Eco-Politics and Global Climate Change (Environment & Policy, 65) 303148097X, 9783031480973

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Environment & Policy  65

Sachchidanand Tripathi  Rahul Bhadouria · Rishikesh Singh  Pratap Srivastava  Rajkumari Sanayaima Devi   Editors

Eco-Politics and Global Climate Change

Environment & Policy Volume 65

The series, Environment & Policy, aims to publish research that examines global and local environmental policies. It covers a variety of environmental topics ranging from biodiversity, ecology, pollution, climate change, agriculture, biodiversity, sustainability, resources, to water security. This long-standing series has published renowned authors for over a decade and it continues to be the home for environmentalists, policy experts, and related discipline experts who are genuinely interested in tackling the issues of our days.

Sachchidanand Tripathi • Rahul Bhadouria Rishikesh Singh • Pratap Srivastava Rajkumari Sanayaima Devi Editors

Eco-Politics and Global Climate Change

Editors Sachchidanand Tripathi Deen Dayal Upadhyaya College University of Delhi New Delhi, India Rishikesh Singh Amity School of Earth and Environmental Sciences Amity University Mohali, Punjab, India

Rahul Bhadouria Delhi College of Arts and Commerce University of Delhi New Delhi, India Pratap Srivastava Department of Botany University of Allahabad Prayagraj, India

Rajkumari Sanayaima Devi Deen Dayal Upadhyaya College University of Delhi New Delhi, India

ISSN 1383-5130 ISSN 2215-0110 (electronic) Environment & Policy ISBN 978-3-031-48097-3 ISBN 978-3-031-48098-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48098-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Foreword

Ecopolitics: (Re)turning to the Earth How do we move from human politics to a politics of the earth, which is our common home, our oikos? How can we re-appreciate life on this planet as more important than economic interests? The answers are in many ways quite simple: the accumulation of wealth only benefits a few; consumption only leads to greed, not satisfaction or happiness. Moreover, we have no other choice: we cannot live without a healthy earth. Climate change, pollution, and the depletion of natural resources and living environments are already taking its toll on human and non-human life. From Pope Francis to Greta Thunberg, we hear that politics is failing us both at the local and the global level. We need to radically change course, and ecopolitics is a viable option. It is a politics of the planet involving all the forces that create, generate, and/or destroy. It involves all lifeforms of the multiplicity of ecosystems we find on this planet, as well as everything that makes life possible. Many will object that ecopolitics is unrealistic (how can we engage in politics with other animals?), or too utopistic (how can we move beyond the current system?). Responding to them I reply that we have capabilities to do so: many indigenous cultures have for extend periods of time engaged in what I consider ecopolitics: decentered political systems in which humans were only a small part. I am not suggesting to return to their systems (although we can learn from them). Ecopolitics is a system of the future, including technology, energy, and industry, yet utilized in ways that benefit the planet and with that all of us. We no longer exploit the earth and the poor. We (again) learn how to live with the rest of the earth, in a healthy and mutually beneficial way. It will not be all harmony and peace. Life is full of struggle and suffering, but the aim is less struggle and suffering, and more cooperation. How we let ecopolitics function exactly will to some degree depend

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on us: the sooner we act, the more influence we can have on its shape. If we wait too long, ecopolitics will not even include Homo sapiens, besides as a memory of the cause, symbol, and one of the many victims of the Sixth Great Extinction. Politics as we know it today is relatively new. Dynasties, monarchies, and democracies go back thousands of years, but that is recent history compared to some indigenous cultures (many of which existed for tens of thousands of years). Moreover, the human politics of empires is incredibly short compared to the history of the human species, and a split second in the history of life. The first lesson of this is that we still have a lot to learn. Secondly, we must consider that we are the result of a lengthy process of life, in which political structures are the norm, even if we do not recognize them yet. To take an example, I discussed in detail in Ecopolitics: Redefining the Polis, ants engage in complex decentered political relationships, solving complex problems collectively. Taking lessons from these other political species – whose politics, for better or worse, is engrained in our DNA – I suggest that ecopolitics is not just a human politics that attempts to represent the interest of non-human agents as well (even though this can be an important aspect of ecopolitics). It is a politics much larger than our own affairs. It is a political body (if we can use the word “body”) that involves all living and non-living inhabitants of the planet, each with their own interests yet part of the larger oikos. Even more, it involves the forces and processes of the earth, and we are a part of it as decentered members. The essays in this book reflect on ecopolitics from a variety of academic perspectives. Interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary work shows that change is happening. In different corners of the academy, I notice an interest in ecopolitics. Radical approaches such as degrowth, reviving indigenous wisdom, comparative approaches, and an openness to rethinking who we are and can be are part of the agenda. It is also exactly the multiplicity of approaches that is in my view central to ecopolitics: we must see our own academic landscape as a variety of ecosystems, which are not fenced off from one another, but which influence one another and between which the boundaries are fluid. It is the crosspollination across disciplines that can invigorate the academic world. Likewise, the natural world as the totality of all ecosystems can revitalize once we humans learn to live together with the whole and contribute in a way so that other species benefit from our presence. The aim of ecopolitics is nothing less than such symbiotic relationships, in which we turn away from a politics that merely ensures the extraction and flow of resources. The politics of the future listens carefully to the earth and to one another. Ecopolitics itself calls forth new scholarship, not aimed at filling one’s CV, but in fulfilling the need of a planet in peril. Philosophy, Theology, and Religious Studies Nijmegen, The Netherlands [email protected]

Gerard Kuperus

Foreword

vii Gerard Kuperus, Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at the University of San Francisco and Researcher Integral Ecology in the Dutch Context at Radboud University. Author of Ecopolitical Homelessness: Retrieving Place in an Unsettled World (Routledge 2016) and Ecopolitics: Redefining the Polis (SUNY 2023).

Introduction

The environment is now in front row on the global political agenda. Eco-politics has always been in global discourse in many ways. In current scenario, many academicians and policymakers recognize that the nexus between environmental concerns and international relations cannot be overlooked. Indeed, it is critical to investigate global eco-politics or the linkages between ecological crises and global politics. Environmental issues on a global scale are frequently complicated and ambiguous from a scientific point of view. Considering the urgency to address the global environmental crisis, new perspectives and tactics are required to achieve a more sustainable and equitable future since greens have traditionally prioritized world peace, gender equality, and environmental sustainability. This has resulted in a plethora of research on the subject of science-policy interactions. Further, the far shorter political timeline of politicians and diplomats and a longer period of both the consequences of environmental problems and the efforts required to mitigate/ or remediate them pose a number of governance challenges. Furthermore, as environmental problems often do not follow boundaries, they provide obstacles for international collaboration, resulting in burgeoning research on global environmental governance. The broad potential for huge economic, political, and ecological displacement as a result of global environmental problems, as well as potential strategies to solve those concerns, has prompted researchers to investigate global environmental politics from every perspective within international relations, as well as research from a variety of other disciplines. Finally, efforts to address the consequences of environmental crises have prompted debatable ethical and apportionable justice issues and led to the development of different school of thoughts in global ecopolitical arena. In the era of global climate change, policies framed by governments across the world towards various environmental issues are going to be critical for the adaptation and mitigation of climate change. A critical analysis of the same is urgently required

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to understand and suggest some further measures in achieving the goals set to address environmental issues in the backdrop of global warming. Work on economics is likely well-developed in academic literature from a green perspective. This is reasonable, considering that the economy represents the material, resource, energy, and waste metabolism between human civilization and the larger environment of which it is a part. International discussions and treaties have given global environmental politics a lot of attention, but its more radical sibling – ecopolitics – has been overlooked. In this book, we have taken a global approach to provide an in-depth insight into the green/ecological perspective on a number of issues, including security (at different levels), the economy, the state, water, global governance, development, and the environment. Furthermore, it also provides a contemporary and accessible description of why we need to embrace eco-politics in order to address the various ecological challenges that we face in current changing climate scenario. The book will be helpful to address the queries of environmental scientists, policymakers, politicians, researchers, planners, and general people alike. The book contains 13 chapters. Chapter 1, ‘From Biopolitics to Ecopolitics: A Philosophical Framework for Geopolitics’, by Jessica Ludescher Imanaka from USA schematizes the core philosophical dimensions of the concept of ecopolitics with the aim of developing a new framework of relevance for geopolitical challenges like rapid climate change. The author suggests for holistic understanding of ecopolitics by practicing and disseminating the various negative, affirmative, and intermediate forms, with the entire oikos (home) encompassing our ecosystems and life worlds falling under the purview of novel apparatuses of power. Chapter 2, ‘Global Biogovernance: Between Intergovernmental and Supranational Cooperation’, by Janusz Ruszkowski from Poland elaborates the constitutive features and mechanisms of global biogovernance contributing to the elimination or reduction of cases of unsustainable development. Chapter 3, ‘Ecopolitics to International Environmental Law: A Literature Review on How Countries Are Performing Under the International Convention on Climate Change’, by Nima Norouzi from Iran explores the legal and international requirements related to the Convention against Climate Change impact countries’ performance and advocates for constant feedback and financial support to improve the overall performance of the countries and formulation of policies to achieve sustainable development goals. Chapter 4, ‘Ocean Governance in the Anthropocene: A New Approach in the Era of Climate Emergency’, by Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau et al. from Brazil argues that a new phase of great powers competition has started, in which the marine resources will most likely be overexploited, falling short of sustainability obligations. The authors of this chapter suggest that traditional geopolitics need to engage more effectively with the ocean and climate governance, to integrate global risks and strengthen ecopolitics.

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Chapter 5, ‘International Water Law Where World Needs Ecopolitics Most: A Study of the Framework of States’ Right to Exploit Transboundary Water Resources via Dam Construction’, by Nima Norouzi from Iran highlights the lack of specific regulations and policies at international level for dam construction by considering some case studies. Chapter 6, ‘China’s Growing Footprint in Antarctica: Soft Power, Science, and Global Ecopolitics’, by Jonathan Harrington from USA analyses the evolution of and possible motivations behind China’s growing footprint in Antarctica. The author concludes that China’s overall contribution to research and governance in the region has been mostly positive and reflects general acceptance of status quo governance institutions in the region. Chapter 7, ‘Environmental Management Through Ecopolitics: An Alternative and Strategic Approach for Rebuilding the Global Carbon Sink’, by Bill Butterworth from UK emphasizes on the relationship between financial and environmental sustainability and describes a socio-economic mechanism which includes a system of reverse franchising and local supervision by members of a professional body. Chapter 8, ‘Urban Governance Transformation Under the Background of Ecological Civilization Construction’, by Lin Dan and Luo Yan from China proposes a conceptual model of ‘localized eco-state reconstruction’, with the expectation to explain city and regional governance transformation under the restriction of state ecological spatial regulation policy. In this context, city and regional governance transformation can be promoted through four types of strategies: ecological transformation development strategy, ecological progressive transformation development strategy, ecological alternative development strategy, and ecological conservative development strategy. Chapter 9, ‘The Missing Link: Environmental Culture and the Climate Crisis’, by Jyotishman Kalita from India establishes a relationship between environmental culture and climate problems. Chapter 10, ‘Ecopolitics and International Security: The Challenges and the Politics’, by Cláudia Toriz Ramos from Portugal describes the ecopolitics which create major threats to human security and responsible for major environmental challenges that jeopardise the balance between human beings and nature. Chapter 11, ‘Global Eco-politics: Media Discourse and Conflicting Climate Change’, by Amarendra Kumar Aarya from India underscores the impact of media framing on public opinion and policy discussions, the presence of conflict and polarization within media discourse, and the sway of political, economic, cultural, and regional factors. Chapter 12, ‘Media’s Role in Global Ecopolitics: Unravelling Climate Change Narratives and Fostering Informed Dialogue’, by Neha Jingala and Nidhi Chaudhry from India explains the role of media in shaping public perception, policy development, and collective action in response to climate change concerns, drawing on a thorough analysis of media narratives.

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Chapter 13, ‘Leave Fossil Fuels in the Soil, Halt Deforestation: Stop Threatening the Planet’, by M. Satish Kumar and Steven Donnelly from UK focuses on the role of ecological security as a framework for addressing the critical challenges faced by both the global North and South. New Delhi, India New Delhi, India Mohali, India Prayagraj, India New Delhi, India

Sachchidanand Tripathi Rahul Bhadouria Rishikesh Singh Pratap Srivastava Rajkumari Sanayaima Devi

Contents

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From Biopolitics to Ecopolitics: A Philosophical Framework for Geopolitics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jessica Ludescher Imanaka

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Global Biogovernance: Between Intergovernmental and Supranational Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Janusz Ruszkowski

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Ecopolitics to International Environmental Law: A Literature Review on How Countries Are Performing Under the International Convention on Climate Change . . . . . . . . . Nima Norouzi Ocean Governance in the Anthropocene: A New Approach in the Era of Climate Emergency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau, Guilherme Lopes da Cunha, Carlos Henrique Tomé, Fábio Albergaria de Queiroz, Paulo Eduardo Câmara, Carina Costa de Oliveira, and Fábio Henrique Granja e Barros International Water Law Where World Needs Ecopolitics Most: A Study of the Framework of States’ Right to Exploit Transboundary Water Resources via Dam Construction . . . . . . . . Nima Norouzi China’s Growing Footprint in Antarctica: Soft Power, Science, and Global Ecopolitics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jonathan Harrington

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Environmental Management Through Ecopolitics: An Alternative and Strategic Approach for Rebuilding the Global Carbon Sink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Bill Butterworth xiii

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Urban Governance Transformation Under the Background of Ecological Civilization Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Lin Dan and Luo Yan

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The Missing Link: Environmental Culture and the Climate Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Jyotishman Kalita

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Ecopolitics and International Security: The Challenges and the Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 Cláudia Toriz Ramos

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Global Eco-Politics: Media Discourse and Conflicting Climate Change Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Amarendra Kumar Aarya

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Media’s Role in Global Ecopolitics: Unravelling Climate Change Narratives and Fostering Informed Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . 215 Neha Jingala and Nidhi Chaudhry

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‘Leave Fossil Fuels in the Soil, Halt Deforestation’: Stop Threatening the Planet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 M. Satish Kumar and Steven Donnelly

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Contributors

Amarendra Kumar Aarya Department of Journalism, Delhi College of Arts and Commerce, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau International Relations Institute, University of Brasilia, Earth System Governance Network, and Superior Defense College (ESD), Brasilia, Brazil Bill Butterworth The Director, Land Research Ltd, Wiltshire, UK Paulo Eduardo Câmara Department of Botany, University of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil Brazilian Antarctic Program (PROANTAR) and Superior Defense College (ESD), Brasilia, Brazil Nidhi Chaudhry Department of Journalism & Mass Communication, Maharaja Agrasen Institute of Management Studies, Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, New Delhi, India Guilherme Lopes da Cunha Superior War College (ESG), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil International Relations Institute, University of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil Superior Defense College (ESD), Brasilia, Brazil Lin Dan Department of Landscape Achitecture, Centre of Tourism Development, Shenzhen Tourism College, Shenzhen, Guangdong, China Carina Costa de Oliveira Law Faculty, University of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil Fábio Albergaria de Queiroz Superior Defense College (ESD), Brasilia, Brazil Steven Donnelly Geography, Archaeology & Palaeoecology, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK Fábio Henrique Granja e Barros Union Accounting Court, Brasilia, Brazil

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Jonathan Harrington Division of Social Sciences and Humanities, Olympic College, Bremerton, WA, USA Jessica Ludescher Imanaka Department of Management and Philosophy, Seattle University, Seattle, WA, USA Neha Jingala Department of Journalism, Delhi College of Arts & Commerce, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India Jyotishman Kalita Department of English, Gauhati University, Guwahati, Assam, India M. Satish Kumar Geography, Archaeology & Palaeoecology, School of Natural and Built Environment, Faculty of Engineering and Physical Science, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK Nima Norouzi School of Law and Legal Studies, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran Cláudia Toriz Ramos Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, University Fernando Pessoa and CEPESE, Porto, Portugal Janusz Ruszkowski Institute of Political Science and Security Studies, University of Szczecin, Szczecin, Poland Carlos Henrique Tomé University of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil Luo Yan Wuhan Branch of China Academy of Urban Planning and Design, Wuhan, Hubei, China

Chapter 1

From Biopolitics to Ecopolitics: A Philosophical Framework for Geopolitics Jessica Ludescher Imanaka

Abstract This book chapter schematizes the core philosophical dimensions of the concept of ecopolitics with the aim of developing a new framework of relevance for geopolitical challenges like rapid climate change. I begin by situating the concept of ecopolitics against the backdrop of the theoretical field of biopolitics. Locating the notion of biopolitics in the work of Michel Foucault, I explicate biopolitics in terms of modern and contemporary apparatuses that exert power over life with the aim of cultivating life at the individual and population levels. Under Foucault’s paradigm, health and life extension become key objectives of biopolitical management. I then model the trajectories that philosophical theorization of biopolitics has taken since Foucault, differentiating the affirmative accounts proffered by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri from the negative accounts unearthed by Giorgio Agamben. I also examine the more nuanced intermediate account developed by Roberto Esposito. I then consider the proliferation of permutations on the biopolitical paradigm, such as the notions of geopolitics, psychopolitics (discussed by Franco Berardi, Peter Sloterdijk and Byung-Chul Han), necropolitics (Achille Mbembe), and even posthumanism (Rosi Braidotti). Politics and power can be applied to life, the geosphere, the psyche, death, and now everything incorporated by the ecological dimension (including the economy). With such a theoretical backdrop, I argue that ecopolitics could be comprehended as an extension of any of these paradigms, and as such a wide variety of theoretical frameworks are available for application to the term ecopolitics. As with biopolitics, psychopolitics, and necropolitics, a central matter of consideration is the meaning, role, and deployment of power: by whom, for whom, with whom, and against or over whom. In its most negative manifestation, a framework of ecopolitics would devolve into pure technocratic management of life systems for the benefit of powerful parties at the expense of vulnerable beings (human and nonhuman). An affirmative ecopolitics would aim to liberate the vital forces of the human and nonhuman worlds and build solidarity and collaboration across diverse domains. Posthumanism lends itself best to the cultivation of such an

J. L. Imanaka (✉) Department of Management and Philosophy, Seattle University, Seattle, WA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Tripathi et al. (eds.), Eco-Politics and Global Climate Change, Environment & Policy 65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48098-0_1

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affirmative ecopolitics. Ultimately, ecopolitics as it is likely to be understood, practiced, and disseminated will be a hybrid of various negative, affirmative, and intermediate forms, with the entire oikos (home) encompassing our ecosystems and life worlds falling under the purview of novel apparatuses of power. Keywords Agamben · Biopolitics · Esposito · Foucault · Negri · Posthumanism · Psychopolitics

1.1

Introduction

Ecopolitics would appear to bring together the world of ecology with that of politics. Since both fields encompass many subdisciplines that already intersect, ecopolitics clearly converges with concepts, frameworks and paradigms like environmental ethics, environmental justice, environmental democracy, deep ecology, ecofeminism, and political ecology. Such constructs have emerged in the academic disciplines of philosophy, political theory, anthropology, and geography. When ecology dovetails with the economy (as it should give their common etymological conceptual base in the notion of home-oikos), constructs like sustainability, sustainable development, resilience, and the green economy govern the intersection of ecological and political-economic domains. All these framings find points of convergence between ecological problems, considerations, and demands and political structures, responses, and solutions. If ecopolitics is to be understood as the synthesis of the worlds of ecology and politics, then in a certain sense, all these constructs fall within the purview of ecopolitics. This chapter seeks to clarify a more precise meaning of ecopolitics by building a distinctive philosophical framework in relation to yet another trajectory of theories: that of biopolitics. In doing so the objective is not to eclipse any of the above constructs from other disciplines or philosophical disciplines but to offer a way of thinking about the potential and limitations of ecopolitics in ways that could shed light on work done in other ecopolitical spaces such as that of political ecology. Several scholars have already remarked on the possibility of shifting biopolitical discourse into an ecopolitical one (Imanaka, 2018). As early as the 1990s, Paul Rutherford was beginning to articulate the implications of Foucauldian biopolitics for environmental governmentality in connection with the concept of ecopolitics (Rutherford, 1993), an idea pursued by Darrier (1999) and Stephanie Rutherford (Rutherford, 2007). By the early decade of the millennium, Andrée (2002) and Hindmarsh (2005) began to apply the concept of ecopower to an analysis of the politics surrounding genetically modified organisms. Within the next decade, Passetti (2013) extended the biopolitical paradigm to that of ecopolitics of the globe as it pertained to planetary governmentality and neoliberalism in the emerging sustainable development models. The notion of eco-governmentality is likewise developed by Malette (2009) in consideration of Rurtherord and Darrier’s articulation of the transformation of biopolitics into ecopolitics. Rutherford and Rutherford

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(2013a, b) make the case for geographers to develop more rigorous and empirically grounded redeployments of the concept of biopolitics in relation to geopolitics and to cultivate its affirmative potential. Neyrat (2016) decries the “biopolitics of catastrophe” that biopolitical application to environmental degradation engenders regarding both aversion and regulation, arguing that such a biopolitics hinders the development of an ecopolitics that would address root causes of environmental issues. More recently, scholars have explored the interconnections between biopolitics, ecopolitics and geopolitics via the concept of “border environments” in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and issues related to migration and climate change (Banerjee, 2021). Cadalen (2023) has retheorized Foucault’s notion of biopower (Foucault, 1990) as ecopower, understood as a new form of sovereignty generating the Anthropocene. The connection between the term ecopolitics and the term biopolitics has an obvious semantic resonance. Both terms attach a prefix concerning the life sphere to the word politics. Etymologically, “bio-” stems from the Greek word “bios”, meaning “one’s life, course or way of living, lifetime”, while “eco-” stems from the Greek word “oikos”, meaning “house, dwelling place, habitation” (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2023). Hence, the prefixes bio and eco both deal with life in different senses, with the latter encompassing entire systems that include non-life entities and the realms of the inorganic such as minerals, rocks, rivers, and weather systems. From this perspective, it would seem that the term ecopolitics extends the scope of biopolitics to a larger domain. Beyond the obvious semantic parallel between the terms, another reason to consider ecopolitics against the backdrop of biopolitics is to examine it from the lens of power. Biopolitics deals fundamentally with the power aspect of politics (Campbell & Sitze, 2013) wherein life becomes the basis for or the subject of power (Lemke, 2011). Likewise, ecopolitics considered from that framing would be centrally concerned with ecology as the basis for or the subject of power. Obviously, the political should not be exhaustively understood in terms of power (Partridge, 1963; Morgenthau, 2012; Gaus, 2018), and we need to allow for a nuanced understanding of political power (Parsons, 1963), so in a sense, this vantage point on ecopolitics could also have its limits. At the same time, reckoning with the realities of power in all its guises and both positive and negative manifestations should prove valuable for all the constructs discussed above that fall under the purview of ecopolitics. This chapter will begin by anchoring our account in the late work of Michel Foucault from the 1970’s, where he articulated the bases for a theory of biopolitics against which subsequent biopolitical articulations emerged (Foucault, 1990, 2003, 2010). We will then take a look at three different contemporary trajectories spawned by this Foucauldian theory of biopolitics: the negative biopolitics theorized by Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2004, 2005, 2016, 2017), the affirmative biopolitics advanced by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (Hardt & Negri, 2000, 2004, 2011, 2019), and the intermediary account developed more recently by Roberto Esposito (2008, 2021, 2022), which nuances the affirmative potential of biopolitics. Finally, we briefly canvass the field of terminology related to biopolitics (geopolitics, psychopolitics, and necropolitics). We lastly explore an affirmative approach offered

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by posthumanism (Braidotti, 2013, 2019) and consider its points of convergence and divergence with the prior accounts of biopolitics. In all these sections, we seek to situate the notion of ecopolitics in relation to these various theories. Ultimately, we conclude with a framework for thinking about ecopolitics that builds on all these theoretical orientations. The main contribution of this chapter may be its cautionary reminder to consider the multiple possible permutations of power under which any ecopolitics may proceed: affirmative, negative, and every possibility in between. When applying ecopolitics to geopolitical problems like climate change, we need to have learned our lessons from the field of biopolitics and its progeny and relations. The ultimate aim of this chapter is to clarify the meaning of ecopolitics philosophically in relation to geopolitical challenges like global climate change. The term ecopolitics is a relatively new term that has been deployed in a variety of ways across academic disciplines and by civil society actors who remain a minority of theorists and practitioners. This nascency accounts for the conceptual vagueness of the term and the variability of its application. Philosophy as a discipline can facilitate conceptual clarification from a macro-theoretical perspective. Philosophically, the basic question we might ask is: What is ecopolitics? Relatedly, how can we situate this concept of ecopolitics in the context of related theoretical frameworks? Specifically, what can biopolitics teach us about the meaning and potential of ecopolitics?

1.2

Foucauldian Biopolitics: Make Die and Let Live / Make Live and Let Die

Michel Foucault articulated a framework for biopolitical theory in several short pieces in the late 1970s. The first place where he introduced this framework was in the concluding part of his landmark History of Sexuality: Volume 1, An Introduction in the chapter entitled “The Right of Death and Power over Life” (Foucault, 1990), originally published in 1978. This piece examines significant shifts in the operations of power arising in modernity in contradistinction to the sovereign power of prior ages. Sovereign power expressed its might in its “power of life and death” as exemplified via the public execution in all its brutal, bloody, and grotesque theatres. Modernity commences the biopolitical era in which sovereign power gives way to new mechanisms in relation to life and death. “One might say that the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault, 1990, p. 138). Biopolitics becomes concerned with improving upon life and enhancing its quality. The scope of its concern spans education, healthcare, athletic and military training as well as birthrates, mortality rates and the mitigation of disease (now called public health). Foucault traces the origins of modern biopolitics to the seventeenthcentury when power mechanisms began to develop to both discipline the individual bodies of modern subjects and to regulate populations as a whole (Foucault, 1990, p. 139). This “bio-power” keeps developing over several centuries and is necessarily

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entangled with other political-economic developments like capitalism and the nation-state. Biopower gets exercised as a form of administration and management of life, propagated across a variety of institutions beyond the state government, such as schools, medical, and military facilities. This broad governmentality was supported by the development of systems and technics of “knowledge-power” to calculate, control, and cultivate life individually and collectively (Foucault, 1990, pp. 141–143). Here and elsewhere Foucault characterizes this matrix of bio-power and knowledge as “technologies of power” and as dispositifs (apparatuses). Such a power transforms all of life and does so primarily through the tool of the “norm” as opposed strictly to the law itself. “Such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display itself in its murderous splendor; it does not have to draw the line that separates the enemies of the sovereign from the obedient subjects; it effects distributions around the norm” (Foucault, 1990, p. 144). Knowledge, systems of knowledge and the institutions in which they develop cannot be separated from power, specifically, from the seventeenth century onwards, as biopower. In a 1976 lecture called “Society Must Be Defended”, written around the same time as History of Sexuality, Volume 1, Foucault clarifies the two levels of technologies of power operative in modern biopolitics (individual and population) and explores the problem of why a bio-power oriented towards the cultivation of life would cause so much mass death through wars and genocides. This lecture offers some key refinements and distinctions of and between ideas laid out in the History of Sexuality, Volume 1. The chapter in that book did not parse out the differences between the technologies of power pertaining to disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms. It also tended to treat biopower as a replacement for rather than a supplement to prior forms of sovereign power. Most significantly, it did not provide an explanation for why the seemingly positive orientation of biopower towards “making live” or fostering life would coincide with the massive increase in state-sponsored murder. We will see that “Society Must Be Defended” supplies us with some basic answers to these problems and furnishes us with some insights of relevance to ecopolitics. In “Society Must Be Defended”, Foucault moves beyond the language of rights in mapping the shift from sovereign power to early disciplinary biopower and fleshes out a theory of technologies of power in modern biopolitics. Foucault here posits a lucid differentiation between individual and population levels of biopower: “So, we have two series, the body-organism-discipline-institutions series, and the population-biological processes-regulatory mechanisms-State” (Foucault, 2003, p. 70). He specifies that the latter series emerged later in modernity than the former series: towards the latter half of the eighteenth century. Disciplinary power, which made use of techniques like spatial distribution, surveillance, and training, targeted individual bodies and was the easier adjustment of sovereign power to complex demographic and industrial shifts requiring new means of control over subjects (Foucault, 2003, pp. 63; 69–70). While these technologies of power could be deployed via bureaucratic institutions, the development of a power that applied to the species, biological processes, or life itself required centralization in State

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apparatuses and involved complex coordination schemes to produce and apply knowledge of how populations operated in mass (biologically, sociologically, economically, etc.) (Foucault, 2003, pp. 64, 66, 69–70). Biopolitics comes to apply not merely to the human being as a living body but to the species level of our existence, whose processes of birth, disease, and death can and should be “regularized” to “optimize a state of life” and create security: technologies of security get developed using scientific tools like statistics (Foucault, 2003, pp. 64, 67, 69). For Foucault, it is once biopower encompasses the population level to defend a society that such technologies of power in modern governmentality properly become biopolitical as opposed to anatomo-political (Foucault, 2003, p. 141; Foucault, 1990, p. 139). To explain why State production of death has increased in modernity despite the rise of biopower vis-à-vis sovereign power, Foucault introduces a theory of Statesponsored racism. National Socialism and the Holocaust are the prime cases he has in mind when developing this theory. Basically, racism comes to have “two functions” in biopolitics: (1) “to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower”; (2) to justify the supposed enhancement of health or purity of one population via the genocide of another population (Foucault, 2003, pp. 74–5). Foucault concludes this lecture by suggesting that insofar as modern States and their societies exercise both biopower and the “rights of war, the rights of murder and the function of death” they necessarily adopt racism (Foucault, 2003, p. 81). The tension between biopower that makes live and one that makes die is highly germane to our topic of ecopolitics, wherein power over the ecological sphere has both affirmative and negative dimensions. Racism in ecopolitics takes on the form of environmental injustice, climate injustice, and spatial injustice. However, the mechanisms accounting for the mass extinction of species take us beyond environmental racism and necessarily incorporate other apparatuses such as those involved in global capitalism. Foucault does offer some preliminary comments on how environmental concerns factor into biopolitics, indicating that the study of the environment features in biopower insofar as environmental factors impact life and its cultivation. Biopolitics’ last domain is, finally (. . .) control over relations between the human race, or human beings insofar as they are a species, insofar as they are living beings, and their environment, the milieu in which they live. This includes the direct effects of the geographical, climatic, or hydrographic environment: the problem, for instance, of swamps, and of epidemics linked to the existence of swamps throughout the first half of the nineteenth century (Foucault, 2003, pp. 65–66).

Environmental considerations also extend to the non-natural urban environment as they affect human life. Environment, according to Foucault, was one of the domains alongside that of birth, death, disease, and disability to which biopolitics applied knowledge as power to intervene in the management of human life. With the inclusion of environmental science, biopolitics begins to converge on what we are calling ecopolitics. Yet, insofar as the purpose of such environmental study is to cultivate human life, it falls properly within the purview of biopolitics. The environment is a factor to be studied and manipulated for the human bios. Yet, over time, we have seen how the acceleration of this process as it dovetailed with rapid

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industrialization and globalization of capitalism has spawned the Anthropocene crises we now face. The narrowly construed attempt to manage and exploit environmental conditions to service human needs has engendered ecological destabilization that heralds catastrophe for humanity over the long term. We are now faced with the prospect of attempting to rectify these wrongs with a totalization of management of all life or by pursuing other alternatives. Liesen and Walsh (2012) conducted a study of how the term biopolitics has been deployed in the academic discipline of political science. Unsurprisingly, they found that Foucauldian “postmodern” concepts of biopolitics had come to prevail in the discipline, eclipsing the use of the term by those in the life sciences who advance a very different conception of scientific biopolitics. Scientific biopolitics seeks to harvest knowledge and findings from the life sciences to apply to socio-political issues, including policy (biopolicy). While this article mainly spells out the contrasts between these two different conceptions of biopolitics in relation to the study of sex and sexuality, its findings would apply to the application of Foucauldian and scientific biopolitics to a broader array of political issues, including environmental ones. They mention briefly that scientific biopolitics has been utilized in relation to biosecurity problems like biohazards and biological weapons (Liesen & Walsh, 2012, p. 10). Ultimately, they suggest that those doing scientific biopolitics in political science replace the term biopolitics with a new term to capture their field of study that “succinctly captures the intersection of politics and the life sciences”. They conclude that such a label would “describe (. . .) the approach incorporating human biology, the environment, and culture in the analysis of political behavior, policy, and politics” (Liesen & Walsh, 2012, p. 13). Perhaps this term has since emerged as the study of political ecology. Ecopolitics could be another candidate term. But insofar as ecopolitics engages with the Foucauldian study of power, it would need to moderate and temper the findings of the life sciences in their applications to the sphere of the political science. In a related vein, Fletcher (2010) applies Foucault to advance a “poststructuralist political ecology”, redeploying his use of the term “neoliberal environmentality” based on the then recently released lectures on The Birth of Biopolitics (Foucault, 2010). Fletcher shows how the concept of environmentality and the different possible environmentalities explain various debates within conservation circles, where a trend towards neoliberal governmentality as an approach to environmental problems has been prevailing. Social scientists and activists calling for environmental justice in a competing approach to conservation are, in Fletcher’s framework, hailing from a different outlook on environmentality. What Fletcher helps us to see is how Foucault’s theories of governmentality and biopolitics serve to account for both problematic approaches to conservation that reinforce biopower and the resistance to these approaches. He closes with an invitation towards a “liberationist environmentality” in political ecology, which allows for a plurality of environmentalities and stakeholder vantage points in environmental challenges. Such a liberationist environmentality would constitute what we will call later, inspired by Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 2011, 2019), and in synergy with Rutherford and Rutherford (2013b), an affirmative ecopolitics.

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Agamben: The Hidden Origins of Biopolitics in Ancient Western Onto-Politics

Giorgio Agamben developed a novel theory of biopolitics (1998) that greatly expanded upon Foucault’s work and had considerable influence on multiple academic fields, especially political theory. His first, now classic, articulation of biopolitics appeared in a now widely cited text, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Agamben, 1998), becoming the first volume (Homo Sacer I) of his nine-volume Homo Sacer series, completed over the course of 20 years (Agamben, 2017). Agamben begins Homo Sacer by reasserting Foucault’s point about the significance of the biopolitical transformation of power in modernity, acknowledging that Foucault’s early death prevented the full development of his biopolitical theory (Agamben, 1998, p. 4). He proceeds to indicate that his work aims to “correct (. . .)” or “complete (. . .)” Foucault in showing that life has been the subject of politics (literally and ontologically since ancient times) but by late modernity the distinctions that had allowed sovereign power to conceal the inter-penetration of life and politics have collapsed (Agamben, 1998, p. 9). According to Agamben, Foucault’s final sketch for theorization of contemporary power in its totalizing and individualizing modes (biopolitics and subjectivization) requires us to analyze how they intersect/converge, and that doing so must return our attention to the juridicalinstitutional models of sovereign power that Foucault had jettisoned in his studies of modern biopolitics (Agamben, 1998, pp. 5–6). Agamben’s study of biopolitics hence proceeds by insisting upon its intersection with “juridico-institutional (. . .) models of power”, which takes him to Ancient political conceptualizations and legal norms regarding life: “the inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original—if concealed—nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power” (Agamben, 1998, pp. 5–6). Lemke (2011) draws a distinction between Foucault’s idea of modern biopolitics as a “historical caesura” that radically transformed sovereign power and Agamben’s notion of “a logical connection” between Ancient and modern forms of power. He explains that for Agamben, “The modern era signifies (. . .) not a break with the Western tradition but rather a generalization and radicalization of that which was simply there at the beginning” (Lemke, 2011, p. 53). A key limitation of Foucault’s treatment of biopolitics as it was deployed by National Socialism lay in his lack of analysis of concentration camps (Agamben, 1998, p. 119). Over the course of Homo Sacer, Agamben proceeds to argue that the Nazi death camps were not juridical exceptions to modernity but a form of biopolitics that exists in secret continuity with democratic states. “The camp, which is now securely lodged within the city’s interior, is the new biopolitical nomos of the planet” (Agamben, 1998, p. 176). The camp displaces the city (polis) as the paradigmatic site of modern biopolitics (Agamben, 1998, pp. 171, 181), which takes on different forms in democratic capitalist contexts (Agamben, 1998,

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pp. 10–11, 166). The reason for regarding the camp as not exceptional but as coinciding with the law can be found in a careful re-reading of the ontologicalpolitical structure of the West, starting with the differentiation between the two concepts for life in Ancient Greece: zoe (natural life held in common with all living beings) and bios (form of life). Although in Homo Sacer I, Agamben translates zoe as bare life (nuda vita in Italian) (Agamben, 1998, p. 4), by the conclusion of the Homo Sacer series in The Use of Bodies, Homo Sacer IV, 2, it becomes evident that “bare life” is not strictly identical to zoe (natural life), but what is produced through the Western onto-political machine (Agamben, 2016, p. 263).The obscure figure from Roman law called “homo sacer”, or a person who could be killed but not sacrificed to the gods, expresses for Agamben “bare life” as a zoe (natural life) which has been captured and excluded by politics (both Ancient and modern). Homo Sacer becomes the dweller in Nazi concentration camps but also appears in any other modern context in which life has been stripped of its form and made naked life by political apparatuses. Contemporary examples today abound in refugee camps, immigration detention zones, “special” military incarceration centers, certain prisons and police zones, and homeless encampments. Law operates through the “strategy of the exception”, remaining in force as it deprives subjects of rights and citizenship (Agamben, 2005). According to Agamben, the passage through modernity into biopolitical camps and death zones makes any attempt to return (with Arendt) to ancient politics to recover affirmative usage of its categories futile (Agamben, 1998, p. 188). Foucault, who likewise sought a “different economy of bodies and pleasure” in his genealogies of sexuality reaching into Ancient Greece, failed to recognize how thoroughly political the meaning of body has always been and become (Agamben, 1998, pp. 187–188). Like Foucault, Agamben theorizes biopolitics in terms of the technologies of power, or apparatuses, through which it operates. One of the main ones that Agamben identifies is the “strategy of the exception”, or the ex-ceptio, by which something is included through its exclusion, or an “inclusive exclusion”, taking the form of the “ban” (Agamben, 1998, pp. 17–18, 21, 29, 181). The exceptio applies ontologically to a variety of Western political processes, founding conceptions of the city, the human, the law, and governance, each of which become the arche (foundational principle) of Western onto-politics (Agamben, 2016, pp. 263–267). The process works, says Agamben, by dividing something and then cutting it off, and through this expulsion founding something new, while keeping what has been expelled concealed from the understanding of the new. Eventually, what was concealed and pushed to the margins or outside enters into view as centrally inside, so that topologically, inside and outside merge into one another (see: Agamben, 1998, p. 37). Bringing these unusual structures to view drives Agamben’s strategy for arresting the operativity of Western biopolitics, whose origins must be located in Ancient onto-political apparatuses. Of particular relevance to environmental applications of Agamben’s theory of biopolitics is a work that didn’t technically form the corpus of the Homo Sacer project, yet remained centrally discussed in its concluding volume: The Open: Man

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and Animal. In this work, Agamben explores the anthropological machine of the West by which the notion of the human being gets forged in processes of “anthropogenesis”. Central to these operations in the West concerns the articulation of the human as not animal and the articulation of some humans as inhuman, where aspects of humanity get separated and buried to produce a certain notion of the human (via an exceptio) (Agamben, 2004, p. 37). Of particular relevance to our inquiry about ecopolitics is Agamben’s treatment of one of the founders of the science of ecology (Jakob von Uexkuell) whose work on animal environments (Umwelt) informed Heidegger’s distinctions between world and environment and world and Earth, wherein animals are found to exist in a state of “poverty in world” (Agamben, 2004, pp. 39, 55). Ultimately, Agamben does not find the Heideggerian approach to be satisfactory in confronting the problems arising in global capitalism wherein the hitherto forged distinctions producing anthropogenesis in the anthropological machine of the West eventually generate a conflict between humanization and animalization through their convergence in zones of indistinctness via modern biopolitics (Agamben, 2004, pp. 76–80). Under such conditions, the prospect of the “total management of life” emerges, a solution that gets applied to myriad spheres of existence as a “burden” of human responsibility: the crises and catastrophes of modern biopolitics (Agamben, 2004, p. 77). Agamben concludes this volume with a cryptic call to depose this trajectory through what he will explain in The Use of Bodies as a “deposition”, “destitution”, “deactivation”, or “idling of the machine”: To render inoperative the machine that governs our conception of man will therefore mean no longer to seek new—more effective or more authentic—articulations, but rather to show the central emptiness, the hiatus that—within man—separates man and animal, and to risk ourselves in this emptiness: the suspension of the suspension, Shabbat of both animal and man (Agamben, 2004, p. 92).

Agamben’s treatment of animality in The Open has served as the most obvious entry point to environmental studies, and a proliferation of articles on this topic abound related especially to animal rights. We will not here reinforce that space but take on the more challenging project of teasing out an implication of Agamen’s biopolitics to ecopolitics more broadly construed. One challenge is that Agamben himself said very little about the environment and only in passing, neglecting to take up grand challenges like rapid climate change. It is on one hand certainly obvious that Agamben would worry that the “states of emergency” generated by eco-crises could be used as a pretext to expand the sovereignty of government and other institutional powers beyond any hitherto experienced limit. On the other hand, we may use his framework to help discern and highlight how present environmental injustices operate so as to contest them. In closing this section, we will briefly canvass a few promising approaches to Agambenian ecopolitics. An early piece by cultural geographer Gandy (2006) takes a look at both Foucault and Agamben’s biopolitics to explore the “zones of indistinction” that emerge in the modern polis that produces bare life at its center. He points out that the extension of Foucault’s theory to explore the hidden alliance between totalitarian and democratic

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states reveals a problematic amplification of biopower “whether reflected in genocidal conflict over access to resources or systematic processes of exclusion from medical care for the world’s poor” (Gandy, 2006, p. 501). Grady notes myriad examples of how the camp appears in pockets of the developed and developing world where denizens experience degraded and unsafe environments. Contemporary urban spaces are rife with zones of disease where their dwellers become stigmatized and rendered invisible. In a related vein, López-Calvo and Chavolla (2022) apply a combination of Foucault, Agamben and Mbembe’s notions of biopolitics to characterize the environmental injustices faced by indigenous peoples regarding neoliberal extractivism in Latin America. Conservation theorist Fletcher (whom we looked at regarding Foucault’s potential ecopolitics) likewise incorporates consideration of Agamben’s theories (alongside Foucault and Mbembe’s) to draw our attention to the potential deployment of “states of exception” to legitimate violence by both state and non-state actors, including so-called “green violence” (Fletcher, 2018). He cautions us to attend to the “significant transformation in the role of environmentalism within the contemporary geopolitical order” that the green wars augur (Fletcher, 2018, p. 154). Rutherford and Rutherford (2013b) characterize theory that deals with these and related issues of terrorism “geographies of terror or biopolitical geopolitics”. However, in utilizing Agamben’s negative theory of biopolitics, we must exercise caution. Otherwise, we could succumb to the “Agamben effect” whereby biopolitics becomes entirely transformed into thanatopolitics, hence precluding awareness of some of the affirmative and vital potentialities for biopolitical applications to ecological concerns (Rutherford & Rutherford, 2013a, b). Minimally, Agambenian ecopolitics invites us to turn our attention to the ways existing regimes produce various forms of bare life and states of exception both through malevolently and benevolently intentioned forms of sovereignty. These could arise from callous neoliberal indifference to the value of any life that does not maximize profits and produce short-term affluence for the powerful as well as from schemes of remediation that narrow their sphere of care to life that should be preserved to the neglect of others. What an Agambenian approach contributes to ecopolitics is a considered and nuanced attention to the often-hidden operations of power. It has become easier for environmentalists to critique entrenched corporate interests that resist new environmental and climactic regulations, taxes, or policies, by lobbying or funneling enormous sums into misinformation or fantasy narratives about technological miracles or the magic of free markets. Ecopolitical resistance to these forms of power has been well developed and institutionalized via academia and nongovernmental organizations. With Agamben’s lenses we are also invited to examine all environmental policies from the standpoint of whose life is being optimized versus being degraded. However, such an approach does not give a pass to neoliberalism as if the life of corporate persons should now somehow be interpreted as endangered. For our purposes, Agamben’s negative ecopolitics may be best adopted as contributing to a critical frame of analysis and a check on naivete and excess in cultivating affirmative ecopolitics.

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1.4

Hardt and Negri: Affirmative Biopolitics and the Power of the Multitude

Hardt and Negri (2000) advanced an alternative biopolitical theory to that offered by Agamben starting in their groundbreaking and influential book Empire. “Empire” is the word they use to designate the then-emerging capitalist world order under which the power of nation-states had eroded. This political body and new form of sovereignty becomes all-encompassing, pervading every aspect of life, and knowing no boundaries, with neither center nor periphery. Due to this unprecedented scope of power, Hardt and Negri drop the definite and indefinite articles “the” and “an” in referring to “Empire”. “It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. xii). With this account, biopower becomes all-inclusive, thanks to the expansion and dominance of capitalist systems of production that seek to abolish all limits (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. xv). Like Agamben, Hardt & Negri take their cues from Foucault in theorizing biopolitics, however, they do so via Marxist and post-Marxist thought and especially via Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983, 1987) theorization of capitalism as schizophrenia. Following Deleuze, they reinterpret Foucault’s account of power in modernity as demonstrating a progressive shift from a disciplinary society to the “society of control” wherein power comes to pervade the interior of the person (as referenced by Agamben above in his critiques of Foucault’s account of modern power) (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 22–23). The nature of power as utilized by the society of control congeals with that of biopower to thoroughly extend its reaches in Empire. Hardt and Negri basically argue that Foucault’s analysis of power in modernity is incomplete without a thorough accounting of how biopolitics and capitalism reinforce each other (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 27–30). Their project draws on the work of the Italian Marxist autonomist tradition that has theorized the relevance of Marx for our contemporary era in which labor has become “immaterial” and capitalism co-opts the affective, linguistic, and cognitive aspects of what Marx called “the general intellect” along with its networks of connectivity and relationality (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 29–30). It is with a reconsideration of the power of the general intellect that Hardt and Negri find liberation. Hardt and Negri’s project, while stringently critical of Empire seeks to expose its vulnerabilities in order to overcome it and reconstitute power democratically. In contrast with Agamben’s work, their project is ultimately affirmative and hopeful. A key concept that facilitates their emancipatory vision is that of the multitude, which the masses of exploited people globally whose life and power have been co-opted by Empire. The creative forces of the multitude that sustain Empire are also capable of autonomously constructing a counter-Empire, an alternative political organization of global flows and exchanges. The struggles to contest and subvert Empire, as well as those to construct a real alternative, will take place in the imperial terrain itself—indeed, such struggles have already begun to emerge (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. xv).

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Giorgio Agamben is mentioned explicitly only once in this text in a place (along with others) where they argue that naked life has not been so much destroyed as massively fostered across the entire machinery of global capitalism (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 366). Paradoxically, Hardt & Negri find hope in the newly unleashed powers of naked life as sites of resistance to Empire. “Now the new virtualities, the naked life of the present, have the capacity to take control of the processes of machinic metamorphoses” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 367). Lemke points out that the “dynamic and creative potential of Empire” that Hardt & Negri invite us to imagine with the notion of “multitude” is more clearly understandable when we look at how they further unpack Foucault’s biopolitics in their subsequent book Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, where (unlike Foucault) they differentiate between biopolitics and biopower (Lemke, 2011, pp. 68–69). Hardt and Negri indicate that both biopolitics and biopower pertain to “social life in its entirety”, however, they find the former to hold the potential for liberatory democratic reconstitution in the multitude, whereas the latter applies to the top-down warlike imposition of power from above: biopolitics is immanent and biopower is transcendent (Hardt & Negri, 2004, pp. 94–95). It is noteworthy that this distinction between forms of power has its ultimate origins in Spinoza, as mediated by Deleuze and Guattari. Hardt and Negri find in the diverse global multitude generated by Empire the possibility for the forging of radical democracy in contestation to Empire. They indicate that the fostering of such democracy has both economic and political dimensions, with the former arising from the biopolitical production upon which Empire depends (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. xv). Economically, they again draw from the Italian autonomist tradition to look at how “our communication, collaboration, and cooperation” arise out of a new “common” (not “the commons” of Hobbes and Locke) and also generate this common (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. xv). Politically, they see a great yearning for democracy and rebellious spirit on the rise in recent years (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. xvi). Hardt and Negri will further develop the idea of the “common” and of “multitude” in the third volume of this series that had started with Empire (Hardt & Negri, 2000) in Commonwealth (Hardt & Negri, 2011). Here they define biopower as “power over life” and biopolitics as “the power of life to resist and determine an alternative production of subjectivity” (Hardt & Negri, 2009, p. 57). Reflecting on Foucault via their post-Marxist lenses they see Foucault as beginning to find in biopolitics “a tightly woven fabric of events of freedom” whereby new autonomies can be forged (Hardt & Negri, 2009, pp. 56–59). This vein continues to be advanced in their fourth and final volume in this series, Assembly (Hardt & Negri, 2019). Negri himself never ceases to elaborate his philosophy in a tight dance between the thought of Marx and Foucault, launching yet another series of books (Negri, 2017, Negri 2018), starting with a work entitled Marx and Foucault (Negri, 2017). There, Negri clarifies that Foucault’s theories of subjectivization and specifically “the technologies of the self” have been most instructive in re-reading Marx and theorizing the power of the multitude (Negri, 2017, pp. 188–198).

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Hardt and Negri’s treatment of the environment is impartially articulated, albeit from their standpoint on the universality of Empire, a requisite aspect of their theory. For example, they dedicate about 3 pages of Empire to the topic of the “ecology of capital”, a section that is nevertheless choice in its phrasing wherein they assert the existence of “machine-made nature” and the subjugation of all of nature to capital (“nature has become capital”) which then becomes part of the “capitalist response to the threat of ‘ecological disaster’” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 272). Lemke teases out further passages that deal with the environment, which mainly amount to the totalization of Empire that necessarily includes ecology (Lemke, 2011, pp. 71–73). An interesting approach to considering the ecopolitical ramifications of Hardt and Negri’s account of biopolitics may be found in a piece by Anderson (2012) which goes deeply into the role of affectivity in the work of Foucault and Negri. Of particular interest to us would be his treatment of Foucault’s notion of environmentalities and how they serve to generate affective regimes, constituting certain collective attitudes like “state phobia” (Anderson, 2012). Anderson also invites us to consider the possibilities for affect to resist and overcome biopolitical apparatuses, bringing a synthesis between Foucault’s notion of life as that which may always oppose control with Negri’s affirmative aspirations for biopolitics. One potentially affirmative affect to which he alludes in his concluding projections for future research studies is “the lived force of ideals of freedom”, which is currently co-opted by neoliberalism (Anderson, 2012, p. 40). This consideration invites us to read Hardt and Negri’s affirmative biopolitics with a reminder about the importance of how the affective dimension of environmentality may pertain to views about the political structure as they govern the ecosphere. State phobia certainly props up neoliberalism regarding environmental regulations as resistances to climate change mitigation policies take the form of fears and anxieties about eco-totalitarianism. Relatedly, terror and anxiety over environmental doomsday scenarios mobilize the eco-Left in advocating for environmental regulations and proactive policies. One lesson we can take from Anderson (2012) in building an affirmative ecopolitics is to discern and cultivate healthier affects such as the joys of solidarity and the aspiration for new forms of freedom, including liberationist and collective visions.

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Roberto Esposito: Instituting Thought

Roberto Esposito is another biopolitical theorist in contemporary Italian Thought. His works date to the same era as the writings of both Agamben and Negri yet have had less reception in the English-speaking world due to a much larger lag in translation time. Many of his books are only now being translated, and he continues to work actively as a philosopher in Italian. Esposito’s corpus remains tantamount to Agamben’s and Negri’s in size and complexity, and due to space constraints of this chapter, we will need to limit our treatment of his thinking to a few key strands. For our purposes, we will focus more on his relationship to Agamben and Negri and limit ourselves to an introductory treatment of his unique philosophical contributions. We

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shall begin with an essay written by one of Esposito’s main translators, Timothy Campbell, on Esposito’s theory of bios and immunitary paradigm, and then turn to Esposito’s most recent writings on an Instituting paradigm and its relation to the pandemic. Campbell interprets Esposito as advancing an affirmative theory of biopolitics via a synthesis of both Agamben’s negative biopolitics and Hardt and Negri’s affirmative biopolitics (Esposito, 2008, translator’s introduction, pp. viii-ix). Simply put, Esposito thinks that Agamben did not sufficiently theorize the historical specificities of Nazi thanatopolitics because he did not consider the immunitary dimensions of the Nazi paradigm. Esposito charges Hardt and Negri with insufficient regard for the brutal thanatopolitical realities that have pervaded modernity, especially in their manifestation in the Nazi extermination camps. In both cases, Campbell portrays Esposito’s critiques of these thinkers as ignoring the immunitary dimensions at the heart of modern sovereignty. Esposito had written a book on Immunity (Immunitas) and another on Community (Communitas) prior to Bios; these political categories deeply interpenetrate one another in Esposito’s thought (Esposito 2012). Campbell elegantly shows how Esposito traces these concepts to their etymological forebear in the Latin munus (or a gift that one must give as an obligation based on the prior receipt of a gift) (Esposito, 2008, p. x). Community is forged through this expected reciprocity and immunity emerges as a dispensatio; one gains immunitas from the obligations of the community to protect one’s individual needs and possessions (Esposito, 2008, pp. x-xi). Esposito’s writings explore the complex dance between the individual’s attempts to free himself and his property from the community and the community’s constitutions of sovereignty as a means of protecting both itself and the individual, especially in modern forms. According to Campbell, Esposito uses this framework to expand Agamben’s critique and reign in the excesses of Hardt and Negri’s positivity. It would seem that Esposito does align with the attempts of Hardt and Negri to reverse the negative deployments of biopower, but in doing so one must be wary of the multitude’s potential to engender new forms of immunity, a threat especially prevalent due to Hardt and Negri’s tendency to dissolve individuality into the common (Esposito, 2008, pp. xxvii-xxix). Campbell shows how the affirmative biopolitics put forth by Esposito in Bios emphasizes birth and individualization in new forms of life: “Esposito shows that immunization isn’t the only category capable of preserving or protecting life from death, but rather that birth, or the continual rebirth of all life in different guises, can function similarly” (Esposito, 2008, pp. xxxii). Esposito’s recent books, Instituting Thought: Three Paradigms of Political Ontology and Institution seek to clarify a third alternative to the biopolitical trajectories of both Agamben and Hardt and Negri. Esposito calls this paradigm of political ontology: instituting thought or instituting praxis. The intellectual antecedents for the instituting paradigm derive ultimately from Machiavelli and pass through Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Claude Lefort as well as legal theorists like Santi Romano. Esposito argues that: “Today, the only paradigm of political ontology that is capable of politically rearticulating being and thought is the one that refers to instituting praxis” (Esposito, 2021, p. 13). Esposito positions the instituting

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paradigm as a more intermediate orientation situated between two extreme axes of Twentieth century thought: the destituting paradigm of political ontology and the constituting paradigm of political ontology. Political ontology refers to the relationship between politics and being. According to Esposito, the destituting paradigm revolves around the thought of Martin Heidegger, whereas the constituting paradigm circles around that of Gilles Deleuze. Agamben’s work falls under the rubric of the destituting paradigm, while Negri’s work falls under the rubric of the constituting one. Essentially, the destituting paradigm opens up a vast and unbridgeable chasm between politics and being, seeking to inscribe ontology with all that is impolitical, and hence takes on radical theoretical orientations that seek (in Agamben’s language) to “deactivate” or “depose”, to “render inoperative” or “destitute”, existing political-ontological structures in a manner that verges on both anarchy and inaction. The constituting paradigm, on the other extreme, tends to collapse ontology into politics in a way that dissolves being into endless becoming and fails to demarcate what anything is NOT, leading ultimately to such a state of plurality that constitution necessarily undoes itself and arrives at destitution. Esposito’s analysis hinges on the ontological category of “negation”, which he sees as operating at an excess in the destituting paradigm and at a deficiency in the constituting paradigm (Esposito, 2021, pp. 4, 9). “What characterizes the instituting paradigm, on the other hand, is a productive relationship with negation that allows one to articulate being and politics in a reciprocally affirmative relation” (Esposito, 2021, p. 4). He will go onto explain instituting praxis in terms of the political “institution of the social” in a manner that never ceases to resolve ultimately the conflict and antagonism that characterizes the ongoing formation of the social out of which we are always emerging (Esposito, 2021, pp. 10–12). Institution (Esposito, 2022) was written during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, completed in August 2020, and published in Italian in 2021 and then translated into English by 2022. This text further develops the political ontology of instituting praxis and makes the case for rethinking biopolitics so as to consider the prominence of institutions in the matrix of power and life. Esposito astutely draws our attention to the rise of institutional forces in society that, while not eliminating nation-states and sovereign power, form strong nexuses of power vis-à-vis the state (Esposito, 2022, pp. 56–75, 98). Beginning with an obscure Roman juridical expression, vitam instituere, “to institute life”, Esposito frames the problematic of this book as one that seeks to understand what this means and how institutions and life relate in both “the vital character of institutions and the instituent power of life” (Esposito, 2022, p. 1). He suggests that Foucault did not sufficiently reckon with the affirmative power of institutions in his account of biopolitics and implies numerous critiques of Agamben’s biopolitical theories, rejecting Agamben’s category of bare life as never truly realized in history (Esposito, 2022, pp. 2, 11, 91). The “institution of life” is strongly connected with the notion of birth, and specifically the birth of humanity through language and symbol, wherein we institute meaning in a common world (Esposito, 2022, pp. 2–4). In a chapter entitled “The Eclipse”, Esposito examines the biopolitics of the pandemic through the lens of the role of institutions in forging both the context of and the responses to it, expressing views that remain forcefully, yet

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tacitly, opposed to Agamben’s, 2021 and 2022 extremist critiques of state overreach in managing the emergency (Esposito, 2022, pp. 5–22). While institutions have and can play negative roles in relation to life, they also can exert positive and affirmative roles, the latter possibility being the orientation to which Esposito seeks to turn out attention in developing an affirmative biopolitics of instituting life (Esposito, 2022, pp. 94–95, 98). Although institutions and institutionalism have held conservative and even authoritarian connotations since the Medieval period, Esposito discerns a strong “Return” of interest in the life-affirming potential of institutions in sociology, law, philosophy, and politics (Esposito, 2022, pp. 23–38). A key to revitalizing institutions, instituent power, and instituting praxis may be found in the dynamic interplay between institutions and movements, where the latter continually invigorate and transform the former while the former help fortify and strengthen the operative power of the latter (Esposito, 2022, pp. 10–13). Moreover, it is not just institutions that are powered by life, but life itself (bios – form of life) that is always already instituted and instituent (Esposito, 2022, p. 90). Without some connection to institution, the raw power of life devours itself in death, as seen in Nazism as well as in the anthropocentric driven “current ecological disasters” and even in Deleuze’s paradigm of immanence (Esposito, 2022, pp. 92–93). Esposito concludes: “The need to institute life has once again become the priority, in both senses: to vitalize institutions and to restore to life those instituent traits that propel it beyond mere biological matter” (Esposito, 2022, p. 99). While Esposito’s writings deal very obliquely with environmental matters and, apart from a few geography studies (Rutherford & Rutherford, 2013a), little to no secondary scholarship in English exists on an application of Esposito to environmental or ecological issues, there is certainly great potential for the application of his work to ecopolitics. His previous work on biopolitics has certainly been applied to the field of biology (Helmreich, 2011; Malabou, 2016), alongside that of other biopolitical theorists. Esposito’s emphasis on immunity as a framework for understanding biopolitics has direct applicability to issues of biosecurity, particularly regarding zoonotic diseases and global epidemics or pandemics. Rutherford and Rutherford observe a convergence between the biopolitical geopolitics embodied by Agambenian scholars and the life affirming orientation of vital geographers (2013b, p. 427) that Esposito’s work arguably straddles. It would appear that the recent turn in his thinking towards the paradigm of instituting praxis provides fertile material for theorizing ecopolitics. The intermediating role of institutions during the COVID-19 pandemic makes clear the relevance of Esposito’s immunitary approach to biopolitics situated within a framework of the instituting paradigm. Organized bodies of medical experts weighed heavily in the decision-making of both state actors andcitizens, as well as decision-makers in both civil society and business sectors regarding their roles to play in mitigating the pandemic. It is also certainly the case that our current environmental and ecological crises have been caused by and dealt with by a range of civil society actors, with various subnational and supernational institutions playing increasingly predominant roles for good or ill. In the void of sufficiently strong state action, institutions may be our only hope for safeguarding all life on the planet. We can also discern in Esposito’s (2022,

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pp. 92–93) critique of the unbridled effects of anthropocentrism (which he seems to view as operating along Social Darwinist principles) a case to be made for bolstering institutions in relation to the total web of life. His affirmative vision for an institutionally informed biopolitics could serve as a guide for a healthful ecopolitics of the future: “But the concept of biopolitics must be rethought to overcome the underlying divide between what appears to some as an absolute power over life and to others as a life free of all power” (Esposito, 2022, p. 95).

1.6

Permutations of Biopolitics: Geopolitics, Psychopolitics, Necropolitics, and Posthumanism

Politics and power can be applied to life, the geosphere, the psyche, death, and now everything incorporated by the ecological domain (including the economy). These fields get the labels of geopolitics, psychopolitics, and necropolitics. Geopolitics doesn’t tend to be studied by philosophers, though it remains of utmost concern to those operating in the sphere of political science, especially politicians and civil servants. The philosophy of geopolitics is sorely lacking and in need of development. This paper gestures in that direction without fully taking on such a large-scale project. For our purposes, philosophical consideration of geographical theories will be constructive. Psychopolitics is a term that has been deployed by a range of contemporary Continental European philosophers, most notably by Byung-Chul Han, Peter Sloterdijk, and Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi. Necropolitics has been most famously theorized by Achille Mbembe. Posthumanism is another hot area of study and practice that advances perspectives quite aligned with affirmative ecopolitics. Posthuman theorists have engaged with both Agamben and Hardt and Negri, while having more convergence with the latter theorists due to their common genealogical intellectual forebears of Spinoza and Deleuze. Posthumanism seeks more liberatory vantage points in the diversity of life power and finds affirmative avenues for alternative futures therefrom. In what follows in this short chapter, we will offer some introductory thoughts on these permutations of biopolitics as they bear on ecopolitics. Further elaboration of such trajectories must be deferred to future projects. Geopolitics pertains to the study of the intersection of geography and politics, as the etymology of this word makes clear. However, the field of geography encompasses not just the physical features of the Earth and its regions but the human terrain with its modes of dwelling and infrastructure as well as the political, economic, and cultural systems that inform this terrain. For our purposes, we use the term geopolitics in its application to rapid climate change, examining the intersection between the geosphere and politics in the era of the Anthropocene. We posit that any ecopolitics worthy of its name must consider the entire geosphere in which the ecological perspective is embedded. In a certain sense, the study of rapid climate change necessarily brings together the sciences of geology and ecology, with

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geography and geopolitics emphasizing the human link in terms of both causality and consequences of this and related intersections. If we are to situate the concept of geopolitics against the backdrop of our foregoing discussion of biopolitics as some political geographers have attempted (Rutherford & Rutherford, 2013b; Fletcher, 2018), we would highlight the structures of human power that operate on the geosphere in its Anthropocenic guises, for better or for worse. In a certain sense, the term Anthropocene could be a cipher for geopolitics under this signification. Redeployment of the term geopolitics in line with a biopolitical genealogy would serve to highlight the role of human technologies of power that operate on the geosphere as they pertain to problems like climate change, potentially reconfiguring our thinking about geopolitical problems like resource wars. Psychopolitics is a term that considers the applications and effects of power on the human psyche and the psychosphere. As it is deployed by various theorists it has more or less to do with biopolitics. Byung-Chul Han popularized the term with his book Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power. Peter Sloterdijk, another popular writer in Germany known for his coinage of terms and playful vocabulary reach has peppered his writing with the term “psychopolitics”; however, his intellectual lineage remains more informed by Nietzsche and Heidegger than Foucault, with the Nietzchean influence prevailing most strongly in his usage of the term psychopolitics. Sloterdijk’s (2012) Rage and Time: A Psychopolitical Investigation puns directly on Heidegger’s now-canonical work, Being and Time. Franco Berardi operates in the same lineage as Antonio Negri of autonomist Marxism and as such utilizes some of the same theorists and approaches. Berardi is known for his work on semiocapitalism that bridges post-psychoanalytic research from Guattari (with whom he had studied) with the autonomist Marxist tradition (Berardi, 2015, 2017). In that sense, Berardi’s theorization of psychopolitics and the psychosphere has more to do with psychoanalysis than with Foucault (Berardi, 2021). Byung-Chul Han likewise draws widely from the Continental European tradition in his theories. However, in his case, the term pscyhopolitics has clear antecedents in and inspiration from the work of Foucault. Byung-Chul Han argues that Foucault’s preoccupation with the body and with disciplinary society and ambivalent relationship to neoliberalism did not permit him to see the degree to which advanced capitalist systems had extended their power over the domain of the psyche and its effects. Han argues that neoliberalism exploits the psyches of its subjects by compelling them to voluntarily self-exploit themselves to the point of burnout, preserving the feeling of freedom rather than disciplinary control from overlords (Han, 2017). Han also engages with Marx in his critiques of capitalism but finds Marx’s nineteenth-century articulations of class conflict inadequate to the task of explaining the phenomenology of contemporary knowledge workers. Like Sloterdijk, Han’s theorizations tend to be thoroughly Heideggerian. In a sense, both Han and Berardi seek to bridge anti-capitalist perspectives with theories that help to reveal the ways the psychological and emotive dimensions of neoliberal subjects suffer from exploitation and the degradation of autonomy under advanced capitalist systems of oppression.

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While psychopolitics per se may appear to be unrelated to ecopolitics, we could certainly find points of connection insofar as global capitalism produces the eco-crises we face today along with a set of proposed solutions (green capitalism, eco-technology, geoengineering, etc.) Moreover, as deep ecology reminds us, consideration of the psychological aspects of the ecological transformation ought not be neglected but may in fact be of central significance for the cultivation of healthy and affirmative ecopolitics. Han’s and Berardi’s anti-capitalist critiques of psychopolitics help us to appreciate how ecopolitics could go wrong and perhaps to offer some glimmers of liberating alternatives. Han tends to follow the destituting approach of Heidegger et al. in inviting us towards more contemplative dimensions that slow down, disrupt, and reconfigure our relationships to one another in contradistinction to the existing accelerationist neoliberal reality. In that sense, Han’s approach to ecopolitics may have more in common with Agamben. Berardi, on the other hand, would fall within the same zone of approach as Hardt and Negri in seeking ways to build collective autonomy while using the existing array of power propagated under neoliberalism. Necropolitics is a term coined by Achille Mbembe, who draws on the Continental philosophical tradition to theorize death power as informed by his studies of colonialism and imperialism from his situatedness in South Africa. Mbembe uses Foucault’s theory of biopolitics and articulation of racism as a point of departure, along with Arendt and Agamben’s analyses of Nazi concentration camps. Implicitly, he develops the thanatopolitical angle mentioned by Agamben (1998, p. 142), however, he goes further in relabeling the structures of power operative since the modern period as “necropower”, centering the production of death as a tool to exploit and terrorize the living. While he indicates that he doesn’t aim to dispute the singularity of the Holocaust, he finds the necropolitical operations of modern biopower to have pervaded modernity more thoroughly than Agamben seems to have recognized (Mbembe, 2019, p. 67). Using the Agambenian language of “hidden matrix” he locates it in a relationship between “democracy, the plantation, and the colonial empire” (Mbembe, 2019, p. 23). Akin to Agamben, Mbembe draws a connection between biopower and the state of exception; however, he also adds the state of siege (and its “relation of enmity”) to this matrix, which enables him to theorize the specificity of necropower (Mbembe, 2019, p. 70). Mbembe argues that Foucault’s notions of disciplinary power and biopower need to be supplemented with a notion of necropower to account for the realities that have been unfolding since the colonial era (Mbembe, 2019, p. 82). Ultimately, Mbembe arrives at a picture of “our contemporary world, [where] weapons are deployed in the interest of maximally destroying persons and creating death-worlds, that is, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to living conditions that confer upon them the status of the living dead” (Mbembe, 2019, p. 92). Another theorist of necropolitics is Warren Montag who has applied the necro-frame to the economic sphere using a term he dubs, “necro-economics” (Montag, 2005). Weheliye (2014) engages with Mbembe’s earlier theorizations of necropolitics, drawing attention to alternative forms of life dismissed by both biopolitics and necropolitics. In the context of ecopolitics, we can certainly see the ramifications

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of necropower as it pertains to both human populations (now and the future) who are furthest from environmental justice and to the countless species whose extinction the Anthropocene continues to enforce. Posthumanism draws its name from the interconnected set of French schools of thought that have dubbed themselves “post” something: especially postmodernism and poststructuralism. Francesca Ferrando has characterized philosophical posthumanism as post-humanism, post-anthropocentrism, and post-dualism (Ferrando, 2020, pp. 22, 54), and relatedly as a “post-centrism and post-exclusivism” (Ferrando, 2020, p. 56). Ferrando explains that an important aspect of the posthuman project is the deconstructing (or decentering) of the human, which is one way to differentiate it from transhumanism, which does the opposite in excessively centering the human in a sort of ultra-humanism (Ferrando, 2020, pp. 3–4, 33). In decentering the human, posthumanism makes space for a variety of centers of value in the world, ranging from ecosystems and other species to artificial life-like robots. Posthumanism opens the possibility of viewing other beings as agents, contributors, and participants in a world, along with inviting a radical expansion in our appreciation for what is valuable and what it means to be a source of value (atomistic, rational agency being just one historically specific human conception that should not be used as the gold standard for all ethics). This approach engenders an exuberant attitude towards life, which is particularly salient in the writings of Rosi Braidotti (2013, 2019). Braidotti explicitly draws from Spinoza and Deleuze to advocate for affirmative expressions of politics and ecology that creatively reimagine and rework the negative trajectories spawned by imperial necropolitics and capitalist exploitation. She invites a “reterritorialization” laced with “transveral links” including a diverse set of subjectivities that are “post-humanist, postanthropocentric, embedded, embodied, relational, affective, and ethically accountable” (Braidotti, 2019, p. 153). In this imaginary, other natural and artificial beings become our friends and co-creators in a broadened solidarity network of reimagined life. This vision seems to be the apotheosis of affirmative ecopolitics. Rutherford and Rutherford (2013b) have likewise noted a powerful synergy between posthumanism and geography in cultivating an affirmative ecopolitics in which nonhuman animal agents are included and the scope of justice extended. They recommend ongoing empirical studies of the ways animals have altered environments in response to anthropogenic environmental changes. Affirmative ecopolitics needs to recognize the value of nonhuman agency.

1.7

Conclusion

With this theoretical backdrop, we can see that ecopolitics could be comprehended as an extension of any of these paradigms, and, as such, a wide variety of theoretical frameworks are available for application to the term ecopolitics. As with biopolitics, psychopolitics, and necropolitics, a central matter of consideration is the meaning, role, and deployment of power: by whom, for whom, with whom, and against or over

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whom. In its most negative manifestation, a framework of ecopolitics would devolve into pure technocratic management of life systems for the benefit of powerful parties at the expense of vulnerable beings (human and nonhuman). An affirmative ecopolitics in the vein of Hardt and Negri’s affirmative biopolitics of posthumanism would aim to liberate the vital forces of the human and nonhuman worlds and build solidarity and collaboration across diverse domains. Posthumanism perhaps lends itself best to the cultivation of such affirmative ecopolitics due to its postanthropocentric canvassing of non-human life forms and systems. Ultimately, ecopolitics as it is likely to be understood, practiced, and disseminated will be a hybrid of various negative, affirmative, and intermediate forms, with the entire oikos (home) encompassing our ecosystems and life-worlds falling under the purview of novel apparatuses of power. An aspiration of this chapter is to serve to clarify these various possible deployments of power structures as they pertain to ecopolitics in the hopes of crafting a critical framework to be applied to studies and practices that fall under the auspices of ecopolitics or ecopower. Disclaimer The views and/or claims/ or data expressed in this chapter are solely authors’ own or based on literature survey and are not necessarily linked with their affiliations, editors of the book, reviewers of the chapter or the publisher.

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Chapter 2

Global Biogovernance: Between Intergovernmental and Supranational Cooperation Janusz Ruszkowski

Abstract The biosphere consists of three groups of elements: (1) organic (fauna and flora), (2) inorganic (hydrosphere, atmosphere, lithosphere) and (3) an intermediate element (soil). Due to its universal, comprehensive and existential properties, the biosphere requires international cooperation, including global governance, therefore, Biogovernance is to a large extent a component of global governance. Global Biogovernance is debordered because it ignores national boundaries and is plural and fragmented as it does not have a single center of power and functional competences used within it are distributed among many state-actors and non-state actors. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the constitutive features and mechanisms of global Biogovernance contributing to the elimination or reduction of cases of unsustainable development. The theoretical basis for the analysis will be intergovernmentalism and supranationalism with attempt to create a bridge between both approaches. Keywords Biodiversity · Biogovernance · Biophysical · Biosafety · Biosphere · Global governance · Global biogovernance · Biopolitics

2.1

Methodological Assumptions

The biosphere consists of three elements: (1) organic (fauna and flora), (2) inorganic (hydrosphere, atmosphere, lithosphere) and (3) intermediate, i.e. soil. The biosphere understood in such a way is a term superior to biopolitics1 and biopower.2 “The

Biopolitics is a set of mechanisms, techniques, ways of influencing and shaping the population – in its global and individual dimension – and the surrounding biosphere (Filipowicz & Trejnis, 2015). This is a Foucauldian understanding of biopolitics. 2 Biopower in the narrow sense is the authority and, at the same time, the ability to influence the social environment (people and their lives), institutions (and their lives), the natural environment 1

J. Ruszkowski (✉) Institute of Political Science and Security Studies, University of Szczecin, Szczecin, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Tripathi et al. (eds.), Eco-Politics and Global Climate Change, Environment & Policy 65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48098-0_2

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intensification of research in the field of exact sciences at the end of the 20th century influenced human compulsive interference with the order of natural processes. The development of bio-experimental sciences has largely contributed to this. They made it possible to dominate human being both individually and globally. Through designing a new universum with the help of scientific creations left its mark on traditional systems of power. As a result, the institution of a government needed a quick adaptation. In response to the changing reality, biopolitics emerged” (Filipowicz & Trejnis, 2015). The aim of the analysis is, on one hand, to identify the constitutive features and mechanisms of global biogovernance contributing to the elimination or reduction of instances of unsustainable development, and, on the other, to demonstrate that both intergovernmental cooperation and activities at the supranational level do not have to be separated from each other, and the multi-level nature of global biogovernance (in particular biodiversity and climate protection) may be its natural structure. Biogovernance in international relations takes place both in relations between states (in fact their governments), which are characterized by strong politicization, and in supranational cooperation, which is more technocratic and less political in nature. The analysis will include the intergovernmental paradigm (intergovernmentalism), which is a post-realist approach to explaining various phenomena based on the central role of nation state actors, whose governments behave rationally and carry out negotiations and rational compromise in order to implement national interests and preferences. The national interest, with the accompanying egoism, is the main motivation for states to act in an anarchic international environment. This results in predetermined and relatively uniform national preferences governing the behaviour of states. According to the intergovernmental approach, nation-state actors should retain their sovereignty almost unlimitedly and are very interested in keeping control over integration processes. Hence, sovereign states place emphasis on intergovernmental negotiations, which are to facilitate the achievement of previously assumed goals. Thus, in the course of intergovernmental negotiations, national preferences are stable and clearly defined by the parties involved, as they are based on internal interests. The relationships between internal interest and national preferences articulated in the international arena are variable (Moravcsik, 1993). However, intergovernmental cooperation in biosphere protection should be directed primarily at the common interest, and not at the internal (national) interest. Since, in the intergovernmental theory, the state is the main actor of international cooperation, cooperation in the field of biosphere protection goes as far as the state allows it. At the same time, it should be remembered that states generate political tensions, which affects the quality of this cooperation and its effects. It results from egoism and state particularism as well as from natural national interests on which the stable national preferences, clearly defined and displayed by the Member States, are (and its life), etc., and to decide on these entities while retaining the right to sanctions, pressure and persuasion, and with the use of biological tools and regimes in economics or politics (e.g. policy towards the elderly, emission reduction systems, legal restrictiveness in the protection of species, etc.). Biological and political power enters the biological sphere and wants to regulate biological processes that affect political, social and economic processes.

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based. States behave unilaterally, even when they are reluctant to implement international regulations. In the case of liberal intergovernmentalism, one can speak of a formula that expresses itself in the following order: national interest ! state preferences ! international negotiations ! results (Moravcsik, 1993; Dehousse, 1996).3 The liberal intergovernmental approach emphasizes that progress in international cooperation is the result of an economic approach (even trade benefits), a negotiating approach of governments taking into account their national interests and the motivation to strengthen confidence in the implementation of commitments made by states (Moravcsik, 1988). Thus, a purely transactional approach is dominant here. Certain elements used to go beyond pure national interest can be brought by ecological interdependence, which favours the benefits of cooperating states, and international institutions only constitute a response to such interdependence and its tools. Thus, international cooperation is an exclusive product of national leaders (Hooghe & Marks, 2019). Since biosphere protection should be focused primarily on the common interest, and not on the internal (national) interest, an important system for explaining community dependencies in such a cooperation is also the supranationalism theory, which, unlike the classical intergovernmental (IG) theory and the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism (LIG) has a completely different explanatory load because it assumes the need to build supranational forms of international cooperation and communitisation (or supranationalization) of specific areas of cooperation, methods of operation and governance in the field of biosphere protection. Communitisation of such areas of cooperation requires shifting the competences of nation state actors to supranational institutions. On the other hand, supranational decision-making produces a uniform direct effect for all participating entities and is based on the creation of an autonomous legal system with its supremacy over national systems. A supranationalized agenda setting to protect the biosphere becomes common to the participating states and helps identify focal points that will become the subject of technocratic actions and solutions. Thus, one can speak of a supranational level of governance above states, which is the most optimized form of globalization. Significant support for the supranational level of governance is sharing common values, principles or ideas that create bonds and facilitate understanding. Biosphere protection is certainly such a common value. For the participants of such cooperation, supranationalism means more complex challenges and greater restrictions. Thus, the basic attributes of supranationalism in international relationships include: the existence of common (supranational)

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A. Moravcsik placed his liberal intergovernmentalism within the framework of liberal institutionalism, in which representatives of the Member States enjoy a high level of indirect legitimacy in the international arena, while at the same time being accountable to national constitutional institutions. Supranational institutions and non-governmental actors with their amorphous understanding of accountability did not show such features. LIG devoted a lot of space to faith in the ability of national governments to legitimize the decision-making process “outside the state” (e.g. in the European Union).

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institutions, delegating national competences to supranational institutions, voting by a majority of votes (with no or limited right of veto), respecting common values (human rights, democracy, free market economy, etc.) (Price, 2004). Ecology is supranational and therefore global in nature, as it does not stop at state borders, so it is characterized by strong penetrability. However, protective measures and biogovernance have a noticeable multi-level character (national, intergovernmental and supranational). Ecology is also interdisciplinary in nature, as in practice it affects all spheres of human activity (economy, politics, culture) and many fields of scientific research (economics, political science, chemistry, biology, sociology, etc.). Research on biogovernance should also use the achievements of new environmentalism (NE) (Steer, 1996), which suggests a move towards biophysical factors that define the material limitations of decisions made and executed in a given situation. New environmentalism, emphasizing the social imperative of environmental protection, also sees its economic benefits. Therefore, biogovernance must be based on the concept of the bio-based economy, and in a broader international sense, on the greener economic model (GEM). The GEM is based on the symbiosis of the economy (including market incentives to reduce environmental damage) (Aldy & Stavins, 2012) and the natural environment, emphasizing the economic decisionmaking process taking into account e.g. climate change.4 In global biogovernance, the issue of bio-responsibility is important, more so as each violation of the biological balance has its source in human activity, so it is almost always possible to indicate the responsible entity. The issue of bio-responsibility can be illustrated by the fundamental principle of polluter-pays (Khalatabari & Poorhashemi, 2019). Biogovernance is also explained in game theory, in particular when we analyse the reactions and goals of leading players operating in the emissions trading market or participating in environmental decision-making, and when we observe their impact on adjustment mechanisms to the international climate protection system (Helm, 2012a, b; Parker et al., 2017) or the conservation of biodiversity. Polycentrism of game theory allows for the effective diagnosis of horizontal (intergovernmental i.e. between states) and vertical (supranational) institutional ties, interactions between players and relationships between various activities, situations and events. The analysis undertaken mainly includes the complementary activity of players operating on two levels in biogovernance. On one hand, it is an intergovernmental level, the main actors of which are nation-state actors through their governments, which perform subsidiary tasks in this governance. On the other hand, it is a supranational level, the main actors of which are institutions characterized by common goals, solutions and standards of conduct in biosphere protection. The dynamics of solutions in the field of biogovernance and the institutional

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GEM also includes a production system that is based on biophysical or biochemical life sciences processes and associated genetic technologies. The GEM model is closely related to the concept of a sustainable and competitive circular economy (The European Environment. State and Outlook, 2010).

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infrastructure in this area prove that directions and indications for actions and solutions appear on both levels, and then, if they are accepted, they are transferred between the levels. In addition, it will be important to identify tools for biogovernance that are available to actors at both levels and in its two main areas: biodiversity conservation governance and climate protection governance. Therefore, a specific conceptual and tool infrastructure of global biogovernance is needed, which will allow for the conceptualization of biogovernance and its practical operationalization.

2.2

Conceptualization of Biogovernance

Governance is characterized by an “innovative approach to the political decisionmaking process”. [This] term is usually used to describe a new method of governing, different from the old (Westphalian), hierarchical model in which state authorities exercise sovereign control over people and groups that make up civic society (Kolarska-Bobińska, 2009).5 The specificity of governance is the multiplicity of participating actors and its own internal dynamics, which determines the cooperation of state actors and non-state actors. James A. Caporaso believes that governance is only collective problem-solving in the public space (Caporaso, 1996, 2000; Caporaso & Madeira, 2011). In his concept of governance, James Rosenau (2003) emphasizes the necessity of consensus in the governance mechanism and the value of coordinating decisions bypassing the central body in the state. Mario Telo (2007, 2009), on the other hand, emphasizes the difference between the terms governance and government, arguing that the former is more internally coherent. The difference between a democratic government and governance is that a government is based on representative democracy, and governance is based on a variety of regulatory, representative and governing processes (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). Governance encompasses all forms and levels of power that can be public, private, pluralistic and informal (neither institutionalized nor hierarchical), decentralized and transferred to a polycentric, subnational and transnational system of variable geometries (Rosenau, 1987; Telo, 2006). As can be concluded from the above, governance in biosphere protection concerns both the non-hierarchical and hierarchical system of political negotiations, regulations and administration, which is located outside the traditional understanding of the sovereign state as the central body and the basic arena for the decisionmaking process and conflict resolution (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). In this case, there may be reverse denationalization, i.e. the effect of denationalization of governance

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The authors of this work explain the concept of governance as deliberate actions of any community that maintain the mechanisms to ensure its security, prosperity, cohesion, stabilization and continuity.

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Table 2.1 Constitutive features of biogovernance 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Cooperative way of making decisions Lack of a single decision-making centre (government), dispersion of the decision-making process Not having the apparatus of force (compulsion) Allowing non-state actors to participate in the decision making process Independence from voters (apoliticality) Determining the cooperation of state and non-state actors Location outside one state (with simultaneous participation by many states) No links with a specific territory (deterritorialization) Dominance of the regulatory and stabilizing character over the redistributive one Using formal and informal mechanisms

Source: The author’s elaboration

(Zürn, 2004). Biogovernance relates primarily to decision-making procedures and the formulation of regulations and political principles at all levels – national, intergovernmental and supranational. Biogovernance has ten constitutive features that have been catalogued in Table 2.1. Biogovernance is, therefore, characterized by an innovative approach to the political decision-making process, but at the same time, it is a new method of dispersive governance (many actors, various spheres of the biosphere: biodiversity, climate protection), different from the old, hierarchical model based on the state power exercising control over people and groups creating civic society. The specificity and typology of biogovernance prove that we are dealing with both a shift from a formal government to more deformalized governance, and a dynamically developing reflection on not only governance itself, but also its multi-level nature. Biogovernance is multi-level because in practice it is both horizontal (when it takes place only at the intergovernmental level, i.e. between states) and vertical (when it takes place at the supranational level). In both cases, biogovernance involves multilevel administrations. Making decisions in this type of governance must be integrated and coordinated. One of the most important features of biogovernance is the inter-level (vertical) permeation of decisions and findings,6 which causes the decisions of actors at the supranational level to influence the actions, final effect, or choice at the intergovernmental level and vice versa (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2012). Therefore, biogovernance is both horizontal and vertical (i.e. vertihorical), and the decisions and their results within it are either vertical (inter-level) or horizontal.7 In biogovernance the decision-making process is fragmented not only between levels and many actors, but also because it occurs despite the lack of a single strict

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Of course, this by no means excludes decisions made on one level (horizontal). Inside the biogovernance system, on one hand, a specific conglomerate of governance levels can be observed, but on the other, a set of vertical processes occurring between these levels and on these (horizontal) levels, as well as a set of state and non-state actors operating at these levels. 7

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decision-making centre. So, biogovernance is not only inter-level, but it is also multi-level (MLBG), which undoubtedly helps limit unsustainable development. Garry Marks (1992), Marks et al. (2018), and Marks and Hooghe (2021) perceives multi-level governance as a system of permanent negotiations between governments at several territorial levels, characterized by the process of institution building and the relocation of the decision-making process, by delegating some previously centralized functions of the state “up” to the supranational level and others “down” to the regional or local level. It is worth paying attention to the term “relocation of the decision-making process”, which is directly related to the delegation of competences, tasks, functions and the division of responsibility for the biosphere between the levels within MLG. Multi-level biogovernance is also polycentric as it is based on creating links between multiple actors who delegate functional tasks to various dispersed and relatively independent bodies that make up multiple centres of governance. The latter are neither de jure nor de facto controlled by a single institution, which means that we are dealing not with one decision-making (governance) centre, but with many centres located at different levels. Biogovernance includes at least two forms: elite governance and civic republicanism. The first type, i.e. elite governance (elitism), is a top-down resolution of problems by decision-makers, by leaders, who in various forums (climate summits, earth summits, etc.) define political directions and guidelines which, through their commitments and their implementation are to bring the expected result.8 Elite governance is a type of top-down governance and central governance (CG), which has an institutional-political structure situated in the epicentre of the international system, i.e. focused on elites and universal institutions and international regimes (e.g. the Kyoto Protocol) deciding on the solutions adopted in the field of biosphere protection (Aldy & Stavins, 2008). In turn, the second type of biogovernance can be described as civic republicanism. It has a bottom-up nature and is the result of criticism of elitism. In this case, citizens, their (non-governmental) organizations and social movements have the most to say. Citizens, social groups and professional groups are looking for negotiation opportunities as well as consensual or contesting solutions regarding social and natural effects that are to be achieved in the area of biosphere protection. Multi-level biogovernance makes it possible to see that international, regional and global organizations are much less busy than national bureaucracies, and thus are more effective in carrying out tasks and achieving goals. Due to its comprehensive, universal and supranational nature, biosphere protection requires global governance. Therefore biogovernance largely constitutes an element of global governance and covers several areas of control. The most important of these include climate change, 8

A variant of elite governance is the involvement of experts, analysts, scientists, etc., who by creating epistemic communities influence power through their scientific studies, expert opinions, specialist reports, etc. Deliberation between these communities not only has an epistemic value, thanks to which knowledge and information base grows, but also has a transformational value, i.e. serving changes (Oddvar Eriksen & Fossum, 2005; Harlow, 1999).

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biodiversity protection, deforestation, access to drinking water, land degradation (including desertification), depletion of fish resources and sustainable energy consumption. The following analysis will cover cases from two areas: biodiversity protection and climate protection. Global biogovernance, thanks to the fact that it is pluralistic and dispersed (Zielonka, 2007), helps implement global solutions at the national level and introduce even more advanced solutions. It is important because states do not always show the willingness and full readiness to implement solutions in the field of biosphere protection and to coordinate their activities with other states. Thus, global biogovernance can be intergovernmental (when it occurs between governments, possibly in intergovernmental international organizations) or supranational (when it takes place in international institutions taking over tasks and decisions that have been delegated to these institutions by states).

2.3

Intergovernmental Biogovernance

The main actors of intergovernmental biogovernance (IBG), including in particular climate protection governance and biodiversity protection, are nation-states and international governmental organizations. States should not only pursue the goals of IBG, but also co-define its agenda, which means that intergovernmental governance is threatened by strong politicization. The dynamics of intergovernmental interactions and solutions undertaken as part of biogovernance allows to indicate the dominant activity of states (in fact their governments) that undertake it in the forums of international organizations. It is intergovernmentalism through international organizations (IGtIO), which is characterized by bilateral interactions on one hand and multilateral relationships on the other. An example of bilateral intergovernmental interactions is the agreement between the Spanish government and UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) of May 18, 2022 on the continuation of the maintenance of the seat of the International Centre on Mediterranean Biosphere Reserves (UNESCOMED9) in Spain as a Category 2 Center – (C2C).10 On the other hand, intergovernmental multilateral relationships find their dynamics mainly due to the use of three instruments. The first instrument involves international conventions and protocols adopted by states within the framework of international organizations (convention instrument). The second instrument in 9 The aim of the UNSECOMED, located in Castellet Castle near Barcelona, is to promote and strengthen international cooperation in the field of research, joint training and knowledge transfer between Mediterranean biosphere reserves. Promoting sustainable development and strengthening its technical capabilities should help govern the biosphere. 10 Category 2 Centresare bodies run by UNESCO, while Category 1 Centres are national bodies run by states and cooperating with UNESCO. It is a classification that proves multi-level biogovernance.

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intergovernmental multilateral relationships are working and specialist groups established by governments within international organizations (institutional instrument). The third instrument are intergovernmental programs initiated to support the biosphere in a multi-directional way (program instrument). The main convention instrument in the field of biodiversity conservation is the UN Convention on Biological Diversity – CBD, signed in 1992 at the first Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. The document contains the rights and obligations of the signatory states in the field of preserving biodiversity in the world.11 The 2003 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which sets minimum standards for cross-border trade in genetically modified organisms, and the 2010 Nagoya Protocol on access to genetic resources and fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from their use12 were added to the convention. This document is dedicated to the global reduction of biodiversity loss. The CDB convention has been supported since 1994 by annual Conferences of Parties (COPs), which are the second type of institutional instrument, i.e. a specially appointed body to make decisions and responsible for monitoring and reviewing the implementation of CBD regulations at the national level. In the area of climate protection, intergovernmental multilateral relationships are implemented through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which – like the CBD convention – was adopted in 1992 during the first Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. The document obliges states – parties to develop national plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.13 The UNFCCC convention is also supported by the second institutional instrument. These are the annual conferences of the parties (COPs), which have their own secretariat located in Bonn (Germany). The main task of the COP at the UNFCC is to review and evaluate national reports on greenhouse gas emissions. Both the UNFCC COPs and the CBD COPs are a kind of conventionally linked institutions. A classic intergovernmental convention instrument and a specific point of reference in the climate protection policy is the Kyoto Protocol of December 11, 1997,14 the main goal of which is to set the level of reducing pollutant emissions in developed countries by 5.2% compared to the values from the base year 1990. The intergovernmental regulatory order in global climate protection governance was strengthened by the agreement concluded in 2015 at the Paris climate summit, which was signed by 195 countries.15 The Paris Agreement on Climate Change

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The next step was the Declaration on Cities and Biodiversity adopted at the second CBD meeting in Curitiba in 2007. 12 UNESCO has a total of 727 biosphere reserves and national parks located in 131 countries. uenscomedcenter.org 13 The convention entered into force in 1994. 14 The end of the ratification process of the Protocol did not take place until 2005. 15 However, the key roles in carbon dioxide emissions are played by the USA and China (in 2006, these countries accounted for a total of 41.8% of global emissions), which allows them to be treated in this context as a kind of duumvirate, or even an actual two-part G2 group (Falkner et al., 2010).

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became the first legally binding global commitment in the twenty-first century,16 the aim of which is primarily to keep the limit of global warming below 2 °C compared to the pre-industrial era (ultimately following the limit of this increase up to 1.5 °C) (Paris Agreement, Keohane and Raustiala 2009) and, moreover, achieving climate neutrality by the end of the twenty-first century. An intergovernmental institutional instrument in multilateral relationships does not have to be linked to a convention. It often happens that states establish multilateral working or specialized bodies within international organizations, but these newly established institutions are not used to implement, monitor or evaluate a specific convention. An example of this type of intergovernmental institutions not linked by a convention is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established in 1988, the main task of which is to evaluate scientific, technical and socio-economic information on climate change. The work of the IPCC results in cyclical Assessment Reports17 containing findings resulting from scientific research. For example, the 2018 Assessment Report warns that without social transformation and rapid introduction of large-scale greenhouse gas reductions, the task of limiting climate change to 1.5 °C and achieving sustainable development will be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Another intergovernmental institutional instrument not linked to a convention is the Intergovernmental Platform for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), established by the governments of 140 countries in 2012, which was planned as an independent intergovernmental body with a Bonn-based secretariat. The IPBES aims to strengthen the role of science in the decision-making process regarding services in the field of biodiversity and the ecosystem. Scientific support for governments is to contribute to the substantive optimization of political decisions, which should be based on proven, independent and scientifically justified knowledge. Program instruments in intergovernmental biogovernance were initiated in the UN system. The oldest of them is the Man and the Biosphere (MAB) program, implemented by UNESCO in 1971, which assumes biodiversity protection and sustainable use of its heritage. Each state participating in the MAB has its own MAB national committee, which is a kind of information and communication hub supporting the national dialogue in the area of sustainable development (Schliep & Stoll-Kleermann, 2010). In addition to national committees, internal bodies help implement this program, in particular the International Coordinating Council. A year later, the global United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) was established, which on one hand creates an agenda for biosphere protection, and on the other supports the consistent implementation of pro-ecological solutions. The UNEP supports the search for synergies between various conventions related to the topic

16 The Paris Agreement became part of international law on November 4, 2016, after the ratification process was completed by the signatories. The Paris Climate Summit was in fact the 21st Annual Conference of the Parties (COP) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 17 The first report was published in 1990.

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of biodiversity and also coordinates the activities and dispositions resulting from these documents (Implementing International Biodiversity, 2013).

2.4

Supranational Biogovernance

The main actor undertaking supranational activities and solutions in the field of biogovernance is the European Union (EU) and its institutions, which makes supranational biogovernance (SBG) less politicized, and more technocratic (i.e. based on technocratic participation). An important role in this governance is played by the leading supranational institution of the European Union, which is the European Commission, including its Directorate General for the Environment (DG Environment) and specialized agencies and bodies established by the European Commission for supranational biogovernance. The European Parliament also has its role in supranational biogovernance. There are four areas of activity of the European Commission and European Parliament in supranational biogovernance. The first area involves the supranational system proposals, among which the flagship initiative of the European Commission is the European Green Deal (EGD) presented in December 2019, which is aimed at Europe’s climate neutrality, including the reduction of pollutant emissions by 55% by 2030. As a result, the EGD is to make Europe the first continent with climate neutrality and sustainable development by 2050. On June 22, 2022, the European Parliament adopted another supranational system solution, i.e. the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030.18 The document focuses its goals on the protection of ecosystems and their resilience to climate change while maintaining biodiversity. The supranational biogovernance identifies six strategic areas: nature protection, ecosystems and ecosystem services, agriculture and forestry, fisheries, invasive alien species (Roman & Mauerhofer, 2019) and activities on a global scale.19 The second area is the initiation of legal acts by the European Commission, primarily directives and regulations, regulating the detailed aspects of biogovernance. Through the powers for agenda setting (including a legislative initiative), the European Commission proposes such legislation within the EU that mobilizes Member States to coordinate responses to the main challenges related to biodiversity. This legislation eventually becomes an element of the EU acquis environment. The basic tools in the acquis environment resource for biogovernance are acts of secondary law in the form of directives and regulations. An example of such legislation may be the Wild Birds Directive of 1979 and its new version of 2009

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The strategy is a continuation of the previous version of this document adopted in 2010, planned until 2020, based on the action plan for biodiversity launched in 2006 and reflecting the global goals of halting biodiversity loss in the Nagoya World Agenda. 19 Detailed actions and tools are to help achieve the goals of the strategy.

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(Council Directive, 2009/147/EC), the Habitats Directive of 1992 (Council Directive 92/43), or the Regulation (EC) of 2008 on the protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems. Both directives and regulations are supranational legislation for the Member States, but they are also an element of ad extra Europeanization, as they become a model example of solutions adopted also outside the EU, including in the UN system. The third area involves action plans and programs initiated by the European Commission to support biogovernance, including biodiversity protection and climate protection. In practice, the European Commission launches two types of programs: 1. Action plans and programs. The most important here seems to be the European Climate Change Program (ECCP), which was announced by the European Commission in June 2000.20 This group also includes programs financing specific environmental projects, including, for example, the 7th Environment Action Program (2013–2020), which includes biodiversity conservation among its priorities. In 2017, the European Commission launched two environmental programs. It was the Biodiversity Action Plan (BAP), which aims to halt the loss of protected species and support biodiversity and the Action Plan for Nature, People and Economy (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 2017) focused on the implementation of nature directives. Of course, there are many more such programs and plans.21 2. Programs creating protected areas and reserves, such as NATURA 2000. This program was established under the 1992 Directive. The main goal of the NATURA 2000 network of protected areas is the protection of biodiversity in the Member States through the protection of natural ecosystems and the protection of fauna and flora.22 The fourth area of supranational activity of the European Commission in biogovernance is building information infrastructure, i.e. databases, or research centres that specialize not only in monitoring changes in individual components of the biosphere, but also in collecting, analysing, evaluating and synthesizing information relevant to national and international administrations dealing with environmental protection. In 2000, a decision of the European Commission established the European Pollutant Emissions Register (EPER), which is the first European database on industrial pollution levels. The EPER is based on a database of emissions of 20

It provided for, inter alia, intensification of activities aimed at limiting pollutant emissions, in line with the Lisbon Strategy. 21 For example, established in 1991, the LIFE program (L’Instrument Financier pour Environment) financially supports activities aimed at the protection of endangered species and initiates and dynamizes the activities of project teams aimed at supporting biodiversity. 22 NATURA 2000 areas constitute the largest network of protected areas in the world with 26,000 areas of this type and are considered key to the EU’s biodiversity policy (Directive 43/1992 of 21.5.1992.).

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pollutants to water and air from large and medium-sized EU enterprises and publishes them in regular reports.23 Thus, the EPER ensures people, the public and commercial entities with the right to know about pollution in their close vicinity. In February 2008, the European Commission established the Shared Environmental Information System (SEIS), which soon became an integrated tool for collecting and exchanging information in the field of environmental protection by simplifying and modernizing the existing information systems and processes (Communication from the Commission, 2008). Since 2010, the European Commission, in partnership with the European Environment Agency (EEA), has been developing the Biodiversity Information System for Europe (BISE), which contains data on biodiversity and ecosystem services as well as assessments and research results from multiple sources. In turn, in May 2020, the European Commission established the Knowledge Centre for Biodiversity (KCBD), which develops tools to support the implementation of the assumptions of the Biodiversity Strategy until 2030 in the European Union and provides scientists, politicians, non-governmental organizations, etc. with the necessary evidence and information on the protection of biodiversity. The information infrastructure built by the European Union (databases, registers, scientific centres, etc.) contributed to a clear reduction of information asymmetry both between its Member States and between the EU and other actors on the international arena (e.g. the USA,24 the UN etc.) and to the implementation of the right-to-know what is the state of the natural environment in its various elements.

2.5

Combined Biogovernance (Intergovernmental/Supranational)

Attempts to combine institutional intergovernmental and supranational cooperation in the protection of the biosphere can be observed. It seems that such a combination of the two levels can reduce its costs and bring cumulative effects that would not be so easily achieved without their penetration (Peterson, 2000). Such combined intergovernmental/supranational biogovernance (CBG) can change the lives of millions of people around the world and reduce unsustainable development. The penetration of the intergovernmental and supranational level has been noticeable for a long time within the EU in the area of biosphere protection, but this type of interlevel relationship is also becoming an element of global biogovernance, which gives it new abilities to influence both the process of biosphere protection and the actors participating in this process. As stated above, supranational biogovernance is particularly advanced in the European Union. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the possible penetration of 23 24

The first EPER report was released in 2004. The USA has a similar register to the EU’s EPER it is TRI (Toxic Release Inventory).

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this supranational biogovernance in the EU with intergovernmental biogovernance outside the EU, including, first of all, in the forum of intergovernmental agencies of the United Nations. It seems that from the point of view of the European Union, such penetration of both models of biogovernance takes place in two directions: outside the EU (ad extra) and inside the EU (ad intra). Illustrating the first direction of penetration outside the EU (ad extra) of the supranational model and the intergovernmental model in the area of biogovernance, let us note that the European Union is a party to the Convention on Biological Diversity – CBD as the only international organization among other parties to this convention that are states. As a result, the EU participates in intergovernmental conferences of the parties to this convention (COP), which means that the EU is placed on an equal footing with the other 195 states – parties to the convention in this cooperation. In this case, the supranational model of biogovernance promoted by the EU permeates with the intergovernmental convention environment. The EU’s accession to the CBD convention is part of the EU’s foreign policy, i.e. supranational responsibility of the European Commission (Parker et al., 2017). Another example of ad extra penetration of the supranational and intergovernmental model is the cooperation between the European Union and UNESCO. When the European Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with UNESCO on October 8, 2012, it turned out that thanks to such cooperation it was much easier to find common tools to mitigate the effects of climate change while increasing the level of education in this area.25 In practice, the European Union also finances biodiversity projects carried out under the aegis of UNESCO.26 Such an inter-level strategic partnership increases the coherence of undertaken actions and solutions, but most importantly, it can bring synergistic results. Both the Memorandum of Understanding signed with UNESCO and the EU’s accession to the CBD convention are elements of the European Union’s foreign policy, and thus prove the ad extra penetration of the supranational and intergovernmental level. An example of the second direction of penetration of the supranational model and the intergovernmental model in biogovernance inside the EU (ad intra) is the implementation by the European Union of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).27 To this end, legislation

25 An example of such a common tool included in the MoU may be integrated governance of oceans A (10), or integrated maritime policy C (20) (Memorandum of Understanding 2012). 26 An example is the CoastWAVE Project, launched on September 1, 2021, aimed at strengthening the resilience of coastal areas in parts of the North-East Atlantic and the Mediterranean basin to Tsunami attacks and other coastal threats. The project is financed by the ECHO (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operation), which is an EU agency. In turn, in 2016–2020, the European Commission joined the financing of the Central Africa World Heritage Forest Initiative (CAWHFI), primarily supporting landscape monitoring systems and equipment used to protect biodiversity. 27 The CITES Convention was adopted in 1973 to protect wild populations of endangered species of animals and plants by controlling, monitoring and limiting international trade in them, their recognizable parts and their derivatives. Currently 183 countries are parties to the convention.

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within the EU has been enriched with a package of Wildlife trade Regulations. The implementation process started in 1984, and the regulations mentioned are directly applicable also in the Member States and transferred to national legal systems. A similar case of ad intra penetration are the measures adopted by the EU in the Biodiversity Strategy until 2030. These measures are aimed at the effective implementation of the global assumptions for the protection of biodiversity contained in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) within the EU. This implementation found its legal finalization primarily in the so-called Birds Directive and the Habitats Directive, which currently form the basis of the EU’s biodiversity policy. The European Commission also has a special instrument to monitor and support the implementation of the CBD in the territory of the Member States, which is Streamlining European Biodiversity Indicators (SEBI). Since 2005, SEBI have been assessing and providing information on progress towards the goals and commitments of the EU’s Biodiversity Strategy until 2020 and international obligations under the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD). SEBI are based on datasets and information collected by the Biodiversity Information System for Europe (BISE). Both directions of ad extra and ad intra penetration of the intergovernmental (IBG) and supranational (SBG) model (and level) of biogovernance allow, firstly, to achieve new results that would not be possible to achieve only at one of these levels, and secondly, they create a bridge for the third biogovernance model, which is the combined supranational-intergovernmental model (CBG). This mixed governance model is both technocratic and politicized with noticeable technocraticpoliticized participation. Thus, global biogovernance in practice consists of intergovernmental biogovernance, supranational biogovernance and combined biogovernance (Fig. 2.1).

Global Biogovernance

Intergovernmental

Suparnational

Combined

Biogovernance

Biogovernance

Biogovernance

Convention instruments

System solutions

ad extra-penetration

Institutional instruments

Acquis environment

ad intra-penetration

Program instruments

Action plans and programs Information infrastructure

Fig. 2.1 Global biogovernance structure

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Conclusions

As the analysis shows, global biogovernance can be intergovernmental (when it occurs between governments, possibly in intergovernmental international organizations) or supranational (when it takes place in international institutions taking over tasks and decisions that have been delegated to these institutions by states). The conducted research leads to several final findings regarding biogovernance: 1. Biogovernance is an essential component of global governance. 2. Biogovernance takes place not only horizontally on one of the possible levels (intergovernmental or supranational), but also vertically, i.e. between these levels, which in practice allows us to talk about multi-level biogovernance (MLBG). Thus, biogovernance is both vertical and horizontal (vertihorical). 3. Multi-level biogovernance is polycentric because it is based on creating connections between many actors who delegate functional tasks to various dispersed and relatively independent bodies and between many decision-making centres. 4. Biogovernance includes at least two forms: (1) elite governance, which is a type of top-down and central governance, and (2) civic republicanism, which is a type of bottom-up, decentralized and distributed governance. 5. Penetration of the supranational and intergovernmental level and the model of biogovernance at these levels (outside the EU and inside the EU) allows for the achievement of new results that would not be achievable only at one of these levels and creates a bridge for the third model of biogovernance, which is the combined (supranational and intergovernmental) biogovernance model. Thus, in practice global biogovernance consists of intergovernmental biogovernance, supranational biogovernance and combined biogovernance. It can be noted that multi-level biogovernance (MLBG), regardless of the scope it covers, has become an element that builds ecological civilization and ecological solidarity between nation-states and governmental as well as supranational international institutions. Disclaimer The views and/or claims/or data expressed in this chapter are solely authors’ own or based on literature survey and are not necessarily linked with their affiliations, editors of the book, reviewers of the chapter or the publisher.

References Aldy, J. E., & Stavins, R. N. (2008). Designing the Post-Kyoto climate regime (p. 11). Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements. Aldy, J. E., & Stavins, R. N. (2012). Using the market to address climate change: Insights from theory & experience. American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Caporaso, J. A. (1996). The European Union and forms of state: Westphalian, regulatory or postmodern? Journal of Common Market Studies, 4(1), 29–52. Caporaso, J. A. (2000). European Union: Dilemas of regional integration. Westviews Press.

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Caporaso, J. A., & Madeira, M. A. (2011). Globalization, Institutions and Governance. Sage. Closing the loop – An EU action plan for the Circular Economy. http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ circular-economy Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Towards a Shared Environmental Information System (SEIS), COM 2008, 0046 final. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2017) 198 final, Brussels 27.4.2017. Council Directive 92/43/ECC of 21 May 1992 (Habitats Directive). Council Directive 2009/147/EC of 30 November 2009 (Birds Directive). Dehousse, R. (1996). Integration ou desintegration? Cinq theses sur l’incidence de l’integration europeenne sur les structures etatiques (EUI Working Papers, 96(4)). European University Institute. Directive 43/1992 of 21.5.1992. Falkner R., Stephan H., Vogler J. (2010), International climate policy after Copenhagen: Towards a ‘building blocks’ approach., Global Policy. Filipowicz, A., & Trejnis, P. (2015). Kapilarność biowładzy w biopolitycznym dyskursie Michela Foucault. Studia Bobolanum, 2. Harlow, C. (1999). Citizen access to political power in the European Union (EUI Working Papers, RSS, 99(2)). European University Institute. Helm, D. (2012a). Forget the Kyoto Accord and tax carbon consumption. Yale Environment 360. Helm, D. (Ed.). (2012b). Trade, climate change and the political game theory of border carbon adjustments (Centre for Climate Change Economics, Policy Working Paper, 92). Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2001). Multi-level governance and European integration. Rowman & Littlefield. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2019). Grand theories of European integration in the twenty-first century. Journal of European Public Policy, 26(8), 1113–1133. Implementing international biodiversity commitments. (2013). Environment for Europeans, March:49. Keohane, R. O., & Raustiala, K. (2009). Toward a Post-Kyoto climate change architecture: A political analysis. In Post-Kyoto international climate policy: Implementing architectures for agreement. Cambridge University Press. Khalatabari, Y., & Poorhashemi, A. (2019). Environmental damage: Challenges and opportunities in International Environmental Law. CIFILE Journal of International Law, 1(1), 21–28. Kolarska-Bobińska, L. (red.). (2009). Nowe metody zarządzania w państwach Unii Europejskiej. Warszawa. Marks, G. (1992). Structural policy in the European Community. In A. M. Sbragia (Ed.), Europolitics: Institutions and policy-making in the new European Community. Brookings Institution Press. Marks, G., & Hooghe, L. (2021). Multilevel governance and the coordination dilemma. In A. Benz, J. Broschek, & M. Lederer (Eds.), A research agenda for multilevel governance. Edgar Elgar. Marks, G., Hooghe, L., & Lenz, T. (2018). Contested world order: The delegitimation of international governance. Review of International Organizations, 14, 731. Moravcsik, A. (1988). The choice of Europe. Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht. Routledge. Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal intergovernmentalist approach. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(4), 473. Oddvar Eriksen, E., & Fossum, J. E. (2005). Closing of the EU’s legitimacy gap? In E. Oddvar Eriksen, J. E. Fossum, M. Kumm, & A. J. Menendez (Eds.), The European Constitution: The Rubicon crossed? (Arena Report, Oslo 3(05)). Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo. Paris Agreement, unfccc.int

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Parker, C. F., Karlsson, C., & Hjerpe, M. (2017). Asssessing the European Union’s global climate change leadership: From Copenhagen to the Paris Agreement. Journal of European Integration, 39(2), 239–252. Peterson, E. W. F. (2000). The design of supranational organizations for the provision of international public goods: Global environment protection (p. 12). University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Price, D. H. (2004). Schuman or Monnet? The real architect of Europe. Bron Communications. Roman, A. I., & Mauerhofer, V. (2019). Multilevel coordination and cooperation during implementing supranational environmental legislation: A case study on invasive alien species. Sustainability, 11(6), 1531. Rosenau, J. N. (1987). Governance without government: Systems of rule in world politics. Institute for Transnational Studies, University of Southern California. Rosenau, J. N. (2003). Distant proximities: Dynamics beyond globalization. Princeton University Press. Sabel, C. F., & Zeitlin, J. (2012). Experimentalist governance in the European Union. Towards a New Architecture. Oxford University Press. Schliep, R., & Stoll-Kleermann, S. (2010). Assessing governance of biosphere reserves in Central Europe. Land Use Policy, 27(3), 917. Steer, A. (1996). Ten principles of the new environmentalism. Finance and Development-English Edition, 33(4), 4–7. Telo, M. (2006). Europe: A civilian power? European Union, global governance, world order. Telo, M. (2007). European Union and new regionalism: Regional actors and global governance in a post-hegemonic era. Ashgate Publishing. Telo, M. (2009). International relations: A European perspective. Routledge. The European Environment. State and Outlook 2010. Synthesis, Luxembourg. Zielonka, J. (2007). Plurilateral governance in the enlarged European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(10), 187–209. Zürn, M. (2004). Global governance and legitimacy problem. Governance and Opposition, 39(2), 260–287.

Further Reading Cohen, M. A. (2001). Information as a policy instrument in protecting the environment: What have we learned? Environmental Law Reporter, 31, 10425. Gouldson, A., & Sullivan, R. (2007). Corporate environmentalism: Tracing the links between policies and performance using corporate reports and public register. Business Strategy and the Environment, 6, 1–11. Jachtenfuchs, M. (1995). Theoretical perspectives on European Governance. European Law Journal, 1(2), 115–133. Lamy, P. (2020). Greener after: A green recovery stimulus for Europe. Jacques Delors Institute. MacCormick, N. (1993). Beyond the sovereign state. The Modern Law Review, 56, 1. Rosenau, J. N. (1992). Governance, order, and change in world politics. In J. N. Rosenau & E.-O. Czempiel (Eds.), Governance without government: Order and change in world politics. Cambridge University Press. UN Habitat. (2009). International guidelines on decentralisation and access to basic services all. UN Habitat. UN Habitat. (2020). The new urban agenda illustrated. UN Habitat.

Chapter 3

Ecopolitics to International Environmental Law: A Literature Review on How Countries Are Performing Under the International Convention on Climate Change Nima Norouzi

Abstract The purpose of this study is to determine how legal and international requirements related to the Convention against Climate Change impact countries’ performance. In this study, an in-depth study method was used, and comparisons were made. In the following, the authors proceeded to design an assessment checklist. The criteria used in this checklist were established based on the provisions of the Climate Change Convention. The scores and evaluations were based on the commitments of the countries and the measures taken. There are three types of approaches and three models of mechanisms determined for all countries, according to the results. The obstacles and challenges are classified into 6 categories on both a national and international level. As far as “stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels” is concerned, only developed countries have welcomed it. In addition, developed countries are better at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to climate change effects. India and Mexico are the only countries with acceptable performance under the “joint implementation” mechanism. The performance of countries on the “diffusion trade” mechanism has been acceptable, and the number of countries joining the mechanism has grown each period, and only four countries have been successful in “Sustainable development”. According to the findings of this research it is suggested that the countries constantly estimate their improvement according to the standards introduced by united nation conventions. This constant feedback can improve overall performance of the countries and helps them to derive their environmental policies and achieve sustainable development aims. Keywords Climate change convention · Ecopolitics · Environmental diplomacy · International environmental law · Kyoto protocol

N. Norouzi (✉) School of Law and Legal Studies, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Tripathi et al. (eds.), Eco-Politics and Global Climate Change, Environment & Policy 65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48098-0_3

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Introduction

Today, climate change is one of the important environmental issues of the world. Climate change refers to any significant change in climatic parameters that continue for a long period (de Oliveira et al., 2020). In other words, climate change includes serious changes in temperature, precipitation, or wind patterns that occur over several decades or more. During the last 100 years, the average temperature of the earth’s surface has increased by 1 °C. During the next 100 years, climatologists have predicted that the average temperature of the earth’s surface will continue to rise (IPCC, 2014). The most conservative estimates show that by the year 2100, the temperature of the earth’s surface will rise by another 1.9°. Some models have predicted that this amount may be up to 6° (Singh et al., 2017). Temperature changes cause increased floods and heavy rains, droughts and heat waves. More intense precipitation occurs because global warming can lead to more intense and powerful storms. The increase in temperature has caused the melting of the icebergs in the pole, which raise the level of the seas (Brocherie et al., 2015). In the United States, the southern and western regions, where the population grows at a high rate, experience coastal storms and serious droughts, as well as air pollution and heat waves (de Oliveira et al., 2020). As a result of accurate measurements, it has been determined that the concentration of carbon dioxide in the earth’s atmosphere is increasing, so that currently the concentration of this gas has increased by more than 30% compared to the years before industrial development (Yang & Wan, 2010). Scientific circles announced in 1979 that if the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere increases, the world’s climate will undergo dramatic changes. Due to the destructive effects of development, the issue of the environment was clearly and clearly brought to the attention of the world community after the great acceleration of industrialization in the 1972 Stockholm Conference and the 1992 Rio Declaration. In the international meetings held after the Rio de Janeiro conference, as well as in the documents approved by these conferences, the concept of “sustainable development” was emphasized again. The Climate Change Convention is one of the most important international documents that was established in 1992 to prevent the increase of greenhouse gases. Fixing the emission rate of these gases is considered the most important goal of this convention. In this sense, the member states of the annex of a convention were required to return their greenhouse gas emissions to the level of 1990 by the year 2000. The Climate Change Convention drafted general obligations regarding the stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions. In fact, environmental conventions state the general principles and obligations related to cooperation between governments in a certain field. But the way of cooperation and its details are left to supplementary protocols or agreements. In the negotiation process of the third meeting: In December 1997, the members of the Kyoto Protocol were approved, which as a new experience faced problems in implementation and the failure of the Copenhagen negotiations (the product of the fifteenth meeting of the members in December 2009). Finally, in November 2015, the twenty-second meeting in France led to the

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conclusion of the Paris Agreement with the participation of the maximum number of governments. However, there were some shortcomings in the process of its implementation. Among other things, the withdrawal of the United States of America (a country that plays a major role in the emission of greenhouse gases) from the aforementioned agreement led to uncertainty in the perspective of such a big decision. The purpose of this research is to investigate the role and effectiveness of international legal requirements in the fight against climate change. Originally, clarifying the position of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change at the global level and creating a legal framework to oblige members to comply with its provisions is one of the most important actions of this research. Scientists believe that the emission of greenhouse gases caused by human economic and industrial activities causes a significant increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases in the earth’s atmosphere, which will result in an increase in the average temperature of the earth’s surface (Damm et al., 2017). The increase in the temperature of the earth will also bring unfortunate consequences, including the melting of the polar ice caps, the rise of the oceans, the change in the rainfall, the increase in the desertification process, the occurrence of severe storms, the destruction of the habitats of aquatic and non-aquatic animals. IPCC pointed out the outbreak of pests and plant diseases, the reduction of agricultural products and many other anomalies. During the last century, the temperature of the earth has increased by 0.8 °C (IPCC, 2014). Studies conducted by the US Environmental Protection Agency indicate that at the end of this century, the temperature of the earth will increase by 1.1–6.5 °C. Studies show that if the temperature of the earth rises by 3 °C by the middle of the twenty-first century, the sea level will rise by one meter and by the end of this century, it will reach two meters. In such a case, many coastal cities and even some countries will go under water (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2016). For example, a one-meter rise in the sea level will make fifteen million people in Bangladesh homeless, and with a two-meter increase in the water level, the two-thousand-year-old culture of the Maldives in the Indian Ocean will be completely destroyed (Biagini et al., 2014). According to several researches in this field, currently, the snow cover in the Northern Hemisphere is 10% less than the average of two decades from 1966 to 1986. During the last 150 years, the mountain peaks of Western Europe have become 1–2° warmer. The years 2015 and 2020 have been the warmest years in the entire recorded history of the earth (Damm et al., 2017; Cronin et al., 2018; Armstrong McKay et al., 2022). This research is of a theoretical type, which was carried out using the Literature review method and using authentic and official documents. At first, the basic data and theoretical foundations of the research were collected, and then they were categorized based on the research objectives. In the following, the authors proceeded to design an assessment checklist. The criteria used in this checklist were established based on the provisions of the Climate Change Convention. The scores and evaluations were based on the commitments of the countries and the measures taken. For this purpose and based on the reports of the United Nations, the performance of 96 selected countries (developed and developing) was examined and evaluated.

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Literature Review

Today, environmental protection is one of the most important concerns of the international community. The diversity of environmental documents at the national, regional and international levels indicates the importance of its protection. Globalization is one of the factors that has generally had a very important effect on the concepts and phenomena around it. In 1972 in Stockholm, declarations with the theme of human and environment were approved by the members and the result was a non-binding and ethical statement. The final statement of the Stockholm Summit in 1972, by declaring the human right to have a healthy environment, created a fundamental link between environmental protection and human rights and marked the beginning of a new evolution in international law. The common responsibility of the countries to protect the environment and at the same time their different obligations by considering the different and specific conditions and circumstances of the countries in creating environmental problems and their technical and economic abilities to solve environmental problems were emphasized. This principle has been used in many international documents. Although it has not yet become an international customary rule its important and key role in the development and implementation of international environmental law by making treaty obligations fair and helping the sustainable development of developing countries is significant. The concept of the “principle of common but different responsibility of states” in international law is a new concept that is rooted in the concept of “common heritage of humanity” (Charter et al., 2017). This principle pays attention to the historical differences in the share of developed and developing countries in global environmental problems and the technical and economic abilities of each to solve the problems. Based on the principle of common but different responsibility, most of the developing countries had emphasized that the developed countries should have binding mitigation commitments. But developing countries should not be like this. Since 1992, the parties to the United Nations Convention have been working on actions related to act against climate change. In Copenhagen, most of the developed countries, including the United States, have expressed their displeasure over the lack of environmental restrictions for developing countries such as China and India in terms of agreements to reduce greenhouse gases. On the other hand, the developing countries blame the industrial world for the production of greenhouses, and this brought the previous negotiations to a dead end. Another obstacle to joint negotiations was financial problems. According to most of the members of the meeting, the countries that are responsible for the production of greenhouse gases are obliged to provide financial assistance to the countries that are facing problems caused by global warming in order to meet the costs of fighting the effects of these gases. In the process of these negotiations, many problems occurred and almost collapsed in Copenhagen in 2009 (Morrissey et al., 2020). Finally, with the realization of the dangers of greenhouse gas emissions, climate change has been assessed as one of the serious risks that threatens sustainable development in various environmental dimensions, human health, food security, economic activities, natural resources

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and infrastructure structures. Also, to achieve success, compliance must be recognized as a cross-cutting issue and strategies must be integrated across sectors and at different government scales. The findings show that the discussion about compliance barriers is still in its early stages, but it is evolving rapidly. Compared to rural people, urban people consume more energy, which is mostly produced through fossil fuels (McGuire, 2018). In the arena of the international community, every obligation creates a responsibility for the subject or subjects of international law. Therefore, the importance of commitment to create a comprehensive and inclusive commitment that causes international responsibility for the governments is more obvious than before. As principles 21–26 of the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 show the responsibility of countries in the field of environmental protection and their responsibility to compensate for damage. One of the main challenging issues in the provisions of the climate change convention is the clauses related to the obligations of the countries regarding future measures to act against climate change. In international law, you can refer to the statute of the International Court of Justice to get the concept of “obligations”. By taking into account the framework of obligations contained in paragraph 1 of Article 38 of the Constitution, a subtle point of creating a “must and obligation” that lies in the nature of “obligation” can be reached. According to the definition contained in the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, a treaty can be considered as a legal practice by which the will of all governments is reflected in the form of an obligation with specific legal effects. In other words, according to Part A, Clause 1, Article 2 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “Treaty means an international agreement between countries that is concluded in writing and is subject to international law, whether it is in a single document or two or more. The related document is brought together, regardless of its specific title”. Although the conclusion of a commitment in the international arena requires the agreement of “intentions” between the contracting parties on a specific issue. But this coordination does not necessarily mean simultaneous acceptance. Because the agreements that are formed in the form of a treaty, may be created from the unilateral acceptance of a country and the subsequent acceptance of another country separately and individually, and in terms of international law, such an obligation causes legal responsibility at the international level. Most legislative treaties contain customary rules and regulations; therefore, they are binding for all member and non-member states. In international law, there are two types of obligations, soft obligations and hard obligations. Basically, in the field of international relations, governments have not been willing to accept international legal obligations except based on their agreement and will, and the effects of this approach are evident with the remaining importance of treaties in international law. However, in climate change, governments have to accept numerous treaty requirements and have to create a flexible tool for quick legal response to uncertain or urgent matters (Hagen & Schneider, 2021). Soft law is a suitable legal framework for cultivating the maturing concepts of international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is one of the most important non-binding documents and soft rights. But it has inspired the approval of dozens

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of binding documents of international and domestic laws of countries regarding the protection of human dignity. The documents of the 1972 and 1992 environmental summits in Stockholm and Rio explained the general principles of protecting the environment against human activity and established the theory of sustainable development. Although these documents are considered soft rights, they have become the basis for the approval of international conventions on nature protection. Therefore, soft law is program-oriented rather than command-oriented and instead of applying hard requirements, it provides a path-breaking instruction for hard law. Thus, with the expansion of mass communication tools in the contemporary world and the creation of public sensitivity at the global level towards environmental events and the increase in the number of demands of nations from their governments in the form of the right of claims regarding the right to a healthy environment, it provides the basis for the formation of hard rights.

3.3

Discussion

The purpose of the convention to act against climate change is to regulate the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere so that the earth’s ecosystem has the opportunity to recover its natural cycle. The mentioned convention encourages member countries to collect and share information about reducing greenhouse gases (Scarpelli et al., 2020). This is despite the fact that according to this convention, none of the countries’ activities in line with the goals of the convention should endanger food safety and social and economic development. The member countries are divided into the following categories: (1) Annex one and two member countries: are industrialized and developed countries that are required to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, according to this agreement. (2) Developing countries that do not have any obligation to immediately reduce emissions (Haigh, 2019). The later is basically to prevent the reduction of economic and industrial development of these countries. The convention to act against climate change is conducted in 26 articles and 2 appendices. Basically, by relying on the principle of participation, without imposing a duty on the countries, the convention assigned the requirements to the protocols mentioned in the text, which were the clearly aligned with the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. In the Kyoto Protocol, three market-based mechanisms are considered as flexible mechanisms: (A) Joint implementation: According to the protocol, members can implement their obligations jointly. The incentive and economic mechanism of joint implementation is also foreseen in Article 6 of the protocol. (B) Emission trade: This method, which is implemented only by the member countries of Annex 2, allows the mentioned countries to obtain in the form of units with certain amounts from other member countries where it is affordable for them in return for the commitment to reduce emissions within the country. It is more economical to buy emission reduction points. According to Article 12 of the protocol, if a member country of Annex 2 reduces its greenhouse gas emissions to a level lower than the base limit of

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greenhouse gases, it can sell its surplus in the form of emission reduction credits to another member country of Annex 2. (C) Green Development Mechanism: In the Conference of Members in Kyoto, the Clean Development Mechanism, which is foreseen based on Article 12 of the Protocol, is a tool to assist the member countries of Annex 1 to achieve compliance with the obligation to reduce and quantitatively limit the emission of greenhouse gases according to Article 9 of the Protocol. Based on this, member countries can invest in greenhouse gas emission reduction projects of non-member countries, and comply with the obligations of reduction and quantitative limitation of greenhouse gas emissions in their own sovereign land from the approved emission reductions that result from the said activity, based on Article 9 to benefit as determined by the members’ meeting (Atwoli et al., 2022). In addition, the review of international legal documents related to climate change shows that the international community has pursued three approaches in order to deal with the issue of climate change: • The first approach is to stabilize the emission of greenhouse gases to the level of 1990 • The second approach is trying to reduce the amount of greenhouse gas production • The third approach, adapting to the consequences of climate change Therefore, it can be said that the necessary legal bases were provided to take appropriate measures in this field. However, climate change is a long-term process that is far beyond the management cycle of adaptation programs. Therefore, the real effect of these programs will be revealed in the long term (Boyd et al., 2021). The legal form of the Paris Agreement as a treaty is officially binding for its parties. It also declares a global commitment as soon as possible in the way of reaching the global peak of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, which has a special reference to the goal of stabilizing the increase of 1.5 °C. Finally, in December 2015, the negotiations to draft a new legal regime were concluded and an agreement called the Paris Agreement consisting of an introduction, 29 articles and 139 decisions was approved by the consensus of all the countries of the world, which got implemented from the end of 2020 (Arneth et al., 2020). This agreement has been signed by 196 countries and 187 countries have approved this agreement in their legal authorities. Also, in the framework of the “principle of common but different responsibility”, countries are responsible for environmental crises, and this responsibility is also different according to the power and capacity of developed and developing countries. Based on this, according to Article 9 and 10 of the Paris Agreement, developed countries have committed to transfer and develop technology, financial provision and capacity building for developing countries to attract their participation to accompany efforts to stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gases (Swinburn et al., 2022). In addition to this examination of normative and executive challenges and obstacles, it is also very important to fulfill the obligations of governments in dealing with climate change. In the past, security was only limited to the concept of using force and using military force to deal with external threats, while today the word security has a broader meaning. In today’s world, the problem of pollution and

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environmental damage is one of the most important and acute crises of human civilization, which is considered a threat to the existence of human and animal life. Climate change is a global issue that has a deep connection with human security, and its proposal in the Security Council is important as a part of the conflict prevention strategy to maintain international peace and security (Nunez et al., 2019). The most important consequences that affect global security and human rights are: the creation of war and conflict, the threat of water and food resources, the impact on the spread of poverty, internal and external migrations, political geographical borders, the threat to human health and the spread of infectious and dangerous diseases. Technical limitations include the lack of advanced technical equipment and trained local workers (Lowitzsch et al., 2020). On the other hand, technology also plays an important role in the ability to maintain, reduce or transfer the risk of climate change or deal with its effects. However, vulnerable communities do not fully benefit from existing technology, while technology can assess the extent of compliance and how to report on this injustice as part of key global agreements. However, technology is also one of the basic components of the comprehensive strategy of climate change, which includes global efforts to limit and reduce the emission of greenhouse gases and the negative effects of adaptation. Vulnerability caused by climate change can be related to direct physical damage caused by factors such as temperature increase, sea level rise, drought, and economic damage caused by this issue. Economies of fragile countries, often based on agriculture, will be disproportionately affected by climate change (Corsi et al., 2020). The Convention has requested all members that Clean Development Mechanism projects lead to the transfer of environmentally sound technologies and are intended for the establishment of existing low-carbon technologies. Among the practical obstacles are economic factors that are important: if fossil fuels are cheap and other options are expensive, then there is little incentive to save energy or convert it to renewable materials. Sanctions have a negative effect on the environmental category in fulfilling the obligations of all countries and even its effects spread to other countries. In recent years, there has been a heresy in international law, and the United States of America has acted against international law in considering its internal laws as extraterritorial (Warren et al., 2020). These punishments will effectively be a challenge for the economic and environmental policies of other countries, provided that these policies are not sensitive enough to the risks caused by climate change. Sanctions prohibit countries from participating in multilateral climate cooperation. Although countries are eager to adopt more ambitious climate policies, such unilateral climate change policies may be very common domestically, but they are probably not enough to solve a truly global problem. In this section, the performance of the countries and the degree of effectiveness of the requirements of the climate change convention are evaluated through the principles of international law. Based on this, the performance of selected countries in 6 fields (including 3 types of approaches and 3 types of mechanisms) was investigated. Figure 3.1 shows the comparison of the performance of developed and developing countries in the context of adopting the first approach of the climate change convention, that is, “fixing the amount of greenhouse gas emissions to the

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6

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Successful countries

Failed countries

Countries with uncertain performance

Fig. 3.1 Comparison of developed countries’ performance in the context of the first approach of the climate change convention

level of 1990”. As indicated in the diagram, only developed countries have welcomed this approach and no developing country has adopted this approach. On the other hand, among the developed countries, only 6 countries have succeeded in bringing their greenhouse gas emissions to the level of 1990, and the rest have either failed or the manner and extent of their performance is not known (Bose et al., 2022). Successful countries are: Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Switzerland; Countries with uncertain performance are: Germany, England, Japan, Austria and Netherlands; Failed Countries are: France, Spain, Cyprus, South Korea, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, USA, Italy, Belgium, Ireland. Figure 3.2 shows the comparison of the performance of developed and developing countries in terms of adopting the second approach of the climate change convention, i.e., “efforts to reduce the amount of greenhouse gas production”. As indicated in the graph, in this field, successful countries can be seen in both groups of developed and developing countries. Of course, the performance of developed countries has been better. According to this, among the developed countries, 8 countries have had a very successful performance, which are: Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, New Zealand and Canada. Also, 6 countries have also had a successful performance, which are: Germany, England, Japan, Austria, Netherlands and Australia. Four countries have had a relatively successful performance, which are: France, Spain, Cyprus and South Korea. Figure 3.3 shows the comparison of the performance of developed and developing countries in terms of adopting the third approach of the climate change convention, i.e., “adaptation to the consequences of climate change”. As indicated in the chart, in this field, successful countries can be seen in both groups of developed and developing countries. Considering that the number of developed countries that have

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Relatively successful

Successful

Significantly successful 0%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Developing countries

Developed countries

Fig. 3.2 Comparison of countries’ performance in the context of the second approach of the climate change convention

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Successful countries

12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1998

2004 Developing countries

2010

2016

2020

Developed countries

Fig. 3.3 Comparison of countries’ performance in the context of the third approach of the climate change convention

succeeded in reaching the compliance level in each period of time has been more, as a result, it can be said that the performance of developed countries has been better. Figure 3.4 shows the comparison of developing countries’ performance in adopting the “joint implementation” mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. As indicated in the graph, in this field, the only countries that have an acceptable performance are India and Mexico, and other developing countries either did not go to this mechanism or did not have a successful performance.

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8 7

Success Score

6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Acceptable score by 2020

Score in 2020

Fig. 3.4 Comparison of the performance of developing countries in the context of adopting the joint implementation mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol

Successful countries

25 20 15 10 5 0 1998

2004 Developing countries

2010

2016

2020

Developed countries

Fig. 3.5 Comparison of the performance of countries in the field of adoption of the emission trading mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol

Figure 3.5 shows a comparison of the performance of developed and developing countries in terms of adopting the “emission trading” mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. As indicated in the chart, the performance of countries and their governments in this field has been acceptable. The graph shows that there is a growing trend in terms of the number of countries that have joined this mechanism in each period of time. Meanwhile, of course, the number of developed countries has been more than

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10

Green Development Score

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Germany

Canada

Japan

New zealand

Fig. 3.6 The performance of four developed countries in the context of adopting the clean development mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol

the developing countries in each time period. The regression equations also show that the trend of changes is upward. Figure 3.6 shows the comparison of the performance of developed and developing countries in terms of adopting the “clean development” mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. As indicated in the diagram, the performance of countries and their governments in this field has not been acceptable. The graph shows that only some developed countries have used this mechanism. The accelerated process of industrial development in the countries of the world, especially after the Second World War, reached such an extent that a dangerous alarm was sounded for human health. Thus, in the 70s, with the need to change the attitude towards the environment, a turning point was created in the Stockholm Declaration, and the term sustainable development was seen as a necessity in human activities. The most important and vital part of the environment is the climate, any change in it directly affects human life on earth, and based on this, international environmental treaties were formed. One of the most important of them was the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Considering the regular and annual holding of numerous meetings of the members regarding the investigation of climate change obstacles and the solutions to solve them, they took measures that led to the formation of the Kyoto Protocol in the third meeting in December 1997 and the fifteenth meeting in December 2009 in Copenhagen, which was finally a big step. In November 2015, the 200 members summit was held in Paris and comprehensive agreements were concluded to reduce global warming. Regardless of the United States of America, as one of the largest producers of greenhouse gases in the world, which withdrew its signature and chose to withdraw from the treaty, this global

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agreement is one of the most fruitful measures due to the comprehensive effort of countries to reach a consensus at the international level for a common purpose. Although the 25th meeting of the members committed to the climate change convention was held in December 2019 in Madrid, Spain, which, based on the Paris Agreement. It aimed to reach an international agreement on issues such as transparency of action, provision of financial resources, capacity building, damage reduction and technology transfer and enquired the possibility of taking advantage of global support under the climate change convention. In the Paris Agreement, with regard to the obligation of all governments to present a national program, a kind of categorization of the governments’ obligations to reduce the amount of emissions has changed from dividing the world’s governments into two categories, developed and developing. Currently all member governments are committed to providing National program to reduce emissions and compliance programs. Despite this amount, reducing emissions and how to achieve it was left to the governments themselves, considering the internal capabilities of the government (Gilley & Kinsella, 2015). As a result, governments consciously assume obligations by presenting the national reduction program and the method of achieving it. On the other hand, considering the nature of the Paris Agreement as an international treaty, the parties to the aforementioned treaty, in addition to being required to implement formal obligations such as providing correct information, cooperating with other governments in the relevant fields, will also undertake to implement the provisions of the national program. Also, they need to participate in the control mechanism of adherence to commitments in a way that will be determined in the mechanism of the Paris Agreement. Today, climate change is one of the significant issues and concerns of the international community. The United Nations has recognized this issue since 1979 and by holding dozens of international and regional summits and approving two binding international documents, it has gradually developed policies, guidelines and legal measures for dealing with the mentioned changes. Stabilization, reduction of greenhouse gases and adaptation to climate change are the three policies of the United Nations in this regard. The approval of these documents has removed a significant part of the normative poverty in facing the obstacles of climate change. After 25 years of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the governments of the world have agreed on treaties that require joint actions by the member countries, and this issue has finally ended decades of conflict between developed and developing countries in accepting joint commitments. One of the ways What can deal with the obstacles of such a change is to make a smart choice in the accurate use of energy that is appropriate and healthy from the point of view of climate (Batten et al., 2018).

3.4

Conclusion

In recent years, it has been widely recognized that the multilateral climate regime has not been able to curb the increase in global greenhouse gas emissions. It is clear that the issue of the status of “climate power” is close to how it relates to climate policies.

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Basically, the main goal of the rules of international environmental law is to protect the earth’s environment, to provide the necessary grounds for the sustainable development of societies and to remove obstacles. Protecting the environment is considered as a tool for the implementation of human rights norms and standards. The rights of future generations have been recognized as a right in several documents, including the first principle of the Stockholm Declaration of 1972, which is considered the first founder of this principle. According to which man has the duty to provide conditions while using the environment appropriately so that future generations will benefit from a healthy environment. Documents that state “the right to a healthy environment”, such as the Stockholm Declaration, the draft of the Third International Covenant on Mutual Rights, the World Charter of Nature, the Rio Declaration, etc., are not binding, but the governments must morally comply with their provisions due to their previous signatures. Article 10 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on treaty rights should be adhered to. These convections are based on encouraging participation, negotiation, compromise and competition. But with the exception of the European Union’s export trading system, effective and extensive international cooperation to reduce greenhouse gases has failed, even if progress has been made in some countries. The production of greenhouse gases in developing countries is increasing. Coercion can be a suitable reducing measure, an effective tool to reduce the production of greenhouse gases by raising short-term costs. • Although the request for the development of new technologies has been welcomed by many people, in order to concentrate the current efforts on the greenhouse gas emission reduction. It is argued that the level of carbon emission reduction can reach the pre-industrial level to a significant extent with this development. The process of identifying the measures to remove the obstacles are: (1) Personal and documented experience about policy-making measures from other countries, in general, can be a very important input in this process to provide case studies in the field of active frameworks of renewable energy technologies in different countries. (2) In cases where logical problem analysis has been used to identify obstacles, the same tool should be used to transfer problems to the other side. • Also, countries can use different strategies to manage and deal with the pressure. They can accept this pressure, deal with its effects, or continue on their way regardless of all these issues. In other words, sanctions are imposed that the target country welcomes, because it improves the economic and political situation in that country and even improves the international position of that country. This is one of the main problems when imposing sanctions. With regard to the mentioned cases, if a country does not take action on the ways to deal with climate change, the issue will be discussed through the member’s meeting. In addition, according to paragraph 4 of article 16 of the Paris Agreement, the members are entrusted with any action they want to confront the offending country. In this regard, sanctions are also a kind of tool to force the guilty country to accept the rational and collective wisdom of solutions to deal with climate change. Despite the scientific agreement about the negative effects of human climate changes, efforts

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to find cooperative solutions at the international level have not been satisfactory so far. Their ability to facilitate climate cooperation is unclear. For the implementation of trade sanctions, two conditions must be observed: first, the punishments must be able to remove the weakness, and second, the punishments through trade sanctions must be severe enough to prevent non-commitment. Disclaimer The views and/or claims/or data expressed in this chapter are solely authors’ own or based on literature survey and are not necessarily linked with their affiliations, editors of the book, reviewers of the chapter or the publisher.

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Chapter 4

Ocean Governance in the Anthropocene: A New Approach in the Era of Climate Emergency Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau, Guilherme Lopes da Cunha, Carlos Henrique Tomé, Fábio Albergaria de Queiroz, Paulo Eduardo Câmara, Carina Costa de Oliveira, and Fábio Henrique Granja e Barros

Abstract The ocean is the most important life-supporting system on Earth, and it is directly threatened by climate change and the race to exploit marine biological and mineral resources, bringing up new risks and threats to the governance of sustainability. Paradoxically, ocean governance efforts are centuries old, but they are insufficient, disconnected from the climate regime, and strongly fragmented. The international regime based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea A. F. Barros-Platiau (✉) International Relations Institute, University of Brasilia, Earth System Governance Network, and Superior Defense College (ESD), Brasilia, Brazil e-mail: [email protected] G. L. da Cunha Superior War College (ESG), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil International Relations Institute, University of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil Superior Defense College (ESD), Brasilia, Brazil C. H. Tomé University of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil F. A. de Queiroz Superior Defense College (ESD), Brasilia, Brazil P. E. Câmara Department of Botany, University of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil Brazilian Antarctic Program (PROANTAR) and Superior Defense College (ESD), Brasilia, Brazil C. C. de Oliveira Law Faculty, University of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil e-mail: [email protected] F. H. Granja e Barros Union Accounting Court, Brasilia, Brazil e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Tripathi et al. (eds.), Eco-Politics and Global Climate Change, Environment & Policy 65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48098-0_4

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(UNCLOS) represented a big step for ocean governance, but it needs to be reformed to adapt to the era of climate emergency. Different international organizations produced several sectoral treaties and four different regimes concerning areas beyond national jurisdiction for both glacial oceans, the water column, and the seabed. While the Arctic has its powerful Council, Antarctica has its own treaty system, both evolving slowly in comparison to recent geopolitical shifts. If the unity of oceans was recognized by scientists as a single body (space and resources) before the 1967 Maltese proposition of the “common heritage of mankind” principle to the United Nations General Assembly, why was it not maintained by the UNCLOS III? We contend that sovereign states defend primarily their national interest, to the detriment of the vital interest of humankind. Of particular interest is how geopolitics led to this context of institutional fragmentation and poorly connected multilateral regimes. Looking back in time, since the beginning of the UNCLOS I talks, we can assess how ocean management has been unsustainable. Therefore, this chapter argues that a new phase of great powers competition has started, in which the marine resources will most likely be overexploited, falling short of sustainability obligations. Ultimately, traditional geopolitics needs to engage more effectively with the ocean and climate governance, to integrate global risks and strengthen ecopolitics. Keywords Anthropocene · Blue acceleration · Climate emergency · Fragmentation · Ocean governance

Abbreviations BBNJ treaty CoP ILO IMO ISA RFMOs UN UNCLOS UNDP UNEP UNESCO WMO

The international legally binding instrument for biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction UN climate regime Conference of the Parties International Labor Organization International Maritime Organization International Seabed Authority Regional fisheries management organizations United Nations United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas United Nations Development Program United Nations Environment Program United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization World Maritime Organization

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Introduction

The ocean is the most important life-supporting system on Earth, and the deep ocean is still pristine and mostly unexplored, keeping precious scientific data on the Earth’s evolution and resources for the future demand for mineral and biological resources. However, the ocean is directly threatened by climate change and human activities (Cheung & Jones, 2019; Wunderling et al., 2021; Hupke, 2023). They accelerate ocean acidification and other profound biophysical changes (Wunderling et al., 2021; IOC-UNESCO, 2022). Furthermore, human activities have increased faster than multilateral regulatory frameworks, creating increasingly serious ecological damages and crises. In this context, Du and Ni (2023) mapped out the “Blue Country Space” for economic purposes and demonstrated there is a power shift to Europe and Asia, notably China, considered as comparable competitors in some respects. As a result, ocean governance is strongly fragmented and inadequate, demonstrating the need for global politics aimed at sustainability, also named ecopolitics (Le Prestre, 2017). Although scientific communities and political authorities increasingly acknowledge the ocean’s role as a life-supporting system, multilateral responses toward the sustainable use of marine biological and mineral resources are inadequate (Röckstrom et al., 2023). Over the centuries, the ocean has been used as a limitless sewage sink and trash bin, as if it could recover indefinitely. Even nuclear testing was carried out in the ocean as if radiation would not affect marine life for millennia. Nevertheless, scientists argue that the ocean is one of Achilles’ heels of the Earth (Steffen et al., 2004) because it can be the starting point of cascading effects, disruptive changes, and catastrophic collapse. The increasing number and gravity of environmental damages and losses related to pollution, contamination, ocean acidification, eutrophication, and overfishing, to mention only a few, are clear evidence of historical political irresponsibility (UNEP, 2022; UNDP, 2022). Currently, there are diverse sectoral treaties and four different regimes concerning areas beyond national jurisdiction for both glacial oceans, the Area (seabed, ocean floor and subsoil) and the High Seas (the water column). While the Arctic has its powerful Council (Rottem, 2020), Antarctica has its own “system”, evolving slowly, compared to recent geopolitical shifts and abrupt climate changes (Williams & Burke, 2019). Climate change effects on the ocean are serious and underrated (Röckstrom et al., 2023). They include altered water temperature and circulation, oxygen levels, density, and acidity, as well as thermal expansion of ocean water. It can also be associated with other human-made stressors like the degradation of essential marine habitats (Cheung & Jones, 2019; IPCC, 2022). Ocean governance, based on the forty-year-old United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), requires reform in order to face the challenges posed by the growing impact of human activities. This is the scenario of blue acceleration (Jouffray et al., 2020), bringing up blue risks (Bennett et al., 2021), aggravated by their partial disconnection with the current climate emergency scenario.

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Of particular interest is how geopolitics led to this context of poorly connected multilateral agendas. Does the control of the oceans shape the fate of superpowers, as Jones (2021) stated? Or, on the contrary, do superpowers shape the destiny of the oceans? Based on a “climate emergency era” (Verbitsky, 2023) approach, this chapter argues that we are entering a new phase of great powers competition (Brands, 2022), in which the trends are that environmental resources will most likely be overexploited, the accumulation of industrial waste, carbon dioxide, and methane will continue, while sustainability concerns will be left behind (UNDP, 2022). Ultimately, we suggest that policymakers move from a traditional geopolitical agenda to engage effectively with the governance of the Earth system to integrate global risks, connecting the climate risks to our future, as stated by Höfele et al. (2022). Then the concept of geopolitics of the Anthropocene (Dalby, 2020) makes sense as a helpful framework for the analysis of the process of the development of ocean governance. In a nutshell, as Williams and Burke (2019, p. 128) stated: Managing ecosystems in a quickly changing world can be distilled to the challenge of managing rates of change. We must slow the rates of processes deemed harmful to species of concern, ecosystem health, or ecosystem services. Via adaption, we seek to accelerate adaptive processes and, via carbon-mitigation strategies, buy time for species to adapt. We must prepare for abrupt ecological responses triggered by climatic extreme events and by nonlinear responses and feedbacks of ecological systems to more gradual forcings (National Research Council 2013) and for the ecological surprises caused by the rapid transition of the climate system to a state potentially without precedent in human history.

Since the major greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters and great nuclear powers, namely the United States, Russia, and China did not yet commit to cutting emissions effectively, they are sending the wrong signals to the climate regime stakeholders. Meanwhile, Germany, India, and the United Kingdom keep high shares of fossil fuels in their energy planning. According to the UNEP (2022) Report, the four biggest CO2 emitters are China, the United States, India, and Russia. However, there is a huge disparity in terms of per capita emissions. The United States accounts for 14.4 tons/per year, Russia has 11.4 tons/per year, China has 7.1 tons/per year, and India has only 1.7 tons/per year. In the context of large asymmetries in CO2 emissions among all nations, we contend that ocean governance corresponds to a paradox because it is far from delivering the ecopolitics humanity needs to shape a more sustainable future (Sect. 4.1). Then we argue that the Anthropocene geopolitics may contribute to the apprehension of the climate emergency era and the vital interests of humankind (Sect. 4.2). This chapter examines recent literature on geopolitics, international law, and environmental issues, to conclude that ocean governance must incorporate a new approach based on the climate emergency.

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The Ocean Governance Paradox

From a geopolitical perspective, the ocean was first taken for its instrumental importance as a naval dominion for power projection. This historical background shaped international law and the current institutional architecture in a fragmented way, despite the fact that the 1982 UNCLOS was considered “the constitution of the sea”. Moreover, it led to the ocean governance paradox because the ocean was considered relevant to the political agenda since the first civilizations, but not because of its intrinsic value as a life-supporting system and the services it provides, starting with global atmospheric temperature (Sect. 4.2.2). Consequently, ocean governance was developed as a patchwork of different fabrics from maritime law, law of the sea, and environmental law, including cross-cutting issues such as biodiversity and climate change (Sect. 4.2.1).

4.2.1

A Fragmented and Inadequate Ocean Governance

Several challenges show how difficult it is to build institutional and multilateral responses to more sustainable ocean governance. First, the United Nations system is not free from political divergences and asymmetries that hinder the decision-making processes (Caballero, 2019; Kotzé & Adelman, 2022). Concerning the ocean, two key points must be highlighted. The ocean was divided into two different parts for geopolitical and legal reasons based on the principle of sovereignty, one under national jurisdiction and the other beyond national jurisdiction (the high seas and the Area), with the Draft Ocean Space Treaty of 1971 (Taylor, 2011). This robust structure of ocean governance is the root cause of fragmentation, thus preventing policymakers from taking steps toward the “community of shared future for humankind” as China puts it (Liu & Zhang, 2018). In fact, considering the climate change diplomatic failure, and the ocean institutional fragmentation, the survival of the most vulnerable part of humankind and biodiversity is already seriously threatened. Even if the CO2 emissions were totally cut today, the Planet would take decades, or maybe centuries to recover. However, there is no global ecopolitics to promote the “vital interests of humankind” yet. In other terms, humankind, not the states, needs to be considered for the development of ocean governance in the Anthropocene. Institutional fragmentation corresponds primarily to geography, international law, and sectoral activities. From a geographic standpoint, there are two glacial oceans and three oceans: the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian. From a geopolitical perspective, the Indo-Pacific Ocean corresponds to one area of utmost importance due to the rise of China and, to a lesser extent, India. According to international law, beyond the jurisdictional cleavage, there are different legal regimes for the Area and the water column (the high seas). While different governmental and regional organizations poorly regulate the high seas, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) addresses the Area, under the UNCLOS auspices. Because of the demarcation of the

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ocean space between the high seas and the Area, the latter is considered a common heritage of mankind and the former is part of the principle of freedom of use of resources. Nevertheless, the 2023 Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) treaty has ignited a new debate about the limits to such freedom. Furthermore, international law is divided into two connected but separated big sets, public and private international law (Weiss, 1989; Varella, 2018). Public international law encompasses the law of the seas and environmental law as well as some aspects of maritime law. Regarding private international law, it regulates important international contracts in different activities realized by private companies in different sectors, such as shipping. Therefore, the boundaries of the law of the seas and maritime law are blurred. Second, myriad organizations are related to the ocean, inside and outside the United Nations system (Barros-Platiau & Maljean-Dubois, 2015). The most relevant ones are the Office of Legal Affairs (DOALOS) and the General Assembly (UNGA), the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Seabed Authority (ISA). Recently, the UN created an Interagency collaboration mechanism including the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Science and Education Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) for better governance of the ocean. From a regional and sectoral perspective, and partially connected to the UN legal framework, there are regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) spread all over the world map, either focusing on specific areas or species. Although they contribute to regulating fisheries and conserving species such as tuna and other finfishes and are very limited in scope and membership (Tomé, 2020, 2023). Nevertheless, RFMOs have started to bind two legal regimes of fisheries and climate, as observed in the case of tuna in the Pacific (Karim, 2023). Maritime law regulates navigation, security, and safety under the aegis of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Moreover, negotiations on reducing greenhouse gas emissions from shipping activities occur within this multilateral arena, under the United Nations legal framework concerning the climate change regime. Some examples of synergy between different Organizations, such as IMO and the Climate change regime based on the Climate Convention (UNFCCC), can be pointed. For instance, the Resolution A.963(23) on IMO Policies and Practices Related to the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships from 2003 tried to build more connections between the regimes. However, this initiative of sustainability governance was hampered by great powers, that is, the Anthropocene geopolitics chessboard. Furthermore, international environmental law has traditionally disregarded ocean governance, as if it was already covered by the law of the sea and disconnected from other subjects, such as biodiversity. Although the talks that led to the negotiation of the UNCLOS (from 1973 to 1982) correspond to the debates that paved the way for the United Nations Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972, UNCLOS was less the result of environmental challenges than the outcome of geopolitical and trade competition, since Washington and Moscow were struggling

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for world hegemony during the so-called “Cold War”. Moreover, most of the relevant multilateral environmental agreements since the 1970s did not mention the ocean or only mentioned ocean/seas superficially (Mazzega et al., 2017). Likewise, the 1992 Rio Summit (the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development) barely mentioned the ocean, as if it was not of paramount importance for the sustainable development of multilateral goals and the Millennium Development Agenda. It was only at the Rio+20 Summit in 2012 that the ocean was on the agenda but still disconnected from the climate regime. Anyway, the central concept of the conference was the “green economy”, not yet the “blue economy”. Third, concerning the climate change international regime, Masood and Tollefson (2021) argued that the consensus-building mechanisms under the Conference of the Parties (CoP) legal pathway limited the regime development. On top of that, the regime was based more on the economic interests of the significant emitter countries (and their industries) than on scientific evidence published in official reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), notably the 2019 IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (SROCC). Only in 2022, during the CoP 27 in Egypt, was the ocean mentioned in the final declaration. In other words, it took Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention (UNFCCC) three decades to formally mention the most crucial carbon sink and temperature regulator for the Planet. Regarding polar regions, comparable in terms of relevance to climate change science, geopolitics, and diplomatic agenda, the Arctic and the Antarctic are two very different polar regimes. The Arctic regime corresponds to the international order after World War I when European powers envisaged the region as a geopolitical option for the future. In this vein, the region became more strategically relevant after World War II. The Arctic Council was created in 1996 with eight member Parties to foster strategic dialogue between Washington and Moscow. Nowadays, there are two significant shifts. One is that some parts of Arctic ice are melting faster than before, notably in Greenland. This rings the alert for geopolitics regarding resource exploitation, navigation, and security issues, as well as extreme climate events. If the ice melts too quickly, what happens to the planetary cycles? What major shifts will the ocean suffer? And marine life? And humanity? The future is uncertain. The other is geopolitical because the Council suspended Russia due to the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Despite the enormous work of the Council related to the climate change agenda, little has been achieved to avert this risky scenario for the planet. Indeed, more viable navigation routes in the high North are interesting for exporters deeply dependent on the Suez Canal, such as China (with the polar silk road), Russia, and the United States. Geopolitics also shaped the Antarctic regime. In 1959, the Antarctic Treaty System was crafted but did not expressly encompass the Antarctic glacial ocean. As the world bipolar order marked the treaty provisions, it established that Antarctica, as a frozen continent, should remain free of military activities and weaponization. However, nuclear-powered submarines can remain very close to the continent. Nowadays, there are 29 member states that have the right to vote for the development of new legal obligations, during the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings

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(ATCM). The treaty has an environmental protocol, but the climate change challenges are still underestimated by diplomats and other authorities, even though scientific evidence about the role of Antarctica in climate stability is uncontroversial. Finally, both polar regimes are out of the scope of the United Nations, for geopolitical reasons. On the contrary, the United Nations system is the key arena for the regulation of the deep seabed, which is under the authority of the 1994 International Seabed Authority (ISA). The ISA allows states and companies to research in marine areas under 15-year exploration contracts.1 Since 2010, the “polymetallic-nodule-mining industry” has been growing due to the demand for batteries to decarbonize the world economy. Therefore, a mining code is under negotiation (Campanella, 2024) and expected to be adopted quite quickly. When it is implemented, seabed mining for commercial purposes will be regulated and authorized. The High Seas will also have a new treaty to regulate marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ). However, marine biodiversity talks remain disconnected from the wider biodiversity, fisheries, and climate agenda (Mendenhall et al., 2022). As a result, the BBNJ treaty is only partially connected to other international regimes such as the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, the 2022 Global Biodiversity Framework, the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), and the future ISA Mining Code. Unsurprisingly, none of those regimes aforementioned take the abrupt climate changes seriously. While the Arctic regime allows for mining irrespective of the melting of the cryosphere reported by the IPCC SROCC (2019), the ISA Mining Code may be adopted, disregarding scientific concerns and some State’s request for a moratorium until impact assessment reports can provide more reliable scenarios.2 Since the ocean is a giant carbon sink, mining activities may accelerate carbon releases into the atmosphere and provoke severe cascading effects.

4.2.2

The Ocean as a Life-Supporting System in the Era of Climate Emergency

The ocean covers around 71% of the Earth’s surface as a single body of water in profound interconnection with the atmosphere and the continents (Cheung & Jones, 2019). Naturally, it is vital for the biosphere due to the services it provides. The ocean contributes to the regulation of the temperature of the Earth and it is also the most significant carbon dioxide sink. Moreover, there would be no life on Earth

1 In December 2022 there were 31 contracts according to ISA. Retrieved from: https://www.isa.org. jm/exploration-contracts. Dec 12, 2022. 2 Since 2018 some countries such as Fiji, Palau, Samoa, Chile, Costa Rica, New Zealand, France have raised the necessity of a moratorium of seabed mining based on scientific concerns and other reasons. See: Blanchard et al. (2023).

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without the ocean since food webs are intertwined. Confronted with the concepts of climate failure (Masood & Tollefson, 2021; WEF, 2022; UNEP, 2022) and climate emergency (Verbitsky, 2023), we can state that ocean governance is driven by geopolitics, trade, science and law combined. To be more coherent and bring some “blue climate justice”, ocean governance shall also deal with the risks of sea level rise and the melting cryosphere.3 It must also include the social dimension of the challenges related to climate change and life below water as was set in the United Nations 2030 Agenda, namely Sustainable Development Goals 13 and 14. However, deep changes are required. The United Nations and other initiatives did not achieve the necessary transformative changes we need (Biermann et al., 2022; Kotzé & Adelman, 2022; Röckstrom et al., 2023) to promote the vital interest of humankind. Diplomacy and international law have proved insufficient if great powers’ geopolitics does not consider the climate emergency paradigm seriously. This implies that the controversial concept of Anthropocene makes sense on a global scale because a minor part of humankind has the power to destabilize climate cycles and threaten the livelihoods of the most vulnerable populations around the planet.

4.3

Geopolitics of the Anthropocene

Jones (2021) argued that the ocean shaped the fate of great powers. In other words, great powers that controlled the ocean were able to historically improve their power projection and create their empires. This still holds true, and it explains why the “sea blindness” concept is rooted in geopolitics and strategy (Barros-Platiau & Barros, 2022). Humanity can be divided into at least three big groups: a tiny high-income and privileged group with an enormous material and climate footprint; a middle-income group that is growing in Southeast Asia and declining in the West; and a big group of disenfranchised communities. The latter is concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and small islands developing states (SIDS), whose material and climate footprint is insignificant. Indeed, the latter comprises the victims of the pressure exerted on them by the other groups. The actions of each group have different impacts on the shape of the ocean governance. While the great powers shape the fate of the ocean, they also shape the chances of survival of most people on Earth.

3

The International Law Commission has been working on this issue. See: https://legal.un.org/ilc/ ilcintro.shtml. See also: https://unfccc.int/news/momentum-builds-to-blue-climate-action-at-juneocean-dialogue

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Do Great Powers Shape the Fate of the Ocean?

Not only are great powers responsible for most of the damages and threats to the ocean over centuries, but the technological advances they produce may cause a further impact on the ocean’s health and wealth. In this sense, a paradigm shift is necessary to apprehend that great powers are the key stakeholders regarding economic and blue acceleration, blue risks, and sea blindness.

4.3.1.1

Acceleration

It is not coincidentally that acceleration corresponds to the reconstruction of Europe, devastated after World War II, with funding from the United States. Although difficult to define, acceleration is a key concept to apprehending the global challenges a minority of people are currently aggravating. This comes with numerous overlapping folds and the risk of ecosystems’ collapse, posing existential threats to life on Earth (Wunderling et al., 2021). Put bluntly, it corresponds to the rapid economic growth of Western countries during the twentieth century, leading to unprecedented unsustainable industrial activities. The accelerated increase in world population and per capita consumption of goods and services led to the expansion of global demand for food, water, energy, and minerals. Consequently, it gave rise to starker interests in agriculture and mining, including on the deep seabed (Steffen et al., 2015; McNeill & Engelke, 2016; WEF, 2022). It also entailed an accelerated accumulation of industrial, toxic, and nuclear waste. Therefore, the “great acceleration” corresponds to human-driven changes since the 1950s, reflecting the rapid economic growth in developed countries and the population growth in the rest of the world. Consequently, the income concentration and asymmetrical material footprints (Guterres, 2019) have led to more unsustainable development worldwide, aggravated by the covid 19 crisis (UNDP, 2022). In line with the economic acceleration that sustains the Western liberal order, a “blue acceleration” is underway. However, this time the two competing powers are the United States and Europe on one side and China and Russia on the other.

4.3.1.2

The Blue Acceleration

The ocean is considered a new frontier in economic development (Bennett et al., 2021). The blue acceleration refers to the growing exploitation of marine resources and the use of the ocean as a new chessboard. Besides shipping, naval power, and tourism, the ocean is also a space for mining, oil, and gas pipelines, such as Nordstream I and II, communication cabling, artificial islands, fish farms and aquaculture, energy parks, and so on. Jouffray et al. (2020) described the blue acceleration as “a race among diverse and often competing interests for ocean food, material, and space. Exploring what this new reality means for the global

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ocean and how to steer it in a sustainable and equitable way represents an urgent challenge”. According to the authors, while 12 of 15 megacities are coastal, around 40% of the world’s population lives around 200 km near the coast. Therefore, unsustainable growth of activities related to the ocean may engender new risks to the most vulnerable populations.

4.3.1.3

The Blue Risks

Bennett et al. (2021, p. 1) argued that blue growth might produce grave risks, which they classified as: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10)

dispossession, displacement and ocean grabbing; environmental justice concerns from pollution and waste; environmental degradation and reduction of ecosystem services; livelihood impacts for small scale fishers; lost access to marine resources needed for food security and well-being; inequitable distribution of economic benefits; social and cultural impacts; marginalization of women; human and indigenous rights abuses; and, exclusion from governance.

All those risks are not new or unforeseeable. On the contrary, they are comparable to the risks stemming from traditional land-based activities. What is new, is the climate impacts on the Earth’s system and the air quality (WMO, 2022; IPCC AR6 2022; UNEP, 2022), as well as the impoverishment of communities around the Planet. There is an accumulation of socioeconomic and natural risks which must be considered, because stressors such as habitat destruction and biodiversity loss will lead to more poverty and starvation. Therefore, we contend that the climate change regime must consider the damages and losses caused by the biggest CO2 and methane emitters, as it was decided in the climate Conference of Parties in 2022 (CoP 27). However, the absence of leadership from great powers is keeping humanity on the brink of a catastrophic collapse. As the UNEP Report (2022) showed, we are far from the 2015 Paris Agreement target of 1.5 °C (or even 2 °C) and the CoP 26 compromise in Glasgow. Put bluntly, there is “no credible pathway to 1.5 °C” so far, according to the same Report. Moreover, CoP 27 was also very restrained in terms of commitments, notably referring to damages and losses as the island states insisted. Consequently, the ocean’s health and wealth will probably continue to be undermined, and the 2030 sustainable development goals will most likely be very disappointing. Because the context and challenges discussed above are intertwined, urgent, and global, the scientific community has a key role to play in the decision-making process. The United Nations Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021–2030) is one of the most relevant efforts to promote “the science we need for the ocean we want” (Ryabinin et al., 2019). Nevertheless, while humanity becomes more vulnerable as time goes by, we are far from the governance approach we need to deal with the era of climate emergency.

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Conclusion

There is a much more complex global scenario resulting from social and environmental chessboards, unsustainable growth, and great powers’ competition. The ocean is threatened by climate action failure, and at the same time, the oceanic changes worsen the climate instability. Consequently, ocean governance is marked by the interests of naval powers that hamper the promotion of stronger legal obligations related to the Arctic, Antarctica, the High Seas, and the Area. If the great powers do not promote a more sophisticated ocean governance for the sake of humankind, only the more competitive stakeholders will benefit from the traditional rationale “first arrived, first served”. Therefore, the risks of social unrest and catastrophic changes may escalate considerably. They are described as the blue risks already increasing with the recent blue acceleration process, led by the great powers. However, international law and ecopolitics are not sufficiently strong to assure more effective ocean governance, despite the fact that the use of biodiversity and mining resources will be more regulated. Anthropocene geopolitics may contribute to raising awareness concerning the risks of catastrophic collapse and convince world leaders that ocean governance cannot ignore the era of climate change emergency. Disclaimer The views and/or claims/or data expressed in this chapter are solely authors’ own or based on literature survey and are not necessarily linked with their affiliations, editors of the book, reviewers of the chapter or the publisher.

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Chapter 5

International Water Law Where World Needs Ecopolitics Most: A Study of the Framework of States’ Right to Exploit Transboundary Water Resources via Dam Construction Nima Norouzi

Abstract As one of the largest man-made structures, damming dates back thousands of years. Even though dams are important for providing drinking water, irrigation, hydroelectric power, and economic and social development, their irreparable environmental impacts on peripheral states should not be ignored. Due to the lack of clear and specific regulations regarding the international obligations of States in the damming process, a large number of states, including Turkey, have been able to construct numerous dams with the aid of the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty because of the absence of clear and specific regulations. Consequently, water resources have been reduced, droughts have occurred, populations have migrated, and dust storms have emerged in neighboring countries, leading to international disputes. Through a descriptive-analytic approach, this study addresses the legal events of dam construction, such as the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Canada-United states lake Ontario (Gut) Dam Project, Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP) Dam Project, Kajaki Dam, and Doosti Dam, and by considering these events, the chapter attempts to clarify the rules governing the construction of dams by nations. Keywords Aquapolitics · Hydro-ecopolitics · Hydropolitics · International environmental law · International water law

5.1

Introduction

In transboundary river basins, the complex effects of human activity on the socioeconomic, political, and environmental conditions of riparian countries are critical. Reconciling the territorial integrity of other riparian countries with the sovereignty of N. Norouzi (✉) School of Law and Legal Studies, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Tripathi et al. (eds.), Eco-Politics and Global Climate Change, Environment & Policy 65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48098-0_5

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one state within its territory is a basic difficulty in international water conflict management involving the use of shared water resources under international water law (Wehling, 2020). Absolute territorial sovereignty, often known as the Harmon Doctrine, is based on complete authority over national waterways. According to this principle, a state is free to utilize its territory as it sees fit, without being constrained or worried about the harm or negative effects that such use might have on other riparian states (Salman, 2007). Contrarily, the idea of ultimate territorial integrity accords the downstream state a complete right to the uninterrupted flow of a river flowing from the upstream states (Kotkasaari, 2008). The 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes adopted in Helsinki in 1992 (Bergesen et al., 2018), and the 1997 Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Use of International Watercourses adopted in New York (Loures & Rieu-Clarke, 2013), serve as the foundation for today’s international water law. The aforementioned global conventions, as well as modern international water law, are founded on theories of limited territorial sovereignty and community of interest. The ‘equitable and reasonable utilization’ and ‘no-harm’ principles emphasize that riparian countries should not use their territorial waters in ways that cause damage and have an unfavorable impact on downstream co-riparian countries (Ghosh & Modak, 2021). The current doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty is diametrically opposed to previous doctrines. One of the most fundamental principles in international water law is the obligation of one state not to cause significant harm to (an)other state(s). This is known as the no-harm rule (Tanzi, 2020). This principle has implications for both the allocation of shared watercourse uses and the environmental protection of those watercourses (Kasimbazi & Bamwine, 2021). This principle is also considered implicitly in the Ramsar Convention of 1971 (Bridgewater & Kim, 2021). International water law has changed significantly over time to reflect changes in both the use of global water resources and our understanding of hydrological systems, but it still falls short in some key areas that are becoming increasingly important (Wehling, 2020). Ambiguity in some international water law articles has been identified as a major cause of conflict among riparian countries and the failure of international water laws to manage international water disputes (Rigi & Warner, 2020). In the case of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, for example, Turkey bases its arguments on Article 5 while implementing the GAP project, indicating that it uses the rivers in an equitable and reasonable manner. Syria and Iraq, on the other hand, rely on Article 7 to argue that Turkey is causing significant harm to downstream countries (Al-Muqdadi, 2019). This is also true in the case of the Blue Nile water conflict between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia (Mirzaei-Nodoushan et al., 2022). As mentioned earlier, water had a vital role in all periods of human life and in the ever-increasing expansion of the population, the crisis of water scarcity is predictable and has always prompted experts to reduce water loss and make it easily available to the public by presenting plans and methods of water control (Wieland et al., 2014). For many years, dam construction has been considered one of the basic solutions as an obstacle against the movement of water and its storage in huge reservoirs, energy production, etc. In addition, large dams are symbols of civilization

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and play an important role in flood control, electricity generation and cheap and clean energy. In 1997, the World Trade Organization established the “World Commission on Dams” (hereafter, the 1997 Commission) in response to the significant growth of dam construction projects. In its report on dams and development, this commission states in the importance of dams that these man-made structures were established with the aim of symbiosis between the three elements namely, water, energy and human economic development. Therefore, today, large dams are mentioned as one of the physical elements effective in human growth and development. Despite the role of dams in human development, the negative effects of dams on the surrounding environment, such as fish populations, should not be overlooked. in order to reduce and eliminate the negative effects of dams on the natural environment, though the 1997 commission has proposed the solution of setting basic rules by governments, much attention has not been sincerely paid towards the environmental effects of dams in the design and implementation of dam construction projects. The lack of international laws and regulations regarding the obligations regarding the dam-building process and the government’s reference to the doctrine of “absolute territorial sovereignty” has further fueled this lack of attention by the governments. According to the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty, which is based on the traditional and absolutist concept of territorial sovereignty, each government, regardless of the consequences of its actions for other relevant governments, exercises unlimited and absolute sovereignty over the waters in its territory (Bosshard, 2010). This doctrine actually works for the benefit of upstream governments. In some cases, unlimited interference and exploitation of the basin, upstream governments through the construction of numerous dams have led to negative environmental consequences (i.e., water share reduction, severe droughts and etc.) for the downstream governments (Cornelisse & Versluis, 2013). These cases can endanger international peace and security with escalating regional and national tensions. Considering what has been said, it seems that a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of the obligations of the governments in the process of dam construction in light of the growing developments of contemporary international law and recent literature is necessary (Skinner et al., 2017). Mianabadi et al. (2021) in their study on the international legal principle of ‘noharm’, stated it as a customary international law that lies at the heart of numerous international transboundary water conventions, rules, and agreements. The current study identifies and examines the three most common categories of harm, namely health, environmental, and economic, in an integrated framework. Exploitation of the Kamal Khan dam over the Hirmand/Helmand Transboundary River, shared internationally between Iran and Afghanistan, has been selected as a case study. For this aim, an integrated modeling approach that links Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT), Indicators of Hydrologic Alteration (IHA), dust storm events (DST) and crop production was developed to simulate the indicators and their parameters under historical conditions and future exploitation of the dam. Effects on the three types of harm are classified as being low, moderate or high. The results showed that the effects of the dam diversion for economic harm would be high. For instance, it

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could reduce the wheat production of the Iranian side of Sistan plain up to 70%. The hydrological alteration of the river is also significant, up to 80% during the winter and spring months. This can result in health and environmental harms. The region’s health and environment are already in a critical situation mainly due to the drying of Hamoun wetlands, which rely on the inflows of the Helmand River and are the major sources of dust storms. Notably, these issues would affect the entire plain in both Iran and Afghanistan. The scope of this study was the principle of ‘no-harm’ but the methodology with some additional modifications could be considered for other principles like “equitable and reasonable utilization” in transboundary river basins. Zhao et al. (2022) performed an empirical analysis of 459 international water treaties. This research revealed that equal protection of prior use and later use is becoming an emerging trend for international treaty practices, while obligations of “due diligence” emerge to redefine the “no-harm” principle. The growing concern for environmental protection challenges the basic understanding of the concepts of “harm” and “reasonableness”. To strengthen the trend for equal protection and to ensure greater flexibility and adaptability of IWL, this paper focuses on the promotion of institutional water cooperation, the forging of common understanding over the importance of transboundary environmental protection, and the development of more up-to-date global legal frameworks. Hayat et al. (2022) attempted to analyze the existing literature on hydrohegemony (HH) theory, which has emerged to explain transboundary water interactions. The literature highlights that the conventional water interaction literature inadequately deals with three important factors: (i) asymmetric power relations, (ii) varying intensities of conflict, and (iii) the importance of the geographical location of riparian states. Since its emergence, it has evolved both in theory development and in application to transboundary basins. Although attempts have been made earlier for reviewing, organizing and evaluating the overall literature on HH, these reviews itself are somehow silent on the hegemonic approaches to assess its contribution to the transboundary water governance literature and to identify the existing and future research gaps. This paper, however, not just addresses these omissions to (i) review the scholarly literature on HH; (ii) explore the challenges associated with power, cooperation, and conflict; and (iii) identify and explore potential trends in HH theory, but it also gives special attention to the hegemonic approaches within states’ boundaries and the ingredients to enrich the theory and research agenda of HH. Mogomotsi et al. (2020) discussed the legal aspects of the institutional arrangements in the Okavango River Basin. It highlighted the importance of river basin organizations in the effective management of transboundary watercourses. This article concludes that the institutional arrangements between the riparian states with access to the Okavango River provide the framework for resolving possible disputes peacefully. Further, these institutional arrangements promote co-operation over the management of the shared water resources. Despite their efforts in improving legal doctrines and helping to find a solution for increasing transboundary water disputes, no research mentioned the truth that the importance of transboundary water basins in current global hydro and geopolitical

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situation needs a firmly structured transboundary water doctrine. A doctrine cannot be without a set of general principles that constructs its modules and constraints. This bottleneck is the exact aspect that this chapter is aimed to discuss. And which is highlighted below in points: 1. This paper studies those dam construction cases which caused negative environmental consequences on neighboring countries which lead to a legal dispute. 2. The litigation proceedings and jurisdiction authority are studied in concerned case. 3. Court verdict and its sources of legal citation are also studied for concerned case. 4. Using the descriptive-analytic approach and data gathered from each case globally accepted principles governing the recent emerging transboundary water law are structured and discussed in the chapter.

5.2

Legal Cases

In order to achieve legal rules in the field of dam construction, it is necessary and unavoidable to investigate the facts. In this regard, many events were recognized., As it would require plenty of time to investigate all these cases, in this chapter, a limited number of these events are investigated. (a) Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros project case (Hungary/Slovakia, vote on September 25, 1997) On September 16, 1977, a contract was signed between Hungary and Slovakia for the construction of the Gabčíkovo (Slovakia)-Nagymaros (Hungary) dam on the Danube River, and it came into effect on June 30, 1978. In the introduction of this contract, it is stated that this contract was concluded in order to develop water resources, transportation, agriculture, energy and other areas related to the national economy (Kuokkanen et al., 2016). In addition, the parties to this contract have committed that the water quality level of the Danube River will not decrease as a result of the implementation of this contract. Following the construction of the dam project on the Danube River and the implementation of the variant C project unilaterally by Slovakia,1 which was desperately seeking economic development, this country, by insisting on the completion of the project, caused the destruction of wetlands in the region, the pollution of water sources and the drying of pastures and forests. In this way, after many disputes arose and this issue turned into a national-patriotic issue for the two countries, the dispute was raised in the International Court of Justice (Kaya, 2003). This action was carried out following the withdrawal of Hungary from the continuation of the project due to environmental necessity. In this case, the court was asked to first issue a verdict on (1) whether Hungary had the right to abandon the Slovak project, (2) the right to implement variant C, and (3) whether Hungary had

1

A unilateral diversion of the Danube by Czechoslovakia on its territory called Variant C.

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the right to terminate the contract. In relation to the first claim, the court stated that Hungary has violated the contract by stopping the project operation and it cannot justify the violation of the contract by citing the need to comply with environmental considerations (Atapattu, 2007). In the second case, Slovakia’s action to deny Hungary a “reasonable and fair share” of the Danube was declared illegal by implementing variant C. Finally, the court ruled that the termination of the contract by Hungary is invalid. In any case, it was the first environmental case that was raised in the International Court of Justice and the court mentioned the international obligations of governments in the field of dam construction. (b) Canada-United states lake Ontario (Gut) Dam Case (Canada/United States, vote on 1968) In 1874, Canada proposed the construction of the Gate Dam between Adams Island in Canada and Les Gallops Island in the United States of America in order to improve navigation. The United States government accepted this proposal as part of the 1903 agreement. In this regard, the United States government imposed two conditions: 1. If, after the construction of the dam, the water level of Lake Ontario or the St. Lawrence River is affected, and as a result, the interests of the United States government are damaged, the Canadian government has to take action based on the decrees according to the Ministry of War (Dupuy & Viñuales, 2018). 2. If the construction and operation of the dam leads to damage to property owners located on Les Gallup Island or the property of other citizens of the United States of America, the Canadian government must pay compensation to the victims. Between 1951–1952, the water level of the river rose and led to flooding and damage to the south and north shores of the five lakes, including Lake Ontario and the properties of American citizens. In 1962, the United States Congress first established the “Foreign Claims Settlement Commission”, and then the governments of the United States of America and Canada signed agreements in 1965, according to which the Lake Ontario Claims Court was established. The court issued its first verdict on January 15, 1968. In the trial process, the first issue raised in the court was about the responsibility of the Canadian government for the damages caused by the Gate Dam. The Canadian government believed that it was solely responsible for the damages caused to a small class of persons, the property owners located on Los Gallup Island. On the other hand, the United States of America argued that according to the 1903 agreement, Canada is required to pay compensation to all citizens of the United States of America whose properties were damaged by the flood. The court decision was issued in accordance with the position of the United States of America. The court announced that the obligations of the Canadian government, in addition to the residents of Gallup Island, also extend to other citizens of the United States of America (Stefano & Davis, 2017). As a result, Canada is responsible for both categories or one of them in case of breach of its obligations. The decision of the court on February 12, 1968, was issued in response to the question that there is a time frame regarding the obligation of the Canadian government to compensate the damages caused to the citizens of the United States of America? In short, it should be said that Canada believed that the obligation to compensate damages has a

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specific time frame that expired in 1908. On the other hand, the United States of America believed that there is no specific time frame in this regard, because Canada sent a diplomatic note to the United States of America in 1952, and in that note, Canada assumed the damages caused by the dam (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991). As a result, it cannot be argued that the time period of its obligations has passed. The court stated that the Canadian authorities in their diplomatic statements expressly committed to pay reparations until 1951–1952. Finally, the court issued its third verdict on September 27, 1968. Negotiations were held between the two countries, which led to the conclusion of agreements. According to this agreement, Canada must pay 350 thousand dollars to the United States of America for the damages caused to its citizens. The court issued a joint declaration regarding the commitment of the parties to settle the dispute. (c) Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP) dam project (Turkey) The dam building center of the Turkish government is located in the area of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in the southeast of this country. Since 1977, Turkey has built several dams on the Tigris and Euphrates as part of the Gap project (Stefano & Davis, 2017). In this ambitious project, Turkey tried to build 22 dams and 19 hydropower plants by diverting the flow of Tigris and Euphrates water to supply the water needed for 1.7 million hectares of agricultural land with a storage volume of 32 billion cubic meters. This turned the issue of exploitation of Tigris and Euphrates waters into a growing multinational problem. Although in 1980, according to the treaties, Turkey agreed to provide at least 500 cubic meters per second of Euphrates water for its two neighbors, Syria and Iraq, but this did not materialize (Steadman & McMahon, 2011). As part of this project, the Atatürk Dam was built in 1992 with a reservoir volume of 30 billion cubic meters. The Atatürk Dam, which was built on the southeastern border of Turkey and in a way after the Keban Dam, is known today as the largest dam in the Middle East and the ninth largest dam in the world and has the potential to hold all the water of the Euphrates behind its reservoirs. In the first stage of water extraction of this dam, when Turkey announced to Syria and Iraq that it plans to close the river’s path for a month, the anger of both countries was aroused. Since the construction of the said dam, a huge amount of water has been contained behind it, which caused the dissatisfaction of two countries, Syria and Iraq. In addition to what was said, the Karakaya dams (completion year: 1987), which caused concern for both Iraq and Syria, Birjik dam (completion year: 2001) and Karakamish dam (the construction of which began in 1996) are all part of the project’s dams. It is the gap that caused the reduction of the rights of the countries of Syria and Iraq. In addition, the construction of these dams led to the drowning of hundreds of archeological sites (Brennan & Herzog, 2014). In this context, Ilisu dam, which is one of the Gap projects dams, can be specifically mentioned. The construction of Ilisu has caused the historical city of Hasan-Kif to be flooded. Despite this, in the international arena, the construction of the Gap project, especially the Ilisu Dam, will reduce the Tigris River water by 47% and deprive the residents of Mosul, Iraq, of 50% of access to water sources in the summer season. The construction of this dam will also cause 696 thousand hectares of Iraqi

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agricultural land to be deprived of irrigation. The interesting thing to note is that the Gap project harms the environment so much that the environmental circles in Turkey also protested because it leads to submersion and obliteration of some ancient monuments and the forced migration of some ethnic groups. Due to the fact that 85% of Iraq’s freshwater comes from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the Gap dam project has led to the reduction and drying up of Iraq’s water resources. In addition to the governments of Iraq and Syria, the negative effects of the construction of the Gap project also affect the government of Iran. The percentage of Tigris water is imported from Turkey, and if the Gap project is completed, there will be many changes in Iran’s environment, which will cause serious damage. In fact, with the completion of this project, Iraq’s Mesopotamian wetlands, whose water originates from the Tigris, will dry up quickly. In this way, with the drying up of the central wetlands of Iraq and Syria, the Horul Azim wetland in Khuzestan will become the biggest critical center of particulate matter in the region, and 25 western and central provinces of Iran will face the problem of particulate matter. The significant increase in this issue is due to the removal of the rights of the governments of Syria and Iraq from the Tigris and Euphrates. Based on this, today, experts believe that the foreign origin of micro dust in the southwest and west of Iran is mainly the deserts of Arabia, Iraq and Syria, which is especially caused by the dry bed of Tigris and Euphrates due to dam building policies in the upstream country (Turkey). Therefore, the completion of the Gap project will cause the Tigris River in Iraq and the Horul Azim wetland in Iran to face dryness and water shortage on the one hand, and on the other hand, this will lead to the production of fine dust in the country of Iraq and its transfer to the border provinces of Iran and cities (Behnassi & McGlade, 2017). (d) Kajaki Dam and Arghandab Dam (Afghanistan) Kajaki Dam was built on the Hirmand River in Kajaki, located 80 km north of Greshak. In 1953, the operation of its construction was completed and the dam began to take water (Williams, 2011). This dam was built in order to irrigate agricultural lands and use for industry and drinking in Shamalan, Nad Ali, Sarja Darvishan and other downstream areas. Currently, this dam supplies almost all the energy of southern Afghanistan. Another one of the dams built on Hirmand River is called Arghandab Dam. The said dam is located 18 kilometers northeast of Kandahar. The construction of this 388 cubicmeter dam was completed in 1952 (Jones, 2009). Supplying the water needed by the agricultural lands around Kandahar and the drinking water of this city is one of the objectives of the construction of the mentioned dam. According to the opinion of the Hirmand Delta Joint Commission, which was established in 1947 with the participation of representatives from the United States, Chile, Canada, Iran and Afghanistan to resolve the water dispute. It was observed that “Kajki Dam is a reservoir dam and collects wastewater during floods; Therefore, it leads to the development of construction projects in the upper part of the river, without causing a loss in Iran’s share of water. In addition, it is possible that after the completion of the construction work of the Kajaki Reservoir Dam, the construction plans of the Baqarah project will be developed without harming the irrigation of the Sistan and

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Chaghansur delta areas (Ahmadzai & McKinna, 2018). But Afghanistan has continuously refused to pay Iran’s water dues due to drought. In fact, during the drought, the Afghans used to collect water in the upper part of the river and prevent it from reaching the lower parts, and as a result, damage was caused to Iran’s Sistan. The government of Iran has reacted to this issue many times in its official statements. In order to resolve the dispute, in 1951, treaties under the title “Treaty on the water of the Hirmand River between the governments of Iran and Afghanistan“ were concluded. According to Article 2 of the said agreement, “the right of the Iranian government from Hirmand River is 22 cubic meters per second, to which another 4 cubic meters were added.“ In Article 4 of the Agreement, regarding the years of low water inlet, it states that “In the years when due to climatic events, the amount of river’s water flow is less than the normal water year according to the measurement figures comparing to the to the same months of the normal water year. The Iran’s water share should be adjusted according to the special formula mentioned in the table presented in the article 3.” (e) Doosti Dam (Iran-Turkmenistan) The government of Turkmenistan is the heir to the agreements between Iran and the former Soviet Union regarding the Khatun Bridge Dam on Harirud, which later became known as the Friendship Dam. Based on the previous agreements, the two countries started joint measures to implement the construction of the dam. These measures were met with protests by Afghanistan in 1997, which stated that it was planning to build the Salma Dam on this river. Since the construction of the dam had a long history of agreements between Iran and the Soviet Union and the implementation of the dam had started on the mentioned date, the government of Iran asked the government of Afghanistan to continue flowing the same amount of water as before the construction of the Salma Dam on the common border between Iran and Afghanistan has flowed to the borders of Iran. Therefore, the construction of the dam continued and it was put into operation on 23 April 2005 with the presence of the presidents of Iran and Turkmenistan. Both governments benefit from the benefits of the dam equally (Bradnock, 2015). It is worth mentioning that this dam is located 260 km northeast of Mashhad city and the border point of Iran and Turkmenistan. In general, the desired goals of Doosti Dam are: 1- Storage and regulation of seasonal Harirud river water, 2- Supplying a part of the drinking water of Mashhad city, 3Supplying agricultural water of Sarkhs Plain in Iran and Turkmenistan, and 4Stabilizing the Iran-Turkmenistan border against seasonal floods. The said dam was built on a river whose source is not located in either of the two countries of Iran and Turkmenistan (Harirud River originates from the mountains of central Afghanistan). Therefore, the dependence of the cities and downstream areas on the water of this dam can be put in the hands of Afghanistan as a leverage in crisis and emergency situations and in this way create a situation for the two countries of Iran and Turkmenistan or force them to give concessions. Based on this, from a geopolitical point of view, the construction of this dam has made Afghanistan’s position much more favorable than Iran’s and has provided the basis for Iran’s greater dependence on Afghanistan (Berga et al., 2006). In addition, surely by establishing

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stability in Afghanistan, the government will follow up its serious measures to control its border waters. This component will be a serious threat to Iran, and only with active diplomacy to improve relations in various fields, agreements can be reached on this river and respect downstream rights for the exploitation of common waters (Peng et al., 2021).

5.3

Legal Principles

Through legal events, legal rules emerge that protect the environment. Below, some of these rules are reviewed: (a) Non-harmful use of the land principles In the Jirga of international documents, the rule of non-harmful use of the land was recognized for the first time in the “Stockholm Declaration”. According to Article 21 of this declaration, “Governments, according to the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law, have sovereign rights to exploit their resources in accordance with their environmental policies, and they must arrange for the activities carried out within their jurisdiction or supervision to the environment of other countries or areas outside their jurisdiction. Do not harm their nation”. The mentioned rule has a customary status in international law and for this reason, it is emphasized in the documents prepared after the Stockholm Conference, such as the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity and the Rio Declaration (Byrne et al., 2017). The first decision of the international judicial authorities that dealt with the mentioned rule was the arbitration decision of the Trail Smelter case between the two governments of the United States of America and Canada. The Court of Arbitration, after comprehensive proceedings and referring to the legal system of the United States of America, has stated: “According to the principles of international law as well as the rules of the United States, no state has the right to use or allow the use of its territory in a way that causes damage to the other states”. The mentioned rule has high enforceability in various fields of international law, including dam building. The rule of non-harmful use of the land was considered in the process of the Gabchikovo-Nagymaros dam case. Hungary argued that the requirements of international law on environmental protection made it impossible to implement the treaty and that the pre-established obligation to prohibit the entry of substantial damage into the territory of another state was transformed into a “general obligation” to prevent damage in accordance with the principle of prevention. As a result, Hungary argued that because of the other party’s opposition to the extension of the work of variant C, it was forced to end it. In this ruling, the court states that the obligation of governments to prohibit the creation of transboundary environmental damage is based on international custom. Regarding the Hirmand River, on which many dams such as the Arghandab Dam and the Kajaki Dam have been built, the Treaty on the Water of the Hirmand River between the Government of Iran and Afghanistan states in Article 5 that Afghanistan agrees not to act to deprive Iran of its

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water rights. The water of the Hirmand (Helmand) river, which has been established and limited according to the provisions of articles 2, 3 and 4 of this treaty, is to be partially or completely deprived. In other words, the government of Afghanistan is committed to refrain from any action in its territory that leads to damage to the environment of the government of Iran (Lyster & Bradbrook, 2006). As seen, the mentioned treaty has emphasized the rule of non-harmful use of the land. In today’s age, one of the biggest challenges of international law is the Gap dam project in Turkey. As mentioned above, the implementation of the mentioned project has led to the reduction of water resources and successive droughts in Iraq and Syria and the appearance of dust springs in Iran. Diplomatic negotiations between the governments of Syria, Iraq and Iran with the Turkish government have not reached any results. It seems that the governments of Syria and Iraq can file a lawsuit against the Turkish government in the international authorities based on the customary rule of non-harmful use of the land, and the Iranian government can enter this lawsuit as a third party. Regarding the International Court of Justice, all three countries, Turkey, Iraq and Iran, are members of the court by virtue of their membership in the United Nations. Proceedings in the court are subject to a special agreement in which the explicit agreement of the parties is included. Therefore, by concluding a special agreement, the governments of Turkey and Iraq can refer the case to the International Court of Justice. In addition, if the parties have accepted the “declaration of optional condition” of the court, the court has the jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit at the request of one of the parties. Regarding the declaration of the optional condition, the Iranian government submitted this declaration to the Permanent International Court of Justice in 1930 and received it from the successor of the Permanent International Court of Justice, i.e., the International Court of Justice, in 1951 (Zimmermann et al., 2019). The governments of Turkey and Iraq have not issued this declaration until today. Therefore, it is not possible to resolve the dispute between Turkey, Iraq and Iran through this organization until they issue this declaration. In addition, the aforementioned rule regarding the friendship barrier is enforceable. During the construction of Salma dam on Harirud, the Afghan government should refrain from any action (for example, refraining from reducing water rights) that will lead to damage to the environment of the territories of the governments of Turkmenistan and Iran. With regard to the aforementioned content, it can be concluded that the governments are committed to complying with the customary rule of non-harmful use of the land in the process of building dams, and the violation of this rule entails their international responsibility (Sands & Peel, 2012). (b) Necessity principle The beginning of the principle of environmental protection should be found in the Stockholm and Rio declarations. According to this old rule and the first international law, it is necessary to take all possible measures to prevent damage to the environment. In the field of international law, this rule was raised for the first time in the dispute between Hungary and Slovakia, or the case of the dam. In this case, the Hungarian government cited the need to protect and protect the environment in order to justify its action in terminating the treaty. The court examined this issue as if there

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was a state of necessity according to international law in 1989, so that Hungary could, without being held responsible, to have international rights, to suspend and abandon the affairs that he was committed to implement in accordance with the 1977 treaty and related documents? The court states that the state of necessity is accepted in international law as one of the factors that diminishes the definition of a criminal act. In this case, the Court takes into consideration the conditions stipulated in Article 33 of the draft plan of the governments’ responsibility: according to article, in the case of necessity, the illegal act should be the only way of the country in order to protect its fundamental interest against severe and imminent danger. And this right is in the conditions that one countries fundamental interest doesn’t compromise the fundamental interest or requirement of other countries or be against the interests of international community as a whole. Also, other condition is that the country in question has not itself created the situation of necessity and the international obligation in question has not denied the possibility of invoking necessity (Dekker & Hey, 2011). These conditions have been crystallized in customary international law. The Court confirmed that Hungary’s concerns regarding the natural environment of its region, which is affected by the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros project, are related to the fundamental interest of that government in the sense of Article 33 of the Draft Government Responsibility Plan. Despite this, in relation to GabčíkovoNagymaros, the Court declared that the verification and imminention of the risks cited by the Hungarian government was not as severe and considerable as Hungarian side claimed. In addition, instead of abandoning the project, Hungary could pursue a negotiation solution in order to revise the project and extend its deadlines. Finally, the court did not accept Hungary’s claim regarding the conclusion and non-implementation of the treaty due to the emergence of new conditions of international law regarding the protection of the natural environment. In addition, the rule of the necessity to protect and protect the environment has been emphasized in the treaty regarding the water of the Hirmand River between the governments of Iran and Afghanistan. According to Article 7 of this agreement, any type of joint technical building, the construction of which is considered necessary for the purpose of strengthening the river bed in the places where the border line is located in the bed of the Helmand River, after the agreement of the parties on its conditions and specifications, can be built based on this. The governments of Iran and Afghanistan can take necessary measures to protect the river bed. Article 33 of the Draft Plan of State Responsibility, approved in 2001 by the International Law Commission, is a compilation of customary rules, and the Court has endorsed this in the GabčíkovoNagymaros judgment and mentions this rule as an exceptional rule that can only be invoked under certain conditions. This rule is used in the field of dam construction when there is a conflict between the basic interest of the government (for example, the protection of the natural environment) and the implementation of the treaty obligations of that government. If such an assumption is fulfilled, the environment as a common heritage of different generations of mankind is prioritized over other legal rules. As a result, the relevant government is obliged to take all necessary measures to protect the environment. In fact, it can be concluded that this rule is a positive step in the direction of transitioning the soft rules of the field of dam

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building to the hard rules of that field, provided the conditions are met (Manton, 2016). (c) Sustainable development principle This rule was proposed with the aim of reconciliation between the three inseparable elements of economic development, social progress and respect for the environment. Although international soft documents such as the Stockholm Declaration have confirmed the issue of sustainable development, little progress has been made in providing the definition of sustainable development. Despite this, the World Commission on Development and Environment defined sustainable development in 1987. Based on this, sustainable development means “meeting the needs of the present generation without jeopardizing the capacities of future generations so that the needs of the future generations are not jeopardized” (Pearce et al., 2013). The “1997 Commission” regarding the importance of the environment in realizing the principle of sustainable development believes that key issues related to various aspects of dam construction, such as its environmental aspect, should be considered in relation to the role of dams in sustainable development. The commission believes that paying attention to the rule of sustainable development in the field of water resources and energy (dams) will have positive consequences such as gaining public consent, preserving the environment and river life, paying attention to the condition of existing dams, ensuring compliance with laws, consolidating peace and security and human development. In the field of international judicial procedure, the establishment of the special environmental branch by the International Court of Justice in 1993 was the first step towards the evolution of the rule of sustainable development at the international level. In the next step, the Gabčíkovo and Nagymaros dam case is the first arbitration case that directly raises issues related to international law, including the rule of sustainable development (McIntyre, 2016). Court states in the mentioned case regarding the rule of sustainable development: throughout the centuries, humans have always interfered in nature for economic and non-economic purposes, and in the past, this intervention has often been done without considering its effects on the environment. With the help of scientific discoveries and increasing people’s awareness of environmental hazards for humans, new criteria and norms have been formed, which have been introduced in many legal documents during the last two decades. These new norms and standards, not only when countries are trying to take new measures, but also when they are continuing the activities started in the past, should be taken into consideration and given the necessary importance. This need to create compatibility between economic development and environmental protection, as it is necessary, has been brought up in the discussion of sustainable development (Issar, 2010). In this matter, Court emphasizes the importance of sustainable development in water resources management as a part of the natural environment. In his separate opinion, Judge Weeramantry believes that the rule of sustainable development, as a universal rule, involves creating a compromise between the necessity of development and the necessity of protecting and protecting the environment. In addition, today, the implementation of the Gap project is in clear conflict with the rule of sustainable development, because the

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purpose of this rule is to meet the needs of the present generation without jeopardizing the capabilities of future generations (Rogers et al., 2012). The destruction of agricultural lands in Iraq and Syria, the forced migration of the population, the creation of dust sources and the destruction of ancient monuments, all indicate the violation of the rule of sustainable development by the Turkish government (Alam et al., 2015). (d) Prevention principle The rule of prevention aims to protect the environment by taking preventive measures. In this way, this rule mandates that the governments in applying the regulations should try to ensure that the activities of the public and private sectors under his supervision and control are not harmful to the environment on the basis of fair and proper practice in the direction of public order. The purpose of the said rule is to prevent environmental pollution and destruction before the incident. Therefore, this rule is not intended to remove the harmful effects after the occurrence of the desired event (De Sadeleer, 2020). The mentioned rule is implemented in cases where there is scientific certainty about the harmfulness of any activity on the environment. In these cases, the perpetrator of that activity should refrain from doing that behavior, or the responsible government should not issue a license for that behavior. Some authors believe that the rule of prevention in the field of international (common) law was first proposed in the Smelter arbitration case. This vote expresses the basis for the commitment to prevent and ensure responsibility of governments for transboundary damages (Verheyen, 2005). The arbitrator stated in his decision that the government of Canada should avoid damages to the territory of the United States of America in the future. Also, the International Court of Justice in the case of Corfu Channel, while emphasizing the customary nature of this rule, declares that all governments are obliged to use all available tools to prevent activities that cause serious damage to the environment of other governments. Governments’ commitment to prevent damage to the environment, especially in the field of dam construction, can be seen in the case of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros dam (Larsson, 1999). In this case, the court describes the rule of prevention and states that prevention is necessary in the field of environmental protection, considering the irreparability of the damage caused to the environment. In addition, in order to control and monitor the activities of the governments of Afghanistan and Iran in the Hirmand River and prevent damage to the environment, according to Article 8 of the Agreement on Hirmand Water, each of the parties has to appoint one commissioner and one deputy commissioner from among their nationals. In any case, the importance of dam construction in the economic and social development of human societies on the one hand and the need to protect the natural environment for the present and future generations with regard to the fragile nature of the said environment, on the other hand, requires the establishment of laws and regulations in order to predict and prevent from damage to it. In this legislative process, the government, as a manifestation of sovereignty, can play a positive role in the implementation of preventive rules by predicting executive mechanisms (Patel, 2014).

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(e) Environmental effects evaluation principle The previous assessment of potentially dangerous activities is an obligation that originates from the concept of prevention. Since failure to prevent transboundary risks can lead to international responsibility, it can also be investigated that the correct and accurate assessment of environmental effects can be considered as a standard to determine the level of attention and accuracy in risk prevention. Therefore, risk assessment is an element of the principle of evaluating environmental effects, because the concept of assessment is related to the direct and indirect effects of future actions (De Sadeleer, 2012). “Commission 1997” in approving the environmental effects evaluation rule states that the governments are obliged to evaluate the environmental effects of the dams on the rivers and the governments neighboring the rivers in the process of building dams. This commission adds regarding the time frame of evaluation of environmental effects: when the economic and technical studies for the construction of the dam begin, the technical consultants and organizations involved in the dam construction process should focus on ecological issues. In the area of dam construction, the International Court of Justice has mentioned the rule of evaluation of environmental effects. In the case of the dam, the court states that the awareness of the vulnerability of the natural environment and the acceptance of the issue that the risks to the natural environment must be continuously evaluated have been pursued more seriously in the years after the conclusion of the treaty. The court further acknowledges that both parties agree that they should seriously consider environmental concerns and take necessary precautions. But the two sides fundamentally disagree about the consequences of these precautionary measures on the joint plan. In this case, the involvement of a third party may be very beneficial and effective in finding a solution, provided that each of the two parties acts flexibly in their positions. Also, it can be implied that the responsibility of the Canadian government in the case of the Ghat Dam has arisen as a result of the lack of assessment of the water level of the river. In this case, the Canadian government was committed that if the construction and operation of the dam leads to damage to property owners located on Les Gallup Island or the property of other citizens of the United States of America, it must pay compensation to the victims. Between the years 1951–1952, the water level of the river rose and the lack of necessary assessments to prevent this led to flooding and damage to the environment of the south and north of the five lakes, including Lake Ontario and the properties of American citizens.

5.4

Conclusion

In the contemporary international society, dam building is considered as one of the human-made structures, which is also observed as one of the symbols of civilization and human development. Despite the role of dams in civilization, in dam construction, the conflict between the manifestos of human development and the protection

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of the natural ecosystem is more visible than ever. In other words, the need to pay attention to human development on the one hand and the need to protect the natural ecosystem on the other hand, and ultimately the priority of one over the other in contemporary international law, is an important, decisive and guarantor of human life. The search in international binding documents confirms the lack of binding international contractual provisions regarding the obligations of governments in the field of dam construction. Despite this, nowadays, in the light of international soft documents, international judicial decisions and international custom, legal rules have appeared that can be applied in the field of dam construction. Currently, the Westphalian concept of absolute sovereignty has faced a structural transformation in the international community. Governments can no longer unilaterally and arbitrarily exercise their sovereign authority over the waters in their territory based on the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty and regardless of the consequences of their actions for the respective governments. In the world of limited water resources and the need to protect the environment as much as possible, the said doctrine cannot be answered by humans, and as a result, such a doctrine is rejected and abandoned from the legal point of view. The mentioned doctrine is in clear conflict with the rules of non-harmful use of land, necessity, sustainable development, prevention and evaluation of environmental effects. Today, in the process of building dams, governments are committed to complying with the customary rule of non-harmful use of land. Any dam construction operation that leads to the reduction of water rights and the drying up of the agricultural lands of the government or the governments downstream of the river, violates the international obligation of that government according to the aforementioned rule. Therefore, the government/governments downstream of the river that has/have suffered damage through the dam construction operation of the government/governments upstream of the river can be considered as the international responsibility of the upstream government/governments based on the customary rule of non-harmful use of the land. In addition, in the contemporary international community, although the conclusion of joint agreements in the field of dam construction has grown significantly, it is observed in some cases that a government suspends the implementation of the agreement due to the necessity of protecting its natural environment. In fact, in such exceptional cases, the environmental benefit in the dam-building process has priority over the economic benefit resulting from the implementation of the treaty. As a result, governments can refuse to implement the treaty related to dam construction without being recognized as responsible in order to protect their environment by referring to the customary rule of necessity. Another rule that governments are committed to following in the dam-building process is the rule of sustainable development. According to this rule, the governments are committed to prioritize the continuous protection of the environment as a long-standing treasure of human generations in their economic activities such as dam construction. Today, the protection of this ancient treasure has gained more momentum with the generalization of the “rule of prevention” by the International Court of Justice. Based on this rule, governments are obliged to control the activities of the public and private sectors by applying regulations in the process of dam construction, so that no damage is caused to the environment. Undoubtedly,

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any failure to fulfill this obligation will result in the violation of the international obligation of the guilty government and, accordingly, the responsibility of that government. In the end, it should be mentioned about the environmental impact assessment rule as one of the emerging rules of international law, that according to this rule, governments are committed to prevent the occurrence of dam building risks by correctly and accurately assessing the environmental effects. The correct implementation of this obligation can be the basis for the implementation of the obligation to prevent. Disclaimer The views and/or claims/ or data expressed in this chapter are solely authors’ own or based on literature survey and are not necessarily linked with their affiliations, editors of the book, reviewers of the chapter or the publisher.

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Chapter 6

China’s Growing Footprint in Antarctica: Soft Power, Science, and Global Ecopolitics Jonathan Harrington

Abstract Over the past 30 years, China has made a significant long-term commitment to expanding its presence in Antarctica. This case study analysis asserts that China’s activities indicate its broad acceptance of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and other status quo institutions. Its efforts to conduct research, build infrastructure, and actively participate in regional governance are mostly consistent with the actions of other major powers on the Continent. China’s growing engagement in the Region is an outgrowth of China’s long-standing participation in global environmental governance. On balance, China has reaped significant benefits from active involvement in global ecopolitics. China’s environmental foreign policy engagement in general and Antarctica’s related activities seem to enhance “Chinese style soft power.” Its infrastructure contributions and growing scientific activity are consistent with China’s broader commitment to becoming a science superpower. The Antarctic case is also informative in revealing conditions where China may be expected to actively contribute to global governance in other regions. This chapter analyzes the evolution of and possible motivations behind China’s growing footprint in Antarctica. The author concludes that China’s overall contribution to research and governance in the region has been mostly positive and reflects general acceptance of status quo governance institutions in the region. Keywords Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) · China environmental foreign policy · Global environmental governance · Polar politics · Science power

6.1

Introduction

In November 2016, the twenty-four-member Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) met in Hobart, Australia to hammer out an agreement to establish a permanent Marine Protected Area (MPA) in the Ross

J. Harrington (✉) Division of Social Sciences and Humanities, Olympic College, Bremerton, WA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Tripathi et al. (eds.), Eco-Politics and Global Climate Change, Environment & Policy 65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48098-0_6

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Sea region of Antarctica. The 2012 proposal (submitted by the United States and New Zealand) called for restricting operations in a 2.3 million square km area, 1.6 million of which would be closed to commercial fishing (CCAMLR, 2013). Russia, Ukraine, and China (all major fishing powers) questioned the need for such a large, protected zone. Other objections included concerns that the science supporting the need for the protected area was questionable. In addition, the MPA would limit China’s sovereign right to make rational use of international waters. They also worried that already present actors in the Region might use the MPA to block new entrants (Cressey, 2012). However, after five long years of negotiations, all parties agreed to a 1.5 million sq. km. MPA, of which 1.1 million sq. km. is closed to commercial fishing (Waters, 2016; NOAA, 2021). Many ecologists and trans-national non-governmental organizations (TNGOs) were disappointed in the outcome. However, elected leaders and government officials around the world praised the agreement, which created the planet’s largest MPA. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) media wasted no time publicizing the deal, which underscored its commitment to global environmental problems at home and abroad (SCMP, 2016). Only months later, the PRC hosted the 2017 Antarctic Treaty System Meeting (ATSM) in Beijing. Chinese scientists and policymakers used the event to reinforce their long-term commitment to multilateral governance in Antarctica and global environmental governance in general (Zhen & Huang, 2017). Finally, China announced plans to build its 5th Antarctic base near the MPA region. The Ross Sea is one of the main focal points for Antarctic research on Mainland Antarctica. The new base is less than 30 km from three other international Stations and 200 km from the sprawling U.S.-run McMurdo Station (U.S. Department of State, 2020). As of early 2023, construction of the new site is ongoing.

6.1.1

Relevance

Why study China’s activities and motivations in Antarctica? China’s initiatives have received relatively little attention in the English language literature. How Antarctica is governed matters. Has China accepted status quo values, norms, and institutions that govern the Region? Antarctica is the last undeveloped landmass on Earth. Global warming is having a major impact on the Continent and the world. Glacial melting and collapse are primary contributors to sea-level rise, affecting hundreds of millions of people in low-lying areas. The effects of climate change are experienced most acutely in polar regions. The Southern Ocean supports incredibly biodiverse marine habitats (Chown et al., 2022). As a populous greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions contributor, wealthy, and technologically developed nation, China’s actions have a material effect on the health and stability of global ecosystems.

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China in Antarctica: Resources and Territory?

Many policymakers, commentators, and pundits question China’s intentions in the Region. Criticism is especially pronounced in the United States, U.K., and Australia. Some claim that China’s expansion in Antarctica is simply an artifact of a larger strategy to dominate the world. Realist thinkers such as John Mearsheimer believe that China’s rise to superpower status is inevitable and conflict with liberal Western states will increase over time (Kaplan, 2011; Mearsheimer, 2018). Referring specifically to Antarctica, New Zealand scholar Ann-Marie Brady has consistently sounded her concerns about China’s intentions to acquire territory and resources in the Region (Brady, 2010, 2017). Hemmings (2018) worries that the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is not suited to manage future resources and territorial competition (Hemmings, 2018; Strating, 2022). The overall tone of U.S., U.K., and Australian coverage of China’s activities in Antarctica is generally negative (Harrington, 2016; Liu, 2022).

6.1.3

Soft Power, Science, and Global Ecopolitics

However, there are reasons to be hopeful about China’s contribution to research, governance, and infrastructure development on the Frozen Continent. This historical process tracing study posits that China’s Antarctic engagement is closely associated with three policy streams which all support China’s peaceful, cooperative, and materially beneficial rise in the Region (Harrington, 2016). • Soft power with Chinese characteristics. • China’s quest for science superpower status. • China’s engagement in global ecopolitics and sustainable development. Each of these policy streams is mutually reinforcing and offers feedback loops that strengthen their impact over time.

6.2

China’s Antarctic Record

Whatever one believes about the PRC’s hidden motivations for its involvement in Antarctica, China’s material and policy achievements on the Continent are descriptively significant. China’s engagement in the Region closely tracks the country’s involvement with global environmental governance institutions. China tried to join the Antarctic club in 1959. However, it was rebuffed by Western powers. The first reform period visitors set foot on the Continent in the late 1970s (Meng, 2014). In 1983, the PRC signed the Antarctic Treaty. It became a full consultative member in 1985, the same year that it commissioned its first research station on King George

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Island. Its second base, located in East Antarctica, began operations in 1989 (Guo, 1985; Xinhuanet, 2019). During the 1990s, the PRC continued to build the infrastructure, technology, and institutional capacity required to maintain and expand its permanent presence. Its first true icebreaker, the Xuelong, entered service in 1994. The refurbished Ukrainian vessel allowed China to support operations in both polar regions. China’s engagement in climate change governance, including the 1992 Rio Summit and Kyoto Protocol, reoriented research in that direction (Harrington, 2015; Hong, 2021). The early 2000s witnessed a significant expansion of China’s footprint. The Hu Jintao administration significantly increased funding for Antarctic infrastructure and operations (Brady, 2010). In 2009, China established Kunlun Station, which is located far inland and 4000 meters above sea level. China opened Dome A to numerous multinational research efforts, especially in astronomy and ice core drilling (Ding et al., 2015; Hui et al., 2015; Li et al., 2015). To support the remote site, China built Taishan Station, halfway between Zhongshan and Kunlun (Xinhuanet, 2019). A fifth site is under construction on Inexpressible Island, which borders the recently approved Ross Sea MPA (Li, 2017). When completed, China will have the same number of bases as the United States (Buchanan, 2022). Antarctica-related scientific publication output has increased dramatically over the period. Around 40% of peer-reviewed manuscripts include at least one foreign author (Dastidar & Persson, 2005; Aksnes & Hessen, 2009; Sanchez, 2016). Successive PRC leaders and policymakers conspicuously support Antarctica initiatives. Every Antarctica research survey has received significant coverage in the domestic press. Media coverage rarely mentions possible Chinese interest in Antarctic mining or drilling. Rather, it emphasizes China’s commitment to environmental protection, sustainable development, and peaceful cooperation. PRC leaders express support for ATS status quo institutions and multilateral governance and oppose the territorial claims of other states. Books have been written about the “heroic” exploits of Antarctic scientists. New Antarctic bases, infrastructure projects, research vessels, and scientific discoveries receive significant press coverage as enlisted in Table 6.1 (Harrington, 2016). PRC engagement in Antarctica and global environmental governance China is increasingly active in Antarctic Treaty System governance. Large delegations attend yearly Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM), China hosted in 2017 (Sanchez, 2016). According to Harrington (2016), China is largely compliant with AT protocols, measures, decisions, resolutions, and recommendations. It is a signatory of the 1991 Environmental Protocol, which includes a ban on mining or drilling operations. There is no evidence of PRC military presence. Importantly, China has made no territorial claims and opposes the claims of other Antarctic actors: Norway, Australia, the U.K., France, New Zealand, Chile, and Argentina. The state maintains membership in virtually every ATS institution, including Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) and CCAMLR. Antarctica has also become a popular destination for PRC tourists. Visitor numbers are second behind the United States (IAATO, 2019). Overall, China’s engagement in Antarctic institutions is largely consistent with other “status quo” powers in the region.

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Table 6.1 List of important events related to environmental issues Year 1820

Event Antarctica “discovered by Russians”

1940s 1959

Seven nations make territorial claims in Antarctica Antarctic Treaty negotiations start PRC expressed interest but was shut out of the negotiations PRC rejects territorial claims and adopts “common heritage of mankind” concept PRC replaces ROC in the United Nations PRC delegation attends United Nations Conference on the Human Environment PRC begins engagement in environmental ‘conference diplomacy’ Post-Mao reform Period begins

1971 1972

1978

1979 1979 1983 1984 1985 1985 1987 1989 1989 1990 1990 1991 1991 1992 1994 1994 1996

Deng Xiaoping declares Four Modernizations: Agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology Deng Xiaoping visits the USA, begins “panda diplomacy” strategy First recorded visit of PRC journalist to Antarctica PRC delegation attends first ACTM as a non-consultative member China engages in first Antarctic survey China establishes Great Wall Station (Changcheng Zhan) on King George Island China becomes a full consultative members of the AT Bruntland Report, Our Common Future published PRC establishes Zhongshan Station in East Antarctica PRC establishes Polar Research Institute of China in Shanghai UN IPCC publishes first Assessment Report, climate change becomes a major issue Joseph Nye publishes Bound to Lead, soft power concept discussion begins in PRC PRC signs Montreal Protocol London Amendments ATS Environmental Protocol negotiations, China signs Protocol in 1998 PRC sends senior leader delegation to Rio Summitt, PRC signs three conventions PRC is first nation to publish an Agenda 21 report dealing with SD proposals PRC commissions first icebreaker, the Xuelong PRC signs UNCLOS, uses opportunity to oppose territorial claims in Antarctica

Sources Larson (2011) and Belanger (2006) Belanger (2006) Joyner (1998)

Joyner (1998) Economy (2001)

Naughton and Tsai (2015)

Harrington (2005) Meng (2014) Meng (2014) Wen (2014) Guo (1985) Brady (2010) World Comm. on Enviro. and Dev. Xinhuanet (2019) Brady (2010) IPCC (1992) Nye (1990) EPA (2021) Zacharias and Ardron (2020) Harrington (2005) Harrington (2005) Humpert (2019) Dodds and Hemmings (2016) (continued)

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Table 6.1 (continued) Year 1997 2001 2002 2003 2006 2009 2012 2013 2014 2015 2015 2016 2017 2017 2018 2019 2019 2020

6.3

Event PRC signs Kyoto Protocol as an Annex II country, ratifies in 2002 USA pulls out of the Kyoto Protocol PRC sends senior delegation to World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannasburg President Hu promotes “harmonious development” concept with soft power, SD elements PRC joins Comission for the conservation of Antarctic Living Marine Resources (CCAMLR) PRC commissions Kunlun Station at Dome A, 4000 meters above sea level USA and New Zealand propose Ross Sea Marine Protected Area President Xi announces Belt and Road Intiative, promises sustainable development PRC commissions Taishan Station (at the midpoint between Kunlun and Zhongshan Stations PRC signs the UNFCCC Paris Agreement PRC co-sponors UNDP Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) framework PRC agrees to CCAMLR Ross Sea MPA, the largest MPA in the world PRC hosts first ATSM conference in Beijing PRC plans for 5th base on Inexpressible Island in Terra Nova Bay area PRC publishes comprehensive Arctic policy, draft Antarctica plan is still under discussion PRC commissions second civilian icebreaker, the Xuelong II PRC annouces plans for its first nuclear powered icebreaker, expected commission in 2024 USA conducts inspection of PRC base under construction in Irrepressible Island

Sources Harrington (2016) Joyner (2011) World Bank (2013) Harrington (2017) Zacharias and Ardron (2020) Li (2012) Waters (2016)

Xinhuanet (2019) Denchak (2021) Gåsemyr (2020) Waters (2016) Zhen and Huang (2017) Xinhuanet (2018) Humpert (2019) Xinhuanet (2020) Humpert (2019) US State Department (2020)

Policy Stream One: Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics

China has a long-standing record of applying non-coercive foreign policy approaches to build relationships and win friends in the international arena. Participation in global environmental governance has long been considered a “soft power” issue area where policy outputs are relatively low cost (material cost) and symbolic in nature (Young & Levy, 1999; Young, 2018). In his Forward to the edited book Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics (2020), Joseph Nye asserts that “soft power” is a core element of China’s overall foreign policy strategy. As a rising power, Chinese policymakers understand the importance of projecting positive

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narratives, i.e., that the country’s rise will be peaceful and that Chinese culture, society, history, and institutions offer tremendous benefits to the world. Nye defines soft power as “the universalism of a country’s culture and its ability to establish a set of favorable rules and institutions that govern areas of international activity are critical sources of power and that these sources of power are becoming more important in world politics today” (Nye, 1990, 33). He notes that since the early 1990s, the term “soft power” (ruan shili) has been used widely in both PRC academic and policymaking circles and regularly appears in the popular press. He lauds China for embracing the importance of the concept and how it serves to moderate the use of force. He adds that President Xi seems to understand that China must tell China’s story in a non-threatening light. During his administration, China has expanded its overseas media reach to counter negative narratives while bolstering China’s image (Nye, 2020). Edney et al. (2020) add that soft power stories are critical to drawing attention away from China’s growing economic and military influence. They note that “soft power involves a country attracting and co-opting others to admire and share its core interests. . .and draws on resources such as culture, values and exemplary foreign policy behavior to create an international environment where others will be more inclined to cooperate” (Edney et al., 2020: p. 1). Many Chinese scholars assert that elements of the “soft power” concept have been embedded in Chinese foreign policy for centuries and that Nye’s conceptualization is viewed as too narrow to encapsulate the full range of soft policy approaches adopted by successive Chinese regimes (Lampton, 2008; Lai, 2013). Scott (2013) identifies six indigenous foreign policy concepts that have had a longstanding influence on policy outcomes. These include: • • • • • •

“Peaceful development” (heping fazhan). “Multipolarity” (duo jihua). “Democratization of international relations” (guojigianxi mingzhuhua). “Multilateralism” (duobian zhuyi). “Peaceful rise” (heping jueqi). “Harmonious world” (hexie shijie) (Scott, 2013, 40).

Another related approach is offered by Lampton (2008). He believes that Chinese policy approaches include something called “ideational power.” Ideational power reinforces China’s commitment to peaceful development, peaceful rise, engaging in collective action to confront common problems, and promoting win-win outcomes (Lampton, 2008). President Xi’s “China Dream” concept includes most of the above concepts as part of an overall strategy to build a peaceful and harmonious world (Liu, 2015). Zhao (2020) adds that PRC policymakers are actively working to reconceptualize Chinese history, emphasizing successive dynastic regimes’ commitment to peace, prosperity, and benevolent leadership in Asia. China’s two-thousand-year relatively peaceful and stable domination of the Asian Continent compares favorably to Western domination, characterized by imperialism, cultural hegemony, frequent warfare, and economic mismanagement. He states that policymakers assert that “China’s rise is thus to restore justice in an unjust world and will bring peace and

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order to the Region” (Zhao, 2020). This message is echoed by Kishore Mahbubani (2020), who has long supported the narrative that the world would be better if the West accepted China’s traditional global leadership role (Mahbubani, 2008, 2020).

6.4

Policy Stream Two: China as a Science Superpower

Among the various tools available to achieve Chinese foreign policy goals, science stands out as both a hard and soft power resource. The importance of science is enshrined in China’s Four Modernizations: agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology (Baum, 1980; MacFarquhar, 2011). At the beginning of the Reform Period, science and technology were China’s weakest links. Scientific progress was slow during most of the Mao period, leaving China decades behind the developed world. However, China now ranks first or second globally in four key indicators of science and technology development: patents and trademarks, manufacture and trade of high-tech goods, production of science PhDs, and publication of science-focused articles (World Bank, 2015). China’s rise as a “science power” is undeniable, and upward trends in these major science prowess measurements positively contrast with Japan and the United States. It hosts world-beating high-tech firms such as Huawei, Tencent, and Alibaba. It is a world leader in supercomputing, nanotechnology, and biotech. It also is building an ambitious space program. It is only the second country to land a rover on Mars and the first to explore the dark side of the Moon. By 2024, scientists will complete the construction of a new permanently human-crewed space station. How do environmental science and related policies fit into China’s overall efforts to accelerate science and technology development? Environmental science did not initially rank high on the list of modernization priorities. As China emerged from the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders were far more concerned with catching up with the West economically. This policy of leaning to one side, growth over the environment, is a perennial problem that plagues all developing nations, and even today still inhibits Chinese environmental policy (Harrington, 2017; Economy, 2018). However, after the United Nations officially recognized the PRC as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people, China began to reengage with the global science community. Chinese environmental scientists were among the earliest to venture beyond China’s borders and engage in “conference diplomacy” (Economy, 1998). It did take some time for these efforts to catch the attention of senior leaders. However, Deng Xiaoping consciously used Western affection for China’s native Giant Pandas to score political points. China’s “Panda Diplomacy” initiatives focused on the symbolic value of using environmental cues to foster goodwill in international circles (Harrington, 2005). China’s premier status as a global science power is bolstered by its Antarctica operations. China’s Kunlun Station is constructed atop a 4000-meter-thick ice dome

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in the most remote and least-studied part of Antarctica. The average daily temperature is -58 °C. It takes two weeks via snowcat from Zhongshan Station to reach the summit. Virtually all other bases are built near coastlines. Scientists are working to collect some of the world’s deepest and oldest ice cores (Tang et al., 2020). Due to its extremely dry atmospheric conditions and dark skies during the winter, Dome A provides a unique location for astronomical investigation, including the hunt for extra-solar planets (Li et al., 2015). Zhang and Haward note that the number of scientific projects and related funding more than doubled between 2010 and 2018 (Zhang & Haward, 2022). China is also innovating in the icebreaker arena. It commissioned its second icebreaker (Finnish-designed) in 2019 and plans to complete its first nuclear icebreaker in 2024 (Xinhuanet, 2020). The nuclear icebreaker will vastly improve China’s ability to carry out months-long operations without resupplying anywhere in the world (Humpert, 2019).

6.5

Policy Stream Three: Participation in Global Ecopolitics

For China, early engagement in global ecopolitics was a low cost-high reward endeavor. The starting point for China’s foray into global ecopolitics was its participation in the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. A small cadre of Chinese scientists, many of whom later took on leadership posts in domestic environmental institutions, became involved in environmental “conference diplomacy.” The international community was excited about the PRC participation in global governance. Many nations, development banks, and international organizations were willing to provide financial, technical, and institutional support to upgrade China’s environmental conditions (Economy, 2001; Harrington, 2005; World Bank, 2013). Since China had no tradition of environmental regulation, foreign actors had an outsized role in formulating environmental laws and regulations. Deng Xiaoping’s habit of using pandas to cement bilateral relations highlighted the country’s interest in biodiversity protection. Also, environmentalists’ calls for reducing global population growth were congruent with China’s population control policies (Ross, 1998). During the 1980s, western models comingled with Chinese bureaucratic traditions. China’s National Environmental Protection Agency mirrored similar entities in the U.S. and Europe, and environmental bureaus appeared at different levels of government. As the economy grew at double-digit rates, policymakers also became increasingly aware of the negative externalities of unchecked economic development (Ma & Ortolano, 2000; Economy, 2018).

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Sustainable Development

Another important outgrowth of China’s ecopolitics engagement was the growing domestic interest in sustainable development. After the 1987 publication of Our Common Future, the concept has become a core component of environment and development discourses worldwide (Brundtland Commission, 1987; Sachs, 2015). China’s participation in the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio Summit) educated senior leadership about both the concept’s domestic and global ecopolitics utility. China quickly jumped on the bandwagon. China was the first country to publish an “Agenda 21” sustainable development plan, which received plaudits in international capitals (Harrington, 2005; Stensdal, 2014). It also joined the Kyoto Protocol regime. Since China was classified as a developing country, it was not required to promise mandatory cuts in GHG emissions. This allowed policymakers to criticize deficiencies in developed nations commitments while taking little action at home. At the 2002 United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powel was famously booed for trying to defend President Bush’s pullout of the Kyoto Protocol (Lewis, 2013; Economy, 2018). China’s commitment to ecopolitics/sustainable development discourses deepened in the 2000s. China was a strong supporter of the Millennium Development Goals. Sustainable development is included on the list. It was also involved in the creation of the 2015 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The Sustainable Development Goals (17) offer a far more expansive view of sustainability, including gender equality, income inequality, clean water and sanitation, ending poverty and hunger, promoting sustainable urbanization, and many others. As the world’s most populous country, China shares these challenges and Chinese leaders acknowledge that that balancing economic growth, sustainability, and equitable development are key to the country’s future prosperity and stability (UNDP, 2015a; Harrington, 2017). Chinese negotiators were heavily involved in drafting the final Agenda document. China has also conceptually integrated multiple Sustainable Development Goals into its multitrillion Belt and Road Initiative (Lajcak, 2018; UNDP, 2015b). China’s engagement in the United Nations Framework on Climate Change negotiations compares favorably to some other large economies such as the United States. President Trump, following in President Bush’s footsteps, rejected the 2015 Paris Accords agreement. President Biden reinstated United States participation in the Paris Accord regime in 2021. Also, China, along with India and other large developing countries, successfully fought for creation of a loss and damage fund which acknowledges the primary responsibility of developed countries for historical emissions and commits them, in principle, to increase financial support to address the deleterious effects of global warming in less affluent countries (Ji, 2022).

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Conclusion

This author asserts that multiple reinforcing policy streams, including soft power, the quest for science supremacy, and participation in global ecopolitics, contribute to China’s demonstrated interest in Antarctica. Moreover, progress in Antarctica has roughly moved in tandem with each of these streams.

6.6.1

Demonstrating Leadership

Antarctica provides an excellent platform for China to show its commitment to global environmental governance. The cost of entry into the ATS is relatively low. ATS values such as democratic governance, multilateralism, peaceful development, and democratic governance are officially embraced and supported by Chinese policymakers. Democratic governance is an issue of particular interest because many international organizations skew voting power in favor of large donor countries. ATS voting systems give equal voting power to each member. The primacy of scientific investigation is enshrined in the AT, Environmental Protocol, and other documents as the core mission of all ATS states. Science is the currency of power in Antarctica, which dovetails with China’s rise as a premier science power. The more it invests in research and infrastructure, the more credit it can claim. The ATS’s weak enforcement mechanisms and the Region’s vast size provide plenty of freedom to pursue members’ sovereign interests. In short, “Antarctica provides a venue in which China can demonstrate its current and future interest in global problems such as climate change and species protection, defend the commons against territorial claims by others, and show its support for collective governance laws and institutions” (Harrington, 2016).

6.6.2

Wither Resources and Territory Narrative?

Deng Xiaoping coined a useful phrase that is still poignant across time and borders, “learn truth from facts.” In his case, he responded to the Cultural Revolution’s chaos and ideological fervor. This analysis does not reject the assertion that “resources and territory” are active motivations for China’s Antarctic activities. Other major regional powers have expressed similar interests. In fact, the Reagan Administration led an effort to open Antarctica to mining in the 1980s (Joyner, 1998). Australia only recently shelved a plan to build a multi-use concrete runway near Davis Station (Liu, 2022). However, facts on the ground and China’s descriptive performance support a more peaceful and cooperative stance. Some Western elected officials, academics, and media outlets believe that China is just biding its time until it can fulfill its true

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“hard power” intentions. That may be true, but currently, available evidence does not support it.

6.6.3

Caveats and Opportunities for Research

The primary purpose of this analysis is to explain why the PRC has shown significant interest in Antarctica. Little discussion is provided about larger geopolitical forces and contexts outside the realms of soft power, environmental science, and global environmental governance. Great power rivalry led to the creation of Antarctica and has the potential to turn Antarctic affairs in a totally different direction. It would be useful to more clearly articulate the interaction of these external forces on Chinese actions in the region. Further research is needed on China’s station-level operations on the Continent. Chinese officials are not always completely forthcoming about future Antarctic base activities and plans. This is especially true of its newest and potentially largest base on Inexpressible Island. Introduction of dual use technologies and infrastructure with potential military applications is always a possibility (this applies to other countries as well). It is important for all Antarctic countries to provide timely and clear information about their operations. Also, this study primarily draws from the English language literature. English works emphasize environmental themes while Chinese language publications put more focus on possible future economic and resource utilization opportunities. A fuller survey of the Chinese language literature will provide even deeper insight into China’s policy motivations and long-term intentions on the Frozen Continent. Disclaimer The views and/or claims/or data expressed in this chapter are solely authors’ own or based on literature survey and are not necessarily linked with their affiliations, editors of the book, reviewers of the chapter or the publisher.

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Chapter 7

Environmental Management Through Ecopolitics: An Alternative and Strategic Approach for Rebuilding the Global Carbon Sink Bill Butterworth

Abstract Globally, fear of cutting Carbon emissions resulting in degrowth has led to false promises by politicians, particularly at COP26. This, in turn, is mobilising youth opinion and there is a growing civil disobedience. The re-building of the global terrestrial Carbon sink is examined as one of the important options. This is discussed in the context of increasingly restrictive regulation and also looks at the necessity of cash drivers to bridge the gap between action to curb climate change and economic growth. Re-designing regulation and the cost to the state is proposed. The necessary recycling of urban waste is linked to the global youth, including the millions unemployed, using proximity farm and forestry land with the cash drivers necessarily involved. In this chapter, the relationship between financial and environmental sustainability is discussed and a socio-economic conclusion is described which includes a system of reverse franchising and local supervision by members of a professional body. Keywords Carbon · Cash · Recycling · Regulation · Waste · Young people

Abbreviations COP UNFCCC CCS

Conference of the Parties United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Carbon Capture and Storage

B. Butterworth (✉) The Director, Land Research Ltd, Wiltshire, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Tripathi et al. (eds.), Eco-Politics and Global Climate Change, Environment & Policy 65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48098-0_7

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Introduction

Energy from Carbon fuels and discussion about global warming became a formal, international discussion with COP 1 held in Berlin in 1995. It was followed by one COP every year and, notably, there was an agreement at COP15 in Paris in which 195 nations pledged to keep global warming “below” 2 °C and to pursue efforts to limit the rise to 1.5 °C. In 2018, the UK government published a plan (UK Government, 2018) setting out a commitment to improve the environment. By COP26 in Glasgow (UK) in 2022, it became clear that empty promises had been made and were being increasingly made at political level (Vidal, 2021) and global Carbon dioxide (CO2) level in the atmosphere was continuously rising. Political leaders were increasingly fearful of the consequences to political power if economic progress were to be reversed (Linaerts et al., 2021; Monbiot, 2021). This fear of de-growth is not new (Malthus, 1798). The opposing forces of global energy production from fossilised fuel and the rise of active environmental interest have sparked many bursts of publicity, notably by young people such as Greta Thunberg, the environmental campaigner (Carrington, 2019). There has also been a surge in media interest and notably from the BBC and its nature programmes. For example, the first episode of BBC’s latest David Attenborough series was seen by 14.1 million, equivalent to 20% of the UK population (Raddick, 2017; Prynn, 2019; Rogan, 2020) This surge in media coverage also indicates that people are changing their lifestyles to adapt and respond to climate change (Cockburn, 2022). Logically, even if the rise in CO2 emissions is slowed down or stopped, taking some of the increased level of gas out of the atmosphere is still desirable. As the emission currently continue to rise, then taking such emissions out becomes urgent. Certainly, the rising interest in industrial Carbon Capture and Storage is important and logically must be pursued. However, most of such processes, if not all, take energy to drive them and it will take decades to build capacity. All of this avoids the question of economic progress and political interests, plus the potentially more sinister interests of political relationships with major business interests such as the oil industry.

7.2 7.2.1

The Options: Pyramid of Life Starts at the Bottom Iconic Species

It is always politically popular to talk about biodiversity and rewilding, especially when emotive and iconic species can be talked about, including whales, dolphins, lions, tigers, chimpanzees, polar bears, and elephants. Logically, each one of these depends on their food supply and so on down to the base of the food chain, to micro-

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organisms (Trebilco et al., 2013; Rawat et al., 2020). Basis of all higher life has been, and continues to be, based on micro-organisms (Timberley et al., 2009; Dance, 2021). However, there is a problem in that microbes are not attractive for politicians to talk about in terms of securing political support. Nevertheless, they are fundamental to arresting a climate disaster.

7.2.2

Microbial Building Blocks

It is certainly the case that many small creatures become food to other creatures up the food chain. However, there are no barriers as to what eats what. For example, the Blue Whale (at up to 10 m long and 130 tonnes in weight, the largest creature on Earth, ever) feed on Krill, one of the smallest creatures visible to the human eye (Torres et al., 2014).

7.2.3

Phytoplankton and Climate Change

The microbial population of the oceans and climate change are closely related (Danovaro, 2022). Indeed, satellite photography is showing that global warming reduces phytoplankton growth and productivity (Walsh, 2014). Therefore, as the plankton in the oceans are the largest “lung” globally for taking CO2 out of the atmosphere, and giving back Oxygen, it is here that one of the most critical tipping points approaches.

7.2.4

Closing the Urban Waste Loop

In 2007, the proportion of the global human population living in cities, passed the 50% for the first time, and estimated to be greater than 60% by 2030. Critically, they already account for 70% of Carbon dioxide emissions and 60% of resource use (United Nations, 2022a; York, 2022). It is here, then, that a significant opportunity grows. Cities produce wastes and it is a physical reality of significant weight and volume which actually mechanically blocks movement if not collected and cleared. Further, it has been known for centuries that city waste may carry a potentially catastrophic disease risk such as with the plagues of the Middle Ages (Menzies, 2002). Municipal wastes are estimated to already be over 2 billion tonnes annually (Kaza et al., 2018). Estimates of how much of this could be composted and returned to the land as fertiliser are highly variable (Butterworth, 2009b). One estimate is discussed below in Sect. 7.6.

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Taking wastes produced by humans, at the “top” of the pyramid, and recycling it by digesting it using micro-organisms at the “bottom” of the pyramid, turns the whole into a circle, rather than a pyramid and, therefore, has a chance of perpetual existence (Butterworth, 2019).

7.3 7.3.1

The Dilemma in Regulation Negative Regulation. The Need to Limit Risk to Human Life, Wildlife and the Environment

There is an intrinsic element of failure in regulation. Jim Collins (Collins, 2001) in his book on his excellent research into what makes a really great business operation, made a very interesting and succinct observation about bureaucracy. The research team looked the work of George Rathmann, the co-founder of Amgen, a very successful pharmaceutical company in the USA. Collins saw that Rathmann understood that “the purpose of bureaucracy is to compensate for incompetence and lack of discipline”. In that research Collins adds, “The regulators clearly have a function and the State, wherever it is, has a duty to set up just such a control mechanism; there is always incompetence and indiscipline in every area of society and nowhere more than in handling wastes.” However, Collins goes on to observe that what happens in most organisations is that the culture of the bureaucracy is to develop itself in order to build increasing improvements in risk management and safety levels. This is encouraged and accelerated by the small percentage of operators who are prepared to take unacceptable environmental risks and continue, in their own culture, to try to get round the regulations and the regulators. This tends to increasingly inhibit the disciplined operators who really want to “do it right” and they get faced with a choice of bending the rules or going out of business. Rathman was spot on; the inevitable result of prescriptive regulation is to turn the good guys into bad guys.

7.3.2

Nitrate Pollution of Groundwater

As an example of the divergence of science and regulation, consider the glaring failure of the Environment Agency in the UK to recognise the difference between organically held Nitrogen and soluble Nitrogen fertiliser. It is perfectly true that mineral Nitrogen from say, ammonium nitrate, will suffer significant losses to ground water. Rain or irrigation will leach maybe over 50% of the N into groundwater on sand but somewhat less on clays. The Agency is quite right to try to limit that. However, Vermuyden, when the Dutch engineer, drained the Fens in the east of the UK some 300 years ago, some of the organic soils were over 13 m deep and it has been possible to grow the best crops in the country, every year, without ever adding

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any Nitrogen fertiliser. The reserves were enormous and yet there is no evidence of pollution of the dykes and groundwater. How this safe system works is quite simple; the N was organically bound (Butterworth, 1999). Good composting can do the same. There is no need to limit the amount of organic N per ha and putting on a 10-year supply in one run will reduce fuel costs and compaction (Butterworth, 2009a).

7.3.3

Soil Microbiome and Safety

The soil, with the organisms in it, is a staggeringly flexible and tolerant universe. The micro-organisms evolved with plants in an integrated and inter-related package which, on the whole, works rather well. Farmers themselves generally do not go somewhere else at 5 pm – if they make a mistake, they know they will suffer loss in the short run and possibly hand that loss on to their children. Add to that an organised discipline based on fundamental science and applied technology and there is the basis of a sustainable operation. The question then arises as to whether that “organised discipline” is the farmers and their organisation, or the state. The logical answer is, of course, a partnership of all three. However, in Western democracies, there is a tendency for state regulators to feel safe if they regulate for those who are not responsible citizens, to the detriment of those who are. When responsibility is taken away from people actually on the ground, either by big business or by the state, then innovation is stifled, and entrepreneurial activity is inhibited. The system will break down and the environment will suffer. Farm-based systems do not have that fundamental fault simply because the farmer has to live with his mistakes and pass them on to his family and children.

7.3.4

Bio-assay – in vivo

There is one test that is above all laboratory tests and that is “bio-assay” which, itself, can be done in the lab but is better still if it is in vivo i.e., in the real living world. It is not in the nature of a regulated society, even anarchy, to allow operators to just get on with it, so laboratory tests are, and will always be, the basis of scientific appraisal of any situation, including the possible use of wastes on the land to grow crops sustainably. Nevertheless, when all the lab tests are done, there is one useful advantage of composting; it is a buffer in the chain between production of wastes and use on the land. Biological systems are rarely instant, and commonly not even fast. Certainly, digestion is slow and the bigger the molecule, the slower the process. However, given time and possibly enough dilution, nature will digest almost anything, including molecules such as PCB’s (polychlorinated hydrocarbons) and the explosive TNT (tri-nitro toluene) (USEPA, 1998).

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As a guide rule, if a material is put into a compost heap, and the process follows normal patterns of temperature progress, time, odour, and visual appraisal, then it is probably safe. Having said that, even if not demanded by regulation, the testing of output of the composting process is good scientific procedure and essential for managing heavy metal content and sustainability.

7.3.5

The Safety of Composting

As an extension of this above-mentioned thinking, all of the farms in the Land Research’s composting network in the UK complied with not only regulation but beyond that using best available technology to evaluate composts before putting to land. Some of these farms were still not able to detect anything but sustainable benefits after over 20 years of putting compost on the same land for that period. Yields were still creeping up, crop disease was slowly creeping down and no one, including the UK Environment Agency (despite exercising their powers very actively) was able to identify negative effects. There is an important principle here; long-term monitoring is a fundamental of managing sustainability responsibly.

7.3.6

Enabling

There is a difference between what is scientifically possible and likely to be safe under a particular set of circumstances and what the regulators think should be allowed under any circumstances. In the EU and UK, that difference is sometimes significant. In the UK, the interpretation of EU rules (as originally adopted) is based on avoiding crisis or liability, rather than enabling. It follows that regulation is frequently bad for the environment. It ought not to be that way, but often is and, nevertheless, the law is the law.

7.3.7

The Alternative to Over-Regulation

Malthus (1513) pointed out that “There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For, the reformer has enemies in all who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order. This lukewarmness arises partly from fear of their adversaries who have the law in their favour; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything until they have had actual experience of it.” In short, innovation has forces against it which are likely to lead to failure.

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The historian, Jane Marshall (2009), once said to the author of this text; “It is in the history of the world that, whenever an empire collapses and for whatever reason, those left in power in the middle pass more and more regulations, involving more and more public servants, in order (they think) to reverse the collapse. What actually happens is that they stifle innovation and inhibit entrepreneurial activity, so accelerating the rate of decline. That is what is happening in the UK, here and now.” The alternative to the progressive, negative development of over-regulation is that the regulator has to find a way of imposing a discipline without switching off the good guys. This is always possible if the right minds are put to work on the problem and the political will is there. That political will may come from reducing the cost to the State. There are potentially many solutions to this and the one outlined below involved development of the basic principle of making the operator on the ground responsible, legally and, most importantly, financially, for their own success or failure by using a recognised professional supervisory mechanism. There is one more pitfall to be recognised before looking at the potential solution. There is a cancer-like mechanism in bureaucracy. The democracies of the Western nations have a real problem, and it is the growth of numbers employed in the state sector. Generally, in the experience of the author of this text, two regulators do half as much effective policing and twice as much inhibition to good operators, as one regulator. It is fundamental that the humans that run the arms of government will seek to protect themselves. Most economists agree that when public expenditure (of a state) gets to 50% of total national spend (as GDP), the situation is, at best, potentially very difficult (Parkinson, 1955; Fowler, 1957; European Central Bank, 2020) Some economists argue that at that point, total collapse of the economy is unavoidable. The UK is close to that 50%.

7.3.8

Positive Regulation: The Need to Limit Risk to Human Life, Wildlife and the Environment

Running an efficient and enabling civil service depends on having a very clear vision of what the objectives are and a very clear discipline of the joint obligations of policing and enabling. Generally, that cannot be achieved with more staffing, it is achieved with less staff, properly trained, properly paid and properly led. This comes down to leadership at the very top, clearly understood mission statements and backing of the people. An example of such clarity is French civil service where, to get to the top, you have to be trained at La Grande Ecole, where there is one thing that is deeply entrenched in teaching which is the question; “Is this good for France?”

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Professional Enablement vs. Regulation

There can be no doubt of the necessity of having central government involved in the enforcement of environmental safety. There is, however, a question of principle and detail. For example, in the UK, there used to be a relatively small, separate, completely independent body called HMIP – Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution. It acted if, and only if, there was actual pollution or danger of imminent and significant pollution. That was backed up by taking cases to Court for legal proceedings. It was up to the Court to decide if there was pollution and, indeed, how that word was defined at the time. That organisation was widely respected. Where the EU and UK went wrong is in the development of prescriptive regulation which, as the above concludes, become progressively disabling. There is also the need to recognise that pollution is not just an individual or national issue, it is one of global significance and of human right of survival. Suppose, then, there would be an equivalent of HMIP, possibly called the “Environment Police” and no further regulation, other than prohibition of pollution and environmental damage. Instead, possibly the United Nations takes the initiative and works with an organisation such as the International Union of Soil Scientists (IUSS), and/or other professional bodies, to set up, and keep under continual review, a statement of the parameters of what pollution really is, then, leave the detail of interpretation at national level to bodies such as the American Society of Agricultural and Biological Engineers (in the USA) or the British Society of Soil Scientists (in the UK). Such bodies give guidance on operational frameworks to their professionally qualified Members. Finally, local municipal authorities can be empowered to appoint one or more professionally qualified persons to oversee recycling operations in their area. If the Environment Police, sees fit to prosecute and take a case to Court and there is pollution confirmed, then that Court has the option to restrict, penalise or withdraw the permitted supervision. That is, in effect, what Land Research set up with a percentage of the gate fee used to fund the supervision (Butterworth, 2009a, b). The evidence suggests that a more productive, environmentally safer operation to re-build the global terrestrial Carbon sink can be run with the government at arm’s length (Butterworth, 2022).

7.4

7.4.1

Political Government and Populism, Implementation by Regulators, and Commercial Delivery: The Conflict Between These Parties Media Reporting

The tide of media reporting on international action on climate change was marked by a UK newspaper on a report in a German newspaper in September 2022 (The Week, 2022) on the German government attempt to alleviate the economic pressure on its

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population caused by the fuel cost crisis, by offering a very low cost, Euro 9, ticket to use public transport for 3 months. The 52 million tickets sold were estimated to have saved 1.8 million tonnes of CO2 being pumped into the atmosphere. The fact that this was a newspaper reporting on another newspaper is an indicator of rising media interest in reporting on the public response to positive action by government action on energy use linked to the government index of the cost of living.

7.4.2

Chilean Referendum

Voters are still concerned with their own economic survival. Chilean voters voted 62 to 38 against incorporating a string of environmental measures into the Chilian constitution (Romo et al., 2022).

7.4.3

Voting for Cash

The difference between the German government offer of a heavily subsidised travel ticket (which offered a cash saving to economically stressed individuals) and the Chilean referendum (which appeared to threaten extra expense to individual voters) was, quite simply, cash in the pocket of a significant proportion of public opinion. The key to a rational garbage policy is to ensure that the prices people are charged for disposal services reflect the true social costs of getting rid of the stuff (Paccell, 1991). Nevertheless, the management and regulation of municipal wastes remains a significant government problem and cost.

7.4.4

Political Influence on Public Opinion

The conclusion from this short discussion is that governments, whatever their nature, always have a fundamental, deep-seated desire for their own survival and that survival is related to the feeling of survival in each individual in their support network, i.e., the population they govern. History is littered with orators who can sway opinion in the masses. However, history also shows that that sway is likely to be short-lived, or at least ultimately fail, if it does not provide for the mass of its population to feel secure. The short-term trigger for that feeling is economic gain (Wittmer, 2022). If that logic is accepted, then it follows that for climate change to be managed, then the mass of population must feel that any required change brings them economic security, most obviously measured by cash in their pocket. Is that too simplistic? Possibly so. However, in view of the likely time scale (IPCC, 2018) and the need to act before any final tipping point, probably not.

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The Independence of the Media

It is generally accepted that the scientific literature is relatively politically independent. Relatively, the popular press often is not. The estimated (Jafar, 2021) global 1.9 billion unemployed young people rarely read the popular press and probably never the scientific press. However, some at least do get messages via the social media. It is here that the battle for the minds of the young is being fought. The bad news is that misinformation is often more emotional and can change things negatively, than the truth. However, it is still available for the constructive opening of doors for the young to develop their place in the business world which can help change the way climate change develops, reduce pollution, grow food and sustain their communities.

7.5 7.5.1

Incentive, Prohibition, and Policing: Delivery in the Real-World Regulation and Cash Drivers Incentive

In most situations, in most countries, cash can be used as both the incentive and the penalty. Rural enterprise, driven by cash incentives, can certainly deliver recycling (Lagerfeld et al., 2021) and recycle urban wastes to produce organic fertilisers (Butterworth, 2009b). Therefore, rebuilding the global soil Carbon sink remains the option with the hope of volume and speed.

7.5.2

Prohibition

The argument that the only way that those who intend to push and break the rules is by regulation and policing, is illogical, although that is the way most regulators evolve and work. The problem is that prohibition usually does not work very well, if at all (Luckhurst, 2020). The truth logically is that regulations are necessary but, to work, they also need to enable operators to earn their living.

7.5.3

Policing

Policing by the state, if it works at all, is expensive (McKean, 1980). Indeed, as time has progressed one might be forgiven for observing that crime does pay. The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement and Co-operation (EUROPOL) estimated in 2022 that “Overall, the annual value of transnational environmental crime is estimated to be worth USD 70 to 213 billion annually” (EUROPOL, 2022). (For a detailed discussion on enabling and incentives, see detail in Sect. 7.7 below.)

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Delivery in Real-World Regulation and Cash Drivers

As Sect. 7.3 above observes, regulation happens and usually leads to the stifling of innovation. As Sect. 7.4 argues, the required innovation necessary to control climate change involves cash drivers which will produce incentives to fund change, without restricting the economic status of the wider population.

7.6 7.6.1

The Opportunity. Figures on Re-building BACS - The Global Bio-active Carbon Sink The International Labour Organisation

The International Labour Organisation, concluded (ILO, 2020) that “Young women and men are well placed to benefit from the expansion of green and blue (ocean resources and their sustainable use) economies. According to the report, an additional 8.4 million jobs for young people could be created by 2030 through the implementation of green and blue policy measures.” So, where might these jobs be?

7.6.2

Energy and Carbon Dioxide Production

In 2015, human consumption of energy produced about 10 billion tonnes of CO2 pa and about half that, according to Raupach (Raupach, 2011; Butterworth, 2021) stays in the air, and half goes to land and the oceans. By the year 2021, the global CO2 emissions from burning fossil fuels was estimated to have reached in the region of 35 to 40 billion tonnes and growing (IEA, 2022). In theory at least, the land and the seas are able to process that Carbon dioxide by photosynthesis and produce organic Carbon-based molecules and return Oxygen to the atmosphere. Whatever that total is currently, or may rise to, the air is where the additions of these emissions arise and that concentration is static or rising and, therefore, both the problem and the opportunity. It is certainly necessary to reduce these emissions to the atmosphere. Managing the sea is something we are only just starting to do. As urgency is imperative, it is the land, where the technology is available, that is the opportunity.

7.6.3

Land Use

How much dry land exists is roughly known. It is shrinking but we do at least have a handle on it. How much agricultural and forestry land is available for use is also at least estimated (World Bank, 2022b).

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Global land area . . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. Cultivated area . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . Forest . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. Grassland and natural ecosystems. . .

13.2 billion ha, shrinking as sea levels rise 1.6 billion ha, shrinking under urbanisation and desertification 3.7 billion ha, shrinking under urbanisation, desertification and agriculture. 4.6 billion ha, shrinking under urbanisation, desertification and agriculture.

For the purposes of this text, it is only the approximate areas that are significant. Suppose we use the land in each of these categories for the purpose stated in the World Bank’s figures, plus another use, i.e., as a Carbon sink. For the sake of this discussion consider those areas as follows; Cultivated land – possibly 1 billion ha could be used Forest land – possibly 1 billion ha could be used Grassland, savannahs, and natural ecosystems – 2 billion ha could be used Possibly, 4 billion ha in total.

7.6.4

Carbon End State – Current

Suppose, for the sake of an indicative calculation, a figure of 40 billion tonnes of CO2 per annum is produced globally (IEA, 2022). Taking atomic weights of Carbon and Oxygen means that would contain, say, around 10 billion tonnes of Carbon. There is a classic way of solving a problem. It is to find a mirror image problem and put the two together so as they cancel each other out and, with cleverness and luck, it may be possible to create a synergy and get ahead. The human race has two such problems; too much CO2 and too much waste. Of all the many things we, the human race, have to do, one of the necessary actions is to clear cities from waste and recycle it – most of it can go to farm or forestry land. Remember that 1 tonne of Nitrogen nutrient in a fertiliser, made in a modern and efficient American factory, typically takes 21,000 kWh to manufacture and deliver (Gellings & Parmenter, 2004). Using “Garbage”, the wastes from cities and urban areas, and nearly all of it, as fertiliser is the only sustainable way for the human race to produce food, reduce irrigation demand, reduce direct and indirect or “surrogate” energy use in agriculture, and survive. World Bank figures (World Bank, 2022a) indicate very wide variation in human waste output, varying from 0.09 kg per person per day in parts of North Africa to 2.0 Kg in OECD countries with a current global total of around 2 billion tonnes, rising to 3.5 billion by 2050. A further waste, rich in plant nutrients is human excrement. The human race produces about 290 billion kg of faeces per year, and about 1.98 billion litres of urine.

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Carbon End State – Options

Adding the garbage and excrement figures together and composting the lot together, would give a total input of around 2.5 billion tonnes per annum. After composting, which loses some moisture (and a little of the Carbon), there might be 2 billion tonnes fresh weight. The total organically bound Carbon will certainly be variable, but for the sake of this indicative calculation, 15% of the fresh weight is likely to be a useful guide, which indicates a global total of around 325 million tonnes. Put that into landfill and it could, potentially, produce over 400 million tonnes of methane – a very potent greenhouse gas. Alternatively, incinerate it and, potentially, it would produce over 1 billion tonnes of CO2. This calculation shows that incineration of urban wastes is mass suicide. There is an alternative which is to develop composting of as much urban waste as possible. There is a note of caution, here, in that composting and application to soil does result in a low level of oxidation of the Carbon and Nitrogen – but it is low level and can be managed to be very low level (Butterworth, 2009a). Despite that, there would be 3 very attractive environmental results: (i) Directly build the soil organic Carbon sink. It will be biologically active (i.e., BACS – Biologically Active Carbon Sink) and will grow crops with almost no loss of nutrients to groundwater. (ii) The expanding global population needs feeding and that will need both the mineral fertiliser production that we already have plus the composted urban wastes as above. That compost will save the energy used to produce mineral fertilisers (Butterworth, 2009a). (iii) Grow more green-leaved plants, including on remediated arid and desert land.

7.6.6

Percentage Compostable

Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) varies in its composition within a nation, seasonally and related to the affluence of the area from which it is collected, and similarly across the globe. If it is possible to separate collection of really toxic materials, such as from industrial areas, and to mechanically or by hand pick the collected material (i.e., the MSW or “garbage”) for materials which can have a value and possibly be sold (separating out most of the hard plastic may not be necessary – see below), then what is left is potentially valuable from soil and plant food point of view. Composting separated-residual MSW with sewage, subject to testing for toxins at unacceptable levels, will make a safe additive for soils, even if it does not look attractive. That look can be changed by appropriate management (Butterworth, 2021, 2022).

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7.6.7

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Developing the Technology Low-Level Air Extraction, Evolving Species of Micro-organisms to Digest Plastics

Low volume extraction of air from under a composting operation can completely remove public nuisance from odour (Butterworth, 2009b, 2021). That is certainly a start in avoiding public objection. However, the really exciting technology is that of the evolution of new species, or at least new strains of existing micro-organisms that can and do digest plastics (Gunter, 2016; Fujiwara et al., 2021). What this means is that we are moving towards being able to build local businesses which will up-cycle 100% of municipal and industrial wastes as fertilisers to grow food.

7.6.8

Fertiliser Energy Value

Take just Nitrogen nutrient alone and, for the sake of an indicative value of this compost, put the energy cost of other crop nutrients on one side and just look at the energy savings in Nitrogen fertiliser production. Two billion tonnes of such compost, even if it only providing 1% (and it might, depending on input material be 3 or 4%) of N nutrient would make a significant saving energy cost and Carbon dioxide production. Gellings’ figure of 21,000 kWh of electricity to manufacture and deliver one tonne of N nutrient may give too rosy a picture (Gellings & Parmenter, 2004). Some factories, according to informal research by Land Research Ltd., in production elsewhere in the world are up to a factor of 26 times less efficient. Nevertheless, take only a 1% N level and the 21,000 to give an indication of the problem and the opportunity. Global Nitrogen fertiliser production is approaching 150 million tonnes. Most of the electricity used in that production will have come from burning fossilised, hydrocarbon fuels (See www.landresearchonline.com 20 December 14). As a guestimate, that may be more than a global consumption of a thousand, trillion kWh electricity per annum (i.e., 1000,000,000,000 kWh). The Table 7.1 below (EIA, 2021) shows typical values for the Carbon dioxide produced by burning hydrocarbon fuels to generate 1 kW h of electricity. Of course, the actual figures do depend on a number of efficiency factors but, for the sake of a good guide, these figures are indicative in a useful way. It shows, amongst other things, that gas is half as polluting as lignite (brown coal), or to put it the other way round, lignite is 100% more polluting in CO2 terms, than gas. Putting that observation on one side, take coal as a common fuel and use that to indicate how much Carbon dioxide would be produced if coal was used (as is the substantially case) to generate the electricity to make the Nitrogen fertiliser as in the above paragraph. The answer is 340,000,000,000 kg or 340 million tonnes of CO2. The energy needed to manufacture and deliver mineral fertilisers, especially Nitrogen, is a significant share of global energy consumption and a real dilemma in planning food security. It is also a potential vulnerable resource, as the recent war in Ukraine showed, for individual farms in terms of cost. There is also the

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Table 7.1 Carbon dioxide produced by burning hydrocarbon fuels to produce electricity (Based on Volker Quaschning 2023)

Fuel Wood Peat Lignite ... Lusatia ... Central Germany ... Rhineland Hard coal Fuel oil Diesel Crude oil Kerosene Gasoline Refinery gas Liquid petroleum gas Natural gas

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Emissions in kg CO2/kWh 0.39 0.8 0.36 0.41 0.37 0.41 0.34 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.20

environmental issue of pollution of groundwater. However, we most certainly do need mineral fertilisers, and more of them, especially Nitrogen, if we are going to seriously try to feed the global population. Nevertheless, while that system of cropping based on mineral fertilisers has fed millions, even billions, who would otherwise have starved, we also need to recycle wastes to land, and this will raise organic matter in soils. In turn, raising soil organic Carbon reduces losses of mineral Nitrogen to groundwater and the associated pollution of groundwater. Indeed, if mineral fertilisers are blended into the late stages of a composting operation, then this will reduce, close to eliminate, the potential losses of 30 to 55% of mineral Nitrogen to groundwater by rainfall or irrigation at a later date after application to land. However, if we keep that Nitrogen fertiliser production, and at the current level, that puts Carbon dioxide into the atmosphere we breathe and locks up some of the Oxygen. Fertiliser manufacture, covering Nitrogen, plus phosphate, potash and others, is responsible for between 1 and 2% of global Carbon dioxide production, somewhere about 600,000,000 tonnes pa.

7.6.9

Application, Opportunity and Results

This discussion is, of course, an over-simplification but it does indicate that, with care and scientific discipline, there is more than just an opportunity here; there is real scope to make a material contribution to crack the problem of global warming resulting from CO2 emissions from burning hydrocarbon fuels. And it would give us back the Oxygen (Butterworth, 2009b).

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The Environment Agency in the UK will allow dressing of 25 tonnes of compost per ha and Land Research Ltd. is looking at putting up to 2000 to 3000 tonnes per ha to reduce irrigation need and reclaim desert. There is no scientific reason to have a limit on tonnes per ha provided the system is organic-Carbon based, there is a balance of the full range of nutrients, and the build-up of toxic elements is within scientifically reasoned limits (Butterworth, 2009a, b). So, where do all these figures lead? Taking 2 billion tonnes of compostable urban wastes as a start, and spreading as little as 25 tonnes per ha, that would take 80 million ha. However, as Para 6.2 above shows, there is potentially 2 billion ha available. There is certainly a constructive use for most of the global production of urban waste, and arguably, not enough of it. There are, of course, significant problems, including the logistics and discipline of organising such a use of urban waste. However, the evidence is that it can be done, i.e., a five million tonnes over 15-year trial which is still going on (Butterworth, 2009a, b, 2022). Although estimates vary quite widely (Raupach, 2011), a reasonable guide for the purposes of this text, of the estimated global terrestrial Carbon sink, i.e., the amount of SOC (Soil Organic Carbon) locked up in the area of dry land (as distinct from the oceans) is in the region 1500 PgC (i.e., 1500 trillion tonnes of Carbon) (Scharlemann et al., 2014). What the above discussion points out is that even small changes, up or down, to that quantity will make significant differences to global warming and human survival. That figure may go down by continued desertification (United Nations, 2022b) and forest fires. It can be pushed up by what is discussed here.

7.6.10

Green Extras

There is another consequence of this recycling of wastes to land. More crops with green leaves can be grown, producing more food and taking more CO2 out of the atmosphere and giving us more Oxygen back. This is not just closing the loop; it is growing the loop.

7.6.11

Caution

There is a note of caution. This is not a secure soil bank; it is dynamic. There are losses of Carbon in composting and in soils, producing CO2, nitrous oxide and methane. These losses are relatively quite small percentages but they do occur. When Carbon is put into the soil Carbon sink, it goes into a biologically active universe – hence the concept of the “Bio-Active Carbon Sink”. It is a dynamic treadmill with Carbon being added and being oxidised in a dynamic closed loop.

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Growing Political Advantage

There needs to be a co-ordinated, master plan for the human race in a sustainable partnership with the land, oceans and nature. Fortunately, some countries are already recycling significant amounts of source-separated municipal waste, via composting to land (Eklind & Kirchmann, 2000; Butterworth, 2022).

7.7

7.7.1

A Novel and Tested Strategy. “Reverse Franchising”. Incentives and Policing by the State and Supervision by Professional Bodies The Basic Idea of “Revere Franchising” Is that the Franchisees Get to Own the Franchisor

A central company, which does not trade, is set up with each farmer, however big or small they are, owning one share. That company is the franchisor and makes the rules and imposes a discipline on field activity. It also does not trade and, therefore, the legal risks are isolated. The Franchisor also sets up and runs, as a separate company, a “Central Support” organisation that provides Codes of Practice based on common sense, farmermembers’ own knowledge, technology, regulation (a key component of organisation) and perhaps most important of all, the developing pool of experience which the organisation has as a whole, i.e., all of its members. This is where the legal responsibility lies. The central operation also provides supervision, advice, commercial assistance, and whatever support members need to develop their businesses. It may also help individual farms set up their own trading companies, still within the group, and with Central Support owning one share in the farmer’s company (Fig. 7.1). There is one other component that is fundamental to success in the face of external concerns and regulation and that is the organisation is supervised by at least one person who is a member of an appropriate professional body, in this case, probably the British Society of Soil Science. It is that person who carries the legal responsibility. For the sake of a label, that position might be called the Secretary of Central Support and while that position may be regarded as the servant of the franchise as a whole, it is also important that their power to prohibit is respected by the whole of the organisation.

7.7.2

The Question of Scale of Operation

This organisation, then, is a way of farmers biding for and managing large contracts to recycle municipal, urban and industrial wastes, without losing individual sovereignty and, at the same time, working together on developing procedures acceptable to the regulators.

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BIO FUELS The LAND

FOOD TIMBER FIBRES OIL SEEDS

LOCK-UP OF CO 2

1 to 10 FARMERS

1 to 10 FARMERS

1 to 10 FARMERS

Proximity Process

Proximity Process

Proximity Process

LAND NETWORK Central Support

WASTE

LEGAL CONTRACTS TECHNICAL CODES of PRACTICE BRAND

Fig. 7.1 The managed landbank using reverse franchising

Initially, the farms do all the physical work and Central Support does virtually all the paperwork. The farms are supplied with the necessary paperwork, including data sheets for recording waste “in” (weighbridge ticket or other means of estimating load quantity and identity) and support to manage their own bank account. Central Support collects the Gate Fees (i.e., the amount charged when a load of waste enters the farm gate) and takes an agreed, small percentage, before passing on the majority of the cash immediately on receipt from the waste hauliers. If and when an individual farm grows big enough and if all the conditions are right for sustaining that growth, then they are set up with their own company which carries a regional label. Examples of real commercial operations working within the framework of a national consortium can be viewed further in the book “Survival” (Butterworth, 2022). The farms remain as individual, sovereign businesses but they may operate in a group in order to serve one large supply contract. The structure is the classic upside-down pyramid, starting with the Central Support Directors (i.e., the farmers with one share each) who support the regional companies. They then, in turn, operate their own industrial composting facility and their own landbank. This can be used to assist small farms operating maybe as little as 1000 tonne pa to developing major, farmer-owned, industrial processing facilities, capable of composting in-vessel and in tonnages ranging from 25,000 tonnes per annum up to 125,000 tonnes pa, or more, in one site. While there is an advantage of scale in big sites, this also increases trucking in and out of the site and potential local objection to traffic inconvenience, noise and pollution in populated areas. It is important that from an environmental point of view, this is a proximity-based system that seeks to avoid centralisation.

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Discipline and Supervision

It is important to stress that there is an over-all supervision by a person who is appropriately trained and experienced in knowing how the various processes work, what the environmental pressures and risks are, and is seen to have a recognised professional status. Central Support is responsible for disciplining the supply chain, which starts with “waste” at the point of its creation and ends with the production of crop and animal products. Increasingly, using the land as a Carbon sink to lock up Carbon dioxide, is seen as a product.

7.8 7.8.1

Global Co-operation. Using Recycling Business Growth to Empower Young People Growing Action from Young People

Young people have driven, are driving and will drive, environmental change (Tyson & Gen, 2021; WMO, 2022) The alternative may also be true, i.e., that stabilising or reversing climate change will fail without the involvement of young people (Barford, 2021). Perhaps the highest profile of youth involved in environmental action is that of Greta Thunberg and “Fridays for Futures” (See https:// fridaysforfuture.org/). That non-violent, civil disobedience produces results that is supported by research (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). The statistics from the world’s economic researchers show a global problem of youth unemployment, approaching a total of 2 billion, much of that total in developing countries (Jafar, 2021).

7.8.2

Youth as a Resource

As the Berlin trial showed (Berlin, 2021) vocational training can provide a route out of many problems. Suppose, then, youth that is looking for a safer future can be involved in vocational training to develop new cash-generating businesses to deliver environmental change and, in particular, a route to surviving climate change. As this text indicates, the technology is available to recycle urban wastes, the land is available, the youth labour is available and wants to do something. Vocational training can link these and deliver real change.

7.8.3

A Climate Apprentice

Jennie Butterworth, while CEO of the UK charity, “Envision” (https://envision.org. uk/) developed the concept of “Community Apprentice” and this was taken on

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nationally by the UK government. The idea involves a member of Envision’s staff working with schools in less advantaged areas to identify a group of students who will develop their skills and confidence from running a project. They ask the students to choose a community project. The staff member will guide but not choose where the students will help their community. It is important that the students own the project. The Envision staff will, in parallel, approach local businesses and look for volunteer business mentors to provide a range of skills needed to help the students to design, fund, organise, progress and complete the project. Again, these volunteers can advise and guide, but the decisions are made by the students. The label for the programme is “Community-Apprentice”. Using this model, there is a possible “Environment Apprentice”, or Climate Apprentice, or indeed, a number of specialist titles and awards, all involving vocational, or “hands-on” training, but possibly also linked, where desired by students, qualifications up to degree level. Success in delivering a project to conclusion could result in the award of “Environment Craftsman”, and so on with publicly recognisable awards. However, it is important to build into this model that the objective is to build eco-businesses that are cash-driven. What is different about this approach is that it uses the available youth, business, land-owning, professional and other local skills and resources to develop businesses for young people to develop and own. If the city authorities and the waste collection industry organise suitable separation of the wastes and then pays the new eco-business to process, by composting or other suitable treatment, and apply it to the land and to improve or reclaim land from desert (Goval, 2016), and grow crops and trees, indeed anything with green leaves, then there is a new sustainable eco-business. The objective is to build the soil Carbon sink and grow crops or forests and reverse the climate change progression. All of this to be driven by cash as discussed in Sects. 7.4 and 7.5 above.

7.9 7.9.1

Conclusions and Future Perspective Discussion

The real problem is that there is little time left for discussion, the information we have says that we are increasingly rapidly approaching a major tipping point in climate change.

7.9.2

Conclusions

In young people, we have a resource to drive change. If civil disobedience is the only way they see to drive change, that too, is a waste of their lives and may accelerate climate change simply because they use energy just to exist. If that resource can be harnessed to recycle urban wastes, to produce fertilisers, to reclaim land for farming

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and forestry, to grow crops, to feed people, then maybe this is one of the things the human race can do to survive. What is discussed here is one example of some research and development work.

7.9.3

The Future Prospects

Just as our political leaders find it easy to accept that financial sustainability is necessary if there is to be environmental sustainability, it is also necessary that the environmental lobby needs to actively embrace that the reverse is true, i.e., that environmental sustainability depends on financial sustainability. The evidence we have from a stream of IPCC reports is that we cannot survive if we do not de-couple economic growth from the burning of fossilised fuels. If we, the people, insist our leaders give us economic growth, we urgently need to couple growth to renewable energy and a closed-loop economy. What this text has begun to look at is the cash drivers that are necessary to rebuild the global terrestrial Carbon sink and make arresting climate change happen. If the major generators of global wealth, such as the global petroleum and manufacturing businesses can get the reward of Carbon Credits by supporting the young to actually do something to drive sustainability, then it might work. Community “Craftsman” might accelerate change in the right direction. Disclaimer The views and/or claims/or data expressed in this chapter are solely authors’ own or based on literature survey and are not necessarily linked with their affiliations, editors of the book, reviewers of the chapter or the publisher.

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Chapter 8

Urban Governance Transformation Under the Background of Ecological Civilization Construction Lin Dan and Luo Yan

Abstract The ecological spatial regulation strategy with the eco-redline (ECR) as its core policy constitutes one of the key contents of the Chinese ecological civilization system. How to implement this policy by local governments, whether the state ecological regulation requirements can be incorporated into the existing city management model is the key to ensuring the effective implementation of the ECR. Drawing on discussions of ecological governance theory, ecological spatial regulation and management research, and local and regional regulation and governance theory, this article proposes a conceptual model of “localized eco-state reconstruction”, with the expectation to explain city and regional governance transformation under the restriction of state ecological spatial regulation policy. The main aim of the research is to understand the ways in which cities achieve both economic and social development through governance restructuring under the ECR. Based on qualitative research, the article finds that the implementation of eco-redline at city and regional scale, the core design factors, and the strength of ecological regulation of the ECR is shaped by various forces originating from the factors such as the stock of regional ecological resource, local growth and management model, the green governance capacity of local governments, the degree of marketization in ecological conservation and local social governance ecology. The way of practices is best understood as the power of the city government to balance forces and demands placed on it. The case studies show four currently emerging modes of localized urban management in China: “strong constraints-transformation development model”, “strong constraintsprogressive transformation model”, “weak constraint-alternative development model” and “weak constraints-conservative development model”. In this context, city and regional governance transformation can be promoted through four types of strategies: ecological transformation development strategy, ecological progressive

L. Dan (✉) Department of Landscape Achitecture, Centre of Tourism Development, Shenzhen Tourism College, Shenzhen, Guangdong, China e-mail: [email protected] L. Yan Wuhan Branch of China Academy of Urban Planning and Design, Wuhan, Hubei, China © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Tripathi et al. (eds.), Eco-Politics and Global Climate Change, Environment & Policy 65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48098-0_8

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transformation development strategy, ecological alternative development strategy and ecological conservative development strategy. Keywords Eco-redline · City governance · Localized eco-state restructuring · Ecological transaction · China

8.1

Introduction

Since the early 1990s, China’s nationwide deteriorating ecological environment has posed a severe test to the rapid expansion of the economy. The leeway for economic growth in terms of resources and environment is getting smaller and urgently requires a transformation of the economic growth mode. In the early 1990s, China attempted to respond to the international environmental protection agenda at the national level and began to establish the ideological foundation of ecological civilization construction and enrich the overall content of ecological civilization construction in 2002. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, under the guidance of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s ideological framework for ecological civilization, the institutional system of ecological civilization construction has been further improved and concrete progress and implementation have been made (China State Council 2015). In December 2013, at the Central Urbanization Work Conference, General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized the need to delineate the ecological protection red line. In 2014, the Ministry of Environmental Protection issued the “National Ecological Protection Red Line – Technical Guidelines for the Delineation of Ecological Function Baselines (Trial)” which established an index system and technical methods for the delineation of the ecological protection red line from the importance of ecological function, sensitivity of the ecological environment, and environmental disaster risk (Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People’s Republic of China, 2014). It also required the completion of the delineation task for the ecological protection red line throughout the country starting in 2014 (Gao, 2014). The ecological space regulation strategy, with the ecological protection red line as its policy core, has become one of the important contents of China’s entire ecological civilization institutional system construction. As Chung et al. (2018) pointed out, urban areas are the main practical scale for China’s current environmental ecological policies. As a national-level policy, the ecological protection red line means a series of institutional changes and constraints for urban areas. This includes determining a new spatial framework for its governance (the spatial reserve quota for urban development) and a new total amount of resource utilization. The key to ensuring the effective implementation of the ecological protection red line policy is how urban governments implement the policy and whether they can incorporate national ecological regulation requirements into existing governance models to achieve coordinated development of local social, economic, and environmental factors (Li & He, 2017). There are currently two major limitations in the research on the ecological protection red line policy: (1) Conceptualizing the ecological protection red line policy from the perspective of technical systems. Under the influence of this research paradigm, researchers focus on

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exploring the technical means of ecological protection red line compilation, aiming to consider how to meet the relevant ecological technical indicators from a normative perspective (Li & He, 2017; Wang et al., 2017). However, only focusing on the technical level discussion ignores the institutional nature of the ecological protection red line as a national-level ecological governance policy tool. In fact, ecological space regulation is one of the most important contents of the ecological national reconstruction background (While et al., 2010; Lin, 2017). Only by placing the ecological protection red line policy as a policy tool for ecological space regulation in the context of national ecological governance, can we fully understand its institutional background and policy essence. (2) Regarding the implementation of the ecological protection red line policy as a top-down indicator implementation process. The research on environmental regulation and governance at the city and regional levels reveals the key role of local governments during the process of policy implementation and their influence on the effectiveness of environmental regulation. However, this strands of research ignores the inherent relationship between the policy implementation process and urban development politics. As local governments are the delineated subjects and have certain local discretion, they will decide whether and how to incorporate the above national ecological space regulation requirements into existing governance models based on their specific urban development and governance backgrounds (While et al., 2004). And this process often involves the complex restructuring of power, capital, regulation, and territorial structure at various scales, rather than simple boundary demarcation (Lin, 2017). In other words, the implementation of ecological space regulation policy must be discussed in relation to urban governance and growth management (Zhang & Wu, 2021; Lin & While, 2022). With the aim of understanding urban governance under the constraint of national ecological regulation, this article integrates national-level ecological governance theory and research on ecological space regulation and management evaluation based on the research of urban and regional regulation and governance theory. The concept model of “ecological national localization reconstruction” is proposed to explain the transformation of urban governance under the background of national ecological space regulation policy constraints. The question of “What is the essence of the ecological protection red line policy? What will happen when it is implemented at the urban level, and how will it affect the transformation of urban governance?” is raised. Based on considerations of representative and diverse geographic areas and their resource endowments, local socio-economic development characteristics, and the difficulty of obtaining relevant data, this research selects four different urban areas in China as case studies: innovative cities and regions (Shenzhen); comprehensive cities and regions (Wuhan); ecological cities and regions (three counties in the main stream of Chishui River Basin); and resource-based cities and regions (Handan). A combination of literature research (involving relevant academic research results, local yearbooks, social and economic 5-year plans, various versions of urban master plan texts and manuals, and materials from relevant departments) and semi-structured interviews (group interviews) were used for data collection. A qualitative, temporal, and cross-sectional analysis method was used for case studies.

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Model of Ecological Transformation in Urban Governance Under the Background of National Ecological Space Regulation Policy

This article constructs a theoretical model for the ecological transformation of urban governance under the background of ecological space regulation. The theoretical model involves three levels of issues. First, it is to understand the ecological protection red line policy in the context of national ecological regulation, pointing out that the emergence of the ecological protection red line policy is one of the strategic results of national ecological reconstruction, which means the strengthening of the state’s intervention in environmental protection. This theoretical perspective can help us understand the changes and stages of the national policy background through the policy of ecological protection red line, laying the foundation for our understanding of urban governance. At the national level, the study of ecological governance and its theoretical foundation mainly involves the theories of ecological modernization (Mol et al., 2013) and ecological state (Meadowcroft, 2005). These theories interpret the role of the state in ecological governance from the perspective of the essential function of the state. The theory of ecological modernization assumes that ecology and modernization must be balanced, and the market plays a major driving role. The state only plays a supporting role in resolving environmental externalities in economic activities (Lin, 2016). On the other hand, the concept of “ecological state” emphasizes that “the state should be committed to controlling environmental impacts and adjusting the interactive modes of social ecology to avoid ecological crises and enhance ecological value; it should be committed to establishing relevant management institutions and legalizing political concepts related to the above practices” (Meadowcroft, 2005). While the theory of ecological modernization provides sufficient theoretical explanations for the ecological processes of capitalist countries, the concept of ecological state is more suitable for the theoreticalization of ecological governance practices in countries with strong state bodies like China. Based on the concept of ecological state, While et al. (2010) further developed the theoretical framework of “ecological state reconstruction” to describe the reorganization of state power, capital, regulation, and territorial structure around institutional paths and strategic projects. This model, at a given stage, is a pattern of relatively low environmental destruction from the perspective of national interests. The core of this model is to understand the nature of state and local government power and their strategic choices. In the process of ecological regulation and management, governments at different levels actively manage different ecological, economic, and social needs and various related strategies, and achieve specific economic and environmental goals through power reconstruction, forming different strategic relationships between the state and the environment. This includes organizing and mobilizing managers to undertake projects and activities that are consistent with the strategic environmental goals and achievements set by the state at the international and domestic levels. Such projects and activities include enhancing biodiversity by

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protecting ecosystems and the environment, reducing or recycling waste, improving air quality, and changing consumption behaviors. This article believes that since the 1970s, China has experienced a series of ecological state reconstructions from environmental protection focusing on pollution control in the 70 s and 80 s, to the proposal and practice of sustainable development ideas, to the overall improvement of emission reduction policies and the establishment of an ecological civilization system. During the period of environmental protection, China’s core ecological challenge was the negative environmental effects caused by industrial production. The main policy orientation at the national level during this period was “prevention and control” (Qu, 1997), which includes two parts: prevention and control of pollution, and the implementation of the international protection system for species and habitats in China. In addition, the orientation of economic development and urban expansion in decision-making processes at all levels of government also became the biggest challenge facing ecological environmental protection (Zhu, 1989). Since the early 1990s, the continuous deterioration of China’s ecological environment at the national level has posed severe tests for the rapid expansion of its economy. The leeway for economic growth in resource and environmental aspects has become smaller and smaller, urgently requiring a transformation of economic growth modes. Influenced by relevant ideas in the international community, China began to gradually explore the institutional path of sustainable development and the establishment of an ecological civilization (Zhang, 2014; Fu et al., 2015; Zhang & Wu, 2021). The formation of China’s ecological civilization construction theory is a phased and gradual process. Overall, it can be divided into two stages. The first stage initially established the ideological foundation of ecological civilization construction and enriched the overall content of ecological civilization construction (02–12); the second stage focused on the improvement of the institutional system for ecological civilization construction and its specific promotion and implementation (13 to the present). General Secretary Xi Jinping, on the basis of further enriching and developing the Marxist natural view, proposed the concept of ecological productivity, which provides a new conceptual framework for the theoretical and practical connotations of the development and protection of ecological civilization systems in the context of China’s social, political, and economic environment, and lays a theoretical foundation for the improvement, promotion, and implementation of the institutional system for ecological civilization construction (Central Literature Research Office, 2017; Li et al., 2015). The ecological protection red line represents the strengthening of the state’s power in the process of ecological regulation. Secondly, this requires understanding the local government’s response and specific practical methods to the ecological protection red line policy in the context of ecological national reconstruction. There are currently two main paradigms of research. The first is the mechanistic research paradigm. This paradigm starts with the field of ecology and focuses on the spatial delimitation of the ecological protection red line and the technicalities of protection. It has formed two views of equilibrium and non-equilibrium ecology, and derived and developed two definitions of rigid and fixed protection boundaries and hierarchical and overlapping

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protection boundaries. The focus of technical method exploration is on the analysis of variables such as the topographic characteristics of the ecological resources, the diversity of habitats, the accessibility of invasive species, and the abundance of ecological resources (as described by MacArthur & Wilson, 2001; Cox & Moore, 2010). The understanding of this paradigm isolates ecological issues from urban development and regards the implementation of ecological protection red-line policy at the local level as a top-down process of indicator implementation. The second is the institutional research paradigm. This paradigm places the delimitation of ecological protection red lines in the larger context of ecological spatial regulation policies and starts with the inherent political relationship between the environment and society, exploring the deep-seated reasons that affect the effectiveness of ecological zoning protection. This article will continue the institutional research paradigm and further use the concept of “biophysical fixes” (Lin, 2017) to explain the implementation of ecological regulation policies at the local level. This concept reveals how local governments balance environmental and ecological goals with other pressures and demands within the social scope and make strategic choices. As a basic component of urban space, ecological space has various economic, social, and ecological values for urban development. Different stakeholders will have different claims on how to use or protect the ecological space. These competitive claims will put pressure on decision-makers in local governments through various decision-making activities related to ecological protection. The final implementation of ecological regulation at the urban and regional levels depends on the interaction of a series of local factors: the ecological resource background, growth and governance models (Malecki, 2004), the government’s green governance capacity (While et al., 2004), the degree of marketization of ecological protection, and the governance of social ecology (Dai, 2011). It needs to be further emphasized here that even in the context of ecological national reconstruction, although the role of the state in guiding, legalizing, and exercising power in the process of implementing ecological protection red-line policies has been further strengthened, local governments as implementing subjects still have agency and can selectively integrate ecological demands into the social space governance process on the basis of balancing other socio-economic and political pressures, through a series of social practices aimed at protecting, preserving, and restoring these ecological resources, so as to achieve the goal of managing ecological disputes or obtaining new accumulation strategies (Lin, 2017; Lin & While, 2022). The anchoring process ultimately presents differences in the strength of ecological regulation at the local level. Ecological national reconstruction means that the level of state intervention in ecological protection has been further enhanced, which is reflected in several aspects: first, strengthening the regulation and restraint of space and resource use, including the formulation of a national land space development and protection system, a spatial planning system, a total resource management system, and a comprehensive conservation system. Second, the construction of an environmental governance system based on the participation of multiple stakeholders. Third, the establishment of an ecological civilization performance evaluation, assessment, and accountability system. Fourth, the construction of a market-based ecological

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protection system based on national policies, including a natural resource asset ownership system, a system of compensated resource use and ecological compensation, an environmental governance and ecological protection market system (People’s Publishing House, 2015). In the context of ecological national reconstruction, the ecological protection red line policy reflects the strengthening of the state’s efforts in regulating space and resource use for ecological protection, including mandatory constraints at the sub-national level in the national land space development framework and total resource development. The formation of China’s ecological protection red line policy was not achieved overnight, but went through a series of cross-scale continuous construction processes, such as the state’s clarification of ecological protection concepts, the borrowing of local city and regional pilot trials, the state’s confirmation of its legitimacy, and the local policy trial until it became a national ecological regulation policy. From the perspective of its significance for human social development, the delimitation of ecological protection red lines includes two aspects: guaranteeing ecological security and supporting sustainable social and economic development. First, by protecting ecologically fragile and sensitive areas, the national ecological security pattern is optimized. Second, through strict ecological protection regulatory systems, the current and future economic and social development and construction activities are regulated and guided (Gao et al., 2017). Based on this, the ecological protection red line includes two aspects: the ecological safety bottom line and the upper limit of resource utilization. Both aspects can be further recognized from the perspective of space and total quantity (Fu & Li, 2007). Its delimitation principles include importance, comprehensiveness (systematicness), hierarchy, coordination, operability, reality, and dynamism. Its classification methods are diverse, and they are divided according to the differences in ecosystem service functions, ecosystem management methods, ecological functional zone categories, the scale level of protected objects, and the importance and protection levels of ecosystems (Wang et al., 2014). The differences in the classification of the above ecological protection red lines make the indicators relied upon in the delimitation of ecological protection red lines different. Overall, the delimitation is based on three major categories: the evaluation results of various indicators of the ecosystem, national environmental standards, and the basic needs of national economic and social development. The specific technical planning and compilation methods can be summarized as “ecological orientation, technical implementation, and overall coordination.” First, establish an ecological protection red line evaluation index system based on the importance of ecological functions, ecological environmental sensitivity, and environmental disaster risk for the protection objects. Based on this, using technical tools such as ArcGIS, overlay analysis, and spatial analysis, the boundary of the ecological protection red line for the target area is finally delineated, and the ecological protection focus and specific management direction within the red line area are further clarified (Liu et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2008). Thirdly, the core of urban and regional governance ecological transformation lies in considering how ecological regulation will change the basis of urban and regional development. Ecological spatial regulation is one of the most important contents of

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ecological national reconstruction. In essence, the logic of ecological regulation means that new connections need to be established between the local economy and environment. Ecological regulation sets a new spatial framework for local governance (the spatial reserve quota for urban development) and a new total resource utilization. Both of these lead to cities having to redefine their development and governance models to adapt to the above regulation background. Based on the concept of ecological national reconstruction and ecological spatial anchoring, this paper develops the concept of “Localization of Ecological National Reconstruction” and further summarizes the theoretical choices for governance transformation strategies at the city and regional level. Understanding local and regional governance transformation as “Localization of Ecological National Reconstruction”, i.e., in the process of ecological regulation and management, different levels of government at the local and regional level actively manage various ecological, economic, and social needs and related strategies through power restructuring to achieve specific economic and environmental goals and form different strategic national-local regionenvironmental relations. In the process of ecological national reconstruction, local government decision-makers may make three choices: one is to reform and adjust the existing industrial structure, carry out experiments in “governance re-territorialization” and reshape the economic-environmental relationship. The second choice is to replace the development management mode. Compared with affluent, service-based economies, economically marginal areas may generate less environmental pollution and carbon emissions in consumption, but they often produce higher carbon emissions due to economic activities that rely heavily on traditional energy. When the direct carbon emissions of production need to match the indirect carbon consumption of service activities, economically marginal areas may tend to choose a new alternative development strategy (such as tourism) due to lack of funds for infrastructure investment. The third choice is to adopt a conservative development management mode. By strictly controlling population migration and formulating local energy solutions to implement ecological protectionism, output can be minimized to reduce ecological damage. For Chinese local governments, the determination and implementation of ecological national reconstruction and ecological protection red lines directly affect urban and regional development through at least four channels: (1) cities and regions must comply with the regulatory objectives related to supply in national laws; (2) sub-national governments face pressure to invest in green society and green infrastructure; (3) ecological civilization performance evaluation and accountability systems mean that city and regional governments need to manage local ecological protection budgets under regional goals set by higher-level governments in response to punishments (or financial incentives) for failure to meet standards; (4) participating in ecological markets (such as carbon trading markets), allowing local governments to offset higher ecological input costs by intervening in the market or obtaining economic returns. In conjunction with the above three management modes, there are different regional transformation promotion policies. The first is cross-level cooperative network governance transformation strategy, which realizes local governance by constructing a cooperation mechanism for policy stakeholders’ negotiations. The

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second is the economic system introspective transformation policy. This approach believes that democracy, efficiency, fairness, justice, and profitability can coexist. By increasing resource accessibility and utilization, natural resources can bring more value to interest-related groups and contribute to the well-being of local residents, thus becoming the driving force of protection. The economic system introspective transformation hopes to expand the “free market” to areas that were previously protected or unregulated, thus resolving conflicts between nature and society within the market scope. The third is the technology innovation type transformation promotion policy. Technological environmental innovation requires the transformation of industrial production through the development and application of better technology.

8.3

Analysis of the “Localized Eco-state Restructuring” Model of Urban Governance Ecosystem Under the Background of Ecological National Reconstruction

Research analysis has found that the implementation of ecological regulation policies under the background of ecological national reconstruction into specific areas will interact with local ecological resource background, growth and governance modes, government green governance capabilities, degree of market-based ecological protection intervention, and governance of social ecology, forming various conditions (demand and opportunity) and obstacles (pressure) for different regions to form differentiated ecological space anchoring states (Table 8.1). Under the background of ecological national reconstruction, four urban and regional governance ecological transformation models and related strategies have been formed in China: (1) “Forced Constraint-Transformational Development Model” refers to cities and regions that have already entered the post-industrial development stage. In the process of realizing the localized reconstruction of the ecological nation, by choosing a strongly regulated-transformational development path, using ecological protection opportunities, and leading ecological multi-cooperation network governance as the responsibility of the city government, the local economic foundation undergoes a deep transformation, thus achieving economic sustainable development and social harmony progress based on urban environmental improvement and ecological optimization. (2) “Forced Constraint-Gradual Transformational Development Model” refers to cities and regions in the middle and later stages of industrialization. In the process of realizing the localized reconstruction of the ecological nation, by choosing a strongly regulated-gradual transformational governance path, ecological protection is utilized to reform and adjust the existing industrial structure, and “re-regionalization of governance” experiments are conducted to reshape the economic-environmental relationship. By transforming the traditional economic growth mode, the environmental consideration is “internalized” into the entire process of economic and social development, and the modernization of the entire

Source: Authors

Local government governance model Local government green governance capacity Local Government’s financial investment capacity in ecological governance Market-based intervention opportunities for ecological protection Public pressure for ecological protection in local governance Demand for growth by growth political system Community residents’ opposition Ecological anchoring

Regional growth model Economic growth foundation

Regional ecological resource background

Moderate

Relatively high

Weak Weak Strong Strong

Strong

High

Strong

Weak

Strong

Strong

Weak

Weak

Strong

Weak

Weak

Weak

Prominent

Local development government

Regional development model with low-speed roads Local development government governance model Not prominent

Regional development model with low-speed roads

Weak constraint-substitute development model (Chishui) Good urban ecological environment, ecological crisis not structurally constrained Stock development Comprehensive city

Urban corporate governance model Fragmented management power

Weak constraint-conservative development model (Handan) High-quality ecological resource background, ecological crisis structurally constrained Land use pattern Manufacturing industry foundation Regional development model with high-speed roads

Strong constraint-gradual transition development model (Wuhan) Poor urban environmental quality, ecological crisis not structurally constrained Incremental development Agricultural foundation

Table 8.1 Models and strategies for ecological transition in China’s regional governance

Weak

Weak

Strong

Weak

Relatively weak

Weak

Incremental development Heavy industry foundation Regional development model with low-speed roads Local development government Prominent

Strong constrainttransformation development model (Shenzhen) Excellent ecological resources

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social economy includes environmental dimensions. Protect in transformation, and transform in protection. (3) “Weak Constraint-Alternative Development Strategy Model” refers to cities in the early and middle stages of industrialization. In the process of realizing the localized reconstruction of the ecological nation, by choosing an alternative industrial development governance path, ecological protection opportunities are utilized to pursue non-value-added, degrowth, low-consumption, or alternative growth strategies, achieving alternative development of the city and regional economy under the background of ecological regulation and resource constraints. (4) “Weak Constraint-Conservative Development Strategy Model” refers to cities and regions in the mid-stage of industrialization and with heavy industry as the current industrial foundation. In the process of realizing the localized reconstruction of the ecological nation, by choosing a conservative development path for urban and regional governance, better technology is developed and applied to achieve purification and transformation of industrial production. Here, “forced constraint” and “weak constraint” refer to the results of the anchoring of the ecological protection red line at the local level, rather than the regulatory intensity of the ecological space regulatory system itself.

8.4

Mechanisms for Guiding Ecological Transformation in Urban Governance

Along with four management models, different policies for promoting urban and regional transformation have emerged (see Table 8.2). Ecological transformation development strategy. Its goal emphasizes restraining urban sprawl, intensive use of urban built-up areas, improving the quality and mixed functions of urban space, coordinating economic development and environmental protection, promoting regional cooperation and public participation. Management entities are no longer limited to central and local governments, but include all levels of government, market subjects, and social actors in an overall management framework, building a strategic cross-level cooperation network governance framework. In terms of policy formulation, it is necessary to shift from process control to the collaborative construction of a regional innovation network. Local ecological protection policies are not simply implemented from top to bottom, but are realized through the negotiation and cooperation mechanism between policy stakeholders at the local level. Different institutions and organizations in the governance process have their own corresponding interests and demands. In order to effectively achieve ecological governance goals, government leaders, private sectors, and non-profit organization leaders need to collaborate with each other, sharing power and resources to achieve self-interest. Therefore, urban and regional governance can be seen as a negotiation process among various policy-related actors, rather than the result of bureaucratic management or market competition. This makes the new vision of urban and regional governance not focused on institutional structures or

Improving the effectiveness of Laws, regulations, and policy measures for the construction of ecological civilization advanced areas, and improving the Government’s formulation of guiding industrial policies

Establishing green performance evaluation system, establishing administrative incentive and constraint mechanism, clarifying legal protection, and overall planning for clean technology

Mechanism construction

Economic system reflection transformation policy

Economic system reflection transformation policy

Technology innovation transformation promotion policy

Strategic

Comprehensive

Management object Policy orientation

Various levels of government and market participants

Ecological gradual transformation development strategy Regional sustainable development, including natural resource protection, infrastructure development, housing, economic development, and long-term planning

Various levels of government, market participants, social actors Comprehensive

Ecological substitution development strategy Regional sustainable development, including natural resource protection, infrastructure development, housing, economic development, and long-term planning

Various levels of government

Ecological conservative development strategy Protecting land and ecological environment

Management subject

Ecological governance transformation strategy Goal orientation

Table 8.2 Different strategies of ecological governance transformation

Cross-level cooperative network governance transformation strategy Establishing regional environmental protection inspection agencies, promoting the local and regional medium- and long-term planning for industrial ecological transformation, industrial exit mechanisms, and emerging industrial development strategies

Ecological transformation development strategy Suppressing urban expansion, intensive use of urban built-up areas, improving urban spatial quality and functionality, coordinating economic development and environmental protection, promoting regional cooperation and public participation Various levels of government, market participants, social actors Strategic

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Dynamic allocation model of pollutant emission Total amount, comprehensive utilization of resources and pollution control Enterprise financial subsidy system, ecological compensation mechanism, paid use system of land, paid use system of mineral resources, and ecological labeling system Cultivating ecological culture, establishing cultivation mechanism for environmental protection social organizations

Regulatory policies to suppress spatial regulation (urban growth boundary, Urban Service boundary, growth restriction/speed control)

Ecological protection management based on communities, available ecological protection areas, and comprehensive ecological protection practice models

Guiding spatial policies (strengthening protective planning, establishing graded classification management mechanisms, and agricultural land protection policies) Agricultural ecological subsidy system, incentive compensation, and reform of resource product prices and taxes

Voluntary contract non-profit policy consultation

Establishing government green investment fund, cultivating financial market system, innovating financial products, innovating trial environmental insurance system, providing risk funds and introduction assistance in special ways

Innovative environmental financial policies, innovative environmental Price and market policies, and accelerating resource and environmental tax and fee reform

Establishing and improving government environmental management information disclosure system, public hearing system, and strengthening and improving support and guarantee measures for public participation

Supporting spatial policies (ecological release Bank)

Guiding spatial policies (purchase and transfer of development rights, government purchase of land)

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the behavior of local autonomous bodies, but on establishing connections among different public institutions and private actors for urban regional governance. Different actors and institutions with different backgrounds and powers form a cooperation and coordination network to define and provide cross-regional services independently of institutional jurisdictional boundaries. At the same time, formal or informal public-private partnerships and collaboration processes will become a necessary component of urban regional governance. Core policies include: the construction of government-related management guarantee mechanisms (the construction of a cooperative trust system, establishment of information sharing mechanisms, innovation of network participation channels, and establishment of network coordination organizations); supporting spatial management guarantee mechanisms (ecological mitigation bank based on market regulation); market regulation guarantee mechanisms (establishment of government green investment funds, cultivation of financial market systems, innovation of financial products, innovation of environmental insurance system, provision of risk funds and referral assistance in special ways); and social participation guarantee mechanisms (voluntary contracts, non-profit organization policy consulting). Gradual ecological transformation development strategy. Its goal is to achieve regional sustainable development through government-led regional industrial structure upgrading and adjustment, combined with natural resource protection, infrastructure development, and social security facilities improvement. The main management entity is the local government, which includes all levels of government, market subjects, and social actors in an overall management framework. In terms of policy formulation, the core policies include: government management guarantee mechanisms (establishment of regional environmental protection inspection agencies, promotion of local and regional medium- and long-term planning for industrial ecological transformation, industrial exit mechanisms, and emerging industry development strategies); guiding spatial policies (purchase and transfer of development rights); market regulation guarantee mechanisms (innovation of environmental fiscal policies, innovation of environmental pricing and market policies, and accelerating resource and environmental tax and fee reforms); and social participation guarantee mechanisms (establishment of a sound government environmental management information disclosure system, public hearing system, and strengthening and improving support measures for public participation). Ecological substitution development strategy. The goal of ecological substitution development strategy is regional sustainable development, including natural resource protection, infrastructure development, housing, economic development and long-term planning. The main management entity is the local government, which includes all levels of government, market subjects, and social actors in an overall management framework. In terms of policy formulation, it leans toward further strengthening the policy of economic system introspection transformation. The governance model is dominated by local government, which includes all levels of government, market subjects, and social actors in an overall management framework. In terms of policy formulation, it tends to believe that market behavior is an effective way to protect the environment, solving the contradictions between nature

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and society within the market scope, promoting the protection or sustainable use of ecological resources with the driving force of economic value, and achieving the goal of increasing tax revenue, capital accumulation, and overall economic value of resources through ecological protection. By increasing accessibility and utilization of resources, nature can bring more value to the interest-related groups and contribute to the welfare of local residents, thus becoming a driving force for protection. By expanding the “free market” to areas that have been regulated or not previously regulated by protected boundaries, the contradictions between nature and society can be solved within the market scope, such as parks and people, protection and development, and the use of wildlife, and the development of a functional market for “ecosystem services” and the fixed market for ecosystem services. It attempts to achieve the prospect of creating tax revenue, capital accumulation, and overall economic value of resources through ecological protection. Core policies include: the construction and improvement of the ecological administrative management system (establishment of a green performance evaluation system, establishment of administrative incentive and restraint mechanisms, clarification of legal guarantees, and overall planning of clean technology); regulatory spatial policies (strengthening and compiling adaptive protection plans, establishing a hierarchical and classified management mechanism, and agricultural land protection policies); market regulation guarantee mechanisms (agricultural ecological subsidy system, incentive compensation, resource product price and tax reform); and social participation guarantee mechanisms (ecological protection management based on communities, available ecological protection areas, and comprehensive ecological protection practice models). Ecological conservative development strategy. The goal of ecological conservative development strategy is to protect land and the ecological environment. The main management entities are the central and local governments. The core strategy is driven by technological innovation transformation. Technological environmental innovation is of great significance in the production and life cycle of products themselves, achieving the transformation of industrial production through the development and application of better technology. For example, by adopting clean filtering measures to eliminate pollution, such as using fluid desulfurization equipment to prevent acid rain generation; through technological innovation, making the production process and products more adaptable to environmental benign development, such as improving combustion efficiency. In order to achieve sustainable technological innovation, this type of system design also proposes an industrial metabolic compatibility strategy, aiming to change the technology structure and product process from the source through the introduction of new technology systems, management systems, and practices, gradually embedding into the metabolic process of the original industry. Core policies include: the construction and improvement of the ecological administrative management system (establishment of a green performance evaluation system, establishment of administrative incentive and restraint mechanisms, clarification of legal guarantees, and overall planning of clean technology); restraining spatial regulatory policies (urban growth boundaries, urban service boundaries, growth restrictions/speed control); market regulation

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guarantee mechanisms (dynamic allocation of total pollutant discharge, comprehensive utilization of resources and pollution control enterprise financial subsidy system, ecological compensation mechanism, paid use of land system, paid use of mineral resources system, and ecological labeling system); and social participation guarantee mechanisms (cultivation of ecological culture, community-based ecological protection management, available ecological protection areas, and comprehensive ecological protection practice models).

8.5

Conclusion and Future Perspectives

Based on the theory of eco-state restructuring, this article reconstructs the basic theoretical model of urban and regional governance ecological transformation, and proposes a theoretical explanation framework and normative model for the ecological transformation of local government governance under the background of national strengthening of environmental regulatory constraints, namely the concept of “localised eco-state restructuring”. This model: (1) considers the role of the state in local environmental regulation and governance, as well as the mutual coordination and cooperation of governments at different levels in the process of environmental regulation and governance. At the same time, the discussion on introducing the role of the state into local environmental regulation-related issues enriches its theoretical connotation. (2) Includes ecological space protection in the discussion category of regional social and economic space governance, and combines the discussion of the technical means of ecological protection red line compilation with the discussion of regional development politics. This article further applies this framework to the specific practice of the implementation of China’s ecological protection red line. By examining four representative regions, this article discusses the nature of the implementation of ecological protection red lines at the local level, the problems that exist, and the policy orientation of local governance transformation. The study points out two points: (1) the implementation of ecological protection red lines constitutes the conditions and obstacles for regional governance transformation. When ecological protection red lines are implemented in specific regions, they will interact with the region’s ecological resource background, regional growth and governance models, local government green governance capabilities, the degree of ecological protection marketization, and regional governance social ecology, etc., to form further regional governance transformation conditions and obstacles. The final practical method, core design elements, and regulatory intensity of ecological protection red lines are the results of local government balancing the abovementioned various demands, pressures, and opportunities. (2) there are differentiated regional governance choices under the background of ecological protection red line policy. In the process of implementing ecological protection red lines, governments at different levels in the region actively manage different ecological, economic, and social needs and various related strategies through power reconstruction, and form different strategic national-local regional-environmental relationships. Empirical

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case analysis reflects four localized reconstruction modes of regional governance currently appearing in China: “mandatory constraint-transition development mode”, “mandatory constraint-progressive development mode”, “weak constraint-substitute development mode”, and “weak constraint-conservative development mode”. For these four modes, this article proposes four strategies for promoting regional governance ecological transformation: ecological transformation development strategy, ecological progressive transformation development strategy, ecological substitute development strategy, ecological conservative development strategy. Future research can be approached from a variety of angles. One way to further explore the ecological transformation of urban and regional governance is to transition from qualitative research to quantitative research within the framework of eco-state restructuring theory. This complex system involves multiple relationships and can benefit from in-depth quantitative analysis. Another area of potential study is the community transformation and development guidance mechanism within the ecological protection red line. This mechanism, which has been implemented in some pilot cities such as Shenzhen, refines the types of transformation and upgrading of projects within the line, including modern agriculture, education and research, culture, sports, tourism, design, rehabilitation, and health. It is important to track and study the implementation of this mechanism, examine the main difficulties faced by community development within the line, explore the problems existing in the implementation of the guidance mechanism, and analyze their underlying reasons. From a theoretical level, feasible countermeasures can be proposed based on international experience and models. Disclaimer The views and/or claims/or data expressed in this chapter are solely authors’ own or based on literature survey and are not necessarily linked with their affiliations, editors of the book, reviewers of the chapter or the publisher. Acknowledgement This work was supported by [Shenzhen Academy of Social Sciences] under Grant [number SZ2022B019]; [Natural Science Foundation of Province, China] under Grant [number 2023A1515011350], and [National Natural Science Foundation of China] under Grant [number 52278071].

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Chapter 9

The Missing Link: Environmental Culture and the Climate Crisis Jyotishman Kalita

Abstract The language and tone of recent reports on the climate crisis signal an urgency and suggest we may have failed in creating a sense of environmentality and in communicating about the climate crisis to a large section of people. Creating a sense of environmentality is difficult because people have different experiences of their environments and because academic disciplinary purity categorizes the environment and the climate crisis mainly as scientific and political problems. Building upon the work of environmental humanities, we need to see the climate crisis as a cultural problem and seek cultural solutions by emphasizing on ‘environmental culture’. The framework of ‘environmental culture’ can have four pathways- first, an environmental narrative is made by adding stories about the environment already present in cultures with narratives of experiences of people. Second, by reexamining the language we use to describe and represent our environment and by ‘re-storyation’ of marginalized narratives. Third, by telling stories of science so that sciences and humanities can work together and it is easier to communicate about the environment and the climate crisis. Fourth, by correcting dominant yet potentially flawed narratives in our culture with the help of science so that we can have alternate paradigms of understanding our environment and the climate crisis. Finally, this chapter charts a pedagogical strategy for teaching and communicating ‘environmental culture’ through the concept of ‘transformative learning’ and teaching. This can be seen as a part of a ‘biospheric curriculum’ that can lead to an improvement in ‘biospheric perception’. By using a four-step model consisting of awareness, analysis, evaluation, and participation, ‘environmental culture’ can be used to improve the sense of environmentality in the classroom or for the general public. ‘Environmental culture’ and an alternate way of communicating about the environment and the climate crisis is the potential missing link in mainstream climate research and that needs to be acknowledged.

J. Kalita (✉) Department of English, Gauhati University, Guwahati, Assam, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Tripathi et al. (eds.), Eco-Politics and Global Climate Change, Environment & Policy 65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48098-0_9

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Keywords Communication · Environmentality · Environmental pedagogy · Narrative · ‘Re-story-ation’ · Transformative learning

9.1

Introduction

Over the course of the year 2021–2022, a few interesting words were used by apex global environmental bodies to represent the climate crisis, our responses and responsibilities and where we stand with regard to the situation of emergency. Consider these examples- the Adaptation Gap Report (AGR) released by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) on 14 January 2021 was titled ‘The Gathering Storm: Adapting to Climate Change in a Post-Pandemic World’ (UNEP, Adaptation Gap Report, 2021: The gathering storm – Adapting to climate change in a post-pandemic world, 2021). In 2022, the language of the title of the AGR had changed in tone- ‘Too Little, Too Slow: Climate Adaptation Failure puts World at Risk’ (UNEP, 2022). On 4 April 2022, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) came out with a press release from Geneva announcing the approval of the Summary for Policymakers of the IPCC Working Group III report, Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Here are three key phrases from the press release- ‘the time for action is now’, ‘We are at a crossroads’ and by far the most popular- ‘It’s now or never’ (IPCC Press Release, 2022). Exactly 8 months later, on 19 December 2022, BBC reported on a ‘historic’ deal to protect nature at the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (COP 15) held in Montreal, Canada. However, the key phrase of this report, one that shifted focus from the ‘historic’ nature of the deal to the direness of the situation, was how this is the ‘last chance’ to ‘put nature on a path of recovery’ (Briggs, 2022). There are two reasons why these phrases are important. First, the good work of these agencies, translated to full-length reports and executive summaries for policymakers are relatively inaccessible to the general public. Relatively, because, though they are in the public domain; charts, graphs and statistics do not necessarily lead to environmental action for the general public and adaptations of the same in simpler and accessible language still do not necessarily translate to an emotive response to the climate crisis. The executive summaries and summaries for policymakers translate to action programs that are implemented through administrative and legal processes through a ‘top down’ approach, for a general public which is not equipped to understand the severity of the situation based on lengthy reports, or executive summaries or scientific jargon and statistical charts. In some cases, mitigation and adaptation policies by the state can also be seen as coercive action plans, which they might indeed be if states adopt top-down policies without fully understanding the relationships that certain communities share with their environment. In such a scenario, the language of climate change, the language that is used to describe the situation in news media or general environmental forums and the language that a large section of the public consumes to understand the crisis becomes very important. Secondly, what do words like ‘crossroads’, ‘last chance’, ‘now’,

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‘never’, ‘late’ etc. imply by the very virtue of their being the key phrases either in the cover pages or the reports? They suggest a sense of urgency, of course, and they also ring the alarm bell for everyone, not just climate scientists and policymakers- they are implied to attract the attention of the general public. But they also imply that whatever we may have done till now has been ‘too late and little’. Words like these imply that we might have missed some trick since we are at a ‘crossroads’ or that we might need to look for alternate and associated solutions, ‘now or never’. This certainly is the last chance. They imply collective responsibility and collective action, but are either of them possible without a collective understanding of the problem? Together, these two reasons suggest that we need a massive change in the attitude of the general public towards the climate crisis through alternative means that are not imposed top-down but are built bottom-up, most likely through cultural changes that will do justice to the severity of the situation. If we were to set aside everything we are doing right now and quietly reflect on the scale, velocity and immanence of the climate crisis, most of us who are attentive would come to roughly the same conclusion: every being on this planet needs to be an environmentalist. This is a tall order. This seemingly simple yet urgent conclusion is fraught with several contradictions and constraints, some of them potentially tied up with disciplinary boundaries. For, is it not the case, that, by default, every being is a constituent unit of ecological systems and is so embedded with other beings and the environment that individual survival is impossible? ‘Being’, in this case, includes all life forms; plants, animals and microorganisms- and it would appear that they are better environmentalists than us since their role in this crisis seems more to bear the brunt of the fallout, rather than be the cause of it. In the opposite sense, if the meaning of the word ‘being’ is limited to human beings only, we have another problem on our hands- one that originates in the postulates of modern western philosophy and is upheld by the twin forces of rationality and enlightenment. A discussion of this particular debate is beyond the scope of this chapter, but scholarship suggests that distinctions in the meaning of ‘being’ could be detrimental to how we understand and face the climate crisis (Plumwood, 2002; Goodale, 2015). For the sake of this chapter, and coming to an understanding of what is environmental culture, we shall stick to the first implication of the word ‘being’- one that includes all, even non-living matter. Second, if every being on this planet were to be an environmentalist, would that endanger all the hard work and dedication that designated and qualified ecologists and environmentalists have accomplished over the past several decades? Hardly, since their work would anyway be at the forefront of the crisis, with every individual expected to follow on, as is the expectation now. Besides, the designated and disciplinary role of being an ecologist or an environmentalist comes with an unfair burden of carrying on the fight all alone, while the rest of the world can go on with life as usual. Conversely, this would also imply that designation does not set apart a group of individuals with exclusive access to climate epistemology and its discursive functions thereof. That would be symptomatic of selectiveness and remoteness, as shall be discussed in this chapter. At any rate, the climate crisis is neither exclusive nor remote, though it might appear that way to some people. The common playing

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ground that we are looking for, one that makes every individual an environmentalist without the limitations of exclusivity, may be found if we consider the climate crisis not only as a scientific problem awaiting technocratic and polity-based solutions but also as a cultural problem awaiting cultural solutions. If we reflect on our present understanding of the climate crisis, several problems stand out. These problems, as we shall see, decide how we perceive the climate crisis and what we chose to do about it. This chapter has three objectives. The first objective of this chapter is to attempt to identify two fundamental problems that prevent every being from being an environmentalist. Second, it proposes that the two problems we face can be addressed if we come to a working framework of an ‘environmental culture’. Third, it attempts to draw out a pedagogical method of ‘transformative learning’ which can aid us in teaching environmental culture whereby we can get a step closer to developing every being as an environmentalist.

9.2

The Problems: Social and Academic

There are two reasons why it is difficult to develop everyone as an environmentalist; one reason is social and the other one is academic. Both are linked by a strong thread of commonality that we can understand if we see the cultural angle of the environmental problem. The first reason why it is difficult to see everyone as an environmentalist is the differences in the ways we perceive the environment and the climate crisis. Consider the following definitions and understandings of the concepts of environment and nature, and the climate crisis. For a large part of the general population, the environment and nature are things that are far off, at a distance from everyday life. The basic understanding of the words environment and nature have become an imagined or distant space that people would like to take a vacation to, or a short holiday to experience the ‘beauty’ or ‘tranquility’ or ‘wilderness’ or ‘peace’ in nature. Animals are living beings found in zoos or factories or as pets, birds are found in cages or sanctuaries, and insects are more or less a nuisance that can be killed by a spray advertised in a television commercial. For some people, nature and the environment have now become an excuse to escape the existential crisis of a post-capitalist globalized world. For some people, the definition changes, and the environment becomes an image of yearning- to forever escape our human condition, to return to a state in nature, philosophically or practically- as some proponents of deep ecology would have us believe. For another section of people, the environment becomes a source of survival and progress- while a section of people understands their cohabitation systems in the environment and nature, for others, it becomes a source of ‘resources’ that can be exploited for commercial gain. For another section of people, the environment becomes a symbol of resisting political and economic power structures, by whatever means necessary, and they do not stop at either violence or terrorism to achieve their ends. Yet, for another section of people, the same environment is worth saving at the cost of their lives and they do not stop at

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adopting unusual methods of protest against the powers that be. For another section of people, the environment and nature become the source of creativity and innovation- they turn to literature and art- whether in celebration or nostalgic reflections on degradation; it does not matter, because another section of people is quick to dismiss them as a hindrance to understanding the environment rather than being an asset. For this section of people, the environmental problem is an academic challenge that needs to be overcome by objective and dispassionate means, which may be fueled by responsibility or activism or unavoidable requirements of a career choice but is destined to follow a solitary and restricted path. These definitions and understandings ought to tell us some things. No single understanding that has been mentioned above is complete or absolute or perfect. For all the understandings mentioned above, many more, equally powerful, have been left out as examples. All the understandings mentioned above are flawed in their own ways, some more, some less. Yet, all of them have something to offer in understanding what nature is, what the environment is and how the climate crisis may be approached. Each individual, in this sense, has an idea of the environment, but that idea may be incomplete at best, and flawed at worst. The social problem, therefore, is that we have closed ourselves in brackets and boxes and limitations that prevent us from seeing the complete picture. This is not to suggest that there is a monolithic and grand idea of the environment and the climate crisis which is able to subsume every other understanding and idea. This is quite the opposite of that. Each one of us is seeing our own version of the environment- which, though ideally not a bad thing in itself, becomes a reductive idea if we refuse to acknowledge that someone else’s idea of the environment or the crisis is as valid as ours. This is the reason why the climate crisis is generally seen only as an industrial problem which can only be solved by scientific progress and innovation. This is also the reason that for most people, someone else is to blame for the climate crisis, and someone else; perhaps a scientist or a policy maker or an activist has the responsibility of solving the problem. Most people would neither see themselves as a part of the problem nor see themselves as a part of the solution. Both are distant factors- outside and farther away from everyday existence. The second problem that affects how we understand the climate crisis is closely related to the first one: the idea of being an environmentalist is limited by disciplinary requirements that are shared either by science and social activism, leaving out other disciplines outside the ambit of what Lawrence Buell calls ‘environmentality’ (Buell, 2005) and what Roman Bartosch entitles ‘EnvironMentality’ (Bartosch, 2013). As he methodically crafts the various facets of ‘EnvironMentality’, Bartosch lays the foundation of this powerful idea by arguing that EnvironMentality ‘involves radical reassessments of what we think we know about the world’ (Bartosch, 2013, 12). Ever since the eighteenth century, we have been led on a path of ‘progress’ by a system of thought that privileges the supremacy of reason, rationality and objectiveness over emotive or subjective viewpoints. There is little doubt now that the climate crisis is a fallout of this tendency of seeking to (re)structure our environment according to our own human needs and perspectives. The chief cause of this is a

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regime of ‘hyperrationality’, which is assumed to be the quality and destiny of human beings, but as Val Plumwood points out, this kind of hyperrationality could only be one of the many faces of ‘reason’ and does not define or stand for ‘reason’ itself: It is not reason itself that is the problem, I believe, but rather arrogant and insensitive forms of it that have evolved in the framework of rationalism and its dominant narrative of reason’s mastery of the opposing sphere of nature and disengagement from nature’s contaminating elements of emotion, attachment and embodiment (Plumwood, 2002).

What this hyperrationality does, in the name of objectivity and steadfastness, is create a model of ‘sadodispassionate’ discourse of scientific and technological progress (and solutions for the climate crisis) that takes the help of the dualisms of reason/emotion and nature/culture to cut off empathy or identification with the otherin this case, nonhumans and the environment (Brennan, 1993; Plumwood, 2002). We also end up ‘hyper-separating’ ourselves from the lived experiences of the real world. This sadodispassionate narrative creates a ‘monological discourse’ around science and knowledge, whereby only one kind of narrative can now be approached as having all solutions. This, in turn, is responsible for creating dysfunctional ‘conceptual blindspots’ which both prevent us from understanding our relationship with the environment and seeking solutions for the climate crisis. Indeed, this same discourse is directly related to ‘monological relationships’ in nature and culture, where one side can be seen as the ‘active’ provider of solutions and the other side can be seen as a ‘passive’ receiver or follower of the solutions. This is at the heart of the failure of most ‘top down’ solutions that we have seen emerge in the last few decades, thrust down the throats of a ‘recalcitrant citizenry’ (Plumwood, 2002). Any understanding of the climate crisis must focus on a dialogical relationship between nature and culture and must be aided by the choice of alternative frameworks for imagining these relationships. As Plumwood points out: Not only is it rationally possible to choose a richer and more generous framework, it is in the present context of ecological destruction essential to do so – in the interests of ethics, prudence AND reason (Plumwood, 2002).

The environmental culture and the exemplary frameworks discussed in this chapter are a step in that direction. The hyper separation and dysfunctional conceptual blind spots, as discussed, manifest themselves in academic disciplinary purity which is another roadblock in our understanding of the climate crisis. It reflects in our tendency to see the climate crisis only as a technological problem of the Anthropocene, to be solved by scientists and policymakers while associated disciplines of the humanities and post-humanities have little or no role to play in this. Calling for an ‘integrative approach’, Steven Hartman criticizes the fact that the humanities ‘remain conspicuously absent in top-down international efforts to address climate change and other pressing issues linked to today’s global change developments’ (Hartman, 2017, 72). Hartman goes as far as to say that environmental humanities should in fact be leading the way to secure a sustainable future for the planet since:

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Throughout human history, societies have shaped and legitimated relationships with their environments through arts, philosophy, literature, science, and religion. The rich repertoire of human experience embedded in these cultural traditions must be brought to bear in our quest for new paradigms of sustainable human endeavor (Hartman, 2017, 73).

Keeping in mind similar criticisms, a cursory look at the humanities and the posthumanities in recent decades will tell us of the major contribution of the field in understanding the climate crisis. There however, remains a level of uncertainty in actually believing that the humanities could have a working solution for the climate crisis where other disciplines seem to have failed (so far). Lawrence Buell (2005) summarises this perfectly in the preface to his highly instructive work The Future of Environmental Criticism: . . .environmental crisis is a broadly cultural issue, not the property of a single discipline. All thinking persons have a stake in it. For science, engineering, and public policy that is most obviously so. These are the bases on which university programs in environmental studies have generally built. But no less intrinsically important are the environmental humanities – history, philosophy, religion, cultural geography, literature, and the other arts. For technological breakthroughs, legislative reforms, and paper covenants about environmental welfare to take effect, or even to be generated in the first place, requires a climate of transformed environmental values, perception, and will. To that end, the power of story, image, and artistic performance and the resources of aesthetics, ethics, and cultural theory are crucial (Buell, 2005).

In a similar line of thought, in The Environmental Humanities: A Critical Introduction, Robert S. Emmett and David E. Nye think that ‘scientists excel at identifying and explaining such problems, but they alone cannot solve them. Solutions will require political and cultural expertise as well’ (Emmett & Nye, 2017). They go on to say that environmental humanities must offer constructive knowledge and criticism, and in a positive note, they add how survey data proves that this view is ‘widely held by millennials’ as compared to older generations. Louise Westling is of the opinion that ‘natural philosophy and literature coexisted quite comfortably until the late nineteenth century when the physical and life sciences began to grow more specialized and systematic’ (Westling, 2012). This uncertainty may also be the result of a lack of understanding and mutual incomprehension between two cultures, the first culture being that of the ‘literary intellectuals and the second being that of the ‘natural scientists’, as suggested by C.P. Snow in 1959: Literary intellectuals at one pole—at the other scientists, and as the most representative, the physical scientists. Between the two a gulf of mutual incomprehension—sometimes (particularly among the young) hostility and dislike, but most of all lack of understanding. They have a curious distorted image of each other (Snow & Collini, 2012, 1959, 2012).

As the matter stands, we are in no position to understand the climate crisis if there exist distorted images of other academic disciplines in our minds. All other terms of mutual mistrust mentioned- we simply cannot afford. Stephen Jay Gould maintains that to imagine the sciences and humanities to be separated by an ‘unbridgeable gulf’ is a misguided notion and we need to ‘achieve a proper healing of our age-old

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conflict’ (Gould, 2011). Commenting on Gould’s idea of consilience, Westling is of the opinion that: Gould’s notion of consilience is therefore based on pluralistic cooperation among varying sciences as well as between science and the humanities, with equal regard for the distinctive perspectives and methods among disciplines (Westling, 2012).

It could even be argued that we need a combined collaborative effort since now there is a ‘crying need for experiment over and above the traditional university and its disciplinary divides’ when it comes to dealing with the climate crisis (Holm et al., 2015, 192). Whereas, it is Wetling, who perhaps gives the best assessment of the rift or a reconciliation thereof- ‘All are swimmers in the same cultural sea’ (Westling, 2012). If we rethink the two problems, social and academic, that affect our understanding of the climate crisis, we can find that they are closely linked by cultural notions of what the environment and the climate crisis are. In the first case, we have a culture that plays on differences between various understandings of what the environment and the climate crisis are and in the second case, we have a culture that depends on flawed dualities that prevent us from fully understanding the gravity of the situation and working together. In effect, the result is that we are unable to perceive the climate crisis primarily as a cultural problem. As such we are also not looking for cultural solutions. This is a complete circle of events that has led to the general tendency of perceiving the climate crisis as someone else’s problem: who that someone else is, depends on the time, space and ideology of the perceiver. Looking for solutions, scientific or technological, is also someone else’s burden, and to quote Plumwood, ‘But we did not just stumble by some freak technological accident into the ecological mess we have made, and it will take more than a few bright boys and better toys to get us out of it’ (Plumwood, 2002). This is the single most dangerous event in history right now, and it is not even limited to a select section of people. This cultural ‘remoteness’, to borrow a term from Plumwood, is the chief reason why any amount of adaption or mitigation will not work- simply because most people perceive themselves as remote from both the problem and the solutions. At this rate, very few people can even be called ‘environmentalist’. Plumwood uses the concept of ‘remoteness’ with regard to our hyperrational culture in four different ways, of which ‘communicative remoteness’, which she describes as ‘blocked communication with those affected which weakens knowledge and motivation about ecological relationships’ (Plumwood, 2002), and the same concept can be understood a bit differently here. Everyone is now affected and everyone is now the solution and hence communicating remoteness must now mean communicating environmentality itself, without distinctions or discriminations. This is why we need a new kind of environmental culture, one that works out from the bottom up, is inclusive in nature, and one that is built upon the relationship between humans and everything else, living or non-living.

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161

A Solution in Theory: Environmental Culture

The vision and need for an environmental culture are a set of overlapping categories. By no means are we strange to either of the two words that make up the general concept of an environmental culture. For most readers, imagining some form of an environmental culture should not be a difficult problem either. However, advances in cultural studies, environmental humanities, post humanities, literary ecocriticism, and cultural ecology in the last four decades have ensured that the general understandings of both culture and environment are no longer suitable to either understand the problem or to look for solutions. For starters, the very understanding of the concept of culture has undergone a plethora of changes since the 1970s- so much so that ‘culture’ now happens to be at the center of all discourses of the humanities and the post-humanities. To summaries advances in the study of culture is beyond the scope of this chapter, yet it would be a good idea for the sciences and allied disciplines to gain a basic understanding of how cultural studies inform academic disciplines, especially ecology and environmentalism (During, 2005; Zapf, 2016). Explaining the general understanding of the term culture in environmental context, Rocheleau and Nirmal (2016) have the following to say about ‘culture’ in Keywords for Environmental Studies: In contemporary vernacular understanding, culture is the ongoing collective sense making of how we be in relation with each other, other living beings, and the living world, and may include everything from microbes to artificial intelligence, virtual worlds, and the “viral” phenomena that sweep across the worldwide web (Rocheleau & Nirmal, 2016).

This generalised understanding of culture can serve as a starting point for scientists to gain a basic academic understanding of ‘culture’, however, more nuanced advances in culture studies have had an extremely significant impact in the environmental humanities and environmental post humanities (Plumwood, 2002). What needs to be the framework of an environmental culture? From our understanding of the problem, and the progress in academia- both within and outside the sciences and from the standpoint of every ‘being’ caught in the crisis, we can come up with a working framework of what environmental culture we are looking for. This kind of environmental culture does not negate any other explanation of what environmental culture is, but respects and integrates them from time to time- all with the purpose of foregrounding the relationship of a human with other beings and the natural world. The following paragraphs are not meant as a set of objective rules that define environmental culture and are meant more as subjective choices for us to employ (both as academicians and responsible beings) in our respective and localized confrontation with the climate crisis. This clarification is necessary because apart from being a global phenomenon, the local experience with the environment and the changes that it is undergoing is different for each individual and each community/locality (Thomashow, 2002; Heise, 2008). This clarification is also necessary because the idea of an environmental culture that is upheld by this chapter is envisioned as radically opposed to the ‘top-down’ approaches of most climate crisis policies and solutions that are handed down by institutions and authorities

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without acknowledging the differences in the lived experiences of the ‘subjects’. To put this in other words, we must all chose our own battles and own shields, and hence an environmental culture based on subjective experiences and choices that opens up the playing field for us. Finally, this working framework is also meant to undermine the ‘anthropocentric bias’ that informs our epistemological discourses, disciplinary differences notwithstanding. First and foremost, this new environmental culture must be made up of narratives of the environment. It must include experiences of the environment, from any perspective possible, and must be inclusive in nature. In this spirit, environmental culture can be described as any discourse or narrative that brings humans and the environment closer. People experience their respective environments differently, and the present kind of environmental culture discussed in this chapter considers each as a part of a global environmental culture (Heise, 2008). Take, for example, on one hand, the interactions of human beings who have spent most of their lives in industrialized and urban places with increasing environmental degradation and on the other hand, human beings who have spent most of their lives in a pastoral environment with closer interaction with nature. They are bound to have very different experiences of their respective environments, and this understanding of environmental culture does not presuppose the superiority of a pastoral environmental experience over any other experience. This environmental culture considers both as environmental narratives- powerful narratives that can supplement each other in understanding where we are headed together. The narrative of the pastoral experience can tell the urban listener that there are alternate ways to imagine our relationship with nature and the narrative of the urban/industrialized experience can tell the pastoral listener that their relationship with nature is worth preserving. Both narratives could tell a third listener that differential environmental experiences are the essence of an environmental culture. An environmental culture in narrative also looks at stories that exist in our cultures in the form of folk tales, animal tales, ballads, folk songs, mythologies and legends. Before dismissing them as fanciful narratives, perhaps it is time to reconsider them as a rich source of narratives that store information about how different cultures in time and place had interacted with their environments. In a landmark study, it has already come to light that animal stories have an important and positive role to play in raising empathy in readers (Małecki et al., 2019). Taking a cue from the same study, we can infer that tales of talking animals, human-animal co-existence, the folklore of plants, the stories of earthy forces and mythologies of creation hold ample number of alternate narratives that challenge hyper-rational epistemologies and hyper separation from nature and in the process establish a dialogical relationship with the environment. It does not matter if these stories do not fit into the logic of human enlightenment and superiority over other species and nature. The fact remains that they are proof of proximity between humans and nature and sometimes proof of struggle, but either way, the central players of our environmental culture, humans, non-humans and natural elements are present in the dialogue. This also conforms to the idea that we need to acknowledge and study ‘deep history’ to understand the climate crisis better, as has been pointed out by Dipesh

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Chakrabarty (Chakrabarty, 2009). As more and more of these stories are now being published, read and adapted to cinema and animation, we have already started on a path of creating an environmental narrative. What needs to be done is to expand this narrative by adding the narratives of the experiences of different people and places to the narratives that already exist in our cultures. The outcome of this will be a huge repository of stories that focus chiefly on the differential relationships of humans with non-humans and the environment. An environmental culture based on these narratives that already exist can then become a limitless source of communicating about the environment and climate change, through pedagogical methods, media, adaptations, cinema, or practically any method that we may need in our respective fields, as has been illustrated sufficiently by Greg Garrard (Garrard, 2012). Secondly, environmental culture must be an exercise in ‘re-story-ation’. Biologist Robin Wall Kimmerer (2013) mentions Gary Nabhan’s concept of ‘re-story-ation’ in Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom, Scientific Knowledge and the Teaching of Plants and argues that: . . .we can’t meaningfully proceed with healing, with restoration, without “re-story-ation.” In other words, our relationship with land cannot heal until we hear its stories (Kimmerer, 2013).

We would do well here to notice the innovative wordplay around the concepts of the story and restoration. Restoration, in this sense, is not just a function of reordering the balances in nature, it is also a function of recovery- of relationships in nature and how they may have been obscured, but not entirely lost. In a similar way, stories are not just tales we tell and write, sometimes it is more about recovering narratives that seems to have been pushed to the boundaries of literary and cultural discourses, both by our overstated emphasis on empiricism and rationality and by the curious demands of disciplinary purity in some academic disciplines. The emphasis on stories and restoration needs to be seen in a different light, and each according to our respective requirements, must understand ‘re-story-ation’ differently. There are several pitfalls and cautions in such an understanding of ‘re-story-ation’. This should not be understood as a utopian dream of restoring nature to its past glory- we are anyway far beyond that- or as a conservative attempt by going back to a remote past by negating all human actions that have led us to this point. This should also not be dismissed as a function of romantic or literary idealism or imagination, a charge that most literary expression and scholarship is familiar with (Howarth, 1996). ‘Re-story-ation’ must be seen as a function that makes us re-examine our language and everyday narratives that we use to interact with the environment around us. Our first understanding of ‘re-story-ation’ should be with a reexamination of how we talk about the environment and how we understand our relationship with it. What language do we use to describe the environment and its constituents? What is implied by the use of such language to represent the non-human? As feminist theory and critical race theory have explained far better, the function of language in maintaining hegemonic power relationships cannot be understated and as the study of speciesism is picking up on similar lines, we now know that our language hides clues as to how we perceive the environment (Dunayer, 1995). Consider the

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following ‘simple’ examples. As a child grows into the world through education, both formal and informal, she learns to define the world as she goes along. What is a tree, she learns. What is a cow, she learns. Trees give us oxygen and shade, comes the definition. Later, in advanced classes, she learns that oxygen is a byproduct of photosynthesis, shade is an outcome of thermodynamics and optics, and fruits are byproducts of a reproductive function, but by then, utilitarian explanations of environmental and related phenomenon have already left a mark. Trees don’t ‘give’ shade or oxygen or fruits, they are just there, independent of their relative value to humans. Consider the emphasis on the word ‘give’- it implies a position where an entity exists for the sole purpose of ‘giving’ to another entity, whose role in this dynamic is to ‘take’. This tendency to look and define the environment, among another phenomenon, in terms of a language of transactions establishes the groundwork for paradigms of defining everything else that comes later in life, from existence to administration to polity to perceptions of reality. Consider words and concepts like ‘utility’, and ‘resource’; both human and natural, ‘output’, ‘product’, and ‘value’. These words and concepts are at the very center of the state of our civilization, yet these are the same words that form the part of a discourse that contributes in perpetuating speciesism (Dunayer, 2001). Apart from being an issue that is discussed in political and ideological forums that look to correct historical mistakes from the perspective of the present and future, this is an issue that needs ‘re-story-ation’ much before children become adults with biased paradigms of understanding their environment. What is a cow? A cow is a four-legged domestic animal that gives us milk. Does she though? Or is it the case that the relationship is more about us, who ‘take’ the milk, and use the reverse description of ‘give’ to justify our needs and maintain that paradigm thereof? This giving and taking of milk, for example, eventually become a mammoth system of exploitation done on an industrial scale, and by all proven means, it functions on questionable ethical standards (Twine, 2010). Thirdly, the narrative of environmental culture should include a reexamination of an old relationship that now does not appear important to most academicians, but has the potential to be the most significant quality of the kind of environmental culture that we are looking for. Despite what most present-day disciplinary exclusivities would have us believe, science and stories and old friends. Much before empirical science became one of the fundamental ways in which human civilization sought to understand the secrets of the universe or seek out ‘absolute’ truths, our ancestors made up stories to explain and understand their environments. These were not random fantasies. Observed natural phenomenon was a storehouse of patterns and outcomes that could be codified in stories in the absence of empirical methods. Donna Haraway, cultural historian of science, presents this as the very nature of scientific practice: Scientific practice may be considered a kind of story-telling practice—a rule-governed, constrained, historically changing craft of narrating the history of nature. Scientific practice and scientific theories produce and are embedded in particular kinds of stories. Any scientific statement about the world depends intimately upon language, upon metaphor. The metaphors may be mathematical or they may be culinary; in any case, they structure scientific

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vision. Scientific practice is above all a story-telling practice in the sense of historically specific practices of interpretation and testimony (Haraway, 1989, 4).

Hence, to cite an example, much before condensation and evaporation could explain rain, and much before friction and electricity could explain thunder, our ancestors had already made stories about them. This point has less to do with the empirical need to scientifically prove a theory, and more to do with the human propensity of living in stories and making sure they pass it on to generations afterwards. Timothy Clark, quoting Lynn Margulis, says that even scientists need to narrate ‘to integrate their observations into origin stories’ (Clark, 2019, 82). Thus, Thor and Benjamin Franklin are two sides of the same coin, separated by a mythical hammer and an empirical kite. By all means, Thor is now equally, if not more, in the public imagination, thanks to another retelling of an old story through the medium of cinema and animation. If at all, both stories bring us closer to nature, the kite in revealing a fundamental force of nature and the hammer in evoking respect and reverence for natural phenomena. That the religious and spiritual element embodied in the old mythological tale has now been replaced and retold by powerful representative forces of popular culture should tell us another thing about the nature of ‘restory-ation’, but this is probably the subject for another discussion. This is an example not limited to ancient stories about knowledge systems. In a random pedagogical experiment conducted by the author of this chapter in a class of 50 students pursuing a postgraduate degree in English literature, no student was able to correctly state Newton’s formula for the law of gravitation, though a lot of them hovered around concepts of force, mass and distance. But then, all 50 of them knew about the apple. Newton’s law can stand for itself without the apple, yet the apple persists, proven or unproven. Neither science nor gravity needs the apple, yet it persists as a powerful narrative that demonstrates a human being’s ingenuity and even if someday most beings do forget the accurate ingenuity, they remember a fruit that may or may not have fallen on one person’s head. For most students who have passed through any form of elementary education, the stories of Newton or Graham Bell or the Wright Brothers or Edison, or Tesla would have come around the same time they were introduced to the very basics of empirical science in the western civilization, and this time the students did not need the story of a naked man running through the streets of ancient Athens screaming on the top of his voice to mathematically illustrate the working of a natural phenomenon. Fourth, the narrative of environmental culture should be one that is self-critical, and to do this it must take the help of current science. A better part of modern history and western epistemology has been influenced by flawed narratives with the support of powerful institutions that have more or less directed how humans have perceived (and perceive) their place in this universe and how they place themselves in their environments (White, 1996). Challenging and changing such narratives is no easy task. Take for example the events of 1633 and Galileo’s perception-altering intervention. It took three hundred and 59 years, in 1992, for the Vatican to come close to admitting that Galileo might have been right after all (Finocchiaro, 2005). Darwin is another example in this two-way street and before, in between, and after, there have

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been many scientists and innovators who have stood up to alter narratives. Some have been successful, some perhaps not. Herein lies a fundamental lesson, both for science and narratives- narratives do not necessarily stand for the truth and it is the responsibility of science to offer course correction whenever needed. In the case of the climate crisis, science seems to be on the correct path, but it has to challenge dominant narratives that do not regard climate change to be a problem serious enough for everyone’s consideration. But perhaps more importantly, contemporary science needs to communicate to the world at large, in a language that the world will understand, the severity of the situation and what needs to be done. The work of contemporary science needs to become a narrative that moves beyond the scientific community and becomes a constituent part of an environmental culture. The long and short of the proposed pathway is this- science needs stories and stories need science. This ‘re-story-ation’ can point us towards an environmental culture. A kind of environmental culture built along these four pathways, but always looking forward to other pathways, can be a significant step towards developing every being as an environmentalist. Climate research must now focus on this kind of a flexible framework which can help in the movement from environmentalism to environmentality, as has been mentioned previously with regard to works by Buell and Bartosch (Buell, 2005) (Bartosch, 2013).

9.4

A Solution in Practice: Environmental Culture and Transformative Teaching-Learning

A concept or framework of environmental culture shall be incomplete if we do not include a pedagogical strategy that can practically implement our ideas into practice. Fortunately for us, there exist several models of pedagogical strategies which can be instrumental in the teaching of environmental culture. One of the prominent pedagogical strategies which we can implement for our cause is the model of ‘transformative learning’ proposed by Jack Mezirow, building upon the work of theorists like Jurgen Habermas (Mezirow, 1991). Mezirow describes transformative learning as: Transformative learning is learning that transforms problematic frames of reference- sets of fixed assumptions and expectations (habits of mind, meaning perspectives, mindsets)—to make them more inclusive, discriminating, open, reflective, and emotionally able to change. Such frames of reference are better than others because they are more likely to generate beliefs and opinions that will prove more true or justified to guide action (Mezirow, 2003).

Though Merizow frames transformative learning as a discourse useful for adult education, we can see that this definition is the perfect fit for the teaching of a narrative of environmental culture- to recipients of all age groups. If we follow closely the definition in tandem with what we have discussed in the introduction and the previous section of this chapter, we can see that we are already enroute to address problematic frames of reference, fixed assumptions and expectations that have prevented a proper understanding of the climate crisis. In our discussion on the pathways to acquiring an environmental culture through ‘re-story-ation’, we can see

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how we are on an inclusive path, without discrimination towards any experience or knowledge so that we are open and reflexive about the problem and possible solutions. And by all means, the very nature of environmental culture rests on an emotive platform and the expectation that guided action is imminently necessary. In this section of the chapter, we shall see how environmental culture is instrumental in the formation of a ‘biospheric perspective’ that is a fundamental part of a ‘biospheric curriculum’ (Thomashow, 2002). Second, we shall discuss a four-step practical strategy (awareness, analysis, evaluation, and participation) proposed by Steve Pratchett (Pratchett, 2009) and implemented by Hayden Gabriel and Greg Garrard (Gabriel & Garrard, 2012) towards achieving an ‘unprecedented ecocritical pedagogy’ (Garrard, 2017). Third, we shall propose a strategy where the four-step model can be used to communicate about the environment, environmental culture and climate change. Transformative learning calls for a practice of transformative teaching. For that to materialize, we need what Mitchell Thomashow calls a ‘biospheric curriculum’ (Thomashow, 2002). In his seminal work Bringing the Biosphere Home: Learning to Perceive Global Environmental Change, Thomashow elucidates the nature of a biospheric curriculum: At the core of a biospheric curriculum is a set of qualities—wonder, indebtedness, appreciation, gratitude, praise, and reverence. These qualities aren’t taught as much as practiced. To a certain extent every person has to learn for himself how to exemplify these qualities (Thomashow, 2002).

His criteria for a successful curriculum require that we integrate the developments in global science along with the awareness of how different people perceive ‘place and time’ and identify educational methods that can serve both purposes. Such a curriculum is built upon the expectation that it shall be successful in breaking down the barriers between school and community and turn the school into a ‘living laboratory of multigenerational vitality’ (Thomashow, 2002). The development of an environmental culture follows much along the same lines. Thomashow’s curriculum is also directed by a specialized role for the educator, whose ‘subtle’ duty is ‘not just to raise awareness, but to encourage perception and facilitate wonder’ (Thomashow, 2002). The central role in Thomashow’s curriculum lies with the concept of ‘biospheric perception’- which he develops through several stages to arrive at a working model that leads to a biospheric curriculum. The vision and pathway of an environmental culture that has been developed in this chapter closely follow Thomashow’s ‘biospheric perception’, in the sense that both are a function of practice, of rigorous reexamination and reflections on our relationships in the environment. Just as ‘re-story-ation’ stressed on the function of retelling and reclaiming certain kinds of narratives to stress on our relationships with the environment, Thomashow stresses on the function of imagination for cultivating biospheric perception by conjuring ‘images of what the deep past looked like by drawing them’. He states that to cultivate biospheric perception, ‘you have to dream the biosphere as well as study it’ (Thomashow, 2002)- much like what this chapter attempts to do- to tell stories of the environment to reclaim our relationships

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in it. Both environmental culture and biospheric perception require ‘patience, perseverance, and mentoring, as well as a sense of critical self-reflection’ (Thomashow, 2002). As this chapter has been structured along the lines in which the pathways of an environmental culture are expected to function, Thomashow’s three-step emphasis on learning to observe global environmental change, deriving meaning from it and then choosing to do something about it- is the axis on which a pedagogical strategy can be built. In what way can we teach about environmental culture as a part of a biospheric perception and curriculum so that it leads to transformative learning? To do this, we can take the help of another innovative method that is an instrumental part of ecocritical and green cultural studies pedagogy. In Teaching Ecocriticism and Green Cultural Studies (2012), Greg Garrard brings together a commendable number of scholars and teachers who have adapted and developed innovative methods to teach the environment and the climate crisis to students and people at large. Gabriel and Garrard’s own essay ‘Reading and Writing Climate Change’ (2012) makes use of a version of transformative teaching that functions on a four-step schematic – awareness, analysis, evaluation and participation (Pratchett, 2009) whose objective is to ‘facilitate informed critical and creative responses to climate change and eco-systemic ontology’ (Gabriel & Garrard, 2012). Garrard later makes a case for the need of an ‘unprecedented’ ecocritical pedagogy considering the unprecedented nature of the crisis and is of the opinion that it is possible that such pedagogical strategies are already in practice at different places but have not been appropriately articulated (Garrard, 2017). Contemporary research has not only widened the importance of teaching and communicating about the climate crisis, but have highlighted various interdisciplinary, innovative and creative techniques that can be used by instructors and teachers (Siperstein et al., 2017; Bartosch, 2019; Drewes & Andrea, 2020; Singer, 2022). It should be noted here that Gabriel and Garrard’s schematic is particularly mindful of the need to develop a biospheric perception and curriculum as envisioned by Mitchell Thomashow. In the examples illustrated by Garrard, the awareness component includes reading of texts and watching documentaries and cinema that relate to the climate crisis, which could ‘raise students’ environmental and literary awareness. The analysis and evaluation components include a comparison of different depictions of wilderness and thinking about the idea of an environmental aesthetic, among others. The participation component included collaborative projects, productions of new environmental narratives and expressions of personal views on the climate crisis through exemplary mediums like writing letters to self, which could ‘invite students to participate in the writing and criticism of literary works which are demonstrably oriented to the environment and ecology’ (Gabriel & Garrard, 2012). A variation of this model used by Garrard can be instrumental in the teaching of environmental culture and its narratives. It should be kept in mind here that a pedagogical strategy for environmental culture, built upon the four-step schematic, does not recognize distinctions based on the discipline the students are pursuing. Students of science, environmental or otherwise as well as students of humanities need to be taught the holistic nature of

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environmental culture. We may pick the narratives according to the age group of the students we are addressing, but as we move through the rungs of higher education, students of sciences need to be taught what the environmental humanities are up to and vice versa, through stories and narratives of environmental culture that have been mentioned in the previous section of this chapter. Additionally, we need not restrict ourselves to formal education and as and when necessary, the same pedagogical strategy can also be used to communicate about the climate crisis to the general public at large. For the awareness section of teaching environmental culture, the repository of environmental narratives is more than enough. For as much as possible, this narrative must be made a part of daily discourse, and not just within the classroom. Within the classroom, students can be given readings on the experiences of people from different geographies and climatic conditions, so that they are aware of environmental conditions, firsthand, from as many places as possible. For this purpose, videos and audio recordings would do just as well as written narratives. We may encounter language barriers, but then environmental narrative in any common language that students are familiar with would serve our purpose. The idea here is to expose students to as many narratives as possible, and the role of a translator may also be considered instrumental if the need arises. Students and the public must also be exposed to stories from their own culture as well as other cultures that represent the relationships between humans and their environment. The awareness section should also include stories, in simple narrative structures, about science and scientific advancements with regard to the climate crisis. Then, for the component of the analysis, students may be asked to highlight sections of the narratives that they find most important in understanding their local condition with regard to the climate crisis. These categories may include analysis of local food habits, architecture, interactions with animals and plants, and how they relate to their immediate geography. More importantly, they should be encouraged to spot changes in these categories that may be interpreted as the direct impact of the climate crisis. Then they may be asked to compare their local understanding with that of some other narrative from anywhere else so that they understand the connection of the local to the global as well as the fact that for different people, experiences of the environment may be very different. Once the students are aware of different narratives and stories and they have analytically assessed the building blocks of an environmental culture, we can move to the evaluation component of these narratives. This component may consist of questions and answers, where students learn their place and significance in the environment and the climate crisis. They should be encouraged to ask questions like how have we been contributing to the climate crisis? What are our responsibilities, once we know that we are implicated? How do our actions affect the lives of our companion species and nature at large? How do our actions affect people in a separate geographic and cultural locations? How do their actions affect us? Is it possible that even the smallest actions that we can undertake may contribute towards healing the planet? Can we critically look at a scientific understanding of the problem and contribute to climate knowledge? How can the humanities and the

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arts contribute to climate change research? The answers to these questions can be diverse and multiple, and the focus of the instructor should be on the dissemination of climate knowledge and not deciding which is the right answer and which is the wrong one. This kind of discursive attitude and evaluation can eventually lead to the participation component. Once students start collecting and evaluating responses based on their subjective opinions, they can each decide their own contribution to the climate crisis. Participation can also mean contributing to the narrative of environmental culture by adding on stories, or by recovering lost and ignored stories through personal interventions. The above schematic of using the four-step model must be seen as an example of communicating the environment and environmental culture. According to our place and time, we may adopt any of the four steps or even add a few more steps according to our needs. The entire idea of this schematic in the context of teaching environmental culture is to be flexible, inclusive and open to change and debate- much as the working framework of environmental culture. The final suggestion of this pedagogical strategy is rather simple yet likely to be controversial. The teaching-learning of environmental culture, through whatever strategy, must be kept out of the reach of formal academic evaluation processes usually maintained by the award of grades and scorecards. Grades, scores, and scorecards may be an integral component of every academic discipline, but learning about the environment and the climate crisis cannot be a competition, with oneself or with others. This is a potentially viable way of developing every being as an environmentalist, and not a selected few.

9.5

Suggestions for Policy Implementation

Based on the arguments presented in this chapter, the following paragraphs may be considered as suggestions for policy implementation. Creating a sense of environmentality in all individuals should be the primary objective for policy implementation. Documents, reports, and research on the climate crisis need to be communicated better, made more accessible, and written in a language that directly addresses the general public instead of a selected circle of people. Policy implementation should reconsider altering academic language too, if possible, by making it simple and jargon free so that research is more accessible to the general public. The people need to know what lies behind theories, hypotheses, charts, graphs, technologies, innovation and policies. This is a primary requirement in creating a sense of environmentality and climate research can benefit from it immensely. To achieve this, policy implementation needs to acknowledge that the climate crisis is primarily a crisis of culture, and hence urgently look towards fostering forms of environmental culture and promoting cultural solutions. Secondly, environmental culture and environmentality have extensive characteristics, only a few of which have been mentioned in this chapter, and hence, policy implementation needs to acknowledge and refer to research in the environmental humanities for a holistic understanding of the climate crisis and solutions thereof. It

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needs to be acknowledged that emotive responses to the climate crisis are no lesser in value than technocratic ones. Insisting on disciplinary purity and exclusivity will get us nowhere in this crisis and policy implementation needs to actively pursue to breakdown disciplinary hierarchy in climate research. It would not be an exaggeration to say that human beings are in a humbling position with regard to where we stand in the climate crisis. Perhaps academic research also could do well with a little more humility and a little less competition. All academic disciplines may or may not be a part of the problem, but all academic disciplines are certainly a part of the solution. Hence, policy implementation also needs to reexamine dominant academic trends in climate research and look to increase funds for research in the environmental humanities. Thirdly, policy implementation needs to consider looking for alternate solutions for the climate crisis, apart from technocratic ones. The flexible framework of environmental culture suggested in this chapter is but exemplary, and several similar and better frameworks do exist in research, tradition, and practice. Nevertheless, one of the starting points that can be considered is altering the dominant language that presently represents the relationship of human beings with the environment and non-humans, and replacing it with a language that is more compassionate, attached to emotive responses, unbiased, non- hierarchical, and one that does not treat the environment and non- humans as the means to an end. In essence, policy implementation needs to promote a bottom-up approach in dealing with the climate crisis instead of the prevalent top-down approach. Fourthly, we must circle back to the first suggestion for policy implementation once more. While communicating about the environment and the climate crisis, and in effort to enhance a sense of environmentality, policy implementation needs to promote the building up of environmental narratives. This can be done in two ways. First, we must unearth the vast number of stories about the environment that exist in our traditional narratives and combine them with stories of personal interactions with the environment so that we have a huge cache of narratives that can be communicated to people in different circumstances. Second, we must tell stories about science. Throughout history, science has often fallen back on stories and metaphors to communicate about its growth, and this tradition needs to be revived and science needs to be communicated through stories again. In effect, we need a new narrative of science. Hence, policy implementation needs to take the concept of ‘re-storyation’ as extremely necessary and urgent. Finally, policy implementation needs to acknowledge environmental and climate pedagogy as a very vital component of climate research and must actively encourage alternate pedagogical strategies. Several innovative pedagogies have been developed in the past few decades, and some specifically with regard to the climate crisis and only a couple of them have been discussed in this chapter. Policy implementation needs to promote research in environmental and climate pedagogy and encourage alternate and innovative strategies wherever possible.

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Disclaimer The views and/or claims/or data expressed in this chapter are solely authors’ own or based on literature survey and are not necessarily linked with their affiliations, editors of the book, reviewers of the chapter or the publisher.

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Mezirow, J. (2003). Transformative learning as discourse. Journal of Transformative Education, 1(1), 58–63. https://doi.org/10.1177/1541344603252172 Plumwood, V. (2002). Environmental culture: The ecological crisis of reason. Routledge. Pratchett, S. (2009). A model for sustainable development. Primary Geographer, 68, 25–27. Rocheleau, D., & Nirmal, P. (2016). Culture. In W. A. Gleason, D. N. Pellow, & J. Adamson (Eds.), Keywords for environmental studies (pp. 50–55). New York University Press. Singer, A. J. (2022). Teaching climate history: There is no planet B. New york. Siperstein, S., Hall, S., & LeMenager, S. (Eds.). (2017). Teaching climate change in the humanities. Routeledge. Snow, C. P., & Collini, S. (2012). The two cultures. Cambridge University Press. Thomashow, M. (2002). Bringing the biosphere home: Learning to perceive global environmental change. The MIT Press. Twine, R. (2010). Animals as biotechnology: Ethics, sustainability and critical animal studies. Earthscan. UNEP. (2021). Adaptation gap report 2021: The gathering storm – Adapting to climate change in a post-pandemic world. UNEP. UNEP. (2022). Adaptation gap report 2022: Too little, too slow – Climate adaptation failure puts world at risk. UNEP. Westling, L. (2012). Literature and ecology. In G. Garrard (Ed.), Teaching Ecocriticism and green cultural studies (pp. 75–89). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230358393_7 Lynn White, Jr. 1996. The historical roots of our ecologic crisis. In The ecocriticism reader: Landmarks in literary ecology, Harold Fromm Cheryll Glotfelty, 3–14. University of Georgia Press. Zapf, H. (Ed.). (2016). Handbook of ecocriticism and cultural ecology (Vol. 2). De Gruyter.

Chapter 10

Ecopolitics and International Security: The Challenges and the Politics Cláudia Toriz Ramos

Abstract The chapter aims to tackle the connection between ecopolitics and international security. Often presented as a subfield of new geopolitics, ecopolitics is a political framework for answering major environmental challenges that jeopardise the balance between human beings and nature. In doing so, they constitute major threats to international and human security. The chapter draws on the academic field of international security studies by analysing the role of non-military structural threats to security. Nevertheless, a connection is made with scenarios of conflict (either pre-existing or resulting from environmental problems), socio-economic turmoil, state fragility and violence. Ecopolitical approaches to those problems are debated, both in the context of crises and as preventive measures. The discussion is framed within the diverse perspectives on the issue adopted by different United Nations agencies. The study is complemented by an analysis of policy approaches to natural catastrophes (often related to climate change) and to the migration agenda, as it showcases the case of the connection between ecopolitics and security. The chapter ends with an overall balance of ecopolitics today, and the ways forward in order to reinforce human and international security. Keywords Climate change · Climate Refugees · Ecopolitics · International security · Natural disasters · Securitisation

Abbreviations CSM DPPA DRR EcoDRR

Climate Security Mechanism United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Disaster Risk Reduction Ecosystem-based disaster risk reduction

C. T. Ramos (✉) Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, University Fernando Pessoa and CEPESE, Porto, Portugal e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Tripathi et al. (eds.), Eco-Politics and Global Climate Change, Environment & Policy 65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48098-0_10

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IOM OCHA PEDRR UN UNDP UNDRR UNEP UNFCCC UNHCR WHO

10.1

International Organization for Migration United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Partnership for Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction United Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction United Nations Environment Programme United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change The UN Refugee Agency World Health Organization

Introduction

Ecopolitics can be addressed both from the point of view of political ideas and ideologies, and from the point of view of politics put into practice and actual policy outcomes. It can therefore be studied both as a set of normative theories and as political action. Although initially the debate on ecology or the environment was a fairly marginal one, it moved centre stage and is now part of mainstream politics in national and international agendas (Leonard & Barry, 2010; Harris, 2022). The ‘sustainable development goals’, i.e., the United Nations global agenda for sustainable development, is the paramount example of that process. Although the term ‘ecopolitics’ does not imply an immediate connection with security issues, there has been evolution at the level of international security studies leading to the appraisal of ecological issues as security issues, and thus, connecting ecopolitics with security endeavours. This chapter discusses the connections between ecopolitics and international security. International security as a field of research and policy area has incorporated the characteristics of post World War II (WWII) world order, which tends to proscribe international war and to focus on peace, security, reconstruction and conflict prevention. The process led to redefining ‘security’ as a broad concept that goes well beyond the single absence of war, and beyond the national security focus. This means that a broader range of threats to security is now considered, and also that, at least for some observers, the focus has shifted from national to human security (Malik, 2020; Hough, 2021). Environmental challenges are therefore often appraised as threats to human security and are increasingly being included within the perimeter of security policies. Bringing the debate on environmental hazards into the field of ‘security’ may in turn broaden the field of available policy instruments to tackle urgent problems (Hough et al., 2020; Hough, 2021). Climate change may be one such problem awaiting effective solutions. Conceptually, this process can be framed within theories on ‘securitisation’ (Buzan et al., 1998). Therefore, the core argument of the chapter is that the securitisation of ecopolitics – namely the framing of climate change as a major security issue – may lead to political gains in tackling the inherent challenges.

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For presenting the convergence between ecopolitics and international security, an overview of both fields is required, hence the next section presents some definitions and conceptual debates. In the second section, the chapter covers policy-oriented approaches resulting from the encounter between ecopolitics and international security. The third section addresses two policy issue areas in which that encounter is relevant:‘natural’ catastrophes (often related to climate change), and the migration agenda.

10.2 10.2.1

Definitions and Debates Ecopolitics

Geopolitics, a field of research that partly overlaps with international security, results from the merger of geographic considerations with political power (Correia, 2018; Flint, 2022). The field traditionally shows the relevance for politics of the dominance over territories – because of their extension, position, natural resources, population, communication networks, wealth, or even symbolism. In conventional geopolitics, state borders are a key feature to map and are determinants for power relations. In turn, ecopolitics can also be described as an intersection between the territory and politics, and from that perspective it becomes convergent with geopolitics; however, ecopolitics is not primarily framed by political borders. On the contrary, ecopolitics emerged from the acknowledgment of the importance of nature preservation for human societies in general (Dobson, 2007; Barry, 2014). Further, it also stemmed from the recognition of the profound imbalance introduced by modern industrial societies to human-nature relations. Authors writing about the perspective of ‘new geopolitics’ (Correia, 2018) actually resort to ecopolitics to define a new subfield in the discipline, one that delves into the connections between the environment and politics and also one that is able to overcome conventional political borders, under a new consciousness of the territory, natural resources and their preservation. The debate on ecopolitics is also one major strand of contemporary ideological arenas (Goodin, 1992; Dobson, 2007; Barry, 2014). It emerged from a set of political ideas gathered under different labels – ecologism, environmentalism or green politics – all referring to a common stance, which is the concern with the effects of human behaviour upon nature, but carrying also some specificities that allow for differentiated uses of the three terms. While political parties and their political programmes may often be labelled ‘green’, the dividing line between environmentalism and ecologism is more of a theoretical nature and carries some practical implications as a consequence. Environmentalist theories are said to be anthropocentric, i.e., while focusing on rebalancing humans with nature, they will still consider that the focus of any ideology or policy is the human being and not nature per se. Unlike this, ecologists tend to a more radical discourse, often presenting humans just as another species in nature, with no reason whatsoever to be predominant, and thus, adopting an ecocentric standpoint. Consequentially, in practical

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political terms, supporters of the first will stand for adaptive measures and reforms, whereas followers of the second will align with more radical views and are prone to support major structural changes to modern societies (Goodin, 1992; Dobson, 2007; Barry, 2014). Serres (2020) even argues that, after the ‘social contract’, the ‘natural contract’ has emerged as a core necessity for the survival of human societies on Earth. Recent arguments on the Anthropocene make this debate all the more visible, if not imperatively urgent (McNeill & Engelke, 2014; Benner et al., 2022; Mendes, 2022). It has been made clear in the academic field that there is major pressure imposed upon nature by industrial and technological societies, which are prone to consumerism, and which have introduced such an imbalance upon ecological systems that rupture may be rapidly emerging on the horizon. Philosophies of optimism and progress have therefore given place to pessimistic views on foreseeable catastrophes, and indeed proposals for systemic changes have emerged, from plans to utopian returns to nature, to the idea of the circular economy, or the debate on the actual perimeter of the ‘basic necessities’. If one thing has been shown, it is therefore that humans and nature altogether are profoundly vulnerable (Beck, 2017). In political terms, ecopolitics has emerged first as a social movement, then party politics, and eventually reached mainstream political agendas (Leonard & Barry, 2010). The shaping of the concept of ‘sustainability’in the United Nations (UN) framework (Brundtland, 1987) and its iconic inclusion in the ‘Global Agenda’ (UN, 2023) account for the latter. With its economic, social and environmental pillars, and the requirements of intra- and inter-generational solidarity, the concept is ambitious and dictates a far-reaching agenda (Purvis et al., 2019). However, formulations such as weak and strong sustainability provide evidence both on the conceptual stretch of and the ideological divides stemming from the term (Pelenc, 2015). Likewise, the path followed ever since the initial Stockholm Conference on the Environment in 1972 up to the 2022 meeting in the same city created not only an agenda, but also structures for the international governance of the environment, and a major assembling of diversified actors (Ramos, 2022). In becoming part of the political mainstream, some of the radical stances of the initial movements for the environment may have been lost but, in spite of all the shortcomings, environmental policies can no longer be ignored by any political actor in the world.

10.2.2

International Security

International security is sometimes defined as a sub-field of international relations, although not all authors would subscribe to this assertion, and some would even argue in favour of the relative autonomy of the field vis-à-vis that of international relations (Williams & Mcdonald, 2018; Hough et al., 2020). As an academic discipline it is coterminous with war studies. However, the perspective is quite different, because while also dealing with conflicts it approaches them from the perspective of security, rather than concentrating on warfare. Furthermore,

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international security has gradually moved beyond the conceptual borders of ‘national security’, and thus, introduced new challenges to the discipline. Some schools tend to be more human-centred, and extensions towards the concept of ‘human security’ can be devised (Malik, 2020). Conflicts are also addressed from a broader perspective than traditionally. Not all conflicts are wars, even fewer international wars, and understanding the conditions for the promotion of peace has also become a challenge for the discipline. This is why international security often addresses the underlying structural conditions of conflicts and the connected ways of overcoming those. Therefore, both prevention and reconstruction tools are now among the objects of research and the field of the discipline has enlarged towards considering efforts for conflict prevention and the building of structural peace (Williams & Mcdonald, 2018; Hough et al., 2020). The broadening of the object thus relies on a (re)definition of security that encompasses a lot more threats than traditional war studies would. From military to non-military threats, from immediate to structural causes, the discipline covers a vast array of issues that may, one way or the other, jeopardise ‘human security’. Human security as a concept started being developed in the framework of the United Nations in its 1994 ‘Human Development Report’. It is normally defined as “freedom from fear, freedom from want and a right to live in dignity” (UN-Human Security Unit, 2016: 4). It, therefore, incorporates both a subjective and an objective dimensions, and it broadens threats to security to the issues of poverty and scarcity. The connections with the fields of human rights and development are obvious, but the environmental dimension is also targeted. The United Nations Human Security Handbook specifies: “environmental degradation, resource depletion and natural disasters” as the main components of ‘environmental insecurity’ (UN-Human Security Unit, 2016: 7). Environmental security has, therefore, become a necessary area of study in international security, especially as a non-military security category (Dalby, 2009; Öjendal & Swain, 2020; Hough, 2021). Yet, connections of environmental problems with military security and conflicts, in general, can also be identified. On the one hand, conflicts may lead to environmental degradation and the destruction of resources; on the other hand, resource scarcity and environmental pressure in general may ignite conflicts. These struggles may be more immediate for less-developed countries, where scarcity goes in tandem with poverty, as often portrayed in the water wars literature (Hough, 2021); but they can also involve major geopolitical powers in the quest for scarce vital resources, as for example energy supplies. Besides, the regional and even global environmental consequences of conflicts and wars should also be considered – from regional instability to major environmental impacts of destruction, which naturally go beyond political borders (Öjendal & Swain, 2020; Hough, 2021). It is nevertheless as non-military threats to security that environmental hazards are more compelling, especially if seen from the perspective of ‘human security’. Borders are mostly meaningless for climate change, for instance, and major impacts of environmental catastrophes upon human life are foreseeable. Pollution already kills annually a substantial number of people (WHO, 2022). Many so-called natural

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catastrophes may indeed find a remote cause in the ruptures caused to the ecosystems by humans. Still, in political terms, it may prove difficult for main international organisations, for states, and even for leading individuals to consider the environment as a standard threat to security. Furthermore, ecologists themselves may react negatively to this type of approach, for fear that it will lead to the militarisation of environmental issues, instead of driving enhanced environmental protection (Hough, 2021). Therefore, the central debate is what is to be considered a security issue, and thus, what is deemed as a threat to security.

10.2.3

The Securitisation of the Environment

When in the nineties, Buzan et al. (1998) made common the concept of ‘securitisation’ with reference to five political areas – military, political, economic, society and the environment –they paved the way for a major debate on the construction of security issues, i.e., the idea that security threats and objects to be securitised are not stable referents; that they depend on discursive constructions to exist as security issues. In spite of the many theoretical debates stemming from this core idea in the following years (Stritzel, 2014), it did pave the way to understanding that security issues are not only military security threats, and that, depending on the political approach, a given topic can travel from another policy area into security policies. This idea has often been debated in negative terms, for the mobilisation of disproportionate and exceptional means a security problem may entail. Yet, it can also be addressed the other way round, i.e., if a given problem seriously endangers human life, then it should be tackled not as an ordinary problem, but as a major challenge to societies. Whereas conventional views of security concentrated on military threats and treated power as a major advantage to face those, more recent perspectives tend to value ‘survival-plus’ and human ‘emancipation’ (Booth, 2007). This implies a shift in the focus, but also a substantial broadening of the range of potential threats. Back in 1991, Buzan described the environmental dimension of security as one “concerned with the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend” (1991: 19–20). It, therefore, seems unavoidable to consider the environment as a basilar component of human security. Besides, a comprehensive view of security enables the identification of the deep causes of insecurity, and thus, paves the way for more prevention-oriented perspectives. As Trombetta argues, not all security action has to be based on “emergency and contingency”, for there can be a clear necessity for “prevention and management” and “new roles for security actors and different means to provide security” (2008: 585). Yet, the acceptance of those new perspectives and the mobilisation of due resources to tackle emerging problems may be more controversial. Political debates on environmental issues still count with endless cohorts of ‘deniers’, i.e., unwilling ‘agents’ and ‘audiences’ who do not accept securitising the environment and who

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downscale the problems, with clear impacts upon policies and international negotiations. On 13 December 2021, the Security Council of the United Nations failed to adopt draft Resolution S/2021/990 (UN-Security Council, 2021a) integrating climate-related security risk into conflict-prevention strategies, after the negative votes of Russia and India. The core counter-argument was that the Security Council was not the appropriate setting for such resolution, especially framed as it was under Chap. 7 of the Charter and, since it was climate change related, it was considered as a United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) issue (UN-Security Council, 2021b). However, the vision emerging from the result is one of international security still conceived as a hard-security military matter, and not a comprehensive conflict-prevention view, as was attempted in the draft resolution (UN-Security Council, 2021a). All in all, it means that a wide-ranging, prevention-oriented perspective is still not consensual.

10.3

International Security Challenges and Policies

This section covers two issue areas in which the connection among ecopolitics, human and international security is quite obvious and which, for that reason, have moved centre stage in current debates on ecopolitics and security.

10.3.1

‘Natural’catastrophes

Natural catastrophes are normally perceived as security challenges of the non-military category and are frequently addressed as internal (national) security issues, in the framework of civil protection services. Nevertheless, structures of international cooperation have been developed, both for facing some of those crises and for preventing them, especially with reference to their reach, to the fragility of the victims and of the states where they unfold, or to the cross-border development of the events (European Commission, n.d.; OCHA, n.d.; Schofield, 2015; UNDRR, 2022). Natural disasters (e.g., droughts, floods, earthquakes, wild fires) are by definition ‘naturally’ generated. However, science has provided evidence that a substantial number of present days such catastrophes actually bear a connection with major impacts of humans’ life styles upon the environment and subsequent ecological imbalances (OCHA, n.d.; Schofield, 2015). Climate change, as part of global warming, is one such variable. Seen from this perspective, the distinction between natural and manmade catastrophes becomes blurred in some cases. Catastrophes are addressed as crises, hence reactively; but also, from the perspective of a structural approach, in a preventive manner, which implies both preparedness and tackling the root causes, whenever possible (UNDRR, 2022). Moreover, the challenges of climate change are by no means national security issues only, since they do not

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stop at the borders of states, and thus require convergent political solutions. The international governance structure as created in the framework of the UNFCCC, which has today near-universal membership, is relevant for the purpose, and so are the annual Conferences of the Parties (COP), even if the pace of political-diplomatic negotiation is slow before the eyes of public opinion (UNFCCC, 2022). The fact that those catastrophes impact more heavily on fragile states, because of their lack of preparedness and weak response to crises, also creates major geopolitical imbalances and human rights issues. The overlapping maps of conflict and natural disasters provide evidence of the risk multiplier effect of environmental degradation. Miroslav Jenča, the UN Assistant Secretary-General, stated before the UN Security Council in 2020 that: “The failure to consider the growing impacts of climate change will undermine our efforts at conflict prevention, peacemaking and sustaining peace, and risk trapping vulnerable countries in a vicious cycle of climate disaster and conflict” (UN, 2020). Securitising these crises as international security issues seems sensible and may foster the tools for dealing with them. While the Security Council remains reluctant to this, as was mentioned before, there are attempts to do it under the auspices of other bodies of the United Nations, which approach security in a more encompassing way, and which are increasingly using the concepts of ‘environmental security’ and ‘climate security’. The cross-sectoral characteristics of these crises are identified for instance in the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM), which is a joint initiative by the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (UNEP-DPPA-UNDP, 2021). This means explicitly acknowledging the connections between peacebuilding, development and climate security. However, some hindrances remain, notably at the organisational level, as stated in the 2021 progress report: Yet a number of challenges need to be overcome in order to maximize these opportunities and effectively address climate-related security risks. A shared conceptual understanding of the topic remains elusive, and sensitivities continue around the framing of climate security. This can complicate cooperation between partners and make it difficult to evaluate outcomes and lessons learned from different activities. The inherently cross-cutting nature of climate security further means that this work often has no natural home in the structures of international organizations or national governments, and no unit designated to take the lead and convene appropriate stakeholders (UNEP-DPPA-UNDP, 2021: 19).

Another attempt is the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) activity grounded on ‘naturebased solutions’, as presented in a guide for action jointly authored by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), the UNEP and the Partnership for Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction (PEDRR). The concept is presented as “an umbrella term covering a range of ecosystem-based approaches for different societal challenges within the paradigm of sustainable development” (UNDRR-UNEP-PEDRR, 2021: 14). Some of the case studies presented in that report, in order to provide evidence of principles put into practice, are: (i) Ridge-toreef for ecosystem-based disaster risk reduction (EcoDRR) in Haiti (idem, 2021: 28); (ii) Mangroves for coastal defense in Vietnam (idem, 2021: 45); and (iii) Land

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subsidence in north coast Java, Indonesia (idem, 2021: 49). This is, therefore, a United Nations endeavour, but runs within bodies other than the Security Council, which remains focused on ‘hard’ security issues.

10.3.2

Migration and the Environment

Migration is another rising debate that bridges environment with security concerns and there has been substantial discussion on the securitisation of migration (Hammerstadt, 2014). While this is often seen as a negative approach, it can also be argued that such perspective only applies to views which identify the migrants as the threat, and the populations in the destination countries, or the countries themselves, as the threatened objects. Clearly, from a human security perspective, the argument does not stand. More often than not, the populations at risk will be first and foremost the migrants, especially if under conditions of involuntary migration and asylum seeking. Therefore the securitisation of migration and refuge may instead urge political measures that would otherwise lag behind necessity. The focus of this chapter is on how migration can be connected with environmental crises (Zetter & Morrissey, 2014). As was stated before, military conflicts may either result from environmental hazards or impact negatively upon the environment, which in turn will affect peoples’ lives. Environmental degradation is therefore a risk multiplier, for the conflicts being concerned, but also for human security in general. Even if conflicts do not emerge, natural disasters, environmental degradation and resources depletion may be the direct triggers of displacement and mass migration. Apap and Revel (2021:1) state that: According to statistics published by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, since 2008 over 318 million people around the world have been forcibly displaced by floods, windstorms, earthquakes or droughts, 30.7 million in 2020 alone. This is equivalent to one person being displaced every second.

This problem has often been framed within the debate on ‘climate refugees’, or sometimes with reference to the broader concept of ‘environmental refugees’ (Apap & Revel, 2021; Hiraide, 2022). The core idea is that the international legal framework for protecting refugees (The 1951 UN Refugee Convention) could be stretched to victims of life-endangering, and climate change-related environmental threats. The 1951 Convention defines a refugee as someone who: owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country (UNHCR, 2022a: 14).

However, even if the concept of ‘climate refugee’ is popular among non-governmental organisations (e.g. Climate Refugees, 2022) and is sometimes even mentioned in political- institutional discourses, it is also highly contested and does not have any legal status so far. In legal terms, the parallel with the extant

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definition of a refugee might be difficult to establish, namely because climate issues often lead to internal and not international displacement. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) (2022b) does not endorse the concept and puts forward “persons displaced in the context of disasters and climate change” instead. Still, proposals have been made in order to foster the use of the ‘climate refugee’ concept (Docherty & Giannini, 2009), hence the debate remains open. Hiraide (2022), for instance, states that the alternative concept of ‘ecological displacement’ might be a better option, for the sake of unburdening the victims of such events of the stigma so often associated with the condition of ‘refugee’. A broad conception of threats to human security requires tackling environmental threats as a major cause of risk and death. Therefore, internal displacement and international migration stemming from those causes need to be framed as both humanitarian and security issues. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2021), for instance, has developed the Institutional Strategy on Migration, Environment and Climate Change 2021–2030, the sub-title of which is “for a comprehensive, evidence and rights-based approach to migration in the context of environmental degradation, climate change and disasters, for the benefit of migrants and societies”. From floods in Northern Honduras, to droughts in Ethiopia and Mogadishu, all leading to displacement, IOM presents abundant evidence of the challenges and the urgent necessity for environmental-related security policies (IOM, 2022). The UNHCR also documents many cases and many efforts to bring support to displaced people and help in the reconstruction – as in the case of Northern Mozambique, where cyclones further hindered the living conditions of people already affected by the bloodshed of the Cabo Delgado conflicts (UNHCR, 2022c).

10.4

Conclusion

Human and international insecurity are the result of a multiplicity of causes, among which environment-related causes are getting increasingly important. Furthermore, the many causes of insecurity tend to be associated, and thus, tackling insecurity requires comprehensive approaches. Environment imbalance, notably climate change, is well documented as a cause of dramatic human insecurity. It is a strong risk multiplier that stands as a serious threat in many scenarios of crisis, but it is also a permanent structural challenge to the very existence of humankind should the problems it entails not be addressed. Authors writing within the debate on the Anthropocene have made this perspective clear and urgent. It, therefore, seems fundamental that ecopolitical issues be addressed under global security policies and that the ‘securitisation’ of ecopolitics be considered as a way of protecting human beings and nature itself, and not as the subsuming of the environment to a narrow or even military view of security. Besides, environmental security cannot rely on a reactive attitude towards crises, it requires long-term prevention, preparedness and effective disaster risk reduction measures. Conceptually, there have been new challenges but new results too, such as those entailed in debates on human

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security, climate security, or climate refugees. Ecopolitics moved from being a theoretical debate into actual practice and policy guidelines. However, shortcomings remain in political-institutional terms, notably the gap between hard (military) and soft (in the case of environment related problems) security issues. The cases drawn from the organisational structure and the decision-making procedures of the UN provide substantial evidence of that mismatch. How to face the future, then? It seems the concept of security needs to be amplified and needs to encompass the many threats to human existence. It also seems that the intricacy of causes leading to insecurity requires integrated, comprehensive approaches, whether the starting point is an armed conflict, a migration crisis, or an alleged natural catastrophe. Last but not the least, it seems global security would strongly benefit from a coherent structure of governance converging around the same goals and agreeing on the same tools. Quite plainly, security is no longer a matter of the national scope only. Ignoring it, or persisting in addressing structural causes of human insecurity from that perspective, will only raise the odds for the catastrophic views on the future of earth and humankind to prove right. Disclaimer The views and/or claims/ or data expressed in this chapter are solely authors’ own or based on literature survey and are not necessarily linked with their affiliations, editors of the book, reviewers of the chapter or the publisher.

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UNFCCC-United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2022). United Nations climate change. https://unfccc.int/. Accessed 12 Nov 2022. UNHCR-The UN Refugee Agency. (2022a). Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10. Accessed 12 Nov 2022. UNHCR-The UN Refugee Agency. (2022b). Climate change and disaster displacement. https:// www.unhcr.org/climate-change-and-disasters.html. Accessed 12 Nov 2022. UNHCR-The UN Refugee Agency. (2022c). Displaced people join efforts to adapt to climate change in Mozambique. https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2022/11/636cc7374/displacedpeople-join-efforts-adapt-climate-change-mozambique.html. Accessed 12 Nov 2022. UN-Human Security Unit. (2016). Human security handbook. United Nations. UN-Security Council. (2021a). Draft resolution S/2021/990. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/GEN/N21/394/61/PDF/N2139461.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed 15 Dec 2022. UN-Security Council. (2021b). Security council seventy-sixth year. 8926th meeting. S/PV.8926. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N21/392/34/PDF/N2139234.pdf? OpenElement. Accessed 15 Dec 2022. UN-United Nations. (2020). Climate emergency ‘a danger to peace’, UN Security Council hears. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/07/1068991. Accessed 12 Nov 2022. UN-United Nations. (2023). Sustainable development goals. https://sustainabledevelopment.un. org/sdgs. Accessed 15 Dec 2022. WHO-World Health Organization. (2022). Air quality and health. https://www.who.int/teams/ environment-climate-change-and-health/air-quality-and-health/health-impacts. Accessed 15 Dec 2022. Williams, P., & Mcdonald, M. (Eds.). (2018). Security studies: An introduction (3rd ed.). Routledge. Zetter, R., & Morrissey, J. (2014). The environment-mobility nexus: Reconceptualizing the links between environmental stress, (im)mobility, and power. In E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of refugee and forced migration studies (pp. 342–354). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199652433.013.0015

Chapter 11

Global Eco-Politics: Media Discourse and Conflicting Climate Change Frameworks Amarendra Kumar Aarya

Abstract Climate change is a pervasive global issue that has garnered substantial attention from media outlets worldwide. However, media discourse on climate change frequently reflects conflicting frameworks, obstructing the formulation of a cohesive approach to addressing this multifaceted challenge. To address conflicting climate change frameworks, media outlets must prioritize precise and objective reporting. Enhancing scientific literacy among journalists and media professionals is essential for delivering accurate information to the public. Incorporating diverse voices in media coverage, such as scientists, policymakers, activists, and affected communities, can cultivate a more comprehensive dialogue. Fact-checking and holding accountable those who propagate misinformation are indispensable for maintaining accuracy and combatting misleading narratives. Fostering constructive dialogue necessitates collaborative efforts between media organizations, scientific institutions, and civil society. Collaboratively, these stakeholders can bridge gaps, endorse accurate reporting, and stimulate public engagement on climate change. Addressing conflicting climate change frameworks in media discourse is paramount for nurturing informed decision-making and effective action on a global scale. The significance of this study lies in its potential to elucidate this global issue from a comprehensive perspective. By comprehending the intricate mechanisms behind climate change, we can potentially devise effective strategies to limit our impacts and adapt to changes. The goal is to provide the necessary knowledge that would empower individuals, societies, and governments to make informed decisions and take responsible actions towards a sustainable future. The study strives not merely to articulate the problem but also to highlight the solutions, emphasizing that while the challenge is immense, so too is the collective capacity of humanity to address it. This article delves into the realm of global eco-politics, concentrating on the influence of media discourse and the obstacles posed by conflicting climate change frameworks. It underscores the impact of media framing on public opinion

A. K. Aarya (✉) Department of Journalism, Delhi College of Arts and Commerce, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Tripathi et al. (eds.), Eco-Politics and Global Climate Change, Environment & Policy 65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48098-0_11

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and policy discussions, the presence of conflict and polarization within media discourse, and the sway of political, economic, cultural, and regional factors. Keywords Cultural serene · Empowerment · Global eco-politics · Humanity · Political interests · Public opinion

11.1

Introduction

Climate change, a phenomenon recognized worldwide for its overwhelming implications, represents a pressing issue of our era. In broad terms, climate change refers to any significant alteration in the Earth’s typical patterns, including shifts in temperature, precipitation, or wind. These changes can be natural or induced by human activities and usually happen over extended periods (Bhadouria et al., 2023). However, it is human-induced or “anthropogenic” climate change that is currently a major global phenomenon (Bhadouria et al., 2019). Anthropogenic climate change stems from the high volume of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide, released into the atmosphere primarily from burning fossil fuels, deforestation, and industrial processes. This increase in greenhouse gases (GHGs) enhances the natural greenhouse effect, leading to the “global warming” phenomenon, which is characterized by a rise in the Earth’s average temperature. A glance at the history of climate change reveals its evolution as a critical global issue (IPCC, 2014a, b). Modern understanding of climate change began in the nineteenth century when scientists first suggested that human activities could change the Earth’s climate. In 1896, Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius became one of the first to propose that fossil fuel combustion could lead to enhanced global warming. However, it wasn’t until the mid-twentieth century, with the rapid growth of industrialization post World War II, that global temperatures began to rise at an unprecedented rate, putting climate change at the forefront of scientific concern (NASA, 2021a, b). The effects of climate change are far-reaching and devastating. These include increased heatwaves, droughts, intense storms, rising sea levels, melting glaciers, loss of biodiversity, and shifting wildlife populations and habitats. Further, these changes have critical implications for human societies, affecting agriculture, economy, and health (Hulme, 2010). These issues are expected to intensify in the future if greenhouse gas emissions are not curtailed. Climate change is unequivocally one of the most critical challenges of the twentyfirst century. Defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as “a change in the state of the climate that can be identified by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer,” climate change is a global issue that affects every corner of the planet (IPCC, 2013). It involves significant shifts in temperature, precipitation, wind patterns, and other aspects of Earth’s climate system. Climate change, as a global issue, is not bound by national frontiers. Its impacts are felt globally, albeit unevenly. As highlighted in numerous IPCC reports, climate change disproportionately affects developing nations and marginalized

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communities, which often have lesser resources to cope with these changes (IPCC, 2014a, b). The effects of climate change are manifold and interconnected, leading to multiple global challenges. These include increasing global temperatures, rising sea levels, melting ice caps and glaciers, and more frequent and severe weather events such as heatwaves, droughts, floods, and storms (IPCC, 2014a, b). Further, it is causing changes in biodiversity and ecosystems, resulting in species extinction and loss of natural habitats (IPBES, 2019). These shifts threaten global food security, increase the risk of water scarcity, and jeopardize human health (IPCC, 2019). Global warming is also resulting in ocean acidification and deoxygenation, severely affecting marine life and those human societies that depend on it (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2007). Another concerning effect is the potential release of vast amounts of additional carbon dioxide and methane from thawing permafrost, which could further exacerbate the problem (Schuur et al., 2015). Societies and economies worldwide are grappling with these challenges. In the subsequent sections, this article will delve into the influence of media discourse on climate change, the challenges posed by conflicting climate change frameworks within media, and the critical role of accurate reporting, diverse voices, and collaborative efforts in fostering a more informed and constructive global dialogue on climate change and its implications.

11.2

Global Politics around Climate Change

Climate change poses significant risks to the global economy, with potential disruptions in supply chains and increasing costs associated with climate-related disasters (Stern, 2006). It threatens human security by exacerbating poverty, social inequality, and political instability, potentially leading to conflicts and population displacement (IPCC, 2014a, b). Despite the grim realities associated with climate change, it is essential to recognize that efforts are underway to mitigate its impacts and adapt to its inevitable effects. The Paris Agreement, adopted in 2015, represents a worldwide commitment to limiting global warming to well below 2 °C, preferably to 1.5 °C compared to pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC, 2015). Achieving this target requires a rapid reduction in GHG emissions, transitioning to a low-carbon economy, and investing in climate-resilient development. Moreover, the concept of climate justice emphasizes the ethical considerations of climate change, recognizing the unequal responsibility for and impacts of climate change across countries and communities (Schlosberg, 2013). It calls for equitable solutions and climate policies that prioritize the most vulnerable groups. Climate change education and communication also play a crucial role in driving climate action. They increase public awareness, influence attitudes, and can lead to more sustainable behavior. Climate change is not just an environmental or scientific issue; it is fundamentally a political issue with profound implications for global governance, international relations, and security. The politics around climate change involve a wide array of actors, including nation-states, international organizations, non-governmental

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organizations (NGOs), and civil society groups, all grappling with the challenges of mitigation, adaptation, and the social and economic transformations required to address climate change (Bulkeley et al., 2014).

11.3

Mapping the Threat of Climate Change

Climate change is an indisputable global crisis that poses severe and irrevocable threats to humanity and the planet’s ecological balance. This anthropogenic dilemma is a product of a complex nexus of industrialization, urbanization, and unsustainable practices, culminating in an increase in GHGs and consequent global warming (IPCC, 2014a, b). The intricacies of these threats necessitate comprehensive mapping and assessment to aid in devising strategic solutions. Some of the major concerns related to the climate change are presented as: • Understanding Climate Change: Climate change refers to long-term alterations in global temperatures and typical weather patterns. It’s primarily caused by human activities that increase the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, resulting in a warming effect known as global warming (NASA, 2021a, b). Increasing temperatures instigate numerous detrimental impacts, including sea-level rise, changes in precipitation patterns, and increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events (US EPA, 2016). • The Physical Implications: Mapping climate change threats helps to visualize the physical consequences. Sea-level rise is an eminent threat, with predictions suggesting a rise between 0.26 and 0.77 meters by the end of the twenty-first century (Church et al., 2013). These estimations pose severe challenges to coastal communities and low-lying islands, with a potential displacement of millions of people. Moreover, changes in precipitation patterns, coupled with increasing temperatures, have resulted in increased frequency and intensity of droughts and heatwaves, causing massive agricultural loss (Schlenker & Roberts, 2009). Glacial retreat and decreasing snowfall are also significant climate change impacts, threatening freshwater sources for billions of people (Barnett et al., 2005). • Socio-economic Impacts: The socio-economic impacts of climate change are vast and interconnected, threatening food security, public health, and economic stability. Rising temperatures and changing rainfall patterns disrupt agricultural systems, posing food security threats (FAO, 2016). Increased heat stress, malnutrition, and the prevalence of vector-borne diseases like malaria and dengue fever are escalating public health risks (Watts et al., 2015). Furthermore, climate change triggers economic instability due to losses in productivity, damage to infrastructure, and increasing costs of adaptation (Stern, 2007). • Mapping Vulnerability: Mapping vulnerability to climate change involves identifying regions and populations most susceptible to these threats. Developing nations with high poverty rates, low literacy rates, and fragile economies are the

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most vulnerable due to low adaptive capacity and increased exposure to climate change risks (Adger, 2006). Additionally, regions with high population density like South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, along with areas with considerable climate impact like the Arctic, are also among the most vulnerable (IPCC, 2014a, b). • Consequences for Biodiversity: Climate change significantly affects biodiversity, leading to shifts in species distribution, population declines, and increased extinction rates (Parmesan, 2006). Rising ocean temperatures and acidification due to CO2 absorption pose severe threats to marine ecosystems, including coral reefs and fish populations (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2007). On land, changing climates can disrupt the phenology and distribution of numerous species, impacting ecosystem functioning and services (Parmesan & Yohe, 2003).

11.4

The International Negotiations

International negotiations on climate change have taken center stage, given the urgent need for collective and decisive global action. These negotiations are crucial for establishing binding agreements on GHGs emissions reduction, adaptation strategies, and financial support for developing nations grappling with climate change impacts. A few of the major international negotiations associated with climate change are described as follows: The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) The UNFCCC, adopted in 1992, set the foundation for international negotiations on climate change (UNFCCC, 1992). Its objective is to stabilize GHG concentrations at a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. The UNFCCC provides a platform for countries, known as ‘Parties,’ to negotiate and implement strategies to reduce global GHG emissions. The Kyoto Protocol The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, was the first significant outcome of these negotiations (UNFCCC, 1998). It legally bound developed countries to reduce their GHG emissions. However, it did not include developing countries and the USA did not ratify it, reducing its overall effectiveness. The Paris Agreement The most recent milestone in climate negotiations is the Paris Agreement of 2015, with 197 Parties committing to keeping global warming well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5 °C (UNFCCC, 2015). The agreement introduced nationally determined contributions (NDCs), where each country sets its emission reduction targets. The Paris Agreement’s success will depend on future negotiations and the willingness of countries to meet and revise their NDCs upwards. The Kyoto Protocol, which represented the first major step in global climate politics, introduced legally binding emissions reduction targets for developed countries. The Protocol employed a ‘top-down’ approach, with targets and timetables

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established internationally (Grubb, 2003). However, the Kyoto Protocol faced significant challenges. Some major emitters, notably the United States, did not ratify the agreement, and developing countries, including emerging economies like China and India, were not subject to binding emission targets. The Paris Agreement uses a ‘bottom-up’ approach, where countries determine their own emissions reduction targets, known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Unlike Kyoto, the Paris Agreement includes all countries – both developed and developing – in its efforts to limit global warming to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C (UNFCCC, 2015). The Paris Agreement also broadened the scope of international climate cooperation beyond mitigation, emphasizing the need for adaptation, loss and damage, finance, technology transfer, capacitybuilding, and transparency (Bodansky, 2016). However, it faces its own set of challenges. Current NDCs are inadequate to achieve the Agreement’s temperature goals, and the provision of climate finance to support developing countries is still a contentious issue. COP26 and Beyond The 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) held in Glasgow in 2021 aimed to accelerate action towards the goals of the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC. The summit saw renewed commitments, especially concerning coal phase-out, methane emissions, and deforestation. However, translating these commitments into action is the next big challenge in international negotiations. International negotiations are vital in the fight against climate change. While the negotiations have yielded key agreements like the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, the true measure of success will be in their effective implementation. It is imperative for the international community to unite beyond geopolitical and economic considerations, recognizing that climate change is a shared problem that requires a shared solution. Since the 1990s, the primary forum for global climate negotiations has been the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) The principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR), embedded in the UNFCCC, is a direct response to the North-South divide. It acknowledges that while all nations must confront climate change, developed countries should shoulder a greater responsibility due to their historical emissions and greater financial and technological capacities to respond to climate change. This principle led to the creation of legally binding emission reduction targets for developed countries under the Kyoto Protocol but has also been a source of contention, especially concerning climate finance and technology transfer (Rajamani, 2006a, b). Global Climate Politics and Equity Central to the North-South dynamics is the notion of equity, which involves not only fairness in sharing the burden of mitigation but also access to development opportunities. The South, in its quest for socioeconomic development, contends that it should not be denied the use of fossil fuels, as the North was during its industrialization phase. This argument is central to

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debates on climate finance, where the North is urged to provide resources to assist the South in pursuing a sustainable development path (Newell, 2019).

11.5

Climate Justice

Climate justice encapsulates the ethical and political issues associated with the distribution of climate change impacts and responses. It emphasizes that those least responsible for climate change–often the poorest, most marginalized populations in the South, are most affected and have the least resources to adapt. Climate justice calls for a fair distribution of climate risks and benefits, as well as the active participation of all stakeholders in climate decision-making (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014). Climate justice is another important theme in global climate politics. It recognizes that the impacts of climate change are disproportionately felt by the most vulnerable populations, particularly in developing countries and marginalized communities. Climate justice calls for fair and equitable solutions to climate change, considering issues of human rights, development, and social and economic inequality (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014). Furthermore, non-state actors have increasingly played a vital role in global climate politics. These include cities, regions, businesses, and civil society groups, which are implementing a wide range of initiatives to reduce emissions and adapt to climate change, often filling the gaps left by national governments (Hoffmann, 2011). Climate activism, as exemplified by the global youth-led movement “Fridays for Future”, has also exerted significant pressure on political leaders to take more ambitious climate action (Ayeb-Karlsson, 2020a, b). The North-South Divide and Climate Change The politics of climate change inherently involves complex North-South dynamics and issues of climate justice. These terms refer to the disparate impacts of climate change on developed “Northern” countries and developing “Southern” countries, and the quest for equitable solutions to these impacts. The North-South divide in climate politics is an extension of the economic and development disparities between industrialized, wealthy countries (generally in the Northern Hemisphere) and less developed countries (generally in the Southern Hemisphere). The North, being historically industrialized, has significantly contributed to the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere, leading to climate change. Conversely, the South, although contributing minimally to the problem, is most susceptible to the adverse impacts of climate change, such as severe weather events, rising sea levels, and disruptions to agriculture (Roberts & Parks, 2007). This asymmetry in contribution and impact underscores the fundamental inequity at the heart of global climate politics.

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The Role of Emerging Economies

The role of emerging economies, particularly China, India, and Brazil, in global climate politics is crucial. As some of the world’s largest GHG emitters and significant economic powers, these countries have a substantial influence on the outcomes of international climate negotiations and the global response to climate change. Some of the major emerging economies having a considerable role in climate change mitigation, with special reference to India, are listed as: A Developing Giant India, the third-largest global emitter, faces the delicate task of balancing climate change mitigation with poverty alleviation. Like China, India relies heavily on coal for energy, but it is also rapidly expanding its renewable energy sector. Under the Paris Agreement, India’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) includes a commitment to reduce its emission intensity (emissions per unit of GDP) by 33–35% below 2005 levels by 2030 and to achieve 40% of its electricity generation from non-fossil fuel sources by the same year. However, it is important to note that these targets do not necessarily imply a reduction in absolute emissions, considering India’s projected economic and population growth (Dubash, 2020). With its large population and rapidly growing economy, India has become a significant player in global climate politics. As the third-largest emitter of GHGs, India’s actions have a significant impact on global efforts to address climate change. However, as a developing country with widespread poverty and substantial developmental needs, India faces the challenge of pursuing economic growth while also addressing climate change. The country’s emissions primarily come from energy production, particularly coal-fired power plants, as well as agriculture and deforestation. India’s per capita emissions remain relatively low compared to developed countries due to its lower level of industrialization and consumption. Nevertheless, these emissions are projected to increase with economic and population growth (Dubash, 2020). India has made several commitments under the Paris Agreement, reflecting its dual challenge of development and climate change. The country has pledged to reduce the emissions intensity of its gross domestic production (GDP) by 33–35% from 2005 levels by 2030. This means that while India’s absolute emissions may continue to rise with economic growth, it aims to improve its carbon efficiency. Additionally, India has committed to achieving 40% of its electricity generation from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030. With its abundant solar potential, India has set an ambitious target of reaching 100 GW of solar capacity by 2022 under the National Solar Mission. However, India continues to heavily rely on coal for energy, which poses a significant challenge to overcome. Moreover, the country’s vulnerability to climate impacts, such as changing monsoon patterns, rising sea levels, and extreme weather events, necessitates considerable adaptation efforts. These impacts pose risks to India’s agriculture, water resources, and large coastal population. Therefore, India

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has emphasized the importance of adaptation in its climate strategy and called for greater international support in terms of finance, technology transfer, and capacitybuilding. India’s position in international climate negotiations often highlights the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR), which asserts that developed countries, as major historical emitters, bear a greater responsibility for emissions reduction and assisting developing countries in their climate efforts. India’s Climate Diplomacy As the world’s third-largest emitter of GHGs, India has played a central role in global climate negotiations over the past two decades. India’s position in these negotiations has evolved from a staunch defence of sovereignty and development rights to a more proactive role in advocating for global climate action. India’s climate diplomacy emphasizes equity and the principle of CBDR-RC. This reflects India’s position as a developing country with substantial poverty and development needs. The role of Indian political leadership in climate change is evolving and complex. The need for economic development, energy access, and poverty alleviation must be balanced with the urgent requirements to mitigate emissions and adapt to climate change impacts. The coming decades will be crucial for India, and its political leadership will play a vital role in determining the path the country takes. I. Early Years: Protection of National Interest (2000–2009) At the turn of the millennium, India’s climate diplomacy was primarily driven by the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR). As a developing country with a large population still struggling with poverty, India argued that developed countries, which historically contributed more to climate change, should bear a greater burden of emissions reductions. This stance aligned with the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. However, it led to India being perceived as a defensive player more focused on safeguarding its development rights than contributing to global climate solutions. II. Transitional Phase: From Resistance to Engagement (2010–2015) The Copenhagen Accord in 2009 marked a turning point for India’s climate diplomacy. The accord acknowledged the scientific consensus that global temperature increase should be kept below 2 °C. However, it also shifted the responsibility for action onto all countries, not just the developed world. In response, India began to take on more substantial commitments to address climate change. The National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC), rolled out in 2008, established the country’s strategy to address climate change and promote sustainable development. III. The Paris Agreement: India’s Emerging Leadership (2015–Present) The Paris Agreement in 2015 signaled a new phase in India’s climate diplomacy. India committed to reducing the emissions intensity of its GDP by 33–35% by 2030 compared to 2005 levels, as well as creating an additional carbon sink of 2.5–3 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent through additional forest and tree cover by 2030. India also took on a leadership role by launching the International Solar Alliance (ISA) in partnership with France. The ISA aims to mobilize over USD 1 trillion in

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investments by 2030 for the large-scale deployment of solar energy, highlighting India’s transition from a defensive to a proactive player in climate negotiations. IV. Challenges and Opportunities Ahead Despite these achievements, India’s climate diplomacy faces significant challenges. Firstly, the country must strike a balance between its need for economic growth and its climate commitments. The transition to a low-carbon economy could potentially disrupt sectors like coal, which employ millions of Indians. Secondly, India needs to secure sufficient financing for its ambitious renewable energy targets, despite promising initiatives like the ISA (Anand, 2017). Nevertheless, there are also opportunities on the horizon. The push for a green recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic provides a chance to further integrate climate action into India’s development strategy. This includes promoting green jobs and expanding clean energy, which could not only help achieve India’s climate targets but also drive economic growth and social development. India’s evolution in climate diplomacy over the last two decades demonstrates a significant shift from an initially defensive stance to proactive engagement and leadership. Despite the significant challenges that lie ahead, India’s growing prominence on the global climate stage reflects the recognition of its critical role in shaping global climate solutions. While much work remains to be done, the country’s ongoing evolution suggests a continued progression towards leadership in global climate action—a transition that is crucial for both India and the world as they grapple with the monumental task of addressing climate change (Rajamani, 2018). India’s Political Leadership and Climate Action Shri Narendra Modi assumed the Prime Minister’s office in 2014, and under his leadership, the Indian government has shown an increased focus on climate change mitigation and adaptation. A pivotal moment came with the ratification of the Paris Agreement in 2016, where India committed to reducing its emission intensity relative to GDP by 33–35% by 2030 compared to 2005 levels. Additionally, India pledged to achieve 40% of its electricity capacity from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030 (MNRE, Government of India, 2015). The World’s Largest Emitter China is currently the largest emitter of GHGs in the world, responsible for about 28% of global emissions as of 2019 (Le Quéré et al., 2020). China’s rapid industrial growth, heavy reliance on coal for energy, and large population contribute to its high emission levels. However, China is also leading in renewable energy development and investment, particularly in solar and wind power. Under the Paris Agreement, China pledged to peak its carbon emissions by 2030 and to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in its energy mix. Yet, the specifics of how China will achieve these targets, and whether they are ambitious enough to align with the Paris Agreement’s temperature goals, are subjects of ongoing debate (Lewis, 2020).

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A Forest Nation Brazil, home to the world’s largest tropical rainforest, plays a unique role in global climate politics. Brazil’s emissions are primarily from deforestation and land-use change in the Amazon, which also has profound implications for biodiversity and indigenous rights. Brazil has historically been a leading voice for developing countries in climate negotiations. Under the Paris Agreement, Brazil pledged to reduce its GHG emissions by 37% below 2005 levels by 2025, and by 43% by 2030. However, recent increases in deforestation and changes in environmental policies under President Jair Bolsonaro have raised concerns about Brazil’s commitment to these targets and its role in global climate governance (Rajão et al., 2020).

11.7

The European Union (EU)’s Climate Diplomacy

The European Union (EU) has set some of the world’s most ambitious climate targets. Under its European Green Deal, it aims to be climate-neutral by 2050, meaning it will not add new GHGs to the atmosphere. To achieve this, the EU is pursuing a broad range of policies to decarbonize its economy, including renewable energy, energy efficiency, cleaner transport, and a shift towards a circular economy. It also plans to halve its emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, a significant increase from its previous target of a 40% reduction (European Commission, 2020). The EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS), established in 2005, is a key tool in the EU’s climate policy. It is the world’s first and largest carbon market, covering around 45% of the EU’s GHG emissions. The system puts a cap on the total amount of certain GHGs that can be emitted and allows companies to trade emission allowances, thus providing an economic incentive to reduce emissions (European Commission, 2021a, b). The EU uses climate diplomacy to encourage other countries to take action on climate change. It promotes climate change mitigation, adaptation, and resilience in its relationships with third countries and regional organizations. It also uses various tools, including development cooperation, trade policy, and diplomacy, to support its climate objectives. The EU’s Global Climate Change Alliance with developing countries, for example, provides technical and financial support for climate action (European Commission, 2021a, b). The EU’s leadership in global climate politics is characterized by ambitious domestic climate targets and policies, a key role in international climate agreements, and active climate diplomacy. Through these efforts, the EU is seeking to lead by example and encourage other countries to undertake ambitious climate action. Obama Era and the Paris Agreement The Obama administration marked a shift in U.S. climate policy. Obama introduced the Clean Power Plan, aimed at reducing carbon pollution from power plants, and played a key role in securing the Paris Agreement in 2015. The U.S. pledged to reduce its GHG emissions by 26–28% below 2005 levels by 2025 under the agreement (Bodansky, 2016).

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Trump Administration and Paris Agreement Withdrawal The Trump administration represented a reversal of the U.S.’s commitment to climate action. One of the most significant decisions was the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Agreement in 2017, claiming it disadvantaged the U.S. to the benefit of other countries. The Trump administration also rolled back several environmental regulations and promoted fossil fuel industries (Banerjee et al., 2020). Rejoining the Paris Agreement Under Biden The election of Joe Biden as president in 2020 brought about a renewed commitment to climate action. One of Biden’s first acts as president was to rejoin the Paris Agreement. His administration has proposed an ambitious climate plan that includes a target of net-zero emissions by 2050 and a $2 trillion investment in clean energy and infrastructure (Friedman, 2020).

11.8

Climate Change and Security

Climate change is increasingly being recognized as a ‘threat multiplier’ in the realm of international relations and security. It exacerbates existing social, economic, and political challenges, and may lead to conflicts over resources, mass displacement of people, and destabilization of societies. Here, we examine how climate change intersects with security and its implications for international relations (Suliman, 1993). Resource Scarcity and Conflict Climate change impacts such as changes in temperature and precipitation patterns, extreme weather events, and rising sea levels can lead to resource scarcity, particularly concerning water and food. This scarcity can heighten competition over resources and potentially ignite conflict, especially in regions with a history of tensions or disputes. The conflict in Darfur, Sudan, has been partly attributed to climatic changes, which exacerbated existing resource shortages and social tensions (Suliman, 1993). Climate-Induced Migration and Displacement Climate change can displace people due to extreme weather events, sea-level rise, and desertification. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates that weather-related hazards displaced 23.9 million people in 2019 alone. Such climate-induced migration can cause political, social, and economic instability in both origin and destination countries and can strain relations between countries (Baset & Denning, 2017). State Fragility and Security Climate change can exacerbate state fragility by overwhelming the capacity of governments to respond to climate impacts. This can undermine state authority, lead to social unrest, and create a breeding ground for non-state armed groups and terrorist organizations. For example, the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria has been linked to environmental degradation in the Lake Chad Basin, which aggravated poverty and social inequality (Baset & Denning, 2017).

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Geopolitical Shifts and Security The melting of Arctic ice due to climate change has geopolitical implications. It opens up new shipping routes and access to untapped oil and gas reserves, which could lead to territorial disputes among Arctic states and heighten geopolitical tensions. Human Security Climate change also has profound implications for human security, including the right to life, livelihood, health, and an adequate standard of living. Recognizing climate change as a human security issue shifts the focus from state security to the well-being of individuals and communities and underscores the importance of climate justice in international relations. In response to these challenges, climate security has become a growing focus in international relations. International organizations like the United Nations Security Council have started to recognize climate change as a security issue. Meanwhile, ‘climate diplomacy’ has emerged as a diplomatic tool to foster international cooperation on climate change mitigation and adaptation, peacebuilding, and sustainable development. In conclusion, climate change has significant implications for international relations and security. It underscores the need for international cooperation, climate action, and climate justice to maintain global stability and security in the face of this existential threat (Adger, 2006).

11.9

Sources of Climate Finance

Climate finance can be public or private, domestic or international. Public finance comes from various sources such as national budgets, bilateral aid agencies, multilateral development banks, and international climate funds like the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Private finance can stem from investments made by businesses, commercial banks, or other private entities. Increasingly, innovative financial mechanisms such as green bonds and carbon pricing are being used to generate climate finance (Buchner et al., 2019). North-South Dynamics in Climate Finance Climate finance is a key issue in North-South relations, reflecting the principle of CBDR enshrined in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This principle acknowledges that while all nations have a shared responsibility to address climate change, developed countries bear a greater responsibility due to their historical emissions and their financial and technological capacities. This has led to commitments by developed countries to mobilize $100 billion per year by 2020 to support developing countries in their climate actions, although the fulfillment of this commitment is a subject of ongoing debate and contention (UNFCCC, 2009). Mitigation vs Adaptation Funding Historically, the majority of climate finance has been directed towards mitigation rather than adaptation. This is problematic given that developing countries, which are often most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, have urgent adaptation needs. Therefore, ensuring a balance

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between mitigation and adaptation finance has been a central concern in international climate negotiations (Betzold, 2015). Effectiveness and Transparency of Climate Finance Questions around the effectiveness of climate finance are linked to its delivery, use, and monitoring. Criticisms often revolve around the complexity of accessing funds, inefficiencies in disbursement, and the lack of effective monitoring and evaluation systems. Greater transparency is called for to ensure that funds are reaching intended recipients and are being used for their stated purpose (Olsen & Fenhann, 2015a, b). So, the politics of climate finance is a critical aspect of global climate change governance. It is not only about the mobilization of resources but also about the broader issues of equity, effectiveness, and accountability in the global response to climate change. Climate Change and Politics of the Global South Climate change poses significant challenges for the global South, which encompasses developing countries across different regions. These countries often face a combination of development priorities, vulnerability to climate impacts, and limited capacity to address climate change. The politics surrounding climate change in the global South are shaped by issues of development, equity, and the pursuit of sustainable pathways (Leech et al., 2009).

11.10

Global Civil Society and Climate Activism

Global civil society and climate activism have emerged as powerful forces for pushing governments and international institutions to take stronger action on climate change. They have played a crucial role in raising awareness, mobilizing public support, and exerting pressure for policy change at various levels. Here are some key aspects of global civil society and climate activism in driving policy change: Awareness and Public Engagement Civil society organizations and climate activists have been instrumental in raising awareness about the urgency and severity of climate change. Through campaigns, protests, demonstrations, and media engagement, they have helped to educate the public about the impacts of climate change and the need for swift action. By engaging with diverse communities, youth groups, and marginalized populations, they have broadened the climate change discourse and highlighted the social justice dimensions of the issue (Wilson et al., 2017). Grassroots Mobilization and Bottom-Up Pressure Climate activism has gained momentum through grassroots mobilization, driven by youth-led movements like “Fridays for Future” and “Extinction Rebellion” (Thunberg, 2018; Morris, 2023). By organizing strikes, protests, and direct actions, activists have drawn attention to the climate crisis and demanded policy changes (Thunberg, 2019). Grassroots pressure has been influential in pressuring governments and businesses to take bolder action on climate change, often challenging the status quo and traditional power structures (Milman, 2019).

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Advocacy and Lobbying Civil society organizations and activists engage in advocacy and lobbying efforts to shape climate policies. They provide expert analysis, research, and policy recommendations to inform decision-makers about the urgency and feasibility of climate action. Through targeted advocacy campaigns, they push for specific policies, legislation, and international agreements, influencing the political agenda and holding governments accountable for their commitments. Coalition-Building and Collaboration Global civil society organizations and climate activists form coalitions and alliances to amplify their voices and increase their impact. These collaborations bring together diverse actors, including environmental groups, indigenous communities, faith-based organizations, and social justice advocates. By sharing resources, expertise, and networks, they strengthen their collective influence and create broader movements for climate justice (McDonough et al., 2017). Holding Governments and Corporations Accountable Civil society organizations and activists actively monitor and scrutinize the actions of governments and corporations regarding climate change. They publish reports, conduct research, and utilize legal mechanisms to expose environmental harm, lack of transparency, and inadequate climate policies. By leveraging public pressure and social media platforms, they hold decision-makers accountable for their actions or inaction on climate change (Dabelko & Schramm, 2019). Influence on International Climate Negotiations Climate activists and civil society organizations have a presence in international climate negotiations, such as the Conference of the Parties (COP) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). They participate as observers, organize side events, and provide inputs to the negotiation processes. Their presence helps to bring grassroots perspectives, raise ambition levels, and push for more ambitious climate targets and commitments from governments.

11.11

Climate Change Skepticism and Denial in Political Discourse

Climate change skepticism and denial in political discourse refer to the rejection or downplaying of the scientific consensus on the reality, causes, and severity of climate change. While skepticism is an essential aspect of scientific inquiry, the term “climate change denial” typically refers to the deliberate rejection or distortion of scientific evidence for ideological, political, or economic reasons. Here are some key points regarding climate change skepticism and denial in political discourse: Nature of Climate Change Skepticism and Denial Climate change skepticism and denial manifest in various forms, ranging from outright denial of the existence of climate change to questioning the extent of human influence on the climate system.

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Skepticism is often driven by scientific disagreements, uncertainties, or skepticism about climate models, while denial tends to involve the rejection of overwhelming scientific evidence. Political Motivations and Economic Interests Climate change skepticism and denial are often influenced by political motivations and economic interests. Some political actors, industry groups, and fossil fuel companies have vested interests in maintaining the status quo or minimizing regulation and policy measures aimed at mitigating climate change. Consequently, they may fund or support climate change denial campaigns or engage in lobbying efforts to delay or obstruct climate action. Manufactured Doubt and Misinformation In some instances, climate change skepticism and denial have been fueled by deliberate efforts to sow doubt and spread misinformation about climate ecosystem. Tactics used to undermine climate science include cherry-picking data, questioning the credibility of scientists, promoting false controversies, and amplifying scientific disagreements to create a perception of uncertainty that does not align with the actual scientific consensus. Polarization and Political Ideologies Climate change skepticism and denial have become increasingly polarized along political ideological lines. In some countries, climate change has become a politically divisive issue, with conservative or rightleaning parties or individuals more likely to express skepticism or denial, while progressive or left-leaning groups tend to emphasize the urgency of climate action. This polarization can hinder effective policy responses and contribute to a lack of bipartisan support for climate measures (Dunlap & McCright, 2008). Impact on Climate Policy and Public Perception Climate change skepticism and denial can influence public opinion and policy-making processes, potentially impeding the development and implementation of effective climate policies. Skepticism and denial can create confusion among the public, erode trust in scientific institutions, and hinder the public’s demand for action on climate change. As a result, it may lead to delays in adopting necessary mitigation and adaptation measures.

11.12

The Global Media Response to Climate Frameworks

Climate change represents one of the most pressing challenges of our time, demanding substantial action across all sectors of society. One sector that plays a pivotal role in shaping public understanding and catalyzing action on climate change is the media. The media’s role as an information disseminator and public opinion influencer makes it a critical player in the fight against climate change. Media outlets worldwide have a responsibility to communicate the complexities, uncertainties, and impacts of climate change accurately. However, the global media response to climate change has been marked by varied levels of coverage, differing narratives, and occasional misinformation. This diversity stems from factors such as political ideologies, economic interests, cultural contexts, and the differing impacts of climate

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change across regions. In some parts of the world, media coverage of climate change is frequent and thorough, emphasizing the scientific consensus and the urgent need for action. These outlets often highlight the extreme weather events, rising temperatures, and other tangible impacts that make climate change a palpable reality. By doing so, they help to raise public awareness and understanding of the issue and can stimulate demand for climate action. However, in other regions, media coverage is less consistent and sometimes misleading. Skepticism, denial, and minimization of climate change can be found in media outlets influenced by political and economic interests resistant to climate action. Such conflicting narratives can foster polarization, confuse the public, and obstruct effective climate policy. The global media landscape is further complicated by the rise of social media platforms and the spread of online misinformation. Unverified or misleading content on these platforms can spread rapidly, sowing doubt about the reality and severity of climate change and the need for urgent action. Addressing these challenges requires a concerted effort from media outlets to prioritize precise, objective, and fact-checked reporting. Enhancing scientific literacy among journalists and media professionals is essential to ensure the accurate translation of complex climate science to the public. Diverse voices, including scientists, policymakers, activists, and affected communities, should be incorporated to foster a comprehensive dialogue. Media organizations must also work collaboratively with scientific institutions and civil society to bridge gaps in understanding, endorse accurate reporting, and stimulate public engagement on climate change. Fact-checking initiatives and efforts to hold those who propagate misinformation accountable are vital to maintaining accuracy and combating misleading narratives.

11.13

Prioritizing the Real-Life Stories

Real-life stories play an integral role in climate change communication, making the abstract and often distant problem of climate change more tangible and relatable. They humanize the science and statistics, connecting audiences with the people who are experiencing the impacts of climate change first-hand. Personalizing Climate Change Real-life stories personalize the impacts of climate change. They put a human face to the facts and figures, making the consequences more immediate and concrete. This can enhance understanding and empathy, and stimulate concern and action (Marks, 2019). In 2016, National Geographic presented a heart-wrenching image of a malnourished polar bear in the Canadian Arctic, victim to the decreasing sea ice due to rising global temperatures. The story connected people emotionally with the harsh realities faced by these creatures due to climate change, effectively spotlighting the urgency of the issue (Beal, 2020). Highlighting Inequities Real-life stories can highlight the inequities of climate change, showing how vulnerable and marginalized groups bear the brunt of the

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impacts. These stories can be powerful in driving social and political action for climate justice (Harlan et al., 2015). For example, the Pacific Island nation of Kiribati is facing an existential threat due to rising sea levels. The personal stories of the Kiribati people, like that of former president Anote Tong who has been vocal about his people’s plight, are powerful tools in highlighting the unequal distribution of climate change impacts (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012). Showcasing Solutions Real-life stories can showcase the solutions to climate change, highlighting the efforts of individuals, communities, and organizations to reduce emissions and adapt to changing conditions. These stories can inspire and empower others to take action (Hoffman & Jennings, 2018). For example, the story of Jadav Payeng, who single-handedly planted a forest larger than Central Park on a barren sandbar in India, demonstrates how individuals can help combat climate change. The Molai Forest, now home to many species of birds and animals, stands as a testament to individual efforts in addressing environmental challenges (Subramanian, 2012). Engaging Audiences Real-life stories are more engaging and memorable than abstract information. They tap into our emotions and values, making the issue of climate change more compelling and motivating (O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009). For example, the story of the Bangladeshi community adapting to increased flooding due to climate change by developing floating gardens and schools serves as a beacon of resilience. These narratives inspire others in similar situations and provide practical solutions that can be implemented in other parts of the world (Irfan et al., 2019). Building Resilience Real-life stories of coping and adaptation can foster resilience, showing how communities can survive and thrive in the face of climate change. These narratives can encourage learning and sharing of best practices (Adger et al., 2013). Prioritizing real-life stories can be an effective strategy for climate change communication. It helps to bridge the gap between global climate phenomena and local realities, making the issue of climate change more accessible, understandable, and actionable.

11.14

Media’s Role in Climate Politics

The media plays a vital role in shaping public opinion and policy on climate change. It serves as the primary channel of communication between scientists, policymakers, and the public, and its portrayal of climate change has significant implications for climate politics. Informing the Public The media is a critical source of information for the public on climate change. It translates complex scientific concepts into accessible language and narratives. The way the media frames these narratives can significantly influence public understanding and concern about climate change (Anderson, 2009). The rise

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of digital media has also expanded the accessibility and diversity of climate change information, allowing people to engage with the issue in more interactive and personalized ways (Williams et al., 2015). Shaping Public Opinion The media plays a key role in shaping public opinion on climate change. Media coverage can heighten awareness, change perceptions, and motivate actions related to climate change. However, the effect of media on public opinion can vary depending on the framing, consistency, and credibility of the coverage (Hart & Feldman, 2016). Influencing Policy Media coverage of climate change can shape the policy agenda by highlighting certain aspects of the issue, influencing the perceived importance of climate change among policymakers and the public, and triggering policy responses. The media also plays a crucial role in holding policymakers accountable for their actions (or inactions) on climate change (Carmichael et al., 2017). Promoting Dialogue and Debate The media facilitates dialogue and debate on climate change, providing a platform for different voices and perspectives. This can help to deepen understanding, negotiate conflicts, and build consensus on climate change (Schäfer & Schlichting, 2014). However, the role of media in climate politics is not without challenges. Issues such as the politicization of climate change, “false balance” in reporting, and the influence of media ownership on coverage can hinder the media’s effectiveness in promoting understanding and action on climate change (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004).

11.14.1

The Media Coverage of Climate Changes Issues

Media coverage of climate change plays a crucial role in shaping the public understanding of and response to this global crisis. The degree, consistency, and accuracy of this coverage can significantly impact policy decisions and societal behavior. Here is an exploration of the role and trends in media coverage of climate change: Quantity of Coverage There has been a dramatic increase in media coverage of climate change in recent years. A large part of this surge can be attributed to the mounting public interest, key political events (like the signing of the Paris Agreement), extreme weather events, and reports from bodies like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (O’Neill et al., 2015). Quality of Coverage While quantity is important, the quality of climate change coverage is equally crucial. It is not just about reporting the facts; it is also about explaining the science, impacts, mitigation, and adaptation strategies, and policy implications in a way that is accurate, balanced, and comprehensible to non-expert audiences (Feldman et al., 2012).

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Framing of Coverage The way climate change is framed by the media can significantly influence public perception and policy priorities. Different frames can emphasize different aspects of climate change, such as scientific evidence, economic implications, moral-ethical considerations, or political debates (Nisbet, 2009).

11.15

Challenges in Media Coverage

a. False Balance: One common criticism is the “false balance” in climate reporting, where media outlets present opposing views on the existence of climate change despite the overwhelming scientific consensus. This approach has contributed to public misunderstanding and skepticism about the reality of climate change (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004). b. Event-Driven Coverage: Media attention to climate change often peaks in response to specific events, such as international climate conferences or extreme weather events, rather than providing consistent, ongoing coverage. This can lead to public complacency and a lack of understanding of the persistent nature of the problem (Schäfer & Schlichting, 2014).

Positive Developments a. Increased Coverage: There has been a significant increase in the quantity and quality of climate change coverage over the past decade. More media outlets are dedicating resources to environmental journalism, and climate change stories are making headlines more frequently (TVG, 2020). b. Educating the Public: The media has the potential to educate the public about the causes, impacts, and solutions of climate change. Well-researched, accessible, and compelling stories can play a significant role in raising awareness and understanding. c. Driving Policy and Action: By bringing climate change to the forefront of public discourse, the media can influence policy-making and promote climate action. Media scrutiny can also hold governments and corporations accountable for their environmental practices (Hansen, 2011). While there are challenges in media coverage of climate change, there are also substantial opportunities. The media can be a powerful tool in combating climate change, and its role will be crucial in shaping public perception and policy responses in the years to come. Public Awareness and Understanding Indian media play a pivotal role in creating public awareness about climate change, informing citizens about its causes, consequences, and the necessary mitigation and adaptation measures. The coverage varies significantly among national and local outlets, with national media usually providing a more global perspective while local media focus on region-specific impacts (Billett, 2010).

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Diversity of Media India has a rich and diverse media landscape, including print, broadcast, digital, and social media, all of which cover climate change to varying degrees. Digital and social media have become increasingly influential in shaping public discourse on climate change, offering interactive platforms for information sharing, discussion, and action (Chaturvedi & Doyle, 2015). Focus on Extreme Events Much of the media coverage of climate change in India focuses on extreme weather events, such as heatwaves, floods, and cyclones. While these stories can raise awareness about the impacts of climate change, they sometimes lack the connection between these events and climate change, missing opportunities for public education (Singh, 2017). Policy Debates The Indian media extensively covers policy debates related to climate change, both nationally and internationally. These include India’s commitments under the Paris Agreement, its National Action Plan on Climate Change, and various sector-specific policies and initiatives. Media also highlight the conflicts and trade-offs between economic development and environmental protection (Dubash & Jogesh, 2014). Equity and Justice Indian media often highlight issues of equity and justice in relation to climate change. They underscore the historical responsibility of developed countries for climate change, the need for financial and technical support for developing countries, and the disproportionate impacts on vulnerable populations in India (Thaker & Zhao, 2017).

11.16

Conclusion

Understanding the global response to climate change necessitates a multifaceted approach, incorporating perspectives from politics, economics, science, media, and culture. As seen in the case of India, these perspectives often interlink, with media acting as a catalyst for climate action, translating scientific knowledge into accessible information and emphasizing the human stories behind the abstract concept of climate change. Furthermore, the international political landscape and the commitments of global agencies, including the IPCC and UNFCCC, have shaped the trajectory of climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. However, despite the establishment of such organizations and the formation of international treaties, climate change remains an impending threat. Challenges in climate politics and media discourse range from dealing with conflicting discourses, public skepticism, and the need to strike a balance between development and sustainability. Yet, the same platforms also provide opportunities for driving home the gravity of the situation and influencing policy-making. The media can prioritize real-life stories and humanize the issue of climate change, thus, connecting the global to the local and making climate change tangible to the public. Lastly, the Indian perspective on climate change provides insights into the

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challenges and opportunities faced by developing countries. India’s approach underscores the importance of considering climate action within broader development and equity contexts. The country’s balancing act between climate action and development needs is representative of similar struggles faced by other developing nations. The future of global climate politics is marked by numerous challenges but also rich with opportunities, with technology, international cooperation, and public mobilization playing crucial roles. The transition to a sustainable future requires collective efforts and the integration of diverse perspectives and approaches. India plays a significant role in global climate politics, often acting as a voice for developing countries. India’s leadership in the International Solar Alliance, its active participation in the Paris Agreement, and its domestic actions on climate change reflect its commitment to global climate action, balanced with its developmental needs. India’s perspectives on climate change are shaped by its unique challenges and opportunities, balancing between development needs, climate vulnerability, and global responsibility. As the threat of climate change looms large, it is essential to understand these complexities and ambiguities and use them as a starting point for effective, sustainable, and equitable climate action. The fight against climate change is a shared responsibility–one that requires us to understand the threats, acknowledge the challenges, and capitalize on the opportunities.

11.17

Future Prospects and Recommendations

• Accelerated Mitigation Efforts: Governments and industries need to intensify efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through policies, regulations, and investments in renewable energy sources. • Adaptive Infrastructure: Building climate-resilient infrastructure and urban planning can enhance communities’ ability to cope with climate change impacts such as floods, storms, and heatwaves. • International Cooperation: Collaborative global action is essential to address climate change. Continued commitment to agreements like the Paris Agreement and strengthening international partnerships can drive effective solutions. • Inclusive Climate Policies: Climate policies should prioritize the most vulnerable populations, considering their unique needs and ensuring equitable access to resources and opportunities. • Green Technologies and Innovation: Investing in green technologies and fostering innovation can lead to sustainable solutions for reducing emissions and adapting to climate change impacts. • Public Awareness and Education: Enhancing climate change education and awareness campaigns can empower individuals to make informed decisions and adopt sustainable lifestyles. • Conservation and Biodiversity Protection: Efforts to protect and restore ecosystems can contribute to climate change mitigation and enhance the planet’s resilience to its impacts.

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• Research and Data Sharing: Continued research on climate change impacts, vulnerabilities, and adaptation strategies is essential. Sharing data and findings can inform evidence-based policies. • Financial Support for Developing Nations: Developed nations should provide financial and technical assistance to developing nations to help them build resilience and transition to low-carbon economies. • Community Engagement: Engaging local communities in climate change planning and decision-making processes can lead to more effective and contextspecific solutions. By embracing these future prospects and recommendations, we can collectively work towards a sustainable and resilient future, mitigating the worst impacts of climate change and fostering a healthier planet for generations to come. Disclaimer The views and/or claims/ or data expressed in this chapter are solely authors’ own or based on literature survey and are not necessarily linked with their affiliations, editors of the book, reviewers of the chapter or the publisher.

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Parmesan, C., & Yohe, G. (2003). A globally coherent fingerprint of climate change impacts across natural systems. Nature, 421(6918), 37–42. Rajamani, L. (2006a). The principle of common but differentiated responsibility and the balance of commitments under the climate regime. Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, 9(2), 120–131. Rajamani, L. (2006b). Differential treatment in international environmental law. Oxford University Press. Rajamani, L. (2018). India’s evolving role and interests in international climate politics. Journal of Environmental Law, 30(3), 477–502. Rajão, R., et al. (2020). The rotten apples of Brazil’s agribusiness. Science, 369(6501), 246–248. Roberts, J. T., & Parks, B. C. (2007). A climate of injustice: Global inequality, north-south politics, and climate policy. MIT Press. Schäfer, M. S., & Schlichting, I. (2014). Media representations of climate change: A meta-analysis of the research field. Environmental Communication, 8(2), 142–160. Schlenker, W., & Roberts, M. J. (2009). Nonlinear temperature effects indicate severe damages to U.S. crop yields under climate change. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(37), 15594–15598. Schlosberg, D. (2013). Climate justice and the capabilities approach: The flourishing of human and non-human communities. Schlosberg, D., & Collins, L. B. (2014). From environmental to climate justice: Climate change and the discourse of environmental justice. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 5(3), 359–374. Schuur, E. A. G., et al. (2015). Climate change and the permafrost carbon feedback. Nature, 520, 171–179. Singh, S. (2017). Climate change and media: Examining media coverage of climate change in India. Asia Pacific Media Educator, 27(2), 241–255. Stern, N. (2006). Stern review on the economics of climate change. Stern, N. (2007). The economics of climate change: The Stern review. Cambridge University Press. Subramanian, S. (2012). Forest man. The Indian Quarterly. Suliman, M. (1993). Civil war in the Sudan: From ethnic to ecological conflict. Ecologist, 23(3), 104–104. Thaker, J., & Zhao, X. (2017). Reporting to whom? The rhetorical complexity of climate change in India’s news media. Environmental Communication, 11(6), 759–776. Thunberg, G. (2018). I am striking from school to protest inaction on climate change. The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/20/schoolstrike-climate-change-greta-thunberg Thunberg, G. (2019). No one is too small to make a difference. Penguin. TVG. (2020). State of the media report. The Vendeé Globe. UNFCCC. (1992). United Nations framework convention on Climate Change. United Nations. UNFCCC. (1998). Kyoto protocol to the United Nations framework convention on climate change. United Nations. UNFCCC. (2009). Copenhagen accord. Retrieved from: https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/ pastconferences/copenhagen-climate-change-conference-ember-2009/statements-andresources-for-copenhagen/copenhagen-accord UNFCCC. (2015). Paris Agreement. United Nations. US EPA. (2016). Climate change indicators: Weather and climate. US Environmental Protection Agency. Watts, N., et al. (2015). Health and climate change: Policy responses to protect public health. The Lancet, 386(10006), 1861–1914. Williams, H. T., et al. (2015). Network analysis reveals open forums and echo chambers in social media discussions of climate change. Global Environmental Change, 32, 126–138. Wilson, S. J., Schelhas, J., Grau, R., Nanni, A. S., & Sloan, S. (2017). Forest ecosystem-service transitions. Ecology and Society, 22(4), 38.

Chapter 12

Media’s Role in Global Ecopolitics: Unravelling Climate Change Narratives and Fostering Informed Dialogue Neha Jingala and Nidhi Chaudhry

Abstract The chapter investigates the crucial part played by the media in influencing the global eco-political discourse on climate change. It explores how media shapes public perception, policy development, and collective action in response to climate change concerns, drawing on a thorough analysis of media narratives. It sheds light on the power dynamics, biases, and implications that affect wellinformed decision-making by dissecting the intricate network of climate change narratives that are widely spread by the media. The chapter examines how media plays a key role in forming not only understanding but also emotional connections to environmental challenges, from traditional news reporting to cutting-edge digital platforms. The chapter highlights the capacity of media to promote informed discourse and inspire group action. By presenting effective initiatives, innovations, and community-driven activities, the chapter sees the advent of climate change solutions journalism as a potent weapon for driving positive change. Furthermore, in order to give climate change narratives a comprehensive understanding, our findings emphasise the significance of involving a variety of stakeholders, including scientists, politicians, activists, and affected communities. To close gaps in information distribution and policy creation, the chapter supports continuing cooperation between the media, scientific communities, and policymakers. In addition, the chapter suggests incorporating interdisciplinary viewpoints to develop thorough narratives that accurately depict the complexity of climate change challenges. Additionally, it emphasises the necessity for media outlets to place a high priority on accountability, moral reporting, and open factchecking procedures in order to maintain the veracity of climate change narratives. In conclusion, by providing a comprehensive understanding of climate change

N. Jingala (✉) Department of Journalism, Delhi College of Arts & Commerce, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] N. Chaudhry Department of Journalism & Mass Communication, Maharaja Agrasen Institute of Management Studies, Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Tripathi et al. (eds.), Eco-Politics and Global Climate Change, Environment & Policy 65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48098-0_12

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narratives, their implications, and their ability to create informed dialogue, the chapter contributes to the discussion on the media’s crucial role in global ecopolitics. Keywords Accountability · Decision-making · Information distribution · Media narratives · Policy creation · Scientific communities

12.1

Ecopolitics: An Introduction

A viewpoint that places the environment at the centre of political issues is known as ecopolitics (Neumann, 2009). Ecopolitics proponents push for the politicisation of environmental issues and ecological consciousness. The ecopolitical perspective is predicated on two axioms: (1) political judgment is a crucial component of ecological awareness, and (2) analyses of political systems and the formulation of political policies must be done with ecological awareness in order to be thorough and effective. Ecopolitics stands in stark contrast to the dominant global ideology of neoliberalism, which now shapes the economic and political choices made by nation-states and businesses around the globe (Davis, 2017). This is because ecopolitics places a strong emphasis on a politicised and centralised ecological consciousness. Ecopolitics’ integrative approach in light of the humanities, social analysis, and international relations offers a set of practical tools for the formulation of environmental policy (Reis, 2015). The field of ecopolitics encourages us to discuss the direct connection between scientific understanding and public perception, but we also need to frame environmental management systems for both rich and underdeveloped nations using some concrete models (Dular, 2014). Ecopolitics plays an ambiguous and conditional function in environmental management, serving as a filter and funnel for decision-making on environmental issues and concerns (Polasky et al., 2011). The ideal viewpoint for deciding on environmental policy is informed by science, expertise, and politics (Millner & Ollivier, 2016). By explicitly focusing on environmental challenges and policies in the global setting, ecopolitics creates a link between international politics and environmental concerns. One of the most contentious global public policy issues right now is the environment. It is discussed in legislatures and communities around the world and is covered by important international treaties (Dalby, 2016). In reality, it has developed into a biological necessity for existence to take into account how our public policies affect the web of relationships present in ecosystems and to include an ecological framework in our economic and political decision-making. Humans, on the other hand, do not often function in a more or less automatic manner; rather, they require conscious and intentional actions to change their course. The ability of humans to create and pursue goals is the sole factor that can cause an ecosocial system, which consists of both natural and human systems, to change (Wang & Altanbulag, 2022). Therefore, one must strive to comprehend the social process underlying the ecological crisis (limited resources) and environmental crisis (limited “pollutable” reservoirs). And it is necessary to look within the social structure itself for potential answers to these problems. In actuality, adequate comprehension of the ecological

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effects of human resource usage are ultimately correlated with the interpersonal interactions of individuals. On the other hand, modern politics is based on the ecological foundations of society because the most basic resources, such as the food we eat, the water we drink, the air we breathe, and the materials we use to build and equip our shelters, are all provided by natural processes. These interconnected interactions, in a nutshell, are the foundation of ecopolitics. Karl Deutsch (1977) defines ecopolitics as: it asks about the viability of ecological and social systems, singly and in their ecosocial interplay, and about the possibility, desirability and limits of political intervention. Its approach rejects the romantic illusion that all natural ecological systems are necessarily viable. Most of the earth’s deserts are not man-made. But it does insist that no social system can remain viable for long if it degrades or destroys its natural environment, or if it fails to save it from deterioration or self-destruction.

The term “ecological politics,” sometimes known as “ecopolitics,” expresses the holistic idea that one must examine the connections among various social issues, much like how an examination of the ecological principles reveals that everything in social, natural, and human life is in some way interconnected (Andermatt Conley, 1997). Decisions that seem preferable from a purely environmental perspective almost always result in confrontations with economic decisions, whether they are market- or government-driven or both. It also refers to the relationships between various elements of a political system, including social stratification, institutional frameworks of governance, power dynamics in society, and the method by which public decisions are made. The realisation that political decisions must be made in order to address the current ecological crisis of sustainability, which is characterised by poverty and social destitution as well as scarcity and exhaustion of natural resources and environmental services, is known as ecopolitics (Hajer, 1995). Some interests will be prioritised above others during this process, both between and within states. It is not simply a matter of life but also follows logically that most of our contemporary political issues have ecological foundations. It is urgent because time, the most limited resource of all, is running out quickly, or at least more quickly than our social and political institutions can acknowledge the reality of socio-ecological entanglements (Mensah, 2019). The social sciences are faced with hitherto unanticipated issues as a result of the rise of this new eco-political dimension in our lives, as well as the regular concerns of individuals and governments. Of course, this has theoretical as well as practical ramifications (Deutsch, 1977). The political agenda now places a high priority on combating global climate change. Climate change-related issues are now viewed as being essential to policy development among political players, whether nation-states or other political actors (Kamarck, 2019). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) or the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are two major intergovernmental institutions that have institutionalised climate change as a significant issue and taken centre stage at high-profile summits and meetings. The Group of 20 (G20) frequently discusses it, and events as disparate as the World Economic Forum and the World Social Forum pay close attention to it.

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International Ecopolitical Agendas

International ecopolitical agendas cover a variety of crucial geopolitical and environmental issues that countries work together to address in order to tackle global difficulties. The global commitment to address pressing environmental issues and achieve sustainable development for both the present and future generations is reflected in these international ecopolitical agendas. Several notable examples include: 1. Climate Change Mitigation: Accords like the Paris Agreement seek to restrain the rise in global temperatures and improve resiliency to the effects of climate change (see Box 12.1 for more details). 2. Biodiversity Conservation: Projects like the Convention on Biological Diversity place an emphasis on protecting biodiversity, responsible resource use, and fair benefit distribution. 3. Sustainable Development Goals: The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations include objectives for access to clean energy, cheap and sustainable energy sources, responsible consumption, and climate action. 4. Marine Protection: Initiatives like the Global Ocean Alliance seek to create marine protected areas that will protect at least 30% of the world’s seas by the year 2030. 5. Reducing Plastic Pollution: Initiatives like the Basel Convention, which regulates transnational movements of hazardous waste, aim to combat plastic pollution. 6. Transition to Renewable Energy: For sustainable development, international commitments urge moving away from fossil fuels and towards renewable energy sources. 7. Water Security: Access to clean and safe water is a key component of several agendas, including the United Nations’ Water Action Decade. 8. Forest Conservation: Collaboration efforts are being made to stop deforestation, encourage reforestation, and safeguard vital forest ecosystems. 9. E-Waste Management: Agendas cover the ethical disposal and recycling of electronic waste in order to reduce risks to the environment and human health. 10. Air Quality Improvement: Improvements in air quality are being made by initiatives aimed at lowering pollution levels and enhancing air quality in urban and industrial regions. 11. Transition to a “green economy”: Agendas support viable economic models that place a premium on social justice and environmental protection. 12. Climate Resilience Building: Building climate resilience is the focus of efforts to make nations better prepared to adapt to the effects of climate change, including those that affect vulnerable populations. 13. Environment Diplomacy: Agendas support worldwide discussions and collaboration to settle ecopolitical disputes and advance environmental cooperation.

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14. Ecosystem Restoration: Initiatives to reverse ecosystem deterioration and advance sustainable land management include the UN Decade on Ecosystem Restoration. 15. Carbon Pricing: Agendas look at carbon pricing strategies like carbon markets and levies to encourage emission reductions and finance climate efforts.

Box 12.1: The 2015 Coverage of the Paris Agreement Is One Instance of How Environmental Issues Are Discussed in the Media Influencing Legislation and International Talks At the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in Paris, France, the historic global climate pact known as the Paris pact was approved. By reducing global warming to far below 2 degrees Celsius over pre-industrial levels, the accord aimed to combat climate change. Public opinion, awareness, and pressure on governments to adopt bold climate action were all significantly influenced by media coverage of the Paris Agreement discussions in the run-up to and during those negotiations. The media’s attention was drawn to the pressing need to address climate change, the potential repercussions of inaction, and the significance of coming to a worldwide agreement. The media helped the general public realise the importance of taking prompt action by publicising the most recent scientific findings, the effects of climate change, and the voices of communities who have been impacted. News organisations covered the discussions, important problems, and viewpoints of various nations, fostering an atmosphere of openness and responsibility. Additionally, the media highlighted instances of nations, towns, companies, and civil society organisations proactively addressing climate change. These success stories, which featured creative ideas, renewable energy efforts, and projects, served as motivation and proof that taking action on climate change is possible. The negotiations were directly impacted by how the media influenced public opinion and put pressure on governments. Governments were under increasing scrutiny for their positions and behaviours during the negotiations, making them more accountable to their constituents. Media coverage encouraged countries to take more action and pushed for more ambitious outcomes in the Paris Agreement. This helped mobilise popular support for lofty goals and promises. By increasing knowledge, generating public pressure, and swaying official stances, media coverage of the Paris Agreement helped the discussions succeed. Holding governments responsible, emphasising the value of international cooperation, and igniting vows to combat climate change were all made possible by it. (continued)

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Box 12.1 (continued) Additionally, media coverage still has an impact on how policies are implemented and how the Paris Agreement is followed up. Media outlets highlight opportunities and problems in the transition to a low-carbon future, as well as the progress that nations are making towards achieving their climate targets. Overall, media coverage of the Paris Agreement and other global climate agreements has a significant impact on policy through swaying public opinion, holding governments responsible, and affecting the political will for climate action.

12.3

Different Approaches Taken by India to Address Climate Change

India is one of the countries most vulnerable to the harmful effects of global climate change. Based on the Global Climate Risk Index, Germanwatch 2021 listed it as the seventh most climate-affected country in the world in 2019 (Global Climate Risk Index, 2021). India’s topography is diverse, with islands, deserts, northern hilly terrain, northern plains, a peninsula plateau, and northern plains. It is positioned halfway between the Indian Ocean and the Himalayas. They include the Himalayas, which have an icy temperature and are covered in snow, the humid subtropical climate in the north, centre, and east, the tropical south and southwest, and the desert and semi-arid west and south centre. The southwest monsoon, which occurs between June and September, brings the majority of the country’s annual rainfall with noticeable regional variations, while the northeast monsoon, which occurs between October and December, contributes a good portion of the rainfall falling in the southern regions. India has unique geographic features that provide a wide range of weather fluctuations. Extreme weather events are occurring more frequently as a result of climate change, and hydro-meteorological risks including cyclones, floods, and droughts are getting worse. Recent decades have seen an extremely rapid warming. Between 2005 and 2019, eleven of the fifteen years had some of the hottest temperatures since 1901. Heat waves are occurring more frequently and with greater severity (MOEFCC, 2021) People who live in congested, inadequately ventilated dwellings and urban slums will be affected by heat waves with maximum temperatures reaching 48 °C in some Indian cities in 2020 (Golechha & Panigrahy, 2020). India has a large influence on climate politics and policy. Although it has participated actively in international climate negotiations, its position has evolved over time. India has evolved into a trial ground for policies that integrate climate considerations into growth in an interaction relationship between domestic policy and international positions (Mohan, 2022).

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Due to its status as a developing power and high susceptibility to its impacts, India is a key participant in the fight against climate change. India has made an effort to include the geostrategic uses of the phenomenon into a bigger shift in its foreign policy in an effort to show how it can lead to both competitive and cooperative geostrategies. India has chosen to take a cooperative stance in order to emphasise its responsibility through diplomacy and investments in sustainable energy, thereby solidifying its position as a global power and extending its influence in partner countries (Hakala, 2019). Under the able leadership of Prime Minister of India Shri Narendra Modi, the following initiatives have been carried out: 1. International Solar Alliance The development of solar energy is a collaborative endeavour between the United States and France. To maximise the use of solar energy, an alliance of “sunshine countries” was formed in 2015. Reducing dependency on fossil fuels and other non-renewable energy sources is the alliance’s main objective. 2. One Sun, one world, one grid project along with the United Kingdom The foundation of OSOWOG is the expansion of inter-regional energy grids for the global distribution of solar energy. It might be the solution to most of our present problems with the global energy supply. 3. Mission Swachh Bharat The comprehensive initiative placed a strong emphasis on sanitising India’s cities and villages by installing toilets in every home. 4. COP26 Glasgow Summit The biggest and most significant action taken by Indian Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi on behalf of India was during the COP26 Glasgow submit; (a) To reach 500 GW of non-fossil energy capacity in India by 2030. (b) To reduce India’s carbon intensity by over 45% by 2030. (c) By 2070, India will reach the goal of having net zero carbon emissions.

12.4

Media Discourse in Global Ecopolitics

Media outlets have the power to influence how we perceive environmental issues, from framing debates to highlighting specific solutions. The way that these issues are presented can have a significant impact on public attitudes towards policies designed to address them (Stecula & Merkley, 2019). One of the most important issues facing the globe right now is climate change. As countries struggle to navigate the complexities of this global problem, media discourse has played a critical role in shaping public opinion and policy decisions. However, conflicting climate change frameworks have created a challenging environment for ecopolitics on a global scale (see Box 12.2 for example). The media plays an instrumental role in shaping public perception and understanding of climate change. It is through media discourse that people learn about the causes, impacts, and potential solutions to this complex issue. However, with multiple conflicting frameworks surrounding climate change, it can

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be difficult for the media to present a unified message. Global ecopolitics is also impacted by these conflicting frameworks as different countries adopt different approaches to addressing climate change. Some nations prioritize economic growth over environmental concerns while others focus on reducing carbon emissions at all costs. As we move forward into an uncertain future, it is essential that we understand the role of media discourse and conflicting climate change frameworks in shaping our perceptions and policies around this critical issue. Global eco-politics, which refers to the meeting point of ecological concerns and political decision-making at the global level, is significantly shaped and influenced by media discourse. The media is an essential tool for informing the public, forming public opinion, and influencing policy agendas. The following are some crucial facets of how media discourse affects international eco-politics: 1. Setting the agenda and creating awareness: The media is essential in bringing attention to environmental issues and its political ramifications. The media raises awareness of environmental issues among the general public through news coverage, documentaries, opinion articles, and investigative journalism. The media shapes the agenda-setting process, influencing the priorities of both policymakers and the general public by stressing the importance and significance of certain topics (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) 2. News Coverage: Reporting on scientific studies, climate-related occurrences, and policy developments relating to climate change is common in the media. News articles inform readers about various environmental effects, such as melting ice caps, harsh weather, and rising global temperatures. The media assists people in comprehending the gravity and urgency of the situation by distributing this information to a wide audience. 3. Documentary Movies: Movies like “An Inconvenient Truth” and “Before the Flood” have been essential in educating the public about climate change. These films communicate the scope of the issue and its potential repercussions through a combination of scientific proof, individual stories, and visual storytelling. They frequently draw attention to the political aspects of climate change, such as the function of governments, businesses, and international negotiations (Dunn et al., 2020) 4. Opinion pieces and editorial content: Opinion pieces and editorials that analyse and comment on environmental issues from a political standpoint are frequently featured on media platforms. These venues are used by journalists, specialists, and activists to convey their opinions on the necessity of policy action, the power of special interests, and the significance of international cooperation. These opinion pieces influence public opinion and the public conversation. 5. Investigative Journalism: Investigative reporting is essential for revealing environmental problems and their political ramifications. Journalists investigate tales of corporate wrongdoing, environmental deterioration, political inertia, and special interest group sway. Investigative journalists reveal these problems through in-depth reporting, increasing public awareness and frequently igniting demand for accountability and legislative action (Tong, 2015).

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6. Online activism and social media: Social media platforms are now crucial for bringing attention to environmental issues. Many people use hashtags like #ClimateChange, #FridaysForFuture, or #ActOnClimate to share facts, news stories, academic research, and first-hand accounts of environmental problems. Environmental organisations use social media to engage a worldwide audience, spread awareness, and rally support for political action through online activism and digital campaigns (Lodhia & Stone, 2017) 7. Framing environmental issues: Media framing is the presentation of a subject, highlighting some aspects while underplaying others. Public views and policy responses to environmental concerns can be influenced by how the media frames them. Media coverage, for instance, may frame climate change as a social justice problem, highlighting its disproportionate consequences on marginalised people, or as an economic one, emphasising prospective implications on sectors and employment markets. These frames have the power to shape political discourse and affect public opinion (Scheufele, 1999). 8. Public Opinion and Political Pressure: Public opinion on environmental concerns is greatly influenced by media discourse. The media educates and shapes people’s perspectives, attitudes, and beliefs through news reporting, op-eds, and social media. Media coverage of environmental issues and its political implications can lead to increased public pressure for action. Politicians, decision-makers, and international talks can all be influenced by public opinion (Bell, 1994a). 9. Keeping Power Accountable: The media is essential in keeping powerful individuals and organisations responsible for their environmental activities or inactions. By shedding light on environmental wrongdoings, corruption, and policy shortcomings, investigative journalism and exposés increase public pressure for responsibility and change. The media may upend the present quo and help create a more open and accountable global eco-political environment by discovering and spreading knowledge (Jharotia, 2018). 10. Dialogue and Debate Platform: The media offers a stage for the discussion and debate of environmental concerns. The media promotes debates between professionals, decision-makers, activists, and the general public through opinion pieces, interviews, and broadcast dialogues. These exchanges promote critical thinking, encourage civic engagement, and help to shape the evolution of the eco-political discourse (Luedecke & Boykoff, 2017). 11. Global Reach and Transnational Connections: Media has the ability to traverse international borders and link people from all over the world. It makes it easier for people to exchange ideas, information, and top environmental practises. Global media coverage of eco-political issues like climate change, deforestation, or biodiversity loss can promote a sense of interconnectedness and international cooperation. 12. Influence on Policy and International Negotiations: Media discourse can have an impact on environmental policy choices and international negotiations. Media attention to the significance and urgency of particular issues might

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influence decision-makers to take action or give particular environmental efforts more priority. Additionally, media coverage of international environmental talks, like climate summits, can impact diplomatic dynamics, alter public perceptions, and even change the results of these negotiations.

Box 12.2: Media Organisations from all Over the World Covered the Topic in Depth as Large-Scale Flames Erupted in the Amazon Rainforest: The Size of the Fires, the Destruction of Priceless Ecosystems, and the Possible Effects on Climate Change, Biodiversity Loss, and Indigenous Communities Were all Underlined in the Media Coverage People all across the world shared a sense of urgency and concern as a result of the Amazon fires being covered by international media. It helped people realise that the destruction of the Amazon rainforest has effects that extend well beyond national boundaries. The coverage emphasised how important the Amazon is as a carbon sink, helping to prevent global warming and preserve biodiversity. The issue’s interconnection was brought to light by the media, which sparked cooperation and action on a global scale. Public pressure forced governments, nongovernmental organisations, and international organisations to take steps to safeguard the Amazon and address the root causes of deforestation. Discussions about the importance of sustainable land use methods, the function of global supply chains, and the accountability of local and international actors in protecting the rainforest were sparked by the media coverage. The widespread media coverage promoted information exchange and idea sharing amongst nations dealing with comparable environmental issues. It gave scientists, environmental specialists, and representatives of indigenous groups a forum to discuss the significance of protecting the Amazon and the wider ramifications for environmental sustainability. Additionally, popular support for programmes and campaigns aimed at saving the Amazon was increased as a result of the media coverage. It sparked donations to environmental charities, boycott calls for goods linked to deforestation, and awareness-raising campaigns about the importance of sustainable development and ethical consumerism. International cooperation was aided by the interconnection that was portrayed in the media coverage of the Amazon fires. Different governments, NGOs, and companies took part in talks and actions to assist the preservation of forests, sustainable development, and indigenous rights. To provide financial support, exchange best practises, and build procedures to stop deforestation, international cooperation was sought. (continued)

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Box 12.2 (continued) As an illustration of how media can inspire international cooperation on eco-political concerns and foster a sense of connectivity, consider how the Amazon fires have been covered by the world’s media outlets. Media coverage may mobilise group action and promote international collaboration to solve issues like climate change, deforestation, and biodiversity loss by highlighting the global significance of environmental concerns and highlighting the shared responsibility to address them (Boykoff, 2009). In conclusion, media discourse has a wide range of effects on international eco-politics. It promotes discourse, changes public opinion, sways policy agendas, holds those in positions of power accountable, and links international audiences. For informed citizens to make wise decisions in the realm of international eco-politics, it is crucial to comprehend and critically assess how environmental concerns are represented in the media.

12.5

Conflicting Climate Change Narratives

Conflicting climate change narratives in the media can significantly influence how people view and act on environmental issues. Here is a description of the function they perform: 1. Scientific Uncertainty and Scepticism: Due to scientific doubt and scepticism, conflicting climate change frameworks might appear in the media. Although the vast majority of experts concur that human activity is the primary cause of climate change, media attention may be given undue weight to a tiny number of dissenting voices. This may give the public the erroneous impression that there is scientific disagreement and sow doubt about the severity and urgency of climate change. Such doubt can affect policy choices and public perception, resulting in delays or ineffective action (Antilla, 2005). 2. Political Polarisation: Climate change has become a very polarising political topic, and contradictory media narratives may reflect this polarisation. Contrasting narratives on climate change may be presented by media outlets with various political allegiances or biases, emphasising various origins, effects, and policy solutions. People tend to connect themselves with media sources that support their pre-existing opinions, which can impact public impressions. Media coverage that is too politically divisive can make it difficult to reach agreements, slow down policy development, and make it difficult to take meaningful environmental action (Pompper, 2004). 3. Influence of Special Interests: Companies that produce fossil fuels, for instance, have been known to support initiatives that question the validity of climate

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science or advance debunked theories about how climate change occurs. This may lead to the spread of false information, obfuscating the scientific consensus and preventing effective policy action. Special interests’ impact on media coverage has the potential to alter public perception, postpone the implementation of new policies, and preserve an unsustainable status quo. 4. Framing and narrative development: Media organisations are essential in framing climate change concerns and developing narratives around them. Different framing decisions might provide conflicting frameworks in media coverage by highlighting certain aspects of the problem. For instance, media coverage of climate policy may emphasise their financial ramifications, stressing potential job losses or financial costs while downplaying their positive effects on the environment or public health. These many frames can affect policy discussions, public opinion, and the order in which environmental issues are prioritised (Spence & Pidgeon, 2010). 5. International Climate Discussions: Conflicting narratives about climate change in the media can have an effect on these discussions. Media outlets from other nations frequently give national interests and viewpoints precedence, which results in diverse narratives and coverage of these conversations. Conflicting media narratives can lead to misconceptions, impede collaboration, and make it more difficult to reach a global agreement on climate action. Different media narratives can have an impact on domestic political environments, public opinion, and countries’ desire to participate positively in international discussions. Overall, conflicting climate change frameworks in the media have the potential to influence public perceptions and policies regarding environmental issues by influencing scientific understanding, sustaining political polarisation, amplifying the influence of special interests, framing issues differently, and influencing international negotiations. To have a thorough awareness of climate change and its effects, media consumers must critically assess information sources, look for different viewpoints, and rely on reliable scientific sources. It appears that the mass media has demonstrated to the world’s population that it is a significant actor that contributes to, shapes, and positively influences discourse, understanding, perceptions, opinions, as well as actions on and about the issue of climate change (Wilson, 1995). Research has shown that the public learns and is exposed to a wide range of knowledge and viewpoints regarding science through the consumption of news items in the mass media. In order to provide perspectives, knowledge, narratives, and developments in a variety of ways about the global discussion on climate change, media representations include a wide variety of news and information packaged in different formats and targeted at the general public via numerous channels. Climate research, policy, media, and public interactions are intricate and dynamic. Since the most serious effects of climate change are most likely to manifest themselves in the future rather than in the present, the mass media assumes a leading role in communicating about it. In contrast to other global issues, climate change appears to be complex and an unfavourably noticeable topic among people.

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The mass media aims to promote global conversation about climate change issues beyond merely interpersonal communication. The media’s portrayal of climate change is frequently muddled with the subjective views and positions of these stakeholders due to the diversity of perspectives, positions, and competitions among scientists, industries, policymakers, NGOs, and the international community regarding the existence of climate change, its urgency, and decisions regarding it. As a result, it may eventually have an impact on public views, opinions, awareness, and understanding regarding climate change as well as open the door for new viewpoints to be developed on it. There are indirect and difficult ways to perceive the causes, effects, and implications of climate change. A large part of what almost everyone knows about climate change issues comes from the media. Both the public’s perceptions of numerous environmental, technological, and risk-related issues as well as the translations between science and policy have been significantly altered by mass media coverage and representational practises. In addition to providing the public with information regarding scientific facts, the media also has an impact on how the public views the world (Nelkin, 1987). The language and pictures that the media employ in their reporting have the power to influence the public’s perception of the issues and how they should think about them. It is quite easy to blame the media for popular misconceptions about science. Scientists can hold the media accountable for misleading the public, just as the public may hold the media accountable for confusing them with contradicting facts. According to several scientists (Lindzen, 1990; Lashoff, 1990; Nelkin, 1987), the media should pay more attention to the opinions and reports of other scientists and not just those provided by a small number of experts. Others contend that the media completely ignores the unresolved problems related to the climate change issue. Many scientists and others with special interests use the media to communicate with the rest of the world since it is such an effective instrument for teaching the general audience. In order to spread their ideas and viewpoints, scientists and government officials are now regularly distributing papers and “news releases” on climate change to media sources in the USA (Wilson, 1999). The vast majority of people learn about climate change and the present issues related to it through the global mass media because it is an easily accessible source with sped-up scientific data that is understandable without a great deal of scientific skill. According to research, the media serves as the main conduit via which the general public learns about science, particularly as it relates to climate change (Bell, 1994b; Wilson, 1995). As a result, the media are effectively in charge of making sure the general public is properly informed about the problems the globe is facing with climate change and the science that supports it. However, in reality, the media frequently dramatises and exaggerates tales in order to attract their audiences, which can have the unintended consequence of reducing the significance of the actual facts related to climate change (Wilson, 1999).

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Climate Misinformation

The forms that misinformation about the environment takes on are ever-changing. Climate denial has drastically declined as a result of the overwhelming consensus that anthropogenic global warming is real. Historically, climate disinformation emphasised the rejection of climate change. Today’s climate misinformation focuses on sowing doubt about the science behind climate change and the efficacy of the strategies employed to prevent it, discouraging people from taking action (Moser, 2016). For instance, arguing that climate change policies are harmful to the economy or national security, portraying clean energy as unreliable, portraying the fossil fuel industry as a key component of the solution (also known as “greenwashing” or “wokewashing”), overemphasising the role of individual lifestyle choices while diverting attention from systemic solutions, or asserting that the effects of global warming may not be as severe as scientists claim are just a few examples. Different taxonomies have been proposed by researchers to classify various forms of climate misinformation. Misinformation about climate change is spread in “subtler” ways. While overt climate denial is simple to disprove with facts, it can be more challenging to spot subtle forms of climate disinformation, such as statements that adopting green policies will be too expensive. Such assertions are “half-truths” that only suggest error when taken in a larger context. Because they are more difficult to spot and have the potential to be more persuasive, cherry-picking data or presenting false information may be even more hazardous than explicit climate denial. Silence on climate issues is also deemed to be false information. Even while the real-world effects of climate change, such as extreme weather and natural disasters, are increasingly obvious, media coverage of these effects frequently fails to link climate change to them. By removing crucial context, the failure to show links between climate change and its impacts could harm the information environment. The effects of climate misinformation vary depending on geography and culture. Not everyone in the world is equally affected by climate change. Similar to how government policy and public perception of climate change vary by region, so do public perception and knowledge of the issue. These subtleties should be taken into account as businesses confront climate disinformation (Ford Foundation). Therefore, there is a need to stress on the importance of media literacy in navigating the deluge of information and misinformation around climate change, emphasising the necessity for viewers to evaluate sources critically and distinguish between facts and myths.

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Media Depiction of Climate Change

In the relevant literature, analyses of the portrayal of climate change in media are most prevalent and primarily originate from the social, political, and communication sciences. Although still predominantly from the Western world, these studies include a wide range of nations, media outlets, decades, and many aspects of climate change. Following are their primary conclusions: 1. Numerous studies have examined how much coverage climate change receives in the media. They demonstrate how important the issue is in numerous nations across all continents. They also show that there has been a significant increase in media coverage of climate change in several nations during the past few years (Schmidt et al., 2013). 2. Furthermore, research has demonstrated that media coverage of climate change, like that of many other problems, varies significantly over time and peaks at particular times (Schmidt et al., 2013). The media’s attention to climate change peaked around Hurricane Katrina, the “flood of the century” in Germany, and the heat waves in Europe. Some of them are weather-related occurrences, notably extreme weather. Even though these statements frequently lack scientific support, journalists can interpret such incidents as signs of climate change while seeking newsworthy aspects of climate change and visible manifestations of the unseen process. Sociopolitical issues also cause media coverage of climate change. International climate politics proceedings, specifically the Conferences of the Parties to the UNFCCC process, where high-ranking politicians discuss international climate politics and numerous sizable NGOs offer additional interpretations and photo ops for journalists, are particularly influential. These prominent political occasions take place every year, are predictable, and regularly draw a lot of media attention to climate change and climate politics. However, periodic releases of the IPCC Assessment Reports or the Stern Review on the economic effects of climate change, as well as cultural events like the “Live Earth” concerts and motion pictures like “An Inconvenient Truth” or “The Day After Tomorrow,” have also sparked media interest in climate change (Schäfer, 2012). 3. The positioning of climate change in media coverage has evolved over time, according to longitudinal content analysis conducted in a number of nations. While it was mostly covered on science pages (or segments) in the early 1990s, the topic expanded from being primarily a scientific issue to include politics and the economy. Politics, business, and society are becoming more and more concerned with climate change. Media coverage of climate change is increasingly focusing on issues like the political push for a global agreement on emissions reductions, the economic costs of transitioning to low-carbon societies, or the humanitarian and security ramifications related to potentially escalating resource conflicts and migration brought on by climate change.

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4. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that mass media – mainly television and newspapers, but also increasingly the Internet – are the most significant sources of information for people’s understanding of climate change. Additionally, individuals appear to trust the media more than, say, relatives and friends when it comes to this topic, making it clear that the media is a reliable source. However, little is known regarding uses and reception procedures beyond these rather fundamental features. The social circumstances, motivations, and gratifications of users who interact with climate-related media content, as well as their interpretations of the content, have not yet been adequately addressed. These aspects may be clarified by using motivational theories like uses and gratifications, interpersonal communication theories, and theories of information diffusion. 5. Studies on the impact of media portrayals of climate change have primarily concentrated on effects at the individual level on people’s problem awareness, their degree of information, and their willingness to act, or on potential first-level agenda-setting effects and persuasion. They have shown that the quantity of representations of climate change that people see in the media is related to how much they are aware of the problem, suggesting an agenda-setting influence. This conclusion was primarily drawn from polls of people’s self-reported media use, which are infrequently supported by examinations of actual media use or content. Future research should consider these elements and seek to differentiate the unique agenda-setting contribution of various media. 6. Additionally, media portrayals of climate change have been found to have cognitive consequences time and time again. People learn something about the subject and receive information about it via the media. The extent and causes of climate change, as well as potential remedies and alternatives for (individual) action, are all included in this (Stamm et al., 2000). When individuals particularly look to the media for information regarding climate change, these methods of information gathering are well established. For general, unfocused media use, i.e., when people regularly utilise media and unintentionally stumble upon climate change material, their existence and scope are less certain. Several factors affect how news is framed by a media organisation. The occurrence of significant events, the social, educational, and cultural backgrounds of news reporters and editors, the political, social, and economic environment, current journalistic norms and values, asymmetrical power relationships, and media policies all have an impact on how environmental news is framed in the media. Because of this, media coverage of climate change (adaptation and mitigation) goes beyond a simple compilation of news stories and videos made by journalists and producers. Instead, representations signify key frames derived through intricate and non-linear relationships between scientists, policy actors, and the general public, frequently through the media of news stories. It takes inventive news framing to encourage climate change concerns. The media sets the agenda for what the general population will think. Media framing in relation to climate change issues involves emphasising some events over others, shaping the communication’s tone and terminology, and

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allotting space and time to the topic. Depending on these choices, the news will either be a significant topic or one that deserves little attention. Other factors also play a role in how the news is presented. Deadlines and space constraints may have an impact on a journalist’s ability to cover the news. Because of time constraints, for example, journalists might not be able to comprehend and communicate complex climate issues, which might lead to stories that only use one source of information (Dunwoody, 1986). Coverage also depends on how well-versed and competent the reporters and subeditors are in covering environmental news. It affects how scientific information is transmitted when complex scientific concepts are simplified in media articles (Neelima & Reddy, 2014).

12.8

Usage of Different Media Channels in Shaping Public Discourse on Environment Issues

The debate surrounding environmental issues is shaped in different ways by various media platforms, including traditional news organisations, alternative media, and social media sites. At both the national and international levels, the way they frame and display information can affect policy choices. 1. Mainstream News Outlets: The public discourse and policy choices are significantly shaped by traditional mainstream media outlets like newspapers, television networks, and online news sources. They have the ability to set the agenda and define environmental issues in certain ways thanks to their wide influence and reputation. How the general public and decision-makers perceive environmental concerns can be influenced by the headlines chosen, the reporting style and the sources used. Media outlets that are part of the mainstream frequently take a more balanced stance, presenting various viewpoints and consulting experts. They are essential in providing in-depth analysis and investigative reporting, which can raise public awareness and, as a result, put pressure on politicians to take action. 2. Alternative Media: Alternative media channels offer alternate viewpoints and contest dominant narratives. These include independent internet journals, blogs, and grassroots media organisations. They frequently concentrate on topics that get less coverage in the mainstream media and offer opposing views to those taken by governments, businesses, and the corporate sector. Alternative media may highlight the voices of grassroots movements, environmentalists, and underrepresented groups. They have the power to influence public opinion and advance policy improvements by spotlighting underrepresented viewpoints and arguing for systemic change. 3. Social Media Platforms: Public conversation on environmental issues has changed as a result of social media. Using websites and apps like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube, people and organisations may disseminate information, participate in discussions, and rally support on a large scale. Social

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media makes it possible for news, opinions, and user-generated content to circulate quickly, which has the potential to both increase awareness and propagate false information. Social media campaigns’ viral potential can greatly increase public pressure and have an impact on political choices. For instance, Greta Thunberg’s #FridaysForFuture initiative garnered international attention and inspired young people to demand climate action. 4. International Media and Global Coverage: Environmental challenges can have a global scope, necessitating cooperation and coordination on an international scale. Environmental issues are covered globally by international media entities like global news networks. Their reporting on international climate negotiations, agreements, and controversies can influence policy choices and form the global narrative. These publications’ international reach guarantees that environmental concerns are discussed internationally, encouraging knowledge sharing and influencing policy debates at international forums. The influence of the media on political choices is complex and varies depending on the situational circumstances and the interplay of numerous variables. By influencing public opinion, creating awareness, framing issues, exposing social and political ramifications, and encouraging public pressure for action, media discourse can, however, have an impact on policy decisions (Mavrodieva et al., 2019). When environmental issues are prominently featured in the media, policymakers are more likely to give them priority and take action. Furthermore, media scrutiny can encourage the adoption of stronger and more effective policy measures by holding decision-makers responsible for their environmental commitments (see Box 12.3 for examples). Box 12.3: Two Examples of How the Media Can Be Used to Encourage Environmental Awareness and Action 1. The “Blue Planet II” Documentary Series The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which produced the documentary series “Blue Planet II,” significantly contributed to the public’s increased awareness of marine pollution and its detrimental impacts on marine life. Sir David Attenborough served as the series’ narrator, highlighting the beauty and fragility of marine ecosystems as well as the negative effects of plastic waste, overfishing, and climate change. A worldwide audience was captivated by the arresting images and gripping narrative, which sparked widespread indignation and calls for action. There was a notable increase in public interest in and conversations about marine conservation after the premiere of the series. Governments, businesses, and people were encouraged to take action, which led to changes in policy, more financing for programmes aimed at marine conservation, and a worldwide movement against single-use plastics (Dunn et al., 2020). (continued)

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Box 12.3 (continued) 2. Indigenous media and the Standing Rock protests: In the United States, from 2016 to 2017, there were demonstrations against the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL), which was being built close to the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation. To oppose the pipeline’s possible negative effects on the environment and culture, indigenous activists, environmentalists, and their supporters banded together. Through the use of social media and other alternative media outlets, this campaign received a lot of attention and support. On websites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, indigenous activists, independent journalists, and citizen journalists reported on the demonstrations and provided real-time information. Instances of police brutality were documented via livestreams and recordings, bringing attention to the protesters’ experiences with human rights abuses and environmental injustice. These media resources were widely disseminated, which enhanced popular support for the pipeline project, raised awareness of indigenous rights and environmental issues, and increased pressure on the government and the companies involved (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007). In both instances, the media was crucial in educating the public about environmental issues and rallying support for action. These media projects had a real impact on policy choices, public perception, and engagement in environmental concerns through gripping storytelling, potent imagery, and the amplifying of underrepresented voices. They serve as examples of how the media may operate as a change agent by bringing attention to environmental issues, stirring up public opinion, and influencing governmental and corporate decisions.

12.9

Conclusion and Future Dimensions

The start of the twenty-first century marked a turning point for environmental concerns, both in terms of hazards and potential. For instance, in 2009, the conversation about reducing GHGs and the difficulties associated with climate change swiftly came to an end. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which expires in 2012, was at danger as leaders attempted to come to an agreement. Reporting on these issues has become harder, not easier, as a result of rising political and economic pressure on and within the journalism sector. However, how the public perceives environmental challenges in the twenty-first century continues to be significantly influenced by media representations of Anthropocene geopolitics. Furthermore, the interaction between research, government, and public awareness and involvement continues to be impacted in a number of different ways by these networked media platforms. Media organisations play a significant role in debunking myths about climate change, promoting educated discourse, and encouraging proactive participation in international ecopolitics. To guarantee a thorough knowledge of the subject, media

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outlets should give priority to reporting on varied voices and opinions on climate change. A well-rounded story can be produced by amplifying the voices of affected communities, scientists, activists, policymakers, and indigenous organisations. According to empirical evidence, media representations of environmental issues have momentarily improved, including more accurate coverage of anthropogenic climate change. However, there are still a lot of institutional barriers that prevent improved environmental media coverage over the long run. In the politicised and disputed arenas of dynamic cultural politics, where agents of definition strive for recognition and discursive traction, the implications for climate policy and action remain an unresolved subject. The term “environmental media coverage” refers to crucial frames that are the result of complex and nonlinear relationships between scientists, policy actors, and the general public, which are typically mediated by news items written by journalists. Media outlets must make significant investments in effective fact-checking procedures and hold themselves accountable for truthful reporting. In order to deliver accurate, easily available, and context-rich information, media should actively engage scientists and professionals. Furthermore, in order to obtain reliable data, resources, and expert insights for thorough reporting, media organisations should work with NGOs and government institutions. Media coverage is more than just a compilation of news stories and videos created by producers and journalists. Nisbet (2009) has remarked that “the events that take place in the policy sphere and the groups that compete in the political system are not only mirrored (or covered) in the media but also shaped by the media.” As media representations are shaped throughout time by both internal (such as journalistic norms) and external (such as political economics) factors, the terms of continuous interactions in the field of environmental politics have undergone dynamic reconfiguration. Consequently, these have had an effect on current theories as well as challenges in environmental governance and policies. The “circuits of communication” idea put forth by Carvalho and Burgess may be useful to keep in mind while thinking about the many facets of these intricate media reporting on the environment processes. In this concept, communications travel through three sites or circuits across time. Media communications first begin, then move into the public realm, and then, in the third step, they penetrate the private sphere of individual participation. Stories and reports are assembled during the course of our daily contacts, compete for our attention, receive varying degrees of response, and then feed back again. These remarks affect future news coverage and the ongoing linkages between environmental science, policy, and practises. To report on specific occurrences within a greater current of dynamic activity, the media must generally make a necessary set of decisions. The articles that follow compete for readers’ attention and thereby affect how science, policy, the media, and the general public interact throughout time. These encounters also support enduring media representations. Increasing environmental coverage in the media, particularly fair, honest, and complete coverage, is obviously not the solution. Journal editors, scientists, and journalists working together to improve reporting with more context and clarity will surely help to more effectively engage the public and broaden the variety of alternatives for appropriate action. As was already indicated, a range of political, economic,

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technological, institutional, and cultural factors will continue to bring opportunities as well as challenges for media coverage of the environment as we move further into the twenty-first century. Reporting on innovative ideas, successful campaigns, and implementable solutions to combat climate change should take precedence in the media. This strategy can encourage constructive behaviour and enable people and communities to make important contributions. The media should encourage interdisciplinary debates involving social scientists, policymakers, economics, and environmentalists as these discussions can encourage creative solutions and offer a comprehensive view of the issue of climate change. The power of modern media must be tapped for spreading interesting information about climate change, virtual reality, interactive formats, and data visualisation may be used to increase audience comprehension and engagement. The media can be a key catalyst for promoting group action by creating media-driven public engagement programmes that nudge people to take significant climate change action. Providing fair-minded and factbased narratives can help promote educated public discourse. Therefore, media houses must maintain coverage of climate change beyond transient incidents, promoting ongoing public awareness and comprehension, long-term reporting keeps the issue’s urgency and resolve in focus. Disclaimer The views and/or claims/ or data expressed in this chapter are solely authors’ own or based on literature survey and are not necessarily linked with their affiliations, editors of the book, reviewers of the chapter or the publisher.

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Chapter 13

‘Leave Fossil Fuels in the Soil, Halt Deforestation’: Stop Threatening the Planet M. Satish Kumar and Steven Donnelly

Abstract This chapter seeks to investigate the climate-related conundrum facing humanity as we lurch from one climatic catastrophe to another. Global climate governance sought to provide a coordinated form of agreements to explicitly use liberal capital to incentivise action around the Conference of Parties (COP). It will trace the evolutionary development of this movement and seek to evaluate the significance of this initiative in meeting climate targets towards 2030. In particular, the transnational climate justice approach based on CBDR/INDC will be a way forward to ensure choices towards unifying targets and their contradictions. The chapter will conclude with observations on the role of ecological security as a framework for addressing the critical challenges faced by both the global North and South. Keywords Anthropocene · Conference of Parties · INDC · Climate Justice · Ecological Security

13.1

Introduction

Lord Giddens in his influential volume The Politics of Climate Change (Giddens, 2009) presents the framework for how the politics of climate change should be enumerated for the future. The key arguments suggested that (i) climate change is not a Right or Left issue and that a non-partisan, cross-party consensus is required to move forward. (ii) Any progressive dialogue on climate change can only be achieved with the convergence of both the political and the economic. In other words, the M. S. Kumar (✉) Geography, Archaeology & Palaeoecology, School of Natural and Built Environment, Faculty of Engineering and Physical Science, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK e-mail: [email protected] S. Donnelly Geography, Archaeology & Palaeoecology, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Tripathi et al. (eds.), Eco-Politics and Global Climate Change, Environment & Policy 65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48098-0_13

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competitive nature of climate negotiations calls for its alignment to political goals, economic and technological innovation space. (iii) Lastly, climate change politics which ignores the needs of emerging and developing economies with large population bases will be a non-starter. Gidden calls this the “development imperative” (See also Brown, 2010). While Zero Growth remains a non-starter, however, a clean and decarbonised approach to development is an acceptable proposition as long as opportunities for accessing technological innovations remain in place. While Giddens seeks a State-led driver for climate change politics, however since the Paris Agreement (2015) the role of both the public and private sector in delivering the mandate for climate change remains highly visible and viable. Climate negotiations and their geopolitics remain insulated from the more pressing demands of global poverty, increasing inequalities, and regional disparities. The Homeric choice for Odysseus is between Scylla (the six-headed monster) and Charybdis (the deadly whirlpool), i.e., poverty alleviation or development and saving the planet or sustainable development. Indeed, the planet has moved beyond the Gidden’s Paradox, of Business as Usual (BAU) model with the advent of the Anthropocene (Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000). Increasingly the dangers posed by drastic changes in the climate regimes, and weather patterns have only compounded the challenge imposed by the new epochAnthropocene. Suffice it to add that countries and people most affected by the changing climate are those who contributed the least to global warming. This remains the core concern for ecopolitics. The challenge is about centring the politics of climate change more on the people rather than on the economy alone. This seems to be the main trap that most countries in the global North and South have succumbed to. Just like South Africa’s ‘Ubuntu’ or ‘Sumac Kawsay’ of Ecuador which situates local particularities with global challenges, India too has its own individualised approach to the environment. In the ancient spiritual tradition, humans were considered part of nature or ‘Panchabuttas’. The tradition of Vedas, Puranas, and Upanishads along with the discourses of the Bhagavad Gita continue to reinforce the significance of our environment from time immemorial. The Assisi Declaration (1987) reinforced the fact that human role is not separate from nature. That Nature is sacred and the divine is expressed through all its forms. Reverence for life and ahimsa (non-violence) is an essential principle. Finally, Nature cannot be destroyed without humanity destroying itself. As late Wangari Maathai notes, reinforcing questions of empowerment and culture in the context of the environment cannot be remedied by economic growth models alone (Harper-Shipman, 2019: 646). Remediation of the socio-political also calls for increasing recognition and developing solidarity among the G7, G20, BRICS, LICS, and MICs. The ontological politics of climate change demands the options and opportunities that are available for nation-states when it comes to consensus. The first common ontological sittings of climate change relate to ‘recognising the changing dynamics of climate regimes’. The second focuses on the making of Anthropocene-induced climate or ‘human-modified’ climate and finally, the third is the unfinished agenda of sustainable development as demonstrated by the Conference of Parties (COP)

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submissions. The remaining sections of this chapter is devoted to contextualising COPs within the emerging framework of the Anthropocene, followed by an overview of global climate negotiations; the formation of UNFCC and in particular the situatedness of CBDR and INDC as key collective bargaining tools for both the global South and the North. The final section is devoted to unpacking the criticality of COPs based on an assessment of COP21–27. The concluding sections draw out the key strands of the debate and its implications moving forward for the forthcoming COP28 Presidency and host in UAE-Dubai.

13.2

Advent of the Anthropocene

The term ‘Anthropocene’ originated in 2000 (Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000; Zalasiewicz et al., 2010; Butler, 2021), declaring that humans have become the predominant drivers of Earth’s systems. The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2017, established the true significance of the impact of human action on the planet Earth. Indeed, climate change cannot be divorced from the complexity of ecological challenges imposed by humans at a planetary scale. “Humans have interfered with and broken the shortterm planetary carbon cycle through over generation of carbon dioxide” (Chakraborty, 2017, p. 28). This is manifested in the loss of biodiversity, and unseasonable and cataclysmic weather-related events. Indeed, “The planetary now bears down on our everyday consciousness” (Chakraborty, 2019). In July 2023, news articles presented a story focused on the stratigraphical laminations of Crawford Lake in Ontario Canada as recording the beginning of a new chapter in the Earth’s historical timeline. The prominence of this new era, the Anthropocene, is observed within geological records dated as beginning in the 1950s wherein sediment analysis goes a long way in “reveal[ing] the geochemical traces of nuclear bomb tests, specifically plutonium as a radioactive element widely detected across the world in coral reefs, ice cores and peat bogs” (Hunt, 2023). The emphasis of the article strongly lies in the impacts of human action on the natural environment and biosphere over the last 100 years. According to Seo (2017), humanity has become increasingly concerned about the trend of global warming as the global atmospheric temperature has risen steadily, with major fluctuations during the past century particularly 2014, 2015, and 2016 reported to be the hottest years (at the time of publication) in the historical record of global temperature available since 1880. They were also the highest years of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration (Seo, 2017; Keeling & Whorf, 2005; NOAA, 2023). Gibbard (2022) presents a definition of the Anthropocene as “the aggregated effects of human activities that have transformed and continued to transform the Earth system and influence biodiversity, thereby producing a substantial record in sedimentary strata and the human-modified ground”. Moreover, the author continues to present the Anthropocene as a geological event characteristically illustrating a period of increasing human influence on the Earth. Lewis and Maslin (2015) further

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articulated the profound influence humanity had on the global environment as a consequence of modalities of urbanisation, agricultural systems, innovations, industrialisation, colonialism, and globalisation throughout recent history. This activity has been placed under the umbrella of the ‘Great Acceleration’ with associated earth system and socio-economic data illustrating trends demonstrating the post-1950 acceleration of the human imprint on the Earth System. A world-historical shift in which humanity becomes a technologically empowered and primarily material planetary force (Shoshitaishvili, 2020). The observation of graphically expressed statistically increasing trends for coefficients such as fertiliser consumption, transportation, world population, carbon dioxide, ocean acidification, and rainforest loss help explain recent climate change and ecological disturbance (Shoshitaishvili, 2020). Further articulating such interactions of social, cultural, and economic developments with the environment, Folke et al. (2021) describe humans as the dominant force of change on the planet wherein society must be discussed as a component of the global biosphere and not secular of it. This emphasis on the entwinement of human society and biosphere processes gives way to narratives focusing on symbiosis which humans play a major role within. The future conditions of the planet will either be hostile or beneficial to human life and the wellbeing of the Anthropocene-era biosphere. Such understandings become critical for evaluating human-induced climatic influence and enhancing the resilience and regulatory capacity of the biosphere. Acknowledgment of this entwinement and its placement in effective negotiations remain key in the decision and policy-making pertinent to climate futures. Concerning statements from the Irish President Mary Robinson in 2011 – the negative effects of climate change are to be seen as a possibility, not a probability. The threat of climate change therefore becomes omnipresent in discussions of food and eco-security, to surviving nations and cultures. Thus, the emerging narrative of human and biospheric futures then gives rise to articulations of environmental justice and sustainable practices. For Bennet et al. (2023), environmental justice broadly refers to the distribution of environmental benefits and burdens and the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people in environmental decision-making and legal frameworks. The conceptualisation of environmental justice seeks to identify viable and just solutions at different geographical scales for the benefit of all humans and livelihoods, flora and fauna, and the empowerment of all nations to participate in climate and environmental futures. In line with Bond (2012), the present-day politics of climate continues, despite some improvements, to provide a top-down procrastination of world elites in grappling effectively with climate and positioning their perspectives amidst market-driven prioritisations. Meanwhile, anti-climate change narratives antagonise climate justice pronouncements and create a profound influence on the geopolitical rhetoric and ambition of climate negotiators, including climate finance towards mitigation and sustainable infrastructures. For Lomborg (2001; also see Gardiner, 2010), the sensationalising of climate news and scepticism emerging from unbalanced streams of information obfuscate what information is to be deemed important and the prioritisation of actions as such. The communication of climate change therefore

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must consider political ideology as an important explanatory factor as indicative of varying degrees either championing or creating doubts about anthropogenic climate data in their diverse discourses. It is emphasised that a broad one-frame-fits-all approach does not hold when it comes to ranking the importance of environmental-based and climate-centric issues or the capacity of a particular group of people to respond and prepare (Lahsen & Ribot, 2021). The themes of response and capacity have remained prevalent in global climate negotiations since the publication of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992 (henceforth UNFCCC) following the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The theme perpetuates and stimulates agendas, discussions and decisions of the Conference of the Parties (henceforth COP) held annually in different worldwide locations since 1995.1 Key global problems of climate change, resource depletion, and diminishing biodiversity are squarely positioned in this era of climate change. The time for procrastination about excessive warming due to human action is receding gradually and surely (Brand, 2007). Indeed, the difference between 1.5 and 2 °C of global warming implies a vastly compromised future for the forthcoming generations. Whether it is 6 or 16 million people being affected is as real due to the warming of the Seas, the increased depletion of the Arctic and Antarctic Ice shields, or the loss of critical ecological habitats. Here Net Zero and carbon neutrality matter more than simple Degrowth or Zero Growth. Net Zero encompasses the reduction of all forms of greenhouse gases, including methane, nitrous oxide, and others. This would involve improving the efficiency of agricultural practices, reducing supply chains, and bringing in greener supply chain options. It also includes a greater focus on the circular economy by reducing waste and enhancing natural carbon sinks such as forests and oceans. The era of the Anthropocene presents an irreversible impact on Life on Earth with humans as the key arbiter of destiny. The ticking ‘climate time bomb’ fuse is shortened by uncontrollable CO2 emissions (U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, March 20, 2023; Steffen et al., 2004; Zalasiewicz, 2008). Thus, the problem of politics of climate change is the scalar problem of human action, both at an individual and collective level. The increasing convergence of centralised statism ever since the COVID-19 pandemic has also resulted in increased commodification (neoliberalism) of every human activity. Capitalism is here to stay and how we negotiate with its imperatives remains a key agenda in saving our planet for future generations. Thus, climate change, economy, and society can no longer be seen as separate realms from the polity (Ward & Imbroscio, 2011: 866). Such a shift to polity from the political economy approach brings human society to the centre of debates along with the state and the economy (Ward & Imbroscio, 2011: 858).

1 With the exception of a COP in 2020 due to the COVID-19 Pandemic. This was deferred until 2021 in Glasgow, UK.

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Global Climate Negotiations

This section seeks to present an overview of the global climate negotiations and climate-focused governance across the COP annual climate meetings. The inception of the Common but Differentiated Response (henceforth CBDR), and its later reinvention as Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (henceforth INDCs) emphasised transnational climate justice and the recognition of multivariate challenges faced by (particularly in the case of CBDR) Non-Annex (colonised) and Annex-I, and Annex-II-developed countries of global South and North. The focus here is on COP21 (Paris) through to COP27 (Egypt). The proceedings of COP21 in 2015 gave way to the Paris Agreement which was historically accepted and signed by 198 countries (ratified by 195 signatories with Iran, Libya, and Yemen yet to action). The Paris Agreement is presented as a legally binding document that aspires to limit global temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels by 2100. Many nations have since followed suit by presenting their vision for net carbon and sustainable futures. The COP following the Paris Accord has built upon themes of capacity, whilst the dynamics of the Paris Agreement remained politically fluid. The topic of political dissent and critique arises as support either grows for climate change interventions or as the responsibilities and developmental priorities of Developed and Developing nations come into focus.

13.4

The Formation of the UNFCCC and CBDR/INDC

According to the official UNFCCC website, the Conference of the Parties (COP) is the supreme decision-making body of the [UNFCCC] Convention. It was an annual meeting held in different cities across the world and attended by a diverse delegation of nation-state government leaders and representatives, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), charities, and members of the scientific community. The conference was premised on representation, negotiation, promotion and implementation of the UNFCCC Convention, and furthering institutional arrangements. The UNFCCC as a ground-breaking framework adopted in 1992, acknowledges the global impact of human activities and emissions on climate and the biosphere. It emphasised anthropogenic-induced climate change. The adoption of this framework saw countries across the globe joining hands for an international treaty on climate change in order to limit increases in global temperature. This made it obligatory for developed countries to reduce their emissions. This legally binding document gave way to the Kyoto Protocol which emerged from COP3 in 1997. The protocol outlined an initial commitment period expiring in 2012, and a second commitment period (2013–2020) extending the goals of the Kyoto Protocol, producing new targets, and making available more finances for tackling climate change as implemented and ratified by the delegation of the COP18 in Doha (also known as the ‘Doha Declaration’). It aspired to heighten ambition toward

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Table 13.1 Comparison between the CBDR and INDC nomenclature 1992 Earth Summit/ UNFCCC 2013 COP 19: Warsaw

CBDR – Common but Differentiated Responsibilities Acknowledgement of different perspectives on climate change, and differentiated responsibilities in addressing anthropogenic climate change. Different capabilities and developmental priorities. INDC – Intended Nationally Determined Contributions Self-differentiation of responsibilities to increase national ambition toward achievement. Formulation of bottom-up participation and nationally focused goals.

sustainable practices, however of the 37 industrialised countries party to the agreement, throughout the first commitment, several countries either didn’t meet their targets, or withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol due to contentions (i.e., United States’ critiques of China’s emissions), or refused to ratify a second commitment period (i.e., Japan, Russia). Historically, the exclusions of China, India, and the US from the Kyoto Protocol meant that mitigation obligations under the Kyoto Protocol were largely limited to the European Union and Japan. Moreover, one of the conspicuous issues in the publications of the IPCC (International Panel on Climate Change) reports and COP documentation has been the difficult task of coordinating a large number of authors/scientists, often thousands of them, to produce a single consensus document (Seo, 2017). Central to the framework of the UNFCCC document in 1992 was Common but Differential Responsibilities (CBDR) which acknowledged specific national and regional development priorities in the context of climate action (Table 13.1). The goal of the UNFCCC was to protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations based on equity. Its conceptualisation of protection can be described as formulating precautions to anticipate or minimise the effects of climate change and the threat of irreversible damage. The designation of Annexe-1 included the industrialised countries that were members of the OECD, plus countries with economies in transition (the EIT Parties), including the Russian federation, the Baltic States and several Central and European States (for additional details see, https:// unfccc.int/parties-observers) The Annex II Parties consist of the OECD members of Annex I, excluding EIT Parties, whose main mandate was to provide financial and technological support to the developing countries to implement emission reduction activities under the Convention and help adapt to the effects of climate change. In addition, they were also required to ensure the promotion and transfer of ‘environmentally friendly technologies’ to EIT Parties and the developing countries. NonAnnex Parties mostly comprised on the developing world. There was a recognition of some of these countries who were extremely vulnerable to the effects of climate change. This included low lying coastal areas and those prone to droughts and desertification. There were others whose income generation is dependent on the exploitation of fossil fuels and are exposed to increased vulnerabilities caused by climate action agenda. Such a framework emphasised specific needs and special circumstances of developing countries, vulnerable to adverse climate effects, and parties that would

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bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under Article 3. Thus, through CBDR mechanisms, the UNFCCC acknowledged the limits and challenges of implementing climate change actions in its approaches to political environmental diplomacy. Deconstructing equity not only brings forth themes of responsibility and capacity; but also, justice and impartiality. Under the rubric of CBDR, there is an implicit acknowledgment of the fact that not all countries have contributed to global warming in the same manner or the same degree (Tandon, 2017). In 2004, Chief Negotiator for the US Robert Reinstein stated that “[the] next stage of negotiation needs to approach the issue of future commitments by all countries from the bottomup, in light of large differences in national circumstances, especially for developing countries” (Reinstein, 2004, p. 309). The reflections of Reinstein were soon realised especially during the COP17 Durban Platform in 2011 which provided the slate upon which to build a bottom-up and universal (i.e., based on contributions by all countries) global climate regime (Mbeva & Pauw, 2016). Building on equity as described in the 1992 UNFCCC framework, the re-imagining of the CBDR mechanism to the INDC mechanism saw a move from the acknowledgment of differential capacities for all, to submitting agendas presenting a self-differentiation of responsibilities and goals to increase national ambition toward achieving mandated targets. The concept of INDC saw a mechanism through which individual countries decide their contribution, while taking domestic circumstances into account. Unlike the CBDR which placed the onus entirely on developed nations concerning emissions, as per the Paris Agreement every country will now be obliged to adhere to its own INDC goals (Tandon, 2017). Equity then shifted from an understanding wherein developed nations through their industrialisation and urbanisation were more responsible for adverse climate effects (despite developing nations such as China emerging as industrialised superpowers since 1992); to a new paradigm of thought wherein both developed and developing nations co-produce narratives and implement co-ordinated mechanisms together to tackle issues of global temperature increase. The implementation of the INDC mechanism has remained a key aspect of succeeding COP conferences, especially with a particular focus on conferences COP21 (Paris) through to COP27 (Sharm El-Shiekh). Numerous components such as loss and damage, mitigation, adaptation, finance and climate debt, and socioeconomical parameters such as gender and race have been extensively discussed through the lens of climate futures. At the same time, anticipating an increasing ambition and accountability toward fulfilling the Paris Agreement remains significant throughout future COP meetings. Moreover, the INDC mechanism was open to critique concerning the strength of its legal force and flexibility, accountability, and transparency in assisting developing nations. The fear remained that selfdifferentiation of developed nations may impinge on the provision of support to developing nations and at the same time these cannot be held accountable for failure to meet their INDCs in circumstances where explicit support during negotiations remain unfulfilled (Pauw et al., 2019; Sun et al., 2022).

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Conference of the Parties (COP) – COP21 Thru COP27

The importance of the COP21 Paris Accord in 2015 is described in terms of its reinvigoration of ambition and enthusiasm in the fight against anthropogenic climate effects in the twenty-first century. Signed by 198 members and ratified by 195 (as of 2023), the Paris Agreement has spearheaded a number of considerations toward enhancing the capacity for all nations to limit global temperature increases to 1.5 °C. The notable mechanism conferred by the COP21 was the activation of the INDC mechanism for self-differentiation of achievable sustainable targets that complemented developmental, socioeconomic, and fiscal aspirations of each state. However, for Seo (2017) and Sun et al. (2022), observations on the legal force of the Paris Agreement paled in contrast to that of the preceding Kyoto Protocol, wherein the nationally determined contributions are voluntarily submitted by each country and the COP21 agreement does not have a formal article on the quantitative number of agreed reductions in emissions and its significance in the race to stop global warming. In succeeding COPs (see Table 13.2), namely COP23 Marrakesh and COP24 Bonn/Fiji, the solidification of the Paris Agreement rulebook and applicable mechanisms for transparency in data, and accountability to pledges, was accompanied by two further notable events. Firstly, the submission of the Marrakesh Action Proclamation for Climate and Sustainable Development, which echoed the enthusiasm of Paris Agreement through the reaffirmation of positive action toward climate change. The proclamation called for urgent raising of ambition and strengthening of cooperation, to close the gap between current emissions trajectories and the pathways needed to meet long-term temperature goals of the Paris Agreement. At the same time, there is a proposed call for increased volume, flow, and access to finance for climate projects, in addition to improved capacity and technology from the developed to developing countries, of USD 100 billion per year (UNFCCC, 1992). Throughout the annals of climate negotiations, it is evident that the international community has achieved a series of milestone international climate treaties, including the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement. Additionally, decisions made within the Conference of the Parties (COP), such as the Marrakesh Declaration and the comprehensive package of implementation rules outlined in the Katowice and Glasgow Climate Pact, collectively establish the framework of the global climate governance mechanism (Sun et al., 2022, see Table 13.2). Of particular significance during COP23 and the subsequent Talanoa Dialogue were the facilitative dialogues that revolved around themes of justice, co-production, transparency, and sensitivities related to developmental disparities. The aim of the dialogue was to bridge the divide between climate change negotiations and a broader network of participatory stakeholders beyond the domains of science and governance. This endeavour sought to foster the exchange of narratives and experiences, with the goal of elevating ambition and cultivating a shared comprehension of the ramifications of adverse climate consequences. Moreover, the facilitative dialogue underscored the principles of inclusivity and participation.

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Table 13.2 Notable events and key agreements emerging from COP21 thru COP27 on the basis of implementation and facilitative dialogues Year 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2021 2022 2023

Conference COP21 – Paris, France COP22 – Marrakesh, Morocco COP23 – Bonn, Germany; Fiji/ Small Islands COP24 – Katowice, Poland COP25 – Madrid, Spain/ Chile COP26 – Glasgow, UK COP27 – Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt COP28 – Dubai-United Arab Emirates

Notable event/agreement Paris Agreement Marrakesh Action Proclamation Talanoa Dialogue/Facilitative Paris Rulebook; Katowice Climate Pact Article 6 US-China Joint Climate Declaration; Glasgow Climate Pact Sharm el-Sheikh implementation plan First global stocktake post-Paris Agreement

Conversely, while deliberations concerning the implementation of climate mechanisms and decisions pertaining to areas such as loss and damage, adaptation, climate funding, climate debts, and cooperation unfolded, the concept of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) remained a contentious issue within the geopolitical discourse. Notably, critiques surfaced during the examination of Article 6, focusing on international carbon trading markets and cooperation, during COP25. Simultaneously, the necessity to stabilise and forge consensus regarding vital funding and diplomatic endeavours aimed at realising the mandates of the Paris Agreement and its corresponding rulebook came to the fore. This encompassed expediting endeavours to phase out unabated coal power and ineffectual fossil fuel subsidies, as demonstrated within the Glasgow Climate Pact (COP26) and the Sharm El-Sheikh Implementation Plans (COP27). A pivotal milestone was achieved with the finalisation of the implementing rules, reaffirming commitments to climate finance support for developing nations. The emphasis on fortifying resilience and adaptation against the impacts of climate change was underscored, showcasing a tangible manifestation of political determination to attain the overarching long-term global objective as outlined in the Paris Agreement. Political discourse on the theme of climate change remains contentious across all aspects and memberships within the context of COP activities (Sun et al., 2022). The sequence of Conference of the Parties (COP) events, with particular emphasis on the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) mechanism, has furnished an avenue for comprehending and collectively constructing narratives pertaining to the developmental objectives, ambitions, and prioritizations of each of the 195 ratifying member states. In all of these negotiations, the theme of Equity served as a conduit for establishing fairness and accountability in the context of future climate actions. This equity theme is orchestrated through self-differentiation components inherent within the INDC mechanism and allows each member state to engage and regulate in alignment with their respective national aspirations. However, this mechanism also reignites development-induced distortions that occasionally run counter to sustainability trends. The COP events have consequently

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persisted as a platform for engaging in geopolitical dialogues concerning responsibility in addressing challenges imposed by climate change. A notable illustration of this dynamic is exemplified by the United States’ actions during various COPs. The withdrawal of the United States under the Trump Administration during COP22 and COP23 mirrored the values espoused within a Republican geopolitical discourse that undermined and diluted the very gravity of climate change concerns. In contrast, the Biden administration’s re-engagement in climate discussions during COP25 signalled a renewed commitment under a Democratic political leadership discourse. This oscillation in approach is not novel for the United States, especially considering its historical stance during the Kyoto Protocol due to concerns raised related to fairness and also its continued endorsement of fossil fueldriven industrialisation policy. Additionally, it draws attention to the contrast between the punitive measures imposed on Developed countries and the outdated, Non-Annexed classification of burgeoning industrial centres like China. The interactions between the United States and China in climate negotiations are indeed emblematic of these differing geopolitical discourses, of associated contentions and ideologies surrounding questions of equity and future climate scenarios. In a surprising turn of events, the Glasgow COP26 conference bore witness to the unveiling of the US-China Joint Climate Declaration, a significant step toward fulfilling the obligations of the Paris Agreement and achieving the goals of transitioning to clean energy protocols. This declaration also acknowledged the collective impact of their actions. Moreover, the accord underscored the gravity and exigency of the climate crisis, thereby manifesting a resolute commitment to addressing it through accelerated measures in this crucial decade of the 2020s. Both the US and China had collectively used the term “phase down” of coal at COP26 accepted bilateral climate agreement. Both countries pledge to collaborate within multilateral frameworks, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process, to avert catastrophic climate-related consequences. Despite all the rhetoric of ‘phase down and phase out’ debates, and castigating India for its stance, what remains unresolved is the ongoing issues of climate injustice for the low-income and middle-income countries. Net Zero target has emerged as a reality in this discourse despite the fact that most of the emerging and developing economies do not have the luxury to choose between renewables and non-renewables. Here again, while coal and its users such as India and China are vilified, there is an abject silence regarding the continued and abundant usage of fossil fuels such as natural gas and oil by G7 countries. In addition, the expectation is that phasing out coal by the G20-Developing countries will need to be in line with the G7-developed nations is hugely problematic. The switch from coal to natural gas still affects the environment and there is no admission of guilt here. Simultaneously, the ‘Talanoa Dialogue’ emphasised the significance of local contexts and the exchange of information to enhance participation, nurture a heightened sense of climate justice and urgency, and broaden the scope of climate discourse to include diverse stakeholders. As articulated by Scholsberg and Collins (2014), this discourse emerged distinctly from grassroots movements. Within these movements, articulations of climate justice resonated consistently, centering on

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Fig. 13.1 Flows of information in the climate discussions

concerns and principles of environmental justice, unequal vulnerabilities, the pivotal role of community voices, and demands for community sovereignty and agency (Scholsberg & Collins, 2014). The movement of consistent messaging pertaining to key political discourse emerging from state and non-state actors to the international stage is heavily reliant on continuous feedback (see Fig. 13.1). The flow of information from the UNFCCC treaty to the decision-making efforts of the COP, the provision of scientific evidence by the IPCC, to the concourse of the State and Non-State actors, within their respective geographical engagements and policy frameworks, presents a cacophony of voices around potential climate futures, sense of threat, and divergent developmental aspirations. The renewal of ambition through successive implementation plans, key agreements, and formation of rulebooks, i.e., The Paris Agreement reaffirms the climate crisis at hand, whilst also exposing the underlining politicaleconomic rhetoric that colour the perspectives of respective member states. For Jamieson (2010), responsibility breaks down into practical responsibility, of what we are doing about climate change and theoretical responsibility, what we are thinking. The implementation plans seek to straddle both the practical and theoretical over a given time period, leaving space for future reconceptualisations. The author continues a line of thinking further deconstructing responsibility into prudence, a concern for self, and ethics, a concern for others. Uncertainty and scepticism around the politics of data, finance, morality, and prioritisation of actions emerging from climate negotiations, are further muddied by disagreement concerning divergent trajectories of development goals (Gardiner, 2010). For Lomborg (see Gardiner, 2010), the moral conundrum rests especially in the case of developing nations, on whether to help them now or their descendants later. The moot point being whether current mechanisms and implementation plans of the COP effectively and ethically provide just transitions for all member states. This remains tied up in the nexus of

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prudence, ethics, equity and responsibility which define climate justice and effective mediation. Where then do we place climate within the present-day narratives of global justice, environmental ethics, and the ethics of human well-being (Gardiner, 2010)?

13.6

Conclusions

COP21 in Paris brought about a renewed enthusiasm toward global cooperation on climate change policy and produced new narratives on climate action and justice. This chapter adopted a frame of reference within COP21 (Paris, France) through to COP27 (Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt) and focused on the Common But Differentiated Response (CBDR) and Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) mechanisms which emerged from the 1992 UNFCCC framework and succeeding amendments. The transition from CBDR to INDC perpetuates an acknowledgment of differing perspectives and priorities toward meeting climate change scenarios. It also provides the space to enable both the developed and developing nations to suggest or selfdifferentiate their capacity to meet the goals of UNFCCC agreement (in this case, the Paris Agreement 2015/2016) based on their individual developmental aspirations. Moreover, equity, akin to fairness, in CBDR framed conceptualisations of responsibility from the perspective of developed nations (Annex-I nations) as previously being allowed to industrialise. Contrarily, within today’s paradigm, Non-Annexdecolonised countries such as China, India Brazil today pursue the same industrialisation and developmental aspirations under the same former liberties. Only now, a greater emphasis on sustainability is at play and permeates into all factors of development, politics, society, and fiscal and regional affairs. The concept of equity then is challenged on an international stage concerning prudence, centring on the needs of the nation, ethics and a consciousness about the pressing needs of one’s neighbour on this planet. The narratives presented during post-COP 21 conferences, the facilitative dialogues (such as the ‘Talanoa Dialogue’ focusing on the sharing of stories), and implementation plans echo these sentiments of global awareness and participation as a global network. However, the contentious political discourses of other member states are also presented as challenging equity considerations and conceptualisations of climate futures. Discourses on climate policy and intervention should be viewed as interconnected flows of information between State and Non-State actors, towards advancing their respective sustainable developmental targets and of climate justice. The COP, serving as the supreme decision-making body, has seen various instances of stalemates, rejections, and exits from agreements driven by geographically situated political rhetoric (for example, the United States, China, and Brazil). The degree to which these discourses operate cooperatively with other nation-states either enables or disables nation-states to effectively participate in climate action, creating

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uncertainty for their climate futures. Here the role of ecological security norms have emerged as another point of discussion in this dialogue. The Ecological Security paradigm legitimises the need to maintain a status quo in the continued flow of critical ecological resources, infrastructure, and services at the national, regional, and local scales. There is increasing recognition in the global North that securing ecological and material reproduction can only be possible by understanding the limits imposed by the geopolitics of climate change. This has emerged as an outcome of increased neoliberal-market-based capitalism to help secure what we produce and consume to sustain existing lifestyles in the North and maintain life in the South. The ecological reproduction of nations, cities, and farmlands remains the key imperative, underpinning competition for common but differentiated goals. Thus, the politics of climate change is one of economic competition, for ecological security (Hodson & Marvin, 2009; Keil & Boudreau, 2006). The biggest challenge today is about the intensification of resource-based development despite the slide toward the tipping point of no return in terms of Anthropocene-led global warming. Socio-technical- Infrastructural fixes to meet geopolitical agenda in the world are escalating the drive for increased human action thereby jeopardising the dominant global ecological security in place. The question is how can we incorporate environmental governance to clear commitments to enable coalitions for the common good (see While et al., 2004). Thus, climate change along with the environment gets mangled into the material, social, political, and economic intersectionality. There is nowhere to hide, whether we are being baked in the sun or drenched by the unseasonal rains or indeed chased by wildfires or a dam burst. Climate volatility is here to stay. So why does everyone think that planets can save itself? How can we work with our planet to secure our sustainable future? Why do we believe that apportioning blame on the newly emerging LIC and MICs will somehow wish away the climate-related crises in vogue? How can slums save our planet? (Angelo & Wachsmuth, 2020: 2207). Climate actions that have emerged since include, a cap on trading schemes for emissions (EU ETS); subsidising clean energy use, rather than taxing emissions (USA) and reviving indigenous knowledge systems and naturebased solutions focused on adaptations, rather than reducing emissions (Rajan, 2023). Each of these measures has unintended consequences. For the global South adaptation to climate change is becoming more critical as the direct cost of financing technological transitions becomes unreachable. So, it makes sense to support hydrogen and green energy transitions as India and China have embarked to do so. Seeking a just climate action agreement can only succeed if countries in the global North go the extra mile. In both the global North and South, the marginalised and economically poor communities continue to face the brunt of climate change effects. Seeking solutions by relocating to other geographical locations inevitably results in facing similar challenges from extreme droughts to excessive precipitation to wildfires to ginormous cyclones and hurricanes (see Baada et al., 2023). Taking steps to seek out complementarities and trade-offs between climate change and Sustainable Developmental Goals (SDGs) becomes all the more significant in the current

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context. Thus, advancing clean and affordable energy (SDG7) while helping to tackle climate change (SDG13), would at the same time hurt biodiversity (SDG14 and 15) when constructing solar and wind farms (Nature, 2023). In much the same way promoting SDG8 of employment opportunities in infrastructural developments from road building to city development can have a detrimental impact on the local environment as seen in Uttarakhand in India. Unplanned development of cities, encroaching on urban and rural commons (Vira, 2015) and waterbodies have resulted in increased ecological stress across major global cities, without exception (Kaliyath, 2013). Regulating against unsustainable practices will be the way forward to meet the challenges imposed by the Anthropocene. There is a need to take the ‘natural limits’ seriously as we engage with the politics of climate change. Disclaimer The views and/or claims/ or data expressed in this chapter are solely authors’ own or based on literature survey and are not necessarily linked with their affiliations, editors of the book, reviewers of the chapter or the publisher.

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Index

A Accountability, 27, 138, 140, 202, 222, 224, 246–248 Adaptation Gap Report (AGR), 154 Adaptive infrastructure, 210 Agenda 21, 97, 102 Air quality improvement, 218 Alternative media, 231, 233 American Society of Agricultural and Biological Engineers, 116 Annex-I nations, 251 Antarctica, 61, 66, 70, 93–104 Antarctica initiatives, 96 Antarctic research, 94 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM), 65, 96 Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), 65, 95–97, 103 Antarctic Treaty System Meeting (ATSM), 94, 98 Anthropocene, 3, 7, 18, 19, 21, 59–70, 158, 178, 184, 233, 240–243, 252, 253 Anthropocene geopolitics, 62, 70 Anthropology, 2 Aquapolitics, 73–89

B Bio-assay, 113–114 Biodiversity, 26, 28, 30, 33–39, 63, 64, 66, 70, 110, 136, 190, 191, 193, 199, 218, 224, 241, 243, 253 Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ), 64, 66 Biodiversity conservation, 29, 33, 36, 218

Biodiversity loss, 33, 35, 69, 223–225 Biodiversity protection, 32, 34, 36, 101, 210 Biogovernance, 26, 28–32, 35, 36, 38–40 Biological resources, 61 Biophysical, 28, 138 Biophysical changes, 61 Biopolitics, 1–22, 25, 26 Biopower, 3, 5–7, 11–13, 15, 20, 25 Biosafety, 33 Biosphere, 25–34, 36, 37, 66, 167, 180, 241, 242, 244 Blue acceleration, 61, 68, 70 Blue Country Space, 61 Blue risks, 61, 68, 69 BRICS, 240 British Society of Soil Scientists, 116 Building resilience, 206, 211

C Canada-United States Lake Ontario (Gut) Dam, 78 Capitalism, 5–7, 10, 12, 13, 19, 20, 243, 252 Carbon, 56, 65, 66, 116, 118–121, 123, 124, 127–129, 140, 196–198, 201, 219, 221, 224, 241, 243, 244, 248 Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), 110 Carbon dioxide (CO2), 33, 44, 48, 62, 63, 66, 69, 110, 111, 119–124, 127, 190, 191, 193, 197, 241–243 Carbon end state, 120, 121 Carbon fuels, 110 Carbon pricing, 201, 219 Cartagena Protocol, 33

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Tripathi et al. (eds.), Eco-Politics and Global Climate Change, Environment & Policy 65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48098-0

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258 Cash, 117, 118, 128 Catastrophic collapse, 61, 69, 70 Chilean referendum, 117 China, 33, 46, 61–63, 65, 68, 93–104, 134–137, 139, 141, 142, 148, 149, 194, 196, 198, 245, 246, 249, 251, 252 China’s Antarctic Record, 95–98 Chinese policymakers, 94, 98 City governance, 135 Clean Development Mechanism, 49, 54 Clean energy, 75, 198, 200, 218, 228, 249, 252, 253 Climate action, 70, 191, 195, 197–201, 203–205, 208–210, 218–220, 226, 232, 245, 248, 251, 252 Climate activism, 195, 202–203 Climate Apprentice, 127–128 Climate change, 3, 28, 44, 61, 94, 110, 154, 176, 190, 217, 239 Climate change and security, 200–201 Climate Change Convention, 44, 45, 47, 50–52, 55 Climate change frameworks, 189–211, 222, 225, 226 Climate change mitigation, 196, 198, 199, 209, 210, 218 Climate change narratives, 215–235 Climate change politics, 240 Climate change skepticism, 203–204 Climate convention, 33, 43–57, 245 Climate crisis, 153–171, 202, 249, 250 Climate diplomacy, 197–201 Climate emergency, 59–70 Climate finance, 194, 195, 201–202, 242, 248 Climate frameworks, 204–205 Climate-induced migration, 200 Climate injustice, 6, 249 Climate justice, 191, 195, 201, 203, 206, 242, 244, 249, 251 Climate misinformation, 228 Climate negotiation, 193, 198, 199, 232, 240, 247, 249, 250 Climate neutrality, 34, 35 Climate pedagogy, 171 Climate politics, 195, 206–209, 220, 229 Climate power, 55 Climate protection, 26, 29, 30, 32, 33 Climate refugees, 183–185 Climate regimes, 55, 62, 65, 240, 246 Climate-related disasters, 191 Climate research, 166, 170, 171, 226

Index Climate resilience, 218 Climate risks, 62, 195 Climate Security Mechanism (CSM), 182 Cold War, 65 Combined biogovernance, 37–40 Commission For Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), 93, 94, 96, 98 Common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), 46, 49, 194, 197, 201, 241, 244–247, 251 Communication, 13, 34, 48, 68, 160, 177, 191, 205, 206, 227, 229, 230, 234, 242 Communitisation, 27 Community engagement, 211 Composting, 113, 114, 121–126, 128 Conference of Parties (COPs), 33, 34, 38, 110, 154, 182, 203, 240, 241, 243–251 Continuum, 6 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 33, 38, 39, 66, 82, 218 CO2 production, 119, 123 Critical global issue, 190 Cryosphere, 66, 67 Cultural hegemony, 99 Cultural Revolution, 100, 103

D Dam construction, 73–89 Debate platform, 223 Decision-making, 17, 27–31, 34, 40, 63, 69, 137, 138, 185, 195, 211, 216, 222, 242, 244, 250, 251 Democratization of international relations, 99 Demographic, 5 Developed countries, 33, 46, 48, 51–54, 68, 102, 194, 195, 197, 244, 249 Developing countries, 46, 49–54, 102, 127, 193–197, 199, 201, 202, 209, 210, 245–247 Developing nations, 100, 190, 193, 210, 211, 244, 246, 248, 250, 251 Diplomatic negotiations, 83 Disaster risk reduction (DRR), 182, 184 Diversity of media, 209 Documentary movies, 222 Doha Declaration, 244 Doosti Dam, 81 Dust storm events (DSTs), 75

Index E Earth’s climate system, 190 Earth Summit, 33, 243, 245 Eco-governmentality, 2 Ecological awareness, 216 Ecological civilization, 40, 134, 137, 138, 140, 144 Ecological civilization construction, 133–149 Ecological environment, 134, 137, 142, 144, 147 Ecological governance policy tool, 135 Ecological national reconstruction, 137–143 Ecological orientation, 139 Ecological protection, 134–143, 145, 147–149 Ecological regulation, 134–141, 143 Ecological security, 139, 252 Ecological state, 136, 137 Ecological technical indicators, 135 Ecological transformation, 20, 136–141, 143–148 Ecologism, 177 Economic growth models, 240 Economic power structures, 156 Ecopolitics, 1–22, 43–57, 61–63, 70, 73–89, 93–104, 109–129, 175–185, 215–235, 240 Ecosystem-based disaster risk reduction (EcoDRR), 182 Ecosystem restoration, 219 Editorial content, 222 Emerging economies, 194, 196–199 Empowerment, 240, 242 Energy production, 74, 110 Environmental challenges, 7, 64, 176, 206, 216, 232, 233 Environmental conditions, 73, 101 Environmental criticism, 159 Environmental culture, 153–171 Environmental damage, 28, 50, 61, 82, 116 Environmental degradation, 3, 69, 162, 179, 182–184, 200 Environmental dimension, 46, 143, 179, 180 Environmental diplomacy, 97, 101, 246 Environmental disaster risk, 134, 139 Environmental ecological policies, 134 Environmental factors, 6, 134 Environmental governance, 138, 139, 234, 252 Environmental humanities, 158, 159, 161, 169 Environmental injustice, 6, 10, 11 Environmentalism, 11, 28, 161, 166, 177 Environmental issues, 3, 44, 62, 97, 123, 180, 216, 218, 219, 221–226, 231–234

259 Environmentality, 7, 14, 157, 160, 166, 170, 171 Environmental management, 109–129, 145, 146, 216 Environmental media coverage, 234 Environmental pedagogy, 156, 163, 168, 171 Environmental policy, 11, 50, 82, 100, 216, 223 Environmental pollution, 86, 140 Environmental problems, 46, 157, 179, 222, 223 Environmental protection, 37, 46, 47, 76, 82, 83, 85, 136, 137, 144–146, 180, 209, 218 Environmental protection agenda, 134 Environmental Protocol, 66, 96, 97, 103 Environmental safety, 116 Environmental security, 179, 182, 184 Environment and development, 85, 143, 144, 209 Environment diplomacy, 218 Equity, 194, 197, 202, 209, 210, 245, 246, 248, 249, 251 Ethics, 2, 21, 158, 159, 250, 251 European Green Deal (EGD), 35, 199 European Union (EU), 27, 35–40, 56, 114, 116, 199, 245 European Union Agency for Law Enforcement and Co-Operation (EUROPOL), 118 Eutrophication, 61 E-waste management, 218

F Fertiliser energy value, 122–123 Fish, 32, 68, 75, 193 Flood control, 75 Forest conservation, 218 Forest Nation, 199

G G7, 240, 249 G20, 217, 240, 249 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, 77, 82, 84, 86 Genocide, 5, 6 Geography, 2, 11, 17–19, 21, 63, 159, 169 Geopolitical shifts, 61, 201 Geopolitics, 1–22, 62, 65, 67–70, 177, 233, 240, 252 Geosphere, 18, 19 Glacial melting, 94 Glasgow Climate Pact, 247, 248

260 Global Agenda, 176, 178 Global awareness, 167, 251 Global bio-active carbon sink, 119–125 Global biogovernance, 25–40 Global carbon sink, 109–129 Global challenges, 191 Global civil society, 202–203 Global climate governance, 199 Global climate negotiations, 194, 197, 241, 243, 244 Global climate politics, 194–196, 199, 210 Global Climate Risk Index, 220 Global co-operation, 127–128 Global ecopolitics, 63, 93–104, 189–211, 215–235 Global environmental governance, 94–96, 98, 103, 104 Global governance, 31, 40, 101, 191 Global issue, 50, 190, 226 Globalization, 7, 27, 242 Globalized world, 156 Global media response, 204–205 Global network, 251 Global politics, 61, 191–192 Global security, 50, 184, 185 Global warming, 34, 44, 46, 54, 94, 102, 110, 111, 123, 124, 190–194, 219, 224, 228, 240, 241, 252 Global water resources, 74 Governance models, 134, 135, 140, 142, 146, 148 Grassland and natural ecosystems, 120 Green Development Mechanism, 49 Green economy, 2, 65, 218 Greener economic model (GEM), 28 Green extras, 124 Greenhouse gases (GHGs), 33, 34, 44–46, 48–51, 54–56, 62, 64, 94, 102, 121, 190–193, 195–199, 210, 233, 243 Green politics, 177 Green technologies, 210 Groundwater, 112–113, 121, 123 Growing political advantage, 125 Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP) Dam, 79–80, 83

H Harmonious world, 99 Himalayas, 220 Holocaust, 6, 20 Humanity, 7, 10, 16, 46, 62, 65, 67, 69, 158–161, 168–171, 192, 216, 240–242

Index Human security, 50, 176, 179, 180, 183, 184, 191, 201 Human societies, 86, 177, 178, 190, 191, 242, 243 Hydro-ecopolitics, 73–89 Hydrological alteration, 76 Hydropolitics, 73–89 Hydrosphere, 25

I Iconic species, 110–111 Ideational power, 99 Immigration, 9 Inclusive climate policies, 210 Indicators of Hydrologic Alteration (IHA), 75 Industrialization, 7, 44, 143, 192, 194, 196, 242, 246, 249, 251 Influencing policy, 207, 222, 232 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), 241, 244–248, 251 Intergovernmental biogovernance (IBG), 32–35, 38–40 Intergovernmentalism, 26, 32 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 34, 44, 45, 61, 65, 66, 69, 117, 129, 154, 190–193, 207, 209, 217, 229, 241, 245, 250 Intergovernmental Platform for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), 34, 191 International agendas, 176 International Centre on Mediterranean Biosphere Reserves, 32 International climate negotiations, 196, 197, 202, 203, 220 International Convention on Climate Change, 43–57 International cooperation, 26, 27, 32, 56, 181, 201, 210, 222–225 International Court of Justice, 47, 77, 78, 83, 85–88 International ecopolitical agendas, 218–220 International environmental law, 43–57, 64 International Labor Organization (ILO), 64, 119 International law, 34, 46, 47, 50, 62–64, 67, 70, 75, 82–85, 88, 89 International Maritime Organization (IMO), 64 International media, 224, 232 International negotiations, 27, 193–195, 222, 223 International Organization for Migration (IOM), 184

Index International regimes, 31, 65 International Seabed Authority (ISA), 63, 64, 66, 197, 198 International security, 175–185 International Union of Soil Scientists (IUSS), 116 International water conflict, 74 International water disputes, 74 International Water Law, 73–89 International water treaties, 76 Investigative Journalism, 222, 223

J Juridico-institutional, 8 Justice, 2, 7, 21, 47, 67, 69, 77, 78, 83, 85–88, 99, 141, 155, 191, 202, 206, 209, 218, 219, 223, 239, 242, 244, 246, 247, 249–251

K Kajaki Dam and Arghandab Dam, 80–82 King George Island, 97 Knowledge Centre For Biodiversity (KCBD), 37 Kyoto Protocol, 31, 33, 44, 48, 52–54, 98, 102, 193, 194, 197, 233, 244, 245, 247, 249

L Land use, 119–120, 142, 199, 224 Language of climate change, 154 LICS, 240 Life-supporting system, 61, 63, 66–67 Lithosphere, 25 Localized eco-state restructuring, 141–143 Long-term intentions, 104

M Mainstream news outlets, 231 Man and Biosphere (MAB), 34 Marginalized communities, 190, 195 Marine Protected Area (MPA), 93, 94, 96, 98, 218 Marine protection, 218 Marrakesh Declaration, 247 Media, 94, 96, 99, 103, 110, 116–118, 154, 163, 189–211, 215–235 Media channels, 231–233 Media coverage, 96, 205, 207–209, 219, 220, 223–230, 234, 235 Media depiction, 229–231

261 Media discourse, 189–211, 221–225, 232 Media narratives, 225, 226 Media outlets, 103, 204, 205, 208, 220, 221, 225, 226, 229, 231, 233, 234 Media reporting, 116–117, 234 MICs, 240, 252 Millennium Development Goals, 102 Modernizations, 97, 100, 136, 141 Multilateralism, 99, 103 Multilateral regulatory frameworks, 61 Multi-level biogovernance, 26, 28, 30–32, 40 Multipolarity, 99

N Narrative, 11, 99, 100, 103–104, 158, 162–171, 204–206, 215–235, 242, 246–248, 251 National defense, 97, 100 National ecological space regulation policy, 135–141 National jurisdiction, 61, 63, 64, 66 National security, 176, 179, 181, 228 Natural contract, 178 Natural disasters, 181–183, 228 Natural environment, 28, 37, 84–88, 217, 241 Natural habitats, 191 Natural limits, 253 Natural resources, 46, 139, 141, 144, 146, 177, 217 Necropolitics, 3, 18–21 Negative regulation, 112 Neoliberalism, 2, 11, 14, 19, 20 New environmentalism, 28 News coverage, 222, 234 Non-Annex-decolonised countries, 251

O Ocean acidification, 61, 191, 242 Ocean governance, 59–70 Ocean governance paradox, 63–67 Onto-politics, 8–11 Overfishing, 61, 232

P Pandemic, 3, 15–17, 154, 198, 243 Paris Agreement, 33, 34, 45, 48, 49, 55, 56, 69, 98, 191, 193, 194, 196–200, 209, 210, 218–220, 240, 244, 246–251 Partnership for Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction (PEDRR), 182 Peaceful development, 99, 103 Peaceful rise, 99

262 Personalizing climate change, 205 Plastic pollution, 218 Polar politics, 225, 226 Policing, 115, 118–119, 125–127 Policy, 7, 33, 50, 80, 95, 117, 134, 154, 176, 191, 216, 249 Policy debates, 209, 232 Policy implementation, 135, 170–171 Policymakers, 62, 63, 94–96, 98, 99, 101–103, 154, 155, 158, 205–207, 222, 227, 232, 234, 235 Policy-making, 56, 204, 208, 209, 242 Political action, 176, 206, 223 Political government, 116–118 Political ideologies, 204, 243 Political influence, 117 Political instability, 119 Political interests, 110 Political judgment, 216 Political leaders, 110, 129, 195, 197, 198, 249 Political leadership, 197, 198, 249 Political motivations, 204 Political polarisation, 225, 226 Political pressure, 138, 223, 233 Political programmes, 177 Polycentrism, 28, 29, 31, 40, 66 Population displacement, 191 Positive regulation, 115 Post-pandemic world, 154 Poverty alleviation, 196, 197, 240 Principle of common but different responsibility of states, 46, 49 Professional enablement, 116 Protection of national interest, 26, 197 Psychopolitics, 3, 18–21 Public engagement, 202, 205, 235 Public opinion, 117, 182, 204, 206, 207, 219–223, 225, 226, 231–233 Public perception, 204, 208, 216, 225, 226, 228, 233

R Racism, 6, 20 Ramsar Convention, 74 Real-World Regulation, 118–119 Recycling, 112, 116, 118, 124, 125, 127–128, 137 Red line policy, 134–139 Regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs), 64 Regional Governance, 139, 140, 142, 143, 146, 148, 149 Regulation, 3, 27, 47, 66, 75, 101, 112, 134, 200 Renewable Energy, 198, 210, 219, 221

Index Republicanism, 31, 40 Resource scarcity, 179, 200 ‘Re-story-ation’, 163, 164, 166, 167, 171 Reverse franchising, 125–127 Rio declaration, 82, 83 Riparian countries, 73, 74 River, 3, 73–88

S Sadodispassionate, 158 Science and technology, 100 Science power, 100, 103 Science superpower, 95, 100–101 Scientific communities, 61, 69, 244 Scientific uncertainty, 225 Sea blindness, 68 Securitisation, 176, 180–181, 183, 184 Socialism, 6, 8 Social media, 118, 203, 205, 209, 223, 231–233 Soft power, 93–104 Soil microbiome and safety, 113 State fragility, 201 Stockholm Declaration, 46, 47, 56, 82, 85 Supranationalism, 27 Sustainable development, 2, 26, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 46, 54, 65, 68, 69, 85–86, 88, 95, 96, 102, 137, 141, 144, 146, 176, 182, 195, 197, 201, 218, 224, 240, 247, 251 Sustainable development discourses, 102 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 98, 102, 176, 218, 252

T Transboundary water resources, 73–89 Transformative learning, 156, 166–168 Transnational connections, 223 Transnational environmental crime, 118 Trans-national non-governmental organizations (TNGOs), 94

U United Nations (UN), 34, 36–38, 45, 55, 63, 64, 66, 67, 100, 111, 116, 176, 178, 179, 182, 183, 185, 218 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 65, 102 United Nations Conference on Human Environment, 64, 97, 101 United Nations Convention on Law of Seas (UNCLOS), 61, 63, 64, 97 United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), 182

Index United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 61, 62, 64, 68, 98, 102, 182 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 32–34, 38, 64 United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), 34, 61, 62, 64, 67, 69, 154, 182 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 33, 34, 54, 64, 65, 67, 181, 182, 191, 193, 194, 201, 203, 209, 217, 219, 229, 241, 243–247, 249–251 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), 181, 182 United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development, 102 The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 183, 184

263 Urban environment, 6, 141, 142 Urban governance, 133–149 Urban waste loop, 111–112

W Wangari Maathai, 240 Waste, 62, 68, 69, 111–113, 117, 118, 120–128, 137, 218, 232, 243 Water security, 218 Western, 8–11, 44, 45, 68, 80, 95, 99–101, 103, 113, 115, 155, 165, 229 World Commission on Dams, 75 World Economic Forum, 217 World Health Organization (WHO), 179 World Maritime Organization (WMO), 69, 127 World Social Forum, 217 World Trade Organization, 75