned prey),
had the unfortunate
of killing the
effects
moribund and poisonous
loving caterpillars (hitherto kept in check by the the thatched roof free to gorge without limit.
village cats,
and leaving the straw-
lizards,
lizards) that
inhabited
The end result was
a plague
of rats, the population of which exploded in the near absence of cats, and destruction of the roofs of the villagers' huts (Anon. 1968). This might be simply an entertaining story were
it
not, in effect, a
model of what pesticides and other chemicals are doing to the global life-support system. Like a
DDT, many
broad spectrum of life forms. And
of these chemicals are poisonous to
like
DDT, they are persistent. Because
they are synthetic rather than natural compounds, no organisms have
evolved an ability to metabohze them; hence they accumulate to
dangerous
levels
in
ecosystems.
phenomenon of "biological
In
addition,
as
with
DDT,
the
magnification" concentrates poisonous sub-
stances approximately tenfold with each step
up the food
chain, because
many its own weight in smaller The release of even modest quantities of chemicals can therefore become lethal to the carnivores (eagles and pelicans, for example) at the top of the food chain. We would be wise to remember that humans each grazer or predator must eat
times
organisms.
also feed at the top
People
who
of our food chains.
protest that the extinction of a
few carnivore
species
is
a
small price to pay for protecting our crops against the ravages of pests are
missing the point. richness
The Bermuda
of the biosphere on a worldwide
diminished. Indeed, the extinction of result
many
scale
would hardly be
top-carnivore species
of chemical poisoning would not jeopardize our survival
However, their disappearance as
could disappear, and the
petrel, say,
is
an indicator of an ecological sickness, just
sugar in the urine, though not dangerous in
The long-term consequences of such tially grave. It
has
as a
directly.
itself,
indicates diabetes.
ecological illness are poten-
been experimentally shown,
for example, that
many
The Science of Ecolog>'
23
synthetic chemicals in widespread use affect the species composition of
plankton in the ocean,
a
change that might have serious imphcations not
only for the structure of oceanic food chains (of which plankton are the
of plankton in the ocean's governance of the
base) but also for the role
cycles that rule the biosphere, such
carbon dioxide.
problem
is
that,
One
ot the
owing
is
the reduction of atmospheric
most worrisome aspects of
kind of
peak
impact, ot chemicals that are
full
not experienced until some time
we have already done when it is too late.
therefore exists that will find out only
this
to the inherent lag in biological systems, the
concentrations, and therefore the released
as
m the future. The possibilit\-
irreparable
damage but
that
Moreover, trsing to make simple modifications to ecosystems quently turns out to be ticides again
provide
fre-
well as self-destructive. Chemical insec-
futile as
model. Plant-eating insects have
a
we
long
a
histor\-
of
adapting to chemical warfare, because the principal defense of plants against being eaten
to
is
make
poisonous. Thus, although an apphcarion of insecticide
few of
a
or
their \-ulnerable parts unpalatable
may
kill all
but a
given pest population, those hardy few Hve to reproduce, and
they pass to their numerous progeny the resistant genes that enabled them to
surMve the poison. Before too many generations have passed, \mually
an entire population of pests has become used, and the
war must be
escalated
resistant to the
\\'ith vastiy
chemical weapons.* In the long term,
chemical being
new for we
increased dosages or
this is a
no- win
strategy-,
cannot expect to stay ahead indefinitely in chemical war with msects."
*
The same kind of problem
Bacterial resistance to the
is
being encountered in our war against microbes.
common
antibiotics
is
increasing rapidly, to the alarm
of the World Health Organization (DLxon 1974). t
By 1980 more dian 400 insects, ticks, and mites had developed pesticide resistance,
along with more than 100 bacteria and \Truses. Chemical manufacturen put more than 1000
new
resistance.
Smce
pesdcides
on
the market each year in an attempt to
overcome
pest
the 1940s, crop losses to insects have doubled even as farmers
increased their use of pesticides tenfold (Mott 1988, pp.20-29). According to the
National Academ\- of Sciences, "alternative agriculture." defined chemicals or with "low-input" pesticide applications, has
than chemical
Arming
in
some
cases because
drastic pesticide applications (1989.pp.4-6') (see
organizational
techniques.
and go\"emment
as
farming without
become more
producti\'e
of the expense of appKing more
Chapter
2).
Nevertheless, substantial
obstacles prevent widespread adoption
of these
CHAPTER
24
Indeed, destroy
likely to leave us
it is
many of
worse
the natural controls
tivorous birds and insects,
which
off,
on
much
reproduce more slowly than plant-eating
smaller populations and
insects, are
evolve resistance to the pesticides.) Thus, even
if
much
less likely to
they were not ecologi-
cally destructive, single-purpose technological solutions a natural
may
because the insecticide
the pest's population. Insec-
ordinarily exert control over the pest, are
killed off. (Predators, because they have
not succeed in
1
would probably
environment characterized by an all-pervasive
interdependence.
The human
ecological problem
development tend unintended
effects
that
all
the activities
we
caU
to involve relatively single-purpose additions to or
from natural ecosystems. Cases abound in which the nega-
subtractions tive
is
of intervention outweigh the intended primary
effects
(Farvar and Milton
1968). Consider the
dams and
irrigation
projects that have spread schistosomiasis (bilharzia, an extremely debilitat-
ing parasitic disease) or that have led to loss of productive land through saUnization or erosion (see Chapter clearly
how
"everything
is
2).
In order to understand
connected to everything else" and
human action can therefore boomerang economy of nature more closely.
ecologically, let us
more
why
examine the
Homeostatic Stability
A major characteristic state
of homeostasis
of undisturbed natural systems
—
that
is,
is
that they are in a
they include mechanisms of self-main-
some cases, produce a relatively stable balance or dynamic equilibrium. Even certain kinds of disruption, such as tenance and self-regulation
and flood,
fire
that
that, in
one might consider destructive of natural ecosystems, of those systems. Fires and floods, after
actually contribute to the renewal all,
have been around for so long that plant and animal communities have
become highly adapted to due
to volcanism
these stresses. Thus, apart from local disruption
and earthquakes, the
of natural ecosystems
status
is
threatened only by long-term changes in climate and geology and by the actions of humans.
The one
tion of
of the biological components tend to prevent any from changing the character of the ecosystem. If the popula-
interactions
species
one
species starts to grow, then the population that preys
responds by growing
also.
Even top
predators,
who need
eaten themselves, are subject to parasites and disease
"density-dependent" causes of mortality.
many predators
are ahve, the
where some predators
starve
And
number of prey and
a balance
is
is
if for
as
on
it
not fear being well as other
some reason too
soon reduced to the point
restored.
The Science of Ecology
25
Ecologists conceive of the biosphere state that
in
a finite
stock of materials
terizes this steady state
The
an open system in
a steady
driven by the fairly constant input of energy from the sun and
is
which
as
and
how
is it
constandy recycled.
is
What
charac-
maintained?
Life Cycle
SunHght
the energy source for photosynthesis in plants ranging from
is
microscopic phytoplankton to giant
trees. In
photosynthesis, carbon
combined
dioxide, water, and other inorganic chemicals are
the carbohydrates that plants require for their
to create
own metabolism and
growth and upon which animals feed. At the same time, plants also respire the oxygen that animals use to metabolize their food. Because plants take nutrients in raw inorganic form from the environment and convert them to the organic form required to support the higher levels on the food chain, the plants are called producers. The producers are consumed by organisms at the next level of the food chain, the herbivores, who are called the primary consumers. They in turn are eaten
by the carnivores, the secondary consumers. Except for the carbon dioxide
by
respired
the
consumers, which
is
producers, the flow of materials so far described
continued, the
transfer
is
available
the
for
unidirectional. If
of energy would not be
cycHcal.
it
Soon
producers would exhaust their supplies of chemical nutrients and cease producing; the rest of the food chain
there
organic debris
such
would then
another major group of organisms whose role
is
—dead producers and consumers, —and break down
fallen leaves
as
into
it
collapse. is
feces, its
But
to take
and
all
detritus
inorganic
com-
ponents. These components can then be reused by the producers, and the
and
whole system insects
—
stays in operation.
These organisms
—
bacteria, fungi,
are called decomposers.
In reality, of course, things are much more complex than this simple schema conveys. In nature food webs usually replace simple food chains,
and there
are even
some
plants that eat insects. Nevertheless, the
schema
conveys the essence of the major cycle of Hfe. It is
useful to note that the absence of complexity in
tural fields
other crop
is is
responsible for pest problems. a highly simplified
one highly succulent kill
Responding
become
to the pests.
banquet spread
When
the pests, they destroy the natural controls
population, thus simpUfying the system
problem.
agricul-
ecosystem containing large numbers of
species of plant.
before them, insects multiply rapidly and
attempt to
human
A monoculture of corn or any
still
on
farmers the pest
fiirther^and exacerbating the
CHAPTER
26
1
Biogeochemical Cycles In addition to the basic
cycle, there are
life
many
material cycles of
importance to the operation of the biosphere. In the well-known
critical
water cycle, water evaporates from the oceans and other bodies of water
by the atmosphere
to be transported
land,
where
once
again, or
it
precipitates to
nitrogen cycle,
(via
be used by plants and animals and evaporate
run off eventually to the
on
energy from the sun) over the
the other hand,
is
a
sea,
appreciated by the nonspeciaUst. Plants need nitrogen
grow, but the nitrogen gas in the atmosphere
cannot be used direcdy by the living free in the soil
plants.
The
thus closing the cycle.
major biogeochemical cycle
little
compounds
biologically inert
is
Various bacteria and algae,
and others associated with the roots or
to
and
some
leaves
of
of "fixing" the nitrogen from the atmosphere into
plants, are capable
compounds that plants can absorb and use. Other microorganisms decompose fallen organic material and break down its nitrogen into a form suitable for plant nutrition. The plant may then be eaten by an animal; the nitrogen
animal
is
either excreted or returned to the soil
when
the
dies, thus closing the cycle.
AU
The
such natural cycles are of the same character:
materials
necessary to maintain the processes of life are used and then recycled such that they can
be used again. Unlike the energy in sunlight, these materials
have no cosmic inputs; the biosphere works with the
each element that
is
is
on
almost no such thing
organisms waste
is
as
another's food.
soil
is
the
Without
of the natural cycles interlock in
home
many
some components
are
all
critical
own
wastes.
ways. For example, the terrestrial plants
other necessary nutrients.
different cycles. In
more
efiiciency. In-
cycling of materials,
this
of the decomposers that provide
only with nitrogen but also with the soil disrupts
quantity of
human activities,
waste in nature, for by and large one
organisms would long ago have drowned in their
Many
finite
the planet. In contrast to
ecosystem reuses materials with great
a well-functioning
deed, there
present
not
Damage
to
an interdependent ecosystem,
sensitive to disruption than others because
is large or critical, and comparatively minor disruptions in such components can be amplified into major consequences for the system as
their role
a
whole. In
this
connection,
dependence of all
life
on
it is
natural cycles. Just as the nitrifying role in the
impossible to overemphasize the utter
the tiny creatures that play essential roles in
and denitrifying bacteria play
all
a critical
nitrogen cycle, so the phytoplankton in the oceans are
indispensable for the homeostatic maintenance of the oxygen and carbon cycles.
The
survival of these critical
basic cycles are crucial to
long-term
components and the
human
welfare.
integrity of the
The Science of Ecology
The
instructive contrast
earlier eras,
humanity
human
itself,
and
human practices should be apparent. In was principally organic, and it was, like
with
detritus
scattered thinly over the surface of the earth.
humans have come
recently,
waste,
27
to generate large quantities
More
of nonorganic
their organic wastes are highly concentrated in limited areas.
Local ecosystems cannot absorb
all
that
is
asked of them. Furthermore,
no longer tends to be deposited near where the raw were obtained, for some regions are agricultural mines that
organic waste materials
produce food for people living the soil but
dumped
by applying
artificial
whose waste is not returned to make up for this loss fertilizer, which not only requires a large amount of far away,
into the ocean. Farmers try to
energy to manufacture but also creates water pollution into lakes cycles.
and
rivers,
becoming
when
it
runs off
yet another waste out of place in natural
Despite the prevalence of cycles in the biosphere, not
all
natural
processes are perfectly cyclical. Although, in general, the biosphere
is
characterized by closed cycling in a steady
is
state,
the cycle of materials
not completely closed except over the longest spans of time. Indeed,
some
processes are irreversibly linear (erosion
is an obvious example), and ecosystems do not reuse chemicals with total eflSciency Thus materials
eventually find their
way into
a "sink," typically the abyss of the sea. After of mountain building may return these materials to the active part of the biosphere and they may thus reenter the cycle, but in the short run their path is unidirectional. Similarly, fossil fuels are
many
years, the process
of nonrecycled organic material deposited during past
the residue
geological ages.
energy that
some
we
fiiture
They
are a stored source of solar or photosynthetic
are using
up and
that can
be replenished,
if at all,
only in
geological era.
The Limits of Ecosystems
Why
are human-made wastes a problem for ecosystems? After all, if ecosystems are self-maintaining and self-regulating, might one not infer that they can repair themselves after experiencing
stresses?
Unfortunately, this
is
major environmental
true only within certain natural Hmits.
Over the course of evolution, species become adapted
to conditions their
ancestors faced in the past, and by analogy, ecosystems can survive certain stresses to which they are adapted. Thus ecosystems can cope with fire, but not with large doses of radiation, synthetic chemicals (for which no
decomposer
and the other novel
stresses with which human them. Given enough time, organisms might evolve to meet conditions, and ecosystems would restructure themselves until exists),
activity taxes
the
new
they were once again in a
state
of dynamic homeostasis. Unfortunately,
CHAPTER
28
these processes require time
come
stresses
too
on
a geological scale,
and human-made
Some
the processes of evolution to keep pace.
fast for
1
human-made
stresses
(such as heat) are natural in the sense that they are not completely
new to
wastes (such
sewage) are biodegradable, and some
as
nature; yet these too can cause environmental disruption if the rate at
which they enter an ecosystem
is
greater than the rate at
be absorbed. Under such conditions, the system homeostatic
stability
This process
is
is
which they can
driven away from
toward disruption.
illustrated
by the phenomenon
called eutrophication,
the overenrichment of an aquatic ecosystem by an excess of nutrients. In
herbivorous invertebrates and
by carnivores
are eaten
and
die,
(the
balance. Furthermore,
rapidly,
is
it
who
The system
food.
as
are grazed
on by
who
in turn
primary consumers),
The
fish release
essentially closed
is
waste
generate the inorganic
and
in
capable of handling normal environmental
summer
In response to the light of the
sun, the algae multiply
temporarily depleting the supply of inorganic nutrients. But the
by eating more algae and increasing
fish react
which
fish (the
secondary consumers).
providing food for the decomposers,
products the algae need
stresses.
grow and
(the producers)
a freshwater lake, algae
their
had to adapt
population,
decomposers turn into
creates additional organic waste that the
nutrients for the algae.
own
A new level of seasonal stability is attained. Having ecosystem has developed
to this stress annually for eons, the
an appropriate self-regulating response.
However, when
a lake
is
artificially
phorus compounds (previously algae,
which
are ordinarily limited
lake, multiply
very
the algae can
become As
household detergents), the
in
by the low
level
rapidly. If the additional level
so dense that the water
cannot respond (reproductively) tion explosion.
enriched with inorganic phos-
common
algae
fast
enough
complete their
life
of phosphorus in the
of nutrients
is
is
sufficient,
impenetrable.
The
fish
to contain the algal popula-
cycle and start to die in large
numbers, the amount of dead organic matter becomes so great that the bacterial
decomposers begin to deplete the oxygen content of the water.
The lowered oxygen
availability results in the
death of many
fish,
further
adding to the decomposers' load. But the algae continue to grow because they no longer depend on the decomposers to supply
them with
nutrients and because the primary herbivores (the fish) have died
so on, in a vicious circle.
Sudden enrichment
feedback mechanism governing
production that the
rest
algal
off.
And
has destroyed the negative-
growth, resulting in excessive
of the ecosystem cannot
as oxygen content. two kinds of intrinsic limits operate
tolerate,
given the
existence of other limits such
Note is
that
the physical limit set by the oxygen supply
in this case. First, there
when
the nutrients that
The Science of Ecology
29
ordinarily limit algal
growth
are available in excess.
limited by the biological lag built into
could reproduce
fish
then any
algal
Second, the system
mechanisms.
self-regulating
weU
fish as
bloom could be
as
the decomposers, were not limiting),
contained.
But because ecosystems
adapted to
much more modest
inflicting,
they typically cannot respond to sudden or massive
enough
rapidly
Our
axiom
The
throughout the biosphere energy required. Waste
is
as
the
self-maintaining cycles circulate materials
long
as
essentially a
destroys the natural cycles unless
the sun continues to provide the
human phenomenon; it obstructs
it
is
disposable form, in acceptable amounts,
which depend on the
underscores
cycles
must go somewhere." The law of the matter can be transformed but cannot
states that
be created or destroyed.
stress
from being overwhelmed.
of biogeochemical
that "everything
conservation of matter
are
of stress than humans are capable of
levels
to prevent the system
understanding
ecological
is
If
rapidly as algae (and if other factors, such as
as
oxygen, needed by the
its
or
introduced into ecosystems in
and
at
manageable
natural limits of the ecosystem.
of
rates, all
Merely dumping
wastes does not solve our waste-disposal problem in any but the most
temporary fashion, for the consequence of pollution
The
is
a decaying or
capital, from which we draw income in the form of food, water, and breath (to mention only the most fiindamental requisites of Hfe) so human health
dying ecosystem.
biosphere
is
in effect
our biological
,
and survival are direcdy related to the health of the biosphere.
The
Price of Intervention
Human
intervention in nature
organisms, have an impact
on
is
Uke which we
inevitable because we,
the ecosystems in
all
other
live.
The
humans were hunter-gatherers without fire or even the crudest technology. With the subsequent development of technology, our impact on the environment was magnified, and unfortunately that impact has had a detrimental effect on nearly every ecosystem we inhabit. The issue of ecosystem disturbance has become an economic one: ancestral
Because every intervention in nature to solve benefit simultaneously creates tal costs,
costs tal
is
we must make
new problems and
a
certain that the trade-off
truly in their favor.
As indicated
problem or obtain
between
in the Introduction,
benefits
grown enormously,
earlier days, the benefits
outweighed the
modern
human era. In
of environmental intervention probably
far
Through ignorance, we damaged ecosystems more those benefits, but our numbers and the low level of
costs.
than necessary to get
particularly in the
and
environmen-
disruption has a very long history, but the magnitude of
intervention has
a
generates environmen-
CHAPTER
30
1
made it impossible for us to tear asunder the no longer true. Nature has indeed been destroyed, at least to the point where humans may find it difficult or impossible to survive in many areas. What are some of the trade-offs built into the economy of nature?
technology fabric
we
possessed
of nature. This
is
Ecological Succession
Nature
is
not
static.
The biosphere
is
a
dynamic and open
steady-state
system; ecosystems always contain the latent capacity to change in
response to external or internal perturbations. Because the history of the earth consists of long periods of geological and climatological stability interspersed
much
with
shorter episodes of relatively rapid
most times the major physical and chemical parameters of the biosphere have been relatively unchanging, and nature appears to have been relatively stable. This appearance is deceptive, however, for natural undisturbed systems can be observed to change even on change,
at
human time scales. If we could watch for a down firom a mountain peak
long time a bare boulder that had rolled to the valley below,
changes occurring. Devoid of life
at first, the
we would
see regular
boulder would eventually be
colonized by lichen. Aided by such mechanical processes
as
weathering,
would change the chemical composition of the rock's surface moss could grow in one or two areas. After many years, the moss would have created conditions that enabled other plants to grow, and insects as well as microorganisms of various kinds would have long since the lichen
until
found
a
home on
the boulder. Afi:er
many more
boulder would have been transformed by
years, large areas
this biological activity,
day a pine seed would be able to take root in the newly created this time,
displaced:
of the
and one soil.
By
inhabitants of the boulder would have been
many of the early The "pioneer" species
that created conditions favorable for
other types of organisms thus did themselves out of
During the
pine's
haps spHtting
it
growth,
it
would
fiirther
into smaller fragments.
home and
job.
transform the boulder, per-
Thus through
a
combination of
physical and biological processes, a large, hard piece of rock was trans-
formed into hfe-supporting of a habitat
as
soil.
Ecologists refer to such transformations
ecological succession.
This brief and simple example ecological principles.
As we
adjust to their environment, they
repeat
on
a
much smaller scale
by the microscopic creatures
illustrates a
number of important
stated earlier, living things
modify
it.
And
do not merely and mosses
lichens
the task performed in the primitive oceans
that created the
atmosphere
as
we know
it.
The Science of Ecology
31
Ecological succession moves nature from non-life to life
life
and from simple
forms and communities to more complex and diversified ones that
exhibit a higher degree of negentropy, or biophysical organization.
The second law of thermodynamics, one of the
frindamental physical
principles of the universe, teUs us that entropy, or disorder, always tends to increase, impelling
all
What, then, accounts
systems toward a state of uniform, for evolution
random
chaos.
and ecological succession, for the
and order of nature?
incredible negentropic diversity
The answer lies in the capacity of life to trap the energy of the sun and perform work that decreases entropy before the energy is degraded to dispersed, random heat. Why life exists at all remains a mystery; yet the existence of
life
transformations
By
is
causes
it
and once
a fact,
gets started, the nature
it
quite clear.
is
studying the orderly succession of plant and animal communities
in diverse habitats, ecologists have derived the
An
of the
abiotic
environment
characteristic
of
Gradually the
first
a
is
dynamics of the process.
colonized, and an extremely simple ecosystem
young or pioneer
stage
of succession
is
created.
colonizers transform the environment, until a sHghdy
more complex pioneer ecosystem is established. This in turn creates the preconditions for more and more complex ecosystems, until the most complex ecosystem the local climate and physical environment are able to sustain comes into being. This final stage, which represents the temporar/ end of development, is called the chmax ecosystem. It will endure essentially
unchanged
tion, or other
as
unusual
long
as
it is
stresses,
undisturbed by
fire,
human
interven-
or until major geological or cHmatic
changes cause the process of succession to continue.
Pioneer and cHmax ecosystems tant attribute
difrer sharply in
differences are listed in the following table (after E. table can
almost every impor-
by which ecologists describe ecosystems. The
be summarized by saying
P.
that in creating a
Odum
essential
1971). This
more complex and with more
diversified ecosystem, nature replaces opportunistic species
estabHshed species. Plants characteristic of pioneer stages (hke weeds,
which epitomize pioneer
grow prodigiously, and the amount of compared to the total amount of the biomass, In mature stages, phnts grow much more slowly and have species)
vegetable matter produced, is
very large.
longer hves; although total productivity (that higher in mature stages, net
lower than in the pioneer
is,
photosynthesis)
community production
stages,
because energy
is
is
actually
(annual "yield")
invested not in a
is
new
"crop" but in the maintenance and the slow, organic growth of the already existing biomass. Thus, whereas in the pioneer stage energy
used in relatively
a fairly straightforward
empty
habitat can
way
to
grow more
is
plants, so that a
be populated, in the mature system the
CHAPTER
32
greater part of the energy existing
used to enhance the persistence of the
is
community, which already occupies
the territory available.
all
Pioneer State
Climax
Few
species
Many
One
or few species dominate
Relative equaUty of species
State
species
Quantity growth
Quality growth
Few
Many
symbioses
Short, simple
life
Mineral cycles
1
symbioses
Long, complex Ufe cycles
cycles
relatively
open
Mineral cycles circular and
and Unear
closed
Feedback control/homeo-
Rapid growth
stasis
of energy
Relatively inefficient use of energy
Efficient use
Low degree
High degree of structured, complex order (negentropy)
Humans,
of order (high entropy)
the Breakers of
Where do humans
Climaxes
into this scheme? Unfortunately, ever since they
fit
acquired technology in the form of fire, cal succession
climaxes,
which contain the
animals, and
soil.
humans have invaded
human
burned-over tracted an
on the income
by the species
the capital
itself.
produced
ecologi-
breakers of
a
(the production)
of the
that populate such ecosystems,
One
interventions was the use of areas
as
stored wealth of the ages in their plants,
Instead of Hving
biological capital inherited
tant
humans have disrupted
and climax communities. Humans have Hved
of the
fire:
first
Early
new growth of
and most impor-
humans found
that
succulent grass that at-
abundance of game. However, the agricultural revolution
resulted in the greatest simplification of natural ecosystems, as described
by the
cultural ecologist
Roy
Man's favored
cultigens...are
self-sufficiency.
Some
Rappaport:
seldom
if
ever notable for hardiness and
are ill-adapted to their surroundings,
some cannot
even propagate themselves without assistance and some are able to survive only
if
they are constantly protected from the competition of the natural
pioneers that
prompdy
invade the simplified ecosystems
structed. Indeed, in man's quest for higher plant yields
of the most
delicate
and unstable ecosystems ever
man
has con-
he has devised some
to have appeared
on the
The
Science of Ecology
face
of the
33
earth.
The
human-dominated
ultimate in
associations are fields
planted in one high-yielding variety of a single species. in the
man
ecosystems dominated by
successive anthropocentric stages natural
ecosystems.
is
apparent that called
exactly the reverse of the trend in
The anthropocentric
simplicity rather than complexity,
It is
what can be
the trend of
trend
is
the direction of
in
of fi-agiHty rather than
stability
(1971
,
p.
13).
It
is
not cultivation alone that simpHfies ecosystems.
The sheep
rancher does not want bison eating the grass that could be used to feed
more
sheep, so the bison must go.
So must the mountain Hon, the wolf,
the coyote, the eagle, and any other predator that might cut into production. Ecological poisons
such
tems, because they tend to
as
kill
DDT
and radiation
the organisms high
also
simpUfy ecosys-
on
the food chain,
numbers of a few resistant species.* Overfishing and overhunting have the same effect. So does nearly every form of human activity. The dilemma is clear. Humans must have productive ecosystems
leaving behind large
in
order to survive, but high productivity requires simple and even
dangerously fi-agUe ecosystems. Further, since the biosphere
is
highly
intergrated, other ecosystems are also simplified, natural cycles disrupted,
whole system of the biosphere rendered less stable. down, what will perform the forests' flood-retaining
materials lost, and the If every forest
is
cut
and oxygen-making
fijnctions? If
all
marshes and estuaries along our
is the most "productive" use for them, of the oxygen-producing plankton supported by
shores are developed, because that
what
will take the place
the large quantities of organic matter washed by the tides from estuaries to the continental shelves?
And what will
replace the fish that
depend on
them? In short,
humans do not Hve by food and
although maximization of production
as
we
fiber alone.
However,
have traditionally defined
it
would totally compromise our Hfe-support system, discreet cropping of cUmax ecosystems is possible only in the hunting-gathering mode of
human strike a
existence.
Humans
in a technological society
tion of their environment. Stated another way, to
humans must be prepared
optimize their level of production, taking into consideration the
contribution of nonproductive elements of nature, such
*
must therefore
balance between production from their environment and protec-
One
goal of current biotechnological research
is
as
to breed crops
poisons so that farmers can apply broad-spectrum sprays and kiU for the
CI).
immune
wilderness, to
crop, in their fields {The Washington Post,
immune
all life,
May
to
except
17,1988,
p.
CHAPTER
34
their well-being.
The maximization of productivity,
as
1
narrowly defined
A fundamental by economists, optimum for quality is principle of human ecology thus emerges: "The always less than the maximum quantity that can be sustained" (E. P. is
fatal for
eventually
the system as a whole.
Oduml971,p.510).
Variability
Even
of the Climax
in areas
raphy and
soil
factors are the same,
where climate and other general
microcUmates and
habitats differ as a result of local variations in topog-
composition:
Some
higher-than-average ground,
low-lying areas are boggy, some are on
some
get
more
sunlight or are
more ex-
posed to wind. In accordance with these variations in microcUmate and habitat, species are unevenly distributed. We therefore find not one
uniform climax everywhere, but a general cHmax state (sometimes called a polyclimax) that is a mosaic of a large number of "edaphic" climaxes, adaptations of the basic climax to special local conditions. Thus even within the overall biogeochemical determinism of nature, there
is
a
surprising degree of pluralism.
Sometimes ecosystems never
attain the true
cHmax
state.
Areas that
are subjected to periodic natural stresses, such as fire inundation or
may never reach the cHmax state that is theoretically Instead, the community adapts to the stress and displays what is
fi-equent hurricanes, attainable.
knov^Ti as a cyclic cHmax. Again, special local conditions overrule the
general direction of nature. In
some
cases
humans
anthropogenic subclimax.
are a source
Many
of stress, and the
result
is
called an
example, were produced
grasslands, for
by deliberate burning and are thus an anthropogenic subclimax. Asian paddy land, which has been cultivated for millennia, is another humanmade subcUmax, one that mimics a natural marsh. Anthropogenic subclimaxes are inevitably less natural than the true climax, but the best of
them
attain quite
high
levels
of maturity and yet
quite a high yield of usefiil products.
Even
today,
the English countryside are at this high level
Unfortunately, this type of subclimax
is
rare
also fiirnish
some productive
humans areas
of
of ecological maturity.
compared to those sub-
climaxes, such as once-fertile lands turned into desert, that result fiom
humanity's destruction of habitat.
Exploiting Ecosystems for Production
The hkelihood
that an anthropogenic climax will succeed
local conditions. Intensive agriculture of the kind
we
depends on
practice drives our
.
The Science of Ecology
35
back to the pioneer
fields
of the
soil,
cultigens,
which
effects,
are adapta-
areas, climate, the
and the nature of the broken climax aU permit
without immediately harmful
way
where our
stage,
of natural weeds, flourish. In temperate
tions
provided that
it is
condition
occur
this to
done
in the right
(by not grossly simplifying ecosystems with broad-spectrum insec-
by not mining the
ticides,
soil,
by minimizing monocultures, and so on).
Intensive agricultural exploitation of mature tropical ecosystems,
on
the other hand, can produce total collapse. For example, in a tropical rain forest,
almost
contained in the
much of the (or worse,
up
the nutrients are tied
all
soil.
Thus when
of forest
a plot
ecosystem's biological capital
burned) and so
is
lost to that
flee to still-undisturbed areas, dispersing capital.
At most
a
few
in the biomass; very
is
is
are
cleared for cultivation,
hauled away to lumber mills
ecosystem.
Most of the animals
another portion of the biological
of profitable exploita-
years (typically four or five)
tion are possible before rain leaches out the remaining nutrients
sun bakes the resulting clay into concrete. As exploitation, this highly diverse, mature,
be an
few
and
stable
and the
of fll-advised
a result
ecosystem
may now
environment.* Moreover, because the
essentially abiotic (lifeless)
no longer stabilized by plants, the heavy rains cause accelerated which can effectively prevent life fi^om making a significant comeback for many generations, if ever. (The erosion also disrupts the dynamics of the river ecosystems into which the soil may be washed) Thus ancient and apparently stable ecosystems (for example, the Amazon soil
is
erosion,
basin forests) are paradoxically quite vulnerable to for they can
irreversible collapse.
And what
is
lost
is
intervention, total
and
not merely future production but
the invisible contributions such forests
all
human
be driven by overexploitation to the point of
make
to the general health of
the biosphere. Hence, in addition to the local trade-off between production
and protection, humans must confront
paradox in an era
when demands
this
food are
for
kind of global ecological above
rising, in the tropics
aU.
Ecologists propose a basic agricultural strategy reflecting the fact that
the safest landscape forests, lakes,
is
one
that contains
marshes, and so forth
—
as
all
well
the variety of nature as a
of different ecological ages. (They point out that
most pleasant landscape to
*
—
^in
this
would
also
be the
Margalef (1968, p. 49) calls for a honeycomb, of exploited and protected
short, compartmentalization.
According to the World Resources
forest are
crops,
inhabit.)
"balanced mosaic, or rather a areas"
—
mixture of communities
Institute,
being destroyed each year. (1990-91,
40 to 50 million p. 102).
acres
of tropical
CHAPTER
36
1
—2 Some Consequences of Destroying Tropical Forests The
destruction of tropical forests
may be
bringing about a
extinction, similar to the Cretaceous Period
For example, only
1%
of Brazil's Adantic
some
new
age of
65 million years ago.
remain; apart from un-
forests
known numbers of plants species found nowhere else, they are the only home of 20 species and subspecies of monkeys, about 10% of the world's total. Some of these are in immediate danger of extinction. Likewise, only 10% of Madagascar is still covered with natural vegetation, and 7000 species of plants exist nowhere else in the world. The same
is
true of lemurs, a major group of primates. Worldwide, 2 or 3
species are
becoming
extinct each day.
thetic or ethical interest.
Wild
AU
of this
not merely of aes-
is
plants often interbreed with humanity's
making the crops stronger or more resistant to disease. One-fourth of our medicines come from chemicals found in plants.
cultivated crops,
And are
five-sixths
still
of the estimated number of plants species in the world unclassified by the world's biologists. Most of
unknown and
these are in the tropics.
Tropical forest destruction also affects
3 to 6 million people lived
—
sustainably
humans
—
^in
the
today only 500,000 people remain. Needless to the rain forests
whose
—
habitats
cattle
and
ranchers and peasants
lives are
Another solution
is
—
directly.
Amazon say,
At one
time,
rain forests;
the people burning
are not the
same people
being wiped out.
the development and utilization of
compromise
ecosystems; these are essentially "good" anthropogenic subcHmaxes, sys-
tems that combine the virtues of production and protection. Kice paddies and fish ponds, which are cultivated analogues of natural marshes and estuaries,
are
examples of successful compromise ecosystems. Such
ecosystems are highly productive and more could be developed, especially in the tropics. Detritus agriculture
(mushrooms) and pisciculture
breeding, rearing, and transplantation of fish,
as in
opportunities for the invention of productive
another kind of compromise tropical areas,
where
it
has long
is
tree
(the
carp ponds) also offer
compromise
systems. Yet
cropping for food, especially in
been practiced (though not always wisely)
The Science of Ecology
37
and cocoa. Also, native
for cash crops such as coffee
tropical gardening
techniques are ecologicaUy very sophisticated, and research might disclose
ways to make them more productive.
The
of
basic strategy
these
all
compromise systems
nature of the climax and then, instead of breaking it
humans
closely or to insert
will not
to study the
is
completely, to
mimic
into the process as careful parasites that
much food as possible. However,
preserve the host while siphoning off as
compromise systems
it
work everywhere. Some ecosystems
are too
vulnerable or difficult to manage. Furthermore, the productivity of many
compromise systems is not high enough to feed great masses of people Thus for large parts of the globe, we rnust_attempt to strike a balance between production and protection by comprehensive zoning, retaining some areas as a source of biological capital from which we draw interest in the form of security and well-being, while subjecting other
living in cities.
areas to intensive (but,
one hopes,
less destructive) cultivation in
order to
obtain the food and fiber a large population needs. (Ecologists generally insist that
the oceans must remain essentiaUy protected areas; rational
cropping of naturally occurring ture,
such
oceans
if
as
fish,
and compromise systems of maricul-
the growing of oysters, are
we wish
all
to avoid the risks that
this crucial regulator
of natural
that
we
should expect fi^om the
would be involved
in exploiting
cycles.)
In general, then, ecologists urge a
move toward an
overall global
anthropogenic subclimax that would give the optimal trade-off between
production and protection,
as
well
as a
considerable degree of amenity in
form of a varied and pleasant landscape. Ecological succession provides a model for the transformation of our agriculture: from rapidthe
growth, high-production, pioneering stages to
mature subclimax that
*
As the drawbacks of
more and more
optimal considering
modem
all
relatively stable
and
of our needs and that
industrial-intensive agriculture have
is
become
means of increasing food production ecologists have rediscovered some of the agronomists and
apparent, particularly as a
in tropical areas,
virtues
is
a
of traditional agriculture. Though unproductive in terms of the market
economy, many old
agricultural practices
mm
out to be superior in terms of
productivity per acre as a flinction of energy input and long-term environmental compatibility (Armillas 1971, Rappaport 1971, Thurston 1969). Moreover, as
we
will note in the next chapter, traditional agriculmre,
modem
when
modified by
organic farming techniques, can be productive in terms of the market
economy. Even was found
in an
advanced country
like the
United
States,
organic farming
to be competitive with industrial-intensive agriculture (National
Research Council 1989).
CHAPTER
38
1
characterized by constructive symbiosis rather than warfare between
humans and
Life Is
nature.
Energy
Whether an
ecologically optimal agriculture will also serve to feed large
numbers of people
will
depend
on how well it adapts itself to the make the economy of nature operate.
largely
character of the energy flows that
economy; the biomass and stock of materials are its inventory, or capital. Natural systems trap incoming solar energy and make use of it for production; the more mature the ecosystem, the more efficiently this energy is utilized and the more is produced.
Energy
is
the currency of nature's
productivity. This seems paradoxical. If
Thus energy determines ecologically
immature
energy use,
why
cultigens are domesticated weeds, adapted
of the reason
gives a high yield
However,
is
that
our
by nature and then by us for cropped. Moreover, the total
when
which amount of radiation is so large and the total area that enormous quantities are produced despite
process.
of
agricultural systems are so inefficient in terms
are they so productive? Part
rapid growth,
our
to answer this question fully,
in production
is
so vast
the inefficiency of the
it is
necessary to look
at
the energetics of food chains and at the concept of energy subsidy in
ecosystems.
An
examination of food chains soon reveals that very large numbers
bivores, which in turn maintain a
still
much
smaller number of hernumber of carnivores. There smaller
of producers are required to maintain
a
are several reasons for this, but the principal
one
is
the loss of energy in
food chains due to the tendency of energy to degrade into nonusefiil forms,
as
ordained by the second law of thermodynamics. Natural proces-
of rather low thermodynamic efficiency from a mechanical engineer's point of view. Photosynthesis, for example, is only about 1% efficient in terms of energy fixation or the amount of protoplasm created
ses are typically
by producers
in proportion to
incoming
solar radiation.
Also, producers
they tend to burn up a lot of what they and herbivores consume energy maintaining themselves and grazing the producers. Thus, at each step in the food chain, energy dribbles away in the form of waste and heat. In the typical
have a high metabolic
produce just to
This
is
quantities
rate, so
stay alive,
not so inefficient
of
solar
as
it
might seem.
energy are used to
clouds around, and do
all
warm
Remember
that
enormous blow
the globe, evaporate water,
the things that keep natural cycles going.
ecological language, most of the incoming energy
is
To
used for maintenance.
use
The
Science of Ecology
-iq
food chain, the energy available declines by a factor often at each trophic (feeding) level, although the ratio can vary. Thus the efficiency of agriculture in feeding people
the chain.
When
cereal
only about
tion,
themselves hve
depends
a tenth as
as cereal
a great deal
on where food
fed to pigs or cows raised for
is
many people
and vegetable
can be fed
taken from
is
human consumpas when humans
There is thus a trade-off in between the quantity and the "quahty" of our diet. Low at the efficiency of agriculture in supporting human beings is even eaters.
agriculture best,
lower
if
they wish to eat high off the hog.
However, the
*
crucial factor in agricultural productivity
is
the
amount
of energy subsidy that humans provide to crops. Natural energy subsidies exist, such as the tidal flushing that brings nutrients to estuaries. But energy subsidy is largely the work of humans, often unintentional and unwelcome, such as the eutrophication of a lake), but more often
no matter how primitive, depends on an input of energy in the form of labor or materials. In traditional agricultural deliberate. All agriculture,
systems, this subsidy primarily takes the
help from draft animals.
The
total
form of human labor, with some amount of the subsidy is typically rather
smaU compared
to the yield (returns
although 15 to
is
1
(but not always) comparatively low.
agriculture
than
of up to 50 to
more common). However,
By
gross productivity
contrast,
modern
quite productive but not very efficient, for
is
a biological
machine
for turning
ftiels
are possible,
1
is
often
technological
it is
into food. In fact,
Httle
when
more all
the
subsidies supporting industrial agriculture are taken into account, it clearly spends more energy than it produces; in other words, the energy yield of industrial agriculture
is
negative.
The dependence of industrial agriculture on energy has important implications. The Umted States produces about three times as much food per hectare
as India,
but
this
increased production requires ten tunes die is conservative if anything, because the
mput of energy. (The comparison
hotter the environment, the higher the
metabohc rate and thus the other factors being equal, temperate zones produce higher yields than tropical zones.) This gives some insight into the problems of raising agricultural productivity in developing areas. For them to achieve anything like the productivity enjoyed by the developed energy
*
loss
of
If the world's
a plant. All
food supply were distributed equally, and it were consumed in enough food exists for 6 biUion people to be fed an adequate
the form of grain, diet.
On
the other hand, only 4 billion people can be adequately fed if
their calorie intake if
30% of their
10% of
from animal sources, and only 2.5 billion people can be fed calorie intake is from animal sources (Corson, 1990, p. 73). is
CHAPTER
40
temperate zones, the energy subsidy must be increased In the final analysis, food, like every other aspect of
ten times.
at least
life, is
1
matter of
a
energy.
The
Essential Message of Ecology
To
recapitulate, although
rationally
it
is
possible in principle to exploit nature
and reasonably for human ends, humans have not done
so.
Because they have not been content with the portion naturaUy allotted them, humans have invaded the biological and ecological over evolutionary time. Moreover, nature's workings, they have
With our new
as a result
done so
is
up
in a peculiarly destructive fashion.
ecological understanding,
purpose exploitation of nature
capital built
of human ignorance of
we
can see that
linear, single-
not in harmony with the patterns in the
biosphere and must be abandoned. Instead,
we must
learn to
work with
nature and to accept the basic ecological trade-ofis between protection
and production, optimum and maximum, quality and require major changes in our
lives,
quantity. This will
for the essential message
of ecology
is
much the biosphere can take and only so much it can give, and this may be less than we want. In the next chapter, we shall explore the consequences for human action that foUow inescapably fi-om limitation:
There
is
only so
the existence of fundamental biospheric limits.
2 Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
In the
human beings, by invading the biological up over the course of evolution, have created economic unprecedented numbers of people. In the last four decades, the three centuries,
last
capital built
wealth for
additional wealth created in each decade on the average equalled that added between the beginning of civilization and 1950 (Brown 1990, 1990b, p. 3)! Yet during the past 20 years, studies based on computer projections of trends in resource use, environmental impacts, and
tion
growth have shown
decelerate.
The
that
the
growth
studies differ in detail, but
all
material growth cannot continue indefinitely that environmental, population,
on
us
and resource
now; they disagree only on how
in
populawealth has started to
agree that population and
on
a finite planet. All agree
stresses are
drastically
and
being
inflicted
how soon we must
respond in order to avert human disaster. The Club of Rome study reported in The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972) appeared to show that an immediate rather than an eventual transition
to the steady state was necessary and that the actions required to cope with the problems of transition violated both conventional
wisdom and our
current values.
More
important, this was the first study of a holistic nature. Past ecological warnings had tended to focus on or become identified with
one particular limit to growth, such as pollution (Carson 1962) or population (Ehrlich 1968). They were therefore
vulnerable to the counterargument that the problem could be solved by using resources from other sectors. What The Limits to Growth
41
CHAPTER 2
42
purported to show, by identifying all the important relationships among various sectors and linking them in a computer model designed to reveal the resultant of
these interactions,
all
longer. The Global
2000 Report
President,
to the
that this
v^^as
work much
strategy of borrow^ing from Peter to pay Paul would not
published in 1980, used
approach and came to the same conclusion. Paradoxically, however, these studies tended to intensify debate about
a similar
particular hmits to growth, for the critics charged that they
were based on
excessively Malthusian and pessimistic assumptions about
aUeged
limits that largely
determined
their
outcomes.
many of
was asserted
It
the that
with more "reasonable" or optimistic assumptions about population dynamics, resource availability, pollution-control technology, and the like,
new "doom had prepared it. Not
quite different conclusions could be reached. In the United States, a
administration characterized The Global
2000
Report as projecting
and gloom" and cut the budgets of the agencies surprisingly,
however, budget cutting did not make the problems cited in
the report go away. Possible,
Global
that
pubhshed
2000
The World Resources
in
Institute report.
The Global
1985, reiterated the major trends found in The
Report and suggested priorities for action in such areas as
curbing population growth
rates,
reducing poverty, protecting
forests
and
other habitats, and curbing pollution. So did Our Common Future, commissioned by the United Nations, World Commission on Environment
and
Development
(1987).
Moreover, every year
since
1984,
the
Maturity or
steady state
Transition
Deceleration
Point of inflection
Rapid growth Take-off
Inception
FIGURE
2-1
humanity
lives
The on
logistic curve, or
a planet
every living population and process,
by
a
sigmoid curve.
sigmoid curve, and
endowed with it
finite resources,
its
features.
it is
Because
certain that, like
must obey the law of growth depicted
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
WorldWatch
an annual report on The
Institute has issued
Year after year,
43
State of the World.
has recorded the continuing deterioration of the earth's
it
physical condition and the threat that this deterioration
unmanageable, leading to economic decline and
What
follows
is
a synoptic
is
review of the various limits (primarily but
not exclusively physical) that have been identified by qualified
The argument makes
four
becoming
social disruption.
general
There
specialists.
indeed demonstrable limits to the demands humanity can place on its environment. (2) Although technology can help us "juggle" Hmits in accordance
v^th
human
points:
(1)
preferences, outright repeal of the Umits
Manipulating the
Time
or wish, to bear.
of the essence
impossible. (3)
is
limits technologically entails costs that
are
we may
not be
we wish
to cope with (4) and humanely. In sum, an era of ecological scarcity has dawned. The argument focuses on a few key factors, such as pollution, able,
is
if
limits effectively
that are truly critical for the system as a whole,
possible the interactions
not simply
a series
their interactions
among
of discrete problems.
—
a
and
it
makes
as explicit as
separate limits, for ecological scarcity
"problematique"
It is
—and can be understood
other fashion.
300
German woman
American
woman
African
Country
FIGURE
2-2
Number of offspring
is
an ensemble of problems and
in three generations.
woman
in
no
CHAPTER 2
44
Population and Food
No
period than the "population explosion." tion
more attention over a long The primordial limit on popula-
aspect of ecological scarcity has received
is
food, so
let
us consider the supply of arable land and other basic
of agricultural technology, and above all the costs and consequences of feeding people especially the large numbers of to see how additional people who will be born in the decades to come
factors: water, the state
many human
—
—
beings the earth can reasonably support.
THE POPULATION EXPLOSION
6
Billion (projected in 1998)
5 Billion (1987) 4 Billion (1974)
3 Billion (1960) 2 Billion (1972) Billion (1810)
1
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1500
1400
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
2080
Year
FIGURE for the
2-3
human
It
took from the beginning of time to about the year 1810
population to reach
1
billion people. Just over
100 years
later,
were added. By 1987 the earth was home to 5 billion population is growing by more than 93 million each Currently, beings. human projected to exceed 6 billion before the year 2000, numbers are Human year. the next billion people
and unless the
human
availability
and use of contraceptives increase
dramatically, the
population could reach 14 billion by the end of the next century.
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
The
45
Inevitability of More People
when the first edition of this book was written, approximate4 bilHon people inhabited the earth. In 1990 the figure had risen to
In 1977, ly
The population of the earth is exploding. 10,000 people added to the earth every hour, 240,000 every day about 1 million
5.2 bilhon. are
every 4 days. If the current rate
of world population growth continues, there will be 10 billion people on the globe by 2025 and 16 biUion by 2100 (Haub 1988).
Of course,
on which they
these projections are only as
are based.
good
as the
assumptions
The United Nations Population Fund
projec-
assume that human fertility will decline to replacement levels by the middle of the tweny-first century and that world population will tions
stabilize at about 14 billion people by 2100. That number could go higher or lower, depending on the extent of birth control use within the next few decades. Even so, most experts regard a world population of 12
to 16 billion
people
as
foreordained.
*
The primary reason for this inevitabihty is the phenomenon of demographic momentum. For example, even though the United States attained replacement-level fertihty in the 1970s, the population
grew. In
fact,
assuming that
we
maintained a
fertility rate
of 1 .8, the
still
level
achieved in the 1970s, the population would continue to grow from its current 215 million to at least 292 million in 2080. This is because rapid growth in decades past has bequeathed us a young population that is, a
—
population distribution with disproportionate numbers of young people who have yet to replace themselves. Thus, even assuming a constant low fertility rate,
for
the U.S. birthrate
many more
would continue
to
exceed the death
rate
years.
But the United
States has not
maintained the fertility levels of the had reached 2.0 and had not yet peaked. went as high as 2.2, as the Census Bureau assumes in projections, the United States population would reach
1970s. In 1990 the fertihty level If the fertility rate its
"high-fertility"
not 292 miUion but 421 million by 2080, and
would increase by 20 numbers might be too if Hfe spans were extended, as some
million people per decade after that. low. This
*
The
would be
especially true
staggering magnitude
of "billions"
mathematician John Allen Paulos brings asking audiences
answer, he
tells
how long it will
them,
is
get to a billion seconds?
is
home
it
these
often
not appreciated.
the reality of these
take for a million seconds to pass.
about 11.5 days.
The
Even
He
correct answer
then asks
is
32
years.
how
long
it
The
numbers by
The
correct
will take to
a
CHAPTER 2
46
medical
hope, for then the death rate might remain below the
scientists
growth ceased.
birth rate for additional years before
Of
problem
course, the U.S. population
compared
to that
is
of
dimensions
trivial
of underdeveloped countries, where
replacement
a
from being achieved. Most have population growth
level
of fertility
rates
of about 2.1% per annum, resulting in truly explosive growth
is
far
—
doubling every 33 years.
Many hope
growth
that such rapid
porary phase and that the so-caUed demographic transition fertility in
tem-
a
is
drop in
(a
response to lowered death rates and economic improvement,
similar to that experienced
by the now-rich countries
in the course
their development) will begin to slow the population explosion. ever, the last
20 years have produced
transition.
A
industrial
development
evidence for such demographic
little
few countries have lowered their birthrates with (Sri
of
Howlittle
Lanka, Costa Rica, and China); other
3^ Halting Population Growth Halting population growth in the developing world
The
task.
average family size in these nations
is
now
is
a
monumental Be-
4.8 children.
cause these countries have large numbers of young people, family size
must drop below replacement
levels (that
is,
to fewer than
2 children)
and must remain there for some time. Only China has approached goal,
and
The
this
by coerced draconian measures.
that
obstacles are many. Children are valued for important
economic reasons
in developing countries: to
support parents in their old age. High
mark of virtue and proof of a man's uneducated and lack equal
women gain
rights.
fertility
virility.
There
is
work is
in the fields
and to
considered both a
Women in most places are
some evidence
that
where
education and equal rights, they concentrate on improv-
ing the health and sanitation of their
homes and become receptive to more likely to sur-
contraception. This occurs because their children are
vive and because they gain sources of status other than children. Al-
though such
signs are encouraging,
educated or achieving equal
women
rights, and,
are only slowly
when
evidence that most will voluntarily reduce their family
placement
levels.
becoming is no below re-
they do, there size
Popularion, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
47
countries failed to lower their birthrates despite
ment
between a
and Mexico). Also,
(Brazil
GNP
statisticians
and lowered birthrates
demographic
in
some
industrial develop-
have found
connection
little
developing countries. Although
might yet develop in some countries, most
transition
developing countries are growing
as
rapidly as ever.
It
seems
likely, in
the
absence of catastrophic famine, disease, or other Malthusian checks, that
demographic
momentum
in countries
the period 2040-2070.
How Many Can A
Can we
can support.
But
feed this
many
billion within
people?
Be Fed?
number of studies have
biUion.
with extremely young popula-
world population of 12 to 15
tions virtually guarantees a
One
tried to establish
concludes that
how many
people the earth
we could feed a world population of 50 number of totally unreaHstic assump-
to arrive at this figure, a
tions are needed. First, suitability; would
all
potentially arable land, regardless of fertility or
have to be dedicated to food production.
Humans
could
inhabit only wasteland totally unsuited to agriculture; suburbs and cities
would have
to
be uprooted and turned into farmland; the bulk of the
population would perforce be housed in Arctic regions; and so forth.
Second, all land, even infertile land that had been pressed into production, would have to \deld food at a level of production that has not been attained on our most fertile soil with the best means of which we are in other words, a level that plant physiologists dream about but capable that has no real prospect of being achieved outside a laboratory. Third, all
—
the possible side effects of intensively farming every conceivable acre at the highest technological level must be ignored, including the pollution
caused by
fertilizer runoff, the
enormous flow of
energ\' required for
such colossal and high-technology agriculture, the climatic turning ces,
on
and
all
forests into farmland, the
so forth.
Thus
that
is
an optimistic limit based purely
on
and Agricultural Organization realistic
of
enormous demand on water resour-
57 biUion
the potentiaHt\' of plant physiology, not
The Food 1983 that made more
effects
the reahties of agriculture.
(FAO) pubUshed
assumptions about land use,
a
study in
soil
quaUty,
water supply, and the application of agricultural inputs (basic fertiHzers, simple conser\'ation measures, improved plant varieties, and so on).
It
projected that most countries of Asia and South America could feed their
populations in the year 2000 from their
own
cultivated lands, whereas
most African and Middle Eastern countries could was optimistic, because
it
assumed
that
all
not.
But even
cultivable land
this
study
would be
brought into production, that the land w^ould be used to grow only food crops,
and
that the
food would be distributed
fairly to all
economic
CHAPTER 2
48
groups. In
reality,
world grain output per person has
declined since 1984.
and Latin America, the food produced per person has declined dramatically in the past decade, and those regions, as well as Asia, began In Africa
the period with high rates of malnutrition (see Table 2-1). Presently one-fifth of the world's population does not
lead an active
working
Even worse, 40
life.
consume enough to
calories to
60 million people
die in
developing countries each year from hunger and diseases related to hunger.
The
worldwide
nutritional shortfall
is
such that even with per-
fecdy equal distribution of the current world food production (theoretically possible
but poHticaHy inconceivable), everyone would be some-
what malnourished. Thus we do not reaUy provide 5.2 biUion
human
beings (see
Recent developments Green Revolution)
now
Box
in
agricultural
not
immune
to
and
as
countries)
drought
we
its
(a
shaU
agricultural productivity
Besides, as even
technology
(the
so-called
being apphed to underdeveloped countries have
averted a catastrophic global famine thus is
for even the existing
4).
far.
But the Green Revolution
perennial problem in see, it
of which
may
it is
many
less
have achieved the
capable in
developed
maximum
many parts of the world.
proponents admit, the Green Revolution cannot solve
the problem of overpopulation;
it
simply buys us some time to bring
population growth under control. Moreover, the world already confronts severe ecological problems because of its current mode of agricultural production, and the Green Revolution intensifies these problems. has a
number of
painfial social side effects
—
farmers worse off while making rich farmers better
TABLE in Latin
Latin
(It
also
making poor Thus the time
for example, off".)
Decline in Annual Grain Production Per Person America, Asia, and Africa, Peak Year and 1990
2-1
Kg
Year of
Kg
Peak Pro-
Person in
Person
duction
Peak Year
in
Per
Percent Mal-
Per
1990
Percent
nourished
Change
1985-87
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
49
4 A Mere
Distribution Problem?
In discussing world hunger,
some claim
that there
problem, only a food distribution problem. But
were distributed
leading. If food
equally,
no population
is
this
statement
and everyone
ate the
is
mis-
way
world population could be fed on the record harvests of 1985 and 1986 (ErUch 1990). Only if food
Americans do, less than
half the present
were distributed equally and everyone got
their
would the food supply be
vegetarian sources
needed
calories
from
sufficient to feed
everyone. If everyone ate hke the average Latin American and con-
sumed
a
mere 10% of their
calories
people could be fed (Corson 1990,
from animal sources, only 4
billion
p. 73).
American consumes about 30% of his or her calories from animal sources. And there is no indication that many of them are ready to stop eating their steaks, cheeses, and chickens to benefit of the world's hungry (assuming that their abstinence would mean more food for the hungry) And what if they tvere willing? World population is in-^ creasing at a rate of 1 miUion people every 4 days. So at best, a strict M
The
average
.
vegetarian diet by everyone, along with equal distribution of grain,
would provide Clearly, the
mere temporary
a
urgency of the population problem
by the assertion
that
it is
m
from the hunger problem.
respite
is
only a matter of fmding
merely camouflaged
more
equitable ways
to distribute food.
being bought
now
examination of the
at
is
the expense of the future.
difficulties,
A
more
detailed
dilemmas, and contradictions in current
and projected agricultural practices
will
show why feeding adequately
even double the present number of humans will overstrain the ecological and energetic resources to the breaking point and
is
earth's
Ukely to
be out of the question.
The Basic Agricultural Predicament: Limited Land The fundamental agricultural land
fact
is
about agriculture
is
that
it
requires land,
in diminishing supply. First, virtually
all
and good
good
agricul-
CHAPTER 2
50
world
tural land in the
us with almost supplies
now
80%
already in use;
is
our food. The best
all
more of the thus make only
in use
or
critical for dietary quality)
tural land
on
a
that provides
land in use probably
The marginal
modest contribution (although
much
it is
often
of the presently good agricul-
is
is becoming marginal while some marginal becoming altogether useless to agriculture.
are several reasons for the loss
One
of agricultural land.
—
sheer overrunning of agricultural land by population pressures
homes,
lands
the planet
agricultural land
There
good land
this
total agricultural output.
Second,
.
it is
50% of the
and roads
industries,
that people
demand. This
is
the
for the
happening
is
everywhere, but especially in East Asia, where population pressures claim
1990,
p. 65).
Another problem
soil
is
erosion.
conserved topsoil by such practices to
Whereas
as rotating
traditional agriculture
crops and permitting land
remain fallow for periods of years, many farmers today grow the same
They minimize
crop each year on the same land. is
Young
half-miUion hectares of agricultural land per year (Brown and
a
plowed and
left
organic matter the topsoil billion
is
more
it
periods
needs to rebuild the
wind and water
lost to
soil structure; as a result,
erosion.
One
estimate
is
Some of
irrigated.
behind minute amounts of top few inches of soil; kill
salts
salt.
The water
zones of the crops.
need
some of that
25
Eventually these
salts
accumulate in the
when
irrigated lands are not properly
table therefore rises, eventually reaching the root
The
roots in this water cannot get the
to survive. SaHnization
that are degrading
Salinization occurs
the diverted water evaporates, leaving
reduce the yields of the crops and ultimately
them. Waterlogging occurs
drained.
is
of the
of 9 to 21 miUion tons of grain production annually
(Brown and Young 1990, p. 61). A third problem is salinization and waterlogging. land
the land
soil
tons of topsoil are lost to erosion each year than are formed,
resulting in the loss
when
when
"unproductive." These practices deprive the
24% of
and waterlogging today the world's croplands.
oxygen they
are serious
Each
problems
year, 1.1 to 3.6
million tons of crop output are lost to salinization and waterlogging. Finally, deforestation causes the loss
hectares of the earth
s
of cropland. Seventeen million
tree cover are destroyed
of Austria (Brown 1991,
p. 7).
Some
each year, an area the
deforestation
size
may produce tem-
porary gains in croplands, but on the massive scale on which deforestation is
occurring,
runoff and
it
destroys
more than
affects rainfall
causes flooding in
some
cycles
it
creates. Deforestation increases
and
water
rainfall distribution. It therefore
places and desertification in others.
The
deser-
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
51
brought about by deforestation (and by the overgrazing of
tification
livestock) affects almost one-third
tion results in the loss of 6
of the
earth's land surface. Desertifica-
miUion hectares of agricultural land each year.*
In addition, deforestation indirectly adds to the problem of soil erosion.
People in deforested areas are forced to burn for fuel, thus depriving the soil of fertiUzer
up the
soil structure
Lester
Brown
and holds
it.
cow dung and
crop residues
and organic matter
that builds
Putting these and other factors together,
observes that "each year, the world's farmers must try to
feed 88 miUion
more people with 24
(Brown 1989, p. 29) Although there appears
billion fewer tons
to be other land in the
of topsoil"
world that could be
developed, bringing into production any sizable quantity of
new
land
enormous amounts of capital, vast expenditures of energy, and above all, ecological expertise beyond any we now possess. And
would
require
The preceding
production gains are likely to be ephemeral. addressed the ecological
fiatility
numerous countries
lands. Yet
tropical forests at a rate
chapter
of trying to clear and farm tropical
forest
are allowing the irreversible destruction
of 500,000
trees
per hour
reaping a few years of harvest but leaving
a
(Newsweek
of
1989, p. 59),
legacy of serious ecological
problems and potential cUmatological consequences. Even where the
of forest lands are capable of supporting some kind of more intensive
soils
cultivation, cutting
down
forests carries the risks
of erosion, flooding, and
desiccation of climate, the result of ignoring the ecologist's warning that
the so-called nonproductive parts of an ecosystem perform invaluable protective ftinctions and are vital to production
on even
the most suitable
land.
Some used land
novel kinds of ecologically sophisticated exploitation of un-
—
tree culture, pisciculture,
modernized versions of native gar-
—can provide
dening techniques, and so on
a useful
supplement (of vital
protein especially) to a basic cereal diet, but except in a few favored areas,
they are not the answer to the present and future food needs of humanity.
*
Air pollution, though
one
estimate,
1
it
(Brown and Young 1990, caused by acid
ozone
p. 63).
losses.
Other pollution damage
rain, rising ultraviolet radiation levels
layer in the stratosphere,
calculated yet.
crop
does not destroy cropland, also causes crop
losses.
By
million tons of grain are lost just to ozone pollution each year to crops, (such as that
due to the depletion of the
and global warming) have not been
But the evidence suggests
that each
of these
reliably
factors will accelerate
CHAPTER 2
52
.
.
.And Limited Water Irrigation has
astonishing
But
opened up many
human
throughout
and semiarid lands
arid
from 50 million hectares to 250 million
rate,
to agriculture
(Postel 1990, p. 40).
irrigation also has limits. Since 1978, irrigated area per capita has
decreasing worldwide.
of
costs
—
irrigation
that force
some
We
been
have already noted some of the environmental
the intensified erosion, waterlo^ing, and salinization
irrigated land out
countries, irrigated runoff
of production. Furthermore, in developed
becoming contaminated with
is
pesticide residues, polluting the sources
human
an
history. In this century, irrigated land has risen at
of the irrigated water
fertilizer
itself, as
and
well as
drinking water. In the United States, over 50 pesticides contaminate
groundwater in 32 American
states
(Corson 1990,
p.
163). In third-world
countries, water-development projects have spread disease, destroyed traditional
upon which poor people
agriculture
destroyed
many
species
by eliminating
schistosomiasis have resulted
Today
irrigation systems.
600 million
who
farmed
are in
from
at least
rely,
ruined
their habitats.
fisheries,
a parasite that lives in reservoirs
200 million people have the
danger of getting
(Corson 1990,
it
or fished in floodwaters lost their
and
Major outbreaks of disease;
162).
p.
way of life
as
and
another
Poor people
dams upstream
stopped the flooding on which they depended. (These dams do not normally
become
substitute fisheries, for their
providing insufiicient nutrients for
deep waters are usually
The environmental consequences of serious, are only part
of the reason
the future. Another problem
is
sterile,
fish).
why
that
however
irrigation projects,
such projects wiU be limited in
both water and
irrigable land are
The cost of irrigation is therefore becoming too expensive to justify in many parts of the world. Africa, where food needs are greatest, is the worst case; the cost per hectare of irrigating land on that
getting scarce.
continent has risen to between $10,000 and $20,000. This cost tive for agriculture,
increased by only
which
5%
partially explains
why
is
prohibi-
Africa's irrigated area
in the last decade (Postel 1990, p. 42).
The most fundamental
limit
on
irrigation
is
the decreasing availa-
of good water. Rivers and lakes worldwide receive enormous quantities of industrial discharges, agricultural runoff, and municipal
bility
sewage.
A quarter of the world's population— 1.2 billion people
have access to
safe
agriculture and
—do
not
drinking water. Because of the scarcity of good water,
growing numbers of people compete
and eastern Africa,
in parts
of the Middle
East, in
for
it.
In northern
China, and even,
serious problem,
United States, where getting usable water is a growing populations often require that water be shifted
from agriculture
to drinking purposes.
occasionally, in the western
a
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
53
tables are falling in many parts of the world. Indeed, in some water has already become too expensive to pump, forcing land to be abandoned. In many parts of the world, including one-fifth of the
Water
areas
United
irrigated area in the
farmers are
States
pumping water out
and large
faster
than
of China and India, being "recharged"
parts
it
is
—
process that cannot continue indefinitely. Gigantic aqueducts to transport
water very long distances have been built to overcome these shortages. Such systems require enormous quantities of energy to build and main-
and even more grandiose ones are being considered. But realistic prospects for major gains in irrigated areas of the world are poor. In Thailand, the Philippines, and parts of India, some potential exists for tain,
enlarging irrigated areas, but in other parts of India, wells are going dry. China and the United States have actually decUned in irrigated area since
pumping is outpacing replenishment, that decline expected to continue. Even general adoption of drip irrigation and
the 1970s, and because is
other techniques that conserve water (but boost energy costs) will not alter this picture substantially. In fact, the proliferation
which reduce water flow and increase evaporative paces improvements in water supply in many areas. Despite high areas,
but
it
costs,
desaUnation
a possible
is
loss,
of waterweeds,
more than out-
answer for some local
requires such great expenditures of energy for production
transportation that
widespread use
its
is
and
unhkely. Moreover, the hot brines
that are an inevitable by-product will create a pollution large dimensions.
Such remote
possibilities as
problem of very towing icebergs fi-om the
Antarctic are occasionally advanced to growth, but
minor, local
as solutions to this very serious limit even the most favorable estimates relegate them to a
role. It
is
just barely conceivable, for example, that icebergs
one day supply water to the Atacama Desert in CaHfornia, but the ecological, economic, and practical barriers to providing North America
will
with agricultural water from Finally, global
more
severe.
this
source are immense.
warming may make
the problem of Umited water even
(For a discussion of the physical
warming, see Chapter
3).
One
possible effect
mechanism of global of global warming will be
to shift the areas where water is available. Dams, flood control, hydropower, reservoir and other water management projects built where water is
now available will become less productive
projects will that
or even useless where rainfall
New water management enormous cost, in the new wet locales materiahze. Global warming is also predicted to increase evapo-
and snowpack
areas have shifted elsewhere.
need
to
be
built, at
transpiration in crops. If this occurs, increased irrigation
of existing and the irrigation of cropland now rain-fed will be required to achieve the same crop productivity. Although a number of irrigated cropland
CHAPTER 2
54
now-irrigated areas scientific
in the
benefit firom increased rainfall levels,
that
much of the newly
available
water
Help from
Nor can we
of soil moisture for crops, will be the
Sea
the
expect the sea to provide basic subsistence for added
depend on the few
fisheries
trients are
believe that
areas
where
harvest
ocean
nu-
brought to the surface by upwelling. For another, experts
we
are already close to the
may be
is
billions.
deserts. All
large quantities of
maximum
sustainable yield
100 million tons offish per year (Corson 1990, p. 142).
sea:
may be
result.
For one thing, the oceans are for the most part biological
major
some
form of intensified monsoons. If so, occasional flooding, rather than
a stable source
Little
may
models suggest
unsustainable in the long run.
critical to its
The
of the
And even
this
top millimeter of the
productivity and general ecological health, and
we
ay
A Ray of Hope?
Mariculture: Although some
species are being overfished or are
becoming too pol-
luted to consume, the farming offish offers an alternative source of protein. In 1980,
worldwide production of seafood and edible seaweed
was 8.7 million metric
tons, nearly one-eighth
of the
such resources. Third- world countries produced
(Corson 1990,
p.
148). Aquaculture has the potential for
in third-world countries, because
it is
be practiced not only in bays and the semi-fireshwater estuaries as well. for
it is
total harvest
74% of this
potentially
much more
good growth
usually labor-intensive sea but in fireshwater
It also
efficient
of
harvest
and can
ponds and
can be extremely productive, than
terrestrial agriculture at
converting solar energy into animal protein.
However, aquaculture may never quires scientific
knowledge and
purity, location, spacing
realize
capital; the
and so on,
its
fuU potential.
First, it re-
requirements of water
are extremely
demanding; and the
techniques of managing aquatic ecosystems are intricate. Second, pollution and coastal development must be well controlled for mariculture to work.
So
far,
unfortunately, such control
to both pollution
and development.
is
weak and
is
losing
ground
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
are polluting industrial,
with
it
of land-generated wastes
a multiplicity
and agricultural
—
as
55
—
municipal,
well as with oil and plastics from both
at sea. Much of the increase in fishing since 1983 has been of species used to feed animals and to make fish meal, rather than of fish which people consume. Yields of some major fisheries have leveled
land and our ships
off or are declining.
Once
and the Alaskan crab
a fishery collapses, as did the
Peruvian anchovy
may never recover to former of whales are already "extinct" for practical purposes, because for more than a century, the few remaining animals have failed to levels.
Many species
reproduce
also
damaging
satisfy
wedands,
respectively,
commercial demand.
marshes, mangroves and coral reefs in
salt
parts of the world. Salt marshes
tropical tive
adequate to
at a rate
People aie
many
fisheries, harvests
and mangroves
and they are
far
more
are
temperate and
biologically produc-
than the open ocean. Mangroves, especially, spawn and support
enormous filter
out
ponds and
down many
of
quantities
human-made
and
finfish
pollution.
and the
shellfish,
But they
and
at
the same time they
are being converted to
shrimp
mangrove trees are being cut and firewood. Coral reefs are starving, and in cases dying, throughout the world (Booth 1990 p. A8). Some die rice fields,
salt-tolerant
for building materials
because rivers
filled
from reaching the
with sediment flow into them, preventing sunlight Others die because fishers dynamite reefs to kill
reefs.
the fish that hide in them. pollutants
kill still
other
coral reefs are dying
is
Mine
But
warmest decade
in the last
modern
The dying of the
records.
taifings, pesticides, cyanide,
and other
new and ominous reason why abnormally warm seas. The 1980s were
reefs.
of possible global warming.
100
a
years,
the the
and 1990 was the hottest year in may be an early biological effect
reefs
*
At the same time, in more temperate climates people are destroying wedands for development. Estuaries, where commercially valuable fish spend part of their Hves, are becoming reservoirs of human contaminants. Contrary to a popular assumption, the estuaries into which polluted rivers
flow do not flush these pollutants out to the
sea.
Rather, the
* The destruction of the ozone layer is also affecting the seas in a worrisome way. In 1988, an ozone hole over Antarctica resulted in a 15% overall decline in
ozone
levels. Surface phytoplankton levels in that area also decreased by 15 to (Roberts 1989, p. 288-289). If the decrease in ozone levels caused the decrease in phytoplankton, then ozone depletion harms the oceanic food chain.
20%
In addition, a decrease in phytoplankton decreases the ocean's ability to absorb
atmospheric carbon and accelerates global warming.
CHAPTER 2
56
pollutants concentrate in the estuaries, endangering marine
making
National and international pollution. Certain treaties limit
ocean dumping fi-om
nations control over the seas v^thin
enabling
United
them to
States
regulate
failed.
Some
Many also
nations
fail
200 miles of their
and some other countries have laws
gallons
another gives
coasts, theoretically
that territory.
The
development
restricting
water. Yet as a whole, these efforts have
do not agree to or comply v^th
international controls.
to enforce their clean water laws or adequately fund clean-up
United
projects to reverse the pollution firom internal sources. In the
most bays
for example,
and
to control ocean
ships;
and protect the resources within
wedands and protecting clean
in
made
have been
efforts
life
human consumption.
the fish (especially shellfish) dangerous for
are badly polluted.
Americans dumped 3.3
States, trillion
of sewage into marine waters in 1980, and since then the amount of
dumping
has increased. Industries add 5 trillion additional gallons of in-
dustrial waste to
runoff, in the
domestic waters each year (Corson 1990,
form of solid
heavy metals, adds herbicides,
and
pollutants. All
billions
wastes,
lawn
of this occurs in
been half-hearted and
So
far efforts to
largely
Urban and
to say nothing about fertilizers,
and
atmospheric
fallout firom
of national, state, and
spite
146).
—
of gallons more
pesticides firom agriculture
to deal with the problem.
p.
pesticides, toxic chemicals, oil,
local laws enacted
curb overfishing have likewdse the
in
unsuccessfiil
United
States
and
throughout the world.
Diminishing Returns from Increased Energy Input and Intensification of Agriculture Experts agree that the only possible answer to the problem of feeding
double the present world population Hes not in the opening up of new firontiers either
on the land or
in the oceans, but in the preservation
more
intensive exploitation of lands that are
most
suitable for intensive agriculture.
Even
and
now farmed and that are the if v^e
overlook
its
ecological
consequences, intensification of production requires a vast input of energy.
Modern
fossil fiaels
*
intensive agriculture
essentially a
is
and minerals into grain and
fiber.
technique for converting
From 1950
to 1984,
world
For example, even though the atmospheric nitrogen for making nitrogenous
fertilizer
is
itself free
(and essentially inexhaustible), the process of converting
into chemical forms that plants can use
Every ton of nitrogenous
costly in terms
fertilizer requires
to manufacture (McHale 1970,
intensive agriculture
is
may come
p.
12).
one ton of steel and
Some of
to be in short supply.
it
of materials and energy: five tons
of coal
the minerals essential to
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
fertilizer
use
grew from 14 million tons
57
to 146 million tons, a fivefold
increase per capita. This increase offset a one-third decline in grain area p. 52). But the rate of increase in fertilizer use since 1984. As a result, world grain yield has declined from decHned has 343 kilograms per person in that year to 329 kilograms per person in 1990 (Brown 1991, p. 13). This is not to say that agricultural production dechned during those years; it increased. But while grain production
per person (Brown 1989,
1984 to 1990, population grew by 2% (Brown In addition, the rate of increase in yields of the staple crops
grew by 1% annually 1991,
p. 14).
fi-om
may have peaked. First, the miracle
strains that
Revolution are already in widespread grains
may
yields, for
When
were the
basis
of the Green
Second, some of these miracle
use.
have reached their biological Hmits of productivity. Rice
example, have not increased since 1984 (Brown 1991,
the upper limit of photosynthetic efficiency of a plant
is
p. 12).
reached,
further application of fertilizer does not increase yields. In a finite en-
vironment, aU biological processes grow in
S-shaped curve,
at
a
the end of which they do not
manner reflected by an grow further (see Figure
2-1).
Some
people
hope
biotechnology research will
result
in
dramatic increases in world food production. Biotechnologists have
al-
that
ready achieved some impressive gains. For example, they have produced
hormones
that increase milk production
and have developed vaccines
and drugs to increase livestock productivity. Biotechnology promises to create
some foods
may be
in the laboratory. Biotechnologists
able to
breed natural enemies of plant pests or render existing pests harmless.
They may
also
pests,
and
fi-ost,
be able to breed plants more tolerant of heat, drought, salt.
These techniques increase the
the growing of food
—
in terms
Biotechnology thus may be able to
finite
environment for
of both area and growing season. offset the losses
of croplands currently
in use.
But biotechnological progress in some areas has been controversial or Disagreement exists over the safety of foods to which residues of hormones or drugs cHng. Plant genetics has not been easy to understand. Genetic manipulation has had unpredictable results. In the few cases slow.
where gene
transfers
much
have been successfijUy introduced to crops,
time to obtain
new
as
takes.
Furthermore, the biotechnology research agenda so
dominated by
a
it
has
variety as conventional breeding
taken
large corporations. Their
far has
been
primary objective has been to
produce herbicide-resistant crops so that pesticides can be spread pervasively over fields, thereby reducing tillage. This contributes to soil
erosion and has other dangerous consequences (see
Box
6)
—and
in
any
event does Httle to help farmers in developing countries, where tilHng by
CHAPTER 2
58
- independence" in the near future (A. L. Hammond 1974a). Maximum coal development w^uld also necessitate the a
—
destruction of good arable and forested land
long-term
in short, the sacrifice
of
agricultural productivity for short-term energy production.
Thus the amount of coal we can reasonably expect to obtain and use is far less than the amount theoretically available in the ground. At only a temporarv^ stopgap satisfaction of our short-term energy requirements, and we shall very soon have to conceive and construct alternative technologies of energy supply that do not depend on
best, coal offers
such nonrenewable and environmentally damaging
drainage
problem, which
beyond the mining
Even
contaminating streams
v^th the pollution caused by the extracquestionable whether humanity can Hve with the
could
ftiels, it is
live
pollution caused by their burning. In Chapter 3,
which
how
it
affects
human
aquatic
is
health.
We
also will
life
exist to
will see the extent to
species of
observe
health problems, damages agriculture, and also
means
we
in eastern lakes and streams
damaging corrodes buildings, weakens some
acid rain
and groundwater
areas themselves.
if humanity
tion of fossil
is
fiiels.
trees,
how smog kills forests.
and
and adversely causes
human
Technological
reduce the amount of smog and acid rain formed with the
burning of fossil
fiiels,
both by producing "cleaner"
fiiels
in the
first
place
and by using new control technologies during burning. Some advanced repowering technologies for producmg coal-gasification
combined
electricity,
cycle system
such
as
the integrated
(IGCC), can reduce methane
CHAPTER 2 and remove almost all of the sulfide by-products of coal before the is burned (Fulkerson et al. 1990, p. 131). At the same time,
synthesis gas
the efficiency by
34%
(for a
which power
is
produced
in these plants
coal-burning conventional plant) to 42%. But
is
raised
utilities are
The new technologies may be be) more cosdy, or they may be
to adopt advanced technologies. to be (and indeed
may
at first
as unnecessary. Utilities
do not want
plants before their useful
and
may
it
conceived until
it
is
last
from 20 to 40
from the day
a
new
slow
perceived
perceived
to retire today's conventional
(which may
life
take a very long time
from
years)
power is
over,
technology
is
designed, developed, tested, refined, and finally
installed.
Moreover, even
and industry were persuaded or forced to
if utiHties
quickly adopt state-of-the-art technologies to reduce the emissions of
smog and
cause
fossil fuels that
acid rain, carbon dioxide
is
the inevitable
product of combustion. The buildup of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere causes the greenhouse
effect.
Six billion tons of carbon are added
amount
to the atmosphere each year, and the
has been rising by 400
million tons annually since 1986 (Flavin and Lenssen 1991,
p. 24).
A
United Nations study concluded in 1990 that these levels of carbon emissions will produce rapid and highly disruptive climate changes in
coming
the
people
years
directly.
—changes
(We
that will
harm
will discuss this fiarther in
3.)
we
have
fossil fuel.
Coal
Unfortunately the carbon emissions of burning coal, which in abundance, are higher than those
produces
80%
and gas.
IGCC,
of burning any other
higher carbon emissions than an equivalent amount of oil
higher carbon emissions than an equivalent amount of natural
Producing synthetic
overcome as
25%
and
agriculture, forests,
Chapter
this *
fuels or synthetic natural gas
from coal does not
problem. Although advanced powering technologies, such
can reduce carbon dioxide emissions sHghtly by improving
the efficiency of electrical production, coal gasification by conventional
* a
Integrated coal-gasification
combined
cycle plants
gaseous mixture, using steam and oxygen.
The
would convert coal to would power a gas gas would be harnessed
gases
turbine to produce electricity, and the heat from the
to vaporize water to run a steam turbine (Fulkerson et
Because the process powers two turbines, energy supplied than do today's coal efficiency
may be
compared
to about 33 to
bum
as
high
as
it
gets
more
plants. Theoretical
al.
1990, p. 132).
electricity for the
models suggest
42% with advanced power
37% with
conventional plants.
The
that
technologies, latter
simply
coal to vaporize water to run a steam turbine; the gases themselves just
go up
a
smokestack
as
waste.
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
means
increases
89
carbon dioxide emissions by
energy produced (Corson 1990,
p.
50%
more per
or
atmospheric con-
Scientists believe that in order to stabilize the
centration reduced
of carbon dioxide, worldwide carbon emissions must be
80%
(Flavin
and Lenssen 1991,
1989
rates
utterly incompatible
by 60 to
consume
unit of
194).
coal at
is
In any event, humanity
may not
stabilize
p.
25).
with
To produce and this objective.
atmospheric concentra-
tions of carbon dioxide in time to avert highly disruptive climate
changes.
even
takes decades to achieve reductions in carbon emissions,
It
when
there
is
—
as in
the United States there
analysts belitve that
25%
Western Europe must cut
its
—
not
is
will to achieve this goal.^ As population continues to
the political
grow worldwide,
per capita carbon
of what they are today. The United
States, which consumes almost twice as much energy per capita as Western Europe and Japan, would have to reduce its per capita carbon emissions to less than 15% of what they are today. To accomplish this would require changes not only in America's methods of producing energy but also in American industry, agriculture, transportation, and housing and consumption patterns.
emissions to
The
Potential
Many era
and
Peril of Nuclear
Energy
coming changes and
regard the
foreseeable end of the fossil-fuel
with complacency, for they believe
that, just as coal
replaced
wood
and expensive, new technologies will take over the burden of energy production, allowing material growth
when
the latter
* Oil shale
and
became
scarce
sand deposits were thought
tar
sources of Hquid hydrocarbons.
former, Canada of the resources required
The United
latter.
enormous
at
one time
However, obtaining
quantities
to be alternative
States has substantial reserves
liquid fuel
of the
from these
of rock to be mined, processed, and
disposed of at high monetary, energetic, and environmental cost. In addition, required the use of
more water than could be
supplied. Finally, oil shale
it
and
other synthetic fuels have a high carbon content per unit of energy produced.
The United program
States
abandoned
in the 1980s as
its
government-subsidized
t Fifteen nations, mostly
States
spurned
beginning in 1989,
on
specific goals
(Meyer 1990,
it
this
by
20%
or more. But the
undertaking. At several international conferences
has prevented international agreement from being reached
and timetables
p. 3).
development
from the European Economic Community, recently
established a goal of reducing their carbon emissions
United
oil shale
uneconomic.
for stabilizing
and reducing carbon emissions
CHAPTER 2
90
we can turn many of its pro-
to continue. In the relatively short term, say these optimists,
to nuclear power.
But
ponents claim? Indeed,
energy until
we
is it
some of the more
issues
even
a safe
and sensible stopgap source of
develop thermonuclear fusion and explore other long-
range possibilities? This aside
nuclear power the panacea
is
an exceedingly controversial
is
issue.
Leaving
examine the be the main points of
esoteric technical problems, let us
of nuclear safety and waste, for these seem to
controversy.
As we
will see in
Chapter
3,
very small amounts of radiation can
harm to ecosystems and people, particularly if the release of radioactive compounds continues for a number of years. Thus virtually perfect radionucUde-emission control is required. The boosters of nuclear power believe that we have the engineering and management capacity to cause severe
achieve
The be
this level
critics
of control for large-scale generation of nuclear power.
contend that
What
achieved."*"
been achieved so
this hasn't
are the
major points
Proponents of nuclear power
far
and that
it
can't
at issue?
reiterate tirelessly that nuclear generat-
ing plants are designed to keep emission during normal reactor operation
low enough
*
that
any threat to public health
is
negligible.
Even
if
one
At one time, some thought that the development of nuclear power would be by finite global supplies of uranium. Light- water reactors (LWRs),
restricted
the predominant type, burn only
The
uranium 235, which
constitutes only a tiny
of naturally occurring uranium (composed largely of uranium 238).
fraction
uranium-235
must
energy-intensive techniques
carbon dioxide
—before
inefficiency with
which
be
it
can be
fissionable
is
consumed
in light
laborious
and
highly
that release substantial quantities
used for reactor
uranium
is
fuel.
Added
to
of
the
obtained, light-water reactors
energy converters.
are also relatively inefficient
uranium
by
concentrated
—techniques
If all the
world's supply of
water reactors, only 70 terawatt-years of thermal
energy will be produced, compared to the 154 from already discovered reserves of oil
LWRs
138).
and 130 from already discovered natural gas (Hafele 1990, p. than 0.6% of available uranium atoms; over 99% are
fission less
is plentiful. The current estimated world supply between 6 and 7 million tons enough to power the number of nuclear plants currently in operation and the 96 under construction for
wasted. Nevertheless, uranium
of uranium ore
about 100 years (Hafele 1990, t
One
—
is
p. 137).
indication of the radiation being released from nuclear
the concentration of krypton-85, tion.
From 1970
in the
which
is
power
plants
is
uniquely associated with their opera-
to 1983, the average annual concentration of this radioactive gas
atmosphere increased by
80% (Commoner
1990,
p. 34).
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
grants the validity of this position,*
it
91
is
hardly decisive, for the very
assumption of normalcy begs most of the important questions. Nuclear
power generation can be
from
acts
phases of the
and
fliel
disposal) can
alarming
installations
list
if
errors; only if
can be perfectly protected
of God, terrorism and sabotage, criminal
or foreign; and only
civil
no accidents or operating
and other nuclear
reactors, fuels,
and construction of the
safe only if the design
reactor are flawless; there are
acts,
and
acts
the release of radionuclides during
of war,
all
other
cycle (mining, processing, transportation, reprocessing,
be rigidly controlled. As
of "ifs." In
fact,
point out,
critics
this
a rather
is
the nuclear industry has run into trouble in
almost every one of the areas mentioned.
Design aad operator competence have been Chernobyl, which
catastrophe at
deaths and
whose ultimate
from
far
The
perfect.
expected to cause 70,000 cancer
is
government's
costs will surpass the Soviet
total
prior investment in nuclear power, was initiated by operator errors. But
design defects
pounded
—
—com-
control systems that proved to be inadequate
the effects of operating errors (Flavin 1987,
p. 33).
The
nuclear
industry proclaimed that such an accident could not happen in the
United
States because
western plant design was superior. But in March
1979, a minor problem developed in the plumbing of the Three Mile Island-2 plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Operator errors and design defects then led to a partial
meltdown
in the
TMl-2
core.
Some
control
systems did not work, meters displaying crucial data were hidden from operators' view; a critical valve got stuck, an important sensor didn't
work, and hundreds of warning
One
later told investigators that operators
was allowing cooling water
to
came on and alarms sounded
lights
only confused the operators more.
reactor operator,
1986,
p. 12).
Some
that
Frederick,
had closed the stuck valve (which
drain away from the overheated
only because "no one could think of anything
Nogee
Ed
else to
reactor)
do" (quoted
experts believe that the United States
in
came
within 30 minutes of a catastrophe that would have at
Chernobyl. (Nogee 1986,
p. 12)
far exceeded the one Chernobyl released between 50 and
100 million curies of radioactivity into the biosphere; the containment
TMI-2
*
held in 18 biUion curies of radioactivity (Corson 1990,
Many
critics
do not grant
it.
Because
it
has
now become
doses of radiation have long-term adverse effects health (see
—
that, in
Chapter
from
plants
3)
even tiny ecological
other words, no radiation exposure can be considered risk-free
—
now
clear that
on human and
at
p. 196).
critics
contend that even the low-level, "normal" emissions
operating constitute a threat to health.
CHAPTER 2
92
Some
nuclear advocates point out that the ultimate safety device, the
containment structure, did hold demonstrating
at
TMI-2 and
key design superiority. But
a
tainment held may have been
that
matter of luck.
a
no one was
the fact that
An
killed,
TMI-2 s con-
official
of General
Public Utilities, TMI's owner, has recently admitted that "we're surprised the reactor vessel contained the accident" (quoted in Flavin 1990,
Moreover, the Soviet containment structure at
some Western
standards;
plants built in the
United
it
p. 60).
Chernobyl was up
to
was, in fact, similar to the containments at
States
by General Electric (about one-third of
U.S. reactors).
important. United States nuclear plants have been plagued by
More
Between 1979 and 1987, power plants. In 1985, for example, there were 3000 plant mishaps and 764 emergency shutdowns, 18 of which were serious enough to lead to core damage (Flavin 1987, p. 42).t In 1987 there were 3000 mishaps, 104,000 incidents of worker exposure to radiation, and 430 emergency plant shutdowns. There were
serious accidents, shutdowns,
and near
misses.
there were 27,000 mishaps at licensed nuclear
more than 150
serious accidents in 14 Western nations fi-om 1971 to
1984. Significant nuclear incidents have been initiated by field mice, a loose
shirttail,
and an improperly used candle. When accidents reveal utifities to add safety features to existing
design flaws and regulators force plants, these additions are
tegrated into the
unavoidably piecemeal and are poorly in-
facility's layout.
Atomic Energy Commission's top safety officer concluded that GE's containment was inadequate and should be banned. Exhibiting an attitude that is commonplace among nuclear regulators, Joseph Hedrie, who later became the Chairperson of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, rejected his safety officer's recommendation. A memo obtained by the Union of Concerned Scientists quotes him as writing that the proposed ban "could well be the end of nuclear power. It would throw into question the continued operation of licensed plants, would make unlicensable the GE [and some Westinghouse] plants now in review, and *
Actually, in the early 1970s, the
would
generally create
(quoted in t
One,
ment
at
Nogee
I
can stand thinking about."
p. 13).
the Davis-Besse nuclear plant near Toledo, Ohio, involved 16 equip-
failures,
including the same stuck valve and
human
error involved in the
TMI-2. Operators averted core damage because they quickly shut allowing auxiliary pumps to cool the core.
near disaster that valve,
1986,
more turmoil than
at
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
93
la Nuclear Safety: The Big Gamble That nuclear
safety
may be
a
bad gamble
is
indicated by the refusal
of commercial insurance companies, bastions of prudence and the careful calculation of risks, to cover the nuclear industry until they
and government reinsurance through the Price- Anderson Act. This Act, renewed in 1988, limits payment for nuclear accidents to $7 billion, even though a 1982 study done for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission reported were assured of drastically limited
that a
liability
major nuclear accident could
in injuries
result in
and property damage. Even
more than $100
this larger figure
billion
does not in-
clude most of the special ecological and societal costs of radioactivity,
such
as
chronic, long-term ecosystem
damage and adverse
genetic effects.
The safety
is
nuclear industry attempts to assure the public that nuclear
good gamble by pubUcizing
a
risk analysis"
an event
of nuclear
the results of their "probabilistic
reactors. This defines risk as the probability that
v^ happen multipHed by
its
consequences. These analyses
predict that core -damaging accidents should occur once every 10,000._ to
20,000 years of reactor operation (Hafele 1990,
Mile Island occurred
after
tions,
and Chernobyl occurred
1987,
p. 40). Probabilistic risk analysis
after
is
that
141).
But Three a|
only another 1900 years (Flavin
models have certain
For example, they make assumptions that such assumption
p.
only 1500 years of cumulative reactor opera-
may not
difficulties.
reflect reahty.
But when a technician used a candle to ch eck for Browns Ferry, Alabama, nuclear plant in 1975, a fire
simultaneously. leaks at the
One
redundant safety systems wiU not be destroyed
destroyed several redundant electrical systems
at
air
the same time, actually
down the control room! Probabilistic risk analysis also does notlakelnto TccounTunknown dangers of reactors built in developing
shutting
countries,
which have
firequently
been plagued by mismanagement, sub-
standard construction materials and tecliniques, and bribes paid to inspectors. is
I
not
As
much
a result, nuclear critics claim that probabilistic risk analysis
better than guesswork.
No
one knows when and where
the next nuclear accident will occur, but everyone
where,
it
will.
knows
that,
some-
CHAPTER 2
94
some nuclear
In
been released into the
incidents, radiation has
environment.* Nuclear regulatory bodies, which are usually protective of the industry, minimize incidents and nuclear hazards. Radiation releases are regularly characterized as presenting
France,
as
no danger
to the public; in
Chernobyl's radioactive cloud passed overhead, French
stated repeatedly that
it
had missed the country.
Utilities
officials
sometimes have
not reported nuclear incidents or have delayed reports of them. delayed reporting the
TMI-2
GPU
incident and then repeatedly issued mis-
leading statements minimizing
its
seriousness.
Additional safety hazards loom. Nuclear plants have a relatively short life
—
most 40
at
old. T^lready,
years.
many
are
By
1990, 35 nuclear plants were
showing
pressure vessels, causing
them
signs
to
at least
25 years
of aging. Neutrons bombard
become
embrittled.
steel
Steam generators
corrode. Pipes burst in unexpected places. In 1986 a hot-water pipe burst in the Surry
Nuclear plant in Virginia, and four workers were
(Flavin 1987, p. 45). Nuclear radiation builds
of a reactor; dangerous
killed
up continually over the
life
of radionuclides will remain for thousands
levels
of years. Therefore, unlike conventional power plants, nuclear reactors cannot
be destroyed with
a
wrecking
ball.
They must be dismanded and buried
(decommissioned), or they must be mothbaUed for several decades until short-lived radioisotopes decay third option,
impossible.
entombment of
No matter how
the radioactivity did and sphere.)
Not only do
it
and must then be decommissioned. (A the reactor
would
ment, the concrete. Even
A more
insidious safety
radionuclides from rather
common
all
site, is
regarded
as
before
release the radioactivity into the bio-
is
radioactive
—
the pipes, the equip-
the solvents used for cleaning
problem
the accumulation of
is
the other phases of the fuel cycle.
today.
now
tomb would decay
the plants contain high levels of radioactive ele-
ments but everything in the reactor
*
on
was designed, the
An example
is
the
Such
up the reactor
minor
releases
of
releases are in fact
planned release of long-lived
radionuclides during fuel reprocessing. In addition, refining uranium for use in
nuclear
power
plants produces
uranium miU
by 1987, the
taUings;
licensed mills had produced 186 million metric tons of firom
uranium mine
emit radon gas
tailings
already a
problem
in
some
nations'
Radioactivity
localities.
Tailing piles
into the atmosphere and contaminate the groundwater below
them with dangerous
levels
the groundwater exceed (Critical
is
tailings.
Mass 1989,
of radioactivity. At some
EPA
standards
factsheet 5).
by
a factor
sites,
of a
radioactivity levels in
hundred or
a
thousand
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
95
11 Low-Level Nuclear Wastes Nuclear power plants
produce large amounts of low-level nuclear they are decommissioned, they will produce 16,000 cubic meters more almost half as much as they produce
wastes each year.
also
When
—
cumulatively over their operating
No
one knows what
dumped
to
life.
do with
these wastes. Right now, they are
into special commercial landfills.
But half of the landfills desigpurpose have been closed because their radioactivity is contaminating adjacent property. In Illinois, Kentucky, and New York, nated for
this
plutonium and other contaminants fi-om these
landfills
have leaked into
the groundwater.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's proposed solution to is simple. It wants to label some of these wastes "below
the
|roblem
Regulatory concern" and allow producers to dispose of them in unregulated municipal landfills (Critical
Mass 1989). The
slieves that the solution to pollution is dilution
everywhere will not mind just
a
little
NRC apparently
—
that hardy folks
radioactivity in their drinking
water.
become contaminated; any whatever surface they
solvents that
splatter. All
spill
machinery
contaminate the in contact
soil
or
with a con-
taminated surface becomes radioactive. Furthermore, neutron-activated parts of the reactor, including its pressure vessel, its internal components
and structures, and tive
its concrete shield, become. 1000 times than other contaminated components; because they
more radioacbecome com-
posed of radioisotopes, they cannot be washed clean (Pollock 1986, p. 10). A huge amount of materials must be dismantled, chopped up into pieces
and removed by remote-control devices, and buried. No machinery has been designed for this task. It will be very labor-intensive, and the
yet
peoples
who
will have to
operate the machinery and do other decommissioning be rotated firequently to avoid radiation overexposure.
tasks
Un-
planned radiation leaks are inevitable. Decommissioning will be compli-
CHAPTER 2
96
cated, hazardous, as
—
time-consuming, and expensive
building each nuclear plant in the
And
there
of wastes,
a
nowhere
is still
to
first
reason
is
expensive, perhaps,
place.
bury these materials
half-century into the nuclear age,
The fundamental
as
is
Disposal
safely.
an unsolved problem.
that the wastes are dangerous for millennia
but planetary changes cannot be predicted for millennia. The metals alone in each of the nation's nuclear plants will have built up an average of 4,600,000 curies of radioactivity. Each reactor produces 30 tons a year of highly radioactive spent fuel. These materials will take
3,000,000 years to decay sufficiently to no longer be
a serious risk.
Spent fuel continually accumulates and no one knows what to do with it.
Temporarily,
metric tons are
it
stored in pools of water at each reactor: 21,000
is
now
sitting in these pools,
Some
accumulate by 2000.
reactors are
store spent nuclear fuels. This material
unshielded,
a
and 40,000 metric tons will running out of capacity to very dangerous. If
is
person nearby would receive
a lethal
were
it
dose of radiation in
seconds.
The
nuclear industry contends that radioactive waste disposal
pohtical problem, not a technical one.
It is
NIMBY
my
—
phenomenon
ignorant public. But
is it?
the "not in
No
one disputes
the victim, they
that nuclear wastes
the alternatives explored so far
of the most
unworked
attractive
salt
a viable alternative.
seem
one location
at
facility in
too, has
another
exceptions) force
utilities
electric bills as
an energy source).
to save for
have the
of customers.
money
available for
they did not use the
it is
power
unfair
at
(If
Nor do
decommissioning
needed. Furthermore, customers of utilities
undoubtedly claim that
salt
deposit
water leaking into
it
in
the rate of a gallon a minute. This water will create
power or into the power would be ruled out will
One
when the dangers of The Department of Energy has
These expenses, moreover, have not been figured into the
many
Unfortunately,
mines in Kansas had to be abandoned
nuclear
that
there any
to have serious drawbacks.
poured over $700,000,000 into a "test" under the desert in New Mexico. But it,
*
is
schemes, solidifying the wastes and placing them in
water percolation became apparent.
at least
Nor
must be
plants,
have been casting about for years for all
a
some of which have already leaked inadequate for this purpose. The authorities
power
or are reaching capacity, are
is
of the
back yard" reaction of an
perfectly contained (and guarded) for millions of years.
dispute that the pools at
say,
costs
of producing
they were, nuclear
regulators (with
costs. It
is
few
highly unlikely
decommissioning when
it
is
the time of decommissioning will
and unethical
the plant produced.
for them to
pay for
it,
because
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
a
97
brine solution that will, within decades, corrode the steel drums in
which the
radioactivity
contained.
is
no
secrecy, has released
problem, but
When
they corrode, the drums will
Energy, which has enshrouded the project in
The Department of
leak.
on how or whether
details
it
can solve
this
proceeding with the project. In 1987 Congress desig-
it is
nated Yucca Mountain, Nevada, scientific investigation
nuclear waste repository without
as a
of whether the
site
was geologically or hydrologi-
(The site was, however, politically suitable. It is underpopuand remote, and Nevada had only one unhappy congressional
cally suitable.
lated
senators.) It turns out that the site is on no one can be certain wdU be stable for 3,000,000 years; furthennore, no one also knows whether nearby underground nuclear tests have cracked the volcanic tuff. Like the New Mexico project, the Nevada project is proceeding as though there were no
representative
and two unhappy
volcanic rock that
problems, while the industry describes local opposition
scientific
NIMBY phenomenon.
merely an example of the It
may be
government and industry intransigence
that
as
a
reflects
desperation that engineers will not admit publicly. Radioactive wastes are
accumulating everywhere; is
as
we
will see in
only part of the problem. Military
Chapter
sites,
3,
the
power industry
and the groundwater and
streams near them, are already seriously contaminated. Nuclear authorities
may know
that they have their backs
up
against the wall
and
that
they simply must override normal democratic processes in order to get site.
Certainly
wastes have an
some of air
their other proposals for dealing
a
with nuclear
of desperation about them: using Antarctic
glaciers as
repositories (extreme transportation hazards; serious risk of upsetting the
dehcate heat balance of the glaciers, with potentiaUy
momentous
clima-
tological consequences) or rocketing the wastes into space (staggering
expense; potentially grave consequences of rocket proposals
also
failure).
sound desperate: constructing "temporary
storage facilities ...
on
islands or peninsulas"
(Hafele 1990,
this will
already had 50 years) "the time
needs to develop
and Another "advantage" of
latest
retrievable p.
144).
give the industry (which has
Nuclear authorities believe that it
Their
scientific,
technologic
methods" (Hafele 1990, p. 144). proposal is that it would "encourage the
institutional final waste disposal this
development of new global
institutions [to
national politics" (Hafele 1990,
In sum, there are security, health,
difficult
The
immune
and for the most part unsolved
resolution of these problems
how much money and
has written,
siting]
to
safety,
and pollution problems connected with the use of
nuclear technology.
matter
many
do the
p. 144).
effort
is
is
not assured, no
expended. As Christopher Flavin
CHAPTER 2
98
Nuclear power the
fifties
is
not the mature industry that proponents claim, but
one sustained by government
rather a sick
subsidies....
The noble visions of
did not include shoddy construction practices, billion-dollar cost
overruns, disinformation campaigns by government
officials,
thousands of
tons of accumulating nuclear wastes, or exploding reactors that con-
taminate foodstuffs a thousand kilometers away (1987,
Already the nuclear problem dens and other social
costs,
is
p.
64-5).
imposing very heavy management bur-
important matters that will be explored in
Above all, nuclear power does not appear some of its proponents claim. Indeed, it does not even seem very attractive as a short-term stopgap. The earth does not seem large or stable enough to accommodate its wastes; human beings Chapter 3 and
later in Part II.
to be the panacea that
be infallible and thus will never be able to control all its Even if we factor in the possible adverse effects of global warming, it is foolhardy to choose a source of energy that is devilishly will never
hazards.
human
unforgiving of the slightest toxins,
some of which have
failure
half-lives
and
that produces lethal
longer than the span of recorded
history.
Fusion Power:
Infinite Potential
Fraught
with Problems and Limitations In theory, controlled thermonuclear fusion constitutes a potentially in-
Many
long-range answer
finite
source of energy.
to
problems of energy supply. However, although fusion
all
attractive
therefore regard
on many grounds,
it
it
as the
by no means
is
free
is
undeniably
of problems and
hmitations.
Above
all,
no one
has yet demonstrated
its
practical feasibility,
even in
the laboratory, despite over 40 years of sustained international effort.
Thermonuclear
reactions
take
place in plasmas of ionized gases at
temperatures and pressures comparable to those found in the sun and other
stars.
These plasmas cannot be physically contained, so confinement
by magnetic
employed
field
and other
difficult
and esoteric techniques have been
in an effort to attain the levels of temperature
necessary for a continuous reaction. Very
little
and pressure
progress toward this
The best achievements still fall considerably needed. Most scientists working in this field are confident
objective has been made.
short of what
is
that the laboratory
breakthrough will eventually come, but the history of
research in the field suggests that the solution to each particular problem either reveals a
solutions
to
worse one behind
other
problems.
it
or proves incompatible with the
Even
optimists
concede
that
the
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
99
12 Safe Nuclear Power? Nuclear advocates are pursuing research that they claim will lead to the production of safe nuclear reactors. One type of new reactor would incorporate passive safety systems into new Hght- water reactors; the other type would be gas-cooled, the reactor being theoretically unable to reach temperatures that would melt the fuel particles. But nuclear scientists have not yet reached a consensus about which design to pursue. Once that was done, building and completing tests on a prototype
would
take at least a decade.
And
even
if the
new
reactor passed
all
would probably not be until 2010 that these "safe" reactors could come on line. There is no guarantee that the newly designed reactors would pass safety tests,
all
it
safety tests.
"Nucleonics Week," an industry publication, concludes unconvinced that safety has been achieved or
—
that "experts are flatly
even substantially advanced by the 1990,
new
designs" (quoted in Flavin
p. 24).
In addition,
how much
these
new
reactors will cost,
compared
other energy sources then available, has not been addressed.
The
to
nuclear
mdustry has a history of substantially underestimating the costs of nuclear projects. The industry has also not addressed the problem of nuclear wastes, which the
new
reactors will
still
produce.
breakthrough
is unlikely before 2050, at the earHest (Hafele 1990, p. 142). In any event, laboratory feasibility is only the first of a very long and expensive series of steps in research and development that will
be re-
quired to
make
fusion practical.
The engineering problems
to
be solved
are enormous; temperatures and pressures of stellar intensity are far beyond anything technologists and engineers have hitherto tried to tame. Even research costs are skyrocketing. Governments seem unable to afford
present and prospective costs, and fusion budgets are declining. If fusion power ever does become a possibihty, it will not be without problems. Although a virtually infinite supply of fuel is claimed by fusion enthusiasts, in fact the reactors now being invented will fuse deuterium
and tritium, the
latter
of which must be produced from lithium. Although
CHAPTER 2
100
deuterium
so abundant in seawater that
is
available, lithium
purposes infinitely
it
isotope needed for the fusion reaction,
scarcer
is
been used up, it
exploitable lithium ores have
will
be for aU practical
relatively scarce,
is
still.
and lithium-6, the
Thus, once readily
will have to
"burning the rocks." In short, the problem of
be obtained by not
fuel supply will
necessarily be abolished by the generation of fusion power.
Producing tritium from lithium involves two other problems. production must be done in a breeder reactor. Breeder reactor
First,
technology
is
complicated and extremely dangerous;
1984 the
in
United States abandoned the Clinch River Breeder Reactor spending $1.5 billion for
development. Scientists believe
its
a
after
hthium-
blanketed breeder reactor would be especially difficult to design,
because lithium the tritium
is
highly reactive and even explosive. Second, even
is
successfully produced, tritium
tritium releases are
make
reaction will
inevitable.'''
A
for
radioactive.
Some
Neutrons from the deuterium-tritium
the containment vessel radioactive. Fusion technol-
ogy, as presently conceived,
*
is
not clean.
is
breeder reactor uses plutonium (instead of relatively scarce uranium-235) fuel;
because
simultaneously
it
converts
a
surrounding
effect creates
uranium
more
fuel than
supplies
it
markedly diminishes the possible advantage comes
Some of this safe
in the very
side effects
toxic:
in
Plutonium
is
long term, and
of uranium mining. But
Breeders require reprocessing.
at a price.
it
burns. This essentially eliminates any concern
might run out, except
produce are extremely
of
blanket
comparatively abundant uranium-238 or thorium into more plutonium,
that
if
The
it
this
substances they
known.
the most toxic substance
waste must be discarded into nuclear waste disposal
sites
one has not been developed. The plutonium created during the
—and
fission
uranium, along with the unused uranium, must be extracted from the spent
a
of
fuel.
Plutonium's extreme toxicity greatly magnifies the health hazards of a reactor accident or a release of radioactive materials Finally, unlike the fuels
at
can be used to manufacture weapons. Thus raised
t
by the plutonium
Although
tritium,
any other stage
used in light-water reactors, plutonium
many thorny
in the fuel cycle.
fuel cycle.
one of the radioactive isotopes of hydrogen,
ous than some radionuclides,
cannot be fuUy contained
—
it
is
at least
still
0.03 percent of the
—
a century).
is less
hazard-
extremely dangerous both because total
it
inventory in reactors
would escape each year (Metz 1972) and because it is especially up and concentrated in living systems (where its half-life of 12 dangerous for over
a material that
is
security issues are
apt to be taken
years
makes
it
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
It is
true that other scientists envision alternative fusion technologies
can be determined,
that, as far as
be
clean.
producing it
at this stage
But some of these may never pan
of their conceptualizing, would
it
in problematic breeder reactors
from the moon, where
is
envisions
not radioactive. Instead of
(which
abundant.
it is
One, for example,
out.
helium-3 for tritium. Helium-3
substituting
mine
101
How
is
we could
possible),
this
would provide
us
with a net energy gain, however, has not been explained. In fact, the potential net energy yield of a fusion reactor
remains
a
question mark. First
—
—
just as
economy
with ordinary nuclear technol-
more so starting up a fusion power system will require an enormous expenditure of energy. Containment and heating of the
ogy, only
plasma require great quantities of energy. Especially the fusion reactors proves to be
less
than the hoped-for 60%,
power output of each
large proportion of the
if the efficiency
a
of
very
reactor will have to be
used just to keep the reactor in operation. Producing deuterium fuel
from seawater will also require the expenditure of energy. Finally, any conceivable form of thermonuclear reactor technology will demand, in addition to lithium, large
quantities of scarce minerals such as
helium, vanadium, and niobium, domestically. Eventually, these too
rock are
at
many of which would have
are not
produced
to be extracted
high cost in energy. Thus the net yield of energy
from
after all costs
counted may be very low. In sum, the Promethean attempt to provide
haustible stellar fire
is
a
bold enterprise that
humans with inex-
may bring
great benefits if
But given the extraordinary challenges, the development of fusion power may take several generations, if indeed it proves
it
succeeds.
possible at
all.
And
the promise of thermonuclear fusion should not be
allowed to obscure the
many problems and
hard choices that are
evident even today.
The **Energy Options** With
fusion energy not in sight,
burning
a
fossil fuel
supplies finite and their
source of serious pollution, and nuclear energy
a fool's
what are the options for humanity? One option, of course, go all out in producing ever more supplies of energy from fossil and iiuclear power, allowing carbon dioxide, radiation, and other
alternative, is
to
fuels
pollutants to build in
many
up
in the biosphere. Unfortunately, political leaders
countries support this option, and
none more strongly than
CHAPTER 2
102
R&D Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1991, United
Table 2-6 States
Government
Renewable
$158
Nuclear
fission
$305
Nuclear fusion
$274
Fossil fiiels
$459
Source: Nucleus, Spring 1991,
p. 5.
Amounts
are in millions
of dollars.
government (see Table 2-6). The probable consequences ofagricultural disruption and increasing starvation, cancers, and death will be inflicted primarily not on people who are the decision makers today but on future individuals, some not yet born. Another possibility is to choose the opposite path: to quickly and sharply reduce the production of energy from fossil fuels and nuclear power, develop energy sources that have few or no harmful consequences, and use the energy that is produced far more efficiently than it is used today. This option would have beneficial environmental impacts, but it would involve disruptive changes in the way people work and live, especially in the industrialized world. No one takes this option seriously. A less drastic choice would be to (1) discontinue use of nuclear energy as a power source, (2) phase down the use of fossil fuels, (3) rely more heavily on natural gas the least polluting and most efficient of the fossil fuels among the fossil fuels that the United States
—
are used, (4) bring into
—
widespread use already-available technology that
increases energy efficiency,
and
(5)
support research into renewable
energy alternatives that are not yet competitive, and develop and immediately use those that are. This option
mental
effects,
amount of
would also have beneficial environwhich would be to reduce the
the most important of
additional radiation and carbon dioxide emitted into the
biosphere. It
would require some changes
in
our habits and involve some
decentralization ofenergyproduction,but the changes themselves would
have relatively minor effects on the advantages overall
economic
sibilities for
activity.
using energy
ing sources of energy.
What
follows
is
a
we obtain from energy or
review of theoretical pos-
more efficiently and for developing nonpollut-
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
103
Conservation and Improved Efficiency
By becoming giving
more time
itself
we have, humanity can doing to the environment while
of the energy
efficient in the use
reduce the ever-escalating damage
it is
to phase in the use of nonpolluting energy
sources.
Although cutting per
itself be
adequate to avoid global warming, one study shows that
energy use by one-half will not in
capita
this level
of efficiency in industrial countries can be achieved without reducing present standards of living
(WRI
1990-91,
p. 146).
how much energy they conproduce the same amount of economic output. The
Countries already vary significantly in
sume
in order to
United
much energy as West produce the same output. The Rocky Mountain
for example, uses about twice as
States
Germany and Japan
to
Institute estimates that the at
United
States
can cut
its
by 75%
electricity use
an average cost of 6 cents per kilowatt-hour. Accordingly,
it is
cheaper
(on average) to improve efficiency than to produce
burning
fossil fuels.
more electricity by cheaper than producing more electricity by
And is far
nuclear energy (Fickett et
al.
1990,
States are already convinced. Sixty efficient lamps, appliances,
among
customers
their
p. 66).
Some
utilities in
the United
of them promote the use of electrically
windows, insulation, motors, and other devices rather
than
new power plants. money saved
building
Regulators in each case allow the utiUty to keep part of the
both
via the efficiency programs, so
utility
and customer
gain.
The potential and benefits of energy efficiency in some sectors of the economy are huge. For example, if everyone in the United States did nothing
else
but substitute currently available
efficient lights for
incandescent
power plants costing fi-om $85 to $200 and $18 to $30 billion a year to operate (Fickett et al. Comparable savings can be obtained with efficient motors and
bulbs, utilities could avoid building billion to construct
1990,
p. 67).
superefficient appliances. (Switching to efficient billion watts; the
(Fickett et
lated
al.
motors can save 80 to 190
changes pay for themselves in an average of 16 months
1990,
p. 68). It is
possible for builders to construct super-insu-
homes, offices, stores, schools, and
hospitals that
consume
as little as
of the energy needed for heating their conventional equivalents In Sweden,
new
them through
office buildings
need no manufactured energy
(see
Box
their cold v^dnters. Sunlight, plus the heat generated
and building materials partially ofiset
p. 79.)
The Swedes
install
central heating
exchangers ventilate interior space.
by the
warm
super insulation
that store solar heat; the extra cost
by not building
13).
at all to take
people, lights, and office equipment, are sufficient to keep buildings
(Bevington and Rosenfeld 1990,
10%
of doing so
is
and ventilation systems. Air
CHAPTER 2
104
13 Home Energy The
Savings
benefits an individual can achieve
are astonishing.
According to
a single 75-watt bulb
by using
Scientific American,
electricity efficiently
consumer
"if a
replaces
with an 18-watt compact fluorescent lamp that
10,000 hours, the consumer can save the electricity that a typical
lasts
power
plant would make firom 770 pounds of coal. As a result, about 1600 pounds of carbon dioxide and 18 pounds of sulfur dioxide would not be released into the atmosphere.... Alternatively, if that
U.S.
electricity
were produced by an oil-fired electric plant, the compact lamp would save 62 gallons of oil enough to fuel an
—
fluorescent
American car for a ISOO-mile journey. Yet far firom costing extra, the lamp generates net wealth and saves as much as $100 of the cost of generating electricity" (Fickett et benefits personally
over
its
lifetime,
it
The bulb
al.
1990,
will cost
will save that
him
p. 74).
The consumer also
or her about $18.00. But
customer $57.00
$0.10 per kilowatt-
(at
hour) in electricity and replacement bulbs. Individuals can also achieve astonishing savings in providing energy
homes. Superinsulated homes are standard in Sweden, for example. Using materials that store solar heat and superinsulation, these to heat their
homes
get
all
the winter heat they need by diverting hot water firom
their hot-water heaters to small heating units. In the
builders can save
$1000
to
$2500 on
United
central fiirnaces
systems to pay for superinsulation; one superinsulated
had a winter heating 82).
bill
ply
But superinsulated homes are States has been content so
more
much
in
Chicago
energy savings,
as,
rarely built in the
United
States.
The
begin to attain only modest for example, window manufacturers sup-
efficient low-emissivity
heat through their
home
of $24.00 (Bevington and Rosenfeld 1990, p.
United
residential
States,
and ventilating
far to
(low-E) windows. (Americans lose
windows each year
of entire annual flow through the Alaska
as
as
the energy equivalent
pipeline).
Builders can also retrofit existing buildings. Retrofits usually obtain
30
to
70%
energy savings. Customers typically spend nothing for these
efficiency measures. Instead, energy-services ficiencies
and
are paid
back with 50 to
companies finance the
70% of the
ef-
savings accrued fi-om
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
the
105
investment until their costs plus profits are achieved
efficiency
(Bevington and Rosenfeld 1990, p.78).* All in
then, industrial countries can gain major efficiencies in the
all,
use of energy in their
people
live
cost-effectively, as in
many
sectors of modern
or the
way they do
with either
life
without changes
business.
a relatively
It is
quick payback of up-front costs
no up-front
costs at
or,
com-
the case of innovative utility programs and energy services
panies, the consumer's incurring of
way them
in the
possible to adopt
(Southern
all.
among other things, gives away compact fluorescent program "creates" energy at an average cost of 2 cents per kilowatt-hour, far less than the cost of any power plant (Fickett et al. 1990, p. 71). These methods of boosting efficiency cost less than any other California Edison,
light bulbs. Its
method of producing power
(Table 2-7). Achieving improvements in
of seven times
efficiency can also displace the buildup
dioxide in the atmosphere, per dollar invested,
as
much
as
carbon
expanding nuclear
power. People in industrial countries can make greater gains in energy efficiency if they are willing to
modify some of
Consider, for example, the transportation sector
—
their living patterns.
which
the only one in
highly efficient products are not yet available. Great gains in transportation efficiency are nevertheless possible if people travel
rather than private automobile. In the
United
States, a
carrying 55 passengers uses an average of 640
by public Hght
BTUs
rail
by automobile (Lowe 1991, p. and despite the pollution and traffic congestion
fact,
travel
automobile commuting, over
by private vehicle.
By
80% of the
contrast, in
commute by
*
is
this
that result
from
population commutes to
work
rail
and bus
half that. In Tokyo, only
16%
efficiencies in the transportation sector are not yet available.
regrettable because, as
major polluters and the significant
per
private automobile.
Comparable
This
is
BTUs
59). Despite
Europe, where efficient
systems are maintained, the figure
vehicle
of energy per
passenger per kilometer, and a bus 690. This compares to 4580
passenger-km to
transit
size
improvements
in
we
will see in
of the global
Chapter
fleet
is
3,
automobiles are
increasing rapidly. But
automobile efficiencies are possible, despite
manufacturers' claims to the contrary. Volvo, for example, has produced a
prototype compact car that as
rapidly as a typical
requirements,
1990-91,
is
designed to cost no more than and accelerates
compact
and achieves 63
p. 151).
car,
mpg
meets city
all
countries' crashworthiness
and 81
mpg highway (WRI
106
CHAPTER 2 Table 2-7 Costs of Avoiding Carbon Emissions Associated with Alternatives to Fossil Fuels, 1989
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
shown
little interest.
To
107
the extent that efficiency measures have been
adopted, they have been adopted in the industrial world.
Why
isn't
when doing
humanity
so
fully exploiting the possibilities for efficiency
clearly in
is
short-term interest
as
well?
not only
The
its
long-term
interest
technological, will be discussed in Part tions are in order here. First, there
is
infrastructures; industry
to invest
anew
II.
and government,
been made
cheaper item even
a
if
making
initial costs;
a
higher
in
therefore, are reluctant
in energy efficiency.''' Second, people
discount future savings in favor of lower
buy
its
the matter of inertia. In industrial
countries, for example, heavy investments have already
modern
but
which are institutional not But a few preliminary observa-
obstacles,
and industry tend
most consumers
initial
to
will
investment has a
two years (Gladwell 1990, p. A3). Third, people government poUcies to encourage conservation whenever those poHcies burden them. In the United States, for example, payback time
as short as
and industry
resist
voters frequently reject increased gasoline taxes, mass-transit expenditures, land-use controls to
prevent suburban sprawl, and even mandatory
recycHng measures. Industry lobbies heavily against mandatory conservation measures.
However, these generalizations
are not always true. France,
Belgium,
the Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal, and the Scandinavian countries have
economic growth from increased energy consumpcommitted to reducing energy consumption by 25%
already decoupled tion.
Germany
is
over the next 15 years (Flavin and Lenssen 1991,
p. 25). Japan has an energy manager in every industry. In Europe, public opinion seems to
take the greenhouse effect seriously.
By
investing in energy efficiency,
these countries not only slow the greenhouse effect but improve their
*
For example,
it
is
cheaper for developing countries to replace inefficient
motors and lighting with
efficient devices,
water heaters and stoves for hydroelectric central
power
electric ones,
plants.
energy by the world's poor.
than to build
Efficiencies are
New,
developed that can be produced
at
pour
is
its
new
inexpensive solar cookers have been
undoubtedly part of the reason
(Gorman 1990,
why
p. 206).
the United States continues to
transportation investments overwhelmingly into highways instead of
building and maintaining transit systems and encouraging
them.
coal, nuclear, or
even possible in the use of
the village level and used in place of
flielwood to cook food and pasteurize water t This
and to substitute solar-powered
its
citizens to use
CHAPTER 2
108
economic competitiveness. Second, not
make purchases on
we
all
of industry or
the basis of the short-term
have already seen that some
utilities are
bottom
consumers
all
line.
For example,
learning to create both market
push and market pull to influence the purchase of efficient devices. The
some form of rebate
majority of them pay pull; p.
some
These methods seem
71).
Finally, the
accept
to
be
effective in
European experience shows
some government
market
al.
changing purchasing
that
1990,
habits.
people and industry will
encourage conservation even
policies to
burdensome; high gasoline
it is
to purchasers to create
pay suppliers rebates, creating market push (Fickett et
when on
taxes, mass-transit faciHties, controls
land development, energy standards for buildings, bicycle pathways, and recycling are
commonplace on
the continent.
However, these encouraging developments notwithstanding, or
as
extensively as
necessary (even in Europe). Thiis,
is
if
energy efficiency are confined to the industrialized world
most
global changes in climatic
part, today)
problems will probably be
development in developing countries their
as fast
improvements
(as
they
are, for
in
the
and other environmental
economic
Population growth and
severe.
institu-
measures from being adopted
tional obstacles are preventing efficiency
will probably result in a
carbon emissions per person by 2030. So even
if
doubling of
the industrialized
countries (including the United States) were to halve their per capita carbon
emissions by that time, annual emissions of carbon dioxide
times what they are
now
(Gibbons
carbon dioxide emissions are
must be
reduced
by 60
to
80%
amount of carbon dioxide
et
increasing
—
1989,
al.
p.
141).
—
to the level of the 1950s
in the atmosphere (Flavin
as a
one-half
whole
as
will
much
year.
They
to stabilize the
and Lenssen 1991,
p.
energy system, the
have to produce goods and services with one-third to
energy
as
today,
quadruple (Flavin and Lenssen 1991, Finally,
2.5
present, global
by 400 million tons each
25). Scientists have calculated that to achieve a sustainable
world
At
would be
and renewable energy sources must p. 26).
whatever the pace or extent of efficiency,
for eliminating the pollution caused
energy production. For example, even energy consumption in
half,
it
it is
not
a
panacea
by humanity's current methods of
we were
if
to succeed in cutting
would merely have the same
effect as
doubling the supply. Rapid population increases and economic develop-
ment
will eventually cause
of increased
*
efficiency.
Only China among
energy
4.7%
to
be used and overrun the
the developing countries has
efficiencies, cutting
a year for the past
more energy
effect
Consequently, energy conservation alone can
implemented
significant
energy required per unit of economic output by
decade (Chandler
et
al.
1990, p. 125).
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
never be more than
a
short-term
conservation must be seen
as
pollution and give humanity
109
palliative.
To the extent
it
is
adopted,
an interim measure to avoid some global
more time
to develop nonpolluting energy
sources.
Geothermal Power: Tapping the Heat of the Earth The technology
to use the earth's interior heat
both to heat buildings
direcdy and to generate large amounts of electricity
Moreover, given that due care
is
is
essentiaUy in hand.
taken, the environmental consequences
of exploitation are comparatively benign. Global geothermal capacity increased by
Today
it
16%
per year from 1978 to 1985 (Corson 1990,
produces 6 million kilowatts of electrical power.
from geothermal
get a substantial portion of their electricity
Salvador gets 40%, Nicaragua, almost
Some
30). total
30%
p. 197).
A few countries sources: El
and Lenssen 1991,
(Flavin
estimate that the United States can get
as
much
as
p.
10% of its
energy supply in the year 2000 from geothermal power.
But geothermal power has limits. Although some countries have and hot-water fields that can be exploited for power production, others do not. (For a variety of reasons, not all natural geysers, natural steam,
geothermal resources are available developed in the United
(Wysham
1991,
p.
12).)
countries wdthout these
To produce
fracturing the rocks,
pumping
sources. Consider as an
geothermal
substantial
fields, artificial
down
to areas
fields
should be
amounts of power
in
geothermal reservoirs must be
of high heat flux in
in water to be heated,
the heat from the resulting steam.
The technology
basal rocks,
and then extracting
for this
is
becoming
early experiments
with the technique are promising, but more research, development, and exploration must be done before
available,
much
large
only tropical rainforest in Hawaii
States'
created by drilling
and
power
as
example the controversy over whether
a clear picture
The
of the extent of geothermal resources emerges.
power is also not pollution-free. The steam or hot water used to produce power almost always contains noxious gases and corrosive compounds; many wells emit significant exploitation of geothermal
quantities of radionuclides. Well blowouts
sometimes occur, releasing the
steam into the atmosphere. Environmentally compatible ways of both capturing and disposing of used steam and water are improving, but the
problem
is
not yet solved. Another problem
must be located be produced
some
that
is
in geologically suitable areas,
geothermal reservoirs
which
requires that
power
from markets. This means that the monetary and environmental costs of power transmission (as well as the at
attendant energy losses)
distance
may be
considerable.
(On
the other hand, this
CHAPTER 2
no problem can be surmounted
develop materials that are super-
if scientists
work with. "Practical" superconductivity would achieve more than making geothermal and other location-specific power sources more available. It would, in effect, conductive at temperatures that are practical to
"create"
more
electricity. Presently,
50% of the
electricity
produced
is
lost
in transmission.) All in
all,
geothermal power has significant potential
as
an energy
form of energy as ultimately contributing more than 20% of supply. * For it to do so, more effort and money than are currently being invested will be needed to develop the technology for geothermal's use in more areas and to overcome its minor but stubborn source; optimists foresee this
pollution problems.
Biotnass Plants are the oldest source is
created in photosynthesis.
burn other
solar energy; they
Traditional
fiiels,
primarily
developing nations.
wood
known to humans. Green plant matter Humans eat the plants containing this stored
of energy
plants, especially
wood,
wood, provide 40% of
The obvious
problems, however, are
burning, conflict with other uses for wood, and
(leading to potential conflict with needs for food living room). Unfortunately, as
we
to
do
their
work.
the energy supply of
and
air
pollution from
demand
for space
fiber or, at least, for
many nations are destroying Out of hunger for energy
have seen,
their forests faster than they are replacing them.
people are continuing the ancient pattern of reducing forested mountains to bare rock skeletons. In countries,
fact, this
where the populace
pattern
is
prominent today in many poorer
ravages the land for
Deriving energy firom biomass, however, the burning of fiielwood.
It
refers
is
wood
fiiel.
usually distinguished
from
to converting a variety of plant
materials into efficient fuels without producing poUution. First, the
source plant material must be
carbon dioxide produced
grown
when
sustainably, so that the
the plant
is
amount of
processed and burned
is
the
same as that which was consumed as the plant grew. Second, the fuel must burn without creating other kinds of poUution. The production of ethanol from sugar cane residues satisfies these requirements and is a major industry in
Brazil.
minor modifications of
*
Ethanol can power existing motor vehicles with their engines. In 1986, ethanol supplied half
Geothermal's potential could be
practical superconductivity,
extract energy
it
were
still
higher
if,
of
in addition to achieving
possible to develop the technology to
from underground masses of hot rock.
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
Brazil's
automotive fuel (Corson 1990,
gasify plant materials.
considerably
less
The
gas can
p.
power
polluting than that of
plants are only at the theoretical stage.
75% of Africa's
111
Another
211).
and
turbines,
use
is
to
would be
Gasifier-gas-turbine
fossil fiiels.
But
possibility
its
scientists
have calculated that
current electrical capacity can be generated by using plant
wastes alone (Flavin and Lenssen 1991,
p. 29).
Unfortunately, biomass energy has a significant disadvantage
energy source: the scarcity of
its
resource base.
we shall see, the fliel (sun, wind, What is required of technology is
With other
as
an
solar tech-
nologies, as
or water)
renewable.
the ability to harness the
energy in the biomass fuel a
is
fiiel.
not.
But although
One
world where there
possibility
is
grow energy
to
plentifial
and
and renewable,
plantations.
But
in
be insufficient food and fiber for rapidly
will
growing populations, diverting
win
plants are also plentiflil
is
agricultural land for this purpose seems
Even some developed countries, such as those in Western Europe, where an adequate food supply is not a problem, do not have enough land available to grow large amounts of biomass. Alternatively, biomass will rely on plant residues. However, many of these residues are presently plowed back into the soil to enhance soil fertility. unlikely to
Diverting
it
approval.
to other purposes will only reduce agricultural yields. In
Nepal, the diversion of biomass from the
by 15% (Corson 1990,
Biomass, then, has some limited potential
Some of
the support for biomass
is
which can be used
enough
free land or plant residues in the
say
as a
based on
alcohol,
fleet, to
has reduced grain yields
fields
p. 151).
its
future energy source.
capacity to produce
in (modified) gasoline engines.
nothing of one expected to double in 30
realistic possibility is that
industry wastes)
But there
isn't
world to power today's vehicle years.
A
more
biomass (mostly wood, cane sugar, and beverage
wiU supply the alcohol
(gasohol). This gasohol could
for an alcohol-gasoUne mixture
be used
as
a
transitional vehicle fuel,
reducing poDution until some other means of powering motor vehicles
is
developed.
Hydropower
An
estabHshed technology that
haustible source of energy
the world electric
is
is
relies
on
a theoretically renewable, inex-
generated fi-om falling water.
power
20% of the electricity of Norway obtains 50% of its
hydropower. About
fi-om hydro.
Hydroelectric power's theoretical capacity has also hardly been tapped.
Whereas North America had developed 60% of its large-scale Europe had developed only 36%, Asia
hydroelectric potential in 1980,
CHAPTER 2
112
9%, Latin America 8%, and Africa 5%. Developing countries have made it a priority to expand hydroelectric capacity since that time. From 1980 to 1985, 31 developing countries doubled their capacity. But even with this doubling, the hydroelectric potential in developing countries
is
10 times
what is currently being generated. Hydropower, however, is not without adverse environmental effects. As we will discuss in Chapter 3, the large dams many countries have been building spread diseases. The reservoirs, which are usually too deep and sterile to support fish, often expand the breeding grounds for the carriers of malaria, schistosomiasis, and river blindness. The large dams also inundate
forests, farms,
and
wildlife habitats; entire species
animals have been wiped out in submerged areas.
Many
of plants and
people upstream
dam are physically displaced, and their way of life may be
of the
Silting
is
destroyed.
serious problem, reducing the storage capacity and power
a
potential of the
dams over
time, and depriving the soUs
downstream of
comes firom silt-bearing floodwater. As a result, the people who have farmed or fished downstream of the dam in these floodwaters for millennia are dispossessed of their food supply. Their way the fertilization that
of life may
also
be destroyed.
Hydropower, potential.
therefore, cannot be
But with due
much room
care to limit
its
developed to
its
environmental
for growth. Projects using small
fuU theoretical
effects, it still has
dams and
reservoirs have
effects, and their disruptive effects on human more manageable. China may provide something of a
fewer adverse ecological populations are
model of what can be done; it has built over 86,000 small hydroelectric projects that provide some power to almost every province in the country (Corson 1990, p. 197). By itself, however, small-scale hydroelectric power generates relatively smaU amounts of electricity, and the potential varies gready with locality. Therefore, small-scale power production from water can be only a minor part of the answer to the needs of an energy-intensive industrial civiHzation.
Solar Power:
The Ultimate
In the final analysis, almost fiaels
''Fuel" all
the energy available to people
are simply the stored legacy
is
solar. Fossil
of past photosynthesis; the fissionable
elements were formed in a solar fiarnace; and a thermonuclear reactor
is
essentially a miniature
ordinarily refers to the use
of the
sun.
However, the term
natural heat traps,
of
power
direct energy of the sun's rays via solar
heat collectors or photovoltaic conversion the indirect results
solar
fiasion
—
solar heating
and photosynthesis.
cells
and
falling or
to the exploitation
moving
of
water, wind,
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
Hydroelectric power
is
a
form of solar energy and is renewable: The falls as rain, which flows into rivers.
water which
sun's heat evaporates
The dams hold back and channel turbines.
Biomass
the energy of the faUing water to rotate
But hydroelectric power
differs in a critical
Whereas hydroelectric
solar technologies.
vironmental
113
the
effects;
new
would appear
humanity's long-term
to
solar
be appropriate sources of energy for
solar
energy
that
is
difficult to harness. It
it is
some forms of
it
is
are available only in limited
quantities during any given period. Nevertheless, the total
energy
alone
unequally distributed around the globe, and variable with
season and weather, and
solar
it
ftiture.
The problem with also diffuse,
new
new
solar technologies;
does not rely on an ample resource base. Thus only the technologies
the
technologies have inconsequential ones.
from other new
also differs critically
way from
projects can have serious en-
is
huge
so
that harnessing
even
a fraction
amount of
of it could
satisfy
the energy requirements of humanity.
Wind Power Wind power already appears to be an almost Uniquely among the new solar technologies, it is tive
v^th energy produced from
more cheaply than
power
watts of wind-generating capacity was installed
85% of
it
in California.
electricity at 5
produced from
which
The CaHfornia windmills
new
takes years
same
1660 mega-
plant.
worldwide
cents per kilowatt hour, the a
economically competican produce electricity
fossil fuels. It
the most efficient nuclear
perfect energy source.
in
in the 1980s,
1991 produced
cost as electricity
coal plant. Moreover, in contrast to a coal plant,
from the design stage to the production of electricity, mass-produced and can be properly sited and
today's windmills can be
"on
line" in a matter of months.
According to the U.S. Department of
Energy, advances in windmill technology are expected to bring the cost
of wind power
down
to 3.5 cents per kilowatt-hour at
the next 20 years (Weinberg and Williams 1990,
Plenty of good the United States, states,
sites are available
90% of these
p.
good
sites
within
148).
for wind-generated electricity. In
mountain and plain where windmills can be placed on ranches and farms without are in 12 contiguous
disturbing present agricultural activities. In California, cattle graze under
*
The amount of solar energy
theoretically available is staggering.
Each year the
Q (5 X 10^^ BTU) from the sun. By contrast, humans have thus far consumed only about 15 Q of fossil earth receives about
5000
fiael!
CHAPTER 2
114
wind machines while
existing
the ranchers reap royalties for the use of
their land. Scientists have calculated that entire
enough
meet the
electricity to
needs of the United States could theoretically be
electrical
generated by means of wind energy alone (Weinberg and Williams 1990, p.
To do
148).
would
so
require only
10% of U.S. land
compatible with existing (mostly agricultural) Scientific obstacles to this
are political obstacles as well.
generated energy
is
development These
area
and would be
uses.
however. (There
exist,
still
are discussed in Part
intermittent. Therefore, using
II.)
Wind-
wdnd power can
save
would otherwise be needed to generate the same power in conventional power plants and can make it unnecessary to build the conventional power plants needed to supply electricity in periods of peak demand. But wind power cannot serve as an exclusive power source. Base-line power must be generated by some other method. One way around this limitation, which affects most solar technologies, is to develop much better methods for storing electricity. Batteries, at least the
fossil fuels that
batteries
of the types currendy in
method
is
When
use, clearly will
not do.
to use electricity to compress air into
energy
is
needed, the
air
is
released
and
is
already in use in
Another
difficulty
with wind-generated
solar technologies: the cost (in dollars
to
power produced from
urban
storage.
method
is
70%
effi-
Germany.
we observed with geothermal power and the
promising
from the cavern, heated, and
flinneled through turbines to produce power. This cient
One
underground
electricity
affects
where
local
the same one
most of the other new
and energy
losses)
rural locations in relatively
areas in distant states
is
demand
of transmitting
unpopulated
for electricity
is
areas
high.
Apart from research on superconductivity, another approach to solving this
problem
which
is
is
to develop a
"hydrogen economy," the technology for
unfolding.
In sum, scientists are surmounting the technical obstacles to fuU
exploitation of wind-generated electricity. As they do, wind power can become a major provider of electricity in many countries. Production of wind power causes no pollution. It takes up land, but most of the land can
be used for other purposes simultaneously. Noise used to be
*
Hydroelectric
power
is
power and biomass
to
problem.
use stored energy as needed; thus their
not intermittent except in extreme situations.
hydropower, when seasonal variations electrical
a
in
water
power can be used to pump water up
availability
In
the
case
of
can be anticipated,
into the reservoirs in
good
times,
be used in periods of droughts. These pumped hydroelectric storage systems
achieve about
70%
efficiency (Flavin
and Lenssen 1991,
p. 30).
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
but
modern wind
About
turbines are quiet.
mental damage done
the only remaining environ-
sometimes
that birds
is
115
fly into
the windmills and
are killed.
Power
Solar Thermal
power
Solar thermal
that fluid
Corporation has
promising
and collect
to track the sun
3000°C, and
also a
is
is
its
then used in
commercial
built
desert northeast of Los Angeles.
power
at
new
per kilowatt hour with
producing
technology.
It
That heat warms
uses collectors a fluid
60%
to
solar thermal facilities in California's
These
facilities
reliability. It
95%
produce 350 megawatts of reliability.
This
a figure that
far
exceeds
at
13 cents
only slightly exceeds the cost of
electricity at coal-fired plants,
—
up
power-generation cycle. The Luz
nuclear plants, which produce power
kilowatt-hour on average
of
a
new
8 cents per kilowatt-hour with
the capabilities of
costs
heat.
which
costs 6 to 8 cents per
does not however, include the
lost productivity, health-care expenses,
and cleanup of
coal's
environmental pollution. Like
wind power,
solar
Their production costs are like a
wind
facihty, a solar
thermal components can be mass-produced.
come down
likely to
further over time. Also
thermal plant takes only months to construct.
Luz constructed one plant in nine months. A coal plant takes 6 years to come on line; a nuclear plant can take up to 15 years. SoLr thermal plants are practical only in sunny and mostly sunny areas.
only
The as
fiiU
exploitation of solar thermal power, therefore, can occur
the technology for efficient electrical transmission and storage
capabilities continues to develop. Solar
thermal power, however,
itself
provides a means for storing electricity. Sun-tracking mirrors can concentrate
tremendous heat in water,
months;
85%
power
oil,
and bedrock during hot summer
of the stored heat can be recovered
later for use as a heat or
source.
occupy unavailable for most But they more land than conventional power other uses. do not take up sources, if one includes the land used for mining or drilling for the fiaels Solar thermal plants render the land they
that conventional facilities require. Solar thermal plants also don't pollute.
The only "pollution" associated witn them some of their high-tech components.
occurs in the manufacture of
Ocean Energy Another emerging
(OTEC). The
solar
technology
principle of
is
ocean thermal energy conversion
OTEC has been understood for many years;
it
CHAPTER 2
116
can best be described
as
an
air
conditioner in reverse.
An
uses electricity to create a difference in temperature;
air
conditioner
OTEC
uses the
difference in ocean temperatures between surface and deep water to
OTEC
create electricity. Several countries have built small prototype plants.
central
The
work most
technology, however, will
power
wherever there
stations
is
with large
efficiently
at least a
20° C difference be-
tween surface and deep ocean waters. These plants are expected to produce power at a cost of 7 cents per kilowatt-hour (Corson 1990, p. 198).
When it is
developed, island countries with population centers close
to the sea can profit
most from
OTEC
technology. There are 300
population centers close to ocean waters that have sufficient differences
OTEC,
in temperature for tries,
such
almost
all
of
theoretically, to
Japan, are short
as
their fossil fiaels.
on
The
work.
Many
of these coun-
now
natural resources; they "fiael"
of OTEC, seawater,
is
import
plentiful.
Governments and utiBties have drawn up plans to build or are already constructing commercial OTEC plants off the coasts ofJapan, Tahiti, and Bali (Penney and Bharathan 1987, p. 87).
OTEC
unique among the
is
intermittent;
new
solar technologies in that
it is
not
the difference between seawater temperatures, varies
its fiael,
only slightly from day to day. (Seasonally,
its
greatest potential
is
in the
summer, when power demands are highest.) Hence it does not depend on the development of new electrical storage technologies. OTEC is also pollution-free. In fact, OTEC's by-products are one of the main arguments Jbr developing the technology (The Economist 1987, p. 94). One by-product is fresh water, formed when steam is condensed by the cold seawater.
Another
is
aquaculture,
nutrients in the cold seawater that
then discharged
OTEC
at
which can be sustained by the is
pumped
into an
OTEC
converting only about
doesn't matter;
plant and
the ocean surface.
does have some remaining technical problems.
in conventional
rich
3% of the
heat energy to
It is inefficient,
power, compared with 35%
power plants (The Economist 1987, p. 94). In one sense, this OTEC's fuel is practically infinite. But to take advantage of
bounty of seawater requires enormous heat exchangers that will resist corrosion and fouling, and it requires the means to pump and pipe huge
this
amounts of cold water from the ocean's depths (Penney and Bharathan 1987, Keeping a plant seaworthy under all storm conditions and
pp. 89-90, 92). sufficiently
immobile to attach an
electrical
problems. These problems are being solved, but is
needed before
cable to it is
it
two other more research
are
clear that
OTEC can be used widely.
Other ways of harnessing energy ment. Norway has
built
via seawater are also
two small wave-power
plants.
under develop-
At
least
one
is
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
and
financially viable,
117
Norwegian company
a
commercially. British engineers have designed
weighing 23,000 tons and intended
The
bed.
air pressure,
of
which
megawatts of
power
in turn will
electricity
and
rises
France has built a
electricity.
OTEC
water that
no
wave power plant
tidal
principle as the
a turbine to
power
(Corson 1990,
198).
p.
produce large amounts
plant that can generate 240
These technologies, rain,
like
no carbon dioxide
Thus they would seem
radioactivity.
Norwegian
inside a cylinder will generate
falls
and other renewables, produce no acid
buildup, and
seUing the machine
to be located underwater, in the sea
on the same
plant will operate
plants: Oscillating
is
a large
good
to have
long-term potential.
Photovoltaics
The
ultimate energy source
is
photovoltaic energy. Photons (indivi-
dual particles of light) from the sun are absorbed in
and produce
to displace electrons
no maintenance and there water or wind, cause no
semiconductor
a
installed,
are
nologies, can be placed close to are in partly
Once
they need no operational costs. They require no noise, and, unhke other new solar techa current.
users of electricity, even those
all
cloudy locations. They can be constructed in small
using current technology, a 40-square-meter array on
roof in
a locality
United
States
(Weinberg and Williams 1990, be constructed
windpower or than
solar
p.
149).
Or
units).
a year, a large array in less far,
A
149).
kwh
companies.
utility
(though not so
fast as
than two. price.
is
The
m
PV
power has $60 per kilowatt hour in
price of
1990 (Weinberg and Williams 1990,
These declines were achieved despite minuscule government
search support. But at these prices,
tions facilities
countries find
home
p.
re-
PV power is still about five times more
expensive than conventional power.
remote commercial or
PV
small array can be built in less
declined dramatically in the past 20 years, fi-om
1970 to 20 to 30 cents per
sunlight in the
they can be built in large
of power for
relatively quickly
thermal
Their disadvantage, so
south-facing
the electricity needed by that household
all
arrays to provide a central source arrays can
amount of
receiving an average
can supply
a
who
units;
Its
use
applications
is
justified
predominantly in
and military and communica-
where power lines are not available. Some developing power economically justified in rural electrification
PV
projects. Still,
PV power
is
expected to continue to achieve
decHnes in price in the near
may be
possible.
fiiture.
For example,
fiarther
dramatic
Further technological breakthroughs
scientists
have developed solar ceUs in the
CHAPTER 2
118
Table 2-8
Land Use of Electricity-Producing Technologies
the United States
in
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
119
States currently consumes could be supplied by PV arrays taking up 0.37% of the land area of the country (Weinberg and Williams 1990, p.
amount of space needed
149).* Furthermore, a substantial will not
be on land
In Spain and
at all;
will
for
PV power
be on rooftops and other such structures.
government
the
Italy,
it
is
funding rooftop
installations
on
homes.
PV energy is intermittent. It produces no power at night and htde on humanity to fuUy exploit PV power requires improved energy-storage technology. In this respect, PV energy is like overcast days. Thus, for
wind and
solar
thermal energy.
The Hydrogen Economy The technology veloped in
We
amounts of electricity is being dewith the development of renewable energy sources.
to store large
parallel
have previously noted the
high-temperature
technology
(solar)
solar
is
possibilities
thermal storage.
of compressed-air and
An
even more promising
hydrogen. Energy from the sun can generate
which can be passed from one electrode
electricity,
The process splits water into two oxygen. The hydrogen can be burned in
water.
parts
to another in
hydrogen and one part
place of
oil,
coal,
gas. It
can also be transported to distant locations where
much
as
natural gas
Hy drogen
is
is
and natural
it is
needed,
today.
an extraordinarily clean-burning
fuel.
Unlike
fossil fiaels, it
no carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, particulates, volatile organic compounds, or sulflir dioxide. To burn hydrogen is simply to recombine it back v^th oxygen to produce water. Combustion also produces small amounts of nitrogen oxides, which catalytic converters can almost completeemits
ly eliminate.
Because hydrogen can be stored in tanks and transported through
where it is needed, humans can substitute a hydrogen one based on fossil fuels. Hydrogen will allow solargenerated power to be used in places and at times dissociated from when the sun is shining or the wind blowing. Scientists have projected that PV
pipelines to
economy
cells
for
can be located in desert locations to manufacture the hydrogen,
because the annual is
needed
scientists
it
now
arrays used to
most
deserts get suppUes
more water than
(Weinberg and Williams 1990, p. 154). Moreover,
have calculated that
pipeline than
PV
rainfall that
in electrolysis
it
hydrogen by by wire (Weinberg and
will cost less to transport
costs to transport electricity
produce hydrogen can be located in unpopulated
deserts.
CHAPTER 2
120
—14 The Multiplex Energy Economy of the Future It
seems
likely that in the fiiture
ferent energy sources,
we
shall
from the age-old
make
of many
eclectic use
to the ultra-modern, in a
dif-
"mul-
economy." The centralized power production characof today s advanced industrial civilization is encountering
tiplex energy teristic
Old fuels will become too noxious to burn and some new sources of energy, such as nuclear fission,
various types of Umits. eventually run out;
are ecologically dangerous
ing
new forms of energy
need not
fit
no longer be
be
tendency toward
ficiency
socially problematic;
and
and other promis-
supply, such as geophysical or solar power,
exclusively into the current system.
will a
and
so cheap
and abundant
(1) greater
as
it
Energy from
has been.
The
all
sources
result will
decentraUzation and energy self-suf-
intensive exploitation of every nonpolluting source of
(2)
energy (combined with scrupulous conservation).
The
possibilities for greatly increased
tually endless.
Roofs can hold
energy self-sufficiency are vir-
solar collectors
and small windmills,
small water turbines in local streams can produce electricity, local
un-
derground heat can be tapped, and so on. In India today, village children collect cow dung and other organic wastes to produce
methane
gas,
which
yields the villages' electricity supply.
yourself home techniques that are
Williams 1990,
p.
hydrogen. As
we
without adverse be used
as part
now being pioneered by
153), so desert production
practical. (In addition,
The
wind-generated
of
electricity
do-it-
"soft" tech-
electricity
should be
can be used to produce
have seen, windmills can be sited in agricultural areas
some
In
effects.)
of the (wind
or)
cases, existing natural gas pipelines
can
PV-hydrogen's distribution network.
Hydrogen does pose problems, however. Most often mentioned is its explosiveness. But in fact, hydrogen does not pose a greater danger of exploding than does natural learned
how
to handle
it.
gas;
although accidents occur, users have
For example, hydrogen has been used
safely
"town gas" to heat homes. Industries have also developed processes for handHng hydrogen harmlessly in a variety of commercial applications, such as making ammonia, fertiUzer, dyes, and since the 19th century
rocket
fuels.
An
as
important limitation of hydrogen
readily substitute for gasoline as a
motor
is
that
vehicle fuel.
it
does not
Compared
to
gasohne, hydrogen has both a low density of energy and a low density of
— Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
nologists should
economy even
become
if,
as will
mass
transit,
In addition,
more
be centrally generated to run
still
and the
we
one aspect of our future energy
at least
probably be the case, most electricity and
other forms of energy will tories,
121
cities, fac-
like.
can probably expect energy sources to be
now
varied than they
are.
mountain
farms, grasslands, and
on
hydroelectric projects
For example,
we
on
passes, solar collectors in deserts, small
and streams, and
rivers
much
will see windmills
OTEC
and wave
projects offshore. Small biomass facilities will be located in the villages
of developing countries and near
forests
source of energy will go unexploited. kinds
—
to
industrial,
commercial,
much more
will be
produce heat, or
making
a
supply. In
though
many
distilled to
their
safe
m
residential, agricultural, silvacultural efficiency,
produce gaseous and liquid
burned
fuels,
locally significant contribution to the
areas, draft
No
plantations.
that wastes of all
widely reused to achieve energy
modest but
some
and sugar
It is likely
energy
animals seem likely to be retained, even
upkeep often requires heavy energy expenditure, for in
cases the alternative to draft animals
is
human
labor.
We seem, then, to be headed for a kind of multiplex, two-tier energy economy in which centralized, industrial power production wiU support certain key sectors but in which individuals and localities, employing a curious combination of pre-modern and post-industrial means,
wiU be important
power
(Bleviss
players in
meeting humanity's energy needs.
and Walzer 1990,
p.
106).
The former limits
load of a hydrogen-powered vehicle, the latter
and Walzer 1990,
(Bleviss
p.
106).
its
These problems do not seem insur-
mountable, but they have not yet been conquered.
A
few automobile
manufacturers are working to develop hydrogen-powered
*
One
oxygen
possible solution in a
fliel cell,
a
is
the range and
ability to accelerate
to generate electricity
cars,
but unlike
by combining hydrogen and
chemical reaction that produces no nitrogen oxides.
The
generated electricity would fuel stUl-to-be-developed electric motor vehicles.
Another
possibility
Methanol,
is
to
like ethanol,
combined with
produce methanol from hydrogen and carbon dioxide. can
fliel
motor vehicle engines
directly or can
be
gasoline to produce another type of gasohol. This "solution,"
however, creates
a serious pollution
problem:
The combustion of methanol
produces formaldehyde, a carcinogen (Schmidt-Perkins 1989,
p. 21).
CHAPTER 2
122
the case with fliel-efficient and electric models, they have not yet pro-
duced prototypes. This drawback, however, should not detract from hydrogen's pracother energy applications. Hydrogen both stores and trans-
ticality in
power and thereby makes solar power available when and where it is needed.* It is a means of converting solar electricity into alternating current, a more usable form of electricity. It is also a means of converting electrical energy into gaseous or liquid fuel, which is
ports solar
important because only about 25 percent of our current energy needs are supplied in the
form of
combined with the
efficient use
A
electricity.
travagant transportation patterns, offers the
energy needs. small
The manufacture of some
may
to the processes,
of energy production today, solar-hydrogen
haustible
less
if
ex-
hope of meeting humanity's
solar collectors
amount of pollution. But compared
effects
solar-hydrogen economy,
of energy and perhaps with
involve a
methods, and
virtually inex-
is
and poUution-firee.
Energy, Heat, and Climate Although progress toward a solar-hydrogen economy has been made, and such an arrangement will undoubtedly be in humanity's long-term future, the critical question is whether its present limitations will be surmounted in time to avoid extensive environmental degradation and
human
suffering.
The answer
to that question
still
is
uncertain. Solar
technology requires more research and development support than getting; as Table
2-6 shows, research
is
grossly biased in favor of fossil fuels
and the nuclear option. Other than sheer
inertia, this
uranium,
fact that solar energy, unlike fossil fuels or
can be owned. Moreover, some forms of initially
it is
it
probably
is
not
reflects the
a resource that
(such as rooftop collectors)
appeared to lend themselves primarily to local and perhaps even
individual exploitation,
we
which
is
of no
interest to gigantic regionally
no longer accurate; with hydrogen as a storage and transportation mechanism, solar collectors can be located in deserts, wind farms can be located in agricultural areas, oriented utiHties. As
*
Hydrogen
actually
power. For example,
have seen,
this
is
complements the weaknesses of solar-generated
hydrogen, for
electrical
on high-voltage alternating current. One where possible, to work on low-voltage But the alternative is to use the low-voltage power to make which it is ideally suited, and later to bum the hydrogen to
to redesign applications,
direct current.
is
PV power is in the form of low-voltage direct current, but
today's machinery and appliances run
solution
perception
produce high-voltage alternating current.
Popularion, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
and ocean energy can be tapped
123
in offshore locations. All solar tech-
nologies are adaptable to either local or central production
How much
time humanity has before
it
facilities.
must develop solar energy
is
The impact on climate is the ultimate limit on human energy use, a Hmit that no amount of technological ingenuity can remove. Ever since humans became technological beings by inventing fire, they also uncertain.
have significantly altered the climate of the earth, creating semiarid savannahs where once there were grasslands. Nevertheless, the impact of
humanity on global climate
industrial
potentially far greater, for the
is
continuation of certain current trends could render the earth quite
human race and most other species as well. know what we are doing to cHmatic mechanisms. In effect, with only minimal theoretical knowledge, we are running an enormous experiment on the global climate. By discharging carbon literally
uninhabitable by the
But we do not
really
dioxide, particulates, chlorofluorocarbons, and other substances into the
atmosphere, global
we
tampering with the watch-like perfection of the
are
cHmate system, not understanding
clearly
Worse
the consequences of our actions will be. truction of the ozone layer,
consequences just
as
Now, any remedy we worsening wdll result
effects.
we come try
is
too
and too
as
works or what with the des-
actions are producing visible
to understand
little
still,
it
what we have wrought. the inevitable and
late to halt
In the United States alone, 12,000,000 skin cancers
and 200,000 people
mechanisms. All radiation,
some of our
how
on
life
and some
will die fi-om just this intrusion
earth will suffer
sensitive
harm
on cHmate
firom intense ultraviolet
organisms crucial to global ecology will pro-
bably succumb.*
Most scientists are now predicting that our emissions of greenhouse wiU result in global warming. But again, humanity does not know what it is doing. We do not know how much or how fast this warming will occur; we do not know how much it will alter our capacity to grow gases
*
It
was once thought
that aU forms
and heat
human
of human-made heat might also disturb The second law of thermodynamics ordains
that the release
the mechanisms of climate balance.
of energy must inevitably decay into low-grade heat, so energy use
release are ultimately
use of energy
now
synonymous. However, the extra heat due to
appears to be pitifully small
compared
to the total
energy flow involved in the global heat balance (the flow of human-made heat is
only about 1/15,000 or 1/20,000 the absorbed solar
would
take
200 years
at a
5% growth
flux). It
rate in fossil, fission,
appears that
and
it
flision fuel
production for humanity to produce enough heat to cause noticeable global
warming. This the heat
we
are
is
extremely unlikely, for
now putting into
all
the reasons
the atmosphere
is
we
have
cited,
not Hkely to be
a
and so
problem.
.
CHAPTER 2
124
15 The Thermodynamic Economy Although the currency of nature's economy
human economy monetary
cost
takes
is
energy, the current
energy into account only
of energy production and
use. It
is
indirectly, via the
therefore in conflict
with basic laws governing our physical existence. The laws of ther-
modynamics
we cannot
get something for nothing. The mati thermodynamicaUy interchangeable) from which we derive economic benefit have to come from somewhere, andl ter
tell
us that
and energy (which
are
the inevitable residuals remaining after
we
have obtained the benefits
have to go somewhere. Unless the thermodynamic cost of obtaining the energy and disposing of the residuals
use to which the energy
is less
than the benefits of the
whole loses. Thus a "thermodynamic economy" based direcdy on an accounting of energy*
or entropy has traditional
become
economic
is
put, the system as a
essential, for
criteria will
otherwise social decisions based on|
continue to compromise the system
through so-caUed externahties, or side entropy
tem
—
as a
The
effects, that create
—
in the sys-
whole. basic insight
of thermodynamic economics
the real basis of economic scarcity. There
tween
more
increased disorder or reduced energetic potential
is
and thermodynamic
a
is
that entropy
is
ftmdamental difference be-
—
that is, between a of land and other reusable or flow resources such as solar radiation and a scarcity of coal or other nonrenewable resources that, once used, are gone forever (or can be recycled only with limited efficiency classical scarcity
scarcity
scarcity
and at a high cost in energy). Thus, says the thermodynamic economist, our nonrenewable resources are exceedingly precious capital stocks tha^l can never be recreated, so to waste them or even to expend them primarily
may be
on current consumption
in terms
of dollars and
In practical terms,
what
tons of topsoil every year; forests;
we
absurd,
no matter how
rational
it
means
is
that
we
are eroding
26
billion
have destroyed half of our tropical rain
have polluted most of our rivers and lakes and some of our
groundwater; and the planet has become one-third desert. Yet none of counts when a country calculates its gross national product. Perver-
this
sely, it also
means, for example, that the Exxon Valdez
the United States'
Hons of dollars
| I I
cents.
this
we
is
oil spiU
improved
economic performance. After all, Exxon spent biion the cleanup; it created jobs and consumed resources.
Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy
125
What to do about this is being debated. Economists have focused on schemes of natural resource accounting, a century-old idea that Germany is attempting national product. The task is difficult. For ex-
originated with Alfred Marshall (1842-1924). to calculate a green gross
ample, the
Germans can
easily calculate the
because pollution has killed ficult to calculate the
much of the
revenue loggers have
lost
more
dif-
Black Forest.
It is
value of lost plants, lost animals, lost
species, lost ecosystems,
and
tion. Forests also clean the air,
recreational opportunities.
whole
lost habitats resulting firom forest destruc-
conserve
soil,
Some American
purify water, and provide
economists have devised
a^
way
to deal with some of these problems: an "index of sustainable fl| economic welfare" that incorporates goods and services provided by the environment into economic accounting (Daly and Cobb 1989, p. 401). Thus we know how much a sewage plant costs to build and operate. If the forest performs the same service "free," Daly and Cobb's
suggestion
is
that the forest provides the equivalent value
of the sewage
Other economists propose panel interviews to determine what forests or species (and so on), are worth to samples of people. However plant.
these matters are ultimately resolved, certain preliminary conclusions
have already emerged.
never pay humanity to run a comsome extreme technological visionaries cheap if we let nature do it and fantastically ex-
First, it will
pletely technological world, as
urge, for
life
support
pensive if we take tion
is
on
this
burden
ourselves. Second, even
though collec-
and conversion percentages may be quite low compared to some
of humanity's engineering creations, and despite the apparendy greater
economic
costs,
when
are considered, solar
pollution and
all
the other
thermodynamic
costs
energy and other forms of decentralized energy
production are actually more efficient than methods based on using up
thermodynamic bargain. Third, human labor may become thermodynamicaUy cheaper than
nonrenewable resources and are therefore capital or other factors
a
of production; industry
may
therefore
become
increasingly labor-intensive. Similarly, less energy-intensive materials
wood and steel will
aluminum, which thermodynamic (or, to put this concept in its proper context, sustainable) economy would aim at carefiil husbandry of resources, dependence on natural flows and processes, decentrafization, more labor-intensive production, and a combination of ultra-sophisticated technology with some of the energysaving methods that sustained our forebears. ^^^» such
as
are highly energy-
and
displace such materials as
capital-intensive. In short, a
CHAPTER 2
126
how much it will shift areas don't know how able we will be in
food,
few
things,
human
however.
First, if cHmate
suffering, anything
we
of endemic
disease,
coping with
its
and the
effects.
it
We
We do know a
change does cause death,
try to stop
like.
disease,
and
then will be woefully
inadequate. Second, if climate change produces unacceptable consequences
and forces humanity to
drastically
reduce carbon dioxide emissions,
the costs of doing so will be higher than
what
it
would have
cost to
develop renewable energy sources before that time. Unfortunately, the standard
wisdom of the economic and
poUtical elite in the United States
that, as far as energy is concerned, we must have more of the same: more fossil fuel production and more development of nuclear power. Government funds pour overwhelmingly in the direction of supporting is
—by
these technologies
means where
necessary.
research,
by
direct subsidies,
even by military
129 00
3 Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution, the
Management of Technology, and an
Overview of Ecological Scarcity
So far, we have became apparent
discussed the in the 1960s
components of ecological
scarcity that
and 1970s: the exploding growth in human
population, the difficulty of fulfilling expanding
demand
the supply of agricultural land cannot keep up (and
is
for food
being
when
lost),
the
depletion of essential minerals, and the Hmits to satisfying the growing
demand ing.
But
for energy
by relying on sources
that are
both
finite
and pollut-
in the 1980s, observers recognized that these are not
difficulties.
Human demands on
the
our only
environment are causing the
problems shown in Table 3-1. Thus by the year 2000, according to projections, the
growth in human population and
activities will
eUminate
not only one-sixth of our grain land per person and one-tenth of our irrigated land, but nearly one-fifth of
person. These losses activities are
wiU occur
in just
our
forest
causing increased pollution of the
—
even of the stratosphere
and grazing land per
one decade. In addition, human air,
water, and land
—and
despite expensive poUution-control efforts
over the past two decades.
127
128
CHAPTER 3 Table 3-1 Basic Natural Resources Per Person with Projected Population Growth
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
129
—
A18).
40% to 42 million acres per year (Booth Sept. Some estimates of tropical forest destruction are still
mucli
as
creased by
The
50 million acres per year of tropical
(WRI
1990-91,
p.
mark of how
9,
1991,
—
higher
p.
as
102).
human beings are exterminating whole species of plants and animals, destroying watersheds, and affecting both regional and global climates. Tropical forests sustainably
loss
forests
is
a
fast
support people and millions of plants and animals.
vegetables, spices, nuts, medicines, timber,
oils,
They provide
fruits,
waxes, and rubber con-
sumed by people and industry around the world. Staple grains have relatives of somewhat different genetic makeup in the forests; these wild have been interbred vdth staple crops to provide resistance to and pests. In fact, 40% of all medicines are derived originally from
strains
diseases
chemicals found in tropical plants. Forests moderate
air
temperature,
recycle wastes, control soil erosion, and regulate stream and river flows,
which moderate the floods and droughts that lower agricultural yields. Forests take carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and produce the oxygen aD animals need.
When
a
tropical forest
is
destroyed, a habitat for living things
Although some species can adapt to other habitats or can persist in diminished numbers in remaining forests, thousands of species of plants and animals are being wiped out each year. Human communities are also vanishes.
being destroyed. Brazil's Indian population has decreased from 6 miUion people in the sixteenth century to about 200,000 today (Corson 1990, p. 123). Valuable products are lost. In less than 10 years, fewer than 10
—
tropical forest nations will be net exporters of forest products down from 33 such nations today (Corson 1990, p. 124). Deforestation also degrades forest soils. Urdike what occurs in forests in temperate cHmates,
when
leaves or trees
nourish the forest
or animals die in tropical forests, they do not Rather, other forest organisms quickly decompose
fall
soil.
them, and then these creatures support other tropical Hfe. So deforested nutrient-poor to start off with, and they support agriculture or
soils are
ranching for only
cattle
second
largest
a
few
years.
At the same time, deforestation
human source of atmospheric carbon
is
the
dioxide, right behind
the burning of fossil fuels. One-third of the carbon dioxide emissions that
humans produce
is caused by deforestation. In 1987 carbon dioxide emissions from deforestation in Brazil alone are beHeved to have equaled the total carbon dioxide emissions from all sources in the United States
(WRI
1990-91,
p.
110).
If tropical deforestation has but
temporary benefits and is selfwhy do people continue the
destructive even over the middle term,
The first reason is to increase cropland. For thousands of years, people slashed and burned small areas of forest, farmed it for a few years. practice?
CHAPTER 3
130
and moved on
up
to
new
to a
plot.
Old
would
plots, small in size,
lie
fallow for
30 years and revert to their wild state. This practice did the forest no fed small communities. Today slash-and-burn agriculture still
harm and
feeds people, but the
way
practiced
it is
people are clearing forests more too
fast
them
for
to regain their
countries a few wealthy people
population owns
93% of the
is
destroying the forests.
More
frequently and re-cultivating old fields fertility.
Because in many tropical
own most of the land
fertile land),
(in Brazil,
7%
of the
thousands of landless peasants,
suffering firom hunger, take to the forests to farm. Moreover, people are
Such crops much-needed foreign cash to finance pay off foreign debts. The government of
increasing cropland to produce commercial crops for export. as
bananas, coffee, and coca bring in
development projects or
to
Indonesia explained in a United States magazine advertisement that
people have the same aspirations
20% of its
Americans;
as
produce
forests to plantations to
other agricultural crops {U.S. News
&
it
its
must, therefore, convert
teak, rubber, rice, coffee,
World Report,
December
and
18, 1989,
pp. 80-81).
Second, government poHcies encourage large development projects,
sometimes to
resettle
people firom teeming
The people who
dams or roads.
or to build hydroelectric
cities
obtain short-term benefits fi-om these
developments are not usually the same people harmful
effects a large project
already
seen
hydropower
some of
the
may
who
suffer fi-om the
have on the environment.
adverse
environmental
effects
We
have
of large
projects.
A third reason to clear forests
is
to "harvest" timber.
At
least 5
million
hectares of tropical forests are logged each year, mostly for timber ex-
ported to Japan and the United
States, to
bring in foreign currency to
finance development or pay foreign debts. Unfortunately, most logging
Even in those places where logging operado not destroy ecosystems, land-hungry peasants ofi:en use logging roads to penetrate once-inaccessible forests and burn down most of the remaining trees to grow crops. According to a 1988 survey of the International Tropical Timber Organization, timber is being produced operations are unsustainable. tions
sustainably
WRI A
on
1990-91,
less
than
1% of
the exploitable tropical forests (cited in
p. 106).
fourth reason for deforestation
Two-thirds of Central America's tropical
is
to create pasture for cattle.
forests
have been cleared, mostly
However, Central Americans do not cut down their forests because they eat a lot of beef; rather, most of their beef is exported to the United States, to fast food chains and for pet food (Corson 1990, p. 121). Every American hamburger for which meat was imported ffom for cattle ranching.
Central America
is
estimated to have destroyed five square meters of
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
forest
(Corson 1990,
p.
121). Finally, local people destroy forests because
they need fuelwood. Fuelwood
cooking and heating by over
1
131
the primary source of energy for
is
80% of the
people in the world;
it is
scarce for
billion people.
Unfortunately, for reasons deforested in the tropics,
it
we
have explained, once a large area
is
supports a few years of productivity but then
becomes degraded. A 3 -million-hectare
area of the Brazihan Amazon that was converted into cropland in the 1880s is today a vast, uninviting, nonproductive expanse of scrub (Corson 1990, p. 121). Cattle pastures
created in the
become unproductive.
1960s have already
government authorities have seen the and have stopped subsidizing it. Even order to get
..
.And
so,
of clearing
some people
In Brazil,
forest for pasture
seek pasture in
still
to land, to secure an inflation-free investment,
title
Ranching merely brings
gain status.
futility
and to
in extra income.
the Loss of Biodiversity
Wildlife habitats are areas
where nondomesticated
species find the food,
Humans
water, and other resources they need to survive.
them
converting
have been
to their purposes since pre-agricultural times.
But
it is
only since the Industrial Revolution and the colonial expansion of the nineteenth century that
we
have been destroying
forests, grasslands,
wetlands, riparian areas, mangroves, sea grasses, and coral reefs both rapidly
(WRI 1990-91, p. 123). The area of temperate been reduced by one-third, and most of those remaining are
and extensively
forests has
new-growth old-grov^h deciduous only
forests,
forests
forests
which do not
provided
trends.
1990-91,
and wetlands
size.
The
107).
Woody savannas and
are fragmented, but
41% of their
forests are
data for the loss of dry tropical forests,
For example, in Africa and Asia,
natural grasslands to California,
p.
have been reduced by one-fourth. Tropical
60% of their original
grasslands,
(WRI
restore the native habitats that the
what we have
human
original size
69 percent of the Central
indicates broad
activities
(WRI
Valley's
have reduced
1990-91,
p.
125). In
grasslands have
been
(WRI
1991, p. 125). 60% of the wedands have been converted to agriculture or development in Asia, 56% in the United States (WRI 1990-91, pp. 127-128). 26% of the mangroves in the United States and destroyed
Puerto Rico have been destroyed. In the European heartland, few original wildhfe habits remain
(WRI
1990-91
p.
126).
Everywhere,
if
any
as
we
have seen, coral reefs are dying.
The
extinction of plant and animal species has been rising in rough
proportion to the
loss
of habitats
(see Figure 3-1).
to 17,500 species a year (Corson 1990, p. 101).
We may
Some
be losing up
scientists
beUeve
we
CHAPTER 3
132
100,000 r-
10,000
1,000
-
100
-
2000
FIGURE
1900
3-1
Estimated annual rate of species
1700
1800
loss,
1700-2000.
could lose 25% of the species on the planet in the next few decades, which would be a larger loss than any of the extinctions in geological history. The most threatened habitats today are those richest in species diversity and biological productivity, the tropical forests and the coral reefs.
A square mile in a Peruvian lowland has twice as many butterflies as
the entire United States and Canada; one river in Brazil has offish than
all
more
the rivers in the United States (Corson 1990,
p.
species
100).
becoming extinct for three reasons. First, as human population explodes, more habitats are converted into croplands. Hungry people will convert any place where crops can be grown into food Species are
production. Second, people introduce non-native species into
new
en-
vironments; native species that do not have the appropriate defenses against the invader die out. Third, people overharvest desired products
and
areas.
For example, tropical agroforestry, based on small
plots,
on the
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
intermixing of tree and
133
on the inclusion of domestic
soil crops,
and on the recycling of plant and animal wastes,
—but
and would be sustainable over the long term
it is
scarcely practiced.
Likewise, people are killing off 80,000 elephants a year, their ivory; only 15
animals,
technically possible
is
mosdy
white African rhinos are believed to be
to harvest left in
the
humans want their horns as a supposed aphrodisiac; and whales have been reduced below the level of commercial viability because some people want their oils (Corson 1990, p. 103). wild, largely because certain
Several practical reasons exist for preserving healthy ecosystems
We
the biodiversity within them.
discussed
some of
these in the
and last
performs free environmental services. Plants take
section. (1) Wildlife
carbon dioxiae from the
and produce oxygen. They counteract
air
greenhouse emissions. They regulate stream flows and groundwater levels,
and cleanse poDutants from surface water. Both and animals degrade wastes, help to control floods and soil producand contribute to pest control. Even insects, usually regarded as
recycle soil nutrients, plants tivity,
not always
pests, are
of waste.
(2)
Wild
so;
many
are
important pollinators and decomposers
of over
species are the original source
chemicals used in prescription drugs (Corson 1990,
the cures for such diseases as
AIDS and
bilharzia. (3)
p.
Wild
the
Lurking in
103).
know
one or more of the thousands of species we do not
40% of
may be
about
species provide
humans with needed products and services. We have already noted how wild plants have made it possible to bestow immunity on cultivated crops. True, technologists may come up with synthetic substitutes for some of these products or services. Synthetic rubber, for example, has replaced natural rubber in two-thirds of its uses (Corson 1990,
rubber such
as
of better quality and
is
airplane
tires.
needed to accomplish
When
—
potential loss
may
a species
is still
lost, it
is
not renewable.
direct
where we
emissions
on
is
gone, forever.
milHon species by the year 2000,
are
are doing. vAlong
particular function or
Its
running with
a large
this
biodiversity. If
A
given
consequences for people. But with the
assume that the whole phenomenon area
natural
preferred for heavy-duty applications
—
1
But
their goals.
is
may not have
possible loss of
104).
technologists seek wild plants for the genes
unique combination of genes
its
or
And
p.
is
it
would be
inconsequential. This
foolish to is
another
experiment without knowing what
uncertainty
is
we
the effect of our greenhouse
cUmate changes
are
of the magnitude that
a
warming will affect the habitats on the planet (WRI
majority of scientists are predicting, global location, size,
1990-91,
p.
and character of
130).
and extinctions
Many
will
all
wildlife
species will not be able to adapt quickly
dwarf any
will shift, shrink, or disappear
that have
(WRI
been predicted, because
1990-91,
p.
130).
enough, habitats
CHAPTER 3
134
Pollution
The
Inevitability of Pollution
Nature does not produce "pollution." Plants grow, taking up carbon dioxide from the
and
air
Animals
into the
air.
organic
compounds
from the
nitrates
soil.
eat the plants, excreting
They
"excrete" oxygen
carbon dioxide to the
that the plants use as fertilizer. This
air
and
and other natural
cycles repeat themselves.
Humans, on
do produce
the other hand,
pollution.
They produce
chemicals and products that are not found in nature and cannot be used
by
(eaten)
living things, or they
overwhelm
produce them in such great quantity
nature's ability to use
them.
Many
as to
dangerous forms of pollu-
tion already abound; the intensification of agriculture and basic-resource
production will only aggravate the problem. In
modern
fact,
because virtually
all
techniques of production and consumption entail pollution, any
increase in production
and consumption necessarily produces
The
tionate increase in pollution.
laws of physics
tell
a
propor-
us that matter
and
energy can be neither created nor destroyed, but only transformed. These transformation processes are never completely efficient; by-products or residuals are at least
an inevitable
unwelcome,
dustrial practices
converts
less
than
is
to
result,
some
and these
low. For example, the
40% of the
are almost always noxious, or
degree. In practice, the efficiency of in-
most modern
energy in coal or
fossil-fuel plant
of the energy escapes up the stack and into cooling water large quantities of residuals in the
Thus pollution
is
form of
The
rest
as heat,
and
oil into electricity.
ash and gases are produced.
the result of the operation of basic physical laws.
Moreover, this description understates the problem. The petrochemical industry, for
example, each year produces about 600 billion pounds of
products and 500 billion pounds of toxic chemicals, only destroyed
(Commoner
1990,
p. 51).
industry are themselves pollutants pesticides results ses
and plastics
—
that also
1% of which
are
But many of the "products" of this
—
solid or hazardous wastes,
such
as
cannot be used by nature. Thus pollution
not only from the inefficiencies of physical transformation proces-
but also from some of the very products humans contrive these
processes to produce.
Why
not simply use technological devices to control pollution?
is no way that we can many forms of pollution technologically. Waste heat is the prime example, but many others are also important, including fertilizer run-off" and carbon dioxide from combustion. Their damage to ecosystems may
Unfortunately, for thermodynamic reasons, there control
be mitigated in some ways, but short of forgoing production altogether
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
135
or adopting radically different technologies, there
simply no way to
is
contain these high-entropy pollutants.
Other forms of pollution
are,
of course, susceptible to technological
control, but even these pollutants cannot be controlled indefinitely, for
continued growth in industrial output must inevitably overwhelm any pollution-control technology that
ample,
if overall industrial
90%
reducing by
output grows
at
100%
than
less
is
5%
effective.
For ex-
(doubling period 14 years),
the quantity of pollution emitted and maintaining this
fiature would buy only about 45 years of grace, amount of time, the absolute level of pollution would be the is today. Even a 99% level of efficiency would extend this
of efficiency in the
level
for after that
same
as
it
period of grace by only 46 years. Thus, with continued industrial growth, at
some point
pollution will reach dangerous levels under any pollution-
control regime. This point level
may not be
very
far away, for
of overall control effectiveness would be
to achieve in practice,
would have
and
to be paid for
physical laws that
the same coin also
tell
not impossible,
money and energy
it.
The Dilemmas and Costs of Technological The same
difficult, if
considerable price in
a
Pollution Control
make production and
us that
all
technology can do
"solve" the original problem, there
is
bound
two sides of exchange one form
pollution is
of pollution for another. Worse, because energy
is
generally used to
be an overall increase in
to
both gross pollution and entropy. For instance, some of the stitutes
now coming
into use to avert the destruction of the
are themselves toxic, exacerbate the
photochemical smog. They are less effective
than the
90%
even the
CFCs
greenhouse
also less
sub-
ozone
layer
or contribute to
energy efficient to produce and
they replace. As
case, a particular technological "fix"
effect,
CFC
may
is
undoubtedly true in
this
on
nevertheless be desirable
economic, ecological, or aesthetic grounds despite the overall thermo-
dynamic
loss,
sector that
is
because the burden will presumably be shifted away fi^om a harder pressed ecologically or whose degradation
is
more
obnoxious to our senses and health. However, once the absorptive capacity of the environment has
been used up, and
all
sectors are about
equally hard pressed, then simply converting pollution into a different
form
will
matter
no longer be
a
workable
how much money and
some ultimate
on our
strategy. It
energy are
at
is
our
clear, therefore, that
disposal, there
no
must be
without
also
are unlikely to reach this ultimate ecological limit.
Our
limit
ability to control pollution
controlling production.
However, we
supplies of money, energy,
and other resources
are not
without
limit,
and
CHAPTER 3
136
at
some point the
increased costs of pollution control
seem
likely to
render further growth in production fruidess. For example, imagine a lake
with a "waste-absorption capacity" of y units of residuals. (In fact, as we shall see later, waste-absorption capacity is an economist's concept that has
no ecological
units
of
validity.)
A factory on the shore
of a certain commodity and
at
now
Although the factory
residuals.
pollution, the residuals
it
of this lake produces x
the same time emits exacdy y units
no control over
exercises
its
emits have not yet begun to degrade the quality
of the lake water. However, suppose that demand for the commodity doubles, requiring
either
a
second factory of
like
capacity
or an
equivalent addition to the old one. Without pollution control the lake would begin to die biologically, because the 2y units of residuals resulting from 2x units of production would be twice what the lake can safely absorb. Thus pollution-control equipment that is 50% effective must be installed to reduce the residuals to a safe level. If demand doubles again, production of 4x units of the commodity produces 4y units of residuals to dispose of,
and pollution control must
that if doubHng
now be 75% effective. It is clear 99% effectiveness in
of production continues, more than
becomes necessary. by reviewing the recent history of pollution-control efforts in the United States. Since the 1970s, the United States has spent about a trillion dollars on poUution-control efforts. What does the country have to show for it? Unfortunately, not much. pollution control eventually
These points
are supported
Despite the fact that
we
have reduced pollution per process or pollution
per event, our growth in numbers and productivity has so eroded our
accomplishments that our net gain seriously
polluted,
humans and
nil.
is
Both
air
and water remain
with increasingly serious consequences both to
to the planet. Hazardous substances are entering the en-
vironment in record (and growing) amounts. These substances, including toxic
and nuclear waste,
serious
human
pesticides,
and
industrial chemicals are causing
health consequences, notably cancer, birth defects, and
heart and lung diseases. Solid wastes are overrunning our ability to
manage them and
are contaminating the drinking water of millions
of
Americans.
Air Pollution In 1971 the Environmental Protection the levels in the air of substances
on human damage the
beings.
to
set standards for
reducing
produce serious health
effects
and nitrogen oxides, which and lungs, carbon monoxide, which deprives
These included
respiratory tract
Agency
known
sulfur
the blood of oxygen, and organic hydrocarbons,
some of which
cause
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
137
human
cancer and birth defects. (These substances also adversely affect
health by contributing to the formation of ground level ozone and acid
And they also harm the environment.) The EPA thought its standwould result in an 80 to 90% reduction in the emissions of these substances between 1975 and 1985. In fact, the average reduction in the emissions of these substances between 1975 and 1987 was 18% (Comrain.
ards
moner
1990,
p. 22).
Nitrogen oxide emissions actually
Why? The
during those years.
answer
is
increased
by
2%
not merely the regulatory retreat
new and 75%
by the administration that came to power in 1981. For example, automobiles in the United States emit less
90%
fewer hydrocarbons
carbon monoxide than did those of the early 1970s. But the number
of vehicles on the road has nearly doubled in the
last
20 years (Mc-
The increased number of motor vehicles, new industrial plants, and new power plants (even though many are equipped with such pollution-control devices as scrubbers), have nullified much of the pollution controls. The same outcome has occurred in other inCloughlin 1989,
p. 48).
dustrialized countries attempting to control pollution
some countries
the record
is
by 29%);
(Commoner
1990,
p.
in
15%
(its
nitrogen oxide emis-
Great Britain, the average reduction was
— opposed —have seen as
it
the pollutant fi-om being produced at aU
negated by the economic "growth" taking place in those a result,
1%
36). In general, countries that have tried to reduce
the emission of a pollutant by controlling
As
that in
worse.* In West Germany, for example, the
average reduction of these emissions was sions increased
—except
to preventing
their controls
countries."''
and because many countries have no or few pollution
huge quantities of pollutants enter the atmosphere fi-om human activities. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and controls,
Development, 110 million tons of
*
Sweden
is
a notable exception.
Its
sulfur oxides,
69 million tons of
reductions of pollution have exceeded
increases in growth; sulfur dioxide emissions, for example,
its
dropped by more
than two-thirds between 1970 and 1985. t
Lead
the only notable success story in diminishing an air pollutant. Lead
is
metal.
toxic
children)
It
causes neurological disorders
and kidney
In the United States,
failure. It inhibits it
has almost
emissions of lead were reduced by p.
22)
.
The
control lead
reason for
this
(especially
both respiration and photosynthesis in
been eliminated
94% between
as
an
is
a
mental retardation in
air pollutant; total
1975 and 1987
plants.
annual
(Commoner
1990,
unique success was that the government did not try to
pollution but rather
removed
its
source
from the environment. That
forced technological change. Because lead clogged catalytic converters,
oil
panies were forced to use lead substitutes to raise the octane levels of gasoline.
is, it
com-
CHAPTER 3
138
nitrogen oxides, 193 million tons of carbon monoxide, 57 million tons of
organic hydrocarbons, and 59 miUion tons of particulates were emitted into the atmosphere in 1980 (Corson 1990,
include substances classified
The
shordy.)
which we
of 50,000 Americans
sulfates in the air
a year
may
(Corson 1990,
cause the premature death 223).
p.
Association concluded in 1990 that pollution from costs
Americans $40 and causes
tures
as
billion to
many
$50
Moreover, these
worrisome health
when
oxygen
The American Lung motor
vehicles alone
billion in annual health-care
expendi-
120,000 unnecessary or premature deaths
as
{The Washington Postjan. 21, 1990,
created
will discuss
Office of Technology Assessment estimates that current
of particulates and
levels
221). (This Usting does not
p.
emissions,
as toxic
A12).
p.
pollutants are not the only ones that have
five
effects.
Ozone
another serious
is
air pollutant. It
is
organic hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides react with
in the presence
of sunlight. Ozone
around the world, primarily by
produced
is
in great quantities
and trucks. In some countries, no
cars
on the emissions of motor vehicles. Where controls do exist, numbers of vehicles are nullifying the reductions, especially that of nitrogen oxides. In 1988, 96 cities and counties failed to meet the standards the Environmental Protection Agency set for ozone in the controls exist
the increasing
United
States.
interferes tion,
and
Ozone
contributes to smog, reduces resistance to infection,
with lung functions, contributes to asthma and nasal congesirritates
greenhouse
the eyes.
effect.
It
At current
also
damages crops and contributes
levels,
to the
ozone causes crop damage estimated
between $2 biUion and $4.5 bilHon per year. Acid rain is another air pollutant. Acid rain is weak sulfuric and nitric acid. It forms when nitrogen and sulflir oxides combine with moisture in at
the
air.
Acid rain can
damage facades,
kill fish
and other aquatic
structures such as metals, (such as
and
Half the
paints.
Acid
forest area in
rain 1 1
damage
life,
destroy forests, and
railroad tracks), building
varies in different parts
European countries shows acid
35% of the forests in Europe 106). 43% of the conifers in
whole
of the world. rain
damage;
damaged (Brown 1 990,
over
as a
p.
the Alps in Sv^tzerland are dead or
are
damaged (Corson 1990, p. 225). 80% of the lakes in Norway are dead; in Sweden 14,000 lakes cannot support sensitive aquatic Hfe; in Canada 150,000 1 out of 7 eastern lakes are biologically damaged. On the other hand, although eastern China has acid rain damage, Japan has found no evidence of large-scale damage from acid seriously
biologically
—
rain
(OECD
1991,
p. 47).
Acid
mental damage in the United
conducted over 10 about
years,
10% of eastern
—
rain has caused only
States.
concluded that aquatic
lakes
moderate environ-
A recent federal
and streams, that
government
life is
visibility
study,
being damaged in
is
being reduced in
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
some metropoHtan
the eastern United States and in acid rain
areas
of the west, that
contributing to the erosion and corrosion of stone and metal
is
structures,
139
and
that
it is
reducing the
York Times, Sept. 6, 1990,
p.
A24.)
trees at
high
New
also
It
of red spruce
by cold temperatures {The
ability
altitudes to withstand the stress caused
found evidence that acid rain
is
contributing to the decline of sugar maple trees in eastern Canada and causing respiratory and other diseases in humans.
It
predicted that acid
would lead to forest decline in the decades ahead. may combine with ozone pollution to have more damag-
rain, if unchecked,
Acid
rain
ing effects than either substance does alone.
Some
scientists believe the
combination of these two pollutants have weakened
where 70% of the standing feet) in Virginia,
228).
trees
trees to the point
above an elevation of 900 meters (2950
Tennessee, and North Carohna are dead (Corson 1990, p.
(Ozone and
acid rain are
more concentrated
at
higher elevations in
a given area.)
Chlorofluorocarbons and halons pose another threat to health.
They
stabilizers, in fire extinguishers,
228).
The
military
is
a
major
and in blowing foam (Corson 1990, p. But these chemicals, along with
user.
nitrogen oxides, cause depletion of the earth's ozone layer. the stratosphere radiation
is
not
from the sun.
crop yields.
It
kills
a pollutant
UV
but
a filter
Ozone
in
of harmful ultraviolet
exposure damages plants, causing reduced organisms, including, ominously, the
aquatic
phytopJankton that produce life
human
are used as propellants, as refrigerants, as solvents, as
much of the oxygen on which
all
animal
depends. Increased exposure of humans to ultraviolet radiation
increases the incidence of a fatal
form of skin
cancer, eye damage, and
immune system disorders. The incidence of melanoma has increased 83% over the past 10 years in the United States (Shea 1989, p. 82); skin cancer cases are expected to increase from 500,000 to 800,000 a year
(Weisskopf 1991, stratosphere
p.
decHned
Al).
The
2% from
average ozone concentration in the
1969 to 1986, but
a
1991 report issued
by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration concludes that ozone depletion is accelerating twice as fast as previous projections. Despite this, the production of chloroflurocarbons, the most important cause of this decline,
*
The U.S.
is
military, for
the United States and
increasing by
example, uses
50% of
the
5%
a year.
76% of aU halon-1211 consumed
CFC-113. Each space
deposits 56 tons of chlorine into the upper atmosphere (quoted in
1991, p. 140).
in
shuttle launch
Renner
— CHAPTER 3
140
The
world have agreed to phase out the
industrial countries of the
CFCs by the year 2000 if possible. But millions of additional of CFCs will be released into the atmosphere in the meantime.
use of
tons
They
now producing CFCs ozone
will stiU deplete the
A
100 years. Furthermore, the chemical
will persist there for over
companies
worse problem
is
layer,
will
be introducing substitutes that
though
at a significantly
lower
rate.*
that developing nations have refused to join in
phasing out their use of CFCs; they believe that the substitute chemicals will increase
and slow
their costs
their
growth
rates.
dustrialized countries, for their part, agreed not to restrict
The
in-
CFC
ex-
ports to the developing world. In sum, although in this case the industrialized world has concurred
on joint action
ous environmental pollutant, the endeavor will not stop the destruction cases
of the ozone
too
is
layer.
to
little
combat a periland too late; it
Millions of additional
of skin cancer, reduced yields of crops, and reduced phyto-
plankton activity are the predictable consequences.
carbon dioxide
Finally,
—the main by-product of combustion
along with nitrous oxides, methane, and chloroflurocarbons, produces a greenhouse effect. These gases trap the heat absorbed by the earth from the sun and prevent its escape back into space. Scientists have proved conclusively that the earth is about 33°C warmer than it would be if it did not have carbon dioxide in its atmosphere. Also, scientists
have observed that for the past 160,000 years, whenever atmospheric
carbon dioxide thereafter;
levels increased, the earth's
CO2
levels
and the
earth's
correlated through the centuries (quoted in
#403). Today, atmospheric than years.
at
CO2
temperature rose shortly
temperature have been closely
Wind Energy Weekly 1990,
concentrations are 20 to
25%
higher
any time in the pre-industrial period, going back 160,000
In
molecule of which
atmospheric concentration of methane,
the
addition,
traps
20 to 30 times the heat of a
CO2
a
molecule,
more than double pre-industrial levels. The atmospheric concentration of CFCs, a molecule of which traps 20,000 times the has reached
heat of a
CO2
dustrial times,
molecule, obviously
when
it
predict the earth will
*
Substitutes for
ozone-depleting
CFCs effects
Chemical, and other
did not
is
exist.
warm 2°C
to
infinitely higher than in pre-in-
For these reasons, most
5°C
exist that (unlike the
scientists
in the next century
HCFC's now
(WRI
planned) have no
but are significantly more expensive. DuPont, Allied
CFC
producers have thus
far
shown no
interest in these
chemicals. If enforced, however, the 1990 Clean Air Act will require phasing
out of the use of HCFCs by 2030 in the United
States.
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
1990-91,
(The
p. 13).
earth's
141
temperature during the
age was
last ice
5°C cooler. The predicted increase in temperature is of like magnitude but would occur 10 to 40 times as fast).''' The implications of such rapid warming for Ufe on earth are not well understood. Oceans may rise. That will contaminate nearby groundonly
3°C
to
waters with their
salt,
cause coastal flooding, and drive millions of people from
homes. The cost of protecting
levels will
cities
from
be in the hundreds of biUions of
Experiencing
1°C
a
rise in
temperature
is
a
1
-meter
rise in
ocean
may
suffer.
dollars. Forests
equivalent to
moving 200
may not
kilometers toward the equator; with global warming, tree species
be able to "migrate" toward the poles that species's range, trees less
would be more
able to adapt to other
* Scientists
fast.
At the warmer
susceptible to disease
human-made environmental
and
limits
of a
insects
and
stresses,
such
as
cannot be sure of the extent or timing of global warming because of
uncertainty about several variables, including the absorptive capacity of the
oceans and probable changes in cloud cover. that
A small minority of scientists doubt
greenhouse gases will actually produce global warming; some of the
doubters believe that increased evaporation and phytoplankton activity resulting
from the warming
effect
of greenhouse gases will lead to increased cloud cover,
amount of solar warmth reaching the earth. In addition, two Danish scientists have linked the global warming we have already experienced to sunspot intensity (Stevens 1991, p. C4). However, another minority of scientists believe that the warmer it gets, the hotter it mil get. Some cite evidence that methane stored in permafrost will be released as it is warmed, thus causing more reducing the
evidence that since 1976 plants have dramatically increased
warming; others
cite
their production
of carbon dioxide and methane
respiration."
with
rising
Dark
—
temperature
t In January 1991, scientists at the
ing data from 2000 that
a
process called "dark
unlike photosynthesis, the rate of
point and then declines (Moore 1990,
announced
in
respiration occurs because plant respiration rates increase
sites
p.
which
rises to a
C3).
Goddard
Institute for
Space Studies, measur-
worldwide, and the British Meteorological Office
1990 was the warmest year of the 140 years since weather
records have been collected (Booth Jan. 1991,p. A3). This record followed heels of several broken in the 1980s; six of the seven
occurred during that decade.
It is
possible,
on the
warmest years on record
of course, that these records have
nothing to do with global warming; temperatures flucmate from year to year, or in groups is
of years,
also possible that
for reasons having nothing to
do with
a
greenhouse
effect. It
thermometers were not calibrated exactly the same 50 or 125
years ago, producing false comparisons today.
The
question
is
whether
it
is
prudent for humanity to act on evidence that global warming may be under way or to use such pretexts to deny
it.
CHAPTER 3
142
increased
UV
could also
suffer.
radiation, ground-level ozone,
Although some
the presence of high
plants' rate
and acid
rain.
Agriculture
of photosynthesis increases in
CO2 levels, this characteristic has not been identified
humans have cultivated. As we noted earUer, changing rainfall may make many agricultural lands unsuitable for farming, render obsolete many irrigation facilities, and require new ones to be built
in the crops
patterns
elsewhere
The
at great cost.
sources of carbon dioxide are everywhere
fossil fuels are
burned
The production of most of the energy to power industry, commerce, and homes produces carbon dioxide. The average car spews out prodigious amounts of carbon dioxide: 16,000 pounds a year. The (see Table 3-2).
CFCs
in a car's air conditioner have the
greenhouse impact of another
4800 pounds of CO2. To the extent that these emissions have been controlled, it has been by increasing gas milage. The average fuel efficiency of American cars, for example, has doubled since 1970,fi-om 13 to 26.5 miles per gaUon. This success, however,
Americans drive nearly twice as
is
nullified
many motor
by the
fact that
vehicles than they did in
1970. Vehicle miles are increasing by 25 billion miles a year. Worldwide,
worse. Despite the fact that fuel milage in other industrial
the problem
is
countries
now
is
average fuel
slightly better
economy
is
than in the United States, the global
20 miles per
gallon.
Most
countries have not
adopted gas milage standards, but the increase in their numbers of cars has that of the United States. In 1950 there were 50
been comparable to
number had doubled. By 1970 and by 1990 the number had They spew 550 million tons of CO2
million cars in the world; by 1960 that
number
there were double that
again,
redoubled again to 400 million
cars.
into the atmosphere per year.
By
million
cars!
It
is
true
that
2010, there are expected to be 700 aU governments
if
automobile gas efficiency to be 50 miles per
*
require
would
Cars in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
countries
—
that
gallon. (Bleviss t
agreed to
gaUon,"!" success
and Walzer 1990,
The technology
built prototypes
compact
the industrialized
is,
to
of
do
Even
is
(OECD)
30 miles per
in 1991, several manufacturers have
exceed 50 miles/gallon. Volvo has
car that gets 63 miles/gallon in the city
highways; the car
—average
p. 103).
this exists.
cars that
West and Japan
effect
designed to meet
all
a
prototype
and 81 miles/gallon on
U.S. emissions and safety requirements
and to exceed the U.S. crash standard of 30 miles/hour. The car would cost litde more than current cars to manufacture (Bleviss and Walzer 1990, p. 106; WR\ 1990-91, its
p.
151). Already in the
1992 model
year,
Honda
is
selling a version
popular "Civic" that gets nearly 60 miles/gallon on highways.
of
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
Table 3-2
Major Sources of CO2 Emissions
the United States
143
in
CHAPTER 3
144
much
less
reduce them.
(Why
this
true
is
is
the subject of Part
II
of this
book.)
Moreover, cars constitute only 15% of the global carbon dioxide problem (though they contribute 25% of all U.S. carbon emissions). Growth in the industrial, commercial and residential sectors is also increasing carbon emissions faster than increases in efficiencies are
reducing them. Increases in energy productivity in the developed world have been modest at best. Most governments have made only token efforts to develop energy from renewable carbon-free sources. Finally, as
forests
we
have seen, people are destroying 17 million hectares of
each year. This increases atmospheric carbon dioxide because
destroyed forests release trapped carbon dioxide and no longer "con-
sume" carbon dioxide forests
is
The liquidation of the earth's for 10% of the excess carbon
in photosynthesis.
thought to be responsible
dioxide in the atmosphere; in the tropics, where the forests are wiped
out mostly by burning, the billion tons
of CO2 per
About 15
nations, mostly in
their production
United
States,
themselves produce another
fires
1
to 2
year.
Western Europe, have plans to limit years. But the
of carbon dioxide over the next 15
which, with
for
more than 25% of the
in
C02-reduction
5%
of the world's population,
is
responsible
world's carbon emissions, has refused to join
efforts.
And
it
has
repeatedly
prevented the
Europeans from converting their plans into binding targets (Meyer 1990, p. 3; Stevens 1991, p. 61). (Ironically, the United States is now
Western Europe and Japan are, so increasing its energy productivity to reduce carbon emissions would improve the "competitiveness" of the United States economy.) Underdeveloped countries also have no plans to reduce carbon emisonly half as efficient in using energy
as
There remains, therefore, a vast gap between projected growth rates in carbon emissions and what scientists believe is necessary to control global warming.
sions.
*
The United
States
government
in particular has invested
huge amounts of were
research and development funds in nuclear energy (the hazards of which discussed in Chapter 2) while investing trivial
amounts
in,
and eliminating
once-existing tax breaks for research and development in renewables. President
Reagan even removed a flilly flinctioning solar hot-water system from the White House. Despite this, non-nuclear carbon-free sources of energy exist; they include wind, geothermal, photovoltaic, solar thermal, biomass, and ocean
thermal energy conversion.
With
flirther research,
A few are already cost-comperitive with fossil ftxels.
more could
be.
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
145
Water Pollution Water pollution United
also
is
worsening
in
industrial countries. In
the
government has spent over $100
States alone, the national
we have little to show for it. More than 17,000 of the nation's rivers, streams, and bays are polluted. From 1974 to 1982, levels of fecal coliform bacteria decreased at only million to clean up surface waters, and
a
few
as
about the same number of sites which they decreased (Commoner 1990, p. 25). Nitrate increased at four times as many as those sites at which they
those
levels
of dissolved oxygen, suspended
river reporting stations; levels
sediments, and phosphates increased at
cadmium
decreased. Arsenic and
water quality has deteriorated
measuring against
at
stations.
Various
eating, the
fish
levels are also increasing. Overall,
more than
at
three-quarters of the
states prohibit eating,
or warn their citizens
caught in their rivers and
hundreds of millions of dollars (including
lakes.
For the
and local spending for
state
sewage-treatment plants, private spending for septic tanks, and the
Americans have spent to clean up their waters, relatively few waterways that had undrinkable water or were unsafe for swimming in
like)
"swimmable" water had good water in the 1970s
the 1970s have drinkable or
many
time,
sites that
addition, sewage, plastic
litter,
At the same
today.
are unsafe today. In
discarded fishnets, tar
balls,
and toxic and
radioactive substances are contaminating coastal waters.* areas are so polluted that they are closed to oyster
Despite pollution-control
and
Some
the percentage of coastal waters
efforts,
now
closed to such fishing has been increasing; about half are
A
quarter of the usable groundwater in the United States
—more than three-quarters
taminated
164). Sixty pesticides,
some
as
well
as saltwater
water
*
is
polluted,
Oil from
oil
is
it
spills
pollution; witness the spills
on
no
remains
of Mexico over
way
generates
more
Exxon Valdez
Other
toxic
to clean
it
is
up:
also
particularly insidi-
Once
the ground-
publicity than other kinds of water
spiU.
However
harmfiil, the effects
of
oil
grave than routine unheralded municipal and
For example,
lead,
164).
p.
in
so.
every day the oil industry
1.5 million barrels
cadmium, benzene,
p.
and microbiological substances, are
practical
coastal waters are less
industrial practices.
con-
is
areas
polluting groundwater. Groundwater pollution
ous because there
closed.
(Corson 1990, many of them carcinogens, have been found in
the groundwater of 30 states (Corson 1990,
chemicals,
coastal
shellfish fishing.
dumps
into the
of waste water containing
and other toxic organics and metals!
oil,
Gulf
grease,
CHAPTER 3
146
Many Table 3-3.
causes for water pollution exist; they are
We
summarized
in
have also discussed additional problems caused by acid
mine drainage and acid rain. Agricultural practices are the source of some of the organic chemicals in water. For example, the groundwater contamination from pesticides results from repeated (and increasingly poisonous) sprayings, and only target pests.
But
1% of
pesticides actually reach the
fertiUzers used in agriculture also contribute to water
pollution; fertilizer not used by the plants either runs off into surface
water or leaches
down
into the groundwater.
The runoff
distributes
large amounts of nitrogen and phosphorous to the water. Finally, water
used for irrigation picks up rivers
salts
on
the land and carries
them back
to
and streams.
Industry causes another large share of toxic water pollution. largest producers of toxic water pollution (and, as
Table 3-3 Substance
we
shall see,
Causes and Effects of Water Pollution
The
of hazard-
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
ous solid wastes) are the chemical and steel
147
plastics industries.
At
pollution. facilities,
least
627
finishers,
Two-thirds of industry's toxic products are
eventually seep or leach
known
disposal sites are 163). Nearly
with 250 city sewage American surface waters.
industrial firms, along
routinely discharge toxic wastes into
injected into injection wells or sites
Metal
makers, and the pulp and paper industries also generate toxic water
pits.
The
down
dumped
chemicals in
into landfills or
all
of these disposal
into the groundwater. 77,000 such
to exist in the
United
States
(Corson 1990,
Agency
urgendy requiring attention because they already leaking into the groundwater or are threatening to do so. Protection
p.
1000 of them have been identified by the Environmental
These problems
as
are repeated in other industrial countries.
the rivers monitored in
Europe have
are
90% of
5% have nitrate Many rivers have
nitrate pollution;
concentrations over 200 times the unpolluted
level.
levels of such metals as zinc, lead, chromium, copper, arsenic, nickel, cadmium, and magnesium, as well as organic chemicals. Some European nations, such as the United Kingdom, Finland, Belgium, and Spain, have higher levels of chlorinated hydrocarbons (DDT-type insecticides and PCBs) in their waters than does the United States. Worse yet, many
high
pesticide-using countries in the developing world have higher levels of
chemical residues in their waters than either Europe or the United States.
Examples include Thailand, China, Colombia, Tanzania, Malaysia,
and Indonesia.
Sewage causes water pollution in all parts of the world. In this world has the severest problems by far, be-
instance, the developing
cause sewage
American 1990-91,
is
often not treated at
rivers p.
162). This
recommended human disease
compares to
level for drinking
in the
all.
world
is
Fecal coliform counts in Latin
100,000 per 100
are as high as
a
milliliters
(WRI
World Health Organization
water of
per 100 ml.
80% of
all
linked to unsafe water, poor sanitation,
and lack of basic knowledge of hygiene and disease mechanisms (Corson 1990, p. 162). 25 million people die each year from water-
borne diseases (Corson 1990, p. 162). Every hour over 1000 children die from diarrheal diseases (Corson, p. 162). Developing countries are increasing their expenditures on building adequate wastewater treat-
ment
But to eradicate these conditions while their populagrowing is simply beyond their resources. tions are By comparison, the United States and Europe have minor sewage treatment problems. 80% of the people in West Germany, Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden are connected to sewage-treatment plants. Only 106,000 people in the United States picked up waterborne diseases facilities.
between 1971 and 1983, although
that figure excludes cancers caused
by
CHAPTER 3
148
toxic pollutants (Corson 1990, p. 165).
adequate wastewater treatment countries. In the
United
Still,
facilities
States, the
the expense of building
huge, even for industrial
is
Clean Water Act of 1972 forbade
municipalities to discharge sewage after 1977 until
and pollutants in was extended
it
85%
had been removed. Then the deadline
until 1988.
By
of the bacteria for
compliance
EPA
1989, after that deadline had passed, an
study reported that two-thirds of the 15,600 wastewater treatment plants in this country
still
meet federal standards and that it would cost bring them into compliance. That figure is 17 times
did not
83.5 biUion dollars to
more than the whole EPA budget for all antipollution controls. To preserve fresh water that human beings can safely drink is thus a daunting task. (Making fresh water from the sea is not an easy way out of our difficulties. It takes 3 kilowatt-hours of energy to make 1 gallon
of freshwater.
Not
desahnization plants are 150).)
Water pollution
two-thirds
of the world's
on the Arabian Peninsula
(Postel 1990, p.
surprisingly,
controls, like air pollution controls, have
very expensive and, except for sewage, have produced
of
results.
pollution,
As with the
rather than trying to control
than building expensive
chemical
it
may be
fertilizers tp
been
in the
way
case of the near elimination of airborne lead
humans may have
for example,
little
to eliminate the sources of pollutants
them
facilities to
after
they are produced. Rather
control nitrogen levels in water,
that agribusinesses will have to stop using
grow
The production of human sewage such devices as composting toilets may
crops.
cannot be eHminated, but using
be more practical in many areas than expensive centralized sewage collection and wastewater control facilities.
water control
facilities are built,
toxic-free compost,
which
in turn
Where
centralized waste-
they must be designed to produce
can be used
as a substitute
source of
no control mechanisms for pesthey will end up and accumulate in are forced not to use them. As we
fertilizer for agriculture. Similarly,
on
ticides sprayed
groundwater
the land exist;
until agribusinesses
see, no economic means of controlling the toxic chemicals produced by the petrochemical industry exist; that industry endures
shall
only because
it
does not pay
in only a
Still,
its
environmental
few instances (PCBs
costs.
fi-om industrial
and
electrical
DDT and related chemicals from pesticides, and, in a few phosphorous fi-om detergents) has an isolated harmful product or
products, states,
process been eliminated from production.
Where used, such elimination The reductions cannot be
has dramatically reduced particular pollutants. nullified
by increases in economic growth. But the elimination of most and agricultural products and practices that cause pollution is
industrial
discussed very
little.
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
I49
Hazardous Wastes Air and water pollution controls, which have achieved only modest reductions of a few poUutants, look like a roaring success compared to efforts to control hazardous wastes. A hazardous substance is one that
harms human health or the environment; it mcludes "toxics," which are directly poisonous to humans. Humanity is engulfed by hazardous substances. In the United States alone, 260 million metric tons of hazardous substances are produced each
the country.
The
three
year—more
common
most
than
1
ton for every person
m
types of hazardous substances are
chemicals, (70,000 of them, mostly synthetic organics such as vinyl
chloride or dioxin), pesticides
and heavy metals.
70% of all
(1 biUion pounds of them used each year), hazardous substances are produced by the
petrochemical industry. Except for pesticides, which are sprayed widely over agricultural land, they are dumped in a variety of sites in and out of the country.
We
have discussed the pesticide problem before.
The National
Academy of Sciences
has estimated that in the United States, 20,000 new cases of cancer are caused each year by pesticide residues in the food
EPA
supply In addition,
groundwater in 34
tests
states; 1
show
in 9
weUs
that pesticides
tested
contaminate the
was contaminated (Allen on groundwater as their
1990, p. 129). 95% of rural Americans rely drmking source. In the San Joaquin vaHey of CaHfornia, investigators have found pesticides in 2000 weDs, mcluding 125 pubHc water systems
(Corson 1990, p. 252). There, and in some other places of heavy pesticide use, cancer rates are up, especially
among children. The World Health Organization estimates that 1,000,000
pesticide poisoning occur
worldwide each
year,
5000
to
cases
of
20,000 resulting
in death (French 1990, p. 14). People in developing countries suffer most of these deaths, partly because pesticide companies do not label their products, the people cannot read pesticide labels, or they are not trained in proper pesticide handhng. Developing countries also use extremely
toxic
pesticides that industrial countries
400
to
either
ban
in their
own
countries.
25% of the
600 million pounds of pesticides that the United States exports banned or severely restricted in this country (French
are
1990, p. 14). Three-quarters of all pesticides used in India, for example, are chemicals
banned in the United States (Corson 1990, p. 252). United States consumers reap some of the poisons their government permits chemical companies to sow: A Natural Resources Defense Council sampling of coffee beans in 1983 revealed that all samples had residues of DDT, and other banned pesticides. More than one-third of all fruit sold
Umted
States
is
grown
in countries
where few or no
controls
on
BHC, in the
pesticide
CHAPTER 3
150
Toxic Substances Discharged by U.S. Industry, 1987
Table 3-4
Millions of Pounds
Destination
2,700
Air Lakes, rivers, Landfills,
550
and streams
earthen
3,900
pits
Treatment and disposal
3,300
facilities
10,450
Total
Source: EPA, reported in The Washington Post, April 13, 1989,
use exist, and
less
than
p.
A33.
1% of food imports are inspected for pesticide Some believe that 50% of all imported
residues (Corson 1990, p. 253).* fruit is
pesticide-contaminated (Weir and Matthiessen 1990,
Other than produced
pesticides, two-thirds
in the
United
of the hazardous and toxic wastes
States are disposed
contaminate groundwater.
The
rest
p. 119).
of in ways that eventually
of the wastes are either spewed into
the air or discharged into streams and rivers (see Table 3-4). Fifteen
thousand
hazardous-waste
uncontrolled
landfills
and
80,000
con-
taminated surface lagoons have been identified in the United States
American industry exports 3 million tons of hazardous wastes to underdeveloped countries that, for the most part, are even less aware of their hazards than Americans are. The Environmental Protection Agency has identified 1200 hazardous-waste sites as the most dangerous in the country. These sites qualify for cleanup paid for out of federal funds under a "superfund" (Corson 1990,
p.
248). Moreover,
law passed in 1980. From 1980 to 1986, the agency spent 1.6 billion dollars to clean up 13 sites (Corson 1990, p. 249). At that rate, the cost
of cleaning up the most dangerous In
fact,
would be 148
the cost of cleaning up toxic wastes
Commoner
by
For example, the United
from 1983
is
billion dollars.
starkly prohibitive.
Barry
has noted that in 1986, the annual output of the chemical
industry, as represented
*
sites
to 1985.
States
Of these,
for pesticide residues.
top 50 products, was 539 billion pounds
its
the
Moreover,
imported 17,620,000,000 pounds of bananas
Food and Drug Administration examined 160 it
tested for fewer than half
used on bananas (Weir and Matthiessen 1990,
p. 119).
of the pesticides
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
(Commoner billion
1990,
p. 89).
The
151
industry that same year discharged 400
pounds of toxic chemicals into the environment. Assuming
industry were forced to incinerate these chemicals
dioxin and other toxic chemicals but average charge of $100 per ton,
same
was $2.6
As long
billion as
(Commoner
—
a process that emits
the only "control" available
would
it
Commoner reports, the
year.
is
cost industry
chemical industry's
1990,
that the
p. 90).
$20
—
billion.
at
an
That
total after-tax profit
In short, industry cannot do
it.
petrochemical products are produced in anything like current
quantities, there
is
no
realistic
prospect that the accumulation of toxics in
much less reduced. The products of the petrochemical
the environment will even be stabilized,
The problem
worse than
is
industry themselves
—
used just once
and botdes
as
is
become
that.
"wastes." Plastics, for example, are often
the case with household grocery bags, packaging,
—and then thrown
away. These plastics
do not,
and the other products they replace, decompose
leather,
like paper,
in the landfills
where they wind up. In addition, the sheer volume of solid wastes is filling up existing landfills and making it most unlikely that we can find enough new landfill sites. The petrochemical industry does not pay the costs of managing the solid wastes that its products become any more than
pays the costs of detoxifying the hazardous wastes generated
it
when
it
produces those products.
release
harmful substances even
clude
carpets
some petrochemical products
Finally,
when
used
as
intended; examples in-
gasolines that
and automobile interiors that emit formaldehyde, emit benzene, and solvents that emit carbon tetrachloride.
Some of these
chemicals are carcinogenic, are mutagenic, or damage the
nervous system.
The
industry does not pay the medical expenses of those
who contract disease as a result. The EPA estimates that the 2.7 bilhon pounds
persons
discharged into the
air
alone cause 2000
the general population.
But
new
cases
of toxic substances
of cancer each year in
that figure underestimates the harmfiil
sequences of these emissions.
First, it
con-
does not account for the possibly
carcinogenic effects of hundreds of suspect substances that are vented into
*
Some European
countries reduce the production of trash via public policies that
Norway
taxes non-returnable
1991, p. 49).
Germany has ordered
encourage the use of retumables and recycling.
Denmark prohibits their use (Young
containers.
the packaging industry and retailers to recover
1995 (Environmental Action March/ April 1991,
few
places,
programs.
A
such
as Seatde,
80% of all
packaging materials by
p. 29). In the
United
States only a
Washington, have enacted comprehensive recycling
1987 survey found
that the states as a
much money on incineration as on
recycling
whole were spending 39 times
(Young 1991,
p. 45).
as
CHAPTER 3
152
the atmosphere but the
example, that agency
EPA
From 1970
has not studied.
standards for only 7 of these (Maillet 1989). Second, the
does not examine the health
with birth
EPA
at a time. It
imposed on the
effects
on as
industrial plants
1000 times the
considered
at these sites are
compounds
1990,
it
is
does not consider
known
more than 200
that
32).
p.
chloroform, and
safe
air at levels
over
by the Agency; 7 million Americans
thus subject to added health
risks.
of 900 people representative of the United
fat tissue
of the subjects were found to exhibit 33 of
States population, two-thirds
the 37 toxic
also
It
around the country emit toxics into the
level
In a study of the
moner
risks
and hypersensitive segments of the population, such
children and the elderly. Moreover,
who work
on
does not consider the fact
exposed to multiple chemicals and that such exposure has
that people are
additive or synergistic consequences.
vulnerable
estimate
nervous system damage, and other
estimates are based
average person from one chemical
set national
EPA
of chemicals that have been identified
effects
defects, sterility, central
serious ailments. Third,
to 1989, for
only 8 hazardous substances and
listed
which the
for
Among
tests
were conducted (Com-
the carcinogens found were benzene,
dioxin."^'
A few industrial some hazardous wastes before lowering the speed at which toxics are acof cleaning up hazardous waste sites. In other
Toxic wastes are a problem elsewhere in the world. countries (one
Denmark)
is
disposing of them, thus
cumulating and the costs
*
Workers
at
detoxify
chemical plants suffer
but also from industrial accidents. reported, and thousands
138 deaths, 5000
in
homes. The
EPA
produce worse
risks
not only from normal toxic emissions
From 1981
to 1985,
7000 such accidents were
more were unreported. The reported accidents resulted
injuries,
and 200,000 people forced to evacuate
casualties than the accident at
died and 200,000 persons were injured
Bhopal, India, where over 3000
(Waxman
1989).
t Dioxin exposure of the general population results in part
tion
—
in particular, the
products. Because
it
creates
acid gases, and ftirans into the
air,
mercury, and lead (Young 1991, filters
pits air
or
accumulate in the
end up
ash.
and
its
own
On new
it
carbon monoxide, as
cadmium,
"clean" incinerators, scrubbers
pollutants.
But most of the "removed" pol-
This ash
disposed of by being injected into
is
into landfills. Eventually, therefore, the toxics
in the groundwater.
wood when it
and
toxic wastes. In addition
sulfiir oxides,
along with such heavy metals
p. 46).
remove most of these
dumped
trash incinera-
plastics
mountains of trash, the public incinerates
to dioxin, incineration discharges nitrogen
and
from
combustion together of chlorinated
runs out of landfills, but incineration produces
lutants then
their
estimated that 17 of these accidents had the potential to
removed from the
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
153
countries petrochemical wastes and heavy metals are are
m
dumped, just
as
they
the United States. In the developing world, they are sometimes
dumped
on
into the water supply or
agricultural lands.
Heavy-metal and
organic-chemical contamination appear in vegetables and other foods. Millions of tons of hazardous wastes are imported into these countries
from the United
dumped
States
it
evident that the world has not
is
hazardous substances tion have so far
it is
producing.
had minimal
effects,
Human but
These too
on
reduce
this
pollu-
much, because have been provided
hasn't mattered
indefinitely.
rates in industrial countries are already
Reports about
appearing in
ineffective
rising cancer
scientific journals.
cannot be explained by the aging of the population (Okie
rates p.
are
to grips with the
by the environment. But worsening pollution and
pollution control cannot go
1990,
it
come
efforts to
"control" of these substances seems to
effective
These
illegally*
in uncontrolled ways.
Thus
"free"
and Europe, usually
Al).
When
the incidence of environmentally caused disease
becomes higher and more obvious, humanity wiQ recognize that this is the bill from past environmental neglect. The environment in effect will force stern action on us. (Unfortunately, by that time, there wiU be little we can do to lower immediately the rates of cancer, birth defects, and so on that result from long-term exposure). We may then eUminate from production any products that are themselves hazardous or the production of which creates hazardous wastes. The substitute products may be somewhat more expensive, less efficient, or less convenient. In that event, the net effect will be to reduce either our purchasing power or our "standard
of living"
as that
may seem
less
term
is
conventionally understood today. But that loss
painful (or cosdy, in terms of medical costs) then the rising
incidence of disease and death. If
we
don't eliminate hazardous products altogether,
substantially higher costs to "control" pollution.
makes
tion control
often makes
us pay for
no contribution
something
we
will incur
However, because pollu-
that used to cost us
nothing and
to productivity^ or product improvement,
the net effect of increased commodity' prices due to pollution control a
reduction of our purchasing power. Such price
of the day
when
coming
when
cease.
The European Economic Community' agreed
radioactive waste to their 68 former turn, agreed not to
the
marginal costs of growth equal the gains and
growth wiU therefore
*
rises foretell
is
European
in
1990 not to export toxic and
colonies.
import toxic wastes from am-where
and 50 developing countries are not
These ex-colonies,
else.
The United
in
States
parries to this treaty (French 1990, p. 13).
CHAPTER 3
154
A
problem more serious than
technological control
financial costs
is
even where
that
theoretically possible, the technical problems
is
may be extremely demanding. For example, we
have no really
still
Of
workable technological means of detoxifying hazardous wastes. course, fliture inventions
may improve
many
conditions greatly in
areas,
but certain pollutants appear to be so intractable that effective technological control
may never be
achieved.
Radiation: Tlie Insidious Pollutant the primary case in point.
Radiation
is
examine
in detail because
it
many
It
theorists
especially important to
is
seem
to rely heavily
on
the
generation of nuclear power both to circumvent the unacceptable pollution that
would
from the expansion of conventional
result
power production and fuels altogether.
fossil
to
fossil-fuel
compensate for the eventual disappearance of
Moreover, radioactive compounds
most vicious of the wide array of dangerous chemicals we into the environment without any real knowledge of
are only the
now discharge
potential for harm, so the case of radiation can serve as a
their ultimate
model of the
general long-term dangers of pollution and of the dilemmas that con-
found technological pollution control. Radioactive isotopes, or radionuclides, are dangerous in extremely has become clear that even tiny doses have long-term on human and ecological health that no radiation exposure can be considered risk-fi"ee. Thus experts agree that virtually any small doses.
It
—
adverse effects
increase in radiation exposure
*
to
is
Why are
be avoided.
That was the conclusion of the National Research Council
radionucHdes so
in 1989.
Its
study also
concluded that the incidence of fatal cancers increases in proportion to increases in radiation exposure (Smith 1989, p. A3). the
A recent study
American Medical Association reported that workers
Laboratory in Tennessee
who were
below permissible
and well below exposure
—
power
plants
levels
^had a
exposed to very low
leukemia death
(quoted in Lippman 1991,
p.
published in The Journal of
rate
63%
Oak Ridge
at the
levels
levels at
—
^well
commercial nuclear
higher than the general population
A3). In the past,
some
scientists
had no harmflil
had believed
below
a certain threshold, radiation either
effects
would be unmeasurable because any cancer that showed up
been the consequence of inducers other than
Ridge study controlled
National
of radiation
effects
later
radiation exposure.
for other cancer-causing fectors,
and
it
that,
or the harmful
could have
But the Oak
revealed that the
longer workers were exposed to tiny levels of radiation, the higher the incidence of cancer.
Of course,
these studies
do not end
all
controversy about the health effects
of low-level radiation; the U.S. Council for Energy Awareness, trade group, criticized
both
studies.
a nuclear industry
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodivenity, Pollution...
dangerous? a pervasive
First,
physical
phenomenon.
155
and biological concentration of radionuclides is It can take the form of geographical concentra-
tion in lakes, estuaries, airsheds, or any other places
of
air
and water
restricted.
is
Or
where the
circulation
can take the form of physiological
it
concentration in the body, for example, inhaled plutonium oxide particles
tend to lodge permanently in the lung and therefore to irradiate sur-
rounding
tissues intensely
Concentration can
which was described
in
over a long period.*
form of
also take the
Chapter
1
in
biological magnification,
connection with pesticides.
Once
a
biologically active radionuclide enters a food chain,
it
approximately tenfold
For example, the
at
each higher trophic
level.
concentrated
is
modest quanrity of radioactive strontium 90 that falls on a pasture is concentrated in grass, again in the cows that eat the grass, and last in the
who
child
drinks
the
cow's
milk.
Finally,
for
metabolic
reasons
radionuclides are concentrated selectively in particular tissues or organs.
For example, strontium-90 mimics calcium in the body and concentrated in bones and bone marrow, iodine- 131
is
selectively
trapped by
is
thyroid glands, and cesium-137 concentrates in muscles and soft organs,
such
as
Thus radiation standards set in terms of whole-body doses may not be very meaningful in
the liver and gonads.
averages or so-called
two ways: (1) any radiation exposure causes cancer. (2) No matter how low the levels are set, because radioactive substances are certain to be concentrated in particular locations, a dose of radiation that the putative limits of tolerance
may nevertheless
prove
In addition, there
on
is
damage by
is
no such thing
history.
compounds of any
as
an "average" person for
judged
safe.
An
The
kind.
are also at higher risk,
fetus
its life is
Growing
and the
certain developmental stages.
children, with their high
affinity
Thus
cycle as well as to other accidents
particularly vulnerable to poisonous
metaboHsm,
of a radioactive compound such
strontium-90 for bone and marrow can
make
standards
it
as
particularly devastating at
must
take into account the
basic ecological principle that the reproductive period
*
whom
organism's vulnera-
radioactivity (or any other pollutant, for that matter)
directly related to the stage in
of personal
well within
whole body
lethal.
certain levels of radioactivity can be
bihty to
is
the average or over the
Plutonium's peculiar properties and extreme toxicity make
is
it
critical (E. P.
by
far the
most
virulent of aU radioactive substances. This fact has generated a major controversy
over the dangers of plutonium to pubUc health.
The more extreme
radiation standards-setting process claim that inhalation of as
may be
sufficient to
produce a
significantly increased risk
Little as
critics
one
of the
particle
of contracting cancer.
CHAPTER 3
156
Odum
1971,
others
who
108): What to adults or the general pubUc may be an may be very much more damaging to the young and to
p.
acceptable risk
are pecuHarly vulnerable.
Furthermore, the
effects
of radiation combine synergistically with
the effects of other pollutants or environmental stresses to produce
damage to bodies and ecosystems. Synergism occurs causes combine to produce a net effect that is greater or more two when than the mere sum of their separate effects. Thus, to use a well-known disproportionate
medical example, exposure to a modest quantity of either carbon tetrachloride or alcohol has no serious consequences, but simultaneous
exposure to both causes serious
or death.
illness
problems are either produced by synergism
smog) or aggravated by
it
theoretical basis for this stress
(for
(for
Many
environmental
example, photochemical
example, poisoning by heavy metals).
was discussed
in
Chapter
1
:
Any
The
environmental
tends to simpHfy an ecosystem and therefore to reduce
its
stabihty.
of pollutants. So
Few studies have been done on many biologically active compounds have been released in such large quantities that neither the money nor the labor power is available for the synergistic effects
more important interactions. Howon the structure and functioning of ecosystems and on the human body is amply documented (Smith 1989, p. A3; Wallace 1974; Conney and Bums 1972; Woodwell 1969). In effect, radioactivity "softens up" a biological system, making it studying even a tiny fraction of the
ever, the deleterious effect of low-level radioactivity
more
vulnerable to disruption by other pollutants and stresses (and vice
versa,
of course). The addition to our environment of such a potent stress is therefore a matter for deep concern, even if no
as
chronic radioactivity
immediate It is,
effects
can be observed.
long-term
in fact, the
effects
of radiation exposure that are the
most worrisome. The general epidemiological evidence for increased mortality due to chronic low-level pollution over the last 50 to 100 years is
incontrovertible. Epidemiologists agree that the sharp rise in death rates
from emphysema, various forms of malignancy, and a number of other prominent modern ills is primarily due to pollution. Researchers estimate, for example, that
between 60 and 90% of cancer
cases (1,040,000
discovered each year in the United States) are caused by envirormiental factors,
mostly chemicals (Maugh 1974). Moreover,
the overall
mortality
damage
statistics
natural systems
is
to
pubhc health
is
as
Figure 3-2 reveals,
Ukely to be
far
greater than
alone indicate. In addition, the effect of
nonhnear
(so that
stress
on
doubling the dose more than doubles
and we can confidently expect future increments of low-level radiation (and of other pollutants) to produce disproportionately more damage to human health than past levels of pollution. the resulting
illness),
.
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution.
FIGURE (after
3-2
157
.
Spectrum of biological responses
to exposure to pollutants
Newill 1973).
Even more important is the fact that radiation is by far the most powerfiil mutagen known. The radionucHdes released by human activities are therefore doubly dangerous:
By
exposing us to
significandy higher than the so-called
a level
of radioactivity
background radiation of the earth
(which our evolutionary history has prepared us to withstand), they threaten the genetic integrity of
unborn
ceivable, for example, that today's adults
escape serious
harm but
that
generations.
and even
It is
entirely
con-
today's children could
our grandchildren would be grievously
injured by current levels of radioactivity. In sum, despite the remaining areas
of controversy, the long-term dangers from low
mental radioactivity are Finally, the threat
levels
of environ-
essentially indisputable.
from radionuclides
is
intensified
by
their persist-
ence. For example, the half-Hves of tritium, strontium-90, and cesium-
137 are 12.4, 28, and 33 years, respectively. Because the period of biological danger
is
roughly 10 times the
half-life,
the tritium
we
release
today will be a problem for 124 years, and the other two isotopes wiU
remain dangerous for about 3 centuries. such long
half-lives that
most dangerous of these years),
which
they is
v^
A few other radionuclides
be with us in
plutonium-239
takes a quarter
(it
virtual perpetuity.
have
The
has a half-life of 24,000
of a million years to decay to the point of
CHAPTER 3
158
harmlessness. (Plutonium fiiel
cycle, either as a
used in weapons and
is
by-product or
of radionucHdes released year
as a fuel.)
is
part of the nuclear
Consequently, tiny amounts
after year can,
over the not-so-very-long
run, build up a large inventory of dangerous radioactivity in ecosystems
and human bodies. Thus, even if we and our immediate progeny escape harm, we could still saddle our more remote posterity with a lethal burden of radioactivity.
The conclusion pounds
to the
is
comamounts, made up
inescapable that the release of radioactive
environment in any but the most
preferably only of those
trivial
compounds with very with
short half-hves and the
some very
least capacity for biological
harm,
carries
Anything
100%
control of radioactive emissions
less
than virtually
it
dangerous to the future biological health of the planet and especially
its
human
serious risks.
its
is
truly
inhabitants,
inhabitants.
Toxic Nuclear Wastes Given the dangers of radiation, the wastes generated by the military and civihan uses of nuclear power pose a formidable long-term threat to
The military facihties of the United States and the Union have generated huge quantities of nuclear wastes. The military has openly dumped its nuclear wastes into lakes and humanity.
Soviet Soviet rivers,
forcing the evacuation of people living along their shores and con-
taminating the Arctic Ocean, thousands of kilometers away.
A
Soviet
exploded in 1957, contaminating
high-level nuclear storage facility
15,000 square kilometers of land on which 250,000 people worst
civilian nuclear accident in history, a reactor at the
power
station
lived. In the
Chernobyl
exploded in 1986, releasing between 50 and 100 million Up to 50 different
curies of radioactive material into the environment.
radioactive isotopes
were included in the
release,
with
half-lives
ranging
33 from 2 hours to 24,000 years. A years) was released and was detected in high amounts in the milk of countries as far away as Switzerland, Germany, and the United Kingdom. One hundred million people in Europe were put under food restrictions, as the radiation contaminated fruits, vegetables, and the grass on which
huge quantity of cesium-137
livestock feed.
Soon
after the
explosion occurred, 116,000 people living
within 18 miles of the reactor were the reactor
may remain
government
allocated
(Shogren 1990, land. levels
By 1990
p.
(half-life,
moved
out; the land in the vicinity of
uninhabitable for 15,000 years. In 1990 the Soviet
$26
billion
to
move 200,000 more people
Al). But 4 million people
still
live
on contaminated
doctors in the area were reporting dramatically higher
of skin cancer and other cancers, miscarriages, genetic mutations,
Deforestarion, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
159
and enlarged
birth defects, gynecological problems, anemia, heart attacks,
thyroid glands. Cancer deaths attributable to the accident are projected by
the National Research Council to be
30,000 of these radiation release in tens
fatalities
wall
as
from Chernobyl
is
radioactive waste
as
70,000 people. Over
expected to cause cancers to develop
of thousands of additional people
The United
high
occur outside the Soviet Union. The
who
will survive the disease.*
States military has also generated
—an
huge amounts of
estimated 1.4 billion curies. (This compares to the
50 to 100 million curies of radioactive material released
at
Chernobyl
(Renner 1991, p. 147).) United States military waste has contaminated the soil and groundwater at over 3200 sites owned by the United States Department of Energy. More than 50 Nagasaki-sized nuclear bombs could be buHt just from the wastes that have already leaked from storage (Renner 1991, p. from
tanks at the Hanford, Washington, nuclear reservation
147); 4.5 million liters of high-level radioactive wastes have leaked
(Renner 1991, p.
these tanks so far
nuclear
known
facility in
148). Radiation
from the Rocky
quantities throughout the
Denver region; strontium and cesium
have leaked into the ground water (Renner 1991,
employees
The Oak Ridge, at least
Rocky
148).
and chromosome aberrations (Renner 1991, Tennessee, nuclear
Flats
p.
147).
emitted thousands of
facility has
pounds of uranium into the atmosphere; the emitted
p.
of brain tumors, malignant melanoma,
suffer elevated levels
respiratory cancer,
Flats
Colorado, including plutonium, has spewed in un-
facility at
250 tons of uranium oxide. The
Fernald, Ohio, has
facility's
wastes have
contaminated nearby surface water and groundwater with cesium, uranium, and thorium. The aquifer under the Savannah River, South Carolina, nuclear facility contains radioactive substances and chemicals at 400 times the concentrations the government considers "safe" (Renner 1991, 148). All
of
this radiation
(and more,
thousands of other
p.
facilities) is
No
one knows what
do with the portion of these nuclear wastes (and
civilian nuclear
hazardous to biological systems and to
at
is
accumulating.
wastes) that can be "cleaned up," because
storing nuclear wastes has been found.
wastes cannot be "cleaned up"; either are already dispersed into the
air,
Worse
we
no
satisfactory facility for
still,
don't
some of these nuclear
know how
or the wastes
the water, and particularly the ground-
water where they wall remain harmfiil, depending on the contaminant, for dozens, hundreds, or thousands
*
of years.
Apart from the possibility of catastrophic accidents, nuclear power
with other
difficulties,
which were
discussed in Chapter 2.
is
beset
CHAPTER 3
160
The
Fallacies of Technological Pollution Control
The
between radioactive pollutants and more ordinary polone of degree, not of kind. Radionuclides are particularly and especially toxic, but many other pollutants behave in a
difference
lutants
is
insidious
of the thousands of synthetic
similar way. In fact, the vast majority
chemical compounds released in any quantity are physically and biologias to attack certain body tissues on reproduction or early development; react synergistically with other compounds or "soften up" natural systems; have potential or demonstrated delayed effects on ecosystems and
cally
concentrated or magnified so
selectively;
human
have
critical effects
populations; are mutagenic; and are sufficiently persistent to allow
long-term buildup of toxic material. Consequently, we already confront public health and ecological
dilemma of unknown but
a
clearly large
dimensions. Adding additional quantities of pollution of whatever form
can only worsen
this situation.
For these reasons, ecologists and environmental health
specialists find
completely unacceptable the usual economist s position that
on
rely
we
should
the "natural assimilative capacity" of air and water, controlUng
pollution only
when
recreational or other
economic "use values"
damaged. This economic criterion can have ecological only for nonsynthetic poUutanfs (such
as
will
be
validity, if at aU,
sewage and other organic
materials) that ecosystems are naturally adapted to handle in reasonable
amounts. But
it
has
no
validity at
say nothing of radionuclides.
all
Thus
it
for synthetics like petrochemicals, to
may make
ecological sense to speak
of using the environment to dispose of natural organic compounds (providing, contrary to current fact, that they are not contaminated with synthetics), but
pollutants.
By
much more
these are the least dangerous
contrast,
we must
and
achieve virtually
least
100%
troublesome
control of the
dangerous and troublesome synthetics; economics not-
withstanding, there
little
is
or no safe assimilative capacity for such
unnatural compounds.
Furthermore, even
if
we were
to allow that the
environment could
absorb with impunity a minimal quantity of these compounds,
not determine whether there existed trial
and
error.
cancers in
Thus
human
to radionuclides. paralleled,
and
in
it
a "safe" level
we
could
of usage except by
has taken the observation of increased incidence of
beings for us to recognize that there
Our
ignorance about
most
cases exceeded,
safe levels
is
no
safe
exposure
of toxic substances
is
by our ignorance of what ecosys-
tems can tolerate over the long term and of numerous other factors essential to administering
man
an "economic" poUution-control
strategy.
Hu-
beings will continue to be the guinea pigs, while administrators of
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
161
pollution-control laws face the task of setting pollution controls despite
ignorance of what the environment can absorb.
this
Nor
means
are the technical
prepossessing. In fact, because so runoff,
available to the administrator at aU
much
from "non-point" sources
truly heroic technological measures, sible
to that
makes
a
of sewage, yet there
why
be controlled,
strict
controls
almost
only by
if at aU,
on
fruitless.
readily acces-
General urban
contribution to water pollution about equal
no way
is
hydrological reengineering of our
of the reason
even
may be
"point" sources of pollution
runoff, for example,
pollution derives, Hke agricultural
that can
to control
cities (at
it
short of a massive
astronomical cost). This
the $100 billion spent so far to
is
part
meet the standards of
the Clean Water Act has been an "almost meaningless enterprise" (after
Abelson 1974). In this light, our hypothetical poUution-control rather conservative.
Not
model now appears
only are the original x units of residuals already
an ecological and public-health threat (though probably not yet one), but because pollution
development effluent,
as
to
the
is
due
more
much
as
easily
a large
to the general side effects
of
controlled discharges of factory
each doubling of production from the factory will more than
double the incidence of pollution. Thus both the necessity for stringent pollution control and
proportional
its
expense will increase more rapidly than a simple
model would
predict.
In sum, therefore, as a strategy of coping v^th the ever-increasing
load of pollution that inevitably accompanies increased production, technological pollution control has ing, for the
some very
serious limitations. Even grant-
sake of argument, that engineers mil come up with systems ofpollution
control that are, especially for radionuclides,
90%
or more effective, growth of
production cannot continue forever In fact, if we try to
double and redouble
current levels of production in the United States,
seems very
we
shall
soon be restrained by
rising costs
some commodities) and by rising
levels
control. Pollution control (as distinct
poUutants in the
first
place)
is
of pollution control
of pollutants that
likely that
(at least
we
for
cannot
from eHminating the production of
therefore only a temporary tactic that will
allow growth of production to continue for just a
it
a
while longer.
It is
not
genuine solution to the problem of pollution, even under the most
optimistic assumptions about our technological capacities and energy supply.
In addition, the basic problems of pollution control are at least as
much pohtical, social, and economic as technological. For example, it may well be that we shall come to accept levels of pollution and damage to public health that we would regard as intolerable today. If so, then growth could continue for somewhat longer, until mortaHty and morbidity grow
CHAPTER
162
3
—16 Ecological Pollution Control From
almost every point of view except short-term
profitability,
an
ecological strategy of pollution control and waste recycling, involving as
much
as possible
would be
the planned use of natural recycling mechanisms,
preferable to relying
on
expensive, energy-devouring, and
failure-prone technological devices to perform these functions. Specifically,
we
—
should create waste-management parks
that
is,
portions of
the environment deliberately set aside as natural recycUng "plants" {E. P.
Odum
1971, Chap. 16). In these parks, sewage and other controllable
wastes capable of being naturally recycled (and not used directly tilizer
on
farms)
would be sprayed on
would remove and
forests
and
grasslands,
as fer-
which
reuse the nutrients that cause water pollution and
return the purified water to aquifers. Forestry, fish ponds, grazing, and
other means of exploiting the potentially productive energy contained in the recycled wastes
tion control
is
would help pay
would do most of the work
firee,
wastes. Also, because such a park
would
the costs. This concept of pollu-
the most efficient and economical overall, for nature
and productive use would be made of
would be
in a quasi-natural state,
serve ecologically as a protective zone, balancing
more
it
intensive
development elsewhere.
to catastrophic proportions. Also, technological frxes are not ecologically
optimal solutions to
many important
pollution problems. For example,
attempts to dispose of urban organic wastes technologically are mis-
unused resource
directed, for these wastes are really an
recycled
as fertilizer.
Unfortunately, even though
and ecologicaUy rational and would probably save the long run, recycling wastes financial in
and energy
costs
is
impeded not only by the initial also by the numerous changes would be required to make this
seriously
our general way of doing things that
later,
control.
Thus even where control measures
—
Box
16). Finally, as
we
"rational" to pollute and to avoid paying for pollution
shaU see
wise
be
of transition, but
kind of ecological pollution control feasible (see it is
that could
thermodynamicaUy money and energy in
it is
—
are readily available, they usually cannot
within a general firamework of political,
social,
technological or other-
be implemented except
and economic reforms.
.
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution.
Unfortunately, such
a strategy
1
.
has limits. In the
first
place, the
63
con-
cept of the waste-management park assumes that resources are not so intensively exploited that
we cannot
afford to reserve large potentially
productive areas for protective purposes. Moreover,
many forms of uncontrollable
as
we
have seen,
pollution will remain despite any con-
ceivable changes in pollution-control strategy. Also, materials such as
many
radionuclides and
synthetic chemicals,
troduce into ecosystems, will dustrially.
Thus
may be
are
dangerous to in-
insuperable, (Scientists are studying the
of transmuting nuclear wastes, that
neutrons to break them years,
which
have to be treated and controlled in-
the problems of technological pollution control dis-
cussed in the rext possibility
still
down
is,
bombarding them with 300
into substances that would, in about
be no more dangerous than natural uranium. (BrowTie 1991,
p.
But transmutation has not yet been proven practical; moreover, most transmutation methods would produce plutonium. Scientists envision that the plutonium would be processed in a breeder reactor, but the United States previously abandoned an earlier breeder reactor program as too dangerous). Therefore, it would seem that genuine control CI).)
of pollution will oblige us not to produce pollutants in the this will
social habits
There a Limit
One
place;
and values.
Technology and Is
first
require significant industrial changes as well as changes in our
Its
to
Management
Technological
Growth?
of the main components of the argument against the limits-to-
growth
thesis
is
technological optimism (see
the type of technology at issue).
The
Box
17 for a description of
optimists believe that exponential
technological growth will allow us to expand resources and keep ahead
of exponentially increasing demands. The eminent British elder statesman of science Lord Zuckerman (quoted in Anon., 1972a) complained about
The Limits to Growth that "the only kind of exponential growth with which the book does not deal, and which I for one believe to be a fact, is that of the growth of human knowledge"; Zuckerman went on to assert categorically that "the tree of knowledge will go on growing endlessly."
CHAPTER 3
164
—17 Bulldozer Technology Unless they return to a tools or
fire,
humans
life
of hunting and gathering without either
are incurably technological in the sense that they
by some kind modes of technological
will always have to transform nature for utilitarian ends
of applied science. However, existence are possible.
radically different
What we
concerned with here
are
is
the pecuHar
kind of technology that grew out of Baconian experimental science,
which
first
had a
social
England, and which has
impact during the Industrial Revolution in
purpose giving people power
as its explicit
over nature in order to promote "the effecting of all things possil to use Francis Bacon's arresting slogan
(Medawar 1969).
For our purposes, the most important characteristics of this kind
dependence on
and other nonrenewand lack of integration with natural processes, its dominating scale, and its narrow concept^ of rationality or efficiency; Because all attempts at an exact yet reasonably succinct definition fall short, it might be best to resort to symbolism and call it "bulldozer" technology. The bulldozer and of technology are
able or
man-made
its
resources,
its
fossil fuel
linearity
^
other earth-moving machinery
make
possible the airports, dams,
highways, skyscrapers, and most of the other vaunted achievements
of modern technological
civilization.
Moreover,
its
violent power,
way in which it reshapes nature to human design, and its dependence on human-made energy and a complex industrial infirastructure make the bulldozer a paradigm of modern technology. It is on such a technology, rather than on some of its the single-minded
M
conceivable alternatives, that proponents of exponential technologic cal
growth appear to
rely.
Zuckerman's boast held article of philosophes, the
been our
is
modern
not merely a personal opinion but faith.
according to
Karl Marx, eventually scarcity
its
more Utopian pro-
ponents, such
as
age-old
of poverty and injustice that are rooted in
abolished.
amounts
widely
ideology of progress through science and technology has
social religion. Indeed,
evils
a
Since the age of the Enlightenment
Thus
to challenge endless scientific
to a kind of secular heresy.
itself
(and therefore the it)
will
be
and technological progress
— Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
Yet, as
we
165
have seen in the preceding discussions of the particular
technological solutions proposed to deal with the problems of growth in the production of food, minerals, and pollution, there are demonstrable limits to the technological
come
manipulation of ecological
some of
to generalize about
practical
The time
limits.
has
these limits and to discuss certain
problems of technological management that are only partly
connected with the physical limitations of the
earth.
It
be seen that
will
neither in theory nor in practice can technological growth be as endless as
Lord Zuckerman
human
the
knowledge and manage technological solutions
Already, in fact, limits to
asserts.
capacity to plan for and
to to
environmental problems have begun to emerge.
Limits
Knowledge and
to
Most
Application
to Its
and technologists
scientists
with Zuckerman, that necessity
believe,
However, although we cannot
unfailingly brings forth invention.
specify the
exact limits and must always be aware of potential "failures of imagination
and nerve" possibilities
[relevant]
that
would tend
knowledge
that the enterprise
any event
is
will
make
to
(Clarke 1962), there
is
us overly pessimistic about fiiture
at least
reasonable doubt that "the tree of
go on growing
of science will end, and
an assertion in
clear that such
true of some fields than others. Nevertheless,
less
it
appears that
the process o( relevant scientific discovery must eventually cease. That as
we
ha/e turned mechanics and
therefore, into played-out fields
come
to the
classical optics
of
surmounting the
limits to
in other fields relevant
new
more
scientific
work
that
translatable into
new
shall
we
problem of
illustrates is
the law of diminishing
done, the
more
likely
intact.
it is
that
Thus new knowledge may not
technology In physics the clockwork
mechanical theories of Isaac tic
too
to the
theories will be corrections or refinements of previous ones, leaving
most of the old structure of knowledge be
just
growth.
Indeed, the history of science clearly returns, for the
is,
into engineers' tools and,
scientific investigation, so
end of scientific discovery
mean
This does not
endlessly." it is
Newton have been
superseded by the
celestialrelativis-
and quantum- mechanical theories associated with Albert Einstein and
Werner Heisenberg, but a significant practical
biological
and
ones that
totally
may contribute human species. Moreover,
neither relativity nor the uncertainty principle have
impact on the ordinary physical
social existence.
change our little
to
Thus even very
scientific
a greater scientific
of our
species's
world view or our view of ourselves,
removing the ecological
not seem possible, for the
reality
great fijture discoveries
limits
now confi-onting
and technological research
scientific enterprise itself is
efFort
the
does
now struggling with
CHAPTER 3
166
numerous
limits to
its
own
growth. For example, the costs of basic
many areas have risen inordinately in recent symptom of diminishing returns. And even when theory research in
years, a clear
clearly favors
real-world technological advance, acceptable engineering solutions
not be achievable because the technical
may
too great. As
difficulties are
previously suggested, fusion could be just such an area.
we
Finally, as
have had occasion to note in connection with
pollution control and energy production, one cannot improve
a
tech-
nology indefinitely without encountering either thermodynamic of
limits or limits
practical interest.
scale
Many
beyond which further improvement
is
of no
technologies are already near this point, and
the rest soon will be, for the substitution of one ever-more-efficient
form of technology effect, the better
improve upon
for another simply cannot continue forever. In
our current technology, the harder
it.
(In the real world,
it is
moreover, there
likely to is
be to
frequently a
trade-off between efficiency and rehability, such that maximizing efficiency can be self-defeating.)
In sum, there
knowledge or
may be limits to relevant scientific and technological human capacity to discover such knowledge. If so,
to the
basing our strategy of response to ecological limits scientific
on
the assumption that
and technological knowledge wiU grow endlessly or even
rate typical
at
the
of the recent past appears to be imprudent.
The Overwhelming Burden of Planning and Management Even
if
knowledge proves not
lack of scientific and technological
an obstacle, implementation of technological solutions to the
of problems ning and
we
have discussed will place
management on our
full
to
be
array
staggering burden of plan-
a
decision
and
makers
institutional
machinery.
The 1987
report of the
World Commission on Environment and
Development viewed the problem
as follows:
When the
century began, neither human numbers nor technology had the power radically to alter planetary systems. As the century closes, not only do vastly increased human numbers and their activities have that power,
but major, unintended changes are occurring in the atmosphere, in
soils, in
among plants and animals, and in the relationships among all of The rate of change is outstripping the ability of scientific disciphnes
waters, these.
and our current
capabilities to assess
and
advise.
attempts of political and economic institutions, ferent,
more fragmented world,
to adapt
It
is
frustrating the
which evolved
and cope (Corson 1990,
in a difp. 3).
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
Furthermore, the environmental problems;
crisis
not
is
of discrete
a series
of interacting problems that exacerbate each other
a set
it is
167
through various kinds of threshold, multiplicative, and synergistic
ef-
Thus the difficulty and complexity of managing the ensemble of problems grow faster than any particular problem. Moreover, all the work of innovation, construction, and environmental management fects.
needed
to
cope with
ensemble must be orchestrated into
this
a rea-
sonably integrated, harmonious whole; the accumulation of the side
of piecemeal solutions would almost certainly be intolerable.
effects
Because delays, planning tively
and general incapacity to deal
failures,
with even the current range of problems are
we must
all
effec-
too visible today,
further assume that our ability to cope with large-scale
com-
few decades. In
brief,
plexity will improve substantially in the next
technology cannot be implemented in an organizational vacuum. Something like the ecological "law of the
minimum," which
states that the
supply governs the rate of growth of a system
factor in least
applies to social systems as well as ecosystems.
as a
whole,
Thus technological
fixes
human capacity to plan, construct, fund, and many technological optimists (for example, Starr
cannot run ahead of the
—
staff
them
and
Rudman
a fact that
Foresight, Time,
Our
1973) either overlook or assume away.
and Money as Factors
achieve the requisite level of effectiveness in planning
ability to
complex systems
especially doubtfiil. Already the civilization are seen
breakdown,
economic
One
and
by some
current
—appear
what
*
risks
to be grossly
hierarchical,
adapted to the nature of the problems.
acts
is
that the conse-
cannot be foreseen with
certainty.
attached to nuclear energy or to the use of certain
Even
(1)
Even
answers to such "trans-scientific" questions
if
change
a healthy river into a
sewer once the
wastes and pollution has been exceeded (the threshold
if population
and per capita consumption grow separately
demand
that uses twice as
much
multiplies
more
produce more
ill
rapidly,
health than
on
the
of pollution, from noise
would
addition of the particular effects (the synergistic effect).
at quite
such that a
has four times the impact
(the multiplicative effect). (3) Various forms
to radiation, interact to
as
per capita consumption and waste remain constant,
the total environmental
doubled population
environment
the brink of
are
examples:
rates,
on
linear,
scientific
river's capacity to digest
modest
ill
—
no
a small increase in population can
effect). (2)
perpetually hovering styles
is
that sustain industrial
very troublesome problem for social planners
exist
Some
as
management
quences of our technological
There
Supply
in Least
result
simply from the
CHAPTER 3
168
way
chemicals (Weinberg 1972); the only pirically
is
to
run
to determine these risks
experiment on the population
a real-life
at large.*
emThe
more Thus there are no technical solutions to the dilemmas of environmental management, and policy decisions about environmental
potential social consequences of technological innovation are even
obscure.
problems must be made
by prudent
politically
citizens,
not by
scientific
remedy
administrators. This being the case, technology assessment, the
proposed for the general
problem of technological
political
can never be the purely technical exercise
side effects,
many of its proponents seem come to resemble a power
to envision; instead, the planning process will
between
struggle values.
The
entails are
siting
and
of differing economic,
partisans
foreshadowed by current safety
creation of social consensus and
becoming
issues.
commitment on
increasingly apparent that
for time will
be one of our
example of the it
lily
is
can
is
these difficult issues. Yet
to let things slide until
then even heroic action
it is
seems, dealing
it
really the lesser part
illustrates, until a limit
we Americans
For example,
become
they are pressing
may be too
so central to our
of the problem.
so insidious: As the
is
very close in time,
to 135 chemical plants air,
'a
massive
Although
and miscarriage among anti-pollution laws)
is
that
in
this
New
in the
towns
we
for
cannot
United
Orleans, Louisiana,
by
live
States
is
which
is
The Washington Post reported
corridor are so fuU of carcinogens, specialist
experiment....'" (Mariniss and
defined
Weisskopf
in the corridor report high rates of cancer
their populations,
nothing special (beyond weak federal
being done to stop the emission of pollutants from these
plants or to relocate the people
of chemicals
Hves that
an environmental health
human
several
human
fatal,
late.
phenomenon to
oil refineries.
ground, and water along
living [there] as
1988, p. Al).
Rouge
and 7
mutagens and embryotoxins
too
all
potentially
have allowed the private automobile to
Perhaps the worst local example of this
that "the
is
economy and our private
the 85-mile corridor from Baton
home
and too
little
it
iU afford the associated delays,
dangerous primarily because
pad and pond
essential for the
seems very far away physically and psychologically. Thus the
tendency
*
we
scarcest resources. Difficult as
with very large increments of growth Exponential growth
political
power-plant
conflicts over nuclear
and over other environmental
Of course, such drawn-out political batdes may well be is
and
social,
and delays such an adversary planning process
difficulties
away from them. The reason
promoting these
diseases
is
is
that the effects
long-term and
"creeping";
fiirthermore, as federal officials tirelessly repeat in discussing everything pesticides to radiation,
no one can prove what
role
what
from
particular chemical
played in causing what particular disease in a particular person, compared to other possible sources of that person's cancer or miscarriage.
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
without longer
of
its
169
in the short term, yet because
it
with
live
it
side effects
in
We
current form.
its
of
we
air pollution,
can no
are forced to alleviate the worst
wdth stopgap technological responses, but
this strategy
not even enable us to meet necessary clean-air standards without
wall
additional social
and
institutional changes.
we
almost helpless to do better, for
At
too big to handle by any means that are technically feasible
now
it
are
became
economically, and
or in the immediate future. Similarly, warnings of
ozone
the destruction of the itself in a
politically,
we
however,
this point,
ignored the problem until
layer
were ignored, and the world
predicament in which nothing
we
finding
is
can do wall avert millions of
additional cancer cases.
Nor must
is it
enough merely
to foresee an
also anticipate the lead
emerging problem. Planners
time necessary to take delivery of even
readily available technological solutions, such as using hydrochlorofluoro-
carbons instead of chloroflurocarbons (10 to 20 years), or to replace a
harmful technology with one that does not use chlorine (20 to 40 as
is
years),
apparently going to be necessary to bring ozone depletion under
control. Often, however, the replacement technology does not yet exist,
more
so even
lead time must be allotted for
its
invention. Worse,
take a very long time for any significant results to appear
once
it
may
a tech-
CFCs, for 100 years. Even if we
nological fix has actually been applied in the real world.
example, remain intact in the upper atmosphere for stop producing
them immediately, each chlorine atom
already created has
the capacity to destroy around 100,000 ozone molecules. For another
example, the sheer quantity of the toxic wastes
now
so
overwhelming
Even
impossible. scientific
if
that cleaning
we were
it
up
dumped
in this country
has already proved to be
to stop producing toxic wastes quickly, with
implement
radical
change (none of which
groundwater contamination
dumped. So too
are cancers
their drinking supply. In
is
inevitable
among
the people
who
exists),
the
fi-om
planning horizon of 30 to 50 years
is
The Superfund Law, which provided
—and
sites
the
minimum
for the cleanup
tip
by 1988,
fi-om
1980 to 1986 the
foresight,
at
our
and
a
consistent with the
of toxic waste sites
EPA
were
sites
in
identified
cleaned up only
(Corson 1990, pp. 249-250). And this may of the iceberg: In 1987, the General Accounting office estimated
that at a cost
be only the that over
waste
already
use groundwater for
the United States, has thus far been a farce. Although 1177 as "priority"
much more
wastes
sum, coping with exponential growth
advanced stage of development requires the exercise of
13
is
but
breakthroughs, a crash program of development, and the politi-
cal will to
*
all
of $1.6
billion
425,000 hazardous waste
sites
may
exist in this country.
CHAPTER 3
170
existence of innumerable natural and social failure to exercise foresight
In spite of the fact that
means
money
that
is
we have
lags.
Moreover, our past
already fallen far behind.
also a significant practical limitation
on
technological growth, there are abundant examples of failure to count the financial cost
of technological schemes.
has unfortunately
begun
ecological bind here
on
to achieve
earth
One
some
lies in
found
is
in the assertion,
currency, that the
space
(Chedd
1974).
colonies or whatever the ultimate cosmic destiny of the ofiers
a
no escape
growth on
fi-om the limits to
day's
flight,
2500
human
rocket into space in the population
flights
a
major undertaking
would be
This alone would generate colossal environmental problems
of energy for
quantities
fiiel,
race, space
To
of the world (approximately 250,000 people) would be (assuming 100 persons per shutde
abundandy
extraterrestrial
growth
this planet.
number of individuals equivalent to just one
way out of our It is
whatever the ultimate potential for founding
clear that,
which
necessary).
—enormous
pollution of the atmosphere (especially the
vulnerable stratosphere) by toxic exhaust gases (not to mention chlorine),
—and
and so on totally
trying to keep pace with population
growth would be
out of the question. Moreover, the expense would be staggering.
only would
would be
it
cost billions to
lift
just the beginning.
Not
into orbit these 250,000 persons, but that
There would
also
be the
costs for space
colonization and other life-support costs in space. Unquestionably, keeping
pace with the world's population growth for just one year would require a
sum exceeding the
U.S. gross national product.
developed and routinized space
movement of people and
travel
materials to
is
It is
not
apparent that even highly
likely to involve large-scale
and fi^om the
earth, at least
not in any
foreseeable future.
Even
less
the reasons
(and
why
may cost too much. One of no American supersonic transport (SST) program AngloFrench Concorde SST project is continually embroiled grandiose technological schemes
why
the
there
is
in political controversy as well as red ink) private industry
is
was willing to undertake the
that neither
government nor
financial burdens. Indeed, the
mere expansion of currently feasible technology will strain our capital resources in the coming decades. To stop carbon emissions and meet our electrical needs by increasing nuclear power production would cost upwards of two
trillion dollars
over the next 25 years, not including the costs of
decommissioning plants or the disposal of radioactive wastes. replace
all
coal-fired
power
plants with nuclear plants
If we
were
have to build one plant every two and one-half days every year! staggering expense
is
one of the major reasons why
ment support, are not likely to choose
to
by 2025, we would
utilities,
The
despite govern-
the nuclear route. Moreover, given the
general shortage of capital, when dollars are spent for expensive technologies to solve a
problem
in
one
area,
investment must be foregone in other kinds
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
of new plant and equipment needed
to
171
cope with another environmental and so forth. Insufficient
pollutant, or in housing, or in social welfare,
investment capital
is
therefore likely to be a very serious limitation
on
continued technological expansion.
Vulnerability to Accident
and Error
Because major and irrevocable commitments of money materials, and effort are necessary to stay ahead of population growth and because major risks are inherent in certain technological choices if all does not go well, it has become supremely important to make the right decisions the first time, for
we may
have no second chance to solve the problems being us so rapidly Yet even supremely foresightfiil, intelligent, and timely decision making may do little to reduce the growing vulnerability of a highly technological society to accident and error. thrust
upon
The
mam
nologies are
cause for concern
beginnmg
to
is
that
be deployed.
some
especially dangerous tech-
We
have seen, for example, that there are inherent in nuclear power production (especially with the breeder reactor) certain risks that make virtually perfect
containment mandatory, and the evidence does not suggest that such perfection is achievable (see Box 10 and the related discussion). In addition, many other modern technologies—^uch as the chemical industry the transport
and storage of natural
and the supertanker—are capable of inflicting catastrophic ecological or human damage. Experience with these technologies also shows clearly the near impossibility of preventing all accigas,
dents. Especially in the
developed world, people depend so heavily on a even less intrinsically dangerous for example, a sustained electric-power failure can have
basic technological infirastructure that
accidents
—
—
devastating consequences.
As population grows and civilization becomes more complex, it will much more effort and skill for us to cope with this increasing
require
vulnerability to disorder (entropy) design,
skill,
and
efficiency, or reliability in
failure.
But to count on perfect
human enterprise is folly. In how perfect as self-contained
any
addition, all human works, no matter engineering creations, are vulnerable not only to such natural disasters as earthquakes, storms, droughts, and other acts of God,* but also to
* This fact alone makes it unlikely that the requisite degree of nuclear safety can ever be achieved, especially given the human propensity to buUd extensively in
natural flood plains, disasters.
known
earthquake zones, and other spots
liable to natural
CHAPTER 3
172
deliberate
disruption by crackpots, criminals, terrorists, and military
enemies. Nevertheless, despite the patent impossibility of achieving any
such thing,
modern
which nothing
less
society seems to be approaching a condition in
than perfect planning and
will object to such a strong statement several
management
of the problem, so
of the arguments that purport to dismiss
sometimes
Some
will do.
let us
examine
concern.
this
of any one of these disastrous low as not to be worth worrying about. Of course, humanity must run some risk in order to reap the fruits of technology, It is
events happening
is
said that the probability
so
but dismissing the problem in
fashion betrays a potentiaUy
this
fatal
misunderstanding of the laws of probability, for an apparently low prob-
of accident may be
ability
reactor safety in
Box
10,
illusory. First, as
whether
on how many sources of
risk there are.
kind of reactor accident are year
is
in
1
is
we noted
we
already
do
so
many
in the discussion
large or small
That
if
is,
1000 per reactor
a certainty (on average) if there are
Because small,
a risk
the chances of
year,
then
1000 reactors
some
things that have
of altering the climate or unleashing other
of
depends greatly
in operation.
potential,
disasters,
some
accident a
1
we
however
should not
be complacent about the apparently highly improbable. Second, some
There
risks are essentially incalculable.
is
no way,
for example, to estimate
the degree of danger to nuclear installations in developing countries from
cunning enough
fanatical political terrorists
devices and security procedures. Third,
when
we
outwit
to
all
the safety
cannot afford to relax even
the probabilities are truly small, for the million-to-one shot
equally likely to occur at the
first
event, at the millionth, or well
the millionth. If the result of failure
is
is
beyond
potentially catastrophic, then
we
are
simply engaged in playing a highly recondite version of Russian roulette.
As game loss
is
theorists have
shown,
unlikely to be sound,
prudent
a course
believe that
the problems
blems.
strategy also limits his gains.
we
we
certainly a are called a host
them conceptually and difficult
if this
shaU soon achieve a level of material and
we
are
now
cited in support of this belief
They contain
very serious
attractive the potential gain; a
systems reliability far above what
program is often space program is
risks
even
strategist limits his risks
Some
of action that
no matter how
capable
of;
the space
However, although the
triumph of technical engineering, most of
on
to solve are not pure engineering pro-
of social and other "soft" factors that make
of magnitude more
practically several orders
than the space program. Moreover,
this
claim conveniently
overlooks the fiery death of three astronauts, the near disaster of Apollo Thirteen, and the Challenger space program. In addition,
power
to turn
all
disaster, to
we
mention only the American
have neither the
our technological
acts into a
money nor
the labor
simulacrum of
a
moon
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
shot.
The
nuclear industry
expect, but as
and
safety
The death
we
much more
realistic
model of what we can
have seen, despite far greater than average attention to
fail-safe toll
a
is
173
design strategies,
safety record
its
from Chernobyl alone,
as
we
far
is
have noted,
is
from
perfect.
expected to be
70,000 people. In sum, even massive amounts of money, enormous effort, and supreme technological cleverness can never guarantee accident-free operation of technological devices, and it is indeed strange that technologists
—
discoverers of the infamous
ly states that "If
make
often assume that they can
God
Murphy's Law, which sardonical-
—should
so
their creations invulnerable to acts
of
something can possibly go wrong,
will"
it
or foolproof in normal operations. Indeed, the array of potential
ecological and societal disasters confronting a civilization that increasingly depends
on the smooth and
incredible accidents can
the Titanic,
whose
happen,
still
designers believed
dehberately adopting
of technological
errorless operation
systems should give any prudent individual pause. as it
new technologies
is
It
is
not just that
well illustrated by the fate of
to be unsinkable. Rather,
we
in fuU awareness that they are
are
by
no means "unsinkable." In
fact,
the supertanker
may be an even
better
technological society than the bulldozer (see
Box
metaphor 17).
for
barges are maritime disasters looking for a place to happen. disaster
caused by the wreck of the Torrey Canyon, not
oil
The eco-
a particularly large
supertanker by current or projected standards, was surely a
come. Any doubt on
modern
These massive
taste
of things
removed when the Exxon Valdez disaster occurred and that was only the most visible of supertanker spills, which now occur with regularity. Supertankers are fragile. They are cheaply built to minimum standards and in such a way as to flout scandalously nearly all the canons of good seaworthiness established over to
score was
this
—
centuries of experience (Mostert 1974). Their thin and over-stressed hulls are not equal to
all
the challenges of the sea; they lack the ability to
maneuver or stop within any reasonable distance; and they have only a single boiler and a single crew, so that even routine failures leave them helplessly adrift wdth as a fair-sized
much
hydrogen bomb.
thermal energy in their tanks
* In
August 1990,
after a year
new
is
stored in
Like the monstrous supertanker, a highly
technological society appears fated to exist
legislation requiring
as
on the
of highly publicized
thirmest of safety
oil spills.
Congress passed
supertankers to be double hulled and mandating
the eventual retrofitting of existing supertankers (Chasis and Speer 1991, p. 21).
CHAPTER 3
174
margins,* and there
is
abundant evidence that such
a small
margin
will
To proceed on the assumption that we can achieve standards of perfection hitherto unattained would be an act of technological hubris exceeding all bounds of prudence. eventuaUy prove
The End of
insufficient.
''Endless" Technological
The important
question
do
to
is
we do
What
At what
it is
and
at
risk?
fallible to
is
that,
even
if
yield to abstract analysis
the problems of
and technological
them
deal with is
a false
technological solutions
hope, for
seem
can never be the
it
that
technological solu-
all
anathema. Indeed, to counter single-minded technological
are
optimism with an equally single-minded neo-Luddite nology in
all
impossible.
The
forms
its
is
questions at issue are what kind of technology it is
to be appHed.
technology needs to be demythologized so that
of what technology can, what basic features
identified
(Box
hostility to tech-
absurd, for a nontechnological existence
adopted, and to what social ends
18).
it
The whole
we
have a
cannot do, and what
its
ecological and
The
in the
thermodynamic premises
NRC
United
view
revive
the
States, exemplifies this willingness to
when
a reactor
adverse Court of Appeals decision in
finstrated this effort, but
to
both the
NRC
is
finished
and about
November 1990
to
The
NRC
is
also
go
temporarily
and the Bush administration are
lobbying Congress to eliminate the hearings by legislation (Wasserman 1991, 656).
it
that are
has been trying, administratively, to eliminate
public hearings heretofore required
An
subject of
realistic
costs are.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, attempting risks.
is
be
to
of a valid alternative technology have already been
moribund nuclear industry take increased
is
Unlike current bulldozer-supertanker technology,
would be based on
line.
are
to anticipate:
mounted only with great difficulty, if at all. This judgment certainly does not mean
on
we
in the real world. In short,
Even in the shorter term, pose problems of management that can be sur-
endless process optimists
*
we do it? human
a crisis?"
exponential technological growth
The
Will
possible that they will not be solved simply because
human and
tions
what
of foresight and the very
of questions suggests
this array
exponential growth seemingly solution,
cost
in time, given lack
it
tendency to wait for
too
ask,
once, given shortages of money, labor power, and other factors
at
potentially in least supply?
Will
we do it?" in the narrow tech"Can we do all the things we have
not "Can
we must
nological sense. Rather,
Growth
expected to promulgate
new
p.
rules providing for the
renewal of reactor hcenses past the end of a reactor's natural 40-year-life.
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
175
compatible with the coexistence of humans and nature over the long term. As a consequence,
would necessarily eschew merely quantitative maximize general human welfare at mini-
it
progress, striving instead to
mum
material cost.
Such an
alternative (or "soft," "appropriate,"
impact," "intermediate") technology
"low-
it would theme we shall return to in Chapter 8. Even under the most optimistic assumptions, the kinds of alternative technologies under discussion probably cannot support affluence as we in
also
be desirable
is
is
come
it,
so a certain lowering of
of the technological
problems of exponential growth
makes
to define
called for. In fact, extensive social changes are inevitable.
One of the major attractions awkward
certainly possible; that
a
the richest countries have social sights
is
is
that
it
fix as a
response to the
appears to avoid the need for
social change. In other words, reliance
on technological growth But as we have seen
possible the continuation of business as usual.
throughout our discussion of ecological Hmits, business
as
usual cannot
continue under any circumstances, no matter what one assumes about
our civiHzation's technological response, because social,
and economic
environmental identified
Introduction.
it
multitude of political,
a
He concealed within nearly aU aspects of the
limits to technological
growth
that
we
have
even clearer that the essence of the solution to the
must be poHtical
crisis
in
the sense specified in the
We shall explore these thorny issues
cal side effects
An
The
crisis.
make
environmental
issues
(particularly the politi-
of continued technological growth) in Part
II.
Overview of Ecological Scarcity
What
Is Ecological Scarcity?
Ecological scarcity
is
an all-embracing concept that encompasses aU the
various limits to growth and costs attached to continued growth that
were mentioned above. As we have seen,
it
includes not only Malthusian
impending shortages of mineral resources, biospheric or ecosystemic Umitations on human activity, and limits to the scarcity
human
of food but
also
capacity to use technology to expand resource supplies ahead of
exponentially increasing demands (or to bear the costs of doing so).* We
have seen diminishing returns, which have overtaken not only agricul-
*
A
complete definition of ecological
social costs attached to
scarcity
ought properly to include the
continued technological and industrial growth, the
economic problems of coping with the physical aspects of scarcity, and other sociopolitical factors that wiU be dealt with in Part II.
certain
CHAPTER 3
176
— 1« Alternative Technology All forms of alternative, or "soft," technology share certain characteristics. First
and
and foremost, they are closely adapted to natural cycles
processes, so pollution
is
minimized and
as
much of the work
as
is done by nature. Second, they are based primarily on renew"income" flows of matter and energy such as trees and solar radiation rather than on nonrenewable, "capital" stocks such as rare ores and fossil fuels. Third, the first two characteristics encourage the revival of
possible able,
some
labor-intensive
modes of production. Fourth, these
three together
imply the creation of a "low-throughput" economy, in which the per capita use
and
social costs are
Fifth, all less
of resources
is
minimized and long-term thermodynamic
not ignored for the sake of short-term benefits.
of these seem to point to technologies that are
dependent on
a specialized technical elite,
smaller, simpler,
and therefore more
decentralized with respect both to location and to control of the
of production.
Finally,
among
means
the possible social side effects of such al-
ternative technologies are greater cultural diversity, reduced liability to
misuse of technology by individuals and nations, and
anomie and
own
lives
alienation
less overall
once individuals have greater control over their
than they do under the current technological dispensation.
Naturally, one way to achieve these goals would be to renounce modern science and technology entirely and revert to a low-technology, pre-modem agrarian society, but the proponents of alternative technology are not urging a return to some imaginary paradise of pristine closeness to nature. They propose instead a creative blend of the most advanced modern science and technology with the best of the old, pre—Industrial Revolution "polytechnics" (Mumfbrd 1970). "Yet at
the same time, alternative technology technological, for gical
it is
diametrically
growth of the kind
that has
is
indeed profoundly anti-
opposed
to
autonomous technolo-
produced an ecological
crisis.
Perhaps
technology has not exerted a determining influence on modern
tural
production but every other economic activity
as well;
society,
the limits to
the efficiency of pollution control and of energy conversion, the need to
mine ever-thinner
ores to get the
same
useflil
quantity of metals, the need
pour ever-more money and energy into the maintenance of the basic technological infrastructure, and so on. Instead of being able to do ever to
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
as
some of its more extreme
during the
last
300
critics
177
maintain, but
vice versa. In seeking to reverse this situation
under
cal process
not
scientific
components of a already
known
and bring the technologi-
in the broadest sense primarily pohti-
is
or technical. (Indeed, most of the essential viable alternative technology, such as solar power, are
or invented and merely require development; the
process of changeover could therefore be quite dustrial
installed
without unacceptable
a revolutionary break
unlike the In-
wiU
social costs,
its
people there
are. It
is
adoption will require
with the values of the industrial
be. Unfortunately, the
and could
technically feasible
is
A major unanswered question is how high living
fast,
Revolution, which was retarded by the slow pace of invention.)
Thus, although alternative technology
be
quite evident that
control, alternative technology poses a chal-
full social
lenge to the current order that cal,
it is
adapted to technology rather than
years, society has
era.
the material standard of
how many
answer depends largely on
abundantly clear that "soft" technology
is
able to
provide an ample sufficiency of material well-being to very large bers of people.
now
profligacy
On
the other hand,
num-
cannot support the materiaUstic
it
enjoyed by the richest one-fifth of humanity.
Humanity's affluent economies have emitted two-thirds of the green-
house
of the
gases, three-fourths
It is
nor possible under any scheme
Americans, for before waste. a
One rough
it
and nitrogen oxides, most of the
sulftir
90% of the
world's hazardous wastes, and
world's chlorofluorocarbons.
the world to Hve like today s
ft)r
could happen, the planet would be
estimate
is
world population of about
that alternative technology could support 1
biUjon people
at
the current standard of
Uving of Norway or the Netherlands (de BeU 1970, resourcefulness
may
world maintained
estabhsh that this
is
with
in ecological balance
p. 154).
more
And
those people will have to be
Human
a gross underestimate. its
resources
more
frugal
But
a
by means of
alternative technology will likely contain fewer people than
now.
%
laid to
it
does
and contribute
physical labor for their afiluence than does the richest one-fifth
of humanity today.
more with as
ever
less
or to substitute one resource for another indefinitely,
economists often claim
is
possible,
energy, and social effort to obtain the quantity,
of
usefial
we
shall
same
have to spend more money,
quantity, or
even
a
diminished
output. Furthermore, most proposed technological
solutions to the problems of
growth caD
for
more
materials (often
CHAPTER 3
178
more pollution (or demand more technological solutions to control it), require more energy, and absorb more human resources. Thus the costs of coping with each
materials of a very particular and scarce type), create
additional increment of growth rise inexorably
We
have also seen
and exponentially. and
that, in general, all sectors are interacting
on
interdependent, so that
the one hand, the combination of sectoral
micro-problems creates an almost overwhelming macro-problem, while the other hand, the solutions to the macro-problem (as well as those most of the separate micro-problems) depend on the questionable availability of a host of factors that may be in least supply. Thus problems exacerbate each other. Also, the solution to one micro-problem is often
on to
inconsistent with the solution to other micro-problems or
on
the solution of
still
is
dependent
another problem, which depends in turn on the
solution to a third problem, and so on.
Nothing
strategy that takes into account the full
ensemble of problems and their
interactions can
hope
less
than a coordinated
to succeed.
Thus, stating that ecological scarcity will one day bring growth to halt
is
much more
grovvl;h
than merely asserting that the earth
must therefore cease some day
is
a
and that
finite
in the future. Ecological scarcity
is
indeed ultimately grounded on the physical scarcity inherent in the earth's finitude,
but
it is
manifested primarily by the multitude of inter-
acting and interdependent limits to growth that will prevent us from ever testing the finitude
of the biosphere and
see, ecological scarcity has already
The scarcity logistic
overall course
is
its
begun
of industrial
we
resources. In fact, as
to restrain growth.
civilization as
it
responds to ecological
Figure 3-3 by the familiar sigmoid or
illustrated graphically in
growth curve. In the period between
A
and B, the ecological and
other resources necessary for growth are present in abundance potentially),
shall
and splendid and accelerating growth ensues, as
it
(at least
has during the
300 years or more. Eventually, however, resources are no longer abundant enough to support further growth, and technological ingenuity can no
last
longer postpone the day of reckoning. At
this
point of inflection (Q,
deceleration begins; in the narrow transition zone {B to D),
which
is
approximately one doubling period wide about the point of inflection, considerable further growth due to
abundance
warning tive
that fueled accelerating
signs
of ecological
feedback pressures that
momentum
growth begins to
scarcity are quickly start to
the
most
critical section
is
disappear,
and the
first
succeeded by various nega-
choke off further growth. Beyond the
brief transition period these pressures build
continues until equilibrium (£)
occurs, but the ecological
attained.
up quite
rapidly,
and deceleration
The zone of transition is
therefore
of the grov^h curve. The entire changeover firom
accelerating to decelerating
growth occurs in a very brief time,
especially
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
179
Transition Period
r^
E
Time
FIGURE
Growth curve of industrial
3-3
civilization:
A, steady
state
(begin-
ning of accelerating growth); B, end of unrestrained growth (beginning of transition period); C, point
of inflection (beginning of deceleration); D, end of
transition period; E, terminal steady state.
compared
of growth that precedes
to the seemingly infinite period
during which the very idea of
or
limits
scarcity,
except
as
it,
temporary
challenges to ingenuity, seems ludicrous.
Thus
ecological scarcity
becomes evident only once the curve is within mere fact that so many aspects of
the transition zone. This being the case, the
ecological scarcity have been discussed and debated at great length should be
ample evidence inflection fact,
that industrial civilization
the controversy continues.
factor
is
is
near or past the point of
and confronts the prospect of deceleration
As we noted
to a steady state. Yet, in
in the Introduction, the time
the crux of the debate over the limits to growth, so let us examine
in greater detail the question
and ultimate
the proximate
How Far Away
of how
limits to
away
far
industrial civilization
is
from
growth.
Is Ecological Scarcity?
The evidence
is
overwhelming
that
we
have entered the transition zone.
People can impressionistically obser /e rising pollution problems, not only in industrial nations but in
many over-crowded and
developing countries. These were the
coming
first
signs
over-urbanized
of thermodynamic
bills
due. Since then, speciahsts have observed degradation of aU three
of the biological systems on which the worlds economy depends: croplands, forests, and grasslands.
CHAPTER 3
180
many raw materials that industry uses. many other products. Grasslands are the source of meat, milk, leather, and wool. As of 1986, 11% of the earths land was cropland, 31% was forest, and 25% was pasture. The rest of the Croplands provide feed, food, and
Forests provide
fliel,
lumber, paper, and
earth s land surface had Utde biological activity;
paved over for
human
crops has been offset by an equal
it
either
was desert or was
amount of land reclaimed
use. Since 1981, the
amount no longer
for
suitable for agriculture
or paved over. The amount of grassland worldwide has declined, as overgrazing turns
it
into pasture. Forests have
1980s, at a rapidly accelerating rate. cally productive areas has
been shrinking for centuries and, in the
The combined area of the
three biologi-
been shrinking since the 1980s, whereas the
earth's
biological wastelands (deserts and paved areas) have been expanding.
Worse, productivity in two of the areas
also
is
growth
whole
rates
species
and other
earth's three biologically
of trees and even
stresses.
local forests are
Grassland destruction
is
dying from acid
of the grassland
in fair to
is
rain,
forest areas,
ozone,
occurring on every continent,
grazing exceeds the carrying capacity of the land. a majority
productive
down. Throughout the Northern hemisphere, where are measured, trees are growing more slowly. In many
Even
in the
United
poor condition. As grassland de-
and the capacity to carry livestock
teriorates, soil erosion accelerates
as
States,
is
reduced further; eventually, the area mrns into a desert. Livestock growers then seek grain from cropland for their animals, putting increased pressure
on
farmers,
increase in
whose production of food per
human population
According
now
capita has not kept
to Stanford University biologist Peter Vitousek,
appropriate
40% of the
primary biological product
land's net
the
is
amount of energy
is
other species will find
it
human
human impact on
more
primary pro-
earth's
activity.
own
land-based
used by humans or has been
of the alteration of ecosystems by
several things. First, as the
that
energy they use in their
growth and reproduction. In other words, 40% of the photosynthetic product either
humans
primary biological product. Net
ducers capture via photosynthesis, less the
result
up with the
since 1988.
lost as a
This means
the environment increases,
difficult to survive.
Eventually they will not
and human life-support systems will begin to unravel. Second, "eventually" is not so far off. Let us assume a constant level of per capita
survive,
resource consumption.
of the
land's
NPP, 10
Then
billion
if
5 billion
human
human
beings appropriate
40%
beings will appropriate 80%; before
the population got to the projected 14 billion by 2100,
humans would
have consumed the entire world's net primary biological product, which is
impossible. Indeed, even
80% is
ecologically impossible;
survive without the survival of ecosystems
of which would be dead by that point.
humans cannot
made up of other species, most
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
181
Carrying capacity
Long-term carrying
capacity
exceeded
\
Environmental
demand
Time-
FIGURE
3-4
Growth
versus carrying capacity. If growth results in environ-
mental degradation, the carrying capacity
is
progressively reduced.
As the example of the lily pond makes demand for various biological products human population growth and appetites, as
earth
is
capacity has already
time
is
running out. Just
increasing to keep
up with
the carrying capacity of the
would argue that the carrying been exceeded whenever one can observe dangerous most
ecologists
of pollution, serious ecological degradation, or widespread dis-
turbance of natural balances,
of which are readily observable today.
all
Thus, although precise forecasting tive
is
decreasing with the depletion and degradation of resources
(Figure 3-4). Indeed,
levels
clear,
is
not possible, the available quantita-
evidence rather strongly suggests that industrial civilization will be
obhged to make an abrupt transition from fiill-speed-ahead growth to some kind of equilibrium or steady-state society in Httle more than one
—and
generation
The
that the process
of deceleration has already begun.
Historical Significance of Ecological Scarcity
The
meaning of ecological scarcity is that humanity's poHtical, economic, and social Hfe must once again become thoroughly rooted in essential
the physical reaHties of the biosphe/e. Scarcity and physical necessity have
not been abolished; after a brief historical interlude of apparendy endless
abundance, they have returned stronger than ever (with pohtical conse-
quences to be taken up in Part things that
we now
II).
Because of ecological
scarcity,
many
take as axiomatic will be inverted in the near fiature.
For example, during the growth
era, capital
and labor were the
critical
CHAPTER 3
182
factors in the
economic
and Japan
yond
—
the so-called "haves"
their ecological means, they
—
are
now
United
may turn
become
resource-rich will suddenly
into
is
new
the
(that
is,
Europe,
States,
some extent beecological and economic
living to
who
"have nots," while some current "have nots"
tion
and resources
process; henceforth, land
nature) will be critical. In addition, because the
are comparatively
"haves." (This transforma-
already under way.) All the institutions and values that characterize
industrial societies
and
aU, the
on continuous growth
are predicated
confronted with ruthless
reality tests
sudden coming of ecological
faced with an epochal political task.
be
will
and revolutionary challenges. Above scarcity
The
means
transition
that
our generation
under way
is
of our wishes in the matter, so our only proper course
is
is
regardless
to learn
how
to
adapt humanely to the exigencies of ecological scarcity and guide the transition to
equilibrium in the direction of a desirable steady-state
society.
is
The great danger from the sudden emergence of ecological scarcity we will not respond to its challenges in time. We have already seen
that
that time
is
probably our scarcest resource; the sheer
momentum
growth, the long time constants built into the biosphere, and above social response rates that for various reasons lag
any event governed by the factor in system and most of
would be
is
behind events (and are
least supply) all
in
predispose the world
subsystems to overshoot (exceed) the level that
its
But the
sustainable over the long term.
of overshoot
of all,
collapse.
The
inevitable
consequence
trend depicted in Figure 3-4 cannot con-
tinue in the real world, for environmental
demand can never long exceed
the carrying capacity. Figure 3-5 represents the three basic real-world possibilities: (a)
(which
is,
as
smooth convergence on
noted above, unlikely);
eventual convergence
on
overshoot and collapse to level
(b)
a relatively a significantly
the optimal equilibrium level
overshoot and collapse with
high equilibrium
level;
and
(c)
lower than optimal equilibrium
because the carrying capacity has been drastically eroded by the
destructiveness associated with the overshoot.
Because the degraded,
we
3-5 (c), which
earth's carrying capacity
are speeding rapidly is
highly undesirable for
and misery created by
a large
is
clearly
being depleted and
toward the outcome depicted in Figure at least
three reasons:
The
suffering
overshoot of the carrying capacity will be
enormous. Any large overshoot seems certain to erode the carrying capacity so severely that the surviving civilization will have rather limited
material possibilities. cal
and
And
the opportunity to build the basic technologi-
social infrastructure
irretrievably lost.
That
is,
of
a high-level, steady-state society
may be
unless the remaining supplies of non-renewable
resources are carefully husbanded and used to
make
a
planned transition
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...
183
to a high-technology steady state, only steady states comparatively
poor
in material terms will
be achievable with the depleted resources left following overshoot and collapse. Thus, although ecological scarcity
means that there is no option other than the steady-state society in which people and their demands are in balance with the environment and its resources, the current generation does have a significant say in the type
and basic quaHty of the steady
state that will be achieved. options are presented graphically in Figure 3-6.
The
basic
pohcy
Throughout most of recorded history, the human race has existed in rough equilibrium with its resource base. Growth occurred, if at all, at an infinitesimal pace; even the population
grew
much
at
less
than
1%
upward. With the
continue to
rise.
The
first
immediate and direct
relatively dynamic Europe between A. D. 600 and 1600. But then, Revolution rocketed the scale of economic
a year
very suddenly, the Industrial activity
of
arrival
of ecological
poUcy option
afiluent in material terms
occasion
(however fi^gal
a fall to a significantly carefiilly
even to
a level
agrarian
way of life
an
it is
might seem
to
many now
not taken, overshoot must
a reversion to
the traditional
premodern Revolubrief and anomalous spike in
(transition III), so that the entire Industrial
flat
we new
In short,
unprecedented. That
ecological trace, a transitory
when
centuries in duration,
thusian apocalypse
is
lower steady-state
tion fi-om start to finish will appear as a
not completely
in Figure 3-6)
level than could have planned and timely action (transition II), or
tantamount to
humanity's otherwise
scarcity.*
I
rocket cannot
transition to a steady-state civilization relatively
living in the richest countries). If this option
been achieved by
scarcity, the
(transition
epoch a few momentarily seemed possible to aboHsh a genuine crossroads. Ecological scarcity is
it
stand at
in history, but the crisis is, it is
on
not
a
we
confront
simple repetition of the
a larger scale, in
which nothing
is
largely
classic
Mal-
has changed but
the numbers of people, the ruthlessness of the checks, and therefore the greater potential for misery once the day of reckoning comes. The wars, plagues, and famines that have toppled previous civilizations are over-
shadowed by horrible checks Malthus never dreamt of (such
*
There
some
is
transition
(I
risk
that in trying to
in Figure 3-6),
we
make
shah achieve
as large-
the immediate and direct
a steady-state level
somewhat
lower than the maximum possible. However, the sacrifice of such a marginal gain seems small compared to the risks attached to overshoot. Moreover, it will always be possible to adjust upward if later experience or further inventions
make
temporarily.
it
feasible; thus the
marginal gains will be forgone only
CHAPTER 3
184
Carrying capacity
Equilibrium
Environmental
demand
(a)
Time
Carrying capacity
Equilibrium
(b)
Time
>~
Carrying capacity
Equilibrium
(c)
Time
Deforestation, the Loss of Biodivenity, Pollution...
3000
B c
FIGURE ture:
I,
what
185
1650
The
3-6
Present
ecological history of the world
direct transition to high-level steady state;
lower-le\'el steady state;
scale ecological ruin
III,
reversion to
II,
Future
—
past, present,
pre-modern agrarian way of life.
and global radiation poisoning),
threats to the very existence
of the
and fu-
belated transition to some-
On
for these checks are
possess technical resources that previous civilizations lacked
we also when they
encountered the challenges of ecological
our case
successful response
is
possible:
We
industrial, steady-state civilization
of preindustrial
is
species.
the other hand,
scarcity.
Thus
in
a
can create a reasonably affluent post-
and avoid
a traumatic
fall
into a version
civilization.
This imposing task devolves upon the current generation, and there to lose. Already many trends, such as demographic momentum,
no time
carmot be reversed within any reasonable time without Draconian measures. Moreover, as we shall see in Part II, the way ahead is strewn with painful dilemmas. Indeed, nothing can be
accompHshed without the
many deeply ingrained expectations and the exaction of genuine sacrifices. The epoch we have already entered is a turning point in the ecological history of the human race comparable to the NeoHthic frustration of
Revolution.
It
extraordinary
will inevitably involve racking political turmoil
reconstitution
and an
of the poUtical paradigm that prevails
throughout most of the modern world.
FIGURE maturity:
3-5 (Left) (a)
ing capacity;
smooth (b)
Three scenarios
for the transition
transition to equilibrium
from growth to
with minimal erosion of carry-
overshoot with substantial erosion of carrying capacity;
overshoot with drastic erosion of carrying capacity.
(c)
II The Dilemmas of Scarcity
,
4 The
Politics
of Scarcity
Having explored the general nature and meaning of ecological
we
shall
now
delve into
its
scarcity,
poHtical consequences. This chapter examines
the basic poHtical dynamics of ecological scarcity; Chapters 5 and 6 assess the specific challenge to the
American market system; and Chapter 7
extends the analysis of the preceding three chapters, showing that applies in
The
all
important respects to the
Political Evils It
of Scarcity
was su^ested in the Introduction
political sin:
allocated
it
of the world.
rest
Resources
that scarcity
that are scantier than
by governments, for naked
conflict
the source of original
is
human wants
would
have to be
result othenvise. In the
words of the philosopher Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan (1651 p. 107), human life in an anarchic "state of nature" is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and ,
short."
there
To prevent
must be
the perpetual struggle for
a civil authority capable
power in
a
war of aU
against
all,
of keeping the peace by regulating
property and other scarce goods. Scarcity thus makes politics inescapable.
Presumably, the estabhshment of a truly just eliminate
all
civil
assured of a fair share of goods, social
harmony would
would With all
authority
the political problems that arise from scarcity. replace
strife,
and
people would enjoy long and happy Uves of peacefril cooperation. Unfortunately, this has never happened. Although they have certainly
mitigated
some of
the worst aspects of the anarchic state of nature
(especially the total insecurity that prevails in a civilized poHties
war of aU
against
all)
have always institutionalized a large measure of in-
equahty, oppression, and conflict. Thus, in addition to being the source of original pohtical sin, scarcity
is
also the root
189
of political
evil.
CHAPTER 4
190
The
reason
quite simple. For
is
margin or very close to
existed at the ecological
income and wealth,
Not
most of recorded
therefore,
would condemn
unnaturally, the tendency has
been
it.
An
equal division of
life
of shared poverty.
to a
all
have
history, societies
for political institutions to fiirther
impoverish the masses by a fractional amount in order to create the surplus
more than
that enables a small elite to enjoy life.
its
share
of the
fruits
of civilized
Indeed, until recendy energy has been so scarce that serfdom and slavery
have been the
—
norm
Aristode in his
-justifiably so, says
Politics,
genuine civihzation would be impossible. Except for a few periods
when for some
inequality, oppression, political
of the
life,
rulers
reason the burden of scarcity was temporarily
and
and other ephemeral
Our own
been very prominent
conflict have
merely waxing and waning
era has
for otherwise
relatively brief
slightly in
of
response to the character
factors.
been the longest and
exception. During roughly the
lifted,
features
last
450
certainly the
most important
years, the carrying capacity
of the
globe (and especially of the highly developed nations) has been markedly
expanded, and several centuries of
transformed the face of the earth and civilization
and
are today
—
made our
relatively
societies
and our
open, egalitarian, libertarian,
conflict-free.
The Great The
what they
abundance have completely
relative
Frontier
economic boom we have enjoyed
causes of the four-century-long
are readily apparent: the
European discovery and exploitation of the
World, Oceania, and other founts of virgin resources Persian Gulf
oil);
(for
New
example,
the take-off and rapid-growth phases of science-based,
energy-intensive technology; and the existence of vast reservoirs of "free" ecological goods such as air and water to absorb the consequences of our
exploiting the
cause
is
new
clearly the
Before the discovery of the pressed hard societies
were
on
its
means of
politically,
opening up of
a
new technology. However, the
resources with the
New
World, the population of Europe
subsistence,
and
as
a result,
available for cultivation
European
economically, and socially closed. But with the
"Great Frontier" in the
New
World, Europe suddenly
faced a seemingly limitless panorama of ecological riches.
was suddenly multiplied about
stands of high-grade timber, a scarce far as the
first
most important.
commodity
in
The
land
five times; vast
Europe, stretched
as
eye could see; gold and silver were there for the taking, and rich
lodes of other metals lay ready for exploitation; the introduction of the
potato and other
new food crops from the New World boosted European
agricultural production so sharply that the population
doubled between
1
The
Politics
of Scarcity
1
1750 and 1850. This bonanza of found wealth
lifted the
yoke of ecologi-
cal scarcity and, coincidentally, created all the peculiar institutions
modern
values characteristic of
civilization
9
and
—democracy, freedom, and
individualism.
Indeed, the existence of such ecological abundance
an indispensable
is
Adam Smith, the two whose works epitomize the modern bourgeois views of political economy on which all the institutions of open societies are based. For
premise of the libertarian doctrines ofJohn Locke and thinkers
example, Locke (1690, paras. 27-29) saying that
it
derives
from the mixture of
commons of nature. But he make
part of
does not still
work
to
(para. 33).
a
the institution of property by
man's labor with the original
is
the
common
to
good
as
left;
heritage of
and more than the yet unprovided could use"
His argument on property by appropriation
references to the wilderness of the
New
is
shot through wdth
World, which only needed to be
occupied and cultivated to be turned into property for any it.
man
continually emphasizes that for one
mankind his own property the disadvantage of other men. Why? Because "there was
what
enough and
justifies
man who desired man to
Locke's justification of original property and the natural right of a
it from nature thus rests on cornucopian assumptions. There is more left; society can therefore be Libertarian. The economics of Adam Smith rests on a similar vision of ecological abundance. In fact. Smith is even more optimistic than Locke, for he stresses that the opportunity to become a man of property (and therefore to enjoy the benefits of liberty) now Hes more in trade and industry than in agriculture, which is potentially limited by the availability of arable land. Indeed, says
appropriate
always
Smith, under prevailing conditions, simply striking shackles
system
faire
ofi" all
on economic development and permitting of wealth-getting
to
operate
"opulence," which would in turn liberate
the mercantilist
a free-for-all, laissez-
would
instead
men from the
social
and
generate political
of feudalism. Smith's The Wealth of Nations {Ml 6) is therefore a manifesto for the attainment of poHtical liberty through the economic restrictions
exploitation of the found wealth of the Great Frontier.
The
Hberal ideas of Locke and Smith have not gone unchallenged,
but with very few exceptions, Hberals, conservatives, munists, and other
*
Of
modern
ideologists have taken
socialists,
course, the idea of individualism antedated the discovery of the
World, but before expression.
that time there
had been
little
com-
abundance for granted
opportunity for
its
New
concrete
However, once the boom permitted it to be expressed, became the basis for almost all of the most characteristic features
individualism
of modernity:
and
self-rule in
democracy, self-enrichment
self-salvation in Protestantism.
in industrial capitalism,
CHAPTER 4
192
and assumed the necessity of further growth. They have disagreed only about how to produce enough wealth to satisfy the demands of hedonistic,
"economic" men and about what constitutes of the spoils. Karl Marx was even more Utopian than
materialistic
division
Locke or Smith, merely
a just
either
he envisioned the eventual abolition of scarcity.
for
He
on grounds of social justice, the march of progress be by the state in the interest of those whose labor actually
insisted that,
centrally directed
produced the goods. has
now
But the
boom
been
but exhausted.
all
is
over.
And
The found wealth of the Great technology
is
no
Frontier
real substitute, for
it is
means of manipulating what is already there rather than a way of creating genuinely new resources on the scale of the Great Frontier. (Moreover, as we saw in Part I, technology is encountering limits of its own.) Thus a scarcity at least as intense as that prevailing in the premodern era, however different it may be in important respects, is merely
a
about to replace abundance, and
this
will
necessarily undercut the
material conditions that have created and sustained current ideas, institutions,
are
and
practices.
no longer
Once
relative
abundance and wealth of opportunity
available to mitigate the harsh poHtical
dynamics of scarcity,
the pressures favoring greater inequality, oppression, and conflict will
build up, so that the return of scarcity portends the revival of age-old poUtical evils, for our descendants if not for ourselves. In short, the golden
age of individualism,
understood)
is
all
liberty,
and democracy
(as
those terms are currendy
many important
but over. In
respects,
we
shall
be
obliged to return to something resembling the premodern, closed polity.
This conclusion will be reinforced by a more detailed exploration of the
problem of controlling the competitive overexploitation of
political
resources that has produced the ecological
crisis.
The Tragedy of the Commons It
has
been recognized
common greatest
since ancient times that resources held or used in
tend to be abused. As Aristotle
number
gets the least
said,
amount of
"What
is
common
care" (Barker 1962,
However, the dynamic underlying such abuse was
first
to the p. 44).
suggested by a
litde-known Malthusian of the early nineteenth century, William Forster p. 29), who wondered why the cattle on a puny and stunted" and the common itself "bare-worn." He found that such an outcome was almost inevitable. People seeking gain naturally want to increase the size of their herds.
Lloyd (cited in Hardin 1969,
common
pasture were "so
Because the
number of
commons
is
finite,
cattle reaches the
the day must
come when
the total
carrying capacity; the addition of
more
The
Politics
of Scarcity
cause the pasture to deteriorate and eventuaDy destroy the
cattle will
resource is still
on which the herders depend. Yet even though
in the rational self-interest
Each reasons
to his herd.
outweighs
among
that his personal gain
is
done
to the
commons
as a
the users. Worse, even if he
all
this
it
from adding animals
is
whole and so
commons, partitioned
is
inclined to self-restraint, an
may not
individual herder justifiably fears that others
They
be.
and gain thereby while he does not,
increase their herds
the case,
is
of each herder to keep adding animals
proportionate share of the damage done to the
his
damage
for the
93
1
will
of
in spite
his
having to suffer equally from the resulting damage. Competitive overexploitation
of the
commons
the inevitable result.
is
The same dynamic of competitive overexploitation applies to any "common-pool resource," the economist's term for resources held or used in common. A classic illustration is the oil pool. Unless one person or organization controls the rights to exploit an
on
the rights can agree interest
of each user to
she possibly can; in
fact, failure to
days of the
other to sink
American
many
as
economic and
or her a
fair share.
oil industry, drillers
wells as possible
political
pool or the owners of it
is
in the
he or
fast as
do so exposes the individual owner
him
the risk that others will not leave
boom
oil
scheme of rational exploitation, extract oil from the common pool as a
on
to
Thus, in the early
competed with each
their properties.
The
resulting
chaos was remedied by the establishment of state
control boards that surveyed the pools and then allotted each
owner
a
quota of production for each acre of oil-bearing land. Oil was thereby transformed from a
common
pool resource to private property, and
exploitation proceeded thereafter in a largely rational and conflict-free
manner.
The dynamic of the commons for
one
is
particularly stark in the case
of oil,
But even resources
could
person's gains are another's losses.
that
be exploited cooperatively to give a sustained yield in perpetuity are subject to the same dynamic. Fisheries are a
was abundance enough for
all
prime example. At
first
there
to exploit the resource freely. Conflicts
occurred, but their impact was local. Fishing a litde farther away or
*
We
are grateful to
resource for the
Margaret
McKean
term common-property
for suggesting the
resource
book. She argues that "if resources become property only attach
rights
and
duties
to
them,
term common-pool
used in the previous edition of this
then
the
when human
problematic
beings
resources
are
non-property, not property." She also points out that the "tragedy of the
commons"
—
figure out a
that
way
is,
tragic
—
overuse
to attach rights
occurs only
and duties
the problems of subtractibility or rivalness.
when human
beings do not
to these resources in order to solve
CHAPTER 4
194
improving techniques were
to fighting over the
alternatives
hmited
resources in any particular area. In time, however, even the vastness of the
ocean began to be more or
less fiilly
they did in the early days of the
exploited, and people reacted just as
oil business,
overexploiting and destroy-
ing fisheries. In response, coastal nations have privatized parts of the fishing
common
by declaring complete economic sovereignty over the
oceans within 200 miles offshore, so that fishery
would flow
"privatization"
is
that
it
the benefits of the nearby
all
One
to their nationals.
potential benefit of such
then becomes possible, within these zones, for
ban access and to
collective units such as fishing co-ops, to
internalize the
important externalities. But fishing "wars" and other poUtical conflicts over marine resources remain
common
open ocean. There,
in the
operations have increased in scale and technical virtuosity, just drillers
fishing
as early oil
sank dozens of wells on a tiny piece of land. Technological
progress in the fishing industry has produced gigantic floating factories,
which use can or
driftnets
fireeze
and other ultramodern techniques
them on
to catch fish
and
the spot, thus eliminating the time that must be
spent returning to port in traditional
The result, not surprisingly,
fishing."''
has been relentless competitive overexploitation and an alarming general
decline in fish stocks.
Pollution also exemplifies the self-destructive logic of the
mons,
for
tion without altering
emissions
much
so
is
nature:
its
larger than
The
my
cost to
me
of controlling
me see
me
to pollute if
harm the Box 19.)
public.
to
The
unratified
(It
Law of
I
can get away with
does not pay
the
my
proportionate share of the en-
vironmental damage those emissions cause that rational for
com-
simply reverses the dynamic of competitive overexploita-
it
me
it
it.
will always be
In short,
profits
it
to benefit the public either;
Sea Convention
recognizes offshore
(1982)
200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) for coastal nations (Corson 1990,
p.
145). '
Japanese fishing boats cover more than 500 square miles of Pacific
waters with over 2 million miles of driftnets.
The
nets
Ocean
sweep up everything
that
swims into them, depleting the stock of desired species and causing the death or injury of 70% of the catch, including sea
and Taiwan
also driftnet in other areas
General Assembly in 1989 called for
a
mammals, which of the
Pacific.
are
unwanted. Korea
The United Nations
moratorium on high-seas
driftnetting
by
1992, but unfortunately, the resolution allows nations to exempt themselves they practice unspecified marine conservation measures. Japan, after
nouncing
that
it
would exempt
with the moratorium.
itself,
recently indicated that
it
first
if
an-
would comply
The
of Scarcity
Politics
1
Unfortunately, virtuaUy
all
ecological resources
—
95
airsheds, water-
sheds, the land, the oceans, the atmosphere, biological cycles, the bio-
sphere
—are common-pool resources. For example, the smoke from
itself
factories or the exhaust gases
from automobiles cannot be confined so
harm only those who produce them. They harm all in the common airshed. Even most resources that seem to be private property are in fact part of the ecological commons. The logging comthat their noxious effects
pany
that cuts
down a whole
stand of trees in order to maximize
its
profits
contributes to flooding, siltation, and the decline of water quality in that
watershed.
may be
And
if
enough
altered, as has
down enough
loggers cut
occurred
many
trees,
carrying capacity of the biosphere has been approached,
we
are in serious danger
petitive overexploitation.
even climate
Now
times in the past.
if not
that the
exceeded,
-^
of destroying aU ecological resources by com-
Thus the metaphor of
commons
the
is
^
not
-^
merely an assertion of humanity's ultimate dependence on the ecological life-support systems of the planet;
current
human
it is
also
an accurate description of the
predicament.
a
In short, resources that once were so abundant that they were available to
all
have
now become
fi-eely
regulated and protected in the
outcome
will
common
-yj
interest, the inevitable
y^
be the mutual ecological ruin that the human ecologist
Garrett Hardin (1968) has called "the tragedy of the
much more
commons."
widely the same kind of social rules and
We need
commons
in the past (although these controls have not always
sufficiently strong to avert partial or
even
total destruction
and
been
of a resource).
i
^
T
^
political
controls that have traditionaUy governed the use of grazing lands
other
j
ecologically scarce. Unless they are
somehow
to apply
'^
v
^
^
l^
.^
O
A
Hohhesian Solution? Beyond
telling us that the
answer to the tragedy
is
"mutual coercion,
mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected"
he means
social
prescription. liberties
restraint,
—Hardin
not naked force
However, he does suggest
—by which
avoids
poHtical
that unrestrained exercise of our
does not bring us real fireedom: "Individuals locked into the
logic of the
commons
are free only to bring
on
universal ruin;
once they
of mutual coercion, they become firee to pursue other goals." By recognizing the necessity to abandon many natural freedoms we now believe we possess, we avoid tragedy and "preserve and nurture
see the necessity
other and
more precious freedoms." There
regime of "mutual coercion," but without collective selfishness
commons
are obvious dangers in a
restraints
on
individuals, the
and irresponsibility generated by the logic of the
will destroy the spaceship, so that
any
sacrifice
of fireedom by
CHAPTER 4
196
10 The Public-Goods Problem The public-goods problem
is
commons
the obverse of the
Just as the rational individual gains by harming fellow
common, he At
best,
he
loses
by benefiting them with
gets only a small return
on
a
problem.
members of the
pubHc or
collective good.
his investment; at worst,
he
is
economically punished. For example, the good husbandman cannot sur-
economy; if he maintains his soil while his neighbors mine theirs for maximum yields, sooner or later he must either abandon farming or become a subsistence farmer outside the market. He
vive in a market
cannot afford to benefit posterity except Similarly,
at great
although a socially responsible plant owner might wish to
control the pollution emanating firom her plant,
own
personal sacrifice.
if
competitive disadvantage. Thus the tragedy of the the culprit gets
mons but
all
the benefits from transgressing
who
while they pay
reap virtually
premium
is
at
her
all
all
of the
the costs, the other
is
at a
is
turned
discover
members of the community
benefits.
try to persuade
consumers to pay
prices for his products as a reward for his virtue.
crew members
is
commons, in which the Hmits of the com-
common good soon
try to benefit the
Of course, a producer could
the
it
succeeds in relegating most of the costs to others,
around. Those that,
she does
expense whatever her competitors do, then the plant owner
clearly the lesser evil. After
all,
says
But he
J
Hardin, "injustice
preferable to total ruin," so that "an alternative to the
commons need
not be perfectly just to be preferable" (Hardin 1968, pp. 1247-1248). Hardin's implicit political theory is in all important respects identical
of Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan (1651). Hardin's "logic of the commons" is simply a special version of the general political dynamic of
to that
Hobbes's "state of nature." Hobbes
says that
where men
desire
goods
fall to fighting. Each knows would be better off if they abstained from fighting and found some way of equitably sharing the desired goods. However,
scarcer than their wants, they are likely to
individually that
all
they also reaHze that they cannot alter the dynamics of the situation by their
own
behavior. In the absence of a civil authority to keep the peace,
personal pacifism merely makes
be persuaded or forced to
lay
them
down
easy prey to others. Unless their
all
can
arms simultaneously, nothing
The
of Scarcity
Politics
would be
1
unlikely to find
tuous," were
no
many
buyers for products that, however "vir-
better than the cheaper ones of his competitors.
Another conceivable solution would be tended to control pollution to take up fected. After
all,
97
if his
or her pollution
for the manufacturer
who
in-
a collection fi-om all those af-
harmftil to them, they should
is
be willing to pay something to reduce or eliminate
it.
However, even
if
the considerable practical difficulties of organizing such a scheme were
overcome,
would almost
it
certainly
other kind of public is
good
of the
never available in optimal quantity under market conditions.
For example, no government can
on voluntary tax payments. If economic competition, public
subsist
external defense, internal order, rules for health, education, tities
and other pubUc goods
are to be
as
in quanmust be if ecological public goods
all its
members.
Similarly,
clean air and water and pleasant landscapes are to be provided
in reasonable
Thus, just
mounts,
as for the
goods problem
is
it
be only
will
nature
is
thus to
make
it
safe for
all.
men
The
crucial
that
would
constrain
all
men
problem
in the state
to be reasonable, rather than
a majority,
to be reasonable
Hardin's "mutual coercion, mutually agreed
and
upon by
of
of
merely
what the environment
Hobbes's solution was the erection, by
power
the answer to the public
authoritative political action.
"rational," so that they can share peacefully offer.
of collective decisions.
as a result
commons,
tragedy of the
can prevent the war of aU against
is,
produced
that are rationally desirable for the society, then taxes
compulsory on such
The reason is simple: It make others pay most or all
of a public good that benefits everyone equally; thus the
costs
is
of any
in optimal amounts.
entirely rational for individuals to try to
good
con-
for people are unlikely to
fail,
tribute voluntarily to pollution reduction or to the production
has to
a sovereign
peaceflil
—
that
the majority of
the people affected."*
In the tragedy of the
commons,
the state of nature (political order
much more
is
the
not
dilemma at stake),
is
not so stark
but
it is
in
as
it is
in
many ways
on the
part of
any person or group, the tragedy wiU occur. In the case of the
village
*
For
insidious, for
a fuller discussion
even without
of the
evil propensities
virtual identity
Hardin and Hobbes, see Ophuls 1973.
of analyses and prescriptions in
CHAPTER 4
198
common, between
damage
own
and the deterioration of the commons, but in most
their acts
of competitive overexploitation, individuals are not even aware of
cases
the
the actors can hardly avoid noticing the causal relationship
seems infinitesimally
commons
tragedy of the
—
behavior
A
we
not
^that is,
own behavior when their fellows That people
if
they are aware, their
Thus, to bring about the
dilute.
not necessary that people be bad, only that
it is
good
they not be actively
generosity.
and even
that their acts are causing,
responsibility
will
enough
altruistic
to limit their
not regularly perform
are in fact not this altruistic
acts
of public
confirmed
is
daily
by
aU see around us (and see Schelling 1971).
perfect iUustration of the insidiousness of the tragedy of the
commons
in operation
the situation of the inhabitants of Los Angeles
is
vis-a-vis the automobile:
who
Every person
lives in this
basin
has been living through a disaster. participated in
it
with
knows
We
knowledge just
full
that for twenty-five years
have as
all
watched
Angeleno
is
do
is
now
He
its
the
spread.
Each
nearly impossible, and, in any case,
would be mean-
end what he
else did the
getting everyone else to do
such a course.
to stop
is
But there
individual act of
everyone
ingless unless
gratification.
An
totally powerless to
renunciation
The smog
mills."
often million individual pursuits of private
absolutely nothing that any individual can
is
he
happen, have
men and women once went
knowingly and willingly into the "dark Satanic result
it
same
hates.
thing.
But he has no way of
He does not even have any way to talk about know how or where he would do it or what
it.
does not
language he would use. (Carney 1972, pp. 28-29).
As
commons one
is
example
this
even aware of
vantages of self-denial
*
own
that one's
is
know
People do
of the tragedy of the
clearly shows, the essence
contribution to the problem (assuming that
seems infinitesimally
it)
loom very
that
small,
by "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the
majority of the people affected," Los Angeles can control
1989 the Southern California Air Quality Management proposed an ambitious antipollution plan reduce
smog-producing
(Elmer-Dewitt 1989, people
live
agreement. critics
them
emissions
p. 65).
in
it
the
Los
downtown
pollution. In
District
(AQMD)
implemented, could
Angeles
area
by
70%
in the
way
has been difficult to obtain mutual
AQMD has been forced to abandon several of
contend variously that the plan (higher
that, if fully
its air
But because the plan requires changes
and conduct business,
The
while the disad-
large; self-restraint therefore appears to
is
its
proposals, as
too expensive, too burdensome on
parking fees are an example) or that companies will
relocate, resulting in a loss
,
of jobs (Matthews 1991,
p.
A21).
The
of Scarcity
Politics
199
be both unprofitable and ultimately universal concurrence.
much by
Thus we
the evil acts of selfish people as by the everyday acts of ordinary
people whose behavior
dominated, usually unconsciously, by the
is
remorseless self-destructive logic of the
The
tragedy of the
commons
Jacques Rousseau,
who made
French
political
problem
philosopher Jean-
between the "general what reasonable people, leaving
a crucial distinction
and the "will of all." The former
aside their self-interest
commons.
also exemplifies the political
that agitated the eighteenth-century
will"
one can be certain of
futile unless
are being destroyed ecologically not so
is
and having the community's
interests at heart,
would regard as the right and proper course of action. The latter is the mere addition of the particular wills of the individuals forming the polity, based not on a conception of the common good but only on what serves their
own self-interest. The
ly vicious instance
true
common
lem
in
The
tragedy of the
interest. In essence,
Social Contract
be "forced to be
commons
is
simply a particular-
of the way in which the "will of all"
fi-ee"
—
is
not
that
Rousseau's answer to
much
is,
short of the
this crucial
different fi-om Hobbes's:
prob-
Man
must
protected firom the consequences of his
own selfishness and shortsightedness by common good or "general will," which Rousseau thus wants
falls
being made obedient to the represents his real self-interest.
political institutions that will
make people
virtuous.
therefore appears that if under conditions of ecological scarcity,
It
individuals rationally pursue their material self-interest unrestrained
common bound
authority that upholds the
to be
common
institutions
political
how
human
forces us to confi-ont
is,
the acts.
ecological
who make it up
(or
enough of them
(or are impelled to behave) in a selfish, greedy,
only solution
Hobbes,
is
a sufficient
a certain
case,
we must
level
Rousseau,
must be imposed by our
have
that the
fi-om
environmen-
of political philosophy:
when
the
to create a problem) behave
and quarrelsome
measure of coercion
minimum
established; according to
It
a is
common good
The problem
in fact, at the core
by
the eventual result
to protect or advance the interests of the collectivity
individuals
virtue
interest,
environmental ruin. In that
that preserve
destruction by unrestrained tal crisis
common
(see
Box
20).
fashion.
The
According to
of ecological order or peace must be a certain
minimum
level
of ecological
political institutions.
hardly need be said that these conclusions about the tragedy of the
commons Under
radically challenge
fundamental American and Western values.
conditions of ecological scarcity, the individuals, possessing an
inalienable right to pursue happiness as they define
it
and exercising
their
Uberty in a basically laissez-faire system, will inevitably produce the ruin
of the commons. Thus the individualistic
basis
of society, the concept of
inalienable rights, the purely self-defined pursuit of happiness, liberty as
CHAPTER 4
200
2a Coercion The word
coercion has a nasty fascist
ring to
it.
However, politics
is
a
means of taming and legitimating power, not dispensing with it. Any form of state power is coercive. A classic example is taxation, which is nowhere voluntary, for as the theory of public goods (see Box 19) tells us, the state would starve if it were. Assuming a reasonable degree of consensus and legitimacy, coercion means no more than a stateimposed structure of incentives and disincentives that is designed to advance the common interest. Even Locke's libertarian political theory does not proscribe coercion: If the sovereign must
do whatever
Hke Hobbes, Locke does
is
common
interest
necessary to protect
try to set
up
is
it.
threatened, the
Nevertheless, un-
inviolable spheres of private
rights that the sovereign may not invade, and he also demands that power be continually beholden to consent of the governed. The difference between Hobbes and Locke on the matter of coercion is one of degree, with Locke demanding more formal guarantees of limits on the sovereign's power than Hobbes believes are workable. In short, coercion is not some evU specter resurrected from an odious past. It is
an inextricable part of politics, and the problem
and bend
Some tirely
to the
it
aspire to
common
is
how best
tame
to
it
interest.
do away with power
politics
and
state
coercion en-
by making people so virtuous that they will automatically do
maximum freedom
of action, and the
laissez-faire principle itself all
become problematic. All require major modification or perhaps even abandonment if we wish to avert inexorable environrhental degradation and eventual extinction it
*
as a civilization. Certainly,
democracy
as
we know
cannot conceivably survive.
As
we know
government
is
it
today, our current political system
a bureaucratic
and
electoral
is
essentially statist; the federal
behemoth, beholden
monied
interests,
dedicated to the satisfaction of human appetite
nature.
Such
"democracy" cannot
a
survive.
fijndamentaUy Jeffersonian and Thoreauvian in
A
to organized at the
and
expense of
genuine democracy that
spirit
and
practice,
is
however, can
survive (see the discussion of these points in Chapter 8 and the Afterword).
The
Politics
of Scarcity
201
is in the common interest. In fact, this is precisely what Rousseau proposes: small, self-sufficient, frugal, intimate communities inculcating civic virtue so thoroughly that citizens become the "general will"
what
in-
carnate.
However,
side to inside
—
merely changes the locus of coercion from outthe job of law enforcement is handed over to die interthis
—
nal "police force"
of the superego and many liberals (for example. Popper 1966) would argue that this kind of ideological or psychological coercion is far worse dian overt controls on behavior. Nevertheless, pohtical education cannot be
done away with
entirely, for
widiout
a
reasonable degree of consensus and legitimacy, no regime can long endure. Thus it is again a question of balance. Hobbes and Rousseau, for
example, would both agree that law enforcement and political education must be combined, however much they might disagree on
wl
proportion of each Political
is
jStting.
coercion in some form
is inevitable. Failing to confront Hkely to have the same effect repression has on the individual psyche: The repressed force returns in an unhealthy form. By contrast, if we face up to coercion, full political
openly the issues
it
raises
awareness will dispel
tame
it
and make
suggests a
it
its
is
seeming
a pillar
way of taming
nastiness,
of the
and we
common
shall
interest.
be able to
(The next box
Leviathan, and Chapter 8 discusses the
poHtics of a steady-state society in
more
general terms.)
This IS an extreme conclusion, but it seems to follow from the extremity of the ecological predicament that industrial humanity has created for itself. Even Hobbes's severest critics concede that he is most cogent when stark political choices are faced, for self-interest
moderated
by
self-restraint
may not be workable when extreme
conditions prevail.
Thus theorists have long analyzed international relations in Hobbesian terms, because the state of nature mirrors the state of armed peace existing
between competing
power. Also,
when
nation-states that are obedient to
social or natural disaster leads to a
no higher breakdown in the
patterns of society that ordinarily restrain people, even the tarian
most hbergovernments have never hesitated to impose martial law as the only
alternative to anarchy. Therefore, if nuclear holocaust rather than
mere
war, or anarchy rather than a moderate level of disorder, or destruction of
CHAPTER
202
the biosphere rather than
mere
of Hobbes's
reahty,
analysis
fits
of amenity
loss
and
it
is
4
the issue, the extremity
becomes
avoid his
difficult to
conclusions. Similarly, although Rousseau's ultimate aim was the creation
of a democratic
he recognized that strong sovereign power
polity,
"Legislator," in Rousseau's language)
cumstances, especially
if
may be
(a
necessary in certain cir-
the bad habits of a politically "corrupt" people
must be fundamentally reformed.
Altruism
Some
Is
Not Enough hope or
theorists
assert that attitudinal
change
major changes in individual behavior to save
enough
will bring
a democratic, laissez-faire
system from ecological ruin. However, except in very small and tightly
norms
knit social groups, education or the inculcation of rigid social
not sure proof against the logic of the commons. Apparently,
not true
that,
it is
once they are aware of the general gravity of the
is
simply
situation,
a large number of people will naturally moderate their demands on the environment. A number of studies have shown that even the individuals
who
presumably the most knowledgeable and concerned about
are
growth evince
population
willingness
Uttle
to
restrain
own
their
reproductive behavior (Attah 1973; Barnett 1971; Eisner et
1970).
al.
How much can we expect of most ordinary citizens? The problem
is
that
commons, people in overwhelming do positive good whether or not cooperation
in order to forestall the logic of the
numbers must be prepared to is
universal.
interest as
And
in a political culture that conceives
sum of our
being no more than the
we can
seems unlikely that ported altruism ecologically
(this
more
is
prudently count on
of the
common
individual interests,
much
it
help from unsup-
not to say that people cannot be educated to be
responsible than they are at present).
In any event, even the most altruistic individual cannot behave responsibly without acts
full
knowledge of the consequences of
—and such knowledge
is
not
available. If
his
even the experts
or her fiercely
debate the pros and cons of nuclear power or the effects of a particular
chemical on the ozone
layer,
using highly abstruse analytical techniques
and complex computer programs stand,
how
additional are
is
that only the specialist can
the ordinary citizen to
problem
is
accompanied by
time.
High
rates
know what
filter
down
to even the
under-
An
of change and exponential growth
a serious lag in public understanding.
seems to take two to four generations for the ideas science to
fijlly
the facts are?
informed public.
at
For example, it the frontier of
We
have
still
not
.
The
of Scarcity
Politics
203
completely digested Darwin, much
How
reasonable
is
to expect
it
less Einstein and quantum mechanics. from the public at large a sophisticated
ecological understanding any time soon, especially business, professional, attentive
much
and
political ehtes
who
when
the academic,
constitute the so-called
and informed public show litde sign of having understood, embraced, the ecological world view? (As noted in the
less
foreword, children do seem to embrace an ecological world view when it is taught to them. This is an encouraging development, but it is not yet known how many curriculums include ecology or how many children will retain their
world view
as adults.)
Others pin their hopes for
a solution not on individual conscience but on the development of a collective conscience in the form of a
world view or rehgion rather than
that sees
humanity
as
the partner of nature
antagonist. This attitude will
undoubtedly be essential our survival in the long term, because without basic popular support, even the most repressive regime could hardly hope to succeed its
for
in protecting the
environment for long. However, mere changes in and social arrangements that implement values are indispensable for turning ideals into world view
are not likely to be sufficient. Political
For example, despite a basic world view profoundly respectof nature, the Chinese have severely abused and degraded their environment throughout their very long history more, ironically, actuality.
ful
—
than the premodern Europeans,
who
lacked
philosophy expressive of the same kind of natural harmony. Thus Chinese ideals were not proof against the urgency of human desires that drives the tragic logic of the a
commons. appears, therefore, that individual conscience
It
cultural attitudes are not
term considerations
by themselves
sufficient to
that lead people to degrade their environment.
altruism and genuine concern for posterity
*
Some
(for
and the right kind of overcome the short-
may not be
example, Reich 1971) would protest that our age
that a genuinely
new
consciousness
is
Real
entirely absent.
is
different
and
emerging. This view cannot simply be
brushed
aside, for substantial changes in values are clearly occurring in some segments of American society, and out of this essentially religious ferment, great
things may come. For example, the "back to the land" movement has been much ridiculed, but its symbolic reaffinnation of our ties to the earth has already
had
a far
from negligible impact on the
new values of faith
mdely
will
become
at this point. Past
treated
by
larger society. Nevertheless, that these
universal in the fiiture appears to be essentially a matter
hopes for the emergence of a "new man" have been it is difficult to be optimistic
history, so
CHAPTER 4
204
but they are not present in sufficient strength to avert the tragedy. Only a
government with the power
common
ecological
commons. To recapitulate,
interest
to regulate individual behavior in the
can deal effectively with the tragedy of the
the tragic logic of the
commons
is
sustained
by three
commons, cattle that need ample grazing room to commons from becoming "bare-worn," and rational, self-
premises: a limited
prevent the
seeking herdspeople. If any one of these premises is
averted.
the
first
As we
is
removed, the tragedy
have already seen, the Great Frontier in effect removed
premise for nearly 400 years.
It
was precisely
this that
allowed
John Locke, whose political argument is essentially the same as that of Hobbes in every particular except scarcity in the state of nature, to be basically Hbertarian, whereas Hobbes is basically authoritarian. Thanks to the Great Frontier, Locke and Smith found that there was so much abundance in the state of nature that a Hobbesian war of all against all was unlikely; every person could take
away some kind of prize, and competi-
would be socially constructive rather than destructive, wdth the hand" producing the greatest good for the society as a whole. Thus government was required only to keep the game honest a mere and minimal institutional referee, needing only modest powers tion
"invisible
—
—and
machinery
they defined
The
it
individuals could be left alone to pursue happiness as
without hindrance by society or the
frontier
is
state.
gone now, and we have encountered the Umits of the
commons. However,
the physical disappearance of the frontier was for a
long time mitigated by technology, which allowed us to graze more cows
on the same amount of pasture. Now we have reached the limits of The cows are standing almost shoulder to shoulder, many are starving, and the manure is piling up faster than the commons can absorb technology:
it.
All that remains
individuals collective
of the
to alter the rational, self-seeking behavior
is
and groups
that use the
commons. This must be done by
means, for the dynamic of the tragedy of the
commons
is
so
powerfijl that individuals are virtually powerless to extricate themselves
unaided from
its
remorseless working.
indeed force us to be
Our
political institutions
must
free.
Legislating Temperance
That we must give our
political authorities great
of our daily actions
a
political systems that
is
profoundly
distasteful
powers to regulate many thought.
We
tend to see
do not bestow our kind of political and economic
liberties as "totalitarian," a
word
that brings to
mind
all
the evil features
The
Politics
of Scarcity
205
how
of past dictatorships. But even Hobbes, no matter
firm his convic-
tion in the necessity of absolutism, certainly did not have Stalinesque
tyranny in mind. Hobbes makes clear that order in the
commonwealth
is
means without which the fruits of civilization cannot be enjoyed. The sovereign power is to procure the "safety of the people... But by safety here is not meant a bare preservation but also all other contentments of life which every man by lav^l industry, without danger or hurt to the commonwealth, shall acquire to himself (Hobbes 1651, p. 262). And it is part of the task of the sovereign power to actively promote these "contentments of life" among its subjects. Furthermore, Hobbes will not countenance tyranny. The sovereign power must rule law^Uy, give a fiill explanation of its acts to its subjects, and heed their legitimate desires. Through wise laws and education, the not the goal but
is
subjects will learn
rather the
moral
restraint. Also, the
dictator regulating every action
people fi-om
Hobbes their
(p.
272).
compatible with Similarly,
power
is
not to be
a
does not "bind the
it
not to stop
Thus many
travelers,
different styles
but to keep them in
of rule and of hfe are
his basic analysis.
Hardin makes
temperance," not to
may
citizen:
voluntary actions" but only guides them with laws that
all
likens to "hedges... set
ways"
of the
sovereign
it
clear that the
problem
He
institute iron discipline.
is
to "legislate
acknowledges that
this
require the use of administrative law, with the consequent risk of
abuse of power by the administrators. However, he believes that the
appHcation of his formula of "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by
would be an adequate defense we would be democratically coercing our-
the majority of the people affected," against bureaucratic tyranny, for selves
to behave responsibly (Hardin 1968, p. 1247).
The
question of political wiU
wdUingness
to
restrain
is
individual
therefore crucial. Given a basic
self-seeking
and
legislate
social
temperance, social devices acceptable to reasonable persons and suited to a
government of laws could readily be found to serve as the "hedges" that keep us on the path of the steady state.* For example, law professor
will
Christopher Stone (1974) proposes giving natural objects, such
*
Merely increasing the power of the
state
is
no
solution.
As
will
Chapter 7 (and contrary to the opinion of many), mere socialism solution to the tragedy of the the
means of production
is
commons. That
not very
is,
as trees,
be shown is
not a
in
real
giving the state ownership of
useflil if the state
is
committed
to
economic
expansion, for the same ecologically destructive dynamic operates within a socialist
1974 on
economic bureaucracy this point).
as in the capitalist
marketplace (see Heilbroner
CHAPTER 4
206
mountains,
rivers,
and
now
(comparable to those
lakes, legal rights
en-
joyed by corporations) that could be enforced in court.
However, although the socioeconomic machinery needed a steady-state political
our everyday
economy need not
doing things It
we
are
involve dictatorial control over
indeed encroach upon our freedom of action,
lives, it will
for any social device that
to enforce
effective as a
is
now free
to
hedge will necessarily prevent us from
now prefer not to do. squeeze no more cattle onto
do or make us do things we
could hardly be otherwise: If we can safely
commons, then we herders must be satisfied either with the herds we now possess or, more likely, with the lesser number of cattle that the commons can tolerate ecologically over the long term. The solution to the tragedy of the commons in the present circumstances requires a perhaps much less willingness to accept less than we now get from the
—
—
the
commons.
No
technical devices will save us. In order to be able
we wish to apply to ourselves, we must of rights we now enjoy and bind ourselves to in the common interest. The only alternative to
mutually to agree on the give
up the
exercise
perform public duties this
restraints
kind of self-coercion
is
—
the coercion of nature
or perhaps that of an
compel our consent to hving with
iron regime that will
less.
Technology's Faustian Bargain
Given
this
optimism
is
unpalatable conclusion, the seductive appeal of technological
human demands to the available
apparent: If adjusting
ecological
resources will entail a greater degree of political authority, then let us by aU
means
press
on with
the attempt to
surmount the
technologically. Thus, to the extent that technologists
of
a steady state, they
aim
at a
nological superabundance in
limits
will use
growth
concede the necessity
"maximum-feasible" steady
which we
to
state
of tech-
our alleged mastery of
inexhaustible energy resources to evade ecological constraints, instead of
learning to live finagally
on flow
resources such as solar energy
sake of argument, let us put aside
all
questions of practicality and ask instead
what would be the poHtical consequences of implementing technological solutions to ecological
*
principles.
Only
maximum a
life
is
a virtual contradiction in terms,
out of nature runs contrary to basic ecological
lived
comfortably
within
interdependence merits the designation "steady optimists customarily talk as state
these kinds of
scarcity.
In reality, a maximum-feasible steady state
for squeezing the
As we have
enormous, but for the
seen, the barriers to success in such an enterprise are
the
state."
circle
of natural
But the technological
though there were no possible model of the steady
other than the maximum-feasible one.
The
Politics
of Scarcity
207
Alvin Weinberg,
who was for many years director of Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
Energy Commission's
leading spokesman for the technological
fix,
the
Atomic
has been a
especially nuclear power.
Indeed, he has castigated environmentalists for proposing "social fixes" to ecological problems;
he argues that technological solutions are "more
humane" because they do not "disrupt the economy and... cause the human suffering that such disruption would entail" (Weinberg 1972b). Yet Weinberg himself admits that the specific technological solution he
proposes comes with a truly monstrous social
fix
firmly attached! Be-
cause nuclear wastes will have to be kept under virtually perpetual surveillance,
and because nuclear technology places the most exacting
demands on our engineering and management
We
nuclear people have
hand,
we
offer.
But the price
.
made
a Faustian bargain
with
of energy
.an inexhaustible source
that
capabilities,
we demand of society
society.
for this magical energy
we
vigilance and a longevity of our social institutions that
unaccustomed
to
Part of this price
is
[Weinberg 1972a,
politically
On the one
[the breeder reactor] is
....
both
a
are quite
p. 33].
ominous:
In a sense, what started out as a technological fix for the energy-environment
impasse
—
clean, inexhaustible,
cial fixes as well:
sible technologists
their
and
the creation of a
who
fairly
—
cheap nuclear power
will guard the reactors
and the wastes so
continued safety over millennia [Weinberg 1973,
p.
Expanding on the "priesthood" theme, Weinberg "our commitment to nuclear energy will
involves so-
permanent cadre or priesthood of respon-
is
need "a permanent cadre of experts
assumed
as to assure
431].
tells
us that because
to last in perpetuity,"
that will retain
its
we
continuity over
immensely long times [but this] hardly seems feasible if the cadre is a national body," for "no government has lasted continuously for 1,000 years."
What kind of organization
Only
the Catholic
2,000 years or
Church
so... The
International Authority]
and
more or Church is the
has survived
Catholic I
does possess the requisite continuity?
have in mind: a
to a degree enforces doctrine, maintains
its
and has connections to every country's
[cited in
Speth
al.
own own
a true heir
example of
[the
long-term
social
Catholic Church
1974, emphasis added].
In proposing such a technological "priesthood,"
be
continuously for
central authority that proclaims
stability,
et
less
best
of the French Utopian
Weinberg appears to Claude Henri
social philosopher
CHAPTER 4
208
Saint-Simon (1760-1825), one of the
who
earliest
prophets of technocracy,
was humanity's mission to transcend nature with by the disruptive social effects of technology Distressed technology. within a bourgeois, laissez-faire political economy, Saint-Simon aspired to beUeved
that
it
create a stable, organic civilization such as that of the
Middle Ages, but
end he proposed the creation, on the scientific priesthood that would both Church, of a Cathohc model of the dispense political justice and promote the economic wealth of society.
with science
as its religion.
Saint-Simon stressed
society as determined
—
all
this
social planning, the necessity for authority based
scientific expertise, the
technology
To
on
subordination of the individual to the needs of
by the
experts,
and the integration of society and
themes that emerge in the writings of modern tech-
nological visionaries.
By whatever name
it
comes
to
be
called, technocratic
likely to be the price of Weinberg's Faustian bargain.
formally voted steps as
we
in,
of course, but wiU emerge in a
series
government It
is
wiU not be
of small but
fateful
follow what seems to be the Hne of least resistance through
our environmental problems. Indeed,
critics
were alarmed by the civilby the Atomic Energy
rights implications of the safeguards proposed
Commission
in
its
draft
environmental-impact statement on plutonium
recychng. These included the estabUshment of a federal pohce force for the protection of plutonium plants and shipments, the extension of
current military security-clearance procedures to include
all
the civilians
might have access to plutonium, and generally increased pohce powers to cope with the security requirements of a plutonium-based power economy (Speth et al. 1974). The United States abandoned its breeder reactor program in 1984, but the fact remains that there may be
who
no way
to ensure the social stability
institutions
—
—
indeed, the near-perfect social
necessary for an era of nuclear
power except with an
engineered society under the direction of a technocratic priesthood.
A
Pact with the Devil? It is
not nuclear technology alone that offers a pact with
a devil
who
will
end claim our political souls. Few technological optimists are as as Weinberg about the pohtical implications of the solutions they propose, but technocracy has been looming on the horizon for some time. Harrison Brown, a scientist who foresaw most of today's ecological
in the
candid
concerns almost four decades ago, predicted that the dustrial society
would become
instability
of in-
greater as development proceeded. This
and other organizational requirements, he social control necessary, so that "it
is
said,
wiU make ever-greater
difficult to see
how
the achievement
The
209
of Scarcity
Politics
and the maintenance of individual liberty can be made compatible" (Brown 1954, p. 255). Buckminster Fuller, one of the most of
stability
visionary of the supertechnologists, states plainly that those
"Spaceship Earth" cannot afford to
make "concessions
who
to the
run
non-
synergetic thinking (therefore the ignorandy conditioned reflexes) of the
well advised of the potential mass customers [that
least
is,
the average
Numerous other writers of varying permore technology means greater complexity
citizen]" (Fuller 1968, p. 367).
same trend: and greater need for knowledge and technical expertise; the average suasions see the
citizen will not
making, so
be able to make
that "experts"
a constructive contribution to decision
and "authorities"
because accidents cannot be permitted, that deviates
much
will rule perforce; less
and
individual behavior
from technological imperatives, the grip of planning and
social control will
of necessity become
a stranglehold (Bell
1973;
Cham-
berlin 1970;Heilbroner 1974).
Thus, the danger in the Faustian bargain lies in the mounting complexity of technology and with the staggering problems of managing the response to ecological scarcity, for these problems wiU require us to
depend on
special
a
class
of experts in charge of our survival and
well-being: a "priesthood of responsible technologists."
Elite Rule:
Democracy versus
The
Issue of Competence
of the key philosophical supports of democracy
One
people do not
ment may
gready in competence, for
differ
if
is
the assumption that
they do, effective govern-
require the sacrifice of political equality and majority rule. Indeed,
under certain circumstances democracy must give way to elite rule. As the eminent political scientist and democratic theorist Robert Dahl points out, in a political association
such
as a hospital
whose members
or
competent people to
the most
p.
are
58, emphasis added). In other words, the
closely one's situation resembles a perilous sea voyage, the stronger the
rationale for placing
how
competence,
man wiU want
have authority over the matters on which they
most competent" Pahl 1970,
more
"differ crucially in their
a passenger ship, a reasonable
to
run the
power and authority
in die hands
of the few
who know
ship.
Ecological scarcity appears to have created precisely such a situation.
must be made. Although it is true that most of them are "trans-scientific" in that they can only be made politically by prudent people, at least the basic scientific elements of the problems must be Critical decisions
understood reasonably well before an informed political decision is possible. However, the average person has neither the time to inform himself or herself nor the requisite background for understanding such
CHAPTER 4
210
complex technical problems. Moreover, many people are simply not enough or well enough educated to grasp the issues, much less the important features of the problems. Even highly attentive and com-
intelligent
petent specialists do not always understand the problems
they do (or claim
to),
they can almost always be found
fully.
Even when
on both
of
sides
any major question of pubHc pohcy. (The dispute over nuclear-reactor safety is a prime example, with Nobelists lining up both for and against nuclear power.) Thus, even assuming that the politicians and people
understand the issue well enough to ask the right questions, which
Can
experts should they listen to? saying? If
we
they understand what the experts are
grant that the majority of the people probably will not
understand and are therefore not competent to decide such
issues, is it
very likely that the political leaders they select will themselves be petent enough to deal with these issues? these leaders
make
And
authoritative decisions that
even
if
they
are,
com-
how
impose heavy present
can
costs
or that violate popular expectations for the sake of future advantages
them only
revealed to analysis,
perhaps even
knowledge derived from complicated
as special
as
the Delphic pronouncements of a computer?
Such questions about the
viability
of democratic
politics in a super-
technological age propel us toward the political thought of Plato. In The Republic, the fountainhead
gued
that the polity
needed
be
to
was
of
all
Western poKtical philosophy, Plato
like a ship sailing
commanded by
dangerous waters.
It
ar-
therefore
the most competent pilots; to allow the
crew, ignorant of the art of navigation, to participate in running the vessel
would be an
to invite shipwreck.
elite class
of this
elite,
of guardians,
Thus
the polity
to
be run by
guided by the cream
the philosopher-kings. As the quotation from Dahl suggests,
to the extent that Plato's analogy
of the ship of state approximates
his political prescriptions are difficult to evade.
Aristode on, those politics
would have
who would themselves be
who
This
is
reality,
precisely why,
from
have favored democratic rather than oligarchic
have concerned themselves with keeping the political com-
munity small enough and simple enough so that elite rule would not be necessary for social survival. The emerging large, highly developed, complex technological civilization operating
margin appears to
fit
Plato's
premises
at
or very near the ecological
more and more
closely,
foreshadow-
ing the necessity of rule by a
class
of Platonic guardians, the "priesthood
of responsible technologists"
who
alone
Such ideas
of
a
Saint-Simon suggest, but the
able in a
know how
to
run the spaceship.
development has always been implicit in technology,
crowded world Hving
we
for
it
has
as
the
become unmistak-
close to the ecological limits, for only
through the most exquisite care can nological Leviathan
need
are well
on
we the
avert the collapse
way
of the tech-
to creating. C.
S.
Lewis
— The
Politics
1
of Scarcity
observed that
power
21
"What we call Man's power over Nature turns out to be a some men over other men with Nature as its
exercised by
instrument" (Lewis 1965, yielded up to
69),
p.
more
technological power, the
some people by
and
appears that the greater the
it
power that must be Thus we must ask ourselves
absolute the political
the others.
whether continued technological growth
will not merely serve to replace the so-called tyranny of nature with a potentially even more odious
tyranny of people.
Why
we
indeed should
"priesthood of responsible technologists"
are merely technical exand may well lack the excellence of character and deep philosophi-
perts cal
understanding that Plato
justify their rule? In fact, elite
deliver ourselves over to a
who
possessed of both
profound
The
guardians must possess in order to
why accept the
wisdom and
rule
of even
a
when
all
expertise
genuinely Platonic history teaches us
and goodwill of mortal people
that the abilities, foresight,
imperfect?
insists his
are limited and technological response to ecological scarcity thus raises
political
difficult poHtical
issues, in
dilemmas
particular
one of the most ancient and
quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
"Who
will
watch
the guardians themselves?"
Technology and the Path
Modern humanity transcend nature.
to
a Brave
New
World
has used technology along with energy to try to
We have
seen that it cannot be done; nature is not to be transcended by a biological organism that depends on it. Worse, any attempt to do so will have momentous political and social consequences. Far from protecting us from painful and disruptive social changes, as the technological optimist is wont to claim, continued technological growth likely to force such changes on us. We are, in fact, in the process of making the Faustian bargain without ever having consciously decided to do so. As a result, we appear to be traveling down the road to total
is
domination by technique and the machine, to the "Brave New World" that Aldous Huxley (1932) warned was the logical end point of a hedonistic, high-technology civilization.*
Technology may not be inherently and
*
it
evil, but it does have side effects, does exact a social price. Moreover, in the hands of less-than-per-
All the techniques
of social control and biological manipuladon forecast in
Huxley's dystopian novel are being invented today in our laboratories (Cohen 1973; Delgado 1969; Holden 1973; Kass 1971, 1972; Skinner 1971). And weU before these developments occurred, Huxley (1958) was himself appalled to witness in his
own
lifetime
much of what he had imagined
or seven hundred years in the future.
as
taking place six
— CHAPTER 4
212
21 Taming Leviathan: Macro-constraints and Micro-freedoms The only
escape from the political dilemma of ecological scarcity
—
authoritative rule or ecological ruin
^is
indicated in the Epigraph: If
people exercise sufficient self-control of their passions, the ternal authority
become
fetters
of ex-
unnecessary. Unfortunately, poUtical history
of moral restraint and altruism to be expected from the members of large, complex, mass societies is Hmited at best. These virtues are even less Hkely to be found in industrial civilization, for its citizens have been brought up to beHeve that satisfying their suggests that the level
hedonistic wants
is
not only legitimate but positively virtuous. Besides,
and highly interdependent societies, even the most willing citizen would not know how to be ecologically virtuous without a large amount of central direction and coordination. In other words, unin complicated
less
we
return to face-to-face, simple, decentraUzed, small-community
—^which may be
Uving
argue) but
a desirable
long-term goal
—we
hardly a short-term possibiHty
is
Chapter 8 will
(so
with the
are stuck
authority palatable and protecting ourselves
problem of making those who would abuse
their ecological guardianship.
Traditional political theory has proposed
lem. However, one
from
many
answers to this prob-
basic principle stands out: If self-restraint
is
inade-
quate, macro-constraints are vasdy to be preferred to micro-constraints, for the psychological differences
on our freedom
Hmitations
feet
human beings, technology
often claim;
it
between them
can never be neutral,
As
a
consequence of ecological
economic, and is
social
between change
stringent
That
is,
and impersonal
as its
There
scarcity,
changes are inevitable whatever
that
happens to us
technological
imperatives
no
is
major
fixes
escape from
ethical, poUtical,
we
as a "side effect"
and change that
are
proponents too
can only be used for good or evU. Thus technological
are dangerous surrogates for political decisions.
pohtics.
are crucial.
that are indirect, remote,
do.
The
choice
of ever-moreis
deliberately
selected as compatible with our values.
Unfortunately,
at this
point even total renunciation of technology
dangerous to our democratic health
would not enable
us to avoid
all
as
the
The
Politics
213
of Scarcity
and personal. In the former case, the limitations become an almost invisible part of "the way things are," instead of obvious impositions. For example, modern humans feel generally free despite their nearly total submission to such
preferable to those that are direct, proximate,
powerful but faceless forces
as
technological change and the
marketplace; the feudal peasant, by contrast, was so
of direct personal obligations that this
web of obHgations may
he
felt
much
bound up
less free,
have been in important respects
nical in practice than the impersonal forces to
in a
web
even though less
tyran-
which modern humani^
obliged to submit. Putting the matter more abstractly, the contemporary political philosopher Isaiah Berlin (1969) has defined freedom
is
the number of doors open to a person, how open they what prospects they open. All other things being equal,
number freedom
of meaningful options brings the is
maximum
are,
^ as
and upon
dien, the widest
of freedom; macro-
sum of the micro-freedoms available to us. Because the of the commons leaves us with few meaningful options,
the
destruction
some of the doors now
must be pardy or even complete^
available to us
then this ly closed, but if we wish to preserve a sense of freedom, close the or should be done in ways that limit the micro-freedoms, doors of daily
Thus an
life, as
litde as possible.
effective
way of making
authority acceptable
is
to impose
macro-constraints that encourage the behavior necessary to maintain a steady- state society but to leave individuals
micro-freedoms freedom.
How
that,
with
when added up, give them
such a steady-state society
a relative
abundance of
an overall sense of
might be "designed"
will
be
discussed in Chapter 8.
pohtical dilemmas described above.
steady state one can envision,
it
During the transition to any form of would be imperative to minimize
probably pollution and use resources as efficiently as possible, and this term, short the in control expert would mean greater centralization and
even
if
the long-term goal
is
a technologically simple, decentralized
society favorable to a democratic politics.
Even beyond the be democratic
is
at
transition period, whether a steady-state society can least
questionable.
A
society cannot persist as a
genuine democracy unless the people in their majority understand tech-
nology and ecology well enough to make responsible decisions.
And
CHAPTER 4
214
22 The Ecological Contract The Great
Frontier and the Industrial Revolution unleashed forces that
eventually destroyed the medieval political synthesis, generally
on
which was based
the Heaven-ordained hierarchy of the "great chain of
being" and specifically on the "divine right of kings." Changing
economic conditions gradually transferred de facto poHtical power firoi monarchs, priests, and nobles to the enterprising middle classes. Although and
at first
the bourgeoisie acquiesced in continued autocratic rule
aristocratic patronage,
came
it
eventually tired of supporting
to see as unproductive social parasites;
it
what
:^M
it
overthrew the anden '^^^
and embarked on democratic self-rule, the only form of government that could be intellectually and practically reconciled with its new sense of individualism. Such major transfers of power must be regime
theoretically
and morally legitimated, and the
"social contract" theory
of government was devised to fulfill this need. In essence, the theory of the social contract
says that individuals are
not part of a preexisting hierarchy to which they must unquestioningly adapt but rather are free to decide how they wish to be ruled. It is thus primarily concerned with
how free and
an anarchic "state of nature") can
come
equal individuals (starting from together to erect political in-
stitutions that will preserve their individual rights to the fiillest extent
yet also
promote the
social
harmony they need
although the technology of a frugal steady
state
to enjoy these rights in
should be more accessible
to the average persons understanding than current technology
same may
is,
the
not be true of the ecological knowledge on which the
steady-state society will have to be based. Intuition
and
common
sense
alone are of little help in understanding the counterintuitive complexity
of the
human ecosystem
—and nowhere
dangerous. Thus, although not in the sense that only those
them
else
can
a little
intrinsically mysterious,
whose
talents
knowledge be
ecology
is
so
esoteric
and training have equipped
to be the "specialists in the general" discussed in the Introduction
are likely to possess the kind
"reasonable man."
The
of competence that would
ecologically
complex
satisfy
Dahl's
steady-state society
may
therefore require, if not a class of ecological guardians, then at least a class
The
Politics
of Scarcity
215
Hobbes
peace. Ironically, the device of the social contract was used by to provide secular support for tic,
hedonistic,
However,
as
it
monarchy, starting from the individualis-
and
materialistic premises
was
later
of the bourgeois world view.
developed by Locke and Rousseau, the social
became the foundation for popular sovereignty and liberal democracy (even Marxism has very deep roots in Rousseau's thought). The untrammeled individual was now king. contract
As is
a
product of the Great Frontier, the theory of the social contract
fundamentally cornucopian: Nature's abundance being endless and in-
exhaustible,
mony
one has only
politics.
But
problem of achieving
to solve the
through a just division of the
Nature
spoils.
these cornucopian premises have
an age of ecological scarcity
as
is
social har-
M
thus external to
become
as
anomalous in^
the divine right of kings was in the era
fl no other be obUged to give
of the Great Frontier and the Industrial Revolution. Ecology and poUtics are reason, a
now
vaHd poHtical theory of the steady
the same weight to ecological as it
of prudent
inseparable; out
was the
task
harmony
as
self-restraint, if for
state will
to social harmony. Thus, just
of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
political
philosophers to create the social-contract theory of government to take
new socioeconomic
iccount of the
scent of the bourgeois
class,
so
it
conditions and justify the poHtical
will
be the duty of the next genera-
promotbetween humanity and^
tion of philosophers to create an "ecological-contract" theory
ing harmony not just among humans, but
also
nature.
of ecological mandarins
run
it
society
well.
will
Whatever not
only
who its
possess the esoteric
level
be
knowledge needed
to
of material affluence, the steady-state
ostensibly
more
authoritarian
and
less
democratic than the industrial societies of today (the necessity of coping
wdth the tragedy of the also
be more ohgarchic
commons would as well,
process restricted to those
petencies necessary to
*
In Chapter 8,
we
who
with
full
alone ensure
possess the ecological
make prudent
that),
but
may
and other com-
decisions.
present the conditions for an ecological democracy
could avoid these consequences.
it
participation in the poHtical
which
CHAPTER 4
216
Hard
and a
Political Realities
New Paradigm
In summary, scarcity in general erodes the material basis for the relatively benign individualistic and democratic politics characteristic of the modern industrial era. Ecological scarcity in particular seems to engender
overwhelming pressures toward authoritarian by current standards,
political
for there
systems
that
are
frankly
seems to be no other way to
check competitive overexploitation of resources and to ensure competent direction of a complex society's affairs in accordance with steady-state imperatives. Leviathan
may be
mitigated but not evaded (see
Box
21).
Ecological scarcity thus forces us to confront once again, perhaps in
and cruel dilemmas of classical from which four centuries of abnormal abundance have shielded us. As a result, we shall have to reexamine fiindamental poHtical questions in the light of ecology and construct a new steady-state paradigm of
a particularly acute form, the hard realities politics,
politics
based on ecological premises instead of on the individualistic,
and anthropocentric premises of bourgeois "social contract" theory (see Box 22). The alternative is to let the shape of the steady-state paradigm be decided for us by accepting the outcome of
hedonistic, materialistic,
current trends toward technocracy.
Given current
political values, this
choice. However, the
one sure thing
is
may not seem
that current values
like
and
much
of a
institutions
be able to endure unchanged. Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter 8, the latitude of choice is wider than might be suspected; indeed, the crisis of ecological scarcity might actually be turned into a
will not
more humane and genuinely democratic two chapters, we shall explore specific American political economy to determine how well it is
grand opportunity to build
a
post-industrial society. In the next features
of the
Ukely to cope with the challenges of ecological
scarcity.
u
> The American Political Economy I: Ecology Plus Economics'^ Equals Politics
Having discussed the
of scarcity in general,
politics
of the American
particulars
situation.
As
we now
difficult as
keep economics and poHtics separate, especially in
it
this
turn to the
sometimes country,
we
is
to
shall
economic aspects of poUtical economy in this chapter and take up the more pohtical aspects in the next. However, both chapters share an discuss the
approach different from that taken in by most critiques of the American system.
We are not interested here in whether the system falls short of the
democratic ideal of freedom, equaUty, and justice but only in whether is
it
Hkely to be able to surmount without fiindamental change the chal-
lenge of ecological
scarcity.
To
this
question both chapters give essentially
the same answer: Ecological scarcity undercuts the basic laissez-faire, individuaUstic premises of the
American
political
economy
so that cur-
rent institutions are incapable of meeting the challenges of scarcity. is
needed
is
a
new paradigm
Market Failures and As noted
of politics.
\
Social Costs
in the Introduction, at least
argument
rely heavily
on
some
They beUeve
critics
the market price
smooth, gradual transition to the steady necessary.
What
that as the costs
217
of the limits-to-growth
mechanism whenever
state
to ensure a it
of friels and materials
becomes owing
rise
CHAPTER
218
to scarcity, will
and
as
the costs of pollution control increase, further growth
become uneconomic;
the steady state will therefore be ushered in
automaticaUy by market processes. In the competitive market system
must be
problem
that
how the
market
5
fails
is
fact,
however, in
an environmental
current form
its
villain
—
part of the
solved, rather than the solution. Let us
to deal appropriately
examine
with common-pool resources,
resource depletion, and other aspects of ecological scarcity.
According
to
Adam
Smith, self-interested participants in a competi-
tive j^^lf^f^f^c^wS^f^fimmitiiii^^^S^^^pT^omote the
by
^
e "invisible
hand" of t he mark^^jKat
is,
own
producer^cnn^WWfiB^TfHmximizet^
gain, the
automatically allocate resources with greatest efficiency
maximum
common good
with consumers and
market
v^
and generate
of individual and social prosperity. Thanks to the invisible
hand, self-seeking individuals, despite the lack of any intention to do will benefit their fellows as they enrich themselves.
argued for
a
so,
Smith therefore
competitive market system of economics.
a laissez-faire,
As we have seen, the premise of abundance necessary to support Smith's contention has vanished. Thanks to ecological scarcity, rational self-seeking individuals, despite the lack of any intention to do so, harm their fellows
economist
as
they attempt to enrich themselves. As steady-state
Herman Daly
(1973,
p.
17)
apdy puts
it,
the invisible hand has
turned into an "invisible foot" that threatens to destroy the
common
good with pollution and other "external diseconomies" or "externahties," the economist's terms for the social costs of production that are not accounted for in the price mechanism. In fact, the problem of the invisible foot is simply the economic version of the commons problem discussed in the preceding chapter. Individuals rationally seeking gain (or at least non-loss) are virtually
commons invisible
to
compelled by the logic of the marketplace
make economic micro-decisions
foot into
that are aggregated
an ecological macro-decision that
destructive for the society as a
the individual as well.
market system, in which
whole
—and
is
by the
increasingly
therefore, paradoxically, for
Thus an unregulated, competitive, laissez-faire all have access to the economic commons and in
which common-pool resources are treated as free goods, has produced a tragedy of the commons: the overuse, misuse, and degradation of resources on which we all depend for ecological health and economic wealth.
Other properties of reinforce
its
a free-for-aU system
of wealth getting strongly
tendency to.jdesir^L^he commons. For one thing, market economic value of the
decisions are inevitab^short-sighteJ)because the fliture
is
counted
understated at
oT^ 'disco nlited. " Future
the interest rate
values are usually dis-
available to a prudent investor;
at
a
7%
The American
Economy
Political
I:
Ecology Plus Economics Equals
interest/ discount rate, the investor as
$800,000 in 30
at
7%,
it
will
years.
Why?
will have
same interest/discount
Similarly, at the
will
if
as
be worth $800,000 has
$100,000. In fact, for
20 years in the
all
soon have $100,000
he or she
The
be worth $800,000 in 30 years.
same amount of money and
now
would just
Because
run
rate, a
now
$100,000
invests the
investor will have the
little
or no risk to get
it.
resource that 30 years from
a present value
practical purposes, costs
fiiture are
219
Politics
of no more than
and benefits more than
discounted to zero; owing in part to such
on capital, it is a rare economic decision maker whose time horizon extends more than 10 years into the fiiture. Thus critical ecological resources that will be essential for our well-being even 30 years firom now not only have no value to rational economic decision makers, but scarcely enter their calculations at all. They are therefore likely to make decisions that additional factors as the prevailing rate of return
irreversibly
deplete or destroy vital resources
(especially
since
each
maker realistically fears that his or her own self-restraint would simply hand over to another the opportunity for profit). Thus, as Karl Marx put it a century ago, the watchword of market capitalism is "Apres decision
nous
deluge," as entrepreneurs strive to
le
expense of the
An
maximize current
problem
additional
is
that although the
handles incremental change with relative ease,
when
benefits at the
fiature.
market price mechanism it
confi-onted with absolute scarcity or even
between supply and demand. In such
downcfc^
tends to break
marked
discrepancies
situations (for example, in famines),
the market collapses or degenerates into uncontrolled inflation, because the increased price supply.
is
incapable of calling forth an equivalent increase in
In a famine, supply and
demand
are eventually
brought into
balance by death, emigration, or the deus ex machina of relief efforts
—
that
by physical readjustments, not by the price mechanism. Thus the market is unlikely to preside over a smooth and trouble-firee transition to is,
a steady state, for the crisis scarcities (lack
poisons) that
mere money can remedy,
not indefinitely or
*
To
of ecological
of food, water, time, or
all at
scarcity involves absolute physical
human if at all,
shifting
scarcity,
uncomfortable
(for
another), but
it
raising prices
in
suspect that this
is
only in part (and certainly
once). Indeed, shortages leading to rising prices
use the economist's terms, the market
relative
physiological tolerance for
the
burden
is
splendid
of scarcity
so
at
coping with
that
it
is
least
example, by inducing substitution of one resource for incapable of dealing with absolute scarcity except by
general is
industrialized world.
—
that
is,
through
inflation.
There
is
reason to
the underlying cause of the inflation existing in the
CHAPTER
220
may
5
simply increase the incentives to exploit remaining resources heeddesperate attempt to meet current demand. Rising prices, then,
lessly in a
are not Hkely to induce timely scarcity,
and they
will certainly
and appropriate responses to ecological not preserve resources from exhaustion
they may simply intensify the mode of ecological overshoot. other reasons why the market may fail to
and degradation. In
fact,
pressures that are
producing the current
There
are
respond smooth-
ly and appropriately to the price signals generated by ecological scarcity
For one thing,
scarcity tends to
induce competitive bidding and preemp-
buying, which lead to price fluctuations, market disruption, and the
tive
inequitable or inappropriate distribution of resources. For example, un-
warranted in
fears that oil
suppHes might be scarce
after Iraq
invaded Kuwait
1990 caused speculative bidding and major rises in the price of oil, Europe and the developing world,
resulting in oil shortages in Eastern
whose economies could not bear
the increased costs. Similarly, despite an
alleged timber shortage in the continental interests
as
United
States (used
by logging
an argument against controls on ecologically destructive
practices), the
primeval forests of Alaska, one of the few remaining large
sources of high-grade timber in the United
States, are
being intensively
logged for export to Japan, instead of being preserved for our
own
future
needs (Harnik 1973).
Economists
also
assume that consumers will respond in
a reasonably
elastic fashion to rising prices due to ecological scarcity. However, this
by no means obvious. For one
on
factors other than price.
thing,
many consumer
For instance, very great
is
decisions are based
differentials in cost are
not enough to lure most drivers out of their cars into mass transit, because such factors as prestige and convenience are more important to the
consumer than mere be
likely
to
price.
Thus only
prohibitive increases in cost
would
reduce significantly the private ownership and use of
may lock consumers of price. Homeowners and
automobiles. In addition, prior investment decisions into using a specific resource, regardless
industries that use natural gas for space or process heat, for example,
cannot
easily
switch to substitute forms of energy in the short term, no
Even very high prices, then, may not be sufficient to keep the consumption of ecologically damaging goods and the use of non renewable resources at a level that is
matter what happens to the price of natural
gas.
socially optimal.
Additional problems of a place, in a
just
—
market economy
one among others
—
all
more structural nature abound. In the first where the market is the economic tool, not the incentives of producers are toward
growth and the wasteful use of resources. to have a
high-throughput economy
It is
in the interest
of producers
characterized by high consumption
The American
Political
Economy
I:
Ecology Plus Economics Equals
221
Politics
through product proliferation and promotion, rapid obsolescence, and the not economically advantageous for a producer to make an
like. It is just
indestructible, easily repaired, inexpensively operated car. If
were perfectly
rational
economic advantage nothing
else,
but
—
—
is,
if
they could no doubt obHge producers to turn out
very well that consumers are not completely of all) and that producers do everything in their
to exploit this irrationality to boost sales (for example,
that play
consumers
they acted solely according to their
we know
rational (about cars least
power
that
upon consumers' social and
sexual insecurities).
the incentives to satisfy needs with
minimum
By
by using ads comparison,
inputs of energy and
material and the lowest real or long-term cost are quite weak, as
exemplified by the entrepreneurial flight fi-om passenger
rail
is
weU
transporta-
of economic advantage, producers can be expected to promote higher consumption and in general to exploit every opportion. In theii pursuit
tunity to profit by not counting the ecological costs. And of course the growth orientation of the private sector is reinforced by the government, which uses its taxing, spending, and monetary powers to promote prosperity and fiill employment.
Conversely, producers lack significant market incentives to respond alertly
and appropriately
to
scarcity.
For example,
electric
power companies
fiiel-based
it is
many of the problems
created by ecological
simply not in the interest of oil companies or to
promote
alternatives to the current fossil-
energy economy or to the centraHzed system of power
production and distribution. In
the purely "economic" person, would be one in which people are almost of what only he or she can supply. It is therefore fact, for
the best of all possible worlds Hterally
dying for lack
entirely rational for entrepreneurs to let scarcity reach uncomfortable levels before
innovating or bringing
market price system spirited, tives
is
new
resources to market.
unlikely to favor far-sighted,
much
Thus the
less
public-
investment decisions or to promote ecologically sound alterna-
to current technologies, especially because
alternatives,
such
as alternatively fiaeled
some of
the logical
automobiles, could reduce the
dependence of consumers on producers. At the very least, producers are demand builds up, and they are ensured of large profits
likely to wait until
before they invest heavily in such alternatives require a great deal of time and
commercial
viability.
Thus
money
as
fiision,
which may
to develop to the point
of
there are major structural obstacles to innova-
tion and investment that will seriously
impede response to the
pressures
of ecological scarcity (particularly in regulated monopoly industries, where real market competition does not exist). At best, market solutions will lag well
behind the rapidly developing real-world problems of
ecological scarcity.
CHAPTER
222
In short, an unregulated market
economy
5
inevitably fosters ac-
and resource depletion through ever-
celerated ecological degradation
higher levels of production and consumption. Indeed, given the cor-
nucopian assumptions on which
market system of economics
could hardly be otherwise; both philosophically and
it
market economy
The
a
If the
market in
its
is
rely so heavily
on
scarcity?
Mostly
Is
liabiUties, which
it
some of the market
as
many
serious environmental
has
liabilities
a
why do we
from the consequences of ecological
to save us
about
mechanism
Politics
current form has so
to be that although they tend to talk as if it
were already an accomplished price
practically, a
not disputed by the vast majority of economists,
The answer seems
are really talking
based,
incompatible with ecology.
is
New Economics
is
those
fact,
who
put forward
market that does not yet
—
exist
this solution
market whose
a
been thoroughly overhauled to eHminate
we
have noted. In short, those
who
at least
argue for the
an economic solution to ecological scarcity are actually urging
a political solution, for
of these reforms will require expUcit and
all
deliberate social decisions, as a brief review of the proposed changes will indicate.
A
number of economic
devices have been proposed to mitigate or
eliminate the degradation of common-pool resources and to promote the
provision of public goods, such
as
clean
air,
or the careful husbandry of
nonrenewable resources. These devices are principally administrative
common-pool
the creation of property rights in
poUution
taxes, the
fiat,
resources, effluent or
auctioning of pollution rights, severance taxes
on
the
use of resources, and the creation of "public markets." Although their technical merits are debated
the
main
by economists, there
simply forbid emissions above a certain
poUcy with respect
level,
which
is
grounded on
ecological theory of economics
"physiocratic" or nature-based
theories inspired
economics wiU be discussed "right livelihood."
the current U.S.
(in
by in
inefficient (in the
Chapter
real physical flows rather
would
economic
Adam
2) indicated,
than on money.
therefore resemble the theories that,
opening up of the Great Frontier, were eclipsed by the
economic
on
governments can
is
cumbersome and
As the discussion of a "thermodynamic" economy
ecological economics
An
general agreement
to automobiles, but economists tend to believe that
direct administrative controls are
*
is
outlines of a market solution. For example,
premodem
subsequent to the
capital-
and labor-based
Smith. Other aspects of an ecological
Chapter 8 in connection with stewardship and
The American
Political
Economy
I:
Ecology Plus Economics Equals
223
Politics
-23 Determining the Optimal Level of Pollution
This curve is the sum of the two
bottom curves.
The costs of cleaning
up the last remaining pollutants
is
very high.
As
pollution
increases,
the social costs of pollution rise rapidly.
Lowest social cost
Nature can handle low levels of pollution.
If
we
renriove these pollutants, the costs of cleaning up are higher than their
if
we
allow
more
than the optimal
pollution level,
the social costs of pollution is
higher than the cost
of cleaning
it
up.
social costs.
'Economists calculate the estimated optim.al level of pollution by plotting a curve reflecting the estimated social costs of pollution against a irve reflecting the social costs
curves
is
the total social cost.
of cleaning
The
it
up.
lowest point
optimal level of pollution. Source: Miller 1990,
The sum of the two
on p.
this third
581.
curve
is
the
CHAPTER 5
224
economic sense) in that they are not likely to provide the necessary amount of control at the least cost. Alternatively, governments can award environmental property rights to persons and corporations, thus creating a
framework
litigation
for bargaining, negotiation, exchange, and, if
all
else fails,
(none of which can take place effectively over property that
nobody owns). According
once the commons
to this view,
private property, market forces and the legal system
preserve rather than degrade that giving
away property
it
(see
is
made
into
would work
to
Box 24). However, economists fear commons to producers would be
rights in the
them and that the dispersed citizens would not be able to organize effectively to buy amenity. And they fear that if the public at large had individual "amenity rights" (so that a producer would have to buy pollution rights from each person affected by its effluent), the result would be economic paralysis. While recognizing that both these devices may be effective and even necessary in some cases, environmental a
tremendous windfall
for
economists generally favor restructuring the system of market prices with various taxes that
would obHge producers
to "internalize" (that
in-
is.
corporate into prices) the environmental costs of production. In principle, this
is
a simple
and just solution. Government agencies
could calculate the public damage caused by the wastes of a producer and
24 Marketing Pollution Rights One way
to control pollution
to
rights that allow pollution
sell
optimum The 1990 Clean Air Act experiments with
the estimated these rights.
is
and then
level
proach, setting a cap
on
another gress
hopes that
sulfiir
reduce
this
its
a
market ap-
its
emissions,
it
must pay
emissions by an equivalent amount.
market mechanism
dioxide reduction
to
sulfur dioxide emissions in the year 2000.
Thereafter, if a utility wants to increase utility to
up
to allow the polluters to trade
at least cost.
To
Con-
will achieve the desired level
of
take a simple example, if it
A $10 million to achieve a given level of pollution control, but costs utility B $5 million to do the same, A may be able to costs utility
negotiate an agreement with to spend $5 utilities
faith
miUion of these
B
to pay
"make" $2.5 million on the
by both
it
$7.5 million dollars if B agrees
dollars to offset
As
Both good
excess pollution.
transaction and, assuming
parties, achieve the desired pollution control.
— The American
Economy
Political
Ecology Plus Economics Equals
I:
225
Politics
then charge that individual or company the appropriate amount
as
an
government could levy severance promote more rational use of resources, especially virgin nonrenewable resources. The producer would internalize these new costs of doing business, which would be reflected in the price it charged for its products, so the consumer would pay the real cost of the effluent or pollution tax. Similarly, the taxes designed to
product
—
that
not only the costs of production but
is,
who
Those
ecological and social costs.
also the associated
ultimately benefited from the use
or consumption would jusdy pay what they should and
more
make
to
likely
consumption
if the
make
that
is,
prices,
its
more
set,
efficient in
did
thriftier. If it
would have an incentive an ecological and social sense
the producer
so,
and win customers away from
theoretical
mental
operations
cleaner and
could pay
it
is
lower
less tax,
efficient competitors.
less
outcome of the well-administered
costs
thus be
reducing
as
price were too high. Moreover, if the level of effluent
or severance tax were careflilly to
would
responsible market decisions, such
its
The
internalization of environ-
thus a transformed market that responds readily to the
pressures of ecological scarcity.
Unfortunately, this conceptually simple and reasonably equitable ap-
proach
is
far
from easy
to implement.
—
price with relative ease
^for
attributable to air pollution
readily quantified.
impossible to
which span?
know who
stay inside?
risk
What
from
a
nearby
Consider the health
agents. Besides,
Of the
Some
suffers, to
what
is
the
provide a sustained yield?
economic
—
or even
How
do we decide whether
More increased
*
air pollution. It is
Of a
of life?
Of being
much less what
almost
reduced
what
level
a price
disaster,
such
irreversible
ones, for that
of exploitation
on as
life
smog to on the use
forced by
on many renewable
closes fiiture options, such as building houses at all,
cost
do we put
involved in the unlikely but possible
undertaken
However, most cannot be
what degree, and from what amount of
matter, biologists often being uncertain
How
of
or house painting
bills
can be used to establish severance taxes
of nonrenewable resources
accident?
factory.
effects
of contracting emphysema? criteria
can be assigned a
externalities
example, extra laundry
will
the externalities
a serious nuclear
development
that fore-
on prime farmland, should be
price should be assigned to
it?
generally, what about such social costs of industrial growth as commuting time and mental stress, to say nothing of the fiirther
Alternatively,
the
government could auction
off"
Limited
pollution
exploitation rights, in effect letting the market establish the tax. This
much of the
cost
or
would save
of information gathering and tax calculation but, among other
drawbacks, would give an advantage to those with the greatest market power.
CHAPTER
226
5
—25 Technology Assessment Just as laissez faire in economics generates environmental costs, so too "laissez innover,"
or the unrestrained freedom to innovate technologi-
generates social costs. In both cases these costs have reached unac-
cally,
ceptable levels, and remedies are being sought. If internalization
the
is
economists' answer to environmental costs, "technology assessment" the technologists' cure for the social costs of laissez innover.
of both
is
groups to
—
is
The aim
to make it no longer possible for individuals and make micro-decisions that produce a macro-decision inimi-
the same
common interest. As might be expected, therefore, technology assessment encounters the same kinds of problems as internalizacal to the
tion,
but in a more acute form, because the issues involved are
much
broader and even harder to analyze (especially in terms of quantifiable costs
and
benefits) than those involved in internalization.
Thus
decisions about the introduction of new technology are inevitably
more
political (or "trans-scientific," to use the technologists'
term)
than those confronted by environmental economists.
The
heart of the difficulty
is
something already familiar to us from
previous discussion. As Allen Kneese, a leading environmental
economist and expert on cost-benefit
community
erosion of organic
life?
analysis, says,
How
do we decide whether deple-
tion of resources in the present should proceed if
it
impoverishes
fiature
what extent should the cost of fiiture depletion be discounted? We have no way of knowing at present. Indeed, even with perfect information, the economists could not answer most of these questions, for they involve political, social, and ethical issues, not the issue of efficient resource allocation that neoclassical, marginalist economics was designed to handle. They are "trans-economic" questions. generations, and to
*
To
take but one example of the difficulty of such assessments, a 1984
EPA
cost-benefit analysis of a proposed revision of the Clean Air Act determined that
the net benefits over the net costs ranged
from —$1.4
depending on what values w^ere assigned to human cleaner environment (Miller 1990, p. 583).
billion to
life,
+$110
human
billion,
health,
and
a
The American
It is
Political
Economy
I:
Ecology Plus Economics Equals
my belief that benefit-cost analysis
227
Politics
cannot answer the most impor
tant policy questions associated with the desirability of developing a large-scale, fission-based
bear a burden a
deep
it
cannot
I
sustain.
This
is
it
to
do
so
may
well obscure
Unfortunately, almost
all
is
to ask
to
it
so because these questions are of
ethical character. Benefit-cost analyses certainly
such questions and
I
economy. To expect
cannot solve
them [Kneese 1973,
p. 1].
com-
discussion of technology assessment
pletely overlooks this point. Just like the majority of economists,
who
I
evince an almost religious faith in the tools of neoclassical economics
I
and the technical
I f
efficacy
of the market mechanism, technologists
tend to look upon technology assessment
as
an exercise
in
pure cost-
benefit analysis that will avoid rather than require poHtical and ethical
But
the criteria and methods of analysis are narrowly tech-
I
decisions.
I
nical
I
for example, will be
if
and economic, then there is little doubt that the Faustian bargain, found cost-effective. In its current form, therefore,
technology assessment
may indeed
obscure rather than illuminate the
most important questions connected with continued technological innovation.
Thus "the new economics is mostly politics" (WUdavsky 1967). Even though economic analysis and the market itself, which is a highly effective mechanism for efficiently and automatically allocating resources and for sending signals to economic decision makers, both have a definite contribution to make, society will have to use noneconomic criteria to decide which trade-offs are to be made between production and other elements of the quality of life. (The assessment of technology poses a similar problem; see Box 25.) In effect, because economics itself cannot produce what economists call a "social welfare function," a means of assigning monetary values to non-market goods and bads, such a function will have to be invented politically
(see
Box
Moreover, even an overhauled price system will not eliminate liabihties
direct
we
all
26).
the
have discussed, so that in any event, an expansion of
government intervention
in
the
economic process
will be
CHAPTER
228
5
—26 Assigning Prices to Environmental Goods Economists have given thou^t to hov^ to assign prices to "externalities," or ecological goods and services having
|
no market value. For example, the |
value of beautifiil scenery or a national park or spotted owls can be es-
timated by asking people the see them, even
if they
maximum they would be willing to
don't actually have to pay
it.
pay to |
Likewise, in doing cost-?
benefit analyses, economists have used the technique in determining
much
people might be willing to pay to avoid
costs associated
But
with
the validity
illness
loss
\
1
or some medical symptoms.
of such "goods"
as
owls or a species of fi"Og, the people give answers that depend on are.
how
of income and medical
of the technique varies with the subject matter.
Among other things, when assessing the value informed they
|
The technique
also fails to incorporate
spotted 1
how welil
long-term goals
I
because flimre generations can't bid in the hypothetical market.
Economists have tainty into the
also
given thought to
market system.
One
how
possibiUty
is
^
to incorporate uncerto require
companies
bond equal to the current best estimate of the greatest potential environmental harm their product or service could cause. The bond would pay interest and would be returned if the company could show that its product would not harm the environment. On the other hand, if the product did cause harm, the bond money would be used to repair the damage and to compensate its victims. The technique would require polluters to assume the risks that society now assumes and would give them an incentive to minimize environmental harms. to post a
But
this proposal faces substantial poUtical obstacles. Polluters have
been powerfiil enough liabilities
(such as the financial limits to
are subject in nuclear accidents)
mental and health
on their environmental which nuclear power producers
to obtain legal caps
,
1 J
and to force society to assume environ-
risks (for instance, pesticides
of dubious
safety are per-
mitted in the marketplace until the government proves they are harmfiil).
needed (for example, to subsidize vital but risky research and development on alternative technologies). Thus, as even leading exponents of the market strategy acknowledge, our political system will be handed the uncomfortable and unwanted burden of making decisions hitherto left to the invisible hand. This means that open collective decision
The American
Economy
Political
I:
Ecology Plus Economics Equals
229
Politics
—
making on a scale never before attempted by our political institutions as as much more efficient, innovative, and timely government action in wiU be essential to the success of the market strategy as a means general
well
—
of responding to ecological scarcity.
The
Political
Costs of Internalization
Because
leans so heavily
it
on
poHtics, the market strategy of coping with
ecological scarcity must also be evaluated in political terms. This will raise further questions about
world of American
how weU it can be
expected to succeed in the
opposed to the
politics, as
abstract
real
world of economic
analysis.
In the
have such
first
market adjust supply and demand can
place, letting the
painflil social
and
consequences that governments
political
have usually gone to considerable lengths to prevent the free play of
market
forces. Recession, for
example, makes exceedingly bad poUtics. So
market strategy
will internalization, for to the extent that a
environmentally,
it is
bound
to cause social
and economic
effective
is
distress.
The
internaUzation of environmental costs usually means that people have to
pay for what they used to get
fi-ee.
Pollution control, for instance, often
production process more
more
does not
make
similarly,
severance and pollution taxes increase costs without increasing
a
the quahty of goods.
of living
is
must happen
known,
The
result
eroded by inflation in the face
a general rise in prices,
is
—
a rise in prices affects
scarcity.
income groups
fact
all
who
expensive;
and the standard
what economic theory
exactly
of absolute
wdth fixed incomes, and in
efficient, just
Furthermore,
selectively.
The
predicts
as
is
weD
poor, those
are not in a position to pass
on the
increased costs sufier disproportionately. In addition, if a poHcy of internalization
is
faithfully
implemented, the price of owning certain
highly desired but ecologically damaging goods, such
seems
likely to rise the fastest
disruption of the economy,
the automobile.
It
would
and
highest. This
which depends
heavily
and disruptive
effects
on
numbers
case, ecological scarcity
the economy, producing a
In the United States, real wages have declined since 1972, and productivity
has been stagnant for about a decade. effects as
tendency
political results if large
of people are priced out of car ownership. In any
*
the automobile,
also intensify the maldistributive
noted above, with potentially explosive will have painful
as
would cause serious on mass ownership of
of rising
a result
Both trends
real resource costs, especially
are partially attributable to the
energy resources, which are rising
of their decreasing energy output/input
internalizing
some of their environmental harms.
ratios
and the
costs
of
CHAPTER
230
lower standard of living
whether
it
is
we
as
Thus the question is economic consequences of
usually conceive of it.
desirable for the inevitable
ecological scarcity to be distributed in a relatively laissez-faire fashion
the invisible
hand or by
a
5
by
planned economic contraction designed to
mitigate these side effects. This will be a prime poHtical issue confronting the
American
return to
Making An
it
consequence of ecological
polity as a
scarcity, so
we
the Invisible
Hand
additional poHtical
Visible
problem
is
the very openness and expUcitness of
it will make name impHes, one of the
what has hitherto been
the internalization process, for
public
hidden. As
characteristic features
invisible
shall
in the next chapter.
its
hand
is
of the
workings of the economic process are largely
that the
concealed, and responsibihty for the economic macro-decision that
from the summation and integration of many small economic
results
micro-decisions
is
diffiased.
any particular person or can pursue their
own
The outcome
act.
due
result
(at least as
we
pubHc
have experienced
it)
costs, in
who
costs their
"development." Capitalism
is
an economic system founded on hidden social
ment
to "the market," not to
private profit while ignoring the
impose on others. The
actions
is
This gready favors the entrepreneurs,
is
thus
which develop-
would not have occurred
if all
the costs had been counted in advance. For example, the gentry and the
bourgeois clearly did very well by the Industrial Revolution, while the
urban and rural masses suffered gready fi-om the disruptive development; one in the countries
sees essentially the
of the Third World.
We
of
its
resistance
on
its
present
form
pollution had to be paid for by the industry.
of the atomic energy establishment to
the merits of nuclear
power
closure of costs and benefits
is
of
saw in Chapter 3 that the
also
petrochemical industry would not exist in costs
side effects
same process being repeated today
suggests just
to those
who
a
how
fiill
if
the pubUc
The extreme
and frank debate
threatening
full dis-
have hitherto been able to
hide behind the invisible hand of dispersed, laissez-faire decision making. In brief, honesty and "progress"
That openness and makers
is
may not be
explicitness are
a
Society
not welcomed by most policy
evident fi-om the brief history of the National Environmental
PoHcy Act of 1969 (NEPA). The
*
compatible.
Act's
purpose was, in
part, to
"promote
would undoubtedly want a small petrochemical industry to produce for which there are no substitutes (drugs, artificial
few valuable products
hearts,
and the
like)
even
many pounds of hazardous
if,
as is true
wastes
as
today, the industry generated nearly as
pounds of product produced.
— The American
Political
Economy
I:
Ecology Plus Economics Equals
231
Politics
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
efforts that will
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man." Section 102 of that
Act requires
all
federal agencies to prepare an environmental-impact
statement (EIS) on any of their activities that have a significant effect on
human environment. The
the quality of the
purpose and need for the proposed action,
statement must include the its
probable environmental
impact, and the impact of possible alternatives. In other words, the Act requires a
public accounting of the costs and benefits of any Federal
fiill
action that might have environmental consequences that decision makers
and the interested public should be made aware also
and even some private tal
of.
(Thirty-six states have
adopted legislation requiring similar statements for governmental
impact.)
The Act
—
projects likely to have a significant
environmen-
has been interpreted to be only procedural; that
is, it
no criteria of acceptability for a proposed action to go forward. The United States Supreme Court ruled in 1980 that the National Environmental Pohcy Act requires agencies only to "consider" the environmental impacts of its projects. Under the decision, an agency can report that a proposed activity wiU cause the sky to fall by 2000 and established
still
proceed with the project once
it
has satisfied the procedural require-
ments of the Act. Nevertheless, lower courts, in response taUst suits,
to
environmen-
have forced government agencies to Hve up rather stricdy to
the requirement that a fiaU-blown envirormiental-impact statement be
prepared.
As that
a result, a
number of projects have been abandoned when it appeared
an honest public accounting would be too damaging; others have been
temporarily shelved for redesign to remove ecological Uabilities; and
some of
others have been held
still
the
more
glaring
up by the extensive
paperwork and inter-agency consultation needed to complete an EIS. Furthermore, the statements have tal
made
splendid ammunition for environmen-
defenders during the regulatory proceedings that are ofi;en needed before
a project can
be carried out. The nuclear power industry, already saddled
v^dth relatively
location
heavy procedural and
and reactor
licensing,
was
legal requirements involved in site
especially hard hit
accountability generated by EIS statements, but the
by the Hmited public
Army Corps
of En-
gineers and other development-oriented agencies have also found living to their obHgations
As the
fiaU
under Section 102 to be
a
up
troublesome burden.
consequences of Section 102 became apparent, an
administrative and legislative backlash set in. In part, this was
due
to the
admittedly expensive and time-consuming process of preparing a report, circulating
it
to interested agencies for criticism,
However, most of the
distress
expUcitness of the process,
and so
draft:
forth.
was due precisely to the openness and
which
gives potential
opponents
(usually a
CHAPTER
232
5
public-interest or environmental action group, but occasionaUy a rival
agency) an opportunity to prevent a project from being carried out. For the sponsoring agency and especially pork-barreling
and
legislative
its
industrial constituency,
members of Congress, such an outcome
is
horrible to contemplate, for projects bring prestige, profits, political favor,
and many other
NEPA
was an attempt to weaken
benefits. Predictably, there
legislatively.
When
the
failed, essentially
this
same
was
result
achieved by an administrative modus vivendi, supported by the United States
Supreme Court.
Instead of treating the process of preparing an EIS as an opportunity to
improve the quality of their decision making, sponsoring agencies have turned
paperwork compliance with the requirements of
into pro forma,
it
Section 102 (Krieth 1973). The Supreme Court has sanctioned
NEPA's requirements
calling the
gone so
far as to
information once
"essentially procedural."
Corp. of Engineers
court has
new and
approve an agency's refusal to consider it
this practice,
The
better
own EIS. For example, after the Army issued an EIS concerning a proposed dam on a tributary has completed
its
of the Rouge River in Oregon, the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife and the federal government's
own Soil
Conservation Service found
evidence that the environmental impact would be worse than the Army's
EIS had predicted. The supplement
"When
its
own
Army
discretion to rely
experts" to support matter, a court
its
on
information or
Supreme Court sanctioned
specialists express conflicting
must have
new
refused to consider the
EIS, and the
views," the court
said,
the reasonable opinions of its
preferred option. This
is
so "even
if,
that reflisal.
"an agency
own as
qualified
an original
might find contrary views more persuasive" {Marsh
Oregon
v.
Natural Resources Council 109 S.Ct. 1851, 1861 (1989).
Fully aware of this minimal reading of
NEPA,
reviewing agencies
often give EISs a perfunctory review, thus saving themselves the
and the
staff
the same time chalking their
money
time that would have had to go into a genuine study, and
own pet projects
up
a political favor that
are passed
around for
can be collected
criticism.
especially controversial projects are important
Because only
enough
at
when a
few
to attract the
attention of overworked and underfinanced public-interest groups, the vast majority
of impact statements glide through with only the most
*
The Supreme Court
of
NEPA. An
From 1975
has consistently supported the executive branch's views
indication of the court's approach can be seen in the
to 1991, the court
narrowed the scope of the
act.
reviewed 11
In the
NEPA
Supreme Court refused
and
in
statistics: all
11,
it
same time period, environmental groups
asked the Supreme Court to review cases they had the
cases,
lost in
to consider their appeals in
lower courts 25 times;
all
25
cases.
The American
Political
Economy
cursory review. In pitifully
fact,
Ecology Plus Economics Equals
I:
233
Politics
even some highly controversial projects receive
inadequate reviews. Agencies also seek to avoid the larger sub-
stantive issues their projects raise
by using,
as
much
and exclusive definitions of project and environmental
when
the
leases,
mining
as possible,
impact.
narrow
For example,
Department of the
Interior engaged in a regional study of of way, and the distribution of scarce water resources in connection with its plans to approve coal strip mining in the rights, rights
Northern Great Plains, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Interior Department should decide whether to prepare an EIS for the region before any individual strip-mining projects started. But the
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, accepting the Interior Department's claim that it had no "program" or "proposal" for the region on which to prepare an EIS at that time. Finally, in
the
the case of the Trans-vMaska Pipeline, a case that arose before
Supreme Court had
NEPA
was simply
NEPA
established that the
set aside.
When
the
is
essentially procedural,
Department of the
Interior, despite
White House pressure, could not produce an EIS favorable to the pipeline yet plausible enough to stand up in court, the administration simply intense
persuaded Congress to pass legislation exempting the pipeline project fi-om
M
compliance with
Chapter
we
2,
Thus, although aborted,
it
NEPA
NEPA
ancy, for agencies have
that
its
is
some
Ml, open, and
fiilfilled
only the
spawned by
simple:
gain
No
may be
letter
that decision.
ill-conceived projects to be
explicit letter
environmental account-
of the law
by the Supreme Court) while evading the
important instance even the reason
has caused
has not resulted in
interpreted
requirements (Carter 1973; Odell 1973). In
discussed the environmental havoc
(as
spirit,
of the law was deliberately
Full disclosure
loss.
The known
set aside.
project sponsor or developer wants to let
the community's
minimally
and in one
it
be
of the kind of
information needed to internalize the costs of production and make intelligent decisions
on future development is deeply threatening to the industrial on the
order and to a political and economic system that has thrived invisibility
of the
invisible
hand.
One must
therefore question
whether the
openness and exphcimess needed to make internalization work can be achieved with our current institutions. At the very
some
painful readjustments in
hidden
costs,
our economic
and in the administrative and
least,
there
v^ have to be
mode of life, which is based on
political process allied
with
it.
Into the Political Cockpit Internalization
would be
precisely to the degree that this
approach explain why:
resisted it
was
by important economic effective.
Two
interests
leading proponents of
CHAPTER 5
234
A
system of pollution charges... would establish the principle that the
environment
must pay
owned by
is
Such massive
disposal.
seldom
represent
Haveman
the people as a
transfers
that the polluters
of "property rights" and the wealth they
without
occur
whole and
of using part of the environment for waste
for the privilege
political
and
(Freeman
upheaval
1972).
Implicit in any effective
program of internaUzation or environmental
management,
a deliberate reversal
therefore,
is
of
200-year-old bias in
a
favor of development and growth. Tow^ard this end, the
government
wdll
be required to take jealously guarded privileges aw^ay from, and impose heavy
new
obligations on, some of the most important and powerful actors in
For example, companies extracting virgin materials
the political system.
now
benefit
from
form of
a substantial tax break in the
new scheme of
allowance; in the
things,
not only will
a depletion
depletion
this
allowance be taken away but additional pollution and severance taxes will
be imposed.
It
apparent that producers have
is
little
how
cooperate in a program of internalization, no matter
incentive
to
well and fairly
administered, that threatens drastically to curtail both profits and power.
The
battle over stricter emission
and efficiency (milage) standards for
automobiles offers a foretaste of the kind of long political struggle that
would become
pervasive as Washington tried to force producers to
internalize ecological
and
social costs. Vital issues are at stake.
Oil
com-
panies and the automobile industry see a threat in higher-priced gasoline, alternative fuels,
trend
is
and smaller automobiles. They believe
allowed to proceed to
its
that if the current
logical conclusion, automobiles
eventually be luxury items again, with devastating effects
Labor, too, sees the threat implicit in controls
consumers do not terms of
utility.
desire
least,
pollution,
v^U
profits.
and even
goods that are more expensive but no better in
In short, internalization will inhibit if not prevent con-
tinued growth, and
very
on
on
nobody
really
wants material growth to end. At the
everybody wants somebody
else to
bear the costs of restructur-
ing the economy.
With important
interests so clearly
opposed,
seems doubtful that a
it
program of internalization can be fully, fairly, and efficiently administered. At best, there will be considerable lag as time-consuming political battles are fought out in the legislature and the courts, and economists agree that substantial delay in internalizing costs will be fatal to the market strategy.
At worst, internalization will be only partially apphed, and primary reliance on politically more cally less efficient measures,
such
(as
well as belatedly)
feasible
but economi-
as direct regulation, wall
shackle the
The American
Political
Economy
I:
Ecology Plus Economics Equals
235
Politics
market with price
a jumble of controls that will increase the irrationality of the mechanism without removing any of its environmental liabilities.
The market strategy thus seems likely to founder on politics, for the attempt to reform the price mechanism will transfer from the invisible hand to the highly visible political realm decisions on matters of critical importance to major
made
visible
then
interest,
interests in the society. If the invisible
and obedient to some
will inevitably bring
this
hand must be
conception of the
explicit
about
a
basic
common
change in the
character of American government, which has relied heavily on the market mechanism. Laissez-faire economics has been, in effect, a surrogate for politics.
With
demise, government seems likely to turn into competing economic interests fighting desperately in an age of ecological scarcity. its
a political cockpit for
for survival
Farewell
Man"
''Economic
to
The most fundamental concepts its
the system has habitually used to firame
A laissez-faire market system of "economic man," and these values
decisions are being called into question.
of economics
reflects the values
themselves, not just laissez-faire institutions, have become pernicious. For example, to a purely economic person there is no higher value than the mdividual wants of those living today; in pursuit of these wants it is
economically optimal to keep growing until one further increment of
growth will precipitate ecological catastrophe (Pearce 1973). The ultimate consequence of such a policy of ecological brinkmanship would, of course, be ruin. But
who
cares about ultimate consequences? In fact, any purely economic person must ignore the interests of posterity, for it has no agent he or she can bargain with in a market place and nothing of
economic value
to offer the person of today
posterity never has been, Posterity
is,
and never
damned
therefore,
if
Thus the current paradigm of political
The market
economic
tasks,
but
will
it
social values. Similarly,
an economic fact that
do anything
for us.
made "economically." economy which is based on
decisions are
the primacy of economics, must give politics.
It is
will be, able to
will cease to
way
one based primarily on performing vital be the dominant mode of allocating
remain an
to
essential tool for
economics, instead of being the master science
it
been since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, will be reduced to the more modest but still important role of handmaiden to has
ecological politics, supporting the material goals of the polity and
ing the
human
ecological household in a
way
nature and the long-term interests of humanity.
manag-
that respects the laws
of
The American Political Economy II: The Non-politics of Laissez Faire
The preceding
chapter showed that the invisible hand
reUed on for social decisions; we choices in order to
—
that
of its
The
we Americans
laissez-faire
American
Instead,
life.
no longer
to
be
explicit political
scarcity.
This
is
an
have never had a genuine
something apart from economics
is,
our community
be obHged to make
meet the challenges of ecological
embarrassing conclusion, for poHtics
shall
is
that gives direction to
politics has
been but
a reflection
economic system.
Functions of Economic Growth
Political
From our
earhest colonial beginnings, rising expectations have
been
a
fundamental part of the American credo, each generation expecting to
become
richer than the previous one.
growth,
the
class
and
conflict
nineteenth-century Europe were
Thanks
social all
to this expectation
discontent
typical
of
of early
but absent in America; poHtics was
accordingly undemanding, pragmatic, and laissez-faire. Thus, said Alexis
de TocqueviUe in his America,
we were
Growth
classic
indeed
is still
a
study of American civilization Democracy
in
"happy republic."
central to
American
poHtics. In fact,
it
matters
more
than ever, for the older social restraints (the Protestant ethic, deference, isolation)
have
all
been swept away. Growth 237
is
the secular religion of
CHAPTER 6
238
American and to
society,
a source
providing a social goal, a basis for political
of individual motivation.
society
—
itself
—has
an enor-
Basis of Pragmatic Politics
Growth continues to be essential style of American politics, which history
is
to the characteristic pragmatic, laissez-faire
has always revolved around the question of
to the opportunity to get
fair access
of the
government
individuals, enterprises, the
vested interest in the continuation of growth.
The Economic
on financially. Indeed, American political
but the record of a more or
spoils
economic growth
issues into
social
problems have been handled
for political principle, transforming
non-
ones that could be solved by economic bargaining. For
example, when labor pressed status as a
amicable squabble over the division
less
of a growing economy. Even
substituting
economic
its
come
pursuit of happiness has
be defined almost exclusively in material terms, and the entire
mous
by
The
solidarity,
its
class
demands, the response was to legitimize
bargaining unit in the division of the
spoils.
Once
labor had to
be bargained with in good businesslike fashion, compromise, in terms of
wages and other costable
benefits,
became
possible. In return for labor's
abandonment of uncompromising demands for socialism, others at the economic trough "squeezed over" enough for labor to get its share. Similarly new political demands by immigrants, farmers, and so on were bought ofi"by the opportunity to share in the fiiiits of economic growth. The only conflict that we failed to solve in this marmer was slavery and its aftermath, and it is typical that
once the legitimacy of black demands was recognized
1960s, the reflex response was to
promote economic opportunity
training, education, "black capitalism,"
and
fair
hiring practices
—
in the via
that
is,
job the
wherev^thal to share the affluence of the envied whites. If blacks prosper economically, says our intuitive understanding of politics, racial problems will vanish.
As all, it
a poHtical
is
a
mode, economic reductionism
has
many
virtues.
Above
superb means of channeling and controUing social conflict.
Economic bargaining is a matter of a little more or a litde less. Nobody loses on issues of principle, and even failure to get what you want today is tolerable, for the bargaining session is continuous, and the outcome of the next round may be more favorable. Besides, everybody's share is growing, so that even an unfair share
is
a
more-than-acceptable bird in
Most people understand that in a growth economy, individuals more to gain fi*om increases in the size of the enterprise as a whole than firom any feasible change in distribution. Furthermore, people have gotten what was of primary interest to them access to income and wealth and with their chief aim satisfied, they were able to the hand.
or groups have
—
—
— The American
Economy
Political
repress desires for
II:
The
community,
Non-politics of Laissez Faire
239
power, and other
social respect, political
values that are not so easily divisible as money.
This characteristic
style
of conflict resolution presupposes agreement on
the primacy of economics and a general willingness to be pragmatic and to
accept the bargaining approach to political and social issues.
as
well as
economic
Unfortunately, the arrival of ecological scarcity places issues
political
agenda that are not
easily
of all in terms of money. Trade-offi
on
compromisable or commensurable, are possible,
the
least
of course, but environmental
imperatives are basically matters of principle that cannot be bargained away in an
economic
fashion.
which our political
Environmental management
institutions are miscast, because
it
is
therefore a role for
involves deciding issues
of principle in favor of one side or another rather than merely allocating shares in the spoils.
opposing
made
it
Worse, a cessation or even
a slowing
interests into increasingly stark conflict.
possible to satisfy the
of growth
demands of new claimants
without taking anything away from others. Without however,
we
are left
will bring
Economic growth
has
to the spoils
significant
growth,
with a zero-sum game, in which there will be winners
and losers instead of big winners and
little
winners. Especially in recent years,
growth has become an all-purpose
"political solvent" (Bell 1974, p. 43),
satisfying rapidly rising expectations
while allowing very large expenditures
for social welfare
and defense. Without the
provide quasi-automatic solutions to
our
political institutions will
many of our domestic meet
important, long-suppressed social issues can
To
state the
social
problems,
a plethora
now
how
of demands. More
be expected to surface
of equality.
Ecological Scarcity versus
been
of growth to
be called on to make hard choices about
best to use relatively scarce resources to
especially the issue
political solvent
problem
Economic Justice
succinctly,
substitutes for equality
growth and economic opportunity have
of income and wealth. We have justified large
income and wealth on the grounds that they promote all members of society would receive fiature advantage from current inequality as the benefits of development "trickled down" to the poor. (On a more personal level, economic growth also ratifies the ethics of individual self-seeking: You can get on without concern for the fate of others, for they are presumably getting on too, even if not so well as you.) But if growth in production is no longer of overriding impordifferences in
growth and
that
tance, the rationale for differential rewards gets thinner,
cessation
of growth
it
and with
a
virtually disappears. In general, anything that
diminishes growth and opportunity abridges the customary substitutes for equality.
Because people's demands for economic betterment are not
CHAPTER 6
240
likely to disappear,
once the pie stops growing
date their needs, they will begin
Even more
fast
making demands
enough
accommo-
to
for redistribution.
serious than the frustration of rising expectations
prospect of actual deprivation off in terms of real
income
numbers of people get worse
as substantial
as a result
the
is
of scarcity-induced inflation and the
internalization of environmental costs. Indeed, the eventual consequence
of ecological it,
of
scarcity
least,
lower standard of living,
we
is,
can expect that
define
At the
our poHtics will come to be dominated by
—or "emulation,"
many times in To make the
more
we currendy
in fact, the classic prescription for revolution.
resentment and envy has
as
nature to realize that this will create
social tension. It
very
a
members of society. One does not need a gloomy view enormous political and
for almost aU
human
is
to use the old
word
—
-just as it
the past in democratic polities.
revolutionary potential of the politics of emulation
concrete, let us imagine that the current trend toward
making
automobile ownership and operation more expensive continues to the point where the car becomes once again a luxury item, available only to "the carriage trade." aristocrat
with
his or
How her
will the average person,
own
scooter or a bicycle, react to
this
private carriage but
once an economic
now demoted
deprivation, especially in
that the remaining aristocrats will
to a
view of the
fact
presumably continue to enjoy their
private carriages?
Of
course, such an extreme situation
(although
many would be
costs attributable to the
probably a long
is
priced out of the market today
if aU
automobile were internalized). Yet
it
way
off
the social
toward
is
such a situation that the rising costs due to ecological scarcity are pushing us. Already, in striking contrast to
the not-too-distant past, the price of a
detached house in the most populous areas of the country the average family can afford to pay. Also,
as
basic necessities continues to increase, less disposable
for the purchase
deprivation
is
is
more than
the cost of food and other
income
will
be
left
of automobiles and other highly desired goods. In sum,
inevitable,
even in the short term.
This point has not been
lost
on advocates
for the disadvantaged,
who
have already protested vehemently against the regressive impact of even
modest
increases in the cost of energy (through increased gasoline taxes,
for example)
*
and goods.* More
For every $1.00 increase
United
States.
Yet
if
generally, they fear that lessened
in the price
the gasoline tax
subsidies to the automobile,
gas (Schaeffer 1990, p. 15).
of oil, about 78,000 jobs are
were adjusted
to pay the cost
growth
lost in the
of all public
Americans would have to pay $4.50 per gallon of
— The American
Economy
Political
II:
The Non-politics of Laissez
will tend to restrict social mobility
some
the clock back in
The
areas,
political stage
is
minority
as
quo, or even turn
status
rights.
showdown between the on the one hand and socioeconomic justice therefore, for a
set,
claims of ecological scarcity
on the
such
and freeze the
241
Faire
other. If the impact of scarcity
distributed in a laissez-faire
is
fashion, the result will be to intensify existing inequalities. Large-scale redistribution, however,
is
almost totally foreign to our political
ma-
which was designed for a growth economy and which has used economic surplus as the coin of social and political payoff. Thus the chinery,
political
measures necessary to redistributing income and wealth such
that scarce
much
commodities
are to a large degree equally shared will require
greater social cooperation and solidarity than the system has
exhibited in the past.
They
will also require greater social control.
scarcity, there
a trade-off
is
between freedom and
equality necessitating almost total social control
Maoist China). However, even sale
will
as
in the
with perfect
was attempted in
(as
economy and major
whole-
transfers
of
well as other infringements of liberty in general, that
be resisted bitterly by important and powerfiil
—
Thus either horn of the dilemma would toss us into serious difficulties political
conditions of
partial redistribution will involve
government intervention
property rights,
Under
equality,
and moral resources
to or
interests.
laissez faire
that
beyond
or redistribution
would
capacity.
strain
our meager
American
founded on competition rather than cooperation, and
scarcity
society
is
is
likely to
aggravate rather than ameliorate the competitive struggle to gain eco-
nomic
benefits for oneself or one's group. Similarly,
based on a just division of the
spoils,
access to the increments of growth;
gone,
little is left
to
promote
social
Smith pointed out, the "progressive contrast, the stationary state
(Smith 1776, p. 81). ly predicated
is
once the
state"
is
—
that
of abundance are
Adam
and "hearty"; by
"hard," the declining state "miserable"
years of continuous
scarcity?
Process
only a specific instance of a more general problem. In
is
areas, the
is
How well will a set of political institutions complete-
The Non-politics of Due many
spoils
"cheerfiil"
growth cope with the "hardness" of ecological
policies
political ethic
cooperation and sharing. As
on abundance and molded by over 200
This dilemma
our
defined almost purely in terms of fair
American government
is,
specific
will
be obliged to have genuine
measures or programs designed to
fiarther
some
particular conception of the public interest. This will require radical
changes, because in our laissez-faire poHtical system, ends are subor-
CHAPTER
242
dinated to political means. In other words, as
opposed to "systems"
we
6
practice "process" politics
As the name
politics (Schick 1971).
implies,
emphasizes the adequacy and fairness of the rules govern-
process politics
ing the process of politics. If the process
is fair,
according to due process, the outcome
is
By
the best that the system can achieve.
then, as in a
assumed
trial
to be just
conducted
—
or
at least
contrast, systems politics
is
concerned primarily with desired outcomes; means are subordinated to predetermined ends.
The
process
model
many
has
virtues.
Keeping the question of ends out
of politics greatly diminishes the intensity of social the fairness of the rules, agree,
and they do not
conflict.
a matter about which they find
confi-ont each other
it
People debate
relatively easy to
with value demands, which
may
not be susceptible to compromise. However, by some standards, the process
model hardly deserves the name of politics, the
common
The common
"general will" are identical.
whatever the
political system's invisible
Of course, we laissez-faire
our
for
it
evades the whole issue of
interest simply by declaring that the "will of interest
hand cranks
have found that pure
been to curb the
reforms designed to preserve
we
prevent the efiicient or
definition, ill.
Hke pure
find intolerable, but
social costs
basic features:
its
by
and the
good or
laissez-faire politics,
economics, produces outcomes that
instinct has always
thus,
is
out, for
all"
We
of
by
laissez faire
check practices that
operation of the market rather than convert-
fair
ing to a planned economy;
we promote
equal opportunity rather than
redistributing wealth or income. Planning with certain ends in
mind does
Each separate atom or molecule in corporations, government agencies, ad-
take place in such a political system.
the
body poHtic
(individuals,
visory commissions, and supreme courts) plans in order to maximize
own
its
hand produces the aggregated result of action on these private plans. But the central government does not plan in any VA and FHA home systematic way, even though its ad hoc actions do in a sense constitute loans, tax breaks for homeowners, and the like ends, and the invisible
a "plan" for certain
In
reality,
What we
outcomes
—
really
suburban sprawl.
have
is
have non-policies.
is
almost a misnomer.
congeries of unintegrated and competitive subsys-
—
a
non-system.
outcome of due process means
accepting the
ceptable.
in this case,
"the American political system"
tems pursuing conflicting ends
produced by
— —
Now, however, just
this laissez-faire
Coping with
as in
And
that in
our
overall policy
most
particulars
economics, the externalities
system of non-poUtics have become unac-
the consequences of ecological scarcity will re-
quire explicit, outcome-oriented political decisions taken in the
some conception of an interest.
What
of
we
ecological, if not a political
likeHhood
is
there of this happening?
and
social,
name of
common
The American
Who
Dominates
Critics
Economy
Political
II:
The
Non-politics of Laissez Faire
243
the Political Marketplace?
of the American
(or superiority)
political
of process
system almost never question the necessity
politics. If bad
outcomes
are generated,
must be
it
because powerflil interests dominate the political marketplace and prevent the will of the majority from being
There has been,
domain by although the
flilly
and
fairly translated into
say the critics, a wholesale expropriation
outcomes.
of the public
(Lowi 1969; McConnell 1966). Nevertheless,
private interests
much of this criticism is incontrovertible, the general preferences of
American people
are in fact quite well reflected in political output.
People want jobs, economic opportunities, and a growing, economy. Indeed, to the extent that the system has
had
a guiding policy goal at
precisely to satisfy the rising expectations
of
its
citizens.
all, it
Even
been
has
if special
have benefited disproportionately from the measures taken to
interests
promote
this
end, most of the benefit has been transmitted to the vast
majority of the population.
The problem,
institutions are unresponsive to
the tragedy of the
our
then,
is
not that our
but that what
wills
we
political
desire generates
commons.
Naturally, to the extent that our
house for special
government
interests, the situation
largely a brokerage
is
much
is
worse, because such
have an even bigger stake in continued economic growth. But
interests
within a process system of politics, government decisions that consistentiy favor producer over
marketplace
political
is
are strongly motivated to organize, lobby,
advertise, Htigate,
By comparison,
indirectly afiected
but inevitable, for the
have a direct and substantial financial interest in
and regulation
campaign contributions, interests.
interests are all
subject to the pubHc-goods problem (Box 19).
who
For example, those legislation
consumer
make
and so forth in pursuit of their
the great mass of the people,
who
and whose personal stake in the outcome
is
will
be
likely to
be negligible, have very Utde incentive to organize in defense of their interests.
After
the "right" decision
all,
may be worth $10
million to
General Motors but will cost each individual only a few pennies. Thus those
who
try to stand
up
to special interests
on environmental
themselves up against superior poHtical resources
The
gross political inequaUty
of
profit
all
issues find
across the board.
and nonprofit
interests
epitomized by the favorable tax treatment accorded the former.
By
is
law,
tax-deductible donations cannot be used for lobbying or other attempts advertising).
Thus the nonprofit
depend very heavily on donations
are severely handi-
to influence legislation (for example,
organizations that
capped;
if they lobby,
contrast, can
taxable
they undercut their financial support. Businesses, by
deduct any
income and
by
pass
money on
spent for the same purpose from their
the remaining expense in the
form of higher
CHAPTER 6
244
prices. sidizes
The one
public,
both
consumers and
as
as taxpayers,
therefore sub-
in environmental disputes. Moreover, the law
side
changed without losing
tax-exempt
their
Thus the outcome of the
is
self-
cannot even lobby to have
protecting, for public-interest groups
it
status.
process of American politics faithfully reflects
the will of the people and their desire for economic growth. However, just as in
economic marketplace, the public
the
externalities as a result
power tends
political
mand, the
all
of producers
The Ecological The
faire,
political
wherein individual decisions add
make this macro-decision even more would otherwise be.
that tends to
than
it
Vices of Muddling
logic of the
reinforce, rather than counter-
destructive macro-decision, as well as a structural bias
commons
destructive of the
certain negative
power of producer interests;
economic market. In sum, the American
the drawbacks of laissez
up to an ecologically
and
from
suffers
political
to be used to ratify
decisions of the
system has
in favor
of the inordinate
commons
is
Through
enshrined in a system of process politics
obedient to the demands of both consumer and producer for economic
The
growth.
ecological vices of this system are further intensified
decision-making incrementalism
of
style characteristic
or, to
use the
all
our
institutions
more honest and
—
by the
disjointed
descriptive colloquial
term, "muddling through."
Incremental decision making largely ignores long-term goals; focuses
on the problem immediately
at
hand and
it
the solution
tries to find
most congruent with the status quo. It is thus characterized by comparison and evaluation of marginal changes (increments) in current
that
is
policies,
not radical departures from them; by consideration of only a
restricted
number of
policy alternatives (and of only a few of the
important consequences for any given alternative); by the adjustment of ends to means and to what
is
"feasible"
and
"realistic";
by
or
serial
piecemeal treatment of problems; and by a remedial orientation in which policies are designed to cure obvious
about some desired future is
not disinterested, for
it is
state.
immediate
Moreover,
ills
analysis
rather than to bring
of policy
alternatives
carried out largely by partisan actors
who
are
trying to improve their bargaining position with other partisan actors.
Muddling through is therefore a highly economic style of decision making that is well adapted to a pragmatic, laissez-faire system of politics. Moreover,
it
has considerable virtues. Like the market
incrementalism promotes short-term
stability
itself,
disjointed
by minimizing serious
conflict
over ultimate ends, by giving everybody something of what they want, and
by bringing bargained compromises among
political actors, satisfying their
The American
Political
Economy
needs reasonably well
same time,
at
II:
The Non-poUtics of Laissez
minimumal
public policy.
(assuming that
all
who
participate in the political
legitimate interests can participate equally,
does not
It
slight traditional values,
the costs of change, and It
may
At the
financial cost.
democratic; like the economic market,
also basically
It is
preferences of those
always the case). Disjointed incrementalism sense:
and
promotes the consensus and legitimacy needed to support
it
reflects the
intellectual
245
Faire
which
is
not
good
is
also conservative in a
it
encourages appreciation of
prevents overly hasty action
it
it
market
on complex
issues.
avoid serious or irreversible mistakes, for an incremental
also
measure that turns out to be mistaken can usually be corrected before
major harm has been done. Under
circumstances, disjointed in-
ideal
crementalism therefore produces a succession of policy measures that take the system step interests
by
step
toward the policy outcome that best
of the participants in the
some
Unfortunately, muddling through has
example,
it
does not guarantee that
account, and past
it is
likely to
equally large vices. For
overlook excellent poUcies not suggested by
experience. In addition, disjointed incrementalism
opportunities, and the like
—
in other words,
simple continuation of past policies important, because decisions are
muddling through
come up with
a series
is
is
not well
crises,
grand
any situation in which
not an appropriate response. Most
made on
the basis of immediate self-in-
almost guaranteed to produce policies that
is
will generate the tragedy
the
relevant values will be taken into
all
adapted to handling profound value conflicts, revolutions,
terest,
reflects
market.
political
of the commons.
the basis of short-term calculation
It is
perfectly possible to
seem eminently reasonable on of costs and benefits and that satisfy
of decisions that
all
current preferences but that yield unsatisfactory results in the long run, especially because the fixture
of costs and
is
likely to
benefits. In fact, that
into an ecological predicament. stability
is
be discounted in the calculation
just
achieved by muddling through
expense of long-term
stability
how we
have gotten ourselves
Thus the short-term adjustment and is
likely to
be achieved
at the
and welfare.
A perfect illustration of the potential dangers of muddling through is our approach to global warming. As decisions
made by
a result
of millions of separate
industry and individuals, 6 billion tons of carbon
dioxide are emitted into the atmosphere each year, and emissions are
3% annually. Yet no real congressional debate has occurred on whether to control these private decisions in order to reduce carbon emissions. Even worse, the executive branch blithely ignores the problem and advocates a more aggressive pursuit of the traditional energy and
increasing by
growth
policies that have
emissions.
As
a result,
brought about the
we go on
rise
in carbon dioxide
unwittingly pursuing business
as usual,
CHAPTER
246
making short-term
calculations of costs
and
6
and bring upon
benefits,
ourselves the greenhouse effect almost by default.
Indeed, in instead
its
purest form, muddling through
of by conscious choice
policy
is
—
making by
default
simply an administrative device for aggre-
gating individual preferences into a "will of
all" that
may
bear almost no
resemblance to the "general will." Unfortunately, the contrasting synoptic, or outcome -oriented,
style
of decision making cannot be
fully
achieved in
the real world because of limits to our intellectual capacities (even with
computers), lack of information (plus the cost of remedying
about our values and
many
lesser factors.
conflicts
between them, and time
Moreover, in
its
it),
uncertainty
constraints, as well as
pure form, synoptic decision making
could lead to irreversible and disastrous blunders, obliviousness to peoples values,
and the destruction of
muddling through
a
is
political consensus.
Thus some measure of
simple administrative necessity in any political system.
However, we Americans have taken muddling through, along with and other prominent features of our political system, to an
laissez faire
extreme.
We
have
made compromise and short-term adjustment
into
ends instead of means, have failed to give even cursory consideration to the fixture consequences of present acts, and have neglected even to try to relate current policy choices to
we
some kind of long-term
have taken the radical position that there can be no
beyond what muddling through produces. In what
is
brief,
an undeniable administrative necessity into
government, becoming in the process an "adhocracy" to the implications of our governmental acts
dangerous waters of ecological
and
goal.
Worse,
common
interest
we
have elevated
a
philosophy of
virtually oblivious
politically adrift in the
scarcity.
Disjointed incrementalism, then, provides an almost sufficient explanation of ecological
how we
crisis
have proceeded step by step into the midst of
and of why we
are not
meeting
its
challenges at present.
program for ecological catastrophe; as an entrenched reaHty with which the environmental reformer must cope, it is a cause for deep pessimism. At the very least, the level or quality of muddling through must be gready upgraded, so that ecology and the fliture are given due weight in policy making. But As a normative philosophy of government,
it is
a
goal-oriented muddling through comes close to being a contradiction in
terms (especially within a basically democratic system). Moreover, in-
crementalism in
is
adapted to status-quo, consensus
which policy outcomes
paradigm of politics
itself
especially pp. 300-304;
Thus
are
of
critical
politics,
not to situations
importance or
may be undergoing
radical
which the
change (Dror 1968,
Lindblom 1965; Schick 1971,
especially p. 158).
steering a middle course will be difficult at best, and
possible at
in
aU during the transition to a steady-state society.
it
may not be
The American
Political
Economy
II:
The Non-poUtics of Laissez
Poliq^ Overload, Fragmentation,
247
Faire
and Other
Administrative Problems Disjointed incrementalism
is
not the only built-in impediment to an
effective response to ecological scarcity. In the first place, the
complexity, and interdependence of society
scale,
making environment
make
growing
the decision-
increasingly problematic, for the greater the
ber of decisions (and, above
all,
num-
the greater the degree of risk they
make them. Given the of environmental management alone,
entailed), the greater the social effort necessary to
and complexity of the
size
especially
would be
there
task
with the declining margin for ecological or technological a
ecological scarcity
danger of administrative overload. But the only one
is
crises that will afflict decision
An
allied crisis
of
crisis
among many
—
impends,
as
of
part of a crisis of
makers in the decades ahead
priorities also
error,
crisis
(Piatt 1969).
burgeoning demands for
environmental cleanup, more and better social services, and so on compete for the tiny portion of government resources remaining after the "fixed" sacred
demands of
cows
defense, agricultural supports, and other budgetary
are satisfied, so that decision
makers
will simply lack suffi-
cient fiinds to act effectively across the board. (In the
been true throughout the 1980s and
has
may be
critical shortfalls in
United
States, this
early 1990s.) In addition, there
labor power, especially technical and scientific
labor power. In short, the problems are growing faster than the where-
withal to handle them, and political and administrative overload fore a potentially serious
problem
A second serious problem
is
is
there-
for the fiature, if not right now.
fragmented and dispersed administrative
The agency in charge of decisions on air pollution, for example, usually has no control over land-use poUcy, freeway building, waste disposal, mass transit, and agriculture! Also, some elements of poHcy responsibility.
handled
are
local
no
at
the federal level, whereas others belong to the state and
governments; the boundaries of local governments,
especially,
have
As a result, it firequently happens one agency or unit of government works at cross-purposes with another, or even with itself, as in the old Atomic Energy Commission, relationship to ecological realities.
that
which was charged with both nuclear development and radiation safety.* Furthermore, each agency has been created to perform a highly
*
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, whose
mission
is
protection of the
public from nuclear and radiation hazards, in practice also promotes nuclear
energy.
It
industry
it is
has
become,
as
do most government agencies, the captive of the
charged to regulate.
CHAPTER
248
which
specialized fiinction for a particular constituency,
leads to a single-
mindedness or tunnel vision that deHberately ignores the est. is
we
In brief,
have
them
difficult to get
A third
many
as
different policies as
we
6
common inter-
have bureaus and
it
to pull together.
major defect of our policy-making machinery
inevitably lag behind events
—
that decisions
is
usually far behind. In part, the
problem
is
that
the decision makers' information and knowledge are deficient and out of
Owing to
date.
the complexity and scope of the problems of environmental
management, these Thus, even
muddle through
provoke disruptive side
problem, however,
is
effects.
sions to lengthy delays.
Air Act to protect until 1990,
critical
problems with stopgap measures
Much
the larger part of the time-lag
that the procedural checks
basically adversary system of policy
took
end up
visibility in large national
EPA had proposed subjects aU
be issued of such
it
p. 28).
The
White House
matter
may
stiU
Office of Manage-
regulations to cost-benefit analysis.
But
plants to install "the best available retrofit
air
pollution impairing visibility in the parks.
that in so far as cost-benefit analysis causes regulations to
is illegal.
event, supports
parks and wilderness areas;
two-thirds of the visibifity reduc-
do not require the use of the
that
anlysis
subject controversial deci-
(Rauber 1991,
EPA
power
technology" to eliminate the
Opponents argue
our
EPA to issue draft regulations to implethe EPA issued its final regulations, the
in court. By presidential decree, the
the 1977 law requires
built into
For example. Congress in 1977 amended the Clean
however, for the
ment and Budget
and balances
making can
ment the law. Thereafi:er, before White House weakened them, sacrificing tions that the
costly.
they are inclined to be forward-looking, decision makers are
if
virmally obliged to that
remedy or too
deficiencies are either impossible to
They also argue
EPA
the original
best available technology, the use
a proper cost-benefit analysis, in
draft regulations
—
OMB
that
any
simply
manipulated the data to weaken them. This example suggests that the best
we can
expect in most cases
is
long wars of legal
mental despoilers. However, the adversary difficulty
coping with environmental
environmental poHcy making
*
Increased
volume
for redressing civil
is
where
is
and there
is
simply bog
only part of the problem.
The
wrongs, designed for two-party
with standing to sue and other suit,
may
issues,
society as a
whole
is
attrition against environ-
system
legal
down
already having
some
traditional legal
litigation,
risk that
in a morass of
is
machinery
having trouble
issues that
crop up in the typical environmental
one of the
parties. Also,
situations faster than the courts can
work out
new much of the
technology creates
precedents, and
of
and
scientific
evidence used in environmental litigation
statistical
nature that iU accords with the standards of proof traditionally
demanded by
courts.
is
a probabilistic
The American
Economy
Political
hearings, suits, countersuits, interests,
and
appeals, as
bound
to
each other.
And
even
be significant delays
249
Faire
government agencies, business
and environmentalist groups use
available to harass
are
The Non-polirics of Laissez
II:
all
the procedural devices
stalemate
if total
is
avoided, there
—an ominous prospect now
anticipatory response to problems has
become
that an
essential for their solution.
Additional hindrances to effective environmental decision making
abound. The narrowly
rationalistic
norms and modus
of
operandi
bureaucracies, for example, are at odds with the ecological holism
needed for the
of environmental management. History also shows
task
that regulatory agencies tend to
be captured by the
interests they are
supposed to be regulating, so that they rapidly turn into guardians of special interest instead of public interest. In addition, the institutions charged with environmental management are frequently so beholden to their
own
institutional vested interests or so
inertia that they actively resist change,
employing
dominated by sheer secrecy, special legal
advantages available to government agencies, and other devices to
squelch the efforts of
critics
Lewis 1972). In recent
years,
and would-be reformers
example,
(for
environmental decision making has been
hindered by nonstatutory mechanisms established in the White House.
The
Council on Competitiveness, for example, is a nonstatutory body that, after closed meetings with industry, has repeatedly forced the Environmental Protection Agency to rewrite regulations to President's
make them
hospitable to industry interests.
Council has successfully forced the visions
—some
say the "pillars"
Sept. 1991, p. Al).*
These
— of
EPA
As of
this writing,
to gut four
the
major pro-
the 1990 Clean Air Act (Weisskopf
difficulties suggest that the
problem
is
not
simply to overcome inertia and vested interest but rather to arrest the institutional
momentum
in favor of
growth created by two centuries
of pro-development laws, policies, and practices. This will require across-the-board institutional reform, not merely
new
policies.
In sum, administrative overload, fragmented and dispersed authority,
institutional legacy
making and enforcing
decisions,
and the
of the era of growth and exploitation are
likely to
protracted delays in
obstruct timely and effective environmental
*
social
poHcy making.
Industry and administration lobbyists had tried to persuade Congress to adopt
their
substitutes
for
all
four
provisions
when
the
legislation
was being
considered, but Congress had refiased to adopt them. Environmentalists thus be in a strong position to challenge these regulations as
illegal,
may
but even
if
they prevail, implementation of the law's requirements will be substantially delayed.
CHAPTER
250
6
How Well Are We Doing? None
of the tendencies and trends
optimism
our pohtical
that
we
have just considered inspires
institutions at
any
level are
much
adequate to the
challenges of deaHng with ecological scarcity. Although the final verdict
not yet in, this conclusion
performance so
certainly reinforced
is
far.
Energy policy
a
is
good
illustration.
coherent national energy policy
and
social turmoil, a
compromise of genuine
is
by the quality of their
its
Despite a consensus that a
economic
absolutely essential to avoid
menacing international
trade deficit,
and even the
poHtical independence, the United States has
much
poficy,
is
no
coherent one. Instead, the past decade has
less a
seen almost continual dithering and muddle and devotion to business
as
usual. In 1989 President Bush called for a long-term comprehensive poHcy, but what he proposed in 1991 was a mere grab-bag of favored
projects of the
oil, coal, gas,
and nuclear power
industries.
Among
these
was more off-shore oil drilling, drilling in environmentally pristine areas, and the doubling of nuclear power capacity by 2030. The President proposed few conservation measures, only a minuscule increase in research fijels
on renewable
energy, and support only for selected alternative
(ethanol and methanol but not for hydrogen,
fiiel cells,
or electric
vehicles). He proposed nothing to combat greenhouse gas emissions, except as an incidental consequence of his support for nuclear power. When the Reagan administration made similar proposals during its
and Congress fought each other to conservation, environmental protection, and the
years in office,
it
renewable energy and
fiaels
oU
drilling in the Arctic
favors raising automobile
oil
and nuclear
and other wilderness
areas; instead it
40 miles per gallon expected to be produced
to 10 times the oil
drilhng in the Arctic. But the Congressional majority
veto-proof and the sets
fiiel
majority in Congress has thus far
fiael-efficiency standards to
by 2001, which would save 5 by
a
on energy
support for
relative
versus the support for fossil
energy development. For example, rejected
a stalemate
result
is
a stalemate.
Continued
is
not
stalemate, regrettably,
the stage for an eventual general collapse of our energy
because of either rising costs of petroleum or intolerable
economy
levels
of pol-
lution. Similarly,
our
political institutions
have so
far
conspicuously failed to
meet the challenge represented by the automobile.
The decHne
in air
quahty was sufficiently alarming to cause Congress to pass the Clean Air Act in 1970. For all its faults, this was a landmark piece of environmental legislation, and acting under the law's authority, government agencies forced emission control on a reluctant automobile industry. However,
— The American
Political
Economy
II:
The Non-polirics of Laissez
251
Faire
Detroit several times succeeded in winning delayed compliance.
mandated by Congress
over, the air-quality standards
in the
1
More-
970 Clean
Air Act simply could not be achieved through technology alone. Yet
when
the Environmental Protection
Agency tried to impose on key would have penalized or re-
municipalities pollution-control plans that stricted car use (through gas rationing stance), the resulting poHtical
and
all
and parking surcharges,
ruckus soon forced the
EPA
for in-
into retreat,
pretense of meeting the original standards was abandoned. At the
same time. Congress
Economy
tried to control emissions
A
Standards (CAFE).
through Corporate Fuel
1975 law required manufacturers to
raise
the average efficiency of the cars they sold to 27.5 miles per gallon by
1985. Again, the executive branch granted the automobile industry
complying with the
many
and by 1990, efficiency standards had reached only 26.5 miles per gallon (which meant that the hoped-for delays in
law,
reduction in pollution was nuUified by a doubling, since the law was passed, of the
number of vehicle
The 1990 Clean Air Act
miles driven).
does tighten emission standards further and hopes to achieve
its
objectives
via technological changes such as the use of reformulated gasoline in the
nine most polluted metropohtan regions by 1995. But although the 1990
law will help, cleaning up the
air
and reducing greenhouse gas emissions
cannot be achieved by more stringent emissions standards alone, because
improvements in clean-air technology
are more than eaten up by growth and increases in vehicle miles driven. In short, as was shown in Chapter 3, Americans must simply drive much less than they do now (with much more efficient vehicles) and use mass transit
in the
automobile
fleet
much more. Unfortunately, having allowed to
dominate our hves that to
economic and hope
that
social crisis,
the automobile so completely
its
use
are repeatedly
would produce
instant
reduced to the desperate
some kind of technological fix will turn up in time to prevent mechanisms extreme price rises, national bankruptcy,
—
natural feedback
intolerable levels
Thus
we
restrict
of air pollution
—
fi-om taking matters out of our hands.
we are faiHng to meet the Everybody wants clean air and water, but nobody wants to pay Nor do we wish to give up the appurtenances of a high-energy in these
and other
critical areas
challenges.
the price. style
of hfe or to accept the major restructuring of the economy and
would be needed to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions sigEven modest invasion of sacrosanct private property rights for example, in the form of vitally needed land-use law has also proved to be well beyond our current pohtical capacity. In fact, since the beginning of the 1980s there has been considerable backlash and backsHding on environmental issues, leading to relaxed standards and blatant society that nificantly.
—
denial of problems. In short, although there has
been genuine progress
CHAPTER
252
since environmental issues
have so
political institutions
management and have efforts they
became
first
far largely
for the
a
matter for political concern, our
avoided the tasks of environmental
most part done too htde too
late in those
have undertaken.
As we have seen, the
and modus operandi
basic institutional structure
of the American
political
theless, the lack
of courage and vision displayed by the current
political
6
system are primarily responsible for
this.
Neverset
of
Congress nor the
actors should not escape notice. Neither
executive branch has provided real leadership or faced up to crucial issues. the extent that they have acted, as in the area of pollution control, they
To
have acted faintheartedly than
effectively.
and the
difficulty
what
of the problems,
leaders are doing the inability or reluctance
desires
or,
is
almost worse, expediently rather
Say what one will about the institutional impediments it is
hard to conclude that our political
job they were elected of our
But of course, the
to do.
simply
political officials to act
of the majority of the American people,
only modest willingness to make minor
who
have so
sacrifices (for
reflects the
evinced
far
example, to sup-
port and engage in recycling) for the sake of environmental goals, but no willingness to accept fiindamental changes in their
example, to
restrict
development to
areas
where public
or to support and use public transit and drive
can hardly be expected to commit environmental measures on
us.
political suicide
can expect
farther
is
Our
is
life
(for
available,
public officials
by forcing unpopular
Until the will of the people ordains
otherwise or fundamental changes are quite
we
less).
way of transit
literally
forced
on
us, the best
piecemeal, patchwork, ineffective reform that lags ever
behind onrushing events.
The Necessity for Paradigm Change Our
political institutions, predicated
almost totally on growth and abun-
dance, appear to be no match for the mounting challenges of ecological scarcity.
This
is
a
shocking conclusion about
once regarded, even by many foreigners, aU It
its
faults,
as
a poHtical
system that was
marvelously progressive. For
American political system are undeniable: nearly two hundred years, and it was eminently just
the virtues of the
worked well
for
and humane by any reasonable
historical standard. Unfortunately, the
problems of scarcity that confiront the system today are problems that was never designed
to handle.
what we must now of ecological
it
Many of its past virtues are therefore irrelevant;
address are
its
equally undeniable failings in the face
scarcity.
Efforts to patch
up the current paradigm of pohtics with new modes
of decision making and planning
—or even with new
policies
—
will
not
The American
Political
Economy
II:
The
Non-politics of Laissez Faire
253
succeed. These can only delay, and perhaps intensify, the ultimate break-
down. Only
a
new
pohtics based
practically appropriate to
achieve this
new
on
politics will require a revolution
than that which created our nation in the features of
American
must be transformed. Will
we make
civilization,
first
are morally
Chapter
(see
and
8).
To
even more fundamental
place, for the characteristic
not merely the nature of the regime,
A great question stands before
the
American
polity:
the effort to translate our ideals of equality and fi-eedom
into forms appropriate to the
new
continuing prodigally to sow
as
reap the consequences?
age of scarcity, or will
long
Only time
as
will
must inevitably presage retrogression quality, oppression,
are
of values that
a set
an age of scarcity will do
and
conflict,
we tell
we
not even
whether the return of scarcity
to the classical scenario
but one way or another,
about to find out what kind of people
try,
can and leaving the future to
we
really are.
of ine-
we Americans
Ecological Scarcity and International Politics
The Comparative Our
Perspective
principal focus so far in Part
has
II
been on the American poHtical
system, specifically the strong market orientation of its poHtical economy.
However, as noted the
United
in the Introduction, the
extreme version of modern industrial
American version of
civilization,
this civilization
obscure the wider implications of the
States
is
only the most
and the pecuHarities of
ought not to be allowed to
analysis.
Some problems may be
uniquely American, but most are universal in one form or another. Let us therefore extend the analysis international political arena.
and dilemmas of ecological changed. Furthermore, tions in Chapters 5
to other nations
first
scarcity discussed in
much of the
crisis
and 6 can in
and communist
of ecological
is
of American
institu-
be appHed, with appropriate
fact
weU
alike, as
scarcity
Chapter 4 remain un-
specific analysis
modifications, to aU developed and even capitaHst
and then to the
We shaU find that the basic poHtical dynamics
many developing
as to
thus a planetary
countries,
the world in general.
The
crisis.
Western Europe In Chapters 2 and
3,
we compared
various aspects of Western Europe's
environmental situation to the United
States.
Western Europe's environ-
and magnitude
mental problems are essentiaUy the
same
those of the United States, and
governments on the whole seem to
exhibit the
its
same degree of capacity
in character
to deal
255
as
with them. In some ways,
CHAPTER 7
256
however, Western European governments have dealt with their problems
more
effectively than this
country
has.
For example, Western European
governments, with the exception of the United Kingdom, have managed to reduce atmospheric emissions of sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides,
and
particulates to lower levels per unit of gross domestic product than has
the United States.
On
the other hand, emissions of nitrogen oxides,
compounds, and toxic wastes are rising in almost all countries. Surface waters in Western Europe suffer ffom low oxygen levels, eutrophication from nitrates and phosphates, and high levels of toxic metals. In addition, lakes are dying from acid deposition. Although volatile organic
isolated success stories have occurred (for example,
discharges of toxic metals into to 55 tons per year in 1985),
its
Sweden reduced
waters from 1300 tons per year in 1972
Western European waters are generally in the
same condition as those in the United improvement. In certain respects, as
States
—
polluted, with
of
a result
its
little
overall
greater density of
population and industrial development, Europe's pollution problems are
worse than our own. The contamination of the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas and of the RJiine River, heavy oil spillage from tankers and refineries,
and the "acid rains" that
fall
particularly
on Scandinavia
are only
most notorious examples. Europeans also have more threatened species and decHning forests than does the United States. With respect to resources. Western Europe's predicament is clearly much worse. Even taking due account of the temporary respite that
some of
the
development of North Sea gas and oil has brought, Europe's long-term dependence on external sources of energy is far greater than our own; for example. Western Europe has nothing resembling America's vast coal
Western European mineral resources are almost negliactual and potential demand. Perhaps more critically. compared to gible Western Europe as a whole is a major net importer of food and fiber, and the dependence of many European countries, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, on food imports is overwhelming (both to feed the poreserves. Similarly,
pulace and, ironically, to sustain energy-intensive agricultural systems that are mainstays
of their economies). Thus Western Europe
overextended ecologically in relation to
United
States.
For us Americans,
a
its
own
is
even more
resources than the
major disruption of world trade would
would be little danger of starvation, and domestic sources of energy would be available in sufficient quantity to keep the economy fimping along. Europe does not enjoy such luxury. World trade must continue along established lines or economic cause painful retrenchment, to be sure, but there
coUapse threatens.
Western European political systems have the same tendency as the American system to permit activities that degrade the environment. AH
Ecological Scarcity and International Politics
257
same growth-oriented world view.
share the
All have followed the path
blazed by the United States toward high mass consumption and, to a
somewhat lesser extent, high energy use. All are mass democracies in which political parties compete for favor largely on the basis of how well they can
years,
the material aspirations of the citizenry. In short, having
satisfy
traveled the
we
same
basic path in roughly the
Westerners have
wound up
Nevertheless, just as there are
of ecological
scarcity,
some
so too there are
potential for political adaptation. For
same manner
for the last
in approximately the
same
differences in the nature
some
one
250
place.
and degree
significant differences in the
thing,
Europe has had
to
contend
with ecological scarcity in numerous ways even during an era of unparalleled abundance. ple,
Not
possessing the
same cornucopia of found wealth,
Europe hds never been so
States.
with
profligate
its
for
exam-
resources as the United
For instance, Europeans manage to achieve roughly comparable living while using only about half
standards
as
much
Americans. Also, Europeans practice sustained-yield quite stringendy
by U.S.
standards, support
energy per capita
forestry, control
and use public
transit
as
land use
more than
Americans do, and so on. Thus, both because of necessity and because of a generally less doctrinaire attachment to the principles of laissez
much
exists in
Europe
controls.
Moreover, at
acquisition as a
a
greater willingness to accept planning
least in
way of life
faire,
there
and
social
some quarters, disenchantment with bourgeois grown markedly. The rise of Green political
has
parties in several countries has
introduced an ecological agenda into the
political arena. In general, therefore,
European nations may cope somewhat
better with ecological scarcity than the physical challenges they will
United
States, despite the greater
face.
Japan Although
in terms
of ecological scarcity Japan's situation
is
much more
desperate than that of Europe, Japan possesses countervailing political and social advantages over
United
States, a
Europe. With about half the population of the
land mass about the size of
Montana
that
is
mostly
mountainous and poorly endowed with mineral and energy resources, and the second
largest
economy
in the world, Japan
island indeed. Prevented firom gaining
is
a
very tight
by military means
little
a position
of
power, respect, and economic security in the international community, the Japanese entered the great postwar international
GNP
stakes deter-
mined to v^n economically what could not be won by force of arms. They "aped" (their own word) the acquisitive ethic and mass-democratic institutions of the West so effectively that they achieved economic growth of unprecedented intensity and
rapidity.
This extraordinary "success"
CHAPTER 7
258 earned them notorious pollution problems, such ing that killed a level
as
the mercury poison-
1900 people and paralyzed or affected thousands more, and
of dependence on foreign trade and foreign sources of raw
materials and fuels that
turmoil and resource artificial restriction
extreme form.
A
makes them extremely vulnerable to international whether due to natural exhaustion or to
scarcities,
by
Japan thus faces ecological scarcity in an
cartels.
serious interruption of oil supplies
from the Persian
Gulf, a substantial decUne in the fish catch, the inability or unwillingness
of the United
States
and other countries to continue to supply
quantities of food, timber, minerals and other vital products
numerous other which has
—
vast
these and
potential threats could have severe consequences for
committed itself to the modern way of industrial beyond its ecological means. Beginning in the early 1970s, and especiaUy after the energy crisis of 1973-1974, the Japanese awoke to the fact that they were headed for an ecological precipice. The Japanese government cracked down on pollution with progressively greater severity and has recently moved to conserve energy and control growth in general. An awkward problem for Japanese poHtical leaders, who are largely drawn from the businessoriented, conservative Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) that has ruled throughout the postwar era, is that the powerful economic interests that are the LDP's main source of support, financial and otherwise, are also the
Japan, life
and to living
totally far
chief polluters and main beneficiaries of growth. there are a
number of positive
cost of living, the cost
factors.
On
the other hand,
Because of extreme congestion, the
and importance of educating children, and the cost
of caring for the aged (before the government
started to
do
so in 1973),
Japanese families have successfiiUy controlled their birth rate in the
postwar
era.
overcome
That success was achieved despite the ruHng
party's efforts to
labor shortages by tightening the country's abortion law, pro-
hibiting the sale of birth control
bonuses" to
women who
had
pills,
a third
and proposing to give "baby
and fourth
child. In addition, the
adoption and implementation of environmental regulations have been facilitated
by
economic and
a
tradition
social
indicators, Japan
life.
by the
of government intervention in
The late
result has
been
that
all
areas
of
on many environmental
1980s was doing better than either the
Western Europe. For example, between 1975 and the late 1980s, Japan had reduced its annual sulfur dioxide emissions by more than 60%; the comparable reduction for the United States was only 25%. United
States or
Japan was the only industrialized country that successfully reduced emissions
of nitrogen oxides during that period. Likewise, Japan has been
reducing toxic pollution of countries and
more than
its
waterways more than most European
the United States.
Ecological Scarcity and International Politics
259
Eastern Europe and The Soviet Union
The former case.
Soviet bloc is the most interesting and revealing comparative Because they were the leading non-market industrialized nations, these
countries should seemingly have been exempt,
if not
dynamics of scarcity,
failings
from most of the
at least
economics and poUtics discussed the U.S.S.R.
and
former
its
and have demonstrated
from the
basic political
of American market
in the preceding chapters. In fact, however,
have severe environmental problems
satellites
far less capacity to deal
with them than the United
and other market-oriented democracies.* That the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have
States
problems
and
is
their structures are deteriorating,
mountains
crop yields are diminishing, rivers are
water
earlier
little
going down in some
are
teeming with dead
more than open
and clean drinking water
polluted,
is
actually
environment
serious
not denied by governmental spokespeople. Cities are blackening
expectancy
scarce. Life
is
trees,
ground-
sewers,
is
men die 7 to 10 years men in other developed countries; in Northern Siberia, men die and women 14 years earHer than men and women in the northern areas. Statistically, Russian
than
22 years
countries of Western Europe (Yablokov et industrial areas have high rates
other diseases. Indeed, standards.
Coal
containing high
some
Czechoslovakia's
soils
1991,
C3). People in
p.
of cancer and of respiratory,
and
skin, Hver,
pollution levels are astonishing by Western
the primary
is
sulfrir levels,
al.
friel
in Eastern Europe;
it
is
"dirty" coal,
and is burned wdth few or no emission
controls.
receive 25 metric tons of emitted pollutants annually
per square kilometer, compared to 0.6 tons for Sweden. Twenty million Russians breathe highly polluted
have
become environmental
Nizhny
al.
Many people
refrigees;
Tagil, Kirishi, Angarsk,
water (Yablokov et
air.
they have
in the
former Soviet bloc
moved from Prokopyevsk,
and other places in search of clean
air
and
1991, p. C3). Industries and municipalities throughout
commonly discharge their wastes, untreated, into rivers. The Union treats only 30% of its sewage annually. Many present and former Soviet cities among them PJga, the capital of Latvia have no sewage treatment plants at all. 75% of Russia's surface water is too polluted to drink. 50% of Poland's cities don't have sewage treatment plants; 35% of its industries don't treat their wastewater. 65% of Poland's river water is too the former bloc
Soviet
—
—
corrosive (to say nothing of its contamination with sewage
*
In the
breaking
summer of up
into
1991, what had been the Soviet
independent
confederate government
However, we
shall
at
or
whose
final
toxins) to
Union appeared
semi-independent
the "center"
and
countries,
be
to
be
with
a
form has not yet emerged.
continue to use the term Soviet Union to refer to the area that
was, until mid- 1991, one country.
.
CHAPTER 7
260
used by industry. Even automobile pollution, which should be low because the
number of cars per
in the West,
is
a
capita in these countries
were built with two-stroke engines that burn create a sooty, air
smoking exhaust. Needless
and water pollution,
the Soviet Union, dying.
A
is
lower than
far
problem. Soviet bloc cars had no pollution controls.
with such high
levels
69% of the
that
fresh- water fish in Russia are
"extremely contaminated" by mercury-based pesticides (Yablokov 1991, has
of
polluted and their fish populations
are
seas
1989 study showed
say,
Some
and gasoline together to
everywhere in the region are expiring; in
lakes
whole
to
oil
et
al.
C3). Sadly, people are dying too; the Soviet Ministry of Health
p.
found that
itself
and mortality
disease
higher in badly
are
rates
polluted areas than in other areas of the Soviet Union.
Eastern European countries also use energy inefficiently
—
about United States, which itself is only half as efiBcient as Western Europe and Japan. Moreover, despite a relatively favorable position compared to Europe and America, the U.S.S.R. is not exempt from ecological scarcity with respect to its resources. For half as efficiently as does the
example, sizable grain purchases in recent years have made that the Soviet Union's agricultural situation
prospect of Malthusian starvation
is
is
it
evident
problematic, even
the
if
remote. Some of the problem may
be attributed to deterioration of the country's soils. Two-thirds of the country's arable land suffers from soil erosion; 1.5 billion tons of topsoil are lost each year. In addition,
irrigated land has
been
lost
more than 10% of the
U.S.S.R.'s
to salinization. Soil deterioration
and
pollution result in 16 billion rubles worth of crop losses each year in the Soviet Union.
Even the Soviet Union's apparent abundance of domestic energy
may be
resources
illusory, at least in part.
regions; they also indicated. Finally,
may be
Some
of
its
resources are not
remote and environmentally forbidding substantial than rough estimates had
readily exploitable, for they lie in less
they probably cannot be
vanced Western technology and Western
fially
exploited wdthout ad-
capital,
which Soviet bloc
countries desperately seek (and which, at least from public sources in the
West, has not been readily available)
Why
have communist countries failed so dismally
their environmental problems? sibihty thrall
of such
by
selfish
failure.
After
market
interests.
at
coping with
Communist propaganda denied
all, it
said,
the Soviet system
Therefore
it
would
easily
is
the pos-
not held in
be able to deal
with any environmental problems that cropped up, whereas pollution and other environmental
ills
in the
West were seen
as
serious
emerging
"contradictions" (inherent self-destructive forces) that capitalist nations
would not be
able to overcome.
It
didn't
work out
that way.
Why?
Ecological Scarcity and International Politics
First,
261
the ideology of growth and behef in the
were even more strongly entrenched
power of technology
in the U.S.S.R. than in the West, so
abandoning or even compromising growth in production for the sake of environmental protection or resource conservation was heretical concept.
For one thing,
as
pointed out
a
much more
in the Introduction, the
its achievement on the aboHtion of material abandon growth would be tantamount to abandoning a Utopian promise that had inspired the whole society. Worse, this cherished Utopian goal was used to justify many features of Soviet life that seemed
Marxist Utopia depends for
scarcity.
Thus
to conflict
to
with basic Marxist principles. Soviet leaders, for example,
explained the use of differential rewards
munist principle "to each according to
(as
his
opposed needs")
to the true as a
com-
necessary ex-
pedient to help build the requisite material and productive base for a Utopia of abundance.
More
important, the "proletarian dictatorship" and
"democratic centralism" exercised by the Communist Party were rationahzed with
this
brand of logic. The
tions could thus cause
Second, largely
awkward a
as
loss
also
of such convenient justifica-
political repercussions.
of
result
toward material expansion (but
this
also
fundamental ideological bias
because of preoccupation with
economic concerns in policy on production to the virtual made the Soviet efite very resistant to more than
national security) the primacy of narrow
matters was almost
exclusion of
all
else
total,
and
fixation
token concern for the environment. Third, although they were employed by the state rather than by
economic managers competed with other managers v^thin the basic framework of the national plan, and their reluctance to spend money on nonproductive pollution control, their
private corporations, Soviet
v^dlhngness to foist the external costs of production onto others, and their desire to
win promotions by overproducing
the quota
made them be-
have, with respect to the environment, just like capitalist managers.
Moreover, economic managers in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
had
far greater political
respect, the tragic logic
power than
of the
their
commons
Western counterparts. In one
operated even more viciously in
those countries: Because not only air and water, but virtually resources,
were (thanks to
state
ownership) treated
as free
all
natural
or semi-fi-ee
goods, there was an even greater tendency on the part of economic
managers to use land, energy, and mineral resources wastefuUy Fourth, because government decisions were
by leaders
who
made
in private council
put production and the vested interests of the
state
economic bureaucracy first, those concerned about the problems of growth had little opportunity to influence policy as it was being formed; they could only point out the adverse consequences of past policies.
CHAPTER 7
262
Environmentalists, to the extent that they dared to appear, were vigorously suppressed in Soviet bloc countries.
Only
after
Chernobyl and Mikhail
Gorbachev's ^/tJ5«05^ could people participate in environmental protests.
to
In short, Soviet economic and political institutions seem designed produce environmental deterioration and resource depletion more
relentlessly than their
American counterparts. The essential reason was on Soviet environmental policy:
sardonically stated by a leading expert
"The replacement of private greed by
public greed
is
not
much
of an
improvement" (Goldman 1970). But even that was an understatement, for private greed has been subject to modest, though inadequate, controls. The irony is that Soviet bloc environmental standards on the books were stringent; air and water quality standards were even stricter than those in Western countries. This was because the standards were promulgated on the basis of public health and did not need to be compromised in order to accommodate powerful economic interests. There was only one problem: The powerful economic interests that is, powerful government ministries, operating in secret and with no outside input saw to it that the regulations were not enforced. The standards had no chance of prevailing among ministers whose overriding goal was growth. The communist experience demonstrates that although both Western and communist economic institutions produce environmental deterioration, the nature of the particular political institutions through which the "greed" for material growth is translated into economic output makes a difference. In the final analysis, the greed of powerfiil economic interests can be controlled more easily when openness and democracy prevail. The communist experience also demonstrates that if they are very strongly committed to growth, highly centralized and effective governments may wreak more and faster havoc on the environment than even the most
—
—
laissez-faire
government.
The Third World The developing
or less-developed countries (LDCs)
so-caUed Third World of course
differ greatly
constituting the
from each other
important respects, but for the purposes of our discussion,
*
Lacking any reasonable alternative,
seems to
Box
us, culturally biased
we employ
all
modemizers
of
its
many by
these well-established but,
it
terms in their narrow economic sense. Bhutan (see
27), a country that preserves the ancient
virtually
in
little is lost
traditional
richness,
is
to the contrary notwithstanding.
and admirable Tibetan culture in scarcely
undeveloped,
fanatical
Ecological Scarcity and International Politics
263
27 Bhutan: Developing Sustainably Bhutan, alone
among modern
countries, practices sustainable
development. According to Christopher Flavin, {World Watch, 1990) although the country's last two kings have supported some
economic growth, they have given first priority to the environment. Government officials nationahzed the country's forests in 1979 to stop them from being over-exploited. Now, forestry officials permit only selective logging
at a rate
they believe
is
ging
is
They have outlawed
permitted.
They have which no log-
sustainable.
established large wildlife reserves and greenbelts in
the export of raw logs.
—
The
country generates most of its energy renewably with wood and hydropower. Government policy favors energy growth by more hydropower and solar energy rather than by fossil or nuclear fuels. Bhutan's population growth has been about
enjoy a high
status. All
time of marriage and
2% per year. Women
couples receive population counseling
after the birth
of each
child.
at the
The government
has made contraceptives available at 70 Basic Health Units spread around the country. There are no great disparities of wealth in the
Most farmers grow their crops on small plots and graze catand yaks in the mountains. Bhutan has escaped the growth ideology common to the rest of the world partly because of geography and partly because of culture. Bhutan is a very isolated Himalayan country; it has been almost entirely inaccessible to the outside world. Its religion, Buddhism, retains a love for nature and all Hving things. It has few economic tensions and no powerful business interests no industries left behind by the British. Its people know little about consumer items that people in other cultures crave. Its kings have not been corrupted by business or other powerful interests, and they have left much government decision making to local government units. As the country proceeds to develop, economic and consumer interests that clash with the requirements of sustainability may yet come into being. But so far, Bhutan has retained an exceptional status. country.
tle
—
considering
them
together. In brief,
most LDCS, and
especially the
group
of exceptionally poor countries sometimes called the Fourth World, are not sufticiently developed to experience neo-Malthusian ecological scar-
CHAPTER 7
264
city.
Instead, they confront ecological scarcity in
form: too
with
about to
many
people, too
little
food. Because this core problem, along
major ramifications, was covered in Part
its it
here, except that almost
crudest Malthusian
its
I,
everywhere the
no more need be said seem greatly
difficulties
exceed the capacity of current governments in the
them. Even now, for example,
LDCs
many governments cannot
to
cope with
assure
their
all
enough food to maintain life, and the future prospects are grim. However, there are some interesting exceptions to this general picture. The LDCs run the gamut from virtual non-development to what is usually called semi-development, in which considerable industrialization citizens
and modernization coexist with continued non-development, especially in rural areas. In general, countries moving toward semi-development
seem
to follow established models.
Mexico and
Brazil, for
followed a basically American path (Mexico City has a
example, have
smog problem
worse than that of Los Angeles), and Brazil's treatment of its undeveloped wealth, especially such fragile and irreplaceable resources as the Amazon rain forest, epitomizes frontier
economics
at its
most
other hand, Taiwan and South Korea have proceeded
heedless.
more or
On
less
the
along
down by Japan and have encountered many of the same The environmental problems of developing countries are ex-
the lines laid
problems.
acerbated by the burden of their debt to the developed world. In 1989
developing countries paid $77 biUion in interest on their debts and $85 billion in principal, paying out
$50 biUion
a year
to wealthy nations than they received in
new
more
This massive transfer of resources from poor poverishes the people of these regions but
behind many environmental forests,
—
disasters
is
the
in debt
repayments
developmental
assistance.
to rich not only
also the
im-
propeUing force
unsustainable logging of
the overgrazing of pasture, the depletion of mineral resources, the
overexploitation of fisheries, and the grov^dng of crops (such as cofree) that
can earn cash
as
exports rather than crops that can feed their
own
famished people.
The
International State of Nature
The
International
Macrocosm
If in the various national
community
microcosms constituting the world
the basic dynamics of
across the board, in the
political
ecological scarcity apply virtually
macrocosm of international
politics they operate
Ecological Scarcity and International Politics
even more
strongly. Just as
logic of the
mon-pool
commons
it
265
does within each individual nation, the tragic
com-
brings about the over-exploitation of such
resources as the oceans and the atmosphere. Also, the pressures
toward inequality, oppression, and conflict are even more intense within it is a community in name only, and marked cleavage between rich and poor threatens to become even greater. Without even the semblance of a world government, the solutions of such problems depends on the good will and purely volun-
the world political community, for
the already
tary cooperation
of over 170 sovereign
inspire optimism. Let us
examine these
states
—
issues in
does not
a prospect that
more
detail, to see
how
ecological scarcity aggravates the already very difficult problems of international poHtics.
The Global Tragedy of the Commons The
of the
tragic logic
commons
are readily visible internationally
national rivers, of seas, and that has caused a as
now
marked decline
operates universally, and
—
in the
effects
its
growing pollution of
inter-
of even the oceans; in the overfishing in the fish catch in
some
areas, as well
the near extinction of the great whales; and in the
impending
scramble for seabed resources by maritime miners or other exploiters.
There
is
no way
to confine environmental insults or the effects
of
ecological degradation within national borders, because river basins, airsheds,
local
and oceans
are intrinsically international.
Even seemingly
environmental disruption inevitably has some impact on the
quality of regional and, eventually, global ecosystems. Just as
it
does
within each nation, the aggregation of individual desires and actions overloads the international
commons. But,
to turn a blind eye to this, for they profit
while others bear most or
all
while others receive most or
of the all
like individuals, states
tend
by the increased production they lose by self-restraint
cost, or
of the benefit. Thus Britain
gets the
factory output while Scandinavia suffers the ecological effects of "acid
French and Germans use the Rhine for waste disposal even though this leaves the river little more than a reeking sewer by the time when, downstream, it reaches fellow European Economic Community member Holland. Even though the problems are basically the same everywhere, the rain"; the
political implications
of the tragedy of the
serious in the international arena.
international poHtics
is
It
commons
has long
are
much more
been recognized
that
the epitome of the Hobbesian state of nature:
Despite aU the progress over the centuries toward the rule of internation-
CHAPTER 7
266
sovereign
al law,
states,
unlike the citizens within each
state,
acknowledge
no law or authority higher than their own self-interest; they are therefore free to do as they please, subject only to gross prudential restraints, no matter what the cost to the world community. For example, despite strong pressures from the international community, including a 5-year
moratorium on commercial whaling by the International WhaHng Commission, Japan and Iceland continue to hunt whales. More than 13,000 whales have been killed since the international community banned whaling. The United States relendessly spews huge amounts of carbon dioxide into the
air
commons,
among
despite efforts
other industriaHzed
nations to get an agreement to reduce greenhouse emissions. In international relations, therefore, the dynamic of the tragedy of the
commons
even stronger than within any given nation
is
community, has
a real political
at least
on
binding, authoritative decisions protection.
By
state,
which, being
the theoretical capacity to
make
resource conservation and ecological
contrast, international
agreements are reached and enforced
by the purely voluntary cooperation of sovereign nation states existing in a state of nature. For all the reasons discussed in Chapter 4, the likelihood of forestalling
by such means the operation of the tragedy of the commons
extremely remote. Worse, just
outcome by refiises
his
or her
own
as
any individual
is
nearly helpless to alter the
is
actions (and even risks serious loss if he or she
to participate in the exploitation of the
commons), so
too, in the
absence of international authority or enforceable agreement, nations have choice but to contribute to the tragedy by their
little
would be
steady-state
world,
own
actions.
This
true even if each individual state was striving to achieve a domestic
economy, for unless one assumes agreement on
states
would
mize the resources
still
compete
available to
them. Ecological scarcity thus
fiandamental problem of international politics
—by adding
order
a largely autarkic
with each other internationally to
—
maxi-
intensifies the
the achievement of world
further to the preexisting difficulties of a state of nature.
Without some kind of international governmental machinery with enough authority and coercive power over sovereign states to keep them within the bounds of the ecological must
suffer the
tragedy of the
The
common
interest
of all on the planet, the world
ever-greater environmental
ills
ordained by the global
commons.
Struggle Between Rich
and Poor
Ecological scarcity also aggravates very seriously the already intense struggle
between rich and poor. As
is
well
known, the world today (some
Ecological Scarcity and International Politics
forthcoming changes
will
267
be discussed in the following section)
polarized between the developed, industrialized "haves," greater or lesser degree
and
all
more
getting
underdeveloped or developing "have nots,"
affluent
all
is
sharply
affluent in a
the time, and the
relatively
all
all
and absolutely
impoverished and (with few exceptions) tending to faU further and further behind despite their often feverish efforts to grow.
The degree of
known: The United States, with only 6% of the world's population, consumes about 30% of the total energy production of the world and comparable amounts of other resources; it throws away enough paper and plastic plates and cups to set the table for a worldwide the inequaUty
also well
is
picnic six times a year (Durning 1991,
The United
p.
161).
of the "haves," though only about half as prodigal
rest
States,
still
consume resources
far
as
the
out of proportion to their
population. Conversely, per capita consumption of resources in the
developing world ranges from one-tenth to one-hundredth that in the
"have" countries. To make matters worse, the resources that the "haves" enjoy in inordinate amounts are largely and increasingly
imported from the developing world. For example, developed nations consume two-thirds of the world's steel, aluminum, copper, lead, tin, zinc, and three-fourths of the world's energy. Thus economic inequality and what might be called ecological colonialism have become intertwined. In view of this extreme and long-standing
nickel,
inequality (which, moreover, has
its
roots in an imperialist past),
it is
hardly surprising that the developing world thirsts avidly for develop-
ment or
that
it
has
become
the current world order
and powerful Alas, the
the
as
it
increasingly intolerant of those features of
perceives as obstacles to
its
becoming
as
rich
the developed world.
emergence of ecological
scarcity appears to have
death knell for the aspirations of the
sounded
LDCS. Even assuming
(contrary to fact) that there were sufficient mineral and energy resources to
make
it
tolerable stress
not endure the
possible, universal industrialization would impose inon world ecosystems. And humans, in particular, could pollution levels that would result. Already, the one-fifth
of the world's population that
lives in industrial
countries generates
most of the world's toxic wastes, two-thirds of the world's greenhouse emissions, three-fourths of the world's nitrogen oxides and sulfur emissions, and 90% of the gases that are already destroying the world's protective ozone layer. In short, the current model of development, which assumes that all countries
will
eventually
become
heavily
industrialized
mass-
CHAPTER 7
268
consumption
societies,
is
doomed
to failure.
unacceptable to the modernizing
totally
their political
power
is
generally founded
Even more important, simply
Naturally, this conclusion
of the developing world;
elites
on
is
the promise of development.
growth would freeze the current
halting
pattern of inequality, leaving the "have nots" as the peasants of the world
community in perpetuity. Thus an end to growth and development would be acceptable to the developing world only in combination with a radical redistribution
the world's
Yet
it
economy
of the world's wealth and
a total restructuring
seems absolutely clear that the rich have not the
of relieving the plight of the poor
of
maintenance of economic justice.
to guarantee the
if it entails
slightest intention
own
the sacrifice of their
hving standards. Ecological scarcity thus gready increases the probabiUty
of naked confrontation between rich and poor.
Who
Now
Are
and
the ''Haves''
the
"Have Nots"?
An important new element has been injected into this
struggle.
The
great
"resource hunger" of the developed world, and even of some parts of the
developing world, has begun to transfer power and wealth to those
have resources to seU, especially
resources such as petroleum.
critical
the geopolitics of the world
result,
is
despite
*
bound North Sea and Alaskan oil and
The
ecologically
self-sufficient,
viable
The power and wealth of
alternative,
regardless of
depicted in
27).
whether or not the
Part
III,
is
a
locally
semi-developed, steady-state society based on renewable or
"income" resources such
realistic
as
Only Bhutan
photosynthesis and solar energy. as a
matter of principle (see
Others find themselves unable to see such apparent frugality the
All
option.
pressures
standardization, centralization,
and
impel
them
toward
is
developing countries are heavily overpopulated, choosing implies
a
compulsory abortions rainforests.
It
is
as a
"efficiency,"
large scale. In addition, because sustainable
development does not work when population pressure sometimes
a
to increase over the next five decades,
seems self-consciously to be developing sustainably
Box
As
changing.
This process can be expected to continue. the major oil producers are
who
willingness
to
use
harsh
extreme and most
restraint or frugality
measures
—
for
example,
to stabilize populations or forced resettlement to save the
not surprising that most leaders prefer to continue in the
hope of achieving heavy and prestige, the desire for
illusory
industrialization. In addition, the lust for
status
military power,
and many other
less
than
noble motives are also prevalent, and the frugal modesty of semi-developed self-sufficiency can
do
little
to satisfy
them.
Ecological Scarcity and International Politics
269
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) manages
to act
manner.
in a unified
Some believe that oil is a special case and that the prospect of OPEC-type cartels for other resources is dim (Banks 1974; MikeseU 1974). These assessments may be correct, but it seems inevitable that in the long run an era of "commodity power" must emerge. The hunger of the industrialized nations for resources is
no
substantial
growth
likely to increase,
is
in output to generate increased
developed countries have begun to be exhausted.
more of 12
there
raw
The United
States, for
platinum, mica, chromium, and
90% of its manganese, aluminum,
strontium; over
50%
its
if
for
and energy resources of the
materials, because the domestic mineral
example, already imports 100% of
even
demand
tantalum, and cobalt;
(Wade 1974). However, the developed countries seem determined to keep growing, and assuming even modest further growth in industrial output, their dependence on
and
or
additional key minerals
developing world supplies
budding overall
is
bound
to increase
markedly in the next few
Thus, whatever the short-term prospects for the success of
decades.
and other minerals, the
in copper, phosphates,
cartels
long-term trend
is
toward a
clear
market in basic resources and
seller's
"commodity power," even if this power grows more manifested in a less extreme form than that of OPECt"
therefore toward
slowly and
is
Thus the poor
basic,
in terms of
long-standing division of the world into rich and
GNP per capita will eventually be overlaid with another
rich—poor polarization, in terms of resources, that will both moderate and intensify the basic spHt.
Although there
dencies in world trade
for example, U.S.
to
many
countries
Naturally, there
—
as their
are
many complex
interdepen-
food exports are just
mineral exports are to us
—
it is
wiU be short-term exceptions. Developed
countries, for
example, will remain somewhat independent of Middle Eastern while North Sea
and
as
long
as
oil
other
production and Alaskan
non-OPEC
oil
sources of oil
production remain exist.
On
as critical
already clear
oil supplies
at
high levels
the other hand, one of
the reasons for the Persian Gulf war was undoubtedly the desire to keep Kuwaiti oil in finendly
hands.
dependence wiU be T Actually,
The
OPEC-Uke
disorganized
seller's
respites
transitory
from the
and Limited
cartels
overall trend
toward increasing
to particular commodities.
in other resources
might be preferable to
a
market. Cartels can be bargained with and integrated into
the normal diplomatic machinery, so that the drastic price fluctuations and outright interruptions of supply that cause
avoided. But the price of stability political
power
for cartel
is
members.
extreme economic
distress
are
higher prices for commodities and increased
CHAPTER 7
270
that the resource-rich nations
greater wealth
and power
nationalization
at
of the developing world stand to gain
the expense of the "haves." Already, through
and forced purchase, the
OPEC
nations have largely
wrested control of drilling and pumping operations from the Western
companies;
of the
it is
only
oil business.
a
In addition, as
is
rich are not likely to setde for
newly resource-
already evident, the
mere commercial
gains.
long-standing political grievances against other nations
developed nations
—
oil
matter of time before they expand into other areas
that they will try to
remedy with
—
They have
especially the
their
new
power.
Unfortunately, the defense the industrial powers are most likely to use
moves on the part of any of these countries will be military, as it was in the Persian Gulf war, where the industrial nations have an overwhelming advantage. This discussion leaves out the majority of poor countries those without major resources of their own. As they are forced to pay higher against unfriendly
economic or
political
—
prices to resource-rich countries, they will sufier
have suffered
—
—indeed, they
already
^major setbacks to their prospects for development. This
is
poor countries of Africa and Asia but also of countries whose development programs have already acquired some
true not only of the hopelessly
momentum. In sum, world geopolitics and economics are in for a reordering.
Western economic development has involved
a net transfer
of resources,
power from the current "have nots" to the "haves," creating the cleavage between the two that now divides the world. In recent
wealth, and
years,
developed nations have added the additional burden of debt
repayment, increasing the wealth transferred to them from the "have nots." In the long term, this situation will change; wealth will also be transferred to those nations that have scarce resources.
But only the
amounts of resources will gain; the rest of the poor will become more abject than before. Thus the old polarization between rich and poor seems likely to be replaced by a threefold division into the rich, the hopelessly poor, and the newly relatively
few "have nots"
—and such
enriched
a
that possess significant
major change in the international order
is
bound
to create tension.
Conflict or Cooperation?
How
this
danger
is
tension will play out in the years ahead that to
many of the
is
hard to
say.
The
declining "haves," ill-equipped to adapt to
an era of "commodity power" and economic warfare, the grip of the
newly
enriched
on
essential
stranglehold to be broken at
all
will seem an intolerable At the same time the poor, having
resources costs.
Ecological Scarcity and International Politics
had their revolutionary hopes and litde to lose but their chains.
on top of ecological
scarcity
Thus
—
a
271
rising aspirations crushed, will have
the world
may
face turmoil
destructive character of modern warfare (see
Box
Some, on the other hand, hope or believe
28).
that ecological scarcity
Because the problems will become so
will have just the opposite effect:
overwhelming and so evidently insoluble without nation
cooperation,
states
discard
will
sovereignty and place themselves under
ment
that will regulate the global
humanity and begin the
tional
(which they recognize
economic,
political,
their
commons
for the benefit of
own
including ecological
and military
national
all
of gradual economic re-
be driven by their
as
total international
outmoded
some form of planetary govern-
essential process
distribution. In effect, states will interests
and war
horrible prospect, given the ecologically
factors) to
as
vital national
well
as tradi-
embrace the ultimate
interdependence needed to solve ecological problems (Shields and Ott 1974). According to this hypothesis, the very direness of the
cooperation does not prevail
The
War
pattern, so
far,
for resources has
may
has fallen
ensure that
it
somewhere between
broken out on occasion;
outcome
if
will.
as
we
these extremes.
have noted, one of
the reasons for frequent United States military activity in the Middle East is
to
keep the control of
oil fields
and commerce in friendly hands.
On
the other hand, there has also been considerable talk about cooperative international action to deal with the problems of environmental degradation,
and some
momentum
toward greater cooperation has developed.
However, with the possible exception of agreements among the nations of the European Economic Community, which are in international environmental agreements have forceable, or
what they have required has been
reluctant nation has
The
inadequate.
a
common
that
which the most
—measures
been willing to concede
—
players
that are usually
international envirormiental regulatory process thus re-
sembles process politics in the American context, with
The
market,
been piecemeal and unen-
in this case the polluters
bargaining table;
if
—
this difference:
cannot be forced to come to the
they do come, they can't be forced to agree to
anything; and if they do agree to something, the agreement cannot be enforced.
An
Upsurge
A look
at
in
Conference Diplomacy
the record of international environmental agreements thus far
concluded
reveals only
modest accompHshments. By the
late
1960s some
of the alarming global implications of pollution and general ecological
CHAPTER 7
272
28 War and Ecocide War may
occasionally be the lesser of evils, but
by
always been anathema to any reasonable person. ecologist
doubly horrible.
it is
modern world
the
is
One
its
To
very nature
it
has
human
the
of the most appaUing features of the
enormous amount of ecological damage and
resource wastage that can be attributed to warfare and military preparedness. Resources that should have been used for (or that should never have been used
at all)
human
welfare
have been sacrificed to the
gods of national security in the jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam and the deserts of the Middle East.
But
this
is
only the most obvious
The military consumes prodigious amounts of energy; the Pentagon uses more energy in a year than a mass transit system consumes wastage.
in 14 years. In just
sumes more p. 137).
The
fiiel
1
hour, an F-16 fighter jet
U.S. military emits
more carbon
the total emissions of Great Britain.
of the
CFCs
on
a training flight
con-
than an average motorist does in a year (Renner 1991,
It
emits
into the atmosphere than
76% of the
halons and
50%
the United States emits into the stratosphere (Renner
p. 140). It uses more nickel, copper, aluminum, and platinum than whole developing world combined (Renner 1991, p. 140). The Pentagon also generates more toxic wastes than the five biggest chemical companies combined (Renner 1991, p. 143). We have already discussed
1991,
the
degradation had first
become widely
apparent, and preparations began for the
major international conference on the environment
at
Stockholm
1972. Depending on one's point of view, the Stockholm Conference give
it its
proper
Environment failure.
tide, the
—was
United Nations Conference on the
—
in
to
Human
either a major diplomatic success or an abysmal
On the positive side, the elaborate preparations for the conference
(each country had to
make
a detailed
inventory of
its
environmental
problems), the intense publicity accorded the over two years of prelimi-
nary negotiations, and the conference
environmental
awareness
around
itself fostered a
the
diplomats in 1969, the environmental
globe.
crisis
very high level of
Virtually
ignored
by
had by 1972 rocketed right
Ecological Scarcity and International Politics
273
the frightening amounts of nuclear toxic waste generated by the U.S.
and Soviet military machines.
Even more criminal from an
ecological point of view
the increas-
is
ingly ecocidal nature of modern warfare. Nuclear warfare, of course,
is
the prime villain, for any substantial number of nuclear explosions would poison world ecosystems and gene pools for untold generations and probably disrupt the structure of the atmosphere enough to cause
mass extinctions. (In addition, the widespread dispersal of nuclear materials
and technology
for so-called peacefril purposes increases the
war and
probability of nuclear prohferation and therefore of nuclear rorism.)
However, any form of chemical and bacteriological warfare
—
potentially ecocidal
teris
for example, the use of broadcast herbicides in
Vietnam. But even more conventional forms of modern warfare are exceedingly destructive of local ecologies. In Vietnam, for instance, the U.S. mihtary devastated millions of acres of farm and forest with saturation
bombing and
giant earth-moving machinery. Iraq was
bombed
back into the nineteenth century in the Persian Gulf war. Moreover, the
J
fires that
the Iraqi
government
set in the oil fields
of Kuwait wasted'
tremendous amount of oil before they were extinguished.
Of course,
armies have employed ecocidal weapons
Tcorched earth and even armed peace,
salted lands
is
far
destructive to the earth. lutant
more
War
—
^for
war of scarce resources and
since ancient times. Yet
wastefril
has
—
been
example, today, or far
more
rightly called the ultimate pol-
of the planet Earth.
up alongside nuclear weapons and economic development big issues of international politics.
as
one of the
The second major achievement of the
Stockholm Conference was the establishment of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to monitor the state of the world environment and to provide Haison and coordination between nation states and among the multitude of governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned with environmental matters. Finally, a
liminary agreements covering certain
less
controversial
and
few pre-
less critical
ecological problems, (such as setting aside land for national parks and
suppressing trade in endangered species) were reached either at the
conference or immediately thereafter.
CHAPTER 7
274
Despite these acknowledged achievements, environmentalists were
unhappy with the conduct and outcome of the especially disillusioned, for example, by the way the original ecological purity of the conference's agenda was rapidly watered down by pressures from countries of the developing world, who made it plain that they would have nothing to do with the conference unless, in effect, underdevelopment was interpreted as a form of polluby and
large rather
They were
conference.
tion.
Moreover, a great part of the proceedings was devoted not to the
problems on the agenda, but to the kind of "have" versus "have not" debate discussed above, and routine ideological posturing on such political issues
consumed additional time. Also, cold-war Thus the perhaps naively idealistic hope ecological issue would at last force quarrelsome and
"colonialism"
as
politics reflased to take a vacation.
of
many
that the
self-seeking sovereign nation states to put aside stale old grudges, recog-
nize their
human
common
predicament, and act in concert to improve the
condition was completely dashed.
Worse, some of the features of the current world order most objectionable from an ecological point of
view were
actually reaffirmed at
Stockholm, including the absolute right of sovereign countries to develop their
own
domestic resources without regard to the potential
external ecological costs to the world community, and the unrestricted
freedom
by the Universal Declaration of
to breed guaranteed
Human
made no and they have mounted only
Rights. Subsequent environmentally oriented conferences have
on these fundamental principles, cumbersome attacks on some forms of environmental degradation. For example, the U.N. World Population Conference in 1974 somehow managed to end "without producing explicit agreement that there was a world population problem" (Walsh 1974). Another World Population Conference, in Mexico City in 1984, also failed to achieve concrete results. The best the international community has been able to achieve on inroads
population policy
is
that
by 1988, 48 heads of government had signed
1985 statement supporting
However, no binding
The United
States,
a
world goal of population
a
stabilization.
program have been agreed to. one time provided leadership and major
targets or concrete
which
at
financing for international population control efforts, has reduced
its
support for them since 1981.
*
Among the
in the text
water
most important U.N. environmental conferences not mentioned were conferences on women (1974), human settlements (1976),
(1977),
desertification
(1977),
renewable
energy
environment (1982), and the ozone layer (1987, 1989).
(1981),
human
Ecological Scarcity and International Politics
The 1973.
Its
international
first
275
Law of
the Sea Conference took place in
supporters wanted to establish an all-encompassing treaty deal-
on They
ing with overfishing, seabed mining, and pollution controls, premised the view that the oceans are the
By
failed.
the time a
draft;
"common was
treaty
heritage of mankind."
agreed to in 1982,
finally
had
it
carved the oceans into national zones of exploitation for 200 miles out s coasts; the nation controlling the Exclusive Economic Zone may control who, if anyone, may enter the zone for economic purposes. Only seabeds were declared a "common heritage of mankind,"
firom each nation
to
be mined according to regulations established by an International
Seabed Authority. However, even and many other
should be mined on
Behind
interests,
was too
The
much for the United
U.S. position
United
is
States
that seabeds
without international
a first-come, first-served basis,
regulation. Therefore, the treaty.
this
industrial countries.
States has refused to sign or ratify the
these diflferences in legal position are differing national
not just differing views on the best way to protect the ocean
environment.
The
soon have the capacity
industrial countries have or will
to begin deep seabed mining; they can enrich themselves further, or at least
put off the day of their
first-served approach.
more
firom a
own
mineral depletion, with a first-come,
The developing
controlled
"common
world, on the other hand, benefits
heritage" approach. So nationalism
may block adoption of the proposed treaty. Only 40
countries had ratified
by 1989, and 60 must do so for it to go into effect. Other international agreements affecting the sea are confined to narrower issues, but even so, some have been difficult to implement.
it
MARPOL,
the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, estabHshed minimal distances from the land for
ocean dumping, Hmited the dumping of garbage, required ports to provide facihties for receiving trash from incoming ships, and prohibited the
dumping of plastics. Only 39
later,
and
treaty,
nations had ratified this treaty 18 years
took 14 years for the United States to
it
the U.S. ban
on
the
dumping of
plastics
ratify
took
it.
Under
effect in
the
1989,
although the largest source of plastics dumping, the armed forces, will not
be brought under the treaty until 1994. The London tion of
1972 has
won wider support; 63
ocean dumping of heavy
Dumping Conven-
nations have signed
metals, specified carcinogens,
and other hazardous substances. Yet enforcement of the spotty; violators are caught
and punished with only
nation chooses to muster. In
even ocean
treaties
(such as the fishing) either
this
connection,
and conventions
as
as
we
it.
It
prohibits
and radioactive treaty has
much vigor as
been each
have noted earHer,
that have nearly universal support,
moratorium on whaling and the prohibition of driftnet have loopholes through which nations can jump or, as with
CHAPTER 7
276
whaling, are often openly flouted. Occasionally, another signatory to such a treaty
who
is
angry about such defiance
may engage
in a trade sanction
against a delinquent country. Generally, however, a country's flouting
environmental agreements does not
result in the international
of
com-
munity's imposing a meaningful penalty. Still,
ocean conventions and
treaties
have had more results beneficial
environment than have international agreements concerning haz-
to the
ardous wastes and international
air
pollution.
community
has
Regarding hazardous wastes, the most the
managed
to agree to
transboundary shipment of such goods by draft treaty forbids
transboundary
stealth.
a
is
prohibition of
A 1989 United Nations
movement of waste without
notifica-
tion by the exporter, without the consent of the importer, or with
documents
that
do not conform to the shipment. A 1990 United Nations Informed Consent regarding restricted chemicals
of Prior
system
requires that prospective importing nations be
(primarily pesticides)
provided with information about the benefits and before deciding whether to allow
it
risks
of a chemical
to be imported. Environmentalists
making it illegal for a country to export to another country a chemical that is banned within the exporting country itself But the United States, which exports large amounts of banned had wanted
a stronger draft
pesticides, led the successfial opposition to that proposal.
International air pollution treaties and conventions have also been
weak. Developing countries have largely
refijsed to agree to international
controls of air pollution, fearing that such controls
of development. Most
air
among Western European
only
wiU impede
their pace
pollution agreements have been concluded nations,
sometimes with the United
and/or Britain not going along, although they were invited to sign. Examples include the 1988 conventions to reduce sulfiir and nitrogen States
emissions. also
had
United
The United
States
several conferences
and Western European governments have
on reducing greenhouse
States has refiised to agree to targets to
emissions, but the
reduce carbon emissions
and has fi-ustrated the attempts of European nations to come to a binding agreement among themselves. The best of the international air pollution agreements was the Montreal commitment by industrial countries to phase out their use of CFCs by 2000 (see Chapter that this
agreement
will
be too Htde and too
3).
But we have seen
late to avert
hundreds of
thousands of cancer deaths and millions of cancer cases that will result firom
ozone depletion.
The ments
forces that prevent strong international environmental agree-
are
many.
First,
the spirit of mihtant nationalism that has animated
much of the history of the postwar world has not abated, except among Western European governments. Indeed, the tendency of the
so
Ecological Scarcity and International Politics
world
move
to
is
277
in the opposite direction,
with the nations of Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union breaking up into mihtant ethnic states. Nation states insist on the absolute and sovereign right of self-determinaof resources, population
tion in use regardless
World countries intensity,
policy,
and development
of the wider consequences. Second, the demand for
economic development
and whatever seems
in general,
among Third
has, if anything, increased in
to stand in the way, as ecological considera-
tions often do, gets rather short shift. Third, largely because their prospects
for
development
begun (a
"new
international
environmental
who
those
are so
dim, the countries of the developing world have
to press even harder for flindamental reform of the world system
issues
economic order"). Thus every discussion of such as food and population is inevitably converted by
represent the developing world into a discussion of interna-
which enormously complicates the become pawns diplomatic and political struggle between the nations.
economic justice process of negotiation. In tional
in the larger
well,
as
short, environmental issues have
In addition, diplomats, Hke national leaders, have attempted to handle
the issues of ecological scarcity not
as part
of a larger problematique but
piecemeal, so that their interaction with other problems
is all
but ignored.
For example, the World Food Conference was solely concerned with the
problem of feeding the hungry and paid
virtually
no attention
to the
more food or subsidizing increased food aid. To some extent,
eventual ecological consequences of growing ftirther
overpopulation with radically
therefore, the successes of international conferences that simply try to
solve
one small piece of the
larger
problem
are as
much
to be feared as
their failures. If
one wished
community
to
be optimistic, one could conclude that the world
has taken the
first
and
attitudinal
meeting the challenges of ecological
scarcity.
institutional steps
A more reaUstic
toward
assessment,
however, would be that although modest environmental improvements have been achieved, major impediments to fiirther progress remain.
might even be forced to conclude, more poHtical
community
as
pessimistically, that the
presently constituted
coping with the challenges of ecological
Planetary Government or the
simply incapable of
is
scarcity, at least in a
timely way.
War of All Against All
In short, the planet confronts the same problems in a greatly intensified form. scarcity,
One
world
Even before
as
the United States, but
the emergence of ecological
the world's diflaculties and their starkly Hobbesian imphcations
were grave enough. Some saw the "revolution of pushing the world toward
a situation in
rising expectations"
which wants
greatly
exceeded
CHAPTER 7
278
meet them, provoking Hobbesian turmoil and violence The world lives under the blade of a deadly Sword of holding this environmental Sword has come loose; hair The Damocles. capacity to
(Spengler 1969).
pollution and other environmental problems will not obligingly post-
pone
their
impact while diplomats haggle, so the Sword
descending toward our unprotected heads. There
world community
and go about
its
is
thus no
is
way
already for the
mind Sword that
to put the environmental issue in the back of its
business.
The
crisis
of ecological
scarcity
is
a
must be parried, squarely and soon. The need for a world government with enough coercive power over fractious nation states to achieve
the planetary
common
what reasonable people would regard
interest has
as
become overwhelming. Yet we must
recognize that the very environmental degradation that makes a world
government necessary has
The
clear
danger
is
that,
also
made
it
much more
logical scarcity will simply intensify the all
—with
the destruction of the
habitation) the tragic
difficult to achieve.
instead of promoting world cooperation, eco-
outcome.
Hobbesian war of
common planet
(for
all
against
purposes of human
Ill Learning to Live with Scarcity
8 Toward
a Politics
of the
Steady State
How we
are to learn to live
with ecological scarcity
is
the problem that
dominate the coming decades. However daunting
will
seem,
it is
indeed possible to make
this task
must
a transition to a relatively desirable
steady state instead of simply letting nature take certain to lead in the opposite direction. that a large
its course, which is However, we must recognize
measure of devolution or retrogression in terms of our
current values will inevitably follow 400 years of continual evolution
and "progress." But not
all
the poHtical, social, economic, cultural, and
technological advances of the past four centuries must be abandoned.
Too, the sooner
we
confront the challenge squarely, the greater the
likeHhood of saving the best of
legacy and, what
this
important, of making a virtue out of necessity. critical
Our
may be more
actions over the
next few decades will therefore either create or preclude a
and our descendants. However, no concrete or formal solutions to the political dilemmas of ecological scarcity. There are several reasons for this. relatively desirable future for ourselves
we
offer
Learning First,
to
See
Anew
the most important prerequisite for constructive change
world view based on, or
human
at least
ecological predicament.
compatible with, the
The
solution
crisis is
realities
a
new
of the
in large part a
crisis: Most people simply do not realize that they are part of web of hfe that their own actions are destroying, yet any viable will require them to see this. Once such a change in
perceptual a delicate
ecological
is
281
— W
282
CHAPTER
"paradigm" has occurred
—once people have chosen
limitations deliberately as a
as
we
to adopt ecological
consequence of their new understanding
humane solutions
then practical and
8
will
be found in abundance. Indeed,
have already seen, the essential elements of the steady
state are
not
and some good work has been done on suitable But the psychological readiness and poUtical will to adopt
so hard to discern, institutions.
Thus "metanoia," or a fundamental transformation of world view, must pave the way for concrete action. Second, at this juncture any specific set of solutions would immediately
them
be
are wanting.
criticized as politically unrealistic. Indeed,
Current
political values
abnormal abundance
would
scarcity
and
how
could
be otherwise?
it
of the age of
institutions are the products
now drawing to a close, so any solutions predicated on with them. Of course, to work "within
necessarily conflict
the system" to prevent fiirther ecological degradation and promote in-
cremental change toward the steady
But
support.
change
state
is
an essential task deserving great
to accept current political reality as not itself subject to radical
away the game at the outset and render the situation it must be understood that ultimately politics is As ]o\m Maynard Keynes pointed out, we are reality itself. of
to give
is
hopeless by definition. Indeed, about the definition all
the prisoners of dead theorists; the ideas ofJohn Locke, Adam Smith, Karl
Marx, and
all
reality for us.
their
we
can even see what the problem
is,
politics
one can
is
indeed "the
art
of the possible";
it
only one
part of politics,
the art of creating
system tivities
to a
is
and the
lesser part at that. In
—
its
another way,
of working
^that is,
it its
as
inside the
true
name)
is
truest sense, politics
for human progress. Because the current we must direct our concrete political ac-
new possibilities
ecologically defective,
primarily toward producing a change of consciousness that can lead
new political paradigm. Until people
reality
it
consists
for valued objectives "within the system"
current political paradigm. However, politicking (to give
is
we must throw off
bonds they have clamped on our imagination. To put
normal best
the other philosophers of the Great Frontier in effect define
Before
at large
begin to see a
new kind of
based on ecological understanding, environmental politicking within
the system can be only a rear-guard holding action designed to slow the pace
of ecological ly
on
a
retreat.
Rejecting current
political realities
change of consciousness may seem
given what people want and believe today, but
only a Utde over a century ago Already,
many people
it
was
are finding
it
should be remembered that
legal to treat
our
slavish
and relying primari-
utterly impossible to achieve,
human beings
as property.
treatment of nature stupid
come
at
and morally repugnant at worst. The bound to increase their number. Looking back on us as we ourselves look back on our slave-holding ancestors, our descendants will wonder why it took us so long to come to our senses. best
events of the decades to
are
Toward
of the Steady State
a Politics
283
Thus
Third, the transition will take several decades. us to have
all
the answers to ecological scarcity today.
it is
not necessary for
What
is
essential
is
for
us to begin the disciplined and serious search for such answers now, instead
of waiting
until the point
of panic-stricken extremity.
We sometimes forget,
our Constitution was the culmination of several decades of
for example, that
intense and sustained political discussion and action by our founding fathers.
We
confront a challenge perhaps greater than
and we should not
theirs,
deceive ourselves about the magnitude and duration of the task. Moreover,
example
as this
hope
suggests,
to supply
no one
more than
no one work, no one invention can
person,
of the solution that
a small piece
v^ eventually
The final result wall be a mosaic of many elements, some designed of human effort, others fashioned by the accidents of history. Thus to
emerge.
by dint
advance and promulgate specific solutions harmfiil, for such premature closure
more
we
crucial task
of going back to
have agreed on political
"first
founding fathers generally did
machinery
to incorporate
is
first
at this stage
principles
principles"
v^
—
that
and the
at Philadelphia,
them
a
is,
positively
from the much to politics.
lessons
Once
of history, as our
then building the institutional
not be such a
difficult task.
before trying to give rebirth to our political institutions,
time for
might be
likely to deflect us
we must
In sum,
first
allow
proper gestation.
Fourth, the hour
very
is
late.
Now that
everyone can recogni2e the
much too late for a carefully planned transition to the steady state. Had we prudently listened to earUer warnings and acted appropriately when the environmental crisis first came to Hght many years ago, we might have devised a comprehensive master plan for the transition. This is no longer possible, for as we have evils
of ecological
seen,
scarcity, it
some measure of
is
probably
ecological overshoot (with attendant disruptive
side effects that are unpredictable)
are so
committed
evils that
we
to
most of the things
at
totally
unrealistic,
them.* Only
many
*
all
the constructive actions that
people in so
and neither
after
many ways
politicians
nor
that they are
would
citizens
nature has mandated certain changes and
overwhelmingly demonstrated the sible to
we
that cause or support ecological
present (for example, drastically restricting population
growth) are so painful to so
tolerate
virtually foreordained. Besides,
are almost paralyzed; nearly
could be taken
indeed
is
advisability
of others wiU
it
be pos-
think in terms of a concrete program of transition. Until then, our
All societies display social fanaticism to is
paradigm, which
after all a
is
extent. Their
first
response to
up belief in the current
kind of civil religion. Thus our tendency
to the challenges of ecological scarcity
more and more
some
to redouble their efforts to shore
threatening doubts
by ignoring or denying
it
is
to react
and mounting
desperate efforts to stave off the inevitable changes.
CHAPTER
284
time and effort
groundwork
move
is
and philosophical
better spent laying the scientific
moment of
so that the
8
ripeness will find us prepared to
rapidly fi-om thought to action.
Finally, in
many
and unseen, the process of transition
respects seen
no accident
under way.
It is
tion, either
grounded
produced in recent
many
that
radical critiques
Nor
years.
it
is
surprising that so
individuals are experimenting with radically different
nologies,
of industrial
in ecology or self-consciously related to
many of them avowedly
it,
is
well
civiliza-
have been
many groups and and tech-
life styles
Nor that
based on ecological principles.
a
quasi-reUgious ferment of self-examination and self-criticism seems to have
new images of people
sprung up throughout the industrial world, leading to
and of human needs and
potentials.
The raw
materials for social transforma-
tion are being produced right now, and the process of tearing reality
and constructing the new has already begun.
natural transition process cal scarcity
leadership
halting, belated,
is
tending to manufacture
is
and
a
its
and imperfect, the
own
challenge,
the old
ill
comprehensive theory will be necessary
at
social vision
some
transition
would degenerate
into a
point;
and sense of
need to make constructive personal responses to any
and the
this
of ecologi-
remedy. Certainly, inspiring
without them, ordinary people would lack the direction they
down
Thus, although
social
mere muddling
through. However, to a very large extent the transition will evolve, instead of
being created by theorizing and social planning.
composing the attractive set
collectivity will
more or
less
The
individuals
and groups
willingly seek a viable
and
of social answers by responding to the pressures of ecological
scarcity in their daily lives.
The
answers that emerge will then be
ratified
theory. (Similarly, colonial
Americans had already evolved many
features
of
American way of life well before they were formalized
in
the distinctively
by
political institutions.)
In short, excessive or premature specificity about the institutions of the steady-state society
Again metanoia
is
is
either not very useful or a positive hindrance.
the key, for
it
will almost automatically
concrete, practical arrangements that are congruent with
engender
it.
Nevertheless, a general outline of a solution to the problems of ecological scarcity
is
implicit in the concept of the steady state. Let us
therefore review the essential characteristics of a steady-state or sustainable society.
*
In his The Promise of the
identifies
Coming Dark Age, the
historian L. S. Stavrianos
important elements of this process and shows
how the
"grass" of a
new
on decentralized self-management is even now pushing up through the "concrete" of the moribund industrial order. civilization based
Toward
The
a Politics
of the Steady State
285
Characteristics of the Steady State It
is
not possible to specify the structural features of the steady-state
The
human
which have existed in a virtual steady state throughout most of recorded history, shows that there are many different ways to similar ends. However, any such set of structural features would clearly have to reflect certain basic characsociety.
teristics
great diversity of
of the steady
state.
societies,
In preceding chapters
we
have discussed in
some detail its purely physical characteristics: primary dependence on income or flow resources, the maintenance of population levels within the ecological carrying capacity, resource conservation and recycling,
now
generally
good
necessary
sociopolitical characteristics
of how
chooses to give them social form. For the reasons given in the
last
it
ecological husbandry, and so on. Let us
section, the following treatment
indicate the general direction industrial civilization
we
of any steady-state
is
tentative.
will travel as
toward the steady
designed merely to
we move
firom
our current
of abnormal abundance.
seems predictable, therefore, that on our way toward the steady
move
fi*om individualism toward
that individualistic political, tified as
communalism. The
economic, and
being in the overaU best
the
age of rampant individualism
that arose historically fi-om circumstances
shall
on
state.
We have been living in an
Communalism
It is
focus
society, regardless
interests
state
It
we
self-interest
social philosophies
of the community
have jus-
(as
long
as
the growth "frontier" provided a safe outlet for competitive striving) will
begin to seem more and more reprehensible and illegitimate
and other aspects of
community over
scarcity grow.
And
pollution
the individual that has characterized virtually every
other period of history will be restored. individual to
as
the traditional primacy of the
community
How
far the
subordination of
values and interests will have to go and
v^ be achieved are for the fiature
to determine.
inflexible feudal hierarchies are unlikely to
Rigid
how
caste systems
it
and
be necessary, but the degree of
individual subordination (for example, of property "rights") that will
eventually be required
would probably seem
quite insupportable to
many
living today.
Authority priority,
we
community
As the community and shall necessarily
move
its
rights are given increasing social
fi^om liberty toward authority, for the
will have to be able to enforce
This prospect
may seem
justify the fear that
its
demands on
individuals.
alarming, but the historical record does not
any concession of political rights to the community
CHAPTER
286
8
must lead to the total subjugation of the individual by an all-powerful state. There is no reason why authority cannot be made strong enough to maintain a steady-state society and yet be limited. The personal and civil rights
guaranteed by our Constitution could be largely retained in an appropriately
designed steady-state
Nor need
society.
Only
personal property be taken away.
enjoy adequate
the right to use private property
ways would have to be checked. Thus au-
in ecologically destructive
thority in the steady state
own and
the right to
need not be remote, arbitrary, and capricious. In state, authority could be made con-
a well-ordered and well-designed stitutional
and limited.
from
movement away
Allied with the foregoing transition will be a
Government
egalitarian
democracy toward
the mere summation of "will of all" has
become
competence and
political
status.
Because
equally regarded individual wants into Rousseau's ecologically ruinous,
we must
ways of achiev-
find
ing the "general will" that stands higher than the individual and his or her wants.
To
this
end, certain restrictions
on human
activities
petently determined, normatively justified, and then imposed that
would do something
desires
quite difierent if it was
to
its
on
own
a
populace
immediate
and devices. This can be accomplished in more than one way. Power
who arefittest to rule (as in Thomas
can be given or allowed to accrue to those Jefierson's "natural aristocracy").
matter
left;
must be com-
how open and well
However, the creation of a ruling
qualified,
class,
immediately delivers us into the
—and
"Who will watch the guardians?" dilemma
as
noted
earlier,
no
classic
the greater
the scarcity, the greater the likelihood of oppression of the ruled by the ruling
class.
political is,
This dilemma can be avoided,
system by
common
consent on a
of values Jit
common
principles designed to foster the
would
instead of the particular interests that successfiilly,
at least in part,
set
interest
destroy
it.
to
by founding the
—
be ruled by
of the steady
If this
that
state
could be done
government would be respected and there would be a funamong citizens on how their communal Ufe was to be
damental agreement regulated.
But
administrative authority
the reach of the citizens.
would be
decentralized and v^thin
Citizens pursuing an ecological ethos would
themselves promote and support laws obliging themselves to live within ecological Hmits,
much
as citizens
enforced the criminal laws in nineteenth-
century America (Tocqueville 1835, tions
of a ruling
class
would be much
ofJefiersonian natural it
p. 71).
aristocrats
was
lessened, still
could be subjected to constitutional
the
American
republic. (See
Box 29
criteria" approach.) Nevertheless,
something other than personal
Then
the need for the ministra-
and to the extent
needed
to
make
that a class
the system work,
restraints, also as in the earliest
for further discussion
once the
self-interest,
basis
of
this
days of
"design
of pofitical values becomes
age-old dilemmas related to the
Toward
a Politics
287
of the Steady State
of rule immediately
legitiinacy
Future political theorists will there-
arise.
overcome the exceedingly
fore have to
problem of legislating the
difficult
temperance and virtue needed for the ecological survival of a steady-state society wdthout at the
same time exalting the few over the many and
subjecting
to
power of
individuals
exercise
of administrative
some dogma.
to excessive conformity to
Because the
Politics
unwarranted
the
of market forces and individual
free play
initiative
produces the tragedy of the commons, the market orientation typical of
most modern viable
and
principles
have to be
societies will
and then put them into
governed. If
strictly
we must
attractive steady-state society,
effect in either a
we want
determine
planned or
a
a
basic
its
designed
Box 29 for a discussion of the important distinction between Another way of stating this is to say that we must move from
fashion (see the two).
non-politics toward politics. Laissez faire
a device for
is
making
political
and other desired goods
decisions about the distribution of wealth
automatically and rather non-politically, instead of in face-to-face political
confrontation
As noted
in
(as
Chapter
an outcome or
happened, for example, in the Greek democracies).
from
6, shifting
political
mode
a process or non-political
mode
to
holds serious dangers, for the political
and counter-revolution (again as Greek democracies).* It v;dll thus be necessary for the
struggle can escalate into revolution
happened political
in the
and
social philosophers
of the steady
state to discover principles
of legitimacy, authority, and justice that wall keep the political struggle wdthin reasonable bounds. Yet even
unUkely to be able to discover
are
the market for
Hve
making poUtical
if they are successfiil in this task,
they
a device as effectively non-political as
decisions.
At
least at the outset, those
in the steady state will therefore have to
who
be genuinely poHtical
animals in Aristotle's sense, self-consciously involved in designing and
planning their community Ufe.
Stewardship
ogy
The
will engulf
character of
economics, and
economic
we
shall
life
will
change
move away from
growth, proffigacy, and exploitation typical of "economic sufficiency, frugaUty,
and stewardship. The
minimal form of trusteeship, cal
*
will
become
totally.
the values of
man" toward
last especially, at least in its
the cardinal virtue of ecologi-
economics. To use the analogy of ecological succession, we
The
discussion in
Box 29
Ecol-
suggests that there
is
shall
move
thus considerable merit in
agreeing poUticaUy on design criteria for the state that wiU minimize the scope of politics
and
political
decision
making
non-poHtics has considerable merit.
thereafter.
As
a
mode of
politics,
CHAPTER
288
8
20 Planning Versus Design There is a subtle and often overlooked but important distinction between planning and design. Both are attempts to achieve a desired real-world outcome by influencing nature. Although the difference is sometimes obscure in practice, planning is the attempt to produce the outcome by actively managing the process, whereas design is the attempt to produce the outcome by establishing criteria to govern the operations of the process so that the desired result will occur more or less automatically without further
complexity of human
human
intervention.
activities,
Because of the
scale
and
planning inevitably requires large
bureaucracies and active intervention in people's
The
lives.
Soviet
Union's economic planning machinery was perhaps the most elaborate, but virtually
even developing
of planning. As
all
modern
societies (to a considerable extent,
pervaded by the apparatus
societies) are increasingly
a result,
we
have
all
become
personally familiar with
cumbersome and Thus the apparent need for even more
the inefficiencies, limitations, and costs of such bureaucratic social control.
planning to cope with the exigencies of ecological scarcity frightening and repugnant prospect of minute and vision of all our activities, in the
name of ecology, by
and powerful bureaucratic machine,
a veritable
raises the
total daily supera
ponderous
Orwellian Big
Brother.
However,
this
is
not inevitable, for
we
can adopt
a
design ap-
proach instead of a planning approach to the problematique of ecological scarcity. set
By
self-consciously selecting and implementing a
of design criteria aimed
at
channeling the social process quasi-
automatically within steady-state limits, stantly to plan,
criterion
manage, and supervise.
comes from
we
An
can avoid having con-
example of such
social critic Ivan Illich (1974a),
who
a design
has
proposed an absolute, across-the-board speed limit of 1 5 to 25 miles
—
per hour
that
is,
the speed of a bicycle. lUich believes that adoption
of this single proscription would eliminate most of the worst ecological and social consequences of high energy use without subjecting individuals to daily bureaucratic regulation.
the merits of this particular proposal, but
it
One
can debate
nevertheless illustrates
Toward
a Politics
of the Steady State
289
how powerfliUy the adoption of a few simple (albeit drastic in terms of current values) design criterion could indeed have major social impacts sufficient to
produce
proach to
a steady-state society
without also creating a Big Another well-known example of a design apsolving environmental problems is economist Kenneth
Brother to supervise
it.
Boulding's proposal for achieving population control with marketable baby hcenses; once the basic idea was accepted, the system
would
operate with minimal bureaucratic supervision, and people would be able to determine for themselves how to respond to the market pres-
by the licensing system (that is, they could have as many as they wanted by buying additional licenses from those who wanted few or no children) (1964, pp. 135-136). The Clean Air Act of 1990 adapts a design approach with a market option to sulilir dioxide emissions. The Act sets a cap on sulflir dioxide emissions for each utihty company. If a utility seeks to increase its emissions over the cap, it must pay another utility to make an equivalent reduction. fl It should be evident that the design approach has substantial sures created
children
ad-
vantages over plannmg, a point not lost
on our founding
fathers,
who
unconsciously favored a design strategy in establishing our system as a poHtical and economic marketplace governed predominantly by iaissez faire.
Now^ of course,
these particular design criteria are inappropriate
Por our changed circumstances, so they must be exchanged for new ones, but it would seem wise to emulate our founding fathers in their
^
preference for design over planning.
should also not be forgotten that design is nature s way. As a ^^quence of certain basic physical laws (the design criteria), It
con^
natural sys-
tems and cycles operate automatically to produce an integrated, harmonious, self-sustaining whole that evolves in the direction of greater
I
biological richness
and order, eventually reaching a chmax that is the ultimate expression of the design criteria. The essential task of the poHtical and social philosopher of the steady state is therefore to devise fl design criteria that will be just as effective and compeUing as those of nature in creating an organic and harmonious
chmax
that are neither so ruthless
humane
nor so
alternatives to nature
criteria for a steady state?
s
cruel. In other
wa.-^, plagues,
civilization
but
words, what are the
and famines
as
design
CHAPTER
290
from pioneer
new
stable
maturity in
resources,
growth and exploitation of
to climax economics; the rapid
possibilities typical
of the pioneer stage will give way to
which maximum
and energy
8
amenity
is
obtained from
a state
of
minimum
devoted primarily to maintenance of the current
is
new
capital stock rather than to
growth. In short, quaUty will replace
and husbandry will replace gain, as the prime motives of economic life. Learning to hve with scarcity does not mean learning to live without. If the ideal of stewardship were more positively embraced, quantity,
numerous human
economic activities would become a garden yielding beauty as well as ample subsistence (Dubos 1968). Approached in this spirit, the economics of the steady state, no matter how frugal and careful, need not involve joyless self-abnegation on the part of individuals, for they would be participating in what could be a deeply satisfying then, as
could be designed to
the earth" so that
it
today might not share
this
In the area of cultural
However, once the
that
many people
living
sanguine assessment of the potential for delight
self-fulfillment in a steady-state
Modesty
it
must be acknowledged
civiHzational task. Yet
and
ecologists have suggested,
"woo
economy
norms
characterized by frugality.
the changes are
less predictable.
on people have become power and "progress" should give way to
limitations nature imposes
clearer, Faustian striving after
modesty of both ends and means. One human ecologist describes the impending social change as one from tragedy to comedy (Meeker 1974): We shall abandon the tragic hero's deadly serious and angst-ridden quest and new fields to conquer (which usually ends badly for and learn instead cheerfially to enjoy the simple himself and
for greatness
others)
pleasures of ordinary Hfe.
The people
could therefore be more relaxed,
inhabiting the fiature steady state
playfiil,
today,
who must spend large amounts
keep
afloat in the
and content than those living
of energy constantly striving just to
waves of change that inevitably accompany rapid
material growth. Moreover, although
some
profess to see the steady state
tantamount to rigor mortis, once the getting and spending of material wealth have ceased to be the prime determinant of status and self-esteem, the search for social satisfaction and personal frilfillment can turn toward as
the
artistic, cultural, spiritual, intellectual,
which
and
scientific spheres
—none of
confined by physical limitations. (Even space
seriously
are
programs and other types of "big science" are possible in the steady provided the political will fashion.) In
despite
its
sum, there
no
exists
to
expend
intrinsic reason
why
a steady-state society,
material frugality, should suffer from cultural stagnation, nor
there any reason
rewarding
is
state,
scarce resources in this
as it
is
why
personal and cultural
life
should not be
in today's industrial civilization.
is
at least as
But the rewards must
Toward
a Politics of the Steady State
291
of the steady
necessarily be rather different, for the culture certainly be far
The
Diversity
more
more
state will
and modest than our own.
frugal
steady-state society should be less
homogeneous and
our own. As noted previously, the pressures
culturally diverse than
of ecological scarcity urge upon us technological pluralism, some more labor-intensive
modes of production, and
adapted to local ecological
realities.
As
smaller-scale
enterprise
a result, populations are likely to
be spread more evenly over the land and to be more self-sufficient in the basic necessities. Thus extreme centralization and interdependence, which depend on high levels of energy use, should give way to greater decentralization, local autonomy, and local culture. The extent of the
reversion to diversity and decentralization
is
unpredictable because, bar-
ring a total collapse of technological civilization, the continued existence
of modern communications each locality was in effect a
of
political
determine
and
local
is
likely to forestall a return to the era
little
country
own. In
all its
and economic arrangements ultimately adopted
how
That
far this process goes.
autonomy seem
to
fit
more
when
addition, the kind will largely
diversity, decentralization,
is,
some of the
naturally with
political
and economic choices mentioned above than with others. For example,
a
decision in favor of a planned rather than a designed steady-state society
would
actually
be
a decision in favor
of
maximum
central control. Nevertheless, the limitations in
any conceivable steady
state
seem
standardization and
on energy and
material use
likely to lessen substantially the
currenr high degree of homogenization, centralization, and interdependence.
Holism crisis
Because the kind of one-dimensional thinking that created the
of ecological
no longer be
scarcity in the first place will
there will be a decisive
movement away from
assumption inherited from Francis Bacon that nature
by dissecting
it
into
its
is
to
be understood
smallest constituent parts) toward holism, the
contrary assumption that nature interrelationships that link
all
best understood
is
parts
by focusing on the
of the whole. In other words, what has
been called the "systems paradigm" tual
tolerable,
reductionism (the
scientific
become
will
and epistemological mode; biology, or more
replace physics as the master science.
The
the dominant intellec-
specifically ecology, will
effects
of
this intellectual
inversion are likely to be profound. For example, embracing holism will
tend to make thinkers generalists tant,
first
and
however, greater holism would
Reductionist science has
left
ruthlessly destroying older
most
specialists
alleviate
second.
many
More impor-
current social
ills.
—by
individuals psychologically adrift
world views without putting anything in
their
CHAPTER 8
292
by fragmenting the corpus of knowledge, and by alienating people A new synthesis based on a fliller understanding of the total ecology of the planet would go a long way toward making the average place,
from
nature.
person
feel at
in the universe
by genuine morality,
ethics. It
seems extremely
again.
opposed
as
to a purely instrumental set
of enlightened
change of heart. But the same could be
developments
we
can be viewed
primarily a moral
self-interest;
about
said
have outlined. Indeed, the
as
undoubtedly be charac-
crisis
in
crisis
of
commitment
unlikely, for example, that a real
to stewardship could arise out a
once
Finally, the steady-state society will
Morality terized
home
will require
it
many of the
other
of ecological scarcity
which
the ugliness and
destruction outside us in our environment simply mirror the spiritual
wasteland within; the sickness of the earth
reflects the sickness in the soul
of modern industrial individuals, whose whole gain, to the disease their
given over to
lives are
of endless getting and spending that can never
deeper aspirations and must eventually end in cultural,
physical death. If this assessment
steady state must involve a
is
correct, then the
new
satisfy
spiritual,
and
morality of the
movement from matter toward
spirit,
not
simply in the sense that material pursuits and values will inevitably be
deemphasized and restrained by
self-interested necessity, but also in the
sense that there will be a recovery or rediscovery of virtue
We
shall learn again that
canons higher than
wants are necessary for people to
live
self-interest
in productive
and
sanctity.
and individual
harmony with
themselves and with others. Thus the steady-state society, like virtually aU
other
human
civiHzations except
tainly have a religious basis
modern
—whether
it
industrialism, will almost cer-
be Aristotelian
political
and
civic
excellence. Christian virtue, Confucian rectitude, Buddhist compassion,
Amerindian love
for the land, or an
amalgam of these and other
spiritual
values.
To sum up, ecological scarcity obliges us to abandon modern values in favor of ones that resemble pre-modern many important respects. This does not mean that we shall
Post-modernity
most
basic
values in
simply revert to an earlier
happen
if
we
fail
mode of existence, although
to exercise forethought
the analogy of ecological succession,
it
and
this
is
self-restraint.
what could
Again using
can be said that the very success of
the industrial stage of civUizational succession has created conditions
under which, to avoid
must move
to a
post-modern
a simple relapse into
pre-modern
civilization,
we
new, higher, more mature stage of post-industrial or
civilization that shares
while being something
new
in
many
world
features
history.
of earlier
civilizations
Thus the emergence of the
Toward
of the Steady State
a Politics
steady-state society will in close. It
now
is
one way or another bring the modern era to a whether we will accept the challenge
for us to decide
of ecological
implicit in the crisis
modern
293
civilization that
The Roots of Wisdom:
by creating
scarcity
genuinely post-
a
combines the best of ancient and modern.
Philosophy
Political
Having seen what some of our choices on the path to the steady-state might be, we come to the second and harder question: Where
society
we find the wisdom to make such fatefiil choices and to guide us in momentous enterprise of building a post-modern civilization? There
shall
the is
obviously no straightforward answer to
some of the
ills
of industrial
A logical
this
One
discernible avenues of approach.
is
to
question, but there are
make
a
profound study
civilization.
starting point in this
endeavor
is
ecological philosophy, the
attempt to discover the larger meaning and practical lessons of ecology.
Although
book emphasizes
and
it
this
must be complemented by the works of
have asked nature
how
people can
live in
harmony
it.
The next
step
contemporary
toward mastery of the problem
radical social critics
what could be
fi-om
called
whatever the differences successes find
human
engages throughout in ecological philosophy,
politics,
who
other writers
with
it
of industrial
among them,
civilization,
them more or less
judge the industrial paradigm perspective.'''
That
is,
they aU examine the proudest
as
science and development, and
new
do
post-industrial order. (Thus they
Dubos, R. So Human an Animal and
See, for example,
A
such
work of
to study the
pernicious. Accordingly, they propose not reforms
but the creation of an entirely
Leopold, A.
who
post-industrial
a
is
A
God
Within;
Sand Country Almanac; Shepard, P. and McKinley, D. The
Subversive Science: Essays
Toward an Ecology of Man; Nash, R. The Rights of Nature: Rolston, M. Environmental Ethics: Duties to and
A History of Environmental Ethics;
Values in the Natural World; Berry, T. The
Earthbound:
New
Dream of the
Earth;
Regan, T.
ed.,
D.
ed.,
Introductory Essays in Environmental Ethics; Scherer,
Upstream /Downstream;
Wenz,
P.
Environmental
Justice;
and
Milbrath,
L.
Envisioning a Sustainable Society. T See, for example,
Bookchin, M. The Ecology of Freedom: Remaking
Society;
Roszak, T. The Making of a Counter Culture and Where the Wasteland £«^5;Maslow, A. The Psychology of Science and The Farther Reaches of Human Nature; lUich, I. Deschooling Society, Tools for Conviviality, and Energy and Equity; Schumacher, E. Small
Is Beautiful:
History
Economics as
and The Myth and
if
People Mattered;
the Machine.
and Mumford,
L.
The City
in
CHAPTER
294
not simply repeat old
much critics
criticisms.
may sometimes seem
it
8
Their work looks forward, however
to hark back to the concerns of the earliest
of the Industrial Revolution.)
We
must ponder unflinchingly the
secular heresies of these post-industrial critics in order to liberate ourselves
from inherited prejudices.
As important as it is to analyze modern industrial civilization in the of the crisis of ecological scarcity, it ought to be evident that the
light
book are scarcely new but in fact are on ancient themes. This being the case, once we have
questions raised throughout this
modern
variations
understood those things that make us unique,
we must
—
the greater part of our guidance from the past
expect to receive
from political
^particularly
philosophy, the long and rich tradition of discourse that precisely with
We
how people
Edmund
the British conservative thinker
pre-modern point of view. For
ecological philosophy and of Burke
its
many important
uncanny resemblance
steady-state values bear a particularly
ship.
concerned
have already seen that the values of a steady-state society would
have to resemble pre-modern values in
for the
is
can best Hve in community.
is
Burke, the
last
instance, the
respects,
but
to the ideas
great
of
spokesman
major tenet both of
trusteeship or, better yet, steward-
Burke wrote mainly about humanity's social patrimony rather than from the nature of his reasoning it is clear that he
natural heritage, but
meant both: The current generation holds the present as a patrimony in moral entail from its ancestors and must pass it on to posterity improved if possible, but at all costs undiminished. Beyond this general overriding imperative, almost all of Burke's ideas resonate strongly with
—
those of the ecological philosophers:
General skepticism about the possibility of "progress"
Awareness that the solution to one problem generates
a
new
set
of
problems
Acceptance of human
limits
and imperfections
The need for organic change in order harmony of the whole social order
The interdependence and The need
to
to preserve the balance
thus mutual moral bondage of society
check aggressive
self-interest, the
contingent and
situational nature
of morality
The
and
desirability
of diversity among
societies
and among
societies
inevitability
both within
and
human
beings
Toward
a Politics of the Steady State
295
what
Progress as a gradual evolution toward
is
immanent
in a
historical society
The
social order as part of, or as
an outgrowth
the natural order
of,
Pohtics as the balancing of many conflicting and equally legitimate claims to achieve for
humanity the best
possible state given the
objective situation
Burke
ment and
also grasped the
profound
the Industrial Revolution.
social implications
He
of the Enlighten-
foresaw, for example, that turning
the direction of society over to "sophisters, economists, and calculators" (his epithets for the amoral capitalists
wealth)
would
one person gain.
who
typified the
new way of accumulating
destroy community, lead to the atomization of society, and set
against another in an endless
and
self-destructive struggle for
He also saw that zeal for liberty and equality in the abstract would soon
lead to the destruction of
all
the "litde platoons"
communes, and other intermediate corporate the individual and the
is,
the guilds,
bodies) intervening
so that individuals
state,
(that
would
between
eventually be
left
standing alone and defenseless before an all-powerfid state that in theory
represented their interests but in practice was largely beyond their control. As
we
have seen, both these
analysis
of ecological
issues are closely
intertwined with our general
scarcity.
Ecology broadly defined tation to the world. Indeed,
is
thus a fijndamentally conservative orien-
one biologist has
called the climax state (the
natural analog of the steady state) "a perennial feudal society"
However,
1970).
political doctrines. at best
surely have
much
Human says that
as
we must
landed aristocracy would be anachronistic
worst. Yet in our search for a set of social and
is
also
consonant with even older bodies of political
the classical tradition. In
although people need
and humane
modest
life,
tools,
level
Book Two
some
of his Republic, Plato
division of labor,
of development
they do not seem to
—
war, and
many
other
iUs.
To prevent
know when
people with wise rule by philosophers is
this, says Plato,
and the
in order to live a
to stop.
they overdevelop, and the consequences include luxury, vice, gle,
(McKinley
adopt Burke's
to teach us.
in other words, a
civilized
at
a
that
correspond to an ecological world view, Burke will
ecology
thought, such
—
Rule by
and reactionary
political ideas that
like
by no means follows
it
Thus
class strug-
we must
restrain
who know that what people
desire
not always desirable for them and that true justice requires the estab-
lishment of controls to maintain the balance and
The
classical
tradition also
distrusts
harmony of the whole.
technology: Just
as
excessive or
uncontrolled economic development threatens to turn the direction of
CHAPTER
296
society over to
monied
interests
and the vagaries of the market,
uncontrolled technological change undermines the broadest sense) direction of human
so, too,
politics, the rational (in
by turning
affairs,
8
social decisions
over to the apparent imperatives of mere things.
The more modern anarchist for decentralization, local teristics
of the steady
tradition
may also
state
seem
favorable to developments in this direction.
movement
Indeed, to the extent that the environmental political ideology,
a
predominantly
it is
planned versus a designed steady
of anarchism that
many of the
it is
political
shares a
common
Moreover, the whole
issue
of
problem
perhaps the most direcdy relevant body of theory for the preceding section. as a whole contains many valutwo of the most important and
philosophy taken
examine
able lessons. Let us
anarchist.
state cuts so close to the central
critical issues raised in
Western
contain valuable lessons,
autonomy, modesty, community, and other charac-
briefly
obvious ones. First, it is
only a slight exaggeration to say that aU political theory
teaches the necessity of prudence, tells
us
is
a
which
Webster's Third
New International
comprehensive term implying "a habitual deliberateness,
caution, and circumspection in action," further qualified as
shown
in the exercise
(1)
"wisdom
of reason, forethought, and self-control,"
management of affairs... shown in and use of means to a desired end,"
"sagacity and shrewdness in the selection, adaptation,
skillflil
"providence in the use of resources," and
(4)
(2)
the (3)
"attention to possible
hazard or disadvantage." As the preceding discussion has amply demonstrated, the
behavior of industrial civilization has been imprudent in the
extreme. Unlike abundance, however, scarcity tolerant of lapses in prudence, so this virtue
is
extraordinarily in-
must certainly be
a part
of
the steady-state solution, regardless of the particular doctrinal and institutional
form
it
eventuaUy
takes.
The
lessons of
prudence can of
course be acquired in the school of hard knocks, but they are perhaps best learned
from the great political theorists of the past (as well as the such as Thucydides and Tacitus, who have tradition-
political historians, ally
been read along with them)
for
whom
prudence
is
the cardinal
virtue of politics.
A
second indispensable
The Epigraph
to this
lucid prose for
argument
Man
is
political virtue
is
individual self-restraint.
book, taken from Burke, explains
which he
is
famous. Reduced to
its
states that
a passionate being.
There must therefore be checks on
will
and
appetite.
why
in the
essentials, his
Toward
of the Steady State
a Politics
297
checks are not self-imposed, then they must be applied
If these
externally by a sovereign power.
We
have seen
analysis
—
how
in the
problem has surfaced again and again
this
in
our
Hobbesian dynamics of the tragedy of the commons,
in
the consequences of accepting the Faustian bargain of nuclear technol-
and so on. The
ogy,
essential political
learn ecological self-restraint before
message of this book it
is
forced
on
us
is
by
that
we must
a potentially
monolithic and totalitarian regime or by the brute forces of nature. are currently sliding
by default
two outcomes. Only the
restoration of
some measure of civic
use the traditional term) can forestall this
from
virtue are, again, better learned
fate,
We
of one (or both) of these
in the direction
and the necessary
political
virtue (to lessons in
philosophy than from
personal suffering.
we
If
are to take political philosophy seriously again,
broaden our perspective beyond the political
have
specifically
should
tradition of
thought, for the political history and theory of other civilizations
much
to teach us. For example, given the probable nature of the
steady-state society, there
is
much
in
our
seems to favor the revival of something
However, the Western
political tradition
problem of keeping peace between to study the millet system
own
the classical city
like
never
city states.
political tradition that
s*ill
providing
larger poHtical
Thus
reversion to the city state
accommodated and
it
might be valuable
of the Ottoman Empire, which granted the cities
and provinces
them with peace and most of the other
community. is
state.
satisfactorily resolved the
widest measure of local autonomy to individual
while
Western
we
On
the other hand,
unreahstic given the
it
benefits of a
might be argued
numbers of people
that
to
be
the size of the territory to be governed. If so, then the
—
and poHtical thought of agrarian societies especially China from Shang Dynasty to Mao are worthy of the closest study. Similarly, feudal societies, whose resonance with ecology we have noted, should contain many important lessons; Westerners would do well to go beyond history
—
the
their
own
medieval history to study Tokugawa Japan, which existed in
almost total autarky for several centuries yet supported (albeit frugally) a rather large population at a high cultural level.
However, we must not expect
political
theory and history to provide
us with specific solutions or even neatly packaged object lessons
not to
do. What
is
essential
is
that
we once
on what
again approach politics from a
philosophical perspective instead of grasping after easy answers that
current prejudices. As Ivan Illich (1974b) says
on the
fit
subject of our
modern dependence on "energy slaves," "The energy crisis focuses concern on the scarcity of fodder for these slaves. I prefer to ask whether
— CHAPTER 8
298
free
men need
them." Once
problem with ecological tions that really
wisdom
need
will certainly
and
approach the
this perspective,
be asked, then solutions informed by
to
of our
totality
asking the quespolitical
emerge.
The Roots of Wisdom: Ultimate Political
—we
if-
from
scarcity
philosophy alone
Values
The wisdom
not enough.
is
to ask the right
comes ultimately from so-called higher values, and all the great theorists of politics invoke them as an essential element in their political arguments. However, to assert the necessity of ultimate values in this day questions
and age
Because
heretical.
is
scientific
orthodoxy maintains
that values
have no epistemological standing, any statement that one value preferred to another
is
our standard of
science
is
socially
meaningful
thodoxy holds
social reality,
either. Similarly, the
to be
modern
liberal-democratic or-
an inalienable right to create their
that people have
values; accordingly,
is
But because value questions must not be
therefore scientifically meaningless.
own
any attempt to judge these values or replace them
with others in the name of some nebulous ideological concept such "the
common interest"
to the ideologically
equal,
and
interest,
politics
and ultimately
as anti-liberal
committed
moderated only
to
taken
scientist
and democrat,
fascist.
all
as
Thus,
values are
can be no more than the clash of personal and factional
about what constitutes
comes
is
slightly
by some minimal
a just division
of the
ethical conceptions
spoils. Politics, therefore,
be devoted almost exclusively to the utihtarian
satisfaction
of
desire or appetite,
which, in the absence of any higher values, necessarily
becomes the
measure of individual and
sole
social
good.
The
idea that
public authority might exist in part to direct people toward virtuous ends
becomes anathema. Yet wisdom, if only the rough and ready kind acquired by everyday living, teUs us that not all values are equal and that virtue matters. In practice, science and democracy alike would be a shambles without the implicit values that govern them; indeed, "science" and "democracy" are themselves high-level values that generate the criteria by which utilitarian political decisions
know
can be
too that the Protestant
established,
faith,
made
in industrial civilization.
even though
justification for acquisitiveness
"under God."
of right and
virtue,
one
We that
human
and other bourgeois
were motivated by deep
institutions
We
was not everywhere
was the unofficial reUgion of the Industrial Revolution,
providing a transcendental explanation of the
fathers
it
condition traits.
still
lingers
on
well
as
Our founding
up our
political
effect, a positive
standard
religious faith to set
used to have, in
as
in an unconscious
and
Toward
a Politics
we
degenerate form. Thus
We
299
of the Steady State
have had a value-based civic religion
have simply never acknowledged
Of course,
civic religions are
is
human
We
must
never easily changed, and resistance to
more than
turning politics once again into
be very high.
a
mere
clash
of interests will
given the htany of horrors that
also recognize that,
history, the
along.
all
such.
as
it
widespread suspicion of values
not without
is
Too many crimes have been committed by leaders and peoples who were convinced that they had God on their side. Moreover, foundation.
not always an easy task to distinguish genuine needs, the satisfaction
it is
of which
essential to
is
ment of which
human
well-being, from
is
ever difficult and controversial the task,
some
for
mere wants, the
fulfill-
dispensable without real sacrifice. Nevertheless,
we
how-
have no choice but to search
ultimate values to inform the construct of a post-modern
civilization.
What
follows
to be, but the discussion
an effort to indicate what these values ought
is
is
even more condensed,
personal than the previous discussion of poHtical values. gests that there
is
and
tentative, general, It
merely sug-
already remarkably widespread agreement
on what an
appropriate set of ultimate values ought to be under any circumstances
and that these values favor a certain type of steady
We noted earfier that the a
moral and
made of
crisis
looking out
spiritual crisis. In
the earth,
we
state.
of ecological scarcity at
are Hkely to cause further ecological ruin.
now become
summarized Nature
have
spiritually that
we
But the point has been reached
The
earth
is
teaching us a moral lesson:
individual virtues that have always been necessary for ethical
have
we
can no longer continue without serious
a vicious circle
consequences for humanity.
fiandamentally
what manner of people we have become.
see
Worse, the degraded environment so impoverishes us
where such
is
the ecological ruin
imperative for practical ones.
in the fifth century B.C.
and
The
spiritual reasons
These virtues were
pithily
by the Taoist sage Lao Tzu:
sustains itself through three precious principles,
which one does
well to embrace and foUow.
These
are gendeness, frugality
and humility [Chap.
67].
ImpUcit in gendeness, frugahty, and humiBty are simpUcity and closeness to nature. Walden, critique is
Henry David Thoreau's famous symboUc
of an American society rapidly headed in the opposite direction,
an extended sermon on the necessity of natural simpUcity
way
to avoid living the quietly desperate Uves of those
striving for power, possessions,
mean
rejection of
"Economy."
all
as
the only
weighed down by
and position. Such simpUcity does not
progress, as
Thoreau makes
clear in his chapter
on
CHAPTER
300
Though we are not so degenerate but that we might or a wigwam or wear skins today, it certainly is advantages, though so dearly bought,
mankind
offer.
whole
logs, or
stones.
flat
I
better to accept the
the invention and industry of
and more
obtained than suitable caves, or
easily
bark in sufficient quantities, or even well-tempered clay or
speak understandingly on
acquainted with
we might
possibly Hve in a cave
In such a neighborhood as this, boards and shingles, lime
bricks, are cheaper
and
which
8
it
this subject, for
both theoretically and
I
made myself
have
With
practically.
a
use these materials so as to become richer than the richest
make our civilization
a blessing. Tlte civilized
man
is
more uHt
little
now
a more experienced
are,
and
and wiser
savage [1854, p. 295, emphasis added].
It is
of course quite obvious that development
complexity, violence, prodigality and pride,
is
as
we know it, in
all its
utterly noxious to these
fundamental ethical-spiritual principles. The greatest sociologists and political
German
his classic work The Protesrenowned nineteenth-century
economists would hardly disagree. In
tant Ethic
and
the Spirit of Capitalism, the
sociologist
Max Weber
foresaw the spiritual death that awaited
an increasingly rationalized, bureaucratized society: "Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level
John
of civilization never before attained" Stuart
Mill,
one of the
(cited in
Burch 1971,
p.
159).
and most ardent philosophical
ablest
defenders of liberty and other bourgeois values, was nevertheless dis-
by "the trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each on" seemed inevitably to produce (1871, p. 748). Mill also foresaw that the long-term consequentressed
other's heels" that the relentless struggle to "get
ces
of development would be pernicious.
If the earth
must
lose that great portion
to things that the unlimited increase
extirpate
from
it,
for the
of its pleasantness which
mere purpose of enabhng
but not a better or a happier population, posterity, that they will
compels them to
it [p.
it
owes
of wealth and population would
be content to be
I
it
to support a larger,
sincerely hope, for the sake
stationary,
of
long before necessity
751].
Even Adam Smith, perhaps the person most directly responsible for economic nature of modern civilization, clearly believed that one who pursued wealth was prey to vanity, greed, and the materialistic and
other foolish and ignoble motives (1792,
III-2).
The eminent
twentieth-
century economist John Maynard Keynes, whose fame and influence
on his prescriptions for keeping the engine of economic growth in high gear, was still more adamantly opposed to the values of "economic man."* Noting that the whole long era of developironically rest primarily
Toward
a Politics
ment
of the Steady State
301
some of the most
has "exalted
men and women would once more free.
and a
.
.to return to
some of the most
traditional virtue
—
that avarice
truly in the paths
We
shall
We
to the useful.
hoped
for
a vice, that the exaction is
detestable, that those
shall
do they
follows fi-om
of usury
is
walk most
who take least thought for the
once more value ends above means and prefer the good
honour those who can teach us how
spin [1971,
p.
to pluck the
well, the delightfial people
capable of taking direct enjoyment in things, the
It
qualities into
speedy end, so that
sure and certain principles of religion is
of virtue and sane wisdom
hour and the day virtuously and not, neither
its
be
misdemeanor, and the love of money
morrow.
of human
distasteful
the position of the highest virtues," he
lilies
of the
field
who who
are toil
192].
what these writers
say (and
from
similar sentiments
expressed by people of every age and tradition) that nothing of real value
would be
lost if
development were
to cease. Rather, the Hkelihood of
men and women leading reasonably happy, sane, fulfilled, and harmonious personal less
and
lives
would be
enhanced.'''
Moreover, once the ultimately
fruit-
more private affluence was abanto grow and to produce all the kinds
self-destructive quest for ever
doned, public amenity would be free
Paradoxically,
Keynes believed
that because "foul
could not afibrd to abandon these values until
is
usefiil
we were
and
fair is
not,"
we
out of "the tunnel of
economic necessity" a hundred years hence-that is, until we had abolished scarcity. Even if this were possible, the problem with this qualification is that the tunnel
is
likely to
simply produces
be endless unless one learns to
more mouths and
say,
greater wants
"Enough!" For growth
and
is
thus self-defeating.
Furthermore, even Keynes suggested that economics be radically devalued during our passage through the tunnel. T
The
available empirical evidence supports the position that
development shows
is
economic
largely irrelevant to personal happiness. Easterlin (1973)
that people's sense of economic well-being
depends primarily on their
(Thus the American poor, most of whom are quite rich by any historical or comparative standard, nevertheless feel acutely deprived.) relative standing.
The popular demand
a
desire to keep
a
for more growth is therefore largely motivated by up with (or catch up with) the Joneses. Unfortunately, this is
never-ending pursuit; a few Joneses will always pull ahead of the crowd and
package of goods that one needs to feel non-poor grows constantly. Relative equality and distributive justice thus seem more
inspire emulation, so the
important for individual happiness and well-being than does the absolute level
of production.
CHAPTER 8
302
of cultural riches people have been able to enjoy in the gross quantity of production were
Lewis
Mumford
Roman
the
if
today. Indeed, social critic
it is
Pom-
provincial town, enjoyed a quaHty of Hfe
many important
superior in
than
even
argues persuasively that the inhabitants of ancient
an ordinary
peii,
less
past,
respects to that attainable in present-day
California (1973, pp. 462-473). Nor should we forget the cultural glory of Athens, Florence, Kyoto, and other ancient centers of civilization
whose achievements antedate the Industrial Revolution. Thus development appears to be virtually irrelevant to cultural richness and progress; social arrangements, not wealth in itself, seem to determine the level of In sum, "with a little more wit we might... become social amenity. richer than the richest now are, and make our civilization a blessing."
The Minimal, Frugal Steady The
State
now
nature of the most desirable type of steady state should
clear.
We
saw
earlier that the
attempt to achieve
a
maximum-feasible steady-state society involved fraught with dire political consequences.
maximum-feasible steady
state,
a
Now we
which aims
at
be
high-throughput or Faustian bargain see too that the
gratifying as
far
as
possible the materialistic and hedonistic appetites of the populace,
flies
in the face of the lessons to be discovered in political philosophy
and
in the ethical—spiritual teachings of wise people of every age
and
tradition. In other words, political
and
spiritual
adoption of the minimal, frugal steady
wisdom
state as the
alike
urge the
form of
a post-
industrial society.
minimal steady
PoUtically, a
the favorite prudential
ment
is
state
would,
as its
name
implies, follow
maxim of our founding fathers: "That governWhere this seems to lead is toward a
best that governs least."
decentralized Jeffersonian poUty of relatively small, intimate, locally
The empirical when it comes to
evidence again supports the impressionistic judgment that
*
no more than
culture, bigger
is
not necessarily better.
half the U.S. per capita
Some
consumption of energy
countries with
actually outrank
the United States statistically in important indicators of the quality of life, such as
the rate of infant mortality and the
number of books published per
number of persons per
hospital bed, the
year per million persons, and even public
expenditures for education as a percentage of national income (Watt 1974,
Chap.
11).
Of
course,
some minimum
level
of wealth
is
necessary for a
reasonable level of comfort, but the level of production with appropriate
technology in a steady-state society of reasonable population should be high
enough
to support
moderate and judicious
cultural aspirations.
Toward
of the Steady State
a Politics
303
autonomous, and self-governing communities rooted other local ecological resources) and a
few
in the land (or
affiliated at the federal level
clearly defined purposes. It leads,
only for
m
other words, back to the original American vision of pohtics. Unlike mass society, such a minimal polity can place primary reliance on the inherent virtue of the citizen (or
on the power of local public opinion
to recall a straying citizen to her or
This minimizes the perceived restrictions on individual accordance with the principle of macro-constraint and
his civic duty).
fi-eedom
(in
micro-fi-eedom described in Chapter design over
plannmg expressed
individual
capacity to
4, as
well as the preference for
m Box 29). Of course, as
is unfortunately true of all forms of political association, such a polity also has its attendant dangers. Local tyranny is first among them. However, the tyranny currendy exercJsed over our lives by impersonal forces beyond
any
s
are largely at
comprehend, much less control, is far greater; we the mercy of market forces, efficiency, technological change,
monopoly (that is, our almost total dependence on the ministraof doctors, lawyers, teachers, and other professionals), and so on. By
radical
tions
contrast, local tyrants are highly visible
one would know against
whom
this basically Jeffersonian polity,
for exacting an
and few in number, so
to revolt. Cities
would
but they should be
economic surplus
less
still
that at least
exist
within
of an instrument
fi-om the countryside than they are
now. Eventually they would probably come to resemble the pre-modern city state in size and spirit, a highly desirable development if the coundess historians and political philosophers who have praised this organic form of political and steady state
social
would
community
are to
be believed.* The minimal, fi-ugal
thus predominantly consist of
medium
sized
com-
munities and rural areas, but through modern communications, what Karl Marx called the idiocy (the political, social, and cultural
uncon-
sciousness)
*
As
we
of rural
life
should be avoidable.
noted before, an alternative to the
political association
is
the agrarian empire,
city state as a
which has
primary model of
certain undeniable virtues
and some correspondingly large drawbacks, as Maoist China seems to have shown. Nevertheless, given the large numbers of people in the world and the realities of international politics, a degree of international decentralization, decoupling, and autarky sufficient to support Jeffersonian politics at the local may simply be unattainable. However, any form of minimal steady-state
level
society
would have
decentralization,
interdependence
to
be supported by a large measure of intemational and autarky, for the current degree of
decoupling,
is politically destabilizing and economically disruptive. It and universalizes problems instead of solving them, and it generates strong pressures toward political centralization.
amplifies
CHAPTER 8
304
In economics, too,
less
is
better.
The
goal
is
frugality,
which means
neither poverty nor abundance, but rather an ample sufficiency.
governing principle of economic
The
in a minimal, frugal steady state
life
would be "right livelihood" (Schumacher 1973, pp. 50-58). Honest work from which one can derive satisfaction (not simply a wage), a sense of working in community with and for one's fellows, and an opportunity to develop one's native talents for the benefit of self and others are just
enough income
for a decent
important
as
ence. This
view of economics does not
in
itself,
but
it
does
and dignified material
reject productivity or
as
exist-
technology
demand that the value and dignity of human labor be economy be run "as if people mattered." Following
restored and that the these prescriptions
would
inevitably
promote
virtually self-administering, locally oriented
that
small-scale, self-sufficient,
and controlled enterprise
depends on simple, inexpensive, more labor-intensive means of
production that are ecologically appropriate. All of dividuals back in charge of their frugal
economy compatible with
Although
our net
to cast
our search for
in
widely
as
own economic
we
should put in-
destiny and produce a
we have described. we certainly ought by no means follows that we must
the minimal polity
a suitable civil religion
as possible,
it
convert to Taoism or other seemingly alien reHgious. As
this
faiths political,
economic, or
have seen, the political philosophy of Thomas Jefferson
can supply a large part of the ideological foundation for a minimal, frugal steady
state.
What
is
lacking
may be found
in the ideas
of Thoreau and
all
the other "literary" critics of American civihzation, such as Melville and
Whitman, who chided to the betrayal
us for following a path that
of our basic principles.
Christianity has rightly been found
by
critics (for
to be ecologically objectionable (in that nature
and humans
are given
dominion over
must eventually lead
Moreover, although
much
example, Roszak is
not viewed
as
1
in
973)
sacred
creation), others point out that
stewardship and other Christian virtues could easily form the basis of an ecological ethic. critical
The
historian
Lynn White, for example, though
of Christianity, nevertheless sees
St.
Francis of Assisi,
generally
who wor-
shiped nature and preached absolute identification and harmonious equality with the rest of creation, as a potential "patron saint of ecology" (1967).
The
ecological philosopher
prefers St. Benedict also
*
Rene Dubos, on
the other hand,
of Nursia, because he did not merely love nature but
founded an order of monks
who worked
with the natural environ-
Historian Leo Marx's excellent essay "American Institutions and Ecological
Ideals" (1970)
shows
society have merged.
how
the literary and ecological critiques of
American
— Toward
a Politics of the Steady State
ment
305
to create beautiful, productive,
and harmonious landscapes, thus
of stewardship into physical actuahty (1972, Chap. 8). economist E. F. Schumacher prefers to focus not on a
translating the ideal
By
contrast,
on the "Four Cardinal Virtues" of Christianity and temperantia which would, if observed,
particular figure but
—
prudentia, justitia, fortitude,
almost automatically produce (1974). Christian leaders in the
minimal, frugal steady-state society
a
United
even today developing
States are
a new "green gospel"; the Baptist, United Methodist, Congregational, and Presbyterian churches have produced policy statements on the en-
vironment. Individual leaders of the tant faiths have
been developing
Roman Catholic,Jewish, and Protes-
links
between ecology and theology.
Thus self-renewal or self-transformation based primarily on native American and Western principles is eminently possible, for the minimal and frugal steady
state
in
is
complete accords with the best in our
own
tradition.
The Grand Opportunity Other
of the minimal, frugal steady
visions
state are possible,
but the
foregoing should suggest that feelings of despair and impotence are not appropriate responses to the
crisis
of ecological
scarcity.
True, the transi-
form of steady-state society is likely to be but some measure of destruction is a precondition
tion to any conceivable
wracking and
painfial,
a necessary but in many respects ugly human history that we should rejoice to put behind us. Moreover, if we act wisely and soon, the transition need not involve unbearable sacrifices or frightfiil turmoil. Indeed, we are con-
of rebirth, and the industrial era was
and
di:^ag^eeable phase in
fronted not v^dth the end of the world (although
we
it
will surely
be the end
known it) but with an unparalleled opportunity to share in the creation of a new and potentially higher, more humane form of post-industrial civilization. But we must not delay, for unless we of the world
as
have
begin soon, an ugly and desperate transition to tyrannical version of the steady state
may become
almost inevitable.
A Politics of Transformation Seizing this grand opportunity will require a politics of transformation.
Metanoia
is
tantamount to religious conversion and
is
therefore not easily
achieved. As in the revolutionary eras of the past, inspirational leadership will tion.
be needed to
The
critical
steer us clear
question
the one hand, by a
is
of anarchy and chaos during the
transi-
whether such leadership wiU be provided, on
"man on horseback"
or Big Brother's Ministry of
CHAPTER 8
306
Propaganda "natural
on the
or,
other,
by
Gandhi or
a
Republic. Unfortunately, the breadth of typical
of the
who
resembling those
aristocrats"
latter are
group of Jeffersonian
a
founded the American
mind and nobiHty of character
hard to find these days, for our institutions are
designed to turn out experts and other brilliant mediocrities whose distinguishing characteristic
incapacity" to see
avoid
beyond
is
what Thorstein Veblen
their professional blinders.
called a "trained
Even
who
those
Few even entertain the idea that central to modern civiHzation, such as
often cHng to the past.
this pitfall
many of the Enlightenment values reliance on reductionist information acquired through endless schooling, might have to be discarded. What therefore typically emerges is a call for change in general that ignores most of the a call for
commitment from, only leaders
who
little real
worse, in,
or
have themselves fully embraced the future can provide
Next
to the sheer lack of time in the face of
onrushing events, the paucity of genuine leaders serious obstacle to a better
and more humane
People of Intemperate Minds Cannot is
is
change
the would-be leader. But this cannot be effective;
inspirational leadership.
Leadership
what
critical issues or,
change in the other fellow that implies
is
probably our most
future.
Be Free
only part of the politics of transformation, for even the most
inspired leaders can
do only so much.
We
as individuals
must
also stop
clinging to the past and embrace the future, accepting our personal
make this vision of a more beautiful and come true. Like charity, transformation begins at
responsibility for helping to joyflil steady-state future
home. Above
we must somehow learn
all,
the essential lesson of the
ecological scarcity. In the words of Edmund Burke,
crisis
of
"men of intemperate
do indeed "forge their fetters." It is not that nature has made scanty provision for our wants; nature's economy is generous and plentiful for those who would live modestly within its circle of interdependence. It is our numbers and our wants that
minds cannot be
free," for their passions
have outrun nature's bounty. If
we
will
not freely and joyfully place
"moral chains" on our will and appetite, then
we
shall abdicate to the
brute forces of nature or to a political Leviathan what should be our
own
moral duty. Because even nature's bounty can be exhausted by the infinitude of
human
ficiency in natural
wants, only a Hfe of self-restraint and simple suf-
harmony with
the earth will allow us and our descen-
dants to continue to enjoy Ufe, liberty, and estate.
such a
life,
we
shall find that
precisely to the degree to
it
has
its
which we
own
Having
richness, for
freely
chosen
we become
rich
eliminate violence, greed, and pride
Toward
a Politics
of the Steady State
iS-om our lives. shall see
earth is
is,
When we
3O7
have rediscovered
this
primordial wealth,
we
something the wise have always knovm: The greatest value of the always has been, and always will be not that it is useful but that it
beautiful
—and
that
it
simply
is.
Afterword
Rereading Ecology and
the
of Scarcity 14 years after
Politics
its
initial
publication brings a sad awareness: Despite the existence of a vast literature
on ecology and environmental problems, several decades of political
activism in support of environmental causes, and considerable govern-
ment
environmental wrongs, both domestically and
activity to redress
internationally, very litde has
natural milieu. Nature treated accordingly.
is
The
still
changed seen
humankind's relationship to
in
as either a
mine or
a
dump and
basic laws of ecology are ignored, denied,
its is
and
and humanity continues to hasten down the path to ecological
flouted,
Thus
the concerns of Earthday 1990 differed hardly at
all from on the planet, we can observe more and more people making more and more demands on their environment demands that lead to an inexorable drawdown of finite resources,
perdition.
those of Earthday 1970. Everywhere
—
an acceleration of biological extinction and habitat destruction, and an increase in environmental pollution
grown
steadily
more crowded, and
deteriorate alarmingly.
Many
and its
In short, the planet has
large areas, such as Eastern Europe, have
become acknowledged environmental degradation that results
stress.
physical condition continues to
disaster zones.
when human demands outrun
And
the social
natural capacities
has increased markedly.
Nor
has there
civilization for
been
more
Populations continue to Political leaders
who
likely to suffer the
a significant shift in the appetite
of modern
material wealth defined in terms of "affluence."
demand
"prosperity" and "progress" above aU.
try to talk ecological sense to their constituents are
consequences (wimess the anger and disdain that
greeted President Carter's mention of Hmits). Thus, although the increased media attention focused
on environmental matters during 309
the
AFTERWORD
310
two decades has
past
certainly
promoted
profligate ways, the
what
it
greater ecological awareness,
we must one
along with the nagging suspicion that
watchword of industrial
has been since
its
mend our
day
civilization continues to
be
inception: "Apres nous le deluge."
Rereading the previous edition
me aware that much has now out of date or even
changed.
of many years
after a lapse
Many
of the
erroneous, and certain of
my
specific opinions
were clearly mistaken. At the time of writing, for example, an age of massive dependence on nuclear power was
makes
also
recorded there are
facts
seemed
it
that
virtually inevitable,
but a number of factors (principally energy conservation) have sharply
reduced the need for environmental
new
critics,
generating capacity.
Of course, the
warnings of
myself included, were instrumental in mobilizing
doom by
public opinion against nuclear power, so our prophecies of radiation became, in effect, self-denying
who
deal with the future willingly run.
Boyan making the work
available to a
Nevertheless, with entails,
am
I
what
is
all
new
and to the publishers
generation of readers.
due respect for the labor
important in
this
work
is
risk that aU
therefore deeply grateful to
for preparing this revised edition
Professor for
—an occupational
not particular
that such updating facts
may be
but rather the
which is unchanged. more ample now than it was 15 years ago though at what political and economic cost? or that population growth has declined in some areas of the world faster than originally projected. But essence of the argument,
of
It
fossil fuels is
for each fact
with too
—
viewed too
I
much
that the supply
pessimistically before, there
is
—
another
I
saw
optimism. For example, the extent and rate of rain-forest
destruction has accelerated, both firom commercial logging and land
hunger, and for
its loss.
edition,
we now
understand in more depth the high price
Similarly acid rain,
now looms
as a
which was
scarcely
mentioned
we will pay in the
first
very large and intractable problem noxious to the
health of both natural environments and
human
words, the changes in particulars over the past
populations. In other
20 years have
at best
canceled each other out, allowing the pervasive trend toward ecological scarcity to
continue unchecked.
In addition, the the latest
human mind
tends to assign too
news from the environmental
dramatic or threatening.
It
WiUiam Sound
Exxon Valdez
generated far more concern than
warranted in the overall ecological scheme of things. relatively well
with isolated
insults,
but
it
of an
oil spiU.
is
oil spill
it
really
Nature copes
succumbs over the long term to which lacks the high
the slow and steady assault of chronic pollution, visibihty
to
thereby overlooks or underestimates the real
dangers and their root causes. Thus, for instance, the in Prince
much importance when it
front, especially
Afterword
311
Moreover, certain apparently grave problems may well be taken
many believe doomed by population
care of by natural feedback mechanisms. For example,
of Africa
that the extraordinary fauna
pressure,
which
but
the underlying cause of poaching, fencing, and
is
habitat destruction. ly
is all
It
now
appears, however, that a tragic and classical-
Malthusian combination of famine and diseases, such
AIDS,
humanity's
loss
malaria and
with
being the animals' gain. Similarly, although the threat
of global warming
some
as
will apocalyptically reduce this continent's population,
predict, this
is
real,
and the eventual outcome may be
by no means
is
we
certain.
grim
as
as
Hidden feedback me-
unaware may sop up the excess carbon dioxide, resulting in no discernible change in climate despite greatly increased emissions, and it is even conceivable that these same feedback mechanisms could, by increasing the formation of clouds, chanisms of which
are currently
induce significant global cooling in the next century. (Various
God, such
would
acts
of
extensive vulcanism, or of man, such as nuclear war,
also result in cooling.) In short, basing the ecological case
particulars
bad
as
—no
matter
how
on
—
dramatic, menacing, or "scientific"
is
strategy.
The
appropriate strategy
is
place particular environmental
to
events in the context of the fundamental ecological dynamics that
underlie them. Facts and opinions
may
change, but basic laws and
principles, such as the laws of thermodynamics,
do
not.
These laws tell and that, like
us clearly that the planet has a limited carrying capacity
every other creature,
we
soon have
will
biological income, for
we cannot
It
improvements in our
as
of fossil
fuel, are strictly
such
to
to survive
on our
be clear
why seeming
the discovery of larger supplies
temporary and
bound
pay primary attention to the
will then
forces that create ecological scarcity.
to evade ecological limits are
some way
learn to live
continue to squander capital without
becoming ecological paupers. We need situation,
to find
we must
within that capacity. In other words,
why
almost
all
of our attempts
to be self-defeating in the
long
run. Similar remarks apply to the poUtical discussion in Parts
The
core of the argument
industrial
civilization
institutions are grossly
transition difficult
action.
anti-ecological,
are
The
its
painfiil, for
is
required
is
a revolution in
suffering will be especially severe in the is
scarcity.
and
The
to scarcity will consequently be extremely
what
because American politics
III.
modern
values, practices
maladapted to the emerging age of
from abundance
and
all
and
II
that because the basic premises of
is
predicated
thought and
United
States,
on cornucopian abundance. Our
poHtical institutions were designed for the easy job of dividing the rich
^
AFTERWORD
312
spoils
much
of an almost virgin continent, not for the
harder task of
allocating scarce resources. In this Hght, the details of environmental
poHcy and of the poHtical importance.
What
is
infighting that surrounds
crucial
is
it
are not
of primary of
to understand the fiindamental nature
the underlying dynamic.
my
argument has sometimes been misinterpreted as Hobbesian in spirit, so a few words to guide the reader are in order. As I said in the Preface to the previous edition, my intention was never to offer solutions, much less the solution, to our poHtical-ecological predicaUnfortunately,
ment. If I used Hobbes extensively in the analysis, it was because he is, to echo Marx's homage, "the father of us all" that is, the author of the
—
basic poUtical theory underlying
and
all
forms of modern poHtics,
sociahst alike. His thought therefore reveals
most
capitalist
clearly the pro-
found tensions and contradictions impUcit in this theory of politics. In addition, Hardin's analysis of the tragedy of the commons unknowingly repHcated Hobbes, and Hardin's solution was indeed expUcidy Hobbesian. I expanded on Hardin's argument and suggested various ecological Leviathan might be tamed, I never offered an which ways in this as my own solution. (In the same manner, I used Burke, Plato,
Thus, although
Rousseau, Saint-Simon, and other theorists to permit myself to suggest the direction in
humane long-term
elucidate
When
confi-ont, not to provide ready answers.)
the issues
we now I
did
which we should look
for
in the final chapter
answers, the tenor of the discussion was explicidy
anti-Hobbesian:
The
essential political
cal self-restraint
message of this book
before
it is
forced
is
on us by
that
we must
learn ecologi-
a potentially monolithic
and
regime or by the brute forces of nature. We are currendy sliding by default in the direction of one (or both) of these two outcomes. totalitarian
Only
the restoration of some measure of civic virtue (to use the traditional
term) can
Moreover,
forestall this fate....
can hardly be accidental that the book's epigraph, drawn
it
firom Burke, urges self-restrained control of will
paragraph reprises Burke's theme.
final
therefore far
The
and appetite or
overall spirit
that the
of the work
is
from Hobbesian.
In sum, far from being the solution, the problem.
The
Hobbes
is
rather the essence of
current environmental problematique
outgrowth of the system of
individualistic
is
a
direct
and economic poUtics that
evolved out of the social contract theory elaborated in Leviathan. Thus we
not begin to deal with our problems constructively until we acknowledge that we must reassess our whole world view and way of life.
shall
Afterword
313
Reforms intended merely deepen the are already
crisis in
to sustain the current political system will only
the long run and,
what
worse, feed the forces that
is
pushing us in the direction of Leviathan.*
Nevertheless,
I
now
see that
I
could have made the reader's task
easier by employing Alexis de Tocqueville's all-important distinction between government and administration. No human group can exist without government that is, without a fundamental agreement among its members on how their communal Hfe is to be regulated. On
—
the other hand,
human
beings can get along quite
weU without
administration. So-called primitive tribes dispense with
it
entirely
some early observers to conclude, erroneously, that these tribes had no poHtics). Conversely, it is possible to have a polity that is all administration and little or no government. Such was the unhappy (leading
plight of the former Soviet
Union:
A
monstrous bureaucratic ap-
paratus refused to die, while the political spirit that once gave
and meaning was aU but extinguished. have also
moved
we
in the
United
States
quite far in the direction of the administrative state,
and our governing
Thus
Alas,
it life
spirit
too burns
my
much
brightly than before.
less
which could be misunderstood as providing the rationale for an even bigger and more coercive administrative state, would alarm some readers. If we use de Tocqueville's language, however, matters become much clearer. We desperately need more government that is, stronger checks on the competitive overexploitation of the ecological commons and therefore on human self-aggrandizement. But it does not necessarily follow from this that we need more administration. On the contrary, or it
is
not surprising that
critique,
—
so
it
seems to me, given the appalling record of the administrative
this century,
the better solution
is
form of government that is within its ecological means but need
a
ecological Leviathan (which, as
to
state in
be found in the other direction.
effective in obliging
humankind
that does not require us to erect
many of my
critics rightly
simply would not work in the long run). This
is
why
I
We
to live
an
pointed out,
championed
design over planning (Box 32) and macro-constraints in the service of
micro-freedoms (Box 24).
Similarly,
I
suggested (Box 25) that the
new
form of government would have to be based on an "ecological contract" to ensure that a basic harmony between man and nature was at the core
*
I
describe these forces in a
work
in progress entitled
Moribund Liberalism:
The Tragedy of Enlightenment Politics, which explores the contradictions and self-destructive tendencies of modem politics and traces them back to Hobbes's fundamental
from
virtue.
error, believing that politics
could ever be separated
AFTERWORD
314
of politics.*
I
pointed out (Chapter
also
the most critical need
8) that
is
we have embraced an we cannot possibly have a genuinely ecological poUtics. now be apparent why those among my critics who beheve
for a change of heart, or "metanoia," because until
ecological ethos, It
should
that democratic activism within the current system
is
the solution to our
environmental problematique are almost certainly mistaken. Unless the fundamentally restructured, "more democracy" cannot be ef-
system
is
fective.
This
is
not to say that environmental pressure groups cannot be
effective in preventing
tories are
or that ecological atrocity, but isolated vic-
this
not enough to deflect the drive for development
of nature. Moreover, although people activism
seem group
to
at
the expense
see the answer in political
may be noble champions of the democratic ideal, they do not appreciate what they are up against. The trouble with interest-
politics
that, for all the reasons
is
the long run.
over the
The
outlined in Chapters 5 and
common
interest in
prospect of the ecological interest
somehow
prevailing
bound
commercial,
to
financial,
and manufacturing
interests
pays the media pipers and finances the electoral process
fore remote, to say the least. (Paradoxically, the
mental interest groups
are,
the
more they begin
more
is
is
whose there-
successful environ-
to resemble other interest
groups and the more they necessarily collaborate in an established cal process that
6,
be victorious over the
special interests are
money
who
politi-
both fundamentally anti-ecological and increasingly
anti-democratic.) In short, as
I
said in the fmal chapter,
"environmental
politicking within the system can only be a rear-guard holding action
designed to slow the pace of ecological retreat"
who
(p.
282).
on "more democracy" within the current political context also commit the grave error of confusing "interest-group liberaUsm" with genuine democracy. Nothing could be fiirther firom the Those
truth.
Our
rely
current political system
government
is
a bureaucratic
primary end: the
satisfaction
Popular participation, such
and
is statist,
electoral
not democratic.
of human appetite
as it
is, is
The
behemoth dedicated at
federal
to
one
the expense of nature.
token, minimal, symboHc; and the
behemoth is largely beholden to organized and monied interests. Genuine democracy, by contrast, is se/^government, and self-government
*
In retrospect, even
ecological contract
though
was not
apt.
it is
an obvious play off social
Contract
is
a
contract,
the phrase
commercial concept, and by using
it,
Hobbes was (knowingly or unknowingly) creating a poUty in which the economic motive would predominate to the detriment of other values. Thus the appropriate term would have been ecological covenant; both the denotation and the connotations of covenant suggest the very underlie an ecological political order.
different spirit that
must
Afterword
315
requires
own
two
things: a population that
economic
structure that
is
amenable
is
willing and able to restrain
common good
of the
appetites for the sake
to,
and
and indeed
a social
fosters,
United
in the
Thus,
States.
I
Thoreauvian ecological
exists
too believe that democracy can be part of the
long-term solution to our ecological predicament, but only genuine democracy
popular
now
understanding and local control. Neither of these conditions
its
and
—democracy
that
in spirit
and
practice. It
democracy
that
most of the
who
In sum, therefore, those
justification for increased state
is
toward such an
in fact, precisely
final
chapter points.
work an anti-democratic
see in this
power
it
fundamentally Jeffersonian and
is
is,
if
to enforce ecological imperatives
have fundamentally misunderstood the argument. Instead,
raise
I
and
explore the political contradictions of the current system in the light of
ecology and then point toward a ecologically
sound and more
trust that, read in this spirit,
American
critique of the
political
order that would be both
truly democratic than
my work
remains a
more
our current one.
I
and important
usefiil
political system, as well as a significant
contribu-
and long-term
tion to the intensifying debate over man's place in nature future. I
regret to
believe that I
we
say,
however, that
wdll
saw us confi-onted with
future,
and
I
I
am now
less
inclined than before to
respond positively to the ecological challenge. Then,
beHeved
a
grand opportunity to create
that the transition to a
more
a
more humane
ecologically en-
we have frittered away the two decades since the first Earthday without seizing this grand opportunity. To the extent that we have acted other than symbolically, we have spent the last 20 years doing all the easiest and least painflil things. Now we must do the hard things: reshape basic attitudes and expectations, alter
Hghtened world view had already begun. But
established lifestyles,
and restructure the economy accordingly. But rather
than adopt ecological principles for pubHc policy, thing
we
we seem
to
do every-
can to avoid facing up to the inevitabihty of Hmits and of
changing our profUgate way of shorter and the problems have
In other words, time has grow^n
life.
become
larger
and more entrenched, but
our resistance to dealing with them constructively has increased. Worse, the end of the Cold War, universal peace, has
dangerous place than
made it
was
far firom
the world a
a
bringing about an era of
more complex,
unstable,
and
decade ago. History has reawakened from
nearly a half-century of hibernation. Long-frozen political, ethnic, and
reHgious passions have thawed, and the economic struggle both for
markets and for resources has simultaneously heated up. prospect
is
for widespread conflict
and turmoil
in
The
depressing
many areas of the globe.
Preoccupation with geopolitical advantage, military reaHgnments, and
AFTERWORD
316
economic competitiveness seems likely to preempt the policy agenda in hardly the best political environment for making the coming decade thoughtful and far-sighted decisions about a human future based on
—
ecological harmony.
Nevertheless, to
work
I
have by no means
for the benefit of the Earth
posterity that has never
done anything
same. Together we may make
or hope, and
lost heart
and the Ufe for
me.
I
it
I
continue
bears, as well as for the
urge the reader to do the
a difference.
William Ophuls
January 1992
.
.
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—
1989 "Environmental Ethics
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1972 "Radiation and
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Holdren, John R, and Paul R. EhrUch
1971 Global Ecology: Toward a Rational
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York: Harcourt Brace
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HoUng, Dwight 1991 "America's Energy Plan," The Amicus Journal, Winter, 12-20.
Holmberg, Bo,
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1975 Special
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Howland, H. Richard 1975 "The
Hehum
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.
.
.
Chapter 2
327
Huffaker, Carl B.
1971 "Biological Control and
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a
Pest Control Strategy,"
Technology
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Inman, Douglas
L.,
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1973 "The Coastal Challenge,"
Science
181:20-31.
Janzen, Daniel H.
1973 "Tropical Agroecosystems,"
Science
182:1212-1219.
Kenward, Michael 1972 "Fighting 1989
for the
"'Killer' Trees
Clean Car,"
New
Scientist
51:553-555.
To The Rescue," Newsweek 114(14):
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Kramer, Eugene
1973 "Energy Conservation and Waste Recychng: Taking Advantage of Urban Congestion,"
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Atomic
Scientists
29(4):13— 18.
Laing, David
1974 "The Phosphate Connection," Not Lee, Douglas
Man Apart 4(13):1,
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H. K.
1973 "Specific Approaches
to
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Lichtenstein, E.
P.,
T. T. Liang,
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1973 "Synergism of Insecticides by Herbicides," Likens,
Gene
and
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1974 "Acid Rain:
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A
Science
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Serious Regional Environmental Problem," Science 184:1176-
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Loosh, J. K.
1974
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Human
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McHale,John 1
970 The
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1971 The Future of the Future Maclntyre, Ferren
1974 "The Top MiUimeter of the Ocean,"
Scientific
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McKelvey, Vincent E
1972 "Mineral Resource Estimates and Public Policy," American
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60:32-
40.
1974 "Approaches to the Mineral Supply Problem," Technology Review 76(5):13-23.
Maddox, John 1972 The Doomsday Syndrome (London: Macmillan).
Malenbaum, Wilfi-ed 1
973 "World Resources for the Year 2000," Annals of the American Academy of Political and
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1974 "Nitrogen Mathews,Jessica
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1990 "Rescue Plan for
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1974 "Chemical Carcinogenesis:
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Science
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Meadows, Dennis L., et al. 1974 The Dynamia of Growth
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et
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al.
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Meier, Richard L.
1966
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New
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Cambridge:
MIT). Metz, William D., and Allen
L.
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1974a "Geodynamics Report: Exploiting the Earth Sciences Revolution, "Sdence 183:735-738, 769.
1974b "Helium Conservation Program: Casting
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Meyer, Alden 1990a "The 'White House
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1990b "United mer,
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3.
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1972 "Renewing the
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Secretary, ed.
1971 Rxipid Population Growth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins). National Research Council
1989
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NCMP (National Commission on Materials Pohcy) 1972 Towards
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1973 Toward a National
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Newill,Vaun A.
1973 "Pollution's Price tists
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in
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Newman, James
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1974 "World CUmates and Food Supply Variations,"
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1987 The Economist, 20 June, 94. Odell, Rice
1974 "Water Pollution: The Complexities of Control," Conservation Foundation Letter,
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December.
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1971 Fundamentals of Ecology (3d ed.; Philadelphia: Saunders).
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Chapter 2
329
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1968 Affluence
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1974 "Protein Deficiency or Starvation?"
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1987 "Power fiiom the Sea,"
Scientific
American 256(l):86-92.
Perelman, Michael J.
1972 "Faming with Petroleum," Environment 14(8):8-13. Pimental, David, et
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1970 "Marine Farming,"
Scientific
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1987, September "Defusing the Toxics Threat: Controlling Pesticides and Industrial
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1990 "Energy for Industry," Russell,
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330 Sagan, L. A.
1972
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Salk, Jonas
1973 The
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Suruival of the Wisest
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1970 Man's Impact on
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the Global
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1989 "Are Alternative Fuels the Answer?" Environmental Action, July/ August, 21—22. Shapley,
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1973a "Auto Pollution:
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Houghton
pollution].
Singer, S. Fred
—When Does Growth Become Too Expensive?"
1971 "Environmental Quahty Is
Optimum
There an
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in
York:
McGraw-Hill). Skinner, Brian J.
1969 Earth Resources (2d
ed.
;
Englewood
Clifis: Prentice-Hall).
Small, WiUiamE.
1971 "Agriculture: Smith,
Roger
H., and
The
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R. C. von Borstel
1972 "Genetic Control of Insect Populations,"
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178:1164—1174.
Spurgeon, David
1973 "The Nutrition Crunch:
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World View,"
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of the Atomic Scientists
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1974 "Digesting the
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Scientist
61:609-611.
Roger, and James Carlson
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1968 "Pollution and Poverty," Steinhart,John
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Public Interest
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1974 "Energy Use in the U.S. Food System," Sterling,
costs].
and Carol E. Steinhart Science
184:307-316.
Theodor D.
1971 "Difficulty of Evaluating the Toxicity and Teratogenicity of 2,4,5-T fixjm Existing
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Summers, Claude M. 1971 "The Conversion of Energy," in Energy and Power, ed. Scientific American
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Theodore
1973 The
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Teitelbaum, Michael
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1975 "Relevance of Demographic Transition Theory for Developing Countries," Science
188:420
Valery, Nicholas
1972 "Place in the Sun for Helium,"
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Chapter 2
331
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1974a "Green Revolution
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A
Just Technology,
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Often Unjust in Use."
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186:1093-1096.
1974b "Green Revolution
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1974d "SaheUan Drought:
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1975
No Victory for Western Aid,"
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Search for an Alternative Agriculture," Science
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Geoi^
1973 Health
L. Effects
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Wallace, Bruce
1974 "Commentary: Radioactive Wastes and Damage to Marine Communities," BioScience 24: 164-167.
Ward, Barbara, and Rene Dubos
1972 Only One Earth: The Care and Maintence of
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Weeks,
W
E, and W.J.
CampbeU
1973 "Towdng Icebergs Atomic
Weinberg, Alvin
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1972 "Science and Trans-Science," Minerva 10 (2): 209-222. Weinberg, Carl J., and Robert H. WiUiams
1990 "Energy from die Sun"
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Common
1987 "Pesticides in 15
Eoods
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Westman, Walter E. 1972 "Some Basic
Issues in
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de Wilde, Jan
1975 "Insect Population Management and Integrated Pest Control," Amino 4:105-111. Wilkes, H. Garrison, and Susan Wilkes
1972 "The Green Revolution," Environment 14(8):32-39. Wittwer,
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1974
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183:1049-
1052.
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1990 World
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332 Young, Gale 1970 "Dry Lands and Desalted Water,"
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in State of the World, 1991, ed. Linda
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Water Wasteland: Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Water Pollution (New York:
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Chapter 3 Aaronson,Terri
1971 "The Black Box," Environment 13(10):10-18 [on fuel
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Abelson, Philip H., ed.
1974 "Energy,"
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Ahmed, A. Karim
Human
1975 "Unshielding the Sun:
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American Lung Association 1990 "Air Pollution Health Costs Calculated," The Washington
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21 January, Al 2.
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to
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66:300
atmospheric and cUmatic dangers of the Space Shuttle program].
Anthrop, Donald
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1970 "Environmental Side Scientists
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Armstead, H. C. H., ed.
1973 Geothermal Energy: Review of Research and Development (New York: UNESCO).
Atwood, Genevieve 1975 "The Strip-Mining of Western Coal,"
Scientific
American 233(6):23-29.
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Eugene 1950 "Power from
Science
187:795-803.
Ayres,
Baldwin, Pamela
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the Sun,"
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1974 "Offihore
OU
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Baldwin
Up
as
Energy
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1975 "Hydrogen: A Versatile Element," American
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Chapter 3
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1975 Symposium on "Can
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in
Barnea, Joseph
1972 "Geothermal Power,"
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American 226{\):70-77.
Barraclough, Geofl&ey
1974 "The End of an Era,"
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de Bell, Garrett, ed. 1
970 The Environmental Handbook (New York: Ballantine).
Berg, Charles A.
1973 "Energy Conservation through Effective Utilization,"
1974 "A Technical Basis
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Energy Conservation," Technology Review 76(4):15-23.
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1973 "Hot Wastes firom Nuclear Power," Environment 15(4):36-^4. Berry,
R. Stephen
1971 "The Option for Survival," Bulletin of the Atomic ,
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1973 "The Energy Cost of Automobiles,"
Bulletin of the
Atomic
Scientists
29(10):1 1-
17,58-60. ,
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1974 "Energy Thrift in Packaging and Marketing," Technology Review 76(4):33-43. Bezdek, Roger, and Bruce Hannon 1974 "Energy, Manpower, and the Highway Trust Fund,"
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185:669-675.
Bockris, J.
Crisis
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1:241-249. Boffey, Philip
M.
1975 "Rasmussen
Issues
Revised Odds on
a
Nuclear Catastrophe,"
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190:640. Bolin, Bert
1974 "Modelling the Climate and
Its
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Booth, William
1990 "Carbon Dioxide Curbs Po5f,
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10 March, Al.
1991a "Tropical Forests Disappearing
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tember,A18.
1991b "Global Warming Continues, but Cause
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1964 The Meaning of the and Row).
Twentieth Century:
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Transition
1973 "The Economics of die Coming Spaceship Earth," Brinworth, B.J. 1973 Solar Energy for Broecker, Wallace
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1975 "Climatic Change: Are Science
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1973 "The Technology of Zero-Growth," Daedalus 102(4): 139-152.
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334 Brown, Harrison, James Bormer, and John Weir 1963 The Next Hundred Years (New York: Viking). Browne, Malcolm W. 1991
Waste," The
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New
York Times, 29
October, CI. Bryson, Reid A.
1973 "Drought in Saheha: Who or What
1974
Is
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on CUmatic Change,"
to
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Ecologist
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184:753-760.
Science
Bupp, Irvin
1974 "The Breeder Reactor in the U.S.:
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Economic
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New
1971 "After the Age of Discovery?"
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52:96-100.
Bury, J. B.
1955 The Idea of Progress.: An Inquiry
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Callahan, Daniel
1973 The Tyranny of Survival (New York: Macmillan) ways of reexamining technology].
Chap.
[esp.
3,
which
discusses
Calvin, Melvin
1974 "Solar Energy by Photosynthesis,"
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184:375-381.
Carter, Luther J.
1973 "Deepwater
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1974 "Floating Nuclear
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Power from the Assembly Line,"
Science
183:1063-
1065.
Chapman, Peter 1974 "The
Ins
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New
Scientist
64:966-969
[net energy
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Chedd, Graham 1974 "Colonisation Cheney, Eric
at
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64:247-249.
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1974 "U.S. Energy Resources: Limits and Future Oudook," American
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62:14-22. Clark, Wilson
1974 Energyfor Survival: The Alternatives
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Clarke, Arthur C.
1962
Profiles
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and Row). Cloud, Preston, ed.
1969 Resources and
Man (New York:
W H. Freeman and
Co.).
Cochran, Thomas B.
1974 The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder
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Cohen, Bernard
L.
1974 "Perspectives on the Nuclear Debate: Atomic
Scientists
An Opposing
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the lesser
Bulletin of the
evil].
Comey, David D. 1974 "Will
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the
Atomic
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30(9):23-28.
1975 "The Legacy of Uranium Tailings,"
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.
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Chapter 3
335
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the Planet
York: Pantheon Books).
Howard Boksenbaum, and Michael Corr, eds. 1975 Energy and Human Welfare: A Critical Analysis (3 vok; Riverside, N.J.: Macmillan ,
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Conservation Foundation
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1970 "Can
1973
May.
Letter,
1974a "Carrying Capacity Analysis tion Letter,
June
[a
Is
Useful
—
^But Limited," Conservation
of the multiple
useful discussion
taken into account in thinking about carrying capacity for
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Founda-
factors that have to
human
be
use].
Scene of Many Energy Conflicts," Conservation Foundation
Is
January.
Letter,
Cook, C. Sharp 1973 "Energy: Planning for the Future," American
Scientist
61:61—65.
Cook, Earl 1971 "The
How of Energy in an Industrial Society,"
1976 Man,
Energy, Society
(New York:
Scientific American
W H. Freeman and
224(3): 134— 144.
Co.).
Cottrell, Fred
1955 Energy and
Society:
Development
Craven,
The Relation Between Energy,
Social Change,
and Economic
(New York: McGraw-Hill)
Gwyneth
1975 "The Garden of Feasibility,"
Harper's,
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[a
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Crossland, Janice
1974 "Ferment in Technology," Environment 16(10):17-30 [fermenting organic materials for fuels and other usefiil products]
Dahlberg, Kenneth A.
1973 "Towards
Herman
Daly,
a Policy
of Zero Energy Growth," The
Ecologist
3:338-341.
E., ed.
1973 Toward
a Steady State
Economy (New York:
W H. Freeman and
Co.).
Daniels, Farrington
1964
Direct
Use of the Sun's Energy
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1971 "Direct Use of the Sun's Energy," American
summarizes
his
book,
still
a standard
work
Scientist
55:5—47 [updates and
in the field].
David, Edward E., Jr.
1973 "Energy: Day,
M.
A Strategy of Diversity,"
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C.
1975 "Nuclear Energy: Scientists
DeNike,
L.
A
Second
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[fiiel
Round of
Questions," Bulletin of the Atomic
supply problems].
Douglas
1974 "Radioactive Malevolence,"
Bulletin of the
Atomic
Scientists
30(2): 16-20 [security
risks].
Dials,
George
E.,
and Elizabeth C. Moore
1974 "The Cost of Coal," Environment
16(7): 18-37.
Dickson, David
1974
Alternative Technology: And the Politics of Technical
Change (London: Fontana).
SUGGESTED READINGS
336 Dinneen, Gerald U., and Glenn
L.
Cook
1974 "Oil Shale and the Energy Djerassi, Carl, et
Crisis," Technology
Review 76(3):27-33.
al.
1974 "Insect Control of the Future: Operational and Policy Aspects,"
Science
186:596-607. Dreschhoff, Gisela, D.
Saunders, and E.J. ZeUer
F.
1974 "International High Level Nuclear Waste Management," Scientists
Bulletin of the
Atomic
30(l):28-33.
Drucker, Daniel C. 1971 "The Engineer in the Establishment,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
27(10):31-34.
Dudley, H. C.
1975 "The Ultimate Catastrophe," [the
remote
of
possibility
a
Bulletin of the
Atomic
31(9):21-34
Scientists
runaway chain reaction following
a nuclear
explosion].
T
EdsaU.John
1974 "Hazards of Nuclear Fission Power and the Choice of Alternatives," Environmental Conservation l(l):21-30
[fossil fuel
the lesser risk].
Ehricke,KraffiA.
1971 "Extraterrestrial Imperative," Bulletin of
the
Atomic
27(9):18-26
Scientists
[escape to space].
EhrHch, Paul R.,and Anne Ehrhch
1972
Population, Resources, Environment: Issues in
W. H. Freeman and
EIC (Environment
Human
Ecology (2nd
ed.;New York:
Co.).
Information Center)
1973 The Energy Index
(New York: EIC).
Eigner, Joseph
1975 "Unshielding the Sun: Environmental Effects," Environment 17(3):15-18. Ems,A.J. 1975 "Geothermal Systems and Power Development," American
Scientist
63:510-521.
Emmett,John L.,John Nuckolls, and Lowell Wood 1974 "Fusion Power by Laser Implosion," Scientific American 230(6):24— 37. Enviro/Info
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Raymond
1975 "Food and
Ferkiss, Victor
1969
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123:1061-1066.
C.
Technological
Man: The Myth and
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Fisher, John C.
1974 Energy Fletcher, J.
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O.
1970 "Polar Ice and the Global Climate Machine," tists
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Atomic Scien-
Chapter 3
337
French, Hillary
1990
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"A Most Deadly Trade"
IVorld PFarc/jJuly-August,
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1-17.
Frisken,W.R.
"Extended
1971
Industrial
Revolution and CUmate Change,"
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Gabel, Medard, ed.
1975
Energy, Earth
&
Everyone (San Francisco: Straight Arrow) [an unconventional
and stimulating treatment of energy by followers of Buckminster
Fuller].
Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas 1971
The Entropy Law and
the
Economic Process (Cambridge: Harvard).
1973 "The Entropy Law and the Economic Problem," 1975 "Energy and Economic Myths," The
Ecologist
Daly 1973, pp. 37-49.
in
5:164-174, 242-252.
Giddings, J. Calvin
Human
1973 "World Population, Atomic Gillette,
Scientists
Disaster and Nuclear Holocaust," Bulletin of the
29(7):21-24, 45-50.
Robert
1973a "Energy
R&D: Under
PoUcy Takes Form,"
Pressure, a National
Science
182:898-900.
1973b "NAS: Water
Scarcity
1973c "Radiation SpiU
at
May Limit Use
of Western Coal,"
Hanford: The Anatomy of
An
Science 181:525.
Accident," Science
181:728-730.
1974a "Budget Review: Energy,"
Science
1974b "Oil and Gas Resources: Did 1974c "Synthetic
Fuels: Will
183:636-638.
USGS Gush Too
Government Lend
High?"
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the Oil Industry a
185:127-130.
Hand?"
Science
183:641-643.
1975 "Geological Survey Lowers Gilhland,
Its
Sights," Science 189:200.
Martha W.
1975 "Energy Analysis and Public PoUcy,"
Science
189:1051-1056.
Glaser, Peter E.
1968 "Power from the Sun:
Its
Future," Science 162:857-861
[gathering solar
energy in space]. Glass, Bentley
1971 "Science: Endless Horizons or Golden Age?" Global
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171:23—29.
Tomorrow Coahtion
1990 The Global Ecology Handbook,
ed. Walter
H. Corson (Boston: Beacon
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Gofinan,John 1972
"Is
Nuclear Fission Acceptable?" Futures 4:21 1-219.
Goldstein, Irving
S.
1975 "Potential for Converting
Wood
into Plastics," Science 189:847-852.
Gough, Wilham C, and Bernard J. Eastlund 1971 "The Prospects of Fusion Power," Green, Harold
Scientific
American 224(2):50-64.
P.
1971 "Radioactive Waste and the Law," Natural Resources Journal 11:281-295. Green, Leon, Jr.
1967 "Energy Needs
vs.
Environmental Pollution
156:1448-1450 [using ammonia
—
^A
Reconciliation," Scietue
as a fuel].
GreenhiU, Basil
1972 "The Saihng Ship in Gregory, Derek
a Fuel Crisis,"
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P.
1973 "The Hydrogen Economy,"
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American 22^(j):\2>-2\.
.
SUGGESTED READINGS
338
Gustafion, Philip
F.
1970 "Nuclear Power and Thermal Pollution: Zion, Scientists
Illinois," Bulletin of the
Atomic
26{3yA7 -23.
Hafele.Wolf
1974 "A Systems Approach Hammond, Allen L.
to Energy," American Scientist 62:438-447.
1974a "Academy Says Energy SelP-Sufficiency Urdikely," conclusions of National
Academy of Engineering
Science
184:964 [reporting
study].
1974b "Energy: Ford Foundation Study Urges Action on Conservation,"
Science
186:426-428.
1974c "Individual SeK^Sufficiency in Energy,"
Science
184:278-282.
A New Sense of Urgency," Science 1975a "Geothermal Resources: A New Look," Science 190:370. 1974d "Modeling the Climate:
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Its
185:1145-1147.
Urgency Recedes,"
Science
187:1181-1183. 1975c "Solar Energy Reconsidered:
1976 "Lithium:
WiU
ERDA Sees Bright Future," Science 189:538-539.
Short Supply
Constrain Energy Technologies?"
Science
Ozone,"
Science
191:1037-1038. ,
and Thomas H. Maugh,
II
1974 "Stratospheric Pollution: Multiple Threats to
Earth's
186:335-338. ,
William Metz, and Thomas H. Maugh,
1973 Energy and
the Future
Hammond, Ogden, and
II
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Martin B.
Zimmerman
1975 "The Economics of Coal-Based Synthetic Gas," Technology Review 77 {S)-A3—51.
Hammond, R. Phihp 1974 "Nuclear Power Risks," American
Scientist
62:155-160.
Hannon, Bruce 1974 "Options for Energy Conservation," Technology Review 76(4):24— 31. 1975 "Energy Conservation and the Consumer," discussion of the
Harleman, Donald R. 1971
97 1
189:95-102
[a first-rate
F.
"Heat— The
Harte, John, and Robert 1
Science
need for an energy standard of value].
Patient Earth
Ultimate Waste," Technology Review 74(2):45-51.
H. Socolow,
eds.
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Hein,R.A. 1974 "Superconductivity: Large-Scale Applications,"
Science
185:211-222.
Heronemus, WiUiam E. 1975 "The Case for Solar Energy," Center Report
WiUiam
8(l):6-9.
R. Rice 1974 "Nuclear Fusion Power and the Environment," Environmental
Hirsch, Robert L.,and
L.
Conservation
1:251-262. Hirst, Eric
1973 "Transportation Energy Use and Conservation Potential," Atomic
Scientists
Bulletin
of the
29(9):36^2.
and John C. Moyers 1973 "Efficiency of Energy Use in the United ,
States," Science
179:1299-1304.
Hobbs, P. v., H. Harrison, and E. Robinson 1974 "Atmospheric Effects of Pollutants,"
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183:909-915.
Chapter 3
339
Hohenemser, Kurt H. 1975 "The
Holdren.John
Failsafe
Risk," Environment 17(1):6-10.
P.
1974 "Hazards of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle," ,
Bulletin of the
Atomic
Scientists
30(8):14-23.
and Paul R. EhrUch
"Human Population and the Global Environment," American
1974
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, United on Health and the Environment.
Scientist
States Congress,
62:282-292.
Subcommittee
An of 1989, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 22 June Testimony of Bruce K. Maillet, on behalf of the State and Territorial Air
1989 Hearing on Air Toxins Control
Pollution Program Administrators and the Association of Local Air PoUution
Control
Officials.
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, United on Health and the Environment. 1989 Hecring on Air Toxins Control Statement of Henry A.
Hubbert,
Aa
States Congress,
of 1989, 100th Cong., 1st
Subcommittee
sess.
,
22 June
Waxman, Chairman.
M. King
1969 "Energy Resources," in Cloud 1969, pp. 157-242. Hueckel, Glenn 1975
"A
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Historical
[an article
in this chapter].
Indonesia,
1989 Inghs,
Government of U. S. Neius and World Report, 18
December, 80-81.
David R.
—
1973 Nuclear Energy dison—Wesley) Johnston, Harold
Its
Physics and
Social Challenge (Reading, Mass.:
Its
Ad-
.
S.
1974 "PoUution of the Stratosphere," Environmental Conservation 1:163-176. Kantrowitz, Arthur
1969 "The
Test:
Meeting the Challenge of New Technology,"
Bulletin of the
Atomic
25(9):20-22, 48 [even more Panglossian than Rabinowitch 1969].
Scientists
Kariel, Pat
1974 "The Athabasca Tar Sands," Kates,
Robert W.,
1973
Sierra
Club Bulletin 59(8):8-10, 32.
et al.
"Human
KeUogg, W. W, and
Impact of the Managua Earthquake,"
S.
Science
182:981-990.
H. Schneider
1974 "Chmate Stabihzation: For Better or for Worse?"
Science
186:1163-1172
[the
of attempting cHmate control].
perils
Kolb, Charles E.
1975 "The Depletion of Stratospheric Ozone," Technology Review 78(l):39-47. Krieger,
David
1975 "Terrorists
and Nuclear Technology,"
Bulletin
of the
Atomic
Scientists
31(6):28-34.
Kubo, Arthur
and David J. Rose
S.,
1973 "Disposal of Nuclear Wastes,
Kuhn, Thomas 1970 The
" Science
182:1205-1211.
S.
Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(2nd
ed.; University
[diminishing returns in scientific discovery].
of Chicago
Press)
.
.
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340 Kukla, George J., and Helena J. Kukla
1974 "Increased Surface Albedo
in the
Northern Hemisphere,"
Science
183:709-
714.
Lamb, Hubert H. 1974 "Is the
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Earth's
Ecologist
4:10-15.
Landsberg, Hans H.
1974 "Low-Cost, Abundant Energy: Paradise Lost?" Landsberg, Helmut
E.,
Science
184:247-253.
and Lester Machta
1974 "Anthropogenic Pollution of the Atmosphere: Whereto?" Ambio 3:146-150. Lapp, Ralph E.
1972 "One Answer the Ocean,"
to the
New
Atomic-Energy Puzzle
1973 "The Chemical Century," Lewis, Richard
—Put
the
Atomic Power Plants in
York Times Magazine, ]une 4, pp. 20-21, 80-90. Bulletin of the
Atomic
Scientists
29(7):8-14.
S.
1972 The Nuclear Power Rebellion: Citizens
vs.
the
Atomic
Industrial Establishment
(New
York: Viking).
Lieberman, M. A.
1976 "United
States
—An
Uranium Resources
Analysis of Historical Data," Science
192:431-436. Lincoln, G. A.
1973 "Energy Conservation,"
Science
180:155-162.
Lindop, Patricia J., and J. Rotblat
1971 "Radiation Pollution of the Environment," Bulletin of
the
Atomic
Scientists
27(7): 17-24.
Lippman, Thomas W. 1991 "Risk Found in
Low
Levels of Radiation," The Washington Post, 20 March,
A3. Lovins,
Amory B.
1975 World Energy
Strategies: Facts, Issues,
and Options (Cambridge: Friends of the
Earth/Ballinger) ,
and John H. Price
1975 Non-Nuclear Futures: The Casefor an
Ethical Energy Strategy
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McCaull,JuUan 1973 "Windmills," Environment 15(1):6-17. 1974 "Wringing Out the West," Environment 16(7):10-17.
McCloughlin, Merrill 1989 "Our Dirty Air," Mclntyre,
Hugh
U S. News and
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C.
1975 "Natural-Uranium Heavy-Water Reactors," [the
Scientific
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CANDU system].
McKelvey,V.E.
1972 "Mineral Resource Estimates and Public Policy," American
Scientist
60:32-
40.
Makhijani, A.B., and A.J. Lichtenberg
1972 "Energy and Well-Being," Environment 14(5):1 1-18.
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Chapter 3
341
Maraniss, David, and Michael Weisskopf
1988 "Jobs and ber,
Margen,
Illness in
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Decem-
At.
Peter, et
al.
1975 "The Capacity of Nuclear Power Plants,"
Bulletin of the
Atomic
Scientists
31(8):3&-46.
Martin,
S.,
and W.J. Campbell
1973 "Oil and Ice in the Arctic Ocean: Possible Large-Scale Interactions,"
Science
181:56-58.
Marx, Wesley 1973 "Los Angeles and
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Mistress
Its
Bulletin
of the Atomic
Scientists
29(4):4-7,
44-48.
Massumi, Brian
Man Apart 4(6): 12.
1974 "Oil Shale Country," Not
Mathews, Jay 1991 "Southern California Clean Air Agency
is
Criticized," The Washington Post,
1
May,A21. Mazur, Allan, and Eugene Rosa
1974 "Energy and Life-Style,"
Meadows, Dennis
L.,
Science
186:607-610.
and Jorgen Randers
1972 "Adding the Time Dimension to Environmental Policy," in World Eco-Crisis: Organizations in Response, ed.
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David A. Kay and Eugene B.
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Meadows, Dennis
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al.
1974 The Dynamics of Growth Medawar, Peter 1969
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Meinel, Aden B., and Marjorie
1971
in a Finite
"Is It
Time
for a
P.
Mernel
New Look
at
Solar Energy?" Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists
27(8):32-37. Mesarovic, Mihajlo, and Eduard Pestel
1974 Mankind
at the Turning Point:
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to the
Club of Rome
(NewYork:
Duttord Reader's Digest). Metz, William
D
1972 "Magnetic Containment Fusion: What Are the Prospects?" Sdence 178:291-292.
1973 "Ocean Temperature Gradients: Solar Power from the Sea,"
Science
180:1266-
1267.
1974 "Oil Shale:
A Huge Resource of Low-Grade Fuel,"
Sdence 184:1271-1275.
1975a "Energy Conservation: Better Living through Thermodynamics,"
Science
188:820-821.
1975b "Energy:
ERDA
Stresses
Multiple Sources and Conservation,"
Scierue
189:369-370. Metzger, H. Peter
1972 The Atomic Establishment (New York: Simon and Schuster) Meyer, Alden
1990 "The 'White House
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Bush Backs Off Carbon Dioxide
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1990 "United
States Increasingly Isolated
on Global Wurming," Nucleus, Summer,
3.
.
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342
Michaelis, Anthony
R.
1973 "Coping with Disaster,"
Mickhn, Phihp
Bulletin of the
Atomic
Scientists
29(4):24-29.
P.
1974 "Environmental Hazards of Nuclear Wastes," 30(4):36-42
[a first-rate
Bulletin of the
Atomic
Scientists
non-polemical review].
Miles, Rufiis., Jr.
1976 Awakening from Mishan, E.J. 1974 "The
the
American Dream
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New Inflation: Its Theory and Practice,"
Moore, Curtis 1990 "Revenge of the
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Killer Trees," The Washington Post,
29 July, C3.
Mostert, Noel 1
974
Supership
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Mumford, Lewis 1970 The Pentagon of Power
Murdoch, WLUiam W.
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1971 Environment: Resources, Pollution and
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Mussett, Alan
1973 "Discovery: A Declining Asset?" NaiU, Roger E, et
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60:886-889.
al.
1975 "The Transition to Coal," Technology Review 78(l):19-29. Nash,
Hugh
1974 "Nader,
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Not
Man
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National
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1975 Mineral
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and
the
Environment (Washington: National
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oil
and gas estimates
Academy of Sciences) as
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National Research Council
1989
Alternative Agriculture (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy
Press.)
Nelson, Saul
1974 "The
Looming Shortage of Primary
Processing
Capacity,"
Challenge
16(6):45-48.
de Nevers, Noel
1973 "Enforcing the Clean Air Act of 1970,"
Scientific
American 228(6): 14-21.
Newell, Reginald E.
1974 "The Earth's Chmatic History," Technology Review 77(2):31-45. Nilsson,
Sam
1974 "Energy Analysis
Goods and
—
^A
Services,"
More
Sensitive Instrument for
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Novick, Sheldon
1969 The 1975
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Brew," Environment 17(4):8-11 [critique of AEC's
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1975 "Net Energy Analysis Can Be Illuminating," Conservation Foundation
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[a
very
usefial
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brief summary of the issues].
O'DonneU, Sean 1974 "Ireland Turns to Peat,"
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countries also have substantial suppUes].
63:18-19 [the
USSR
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.
Chapter 3
343
Odum, Howard T. 1971 Environment, Power and
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1973 "Energy, Ecology and Economics," Ambio 2:220-227. Okie, Susan
1990 "Cancer Rates
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December,
Al. O'Neill, Gerard K.
1975 "Space Colonies and Energy Supply to the Earth,"
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Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
1990 The
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F.
1974 "Coal and the Present
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Situation," Science 183:477-481.
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1974 "Growing Pains in Energy," Smithsonian 5(6):12-15. Park, Charles F,Jr.
1968
Jeopardy:
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Affluence
Minerab
and
the
Economy
Political
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Francisco:
Freeman,Cooper) Patterson, Walter C.
1972 "The British Atom," Environment 14(10):2-9.
and Stephanie Pearl
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1971 "Toward an Ecological Theory of Value,"
Social
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[ther-
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Harry
1974 "The Gasification of Coal,"
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American 230(3) A9-25.
Peterson,James T.
1973 "Energy and the Weather," Environment 15(8):4—9. Plau,John R.
1966 The Step
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Pollard, WiUiamG.
1976 "The Long-range Prospects for Solar Energy," American
[why centrahzed generation of electricity using tical, if not
solar
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64:424—429
energy will be imprac-
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Polunin, Nicholas
1974 "Thoughts on Some Conceivable Ecodisasters," Environmental Conservation 1:177-189 [all the small but potentially lethal risks, especially in combination].
Post,
Richard
F.
1971 "Fusion Power:
The Uncertain
Certainty," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
27(8):42-48. ,
and Stephen
F.
Post
1973 "Flywheels," ,
and
F.
L.
Scientific
1974 "Fusion Reactors Postel,
American 229{6):\7-23.
Ribe as
Future Energy Sources," Science 186:397-407.
Sandra
1990 "Trouble
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Tap"
in Environment
90/91, reprinted fixjm World Watch, Sep-
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Derek J. de SoUa
1961
Science Since Babylon
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SUGGESTED READINGS
344 Primack, Joel, and Frank von Hippel
1974 "Nuclear Reactor
Safety:
The Origins and Issues of a Vital Debate,"
Bulletin of
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Prud'homme, Robert K. 1974 "Automobile Emissions Abatement and Fuels
American
Policy,"
Scientist
62:191-199. Pryde, Philip R., and Lucy
T Pryde
1974 "Soviet Nuclear Power: A Different Approach to Nuclear
Safety," Environment
16(3):26-34.
Rabinowitch, Eugene
1969 "ResponsibiUty of
Scientists in
—
25(9) :2-3, 26 [an argument
technology have aboUshed Ramseier,
Our Age,"
Bulletin of the
^very typical in its rationale
—
Atomic
Scientists
that science
and
scarcity].
Rene O.
1974 "Oil on
How
Ice:
Melt the Arctic and
to
Warm
the World," Environment
16(4):7-14.
RAND Corporation 1973
Quandary
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Monica:
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RANN (Research Applied to National Needs Program) 1972 Summary Report of
the
Workshop on Energy and
Cornell
the
Environment
(Washington: Government Printing Office).
Reed,
T B., and R. M. Lemer
1973 "Medianol: A Versatile Fuel for Immediate Use,"
Science
182:1299-1304.
Renner, Michael
War on the Environment," in State of the (New York: WW. Norton & Company).
1991 "Assessing the Military ed. Linda Starke
W
Rex, Robert 1971 "Geothermal Energy Scientists
RFF
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Bulletin of the
Atomic
27(8):52-56.
(Resources for the Future)
1973 Energy Research and Development
ment Printing
—
Problems and Prospects (Washington:
Govern-
Office).
Rhodes, Richard 1974 "Los Alamos Revisited,"
Harper's,
March,
pp. 57-64.
Rice, Richard A.
1974 "Toward More Transportation with Less Energy," Technology Review 76(4):45-53. Ritchie-Calder, Peter R.
1970 "Mortgaging the Old Homestead," Foreign
Affairs
48:207-220 [supertanker
problems].
Roberts, Marc
1973
"Is
J.
There an Energy
Robinson, Arthur
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L.
1974 "Energy Storage
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Developing Advanced Technologies,"
887.
Robson, Geoffi-ey 1974 "Geothermal
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Rose, David J.
1974a "Energy Policy in the U.S.,"
1974b "Nuclear Eclectic Power,"
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Science
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184:351-359.
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184:884-
.
Chapter 3
.
345
Rubin, Milton D. 1974 "Plugging the
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W. M.S.
Russell,
1971 "Population and Inflation," The
SCEP
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(Study of Critical Environmental Problems)
1970 Man's Impact on
the Global
Environment (Cambridge: MIT).
Schneider, Stephen H.
1974 "The Population Explosion: Can
It
Shake the Climate?" Ambio 3:150-
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and Roger D. Dennett
1975 "Chmatic Barriers to Long-Term
Schumacher, E.
974 Small
1
Seaborg, Glenn
Enei^
Grovvth," Ambio 4:65-74.
F.
Is Beautiful:
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T, and William R.
if People
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Row)
Corliss
1971 M('« and Atom: Building a
New
World Through Nuclear Technology
(New York:
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1989 "Protecting the Ozone Layer"
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in State of the World, 1989, ed.
Linda Starke
& Company).
Shen-Miller,J.
1970 "Some Thou^ts on the Nuclear Agro-Industrial Complex,"BioSde«a 20:98100.
Shogren, EUzabeth
990 "4 Years
1
Later, Chernobyl's
Ills
Widen," The Washington
Post,
27 April, Al
Skinner, Brian J.
1969 Earth Resources (Englewood Chfls: Prentice-Hall). Slesser,
Malcolm
1973 "Energy Analysis
in
PoUcy Making," New
1974 "The Energy Ration," The
SMIC
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1971 Inadvertent Climate Modification (Cambridge: MIT). Smith, R. Jeffi-ey
1989 "Low-Level Radiation Causes More Deaths Than Assumed, Study Finds," The Washington Post, 20 December, A3.
Snowden, Donald
P.
1972 "Superconductors for Power Transmission,"
Scientific American
226(4):84-91.
Sorensen, Bent
1975 "Energy and Resources,"
Science
189:255-260
[a solar
energy economy for
Denmark]. Spurgeon, David
1973 "Natural Power for the Third World,"
1974 "Coal: Starr,
New
60:694-697.
A Past and Future Kirg," Ambio 3:1-14.
Chauncey
1971 "Energy and Power," ,
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Scientific American
225(3)134-144.
Rudman
1973 "Parameters of Technological Growth," Stein,
Scientist
Arthur M.
Squires,
Science
182:358-364.
Richard G.
1972
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346
Stent,
Gunther
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1969 The Coming of the Golden Age: A View of the End of Progress (New York: Natxiral History
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Stevens, William K.
1991 "As Nations Meet on Global Warming, U.S. Stands Alone," The Times, 10 September, ,
York
1991 "Danes Link Sunspot Intensity to Global Temperature Rise," The New York
November, C4.
Times, 5 Stever,
New
CI.
H. Guyford
1975 "Whither the
growing Strong, Maurice
1973
Higher Derivatives,"
Science
189:264-267 [the
of research and development].
F.
"One
An Ecological
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Affairs
Stunkel,
NSF?—The
capital intensity
Approach to Management,"
Foreign
5\i4):690-707.
Kermeth R.
1973 "The Technological Solution,"
Bulletin of the
Atomic
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29(7):42^4.
Tamphn, Arthur R. 1973 "Solar Energy," Environment 15(5):16-20, 32-34 [one of the best short reviews; extensive citations].
Taylor,
Theodore
1973 The
B.,
and Charles C. Humpstone
Restoration of the Earth
(New York: Harper and Row).
UNESCO 1973 "Appropriate Technology,"
a special issue
of Impact of
Science on
Society
23:251-352.
United Nations 1961 Proceedings of
the Conference
on
New
Sources of Energy (6 vols;
Nations) [extensive discussions of wind, tide, and sun
as
Rome: United
sources of power].
Vacca, Roberto
1973 The Coming Dark Age, alarmist
view of the
trans. J. S.
Whale (Garden
City,
NY:
Doubleday) [an
industrial system's intrinsic instability].
Wade, Nicholas 1974 "Windmills: The Resurrection of an Ancient Energy Technology,"
Science
184:1055-1058. Walsh, John
1974 "Uranium Enrichment: Both the Americans and Europeans Must Decide
Where
to
Get the Nuclear Fuel of the 1980's,"
Science
184:1160-1161.
Wanniski,Jude
1975 "The MundeU-Laffer Hypothesis Public Interest
39:31-52
[scarcity
—
^A
and
New View
of the World Economy,"
inflation].
Wasserman, Harvey 1991 "Bush's Pro-Nuke Waters, W.G.,
Enei^
Strategy."
The Nation, 20 May, 656-660.
II
1973 "Landing
a
Man Downtown,"
Bulletin of the
[how environmental management Watt, Kenneth E.
1974 The
differs fi-om
Atomic
29(9):34-35
E
Titanic Effect: Planning for the Unthinkable (Stamford,
Weinberg, Alvin
Scientists
space programs].
M.
1972 "Science and Trans-Science," Minerva 10:209—222.
Conn.: Sinauer).
.
Chapter 4
347
—
1973 "Technology and Ecology
Is
There
a
Need
for Confixjntation?" BioSdence
23:41-45.
1974 "Global
Effects
of Man's Production of Energy,"
Science 186:205.
Weir, David, and Constance Matthiessen
1990 "Will the Circle Be Unbroken?" Jones, ]une, 1989, pp.
in Environment
90/91, reprinted from Mother
20-27, Annual Editions (Guildford, Connecticut: The
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1991 "Ozone Layer over U.S. Thinning Swiftly," The Washington Wentorf, R. H.,Jr., and R. E.
1974 "Thermochemical Hydrogen Generation,"
Westman, Walter
E.,
Post, 5 April,
Al.
Hanneman 185:311-319.
Science
and Roger M. Gifford
1973 "Environmental Impact: Controlling the Overall Level,"
Science
181:819-825
[with an energy currency].
Whittemore, 1973
F.
Case
"How Much
Reserve?" Environment 15(7):16-20, 31-35.
in
Wilkinson, John
1974 "A Modest Proposal for Recycling 7(3):7-12
Our Junk Heap Society," Center Report computer simulation suggests that fiiture living standards wUl
[a
resemble those of the early 1900s].
WiUrich, Mason, and Theodore B. Taylor
1974 Nuclear
Theft: Risks
and Safeguards (Cambridge: BaUinger).
Wilson, Richard
1973 "Natural Gas
Is
Beautiful Thing?"
a
Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists
29(7):35-40.
Wind Energy Weekly 1991 4 June, #403.
Winsche,W.E.,etal. 1973 "Hydrc^en:
Its
Future Role in the Nation's Energy Economy," Science 180:1325-
1332.
Wolf, Martin
1974 "Solar Energy UriHzation by Physical Methods,"
Wood,
Lowell, and John
Science
184:382-386.
NuckoUs
1972 "Fusion Power," Environment 14(4):29-33.
World Resources 1990 World
Institute.
Resources,
Programme and
1990-91 the
in collaboration with the
U.N. Envirormiental
U.N. Development Program.
Wright, John, and John Syrett
1975 "Energy Analysis of Nuclear Power,"
Young, Louise
B.,
New
Scientist
65:66-67.
and H. Peyton Young
1974 "Pollution by
Electrical Transmission:
Voltage Lines," Bulletin of the Atomic
The Environmental Impact of High
Scientists
30(10):34-38.
Chapter 4 Attah, Ernest B.
1973 "Racial Aspects of Zero Population Growth," Barker, Ernst, trans. 1
962 The
Politia of Aristotle
(New York: Oxford)
Science
180:1143-115.
.
.
.
SUGGESTED READINGS
348
Bamett, Larry D. 1971 "Zero Population Growth, Inc.," BioSdence 21:759-765. Bell,
Daniel
1973 The Coming of Post-Industrial
Society:
A
(NewYork:
Venture in Social Forecasting
Basic Books). Berlin, Isaiah
1969 Four Essays on
(New York: Oxford).
Liberty
Brown, Harrison 1954 The Challenge of Man's Future (New York: Viking). Buchanan, James 1969 The Demand and Supply of Public Goods (Chicago: Rand McNally).
Burch,WimamR.,Jr. 1971 Daydreams and Nightmares:
A
Sociological
Essay on the American Environment
(New York: Harper and Row). Buder, Samuel 1
872 Erewhon (New York: Signet, 1 960)
Callahan, Daniel J.
1973 The Tyranny of
Survival;
and Other Pathologies of Civilized
Life
(New
York:
MacmiUan). Carney, Francis
1972
" Schlockology, "
New
York Review o/Boofes, June
1,
pp. 26-29.
Chamberlin.NeilW. 1970 Beyond Malthus: Population and Power (New York: Basic Books). and Anthony Scott
Christy, Francis T.,Jr.,
1965 The Common Wealth
in
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Cohen, David 1973 "Chemical Castration,"
Comford, Francis M.,
New
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57:525-526.
trans.
1945 The Republic of Plato (New York: Oxford).
Crowe, Beryl
L.
1969 "The Tragedy of die
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Dahl, Robert A.
1970
After the Revolution? : Authority in a
Good
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(New Haven: Yale).
Delg^do,Jose Manuel R.
1969
Physical Control of the
Mind: Toward a Psychocivilized
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Thomas, Ari van Tienhaven, and Frank Rosenblatt
1970 "Population Control,
Sterilization,
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Science
167:337.
Ellul, Jacques 1
967 The
Elmer-Dewitt,
Technological Society (rev. ;
New York: Knopf)
Phillip
1989 "A Drastic Plan to Banish Smog," Time, 27 March, 65. Fife,
Daniel
1971 "Killing the Goose," Environment 13(3):20-27 [the logic of the commons]. Forester, E.
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1928 The Eternal Moment (New York: Harcourt, Brace)
R. Buckminster 1968 "An Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth" in Environment and Change: The Next Fifty Years, ed. WilHam R. Ewald.Jr. (Bloomington: Indiana).
Fuller,
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.
Chapter 4
349 1969 "Vertical
Geesaman, Donald
Is
P.,
to Live, Horizontal
to Die," American Scholar
Is
1974 "The Dilemma of Fission Power," extreme security measures
[the
Global
39 (i) -.27 -^7.
and Dean E. Abrahamson Bulletin of the
a nuclear
Atomic
Scientists
power economy
30(9):37-41
will require].
Tomorrow Coalition
1990 The Global Ecology Handbook, Haefele,
Edwin
ed. Walter
H. Corson (Boston: Beacon
Press).
T. ed. ,
1975 The Governance of Common Property Resources (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins). Hardin, Garrett
1968 "The Tragedy of the Commons," 1972 Exploring
Science
162:1243-1248.
New Ethics for Survival (New York: Viking).
,ed.
1969
and Birth Control: A Collage of Controversial
Population, Evolution,
Ideas (2nded.;
New York: W. H. Freeman and Co.). P
Heilbroner,
obert L.
An
1974
Inquiry into the
Human
Prospect
(New York: Norton).
Hobbes, Thomas 1651 Leviathan, ed.
or the Matter,
Form and Power of a Commonwealth,
ealesiastical
and
civil,
H. W. Schneider (Indianapohs: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958).
Holden, Constance 1973 "Psychosurgery: Legitimate
Therapy or Laundered Lobotomy?"
Science
179:1109-1114. Huxley, Aldous L.
1932 Brave 1 958
Brave
New New
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World Revisited
niich, Ivan
1973
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Kahn, Alfred E. 1966 "The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market
Failures, Imperfections,
and the
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Kahn, Herman, and Anthony J. Wiener 1968 "Faustian Powers and nological and
Human
Economic
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Some
Twenty-First Century Tech-
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WiUiam R.
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Leon R. 1971 "The
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—
1972 "Making Babies 26:18-56. Lewis, C. 1
S.
965 The
Abolition of Man
(New York: Macmillan)
Locke, John
1690 Second
Treatise, in
American
Two
Treatises
of Government, ed. Peter Laslett
(New York: New
Library, 1965).
McDermott, John 1969 "Technology: The Opiate of the
Intellectuals,"
New
York Review of Books,]\Ay
31,pp.25-35. Michael, Donald N.
1970 The Unprepared
Row).
Society: Planning for a Precarious Future
(New York: Harper and
.
.
.
SUGGESTED READINGS
350 Morrison, Denton
E.,
Kenneth E. Horseback, and W. Keith Warner
1974 Environment: A
Bibliography of Social Science and Related Literature (Washington:
GPO). 1975 Energy: A Bibliography of Social
Myers,
Science
and Related
Literature
(New Yoric: Garland).
Norman
1975 "The
WhaUng Controversy,"
American
Scientist
63:448-455 [an excellent case
study of the kinds of pressures that promote overexploitation] Odell, Rice
1975
"How
Will
January
[a
We
React to an Age of Scarcity?" Conservation Foundation
Letter,
review of many different opinions].
Olson, Mancur, Jr.
1968 The Logic of Collective Action: Schocken) ,
and Hans Landsberg,
1973 The No-Growth
Public
Goods and
the
Theory of Groups
(NewYork:
eds.
Society
(New York: Norton).
Ophuls, William
1973 "Leviathan or ObUvion?" in Toward Steady-State Economy, (New York: W. H. Freeman and Co.), pp. 215-230.
ed.
Herman
E.
Daly
Orwell, George
1963 Nineteen Eighty-Four:
Text, Sources, Criticism, ed. Irving
Howe (New
York:
Harcourt, Brace and World). Pirages,
C, and
Dennis
1974 Ark
Paul R. EhrUch Response
II: Social
to
Environmental Imperatives
(New York:
W H. Freeman
and Company). Popper, Karl R.
1966 The Open
Society,
and
Its
Enemies
(2
vols,
5th ed.,
rev.;
Princeton University
Press).
Reich, Charles A. 1
97 1
The Greening of America
(New York: Random House)
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques
1762 The
Social Contract, ed.
Russett, Bruce M., and
Charles Frankel
(New York: Hafiier,
1947).
John D. SuUivan
1971 "Collective Goods and International Organization,"
International Organization
25:845-865. ScheUing, Thomas C.
1971 Skinner, B.
"On
the Ecology of Micromotive,," Public Interest 25:61-98.
F.
1971 Beyond Freedom and Dignity
(New York: Knopf).
Smith, Adam
1776
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the (New York: Modern Library, 1937).
Speth, J. Gustave, Arthur
R. Tamplin, and Thomas
B.
Wealth of Nations, ed.
Edwin Carman
Cochran
1974 "Plutonium Recycle: The Fateful Step,"
Bulletin
of the Atomic
Scientists
30(9):15-22. Stillman, Peter G.
1975 "The Tragedy of the Commons:
A Re-Analysis," Alternatives 4(2):12-15.
Stone, Christopher D.
1974 Should
Trees
Have Standing?: Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Cahf.: William Kaufinann).
Objects (Los Altos,
.
Chapter 5
351
Susskind, Charles
1973 Understanding Technology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins).
Tuan,Yi-Fu 1970 "Our Treatment of the Environment in Ideal and Actuality," American
58:244—249
[the
Chinese and their environment through
Wade, Nicholas 1974 "Sahelian Drought:
No
Scientist
history].
Victory for Western Aid," Science 185:234-237 [how
an aid program destroyed the traditional controls on
—with
common
a
catastrophic results].
Webb, Walter
Prescott
1952 The Great Weinberg, Alvrn
Houghton
Frontier (Boston:
Mifflin).
M.
1972a "Social Institutions and Nuclear Energy,"
Science
177:27—34.
1972b Review of John Holdren and Philip Herrers, Energy:
A
Crisis in
Power in
An.erican Scientist 60:775—776.
1973 "Technology and Ecology
—
Is
There
a
Need
for Confrontation?" BioScience
23:41-46.
White, Lynn, Jr.
1967 "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic
Crisis, "Snenre
155:1203—1207.
Wilkinson, Richard G.
1973 Poverty and
An
Progress:
Ecological Perspective
on Economic Development
(New
York: Praeger).
WiUrich, Mason 1 975
"Terrorists
Keep Out! The Problem of Safeguarding Nuclear Materials :
of Malfunctioning People,"
Bulletin of the
Atomic
Scientists
in a
Worid
31(5):12— 16.
Wynne—Edwards, V. C. 1970 "Self-Regulatory Systems in Populations of Animals," in The Subversive Science, ed. Paul Shepard and Daniel McKinley (Boston: Houghton Mifflin), pp. 99-111 [valuable biological perspective on the tragedy of the
commons]
Chapter 5 Abrahamson, Dean E. 1974a "Energy:
AH
in the Family," Environment 16(7):50-52.
1974b "Energy: Sidestepping
NEPA Reviews,"
Environment 16(9):39.
Anderson, Frederick R., and Robert H. Daniels
1973
NEPA
in the
Courts:
A
Legal Analysis of the National Environmental Policy Act
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins). Ayres,
Robert
U.,
and Allen
V.
Kneese
1969 "Production, Consumption, and Externalities," American Economic Review
59:282-297 [Kneese Barnett, Harold J., and Chandler
1963
Scarcity
et al.
1970
in a nutsheU].
Morse
and Growth: The Economics of Natural Resource
Availability (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins).
Beckerman, Wilfred 1974 Bell,
In Defence of Economic
Growth (London: Cape).
Daniel
1971 "The Corporation and Society in the 1970's," Public
Interest
24:5-32.
1
.
.
SUGGESTED READINGS
352 Boguslaw, Robert
New
1965 The
Utopians
(Englewood
Cliffi,
NJ.: Prentice-Hall).
Boulding, Kenneth E.
1949 "Income or Welfare?" Reinew of Economic Studies 17:77-86. 1966 "The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth," in Environmental Quality
in a
Hop-
Grounng Economy, ed. Henry Jarrett (Baltimore: Johns
3-14.
kins), pp.
—
1967 "Fun and Games with the Gross National Product The Role of Misleading Indicators in Social Policy," in The Environmental Crisis, ed. Harold W.
(New Haven: Yale), pp. 157-170. (New York: McGraw-Hill), Chap. 7. Brooks, Harvey, and Raymond Bowers 197 "The Assessment of Technology" in Man and the Ecosphere, ed. Paul R. Ehrlich, John P Holdren, and Richard W. Hohn (New York: W. H. Freeman and Co.). Helfrich,Jr.
1970 Economics
as a Science
Carter, Luther J.
1973 "Alaska Pipeline: Congress Deaf
to Environmentalists," Science
179:1310-
1312,1350. Clark,
CoUnW.
1973 "The Economics of Overexploitation,"
Science
181:630-634.
Commoner, Barry 1973 "Trains into Flowers,"
Harper's,
December,
pp.
78-86 [why
trains
cannot
compete with the auto] Conservation Foundation
1971 "Indiscriminate Economic Growth, Measured with Little Regard for Environmental Costs and Social Well-Being, Is Challenged," CF Letter, May. 1972
"NEPA
Challenges the Nations Plans and Priorities
Some Are Reacting Against Culbertson,John M. and
1
97 1 Economic Development: An
Dales,J.
Ecological
—But
Progress
Is
Slow,
CF Letter, May.
Approach
(New York: Knopf)
H.
1968
Pollution, Property sity
Herman
Daly,
It,"
of Toronto
and
Prices:
An
Essay in Policy-Making and Economics (Univer-
Press).
E., ed.
1973 Toward a Steady-State Economy (New York:
W H. Freeman and
Co.).
Dolan, Edwin G.
1971
TANSTAAFL:
The Economic
Strategy for Ecologic
Crisis
(New
York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston). Edel,
Matthew 1973 Economies and
the
Environment (Englewood CliSs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall).
Freeman, A. Myrick, and Robert H. Haveman
1972 "Clean Rhetoric and Dirty Water," ,
Public Interest 28:51-65.
Robert H. Haveman, and Allen V. Kneese
1973 The Economia of Environmental
Policy
(New York: Wiley).
Gabor, Dennis
1972 The Mature
Society
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Galbraith,John K.
1958 The
Affluent Society (Boston:
1967 The
New
Houghton Mifflin). Houghton Mifflin).
Industrial State (Boston:
.
.
.
Chapter 5
353
Garvey, Gerald 1
972
Economy:
Energy, Ecology,
A
Framework for Environmental
Policy
(New
York:
Norton).
Robert
Gillette,
1972 "National Environmental Policy Act: Signs of Backlash Are Evident,"
Science
176:30-33. Hagevik, George 1971 "Legislating for Air Quality Management," in The
Roos,
Leslie L.
[Excellent
on
Jr.
(New
us.
of Ecosuicide, ed.
the difficulties of internahzing costs.]
Hardesty, John, Norris C. Clement, and
1971 "The PoUtical
Politics
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), pp. 311-345.
CHnton
E. Jencks
Economy of Environmental
the Environment, ed.
Disruption," in Economic Growth
Warren E.Johnson and John Hardesty (Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth), pp. 85-106. Hardin, Garret'
1972 Exploring
New Ethics for Survival (New York: Viking).
Harnik, Peter
1973 "The Biggest Going-Out-of-Business Sale of All Time," Environmental Action,
September l,pp. 9-12. Hays, Samuel
P.
1959 Conservation and HeUer, Walter
the Gospel of Efficiency
(Cambridge: Harvard).
W
1973 Economic Growth and Environmental Quality: town,
N.J.:
General Learning
Collision, or
Co-Existence (Morris-
Press).
Henderson, Hazel 1976 "The End of Economics," The important radical economist;
Ecologist
6:137-146
a valuable
chapter, with usefiil references to her
[a first-rate
critique
by an
supplement to the argument of this
own
previous
work and
to the
work of
others]
Hirschman, Albert
0.
1967 Development
Projects
Observed (Washington: Brookings Institute) [the hidden
of development]
costs
Kapp,K.WilUam 1950 The
Social Costs of Private Enterprise
(New York: Schocken, 1971).
Klausener, Samuel Z.
1971
On Man
and His Environment (San Francisco :Jossey-Bass) [an attempt to
to terms with
some of the
sociological externaHties
come
of development]
Kneese,AllenV.
1973 "The Faustian Bargain: Benefit-Cost Analysis and Unscheduled Events in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle," Resources 44:1-5. ,
Robert U.
Ayres,
and Ralph C. d'Arge
1970 Economics and Environment: A Materials Balance Approach (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins) Kraus, James
1974 "American Environmental Case Law: Krieger, Martin
An
Update,"
Alternatives 3(2):25-30.
H.
1973 "What's
Wrong
pure economic
with
Plastic Trees," Science
analysis].
Krieth, Frank
1973 "Lack of Impact," Environment 15(l):26-33.
179:446-455
[the perversities
of
.
SUGGESTED READINGS
354
Miller, G.Tyler
1990 Living
in the
Environment (6th ed.; Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing
Company). Mishan, EzraJ.
1969 Technology and Growth: The 1971
"On Making the
Price
We Pay (New York: Praeger).
Future Safe for Mankind," Public
Interest
24:33-61
Novick, Sheldon
1974 "Nuclear Breeders," Environment 16(6):6-15. Odell, Rice
—Business
1973 "Environmental Pohticking ter,
Passell, Peter,
Usual," Conservation Foundation Let-
and Leonard Ross
1973 The Pearce,
as
August.
Retreat from Riches: Affluence
and
Its
Enemies
(New York: Viking).
David
1973
"Is
Ecology
Elitist?"
The
Ecologist
3:61-63.
Polanyi, Karl
1944 The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon). Ridker, Ronald G.
1972 "Population and Pollution in the United
176:1085-1090.
States," Science
Rothman, Harry 1972 Murderous
Providence:
A
Study of Pollution
in Industrial
Societies
(New York:
Bobbs-Merrill). Ruff, Larry E.
1970 "The Economic
Common
Sense of Pollution," Public
Interest
19:69-85.
Sachs, Ignacy
1971 "Approaches to a Pohtical tion
5(5):47-58
traditionahsts
[a
Economy
of Environment,"
Social Science Informa-
very perceptive brief overview of the clash between market
and the new economic
hoUsts].
Stone, Richard
1972
'The Evaluation of Pollution: Balancing Gains and Losses," Minerva 10:412425.
Tribe,
Lawrence H.
1971 "Legal Frameworks for the Assessment and Control of Technology," Minerva 9:243-255. Tsuru, Shigeto
1971 "In Place of GNP,"
Social Scierue Information 10(4):7-21
discussion of the drawbacks of
[an especially
good
GNP as an indicator].
UNESCO 1973 "The Social Assessment of Technology,"
special issue of International Social
Science Journal 25(3).
Weisskopf Walter A. 1971 Alienation and Economics
(New York: Dutton).
Wildavsky, Aaron
1967 "Aesthetic Power or the Triumph of the Sensitive Minority over the Vulgar Mass:
A
Political
Analysis of the
New
Economics," Daedalus
96:1115-1128. Wilkinson, Richard G.
1973 Poverty and
Progress:
York: Praeger).
An
Ecological Perspective on
Economic Development
(New
.
Chapter 6
355
Winner, Langdon 1972
"On
Controlling Technology," Public Policy 20:35-59.
Wollman, Nathaniel 1967 "The
New Economics
of Resources," Daedalus 96:1099-1 114.
Chapter 6 Abelson, Philip H.
1972a "Environmental Quality,"
1972b "Federal
Statistics," Science
Science
177:655.
175:1315.
Bachrach, Peter
1967 The Theory ofDemoaatic Bell,
Elitism:
A
Critique (Boston: Little,
Brown).
Daniel
—On
1974 "The Public Household
Sociology' and the Liberal Society,"
'Fiscal
Public Interest 37:29-68.
Brown, Harrison, James Bonner, and John Weir 1963 The Next Hundred Years (New York: Viking)
[esp.
Chaps. 14-17, which discuss
manpower] Bruce-Briggs, B.
1974 "Against the Neo-Malthusians," Commentary July, pp. 25-29.
Burch,WimamR.,Jr. 1971 Daydreams and Nightmares:
(New
York: Harper and
A
Sociological
Essay on the American Environment
Row).
Caldwell, Lynton K.
1971 Environment: A Challenge ,
to
Modem
Society
(Garden
City, N.Y.:
Doubleday).
and Toufiq A. Siddiqi Policy, Law and Administration: A Guide to Advanced Study (Bloomington: University of Indiana School of Public and Environmental
1974 Environmental
Affairs).
Carpenter, Richard A.
1972 "National Goals and Environmental Laws," Technology Review 74(3): 58-63. Carter, Luther J.
1973a "Environment:
A Lesson for the
1973b "Environmental Law
(I):
People of Plenty," Science 182:1323-1324.
Maturing Field
for Laviryers
and
Scientists," Science
179:1205-1209.
1973c "Environmental
Law
(II):
A Strategic Weapon Against Degradation?"
Science
179:1310-1312,1350.
1973d
"Pesticides: Environmentalists
Seek New Victory in
a Frustrating
War,"
Science
181:143-145.
1974a "Cancer and die Environment
(I):
A
Creaky System Grinds On,"
Science
186:239-242.
1974b "Con Edison: Endless Storm King Dispute Adds 194:1353-1358.
to
Its
Troubles," Science
1974c "The Energy Bureaucracy: The Pieces Fall into Place," Science 185:44-45. 1974d "Energy: Cannibalism in the Bureaucracy," Science 186:511.
1974e "Pollution and Pubhc Health: Taconite Case Poses Major Test,"
Science
186:31-36.
1975a "The Environment:
A
'Mature' Cause in
Need of a
Lift," Science
187:45-48.
.
SUGGESTED READINGS
356 1975b The
Florida Experience:
Land and Water
Policy in a
GrouHh State (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins).
Cohn.Victor 1975 "The Washington Energy Show," Technology Review 77(3):8, 68. Conservation Foundation
1972 "Wanted:
A
Coordinated, Coherent National Energy Policy Geared to the
CF Letter, No. 6-72.
Public Interest,"
Cooley, Richard A., and Geoffi^y Wandesforde-Smith, eds.
1970 Congress and
the
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Crossland, Janice 16(2): 15-27.
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362 Nash.A.E.Keir 1970 "Pollution, Population and the
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1970 The Harried
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1973 One Cosmic McKinley, Daniel
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1968 The Encounter of Man and Nature: The
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366 1974 "Message fixjm the Universe," The
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1973 The Tender Carnivore and ,
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1970 The
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(New York: New Directions)
S.
1976 The Promise of the Coming Dark Age Taylor,
(New York: W. H. Freeman and Co.).
Gordon Rattray
1974 Rethink: Radical
Proposals to Save a Disintegrating World (Baltimore: Penguin).
Thoreau, Henry David
1854 Walden, in The
Portable Thoreau, ed. Carl
Bode (New York: Viking, 1964).
Wagar, W. Warren 1971 Building Watt, Kenneth E.
1974 The
the City of Man: Outlines of a
World Civilization
(New York: Grossman).
F.
Titanic Effect: Planningfor the Unthinkable (Stamford,
Conn.: Sinauer).
White, Lynn, Jr.
1967 "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic
Crisis," Science
155:1203-1207.
1
Index
abundance
control failures, 137
1
191
political liberty and,
treaties,
changes and ecological, 190
social
276
alternative agriculture. See organic
accidents, risks of industrial, 152, 170
farming
American Lung Association, The, on
acid rain
air
pollution, 138
as air pollutant, fiael
136
air pollution,
Hume and infinite, 9,
138
American. See United
burning and, 87
States
anthropengenic subchmax, 31, 34
ozone combined with, 139
anthropocentric trend, 33
agrarian society, 297, 303
aquaculture. See mariculture
agreements, international, 276
Arctic National WildUfe Refiige, oil
agribusiness biotechnology, 58
drUling
agricultural efficiency,
in,
84 192
Aristotle, ideas of, 8, 12, 190,
39
Atomic Energy Commission, 92
pollution, 61
authority in the steady
revolution, ecosystems and, 32
automobile. See motor vehicles
state,
285
See also agriculture agriculture
cHmate and weather costs
as restraints,
of intensification
of,
Bacon, Francis, on nature, 164
62
Bhutan, sustainable development
56
biogeochemical cycles, 26
crops and, 60
crop yield, limits
to,
ecological Hmits
to,
energy subsidy organic,
of,
biodiversity
25, 58
deforestation and, 128, 131
60
importance
39
64
133
Umits in ecosystems, 29
pest problems of, 25
magnification, 22, 155
technology and industrial, 64
biomass
water pollution and, 146 traditional,
of,
biological
tropical ecosystems and,
energy source, 110
biotechnology
35
agriculture and, 57, 58
See abo farming; agricultural agroforestry, tropical,
as
biosphere, 19,25,29
37
1
32
risks of,
367
64
in,
263
INDEX
368 Boulding, Kenneth, 11, 289 Brave
New
Clean Water Act, 85
chmate
211
World,
breeder reactor dangers, 100
agriculture and, 39, 62
on
British Meteorological Office
global
bromoxymil, toxicity
energy and,
58
of,
Brown, Harrison, on modern
society,
208
Brown,
changes, problems
89, 123
of,
deforestation and, 129
warming, 141
1
22
climax
humans
breakers,
32
as,
cychc, 34
Lester, 51
Browns Ferry nuclear
plant accident, 93
Burke, Edmund, ideas
of,
and pioneer ecosystems contrasted, 31
104
variabihty of, 34
294, 306
Chnch River Breeder Club of Rome, 41
buildings, saving energy in,
burning technologies, 87
Reactor, 100
coal
Calgene
CEO
consumption, reducing, 89
58
research,
energy demands and, 86
cancer rates, increases in, 1
mining, problems
53
86
of,
See also energy; fuel See also carcinogen
commodity. See resource
capitaUsm, social costs of, 230
Commoner, Barry, on
carbon emissions, 89 carbon dioxide deforestation
and atmospheric, 129
earth temperature and, 140. See also
global fuel
burning and poUution
by,
88
as air pollutant,
138
218
of,
265
communahsm
in the steady state,
community, ecology and concept
carcinogens, 61, 149, 151 carnivores as secondary consumers, 25
compartmentahzation, goal control, ecological
268, 269
catde pasture, deforestation and, 130
and
constraints, macro-,
of,
social,
285 of,
21
35
204, 214
212
conference diplomacy, 271
CFCs earth temperature and, 140. See abo
global
conservation
ecology and, 295
warming
as pollutants,
energyand,83, 103, 108
139, 140
limits of,
change of needed,
5,
281
constraints
and Hmits (compared), 14
consumption
chemical(s) industry, wastes fiom, 149,
150
insects,
control. See types
23
disaster,
9 1 93 ,
chloroflurocarbons. See
CFCs
city state, return to, 297, civilization, 3, 9,
levels, significance of, 1
time scale for controlled, 2
reuse of, 27
Chernobyl
79
consumers, herbivore and carnivore, 25
ecosystems and, 30
war on
194
of,
See also social; society
sources of, 142, 143, 144
aspects
market destruction
problem, intemationahty
140
effect of,
cartels, resource,
good, controls for the, 200, 204
-pool resources, 193, 195
government controls on, 144
carbon monoxide
freedom and, 195
logic, pollution and,
warming
greenhouse
toxic waste, 150
common(s)
303
294
Clean Air Act of 1990, 140, 224, 250
of control
coral reefe, species loss on, 132
Corporate Fuel Economy Standards Act, 251 cost(s). See
under each type
crop(s). See agriculture;
food
369
Index
food and, 59
entropy and, 124
scarcity,
235
social values and,
290
steady-state changes in,
See also socioeconomic
curve, logistical growth, 42, 178
"Economic Man,"
cycle(s)
biogeochemical, 26
26
ecological scarcity and, 181
25
hydrogen, 119
nitrogen, 26
multiplex, 120
water, 26
of nature, 20 steady-state poUtical,
Herman, on common good, 218 life cycle,
agricultural restraints,
25
deforestation, negative effects of tropical,
Demoaaqf
in
scarcity
crisis as
America, 237
emergency, 169, 283
damage, war and, 272 vs.
,
economics
209
in steady-state society,
failure
213
momentum,
in the steady state,
287
of pohtical system, 252
farming, 66
demographic significance of,
history,
45
deprivation and ecological scarcity, 240
design planning contrasted with, 288
deuterium, abundance
of,
development, sustainable, 2
1
52
diversity in the steady state,
dangers
of,
291
222
170
scarcity,
175
scarcity,
administering, 247
scarcity, class conflict
74
to,
commons, 195
safety, costs of,
59
diplomacy, conference, 271 discovery, Umits to,
problems, market solutions resources as
dietary quality as food Umit,
165
philosophy, 293 pollution control, 162
100
developing countries. See Third World
dioxin pollution,
22
imperatives, 9 limits, 60, 82,
53
desalination, use of,
185
illness, effects of,
46
transition, value of,
driftnets,
214
contract, the,
and, 79
democracy ehte rule
62
competence, 209 competition, 62
50, 128, 129, 131
demand, resource
ecological
abundance, society and, 190
Davis Besse nuclear plant, 92
decomposers in
206
thermodynamic, 124
Dahl, Robert, on competence, 209 Daly,
235
fallacy of,
economy
interrelationship of, life,
243
politics and, 22, 237, 238,
culture
and, 266
scarcity,
deprivation and, 240
scarcity,
economic
justice and,
239
194
Dubos, Rene, on ecological
ethic,
302
179
scarcity, era of, scarcity,
growth
scarcity,
intemationahsm
durabihty, value of product, 81
limits and,
scarcity in Japan,
178
of,
255
257
with, 240, 281
earth as finite planet, 2
scarcity, living
economic (s)
scarcity,
market
development, happiness and, 301
scarcity,
government, market, and, 228
ecology and, 160
scarcity
and
ecosystem disturbance and, 29
scarcity,
producers and, 221
and internaUzation, 233, 270 justice and ecological scarcity, 239
scarcity, rise of, 1
interests
life,
steady-state,
287
failures
political
life,
scarcity, significance of, scarcity, social
and, 217
11, 51, 216
181
control and, 241
7
9
INDEX
370 and socioeconomic justice, 241
scarcity
scarcity as political
and moral
crisis,
299
succession, 30
human need
See also ecology, environment
life
82
use consequence, 79
89
nuclear,
community concept and, 21
for,
and, 38
loss as
ecology
as
256
of,
food chains and, 38
Third World and, 267
scarcity.
79
entropy,
European problems
options, 101,103
conservative science, 295
production dangers, current, 82
defining, 6,
economics and,
productivity and, 38, 56
160
3, 7, 9,
105
human, 6 humans and, 20
savings, 104,
poUtics and, 8,
sources, 25, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115,
self-sufficiency,
120
science of, 19
117, 116, 119. See also names of
See also ecological; environmental
sources
supphes, ecological Umits and, 82
ecosystem(s)
adding
to,
Third World problems
21
agriculture
and
tropical,
See also coal;
32
agricultural revolution and,
35
entropy
economic
changes, 19, 21, 23, 27, 30, 180
compartmentalization goal
of,
35
compromise, 36 disturbance,
scarcity and,
and modification
30
of,
government and, 232
environmental
as special,
37
costs,
preserving, 133
costs
pioneer and climax contrasted, 31 pluralism in, 34
costs,
concealment
229
of,
of fossil-fiiel extraction, 84
handhng, 224
226
costs, internahzation and,
production and, 33, 34 of,
crisis, 6,
32
167
good, education and, 202
waste and, 27, 29
goods, pricing, 228
education, environment and, 202 efficiency
improvement option, 39, 103
electricity
production and land use, 118
impact of North Slope
management, pohtics
movement,
Elton, Charles, 19
neglect, results of, politics,
emissions
151
carcinogenic nature
of,
motor
142
vehicle, 138,
oil,
of,
85
239. See also
internalization
eUte rule, democracy and, 209
anarchist nature of, 1
276
53
European, 255, 257
politics, Japanese,
problems of oil
258
drilling,
84
problems of oil transportation, 84
energy agriculture and,
problems, Soviet bloc, 259
39
94
climate and, 122
radiation effects,
conservation, 83, 108
ruin, self-interest and,
consumption
124
79
See also ecology; environmental
27
simphfication
life
U.S.
Umits, 27, 29
oceans
energy,
environment
economics and, 29
interdependent, 20, 26
linear,
106
of,
fiiel
patterns,
demands, increases
in,
99
Environmental ProtectionAgency, haz-
82
ardous waste
economy, multiplex efficiency, goal of, 2, 107,
1
See also ecology;ecological
83
108
150, 151
sites
and, 136, 138,
I
371
Index
also steady-
equilibrium society, 15. See
freedoms, micro-, 212 fiiel
state society
errors, technological, 171
burning, 87, 88
ethanol production, value of, 110
extraction and water supply, 87
Europe, environmental problems of
resources,
Western, 255, 256, 257
European Economic Community, toxic waste export and,
1
fossil,
82, 83-
See also coal, energy, fossil Fuller,
fiiel
Buckminster, on technology, 209
fusion power, 98, 100
53
eutrophication, 28 evolution, dynamics of, 21 exploitation production
gardening techniques, tropical, 37
and ecosystem,
34
General Pubhc Utihties, 92
exponential growth, nature of, 68 extinction of species, 36, 131, 132
Exxon
General Electric nuclear plants, 92
Valdez aisaster, 84,
173
genetic diversity, crop need for,
60
geopoUtics, changes in, 268
geo thermal power, 109, 110 global
48
famine, threat of global, 48
famine, threat
farming
warming,53,63, 123, 141
ecological, fish.
Global Possible, The, 42
66
Global
See mariculture
2000 Report
Goddard
See also agriculture fertihty rate,
of,
global
46
42
to the President,
Institute for
Space Studies on
warming, 141
government
fertilizer(s)
efficiency Umits of, 57
anti-regulatory stance of, 248
UabiHties of, 61
carbon dioxide emission controls,
fire as
144
intervention tool, 32
competence
fish
in steady state,
common
286
good, 204
farming. See mariculture
controls for
pollution and, 145
ecological scarcity, market, and,
Flavin, Christopher, 97,
mining
263
subsidies fitom,
planetary,
food availabihty,
population and, 44
scarcity
277
management
by,
chains, energetics of, 38
tropical deforestation by,
culture and, 59
See also poUtical; politics
and population, 49
distribution
hmit, dietary quality
as,
production, maximizing, 47
biotechnology and, 57
variety,
need
for,
58
See also agriculture; crop; farming See deforestation;rain forest;
greenhouse
106
extraction, environmental costs of,
84 resources, 82, 83
effect
and carbon
dioxide, 140
Green Revolution,
48, 49,
60
growth carrying capacity and, 181 curve, logistic, 178
Umits
fossil fuel
avoidance
grain production in the Third World,
exponential, 66
tropical forest
costs for,
130
groundwater contamination, 95, 150
59
yield, increasing optimally,
forest(s).
9
48
59
production, biotechnology and, 57
safety,
228
80
of, 41, 163,
178
Hmits to technological, 174 material, 2
poUrics and economic, 237, 243
pohcy, timing no-, 72
1
INDEX
372
vs.
resources,
hydrogen, power, value
70
social costs of,
hydropower
175
122
of, 119, 120,
energy source. 111, 112
as
Third World policies and, 268 Gvilf of Mexico, drilling waste in,
84
incrementaHsm
in decision
making, 244
individual self-restraint,virtue of, 296 habitat loss
and deforestation, 128, 129
Haekel, Ernest, 19 halons as
individualism in
modern Ufe, 191
industrial
139
air pollutants,
accidents, risks of, 152
happiness and economic development,
301
agriculture, technology and,
64
civilization analyzed, 3, 182, 208,
Hardin, Garrett, theories
205
of, 195,
hazardous waste(s), 149
treaties,
of,
294
225
See also technological; technology
control costs for, 153 landfills,
growth, costs
Industrial
150
Revolution and
scarcity, 10,
183
276
industry
See also toxic waste; waste (s)
hazardous waste production by, 150
water pollution and, 146
health costs
of industrial growth, 225
effects
See also technological; technology
of toxic wastes, 152
integrated coal-gasification
122
heat, climate and,
combined
cycle system, 87
heavy metal wastes, 149
interdependence in ecosystems, 20
Hedrie, Joseph, 92
internalization, 226, 229, 233, 234. See
herbivores as primary consumers, 25 history ecological, 185
environmental management
agreements, 275, 276
lessons of poUtical,
297
aspects
Hobbes, Thomas, political theories
of,
189,196,200,204,205 holism in the steady
home
also
international
state,
of nature, 264
disparities,
266
politics, 26,
291
255
reordering, effects of, 270
energy savings, 104
International Conference for the Pre-
homeostasis, 24, 27
vention of Pollution from Ships,
human (s)
275
activities,
problems caused
agriculture, pest
by,
127
problems and, 25
52
irrigation, Umits of, 50, insects,
chemical war on, 23
biosphere and, 29 as
climax breakers, 32 Japan, ecological problems of, 257
ecology, principles of, 6, 20
environment influenced
by,
13
intervention, ecosystems and, 21
nature and, 12 as stress
Keynes, John Maynard, ideas Kneese, Allen, ideas
source, 34
knowledge,
of,
limits to,
of,
282, 300
226
165
waste, types of, 27
humanity pollution and,
1
lagoons, contaminated surface, 150
34
power over nature
of,
Hume, David, scarcity
laissez-faire politics, control of,
164
theories of, 9,11
hunger, food production and, 48
as air pollutants,
138
226
land
damage
Huxley, Aldous, 211
hydrocarbons
"laissez-innover,"
to
mined, 86
exploiting unused, 5
242
4
1
373
Index
Manh, George
50
supply, limits of,
use for electricity production, 118
Marx,
hazardous waste, 150
landfills,
Lao Tzu on
Law of the
nature,
299
material(s)
lead pollution controls, 137
need
Leviathan,
196
for,
liberty,
growth, 10 reusing, 81
306
market ecological problems and, 222
on power, 210 abundance and political, 191
Lewis, C.
164
Marx, Leo, 304
Sea Convention, 194, 275
leadership,
Perkins, 15
Karl, theories of, 10,
ecological scarcity and, 228
S.,
economy,
distortions of,
220 and, 217
failures, ecological scarcity
life
cycle in nature, 25
-orientation control, steady-state, 287
energy and, 38
price mechanism, 219, 220
lifeboat problem,
scarcity and,
1
limits
agricultural,
and
60
constraints, interplay between,
219 of,
218
in the steady state,
219
impact
societal
system, uncertainties
in,
to discovery
and substitution, 74
abundant, 77
of ecosystems, 27, 28
mining, ecological costs
to growth, 163, 165
mining
human, 13 43
pollution control,
1
77
34
77, 78
mihtary, nuclear waste and, 158. See also
war
43
Mill, John Stuart, 94,
to tt'ichnological grov^^, 174
mined
See also specific types
mineral(s)
Growth, The,
41,
70, 163
scarcity,
land,
damage
300 to,
86
extraction fixsm thin ores, 77
linear ecosystems, 27
resources, 67, 73, 76, 81
100
fixjm seawater, limits to,
living
77
mining
patterns, energy savings and, 105
standards, changes in, 177,
effects
240 30
Lloyd, WUham Forster, ideas of, 192
Locke, John, ideas
of,
86
Ufe, individualism in,
in,
monoculture, Uabihties of land, 60, 65
198
Monsanto Corporation, 58 moral
crisis,
ecological scarcity
macro-constraints, 212
morahty in the steady
magnification, biological, 22, 155
motor vehicles, pollution
malnutrition, population size and, 48
management, problems
of,
mariculture, promise of, 54
166
191
modifying environment, Hfe and, 30
London Dumping Conference, 275
Malthus, Thomas, theory vahdity
80
77
crops, value of, 65
modem
growth curve, 42, 68, 178
strip,
subsidies for,
metals, processes for,
mixed
191, 202, 204
Los Angeles, commons problem
of coal
government
things and environment changes,
logistic
of,
78
micro-fi"eedoms, 212
and conservation, 79
in the steady state,
hthium
scarce,
as air pollutant, 1 40
methane
to seawater mineral extraction,
to
193
metanoia. See poUtics of transformation
interrelationship of,
to recychng
of, 68,
metal(s)
ecological energy supply, 82
Limits
228
McKean, Margaret, research
14
of, 1
state,
as,
299
292
fi-om,138, 142,
250. See also carbon dioxide; emission; pollution
multiplex
enei^ economy, 120
Mumford, Lewis, 302
1
INDEX
374
mutagen
of radiation, 157
effect
ocean(s)
energy
as
energy source, 115
pollution, control of, 56
National
Academy of Sciences, 61,84,
special ecology of,
149 National Environmental Policy Act, 230
National Research CouncU, 65, 154
oil
149
driUing, environmental effect of, 84
National Wildlife Federation, 56
north slope, 85
nationalism, regulation and, 275
shale, disadvantages as
natural resources, decline in, 61
spills,
nature
source of, 89
84
transportation problems, 84
anarchy
in,
economy
189
of,
homeostasis
humans
optimists, views of, 2
20
in,
ores, mineral extraction firom thin,
24
and, 164
farming, 64
264
hydrocarbons
cycle in, 25
sigmoid curve stress in,
68
in,
lution,
in,
of,
profit interests,
oil
oxides
42
production
overpopulation. Green Revolution and,
72
48
243
ozone
effects,
85
acid rain
nitrogen cycle,
Future, 2,
overexploitation, competitive, 193
See also biosphere; ecosystems
north slope
137
Our Common
26
no-growth poUcy, timing vs.
138
Development on Air Pol-
tion and
technology and, 2
nonprofit
as air pollutants,
Organization for Economic Coopera-
34
waste absence
77
organic
international asset,
life
See also sea(s); water
offihore oil drilling, 84
National Resources Defense Council,
as
37
thermal energy conversion, 115
as air
26
combined with, 139
pollutant, 138
layer destruction, seas and,
as air pollutants, 1
55
48
nuclear Packard, Vance, 8
danger, misinformation about, 94
paradigms, pohtical, 4
emission control, 90 energy, potential
and
industry, position of, plants, safety of, 91,
peril of,
parks,
89
96
pessimists,
99
of,
2
human
agriculture and, 25
pesticides
waste dangers, 90, 95, 96,97,158, 163
biological magnification of, 22,
dangers
See also radiation; radioactive
of, 22, 58, 61,
1
149
waste, 149
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 93,
petrochemical
95,247 "Nucleonics
views
pest problems,
93
safety, 90,
138
people, energy efficiency and, 107
power, controversy over, 90 reactors, 96,
waste-management, 162
particulates as air pollutants,
93
Week" on
nuclear
nutrition, population size and,
safety,
99
59
industry, pollution fi-om,
1
34
products, toxic wastes and, 151
philosophy
See also crops; food
ecological, 293,
304
pohtical, 12
Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, radia-
tion diseases
at, 1
54
photosynthesis, 25, 58 photovoltaics as energy source, 117
55
1
Index
375
physical limits of ecosystems, 28
and science, analogy between, 4
pioneer and climax ecosystems con-
social values and,
of steady-state
31
trasted,
planetary government, prospects
for,
277
190
design differentiated from, 288
Politics,
problems
pollutant(s)
167
of, 166,
136
air,
plant(s)
interaction of, 156
energy source, 110
genetics, use of, as
responses
57
Plato, ideas of, 8,
pollution
12,210,295
plutonium, dangen
agricultural, 61
155
of, 95,
137
air,
political
common-goods
and, 195, 196
anomaly, ecological scarcity
as,
5
change, ecological scarcity and, 216 choices, social-good, 196,
competence
286
in the steady state,
history, lessons of,
inequality, liberty, life,
reaHty,
297
United
control,
States,
136
fiiel
burning, 87, 88
land supply and, 51
11,51,216
motor
vehicle. See
motor vehicle
of oceans, 56 optimal level
of,
223
1
needed changes
in,
282
reform, mechanisms of, 5 revolution, potential for,
240
system, ecological failure of, 252 theories, paradigms and,
wtH, importance
of,
4
petrochemical industry, 134
production control and, 135 radiation,
154
treaties, air,
276
water, 55, 145, 146, 148
See also pollutant(s) types ;
205
See also government; politics
polyclimax, 34
population
pohtics ecological scarcity and, 155, 181
ecology and,
economic
control, technological, 135, 161
inevitabihty of, 134
abundance and, 191
scarcity and,
control, Umits of, 134
from
206
243
philosophy,
194
logic of,
control, ecological, 162
dioxin, 152
economy, American, 217 steady-state,
commons
control, nontechnological, 161
212
dangers of supertechnology, 209
economy,
157
to,
See also pollution
producers, 25
action,
287
of Third World, growth and, 268 See also government; poUtical
planning
as
235
society,
3, 8,
basis of, 222,
need
control,
for,
44, 46,
238
growth
of,
1,
44, 68
growth, land supply and, 50
economic growth and, 237, 243 of environmental management, 239
post-modernity values, 292
European environmental, 257
power
international,
265
Japanese environmental, 258 laissez-faire,
289
food and, 44, 47, 48, 49, 59
9
242
commodity, 269 fusion,
98
geothermal 109,110
movement to steady-state, 281 need for new paradigm in, 217
Price-Anderson Act, reinsurance and, 93
process and systems, 247
pricing environmental goods, 228
of resources, 268
process pohtics,
of scarcity, 189
producer(s)
price,
market response
242
to,
220
1
INDEX
376 reform. See change
ecological scarcity and, 221 interests, strength of,
internalization and, plants as,
product
243
religion, value of,
234
25
research, effectiveness of,
durability, value of,
81
cartels,
control, pollution control and, 135
ecosystem exploitation
for,
34
268, 269
common-goods,
and protection, balancing, 37
decline in natural, 61
exhaustion, controUing, 72
climate and agricultural, 39
fossil-fiiel,
of increased, 56
fiiigal
83
use of, 2
70
ecosystems and, 33
growth
energy and, 38
mineral, 67
vs.
nonprofit interests, 243
Coming Dark Age, and
The,
284
for,
268
regulating, 195 scarcity,
See also
the Spirit of
Capitalism, The,
prudence, need
,
power, 269
protection and production, balancing, 37 Protestant Ethic
us.
poUtical tool,
as
progress ideal, society and, 164
Promise of the
193, 195
ecological competition for, 62
productivity
profit
165
resource(s)
production
costs
305
Republic, The. See Plato
demand reduction commodity
and, 79
reuse of nlaterials, value of, 81
300
296
revolution, potential for poUtical,
240
Rhone—Poulenc research, 58 Rocky Mountain Institute, 103
public-goods problem, 196
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, on commons, radiation
199
environmental, 94
long-term as
Roundup, carcinogenic
effects of, 90, 93,
mutagen,
1
nature of, 58
156
57
pollution, 154
safety,
See also nuclear; radioactive; radioac-
Saint-Simon, Claude Henri, 207, 210
environmental, 90, 160, 170, 173
sahnization, land supply and,
tivity
radioactive
waste contamination, 97
abolishing, 164
See also nuclear; radiation; radioac-
challenges of, 217
tivity;
civihzation characterized by, 9
radionuclides
demand reduction and
radioactivity as
50
scarcity
environmental problem, 94
long-term damage
by, 90, 93,
156
radionuclides
79
entropy and economic, 124 as fijture society factor, 1
biological magnification of, 155
managing,
persistence of, 157
market and, 219
toxicity of,
resource,
ecological. See ecological scarcity
1
54
See also nuclear; radiation; radioactive; radioactivity
9,
10
modern, 10 pohtics of, 189 social control and,
241
science and pohtics, analogy between, 4
rain acid, 87, forests,
138
destruction of, 35; See abo
deforestation; tropical forests
Scientific American
on home
energy, 104
Schumacher, E. E, on Christianity, 305 sea(s)
Rappaport, Ray, 32
farming. See mariculture
recycling, 79, 151
as
food source, 54
1
1
Index
377
on
international agreements
ozone
layer destruction and,
the,
275
55
speciahzation in
See also ocean(s) Sears, Paul,
spaceship problem, 14
ecolc^y defined
by,
7
reef;
seawater fix)m,
life,
7
deforestation
spiritual crisis
energy
modern
species extinction, 132. See also coral
and ecological
scarcity,
299
116
mineral extraction limits fixjm, 77 self-restraint, individual,
standard of living and alternative technology, 177
296
42
sewage, water pollution and, 147
State of the World, The,
sigmoid curve. See
stationary-state society, 15. See also
Smith,
smog,
Adam,
fuel
curve
logistic
theories of, 191, 218,
steady-state society
300
Stavrianos, L.
burning and, 87
social
democracy
fioigal
of capitalism, 230
284
293
values of,
political choices for,
of, 1
181
of,
66
on growth, 41
values, economics, poUtics and,
natural,
235
humans strip
214
34
society and, 4
commons; society
34
as
source
of,
mining,
effects
of coal, 86
subcHmaxes, "good" anthropogenic, 36
society instabiUty of industrial,
substitution, Umits to,
208
market and destruction
of,
218
scarcity as fiiture factor in, steady-state, 12, 15, 212,
commons;
1
See also
213
energy source, 25
Superior Farming Company, 66
Supreme Court, anti-environment
social
tions of, 231,
ecological scarcity, 241
ac-
232
Surry Nuclear plant, 94 Surface
economic
soil erosion,
as
supertankers, dangers of, 173
socioeconomic vs.
74
oxides as air pollutants, 137
Superfund Law, 169
progress ideal of, 164
See also
sulfiir
sunlight
pohtical, 4
justice
work
stress(es)
67
technology assessment and, 226
Social Contract, The, 199,
283
Stockholm Conference, 272
price of technology, 211
See abo
nature of, 302
Steven Pavich and Sons,
212
Ufe, ecological scarcity and,
planning, problems
285
213
transition time to,
design, Umits affected by, 14
good,
in,
movement to, 15, 183, 281 pohtical economy of, 206
of growth, 175, 225
critics,
costs,
transition,
goal of, 2, 212
control of technology, 177
costs
on
characteristics of, 212,
changes, ecological plenty and, 190 control, sci-rcity and, 241
costs
S.,
steady-state society
Mining Control and Reclama-
tion Act of 1977, 86
land supply and, 50
sustainable society, 15. See also steadysolar
hydrogen
power
as
as
state society
energy source, 119
energy source, 112
thermal power
as
energy source, 115
Southern California Air Quality
Management
systems pohtics, 242
District,
198
Soviet bloc environmental problems,
259
"Spaceman economy,"
tar
sand deposits
accidents and errors, 171
growth, limits 1
as fuel source,
technological
to,
optimum, appeal
174 of,
206
89
INDEX
378
value of, 46
pollution control, 135 See also industry; technology
treaties, international
tritium, dangers of,
technology
176
alternative,
tropical
assessment, social costs and, industrial agriculture and, limits of,
226
64
agroforestry,
132
deforestation, 128, 130. See also
165
management
environmental, 276
100
deforestation of,
163
ecosystems, agriculture and, 35
nature and, 211 pohtical dangers of super,
209
pollution control and, 160, 161
destruction of, 36
forests,
resources of,
1
29
gardening techniques, 37
177
social control of, social price of,
forests,
211
Union of Concerned
of waste control, 154
Scientists,
92
United Nations See also industry; technological
Human Environ-
Conference on the temperature, earth, 140. See
also
global
warming
Environmental Programme, 59, 273
Third World countries differences
Food & Agriculture Organization,
among, 264
47, 128
ecological farming in, 66
Population Fund, 45
ecological scarcity in, 264, 267
energy problems fossil-fuel
pohtics,
ment. 5ee Stockholm Conference
of,
106
World Commission on Environment and Development,
use in, 83
growth and, 268 ticides,
population growth
in,
46
Island disaster, 91,
thermal storage, types
of,
93
119
thermodynamic economy, 124 thermonuclear fusion. See
flision
timber harvests, deforestation and, 130
time response to ecological
scarcity, 2,
27, 169, 182, 185
Canyon
disaster,
149
United
States
carbon dioxide emission
173
143, 144 1
54
Department of Agriculture and biotechnology, 58
Department of Energy, poUcies
of,
96,97
and biotechnology, 58
government, anti-environment ac-
248
tions of, 232,
toxic
in,
Council for Energy Awareness,
Forest Service
de Tocqueville, Alexis, on America, 237 Torrey
166
World Population Conference, 274
Thoreau, Henry David, on nature, 299
Three Mile
2, 42,
World Health Organization on pes-
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
emissions as carcinogens, 151 substances, safe levels of, 160 wastes, clean-up costs for, wastes, health effects of,
150
152
174 pollution control, 136
uranium utihties,
supply,
90
fuel-burning pollution and, 88
wastes, nuclear, 158
See also hazardous wastes
Trans- Alaska Pipeline, 84, 85, 233 transformation, poUtics of, 305 transportation, energy savings in, 105
values, search for,
298
Veblen, Thorstein, on mediocrity, 306 Vitonsek, Peter,
on
ecosystems,
transmutation of nuclear wastes, 163 transition state,
Walden,
current, 179
time to steady
state,
on
nature,
war, ecological
283
waste(s)
299
damage
by,
272
1
80
Index
379
-absorption capacity of earth, invalid
concept
of,
1
36
supply depletion and fuel extraction, 87 See also ocean(s); sea(s)
avoidance, 81
waterlogging, land supply and, 50
control costs for hazardous, 153
wave power
control, technology of, 154
wealth, growth of, 41
ecosystem absorption
Weber, Max, predictions
of,
ecosystem destruction
by,
27
29
as
energy source, 116
of,
300
Wealth of Nations, The, 191
hazardous, 149
weather
human, 27
Weinberg, Alvin, on technology, 207
long-term dangers
96
White, Lynn, on ecological
62
wind power as energy source, World Resources Institute, 42 WorldWatch Institute, 43
of,
nuclear, 90, 95, 158
-management
parks,
nature and absence
1
as agricultural restraint,
of,
26
62
ethics, 1
304
13,
14
1
See also toxic; hazardous; types of wastes
water cycle,
26
Yucca Mountain nuclear waste
site,
pollution, 145, 146, 148 supply,
damaging, 55
supply Umits, 50, 52, 53
Zuckerman, Lord, 163 zoning, value of comprehensive, 37
97
Biographical Sketches
William Ophuls graduated from Princeton University in 1955 with an A.B. in oriental studies, then served for four years
Coast Guard.
He joined the
eight years at the
as
an ofi&cer in the U.S.
U.S. Foreign Service in 1959 and spent the next
Department of
State
and
at
U.S. Embassies in the Ivory
Cast and Japan. In 1973, he received a Ph.D. in poHtical science fix)m Yale. He
Northwestern and Oberlin and has lectured and consulted widely.
taught
at
When
Ecology and the
recognized
as
a
Politics
of Scarcity wzs
first
and the Kammerer Award from the American
Association for the best
book on
Political
A. Stephen Boyan, a
w^s
received an A.B. from
Jr.,
Science
U.S. domestic politics. Dr. Ophuls
work on a sequel to Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity. His new work on the internal contradictions of modern politics.
1959 and
it
book on ecology and interna-
International Studies Association for the best tional politics
published in 1977,
pioneering work, winning the Sprout Prize from the
Brown
is
at
focuses
University in
Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1966, both in
pohdcal science.
He
taught
and since 1971 has been
at
Pennsylvania State University for four years
member
a
Maryland Baltimore County. His ethics and constitutional law. He Constitutional Aspects of Watergate.
Movement and was Washington Ethical
of the faculty of the University of
special interests
editor of the six-volume work.
is
He
are environmental
is
a
organizer of the
Leader in the Ethical Culture Earth Ethics project
at
the
Society.
Thomas E. Lovejoy received his B.S. and Ph.D.in biology from Yale From 1973 to 1987, he directed the program of the World
University.
WildHfe Fund-U.S.
He
problems of tropical
forests to the fore as a public issue.
is
generally credited with having brought the
public television series "Nature."
He
is
He
founded the
president of the Society for
Conservation Biology and chairman of the U.S.
Man
and Biosphere
Program. Since 1987, he has been Assistant Secretary for External Afiairs of the Smithsonian Institution.
/
$14:»5
ECOLOGY/ POLITICAL SCIENCE
lilCOMHilY
AM>
TDli!
IHHJTICS
OF SCAllCriT RKVLSn Kl) The Unraveling William Ophuls At
a time
when
of the American
• A.
Stephen Boyan,
Dream
Jr.
the limits of our environmental tolerance are
more apparent than
ever,
and must be overcome if we are to survive. In this ecological critique of American political institutions, William Ophuls and A. Stephen Boyan, Jr. argue that it will require forestalling ecological bankruptcy will require more than quick fix solutions a radical overhaul of our nation's priorities and policies.
Ecology and
the Politics oj
Scarcity Revisited
emerges
as a startling exploration of political
social contradictions that
—
and and economic implications. First published in 1977 and now completely updated by co-author Boyan, the book's argument is supported with the latest information on overpopulation, food shortages, pollution, and shrinking energy resources. Also incorporated into the work are recent environmental developments such as the decline of nuclear power, the destruction of the rain forests, global warming, acid rain, and broad demographic changes.
Ecology and
measures
the Politics oj
its political,
Scarcity Revisited defines the nature of the ecological crisis,
social
concerned by American economic and ecological is blunt, objective, provocative, uncompromising, and at times unnerving. But not without hope. Both authors are convinced we can adapt to ecological scarcity and presep«^what is worth preserving of our political and cultural order. But as this volume so dramatically demonstrates, we must not delay.
Written for anyone involved
in or
policies. Ecology and the Politics oj Scarcity Revisited
"Rereading Ecology and sad awareness.
.
.
the Politics oj Scarcity
.Very
little
fourteen years after
its initial
publication brings a
has changed in humankind's relationship to
its
natural milieu.
Nature is still seen either as a mine or a dump and treated accordingly,- and the basic laws of ecology are ignored, denied, and flouted. Humanity therefore continues to hasten down the path to ecological perdition."
—William Ophuls, from the Author's Afterword
to Ecology and
the Politics oj
Scarcity Revisited
About
the Authors William Ophuls is a former United States Foreign Service Officer. His 1977 volume Ecology and the Politics oj Scarcity was published to widespread critical and popular acclaim, winning the Gladys M. Kammerer Award as the year's best book on public policy, and a similar prize from the International Studies Association. A. Stephen Boyan,
Jr. is
a political scientist
on the
facult"
Baltimore County.
'"* *'-" ^^ w/,An/FCQLOGY^POLITIC S OF gCARC '
ITY REVISITED
OPHULS, FREEMAN
^^
^
0-7167-2313-1
W. H. Freeman and Company 41
Madison Avenue
New York, New York
10010
20 Beaumont Street
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