Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity Revisited: the unraveling of the American dream


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The Unraveling of the American Dream William Ophuls A. Stephen Boyan,

FOREWORD

BY

THOMAS

Jr.

E.

LOVEJOY

OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION

Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity Revisited

Digitized by the Internet Archive in

2010

http://www.archive.org/details/ecologypoliticsoOOophu

Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity Revisited The Unraveling of the American Dream

William Ophuls A. Stephen Boyan, Jr.

Foreword by Thomas E. Lovejoy of The Smithsonian Institution

a W. H. Freeman and Company

New York

Library of Congress Catologing-in-Publication Data

Ophuls,WiUiam, 1934Ecology and the

politics

A. Stephen Boyan, Jr.

;

of scarcity

revisited /

William Ophuls,

foreword by Thomas E. Lovejoy

cm.

p.

Includes bibhographical references and index.

ISBN 0-7167-2313-1 1. 1.

Environmental policy

2.

Environmental protection.

Boyan, A. Stephen, 1938-,

II.

Title.

HC79.E5054 1992 333.7'2—dc20

91-46535

CIP Copyright

No

©

1992 by W. H. Freeman and

part of this

Company

book may be reproduced by any mechanical, photographic, or

electronic process, or in the

form of a phonographic recording, nor may

it

stored in a retrieval system, transmitted, or otherwise copied for public or private use, without written permission

from the publisher.

Printed in the United States of America

1234567890

VB

998765432

be

To the posterity that has never done anything for us

Men

are qualified for civil liberty in exact proportion to their dis-

upon their own controlling power upon

position to put moral chains

cannot exist unless

a

appetites... Society

will

and appetite be

more

placed somewhere, and the

less

there must be without.

ordained in the eternal constitution

of things,

that

men

It is

of it there

is

within, the

of intemperate minds cannot be

free.

Their

passions forego their fetters.

Edmund Burke

Contents

List

of Text Boxes

Foreword

Acknowledgments Preface

Introduction

I Ecological Scarcity and the Limits to

Growth

1

The Science of Ecology

2 Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

3 Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution, the

Management of Technology, and an Overview of Ecological Scarcity

II

The Dilemmas of Scarcity

vm

4 The

Politics

of Scarcity

5 The American

PoHtical

Economy

Economics Equals

The American

Political

I:

Ecology Plus

Politics

Economy

II:

The Non-politics

of Laissez Faire

7 Ecological Scarcity and International Politics

III Learning to Live with Scarcity

» Toward

a Politics

of the Steady State

Afterword Suggested Readings

Index Biographical Sketches

List

1

Paradigms and

of Text Boxes

Political

Theories

2 Some Consequences of Destroying 3

Tropical Forests

Halting Population Growth

4 A Mere

49

A Ray of Hope?

Mariculture:

CJ

Agribusiness Biotechnology

36

46

Distribution Problem?

5

54 58

7 Ecological Farming

66

8

85

Environmental Effects of North Slope Oil Production

Can

We Meet Our Energy Demands

10 Nuclear 1 1 1

4

2

Safety:

with Coal?

The Big Gamble

86

93

Low-Level Nuclear Wastes

95

Safe Nuclear Power?

99

13 Home Energy

14 The

Savings

Multiplex Energy

104

Economy of the

Future

120

1{>

The Thermodynamic Economy

124

IG

Ecological Pollution Control

162

17 Bulldozer Technology Itt Alternative

Technology

164 176

H) The Pubhc-Goods Problem

196

20

200

Coercion

21 Taming

Leviathan: Macro-constraints and

Micro-freedoms

22 The 23

Ecological Contract

Determining the Optimal Level of Pollution

24 Marketmg

Pollution Rights

212 214 223 224

25

Technology Assessment

20

Assigning Prices to Environmental

27

Bhutan: Developing Sustainably

28 War

and Ecocide

2*) Planning Versus Design

226

Goods

228 263

272 288

Forevv^ord

The environmental handwriting is clearly on the wall, but bolder and more insistent than fourteen years ago when the earlier version of this book appeared. Ecological limits mean that it is virtually impossible for all of the 5.4 billion people on earth to achieve the high-consumption habits of U.S.

citizens. Yet

it

is

equally impossible for

embrace the hunter-gatherer societies.

of the 5.4 billion to

all

of the remaining pre-agricultural

life

way we

Obviously, something must change in the

collectively

environment.

relate to the

Will economic growth

crunch because

we

come

to a halt

by design or with

a

horrifying

have blithely allowed ourselves to overshoot the

planet's carrying capacity? Surely the

end

is

in sight for

economic growth

based on ever increasing consumption of fmite natural resources. polluted the clean

composition



We have

and water, thereby changing the atmospheric

air

a certain signal that

we

have already carried

this to the

planetary scale.

Perhaps there dismiss

In

and

an answer in the biological world

is

disdain. Individual organisms have

one the organism simply grows

resources. In the other, organisms

plexity of structure, and,

can serve

as a

There

is

model

by

larger

two

we

in size but rather in

analogy, behavior. Perhaps

growth

widespread longing for an escape from the environmental

it is

work, and because most suggestions

the ones at hand.

It

is

what technology can do

are

of such cosmic

scale

problems

solve

as to

to help. Every technological advance in efficient

the transition to a society in balance with

would be

Environmen-

nonetheless important not to dismiss cavalierly

use and conservation of natural resources will

so, it

fix.

close to impossible for any

that they are as likely to create other environmental

Even

com-

in complexity

for an ecologically sustainable society.

find that solution suspect because

single fix to

forms of growth.

and of necessity consumes more

do not grow

squeeze cage through some ingenious technological talists

so long tended to

distinct

its

make

it

easier to achieve

environment.

foolish to believe that advances in efficiency

conservation and any other marvelous surprises ecotechnology in store will in themselves solve the

and

may have

problem. Society faces not only the

current situation of human numbers and resource consumption but also

frightening rates of increase.

A

current annual addition of 100 million

human

people leads to projections of

many

population

billions larger

than present. To sustain such population growth with the same

set

of

beyond the reach of technological fixes, especially while society is undermining the environmental stability of the planet through myriad activities, the most monstrous of which is alteration of atmospheric composition and climatic stability. The serious question this book explores is whether our institutions, societal values, and economic and political assumptions are up to the resources seems

Or

adjustment.

we without

are

allow us to turn away from our

and

that

human

society currently has

the values and structures necessary for survival, the simple point there

is

no

we must bend our

choice, and that

will

dangerous inclination to bicker, dicker,

Although few would wager

fritter?

which

the structures and viewpoints

is

that

astonishing intellectual

capacity toward creating the conditions for change.

Not many

readers,

provides or with unstated) of

I

expect, will agree with every analysis this

human

societies

challenge. Nonetheless, the

must take place darkness. is

up

One

if

we

are to

how

and

sees only

is

hears, at least occasionally, the question

now more

will

Over

the centuries

been

reckoning. What

about the date. reality in

able

we

most

of whether democracy

the question explored here, and

is

democracy of complacency

certainly

fail.

widespread than ever in

itself by failing to face its greatest

society has

That

positive but guarded, because a

immediate horizons

be for democracy,

How

history, to

it

challenge.

Thomas Malthus must recognize

How much

that

would undermine

ironic

has

been

criticized

each time

by one means or another to postpone

really

(oft

they relate to the environmental

book presents exactly the kind of thinking that do more than stumble around in an ecopolitical

to the environmental challenge.

the answer

book

every insight into the workings and assumptions

its

better

it is

to

is

that

a final

Malthus was only wrong

accommodate

to an inevitable

advance rather than adjust painfully in retrospect.

How much

more sensible to learn how best to use and enjoy newly discovered ways to work within our resource capacities, rather than to grasp in desperation for room to maneuver after we have pushed ourselves to the ecological limits, or indeed beyond. This book challenges us to face the environmental music rather than

unwanted

political

change and

let

social

scarcity force us into

an era of

cacophony.

Thomas E. Lovejoy Assistant Secretary for External Affairs

Smithsonian Institution

January 1992

Acknowledgments

I

want

to give special thanks to Carol Beyers for her valuable research

assistance in the preparation

Parker, of the

Duke

text

also

wish to thank Sandy

Justin Boyan,

com-

and Paul Hertz, Chairman of the Biology Department

Barnard College, for

who

his contributions to

helped

me

prepare tables and calculations,

much

I

University PoHtical Science Department, for their valuable

ments on the at

of this manuscript.

UMBC Geography Department, Margaret McKeon, of the

appreciated support

as

I

Chapter

1

.

Thanks

also

go to

with mathematical formulas needed to as

well as to Kitty Boyan,

who

gave

me

worked on the manuscript. A. Stephen Boyan, Jr. January 1992

Preface

About

and

a century

a half ago,

Victor

Hugo

described the ethical

thought of his day and predicted what would one day become the most challenging task of ethics:

humans with the is a whole

In the relations of

animals, with the flowers, with the

objects of creation, there

great ethic scarcely seen as yet, but

which will eventually break through into the light and be the corollary and the complement to human ethics. Doubtless it was first necessary to civilize man in relation to his fellow men. With this one must begin and the various lawmakers of the human spirit have been right to neglect every other care for this one. That task is already much advanced and .

makes progress

But

daily.

it is

.

.

also necessary to civilize

to nature. There, everything remains to be

quoted

Pyrenees,

I

will

wanted

make

seem unable

in relation

Voyage, Alpes et

in Borrelli 1989, p. 39).

to revise Ecology

plain,

humans

done {En

we

and

the Politics of Scarcity because, as the text

are continuing to

doing

to stop

choices: business-as-usual

so.

is

we

degrade our environment, and

"We seem

to confront

becoming impossible and

an array of tragic intolerable, yet

all

the immediately available political alternatives appear unworkable, un-

downright repugnant." The prospect of ecological

palatable, or

thus forces us to consider our ethics. If relation to nature"

not simply

we need

to think

we

are to "civiUze

about the larger

world of problems but in

live in a

a

issues,

scarcity

humans in for "we do

highly problematical

world, an inherently anti-ecological society. This anti-ecological world will

not be healed by legislation. It

is

a

acts

of [mere] statesmanship or passage of piecemeal

world that

change" (Bookchin 1990,

The

is

direly in

need of far-reaching

prospect of ecological scarcity equally obliges us to consider the

eternal questions of political philosophy. Dr.

tion of readers in the connection

questions of poUtical philosophy. in the nature

Ophuls educated

between ecological

He

said that "the value

and quality of the questions

it raises,

they will be central for our era" and "until clearly in

structural

p. 83).

mind, the

.

.

.

answers

[to

for

we

I

a

genera-

scarcity

and the

of this book

am

lies

convinced that

have these questions

them and our predicament]

are

bound

— to elude us."

and

appreciate Dr. Ophuls's permitting

I

new

to raise these questions to a

me

to update his

book

generation of readers. For despite

the publication of a great deal of environmental literature,

two decades of

environmental activism, and billions of dollars spent on environmental programs, the "bottom line"

doing.

may be

It

to

without some fundamental changes, the planet will someday

suggests, but

not be

that

of the environment

that the condition

is

we need

do more than what we've been the future won't take the form that Chapter 8

continues to worsen. Clearly

a hospitable place for

human

habitation.

Yet although most environmental indicators are worsening, this

book not because

difficult for

me

good news

that are

I

despair,

it is

I

care for the fiiture.

also easy to

overlook the

emerging everywhere. Discouraging

human

population

news

that eight East Asian

is

but because

be optimistic, but

to

is

still

revised

I

as it

is

It is

bits

of

that the

good

increasing prodigiously worldwide, the

and Latin American countries reduced their

by more than 50% between 1960 and 1987. People even in poor countries are capable of changing their attitudes toward reproduction and their reproductive behavior. On another front, even though fertility rates

modern agricultural practices are still spreading throughout the world, the good news is that some farmers in almost every region are returning to organic or

and making

IPM methods and to the much money as they

use of biological pest controls

as

2)

is

that

meaningful steps

And

while the world continues to confuse "growth" with happiness and

measures growth by gross national product, the good news

many, France, and Norway,

among

Other good news is that industrial countries. As John paradigm

a

economic

Its

describes

vision

it,

occurring in

is

the conventional

of earthly paradise

where both recreation and work and where nature is a manicured garden.

cultured world of urban luxury,

high-tech and orderly,

nightmare

waking

is

about losing control

to the cold chill of

Ger-

that

analyses.

change in paradigm

McRuer

rooted in neoclassical economics.

is

other countries, are beginning to

figure natural resource depletion into their

is

the world

more energy, the will see in some utilities, businesses, and individuals are taking to increase the efficiency with which they use energy.

continues to use ever

Chapter

Though good news (as we

did before.

—fumbling

its

development

strategy

is

a

are Its

and

brown-out, angry customers, and missed

investment dollars. In a world driven by competition, the Convention,

whose

ethic

nations.

some

It

is

[stiU]

rational

humanism,

is

the paradigm of

drives politics, business,

extent, religion.

power

in

western

government, the media, and, to

Preface

xvii

Its

opponents are the "Greens." Their nirvana

self-sufficient

communities, which use

is

a

bucohc world of gentle,

simple but adequate technology

a

to coexist affectionately with nature. Their nightmare

nology's

power

to destroy their wild places

—of waking

is

about tech-

to a

world where

suburbs desecrate the meadows, where forests have turned to moonscapes,

where the song

and where the water

birds are gone,

is

befouled with

cancerous substances. Their world works by ethics, by cooperation, by beneficence.

McRuer observes tical,

Greens may be "wistful, imprac-

that although the

and in some ways hypocritical" (they may use

jet to the winter sunshine), they are the force

can prevail against

v^sdom, and thus nature,

natural

all



What

is

forever in wealth and

conservation laws of

that

interesting

even

that

is

"human

grow

humans are not gods" but systems (McRuer 1990, p. 5).

warn

that

The Greens "invoke

that society can

in bHss."

but

"doomsday

a

The Conventions assume

debate" about the planet's future. skill

fiiel-efficient cars

behind

as

are entangled in the fate

of

the debate continues and the

condition of the planet worsens, the Conventions themselves are begin-

ning to support the concept of "sustainable development." Advocates of sustainable

development



for example, the

Global Possible Conference (1984)



technological solutions (hopes that,

still

as

World Resources

Institute's

have high hopes for growth and

we

shall see, are at least in

some

respects a delusion) but also recognize that a stable birthrate, a highly efficient use

nature's

of energy with a

income

rather than

shift

to renewables,

capital

its

and

a reliance

(quoted in Corson, 1990,

(which Greens have traditionally identified

as

key aspects of

p.

on

322)

a "steady

state") are essential.

The fundamentals of

"sustainable

into the everyday decisions of there, they are

beginning to do

development" do not yet enter

most corporations, but

so.

and

again, here

For example, the chemical industry has

quietly asked for the help and cooperation of environmental scientists in

determining

how

best to reduce

its

toxic air emissions.

We

will see

how

some utility executives and state utility regulators are recognizing wdsdom of efficiency measures and a shift toward renewables. The Corporation has hired an environmental vice-president;

in

the

3M

12 years the

company has reduced its waste generation by over 50 percent and is still coming up with new ways to reduce pollution on- and off-site. Encouragingly, it has saved money in the process. The McDonald's Corporation is radically shifting the way it serves food, substituting recycled and recyclable materials for new styrofoam containers. The Borden chemical

company

has altered

procedures to reduce the organic chemicals in

its

waste water by 93%.

too has saved

It

The concept of

sustainable

root in the developing world.

money

development

And

its

in the process. is

even beginning to take

this despite the fact that industrial

countries are selling developing countries environmentally harmful products, such as pesticides,

and transferring their

own

Pohcy

Institute

environmental costs

by relocating industry there to avoid being

to those developing nations

subject to their

own

country's pollution controls.

The Environmental

and the National Wildlife Federation have published

a

booklet on environmentally responsible projects in the developing world.

They

include windbreak planting, watershed restoration, integrated pest

management, environmental reserves, habitat protection, energy efficiency and conservation, fish cultures, agroforestry even family planning in Zimbabwe. In Thailand, just one man launched a private nonprofit corporation whose efforts resulted in 70% of the population practicing birth control and led to a reduction of the birth rate in that country from



3.2%

1.6% in

to

just 15 years!

A

change in thinking takes time to be

Sometimes that action is tentative; sometimes outside pressure or events must push it forward; sometimes one energetic individual with a vision can do so. But when thought gets translated into the first action, each step makes the next step easier and translated into concrete action.

reinforces the previous shift in perspective.

Even more encouraging

is

the change in perspective

among young

people. In schools across the United States, environmental education

Among

courses are springing up.

the objectives of these courses

is

to

"web of life," to show them that "you can't do just one thing," and to involve them personally in planting, recycling, and cleaning up debris in their communities. The fact that teach youngsters such concepts

as

these courses are being taught

from elementary schools "on up"

among

suggests changing attitudes

those

who

the

today's educational elites.

teach these courses are often surprised

—how,

accept ecological concepts

at

how

itself

Moreover,

readily children

indeed, children will encourage their

parents to launch recycling programs or will educate their parents about

other environmental

come with

as

a

no

issues.

surprise at

all.

vague fear of the

One

Just as

worried

at

times that their elders

(Montagna 1991).

If this

is

so,

their elders are

and these children

adopting a change in paradigm, suggestions dismissed today unrealistic will, in

should

suggests that 10-year-olds today are vaguely

of environmental deterioration and worry that

polluting the world

this

today's 40- and 50-year-olds grew up

bomb and

would blow up the world, he fearful

observer has suggested that

are

as politically

some modified form, become tomorrow's political no longer be the nuisance of

imperatives. Environmental impact will

Preface

xix

generating required paperwork but will be an important underpinning for political decisions.

The point of

these examples

not to kindle

is

human

future will take care of itself or that all.

On

shoot

is

the contrary, the text

makes

already predetermined



it

that

a naive faith that the

some way will solve some ecological over-

skill in

clear that

human

suffering

is

bound

already

of our propensity to do too litde, too late. Rather, the point of these examples is to demonstrate that we are slowly learning that to increase because

all

our behavior has consequences. In

to

our fellow beings,

seem

as

we

learned that

though we get away with

us back."

Now we

it,

are learning that

our relations

civilizing ourselves in

when we

treat

people badly,

it

may

but in the long run, people will "get

when we

treat nature badly,

it

may

though we get away with it, but in the long run, nature also will get us back. Nature is beginning to get us back. The sun that has given us

seem

life is

as

now

giving us cancer.

The

rain that has given us drink

is

now

bearing poisons.

The examples ethic for

I

have mentioned show that some are learning an

our relationship to nature. In many quarters, the

humans in relation to nature has begun. Perhaps be more rear-guard actions against the planetary

task

the only

of civilizing

outcome

will

deterioration fueled by

the growth god. But despite the troubles about us, the new making progress daily, and I believe that all is not lost.

ethic

is

A. Stephen Boyan, Jr. January 1992

Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity Revisited

Introduction

The

reality

crisis can no longer be somewhat remote controversy among specialists

and gravity of the environmental

denied. What had been a

and the committed few over the et

1972

al.

common

vs.

Cole

et

al.

limits to

person during the energy

understand in our bones

that,

there might not always be

growth

crisis

(for

example,

home

1973) was brought

Meadows

forcefliUy to the

of 1973-1974.

We

began to

whatever the causes of this particular

enough material or energy

crisis,

to support even

much less the higher levels many aspire to. summer of 1988, with drought baking the soil from east to

current levels of consumption,

Again, in the

west, with 100° heat in cities across the country,

and with

coastal beaches

befouled by garbage, raw sewage, and medical wastes, Americans again had a sense

of foreboding about what we're doing to our planet.

example, seriously

which

asserts

any longer that ecological concern

after a brief pirouette in the

the newest

Nor

crisis.

are there

concerned with environmental designed to siphon

minority

interests.

tions

a

is

excesses of some

crisis is real,

most profound way

some of the most ardent

still

one, for

mere

its

fad,

place to

maintain that those

hoax

public support away from disadvantaged

Whatever the

and values in

many who

will cede

a

issues are perpetrating a political

money and

cause of environmentaUsm, the

media limelight

No

is

and

it

who

have espoused the

challenges our institu-

—^more profoundly even than

environmentalists are willing to admit. This

book

about that challenge.

theory and common sense have always told us that growth and unlimited population increases on a finite

Of course, both infinite material

INTRODUCTION planet are impossible. But has not

seemed

all

somehow, at least in

that pressing,

another could be found to say

problem we could

it

safely leave to

was not. Rather,

was, because bringing an end to

that

we make its

agonizing economic,

undeniable

reality,

country, the problem

who

said

said the latter,

— and

it it

was,

was

a

good thing material growth would demand

our grandchildren

that

despite

this

and for every expert

social,

and

a

political choices.

Thus,

the environmental crisis remains con-

troversial.

However, few really disagree with the ultimate implications. At least seven major studies concluded, in the 1970s, that population and material growth cannot continue forever on a finite planet and that conducting "business as usual" will fail to meet basic human needs (Corson, 1990, p. 15, citing Meadows et al. 1982). These studies called for a "steady-state" society characterized by frugality in the consumption of resources and by deliberate setting of limits to maintain the balance between humanity and nature. In the 1980s five more studies came to similar conclusions. Some, including the World Commission on Environment and Development, called for "sustainable development." Its report. Our Common Future (1987), was endorsed by the United Nations Environmental Program. Like the concept of a steady state, sustainable development requires stable population, high energy efficiency, a resource transition based on utilizing nature's "income" without depleting its "capital," and an economic and political transition. However, it allows for more growth than "steady state" advocates, and advocates of sustainable development are generally more optimistic about whether the necessary changes can be made. Looking at the studies as a whole, the major controversy concerns the time scale.

The

so-called optimists believe that (1) the current

not quite so bad as the doomsayers make out, (2) and technological ingenuity will keep the ecological wolf from the door indefinitely, and (3) there are many social negative-feedback mechanisms (such as the economic marketplace, the impact of media-propagated information on values, and the politisituation in general

continued

is

scientific

promote gradual human adjustment to becomes necessary. Thus, to put it crudely, business as usual can continue for the foreseeable future, and to look beyond that is borrowing trouble. The so-called pessimists believe, to the contrary, that (1) the situation is more urgent than most are willing to admit, (2) limits on our scientific and technological ingenuity and on our ability to apply it to the problems confronting us cal process

itself)

physical limits

that will

when and

if it

— Introduction

and

are already discernible,

which the optimists would

(3)

the negative-feedback mechanisms on

rely have already

begun

to

fail.

Thus time

is

and far-reaching action by the current generation is imperative to avoid overwhelming the earth's capacity to support us in dignity. Failure short,

to act

soon and

effectively

wars, plague, and famine political

could lead us into the apocalyptic collapse



predicted by the early demographer and economist Thomas Malthus, whose famous essay on the dangers

of overpopulation (1798) was the mental limits on

We

human

first

expHcit statement of the environ-

activity.

among the pessimists. Thus the first purpose of make clear the nature of the crisis and why it is pressing. The second and more important is to draw out in full measure the poHtical, social, and economic implications of the crisis, for even some of the more prominent environmentalists appear not to have understood their import. At least in their pubUc statements, they maintain that a this

count ourselves

book

is

to

sufficient quantity

of reform



fairly radical

radical

—would

reform, to be sure

rescue us from our ecological predicament.

To

changes are urged, the language used

political

and

is

often vague. Concrete

arrangements are rarely discussed, and

social

more

the extent that

really

fun-

damental changes in our way of life or our constitutional arrangements are, one could gather, virtually unthinkable. This book argues, to the contrary, that the external reality of

ground out from under our own making merely reformist policies of ecological

ecological scarcity has cut the

system,

poUtical

management

all

evitable for a

but

useless.

few decades

At at

best,

reforms can postpone the in-

the probable cost of increasing the

severity of the eventual day of reckoning. In brief, liberal as 1)



democracy

we know it that is, our theory or "paradigm" of poHtics (see Box is doomed by ecological scarcity; we need a completely new



poHtical philosophy and set of political institutions. Moreover,

it

ap-

pears that the basic principles of modern industrial civilization are also

incompatible with ecological scarcity and that the whole ideology of

modernity growing out of the Enlightenment, especially such central tenets as individualism, may no longer be viable. This conclusion

may

strike

many

as

extreme. Despite overwhelm-

ing historical evidence for the rapid mortality of structures,

tions that

we we

democracy, Political

tend to think of the inherit,

as eternal,

paradigms

set

all

merely

political

of political values and institu-

whether monarchy by divine right or immutable, and, above

are, in fact,

all, right.

They

liberal

are not.

extraordinarily fragile creations.

They

INTRODUCTION

|_ Paradigms and The

have

coherence.

Theories

institutions by which people govern themintellectual, emotional, moral, and practical of high degree

political theories

selves

Political

a

and

A poHtical society

is

arrangements, both explicit and

characterized by definite institutional tacit standards for political

behavior,

what makes politiought to treat authority constituted how cal power legitimate and members of society (especially how the norms of the political associa-

and widely shared understandings on such

tion are to be enforced). practices,

and beUefs

as

We

issues as

can speak of this ensemble of institutions,

the poHtical "paradigm" of the society

(WoHn

1968, 1969).

Because poHtical paradigms have the same kind of internal consistency as scientific theories, the process of political change is analogous to scientific change.

science

—aims

scientific

inquiry

—so-caUed normal

routine puzzle solving under the conceptual umbrella

at

of a fiindamental

famous

Most

scientific

theory or paradigm (Kuhn 1970), like the

DNA or double-helix model of gene replication in molecular

such basic (and partly metaphysical) theories are successful in solving the puzzles thrown up by nature, allowing normal science to make apparent progress, all is well. However, once the puz-

biology As long

as

M

zles

can no longer be solved and disturbing anomaHes

to incorporate tists

them

into

sharing this paradigm

resist all efforts

normal theory, then the community of scienis

ripe for revolution. Scientists begin to cast

around outside the firamework of the old paradigm for answers to the crucial anomalies; fi-om this episode of "extraordinary" science emerges a

new paradigm

another in

one regime replaces

a political revolution.

Putting

New

that overthrows the old, just as

this in poHtical

classes,

new economic

terms, every society undergoes stresses. relationships,

and new reHgious or

racial

patterns emerge. But political associations are conservative. RetooHng the paradigm is "unthinkable" and is Hkely to be resisted to the bitter

may of course

persist

long

after the conditions that

have vanished, but unhappy the people

made them

viable

who live during the long period

of decay or the swifter decHne into revolutionary turmoil. However, our predicament is not hopeless. We can adapt ourselves to ecological scarcity and preserve most of what is worth preserving in our current poHtical

— Introduction

end; before all

considers radical change, a political society will exhaust

it

possibilities for

reform by normal

politics

such reform, then the poHtical changed.

An

example

By

in England.

same

consciousness and assertiveness political

is,

reform within

set

of poHtical

among

its

"facts," rising political

non-eHtes, could not be accom-

paradigm of Czarist Russia. Reform

were unsuccessful, and the new

anomaly

that

is

the extension of suffiage to the working class

is

contrast, the

modated by the



more or less solved by paradigm carries on as before, slightly

basic constitutional structure. If the puzzle

efforts

political facts therefore constituted

that led to political crisis

and eventually revolution

as

an

the only

solution.

There and

are,

political

of course,

significant differences in the

communities respond to anomaly.

for the ability of the leaders of the scientific

pugned,

this

is

one of the most

First,

way

the scientific

although

community

characteristic responses

to be

it is

rare

im-

of the poHtical

impending crisis. As part of its effort to cope with change through normal politics ^provided the paradigm allows for it, whether by election or routinized coup d'etat it will throw one set of leaders association to





out in hopes that the next lot will solve the puzzle better. This successful.

fashion,

However,

and once

a

it is

genuine anomaly cannot be solved in clear that changes in leadership will

a solution, the political crisis.

community can no longer avoid

is

often

this

not produce

confironting

its

Second, for a great variety of reasons, poHtical communities are

much more long-suffering than scientific communities. Urdike scientists, who make radical efforts to replace a suspect theory as soon as possible,

members of a

political

for example, the disparity

community can

between the

tolerate gross anomalies

theoretical

and the actual

of American blacks during the century following the Civil generations.

However, when the

"facts" that constitute

status



War

anomaly

for

will

not go away and can no longer be ignored or borne, then revolutionary (but not necessarily violent) change

The

crisis

of ecological

becomes

inescapable.

scarcity constitutes just

such a gross and in-

eluctable poHtical anomaly.

and civilizational order. But we must not

and our options

are

concepts.

Events are pressing on

us,

To see clearly how and why these indeed forced on us, we must commence by examining basic

array of potentially tragic choices.

choices are

delay.

being rapidly and sharply eroded: Already we face an

INTRODUCTION

6

Ecology This work

an ecological critique of American

is

and

political institutions

What is this "ecology" upon which the Third New International Dictionary gives three

their underlying philosophy.*

argument

Webster's

rests?

meanings:

1.

A

branch of science concerned with the interrelationship of or-

ganisms and their environments. 2.

The

or pattern of relations between organisms and their

totality

environment. 3.

Human

ecology, [that

relationship specifically,

between

first

human community and

a

environment;

its

the study of the spatial and temporal interrelationships

between humans and

The

branch of sociology that studies the

a

is,]

economic, social, and

their

definition describes the

work of the

political organization.

who

professional ecologist,

and experimentation to understand the laws governing the interactions of organisms with their living and nonliving environment. The second definition indicates a more general use of the word—for example, one can speak as readily of "the ecology of

uses laboratory or field observation

community" as of "the ecology of a mountain pine." Thus one would indeed expect human ecology to concern itself with the totality of the relationship between a human community and its environment. a peasant

Unfortunately,

the second part of the third definition reveals, the

as

purview of human ecology has sense.

It

is

such

Meanwhile, they ecology to

and

science

a

embrace the

totality

and

in this sense that it

first

crisis is

society epitomizes the

shown

that

presumed little

to

modernity be

and ready will

of

is

their physical

use the is

word to the

life

number of advantages, such

as

of information. Also, American

in

no longer work

most

respects,

and

if it

can be

here, then modernity can be

we

shall see in

needed to make the argument apply

countries and internationally.

shall

global and civilizational in character,

in trouble elsewhere. Indeed, as

modification

fiall

create.

definition.

availability

modem way

we

clear that the reference

but beginning with the American case offers a familiarity to the reader

to

broaden the meaning of the term human

it is

the environmental

limited, so that at

ecology in the

environmentahsts wish

except where the context makes

Of course,

human

of people's relationships with

science of ecology described in the

*

been rather

science of

that

are trying to

living environment,

ecology,

in practice

no genuine

present there exists

Chapter

to other

7,

very

developed

Introduction

There

etymological justification for

is

root of the prefix eco

Thus ecology

human

its

The

which means "household."

oikos,

enough, the original meaning of

Interestingly

word

also derived

from

was "a science or

oikos,

art

house or household," whereas economy was "the

a

management of ensuring

broad use of the term.

the science or study of the household of the

is

its totality.

economics, a

of managing

word

the Greek

logically

race in

the term

is

this

community, or establishment with

a group,

a

view

to

maintenance or productiveness." Today economics has be-

come

"a social science that studies the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities." Thus, from the science of management of the human household in all its dimensions, economics has narrowed itself to an exclusive focus



ecology

the

or the problems of

—and

money economy

subsystem of

a particular

subsystem

treats this

though

as

it

were autonomous.

Of

course, professional ecologists are often equally guilty of the

narrowmindedness

comes

that

from

Indeed,

overspecialization.

economist and ecologist aUke are victims of the almost vicious degree of specialization characteristic

ecology

now

evolving

is

of the modern world. The science of human

an effort to bridge the gap between

specialties

and make possible the rational management of the whole human household. This effort wiU require us to become, in the general. offered

Its

by Paul

spirit is

Sears,

dean of American professional

It

may

as

the science of interrelation between

clear matters

effect, specialists in

well reflected in the redefinition of ecology

somewhat

to

ecologists:

modify the usual definition of ecology life

and environment. Actually,

way of approaching this vast field of experience by drawing upon the information available from whatever source it may come [Sears 1971].

a

To be human goal. Yet,

dividual

it

of

all

best

of the kind Sears envisions, we must in-

ecologists

tegrate the better part

it is



human knowledge

must be attempted.

clearly

an impossible

We

must hope that, although any inhuman ecology must fall short of the ideal, there wiU

work in body of works

complement each other and give us the way out of the environmental crisis. What follows is the work of one human ecologist and one political scientist who happen to be concerned principally with the political aspects of managing the human household and who therefore have drawn on ecology, other natural sciences, engineering and technology, emerge

a

global understanding

that

we need

to find our

the social sciences, and even the humanities to construct a ecological critique of the

American

political

economy.

human-

INTRODUCTION Politics

Much

of the ensuing argument will appear not to be about

as

usually defined

it is

man or woman in

by the

politics at all

the street or the academic

The difficulty arises in large part from a narrow definition of politics. The word is used to mean either the winning and losing of elections and other political battles, for which a more apspecialist in poUtics.

word

propriate

is

politicking,

or the organization and administration of

units of government, thereby excluding as

well as religion and

many

economic and

social

phenomena

other matters that were once considered part

and parcel of politics. This pinched understanding of politics impoverished, fi-agmented

view of

economy and

a

gap

is

the survival of the

political tasks are the provision

excessive

firom

like the

one between

The

basic

community; two of the

basic

ecology, with similarly perverse consequences.

problem

political

resulting

reality

academic specialization, which has created

reflects the

of food and other biological necessities

and the establishment of conditions favorable for reproduction. Neither of these can be accomplished except in the human household provided by nature, and

in this sense pofitics must rest

The model

for such a

ecological foundation.

comprehensive view can be found in the

poUtical theories of the classical world. Aristotle's Politics

on an

As any reader of Plato's Republic or politics was all-in-

knows, for the ancient philosophers

clusive: Religion, poetry, education,

and marriage were

just as

much

pohtical matters as war, the regulation of property, and the distribution of administrative office. Aristotle's famous description of the

human

as

the

"pohtical animal" graphicaUy conveys our uniqueness in being respon-

organizing our

sible for

without instinct

politics

own communal

would be

and natural

Aristode said that

life.

necessity; their

"government"

is

part of Creation; free of

government. Only humans



is

mortal necessities, gods need no

all

half beast, half

by

genetically given.

Likewise, the spontaneous, infallible right action of the gods as

men

either gods or beasts. Beasts are ruled

ordained artificial



god

struggle to govern

themselves with no certain guide and no assurance of success. For Aristode, as well as for Plato and other major political theorists, "politics"

community on

the earth, and it therefore government narrowly defined. Aristode asks how this political animal can design and create institutions that will assure the survival of the city of man and some measure of the good life

concerns

this struggle to live in

extends to

within

book:

it.

Is

many

It is

the

things besides

just such a broad conception

way we

organize our

of

politics that

communal

life

informs

this

and rule ourselves

compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws?

9

Introduction

Ecology run our

about to engulf economics and

is

For example, one definition of the term

academic

specialists

Woodhouse

politics in that

how we

be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives.

lives will

politics

that

is

prevalent

among

"the authoritative allocation of values." But

is

sleeping mats of the world should therefore be considered politics, for single thing

is

likely to

we Hke

than the reproductive

"authoritatively"

behavior of millions of anonymous

Thus, whether

human

beings.

or not, embracing the larger conception of

it

poUtics that characterized early poHtical theorists inevitable,

and

alone

this

no

determine the general world allocation of values

come more

the years to

in

as

(1972) points out, what happens in the beds and on the

human

the nature of the laws of

is

becoming

virtually

sufiicient justification for carefially delineating

is

ecology that our poHtics must hence-

forth reflect. Moreover, practically speaking, the cogency of many of the

arguments in the second half of

book depends largely on documented in the

this

existence of the kinds of ecological imperatives half.

the first

Thus, expanding our conception of politics to include these ecologi-

cal imperatives

an important

is

first

step

toward coming to terms with

ecological scarcity.

Scarcity

The

habitual condition of civilized people

never been available in such abundance

more often than

David

Hume

the

is

as

goods were

if all

much

as

However, without

wife."

"selfishness

exhaust people's wants;

free, as air

and water

any

earth's a

goods in

common

common

"as [do]

abundance of goods,

and the confined generosity of man, along with the scanty

provision nature has

made

for his wants," inevitably

produce

thus a system of justice that will restrain and regulate the is

are,

he or she wanted without harming others.

People would thus wiUingly share the

man and

as to

gone unmet. The momentous consequences, of which one of the utter inevitability of politics. The philosopher

argued that

person could get

one of scarcity. Goods have

not, even their basic needs have

existence of scarcity has

most important

is

a universal necessity

ment, whether

it

(Hume

takes the

democracy, therefore has

its

1739, III-2-11).

relative scarcity or

passions

of govern-

form of primitive tabu or parliamentary It

follows that assumptions about scarcity

any economic and

abundance of goods has

on the character of poHtical,

human

institution

origins in the necessity to distribute scarce

resources in an orderly fashion. are absolutely central to

The

conflict;

social,

political doctrine

a substantial

and economic

and

that the

and direct impact

institutions.

INTRODUCTION

10

This understanding, however, has been undermined over the past three centuries, during which abnormal abundance has shaped all our

and institutions. The philosophes of the Enlightenment, dazrapid progress of science and technology and the beginthe by zled nings of the Industrial Revolution, envisioned the elevation of the common person to the economic nobility as the frontiers of scarcity were gradually pushed back. The bonanza of the New World and other founts of virgin resources, the take-off and rapid-growth stages of

attitudes

science and technology, the availability of "free" ecological resources

and water to absorb the waste products of industrial and other, lesser factors allowed this process to unfold with apparent inexorability. Karl Marx, who documented and criticized the horrors and inhumanities of the Industrial Revolution, nevertheless celebrated its coming because the enormous productive forces un-

such

air

as

activities,

leashed by the bourgeois overthrow of feudalism could be used to abolish scarcity.

and

all

With

scarcity abolished, poverty, inequality, injustice,

the other flowers of evil rooted in scarcity

would simply wither

away; not even a state would be needed, he thought, because everything would be a free good, like Hume's

and water, that humans

air

could share together without conflict. Marx's Utopian assessment of the shared or

came

to be shared

possibilities

by almost

all

of material growth was

in the West,

though

in a less

extreme form and with considerable difference of opinion on how the march to Utopia should be organized. For example, the works of the political

philosopher John Locke and of the economist

men who

two

tion, are shot

gave bourgeois political

economy

its

Adam

Smith, the

flindamental direc-

through with the assumption that there

is

always going to

be more: more land in the colonies, more wealth to be dug from the ground, and so on. Thus virtually all the philosophies, values, and instituof modern society are the luxuriant fruit of an era of apparendy endless abundance. The return of scarcity in any guise therefore represents a serious challenge to the modern way of life. tions typical

Worse, scarcity appears to be returning in

form

that

we

call

ecological

overpopulation and famine

now

also

worry

(as

scarcity.

though

a

Instead

new and more of simple

daunting

Malthusian

that weren't enough),

we must

about shortages of the vast array of energy and mineral

resources necessary to keep the engines of industrial production running,

about pollution and other limits of tolerance in natural systems, about such physical constraints as the laws of thermodynamics, about complex

problems of planning and administration, and about

a host

of other

Introduction

11

factors

Malthus never dreamed

of separate but interacting

Ecological scarcity is thus an ensemble and constraints on human action, and it surpassing those presented to our ancestors

appears to pose problems far

by

scarcity in

The

its

classical

of.

limits

form.

nature and difficulty of the challenge

in the ironic fact that the very things infinite



abundance

air

and water

Hume

we

confront are apparent

used to

—have become

the state of goods that must

illustrate

scarce

political decisions. The profiindity of the challenge is also apparent in the economist Kenneth Boulding's use of the concept

be allocated by

"spaceman economy" to describe the consequences of ecological scarcity. According to Boulding, because our overpopulated globe is coming increasingly to resemble a spaceship of finite dimensions, with neither mines nor sewers, our welfare depends not upon increasing the rate of

consumption or the number of consumers; both of which are potentially but on the extent to which we can wring from minimum resources

fatal,

maximum

the

richness and amenity for a reasonable population.

perhaps even an affluent, hfe

v^th

a curious

is

parsimony"; in

possible, fact, "far

but

"it will

from

A good,

have to be combined

scarcity disappearing,

it

will

be the most dominant aspect of the society; every grain of sand will have to be treasured, and the waste and profligacy of our own day will seem so horrible that our descendants

v^dll

us" (Boulding 1966). There

of course, no

a society.

What

is

the invention of a to

meet the

is,

hardly be able to bear to think about

ultimately required by the

historical crisis

precedent for such

of ecological

scarcity

new mode of civilization, for nothing less seems

is

likely

challenge.

Theory

Political It is

not the aim of

this

civilization but rather to

book to prescribe the form of post-industrial document the existence of ecological scarcity,

show how it will come

to dominate our political life, and then make plain the inability of our current pohtical culture and machinery to cope with its

challenges.

From

this analysis, a

range of possible answers to the

v^ emerge. For example, if individuaHsm an era of ecological the

mas

scarcity,

communal end of the that confront us



steady

state.

shown

then the answer must

to

lie

somewhere toward

for example, the political price attached to

work

Yet although

crisis

be problematic in

poHtical spectrum. Also, certain general dilem-

tinued technological growth will be In brief, then, this

is

it

is

a

made

con-

expficit.

prologue to a political theory of the

stops well short of formulating a genuine

INTRODUCTION

12

political

theory of the steady state, it

issues that tial

is

directly

concerned with the great

have dominated traditional thought about politics. Our essen-

purpose

to

is

show how

political philosophy have

the perennial, but dormant, questions of

been revived by ecological scarcity. We shall see,

for example, that the political problems related to the task of environ-

mental management have to do primarily with the ends of

political

means needed to achieve from the ensuing analysis are

association, rather than with the political

agreed-upon goals. The questions essentially value questions: What

that arise

is

the

common interest? Under current

democracy a suitable and desirable vehicle for achieving it? What, indeed, is the good life for men and women? In other words, we confront the same kinds of questions that Aristotle,in common conditions,

liberal

is

with the other great theorists of environmental

crisis to

politics, asks.

We

are obliged

enlarge our conception of politics to

its

by the

classical

dimensions. To use a famous capsule description of politics, the questions

about who

gets what, when, how,

and why must be reexamined and

answered anew by our generation. Our goal in this book is to agenda for such a philosophical reexamination of our poUtics.

However, we do not approach

this task as

does a traditional political

philosopher. Past theorists seeking guidance for

grounded

human

shape of the desirable political order can be deduced, they have examined

human

happy and virtuous people.

approaches, and

or, like Aristotle,

behavior over time to see whether certain

kinds of political institutions are

cases,

action have

on revelation or induction. Either, like Plato, they some a priori metaphysical principle from which the

their ideas

have appealed to

a

set the

more

effective than others in

Of course, many

some have introduced other

theorists have

producing

mixed

these

considerations. In almost

however, humanity's linkage to nature has counted for Htde.

contrast, like Malthus,

and the

basic

we

start

all

By

with humanity's dependence on nature

human problems of biological

survival.

and social thinkers have acknowledged humanity's ultimate dependence on nature, and a few have devoted

To be

some

sure,

most

political

attention to the specific effects that environmental constraints

have had on people. In

slavery

Book One of The

and other ecological

scarcity

may be

Republic and

limits,

necessary for civilized

Rousseau

in

Politics,

Aristotle discusses

implying that because of them life.

Plato in

The Second Discourse

Book Two of The

also display a subtle

awareness of the impact the evolving process of getting one's daily

bread can have on social institutions. Nevertheless, with the major

exception of Malthus, political and social theorists have tended to take the biological existence of men and possible.

women

as

given. This

is

no longer

Introduction

13

Nor

is

it

environment.

possible any longer to ignore humanity's impact

Of course,

concern about

damage to human welfare also two thousand years ago, Plato

this

on

has a long history (Glacken 1956). in

the

impact and the consequent

Greece and Mencius

Over

China both

in

worried about the destruction of habitat caused by overgrazing and deforestation.

The

early Christian writer TertuUian called wars, plagues,

famines, and earthquakes blessings because they "serve to prune away the

human race" (Hardin 1969, p. 18), and Aristotle found the poverty caused by population growth to be the parent of

luxuriant growth of the

revolution and crime: "If reproduction... poverty its

is

no

restriction

is

imposed on the

rate

of

the inevitable result; and poverty produces, in

and wrong doing" (Barker 1952, p. 59). Clearly, of the environmental problems we face today have been with

turn, civic dissension

certain

human beings since the very beginning of civilization. The character of these problems, however, has changed markedly over the centuries. In ancient times, humanity's impact on the en-

vironment was

local; by the eighteenth century, worldwide effects were becoming apparent; writers of the nineteenth century remarked

on the extent of this impact and its cumulative effects; and observers in this century have focused on the acceleration of change. Accumulating quantitative impact has thus brought about

a qualitative

We are now

difference in our relation to the physical world:

the prime

agent of change in the biosphere and are capable of destroying the

environment

that

supports

us.

The

radically

different

conditions

prevailing today virtually force us to be ecological theorists, grounding

on the basic problems of human survival on a finite and vulnerable planet endowed with limited resources. A second contrast between this work and traditional poHtical theory our

is

analysis

that, again like

limits to

possible

Malthus, our effort throughout

and constraints on human action.



or, alternatively,

what we

We

are forced to

is

to identify the critical

wish to discover what

is

what

is

do



rather than

come last in this supposedly philosophinot because we disdain the eternal questions of value,

desirable. In other words, values cal analysis.

This

but because

is

a value-neutral

approach

is

called for

on very

practical

grounds.

*

As

will

society,

be explained

change so that world.

shortly, values

wiU be

crucial to creating a steady-state

but values that are widely accepted today

we

as

immutable may have

to

can either avert or endure harmfiil changes in the natural

INTRODUCTION

14

of

First

philosophical, ethical, and spiritual arguments

all,

seem

to

appeal only to the converted. Hard-headed scientists, technologists,



bureaucrats, and businesspeople

the

men

and

—do not

basic decisions that shape

our futures

to such arguments. If one

is

women who make much

often pay

the

attention

to argue constructively with the people

who

incarnate our cultural and poUtical norms, one must argue the case in their

and

own

terms. This requires that

a flindamentally empirical

or agnostic approach, putting aside the question of values,

scientific

least temporarily, to

that

one adopt

fmd

instead

what

is

at

possible given the natural laws

govern our planet. Second, one of the most important reasons for focusing on limits

and constraints

is

the nature of our predicament. Although the

species has never enjoyed total fi-eedom of choice, at

human

some times and

abundance of everything needed for the maintenance of hfe and the construction of culture has made the latitude of choice correspondingly large. By contrast, people cast adrift in a lifeboat with places a relative

short supplies,

many

say,

or the trapped inhabitants of a besieged town, face

painful dilemmas; if they wish to survive, they

stringent hmits

imposes

knowledge of

which

their behavior. Similarly,

come

circumstances

must do

on

certain type of social design

a



to resemble those

by

its

on those embarked. As our

of space

travelers,

we may

design to teU us a great deal about

this social

in other words, to plot the relatively

policies if we

expect

what we

narrow range within

the values and the moral requirements can

become our

must impose

very nature a spaceship

lie.

Nature's dictates

wish to survive.

Nevertheless, questions of value are inescapable. There being





no

that dominates

all agreed-upon prime value not even survival others, solving every problem of public and private morality neccessitates trade-offs between desired goods. To illustrate briefly, even if

ecologists could predict with absolute certainty that a continuation of

current trends would produce massive death and other catastrophes by A.D. 2000, people

doom shall

might

still

decide, in a spirit of profligate fataHsm, to

we number of possible to the lifeboat problem and an even larger number to the problem, so the outcome will be the result of a complex

posterity rather than forgo current enjoyment. Moreover,

not face totally forced choices. There are

solutions

spaceship interplay

between

limits

and

constraints,

a

our present and future

capacity to evade or manipulate limits, and our values. In brief, science

can only defme the limits to the contents.

hope

this

judgments

Where

book

political

science ends,

and

social vision;

wisdom

cannot prescribe

necessarily begins,

will help prepare the reader for

at that point.

it

making

and we

decisions and

Introducrion

15

The Steady

State

Many of those who examine that we are headed toward a must be refined basic,

our ecological predicament tend to agree

Although the concept one that has achieved a

steady-state society*

flirther, a steady-state society

is

long-term balance between the demands of

envirormient that supplies

population and the

a

wants. Implicit in this definition are the

its

preservation of a healthy biosphere, the careful husbanding of resources,

on consumption, long-term

self-imposed Umitations

goals

to

guide

short-term choices, and a general attitude of trusteeship toward future

income instead of managing the earth as we would a perpetual-yield forest, so that it continues to thrive and replenish itself "for as long as the grass shall grow and the sun shall shine." generations. Useful analogies include living off annual

eating up capital and

The rest of the book will help make these abstractions somewhat more concrete. For one thing, from an analysis of our current errors we can infer at least some aspects of the steady-state society, even though a full and systematic description is beyond our present abihty. However, it is

important to understand fi-om the outset that the exact nature of the

balance

and

as

at

any time depends on technological capacities and

social choice,

choices and capacities change, organic growth can occur. For

reason, the steady state

is

by no means

a state

of stagnation;

equilibrium affording ample scope for continued

a

it is

this

dynamic

artistic, intellectual,

moral, scientific, and spiritual grov^h.

human growth

Indeed, without substantial

in every dimension, the

steady-state society can never be realized. Devising an ecological technol-

ogy or

a

new

set

of pohtical institutions for the steady

part of the problem, for

core

its

is

ethical, moral,

and

state

spiritual.

is

the lesser

This idea

is

well expressed in a metaphor suggested by George Perkins Marsh, a

major figure

of the American conservation movement and

in the history

the greatest pioneer of human ecology after Malthus. Marsh's major (1864) depicts the earthly

abode

human

blazing in the hearth.

By

*

and

is

race as a heedless cottager tearing

for kindling in order to

Stationary-state society

inference, the

keep

a

what

a condition

men and women

is

in store for us.

Some

it is

not entirely suitable

believe that even steady-state

equilibrium or a sustainable society.

is

as a

The former

too

it

tends to

description of

static

and prefer

Advocates of a sustainable society beUeve that

"growth" can continue to occur but must conform to natural understood, however, steady-state

his fire

of a steady-state

equilibrium society are alternative terms.

of rigor mortis,

down

Hvely but evanescent

the traditional economic label for a state of zero growth. Because

imply

work

is

appropriate and

we

shall

limits.

Rightly

normally use

it.

INTRODUCTION

16

society

take excellent care to see that their earthly household was

would

knowing that posterity (if not they themselves) would Through frugahty and good stewardship, they would seek ways to be warm that would nevertheless allow them to pass the cotimproved if possible, but at all costs undamaged down to their tage children. The ultimate goal, then, is as much an ethical ideal (the good

preserved intact,

have use for

it.





stewardship enjoined by the BibHcal parable)

economic, and

We let

shall

us in Part

now

concrete set of political,

return to this point at the end of our analysis. Meanwhile, I

explore ecology and the ecological limits and constraints

beginning to press

examine the

as a

social arrangements.

down on

political challenges.

why we need not only new theology as well.

a

new

us.

Next, in Part

Perhaps then

we

theory of political

II,

shall

we

shall

go on

to

understand better

economy but probably

a

I Ecological Scarcity

and the Limits to

Growth

1 The

The Synthetic

Science of Ecology

Science

Ecology's synthetic nature distinguishes

branches of science.

On

the process of

in

life

it

from the more reductionist

the grandest scale, ecologists try to understand the context of the chemical, geological, and

meteorological environment by assembling the isolated knowledge of speciahsts into a single, ordered system. Indeed, the subject matter of

ecology

Hence

called the locale,

so large that simple experimentation

is

ecologists often

often not feasible.

is

conduct observational studies on

a ftinctional unit

ecosystem (the community of organisms living in

a specified



along with the nonbiological factors in the environment

water, rock, and so interactions

among

on all



that support

them,

as

air,

well as the ensemble of

these components).

Understanding the process of Hfe requires seeing ecosystems in

dynamic and

Contemporary ecosystems have developed undergoing both short-term changes and Ernest Haeckel, one of the founders of ecology, "the body of knowledge concerning the economy

historical terms.

from particular origins and long-term evolution.

defmed

this

science as

are

of nature," and Charles Elton described natural

animals"

history

[concerned with]

(Kormondy 1969,

his ecological

the

pp. vi-ix). In

reveal the general principles that

sociology

work

as "scientific

and economics of

sum, systems ecologists try to

govern the operation of the whole

system called the biosphere, the part of the planetary system that contains or influences Hfe.

19

CHAPTER

20

From

this description,

should be obvious that because humanity

it

inhabits the biosphere, ecology must also be concerned with

Today there can be no

activities.

human

1

valid distinction

human

between ecology and

ecology. Nevertheless, ecologists have until recently concerned

economy of nature in pristine environments relativehuman intervention. In this way they have succeeded in ly undefiled by discovering some of the general principles that govern the economy of nature. Using their findings, we shall give a synoptic overview of the basic themselves with the

However, our discussion

principles of ecology.

human

rather than

special relevance to

scientific

human

ecology. That

is,

is

framed in terms of

those things that have

action are emphasized in this description of

general ecological principles and of the basic structure of the natural life-support system of our planetary spaceship.

Interdependence and Emergent Properties

A fundamental principle of ecology sum of its

individual parts; that

is,

is

that an ecosystem

just as the properties

more than

is

the

of water are not

predictable from the individual properties of oxygen and hydrogen, so the

emergent properties of ecosystems

are not predictable solely

from the

properties of the living entities and nonliving matter of

which they

composed. Each ecosystem on Earth must be understood

in terms

interactions

of

its

components. This principle requires ecology

are

of the

to be a

synthetic and process-oriented science.

Flowing immediately from

this first principle

is

the fact of inter-

dependence. Every phenomenon within any ecosystem one chooses to

examine can be shown it.

Moreover, there are

a cause in the

to be related to every other

web of natural

phenomenon within

any simple relationships; every

rarely

interdependency.

effect

is

also

Of course, not all relation-

ships are equally important or equally sensitive,

and many

are indirect.

Certain kinds of important interrelationship are intuitively obvious even to the casual observer.

microbes can cause

who

are buried.

We aU know that there are

disease,

and

However, the

that

worms

casual observer

other interrelationships in nature,

predators and prey, that

inherit the bodies of those is

unaware of the numerous

many of critical importance. The num-

ber of living components alone and the variety and complexity of their couplings are bewildering. For example, no one has ever

made

a

com-

plete census of all the organisms that inhabit so simple an ecosystem as a

pond.

The

fact

of interrelationship

dichotomy between the

living

is

so pervasive that

it

bridges the classic

and the nonliving components of an

The

Science of Ecology

"The Hving and nonliving

ecosystem:

of nature

into the fabric

1971,

21

The

p. 10).

that

parts

of ecosystems are so interwoven

difficult to separate

them"

(E. P.

Odum

evolution of animals, for example, did not take place in a

environment

static physical

it is

which

to

Hfe then adapted. Rather, early

life

modified the physical environment, graduaUy transforming an extremely

one

inhospitable environment into today.

Both

and

air

soil are

tenance depends on the

suitable for the organisms

we know

the products of living systems, and their main-

work of minute

organisms. As a result of their

ordinary metabolic processes, tiny plants have respired the oxygen in our

atmosphere and created

them

humans

leave

with the

bre-^th

The

fact

out of rock and dead organic material. If we

soils

relatively undisturbed,

of Hfe, keep our

soils viable,

they will continue to supply us

and purify our waters.

of interdependence makes the concept of community one

of the most important in ecology. Diverse organisms

live

together and

engage in complex reciprocal interactions. The implications of are profound, for

they occupy.

this fact

people are inevitably major players in the communities

The

principle also shows that

many of our

practices are

misguided. For example, ecologists have often found that the most effective

and

safest

way of controlling

pest organism directly but to

naturally controlled within the stitute the

community. This

a so-called pest

is

not to attack the

modify the community so

that the pest

network of interdependencies

that

is

con-

gives rise to the catch phrases "Everything

is

connected to everything else" and "You can never do just one thing." Let us examine

some

specific

examples to see

why human

often produces unexpected and unintended effects

intervention

on ecosystems.

Unintended Consequences, the Price of Intervention Because every

effect

is

also a cause,

changing one factor in a well-adapted

and smoothly fiinctioning ecosystem

is

likely to unleash a

second-, third-, and fourth-order consequences. For example,

organism fi^om one ecosystem design) to another,

it

is

is

chain of

when

an

transferred (either unintentionally or by

likely at first to

"run amok," for the

new

ecosystem has no history of dealing with such an organism and therefore

no mechanism

becomes an "instant pathogen," like the measles that decimated Eskimos and South Sea Islanders following their first contacts with Western civilization. Examples of introduced pests the Japanese beede, Dutch elm blight, the gypsy moth, and the rabbit in Australia are also well known.



to control

its

spread.

It



Just as adding organisms to ecosystems spells danger, subtracting

may

cause the

whole web of interdependencies

them

in the ecosystem to

CHAPTER

22

unravel.

Many

different types

of

unregulated hunting and fishing, obvious, such

as noise)

human fire,

can have the

activities (habitat destruction,

poUution, and others that are

effect

1

of eliminating

a

less

key species in

an ecosystem, which in turn causes related components to decline or collapse. Insecticides, especially

what happens when we use to

be simple goals

DDT,

drastic

—when we

provide the

of

classic illustrations

measures to accomplish what appear

try to

do

one thing." In

"just

a

remote

jungle village in Borneo, health workers sprayed the walls of the villagers'

with

huts'

DDT

to control the mosquitoes that spread malaria. 7\nd

control the mosquitoes

it

did.

However, the

lizards that

of the huts inevitably absorbed large quantities of

coming in contact with and they

died. This

w^hich ate the

patroUed the walls

DDT

(both from

the sprayed waUs and from eating poisoned prey),

had the unfortunate

of killing the

effects

moribund and poisonous

loving caterpillars (hitherto kept in check by the the thatched roof free to gorge without limit.

village cats,

and leaving the straw-

lizards,

lizards) that

inhabited

The end result was

a plague

of rats, the population of which exploded in the near absence of cats, and destruction of the roofs of the villagers' huts (Anon. 1968). This might be simply an entertaining story were

it

not, in effect, a

model of what pesticides and other chemicals are doing to the global life-support system. Like a

DDT, many

broad spectrum of life forms. And

of these chemicals are poisonous to

like

DDT, they are persistent. Because

they are synthetic rather than natural compounds, no organisms have

evolved an ability to metabohze them; hence they accumulate to

dangerous

levels

in

ecosystems.

phenomenon of "biological

In

addition,

as

with

DDT,

the

magnification" concentrates poisonous sub-

stances approximately tenfold with each step

up the food

chain, because

many its own weight in smaller The release of even modest quantities of chemicals can therefore become lethal to the carnivores (eagles and pelicans, for example) at the top of the food chain. We would be wise to remember that humans each grazer or predator must eat

times

organisms.

also feed at the top

People

who

of our food chains.

protest that the extinction of a

few carnivore

species

is

a

small price to pay for protecting our crops against the ravages of pests are

missing the point. richness

The Bermuda

of the biosphere on a worldwide

diminished. Indeed, the extinction of result

many

scale

would hardly be

top-carnivore species

of chemical poisoning would not jeopardize our survival

However, their disappearance as

could disappear, and the

petrel, say,

is

an indicator of an ecological sickness, just

sugar in the urine, though not dangerous in

The long-term consequences of such tially grave. It

has

as a

directly.

itself,

indicates diabetes.

ecological illness are poten-

been experimentally shown,

for example, that

many

The Science of Ecolog>'

23

synthetic chemicals in widespread use affect the species composition of

plankton in the ocean,

a

change that might have serious imphcations not

only for the structure of oceanic food chains (of which plankton are the

of plankton in the ocean's governance of the

base) but also for the role

cycles that rule the biosphere, such

carbon dioxide.

problem

is

that,

One

ot the

owing

is

the reduction of atmospheric

most worrisome aspects of

kind of

peak

impact, ot chemicals that are

full

not experienced until some time

we have already done when it is too late.

therefore exists that will find out only

this

to the inherent lag in biological systems, the

concentrations, and therefore the released

as

m the future. The possibilit\-

irreparable

damage but

that

Moreover, trsing to make simple modifications to ecosystems quently turns out to be ticides again

provide

fre-

well as self-destructive. Chemical insec-

futile as

model. Plant-eating insects have

a

we

long

a

histor\-

of

adapting to chemical warfare, because the principal defense of plants against being eaten

to

is

make

poisonous. Thus, although an apphcarion of insecticide

few of

a

or

their \-ulnerable parts unpalatable

may

kill all

but a

given pest population, those hardy few Hve to reproduce, and

they pass to their numerous progeny the resistant genes that enabled them to

surMve the poison. Before too many generations have passed, \mually

an entire population of pests has become used, and the

war must be

escalated

resistant to the

\\'ith vastiy

chemical weapons.* In the long term,

chemical being

new for we

increased dosages or

this is a

no- win

strategy-,

cannot expect to stay ahead indefinitely in chemical war with msects."

*

The same kind of problem

Bacterial resistance to the

is

being encountered in our war against microbes.

common

antibiotics

is

increasing rapidly, to the alarm

of the World Health Organization (DLxon 1974). t

By 1980 more dian 400 insects, ticks, and mites had developed pesticide resistance,

along with more than 100 bacteria and \Truses. Chemical manufacturen put more than 1000

new

resistance.

Smce

pesdcides

on

the market each year in an attempt to

overcome

pest

the 1940s, crop losses to insects have doubled even as farmers

increased their use of pesticides tenfold (Mott 1988, pp.20-29). According to the

National Academ\- of Sciences, "alternative agriculture." defined chemicals or with "low-input" pesticide applications, has

than chemical

Arming

in

some

cases because

drastic pesticide applications (1989.pp.4-6') (see

organizational

techniques.

and go\"emment

as

farming without

become more

producti\'e

of the expense of appKing more

Chapter

2).

Nevertheless, substantial

obstacles prevent widespread adoption

of these

CHAPTER

24

Indeed, destroy

likely to leave us

it is

many of

worse

the natural controls

tivorous birds and insects,

which

off,

on

much

reproduce more slowly than plant-eating

smaller populations and

insects, are

evolve resistance to the pesticides.) Thus, even

if

much

less likely to

they were not ecologi-

cally destructive, single-purpose technological solutions a natural

may

because the insecticide

the pest's population. Insec-

ordinarily exert control over the pest, are

killed off. (Predators, because they have

not succeed in

1

would probably

environment characterized by an all-pervasive

interdependence.

The human

ecological problem

development tend unintended

effects

that

all

the activities

we

caU

to involve relatively single-purpose additions to or

from natural ecosystems. Cases abound in which the nega-

subtractions tive

is

of intervention outweigh the intended primary

effects

(Farvar and Milton

1968). Consider the

dams and

irrigation

projects that have spread schistosomiasis (bilharzia, an extremely debilitat-

ing parasitic disease) or that have led to loss of productive land through saUnization or erosion (see Chapter clearly

how

"everything

is

2).

In order to understand

connected to everything else" and

human action can therefore boomerang economy of nature more closely.

ecologically, let us

more

why

examine the

Homeostatic Stability

A major characteristic state

of homeostasis

of undisturbed natural systems



that

is,

is

that they are in a

they include mechanisms of self-main-

some cases, produce a relatively stable balance or dynamic equilibrium. Even certain kinds of disruption, such as tenance and self-regulation

and flood,

fire

that

that, in

one might consider destructive of natural ecosystems, of those systems. Fires and floods, after

actually contribute to the renewal all,

have been around for so long that plant and animal communities have

become highly adapted to due

to volcanism

these stresses. Thus, apart from local disruption

and earthquakes, the

of natural ecosystems

status

is

threatened only by long-term changes in climate and geology and by the actions of humans.

The one

tion of

of the biological components tend to prevent any from changing the character of the ecosystem. If the popula-

interactions

species

one

species starts to grow, then the population that preys

responds by growing

also.

Even top

predators,

who need

eaten themselves, are subject to parasites and disease

"density-dependent" causes of mortality.

many predators

are ahve, the

where some predators

starve

And

number of prey and

a balance

is

is

if for

as

on

it

not fear being well as other

some reason too

soon reduced to the point

restored.

The Science of Ecology

25

Ecologists conceive of the biosphere state that

in

a finite

stock of materials

terizes this steady state

The

an open system in

a steady

driven by the fairly constant input of energy from the sun and

is

which

as

and

how

is it

constandy recycled.

is

What

charac-

maintained?

Life Cycle

SunHght

the energy source for photosynthesis in plants ranging from

is

microscopic phytoplankton to giant

trees. In

photosynthesis, carbon

combined

dioxide, water, and other inorganic chemicals are

the carbohydrates that plants require for their

to create

own metabolism and

growth and upon which animals feed. At the same time, plants also respire the oxygen that animals use to metabolize their food. Because plants take nutrients in raw inorganic form from the environment and convert them to the organic form required to support the higher levels on the food chain, the plants are called producers. The producers are consumed by organisms at the next level of the food chain, the herbivores, who are called the primary consumers. They in turn are eaten

by the carnivores, the secondary consumers. Except for the carbon dioxide

by

respired

the

consumers, which

is

producers, the flow of materials so far described

continued, the

transfer

is

available

the

for

unidirectional. If

of energy would not be

cycHcal.

it

Soon

producers would exhaust their supplies of chemical nutrients and cease producing; the rest of the food chain

there

organic debris

such

would then

another major group of organisms whose role

is

—dead producers and consumers, —and break down

fallen leaves

as

into

it

collapse. is

feces, its

But

to take

and

all

detritus

inorganic

com-

ponents. These components can then be reused by the producers, and the

and

whole system insects



stays in operation.

These organisms



bacteria, fungi,

are called decomposers.

In reality, of course, things are much more complex than this simple schema conveys. In nature food webs usually replace simple food chains,

and there

are even

some

plants that eat insects. Nevertheless, the

schema

conveys the essence of the major cycle of Hfe. It is

useful to note that the absence of complexity in

tural fields

other crop

is is

responsible for pest problems. a highly simplified

one highly succulent kill

Responding

become

to the pests.

banquet spread

When

the pests, they destroy the natural controls

population, thus simpUfying the system

problem.

agricul-

ecosystem containing large numbers of

species of plant.

before them, insects multiply rapidly and

attempt to

human

A monoculture of corn or any

still

on

farmers the pest

fiirther^and exacerbating the

CHAPTER

26

1

Biogeochemical Cycles In addition to the basic

cycle, there are

life

many

material cycles of

importance to the operation of the biosphere. In the well-known

critical

water cycle, water evaporates from the oceans and other bodies of water

by the atmosphere

to be transported

land,

where

once

again, or

it

precipitates to

nitrogen cycle,

(via

be used by plants and animals and evaporate

run off eventually to the

on

energy from the sun) over the

the other hand,

is

a

sea,

appreciated by the nonspeciaUst. Plants need nitrogen

grow, but the nitrogen gas in the atmosphere

cannot be used direcdy by the living free in the soil

plants.

The

thus closing the cycle.

major biogeochemical cycle

little

compounds

biologically inert

is

Various bacteria and algae,

and others associated with the roots or

to

and

some

leaves

of

of "fixing" the nitrogen from the atmosphere into

plants, are capable

compounds that plants can absorb and use. Other microorganisms decompose fallen organic material and break down its nitrogen into a form suitable for plant nutrition. The plant may then be eaten by an animal; the nitrogen

animal

is

either excreted or returned to the soil

when

the

dies, thus closing the cycle.

AU

The

such natural cycles are of the same character:

materials

necessary to maintain the processes of life are used and then recycled such that they can

be used again. Unlike the energy in sunlight, these materials

have no cosmic inputs; the biosphere works with the

each element that

is

is

on

almost no such thing

organisms waste

is

as

another's food.

soil

is

the

Without

of the natural cycles interlock in

home

many

some components

are

all

critical

own

wastes.

ways. For example, the terrestrial plants

other necessary nutrients.

different cycles. In

more

efiiciency. In-

cycling of materials,

this

of the decomposers that provide

only with nitrogen but also with the soil disrupts

quantity of

human activities,

waste in nature, for by and large one

organisms would long ago have drowned in their

Many

finite

the planet. In contrast to

ecosystem reuses materials with great

a well-functioning

deed, there

present

not

Damage

to

an interdependent ecosystem,

sensitive to disruption than others because

is large or critical, and comparatively minor disruptions in such components can be amplified into major consequences for the system as

their role

a

whole. In

this

connection,

dependence of all

life

on

it is

natural cycles. Just as the nitrifying role in the

impossible to overemphasize the utter

the tiny creatures that play essential roles in

and denitrifying bacteria play

all

a critical

nitrogen cycle, so the phytoplankton in the oceans are

indispensable for the homeostatic maintenance of the oxygen and carbon cycles.

The

survival of these critical

basic cycles are crucial to

long-term

components and the

human

welfare.

integrity of the

The Science of Ecology

The

instructive contrast

earlier eras,

humanity

human

itself,

and

human practices should be apparent. In was principally organic, and it was, like

with

detritus

scattered thinly over the surface of the earth.

humans have come

recently,

waste,

27

to generate large quantities

More

of nonorganic

their organic wastes are highly concentrated in limited areas.

Local ecosystems cannot absorb

all

that

is

asked of them. Furthermore,

no longer tends to be deposited near where the raw were obtained, for some regions are agricultural mines that

organic waste materials

produce food for people living the soil but

dumped

by applying

artificial

whose waste is not returned to make up for this loss fertilizer, which not only requires a large amount of far away,

into the ocean. Farmers try to

energy to manufacture but also creates water pollution into lakes cycles.

and

rivers,

becoming

when

it

runs off

yet another waste out of place in natural

Despite the prevalence of cycles in the biosphere, not

all

natural

processes are perfectly cyclical. Although, in general, the biosphere

is

characterized by closed cycling in a steady

is

state,

the cycle of materials

not completely closed except over the longest spans of time. Indeed,

some

processes are irreversibly linear (erosion

is an obvious example), and ecosystems do not reuse chemicals with total eflSciency Thus materials

eventually find their

way into

a "sink," typically the abyss of the sea. After of mountain building may return these materials to the active part of the biosphere and they may thus reenter the cycle, but in the short run their path is unidirectional. Similarly, fossil fuels are

many

years, the process

of nonrecycled organic material deposited during past

the residue

geological ages.

energy that

some

we

fiiture

They

are a stored source of solar or photosynthetic

are using

up and

that can

be replenished,

if at all,

only in

geological era.

The Limits of Ecosystems

Why

are human-made wastes a problem for ecosystems? After all, if ecosystems are self-maintaining and self-regulating, might one not infer that they can repair themselves after experiencing

stresses?

Unfortunately, this

is

major environmental

true only within certain natural Hmits.

Over the course of evolution, species become adapted

to conditions their

ancestors faced in the past, and by analogy, ecosystems can survive certain stresses to which they are adapted. Thus ecosystems can cope with fire, but not with large doses of radiation, synthetic chemicals (for which no

decomposer

and the other novel

stresses with which human them. Given enough time, organisms might evolve to meet conditions, and ecosystems would restructure themselves until exists),

activity taxes

the

new

they were once again in a

state

of dynamic homeostasis. Unfortunately,

CHAPTER

28

these processes require time

come

stresses

too

on

a geological scale,

and human-made

Some

the processes of evolution to keep pace.

fast for

1

human-made

stresses

(such as heat) are natural in the sense that they are not completely

new to

wastes (such

sewage) are biodegradable, and some

as

nature; yet these too can cause environmental disruption if the rate at

which they enter an ecosystem

is

greater than the rate at

be absorbed. Under such conditions, the system homeostatic

stability

This process

is

is

which they can

driven away from

toward disruption.

illustrated

by the phenomenon

called eutrophication,

the overenrichment of an aquatic ecosystem by an excess of nutrients. In

herbivorous invertebrates and

by carnivores

are eaten

and

die,

(the

balance. Furthermore,

rapidly,

is

it

who

The system

food.

as

are grazed

on by

who

in turn

primary consumers),

The

fish release

essentially closed

is

waste

generate the inorganic

and

in

capable of handling normal environmental

summer

In response to the light of the

sun, the algae multiply

temporarily depleting the supply of inorganic nutrients. But the

by eating more algae and increasing

fish react

which

fish (the

secondary consumers).

providing food for the decomposers,

products the algae need

stresses.

grow and

(the producers)

a freshwater lake, algae

their

had to adapt

population,

decomposers turn into

creates additional organic waste that the

nutrients for the algae.

own

A new level of seasonal stability is attained. Having ecosystem has developed

to this stress annually for eons, the

an appropriate self-regulating response.

However, when

a lake

is

artificially

phorus compounds (previously algae,

which

are ordinarily limited

lake, multiply

very

the algae can

become As

household detergents), the

in

by the low

level

rapidly. If the additional level

so dense that the water

cannot respond (reproductively) tion explosion.

enriched with inorganic phos-

common

algae

fast

enough

complete their

life

of phosphorus in the

of nutrients

is

is

sufficient,

impenetrable.

The

fish

to contain the algal popula-

cycle and start to die in large

numbers, the amount of dead organic matter becomes so great that the bacterial

decomposers begin to deplete the oxygen content of the water.

The lowered oxygen

availability results in the

death of many

fish,

further

adding to the decomposers' load. But the algae continue to grow because they no longer depend on the decomposers to supply

them with

nutrients and because the primary herbivores (the fish) have died

so on, in a vicious circle.

Sudden enrichment

feedback mechanism governing

production that the

rest

algal

off.

And

has destroyed the negative-

growth, resulting in excessive

of the ecosystem cannot

as oxygen content. two kinds of intrinsic limits operate

tolerate,

given the

existence of other limits such

Note is

that

the physical limit set by the oxygen supply

in this case. First, there

when

the nutrients that

The Science of Ecology

29

ordinarily limit algal

growth

are available in excess.

limited by the biological lag built into

could reproduce

fish

then any

algal

Second, the system

mechanisms.

self-regulating

weU

fish as

bloom could be

as

the decomposers, were not limiting),

contained.

But because ecosystems

adapted to

much more modest

inflicting,

they typically cannot respond to sudden or massive

enough

rapidly

Our

axiom

The

throughout the biosphere energy required. Waste

is

as

the

self-maintaining cycles circulate materials

long

as

essentially a

destroys the natural cycles unless

the sun continues to provide the

human phenomenon; it obstructs

it

is

disposable form, in acceptable amounts,

which depend on the

underscores

cycles

must go somewhere." The law of the matter can be transformed but cannot

states that

be created or destroyed.

stress

from being overwhelmed.

of biogeochemical

that "everything

conservation of matter

are

of stress than humans are capable of

levels

to prevent the system

understanding

ecological

is

If

rapidly as algae (and if other factors, such as

as

oxygen, needed by the

its

or

introduced into ecosystems in

and

at

manageable

natural limits of the ecosystem.

of

rates, all

Merely dumping

wastes does not solve our waste-disposal problem in any but the most

temporary fashion, for the consequence of pollution

The

is

a decaying or

capital, from which we draw income in the form of food, water, and breath (to mention only the most fiindamental requisites of Hfe) so human health

dying ecosystem.

biosphere

is

in effect

our biological

,

and survival are direcdy related to the health of the biosphere.

The

Price of Intervention

Human

intervention in nature

organisms, have an impact

on

is

Uke which we

inevitable because we,

the ecosystems in

all

other

live.

The

humans were hunter-gatherers without fire or even the crudest technology. With the subsequent development of technology, our impact on the environment was magnified, and unfortunately that impact has had a detrimental effect on nearly every ecosystem we inhabit. The issue of ecosystem disturbance has become an economic one: ancestral

Because every intervention in nature to solve benefit simultaneously creates tal costs,

costs tal

is

we must make

new problems and

a

certain that the trade-off

truly in their favor.

As indicated

problem or obtain

between

in the Introduction,

benefits

grown enormously,

earlier days, the benefits

outweighed the

modern

human era. In

of environmental intervention probably

far

Through ignorance, we damaged ecosystems more those benefits, but our numbers and the low level of

costs.

than necessary to get

particularly in the

and

environmen-

disruption has a very long history, but the magnitude of

intervention has

a

generates environmen-

CHAPTER

30

1

made it impossible for us to tear asunder the no longer true. Nature has indeed been destroyed, at least to the point where humans may find it difficult or impossible to survive in many areas. What are some of the trade-offs built into the economy of nature?

technology fabric

we

possessed

of nature. This

is

Ecological Succession

Nature

is

not

static.

The biosphere

is

a

dynamic and open

steady-state

system; ecosystems always contain the latent capacity to change in

response to external or internal perturbations. Because the history of the earth consists of long periods of geological and climatological stability interspersed

much

with

shorter episodes of relatively rapid

most times the major physical and chemical parameters of the biosphere have been relatively unchanging, and nature appears to have been relatively stable. This appearance is deceptive, however, for natural undisturbed systems can be observed to change even on change,

at

human time scales. If we could watch for a down firom a mountain peak

long time a bare boulder that had rolled to the valley below,

changes occurring. Devoid of life

at first, the

we would

see regular

boulder would eventually be

colonized by lichen. Aided by such mechanical processes

as

weathering,

would change the chemical composition of the rock's surface moss could grow in one or two areas. After many years, the moss would have created conditions that enabled other plants to grow, and insects as well as microorganisms of various kinds would have long since the lichen

until

found

a

home on

the boulder. Afi:er

many more

boulder would have been transformed by

years, large areas

this biological activity,

day a pine seed would be able to take root in the newly created this time,

displaced:

of the

and one soil.

By

inhabitants of the boulder would have been

many of the early The "pioneer" species

that created conditions favorable for

other types of organisms thus did themselves out of

During the

pine's

haps spHtting

it

growth,

it

would

fiirther

into smaller fragments.

home and

job.

transform the boulder, per-

Thus through

a

combination of

physical and biological processes, a large, hard piece of rock was trans-

formed into hfe-supporting of a habitat

as

soil.

Ecologists refer to such transformations

ecological succession.

This brief and simple example ecological principles.

As we

adjust to their environment, they

repeat

on

a

much smaller scale

by the microscopic creatures

illustrates a

number of important

stated earlier, living things

modify

it.

And

do not merely and mosses

lichens

the task performed in the primitive oceans

that created the

atmosphere

as

we know

it.

The Science of Ecology

31

Ecological succession moves nature from non-life to life

life

and from simple

forms and communities to more complex and diversified ones that

exhibit a higher degree of negentropy, or biophysical organization.

The second law of thermodynamics, one of the

frindamental physical

principles of the universe, teUs us that entropy, or disorder, always tends to increase, impelling

all

What, then, accounts

systems toward a state of uniform, for evolution

random

chaos.

and ecological succession, for the

and order of nature?

incredible negentropic diversity

The answer lies in the capacity of life to trap the energy of the sun and perform work that decreases entropy before the energy is degraded to dispersed, random heat. Why life exists at all remains a mystery; yet the existence of

life

transformations

By

is

causes

it

and once

a fact,

gets started, the nature

it

quite clear.

is

studying the orderly succession of plant and animal communities

in diverse habitats, ecologists have derived the

An

of the

abiotic

environment

characteristic

of

Gradually the

first

a

is

dynamics of the process.

colonized, and an extremely simple ecosystem

young or pioneer

stage

of succession

is

created.

colonizers transform the environment, until a sHghdy

more complex pioneer ecosystem is established. This in turn creates the preconditions for more and more complex ecosystems, until the most complex ecosystem the local climate and physical environment are able to sustain comes into being. This final stage, which represents the temporar/ end of development, is called the chmax ecosystem. It will endure essentially

unchanged

tion, or other

as

unusual

long

as

it is

stresses,

undisturbed by

fire,

human

interven-

or until major geological or cHmatic

changes cause the process of succession to continue.

Pioneer and cHmax ecosystems tant attribute

difrer sharply in

differences are listed in the following table (after E. table can

almost every impor-

by which ecologists describe ecosystems. The

be summarized by saying

P.

that in creating a

Odum

essential

1971). This

more complex and with more

diversified ecosystem, nature replaces opportunistic species

estabHshed species. Plants characteristic of pioneer stages (hke weeds,

which epitomize pioneer

grow prodigiously, and the amount of compared to the total amount of the biomass, In mature stages, phnts grow much more slowly and have species)

vegetable matter produced, is

very large.

longer hves; although total productivity (that higher in mature stages, net

lower than in the pioneer

is,

photosynthesis)

community production

stages,

because energy

is

is

actually

(annual "yield")

invested not in a

is

new

"crop" but in the maintenance and the slow, organic growth of the already existing biomass. Thus, whereas in the pioneer stage energy

used in relatively

a fairly straightforward

empty

habitat can

way

to

grow more

is

plants, so that a

be populated, in the mature system the

CHAPTER

32

greater part of the energy existing

used to enhance the persistence of the

is

community, which already occupies

the territory available.

all

Pioneer State

Climax

Few

species

Many

One

or few species dominate

Relative equaUty of species

State

species

Quantity growth

Quality growth

Few

Many

symbioses

Short, simple

life

Mineral cycles

1

symbioses

Long, complex Ufe cycles

cycles

relatively

open

Mineral cycles circular and

and Unear

closed

Feedback control/homeo-

Rapid growth

stasis

of energy

Relatively inefficient use of energy

Efficient use

Low degree

High degree of structured, complex order (negentropy)

Humans,

of order (high entropy)

the Breakers of

Where do humans

Climaxes

into this scheme? Unfortunately, ever since they

fit

acquired technology in the form of fire, cal succession

climaxes,

which contain the

animals, and

soil.

humans have invaded

human

burned-over tracted an

on the income

by the species

the capital

itself.

produced

ecologi-

breakers of

a

(the production)

of the

that populate such ecosystems,

One

interventions was the use of areas

as

stored wealth of the ages in their plants,

Instead of Hving

biological capital inherited

tant

humans have disrupted

and climax communities. Humans have Hved

of the

fire:

first

Early

new growth of

and most impor-

humans found

that

succulent grass that at-

abundance of game. However, the agricultural revolution

resulted in the greatest simplification of natural ecosystems, as described

by the

cultural ecologist

Roy

Man's favored

cultigens...are

self-sufficiency.

Some

Rappaport:

seldom

if

ever notable for hardiness and

are ill-adapted to their surroundings,

some cannot

even propagate themselves without assistance and some are able to survive only

if

they are constantly protected from the competition of the natural

pioneers that

prompdy

invade the simplified ecosystems

structed. Indeed, in man's quest for higher plant yields

of the most

delicate

and unstable ecosystems ever

man

has con-

he has devised some

to have appeared

on the

The

Science of Ecology

face

of the

33

earth.

The

human-dominated

ultimate in

associations are fields

planted in one high-yielding variety of a single species. in the

man

ecosystems dominated by

successive anthropocentric stages natural

ecosystems.

is

apparent that called

exactly the reverse of the trend in

The anthropocentric

simplicity rather than complexity,

It is

what can be

the trend of

trend

is

the direction of

in

of fi-agiHty rather than

stability

(1971

,

p.

13).

It

is

not cultivation alone that simpHfies ecosystems.

The sheep

rancher does not want bison eating the grass that could be used to feed

more

sheep, so the bison must go.

So must the mountain Hon, the wolf,

the coyote, the eagle, and any other predator that might cut into production. Ecological poisons

such

tems, because they tend to

as

kill

DDT

and radiation

the organisms high

also

simpUfy ecosys-

on

the food chain,

numbers of a few resistant species.* Overfishing and overhunting have the same effect. So does nearly every form of human activity. The dilemma is clear. Humans must have productive ecosystems

leaving behind large

in

order to survive, but high productivity requires simple and even

dangerously fi-agUe ecosystems. Further, since the biosphere

is

highly

intergrated, other ecosystems are also simplified, natural cycles disrupted,

whole system of the biosphere rendered less stable. down, what will perform the forests' flood-retaining

materials lost, and the If every forest

is

cut

and oxygen-making

fijnctions? If

all

marshes and estuaries along our

is the most "productive" use for them, of the oxygen-producing plankton supported by

shores are developed, because that

what

will take the place

the large quantities of organic matter washed by the tides from estuaries to the continental shelves?

And what will

replace the fish that

depend on

them? In short,

humans do not Hve by food and

although maximization of production

as

we

fiber alone.

However,

have traditionally defined

it

would totally compromise our Hfe-support system, discreet cropping of cUmax ecosystems is possible only in the hunting-gathering mode of

human strike a

existence.

Humans

in a technological society

tion of their environment. Stated another way, to

humans must be prepared

optimize their level of production, taking into consideration the

contribution of nonproductive elements of nature, such

*

must therefore

balance between production from their environment and protec-

One

goal of current biotechnological research

is

as

to breed crops

poisons so that farmers can apply broad-spectrum sprays and kiU for the

CI).

immune

wilderness, to

crop, in their fields {The Washington Post,

immune

all life,

May

to

except

17,1988,

p.

CHAPTER

34

their well-being.

The maximization of productivity,

as

1

narrowly defined

A fundamental by economists, optimum for quality is principle of human ecology thus emerges: "The always less than the maximum quantity that can be sustained" (E. P. is

fatal for

eventually

the system as a whole.

Oduml971,p.510).

Variability

Even

of the Climax

in areas

raphy and

soil

factors are the same,

where climate and other general

microcUmates and

habitats differ as a result of local variations in topog-

composition:

Some

higher-than-average ground,

low-lying areas are boggy, some are on

some

get

more

sunlight or are

more ex-

posed to wind. In accordance with these variations in microcUmate and habitat, species are unevenly distributed. We therefore find not one

uniform climax everywhere, but a general cHmax state (sometimes called a polyclimax) that is a mosaic of a large number of "edaphic" climaxes, adaptations of the basic climax to special local conditions. Thus even within the overall biogeochemical determinism of nature, there

is

a

surprising degree of pluralism.

Sometimes ecosystems never

attain the true

cHmax

state.

Areas that

are subjected to periodic natural stresses, such as fire inundation or

may never reach the cHmax state that is theoretically Instead, the community adapts to the stress and displays what is

fi-equent hurricanes, attainable.

knov^Ti as a cyclic cHmax. Again, special local conditions overrule the

general direction of nature. In

some

cases

humans

anthropogenic subclimax.

are a source

Many

of stress, and the

result

is

called an

example, were produced

grasslands, for

by deliberate burning and are thus an anthropogenic subclimax. Asian paddy land, which has been cultivated for millennia, is another humanmade subcUmax, one that mimics a natural marsh. Anthropogenic subclimaxes are inevitably less natural than the true climax, but the best of

them

attain quite

high

levels

of maturity and yet

quite a high yield of usefiil products.

Even

today,

the English countryside are at this high level

Unfortunately, this type of subclimax

is

rare

also fiirnish

some productive

humans areas

of

of ecological maturity.

compared to those sub-

climaxes, such as once-fertile lands turned into desert, that result fiom

humanity's destruction of habitat.

Exploiting Ecosystems for Production

The hkelihood

that an anthropogenic climax will succeed

local conditions. Intensive agriculture of the kind

we

depends on

practice drives our

.

The Science of Ecology

35

back to the pioneer

fields

of the

soil,

cultigens,

which

effects,

are adapta-

areas, climate, the

and the nature of the broken climax aU permit

without immediately harmful

way

where our

stage,

of natural weeds, flourish. In temperate

tions

provided that

it is

condition

occur

this to

done

in the right

(by not grossly simplifying ecosystems with broad-spectrum insec-

by not mining the

ticides,

soil,

by minimizing monocultures, and so on).

Intensive agricultural exploitation of mature tropical ecosystems,

on

the other hand, can produce total collapse. For example, in a tropical rain forest,

almost

contained in the

much of the (or worse,

up

the nutrients are tied

all

soil.

Thus when

of forest

a plot

ecosystem's biological capital

burned) and so

is

lost to that

flee to still-undisturbed areas, dispersing capital.

At most

a

few

in the biomass; very

is

is

are

cleared for cultivation,

hauled away to lumber mills

ecosystem.

Most of the animals

another portion of the biological

of profitable exploita-

years (typically four or five)

tion are possible before rain leaches out the remaining nutrients

sun bakes the resulting clay into concrete. As exploitation, this highly diverse, mature,

be an

few

and

stable

and the

of fll-advised

a result

ecosystem

may now

environment.* Moreover, because the

essentially abiotic (lifeless)

no longer stabilized by plants, the heavy rains cause accelerated which can effectively prevent life fi^om making a significant comeback for many generations, if ever. (The erosion also disrupts the dynamics of the river ecosystems into which the soil may be washed) Thus ancient and apparently stable ecosystems (for example, the Amazon soil

is

erosion,

basin forests) are paradoxically quite vulnerable to for they can

irreversible collapse.

And what

is

lost

is

intervention, total

and

not merely future production but

the invisible contributions such forests

all

human

be driven by overexploitation to the point of

make

to the general health of

the biosphere. Hence, in addition to the local trade-off between production

and protection, humans must confront

paradox in an era

when demands

this

food are

for

kind of global ecological above

rising, in the tropics

aU.

Ecologists propose a basic agricultural strategy reflecting the fact that

the safest landscape forests, lakes,

is

one

that contains

marshes, and so forth



as

all

well

the variety of nature as a

of different ecological ages. (They point out that

most pleasant landscape to

*



^in

this

would

also

be the

Margalef (1968, p. 49) calls for a honeycomb, of exploited and protected

short, compartmentalization.

According to the World Resources

forest are

crops,

inhabit.)

"balanced mosaic, or rather a areas"



mixture of communities

Institute,

being destroyed each year. (1990-91,

40 to 50 million p. 102).

acres

of tropical

CHAPTER

36

1

—2 Some Consequences of Destroying Tropical Forests The

destruction of tropical forests

may be

bringing about a

extinction, similar to the Cretaceous Period

For example, only

1%

of Brazil's Adantic

some

new

age of

65 million years ago.

remain; apart from un-

forests

known numbers of plants species found nowhere else, they are the only home of 20 species and subspecies of monkeys, about 10% of the world's total. Some of these are in immediate danger of extinction. Likewise, only 10% of Madagascar is still covered with natural vegetation, and 7000 species of plants exist nowhere else in the world. The same

is

true of lemurs, a major group of primates. Worldwide, 2 or 3

species are

becoming

extinct each day.

thetic or ethical interest.

Wild

AU

of this

not merely of aes-

is

plants often interbreed with humanity's

making the crops stronger or more resistant to disease. One-fourth of our medicines come from chemicals found in plants.

cultivated crops,

And are

five-sixths

still

of the estimated number of plants species in the world unclassified by the world's biologists. Most of

unknown and

these are in the tropics.

Tropical forest destruction also affects

3 to 6 million people lived



sustainably

humans



^in

the

today only 500,000 people remain. Needless to the rain forests

whose



habitats

cattle

and

ranchers and peasants

lives are

Another solution

is



directly.

Amazon say,

At one

time,

rain forests;

the people burning

are not the

same people

being wiped out.

the development and utilization of

compromise

ecosystems; these are essentially "good" anthropogenic subcHmaxes, sys-

tems that combine the virtues of production and protection. Kice paddies and fish ponds, which are cultivated analogues of natural marshes and estuaries,

are

examples of successful compromise ecosystems. Such

ecosystems are highly productive and more could be developed, especially in the tropics. Detritus agriculture

(mushrooms) and pisciculture

breeding, rearing, and transplantation of fish,

as in

opportunities for the invention of productive

another kind of compromise tropical areas,

where

it

has long

is

tree

(the

carp ponds) also offer

compromise

systems. Yet

cropping for food, especially in

been practiced (though not always wisely)

The Science of Ecology

37

and cocoa. Also, native

for cash crops such as coffee

tropical gardening

techniques are ecologicaUy very sophisticated, and research might disclose

ways to make them more productive.

The

of

basic strategy

these

all

compromise systems

nature of the climax and then, instead of breaking it

humans

closely or to insert

will not

to study the

is

completely, to

mimic

into the process as careful parasites that

much food as possible. However,

preserve the host while siphoning off as

compromise systems

it

work everywhere. Some ecosystems

are too

vulnerable or difficult to manage. Furthermore, the productivity of many

compromise systems is not high enough to feed great masses of people Thus for large parts of the globe, we rnust_attempt to strike a balance between production and protection by comprehensive zoning, retaining some areas as a source of biological capital from which we draw interest in the form of security and well-being, while subjecting other

living in cities.

areas to intensive (but,

one hopes,

less destructive) cultivation in

order to

obtain the food and fiber a large population needs. (Ecologists generally insist that

the oceans must remain essentiaUy protected areas; rational

cropping of naturally occurring ture,

such

oceans

if

as

fish,

and compromise systems of maricul-

the growing of oysters, are

we wish

all

to avoid the risks that

this crucial regulator

of natural

that

we

should expect fi^om the

would be involved

in exploiting

cycles.)

In general, then, ecologists urge a

move toward an

overall global

anthropogenic subclimax that would give the optimal trade-off between

production and protection,

as

well

as a

considerable degree of amenity in

form of a varied and pleasant landscape. Ecological succession provides a model for the transformation of our agriculture: from rapidthe

growth, high-production, pioneering stages to

mature subclimax that

*

As the drawbacks of

more and more

optimal considering

modem

all

relatively stable

and

of our needs and that

industrial-intensive agriculture have

is

become

means of increasing food production ecologists have rediscovered some of the agronomists and

apparent, particularly as a

in tropical areas,

virtues

is

a

of traditional agriculture. Though unproductive in terms of the market

economy, many old

agricultural practices

mm

out to be superior in terms of

productivity per acre as a flinction of energy input and long-term environmental compatibility (Armillas 1971, Rappaport 1971, Thurston 1969). Moreover, as

we

will note in the next chapter, traditional agriculmre,

modem

when

modified by

organic farming techniques, can be productive in terms of the market

economy. Even was found

in an

advanced country

like the

United

States,

organic farming

to be competitive with industrial-intensive agriculture (National

Research Council 1989).

CHAPTER

38

1

characterized by constructive symbiosis rather than warfare between

humans and

Life Is

nature.

Energy

Whether an

ecologically optimal agriculture will also serve to feed large

numbers of people

will

depend

on how well it adapts itself to the make the economy of nature operate.

largely

character of the energy flows that

economy; the biomass and stock of materials are its inventory, or capital. Natural systems trap incoming solar energy and make use of it for production; the more mature the ecosystem, the more efficiently this energy is utilized and the more is produced.

Energy

is

the currency of nature's

productivity. This seems paradoxical. If

Thus energy determines ecologically

immature

energy use,

why

cultigens are domesticated weeds, adapted

of the reason

gives a high yield

However,

is

that

our

by nature and then by us for cropped. Moreover, the total

when

which amount of radiation is so large and the total area that enormous quantities are produced despite

process.

of

agricultural systems are so inefficient in terms

are they so productive? Part

rapid growth,

our

to answer this question fully,

in production

is

so vast

the inefficiency of the

it is

necessary to look

at

the energetics of food chains and at the concept of energy subsidy in

ecosystems.

An

examination of food chains soon reveals that very large numbers

bivores, which in turn maintain a

still

much

smaller number of hernumber of carnivores. There smaller

of producers are required to maintain

a

are several reasons for this, but the principal

one

is

the loss of energy in

food chains due to the tendency of energy to degrade into nonusefiil forms,

as

ordained by the second law of thermodynamics. Natural proces-

of rather low thermodynamic efficiency from a mechanical engineer's point of view. Photosynthesis, for example, is only about 1% efficient in terms of energy fixation or the amount of protoplasm created

ses are typically

by producers

in proportion to

incoming

solar radiation.

Also, producers

they tend to burn up a lot of what they and herbivores consume energy maintaining themselves and grazing the producers. Thus, at each step in the food chain, energy dribbles away in the form of waste and heat. In the typical

have a high metabolic

produce just to

This

is

quantities

rate, so

stay alive,

not so inefficient

of

solar

as

it

might seem.

energy are used to

clouds around, and do

all

warm

Remember

that

enormous blow

the globe, evaporate water,

the things that keep natural cycles going.

ecological language, most of the incoming energy

is

To

used for maintenance.

use

The

Science of Ecology

-iq

food chain, the energy available declines by a factor often at each trophic (feeding) level, although the ratio can vary. Thus the efficiency of agriculture in feeding people

the chain.

When

cereal

only about

tion,

themselves hve

depends

a tenth as

as cereal

a great deal

on where food

fed to pigs or cows raised for

is

many people

and vegetable

can be fed

taken from

is

human consumpas when humans

There is thus a trade-off in between the quantity and the "quahty" of our diet. Low at the efficiency of agriculture in supporting human beings is even eaters.

agriculture best,

lower

if

they wish to eat high off the hog.

However, the

*

crucial factor in agricultural productivity

is

the

amount

of energy subsidy that humans provide to crops. Natural energy subsidies exist, such as the tidal flushing that brings nutrients to estuaries. But energy subsidy is largely the work of humans, often unintentional and unwelcome, such as the eutrophication of a lake), but more often

no matter how primitive, depends on an input of energy in the form of labor or materials. In traditional agricultural deliberate. All agriculture,

systems, this subsidy primarily takes the

help from draft animals.

The

total

form of human labor, with some amount of the subsidy is typically rather

smaU compared

to the yield (returns

although 15 to

is

1

(but not always) comparatively low.

agriculture

than

of up to 50 to

more common). However,

By

gross productivity

contrast,

modern

quite productive but not very efficient, for

is

a biological

machine

for turning

ftiels

are possible,

1

is

often

technological

it is

into food. In fact,

Httle

when

more all

the

subsidies supporting industrial agriculture are taken into account, it clearly spends more energy than it produces; in other words, the energy yield of industrial agriculture

is

negative.

The dependence of industrial agriculture on energy has important implications. The Umted States produces about three times as much food per hectare

as India,

but

this

increased production requires ten tunes die is conservative if anything, because the

mput of energy. (The comparison

hotter the environment, the higher the

metabohc rate and thus the other factors being equal, temperate zones produce higher yields than tropical zones.) This gives some insight into the problems of raising agricultural productivity in developing areas. For them to achieve anything like the productivity enjoyed by the developed energy

*

loss

of

If the world's

a plant. All

food supply were distributed equally, and it were consumed in enough food exists for 6 biUion people to be fed an adequate

the form of grain, diet.

On

the other hand, only 4 billion people can be adequately fed if

their calorie intake if

30% of their

10% of

from animal sources, and only 2.5 billion people can be fed calorie intake is from animal sources (Corson, 1990, p. 73). is

CHAPTER

40

temperate zones, the energy subsidy must be increased In the final analysis, food, like every other aspect of

ten times.

at least

life, is

1

matter of

a

energy.

The

Essential Message of Ecology

To

recapitulate, although

rationally

it

is

possible in principle to exploit nature

and reasonably for human ends, humans have not done

so.

Because they have not been content with the portion naturaUy allotted them, humans have invaded the biological and ecological over evolutionary time. Moreover, nature's workings, they have

With our new

as a result

done so

is

up

in a peculiarly destructive fashion.

ecological understanding,

purpose exploitation of nature

capital built

of human ignorance of

we

can see that

linear, single-

not in harmony with the patterns in the

biosphere and must be abandoned. Instead,

we must

learn to

work with

nature and to accept the basic ecological trade-ofis between protection

and production, optimum and maximum, quality and require major changes in our

lives,

quantity. This will

for the essential message

of ecology

is

much the biosphere can take and only so much it can give, and this may be less than we want. In the next chapter, we shall explore the consequences for human action that foUow inescapably fi-om limitation:

There

is

only so

the existence of fundamental biospheric limits.

2 Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

In the

human beings, by invading the biological up over the course of evolution, have created economic unprecedented numbers of people. In the last four decades, the three centuries,

last

capital built

wealth for

additional wealth created in each decade on the average equalled that added between the beginning of civilization and 1950 (Brown 1990, 1990b, p. 3)! Yet during the past 20 years, studies based on computer projections of trends in resource use, environmental impacts, and

tion

growth have shown

decelerate.

The

that

the

growth

studies differ in detail, but

all

material growth cannot continue indefinitely that environmental, population,

on

us

and resource

now; they disagree only on how

in

populawealth has started to

agree that population and

on

a finite planet. All agree

stresses are

drastically

and

being

inflicted

how soon we must

respond in order to avert human disaster. The Club of Rome study reported in The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972) appeared to show that an immediate rather than an eventual transition

to the steady state was necessary and that the actions required to cope with the problems of transition violated both conventional

wisdom and our

current values.

More

important, this was the first study of a holistic nature. Past ecological warnings had tended to focus on or become identified with

one particular limit to growth, such as pollution (Carson 1962) or population (Ehrlich 1968). They were therefore

vulnerable to the counterargument that the problem could be solved by using resources from other sectors. What The Limits to Growth

41

CHAPTER 2

42

purported to show, by identifying all the important relationships among various sectors and linking them in a computer model designed to reveal the resultant of

these interactions,

all

longer. The Global

2000 Report

President,

to the

that this

v^^as

work much

strategy of borrow^ing from Peter to pay Paul would not

published in 1980, used

approach and came to the same conclusion. Paradoxically, however, these studies tended to intensify debate about

a similar

particular hmits to growth, for the critics charged that they

were based on

excessively Malthusian and pessimistic assumptions about

aUeged

limits that largely

determined

their

outcomes.

many of

was asserted

It

the that

with more "reasonable" or optimistic assumptions about population dynamics, resource availability, pollution-control technology, and the like,

new "doom had prepared it. Not

quite different conclusions could be reached. In the United States, a

administration characterized The Global

2000

Report as projecting

and gloom" and cut the budgets of the agencies surprisingly,

however, budget cutting did not make the problems cited in

the report go away. Possible,

Global

that

pubhshed

2000

The World Resources

in

Institute report.

The Global

1985, reiterated the major trends found in The

Report and suggested priorities for action in such areas as

curbing population growth

rates,

reducing poverty, protecting

forests

and

other habitats, and curbing pollution. So did Our Common Future, commissioned by the United Nations, World Commission on Environment

and

Development

(1987).

Moreover, every year

since

1984,

the

Maturity or

steady state

Transition

Deceleration

Point of inflection

Rapid growth Take-off

Inception

FIGURE

2-1

humanity

lives

The on

logistic curve, or

a planet

every living population and process,

by

a

sigmoid curve.

sigmoid curve, and

endowed with it

finite resources,

its

features.

it is

Because

certain that, like

must obey the law of growth depicted

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

WorldWatch

an annual report on The

Institute has issued

Year after year,

43

State of the World.

has recorded the continuing deterioration of the earth's

it

physical condition and the threat that this deterioration

unmanageable, leading to economic decline and

What

follows

is

a synoptic

is

review of the various limits (primarily but

not exclusively physical) that have been identified by qualified

The argument makes

four

becoming

social disruption.

general

There

specialists.

indeed demonstrable limits to the demands humanity can place on its environment. (2) Although technology can help us "juggle" Hmits in accordance

v^th

human

points:

(1)

preferences, outright repeal of the Umits

Manipulating the

Time

or wish, to bear.

of the essence

impossible. (3)

is

limits technologically entails costs that

are

we may

not be

we wish

to cope with (4) and humanely. In sum, an era of ecological scarcity has dawned. The argument focuses on a few key factors, such as pollution, able,

is

if

limits effectively

that are truly critical for the system as a whole,

possible the interactions

not simply

a series

their interactions

among

of discrete problems.



a

and

it

makes

as explicit as

separate limits, for ecological scarcity

"problematique"

It is

—and can be understood

other fashion.

300

German woman

American

woman

African

Country

FIGURE

2-2

Number of offspring

is

an ensemble of problems and

in three generations.

woman

in

no

CHAPTER 2

44

Population and Food

No

period than the "population explosion." tion

more attention over a long The primordial limit on popula-

aspect of ecological scarcity has received

is

food, so

let

us consider the supply of arable land and other basic

of agricultural technology, and above all the costs and consequences of feeding people especially the large numbers of to see how additional people who will be born in the decades to come

factors: water, the state

many human





beings the earth can reasonably support.

THE POPULATION EXPLOSION

6

Billion (projected in 1998)

5 Billion (1987) 4 Billion (1974)

3 Billion (1960) 2 Billion (1972) Billion (1810)

1

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1500

1400

1600

1700

1800

1900

2000

2080

Year

FIGURE for the

2-3

human

It

took from the beginning of time to about the year 1810

population to reach

1

billion people. Just over

100 years

later,

were added. By 1987 the earth was home to 5 billion population is growing by more than 93 million each Currently, beings. human projected to exceed 6 billion before the year 2000, numbers are Human year. the next billion people

and unless the

human

availability

and use of contraceptives increase

dramatically, the

population could reach 14 billion by the end of the next century.

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

The

45

Inevitability of More People

when the first edition of this book was written, approximate4 bilHon people inhabited the earth. In 1990 the figure had risen to

In 1977, ly

The population of the earth is exploding. 10,000 people added to the earth every hour, 240,000 every day about 1 million

5.2 bilhon. are

every 4 days. If the current rate

of world population growth continues, there will be 10 billion people on the globe by 2025 and 16 biUion by 2100 (Haub 1988).

Of course,

on which they

these projections are only as

are based.

good

as the

assumptions

The United Nations Population Fund

projec-

assume that human fertility will decline to replacement levels by the middle of the tweny-first century and that world population will tions

stabilize at about 14 billion people by 2100. That number could go higher or lower, depending on the extent of birth control use within the next few decades. Even so, most experts regard a world population of 12

to 16 billion

people

as

foreordained.

*

The primary reason for this inevitabihty is the phenomenon of demographic momentum. For example, even though the United States attained replacement-level fertihty in the 1970s, the population

grew. In

fact,

assuming that

we

maintained a

fertility rate

of 1 .8, the

still

level

achieved in the 1970s, the population would continue to grow from its current 215 million to at least 292 million in 2080. This is because rapid growth in decades past has bequeathed us a young population that is, a



population distribution with disproportionate numbers of young people who have yet to replace themselves. Thus, even assuming a constant low fertility rate,

for

the U.S. birthrate

many more

would continue

to

exceed the death

rate

years.

But the United

States has not

maintained the fertility levels of the had reached 2.0 and had not yet peaked. went as high as 2.2, as the Census Bureau assumes in projections, the United States population would reach

1970s. In 1990 the fertihty level If the fertility rate its

"high-fertility"

not 292 miUion but 421 million by 2080, and

would increase by 20 numbers might be too if Hfe spans were extended, as some

million people per decade after that. low. This

*

The

would be

especially true

staggering magnitude

of "billions"

mathematician John Allen Paulos brings asking audiences

answer, he

tells

how long it will

them,

is

get to a billion seconds?

is

home

it

these

often

not appreciated.

the reality of these

take for a million seconds to pass.

about 11.5 days.

The

Even

He

correct answer

then asks

is

32

years.

how

long

it

The

numbers by

The

correct

will take to

a

CHAPTER 2

46

medical

hope, for then the death rate might remain below the

scientists

growth ceased.

birth rate for additional years before

Of

problem

course, the U.S. population

compared

to that

is

of

dimensions

trivial

of underdeveloped countries, where

replacement

a

from being achieved. Most have population growth

level

of fertility

rates

of about 2.1% per annum, resulting in truly explosive growth

is

far



doubling every 33 years.

Many hope

growth

that such rapid

porary phase and that the so-caUed demographic transition fertility in

tem-

a

is

drop in

(a

response to lowered death rates and economic improvement,

similar to that experienced

by the now-rich countries

in the course

their development) will begin to slow the population explosion. ever, the last

20 years have produced

transition.

A

industrial

development

evidence for such demographic

little

few countries have lowered their birthrates with (Sri

of

Howlittle

Lanka, Costa Rica, and China); other

3^ Halting Population Growth Halting population growth in the developing world

The

task.

average family size in these nations

is

now

is

a

monumental Be-

4.8 children.

cause these countries have large numbers of young people, family size

must drop below replacement

levels (that

is,

to fewer than

2 children)

and must remain there for some time. Only China has approached goal,

and

The

this

by coerced draconian measures.

that

obstacles are many. Children are valued for important

economic reasons

in developing countries: to

support parents in their old age. High

mark of virtue and proof of a man's uneducated and lack equal

women gain

rights.

fertility

virility.

There

is

work is

in the fields

and to

considered both a

Women in most places are

some evidence

that

where

education and equal rights, they concentrate on improv-

ing the health and sanitation of their

homes and become receptive to more likely to sur-

contraception. This occurs because their children are

vive and because they gain sources of status other than children. Al-

though such

signs are encouraging,

educated or achieving equal

women

rights, and,

are only slowly

when

evidence that most will voluntarily reduce their family

placement

levels.

becoming is no below re-

they do, there size

Popularion, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

47

countries failed to lower their birthrates despite

ment

between a

and Mexico). Also,

(Brazil

GNP

statisticians

and lowered birthrates

demographic

in

some

industrial develop-

have found

connection

little

developing countries. Although

might yet develop in some countries, most

transition

developing countries are growing

as

rapidly as ever.

It

seems

likely, in

the

absence of catastrophic famine, disease, or other Malthusian checks, that

demographic

momentum

in countries

the period 2040-2070.

How Many Can A

Can we

can support.

But

feed this

many

billion within

people?

Be Fed?

number of studies have

biUion.

with extremely young popula-

world population of 12 to 15

tions virtually guarantees a

One

tried to establish

concludes that

how many

people the earth

we could feed a world population of 50 number of totally unreaHstic assump-

to arrive at this figure, a

tions are needed. First, suitability; would

all

potentially arable land, regardless of fertility or

have to be dedicated to food production.

Humans

could

inhabit only wasteland totally unsuited to agriculture; suburbs and cities

would have

to

be uprooted and turned into farmland; the bulk of the

population would perforce be housed in Arctic regions; and so forth.

Second, all land, even infertile land that had been pressed into production, would have to \deld food at a level of production that has not been attained on our most fertile soil with the best means of which we are in other words, a level that plant physiologists dream about but capable that has no real prospect of being achieved outside a laboratory. Third, all



the possible side effects of intensively farming every conceivable acre at the highest technological level must be ignored, including the pollution

caused by

fertilizer runoff, the

enormous flow of

energ\' required for

such colossal and high-technology agriculture, the climatic turning ces,

on

and

all

forests into farmland, the

so forth.

Thus

that

is

an optimistic limit based purely

on

and Agricultural Organization realistic

of

enormous demand on water resour-

57 biUion

the potentiaHt\' of plant physiology, not

The Food 1983 that made more

effects

the reahties of agriculture.

(FAO) pubUshed

assumptions about land use,

a

study in

soil

quaUty,

water supply, and the application of agricultural inputs (basic fertiHzers, simple conser\'ation measures, improved plant varieties, and so on).

It

projected that most countries of Asia and South America could feed their

populations in the year 2000 from their

own

cultivated lands, whereas

most African and Middle Eastern countries could was optimistic, because

it

assumed

that

all

not.

But even

cultivable land

this

study

would be

brought into production, that the land w^ould be used to grow only food crops,

and

that the

food would be distributed

fairly to all

economic

CHAPTER 2

48

groups. In

reality,

world grain output per person has

declined since 1984.

and Latin America, the food produced per person has declined dramatically in the past decade, and those regions, as well as Asia, began In Africa

the period with high rates of malnutrition (see Table 2-1). Presently one-fifth of the world's population does not

lead an active

working

Even worse, 40

life.

consume enough to

calories to

60 million people

die in

developing countries each year from hunger and diseases related to hunger.

The

worldwide

nutritional shortfall

is

such that even with per-

fecdy equal distribution of the current world food production (theoretically possible

but poHticaHy inconceivable), everyone would be some-

what malnourished. Thus we do not reaUy provide 5.2 biUion

human

beings (see

Recent developments Green Revolution)

now

Box

in

agricultural

not

immune

to

and

as

countries)

drought

we

its

(a

shaU

agricultural productivity

Besides, as even

technology

(the

so-called

being apphed to underdeveloped countries have

averted a catastrophic global famine thus is

for even the existing

4).

far.

But the Green Revolution

perennial problem in see, it

of which

may

it is

many

less

have achieved the

capable in

developed

maximum

many parts of the world.

proponents admit, the Green Revolution cannot solve

the problem of overpopulation;

it

simply buys us some time to bring

population growth under control. Moreover, the world already confronts severe ecological problems because of its current mode of agricultural production, and the Green Revolution intensifies these problems. has a

number of

painfial social side effects



farmers worse off while making rich farmers better

TABLE in Latin

Latin

(It

also

making poor Thus the time

for example, off".)

Decline in Annual Grain Production Per Person America, Asia, and Africa, Peak Year and 1990

2-1

Kg

Year of

Kg

Peak Pro-

Person in

Person

duction

Peak Year

in

Per

Percent Mal-

Per

1990

Percent

nourished

Change

1985-87

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

49

4 A Mere

Distribution Problem?

In discussing world hunger,

some claim

that there

problem, only a food distribution problem. But

were distributed

leading. If food

equally,

no population

is

this

statement

and everyone

ate the

is

mis-

way

world population could be fed on the record harvests of 1985 and 1986 (ErUch 1990). Only if food

Americans do, less than

half the present

were distributed equally and everyone got

their

would the food supply be

vegetarian sources

needed

calories

from

sufficient to feed

everyone. If everyone ate hke the average Latin American and con-

sumed

a

mere 10% of their

calories

people could be fed (Corson 1990,

from animal sources, only 4

billion

p. 73).

American consumes about 30% of his or her calories from animal sources. And there is no indication that many of them are ready to stop eating their steaks, cheeses, and chickens to benefit of the world's hungry (assuming that their abstinence would mean more food for the hungry) And what if they tvere willing? World population is in-^ creasing at a rate of 1 miUion people every 4 days. So at best, a strict M

The

average

.

vegetarian diet by everyone, along with equal distribution of grain,

would provide Clearly, the

mere temporary

a

urgency of the population problem

by the assertion

that

it is

m

from the hunger problem.

respite

is

only a matter of fmding

merely camouflaged

more

equitable ways

to distribute food.

being bought

now

examination of the

at

is

the expense of the future.

difficulties,

A

more

detailed

dilemmas, and contradictions in current

and projected agricultural practices

will

show why feeding adequately

even double the present number of humans will overstrain the ecological and energetic resources to the breaking point and

is

earth's

Ukely to

be out of the question.

The Basic Agricultural Predicament: Limited Land The fundamental agricultural land

fact

is

about agriculture

is

that

it

requires land,

in diminishing supply. First, virtually

all

and good

good

agricul-

CHAPTER 2

50

world

tural land in the

us with almost supplies

now

80%

already in use;

is

our food. The best

all

more of the thus make only

in use

or

critical for dietary quality)

tural land

on

a

that provides

land in use probably

The marginal

modest contribution (although

much

it is

often

of the presently good agricul-

is

is becoming marginal while some marginal becoming altogether useless to agriculture.

are several reasons for the loss

One

of agricultural land.



sheer overrunning of agricultural land by population pressures

homes,

lands

the planet

agricultural land

There

good land

this

total agricultural output.

Second,

.

it is

50% of the

and roads

industries,

that people

demand. This

is

the

for the

happening

is

everywhere, but especially in East Asia, where population pressures claim

1990,

p. 65).

Another problem

soil

is

erosion.

conserved topsoil by such practices to

Whereas

as rotating

traditional agriculture

crops and permitting land

remain fallow for periods of years, many farmers today grow the same

They minimize

crop each year on the same land. is

Young

half-miUion hectares of agricultural land per year (Brown and

a

plowed and

left

organic matter the topsoil billion

is

more

it

periods

needs to rebuild the

wind and water

lost to

soil structure; as a result,

erosion.

One

estimate

is

Some of

irrigated.

behind minute amounts of top few inches of soil; kill

salts

salt.

The water

zones of the crops.

need

some of that

25

Eventually these

salts

accumulate in the

when

irrigated lands are not properly

table therefore rises, eventually reaching the root

The

roots in this water cannot get the

to survive. SaHnization

that are degrading

Salinization occurs

the diverted water evaporates, leaving

reduce the yields of the crops and ultimately

them. Waterlogging occurs

drained.

is

of the

of 9 to 21 miUion tons of grain production annually

(Brown and Young 1990, p. 61). A third problem is salinization and waterlogging. land

the land

soil

tons of topsoil are lost to erosion each year than are formed,

resulting in the loss

when

when

"unproductive." These practices deprive the

24% of

and waterlogging today the world's croplands.

oxygen they

are serious

Each

problems

year, 1.1 to 3.6

million tons of crop output are lost to salinization and waterlogging. Finally, deforestation causes the loss

hectares of the earth

s

of cropland. Seventeen million

tree cover are destroyed

of Austria (Brown 1991,

p. 7).

Some

each year, an area the

deforestation

size

may produce tem-

porary gains in croplands, but on the massive scale on which deforestation is

occurring,

runoff and

it

destroys

more than

affects rainfall

causes flooding in

some

cycles

it

creates. Deforestation increases

and

water

rainfall distribution. It therefore

places and desertification in others.

The

deser-

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

51

brought about by deforestation (and by the overgrazing of

tification

livestock) affects almost one-third

tion results in the loss of 6

of the

earth's land surface. Desertifica-

miUion hectares of agricultural land each year.*

In addition, deforestation indirectly adds to the problem of soil erosion.

People in deforested areas are forced to burn for fuel, thus depriving the soil of fertiUzer

up the

soil structure

Lester

Brown

and holds

it.

cow dung and

crop residues

and organic matter

that builds

Putting these and other factors together,

observes that "each year, the world's farmers must try to

feed 88 miUion

more people with 24

(Brown 1989, p. 29) Although there appears

billion fewer tons

to be other land in the

of topsoil"

world that could be

developed, bringing into production any sizable quantity of

new

land

enormous amounts of capital, vast expenditures of energy, and above all, ecological expertise beyond any we now possess. And

would

require

The preceding

production gains are likely to be ephemeral. addressed the ecological

fiatility

numerous countries

lands. Yet

tropical forests at a rate

chapter

of trying to clear and farm tropical

forest

are allowing the irreversible destruction

of 500,000

trees

per hour

reaping a few years of harvest but leaving

a

(Newsweek

of

1989, p. 59),

legacy of serious ecological

problems and potential cUmatological consequences. Even where the

of forest lands are capable of supporting some kind of more intensive

soils

cultivation, cutting

down

forests carries the risks

of erosion, flooding, and

desiccation of climate, the result of ignoring the ecologist's warning that

the so-called nonproductive parts of an ecosystem perform invaluable protective ftinctions and are vital to production

on even

the most suitable

land.

Some used land

novel kinds of ecologically sophisticated exploitation of un-



tree culture, pisciculture,

modernized versions of native gar-

—can provide

dening techniques, and so on

a useful

supplement (of vital

protein especially) to a basic cereal diet, but except in a few favored areas,

they are not the answer to the present and future food needs of humanity.

*

Air pollution, though

one

estimate,

1

it

(Brown and Young 1990, caused by acid

ozone

p. 63).

losses.

Other pollution damage

rain, rising ultraviolet radiation levels

layer in the stratosphere,

calculated yet.

crop

does not destroy cropland, also causes crop

losses.

By

million tons of grain are lost just to ozone pollution each year to crops, (such as that

due to the depletion of the

and global warming) have not been

But the evidence suggests

that each

of these

reliably

factors will accelerate

CHAPTER 2

52

.

.

.And Limited Water Irrigation has

astonishing

But

opened up many

human

throughout

and semiarid lands

arid

from 50 million hectares to 250 million

rate,

to agriculture

(Postel 1990, p. 40).

irrigation also has limits. Since 1978, irrigated area per capita has

decreasing worldwide.

of

costs



irrigation

that force

some

We

been

have already noted some of the environmental

the intensified erosion, waterlo^ing, and salinization

irrigated land out

countries, irrigated runoff

of production. Furthermore, in developed

becoming contaminated with

is

pesticide residues, polluting the sources

human

an

history. In this century, irrigated land has risen at

of the irrigated water

fertilizer

itself, as

and

well as

drinking water. In the United States, over 50 pesticides contaminate

groundwater in 32 American

states

(Corson 1990,

p.

163). In third-world

countries, water-development projects have spread disease, destroyed traditional

upon which poor people

agriculture

destroyed

many

species

by eliminating

schistosomiasis have resulted

Today

irrigation systems.

600 million

who

farmed

are in

from

at least

rely,

ruined

their habitats.

fisheries,

a parasite that lives in reservoirs

200 million people have the

danger of getting

(Corson 1990,

it

or fished in floodwaters lost their

and

Major outbreaks of disease;

162).

p.

way of life

as

and

another

Poor people

dams upstream

stopped the flooding on which they depended. (These dams do not normally

become

substitute fisheries, for their

providing insufiicient nutrients for

deep waters are usually

The environmental consequences of serious, are only part

of the reason

the future. Another problem

is

sterile,

fish).

why

that

however

irrigation projects,

such projects wiU be limited in

both water and

irrigable land are

The cost of irrigation is therefore becoming too expensive to justify in many parts of the world. Africa, where food needs are greatest, is the worst case; the cost per hectare of irrigating land on that

getting scarce.

continent has risen to between $10,000 and $20,000. This cost tive for agriculture,

increased by only

which

5%

partially explains

why

is

prohibi-

Africa's irrigated area

in the last decade (Postel 1990, p. 42).

The most fundamental

limit

on

irrigation

is

the decreasing availa-

of good water. Rivers and lakes worldwide receive enormous quantities of industrial discharges, agricultural runoff, and municipal

bility

sewage.

A quarter of the world's population— 1.2 billion people

have access to

safe

agriculture and

—do

not

drinking water. Because of the scarcity of good water,

growing numbers of people compete

and eastern Africa,

in parts

of the Middle

East, in

for

it.

In northern

China, and even,

serious problem,

United States, where getting usable water is a growing populations often require that water be shifted

from agriculture

to drinking purposes.

occasionally, in the western

a

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

53

tables are falling in many parts of the world. Indeed, in some water has already become too expensive to pump, forcing land to be abandoned. In many parts of the world, including one-fifth of the

Water

areas

United

irrigated area in the

farmers are

States

pumping water out

and large

faster

than

of China and India, being "recharged"

parts

it

is



process that cannot continue indefinitely. Gigantic aqueducts to transport

water very long distances have been built to overcome these shortages. Such systems require enormous quantities of energy to build and main-

and even more grandiose ones are being considered. But realistic prospects for major gains in irrigated areas of the world are poor. In Thailand, the Philippines, and parts of India, some potential exists for tain,

enlarging irrigated areas, but in other parts of India, wells are going dry. China and the United States have actually decUned in irrigated area since

pumping is outpacing replenishment, that decline expected to continue. Even general adoption of drip irrigation and

the 1970s, and because is

other techniques that conserve water (but boost energy costs) will not alter this picture substantially. In fact, the proliferation

which reduce water flow and increase evaporative paces improvements in water supply in many areas. Despite high areas,

but

it

costs,

desaUnation

a possible

is

loss,

of waterweeds,

more than out-

answer for some local

requires such great expenditures of energy for production

transportation that

widespread use

its

is

and

unhkely. Moreover, the hot brines

that are an inevitable by-product will create a pollution large dimensions.

Such remote

possibilities as

problem of very towing icebergs fi-om the

Antarctic are occasionally advanced to growth, but

minor, local

as solutions to this very serious limit even the most favorable estimates relegate them to a

role. It

is

just barely conceivable, for example, that icebergs

one day supply water to the Atacama Desert in CaHfornia, but the ecological, economic, and practical barriers to providing North America

will

with agricultural water from Finally, global

more

severe.

this

source are immense.

warming may make

the problem of Umited water even

(For a discussion of the physical

warming, see Chapter

3).

One

possible effect

mechanism of global of global warming will be

to shift the areas where water is available. Dams, flood control, hydropower, reservoir and other water management projects built where water is

now available will become less productive

projects will that

or even useless where rainfall

New water management enormous cost, in the new wet locales materiahze. Global warming is also predicted to increase evapo-

and snowpack

areas have shifted elsewhere.

need

to

be

built, at

transpiration in crops. If this occurs, increased irrigation

of existing and the irrigation of cropland now rain-fed will be required to achieve the same crop productivity. Although a number of irrigated cropland

CHAPTER 2

54

now-irrigated areas scientific

in the

benefit firom increased rainfall levels,

that

much of the newly

available

water

Help from

Nor can we

of soil moisture for crops, will be the

Sea

the

expect the sea to provide basic subsistence for added

depend on the few

fisheries

trients are

believe that

areas

where

harvest

ocean

nu-

brought to the surface by upwelling. For another, experts

we

are already close to the

may be

is

billions.

deserts. All

large quantities of

maximum

sustainable yield

100 million tons offish per year (Corson 1990, p. 142).

sea:

may be

result.

For one thing, the oceans are for the most part biological

major

some

form of intensified monsoons. If so, occasional flooding, rather than

a stable source

Little

may

models suggest

unsustainable in the long run.

critical to its

The

of the

And even

this

top millimeter of the

productivity and general ecological health, and

we

ay

A Ray of Hope?

Mariculture: Although some

species are being overfished or are

becoming too pol-

luted to consume, the farming offish offers an alternative source of protein. In 1980,

worldwide production of seafood and edible seaweed

was 8.7 million metric

tons, nearly one-eighth

of the

such resources. Third- world countries produced

(Corson 1990,

p.

148). Aquaculture has the potential for

in third-world countries, because

it is

be practiced not only in bays and the semi-fireshwater estuaries as well. for

it is

total harvest

74% of this

potentially

much more

good growth

usually labor-intensive sea but in fireshwater

It also

efficient

of

harvest

and can

ponds and

can be extremely productive, than

terrestrial agriculture at

converting solar energy into animal protein.

However, aquaculture may never quires scientific

knowledge and

purity, location, spacing

realize

capital; the

and so on,

its

fuU potential.

First, it re-

requirements of water

are extremely

demanding; and the

techniques of managing aquatic ecosystems are intricate. Second, pollution and coastal development must be well controlled for mariculture to work.

So

far,

unfortunately, such control

to both pollution

and development.

is

weak and

is

losing

ground

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

are polluting industrial,

with

it

of land-generated wastes

a multiplicity

and agricultural



as

55



municipal,

well as with oil and plastics from both

at sea. Much of the increase in fishing since 1983 has been of species used to feed animals and to make fish meal, rather than of fish which people consume. Yields of some major fisheries have leveled

land and our ships

off or are declining.

Once

and the Alaskan crab

a fishery collapses, as did the

Peruvian anchovy

may never recover to former of whales are already "extinct" for practical purposes, because for more than a century, the few remaining animals have failed to levels.

Many species

reproduce

also

damaging

satisfy

wedands,

respectively,

commercial demand.

marshes, mangroves and coral reefs in

salt

parts of the world. Salt marshes

tropical tive

adequate to

at a rate

People aie

many

fisheries, harvests

and mangroves

and they are

far

more

are

temperate and

biologically produc-

than the open ocean. Mangroves, especially, spawn and support

enormous filter

out

ponds and

down many

of

quantities

human-made

and

finfish

pollution.

and the

shellfish,

But they

and

at

the same time they

are being converted to

shrimp

mangrove trees are being cut and firewood. Coral reefs are starving, and in cases dying, throughout the world (Booth 1990 p. A8). Some die rice fields,

salt-tolerant

for building materials

because rivers

filled

from reaching the

with sediment flow into them, preventing sunlight Others die because fishers dynamite reefs to kill

reefs.

the fish that hide in them. pollutants

kill still

other

coral reefs are dying

is

Mine

But

warmest decade

in the last

modern

The dying of the

records.

taifings, pesticides, cyanide,

and other

new and ominous reason why abnormally warm seas. The 1980s were

reefs.

of possible global warming.

100

a

years,

the the

and 1990 was the hottest year in may be an early biological effect

reefs

*

At the same time, in more temperate climates people are destroying wedands for development. Estuaries, where commercially valuable fish spend part of their Hves, are becoming reservoirs of human contaminants. Contrary to a popular assumption, the estuaries into which polluted rivers

flow do not flush these pollutants out to the

sea.

Rather, the

* The destruction of the ozone layer is also affecting the seas in a worrisome way. In 1988, an ozone hole over Antarctica resulted in a 15% overall decline in

ozone

levels. Surface phytoplankton levels in that area also decreased by 15 to (Roberts 1989, p. 288-289). If the decrease in ozone levels caused the decrease in phytoplankton, then ozone depletion harms the oceanic food chain.

20%

In addition, a decrease in phytoplankton decreases the ocean's ability to absorb

atmospheric carbon and accelerates global warming.

CHAPTER 2

56

pollutants concentrate in the estuaries, endangering marine

making

National and international pollution. Certain treaties limit

ocean dumping fi-om

nations control over the seas v^thin

enabling

United

them to

States

regulate

failed.

Some

Many also

nations

fail

200 miles of their

and some other countries have laws

gallons

another gives

coasts, theoretically

that territory.

The

development

restricting

water. Yet as a whole, these efforts have

do not agree to or comply v^th

international controls.

to enforce their clean water laws or adequately fund clean-up

United

projects to reverse the pollution firom internal sources. In the

most bays

for example,

and

to control ocean

ships;

and protect the resources within

wedands and protecting clean

in

made

have been

efforts

life

human consumption.

the fish (especially shellfish) dangerous for

are badly polluted.

Americans dumped 3.3

States, trillion

of sewage into marine waters in 1980, and since then the amount of

dumping

has increased. Industries add 5 trillion additional gallons of in-

dustrial waste to

runoff, in the

domestic waters each year (Corson 1990,

form of solid

heavy metals, adds herbicides,

and

pollutants. All

billions

wastes,

lawn

of this occurs in

been half-hearted and

So

far efforts to

largely

Urban and

to say nothing about fertilizers,

and

atmospheric

fallout firom

of national, state, and

spite

146).



of gallons more

pesticides firom agriculture

to deal with the problem.

p.

pesticides, toxic chemicals, oil,

local laws enacted

curb overfishing have likewdse the

in

unsuccessfiil

United

States

and

throughout the world.

Diminishing Returns from Increased Energy Input and Intensification of Agriculture Experts agree that the only possible answer to the problem of feeding

double the present world population Hes not in the opening up of new firontiers either

on the land or

in the oceans, but in the preservation

more

intensive exploitation of lands that are

most

suitable for intensive agriculture.

Even

and

now farmed and that are the if v^e

overlook

its

ecological

consequences, intensification of production requires a vast input of energy.

Modern

fossil fiaels

*

intensive agriculture

essentially a

is

and minerals into grain and

fiber.

technique for converting

From 1950

to 1984,

world

For example, even though the atmospheric nitrogen for making nitrogenous

fertilizer

is

itself free

(and essentially inexhaustible), the process of converting

into chemical forms that plants can use

Every ton of nitrogenous

costly in terms

fertilizer requires

to manufacture (McHale 1970,

intensive agriculture

is

may come

p.

12).

one ton of steel and

Some of

to be in short supply.

it

of materials and energy: five tons

of coal

the minerals essential to

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

fertilizer

use

grew from 14 million tons

57

to 146 million tons, a fivefold

increase per capita. This increase offset a one-third decline in grain area p. 52). But the rate of increase in fertilizer use since 1984. As a result, world grain yield has declined from decHned has 343 kilograms per person in that year to 329 kilograms per person in 1990 (Brown 1991, p. 13). This is not to say that agricultural production dechned during those years; it increased. But while grain production

per person (Brown 1989,

1984 to 1990, population grew by 2% (Brown In addition, the rate of increase in yields of the staple crops

grew by 1% annually 1991,

p. 14).

fi-om

may have peaked. First, the miracle

strains that

Revolution are already in widespread grains

may

yields, for

When

were the

basis

of the Green

Second, some of these miracle

use.

have reached their biological Hmits of productivity. Rice

example, have not increased since 1984 (Brown 1991,

the upper limit of photosynthetic efficiency of a plant

is

p. 12).

reached,

further application of fertilizer does not increase yields. In a finite en-

vironment, aU biological processes grow in

S-shaped curve,

at

a

the end of which they do not

manner reflected by an grow further (see Figure

2-1).

Some

people

hope

biotechnology research will

result

in

dramatic increases in world food production. Biotechnologists have

al-

that

ready achieved some impressive gains. For example, they have produced

hormones

that increase milk production

and have developed vaccines

and drugs to increase livestock productivity. Biotechnology promises to create

some foods

may be

in the laboratory. Biotechnologists

able to

breed natural enemies of plant pests or render existing pests harmless.

They may

also

pests,

and

fi-ost,

be able to breed plants more tolerant of heat, drought, salt.

These techniques increase the

the growing of food



in terms

Biotechnology thus may be able to

finite

environment for

of both area and growing season. offset the losses

of croplands currently

in use.

But biotechnological progress in some areas has been controversial or Disagreement exists over the safety of foods to which residues of hormones or drugs cHng. Plant genetics has not been easy to understand. Genetic manipulation has had unpredictable results. In the few cases slow.

where gene

transfers

much

have been successfijUy introduced to crops,

time to obtain

new

as

takes.

Furthermore, the biotechnology research agenda so

dominated by

a

it

has

variety as conventional breeding

taken

large corporations. Their

far has

been

primary objective has been to

produce herbicide-resistant crops so that pesticides can be spread pervasively over fields, thereby reducing tillage. This contributes to soil

erosion and has other dangerous consequences (see

Box

6)

—and

in

any

event does Httle to help farmers in developing countries, where tilHng by

CHAPTER 2

58

- independence" in the near future (A. L. Hammond 1974a). Maximum coal development w^uld also necessitate the a



destruction of good arable and forested land

long-term

in short, the sacrifice

of

agricultural productivity for short-term energy production.

Thus the amount of coal we can reasonably expect to obtain and use is far less than the amount theoretically available in the ground. At only a temporarv^ stopgap satisfaction of our short-term energy requirements, and we shall very soon have to conceive and construct alternative technologies of energy supply that do not depend on

best, coal offers

such nonrenewable and environmentally damaging

drainage

problem, which

beyond the mining

Even

contaminating streams

v^th the pollution caused by the extracquestionable whether humanity can Hve with the

could

ftiels, it is

live

pollution caused by their burning. In Chapter 3,

which

how

it

affects

human

aquatic

is

health.

We

also will

life

exist to

will see the extent to

species of

observe

health problems, damages agriculture, and also

means

we

in eastern lakes and streams

damaging corrodes buildings, weakens some

acid rain

and groundwater

areas themselves.

if humanity

tion of fossil

is

fiiels.

trees,

how smog kills forests.

and

and adversely causes

human

Technological

reduce the amount of smog and acid rain formed with the

burning of fossil

fiiels,

both by producing "cleaner"

fiiels

in the

first

place

and by using new control technologies during burning. Some advanced repowering technologies for producmg coal-gasification

combined

electricity,

cycle system

such

as

the integrated

(IGCC), can reduce methane

CHAPTER 2 and remove almost all of the sulfide by-products of coal before the is burned (Fulkerson et al. 1990, p. 131). At the same time,

synthesis gas

the efficiency by

34%

(for a

which power

is

produced

in these plants

coal-burning conventional plant) to 42%. But

is

raised

utilities are

The new technologies may be be) more cosdy, or they may be

to adopt advanced technologies. to be (and indeed

may

at first

as unnecessary. Utilities

do not want

plants before their useful

and

may

it

conceived until

it

is

last

from 20 to 40

from the day

a

new

slow

perceived

perceived

to retire today's conventional

(which may

life

take a very long time

from

years)

power is

over,

technology

is

designed, developed, tested, refined, and finally

installed.

Moreover, even

and industry were persuaded or forced to

if utiHties

quickly adopt state-of-the-art technologies to reduce the emissions of

smog and

cause

fossil fuels that

acid rain, carbon dioxide

is

the inevitable

product of combustion. The buildup of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere causes the greenhouse

effect.

Six billion tons of carbon are added

amount

to the atmosphere each year, and the

has been rising by 400

million tons annually since 1986 (Flavin and Lenssen 1991,

p. 24).

A

United Nations study concluded in 1990 that these levels of carbon emissions will produce rapid and highly disruptive climate changes in

coming

the

people

years

directly.

—changes

(We

that will

harm

will discuss this fiarther in

3.)

we

have

fossil fuel.

Coal

Unfortunately the carbon emissions of burning coal, which in abundance, are higher than those

produces

80%

and gas.

IGCC,

of burning any other

higher carbon emissions than an equivalent amount of oil

higher carbon emissions than an equivalent amount of natural

Producing synthetic

overcome as

25%

and

agriculture, forests,

Chapter

this *

fuels or synthetic natural gas

from coal does not

problem. Although advanced powering technologies, such

can reduce carbon dioxide emissions sHghtly by improving

the efficiency of electrical production, coal gasification by conventional

* a

Integrated coal-gasification

combined

cycle plants

gaseous mixture, using steam and oxygen.

The

would convert coal to would power a gas gas would be harnessed

gases

turbine to produce electricity, and the heat from the

to vaporize water to run a steam turbine (Fulkerson et

Because the process powers two turbines, energy supplied than do today's coal efficiency

may be

compared

to about 33 to

bum

as

high

as

it

gets

more

plants. Theoretical

al.

1990, p. 132).

electricity for the

models suggest

42% with advanced power

37% with

conventional plants.

The

that

technologies, latter

simply

coal to vaporize water to run a steam turbine; the gases themselves just

go up

a

smokestack

as

waste.

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

means

increases

89

carbon dioxide emissions by

energy produced (Corson 1990,

p.

50%

more per

or

atmospheric con-

Scientists believe that in order to stabilize the

centration reduced

of carbon dioxide, worldwide carbon emissions must be

80%

(Flavin

and Lenssen 1991,

1989

rates

utterly incompatible

by 60 to

consume

unit of

194).

coal at

is

In any event, humanity

may not

stabilize

p.

25).

with

To produce and this objective.

atmospheric concentra-

tions of carbon dioxide in time to avert highly disruptive climate

changes.

even

takes decades to achieve reductions in carbon emissions,

It

when

there

is



as in

the United States there

analysts belitve that

25%

Western Europe must cut

its



not

is

will to achieve this goal.^ As population continues to

the political

grow worldwide,

per capita carbon

of what they are today. The United

States, which consumes almost twice as much energy per capita as Western Europe and Japan, would have to reduce its per capita carbon emissions to less than 15% of what they are today. To accomplish this would require changes not only in America's methods of producing energy but also in American industry, agriculture, transportation, and housing and consumption patterns.

emissions to

The

Potential

Many era

and

Peril of Nuclear

Energy

coming changes and

regard the

foreseeable end of the fossil-fuel

with complacency, for they believe

that, just as coal

replaced

wood

and expensive, new technologies will take over the burden of energy production, allowing material growth

when

the latter

* Oil shale

and

became

scarce

sand deposits were thought

tar

sources of Hquid hydrocarbons.

former, Canada of the resources required

The United

latter.

enormous

at

one time

However, obtaining

quantities

to be alternative

States has substantial reserves

liquid fuel

of the

from these

of rock to be mined, processed, and

disposed of at high monetary, energetic, and environmental cost. In addition, required the use of

more water than could be

supplied. Finally, oil shale

it

and

other synthetic fuels have a high carbon content per unit of energy produced.

The United program

States

abandoned

in the 1980s as

its

government-subsidized

t Fifteen nations, mostly

States

spurned

beginning in 1989,

on

specific goals

(Meyer 1990,

it

this

by

20%

or more. But the

undertaking. At several international conferences

has prevented international agreement from being reached

and timetables

p. 3).

development

from the European Economic Community, recently

established a goal of reducing their carbon emissions

United

oil shale

uneconomic.

for stabilizing

and reducing carbon emissions

CHAPTER 2

90

we can turn many of its pro-

to continue. In the relatively short term, say these optimists,

to nuclear power.

But

ponents claim? Indeed,

energy until

we

is it

some of the more

issues

even

a safe

and sensible stopgap source of

develop thermonuclear fusion and explore other long-

range possibilities? This aside

nuclear power the panacea

is

an exceedingly controversial

is

issue.

Leaving

examine the be the main points of

esoteric technical problems, let us

of nuclear safety and waste, for these seem to

controversy.

As we

will see in

Chapter

3,

very small amounts of radiation can

harm to ecosystems and people, particularly if the release of radioactive compounds continues for a number of years. Thus virtually perfect radionucUde-emission control is required. The boosters of nuclear power believe that we have the engineering and management capacity to cause severe

achieve

The be

this level

critics

of control for large-scale generation of nuclear power.

contend that

What

achieved."*"

been achieved so

this hasn't

are the

major points

Proponents of nuclear power

far

and that

it

can't

at issue?

reiterate tirelessly that nuclear generat-

ing plants are designed to keep emission during normal reactor operation

low enough

*

that

any threat to public health

is

negligible.

Even

if

one

At one time, some thought that the development of nuclear power would be by finite global supplies of uranium. Light- water reactors (LWRs),

restricted

the predominant type, burn only

The

uranium 235, which

constitutes only a tiny

of naturally occurring uranium (composed largely of uranium 238).

fraction

uranium-235

must

energy-intensive techniques

carbon dioxide

—before

inefficiency with

which

be

it

can be

fissionable

is

consumed

in light

laborious

and

highly

that release substantial quantities

used for reactor

uranium

is

fuel.

Added

to

of

the

obtained, light-water reactors

energy converters.

are also relatively inefficient

uranium

by

concentrated

—techniques

If all the

world's supply of

water reactors, only 70 terawatt-years of thermal

energy will be produced, compared to the 154 from already discovered reserves of oil

LWRs

138).

and 130 from already discovered natural gas (Hafele 1990, p. than 0.6% of available uranium atoms; over 99% are

fission less

is plentiful. The current estimated world supply between 6 and 7 million tons enough to power the number of nuclear plants currently in operation and the 96 under construction for

wasted. Nevertheless, uranium

of uranium ore

about 100 years (Hafele 1990, t

One



is

p. 137).

indication of the radiation being released from nuclear

the concentration of krypton-85, tion.

From 1970

in the

which

is

power

plants

is

uniquely associated with their opera-

to 1983, the average annual concentration of this radioactive gas

atmosphere increased by

80% (Commoner

1990,

p. 34).

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

grants the validity of this position,*

it

91

is

hardly decisive, for the very

assumption of normalcy begs most of the important questions. Nuclear

power generation can be

from

acts

phases of the

and

fliel

disposal) can

alarming

installations

list

if

errors; only if

can be perfectly protected

of God, terrorism and sabotage, criminal

or foreign; and only

civil

no accidents or operating

and other nuclear

reactors, fuels,

and construction of the

safe only if the design

reactor are flawless; there are

acts,

and

acts

the release of radionuclides during

of war,

all

other

cycle (mining, processing, transportation, reprocessing,

be rigidly controlled. As

of "ifs." In

fact,

point out,

critics

this

a rather

is

the nuclear industry has run into trouble in

almost every one of the areas mentioned.

Design aad operator competence have been Chernobyl, which

catastrophe at

deaths and

whose ultimate

from

far

The

perfect.

expected to cause 70,000 cancer

is

government's

costs will surpass the Soviet

total

prior investment in nuclear power, was initiated by operator errors. But

design defects

pounded



—com-

control systems that proved to be inadequate

the effects of operating errors (Flavin 1987,

p. 33).

The

nuclear

industry proclaimed that such an accident could not happen in the

United

States because

western plant design was superior. But in March

1979, a minor problem developed in the plumbing of the Three Mile Island-2 plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Operator errors and design defects then led to a partial

meltdown

in the

TMl-2

core.

Some

control

systems did not work, meters displaying crucial data were hidden from operators' view; a critical valve got stuck, an important sensor didn't

work, and hundreds of warning

One

later told investigators that operators

was allowing cooling water

to

came on and alarms sounded

lights

only confused the operators more.

reactor operator,

1986,

p. 12).

Some

that

Frederick,

had closed the stuck valve (which

drain away from the overheated

only because "no one could think of anything

Nogee

Ed

else to

reactor)

do" (quoted

experts believe that the United States

in

came

within 30 minutes of a catastrophe that would have at

Chernobyl. (Nogee 1986,

p. 12)

far exceeded the one Chernobyl released between 50 and

100 million curies of radioactivity into the biosphere; the containment

TMI-2

*

held in 18 biUion curies of radioactivity (Corson 1990,

Many

critics

do not grant

it.

Because

it

has

now become

doses of radiation have long-term adverse effects health (see



that, in

Chapter

from

plants

3)

even tiny ecological

other words, no radiation exposure can be considered risk-free



now

clear that

on human and

at

p. 196).

critics

contend that even the low-level, "normal" emissions

operating constitute a threat to health.

CHAPTER 2

92

Some

nuclear advocates point out that the ultimate safety device, the

containment structure, did hold demonstrating

at

TMI-2 and

key design superiority. But

a

tainment held may have been

that

matter of luck.

a

no one was

the fact that

An

killed,

TMI-2 s con-

official

of General

Public Utilities, TMI's owner, has recently admitted that "we're surprised the reactor vessel contained the accident" (quoted in Flavin 1990,

Moreover, the Soviet containment structure at

some Western

standards;

plants built in the

United

it

p. 60).

Chernobyl was up

to

was, in fact, similar to the containments at

States

by General Electric (about one-third of

U.S. reactors).

important. United States nuclear plants have been plagued by

More

Between 1979 and 1987, power plants. In 1985, for example, there were 3000 plant mishaps and 764 emergency shutdowns, 18 of which were serious enough to lead to core damage (Flavin 1987, p. 42).t In 1987 there were 3000 mishaps, 104,000 incidents of worker exposure to radiation, and 430 emergency plant shutdowns. There were

serious accidents, shutdowns,

and near

misses.

there were 27,000 mishaps at licensed nuclear

more than 150

serious accidents in 14 Western nations fi-om 1971 to

1984. Significant nuclear incidents have been initiated by field mice, a loose

shirttail,

and an improperly used candle. When accidents reveal utifities to add safety features to existing

design flaws and regulators force plants, these additions are

tegrated into the

unavoidably piecemeal and are poorly in-

facility's layout.

Atomic Energy Commission's top safety officer concluded that GE's containment was inadequate and should be banned. Exhibiting an attitude that is commonplace among nuclear regulators, Joseph Hedrie, who later became the Chairperson of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, rejected his safety officer's recommendation. A memo obtained by the Union of Concerned Scientists quotes him as writing that the proposed ban "could well be the end of nuclear power. It would throw into question the continued operation of licensed plants, would make unlicensable the GE [and some Westinghouse] plants now in review, and *

Actually, in the early 1970s, the

would

generally create

(quoted in t

One,

ment

at

Nogee

I

can stand thinking about."

p. 13).

the Davis-Besse nuclear plant near Toledo, Ohio, involved 16 equip-

failures,

including the same stuck valve and

human

error involved in the

TMI-2. Operators averted core damage because they quickly shut allowing auxiliary pumps to cool the core.

near disaster that valve,

1986,

more turmoil than

at

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

93

la Nuclear Safety: The Big Gamble That nuclear

safety

may be

a

bad gamble

is

indicated by the refusal

of commercial insurance companies, bastions of prudence and the careful calculation of risks, to cover the nuclear industry until they

and government reinsurance through the Price- Anderson Act. This Act, renewed in 1988, limits payment for nuclear accidents to $7 billion, even though a 1982 study done for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission reported were assured of drastically limited

that a

liability

major nuclear accident could

in injuries

result in

and property damage. Even

more than $100

this larger figure

billion

does not in-

clude most of the special ecological and societal costs of radioactivity,

such

as

chronic, long-term ecosystem

damage and adverse

genetic effects.

The safety

is

nuclear industry attempts to assure the public that nuclear

good gamble by pubUcizing

a

risk analysis"

an event

of nuclear

the results of their "probabilistic

reactors. This defines risk as the probability that

v^ happen multipHed by

its

consequences. These analyses

predict that core -damaging accidents should occur once every 10,000._ to

20,000 years of reactor operation (Hafele 1990,

Mile Island occurred

after

tions,

and Chernobyl occurred

1987,

p. 40). Probabilistic risk analysis

after

is

that

141).

But Three a|

only another 1900 years (Flavin

models have certain

For example, they make assumptions that such assumption

p.

only 1500 years of cumulative reactor opera-

may not

difficulties.

reflect reahty.

But when a technician used a candle to ch eck for Browns Ferry, Alabama, nuclear plant in 1975, a fire

simultaneously. leaks at the

One

redundant safety systems wiU not be destroyed

destroyed several redundant electrical systems

at

air

the same time, actually

down the control room! Probabilistic risk analysis also does notlakelnto TccounTunknown dangers of reactors built in developing

shutting

countries,

which have

firequently

been plagued by mismanagement, sub-

standard construction materials and tecliniques, and bribes paid to inspectors. is

I

not

As

much

a result, nuclear critics claim that probabilistic risk analysis

better than guesswork.

No

one knows when and where

the next nuclear accident will occur, but everyone

where,

it

will.

knows

that,

some-

CHAPTER 2

94

some nuclear

In

been released into the

incidents, radiation has

environment.* Nuclear regulatory bodies, which are usually protective of the industry, minimize incidents and nuclear hazards. Radiation releases are regularly characterized as presenting

France,

as

no danger

to the public; in

Chernobyl's radioactive cloud passed overhead, French

stated repeatedly that

it

had missed the country.

Utilities

officials

sometimes have

not reported nuclear incidents or have delayed reports of them. delayed reporting the

TMI-2

GPU

incident and then repeatedly issued mis-

leading statements minimizing

its

seriousness.

Additional safety hazards loom. Nuclear plants have a relatively short life



most 40

at

old. T^lready,

years.

many

are

By

1990, 35 nuclear plants were

showing

pressure vessels, causing

them

signs

to

at least

25 years

of aging. Neutrons bombard

become

embrittled.

steel

Steam generators

corrode. Pipes burst in unexpected places. In 1986 a hot-water pipe burst in the Surry

Nuclear plant in Virginia, and four workers were

(Flavin 1987, p. 45). Nuclear radiation builds

of a reactor; dangerous

killed

up continually over the

life

of radionuclides will remain for thousands

levels

of years. Therefore, unlike conventional power plants, nuclear reactors cannot

be destroyed with

a

wrecking

ball.

They must be dismanded and buried

(decommissioned), or they must be mothbaUed for several decades until short-lived radioisotopes decay third option,

impossible.

entombment of

No matter how

the radioactivity did and sphere.)

Not only do

it

and must then be decommissioned. (A the reactor

would

ment, the concrete. Even

A more

insidious safety

radionuclides from rather

common

all

site, is

regarded

as

before

release the radioactivity into the bio-

is

radioactive



the pipes, the equip-

the solvents used for cleaning

problem

the accumulation of

is

the other phases of the fuel cycle.

today.

now

tomb would decay

the plants contain high levels of radioactive ele-

ments but everything in the reactor

*

on

was designed, the

An example

is

the

Such

up the reactor

minor

releases

of

releases are in fact

planned release of long-lived

radionuclides during fuel reprocessing. In addition, refining uranium for use in

nuclear

power

plants produces

uranium miU

by 1987, the

taUings;

licensed mills had produced 186 million metric tons of firom

uranium mine

emit radon gas

tailings

already a

problem

in

some

nations'

Radioactivity

localities.

Tailing piles

into the atmosphere and contaminate the groundwater below

them with dangerous

levels

the groundwater exceed (Critical

is

tailings.

Mass 1989,

of radioactivity. At some

EPA

standards

factsheet 5).

by

a factor

sites,

of a

radioactivity levels in

hundred or

a

thousand

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

95

11 Low-Level Nuclear Wastes Nuclear power plants

produce large amounts of low-level nuclear they are decommissioned, they will produce 16,000 cubic meters more almost half as much as they produce

wastes each year.

also

When



cumulatively over their operating

No

one knows what

dumped

to

life.

do with

these wastes. Right now, they are

into special commercial landfills.

But half of the landfills desigpurpose have been closed because their radioactivity is contaminating adjacent property. In Illinois, Kentucky, and New York, nated for

this

plutonium and other contaminants fi-om these

landfills

have leaked into

the groundwater.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's proposed solution to is simple. It wants to label some of these wastes "below

the

|roblem

Regulatory concern" and allow producers to dispose of them in unregulated municipal landfills (Critical

Mass 1989). The

slieves that the solution to pollution is dilution

everywhere will not mind just

a

little

NRC apparently



that hardy folks

radioactivity in their drinking

water.

become contaminated; any whatever surface they

solvents that

splatter. All

spill

machinery

contaminate the in contact

soil

or

with a con-

taminated surface becomes radioactive. Furthermore, neutron-activated parts of the reactor, including its pressure vessel, its internal components

and structures, and tive

its concrete shield, become. 1000 times than other contaminated components; because they

more radioacbecome com-

posed of radioisotopes, they cannot be washed clean (Pollock 1986, p. 10). A huge amount of materials must be dismantled, chopped up into pieces

and removed by remote-control devices, and buried. No machinery has been designed for this task. It will be very labor-intensive, and the

yet

peoples

who

will have to

operate the machinery and do other decommissioning be rotated firequently to avoid radiation overexposure.

tasks

Un-

planned radiation leaks are inevitable. Decommissioning will be compli-

CHAPTER 2

96

cated, hazardous, as



time-consuming, and expensive

building each nuclear plant in the

And

there

of wastes,

a

nowhere

is still

to

first

reason

is

expensive, perhaps,

place.

bury these materials

half-century into the nuclear age,

The fundamental

as

is

Disposal

safely.

an unsolved problem.

that the wastes are dangerous for millennia

but planetary changes cannot be predicted for millennia. The metals alone in each of the nation's nuclear plants will have built up an average of 4,600,000 curies of radioactivity. Each reactor produces 30 tons a year of highly radioactive spent fuel. These materials will take

3,000,000 years to decay sufficiently to no longer be

a serious risk.

Spent fuel continually accumulates and no one knows what to do with it.

Temporarily,

metric tons are

it

stored in pools of water at each reactor: 21,000

is

now

sitting in these pools,

Some

accumulate by 2000.

reactors are

store spent nuclear fuels. This material

unshielded,

a

and 40,000 metric tons will running out of capacity to very dangerous. If

is

person nearby would receive

a lethal

were

it

dose of radiation in

seconds.

The

nuclear industry contends that radioactive waste disposal

pohtical problem, not a technical one.

It is

NIMBY

my



phenomenon

ignorant public. But

is it?

the "not in

No

one disputes

the victim, they

that nuclear wastes

the alternatives explored so far

of the most

unworked

attractive

salt

a viable alternative.

seem

one location

at

facility in

too, has

another

exceptions) force

utilities

electric bills as

an energy source).

to save for

have the

of customers.

money

available for

they did not use the

it is

power

unfair

at

(If

Nor do

decommissioning

needed. Furthermore, customers of utilities

undoubtedly claim that

salt

deposit

water leaking into

it

in

the rate of a gallon a minute. This water will create

power or into the power would be ruled out will

One

when the dangers of The Department of Energy has

These expenses, moreover, have not been figured into the

many

Unfortunately,

mines in Kansas had to be abandoned

nuclear

that

there any

to have serious drawbacks.

poured over $700,000,000 into a "test" under the desert in New Mexico. But it,

*

is

schemes, solidifying the wastes and placing them in

water percolation became apparent.

at least

Nor

must be

plants,

have been casting about for years for all

a

some of which have already leaked inadequate for this purpose. The authorities

power

or are reaching capacity, are

is

of the

back yard" reaction of an

perfectly contained (and guarded) for millions of years.

dispute that the pools at

say,

costs

of producing

they were, nuclear

regulators (with

costs. It

is

few

highly unlikely

decommissioning when

it

is

the time of decommissioning will

and unethical

the plant produced.

for them to

pay for

it,

because

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

a

97

brine solution that will, within decades, corrode the steel drums in

which the

radioactivity

contained.

is

no

secrecy, has released

problem, but

When

they corrode, the drums will

Energy, which has enshrouded the project in

The Department of

leak.

on how or whether

details

it

can solve

this

proceeding with the project. In 1987 Congress desig-

it is

nated Yucca Mountain, Nevada, scientific investigation

nuclear waste repository without

as a

of whether the

site

was geologically or hydrologi-

(The site was, however, politically suitable. It is underpopuand remote, and Nevada had only one unhappy congressional

cally suitable.

lated

senators.) It turns out that the site is on no one can be certain wdU be stable for 3,000,000 years; furthennore, no one also knows whether nearby underground nuclear tests have cracked the volcanic tuff. Like the New Mexico project, the Nevada project is proceeding as though there were no

representative

and two unhappy

volcanic rock that

problems, while the industry describes local opposition

scientific

NIMBY phenomenon.

merely an example of the It

may be

government and industry intransigence

that

as

a

reflects

desperation that engineers will not admit publicly. Radioactive wastes are

accumulating everywhere; is

as

we

will see in

only part of the problem. Military

Chapter

sites,

3,

the

power industry

and the groundwater and

streams near them, are already seriously contaminated. Nuclear authorities

may know

that they have their backs

up

against the wall

and

that

they simply must override normal democratic processes in order to get site.

Certainly

wastes have an

some of air

their other proposals for dealing

a

with nuclear

of desperation about them: using Antarctic

glaciers as

repositories (extreme transportation hazards; serious risk of upsetting the

dehcate heat balance of the glaciers, with potentiaUy

momentous

clima-

tological consequences) or rocketing the wastes into space (staggering

expense; potentially grave consequences of rocket proposals

also

failure).

sound desperate: constructing "temporary

storage facilities ...

on

islands or peninsulas"

(Hafele 1990,

this will

already had 50 years) "the time

needs to develop

and Another "advantage" of

latest

retrievable p.

144).

give the industry (which has

Nuclear authorities believe that it

Their

scientific,

technologic

methods" (Hafele 1990, p. 144). proposal is that it would "encourage the

institutional final waste disposal this

development of new global

institutions [to

national politics" (Hafele 1990,

In sum, there are security, health,

difficult

The

immune

and for the most part unsolved

resolution of these problems

how much money and

has written,

siting]

to

safety,

and pollution problems connected with the use of

nuclear technology.

matter

many

do the

p. 144).

effort

is

is

not assured, no

expended. As Christopher Flavin

CHAPTER 2

98

Nuclear power the

fifties

is

not the mature industry that proponents claim, but

one sustained by government

rather a sick

subsidies....

The noble visions of

did not include shoddy construction practices, billion-dollar cost

overruns, disinformation campaigns by government

officials,

thousands of

tons of accumulating nuclear wastes, or exploding reactors that con-

taminate foodstuffs a thousand kilometers away (1987,

Already the nuclear problem dens and other social

costs,

is

p.

64-5).

imposing very heavy management bur-

important matters that will be explored in

Above all, nuclear power does not appear some of its proponents claim. Indeed, it does not even seem very attractive as a short-term stopgap. The earth does not seem large or stable enough to accommodate its wastes; human beings Chapter 3 and

later in Part II.

to be the panacea that

be infallible and thus will never be able to control all its Even if we factor in the possible adverse effects of global warming, it is foolhardy to choose a source of energy that is devilishly will never

hazards.

human

unforgiving of the slightest toxins,

some of which have

failure

half-lives

and

that produces lethal

longer than the span of recorded

history.

Fusion Power:

Infinite Potential

Fraught

with Problems and Limitations In theory, controlled thermonuclear fusion constitutes a potentially in-

Many

long-range answer

finite

source of energy.

to

problems of energy supply. However, although fusion

all

attractive

therefore regard

on many grounds,

it

it

as the

by no means

is

free

is

undeniably

of problems and

hmitations.

Above

all,

no one

has yet demonstrated

its

practical feasibility,

even in

the laboratory, despite over 40 years of sustained international effort.

Thermonuclear

reactions

take

place in plasmas of ionized gases at

temperatures and pressures comparable to those found in the sun and other

stars.

These plasmas cannot be physically contained, so confinement

by magnetic

employed

field

and other

difficult

and esoteric techniques have been

in an effort to attain the levels of temperature

necessary for a continuous reaction. Very

little

and pressure

progress toward this

The best achievements still fall considerably needed. Most scientists working in this field are confident

objective has been made.

short of what

is

that the laboratory

breakthrough will eventually come, but the history of

research in the field suggests that the solution to each particular problem either reveals a

solutions

to

worse one behind

other

problems.

it

or proves incompatible with the

Even

optimists

concede

that

the

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

99

12 Safe Nuclear Power? Nuclear advocates are pursuing research that they claim will lead to the production of safe nuclear reactors. One type of new reactor would incorporate passive safety systems into new Hght- water reactors; the other type would be gas-cooled, the reactor being theoretically unable to reach temperatures that would melt the fuel particles. But nuclear scientists have not yet reached a consensus about which design to pursue. Once that was done, building and completing tests on a prototype

would

take at least a decade.

And

even

if the

new

reactor passed

all

would probably not be until 2010 that these "safe" reactors could come on line. There is no guarantee that the newly designed reactors would pass safety tests,

all

it

safety tests.

"Nucleonics Week," an industry publication, concludes unconvinced that safety has been achieved or



that "experts are flatly

even substantially advanced by the 1990,

new

designs" (quoted in Flavin

p. 24).

In addition,

how much

these

new

reactors will cost,

compared

other energy sources then available, has not been addressed.

The

to

nuclear

mdustry has a history of substantially underestimating the costs of nuclear projects. The industry has also not addressed the problem of nuclear wastes, which the

new

reactors will

still

produce.

breakthrough

is unlikely before 2050, at the earHest (Hafele 1990, p. 142). In any event, laboratory feasibility is only the first of a very long and expensive series of steps in research and development that will

be re-

quired to

make

fusion practical.

The engineering problems

to

be solved

are enormous; temperatures and pressures of stellar intensity are far beyond anything technologists and engineers have hitherto tried to tame. Even research costs are skyrocketing. Governments seem unable to afford

present and prospective costs, and fusion budgets are declining. If fusion power ever does become a possibihty, it will not be without problems. Although a virtually infinite supply of fuel is claimed by fusion enthusiasts, in fact the reactors now being invented will fuse deuterium

and tritium, the

latter

of which must be produced from lithium. Although

CHAPTER 2

100

deuterium

so abundant in seawater that

is

available, lithium

purposes infinitely

it

isotope needed for the fusion reaction,

scarcer

is

been used up, it

exploitable lithium ores have

will

be for aU practical

relatively scarce,

is

still.

and lithium-6, the

Thus, once readily

will have to

"burning the rocks." In short, the problem of

be obtained by not

fuel supply will

necessarily be abolished by the generation of fusion power.

Producing tritium from lithium involves two other problems. production must be done in a breeder reactor. Breeder reactor

First,

technology

is

complicated and extremely dangerous;

1984 the

in

United States abandoned the Clinch River Breeder Reactor spending $1.5 billion for

development. Scientists believe

its

a

after

hthium-

blanketed breeder reactor would be especially difficult to design,

because lithium the tritium

is

highly reactive and even explosive. Second, even

is

successfully produced, tritium

tritium releases are

make

reaction will

inevitable.'''

A

for

radioactive.

Some

Neutrons from the deuterium-tritium

the containment vessel radioactive. Fusion technol-

ogy, as presently conceived,

*

is

not clean.

is

breeder reactor uses plutonium (instead of relatively scarce uranium-235) fuel;

because

simultaneously

it

converts

a

surrounding

effect creates

uranium

more

fuel than

supplies

it

markedly diminishes the possible advantage comes

Some of this safe

in the very

side effects

toxic:

in

Plutonium

is

long term, and

of uranium mining. But

Breeders require reprocessing.

at a price.

it

burns. This essentially eliminates any concern

might run out, except

produce are extremely

of

blanket

comparatively abundant uranium-238 or thorium into more plutonium,

that

if

The

it

this

substances they

known.

the most toxic substance

waste must be discarded into nuclear waste disposal

sites

one has not been developed. The plutonium created during the

—and

fission

uranium, along with the unused uranium, must be extracted from the spent

a

of

fuel.

Plutonium's extreme toxicity greatly magnifies the health hazards of a reactor accident or a release of radioactive materials Finally, unlike the fuels

at

can be used to manufacture weapons. Thus raised

t

by the plutonium

Although

tritium,

any other stage

used in light-water reactors, plutonium

many thorny

in the fuel cycle.

fuel cycle.

one of the radioactive isotopes of hydrogen,

ous than some radionuclides,

cannot be fuUy contained



it

is

at least

still

0.03 percent of the



a century).

is less

hazard-

extremely dangerous both because total

it

inventory in reactors

would escape each year (Metz 1972) and because it is especially up and concentrated in living systems (where its half-life of 12 dangerous for over

a material that

is

security issues are

apt to be taken

years

makes

it

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

It is

true that other scientists envision alternative fusion technologies

can be determined,

that, as far as

be

clean.

producing it

at this stage

But some of these may never pan

of their conceptualizing, would

it

in problematic breeder reactors

from the moon, where

is

envisions

not radioactive. Instead of

(which

abundant.

it is

One, for example,

out.

helium-3 for tritium. Helium-3

substituting

mine

101

How

is

we could

possible),

this

would provide

us

with a net energy gain, however, has not been explained. In fact, the potential net energy yield of a fusion reactor

remains

a

question mark. First





just as

economy

with ordinary nuclear technol-

more so starting up a fusion power system will require an enormous expenditure of energy. Containment and heating of the

ogy, only

plasma require great quantities of energy. Especially the fusion reactors proves to be

less

than the hoped-for 60%,

power output of each

large proportion of the

if the efficiency

a

of

very

reactor will have to be

used just to keep the reactor in operation. Producing deuterium fuel

from seawater will also require the expenditure of energy. Finally, any conceivable form of thermonuclear reactor technology will demand, in addition to lithium, large

quantities of scarce minerals such as

helium, vanadium, and niobium, domestically. Eventually, these too

rock are

at

many of which would have

are not

produced

to be extracted

high cost in energy. Thus the net yield of energy

from

after all costs

counted may be very low. In sum, the Promethean attempt to provide

haustible stellar fire

is

a

bold enterprise that

humans with inex-

may bring

great benefits if

But given the extraordinary challenges, the development of fusion power may take several generations, if indeed it proves

it

succeeds.

possible at

all.

And

the promise of thermonuclear fusion should not be

allowed to obscure the

many problems and

hard choices that are

evident even today.

The **Energy Options** With

fusion energy not in sight,

burning

a

fossil fuel

supplies finite and their

source of serious pollution, and nuclear energy

a fool's

what are the options for humanity? One option, of course, go all out in producing ever more supplies of energy from fossil and iiuclear power, allowing carbon dioxide, radiation, and other

alternative, is

to

fuels

pollutants to build in

many

up

in the biosphere. Unfortunately, political leaders

countries support this option, and

none more strongly than

CHAPTER 2

102

R&D Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1991, United

Table 2-6 States

Government

Renewable

$158

Nuclear

fission

$305

Nuclear fusion

$274

Fossil fiiels

$459

Source: Nucleus, Spring 1991,

p. 5.

Amounts

are in millions

of dollars.

government (see Table 2-6). The probable consequences ofagricultural disruption and increasing starvation, cancers, and death will be inflicted primarily not on people who are the decision makers today but on future individuals, some not yet born. Another possibility is to choose the opposite path: to quickly and sharply reduce the production of energy from fossil fuels and nuclear power, develop energy sources that have few or no harmful consequences, and use the energy that is produced far more efficiently than it is used today. This option would have beneficial environmental impacts, but it would involve disruptive changes in the way people work and live, especially in the industrialized world. No one takes this option seriously. A less drastic choice would be to (1) discontinue use of nuclear energy as a power source, (2) phase down the use of fossil fuels, (3) rely more heavily on natural gas the least polluting and most efficient of the fossil fuels among the fossil fuels that the United States



are used, (4) bring into



widespread use already-available technology that

increases energy efficiency,

and

(5)

support research into renewable

energy alternatives that are not yet competitive, and develop and immediately use those that are. This option

mental

effects,

amount of

would also have beneficial environwhich would be to reduce the

the most important of

additional radiation and carbon dioxide emitted into the

biosphere. It

would require some changes

in

our habits and involve some

decentralization ofenergyproduction,but the changes themselves would

have relatively minor effects on the advantages overall

economic

sibilities for

activity.

using energy

ing sources of energy.

What

follows

is

a

we obtain from energy or

review of theoretical pos-

more efficiently and for developing nonpollut-

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

103

Conservation and Improved Efficiency

By becoming giving

more time

itself

we have, humanity can doing to the environment while

of the energy

efficient in the use

reduce the ever-escalating damage

it is

to phase in the use of nonpolluting energy

sources.

Although cutting per

itself be

adequate to avoid global warming, one study shows that

energy use by one-half will not in

capita

this level

of efficiency in industrial countries can be achieved without reducing present standards of living

(WRI

1990-91,

p. 146).

how much energy they conproduce the same amount of economic output. The

Countries already vary significantly in

sume

in order to

United

much energy as West produce the same output. The Rocky Mountain

for example, uses about twice as

States

Germany and Japan

to

Institute estimates that the at

United

States

can cut

its

by 75%

electricity use

an average cost of 6 cents per kilowatt-hour. Accordingly,

it is

cheaper

(on average) to improve efficiency than to produce

burning

fossil fuels.

more electricity by cheaper than producing more electricity by

And is far

nuclear energy (Fickett et

al.

1990,

States are already convinced. Sixty efficient lamps, appliances,

among

customers

their

p. 66).

Some

utilities in

the United

of them promote the use of electrically

windows, insulation, motors, and other devices rather

than

new power plants. money saved

building

Regulators in each case allow the utiUty to keep part of the

both

via the efficiency programs, so

utility

and customer

gain.

The potential and benefits of energy efficiency in some sectors of the economy are huge. For example, if everyone in the United States did nothing

else

but substitute currently available

efficient lights for

incandescent

power plants costing fi-om $85 to $200 and $18 to $30 billion a year to operate (Fickett et al. Comparable savings can be obtained with efficient motors and

bulbs, utilities could avoid building billion to construct

1990,

p. 67).

superefficient appliances. (Switching to efficient billion watts; the

(Fickett et

lated

al.

motors can save 80 to 190

changes pay for themselves in an average of 16 months

1990,

p. 68). It is

possible for builders to construct super-insu-

homes, offices, stores, schools, and

hospitals that

consume

as little as

of the energy needed for heating their conventional equivalents In Sweden,

new

them through

office buildings

need no manufactured energy

(see

Box

their cold v^dnters. Sunlight, plus the heat generated

and building materials partially ofiset

p. 79.)

The Swedes

install

central heating

exchangers ventilate interior space.

by the

warm

super insulation

that store solar heat; the extra cost

by not building

13).

at all to take

people, lights, and office equipment, are sufficient to keep buildings

(Bevington and Rosenfeld 1990,

10%

of doing so

is

and ventilation systems. Air

CHAPTER 2

104

13 Home Energy The

Savings

benefits an individual can achieve

are astonishing.

According to

a single 75-watt bulb

by using

Scientific American,

electricity efficiently

consumer

"if a

replaces

with an 18-watt compact fluorescent lamp that

10,000 hours, the consumer can save the electricity that a typical

lasts

power

plant would make firom 770 pounds of coal. As a result, about 1600 pounds of carbon dioxide and 18 pounds of sulfur dioxide would not be released into the atmosphere.... Alternatively, if that

U.S.

electricity

were produced by an oil-fired electric plant, the compact lamp would save 62 gallons of oil enough to fuel an



fluorescent

American car for a ISOO-mile journey. Yet far firom costing extra, the lamp generates net wealth and saves as much as $100 of the cost of generating electricity" (Fickett et benefits personally

over

its

lifetime,

it

The bulb

al.

1990,

will cost

will save that

him

p. 74).

The consumer also

or her about $18.00. But

customer $57.00

$0.10 per kilowatt-

(at

hour) in electricity and replacement bulbs. Individuals can also achieve astonishing savings in providing energy

homes. Superinsulated homes are standard in Sweden, for example. Using materials that store solar heat and superinsulation, these to heat their

homes

get

all

the winter heat they need by diverting hot water firom

their hot-water heaters to small heating units. In the

builders can save

$1000

to

$2500 on

United

central fiirnaces

systems to pay for superinsulation; one superinsulated

had a winter heating 82).

bill

ply

But superinsulated homes are States has been content so

more

much

in

Chicago

energy savings,

as,

rarely built in the

United

States.

The

begin to attain only modest for example, window manufacturers sup-

efficient low-emissivity

heat through their

home

of $24.00 (Bevington and Rosenfeld 1990, p.

United

residential

States,

and ventilating

far to

(low-E) windows. (Americans lose

windows each year

of entire annual flow through the Alaska

as

as

the energy equivalent

pipeline).

Builders can also retrofit existing buildings. Retrofits usually obtain

30

to

70%

energy savings. Customers typically spend nothing for these

efficiency measures. Instead, energy-services ficiencies

and

are paid

back with 50 to

companies finance the

70% of the

ef-

savings accrued fi-om

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

the

105

investment until their costs plus profits are achieved

efficiency

(Bevington and Rosenfeld 1990, p.78).* All in

then, industrial countries can gain major efficiencies in the

all,

use of energy in their

people

live

cost-effectively, as in

many

sectors of modern

or the

way they do

with either

life

without changes

business.

a relatively

It is

quick payback of up-front costs

no up-front

costs at

or,

com-

the case of innovative utility programs and energy services

panies, the consumer's incurring of

way them

in the

possible to adopt

(Southern

all.

among other things, gives away compact fluorescent program "creates" energy at an average cost of 2 cents per kilowatt-hour, far less than the cost of any power plant (Fickett et al. 1990, p. 71). These methods of boosting efficiency cost less than any other California Edison,

light bulbs. Its

method of producing power

(Table 2-7). Achieving improvements in

of seven times

efficiency can also displace the buildup

dioxide in the atmosphere, per dollar invested,

as

much

as

carbon

expanding nuclear

power. People in industrial countries can make greater gains in energy efficiency if they are willing to

modify some of

Consider, for example, the transportation sector



their living patterns.

which

the only one in

highly efficient products are not yet available. Great gains in transportation efficiency are nevertheless possible if people travel

rather than private automobile. In the

United

States, a

carrying 55 passengers uses an average of 640

by public Hght

BTUs

rail

by automobile (Lowe 1991, p. and despite the pollution and traffic congestion

fact,

travel

automobile commuting, over

by private vehicle.

By

80% of the

contrast, in

commute by

*

is

this

that result

from

population commutes to

work

rail

and bus

half that. In Tokyo, only

16%

efficiencies in the transportation sector are not yet available.

regrettable because, as

major polluters and the significant

per

private automobile.

Comparable

This

is

BTUs

59). Despite

Europe, where efficient

systems are maintained, the figure

vehicle

of energy per

passenger per kilometer, and a bus 690. This compares to 4580

passenger-km to

transit

size

improvements

in

we

will see in

of the global

Chapter

fleet

is

3,

automobiles are

increasing rapidly. But

automobile efficiencies are possible, despite

manufacturers' claims to the contrary. Volvo, for example, has produced a

prototype compact car that as

rapidly as a typical

requirements,

1990-91,

is

designed to cost no more than and accelerates

compact

and achieves 63

p. 151).

car,

mpg

meets city

all

countries' crashworthiness

and 81

mpg highway (WRI

106

CHAPTER 2 Table 2-7 Costs of Avoiding Carbon Emissions Associated with Alternatives to Fossil Fuels, 1989

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

shown

little interest.

To

107

the extent that efficiency measures have been

adopted, they have been adopted in the industrial world.

Why

isn't

when doing

humanity

so

fully exploiting the possibilities for efficiency

clearly in

is

short-term interest

as

well?

not only

The

its

long-term

interest

technological, will be discussed in Part tions are in order here. First, there

is

infrastructures; industry

to invest

anew

II.

and government,

been made

cheaper item even

a

if

making

initial costs;

a

higher

in

therefore, are reluctant

in energy efficiency.''' Second, people

discount future savings in favor of lower

buy

its

the matter of inertia. In industrial

countries, for example, heavy investments have already

modern

but

which are institutional not But a few preliminary observa-

obstacles,

and industry tend

most consumers

initial

to

will

investment has a

two years (Gladwell 1990, p. A3). Third, people government poUcies to encourage conservation whenever those poHcies burden them. In the United States, for example, payback time

as short as

and industry

resist

voters frequently reject increased gasoline taxes, mass-transit expenditures, land-use controls to

prevent suburban sprawl, and even mandatory

recycHng measures. Industry lobbies heavily against mandatory conservation measures.

However, these generalizations

are not always true. France,

Belgium,

the Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal, and the Scandinavian countries have

economic growth from increased energy consumpcommitted to reducing energy consumption by 25%

already decoupled tion.

Germany

is

over the next 15 years (Flavin and Lenssen 1991,

p. 25). Japan has an energy manager in every industry. In Europe, public opinion seems to

take the greenhouse effect seriously.

By

investing in energy efficiency,

these countries not only slow the greenhouse effect but improve their

*

For example,

it

is

cheaper for developing countries to replace inefficient

motors and lighting with

efficient devices,

water heaters and stoves for hydroelectric central

power

electric ones,

plants.

energy by the world's poor.

than to build

Efficiencies are

New,

developed that can be produced

at

pour

is

its

new

inexpensive solar cookers have been

undoubtedly part of the reason

(Gorman 1990,

why

p. 206).

the United States continues to

transportation investments overwhelmingly into highways instead of

building and maintaining transit systems and encouraging

them.

coal, nuclear, or

even possible in the use of

the village level and used in place of

flielwood to cook food and pasteurize water t This

and to substitute solar-powered

its

citizens to use

CHAPTER 2

108

economic competitiveness. Second, not

make purchases on

we

all

of industry or

the basis of the short-term

have already seen that some

utilities are

bottom

consumers

all

line.

For example,

learning to create both market

push and market pull to influence the purchase of efficient devices. The

some form of rebate

majority of them pay pull; p.

some

These methods seem

71).

Finally, the

accept

to

be

effective in

European experience shows

some government

market

al.

changing purchasing

that

1990,

habits.

people and industry will

encourage conservation even

policies to

burdensome; high gasoline

it is

to purchasers to create

pay suppliers rebates, creating market push (Fickett et

when on

taxes, mass-transit faciHties, controls

land development, energy standards for buildings, bicycle pathways, and recycling are

commonplace on

the continent.

However, these encouraging developments notwithstanding, or

as

extensively as

necessary (even in Europe). Thiis,

is

if

energy efficiency are confined to the industrialized world

most

global changes in climatic

part, today)

problems will probably be

development in developing countries their

as fast

improvements

(as

they

are, for

in

the

and other environmental

economic

Population growth and

severe.

institu-

measures from being adopted

tional obstacles are preventing efficiency

will probably result in a

carbon emissions per person by 2030. So even

if

doubling of

the industrialized

countries (including the United States) were to halve their per capita carbon

emissions by that time, annual emissions of carbon dioxide

times what they are

now

(Gibbons

carbon dioxide emissions are

must be

reduced

by 60

to

80%

amount of carbon dioxide

et

increasing



1989,

al.

p.

141).



to the level of the 1950s

in the atmosphere (Flavin

as a

one-half

whole

as

will

much

year.

They

to stabilize the

and Lenssen 1991,

p.

energy system, the

have to produce goods and services with one-third to

energy

as

today,

quadruple (Flavin and Lenssen 1991, Finally,

2.5

present, global

by 400 million tons each

25). Scientists have calculated that to achieve a sustainable

world

At

would be

and renewable energy sources must p. 26).

whatever the pace or extent of efficiency,

for eliminating the pollution caused

energy production. For example, even energy consumption in

half,

it

it is

not

a

panacea

by humanity's current methods of

we were

if

to succeed in cutting

would merely have the same

effect as

doubling the supply. Rapid population increases and economic develop-

ment

will eventually cause

of increased

*

efficiency.

Only China among

energy

4.7%

to

be used and overrun the

the developing countries has

efficiencies, cutting

a year for the past

more energy

effect

Consequently, energy conservation alone can

implemented

significant

energy required per unit of economic output by

decade (Chandler

et

al.

1990, p. 125).

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

never be more than

a

short-term

conservation must be seen

as

pollution and give humanity

109

palliative.

To the extent

it

is

adopted,

an interim measure to avoid some global

more time

to develop nonpolluting energy

sources.

Geothermal Power: Tapping the Heat of the Earth The technology

to use the earth's interior heat

both to heat buildings

direcdy and to generate large amounts of electricity

Moreover, given that due care

is

is

essentiaUy in hand.

taken, the environmental consequences

of exploitation are comparatively benign. Global geothermal capacity increased by

Today

it

16%

per year from 1978 to 1985 (Corson 1990,

produces 6 million kilowatts of electrical power.

from geothermal

get a substantial portion of their electricity

Salvador gets 40%, Nicaragua, almost

Some

30). total

30%

p. 197).

A few countries sources: El

and Lenssen 1991,

(Flavin

estimate that the United States can get

as

much

as

p.

10% of its

energy supply in the year 2000 from geothermal power.

But geothermal power has limits. Although some countries have and hot-water fields that can be exploited for power production, others do not. (For a variety of reasons, not all natural geysers, natural steam,

geothermal resources are available developed in the United

(Wysham

1991,

p.

12).)

countries wdthout these

To produce

fracturing the rocks,

pumping

sources. Consider as an

geothermal

substantial

fields, artificial

down

to areas

fields

should be

amounts of power

in

geothermal reservoirs must be

of high heat flux in

in water to be heated,

the heat from the resulting steam.

The technology

basal rocks,

and then extracting

for this

is

becoming

early experiments

with the technique are promising, but more research, development, and exploration must be done before

available,

much

large

only tropical rainforest in Hawaii

States'

created by drilling

and

power

as

example the controversy over whether

a clear picture

The

of the extent of geothermal resources emerges.

power is also not pollution-free. The steam or hot water used to produce power almost always contains noxious gases and corrosive compounds; many wells emit significant exploitation of geothermal

quantities of radionuclides. Well blowouts

sometimes occur, releasing the

steam into the atmosphere. Environmentally compatible ways of both capturing and disposing of used steam and water are improving, but the

problem

is

not yet solved. Another problem

must be located be produced

some

that

is

in geologically suitable areas,

geothermal reservoirs

which

requires that

power

from markets. This means that the monetary and environmental costs of power transmission (as well as the at

attendant energy losses)

distance

may be

considerable.

(On

the other hand, this

CHAPTER 2

no problem can be surmounted

develop materials that are super-

if scientists

work with. "Practical" superconductivity would achieve more than making geothermal and other location-specific power sources more available. It would, in effect, conductive at temperatures that are practical to

"create"

more

electricity. Presently,

50% of the

electricity

produced

is

lost

in transmission.) All in

all,

geothermal power has significant potential

as

an energy

form of energy as ultimately contributing more than 20% of supply. * For it to do so, more effort and money than are currently being invested will be needed to develop the technology for geothermal's use in more areas and to overcome its minor but stubborn source; optimists foresee this

pollution problems.

Biotnass Plants are the oldest source is

created in photosynthesis.

burn other

solar energy; they

Traditional

fiiels,

primarily

developing nations.

wood

known to humans. Green plant matter Humans eat the plants containing this stored

of energy

plants, especially

wood,

wood, provide 40% of

The obvious

problems, however, are

burning, conflict with other uses for wood, and

(leading to potential conflict with needs for food living room). Unfortunately, as

we

to

do

their

work.

the energy supply of

and

air

pollution from

demand

for space

fiber or, at least, for

many nations are destroying Out of hunger for energy

have seen,

their forests faster than they are replacing them.

people are continuing the ancient pattern of reducing forested mountains to bare rock skeletons. In countries,

fact, this

where the populace

pattern

is

prominent today in many poorer

ravages the land for

Deriving energy firom biomass, however, the burning of fiielwood.

It

refers

is

wood

fiiel.

usually distinguished

from

to converting a variety of plant

materials into efficient fuels without producing poUution. First, the

source plant material must be

carbon dioxide produced

grown

when

sustainably, so that the

the plant

is

amount of

processed and burned

is

the

same as that which was consumed as the plant grew. Second, the fuel must burn without creating other kinds of poUution. The production of ethanol from sugar cane residues satisfies these requirements and is a major industry in

Brazil.

minor modifications of

*

Ethanol can power existing motor vehicles with their engines. In 1986, ethanol supplied half

Geothermal's potential could be

practical superconductivity,

extract energy

it

were

still

higher

if,

of

in addition to achieving

possible to develop the technology to

from underground masses of hot rock.

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

Brazil's

automotive fuel (Corson 1990,

gasify plant materials.

considerably

less

The

gas can

p.

power

polluting than that of

plants are only at the theoretical stage.

75% of Africa's

111

Another

211).

and

turbines,

use

is

to

would be

Gasifier-gas-turbine

fossil fiiels.

But

possibility

its

scientists

have calculated that

current electrical capacity can be generated by using plant

wastes alone (Flavin and Lenssen 1991,

p. 29).

Unfortunately, biomass energy has a significant disadvantage

energy source: the scarcity of

its

resource base.

we shall see, the fliel (sun, wind, What is required of technology is

With other

as

an

solar tech-

nologies, as

or water)

renewable.

the ability to harness the

energy in the biomass fuel a

is

fiiel.

not.

But although

One

world where there

possibility

is

grow energy

to

plentifial

and

and renewable,

plantations.

But

in

be insufficient food and fiber for rapidly

will

growing populations, diverting

win

plants are also plentiflil

is

agricultural land for this purpose seems

Even some developed countries, such as those in Western Europe, where an adequate food supply is not a problem, do not have enough land available to grow large amounts of biomass. Alternatively, biomass will rely on plant residues. However, many of these residues are presently plowed back into the soil to enhance soil fertility. unlikely to

Diverting

it

approval.

to other purposes will only reduce agricultural yields. In

Nepal, the diversion of biomass from the

by 15% (Corson 1990,

Biomass, then, has some limited potential

Some of

the support for biomass

is

which can be used

enough

free land or plant residues in the

say

as a

based on

alcohol,

fleet, to

has reduced grain yields

fields

p. 151).

its

future energy source.

capacity to produce

in (modified) gasoline engines.

nothing of one expected to double in 30

realistic possibility is that

industry wastes)

But there

isn't

world to power today's vehicle years.

A

more

biomass (mostly wood, cane sugar, and beverage

wiU supply the alcohol

(gasohol). This gasohol could

for an alcohol-gasoUne mixture

be used

as

a

transitional vehicle fuel,

reducing poDution until some other means of powering motor vehicles

is

developed.

Hydropower

An

estabHshed technology that

haustible source of energy

the world electric

is

is

relies

on

a theoretically renewable, inex-

generated fi-om falling water.

power

20% of the electricity of Norway obtains 50% of its

hydropower. About

fi-om hydro.

Hydroelectric power's theoretical capacity has also hardly been tapped.

Whereas North America had developed 60% of its large-scale Europe had developed only 36%, Asia

hydroelectric potential in 1980,

CHAPTER 2

112

9%, Latin America 8%, and Africa 5%. Developing countries have made it a priority to expand hydroelectric capacity since that time. From 1980 to 1985, 31 developing countries doubled their capacity. But even with this doubling, the hydroelectric potential in developing countries

is

10 times

what is currently being generated. Hydropower, however, is not without adverse environmental effects. As we will discuss in Chapter 3, the large dams many countries have been building spread diseases. The reservoirs, which are usually too deep and sterile to support fish, often expand the breeding grounds for the carriers of malaria, schistosomiasis, and river blindness. The large dams also inundate

forests, farms,

and

wildlife habitats; entire species

animals have been wiped out in submerged areas.

Many

of plants and

people upstream

dam are physically displaced, and their way of life may be

of the

Silting

is

destroyed.

serious problem, reducing the storage capacity and power

a

potential of the

dams over

time, and depriving the soUs

downstream of

comes firom silt-bearing floodwater. As a result, the people who have farmed or fished downstream of the dam in these floodwaters for millennia are dispossessed of their food supply. Their way the fertilization that

of life may

also

be destroyed.

Hydropower, potential.

therefore, cannot be

But with due

much room

care to limit

its

developed to

its

environmental

for growth. Projects using small

fuU theoretical

effects, it still has

dams and

reservoirs have

effects, and their disruptive effects on human more manageable. China may provide something of a

fewer adverse ecological populations are

model of what can be done; it has built over 86,000 small hydroelectric projects that provide some power to almost every province in the country (Corson 1990, p. 197). By itself, however, small-scale hydroelectric power generates relatively smaU amounts of electricity, and the potential varies gready with locality. Therefore, small-scale power production from water can be only a minor part of the answer to the needs of an energy-intensive industrial civiHzation.

Solar Power:

The Ultimate

In the final analysis, almost fiaels

''Fuel" all

the energy available to people

are simply the stored legacy

is

solar. Fossil

of past photosynthesis; the fissionable

elements were formed in a solar fiarnace; and a thermonuclear reactor

is

essentially a miniature

ordinarily refers to the use

of the

sun.

However, the term

natural heat traps,

of

power

direct energy of the sun's rays via solar

heat collectors or photovoltaic conversion the indirect results

solar

fiasion



solar heating

and photosynthesis.

cells

and

falling or

to the exploitation

moving

of

water, wind,

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

Hydroelectric power

is

a

form of solar energy and is renewable: The falls as rain, which flows into rivers.

water which

sun's heat evaporates

The dams hold back and channel turbines.

Biomass

the energy of the faUing water to rotate

But hydroelectric power

differs in a critical

Whereas hydroelectric

solar technologies.

vironmental

113

the

effects;

new

would appear

humanity's long-term

to

solar

be appropriate sources of energy for

solar

energy

that

is

difficult to harness. It

it is

some forms of

it

is

are available only in limited

quantities during any given period. Nevertheless, the total

energy

alone

unequally distributed around the globe, and variable with

season and weather, and

solar

it

ftiture.

The problem with also diffuse,

new

new

solar technologies;

does not rely on an ample resource base. Thus only the technologies

the

technologies have inconsequential ones.

from other new

also differs critically

way from

projects can have serious en-

is

huge

so

that harnessing

even

a fraction

amount of

of it could

satisfy

the energy requirements of humanity.

Wind Power Wind power already appears to be an almost Uniquely among the new solar technologies, it is tive

v^th energy produced from

more cheaply than

power

watts of wind-generating capacity was installed

85% of

it

in California.

electricity at 5

produced from

which

The CaHfornia windmills

new

takes years

same

1660 mega-

plant.

worldwide

cents per kilowatt hour, the a

economically competican produce electricity

fossil fuels. It

the most efficient nuclear

perfect energy source.

in

in the 1980s,

1991 produced

cost as electricity

coal plant. Moreover, in contrast to a coal plant,

from the design stage to the production of electricity, mass-produced and can be properly sited and

today's windmills can be

"on

line" in a matter of months.

According to the U.S. Department of

Energy, advances in windmill technology are expected to bring the cost

of wind power

down

to 3.5 cents per kilowatt-hour at

the next 20 years (Weinberg and Williams 1990,

Plenty of good the United States, states,

sites are available

90% of these

p.

good

sites

within

148).

for wind-generated electricity. In

mountain and plain where windmills can be placed on ranches and farms without are in 12 contiguous

disturbing present agricultural activities. In California, cattle graze under

*

The amount of solar energy

theoretically available is staggering.

Each year the

Q (5 X 10^^ BTU) from the sun. By contrast, humans have thus far consumed only about 15 Q of fossil earth receives about

5000

fiael!

CHAPTER 2

114

wind machines while

existing

the ranchers reap royalties for the use of

their land. Scientists have calculated that entire

enough

meet the

electricity to

needs of the United States could theoretically be

electrical

generated by means of wind energy alone (Weinberg and Williams 1990, p.

To do

148).

would

so

require only

10% of U.S. land

compatible with existing (mostly agricultural) Scientific obstacles to this

are political obstacles as well.

generated energy

is

development These

area

and would be

uses.

however. (There

exist,

still

are discussed in Part

intermittent. Therefore, using

II.)

Wind-

wdnd power can

save

would otherwise be needed to generate the same power in conventional power plants and can make it unnecessary to build the conventional power plants needed to supply electricity in periods of peak demand. But wind power cannot serve as an exclusive power source. Base-line power must be generated by some other method. One way around this limitation, which affects most solar technologies, is to develop much better methods for storing electricity. Batteries, at least the

fossil fuels that

batteries

of the types currendy in

method

is

When

use, clearly will

not do.

to use electricity to compress air into

energy

is

needed, the

air

is

released

and

is

already in use in

Another

difficulty

with wind-generated

solar technologies: the cost (in dollars

to

power produced from

urban

storage.

method

is

70%

effi-

Germany.

we observed with geothermal power and the

promising

from the cavern, heated, and

flinneled through turbines to produce power. This cient

One

underground

electricity

affects

where

local

the same one

most of the other new

and energy

losses)

rural locations in relatively

areas in distant states

is

demand

of transmitting

unpopulated

for electricity

is

areas

high.

Apart from research on superconductivity, another approach to solving this

problem

which

is

is

to develop a

"hydrogen economy," the technology for

unfolding.

In sum, scientists are surmounting the technical obstacles to fuU

exploitation of wind-generated electricity. As they do, wind power can become a major provider of electricity in many countries. Production of wind power causes no pollution. It takes up land, but most of the land can

be used for other purposes simultaneously. Noise used to be

*

Hydroelectric

power

is

power and biomass

to

problem.

use stored energy as needed; thus their

not intermittent except in extreme situations.

hydropower, when seasonal variations electrical

a

in

water

power can be used to pump water up

availability

In

the

case

of

can be anticipated,

into the reservoirs in

good

times,

be used in periods of droughts. These pumped hydroelectric storage systems

achieve about

70%

efficiency (Flavin

and Lenssen 1991,

p. 30).

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

but

modern wind

About

turbines are quiet.

mental damage done

the only remaining environ-

sometimes

that birds

is

115

fly into

the windmills and

are killed.

Power

Solar Thermal

power

Solar thermal

that fluid

Corporation has

promising

and collect

to track the sun

3000°C, and

also a

is

is

its

then used in

commercial

built

desert northeast of Los Angeles.

power

at

new

per kilowatt hour with

producing

technology.

It

That heat warms

uses collectors a fluid

60%

to

solar thermal facilities in California's

These

facilities

reliability. It

95%

produce 350 megawatts of reliability.

This

a figure that

far

exceeds

at

13 cents

only slightly exceeds the cost of

electricity at coal-fired plants,



up

power-generation cycle. The Luz

nuclear plants, which produce power

kilowatt-hour on average

of

a

new

8 cents per kilowatt-hour with

the capabilities of

costs

heat.

which

costs 6 to 8 cents per

does not however, include the

lost productivity, health-care expenses,

and cleanup of

coal's

environmental pollution. Like

wind power,

solar

Their production costs are like a

wind

facihty, a solar

thermal components can be mass-produced.

come down

likely to

further over time. Also

thermal plant takes only months to construct.

Luz constructed one plant in nine months. A coal plant takes 6 years to come on line; a nuclear plant can take up to 15 years. SoLr thermal plants are practical only in sunny and mostly sunny areas.

only

The as

fiiU

exploitation of solar thermal power, therefore, can occur

the technology for efficient electrical transmission and storage

capabilities continues to develop. Solar

thermal power, however,

itself

provides a means for storing electricity. Sun-tracking mirrors can concentrate

tremendous heat in water,

months;

85%

power

oil,

and bedrock during hot summer

of the stored heat can be recovered

later for use as a heat or

source.

occupy unavailable for most But they more land than conventional power other uses. do not take up sources, if one includes the land used for mining or drilling for the fiaels Solar thermal plants render the land they

that conventional facilities require. Solar thermal plants also don't pollute.

The only "pollution" associated witn them some of their high-tech components.

occurs in the manufacture of

Ocean Energy Another emerging

(OTEC). The

solar

technology

principle of

is

ocean thermal energy conversion

OTEC has been understood for many years;

it

CHAPTER 2

116

can best be described

as

an

air

conditioner in reverse.

An

uses electricity to create a difference in temperature;

air

conditioner

OTEC

uses the

difference in ocean temperatures between surface and deep water to

OTEC

create electricity. Several countries have built small prototype plants.

central

The

work most

technology, however, will

power

wherever there

stations

is

with large

efficiently

at least a

20° C difference be-

tween surface and deep ocean waters. These plants are expected to produce power at a cost of 7 cents per kilowatt-hour (Corson 1990, p. 198).

When it is

developed, island countries with population centers close

to the sea can profit

most from

OTEC

technology. There are 300

population centers close to ocean waters that have sufficient differences

OTEC,

in temperature for tries,

such

almost

all

of

theoretically, to

Japan, are short

as

their fossil fiaels.

on

The

work.

Many

of these coun-

now

natural resources; they "fiael"

of OTEC, seawater,

is

import

plentiful.

Governments and utiBties have drawn up plans to build or are already constructing commercial OTEC plants off the coasts ofJapan, Tahiti, and Bali (Penney and Bharathan 1987, p. 87).

OTEC

unique among the

is

intermittent;

new

solar technologies in that

it is

not

the difference between seawater temperatures, varies

its fiael,

only slightly from day to day. (Seasonally,

its

greatest potential

is

in the

summer, when power demands are highest.) Hence it does not depend on the development of new electrical storage technologies. OTEC is also pollution-free. In fact, OTEC's by-products are one of the main arguments Jbr developing the technology (The Economist 1987, p. 94). One by-product is fresh water, formed when steam is condensed by the cold seawater.

Another

is

aquaculture,

nutrients in the cold seawater that

then discharged

OTEC

at

which can be sustained by the is

pumped

into an

OTEC

converting only about

doesn't matter;

plant and

the ocean surface.

does have some remaining technical problems.

in conventional

rich

3% of the

heat energy to

It is inefficient,

power, compared with 35%

power plants (The Economist 1987, p. 94). In one sense, this OTEC's fuel is practically infinite. But to take advantage of

bounty of seawater requires enormous heat exchangers that will resist corrosion and fouling, and it requires the means to pump and pipe huge

this

amounts of cold water from the ocean's depths (Penney and Bharathan 1987, Keeping a plant seaworthy under all storm conditions and

pp. 89-90, 92). sufficiently

immobile to attach an

electrical

problems. These problems are being solved, but is

needed before

cable to it is

it

two other more research

are

clear that

OTEC can be used widely.

Other ways of harnessing energy ment. Norway has

built

via seawater are also

two small wave-power

plants.

under develop-

At

least

one

is

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

and

financially viable,

117

Norwegian company

a

commercially. British engineers have designed

weighing 23,000 tons and intended

The

bed.

air pressure,

of

which

megawatts of

power

in turn will

electricity

and

rises

France has built a

electricity.

OTEC

water that

no

wave power plant

tidal

principle as the

a turbine to

power

(Corson 1990,

198).

p.

produce large amounts

plant that can generate 240

These technologies, rain,

like

no carbon dioxide

Thus they would seem

radioactivity.

Norwegian

inside a cylinder will generate

falls

and other renewables, produce no acid

buildup, and

seUing the machine

to be located underwater, in the sea

on the same

plant will operate

plants: Oscillating

is

a large

good

to have

long-term potential.

Photovoltaics

The

ultimate energy source

is

photovoltaic energy. Photons (indivi-

dual particles of light) from the sun are absorbed in

and produce

to displace electrons

no maintenance and there water or wind, cause no

semiconductor

a

installed,

are

nologies, can be placed close to are in partly

Once

they need no operational costs. They require no noise, and, unhke other new solar techa current.

users of electricity, even those

all

cloudy locations. They can be constructed in small

using current technology, a 40-square-meter array on

roof in

a locality

United

States

(Weinberg and Williams 1990, be constructed

windpower or than

solar

p.

149).

Or

units).

a year, a large array in less far,

A

149).

kwh

companies.

utility

(though not so

fast as

than two. price.

is

The

m

PV

power has $60 per kilowatt hour in

price of

1990 (Weinberg and Williams 1990,

These declines were achieved despite minuscule government

search support. But at these prices,

tions facilities

countries find

home

p.

re-

PV power is still about five times more

expensive than conventional power.

remote commercial or

PV

small array can be built in less

declined dramatically in the past 20 years, fi-om

1970 to 20 to 30 cents per

sunlight in the

they can be built in large

of power for

relatively quickly

thermal

Their disadvantage, so

south-facing

the electricity needed by that household

all

arrays to provide a central source arrays can

amount of

receiving an average

can supply

a

who

units;

Its

use

applications

is

justified

predominantly in

and military and communica-

where power lines are not available. Some developing power economically justified in rural electrification

PV

projects. Still,

PV power

is

expected to continue to achieve

decHnes in price in the near

may be

possible.

fiiture.

For example,

fiarther

dramatic

Further technological breakthroughs

scientists

have developed solar ceUs in the

CHAPTER 2

118

Table 2-8

Land Use of Electricity-Producing Technologies

the United States

in

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

119

States currently consumes could be supplied by PV arrays taking up 0.37% of the land area of the country (Weinberg and Williams 1990, p.

amount of space needed

149).* Furthermore, a substantial will not

be on land

In Spain and

at all;

will

for

PV power

be on rooftops and other such structures.

government

the

Italy,

it

is

funding rooftop

installations

on

homes.

PV energy is intermittent. It produces no power at night and htde on humanity to fuUy exploit PV power requires improved energy-storage technology. In this respect, PV energy is like overcast days. Thus, for

wind and

solar

thermal energy.

The Hydrogen Economy The technology veloped in

We

amounts of electricity is being dewith the development of renewable energy sources.

to store large

parallel

have previously noted the

high-temperature

technology

(solar)

solar

is

possibilities

thermal storage.

of compressed-air and

An

even more promising

hydrogen. Energy from the sun can generate

which can be passed from one electrode

electricity,

The process splits water into two oxygen. The hydrogen can be burned in

water.

parts

to another in

hydrogen and one part

place of

oil,

coal,

gas. It

can also be transported to distant locations where

much

as

natural gas

Hy drogen

is

is

and natural

it is

needed,

today.

an extraordinarily clean-burning

fuel.

Unlike

fossil fiaels, it

no carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, particulates, volatile organic compounds, or sulflir dioxide. To burn hydrogen is simply to recombine it back v^th oxygen to produce water. Combustion also produces small amounts of nitrogen oxides, which catalytic converters can almost completeemits

ly eliminate.

Because hydrogen can be stored in tanks and transported through

where it is needed, humans can substitute a hydrogen one based on fossil fuels. Hydrogen will allow solargenerated power to be used in places and at times dissociated from when the sun is shining or the wind blowing. Scientists have projected that PV

pipelines to

economy

cells

for

can be located in desert locations to manufacture the hydrogen,

because the annual is

needed

scientists

it

now

arrays used to

most

deserts get suppUes

more water than

(Weinberg and Williams 1990, p. 154). Moreover,

have calculated that

pipeline than

PV

rainfall that

in electrolysis

it

hydrogen by by wire (Weinberg and

will cost less to transport

costs to transport electricity

produce hydrogen can be located in unpopulated

deserts.

CHAPTER 2

120

—14 The Multiplex Energy Economy of the Future It

seems

likely that in the fiiture

ferent energy sources,

we

shall

from the age-old

make

of many

eclectic use

to the ultra-modern, in a

dif-

"mul-

economy." The centralized power production characof today s advanced industrial civilization is encountering

tiplex energy teristic

Old fuels will become too noxious to burn and some new sources of energy, such as nuclear fission,

various types of Umits. eventually run out;

are ecologically dangerous

ing

new forms of energy

need not

fit

no longer be

be

tendency toward

ficiency

socially problematic;

and

and other promis-

supply, such as geophysical or solar power,

exclusively into the current system.

will a

and

so cheap

and abundant

(1) greater

as

it

Energy from

has been.

The

all

sources

result will

decentraUzation and energy self-suf-

intensive exploitation of every nonpolluting source of

(2)

energy (combined with scrupulous conservation).

The

possibilities for greatly increased

tually endless.

Roofs can hold

energy self-sufficiency are vir-

solar collectors

and small windmills,

small water turbines in local streams can produce electricity, local

un-

derground heat can be tapped, and so on. In India today, village children collect cow dung and other organic wastes to produce

methane

gas,

which

yields the villages' electricity supply.

yourself home techniques that are

Williams 1990,

p.

hydrogen. As

we

without adverse be used

as part

now being pioneered by

153), so desert production

practical. (In addition,

The

wind-generated

of

electricity

do-it-

"soft" tech-

electricity

should be

can be used to produce

have seen, windmills can be sited in agricultural areas

some

In

effects.)

of the (wind

or)

cases, existing natural gas pipelines

can

PV-hydrogen's distribution network.

Hydrogen does pose problems, however. Most often mentioned is its explosiveness. But in fact, hydrogen does not pose a greater danger of exploding than does natural learned

how

to handle

it.

gas;

although accidents occur, users have

For example, hydrogen has been used

safely

"town gas" to heat homes. Industries have also developed processes for handHng hydrogen harmlessly in a variety of commercial applications, such as making ammonia, fertiUzer, dyes, and since the 19th century

rocket

fuels.

An

as

important limitation of hydrogen

readily substitute for gasoline as a

motor

is

that

vehicle fuel.

it

does not

Compared

to

gasohne, hydrogen has both a low density of energy and a low density of

— Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

nologists should

economy even

become

if,

as will

mass

transit,

In addition,

more

be centrally generated to run

still

and the

we

one aspect of our future energy

at least

probably be the case, most electricity and

other forms of energy will tories,

121

cities, fac-

like.

can probably expect energy sources to be

now

varied than they

are.

mountain

farms, grasslands, and

on

hydroelectric projects

For example,

we

on

passes, solar collectors in deserts, small

and streams, and

rivers

much

will see windmills

OTEC

and wave

projects offshore. Small biomass facilities will be located in the villages

of developing countries and near

forests

source of energy will go unexploited. kinds



to

industrial,

commercial,

much more

will be

produce heat, or

making

a

supply. In

though

many

distilled to

their

safe

m

residential, agricultural, silvacultural efficiency,

produce gaseous and liquid

burned

fuels,

locally significant contribution to the

areas, draft

No

plantations.

that wastes of all

widely reused to achieve energy

modest but

some

and sugar

It is likely

energy

animals seem likely to be retained, even

upkeep often requires heavy energy expenditure, for in

cases the alternative to draft animals

is

human

labor.

We seem, then, to be headed for a kind of multiplex, two-tier energy economy in which centralized, industrial power production wiU support certain key sectors but in which individuals and localities, employing a curious combination of pre-modern and post-industrial means,

wiU be important

power

(Bleviss

players in

meeting humanity's energy needs.

and Walzer 1990,

p.

106).

The former limits

load of a hydrogen-powered vehicle, the latter

and Walzer 1990,

(Bleviss

p.

106).

its

These problems do not seem insur-

mountable, but they have not yet been conquered.

A

few automobile

manufacturers are working to develop hydrogen-powered

*

One

oxygen

possible solution in a

fliel cell,

a

is

the range and

ability to accelerate

to generate electricity

cars,

but unlike

by combining hydrogen and

chemical reaction that produces no nitrogen oxides.

The

generated electricity would fuel stUl-to-be-developed electric motor vehicles.

Another

possibility

Methanol,

is

to

like ethanol,

combined with

produce methanol from hydrogen and carbon dioxide. can

fliel

motor vehicle engines

directly or can

be

gasoline to produce another type of gasohol. This "solution,"

however, creates

a serious pollution

problem:

The combustion of methanol

produces formaldehyde, a carcinogen (Schmidt-Perkins 1989,

p. 21).

CHAPTER 2

122

the case with fliel-efficient and electric models, they have not yet pro-

duced prototypes. This drawback, however, should not detract from hydrogen's pracother energy applications. Hydrogen both stores and trans-

ticality in

power and thereby makes solar power available when and where it is needed.* It is a means of converting solar electricity into alternating current, a more usable form of electricity. It is also a means of converting electrical energy into gaseous or liquid fuel, which is

ports solar

important because only about 25 percent of our current energy needs are supplied in the

form of

combined with the

efficient use

A

electricity.

travagant transportation patterns, offers the

energy needs. small

The manufacture of some

may

to the processes,

of energy production today, solar-hydrogen

haustible

less

if

ex-

hope of meeting humanity's

solar collectors

amount of pollution. But compared

effects

solar-hydrogen economy,

of energy and perhaps with

involve a

methods, and

virtually inex-

is

and poUution-firee.

Energy, Heat, and Climate Although progress toward a solar-hydrogen economy has been made, and such an arrangement will undoubtedly be in humanity's long-term future, the critical question is whether its present limitations will be surmounted in time to avoid extensive environmental degradation and

human

suffering.

The answer

to that question

still

is

uncertain. Solar

technology requires more research and development support than getting; as Table

2-6 shows, research

is

grossly biased in favor of fossil fuels

and the nuclear option. Other than sheer

inertia, this

uranium,

fact that solar energy, unlike fossil fuels or

can be owned. Moreover, some forms of initially

it is

it

probably

is

not

reflects the

a resource that

(such as rooftop collectors)

appeared to lend themselves primarily to local and perhaps even

individual exploitation,

we

which

is

of no

interest to gigantic regionally

no longer accurate; with hydrogen as a storage and transportation mechanism, solar collectors can be located in deserts, wind farms can be located in agricultural areas, oriented utiHties. As

*

Hydrogen

actually

power. For example,

have seen,

this

is

complements the weaknesses of solar-generated

hydrogen, for

electrical

on high-voltage alternating current. One where possible, to work on low-voltage But the alternative is to use the low-voltage power to make which it is ideally suited, and later to bum the hydrogen to

to redesign applications,

direct current.

is

PV power is in the form of low-voltage direct current, but

today's machinery and appliances run

solution

perception

produce high-voltage alternating current.

Popularion, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

and ocean energy can be tapped

123

in offshore locations. All solar tech-

nologies are adaptable to either local or central production

How much

time humanity has before

it

facilities.

must develop solar energy

is

The impact on climate is the ultimate limit on human energy use, a Hmit that no amount of technological ingenuity can remove. Ever since humans became technological beings by inventing fire, they also uncertain.

have significantly altered the climate of the earth, creating semiarid savannahs where once there were grasslands. Nevertheless, the impact of

humanity on global climate

industrial

potentially far greater, for the

is

continuation of certain current trends could render the earth quite

human race and most other species as well. know what we are doing to cHmatic mechanisms. In effect, with only minimal theoretical knowledge, we are running an enormous experiment on the global climate. By discharging carbon literally

uninhabitable by the

But we do not

really

dioxide, particulates, chlorofluorocarbons, and other substances into the

atmosphere, global

we

tampering with the watch-like perfection of the

are

cHmate system, not understanding

clearly

Worse

the consequences of our actions will be. truction of the ozone layer,

consequences just

as

Now, any remedy we worsening wdll result

effects.

we come try

is

too

and too

as

works or what with the des-

actions are producing visible

to understand

little

still,

it

what we have wrought. the inevitable and

late to halt

In the United States alone, 12,000,000 skin cancers

and 200,000 people

mechanisms. All radiation,

some of our

how

on

life

and some

will die fi-om just this intrusion

earth will suffer

sensitive

harm

on cHmate

firom intense ultraviolet

organisms crucial to global ecology will pro-

bably succumb.*

Most scientists are now predicting that our emissions of greenhouse wiU result in global warming. But again, humanity does not know what it is doing. We do not know how much or how fast this warming will occur; we do not know how much it will alter our capacity to grow gases

*

It

was once thought

that aU forms

and heat

human

of human-made heat might also disturb The second law of thermodynamics ordains

that the release

the mechanisms of climate balance.

of energy must inevitably decay into low-grade heat, so energy use

release are ultimately

use of energy

now

synonymous. However, the extra heat due to

appears to be pitifully small

compared

to the total

energy flow involved in the global heat balance (the flow of human-made heat is

only about 1/15,000 or 1/20,000 the absorbed solar

would

take

200 years

at a

5% growth

flux). It

rate in fossil, fission,

appears that

and

it

flision fuel

production for humanity to produce enough heat to cause noticeable global

warming. This the heat

we

are

is

extremely unlikely, for

now putting into

all

the reasons

the atmosphere

is

we

have

cited,

not Hkely to be

a

and so

problem.

.

CHAPTER 2

124

15 The Thermodynamic Economy Although the currency of nature's economy

human economy monetary

cost

takes

is

energy, the current

energy into account only

of energy production and

use. It

is

indirectly, via the

therefore in conflict

with basic laws governing our physical existence. The laws of ther-

modynamics

we cannot

get something for nothing. The mati thermodynamicaUy interchangeable) from which we derive economic benefit have to come from somewhere, andl ter

tell

us that

and energy (which

are

the inevitable residuals remaining after

we

have obtained the benefits

have to go somewhere. Unless the thermodynamic cost of obtaining the energy and disposing of the residuals

use to which the energy

is less

than the benefits of the

whole loses. Thus a "thermodynamic economy" based direcdy on an accounting of energy*

or entropy has traditional

become

economic

is

put, the system as a

essential, for

criteria will

otherwise social decisions based on|

continue to compromise the system

through so-caUed externahties, or side entropy

tem



as a

The

effects, that create



in the sys-

whole. basic insight

of thermodynamic economics

the real basis of economic scarcity. There

tween

more

increased disorder or reduced energetic potential

is

and thermodynamic

a

is

that entropy

is

ftmdamental difference be-



that is, between a of land and other reusable or flow resources such as solar radiation and a scarcity of coal or other nonrenewable resources that, once used, are gone forever (or can be recycled only with limited efficiency classical scarcity

scarcity

scarcity

and at a high cost in energy). Thus, says the thermodynamic economist, our nonrenewable resources are exceedingly precious capital stocks tha^l can never be recreated, so to waste them or even to expend them primarily

may be

on current consumption

in terms

of dollars and

In practical terms,

what

tons of topsoil every year; forests;

we

absurd,

no matter how

rational

it

means

is

that

we

are eroding

26

billion

have destroyed half of our tropical rain

have polluted most of our rivers and lakes and some of our

groundwater; and the planet has become one-third desert. Yet none of counts when a country calculates its gross national product. Perver-

this

sely, it also

means, for example, that the Exxon Valdez

the United States'

Hons of dollars

| I I

cents.

this

we

is

oil spiU

improved

economic performance. After all, Exxon spent biion the cleanup; it created jobs and consumed resources.

Population, Food, Mineral Resources, and Energy

125

What to do about this is being debated. Economists have focused on schemes of natural resource accounting, a century-old idea that Germany is attempting national product. The task is difficult. For ex-

originated with Alfred Marshall (1842-1924). to calculate a green gross

ample, the

Germans can

easily calculate the

because pollution has killed ficult to calculate the

much of the

revenue loggers have

lost

more

dif-

Black Forest.

It is

value of lost plants, lost animals, lost

species, lost ecosystems,

and

tion. Forests also clean the air,

recreational opportunities.

whole

lost habitats resulting firom forest destruc-

conserve

soil,

Some American

purify water, and provide

economists have devised

a^

way

to deal with some of these problems: an "index of sustainable fl| economic welfare" that incorporates goods and services provided by the environment into economic accounting (Daly and Cobb 1989, p. 401). Thus we know how much a sewage plant costs to build and operate. If the forest performs the same service "free," Daly and Cobb's

suggestion

is

that the forest provides the equivalent value

of the sewage

Other economists propose panel interviews to determine what forests or species (and so on), are worth to samples of people. However plant.

these matters are ultimately resolved, certain preliminary conclusions

have already emerged.

never pay humanity to run a comsome extreme technological visionaries cheap if we let nature do it and fantastically ex-

First, it will

pletely technological world, as

urge, for

life

support

pensive if we take tion

is

on

this

burden

ourselves. Second, even

though collec-

and conversion percentages may be quite low compared to some

of humanity's engineering creations, and despite the apparendy greater

economic

costs,

when

are considered, solar

pollution and

all

the other

thermodynamic

costs

energy and other forms of decentralized energy

production are actually more efficient than methods based on using up

thermodynamic bargain. Third, human labor may become thermodynamicaUy cheaper than

nonrenewable resources and are therefore capital or other factors

a

of production; industry

may

therefore

become

increasingly labor-intensive. Similarly, less energy-intensive materials

wood and steel will

aluminum, which thermodynamic (or, to put this concept in its proper context, sustainable) economy would aim at carefiil husbandry of resources, dependence on natural flows and processes, decentrafization, more labor-intensive production, and a combination of ultra-sophisticated technology with some of the energysaving methods that sustained our forebears. ^^^» such

as

are highly energy-

and

displace such materials as

capital-intensive. In short, a

CHAPTER 2

126

how much it will shift areas don't know how able we will be in

food,

few

things,

human

however.

First, if cHmate

suffering, anything

we

of endemic

disease,

coping with

its

and the

effects.

it

We

We do know a

change does cause death,

try to stop

like.

disease,

and

then will be woefully

inadequate. Second, if climate change produces unacceptable consequences

and forces humanity to

drastically

reduce carbon dioxide emissions,

the costs of doing so will be higher than

what

it

would have

cost to

develop renewable energy sources before that time. Unfortunately, the standard

wisdom of the economic and

poUtical elite in the United States

that, as far as energy is concerned, we must have more of the same: more fossil fuel production and more development of nuclear power. Government funds pour overwhelmingly in the direction of supporting is

—by

these technologies

means where

necessary.

research,

by

direct subsidies,

even by military

129 00

3 Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution, the

Management of Technology, and an

Overview of Ecological Scarcity

So far, we have became apparent

discussed the in the 1960s

components of ecological

scarcity that

and 1970s: the exploding growth in human

population, the difficulty of fulfilling expanding

demand

the supply of agricultural land cannot keep up (and

is

for food

being

when

lost),

the

depletion of essential minerals, and the Hmits to satisfying the growing

demand ing.

But

for energy

by relying on sources

that are

both

finite

and pollut-

in the 1980s, observers recognized that these are not

difficulties.

Human demands on

the

our only

environment are causing the

problems shown in Table 3-1. Thus by the year 2000, according to projections, the

growth in human population and

activities will

eUminate

not only one-sixth of our grain land per person and one-tenth of our irrigated land, but nearly one-fifth of

person. These losses activities are

wiU occur

in just

our

forest

causing increased pollution of the



even of the stratosphere

and grazing land per

one decade. In addition, human air,

water, and land

—and

despite expensive poUution-control efforts

over the past two decades.

127

128

CHAPTER 3 Table 3-1 Basic Natural Resources Per Person with Projected Population Growth

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

129



A18).

40% to 42 million acres per year (Booth Sept. Some estimates of tropical forest destruction are still

mucli

as

creased by

The

50 million acres per year of tropical

(WRI

1990-91,

p.

mark of how

9,

1991,



higher

p.

as

102).

human beings are exterminating whole species of plants and animals, destroying watersheds, and affecting both regional and global climates. Tropical forests sustainably

loss

forests

is

a

fast

support people and millions of plants and animals.

vegetables, spices, nuts, medicines, timber,

oils,

They provide

fruits,

waxes, and rubber con-

sumed by people and industry around the world. Staple grains have relatives of somewhat different genetic makeup in the forests; these wild have been interbred vdth staple crops to provide resistance to and pests. In fact, 40% of all medicines are derived originally from

strains

diseases

chemicals found in tropical plants. Forests moderate

air

temperature,

recycle wastes, control soil erosion, and regulate stream and river flows,

which moderate the floods and droughts that lower agricultural yields. Forests take carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and produce the oxygen aD animals need.

When

a

tropical forest

is

destroyed, a habitat for living things

Although some species can adapt to other habitats or can persist in diminished numbers in remaining forests, thousands of species of plants and animals are being wiped out each year. Human communities are also vanishes.

being destroyed. Brazil's Indian population has decreased from 6 miUion people in the sixteenth century to about 200,000 today (Corson 1990, p. 123). Valuable products are lost. In less than 10 years, fewer than 10



tropical forest nations will be net exporters of forest products down from 33 such nations today (Corson 1990, p. 124). Deforestation also degrades forest soils. Urdike what occurs in forests in temperate cHmates,

when

leaves or trees

nourish the forest

or animals die in tropical forests, they do not Rather, other forest organisms quickly decompose

fall

soil.

them, and then these creatures support other tropical Hfe. So deforested nutrient-poor to start off with, and they support agriculture or

soils are

ranching for only

cattle

second

largest

a

few

years.

At the same time, deforestation

human source of atmospheric carbon

is

the

dioxide, right behind

the burning of fossil fuels. One-third of the carbon dioxide emissions that

humans produce

is caused by deforestation. In 1987 carbon dioxide emissions from deforestation in Brazil alone are beHeved to have equaled the total carbon dioxide emissions from all sources in the United States

(WRI

1990-91,

p.

110).

If tropical deforestation has but

temporary benefits and is selfwhy do people continue the

destructive even over the middle term,

The first reason is to increase cropland. For thousands of years, people slashed and burned small areas of forest, farmed it for a few years. practice?

CHAPTER 3

130

and moved on

up

to

new

to a

plot.

Old

would

plots, small in size,

lie

fallow for

30 years and revert to their wild state. This practice did the forest no fed small communities. Today slash-and-burn agriculture still

harm and

feeds people, but the

way

practiced

it is

people are clearing forests more too

fast

them

for

to regain their

countries a few wealthy people

population owns

93% of the

is

destroying the forests.

More

frequently and re-cultivating old fields fertility.

Because in many tropical

own most of the land

fertile land),

(in Brazil,

7%

of the

thousands of landless peasants,

suffering firom hunger, take to the forests to farm. Moreover, people are

Such crops much-needed foreign cash to finance pay off foreign debts. The government of

increasing cropland to produce commercial crops for export. as

bananas, coffee, and coca bring in

development projects or

to

Indonesia explained in a United States magazine advertisement that

people have the same aspirations

20% of its

Americans;

as

produce

forests to plantations to

other agricultural crops {U.S. News

&

it

its

must, therefore, convert

teak, rubber, rice, coffee,

World Report,

December

and

18, 1989,

pp. 80-81).

Second, government poHcies encourage large development projects,

sometimes to

resettle

people firom teeming

The people who

dams or roads.

or to build hydroelectric

cities

obtain short-term benefits fi-om these

developments are not usually the same people harmful

effects a large project

already

seen

hydropower

some of

the

may

who

suffer fi-om the

have on the environment.

adverse

environmental

effects

We

have

of large

projects.

A third reason to clear forests

is

to "harvest" timber.

At

least 5

million

hectares of tropical forests are logged each year, mostly for timber ex-

ported to Japan and the United

States, to

bring in foreign currency to

finance development or pay foreign debts. Unfortunately, most logging

Even in those places where logging operado not destroy ecosystems, land-hungry peasants ofi:en use logging roads to penetrate once-inaccessible forests and burn down most of the remaining trees to grow crops. According to a 1988 survey of the International Tropical Timber Organization, timber is being produced operations are unsustainable. tions

sustainably

WRI A

on

1990-91,

less

than

1% of

the exploitable tropical forests (cited in

p. 106).

fourth reason for deforestation

Two-thirds of Central America's tropical

is

to create pasture for cattle.

forests

have been cleared, mostly

However, Central Americans do not cut down their forests because they eat a lot of beef; rather, most of their beef is exported to the United States, to fast food chains and for pet food (Corson 1990, p. 121). Every American hamburger for which meat was imported ffom for cattle ranching.

Central America

is

estimated to have destroyed five square meters of

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

forest

(Corson 1990,

p.

121). Finally, local people destroy forests because

they need fuelwood. Fuelwood

cooking and heating by over

1

131

the primary source of energy for

is

80% of the

people in the world;

it is

scarce for

billion people.

Unfortunately, for reasons deforested in the tropics,

it

we

have explained, once a large area

is

supports a few years of productivity but then

becomes degraded. A 3 -million-hectare

area of the Brazihan Amazon that was converted into cropland in the 1880s is today a vast, uninviting, nonproductive expanse of scrub (Corson 1990, p. 121). Cattle pastures

created in the

become unproductive.

1960s have already

government authorities have seen the and have stopped subsidizing it. Even order to get

..

.And

so,

of clearing

some people

In Brazil,

forest for pasture

seek pasture in

still

to land, to secure an inflation-free investment,

title

Ranching merely brings

gain status.

futility

and to

in extra income.

the Loss of Biodiversity

Wildlife habitats are areas

where nondomesticated

species find the food,

Humans

water, and other resources they need to survive.

them

converting

have been

to their purposes since pre-agricultural times.

But

it is

only since the Industrial Revolution and the colonial expansion of the nineteenth century that

we

have been destroying

forests, grasslands,

wetlands, riparian areas, mangroves, sea grasses, and coral reefs both rapidly

(WRI 1990-91, p. 123). The area of temperate been reduced by one-third, and most of those remaining are

and extensively

forests has

new-growth old-grov^h deciduous only

forests,

forests

forests

which do not

provided

trends.

1990-91,

and wetlands

size.

The

107).

Woody savannas and

are fragmented, but

41% of their

forests are

data for the loss of dry tropical forests,

For example, in Africa and Asia,

natural grasslands to California,

p.

have been reduced by one-fourth. Tropical

60% of their original

grasslands,

(WRI

restore the native habitats that the

what we have

human

original size

69 percent of the Central

indicates broad

activities

(WRI

Valley's

have reduced

1990-91,

p.

125). In

grasslands have

been

(WRI

1991, p. 125). 60% of the wedands have been converted to agriculture or development in Asia, 56% in the United States (WRI 1990-91, pp. 127-128). 26% of the mangroves in the United States and destroyed

Puerto Rico have been destroyed. In the European heartland, few original wildhfe habits remain

(WRI

1990-91

p.

126).

Everywhere,

if

any

as

we

have seen, coral reefs are dying.

The

extinction of plant and animal species has been rising in rough

proportion to the

loss

of habitats

(see Figure 3-1).

to 17,500 species a year (Corson 1990, p. 101).

We may

Some

be losing up

scientists

beUeve

we

CHAPTER 3

132

100,000 r-

10,000

1,000

-

100

-

2000

FIGURE

1900

3-1

Estimated annual rate of species

1700

1800

loss,

1700-2000.

could lose 25% of the species on the planet in the next few decades, which would be a larger loss than any of the extinctions in geological history. The most threatened habitats today are those richest in species diversity and biological productivity, the tropical forests and the coral reefs.

A square mile in a Peruvian lowland has twice as many butterflies as

the entire United States and Canada; one river in Brazil has offish than

all

more

the rivers in the United States (Corson 1990,

p.

species

100).

becoming extinct for three reasons. First, as human population explodes, more habitats are converted into croplands. Hungry people will convert any place where crops can be grown into food Species are

production. Second, people introduce non-native species into

new

en-

vironments; native species that do not have the appropriate defenses against the invader die out. Third, people overharvest desired products

and

areas.

For example, tropical agroforestry, based on small

plots,

on the

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

intermixing of tree and

133

on the inclusion of domestic

soil crops,

and on the recycling of plant and animal wastes,

—but

and would be sustainable over the long term

it is

scarcely practiced.

Likewise, people are killing off 80,000 elephants a year, their ivory; only 15

animals,

technically possible

is

mosdy

white African rhinos are believed to be

to harvest left in

the

humans want their horns as a supposed aphrodisiac; and whales have been reduced below the level of commercial viability because some people want their oils (Corson 1990, p. 103). wild, largely because certain

Several practical reasons exist for preserving healthy ecosystems

We

the biodiversity within them.

discussed

some of

these in the

and last

performs free environmental services. Plants take

section. (1) Wildlife

carbon dioxiae from the

and produce oxygen. They counteract

air

greenhouse emissions. They regulate stream flows and groundwater levels,

and cleanse poDutants from surface water. Both and animals degrade wastes, help to control floods and soil producand contribute to pest control. Even insects, usually regarded as

recycle soil nutrients, plants tivity,

not always

pests, are

of waste.

(2)

Wild

so;

many

are

important pollinators and decomposers

of over

species are the original source

chemicals used in prescription drugs (Corson 1990,

the cures for such diseases as

AIDS and

bilharzia. (3)

p.

Wild

the

Lurking in

103).

know

one or more of the thousands of species we do not

40% of

may be

about

species provide

humans with needed products and services. We have already noted how wild plants have made it possible to bestow immunity on cultivated crops. True, technologists may come up with synthetic substitutes for some of these products or services. Synthetic rubber, for example, has replaced natural rubber in two-thirds of its uses (Corson 1990,

rubber such

as

of better quality and

is

airplane

tires.

needed to accomplish

When



potential loss

may

a species

is still

lost, it

is

not renewable.

direct

where we

emissions

on

is

gone, forever.

milHon species by the year 2000,

are

are doing. vAlong

particular function or

Its

running with

a large

this

biodiversity. If

A

given

consequences for people. But with the

assume that the whole phenomenon area

natural

preferred for heavy-duty applications



1

But

their goals.

is

may not have

possible loss of

104).

technologists seek wild plants for the genes

unique combination of genes

its

or

And

p.

is

it

would be

inconsequential. This

foolish to is

another

experiment without knowing what

uncertainty

is

we

the effect of our greenhouse

cUmate changes

are

of the magnitude that

a

warming will affect the habitats on the planet (WRI

majority of scientists are predicting, global location, size,

1990-91,

p.

and character of

130).

and extinctions

Many

will

all

wildlife

species will not be able to adapt quickly

dwarf any

will shift, shrink, or disappear

that have

(WRI

been predicted, because

1990-91,

p.

130).

enough, habitats

CHAPTER 3

134

Pollution

The

Inevitability of Pollution

Nature does not produce "pollution." Plants grow, taking up carbon dioxide from the

and

air

Animals

into the

air.

organic

compounds

from the

nitrates

soil.

eat the plants, excreting

They

"excrete" oxygen

carbon dioxide to the

that the plants use as fertilizer. This

air

and

and other natural

cycles repeat themselves.

Humans, on

do produce

the other hand,

pollution.

They produce

chemicals and products that are not found in nature and cannot be used

by

(eaten)

living things, or they

overwhelm

produce them in such great quantity

nature's ability to use

them.

Many

as to

dangerous forms of pollu-

tion already abound; the intensification of agriculture and basic-resource

production will only aggravate the problem. In

modern

fact,

because virtually

all

techniques of production and consumption entail pollution, any

increase in production

and consumption necessarily produces

The

tionate increase in pollution.

laws of physics

tell

a

propor-

us that matter

and

energy can be neither created nor destroyed, but only transformed. These transformation processes are never completely efficient; by-products or residuals are at least

an inevitable

unwelcome,

dustrial practices

converts

less

than

is

to

result,

some

and these

low. For example, the

40% of the

are almost always noxious, or

degree. In practice, the efficiency of in-

most modern

energy in coal or

fossil-fuel plant

of the energy escapes up the stack and into cooling water large quantities of residuals in the

Thus pollution

is

form of

The

rest

as heat,

and

oil into electricity.

ash and gases are produced.

the result of the operation of basic physical laws.

Moreover, this description understates the problem. The petrochemical industry, for

example, each year produces about 600 billion pounds of

products and 500 billion pounds of toxic chemicals, only destroyed

(Commoner

1990,

p. 51).

industry are themselves pollutants pesticides results ses

and plastics



that also

1% of which

are

But many of the "products" of this



solid or hazardous wastes,

such

as

cannot be used by nature. Thus pollution

not only from the inefficiencies of physical transformation proces-

but also from some of the very products humans contrive these

processes to produce.

Why

not simply use technological devices to control pollution?

is no way that we can many forms of pollution technologically. Waste heat is the prime example, but many others are also important, including fertilizer run-off" and carbon dioxide from combustion. Their damage to ecosystems may

Unfortunately, for thermodynamic reasons, there control

be mitigated in some ways, but short of forgoing production altogether

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

135

or adopting radically different technologies, there

simply no way to

is

contain these high-entropy pollutants.

Other forms of pollution

are,

of course, susceptible to technological

control, but even these pollutants cannot be controlled indefinitely, for

continued growth in industrial output must inevitably overwhelm any pollution-control technology that

ample,

if overall industrial

90%

reducing by

output grows

at

100%

than

less

is

5%

effective.

For ex-

(doubling period 14 years),

the quantity of pollution emitted and maintaining this

fiature would buy only about 45 years of grace, amount of time, the absolute level of pollution would be the is today. Even a 99% level of efficiency would extend this

of efficiency in the

level

for after that

same

as

it

period of grace by only 46 years. Thus, with continued industrial growth, at

some point

pollution will reach dangerous levels under any pollution-

control regime. This point level

may not be

very

far away, for

of overall control effectiveness would be

to achieve in practice,

would have

and

to be paid for

physical laws that

the same coin also

tell

not impossible,

money and energy

it.

The Dilemmas and Costs of Technological The same

difficult, if

considerable price in

a

Pollution Control

make production and

us that

all

technology can do

"solve" the original problem, there

is

bound

two sides of exchange one form

pollution is

of pollution for another. Worse, because energy

is

generally used to

be an overall increase in

to

both gross pollution and entropy. For instance, some of the stitutes

now coming

into use to avert the destruction of the

are themselves toxic, exacerbate the

photochemical smog. They are less effective

than the

90%

even the

CFCs

greenhouse

also less

sub-

ozone

layer

or contribute to

energy efficient to produce and

they replace. As

case, a particular technological "fix"

effect,

CFC

may

is

undoubtedly true in

this

on

nevertheless be desirable

economic, ecological, or aesthetic grounds despite the overall thermo-

dynamic

loss,

sector that

is

because the burden will presumably be shifted away fi^om a harder pressed ecologically or whose degradation

is

more

obnoxious to our senses and health. However, once the absorptive capacity of the environment has

been used up, and

all

sectors are about

equally hard pressed, then simply converting pollution into a different

form

will

matter

no longer be

a

workable

how much money and

some ultimate

on our

strategy. It

energy are

at

is

our

clear, therefore, that

disposal, there

no

must be

without

also

are unlikely to reach this ultimate ecological limit.

Our

limit

ability to control pollution

controlling production.

However, we

supplies of money, energy,

and other resources

are not

without

limit,

and

CHAPTER 3

136

at

some point the

increased costs of pollution control

seem

likely to

render further growth in production fruidess. For example, imagine a lake

with a "waste-absorption capacity" of y units of residuals. (In fact, as we shall see later, waste-absorption capacity is an economist's concept that has

no ecological

units

of

validity.)

A factory on the shore

of a certain commodity and

at

now

Although the factory

residuals.

pollution, the residuals

it

of this lake produces x

the same time emits exacdy y units

no control over

exercises

its

emits have not yet begun to degrade the quality

of the lake water. However, suppose that demand for the commodity doubles, requiring

either

a

second factory of

like

capacity

or an

equivalent addition to the old one. Without pollution control the lake would begin to die biologically, because the 2y units of residuals resulting from 2x units of production would be twice what the lake can safely absorb. Thus pollution-control equipment that is 50% effective must be installed to reduce the residuals to a safe level. If demand doubles again, production of 4x units of the commodity produces 4y units of residuals to dispose of,

and pollution control must

that if doubHng

now be 75% effective. It is clear 99% effectiveness in

of production continues, more than

becomes necessary. by reviewing the recent history of pollution-control efforts in the United States. Since the 1970s, the United States has spent about a trillion dollars on poUution-control efforts. What does the country have to show for it? Unfortunately, not much. pollution control eventually

These points

are supported

Despite the fact that

we

have reduced pollution per process or pollution

per event, our growth in numbers and productivity has so eroded our

accomplishments that our net gain seriously

polluted,

humans and

nil.

is

Both

air

and water remain

with increasingly serious consequences both to

to the planet. Hazardous substances are entering the en-

vironment in record (and growing) amounts. These substances, including toxic

and nuclear waste,

serious

human

pesticides,

and

industrial chemicals are causing

health consequences, notably cancer, birth defects, and

heart and lung diseases. Solid wastes are overrunning our ability to

manage them and

are contaminating the drinking water of millions

of

Americans.

Air Pollution In 1971 the Environmental Protection the levels in the air of substances

on human damage the

beings.

to

set standards for

reducing

produce serious health

effects

and nitrogen oxides, which and lungs, carbon monoxide, which deprives

These included

respiratory tract

Agency

known

sulfur

the blood of oxygen, and organic hydrocarbons,

some of which

cause

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

137

human

cancer and birth defects. (These substances also adversely affect

health by contributing to the formation of ground level ozone and acid

And they also harm the environment.) The EPA thought its standwould result in an 80 to 90% reduction in the emissions of these substances between 1975 and 1985. In fact, the average reduction in the emissions of these substances between 1975 and 1987 was 18% (Comrain.

ards

moner

1990,

p. 22).

Nitrogen oxide emissions actually

Why? The

during those years.

answer

is

increased

by

2%

not merely the regulatory retreat

new and 75%

by the administration that came to power in 1981. For example, automobiles in the United States emit less

90%

fewer hydrocarbons

carbon monoxide than did those of the early 1970s. But the number

of vehicles on the road has nearly doubled in the

last

20 years (Mc-

The increased number of motor vehicles, new industrial plants, and new power plants (even though many are equipped with such pollution-control devices as scrubbers), have nullified much of the pollution controls. The same outcome has occurred in other inCloughlin 1989,

p. 48).

dustrialized countries attempting to control pollution

some countries

the record

is

by 29%);

(Commoner

1990,

p.

in

15%

(its

nitrogen oxide emis-

Great Britain, the average reduction was

— opposed —have seen as

it

the pollutant fi-om being produced at aU

negated by the economic "growth" taking place in those a result,

1%

36). In general, countries that have tried to reduce

the emission of a pollutant by controlling

As

that in

worse.* In West Germany, for example, the

average reduction of these emissions was sions increased

—except

to preventing

their controls

countries."''

and because many countries have no or few pollution

huge quantities of pollutants enter the atmosphere fi-om human activities. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and controls,

Development, 110 million tons of

*

Sweden

is

a notable exception.

Its

sulfur oxides,

69 million tons of

reductions of pollution have exceeded

increases in growth; sulfur dioxide emissions, for example,

its

dropped by more

than two-thirds between 1970 and 1985. t

Lead

the only notable success story in diminishing an air pollutant. Lead

is

metal.

toxic

children)

It

causes neurological disorders

and kidney

In the United States,

failure. It inhibits it

has almost

emissions of lead were reduced by p.

22)

.

The

control lead

reason for

this

(especially

both respiration and photosynthesis in

been eliminated

94% between

as

an

is

a

mental retardation in

air pollutant; total

1975 and 1987

plants.

annual

(Commoner

1990,

unique success was that the government did not try to

pollution but rather

removed

its

source

from the environment. That

forced technological change. Because lead clogged catalytic converters,

oil

panies were forced to use lead substitutes to raise the octane levels of gasoline.

is, it

com-

CHAPTER 3

138

nitrogen oxides, 193 million tons of carbon monoxide, 57 million tons of

organic hydrocarbons, and 59 miUion tons of particulates were emitted into the atmosphere in 1980 (Corson 1990,

include substances classified

The

shordy.)

which we

of 50,000 Americans

sulfates in the air

a year

may

(Corson 1990,

cause the premature death 223).

p.

Association concluded in 1990 that pollution from costs

Americans $40 and causes

tures

as

billion to

many

$50

Moreover, these

worrisome health

when

oxygen

The American Lung motor

vehicles alone

billion in annual health-care

expendi-

120,000 unnecessary or premature deaths

as

{The Washington Postjan. 21, 1990,

created

will discuss

Office of Technology Assessment estimates that current

of particulates and

levels

221). (This Usting does not

p.

emissions,

as toxic

A12).

p.

pollutants are not the only ones that have

five

effects.

Ozone

another serious

is

air pollutant. It

is

organic hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides react with

in the presence

of sunlight. Ozone

around the world, primarily by

produced

is

in great quantities

and trucks. In some countries, no

cars

on the emissions of motor vehicles. Where controls do exist, numbers of vehicles are nullifying the reductions, especially that of nitrogen oxides. In 1988, 96 cities and counties failed to meet the standards the Environmental Protection Agency set for ozone in the controls exist

the increasing

United

States.

interferes tion,

and

Ozone

contributes to smog, reduces resistance to infection,

with lung functions, contributes to asthma and nasal congesirritates

greenhouse

the eyes.

effect.

It

At current

also

damages crops and contributes

levels,

to the

ozone causes crop damage estimated

between $2 biUion and $4.5 bilHon per year. Acid rain is another air pollutant. Acid rain is weak sulfuric and nitric acid. It forms when nitrogen and sulflir oxides combine with moisture in at

the

air.

Acid rain can

damage facades,

kill fish

and other aquatic

structures such as metals, (such as

and

Half the

paints.

Acid

forest area in

rain 1 1

damage

life,

destroy forests, and

railroad tracks), building

varies in different parts

European countries shows acid

35% of the forests in Europe 106). 43% of the conifers in

whole

of the world. rain

damage;

damaged (Brown 1 990,

over

as a

p.

the Alps in Sv^tzerland are dead or

are

damaged (Corson 1990, p. 225). 80% of the lakes in Norway are dead; in Sweden 14,000 lakes cannot support sensitive aquatic Hfe; in Canada 150,000 1 out of 7 eastern lakes are biologically damaged. On the other hand, although eastern China has acid rain damage, Japan has found no evidence of large-scale damage from acid seriously

biologically



rain

(OECD

1991,

p. 47).

Acid

mental damage in the United

conducted over 10 about

years,

10% of eastern



rain has caused only

States.

concluded that aquatic

lakes

moderate environ-

A recent federal

and streams, that

government

life is

visibility

study,

being damaged in

is

being reduced in

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

some metropoHtan

the eastern United States and in acid rain

areas

of the west, that

contributing to the erosion and corrosion of stone and metal

is

structures,

139

and

that

it is

reducing the

York Times, Sept. 6, 1990,

p.

A24.)

trees at

high

New

also

It

of red spruce

by cold temperatures {The

ability

altitudes to withstand the stress caused

found evidence that acid rain

is

contributing to the decline of sugar maple trees in eastern Canada and causing respiratory and other diseases in humans.

It

predicted that acid

would lead to forest decline in the decades ahead. may combine with ozone pollution to have more damag-

rain, if unchecked,

Acid

rain

ing effects than either substance does alone.

Some

scientists believe the

combination of these two pollutants have weakened

where 70% of the standing feet) in Virginia,

228).

trees

trees to the point

above an elevation of 900 meters (2950

Tennessee, and North Carohna are dead (Corson 1990, p.

(Ozone and

acid rain are

more concentrated

at

higher elevations in

a given area.)

Chlorofluorocarbons and halons pose another threat to health.

They

stabilizers, in fire extinguishers,

228).

The

military

is

a

major

and in blowing foam (Corson 1990, p. But these chemicals, along with

user.

nitrogen oxides, cause depletion of the earth's ozone layer. the stratosphere radiation

is

not

from the sun.

crop yields.

It

kills

a pollutant

UV

but

a filter

Ozone

in

of harmful ultraviolet

exposure damages plants, causing reduced organisms, including, ominously, the

aquatic

phytopJankton that produce life

human

are used as propellants, as refrigerants, as solvents, as

much of the oxygen on which

all

animal

depends. Increased exposure of humans to ultraviolet radiation

increases the incidence of a fatal

form of skin

cancer, eye damage, and

immune system disorders. The incidence of melanoma has increased 83% over the past 10 years in the United States (Shea 1989, p. 82); skin cancer cases are expected to increase from 500,000 to 800,000 a year

(Weisskopf 1991, stratosphere

p.

decHned

Al).

The

2% from

average ozone concentration in the

1969 to 1986, but

a

1991 report issued

by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration concludes that ozone depletion is accelerating twice as fast as previous projections. Despite this, the production of chloroflurocarbons, the most important cause of this decline,

*

The U.S.

is

military, for

the United States and

increasing by

example, uses

50% of

the

5%

a year.

76% of aU halon-1211 consumed

CFC-113. Each space

deposits 56 tons of chlorine into the upper atmosphere (quoted in

1991, p. 140).

in

shuttle launch

Renner

— CHAPTER 3

140

The

world have agreed to phase out the

industrial countries of the

CFCs by the year 2000 if possible. But millions of additional of CFCs will be released into the atmosphere in the meantime.

use of

tons

They

now producing CFCs ozone

will stiU deplete the

A

100 years. Furthermore, the chemical

will persist there for over

companies

worse problem

is

layer,

will

be introducing substitutes that

though

at a significantly

lower

rate.*

that developing nations have refused to join in

phasing out their use of CFCs; they believe that the substitute chemicals will increase

and slow

their costs

their

growth

rates.

dustrialized countries, for their part, agreed not to restrict

The

in-

CFC

ex-

ports to the developing world. In sum, although in this case the industrialized world has concurred

on joint action

ous environmental pollutant, the endeavor will not stop the destruction cases

of the ozone

too

is

layer.

to

little

combat a periland too late; it

Millions of additional

of skin cancer, reduced yields of crops, and reduced phyto-

plankton activity are the predictable consequences.

carbon dioxide

Finally,

—the main by-product of combustion

along with nitrous oxides, methane, and chloroflurocarbons, produces a greenhouse effect. These gases trap the heat absorbed by the earth from the sun and prevent its escape back into space. Scientists have proved conclusively that the earth is about 33°C warmer than it would be if it did not have carbon dioxide in its atmosphere. Also, scientists

have observed that for the past 160,000 years, whenever atmospheric

carbon dioxide thereafter;

levels increased, the earth's

CO2

levels

and the

earth's

correlated through the centuries (quoted in

#403). Today, atmospheric than years.

at

CO2

temperature rose shortly

temperature have been closely

Wind Energy Weekly 1990,

concentrations are 20 to

25%

higher

any time in the pre-industrial period, going back 160,000

In

molecule of which

atmospheric concentration of methane,

the

addition,

traps

20 to 30 times the heat of a

CO2

a

molecule,

more than double pre-industrial levels. The atmospheric concentration of CFCs, a molecule of which traps 20,000 times the has reached

heat of a

CO2

dustrial times,

molecule, obviously

when

it

predict the earth will

*

Substitutes for

ozone-depleting

CFCs effects

Chemical, and other

did not

is

exist.

warm 2°C

to

infinitely higher than in pre-in-

For these reasons, most

5°C

exist that (unlike the

scientists

in the next century

HCFC's now

(WRI

planned) have no

but are significantly more expensive. DuPont, Allied

CFC

producers have thus

far

shown no

interest in these

chemicals. If enforced, however, the 1990 Clean Air Act will require phasing

out of the use of HCFCs by 2030 in the United

States.

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

1990-91,

(The

p. 13).

earth's

141

temperature during the

age was

last ice

5°C cooler. The predicted increase in temperature is of like magnitude but would occur 10 to 40 times as fast).''' The implications of such rapid warming for Ufe on earth are not well understood. Oceans may rise. That will contaminate nearby groundonly

3°C

to

waters with their

salt,

cause coastal flooding, and drive millions of people from

homes. The cost of protecting

levels will

cities

from

be in the hundreds of biUions of

Experiencing

1°C

a

rise in

temperature

is

a

1

-meter

rise in

ocean

may

suffer.

dollars. Forests

equivalent to

moving 200

may not

kilometers toward the equator; with global warming, tree species

be able to "migrate" toward the poles that species's range, trees less

would be more

able to adapt to other

* Scientists

fast.

At the warmer

susceptible to disease

human-made environmental

and

limits

of a

insects

and

stresses,

such

as

cannot be sure of the extent or timing of global warming because of

uncertainty about several variables, including the absorptive capacity of the

oceans and probable changes in cloud cover. that

A small minority of scientists doubt

greenhouse gases will actually produce global warming; some of the

doubters believe that increased evaporation and phytoplankton activity resulting

from the warming

effect

of greenhouse gases will lead to increased cloud cover,

amount of solar warmth reaching the earth. In addition, two Danish scientists have linked the global warming we have already experienced to sunspot intensity (Stevens 1991, p. C4). However, another minority of scientists believe that the warmer it gets, the hotter it mil get. Some cite evidence that methane stored in permafrost will be released as it is warmed, thus causing more reducing the

evidence that since 1976 plants have dramatically increased

warming; others

cite

their production

of carbon dioxide and methane

respiration."

with

rising

Dark



temperature

t In January 1991, scientists at the

ing data from 2000 that

a

process called "dark

unlike photosynthesis, the rate of

point and then declines (Moore 1990,

announced

in

respiration occurs because plant respiration rates increase

sites

p.

which

rises to a

C3).

Goddard

Institute for

Space Studies, measur-

worldwide, and the British Meteorological Office

1990 was the warmest year of the 140 years since weather

records have been collected (Booth Jan. 1991,p. A3). This record followed heels of several broken in the 1980s; six of the seven

occurred during that decade.

It is

possible,

on the

warmest years on record

of course, that these records have

nothing to do with global warming; temperatures flucmate from year to year, or in groups is

of years,

also possible that

for reasons having nothing to

do with

a

greenhouse

effect. It

thermometers were not calibrated exactly the same 50 or 125

years ago, producing false comparisons today.

The

question

is

whether

it

is

prudent for humanity to act on evidence that global warming may be under way or to use such pretexts to deny

it.

CHAPTER 3

142

increased

UV

could also

suffer.

radiation, ground-level ozone,

Although some

the presence of high

plants' rate

and acid

rain.

Agriculture

of photosynthesis increases in

CO2 levels, this characteristic has not been identified

humans have cultivated. As we noted earUer, changing rainfall may make many agricultural lands unsuitable for farming, render obsolete many irrigation facilities, and require new ones to be built

in the crops

patterns

elsewhere

The

at great cost.

sources of carbon dioxide are everywhere

fossil fuels are

burned

The production of most of the energy to power industry, commerce, and homes produces carbon dioxide. The average car spews out prodigious amounts of carbon dioxide: 16,000 pounds a year. The (see Table 3-2).

CFCs

in a car's air conditioner have the

greenhouse impact of another

4800 pounds of CO2. To the extent that these emissions have been controlled, it has been by increasing gas milage. The average fuel efficiency of American cars, for example, has doubled since 1970,fi-om 13 to 26.5 miles per gaUon. This success, however,

Americans drive nearly twice as

is

nullified

many motor

by the

fact that

vehicles than they did in

1970. Vehicle miles are increasing by 25 billion miles a year. Worldwide,

worse. Despite the fact that fuel milage in other industrial

the problem

is

countries

now

is

average fuel

slightly better

economy

is

than in the United States, the global

20 miles per

gallon.

Most

countries have not

adopted gas milage standards, but the increase in their numbers of cars has that of the United States. In 1950 there were 50

been comparable to

number had doubled. By 1970 and by 1990 the number had They spew 550 million tons of CO2

million cars in the world; by 1960 that

number

there were double that

again,

redoubled again to 400 million

cars.

into the atmosphere per year.

By

million

cars!

It

is

true

that

2010, there are expected to be 700 aU governments

if

automobile gas efficiency to be 50 miles per

*

require

would

Cars in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

countries



that

gallon. (Bleviss t

agreed to

gaUon,"!" success

and Walzer 1990,

The technology

built prototypes

compact

the industrialized

is,

to

of

do

Even

is

(OECD)

30 miles per

in 1991, several manufacturers have

exceed 50 miles/gallon. Volvo has

car that gets 63 miles/gallon in the city

highways; the car

—average

p. 103).

this exists.

cars that

West and Japan

effect

designed to meet

all

a

prototype

and 81 miles/gallon on

U.S. emissions and safety requirements

and to exceed the U.S. crash standard of 30 miles/hour. The car would cost litde more than current cars to manufacture (Bleviss and Walzer 1990, p. 106; WR\ 1990-91, its

p.

151). Already in the

1992 model

year,

Honda

is

selling a version

popular "Civic" that gets nearly 60 miles/gallon on highways.

of

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

Table 3-2

Major Sources of CO2 Emissions

the United States

143

in

CHAPTER 3

144

much

less

reduce them.

(Why

this

true

is

is

the subject of Part

II

of this

book.)

Moreover, cars constitute only 15% of the global carbon dioxide problem (though they contribute 25% of all U.S. carbon emissions). Growth in the industrial, commercial and residential sectors is also increasing carbon emissions faster than increases in efficiencies are

reducing them. Increases in energy productivity in the developed world have been modest at best. Most governments have made only token efforts to develop energy from renewable carbon-free sources. Finally, as

forests

we

have seen, people are destroying 17 million hectares of

each year. This increases atmospheric carbon dioxide because

destroyed forests release trapped carbon dioxide and no longer "con-

sume" carbon dioxide forests

is

The liquidation of the earth's for 10% of the excess carbon

in photosynthesis.

thought to be responsible

dioxide in the atmosphere; in the tropics, where the forests are wiped

out mostly by burning, the billion tons

of CO2 per

About 15

nations, mostly in

their production

United

States,

themselves produce another

fires

1

to 2

year.

Western Europe, have plans to limit years. But the

of carbon dioxide over the next 15

which, with

for

more than 25% of the

in

C02-reduction

5%

of the world's population,

is

responsible

world's carbon emissions, has refused to join

efforts.

And

it

has

repeatedly

prevented the

Europeans from converting their plans into binding targets (Meyer 1990, p. 3; Stevens 1991, p. 61). (Ironically, the United States is now

Western Europe and Japan are, so increasing its energy productivity to reduce carbon emissions would improve the "competitiveness" of the United States economy.) Underdeveloped countries also have no plans to reduce carbon emisonly half as efficient in using energy

as

There remains, therefore, a vast gap between projected growth rates in carbon emissions and what scientists believe is necessary to control global warming.

sions.

*

The United

States

government

in particular has invested

huge amounts of were

research and development funds in nuclear energy (the hazards of which discussed in Chapter 2) while investing trivial

amounts

in,

and eliminating

once-existing tax breaks for research and development in renewables. President

Reagan even removed a flilly flinctioning solar hot-water system from the White House. Despite this, non-nuclear carbon-free sources of energy exist; they include wind, geothermal, photovoltaic, solar thermal, biomass, and ocean

thermal energy conversion.

With

flirther research,

A few are already cost-comperitive with fossil ftxels.

more could

be.

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

145

Water Pollution Water pollution United

also

is

worsening

in

industrial countries. In

the

government has spent over $100

States alone, the national

we have little to show for it. More than 17,000 of the nation's rivers, streams, and bays are polluted. From 1974 to 1982, levels of fecal coliform bacteria decreased at only million to clean up surface waters, and

a

few

as

about the same number of sites which they decreased (Commoner 1990, p. 25). Nitrate increased at four times as many as those sites at which they

those

levels

of dissolved oxygen, suspended

river reporting stations; levels

sediments, and phosphates increased at

cadmium

decreased. Arsenic and

water quality has deteriorated

measuring against

at

stations.

Various

eating, the

fish

levels are also increasing. Overall,

more than

at

three-quarters of the

states prohibit eating,

or warn their citizens

caught in their rivers and

hundreds of millions of dollars (including

lakes.

For the

and local spending for

state

sewage-treatment plants, private spending for septic tanks, and the

Americans have spent to clean up their waters, relatively few waterways that had undrinkable water or were unsafe for swimming in

like)

"swimmable" water had good water in the 1970s

the 1970s have drinkable or

many

time,

sites that

addition, sewage, plastic

litter,

At the same

today.

are unsafe today. In

discarded fishnets, tar

balls,

and toxic and

radioactive substances are contaminating coastal waters.* areas are so polluted that they are closed to oyster

Despite pollution-control

and

Some

the percentage of coastal waters

efforts,

now

closed to such fishing has been increasing; about half are

A

quarter of the usable groundwater in the United States

—more than three-quarters

taminated

164). Sixty pesticides,

some

as

well

as saltwater

water

*

is

polluted,

Oil from

oil

is

it

spills

pollution; witness the spills

on

no

remains

of Mexico over

way

generates

more

Exxon Valdez

Other

toxic

to clean

it

is

up:

also

particularly insidi-

Once

the ground-

publicity than other kinds of water

spiU.

However

harmfiil, the effects

of

oil

grave than routine unheralded municipal and

For example,

lead,

164).

p.

in

so.

every day the oil industry

1.5 million barrels

cadmium, benzene,

p.

and microbiological substances, are

practical

coastal waters are less

industrial practices.

con-

is

areas

polluting groundwater. Groundwater pollution

ous because there

closed.

(Corson 1990, many of them carcinogens, have been found in

the groundwater of 30 states (Corson 1990,

chemicals,

coastal

shellfish fishing.

dumps

into the

of waste water containing

and other toxic organics and metals!

oil,

Gulf

grease,

CHAPTER 3

146

Many Table 3-3.

causes for water pollution exist; they are

We

summarized

in

have also discussed additional problems caused by acid

mine drainage and acid rain. Agricultural practices are the source of some of the organic chemicals in water. For example, the groundwater contamination from pesticides results from repeated (and increasingly poisonous) sprayings, and only target pests.

But

1% of

pesticides actually reach the

fertiUzers used in agriculture also contribute to water

pollution; fertilizer not used by the plants either runs off into surface

water or leaches

down

into the groundwater.

The runoff

distributes

large amounts of nitrogen and phosphorous to the water. Finally, water

used for irrigation picks up rivers

salts

on

the land and carries

them back

to

and streams.

Industry causes another large share of toxic water pollution. largest producers of toxic water pollution (and, as

Table 3-3 Substance

we

shall see,

Causes and Effects of Water Pollution

The

of hazard-

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

ous solid wastes) are the chemical and steel

147

plastics industries.

At

pollution. facilities,

least

627

finishers,

Two-thirds of industry's toxic products are

eventually seep or leach

known

disposal sites are 163). Nearly

with 250 city sewage American surface waters.

industrial firms, along

routinely discharge toxic wastes into

injected into injection wells or sites

Metal

makers, and the pulp and paper industries also generate toxic water

pits.

The

down

dumped

chemicals in

into landfills or

all

of these disposal

into the groundwater. 77,000 such

to exist in the

United

States

(Corson 1990,

Agency

urgendy requiring attention because they already leaking into the groundwater or are threatening to do so. Protection

p.

1000 of them have been identified by the Environmental

These problems

as

are repeated in other industrial countries.

the rivers monitored in

Europe have

are

90% of

5% have nitrate Many rivers have

nitrate pollution;

concentrations over 200 times the unpolluted

level.

levels of such metals as zinc, lead, chromium, copper, arsenic, nickel, cadmium, and magnesium, as well as organic chemicals. Some European nations, such as the United Kingdom, Finland, Belgium, and Spain, have higher levels of chlorinated hydrocarbons (DDT-type insecticides and PCBs) in their waters than does the United States. Worse yet, many

high

pesticide-using countries in the developing world have higher levels of

chemical residues in their waters than either Europe or the United States.

Examples include Thailand, China, Colombia, Tanzania, Malaysia,

and Indonesia.

Sewage causes water pollution in all parts of the world. In this world has the severest problems by far, be-

instance, the developing

cause sewage

American 1990-91,

is

often not treated at

rivers p.

162). This

recommended human disease

compares to

level for drinking

in the

all.

world

is

Fecal coliform counts in Latin

100,000 per 100

are as high as

a

milliliters

(WRI

World Health Organization

water of

per 100 ml.

80% of

all

linked to unsafe water, poor sanitation,

and lack of basic knowledge of hygiene and disease mechanisms (Corson 1990, p. 162). 25 million people die each year from water-

borne diseases (Corson 1990, p. 162). Every hour over 1000 children die from diarrheal diseases (Corson, p. 162). Developing countries are increasing their expenditures on building adequate wastewater treat-

ment

But to eradicate these conditions while their populagrowing is simply beyond their resources. tions are By comparison, the United States and Europe have minor sewage treatment problems. 80% of the people in West Germany, Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden are connected to sewage-treatment plants. Only 106,000 people in the United States picked up waterborne diseases facilities.

between 1971 and 1983, although

that figure excludes cancers caused

by

CHAPTER 3

148

toxic pollutants (Corson 1990, p. 165).

adequate wastewater treatment countries. In the

United

Still,

facilities

States, the

the expense of building

huge, even for industrial

is

Clean Water Act of 1972 forbade

municipalities to discharge sewage after 1977 until

and pollutants in was extended

it

85%

had been removed. Then the deadline

until 1988.

By

of the bacteria for

compliance

EPA

1989, after that deadline had passed, an

study reported that two-thirds of the 15,600 wastewater treatment plants in this country

still

meet federal standards and that it would cost bring them into compliance. That figure is 17 times

did not

83.5 biUion dollars to

more than the whole EPA budget for all antipollution controls. To preserve fresh water that human beings can safely drink is thus a daunting task. (Making fresh water from the sea is not an easy way out of our difficulties. It takes 3 kilowatt-hours of energy to make 1 gallon

of freshwater.

Not

desahnization plants are 150).)

Water pollution

two-thirds

of the world's

on the Arabian Peninsula

(Postel 1990, p.

surprisingly,

controls, like air pollution controls, have

very expensive and, except for sewage, have produced

of

results.

pollution,

As with the

rather than trying to control

than building expensive

chemical

it

may be

fertilizers tp

been

in the

way

case of the near elimination of airborne lead

humans may have

for example,

little

to eliminate the sources of pollutants

them

facilities to

after

they are produced. Rather

control nitrogen levels in water,

that agribusinesses will have to stop using

grow

The production of human sewage such devices as composting toilets may

crops.

cannot be eHminated, but using

be more practical in many areas than expensive centralized sewage collection and wastewater control facilities.

water control

facilities are built,

toxic-free compost,

which

in turn

Where

centralized waste-

they must be designed to produce

can be used

as a substitute

source of

no control mechanisms for pesthey will end up and accumulate in are forced not to use them. As we

fertilizer for agriculture. Similarly,

on

ticides sprayed

groundwater

the land exist;

until agribusinesses

see, no economic means of controlling the toxic chemicals produced by the petrochemical industry exist; that industry endures

shall

only because

it

does not pay

in only a

Still,

its

environmental

few instances (PCBs

costs.

fi-om industrial

and

electrical

DDT and related chemicals from pesticides, and, in a few phosphorous fi-om detergents) has an isolated harmful product or

products, states,

process been eliminated from production.

Where used, such elimination The reductions cannot be

has dramatically reduced particular pollutants. nullified

by increases in economic growth. But the elimination of most and agricultural products and practices that cause pollution is

industrial

discussed very

little.

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

I49

Hazardous Wastes Air and water pollution controls, which have achieved only modest reductions of a few poUutants, look like a roaring success compared to efforts to control hazardous wastes. A hazardous substance is one that

harms human health or the environment; it mcludes "toxics," which are directly poisonous to humans. Humanity is engulfed by hazardous substances. In the United States alone, 260 million metric tons of hazardous substances are produced each

the country.

The

three

year—more

common

most

than

1

ton for every person

m

types of hazardous substances are

chemicals, (70,000 of them, mostly synthetic organics such as vinyl

chloride or dioxin), pesticides

and heavy metals.

70% of all

(1 biUion pounds of them used each year), hazardous substances are produced by the

petrochemical industry. Except for pesticides, which are sprayed widely over agricultural land, they are dumped in a variety of sites in and out of the country.

We

have discussed the pesticide problem before.

The National

Academy of Sciences

has estimated that in the United States, 20,000 new cases of cancer are caused each year by pesticide residues in the food

EPA

supply In addition,

groundwater in 34

tests

states; 1

show

in 9

weUs

that pesticides

tested

contaminate the

was contaminated (Allen on groundwater as their

1990, p. 129). 95% of rural Americans rely drmking source. In the San Joaquin vaHey of CaHfornia, investigators have found pesticides in 2000 weDs, mcluding 125 pubHc water systems

(Corson 1990, p. 252). There, and in some other places of heavy pesticide use, cancer rates are up, especially

among children. The World Health Organization estimates that 1,000,000

pesticide poisoning occur

worldwide each

year,

5000

to

cases

of

20,000 resulting

in death (French 1990, p. 14). People in developing countries suffer most of these deaths, partly because pesticide companies do not label their products, the people cannot read pesticide labels, or they are not trained in proper pesticide handhng. Developing countries also use extremely

toxic

pesticides that industrial countries

400

to

either

ban

in their

own

countries.

25% of the

600 million pounds of pesticides that the United States exports banned or severely restricted in this country (French

are

1990, p. 14). Three-quarters of all pesticides used in India, for example, are chemicals

banned in the United States (Corson 1990, p. 252). United States consumers reap some of the poisons their government permits chemical companies to sow: A Natural Resources Defense Council sampling of coffee beans in 1983 revealed that all samples had residues of DDT, and other banned pesticides. More than one-third of all fruit sold

Umted

States

is

grown

in countries

where few or no

controls

on

BHC, in the

pesticide

CHAPTER 3

150

Toxic Substances Discharged by U.S. Industry, 1987

Table 3-4

Millions of Pounds

Destination

2,700

Air Lakes, rivers, Landfills,

550

and streams

earthen

3,900

pits

Treatment and disposal

3,300

facilities

10,450

Total

Source: EPA, reported in The Washington Post, April 13, 1989,

use exist, and

less

than

p.

A33.

1% of food imports are inspected for pesticide Some believe that 50% of all imported

residues (Corson 1990, p. 253).* fruit is

pesticide-contaminated (Weir and Matthiessen 1990,

Other than produced

pesticides, two-thirds

in the

United

of the hazardous and toxic wastes

States are disposed

contaminate groundwater.

The

rest

p. 119).

of in ways that eventually

of the wastes are either spewed into

the air or discharged into streams and rivers (see Table 3-4). Fifteen

thousand

hazardous-waste

uncontrolled

landfills

and

80,000

con-

taminated surface lagoons have been identified in the United States

American industry exports 3 million tons of hazardous wastes to underdeveloped countries that, for the most part, are even less aware of their hazards than Americans are. The Environmental Protection Agency has identified 1200 hazardous-waste sites as the most dangerous in the country. These sites qualify for cleanup paid for out of federal funds under a "superfund" (Corson 1990,

p.

248). Moreover,

law passed in 1980. From 1980 to 1986, the agency spent 1.6 billion dollars to clean up 13 sites (Corson 1990, p. 249). At that rate, the cost

of cleaning up the most dangerous In

fact,

would be 148

the cost of cleaning up toxic wastes

Commoner

by

For example, the United

from 1983

is

billion dollars.

starkly prohibitive.

Barry

has noted that in 1986, the annual output of the chemical

industry, as represented

*

sites

to 1985.

States

Of these,

for pesticide residues.

top 50 products, was 539 billion pounds

its

the

Moreover,

imported 17,620,000,000 pounds of bananas

Food and Drug Administration examined 160 it

tested for fewer than half

used on bananas (Weir and Matthiessen 1990,

p. 119).

of the pesticides

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

(Commoner billion

1990,

p. 89).

The

151

industry that same year discharged 400

pounds of toxic chemicals into the environment. Assuming

industry were forced to incinerate these chemicals

dioxin and other toxic chemicals but average charge of $100 per ton,

same

was $2.6

As long

billion as

(Commoner



a process that emits

the only "control" available

would

it

Commoner reports, the

year.

is

cost industry

chemical industry's

1990,

that the

p. 90).

$20



billion.

at

an

That

total after-tax profit

In short, industry cannot do

it.

petrochemical products are produced in anything like current

quantities, there

is

no

realistic

prospect that the accumulation of toxics in

much less reduced. The products of the petrochemical

the environment will even be stabilized,

The problem

worse than

is

industry themselves



used just once

and botdes

as

is

become

that.

"wastes." Plastics, for example, are often

the case with household grocery bags, packaging,

—and then thrown

away. These plastics

do not,

and the other products they replace, decompose

leather,

like paper,

in the landfills

where they wind up. In addition, the sheer volume of solid wastes is filling up existing landfills and making it most unlikely that we can find enough new landfill sites. The petrochemical industry does not pay the costs of managing the solid wastes that its products become any more than

pays the costs of detoxifying the hazardous wastes generated

it

when

it

produces those products.

release

harmful substances even

clude

carpets

some petrochemical products

Finally,

when

used

as

intended; examples in-

gasolines that

and automobile interiors that emit formaldehyde, emit benzene, and solvents that emit carbon tetrachloride.

Some of these

chemicals are carcinogenic, are mutagenic, or damage the

nervous system.

The

industry does not pay the medical expenses of those

who contract disease as a result. The EPA estimates that the 2.7 bilhon pounds

persons

discharged into the

air

alone cause 2000

the general population.

But

new

cases

of toxic substances

of cancer each year in

that figure underestimates the harmfiil

sequences of these emissions.

First, it

con-

does not account for the possibly

carcinogenic effects of hundreds of suspect substances that are vented into

*

Some European

countries reduce the production of trash via public policies that

Norway

taxes non-returnable

1991, p. 49).

Germany has ordered

encourage the use of retumables and recycling.

Denmark prohibits their use (Young

containers.

the packaging industry and retailers to recover

1995 (Environmental Action March/ April 1991,

few

places,

programs.

A

such

as Seatde,

80% of all

packaging materials by

p. 29). In the

United

States only a

Washington, have enacted comprehensive recycling

1987 survey found

that the states as a

much money on incineration as on

recycling

whole were spending 39 times

(Young 1991,

p. 45).

as

CHAPTER 3

152

the atmosphere but the

example, that agency

EPA

From 1970

has not studied.

standards for only 7 of these (Maillet 1989). Second, the

does not examine the health

with birth

EPA

at a time. It

imposed on the

effects

on as

industrial plants

1000 times the

considered

at these sites are

compounds

1990,

it

is

does not consider

known

more than 200

that

32).

p.

chloroform, and

safe

air at levels

over

by the Agency; 7 million Americans

thus subject to added health

risks.

of 900 people representative of the United

fat tissue

of the subjects were found to exhibit 33 of

States population, two-thirds

the 37 toxic

also

It

around the country emit toxics into the

level

In a study of the

moner

risks

and hypersensitive segments of the population, such

children and the elderly. Moreover,

who work

on

does not consider the fact

exposed to multiple chemicals and that such exposure has

that people are

additive or synergistic consequences.

vulnerable

estimate

nervous system damage, and other

estimates are based

average person from one chemical

set national

EPA

of chemicals that have been identified

effects

defects, sterility, central

serious ailments. Third,

to 1989, for

only 8 hazardous substances and

listed

which the

for

Among

tests

were conducted (Com-

the carcinogens found were benzene,

dioxin."^'

A few industrial some hazardous wastes before lowering the speed at which toxics are acof cleaning up hazardous waste sites. In other

Toxic wastes are a problem elsewhere in the world. countries (one

Denmark)

is

disposing of them, thus

cumulating and the costs

*

Workers

at

detoxify

chemical plants suffer

but also from industrial accidents. reported, and thousands

138 deaths, 5000

in

homes. The

EPA

produce worse

risks

not only from normal toxic emissions

From 1981

to 1985,

7000 such accidents were

more were unreported. The reported accidents resulted

injuries,

and 200,000 people forced to evacuate

casualties than the accident at

died and 200,000 persons were injured

Bhopal, India, where over 3000

(Waxman

1989).

t Dioxin exposure of the general population results in part

tion



in particular, the

products. Because

it

creates

acid gases, and ftirans into the

air,

mercury, and lead (Young 1991, filters

pits air

or

accumulate in the

end up

ash.

and

its

own

On new

it

carbon monoxide, as

cadmium,

"clean" incinerators, scrubbers

pollutants.

But most of the "removed" pol-

This ash

disposed of by being injected into

is

into landfills. Eventually, therefore, the toxics

in the groundwater.

wood when it

and

toxic wastes. In addition

sulfiir oxides,

along with such heavy metals

p. 46).

remove most of these

dumped

trash incinera-

plastics

mountains of trash, the public incinerates

to dioxin, incineration discharges nitrogen

and

from

combustion together of chlorinated

runs out of landfills, but incineration produces

lutants then

their

estimated that 17 of these accidents had the potential to

removed from the

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

153

countries petrochemical wastes and heavy metals are are

m

dumped, just

as

they

the United States. In the developing world, they are sometimes

dumped

on

into the water supply or

agricultural lands.

Heavy-metal and

organic-chemical contamination appear in vegetables and other foods. Millions of tons of hazardous wastes are imported into these countries

from the United

dumped

States

it

evident that the world has not

is

hazardous substances tion have so far

it is

producing.

had minimal

effects,

Human but

These too

on

reduce

this

pollu-

much, because have been provided

hasn't mattered

indefinitely.

rates in industrial countries are already

Reports about

appearing in

ineffective

rising cancer

scientific journals.

cannot be explained by the aging of the population (Okie

rates p.

are

to grips with the

by the environment. But worsening pollution and

pollution control cannot go

1990,

it

come

efforts to

"control" of these substances seems to

effective

These

illegally*

in uncontrolled ways.

Thus

"free"

and Europe, usually

Al).

When

the incidence of environmentally caused disease

becomes higher and more obvious, humanity wiQ recognize that this is the bill from past environmental neglect. The environment in effect will force stern action on us. (Unfortunately, by that time, there wiU be little we can do to lower immediately the rates of cancer, birth defects, and so on that result from long-term exposure). We may then eUminate from production any products that are themselves hazardous or the production of which creates hazardous wastes. The substitute products may be somewhat more expensive, less efficient, or less convenient. In that event, the net effect will be to reduce either our purchasing power or our "standard

of living"

as that

may seem

less

term

is

conventionally understood today. But that loss

painful (or cosdy, in terms of medical costs) then the rising

incidence of disease and death. If

we

don't eliminate hazardous products altogether,

substantially higher costs to "control" pollution.

makes

tion control

often makes

us pay for

no contribution

something

we

will incur

However, because pollu-

that used to cost us

nothing and

to productivity^ or product improvement,

the net effect of increased commodity' prices due to pollution control a

reduction of our purchasing power. Such price

of the day

when

coming

when

cease.

The European Economic Community' agreed

radioactive waste to their 68 former turn, agreed not to

the

marginal costs of growth equal the gains and

growth wiU therefore

*

rises foretell

is

European

in

1990 not to export toxic and

colonies.

import toxic wastes from am-where

and 50 developing countries are not

These ex-colonies,

else.

The United

in

States

parries to this treaty (French 1990, p. 13).

CHAPTER 3

154

A

problem more serious than

technological control

financial costs

is

even where

that

theoretically possible, the technical problems

is

may be extremely demanding. For example, we

have no really

still

Of

workable technological means of detoxifying hazardous wastes. course, fliture inventions

may improve

many

conditions greatly in

areas,

but certain pollutants appear to be so intractable that effective technological control

may never be

achieved.

Radiation: Tlie Insidious Pollutant the primary case in point.

Radiation

is

examine

in detail because

it

many

It

theorists

especially important to

is

seem

to rely heavily

on

the

generation of nuclear power both to circumvent the unacceptable pollution that

would

from the expansion of conventional

result

power production and fuels altogether.

fossil

to

fossil-fuel

compensate for the eventual disappearance of

Moreover, radioactive compounds

most vicious of the wide array of dangerous chemicals we into the environment without any real knowledge of

are only the

now discharge

potential for harm, so the case of radiation can serve as a

their ultimate

model of the

general long-term dangers of pollution and of the dilemmas that con-

found technological pollution control. Radioactive isotopes, or radionuclides, are dangerous in extremely has become clear that even tiny doses have long-term on human and ecological health that no radiation exposure can be considered risk-fi"ee. Thus experts agree that virtually any small doses.

It



adverse effects

increase in radiation exposure

*

to

is

Why are

be avoided.

That was the conclusion of the National Research Council

radionucHdes so

in 1989.

Its

study also

concluded that the incidence of fatal cancers increases in proportion to increases in radiation exposure (Smith 1989, p. A3). the

A recent study

American Medical Association reported that workers

Laboratory in Tennessee

who were

below permissible

and well below exposure



power

plants

levels

^had a

exposed to very low

leukemia death

(quoted in Lippman 1991,

p.

published in The Journal of

rate

63%

Oak Ridge

at the

levels

levels at



^well

commercial nuclear

higher than the general population

A3). In the past,

some

scientists

had no harmflil

had believed

below

a certain threshold, radiation either

effects

would be unmeasurable because any cancer that showed up

been the consequence of inducers other than

Ridge study controlled

National

of radiation

effects

later

radiation exposure.

for other cancer-causing fectors,

and

it

that,

or the harmful

could have

But the Oak

revealed that the

longer workers were exposed to tiny levels of radiation, the higher the incidence of cancer.

Of course,

these studies

do not end

all

controversy about the health effects

of low-level radiation; the U.S. Council for Energy Awareness, trade group, criticized

both

studies.

a nuclear industry

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodivenity, Pollution...

dangerous? a pervasive

First,

physical

phenomenon.

155

and biological concentration of radionuclides is It can take the form of geographical concentra-

tion in lakes, estuaries, airsheds, or any other places

of

air

and water

restricted.

is

Or

where the

circulation

can take the form of physiological

it

concentration in the body, for example, inhaled plutonium oxide particles

tend to lodge permanently in the lung and therefore to irradiate sur-

rounding

tissues intensely

Concentration can

which was described

in

over a long period.*

form of

also take the

Chapter

1

in

biological magnification,

connection with pesticides.

Once

a

biologically active radionuclide enters a food chain,

it

approximately tenfold

For example, the

at

each higher trophic

level.

concentrated

is

modest quanrity of radioactive strontium 90 that falls on a pasture is concentrated in grass, again in the cows that eat the grass, and last in the

who

child

drinks

the

cow's

milk.

Finally,

for

metabolic

reasons

radionuclides are concentrated selectively in particular tissues or organs.

For example, strontium-90 mimics calcium in the body and concentrated in bones and bone marrow, iodine- 131

is

selectively

trapped by

is

thyroid glands, and cesium-137 concentrates in muscles and soft organs,

such

as

Thus radiation standards set in terms of whole-body doses may not be very meaningful in

the liver and gonads.

averages or so-called

two ways: (1) any radiation exposure causes cancer. (2) No matter how low the levels are set, because radioactive substances are certain to be concentrated in particular locations, a dose of radiation that the putative limits of tolerance

may nevertheless

prove

In addition, there

on

is

damage by

is

no such thing

history.

compounds of any

as

an "average" person for

judged

safe.

An

The

kind.

are also at higher risk,

fetus

its life is

Growing

and the

certain developmental stages.

children, with their high

affinity

Thus

cycle as well as to other accidents

particularly vulnerable to poisonous

metaboHsm,

of a radioactive compound such

strontium-90 for bone and marrow can

make

standards

it

as

particularly devastating at

must

take into account the

basic ecological principle that the reproductive period

*

whom

organism's vulnera-

radioactivity (or any other pollutant, for that matter)

directly related to the stage in

of personal

well within

whole body

lethal.

certain levels of radioactivity can be

bihty to

is

the average or over the

Plutonium's peculiar properties and extreme toxicity make

is

it

critical (E. P.

by

far the

most

virulent of aU radioactive substances. This fact has generated a major controversy

over the dangers of plutonium to pubUc health.

The more extreme

radiation standards-setting process claim that inhalation of as

may be

sufficient to

produce a

significantly increased risk

Little as

critics

one

of the

particle

of contracting cancer.

CHAPTER 3

156

Odum

1971,

others

who

108): What to adults or the general pubUc may be an may be very much more damaging to the young and to

p.

acceptable risk

are pecuHarly vulnerable.

Furthermore, the

effects

of radiation combine synergistically with

the effects of other pollutants or environmental stresses to produce

damage to bodies and ecosystems. Synergism occurs causes combine to produce a net effect that is greater or more two when than the mere sum of their separate effects. Thus, to use a well-known disproportionate

medical example, exposure to a modest quantity of either carbon tetrachloride or alcohol has no serious consequences, but simultaneous

exposure to both causes serious

or death.

illness

problems are either produced by synergism

smog) or aggravated by

it

theoretical basis for this stress

(for

(for

Many

environmental

example, photochemical

example, poisoning by heavy metals).

was discussed

in

Chapter

1

:

Any

The

environmental

tends to simpHfy an ecosystem and therefore to reduce

its

stabihty.

of pollutants. So

Few studies have been done on many biologically active compounds have been released in such large quantities that neither the money nor the labor power is available for the synergistic effects

more important interactions. Howon the structure and functioning of ecosystems and on the human body is amply documented (Smith 1989, p. A3; Wallace 1974; Conney and Bums 1972; Woodwell 1969). In effect, radioactivity "softens up" a biological system, making it studying even a tiny fraction of the

ever, the deleterious effect of low-level radioactivity

more

vulnerable to disruption by other pollutants and stresses (and vice

versa,

of course). The addition to our environment of such a potent stress is therefore a matter for deep concern, even if no

as

chronic radioactivity

immediate It is,

effects

can be observed.

long-term

in fact, the

effects

of radiation exposure that are the

most worrisome. The general epidemiological evidence for increased mortality due to chronic low-level pollution over the last 50 to 100 years is

incontrovertible. Epidemiologists agree that the sharp rise in death rates

from emphysema, various forms of malignancy, and a number of other prominent modern ills is primarily due to pollution. Researchers estimate, for example, that

between 60 and 90% of cancer

cases (1,040,000

discovered each year in the United States) are caused by envirormiental factors,

mostly chemicals (Maugh 1974). Moreover,

the overall

mortality

damage

statistics

natural systems

is

to

pubhc health

is

as

Figure 3-2 reveals,

Ukely to be

far

greater than

alone indicate. In addition, the effect of

nonhnear

(so that

stress

on

doubling the dose more than doubles

and we can confidently expect future increments of low-level radiation (and of other pollutants) to produce disproportionately more damage to human health than past levels of pollution. the resulting

illness),

.

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution.

FIGURE (after

3-2

157

.

Spectrum of biological responses

to exposure to pollutants

Newill 1973).

Even more important is the fact that radiation is by far the most powerfiil mutagen known. The radionucHdes released by human activities are therefore doubly dangerous:

By

exposing us to

significandy higher than the so-called

a level

of radioactivity

background radiation of the earth

(which our evolutionary history has prepared us to withstand), they threaten the genetic integrity of

unborn

ceivable, for example, that today's adults

escape serious

harm but

that

generations.

and even

It is

entirely

con-

today's children could

our grandchildren would be grievously

injured by current levels of radioactivity. In sum, despite the remaining areas

of controversy, the long-term dangers from low

mental radioactivity are Finally, the threat

levels

of environ-

essentially indisputable.

from radionuclides

is

intensified

by

their persist-

ence. For example, the half-Hves of tritium, strontium-90, and cesium-

137 are 12.4, 28, and 33 years, respectively. Because the period of biological danger

is

roughly 10 times the

half-life,

the tritium

we

release

today will be a problem for 124 years, and the other two isotopes wiU

remain dangerous for about 3 centuries. such long

half-lives that

most dangerous of these years),

which

they is

v^

A few other radionuclides

be with us in

plutonium-239

takes a quarter

(it

virtual perpetuity.

have

The

has a half-life of 24,000

of a million years to decay to the point of

CHAPTER 3

158

harmlessness. (Plutonium fiiel

cycle, either as a

used in weapons and

is

by-product or

of radionucHdes released year

as a fuel.)

is

part of the nuclear

Consequently, tiny amounts

after year can,

over the not-so-very-long

run, build up a large inventory of dangerous radioactivity in ecosystems

and human bodies. Thus, even if we and our immediate progeny escape harm, we could still saddle our more remote posterity with a lethal burden of radioactivity.

The conclusion pounds

to the

is

comamounts, made up

inescapable that the release of radioactive

environment in any but the most

preferably only of those

trivial

compounds with very with

short half-hves and the

some very

least capacity for biological

harm,

carries

Anything

100%

control of radioactive emissions

less

than virtually

it

dangerous to the future biological health of the planet and especially

its

human

serious risks.

its

is

truly

inhabitants,

inhabitants.

Toxic Nuclear Wastes Given the dangers of radiation, the wastes generated by the military and civihan uses of nuclear power pose a formidable long-term threat to

The military facihties of the United States and the Union have generated huge quantities of nuclear wastes. The military has openly dumped its nuclear wastes into lakes and humanity.

Soviet Soviet rivers,

forcing the evacuation of people living along their shores and con-

taminating the Arctic Ocean, thousands of kilometers away.

A

Soviet

exploded in 1957, contaminating

high-level nuclear storage facility

15,000 square kilometers of land on which 250,000 people worst

civilian nuclear accident in history, a reactor at the

power

station

lived. In the

Chernobyl

exploded in 1986, releasing between 50 and 100 million Up to 50 different

curies of radioactive material into the environment.

radioactive isotopes

were included in the

release,

with

half-lives

ranging

33 from 2 hours to 24,000 years. A years) was released and was detected in high amounts in the milk of countries as far away as Switzerland, Germany, and the United Kingdom. One hundred million people in Europe were put under food restrictions, as the radiation contaminated fruits, vegetables, and the grass on which

huge quantity of cesium-137

livestock feed.

Soon

after the

explosion occurred, 116,000 people living

within 18 miles of the reactor were the reactor

may remain

government

allocated

(Shogren 1990, land. levels

By 1990

p.

(half-life,

moved

out; the land in the vicinity of

uninhabitable for 15,000 years. In 1990 the Soviet

$26

billion

to

move 200,000 more people

Al). But 4 million people

still

live

on contaminated

doctors in the area were reporting dramatically higher

of skin cancer and other cancers, miscarriages, genetic mutations,

Deforestarion, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

159

and enlarged

birth defects, gynecological problems, anemia, heart attacks,

thyroid glands. Cancer deaths attributable to the accident are projected by

the National Research Council to be

30,000 of these radiation release in tens

fatalities

wall

as

from Chernobyl

is

radioactive waste

as

70,000 people. Over

expected to cause cancers to develop

of thousands of additional people

The United

high

occur outside the Soviet Union. The

who

will survive the disease.*

States military has also generated

—an

huge amounts of

estimated 1.4 billion curies. (This compares to the

50 to 100 million curies of radioactive material released

at

Chernobyl

(Renner 1991, p. 147).) United States military waste has contaminated the soil and groundwater at over 3200 sites owned by the United States Department of Energy. More than 50 Nagasaki-sized nuclear bombs could be buHt just from the wastes that have already leaked from storage (Renner 1991, p. from

tanks at the Hanford, Washington, nuclear reservation

147); 4.5 million liters of high-level radioactive wastes have leaked

(Renner 1991, p.

these tanks so far

nuclear

known

facility in

148). Radiation

from the Rocky

quantities throughout the

Denver region; strontium and cesium

have leaked into the ground water (Renner 1991,

employees

The Oak Ridge, at least

Rocky

148).

and chromosome aberrations (Renner 1991, Tennessee, nuclear

Flats

p.

147).

emitted thousands of

facility has

pounds of uranium into the atmosphere; the emitted

p.

of brain tumors, malignant melanoma,

suffer elevated levels

respiratory cancer,

Flats

Colorado, including plutonium, has spewed in un-

facility at

250 tons of uranium oxide. The

Fernald, Ohio, has

facility's

wastes have

contaminated nearby surface water and groundwater with cesium, uranium, and thorium. The aquifer under the Savannah River, South Carolina, nuclear facility contains radioactive substances and chemicals at 400 times the concentrations the government considers "safe" (Renner 1991, 148). All

of

this radiation

(and more,

thousands of other

p.

facilities) is

No

one knows what

do with the portion of these nuclear wastes (and

civilian nuclear

hazardous to biological systems and to

at

is

accumulating.

wastes) that can be "cleaned up," because

storing nuclear wastes has been found.

wastes cannot be "cleaned up"; either are already dispersed into the

air,

Worse

we

no

satisfactory facility for

still,

don't

some of these nuclear

know how

or the wastes

the water, and particularly the ground-

water where they wall remain harmfiil, depending on the contaminant, for dozens, hundreds, or thousands

*

of years.

Apart from the possibility of catastrophic accidents, nuclear power

with other

difficulties,

which were

discussed in Chapter 2.

is

beset

CHAPTER 3

160

The

Fallacies of Technological Pollution Control

The

between radioactive pollutants and more ordinary polone of degree, not of kind. Radionuclides are particularly and especially toxic, but many other pollutants behave in a

difference

lutants

is

insidious

of the thousands of synthetic

similar way. In fact, the vast majority

chemical compounds released in any quantity are physically and biologias to attack certain body tissues on reproduction or early development; react synergistically with other compounds or "soften up" natural systems; have potential or demonstrated delayed effects on ecosystems and

cally

concentrated or magnified so

selectively;

human

have

critical effects

populations; are mutagenic; and are sufficiently persistent to allow

long-term buildup of toxic material. Consequently, we already confront public health and ecological

dilemma of unknown but

a

clearly large

dimensions. Adding additional quantities of pollution of whatever form

can only worsen

this situation.

For these reasons, ecologists and environmental health

specialists find

completely unacceptable the usual economist s position that

on

rely

we

should

the "natural assimilative capacity" of air and water, controlUng

pollution only

when

recreational or other

economic "use values"

damaged. This economic criterion can have ecological only for nonsynthetic poUutanfs (such

as

will

be

validity, if at aU,

sewage and other organic

materials) that ecosystems are naturally adapted to handle in reasonable

amounts. But

it

has

no

validity at

say nothing of radionuclides.

all

Thus

it

for synthetics like petrochemicals, to

may make

ecological sense to speak

of using the environment to dispose of natural organic compounds (providing, contrary to current fact, that they are not contaminated with synthetics), but

pollutants.

By

much more

these are the least dangerous

contrast,

we must

and

achieve virtually

least

100%

troublesome

control of the

dangerous and troublesome synthetics; economics not-

withstanding, there

little

is

or no safe assimilative capacity for such

unnatural compounds.

Furthermore, even

if

we were

to allow that the

environment could

absorb with impunity a minimal quantity of these compounds,

not determine whether there existed trial

and

error.

cancers in

Thus

human

to radionuclides. paralleled,

and

in

it

a "safe" level

we

could

of usage except by

has taken the observation of increased incidence of

beings for us to recognize that there

Our

ignorance about

most

cases exceeded,

safe levels

is

no

safe

exposure

of toxic substances

is

by our ignorance of what ecosys-

tems can tolerate over the long term and of numerous other factors essential to administering

man

an "economic" poUution-control

strategy.

Hu-

beings will continue to be the guinea pigs, while administrators of

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

161

pollution-control laws face the task of setting pollution controls despite

ignorance of what the environment can absorb.

this

Nor

means

are the technical

prepossessing. In fact, because so runoff,

available to the administrator at aU

much

from "non-point" sources

truly heroic technological measures, sible

to that

makes

a

of sewage, yet there

why

be controlled,

strict

controls

almost

only by

if at aU,

on

fruitless.

readily acces-

General urban

contribution to water pollution about equal

no way

is

hydrological reengineering of our

of the reason

even

may be

"point" sources of pollution

runoff, for example,

pollution derives, Hke agricultural

that can

to control

cities (at

it

short of a massive

astronomical cost). This

the $100 billion spent so far to

is

part

meet the standards of

the Clean Water Act has been an "almost meaningless enterprise" (after

Abelson 1974). In this light, our hypothetical poUution-control rather conservative.

Not

model now appears

only are the original x units of residuals already

an ecological and public-health threat (though probably not yet one), but because pollution

development effluent,

as

to

the

is

due

more

much

as

easily

a large

to the general side effects

of

controlled discharges of factory

each doubling of production from the factory will more than

double the incidence of pollution. Thus both the necessity for stringent pollution control and

proportional

its

expense will increase more rapidly than a simple

model would

predict.

In sum, therefore, as a strategy of coping v^th the ever-increasing

load of pollution that inevitably accompanies increased production, technological pollution control has ing, for the

some very

serious limitations. Even grant-

sake of argument, that engineers mil come up with systems ofpollution

control that are, especially for radionuclides,

90%

or more effective, growth of

production cannot continue forever In fact, if we try to

double and redouble

current levels of production in the United States,

seems very

we

shall

soon be restrained by

rising costs

some commodities) and by rising

levels

control. Pollution control (as distinct

poUutants in the

first

place)

is

of pollution control

of pollutants that

likely that

(at least

we

for

cannot

from eHminating the production of

therefore only a temporary tactic that will

allow growth of production to continue for just a

it

a

while longer.

It is

not

genuine solution to the problem of pollution, even under the most

optimistic assumptions about our technological capacities and energy supply.

In addition, the basic problems of pollution control are at least as

much pohtical, social, and economic as technological. For example, it may well be that we shall come to accept levels of pollution and damage to public health that we would regard as intolerable today. If so, then growth could continue for somewhat longer, until mortaHty and morbidity grow

CHAPTER

162

3

—16 Ecological Pollution Control From

almost every point of view except short-term

profitability,

an

ecological strategy of pollution control and waste recycling, involving as

much

as possible

would be

the planned use of natural recycling mechanisms,

preferable to relying

on

expensive, energy-devouring, and

failure-prone technological devices to perform these functions. Specifically,

we



should create waste-management parks

that

is,

portions of

the environment deliberately set aside as natural recycUng "plants" {E. P.

Odum

1971, Chap. 16). In these parks, sewage and other controllable

wastes capable of being naturally recycled (and not used directly tilizer

on

farms)

would be sprayed on

would remove and

forests

and

grasslands,

as fer-

which

reuse the nutrients that cause water pollution and

return the purified water to aquifers. Forestry, fish ponds, grazing, and

other means of exploiting the potentially productive energy contained in the recycled wastes

tion control

is

would help pay

would do most of the work

firee,

wastes. Also, because such a park

would

the costs. This concept of pollu-

the most efficient and economical overall, for nature

and productive use would be made of

would be

in a quasi-natural state,

serve ecologically as a protective zone, balancing

more

it

intensive

development elsewhere.

to catastrophic proportions. Also, technological frxes are not ecologically

optimal solutions to

many important

pollution problems. For example,

attempts to dispose of urban organic wastes technologically are mis-

unused resource

directed, for these wastes are really an

recycled

as fertilizer.

Unfortunately, even though

and ecologicaUy rational and would probably save the long run, recycling wastes financial in

and energy

costs

is

impeded not only by the initial also by the numerous changes would be required to make this

seriously

our general way of doing things that

later,

control.

Thus even where control measures



Box

16). Finally, as

we

"rational" to pollute and to avoid paying for pollution

shaU see

wise

be

of transition, but

kind of ecological pollution control feasible (see it is

that could

thermodynamicaUy money and energy in

it is



are readily available, they usually cannot

within a general firamework of political,

social,

technological or other-

be implemented except

and economic reforms.

.

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution.

Unfortunately, such

a strategy

1

.

has limits. In the

first

place, the

63

con-

cept of the waste-management park assumes that resources are not so intensively exploited that

we cannot

afford to reserve large potentially

productive areas for protective purposes. Moreover,

many forms of uncontrollable

as

we

have seen,

pollution will remain despite any con-

ceivable changes in pollution-control strategy. Also, materials such as

many

radionuclides and

synthetic chemicals,

troduce into ecosystems, will dustrially.

Thus

may be

are

dangerous to in-

insuperable, (Scientists are studying the

of transmuting nuclear wastes, that

neutrons to break them years,

which

have to be treated and controlled in-

the problems of technological pollution control dis-

cussed in the rext possibility

still

down

is,

bombarding them with 300

into substances that would, in about

be no more dangerous than natural uranium. (BrowTie 1991,

p.

But transmutation has not yet been proven practical; moreover, most transmutation methods would produce plutonium. Scientists envision that the plutonium would be processed in a breeder reactor, but the United States previously abandoned an earlier breeder reactor program as too dangerous). Therefore, it would seem that genuine control CI).)

of pollution will oblige us not to produce pollutants in the this will

social habits

There a Limit

One

place;

and values.

Technology and Is

first

require significant industrial changes as well as changes in our

Its

to

Management

Technological

Growth?

of the main components of the argument against the limits-to-

growth

thesis

is

technological optimism (see

the type of technology at issue).

The

Box

17 for a description of

optimists believe that exponential

technological growth will allow us to expand resources and keep ahead

of exponentially increasing demands. The eminent British elder statesman of science Lord Zuckerman (quoted in Anon., 1972a) complained about

The Limits to Growth that "the only kind of exponential growth with which the book does not deal, and which I for one believe to be a fact, is that of the growth of human knowledge"; Zuckerman went on to assert categorically that "the tree of knowledge will go on growing endlessly."

CHAPTER 3

164

—17 Bulldozer Technology Unless they return to a tools or

fire,

humans

life

of hunting and gathering without either

are incurably technological in the sense that they

by some kind modes of technological

will always have to transform nature for utilitarian ends

of applied science. However, existence are possible.

radically different

What we

concerned with here

are

is

the pecuHar

kind of technology that grew out of Baconian experimental science,

which

first

had a

social

England, and which has

impact during the Industrial Revolution in

purpose giving people power

as its explicit

over nature in order to promote "the effecting of all things possil to use Francis Bacon's arresting slogan

(Medawar 1969).

For our purposes, the most important characteristics of this kind

dependence on

and other nonrenewand lack of integration with natural processes, its dominating scale, and its narrow concept^ of rationality or efficiency; Because all attempts at an exact yet reasonably succinct definition fall short, it might be best to resort to symbolism and call it "bulldozer" technology. The bulldozer and of technology are

able or

man-made

its

resources,

its

fossil fuel

linearity

^

other earth-moving machinery

make

possible the airports, dams,

highways, skyscrapers, and most of the other vaunted achievements

of modern technological

civilization.

Moreover,

its

violent power,

way in which it reshapes nature to human design, and its dependence on human-made energy and a complex industrial infirastructure make the bulldozer a paradigm of modern technology. It is on such a technology, rather than on some of its the single-minded

M

conceivable alternatives, that proponents of exponential technologic cal

growth appear to

rely.

Zuckerman's boast held article of philosophes, the

been our

is

modern

not merely a personal opinion but faith.

according to

Karl Marx, eventually scarcity

its

more Utopian pro-

ponents, such

as

age-old

of poverty and injustice that are rooted in

abolished.

amounts

widely

ideology of progress through science and technology has

social religion. Indeed,

evils

a

Since the age of the Enlightenment

Thus

to challenge endless scientific

to a kind of secular heresy.

itself

(and therefore the it)

will

be

and technological progress

— Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

Yet, as

we

165

have seen in the preceding discussions of the particular

technological solutions proposed to deal with the problems of growth in the production of food, minerals, and pollution, there are demonstrable limits to the technological

come

manipulation of ecological

some of

to generalize about

practical

The time

limits.

has

these limits and to discuss certain

problems of technological management that are only partly

connected with the physical limitations of the

earth.

It

be seen that

will

neither in theory nor in practice can technological growth be as endless as

Lord Zuckerman

human

the

knowledge and manage technological solutions

Already, in fact, limits to

asserts.

capacity to plan for and

to to

environmental problems have begun to emerge.

Limits

Knowledge and

to

Most

Application

to Its

and technologists

scientists

with Zuckerman, that necessity

believe,

However, although we cannot

unfailingly brings forth invention.

specify the

exact limits and must always be aware of potential "failures of imagination

and nerve" possibilities

[relevant]

that

would tend

knowledge

that the enterprise

any event

is

will

make

to

(Clarke 1962), there

is

us overly pessimistic about fiiture

at least

reasonable doubt that "the tree of

go on growing

of science will end, and

an assertion in

clear that such

true of some fields than others. Nevertheless,

less

it

appears that

the process o( relevant scientific discovery must eventually cease. That as

we

ha/e turned mechanics and

therefore, into played-out fields

come

to the

classical optics

of

surmounting the

limits to

in other fields relevant

new

more

scientific

work

that

translatable into

new

shall

we

problem of

illustrates is

the law of diminishing

done, the

more

likely

intact.

it is

that

Thus new knowledge may not

technology In physics the clockwork

mechanical theories of Isaac tic

too

to the

theories will be corrections or refinements of previous ones, leaving

most of the old structure of knowledge be

just

growth.

Indeed, the history of science clearly returns, for the

is,

into engineers' tools and,

scientific investigation, so

end of scientific discovery

mean

This does not

endlessly." it is

Newton have been

superseded by the

celestialrelativis-

and quantum- mechanical theories associated with Albert Einstein and

Werner Heisenberg, but a significant practical

biological

and

ones that

totally

may contribute human species. Moreover,

neither relativity nor the uncertainty principle have

impact on the ordinary physical

social existence.

change our little

to

Thus even very

scientific

a greater scientific

of our

species's

world view or our view of ourselves,

removing the ecological

not seem possible, for the

reality

great fijture discoveries

limits

now confi-onting

and technological research

scientific enterprise itself is

efFort

the

does

now struggling with

CHAPTER 3

166

numerous

limits to

its

own

growth. For example, the costs of basic

many areas have risen inordinately in recent symptom of diminishing returns. And even when theory research in

years, a clear

clearly favors

real-world technological advance, acceptable engineering solutions

not be achievable because the technical

may

too great. As

difficulties are

previously suggested, fusion could be just such an area.

we

Finally, as

have had occasion to note in connection with

pollution control and energy production, one cannot improve

a

tech-

nology indefinitely without encountering either thermodynamic of

limits or limits

practical interest.

scale

Many

beyond which further improvement

is

of no

technologies are already near this point, and

the rest soon will be, for the substitution of one ever-more-efficient

form of technology effect, the better

improve upon

for another simply cannot continue forever. In

our current technology, the harder

it.

(In the real world,

it is

moreover, there

likely to is

be to

frequently a

trade-off between efficiency and rehability, such that maximizing efficiency can be self-defeating.)

In sum, there

knowledge or

may be limits to relevant scientific and technological human capacity to discover such knowledge. If so,

to the

basing our strategy of response to ecological limits scientific

on

the assumption that

and technological knowledge wiU grow endlessly or even

rate typical

at

the

of the recent past appears to be imprudent.

The Overwhelming Burden of Planning and Management Even

if

knowledge proves not

lack of scientific and technological

an obstacle, implementation of technological solutions to the

of problems ning and

we

have discussed will place

management on our

full

to

be

array

staggering burden of plan-

a

decision

and

makers

institutional

machinery.

The 1987

report of the

World Commission on Environment and

Development viewed the problem

as follows:

When the

century began, neither human numbers nor technology had the power radically to alter planetary systems. As the century closes, not only do vastly increased human numbers and their activities have that power,

but major, unintended changes are occurring in the atmosphere, in

soils, in

among plants and animals, and in the relationships among all of The rate of change is outstripping the ability of scientific disciphnes

waters, these.

and our current

capabilities to assess

and

advise.

attempts of political and economic institutions, ferent,

more fragmented world,

to adapt

It

is

frustrating the

which evolved

and cope (Corson 1990,

in a difp. 3).

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

Furthermore, the environmental problems;

crisis

not

is

of discrete

a series

of interacting problems that exacerbate each other

a set

it is

167

through various kinds of threshold, multiplicative, and synergistic

ef-

Thus the difficulty and complexity of managing the ensemble of problems grow faster than any particular problem. Moreover, all the work of innovation, construction, and environmental management fects.

needed

to

cope with

ensemble must be orchestrated into

this

a rea-

sonably integrated, harmonious whole; the accumulation of the side

of piecemeal solutions would almost certainly be intolerable.

effects

Because delays, planning tively

and general incapacity to deal

failures,

with even the current range of problems are

we must

all

effec-

too visible today,

further assume that our ability to cope with large-scale

com-

few decades. In

brief,

plexity will improve substantially in the next

technology cannot be implemented in an organizational vacuum. Something like the ecological "law of the

minimum," which

states that the

supply governs the rate of growth of a system

factor in least

applies to social systems as well as ecosystems.

as a

whole,

Thus technological

fixes

human capacity to plan, construct, fund, and many technological optimists (for example, Starr

cannot run ahead of the



staff

them

and

Rudman

a fact that

Foresight, Time,

Our

1973) either overlook or assume away.

and Money as Factors

achieve the requisite level of effectiveness in planning

ability to

complex systems

especially doubtfiil. Already the civilization are seen

breakdown,

economic

One

and

by some

current

—appear

what

*

risks

to be grossly

hierarchical,

adapted to the nature of the problems.

acts

is

that the conse-

cannot be foreseen with

certainty.

attached to nuclear energy or to the use of certain

Even

(1)

Even

answers to such "trans-scientific" questions

if

change

a healthy river into a

sewer once the

wastes and pollution has been exceeded (the threshold

if population

and per capita consumption grow separately

demand

that uses twice as

much

multiplies

more

produce more

ill

rapidly,

health than

on

the

of pollution, from noise

would

addition of the particular effects (the synergistic effect).

at quite

such that a

has four times the impact

(the multiplicative effect). (3) Various forms

to radiation, interact to

as

per capita consumption and waste remain constant,

the total environmental

doubled population

environment

the brink of

are

examples:

rates,

on

linear,

scientific

river's capacity to digest

modest

ill



no

a small increase in population can

effect). (2)

perpetually hovering styles

is

that sustain industrial

very troublesome problem for social planners

exist

Some

as

management

quences of our technological

There

Supply

in Least

result

simply from the

CHAPTER 3

168

way

chemicals (Weinberg 1972); the only pirically

is

to

run

to determine these risks

experiment on the population

a real-life

at large.*

emThe

more Thus there are no technical solutions to the dilemmas of environmental management, and policy decisions about environmental

potential social consequences of technological innovation are even

obscure.

problems must be made

by prudent

politically

citizens,

not by

scientific

remedy

administrators. This being the case, technology assessment, the

proposed for the general

problem of technological

political

can never be the purely technical exercise

side effects,

many of its proponents seem come to resemble a power

to envision; instead, the planning process will

between

struggle values.

The

entails are

siting

and

of differing economic,

partisans

foreshadowed by current safety

creation of social consensus and

becoming

issues.

commitment on

increasingly apparent that

for time will

be one of our

example of the it

lily

is

can

is

these difficult issues. Yet

to let things slide until

then even heroic action

it is

seems, dealing

it

really the lesser part

illustrates, until a limit

we Americans

For example,

become

they are pressing

may be too

so central to our

of the problem.

so insidious: As the

is

very close in time,

to 135 chemical plants air,

'a

massive

Although

and miscarriage among anti-pollution laws)

is

that

in

this

New

in the

towns

we

for

cannot

United

Orleans, Louisiana,

by

live

States

is

which

is

The Washington Post reported

corridor are so fuU of carcinogens, specialist

experiment....'" (Mariniss and

defined

Weisskopf

in the corridor report high rates of cancer

their populations,

nothing special (beyond weak federal

being done to stop the emission of pollutants from these

plants or to relocate the people

of chemicals

Hves that

an environmental health

human

several

human

fatal,

late.

phenomenon to

oil refineries.

ground, and water along

living [there] as

1988, p. Al).

Rouge

and 7

mutagens and embryotoxins

too

all

potentially

have allowed the private automobile to

Perhaps the worst local example of this

that "the

is

economy and our private

the 85-mile corridor from Baton

home

and too

little

it

iU afford the associated delays,

dangerous primarily because

pad and pond

essential for the

seems very far away physically and psychologically. Thus the

tendency

*

we

scarcest resources. Difficult as

with very large increments of growth Exponential growth

political

power-plant

conflicts over nuclear

and over other environmental

Of course, such drawn-out political batdes may well be is

and

social,

and delays such an adversary planning process

difficulties

away from them. The reason

promoting these

diseases

is

is

that the effects

long-term and

"creeping";

fiirthermore, as federal officials tirelessly repeat in discussing everything pesticides to radiation,

no one can prove what

role

what

from

particular chemical

played in causing what particular disease in a particular person, compared to other possible sources of that person's cancer or miscarriage.

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

without longer

of

its

169

in the short term, yet because

it

with

live

it

side effects

in

We

current form.

its

of

we

air pollution,

can no

are forced to alleviate the worst

wdth stopgap technological responses, but

this strategy

not even enable us to meet necessary clean-air standards without

wall

additional social

and

institutional changes.

we

almost helpless to do better, for

At

too big to handle by any means that are technically feasible

now

it

are

became

economically, and

or in the immediate future. Similarly, warnings of

ozone

the destruction of the itself in a

politically,

we

however,

this point,

ignored the problem until

layer

were ignored, and the world

predicament in which nothing

we

finding

is

can do wall avert millions of

additional cancer cases.

Nor must

is it

enough merely

to foresee an

also anticipate the lead

emerging problem. Planners

time necessary to take delivery of even

readily available technological solutions, such as using hydrochlorofluoro-

carbons instead of chloroflurocarbons (10 to 20 years), or to replace a

harmful technology with one that does not use chlorine (20 to 40 as

is

years),

apparently going to be necessary to bring ozone depletion under

control. Often, however, the replacement technology does not yet exist,

more

so even

lead time must be allotted for

its

invention. Worse,

take a very long time for any significant results to appear

once

it

may

a tech-

CFCs, for 100 years. Even if we

nological fix has actually been applied in the real world.

example, remain intact in the upper atmosphere for stop producing

them immediately, each chlorine atom

already created has

the capacity to destroy around 100,000 ozone molecules. For another

example, the sheer quantity of the toxic wastes

now

so

overwhelming

Even

impossible. scientific

if

that cleaning

we were

it

up

dumped

in this country

has already proved to be

to stop producing toxic wastes quickly, with

implement

radical

change (none of which

groundwater contamination

dumped. So too

are cancers

their drinking supply. In

is

inevitable

among

the people

who

exists),

the

fi-om

planning horizon of 30 to 50 years

is

The Superfund Law, which provided

—and

sites

the

minimum

for the cleanup

tip

by 1988,

fi-om

1980 to 1986 the

foresight,

at

our

and

a

consistent with the

of toxic waste sites

EPA

were

sites

in

identified

cleaned up only

(Corson 1990, pp. 249-250). And this may of the iceberg: In 1987, the General Accounting office estimated

that at a cost

be only the that over

waste

already

use groundwater for

the United States, has thus far been a farce. Although 1177 as "priority"

much more

wastes

sum, coping with exponential growth

advanced stage of development requires the exercise of

13

is

but

breakthroughs, a crash program of development, and the politi-

cal will to

*

all

of $1.6

billion

425,000 hazardous waste

sites

may

exist in this country.

CHAPTER 3

170

existence of innumerable natural and social failure to exercise foresight

In spite of the fact that

means

money

that

is

we have

lags.

Moreover, our past

already fallen far behind.

also a significant practical limitation

on

technological growth, there are abundant examples of failure to count the financial cost

of technological schemes.

has unfortunately

begun

ecological bind here

on

to achieve

earth

One

some

lies in

found

is

in the assertion,

currency, that the

space

(Chedd

1974).

colonies or whatever the ultimate cosmic destiny of the ofiers

a

no escape

growth on

fi-om the limits to

day's

flight,

2500

human

rocket into space in the population

flights

a

major undertaking

would be

This alone would generate colossal environmental problems

of energy for

quantities

fiiel,

race, space

To

of the world (approximately 250,000 people) would be (assuming 100 persons per shutde

abundandy

extraterrestrial

growth

this planet.

number of individuals equivalent to just one

way out of our It is

whatever the ultimate potential for founding

clear that,

which

necessary).

—enormous

pollution of the atmosphere (especially the

vulnerable stratosphere) by toxic exhaust gases (not to mention chlorine),

—and

and so on totally

trying to keep pace with population

growth would be

out of the question. Moreover, the expense would be staggering.

only would

would be

it

cost billions to

lift

just the beginning.

Not

into orbit these 250,000 persons, but that

There would

also

be the

costs for space

colonization and other life-support costs in space. Unquestionably, keeping

pace with the world's population growth for just one year would require a

sum exceeding the

U.S. gross national product.

developed and routinized space

movement of people and

travel

materials to

is

It is

not

apparent that even highly

likely to involve large-scale

and fi^om the

earth, at least

not in any

foreseeable future.

Even

less

the reasons

(and

why

may cost too much. One of no American supersonic transport (SST) program AngloFrench Concorde SST project is continually embroiled grandiose technological schemes

why

the

there

is

in political controversy as well as red ink) private industry

is

was willing to undertake the

that neither

government nor

financial burdens. Indeed, the

mere expansion of currently feasible technology will strain our capital resources in the coming decades. To stop carbon emissions and meet our electrical needs by increasing nuclear power production would cost upwards of two

trillion dollars

over the next 25 years, not including the costs of

decommissioning plants or the disposal of radioactive wastes. replace

all

coal-fired

power

plants with nuclear plants

If we

were

have to build one plant every two and one-half days every year! staggering expense

is

one of the major reasons why

ment support, are not likely to choose

to

by 2025, we would

utilities,

The

despite govern-

the nuclear route. Moreover, given the

general shortage of capital, when dollars are spent for expensive technologies to solve a

problem

in

one

area,

investment must be foregone in other kinds

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

of new plant and equipment needed

to

171

cope with another environmental and so forth. Insufficient

pollutant, or in housing, or in social welfare,

investment capital

is

therefore likely to be a very serious limitation

on

continued technological expansion.

Vulnerability to Accident

and Error

Because major and irrevocable commitments of money materials, and effort are necessary to stay ahead of population growth and because major risks are inherent in certain technological choices if all does not go well, it has become supremely important to make the right decisions the first time, for

we may

have no second chance to solve the problems being us so rapidly Yet even supremely foresightfiil, intelligent, and timely decision making may do little to reduce the growing vulnerability of a highly technological society to accident and error. thrust

upon

The

mam

nologies are

cause for concern

beginnmg

to

is

that

be deployed.

some

especially dangerous tech-

We

have seen, for example, that there are inherent in nuclear power production (especially with the breeder reactor) certain risks that make virtually perfect

containment mandatory, and the evidence does not suggest that such perfection is achievable (see Box 10 and the related discussion). In addition, many other modern technologies—^uch as the chemical industry the transport

and storage of natural

and the supertanker—are capable of inflicting catastrophic ecological or human damage. Experience with these technologies also shows clearly the near impossibility of preventing all accigas,

dents. Especially in the

developed world, people depend so heavily on a even less intrinsically dangerous for example, a sustained electric-power failure can have

basic technological infirastructure that

accidents





devastating consequences.

As population grows and civilization becomes more complex, it will much more effort and skill for us to cope with this increasing

require

vulnerability to disorder (entropy) design,

skill,

and

efficiency, or reliability in

failure.

But to count on perfect

human enterprise is folly. In how perfect as self-contained

any

addition, all human works, no matter engineering creations, are vulnerable not only to such natural disasters as earthquakes, storms, droughts, and other acts of God,* but also to

* This fact alone makes it unlikely that the requisite degree of nuclear safety can ever be achieved, especially given the human propensity to buUd extensively in

natural flood plains, disasters.

known

earthquake zones, and other spots

liable to natural

CHAPTER 3

172

deliberate

disruption by crackpots, criminals, terrorists, and military

enemies. Nevertheless, despite the patent impossibility of achieving any

such thing,

modern

which nothing

less

society seems to be approaching a condition in

than perfect planning and

will object to such a strong statement several

management

of the problem, so

of the arguments that purport to dismiss

sometimes

Some

will do.

let us

examine

concern.

this

of any one of these disastrous low as not to be worth worrying about. Of course, humanity must run some risk in order to reap the fruits of technology, It is

events happening

is

said that the probability

so

but dismissing the problem in

fashion betrays a potentiaUy

this

fatal

misunderstanding of the laws of probability, for an apparently low prob-

of accident may be

ability

reactor safety in

Box

10,

illusory. First, as

whether

on how many sources of

risk there are.

kind of reactor accident are year

is

in

1

is

we noted

we

already

do

so

many

in the discussion

large or small

That

if

is,

1000 per reactor

a certainty (on average) if there are

Because small,

a risk

the chances of

year,

then

1000 reactors

some

things that have

of altering the climate or unleashing other

of

depends greatly

in operation.

potential,

disasters,

some

accident a

1

we

however

should not

be complacent about the apparently highly improbable. Second, some

There

risks are essentially incalculable.

is

no way,

for example, to estimate

the degree of danger to nuclear installations in developing countries from

cunning enough

fanatical political terrorists

devices and security procedures. Third,

when

we

outwit

to

all

the safety

cannot afford to relax even

the probabilities are truly small, for the million-to-one shot

equally likely to occur at the

first

event, at the millionth, or well

the millionth. If the result of failure

is

is

beyond

potentially catastrophic, then

we

are

simply engaged in playing a highly recondite version of Russian roulette.

As game loss

is

theorists have

shown,

unlikely to be sound,

prudent

a course

believe that

the problems

blems.

strategy also limits his gains.

we

we

certainly a are called a host

them conceptually and difficult

if this

shaU soon achieve a level of material and

we

are

now

cited in support of this belief

They contain

very serious

attractive the potential gain; a

systems reliability far above what

program is often space program is

risks

even

strategist limits his risks

Some

of action that

no matter how

capable

of;

the space

However, although the

triumph of technical engineering, most of

on

to solve are not pure engineering pro-

of social and other "soft" factors that make

of magnitude more

practically several orders

than the space program. Moreover,

this

claim conveniently

overlooks the fiery death of three astronauts, the near disaster of Apollo Thirteen, and the Challenger space program. In addition,

power

to turn

all

disaster, to

we

mention only the American

have neither the

our technological

acts into a

money nor

the labor

simulacrum of

a

moon

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

shot.

The

nuclear industry

expect, but as

and

safety

The death

we

much more

realistic

model of what we can

have seen, despite far greater than average attention to

fail-safe toll

a

is

173

design strategies,

safety record

its

from Chernobyl alone,

as

we

far

is

have noted,

is

from

perfect.

expected to be

70,000 people. In sum, even massive amounts of money, enormous effort, and supreme technological cleverness can never guarantee accident-free operation of technological devices, and it is indeed strange that technologists



discoverers of the infamous

ly states that "If

make

often assume that they can

God

Murphy's Law, which sardonical-

—should

so

their creations invulnerable to acts

of

something can possibly go wrong,

will"

it

or foolproof in normal operations. Indeed, the array of potential

ecological and societal disasters confronting a civilization that increasingly depends

on the smooth and

incredible accidents can

the Titanic,

whose

happen,

still

designers believed

dehberately adopting

of technological

errorless operation

systems should give any prudent individual pause. as it

new technologies

is

It

is

not just that

well illustrated by the fate of

to be unsinkable. Rather,

we

in fuU awareness that they are

are

by

no means "unsinkable." In

fact,

the supertanker

may be an even

better

technological society than the bulldozer (see

Box

metaphor 17).

for

barges are maritime disasters looking for a place to happen. disaster

caused by the wreck of the Torrey Canyon, not

oil

The eco-

a particularly large

supertanker by current or projected standards, was surely a

come. Any doubt on

modern

These massive

taste

of things

removed when the Exxon Valdez disaster occurred and that was only the most visible of supertanker spills, which now occur with regularity. Supertankers are fragile. They are cheaply built to minimum standards and in such a way as to flout scandalously nearly all the canons of good seaworthiness established over to

score was

this



centuries of experience (Mostert 1974). Their thin and over-stressed hulls are not equal to

all

the challenges of the sea; they lack the ability to

maneuver or stop within any reasonable distance; and they have only a single boiler and a single crew, so that even routine failures leave them helplessly adrift wdth as a fair-sized

much

hydrogen bomb.

thermal energy in their tanks

* In

August 1990,

after a year

new

is

stored in

Like the monstrous supertanker, a highly

technological society appears fated to exist

legislation requiring

as

on the

of highly publicized

thirmest of safety

oil spills.

Congress passed

supertankers to be double hulled and mandating

the eventual retrofitting of existing supertankers (Chasis and Speer 1991, p. 21).

CHAPTER 3

174

margins,* and there

is

abundant evidence that such

a small

margin

will

To proceed on the assumption that we can achieve standards of perfection hitherto unattained would be an act of technological hubris exceeding all bounds of prudence. eventuaUy prove

The End of

insufficient.

''Endless" Technological

The important

question

do

to

is

we do

What

At what

it is

and

at

risk?

fallible to

is

that,

even

if

yield to abstract analysis

the problems of

and technological

them

deal with is

a false

technological solutions

hope, for

seem

can never be the

it

that

technological solu-

all

anathema. Indeed, to counter single-minded technological

are

optimism with an equally single-minded neo-Luddite nology in

all

impossible.

The

forms

its

is

questions at issue are what kind of technology it is

to be appHed.

technology needs to be demythologized so that

of what technology can, what basic features

identified

(Box

hostility to tech-

absurd, for a nontechnological existence

adopted, and to what social ends

18).

it

The whole

we

have a

cannot do, and what

its

ecological and

The

in the

thermodynamic premises

NRC

United

view

revive

the

States, exemplifies this willingness to

when

a reactor

adverse Court of Appeals decision in

finstrated this effort, but

to

both the

NRC

is

finished

and about

November 1990

to

The

NRC

is

also

go

temporarily

and the Bush administration are

lobbying Congress to eliminate the hearings by legislation (Wasserman 1991, 656).

it

that are

has been trying, administratively, to eliminate

public hearings heretofore required

An

subject of

realistic

costs are.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, attempting risks.

is

be

to

of a valid alternative technology have already been

moribund nuclear industry take increased

is

Unlike current bulldozer-supertanker technology,

would be based on

line.

are

to anticipate:

mounted only with great difficulty, if at all. This judgment certainly does not mean

on

we

in the real world. In short,

Even in the shorter term, pose problems of management that can be sur-

endless process optimists

*

we do it? human

a crisis?"

exponential technological growth

The

Will

possible that they will not be solved simply because

human and

tions

what

of foresight and the very

of questions suggests

this array

exponential growth seemingly solution,

cost

in time, given lack

it

tendency to wait for

too

ask,

once, given shortages of money, labor power, and other factors

at

potentially in least supply?

Will

we do it?" in the narrow tech"Can we do all the things we have

not "Can

we must

nological sense. Rather,

Growth

expected to promulgate

new

p.

rules providing for the

renewal of reactor hcenses past the end of a reactor's natural 40-year-life.

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

175

compatible with the coexistence of humans and nature over the long term. As a consequence,

would necessarily eschew merely quantitative maximize general human welfare at mini-

it

progress, striving instead to

mum

material cost.

Such an

alternative (or "soft," "appropriate,"

impact," "intermediate") technology

"low-

it would theme we shall return to in Chapter 8. Even under the most optimistic assumptions, the kinds of alternative technologies under discussion probably cannot support affluence as we in

also

be desirable

is

is

come

it,

so a certain lowering of

of the technological

problems of exponential growth

makes

to define

called for. In fact, extensive social changes are inevitable.

One of the major attractions awkward

certainly possible; that

a

the richest countries have social sights

is

is

that

it

fix as a

response to the

appears to avoid the need for

social change. In other words, reliance

on technological growth But as we have seen

possible the continuation of business as usual.

throughout our discussion of ecological Hmits, business

as

usual cannot

continue under any circumstances, no matter what one assumes about

our civiHzation's technological response, because social,

and economic

environmental identified

Introduction.

it

multitude of political,

a

He concealed within nearly aU aspects of the

limits to technological

growth

that

we

have

even clearer that the essence of the solution to the

must be poHtical

crisis

in

the sense specified in the

We shall explore these thorny issues

cal side effects

An

The

crisis.

make

environmental

issues

(particularly the politi-

of continued technological growth) in Part

II.

Overview of Ecological Scarcity

What

Is Ecological Scarcity?

Ecological scarcity

is

an all-embracing concept that encompasses aU the

various limits to growth and costs attached to continued growth that

were mentioned above. As we have seen,

it

includes not only Malthusian

impending shortages of mineral resources, biospheric or ecosystemic Umitations on human activity, and limits to the scarcity

human

of food but

also

capacity to use technology to expand resource supplies ahead of

exponentially increasing demands (or to bear the costs of doing so).* We

have seen diminishing returns, which have overtaken not only agricul-

*

A

complete definition of ecological

social costs attached to

scarcity

ought properly to include the

continued technological and industrial growth, the

economic problems of coping with the physical aspects of scarcity, and other sociopolitical factors that wiU be dealt with in Part II.

certain

CHAPTER 3

176

— 1« Alternative Technology All forms of alternative, or "soft," technology share certain characteristics. First

and

and foremost, they are closely adapted to natural cycles

processes, so pollution

is

minimized and

as

much of the work

as

is done by nature. Second, they are based primarily on renew"income" flows of matter and energy such as trees and solar radiation rather than on nonrenewable, "capital" stocks such as rare ores and fossil fuels. Third, the first two characteristics encourage the revival of

possible able,

some

labor-intensive

modes of production. Fourth, these

three together

imply the creation of a "low-throughput" economy, in which the per capita use

and

social costs are

Fifth, all less

of resources

is

minimized and long-term thermodynamic

not ignored for the sake of short-term benefits.

of these seem to point to technologies that are

dependent on

a specialized technical elite,

smaller, simpler,

and therefore more

decentralized with respect both to location and to control of the

of production.

Finally,

among

means

the possible social side effects of such al-

ternative technologies are greater cultural diversity, reduced liability to

misuse of technology by individuals and nations, and

anomie and

own

lives

alienation

less overall

once individuals have greater control over their

than they do under the current technological dispensation.

Naturally, one way to achieve these goals would be to renounce modern science and technology entirely and revert to a low-technology, pre-modem agrarian society, but the proponents of alternative technology are not urging a return to some imaginary paradise of pristine closeness to nature. They propose instead a creative blend of the most advanced modern science and technology with the best of the old, pre—Industrial Revolution "polytechnics" (Mumfbrd 1970). "Yet at

the same time, alternative technology technological, for gical

it is

diametrically

growth of the kind

that has

is

indeed profoundly anti-

opposed

to

autonomous technolo-

produced an ecological

crisis.

Perhaps

technology has not exerted a determining influence on modern

tural

production but every other economic activity

as well;

society,

the limits to

the efficiency of pollution control and of energy conversion, the need to

mine ever-thinner

ores to get the

same

useflil

quantity of metals, the need

pour ever-more money and energy into the maintenance of the basic technological infrastructure, and so on. Instead of being able to do ever to

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

as

some of its more extreme

during the

last

300

critics

177

maintain, but

vice versa. In seeking to reverse this situation

under

cal process

not

scientific

components of a already

known

and bring the technologi-

in the broadest sense primarily pohti-

is

or technical. (Indeed, most of the essential viable alternative technology, such as solar power, are

or invented and merely require development; the

process of changeover could therefore be quite dustrial

installed

without unacceptable

a revolutionary break

unlike the In-

wiU

social costs,

its

people there

are. It

is

adoption will require

with the values of the industrial

be. Unfortunately, the

and could

technically feasible

is

A major unanswered question is how high living

fast,

Revolution, which was retarded by the slow pace of invention.)

Thus, although alternative technology

be

quite evident that

control, alternative technology poses a chal-

full social

lenge to the current order that cal,

it is

adapted to technology rather than

years, society has

era.

the material standard of

how many

answer depends largely on

abundantly clear that "soft" technology

is

able to

provide an ample sufficiency of material well-being to very large bers of people.

now

profligacy

On

the other hand,

num-

cannot support the materiaUstic

it

enjoyed by the richest one-fifth of humanity.

Humanity's affluent economies have emitted two-thirds of the green-

house

of the

gases, three-fourths

It is

nor possible under any scheme

Americans, for before waste. a

One rough

it

and nitrogen oxides, most of the

sulftir

90% of the

world's hazardous wastes, and

world's chlorofluorocarbons.

the world to Hve like today s

ft)r

could happen, the planet would be

estimate

is

world population of about

that alternative technology could support 1

biUjon people

at

the current standard of

Uving of Norway or the Netherlands (de BeU 1970, resourcefulness

may

world maintained

estabhsh that this

is

with

in ecological balance

p. 154).

more

And

those people will have to be

Human

a gross underestimate. its

resources

more

frugal

But

a

by means of

alternative technology will likely contain fewer people than

now.

%

laid to

it

does

and contribute

physical labor for their afiluence than does the richest one-fifth

of humanity today.

more with as

ever

less

or to substitute one resource for another indefinitely,

economists often claim

is

possible,

energy, and social effort to obtain the quantity,

of

usefial

we

shall

same

have to spend more money,

quantity, or

even

a

diminished

output. Furthermore, most proposed technological

solutions to the problems of

growth caD

for

more

materials (often

CHAPTER 3

178

more pollution (or demand more technological solutions to control it), require more energy, and absorb more human resources. Thus the costs of coping with each

materials of a very particular and scarce type), create

additional increment of growth rise inexorably

We

have also seen

and exponentially. and

that, in general, all sectors are interacting

on

interdependent, so that

the one hand, the combination of sectoral

micro-problems creates an almost overwhelming macro-problem, while the other hand, the solutions to the macro-problem (as well as those most of the separate micro-problems) depend on the questionable availability of a host of factors that may be in least supply. Thus problems exacerbate each other. Also, the solution to one micro-problem is often

on to

inconsistent with the solution to other micro-problems or

on

the solution of

still

is

dependent

another problem, which depends in turn on the

solution to a third problem, and so on.

Nothing

strategy that takes into account the full

ensemble of problems and their

interactions can

hope

less

than a coordinated

to succeed.

Thus, stating that ecological scarcity will one day bring growth to halt

is

much more

grovvl;h

than merely asserting that the earth

must therefore cease some day

is

a

and that

finite

in the future. Ecological scarcity

is

indeed ultimately grounded on the physical scarcity inherent in the earth's finitude,

but

it is

manifested primarily by the multitude of inter-

acting and interdependent limits to growth that will prevent us from ever testing the finitude

of the biosphere and

see, ecological scarcity has already

The scarcity logistic

overall course

is

its

begun

of industrial

we

resources. In fact, as

to restrain growth.

civilization as

it

responds to ecological

Figure 3-3 by the familiar sigmoid or

illustrated graphically in

growth curve. In the period between

A

and B, the ecological and

other resources necessary for growth are present in abundance potentially),

shall

and splendid and accelerating growth ensues, as

it

(at least

has during the

300 years or more. Eventually, however, resources are no longer abundant enough to support further growth, and technological ingenuity can no

last

longer postpone the day of reckoning. At

this

point of inflection (Q,

deceleration begins; in the narrow transition zone {B to D),

which

is

approximately one doubling period wide about the point of inflection, considerable further growth due to

abundance

warning tive

that fueled accelerating

signs

of ecological

feedback pressures that

momentum

growth begins to

scarcity are quickly start to

the

most

critical section

is

disappear,

and the

first

succeeded by various nega-

choke off further growth. Beyond the

brief transition period these pressures build

continues until equilibrium (£)

occurs, but the ecological

attained.

up quite

rapidly,

and deceleration

The zone of transition is

therefore

of the grov^h curve. The entire changeover firom

accelerating to decelerating

growth occurs in a very brief time,

especially

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

179

Transition Period

r^

E

Time

FIGURE

Growth curve of industrial

3-3

civilization:

A, steady

state

(begin-

ning of accelerating growth); B, end of unrestrained growth (beginning of transition period); C, point

of inflection (beginning of deceleration); D, end of

transition period; E, terminal steady state.

compared

of growth that precedes

to the seemingly infinite period

during which the very idea of

or

limits

scarcity,

except

as

it,

temporary

challenges to ingenuity, seems ludicrous.

Thus

ecological scarcity

becomes evident only once the curve is within mere fact that so many aspects of

the transition zone. This being the case, the

ecological scarcity have been discussed and debated at great length should be

ample evidence inflection fact,

that industrial civilization

the controversy continues.

factor

is

is

near or past the point of

and confronts the prospect of deceleration

As we noted

to a steady state. Yet, in

in the Introduction, the time

the crux of the debate over the limits to growth, so let us examine

in greater detail the question

and ultimate

the proximate

How Far Away

of how

limits to

away

far

industrial civilization

is

from

growth.

Is Ecological Scarcity?

The evidence

is

overwhelming

that

we

have entered the transition zone.

People can impressionistically obser /e rising pollution problems, not only in industrial nations but in

many over-crowded and

developing countries. These were the

coming

first

signs

over-urbanized

of thermodynamic

bills

due. Since then, speciahsts have observed degradation of aU three

of the biological systems on which the worlds economy depends: croplands, forests, and grasslands.

CHAPTER 3

180

many raw materials that industry uses. many other products. Grasslands are the source of meat, milk, leather, and wool. As of 1986, 11% of the earths land was cropland, 31% was forest, and 25% was pasture. The rest of the Croplands provide feed, food, and

Forests provide

fliel,

lumber, paper, and

earth s land surface had Utde biological activity;

paved over for

human

crops has been offset by an equal

it

either

was desert or was

amount of land reclaimed

use. Since 1981, the

amount no longer

for

suitable for agriculture

or paved over. The amount of grassland worldwide has declined, as overgrazing turns

it

into pasture. Forests have

1980s, at a rapidly accelerating rate. cally productive areas has

been shrinking for centuries and, in the

The combined area of the

three biologi-

been shrinking since the 1980s, whereas the

earth's

biological wastelands (deserts and paved areas) have been expanding.

Worse, productivity in two of the areas

also

is

growth

whole

rates

species

and other

earth's three biologically

of trees and even

stresses.

local forests are

Grassland destruction

is

dying from acid

of the grassland

in fair to

is

rain,

forest areas,

ozone,

occurring on every continent,

grazing exceeds the carrying capacity of the land. a majority

productive

down. Throughout the Northern hemisphere, where are measured, trees are growing more slowly. In many

Even

in the

United

poor condition. As grassland de-

and the capacity to carry livestock

teriorates, soil erosion accelerates

as

States,

is

reduced further; eventually, the area mrns into a desert. Livestock growers then seek grain from cropland for their animals, putting increased pressure

on

farmers,

increase in

whose production of food per

human population

According

now

capita has not kept

to Stanford University biologist Peter Vitousek,

appropriate

40% of the

primary biological product

land's net

the

is

amount of energy

is

other species will find

it

human

human impact on

more

primary pro-

earth's

activity.

own

land-based

used by humans or has been

of the alteration of ecosystems by

several things. First, as the

that

energy they use in their

growth and reproduction. In other words, 40% of the photosynthetic product either

humans

primary biological product. Net

ducers capture via photosynthesis, less the

result

up with the

since 1988.

lost as a

This means

the environment increases,

difficult to survive.

Eventually they will not

and human life-support systems will begin to unravel. Second, "eventually" is not so far off. Let us assume a constant level of per capita

survive,

resource consumption.

of the

land's

NPP, 10

Then

billion

if

5 billion

human

human

beings appropriate

40%

beings will appropriate 80%; before

the population got to the projected 14 billion by 2100,

humans would

have consumed the entire world's net primary biological product, which is

impossible. Indeed, even

80% is

ecologically impossible;

survive without the survival of ecosystems

of which would be dead by that point.

humans cannot

made up of other species, most

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

181

Carrying capacity

Long-term carrying

capacity

exceeded

\

Environmental

demand

Time-

FIGURE

3-4

Growth

versus carrying capacity. If growth results in environ-

mental degradation, the carrying capacity

is

progressively reduced.

As the example of the lily pond makes demand for various biological products human population growth and appetites, as

earth

is

capacity has already

time

is

running out. Just

increasing to keep

up with

the carrying capacity of the

would argue that the carrying been exceeded whenever one can observe dangerous most

ecologists

of pollution, serious ecological degradation, or widespread dis-

turbance of natural balances,

of which are readily observable today.

all

Thus, although precise forecasting tive

is

decreasing with the depletion and degradation of resources

(Figure 3-4). Indeed,

levels

clear,

is

not possible, the available quantita-

evidence rather strongly suggests that industrial civilization will be

obhged to make an abrupt transition from fiill-speed-ahead growth to some kind of equilibrium or steady-state society in Httle more than one

—and

generation

The

that the process

of deceleration has already begun.

Historical Significance of Ecological Scarcity

The

meaning of ecological scarcity is that humanity's poHtical, economic, and social Hfe must once again become thoroughly rooted in essential

the physical reaHties of the biosphe/e. Scarcity and physical necessity have

not been abolished; after a brief historical interlude of apparendy endless

abundance, they have returned stronger than ever (with pohtical conse-

quences to be taken up in Part things that

we now

II).

Because of ecological

scarcity,

many

take as axiomatic will be inverted in the near fiature.

For example, during the growth

era, capital

and labor were the

critical

CHAPTER 3

182

factors in the

economic

and Japan

yond



the so-called "haves"

their ecological means, they



are

now

United

may turn

become

resource-rich will suddenly

into

is

new

the

(that

is,

Europe,

States,

some extent beecological and economic

living to

who

"have nots," while some current "have nots"

tion

and resources

process; henceforth, land

nature) will be critical. In addition, because the

are comparatively

"haves." (This transforma-

already under way.) All the institutions and values that characterize

industrial societies

and

aU, the

on continuous growth

are predicated

confronted with ruthless

reality tests

sudden coming of ecological

faced with an epochal political task.

be

will

and revolutionary challenges. Above scarcity

The

means

transition

that

our generation

under way

is

of our wishes in the matter, so our only proper course

is

is

regardless

to learn

how

to

adapt humanely to the exigencies of ecological scarcity and guide the transition to

equilibrium in the direction of a desirable steady-state

society.

is

The great danger from the sudden emergence of ecological scarcity we will not respond to its challenges in time. We have already seen

that

that time

is

probably our scarcest resource; the sheer

momentum

growth, the long time constants built into the biosphere, and above social response rates that for various reasons lag

any event governed by the factor in system and most of

would be

is

behind events (and are

least supply) all

in

predispose the world

subsystems to overshoot (exceed) the level that

its

But the

sustainable over the long term.

of overshoot

of all,

collapse.

The

inevitable

consequence

trend depicted in Figure 3-4 cannot con-

tinue in the real world, for environmental

demand can never long exceed

the carrying capacity. Figure 3-5 represents the three basic real-world possibilities: (a)

(which

is,

as

smooth convergence on

noted above, unlikely);

eventual convergence

on

overshoot and collapse to level

(b)

a relatively a significantly

the optimal equilibrium level

overshoot and collapse with

high equilibrium

level;

and

(c)

lower than optimal equilibrium

because the carrying capacity has been drastically eroded by the

destructiveness associated with the overshoot.

Because the degraded,

we

3-5 (c), which

earth's carrying capacity

are speeding rapidly is

highly undesirable for

and misery created by

a large

is

clearly

being depleted and

toward the outcome depicted in Figure at least

three reasons:

The

suffering

overshoot of the carrying capacity will be

enormous. Any large overshoot seems certain to erode the carrying capacity so severely that the surviving civilization will have rather limited

material possibilities. cal

and

And

the opportunity to build the basic technologi-

social infrastructure

irretrievably lost.

That

is,

of

a high-level, steady-state society

may be

unless the remaining supplies of non-renewable

resources are carefully husbanded and used to

make

a

planned transition

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodiversity, Pollution...

183

to a high-technology steady state, only steady states comparatively

poor

in material terms will

be achievable with the depleted resources left following overshoot and collapse. Thus, although ecological scarcity

means that there is no option other than the steady-state society in which people and their demands are in balance with the environment and its resources, the current generation does have a significant say in the type

and basic quaHty of the steady

state that will be achieved. options are presented graphically in Figure 3-6.

The

basic

pohcy

Throughout most of recorded history, the human race has existed in rough equilibrium with its resource base. Growth occurred, if at all, at an infinitesimal pace; even the population

grew

much

at

less

than

1%

upward. With the

continue to

rise.

The

first

immediate and direct

relatively dynamic Europe between A. D. 600 and 1600. But then, Revolution rocketed the scale of economic

a year

very suddenly, the Industrial activity

of

arrival

of ecological

poUcy option

afiluent in material terms

occasion

(however fi^gal

a fall to a significantly carefiilly

even to

a level

agrarian

way of life

an

it is

might seem

to

many now

not taken, overshoot must

a reversion to

the traditional

premodern Revolubrief and anomalous spike in

(transition III), so that the entire Industrial

flat

we new

In short,

unprecedented. That

ecological trace, a transitory

when

centuries in duration,

thusian apocalypse

is

lower steady-state

tion fi-om start to finish will appear as a

not completely

in Figure 3-6)

level than could have planned and timely action (transition II), or

tantamount to

humanity's otherwise

scarcity.*

I

rocket cannot

transition to a steady-state civilization relatively

living in the richest countries). If this option

been achieved by

scarcity, the

(transition

epoch a few momentarily seemed possible to aboHsh a genuine crossroads. Ecological scarcity is

it

stand at

in history, but the crisis is, it is

on

not

a

we

confront

simple repetition of the

a larger scale, in

which nothing

is

largely

classic

Mal-

has changed but

the numbers of people, the ruthlessness of the checks, and therefore the greater potential for misery once the day of reckoning comes. The wars, plagues, and famines that have toppled previous civilizations are over-

shadowed by horrible checks Malthus never dreamt of (such

*

There

some

is

transition

(I

risk

that in trying to

in Figure 3-6),

we

make

shah achieve

as large-

the immediate and direct

a steady-state level

somewhat

lower than the maximum possible. However, the sacrifice of such a marginal gain seems small compared to the risks attached to overshoot. Moreover, it will always be possible to adjust upward if later experience or further inventions

make

temporarily.

it

feasible; thus the

marginal gains will be forgone only

CHAPTER 3

184

Carrying capacity

Equilibrium

Environmental

demand

(a)

Time

Carrying capacity

Equilibrium

(b)

Time

>~

Carrying capacity

Equilibrium

(c)

Time

Deforestation, the Loss of Biodivenity, Pollution...

3000

B c

FIGURE ture:

I,

what

185

1650

The

3-6

Present

ecological history of the world

direct transition to high-level steady state;

lower-le\'el steady state;

scale ecological ruin

III,

reversion to

II,

Future



past, present,

pre-modern agrarian way of life.

and global radiation poisoning),

threats to the very existence

of the

and fu-

belated transition to some-

On

for these checks are

possess technical resources that previous civilizations lacked

we also when they

encountered the challenges of ecological

our case

successful response

is

possible:

We

industrial, steady-state civilization

of preindustrial

is

species.

the other hand,

scarcity.

Thus

in

a

can create a reasonably affluent post-

and avoid

a traumatic

fall

into a version

civilization.

This imposing task devolves upon the current generation, and there to lose. Already many trends, such as demographic momentum,

no time

carmot be reversed within any reasonable time without Draconian measures. Moreover, as we shall see in Part II, the way ahead is strewn with painful dilemmas. Indeed, nothing can be

accompHshed without the

many deeply ingrained expectations and the exaction of genuine sacrifices. The epoch we have already entered is a turning point in the ecological history of the human race comparable to the NeoHthic frustration of

Revolution.

It

extraordinary

will inevitably involve racking political turmoil

reconstitution

and an

of the poUtical paradigm that prevails

throughout most of the modern world.

FIGURE maturity:

3-5 (Left) (a)

ing capacity;

smooth (b)

Three scenarios

for the transition

transition to equilibrium

from growth to

with minimal erosion of carry-

overshoot with substantial erosion of carrying capacity;

overshoot with drastic erosion of carrying capacity.

(c)

II The Dilemmas of Scarcity

,

4 The

Politics

of Scarcity

Having explored the general nature and meaning of ecological

we

shall

now

delve into

its

scarcity,

poHtical consequences. This chapter examines

the basic poHtical dynamics of ecological scarcity; Chapters 5 and 6 assess the specific challenge to the

American market system; and Chapter 7

extends the analysis of the preceding three chapters, showing that applies in

The

all

important respects to the

Political Evils It

of Scarcity

was su^ested in the Introduction

political sin:

allocated

it

of the world.

rest

Resources

that scarcity

that are scantier than

by governments, for naked

conflict

the source of original

is

human wants

would

have to be

result othenvise. In the

words of the philosopher Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan (1651 p. 107), human life in an anarchic "state of nature" is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and ,

short."

there

To prevent

must be

the perpetual struggle for

a civil authority capable

power in

a

war of aU

against

all,

of keeping the peace by regulating

property and other scarce goods. Scarcity thus makes politics inescapable.

Presumably, the estabhshment of a truly just eliminate

all

civil

assured of a fair share of goods, social

harmony would

would With all

authority

the political problems that arise from scarcity. replace

strife,

and

people would enjoy long and happy Uves of peacefril cooperation. Unfortunately, this has never happened. Although they have certainly

mitigated

some of

the worst aspects of the anarchic state of nature

(especially the total insecurity that prevails in a civilized poHties

war of aU

against

all)

have always institutionalized a large measure of in-

equahty, oppression, and conflict. Thus, in addition to being the source of original pohtical sin, scarcity

is

also the root

189

of political

evil.

CHAPTER 4

190

The

reason

quite simple. For

is

margin or very close to

existed at the ecological

income and wealth,

Not

most of recorded

therefore,

would condemn

unnaturally, the tendency has

been

it.

An

equal division of

life

of shared poverty.

to a

all

have

history, societies

for political institutions to fiirther

impoverish the masses by a fractional amount in order to create the surplus

more than

that enables a small elite to enjoy life.

its

share

of the

fruits

of civilized

Indeed, until recendy energy has been so scarce that serfdom and slavery

have been the



norm

Aristode in his

-justifiably so, says

Politics,

genuine civihzation would be impossible. Except for a few periods

when for some

inequality, oppression, political

of the

life,

rulers

reason the burden of scarcity was temporarily

and

and other ephemeral

Our own

been very prominent

conflict have

merely waxing and waning

era has

for otherwise

relatively brief

slightly in

of

response to the character

factors.

been the longest and

exception. During roughly the

lifted,

features

last

450

certainly the

most important

years, the carrying capacity

of the

globe (and especially of the highly developed nations) has been markedly

expanded, and several centuries of

transformed the face of the earth and civilization

and

are today



made our

relatively

societies

and our

open, egalitarian, libertarian,

conflict-free.

The Great The

what they

abundance have completely

relative

Frontier

economic boom we have enjoyed

causes of the four-century-long

are readily apparent: the

European discovery and exploitation of the

World, Oceania, and other founts of virgin resources Persian Gulf

oil);

(for

New

example,

the take-off and rapid-growth phases of science-based,

energy-intensive technology; and the existence of vast reservoirs of "free" ecological goods such as air and water to absorb the consequences of our

exploiting the

cause

is

new

clearly the

Before the discovery of the pressed hard societies

were

on

its

means of

politically,

opening up of

a

new technology. However, the

resources with the

New

World, the population of Europe

subsistence,

and

as

a result,

available for cultivation

European

economically, and socially closed. But with the

"Great Frontier" in the

New

World, Europe suddenly

faced a seemingly limitless panorama of ecological riches.

was suddenly multiplied about

stands of high-grade timber, a scarce far as the

first

most important.

commodity

in

The

land

five times; vast

Europe, stretched

as

eye could see; gold and silver were there for the taking, and rich

lodes of other metals lay ready for exploitation; the introduction of the

potato and other

new food crops from the New World boosted European

agricultural production so sharply that the population

doubled between

1

The

Politics

of Scarcity

1

1750 and 1850. This bonanza of found wealth

lifted the

yoke of ecologi-

cal scarcity and, coincidentally, created all the peculiar institutions

modern

values characteristic of

civilization

9

and

—democracy, freedom, and

individualism.

Indeed, the existence of such ecological abundance

an indispensable

is

Adam Smith, the two whose works epitomize the modern bourgeois views of political economy on which all the institutions of open societies are based. For

premise of the libertarian doctrines ofJohn Locke and thinkers

example, Locke (1690, paras. 27-29) saying that

it

derives

from the mixture of

commons of nature. But he make

part of

does not still

work

to

(para. 33).

a

the institution of property by

man's labor with the original

is

the

common

to

good

as

left;

heritage of

and more than the yet unprovided could use"

His argument on property by appropriation

references to the wilderness of the

New

is

shot through wdth

World, which only needed to be

occupied and cultivated to be turned into property for any it.

man

continually emphasizes that for one

mankind his own property the disadvantage of other men. Why? Because "there was

what

enough and

justifies

man who desired man to

Locke's justification of original property and the natural right of a

it from nature thus rests on cornucopian assumptions. There is more left; society can therefore be Libertarian. The economics of Adam Smith rests on a similar vision of ecological abundance. In fact. Smith is even more optimistic than Locke, for he stresses that the opportunity to become a man of property (and therefore to enjoy the benefits of liberty) now Hes more in trade and industry than in agriculture, which is potentially limited by the availability of arable land. Indeed, says

appropriate

always

Smith, under prevailing conditions, simply striking shackles

system

faire

ofi" all

on economic development and permitting of wealth-getting

to

operate

"opulence," which would in turn liberate

the mercantilist

a free-for-all, laissez-

would

instead

men from the

social

and

generate political

of feudalism. Smith's The Wealth of Nations {Ml 6) is therefore a manifesto for the attainment of poHtical liberty through the economic restrictions

exploitation of the found wealth of the Great Frontier.

The

Hberal ideas of Locke and Smith have not gone unchallenged,

but with very few exceptions, Hberals, conservatives, munists, and other

*

Of

modern

ideologists have taken

socialists,

course, the idea of individualism antedated the discovery of the

World, but before expression.

that time there

had been

little

com-

abundance for granted

opportunity for

its

New

concrete

However, once the boom permitted it to be expressed, became the basis for almost all of the most characteristic features

individualism

of modernity:

and

self-rule in

democracy, self-enrichment

self-salvation in Protestantism.

in industrial capitalism,

CHAPTER 4

192

and assumed the necessity of further growth. They have disagreed only about how to produce enough wealth to satisfy the demands of hedonistic,

"economic" men and about what constitutes of the spoils. Karl Marx was even more Utopian than

materialistic

division

Locke or Smith, merely

a just

either

he envisioned the eventual abolition of scarcity.

for

He

on grounds of social justice, the march of progress be by the state in the interest of those whose labor actually

insisted that,

centrally directed

produced the goods. has

now

But the

boom

been

but exhausted.

all

is

over.

And

The found wealth of the Great technology

is

no

Frontier

real substitute, for

it is

means of manipulating what is already there rather than a way of creating genuinely new resources on the scale of the Great Frontier. (Moreover, as we saw in Part I, technology is encountering limits of its own.) Thus a scarcity at least as intense as that prevailing in the premodern era, however different it may be in important respects, is merely

a

about to replace abundance, and

this

will

necessarily undercut the

material conditions that have created and sustained current ideas, institutions,

are

and

practices.

no longer

Once

relative

abundance and wealth of opportunity

available to mitigate the harsh poHtical

dynamics of scarcity,

the pressures favoring greater inequality, oppression, and conflict will

build up, so that the return of scarcity portends the revival of age-old poUtical evils, for our descendants if not for ourselves. In short, the golden

age of individualism,

understood)

is

all

liberty,

and democracy

(as

those terms are currendy

many important

but over. In

respects,

we

shall

be

obliged to return to something resembling the premodern, closed polity.

This conclusion will be reinforced by a more detailed exploration of the

problem of controlling the competitive overexploitation of

political

resources that has produced the ecological

crisis.

The Tragedy of the Commons It

has

been recognized

common greatest

since ancient times that resources held or used in

tend to be abused. As Aristotle

number

gets the least

said,

amount of

"What

is

common

care" (Barker 1962,

However, the dynamic underlying such abuse was

first

to the p. 44).

suggested by a

litde-known Malthusian of the early nineteenth century, William Forster p. 29), who wondered why the cattle on a puny and stunted" and the common itself "bare-worn." He found that such an outcome was almost inevitable. People seeking gain naturally want to increase the size of their herds.

Lloyd (cited in Hardin 1969,

common

pasture were "so

Because the

number of

commons

is

finite,

cattle reaches the

the day must

come when

the total

carrying capacity; the addition of

more

The

Politics

of Scarcity

cause the pasture to deteriorate and eventuaDy destroy the

cattle will

resource is still

on which the herders depend. Yet even though

in the rational self-interest

Each reasons

to his herd.

outweighs

among

that his personal gain

is

done

to the

commons

as a

the users. Worse, even if he

all

this

it

from adding animals

is

whole and so

commons, partitioned

is

inclined to self-restraint, an

may not

individual herder justifiably fears that others

They

be.

and gain thereby while he does not,

increase their herds

the case,

is

of each herder to keep adding animals

proportionate share of the damage done to the

his

damage

for the

93

1

will

of

in spite

his

having to suffer equally from the resulting damage. Competitive overexploitation

of the

commons

the inevitable result.

is

The same dynamic of competitive overexploitation applies to any "common-pool resource," the economist's term for resources held or used in common. A classic illustration is the oil pool. Unless one person or organization controls the rights to exploit an

on

the rights can agree interest

of each user to

she possibly can; in

fact, failure to

days of the

other to sink

American

many

as

economic and

or her a

fair share.

oil industry, drillers

wells as possible

political

pool or the owners of it

is

in the

he or

fast as

do so exposes the individual owner

him

the risk that others will not leave

boom

oil

scheme of rational exploitation, extract oil from the common pool as a

on

to

Thus, in the early

competed with each

their properties.

The

resulting

chaos was remedied by the establishment of state

control boards that surveyed the pools and then allotted each

owner

a

quota of production for each acre of oil-bearing land. Oil was thereby transformed from a

common

pool resource to private property, and

exploitation proceeded thereafter in a largely rational and conflict-free

manner.

The dynamic of the commons for

one

is

particularly stark in the case

of oil,

But even resources

could

person's gains are another's losses.

that

be exploited cooperatively to give a sustained yield in perpetuity are subject to the same dynamic. Fisheries are a

was abundance enough for

all

prime example. At

first

there

to exploit the resource freely. Conflicts

occurred, but their impact was local. Fishing a litde farther away or

*

We

are grateful to

resource for the

Margaret

McKean

term common-property

for suggesting the

resource

book. She argues that "if resources become property only attach

rights

and

duties

to

them,

term common-pool

used in the previous edition of this

then

the

when human

problematic

beings

resources

are

non-property, not property." She also points out that the "tragedy of the

commons"



figure out a

that

way

is,

tragic



overuse

to attach rights

occurs only

and duties

the problems of subtractibility or rivalness.

when human

beings do not

to these resources in order to solve

CHAPTER 4

194

improving techniques were

to fighting over the

alternatives

hmited

resources in any particular area. In time, however, even the vastness of the

ocean began to be more or

less fiilly

they did in the early days of the

exploited, and people reacted just as

oil business,

overexploiting and destroy-

ing fisheries. In response, coastal nations have privatized parts of the fishing

common

by declaring complete economic sovereignty over the

oceans within 200 miles offshore, so that fishery

would flow

"privatization"

is

that

it

the benefits of the nearby

all

One

to their nationals.

potential benefit of such

then becomes possible, within these zones, for

ban access and to

collective units such as fishing co-ops, to

internalize the

important externalities. But fishing "wars" and other poUtical conflicts over marine resources remain

common

open ocean. There,

in the

operations have increased in scale and technical virtuosity, just drillers

fishing

as early oil

sank dozens of wells on a tiny piece of land. Technological

progress in the fishing industry has produced gigantic floating factories,

which use can or

driftnets

fireeze

and other ultramodern techniques

them on

to catch fish

and

the spot, thus eliminating the time that must be

spent returning to port in traditional

The result, not surprisingly,

fishing."''

has been relentless competitive overexploitation and an alarming general

decline in fish stocks.

Pollution also exemplifies the self-destructive logic of the

mons,

for

tion without altering

emissions

much

so

is

nature:

its

larger than

The

my

cost to

me

of controlling

me see

me

to pollute if

harm the Box 19.)

public.

to

The

unratified

(It

Law of

I

can get away with

does not pay

the

my

proportionate share of the en-

vironmental damage those emissions cause that rational for

com-

simply reverses the dynamic of competitive overexploita-

it

me

it

it.

will always be

In short,

profits

it

to benefit the public either;

Sea Convention

recognizes offshore

(1982)

200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) for coastal nations (Corson 1990,

p.

145). '

Japanese fishing boats cover more than 500 square miles of Pacific

waters with over 2 million miles of driftnets.

The

nets

Ocean

sweep up everything

that

swims into them, depleting the stock of desired species and causing the death or injury of 70% of the catch, including sea

and Taiwan

also driftnet in other areas

General Assembly in 1989 called for

a

mammals, which of the

Pacific.

are

unwanted. Korea

The United Nations

moratorium on high-seas

driftnetting

by

1992, but unfortunately, the resolution allows nations to exempt themselves they practice unspecified marine conservation measures. Japan, after

nouncing

that

it

would exempt

with the moratorium.

itself,

recently indicated that

it

first

if

an-

would comply

The

of Scarcity

Politics

1

Unfortunately, virtuaUy

all

ecological resources



95

airsheds, water-

sheds, the land, the oceans, the atmosphere, biological cycles, the bio-

sphere

—are common-pool resources. For example, the smoke from

itself

factories or the exhaust gases

from automobiles cannot be confined so

harm only those who produce them. They harm all in the common airshed. Even most resources that seem to be private property are in fact part of the ecological commons. The logging comthat their noxious effects

pany

that cuts

down a whole

stand of trees in order to maximize

its

profits

contributes to flooding, siltation, and the decline of water quality in that

watershed.

may be

And

if

enough

altered, as has

down enough

loggers cut

occurred

many

trees,

carrying capacity of the biosphere has been approached,

we

are in serious danger

petitive overexploitation.

even climate

Now

times in the past.

if not

that the

exceeded,

-^

of destroying aU ecological resources by com-

Thus the metaphor of

commons

the

is

^

not

-^

merely an assertion of humanity's ultimate dependence on the ecological life-support systems of the planet;

current

human

it is

also

an accurate description of the

predicament.

a

In short, resources that once were so abundant that they were available to

all

have

now become

fi-eely

regulated and protected in the

outcome

will

common

-yj

interest, the inevitable

y^

be the mutual ecological ruin that the human ecologist

Garrett Hardin (1968) has called "the tragedy of the

much more

commons."

widely the same kind of social rules and

We need

commons

in the past (although these controls have not always

sufficiently strong to avert partial or

even

total destruction

and

been

of a resource).

i

^

T

^

political

controls that have traditionaUy governed the use of grazing lands

other

j

ecologically scarce. Unless they are

somehow

to apply

'^

v

^

^

l^

.^

O

A

Hohhesian Solution? Beyond

telling us that the

answer to the tragedy

is

"mutual coercion,

mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected"

he means

social

prescription. liberties

restraint,

—Hardin

not naked force

However, he does suggest

—by which

avoids

poHtical

that unrestrained exercise of our

does not bring us real fireedom: "Individuals locked into the

logic of the

commons

are free only to bring

on

universal ruin;

once they

of mutual coercion, they become firee to pursue other goals." By recognizing the necessity to abandon many natural freedoms we now believe we possess, we avoid tragedy and "preserve and nurture

see the necessity

other and

more precious freedoms." There

regime of "mutual coercion," but without collective selfishness

commons

are obvious dangers in a

restraints

on

individuals, the

and irresponsibility generated by the logic of the

will destroy the spaceship, so that

any

sacrifice

of fireedom by

CHAPTER 4

196

10 The Public-Goods Problem The public-goods problem

is

commons

the obverse of the

Just as the rational individual gains by harming fellow

common, he At

best,

he

loses

by benefiting them with

gets only a small return

on

a

problem.

members of the

pubHc or

collective good.

his investment; at worst,

he

is

economically punished. For example, the good husbandman cannot sur-

economy; if he maintains his soil while his neighbors mine theirs for maximum yields, sooner or later he must either abandon farming or become a subsistence farmer outside the market. He

vive in a market

cannot afford to benefit posterity except Similarly,

at great

although a socially responsible plant owner might wish to

control the pollution emanating firom her plant,

own

personal sacrifice.

if

competitive disadvantage. Thus the tragedy of the the culprit gets

mons but

all

the benefits from transgressing

who

while they pay

reap virtually

premium

is

at

her

all

all

of the

the costs, the other

is

at a

is

turned

discover

members of the community

benefits.

try to persuade

consumers to pay

prices for his products as a reward for his virtue.

crew members

is

commons, in which the Hmits of the com-

common good soon

try to benefit the

Of course, a producer could

the

it

succeeds in relegating most of the costs to others,

around. Those that,

she does

expense whatever her competitors do, then the plant owner

clearly the lesser evil. After

all,

says

But he

J

Hardin, "injustice

preferable to total ruin," so that "an alternative to the

commons need

not be perfectly just to be preferable" (Hardin 1968, pp. 1247-1248). Hardin's implicit political theory is in all important respects identical

of Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan (1651). Hardin's "logic of the commons" is simply a special version of the general political dynamic of

to that

Hobbes's "state of nature." Hobbes

says that

where men

desire

goods

fall to fighting. Each knows would be better off if they abstained from fighting and found some way of equitably sharing the desired goods. However,

scarcer than their wants, they are likely to

individually that

all

they also reaHze that they cannot alter the dynamics of the situation by their

own

behavior. In the absence of a civil authority to keep the peace,

personal pacifism merely makes

be persuaded or forced to

lay

them

down

easy prey to others. Unless their

all

can

arms simultaneously, nothing

The

of Scarcity

Politics

would be

1

unlikely to find

tuous," were

no

many

buyers for products that, however "vir-

better than the cheaper ones of his competitors.

Another conceivable solution would be tended to control pollution to take up fected. After

all,

97

if his

or her pollution

for the manufacturer

who

in-

a collection fi-om all those af-

harmftil to them, they should

is

be willing to pay something to reduce or eliminate

it.

However, even

if

the considerable practical difficulties of organizing such a scheme were

overcome,

would almost

it

certainly

other kind of public is

good

of the

never available in optimal quantity under market conditions.

For example, no government can

on voluntary tax payments. If economic competition, public

subsist

external defense, internal order, rules for health, education, tities

and other pubUc goods

are to be

as

in quanmust be if ecological public goods

all its

members.

Similarly,

clean air and water and pleasant landscapes are to be provided

in reasonable

Thus, just

mounts,

as for the

goods problem

is

it

be only

will

nature

is

thus to

make

it

safe for

all.

men

The

crucial

that

would

constrain

all

men

problem

in the state

to be reasonable, rather than

a majority,

to be reasonable

Hardin's "mutual coercion, mutually agreed

and

upon by

of

of

merely

what the environment

Hobbes's solution was the erection, by

power

the answer to the public

authoritative political action.

"rational," so that they can share peacefully offer.

of collective decisions.

as a result

commons,

tragedy of the

can prevent the war of aU against

is,

produced

that are rationally desirable for the society, then taxes

compulsory on such

The reason is simple: It make others pay most or all

of a public good that benefits everyone equally; thus the

costs

is

of any

in optimal amounts.

entirely rational for individuals to try to

good

con-

for people are unlikely to

fail,

tribute voluntarily to pollution reduction or to the production

has to

a sovereign

peaceflil



that

the majority of

the people affected."*

In the tragedy of the

commons,

the state of nature (political order

much more

is

the

not

dilemma at stake),

is

not so stark

but

it is

in

as

it is

in

many ways

on the

part of

any person or group, the tragedy wiU occur. In the case of the

village

*

For

insidious, for

a fuller discussion

even without

of the

evil propensities

virtual identity

Hardin and Hobbes, see Ophuls 1973.

of analyses and prescriptions in

CHAPTER 4

198

common, between

damage

own

and the deterioration of the commons, but in most

their acts

of competitive overexploitation, individuals are not even aware of

cases

the

the actors can hardly avoid noticing the causal relationship

seems infinitesimally

commons

tragedy of the



behavior

A

we

not

^that is,

own behavior when their fellows That people

if

they are aware, their

Thus, to bring about the

dilute.

not necessary that people be bad, only that

it is

good

they not be actively

generosity.

and even

that their acts are causing,

responsibility

will

enough

altruistic

to limit their

not regularly perform

are in fact not this altruistic

acts

of public

confirmed

is

daily

by

aU see around us (and see Schelling 1971).

perfect iUustration of the insidiousness of the tragedy of the

commons

in operation

the situation of the inhabitants of Los Angeles

is

vis-a-vis the automobile:

who

Every person

lives in this

basin

has been living through a disaster. participated in

it

with

knows

We

knowledge just

full

that for twenty-five years

have as

all

watched

Angeleno

is

do

is

now

He

its

the

spread.

Each

nearly impossible, and, in any case,

would be mean-

end what he

else did the

getting everyone else to do

such a course.

to stop

is

But there

individual act of

everyone

ingless unless

gratification.

An

totally powerless to

renunciation

The smog

mills."

often million individual pursuits of private

absolutely nothing that any individual can

is

he

happen, have

men and women once went

knowingly and willingly into the "dark Satanic result

it

same

hates.

thing.

But he has no way of

He does not even have any way to talk about know how or where he would do it or what

it.

does not

language he would use. (Carney 1972, pp. 28-29).

As

commons one

is

example

this

even aware of

vantages of self-denial

*

own

that one's

is

know

People do

of the tragedy of the

clearly shows, the essence

contribution to the problem (assuming that

seems infinitesimally

it)

loom very

that

small,

by "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the

majority of the people affected," Los Angeles can control

1989 the Southern California Air Quality Management proposed an ambitious antipollution plan reduce

smog-producing

(Elmer-Dewitt 1989, people

live

agreement. critics

them

emissions

p. 65).

in

it

the

Los

downtown

pollution. In

District

(AQMD)

implemented, could

Angeles

area

by

70%

in the

way

has been difficult to obtain mutual

AQMD has been forced to abandon several of

contend variously that the plan (higher

that, if fully

its air

But because the plan requires changes

and conduct business,

The

while the disad-

large; self-restraint therefore appears to

is

its

proposals, as

too expensive, too burdensome on

parking fees are an example) or that companies will

relocate, resulting in a loss

,

of jobs (Matthews 1991,

p.

A21).

The

of Scarcity

Politics

199

be both unprofitable and ultimately universal concurrence.

much by

Thus we

the evil acts of selfish people as by the everyday acts of ordinary

people whose behavior

dominated, usually unconsciously, by the

is

remorseless self-destructive logic of the

The

tragedy of the

commons

Jacques Rousseau,

who made

French

political

problem

philosopher Jean-

between the "general what reasonable people, leaving

a crucial distinction

and the "will of all." The former

aside their self-interest

commons.

also exemplifies the political

that agitated the eighteenth-century

will"

one can be certain of

futile unless

are being destroyed ecologically not so

is

and having the community's

interests at heart,

would regard as the right and proper course of action. The latter is the mere addition of the particular wills of the individuals forming the polity, based not on a conception of the common good but only on what serves their

own self-interest. The

ly vicious instance

true

common

lem

in

The

tragedy of the

interest. In essence,

Social Contract

be "forced to be

commons

is

simply a particular-

of the way in which the "will of all"

fi-ee"



is

not

that

Rousseau's answer to

much

is,

short of the

this crucial

different fi-om Hobbes's:

prob-

Man

must

protected firom the consequences of his

own selfishness and shortsightedness by common good or "general will," which Rousseau thus wants

falls

being made obedient to the represents his real self-interest.

political institutions that will

make people

virtuous.

therefore appears that if under conditions of ecological scarcity,

It

individuals rationally pursue their material self-interest unrestrained

common bound

authority that upholds the

to be

common

institutions

political

how

human

forces us to confi-ont

is,

the acts.

ecological

who make it up

(or

enough of them

(or are impelled to behave) in a selfish, greedy,

only solution

Hobbes,

is

a sufficient

a certain

case,

we must

level

Rousseau,

must be imposed by our

have

that the

fi-om

environmen-

of political philosophy:

when

the

to create a problem) behave

and quarrelsome

measure of coercion

minimum

established; according to

It

a is

common good

The problem

in fact, at the core

by

the eventual result

to protect or advance the interests of the collectivity

individuals

virtue

interest,

environmental ruin. In that

that preserve

destruction by unrestrained tal crisis

common

(see

Box

20).

fashion.

The

According to

of ecological order or peace must be a certain

minimum

level

of ecological

political institutions.

hardly need be said that these conclusions about the tragedy of the

commons Under

radically challenge

fundamental American and Western values.

conditions of ecological scarcity, the individuals, possessing an

inalienable right to pursue happiness as they define

it

and exercising

their

Uberty in a basically laissez-faire system, will inevitably produce the ruin

of the commons. Thus the individualistic

basis

of society, the concept of

inalienable rights, the purely self-defined pursuit of happiness, liberty as

CHAPTER 4

200

2a Coercion The word

coercion has a nasty fascist

ring to

it.

However, politics

is

a

means of taming and legitimating power, not dispensing with it. Any form of state power is coercive. A classic example is taxation, which is nowhere voluntary, for as the theory of public goods (see Box 19) tells us, the state would starve if it were. Assuming a reasonable degree of consensus and legitimacy, coercion means no more than a stateimposed structure of incentives and disincentives that is designed to advance the common interest. Even Locke's libertarian political theory does not proscribe coercion: If the sovereign must

do whatever

Hke Hobbes, Locke does

is

common

interest

necessary to protect

try to set

up

is

it.

threatened, the

Nevertheless, un-

inviolable spheres of private

rights that the sovereign may not invade, and he also demands that power be continually beholden to consent of the governed. The difference between Hobbes and Locke on the matter of coercion is one of degree, with Locke demanding more formal guarantees of limits on the sovereign's power than Hobbes believes are workable. In short, coercion is not some evU specter resurrected from an odious past. It is

an inextricable part of politics, and the problem

and bend

Some tirely

to the

it

aspire to

common

is

how best

tame

to

it

interest.

do away with power

politics

and

state

coercion en-

by making people so virtuous that they will automatically do

maximum freedom

of action, and the

laissez-faire principle itself all

become problematic. All require major modification or perhaps even abandonment if we wish to avert inexorable environrhental degradation and eventual extinction it

*

as a civilization. Certainly,

democracy

as

we know

cannot conceivably survive.

As

we know

government

is

it

today, our current political system

a bureaucratic

and

electoral

is

essentially statist; the federal

behemoth, beholden

monied

interests,

dedicated to the satisfaction of human appetite

nature.

Such

"democracy" cannot

a

survive.

fijndamentaUy Jeffersonian and Thoreauvian in

A

to organized at the

and

expense of

genuine democracy that

spirit

and

practice,

is

however, can

survive (see the discussion of these points in Chapter 8 and the Afterword).

The

Politics

of Scarcity

201

is in the common interest. In fact, this is precisely what Rousseau proposes: small, self-sufficient, frugal, intimate communities inculcating civic virtue so thoroughly that citizens become the "general will"

what

in-

carnate.

However,

side to inside



merely changes the locus of coercion from outthe job of law enforcement is handed over to die interthis



nal "police force"

of the superego and many liberals (for example. Popper 1966) would argue that this kind of ideological or psychological coercion is far worse dian overt controls on behavior. Nevertheless, pohtical education cannot be

done away with

entirely, for

widiout

a

reasonable degree of consensus and legitimacy, no regime can long endure. Thus it is again a question of balance. Hobbes and Rousseau, for

example, would both agree that law enforcement and political education must be combined, however much they might disagree on

wl

proportion of each Political

is

jStting.

coercion in some form

is inevitable. Failing to confront Hkely to have the same effect repression has on the individual psyche: The repressed force returns in an unhealthy form. By contrast, if we face up to coercion, full political

openly the issues

it

raises

awareness will dispel

tame

it

and make

suggests a

it

its

is

seeming

a pillar

way of taming

nastiness,

of the

and we

common

shall

interest.

be able to

(The next box

Leviathan, and Chapter 8 discusses the

poHtics of a steady-state society in

more

general terms.)

This IS an extreme conclusion, but it seems to follow from the extremity of the ecological predicament that industrial humanity has created for itself. Even Hobbes's severest critics concede that he is most cogent when stark political choices are faced, for self-interest

moderated

by

self-restraint

may not be workable when extreme

conditions prevail.

Thus theorists have long analyzed international relations in Hobbesian terms, because the state of nature mirrors the state of armed peace existing

between competing

power. Also,

when

nation-states that are obedient to

social or natural disaster leads to a

no higher breakdown in the

patterns of society that ordinarily restrain people, even the tarian

most hbergovernments have never hesitated to impose martial law as the only

alternative to anarchy. Therefore, if nuclear holocaust rather than

mere

war, or anarchy rather than a moderate level of disorder, or destruction of

CHAPTER

202

the biosphere rather than

mere

of Hobbes's

reahty,

analysis

fits

of amenity

loss

and

it

is

4

the issue, the extremity

becomes

avoid his

difficult to

conclusions. Similarly, although Rousseau's ultimate aim was the creation

of a democratic

he recognized that strong sovereign power

polity,

"Legislator," in Rousseau's language)

cumstances, especially

if

may be

(a

necessary in certain cir-

the bad habits of a politically "corrupt" people

must be fundamentally reformed.

Altruism

Some

Is

Not Enough hope or

theorists

assert that attitudinal

change

major changes in individual behavior to save

enough

will bring

a democratic, laissez-faire

system from ecological ruin. However, except in very small and tightly

norms

knit social groups, education or the inculcation of rigid social

not sure proof against the logic of the commons. Apparently,

not true

that,

it is

once they are aware of the general gravity of the

is

simply

situation,

a large number of people will naturally moderate their demands on the environment. A number of studies have shown that even the individuals

who

presumably the most knowledgeable and concerned about

are

growth evince

population

willingness

Uttle

to

restrain

own

their

reproductive behavior (Attah 1973; Barnett 1971; Eisner et

1970).

al.

How much can we expect of most ordinary citizens? The problem

is

that

commons, people in overwhelming do positive good whether or not cooperation

in order to forestall the logic of the

numbers must be prepared to is

universal.

interest as

And

in a political culture that conceives

sum of our

being no more than the

we can

seems unlikely that ported altruism ecologically

(this

more

is

prudently count on

of the

common

individual interests,

much

it

help from unsup-

not to say that people cannot be educated to be

responsible than they are at present).

In any event, even the most altruistic individual cannot behave responsibly without acts

full

knowledge of the consequences of

—and such knowledge

is

not

available. If

his

even the experts

or her fiercely

debate the pros and cons of nuclear power or the effects of a particular

chemical on the ozone

layer,

using highly abstruse analytical techniques

and complex computer programs stand,

how

additional are

is

that only the specialist can

the ordinary citizen to

problem

is

accompanied by

time.

High

rates

know what

filter

down

to even the

under-

An

of change and exponential growth

a serious lag in public understanding.

seems to take two to four generations for the ideas science to

fijlly

the facts are?

informed public.

at

For example, it the frontier of

We

have

still

not

.

The

of Scarcity

Politics

203

completely digested Darwin, much

How

reasonable

is

to expect

it

less Einstein and quantum mechanics. from the public at large a sophisticated

ecological understanding any time soon, especially business, professional, attentive

much

and

political ehtes

who

when

the academic,

constitute the so-called

and informed public show litde sign of having understood, embraced, the ecological world view? (As noted in the

less

foreword, children do seem to embrace an ecological world view when it is taught to them. This is an encouraging development, but it is not yet known how many curriculums include ecology or how many children will retain their

world view

as adults.)

Others pin their hopes for

a solution not on individual conscience but on the development of a collective conscience in the form of a

world view or rehgion rather than

that sees

humanity

as

the partner of nature

antagonist. This attitude will

undoubtedly be essential our survival in the long term, because without basic popular support, even the most repressive regime could hardly hope to succeed its

for

in protecting the

environment for long. However, mere changes in and social arrangements that implement values are indispensable for turning ideals into world view

are not likely to be sufficient. Political

For example, despite a basic world view profoundly respectof nature, the Chinese have severely abused and degraded their environment throughout their very long history more, ironically, actuality.

ful



than the premodern Europeans,

who

lacked

philosophy expressive of the same kind of natural harmony. Thus Chinese ideals were not proof against the urgency of human desires that drives the tragic logic of the a

commons. appears, therefore, that individual conscience

It

cultural attitudes are not

term considerations

by themselves

sufficient to

that lead people to degrade their environment.

altruism and genuine concern for posterity

*

Some

(for

and the right kind of overcome the short-

may not be

example, Reich 1971) would protest that our age

that a genuinely

new

consciousness

is

Real

entirely absent.

is

different

and

emerging. This view cannot simply be

brushed

aside, for substantial changes in values are clearly occurring in some segments of American society, and out of this essentially religious ferment, great

things may come. For example, the "back to the land" movement has been much ridiculed, but its symbolic reaffinnation of our ties to the earth has already

had

a far

from negligible impact on the

new values of faith

mdely

will

become

at this point. Past

treated

by

larger society. Nevertheless, that these

universal in the fiiture appears to be essentially a matter

hopes for the emergence of a "new man" have been it is difficult to be optimistic

history, so

CHAPTER 4

204

but they are not present in sufficient strength to avert the tragedy. Only a

government with the power

common

ecological

commons. To recapitulate,

interest

to regulate individual behavior in the

can deal effectively with the tragedy of the

the tragic logic of the

commons

is

sustained

by three

commons, cattle that need ample grazing room to commons from becoming "bare-worn," and rational, self-

premises: a limited

prevent the

seeking herdspeople. If any one of these premises is

averted.

the

first

As we

is

removed, the tragedy

have already seen, the Great Frontier in effect removed

premise for nearly 400 years.

It

was precisely

this that

allowed

John Locke, whose political argument is essentially the same as that of Hobbes in every particular except scarcity in the state of nature, to be basically Hbertarian, whereas Hobbes is basically authoritarian. Thanks to the Great Frontier, Locke and Smith found that there was so much abundance in the state of nature that a Hobbesian war of all against all was unlikely; every person could take

away some kind of prize, and competi-

would be socially constructive rather than destructive, wdth the hand" producing the greatest good for the society as a whole. Thus government was required only to keep the game honest a mere and minimal institutional referee, needing only modest powers tion

"invisible



—and

machinery

they defined

The

it

individuals could be left alone to pursue happiness as

without hindrance by society or the

frontier

is

state.

gone now, and we have encountered the Umits of the

commons. However,

the physical disappearance of the frontier was for a

long time mitigated by technology, which allowed us to graze more cows

on the same amount of pasture. Now we have reached the limits of The cows are standing almost shoulder to shoulder, many are starving, and the manure is piling up faster than the commons can absorb technology:

it.

All that remains

individuals collective

of the

to alter the rational, self-seeking behavior

is

and groups

that use the

commons. This must be done by

means, for the dynamic of the tragedy of the

commons

is

so

powerfijl that individuals are virtually powerless to extricate themselves

unaided from

its

remorseless working.

indeed force us to be

Our

political institutions

must

free.

Legislating Temperance

That we must give our

political authorities great

of our daily actions

a

political systems that

is

profoundly

distasteful

powers to regulate many thought.

We

tend to see

do not bestow our kind of political and economic

liberties as "totalitarian," a

word

that brings to

mind

all

the evil features

The

Politics

of Scarcity

205

how

of past dictatorships. But even Hobbes, no matter

firm his convic-

tion in the necessity of absolutism, certainly did not have Stalinesque

tyranny in mind. Hobbes makes clear that order in the

commonwealth

is

means without which the fruits of civilization cannot be enjoyed. The sovereign power is to procure the "safety of the people... But by safety here is not meant a bare preservation but also all other contentments of life which every man by lav^l industry, without danger or hurt to the commonwealth, shall acquire to himself (Hobbes 1651, p. 262). And it is part of the task of the sovereign power to actively promote these "contentments of life" among its subjects. Furthermore, Hobbes will not countenance tyranny. The sovereign power must rule law^Uy, give a fiill explanation of its acts to its subjects, and heed their legitimate desires. Through wise laws and education, the not the goal but

is

subjects will learn

rather the

moral

restraint. Also, the

dictator regulating every action

people fi-om

Hobbes their

(p.

272).

compatible with Similarly,

power

is

not to be

a

does not "bind the

it

not to stop

Thus many

travelers,

different styles

but to keep them in

of rule and of hfe are

his basic analysis.

Hardin makes

temperance," not to

may

citizen:

voluntary actions" but only guides them with laws that

all

likens to "hedges... set

ways"

of the

sovereign

it

clear that the

problem

He

institute iron discipline.

is

to "legislate

acknowledges that

this

require the use of administrative law, with the consequent risk of

abuse of power by the administrators. However, he believes that the

appHcation of his formula of "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by

would be an adequate defense we would be democratically coercing our-

the majority of the people affected," against bureaucratic tyranny, for selves

to behave responsibly (Hardin 1968, p. 1247).

The

question of political wiU

wdUingness

to

restrain

is

individual

therefore crucial. Given a basic

self-seeking

and

legislate

social

temperance, social devices acceptable to reasonable persons and suited to a

government of laws could readily be found to serve as the "hedges" that keep us on the path of the steady state.* For example, law professor

will

Christopher Stone (1974) proposes giving natural objects, such

*

Merely increasing the power of the

state

is

no

solution.

As

will

Chapter 7 (and contrary to the opinion of many), mere socialism solution to the tragedy of the the

means of production

is

commons. That

not very

is,

as trees,

be shown is

not a

in

real

giving the state ownership of

useflil if the state

is

committed

to

economic

expansion, for the same ecologically destructive dynamic operates within a socialist

1974 on

economic bureaucracy this point).

as in the capitalist

marketplace (see Heilbroner

CHAPTER 4

206

mountains,

rivers,

and

now

(comparable to those

lakes, legal rights

en-

joyed by corporations) that could be enforced in court.

However, although the socioeconomic machinery needed a steady-state political

our everyday

economy need not

doing things It

we

are

involve dictatorial control over

indeed encroach upon our freedom of action,

lives, it will

for any social device that

to enforce

effective as a

is

now free

to

hedge will necessarily prevent us from

now prefer not to do. squeeze no more cattle onto

do or make us do things we

could hardly be otherwise: If we can safely

commons, then we herders must be satisfied either with the herds we now possess or, more likely, with the lesser number of cattle that the commons can tolerate ecologically over the long term. The solution to the tragedy of the commons in the present circumstances requires a perhaps much less willingness to accept less than we now get from the





the

commons.

No

technical devices will save us. In order to be able

we wish to apply to ourselves, we must of rights we now enjoy and bind ourselves to in the common interest. The only alternative to

mutually to agree on the give

up the

exercise

perform public duties this

restraints

kind of self-coercion

is



the coercion of nature

or perhaps that of an

compel our consent to hving with

iron regime that will

less.

Technology's Faustian Bargain

Given

this

optimism

is

unpalatable conclusion, the seductive appeal of technological

human demands to the available

apparent: If adjusting

ecological

resources will entail a greater degree of political authority, then let us by aU

means

press

on with

the attempt to

surmount the

technologically. Thus, to the extent that technologists

of

a steady state, they

aim

at a

nological superabundance in

limits

will use

growth

concede the necessity

"maximum-feasible" steady

which we

to

state

of tech-

our alleged mastery of

inexhaustible energy resources to evade ecological constraints, instead of

learning to live finagally

on flow

resources such as solar energy

sake of argument, let us put aside

all

questions of practicality and ask instead

what would be the poHtical consequences of implementing technological solutions to ecological

*

principles.

Only

maximum a

life

is

a virtual contradiction in terms,

out of nature runs contrary to basic ecological

lived

comfortably

within

interdependence merits the designation "steady optimists customarily talk as state

these kinds of

scarcity.

In reality, a maximum-feasible steady state

for squeezing the

As we have

enormous, but for the

seen, the barriers to success in such an enterprise are

the

state."

circle

of natural

But the technological

though there were no possible model of the steady

other than the maximum-feasible one.

The

Politics

of Scarcity

207

Alvin Weinberg,

who was for many years director of Oak Ridge National Laboratory,

Energy Commission's

leading spokesman for the technological

fix,

the

Atomic

has been a

especially nuclear power.

Indeed, he has castigated environmentalists for proposing "social fixes" to ecological problems;

he argues that technological solutions are "more

humane" because they do not "disrupt the economy and... cause the human suffering that such disruption would entail" (Weinberg 1972b). Yet Weinberg himself admits that the specific technological solution he

proposes comes with a truly monstrous social

fix

firmly attached! Be-

cause nuclear wastes will have to be kept under virtually perpetual surveillance,

and because nuclear technology places the most exacting

demands on our engineering and management

We

nuclear people have

hand,

we

offer.

But the price

.

made

a Faustian bargain

with

of energy

.an inexhaustible source

that

capabilities,

we demand of society

society.

for this magical energy

we

vigilance and a longevity of our social institutions that

unaccustomed

to

Part of this price

is

[Weinberg 1972a,

politically

On the one

[the breeder reactor] is

....

both

a

are quite

p. 33].

ominous:

In a sense, what started out as a technological fix for the energy-environment

impasse



clean, inexhaustible,

cial fixes as well:

sible technologists

their

and

the creation of a

who

fairly



cheap nuclear power

will guard the reactors

and the wastes so

continued safety over millennia [Weinberg 1973,

p.

Expanding on the "priesthood" theme, Weinberg "our commitment to nuclear energy will

involves so-

permanent cadre or priesthood of respon-

is

need "a permanent cadre of experts

assumed

as to assure

431].

tells

us that because

to last in perpetuity,"

that will retain

its

we

continuity over

immensely long times [but this] hardly seems feasible if the cadre is a national body," for "no government has lasted continuously for 1,000 years."

What kind of organization

Only

the Catholic

2,000 years or

Church

so... The

International Authority]

and

more or Church is the

has survived

Catholic I

does possess the requisite continuity?

have in mind: a

to a degree enforces doctrine, maintains

its

and has connections to every country's

[cited in

Speth

al.

own own

a true heir

example of

[the

long-term

social

Catholic Church

1974, emphasis added].

In proposing such a technological "priesthood,"

be

continuously for

central authority that proclaims

stability,

et

less

best

of the French Utopian

Weinberg appears to Claude Henri

social philosopher

CHAPTER 4

208

Saint-Simon (1760-1825), one of the

who

earliest

prophets of technocracy,

was humanity's mission to transcend nature with by the disruptive social effects of technology Distressed technology. within a bourgeois, laissez-faire political economy, Saint-Simon aspired to beUeved

that

it

create a stable, organic civilization such as that of the

Middle Ages, but

end he proposed the creation, on the scientific priesthood that would both Church, of a Cathohc model of the dispense political justice and promote the economic wealth of society.

with science

as its religion.

Saint-Simon stressed

society as determined



all

this

social planning, the necessity for authority based

scientific expertise, the

technology

To

on

subordination of the individual to the needs of

by the

experts,

and the integration of society and

themes that emerge in the writings of modern tech-

nological visionaries.

By whatever name

it

comes

to

be

called, technocratic

likely to be the price of Weinberg's Faustian bargain.

formally voted steps as

we

in,

of course, but wiU emerge in a

series

government It

is

wiU not be

of small but

fateful

follow what seems to be the Hne of least resistance through

our environmental problems. Indeed,

critics

were alarmed by the civilby the Atomic Energy

rights implications of the safeguards proposed

Commission

in

its

draft

environmental-impact statement on plutonium

recychng. These included the estabUshment of a federal pohce force for the protection of plutonium plants and shipments, the extension of

current military security-clearance procedures to include

all

the civilians

might have access to plutonium, and generally increased pohce powers to cope with the security requirements of a plutonium-based power economy (Speth et al. 1974). The United States abandoned its breeder reactor program in 1984, but the fact remains that there may be

who

no way

to ensure the social stability

institutions





indeed, the near-perfect social

necessary for an era of nuclear

power except with an

engineered society under the direction of a technocratic priesthood.

A

Pact with the Devil? It is

not nuclear technology alone that offers a pact with

a devil

who

will

end claim our political souls. Few technological optimists are as as Weinberg about the pohtical implications of the solutions they propose, but technocracy has been looming on the horizon for some time. Harrison Brown, a scientist who foresaw most of today's ecological

in the

candid

concerns almost four decades ago, predicted that the dustrial society

would become

instability

of in-

greater as development proceeded. This

and other organizational requirements, he social control necessary, so that "it

is

said,

wiU make ever-greater

difficult to see

how

the achievement

The

209

of Scarcity

Politics

and the maintenance of individual liberty can be made compatible" (Brown 1954, p. 255). Buckminster Fuller, one of the most of

stability

visionary of the supertechnologists, states plainly that those

"Spaceship Earth" cannot afford to

make "concessions

who

to the

run

non-

synergetic thinking (therefore the ignorandy conditioned reflexes) of the

well advised of the potential mass customers [that

least

is,

the average

Numerous other writers of varying permore technology means greater complexity

citizen]" (Fuller 1968, p. 367).

same trend: and greater need for knowledge and technical expertise; the average suasions see the

citizen will not

making, so

be able to make

that "experts"

a constructive contribution to decision

and "authorities"

because accidents cannot be permitted, that deviates

much

will rule perforce; less

and

individual behavior

from technological imperatives, the grip of planning and

social control will

of necessity become

a stranglehold (Bell

1973;

Cham-

berlin 1970;Heilbroner 1974).

Thus, the danger in the Faustian bargain lies in the mounting complexity of technology and with the staggering problems of managing the response to ecological scarcity, for these problems wiU require us to

depend on

special

a

class

of experts in charge of our survival and

well-being: a "priesthood of responsible technologists."

Elite Rule:

Democracy versus

The

Issue of Competence

of the key philosophical supports of democracy

One

people do not

ment may

gready in competence, for

differ

if

is

the assumption that

they do, effective govern-

require the sacrifice of political equality and majority rule. Indeed,

under certain circumstances democracy must give way to elite rule. As the eminent political scientist and democratic theorist Robert Dahl points out, in a political association

such

as a hospital

whose members

or

competent people to

the most

p.

are

58, emphasis added). In other words, the

closely one's situation resembles a perilous sea voyage, the stronger the

rationale for placing

how

competence,

man wiU want

have authority over the matters on which they

most competent" Pahl 1970,

more

"differ crucially in their

a passenger ship, a reasonable

to

run the

power and authority

in die hands

of the few

who know

ship.

Ecological scarcity appears to have created precisely such a situation.

must be made. Although it is true that most of them are "trans-scientific" in that they can only be made politically by prudent people, at least the basic scientific elements of the problems must be Critical decisions

understood reasonably well before an informed political decision is possible. However, the average person has neither the time to inform himself or herself nor the requisite background for understanding such

CHAPTER 4

210

complex technical problems. Moreover, many people are simply not enough or well enough educated to grasp the issues, much less the important features of the problems. Even highly attentive and com-

intelligent

petent specialists do not always understand the problems

they do (or claim

to),

they can almost always be found

fully.

Even when

on both

of

sides

any major question of pubHc pohcy. (The dispute over nuclear-reactor safety is a prime example, with Nobelists lining up both for and against nuclear power.) Thus, even assuming that the politicians and people

understand the issue well enough to ask the right questions, which

Can

experts should they listen to? saying? If

we

they understand what the experts are

grant that the majority of the people probably will not

understand and are therefore not competent to decide such

issues, is it

very likely that the political leaders they select will themselves be petent enough to deal with these issues? these leaders

make

And

authoritative decisions that

even

if

they

are,

com-

how

impose heavy present

can

costs

or that violate popular expectations for the sake of future advantages

them only

revealed to analysis,

perhaps even

knowledge derived from complicated

as special

as

the Delphic pronouncements of a computer?

Such questions about the

viability

of democratic

politics in a super-

technological age propel us toward the political thought of Plato. In The Republic, the fountainhead

gued

that the polity

needed

be

to

was

of

all

Western poKtical philosophy, Plato

like a ship sailing

commanded by

dangerous waters.

It

ar-

therefore

the most competent pilots; to allow the

crew, ignorant of the art of navigation, to participate in running the vessel

would be an

to invite shipwreck.

elite class

of this

elite,

of guardians,

Thus

the polity

to

be run by

guided by the cream

the philosopher-kings. As the quotation from Dahl suggests,

to the extent that Plato's analogy

of the ship of state approximates

his political prescriptions are difficult to evade.

Aristode on, those politics

would have

who would themselves be

who

This

is

reality,

precisely why,

from

have favored democratic rather than oligarchic

have concerned themselves with keeping the political com-

munity small enough and simple enough so that elite rule would not be necessary for social survival. The emerging large, highly developed, complex technological civilization operating

margin appears to

fit

Plato's

premises

at

or very near the ecological

more and more

closely,

foreshadow-

ing the necessity of rule by a

class

of Platonic guardians, the "priesthood

of responsible technologists"

who

alone

Such ideas

of

a

Saint-Simon suggest, but the

able in a

know how

to

run the spaceship.

development has always been implicit in technology,

crowded world Hving

we

for

it

has

as

the

become unmistak-

close to the ecological limits, for only

through the most exquisite care can nological Leviathan

need

are well

on

we the

avert the collapse

way

of the tech-

to creating. C.

S.

Lewis

— The

Politics

1

of Scarcity

observed that

power

21

"What we call Man's power over Nature turns out to be a some men over other men with Nature as its

exercised by

instrument" (Lewis 1965, yielded up to

69),

p.

more

technological power, the

some people by

and

appears that the greater the

it

power that must be Thus we must ask ourselves

absolute the political

the others.

whether continued technological growth

will not merely serve to replace the so-called tyranny of nature with a potentially even more odious

tyranny of people.

Why

we

indeed should

"priesthood of responsible technologists"

are merely technical exand may well lack the excellence of character and deep philosophi-

perts cal

understanding that Plato

justify their rule? In fact, elite

deliver ourselves over to a

who

possessed of both

profound

The

guardians must possess in order to

why accept the

wisdom and

rule

of even

a

when

all

expertise

genuinely Platonic history teaches us

and goodwill of mortal people

that the abilities, foresight,

imperfect?

insists his

are limited and technological response to ecological scarcity thus raises

political

difficult poHtical

issues, in

dilemmas

particular

one of the most ancient and

quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

"Who

will

watch

the guardians themselves?"

Technology and the Path

Modern humanity transcend nature.

to

a Brave

New

World

has used technology along with energy to try to

We have

seen that it cannot be done; nature is not to be transcended by a biological organism that depends on it. Worse, any attempt to do so will have momentous political and social consequences. Far from protecting us from painful and disruptive social changes, as the technological optimist is wont to claim, continued technological growth likely to force such changes on us. We are, in fact, in the process of making the Faustian bargain without ever having consciously decided to do so. As a result, we appear to be traveling down the road to total

is

domination by technique and the machine, to the "Brave New World" that Aldous Huxley (1932) warned was the logical end point of a hedonistic, high-technology civilization.*

Technology may not be inherently and

*

it

evil, but it does have side effects, does exact a social price. Moreover, in the hands of less-than-per-

All the techniques

of social control and biological manipuladon forecast in

Huxley's dystopian novel are being invented today in our laboratories (Cohen 1973; Delgado 1969; Holden 1973; Kass 1971, 1972; Skinner 1971). And weU before these developments occurred, Huxley (1958) was himself appalled to witness in his

own

lifetime

much of what he had imagined

or seven hundred years in the future.

as

taking place six

— CHAPTER 4

212

21 Taming Leviathan: Macro-constraints and Micro-freedoms The only

escape from the political dilemma of ecological scarcity



authoritative rule or ecological ruin

^is

indicated in the Epigraph: If

people exercise sufficient self-control of their passions, the ternal authority

become

fetters

of ex-

unnecessary. Unfortunately, poUtical history

of moral restraint and altruism to be expected from the members of large, complex, mass societies is Hmited at best. These virtues are even less Hkely to be found in industrial civilization, for its citizens have been brought up to beHeve that satisfying their suggests that the level

hedonistic wants

is

not only legitimate but positively virtuous. Besides,

and highly interdependent societies, even the most willing citizen would not know how to be ecologically virtuous without a large amount of central direction and coordination. In other words, unin complicated

less

we

return to face-to-face, simple, decentraUzed, small-community

—^which may be

Uving

argue) but

a desirable

long-term goal

—we

hardly a short-term possibiHty

is

Chapter 8 will

(so

with the

are stuck

authority palatable and protecting ourselves

problem of making those who would abuse

their ecological guardianship.

Traditional political theory has proposed

lem. However, one

from

many

answers to this prob-

basic principle stands out: If self-restraint

is

inade-

quate, macro-constraints are vasdy to be preferred to micro-constraints, for the psychological differences

on our freedom

Hmitations

feet

human beings, technology

often claim;

it

between them

can never be neutral,

As

a

consequence of ecological

economic, and is

social

between change

stringent

That

is,

and impersonal

as its

There

scarcity,

changes are inevitable whatever

that

happens to us

technological

imperatives

no

is

major

fixes

escape from

ethical, poUtical,

we

as a "side effect"

and change that

are

proponents too

can only be used for good or evU. Thus technological

are dangerous surrogates for political decisions.

pohtics.

are crucial.

that are indirect, remote,

do.

The

choice

of ever-moreis

deliberately

selected as compatible with our values.

Unfortunately,

at this

point even total renunciation of technology

dangerous to our democratic health

would not enable

us to avoid

all

as

the

The

Politics

213

of Scarcity

and personal. In the former case, the limitations become an almost invisible part of "the way things are," instead of obvious impositions. For example, modern humans feel generally free despite their nearly total submission to such

preferable to those that are direct, proximate,

powerful but faceless forces

as

technological change and the

marketplace; the feudal peasant, by contrast, was so

of direct personal obligations that this

web of obHgations may

he

felt

much

bound up

less free,

have been in important respects

nical in practice than the impersonal forces to

in a

web

even though less

tyran-

which modern humani^

obliged to submit. Putting the matter more abstractly, the contemporary political philosopher Isaiah Berlin (1969) has defined freedom

is

the number of doors open to a person, how open they what prospects they open. All other things being equal,

number freedom

of meaningful options brings the is

maximum

are,

^ as

and upon

dien, the widest

of freedom; macro-

sum of the micro-freedoms available to us. Because the of the commons leaves us with few meaningful options,

the

destruction

some of the doors now

must be pardy or even complete^

available to us

then this ly closed, but if we wish to preserve a sense of freedom, close the or should be done in ways that limit the micro-freedoms, doors of daily

Thus an

life, as

litde as possible.

effective

way of making

authority acceptable

is

to impose

macro-constraints that encourage the behavior necessary to maintain a steady- state society but to leave individuals

micro-freedoms freedom.

How

that,

with

when added up, give them

such a steady-state society

a relative

abundance of

an overall sense of

might be "designed"

will

be

discussed in Chapter 8.

pohtical dilemmas described above.

steady state one can envision,

it

During the transition to any form of would be imperative to minimize

probably pollution and use resources as efficiently as possible, and this term, short the in control expert would mean greater centralization and

even

if

the long-term goal

is

a technologically simple, decentralized

society favorable to a democratic politics.

Even beyond the be democratic

is

at

transition period, whether a steady-state society can least

questionable.

A

society cannot persist as a

genuine democracy unless the people in their majority understand tech-

nology and ecology well enough to make responsible decisions.

And

CHAPTER 4

214

22 The Ecological Contract The Great

Frontier and the Industrial Revolution unleashed forces that

eventually destroyed the medieval political synthesis, generally

on

which was based

the Heaven-ordained hierarchy of the "great chain of

being" and specifically on the "divine right of kings." Changing

economic conditions gradually transferred de facto poHtical power firoi monarchs, priests, and nobles to the enterprising middle classes. Although and

at first

the bourgeoisie acquiesced in continued autocratic rule

aristocratic patronage,

came

it

eventually tired of supporting

to see as unproductive social parasites;

it

what

:^M

it

overthrew the anden '^^^

and embarked on democratic self-rule, the only form of government that could be intellectually and practically reconciled with its new sense of individualism. Such major transfers of power must be regime

theoretically

and morally legitimated, and the

"social contract" theory

of government was devised to fulfill this need. In essence, the theory of the social contract

says that individuals are

not part of a preexisting hierarchy to which they must unquestioningly adapt but rather are free to decide how they wish to be ruled. It is thus primarily concerned with

how free and

an anarchic "state of nature") can

come

equal individuals (starting from together to erect political in-

stitutions that will preserve their individual rights to the fiillest extent

yet also

promote the

social

harmony they need

although the technology of a frugal steady

state

to enjoy these rights in

should be more accessible

to the average persons understanding than current technology

same may

is,

the

not be true of the ecological knowledge on which the

steady-state society will have to be based. Intuition

and

common

sense

alone are of little help in understanding the counterintuitive complexity

of the

human ecosystem

—and nowhere

dangerous. Thus, although not in the sense that only those

them

else

can

a little

intrinsically mysterious,

whose

talents

knowledge be

ecology

is

so

esoteric

and training have equipped

to be the "specialists in the general" discussed in the Introduction

are likely to possess the kind

"reasonable man."

The

of competence that would

ecologically

complex

satisfy

Dahl's

steady-state society

may

therefore require, if not a class of ecological guardians, then at least a class

The

Politics

of Scarcity

215

Hobbes

peace. Ironically, the device of the social contract was used by to provide secular support for tic,

hedonistic,

However,

as

it

monarchy, starting from the individualis-

and

materialistic premises

was

later

of the bourgeois world view.

developed by Locke and Rousseau, the social

became the foundation for popular sovereignty and liberal democracy (even Marxism has very deep roots in Rousseau's thought). The untrammeled individual was now king. contract

As is

a

product of the Great Frontier, the theory of the social contract

fundamentally cornucopian: Nature's abundance being endless and in-

exhaustible,

mony

one has only

politics.

But

problem of achieving

to solve the

through a just division of the

Nature

spoils.

these cornucopian premises have

an age of ecological scarcity

as

is

social har-

M

thus external to

become

as

anomalous in^

the divine right of kings was in the era

fl no other be obUged to give

of the Great Frontier and the Industrial Revolution. Ecology and poUtics are reason, a

now

vaHd poHtical theory of the steady

the same weight to ecological as it

of prudent

inseparable; out

was the

task

harmony

as

self-restraint, if for

state will

to social harmony. Thus, just

of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century

political

philosophers to create the social-contract theory of government to take

new socioeconomic

iccount of the

scent of the bourgeois

class,

so

it

conditions and justify the poHtical

will

be the duty of the next genera-

promotbetween humanity and^

tion of philosophers to create an "ecological-contract" theory

ing harmony not just among humans, but

also

nature.

of ecological mandarins

run

it

society

well.

will

Whatever not

only

who its

possess the esoteric

level

be

knowledge needed

to

of material affluence, the steady-state

ostensibly

more

authoritarian

and

less

democratic than the industrial societies of today (the necessity of coping

wdth the tragedy of the also

be more ohgarchic

commons would as well,

process restricted to those

petencies necessary to

*

In Chapter 8,

we

who

with

full

alone ensure

possess the ecological

make prudent

that),

but

may

and other com-

decisions.

present the conditions for an ecological democracy

could avoid these consequences.

it

participation in the poHtical

which

CHAPTER 4

216

Hard

and a

Political Realities

New Paradigm

In summary, scarcity in general erodes the material basis for the relatively benign individualistic and democratic politics characteristic of the modern industrial era. Ecological scarcity in particular seems to engender

overwhelming pressures toward authoritarian by current standards,

political

for there

systems

that

are

frankly

seems to be no other way to

check competitive overexploitation of resources and to ensure competent direction of a complex society's affairs in accordance with steady-state imperatives. Leviathan

may be

mitigated but not evaded (see

Box

21).

Ecological scarcity thus forces us to confront once again, perhaps in

and cruel dilemmas of classical from which four centuries of abnormal abundance have shielded us. As a result, we shall have to reexamine fiindamental poHtical questions in the light of ecology and construct a new steady-state paradigm of

a particularly acute form, the hard realities politics,

politics

based on ecological premises instead of on the individualistic,

and anthropocentric premises of bourgeois "social contract" theory (see Box 22). The alternative is to let the shape of the steady-state paradigm be decided for us by accepting the outcome of

hedonistic, materialistic,

current trends toward technocracy.

Given current

political values, this

choice. However, the

one sure thing

is

may not seem

that current values

like

and

much

of a

institutions

be able to endure unchanged. Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter 8, the latitude of choice is wider than might be suspected; indeed, the crisis of ecological scarcity might actually be turned into a

will not

more humane and genuinely democratic two chapters, we shall explore specific American political economy to determine how well it is

grand opportunity to build

a

post-industrial society. In the next features

of the

Ukely to cope with the challenges of ecological

scarcity.

u

> The American Political Economy I: Ecology Plus Economics'^ Equals Politics

Having discussed the

of scarcity in general,

politics

of the American

particulars

situation.

As

we now

difficult as

keep economics and poHtics separate, especially in

it

this

turn to the

sometimes country,

we

is

to

shall

economic aspects of poUtical economy in this chapter and take up the more pohtical aspects in the next. However, both chapters share an discuss the

approach different from that taken in by most critiques of the American system.

We are not interested here in whether the system falls short of the

democratic ideal of freedom, equaUty, and justice but only in whether is

it

Hkely to be able to surmount without fiindamental change the chal-

lenge of ecological

scarcity.

To

this

question both chapters give essentially

the same answer: Ecological scarcity undercuts the basic laissez-faire, individuaUstic premises of the

American

political

economy

so that cur-

rent institutions are incapable of meeting the challenges of scarcity. is

needed

is

a

new paradigm

Market Failures and As noted

of politics.

\

Social Costs

in the Introduction, at least

argument

rely heavily

on

some

They beUeve

critics

the market price

smooth, gradual transition to the steady necessary.

What

that as the costs

217

of the limits-to-growth

mechanism whenever

state

to ensure a it

of friels and materials

becomes owing

rise

CHAPTER

218

to scarcity, will

and

as

the costs of pollution control increase, further growth

become uneconomic;

the steady state will therefore be ushered in

automaticaUy by market processes. In the competitive market system

must be

problem

that

how the

market

5

fails

is

fact,

however, in

an environmental

current form

its

villain



part of the

solved, rather than the solution. Let us

to deal appropriately

examine

with common-pool resources,

resource depletion, and other aspects of ecological scarcity.

According

to

Adam

Smith, self-interested participants in a competi-

tive j^^lf^f^f^c^wS^f^fimmitiiii^^^S^^^pT^omote the

by

^

e "invisible

hand" of t he mark^^jKat

is,

own

producer^cnn^WWfiB^TfHmximizet^

gain, the

automatically allocate resources with greatest efficiency

maximum

common good

with consumers and

market

v^

and generate

of individual and social prosperity. Thanks to the invisible

hand, self-seeking individuals, despite the lack of any intention to do will benefit their fellows as they enrich themselves.

argued for

a

so,

Smith therefore

competitive market system of economics.

a laissez-faire,

As we have seen, the premise of abundance necessary to support Smith's contention has vanished. Thanks to ecological scarcity, rational self-seeking individuals, despite the lack of any intention to do so, harm their fellows

economist

as

they attempt to enrich themselves. As steady-state

Herman Daly

(1973,

p.

17)

apdy puts

it,

the invisible hand has

turned into an "invisible foot" that threatens to destroy the

common

good with pollution and other "external diseconomies" or "externahties," the economist's terms for the social costs of production that are not accounted for in the price mechanism. In fact, the problem of the invisible foot is simply the economic version of the commons problem discussed in the preceding chapter. Individuals rationally seeking gain (or at least non-loss) are virtually

commons invisible

to

compelled by the logic of the marketplace

make economic micro-decisions

foot into

that are aggregated

an ecological macro-decision that

destructive for the society as a

the individual as well.

market system, in which

whole

—and

is

by the

increasingly

therefore, paradoxically, for

Thus an unregulated, competitive, laissez-faire all have access to the economic commons and in

which common-pool resources are treated as free goods, has produced a tragedy of the commons: the overuse, misuse, and degradation of resources on which we all depend for ecological health and economic wealth.

Other properties of reinforce

its

a free-for-aU system

of wealth getting strongly

tendency to.jdesir^L^he commons. For one thing, market economic value of the

decisions are inevitab^short-sighteJ)because the fliture

is

counted

understated at

oT^ 'disco nlited. " Future

the interest rate

values are usually dis-

available to a prudent investor;

at

a

7%

The American

Economy

Political

I:

Ecology Plus Economics Equals

interest/ discount rate, the investor as

$800,000 in 30

at

7%,

it

will

years.

Why?

will have

same interest/discount

Similarly, at the

will

if

as

be worth $800,000 has

$100,000. In fact, for

20 years in the

all

soon have $100,000

he or she

The

be worth $800,000 in 30 years.

same amount of money and

now

would just

Because

run

rate, a

now

$100,000

invests the

investor will have the

little

or no risk to get

it.

resource that 30 years from

a present value

practical purposes, costs

fiiture are

219

Politics

of no more than

and benefits more than

discounted to zero; owing in part to such

on capital, it is a rare economic decision maker whose time horizon extends more than 10 years into the fiiture. Thus critical ecological resources that will be essential for our well-being even 30 years firom now not only have no value to rational economic decision makers, but scarcely enter their calculations at all. They are therefore likely to make decisions that additional factors as the prevailing rate of return

irreversibly

deplete or destroy vital resources

(especially

since

each

maker realistically fears that his or her own self-restraint would simply hand over to another the opportunity for profit). Thus, as Karl Marx put it a century ago, the watchword of market capitalism is "Apres decision

nous

deluge," as entrepreneurs strive to

le

expense of the

An

maximize current

problem

additional

is

that although the

handles incremental change with relative ease,

when

benefits at the

fiature.

market price mechanism it

confi-onted with absolute scarcity or even

between supply and demand. In such

downcfc^

tends to break

marked

discrepancies

situations (for example, in famines),

the market collapses or degenerates into uncontrolled inflation, because the increased price supply.

is

incapable of calling forth an equivalent increase in

In a famine, supply and

demand

are eventually

brought into

balance by death, emigration, or the deus ex machina of relief efforts



that

by physical readjustments, not by the price mechanism. Thus the market is unlikely to preside over a smooth and trouble-firee transition to is,

a steady state, for the crisis scarcities (lack

poisons) that

mere money can remedy,

not indefinitely or

*

To

of ecological

of food, water, time, or

all at

scarcity involves absolute physical

human if at all,

shifting

scarcity,

uncomfortable

(for

another), but

it

raising prices

in

suspect that this

is

only in part (and certainly

once). Indeed, shortages leading to rising prices

use the economist's terms, the market

relative

physiological tolerance for

the

burden

is

splendid

of scarcity

so

at

coping with

that

it

is

least

example, by inducing substitution of one resource for incapable of dealing with absolute scarcity except by

general is

industrialized world.



that

is,

through

inflation.

There

is

reason to

the underlying cause of the inflation existing in the

CHAPTER

220

may

5

simply increase the incentives to exploit remaining resources heeddesperate attempt to meet current demand. Rising prices, then,

lessly in a

are not Hkely to induce timely scarcity,

and they

will certainly

and appropriate responses to ecological not preserve resources from exhaustion

they may simply intensify the mode of ecological overshoot. other reasons why the market may fail to

and degradation. In

fact,

pressures that are

producing the current

There

are

respond smooth-

ly and appropriately to the price signals generated by ecological scarcity

For one thing,

scarcity tends to

induce competitive bidding and preemp-

buying, which lead to price fluctuations, market disruption, and the

tive

inequitable or inappropriate distribution of resources. For example, un-

warranted in

fears that oil

suppHes might be scarce

after Iraq

invaded Kuwait

1990 caused speculative bidding and major rises in the price of oil, Europe and the developing world,

resulting in oil shortages in Eastern

whose economies could not bear

the increased costs. Similarly, despite an

alleged timber shortage in the continental interests

as

United

States (used

by logging

an argument against controls on ecologically destructive

practices), the

primeval forests of Alaska, one of the few remaining large

sources of high-grade timber in the United

States, are

being intensively

logged for export to Japan, instead of being preserved for our

own

future

needs (Harnik 1973).

Economists

also

assume that consumers will respond in

a reasonably

elastic fashion to rising prices due to ecological scarcity. However, this

by no means obvious. For one

on

factors other than price.

thing,

many consumer

For instance, very great

is

decisions are based

differentials in cost are

not enough to lure most drivers out of their cars into mass transit, because such factors as prestige and convenience are more important to the

consumer than mere be

likely

to

price.

Thus only

prohibitive increases in cost

would

reduce significantly the private ownership and use of

may lock consumers of price. Homeowners and

automobiles. In addition, prior investment decisions into using a specific resource, regardless

industries that use natural gas for space or process heat, for example,

cannot

easily

switch to substitute forms of energy in the short term, no

Even very high prices, then, may not be sufficient to keep the consumption of ecologically damaging goods and the use of non renewable resources at a level that is

matter what happens to the price of natural

gas.

socially optimal.

Additional problems of a place, in a

just



market economy

one among others



all

more structural nature abound. In the first where the market is the economic tool, not the incentives of producers are toward

growth and the wasteful use of resources. to have a

high-throughput economy

It is

in the interest

of producers

characterized by high consumption

The American

Political

Economy

I:

Ecology Plus Economics Equals

221

Politics

through product proliferation and promotion, rapid obsolescence, and the not economically advantageous for a producer to make an

like. It is just

indestructible, easily repaired, inexpensively operated car. If

were perfectly

rational

economic advantage nothing

else,

but





is,

if

they could no doubt obHge producers to turn out

very well that consumers are not completely of all) and that producers do everything in their

to exploit this irrationality to boost sales (for example,

that play

consumers

they acted solely according to their

we know

rational (about cars least

power

that

upon consumers' social and

sexual insecurities).

the incentives to satisfy needs with

minimum

By

by using ads comparison,

inputs of energy and

material and the lowest real or long-term cost are quite weak, as

exemplified by the entrepreneurial flight fi-om passenger

rail

is

weU

transporta-

of economic advantage, producers can be expected to promote higher consumption and in general to exploit every opportion. In theii pursuit

tunity to profit by not counting the ecological costs. And of course the growth orientation of the private sector is reinforced by the government, which uses its taxing, spending, and monetary powers to promote prosperity and fiill employment.

Conversely, producers lack significant market incentives to respond alertly

and appropriately

to

scarcity.

For example,

electric

power companies

fiiel-based

it is

many of the problems

created by ecological

simply not in the interest of oil companies or to

promote

alternatives to the current fossil-

energy economy or to the centraHzed system of power

production and distribution. In

the purely "economic" person, would be one in which people are almost of what only he or she can supply. It is therefore fact, for

the best of all possible worlds Hterally

dying for lack

entirely rational for entrepreneurs to let scarcity reach uncomfortable levels before

innovating or bringing

market price system spirited, tives

is

new

resources to market.

unlikely to favor far-sighted,

much

Thus the

less

public-

investment decisions or to promote ecologically sound alterna-

to current technologies, especially because

alternatives,

such

as alternatively fiaeled

some of

the logical

automobiles, could reduce the

dependence of consumers on producers. At the very least, producers are demand builds up, and they are ensured of large profits

likely to wait until

before they invest heavily in such alternatives require a great deal of time and

commercial

viability.

Thus

money

as

fiision,

which may

to develop to the point

of

there are major structural obstacles to innova-

tion and investment that will seriously

impede response to the

pressures

of ecological scarcity (particularly in regulated monopoly industries, where real market competition does not exist). At best, market solutions will lag well

behind the rapidly developing real-world problems of

ecological scarcity.

CHAPTER

222

In short, an unregulated market

economy

5

inevitably fosters ac-

and resource depletion through ever-

celerated ecological degradation

higher levels of production and consumption. Indeed, given the cor-

nucopian assumptions on which

market system of economics

could hardly be otherwise; both philosophically and

it

market economy

The

a

If the

market in

its

is

rely so heavily

on

scarcity?

Mostly

Is

liabiUties, which

it

some of the market

as

many

serious environmental

has

liabilities

a

why do we

from the consequences of ecological

to save us

about

mechanism

Politics

current form has so

to be that although they tend to talk as if it

were already an accomplished price

practically, a

not disputed by the vast majority of economists,

The answer seems

are really talking

based,

incompatible with ecology.

is

New Economics

is

those

fact,

who

put forward

market that does not yet



exist

this solution

market whose

a

been thoroughly overhauled to eHminate

we

have noted. In short, those

who

at least

argue for the

an economic solution to ecological scarcity are actually urging

a political solution, for

of these reforms will require expUcit and

all

deliberate social decisions, as a brief review of the proposed changes will indicate.

A

number of economic

devices have been proposed to mitigate or

eliminate the degradation of common-pool resources and to promote the

provision of public goods, such

as

clean

air,

or the careful husbandry of

nonrenewable resources. These devices are principally administrative

common-pool

the creation of property rights in

poUution

taxes, the

fiat,

resources, effluent or

auctioning of pollution rights, severance taxes

on

the

use of resources, and the creation of "public markets." Although their technical merits are debated

the

main

by economists, there

simply forbid emissions above a certain

poUcy with respect

level,

which

is

grounded on

ecological theory of economics

"physiocratic" or nature-based

theories inspired

economics wiU be discussed "right livelihood."

the current U.S.

(in

by in

inefficient (in the

Chapter

real physical flows rather

would

economic

Adam

2) indicated,

than on money.

therefore resemble the theories that,

opening up of the Great Frontier, were eclipsed by the

economic

on

governments can

is

cumbersome and

As the discussion of a "thermodynamic" economy

ecological economics

An

general agreement

to automobiles, but economists tend to believe that

direct administrative controls are

*

is

outlines of a market solution. For example,

premodem

subsequent to the

capital-

and labor-based

Smith. Other aspects of an ecological

Chapter 8 in connection with stewardship and

The American

Political

Economy

I:

Ecology Plus Economics Equals

223

Politics

-23 Determining the Optimal Level of Pollution

This curve is the sum of the two

bottom curves.

The costs of cleaning

up the last remaining pollutants

is

very high.

As

pollution

increases,

the social costs of pollution rise rapidly.

Lowest social cost

Nature can handle low levels of pollution.

If

we

renriove these pollutants, the costs of cleaning up are higher than their

if

we

allow

more

than the optimal

pollution level,

the social costs of pollution is

higher than the cost

of cleaning

it

up.

social costs.

'Economists calculate the estimated optim.al level of pollution by plotting a curve reflecting the estimated social costs of pollution against a irve reflecting the social costs

curves

is

the total social cost.

of cleaning

The

it

up.

lowest point

optimal level of pollution. Source: Miller 1990,

The sum of the two

on p.

this third

581.

curve

is

the

CHAPTER 5

224

economic sense) in that they are not likely to provide the necessary amount of control at the least cost. Alternatively, governments can award environmental property rights to persons and corporations, thus creating a

framework

litigation

for bargaining, negotiation, exchange, and, if

all

else fails,

(none of which can take place effectively over property that

nobody owns). According

once the commons

to this view,

private property, market forces and the legal system

preserve rather than degrade that giving

away property

it

(see

is

made

into

would work

to

Box 24). However, economists fear commons to producers would be

rights in the

them and that the dispersed citizens would not be able to organize effectively to buy amenity. And they fear that if the public at large had individual "amenity rights" (so that a producer would have to buy pollution rights from each person affected by its effluent), the result would be economic paralysis. While recognizing that both these devices may be effective and even necessary in some cases, environmental a

tremendous windfall

for

economists generally favor restructuring the system of market prices with various taxes that

would obHge producers

to "internalize" (that

in-

is.

corporate into prices) the environmental costs of production. In principle, this

is

a simple

and just solution. Government agencies

could calculate the public damage caused by the wastes of a producer and

24 Marketing Pollution Rights One way

to control pollution

to

rights that allow pollution

sell

optimum The 1990 Clean Air Act experiments with

the estimated these rights.

is

and then

level

proach, setting a cap

on

another gress

hopes that

sulfiir

reduce

this

its

a

market ap-

its

emissions,

it

must pay

emissions by an equivalent amount.

market mechanism

dioxide reduction

to

sulfur dioxide emissions in the year 2000.

Thereafter, if a utility wants to increase utility to

up

to allow the polluters to trade

at least cost.

To

Con-

will achieve the desired level

of

take a simple example, if it

A $10 million to achieve a given level of pollution control, but costs utility B $5 million to do the same, A may be able to costs utility

negotiate an agreement with to spend $5 utilities

faith

miUion of these

B

to pay

"make" $2.5 million on the

by both

it

$7.5 million dollars if B agrees

dollars to offset

As

Both good

excess pollution.

transaction and, assuming

parties, achieve the desired pollution control.

— The American

Economy

Political

Ecology Plus Economics Equals

I:

225

Politics

then charge that individual or company the appropriate amount

as

an

government could levy severance promote more rational use of resources, especially virgin nonrenewable resources. The producer would internalize these new costs of doing business, which would be reflected in the price it charged for its products, so the consumer would pay the real cost of the effluent or pollution tax. Similarly, the taxes designed to

product



that

not only the costs of production but

is,

who

Those

ecological and social costs.

also the associated

ultimately benefited from the use

or consumption would jusdy pay what they should and

more

make

to

likely

consumption

if the

make

that

is,

prices,

its

more

set,

efficient in

did

thriftier. If it

would have an incentive an ecological and social sense

the producer

so,

and win customers away from

theoretical

mental

operations

cleaner and

could pay

it

is

lower

less tax,

efficient competitors.

less

outcome of the well-administered

costs

thus be

reducing

as

price were too high. Moreover, if the level of effluent

or severance tax were careflilly to

would

responsible market decisions, such

its

The

internalization of environ-

thus a transformed market that responds readily to the

pressures of ecological scarcity.

Unfortunately, this conceptually simple and reasonably equitable ap-

proach

is

far

from easy

to implement.



price with relative ease

^for

attributable to air pollution

readily quantified.

impossible to

which span?

know who

stay inside?

risk

What

from

a

nearby

Consider the health

agents. Besides,

Of the

Some

suffers, to

what

is

the

provide a sustained yield?

economic



or even

How

do we decide whether

More increased

*

air pollution. It is

Of a

of life?

Of being

much less what

almost

reduced

what

level

a price

disaster,

such

irreversible

ones, for that

of exploitation

on as

life

smog to on the use

forced by

on many renewable

closes fiiture options, such as building houses at all,

cost

do we put

involved in the unlikely but possible

undertaken

However, most cannot be

what degree, and from what amount of

matter, biologists often being uncertain

How

of

or house painting

bills

can be used to establish severance taxes

of nonrenewable resources

accident?

factory.

effects

of contracting emphysema? criteria

can be assigned a

externalities

example, extra laundry

will

the externalities

a serious nuclear

development

that fore-

on prime farmland, should be

price should be assigned to

it?

generally, what about such social costs of industrial growth as commuting time and mental stress, to say nothing of the fiirther

Alternatively,

the

government could auction

off"

Limited

pollution

exploitation rights, in effect letting the market establish the tax. This

much of the

cost

or

would save

of information gathering and tax calculation but, among other

drawbacks, would give an advantage to those with the greatest market power.

CHAPTER

226

5

—25 Technology Assessment Just as laissez faire in economics generates environmental costs, so too "laissez innover,"

or the unrestrained freedom to innovate technologi-

generates social costs. In both cases these costs have reached unac-

cally,

ceptable levels, and remedies are being sought. If internalization

the

is

economists' answer to environmental costs, "technology assessment" the technologists' cure for the social costs of laissez innover.

of both

is

groups to



is

The aim

to make it no longer possible for individuals and make micro-decisions that produce a macro-decision inimi-

the same

common interest. As might be expected, therefore, technology assessment encounters the same kinds of problems as internalizacal to the

tion,

but in a more acute form, because the issues involved are

much

broader and even harder to analyze (especially in terms of quantifiable costs

and

benefits) than those involved in internalization.

Thus

decisions about the introduction of new technology are inevitably

more

political (or "trans-scientific," to use the technologists'

term)

than those confronted by environmental economists.

The

heart of the difficulty

is

something already familiar to us from

previous discussion. As Allen Kneese, a leading environmental

economist and expert on cost-benefit

community

erosion of organic

life?

analysis, says,

How

do we decide whether deple-

tion of resources in the present should proceed if

it

impoverishes

fiature

what extent should the cost of fiiture depletion be discounted? We have no way of knowing at present. Indeed, even with perfect information, the economists could not answer most of these questions, for they involve political, social, and ethical issues, not the issue of efficient resource allocation that neoclassical, marginalist economics was designed to handle. They are "trans-economic" questions. generations, and to

*

To

take but one example of the difficulty of such assessments, a 1984

EPA

cost-benefit analysis of a proposed revision of the Clean Air Act determined that

the net benefits over the net costs ranged

from —$1.4

depending on what values w^ere assigned to human cleaner environment (Miller 1990, p. 583).

billion to

life,

+$110

human

billion,

health,

and

a

The American

It is

Political

Economy

I:

Ecology Plus Economics Equals

my belief that benefit-cost analysis

227

Politics

cannot answer the most impor

tant policy questions associated with the desirability of developing a large-scale, fission-based

bear a burden a

deep

it

cannot

I

sustain.

This

is

it

to

do

so

may

well obscure

Unfortunately, almost

all

is

to ask

to

it

so because these questions are of

ethical character. Benefit-cost analyses certainly

such questions and

I

economy. To expect

cannot solve

them [Kneese 1973,

p. 1].

com-

discussion of technology assessment

pletely overlooks this point. Just like the majority of economists,

who

I

evince an almost religious faith in the tools of neoclassical economics

I

and the technical

I f

efficacy

of the market mechanism, technologists

tend to look upon technology assessment

as

an exercise

in

pure cost-

benefit analysis that will avoid rather than require poHtical and ethical

But

the criteria and methods of analysis are narrowly tech-

I

decisions.

I

nical

I

for example, will be

if

and economic, then there is little doubt that the Faustian bargain, found cost-effective. In its current form, therefore,

technology assessment

may indeed

obscure rather than illuminate the

most important questions connected with continued technological innovation.

Thus "the new economics is mostly politics" (WUdavsky 1967). Even though economic analysis and the market itself, which is a highly effective mechanism for efficiently and automatically allocating resources and for sending signals to economic decision makers, both have a definite contribution to make, society will have to use noneconomic criteria to decide which trade-offs are to be made between production and other elements of the quality of life. (The assessment of technology poses a similar problem; see Box 25.) In effect, because economics itself cannot produce what economists call a "social welfare function," a means of assigning monetary values to non-market goods and bads, such a function will have to be invented politically

(see

Box

Moreover, even an overhauled price system will not eliminate liabihties

direct

we

all

26).

the

have discussed, so that in any event, an expansion of

government intervention

in

the

economic process

will be

CHAPTER

228

5

—26 Assigning Prices to Environmental Goods Economists have given thou^t to hov^ to assign prices to "externalities," or ecological goods and services having

|

no market value. For example, the |

value of beautifiil scenery or a national park or spotted owls can be es-

timated by asking people the see them, even

if they

maximum they would be willing to

don't actually have to pay

it.

pay to |

Likewise, in doing cost-?

benefit analyses, economists have used the technique in determining

much

people might be willing to pay to avoid

costs associated

But

with

the validity

illness

loss

\

1

or some medical symptoms.

of such "goods"

as

owls or a species of fi"Og, the people give answers that depend on are.

how

of income and medical

of the technique varies with the subject matter.

Among other things, when assessing the value informed they

|

The technique

also fails to incorporate

spotted 1

how welil

long-term goals

I

because flimre generations can't bid in the hypothetical market.

Economists have tainty into the

also

given thought to

market system.

One

how

possibiUty

is

^

to incorporate uncerto require

companies

bond equal to the current best estimate of the greatest potential environmental harm their product or service could cause. The bond would pay interest and would be returned if the company could show that its product would not harm the environment. On the other hand, if the product did cause harm, the bond money would be used to repair the damage and to compensate its victims. The technique would require polluters to assume the risks that society now assumes and would give them an incentive to minimize environmental harms. to post a

But

this proposal faces substantial poUtical obstacles. Polluters have

been powerfiil enough liabilities

(such as the financial limits to

are subject in nuclear accidents)

mental and health

on their environmental which nuclear power producers

to obtain legal caps

,

1 J

and to force society to assume environ-

risks (for instance, pesticides

of dubious

safety are per-

mitted in the marketplace until the government proves they are harmfiil).

needed (for example, to subsidize vital but risky research and development on alternative technologies). Thus, as even leading exponents of the market strategy acknowledge, our political system will be handed the uncomfortable and unwanted burden of making decisions hitherto left to the invisible hand. This means that open collective decision

The American

Economy

Political

I:

Ecology Plus Economics Equals

229

Politics



making on a scale never before attempted by our political institutions as as much more efficient, innovative, and timely government action in wiU be essential to the success of the market strategy as a means general

well



of responding to ecological scarcity.

The

Political

Costs of Internalization

Because

leans so heavily

it

on

poHtics, the market strategy of coping with

ecological scarcity must also be evaluated in political terms. This will raise further questions about

world of American

how weU it can be

expected to succeed in the

opposed to the

politics, as

abstract

real

world of economic

analysis.

In the

have such

first

market adjust supply and demand can

place, letting the

painflil social

and

consequences that governments

political

have usually gone to considerable lengths to prevent the free play of

market

forces. Recession, for

example, makes exceedingly bad poUtics. So

market strategy

will internalization, for to the extent that a

environmentally,

it is

bound

to cause social

and economic

effective

is

distress.

The

internaUzation of environmental costs usually means that people have to

pay for what they used to get

fi-ee.

Pollution control, for instance, often

production process more

more

does not

make

similarly,

severance and pollution taxes increase costs without increasing

a

the quahty of goods.

of living

is

must happen

known,

The

result

eroded by inflation in the face

a general rise in prices,

is



a rise in prices affects

scarcity.

income groups

fact

all

who

expensive;

and the standard

what economic theory

exactly

of absolute

wdth fixed incomes, and in

efficient, just

Furthermore,

selectively.

The

predicts

as

is

weD

poor, those

are not in a position to pass

on the

increased costs sufier disproportionately. In addition, if a poHcy of internalization

is

faithfully

implemented, the price of owning certain

highly desired but ecologically damaging goods, such

seems

likely to rise the fastest

disruption of the economy,

the automobile.

It

would

and

highest. This

which depends

heavily

and disruptive

effects

on

numbers

case, ecological scarcity

the economy, producing a

In the United States, real wages have declined since 1972, and productivity

has been stagnant for about a decade. effects as

tendency

political results if large

of people are priced out of car ownership. In any

*

the automobile,

also intensify the maldistributive

noted above, with potentially explosive will have painful

as

would cause serious on mass ownership of

of rising

a result

Both trends

real resource costs, especially

are partially attributable to the

energy resources, which are rising

of their decreasing energy output/input

internalizing

some of their environmental harms.

ratios

and the

costs

of

CHAPTER

230

lower standard of living

whether

it

is

we

as

Thus the question is economic consequences of

usually conceive of it.

desirable for the inevitable

ecological scarcity to be distributed in a relatively laissez-faire fashion

the invisible

hand or by

a

5

by

planned economic contraction designed to

mitigate these side effects. This will be a prime poHtical issue confronting the

American

return to

Making An

it

consequence of ecological

polity as a

scarcity, so

we

the Invisible

Hand

additional poHtical

Visible

problem

is

the very openness and expUcitness of

it will make name impHes, one of the

what has hitherto been

the internalization process, for

public

hidden. As

characteristic features

invisible

shall

in the next chapter.

its

hand

is

of the

workings of the economic process are largely

that the

concealed, and responsibihty for the economic macro-decision that

from the summation and integration of many small economic

results

micro-decisions

is

diffiased.

any particular person or can pursue their

own

The outcome

act.

due

result

(at least as

we

pubHc

have experienced

it)

costs, in

who

costs their

"development." Capitalism

is

an economic system founded on hidden social

ment

to "the market," not to

private profit while ignoring the

impose on others. The

actions

is

This gready favors the entrepreneurs,

is

thus

which develop-

would not have occurred

if all

the costs had been counted in advance. For example, the gentry and the

bourgeois clearly did very well by the Industrial Revolution, while the

urban and rural masses suffered gready fi-om the disruptive development; one in the countries

sees essentially the

of the Third World.

We

of

its

resistance

on

its

present

form

pollution had to be paid for by the industry.

of the atomic energy establishment to

the merits of nuclear

power

closure of costs and benefits

is

of

saw in Chapter 3 that the

also

petrochemical industry would not exist in costs

side effects

same process being repeated today

suggests just

to those

who

a

how

fiill

if

the pubUc

The extreme

and frank debate

threatening

full dis-

have hitherto been able to

hide behind the invisible hand of dispersed, laissez-faire decision making. In brief, honesty and "progress"

That openness and makers

is

may not be

explicitness are

a

Society

not welcomed by most policy

evident fi-om the brief history of the National Environmental

PoHcy Act of 1969 (NEPA). The

*

compatible.

Act's

purpose was, in

part, to

"promote

would undoubtedly want a small petrochemical industry to produce for which there are no substitutes (drugs, artificial

few valuable products

hearts,

and the

like)

even

many pounds of hazardous

if,

as is true

wastes

as

today, the industry generated nearly as

pounds of product produced.

— The American

Political

Economy

I:

Ecology Plus Economics Equals

231

Politics

prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and

efforts that will

biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man." Section 102 of that

Act requires

all

federal agencies to prepare an environmental-impact

statement (EIS) on any of their activities that have a significant effect on

human environment. The

the quality of the

purpose and need for the proposed action,

statement must include the its

probable environmental

impact, and the impact of possible alternatives. In other words, the Act requires a

public accounting of the costs and benefits of any Federal

fiill

action that might have environmental consequences that decision makers

and the interested public should be made aware also

and even some private tal

of.

(Thirty-six states have

adopted legislation requiring similar statements for governmental

impact.)

The Act



projects likely to have a significant

environmen-

has been interpreted to be only procedural; that

is, it

no criteria of acceptability for a proposed action to go forward. The United States Supreme Court ruled in 1980 that the National Environmental Pohcy Act requires agencies only to "consider" the environmental impacts of its projects. Under the decision, an agency can report that a proposed activity wiU cause the sky to fall by 2000 and established

still

proceed with the project once

it

has satisfied the procedural require-

ments of the Act. Nevertheless, lower courts, in response taUst suits,

to

environmen-

have forced government agencies to Hve up rather stricdy to

the requirement that a fiaU-blown envirormiental-impact statement be

prepared.

As that

a result, a

number of projects have been abandoned when it appeared

an honest public accounting would be too damaging; others have been

temporarily shelved for redesign to remove ecological Uabilities; and

some of

others have been held

still

the

more

glaring

up by the extensive

paperwork and inter-agency consultation needed to complete an EIS. Furthermore, the statements have tal

made

splendid ammunition for environmen-

defenders during the regulatory proceedings that are ofi;en needed before

a project can

be carried out. The nuclear power industry, already saddled

v^dth relatively

location

heavy procedural and

and reactor

licensing,

was

legal requirements involved in site

especially hard hit

accountability generated by EIS statements, but the

by the Hmited public

Army Corps

of En-

gineers and other development-oriented agencies have also found living to their obHgations

As the

fiaU

under Section 102 to be

a

up

troublesome burden.

consequences of Section 102 became apparent, an

administrative and legislative backlash set in. In part, this was

due

to the

admittedly expensive and time-consuming process of preparing a report, circulating

it

to interested agencies for criticism,

However, most of the

distress

expUcitness of the process,

and so

draft:

forth.

was due precisely to the openness and

which

gives potential

opponents

(usually a

CHAPTER

232

5

public-interest or environmental action group, but occasionaUy a rival

agency) an opportunity to prevent a project from being carried out. For the sponsoring agency and especially pork-barreling

and

legislative

its

industrial constituency,

members of Congress, such an outcome

is

horrible to contemplate, for projects bring prestige, profits, political favor,

and many other

NEPA

was an attempt to weaken

benefits. Predictably, there

legislatively.

When

the

failed, essentially

this

same

was

result

achieved by an administrative modus vivendi, supported by the United States

Supreme Court.

Instead of treating the process of preparing an EIS as an opportunity to

improve the quality of their decision making, sponsoring agencies have turned

paperwork compliance with the requirements of

into pro forma,

it

Section 102 (Krieth 1973). The Supreme Court has sanctioned

NEPA's requirements

calling the

gone so

far as to

information once

"essentially procedural."

Corp. of Engineers

court has

new and

approve an agency's refusal to consider it

this practice,

The

better

own EIS. For example, after the Army issued an EIS concerning a proposed dam on a tributary has completed

its

of the Rouge River in Oregon, the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife and the federal government's

own Soil

Conservation Service found

evidence that the environmental impact would be worse than the Army's

EIS had predicted. The supplement

"When

its

own

Army

discretion to rely

experts" to support matter, a court

its

on

information or

Supreme Court sanctioned

specialists express conflicting

must have

new

refused to consider the

EIS, and the

views," the court

said,

the reasonable opinions of its

preferred option. This

is

so "even

if,

that reflisal.

"an agency

own as

qualified

an original

might find contrary views more persuasive" {Marsh

Oregon

v.

Natural Resources Council 109 S.Ct. 1851, 1861 (1989).

Fully aware of this minimal reading of

NEPA,

reviewing agencies

often give EISs a perfunctory review, thus saving themselves the

and the

staff

the same time chalking their

money

time that would have had to go into a genuine study, and

own pet projects

up

a political favor that

are passed

around for

can be collected

criticism.

especially controversial projects are important

Because only

enough

at

when a

few

to attract the

attention of overworked and underfinanced public-interest groups, the vast majority

of impact statements glide through with only the most

*

The Supreme Court

of

NEPA. An

From 1975

has consistently supported the executive branch's views

indication of the court's approach can be seen in the

to 1991, the court

narrowed the scope of the

act.

reviewed 11

In the

NEPA

Supreme Court refused

and

in

statistics: all

11,

it

same time period, environmental groups

asked the Supreme Court to review cases they had the

cases,

lost in

to consider their appeals in

lower courts 25 times;

all

25

cases.

The American

Political

Economy

cursory review. In pitifully

fact,

Ecology Plus Economics Equals

I:

233

Politics

even some highly controversial projects receive

inadequate reviews. Agencies also seek to avoid the larger sub-

stantive issues their projects raise

by using,

as

much

and exclusive definitions of project and environmental

when

the

leases,

mining

as possible,

impact.

narrow

For example,

Department of the

Interior engaged in a regional study of of way, and the distribution of scarce water resources in connection with its plans to approve coal strip mining in the rights, rights

Northern Great Plains, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Interior Department should decide whether to prepare an EIS for the region before any individual strip-mining projects started. But the

Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, accepting the Interior Department's claim that it had no "program" or "proposal" for the region on which to prepare an EIS at that time. Finally, in

the

the case of the Trans-vMaska Pipeline, a case that arose before

Supreme Court had

NEPA

was simply

NEPA

established that the

set aside.

When

the

is

essentially procedural,

Department of the

Interior, despite

White House pressure, could not produce an EIS favorable to the pipeline yet plausible enough to stand up in court, the administration simply intense

persuaded Congress to pass legislation exempting the pipeline project fi-om

M

compliance with

Chapter

we

2,

Thus, although aborted,

it

NEPA

NEPA

ancy, for agencies have

that

its

is

some

Ml, open, and

fiilfilled

only the

spawned by

simple:

gain

No

may be

letter

that decision.

ill-conceived projects to be

explicit letter

environmental account-

of the law

by the Supreme Court) while evading the

important instance even the reason

has caused

has not resulted in

interpreted

requirements (Carter 1973; Odell 1973). In

discussed the environmental havoc

(as

spirit,

of the law was deliberately

Full disclosure

loss.

The known

set aside.

project sponsor or developer wants to let

the community's

minimally

and in one

it

be

of the kind of

information needed to internalize the costs of production and make intelligent decisions

on future development is deeply threatening to the industrial on the

order and to a political and economic system that has thrived invisibility

of the

invisible

hand.

One must

therefore question

whether the

openness and exphcimess needed to make internalization work can be achieved with our current institutions. At the very

some

painful readjustments in

hidden

costs,

our economic

and in the administrative and

least,

there

v^ have to be

mode of life, which is based on

political process allied

with

it.

Into the Political Cockpit Internalization

would be

precisely to the degree that this

approach explain why:

resisted it

was

by important economic effective.

Two

interests

leading proponents of

CHAPTER 5

234

A

system of pollution charges... would establish the principle that the

environment

must pay

owned by

is

Such massive

disposal.

seldom

represent

Haveman

the people as a

transfers

that the polluters

of "property rights" and the wealth they

without

occur

whole and

of using part of the environment for waste

for the privilege

political

and

(Freeman

upheaval

1972).

Implicit in any effective

program of internaUzation or environmental

management,

a deliberate reversal

therefore,

is

of

200-year-old bias in

a

favor of development and growth. Tow^ard this end, the

government

wdll

be required to take jealously guarded privileges aw^ay from, and impose heavy

new

obligations on, some of the most important and powerful actors in

For example, companies extracting virgin materials

the political system.

now

benefit

from

form of

a substantial tax break in the

new scheme of

allowance; in the

things,

not only will

a depletion

depletion

this

allowance be taken away but additional pollution and severance taxes will

be imposed.

It

apparent that producers have

is

little

how

cooperate in a program of internalization, no matter

incentive

to

well and fairly

administered, that threatens drastically to curtail both profits and power.

The

battle over stricter emission

and efficiency (milage) standards for

automobiles offers a foretaste of the kind of long political struggle that

would become

pervasive as Washington tried to force producers to

internalize ecological

and

social costs. Vital issues are at stake.

Oil

com-

panies and the automobile industry see a threat in higher-priced gasoline, alternative fuels,

trend

is

and smaller automobiles. They believe

allowed to proceed to

its

that if the current

logical conclusion, automobiles

eventually be luxury items again, with devastating effects

Labor, too, sees the threat implicit in controls

consumers do not terms of

utility.

desire

least,

pollution,

v^U

profits.

and even

goods that are more expensive but no better in

In short, internalization will inhibit if not prevent con-

tinued growth, and

very

on

on

nobody

really

wants material growth to end. At the

everybody wants somebody

else to

bear the costs of restructur-

ing the economy.

With important

interests so clearly

opposed,

seems doubtful that a

it

program of internalization can be fully, fairly, and efficiently administered. At best, there will be considerable lag as time-consuming political battles are fought out in the legislature and the courts, and economists agree that substantial delay in internalizing costs will be fatal to the market strategy.

At worst, internalization will be only partially apphed, and primary reliance on politically more cally less efficient measures,

such

(as

well as belatedly)

feasible

but economi-

as direct regulation, wall

shackle the

The American

Political

Economy

I:

Ecology Plus Economics Equals

235

Politics

market with price

a jumble of controls that will increase the irrationality of the mechanism without removing any of its environmental liabilities.

The market strategy thus seems likely to founder on politics, for the attempt to reform the price mechanism will transfer from the invisible hand to the highly visible political realm decisions on matters of critical importance to major

made

visible

then

interest,

interests in the society. If the invisible

and obedient to some

will inevitably bring

this

hand must be

conception of the

explicit

about

a

basic

common

change in the

character of American government, which has relied heavily on the market mechanism. Laissez-faire economics has been, in effect, a surrogate for politics.

With

demise, government seems likely to turn into competing economic interests fighting desperately in an age of ecological scarcity. its

a political cockpit for

for survival

Farewell

Man"

''Economic

to

The most fundamental concepts its

the system has habitually used to firame

A laissez-faire market system of "economic man," and these values

decisions are being called into question.

of economics

reflects the values

themselves, not just laissez-faire institutions, have become pernicious. For example, to a purely economic person there is no higher value than the mdividual wants of those living today; in pursuit of these wants it is

economically optimal to keep growing until one further increment of

growth will precipitate ecological catastrophe (Pearce 1973). The ultimate consequence of such a policy of ecological brinkmanship would, of course, be ruin. But

who

cares about ultimate consequences? In fact, any purely economic person must ignore the interests of posterity, for it has no agent he or she can bargain with in a market place and nothing of

economic value

to offer the person of today

posterity never has been, Posterity

is,

and never

damned

therefore,

if

Thus the current paradigm of political

The market

economic

tasks,

but

will

it

social values. Similarly,

an economic fact that

do anything

for us.

made "economically." economy which is based on

decisions are

the primacy of economics, must give politics.

It is

will be, able to

will cease to

way

one based primarily on performing vital be the dominant mode of allocating

remain an

to

essential tool for

economics, instead of being the master science

it

been since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, will be reduced to the more modest but still important role of handmaiden to has

ecological politics, supporting the material goals of the polity and

ing the

human

ecological household in a

way

nature and the long-term interests of humanity.

manag-

that respects the laws

of

The American Political Economy II: The Non-politics of Laissez Faire

The preceding

chapter showed that the invisible hand

reUed on for social decisions; we choices in order to



that

of its

The

we Americans

laissez-faire

American

Instead,

life.

no longer

to

be

explicit political

scarcity.

This

is

an

have never had a genuine

something apart from economics

is,

our community

be obHged to make

meet the challenges of ecological

embarrassing conclusion, for poHtics

shall

is

that gives direction to

politics has

been but

a reflection

economic system.

Functions of Economic Growth

Political

From our

earhest colonial beginnings, rising expectations have

been

a

fundamental part of the American credo, each generation expecting to

become

richer than the previous one.

growth,

the

class

and

conflict

nineteenth-century Europe were

Thanks

social all

to this expectation

discontent

typical

of

of early

but absent in America; poHtics was

accordingly undemanding, pragmatic, and laissez-faire. Thus, said Alexis

de TocqueviUe in his America,

we were

Growth

classic

indeed

is still

a

study of American civilization Democracy

in

"happy republic."

central to

American

poHtics. In fact,

it

matters

more

than ever, for the older social restraints (the Protestant ethic, deference, isolation)

have

all

been swept away. Growth 237

is

the secular religion of

CHAPTER 6

238

American and to

society,

a source

providing a social goal, a basis for political

of individual motivation.

society



itself

—has

an enor-

Basis of Pragmatic Politics

Growth continues to be essential style of American politics, which history

is

to the characteristic pragmatic, laissez-faire

has always revolved around the question of

to the opportunity to get

fair access

of the

government

individuals, enterprises, the

vested interest in the continuation of growth.

The Economic

on financially. Indeed, American political

but the record of a more or

spoils

economic growth

issues into

social

problems have been handled

for political principle, transforming

non-

ones that could be solved by economic bargaining. For

example, when labor pressed status as a

amicable squabble over the division

less

of a growing economy. Even

substituting

economic

its

come

pursuit of happiness has

be defined almost exclusively in material terms, and the entire

mous

by

The

solidarity,

its

class

demands, the response was to legitimize

bargaining unit in the division of the

spoils.

Once

labor had to

be bargained with in good businesslike fashion, compromise, in terms of

wages and other costable

benefits,

became

possible. In return for labor's

abandonment of uncompromising demands for socialism, others at the economic trough "squeezed over" enough for labor to get its share. Similarly new political demands by immigrants, farmers, and so on were bought ofi"by the opportunity to share in the fiiiits of economic growth. The only conflict that we failed to solve in this marmer was slavery and its aftermath, and it is typical that

once the legitimacy of black demands was recognized

1960s, the reflex response was to

promote economic opportunity

training, education, "black capitalism,"

and

fair

hiring practices



in the via

that

is,

job the

wherev^thal to share the affluence of the envied whites. If blacks prosper economically, says our intuitive understanding of politics, racial problems will vanish.

As all, it

a poHtical

is

a

mode, economic reductionism

has

many

virtues.

Above

superb means of channeling and controUing social conflict.

Economic bargaining is a matter of a little more or a litde less. Nobody loses on issues of principle, and even failure to get what you want today is tolerable, for the bargaining session is continuous, and the outcome of the next round may be more favorable. Besides, everybody's share is growing, so that even an unfair share

is

a

more-than-acceptable bird in

Most people understand that in a growth economy, individuals more to gain fi*om increases in the size of the enterprise as a whole than firom any feasible change in distribution. Furthermore, people have gotten what was of primary interest to them access to income and wealth and with their chief aim satisfied, they were able to the hand.

or groups have





— The American

Economy

Political

repress desires for

II:

The

community,

Non-politics of Laissez Faire

239

power, and other

social respect, political

values that are not so easily divisible as money.

This characteristic

style

of conflict resolution presupposes agreement on

the primacy of economics and a general willingness to be pragmatic and to

accept the bargaining approach to political and social issues.

as

well as

economic

Unfortunately, the arrival of ecological scarcity places issues

political

agenda that are not

easily

of all in terms of money. Trade-offi

on

compromisable or commensurable, are possible,

the

least

of course, but environmental

imperatives are basically matters of principle that cannot be bargained away in an

economic

fashion.

which our political

Environmental management

institutions are miscast, because

it

is

therefore a role for

involves deciding issues

of principle in favor of one side or another rather than merely allocating shares in the spoils.

opposing

made

it

Worse, a cessation or even

a slowing

interests into increasingly stark conflict.

possible to satisfy the

of growth

demands of new claimants

without taking anything away from others. Without however,

we

are left

will bring

Economic growth

has

to the spoils

significant

growth,

with a zero-sum game, in which there will be winners

and losers instead of big winners and

little

winners. Especially in recent years,

growth has become an all-purpose

"political solvent" (Bell 1974, p. 43),

satisfying rapidly rising expectations

while allowing very large expenditures

for social welfare

and defense. Without the

provide quasi-automatic solutions to

our

political institutions will

many of our domestic meet

important, long-suppressed social issues can

To

state the

social

problems,

a plethora

now

how

of demands. More

be expected to surface

of equality.

Ecological Scarcity versus

been

of growth to

be called on to make hard choices about

best to use relatively scarce resources to

especially the issue

political solvent

problem

Economic Justice

succinctly,

substitutes for equality

growth and economic opportunity have

of income and wealth. We have justified large

income and wealth on the grounds that they promote all members of society would receive fiature advantage from current inequality as the benefits of development "trickled down" to the poor. (On a more personal level, economic growth also ratifies the ethics of individual self-seeking: You can get on without concern for the fate of others, for they are presumably getting on too, even if not so well as you.) But if growth in production is no longer of overriding impordifferences in

growth and

that

tance, the rationale for differential rewards gets thinner,

cessation

of growth

it

and with

a

virtually disappears. In general, anything that

diminishes growth and opportunity abridges the customary substitutes for equality.

Because people's demands for economic betterment are not

CHAPTER 6

240

likely to disappear,

once the pie stops growing

date their needs, they will begin

Even more

fast

making demands

enough

accommo-

to

for redistribution.

serious than the frustration of rising expectations

prospect of actual deprivation off in terms of real

income

numbers of people get worse

as substantial

as a result

the

is

of scarcity-induced inflation and the

internalization of environmental costs. Indeed, the eventual consequence

of ecological it,

of

scarcity

least,

lower standard of living,

we

is,

can expect that

define

At the

our poHtics will come to be dominated by

—or "emulation,"

many times in To make the

more

we currendy

in fact, the classic prescription for revolution.

resentment and envy has

as

nature to realize that this will create

social tension. It

very

a

members of society. One does not need a gloomy view enormous political and

for almost aU

human

is

to use the old

word



-just as it

the past in democratic polities.

revolutionary potential of the politics of emulation

concrete, let us imagine that the current trend toward

making

automobile ownership and operation more expensive continues to the point where the car becomes once again a luxury item, available only to "the carriage trade." aristocrat

with

his or

How her

will the average person,

own

scooter or a bicycle, react to

this

private carriage but

once an economic

now demoted

deprivation, especially in

that the remaining aristocrats will

to a

view of the

fact

presumably continue to enjoy their

private carriages?

Of

course, such an extreme situation

(although

many would be

costs attributable to the

probably a long

is

priced out of the market today

if aU

automobile were internalized). Yet

it

way

off

the social

toward

is

such a situation that the rising costs due to ecological scarcity are pushing us. Already, in striking contrast to

the not-too-distant past, the price of a

detached house in the most populous areas of the country the average family can afford to pay. Also,

as

basic necessities continues to increase, less disposable

for the purchase

deprivation

is

is

more than

the cost of food and other

income

will

be

left

of automobiles and other highly desired goods. In sum,

inevitable,

even in the short term.

This point has not been

lost

on advocates

for the disadvantaged,

who

have already protested vehemently against the regressive impact of even

modest

increases in the cost of energy (through increased gasoline taxes,

for example)

*

and goods.* More

For every $1.00 increase

United

States.

Yet

if

generally, they fear that lessened

in the price

the gasoline tax

subsidies to the automobile,

gas (Schaeffer 1990, p. 15).

of oil, about 78,000 jobs are

were adjusted

to pay the cost

growth

lost in the

of all public

Americans would have to pay $4.50 per gallon of

— The American

Economy

Political

II:

The Non-politics of Laissez

will tend to restrict social mobility

some

the clock back in

The

areas,

political stage

is

minority

as

quo, or even turn

status

rights.

showdown between the on the one hand and socioeconomic justice therefore, for a

set,

claims of ecological scarcity

on the

such

and freeze the

241

Faire

other. If the impact of scarcity

distributed in a laissez-faire

is

fashion, the result will be to intensify existing inequalities. Large-scale redistribution, however,

is

almost totally foreign to our political

ma-

which was designed for a growth economy and which has used economic surplus as the coin of social and political payoff. Thus the chinery,

political

measures necessary to redistributing income and wealth such

that scarce

much

commodities

are to a large degree equally shared will require

greater social cooperation and solidarity than the system has

exhibited in the past.

They

will also require greater social control.

scarcity, there

a trade-off

is

between freedom and

equality necessitating almost total social control

Maoist China). However, even sale

will

as

in the

with perfect

was attempted in

(as

economy and major

whole-

transfers

of

well as other infringements of liberty in general, that

be resisted bitterly by important and powerfiil



Thus either horn of the dilemma would toss us into serious difficulties political

conditions of

partial redistribution will involve

government intervention

property rights,

Under

equality,

and moral resources

to or

interests.

laissez faire

that

beyond

or redistribution

would

capacity.

strain

our meager

American

founded on competition rather than cooperation, and

scarcity

society

is

is

likely to

aggravate rather than ameliorate the competitive struggle to gain eco-

nomic

benefits for oneself or one's group. Similarly,

based on a just division of the

spoils,

access to the increments of growth;

gone,

little is left

to

promote

social

Smith pointed out, the "progressive contrast, the stationary state

(Smith 1776, p. 81). ly predicated

is

once the

state"

is



that

of abundance are

Adam

and "hearty"; by

"hard," the declining state "miserable"

years of continuous

scarcity?

Process

only a specific instance of a more general problem. In

is

areas, the

is

How well will a set of political institutions complete-

The Non-politics of Due many

spoils

"cheerfiil"

growth cope with the "hardness" of ecological

policies

political ethic

cooperation and sharing. As

on abundance and molded by over 200

This dilemma

our

defined almost purely in terms of fair

American government

is,

specific

will

be obliged to have genuine

measures or programs designed to

fiarther

some

particular conception of the public interest. This will require radical

changes, because in our laissez-faire poHtical system, ends are subor-

CHAPTER

242

dinated to political means. In other words, as

opposed to "systems"

we

6

practice "process" politics

As the name

politics (Schick 1971).

implies,

emphasizes the adequacy and fairness of the rules govern-

process politics

ing the process of politics. If the process

is fair,

according to due process, the outcome

is

By

the best that the system can achieve.

then, as in a

assumed

trial

to be just

conducted



or

at least

contrast, systems politics

is

concerned primarily with desired outcomes; means are subordinated to predetermined ends.

The

process

model

many

has

virtues.

Keeping the question of ends out

of politics greatly diminishes the intensity of social the fairness of the rules, agree,

and they do not

conflict.

a matter about which they find

confi-ont each other

it

People debate

relatively easy to

with value demands, which

may

not be susceptible to compromise. However, by some standards, the process

model hardly deserves the name of politics, the

common

The common

"general will" are identical.

whatever the

political system's invisible

Of course, we laissez-faire

our

for

it

evades the whole issue of

interest simply by declaring that the "will of interest

hand cranks

have found that pure

been to curb the

reforms designed to preserve

we

prevent the efiicient or

definition, ill.

Hke pure

find intolerable, but

social costs

basic features:

its

by

and the

good or

laissez-faire politics,

economics, produces outcomes that

instinct has always

thus,

is

out, for

all"

We

of

by

laissez faire

check practices that

operation of the market rather than convert-

fair

ing to a planned economy;

we promote

equal opportunity rather than

redistributing wealth or income. Planning with certain ends in

mind does

Each separate atom or molecule in corporations, government agencies, ad-

take place in such a political system.

the

body poHtic

(individuals,

visory commissions, and supreme courts) plans in order to maximize

own

its

hand produces the aggregated result of action on these private plans. But the central government does not plan in any VA and FHA home systematic way, even though its ad hoc actions do in a sense constitute loans, tax breaks for homeowners, and the like ends, and the invisible

a "plan" for certain

In

reality,

What we

outcomes



really

suburban sprawl.

have

is

have non-policies.

is

almost a misnomer.

congeries of unintegrated and competitive subsys-



a

non-system.

outcome of due process means

accepting the

ceptable.

in this case,

"the American political system"

tems pursuing conflicting ends

produced by

— —

Now, however, just

this laissez-faire

Coping with

as in

And

that in

our

overall policy

most

particulars

economics, the externalities

system of non-poUtics have become unac-

the consequences of ecological scarcity will re-

quire explicit, outcome-oriented political decisions taken in the

some conception of an interest.

What

of

we

ecological, if not a political

likeHhood

is

there of this happening?

and

social,

name of

common

The American

Who

Dominates

Critics

Economy

Political

II:

The

Non-politics of Laissez Faire

243

the Political Marketplace?

of the American

(or superiority)

political

of process

system almost never question the necessity

politics. If bad

outcomes

are generated,

must be

it

because powerflil interests dominate the political marketplace and prevent the will of the majority from being

There has been,

domain by although the

flilly

and

fairly translated into

say the critics, a wholesale expropriation

outcomes.

of the public

(Lowi 1969; McConnell 1966). Nevertheless,

private interests

much of this criticism is incontrovertible, the general preferences of

American people

are in fact quite well reflected in political output.

People want jobs, economic opportunities, and a growing, economy. Indeed, to the extent that the system has

had

a guiding policy goal at

precisely to satisfy the rising expectations

of

its

citizens.

all, it

Even

been

has

if special

have benefited disproportionately from the measures taken to

interests

promote

this

end, most of the benefit has been transmitted to the vast

majority of the population.

The problem,

institutions are unresponsive to

the tragedy of the

our

then,

is

not that our

but that what

wills

we

political

desire generates

commons.

Naturally, to the extent that our

house for special

government

interests, the situation

largely a brokerage

is

much

is

worse, because such

have an even bigger stake in continued economic growth. But

interests

within a process system of politics, government decisions that consistentiy favor producer over

marketplace

political

is

are strongly motivated to organize, lobby,

advertise, Htigate,

By comparison,

indirectly afiected

but inevitable, for the

have a direct and substantial financial interest in

and regulation

campaign contributions, interests.

interests are all

subject to the pubHc-goods problem (Box 19).

who

For example, those legislation

consumer

make

and so forth in pursuit of their

the great mass of the people,

who

and whose personal stake in the outcome

is

will

be

likely to

be negligible, have very Utde incentive to organize in defense of their interests.

After

the "right" decision

all,

may be worth $10

million to

General Motors but will cost each individual only a few pennies. Thus those

who

try to stand

up

to special interests

on environmental

themselves up against superior poHtical resources

The

gross political inequaUty

of

profit

all

issues find

across the board.

and nonprofit

interests

epitomized by the favorable tax treatment accorded the former.

By

is

law,

tax-deductible donations cannot be used for lobbying or other attempts advertising).

Thus the nonprofit

depend very heavily on donations

are severely handi-

to influence legislation (for example,

organizations that

capped;

if they lobby,

contrast, can

taxable

they undercut their financial support. Businesses, by

deduct any

income and

by

pass

money on

spent for the same purpose from their

the remaining expense in the

form of higher

CHAPTER 6

244

prices. sidizes

The one

public,

both

consumers and

as

as taxpayers,

therefore sub-

in environmental disputes. Moreover, the law

side

changed without losing

tax-exempt

their

Thus the outcome of the

is

self-

cannot even lobby to have

protecting, for public-interest groups

it

status.

process of American politics faithfully reflects

the will of the people and their desire for economic growth. However, just as in

economic marketplace, the public

the

externalities as a result

power tends

political

mand, the

all

of producers

The Ecological The

faire,

political

wherein individual decisions add

make this macro-decision even more would otherwise be.

that tends to

than

it

Vices of Muddling

logic of the

reinforce, rather than counter-

destructive macro-decision, as well as a structural bias

commons

destructive of the

certain negative

power of producer interests;

economic market. In sum, the American

the drawbacks of laissez

up to an ecologically

and

from

suffers

political

to be used to ratify

decisions of the

system has

in favor

of the inordinate

commons

is

Through

enshrined in a system of process politics

obedient to the demands of both consumer and producer for economic

The

growth.

ecological vices of this system are further intensified

decision-making incrementalism

of

style characteristic

or, to

use the

all

our

institutions

more honest and



by the

disjointed

descriptive colloquial

term, "muddling through."

Incremental decision making largely ignores long-term goals; focuses

on the problem immediately

at

hand and

it

the solution

tries to find

most congruent with the status quo. It is thus characterized by comparison and evaluation of marginal changes (increments) in current

that

is

policies,

not radical departures from them; by consideration of only a

restricted

number of

policy alternatives (and of only a few of the

important consequences for any given alternative); by the adjustment of ends to means and to what

is

"feasible"

and

"realistic";

by

or

serial

piecemeal treatment of problems; and by a remedial orientation in which policies are designed to cure obvious

about some desired future is

not disinterested, for

it is

state.

immediate

Moreover,

ills

analysis

rather than to bring

of policy

alternatives

carried out largely by partisan actors

who

are

trying to improve their bargaining position with other partisan actors.

Muddling through is therefore a highly economic style of decision making that is well adapted to a pragmatic, laissez-faire system of politics. Moreover,

it

has considerable virtues. Like the market

incrementalism promotes short-term

stability

itself,

disjointed

by minimizing serious

conflict

over ultimate ends, by giving everybody something of what they want, and

by bringing bargained compromises among

political actors, satisfying their

The American

Political

Economy

needs reasonably well

same time,

at

II:

The Non-poUtics of Laissez

minimumal

public policy.

(assuming that

all

who

participate in the political

legitimate interests can participate equally,

does not

It

slight traditional values,

the costs of change, and It

may

At the

financial cost.

democratic; like the economic market,

also basically

It is

preferences of those

always the case). Disjointed incrementalism sense:

and

promotes the consensus and legitimacy needed to support

it

reflects the

intellectual

245

Faire

which

is

not

good

is

also conservative in a

it

encourages appreciation of

prevents overly hasty action

it

it

market

on complex

issues.

avoid serious or irreversible mistakes, for an incremental

also

measure that turns out to be mistaken can usually be corrected before

major harm has been done. Under

circumstances, disjointed in-

ideal

crementalism therefore produces a succession of policy measures that take the system step interests

by

step

toward the policy outcome that best

of the participants in the

some

Unfortunately, muddling through has

example,

it

does not guarantee that

account, and past

it is

likely to

equally large vices. For

overlook excellent poUcies not suggested by

experience. In addition, disjointed incrementalism

opportunities, and the like



in other words,

simple continuation of past policies important, because decisions are

muddling through

come up with

a series

is

is

not well

crises,

grand

any situation in which

not an appropriate response. Most

made on

the basis of immediate self-in-

almost guaranteed to produce policies that

is

will generate the tragedy

the

relevant values will be taken into

all

adapted to handling profound value conflicts, revolutions,

terest,

reflects

market.

political

of the commons.

the basis of short-term calculation

It is

perfectly possible to

seem eminently reasonable on of costs and benefits and that satisfy

of decisions that

all

current preferences but that yield unsatisfactory results in the long run, especially because the fixture

of costs and

is

likely to

benefits. In fact, that

into an ecological predicament. stability

is

be discounted in the calculation

just

achieved by muddling through

expense of long-term

stability

how we

have gotten ourselves

Thus the short-term adjustment and is

likely to

be achieved

at the

and welfare.

A perfect illustration of the potential dangers of muddling through is our approach to global warming. As decisions

made by

a result

of millions of separate

industry and individuals, 6 billion tons of carbon

dioxide are emitted into the atmosphere each year, and emissions are

3% annually. Yet no real congressional debate has occurred on whether to control these private decisions in order to reduce carbon emissions. Even worse, the executive branch blithely ignores the problem and advocates a more aggressive pursuit of the traditional energy and

increasing by

growth

policies that have

emissions.

As

a result,

brought about the

we go on

rise

in carbon dioxide

unwittingly pursuing business

as usual,

CHAPTER

246

making short-term

calculations of costs

and

6

and bring upon

benefits,

ourselves the greenhouse effect almost by default.

Indeed, in instead

its

purest form, muddling through

of by conscious choice

policy

is



making by

default

simply an administrative device for aggre-

gating individual preferences into a "will of

all" that

may

bear almost no

resemblance to the "general will." Unfortunately, the contrasting synoptic, or outcome -oriented,

style

of decision making cannot be

fully

achieved in

the real world because of limits to our intellectual capacities (even with

computers), lack of information (plus the cost of remedying

about our values and

many

lesser factors.

conflicts

between them, and time

Moreover, in

its

it),

uncertainty

constraints, as well as

pure form, synoptic decision making

could lead to irreversible and disastrous blunders, obliviousness to peoples values,

and the destruction of

muddling through

a

is

political consensus.

Thus some measure of

simple administrative necessity in any political system.

However, we Americans have taken muddling through, along with and other prominent features of our political system, to an

laissez faire

extreme.

We

have

made compromise and short-term adjustment

into

ends instead of means, have failed to give even cursory consideration to the fixture consequences of present acts, and have neglected even to try to relate current policy choices to

we

some kind of long-term

have taken the radical position that there can be no

beyond what muddling through produces. In what

is

brief,

an undeniable administrative necessity into

government, becoming in the process an "adhocracy" to the implications of our governmental acts

dangerous waters of ecological

and

goal.

Worse,

common

interest

we

have elevated

a

philosophy of

virtually oblivious

politically adrift in the

scarcity.

Disjointed incrementalism, then, provides an almost sufficient explanation of ecological

how we

crisis

have proceeded step by step into the midst of

and of why we

are not

meeting

its

challenges at present.

program for ecological catastrophe; as an entrenched reaHty with which the environmental reformer must cope, it is a cause for deep pessimism. At the very least, the level or quality of muddling through must be gready upgraded, so that ecology and the fliture are given due weight in policy making. But As a normative philosophy of government,

it is

a

goal-oriented muddling through comes close to being a contradiction in

terms (especially within a basically democratic system). Moreover, in-

crementalism in

is

adapted to status-quo, consensus

which policy outcomes

paradigm of politics

itself

especially pp. 300-304;

Thus

are

of

critical

politics,

not to situations

importance or

may be undergoing

radical

which the

change (Dror 1968,

Lindblom 1965; Schick 1971,

especially p. 158).

steering a middle course will be difficult at best, and

possible at

in

aU during the transition to a steady-state society.

it

may not be

The American

Political

Economy

II:

The Non-poUtics of Laissez

Poliq^ Overload, Fragmentation,

247

Faire

and Other

Administrative Problems Disjointed incrementalism

is

not the only built-in impediment to an

effective response to ecological scarcity. In the first place, the

complexity, and interdependence of society

scale,

making environment

make

growing

the decision-

increasingly problematic, for the greater the

ber of decisions (and, above

all,

num-

the greater the degree of risk they

make them. Given the of environmental management alone,

entailed), the greater the social effort necessary to

and complexity of the

size

especially

would be

there

task

with the declining margin for ecological or technological a

ecological scarcity

danger of administrative overload. But the only one

is

crises that will afflict decision

An

allied crisis

of

crisis

among many



impends,

as

of

part of a crisis of

makers in the decades ahead

priorities also

error,

crisis

(Piatt 1969).

burgeoning demands for

environmental cleanup, more and better social services, and so on compete for the tiny portion of government resources remaining after the "fixed" sacred

demands of

cows

defense, agricultural supports, and other budgetary

are satisfied, so that decision

makers

will simply lack suffi-

cient fiinds to act effectively across the board. (In the

been true throughout the 1980s and

has

may be

critical shortfalls in

United

States, this

early 1990s.) In addition, there

labor power, especially technical and scientific

labor power. In short, the problems are growing faster than the where-

withal to handle them, and political and administrative overload fore a potentially serious

problem

A second serious problem

is

is

there-

for the fiature, if not right now.

fragmented and dispersed administrative

The agency in charge of decisions on air pollution, for example, usually has no control over land-use poUcy, freeway building, waste disposal, mass transit, and agriculture! Also, some elements of poHcy responsibility.

handled

are

local

no

at

the federal level, whereas others belong to the state and

governments; the boundaries of local governments,

especially,

have

As a result, it firequently happens one agency or unit of government works at cross-purposes with another, or even with itself, as in the old Atomic Energy Commission, relationship to ecological realities.

that

which was charged with both nuclear development and radiation safety.* Furthermore, each agency has been created to perform a highly

*

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, whose

mission

is

protection of the

public from nuclear and radiation hazards, in practice also promotes nuclear

energy.

It

industry

it is

has

become,

as

do most government agencies, the captive of the

charged to regulate.

CHAPTER

248

which

specialized fiinction for a particular constituency,

leads to a single-

mindedness or tunnel vision that deHberately ignores the est. is

we

In brief,

have

them

difficult to get

A third

many

as

different policies as

we

6

common inter-

have bureaus and

it

to pull together.

major defect of our policy-making machinery

inevitably lag behind events



that decisions

is

usually far behind. In part, the

problem

is

that

the decision makers' information and knowledge are deficient and out of

Owing to

date.

the complexity and scope of the problems of environmental

management, these Thus, even

muddle through

provoke disruptive side

problem, however,

is

effects.

sions to lengthy delays.

Air Act to protect until 1990,

critical

problems with stopgap measures

Much

the larger part of the time-lag

that the procedural checks

basically adversary system of policy

took

end up

visibility in large national

EPA had proposed subjects aU

be issued of such

it

p. 28).

The

White House

matter

may

stiU

Office of Manage-

regulations to cost-benefit analysis.

But

plants to install "the best available retrofit

air

pollution impairing visibility in the parks.

that in so far as cost-benefit analysis causes regulations to

is illegal.

event, supports

parks and wilderness areas;

two-thirds of the visibifity reduc-

do not require the use of the

that

anlysis

subject controversial deci-

(Rauber 1991,

EPA

power

technology" to eliminate the

Opponents argue

our

EPA to issue draft regulations to implethe EPA issued its final regulations, the

in court. By presidential decree, the

the 1977 law requires

built into

For example. Congress in 1977 amended the Clean

however, for the

ment and Budget

and balances

making can

ment the law. Thereafi:er, before White House weakened them, sacrificing tions that the

costly.

they are inclined to be forward-looking, decision makers are

if

virmally obliged to that

remedy or too

deficiencies are either impossible to

They also argue

EPA

the original

best available technology, the use

a proper cost-benefit analysis, in

draft regulations



OMB

that

any

simply

manipulated the data to weaken them. This example suggests that the best

we can

expect in most cases

is

long wars of legal

mental despoilers. However, the adversary difficulty

coping with environmental

environmental poHcy making

*

Increased

volume

for redressing civil

is

where

is

and there

is

simply bog

only part of the problem.

The

wrongs, designed for two-party

with standing to sue and other suit,

may

issues,

society as a

whole

is

attrition against environ-

system

legal

down

already having

some

traditional legal

litigation,

risk that

in a morass of

is

machinery

having trouble

issues that

crop up in the typical environmental

one of the

parties. Also,

situations faster than the courts can

work out

new much of the

technology creates

precedents, and

of

and

scientific

evidence used in environmental litigation

statistical

nature that iU accords with the standards of proof traditionally

demanded by

courts.

is

a probabilistic

The American

Economy

Political

hearings, suits, countersuits, interests,

and

appeals, as

bound

to

each other.

And

even

be significant delays

249

Faire

government agencies, business

and environmentalist groups use

available to harass

are

The Non-polirics of Laissez

II:

all

the procedural devices

stalemate

if total

is

avoided, there

—an ominous prospect now

anticipatory response to problems has

become

that an

essential for their solution.

Additional hindrances to effective environmental decision making

abound. The narrowly

rationalistic

norms and modus

of

operandi

bureaucracies, for example, are at odds with the ecological holism

needed for the

of environmental management. History also shows

task

that regulatory agencies tend to

be captured by the

interests they are

supposed to be regulating, so that they rapidly turn into guardians of special interest instead of public interest. In addition, the institutions charged with environmental management are frequently so beholden to their

own

institutional vested interests or so

inertia that they actively resist change,

employing

dominated by sheer secrecy, special legal

advantages available to government agencies, and other devices to

squelch the efforts of

critics

Lewis 1972). In recent

years,

and would-be reformers

example,

(for

environmental decision making has been

hindered by nonstatutory mechanisms established in the White House.

The

Council on Competitiveness, for example, is a nonstatutory body that, after closed meetings with industry, has repeatedly forced the Environmental Protection Agency to rewrite regulations to President's

make them

hospitable to industry interests.

Council has successfully forced the visions

—some

say the "pillars"

Sept. 1991, p. Al).*

These

— of

EPA

As of

this writing,

to gut four

the

major pro-

the 1990 Clean Air Act (Weisskopf

difficulties suggest that the

problem

is

not

simply to overcome inertia and vested interest but rather to arrest the institutional

momentum

in favor of

growth created by two centuries

of pro-development laws, policies, and practices. This will require across-the-board institutional reform, not merely

new

policies.

In sum, administrative overload, fragmented and dispersed authority,

institutional legacy

making and enforcing

decisions,

and the

of the era of growth and exploitation are

likely to

protracted delays in

obstruct timely and effective environmental

*

social

poHcy making.

Industry and administration lobbyists had tried to persuade Congress to adopt

their

substitutes

for

all

four

provisions

when

the

legislation

was being

considered, but Congress had refiased to adopt them. Environmentalists thus be in a strong position to challenge these regulations as

illegal,

may

but even

if

they prevail, implementation of the law's requirements will be substantially delayed.

CHAPTER

250

6

How Well Are We Doing? None

of the tendencies and trends

optimism

our pohtical

that

we

have just considered inspires

institutions at

any

level are

much

adequate to the

challenges of deaHng with ecological scarcity. Although the final verdict

not yet in, this conclusion

performance so

certainly reinforced

is

far.

Energy policy

a

is

good

illustration.

coherent national energy policy

and

social turmoil, a

compromise of genuine

is

by the quality of their

its

Despite a consensus that a

economic

absolutely essential to avoid

menacing international

trade deficit,

and even the

poHtical independence, the United States has

much

poficy,

is

no

coherent one. Instead, the past decade has

less a

seen almost continual dithering and muddle and devotion to business

as

usual. In 1989 President Bush called for a long-term comprehensive poHcy, but what he proposed in 1991 was a mere grab-bag of favored

projects of the

oil, coal, gas,

and nuclear power

industries.

Among

these

was more off-shore oil drilling, drilling in environmentally pristine areas, and the doubling of nuclear power capacity by 2030. The President proposed few conservation measures, only a minuscule increase in research fijels

on renewable

energy, and support only for selected alternative

(ethanol and methanol but not for hydrogen,

fiiel cells,

or electric

vehicles). He proposed nothing to combat greenhouse gas emissions, except as an incidental consequence of his support for nuclear power. When the Reagan administration made similar proposals during its

and Congress fought each other to conservation, environmental protection, and the

years in office,

it

renewable energy and

fiaels

oU

drilling in the Arctic

favors raising automobile

oil

and nuclear

and other wilderness

areas; instead it

40 miles per gallon expected to be produced

to 10 times the oil

drilhng in the Arctic. But the Congressional majority

veto-proof and the sets

fiiel

majority in Congress has thus far

fiael-efficiency standards to

by 2001, which would save 5 by

a

on energy

support for

relative

versus the support for fossil

energy development. For example, rejected

a stalemate

result

is

a stalemate.

Continued

is

not

stalemate, regrettably,

the stage for an eventual general collapse of our energy

because of either rising costs of petroleum or intolerable

economy

levels

of pol-

lution. Similarly,

our

political institutions

have so

far

conspicuously failed to

meet the challenge represented by the automobile.

The decHne

in air

quahty was sufficiently alarming to cause Congress to pass the Clean Air Act in 1970. For all its faults, this was a landmark piece of environmental legislation, and acting under the law's authority, government agencies forced emission control on a reluctant automobile industry. However,

— The American

Political

Economy

II:

The Non-polirics of Laissez

251

Faire

Detroit several times succeeded in winning delayed compliance.

mandated by Congress

over, the air-quality standards

in the

1

More-

970 Clean

Air Act simply could not be achieved through technology alone. Yet

when

the Environmental Protection

Agency tried to impose on key would have penalized or re-

municipalities pollution-control plans that stricted car use (through gas rationing stance), the resulting poHtical

and

all

and parking surcharges,

ruckus soon forced the

EPA

for in-

into retreat,

pretense of meeting the original standards was abandoned. At the

same time. Congress

Economy

tried to control emissions

A

Standards (CAFE).

through Corporate Fuel

1975 law required manufacturers to

raise

the average efficiency of the cars they sold to 27.5 miles per gallon by

1985. Again, the executive branch granted the automobile industry

complying with the

many

and by 1990, efficiency standards had reached only 26.5 miles per gallon (which meant that the hoped-for delays in

law,

reduction in pollution was nuUified by a doubling, since the law was passed, of the

number of vehicle

The 1990 Clean Air Act

miles driven).

does tighten emission standards further and hopes to achieve

its

objectives

via technological changes such as the use of reformulated gasoline in the

nine most polluted metropohtan regions by 1995. But although the 1990

law will help, cleaning up the

air

and reducing greenhouse gas emissions

cannot be achieved by more stringent emissions standards alone, because

improvements in clean-air technology

are more than eaten up by growth and increases in vehicle miles driven. In short, as was shown in Chapter 3, Americans must simply drive much less than they do now (with much more efficient vehicles) and use mass transit

in the

automobile

fleet

much more. Unfortunately, having allowed to

dominate our hves that to

economic and hope

that

social crisis,

the automobile so completely

its

use

are repeatedly

would produce

instant

reduced to the desperate

some kind of technological fix will turn up in time to prevent mechanisms extreme price rises, national bankruptcy,



natural feedback

intolerable levels

Thus

we

restrict

of air pollution



fi-om taking matters out of our hands.

we are faiHng to meet the Everybody wants clean air and water, but nobody wants to pay Nor do we wish to give up the appurtenances of a high-energy in these

and other

critical areas

challenges.

the price. style

of hfe or to accept the major restructuring of the economy and

would be needed to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions sigEven modest invasion of sacrosanct private property rights for example, in the form of vitally needed land-use law has also proved to be well beyond our current pohtical capacity. In fact, since the beginning of the 1980s there has been considerable backlash and backsHding on environmental issues, leading to relaxed standards and blatant society that nificantly.



denial of problems. In short, although there has

been genuine progress

CHAPTER

252

since environmental issues

have so

political institutions

management and have efforts they

became

first

far largely

for the

a

matter for political concern, our

avoided the tasks of environmental

most part done too htde too

late in those

have undertaken.

As we have seen, the

and modus operandi

basic institutional structure

of the American

political

theless, the lack

of courage and vision displayed by the current

political

6

system are primarily responsible for

this.

Neverset

of

Congress nor the

actors should not escape notice. Neither

executive branch has provided real leadership or faced up to crucial issues. the extent that they have acted, as in the area of pollution control, they

To

have acted faintheartedly than

effectively.

and the

difficulty

what

of the problems,

leaders are doing the inability or reluctance

desires

or,

is

almost worse, expediently rather

Say what one will about the institutional impediments it is

hard to conclude that our political

job they were elected of our

But of course, the

to do.

simply

political officials to act

of the majority of the American people,

only modest willingness to make minor

who

have so

sacrifices (for

reflects the

evinced

far

example, to sup-

port and engage in recycling) for the sake of environmental goals, but no willingness to accept fiindamental changes in their

example, to

restrict

development to

areas

where public

or to support and use public transit and drive

can hardly be expected to commit environmental measures on

us.

political suicide

can expect

farther

is

Our

is

life

(for

available,

public officials

by forcing unpopular

Until the will of the people ordains

otherwise or fundamental changes are quite

we

less).

way of transit

literally

forced

on

us, the best

piecemeal, patchwork, ineffective reform that lags ever

behind onrushing events.

The Necessity for Paradigm Change Our

political institutions, predicated

almost totally on growth and abun-

dance, appear to be no match for the mounting challenges of ecological scarcity.

This

is

a

shocking conclusion about

once regarded, even by many foreigners, aU It

its

faults,

as

a poHtical

system that was

marvelously progressive. For

American political system are undeniable: nearly two hundred years, and it was eminently just

the virtues of the

worked well

for

and humane by any reasonable

historical standard. Unfortunately, the

problems of scarcity that confiront the system today are problems that was never designed

to handle.

what we must now of ecological

it

Many of its past virtues are therefore irrelevant;

address are

its

equally undeniable failings in the face

scarcity.

Efforts to patch

up the current paradigm of pohtics with new modes

of decision making and planning

—or even with new

policies



will

not

The American

Political

Economy

II:

The

Non-politics of Laissez Faire

253

succeed. These can only delay, and perhaps intensify, the ultimate break-

down. Only

a

new

pohtics based

practically appropriate to

achieve this

new

on

politics will require a revolution

than that which created our nation in the features of

American

must be transformed. Will

we make

civilization,

first

are morally

Chapter

(see

and

8).

To

even more fundamental

place, for the characteristic

not merely the nature of the regime,

A great question stands before

the

American

polity:

the effort to translate our ideals of equality and fi-eedom

into forms appropriate to the

new

continuing prodigally to sow

as

reap the consequences?

age of scarcity, or will

long

Only time

as

will

must inevitably presage retrogression quality, oppression,

are

of values that

a set

an age of scarcity will do

and

conflict,

we tell

we

not even

whether the return of scarcity

to the classical scenario

but one way or another,

about to find out what kind of people

try,

can and leaving the future to

we

really are.

of ine-

we Americans

Ecological Scarcity and International Politics

The Comparative Our

Perspective

principal focus so far in Part

has

II

been on the American poHtical

system, specifically the strong market orientation of its poHtical economy.

However, as noted the

United

in the Introduction, the

extreme version of modern industrial

American version of

civilization,

this civilization

obscure the wider implications of the

States

is

only the most

and the pecuHarities of

ought not to be allowed to

analysis.

Some problems may be

uniquely American, but most are universal in one form or another. Let us therefore extend the analysis international political arena.

and dilemmas of ecological changed. Furthermore, tions in Chapters 5

to other nations

first

scarcity discussed in

much of the

crisis

and 6 can in

and communist

of ecological

is

of American

institu-

be appHed, with appropriate

fact

weU

alike, as

scarcity

Chapter 4 remain un-

specific analysis

modifications, to aU developed and even capitaHst

and then to the

We shaU find that the basic poHtical dynamics

many developing

as to

thus a planetary

countries,

the world in general.

The

crisis.

Western Europe In Chapters 2 and

3,

we compared

various aspects of Western Europe's

environmental situation to the United

States.

Western Europe's environ-

and magnitude

mental problems are essentiaUy the

same

those of the United States, and

governments on the whole seem to

exhibit the

its

same degree of capacity

in character

to deal

255

as

with them. In some ways,

CHAPTER 7

256

however, Western European governments have dealt with their problems

more

effectively than this

country

has.

For example, Western European

governments, with the exception of the United Kingdom, have managed to reduce atmospheric emissions of sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides,

and

particulates to lower levels per unit of gross domestic product than has

the United States.

On

the other hand, emissions of nitrogen oxides,

compounds, and toxic wastes are rising in almost all countries. Surface waters in Western Europe suffer ffom low oxygen levels, eutrophication from nitrates and phosphates, and high levels of toxic metals. In addition, lakes are dying from acid deposition. Although volatile organic

isolated success stories have occurred (for example,

discharges of toxic metals into to 55 tons per year in 1985),

its

Sweden reduced

waters from 1300 tons per year in 1972

Western European waters are generally in the

same condition as those in the United improvement. In certain respects, as

States



polluted, with

of

a result

its

little

overall

greater density of

population and industrial development, Europe's pollution problems are

worse than our own. The contamination of the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas and of the RJiine River, heavy oil spillage from tankers and refineries,

and the "acid rains" that

fall

particularly

on Scandinavia

are only

most notorious examples. Europeans also have more threatened species and decHning forests than does the United States. With respect to resources. Western Europe's predicament is clearly much worse. Even taking due account of the temporary respite that

some of

the

development of North Sea gas and oil has brought, Europe's long-term dependence on external sources of energy is far greater than our own; for example. Western Europe has nothing resembling America's vast coal

Western European mineral resources are almost negliactual and potential demand. Perhaps more critically. compared to gible Western Europe as a whole is a major net importer of food and fiber, and the dependence of many European countries, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, on food imports is overwhelming (both to feed the poreserves. Similarly,

pulace and, ironically, to sustain energy-intensive agricultural systems that are mainstays

of their economies). Thus Western Europe

overextended ecologically in relation to

United

States.

For us Americans,

a

its

own

is

even more

resources than the

major disruption of world trade would

would be little danger of starvation, and domestic sources of energy would be available in sufficient quantity to keep the economy fimping along. Europe does not enjoy such luxury. World trade must continue along established lines or economic cause painful retrenchment, to be sure, but there

coUapse threatens.

Western European political systems have the same tendency as the American system to permit activities that degrade the environment. AH

Ecological Scarcity and International Politics

257

same growth-oriented world view.

share the

All have followed the path

blazed by the United States toward high mass consumption and, to a

somewhat lesser extent, high energy use. All are mass democracies in which political parties compete for favor largely on the basis of how well they can

years,

the material aspirations of the citizenry. In short, having

satisfy

traveled the

we

same

basic path in roughly the

Westerners have

wound up

Nevertheless, just as there are

of ecological

scarcity,

some

so too there are

potential for political adaptation. For

same manner

for the last

in approximately the

same

differences in the nature

some

one

250

place.

and degree

significant differences in the

thing,

Europe has had

to

contend

with ecological scarcity in numerous ways even during an era of unparalleled abundance. ple,

Not

possessing the

same cornucopia of found wealth,

Europe hds never been so

States.

with

profligate

its

for

exam-

resources as the United

For instance, Europeans manage to achieve roughly comparable living while using only about half

standards

as

much

Americans. Also, Europeans practice sustained-yield quite stringendy

by U.S.

standards, support

energy per capita

forestry, control

and use public

transit

as

land use

more than

Americans do, and so on. Thus, both because of necessity and because of a generally less doctrinaire attachment to the principles of laissez

much

exists in

Europe

controls.

Moreover, at

acquisition as a

a

greater willingness to accept planning

least in

way of life

faire,

there

and

social

some quarters, disenchantment with bourgeois grown markedly. The rise of Green political

has

parties in several countries has

introduced an ecological agenda into the

political arena. In general, therefore,

European nations may cope somewhat

better with ecological scarcity than the physical challenges they will

United

States, despite the greater

face.

Japan Although

in terms

of ecological scarcity Japan's situation

is

much more

desperate than that of Europe, Japan possesses countervailing political and social advantages over

United

States, a

Europe. With about half the population of the

land mass about the size of

Montana

that

is

mostly

mountainous and poorly endowed with mineral and energy resources, and the second

largest

economy

in the world, Japan

island indeed. Prevented firom gaining

is

a

very tight

by military means

little

a position

of

power, respect, and economic security in the international community, the Japanese entered the great postwar international

GNP

stakes deter-

mined to v^n economically what could not be won by force of arms. They "aped" (their own word) the acquisitive ethic and mass-democratic institutions of the West so effectively that they achieved economic growth of unprecedented intensity and

rapidity.

This extraordinary "success"

CHAPTER 7

258 earned them notorious pollution problems, such ing that killed a level

as

the mercury poison-

1900 people and paralyzed or affected thousands more, and

of dependence on foreign trade and foreign sources of raw

materials and fuels that

turmoil and resource artificial restriction

extreme form.

A

makes them extremely vulnerable to international whether due to natural exhaustion or to

scarcities,

by

Japan thus faces ecological scarcity in an

cartels.

serious interruption of oil supplies

from the Persian

Gulf, a substantial decUne in the fish catch, the inability or unwillingness

of the United

States

and other countries to continue to supply

quantities of food, timber, minerals and other vital products

numerous other which has



vast

these and

potential threats could have severe consequences for

committed itself to the modern way of industrial beyond its ecological means. Beginning in the early 1970s, and especiaUy after the energy crisis of 1973-1974, the Japanese awoke to the fact that they were headed for an ecological precipice. The Japanese government cracked down on pollution with progressively greater severity and has recently moved to conserve energy and control growth in general. An awkward problem for Japanese poHtical leaders, who are largely drawn from the businessoriented, conservative Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) that has ruled throughout the postwar era, is that the powerful economic interests that are the LDP's main source of support, financial and otherwise, are also the

Japan, life

and to living

totally far

chief polluters and main beneficiaries of growth. there are a

number of positive

cost of living, the cost

factors.

On

the other hand,

Because of extreme congestion, the

and importance of educating children, and the cost

of caring for the aged (before the government

started to

do

so in 1973),

Japanese families have successfiiUy controlled their birth rate in the

postwar

era.

overcome

That success was achieved despite the ruHng

party's efforts to

labor shortages by tightening the country's abortion law, pro-

hibiting the sale of birth control

bonuses" to

women who

had

pills,

a third

and proposing to give "baby

and fourth

child. In addition, the

adoption and implementation of environmental regulations have been facilitated

by

economic and

a

tradition

social

indicators, Japan

life.

by the

of government intervention in

The late

result has

been

that

all

areas

of

on many environmental

1980s was doing better than either the

Western Europe. For example, between 1975 and the late 1980s, Japan had reduced its annual sulfur dioxide emissions by more than 60%; the comparable reduction for the United States was only 25%. United

States or

Japan was the only industrialized country that successfully reduced emissions

of nitrogen oxides during that period. Likewise, Japan has been

reducing toxic pollution of countries and

more than

its

waterways more than most European

the United States.

Ecological Scarcity and International Politics

259

Eastern Europe and The Soviet Union

The former case.

Soviet bloc is the most interesting and revealing comparative Because they were the leading non-market industrialized nations, these

countries should seemingly have been exempt,

if not

dynamics of scarcity,

failings

from most of the

at least

economics and poUtics discussed the U.S.S.R.

and

former

its

and have demonstrated

from the

basic political

of American market

in the preceding chapters. In fact, however,

have severe environmental problems

satellites

far less capacity to deal

with them than the United

and other market-oriented democracies.* That the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have

States

problems

and

is

their structures are deteriorating,

mountains

crop yields are diminishing, rivers are

water

earlier

little

going down in some

are

teeming with dead

more than open

and clean drinking water

polluted,

is

actually

environment

serious

not denied by governmental spokespeople. Cities are blackening

expectancy

scarce. Life

is

trees,

ground-

sewers,

is

men die 7 to 10 years men in other developed countries; in Northern Siberia, men die and women 14 years earHer than men and women in the northern areas. Statistically, Russian

than

22 years

countries of Western Europe (Yablokov et industrial areas have high rates

other diseases. Indeed, standards.

Coal

containing high

some

Czechoslovakia's

soils

1991,

C3). People in

p.

of cancer and of respiratory,

and

skin, Hver,

pollution levels are astonishing by Western

the primary

is

sulfrir levels,

al.

friel

in Eastern Europe;

it

is

"dirty" coal,

and is burned wdth few or no emission

controls.

receive 25 metric tons of emitted pollutants annually

per square kilometer, compared to 0.6 tons for Sweden. Twenty million Russians breathe highly polluted

have

become environmental

Nizhny

al.

Many people

refrigees;

Tagil, Kirishi, Angarsk,

water (Yablokov et

air.

they have

in the

former Soviet bloc

moved from Prokopyevsk,

and other places in search of clean

air

and

1991, p. C3). Industries and municipalities throughout

commonly discharge their wastes, untreated, into rivers. The Union treats only 30% of its sewage annually. Many present and former Soviet cities among them PJga, the capital of Latvia have no sewage treatment plants at all. 75% of Russia's surface water is too polluted to drink. 50% of Poland's cities don't have sewage treatment plants; 35% of its industries don't treat their wastewater. 65% of Poland's river water is too the former bloc

Soviet





corrosive (to say nothing of its contamination with sewage

*

In the

breaking

summer of up

into

1991, what had been the Soviet

independent

confederate government

However, we

shall

at

or

whose

final

toxins) to

Union appeared

semi-independent

the "center"

and

countries,

be

to

be

with

a

form has not yet emerged.

continue to use the term Soviet Union to refer to the area that

was, until mid- 1991, one country.

.

CHAPTER 7

260

used by industry. Even automobile pollution, which should be low because the

number of cars per

in the West,

is

a

capita in these countries

were built with two-stroke engines that burn create a sooty, air

smoking exhaust. Needless

and water pollution,

the Soviet Union, dying.

A

is

lower than

far

problem. Soviet bloc cars had no pollution controls.

with such high

levels

69% of the

that

fresh- water fish in Russia are

"extremely contaminated" by mercury-based pesticides (Yablokov 1991, has

of

polluted and their fish populations

are

seas

1989 study showed

say,

Some

and gasoline together to

everywhere in the region are expiring; in

lakes

whole

to

oil

et

al.

C3). Sadly, people are dying too; the Soviet Ministry of Health

p.

found that

itself

and mortality

disease

higher in badly

are

rates

polluted areas than in other areas of the Soviet Union.

Eastern European countries also use energy inefficiently



about United States, which itself is only half as efiBcient as Western Europe and Japan. Moreover, despite a relatively favorable position compared to Europe and America, the U.S.S.R. is not exempt from ecological scarcity with respect to its resources. For half as efficiently as does the

example, sizable grain purchases in recent years have made that the Soviet Union's agricultural situation

prospect of Malthusian starvation

is

is

it

evident

problematic, even

the

if

remote. Some of the problem may

be attributed to deterioration of the country's soils. Two-thirds of the country's arable land suffers from soil erosion; 1.5 billion tons of topsoil are lost each year. In addition,

irrigated land has

been

lost

more than 10% of the

U.S.S.R.'s

to salinization. Soil deterioration

and

pollution result in 16 billion rubles worth of crop losses each year in the Soviet Union.

Even the Soviet Union's apparent abundance of domestic energy

may be

resources

illusory, at least in part.

regions; they also indicated. Finally,

may be

Some

of

its

resources are not

remote and environmentally forbidding substantial than rough estimates had

readily exploitable, for they lie in less

they probably cannot be

vanced Western technology and Western

fially

exploited wdthout ad-

capital,

which Soviet bloc

countries desperately seek (and which, at least from public sources in the

West, has not been readily available)

Why

have communist countries failed so dismally

their environmental problems? sibihty thrall

of such

by

selfish

failure.

After

market

interests.

at

coping with

Communist propaganda denied

all, it

said,

the Soviet system

Therefore

it

would

easily

is

the pos-

not held in

be able to deal

with any environmental problems that cropped up, whereas pollution and other environmental

ills

in the

West were seen

as

serious

emerging

"contradictions" (inherent self-destructive forces) that capitalist nations

would not be

able to overcome.

It

didn't

work out

that way.

Why?

Ecological Scarcity and International Politics

First,

261

the ideology of growth and behef in the

were even more strongly entrenched

power of technology

in the U.S.S.R. than in the West, so

abandoning or even compromising growth in production for the sake of environmental protection or resource conservation was heretical concept.

For one thing,

as

pointed out

a

much more

in the Introduction, the

its achievement on the aboHtion of material abandon growth would be tantamount to abandoning a Utopian promise that had inspired the whole society. Worse, this cherished Utopian goal was used to justify many features of Soviet life that seemed

Marxist Utopia depends for

scarcity.

Thus

to conflict

to

with basic Marxist principles. Soviet leaders, for example,

explained the use of differential rewards

munist principle "to each according to

(as

his

opposed needs")

to the true as a

com-

necessary ex-

pedient to help build the requisite material and productive base for a Utopia of abundance.

More

important, the "proletarian dictatorship" and

"democratic centralism" exercised by the Communist Party were rationahzed with

this

brand of logic. The

tions could thus cause

Second, largely

awkward a

as

loss

also

of such convenient justifica-

political repercussions.

of

result

toward material expansion (but

this

also

fundamental ideological bias

because of preoccupation with

economic concerns in policy on production to the virtual made the Soviet efite very resistant to more than

national security) the primacy of narrow

matters was almost

exclusion of

all

else

total,

and

fixation

token concern for the environment. Third, although they were employed by the state rather than by

economic managers competed with other managers v^thin the basic framework of the national plan, and their reluctance to spend money on nonproductive pollution control, their

private corporations, Soviet

v^dlhngness to foist the external costs of production onto others, and their desire to

win promotions by overproducing

the quota

made them be-

have, with respect to the environment, just like capitalist managers.

Moreover, economic managers in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

had

far greater political

respect, the tragic logic

power than

of the

their

commons

Western counterparts. In one

operated even more viciously in

those countries: Because not only air and water, but virtually resources,

were (thanks to

state

ownership) treated

as free

all

natural

or semi-fi-ee

goods, there was an even greater tendency on the part of economic

managers to use land, energy, and mineral resources wastefuUy Fourth, because government decisions were

by leaders

who

made

in private council

put production and the vested interests of the

state

economic bureaucracy first, those concerned about the problems of growth had little opportunity to influence policy as it was being formed; they could only point out the adverse consequences of past policies.

CHAPTER 7

262

Environmentalists, to the extent that they dared to appear, were vigorously suppressed in Soviet bloc countries.

Only

after

Chernobyl and Mikhail

Gorbachev's ^/tJ5«05^ could people participate in environmental protests.

to

In short, Soviet economic and political institutions seem designed produce environmental deterioration and resource depletion more

relentlessly than their

American counterparts. The essential reason was on Soviet environmental policy:

sardonically stated by a leading expert

"The replacement of private greed by

public greed

is

not

much

of an

improvement" (Goldman 1970). But even that was an understatement, for private greed has been subject to modest, though inadequate, controls. The irony is that Soviet bloc environmental standards on the books were stringent; air and water quality standards were even stricter than those in Western countries. This was because the standards were promulgated on the basis of public health and did not need to be compromised in order to accommodate powerful economic interests. There was only one problem: The powerful economic interests that is, powerful government ministries, operating in secret and with no outside input saw to it that the regulations were not enforced. The standards had no chance of prevailing among ministers whose overriding goal was growth. The communist experience demonstrates that although both Western and communist economic institutions produce environmental deterioration, the nature of the particular political institutions through which the "greed" for material growth is translated into economic output makes a difference. In the final analysis, the greed of powerfiil economic interests can be controlled more easily when openness and democracy prevail. The communist experience also demonstrates that if they are very strongly committed to growth, highly centralized and effective governments may wreak more and faster havoc on the environment than even the most





laissez-faire

government.

The Third World The developing

or less-developed countries (LDCs)

so-caUed Third World of course

differ greatly

constituting the

from each other

important respects, but for the purposes of our discussion,

*

Lacking any reasonable alternative,

seems to

Box

us, culturally biased

we employ

all

modemizers

of

its

many by

these well-established but,

it

terms in their narrow economic sense. Bhutan (see

27), a country that preserves the ancient

virtually

in

little is lost

traditional

richness,

is

to the contrary notwithstanding.

and admirable Tibetan culture in scarcely

undeveloped,

fanatical

Ecological Scarcity and International Politics

263

27 Bhutan: Developing Sustainably Bhutan, alone

among modern

countries, practices sustainable

development. According to Christopher Flavin, {World Watch, 1990) although the country's last two kings have supported some

economic growth, they have given first priority to the environment. Government officials nationahzed the country's forests in 1979 to stop them from being over-exploited. Now, forestry officials permit only selective logging

at a rate

they believe

is

ging

is

They have outlawed

permitted.

They have which no log-

sustainable.

established large wildlife reserves and greenbelts in

the export of raw logs.



The

country generates most of its energy renewably with wood and hydropower. Government policy favors energy growth by more hydropower and solar energy rather than by fossil or nuclear fuels. Bhutan's population growth has been about

enjoy a high

status. All

time of marriage and

2% per year. Women

couples receive population counseling

after the birth

of each

child.

at the

The government

has made contraceptives available at 70 Basic Health Units spread around the country. There are no great disparities of wealth in the

Most farmers grow their crops on small plots and graze catand yaks in the mountains. Bhutan has escaped the growth ideology common to the rest of the world partly because of geography and partly because of culture. Bhutan is a very isolated Himalayan country; it has been almost entirely inaccessible to the outside world. Its religion, Buddhism, retains a love for nature and all Hving things. It has few economic tensions and no powerful business interests no industries left behind by the British. Its people know little about consumer items that people in other cultures crave. Its kings have not been corrupted by business or other powerful interests, and they have left much government decision making to local government units. As the country proceeds to develop, economic and consumer interests that clash with the requirements of sustainability may yet come into being. But so far, Bhutan has retained an exceptional status. country.

tle



considering

them

together. In brief,

most LDCS, and

especially the

group

of exceptionally poor countries sometimes called the Fourth World, are not sufticiently developed to experience neo-Malthusian ecological scar-

CHAPTER 7

264

city.

Instead, they confront ecological scarcity in

form: too

with

about to

many

people, too

little

food. Because this core problem, along

major ramifications, was covered in Part

its it

here, except that almost

crudest Malthusian

its

I,

everywhere the

no more need be said seem greatly

difficulties

exceed the capacity of current governments in the

them. Even now, for example,

LDCs

many governments cannot

to

cope with

assure

their

all

enough food to maintain life, and the future prospects are grim. However, there are some interesting exceptions to this general picture. The LDCs run the gamut from virtual non-development to what is usually called semi-development, in which considerable industrialization citizens

and modernization coexist with continued non-development, especially in rural areas. In general, countries moving toward semi-development

seem

to follow established models.

Mexico and

Brazil, for

followed a basically American path (Mexico City has a

example, have

smog problem

worse than that of Los Angeles), and Brazil's treatment of its undeveloped wealth, especially such fragile and irreplaceable resources as the Amazon rain forest, epitomizes frontier

economics

at its

most

other hand, Taiwan and South Korea have proceeded

heedless.

more or

On

less

the

along

down by Japan and have encountered many of the same The environmental problems of developing countries are ex-

the lines laid

problems.

acerbated by the burden of their debt to the developed world. In 1989

developing countries paid $77 biUion in interest on their debts and $85 billion in principal, paying out

$50 biUion

a year

to wealthy nations than they received in

new

more

This massive transfer of resources from poor poverishes the people of these regions but

behind many environmental forests,



disasters

is

the

in debt

repayments

developmental

assistance.

to rich not only

also the

im-

propeUing force

unsustainable logging of

the overgrazing of pasture, the depletion of mineral resources, the

overexploitation of fisheries, and the grov^dng of crops (such as cofree) that

can earn cash

as

exports rather than crops that can feed their

own

famished people.

The

International State of Nature

The

International

Macrocosm

If in the various national

community

microcosms constituting the world

the basic dynamics of

across the board, in the

political

ecological scarcity apply virtually

macrocosm of international

politics they operate

Ecological Scarcity and International Politics

even more

strongly. Just as

logic of the

mon-pool

commons

it

265

does within each individual nation, the tragic

com-

brings about the over-exploitation of such

resources as the oceans and the atmosphere. Also, the pressures

toward inequality, oppression, and conflict are even more intense within it is a community in name only, and marked cleavage between rich and poor threatens to become even greater. Without even the semblance of a world government, the solutions of such problems depends on the good will and purely volun-

the world political community, for

the already

tary cooperation

of over 170 sovereign

inspire optimism. Let us

examine these

states



issues in

does not

a prospect that

more

detail, to see

how

ecological scarcity aggravates the already very difficult problems of international poHtics.

The Global Tragedy of the Commons The

of the

tragic logic

commons

are readily visible internationally

national rivers, of seas, and that has caused a as

now

marked decline

operates universally, and



in the

effects

its

growing pollution of

inter-

of even the oceans; in the overfishing in the fish catch in

some

areas, as well

the near extinction of the great whales; and in the

impending

scramble for seabed resources by maritime miners or other exploiters.

There

is

no way

to confine environmental insults or the effects

of

ecological degradation within national borders, because river basins, airsheds,

local

and oceans

are intrinsically international.

Even seemingly

environmental disruption inevitably has some impact on the

quality of regional and, eventually, global ecosystems. Just as

it

does

within each nation, the aggregation of individual desires and actions overloads the international

commons. But,

to turn a blind eye to this, for they profit

while others bear most or

all

while others receive most or

of the all

like individuals, states

tend

by the increased production they lose by self-restraint

cost, or

of the benefit. Thus Britain

gets the

factory output while Scandinavia suffers the ecological effects of "acid

French and Germans use the Rhine for waste disposal even though this leaves the river little more than a reeking sewer by the time when, downstream, it reaches fellow European Economic Community member Holland. Even though the problems are basically the same everywhere, the rain"; the

political implications

of the tragedy of the

serious in the international arena.

international poHtics

is

It

commons

has long

are

much more

been recognized

that

the epitome of the Hobbesian state of nature:

Despite aU the progress over the centuries toward the rule of internation-

CHAPTER 7

266

sovereign

al law,

states,

unlike the citizens within each

state,

acknowledge

no law or authority higher than their own self-interest; they are therefore free to do as they please, subject only to gross prudential restraints, no matter what the cost to the world community. For example, despite strong pressures from the international community, including a 5-year

moratorium on commercial whaling by the International WhaHng Commission, Japan and Iceland continue to hunt whales. More than 13,000 whales have been killed since the international community banned whaling. The United States relendessly spews huge amounts of carbon dioxide into the

air

commons,

among

despite efforts

other industriaHzed

nations to get an agreement to reduce greenhouse emissions. In international relations, therefore, the dynamic of the tragedy of the

commons

even stronger than within any given nation

is

community, has

a real political

at least

on

binding, authoritative decisions protection.

By

state,

which, being

the theoretical capacity to

make

resource conservation and ecological

contrast, international

agreements are reached and enforced

by the purely voluntary cooperation of sovereign nation states existing in a state of nature. For all the reasons discussed in Chapter 4, the likelihood of forestalling

by such means the operation of the tragedy of the commons

extremely remote. Worse, just

outcome by refiises

his

or her

own

as

any individual

is

nearly helpless to alter the

is

actions (and even risks serious loss if he or she

to participate in the exploitation of the

commons), so

too, in the

absence of international authority or enforceable agreement, nations have choice but to contribute to the tragedy by their

little

would be

steady-state

world,

own

actions.

This

true even if each individual state was striving to achieve a domestic

economy, for unless one assumes agreement on

states

would

mize the resources

still

compete

available to

them. Ecological scarcity thus

fiandamental problem of international politics

—by adding

order

a largely autarkic

with each other internationally to



maxi-

intensifies the

the achievement of world

further to the preexisting difficulties of a state of nature.

Without some kind of international governmental machinery with enough authority and coercive power over sovereign states to keep them within the bounds of the ecological must

suffer the

tragedy of the

The

common

interest

of all on the planet, the world

ever-greater environmental

ills

ordained by the global

commons.

Struggle Between Rich

and Poor

Ecological scarcity also aggravates very seriously the already intense struggle

between rich and poor. As

is

well

known, the world today (some

Ecological Scarcity and International Politics

forthcoming changes

will

267

be discussed in the following section)

polarized between the developed, industrialized "haves," greater or lesser degree

and

all

more

getting

underdeveloped or developing "have nots,"

affluent

all

is

sharply

affluent in a

the time, and the

relatively

all

all

and absolutely

impoverished and (with few exceptions) tending to faU further and further behind despite their often feverish efforts to grow.

The degree of

known: The United States, with only 6% of the world's population, consumes about 30% of the total energy production of the world and comparable amounts of other resources; it throws away enough paper and plastic plates and cups to set the table for a worldwide the inequaUty

also well

is

picnic six times a year (Durning 1991,

The United

p.

161).

of the "haves," though only about half as prodigal

rest

States,

still

consume resources

far

as

the

out of proportion to their

population. Conversely, per capita consumption of resources in the

developing world ranges from one-tenth to one-hundredth that in the

"have" countries. To make matters worse, the resources that the "haves" enjoy in inordinate amounts are largely and increasingly

imported from the developing world. For example, developed nations consume two-thirds of the world's steel, aluminum, copper, lead, tin, zinc, and three-fourths of the world's energy. Thus economic inequality and what might be called ecological colonialism have become intertwined. In view of this extreme and long-standing

nickel,

inequality (which, moreover, has

its

roots in an imperialist past),

it is

hardly surprising that the developing world thirsts avidly for develop-

ment or

that

it

has

become

the current world order

and powerful Alas, the

the

as

it

increasingly intolerant of those features of

perceives as obstacles to

its

becoming

as

rich

the developed world.

emergence of ecological

scarcity appears to have

death knell for the aspirations of the

sounded

LDCS. Even assuming

(contrary to fact) that there were sufficient mineral and energy resources to

make

it

tolerable stress

not endure the

possible, universal industrialization would impose inon world ecosystems. And humans, in particular, could pollution levels that would result. Already, the one-fifth

of the world's population that

lives in industrial

countries generates

most of the world's toxic wastes, two-thirds of the world's greenhouse emissions, three-fourths of the world's nitrogen oxides and sulfur emissions, and 90% of the gases that are already destroying the world's protective ozone layer. In short, the current model of development, which assumes that all countries

will

eventually

become

heavily

industrialized

mass-

CHAPTER 7

268

consumption

societies,

is

doomed

to failure.

unacceptable to the modernizing

totally

their political

power

is

generally founded

Even more important, simply

Naturally, this conclusion

of the developing world;

elites

on

is

the promise of development.

growth would freeze the current

halting

pattern of inequality, leaving the "have nots" as the peasants of the world

community in perpetuity. Thus an end to growth and development would be acceptable to the developing world only in combination with a radical redistribution

the world's

Yet

it

economy

of the world's wealth and

a total restructuring

seems absolutely clear that the rich have not the

of relieving the plight of the poor

of

maintenance of economic justice.

to guarantee the

if it entails

slightest intention

own

the sacrifice of their

hving standards. Ecological scarcity thus gready increases the probabiUty

of naked confrontation between rich and poor.

Who

Now

Are

and

the ''Haves''

the

"Have Nots"?

An important new element has been injected into this

struggle.

The

great

"resource hunger" of the developed world, and even of some parts of the

developing world, has begun to transfer power and wealth to those

have resources to seU, especially

resources such as petroleum.

critical

the geopolitics of the world

result,

is

despite

*

bound North Sea and Alaskan oil and

The

ecologically

self-sufficient,

viable

The power and wealth of

alternative,

regardless of

depicted in

27).

whether or not the

Part

III,

is

a

locally

semi-developed, steady-state society based on renewable or

"income" resources such

realistic

as

Only Bhutan

photosynthesis and solar energy. as a

matter of principle (see

Others find themselves unable to see such apparent frugality the

All

option.

pressures

standardization, centralization,

and

impel

them

toward

is

developing countries are heavily overpopulated, choosing implies

a

compulsory abortions rainforests.

It

is

as a

"efficiency,"

large scale. In addition, because sustainable

development does not work when population pressure sometimes

a

to increase over the next five decades,

seems self-consciously to be developing sustainably

Box

As

changing.

This process can be expected to continue. the major oil producers are

who

willingness

to

use

harsh

extreme and most

restraint or frugality

measures



for

example,

to stabilize populations or forced resettlement to save the

not surprising that most leaders prefer to continue in the

hope of achieving heavy and prestige, the desire for

illusory

industrialization. In addition, the lust for

status

military power,

and many other

less

than

noble motives are also prevalent, and the frugal modesty of semi-developed self-sufficiency can

do

little

to satisfy

them.

Ecological Scarcity and International Politics

269

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

(OPEC) manages

to act

manner.

in a unified

Some believe that oil is a special case and that the prospect of OPEC-type cartels for other resources is dim (Banks 1974; MikeseU 1974). These assessments may be correct, but it seems inevitable that in the long run an era of "commodity power" must emerge. The hunger of the industrialized nations for resources is

no

substantial

growth

likely to increase,

is

in output to generate increased

developed countries have begun to be exhausted.

more of 12

there

raw

The United

States, for

platinum, mica, chromium, and

90% of its manganese, aluminum,

strontium; over

50%

its

if

for

and energy resources of the

materials, because the domestic mineral

example, already imports 100% of

even

demand

tantalum, and cobalt;

(Wade 1974). However, the developed countries seem determined to keep growing, and assuming even modest further growth in industrial output, their dependence on

and

or

additional key minerals

developing world supplies

budding overall

is

bound

to increase

markedly in the next few

Thus, whatever the short-term prospects for the success of

decades.

and other minerals, the

in copper, phosphates,

cartels

long-term trend

is

toward a

clear

market in basic resources and

seller's

"commodity power," even if this power grows more manifested in a less extreme form than that of OPECt"

therefore toward

slowly and

is

Thus the poor

basic,

in terms of

long-standing division of the world into rich and

GNP per capita will eventually be overlaid with another

rich—poor polarization, in terms of resources, that will both moderate and intensify the basic spHt.

Although there

dencies in world trade

for example, U.S.

to

many

countries

Naturally, there



as their

are

many complex

interdepen-

food exports are just

mineral exports are to us



it is

wiU be short-term exceptions. Developed

countries, for

example, will remain somewhat independent of Middle Eastern while North Sea

and

as

long

as

oil

other

production and Alaskan

non-OPEC

oil

sources of oil

production remain exist.

On

as critical

already clear

oil supplies

at

high levels

the other hand, one of

the reasons for the Persian Gulf war was undoubtedly the desire to keep Kuwaiti oil in finendly

hands.

dependence wiU be T Actually,

The

OPEC-Uke

disorganized

seller's

respites

transitory

from the

and Limited

cartels

overall trend

toward increasing

to particular commodities.

in other resources

might be preferable to

a

market. Cartels can be bargained with and integrated into

the normal diplomatic machinery, so that the drastic price fluctuations and outright interruptions of supply that cause

avoided. But the price of stability political

power

for cartel

is

members.

extreme economic

distress

are

higher prices for commodities and increased

CHAPTER 7

270

that the resource-rich nations

greater wealth

and power

nationalization

at

of the developing world stand to gain

the expense of the "haves." Already, through

and forced purchase, the

OPEC

nations have largely

wrested control of drilling and pumping operations from the Western

companies;

of the

it is

only

oil business.

a

In addition, as

is

rich are not likely to setde for

newly resource-

already evident, the

mere commercial

gains.

long-standing political grievances against other nations

developed nations



oil

matter of time before they expand into other areas

that they will try to

remedy with



They have

especially the

their

new

power.

Unfortunately, the defense the industrial powers are most likely to use

moves on the part of any of these countries will be military, as it was in the Persian Gulf war, where the industrial nations have an overwhelming advantage. This discussion leaves out the majority of poor countries those without major resources of their own. As they are forced to pay higher against unfriendly

economic or

political



prices to resource-rich countries, they will sufier

have suffered



—indeed, they

already

^major setbacks to their prospects for development. This

is

poor countries of Africa and Asia but also of countries whose development programs have already acquired some

true not only of the hopelessly

momentum. In sum, world geopolitics and economics are in for a reordering.

Western economic development has involved

a net transfer

of resources,

power from the current "have nots" to the "haves," creating the cleavage between the two that now divides the world. In recent

wealth, and

years,

developed nations have added the additional burden of debt

repayment, increasing the wealth transferred to them from the "have nots." In the long term, this situation will change; wealth will also be transferred to those nations that have scarce resources.

But only the

amounts of resources will gain; the rest of the poor will become more abject than before. Thus the old polarization between rich and poor seems likely to be replaced by a threefold division into the rich, the hopelessly poor, and the newly relatively

few "have nots"

—and such

enriched

a

that possess significant

major change in the international order

is

bound

to create tension.

Conflict or Cooperation?

How

this

danger

is

tension will play out in the years ahead that to

many of the

is

hard to

say.

The

declining "haves," ill-equipped to adapt to

an era of "commodity power" and economic warfare, the grip of the

newly

enriched

on

essential

stranglehold to be broken at

all

will seem an intolerable At the same time the poor, having

resources costs.

Ecological Scarcity and International Politics

had their revolutionary hopes and litde to lose but their chains.

on top of ecological

scarcity

Thus



a

271

rising aspirations crushed, will have

the world

may

face turmoil

destructive character of modern warfare (see

Box

Some, on the other hand, hope or believe

28).

that ecological scarcity

Because the problems will become so

will have just the opposite effect:

overwhelming and so evidently insoluble without nation

cooperation,

states

discard

will

sovereignty and place themselves under

ment

that will regulate the global

humanity and begin the

tional

(which they recognize

economic,

political,

their

commons

for the benefit of

own

including ecological

and military

national

all

of gradual economic re-

be driven by their

as

total international

outmoded

some form of planetary govern-

essential process

distribution. In effect, states will interests

and war

horrible prospect, given the ecologically

factors) to

as

vital national

well

as tradi-

embrace the ultimate

interdependence needed to solve ecological problems (Shields and Ott 1974). According to this hypothesis, the very direness of the

cooperation does not prevail

The

War

pattern, so

far,

for resources has

may

has fallen

ensure that

it

somewhere between

broken out on occasion;

outcome

if

will.

as

we

these extremes.

have noted, one of

the reasons for frequent United States military activity in the Middle East is

to

keep the control of

oil fields

and commerce in friendly hands.

On

the other hand, there has also been considerable talk about cooperative international action to deal with the problems of environmental degradation,

and some

momentum

toward greater cooperation has developed.

However, with the possible exception of agreements among the nations of the European Economic Community, which are in international environmental agreements have forceable, or

what they have required has been

reluctant nation has

The

inadequate.

a

common

that

which the most

—measures

been willing to concede



players

that are usually

international envirormiental regulatory process thus re-

sembles process politics in the American context, with

The

market,

been piecemeal and unen-

in this case the polluters

bargaining table;

if



this difference:

cannot be forced to come to the

they do come, they can't be forced to agree to

anything; and if they do agree to something, the agreement cannot be enforced.

An

Upsurge

A look

at

in

Conference Diplomacy

the record of international environmental agreements thus far

concluded

reveals only

modest accompHshments. By the

late

1960s some

of the alarming global implications of pollution and general ecological

CHAPTER 7

272

28 War and Ecocide War may

occasionally be the lesser of evils, but

by

always been anathema to any reasonable person. ecologist

doubly horrible.

it is

modern world

the

is

One

its

To

very nature

it

has

human

the

of the most appaUing features of the

enormous amount of ecological damage and

resource wastage that can be attributed to warfare and military preparedness. Resources that should have been used for (or that should never have been used

at all)

human

welfare

have been sacrificed to the

gods of national security in the jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam and the deserts of the Middle East.

But

this

is

only the most obvious

The military consumes prodigious amounts of energy; the Pentagon uses more energy in a year than a mass transit system consumes wastage.

in 14 years. In just

sumes more p. 137).

The

fiiel

1

hour, an F-16 fighter jet

U.S. military emits

more carbon

the total emissions of Great Britain.

of the

CFCs

on

a training flight

con-

than an average motorist does in a year (Renner 1991,

It

emits

into the atmosphere than

76% of the

halons and

50%

the United States emits into the stratosphere (Renner

p. 140). It uses more nickel, copper, aluminum, and platinum than whole developing world combined (Renner 1991, p. 140). The Pentagon also generates more toxic wastes than the five biggest chemical companies combined (Renner 1991, p. 143). We have already discussed

1991,

the

degradation had first

become widely

apparent, and preparations began for the

major international conference on the environment

at

Stockholm

1972. Depending on one's point of view, the Stockholm Conference give

it its

proper

Environment failure.

tide, the

—was

United Nations Conference on the



in

to

Human

either a major diplomatic success or an abysmal

On the positive side, the elaborate preparations for the conference

(each country had to

make

a detailed

inventory of

its

environmental

problems), the intense publicity accorded the over two years of prelimi-

nary negotiations, and the conference

environmental

awareness

around

itself fostered a

the

diplomats in 1969, the environmental

globe.

crisis

very high level of

Virtually

ignored

by

had by 1972 rocketed right

Ecological Scarcity and International Politics

273

the frightening amounts of nuclear toxic waste generated by the U.S.

and Soviet military machines.

Even more criminal from an

ecological point of view

the increas-

is

ingly ecocidal nature of modern warfare. Nuclear warfare, of course,

is

the prime villain, for any substantial number of nuclear explosions would poison world ecosystems and gene pools for untold generations and probably disrupt the structure of the atmosphere enough to cause

mass extinctions. (In addition, the widespread dispersal of nuclear materials

and technology

for so-called peacefril purposes increases the

war and

probability of nuclear prohferation and therefore of nuclear rorism.)

However, any form of chemical and bacteriological warfare



potentially ecocidal

teris

for example, the use of broadcast herbicides in

Vietnam. But even more conventional forms of modern warfare are exceedingly destructive of local ecologies. In Vietnam, for instance, the U.S. mihtary devastated millions of acres of farm and forest with saturation

bombing and

giant earth-moving machinery. Iraq was

bombed

back into the nineteenth century in the Persian Gulf war. Moreover, the

J

fires that

the Iraqi

government

set in the oil fields

of Kuwait wasted'

tremendous amount of oil before they were extinguished.

Of course,

armies have employed ecocidal weapons

Tcorched earth and even armed peace,

salted lands

is

far

destructive to the earth. lutant

more

War



^for

war of scarce resources and

since ancient times. Yet

wastefril

has



been

example, today, or far

more

rightly called the ultimate pol-

of the planet Earth.

up alongside nuclear weapons and economic development big issues of international politics.

as

one of the

The second major achievement of the

Stockholm Conference was the establishment of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to monitor the state of the world environment and to provide Haison and coordination between nation states and among the multitude of governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned with environmental matters. Finally, a

liminary agreements covering certain

less

controversial

and

few pre-

less critical

ecological problems, (such as setting aside land for national parks and

suppressing trade in endangered species) were reached either at the

conference or immediately thereafter.

CHAPTER 7

274

Despite these acknowledged achievements, environmentalists were

unhappy with the conduct and outcome of the especially disillusioned, for example, by the way the original ecological purity of the conference's agenda was rapidly watered down by pressures from countries of the developing world, who made it plain that they would have nothing to do with the conference unless, in effect, underdevelopment was interpreted as a form of polluby and

large rather

They were

conference.

tion.

Moreover, a great part of the proceedings was devoted not to the

problems on the agenda, but to the kind of "have" versus "have not" debate discussed above, and routine ideological posturing on such political issues

consumed additional time. Also, cold-war Thus the perhaps naively idealistic hope ecological issue would at last force quarrelsome and

"colonialism"

as

politics reflased to take a vacation.

of

many

that the

self-seeking sovereign nation states to put aside stale old grudges, recog-

nize their

human

common

predicament, and act in concert to improve the

condition was completely dashed.

Worse, some of the features of the current world order most objectionable from an ecological point of

view were

actually reaffirmed at

Stockholm, including the absolute right of sovereign countries to develop their

own

domestic resources without regard to the potential

external ecological costs to the world community, and the unrestricted

freedom

by the Universal Declaration of

to breed guaranteed

Human

made no and they have mounted only

Rights. Subsequent environmentally oriented conferences have

on these fundamental principles, cumbersome attacks on some forms of environmental degradation. For example, the U.N. World Population Conference in 1974 somehow managed to end "without producing explicit agreement that there was a world population problem" (Walsh 1974). Another World Population Conference, in Mexico City in 1984, also failed to achieve concrete results. The best the international community has been able to achieve on inroads

population policy

is

that

by 1988, 48 heads of government had signed

1985 statement supporting

However, no binding

The United

States,

a

world goal of population

a

stabilization.

program have been agreed to. one time provided leadership and major

targets or concrete

which

at

financing for international population control efforts, has reduced

its

support for them since 1981.

*

Among the

in the text

water

most important U.N. environmental conferences not mentioned were conferences on women (1974), human settlements (1976),

(1977),

desertification

(1977),

renewable

energy

environment (1982), and the ozone layer (1987, 1989).

(1981),

human

Ecological Scarcity and International Politics

The 1973.

Its

international

first

275

Law of

the Sea Conference took place in

supporters wanted to establish an all-encompassing treaty deal-

on They

ing with overfishing, seabed mining, and pollution controls, premised the view that the oceans are the

By

failed.

the time a

draft;

"common was

treaty

heritage of mankind."

agreed to in 1982,

finally

had

it

carved the oceans into national zones of exploitation for 200 miles out s coasts; the nation controlling the Exclusive Economic Zone may control who, if anyone, may enter the zone for economic purposes. Only seabeds were declared a "common heritage of mankind,"

firom each nation

to

be mined according to regulations established by an International

Seabed Authority. However, even and many other

should be mined on

Behind

interests,

was too

The

much for the United

U.S. position

United

is

States

that seabeds

without international

a first-come, first-served basis,

regulation. Therefore, the treaty.

this

industrial countries.

States has refused to sign or ratify the

these diflferences in legal position are differing national

not just differing views on the best way to protect the ocean

environment.

The

soon have the capacity

industrial countries have or will

to begin deep seabed mining; they can enrich themselves further, or at least

put off the day of their

first-served approach.

more

firom a

own

mineral depletion, with a first-come,

The developing

controlled

"common

world, on the other hand, benefits

heritage" approach. So nationalism

may block adoption of the proposed treaty. Only 40

countries had ratified

by 1989, and 60 must do so for it to go into effect. Other international agreements affecting the sea are confined to narrower issues, but even so, some have been difficult to implement.

it

MARPOL,

the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of

Pollution from Ships, estabHshed minimal distances from the land for

ocean dumping, Hmited the dumping of garbage, required ports to provide facihties for receiving trash from incoming ships, and prohibited the

dumping of plastics. Only 39

later,

and

treaty,

nations had ratified this treaty 18 years

took 14 years for the United States to

it

the U.S. ban

on

the

dumping of

plastics

ratify

took

it.

Under

effect in

the

1989,

although the largest source of plastics dumping, the armed forces, will not

be brought under the treaty until 1994. The London tion of

1972 has

won wider support; 63

ocean dumping of heavy

Dumping Conven-

nations have signed

metals, specified carcinogens,

and other hazardous substances. Yet enforcement of the spotty; violators are caught

and punished with only

nation chooses to muster. In

even ocean

treaties

(such as the fishing) either

this

connection,

and conventions

as

as

we

it.

It

prohibits

and radioactive treaty has

much vigor as

been each

have noted earHer,

that have nearly universal support,

moratorium on whaling and the prohibition of driftnet have loopholes through which nations can jump or, as with

CHAPTER 7

276

whaling, are often openly flouted. Occasionally, another signatory to such a treaty

who

is

angry about such defiance

may engage

in a trade sanction

against a delinquent country. Generally, however, a country's flouting

environmental agreements does not

result in the international

of

com-

munity's imposing a meaningful penalty. Still,

ocean conventions and

treaties

have had more results beneficial

environment than have international agreements concerning haz-

to the

ardous wastes and international

air

pollution.

community

has

Regarding hazardous wastes, the most the

managed

to agree to

transboundary shipment of such goods by draft treaty forbids

transboundary

stealth.

a

is

prohibition of

A 1989 United Nations

movement of waste without

notifica-

tion by the exporter, without the consent of the importer, or with

documents

that

do not conform to the shipment. A 1990 United Nations Informed Consent regarding restricted chemicals

of Prior

system

requires that prospective importing nations be

(primarily pesticides)

provided with information about the benefits and before deciding whether to allow

it

risks

of a chemical

to be imported. Environmentalists

making it illegal for a country to export to another country a chemical that is banned within the exporting country itself But the United States, which exports large amounts of banned had wanted

a stronger draft

pesticides, led the successfial opposition to that proposal.

International air pollution treaties and conventions have also been

weak. Developing countries have largely

refijsed to agree to international

controls of air pollution, fearing that such controls

of development. Most

air

among Western European

only

wiU impede

their pace

pollution agreements have been concluded nations,

sometimes with the United

and/or Britain not going along, although they were invited to sign. Examples include the 1988 conventions to reduce sulfiir and nitrogen States

emissions. also

had

United

The United

States

several conferences

and Western European governments have

on reducing greenhouse

States has refiised to agree to targets to

emissions, but the

reduce carbon emissions

and has fi-ustrated the attempts of European nations to come to a binding agreement among themselves. The best of the international air pollution agreements was the Montreal commitment by industrial countries to phase out their use of CFCs by 2000 (see Chapter that this

agreement

will

be too Htde and too

3).

But we have seen

late to avert

hundreds of

thousands of cancer deaths and millions of cancer cases that will result firom

ozone depletion.

The ments

forces that prevent strong international environmental agree-

are

many.

First,

the spirit of mihtant nationalism that has animated

much of the history of the postwar world has not abated, except among Western European governments. Indeed, the tendency of the

so

Ecological Scarcity and International Politics

world

move

to

is

277

in the opposite direction,

with the nations of Eastern

Europe and the Soviet Union breaking up into mihtant ethnic states. Nation states insist on the absolute and sovereign right of self-determinaof resources, population

tion in use regardless

World countries intensity,

policy,

and development

of the wider consequences. Second, the demand for

economic development

and whatever seems

in general,

among Third

has, if anything, increased in

to stand in the way, as ecological considera-

tions often do, gets rather short shift. Third, largely because their prospects

for

development

begun (a

"new

international

environmental

who

those

are so

dim, the countries of the developing world have

to press even harder for flindamental reform of the world system

issues

economic order"). Thus every discussion of such as food and population is inevitably converted by

represent the developing world into a discussion of interna-

which enormously complicates the become pawns diplomatic and political struggle between the nations.

economic justice process of negotiation. In tional

in the larger

well,

as

short, environmental issues have

In addition, diplomats, Hke national leaders, have attempted to handle

the issues of ecological scarcity not

as part

of a larger problematique but

piecemeal, so that their interaction with other problems

is all

but ignored.

For example, the World Food Conference was solely concerned with the

problem of feeding the hungry and paid

virtually

no attention

to the

more food or subsidizing increased food aid. To some extent,

eventual ecological consequences of growing ftirther

overpopulation with radically

therefore, the successes of international conferences that simply try to

solve

one small piece of the

larger

problem

are as

much

to be feared as

their failures. If

one wished

community

to

be optimistic, one could conclude that the world

has taken the

first

and

attitudinal

meeting the challenges of ecological

scarcity.

institutional steps

A more reaUstic

toward

assessment,

however, would be that although modest environmental improvements have been achieved, major impediments to fiirther progress remain.

might even be forced to conclude, more poHtical

community

as

pessimistically, that the

presently constituted

coping with the challenges of ecological

Planetary Government or the

simply incapable of

is

scarcity, at least in a

timely way.

War of All Against All

In short, the planet confronts the same problems in a greatly intensified form. scarcity,

One

world

Even before

as

the United States, but

the emergence of ecological

the world's diflaculties and their starkly Hobbesian imphcations

were grave enough. Some saw the "revolution of pushing the world toward

a situation in

rising expectations"

which wants

greatly

exceeded

CHAPTER 7

278

meet them, provoking Hobbesian turmoil and violence The world lives under the blade of a deadly Sword of holding this environmental Sword has come loose; hair The Damocles. capacity to

(Spengler 1969).

pollution and other environmental problems will not obligingly post-

pone

their

impact while diplomats haggle, so the Sword

descending toward our unprotected heads. There

world community

and go about

its

is

thus no

is

way

already for the

mind Sword that

to put the environmental issue in the back of its

business.

The

crisis

of ecological

scarcity

is

a

must be parried, squarely and soon. The need for a world government with enough coercive power over fractious nation states to achieve

the planetary

common

what reasonable people would regard

interest has

as

become overwhelming. Yet we must

recognize that the very environmental degradation that makes a world

government necessary has

The

clear

danger

is

that,

also

made

it

much more

logical scarcity will simply intensify the all

—with

the destruction of the

habitation) the tragic

difficult to achieve.

instead of promoting world cooperation, eco-

outcome.

Hobbesian war of

common planet

(for

all

against

purposes of human

Ill Learning to Live with Scarcity

8 Toward

a Politics

of the

Steady State

How we

are to learn to live

with ecological scarcity

is

the problem that

dominate the coming decades. However daunting

will

seem,

it is

indeed possible to make

this task

must

a transition to a relatively desirable

steady state instead of simply letting nature take certain to lead in the opposite direction. that a large

its course, which is However, we must recognize

measure of devolution or retrogression in terms of our

current values will inevitably follow 400 years of continual evolution

and "progress." But not

all

the poHtical, social, economic, cultural, and

technological advances of the past four centuries must be abandoned.

Too, the sooner

we

confront the challenge squarely, the greater the

likeHhood of saving the best of

legacy and, what

this

important, of making a virtue out of necessity. critical

Our

may be more

actions over the

next few decades will therefore either create or preclude a

and our descendants. However, no concrete or formal solutions to the political dilemmas of ecological scarcity. There are several reasons for this. relatively desirable future for ourselves

we

offer

Learning First,

to

See

Anew

the most important prerequisite for constructive change

world view based on, or

human

at least

ecological predicament.

compatible with, the

The

solution

crisis is

realities

a

new

of the

in large part a

crisis: Most people simply do not realize that they are part of web of hfe that their own actions are destroying, yet any viable will require them to see this. Once such a change in

perceptual a delicate

ecological

is

281

— W

282

CHAPTER

"paradigm" has occurred

—once people have chosen

limitations deliberately as a

as

we

to adopt ecological

consequence of their new understanding

humane solutions

then practical and

8

will

be found in abundance. Indeed,

have already seen, the essential elements of the steady

state are

not

and some good work has been done on suitable But the psychological readiness and poUtical will to adopt

so hard to discern, institutions.

Thus "metanoia," or a fundamental transformation of world view, must pave the way for concrete action. Second, at this juncture any specific set of solutions would immediately

them

be

are wanting.

criticized as politically unrealistic. Indeed,

Current

political values

abnormal abundance

would

scarcity

and

how

could

be otherwise?

it

of the age of

institutions are the products

now drawing to a close, so any solutions predicated on with them. Of course, to work "within

necessarily conflict

the system" to prevent fiirther ecological degradation and promote in-

cremental change toward the steady

But

support.

change

state

is

an essential task deserving great

to accept current political reality as not itself subject to radical

away the game at the outset and render the situation it must be understood that ultimately politics is As ]o\m Maynard Keynes pointed out, we are reality itself. of

to give

is

hopeless by definition. Indeed, about the definition all

the prisoners of dead theorists; the ideas ofJohn Locke, Adam Smith, Karl

Marx, and

all

reality for us.

their

we

can even see what the problem

is,

politics

one can

is

indeed "the

art

of the possible";

it

only one

part of politics,

the art of creating

system tivities

to a

is

and the

lesser part at that. In



its

another way,

of working

^that is,

it its

as

inside the

true

name)

is

truest sense, politics

for human progress. Because the current we must direct our concrete political ac-

new possibilities

ecologically defective,

primarily toward producing a change of consciousness that can lead

new political paradigm. Until people

reality

it

consists

for valued objectives "within the system"

current political paradigm. However, politicking (to give

is

we must throw off

bonds they have clamped on our imagination. To put

normal best

the other philosophers of the Great Frontier in effect define

Before

at large

begin to see a

new kind of

based on ecological understanding, environmental politicking within

the system can be only a rear-guard holding action designed to slow the pace

of ecological ly

on

a

retreat.

Rejecting current

political realities

change of consciousness may seem

given what people want and believe today, but

only a Utde over a century ago Already,

many people

it

was

are finding

it

should be remembered that

legal to treat

our

slavish

and relying primari-

utterly impossible to achieve,

human beings

as property.

treatment of nature stupid

come

at

and morally repugnant at worst. The bound to increase their number. Looking back on us as we ourselves look back on our slave-holding ancestors, our descendants will wonder why it took us so long to come to our senses. best

events of the decades to

are

Toward

of the Steady State

a Politics

283

Thus

Third, the transition will take several decades. us to have

all

the answers to ecological scarcity today.

it is

not necessary for

What

is

essential

is

for

us to begin the disciplined and serious search for such answers now, instead

of waiting

until the point

of panic-stricken extremity.

We sometimes forget,

our Constitution was the culmination of several decades of

for example, that

intense and sustained political discussion and action by our founding fathers.

We

confront a challenge perhaps greater than

and we should not

theirs,

deceive ourselves about the magnitude and duration of the task. Moreover,

example

as this

hope

suggests,

to supply

no one

more than

no one work, no one invention can

person,

of the solution that

a small piece

v^ eventually

The final result wall be a mosaic of many elements, some designed of human effort, others fashioned by the accidents of history. Thus to

emerge.

by dint

advance and promulgate specific solutions harmfiil, for such premature closure

more

we

crucial task

of going back to

have agreed on political

"first

founding fathers generally did

machinery

to incorporate

is

first

at this stage

principles

principles"

v^



that

and the

at Philadelphia,

them

a

is,

positively

from the much to politics.

lessons

Once

of history, as our

then building the institutional

not be such a

difficult task.

before trying to give rebirth to our political institutions,

time for

might be

likely to deflect us

we must

In sum,

first

allow

proper gestation.

Fourth, the hour

very

is

late.

Now that

everyone can recogni2e the

much too late for a carefully planned transition to the steady state. Had we prudently listened to earUer warnings and acted appropriately when the environmental crisis first came to Hght many years ago, we might have devised a comprehensive master plan for the transition. This is no longer possible, for as we have evils

of ecological

seen,

scarcity, it

some measure of

is

probably

ecological overshoot (with attendant disruptive

side effects that are unpredictable)

are so

committed

evils that

we

to

most of the things

at

totally

unrealistic,

them.* Only

many

*

all

the constructive actions that

people in so

and neither

after

many ways

politicians

nor

that they are

would

citizens

nature has mandated certain changes and

overwhelmingly demonstrated the sible to

we

that cause or support ecological

present (for example, drastically restricting population

growth) are so painful to so

tolerate

virtually foreordained. Besides,

are almost paralyzed; nearly

could be taken

indeed

is

advisability

of others wiU

it

be pos-

think in terms of a concrete program of transition. Until then, our

All societies display social fanaticism to is

paradigm, which

after all a

is

extent. Their

first

response to

up belief in the current

kind of civil religion. Thus our tendency

to the challenges of ecological scarcity

more and more

some

to redouble their efforts to shore

threatening doubts

by ignoring or denying

it

is

to react

and mounting

desperate efforts to stave off the inevitable changes.

CHAPTER

284

time and effort

groundwork

move

is

and philosophical

better spent laying the scientific

moment of

so that the

8

ripeness will find us prepared to

rapidly fi-om thought to action.

Finally, in

many

and unseen, the process of transition

respects seen

no accident

under way.

It is

tion, either

grounded

produced in recent

many

that

radical critiques

Nor

years.

it

is

surprising that so

individuals are experimenting with radically different

nologies,

of industrial

in ecology or self-consciously related to

many of them avowedly

it,

is

well

civiliza-

have been

many groups and and tech-

life styles

Nor that

based on ecological principles.

a

quasi-reUgious ferment of self-examination and self-criticism seems to have

new images of people

sprung up throughout the industrial world, leading to

and of human needs and

potentials.

The raw

materials for social transforma-

tion are being produced right now, and the process of tearing reality

and constructing the new has already begun.

natural transition process cal scarcity

leadership

halting, belated,

is

tending to manufacture

is

and

a

its

and imperfect, the

own

challenge,

the old

ill

comprehensive theory will be necessary

at

social vision

some

transition

would degenerate

into a

point;

and sense of

need to make constructive personal responses to any

and the

this

of ecologi-

remedy. Certainly, inspiring

without them, ordinary people would lack the direction they

down

Thus, although

social

mere muddling

through. However, to a very large extent the transition will evolve, instead of

being created by theorizing and social planning.

composing the attractive set

collectivity will

more or

less

The

individuals

and groups

willingly seek a viable

and

of social answers by responding to the pressures of ecological

scarcity in their daily lives.

The

answers that emerge will then be

ratified

theory. (Similarly, colonial

Americans had already evolved many

features

of

American way of life well before they were formalized

in

the distinctively

by

political institutions.)

In short, excessive or premature specificity about the institutions of the steady-state society

Again metanoia

is

is

either not very useful or a positive hindrance.

the key, for

it

will almost automatically

concrete, practical arrangements that are congruent with

engender

it.

Nevertheless, a general outline of a solution to the problems of ecological scarcity

is

implicit in the concept of the steady state. Let us

therefore review the essential characteristics of a steady-state or sustainable society.

*

In his The Promise of the

identifies

Coming Dark Age, the

historian L. S. Stavrianos

important elements of this process and shows

how the

"grass" of a

new

on decentralized self-management is even now pushing up through the "concrete" of the moribund industrial order. civilization based

Toward

The

a Politics

of the Steady State

285

Characteristics of the Steady State It

is

not possible to specify the structural features of the steady-state

The

human

which have existed in a virtual steady state throughout most of recorded history, shows that there are many different ways to similar ends. However, any such set of structural features would clearly have to reflect certain basic characsociety.

teristics

great diversity of

of the steady

state.

societies,

In preceding chapters

we

have discussed in

some detail its purely physical characteristics: primary dependence on income or flow resources, the maintenance of population levels within the ecological carrying capacity, resource conservation and recycling,

now

generally

good

necessary

sociopolitical characteristics

of how

chooses to give them social form. For the reasons given in the

last

it

ecological husbandry, and so on. Let us

section, the following treatment

indicate the general direction industrial civilization

we

of any steady-state

is

tentative.

will travel as

toward the steady

designed merely to

we move

firom

our current

of abnormal abundance.

seems predictable, therefore, that on our way toward the steady

move

fi*om individualism toward

that individualistic political, tified as

communalism. The

economic, and

being in the overaU best

the

age of rampant individualism

that arose historically fi-om circumstances

shall

on

state.

We have been living in an

Communalism

It is

focus

society, regardless

interests

state

It

we

self-interest

social philosophies

of the community

have jus-

(as

long

as

the growth "frontier" provided a safe outlet for competitive striving) will

begin to seem more and more reprehensible and illegitimate

and other aspects of

community over

scarcity grow.

And

pollution

the individual that has characterized virtually every

other period of history will be restored. individual to

as

the traditional primacy of the

community

How

far the

subordination of

values and interests will have to go and

v^ be achieved are for the fiature

to determine.

inflexible feudal hierarchies are unlikely to

Rigid

how

caste systems

it

and

be necessary, but the degree of

individual subordination (for example, of property "rights") that will

eventually be required

would probably seem

quite insupportable to

many

living today.

Authority priority,

we

community

As the community and shall necessarily

move

its

rights are given increasing social

fi^om liberty toward authority, for the

will have to be able to enforce

This prospect

may seem

justify the fear that

its

demands on

individuals.

alarming, but the historical record does not

any concession of political rights to the community

CHAPTER

286

8

must lead to the total subjugation of the individual by an all-powerful state. There is no reason why authority cannot be made strong enough to maintain a steady-state society and yet be limited. The personal and civil rights

guaranteed by our Constitution could be largely retained in an appropriately

designed steady-state

Nor need

society.

Only

personal property be taken away.

enjoy adequate

the right to use private property

ways would have to be checked. Thus au-

in ecologically destructive

thority in the steady state

own and

the right to

need not be remote, arbitrary, and capricious. In state, authority could be made con-

a well-ordered and well-designed stitutional

and limited.

from

movement away

Allied with the foregoing transition will be a

Government

egalitarian

democracy toward

the mere summation of "will of all" has

become

competence and

political

status.

Because

equally regarded individual wants into Rousseau's ecologically ruinous,

we must

ways of achiev-

find

ing the "general will" that stands higher than the individual and his or her wants.

To

this

end, certain restrictions

on human

activities

petently determined, normatively justified, and then imposed that

would do something

desires

quite difierent if it was

to

its

on

own

a

populace

immediate

and devices. This can be accomplished in more than one way. Power

who arefittest to rule (as in Thomas

can be given or allowed to accrue to those Jefierson's "natural aristocracy").

matter

left;

must be com-

how open and well

However, the creation of a ruling

qualified,

class,

immediately delivers us into the

—and

"Who will watch the guardians?" dilemma

as

noted

earlier,

no

classic

the greater

the scarcity, the greater the likelihood of oppression of the ruled by the ruling

class.

political is,

This dilemma can be avoided,

system by

common

consent on a

of values Jit

common

principles designed to foster the

would

instead of the particular interests that successfiilly,

at least in part,

set

interest

destroy

it.

to

by founding the



be ruled by

of the steady

If this

that

state

could be done

government would be respected and there would be a funamong citizens on how their communal Ufe was to be

damental agreement regulated.

But

administrative authority

the reach of the citizens.

would be

decentralized and v^thin

Citizens pursuing an ecological ethos would

themselves promote and support laws obliging themselves to live within ecological Hmits,

much

as citizens

enforced the criminal laws in nineteenth-

century America (Tocqueville 1835, tions

of a ruling

class

would be much

ofJefiersonian natural it

p. 71).

aristocrats

was

lessened, still

could be subjected to constitutional

the

American

republic. (See

Box 29

criteria" approach.) Nevertheless,

something other than personal

Then

the need for the ministra-

and to the extent

needed

to

make

that a class

the system work,

restraints, also as in the earliest

for further discussion

once the

self-interest,

basis

of

this

days of

"design

of pofitical values becomes

age-old dilemmas related to the

Toward

a Politics

287

of the Steady State

of rule immediately

legitiinacy

Future political theorists will there-

arise.

overcome the exceedingly

fore have to

problem of legislating the

difficult

temperance and virtue needed for the ecological survival of a steady-state society wdthout at the

same time exalting the few over the many and

subjecting

to

power of

individuals

exercise

of administrative

some dogma.

to excessive conformity to

Because the

Politics

unwarranted

the

of market forces and individual

free play

initiative

produces the tragedy of the commons, the market orientation typical of

most modern viable

and

principles

have to be

societies will

and then put them into

governed. If

strictly

we must

attractive steady-state society,

effect in either a

we want

determine

planned or

a

a

basic

its

designed

Box 29 for a discussion of the important distinction between Another way of stating this is to say that we must move from

fashion (see the two).

non-politics toward politics. Laissez faire

a device for

is

making

political

and other desired goods

decisions about the distribution of wealth

automatically and rather non-politically, instead of in face-to-face political

confrontation

As noted

in

(as

Chapter

an outcome or

happened, for example, in the Greek democracies).

from

6, shifting

political

mode

a process or non-political

mode

to

holds serious dangers, for the political

and counter-revolution (again as Greek democracies).* It v;dll thus be necessary for the

struggle can escalate into revolution

happened political

in the

and

social philosophers

of the steady

state to discover principles

of legitimacy, authority, and justice that wall keep the political struggle wdthin reasonable bounds. Yet even

unUkely to be able to discover

are

the market for

Hve

making poUtical

if they are successfiil in this task,

they

a device as effectively non-political as

decisions.

At

least at the outset, those

in the steady state will therefore have to

who

be genuinely poHtical

animals in Aristotle's sense, self-consciously involved in designing and

planning their community Ufe.

Stewardship

ogy

The

will engulf

character of

economics, and

economic

we

shall

life

will

change

move away from

growth, proffigacy, and exploitation typical of "economic sufficiency, frugaUty,

and stewardship. The

minimal form of trusteeship, cal

*

will

become

totally.

the values of

man" toward

last especially, at least in its

the cardinal virtue of ecologi-

economics. To use the analogy of ecological succession, we

The

discussion in

Box 29

Ecol-

suggests that there

is

shall

move

thus considerable merit in

agreeing poUticaUy on design criteria for the state that wiU minimize the scope of politics

and

political

decision

making

non-poHtics has considerable merit.

thereafter.

As

a

mode of

politics,

CHAPTER

288

8

20 Planning Versus Design There is a subtle and often overlooked but important distinction between planning and design. Both are attempts to achieve a desired real-world outcome by influencing nature. Although the difference is sometimes obscure in practice, planning is the attempt to produce the outcome by actively managing the process, whereas design is the attempt to produce the outcome by establishing criteria to govern the operations of the process so that the desired result will occur more or less automatically without further

complexity of human

human

intervention.

activities,

Because of the

scale

and

planning inevitably requires large

bureaucracies and active intervention in people's

The

lives.

Soviet

Union's economic planning machinery was perhaps the most elaborate, but virtually

even developing

of planning. As

all

modern

societies (to a considerable extent,

pervaded by the apparatus

societies) are increasingly

a result,

we

have

all

become

personally familiar with

cumbersome and Thus the apparent need for even more

the inefficiencies, limitations, and costs of such bureaucratic social control.

planning to cope with the exigencies of ecological scarcity frightening and repugnant prospect of minute and vision of all our activities, in the

name of ecology, by

and powerful bureaucratic machine,

a veritable

raises the

total daily supera

ponderous

Orwellian Big

Brother.

However,

this

is

not inevitable, for

we

can adopt

a

design ap-

proach instead of a planning approach to the problematique of ecological scarcity. set

By

self-consciously selecting and implementing a

of design criteria aimed

at

channeling the social process quasi-

automatically within steady-state limits, stantly to plan,

criterion

manage, and supervise.

comes from

we

An

can avoid having con-

example of such

social critic Ivan Illich (1974a),

who

a design

has

proposed an absolute, across-the-board speed limit of 1 5 to 25 miles



per hour

that

is,

the speed of a bicycle. lUich believes that adoption

of this single proscription would eliminate most of the worst ecological and social consequences of high energy use without subjecting individuals to daily bureaucratic regulation.

the merits of this particular proposal, but

it

One

can debate

nevertheless illustrates

Toward

a Politics

of the Steady State

289

how powerfliUy the adoption of a few simple (albeit drastic in terms of current values) design criterion could indeed have major social impacts sufficient to

produce

proach to

a steady-state society

without also creating a Big Another well-known example of a design apsolving environmental problems is economist Kenneth

Brother to supervise

it.

Boulding's proposal for achieving population control with marketable baby hcenses; once the basic idea was accepted, the system

would

operate with minimal bureaucratic supervision, and people would be able to determine for themselves how to respond to the market pres-

by the licensing system (that is, they could have as many as they wanted by buying additional licenses from those who wanted few or no children) (1964, pp. 135-136). The Clean Air Act of 1990 adapts a design approach with a market option to sulilir dioxide emissions. The Act sets a cap on sulflir dioxide emissions for each utihty company. If a utility seeks to increase its emissions over the cap, it must pay another utility to make an equivalent reduction. fl It should be evident that the design approach has substantial sures created

children

ad-

vantages over plannmg, a point not lost

on our founding

fathers,

who

unconsciously favored a design strategy in establishing our system as a poHtical and economic marketplace governed predominantly by iaissez faire.

Now^ of course,

these particular design criteria are inappropriate

Por our changed circumstances, so they must be exchanged for new ones, but it would seem wise to emulate our founding fathers in their

^

preference for design over planning.

should also not be forgotten that design is nature s way. As a ^^quence of certain basic physical laws (the design criteria), It

con^

natural sys-

tems and cycles operate automatically to produce an integrated, harmonious, self-sustaining whole that evolves in the direction of greater

I

biological richness

and order, eventually reaching a chmax that is the ultimate expression of the design criteria. The essential task of the poHtical and social philosopher of the steady state is therefore to devise fl design criteria that will be just as effective and compeUing as those of nature in creating an organic and harmonious

chmax

that are neither so ruthless

humane

nor so

alternatives to nature

criteria for a steady state?

s

cruel. In other

wa.-^, plagues,

civilization

but

words, what are the

and famines

as

design

CHAPTER

290

from pioneer

new

stable

maturity in

resources,

growth and exploitation of

to climax economics; the rapid

possibilities typical

of the pioneer stage will give way to

which maximum

and energy

8

amenity

is

obtained from

a state

of

minimum

devoted primarily to maintenance of the current

is

new

capital stock rather than to

growth. In short, quaUty will replace

and husbandry will replace gain, as the prime motives of economic life. Learning to hve with scarcity does not mean learning to live without. If the ideal of stewardship were more positively embraced, quantity,

numerous human

economic activities would become a garden yielding beauty as well as ample subsistence (Dubos 1968). Approached in this spirit, the economics of the steady state, no matter how frugal and careful, need not involve joyless self-abnegation on the part of individuals, for they would be participating in what could be a deeply satisfying then, as

could be designed to

the earth" so that

it

today might not share

this

In the area of cultural

However, once the

that

many people

living

sanguine assessment of the potential for delight

self-fulfillment in a steady-state

Modesty

it

must be acknowledged

civiHzational task. Yet

and

ecologists have suggested,

"woo

economy

norms

characterized by frugality.

the changes are

less predictable.

on people have become power and "progress" should give way to

limitations nature imposes

clearer, Faustian striving after

modesty of both ends and means. One human ecologist describes the impending social change as one from tragedy to comedy (Meeker 1974): We shall abandon the tragic hero's deadly serious and angst-ridden quest and new fields to conquer (which usually ends badly for and learn instead cheerfially to enjoy the simple himself and

for greatness

others)

pleasures of ordinary Hfe.

The people

could therefore be more relaxed,

inhabiting the fiature steady state

playfiil,

today,

who must spend large amounts

keep

afloat in the

and content than those living

of energy constantly striving just to

waves of change that inevitably accompany rapid

material growth. Moreover, although

some

profess to see the steady state

tantamount to rigor mortis, once the getting and spending of material wealth have ceased to be the prime determinant of status and self-esteem, the search for social satisfaction and personal frilfillment can turn toward as

the

artistic, cultural, spiritual, intellectual,

which

and

scientific spheres

—none of

confined by physical limitations. (Even space

seriously

are

programs and other types of "big science" are possible in the steady provided the political will fashion.) In

despite

its

sum, there

no

exists

to

expend

intrinsic reason

why

a steady-state society,

material frugality, should suffer from cultural stagnation, nor

there any reason

rewarding

is

state,

scarce resources in this

as it

is

why

personal and cultural

life

should not be

in today's industrial civilization.

is

at least as

But the rewards must

Toward

a Politics of the Steady State

291

of the steady

necessarily be rather different, for the culture certainly be far

The

Diversity

more

more

state will

and modest than our own.

frugal

steady-state society should be less

homogeneous and

our own. As noted previously, the pressures

culturally diverse than

of ecological scarcity urge upon us technological pluralism, some more labor-intensive

modes of production, and

adapted to local ecological

realities.

As

smaller-scale

enterprise

a result, populations are likely to

be spread more evenly over the land and to be more self-sufficient in the basic necessities. Thus extreme centralization and interdependence, which depend on high levels of energy use, should give way to greater decentralization, local autonomy, and local culture. The extent of the

reversion to diversity and decentralization

is

unpredictable because, bar-

ring a total collapse of technological civilization, the continued existence

of modern communications each locality was in effect a

of

political

determine

and

local

is

likely to forestall a return to the era

little

country

own. In

all its

and economic arrangements ultimately adopted

how

That

far this process goes.

autonomy seem

to

fit

more

when

addition, the kind will largely

diversity, decentralization,

is,

some of the

naturally with

political

and economic choices mentioned above than with others. For example,

a

decision in favor of a planned rather than a designed steady-state society

would

actually

be

a decision in favor

of

maximum

central control. Nevertheless, the limitations in

any conceivable steady

state

seem

standardization and

on energy and

material use

likely to lessen substantially the

currenr high degree of homogenization, centralization, and interdependence.

Holism crisis

Because the kind of one-dimensional thinking that created the

of ecological

no longer be

scarcity in the first place will

there will be a decisive

movement away from

assumption inherited from Francis Bacon that nature

by dissecting

it

into

its

is

to

be understood

smallest constituent parts) toward holism, the

contrary assumption that nature interrelationships that link

all

best understood

is

parts

by focusing on the

of the whole. In other words, what has

been called the "systems paradigm" tual

tolerable,

reductionism (the

scientific

become

will

and epistemological mode; biology, or more

replace physics as the master science.

The

the dominant intellec-

specifically ecology, will

effects

of

this intellectual

inversion are likely to be profound. For example, embracing holism will

tend to make thinkers generalists tant,

first

and

however, greater holism would

Reductionist science has

left

ruthlessly destroying older

most

specialists

alleviate

second.

many

More impor-

current social

ills.

—by

individuals psychologically adrift

world views without putting anything in

their

CHAPTER 8

292

by fragmenting the corpus of knowledge, and by alienating people A new synthesis based on a fliller understanding of the total ecology of the planet would go a long way toward making the average place,

from

nature.

person

feel at

in the universe

by genuine morality,

ethics. It

seems extremely

again.

opposed

as

to a purely instrumental set

of enlightened

change of heart. But the same could be

developments

we

can be viewed

primarily a moral

self-interest;

about

said

have outlined. Indeed, the

as

undoubtedly be charac-

crisis

in

crisis

of

commitment

unlikely, for example, that a real

to stewardship could arise out a

once

Finally, the steady-state society will

Morality terized

home

will require

it

many of the

other

of ecological scarcity

which

the ugliness and

destruction outside us in our environment simply mirror the spiritual

wasteland within; the sickness of the earth

reflects the sickness in the soul

of modern industrial individuals, whose whole gain, to the disease their

given over to

lives are

of endless getting and spending that can never

deeper aspirations and must eventually end in cultural,

physical death. If this assessment

steady state must involve a

is

correct, then the

new

satisfy

spiritual,

and

morality of the

movement from matter toward

spirit,

not

simply in the sense that material pursuits and values will inevitably be

deemphasized and restrained by

self-interested necessity, but also in the

sense that there will be a recovery or rediscovery of virtue

We

shall learn again that

canons higher than

wants are necessary for people to

live

self-interest

in productive

and

sanctity.

and individual

harmony with

themselves and with others. Thus the steady-state society, like virtually aU

other

human

civiHzations except

tainly have a religious basis

modern

—whether

it

industrialism, will almost cer-

be Aristotelian

political

and

civic

excellence. Christian virtue, Confucian rectitude, Buddhist compassion,

Amerindian love

for the land, or an

amalgam of these and other

spiritual

values.

To sum up, ecological scarcity obliges us to abandon modern values in favor of ones that resemble pre-modern many important respects. This does not mean that we shall

Post-modernity

most

basic

values in

simply revert to an earlier

happen

if

we

fail

mode of existence, although

to exercise forethought

the analogy of ecological succession,

it

and

this

is

self-restraint.

what could

Again using

can be said that the very success of

the industrial stage of civUizational succession has created conditions

under which, to avoid

must move

to a

post-modern

a simple relapse into

pre-modern

civilization,

we

new, higher, more mature stage of post-industrial or

civilization that shares

while being something

new

in

many

world

features

history.

of earlier

civilizations

Thus the emergence of the

Toward

of the Steady State

a Politics

steady-state society will in close. It

now

is

one way or another bring the modern era to a whether we will accept the challenge

for us to decide

of ecological

implicit in the crisis

modern

293

civilization that

The Roots of Wisdom:

by creating

scarcity

genuinely post-

a

combines the best of ancient and modern.

Philosophy

Political

Having seen what some of our choices on the path to the steady-state might be, we come to the second and harder question: Where

society

we find the wisdom to make such fatefiil choices and to guide us in momentous enterprise of building a post-modern civilization? There

shall

the is

obviously no straightforward answer to

some of the

ills

of industrial

A logical

this

One

discernible avenues of approach.

is

to

question, but there are

make

a

profound study

civilization.

starting point in this

endeavor

is

ecological philosophy, the

attempt to discover the larger meaning and practical lessons of ecology.

Although

book emphasizes

and

it

this

must be complemented by the works of

have asked nature

how

people can

live in

harmony

it.

The next

step

contemporary

toward mastery of the problem

radical social critics

what could be

fi-om

called

whatever the differences successes find

human

engages throughout in ecological philosophy,

politics,

who

other writers

with

it

of industrial

among them,

civilization,

them more or less

judge the industrial paradigm perspective.'''

That

is,

they aU examine the proudest

as

science and development, and

new

do

post-industrial order. (Thus they

Dubos, R. So Human an Animal and

See, for example,

A

such

work of

to study the

pernicious. Accordingly, they propose not reforms

but the creation of an entirely

Leopold, A.

who

post-industrial

a

is

A

God

Within;

Sand Country Almanac; Shepard, P. and McKinley, D. The

Subversive Science: Essays

Toward an Ecology of Man; Nash, R. The Rights of Nature: Rolston, M. Environmental Ethics: Duties to and

A History of Environmental Ethics;

Values in the Natural World; Berry, T. The

Earthbound:

New

Dream of the

Earth;

Regan, T.

ed.,

D.

ed.,

Introductory Essays in Environmental Ethics; Scherer,

Upstream /Downstream;

Wenz,

P.

Environmental

Justice;

and

Milbrath,

L.

Envisioning a Sustainable Society. T See, for example,

Bookchin, M. The Ecology of Freedom: Remaking

Society;

Roszak, T. The Making of a Counter Culture and Where the Wasteland £«^5;Maslow, A. The Psychology of Science and The Farther Reaches of Human Nature; lUich, I. Deschooling Society, Tools for Conviviality, and Energy and Equity; Schumacher, E. Small

Is Beautiful:

History

Economics as

and The Myth and

if

People Mattered;

the Machine.

and Mumford,

L.

The City

in

CHAPTER

294

not simply repeat old

much critics

criticisms.

may sometimes seem

it

8

Their work looks forward, however

to hark back to the concerns of the earliest

of the Industrial Revolution.)

We

must ponder unflinchingly the

secular heresies of these post-industrial critics in order to liberate ourselves

from inherited prejudices.

As important as it is to analyze modern industrial civilization in the of the crisis of ecological scarcity, it ought to be evident that the

light

book are scarcely new but in fact are on ancient themes. This being the case, once we have

questions raised throughout this

modern

variations

understood those things that make us unique,

we must



the greater part of our guidance from the past

expect to receive

from political

^particularly

philosophy, the long and rich tradition of discourse that precisely with

We

how people

Edmund

the British conservative thinker

pre-modern point of view. For

ecological philosophy and of Burke

its

many important

uncanny resemblance

steady-state values bear a particularly

ship.

concerned

have already seen that the values of a steady-state society would

have to resemble pre-modern values in

for the

is

can best Hve in community.

is

Burke, the

last

instance, the

respects,

but

to the ideas

great

of

spokesman

major tenet both of

trusteeship or, better yet, steward-

Burke wrote mainly about humanity's social patrimony rather than from the nature of his reasoning it is clear that he

natural heritage, but

meant both: The current generation holds the present as a patrimony in moral entail from its ancestors and must pass it on to posterity improved if possible, but at all costs undiminished. Beyond this general overriding imperative, almost all of Burke's ideas resonate strongly with



those of the ecological philosophers:

General skepticism about the possibility of "progress"

Awareness that the solution to one problem generates

a

new

set

of

problems

Acceptance of human

limits

and imperfections

The need for organic change in order harmony of the whole social order

The interdependence and The need

to

to preserve the balance

thus mutual moral bondage of society

check aggressive

self-interest, the

contingent and

situational nature

of morality

The

and

desirability

of diversity among

societies

and among

societies

inevitability

both within

and

human

beings

Toward

a Politics of the Steady State

295

what

Progress as a gradual evolution toward

is

immanent

in a

historical society

The

social order as part of, or as

an outgrowth

the natural order

of,

Pohtics as the balancing of many conflicting and equally legitimate claims to achieve for

humanity the best

possible state given the

objective situation

Burke

ment and

also grasped the

profound

the Industrial Revolution.

social implications

He

of the Enlighten-

foresaw, for example, that turning

the direction of society over to "sophisters, economists, and calculators" (his epithets for the amoral capitalists

wealth)

would

one person gain.

who

typified the

new way of accumulating

destroy community, lead to the atomization of society, and set

against another in an endless

and

self-destructive struggle for

He also saw that zeal for liberty and equality in the abstract would soon

lead to the destruction of

all

the "litde platoons"

communes, and other intermediate corporate the individual and the

is,

the guilds,

bodies) intervening

so that individuals

state,

(that

would

between

eventually be

left

standing alone and defenseless before an all-powerfid state that in theory

represented their interests but in practice was largely beyond their control. As

we

have seen, both these

analysis

of ecological

issues are closely

intertwined with our general

scarcity.

Ecology broadly defined tation to the world. Indeed,

is

thus a fijndamentally conservative orien-

one biologist has

called the climax state (the

natural analog of the steady state) "a perennial feudal society"

However,

1970).

political doctrines. at best

surely have

much

Human says that

as

we must

landed aristocracy would be anachronistic

worst. Yet in our search for a set of social and

is

also

consonant with even older bodies of political

the classical tradition. In

although people need

and humane

modest

life,

tools,

level

Book Two

some

of his Republic, Plato

division of labor,

of development

they do not seem to



war, and

many

other

iUs.

To prevent

know when

people with wise rule by philosophers is

this, says Plato,

and the

in order to live a

to stop.

they overdevelop, and the consequences include luxury, vice, gle,

(McKinley

adopt Burke's

to teach us.

in other words, a

civilized

at

a

that

correspond to an ecological world view, Burke will

ecology

thought, such



Rule by

and reactionary

political ideas that

like

by no means follows

it

Thus

class strug-

we must

restrain

who know that what people

desire

not always desirable for them and that true justice requires the estab-

lishment of controls to maintain the balance and

The

classical

tradition also

distrusts

harmony of the whole.

technology: Just

as

excessive or

uncontrolled economic development threatens to turn the direction of

CHAPTER

296

society over to

monied

interests

and the vagaries of the market,

uncontrolled technological change undermines the broadest sense) direction of human

so, too,

politics, the rational (in

by turning

affairs,

8

social decisions

over to the apparent imperatives of mere things.

The more modern anarchist for decentralization, local teristics

of the steady

tradition

may also

state

seem

favorable to developments in this direction.

movement

Indeed, to the extent that the environmental political ideology,

a

predominantly

it is

planned versus a designed steady

of anarchism that

many of the

it is

political

shares a

common

Moreover, the whole

issue

of

problem

perhaps the most direcdy relevant body of theory for the preceding section. as a whole contains many valutwo of the most important and

philosophy taken

examine

able lessons. Let us

anarchist.

state cuts so close to the central

critical issues raised in

Western

contain valuable lessons,

autonomy, modesty, community, and other charac-

briefly

obvious ones. First, it is

only a slight exaggeration to say that aU political theory

teaches the necessity of prudence, tells

us

is

a

which

Webster's Third

New International

comprehensive term implying "a habitual deliberateness,

caution, and circumspection in action," further qualified as

shown

in the exercise

(1)

"wisdom

of reason, forethought, and self-control,"

management of affairs... shown in and use of means to a desired end,"

"sagacity and shrewdness in the selection, adaptation,

skillflil

"providence in the use of resources," and

(4)

(2)

the (3)

"attention to possible

hazard or disadvantage." As the preceding discussion has amply demonstrated, the

behavior of industrial civilization has been imprudent in the

extreme. Unlike abundance, however, scarcity tolerant of lapses in prudence, so this virtue

is

extraordinarily in-

must certainly be

a part

of

the steady-state solution, regardless of the particular doctrinal and institutional

form

it

eventuaUy

takes.

The

lessons of

prudence can of

course be acquired in the school of hard knocks, but they are perhaps best learned

from the great political theorists of the past (as well as the such as Thucydides and Tacitus, who have tradition-

political historians, ally

been read along with them)

for

whom

prudence

is

the cardinal

virtue of politics.

A

second indispensable

The Epigraph

to this

lucid prose for

argument

Man

is

political virtue

is

individual self-restraint.

book, taken from Burke, explains

which he

is

famous. Reduced to

its

states that

a passionate being.

There must therefore be checks on

will

and

appetite.

why

in the

essentials, his

Toward

of the Steady State

a Politics

297

checks are not self-imposed, then they must be applied

If these

externally by a sovereign power.

We

have seen

analysis



how

in the

problem has surfaced again and again

this

in

our

Hobbesian dynamics of the tragedy of the commons,

in

the consequences of accepting the Faustian bargain of nuclear technol-

and so on. The

ogy,

essential political

learn ecological self-restraint before

message of this book it

is

forced

on

us

is

by

that

we must

a potentially

monolithic and totalitarian regime or by the brute forces of nature. are currently sliding

by default

two outcomes. Only the

restoration of

some measure of civic

use the traditional term) can forestall this

from

virtue are, again, better learned

fate,

We

of one (or both) of these

in the direction

and the necessary

political

virtue (to lessons in

philosophy than from

personal suffering.

we

If

are to take political philosophy seriously again,

broaden our perspective beyond the political

have

specifically

should

tradition of

thought, for the political history and theory of other civilizations

much

to teach us. For example, given the probable nature of the

steady-state society, there

is

much

in

our

seems to favor the revival of something

However, the Western

political tradition

problem of keeping peace between to study the millet system

own

the classical city

like

never

city states.

political tradition that

s*ill

providing

larger poHtical

Thus

reversion to the city state

accommodated and

it

might be valuable

of the Ottoman Empire, which granted the cities

and provinces

them with peace and most of the other

community. is

state.

satisfactorily resolved the

widest measure of local autonomy to individual

while

Western

we

On

the other hand,

unreahstic given the

it

benefits of a

might be argued

numbers of people

that

to

be

the size of the territory to be governed. If so, then the



and poHtical thought of agrarian societies especially China from Shang Dynasty to Mao are worthy of the closest study. Similarly, feudal societies, whose resonance with ecology we have noted, should contain many important lessons; Westerners would do well to go beyond history



the

their

own

medieval history to study Tokugawa Japan, which existed in

almost total autarky for several centuries yet supported (albeit frugally) a rather large population at a high cultural level.

However, we must not expect

political

theory and history to provide

us with specific solutions or even neatly packaged object lessons

not to

do. What

is

essential

is

that

we once

on what

again approach politics from a

philosophical perspective instead of grasping after easy answers that

current prejudices. As Ivan Illich (1974b) says

on the

fit

subject of our

modern dependence on "energy slaves," "The energy crisis focuses concern on the scarcity of fodder for these slaves. I prefer to ask whether

— CHAPTER 8

298

free

men need

them." Once

problem with ecological tions that really

wisdom

need

will certainly

and

approach the

this perspective,

be asked, then solutions informed by

to

of our

totality

asking the quespolitical

emerge.

The Roots of Wisdom: Ultimate Political

—we

if-

from

scarcity

philosophy alone

Values

The wisdom

not enough.

is

to ask the right

comes ultimately from so-called higher values, and all the great theorists of politics invoke them as an essential element in their political arguments. However, to assert the necessity of ultimate values in this day questions

and age

Because

heretical.

is

scientific

orthodoxy maintains

that values

have no epistemological standing, any statement that one value preferred to another

is

our standard of

science

is

socially

meaningful

thodoxy holds

social reality,

either. Similarly, the

to be

modern

liberal-democratic or-

an inalienable right to create their

that people have

values; accordingly,

is

But because value questions must not be

therefore scientifically meaningless.

own

any attempt to judge these values or replace them

with others in the name of some nebulous ideological concept such "the

common interest"

to the ideologically

equal,

and

interest,

politics

and ultimately

as anti-liberal

committed

moderated only

to

taken

scientist

and democrat,

fascist.

all

as

Thus,

values are

can be no more than the clash of personal and factional

about what constitutes

comes

is

slightly

by some minimal

a just division

of the

ethical conceptions

spoils. Politics, therefore,

be devoted almost exclusively to the utihtarian

satisfaction

of

desire or appetite,

which, in the absence of any higher values, necessarily

becomes the

measure of individual and

sole

social

good.

The

idea that

public authority might exist in part to direct people toward virtuous ends

becomes anathema. Yet wisdom, if only the rough and ready kind acquired by everyday living, teUs us that not all values are equal and that virtue matters. In practice, science and democracy alike would be a shambles without the implicit values that govern them; indeed, "science" and "democracy" are themselves high-level values that generate the criteria by which utilitarian political decisions

know

can be

too that the Protestant

established,

faith,

made

in industrial civilization.

even though

justification for acquisitiveness

"under God."

of right and

virtue,

one

We that

human

and other bourgeois

were motivated by deep

institutions

We

was not everywhere

was the unofficial reUgion of the Industrial Revolution,

providing a transcendental explanation of the

fathers

it

condition traits.

still

lingers

on

well

as

Our founding

up our

political

effect, a positive

standard

religious faith to set

used to have, in

as

in an unconscious

and

Toward

a Politics

we

degenerate form. Thus

We

299

of the Steady State

have had a value-based civic religion

have simply never acknowledged

Of course,

civic religions are

is

human

We

must

never easily changed, and resistance to

more than

turning politics once again into

be very high.

a

mere

clash

of interests will

given the htany of horrors that

also recognize that,

history, the

along.

all

such.

as

it

widespread suspicion of values

not without

is

Too many crimes have been committed by leaders and peoples who were convinced that they had God on their side. Moreover, foundation.

not always an easy task to distinguish genuine needs, the satisfaction

it is

of which

essential to

is

ment of which

human

well-being, from

is

ever difficult and controversial the task,

some

for

mere wants, the

fulfill-

dispensable without real sacrifice. Nevertheless,

we

how-

have no choice but to search

ultimate values to inform the construct of a post-modern

civilization.

What

follows

to be, but the discussion

an effort to indicate what these values ought

is

is

even more condensed,

personal than the previous discussion of poHtical values. gests that there

is

and

tentative, general, It

merely sug-

already remarkably widespread agreement

on what an

appropriate set of ultimate values ought to be under any circumstances

and that these values favor a certain type of steady

We noted earfier that the a

moral and

made of

crisis

looking out

spiritual crisis. In

the earth,

we

state.

of ecological scarcity at

are Hkely to cause further ecological ruin.

now become

summarized Nature

have

spiritually that

we

But the point has been reached

The

earth

is

teaching us a moral lesson:

individual virtues that have always been necessary for ethical

have

we

can no longer continue without serious

a vicious circle

consequences for humanity.

fiandamentally

what manner of people we have become.

see

Worse, the degraded environment so impoverishes us

where such

is

the ecological ruin

imperative for practical ones.

in the fifth century B.C.

and

The

spiritual reasons

These virtues were

pithily

by the Taoist sage Lao Tzu:

sustains itself through three precious principles,

which one does

well to embrace and foUow.

These

are gendeness, frugality

and humility [Chap.

67].

ImpUcit in gendeness, frugahty, and humiBty are simpUcity and closeness to nature. Walden, critique is

Henry David Thoreau's famous symboUc

of an American society rapidly headed in the opposite direction,

an extended sermon on the necessity of natural simpUcity

way

to avoid living the quietly desperate Uves of those

striving for power, possessions,

mean

rejection of

"Economy."

all

as

the only

weighed down by

and position. Such simpUcity does not

progress, as

Thoreau makes

clear in his chapter

on

CHAPTER

300

Though we are not so degenerate but that we might or a wigwam or wear skins today, it certainly is advantages, though so dearly bought,

mankind

offer.

whole

logs, or

stones.

flat

I

better to accept the

the invention and industry of

and more

obtained than suitable caves, or

easily

bark in sufficient quantities, or even well-tempered clay or

speak understandingly on

acquainted with

we might

possibly Hve in a cave

In such a neighborhood as this, boards and shingles, lime

bricks, are cheaper

and

which

8

it

this subject, for

both theoretically and

I

made myself

have

With

practically.

a

use these materials so as to become richer than the richest

make our civilization

a blessing. Tlte civilized

man

is

more uHt

little

now

a more experienced

are,

and

and wiser

savage [1854, p. 295, emphasis added].

It is

of course quite obvious that development

complexity, violence, prodigality and pride,

is

as

we know it, in

all its

utterly noxious to these

fundamental ethical-spiritual principles. The greatest sociologists and political

German

his classic work The Protesrenowned nineteenth-century

economists would hardly disagree. In

tant Ethic

and

the Spirit of Capitalism, the

sociologist

Max Weber

foresaw the spiritual death that awaited

an increasingly rationalized, bureaucratized society: "Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level

John

of civilization never before attained" Stuart

Mill,

one of the

(cited in

Burch 1971,

p.

159).

and most ardent philosophical

ablest

defenders of liberty and other bourgeois values, was nevertheless dis-

by "the trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each on" seemed inevitably to produce (1871, p. 748). Mill also foresaw that the long-term consequentressed

other's heels" that the relentless struggle to "get

ces

of development would be pernicious.

If the earth

must

lose that great portion

to things that the unlimited increase

extirpate

from

it,

for the

of its pleasantness which

mere purpose of enabhng

but not a better or a happier population, posterity, that they will

compels them to

it [p.

it

owes

of wealth and population would

be content to be

I

it

to support a larger,

sincerely hope, for the sake

stationary,

of

long before necessity

751].

Even Adam Smith, perhaps the person most directly responsible for economic nature of modern civilization, clearly believed that one who pursued wealth was prey to vanity, greed, and the materialistic and

other foolish and ignoble motives (1792,

III-2).

The eminent

twentieth-

century economist John Maynard Keynes, whose fame and influence

on his prescriptions for keeping the engine of economic growth in high gear, was still more adamantly opposed to the values of "economic man."* Noting that the whole long era of developironically rest primarily

Toward

a Politics

ment

of the Steady State

301

some of the most

has "exalted

men and women would once more free.

and a

.

.to return to

some of the most

traditional virtue



that avarice

truly in the paths

We

shall

We

to the useful.

hoped

for

a vice, that the exaction is

detestable, that those

shall

do they

follows fi-om

of usury

is

walk most

who take least thought for the

once more value ends above means and prefer the good

honour those who can teach us how

spin [1971,

p.

to pluck the

well, the delightfial people

capable of taking direct enjoyment in things, the

It

qualities into

speedy end, so that

sure and certain principles of religion is

of virtue and sane wisdom

hour and the day virtuously and not, neither

its

be

misdemeanor, and the love of money

morrow.

of human

distasteful

the position of the highest virtues," he

lilies

of the

field

who who

are toil

192].

what these writers

say (and

from

similar sentiments

expressed by people of every age and tradition) that nothing of real value

would be

lost if

development were

to cease. Rather, the Hkelihood of

men and women leading reasonably happy, sane, fulfilled, and harmonious personal less

and

lives

would be

enhanced.'''

Moreover, once the ultimately

fruit-

more private affluence was abanto grow and to produce all the kinds

self-destructive quest for ever

doned, public amenity would be free

Paradoxically,

Keynes believed

that because "foul

could not afibrd to abandon these values until

is

usefiil

we were

and

fair is

not,"

we

out of "the tunnel of

economic necessity" a hundred years hence-that is, until we had abolished scarcity. Even if this were possible, the problem with this qualification is that the tunnel

is

likely to

simply produces

be endless unless one learns to

more mouths and

say,

greater wants

"Enough!" For growth

and

is

thus self-defeating.

Furthermore, even Keynes suggested that economics be radically devalued during our passage through the tunnel. T

The

available empirical evidence supports the position that

development shows

is

economic

largely irrelevant to personal happiness. Easterlin (1973)

that people's sense of economic well-being

depends primarily on their

(Thus the American poor, most of whom are quite rich by any historical or comparative standard, nevertheless feel acutely deprived.) relative standing.

The popular demand

a

desire to keep

a

for more growth is therefore largely motivated by up with (or catch up with) the Joneses. Unfortunately, this is

never-ending pursuit; a few Joneses will always pull ahead of the crowd and

package of goods that one needs to feel non-poor grows constantly. Relative equality and distributive justice thus seem more

inspire emulation, so the

important for individual happiness and well-being than does the absolute level

of production.

CHAPTER 8

302

of cultural riches people have been able to enjoy in the gross quantity of production were

Lewis

Mumford

Roman

the

if

today. Indeed, social critic

it is

Pom-

provincial town, enjoyed a quaHty of Hfe

many important

superior in

than

even

argues persuasively that the inhabitants of ancient

an ordinary

peii,

less

past,

respects to that attainable in present-day

California (1973, pp. 462-473). Nor should we forget the cultural glory of Athens, Florence, Kyoto, and other ancient centers of civilization

whose achievements antedate the Industrial Revolution. Thus development appears to be virtually irrelevant to cultural richness and progress; social arrangements, not wealth in itself, seem to determine the level of In sum, "with a little more wit we might... become social amenity. richer than the richest now are, and make our civilization a blessing."

The Minimal, Frugal Steady The

State

now

nature of the most desirable type of steady state should

clear.

We

saw

earlier that the

attempt to achieve

a

maximum-feasible steady-state society involved fraught with dire political consequences.

maximum-feasible steady

state,

a

Now we

which aims

at

be

high-throughput or Faustian bargain see too that the

gratifying as

far

as

possible the materialistic and hedonistic appetites of the populace,

flies

in the face of the lessons to be discovered in political philosophy

and

in the ethical—spiritual teachings of wise people of every age

and

tradition. In other words, political

and

spiritual

adoption of the minimal, frugal steady

wisdom

state as the

alike

urge the

form of

a post-

industrial society.

minimal steady

PoUtically, a

the favorite prudential

ment

is

state

would,

as its

name

implies, follow

maxim of our founding fathers: "That governWhere this seems to lead is toward a

best that governs least."

decentralized Jeffersonian poUty of relatively small, intimate, locally

The empirical when it comes to

evidence again supports the impressionistic judgment that

*

no more than

culture, bigger

is

not necessarily better.

half the U.S. per capita

Some

consumption of energy

countries with

actually outrank

the United States statistically in important indicators of the quality of life, such as

the rate of infant mortality and the

number of books published per

number of persons per

hospital bed, the

year per million persons, and even public

expenditures for education as a percentage of national income (Watt 1974,

Chap.

11).

Of

course,

some minimum

level

of wealth

is

necessary for a

reasonable level of comfort, but the level of production with appropriate

technology in a steady-state society of reasonable population should be high

enough

to support

moderate and judicious

cultural aspirations.

Toward

of the Steady State

a Politics

303

autonomous, and self-governing communities rooted other local ecological resources) and a

few

in the land (or

affiliated at the federal level

clearly defined purposes. It leads,

only for

m

other words, back to the original American vision of pohtics. Unlike mass society, such a minimal polity can place primary reliance on the inherent virtue of the citizen (or

on the power of local public opinion

to recall a straying citizen to her or

This minimizes the perceived restrictions on individual accordance with the principle of macro-constraint and

his civic duty).

fi-eedom

(in

micro-fi-eedom described in Chapter design over

plannmg expressed

individual

capacity to

4, as

well as the preference for

m Box 29). Of course, as

is unfortunately true of all forms of political association, such a polity also has its attendant dangers. Local tyranny is first among them. However, the tyranny currendy exercJsed over our lives by impersonal forces beyond

any

s

are largely at

comprehend, much less control, is far greater; we the mercy of market forces, efficiency, technological change,

monopoly (that is, our almost total dependence on the ministraof doctors, lawyers, teachers, and other professionals), and so on. By

radical

tions

contrast, local tyrants are highly visible

one would know against

whom

this basically Jeffersonian polity,

for exacting an

and few in number, so

to revolt. Cities

would

but they should be

economic surplus

less

still

that at least

exist

within

of an instrument

fi-om the countryside than they are

now. Eventually they would probably come to resemble the pre-modern city state in size and spirit, a highly desirable development if the coundess historians and political philosophers who have praised this organic form of political and steady state

social

would

community

are to

be believed.* The minimal, fi-ugal

thus predominantly consist of

medium

sized

com-

munities and rural areas, but through modern communications, what Karl Marx called the idiocy (the political, social, and cultural

uncon-

sciousness)

*

As

we

of rural

life

should be avoidable.

noted before, an alternative to the

political association

is

the agrarian empire,

city state as a

which has

primary model of

certain undeniable virtues

and some correspondingly large drawbacks, as Maoist China seems to have shown. Nevertheless, given the large numbers of people in the world and the realities of international politics, a degree of international decentralization, decoupling, and autarky sufficient to support Jeffersonian politics at the local may simply be unattainable. However, any form of minimal steady-state

level

society

would have

decentralization,

interdependence

to

be supported by a large measure of intemational and autarky, for the current degree of

decoupling,

is politically destabilizing and economically disruptive. It and universalizes problems instead of solving them, and it generates strong pressures toward political centralization.

amplifies

CHAPTER 8

304

In economics, too,

less

is

better.

The

goal

is

frugality,

which means

neither poverty nor abundance, but rather an ample sufficiency.

governing principle of economic

The

in a minimal, frugal steady state

life

would be "right livelihood" (Schumacher 1973, pp. 50-58). Honest work from which one can derive satisfaction (not simply a wage), a sense of working in community with and for one's fellows, and an opportunity to develop one's native talents for the benefit of self and others are just

enough income

for a decent

important

as

ence. This

view of economics does not

in

itself,

but

it

does

and dignified material

reject productivity or

as

exist-

technology

demand that the value and dignity of human labor be economy be run "as if people mattered." Following

restored and that the these prescriptions

would

inevitably

promote

virtually self-administering, locally oriented

that

small-scale, self-sufficient,

and controlled enterprise

depends on simple, inexpensive, more labor-intensive means of

production that are ecologically appropriate. All of dividuals back in charge of their frugal

economy compatible with

Although

our net

to cast

our search for

in

widely

as

own economic

we

should put in-

destiny and produce a

we have described. we certainly ought by no means follows that we must

the minimal polity

a suitable civil religion

as possible,

it

convert to Taoism or other seemingly alien reHgious. As

this

faiths political,

economic, or

have seen, the political philosophy of Thomas Jefferson

can supply a large part of the ideological foundation for a minimal, frugal steady

state.

What

is

lacking

may be found

in the ideas

of Thoreau and

all

the other "literary" critics of American civihzation, such as Melville and

Whitman, who chided to the betrayal

us for following a path that

of our basic principles.

Christianity has rightly been found

by

critics (for

to be ecologically objectionable (in that nature

and humans

are given

dominion over

must eventually lead

Moreover, although

much

example, Roszak is

not viewed

as

1

in

973)

sacred

creation), others point out that

stewardship and other Christian virtues could easily form the basis of an ecological ethic. critical

The

historian

Lynn White, for example, though

of Christianity, nevertheless sees

St.

Francis of Assisi,

generally

who wor-

shiped nature and preached absolute identification and harmonious equality with the rest of creation, as a potential "patron saint of ecology" (1967).

The

ecological philosopher

prefers St. Benedict also

*

Rene Dubos, on

the other hand,

of Nursia, because he did not merely love nature but

founded an order of monks

who worked

with the natural environ-

Historian Leo Marx's excellent essay "American Institutions and Ecological

Ideals" (1970)

shows

society have merged.

how

the literary and ecological critiques of

American

— Toward

a Politics of the Steady State

ment

305

to create beautiful, productive,

and harmonious landscapes, thus

of stewardship into physical actuahty (1972, Chap. 8). economist E. F. Schumacher prefers to focus not on a

translating the ideal

By

contrast,

on the "Four Cardinal Virtues" of Christianity and temperantia which would, if observed,

particular figure but



prudentia, justitia, fortitude,

almost automatically produce (1974). Christian leaders in the

minimal, frugal steady-state society

a

United

even today developing

States are

a new "green gospel"; the Baptist, United Methodist, Congregational, and Presbyterian churches have produced policy statements on the en-

vironment. Individual leaders of the tant faiths have

been developing

Roman Catholic,Jewish, and Protes-

links

between ecology and theology.

Thus self-renewal or self-transformation based primarily on native American and Western principles is eminently possible, for the minimal and frugal steady

state

in

is

complete accords with the best in our

own

tradition.

The Grand Opportunity Other

of the minimal, frugal steady

visions

state are possible,

but the

foregoing should suggest that feelings of despair and impotence are not appropriate responses to the

crisis

of ecological

scarcity.

True, the transi-

form of steady-state society is likely to be but some measure of destruction is a precondition

tion to any conceivable

wracking and

painfial,

a necessary but in many respects ugly human history that we should rejoice to put behind us. Moreover, if we act wisely and soon, the transition need not involve unbearable sacrifices or frightfiil turmoil. Indeed, we are con-

of rebirth, and the industrial era was

and

di:^ag^eeable phase in

fronted not v^dth the end of the world (although

we

it

will surely

be the end

known it) but with an unparalleled opportunity to share in the creation of a new and potentially higher, more humane form of post-industrial civilization. But we must not delay, for unless we of the world

as

have

begin soon, an ugly and desperate transition to tyrannical version of the steady state

may become

almost inevitable.

A Politics of Transformation Seizing this grand opportunity will require a politics of transformation.

Metanoia

is

tantamount to religious conversion and

is

therefore not easily

achieved. As in the revolutionary eras of the past, inspirational leadership will tion.

be needed to

The

critical

steer us clear

question

the one hand, by a

is

of anarchy and chaos during the

transi-

whether such leadership wiU be provided, on

"man on horseback"

or Big Brother's Ministry of

CHAPTER 8

306

Propaganda "natural

on the

or,

other,

by

Gandhi or

a

Republic. Unfortunately, the breadth of typical

of the

who

resembling those

aristocrats"

latter are

group of Jeffersonian

a

founded the American

mind and nobiHty of character

hard to find these days, for our institutions are

designed to turn out experts and other brilliant mediocrities whose distinguishing characteristic

incapacity" to see

avoid

beyond

is

what Thorstein Veblen

their professional blinders.

called a "trained

Even

who

those

Few even entertain the idea that central to modern civiHzation, such as

often cHng to the past.

this pitfall

many of the Enlightenment values reliance on reductionist information acquired through endless schooling, might have to be discarded. What therefore typically emerges is a call for change in general that ignores most of the a call for

commitment from, only leaders

who

little real

worse, in,

or

have themselves fully embraced the future can provide

Next

to the sheer lack of time in the face of

onrushing events, the paucity of genuine leaders serious obstacle to a better

and more humane

People of Intemperate Minds Cannot is

is

change

the would-be leader. But this cannot be effective;

inspirational leadership.

Leadership

what

critical issues or,

change in the other fellow that implies

is

probably our most

future.

Be Free

only part of the politics of transformation, for even the most

inspired leaders can

do only so much.

We

as individuals

must

also stop

clinging to the past and embrace the future, accepting our personal

make this vision of a more beautiful and come true. Like charity, transformation begins at

responsibility for helping to joyflil steady-state future

home. Above

we must somehow learn

all,

the essential lesson of the

ecological scarcity. In the words of Edmund Burke,

crisis

of

"men of intemperate

do indeed "forge their fetters." It is not that nature has made scanty provision for our wants; nature's economy is generous and plentiful for those who would live modestly within its circle of interdependence. It is our numbers and our wants that

minds cannot be

free," for their passions

have outrun nature's bounty. If

we

will

not freely and joyfully place

"moral chains" on our will and appetite, then

we

shall abdicate to the

brute forces of nature or to a political Leviathan what should be our

own

moral duty. Because even nature's bounty can be exhausted by the infinitude of

human

ficiency in natural

wants, only a Hfe of self-restraint and simple suf-

harmony with

the earth will allow us and our descen-

dants to continue to enjoy Ufe, liberty, and estate.

such a

life,

we

shall find that

precisely to the degree to

it

has

its

which we

own

Having

richness, for

freely

chosen

we become

rich

eliminate violence, greed, and pride

Toward

a Politics

of the Steady State

iS-om our lives. shall see

earth is

is,

When we

3O7

have rediscovered

this

primordial wealth,

we

something the wise have always knovm: The greatest value of the always has been, and always will be not that it is useful but that it

beautiful

—and

that

it

simply

is.

Afterword

Rereading Ecology and

the

of Scarcity 14 years after

Politics

its

initial

publication brings a sad awareness: Despite the existence of a vast literature

on ecology and environmental problems, several decades of political

activism in support of environmental causes, and considerable govern-

ment

environmental wrongs, both domestically and

activity to redress

internationally, very litde has

natural milieu. Nature treated accordingly.

is

The

still

changed seen

humankind's relationship to

in

as either a

mine or

a

dump and

basic laws of ecology are ignored, denied,

its is

and

and humanity continues to hasten down the path to ecological

flouted,

Thus

the concerns of Earthday 1990 differed hardly at

all from on the planet, we can observe more and more people making more and more demands on their environment demands that lead to an inexorable drawdown of finite resources,

perdition.

those of Earthday 1970. Everywhere



an acceleration of biological extinction and habitat destruction, and an increase in environmental pollution

grown

steadily

more crowded, and

deteriorate alarmingly.

Many

and its

In short, the planet has

large areas, such as Eastern Europe, have

become acknowledged environmental degradation that results

stress.

physical condition continues to

disaster zones.

when human demands outrun

And

the social

natural capacities

has increased markedly.

Nor

has there

civilization for

been

more

Populations continue to Political leaders

who

likely to suffer the

a significant shift in the appetite

of modern

material wealth defined in terms of "affluence."

demand

"prosperity" and "progress" above aU.

try to talk ecological sense to their constituents are

consequences (wimess the anger and disdain that

greeted President Carter's mention of Hmits). Thus, although the increased media attention focused

on environmental matters during 309

the

AFTERWORD

310

two decades has

past

certainly

promoted

profligate ways, the

what

it

greater ecological awareness,

we must one

along with the nagging suspicion that

watchword of industrial

has been since

its

mend our

day

civilization continues to

be

inception: "Apres nous le deluge."

Rereading the previous edition

me aware that much has now out of date or even

changed.

of many years

after a lapse

Many

of the

erroneous, and certain of

my

specific opinions

were clearly mistaken. At the time of writing, for example, an age of massive dependence on nuclear power was

makes

also

recorded there are

facts

seemed

it

that

virtually inevitable,

but a number of factors (principally energy conservation) have sharply

reduced the need for environmental

new

critics,

generating capacity.

Of course, the

warnings of

myself included, were instrumental in mobilizing

doom by

public opinion against nuclear power, so our prophecies of radiation became, in effect, self-denying

who

deal with the future willingly run.

Boyan making the work

available to a

Nevertheless, with entails,

am

I

what

is

all

new

and to the publishers

generation of readers.

due respect for the labor

important in

this

work

is

risk that aU

therefore deeply grateful to

for preparing this revised edition

Professor for

—an occupational

not particular

that such updating facts

may be

but rather the

which is unchanged. more ample now than it was 15 years ago though at what political and economic cost? or that population growth has declined in some areas of the world faster than originally projected. But essence of the argument,

of

It

fossil fuels is

for each fact

with too



viewed too

I

much

that the supply

pessimistically before, there

is



another

I

saw

optimism. For example, the extent and rate of rain-forest

destruction has accelerated, both firom commercial logging and land

hunger, and for

its loss.

edition,

we now

understand in more depth the high price

Similarly acid rain,

now looms

as a

which was

scarcely

mentioned

we will pay in the

first

very large and intractable problem noxious to the

health of both natural environments and

human

words, the changes in particulars over the past

populations. In other

20 years have

at best

canceled each other out, allowing the pervasive trend toward ecological scarcity to

continue unchecked.

In addition, the the latest

human mind

tends to assign too

news from the environmental

dramatic or threatening.

It

WiUiam Sound

Exxon Valdez

generated far more concern than

warranted in the overall ecological scheme of things. relatively well

with isolated

insults,

but

it

of an

oil spiU.

is

oil spill

it

really

Nature copes

succumbs over the long term to which lacks the high

the slow and steady assault of chronic pollution, visibihty

to

thereby overlooks or underestimates the real

dangers and their root causes. Thus, for instance, the in Prince

much importance when it

front, especially

Afterword

311

Moreover, certain apparently grave problems may well be taken

many believe doomed by population

care of by natural feedback mechanisms. For example,

of Africa

that the extraordinary fauna

pressure,

which

but

the underlying cause of poaching, fencing, and

is

habitat destruction. ly

is all

It

now

appears, however, that a tragic and classical-

Malthusian combination of famine and diseases, such

AIDS,

humanity's

loss

malaria and

with

being the animals' gain. Similarly, although the threat

of global warming

some

as

will apocalyptically reduce this continent's population,

predict, this

is

real,

and the eventual outcome may be

by no means

is

we

certain.

grim

as

as

Hidden feedback me-

unaware may sop up the excess carbon dioxide, resulting in no discernible change in climate despite greatly increased emissions, and it is even conceivable that these same feedback mechanisms could, by increasing the formation of clouds, chanisms of which

are currently

induce significant global cooling in the next century. (Various

God, such

would

acts

of

extensive vulcanism, or of man, such as nuclear war,

also result in cooling.) In short, basing the ecological case

particulars

bad

as

—no

matter

how

on



dramatic, menacing, or "scientific"

is

strategy.

The

appropriate strategy

is

place particular environmental

to

events in the context of the fundamental ecological dynamics that

underlie them. Facts and opinions

may

change, but basic laws and

principles, such as the laws of thermodynamics,

do

not.

These laws tell and that, like

us clearly that the planet has a limited carrying capacity

every other creature,

we

soon have

will

biological income, for

we cannot

It

improvements in our

as

of fossil

fuel, are strictly

such

to

to survive

on our

be clear

why seeming

the discovery of larger supplies

temporary and

bound

pay primary attention to the

will then

forces that create ecological scarcity.

to evade ecological limits are

some way

learn to live

continue to squander capital without

becoming ecological paupers. We need situation,

to find

we must

within that capacity. In other words,

why

almost

all

of our attempts

to be self-defeating in the

long

run. Similar remarks apply to the poUtical discussion in Parts

The

core of the argument

industrial

civilization

institutions are grossly

transition difficult

action.

anti-ecological,

are

The

its

painfiil, for

is

required

is

a revolution in

suffering will be especially severe in the is

scarcity.

and

The

to scarcity will consequently be extremely

what

because American politics

III.

modern

values, practices

maladapted to the emerging age of

from abundance

and

all

and

II

that because the basic premises of

is

predicated

thought and

United

States,

on cornucopian abundance. Our

poHtical institutions were designed for the easy job of dividing the rich

^

AFTERWORD

312

spoils

much

of an almost virgin continent, not for the

harder task of

allocating scarce resources. In this Hght, the details of environmental

poHcy and of the poHtical importance.

What

is

infighting that surrounds

crucial

is

it

are not

of primary of

to understand the fiindamental nature

the underlying dynamic.

my

argument has sometimes been misinterpreted as Hobbesian in spirit, so a few words to guide the reader are in order. As I said in the Preface to the previous edition, my intention was never to offer solutions, much less the solution, to our poHtical-ecological predicaUnfortunately,

ment. If I used Hobbes extensively in the analysis, it was because he is, to echo Marx's homage, "the father of us all" that is, the author of the



basic poUtical theory underlying

and

all

forms of modern poHtics,

sociahst alike. His thought therefore reveals

most

capitalist

clearly the pro-

found tensions and contradictions impUcit in this theory of politics. In addition, Hardin's analysis of the tragedy of the commons unknowingly repHcated Hobbes, and Hardin's solution was indeed expUcidy Hobbesian. I expanded on Hardin's argument and suggested various ecological Leviathan might be tamed, I never offered an which ways in this as my own solution. (In the same manner, I used Burke, Plato,

Thus, although

Rousseau, Saint-Simon, and other theorists to permit myself to suggest the direction in

humane long-term

elucidate

When

confi-ont, not to provide ready answers.)

the issues

we now I

did

which we should look

for

in the final chapter

answers, the tenor of the discussion was explicidy

anti-Hobbesian:

The

essential political

cal self-restraint

message of this book

before

it is

forced

is

on us by

that

we must

learn ecologi-

a potentially monolithic

and

regime or by the brute forces of nature. We are currendy sliding by default in the direction of one (or both) of these two outcomes. totalitarian

Only

the restoration of some measure of civic virtue (to use the traditional

term) can

Moreover,

forestall this fate....

can hardly be accidental that the book's epigraph, drawn

it

firom Burke, urges self-restrained control of will

paragraph reprises Burke's theme.

final

therefore far

The

and appetite or

overall spirit

that the

of the work

is

from Hobbesian.

In sum, far from being the solution, the problem.

The

Hobbes

is

rather the essence of

current environmental problematique

outgrowth of the system of

individualistic

is

a

direct

and economic poUtics that

evolved out of the social contract theory elaborated in Leviathan. Thus we

not begin to deal with our problems constructively until we acknowledge that we must reassess our whole world view and way of life.

shall

Afterword

313

Reforms intended merely deepen the are already

crisis in

to sustain the current political system will only

the long run and,

what

worse, feed the forces that

is

pushing us in the direction of Leviathan.*

Nevertheless,

I

now

see that

I

could have made the reader's task

easier by employing Alexis de Tocqueville's all-important distinction between government and administration. No human group can exist without government that is, without a fundamental agreement among its members on how their communal Hfe is to be regulated. On



the other hand,

human

beings can get along quite

weU without

administration. So-called primitive tribes dispense with

it

entirely

some early observers to conclude, erroneously, that these tribes had no poHtics). Conversely, it is possible to have a polity that is all administration and little or no government. Such was the unhappy (leading

plight of the former Soviet

Union:

A

monstrous bureaucratic ap-

paratus refused to die, while the political spirit that once gave

and meaning was aU but extinguished. have also

moved

we

in the

United

States

quite far in the direction of the administrative state,

and our governing

Thus

Alas,

it life

spirit

too burns

my

much

brightly than before.

less

which could be misunderstood as providing the rationale for an even bigger and more coercive administrative state, would alarm some readers. If we use de Tocqueville's language, however, matters become much clearer. We desperately need more government that is, stronger checks on the competitive overexploitation of the ecological commons and therefore on human self-aggrandizement. But it does not necessarily follow from this that we need more administration. On the contrary, or it

is

not surprising that

critique,



so

it

seems to me, given the appalling record of the administrative

this century,

the better solution

is

form of government that is within its ecological means but need

a

ecological Leviathan (which, as

to

state in

be found in the other direction.

effective in obliging

humankind

that does not require us to erect

many of my

critics rightly

simply would not work in the long run). This

is

why

I

We

to live

an

pointed out,

championed

design over planning (Box 32) and macro-constraints in the service of

micro-freedoms (Box 24).

Similarly,

I

suggested (Box 25) that the

new

form of government would have to be based on an "ecological contract" to ensure that a basic harmony between man and nature was at the core

*

I

describe these forces in a

work

in progress entitled

Moribund Liberalism:

The Tragedy of Enlightenment Politics, which explores the contradictions and self-destructive tendencies of modem politics and traces them back to Hobbes's fundamental

from

virtue.

error, believing that politics

could ever be separated

AFTERWORD

314

of politics.*

I

pointed out (Chapter

also

the most critical need

8) that

is

we have embraced an we cannot possibly have a genuinely ecological poUtics. now be apparent why those among my critics who beheve

for a change of heart, or "metanoia," because until

ecological ethos, It

should

that democratic activism within the current system

is

the solution to our

environmental problematique are almost certainly mistaken. Unless the fundamentally restructured, "more democracy" cannot be ef-

system

is

fective.

This

is

not to say that environmental pressure groups cannot be

effective in preventing

tories are

or that ecological atrocity, but isolated vic-

this

not enough to deflect the drive for development

of nature. Moreover, although people activism

seem group

to

at

the expense

see the answer in political

may be noble champions of the democratic ideal, they do not appreciate what they are up against. The trouble with interest-

politics

that, for all the reasons

is

the long run.

over the

The

outlined in Chapters 5 and

common

interest in

prospect of the ecological interest

somehow

prevailing

bound

commercial,

to

financial,

and manufacturing

interests

pays the media pipers and finances the electoral process

fore remote, to say the least. (Paradoxically, the

mental interest groups

are,

the

more they begin

more

is

is

whose there-

successful environ-

to resemble other interest

groups and the more they necessarily collaborate in an established cal process that

6,

be victorious over the

special interests are

money

who

politi-

both fundamentally anti-ecological and increasingly

anti-democratic.) In short, as

I

said in the fmal chapter,

"environmental

politicking within the system can only be a rear-guard holding action

designed to slow the pace of ecological retreat"

who

(p.

282).

on "more democracy" within the current political context also commit the grave error of confusing "interest-group liberaUsm" with genuine democracy. Nothing could be fiirther firom the Those

truth.

Our

rely

current political system

government

is

a bureaucratic

primary end: the

satisfaction

Popular participation, such

and

is statist,

electoral

not democratic.

of human appetite

as it

is, is

The

behemoth dedicated at

federal

to

one

the expense of nature.

token, minimal, symboHc; and the

behemoth is largely beholden to organized and monied interests. Genuine democracy, by contrast, is se/^government, and self-government

*

In retrospect, even

ecological contract

though

was not

apt.

it is

an obvious play off social

Contract

is

a

contract,

the phrase

commercial concept, and by using

it,

Hobbes was (knowingly or unknowingly) creating a poUty in which the economic motive would predominate to the detriment of other values. Thus the appropriate term would have been ecological covenant; both the denotation and the connotations of covenant suggest the very underlie an ecological political order.

different spirit that

must

Afterword

315

requires

own

two

things: a population that

economic

structure that

is

amenable

is

willing and able to restrain

common good

of the

appetites for the sake

to,

and

and indeed

a social

fosters,

United

in the

Thus,

States.

I

Thoreauvian ecological

exists

too believe that democracy can be part of the

long-term solution to our ecological predicament, but only genuine democracy

popular

now

understanding and local control. Neither of these conditions

its

and

—democracy

that

in spirit

and

practice. It

democracy

that

most of the

who

In sum, therefore, those

justification for increased state

is

toward such an

in fact, precisely

final

chapter points.

work an anti-democratic

see in this

power

it

fundamentally Jeffersonian and

is

is,

if

to enforce ecological imperatives

have fundamentally misunderstood the argument. Instead,

raise

I

and

explore the political contradictions of the current system in the light of

ecology and then point toward a ecologically

sound and more

trust that, read in this spirit,

American

critique of the

political

order that would be both

truly democratic than

my work

remains a

more

our current one.

I

and important

usefiil

political system, as well as a significant

contribu-

and long-term

tion to the intensifying debate over man's place in nature future. I

regret to

believe that I

we

say,

however, that

wdll

saw us confi-onted with

future,

and

I

I

am now

less

inclined than before to

respond positively to the ecological challenge. Then,

beHeved

a

grand opportunity to create

that the transition to a

more

a

more humane

ecologically en-

we have frittered away the two decades since the first Earthday without seizing this grand opportunity. To the extent that we have acted other than symbolically, we have spent the last 20 years doing all the easiest and least painflil things. Now we must do the hard things: reshape basic attitudes and expectations, alter

Hghtened world view had already begun. But

established lifestyles,

and restructure the economy accordingly. But rather

than adopt ecological principles for pubHc policy, thing

we

we seem

to

do every-

can to avoid facing up to the inevitabihty of Hmits and of

changing our profUgate way of shorter and the problems have

In other words, time has grow^n

life.

become

larger

and more entrenched, but

our resistance to dealing with them constructively has increased. Worse, the end of the Cold War, universal peace, has

dangerous place than

made it

was

far firom

the world a

a

bringing about an era of

more complex,

unstable,

and

decade ago. History has reawakened from

nearly a half-century of hibernation. Long-frozen political, ethnic, and

reHgious passions have thawed, and the economic struggle both for

markets and for resources has simultaneously heated up. prospect

is

for widespread conflict

and turmoil

in

The

depressing

many areas of the globe.

Preoccupation with geopolitical advantage, military reaHgnments, and

AFTERWORD

316

economic competitiveness seems likely to preempt the policy agenda in hardly the best political environment for making the coming decade thoughtful and far-sighted decisions about a human future based on



ecological harmony.

Nevertheless, to

work

I

have by no means

for the benefit of the Earth

posterity that has never

done anything

same. Together we may make

or hope, and

lost heart

and the Ufe for

me.

I

it

I

continue

bears, as well as for the

urge the reader to do the

a difference.

William Ophuls

January 1992

.

.

Suggested Readings

Foreword Bookchin, Murray

1990 "Death of a Small Planet." in Environment 90/91. Reprinted fiwm The August 1989,

sive,

pp. 19-23, ed.

John Allen

Progres-

(Guilford, Connecticut:

The

Dushkin Publishing Group). BorreUi, Peter



1989 "Environmental Ethics

the

Ojcymoron of Our Time," The Amicus Journal,

Summer, 39—43. Global

Tomorrow Coalition

1990 The Global Ecology Handbook,

McRuer.John

ed. Walter

H. Corson (Boston: Beacon

Press).

D.

1990 "Conventions

vs.

Greens." H^rW, March-April, 5-6, 63.

Montagna, Donald 1991

Interview,

27 ]u\y.

Introduction Barker, Ernest, trans, and ed.

1952 The

Politics

of

A ristotle (New York: Oxford)

Boulding, Kenneth E.

1961

The Image (Ann Arbor: Michigan).

1964 The Meaning of the and Row)

Twentieth Century:

The Great

Transition

(New

"Is Scarcity Dead?" Public Interest 5:36-44. 1970 "The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth,"

York: Harper

1966

Economics: Essays on Society, Religion and Ethics

275-287.

Brown, Harrison 1954 The Challenge of Man's Future (New York: Viking).

317

in

his

Beyond

(Ann Arbor: Michigan), pp.

SUGGESTED READINGS

318

Cole,H.S.D.,etal.,eds.

1973 Models of Doom: A

Critique of The Limits

to

Growth

(New York: Universe).

Dubos, Rene 1969

"A

1972

A God

Social Design for Science," Science 166:823.

(New York: Scribner's).

Within

Durrenberger, Robert W.

1970 Environment and Man: A Bibliography (Palo Alto: National). Geertz, Clifford

1966

Agricultural Involution (Berkeley: California).

Glacken, Clarence J.

1956 "Changing Ideas of the Habitable World", in Thomas 1956, pp. 70-92. Goldsmith, Edward,

1972

"A

et

al.

Blueprint for Survival," Ecologist

2(1):

1-43.

Hardin, Garrett

1959 Nature and Man's Fate (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston). ,ed.

1969

Population, Evolution, and Birth Control:

A

Collage of Controversial Ideas (2nded.;

New York: W H. Freeman and Co.). Hume, David 1739

A

of Human Nature, in Theory of Politia, ed. Frederick Watkins

Treatise

(New

York: Nelson, 1951). Jacob, Francois

1974 The Logic of Life:

A

History of Heredity, trans. Betty E.

SpiUman (New York:

Pantheon).

Kuhn, Thomas 1970 The

S.

Structure of Scientific Revolutions

(2nd

ed.;

University of Chicago Press).

Malthus, Thomas Robert

1798 Essay on

the Principle of Population

reprinted as

1830

First

"A Summary View of the tion, ed.

Frank

As

Essay on Population,

It J

Affects the Future

Improvement of Society,

798 (New York: KeUey, 1965).

Principle of Population," in Three Essays,on Popula-

W Notestein (New York: New American

Library).

Marsh, George Perkins

1864

Man

and Nature, ed. David Lowenthal (Cambridge: Harvard, 1965).

Meadows, Donella H., 1972 The Limits

1982 Groping

et

to

al.

Growth

in the

(New York: Universe).

Dark: The

First

Decade of Global Modelling

(New

York:

Wiley). Mesarovic, Mihajlo, and Eduard Pestel

1974 Mankind

at the

Turning Point: The Second Report

to the

Club of Rome {New York:

Dutton/Reader's Digest). National Research Council

1989

Alternative Agriculture

(Washington, D.C.: National

Academy Press).

Ornstein, Robert E.

1972 The Psychology of Consciousness (New York: Osborn,

W H. Freeman and

Co.).

Fairfield

1948 Our Plundered Planet (Boston:

Little,

Brown).

Pearce, Joseph C.

1973 The Crack York:

in the

Simon and

Cosmic Egg: Challenging Constructs of Mind and Reality Schuster).

(New

.

Chapter

319

1

Polak, Frederik L.

1961

The Image of the Future

(New YorkrOceana).

Seaborg, Glenn T.

1970 "The Birthpangs of a

New World,"

The

Futurist

4:205-208.

Sears, Paul B.

1935 Deserts on 1971 Letter to

Thomas, William

the

March (Norman: Oklahoma).

Scierue 174:263.

L.,Jr., ed.

1956 Man's Role

in

Changing

the Face of the Earth (University

of Chicago

Press).

Vogt, William

1948 Road

Wohn, Sheldon

to Survival

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1968 "Paradigms and PoUtical Theories," in

Politics

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"Political

Theory

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as a

Press), pp.

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Political Science

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1082.

Woodhouse, Edward J. 1972 "Re-visioning the Future of the Third World:

Development," World

Politics

An

Ecological Perspective

on

25:1-33.

World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987 Our Common Future (New York: Oxford University Press).

Chapter

1

Adams, M. W, A. H. EUingboe, and

E. C.

Rossman

1971 "Biological Uniformity and Disease Epidemics," BioScience 21:1067-1070.

Anon. 1968 "Ecology: The

New

Great Chain of Being," Natural History 77(10):8-16,

60-69. ArmiUas, Pedro

1971 "Gardens on Swamps," Bates,

Science

174:653—661.

Marston

1960 The

Forest

1969 "The

and

Human

National

the Sea

(New York: Vintage).

Ecosystem," in Resources and Man, ed. Preston Cloud for

Academy of Sciences-National Research Council (New York:

Freeman and Co.),

W H.

pp. 21-30.

Benson, Robert L. 1971

"On

the Necessity of Controlling the Level of Insecticide Resistance in Insect

Populations," BioScience 21:1160—1165.

Blackburn, Thomas R.

1973 "Information and the Ecology of Scholars,"

Science

181:1141-1146 [contains

an excellent summary of ecosystem thermodynamics with references to original sources]

Cloud, Preston

1974 "Evolution of Ecosystems," American

Scientist

62:54—66.

Cohnvaux, Paul A. 1973

Introduction to Ecology

(New York: Wiley).

Commoner, Barry 1971

The Closing

Circle: Nature,

Man, and

Technology

(New York: Knopf).

.

SUGGESTED READINGS

320

Dansereau, Pierre

1966 "Ecological Impact and America, ed.

History

Human

E, John

Behavior," in Future Environments of North

and John

Eraser Darling

Press), pp.

Dasmann, Raymond 1973

F.

P.

Milton (Garden City: Natural

425-461.

P.

Milton, and Peter H. Freeman Economic Development (London: Wiley).

Ecological Principles for

Davis, James Sholto

1973 "Forest-Farming: tivity," Impact

An Ecological Approach

to Increase Nature

s

Food Produc-

of Science on Society 23(2): 117-132.

Dixon, Bernard 1974 "Lethal Resistance,"

New

Scientist

61:732.

Egerton, Frank N.

1973 "Changing Concepts of the Balance of Nature," Quarterly Review of Biology 48:322-350 [a historical review showing that nature is both very stable and ever-changing]

Emlen, J. Merritt 1973 Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley). Farvar,

M. Taghi, and John

1968 The

Careless

P.

Milton, eds.

Technology: Ecology and International Development

(Garden City:

Natural History Press).

Flawn,PeterT.

1970 Environmental Geology: Conservation, Land-Use Planning, and Resource Management (New York: Harper and Row). Gomez-Pompa, A., C. Vazquez-Yanes, and S. Guevara 1972 "The Tropical Rain Forest: A Nonrenewable Resource,"

Science

177:762-765.

Hardin, Garrett

1966

Biology:

Its Principles

and

Implications

(2nd

ed.;

New York: W. H. Freeman and Co.).

Hirst, Eric

1974 "Food-Related Energy Requirements," Kolata, Gina

Scierue

184:134-138.

Ban

1974 "Theoretical Ecology: Beginnings of a Predictive Science,"

Science

183:400-

401,450.

Kormoridy, Edward J.

1969 Concepts of Ecology (Englewood

Cliffi:

Prentice-Hall).

Kucera, Clair L.

1973 The Challenge of Ecology

McHarg,

(St.

Louis: Mosby).

Ian

1971 Design unth Nature (Garden City: Natural History Margalef,

1968

Press).

Ramon Perspectives in Ecological

Theory (University of Chicago Press).

Menard, H.W. 1974

Geology, Resources,

and

Society:

An

Introduction to Earth Science

(New York: W. H.

Freeman and Co.).

"Monsanto Experiment Seeks Herbicide-Resistant Plant" 1988 The Washington Post, May 17,

CI.

Mott, Lawrie

1988 "Pesticide Alert," The Amicus Journal, Spring.

Odum, Eugene

P.

1971 Fundamentals of Ecology (3id

ed.; Philadelphia: Saunders).

.

Chapter 2

,21

Odum, Howard T. 1

97 1 Environment, Power and

Pimental, David, et

Society

(New York: Wiley)

1973 "Food Production and die Energy Crisis,"

Roy

Rappaport,

.

al.

Science

182:443-449.

A.

1971 "The

Flow of Energy

an

in

Agricultural

Society,"

Scientific

American

224(3):121-132. Reichle, David E.

1975 "Advances in Ecosystem Analysis," BioScience 25:257-264. Richards, Paul

W.

1973 "The Tropical Rain Forest," Ricklefs,

Scientific

American 229(6) :58-67.

Robert E.

973 Ecology (New York: W. H. Freeman and Co.). American

1

Scientific 1

970 The

Biosphere

(New York: W. H. Freeman and

Co.)

Shepard, Paul, and Daniel McKinley, eds.

1969 The

Subversive Science: Essays Toward an Ecology of

Mifilin) Siever,

[many

fine articles

on ecological

Man

(Boston:

Houghton

science].

Raymond

1974 "The Steady State of the Earths Crust, Atmosphere and Oceans," American 230(6):72-79 [excellent on basic ecological cycles]. Steinhart,John

S.,

Scientific

and Carol E. Steinhart

1974 "Energy Use in the U.S. Food System," Thurston, H. David

1969 "Tropical Agriculture:

Science

184:307-316.

A Key to the World Food Crisis," BioScience

1929-

34.

Watt, Kennedi E.

1973

F

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Principles of Environmental Science

Woodwell, G. M. 1967 "Toxic Substances and Ecological Cycles," Scientific American 220(3):24-31. 1970 "Effects of Pollution on the Structure and Physiology of Ecosystems " Science

168:429^33. 1974 "Success, Succession, and

Adam

Smith," BioScience 24:81-87.

Chapter 2 Abelson, Phihp H.

1974 "Water Pollution Abatement: Goals and Costs," ,

et

Science

184:1333.

al.

1975 Special

issue

on "Food and Nutrition,"

Science

188:501-653 [many

useftil

tending toward a rather optimistic conclusion diat technology capable of expanding production markedly]. articles

1976 Special

issue on many important

is

"Materials," Science 191:631-776 [exceUent discussion of including some that are neglected in other sources;

issues,

generally optimistic about the ability of technology to cope with shortages, but the opposite point

of view

is

impending

represented].

Abert, James G., Harvey Alter, and Frank Bernheisel J.

1974 "The Economics of Resource Recovery fiom Municipal Solid Waste " 183:1052-1058.

Science

.

SUGGESTED READINGS

322

Albers.John

P.

A

1973 "Seabed Mineral Resources:

Survey,"

of the Atomic Scientists

Bulletin

29(8):33-38 [optimistic]. Alexander,

M.

1973 "Microorganisms and Chemical Pollution," BioScience 23:509-515. Allen, Jonathan

1973 "Sewage Farming: Science Races Forward to the Eighteenth Century," Environment 15(3):36-41. Allen,

Robert

1974 "Turning Platitudes into Policy,"

development of traditional Ahnqvist,

New

Scientist

64:400-402 [by promoting the

agricultural techniques for

expanding production].

Ebbe

1974 "An Analysis of Global Air Pollution," Ambio 3:161-167.

American Chemical Society 1969 Cleaning

— The

Our Environment

American Chemical

Chemical

Basis for

Action

(Washington:

Society).

Anon. 1970 "Environmental Repairs," Sierra Club Bulletin 60(3):22 [cost of environmental repairs from OECD study] 1973 "The BEIR Report: Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation," Bulletin of the Atomic Bair,

Scientists

29(3):47-49.

W. J., and R. C. Thompson 1974 "Plutonium: Biomedical Research,"

Science

Bardach, John E., John H. Ryther, and William O.

183:715-722.

McLarney

1972 Aquaculture: The Farming and Husbandry of Freshwater and Marine Organisms

(New York: Wiley). Bamett, Harold J., and Chandler Morse

1963

Scarcity

and Growth: The Economics of Natural Resource Availability (Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins). Berg, Alan

1973 The Nutrition

Factor: Its

Role

in

National Development (Washington: Brookings

Institution).

Bergstrom, Georg

1967 The Hungry 1971

Too Many:

Planet:

An

The Modem World at

Ecological

the

Edge of Famine

(New York: CoUier). (New York:

Overview of the Earth's Limitations

CoUier). Bernarde, Melvin A.

1970 Our Berry,

Precarious Habitat

(New York: Norton).

R. Stephen

1971 "The Option for Survival,"

cUng and pollution

Bulletin of the

Atomic

Scientists

27(5):22-27 [recy-

control].

Bevington, Rick, and Arthur H. Rosenfeld

1990 "Energy

for Buildings

and Homes,"

Scientific

American 263(3): 76-89.

Bjorkman, OUe, and Joseph Berry 1973 "High-Efficiency Photosynthesis," Bleviss,

Deborah

L.,

1990 "Energy for Motor Vehicles,"

Bohn, Hinrich

I.,

Scientific American

229{4):80-93.

and Peter Walzer Scientific

American 263(3): 102-109.

and Robert C. Cauthom

1971 "Pollution: The Problem of Misplaced Waste," American

Scientist

60:561-565.

.

.

.

.

Chapter 2

323

Bonner, James, and John Weir

1963 The Next Hundred

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Years

Booth, William

"Warm Seas Norman E.

1990 Borlaug,

Killing Coral Reefs," The Washington Post, 12 October, A8.

1972 "Mankind and Civilization Biological

Boughey, Arthur

S.,

1973 Readings

Another Crossroad: In Balance with Nature

at



^A

Myth," BioSdence 22:41—44.

ed. in

Brooks, David B., and

Man, P.

the Environment,

and

Human

Ecology

(New York: Macmillan)

W Andrews

1974 "Mineral Resources, Economic Growth, and World Population,"

Science

185:13-19.

Brown, Harrison 1954 The Challenge of Man's Future (New York: Viking). 1970 "Human Materials Production as a Process in the Biosphere,"

Scientific

American 223(3): 19-5208.

Brown, Lester R.

(New York: Random House)

1

972 World Without

1

974 By Bread Alone (New York: Praeger)

Borders

1989 "Reexamining the World Food Prospect." In Starke

(New York: W.

1990a "The Illusion of Progress" In York:

W.

ford, Connecticut:

,

1990

State of the World,

in Environment 90/91.

September/October 1989,

York:

Linda

Linda Starke

ed.

(New

W Norton & Company)

1990b "Feeding Six BilHon,"

1991 "The

State of the World, 1989, ed.

W Norton & Company).

New

pp.

32^0, ed.John

Reprinted from World Watch Allen,

Annual Editions (Guil-

Dushkin Pubhshing Group).

World Order,"

Linda Starke

(New

State of the World, 1990, ed.

Linda

in State of the World, 1991, ed.

W W. Norton & Company).

and John E. Young

1990 "Feeding the World in the Nineties," in Starke

(New York: W.

W Norton & Company).

Bryson, Reid A.

1974 "A Perspective on CHmatic Change,"

Science

184:753-760.

Carson, Rachel

1962

Silent Spring (Boston:

Houghton

MifiUn).

Carter, Luther J.

1974 "Cancer and the Environment

(I):

A

Creaky System Grinds On,"

Science

186:239-242. Chandler, William U., Alexei A. Makarov, and

1990 "Energy

for the Soviet

Zhou Dadi

Union, Eastern Europe, and China,"

Scientific American

263(3): 120-127.

Chapman, Duane 1973 "An End to Chemical Farming'" Entnronment 15(2):12-17. Chasis, Sarah,

and

Lisa

Speer

1991 "Congressional Coastal Witch,"Amicus Journal, Winter, 21. Christy, Francis T.,Jr.,

and Anthony Scott

1965 The Common Wealth

in

Ocean

Fisheries (Baltimore: Johns

Hopkins).

Clawson, Marion, Hans H. Landsberg, and Lyle T. Alexander

1969 "Desalted Water for Agriculture:

Is

ItEconomic?"

Science

164:1141-1148.

SUGGESTED READINGS

324 Cloud, Preston

E., Jr.

1968 "Realities of Mineral Distribution," Texas Quarterly 2{2yA03-126. ,ed.

1969 Resources and

Man (New York: W. H. Freeman and Co.).

Coale,AnsleyJ.

1970

"Man and

His Environment," Science 170:132-136

1974 "The History of the

Human

Population,"

Scientific

American 231(3):41-51.

Commission on Population Growth and the American Future 1972 Population and

the

American Future

(New York: New American Library).

Commoner, Barry 1971

The Closing

Man, and

Circle: Nature,

1990 Making Peace With

(New

the Planet

Technology

(New York: Knopf).

York: Pantheon Books).

Conney, A. H., and J.J. Burns

Among

1972 "Metabolic Interactions

Environmental Chemicals and Drugs,"

178:576-586.

Science

Conservation Foundation

1973a

"Is

Man

Letter,

1973b

Facing

"How

Far

tion Letter,

Chronic Food Supply Problem?" Conservation Foundation

Can Man Push Nature

November,

1974 "Pubhc Health: Letter,

a

October, pp. 1-8.

Still

in Search of

Food?" Conservation Founda-

pp. 1-8.

Crux of

the

Pollution Fights," Conservation Foundation

May, pp. 1-8.

Cook, Earl 1975 "The Depletion of Geological Resources," Technology Review 77(7):15-27. Council on Environmental Quality,

et

1972 The Economic Impact of

al.

Control:

Pollution

A

Summary

of Recent

Studies

(Washington: Government Printing Office).

Council on Environmental Quality and Department of State, Gerald O. Barney, Study Director

1980 "The Global 2000 Report to the President" (Washington, Critical

1989 Daly,

DC).

Mass Energy Project Factsheet

Herman

E.,

#5

(Washington,

DC: Public

Citizen).

and John B. Cobb, Jr.

1989 For The Common Good (Boston: Beacon Darnell, Rezneat

Press).

M.

1971 "The World Estuaries-Ecosystems in Jeopardy,"

INTECOL

Bulletin

3:3-

20.

Davis,

Ged R.

1990 "Energy for Planet Earth,"

Scientific

American 263(3): 54-63.

DeBach, Paul 1974

Biol()gical

Control by Natural Enemies

[an important

book on

(New

York: Cambridge University Press)

a critical topic].

Dorst,Jean

1971 Before Nature Dies (Baltimore: Penguin).

Dubos, Rene 1965

Man Adapting (New Haven: Yale University Press).

Eckholm, Erik

P.

1976 Losing Ground: Environmental Norton).

Stress

and World Food

Prospects

(New

York:

.

.

.

Chapter 2

325

Ehrenfeld, David

W.

1974 "Conserving the Edible Sea Turtle: Can Mariculture Help?" American

Scientist

62:23-31. Ehrlich, 1

Anne H. and John

973 Human ,

and John

P.

Holdren

Ecology: Problems

and Solutions

(New York: W. H. Freeman and

Co.).

Holdren

P.

1969 "Population and Panaceas:A Technological Perspective," BioSoCTMe 19:1065-1071. ,

1

John

971

Holdren, and Richard W. Holm, eds.

P.

Man

and

the Ecosphere

(New York: W. H. Freeman and Co.).

Ehrhch, Paul R.

1968 The Population Bomb ,

1972

Population, Resources, Environment: Issues in

W. H. Freeman and ,

(New York: Ballantine).

and Anne H. Ehrhch

Human

Ecology (2nd

ed.;New York:

Co.).

and Ani.e H. Ehrhch

1990 "The Population Explosion," The Amicus Journal, Winter, 22-29. Environmental Protection Agency

1972 The Economia tal

Of Clean Air: Annual Report of the Administrator of The Enviromen-

Protection

Agency

to

the

Congress

of the

United

February

States,

1972

(Washington: Government Printing Office).

Clark W. GeUings, and

Amory B. Lovins

1990 "Efficient Use of Electricity,"

Scientific American

Fickett,

Arnold

P.,

263(3): 64-75.

Havin, Christopher

1987 "Reassessing Nuclear Power: The Fallout from Chernobyl," in Worldwatch Paper 75,

March (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch

Institute).

1990a "Ten Years of Fallout," in Environment 90/91. Reprinted from World Watch

March/ April 1989, pp. 30—37, ed.John AUen

(Guilford, Connecticut:

Dushkin

Pubhshing Group)

1990b "Slowing Global Warming," in York: ,

State of the World,

1990, ed. Linda Starke

(New

W W Norton & Company).

and Nicholas Lenssen

1991 "Designing a Sustainable Energy System," in State of the World, 1991, ed. Linda Starke (New York: Norton & Company).

WW

Hawn, Peter T. 1966 Mineral Resources: Geology, Engineering, Economics,

Politics,

Law

(Chicago:

RandMcNaUy). Foster,

G. G.,

et

al.

1972 "Chromosome Rearrangements for the Control of Insect

Pests,"

Science

176:875-880. Frejka.Tomas

1968 "Reflections on the Demographic Conditions Needed to EstabHsh

a U. S.

Stationary Population Growth," Population Studies 22:379-397. 1 973a

The Future of Population Growth: A 'temative Paths

1973b "The Prospects

for a

Stationary

to

Equilibrium

World Population,"

(New Yoik: Scientific

228(3):15-23. Fulkerson, WiUiam,

Roddie R. Judkins, and Manoj K. Sanghvi

1990 "Energy From Furon, 1

Fossil Fuels," Scientific American 263(3):

Raymond

967 The Problem of Water

(New York: American Elsevier)

128-135.

Wiley)

American

1

.

.

SUGGESTED READINGS

326

Gibbons, John, Peter

Blair,

and Holly Gwin

1989 "Strategies for Energy Use,"

Robert 1972 "Radiation Standards: The

Scientific

American 26 1(3): 136-1 43.

Gillette,

Word

Last

or at Least a Definitive One," Science

178:966-967, 1012.

1974 "Cancer and the Environment

(II):

Groping

for

New

Remedies,"

Science

186:242-245. Gladwell,

Malcolm

1990 "Consumers' Choices About

Money Consistendy Defy Common Sense,"

The

Washington Post, 12 February, A3.

Global

Tomorrow CoaHtion

1990 The Global Ecology Handbook,

ed. Walter

H. Corson (Boston: Beacon

Press).

Grahn, Douglas

1972 "Genetic Groth, Edward,

Efiects

of Low Level Irradiation," BioSdence 22:535-540.

III

1975 "Increasing the Harvest," Environment 17(l):28-39 [an excellent summary of the key issues, amply documented].

Hafele,Wolf

1990 "Energy fi-om Nuclear Power,"

Hammond, Allen

Scientific

American 263(3)136-145.

L.

1974a "Manganese Nodules

Mineral Resources on the Deep Seabed,"

(I):

Science

183:502-503.

1974b "Manganese Nodules

(II):

Prospects for

Deep Sea Mining,"

Science

183:644—

646.

Hannon, Bruce M. 1972 "Bottles, Cans, Energy," Environment 14(2):11-21.

H. Socolow,

Harte, John, and Robert 1

97

Patient Earth

eds.

(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston)

Haub, Carl 1988 "Trial by Numbers,"

Sierra 73:

40-42.

Heichel, G. H.

1974 "Energy Needs and Food Yields," Technology Review 76(8):19-25. Hirst, Eric

1973 "The Energy Cost of Pollution Control," Environment 15(8):37-44.

1974 "Food-Related Energy Requirements," Hoff,Johan

E.,

and Jules Janick,

Science

184:134-138.

eds.

1973 Food (New York: W. H. Freeman and Co.). Hoffinan, Allen R., and David Rittenhouse IngUs

1972 "Radiation and

Infants," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 28(10):45-52.

Holdren, John R, and Paul R. EhrUch

1971 Global Ecology: Toward a Rational

Strategy for

Man (New

York: Harcourt Brace

Jovanovich).

HoUng, Dwight 1991 "America's Energy Plan," The Amicus Journal, Winter, 12-20.

Holmberg, Bo,

et

al.

1975 Special

issue

on "The Work Environment," Ambio

4(l):I-65 [an excellent

review of an important problem]

Howland, H. Richard 1975 "The

Hehum

Conservation Question," Technology Review 77(7):42-49.

.

.

.

Chapter 2

327

Huffaker, Carl B.

1971 "Biological Control and

Remodeled

a

Pest Control Strategy,"

Technology

Review 73{S):3\-37.

Inman, Douglas

L.,

and Birchard M. Brush

1973 "The Coastal Challenge,"

Science

181:20-31.

Janzen, Daniel H.

1973 "Tropical Agroecosystems,"

Science

182:1212-1219.

Kenward, Michael 1972 "Fighting 1989

for the

"'Killer' Trees

Clean Car,"

New

Scientist

51:553-555.

To The Rescue," Newsweek 114(14):

59.

Kramer, Eugene

1973 "Energy Conservation and Waste Recychng: Taking Advantage of Urban Congestion,"

Bulletin of the

Atomic

Scientists

29(4):13— 18.

Laing, David

1974 "The Phosphate Connection," Not Lee, Douglas

Man Apart 4(13):1,

10.

H. K.

1973 "Specific Approaches

to

Health Effects of Pollutants," Bulletin of

the

Atomic

Scientists 29(8): 45-47.

Lichtenstein, E.

P.,

T. T. Liang,

and B. N. Anderegg

1973 "Synergism of Insecticides by Herbicides," Likens,

Gene

and

E.,

F.

1974 "Acid Rain:

Herbert

A

Science

181:847-849.

Bormann

Serious Regional Environmental Problem," Science 184:1176-

1179.

Loosh, J. K.

1974

"New

Sources of Proteins for

Human

and Animal Feeding," BioScience

24:2^31. Lowe, Marcia 1991 "Rethinking Urban Transport," in

(New York: W. W. Norton

State of the World, 1991, ed.

Linda Starke

& Company).

McHale,John 1

970 The

Ecological

Context

(New York: Braziller) (New York: Ballantine).

1971 The Future of the Future Maclntyre, Ferren

1974 "The Top MiUimeter of the Ocean,"

Scientific

American 230(5):62-77.

McKelvey, Vincent E

1972 "Mineral Resource Estimates and Public Policy," American

Scientist

60:32-

40.

1974 "Approaches to the Mineral Supply Problem," Technology Review 76(5):13-23.

Maddox, John 1972 The Doomsday Syndrome (London: Macmillan).

Malenbaum, Wilfi-ed 1

973 "World Resources for the Year 2000," Annals of the American Academy of Political and

Marx, Jean

Social Science

408:30-46.

L.

1974 "Nitrogen Mathews,Jessica

Fertilizer," Science

185:133.

Tuchman

1990 "Rescue Plan for

Monitor

May

Afi-ica,"

in Environment 90/91, reprinted fi-om

World

1989, pp. 28-36., ed. John Allen (Guilford, Connecticut:

Dushkin PubUshing Group)

SUGGESTED READINGS

328 Maugh, Thomas

H.,

II

A

1974 "Chemical Carcinogenesis:

Long-Neglected Field Blossoms,"

Science

183:940-944.

Meadows, Dennis L., et al. 1974 The Dynamia of Growth

MeadowSi DoneUa H., 1972 The Limits

et

to

World (Cambridge: Wright- Allen).

in a Finite

al.

Grotuth

(New York: Universe).

Meier, Richard L.

1966

and Economic Development:

Science

New

Patterns ofLiinng (2d ed.;

Cambridge:

MIT). Metz, William D., and Allen

L.

Hammond

1974a "Geodynamics Report: Exploiting the Earth Sciences Revolution, "Sdence 183:735-738, 769.

1974b "Helium Conservation Program: Casting

It

the Winds,"

to

Science

183:59-63.

Meyer, Alden 1990a "The 'White House

Effect':

Bush Backs Off Carbon Dioxide

Stabihzation,"

Nucleus, Spring, 3.

1990b "United mer,

States Increasingly Isolated

on Global Warming,"

Nucleus,

Sum-

3.

Meyer,Judith E.

1972 "Renewing the

Soil," Environment 14(2):22-24,

29-32.

Murdoch, WUHam W, ed. 1971 Environment: Resources, Pollution and National

Society (Stamford,

Academy of Sciences, Office of the Foreign

Conn.: Sinauer).

Secretary, ed.

1971 Rxipid Population Growth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins). National Research Council

1989

Alternative Agriculture (Washington,

DC: National Academy Press).

NCMP (National Commission on Materials Pohcy) 1972 Towards

a National Materials Policy: Basic

Data and

Issues,

An

Interim Report

(Washington: Government Printing Office).

1973 Toward a National

Materials

Policy:

World

Second Interim Report

Perspective,

(Washington: Government Printing Office).

Newill,Vaun A.

1973 "Pollution's Price tists

—The Cost

in

Human

Health," Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-

29(8):47^9.

Newman, James

E.,

and Robert C. Pickett

1974 "World CUmates and Food Supply Variations,"

Science

186:877-881.

Nogee, Alan 1986 "Chernobyl: It Can Happen Here," "Ocean Thermal Energy: Sunny Side Up."

Environmental Action,]vlY-Augast, 12-14.

1987 The Economist, 20 June, 94. Odell, Rice

1974 "Water Pollution: The Complexities of Control," Conservation Foundation Letter,

Odum, Eugene

December.

P.

1971 Fundamentals of Ecology (3d ed.; Philadelphia: Saunders).

Odum, Howard T 1971 Environment, Power, and

Society

(New York: WUey).

Chapter 2

329

Odum, William E. 1974 "Potential

Effects

of Aquaculture on Inshore Coastal Waters," Environmental

Conservation 1:225—230.

Othmer, Donald E, and Oswald A. Roels 1973 "Power, Fresh Water, and Food from Cold, Deep Sea Water," Sdence 182:121-125. Park, Charles E, Jr.

1968 Affluence

in Jeopardy: Minerals

and

the Political

Economy (San Francisco: Freeman,

Cooper). Payne, Philip

1974 "Protein Deficiency or Starvation?"

New

64:393-398

Scientist

[an excellent

overview of the whole malnutrition-starvation syndrome]. Penney, Terry R., and Desikan Bharathan

1987 "Power fiiom the Sea,"

Scientific

American 256(l):86-92.

Perelman, Michael J.

1972 "Faming with Petroleum," Environment 14(8):8-13. Pimental, David, et

al.

1973 "Food Production and the Energy

Crisis," Science 182:443-449.

1975 "Energy and Land Constraints in Food Protein Production,"

Science

190:754—

761.

Pinchot, Gifford B.

1970 "Marine Farming,"

Scientific

American 223{6):15-2\.

1974 "Ecological Aquaculture," Bio Science 24:265. Pollock, Cynthia

1986, April "Decommissioning: Nuclear Power's Missing Link," in Worldwatch Paper

69 (Washington, D.C.: The Worldwatch

Institute).

Postel, Sandra

1987, September "Defusing the Toxics Threat: Controlling Pesticides and Industrial

Waste," in Worldwatch Paper 19 (Washington, D. C. Worldwatch :

1990 "Saving Water for Agriculture,"

(New York: Probstein,

Ronald

Institute).

in State of the World, 1990, ed. Linda Starke

W W Norton & Company).

F.

1973 "Desalination," American

Scientist

61:280-293.

Rauber, Paul 1991 "Better Natvire Through Chemistry,"

Roger 1974 "Food and Population,"

Sierra, July/ August,

32-34.

Revelle,

Scientific

American 231(3):161-170 [optimistic].

Roberts, LesUe

1989 "Does the Ozone Hole Threaten Antarctic Life?"

Science

244:288-289.

Ross, Marc H., and Daniel Steinmeyer

1990 "Energy for Industry," Russell,

Scientific American

263(3): 88-101.

Dick

1987 "Rush to Market, Biotechnology and Agriculture," The AmicusJournal, Winter, 16-37. Russett,

Bruce M.

1967 "The Ecology of Future International Pohtics," 11(1):

14— 19

[a

good

International Studies Quarterly

discussion of the use of exponential

growth

in

predictions about the future].

Ryther,John H. 1969 "Photosynthesis and Fish Production

in the Sea," Sdence

166:72-76.

making

.

SUGGESTED READINGS

330 Sagan, L. A.

1972

"Human

Costs of Nuclear Power," Science 177:487-493.

Salk, Jonas

1973 The

SCEP

(New York: Harper and Row).

Suruival of the Wisest

(Report of the Study of Critical Environment Problems)

1970 Man's Impact on

Environment (Cambridge: MIT).

the Global

Schmidt-Perkins, Drusilla

1989 "Are Alternative Fuels the Answer?" Environmental Action, July/ August, 21—22. Shapley,

Deborah

1973a "Auto Pollution:

EPA Worrying That

the Catalyst

May

Backfire," Science

182:368-371.

1973b "Ocean Technology: Race to Seabed Wealth Disturbs More Than Fish," Snence 180:849-851,893. Shepard, Paul, and Daniel McKinley, eds.

1969 The

Subversive Science: Essays Toward an Ecology of

Mifflin)

[many excellent

articles, especially

on

Man

(Boston:

Houghton

pollution].

Singer, S. Fred

—When Does Growth Become Too Expensive?"

1971 "Environmental Quahty Is

Optimum

There an

Level of Population?, ed. S. Fred Singer

(New

in

York:

McGraw-Hill). Skinner, Brian J.

1969 Earth Resources (2d

ed.

;

Englewood

Clifis: Prentice-Hall).

Small, WiUiamE.

1971 "Agriculture: Smith,

Roger

H., and

The

Seeds of a Problem," Technology Review 73(6):48-53.

R. C. von Borstel

1972 "Genetic Control of Insect Populations,"

Science

178:1164—1174.

Spurgeon, David

1973 "The Nutrition Crunch:

A

World View,"

Bulletin

of the Atomic Scientists

29(8):5(>-54. Staines, Andrew

1974 "Digesting the

Raw Materials Threat," New

Scientist

61:609-611.

Roger, and James Carlson

Starr,

1968 "Pollution and Poverty," Steinhart,John

S.,

Public Interest

10:104—131 [pollution-control

1974 "Energy Use in the U.S. Food System," Sterling,

costs].

and Carol E. Steinhart Science

184:307-316.

Theodor D.

1971 "Difficulty of Evaluating the Toxicity and Teratogenicity of 2,4,5-T fixjm Existing

Animal Experiments,"

Science

174:1358-1359.

Summers, Claude M. 1971 "The Conversion of Energy," in Energy and Power, ed. Scientific American

(New York: Taylor,

Theodore

1973 The

B.,

W H. Freeman and

Co.), pp. 93-106.

and Charles C. Humpstone

Restoration of the Earth

(New

York: Harper and

Row)

[a

"containment"

pollution-control strategy]

Teitelbaum, Michael

S.

1975 "Relevance of Demographic Transition Theory for Developing Countries," Science

188:420

Valery, Nicholas

1972 "Place in the Sun for Helium,"

New

Scientist

56:496-500.

Chapter 2

331

Wade, Nicholas

"A Message fiDm Com Blight: The Dangen of Uniformity,"

1972

1974a "Green Revolution

(I):

A

Just Technology,

Science

177:678-679.

Often Unjust in Use."

Science

186:1093-1096.

1974b "Green Revolution

Problems of Adapting a Western Technology,"

Science

"Raw Materials: U.S. Grows More Vulnerable to Third World Cartels,"

Science

(11);

186:118^1192. 1974c

183:185-186.

1974d "SaheUan Drought:

"New Alchemy

1975

No Victory for Western Aid,"

Institute:

Science

185:234-237.

Search for an Alternative Agriculture," Science

187:727-729. Waldbott,

Geoi^

1973 Health

L. Effects

of Environmental Pollutants

(St.

Louis: Mosby).

Wallace, Bruce

1974 "Commentary: Radioactive Wastes and Damage to Marine Communities," BioScience 24: 164-167.

Ward, Barbara, and Rene Dubos

1972 Only One Earth: The Care and Maintence of

a Small Planet

(New York:

Norton).

Weeks,

W

E, and W.J.

CampbeU

1973 "Towdng Icebergs Atomic

Weinberg, Alvin

Scientists

to Irrigate

Arid Lands:

Manna

or Madness?" Bulletin of the

29(5):35-39.

M.

1972 "Science and Trans-Science," Minerva 10 (2): 209-222. Weinberg, Carl J., and Robert H. WiUiams

1990 "Energy from die Sun"

Scientific

American 263(3): 146-155.

Weisskopf, Michael

Common

1987 "Pesticides in 15

Eoods

May

Cause 20,000 Cancers a Year,"

Washington Post, 21 May, A33.

Westman, Walter E. 1972 "Some Basic

Issues in

Water Pollution Control Legislation," American

Scientist

de Wilde, Jan

1975 "Insect Population Management and Integrated Pest Control," Amino 4:105-111. Wilkes, H. Garrison, and Susan Wilkes

1972 "The Green Revolution," Environment 14(8):32-39. Wittwer,

S.

1974

H.

"Maximum Production

Capacity of Food Crops," BioScience 24:216—224.

Wood, J. M. 1974 "Biological Cycles

for Toxic

Elements in the Environment,"

Science

183:1049-

1052.

Woodwell, G. M. 1969 "Radioactivity and

World Resources

Fallout:

The Model

Pollution," BioScience 19:884-887.

Institute

Resources, i 990-9 i in collaboration with the U.N. Environmental Programme and the U.N. Development Program. Wysham, Daphne 1991 "FueHng the Fantasy" Greenpeace, May/June, 12-15.

1990 World

1

.

SUGGESTED READINGS

332 Young, Gale 1970 "Dry Lands and Desalted Water,"

Science

Young, John E. 1991 "Reducing Waste, Saving Materials,"

(New York: WW. Norton and Mary Benstock

Starke

Zwick, David, 1

97

167:339-343.

in State of the World, 1991, ed. Linda

& Company).

Water Wasteland: Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Water Pollution (New York:

Grossman).

Chapter 3 Aaronson,Terri

1971 "The Black Box," Environment 13(10):10-18 [on fuel

cells].

Abelson, Philip H., ed.

1974 "Energy,"

o( Science 184:245-389.

special issue

Ahmed, A. Karim

Human

1975 "Unshielding the Sun:

Effects," Environment 17(3):6-14.

Hannes 1972 "Energy and Environment," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 28(5):5-8. 1974 "Fission Energy and Other Sources of Energy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Alfven,

30(l):4-8.

Allen, John, ed.

1989 "The Planet Strikes Back" in Environment 90/91, reprinted from National Wildlife,

necticut:

February/March 1989, pp. 33-40, Annual Editions (Guilford, ConThe Dushkin Pubhshing Group)

American Lung Association 1990 "Air Pollution Health Costs Calculated," The Washington

Post,

21 January, Al 2.

Anon. 1972a

"No

Small Difference of Opinion," World Environment Newsletter in World,

August 15, pp. 30-31. 1972b "120 MiUion Mw. for Nothing," Technology Review 74(7):58. 1975 "What the Shuttie Might [the

Do

to

Our Environment," New

Scientist

66:300

atmospheric and cUmatic dangers of the Space Shuttle program].

Anthrop, Donald

F.

1970 "Environmental Side Scientists

Effects

of Energy Production,"

Bulletin of the

Atomic

26{8):39^\.

Armstead, H. C. H., ed.

1973 Geothermal Energy: Review of Research and Development (New York: UNESCO).

Atwood, Genevieve 1975 "The Strip-Mining of Western Coal,"

Scientific

American 233(6):23-29.

Axtmann, Robert C. 1975 "Environmental Impact of a Geothermal Plant,"

Eugene 1950 "Power from

Science

187:795-803.

Ayres,

Baldwin, Pamela

L.,

the Sun,"

and Malcolm

1974 "Offihore

OU

Heats

Scientific F.

American 183(2):16-21.

Baldwin

Up

as

Energy

Issue," Conservation Foundation Letter,

November. Bamberger, C.

E.,

and J. Braunstein

1975 "Hydrogen: A Versatile Element," American

Scientist

63:438-447.

Chapter 3

333

Barnaby, Frank,

et al.

1975 Symposium on "Can

We Live with Plutonium?"

New Scientist 66:494-506.

in

Barnea, Joseph

1972 "Geothermal Power,"

Scientijic

American 226{\):70-77.

Barraclough, Geofl&ey

1974 "The End of an Era,"

New

York Review of Books,

current economic disarray and

its

June 27,

14-20 [on the

pp.

causes],

de Bell, Garrett, ed. 1

970 The Environmental Handbook (New York: Ballantine).

Berg, Charles A.

1973 "Energy Conservation through Effective Utilization,"

1974 "A Technical Basis

for

Science

181:128-138.

Energy Conservation," Technology Review 76(4):15-23.

Berg, George G.

1973 "Hot Wastes firom Nuclear Power," Environment 15(4):36-^4. Berry,

R. Stephen

1971 "The Option for Survival," Bulletin of the Atomic ,

and Margaret E

Scientists

27(5):22-27.

Pels

1973 "The Energy Cost of Automobiles,"

Bulletin of the

Atomic

Scientists

29(10):1 1-

17,58-60. ,

and Hiro Makino

1974 "Energy Thrift in Packaging and Marketing," Technology Review 76(4):33-43. Bezdek, Roger, and Bruce Hannon 1974 "Energy, Manpower, and the Highway Trust Fund,"

O'M. 1974 "The Coming Energy

Science

185:669-675.

Bockris, J.

Crisis

and Solar Sources," Environmental Conservation

1:241-249. Boffey, Philip

M.

1975 "Rasmussen

Issues

Revised Odds on

a

Nuclear Catastrophe,"

Science

190:640. Bolin, Bert

1974 "Modelling the Climate and

Its

Variations,"

Ambio 3:180-188.

Booth, William

1990 "Carbon Dioxide Curbs Po5f,

May Not

Halt Global Warming," The Washington

10 March, Al.

1991a "Tropical Forests Disappearing

at Faster

Rate," The Washington Post, 9 Sep-

tember,A18.

1991b "Global Warming Continues, but Cause

is

Uncertain," The Washington

Post,

10 January, A3. Boulding, Kenneth E.

1964 The Meaning of the and Row).

Twentieth Century:

The Great

Transition

1973 "The Economics of die Coming Spaceship Earth," Brinworth, B.J. 1973 Solar Energy for Broecker, Wallace

York: Harper

Daly 1973, pp. 121-132.

Man (New York: Wiley).

S.

1975 "Climatic Change: Are Science

in

(New

We

on the Brink of a Pronounced Global Warming?"

189:460-463.

Brooks, Harvey

1973 "The Technology of Zero-Growth," Daedalus 102(4): 139-152.

SUGGESTED READINGS

334 Brown, Harrison, James Bormer, and John Weir 1963 The Next Hundred Years (New York: Viking). Browne, Malcolm W. 1991

Waste," The

"Modern Alchemists Transmute Nuclear

New

York Times, 29

October, CI. Bryson, Reid A.

1973 "Drought in Saheha: Who or What

1974

Is

"A Perspective C, and Jean-Claude Derian

on CUmatic Change,"

to

Blame?" The

Ecologist

3:366-371.

184:753-760.

Science

Bupp, Irvin

1974 "The Breeder Reactor in the U.S.:

A New

Economic

Analysis," Technology

Review 76(8):27-36. Burnet, Macfarlane

New

1971 "After the Age of Discovery?"

Scientist

52:96-100.

Bury, J. B.

1955 The Idea of Progress.: An Inquiry

into Its Origin

and Growth

(New York: Dover).

Callahan, Daniel

1973 The Tyranny of Survival (New York: Macmillan) ways of reexamining technology].

Chap.

[esp.

3,

which

discusses

Calvin, Melvin

1974 "Solar Energy by Photosynthesis,"

Science

184:375-381.

Carter, Luther J.

1973 "Deepwater

Ports: Issue

1974 "Floating Nuclear

Mixes Supertanker, Land

Plants:

Policy," Science 181 :825-828.

Power from the Assembly Line,"

Science

183:1063-

1065.

Chapman, Peter 1974 "The

Ins

and Outs of Nuclear Power,"

New

Scientist

64:966-969

[net energy

analysis].

Chedd, Graham 1974 "Colonisation Cheney, Eric

at

Lagranges,"

New

Scientist

64:247-249.

S.

1974 "U.S. Energy Resources: Limits and Future Oudook," American

Scientist

62:14-22. Clark, Wilson

1974 Energyfor Survival: The Alternatives

to

Extinction

(Garden

City,

N.Y.:Doubleday).

Clarke, Arthur C.

1962

Profiles

of the Future:

An

Inquiry into the Limits of the Possible

(New York: Harper

and Row). Cloud, Preston, ed.

1969 Resources and

Man (New York:

W H. Freeman and

Co.).

Cochran, Thomas B.

1974 The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder

Reactor:

An

Economic and Environmental Critique

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins).

Cohen, Bernard

L.

1974 "Perspectives on the Nuclear Debate: Atomic

Scientists

An Opposing

30(8):35-39 [nuclear power

as

View,"

the lesser

Bulletin of the

evil].

Comey, David D. 1974 "Will

Idle

Capacity Kill Nuclear Power?" Bulletin of

the

Atomic

Scientists

30(9):23-28.

1975 "The Legacy of Uranium Tailings,"

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 31 (7):43-45.

.

.

.

Chapter 3

335

Commoner, Barry 1990 Making Peace With

(New

the Planet

York: Pantheon Books).

Howard Boksenbaum, and Michael Corr, eds. 1975 Energy and Human Welfare: A Critical Analysis (3 vok; Riverside, N.J.: Macmillan ,

Information).

Conservation Foundation

We Have All the Electricity We Want and a Decent Environment Too?" CF Newsletter, No. 3-70. "The Land Pinch: Where Can We Put Our Wastes?" Conservation Foundation

1970 "Can

1973

May.

Letter,

1974a "Carrying Capacity Analysis tion Letter,

June

[a

Is

Useful



^But Limited," Conservation

of the multiple

useful discussion

taken into account in thinking about carrying capacity for

1974b "U.S. Coasthne

Founda-

factors that have to

human

be

use].

Scene of Many Energy Conflicts," Conservation Foundation

Is

January.

Letter,

Cook, C. Sharp 1973 "Energy: Planning for the Future," American

Scientist

61:61—65.

Cook, Earl 1971 "The

How of Energy in an Industrial Society,"

1976 Man,

Energy, Society

(New York:

Scientific American

W H. Freeman and

224(3): 134— 144.

Co.).

Cottrell, Fred

1955 Energy and

Society:

Development

Craven,

The Relation Between Energy,

Social Change,

and Economic

(New York: McGraw-Hill)

Gwyneth

1975 "The Garden of Feasibility,"

Harper's,

August, pp. 66-75

[a

proposal for space

colonization].

Crossland, Janice

1974 "Ferment in Technology," Environment 16(10):17-30 [fermenting organic materials for fuels and other usefiil products]

Dahlberg, Kenneth A.

1973 "Towards

Herman

Daly,

a Policy

of Zero Energy Growth," The

Ecologist

3:338-341.

E., ed.

1973 Toward

a Steady State

Economy (New York:

W H. Freeman and

Co.).

Daniels, Farrington

1964

Direct

Use of the Sun's Energy

(New Haven: Yale).

1971 "Direct Use of the Sun's Energy," American

summarizes

his

book,

still

a standard

work

Scientist

55:5—47 [updates and

in the field].

David, Edward E., Jr.

1973 "Energy: Day,

M.

A Strategy of Diversity,"

Technology Review 75(7):26-31

C.

1975 "Nuclear Energy: Scientists

DeNike,

L.

A

Second

31(10):52—59

[fiiel

Round of

Questions," Bulletin of the Atomic

supply problems].

Douglas

1974 "Radioactive Malevolence,"

Bulletin of the

Atomic

Scientists

30(2): 16-20 [security

risks].

Dials,

George

E.,

and Elizabeth C. Moore

1974 "The Cost of Coal," Environment

16(7): 18-37.

Dickson, David

1974

Alternative Technology: And the Politics of Technical

Change (London: Fontana).

SUGGESTED READINGS

336 Dinneen, Gerald U., and Glenn

L.

Cook

1974 "Oil Shale and the Energy Djerassi, Carl, et

Crisis," Technology

Review 76(3):27-33.

al.

1974 "Insect Control of the Future: Operational and Policy Aspects,"

Science

186:596-607. Dreschhoff, Gisela, D.

Saunders, and E.J. ZeUer

F.

1974 "International High Level Nuclear Waste Management," Scientists

Bulletin of the

Atomic

30(l):28-33.

Drucker, Daniel C. 1971 "The Engineer in the Establishment,"

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

27(10):31-34.

Dudley, H. C.

1975 "The Ultimate Catastrophe," [the

remote

of

possibility

a

Bulletin of the

Atomic

31(9):21-34

Scientists

runaway chain reaction following

a nuclear

explosion].

T

EdsaU.John

1974 "Hazards of Nuclear Fission Power and the Choice of Alternatives," Environmental Conservation l(l):21-30

[fossil fuel

the lesser risk].

Ehricke,KraffiA.

1971 "Extraterrestrial Imperative," Bulletin of

the

Atomic

27(9):18-26

Scientists

[escape to space].

EhrHch, Paul R.,and Anne Ehrhch

1972

Population, Resources, Environment: Issues in

W. H. Freeman and

EIC (Environment

Human

Ecology (2nd

ed.;New York:

Co.).

Information Center)

1973 The Energy Index

(New York: EIC).

Eigner, Joseph

1975 "Unshielding the Sun: Environmental Effects," Environment 17(3):15-18. Ems,A.J. 1975 "Geothermal Systems and Power Development," American

Scientist

63:510-521.

Emmett,John L.,John Nuckolls, and Lowell Wood 1974 "Fusion Power by Laser Implosion," Scientific American 230(6):24— 37. Enviro/Info

1973 Energy /Environment /Economy: An Annotated Bibliography of Selected U.S. Government Publications Concerning United States Energy Policy (April) and Supplement (September) (mimeo; Green Bay: Enviro/Info).

Environmental Action 1991 "U.S. Lacks National Plan for Packaging R^edacUon" Environmental Action, March-April, 25-29. Ewell,

Raymond

1975 "Food and

Ferkiss, Victor

1969

Developing Countries, 1975-2000," BioSdence 25:771.

W

L. Donn "A Theory of Ice Ages,"

Ewing, Maurice, and 1956

Fertilizer in the

Science

123:1061-1066.

C.

Technological

Man: The Myth and

the Reality

(New York:Braziller).

Fisher, John C.

1974 Energy Fletcher, J.

Crises in Perspective

(New York: Wiley).

O.

1970 "Polar Ice and the Global Climate Machine," tists

26(10):40-47.

Bulletin of the

Atomic Scien-

Chapter 3

337

French, Hillary

1990

F.

"A Most Deadly Trade"

IVorld PFarc/jJuly-August,

1

1-17.

Frisken,W.R.

"Extended

1971

Industrial

Revolution and CUmate Change,"

EOS 52:500-507.

Gabel, Medard, ed.

1975

Energy, Earth

&

Everyone (San Francisco: Straight Arrow) [an unconventional

and stimulating treatment of energy by followers of Buckminster

Fuller].

Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas 1971

The Entropy Law and

the

Economic Process (Cambridge: Harvard).

1973 "The Entropy Law and the Economic Problem," 1975 "Energy and Economic Myths," The

Ecologist

Daly 1973, pp. 37-49.

in

5:164-174, 242-252.

Giddings, J. Calvin

Human

1973 "World Population, Atomic Gillette,

Scientists

Disaster and Nuclear Holocaust," Bulletin of the

29(7):21-24, 45-50.

Robert

1973a "Energy

R&D: Under

PoUcy Takes Form,"

Pressure, a National

Science

182:898-900.

1973b "NAS: Water

Scarcity

1973c "Radiation SpiU

at

May Limit Use

of Western Coal,"

Hanford: The Anatomy of

An

Science 181:525.

Accident," Science

181:728-730.

1974a "Budget Review: Energy,"

Science

1974b "Oil and Gas Resources: Did 1974c "Synthetic

Fuels: Will

183:636-638.

USGS Gush Too

Government Lend

High?"

Science

the Oil Industry a

185:127-130.

Hand?"

Science

183:641-643.

1975 "Geological Survey Lowers Gilhland,

Its

Sights," Science 189:200.

Martha W.

1975 "Energy Analysis and Public PoUcy,"

Science

189:1051-1056.

Glaser, Peter E.

1968 "Power from the Sun:

Its

Future," Science 162:857-861

[gathering solar

energy in space]. Glass, Bentley

1971 "Science: Endless Horizons or Golden Age?" Global

Science

171:23—29.

Tomorrow Coahtion

1990 The Global Ecology Handbook,

ed. Walter

H. Corson (Boston: Beacon

Press.)

Gofinan,John 1972

"Is

Nuclear Fission Acceptable?" Futures 4:21 1-219.

Goldstein, Irving

S.

1975 "Potential for Converting

Wood

into Plastics," Science 189:847-852.

Gough, Wilham C, and Bernard J. Eastlund 1971 "The Prospects of Fusion Power," Green, Harold

Scientific

American 224(2):50-64.

P.

1971 "Radioactive Waste and the Law," Natural Resources Journal 11:281-295. Green, Leon, Jr.

1967 "Energy Needs

vs.

Environmental Pollution

156:1448-1450 [using ammonia



^A

Reconciliation," Scietue

as a fuel].

GreenhiU, Basil

1972 "The Saihng Ship in Gregory, Derek

a Fuel Crisis,"

The

Ecologist 2(9):8-10.

P.

1973 "The Hydrogen Economy,"

Scientific

American 22^(j):\2>-2\.

.

SUGGESTED READINGS

338

Gustafion, Philip

F.

1970 "Nuclear Power and Thermal Pollution: Zion, Scientists

Illinois," Bulletin of the

Atomic

26{3yA7 -23.

Hafele.Wolf

1974 "A Systems Approach Hammond, Allen L.

to Energy," American Scientist 62:438-447.

1974a "Academy Says Energy SelP-Sufficiency Urdikely," conclusions of National

Academy of Engineering

Science

184:964 [reporting

study].

1974b "Energy: Ford Foundation Study Urges Action on Conservation,"

Science

186:426-428.

1974c "Individual SeK^Sufficiency in Energy,"

Science

184:278-282.

A New Sense of Urgency," Science 1975a "Geothermal Resources: A New Look," Science 190:370. 1974d "Modeling the Climate:

1975b "Ozone Destruction: Problems Scope Grows,

Its

185:1145-1147.

Urgency Recedes,"

Science

187:1181-1183. 1975c "Solar Energy Reconsidered:

1976 "Lithium:

WiU

ERDA Sees Bright Future," Science 189:538-539.

Short Supply

Constrain Energy Technologies?"

Science

Ozone,"

Science

191:1037-1038. ,

and Thomas H. Maugh,

II

1974 "Stratospheric Pollution: Multiple Threats to

Earth's

186:335-338. ,

William Metz, and Thomas H. Maugh,

1973 Energy and

the Future

Hammond, Ogden, and

II

(Washington: AAAS).

Martin B.

Zimmerman

1975 "The Economics of Coal-Based Synthetic Gas," Technology Review 77 {S)-A3—51.

Hammond, R. Phihp 1974 "Nuclear Power Risks," American

Scientist

62:155-160.

Hannon, Bruce 1974 "Options for Energy Conservation," Technology Review 76(4):24— 31. 1975 "Energy Conservation and the Consumer," discussion of the

Harleman, Donald R. 1971

97 1

189:95-102

[a first-rate

F.

"Heat— The

Harte, John, and Robert 1

Science

need for an energy standard of value].

Patient Earth

Ultimate Waste," Technology Review 74(2):45-51.

H. Socolow,

eds.

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Hein,R.A. 1974 "Superconductivity: Large-Scale Applications,"

Science

185:211-222.

Heronemus, WiUiam E. 1975 "The Case for Solar Energy," Center Report

WiUiam

8(l):6-9.

R. Rice 1974 "Nuclear Fusion Power and the Environment," Environmental

Hirsch, Robert L.,and

L.

Conservation

1:251-262. Hirst, Eric

1973 "Transportation Energy Use and Conservation Potential," Atomic

Scientists

Bulletin

of the

29(9):36^2.

and John C. Moyers 1973 "Efficiency of Energy Use in the United ,

States," Science

179:1299-1304.

Hobbs, P. v., H. Harrison, and E. Robinson 1974 "Atmospheric Effects of Pollutants,"

Science

183:909-915.

Chapter 3

339

Hohenemser, Kurt H. 1975 "The

Holdren.John

Failsafe

Risk," Environment 17(1):6-10.

P.

1974 "Hazards of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle," ,

Bulletin of the

Atomic

Scientists

30(8):14-23.

and Paul R. EhrUch

"Human Population and the Global Environment," American

1974

House Committee on Energy and Commerce, United on Health and the Environment.

Scientist

States Congress,

62:282-292.

Subcommittee

An of 1989, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 22 June Testimony of Bruce K. Maillet, on behalf of the State and Territorial Air

1989 Hearing on Air Toxins Control

Pollution Program Administrators and the Association of Local Air PoUution

Control

Officials.

House Committee on Energy and Commerce, United on Health and the Environment. 1989 Hecring on Air Toxins Control Statement of Henry A.

Hubbert,

Aa

States Congress,

of 1989, 100th Cong., 1st

Subcommittee

sess.

,

22 June

Waxman, Chairman.

M. King

1969 "Energy Resources," in Cloud 1969, pp. 157-242. Hueckel, Glenn 1975

"A

Approach to Future Economic Growth," Scierue 187:925-931 on technological growth that begs almost all the questions raised

Historical

[an article

in this chapter].

Indonesia,

1989 Inghs,

Government of U. S. Neius and World Report, 18

December, 80-81.

David R.



1973 Nuclear Energy dison—Wesley) Johnston, Harold

Its

Physics and

Social Challenge (Reading, Mass.:

Its

Ad-

.

S.

1974 "PoUution of the Stratosphere," Environmental Conservation 1:163-176. Kantrowitz, Arthur

1969 "The

Test:

Meeting the Challenge of New Technology,"

Bulletin of the

Atomic

25(9):20-22, 48 [even more Panglossian than Rabinowitch 1969].

Scientists

Kariel, Pat

1974 "The Athabasca Tar Sands," Kates,

Robert W.,

1973

Sierra

Club Bulletin 59(8):8-10, 32.

et al.

"Human

KeUogg, W. W, and

Impact of the Managua Earthquake,"

S.

Science

182:981-990.

H. Schneider

1974 "Chmate Stabihzation: For Better or for Worse?"

Science

186:1163-1172

[the

of attempting cHmate control].

perils

Kolb, Charles E.

1975 "The Depletion of Stratospheric Ozone," Technology Review 78(l):39-47. Krieger,

David

1975 "Terrorists

and Nuclear Technology,"

Bulletin

of the

Atomic

Scientists

31(6):28-34.

Kubo, Arthur

and David J. Rose

S.,

1973 "Disposal of Nuclear Wastes,

Kuhn, Thomas 1970 The

" Science

182:1205-1211.

S.

Structure of Scientific Revolutions

(2nd

ed.; University

[diminishing returns in scientific discovery].

of Chicago

Press)

.

.

SUGGESTED READINGS

340 Kukla, George J., and Helena J. Kukla

1974 "Increased Surface Albedo

in the

Northern Hemisphere,"

Science

183:709-

714.

Lamb, Hubert H. 1974 "Is the

Climate Changing?" The

Earth's

Ecologist

4:10-15.

Landsberg, Hans H.

1974 "Low-Cost, Abundant Energy: Paradise Lost?" Landsberg, Helmut

E.,

Science

184:247-253.

and Lester Machta

1974 "Anthropogenic Pollution of the Atmosphere: Whereto?" Ambio 3:146-150. Lapp, Ralph E.

1972 "One Answer the Ocean,"

to the

New

Atomic-Energy Puzzle

1973 "The Chemical Century," Lewis, Richard

—Put

the

Atomic Power Plants in

York Times Magazine, ]une 4, pp. 20-21, 80-90. Bulletin of the

Atomic

Scientists

29(7):8-14.

S.

1972 The Nuclear Power Rebellion: Citizens

vs.

the

Atomic

Industrial Establishment

(New

York: Viking).

Lieberman, M. A.

1976 "United

States

—An

Uranium Resources

Analysis of Historical Data," Science

192:431-436. Lincoln, G. A.

1973 "Energy Conservation,"

Science

180:155-162.

Lindop, Patricia J., and J. Rotblat

1971 "Radiation Pollution of the Environment," Bulletin of

the

Atomic

Scientists

27(7): 17-24.

Lippman, Thomas W. 1991 "Risk Found in

Low

Levels of Radiation," The Washington Post, 20 March,

A3. Lovins,

Amory B.

1975 World Energy

Strategies: Facts, Issues,

and Options (Cambridge: Friends of the

Earth/Ballinger) ,

and John H. Price

1975 Non-Nuclear Futures: The Casefor an

Ethical Energy Strategy

(Cambridge: Friends

of the Earth/BaUinger).

McCaull,JuUan 1973 "Windmills," Environment 15(1):6-17. 1974 "Wringing Out the West," Environment 16(7):10-17.

McCloughlin, Merrill 1989 "Our Dirty Air," Mclntyre,

Hugh

U S. News and

World Report, 12 June, 48-54.

C.

1975 "Natural-Uranium Heavy-Water Reactors," [the

Scientific

American 233(4):17-27

CANDU system].

McKelvey,V.E.

1972 "Mineral Resource Estimates and Public Policy," American

Scientist

60:32-

40.

Makhijani, A.B., and A.J. Lichtenberg

1972 "Energy and Well-Being," Environment 14(5):1 1-18.

Manuel, Frank E. 1962 The Prophets of Paris (Cambridge: Harvard) progress]

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Enlightenment ideology of

.

Chapter 3

341

Maraniss, David, and Michael Weisskopf

1988 "Jobs and ber,

Margen,

Illness in

Petrochemical Corridor," The Washington Po$t,22

Decem-

At.

Peter, et

al.

1975 "The Capacity of Nuclear Power Plants,"

Bulletin of the

Atomic

Scientists

31(8):3&-46.

Martin,

S.,

and W.J. Campbell

1973 "Oil and Ice in the Arctic Ocean: Possible Large-Scale Interactions,"

Science

181:56-58.

Marx, Wesley 1973 "Los Angeles and

Machine,"

Mistress

Its

Bulletin

of the Atomic

Scientists

29(4):4-7,

44-48.

Massumi, Brian

Man Apart 4(6): 12.

1974 "Oil Shale Country," Not

Mathews, Jay 1991 "Southern California Clean Air Agency

is

Criticized," The Washington Post,

1

May,A21. Mazur, Allan, and Eugene Rosa

1974 "Energy and Life-Style,"

Meadows, Dennis

L.,

Science

186:607-610.

and Jorgen Randers

1972 "Adding the Time Dimension to Environmental Policy," in World Eco-Crisis: Organizations in Response, ed.

International

David A. Kay and Eugene B.

Skolnikoff (Madison: Wisconsin), pp. 47-66.

Meadows, Dennis

L., et

al.

1974 The Dynamics of Growth Medawar, Peter 1969

World (Cambridge: Wright-Allen).

"On 'The Effecting of All Things Possible,' " Technology Review 72(2):30-35 [a modem descendant of Francis Bacon emotionally defends the hope of progress].

Meinel, Aden B., and Marjorie

1971

in a Finite

"Is It

Time

for a

P.

Mernel

New Look

at

Solar Energy?" Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists

27(8):32-37. Mesarovic, Mihajlo, and Eduard Pestel

1974 Mankind

at the Turning Point:

The Second Report

to the

Club of Rome

(NewYork:

Duttord Reader's Digest). Metz, William

D

1972 "Magnetic Containment Fusion: What Are the Prospects?" Sdence 178:291-292.

1973 "Ocean Temperature Gradients: Solar Power from the Sea,"

Science

180:1266-

1267.

1974 "Oil Shale:

A Huge Resource of Low-Grade Fuel,"

Sdence 184:1271-1275.

1975a "Energy Conservation: Better Living through Thermodynamics,"

Science

188:820-821.

1975b "Energy:

ERDA

Stresses

Multiple Sources and Conservation,"

Scierue

189:369-370. Metzger, H. Peter

1972 The Atomic Establishment (New York: Simon and Schuster) Meyer, Alden

1990 "The 'White House

Effect':

Bush Backs Off Carbon Dioxide

Stabilization,"

Nucleus, Spring, 3.

1990 "United

States Increasingly Isolated

on Global Wurming," Nucleus, Summer,

3.

.

.

SUGGESTED READINGS

342

Michaelis, Anthony

R.

1973 "Coping with Disaster,"

Mickhn, Phihp

Bulletin of the

Atomic

Scientists

29(4):24-29.

P.

1974 "Environmental Hazards of Nuclear Wastes," 30(4):36-42

[a first-rate

Bulletin of the

Atomic

Scientists

non-polemical review].

Miles, Rufiis., Jr.

1976 Awakening from Mishan, E.J. 1974 "The

the

American Dream

(New York: Universe).

New Inflation: Its Theory and Practice,"

Moore, Curtis 1990 "Revenge of the

Encounter 42(5): 12-24.

Killer Trees," The Washington Post,

29 July, C3.

Mostert, Noel 1

974

Supership

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Mumford, Lewis 1970 The Pentagon of Power

Murdoch, WLUiam W.

(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich).

ed.

,

1971 Environment: Resources, Pollution and

Society (Stamford: Sinauer).

Mussett, Alan

1973 "Discovery: A Declining Asset?" NaiU, Roger E, et

New

Scientist

60:886-889.

al.

1975 "The Transition to Coal," Technology Review 78(l):19-29. Nash,

Hugh

1974 "Nader,

UCS Release Suppressed AEC Report on Reactor Safety,"

Not

Man

Apart 4(2):8-9.

National

Academy of Sciences

1975 Mineral

Resources

[critical

and

the

Environment (Washington: National

of the U.S. Geological Survey

oil

and gas estimates

Academy of Sciences) as

too high].

National Research Council

1989

Alternative Agriculture (Washington, D.C.: National

Academy

Press.)

Nelson, Saul

1974 "The

Looming Shortage of Primary

Processing

Capacity,"

Challenge

16(6):45-48.

de Nevers, Noel

1973 "Enforcing the Clean Air Act of 1970,"

Scientific

American 228(6): 14-21.

Newell, Reginald E.

1974 "The Earth's Chmatic History," Technology Review 77(2):31-45. Nilsson,

Sam

1974 "Energy Analysis

Goods and



^A

Services,"

More

Sensitive Instrument for

Determining Costs of

Ambio 3:222-224.

Novick, Sheldon

1969 The 1975

Careless

Atom

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Houghton

Mifflin).

Brew," Environment 17(4):8-11 [critique of AEC's

final

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1975 "Net Energy Analysis Can Be Illuminating," Conservation Foundation

October

[a

very

usefial

Letter,

brief summary of the issues].

O'DonneU, Sean 1974 "Ireland Turns to Peat,"

New

Scientist

countries also have substantial suppUes].

63:18-19 [the

USSR

and other

.

Chapter 3

343

Odum, Howard T. 1971 Environment, Power and

Society

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1973 "Energy, Ecology and Economics," Ambio 2:220-227. Okie, Susan

1990 "Cancer Rates

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December,

Al. O'Neill, Gerard K.

1975 "Space Colonies and Energy Supply to the Earth,"

Science

190:943-947.

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development

1990 The

State of the Environment. (Paris:

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F.

1974 "Coal and the Present

Enei^

Situation," Science 183:477-481.

Page, James K.,Jr.

1974 "Growing Pains in Energy," Smithsonian 5(6):12-15. Park, Charles F,Jr.

1968

Jeopardy:

in

Affluence

Minerab

and

the

Economy

Political

(San

Francisco:

Freeman,Cooper) Patterson, Walter C.

1972 "The British Atom," Environment 14(10):2-9.

and Stephanie Pearl

Pearl, Arthur,

1971 "Toward an Ecological Theory of Value,"

Social

Policy

2(l):30-38

[ther-

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Harry

1974 "The Gasification of Coal,"

Scientific

American 230(3) A9-25.

Peterson,James T.

1973 "Energy and the Weather," Environment 15(8):4—9. Plau,John R.

1966 The Step

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Pollard, WiUiamG.

1976 "The Long-range Prospects for Solar Energy," American

[why centrahzed generation of electricity using tical, if not

solar

Scientist

64:424—429

energy will be imprac-

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Polunin, Nicholas

1974 "Thoughts on Some Conceivable Ecodisasters," Environmental Conservation 1:177-189 [all the small but potentially lethal risks, especially in combination].

Post,

Richard

F.

1971 "Fusion Power:

The Uncertain

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27(8):42-48. ,

and Stephen

F.

Post

1973 "Flywheels," ,

and

F.

L.

Scientific

1974 "Fusion Reactors Postel,

American 229{6):\7-23.

Ribe as

Future Energy Sources," Science 186:397-407.

Sandra

1990 "Trouble

On

Tap"

in Environment

90/91, reprinted fixjm World Watch, Sep-

tember/October, 1989, pp. 12-20, ed. John Allen, Annual Editions (Guilford, Connecticut: Price,

The Dushkin Publishing Group).

Derek J. de SoUa

1961

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SUGGESTED READINGS

344 Primack, Joel, and Frank von Hippel

1974 "Nuclear Reactor

Safety:

The Origins and Issues of a Vital Debate,"

Bulletin of

the Atomic Scientists 30(8):5-12.

Prud'homme, Robert K. 1974 "Automobile Emissions Abatement and Fuels

American

Policy,"

Scientist

62:191-199. Pryde, Philip R., and Lucy

T Pryde

1974 "Soviet Nuclear Power: A Different Approach to Nuclear

Safety," Environment

16(3):26-34.

Rabinowitch, Eugene

1969 "ResponsibiUty of

Scientists in



25(9) :2-3, 26 [an argument

technology have aboUshed Ramseier,

Our Age,"

Bulletin of the

^very typical in its rationale



Atomic

Scientists

that science

and

scarcity].

Rene O.

1974 "Oil on

How

Ice:

Melt the Arctic and

to

Warm

the World," Environment

16(4):7-14.

RAND Corporation 1973

Quandary

California's Electric

(3 vols; Santa

Monica:

RAND).

RANN (Research Applied to National Needs Program) 1972 Summary Report of

the

Workshop on Energy and

Cornell

the

Environment

(Washington: Government Printing Office).

Reed,

T B., and R. M. Lemer

1973 "Medianol: A Versatile Fuel for Immediate Use,"

Science

182:1299-1304.

Renner, Michael

War on the Environment," in State of the (New York: WW. Norton & Company).

1991 "Assessing the Military ed. Linda Starke

W

Rex, Robert 1971 "Geothermal Energy Scientists

RFF

—The Neglected Energy Option,"

World, 1991,

Bulletin of the

Atomic

27(8):52-56.

(Resources for the Future)

1973 Energy Research and Development

ment Printing



Problems and Prospects (Washington:

Govern-

Office).

Rhodes, Richard 1974 "Los Alamos Revisited,"

Harper's,

March,

pp. 57-64.

Rice, Richard A.

1974 "Toward More Transportation with Less Energy," Technology Review 76(4):45-53. Ritchie-Calder, Peter R.

1970 "Mortgaging the Old Homestead," Foreign

Affairs

48:207-220 [supertanker

problems].

Roberts, Marc

1973

"Is

J.

There an Energy

Robinson, Arthur

Crisis?" Public Interest 31:17-37.

L.

1974 "Energy Storage

(II):

Developing Advanced Technologies,"

887.

Robson, Geoffi-ey 1974 "Geothermal

Electricity Production," Science 184:371-375.

Rose, David J.

1974a "Energy Policy in the U.S.,"

1974b "Nuclear Eclectic Power,"

Scientific

Science

American 230(l):20-29.

184:351-359.

Science

184:884-

.

Chapter 3

.

345

Rubin, Milton D. 1974 "Plugging the

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W. M.S.

Russell,

1971 "Population and Inflation," The

SCEP

Ecologist l(8):4-8.

(Study of Critical Environmental Problems)

1970 Man's Impact on

the Global

Environment (Cambridge: MIT).

Schneider, Stephen H.

1974 "The Population Explosion: Can

It

Shake the Climate?" Ambio 3:150-

155. ,

and Roger D. Dennett

1975 "Chmatic Barriers to Long-Term

Schumacher, E.

974 Small

1

Seaborg, Glenn

Enei^

Grovvth," Ambio 4:65-74.

F.

Is Beautiful:

Economics as

T, and William R.

if People

Mattered (New^ York: Harper and

Row)

Corliss

1971 M('« and Atom: Building a

New

World Through Nuclear Technology

(New York:

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1989 "Protecting the Ozone Layer"

(New York: W. W. Norton

in State of the World, 1989, ed.

Linda Starke

& Company).

Shen-Miller,J.

1970 "Some Thou^ts on the Nuclear Agro-Industrial Complex,"BioSde«a 20:98100.

Shogren, EUzabeth

990 "4 Years

1

Later, Chernobyl's

Ills

Widen," The Washington

Post,

27 April, Al

Skinner, Brian J.

1969 Earth Resources (Englewood Chfls: Prentice-Hall). Slesser,

Malcolm

1973 "Energy Analysis

in

PoUcy Making," New

1974 "The Energy Ration," The

SMIC

Ecologist

Scientist

60:328-330.

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1971 Inadvertent Climate Modification (Cambridge: MIT). Smith, R. Jeffi-ey

1989 "Low-Level Radiation Causes More Deaths Than Assumed, Study Finds," The Washington Post, 20 December, A3.

Snowden, Donald

P.

1972 "Superconductors for Power Transmission,"

Scientific American

226(4):84-91.

Sorensen, Bent

1975 "Energy and Resources,"

Science

189:255-260

[a solar

energy economy for

Denmark]. Spurgeon, David

1973 "Natural Power for the Third World,"

1974 "Coal: Starr,

New

60:694-697.

A Past and Future Kirg," Ambio 3:1-14.

Chauncey

1971 "Energy and Power," ,

and Richard

Scientific American

225(3)134-144.

Rudman

1973 "Parameters of Technological Growth," Stein,

Scientist

Arthur M.

Squires,

Science

182:358-364.

Richard G.

1972

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Environment 14(8): 17-20, 25-29.

SUGGESTED READINGS

346

Stent,

Gunther

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1969 The Coming of the Golden Age: A View of the End of Progress (New York: Natxiral History

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Stevens, William K.

1991 "As Nations Meet on Global Warming, U.S. Stands Alone," The Times, 10 September, ,

York

1991 "Danes Link Sunspot Intensity to Global Temperature Rise," The New York

November, C4.

Times, 5 Stever,

New

CI.

H. Guyford

1975 "Whither the

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1973

Higher Derivatives,"

Science

189:264-267 [the

of research and development].

F.

"One

An Ecological

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Affairs

Stunkel,

NSF?—The

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Foreign

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Kermeth R.

1973 "The Technological Solution,"

Bulletin of the

Atomic

Scientists

29(7):42^4.

Tamphn, Arthur R. 1973 "Solar Energy," Environment 15(5):16-20, 32-34 [one of the best short reviews; extensive citations].

Taylor,

Theodore

1973 The

B.,

and Charles C. Humpstone

Restoration of the Earth

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UNESCO 1973 "Appropriate Technology,"

a special issue

of Impact of

Science on

Society

23:251-352.

United Nations 1961 Proceedings of

the Conference

on

New

Sources of Energy (6 vols;

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as

Rome: United

sources of power].

Vacca, Roberto

1973 The Coming Dark Age, alarmist

view of the

trans. J. S.

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City,

NY:

Doubleday) [an

industrial system's intrinsic instability].

Wade, Nicholas 1974 "Windmills: The Resurrection of an Ancient Energy Technology,"

Science

184:1055-1058. Walsh, John

1974 "Uranium Enrichment: Both the Americans and Europeans Must Decide

Where

to

Get the Nuclear Fuel of the 1980's,"

Science

184:1160-1161.

Wanniski,Jude

1975 "The MundeU-Laffer Hypothesis Public Interest

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[scarcity



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and

New View

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inflation].

Wasserman, Harvey 1991 "Bush's Pro-Nuke Waters, W.G.,

Enei^

Strategy."

The Nation, 20 May, 656-660.

II

1973 "Landing

a

Man Downtown,"

Bulletin of the

[how environmental management Watt, Kenneth E.

1974 The

differs fi-om

Atomic

29(9):34-35

E

Titanic Effect: Planning for the Unthinkable (Stamford,

Weinberg, Alvin

Scientists

space programs].

M.

1972 "Science and Trans-Science," Minerva 10:209—222.

Conn.: Sinauer).

.

Chapter 4

347



1973 "Technology and Ecology

Is

There

a

Need

for Confixjntation?" BioSdence

23:41-45.

1974 "Global

Effects

of Man's Production of Energy,"

Science 186:205.

Weir, David, and Constance Matthiessen

1990 "Will the Circle Be Unbroken?" Jones, ]une, 1989, pp.

in Environment

90/91, reprinted from Mother

20-27, Annual Editions (Guildford, Connecticut: The

Dushkin Pubhshing Group). Weisskopf, Michael

1991 "Ozone Layer over U.S. Thinning Swiftly," The Washington Wentorf, R. H.,Jr., and R. E.

1974 "Thermochemical Hydrogen Generation,"

Westman, Walter

E.,

Post, 5 April,

Al.

Hanneman 185:311-319.

Science

and Roger M. Gifford

1973 "Environmental Impact: Controlling the Overall Level,"

Science

181:819-825

[with an energy currency].

Whittemore, 1973

F.

Case

"How Much

Reserve?" Environment 15(7):16-20, 31-35.

in

Wilkinson, John

1974 "A Modest Proposal for Recycling 7(3):7-12

Our Junk Heap Society," Center Report computer simulation suggests that fiiture living standards wUl

[a

resemble those of the early 1900s].

WiUrich, Mason, and Theodore B. Taylor

1974 Nuclear

Theft: Risks

and Safeguards (Cambridge: BaUinger).

Wilson, Richard

1973 "Natural Gas

Is

Beautiful Thing?"

a

Bulletin

of the Atomic Scientists

29(7):35-40.

Wind Energy Weekly 1991 4 June, #403.

Winsche,W.E.,etal. 1973 "Hydrc^en:

Its

Future Role in the Nation's Energy Economy," Science 180:1325-

1332.

Wolf, Martin

1974 "Solar Energy UriHzation by Physical Methods,"

Wood,

Lowell, and John

Science

184:382-386.

NuckoUs

1972 "Fusion Power," Environment 14(4):29-33.

World Resources 1990 World

Institute.

Resources,

Programme and

1990-91 the

in collaboration with the

U.N. Envirormiental

U.N. Development Program.

Wright, John, and John Syrett

1975 "Energy Analysis of Nuclear Power,"

Young, Louise

B.,

New

Scientist

65:66-67.

and H. Peyton Young

1974 "Pollution by

Electrical Transmission:

Voltage Lines," Bulletin of the Atomic

The Environmental Impact of High

Scientists

30(10):34-38.

Chapter 4 Attah, Ernest B.

1973 "Racial Aspects of Zero Population Growth," Barker, Ernst, trans. 1

962 The

Politia of Aristotle

(New York: Oxford)

Science

180:1143-115.

.

.

.

SUGGESTED READINGS

348

Bamett, Larry D. 1971 "Zero Population Growth, Inc.," BioSdence 21:759-765. Bell,

Daniel

1973 The Coming of Post-Industrial

Society:

A

(NewYork:

Venture in Social Forecasting

Basic Books). Berlin, Isaiah

1969 Four Essays on

(New York: Oxford).

Liberty

Brown, Harrison 1954 The Challenge of Man's Future (New York: Viking). Buchanan, James 1969 The Demand and Supply of Public Goods (Chicago: Rand McNally).

Burch,WimamR.,Jr. 1971 Daydreams and Nightmares:

A

Sociological

Essay on the American Environment

(New York: Harper and Row). Buder, Samuel 1

872 Erewhon (New York: Signet, 1 960)

Callahan, Daniel J.

1973 The Tyranny of

Survival;

and Other Pathologies of Civilized

Life

(New

York:

MacmiUan). Carney, Francis

1972

" Schlockology, "

New

York Review o/Boofes, June

1,

pp. 26-29.

Chamberlin.NeilW. 1970 Beyond Malthus: Population and Power (New York: Basic Books). and Anthony Scott

Christy, Francis T.,Jr.,

1965 The Common Wealth

in

Ocean

Fisheries (Baltimore: Johns

Hopkins).

Cohen, David 1973 "Chemical Castration,"

Comford, Francis M.,

New

Scientist

57:525-526.

trans.

1945 The Republic of Plato (New York: Oxford).

Crowe, Beryl

L.

1969 "The Tragedy of die

Commons

Revisited," Science 166:1 103-1 107.

Dahl, Robert A.

1970

After the Revolution? : Authority in a

Good

Society

(New Haven: Yale).

Delg^do,Jose Manuel R.

1969

Physical Control of the

Mind: Toward a Psychocivilized

Society

(New York: Harper

and Row). Eisner,

Thomas, Ari van Tienhaven, and Frank Rosenblatt

1970 "Population Control,

Sterilization,

and Ignorance,"

Science

167:337.

Ellul, Jacques 1

967 The

Elmer-Dewitt,

Technological Society (rev. ;

New York: Knopf)

Phillip

1989 "A Drastic Plan to Banish Smog," Time, 27 March, 65. Fife,

Daniel

1971 "Killing the Goose," Environment 13(3):20-27 [the logic of the commons]. Forester, E.

M.

1928 The Eternal Moment (New York: Harcourt, Brace)

R. Buckminster 1968 "An Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth" in Environment and Change: The Next Fifty Years, ed. WilHam R. Ewald.Jr. (Bloomington: Indiana).

Fuller,

.

.

Chapter 4

349 1969 "Vertical

Geesaman, Donald

Is

P.,

to Live, Horizontal

to Die," American Scholar

Is

1974 "The Dilemma of Fission Power," extreme security measures

[the

Global

39 (i) -.27 -^7.

and Dean E. Abrahamson Bulletin of the

a nuclear

Atomic

Scientists

power economy

30(9):37-41

will require].

Tomorrow Coalition

1990 The Global Ecology Handbook, Haefele,

Edwin

ed. Walter

H. Corson (Boston: Beacon

Press).

T. ed. ,

1975 The Governance of Common Property Resources (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins). Hardin, Garrett

1968 "The Tragedy of the Commons," 1972 Exploring

Science

162:1243-1248.

New Ethics for Survival (New York: Viking).

,ed.

1969

and Birth Control: A Collage of Controversial

Population, Evolution,

Ideas (2nded.;

New York: W. H. Freeman and Co.). P

Heilbroner,

obert L.

An

1974

Inquiry into the

Human

Prospect

(New York: Norton).

Hobbes, Thomas 1651 Leviathan, ed.

or the Matter,

Form and Power of a Commonwealth,

ealesiastical

and

civil,

H. W. Schneider (Indianapohs: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958).

Holden, Constance 1973 "Psychosurgery: Legitimate

Therapy or Laundered Lobotomy?"

Science

179:1109-1114. Huxley, Aldous L.

1932 Brave 1 958

Brave

New New

World

(New York: Modern Library, 1956). (New York: Harper)

World Revisited

niich, Ivan

1973

Tools for Conviinality

(New York: Harper and Row).

Kahn, Alfred E. 1966 "The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market

Failures, Imperfections,

and the

Limits of Economics," Kyklos 19(l):23-47 [the logic of the commons].

Kahn, Herman, and Anthony J. Wiener 1968 "Faustian Powers and nological and

Human

Economic

Choice:

Some

Twenty-First Century Tech-

Issues" in Environment and Choice, ed.

WiUiam R.

Ewald,Jr. (Bloomir^on: Indiana), pp. 101-131. Kass,

Leon R. 1971 "The

New Biology: What Price Relieving Man's Estate?" Science 174:779-788. The New Biology and the 'Old' Morahty," Public Interest



1972 "Making Babies 26:18-56. Lewis, C. 1

S.

965 The

Abolition of Man

(New York: Macmillan)

Locke, John

1690 Second

Treatise, in

American

Two

Treatises

of Government, ed. Peter Laslett

(New York: New

Library, 1965).

McDermott, John 1969 "Technology: The Opiate of the

Intellectuals,"

New

York Review of Books,]\Ay

31,pp.25-35. Michael, Donald N.

1970 The Unprepared

Row).

Society: Planning for a Precarious Future

(New York: Harper and

.

.

.

SUGGESTED READINGS

350 Morrison, Denton

E.,

Kenneth E. Horseback, and W. Keith Warner

1974 Environment: A

Bibliography of Social Science and Related Literature (Washington:

GPO). 1975 Energy: A Bibliography of Social

Myers,

Science

and Related

Literature

(New Yoric: Garland).

Norman

1975 "The

WhaUng Controversy,"

American

Scientist

63:448-455 [an excellent case

study of the kinds of pressures that promote overexploitation] Odell, Rice

1975

"How

Will

January

[a

We

React to an Age of Scarcity?" Conservation Foundation

Letter,

review of many different opinions].

Olson, Mancur, Jr.

1968 The Logic of Collective Action: Schocken) ,

and Hans Landsberg,

1973 The No-Growth

Public

Goods and

the

Theory of Groups

(NewYork:

eds.

Society

(New York: Norton).

Ophuls, William

1973 "Leviathan or ObUvion?" in Toward Steady-State Economy, (New York: W. H. Freeman and Co.), pp. 215-230.

ed.

Herman

E.

Daly

Orwell, George

1963 Nineteen Eighty-Four:

Text, Sources, Criticism, ed. Irving

Howe (New

York:

Harcourt, Brace and World). Pirages,

C, and

Dennis

1974 Ark

Paul R. EhrUch Response

II: Social

to

Environmental Imperatives

(New York:

W H. Freeman

and Company). Popper, Karl R.

1966 The Open

Society,

and

Its

Enemies

(2

vols,

5th ed.,

rev.;

Princeton University

Press).

Reich, Charles A. 1

97 1

The Greening of America

(New York: Random House)

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

1762 The

Social Contract, ed.

Russett, Bruce M., and

Charles Frankel

(New York: Hafiier,

1947).

John D. SuUivan

1971 "Collective Goods and International Organization,"

International Organization

25:845-865. ScheUing, Thomas C.

1971 Skinner, B.

"On

the Ecology of Micromotive,," Public Interest 25:61-98.

F.

1971 Beyond Freedom and Dignity

(New York: Knopf).

Smith, Adam

1776

An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the (New York: Modern Library, 1937).

Speth, J. Gustave, Arthur

R. Tamplin, and Thomas

B.

Wealth of Nations, ed.

Edwin Carman

Cochran

1974 "Plutonium Recycle: The Fateful Step,"

Bulletin

of the Atomic

Scientists

30(9):15-22. Stillman, Peter G.

1975 "The Tragedy of the Commons:

A Re-Analysis," Alternatives 4(2):12-15.

Stone, Christopher D.

1974 Should

Trees

Have Standing?: Toward Legal Rights for Natural

Cahf.: William Kaufinann).

Objects (Los Altos,

.

Chapter 5

351

Susskind, Charles

1973 Understanding Technology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins).

Tuan,Yi-Fu 1970 "Our Treatment of the Environment in Ideal and Actuality," American

58:244—249

[the

Chinese and their environment through

Wade, Nicholas 1974 "Sahelian Drought:

No

Scientist

history].

Victory for Western Aid," Science 185:234-237 [how

an aid program destroyed the traditional controls on

—with

common

a

catastrophic results].

Webb, Walter

Prescott

1952 The Great Weinberg, Alvrn

Houghton

Frontier (Boston:

Mifflin).

M.

1972a "Social Institutions and Nuclear Energy,"

Science

177:27—34.

1972b Review of John Holdren and Philip Herrers, Energy:

A

Crisis in

Power in

An.erican Scientist 60:775—776.

1973 "Technology and Ecology



Is

There

a

Need

for Confrontation?" BioScience

23:41-46.

White, Lynn, Jr.

1967 "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic

Crisis, "Snenre

155:1203—1207.

Wilkinson, Richard G.

1973 Poverty and

An

Progress:

Ecological Perspective

on Economic Development

(New

York: Praeger).

WiUrich, Mason 1 975

"Terrorists

Keep Out! The Problem of Safeguarding Nuclear Materials :

of Malfunctioning People,"

Bulletin of the

Atomic

Scientists

in a

Worid

31(5):12— 16.

Wynne—Edwards, V. C. 1970 "Self-Regulatory Systems in Populations of Animals," in The Subversive Science, ed. Paul Shepard and Daniel McKinley (Boston: Houghton Mifflin), pp. 99-111 [valuable biological perspective on the tragedy of the

commons]

Chapter 5 Abrahamson, Dean E. 1974a "Energy:

AH

in the Family," Environment 16(7):50-52.

1974b "Energy: Sidestepping

NEPA Reviews,"

Environment 16(9):39.

Anderson, Frederick R., and Robert H. Daniels

1973

NEPA

in the

Courts:

A

Legal Analysis of the National Environmental Policy Act

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins). Ayres,

Robert

U.,

and Allen

V.

Kneese

1969 "Production, Consumption, and Externalities," American Economic Review

59:282-297 [Kneese Barnett, Harold J., and Chandler

1963

Scarcity

et al.

1970

in a nutsheU].

Morse

and Growth: The Economics of Natural Resource

Availability (Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins).

Beckerman, Wilfred 1974 Bell,

In Defence of Economic

Growth (London: Cape).

Daniel

1971 "The Corporation and Society in the 1970's," Public

Interest

24:5-32.

1

.

.

SUGGESTED READINGS

352 Boguslaw, Robert

New

1965 The

Utopians

(Englewood

Cliffi,

NJ.: Prentice-Hall).

Boulding, Kenneth E.

1949 "Income or Welfare?" Reinew of Economic Studies 17:77-86. 1966 "The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth," in Environmental Quality

in a

Hop-

Grounng Economy, ed. Henry Jarrett (Baltimore: Johns

3-14.

kins), pp.



1967 "Fun and Games with the Gross National Product The Role of Misleading Indicators in Social Policy," in The Environmental Crisis, ed. Harold W.

(New Haven: Yale), pp. 157-170. (New York: McGraw-Hill), Chap. 7. Brooks, Harvey, and Raymond Bowers 197 "The Assessment of Technology" in Man and the Ecosphere, ed. Paul R. Ehrlich, John P Holdren, and Richard W. Hohn (New York: W. H. Freeman and Co.). Helfrich,Jr.

1970 Economics

as a Science

Carter, Luther J.

1973 "Alaska Pipeline: Congress Deaf

to Environmentalists," Science

179:1310-

1312,1350. Clark,

CoUnW.

1973 "The Economics of Overexploitation,"

Science

181:630-634.

Commoner, Barry 1973 "Trains into Flowers,"

Harper's,

December,

pp.

78-86 [why

trains

cannot

compete with the auto] Conservation Foundation

1971 "Indiscriminate Economic Growth, Measured with Little Regard for Environmental Costs and Social Well-Being, Is Challenged," CF Letter, May. 1972

"NEPA

Challenges the Nations Plans and Priorities

Some Are Reacting Against Culbertson,John M. and

1

97 1 Economic Development: An

Dales,J.

Ecological

—But

Progress

Is

Slow,

CF Letter, May.

Approach

(New York: Knopf)

H.

1968

Pollution, Property sity

Herman

Daly,

It,"

of Toronto

and

Prices:

An

Essay in Policy-Making and Economics (Univer-

Press).

E., ed.

1973 Toward a Steady-State Economy (New York:

W H. Freeman and

Co.).

Dolan, Edwin G.

1971

TANSTAAFL:

The Economic

Strategy for Ecologic

Crisis

(New

York: Holt,

Rinehart and Winston). Edel,

Matthew 1973 Economies and

the

Environment (Englewood CliSs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall).

Freeman, A. Myrick, and Robert H. Haveman

1972 "Clean Rhetoric and Dirty Water," ,

Public Interest 28:51-65.

Robert H. Haveman, and Allen V. Kneese

1973 The Economia of Environmental

Policy

(New York: Wiley).

Gabor, Dennis

1972 The Mature

Society

(London: Seeker and Warburg).

Galbraith,John K.

1958 The

Affluent Society (Boston:

1967 The

New

Houghton Mifflin). Houghton Mifflin).

Industrial State (Boston:

.

.

.

Chapter 5

353

Garvey, Gerald 1

972

Economy:

Energy, Ecology,

A

Framework for Environmental

Policy

(New

York:

Norton).

Robert

Gillette,

1972 "National Environmental Policy Act: Signs of Backlash Are Evident,"

Science

176:30-33. Hagevik, George 1971 "Legislating for Air Quality Management," in The

Roos,

Leslie L.

[Excellent

on

Jr.

(New

us.

of Ecosuicide, ed.

the difficulties of internahzing costs.]

Hardesty, John, Norris C. Clement, and

1971 "The PoUtical

Politics

York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), pp. 311-345.

CHnton

E. Jencks

Economy of Environmental

the Environment, ed.

Disruption," in Economic Growth

Warren E.Johnson and John Hardesty (Belmont, Calif.:

Wadsworth), pp. 85-106. Hardin, Garret'

1972 Exploring

New Ethics for Survival (New York: Viking).

Harnik, Peter

1973 "The Biggest Going-Out-of-Business Sale of All Time," Environmental Action,

September l,pp. 9-12. Hays, Samuel

P.

1959 Conservation and HeUer, Walter

the Gospel of Efficiency

(Cambridge: Harvard).

W

1973 Economic Growth and Environmental Quality: town,

N.J.:

General Learning

Collision, or

Co-Existence (Morris-

Press).

Henderson, Hazel 1976 "The End of Economics," The important radical economist;

Ecologist

6:137-146

a valuable

chapter, with usefiil references to her

[a first-rate

critique

by an

supplement to the argument of this

own

previous

work and

to the

work of

others]

Hirschman, Albert

0.

1967 Development

Projects

Observed (Washington: Brookings Institute) [the hidden

of development]

costs

Kapp,K.WilUam 1950 The

Social Costs of Private Enterprise

(New York: Schocken, 1971).

Klausener, Samuel Z.

1971

On Man

and His Environment (San Francisco :Jossey-Bass) [an attempt to

to terms with

some of the

sociological externaHties

come

of development]

Kneese,AllenV.

1973 "The Faustian Bargain: Benefit-Cost Analysis and Unscheduled Events in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle," Resources 44:1-5. ,

Robert U.

Ayres,

and Ralph C. d'Arge

1970 Economics and Environment: A Materials Balance Approach (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins) Kraus, James

1974 "American Environmental Case Law: Krieger, Martin

An

Update,"

Alternatives 3(2):25-30.

H.

1973 "What's

Wrong

pure economic

with

Plastic Trees," Science

analysis].

Krieth, Frank

1973 "Lack of Impact," Environment 15(l):26-33.

179:446-455

[the perversities

of

.

SUGGESTED READINGS

354

Miller, G.Tyler

1990 Living

in the

Environment (6th ed.; Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing

Company). Mishan, EzraJ.

1969 Technology and Growth: The 1971

"On Making the

Price

We Pay (New York: Praeger).

Future Safe for Mankind," Public

Interest

24:33-61

Novick, Sheldon

1974 "Nuclear Breeders," Environment 16(6):6-15. Odell, Rice

—Business

1973 "Environmental Pohticking ter,

Passell, Peter,

Usual," Conservation Foundation Let-

and Leonard Ross

1973 The Pearce,

as

August.

Retreat from Riches: Affluence

and

Its

Enemies

(New York: Viking).

David

1973

"Is

Ecology

Elitist?"

The

Ecologist

3:61-63.

Polanyi, Karl

1944 The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon). Ridker, Ronald G.

1972 "Population and Pollution in the United

176:1085-1090.

States," Science

Rothman, Harry 1972 Murderous

Providence:

A

Study of Pollution

in Industrial

Societies

(New York:

Bobbs-Merrill). Ruff, Larry E.

1970 "The Economic

Common

Sense of Pollution," Public

Interest

19:69-85.

Sachs, Ignacy

1971 "Approaches to a Pohtical tion

5(5):47-58

traditionahsts

[a

Economy

of Environment,"

Social Science Informa-

very perceptive brief overview of the clash between market

and the new economic

hoUsts].

Stone, Richard

1972

'The Evaluation of Pollution: Balancing Gains and Losses," Minerva 10:412425.

Tribe,

Lawrence H.

1971 "Legal Frameworks for the Assessment and Control of Technology," Minerva 9:243-255. Tsuru, Shigeto

1971 "In Place of GNP,"

Social Scierue Information 10(4):7-21

discussion of the drawbacks of

[an especially

good

GNP as an indicator].

UNESCO 1973 "The Social Assessment of Technology,"

special issue of International Social

Science Journal 25(3).

Weisskopf Walter A. 1971 Alienation and Economics

(New York: Dutton).

Wildavsky, Aaron

1967 "Aesthetic Power or the Triumph of the Sensitive Minority over the Vulgar Mass:

A

Political

Analysis of the

New

Economics," Daedalus

96:1115-1128. Wilkinson, Richard G.

1973 Poverty and

Progress:

York: Praeger).

An

Ecological Perspective on

Economic Development

(New

.

Chapter 6

355

Winner, Langdon 1972

"On

Controlling Technology," Public Policy 20:35-59.

Wollman, Nathaniel 1967 "The

New Economics

of Resources," Daedalus 96:1099-1 114.

Chapter 6 Abelson, Philip H.

1972a "Environmental Quality,"

1972b "Federal

Statistics," Science

Science

177:655.

175:1315.

Bachrach, Peter

1967 The Theory ofDemoaatic Bell,

Elitism:

A

Critique (Boston: Little,

Brown).

Daniel

—On

1974 "The Public Household

Sociology' and the Liberal Society,"

'Fiscal

Public Interest 37:29-68.

Brown, Harrison, James Bonner, and John Weir 1963 The Next Hundred Years (New York: Viking)

[esp.

Chaps. 14-17, which discuss

manpower] Bruce-Briggs, B.

1974 "Against the Neo-Malthusians," Commentary July, pp. 25-29.

Burch,WimamR.,Jr. 1971 Daydreams and Nightmares:

(New

York: Harper and

A

Sociological

Essay on the American Environment

Row).

Caldwell, Lynton K.

1971 Environment: A Challenge ,

to

Modem

Society

(Garden

City, N.Y.:

Doubleday).

and Toufiq A. Siddiqi Policy, Law and Administration: A Guide to Advanced Study (Bloomington: University of Indiana School of Public and Environmental

1974 Environmental

Affairs).

Carpenter, Richard A.

1972 "National Goals and Environmental Laws," Technology Review 74(3): 58-63. Carter, Luther J.

1973a "Environment:

A Lesson for the

1973b "Environmental Law

(I):

People of Plenty," Science 182:1323-1324.

Maturing Field

for Laviryers

and

Scientists," Science

179:1205-1209.

1973c "Environmental

Law

(II):

A Strategic Weapon Against Degradation?"

Science

179:1310-1312,1350.

1973d

"Pesticides: Environmentalists

Seek New Victory in

a Frustrating

War,"

Science

181:143-145.

1974a "Cancer and die Environment

(I):

A

Creaky System Grinds On,"

Science

186:239-242.

1974b "Con Edison: Endless Storm King Dispute Adds 194:1353-1358.

to

Its

Troubles," Science

1974c "The Energy Bureaucracy: The Pieces Fall into Place," Science 185:44-45. 1974d "Energy: Cannibalism in the Bureaucracy," Science 186:511.

1974e "Pollution and Pubhc Health: Taconite Case Poses Major Test,"

Science

186:31-36.

1975a "The Environment:

A

'Mature' Cause in

Need of a

Lift," Science

187:45-48.

.

SUGGESTED READINGS

356 1975b The

Florida Experience:

Land and Water

Policy in a

GrouHh State (Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins).

Cohn.Victor 1975 "The Washington Energy Show," Technology Review 77(3):8, 68. Conservation Foundation

1972 "Wanted:

A

Coordinated, Coherent National Energy Policy Geared to the

CF Letter, No. 6-72.

Public Interest,"

Cooley, Richard A., and Geoffi^y Wandesforde-Smith, eds.

1970 Congress and

the

Environment (Seatde: Washington).

Crossland, Janice 16(2): 15-27.

1974 "Cars, Fuel, and Pollution," Environment Dahl, Robert A.

1970

After the Revolution? : Authority in a

Davies, Barbara

1975 The

S.,

and Clarence J. Davies,

Politics

Good

Society

(New Haven: Yale).

III

of Pollution (2nd ed.;

New York: Pegasus).

Davis, David H.

1974 Energy

Politics

(New York: St. Martin s)

Dexter, Lewis A.

1969 The

Sociology

and

Politics

of Congress (Chicago:

Downs, Anthony 1972

"Up and Down

with Ecology

—The

Rand McNally).

'Issue-Attention Cycle,' " Public Interest

28:38-50. Dror,Yehezkel

1968

Public Policymaking

Reexamined (San Francisco: Chandler).

Edelman, Murray 1964 The Symbolic Uses ofPolitia (Urbana: Forrester,Jay

1971

Illinois).

W.

World Dynamics (Cambridge: Wright-Allen) critique

[esp.

Chaps.

1

and 7 for a

radical

of nonsystematic, incremental decision making].

Forsythe,DallW 1974 "An Energy-Scarce Society: The

New Gillette,

Politics

and

Possibilities,"

Working Papers for a

Society 2(1):3-12 [an excellent short analysis].

Robert

1973a "Energy: The Muddle

at

the Top," Science 182:1319-1321.

1973b "Western Coal: Does the Debate Follow

Irreversible

Commitment?"

Science

182:456-458.

1975 "In Energy Impasse, Conservation Keeps Popping Up,"

Science

187:42-45.

Goldstein, Paul, and Robert Ford

1973

"On

the Control of Air Quality:

Atomic Green, Charles

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357

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974 Environmental

Hirschman, Albert

1970

Exit, Voice

decision

Horowitz, Irving

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.

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1972 "The Environmental Cleavage: Social Ecology versus Theory and

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1974 "Anti-Pollution Backlash

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a

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1975 Clean Air: The

Policies

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of Pollution Control (University of Pittsburgh

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1969 The

Regulators: Watchdog Agencies

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the Public Interest

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Michael

1972 "Congressional Attitudes Toward the Environment,"

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1966 Goab,

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1969 Manpower Needs for National Goak Lewis, Bachard 1

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1965 The

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1973 "The Environment of the Poor:

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1971 "Pohtical Science and Air Pollution:

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358 Michael, Donald N.

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1967 Governing Nature (Chicago: Quadrangle). Nagel, Stuart

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1974 Environmental

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97 1

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1973 "Enforcing the Clean Air Act of 1970,"

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OdeU, Rice 1975a "Automobiles Keep Posing

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March.

1975b "Should Americans Be Pried Out of Their Cars?" Conservation Foundation Letter, April.

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1974 Ark H:

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to

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Environmental Imperatives

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1969 "What Potter,

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1954 People Of Plenty: Economic Abundance and

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1974 "Fighting the Corporate Lobby," Environmental Action, December 7, pp. 3-6 [how the poUtical and other resources of corporations overwhelm the environmental regulators].

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1970 "The Federal Government

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1971 "Systems Pohtics and Systems Budgeting," in

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1967 "Information, RationaHty, and Free Choice in Daedalus 96:771-778. Sills,

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1974 Environmental Quality and

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1971 Ecology and

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974 "Take Water and Heat from Third World,"

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New Scientist

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1972 "Environmental QuaHty and International Trade," 26:419-465.

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1974 "Copper

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1975a "The Great World Crisis,"

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360

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1973 "Japan: Are There Limits to Growth?" Environment 15(10):6— 13. Bergsten, C. Fred

1974 "The Boserup,

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1972 In Defense of Earth: International

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1972 "Environment and Development: The Case of the Developing Countries," International Organization

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1974 "Oil and the Poor Countries," Environment 16(2):10-14. Clawson, Marion 1971 "Economic Development and Environmental Impact: International Aspects," 10(4):23-43.

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1975 The

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1975 The

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1973 Stockholm

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1974 "Living

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1974 "Ecology

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1974 Holt,

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1972 World Kelley,

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1976 The Economic Superpowers and Kiseleva,

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1974

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1975 Special

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1975 "Towards

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710.

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974 "More Third World Cartels Ahead?" Challenge 17(5):24-31

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1972 "Radical Environmentahsm," Not answer].

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362 Nash.A.E.Keir 1970 "Pollution, Population and the

Cowboy Economy,"

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Omo-Fadaka,Jimoh 1973 "The Tanzanian Way of Effective Development,"

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23:107-116. Packer, Arnold

1975 "Living with Oil

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1971 "The Social Costs of Modernization: Ecological Problems in the World

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1972 Conservation

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Quigg,PhihpW. 1974 "The Consumption Dilemma," World Environment

November

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Ritchie-Calder, Peter R.

— 'Smash and

1974 "Caracas

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Rotkirch, Holger

1974 "Claims to the Ocean: Freedom of the Sea for Whom?" Environment 16(5):34-41. Shapley,

Deborah

1973 "Ocean Technology: Race to Seabed Wealth Disturbs More than Fish,"

Science

180:849-851,893.

1975 "Now, a Draft Sea Law Treaty—But Shields,

Linda

P.,

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1974 "Environmental Decay and International Pohtics: The Uses of Sovereignty," Environmental Affairs 3:743-767.

Sigurdson,Jon

1973 "The Suitabihty of Technology in Contemporary China," Impact of Science on Society 23:341-352. 1975 "Resources and Environment in China," Ambio Sivard,

Ruth

1975 "Let Skolnikoff,

4: 1

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L.

Them Eat Bullets!"

Bulletin of the

Atomic

Scientists

31(4):6-10.

Eugene B.

1971 "Technology and the Future Growth of International Organizations," Technology Review 73(8):39-47.

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1974 "Soviet Energy: An Internal Assessment," Technology Review 77(l):17-33. Spengler, Joseph J.

1969 "Return to Thomas Hobbes?" South

Atlantic Quarterly

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Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout 1

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Staines, Andrew

1974 "Digesting the Syer, G.

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N.

1971 "Marx and Ecology," The

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1975c "World Environment: What's Happening

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at

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1972 United Nations Conference on Bibliography

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1973 Environmental

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York:

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Science

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Wade, Nicholas 1974

"Raw Materials: U.S. Grows More Vulnerable

to

183:185-186.

Walsh,John

1974

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1974 "Arms Control and the Environment: Proscription of Ecocide," Atomic

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Wilson, Carroll L.

1973

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1971

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Chapter 8 Barash, David

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1973 "The Ecolc^ist

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97 1

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1975 Ecotopia (Berkeley: Banyan Tree Books).

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968 The Systems Approach (New York: Dell)

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..

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SUGGESTED READINGS

364 Colwell, Thomas B.Jr.

1969 "The Balance of Nature:

Modem Thought Dasmann, Raymond F.

A

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1974 "Conservation, Counter—culture, and Separate ReaHties," Environmental Conservation 1 1 33-1 37 :

Doctor,

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1975 "Gandhi s

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The

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with copious excerpts from Gandhi's

5:300-321

[a

succinct summary,

own writings]

van Dresser, Peter

1972

A

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Human

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1973 "Does

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Happiness?" Public

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1972 "A Blueprint for Survival," The

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[a

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1962

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lUich, Ivan

1971 Deschooling

1973

Society

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Tools for Conviviality

1974a Energy and Equity (London: Calder and Boyars).

1974b "Energy and Social Disruption," The Iyer,

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4:49-52.

Raghavan 1973 The Moral and

Political

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Kateb, George

1973 Utopia and

Its

Enemies

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Keynes, John Maynard

1971 "Economic Possibihties for Environment, ed.

Our

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the

Warren A. Johnson and John Hardesty (Belmont, Cahf:

Wadswordi),pp. 189-193.

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1974

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Ecological

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Kropotkin, Peter

1899

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LaoTzu 1958 Tao Teh King,

ed.

Archie J. Bahm

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Laszlo, Ervin

1972 The Systems View of the World: The Natural Philosophy of the the Sciences

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1972 The Domination of Nature (New York: Braziller).

New Developments

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.

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Chapter 8

365

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968

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Levi-Strauss, 1

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Claude

966 The Savage Mind (University of Chicago

Press)

Lindner, Staffan B.

1970 The Harried

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Livingston.John A.

1973 One Cosmic McKinley, Daniel

Man's Fleeting Supremacy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin).

Instant:

—Mirror

1970 "Lichens

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Audubon 72(6):51-54.

Maslow, Abraham H.

1966 The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance (New York: Harper and Row). 1971 The Farther Reaches of Human Nature (NewYork:Viking). Marx, Karl 1

844 Thi Economic and

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1964 The Machine

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1970 "American

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170:945-952.

Meeker, Joseph W.

1974 The Comedy of Survival:

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Mill, J. S. 1

87 1

Principles of Political

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1

965)

More, Thomas 1516

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H. V.

S.

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Mumford, Lewis 1961

The City

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and

Its

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1967 The Myth of the Machine: Technia and Human Development Brace and World).

(New York:Harcourt,

1970 The Myth of the Machine: The Pentagon of Power (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich)

1973

Interpretations

and

Forecasts

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Nasr, Seyyed Hossein

1968 The Encounter of Man and Nature: The

Spiritual Crisis of Modern

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Allen and Unwin).

Passmore.John 1

974 Man's

Responsibility for Nature

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Roszak, Theodore

1969 The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technoaatic Youthful Opposition (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday). 1973 Where

the

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Politics

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in

Society

and

Its

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1970 Stone-Age Economics (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton). Schumacher, E. E 1

973 Small

b

Beautiful: Economics

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366 1974 "Message fixjm the Universe," The

Ecologist

4:318-320.

Shepard, Paul

1973 The Tender Carnivore and ,

and Daniel McKinley,

1969 The

the Sacred

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eds.

Subversive Science: Essays Toward an Ecology of

Man

(Boston:

Houghton

Mifflin).

Mulford Q. 1973 "The Relevance of Classical

Sibley,

Political

Theory

for

Economy, Technology, and

Ecology," Alternatives 2(2): 14-35. Slater,

PhihpE.

1970 The

Pursuit of Loneliness: American

Culture at the Breaking Point (Boston:

Beacon).

1974 Earthwalk (Garden

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1792 The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in The Works of Adam Smith, Germany: O. Zeller, 1963).

vol.

I

(Aalen,

W.

Snyder, Gary

1969 Earth House Hold (New York: New Directions). 1

974

Turtle

Stavrianos, L.

bland

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S.

1976 The Promise of the Coming Dark Age Taylor,

(New York: W. H. Freeman and Co.).

Gordon Rattray

1974 Rethink: Radical

Proposals to Save a Disintegrating World (Baltimore: Penguin).

Thoreau, Henry David

1854 Walden, in The

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Wagar, W. Warren 1971 Building Watt, Kenneth E.

1974 The

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F.

Titanic Effect: Planningfor the Unthinkable (Stamford,

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White, Lynn, Jr.

1967 "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic

Crisis," Science

155:1203-1207.

1

Index

abundance

control failures, 137

1

191

political liberty and,

treaties,

changes and ecological, 190

social

276

alternative agriculture. See organic

accidents, risks of industrial, 152, 170

farming

American Lung Association, The, on

acid rain

air

pollution, 138

as air pollutant, fiael

136

air pollution,

Hume and infinite, 9,

138

American. See United

burning and, 87

States

anthropengenic subchmax, 31, 34

ozone combined with, 139

anthropocentric trend, 33

agrarian society, 297, 303

aquaculture. See mariculture

agreements, international, 276

Arctic National WildUfe Refiige, oil

agribusiness biotechnology, 58

drUling

agricultural efficiency,

in,

84 192

Aristotle, ideas of, 8, 12, 190,

39

Atomic Energy Commission, 92

pollution, 61

authority in the steady

revolution, ecosystems and, 32

automobile. See motor vehicles

state,

285

See also agriculture agriculture

cHmate and weather costs

as restraints,

of intensification

of,

Bacon, Francis, on nature, 164

62

Bhutan, sustainable development

56

biogeochemical cycles, 26

crops and, 60

crop yield, limits

to,

ecological Hmits

to,

energy subsidy organic,

of,

biodiversity

25, 58

deforestation and, 128, 131

60

importance

39

64

133

Umits in ecosystems, 29

pest problems of, 25

magnification, 22, 155

technology and industrial, 64

biomass

water pollution and, 146 traditional,

of,

biological

tropical ecosystems and,

energy source, 110

biotechnology

35

agriculture and, 57, 58

See abo farming; agricultural agroforestry, tropical,

as

biosphere, 19,25,29

37

1

32

risks of,

367

64

in,

263

INDEX

368 Boulding, Kenneth, 11, 289 Brave

New

Clean Water Act, 85

chmate

211

World,

breeder reactor dangers, 100

agriculture and, 39, 62

on

British Meteorological Office

global

bromoxymil, toxicity

energy and,

58

of,

Brown, Harrison, on modern

society,

208

Brown,

changes, problems

89, 123

of,

deforestation and, 129

warming, 141

1

22

climax

humans

breakers,

32

as,

cychc, 34

Lester, 51

Browns Ferry nuclear

plant accident, 93

Burke, Edmund, ideas

of,

and pioneer ecosystems contrasted, 31

104

variabihty of, 34

294, 306

Chnch River Breeder Club of Rome, 41

buildings, saving energy in,

burning technologies, 87

Reactor, 100

coal

Calgene

CEO

consumption, reducing, 89

58

research,

energy demands and, 86

cancer rates, increases in, 1

mining, problems

53

86

of,

See also energy; fuel See also carcinogen

commodity. See resource

capitaUsm, social costs of, 230

Commoner, Barry, on

carbon emissions, 89 carbon dioxide deforestation

and atmospheric, 129

earth temperature and, 140. See also

global fuel

burning and poUution

by,

88

as air pollutant,

138

218

of,

265

communahsm

in the steady state,

community, ecology and concept

carcinogens, 61, 149, 151 carnivores as secondary consumers, 25

compartmentahzation, goal control, ecological

268, 269

catde pasture, deforestation and, 130

and

constraints, macro-,

of,

social,

285 of,

21

35

204, 214

212

conference diplomacy, 271

CFCs earth temperature and, 140. See abo

global

conservation

ecology and, 295

warming

as pollutants,

energyand,83, 103, 108

139, 140

limits of,

change of needed,

5,

281

constraints

and Hmits (compared), 14

consumption

chemical(s) industry, wastes fiom, 149,

150

insects,

control. See types

23

disaster,

9 1 93 ,

chloroflurocarbons. See

CFCs

city state, return to, 297, civilization, 3, 9,

levels, significance of, 1

time scale for controlled, 2

reuse of, 27

Chernobyl

79

consumers, herbivore and carnivore, 25

ecosystems and, 30

war on

194

of,

See also social; society

sources of, 142, 143, 144

aspects

market destruction

problem, intemationahty

140

effect of,

cartels, resource,

good, controls for the, 200, 204

-pool resources, 193, 195

government controls on, 144

carbon monoxide

freedom and, 195

logic, pollution and,

warming

greenhouse

toxic waste, 150

common(s)

303

294

Clean Air Act of 1990, 140, 224, 250

of control

coral reefe, species loss on, 132

Corporate Fuel Economy Standards Act, 251 cost(s). See

under each type

crop(s). See agriculture;

food

369

Index

food and, 59

entropy and, 124

scarcity,

235

social values and,

290

steady-state changes in,

See also socioeconomic

curve, logistical growth, 42, 178

"Economic Man,"

cycle(s)

biogeochemical, 26

26

ecological scarcity and, 181

25

hydrogen, 119

nitrogen, 26

multiplex, 120

water, 26

of nature, 20 steady-state poUtical,

Herman, on common good, 218 life cycle,

agricultural restraints,

25

deforestation, negative effects of tropical,

Demoaaqf

in

scarcity

crisis as

America, 237

emergency, 169, 283

damage, war and, 272 vs.

,

economics

209

in steady-state society,

failure

213

momentum,

in the steady state,

287

of pohtical system, 252

farming, 66

demographic significance of,

history,

45

deprivation and ecological scarcity, 240

design planning contrasted with, 288

deuterium, abundance

of,

development, sustainable, 2

1

52

diversity in the steady state,

dangers

of,

291

222

170

scarcity,

175

scarcity,

administering, 247

scarcity, class conflict

74

to,

commons, 195

safety, costs of,

59

diplomacy, conference, 271 discovery, Umits to,

problems, market solutions resources as

dietary quality as food Umit,

165

philosophy, 293 pollution control, 162

100

developing countries. See Third World

dioxin pollution,

22

imperatives, 9 limits, 60, 82,

53

desalination, use of,

185

illness, effects of,

46

transition, value of,

driftnets,

214

contract, the,

and, 79

democracy ehte rule

62

competence, 209 competition, 62

50, 128, 129, 131

demand, resource

ecological

abundance, society and, 190

Davis Besse nuclear plant, 92

decomposers in

206

thermodynamic, 124

Dahl, Robert, on competence, 209 Daly,

235

fallacy of,

economy

interrelationship of, life,

243

politics and, 22, 237, 238,

culture

and, 266

scarcity,

deprivation and, 240

scarcity,

economic

justice and,

239

194

Dubos, Rene, on ecological

ethic,

302

179

scarcity, era of, scarcity,

growth

scarcity,

intemationahsm

durabihty, value of product, 81

limits and,

scarcity in Japan,

178

of,

255

257

with, 240, 281

earth as finite planet, 2

scarcity, living

economic (s)

scarcity,

market

development, happiness and, 301

scarcity,

government, market, and, 228

ecology and, 160

scarcity

and

ecosystem disturbance and, 29

scarcity,

producers and, 221

and internaUzation, 233, 270 justice and ecological scarcity, 239

scarcity, rise of, 1

interests

life,

steady-state,

287

failures

political

life,

scarcity, significance of, scarcity, social

and, 217

11, 51, 216

181

control and, 241

7

9

INDEX

370 and socioeconomic justice, 241

scarcity

scarcity as political

and moral

crisis,

299

succession, 30

human need

See also ecology, environment

life

82

use consequence, 79

89

nuclear,

community concept and, 21

for,

and, 38

loss as

ecology

as

256

of,

food chains and, 38

Third World and, 267

scarcity.

79

entropy,

European problems

options, 101,103

conservative science, 295

production dangers, current, 82

defining, 6,

economics and,

productivity and, 38, 56

160

3, 7, 9,

105

human, 6 humans and, 20

savings, 104,

poUtics and, 8,

sources, 25, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115,

self-sufficiency,

120

science of, 19

117, 116, 119. See also names of

See also ecological; environmental

sources

supphes, ecological Umits and, 82

ecosystem(s)

adding

to,

Third World problems

21

agriculture

and

tropical,

See also coal;

32

agricultural revolution and,

35

entropy

economic

changes, 19, 21, 23, 27, 30, 180

compartmentalization goal

of,

35

compromise, 36 disturbance,

scarcity and,

and modification

30

of,

government and, 232

environmental

as special,

37

costs,

preserving, 133

costs

pioneer and climax contrasted, 31 pluralism in, 34

costs,

concealment

229

of,

of fossil-fiiel extraction, 84

handhng, 224

226

costs, internahzation and,

production and, 33, 34 of,

crisis, 6,

32

167

good, education and, 202

waste and, 27, 29

goods, pricing, 228

education, environment and, 202 efficiency

improvement option, 39, 103

electricity

production and land use, 118

impact of North Slope

management, pohtics

movement,

Elton, Charles, 19

neglect, results of, politics,

emissions

151

carcinogenic nature

of,

motor

142

vehicle, 138,

oil,

of,

85

239. See also

internalization

eUte rule, democracy and, 209

anarchist nature of, 1

276

53

European, 255, 257

politics, Japanese,

problems of oil

258

drilling,

84

problems of oil transportation, 84

energy agriculture and,

problems, Soviet bloc, 259

39

94

climate and, 122

radiation effects,

conservation, 83, 108

ruin, self-interest and,

consumption

124

79

See also ecology; environmental

27

simphfication

life

U.S.

Umits, 27, 29

oceans

energy,

environment

economics and, 29

interdependent, 20, 26

linear,

106

of,

fiiel

patterns,

demands, increases

in,

99

Environmental ProtectionAgency, haz-

82

ardous waste

economy, multiplex efficiency, goal of, 2, 107,

1

See also ecology;ecological

83

108

150, 151

sites

and, 136, 138,

I

371

Index

also steady-

equilibrium society, 15. See

freedoms, micro-, 212 fiiel

state society

errors, technological, 171

burning, 87, 88

ethanol production, value of, 110

extraction and water supply, 87

Europe, environmental problems of

resources,

Western, 255, 256, 257

European Economic Community, toxic waste export and,

1

fossil,

82, 83-

See also coal, energy, fossil Fuller,

fiiel

Buckminster, on technology, 209

fusion power, 98, 100

53

eutrophication, 28 evolution, dynamics of, 21 exploitation production

gardening techniques, tropical, 37

and ecosystem,

34

General Pubhc Utihties, 92

exponential growth, nature of, 68 extinction of species, 36, 131, 132

Exxon

General Electric nuclear plants, 92

Valdez aisaster, 84,

173

genetic diversity, crop need for,

60

geopoUtics, changes in, 268

geo thermal power, 109, 110 global

48

famine, threat of global, 48

famine, threat

farming

warming,53,63, 123, 141

ecological, fish.

Global Possible, The, 42

66

Global

See mariculture

2000 Report

Goddard

See also agriculture fertihty rate,

of,

global

46

42

to the President,

Institute for

Space Studies on

warming, 141

government

fertilizer(s)

efficiency Umits of, 57

anti-regulatory stance of, 248

UabiHties of, 61

carbon dioxide emission controls,

fire as

144

intervention tool, 32

competence

fish

in steady state,

common

286

good, 204

farming. See mariculture

controls for

pollution and, 145

ecological scarcity, market, and,

Flavin, Christopher, 97,

mining

263

subsidies fitom,

planetary,

food availabihty,

population and, 44

scarcity

277

management

by,

chains, energetics of, 38

tropical deforestation by,

culture and, 59

See also poUtical; politics

and population, 49

distribution

hmit, dietary quality

as,

production, maximizing, 47

biotechnology and, 57

variety,

need

for,

58

See also agriculture; crop; farming See deforestation;rain forest;

greenhouse

106

extraction, environmental costs of,

84 resources, 82, 83

effect

and carbon

dioxide, 140

Green Revolution,

48, 49,

60

growth carrying capacity and, 181 curve, logistic, 178

Umits

fossil fuel

avoidance

grain production in the Third World,

exponential, 66

tropical forest

costs for,

130

groundwater contamination, 95, 150

59

yield, increasing optimally,

forest(s).

9

48

59

production, biotechnology and, 57

safety,

228

80

of, 41, 163,

178

Hmits to technological, 174 material, 2

poUrics and economic, 237, 243

pohcy, timing no-, 72

1

INDEX

372

vs.

resources,

hydrogen, power, value

70

social costs of,

hydropower

175

122

of, 119, 120,

energy source. 111, 112

as

Third World policies and, 268 Gvilf of Mexico, drilling waste in,

84

incrementaHsm

in decision

making, 244

individual self-restraint,virtue of, 296 habitat loss

and deforestation, 128, 129

Haekel, Ernest, 19 halons as

individualism in

modern Ufe, 191

industrial

139

air pollutants,

accidents, risks of, 152

happiness and economic development,

301

agriculture, technology and,

64

civilization analyzed, 3, 182, 208,

Hardin, Garrett, theories

205

of, 195,

hazardous waste(s), 149

treaties,

of,

294

225

See also technological; technology

control costs for, 153 landfills,

growth, costs

Industrial

150

Revolution and

scarcity, 10,

183

276

industry

See also toxic waste; waste (s)

hazardous waste production by, 150

water pollution and, 146

health costs

of industrial growth, 225

effects

See also technological; technology

of toxic wastes, 152

integrated coal-gasification

122

heat, climate and,

combined

cycle system, 87

heavy metal wastes, 149

interdependence in ecosystems, 20

Hedrie, Joseph, 92

internalization, 226, 229, 233, 234. See

herbivores as primary consumers, 25 history ecological, 185

environmental management

agreements, 275, 276

lessons of poUtical,

297

aspects

Hobbes, Thomas, political theories

of,

189,196,200,204,205 holism in the steady

home

also

international

state,

of nature, 264

disparities,

266

politics, 26,

291

255

reordering, effects of, 270

energy savings, 104

International Conference for the Pre-

homeostasis, 24, 27

vention of Pollution from Ships,

human (s)

275

activities,

problems caused

agriculture, pest

by,

127

problems and, 25

52

irrigation, Umits of, 50, insects,

chemical war on, 23

biosphere and, 29 as

climax breakers, 32 Japan, ecological problems of, 257

ecology, principles of, 6, 20

environment influenced

by,

13

intervention, ecosystems and, 21

nature and, 12 as stress

Keynes, John Maynard, ideas Kneese, Allen, ideas

source, 34

knowledge,

of,

limits to,

of,

282, 300

226

165

waste, types of, 27

humanity pollution and,

1

lagoons, contaminated surface, 150

34

power over nature

of,

Hume, David, scarcity

laissez-faire politics, control of,

164

theories of, 9,11

hunger, food production and, 48

as air pollutants,

138

226

land

damage

Huxley, Aldous, 211

hydrocarbons

"laissez-innover,"

to

mined, 86

exploiting unused, 5

242

4

1

373

Index

Manh, George

50

supply, limits of,

use for electricity production, 118

Marx,

hazardous waste, 150

landfills,

Lao Tzu on

Law of the

nature,

299

material(s)

lead pollution controls, 137

need

Leviathan,

196

for,

liberty,

growth, 10 reusing, 81

306

market ecological problems and, 222

on power, 210 abundance and political, 191

Lewis, C.

164

Marx, Leo, 304

Sea Convention, 194, 275

leadership,

Perkins, 15

Karl, theories of, 10,

ecological scarcity and, 228

S.,

economy,

distortions of,

220 and, 217

failures, ecological scarcity

life

cycle in nature, 25

-orientation control, steady-state, 287

energy and, 38

price mechanism, 219, 220

lifeboat problem,

scarcity and,

1

limits

agricultural,

and

60

constraints, interplay between,

219 of,

218

in the steady state,

219

impact

societal

system, uncertainties

in,

to discovery

and substitution, 74

abundant, 77

of ecosystems, 27, 28

mining, ecological costs

to growth, 163, 165

mining

human, 13 43

pollution control,

1

77

34

77, 78

mihtary, nuclear waste and, 158. See also

war

43

Mill, John Stuart, 94,

to tt'ichnological grov^^, 174

mined

See also specific types

mineral(s)

Growth, The,

41,

70, 163

scarcity,

land,

damage

300 to,

86

extraction fixsm thin ores, 77

linear ecosystems, 27

resources, 67, 73, 76, 81

100

fixjm seawater, limits to,

living

77

mining

patterns, energy savings and, 105

standards, changes in, 177,

effects

240 30

Lloyd, WUham Forster, ideas of, 192

Locke, John, ideas

of,

86

Ufe, individualism in,

in,

monoculture, Uabihties of land, 60, 65

198

Monsanto Corporation, 58 moral

crisis,

ecological scarcity

macro-constraints, 212

morahty in the steady

magnification, biological, 22, 155

motor vehicles, pollution

malnutrition, population size and, 48

management, problems

of,

mariculture, promise of, 54

166

191

modifying environment, Hfe and, 30

London Dumping Conference, 275

Malthus, Thomas, theory vahdity

80

77

crops, value of, 65

modem

growth curve, 42, 68, 178

strip,

subsidies for,

metals, processes for,

mixed

191, 202, 204

Los Angeles, commons problem

of coal

government

things and environment changes,

logistic

of,

78

micro-fi"eedoms, 212

and conservation, 79

in the steady state,

hthium

scarce,

as air pollutant, 1 40

methane

to seawater mineral extraction,

to

193

metanoia. See poUtics of transformation

interrelationship of,

to recychng

of, 68,

metal(s)

ecological energy supply, 82

Limits

228

McKean, Margaret, research

14

of, 1

state,

as,

299

292

fi-om,138, 142,

250. See also carbon dioxide; emission; pollution

multiplex

enei^ economy, 120

Mumford, Lewis, 302

1

INDEX

374

mutagen

of radiation, 157

effect

ocean(s)

energy

as

energy source, 115

pollution, control of, 56

National

Academy of Sciences, 61,84,

special ecology of,

149 National Environmental Policy Act, 230

National Research CouncU, 65, 154

oil

149

driUing, environmental effect of, 84

National Wildlife Federation, 56

north slope, 85

nationalism, regulation and, 275

shale, disadvantages as

natural resources, decline in, 61

spills,

nature

source of, 89

84

transportation problems, 84

anarchy

in,

economy

189

of,

homeostasis

humans

optimists, views of, 2

20

in,

ores, mineral extraction firom thin,

24

and, 164

farming, 64

264

hydrocarbons

cycle in, 25

sigmoid curve stress in,

68

in,

lution,

in,

of,

profit interests,

oil

oxides

42

production

overpopulation. Green Revolution and,

72

48

243

ozone

effects,

85

acid rain

nitrogen cycle,

Future, 2,

overexploitation, competitive, 193

See also biosphere; ecosystems

north slope

137

Our Common

26

no-growth poUcy, timing vs.

138

Development on Air Pol-

tion and

technology and, 2

nonprofit

as air pollutants,

Organization for Economic Coopera-

34

waste absence

77

organic

international asset,

life

See also sea(s); water

offihore oil drilling, 84

National Resources Defense Council,

as

37

thermal energy conversion, 115

as air

26

combined with, 139

pollutant, 138

layer destruction, seas and,

as air pollutants, 1

55

48

nuclear Packard, Vance, 8

danger, misinformation about, 94

paradigms, pohtical, 4

emission control, 90 energy, potential

and

industry, position of, plants, safety of, 91,

peril of,

parks,

89

96

pessimists,

99

of,

2

human

agriculture and, 25

pesticides

waste dangers, 90, 95, 96,97,158, 163

biological magnification of, 22,

dangers

See also radiation; radioactive

of, 22, 58, 61,

1

149

waste, 149

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 93,

petrochemical

95,247 "Nucleonics

views

pest problems,

93

safety, 90,

138

people, energy efficiency and, 107

power, controversy over, 90 reactors, 96,

waste-management, 162

particulates as air pollutants,

93

Week" on

nuclear

nutrition, population size and,

safety,

99

59

industry, pollution fi-om,

1

34

products, toxic wastes and, 151

philosophy

See also crops; food

ecological, 293,

304

pohtical, 12

Oak Ridge

National Laboratory, radia-

tion diseases

at, 1

54

photosynthesis, 25, 58 photovoltaics as energy source, 117

55

1

Index

375

physical limits of ecosystems, 28

and science, analogy between, 4

pioneer and climax ecosystems con-

social values and,

of steady-state

31

trasted,

planetary government, prospects

for,

277

190

design differentiated from, 288

Politics,

problems

pollutant(s)

167

of, 166,

136

air,

plant(s)

interaction of, 156

energy source, 110

genetics, use of, as

responses

57

Plato, ideas of, 8,

pollution

12,210,295

plutonium, dangen

agricultural, 61

155

of, 95,

137

air,

political

common-goods

and, 195, 196

anomaly, ecological scarcity

as,

5

change, ecological scarcity and, 216 choices, social-good, 196,

competence

286

in the steady state,

history, lessons of,

inequality, liberty, life,

reaHty,

297

United

control,

States,

136

fiiel

burning, 87, 88

land supply and, 51

11,51,216

motor

vehicle. See

motor vehicle

of oceans, 56 optimal level

of,

223

1

needed changes

in,

282

reform, mechanisms of, 5 revolution, potential for,

240

system, ecological failure of, 252 theories, paradigms and,

wtH, importance

of,

4

petrochemical industry, 134

production control and, 135 radiation,

154

treaties, air,

276

water, 55, 145, 146, 148

See also pollutant(s) types ;

205

See also government; politics

polyclimax, 34

population

pohtics ecological scarcity and, 155, 181

ecology and,

economic

control, technological, 135, 161

inevitabihty of, 134

abundance and, 191

scarcity and,

control, Umits of, 134

from

206

243

philosophy,

194

logic of,

control, ecological, 162

dioxin, 152

economy, American, 217 steady-state,

commons

control, nontechnological, 161

212

dangers of supertechnology, 209

economy,

157

to,

See also pollution

producers, 25

action,

287

of Third World, growth and, 268 See also government; poUtical

planning

as

235

society,

3, 8,

basis of, 222,

need

control,

for,

44, 46,

238

growth

of,

1,

44, 68

growth, land supply and, 50

economic growth and, 237, 243 of environmental management, 239

post-modernity values, 292

European environmental, 257

power

international,

265

Japanese environmental, 258 laissez-faire,

289

food and, 44, 47, 48, 49, 59

9

242

commodity, 269 fusion,

98

geothermal 109,110

movement to steady-state, 281 need for new paradigm in, 217

Price-Anderson Act, reinsurance and, 93

process and systems, 247

pricing environmental goods, 228

of resources, 268

process pohtics,

of scarcity, 189

producer(s)

price,

market response

242

to,

220

1

INDEX

376 reform. See change

ecological scarcity and, 221 interests, strength of,

internalization and, plants as,

product

243

religion, value of,

234

25

research, effectiveness of,

durability, value of,

81

cartels,

control, pollution control and, 135

ecosystem exploitation

for,

34

268, 269

common-goods,

and protection, balancing, 37

decline in natural, 61

exhaustion, controUing, 72

climate and agricultural, 39

fossil-fiiel,

of increased, 56

fiiigal

83

use of, 2

70

ecosystems and, 33

growth

energy and, 38

mineral, 67

vs.

nonprofit interests, 243

Coming Dark Age, and

The,

284

for,

268

regulating, 195 scarcity,

See also

the Spirit of

Capitalism, The,

prudence, need

,

power, 269

protection and production, balancing, 37 Protestant Ethic

us.

poUtical tool,

as

progress ideal, society and, 164

Promise of the

193, 195

ecological competition for, 62

productivity

profit

165

resource(s)

production

costs

305

Republic, The. See Plato

demand reduction commodity

and, 79

reuse of nlaterials, value of, 81

300

296

revolution, potential for poUtical,

240

Rhone—Poulenc research, 58 Rocky Mountain Institute, 103

public-goods problem, 196

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, on commons, radiation

199

environmental, 94

long-term as

Roundup, carcinogenic

effects of, 90, 93,

mutagen,

1

nature of, 58

156

57

pollution, 154

safety,

See also nuclear; radioactive; radioac-

Saint-Simon, Claude Henri, 207, 210

environmental, 90, 160, 170, 173

sahnization, land supply and,

tivity

radioactive

waste contamination, 97

abolishing, 164

See also nuclear; radiation; radioac-

challenges of, 217

tivity;

civihzation characterized by, 9

radionuclides

demand reduction and

radioactivity as

50

scarcity

environmental problem, 94

long-term damage

by, 90, 93,

156

radionuclides

79

entropy and economic, 124 as fijture society factor, 1

biological magnification of, 155

managing,

persistence of, 157

market and, 219

toxicity of,

resource,

ecological. See ecological scarcity

1

54

See also nuclear; radiation; radioactive; radioactivity

9,

10

modern, 10 pohtics of, 189 social control and,

241

science and pohtics, analogy between, 4

rain acid, 87, forests,

138

destruction of, 35; See abo

deforestation; tropical forests

Scientific American

on home

energy, 104

Schumacher, E. E, on Christianity, 305 sea(s)

Rappaport, Ray, 32

farming. See mariculture

recycling, 79, 151

as

food source, 54

1

1

Index

377

on

international agreements

ozone

layer destruction and,

the,

275

55

speciahzation in

See also ocean(s) Sears, Paul,

spaceship problem, 14

ecolc^y defined

by,

7

reef;

seawater fix)m,

life,

7

deforestation

spiritual crisis

energy

modern

species extinction, 132. See also coral

and ecological

scarcity,

299

116

mineral extraction limits fixjm, 77 self-restraint, individual,

standard of living and alternative technology, 177

296

42

sewage, water pollution and, 147

State of the World, The,

sigmoid curve. See

stationary-state society, 15. See also

Smith,

smog,

Adam,

fuel

curve

logistic

theories of, 191, 218,

steady-state society

300

Stavrianos, L.

burning and, 87

social

democracy

fioigal

of capitalism, 230

284

293

values of,

political choices for,

of, 1

181

of,

66

on growth, 41

values, economics, poUtics and,

natural,

235

humans strip

214

34

society and, 4

commons; society

34

as

source

of,

mining,

effects

of coal, 86

subcHmaxes, "good" anthropogenic, 36

society instabiUty of industrial,

substitution, Umits to,

208

market and destruction

of,

218

scarcity as fiiture factor in, steady-state, 12, 15, 212,

commons;

1

See also

213

energy source, 25

Superior Farming Company, 66

Supreme Court, anti-environment

social

tions of, 231,

ecological scarcity, 241

ac-

232

Surry Nuclear plant, 94 Surface

economic

soil erosion,

as

supertankers, dangers of, 173

socioeconomic vs.

74

oxides as air pollutants, 137

Superfund Law, 169

progress ideal of, 164

See also

sulfiir

sunlight

pohtical, 4

justice

work

stress(es)

67

technology assessment and, 226

Social Contract, The, 199,

283

Stockholm Conference, 272

price of technology, 211

See abo

nature of, 302

Steven Pavich and Sons,

212

Ufe, ecological scarcity and,

planning, problems

285

213

transition time to,

design, Umits affected by, 14

good,

in,

movement to, 15, 183, 281 pohtical economy of, 206

of growth, 175, 225

critics,

costs,

transition,

goal of, 2, 212

control of technology, 177

costs

on

characteristics of, 212,

changes, ecological plenty and, 190 control, sci-rcity and, 241

costs

S.,

steady-state society

Mining Control and Reclama-

tion Act of 1977, 86

land supply and, 50

sustainable society, 15. See also steadysolar

hydrogen

power

as

as

state society

energy source, 119

energy source, 112

thermal power

as

energy source, 115

Southern California Air Quality

Management

systems pohtics, 242

District,

198

Soviet bloc environmental problems,

259

"Spaceman economy,"

tar

sand deposits

accidents and errors, 171

growth, limits 1

as fuel source,

technological

to,

optimum, appeal

174 of,

206

89

INDEX

378

value of, 46

pollution control, 135 See also industry; technology

treaties, international

tritium, dangers of,

technology

176

alternative,

tropical

assessment, social costs and, industrial agriculture and, limits of,

226

64

agroforestry,

132

deforestation, 128, 130. See also

165

management

environmental, 276

100

deforestation of,

163

ecosystems, agriculture and, 35

nature and, 211 pohtical dangers of super,

209

pollution control and, 160, 161

destruction of, 36

forests,

resources of,

1

29

gardening techniques, 37

177

social control of, social price of,

forests,

211

Union of Concerned

of waste control, 154

Scientists,

92

United Nations See also industry; technological

Human Environ-

Conference on the temperature, earth, 140. See

also

global

warming

Environmental Programme, 59, 273

Third World countries differences

Food & Agriculture Organization,

among, 264

47, 128

ecological farming in, 66

Population Fund, 45

ecological scarcity in, 264, 267

energy problems fossil-fuel

pohtics,

ment. 5ee Stockholm Conference

of,

106

World Commission on Environment and Development,

use in, 83

growth and, 268 ticides,

population growth

in,

46

Island disaster, 91,

thermal storage, types

of,

93

119

thermodynamic economy, 124 thermonuclear fusion. See

flision

timber harvests, deforestation and, 130

time response to ecological

scarcity, 2,

27, 169, 182, 185

Canyon

disaster,

149

United

States

carbon dioxide emission

173

143, 144 1

54

Department of Agriculture and biotechnology, 58

Department of Energy, poUcies

of,

96,97

and biotechnology, 58

government, anti-environment ac-

248

tions of, 232,

toxic

in,

Council for Energy Awareness,

Forest Service

de Tocqueville, Alexis, on America, 237 Torrey

166

World Population Conference, 274

Thoreau, Henry David, on nature, 299

Three Mile

2, 42,

World Health Organization on pes-

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

emissions as carcinogens, 151 substances, safe levels of, 160 wastes, clean-up costs for, wastes, health effects of,

150

152

174 pollution control, 136

uranium utihties,

supply,

90

fuel-burning pollution and, 88

wastes, nuclear, 158

See also hazardous wastes

Trans- Alaska Pipeline, 84, 85, 233 transformation, poUtics of, 305 transportation, energy savings in, 105

values, search for,

298

Veblen, Thorstein, on mediocrity, 306 Vitonsek, Peter,

on

ecosystems,

transmutation of nuclear wastes, 163 transition state,

Walden,

current, 179

time to steady

state,

on

nature,

war, ecological

283

waste(s)

299

damage

by,

272

1

80

Index

379

-absorption capacity of earth, invalid

concept

of,

1

36

supply depletion and fuel extraction, 87 See also ocean(s); sea(s)

avoidance, 81

waterlogging, land supply and, 50

control costs for hazardous, 153

wave power

control, technology of, 154

wealth, growth of, 41

ecosystem absorption

Weber, Max, predictions

of,

ecosystem destruction

by,

27

29

as

energy source, 116

of,

300

Wealth of Nations, The, 191

hazardous, 149

weather

human, 27

Weinberg, Alvin, on technology, 207

long-term dangers

96

White, Lynn, on ecological

62

wind power as energy source, World Resources Institute, 42 WorldWatch Institute, 43

of,

nuclear, 90, 95, 158

-management

parks,

nature and absence

1

as agricultural restraint,

of,

26

62

ethics, 1

304

13,

14

1

See also toxic; hazardous; types of wastes

water cycle,

26

Yucca Mountain nuclear waste

site,

pollution, 145, 146, 148 supply,

damaging, 55

supply Umits, 50, 52, 53

Zuckerman, Lord, 163 zoning, value of comprehensive, 37

97

Biographical Sketches

William Ophuls graduated from Princeton University in 1955 with an A.B. in oriental studies, then served for four years

Coast Guard.

He joined the

eight years at the

as

an ofi&cer in the U.S.

U.S. Foreign Service in 1959 and spent the next

Department of

State

and

at

U.S. Embassies in the Ivory

Cast and Japan. In 1973, he received a Ph.D. in poHtical science fix)m Yale. He

Northwestern and Oberlin and has lectured and consulted widely.

taught

at

When

Ecology and the

recognized

as

a

Politics

of Scarcity wzs

first

and the Kammerer Award from the American

Association for the best

book on

Political

A. Stephen Boyan, a

w^s

received an A.B. from

Jr.,

Science

U.S. domestic politics. Dr. Ophuls

work on a sequel to Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity. His new work on the internal contradictions of modern politics.

1959 and

it

book on ecology and interna-

International Studies Association for the best tional politics

published in 1977,

pioneering work, winning the Sprout Prize from the

Brown

is

at

focuses

University in

Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1966, both in

pohdcal science.

He

taught

and since 1971 has been

at

Pennsylvania State University for four years

member

a

Maryland Baltimore County. His ethics and constitutional law. He Constitutional Aspects of Watergate.

Movement and was Washington Ethical

of the faculty of the University of

special interests

editor of the six-volume work.

is

He

are environmental

is

a

organizer of the

Leader in the Ethical Culture Earth Ethics project

at

the

Society.

Thomas E. Lovejoy received his B.S. and Ph.D.in biology from Yale From 1973 to 1987, he directed the program of the World

University.

WildHfe Fund-U.S.

He

problems of tropical

forests to the fore as a public issue.

is

generally credited with having brought the

public television series "Nature."

He

is

He

founded the

president of the Society for

Conservation Biology and chairman of the U.S.

Man

and Biosphere

Program. Since 1987, he has been Assistant Secretary for External Afiairs of the Smithsonian Institution.

/

$14:»5

ECOLOGY/ POLITICAL SCIENCE

lilCOMHilY

AM>

TDli!

IHHJTICS

OF SCAllCriT RKVLSn Kl) The Unraveling William Ophuls At

a time

when

of the American

• A.

Stephen Boyan,

Dream

Jr.

the limits of our environmental tolerance are

more apparent than

ever,

and must be overcome if we are to survive. In this ecological critique of American political institutions, William Ophuls and A. Stephen Boyan, Jr. argue that it will require forestalling ecological bankruptcy will require more than quick fix solutions a radical overhaul of our nation's priorities and policies.

Ecology and

the Politics oj

Scarcity Revisited

emerges

as a startling exploration of political

social contradictions that



and and economic implications. First published in 1977 and now completely updated by co-author Boyan, the book's argument is supported with the latest information on overpopulation, food shortages, pollution, and shrinking energy resources. Also incorporated into the work are recent environmental developments such as the decline of nuclear power, the destruction of the rain forests, global warming, acid rain, and broad demographic changes.

Ecology and

measures

the Politics oj

its political,

Scarcity Revisited defines the nature of the ecological crisis,

social

concerned by American economic and ecological is blunt, objective, provocative, uncompromising, and at times unnerving. But not without hope. Both authors are convinced we can adapt to ecological scarcity and presep«^what is worth preserving of our political and cultural order. But as this volume so dramatically demonstrates, we must not delay.

Written for anyone involved

in or

policies. Ecology and the Politics oj Scarcity Revisited

"Rereading Ecology and sad awareness.

.

.

the Politics oj Scarcity

.Very

little

fourteen years after

its initial

publication brings a

has changed in humankind's relationship to

its

natural milieu.

Nature is still seen either as a mine or a dump and treated accordingly,- and the basic laws of ecology are ignored, denied, and flouted. Humanity therefore continues to hasten down the path to ecological perdition."

—William Ophuls, from the Author's Afterword

to Ecology and

the Politics oj

Scarcity Revisited

About

the Authors William Ophuls is a former United States Foreign Service Officer. His 1977 volume Ecology and the Politics oj Scarcity was published to widespread critical and popular acclaim, winning the Gladys M. Kammerer Award as the year's best book on public policy, and a similar prize from the International Studies Association. A. Stephen Boyan,

Jr. is

a political scientist

on the

facult"

Baltimore County.

'"* *'-" ^^ w/,An/FCQLOGY^POLITIC S OF gCARC '

ITY REVISITED

OPHULS, FREEMAN

^^

^

0-7167-2313-1

W. H. Freeman and Company 41

Madison Avenue

New York, New York

10010

20 Beaumont Street

Oxford OXl 2NQ, England

9

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