Eastern and Oriental Christianity in the Diaspora (Eastern Christian Studies, 30) 9789042939776, 9789042939783, 904293977X

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30

Eastern Christian Studies

EASTERN AND ORIENTAL CHRISTIANITY IN THE DIASPORA

Edited by Herman Teule Joseph Verheyden

EASTERN AND ORIENTAL CHRISTIANITY IN THE DIASPORA

EASTERN CHRISTIAN STUDIES A series published by The Institute of Eastern Christian Studies, Nijmegen and The Louvain Centre for Eastern and Oriental Christianity, Leuven Edited by Joseph Verheyden Heleen Murre-van den Berg Alfons Brüning Herman Teule Peter Van Deun Volume 30

EASTERN CHRISTIAN STUDIES 30

EASTERN AND ORIENTAL CHRISTIANITY IN THE DIASPORA

Edited by Herman Teule and Joseph Verheyden

PEETERS LEUVEN – PARIS – BRISTOL, CT 2020

A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. © 2020 Uitgeverij Peeters, Bondgenotenlaan 153, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium) All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form. D/2020/0602/44 ISBN 978-90-429-3977-6 eISBN 978-90-429-3978-3

CONTENTS Herman Teule and Joseph Verheyden, Introduction . . . .VII Bert Groen, Orthodox Liturgy in the West: Identity Preservation and Acculturation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Daniel Galadza, Liturgy in the Life of the Eastern Catholic Churches in Europe and North America: Theory and Practice in the Ukrainian Greco-­Catholic Church . . . . . . . 33 Astrid Kaptijn, Ecclesiological and Juridical Impact of the Eastern Catholic Diaspora Context within the Catholic Church  57 Pantelis Kalaitzidis, The Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church between Synodal Inertia and Great Expectations: Achievements and Pending Issues . . . . . . . . . 77 Vassilis Pnevmatikakis, Pourquoi est-il si difficile d’avoir une Église orthodoxe unifiée dans la diaspora? Réflexions géopolitiques à partir du cas français . . . . . . . . . .155 Patriciu Vlaicu, Approche canonique sur les défis actuels de la diaspora dans l’Église orthodoxe . . . . . . . . .171 Andreas Schmoller, Anti-Islamic Narratives of Middle Eastern Diaspora Christians: An Interdisciplinary Analytical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .189 Aho Shemunkasho, Syriac Theological Training in the West in the Process of Integration and Adaption . . . . . . .215

INTRODUCTION During the Vatican Synod on the situation of the Christians in the Middle East (October 2010), the Synod Fathers took the decision to establish a special desk intended to study the phenomenon of the ­Christian emigration from the Middle East (Resolution 10) and the ensuing ­creation of a diaspora. Unfortunately, this resolution has remained a dead letter, even though we all know that especially in the case of the Middle Eastern Churches the majority of their faithful live outside their homelands. ­Middle Eastern Churches can hardly survive without the diaspora. The situation may not be as dramatic for Eastern and Oriental Churches from other regions (Eastern Europe, Russia, Kerala-India), but these Churches too have a long history of faithful living in the ‘West’ and in Eastern Asia. It is not without reason that the diaspora and the establishment of appropriate ecclesiastical structures was one of the main themes of the Pan-Orthodox Council in June 2016 and had already been on the Orthodox agenda for several decades. Several aspects need to be studied with regard to the diaspora. In the first place, the canonical situation. It is an issue which requires different approaches. In the case of the Uniate Churches such topics have to be addressed as the limitations or possibilities of the jurisdiction of the Patriarch or Major Archbishop in diaspora territory; the relationship with the Latin Church; the relation of the diaspora communities to their Orthodox Mother Churches. These are all questions that have received only partial and sometimes unsatisfactory answers in the Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum Orientalium (CCEO). For the Orthodox Churches of the Byzantine tradition it is perhaps above all a matter of how to create a unified ecclesiastical structure outside the traditional territories. Secondly, research is needed to investigate how to take into account the different ways of living of the faithful in the diaspora when it comes to liturgy, theological training, religious education, etc. It may involve developing western liturgical forms adapted to a new life style. Various Eastern Byzantine Churches have already established theological academies in the West, which in some instances has led to a renewal of more traditional modes of theological thinking. Is such a development also necessary or even possible for the Oriental Churches?

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Thirdly, there is the issue of how to participate in the ecumenical d­ iscussions in the new situations. The Uniate Churches have the option to present themselves as separate bodies or together with the Latin Church or under its umbrella. The interrelation between a specific Uniate and Orthodox Mother Church is another difficult issue. Fourthly, there are the juridical and practical aspects of establishing a relation between the diaspora and the Church in the homelands. The faithful in the diaspora are often expected to support the home Church financially or otherwise. Critical is also the question to what extent the ecclesiastical discourse and self-understanding of the faithful in the diaspora is on a par with the views of the hierarchy ‘at home’. Then there is the topic of how to harmonize the Realpolitik of Church leaders living in difficult political situations in the homelands with the critical and outspoken views ventilated in the diaspora by faithful enjoying full freedom of expression. Fifthly, there is a need for a full critical history of the emigration of Christians from their ancestral lands. In the case of some Churches, especially from the Middle East, this emigration should be set against the background of the more general emigration of other communities and minorities. It has to be asked if there are any specific factors prompting Christians to settle abroad. The urgency of the study of the diaspora phenomenon affecting all Eastern and Oriental Churches has prompted the Louvain Centre for Eastern and Oriental Christianity (LOCEOC) to devote its bi-annual international conference to this issue. From 5-7th December 2016, a ­number of scholars of different backgrounds discussed a variety of ­subjects linked to this diaspora situation and the challenges and opportunities it offers. On the 6th of December we had the privilege of receiving the Syrian-Catholic Patriarch, H. B. Ignatius Younan, who gave a wellattended public lecture on the reasons why the Christians of the Middle East leave their homelands. As a matter of fact, His Beatitude visited Belgium to explore the possibilities of setting up a Syrian-Catholic Parish in Brussels, which in the meantime has become a reality. This volume offers a selection of the papers that were presented during the symposium. The selection reflects the variety of issues discussed ­during the symposium and the organizers are aware that many other themes and aspects await further exploration. Two papers address the issue of liturgy. Basilius Groen (Graz) discusses the tension between the urge for preserving identity and the need



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for adapting to the new circumstances of the diaspora setting, with a focus on the (Byzantine) Orthodox Churches. Daniel Galadza (Austrian Academy of Science) approaches these issues from the perspective of the Eastern Catholic Churches, especially the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. Astrid Kaptijn (Fribourg, CH) studies the ecclesiological and canonical consequences of the establishment of the 22 Eastern Catholic Churches sui iuris outside the traditional territories. Her study is based not only on the CCEO, promulgated in 1990, but also on some more recent pontifical documents such as Erga migrantes caritas Christi, published in 2004. Pandelis Kalaitzides (Volos Academy and University of Athens) gives a well-documented theological introduction to the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church held at Crete in June 2016, discussing in particular the issue of nationalism and its articulation in a diaspora context, while regretting the lack of substantial progress in this regard in the ­Conciliar documents. The same issues are addressed by Vassilis Pnevmatikakis (independent scholar), but with a focus on one of the more important Orthodox diaspora countries, France. Patriciu Vlaicu (ClujNapoca), after a discussion of the concept of diaspora itself, analyzes the document on the diaspora issued by the Holy and Great Council of Crete, highlighting its practical pastoral approach, but emphasizing the need for clarification regarding the canonical situation, including the relationship with the local Latin Catholic Church. Finally two papers deal with the so-called Oriental-Orthodox Churches. Andreas Schmoller (Center for the Study of Eastern Christianity, Salzburg) analyzes the emergence of a multi-layered anti-Islamic discourse among Middle-Eastern Christians. After a methodological and conceptual introduction, he presents the results of field work conducted among ­Syriac Orthodox and Coptic Christians in Austria, concluding that antiIslamic discourse is related to experiences of exclusion in the host society and to aspects of memory and traditional group identity rather than to flat Islamophobia. Aho Shemunkasho (Salzburg) gives a presentation of the new ‘Master of Arts in Syriac Theology’ program, initiated by the Faculty of Theology of the University of Salzburg in 2012-13. He offers an overview of the various centers of learning of the Syriac Orthodox Church in the Middle East and in Europe and then discusses the needs of an academic study of Syriac Christianity intended in the first place for future religious leaders of the Syriac tradition working in a diaspora ­setting, but open to anyone interested in the study of Syriac Christianity.

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The editors wish to thank the authors for a smooth cooperation. The colloquium was made possible thanks to generous grants from LOCEOC and the Flemish Research Foundation. Herman Teule and Joseph Verheyden

ORTHODOX LITURGY IN THE WEST IDENTITY PRESERVATION AND ACCULTURATION Bert Groen

Migration seems to be a perennial phenomenon on our planet.1 As for Eastern Christians, throughout the centuries, numerous Armenians, Greeks, Serbs, Russians and others have left their native lands and settled elsewhere, either as traders, students, or refugees fleeing from poverty, persecution and war in search of a new mother country. St. Athanasius (ca. 295-373), for instance, spent many years in the West2 — inter alia in Trier, where Sts. Constantine and Helena had been living — and the Byzantine princess Theophano (d. 991), who became empress consort of the Holy Roman Empire, publicized Byzantine Orthodox culture there. In 1690, the Serbian Patriarch Arsenije III Crnojević led approximately 40,000 Serbian families to the Habsburg Empire, where they were settled in Sirmia with Sremski Karlovci as their religious and ethnic center. After the October Revolution and the lost civil war between the Reds and the Whites, over a million Russians, including a high number of intellectuals, fled to the West. In Berlin, Paris, New York and elsewhere they founded their own associations, periodicals and schools. Many of them participated in ecumenical gatherings, and this in turn resulted in renewed Protestant, Anglican and Catholic interest in Orthodox traditions. Another example concerns Greek migration. Between 1900 and 1920, approximately 400,000 Greeks — among them nearly a quarter of the male working class — settled in the ‘New World’, hoping to begin a better existence there.3 To Australia and elsewhere, too, large emigration movements were to take place, and in the period 1960-1970 about 830,000 Greeks migrated to Western Europe, that is, about ten percent of the total 1   I wish to thank Mor Polycarpus Augin Aydin (Syriac Orthodox Archbishop of the Netherlands), Paul Baars, Florentin Adrian Craciun, Steven Hawkes-Teeples and Leo van Leijsen for their valuable comments. 2   In Gaul he stayed 335-337, in Rome 339-340, and during the 340s he travelled to Milan, Trier, Aquileia and Rome. 3   K. Kourelis and V. Marinis, ‘An Immigrant Liturgy: Greek Orthodox Worship and Architecture in America’, in Liturgy in Migration: From the Upper Room to Cyberspace, ed. T. Berger (Collegeville MN, 2012), pp. 155-175, on pp. 156, 164.

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population.4 Altogether, about 7,000,000 Greeks now live in the ‘diaspora’, viz. North and South America, Western Europe and Australia, where the Patriarchate of Constantinople takes care of them. A final example of Eastern Christian migration to the West is the present-day large influx of refugees from the war-torn Middle East, a phenomenon that results in renewed interest for their fate and faith and, at any rate, reshuffles once more the inter-ecclesiastical East-West balance. Here, I will examine which consequences Orthodox migration to the West might have in the field of liturgy and religious popular culture. I will concentrate on Byzantine-rite Orthodoxy, while occasionally referring to Oriental Orthodoxy; for reasons of limitation, the Eastern Catholic Churches will not be dealt with here. Topics of discussion are the architectural setting, ecumenism, liturgical language, sacred music, liturgical theology, the relation between worship and diakonia, different liturgical and religious popular cultures (including corporality, veneration of saints and monasticism), the calendar issue, and Orthodox use of ancient Western liturgies. We will see that in these domains preservation of own identity, the necessity of adaptation and the desire for acculturation, or resistance to it, are the center of attention and that, at the same time, change because of the new environment may evoke ambiguous feelings: both alienation and reassurance of having found a new homeland. The subject of Orthodox liturgy in the West is variegated, also because one has to distinguish between first, second and third generations of immigrants and their different needs, as well as between different Western contexts — France with its laicité differs from Germany with its Kirchensteuer, for example. Consequently, this article cannot pretend to offer a full panorama and deals only with several major issues. Alongside this, the concepts of East and West are confusing. What may be Eastern to some, may be Western to others: for the Assyrian Christians, the Greeks were Western. Several Orthodox communities have been present in the West for so long that they have now become a fixed element of Western religious culture, and the Orthodox in their former home countries now regard them often as ‘Westerners’ (sometimes with contempt, sometimes with jealousy). Unlike the Eastern and Southeastern European Orthodox, the Syriac Orthodox and Assyrians hardly ever had 4   A literary reference to the problem of many emigrants to live simultaneously in two cultures — the Greek one and that of the host country, here Germany — is D. Chatzis, Το διπλό βιβλίο (Athens, 21977), see also H. Hokwerda, Tussen verleden en toekomst: Nieuw­ griekse traditie en ideologie in het werk van de Griekse prozaschrijver Dimitris Chatzis (1913-1981), doctoral thesis University of Groningen (Groningen, 1991), pp. 353-384.



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a homeland, and sizeable parts have fled from the Middle East, nowadays living in the West; until recently the Assyrians even had their head­ quarters in the USA. I myself am a Roman Catholic scholar who lived in Greece, in an Orthodox environment, for several years (1981-84, subsequently many short stays). I have widely travelled throughout Southeastern Europe, the Middle East and North America, and still do field research in Orthodox contexts. From personal experience I know how important, and often controversial, the dimensions of identity preservation, alienation and enculturation are. 1.  Sacred Space Let us first discuss the question of sacred space, because the place where we celebrate is key. Especially for Orthodoxy, the specific architectural setting of its liturgy is fundamental, because here (from the point of view of worship theology) sacred space, church interior, iconography and liturgical performance are interconnected. Obviously, the experience of celebrating in a church with nearly empty walls differs from doing so in a chapel full of frescos, or out in the open or in an attic. Orthodox communities with a long presence in the West have built their own churches and celebrate the liturgy in an environment familiar to them. Some of those churches closely resemble the ones in Russia or Greece, whereas others have been constructed in modernistic or other architectural styles, which might differ from traditional Orthodox architecture to such an extent that the Greek Orthodox in the USA, for instance, have often ‘created a unique American liturgical space, more recognizable by Americans of other denominations than by other Orthodox practitioners’.5 On the one hand, in many places in North America, as well as in European cities like Munich, Ghent and Rotterdam, Orthodox communities were financially able to construct their own churches. On the other, the newly-arrived migrants often gather in buildings that belong to the established local Western churches; hence the migrants depend on the hospitality of those denominations. An important question in this context 5   Kourelis and Marinis, ‘An Immigrant Liturgy’ (see n. 3), pp. 163-175, quotation on p. 173; M. Illert, ‘Die Nutzung evangelischer Gottesdiensträume durch orthodoxe Christen in Deutschland’, in Orthodoxie in Deutschland, eds. T. Bremer, A. E. Kattan and R. Thöle (Münster, 2016), pp. 179-184.

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is who owns the building. In Greek Orthodoxy in the USA usually the local parish owns the church, which previous generations of its faithful have built at great expense. This has also enhanced their autonomy, to such extent that church boards, consisting of laypeople, have been able to hire and fire priests. Elsewhere, property and autonomy issues may differ. In Western Europe, the Greek Republic owns several parish churches and pays the salaries of their clergy (although, because of the economic crisis, in 2016 the government announced it would no longer pay these salaries). The Russian Orthodox St. Catherine Church in Rome is situated on Russian Embassy territory, and also the new Holy Trinity Cathedral in the Russian Orthodox Spiritual and Cultural Center in Paris (inaugurated in 2016) belongs to the Russian state, which has financed its construction. A good number of Western denominations rent, borrow or even donate church buildings to Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox communities. In case of borrowing, before the service begins, the faithful put up a provisional icon screen or several icons, thus separating the chancel from the nave, and they employ the Protestant communion table or the Catholic altar, or put a provisional wooden altar table in front of it. They can use the building only for several hours and, after the service, have to remove the icons and rearrange the interior to its former state. They can have coffee in the parish hall next to the church, but must beware of spoiling anything, because the place is not theirs, and when they want to gather for meetings, Sunday school and parish festivals, they need another arrangement with the owner, or go elsewhere. Self-evidently, a daily celebration of the liturgy of the hours, especially vespers and matins (key elements of Eastern worship!), is hardly possible. In Graz, for instance, the Greek, Serbian, Romanian and Russian Orthodox communities assemble in Catholic churches or chapels, and only the Copts have been able to construct their own church. In Vienna, the former capital of a huge empire where Eastern Christians have been living for centuries — it was adjacent to the Russian and Ottoman Empires with their huge Orthodox populaces — the Greeks, Russians and Romanians, for instance, possess their own churches and episcopal hierarchies.6 6   C. Gastgeber and F. Gschwandtner, Die Ostkirchen in Wien: Ein Führer durch die orthodoxen und orientalischen Gemeinden (Vienna, 2004). As for Salzburg, see Ost­ kirchliches Christentum in Salzburg, ed. P. L. Hofrichter (Salzburg, 2006). As for Oriental Orthodoxy in the Netherlands, see, e.g., J. van Slageren, Wijzen uit het Oosten, uit zo verren land: Oriëntaals-orthodoxe kerken in Nederland. Over hun geschiedenis, liturgie



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If the Orthodox community has been able to buy a formerly Catholic or Protestant church, or if the respective Roman Catholic diocese or ­Protestant congregation has donated it, as a rule extensive alterations are made to provide an Orthodox interior. But even so, both outside and inside, the building’s Western Christian origin remains clearly visible. All in all, it makes quite a difference whether Orthodox celebrate in a Byzantine-rite church replete with icons and frescos, a fixed iconostasis, an episcopal throne, choir space, choir stalls, possibly a narthex, and the like, or whether they celebrate in a Roman-rite Catholic church with glass-stained windows, saints’ statues, confessionals, pews, a modern sanctuary hardly separated from the nave, or whether they celebrate in a Protestant architectural setting, characterized by almost empty walls, a pulpit as prime liturgical center, insulated pews, a big pipe organ, whether or not having an altar-table.7 A different church interior influences the participants’ experience of the service, and not everything can be done just as in a regular Orthodox church. This often causes ambiguous ­feelings: gratitude for the hospitality given to them, on the one hand, and the inevitable need to adapt and possibly feelings of alienation, on the other. Interestingly, newly-arrived Oriental Orthodox migrants from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Syria sometimes use Orthodox churches, and in that way have to adapt to a Byzantine-rite setting. 2. Ecumenism The need to use churches owned by other denominations and dependence upon their hospitality often boost ecumenical relations: in many places the Orthodox Churches are now regular members of regional, national and local ecumenical councils, and in Europe they belong to the Conference of European Churches, except for the Bulgarian and Georgian Orthodox Churches. So, an important experience of Orthodox liturgy in the West is ecumenism. While Orthodox made up the majority in their former homelands, in the West they are a minority. Defining the relationship between Orthodoxy, the state and the people as an ‘indissoluble bond’, as many Greek and Russian bishops and theologians are en geboorteverhalen van Christus (Glane, 2016), pp. 16-17, 52-55, 138, 158-159, 169, 198-199, 201. 7   Cf. J. F. White, ‘The Spatial Setting’, in The Oxford Dictionary of Christian Worship, eds. G. Wainwright and K. B. Westerfield Tucker (Oxford, 2006), pp. 793-816.

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inclined to do, is no longer a viable option, and celebrating the coincidence of religious and national feasts the same way as in the former homeland, including military parades, is no longer possible. The new situation in the West brings about changes in many Orthodox minds regarding religious majority and minority groups, their own identity and ‘otherness’, also owing to better education and frequent experiences with Western denominations. On the one hand, the novel conditions in the West evoke ‘positive’ reactions, in that some clergy and laypersons enjoy the atmosphere, ­participate in ecumenical services (usually Word of God celebrations, not Divine Liturgies) and learn from other denominations.8 They adapt also to the reality of a high number of mixed marriages. The Protestant ­minister or Catholic parish priest may be invited to actively participate in the wedding service, and the service might even include a wedding march and vows — these do not belong to the Orthodox ceremony, during which the couple does not speak at all. When a child born in a mixed marriage is baptized with Orthodox ceremony, occasionally the Protestant minister or Catholic priest says a prayer or blessing at the end of the service. A lot of this happens more or less spontaneously and is not based on official agreements. On the other hand, there are also ‘negative’ reactions: some clergy warn against modernism, ecumenism, multi­ culturalism and inter-religious dialogue; for them ecumenical services, praying together and inter-ecclesiastical recognition of baptism are out of the question. As for Eucharistic hospitality and ‘intercommunion’, which are both desired and disputed, a few Orthodox attend Catholic, Anglican or Protestant services and go to communion there. They consider the inter-ecclesiastical theological disputes that prevent normal communicatio in sacris an exaggeration, their primary aim is fellowship and a common spiritual experience with other Christians. This, however, may evoke fiery reactions among ‘strict’ Orthodox, who consider such intercommunion treason to their true faith. However, as a rule, Western Christians cannot receive communion in an Orthodox Eucharist, although I know of some Orthodox priests who give communion to Catholics. Regarding Oriental Orthodoxy, a distinction must be made. In a good number of Syriac Orthodox communities (and often also in Armenian 8   G. Basioudis, ‘Die Integration der orthodoxen Kirche in Deutschland’, in Orthodoxie in Deutschland (see n. 5), pp. 167-178. Cf. G. Vlantis, ‘Vielfalt unterwegs zur Einheit: Orthodoxie und Ökumene’, Religion & Gesellschaft in Ost und West, 45 (2017), 6, pp. 23-25; S. Athanasiou, ‘Die Orthodoxe Kirche in der Diaspora: Brücke zwischen Ost und West’, Religion & Gesellschaft in Ost und West, 45 (2017), 6, pp. 10-12.



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Apostolic ones) Catholics can receive communion, some bishops giving communion to Protestants as well. In Coptic and Ethiopian Orthodox services, however, more restraint is exercised. In some regions there exist agreements on mutual recognition of and participation in baptism, matrimony, anointing of the sick and funeral. In general, much depends on the goodwill of the clergy involved. A thorny topic concerns the often complex relations between Orthodox, Oriental Orthodox and Assyrians, on the one hand, and Eastern Catholics, on the other. Especially in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, but much less so in the Middle East, the relationship is tense and bitter. I limit myself to the observation that in the West usually there is more cooperation between Orthodox and Eastern Catholics than in their former homelands. Ukrainian Greek-Catholics in Canada, for example, maintain friendly contacts with their Orthodox brethren, on occasion attending each other’s liturgical celebrations, but as a rule not going to communion in the other faith community. Orthodox presence in the West has consequences for relations not only with the Catholic and Protestant Churches, but also for inter-Orthodox relations. In a city like Boston, some Ukrainian Orthodox and Greek Orthodox parishes use the same cover for their Sunday services bulletins, thus lowering the costs. Seminaries of various Churches may cooperate closely. Thus, the extent of inter-Orthodox cooperation may be considerably higher in the ‘diaspora’ than in the former homelands. Nevertheless, also in the West, the existence of different jurisdictions, even schism, rows and excommunications have severely hindered inter-Orthodox ­communication.9 It remains to be seen whether the 2009 decision to ­create in each of the thirteen Orthodox diaspora ‘regions’ a unified Orthodox Bishops’ Conference, presided over by the representative of the Constantinople Patriarchate, will strengthen inter-Orthodox ties. More interdenominational cooperation is also true of Oriental Orthodoxy in the West, where Copts, Syriac Orthodox, Armenians etc. may gather on open days, celebrating the liturgy, listening to lectures, eating, playing music and dancing. In addition, especially where Eritreans, 9   For a sketch of the history of Orthodoxy in the USA and Canada, inter alia its fragmentation and division along ethnic and jurisdictional lines, see D. O. Herbel, ‘Orthodoxy in North America’, in The Orthodox Christian World, ed. A. Casiday (London/New York, 2012), pp. 164-178; D. Llywelyn, ‘The Growth of Eastern Christian Communities in the United States of America’, in Christianity East and West: Jesuit Reflections. Proceedings of the 21st International Congress of Jesuit Ecumenists, Bucharest, Romania 18-24 July 2011, ed. R. J. Daly (Chestnut Hill MA, 2016), pp. 107-139.

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Indian Orthodox etc. do not have their own place of worship, they occasionally receive communion in an Orthodox liturgy, and vice versa. The common diaspora situation of the two large Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox families facilitates liturgical sharing. For a host of migrants, liturgy has a pivotal meaning. Many attendees gather not just because of habit, or devotion, but to remember and revive the culture of the former mother land, see compatriots, speak and hear the native language, even if this is an older form of it. The Church ­warrants and defends national and cultural identity. In addition, the ­congregants can exchange information regarding schools for their children, taxes and other duties of the countries where they now live. Thus the celebrations may serve as a haven, a kind of oasis, perhaps a beacon guiding the congregants in a world where they may feel estranged from their own traditions, a ‘paradoxical native country’, as a Greek movie made by Nikos Aslanidis is called (Παράδοξη πατρίδα, 2014). However, the liturgy may also serve as a ‘laboratory’ where acculturation of the faith community to the Western context happens; henceforth in this article, we will see several concrete examples. 3.  Liturgical Language Liturgical language is a subject of great importance, because the l­anguage used in the worship services indicates the Church’s identity and self-consciousness, and its cultural roots.10 In the former homeland either an ancient language, an older form of the vernacular, or more modern forms are used (for example, Church Slavonic in Russia and Byzantine Greek in Greece, and Romanian in Romania respectively).11 In the new Western homeland the question of adaptation to its mother tongue, or not, becomes urgent. In this field, the Western and Central European ‘landscape’12 shows great variety. Many Greek and Russian Orthodox parishes still celebrate in the traditional liturgical language. To many faithful, however, in both 10   See my own ‘Liturgical Language and Vernacular Tongues in Eastern Christianity’, in Sanctifying Texts, Transforming Rituals: Encounters in Liturgical Studies. Essays in Honour of Gerard A. M. Rouwhorst, eds. P. van Geest, M. Poorthuis and E. Rose, Brill’s Studies in Catholic Theology, 5 (Leiden/Boston MA, 2017), pp. 407-424. 11   However, also in Greece and Russia, the sermon is usually given in the vernacular. 12   The scholar in the field of liturgical and ritual studies, Paul Post (b. 1953) often uses this originally Dutch word (landschap) in his publications.



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their former homelands and the West, the ancient forms of their l­ anguages, though related to their vernaculars, are hardly intelligible. This applies especially to many Psalm texts, readings from the Pauline corpus, as well as numerous hymns. It is less true of the Gospels, whose simple language forms are still partly intelligible for the uneducated. Further, short texts like ‘Lord, have mercy’ and ‘Most holy Mother of God, save us’ are well-known. An additional problem is that, in the course of centuries, several Greek and Church Slavonic words occurring in the Gospels have acquired a different meaning. Critics contend that Orthodox Churches in the Western diaspora that do not employ vernacular languages refuse to apply the traditional Orthodox principle embodied in the missionary work of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, namely, that the vernacular tongue be used in worship and that thus the active participation of the faithful in the liturgy be promoted. These two brothers are venerated as saints, but the principles of their translation work are not followed. The critics point to the fact that the Byzantine Church once permitted translating the Greek liturgy into vernacular tongues so long as the translation corresponded with the original, so that Orthodox doctrine was upheld. Thus the ­Byzantine Church was more flexible and multiform than the Latin, which for centuries had only one liturgical language and was more centralized. A prolific scholar, as well as a former Catholic priest who became an Orthodox one, Peter Plank (1951-2009) states: ‘In principle every literary idiom is suitable as liturgical language’.13 Nevertheless, opponents of the use of the vernacular as liturgical language may point out that the use of a sacred language that is ancient and stylized corresponds to the Church’s tradition and is essential for their ritual-liturgical encounter with God. In addition, they argue that, in the Byzantine rite, text and melody are interdependent, so that the text cannot be altered without rendering it incompatible with the melody; below we will see this argument recur in the Western context. Romanian and Serbian parishes, however, as a rule use modern Romanian and Serbian respectively. Since the Bulgarian Orthodox Church takes a middle position — besides Church Slavonic, modern Bulgarian is increasingly made use of in the worship services — this blend occurs also in the Bulgarian diaspora. A Church open-minded for renewal, Finnish Orthodoxy celebrates the liturgy in modern Finnish, whereas the more conservative Polish Orthodox Church continues to conduct its worship 13  P. Plank, ‘Liturgische Sprachen’, in Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 5 (42002), p. 470: ‘Prinzipiell ist jedes literaturfähige Idiom als liturgische Sprache ­geeignet’.

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services in the ancient Church Slavonic. Georgian Orthodoxy celebrates the liturgy in an old form of literary Georgian, which the educated understand well. Anyone attending a service in the Orthodox cathedral in Damascus (Patriarchate of Antioch) hears there standard literary Arabic, which is also used by the Melkites, although several versions exist. An important reason why nearly all Romanian and Serbian Orthodox parishes in Western Europe use their respective modern vernaculars in the liturgy is the situation in Romania and Serbia, where such reform has occurred, although the Serbs still sing many hymns in Church Slavonic. According to most church officials and the laity, the use of the vernacular furthers the understanding of the liturgical texts and the believers’ full participation in the services. There are, however, a group of monks and some others in these Churches who long for the restoration of the period when more ancient forms of their languages were still employed.14 Litanies, other intercessions and the readings are sometimes chanted or recited in the Western vernacular (French, Italian, English, German, Dutch, etc.). It also happens that in the litanies the traditional tongue and the vernacular are used interchangeably: alternating between some intercessions in Romanian and some in German, for example. In an effort to deal with the problem of linguistic unintelligibility, in many Russian parishes, including the Russian Orthodox cathedral in Vienna, it has become usual to read the Scripture lessons in ancient Church Slavonic   The situation of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the West is complicated. In Ukraine itself, for a long time, the canonical Orthodox Church, in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate, was using traditional Church Slavonic just like the Russian Orthodox Church. Only in some of its parishes, Ukrainian, Romanian and Hungarian were used, in accordance with local usage and permission by the diocesan bishop. The sermon, however, was usually delivered in Russian or Ukrainian, sometimes in Romanian or Georgian, depending on the native language of the congregants. At the outset of 2013, however, church leadership gave the green light to the liturgical use of the vernacular to all parishes in which at least two thirds of the parishioners were in favor of Ukrainian or a language other than Church Slavonic. The two other Ukrainian Orthodox Churches, which are considerably smaller and not canonically recognized by world Orthodoxy, either already make use of modern Ukrainian, as is the case of the ‘Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church’ since the 1920s, or have more recently begun to use it, as is the case of the ‘Ukrainian Orthodox Church / Kiev Patriarchate’. In this way these Orthodox communities wish to show that they embody the national identity of Orthodox Ukraine. As a kind of reaction, this has furnished the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church with additional arguments against the introduction of Ukrainian as the liturgical language, since this Church did (and does) not wish to be identified with ‘schismatic’ Churches. Nevertheless, as we have just seen, it has now also allowed the liturgical use of modern Ukrainian and other tongues. Hence, in the Western world, Ukrainian Orthodox parishes may use a blend of liturgical tongues, be it Church Slavonic, Ukrainian, Russian, or the native language of the new home country. 14



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during the liturgy of the catechumens, and then again in modern Russian shortly before communion. Liturgical booklets for the people are ­common in some places, in many others they are not. Several Orthodox parishes in Germany, for instance, use editions which contain texts in two or three languages — especially Byzantine Greek, Church Slavonic and German, or Byzantine Greek, Modern Greek and German.15 The services themselves may be abbreviated, especially when the priest and his congregation celebrate in borrowed locales (perhaps they have only one hour), and thus essential parts of the service may be omitted, and also considerable differences between services in one place and another may occur. In North America, too, the situation is rather diverse. The ‘Orthodox Church in America’, to which most American Russian Orthodox adhere, has adopted English as its liturgical language, because it considers language an enculturation into American society. There exist several translations.16 The Orthodox Church in America also displays every day the American flag alone, like other Christian denominations in the United States. In contrast, many Greek Orthodox communities adhering to the Constantinople Patriarchate display the Greek flag next to the ‘Stars and Stripes’. For a long time the latter communities celebrated the liturgy in the same language form as in Cyprus and Greece, implying that this continued to determine their identity in America. However, during the last quarter of the twentieth century, most Greek Orthodox communities shifted to English, thus adapting to the vernacular language of their new country.17 Some use a combination of Greek and English. There are many different translations, varying from archaizing English (‘King’s James’ English’) to contemporary English; some translations of the Divine ­Liturgy and other sacraments are excellent.18 So far church leadership has not appointed one of these as the official one. During the services, one 15   See e.g. Die Göttliche Liturgie der Orthodoxen Kirche: Deutsch-Griechisch-Kirchen­ slawisch, ed. A. Kallis, Doxologie: Gebetstexte der Orthodoxen Kirche, 4 (Münster, 4 2000); Die Göttliche Liturgie des heiligen Johannes Chrysostomos: Griechisch-DeutschNeugriechisch, ed. A. Kallis, Doxologie, 9 (Münster, 2004). As for Syriac Orthodoxy, I know of booklets in both German and Syriac, and regarding Coptic Orthodoxy, in­ Coptic, Arabic and English. 16   A fine private translation of the Eucharist is The Divine Liturgy of the Great Church with Melodies for Congregational Singing, trans. and comm. P. N. Harrilchak (Reston VA, 2 2013). 17   Kourelis and Marinis, ‘An Immigrant Liturgy’ (see n. 3), pp. 155, 158-161. 18   Notably two translations of the Eucharist: The Divine Liturgy of Saint John Chrysos­ tom, trans. faculty of the Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology (Brookline MA, 1985); Archdiocese of Thyateira and Great Britain, The Divine Liturgy of Our Father among the Saints, John Chrysostom (New York, 1998).

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may observe people reading the translations in booklets, instead of ­listening directly to the priest and reader, and joining in congregational hymnody; there exist also bilingual editions.19 Regrettably, because of their concentration on the Eucharist, translators have neglected the liturgy of the hours. There are few fine translations, as well as musical settings, of matins and vespers, their rich hymnography included. This seems a main reason why Sunday vespers and matins are not well-attended. For most American Greek Orthodox youngsters, liturgical Greek is a foreign language, because they hardly know the Greek tongue any longer (except for a few sentences in the vernacular like ‘Good morning’ and ‘How are you?’). In some places, courses of Ancient and Byzantine Greek, and Church Slavonic respectively, are offered, so that people can learn the old liturgical language form. However, reactions to this are mixed, and in this way the situation of the Greek and Russian Orthodox resembles that of the Syriac Orthodox and Armenian Apostolic Churches in the West, where since the twentieth century large numbers of Armenians, Syriac and Coptic Orthodox have migrated. Some youngsters there eagerly learn Grabar (Ancient Armenian) and Classical Syriac, but others resent learning the ancient worship tongues. The fact that these youngsters now live in a completely different, modern society where knowledge of Classical Syriac or Grabar seems useless contributes to their resistance. In many places, the third generation of immigrants has fully adapted to its new native country and sees no advantage in learning the languages of the region where their forebears came from, and the argument put forward by the clergy that Classical Syriac and Grabar connect them with their spiritual and cultural traditions and their ‘home countries’ does not convince them. It goes without saying that this has serious consequences for the comprehensibility of the prayers and hymns, if the liturgy is still celebrated in Ancient Armenian or Classical Syriac. However, the number of Syriac parishes in the West where English or another vernacular is used in the liturgy is increasing.20 For their part, Orthodox parishes, in which the majority consists of Western natives (often converts), use the vernacular. In Paris, for example, both the Patriarchate of Moscow and the Russian Orthodox Exarchate in Western Europe — an ecclesial structure created by Metro  The Liturgikon, ed. S. T. Kezios (Northridge CA, 1996), for instance.   As for the blend of liturgical languages in Australia, and problems similar to those in America, see T. Batrouney, ‘Orthodoxy in Australia: Current and Future Perspectives’, in The Orthodox Christian World (see n. 9), pp. 179-186, on pp. 182-183. 19

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politan Evlogy (Georgievsky, 1868-1946) in 1931 when he left the ­Moscow Patriarchate, because of its loyalty to the atheist regime of the Bolsheviks, and joined the Patriarchate of Constantinople — have French-speaking parishes. In Vienna, the Greek Orthodox cathedral began in 2016 celebrating the Divine Liturgy in German on Saturday evening, mainly for converts. In Flanders and the Netherlands, many communities celebrate in Dutch. Nevertheless, the effort to make use of the vernacular as liturgical language often confronts the Orthodox parishes with a dilemma. On the one hand, they wish to become rooted in their Western mother languages. On the other, they want to retain their Orthodox identity and be distinct from other Christian denominations. Some who are newcomers to Orthodoxy wish to gain their Orthodox identity — also in linguistic matters. Thus, in my opinion, in the translation of the Divine Liturgy they do not always use expressions that sound natural in the respective vernaculars, but create new words and expressions, mostly on the basis of Greek or Church Slavonic. As for the Netherlands, for example, one could hear the word ‘diakon’ instead of the familiar ‘diaken’ (deacon). Presently, a thorough revision of the Dutch Orthodox service books is ongoing, aiming at an official translation. Adequately translating ancient worship formularies into other languages is a difficult task: how to render the genius of Ancient Greek or Church Slavonic into that of modern English, French, and so on? Two extremes should be avoided: a literal translation risks becoming artificial, hard to understand, and a free translation risks dissociation from the original contents. (The Roman Catholic Church is faced with the same predicament in its translations from Latin worship texts into the numerous vernaculars.) The Russian-American Orthodox theologian Alexander Schmemann (1921-1983) argues in favor of translation as ‘re-creation’, a creative process which is loyal to the original text and, at the same time, a new production.21 Other linguistic challenges a translator is faced with are, first, inclusive language (widely used in the West), that is, a text that does justice to gender, second, the anti-Jewish statements in the Holy

21   A. Schmemann, ‘Problems of Orthodoxy in America. II: The Liturgical Problem’, St. Vladimir’s Seminary Quarterly, 8 (1964), pp. 164-185.

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Week services22 and, third, the statements against ‘heretics’ such as the Oriental Orthodox.23 The need to translate liturgical texts into Western vernaculars often facilitates reflection on renewal, which may be easier in the diaspora situation. Thus the Orthodox Church in America has revised its liturgy of the hours, allowing for, e.g., more Scripture readings and — a rare phenomenon in Eastern Christian worship — silence.24 Altogether, ­substantial parts of the Orthodox worship texts have been rendered in a solid number of Western vernaculars.25 Interestingly, some Catholics and Protestants attending a Russian Orthodox service held in Church Slavonic, a language they do not understand, feel that thus they can better experience God’s ‘mystery’. Linguistic unintelligibility fosters their ‘mystical’ experience. This makes me think of the Dutch classicist Christine Mohrmann (1903-1988), a noted expert in the field of Christian Latin and Greek. In her opinion, a sacred tongue is not about inter-human communication (which has to be clearly intelligible), but about the expression of a venerable religious-cultural tradition, therefore an ancient language form is preferable.26   See A. Ioniţă, ‘Byzantine Liturgical Texts and Modern Israelogy: Opportunities for Liturgical Renewal in the Orthodox Church’, Studia Liturgica, 44 (2014), pp. 151-162; M. G. Azar, ‘Prophetic Matrix and Theological Paradox: Jews and Judaism in the Holy Week and Pascha Observances of the Greek Orthodox Church’, Studies in ChristianJewish Relations, 10 (2015), pp. 1-27; B. G. Bucur, ‘Anti-Jewish Rhetoric in Byzantine Hymnography: Exegetical and Theological Contextualization’, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 61 (2017), pp. 39-60; B. Groen, ‘Anti-Judaism in the Present-Day Byzantine Liturgy’, Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 60 (2008), pp. 369-387, also published in Heretics and Heresies in the Ancient Church and in Eastern Christianity: Studies in Honour of Adelbert Davids, eds. J. Verheyden and H. Teule, Eastern Christian Studies, 10 (Louvain, 2011), pp. 369-387. 23   P. Sonntag, ‘Zur Übersetzung liturgischer Texte der orthodoxen Tradition in die deutsche Sprache’, in Orthodoxie in Deutschland (see n. 5), pp. 87-99. Sonntag also points to the challenge (for liturgical language) of the increase of the present-day image culture instead of word culture. 24   A Book of Prayers, ed. and trans. Monks of New Skete (Cambridge, 1988). See also Stelyios S. Muksuris, ‘And the Two Become One Text: Rethinking the Mutual Influence between Monastic and Cathedral Liturgy’, Worship, 90 (2016), pp. 551-569, on pp. 563569. 25   Let me also refer to the English translations made by the St. Tikhon’s Monastery, of which I give here a couple of examples: The Great Book of Needs, expanded and supplemented. 2: The Sanctification of the Temple and Other Ecclesiastical and Liturgical Blessings, translated from Church Slavonic with notes by St. Tikhon’s Monastery (South Canaan PA, 1998), pp. 210-213 (blessing of icons) and pp. 341-351 (vespers of Pentecost Sunday). 26   C. Mohrmann, Liturgical Latin: Its Origins and Character – Three Lectures (Washington DC, 1957), pp. 1-15, 83-90. 22



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4.  Sacred Music As I already indicated, sacred music constitutes a specific problem. It is not only difficult to adequately translate Armenian, Syriac, Greek, etc., liturgical texts into English and other vernaculars of the Western world, but also to compose high-quality musical settings for the hymns, which must now be chanted in a new vernacular. How to deal with the interconnectedness of text and melody? How to keep the rhythm and where to place the melismas in a way similar to the originals? Byzantine Greek and German, for example, are two different cultural worlds; this is also true of Armenian and English, Syriac and French, and so on. Syriac hymnody in Sweden, for example, where mainly since the 1970s many Syriac Orthodox found a new home, is performed differently (less ‘Oriental’) from that in Tur Abdin. This happens not by chance, but results from an effort to acculturate Syriac sacred music in the West.27 According to some critics, so far only few satisfying solutions have been found in this domain. Others think that considerable progress has been made. It deserves mention that, not only because of the worldwide Ecumenical Movement, but also owing to the Orthodox presence in the West, Western hymnals contain increasingly more Orthodox songs and melodies.28 In turn, some Greek Orthodox parishes use an electronic organ (although Byzantine chant is a cappella), have a polyphonic choir (consisting of both men and women), or practice congregational singing. Unlike practice in the native countries, prayers may be said aloud instead of inaudibly. This also shows how normal cross-fertilization is between different liturgical rites and cultures. It applies to iconography as well: Orthodox presence in the West fosters the lively interest many Western faithful take in Byzantine iconography, such an essential element of Byzantine-rite worship: courses of iconography flourish and in many Anglican, Catholic and Protestant churches one or more icons can be found. 27   For a fine example of a Coptic Orthodox parish in the USA, see M. Fassler, ‘Chanting and Children at St. Mark’s Orthodox Church, Jersey City’, in Inquiries into Eastern Christian Worship: Selected Papers of the Second International Congress of the Society of Oriental Liturgies, Rome, 17-21 September 2008, eds. B. Groen, S. Hawkes-Teeples and S. Alexopoulos, Eastern Christian Studies, 12 (Louvain, 2012), pp. 415-432. 28   See the respective remarks in my Aufstieg, Kampf und Freiheit: Nikos Kazantzakis, seine Asketik: Die Retter Gottes und die griechisch-orthodoxe spirituelle und liturgische Tradition, Studies on South East Europe, 18 (Berlin, 2015), pp. 94-100 (‘Ost-West“Transfer”’).

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The English musician John Tavener (1944-2013, conversion to Orthodoxy in 1977) composed the opera Mary of Egypt (1989) and­ choral works, whose text had been written by Mother Thekla (Sharf, 1918-2011),29 an Orthodox nun and woman of letters living in England. While the contents of these works are Orthodox, their style is Western because of the use of string instruments and polyphony. Mother Thekla also inspired Tavener to write his The Protecting Veil (1987), a clear reference to Mary’s veil protecting the Church and the world (покров, σκέπη), and together they wrote a spiritual book.30 A strictly liturgical work by Tavener is his The Divine Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom (1977). 5.  Liturgical Theology, Worship and Diakonia A most significant Orthodox contribution to both Western and Eastern theological thought is the liturgical theology developed by the aforementioned Alexander Schmemann, who taught in both Paris and New York. Such theology claims that liturgy is the major source of theology; worship is not an illustration of Orthodox theology, but its point of departure and its basis.31 Schmemann was influenced by the Western twentieth-century Liturgical Movement, that had also a great impact on the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy of the Second Vatican Council, Sacrosanctum Concilium (1964). In the opposite direction, Schmemann exercised major influence on Western liturgists like the Catholics Aidan Kavanagh (1929-2006), David Fagerberg (b. 1952), Reinhard Messner   A. Louth, Modern Orthodox Thinkers: From the Philokalia to the Present (Oxford, 2015), pp. 281-298. 30   J. Tavener and Mother Thekla, Ikons: Meditations in Words and Music (London, 1994). 31  Louth, Modern Orthodox Thinkers (see n. 29), pp. 194-213; J. Bräker, Kirche, Welt, Mission: Alexander Schmemann – Eine ökumenisch relevante Ekklesiologie, Kirche-Konfession-Religion, 60 (Göttingen, 2013); G. Basioudis, Ἡ δύναμη τῆς λατρείας: Ἡ συμβολή τοῦ π. Ἀλεξάνδρου Σμέμαν στή Λειτουργική Θεολογία (Athens, 2008); A. Nichols, Light from the East: Authors and Themes in Orthodox Theology (London, 1995), pp. 146-169; D. W. Fagerberg, ‘What Is Primary Theology (Good For)? The Challenging Legacy of Alexander Schmemann and Aidan Kavanagh’, in Mediating Mysteries, Understanding Liturgies: On Bridging the Gap between Liturgy and Systematic Theology, ed. J. Geldhof, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium, 278 (Louvain, 2015), pp. 231248; P. Galadza, ‘Twentieth-Century and Contemporary Orthodox Sacramental Theology’, in The Oxford Handbook of Sacramental Theology, eds. H. Boersma and M. Levering (Oxford, 2015), pp. 433-452, on pp. 441-443; D. Haspelmath-Finatti, Theologia prima: Liturgische Theologie für den evangelischen Gottesdienst (Göttingen, 2014), pp. 97-108. 29



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(b. 1960), Peter Galadza (b. 1955) and Thomas Pott (b. 1967) — the first three adhere to the Roman rite, the latter two to the Byzantine rite — as well as Geoffrey Wainwright (b. 1939, Methodist) and Gordon Lathrop (b. 1939, Lutheran).32 Concurrently, in both East and West, Schmemann impacted Orthodox theology itself. The emeritus professor of Orthodox theology in the University of Munster, Anastasios Kallis (b. 1934), for example, who has greatly contributed to Orthodox acculturation in Germany, stresses that all genuine Orthodox theology is liturgical.33 So, the rediscovery of the pivotal meaning of liturgical theology is a fine example of East-West mutual learning, the open-minded Orthodox theologian Schmemann (who was less open-minded in his negative analysis of Western culture) studying and teaching in the West and developing there, in colloquy with Catholic theologians and their ressourcement, his synthesis, and Western theologians learning from him.34 In spite of its importance, liturgical theology should not be isolated from other essential aspects of Christian life. Of utmost importance, also for Orthodoxy in the West, is the ‘liturgical triangle’, that is, first, the word of Scripture heard and explained in the sermon, catechesis and exegesis, second, God’s word celebrated in the entire worship service and, third, His Word lived out in diakonia, active charity and pastoral care. These three are inseparably interconnected.35 If these three forms of responding to the Word of God are separated, liturgy and liturgical   Cf. Basioudis, Ἡ δύναμη τῆς λατρείας (see n. 31), pp. 341-420.   See the assessment made in C. Papakonstantinou, ‘Anastasios Kallis: Ein “östlicher” Theologe im “Westen”’, in Die Orthodoxe Kirche: Eine Standortbestimmung an der Jahrtausendwende. Festgabe für Prof. Dr. Dr. Anastasios Kallis, eds. Evmenios von Levka, A. Basdekis and N. Thon (Frankfurt a.M., 1999), pp. 22-39, on pp. 24-29. On Kallis’ open attitude regarding Orthodox involvement in ecumenism and inter-ecclesiastical prayer, see, e.g., his Brennender, nicht verbrennender Dornbusch: Reflexionen ortho­ doxer Theologie, eds. I. and U. Kallis (Münster, 1999), pp. 497-516. 34   J. A. Jillions, ‘Orthodox Christianity in the West: The Ecumenical Challenge’, in The Cambridge Companion to Orthodox Christian Theology, eds. M. B. Cunningham and E. Theokritoff (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 276-291, on pp. 277-279, highlights the significance of mutual inter-ecclesiastical learning in theological debates. See also N. E. Denysenko, Liturgical Reform after Vatican II: The Impact on Eastern Orthodoxy (Minneapolis MN, 2015). 35  L.-M. Chauvet, Du symbolique au symbole: Essai sur les sacrements, Rites et ­symboles, 9 (Paris, 1979), pp. 81-122; B. J. Groen, ‘The Alliance between Liturgy and Diakonia as Witness of the Church: Theological Foundation and Several Examples’, in La liturgie comme témoin de l’Église: LVIIe Semaine d’Études Liturgiques, Institut SaintSerge, Paris, 28 juin–1 juillet 2010, eds. A. Lossky and M. Sodi, Monumenta Studia Instrumenta Liturgica, 66 (Vatican City, 2012), pp. 239-255; Die diakonale Dimension der Liturgie, eds. B. Kranemann and T. Sternberg, Quaestiones Disputatae, 218 (Freiburg i.B., 2006); A. Papaderos, ‘Aspekte orthodoxer Sozialethik’, in Perspektiven ökume­ 32

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theology risk becoming only navel-gazing. Paraphrasing the Romanian Orthodox theologian Ion Bria (1929-2002), one can say that there is also the ‘liturgy after the liturgy’ and the ‘liturgy before the liturgy’.36 It seems to me that in a host of Orthodox communities in the West these three levels are interconnected, that is, that liturgy, catechesis and diakonia are closely linked, thus constituting a place of communal care and identity. A fascinating (but in its radicalness rare) example of the interconnectedness of Orthodox worship and diakonia in the West is the Russian nun Maria Skobtsova (born as Lisa Pilenko in 1891, monastic vows in 1932, and killed in 1945 in the German concentration camp Ravensbruck). On the one hand, she held on to her monastic vows, on the other, she was most active in the fields of social care and charity. Love for God should primarily be charity and helping the distressed, she thought, and genuine asceticism should not exclusively focus on saving one’s own soul, doing penance and attending beautiful liturgical services, but it should leave from the church building and rigidly fixed worship rituals, as well as open up for the big world with its needs and misery. Until her arrest by the Gestapo she was involved in Paris in saving Jews from the Nazis. She engaged also intellectually with the powers of evil in that turbulent war period, doing so ecumenically in close contacts with members of other denominations. She prayed and acted, and was a thinker, writer and artist at the same time, debating, writing poetry, essays, stories and theater plays, as well as painting icons, frescos and ‘secular’ paintings.37 In her own Church, however, she remained an outsider, and many treated her coldly and rejected her. Nevertheless, the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church canonized her in 2004, her annual feast falling on July 20.38 nischer Sozialethik: Der Auftrag der Kirchen im größeren Europa, eds. I. Gabriel, A. Papaderos and U. Körtner (Mainz, 2005), pp. 23-126, on pp. 62-75, 38-39. 36   I. Bria, The Liturgy after the Liturgy: Mission and Witness from an Orthodox Per­ spective (Geneva, 1996). 37   P. Ladouceur, ‘The Saint as Artist: The Art of Saint Maria of Paris (Mother Maria Skobtsova) – The Making of a Poet-Artist’, Sobornost incorporating Eastern Churches Review, 36 (2014), pp. 48-72. 38  M. Plekon, ‘Sister Maria Skobtsova’, in Orthodox Handbook on Ecumenism: Resources for Theological Education – ‘That they all may be one’ (John 17:21), eds. P. Kalaitzidis, T. FitzGerald, C. Hovorun, A. Pekridou, N. Asproulis, D. Werner, G. Liagre, Regnum Studies in Global Christianity (Volos/Geneva/Oxford, 2014), pp. 243247; Louth, Modern Orthodox Thinkers (see n. 29), pp. 111-126; N. Denysenko, ‘Retrieving a Theology of Belonging: Eucharist and Church in Postmodernity’, Worship, 88 (2014), pp. 543-561; 89 (2015), pp. 21-43, on pp. 22-26.



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6. Corporality Language is important, yet only a part of the entire celebration. Other factors must also be taken into account: not only the above-mentioned architectural setting but also chant, iconography and other arts are key. On top of this there is the crucial dimension of corporality: anyone attending Eastern worship services and other religious rituals in Russia, Ukraine, Cyprus, Egypt, etc. can observe that the human body plays a most important part. Eastern liturgy is very sensory. Praying involves substantially the entire body: the faithful often make the sign of the cross, respectfully bow and prostrate, invoke in quick prayers the Mother of God, another favorite saint, or the Holy Trinity, participate in processions, light candles and kiss icons. Regrettably, the pews, a hallmark of many churches in the West, hinder free physical movement, make prostrations impossible, the once mobile congregation becoming immobile.39 I admit though that for a good number of faithful, especially the elderly, the pews are a great convenience, because they do not have to stand all the time (but enough choir stalls can solve this problem). Furthermore, also in North America and Western Europe, a great variety of social and geographical contexts and religious popular cultures exists. For black Orthodox migrants from Kenya and Tanzania, for example, to sway their bodies rhythmically, dance and clap their hands is common practice, whereas white Orthodox in Finland and Belgium may stand still all the time, thus expressing their devotion. Generally speaking, also in the West, for the greater part of the Orthodox believers, in principle, the essence of their faith is performing rituals, thus making corporality into ‘corpo-reality’ (Brigitte Enzner-Probst):40 the body, its gestures and ­postures are religious reality.41 For Eastern Christians, just as for a number of Roman Catholics, High-Church Anglicans and some other Western Christians, the liturgical rituals are not just external expressions of an internal faith, but are the faith itself. They do not symbolize religion, but 39   Thus also P. Galadza, ‘New Frontiers in Eastern Christian Liturgy: Studying the Whole of Worship’, in Rites and Rituals of the Christian East: Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress of the Society of Oriental Liturgy, Lebanon, 10-15 July 2012, eds. B. Groen, D. Galadza, N. Glibetic and G. Radle, Eastern Christian Studies, 22 (Louvain, 2014), pp. 1-19, on pp. 9-13. 40   B. Enzner-Probst, Frauenliturgien als Performance: Die Bedeutung von Corporea­ lität in der liturgischen Praxis von Frauen (Neukirchen, 2008). 41   However, once more: stationary seating, which can also be found in a number of Orthodox churches in the West, is a serious obstacle for free movement. Nevertheless, efforts to remove the pews usually make emotions run high.

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are religion. Believing is doing and enacting.42 In the eyes of other, ‘enlightened’ Western Christians not used to prostrate, cross themselves, light candles, kiss icons and relics, smell incense and go to places of pilgrimage and monasteries, all of this may look exotic, pre-modern, even non-biblical, and the Byzantine ceremonies may seem anachronistic to them. On the other hand, in a Protestant environment, Orthodox may become more aware of their own ‘corpo-reality’ than in their Eastern and Southeastern European homelands where confessional diversity exists to a much lesser degree. (In the Middle East, where more religious disparity exists, the situation is different.) Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox in the West observe how most Protestants, for instance, close their eyes while praying, whereas they themselves pray while lighting a candle, kissing the icon, crossing themselves. Another characteristic of many Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox services is their looseness and ability to improvise, this in contrast to the orderliness (sometimes felt as cold rigidness) of Protestant and Roman-rite Catholic worship. This diversity may also be an eye-opener for Protestants and other Christians who feel that their ‘sober’ way of worshipping can be enriched by the Orthodox tradition. They no longer have to travel to Greece, Romania or Russia to experience Orthodox worship, now they only have to go to another street so to say. In a good number of Western countries, the Netherlands and Belgium, for instance, for decades Byzantine-Slavonic Choirs and ­ priests with a Byzantine-rite training have organized celebrations that also Catholics and Protestants not raised in the Byzantine tradition attend, and in some Catholic bi-ritual monasteries, such as those of the Benedictines in Chevetogne (Belgium) and Niederaltaich (Germany), experiencing the Byzantine-Slavonic rite is possible. In Germany, once a year, an Orthodox liturgy is broadcasted on TV (ZDF), commented by an Orthodox theologian. Books written in Western native tongues inform their readership on Eastern worship. Also the internet has made the Orthodox presence in the West widely known, since many dioceses, parishes and groups have their own websites. Thus — an additional advantage — Western prejudice that Eastern worship is strange and exotic, all about incense, icons, ancient chants, as well as particular ethnic customs and feasts, can be reduced. On the other hand, community singing and the 42   J. Dubisch, In a Different Place: Pilgrimage, Gender, and Politics at a Greek Island Shrine (Princeton NJ, 1995), pp. 57-75. See also E. E. Uzukwu, Worship as Body Lan­ guage: Introduction to Christian Worship. An African Orientation (Collegeville MN, 1997), who claims that African communities express their faith through rituals and that the rituals performed by the human bodies reveal that faith.



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overall high quality of preaching, hallmarks of Protestant services, may result in more communal singing and better sermons in Orthodox liturgy. 7. Different Liturgical and Religious Cultures A major distinction between Orthodox liturgical life in the West and that in Greece, Cyprus, Russia, etc., is that in these former native countries, the church plays a specific role in daily public life, different from Western societies. Let me give some examples. The Great Friday procession and lamentations with mournful music, the stately reading of the resurrection gospel on a podium outside the church during the Easter vigil, the Paschal procession, and the annual festival of the local community’s patron saint, which includes eating and drinking, music and dancing, are social highlights, which in the West in most cases cannot be publically celebrated to the extent that they match practice in the former mother countries. Still another highlight concerns the Epiphany festival and the solemn blessing of the waters. Throwing the cross into a river on Epiphany is certainly possible in the West — many Orthodox communities do so — but it lacks the festive and massive character of the Epi­ phany festival in Cyprus and Greece, where brass bands precede the procession and a lot of politicians and other officials participate. Further, until recently, the majority of Greek couples preferred to be married in church instead of conducting a civil marriage, whereas in many Western countries couples first have to go to the town hall and can only afterwards celebrate the wedding service. Now, however, in Greece too, most couples prefer civic marriage, which is cheaper, an important factor in the country’s current economic crisis; this phenomenon shows also how quickly Greek religious culture is changing. Additionally, whereas in Greek classrooms, courts and public offices, icons are ubiquitous, and in buses the driver pins up not only pictures of his soccer heroes but also icons and images of his favorite saints, in the West this is either not done or much less so. In some countries, Austria, for example, in court one still sees a crucifix, but this has become a matter of dispute. Concurrently, a number of drivers have a picture of St. Christopher in their car. Another item concerns funerals, which according to Orthodox regulation must conclude with interment. In the West, the Orthodox Church, convinced that cremation is both physically and spiritually destructive and therefore forbidding its members to have their dead bodies burnt, is faced with the hard fact that here cremation is rather common, and this may

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‘entice’ Orthodox to do the same. Furthermore, in the Byzantine-rite ­ceremony, the coffin is open, and at the end of the service the attendees approach the deceased for the ‘last kiss’. In several Western countries, such as France, however, an open coffin is forbidden (but in Greek cities, the open coffin is also becoming a rare phenomenon). In addition, the Greek practice of exhumation, that is, digging up the bones of the deceased after three to five years, cleaning them and putting them into an ossuary, is now hardly practiced in the West.43 All of this brings about another experience of the liturgical year and main life passages. Another difference concerns monastic life. Retreating from the busy world, living within a monastic community, or attending the liturgy in a monastery, is a feature of Orthodoxy. However, in the West considerably fewer Orthodox monasteries than in Serbia, Romania, Greece or Russia can be found. Nevertheless, various Orthodox monastic houses in the West not only show Orthodox presence in the West, but play a major role in renewal of Orthodox spirituality and liturgy. Conspicuous examples of this are the monastery of St. John the Baptist in Tolleshunt Knights in Essex, Great Britain, founded in 1959; the convent of the Protecting Veil of the Mother of God in Bussy-en-Othe in Burgundy, France, founded in 1946; and the convent of the Birth of the Mother of God in Asten, the Netherlands, founded in 1989. As for the presence of Oriental Orthodoxy in Western Europe, ground-breaking examples are the monasteries of St. Ephrem in Glane, the Netherlands, inaugurated in 1984, and St. Antony in Kröffelbach, Germany, founded in 1980, which are Syriac and Coptic respectively. The New Skete community in the federal state of New York, which adheres to the Orthodox Church in America, consists of both monks and nuns, as well as married couples and several singles.44 In most of these monastic houses, the community is international, and significant translation work of Greek and Church Slavonic liturgical texts into Western vernaculars takes place. Another feature are iconography ateliers. Some monasteries and convents possess an ecumenical openness, attractive to Western visitors, others emphasize their Orthodox mission in a ‘heterodox’ and ‘secular’ world, while only promoting relations with other Orthodox monasteries and not pursuing contacts with other Christian denominations, although the latter are the age-old local churches. 43   See my ‘“Burying the Dead Is Christian, Burning Them Is Pagan”: The Present Controversy about Cremation in Greece and Greek Orthodox Funeral Rites’, Het Christelijk Oosten, 53 (2001), pp. 201-218. 44   https://newsketemonast1.godaddysites.com (accessed 17 July 2017).



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The veneration of saints constitutes an essential element of Orthodox liturgy and religious popular culture. Of course, celebrating the feast of St. Demetrius in Brussels differs from doing so in Thessalonica, where the saint’s shrine is, processions are held, and even an entire preparatory week takes place.45 A dilemma for many Orthodox is the question of what to do with Western saints. Some communities neglect them ­altogether, whereas others celebrate only Western saints who flourished before 1054. Thus, in England, Venerable Bede (672/73-735) and ­Cuthbert of Lindisfarne (ca. 635-687) and, in France, St. Genevieve (419/22-502/12) and other saints are commemorated, whereas in the Netherlands, several Orthodox celebrate the feast of St. Willibrord (d. 739) on November 7 and go on a pilgrimage to the saint’s grave in Echternach, Luxemburg. However, they do not celebrate saints flourishing after 1054. This seems to me ambiguous, given the fact that the year 1054 can hardly be called the pre-eminent and decisive date for the schism between Byzantine and Latin Christianity. (In the Byzantine archives from that period, the row is not mentioned. Relationships between Constantinople and Rome were resumed, and Latin and Greek believers continued to attend one another’s services for a long time. It is later, painful events — especially the sack and occupation of Constantinople by Western crusaders, the establishment of the Latin Empire there, and the forced replacement of the Greek ecclesiastical hierarchy with a Latin one — that deepened the rift and sealed it with hate. Only then some remembered the 1054 conflict and began to think that this had caused the schism.) On the other hand, sometimes pan-Christian saints from the first millennium are turned into exclusively Orthodox saints; Sts. Cyril and Methodius, for example, are venerated in some Orthodox communities as their own property. St. Francis is a dubious case: some Orthodox communities overlook him, others acknowledge his sainthood, and even on Mount Athos a spiritual father told me that for him St. Francis was a great saint. In the afore-mentioned New Skete community, in celebration of the annual festival of the medieval saint from Assisi, a special service for the blessing of animals is celebrated. In some Orthodox iconography, such as in the New Skete and the Romanian church in Vienna, also second millennium Catholic saints are depicted. In addition, in Austria many Orthodox go on pilgrimage to Mariazell, a major Roman Catholic shrine where a miraculous statue of the Mother of God is vener45   I. M. Foundoulis, ‘Μεγάλη Ἑβδομάς’ τοῦ Ἁγίου Δημητρίου, Κείμενα Λειτουργικῆς, 17 (Thessalonica, 1978).

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ated, and the former Metropolitan of Austria and Exarch of Hungary, Michael Staikos (1946-2011, in office 1991-2011), often prayed in front of that statue. Clearly, Orthodox liturgy is part of a religious culture, which encompasses much more than only Eucharist, other sacraments, and liturgy of the hours. The daily lives of Orthodox believers are also sanctified by means of other rituals, e.g., many blessings (of people, houses, schools, oil, herbs, etc.) and supplication services. In addition to official ecclesiastical worship, there are numerous rituals and customs performed at home, such as anointing and secret prayers against the ‘evil eye’, ubiquitous in the Mediterranean cultures. In difficult situations of their lives many people say and sing litanies and quick prayers. In everyday life, in particular in the country, there are also magic practices and exorcisms, and some people wear amulets, apotropaic maxims and other objects to fend off the ‘evil eye’. In the modernized Western world, these customs either live on — in a Dutch Serbian Orthodox parish, for instance, Roma continue to bid the priest for exorcisms to expel evil spirits and purify their homes — or they undergo change, even fade away. Such (fundamental) change generally results from sociocultural East-West differences. Whereas in the faithful’s lives in their former homelands factors such as family, forebears, region, village or city played a major role, in the Western world these factors acquire a different meaning: instead of an agrarian society one now belongs to an urban and industrialized society, where the nucleus family is the center of attention, far more than the big family, including cousins, great-uncles etc., additionally the family members may be scattered all over the world, and the technological ­revolution, secularized world views and multiform philosophies of life impact Eastern and Oriental Christians as well. Additionally, in the West, where gender equality is more practiced than in traditional Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox communities, women may act as custodians, altar servers, choir members and church council members, offices they would probably not hold in their former home countries. On the other hand, especially for Roman Catholics, it is an eye-opener that during the service the priest’s wife and their children attend. The children may assist their father, preceding him with a burning candle during the Little and Great Entrances, for example, and the priest’s wife often coordinates other important parish activities. This experience is illuminating for those Roman Catholics who think that celibacy is required for presiding in the Eucharist (although their Church fully ­recognizes the validity of the sacraments of holy orders in the Orthodox



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and Oriental Orthodox Churches, and also Ukrainian Greek-Catholics, Melkites and other Eastern Catholics have married clergy). Furthermore, a number of customs and liturgical texts may be recognized as discriminatory for women. Let me give a conspicuous example. At the beginning of the third millennium, in Balkan states with a mainly Orthodox population, many mothers — especially in the country, less so in the cities — still stick to the ‘churching’ ritual (Greek: σαραντισμός, fortieth-day ritual). First, the priest usually reads four prayers in the narthex. The first and second prayers ask ‘to cleanse the woman from sin and the stains of body and soul’.46 (The second prayer also asks for the blessing of the child.) In the third and fourth prayers, which are older than the first two, growth, protection and the blessing of the child are the central themes. These two prayers also refer to the events of Jesus’ presentation in the temple (Lk. 2:22-38). Thereafter, just as Simeon carried the Infant Jesus, the priest blesses the child, takes it into his arms, goes into the nave and presents the child to God. Boys are carried around the altar, girls stay outside. This discrimination of sexes has occurred ever since the sixteenth century; it was also possible that girls were only carried around three quarters of the altar (not on the front side). Most Euchologia from the Byzantine period, however, do not make a distinction between the sexes. Not only the present-day churching ritual but also the Orthodox prayers ‘for the new mother’ used nowadays stress the uncleanliness and sin of the new mother.47 However, Anastasios Kallis, whom we already mentioned, has raised protests. In his opinion, the faith of the Church is deformed and mothers are rudely insulted by these prayers, and therefore, in his edition of the prayers at the occasion of the birth of a child, gratefulness and asking for blessing are the main themes. Thus, in Kallis’ edition of the ritual of going to church after forty days, the ‘defilement of the body and the impurity of the soul’ of the new mother is out of the question.48 According to the prominent Greek liturgist Ioannis Foundoulis (1927-2007), too, it is not the physical functions of the human body but dead works which make a person unclean.49   Mικρὸν Eὐχολόγιον ἤ Ἁγιασματάριον (Athens, 182009), pp. 43-50, esp. pp. 44-46.   Ibid., pp. 33-38. 48   See his Ἀκολουθία τοῦ Βαπτίσματος τῆς Ὀρθοδόξου Ἐκκλησίας – Taufgottesdienst der Orthodoxen Kirche: Griechisch – Deutsch, Doxologie, 3 (Münster, 1999), pp. ix-xiii, 2-39 (quotation: p. x). 49   I. M. Foundoulis, Ἀπαντήσεις εἰς λειτουργικὰς ἀπορίας, IV (301-400) (Thessalonica, 1982), p. 238. Cf. id., Ἀπαντήσεις εἰς λειτουργικὰς ἀπορίας, III (Athens, 32002), pp. 222225; P. I. Skaltsis, ‘Λοχεία καὶ καθαρότητα τῆς γυναίκας: Ἀναφορά στὶς σχετικὲς 46 47

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In the West, many a priest does no longer distinguish between boys and girls in performing the ‘churching’ ritual. Nonetheless, living in the West alone does not warrant adaptation of the problematic ritual in question, as is clear from the view held by Konstantinos Kallinikos (18701940), a learned priest who from 1904 ministered to the Greek Orthodox in Manchester, England. He does not protest but discerns four ‘moods’ that in his opinion are characteristic of the churching ritual: the need for cleansing from physical and spiritual uncleanliness, gratitude for the birth of a child, thankfulness that the mother has been saved, and the need for divine protection.50 However, times were different when he held office, and in his Church then there was far less attention for the position of women and new mothers, although much work remains to be done in this respect. At any rate, the focus on gender equality, typical of many Western settings, results in critical questions on Orthodox rituals like the one just mentioned. Generally speaking, in the West questions regarding marriage and sexuality, such as gay marriage, transgender, premarital sex, cohabitation and extramarital relations, are discussed in a free way, and in several Western countries gay marriage is legal. In a solid number of Eastern Christian communities this causes debate on the existing norm (sex is to take place exclusively within marriage, which has been instituted to join a man and a woman) and results in both critical reflection on one’s own traditions and polarization between pro- and opponents of ‘liberalization’.51 8. Calendar For worldwide Orthodoxy, indeed for all Christian denominations, the calendar is of primary importance.52 Regarding the fixed annual feasts, several Orthodox Churches, such as the Patriarchates of Constantinople, εὐχὲς τῆς Ἐκκλησίας’, in id., Λειτουργικὲς Μελέτες, II (Thessalonica, 2009), pp. 343-365 [also published in Synaxȇ, 77 (2001), pp. 70-86], here pp. 353-354. 50  K. Kallinikos, Ὁ Χριστιανικὸς Ναὸς καὶ τὰ τελοῦμενα ἐν αὐτῷ, Ἅπαντα Κωνσταντίνου Καλλινίκου, 7 (Athens, 31969; first edition: Alexandria, 1921), pp. 379380. 51   See, e.g., the frank statements in N. Denysenko, ‘Pastoral Principles for Orthodox Clergy in America’, in Church and World: Essays in Honor of Michael Plekon, ed. W. C. Mills (Rollinsford NH, 2013), pp. 29-54, on pp. 48-54. 52   This section is grounded in my study ‘How Long It Was and How Far’: A Catholic and Ecumenical View on the Arduous Way to a Common Easter Date, Allgemeine Wissen­ schaftliche Reihe, 35 (Graz, 2013).



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Alexandria, Antioch and Romania, as well as the Churches of Cyprus and Greece, have adopted the ‘Meletian’ calendar, or the revised Julian time reckoning, that is, a somewhat improved version of the Gregorian calendar. The Meletian calendar, named after Patriarch Meletios IV (Meta­ xakis) of Constantinople (1871-1935, in office 1921-1923), who was highly involved in this issue, is a blend calendar, combining the Gregorian time calculation with the determination of Easter according to the Julian calendar. However, other Orthodox Churches, especially the Patriarchates of Jerusalem, Russia and Serbia, the Catholicosate of Georgia, as well as Ukrainian and Polish Orthodoxy, have not adopted this calendar revision but hold on to the Julian time reckoning, the fixed annual feasts included. There are also Orthodox Churches in which some groups use the new calendar — some only for the fixed festivals, others also for the Easter cycle — and others the old, coexisting without schism. The Orthodox Church in America and several Russian and Polish Orthodox parishes in the Western world adhere to the Gregorian calendar for the immovable cycle. The Church of Finland has adopted the Gregorian calendar in toto. In that way Orthodox Finns celebrate Great Friday and Easter on the same days as the Lutherans. So, in present-day multidenominational Finland one observes the joyous phenomenon that nearly all Christian denominations perform the Paschal rites together, an exception being a small Russian Orthodox community which celebrates the Easter cycle together with the Moscow Patriarchate. (Most Russian Orthodox living in Finland, however, celebrate Easter in Russian-speaking communities under the auspices of the Orthodox Church of Finland, at the same time as the Orthodox Finns.) Currently, the Julian calendar ‘lags’ thirteen days behind the Gregorian, while in 2100 the difference will become fourteen days. So, nearly all Byzantine-rite Orthodox Churches, with the sole exception of the Church of Finland and several small communities in the Western world, which follow the Gregorian calendar in toto, celebrate the Paschal cycle on the same dates. In several countries, the Netherlands for example, on the first Sunday of Great Lent, the Sunday of Orthodoxy, all Orthodox bishops of different jurisdictions concelebrate and thus strengthen inter-Orthodox cooperation. The greater part of the Oriental Orthodox (Coptic, Eritrean, Ethiopian, Syriac, and many Armenian communities) also adheres to the Julian ­calendar. The Armenian Apostolic Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin, however, has adopted (1924) the Gregorian calendar in toto. Furthermore, often with the consent of their mother Churches, some Coptic, Ethiopian and Syriac Orthodox congregations in the West have also adopted the

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Gregorian calendar. For its part, the Assyrian Catholic Church of the East (which outsiders often call ‘Nestorian’) remains divided on the calendar issue. The decision taken by Mar Simon in 1964 to accept the Gregorian calendar caused great controversy and even schism. Presently, some Assyrian communities hold to the Julian reckoning, while others have adopted the Gregorian. So, interestingly the Oriental Orthodox and the Assyrians employ either the Julian or the Gregorian calendar in toto, rather than a compromise such as the Meletian. Altogether the Western Churches usually celebrate the Paschal cycle on different dates than most Orthodox and many Oriental Orthodox do. There are, however, years when both Paschal cycles coincide, this has again happened in 2017, and then eight years will pass before a ‘unified’ Pascha can again be celebrated in 2025. Especially in confessionally mixed families, the calendrical disparity leads to conflicting time ­schedules and different menus: whereas some are already feasting, others are still fasting, and whereas for some students Christmas and Easter fall in their Christmas and Easter vacations respectively, for others this is not so. The astounding complexity of the calendrical conundrum can also be grasped by considering the case of one of the most important feasts of the immoveable calendar, namely, Christmas, in many Western countries the emotional and commercial highlight of the year. In Austria, for instance, the Western Churches and the Greek and Romanian Orthodox celebrate the Birth of Christ according to the Gregorian calendar on December 25, so that for the great majority of Christians in that country Christmas falls on the same day. The Russian and Serbian Orthodox, as well as most Oriental Orthodox living in Austria, however, celebrate Christmas on January 7, which for them, of course, corresponds with the Julian reckoning December 25.53 The Armenians, for their part, still celebrate the original Eastern Christian Epiphany feast — a combination of Christmas and Epiphany — on January 6, when the Western Christians and the Greek and Romanian Orthodox commemorate (only) Jesus’ ­baptism. The Russian and Serbian Orthodox enact the Epiphany rituals with their impressive Great Water Blessing on January 19. The road to a common pan-Christian Easter date is thorny and arduous. In addition to key factors as identity, custom and tradition, some Ortho  Cf. J. A. McGuckin’s pertinent remark in his lemma ‘Calendar’, in The Encyclo­ pedia of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, ed. id. (Chichester, 2011), pp. 95-97, on p. 96. 53



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dox communities in the West insist on being the true Orthodox and being distinctive: different from other Christian communities which they tend to regard as heretics and/or schismatics. Salvation of souls can only ­happen in their own Orthodox Church, hence any dialogue with other denominations is a ‘rotten compromise’ and active resistance to ecumenism and calendar revision is considered true Orthodoxy. Even if a common Easter date is not ‘devised’ by ‘heretical ecumenists’ but rather a natural consequence of the occasional coinciding of the Julian and ­Gregorian computations, it resembles an illegitimate adoption of the ‘Western’ calendar and treason to the authentic Orthodox tradition. Of course, in the Orthodox Churches in the West, also many hierarchs, priests and theologically trained laypeople can be found who know the traditions of other faith communities well and stand for dialogue and ecumenical open-mindedness. Several serious proposals to find a way out of the calendrical labyrinth have been made. The Aleppo Statement from 1997 recommends (a) maintaining the norms established by the First Council in Nicaea, according to which Easter must fall on the Sunday following the first full moon of spring, and (b) calculating the necessary astronomical data (spring equinox and full moon) by the most accurate possible scientific means, using the Jerusalem meridian as the basis for reckoning. This lucid Statement has explicitly been supported by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity and many other Christian communities. The ‘North American Orthodox-Catholic Theological Consultation’ has warmly welcomed the Statement’s recommendations and wholly accepts them. Two other proposals have been, first, an appointed date (every year Easter falls on the same date) and, second, provisional acceptance by Western Christianity of the Julian reckoning of the Easter date, while for the fixed feasts the West would hold on to the Gregorian calendar. In the Middle East and the Balkans, the second proposal has resulted in some partial, regional solutions. All in all though, so far no encompassing agreement has been reached. A disputed item such as calendar reform and the pursuit of a common Paschal date for all Churches risks becoming just a pawn on the chessboard of the confrontation between ‘anti-modernists’ and ‘ecumenists’. Hence, the confusing use of different liturgical calendars for the same feasts, including the Western world, continues, hopefully not ‘ad calendas graecas’ (‘till hell freezes over’).

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9. Orthodox Use of Ancient Western Liturgies Interestingly, small groups of Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox (mainly Copts and some Syriac Orthodox) wishing to take root in the Western world, as well as some Roman Catholics, Episcopalians and Lutherans, disaffected with reform in their own Churches and having converted to Orthodoxy, celebrate Western liturgies. The Antiochian Western Rite Vicariate mainly uses either the Divine Liturgy of St. Tichon, derived from Anglican service books, or a revised version of the ‘Tridentine’ Roman Missal, now called the Divine Liturgy of St. Gregory. The latter is celebrated without the filioque, while a Byzantine epiclesis has been added to the Canon Romanus. In addition, on the Sunday after Pentecost (All Saints according to the Byzantine rite), not on Pentecost itself, ­Trinity Sunday, such an important festival in the history of the Latin West, is celebrated. A major difficulty seems to me that the ‘Tridentine’ Roman Missal is grounded in an ecclesiology characterized by the monopoly of Latin and the private mass, as well as by the distance between clergy and people, and this can hardly be called Orthodox. Furthermore, in France, the Église Orthodoxe de France employs ­ a reconstruction of the Gallican liturgy from the first millennium (with Byzantine additions), when the Church supposedly was undivided. The subject of Western Rite Orthodoxy is controversial: ‘pure’ Byzantine-rite Orthodox wonder why those people do not become fully Orthodox, and ‘pure’ Roman Catholics, Anglicans and Protestants denounce alleged Orthodox uniatism.54 On the one hand, converts may bring new insights with them, enrich their new Church and serve as bridges between their former confession and Orthodoxy. A fine example is the former Anglican and now Orthodox Metropolitan Kallistos Ware of Diokleia (b. 1934), whose publications and lectures contribute to more knowledge and better understanding between Eastern and Western Christianity.55 On the other, some converts idealize Orthodoxy and prevent necessary change. In the USA, for example, a lot of converts are opposed to girls as altar servers, because an 54   For a critical discussion, see J. Turner, ‘Western Rite Orthodoxy as a Liturgical Problem’, Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 63 (2011), pp. 333-352; C. Simon, ‘Western Rite Orthodoxy’, in Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Christian East, ed. E. G. Farrugia (Rome, 22015), pp. 1916-1924. 55   See, e.g., Louth, Modern Orthodox Thinkers (see n. 29), pp. 332-348; Abba: The Tradition of Orthodoxy in the West. Festschrift for Bishop Kallistos, eds. J. Behr, A. Louth and D. Conomos (Crestwood NY, 2003).



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important reason why they joined Orthodoxy was their dissatisfaction with feminism and women priests, and their longing for a Church where this ‘plague’ had no chance. But in that way they obstruct any respective discussion in the Orthodox Church and reinforce traditionalism there.56 For them, only Orthodoxy is now the true faith, and they tend to draw clear distinctive lines with ‘schismatic/heretic’ Western Christianity, to which they once belonged. Also some Western liturgical scholars concentrating on official texts, the contents of the official service books, acquire an idealized image of Eastern liturgy and tend to identify the ideal with actual practice. If this tendency is coupled with disappointment about developments in one’s own Church, Eastern worship may be even more idealized. This is the case with several Roman Catholic theologians who reject the implementation of the liturgical reform initiated by the Second Vatican Council and extol ‘unchangeable’ Orthodox worship and its ‘mystical’ character, which they like to place in glaring contrast to the ‘rational’ character of Roman Catholic and Protestant worship. An example thereof is the oeuvre of the German theologian Klaus Gamber (1919-1989).57 There are also Orthodox, Oriental Orthodox and Byzantine Catholic theologians who think that way. From this perspective, Roman Catholic and Protestant worship is just ‘anthropocentric’, ‘subjective’ and ‘rationalistic’, whereas Byzantine liturgy is ‘theocentric’, ‘objective’ and ‘mystical’. In Western worship, humans are the center of attention, but in Eastern it is God! In my opinion, if one would seriously try to examine what life in an average Orthodox parish or family really looks like, the image of the Eastern Churches would probably be less glamorous and more realistic; the actual East-West divide might be smaller. According to the Roman Catholic theologian Johannes Oeldemann (b. 1964), Orthodox ideals must be compared with Catholic ideals, Orthodox reality with Catholic reality, not, as is often the case, Orthodox ideals with Catholic reality (then Orthodoxy always ‘wins’).58 Robert Daly, a Jesuit ecumenist and liturgist (b. 1933), agrees with this view but, comparing the ideal   Cf. ‘American Orthodox Christianity’, The CARA Report, 14 (2009), 3, p. 6.   J. Baldovin, ‘Klaus Gamber and the Post-Vatican II Reform of the Roman Liturgy’, Studia Liturgica, 33 (2003), pp. 223-239. 58   J. Oeldemann, ‘Die Komplementarität der Traditionen: Grundlagen, Problemfelder und Perspektiven des ökumenischen Dialogs mit der Orthodoxie’, Catholica, 56 (2002), pp. 44-67, on pp. 66-67. A similar statement in A. J. van der Aalst, ‘Het palamisme: Geschiedenis en methode – II. Methode’, Het Christelijk Oosten, 31 (1979), pp. 20-41, on p. 40. 56 57

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experiences of Eastern and Western liturgical styles, he does discern a major difference between the two, the Western one being on its way towards heaven, the Eastern one already being there.59 I advocate also that the center of attention be the actual celebration itself and the context in which it takes place.60 Besides ‘prescribed faith’, ‘lived faith’ has to be on the research agenda. Epilogue Unlike what some people think or wish to think, the Byzantine rite is not static but dynamic. Just as the Roman rite, the Byzantine rite and other Oriental rites have incorporated various elements that originate in other traditions. There are neither pure Western, nor pure Eastern rites. The presence of so many Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox in the West entails alterations in their liturgies and religious popular cultures. This is a natural process: life means change, and change means life. Hence, enculturation is a necessity of life itself, in spite of reluctance in some communities (‘we will hold on to our own traditions in a foreign environment’). In the Byzantine-rite Eucharist, the choir sings after communion: ‘We have seen the true light, we have received the heavenly Spirit, we have found the true faith, we worship the undivided Trinity for having saved us’. Despite all disparity and the need to adapt to and take root in their new cultural environment, for Orthodox in the West, as well as for other Christians, these words continue to express their faith and confirm their identity, whether new or not, against all odds of alienation and acculturation challenges, and guide them in both East and West, on their way to the real homeland,61 knowing that in the liturgy, too, ‘all things come from you [God] and of your own we give you’ (cf. 1 Chr 29:14-16). 59   R. J. Daly, ‘Contrasting Liturgical Styles, East and West’, in Christianity East and West (see n. 9), pp. 17-37, esp. pp. 25-37. 60   T. Berger, ‘Die Sprache der Liturgie’, in Handbuch der Liturgik: Liturgiewissen­ schaft in Theologie und Praxis der Kirche, eds. H.-C. Schmidt-Lauber, M. Meyer-Blanck and K.-H. Bieritz (Göttingen, 32003), pp. 798-806, on p. 802, states: ‘Die liturgische Rede ist im Kern … vor allem Vollzug, Handlung, Redegeschehen. Bei einem Blick auf liturgische Texte nähert man sich deshalb nur einem kleinen Teil der Wirklichkeit der Sprache der Liturgie’. Cf. ibid., p. 805. 61  Cf. Letter to the Philippians (Phil 3:20), Letter to the Hebrews (Heb 11:8-16 and 13:14), First Letter of Peter (1 Pet 2:11) and the second-century Letter to Diognetus (V). See The Greek New Testament, eds. K. Aland et al. (Stuttgart, 31984), pp. 689, 770-771, 777, 795; À Diognète, ed. H. I. Marrou, Sources Chrétiennes, 33bis (Paris, 21965), pp. 62-65.

LITURGY IN THE LIFE OF THE EASTERN CATHOLIC CHURCHES IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE UKRAINIAN GRECO-CATHOLIC CHURCH Daniel Galadza

Introduction When addressing challenges and opportunities for Eastern and Oriental Churches in the West in the twenty-first century, it has, unfortunately, become quite common to count the Eastern Catholic Churches as precisely one of the challenges for the life of the Orthodox Churches, even at meetings of theologians and Church hierarchy who are responsible for Eastern Catholics. Regardless, Eastern Catholics have a significant presence in the West — whether historically or in the present, as a result of conflicts in their homelands and because of migration. Thus, it is ­crucial to consider these Churches in the discussions about the future of Eastern Christians in the West. At the same time, the topic and conclusions of this essay can be of use to all Eastern Orthodox, Oriental Orthodox, and Eastern Catholic Christians that currently find themselves in the West. The historical ­circumstances in which most Eastern Catholic Churches arose left certain divisions within the societies of each of those Churches, meaning that people of specific ethnicities or nationalities — and even single families — were divided between these Churches. This is especially felt in countries of the Middle East, such as Syria and Lebanon, where Antiochene Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, and Melkite and Maronite Eastern Catholic Christians are close neighbors, and in Eastern Europe, where Orthodox and Eastern Catholics live side by side. Because of wars and difficult circumstances in many regions of Eastern Christianity, many of these Christians were forced to migrate to the West, often together, bringing with them their faith and traditions — as well as their unresolved ­problems from their homelands. Questions of liturgical practice and more ‘Easternizing’ or more ‘Latinizing’ trends often took on another meaning once Eastern Catholic communities were established in the West.

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Yet another problem added in the process of migration were questions of assimilation, inculturation, and integration. Because liturgy can express how a given community understands itself and its relationship to God and the world, the liturgical life of the Eastern Catholic Churches in the West reveals how these problem were addressed by the Church, and where it looked for examples and solutions. Do Eastern Catholic Churches in the West see themselves as a ‘Diaspora’ and an appendage to their ‘mother Church’ in their homeland? Or do they understand themselves as bearers of their particular, native tradition that is now found in a new world for which they must also be a local Church? This essay considers some of these questions while examining aspects of Eastern Catholic liturgical life in Western Europe and North America. Because there are today twenty-three Eastern Catholic Churches, each with its own history and context, this paper focuses particularly on one of the largest of these Churches, the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church, focusing on the situation of its eparchies and parishes in the West.1 An overview of the theoretical guidelines provided in Church documents from the Second Vatican Council until the present day, and an examination of their practical implementation in the West, along with a case study of two parishes — one in Italy and one in Canada — can provide some broad conclusions that are also applicable to other Eastern Catholic Churches and give insights into the future direction of aspects of liturgical practice among all Eastern Churches in the West. 1.  Historical Background: Eastern Catholic Churches Broadly speaking, the genesis of Eastern Catholic Churches, arising from a desire among local Churches to reunite with Rome, often occurred under difficult political circumstances, which meant that the sought-after union usually resulted in more division.2 The initial uniformity of liturgical practice and theology between the resulting Eastern Catholic Churches and their Orthodox counterparts was lost over the course of history due to specific contexts. The geographic homeland of many Eastern Catholic   Annuario Pontificio per l’anno 2017 (Vatican City, 2017), pp. 3-10.   See P. Galadza, ‘Eastern Catholic Christianity’, in Blackwell Companion to Eastern Christianity, ed. K. Parry (Oxford, 2007), pp. 291-318; A. O’Mahony, ‘Introduction: The Historical and Contemporary Context’, Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 67 (2015), pp. 237-241; R. F. Taft, ‘The Problem of “Uniatism” and the “Healing of Memories”: Anamnesis, Not Amnesia’, Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 41-42 (20002001), pp. 155-196. 1 2



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Churches, between very strong forces of Eastern and Western culture had its impact on liturgy in the form of ‘Latinizing’ versus ‘Easternizing’ or ‘Byzantinizing’ factions, tendencies, and trends3 — something common in the history of all Eastern Catholic Churches from the sixteenth century onwards, whether the Syro-Malabar and Syro-Malankara Churches in India or the Ukrainian and Ruthenian Churches in Eastern Europe.4 Nevertheless, lumping all Eastern Catholic Churches together, as is the case with the common code of canon law promulgated by the Holy See for all Eastern Catholic Churches, does not recognize the unique histories which led to the present day. Turning to the example of Byzantine Rite Catholics in Eastern Europe and to the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church specifically, we can divide their history into three very broad periods. 1.1.  From the Sixteenth Century to the Second Vatican Council Orthodox Christians finding themselves within the Catholic PolishLithuanian Commonwealth, and with limited contact to the Mother Church of Constantinople, gradually joined Rome in various church unions during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.5 Between the Union of Brest in 1596 and the Second Vatican Council, local GrecoCatholic councils and synods sought to strengthen the Catholic identity of Greco-Catholics. In many cases, however, being Catholic was associated with being Roman Catholic of the Latin Rite; differences between the Roman and other rites were tolerated, but not always accepted or fostered.6 The 1720 Greco-Catholic Synod of Zamość ordered that the Filioque be added to the Creed, both in public and private, and anyone who omitted it was to be reported to their local bishop on suspicion of being Orthodox. The same Synod also forbade the practice of infant  Introduction to Churches In-between: Greek Catholic Churches in Postsocialist Europe, eds. S. Mahieu and V. Naumescu, Halle Studies in the Anthropology of Eurasia, 16 (Berlin, 2008), p. 4. For Bishop Gregory Khomyshyn’s tractate against ‘Byzantinism’, see P. Galadza, The Theology and Liturgical Work of Andrei Sheptytsky (1865-1944), Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 272 (Rome, 2004), pp. 473-497. 4   The Code of Particular Canons of the Syro-Malankara Catholic Church (Trivandrum/Kerala, 2012), pp. xiii-xiv. 5   For the first of these church unions, see B. A. Gudziak, Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest (Cambridge MA, 2001). 6   See L. D. Huculak, The Divine Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom in the Kievan Metropolitan Province during the Period of the Union with Rome (1596-1839), Analecta OSBM, Series II, Sectio I (Rome, 1990), p. 73. 3

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communion.7 Liturgical books from the nineteenth century, such as the Typikon of Fr. Isidore Dolnytsky, codified other Latin practices, instructing clergy how to perform processions with the Holy Eucharist on Good Friday, how to do Eucharistic adorations and processions for the parish feast day, and how to celebrate Corpus Christi in the ­Byzantine Rite — practices which are completely absent from the Orthodox ­Byzantine tradition.8 In the first half of the twentieth century, a renewed interest in patristics and liturgy coincided with the reign of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky as Archbishop of Lviv, who was forced to bring together ‘Latinizing’ and ‘Byzantinizing’ factions within his Church. The former was often associated with sympathies to Poland, Hungary, or other major political forces in the West, and the latter associated politically with ‘Russophilism’.9 Thus, liturgical practices among the Greco-Catholics were often seen in a political light and changes that seemed to stem from either Western or Eastern neighbors were looked upon with caution. Yet, unlike the seventeenth-century Russian Old Believers who created a schism because they believed that external rites and rituals themselves expressed the content of the faith,10 the Ruthenian bishops who signed the Union of Brest in 1596 with Rome understood that traditional observance of rubrics was not intrinsically connected to the content of the faith. Thus, not all that was foreign, Western, or Latin was in itself detrimental; on the contrary, some foreign elements provided solutions to local problems. For example, Latin importations that helped bolster 7   Ibid., p. 296; M. M. Morozowich, ‘Eastern Catholic Infant Communion: Has Catholic Dogmatic Teaching Prohibited It?’, Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 49 (2008), pp. 71-90. 8   I. Dolnytsky, Typikon (Lviv, 1899), pp. 504-515. However, not all Greco-Catholic books regulating liturgy presented the same degree of adaptation of Latin practices. For example, the Typikon of Fr. Alexander Mykyta from Transcarpathia does not prescribe processions with the Eucharist or celebrations of other Latin feasts. See A. Mykyta, ­Typikon (Uzhorod, 1901), pp. 6-11 and pp. 72-73. Here, these practices are mentioned as being celebrated in Galicia. It should be noted that, nevertheless, for other aspects of the liturgical ordo, Dolnytsky relied on Greek Orthodox sources from Mount Athos, often comparing them with Russian Old Believer liturgical books. For more on the origins of these books, see I. Vasylyshyn, Il Typikon di Isidoro Dolnyckyj e le sue origini, unpublished doctoral thesis, Pontificio Istituto Orientale (Rome, 2007). 9   P. Galadza, ‘Worship at the Crossroads of East and West: Andrey Sheptytsky’s Liturgical Work’, Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 36 (1995), pp. 69-84; Galadza, Theology and Liturgical Work of Andrei Sheptytsky (see n. 3), especially pp. 299-300. 10   P. Meyendorff, Russia, Ritual, and Reform: The Liturgical Reforms of Nikon in the 17th Century (Crestwood NY, 1991), p. 28.



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authentic piety included the practice of daily Divine Liturgy, participation in singing through the publication of liturgical anthologies for the faithful, and the promotion of paraliturgical hymns rooted in Byzantine theology.11 Inorganic Latinization, on the other hand, included borrowings that violated the ‘structural, theological or spiritual genius of the Byzantine tradition’.12 In the 1940s, the Congregation for the Eastern Churches in Rome took over the publication of Church Slavonic Greco-Catholic liturgical books and issued guidelines aimed at rooting out Latinization. One of the ­restorations introduced by the Roman commission was the prescription to serve the Divine Liturgy with the holy doors of the iconostasis closed at various points, as prescribed by the liturgical Diataxis common in the Orthodox Churches.13 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky opposed this prescription, since it was common practice in Galicia to serve the Divine Liturgy with the holy doors open throughout the service, as is currently done in the hierarchal Divine Liturgy, in the presbyteral Divine Liturgy among Greek Orthodox, and in those Orthodox parishes that consider themselves part of the liturgical renewal movement.14 The Second World War left a lasting mark on the Ukrainian GrecoCatholic Church, whose eparchies found themselves directly on the ­frontline between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. In 1946, the GrecoCatholic Church was liquidated in the Soviet Union, its bishops were arrested and sent to prison camps, and clergy who refused to join the Moscow Patriarchate were either arrested or forced into hiding, continuing their priestly service in the ‘catacomb’ Church.15 Much goodwill 11  See S. Senyk, ‘The Ukrainian Church and Latinization’, Orientalia Christiana Perio­dica, 56 (1990), pp. 165-187. 12   P. Galadza, ‘Liturgical Latinization and Kievan Ecumenism: Losing the Koinê of Koinonia’, Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 35 (1994), pp. 173-194, here p. 176. 13   Sacra Congregatio pro Ecclesia Orientali, Ordo Celebrationis Vesperarum, Matutini et Divinae Liturgiae iuxta Recensionem Ruthenorum (Rome, 21953), especially p. 59. 14  Galadza, Theology and Liturgical Work of Andrei Sheptytsky (see n. 3), pp. 430-431; N. Glibetić, ‘Liturgical Renewal Movement in Contemporary Serbia’, in Inquiries into Eastern Christian Worship: Selected Papers of the Second International Congress of the Society of Oriental Liturgies, Rome, 17-21 September 2008, eds. B. Groen, S. HawkesTeeples and S. Alexopoulos, Eastern Christian Studies, 12 (Louvain, 2012), pp. 393-414, p. 403. See also C. Korolevskij, Metropolite André Szeptyckyj, 1865-1944, Opera Theologicae Societatis Scientificae Ucrainorum, 16-17 (Rome, 1964). 15   Already in 1939, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky authorized various liturgical and administrative practices that proved crucial to the survival of the Greco-Catholic Church during the Soviet period. See I. Hovera, La vita liturgica dei sacerdoti e dei fedeli nella Chiesa greco-cattolica Ucraina (1946-1989), unpublished doctoral thesis, Pontificio ­Istituto Orientale (Rome, 2016).

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among Greco-Catholics who had wished to return to authentic Orthodox liturgical practices was lost due to Russian Orthodox involvement in the liquidation of the Greco-Catholic Church, and has left a mark on the relationship between the two Churches to this day.16 1.2.  From the Second Vatican Council to the Fall of the Soviet Union The Ukrainian Greco-Catholic bishops that participated at the Second Vatican Council represented a ‘Church in exile’ that was preoccupied with many other concerns than those discussed at the Council. Demographic trends in the West pointed to the rapid decline of the GrecoCatholic Church. Despite well-established ecclesiastical structures in the USA, Canada, Western Europe, South America, and Australia, including two Metropolias and 15 Eparchies or Exarchates around 1988, cultural assimilation was most often accompanied by religious assimilation: faithful who no longer had facility with the native language of their specific Eastern Catholic Church would either go to a Roman Catholic church or simply not go to church at all. In North America, those Ukrainian Greco-Catholic parishes that offered an English-language Divine Liturgy often did so ‘on the side’ and English-speaking parishioners were usually not integrated into parish life, since they could not speak Ukrainian. A similar scenario also played out in other Eastern Catholic Churches in the West that emphasized their ethnic roots over mission and integration of Church traditions in the new local context. Along with a demographic decline, most Churches in the West also saw a problem with vocations after the Second Vatican Council. To add to the problem, the standard Greco-Catholic practice of married clergy became outlawed and celibacy was enforced in the West after the Eastern Congregation’s decree Cum data fuerit in 1929. Married candidates to the priesthood were no longer ordained in the West.17 16   Except for the Hungarian Greco-Catholic Church, all Greco-Catholic Churches in Eastern Europe were suppressed for some period of time during the Soviet era and had to undergo a period of normalization after a lengthy stay in the catacombs. S. Mahieu, ‘(Re)Orientalizing the Church: Reformism and Traditionalism within the Hungarian Greek Catholic Church’, in Churches In-between (see n. 3), pp. 207-230. For the history of the period of persecutions, see B. R. Bociurkiw, The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (1939-1950) (Edmonton, 1996); S. Keleher, Passion and Resurrection: The Greek Catholic Church in Soviet Ukraine, 1939-1989 (Lviv, 1993). 17   See the reprint of the decree in Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church, Cum data fuerit, 23 November 1950: https://archive.org/details/CumDataFuerit1929 (accessed



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The return from seventeen years of Soviet imprisonment of Andrei Sheptytsky’s successor, Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj, later Cardinal and Major Archbishop (and subsequently proclaimed Patriarch, although the title has not been recognized by the Vatican), ushered in a period of revival and activity for the UGCC in the West. New churches were built, academic institutions were established, and married candidates were ordained, although clandestinely. This activity went on despite a certain level of resistance from the Holy See and Ostpolitik.18 1.3.  From the End of the Soviet Union to the Present Day The fall of Communism in Eastern Europe allowed the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church, once the largest illegal religious body in the world, to come out from the underground in Eastern Europe and to have direct contact with its Church members in the West.19 In a sense, two different Churches existed in the 1990s within the UGCC: the Church in the West was slowly working to receive the documents of the Second Vatican Council and put them into practice, while the Church in Ukraine was getting back on its feet and grappling with questions of organization and identity. The collaboration of these two parts of one Church has been mutually enriching: the West helped the East with theological education and organizational questions, while the East taught the West about the experience of martyrdom in the time of persecution. Today, the UGCC, like most other Eastern Catholic Churches, is a global Church with 16 Eparchies and Exarchates within Ukraine and 18 in other parts of the 19 December 2017). See also North American Orthodox/Catholic Consultation, ‘On the Occasion of the Eighty-fifth Anniversary of the Promulgation of the Decree Cum data fuerit’: http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/ecumenical-and-interreligious/­ ecumenical/orthodox/on-the-occasion-of-the-eighty-fifth-anniversary-of-the-promulgationof-the-decree-cum-data-fuerit.cfm (accessed 19 December 2017). 18   K. Schelkens, ‘Vatican Diplomacy after the Cuban Missile Crisis: New Light on the Release of Josyf Slipyj’, Catholic Historical Review, 97 (2011), pp. 679-712. For the period of Slipyj’s captivity, see Йосиф Сліпий, Спомини, еds. I. Dacko and M. Horyacha (Lviv/Rome, 22014). 19   For a history of this period, see B. Gudziak, ‘Some Methodological Perspectives on the History of Suffering and Witness in the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church’, in Fede e martirio: Le Chiese orientali cattoliche nell’Europa del Novecento (Vatican City, 2003), pp. 23-52; id., ‘La vita della Chiesa nell’Ucraina post-sovietica’, in Storia religiosa dell’Ucraina, Europa ricerche, 11 (Milan, 2007), pp. 391-416; A. Brüning, ‘“Project Ukraine” under Threat – Christian Churches in Ukraine and Their Relations 1991-2015’, Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 67 (2015), pp. 103-142.

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world, headed by Major Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk, elected to the post in 2011 at the age of 41. 2. Theory: Church Documents With that overview of historical context, let us now examine several Church documents that give directives on the place of liturgy in the Eastern Catholic Churches in general and in the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church specifically. 2.1.  Roman Documents for all Eastern Catholic Churches Documents promulgated by the Holy See and the Congregation for Eastern Churches in Rome were broadly intended for all Eastern Catholic Churches. The awareness of the importance of the common liturgical tradition shared by respective Orthodox and Eastern Catholics is most evident in these liturgical legislative texts. 2.1.1. Documents of the Second Vatican Council: Sacrosanctum Concilium and Orientalium Ecclesiarum Although Sacrosanctum Concilium explicitly mentions the Christian East only in two paragraphs, its principles and norms also apply to Eastern Catholics.20 Immediate response to these documents resulted in the celebration of liturgical services in the vernacular.21 In certain cases, the 20   ‘Among these principles and norms there are some which can and should be applied both to the Roman rite and also to all the other rites. The practical norms which follow, however, should be taken as applying only to the Roman rite, except for those which, in the very nature of things, affect other rites as well’. Sacrosanctum Concilium, § 3. Those paragraphs that appear to apply only to the Roman Rite are §§ 34, 36, 53-55, 57, 58, 70, 71, 75, 76, 77c, 78, 80, 89cde, 96, 97, 116, 117a, and 120. See P. Galadza, ‘Sacrosanctum Concilium and Byzantine Catholic Worship and Chant’, in ΤΟΞΟΤΗΣ: Studies for ­Stefano Parenti, eds. D. Galadza et al., Ἀνάλεκτα Κρυπτοφέρρης, 9 (Grottaferrata, 2010), pp. 139-154, here p. 145. 21   Sacrosanctum Concilium, § 36.2 allowed the vernacular language to be used, but Latin remained the official liturgical language of the Roman Rite (§ 36.1). Church S ­ lavonic functioned as a unifying language in communities where faithful identified themselves according to various nationalities, as Ukrainians, Carpatho-Rusyns, or Slovaks. For the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church, initially only five points of the Divine Liturgy were permitted to be celebrated in modern Ukrainian, namely the Epistle, Gospel, Creed, ‘Our



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vernacular was no longer that of the homeland, for example Ukrainian, Slovak, Belarusian, or other languages, but the local language of Western Europe or North America, for example English, German, or French. Although Ukrainian translations soon appeared for the Divine Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, along with the necessary accompanying Gospel and Epistle lectionaries, official translations for the Liturgy of the Hours — both the proprium and the ordinarium — have yet to appear for the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church in any language. Certain Latinizations soon fell away in the West, such as Eucharistic adoration, devotions to the Sacred Heart, and kneeling to receive Communion.22 This, however, did not automatically mean that Latin pious practices had been replaced by genuine Byzantine practices. Instead, piety in general waned. Whereas even in Latinized Greco-Catholic parishes, Vespers would have been frequently celebrated on Saturday and Sunday evenings and on the eves of feasts, the abandonment of Church Slavonic, the lack of translations of the Liturgy of the Hours into the vernacular, and the gradual dying out of trained cantors meant that Vespers often disappeared completely in Greco-Catholic parishes in the West. More important for the Eastern Catholic Churches was the Vatican II document Orientalium Ecclesiarum (OE), which explicitly mandated that Eastern Catholics ‘preserve their legitimate liturgical rite and their established way of life’ (OE 6). Orientalium Ecclesiarum also encouraged the restoration of the permanent diaconate (OE 17) and the administration of the Sacraments of Initiation together, according to ancient practice (OE 13). In general, the Eastern Churches were encouraged to ‘take steps to return to their ancient traditions’ (OE 6). While the document was a revolutionary response to concrete needs of its time, nevertheless it did not address questions of Eastern Catholics outside their ancestral lands or the question of growth and change in order to respond to the challenges of the world today. Father’, and the Prayer before Communion. Litterae Nuntiae Archiepiscopi Maioris Ritus Byzantino-Ucraini (Graeco-Rutlieni), 1.1 (Castel Gandolfo, 1966), p. 41. In terms of ­comprehensibility for the average person in church, Church Slavonic for East Slavs was as comprehensible as Latin was for Italians. Although repetition is an integral part of Byzantine Rite worship, Sacrosanctum Concilium, § 34 was interpreted to allow various abbreviations to the Divine Liturgy, such as repeated litanies or antiphons. 22   See P. Galadza, ‘The Reception of the Second Vatican Council by Greco-Catholics in Ukraine’, Communio, 27 (2000), pp. 312-339. Citing Sacrosanctum Concilium, §§ 22-23 and Orientalium Ecclesiarum, § 23, the Greco-Catholic bishops were cautious to remove or revise any other aspects of the liturgy without the cooperation of the Holy See. Litterae Nuntiae Archiepiscopi Maioris Ritus Byzantino-Ucraini (Graeco-Rutlieni), 1.1 (see n. 21), pp. 18-22.

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2.1.2. Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum Orientalium (CCEO) The promulgation of the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches (CCEO) by Pope John Paul II in 1990 coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the legalization of the Greco-Catholic Churches in the post-Soviet realm. Although it was one of the first Vatican documents addressed to the Eastern Catholic Churches themselves that specifically discusses liturgy, the CCEO was not intended to legislate on liturgical questions, leaving details of liturgical practice to particular law and liturgical books themselves.23 Nevertheless, the code of canon law gave a framework for the proper regulation of liturgical practice and implementation of changes. According to this document, ideal parish liturgical life is to be modelled on the precedent set by the eparchial bishop in his cathedral.24 2.1.3. Istruzione per l’applicazione delle prescrizioni liturgiche del CCEO For specific questions regarding liturgy, the Congregation for the Eastern Churches prepared a special document in 1996 entitled Instruction for Applying the Liturgical Prescriptions of the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches.25 Where the CCEO was only able to direct the reader to proceed ‘according to the prescriptions of the liturgical books’ of the respective local particular Church sui iuris, the Instruction gives more background information and is able to explain certain canons through biblical and patristic sources, providing general principles. Ecumenical   See CCEO can. 3: ‘The Code, although it often refers to the prescriptions of liturgical books, does not for the most part legislate on liturgical matters; therefore, these norms are to be diligently observed, unless they are contrary to the canons of the Code’. 24   CCEO can. 199 § 1: ‘The eparchial bishop, as the moderator, promoter and guardian of the entire liturgical life in the eparchy committed to him, must be vigilant that it be fostered as much as possible and ordered according to the prescriptions and legitimate customs of his own Church sui iuris’; § 2: ‘The eparchial bishop is to see to it that in his own cathedral at least part of the divine praises are celebrated, even daily, according to the lawful customs of his own Church sui iuris; also, in any parish if possible, the divine praises are to be celebrated on Sundays, feast days, principal solemnities and their vigils’; § 3: ‘The eparchial bishop is to preside frequently at the divine praises in the cathedral or other church, especially on holy days of obligation, and on other solemnities in which a sizeable part of the people participates’. 25   Istruzione per l’applicazione delle prescrizioni liturgiche del Codice dei Canoni delle Chiese Orientali (Vatican City, 1996). For a commentary on this document, see G. Gallaro, ‘Rome’s Liturgical Instruction for the Eastern Catholic Churches’, Logos: A Journal for Eastern Christian Studies, 43-45 (2002-2004), pp. 149-179. 23



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considerations are very prominent in this document and mark a distinct end to the need for Greco-Catholics to distinguish themselves liturgically from Orthodox, whether in theory or in practice. Tacit approval is given to use liturgical books of the corresponding Orthodox Churches where these are lacking for the Eastern Catholic Church. This allowance addresses a great problem, since, except for Greek, no complete set of liturgical books exists for any of the Greco-Catholic Churches, either in their original liturgical language or in translation. Ecumenical considerations are so strong that ‘any unnecessary differentiation between the liturgical books of the Eastern Catholic Churches and those of the Orthodox should be avoided’.26 The document goes on to state that the ‘first requirement of every Eastern liturgical renewal, as is also the case for liturgical reform in the West, is that of rediscovering full fidelity to their own liturgical traditions, benefiting from their riches and eliminating that which has altered their authenticity. Such heedfulness is not subordinate to, but precedes, so-called updating’.27 2.2. Documents Specific to the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church (UGCC) All the documents mentioned thus far addressed Eastern Catholic Churches in general, leaving catechisms, particular law, and liturgical books to each local Church. While many Eastern Catholic Churches promulgated their catechisms and particular law already almost twenty years ago, the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church has published its own such texts only within the last five years. 2.2.1. Catechism of the UGCC The Catechism of the UGCC, entitled Christ – Our Pascha, was published in Ukrainian in 2011 and translated into English in 2016. Its three sections on doctrine (‘Faith of the Church’), liturgy (‘Prayer of the Church’), and moral teachings (‘Life of the Church’) are a response to 26   Istruzione per l’applicazione delle prescrizioni liturgiche, § 29. Similar views are expressed in Directory for the Application of Principles and Norms on Ecumenism (Vatican City, 1993), § 187. 27   Istruzione, § 18.

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the need to help the faithful better understand the Christian faith handed down by their ancestors, to nurture the ‘Kyivan-Christian tradition’, and to strengthen the spiritual bonds between faithful of the UGCC who find themselves in many countries beyond the borders of Ukraine, challenged by globalization and assimilation.28 The whole text is based on the structure of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed and the Anaphora of St. Basil the Great, which give the Catechism its ‘methodological key’. The section on liturgy gives explanations of divine services, sacraments, and other rites and blessings, explaining their Trinitarian, ecclesial, eschatological, and cosmic character. Sources for the Catechism are liturgical texts themselves, along with Church Fathers, such as St. Cyril of Jerusalem, St. Basil the Great, St. Maximus the Confessor, and Nicholas Cabasilas, which attempt to balance different approaches to mystagogy. For example, the explanation of the Great Entrance during the Divine Liturgy combines both the cosmic approach of Maximus the Confessor and the historical/anamnetic approach of Germanus of Constantinople: ‘This symbolizes the triumphant entry of Christ into Jerusalem for the salvific sacrifice, as well as our reception of him as the King of all — visible and invisible, the living and the dead — in order to be joined to his Paschal Mystery’.29 The Catechism is, however, not without its problems since it avoids resolving certain difficult issues and, by its very nature, is unable to address aspects of the basic question ‘What is Eastern Catholic Theology?’30 2.2.2. Particular Law of the UGCC Other prescriptions of the CCEO, such as the promulgation of particular law, have only recently been realized. Of the UGCC particular law’s 146 canons, 38 deal specifically with liturgical questions. The main thrust of these canons is simply to establish order regarding disciplinary questions, attempting to legislate intrusively in the domain of liturgical   ‘Letter of His Beatitude Sviatoslav’, in Catechism, p. xvii.   Catechism, p. 129 (§ 372). See also R. F. Taft, Byzantine Rite: A Short History (Collegeville MN, 1992), pp. 45-47. 30   See N. Krokoch, ‘Der neue Katechismus der Ukrainischen Griechisch-Katholischen Kirche aus ökumenischer Sicht’, Der christliche Osten, 67 (2012), pp. 163-170. For the question on Eastern Catholic Theology, see the articles in Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 39 (1998) dedicated to the question. 28

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questions, and often appealing to the ‘prescriptions of the liturgical books’ as the higher authority on these questions. Nevertheless, the Particular Law takes a clear line on areas where abuses are known to have existed before. For example, the Sacraments of Initiation are explicitly united, meaning infant Communion is prescribed (can. 86; cf. can. 92); the practice of celebrating the Divine Liturgy daily is encouraged (can. 57 § 2), but this is done so with explicit regard for ‘aliturgical’ days, i.e. days when the Divine Liturgy is not to be celebrated due to fasting and the penitential nature of certain liturgical days and seasons (can. 88); and holy days and fasts specific to the Byzantine Rite and the UGCC are explicitly identified (can. 114 and 115).31 Certain leniencies are codified, such as a reduced one hour fast before the beginning of the Divine ­Liturgy (can. 89 § 5, can. 93 § 1), although receiving Communion on an empty stomach (can. 93 § 2) is encouraged and stricter penitential fasting practices are commended as spiritually beneficial (can. 115). While ­certain Latinizing tendencies are rooted out, the feast of Corpus Christi, the solemn adoration of the Holy Eucharist, is retained among important holy days within the Church-wide calendar of the UGCC (can. 114 § 3).32 A liturgical directory for the UGCC, one of the suggestions of the Instruction, remains a desideratum. 31   For the proper documents on the reinstatement of Communion for children, see ‘Інструкція щодо Причастя немовлят і дітей в УГКЦ’, Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, 5 November 2015. http://ugcc.ua/official/official-documents/instruktsiya/ Іnstruktsіya_shchodo_prichastya_nemovlyat_і_dіtey_v_ugkts_75248.html. 32   In comparison, the particular law of the Syro-Malankara Catholic Church promulgated on 10 March 2012 is much more extensive. See The Code of Particular Canons of the Syro-Malankara Catholic Church (see n. 4). Paragraphs 463 to 558 deal with ‘Divine Worship, Especially the Sacraments’, approximately one sixth of the particular law. The text restores the Sacraments of Initiation together (can. 479), requires fasting and prayer before receiving Communion (can. 486), which should be received on Sundays and solemn occasions by all the faithful (can. 488), along with frequent confession (can. 504), and the divine praises are to be prayed before the celebration of the Eucharist (can. 482). Certain canons attempt to correct foreign practices to the Syro-Malankara tradition, such as Eucharistic Adoration and Benediction, although the practices are not outlawed (can. 494 and 495). Throughout, the particular law goes to great lengths to explain not only the legal aspect but also the spiritual and theological mean of the liturgical rites and practices, references in endnotes and a glossary. It is worth noting that the Instruction is not cited by the Syro-Malankara particular law. See The Code of Particular Canons of the SyroMalankara Catholic Church, §§ 146-148. See also J. Kochuthundil, ‘The Code of ­Particular Canons of the Syro-Malankara Catholic Church: Codification and Juridical Significance’, Eastern Canon Law, 1 (2012), pp. 277-286. For the particular law of the Pittsburgh Metropolia, see ‘Particular Law for the Byzantine-Ruthenian Church in the USA’, 29 June 1999: http://www.byzcath.org/index.php/about-us-mainmenu60/33-document-library/documents-of-the-byzantine-catholic-churches/334-particular-lawfor-the-byzantine-ruthenian-church-in-the-usa (accessed 19 December 2017).

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2.2.3. ‘Vibrant Parish’ Initiative One of the concrete attempts to implement many of the decisions in the above-mentioned documents is through an initiative of the Synod of Bishops of the UGCC called ‘Vibrant Parish — A Place of Encounter with the Living Christ’, or popularly called ‘Vision 2020’, in reference to the year 2020, the deadline for its implementation. The initiative, developed by bishops and clergy in North America, attempts to enliven and revive parishes throughout the UGCC. It is the task of clergy, catechists, and community leaders to make this a reality and find new ways of implementation by focusing on six elements, namely: (1) the Word of God and catechization (kerygma); (2) liturgy and prayer; (3) serving one’s neighbor (diakonia); (4) leadership; (5) fostering and serving unity; and (6) the missionary spirit of the parish community. An inter­ national coordinating committee includes representatives and delegates from every eparchy of the UGCC throughout the world. Resources have been published which seek to make the Scriptures and Patristic texts accessible, as well as other Church documents, such as the Catechism of the UGCC and the code of canon law, along with reflections on these texts.33 This initiative has become so central to the current activities of the UGCC that the sixth session of the Patriarchal Sobor of the UGCC, a Church-wide council with a large proportion of lay delegates held in Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine, in August 2015, was dedicated to the theme of the ‘Vibrant Parish’. In advance of the Sobor, each eparchy throughout the world was required to convene its own Sobor, after each parish had held its own parish council meeting, in order to discuss various aspects of the initiative. Surveys for each parish were filled out in order to provide statistics and included such questions on parish life as: the number of clergy, including priests and deacons, and if they were married or not; frequency of parish bulletins, websites and social media presence; if the church had an iconostasis or not; if the church had a daycare, ­kindergarten, or bell tower; frequency of liturgical services and the ­languages in which they were celebrated; ecumenical and interreligious

33   Жива парафія – місце зустрічі з живим Христом. Допоміжні матеріали (Lviv, 2013).



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relations of the parish; etc., consisting of eighteen pages, providing insights into the daily life of the UGCC worldwide.34 The eparchial Sobors that gathered in 2014 to discuss aspects of the ‘Vibrant Parish’ initiative proposed resolutions to the Church-wide ­council in 2015 and were published and circulated. Most resolutions ­generally called for better explanations of liturgical services and more attention in their celebration through improved singing and preparation. Specific resolutions in the area of liturgy included: restoration of the reading of the Anaphora aloud; restoration (or rather, introduction) of Old Testament readings in the Divine Liturgy; practical instructions on how to serve Baptism and Marriage within the context of the Divine Liturgy; restoration of the Creed without the addition of the Filioque; and approval of official translations of the Divine Liturgy.35 Eparchies in Western Europe requested further translations of liturgical texts into French, Dutch, and German. The common appeal in all the resolutions was the need for better resources to explain the liturgy and for cantors to learn how to sing the services properly. Nevertheless, resolutions in a few Eparchies gave the impression that it was also the Church’s mission to spread and cultivate a Ukrainian identity in the West, without much interest for integration into — let alone interaction with — the society in which the Church found itself. Discussion of other resolutions regarding a study of the integration of Western prayer movements into the Byzantine Rite or the possibility of adopting the Gregorian calendar for the whole Church were, surprisingly, suppressed. 3.  Practice: Liturgy in the Life of the Church How have recently-published liturgical books and resources attempted to incarnate the instructions and exhortations in the above mentioned documents and how are they put into practice?

34   Статистични опитування. Стан душпастирського служіння в УГКЦ за 2015 рік, eds. R. Oliynyk et al. (n.p., 2017). 35   Патріарший Собор (Шоста сесія). Резолюції (Ivano-Frankivsk, 2015), pp. 68-69.

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3.1.  Liturgical Books and Resources Most liturgical books printed by Eastern Catholic Churches today are simply reprinted from older texts, without any updates or modifications — sometimes even without corrections suggested by Vatican documents.36 Certain exceptions are found in North America, where several recent liturgical books have embodied the call of Sacrosanctum Concilium to restore the liturgical rites to the ‘vigor which they had in the days of the holy Fathers’ (§ 50). Among these are The Divine Liturgy: Anthology for Worship, published by the Sheptytsky Institute of the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church in Canada in 2004;37 The Divine Liturgies of Sts. John Chrysostom and Basil the Great published by the Byzantine Seminary Press of the Byzantine Catholic Church in the United States in 2006;38 Holy Mysteries published by the Ukrainian Catholic Eparchy of Stamford, USA, in 2012;39 and Christian Initiation of Children published by the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Eparchy of Edmonton, Canada, in 2013.40 While even good liturgical books can be used incorrectly, some of these new publications attempt to counteract potential problems with clearer rubrics, including directives to recite certain ‘mystical prayers’ aloud instead of inaudibly, as had become the practice in the Orthodox

36   The Congregation for Eastern Churches, itself once responsible for the publication of liturgical books for Eastern Catholic Churches, has not published any liturgical books since the 1970s. The revival of the ‘Special Commission for Liturgy at the Congregation for Eastern Churches’ (Commissione Speciale per la Liturgia presso la Congregazione per le Chiese Orientali) on 1 September 2015 has opened the possibility of new publications with Vatican approval. 37   The Divine Liturgy: An Anthology for Worship, eds. P. Galadza et al. (Ottawa, 2004). See also P. Galadza, ‘Principles Applied in the Compilation and Translation of The Divine Liturgy: An Anthology for Worship’, Studia Liturgica, 35 (2005), pp. 81-99. 38  Byzantine Ruthenian Metropolia Church of Pittsburgh, The Divine Liturgy of Our Holy Father John Chrysostom (Pittsburgh PA, 2006); id., The Divine Liturgy of Our Holy Father Basil the Great (Pittsburgh PA, 2006). For a study of the reform of the ­Pittsburgh Metropolia’s liturgical reform, see D. M. Petras, ‘The Witness of the Liturgy of the Ruthenian Church in the New World’, in La liturgie comme témoin de l’Église: LVIIe Semaine d’Études Liturgiques, Institut Saint-Serge, Paris, 28 juin–1 juillet 2010, eds. A. Lossky and M. Sodi, Monumenta Studia Instrumenta Liturgica, 66 (Vatican City, 2012), pp. 372-386. 39   Holy Mysteries/Святі Таїнства (Lviv, 2012). The book has the imprimatur of Bishop Paul (Chomycky) of the Ukrainian Catholic Eparchy of Stamford and was edited by Fr. (now Bishop) B. J. Danylo and Fr. V. Sybirny. 40  Edmonton Eparchial Liturgical Commission, Christian Initiation of Children (Edmonton, 2013). The book was printed with the blessing of Bishop David (Motiuk) of Edmonton.



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tradition during the last millennium.41 Likewise, decisions of local GrecoCatholic bishops’ synods, such as the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic bishops of Canada and the USA regarding the restoration of the Creed without the Filioque,42 have also been integrated into these liturgical books — something that is still not the case in Western Europe or Ukraine. Nevertheless, how the services are to be celebrated and sung is not explained. The Anthology for Worship is the first, officially endorsed, English language resource of the UGCC to integrate aspects of liturgical renewal along with helpful guides and musical notation for congregational singing. The single volume contains all the texts of the ordinarium and ­proprium necessary to serve the Divine Liturgy on any day of the liturgical year and also includes elements of the Liturgy of the Hours to be connected to the Divine Liturgy, as well as prayers and catechetical material in order to prepare for Communion. Along with the book, a CD set of hymns found in the book was recorded as a teaching aid. No such book and CD set exists for the UGCC in Ukrainian. Despite this deficiency for printed Ukrainian resources in the UGCC, Ukrainian-speaking faithful are quite avid social media and smartphone users, with discussion groups for theological and liturgical questions of the UGCC in Ukrainian on Facebook. Liturgical apps for smartphones, such as the DyvenSvit daily liturgical prayer app from the Youth Commission of the UGCC, was created to allow youth to pray the Liturgy of the Hours during their busy schedules. The app has become so popular that priests and religious use it, sometimes even in church, and the ­Patriarchal Liturgical Commission of the UGCC relies upon it to make texts of liturgical services available to the faithful.43 Nevertheless, there are no aids for singing the texts, such as musical notes or audio guides, 41  For more on this question, see P. Trembelas, ‘The Hearing of the Eucharistic Anaphora by the People’, trans. D. Petras, Eastern Churches Journal, 8 (2001), pp. 81-96; D. M. Petras, ‘The Public Recitation of Presbyteral Prayers’, Eastern Churches Journal, 8 (2001), 97-106; R. F. Taft, ‘Questions on the Eastern Churches: Were Liturgical Prayers Once Recited Aloud?’, Eastern Churches Journal, 8 (2001), pp. 107-113. 42   Pastoral Letter of the Ukrainian Catholic Hierarchy in Canada, to the Clergy, Religious, Monastics and Faithful on the Creed and the Filioque [1 September 2005], p. 5: http://www.edmontoneparchy.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Pastoral-Letter-onthe-Creed.pdf (accessed 4 November 2013). A similar decision was made by the Byzantine Catholic Church in the United States in 1993. See D. M. Petras, A Study of the Trinity in the Creed (Parma OH, 1990). See also S. C. Smith, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Eastern Orthodox View of Reception: Divisive Councils and the Filioque’, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 60 (2016), pp. 397-414. 43  See Літургія Церкви [Blog of the Patriarchal Liturgical Commission of the UGCC]: http://plc-ugcc.blogspot.com (accessed 19 December 2017).

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and the app is completely in Ukrainian and organized for the Julian ­calendar, making it impossible to use in North America in a parish that is either on the Gregorian calendar or prays in English. Surprisingly, English-language online resources lag behind Ukrainian ones.44 Even websites that provide texts online, such as the website Royal Doors of the UGCC Winnipeg Archeparchy in Canada, assumes that users will print texts at home or in their parish offices instead of praying and­ singing from smartphones and tablets.45 In an age where people are ­constantly attached to their smartphones and online, North American members of the UGCC are more reluctant to use smartphones inside the church and to make them an integral part of liturgical services. Nevertheless, parishes in both North America and Ukraine have been expanding their online broadcasts of liturgical services, mostly by means of YouTube streaming, which allows the faithful to be tuned into the life of their parish when they are unable to attend.46 3.2. Case Studies: Parish Liturgical Life in Europe and North America Such live streams are also a means for observers to get a sense of the liturgical life of a given community and understand to what extent directives from Church documents are — or are not — put into practice. Two Ukrainian Greco-Catholic parishes — one in Italy and one in ­Canada — will be examined here as case studies. In discussion groups and meetings of the ‘Vibrant Parish’ initiative, both parishes are considered to be among the model parishes of the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church for liturgical practice and parish life worldwide. Because there are no specific factors that would explain each parish’s dynamism, since neither are cathedrals or have liturgical institutes or centers, the consistent work and liturgical mindset of the pastor and the eagerness and zeal of the parishioners seem to be the main factors. The first example is a European parish serving migrant workers coming from Ukraine, while 44   ДивенСвіт Календар УГКЦ: http://calendar.dyvensvit.org (accessed 19 December 2017). 45   Royal Doors: English Language Resources for Ukrainian Greek Catholics: http:// www.royaldoors.net/category/liturgy/ (accessed 19 December 2017). 46   Among the various live streams from the UGCC, see for example, the weekly broadcast of liturgical services from the UGCC Patriarchal Cathedral of the Resurrection in Kyiv, Ukraine: Живе Телебачення: https://zhyve.tv (accessed 19 December 2017).



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the second example is a North American parish with immigrant roots but integrated into Canadian society. As has already been noted, it is difficult to offer objective scientific data here since a methodology for such studies still remains to be developed.47 Thus, my observations here are preliminary and based on­ personal observations in, and contact with, the two parishes examined here over the course of several years, as well as a consideration of their own online resources and their respective contexts. 3.2.1. Parish of Sts. Sergius and Bacchus in Rome, Italy The parish of Sts. Sergius and Bacchus in the Monti neighborhood in downtown Rome, Italy, has been a church of the Byzantine Rite since the early seventeenth century when it was entrusted to the Basilian Order.48 Until the 1990s, the church was — at various points in time — home to a seminary, the curia of the Major Archbishop, a convent, and a house for pilgrims, but never a parish church. Only with the return of the Major Archbishop to Ukraine and with the arrival of migrant workers from Ukraine in the late 1990s did Sts. Sergius and Bacchus Church begin to function as an active parish. Today, the majority of the parishioners are middle-aged women migrant workers employed as house cleaners or caretakers of the elderly. As a result, there are few families or children in the parish, since many of the women live alone in Italy and send money home to their husbands and children. In response to this situation, the schedule of liturgical services strikes a balance between adhering to liturgical prescriptions and accommodating the schedules of the working women. The church’s proximity to a central metro station means daily services are well-attended. Despite the accommodating schedule, the ­Liturgy of the Hours on Sundays, feast days, and on particular days of Lent is perhaps the most complete and rigorous in the UGCC outside a monastery and makes the liturgical life of neighboring Roman Byzantine Rite seminaries pale in comparison. During Vespers and Matins, the pastor serves as the cantor, while an assistant priest presides, and the faithful 47   See B. Groen, ‘From Holy Sepulchre to Interactive Web 2.0: Several Current Developments of Eastern Christian Liturgy and Religious Popular Culture’, in Studies in Oriental Liturgy, eds. B. Groen et al., Eastern Christian Studies, 28 (Louvain, 2019), pp. 1-24. 48   Українська церква Святих Сергія і Вакха в Римі: http://www.ukr-parafiaroma.it (accessed 19 December 2017).

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are given customized liturgical books for each service, including the ­proprium alongside the ordinarium. Because the parish’s website and online presence focuses on presenting news and sermons, rather than live broadcasts or videos of liturgical services, the following observations are based on visits to the parish’s Sunday Divine Liturgy in 2016: – Due to the uncertain future of most of the migrant worker parishioners, liturgical services are celebrated in much the same way as they are in Ukraine, meaning that only Ukrainian is used as a liturgical language. In fact, most of the parishioners speak only basic Italian or have never formally studied Italian. – The parish follows the Julian calendar, meaning that that state-recognized religious holidays and liturgical celebrations among other Catholics in Rome do not coincide with holy days celebrated in the parish. The desire of the parishioners is to celebrate holy days together with their families in Ukraine. – Although no innovations for the sake of facilitating better understanding are introduced to the liturgical services, the meaning of the liturgy is explained through weekly catechesis after the Divine Liturgy, which is based on the text of the new UGCC Catechism. – While daily services and the Liturgy of the Hours are sung in a ­congregational style from the nave of the church and the faithful receive customized booklets to facilitate participation, Sunday Divine Liturgy is sung by a women’s choir in order to give the service a more solemn character. – With the majority of the parishioners being women, there are few, if any, children who can serves as altar servers and no men who can serve as permanent deacons. 3.2.2. Parish of St. Elias the Prophet in Brampton, Ontario, Canada Founded in 1976 as a mission parish, St. Elias the Prophet Church is located in Brampton, a suburb of Canada’s largest city, Toronto.49 Like most newly-founded North American parishes, the faithful of St. Elias started out holding liturgical services in various rented facilities until they 49   Saint Elias the Prophet Church. Eparchy of Toronto | Byzantine Ukrainian Catholic | Brampton Ontario Canada. Церква Святого Пророка Ілії: https://www.saintelias. com (accessed 19 December 2017).



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built their own church, a traditional Ukrainian Boyko-style wooden church. The parish was established to serve Greco-Catholics who had moved to the expanding suburbs of Toronto. Because many of these people no longer spoke Ukrainian, services were held in English. Today, its parishioners are a mix of immigrants from Ukraine over the past ­century, as well as converts with no connection to Ukrainian or Slavic nationality or to Eastern Christianity. They are, nevertheless, able to fully participate in liturgical services because of the equal use of English. Despite the fact that the parish shuns the use of electric light or microphones in its liturgical services, instead favoring candle light, the parish does use social media, as well as online video and audio platforms to make liturgical worship accessible. A video clip shows the Small Entrance from the Divine Liturgy on Christmas Day.50 The most interesting things to point out are the following: – The parish uses languages interchangeably (Church Slavonic, Ukrainian, and English) in order to maintain a connection to ancient and contemporary liturgical languages of the parish’s ‘Mother Church’, but at the same time uses the local vernacular language to make the texts comprehensible to its parishioners raised in the West. – All are encouraged to sing antiphonally, men and women being divided on either side of the church, as is the tradition in Ukrainian villages. – There is no parish choir but the cantor, an ordained reader, guides the singing by intoning verses and using hand gestures to direct the people. – Like in Ukraine, pews are found at the walls of the church, meaning the people stand during the whole service; in a more North American style, children and young people sometimes sit on the carpets on the floor during Epistle readings and the sermon. – Rubrics are followed diligently, as can be seen by the liturgical movements and objects, but at the same time a pastoral sensitivity invites children to venerate the Gospel book — something not prescribed by the rubrics. – Instead of the fixed prayer for the Small Entrance used at every Divine Liturgy during the year, here the priest reads a variable prayer for Christmas from a book published by the Orthodox New Skete Monastery in New York. – Permanent deacons are active in the parish, involved in liturgical ­services as well as catechesis and other aspects of parish ministry. 50   Friends of St. Elias Church, ‘Nativity Liturgy – Little Entrance Festal Tropar – St Elias Church, Jan 7 2013’: https://youtu.be/jwQYFwRU1Tk (accessed 19 December 2017).

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4. Concluding Remarks: Liturgy in Future of the Eastern Catholic Churches in the West Continuing on from what has been said above, allow me to make ­several concluding remarks about liturgical identity in the West, relations with Orthodox Churches, liturgical language, and relations between the Church in the ‘Diaspora’ and the ‘Mother Church’. 4.1.  (Liturgical) Identity in the West Despite all that has been said in various Vatican documents about the restoration of an ‘Eastern’ identity, a return to the ancient traditions of the East, and tensions between ‘Latinizing’ and ‘Byzantinizing’ tendencies, Eastern Catholics in the West are more preoccupied today with a Christian identity grounded in new evangelization. In the course of the last fifty years after the Second Vatican Council, there has been sufficient time to receive the Council’s documents and implement them in the West. Now the goal seems to be to differentiate between ‘little t’ and ‘big T’ notions of tradition in order to evaluate the ‘legitimacy of a liturgical practice’ in liturgical renewal, and to propose a more ‘participatory ­experience of liturgy’.51 Although it has become a topos to speak of ‘bad Latinization’ among Eastern Catholics, Ukrainian Greco-Catholics in the West now seem more interested in positive influences from Roman Catholic liturgical practice and organization to understand if and how these can be integrated into — and enrich — their worship. This process is guided by liturgical scholars and clergy who are aware of the contemporary challenges of family time management, financial struggles, and shifts in use of social media on a daily basis. Most of them are either children or grandchildren of Eastern European immigrants, raised or born in North America, taught the liturgical tradition by their parents and grandparents, but educated in Roman Catholic, Western universities. Nevertheless, the demographics are changing and include more and more ‘non-native’ Eastern Catholics among the faithful.

51   N. Denysenko, ‘A Proposal for Renewing Liturgy in the Twenty-First Century’, Studia Liturgica, 40 (2010), pp. 231-259. See also M. Jalakh, Ecclesiological Identity of the Eastern Catholic Churches: Orientalium Ecclesiarum 30 and Beyond, Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 297 (Rome, 2014).



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4.2.  Relations with Orthodox Churches Being more self-confident in their Eastern Christian identity means that ecumenical relations between Eastern Catholic and Orthodox Churches in the West are more common — something that is not as easy in Eastern Europe due primarily to historical and political factors. Not only does this contact enrich liturgical practice, but it also strengthens Christian identity in the growingly secular West. Use of the local language leads to easier contact with Orthodox Churches, who share a common liturgical tradition.52 Restoration of unity is still far away, but brotherly relations are normal. 4.3. Language The promotion of vernacular languages in liturgy by the Second Vatican Council has a different meaning for Eastern Catholics in the West in the twenty-first century. Knowledge and understanding of a parish’s context in Western Europe or North America suggests some communities are in need of changing focus — from preserving the language of their homeland in liturgical services to transmission of the Gospel message in the local language. Failing to do so means that children associate Christian faith with the Eastern Catholic faith of their parents and grandparents and do not make it their own.53

52   The Ecumenical conception of the UGCC recognizes the great theological and liturgical riches of Orthodox Churches and ‘in specific circumstances […] approves Eucharistic hospitality and the possibility for mutual reception of the Holy Mysteries by the laity’, following its own particular law and documents from the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity. See Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, The Ecumenical Position of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, ed. I. Shaban (Lviv, 2016), pp. 65-66 (§ 55). See also P. Galadza, ‘Liturgical Latinization and Kievan Ecumenism’ (see n. 12), p. 175. 53   Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America officially stated in its charter in 1923, 1927, and 1931 that one of the missions of the Church was to teach the ‘language of the Gospel’, meaning the Greek language. See ‘Charter of the Greek Archdiocese of North and South America (New York, 1923)’, in P. Rodopoulos, An Overview of Orthodox Canon Law (Rollinsford NH, 2007), p. 227. The same text is repeated in the Charter from 1927. See also ‘Constitution’ from 1931 in Rodopoulos, An Overview of Orthodox Canon Law, p. 237 and pp. 244-248. The mission of teaching language is a complicated issue; regardless, Ukrainian is not a biblical language, nor as of yet a language used extensively in theological discussion or writing.

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4.4.  ‘Diaspora’ Mentality and Relationship to the ‘Mother Church’ Such a mentality with regard to language persists when a Church does not see itself at the service of the local community. Overwhelming emphasis on contact with the ‘Mother Church’ means the local Church in the West continues to see itself as a ‘Diaspora’ and can never become a local Church ministering to the people of the place in which it is found.54 The principle of ‘integration, not assimilation’ (‘інтеграція, не асиміляція’) put forward at the 2016 annual meeting of Eastern Catholic Bishops of Europe in Fatima, Portugal,55 does not address those Eastern Catholic faithful who immigrated to the West many decades ago and lost their native language but wish to maintain their Eastern liturgical traditions. Likewise, it does not address the possibility of new, local Eastern Catholic Churches being created in Western Europe or North America.56 Nevertheless, rather than two solitudes, one can speak of two mutually enriching ecclesial realities at the present time: the Church in the homeland receives new impulses and assistance from the West, while the West benefits from the example of a living liturgical tradition, piety, and — for now — full churches in the homeland. How long this relationship continues remains to be seen.

54   I. Noble, ‘The Future of the Orthodox ‘Diaspora’ – An Observer’s Point of View’, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 60 (2016), pp. 171-188 [special issue: ‘The Forthcoming Council of the Orthodox Church: Understanding the Challenges’]. 55   ‘Final Message at the conclusion of the Annual Meeting of the Oriental Catholic Bishops of Europe’: http://www.ccee.eu/calendar-2016/2016-meeting-of-the-bishopsof-catholic-eastern-rite-churches-in-europe (accessed 19 November 2016). These views were repeated by Major Archbishop Sviatoslav (Shevchuk) in his visit to Vienna on 12 November 2016. 56   P. Galadza, ‘The Structure of the Eastern Churches: Bonded with Human Blood or Baptismal Water?’, Pro Ecclesia, 17 (2008), pp. 373-386.

ECCLESIOLOGICAL AND JURIDICAL IMPACT OF THE EASTERN CATHOLIC DIASPORA CONTEXT WITHIN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH Astrid Kaptijn

In the period between 1960 and 1970, several authors noticed already that certain Eastern Catholic churches had about half of their faithful living outside the original territory of these churches.1 As we all know, these numbers have only been increasing during the last decades and especially since the beginning of the twenty-first century. The fact that Eastern Catholics, for a large part, are now living in regions that hitherto have been populated mainly by Latin Catholics, makes the phenomenon of the coexistence of these faithful, and also of their hierarchies and their churches, even more vivid and challenging. (By the way, this shows the specific character of the Eastern Catholic diaspora compared with that of the oriental churches: the Eastern Catholics in diaspora are, in general, confronted with Latin Catholics and their hierarchies.) This explains the title of our talk: the situation of Eastern Catholics must have an influence on the ecclesiological level as well as on the canonical one (in this ­contribution, we use the adjectives juridical and canonical without distinction). Therefore we will present our topic here according to these two aspects, and will try to conclude with a critical evaluation and some new perspectives. 1. The Ecclesiological Impact First of all, we have to remember that the Catholic Church is composed of twenty-three churches sui iuris. This notion was adopted after the Second Vatican Council, that is during the process of preparation of the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, promulgated in 1990. The Council spoke of ‘particular churches’ with reference to the Eastern Catholic churches, especially in the decree Orientalium Ecclesiarum, but, 1   See N. Edelby and I. Dick, Les Églises orientales catholiques: Décret ‘Orientalium Ecclesiarum’. Texte latin et traduction française, Unam Sanctam, 76 (Paris, 1970), p. 322.

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during the process of revision of the Eastern canon law, the commission in charge of it was obliged to look for another expression, since the expression ‘particular Churches’ had been adopted in Latin canon law to designate the dioceses and the structures assimilated to it. The result was the integration in Eastern canon law of the notion of Ecclesia sui iuris. It is described as a group of faithful which has its own hierarchy and has been recognised by the supreme authority of the Catholic Church as a church sui iuris. The main material elements are therefore a group of faithful as well as the existence of a proper hierarchy; recognition by the supreme authority constitutes a formal element. It is a juridical definition that is closely linked to the CCEO. However, it also is used outside the Eastern Code. The expression has its origins in Roman law where it was applied to physical persons. A person who was sui iuris had the right to take his own decisions.2 So, we can conclude that the notion indicates a certain autonomy. Part of this autonomy also is the right of this Church sui iuris to propose or adopt the particular law that only concerns this Church specifically.3 As a consequence, nowadays, some twenty-two Eastern churches sui iuris have been recognised by the supreme authority of the church, if we base ourselves on the fact that they more or less appear as such in the Annuario Pontificio.4 If we add to that the fact that the Latin Church also designates itself as a Church sui iuris,5 according to the wording of some canons in the Latin Code we can conclude that the Catholic Church is indeed composed of twenty-three churches sui iuris.6 The Catholic Church can therefore be considered as a communion of churches sui iuris. We should underline that this aspect of the Latin Church being a Church sui iuris, is not very present in the minds of the Latin faithful, including the pastors. The distinction between the Latin Church sui iuris 2   We can use the masculine form, while it applied especially to the pater familias who decided not only concerning himself but also in respect to the other persons of his family, as well as its slaves. This shows that these other persons did not benefit from the status of being sui iuris. 3   We remember that the CCEO is a Code in common for all of the Eastern Catholic Churches. 4   Annuario Pontificio 2016 (Vatican City, 2016), in the section ‘Riti nella Chiesa’, pp. 1132-1135. 5   See for instance, CIC can. 111-112. 6   This is true even if the Latin Church cannot be considered being a church sui iuris in exactly the same way as the Eastern Catholic Churches, because of the fact that its structure does not really correspond to those provided in the Eastern Code for the different Eastern Catholic churches.



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headed by the Patriarch of the West7 and the entire Catholic Church on the universal level presided over by the Roman Pontiff / the Pope is hardly known, and even if it is known, the distinction is neither made nor practised. This is probably the case because it does not correspond to the experience of the Latin faithful in relation to the ecclesial reality in which they live. The growing presence of Eastern Catholics in Latin regions might change this somewhat as contributing to wider awareness of this aspect. But it takes a lot of time and the growing of this awareness takes place in an unequal rhythm. As usual, people are more sensitive to it if they have had a personal experience of Eastern Catholics, either faithful or hierarchs. One of the results of the coexistence of different churches sui iuris in the same region could be that the Latin faithful are in a greater measure than before confronted with the fact that different traditions and structures exist within the same Catholic Church. Formulated otherwise: Latin faithful become more aware that there are different ways of being and living the faith within the full communion of the Catholic Church. Another aspect in this framework concerns the exercise of the power of government by the Roman Pontiff, which is not the same with respect to the different churches sui iuris because, according to their juridical status, they enjoy a more or less great autonomy within the communion of the Catholic Church.8 However, all of them have the same dignity and this also includes the Latin Church sui iuris.9 This implies that none of these can be considered as more Catholic or as a better Catholic church than the others. To deepen this question, we have to ask ourselves how these different churches sui iuris can and could coexist in the same place. First of all, it should be noticed that there should not be any absorption of the Eastern churches by the Latin church. The Preamble of the decree Orientalium 7   Even if the title has no longer been mentioned in the Annuario Pontificio since 2007, we are of the opinion that the title as such has not been abolished. At least, it is useful for our purpose to distinguish the role of the Pope as head of the Latin Church sui iuris / the Church of the Latin rite, and his function as head of the entire Catholic Church. Ecclesiologically, two different realities are concerned. 8   See P. Erdö, ‘La coesistenza delle diverse Chiese particolari e “sui iuris” nello stesso territorio nel quadro della piena comunione. Realtà e prospettive’, in Territorialità e ­personalità nel diritto canonico ed ecclesiastico. Il diritto canonico di fronte al terzo ­millennio. Atti dell’ XI Congresso Internazionale di Diritto Canonico e del XV Congresso Internazionale della Società per il Diritto delle Chiese Orientali, Budapest, 2-7 Settembre 2001, eds. P. Erdö and P. Szabó (Budapest, 2002), pp. 913-927, on p. 921. 9   We refer here to the decree Orientalium Ecclesiarum (OE) 3.

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Ecclesiarum, issued by the Second Vatican Council, insists on the signi­ ficance and the ‘raison d’être’ of these churches. It states: ‘The Catholic Church holds in high esteem the institutions, liturgical rites, ecclesiastical traditions and the established standards of the Christian life of the Eastern Churches, for in them, distinguished as they are for their venerable ­antiquity, there remains conspicuous the tradition that has been handed down from the Apostles through the Fathers and that forms part of the divinely revealed and undivided heritage of the universal Church’.10 The rites and traditions of these churches have to be held in esteem not only because of their venerable antiquity, but also because they hand down the tradition that comes from the Apostles and that forms part of the heritage of the universal church that has been divinely revealed. The text makes a close connection between the particular heritage of each of the Eastern churches and the heritage of the universal church. Besides that, these heritages receive a very strong legitimation since they have been divinely revealed. For these reasons the Council wants them to flourish. These texts have been partially adopted in one of the canons of the CCEO.11 Some official Roman documents also address the question of the coexistence of Eastern and Latin Catholics in the same location. It has been treated in connection with pastoral care for migrants. Indeed, to some extent the Eastern Catholics can be considered as migrants and therefore part of the guidelines and norms concerning this category of faithful can also be applied to the Eastern Catholics. We think especially of the Instruction Erga migrantes caritas Christi, issued on May 3, 2004 by the Pontifical Council for the pastoral care of migrants and itinerant people. In fact, this is one of the few universal documents of the Catholic Church that explicitly pays attention to the Eastern Catholic churches. It also refers to the norms of the Eastern canon law. However, it could be criticised on the grounds that the particular needs of Eastern Catholics are not sufficiently taken into account. The document on the one hand wants the migrants to maintain their own religious identity, especially in relation to their languages and liturgy, and on the other hand to integrate with the host churches. When it comes to the Eastern Catholics, the aspect of   OE 1.   CCEO can. 39: ‘The rites of the Eastern Churches, as the patrimony of the whole Church of Christ in which shines forth the tradition coming down from the Apostles through the Fathers, and which, in its variety, affirms the divine unity of the Catholic faith, are to be observed and promoted conscientiously’. 10 11



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integration in particular might be problematic. It depends on what will be understood by it, and in what measure it is to be realised. 2. The Juridical Impact As we know, ecclesiology also influences the canonical norms, since the latter always reflect the ecclesiological view of those issuing the norms. So there is a close relationship between these two fields. The juridical impact of the Eastern Catholic diaspora context can be seen on the one hand in the issuing of new norms taking more or less explicit account of this situation, and on the other hand in local initiatives creating, for instance, new ecclesial institutions. We shall present these two aspects in chronological order. 2.1.  New Norms Since the promulgation of the Eastern Code, several new norms have been introduced in Catholic canon law. The norms we will present below all have to do with the diaspora situation of the Eastern Catholics. Some of these new norms can be found in the same instruction Erga migrantes caritas Christi. They mention different ways in which the ­bishops can exercise pastoral care for the migrants. They can appoint priests and/or parish priests, they can create parishes or missions cum cura animarum. The chaplain who takes care of such a mission is juridically assimilated to a parish priest; even if there are some differences, he has almost the same rights and functions as a parish priest, especially with regard to the celebration of the sacraments.12 These norms might clarify and detail several aspects with respect to the Latin migrants. However, Eastern canon law had already integrated in the Code several norms of this kind. With respect to the Eastern Catholics, the norms of the instruction concerning contacts between the episcopal conference of the country of destination and the proper hierarchical structures of the 12   See Pontifical Council for the pastoral care of migrants and itinerant people, Instruction Erga migrantes caritas Christi, issued on May 3, 2004. The document is structured in several parts that are sociological as well as theological and concludes with a part that contains juridical pastoral regulations. For our purpose, this last part is the most interesting. See Chapter II, art. 4-10, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/migrants/ documents/rc_pc_migrants_doc_20040514_erga-migrantes-caritas-christi_en.html#

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Eastern Catholic churches in their home land are relatively new. Contacts have to be established between these institutions in order to find the right persons who can function as chaplain or missionary in the country of destination. These contacts will take place through the mediation of the director of the national commission for migration which should be established in each country affected by migration on a large scale.13 These norms give details compared to the norms existing in the CIC, but even with respect to those of the CCEO, that is already more attentive to the situation of migrants. The Eastern Code only spoke of contacts between bishops having migrants in their eparchies (or dioceses) and the Patriarch who should be asked for his opinion on the appointment of a priest.14 The norms of the instruction situate the contacts in a collegial perspective, mentioning the bishops’ conferences and the Eastern synods, which in my opinion is an advantage. Very often the Latin bishops and their collaborators do not have enough knowledge or awareness of the Eastern Catholic churches and their structures, or they find it too difficult to enter into contact with the ecclesiastical authorities of these churches. This attitude can lead to neglect and omissions with respect to the pastoral care of the Eastern Catholics. Our research on the Ordinariates existing in certain countries, where a Latin archbishop exercises the pastoral care of Eastern Catholics who do not have a hierarchy of their own church, shows that one of the main motives of the Holy See in constituting this type of Ordinariate was always to create a unity of government on a national level. In this sense, we are in favour of some more centralised   Ibid., Chapter V, art. 19-21.   CCEO can. 193 § 3. For a long time, canon lawyers have discussed the question if this canon also obliges Latin bishops. The fact is that a former draft of this canon (speaking in a general way about the care of an eparchial bishop for Catholics who, although residing in his eparchy, belong to another church sui iuris) mentioned explicitly in its first paragraph the Latin bishops, thus laying them under an obligation for what was mentioned in this paragraph together with the tasks listed in the following paragraphs. However, the reference concerning the Latin bishops was deleted by Pope John Paul II during his final revision of the text just before the promulgation. Afterwards, canon lawyers did not agree about the interpretation of this fact. Some were of the opinion that the Latin bishops are not bound by can. 193 since the pope did not want them to be mentioned; others argued that similar norms were already integrated in the CIC, which could have been the motivation for the Pope to make no further mention of the Latin bishops in CCEO can. 193. According to this last group, one could argue that the absence in the CIC of a norm equivalent to § 3 of can. 193 constitutes a ‘lacuna legis’ which, according to CIC can. 19, could be resolved by a recourse to laws passed in similar circumstances, in this case CCEO can. 193 § 3. Finally, the question has been resolved in an implicit way by a ‘Nota explicativa’ of the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts on December 8, 2011. See below for a presentation of its content. 13 14



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structures on the national level putting into practice the collegiality and communion between the bishops belonging to different churches sui iuris and the heads of the Eastern Catholic Churches. A second document I would like to present is an explanation of the Pontifical Council for the Legislative Texts concerning the first canon of the CCEO, issued on December 8, 2011.15 This canon, establishing the field of application of the CCEO, raised the question to what extent the Latin church is obliged to apply the norms of the CCEO. Canon 1 of the Eastern Code reads: ‘The canons of this Code concern all and only the Eastern Catholic Churches, unless, with regard to relations with the Latin church, it is expressly established otherwise’. The canon speaks of an express mention of the Latin church. Indeed, some nine or ten canons of the CCEO mention the Latin church explicitly, so without doubt the faithful and pastors of the Latin church are obliged to obey these norms. However, many norms of the CCEO just refer to churches sui iuris in general. Since the Latin church is also a Church sui iuris, there was a need for clarification of the question whether these norms are also binding on the Latin church. The Pontifical Council responded to this with its Nota explicativa of 2011. On a technical level, it explained, first of all, that the word ‘expresse’ is the opposite of tacitly. This implies that the word could be understood as mentioning either explicitly or implicitly the Latin church. As a consequence, besides the nine or ten norms that mention the Latin Church explicitly, other norms as well can be considered as binding for the Latin church. In order to determine whether the Latin church is included even when mention is made only of churches sui iuris in a general way, the expressions used in the norm as well as its context should be examined. According to the Pontifical Council, it should be held that the Latin church is implicitly included by analogy each time the CCEO uses the expression ‘church sui iuris’ in the context of inter-ecclesial (inter-ritual) relationships. This clarification indeed puts an end to certain doubts. To mention just one example, canon 343 of the CCEO allows that candidates for the sacrament of order be educated in a seminary of another church sui iuris. This extends the possibilities for Eastern candidates since they are not obliged to attend a seminary of their own Church, and at the same time it facilitates the organisation of priestly training by the ecclesiastical authorities, then several churches sui iuris in Eastern regions have the 15   Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts, ‘Nota explicativa quoad can. 1 CCEO’, December 8, 2011, Communicationes, 43 (2011), pp. 315-316.

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right to constitute a seminary for their different churches. For these cases, however, the Eastern Code insists on the fact that the seminarians have to receive an education in their own rite, which implies that the bishops sending their candidates for orders to such a seminary, as well as the authorities directing the seminary, should make sure that this can be realised. The explanation of the Pontifical Council implies that even Latin bishops receiving Eastern candidates in their diocesan seminary must see to it that these persons will be educated in their own rite. It might necessitate special classes for these persons or practical exercises with priests belonging to the same church or professors who are experts in the traditions of the church sui iuris in question. It also implies that it should be possible for these seminarians to participate in the liturgy of their own church. So it is clear that the dispositions for education have to be adapted to this situation.16 In June 2014 the Prefect of the Congregation for the Eastern Churches, Cardinal Sandri, made public a decision of Pope Francis, taken in an audience of December 23, 2013, concerning the exercise of ministry by Eastern married clerics outside the territory of their Church sui iuris.17 This topic has been discussed very often, especially since the promulgation of the CCEO. To understand this problem, we must recall the decrees published in 1929 and 1930 concerning in the first instance only the exercise of ministry of Ruthenian married clerics in North America.18 Some months later, a second decree extended the prohibition to all the Eastern married clergy in South America, Canada and Australia as well.19 And finally, a third decree established in 1930 that only unmarried men could be admitted to the seminaries and to the sacrament of orders. 20 Even if these decrees concerned only some regions of the world, the norms have been extended in practice to other territories that were not 16   We also have to keep in mind that the rite concerns not only the liturgy, but also the theological, spiritual and disciplinary heritage of a church sui iuris. The examples can be found in D. Salachas and L. Sabbarese, Chierici e ministero sacro nel codice latino e orientale: Prospettive interecclesiali (Rome, 2004), pp. 347-349. 17  Congregation for the Eastern Churches, ‘Pontificia Praecepta de Clero Uxorato ­Orientali’, June 9, 2014 (text in Italian), Acta Apostolicae Sedis (AAS), 106 (2014), 6, pp. 496-499. English transl. in J. Huels, ‘Canonical Notes on the Pontifical Precepts on Married Eastern Clergy’, Studia Canonica, 50 (2016), pp. 157-159; French transl., ibid., pp. 160-163. 18   CEO, Decree ‘Cum data fuerit’, March 1, 1929, AAS, 21 (1929), pp. 152-159. 19   CEO, Decree ‘Qua sollerti’, December 23, 1929, AAS, 22 (1930), pp. 99-105. 20   CEO, Decree ‘Graeci-Rutheni’, May 24, 1930, AAS, 22 (1930), pp. 346-354.



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considered as Eastern regions. Exceptions to these prohibitions could be conceded by the Congregation of the Oriental Churches after consultation of the local episcopal conference.21 After the promulgation of the CCEO, in 1990, the question was raised whether these decrees were still in force. One of the preliminary canons of the CCEO determines the relationship between the CCEO and the former law. It establishes that all common or particular laws contrary to the canons of the Code or which concern matters which are integrally reordered in the Code are abrogated with its coming into force.22 Then we have to ask if the decrees from 1929 and 1930 are contrary to the canons of the CCEO or if they concern matters that have been integrally reordered. At first glance, we might come to this conclusion. The CCEO speaks in a positive way about married clerics, mentioning that this practice corresponds to the one that was in force in the primitive church and that it has been maintained in the Eastern churches through the ages.23 Further, it refers to the particular law of each church sui iuris or to special norms established by the Apostolic See that are to be followed in admitting married men to sacred orders.24 This leaves room for the different traditions of the Eastern Catholic churches.25 Several other canons also include norms on married clerics; however, none of these canons explicitly mentions the exercise of ministry by married clerics in diaspora situations. Probably for this reason, the Congregation for the Oriental Churches was of the opinion that the decrees of 1929 and 1930 were still in force. Several exchanges between the Congregation and the Byzantine (Ruthenian) Metropolitan Church of Pittsburgh concerning norms of ­particular law that this church wanted to promulgate, among which a norm concerning the admission of married men to the sacrament of orders, resulted in a kind of relaxation by the Congregation. After ­completion of training, married men could be admitted to the order of deacon; concerning the admission of married men to the order of the presbyterate, however, ‘the special norms issued by the Apostolic See are to be observed, unless dispensations are granted by the same See in 21   In France, for instance, exercise of ministry by a Chaldean married priest has been accepted because of the special circumstance that a whole village from the East of Turkey had migrated with its own parish priest to France. The parish priest happened to be ­married. 22   CCEO can. 6 § 1. 23   CCEO can. 373. 24   CCEO can. 758 § 3. 25   The Syro-Malabar and Syro-Malankar churches, for instance, do not admit married men to the sacrament of orders.

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individual cases’.26 However, it seems that in practice the Holy See very often denied permission, even in these individual cases. Therefore we should welcome the decision of Pope Francis published in 2014. The Holy Father decided to concede to Eastern hierarchs in Eastern administrative circumscriptions, like (metropolitan-) eparchies and ­exarchies constituted outside the traditional territory, the faculty to allow the pastoral ministry of married clerics. They also received the faculty to ordain Eastern married candidates originating from their circumscription. In that case, they have the obligation to previously inform in writing the Latin bishop of the place where the candidate has his residence in order to ask him for his opinion and receive other useful information. Some of my colleagues justly observed that it seems strange to concede this ­faculty to Eastern hierarchs, when those who exercise their ministry within the territory of the Church sui iuris do not need such a faculty.27 We can conclude that, in spite of the fact that local hierarchs can now decide that Eastern married clerics may exercise their ministry outside the proper territory, the new norms continue to maintain a difference between the territory of a Church sui iuris and the diaspora. The Latin environment of the latter receives more importance than the discipline and patrimony of the Eastern churches. The restrictive character of the norms can also be seen in the detail that the married men have to originate from the circumscription of the hierarch. In other words, the hierarch cannot accept for ordination married men who do not come from his circumscription. This disposition probably wants to avoid Latin married men transferring to an Eastern church sui iuris in order to ask for admission to holy orders. The dispositions also seem to pay relatively much attention to the Latin local bishops. On the one hand, the obligation of the Eastern hierarch to inform the Latin bishop is understandable from a perspective of communion between the bishops, especially because of the fact that two different disciplines will coexist inside the same territory. But on the other hand, it might be felt by the Eastern hierarchs as a kind of supervision. If this indeed will be the case fully depends on the interpretation concerning the opinion of the Latin bishop: should he give his opinion on the candidate or on the situation in his territory which happens to be at the same time the 26   N. Rachford, ‘Norms of Particular Law for the Byzantine Metropolitan Church sui iuris of Pittsburgh, USA and Its Implications for Latin Dioceses’, Canon Law Society of America (CLSA) Proceedings, 62 (2000), pp. 233-243, on pp. 240-241. 27   J. Huels, ‘Canonical Notes on the Pontifical Precepts on Married Eastern Clergy’, Studia Canonica, 50 (2016), pp. 145-163, on pp. 148-152.



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territory in which the future married cleric will exercise his ministry? And what happens if he communicates a negative opinion to the Eastern hierarch? Since it is an opinion, this hierarch would not be obliged to take it into account; otherwise it would mean that the decisions of the Eastern hierarch would be subject to the consent of the Latin bishop. The Ordinariates for the Eastern Catholics are also taken into account, as well as the territories in which the Eastern Catholics are entrusted to the pastoral care of Latin bishops for want of a hierarchy of their own Church. The Ordinaries at the head of the Ordinariates have the same faculty as the Eastern hierarchs in their circumscriptions outside the proper territory of their church. They have to exercise it in concrete cases, informing the respective episcopal conference and the Congregation for the Eastern Churches. The difficulty of interpretation lies here in the fact that the Eastern hierarchs benefit from two different faculties: one of allowing the pastoral ministry of married priests, and the other one allowing them to ordain married men to priesthood. With respect to the Ordinaries of the Ordinariates reference is made to just one faculty — the question is, which one? In our opinion, this concerns the first one in particular, since the introduction to the norms speaks only of the faculty to allow the pastoral service of married Eastern clergy outside the traditional Eastern territories. We can conclude that the Latin bishop who exercises the office of Ordinary for the Eastern faithful who do not have a hierarchy of their own Church sui iuris can determine on his own whether to allow married priests to exercise their ministry in the territory of the Ordinariate. In virtue of episcopal collegiality and communion, he only has to inform the episcopal conference. The Congregation for the Eastern Churches has to be informed probably in order to allow it to have a detailed view of the regions where married Eastern priests are exercising their ministry. In places where the Eastern faithful are entrusted to the care of Latin diocesan bishops — other than those appointed as Ordinary of an Ordinariate — these bishops cannot decide to allow the pastoral ministry of married Eastern priests. They need to refer to the Congregation for the Eastern Churches, who can give permission after having heard the opinion of the respective episcopal conferences. In summary, a certain flexibility has at least been introduced with respect to the Eastern hierarchs and to Ordinaries in the Ordinariates who can decide on their own whether they accept married Eastern priests in their territories or not. It amounts to a relaxation of the former norms issued in 1929-1930.

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Recently, on September 15, 2016, a motu proprio of Pope Francis was published with the title De Concordia inter Codices. Its object is to ­harmonise the Latin and the Eastern Code, in the sense that several changes and new texts are now introduced in the Latin Code. The documents contains eleven articles that introduce changes into ten canons of the Latin Code.28 As one of the motives for the publication of this ­document, the Pope especially mentions the fact that discrepancies between the two Codes might have a negative effect on pastoral praxis, specifically in cases where relationships between persons belonging to the Latin church and one of the Eastern Catholic churches respectively are concerned. Three articles of the document concern the ascription to a church sui iuris. A new paragraph is introduced in one of the canons prescribing that whenever only one of the parents is Catholic, the child will be ascribed to the church sui iuris to which the Catholic parent belongs.29 Another canon has now been supplemented with a paragraph concerning the moment at which the transfer to another church sui iuris will enter into force, as well as representatives of the church who can testify this transfer.30 With respect to the third canon in this field, a substantial and a terminological change have been made: where the former text established that the baptismal register of the parish should note different elements concerning the canonical status of a member of the faithful, mentioning explicitly the ‘change of rite’, the new text starts with the prescription that the baptismal register should note the ‘ascription to a church sui iuris or the transfer to another church’. The first element is completely new in the Latin Code and we can observe that the expression church sui iuris, which is in use in the CCEO, is copied here, abandoning the term ‘rite’ to designate the same reality.31 Two articles of ‘De Concordia inter Codices’ concern a canon on ­baptism. A new paragraph 3 is added to this canon allowing for the ­baptism of the child of non-Catholic Christians by a Catholic minister if the parents ask for it, or if it is impossible for them to approach a minister of their own church. The scholars studying the CCEO, which contains a similar text, agree in concluding that in this case the child will of course not be a member of the Catholic Church. The will of the parents in this 28   In one case, two paragraphs of the same canon are concerned, that is can. 868, §§ 1 and 3. 29   ‘De Concordia inter Codices’, Art. 1, modifying can. 111 of the Latin Code (CIC). 30   Ibid., art. 2, adding a paragraph 3 to can. 112 of the Latin Code. 31   See ibid., art. 3, modifying can. 535 § 2 of CIC.



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sense has to be respected: they want their child to be baptised, but we cannot presume that they want the child to be a member of the Catholic Church. This is especially the case when the parents cannot approach a minister of their own church. The Catholic minister acts in this case to supply the absence of the other minister and to render baptism possible with a view to the salvation of souls.32 The expression ‘non-Catholic Christians’ is of course a large one. Those who prepared the CCEO ­specifically had in mind Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox Christians. But the wording of the canon does not exclude other Christians such as Anglicans, Protestants and members of the Old Catholic Church. The fact that the child will not be a member of the Catholic Church is also clear from a reference added to the former paragraph of this canon. It now reads: ‘(For the licit baptism of an infant it is necessary that): 1° […]; 2° there be a founded hope that the infant will be brought up in the Catholic religion without prejudice to § 3’. This last injunction demonstrates that whenever a child of non-Catholic Christians is baptised by a Catholic minister, the condition of a founded hope concerning the education of this child in the Catholic religion will not be upheld. The remaining six articles of the document all concern the celebration of marriage. A very important one constitutes a new text establishing that only a priest can validly assist the marriage of two Eastern future spouses or even the marriage of a Latin future spouse and an Eastern Catholic or non-Catholic partner.33 In the Eastern Catholic and in nonCatholic churches, marriages cannot be celebrated by a deacon, contrary to the practice of the Latin church. The CCEO is very strict in this sense: ‘Only those marriages are valid that are celebrated with a sacred rite, in the presence of the local hierarch, local pastor, or a priest who has been given the faculty of blessing the marriage by either of them [….]’.34 Since the promulgation of the CCEO much has been written   Ibid., art. 5 introducing a new § 3 to CIC can. 868.   ‘De Concordia inter Codices’, art. 6 adding a new paragraph 3 to CIC can. 1108. The act of the priest is qualified as ‘to assist’. This is a technical term in Catholic canon law: the Catholic Church traditionally considers that the spouses are the ministers of the sacrament of marriage, therefore the bishop, priest or deacon or even a lay person act as an official representative of the Catholic Church and ask the manifestation of the consent of the spouses and receives it in the name of the Church. See CIC can. 1108 § 2. By the way, we regret the use of the verb ‘to assist’ since it reflects the Latin mentality. The CCEO consequently speaks of ‘celebrating the marriage’, which better expresses the fact that the priest not only asks for the consent and receives it, but also has to bless the marriage. 34   CCEO can. 828 § 1. 32 33

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about the validity of marriage of two Eastern faithful or even of a marriage of a Latin member of the faithful and an Eastern one, when the marriage would be celebrated by a Latin deacon. Especially the diaspora situation could lead to this type of celebration because Latin pastors very often exercise pastoral care for Eastern faithful. A Latin bishop or a Latin parish priest could be tempted to delegate a Latin deacon for this type of celebration. Several canon lawyers defended the validity of these marriages arguing that the Latin deacon according to Latin canon law has the right to celebrate marriages, and insisting on the validity of the delegation because a Latin bishop or parish priest can indeed give the faculty to a Latin deacon to celebrate marriages.35 Other scholars, however, were of the opinion that there would be a risk that a tribunal of the Catholic Church would declare the marriage invalid whenever it had to pronounce on the validity of the marriage, because Eastern faithful, in virtue of the text quoted above, cannot validly marry without blessing by a priest.36 A long time ago the question had already been submitted to the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts. We can consider that the question has now been answered; it is clear how to proceed in these cases in order to safeguard the validity of the marriage to be celebrated. And the new norm really respects the proper character of the celebration of marriage in the Eastern Churches. This new text also led to changes in other canons. On the one hand, this concerns the canon on delegations, since it must be clear that a Latin deacon cannot receive the faculty to celebrate these kinds of marriages.37 On the other hand, it has consequences for the possibility in Latin canon law that a lay person can act as a representative of the Church in regard

35   We do not want to enter into the details of the arguments, since this would lead us too far afield. We just refer to some publications of those defending the capacity of the Latin deacon. See for instance U. Navarrete, ‘Questioni sulla forma canonica ordinaria nei Codici latino e orientale’, Periodica, 85 (1996), pp. 489-514, pp. 505-506; J. Prader, Il matrimonio tra Oriente e Occidente, Kanonika, 1 (Rome, 1992), p. 201; and also ibid., La legislazione matrimoniale latina e orientale: Problemi interecclesiali, interconfessionali e interreligiosi (Rome, 1993), p. 39. This last author changed his position some ten years later. See id., A Guide to the Eastern Code: A Commentary on the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, ed. G. Nedungatt, Kanonika, 10 (Rome, 2002), p. 570. 36   D. Salachas, Il sacramento del matrimonio nel Nuovo Diritto Canonico delle Chiese orientali (Rome/Bologna, 1994), p. 200; J. Abbass, Two Codes in Comparison, Kanonika, 7 (Rome, 1997), pp. 100-103. 37   Ibid., art. 8 which modifies CIC can. 1111.



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to the celebration of marriage. This also has to be excluded as far as concerns the marriages of Eastern faithful.38 A third consequence of the exclusion of the competence of a Latin deacon in these celebrations can be found in a norm concerning mixed marriages between a Catholic faithful and a future spouse who is a nonCatholic of an oriental rite.39 The Second Vatican Council introduced a relaxation of the norms on marriage celebration. Formerly, with regard to Catholic faithful, only those marriages that had been celebrated in the presence of a representative of the Catholic Church were considered ­valid.40 The Council accepted that a Catholic member of the faithful who enters marriage with an Orthodox or Oriental Orthodox can marry validly in the church of his or her spouse. In this way, it recognised the proper discipline of the Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox Churches and also accepted that a marriage celebrated validly according to the disciplines of these Churches can be recognised as valid for the Catholic spouse even in the absence of a representative of the Catholic Church. This has been incorporated in both Codes. The former Latin norm established that for validity of this marriage the presence of a ‘sacred minister’ is required.41 The expression ‘sacred minister’ however also applies to a deacon, and therefore was not very appropriate with respect to the discipline of the Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox Churches. The new norm changes this terminology and speaks of the ‘intervention of a priest’ as necessary for the validity of marriage. Another point that needed to be clarified concerns the competence of the local Ordinary and the parish priest to celebrate marriages. Several elements are mentioned: for instance, they should not be punished by some church penalty that concerns the exercise of their office; they are competent within the limits of their territory. One of these elements concerns their competence with respect to certain categories of persons, and details this as far as concerns their subjects and those who are not 38   Ibid., art. 9 changes the first paragraph of CIC can. 1112 referring to the new text of can. 1108 § 3 that stipulates that only a priest can validly celebrate the marriage of Eastern faithful. 39   Even if these new norms can be considered as progress in better respecting the proper discipline of the Eastern churches, the terminology that has been adopted very often still reflects the Latin point of view. In the text under study the expression ‘a non-Catholic of an Oriental rite’ would never be adopted by the persons concerned and does not correspond to the terminology in force in the CCEO. 40   ‘De Concordia inter Codices’, art. 11 which changes the terminology in CIC can. 1127 § 1. 41   See CIC can. 1127 § 1.

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their subjects. The former text of this canon contained a final clause ­saying ‘provided one of the contractants is of the Latin rite’. Since this clause was mentioned at the end of the text, it was not clear if it had to be applied only to those who are not subjects of the local Ordinary and the parish priest, or to their subjects as well. The new formulation of the canon demonstrates that this clause only concerns those who are not their subjects.42 The last new norm that is introduced in Latin canon law regards ­Catholic priests who want to celebrate the marriage of two faithful belonging to the Orthodox or Oriental Orthodox Churches and who ask spontaneously for this celebration. The priests have to ask a special faculty from their local Ordinary to proceed to this celebration; they should check that the conditions for validity are fulfilled, and they should inform the competent authority of the church concerned.43 Since the new paragraph refers to the former ones of the same canon, this possibility is presented in the framework of what is called the extraordinary form of marriage celebration, which allows for a celebration of the marriage of Catholic faithful in the presence of two witnesses only, so without an official representative of the Catholic Church. The new paragraph adds another special situation to this, but the conditions mentioned with respect to the first case also apply, that is recourse to the extraordinary form is allowed in danger of death or, outside this situation, if the impossibility of finding a person competent to assist to the marriage were to last for a month.44 This leads us to the conclusion that a Catholic priest can ­celebrate the marriage of Orthodox or Oriental Orthodox faithful only when these persons cannot have recourse to a minister of their own church. Just as in the case of baptism, the Catholic priest will proceed to this celebration in order to supply the absence of a minister of the same church as the faithful in question. 2.2.  Some New Institutions After this short overview of new norms, we also would like to address the question of the institutional impact of the diaspora context, as some

  Ibid., art. 7, with a new text of CIC can. 1109.   Ibid., art. 10, adding a new paragraph 3 to CIC can. 1116. 44   See CIC can. 1116 § 1, 1° and 2°. 42 43



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more or less new institutions in the Eastern Churches came into existence because of the diaspora situation. In the USA and in Canada, Eastern Catholic bishops felt the need of an institution allowing them to meet, to discuss and to promote common goals. The CCEO insists on this in its canon 202: ‘The eparchial bishops of several churches sui iuris exercising power in the same territory are to ensure that through the exchange of views in periodic meetings, they foster unity of action and, by combined resources, help advance common works more readily to promote the good of religion and to more effectively safeguard ecclesiastical discipline’. An institution that can put into practice these goals has been foreseen in canon 322 with the assemblies of hierarchs of different churches sui iuris. These are conceived as interritual, or better inter-ecclesial assemblies of hierarchs exercising their ministry in the same region, including the hierarchs of the Latin Church. In the USA there are about 17 Eastern Catholic circumscriptions and in Canada some 11 eparchies and exarchies,45 so it is easily understandable that these bishops felt a need for collaboration. They did not have recourse to canon 322 to which we just referred. The canon in question, however, is not limited in its application to the traditional Eastern regions. The beginning of the text simply reads: ‘Where it seems advisable in the judgment of the Apostolic See, periodic assemblies are to be held of patriarchs, metropolitans of metropolitan churches sui iuris, eparchial bishops, and, if the statutes so state, other local hierarchs of various churches sui iuris, even of the Latin Church, exercising their authority in the same nation or region’. So all depends on the judgment of the Holy See; no reference is made to a specific territory besides the fact that these bishops and hierarchs have to exercise their power in the same nation or region. The bishops in the USA constituted an organism called ‘Eastern Catholic Associates’; it meets twice a year and envisions the realisation of goals in relationship with the inter-ecclesial communion. In Canada, a Conference of Catholic Bishops of the Ukrainian Rite was already established before the promulgation of the CCEO; it found its inspiration in canon 351 of the motu proprio Cleri Sanctitati (1957). No specific organism or institution was foreseen in this canon; only the common action and meetings of bishops and exarchs, even of different rites, was promoted in the former law. Both of the existing instances, in the USA

  An exarchy is a kind of preliminary stage of an eparchy. See CCEO can. 311-321.

45

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as well as in Canada, are in a certain sense ‘praeter ius’ or ‘praeter legem’ (beyond the law).46 Another new institution is the establishment of an Ordinariate for Eastern Catholics in Spain who do not have a hierarchy of their own church. This happened in June 2016.47 The Ordinariate as such is not a new institution. Ordinariates of this type, that is multi-ritual or multi-ecclesial Ordinariates entrusted to a Latin bishop or archbishop taking care of the Eastern Catholics wherever they are residing on the national territory, have been constituted, especially in the 1950s, in Brazil, France and Argentina. In the 1980s, an Ordinariate was created in Poland. Since the CCEO does not speak about these institutions (neither does the CIC), and the solutions for the pastoral care of faithful residing outside the territory of their Church who do not have a hierarch of their own Church are ­different, one could think that these Ordinariates are now outmoded or a thing of the past. It seems that this is not the dominant opinion at the Holy See. One of the arguments mentioned is the unity of government that can be realised with such an Ordinariate. The Archbishop of Spain is the Ordinary and exercises his power of government cumulatively with the local Ordinaries. These last ones can act on their own but only in a secondary way. 3. Evaluation We can conclude that there has been some juridical impact by the diaspora situation of the Eastern Catholics within the Catholic Church. Several new norms and interpretations have been published. Even if they do not mention explicitly as their goal the situation of the Eastern Catholics living outside the territory of their own church, their aim is to facilitate and to create greater certainty in applying the norms, especially in relationships between Latin pastors and Eastern faithful. The document allowing for the ordination of married men and the pastoral ministry of married clerics in the diaspora clearly attempts to respond to requests that have been submitted for a long time back to the Holy See. Notwith46   J. Abbass, ‘Assemblies of Hierarchs for Eastern Catholic Bishops in the Diaspora’, Studia Canonica, 40 (2006), pp. 371-396. 47   Congregatio pro Ecclesiis Orientalibus, Decretum ‘Ordinariatus pro Christifidelibus orientalibus in Hispania degentibus instituitur’, 9 Iunii 2016, Prot.N. 70/2010. The decree has not been published. For details, see A. Kaptijn, ‘Ordinariato Apostólico para la ­atención de los orientales in España’, Ius Canonicum, 56 (2016), pp. 771-781.



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standing some criticism, this document can be considered as making progress and as an improvement. Does this mean that now the situation of Eastern Catholics in diaspora is perfect? I do not think so. There still are other aspects that are considered as problematic by the Eastern Catholic churches. To mention just one of them: there still is the determination of the proper territory of the Eastern Catholic churches accompanied by the restriction that the superior authorities of these churches (for instance the Patriarch and the Synod of Bishops of the patriarchal Church) cannot exercise their power validly outside the territory, unless exceptions are allowed by the law itself or by the Roman Pontiff. Since the Latin Church is not bound by any comparable restriction and not even a territory has been circumscribed for the Latin Church, this is felt as a discrimination. Besides that, it renders more difficult the protection and the pastoral care of the faithful outside the territory by the proper authorities of their own church. On the other hand, we also have to notice that Pope John Paul II invited the Eastern Catholic churches to submit to him proposals for particular law rendering this aspect more flexible; up till now, at least as far as I know, no proposals of this kind have been submitted. It rather gives the impression that the Eastern Catholic churches only want an abolition of the territorial restrictions and that they do not reflect on different steps that could be taken in this direction, realising slowly the goal they want to reach. Personally, I think it would be very helpful if the authorities of the Eastern Catholic churches would try to advance in collaboration with the local Latin Ordinaries. One of the problems I observed in my research concerning France, at least at a certain moment in history, was the fact that some Patriarchs tried to interfere directly in the territory of Latin Ordinaries, for instance by appointing priests for their own faithful, something that was not really appreciated. If the Eastern superior authorities and the Latin bishops would act more often in a spirit of communion, dialogue and collaboration, it would create more goodwill on both sides. Further we also have to mention the differences in culture in general. We could think for instance of the fact that the separation of church and state is unknown in many countries where the Eastern Catholic churches are established, and especially the ways in which the power of government is exercised as a result of the Roman and Byzantine ­traditions. A lot of problems of this kind could already be improved in practice. Once this is on the way, the norms will follow; seeing that ‘ius sequitur vitam’, the law will follow life.

THE HOLY AND GREAT COUNCIL OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH BETWEEN SYNODAL INERTIA AND GREAT EXPECTATIONS ACHIEVEMENTS AND PENDING ISSUES Pantelis Kalaitzidis

1. Introductory Remarks ‘The Orthodox Church will never be the same after June 26th, 2016. On that day, when the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church held at Crete (Greece) finished, one big chapter of its history was ­concluded, or perhaps, an entirely new one has been opened’.1 As it is known, the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church was held in June 17-26, 2016, in the island of Crete, in Greece. A long-awaited historic event — as the initial idea was already discussed since the beginning of the 20th century, whereas its preparation in the proper sense of the term started already in 1961 — the Council marked an important step towards the re-discovery of genuine conciliarity and synodality, and took important decisions for the present and the future of the Orthodox Church. At the same time, however it was unfortunately convened without or in the absence of the laity, the women, and the youth, with an almost overall dated agenda, which could correspond perhaps to the expectations and 1  A. Jeftić, ‘Foreword’, in Synodality: A Forgotten and Misapprehended Vision. Reflections on the Holy and Great Council of 2016, eds. M. Vasiljević and A. Jeftić (Alhambra CA, 2017), pp. 7-12, p. 7. Cf. V. N. Makrides, ‘Le concile panorthodoxe de 2016: Quelques réflexions sur les défis auxquels le monde orthodoxe doit faire face’, Istina, 62 (2017), pp. 5-26, on p. 7: ‘Malgré tous ces problèmes et la divergence des points de vue, force est de constater que ce concile a été un événement important dans l’histoire de l’orthodoxie moderne et qu’il laissera certainement une trace dans les années à venir’. Cf. ibid., p. 25. Cf. also ‘13 Σημεῖα συνάντησης μὲ τὸν Σεβασμιώτατο Μητροπολίτη Νιγηρίας κ. Ἀλέξανδρο. Συνέντευξη στὸν Ἡρακλῆ Φίλιο’ [Thirteen Points of Meeting with Metropolitan Alexander of Nigeria. An Interview of His Eminence to Iraklis Filios]: http://fanarion.blogspot.gr/2018/03/blog-post_30.html/ (accessed 27 March 2018). ‘The Holy and Great Council of Crete is the most important step of the last centuries in the history of the Orthodox Church. I consider my participation as a true God’s blessing, an unprecedented experience. […] The Council gave a valuable opportunity to all local churches to revive their ecclesiological self-consciousness that seemed to be lost’.

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concerns of the people of the 60s and 70s, but which does not fit in any sense to the today’s concerns. The Council was attended by the ­primates and representatives (mainly bishops) of ten out of fourteen Orthodox churches, as four churches canceled at the last minute their participation (i.e., the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch, the ­Russian Orthodox Church, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, and the Orthodox Church of Georgia).2 The Eastern Orthodox Church consists a communion (and not a federation) of fourteen Patriarchal and Autocephalous churches, ‘recognized at a pan-Orthodox level’ (Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, Russia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Cyprus, Greece, Poland, Albania, Czech lands and Slovakia).3 According to the bold pneumatology that characterizes the Orthodox tradition and theology, and its theology of the local church and Eucharistic ecclesiology, all bishops are equal by virtue of their ordination, and therefore in Eastern Orthodoxy there is no any central governing structure equivalent to Roman Papacy. Each Orthodox territorial church (often national) is governed by a Holy Synod, presided by a Patriarch or an Archbishop, while the Patriarch of Constantinople in Istanbul, Turkey, enjoys since the Chalcedon Fourth Ecumenical Council (451 ad) a primacy of honor and of service in the Christian East (as primus inter pares), whose main aim is to minister the unity of the Orthodox Church, to coordinate and to convene Pan-Orthodox meetings, conferences and synods, and to preside over them. In this capacity, and upon the unanimous decision of all the Orthodox churches expressed in the Synaxis (gathering) of the Orthodox Primates  P. L. Gavrilyuk, ‘Historic Orthodox Council Meets Despite Absence of Four Churches’: https://www.americamagazine.org/issue/historic-orthodox-council-meetsdespite-absence-four-churches/ (accessed 3 March 2018), describes both the attempts towards the subverting of the council and the accounts of how the attempts failed. 3   Cf. ‘Message of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church’. 1: ‘Encyclical of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church’, I, 5: https://www.holycouncil. org/official-documents/ (accessed 3 March 2018). All our references to the conciliar documents are to be found in the above web address. For a general overview regarding the history, theology, ecclesiology, and the spirituality of the Orthodox Church, cf. T. Ware (now Metropolitan Kallistos of Diokleia), The Orthodox Church, revised edition (London, 1997); O. Clément, L’Église orthodoxe, ‘Que sais-je?’, 949 (Paris, 52010); id., Conversations with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, transl. P. Meyendorff (Crestwood NY, 1997), especially pp. 3-19; A. Schmemann, The Historical Road of Eastern Orthodoxy, transl. L. W. Kesich (Crestwood NY, 1977); J. Meyendorff, The Orthodox Church: Its Past and Its Role in the World Today, with selected revisions by N. Lossky, fourth revised edition (Crestwood NY, 1996); J. A. McGuckin, The Orthodox Church: An Introduction to Its History, Doctrine, and Spiritual Culture (Oxford, 2010). 2



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in January 2016, in Chambésy, Geneva, and after a long preparatory process that lasted 55 years (1961-2016), His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, invited the Orthodox churches worldwide to hold a Great and Holy Council on the island of Crete, Greece, in June 17-26, 2016. Although this gathering of the Orthodox hierarchs appears to be extraordinary in our day, it is also completely consistent with the living tradition of the church, of the Fathers, and of the great Ecumenical or local Councils. After the Great Schism between East and West in 1054, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, despite the five centuries of captivity to the Ottoman Turks (15th to 20th century), used to convene Greater Councils (without, however making use of the term ‘ecumenical’, since Christianity has been divided), during the late-byzantine and post-byzantine periods. Such a series of Councils decided in Constantinople on the issue of Hesychasm (1341, 1344, 1347 1351), granted the patriarchal honor and status to the Metropolitan of Moscow (by Ecumenical Patriarch Jeremiah II, 1589/1593), send the famous Answer of the Orthodox Patriarchs of the East to the invitation of the Pope Pius the IX to unite with Rome (1848), and proceed to the condemnation of extreme expressions of nationalism and ethno-phyletism (1872). The same applies also to the modern era. The journey towards a PanOrthodox Council began in the early 20th century, with encyclicals from Ecumenical Patriarch Joachim III in 1902 and 1904, and through biennial meetings among the churches which endeavored to strengthen InterOrthodox relations. In 1902, while addressing himself to all Patriarchal and territorial Orthodox churches that deeply concerned about their unity, Patriarch Joachim III asked them to gather in a conference. But for the Ecumenical Patriarch, this effort towards Orthodox unity in particular was inseparable from his effort towards Christian unity in general, that involves the participation of all Christian churches. Orthodox unity and Christian unity share the same goal: the communion that should characterize the Church of Christ.4 After a long preparatory process, which lasted for decades and went through Inter-Orthodox Commissions, Pan-Orthodox and Pre-Conciliar Conferences, without, however, avoiding faltering and delays, His All4   N. Ruffieux, ‘The Preparation and Reception of the Council’, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 60 (2016), pp. 11-32, on pp. 11-12. Cf. T. A. Meimaris, The Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Movement (Thessaloniki, 2013).

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Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople convened the fifth Synaxis of the Primates of the Orthodox Churches (Phanar, Istanbul, March 2014) that decided to create a Special Inter-Orthodox Committee to expedite the process for preparing the Holy and Great Council. The Special Inter-Orthodox Committee met on three occasions to finalize the agenda and the corresponding documents for the Holy and Great Council. These documents were ultimately referred for approval to the fifth Pre-Conciliar Pan-Orthodox Conference (Chambésy, October 10-17, 2015), which in its turn had received the mandate from the fifth Synaxis of Primates of the Orthodox Churches (Phanar, March 2014) to conclude the preparatory process even with only eight agreed upon topics (instead of ten initially agreed) for the agenda of the Holy and Great Council. Finally, at the sixth Synaxis of Primates of the Orthodox Churches (January 21-28, 2016), the agenda was unanimously fixed. The purpose of the Synaxis was to confirm the achieved preparatory work and also to decide about the convocation, structure, and rules of organization and operation of the Holy and Great Council, as well as its agenda. The Synaxis of the Primates unanimously decided that the convocation of the Council should occur in Kolymbari, Kissamos, at the Orthodox Academy of Crete (and not in the church of Agia Eirini, in Istanbul, as it was ­initially decided in 2014, due to the instable political and military relationships of Russia with Turkey), from June 17th to 26th, 2016. It also unanimously accepted the documents of the fifth Pre-Conciliar PanOrthodox Conference (Chambésy, October 10-17, 2015) with certain additions and deletions, approved the Rules of Organization and Operation for the Holy and Great Council, and determined the agenda of its deliberations. The topics came finally to six: 1) The Mission of the Orthodox Church in the contemporary world; 2) The Orthodox Diaspora; 3) Autonomy and its manner of proclamation; 4) The sacrament of ­Marriage and its impediments; 5) The importance of Fasting and its application today; and 6) Relations of the Orthodox Church to the rest of the Christian world.5 Consequently the Council of Crete deliberated and issued decisions only to the above listed six topics. 5   For a detailed description and information concerning the long preparatory history, and the successive steps towards the Holy and Great Council (Inter-Orthodox Commissions, Pan-Orthodox and Pre-Conciliar Conferences, the Synaxes of Primates of the Orthodox Churches, etc.), cf. inter alia, V. Ionita, Toward the Holy and Great Synod of the Orthodox Church: The Decisions of the Pan-Orthodox Meetings since 1923 until 2009, transl. R. Rus (Fribourg CH/Basel, 2014); id., ‘On the Way to the Holy and Great Synod



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2. The Historic Character of the Council of Crete and the Unique Role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate We now understand why some people use to say that its high symbolic significance, and its certain problems and some abstentions notwithstanding, the Holy and Great Council finally happened! In the given conditions, and in the context defined by the broader political, geopolitical, and ecclesiastical developments, and without a centralized ecclesiological structure or a unique center of decision-making in the Orthodox Church, some went so far as to speak for the holding of the Holy and Great Council as a ‘miracle’, for which a great credit must be given to His AllHoliness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew.6 Many scholars and hierarchs, both Orthodox and non-Orthodox, praised His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew for his decisive role in the preparation, the acceleration of the process, and the convention of the Holy and Great Council, as well as for serving primacy and the exemplary way he exercised His prerogatives of primus inter pares in His capacity of the Chairman of the Council.7 In some cases, this positive appreciation as of the Orthodox Church’, in Orthodoxie im Dialog: Historische und aktuelle Perspektiven. Festschrift für Heinz Ohme, eds. R. Flogaus and J. Wasmuth (Berlin/Boston MA, 2015), pp. 413-434; J. Erickson, ‘Overview of History and Difficulties in Preparing for the Council’, in Orthodox Christianity at the Crossroad: A Great Council of the Church. When and Why, ed. G. E. Matsoukas (New York/Bloomington IN, 2009), pp. 19-39; N. Ruffieux, ‘Un concile panorthodoxe sans les orthodoxes?’, Contacts, 239 (2012), pp. 280-305, p. 305; id., ‘The Preparation and Reception of the Council’ (see n. 4); A. Arjakovsky, En attendant le concile de l’Église Orthodoxe (Paris, 2011); Meimaris, The Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Movement (see n. 4); Toward the Holy and Great Council: Decisions and Texts, ed. N. Symeonides (New York, 2016); Toward the Holy and Great Council: Theological Commentaries, ed. N. Symeonides (New York, 2016); A. Melloni, ‘Le Saint et Grand Concile de Crète: Héraklion-­ Kolymbari-Chania, 18-26 juin 2016’, Contacts, 255 (2016), pp. 323-331; P. Ladouceur, ‘The Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church (June 2016)’, Œcuménisme/Ecumenism, 51 (2016), pp. 18-39, as well as articles posted on religious or ecclesiastical websites and blogs in different languages. 6   J. Behr, ‘The Holy and Great Council 2016’, in Synodality (see n. 1), pp. 13-22, on pp. 13-14. Cf. C. Hovorun, ‘Interview sur le Concile’, Le Messager orthodoxe, 161 (2016), pp. 19-22, on pp. 19-20. 7   See for example Melloni, ‘Le Saint et Grand Concile de Crète’ (see n. 5), pp. 325, 335-336; D. Bathrellos, ‘Le Saint et Grand Concile: Présentation et appréciation’, Contacts, 255 (2016), pp. 352-358, p. 353; R. Thöle, ‘Le saint et grand Concile de l’Église orthodoxe (Crète, 2016) entre épreuve et promesse: Un echo luthérien’, Istina, 62 (2017), pp. 27-38, on p. 37; B. Gallaher, ‘The Orthodox Moment: The Holy and Great Council in Crete and Orthodoxy’s Encounter with the West: On Learning to Love the Church’, Sobornost, 39 (2017), 2, pp. 26-71, pp. 66-67; P. L. Gavrilyuk, ‘Orthodox Council Bridges Tensions, Moves toward Interfaith Dialogue’: www.americamagazine.org/issue/ortho-

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regards the role of the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew before and during the Council of Crete, is linked with the unique place and the coordinating role of the throne of Constantinople towards the unity of the Orthodox Church and its ecumenical and supranational constitution, as well as the challenges the latter faces in its relationship to today’s pluralistic post-modern world in a global scale.8 Following the personal in character remarks of the Orthodox professor Brandon Gallaher, who joined the Holy and Great Council of Crete as a member of the communication team led by the Archdeacon of the Ecumenical Patriarchate John Chryssavgis, Speaking for myself, the whole process of being involved with the Council and serving the Ecumenical Patriarch has confirmed in me that of all the Orthodox Churches only the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and especially His All-Holiness Patriarch Bartholomew, has the vocation, vision and the creativity to face a world changed utterly by the force of the West. Furthermore, in my time working for the Church I have come to the conclusion that of all the Orthodox Churches only Constantinople can lead Orthodoxy into new paths ever faithful to tradition.9 dox-council-bridges-tensions-moves-toward-interfaith-dialogue/ (accessed 3 March 2018). Cf. ‘Reflections on the Holy and Great Council’, An Interview with Metropolitan­ Kallistos [Ware] with M. R. Heinlein, in Synodality (see n. 1), pp. 129-132, p. 131; Bishop Maxim of Western America, Diary of the Council: Reflections from the Holy and Great Council at the Orthodox Academy in Crete, June 17-26, 2016 (Alhambra CA, 2016), ­passim; ‘13 Σημεῖα συνάντησης μὲ τὸν Σεβασμιώτατο Μητροπολίτη Νιγηρίας κ. Ἀλέξανδρο. Συνέντευξη στὸν Ἡρακλῆ Φίλιο’ (see n. 1). 8   Gallaher, ‘The Orthodox Moment’ (see n. 7), p. 52; E. Sotiropoulos, ‘Assembling in Council: Synodality in Grete’, in Synodality (see n. 1), pp. 23-40, on pp. 37-39. Cf. Bishop Maxim of Western America, Diary of the Council (see n. 7), p. 100. For the issue of primacy of Constantinople, cf. A. Schmemann, ‘The Idea of Primacy in Orthodox Ecclesiology’, in Primacy in the Church: The Office of Primate and the Authority of Councils. Vol. 1: Historical and Theological Perspectives, ed. J. Chryssavgis (Crestwood NY, 2016), pp. 339-366 (previous publication in the collective volume: The Primacy of Peter: Essays in Ecclesiology and the Early Church, ed. J. Meyendorff [Crestwood NY, 1992], pp. 145-171); Maximos [Christopoulos], Metropolitan of Sardis, ‘The Primacy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate: Developments since the Nineteenth Century’, in the same volume pp. 367-384; J. Meyendorff, ‘The Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Twentieth Century’, in the same volume, pp. 385-404 (originally published as ‘The Ecumenical Patriarchate Seen in the Light of Orthodox Ecclesiology and History’, The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, 24 [1979], pp. 227-244). 9   Gallaher, ‘The Orthodox Moment’ (see n. 7), pp. 51-52. The quotation by Gallaher continues with a critical reflection on the problems and possible shortcomings encountered in the witness of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the today’s world: ‘Yet sadly, the Ecumenical Patriarchate is all too often badly served by some of those who represent it. As an institution, it has, at times, seemed to value loyalty more than excellence making for mediocrity. It also has repeatedly upheld fidelity to a narrow interpretation of Hellenism making for a turgid ethnic nationalism. Loyalty and ethnocentrism should not be the main marks of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Entrusted to the First-Called is the high c­ alling



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Going back to the holding of the Council, and the challenge it represented for the Orthodox Church, and broader for the Christian world, it should be noticed that after so many centuries the Orthodox Church was gathered in a Council of global scale at the island of Crete. As Metropolitan Kallistos Ware stressed it, ‘[sc. the Council] was a success because it took place. […] I say that because there had not been a council of this kind in the recent history of the Orthodox Church. Some people would say that this is the first time since the seventh ecumenical council [Second Council of Nicaea, 787 ad] that a meeting of this caliber has taken place. So it was a major step forward that after lengthy preparation at last the Holy and Great Council did actually meet’.10 Despite its problems and failures, the historic character of the Council is also highlighted by John Chryssavgis who maintains that, perhaps we should see the absence of four churches in a different light. The truth is that ten churches did in fact convene and converse. Ten churches kept their word to assemble together. This has never occurred in the past. This alone is historical; this had never previously occurred. No other council in [the] history [sc. of the Orthodox Church] has assembled as many churches. And this was achieved without the powerful intervention of a secular emperor, who managed to maintain peace in the first millennium. It was achieved by the good will alone of the ten primates in attendance.11

Furthermore, the Orthodox American theologian Paul L. Gavrilyuk noticed from his side that, the most significant achievement of the Holy and Great Council is that the bishops managed to meet at all, after decades of preparation and the lastmoment attempt of four churches to stop the event. By meeting in a global council, the Orthodox churches proved to themselves and the rest of the world that they were not merely a loose confederation of local churches, but that they were also a unified body, historically continuous with the ‘one, holy, catholic and apostolic’ church of the Creed. The Christian communion that prides itself on being ‘the Church of the seven Ecumenical Councils’ could henceforth not only profess conciliarity as its core ecclesiological principle, but also practice global conciliarity as an important dimension of its ecclesial life.12

to witness to the whole universe the saving message of Christ regardless of origin and language. The vocation of the Ecumenical Throne is the expression of the universality of the Orthodox Faith’. 10   ‘Reflections on the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 7), p. 125. 11   J. Chryssavgis, ‘Looking Back at the Holy and Great Council’: www.huffingtonpost. com/rev-dr-john-chryssavgis/looking-back-at-the-holy-_b_12380732.html/ (accessed 3 March 2018). 12   Gavrilyuk, ‘Orthodox Council Bridges Tensions’ (see n. 7).

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from the

Councils Held

at the

Time

of the

Christian

In fact it is not by change that a meeting of this caliber has not taken place since the Seventh Ecumenical Council (Second of Nicaea) in the 8th century, and that people use to speak on this in terms of synodal ­inertia at the global level. Following the recent scholarship it seems that gatherings of this kind were organized, and financed by the Roman/ Byzantine state whose roads, network of communication, and the overall infrastructure were borrowed by these councils, which were also presided by Byzantine emperors. In fact, the Empire not only facilitated the ­logistics and paid for the expanses, but also influenced the conciliar ­procedures. The decline, and later the fall of the Byzantine empire put an end to this kind of ecumenical or imperial (or global in today’s terms) gatherings, and gradually led to the return to regional or smaller size councils (called by some scholars ‘ad hoc’), like the ones of the early Christian centuries or those on the hesychast controversy, and the endemoysa (ἐνδημοῦσα) council of Constantinople, or like the council which in 1872 condemned ethno-phyletism.13 This imperial support to the councils was neither unconditional nor perennial. It was rather ambiguous, since the councils implied also risks and unpredictable developments. In fact, the Byzantine State was not always in favor of the councils to the extent that the latter were never completely under its control.14 Undoubtedly, in the history of the church, the conciliar development does not begin or coincide with the councils convened or presided by the Byzantine emperor, i.e., the ecumenical councils. Beginning with the election of Mathias, the seven deacons, and the so-called Apostolic Council of Jerusalem (49 ad), until recent years, holding or convening councils is something coextensive with and intrinsic to the very being of the church; the church used to live and to grow by the councils and through councils, although synodality and conciliarity were not practiced at the same level and with the same regularity through ages, and in all places. To repeat a well-known quotation by St. John Chrysostom, ‘the church is an institution and a synod’,15 or following the relevant 13   C. Hovorun, ‘Conciliarity and the Holy and Great Council’, in Synodality (see n. 1), pp. 81-98, on pp. 87-89. 14   Ibid., p. 90. 15   St John Chrysostom, ‘On Psalm’ 149 (PG 55, col. 493): ‘ἐκκλησία γὰρ συστήματος καὶ συνόδου ἐστὶν ὄνομα’.



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comments by Archdeacon John Chryssavgis, ‘there is no church without council. […] In the absence of a council, a Church may function institutionally; but it is not Church’!16 Contemporary Christian theology, in the persons of Metropolitan John D. Zizioulas of Pergamon, Alexander Schmemann (Eastern Orthodox) or Hans Küng (Roman Catholic), rediscovered this intrinsic connectedness between the church and the council, and ‘have demonstrated that the council is not just an appendix to the Church, but the Church itself is a council’.17 Because we become estranged from the culture of conciliarity and communion,18 we do not always realize the central role played by the councils in the life of the church, and how close is the original meaning of the term σύνοδος (synod, council) to the very being of the ecclesial event, i.e., the ekklesia, the coming together (σύναξις ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό), the assembly of the faithful. ‘Coming together in order to decide on important matters ὁμοθυμαδόν seems to have been deeply rooted in the Church’s life from the very beginning’.19 In this line one should recall that the Greek word σύνοδος implies the meaning of ‘being on the same road’ (σύν+ὁδός) or ‘people (bishops) being together on the road’, and furthermore the gathering of people who look at something together.20 16   J. Chryssavgis, ‘Toward the Great and Holy Council: Retrieving a Culture of Conciliarity and Communion’, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 60 (2016), pp. 317-332, on p. 331; the same text has been published in a slightly expanded form as a book under the title: Toward the Great and Holy Council: Retrieving a Culture of Conciliarity and Communion (New York, 2016). Cf. Behr, ‘The Holy and Great Council 2016’ (see n. 6), p. 15; Bishop Maxim Vasiljević [of Western America], ‘Synodality: A Misinterpreted Vision’, in Synodality (see n. 1), pp. 99-128, p. 110. 17   Hovorun, ‘Conciliarity and the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 13), p. 82. For a discussion of the relevant connection between conciliarity and the very heart of the church, i.e., the Eucharist, cf. J. D. Zizioulas, ‘The Development of Conciliar Structures to the Time of the First Ecumenical Council’, in Councils and the Ecumenical Movement (Geneva, 1968), pp. 34-51; reprinted in J. D. Zizioulas, The One and the Many: Studies on God, Man, the Church and the World Today, ed. G. Edwards (Alhambra CA, 2010), pp. 190-213; id., ‘Ὁ Συνοδικὸς θεσμός. Ἱστορικά, ἐκκλησιολογικὰ καὶ κανονικὰ προβλήματα’ [The Synodal Constitution: Historical, Ecclesiological, and Canonical ­Problems], Theologia, 80 (2009), 2, pp. 5-41. 18   Cf. the paper and book with the same title by Chryssavgis, ‘Toward the Great and Holy Council: Retrieving a Culture of Conciliarity and Communion’ (see n. 16). 19  Zizioulas, The One and the Many (see n. 17), p. 211. 20   Ruffieux, ‘Un concile panorthodoxe sans les orthodoxes?’ (see n. 5), pp. 289-290; Chryssavgis, ‘Toward the Great and Holy Council: Retrieving a Culture of Conciliarity and Communion’ (see n. 16), p. 330; Jeftić, ‘Foreword’ (see n. 1), p. 11; Bishop Maxim of Western America, ‘Synodality: A Misinterpreted Vision’ (see n. 16), pp. 109-110. Cf. P. Valliere, Conciliarism: A History of Decision-Making in the Church (Cambridge/ New York, 2012), pp. 9-10; Hovorun, ‘Conciliarity and the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 13), pp. 82-83. In the classical tradition already, ‘the two words, σύνοδος and ἐκκλησία,

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Following the analysis by Fr. Cyril Hovorun, in order to understand how the councils were perceived in the East during the period of Late Antiquity, we should take seriously in account the function and the importance of the ‘root’ (ὁδός). In fact, in order for a bishop to participate in a council, he had to leave his see and ‘to take a way’ (ὁδός) often long and perilous, to reach his destination, where the council would happen. Together with other bishops, who hit the road, they were συνοδοί — those who take the way together. In this sense, the word σύνοδος was synonymous with the word συνοδοιπόρος. The coming of bishops-συνοδοιπόροι together after a long and dangerous trip was celebrated as their σύνοδος. This συν-οδοιπορία, this ‘being on the same road’ and ‘taking a way together’ created among the bishops an atmosphere of fellowship, brotherhood, and exchange, of ‘being together’, something experienced and noticed by many at the occasion of the Holy and Great Council of Crete. In fact, many comments and personal testimonies highlighted the fact that the participants discovered a new conciliar awareness, stimulated by the possibility of a large number of bishops to gather together, to exchange, and to experience the spirit of communion and brotherhood.21 But the issue of road, as suggested already above, interests our discussion for other reasons too, since it was closely linked to ‘the processes of flourishing and decline of the conciliar institutions. When the Church, after being recognized by the Roman Empire, was allowed to use Roman roads, the period of ecumenical councils became facilitated. This period came to an end, when the infrastructure of roads began collapsing’.22 If this assertion is right, then the councils, the ecumenical councils of the undivided church included, should be seen against their background, and linked to the political development of their time, considering the circumstances which did facilitate or did not the holding of councils, but also discussing the elements, legal procedures, and political structures

were also similar, as they meant an assembly. Ekklesia meant an assembly of free citizens of a Greek polis, who decided over the policies of their city. Σύνοδος meant any kind of assembly. Thus, in classical Antiquity, ἐκκλησία and σύνοδος were similar public phenomena’ (ibid., p. 82). 21  Cf. Thöle, ‘Le saint et grand Concile de l’Église orthodoxe’ (see n. 7), p. 37; ­Gallaher, ‘The Orthodox Moment’ (see n. 7), p. 69. Cf. Bishop Maxim of Western America, Diary of the Council (see n. 7), pp. 98ff. 22   Hovorun, ‘Conciliarity and the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 13), p. 83.



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Christian conciliarity borrowed from Greek Antiquity and the Roman Empire. Following again the analysis by Fr. Hovorun, The Christian councils adopted from the institutions of Antiquity not only procedures, but also democratic ethos. It would be anachronistic to see the councils as embodiments of modern or classical democracy. However, they featured some basic democratic procedures. For instance, all their participants had equal rights to speak and to vote — ἰσηγορία, which was an important principle of the Athenian ἐκκλησία. They also came to the councils with the idea that they speak on behalf of their people. They thus participated not only in the capacity of being consecrated as bishops, but also as representatives of their dioceses. Therefore, they felt accountable to their flocks, and considered the consequences of their voting accordingly.   It is remarkable that the councils adopted these democratic procedures in the era when the same procedures were in decline in the political and public sphere: the Senate became a decoration, and the political positions were filled not by elections, but by appointments by senior officials. Moreover, the councils remained the only democratic institution within the Church, when other democratic procedures became abandoned under pressure from Roman political practice. Thus, when the bishops ceased to be elected, they still participated in the councils on behalf of their ‘folks’, even though the logical chain between election and representation was broken.23

If the councils were a democratic institution in the midst of a monarchical era, the era of the empires, even more so it becomes an urgent necessity for the Orthodox Church to actively and genuinely reconnect with this tradition in an era (post-modernity), marked by the democratic and pluralist spirit, a spirit which prevails in our societies after the decline of the empires. To this end it is crucial to recall that the Holy and Great Council of Crete is the first post-imperial general council of Orthodoxy, a council not convened, presided, and supported financially by any emperor or secular ruler, and at the occasion of which the Orthodox Church was challenged to come to the age, and to assume by itself and for itself its own responsibility, without the support of any civil protector, either emperor, tsar or monarch! The crucial issue of the ecclesial reception of the Council of Crete will test if Orthodoxy is getting closer to its spiritual and political maturity or if it still lives according to the outdated medieval or pre-modern model. Furthermore, and with regards to a certain authoritarian spirit cherish some Orthodox, it is important to realize that we are now entering into the aftermaths and the 23   Ibid., p. 84. Cf. Valliere, Conciliarism (see n. 20), pp. 10-12. Opposite views with regards to the connection between ecclesial councils and democratic ethos in Bishop Maxim of Western America, ‘Synodality: A Misinterpreted Vision’ (see n. 16), p. 110.

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reception process of the Holy and Great Council, which means that ‘the acceptance of any institution and its decisions require freedom and time. Institutions which demand unchallenged authority and obedience, […] belong to the past’,24 and that ‘centers of primacy will no longer be ­centralized powers but sanctuaries of communion’,25 offering a model of a primacy of kenosis, and a servant leadership.26 Although conciliarity is perennial and diachronically present in the church as belonging to its nature, and being practiced at all levels of ecclesial administration (community/parish, diocese, territorial church, and finally Pan-Orthodox level), it has been realized in different historical forms, throughout the centuries, despite the fact they might have been labeled under similar or various connotations, such as ‘council’ or ‘synod’ (cf. the councils of the apostolic and early Christian period, the councils dated from the period of imperial recognition of Christianity, councils of the late Byzantine, Ottoman or Tsarist periods, etc.).27 ‘While meeting together in council is vital, the form of that meeting changes through history: there is not one fixed form or criterion’.28 This variety of ­conciliar forms could also apply to the case of the Holy and Great Council. Whereas the latter follows the line of the conciliar continuity of Orthodoxy, it is in vain to dream an idyllic picture regarding the councils and the conciliar tradition or to look for its exact copy in the history and in the present state of the Eastern Church.29 As it is aptly maintained by His Beatitude Archbishop Anastasios of Tirana and All Albania, The Holy and Great Synod is not an exact copy of the Ecumenical Synods, nor is it a facsimile of Assemblies of the Western Christian tradition. Adapted to the circumstances and possibilities of the 21st century it has its own characteristics. It remains however as a tangible and clear symbol of unity of the Orthodox and a valuable institution for its life and witness in the contemporary world. There are some who believe that only an exact repetition of Synods of the past are authentically Orthodox. But the Holy   Bishop Maxim of Western America, Diary of the Council (see n. 7), p. 137.   Chryssavgis, ‘Toward the Great and Holy Council: Retrieving a Culture of Conciliarity and Communion’ (see n. 16), p. 332. 26   Cf. J. Behr and J. Chryssavgis, ‘Contemporary Ecclesiology and Kenotic Leadership: The Orthodox Church and the Great Council’, in Primacy in the Church: The Office of Primate and the Authority of the Councils. Vol. 2: Contemporary and Contextual Perspectives, ed. J. Chryssavgis (Crestwood NY, 2016), pp. 899-916. 27   Hovorun, ‘Conciliarity and the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 13), pp. 85, 86-90. Cf. Behr, ‘The Holy and Great Council 2016’ (see n. 6), p. 15. 28   Behr, ‘The Holy and Great Council 2016’ (see n. 6), p. 19. 29   Bishop Maxim of Western America, ‘Synodality: A Misinterpreted Vision’ (see n. 16), pp. 106-108; id., Diary of the Council (see n. 7), pp. 8, 85. 24

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Spirit does not act only in one era. He remains the determinant guide of the Church throughout the course of time. […]   Some have raised the question: In the great Orthodox Synods some ­heresy was addressed. What heresy is to be tackled by the Holy and Great Synod? The answer is simple. The greatest heresy, the mother of heresies — egocentrism. Personal, group, phyletistic, parochial, ecclesiastical, etc. egocentrism, which poisons human relationships and every form of harmonious and creative coexistence.30

In contrast to the earlier councils, the recent Holy and Great Council, did not aim to address any heretical teaching or to condemn heretical persons. On the contrary it seeked to promote conciliarity among the Orthodox at the global scale, and to resolve via the conciliar way canonical, pastoral and practical problems or to define the relationship of the Orthodox Church to other churches or Christian bodies. As noticed, the Holy and Great Council was to meet for its own sake, that is to say for the sake of conciliarity; in other words the Orthodox Church by ­conceiving the very idea of a Holy and Great Council, sought to prove that conciliarity is not just a nice formula of the past, but a vital way of ecclesial life.31 Referring to the historical perspective, it should be noticed that the multiplicity of conciliar forms includes also the following: a) councils of bishops and laity, councils in which lay people (such as Origen) was invited to lead the discussion and to ‘teach’ the participants (even the bishops), and, finally since the 4th century ad, councils exclusively attended by bishops;32 b) Ecumenical Councils (such as the First [First 30   Archbishop Anastasios of Tirana and All Albania, ‘Address at the Opening Session of the Holy and Great Synod, 19 June 2016’, transl. J. Sanidopoulos: https://panorthodoxcemes.blogspot.it/2016/12/archbishop-anastasios-of-albaniathe.html#more (accessed 3 March 2018); cf. A. N. Papathanasiou, ‘Les douleurs des orthodoxes, des douleurs d’enfantement?’, Le Messager orthodoxe, 161 (2016), pp. 16-18, on pp. 17-18. D. Arnaudov (‘Apport et réception du Saint et Grand Concile orthodoxe de Crète’, Contacts, 255 [2016], pp. 380-384, p. 384) maintains from his side that isolationism is the greatest ­heresy of our time! 31   Hovorun, ‘Conciliarity and the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 13), p. 95; Behr, ‘The Holy and Great Council 2016’ (see n. 6), p. 14. 32   Behr, ‘The Holy and Great Council 2016’ (see n. 6), pp. 15-16. It is a matter of clarification if the presence of the laity in some councils imply an advisory role or a real participation. If the latter is assumed by Behr’s paper, the former is supported by Zizioulas in a series of studies. Cf. for example, Zizioulas, ‘The Development of Conciliar Structures to the Time of the First Ecumenical Council’ (see n. 17); id., ‘Ὁ Συνοδικὸς θεσμός’ (see n. 17). For Zizioulas it is noteworthy that in the very early period of the church, the local (Eucharistic) community in its entirety (all the charisms, clergy and laity) participated in the so to say (pre-)conciliar proceedings, even though only its leaders (the

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Nicaea], the Fourth [Chalcedon], and the Seventh [Second Nicaea]) in which all the bishops or the majority of them participated, and others (such as the Second [First Constantinople], the Third [Ephesus], the Fifth [Second Constantinople], and the Sixth [Third Constantinople]) where a limited number of bishops took part.33 In many cases (even with regard to the ecumenical councils) not all the primates of the churches took part in the conciliar gatherings,34 while — and that is of crucial importance for our discussion — the bishop of Rome never attended in person any Ecumenical council (represented in them by his delegates), even if he was present in the city at the time where the council was held, such as Pope Vigilius in Constantinople in 552-553 ad, giving thus space to ­consider that ‘there seems to have been a certain, important, hesitation on the part of the Pope towards the Councils’;35 and c) an alternation between periods of ‘conciliar renaissance’ and ‘conciliar drought’, proApostles and the presbyters) could finally take the decisions (conciliar process per se) on the various issues under consideration. 33   Metropolitan Chrysostomos Savvatos, Ἡ Ἁγία καὶ Μεγάλη Σύνοδος τῆς Ὀρθοδόξου Ἐκκλησίας ἔκφρασις τῆς συνοδικῆς αὐτοσυνειδησίας τῆς Ὀρθοδόξου Ἐκκλησίας [The Holy and Great Council expression of the Ecclesiological Self-consciousness of the Orthodox Church] (Athens, 2017), pp. 90-92; Hovorun, ‘Interview sur le Concile’ (see n. 6), p. 21; Sotiropoulos, ‘Assembling in Council: Synodality in Grete’ (see n. 8), p. 29. In support of his argument, Sotiropoulos also refers to a well-known quotation by Fr. G. Florovsky (‘The Catholicity of the Church’, in Bible, Church, Tradition: An Eastern Orthodox View, The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, 1 [Belmont MA, 1972], pp. 37-56, p. 52): ‘The sacred dignity of the Council lies not in the number of members representing their Churches. A large “general” council may prove itself to be a “council of robbers” (latrocinium), or even of apostates. […] Numerus episcoporum does not solve the question’. 34   Metropolitan Chrysostomos Savvatos, Ἡ Ἁγία καὶ Μεγάλη Σύνοδος τῆς Ὀρθοδόξου Ἐκκλησίας (see n. 33), pp. 87-90. Cf. Thöle, ‘Le saint et grand Concile de l’Église orthodoxe’ (see n. 7), p. 32. 35   Behr, ‘The Holy and Great Council 2016’ (see n. 6), p. 17. Fr. Behr (pp. 17-18) continues his reflections and hypotheses on the absence of the bishop of Rome from the Ecumenical Councils in the following terms: ‘Perhaps this was because they were not “his” council: they were called by the emperor, hosted at his expense, and with his intense interest (and involvement) in the outcome. On this basis, it is sometimes said today that we can’t have an Ecumenical Council because we don’t have an Emperor to call it. In this regard, it is important to note that the 2016 Council was called by His All Holiness together with the heads of the other churches. That is, it was called “consensually”; we have learnt, or are learning, to adapt to a new situation. [...] But, perhaps there is more to the absence of the bishop of Rome from the councils, besides the fact that they were not his councils. Another important factor at play is the unique position of the Church of Rome, as the oldest, most important see, to which others churches must necessarily have recourse should an issue arise. This was thoroughly entrenched in the tradition by the time of the Councils. It would have been impossible to maintain this role, however, if the bishop of Rome had himself called and chaired a council: he would not have been able to remain a neutral point of appeal if his position had already been compromised by involvement in the process. It was necessary for him to remain “above the fray”. This also echoes



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voked by internal ecclesial reasons, but also by external factors, mainly related to the nature of the church-state relations at the time of the Roman/Byzantine empire. To cite an example, at the time of the synodal withering due to the decline of the empire itself or to the lack of State support, or during the periods of ‘conciliar fatigues’ and ‘conciliar drought’, diverse substitutes for councils made their appearance in both East and West, such as Papacy, Pentarchy, the ‘Ruling Synod’ (in the Russian Orthodoxy under the Tsars), etc. But periods of ‘conciliar drought’ were usually succeeded by periods of ‘conciliar renaissance’,36 like the ones taken place during the 19th and 20th centuries in all Christian traditions. With regards particularly to Orthodoxy, this was the case with the Sobornost understanding of the church, the clergy-laity gatherings in Greece, Bulgaria, and other Balkan countries, the Moscow local council of 1917-18, and more.37 In the light of the above we can understand what some Orthodox ­clerics and theologians held: that despite of some signs of crisis, and the absence of four out of ten territorial Orthodox churches — an absence which hurt the conciliar self-confidence of the entire Orthodox fellowship — the Council of Crete was a Pan-Orthodox one, an authentic voice of conciliarity in our days, while the conciliar texts express the theological, spiritual and ecumenical dimensions of the genuine Orthodox Tradition; at the same time a large consensus seems to be now reached around the idea that, as it was the case with the Ecumenical Councils, and the other local or smaller in seize councils, for which there were no canonical criteria of ‘ecumenicity’, what will determine the importance, the ecumenicity, and ultimately the ‘orthodox’ character of the Holy and Great Council of Crete, that will be the retrospective acceptance, in other words, the reception of that council by the people of God and the­ pleroma of the Orthodox Church, and not the number of bishops nor that of territorial churches present at Crete.38 a point made by St. Ignatius of Antioch regarding the role of the bishop: “the more the bishop is silent, the more he is honored”’. 36   Cf. Valliere, Conciliarism (see n. 20), pp. 10ff. Cf. Hovorun, ‘Conciliarity and the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 13), pp. 90-93. 37   Hovorun, ‘Conciliarity and the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 13), p. 94. 38   Ibid., pp. 95, 96-97; id., ‘Interview sur le Concile’ (see n. 6), p. 21; Behr, ‘The Holy and Great Council 2016’ (see n. 6), p. 14; Jeftić, ‘Foreword’ (see n. 1), pp. 9-10; Bishop Maxim of Western America, Diary of the Council (see n. 7), p. 111. Serious critical voices have been raised, however, as regards conciliarity, and the Pan-Orthodox character of the Council of Crete. For Fr. Dimitrios Bathrellos for example (‘Le Saint et Grand Concile: Présentation et appréciation’ [see n. 7], pp. 352-353), the fact that the bishops have been

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An analogous consensus has been also reached within the Council of Crete, this time around the proposal of convening Holy and Great Councils every seven or ten years. It is noteworthy that the Romanian­ Orthodox Church even offered itself to host the next Council to be held. This proposal confirms the importance and dynamic of the Romanian Church, and its mediating role between Constantinople and Moscow, Hellenic and Slavic Orthodoxy.39 It also expresses the theological and ecclesiological vision of its Patriarch Daniel, who commits himself to work towards the manifestation and implementation of conciliarity and synodality both at the local, and the Pan-Orthodox or global/universal level, and who sees in the Holy and Great Council not only an exceptional event or an eschatological phenomenon (i.e., our last chance to meet before the ‘last times’), but also, in addition, the beginning of a new normality reinforcing conciliarity.40 4. The Long Preparation Period and the Conciliar Awakening The long preparation of this event triggered not only the official ­conciliar process, but also a fervent theological discussion. Moreover it is hoped that it will further enhance the awareness of conciliarity and the level of synodality within the Orthodox Church. In fact, over the last five decades (1961-2016), a truly momentous task has been achieved, sent to the Council not as representatives of their clergy and local communities, but of their territorial church or Patriarchate (the only which had the right to vote at Crete), in other words the fact that the ancient principle ‘one bishop, one vote’ was not adopted by the Council of Crete, and that the autocephalous, national or territorial church absorbed the local church, is a sign of a very problematic understanding of conciliarity, and of a centralized tendency towards ‘vaticanization’ within the Orthodox Church. For Fr. Bathrellos (ibid.), and N. Ruffieux (‘Un concile inachevé’, Contacts, 255 [2016], pp. 391-397), the withdrawal of four Orthodox churches from the Council of Crete seriously affected its Pan-Orthodox character. Both scholars seem not taken sufficiently into account the interests of political character, especially that of Moscow Patriarchate, which led the fourteen autocephalous Orthodox churches to unanimously adopt very restrictive rules for the ­organization and the holding of the Holy and Great Council which unavoidably affected the ideal organization of the Council of Crete. Bishop Maxim of Western America, ‘Synodality: A Misinterpreted Vision’ (see n. 16), pp. 99-124, had already addressed this kind of critics (perceptions of ‘misapprehended synodality’ following his terms), defending the truly ecclesial and conciliar character of the Council of Crete. 39   Cf. ‘Reflections on the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 7), p. 130. Cf. also, Gallaher, ‘The Orthodox Moment’ (see n. 7), pp. 59, 69. 40   Cf. I. Tulcan, ‘L’importance du Saint et Grand Concile orthodoxe de Crète’, Contacts, 255 (2016), pp. 385-390, pp. 387-388. Cf. also, Chryssavgis, Toward the Great and Holy Council: Retrieving a Culture of Conciliarity and Communion (see n. 16), p. 21.



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not only for the appropriate preparation of the selected topics towards the Council, but also for the reinforcement of the conciliar self-conscience of the Orthodox Church. Decades of meetings, theological conferences, round tables, classes and seminars, books and collective volumes, articles in journals and magazines, youth festivals, official and unofficial websites, blogs and fora were dedicated to the Holy and Great Council. Except the official ‘Secretariat for the Preparation of the Holy and Great Council’ settled at the Orthodox Center of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Chambésy, Geneva, the Patriarchate of Constantinople founded also in 1970 the Bulletin of information ‘Episkepsis’ (published both in Greek and French), aiming mainly at promoting the theological dialogue and reflection on the Great Council. Only in recent years, theological conferences on the preparation of the Holy and Great Council were organized by St. Sergius Institute in Paris (2012), the Orthodox Theological Society of America (OTSA) and the Orthodox Christian Studies Center at Fordham University (2015), the School of Theology of Thessaloniki University and the Patriarchal Institute of Patristic Studies (2015), the Institute of Postgraduate Studies SS. Cyril and Methodius of Moscow Patriarchate (2016), the School of Theology of Athens University (2016), etc., while some of the proceedings from these conferences have been already published before the holding of the Holy and Great Council.41 Moreover, on January 4-5, 2016, His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew invited in the Phanar, Istanbul, thirty five Orthodox 41   See for example the proceedings from the 2012 St. Sergius Institute conference: ‘Comprendre les enjeux du prochain Concile de l’Église orthodoxe’, published in the French Orthodox journal Contacts, 243 (2013). Relevant to our discussion is the decision of the fifth Synaxis of the Primates of the Orthodox Church (Phanar, Istanbul, March 2014) to convene the Holy and Great Council at the Pentecost of 2016, was the starting point of a worth noticed multiplication of publications on conciliarity and the Holy and Great Council. Except the Greek (Καιρὸς συνεσταλμένος τὸ λοιπόν... Ἡ Μέλλουσα Πανορθόδοξος Σύνοδος. Ζητήματα, Διλήμματα, Προοπτικές, eds. P. De Mey and M. Stavrou, transl. K. Chiotelli, Z. Pliakou, V. Argyriadis (Athens, 2015) and English (‘The Forthcoming Council of the Orthodox Church: Understanding the Challenges’, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 60 [2016], issues 1-2) translations of the 2012 St. Sergius conference, published at the eve of the Council of Crete, it should also be mentioned, among others, the following: Ionita, Toward the Holy and Great Synod of the Orthodox Church (see n. 5); id., ‘On the Way to the Holy and Great Synod of the Orthodox Church’ (see n. 5); C. d’Aloisio, ‘À propos du concile général de l’Église orthodoxe’, Le Messager orthodoxe, 157 (2014), pp. 4-25; ‘“Ἐκτὸς ἀπροόπτου” Οἱ Ὀρθόδοξοι σὲ Σύνοδο’ [‘Unless something unforeseen occurs’, the Orthodox will gather in Council], Synaxi, 133 (2015) [in Greek]; Chryssavgis, ‘Toward the Great and Holy Council: Retrieving a Culture of Conciliarity and Communion’ (see n. 16); Toward the Holy and Great Council: Decisions and Texts, ed. Symeonides (see n. 5).

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scholars from all around the world to discuss, in presence of His Eminence Metropolitan John D. Zizioulas of Pergamon, and of other distinguished hierarchs, the issues and challenges of the Holy and Great Council, and to establish connections with theologians and academics working in various disciplines and ministries throughout the world in order to become better acquainted with their concerns and aspirations for the church, especially in light of the forthcoming Council.42 Following both its personal experience and appreciation, Brandon Gallaher noticed with regard to this meeting: ‘The result of the Phanar meeting was explosive. Scholars around the world, but particularly in America and Europe, started to write and discuss all of the themes of the Council plus to produce individual articles on the most current events. […] There was hope. Hope at last that perhaps Orthodoxy would seize its moment and respond to a world that was no longer Byzantium’.43 Also after the Council of Crete, people started discussing its decisions and achievements, as well as the pending issues and the challenges ahead of it in conferences and meetings in the US, Athens, Thessaloniki, Fribourg, Berlin, Munich, Rostock (Germany), Geneva, Bari, Cluj-Napoca, Bologna, and today here in Leuven, as well as in journal articles or journal thematic issues,44 individual books or book chapters,45 and collective 42   See more https://www.patriarchate.org/-/scholars-meeting-at-the-phanar/ and https:// www.oikoumene.org/en/press-centre/news/ecumenical-patriarchate-hosts-scholarly-meeting/. Cf. Gallaher, ‘The Orthodox Moment’ (see n. 7), pp. 51-54; Makrides, ‘Le concile panorthodoxe de 2016’ (see n. 1), p. 24. In a different perspective, and with divergent appreciation of the Scholar’s Meeting, Fr. Dimitrios Bathrellos (‘Le Saint et Grand Concile: Présentation et appréciation’ [see n. 7], p. 354) noticed the following: ‘Le Concile n’a pas suffisamment impliqué de jeunes théologiens créatifs; et même si un petit groupe de théologiens s’est rassemblé à Constantinople quelques mois avant le Concile, il était déjà trop tard, et leur nombre était trop restreint. Les documents produits par le Concile auraient été améliorés de manière significative si nos meilleurs théologiens avaient été invités à prendre une part active au Concile. Mais, de nos jours, l’Église orthodoxe — à ses dépends — semble n’accorder que bien peu d’importance aux théologiens’. 43   Gallaher, ‘The Orthodox Moment’ (see n. 7), pp. 53-54. 44   Cf. for example ‘Saint et Grand Concile orthodoxe, Crète, Pentecôte 2016’, Contacts, 255 (2016); ‘À propos du Concile de Crète’, Le Messager orthodoxe, 161 (2016); ‘Γιὰ τὴν Ἁγία καὶ Μεγάλη Σύνοδο’ [On the Holy and Great Council], Synaxi, 140 (2016); ‘Après le Saint et Grand Concile orthodoxe’, Istina, 62 (2017); ‘The Holy and Great Council’, Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai Theologia Orthodoxa, 62 (2017). 45   Bishop Maxim of Western America, Diary of the Council (see n. 7); Metropolitan Chrysostomos Savvatos, Ἡ Ἁγία καὶ Μεγάλη Σύνοδος τῆς Ὀρθοδόξου Ἐκκλησίας ἔκφρασις τῆς συνοδικῆς αὐτοσυνειδησίας τῆς Ὀρθοδόξου Ἐκκλησίας (see n. 33); id., ‘Ideations’ about the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church: The Arguments For and Against, Before and After the Council (Athens, 2017). A slightly shorter version of this text under the title ‘The Positions “For” and “Against”, (Both Before and After) the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church’, transl. H. A. Middleton, can be found in the



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volumes.46 A major international conference of Orthodox Schools and Institutes of Theology on the theme: ‘The Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church: Orthodox Theology in 21st Century’, is expected to take place in May 21-25, 2018 at the University of Thessaloniki, under the auspices of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, with representatives from Orthodox churches, and academic institutions all over the world, in order to critically explore and discuss the significance and the consequences of synodality for the Church and society in a pluralistic world. At the aftermath of and in line with the spirit the Holy and Great Council, the International Orthodox Theological Association (IOTA) was founded at the initiative of Prof. Paul L. Gavrilyuk from St. Paul University (Minnesota, USA) in the summer 2016. This theological association, considered to be an outcome of the Council of Crete, aims at overcoming the isolation of Orthodox scholars, engaging contemporary culture in light of the Orthodox tradition, promoting international exchange of knowledge about the Orthodox faith, and contributing to the growth and renewal of the Orthodox Church, seeking by all these to support Pan-Orthodox unity and conciliarity. IOTA is organized into twenty-five groups, each representing a different area of study, including both traditional theological disciplines, such as Biblical Studies, Dogmatic Theology, Moral Theology, and Liturgical Studies as well as modern fields, such as Missiology, Political Theology, Orthodoxy and International Relations, Orthodoxy in the Public Square and the Media, Religion and Science, and more. IOTA has grown into a network of more than 150 well-respected Orthodox scholars from thirty countries, while besides theologians, it also includes philosophers, historians, social scientists, political scientists, and professionals. IOTA plans to held its first international conference in Iasi, Romania (January 9-12, 2019).47 The long preparation of the Council caused to some people disappointment and skepticism, while to others cultivated great — and unrealistic — expectations of a deep ecclesial and theological renewal. A whole generation of Orthodox clerics and theologians, especially in the milieus collective volume Synodality (see n. 1), pp. 55-68, to which I refer in this paper as easily accessible to the international readership; Anastasios (Yannoulatos) Archbishop of Tirana and All Albania, Ἐγρήγορση: Χρέος τῶν Ὀρθοδόξων [The Orthodox Task Towards an Ecclesial and Missionary Awakening] (Athens, 2017), pp. 231-270. 46   See among others: Synodality (see n. 1); The Reception of the Holy and Great Council: Reflections of Orthodox Christian Women, ed. C. F. Frost (New York, under publication). 47   For more information on IOTA see its website: https://iota-web.org/

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of the so-called ‘diaspora’, but also in the Patriarchates of Constantinople, and Antioch, as well as within ‘Syndesmos’, the World Fellowship of Orthodox Youth, lived and grew up theologically with the vision of the Holy and Great Council in mind. Some of them were even hoping that the Great Council will be an event analogous to Vatican II, both in terms of renovative orientation, and its impact and communication to the surrounding world. Thus, the late Paul Evdokimov and Olivier Clément in their ‘Call to the Church’ (1971) had underlined the dimension of openness which should characterize the pan-Orthodox Council: ‘As in Vatican II, this cannot be a ‘domestic’ affair. The work of Vatican II was followed by the entire world. Far from being a local event in the Latin Church, it was an attempt to respond to people’s expectations, questions and private worries. Today, any large event in the Church is an event for all humankind. [...] So if Orthodoxy gathers together in a council, the whole world will turn its eyes towards her, expecting a word of life, a vital word addressed to all. It will not be a local event but the breathing of what is universal’.48 We know today that, despite many expectations, this was not exactly the case with the Council of Crete. Archdeacon John Chryssavgis warned months before the holding of the Council against the high expectations with regards to the Council, and its comparison with Vatican II: Yet, despite assessments by critics and pundits, both cynical and constructive, we should not expect from the Holy and Great Council such radical consequences as the Second Vatican Council had for the Roman Catholic Church (1962-65). First, while the Ecumenical Patriarch has responsibility and authority as ‘first among equals’, he would never imagine or impose primacy without collegiality. Second, the Autocephalous Orthodox Churches are involved in decision-making, which invariably incorporates local reception rather than universal imposition. And third, while change in the Orthodox Church moves at glacial speed, it is always organic — neither reform from above nor revolution from below. It is the continuity of a living tradition and the succession of apostolic authority.49 48   P. Evdokimov and O. Clément, ‘Vers le Concile? Appel à l’Église’, Contacts, 74 (1971), pp. 191-210, on pp. 194-195; O. Clément, Orient-Occident. Deux Passeurs: Vladimir Lossky et Paul Evdokimov (Geneva, 1985), pp. 198-199. Cf. P. Kalaitzidis, ­‘Concluding Reflections [to the International Conference: The Forthcoming Council of the Orthodox Church: Understanding the Challenges]’, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 60 (2016), pp. 279-297, p. 281. 49   Chryssavgis, ‘Toward the Great and Holy Council: Retrieving a Culture of Conciliarity and Communion’ (see n. 16), pp. 319-320. Cf. Makrides, ‘Le concile panorthodoxe de 2016’ (see n. 1), pp. 23-26; Thöle, ‘Le saint et grand Concile de l’Église orthodoxe’ (see n. 7), p. 28; ‘Comparaison n’est pas raison…’, editorial of the journal Istina,



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The initial joy for its holding was overshadowed by the disappointment for the dated agenda50 and the theological weakness of the conciliar texts, which sometimes give the impression of press release communiqués, lacking an in-depth theological analysis and reflection. In most of the cases, it appears that both the pre-conciliar and the final adopted conciliar texts did not benefit from the rich and profound theological renaissance Orthodoxy contributed in the 20th century. It is like theology and institutional church follow a different direction. What seems to be sure is that the preliminary and the final adopted conciliar documents are the result of a series of compromises:51 between Constantinople and Moscow, but also progressives and conservatives, and furthermore between different tendencies and trends, theological sensitivities and ecclesiastical interests. The final conciliar documents are also the final outcome of a certain theological trajectory turning from a more openminded to a narrower direction. If one overviews the themes debated and adopted in the conciliar documents, how they started initially and how they ended up, ‘he or she will find that there have often been rebates and cuts in the theological and innovative character of the original texts, as a result of the pressure put forth by some territorial churches, successively stressed by different conservative and zealot movements inside them’, a fact that is ‘directly related to the ecclesiological condition of contemporary Orthodoxy’, and to ‘the further marginalization of ecclesial communities in the public sphere of contemporary societies in traditional Orthodox countries’.52 62 (2017), p. 4; I. Noble, ‘Le Grand Concile panorthodoxe: Quelques remarques issues du “reste du monde chrétien”’, Contacts, 255 (2016), pp. 348-351, p. 348. 50   ‘La seconde leçon que l’on peut tirer de l’expérience de Crète, c’est que nous avons hélas tenté de réunir un concile “contemporain”, mais avec un ordre du jour révolu’. A. E. Kattan, ‘Le concile de Crète: En espérant que nous apprenions’, Le Messager orthodoxe, 161 (2016), pp. 11-15, on p. 12. 51   Melloni, ‘Le Saint et Grand Concile de Crète’ (see n. 5), p. 335: ‘Les textes, bien que corrigés et soumis à débat, sont restés ce qu’ils étaient à la fin de la Synaxe: des textes de compromis, parfois décevants, même parsemés de citations patristiques. Peu de paragraphes – comme celui qui, dans l’encyclique finale, considère les réfugiés comme un signe eschatologique et rappelle le Jugement dernier décrit dans l’évangile de Matthieu, ou encore le paragraphe qui parle de la nature conciliaire de l’Église –, peu de paragraphes donc ont un style théologique capable de s’adresser à tous. Mais au moins, il n’y pas eu d’excès provenant des conservateurs comme on aurait pu le craindre au début’. Cf. Noble, ‘Le Grand Concile panorthodoxe’ (see n. 49), pp. 349-350. 52  S. Yangazoglou, ‘Μετὰ τὴν Ἁγία καὶ Μεγάλη Σύνοδο τῆς Ὀρθόδοξης Ἐκκλησίας’ [After the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church], Synaxi, 140 (2016), pp. 56-61, p. 57. Following Hovorun’s remark (‘Interview sur le Concile’ [see n. 6], p. 20), the theological weakness of the conciliar documents is related to the uniqueness

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In the Meeting of Scholars of January 2016 convened by His AllHoliness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, His Eminence Metropolitan John D. Zizioulas of Pergamon explained at length — and regret at the same time — the complicated, time-consuming, and inflexible process adopted for the constitution of the agenda, the preparation, and finally the holding and the decisions of the Holy Council, which did not allowed for any addition or update of the Council’s agenda. Moreover, the principle of consensus (unfortunately interpreted as unanimity) accepted at fifth Synaxis of the Orthodox Primates in Phanar, in March 2014, in order to get the consent of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) for the holding of the Council, led to the theological impoverishment, and even the amputation of the preliminary conciliar texts from many refreshing and rejuvenating theological approaches and features. We know in retrospect that even after so many concessions made by the majority of the Orthodox churches — and especially the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople — to the ROC, the latter did not finally participated in the Council, and did everything to prevent its holding.53 In the words of John Chryssavgis, One of the paralyzing factors in the conciliar process is the introduction of consensus as a way of appealing to or appeasing Churches. […] From the mid-third century, based on Roman law, decision by majority was the general practice. Majority vote was proof of tradition, though it was inspiration — not numbers or power — that brought about a majority of votes. […] It is of course incumbent upon some Orthodox Churches not to obfuscate consensus with unanimity, manipulating it for procrastination. […] The shield of consensus reflects the lamentable lack of conciliarity in the Orthodox Church. How otherwise explain Moscow’s insistence on consensus, of the Council of Crete, i.e., to the fact that the Council, in contrast to what happened in previous cases, had not to resolve a precise problem or to define a doctrinal issue. André Shishkov from his side (‘Sur le Concile de Crète’, Contacts, 255 [2016], pp. 376-379, p. 377), maintains that isolationism and the lack of inter-Orthodox collaboration have influenced the preparation of the preconciliary documents, which in its turn led to the poorness of their content. In a quite different evaluation of the conciliar texts produced by the Holy and Great Council of Crete, the Serbian Bishop Maxim of Western America (Diary of the Council [see n. 7], p. 105), commenting on the Encyclical and the Message argued that ‘what is lacking in these texts is not theological depth (which is not absent) and content, as much as concrete suggestions and proposals in terms of how to deal with these problems. The Council’s purpose was not to create perfect theological dissertations, as was quietly remarked by one of the bishops. In some of the texts it appears that the Council wanted us to arrive from the implicit to the explicit’. 53   Cf. on this point also, Metropolitan Chrysostomos Savvatos, ‘The Positions “For” and “Against”’ (see n. 45), pp. 59-60. Cf. Makrides, ‘Le concile panorthodoxe de 2016’ (see n. 1), p. 25.



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when this virtually ensured that the council and its preparatory meetings would not reach agreement on vital matters? […] Consensus was never a model of conciliar expression. […] Consensus would be inconceivable and intolerable in the internal synodal procedure of any Church, including Moscow and Constantinople.54

The theological weakness of the final documents is a crucial point, and apparently I am not the only one who criticizes the theological quality of the preliminary documents or the conciliar texts, and the relevant discussions which took place during the Council. Again Archdeacon John Chryssavgis has not hesitated to state that ‘the texts are clearly imperfect, even incomplete. Most hierarchs are dissatisfied, while the general public will certainly be disappointed. […] But was it realistic to expect more?’;55 or to report the reactions of some distinguished Orthodox primates: ‘It was spiritually refreshing to hear the Archbishop of Albania contend: “Let’s admit our humility, our inefficiency, our poverty”, adding: “Our documents are the deficient, even defective ‘prosphoron’ that we offer to God, who alone can transform them into Body and Blood of Christ”’.56 Metropolitan Kallistos Ware (Ecumenical Patriarchate) also had to ­confess: ‘I was frankly disappointed in the level of the discussions. I thought a lot of the contributions were not to the point, and we would’ve been better without them. I felt that after all these years of separation, can’t we do better than this? And I think many other people equally were disappointed with the preliminary documents’.57 54   Chryssavgis, ‘Toward the Great and Holy Council: Retrieving a Culture of Conciliarity and Communion’ (see n. 16), pp. 328-330. For the negative effects of the consessus on the conciliar process cf. also Anastasios (Yannoulatos) Archbishop of Tirana and All Albania, Ἐγρήγορση: Χρέος τῶν Ὀρθοδόξων (see n. 45), p. 247. 55   Chryssavgis, ‘Toward the Great and Holy Council: Retrieving a Culture of Conciliarity and Communion’ (see n. 16), p. 323. Similar opinion was shared by Metropolitan Alexander of Nigeria, a fervent advocate and defender of the Holy and Great Council, and press spokesman on it on behalf of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria. See ‘13 Σημεῖα συνάντησης μὲ τὸν Σεβασμιώτατο Μητροπολίτη Νιγηρίας κ. Ἀλέξανδρο. Συνέντευξη στὸν Ἡρακλῆ Φίλιο’ (see n. 1): ‘I personally think that the texts are ­somewhat without boldness. But this was just the beginning. Let us take advantage of this great gift of God and let His creative Spirit lead us forward. And we will move forward. The next Council, however, should be more inclusive, being attended by presbyters, ­deacons, lay people, competitive theologians, men and women, as well as longer in terms of duration’. 56   Chryssavgis, ‘Toward the Great and Holy Council: Retrieving a Culture of Conciliarity and Communion’ (see n. 16), p. 324. 57   ‘Reflections on the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 7), p. 132. Gallaher, ‘The Orthodox Moment’ (see n. 7), p. 67, goes further in his critique when he notes: ‘As it was the revisions of the Council documents were minimal at best and so quite inadequate documents passed with little scrutiny. Bluntly put: what was needed was not small corrections

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5. The Reactions before the Council During the long time of preparation, the positive and hopeful vision about the Council has not been shared by all the Orthodox churches, while some of them which were supported and encouraged by the traditional monastic milieus, they have demonstrated a spirit of suspicion, or even an open hostility. More recently, the reactions against the Council were adopted by some Orthodox churches, and were officially expressed few weeks before the official opening of the Council, which was unanimously decided at the Synaxis of the Primates in the Phanar, in March 2014, by all Orthodox churches. More concretely, the Orthodox Church of Georgia first, and then the Orthodox churches of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Russia, started to contest the unanimously approved final pre-conciliar documents, to accuse Constantinople of not listening to their protests, and to demand revisions and last minute changes mainly — but not exclusively — in relation to the document on the ‘Relation of the Orthodox Church with the rest of the Christian World’, and the document on Marriage, threatening that otherwise they will not take part in the Council. The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch (Syria and Lebanon) from its side, focused mainly — but not exclusively — to the problem caused by the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem which established a parallel ecclesiastical jurisdiction within the boundaries of its canonical territory in Qatar, and warned that it will withdraw from the Council without a prior solution to this problem.58 Finally only four out of the six above mentioned churches decided not to go to the Council (Antioch, Russia, Bulgaria, Georgia), a decision which affected to some and bitty amendments to the texts but their complete change in substance through writing wholly new texts. Those who think thus would say that the Council documents were indeed the product of many years’ preparation, but are theologically quite limited, bearing the fingerprints of a mix of Academic Greek School theology and post-Soviet reactionism. Little in the documents is surprising and mostly they state the status quo. They are, therefore, quite unable to bear the theological weight of the new challenges facing Orthodoxy today’. 58   In addition to the official communiqués that can be easily accessed on the official website of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch (http://antiochpatriarchate.org/), the Antiochean point of view and its critical remarks on the preparatory process, and the conciliar documents are further defended by R. Rizk, ‘“Saint et Grand Concile” ou Concile source des tensions?’, Contacts, 255 (2016), pp. 359-368. Cf. A. E. Kattan, ‘Das Patriarchat von Antiochien und das Konzil von Kreta: Ein Kommentar’, Orthodoxes Forum, 31 (2017), pp. 43-45. Especially for the Qatar issue cf. A. S. Damick and S. Noble, ‘The Great Orthodox Council: Antioch Is Different’: https://www.firstthings.com/blogs/ firstthoughts/2016/06/the-great-orthodox-council-antioch-is-different/ (accessed 3 March 2018).



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extent the Pan-Orthodox character of the Council, and which could ­influence its reception, and the validity of its message to the today world, especially regarding the controversial issues of ‘Diaspora’ and ethnophyletism, ecumenism, and inter-Christian relations.59 However, according to the critical remarks by the Russian historian Sergei P. Brun, published on June 18, 2016, i.e., the day after the beginning of the Council of Crete, If the Russian, Georgian, and Bulgarian Synods had made their decisions regarding the Council earlier (for example in January or February of 2016, after the last Pre-Conciliar Meeting in Chambésy), the argument that ­Constantinople is not listening to the protests of its sister churches would have made sense. But that did not happen. The decisions to abstain from the Council were made less than a few weeks before the agreed start date: a decision that can be seen as direct, intentional sabotage. This, of course, does not apply to the Church of Antioch, which has been openly protesting the situation in Qatar for more than two years, and directly warning the other sister churches that, if the crisis and schism with Jerusalem is not healed, it would not participate in the Council. Then again, the AntiochJerusalem schism brings to mind a simple question: is a jurisdictional feud over a tiny group of parishioners in Qatar really a proper cause for one of the greatest local churches, with its ancient monasteries and communities, its present-day martyrdom, its missionary efforts, its huge diaspora, not to participate in the Holy and Great Council?60

Following some critics, having convened a Council under these c­ ircumstances (with the absence of four Orthodox churches), and on the basis of problematic conciliar and ecclesiological principles (mainly bishops participating in the Council and voting in it not as representatives of their local Eucharistic communities, but on behalf of their territorial, national church or Patriarchate), affects not only its Pan-Orthodox 59   Regarding the Pan-Orthodox character of the Council of Crete I will conclude by quoting the moderate position of the religious studies professor at Erfurt University (Germany), Makrides, ‘Le concile panorthodoxe de 2016’ (see n. 1), pp. 6-7: ‘Et la participation régulière des quatre Églises en question à toutes les étapes préparatoires, aux réunions préconciliaires et à la rédaction commune des documents préliminaires atteste également du caractère fondamentalement panorthodoxe du concile. Il en va de même pour l’étape postconciliaire puisque les documents approuvés officiellement ont été adressés à ces quatre Églises qui ont le droit d’y répondre. Et ultérieurement, la réception du concile pourrait aussi le rendre panorthodoxe. Pour toutes ces raisons, même si nous ne pouvons pas parler d’un “concile panorthodoxe” de jure, il est difficile d’ignorer sa dimension et sa portée panorthodoxes, surtout si nous prenons en compte l’ensemble du processus préconciliaire qui fut panorthodoxe’. 60   S. P. Brun, ‘Pneumatophobia: The Orthodox Church in the Wake of the Great and Holy Council’: https://www.wheeljournal.com/council/2016/6/18/pneumatophobia-theorthodox-church-in-the-wake-of-the-great-and-holy-council/ (accessed 3 March 2018).

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c­haracter and Pan-Orthodox unity, but discredits also the conciliar ­character of the Council itself.61 Yet, critics are also directed against the churches which did not make it to Crete — especially the Russian Orthodox Church — accusing them of hypocrisy, double or ambiguous language, sectarian behaving, and finally of undermining Orthodox unity, and the Holy and Great Council. With regards to the Russian Orthodox Church in particular, many critics were addressed to it for the implicit political dimensions of its decision of not taking part in the Council of Crete, its volunteer instrumentalization for the sake of the Russian State and its foreign policy, as well as for the pressures exercised by it (with limited success) on some Orthodox churches in order to convince them to withdraw from the Holy and Great Council, forgetting thus or even canceling the efforts of distinguished figures of that Church towards the Holy and Great Council.62 For those who are familiar with the life of and the challenges faced by the Orthodox Churches, the developments described above was undoubtedly a disappointment, but at the same time, unfortunately not a surprise. Three seem to be in my understanding the main reasons which could explain both the so-long and so-problematic preparatory process for the Council and the withdrawal of some churches from it, as well as the criticism for the dated agenda and the irrelevant, with regards to the current needs and expectations, outcome of it: 1) the problem of ecclesiastical nationalism and ethno-phyletism, and the close relationship or even dependence on and annexation of the Orthodox churches to the ‘Orthodox’ States, and their instrumentalization for the sake of their respective national States; 2) the rise of an Orthodox fundamentalism, followed by strong anti-ecumenical movements; 3) the pending relationship between Orthodoxy and modernity/post-modernity, which seems to

61   Cf. Bathrellos, ‘Le Saint et Grand Concile: Présentation et appréciation’ (see n. 7), pp. 352, 353-353; and in a more nuanced way, Ruffieux (‘Un concile inachevé’ [see n. 38], p. 393), and Metropolitan Kallistos Ware (‘Reflections on the Holy and Great Council’ [see n. 7], p. 125). 62   Cf. Hovorun, ‘Interview sur le Concile’ (see n. 6), pp. 20-21; Bishop Maxim of Western America, Diary of the Council (see n. 7), pp. 92-93, 130-131; S. Chapnin, ‘Le Concile de Crète a eu lieu, les problèmes restent’, Contacts, 255 (2016), pp. 369-375, pp. 370-371 (with focus also to the problems of internal conciliality within the Russian Church); Metropolitan Chrysostomos Savvatos, ‘The Positions “For” and “Against”’ (see n. 45), passim. Cf. Makrides, ‘Le concile panorthodoxe de 2016’ (see n. 1), p. 15.



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divide today Orthodoxy or which threaten some Orthodox churches. In the words of His Beatitude Archbishop Chrysostomos of Cyprus, The convocation of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church, as much as it may seem unbelievable, is a reality! The absence of some local Churches does not diminish the importance of the Holy and Great Council. Both the themes and the texts of the Council, as well as the convocation of the Council, had been discussed and unanimously approved by the ­representatives and Primates of the Orthodox Churches. Their absence today is not related to the themes and the substance of the discussions, but is due, in my opinion, to reasons of communication or other internal matters of the Churches in question. […]   In my opinion, the inter-Orthodox rivalries on account of ethnophyletism were the first reason why the preparations for the Council took so long. Ethnophyletism is what blocked the question of autocephaly and of the diptychs from coming to the Council, and is also the cause behind the less than canonical solution given to the issue of the diaspora. Nowadays, at a time when national barriers are being eliminated one after the other, we Orthodox do not just set ourselves at naught, but also set ourselves up for ridicule by setting up ethnicity as a constitutive element of our ecclesiology and our ecclesial identity.   The fundamentalist groups, the fanatics — among whom are found both theologians and hierarchs, and who themselves do little — and who are pretty much everywhere in the Orthodox world today, equally merit serious consideration: not only on account of the delay in convening the Holy and Great Council, but also on account of the danger threatened [by them]. The opposition of these groups to every notion of rapprochement with other Christians has indirectly affected even our local Councils, which have attempted and continue to attempt to make profuse amendments to the texts and regulations of the documents that were prepared by the Pre-Conciliar Meetings. We have no illusions. For these groups, we have been found to be mired in heresy and apostasy.   These situations in the Church are neither unknown nor unprecedented. The field of the Church also brings forth tares that have been sown by the enemy; The Church shall live thus until the end of the ages. […]   And, yet, the change in the structures and the symbolic universe of Orthodox societies greatly hampered our work. The Orthodox communities that had been rural and agrarian gradually became urban and industrial. Migrations, both internal and external, overthrew the social and cultural cohesion of communities. The Internet and other media questioned the uniqueness of Orthodox teaching and led many to move away from this. Under these circumstances, human problems are constantly changing shape and priorities are constantly changing, which fact often leads to questioning the value or effectiveness of the issues dealt with by the Council.63 63   Address of His Beatitude Archbishop Chrysostomos of Cyprus to the Holy and Great Council, translated into English for the journal The Wheel by C. Spreche: https://www.

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In the following section of this study I will attempt to clarify the issues raised by the bold statements of His Beatitude the Archbishop of Cyprus, while making more visible both the interconnection between Orthodox ethno-phyletism and Statism, Orthodox fundamentalism, and Orthodox anti-modernism, and anti-westernism, and the way they affected on the one hand the preparation process and the holding of the Holy and Great Council, and on the other its message to the today’s world. 5.1.  Ecclesiastical Nationalism In fact, it is difficult not to connect the decision of the majority of the aforementioned churches to finally withdraw from the Council with the issue of ecclesiastical nationalism and ethno-phyletism, and the related problem of the annexation of the Orthodox churches to the ‘Orthodox’ States, the interest of whose seem to serve more faithfully than the interests of the church itself. As noticed by John Chryssavgis, ethno-phyletism is the singular and significant reason that prevented the participation of all churches at the recent Holy and Great Council. And it is surely what will also emerge as the greatest challenge after the council. I believe that the Holy and Great Council brought out the best and the worst in all of our churches, publicly sharing these with the rest of the world (Orthodox and non-Orthodox, Christian and beyond). This is because it demonstrated the willingness of some to take steps — even if small and seemingly ­insignificant — towards overcoming ethnophyletism, while at the same time revealing the resistance of others to give priority to ecclesiology over ethnophyletism. […]   All of our churches are guilty of the ‘sin’ of ethnophyletism. And unfortunately — or tragically — what is worse is that some of our churches are now even beginning to defend this ‘heresy’ of our time with pastoral arguments or spiritual explanation. This is unheard of and unprecedented in church history; in the past, our churches would openly and honestly admit and advertise that is an aberration or deviation. I think that we will face many challenges as a result of ethnophyletism — perhaps in the very near future. In some ways, ethnophyletism is sometimes defended or discussed more rigorously than even the divisive issue of ecumenism! It will,

wheeljournal.com/council/2016/6/24/address-of-his-eminence-archbishop-chrysostomos-ofcyprus-to-the-holy-and-great-council/ (accessed 3 March 2018). The original text of the Archbishop’s address may be found at: https://www.holycouncil.org/-/opening-archbishop-chrysostomos/ (accessed 3 March 2018).



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I believe, ultimately reveal where the heart of our churches and our church leaders really lies.64

Religious nationalism seems to be the most serious problem facing the Orthodox Church since the fall of Byzantium (1453) and the following period of introversion. Significant aspects of this problem are the identification between church and nation, church and ethno-cultural identity, church and State, and, consequently, the idea of national churches, alongside with the ‘replacement of the history of salvation with the ­history of national revival’.65 By assuming this ‘national’ role, and by being involved in the formation of particular ethno-cultural identities, the Orthodox Church faces serious difficulties in confirming its sense of catholicity, universality, and church unity, while in the context of the multinational post-modern societies, exhausts the theological and spiritual resources of its patristic tradition on the rhetoric of ‘identities’ and on a dated religious tribalism, which contributes to the Balkanization and ethnic fragmentation of Orthodoxy.66 The crucial question here for us Orthodox is if we finally accept to raise the nation as an inherent ­element of our ecclesial identity and our ecclesiology. If there is one serious doctrinal question which the Council should discuss, and which in addition would be of great interest to many outside the canonical­ limits of the Orthodox Church, this would be in my opinion that of ethnophyletism and religious nationalism,67 which is a serious problem not 64   Chryssavgis, ‘Looking Back at the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 11). Fr. Hovorun points out that the Holy and Great Council made visible the inter-Orthodox/intra-Orthodox problems; it did not create them. By using an expression from the medical sciences, ­especially the medical ones, the same theologian points out (Hovorun, ‘Interview sur le Concile’ [see n. 6], pp. 19-20, 21-22) that the Council of Crete functioned as ‘X-ray’ machine, which revealed the actual condition, the present state of Orthodoxy today! Cf. also Bishop Maxim of Western America, Diary of the Council (see n. 7), p. 95; Bathrellos, ‘Le Saint et Grand Concile: Présentation et appréciation’ (see n. 7), p. 357. 65   Cf. P. Kalaitzidis, ‘The Temptation of Judas: Church and National Identities’, The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, 47 (2002), pp. 357-379. 66  Cf. St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 57 (2013), pp. 3-4, containing the papers of the Volos Academy’s Conference on ‘Ecclesiology and Nationalism’, held in May 2012 in Volos, Greece. 67   ‘Isn’t this sin of nationalism alone sufficient reason to convene the Great Council? How can we so brazenly justify this heresy — sometimes theologically and canonically?’, Chryssavgis, ‘Toward the Great and Holy Council: Retrieving a Culture of Conciliarity and Communion’ (see n. 16), p. 325. Chryssavgis furthermore believes that a council should be convened for the burning issue of Orthodox fundamentalism: ‘I don’t believe that we can continue disregarding Orthodox isolationism and its attending fundamentalism that consider dialogue with the other as contamination and heresy. The tyranny of fragmented truth blinds people to the fullness of truth. […] Think of how saintly theologians

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only in Orthodoxy, but also in Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, and even beyond Christianity.68 This question was debated during the Council of Constantinople in 1872 which condemned ethno-phyletism as heresy. The present situation, however, shows that we apparently need to start again, as it was the case with various instances in the history of the church, where the same question was re-addressed in several consecutive councils. We perhaps need to do this with the heresy of ethno-phyletism!69 such as Photius the Great and Mark of Ephesus — those genuine confessors and giant pillars — are frequently parodied as mirroring the conscience of the most orthodox of Orthodox, although they were far more receptive to dialogue than their small-minded contemporary cheerleaders. Is not such a perverse and divisive distortion a sufficiently urgent ecclesiological heresy for a council to convene?’ (ibid., p. 327). 68   See for example the extremely interesting study by S. Jakelić, Collectivistic Religions: Religion, Choice, and Identity in Late Modernity (Farnham, 2010). While Jakelić focuses her research on the Croatian, Bosnian, and Slovenian Catholicism, she takes also into account other examples of collectivistic Christianities from the Roman Catholic (Poland, Ireland, Lithuania), Orthodox (Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece), and the Protestant ­(Nordic countries) world, and even from the Muslim communities in Europe. 69   Except one sentence in the Encyclical (I, 3) referring to ‘ethno-phyletism as an ecclesiological heresy’, a sentence which actually repeats the 1872 condemnation of ethno-phyletism, with explicit reference to that Council, it is hard to find in the official conciliar documents any other reference to the ecclesiatical nationalism and ethno-phyletism. That is why I cannot agree with the very optimistic approach offered by C. Hovorun (‘Ethnophyletism, Phyletism, and the Pan-Orthodox Council’, The Wheel, 12 [Winter 2018], pp. 62-67), who thinks that the issue of nationalism and (ethno)phyletism was addressed in the Council of Crete in 2016, which, despite some differences, established however its succession to the Council held in Constantinople in 1872. He argues that Crete in 2016 handled the matter of nationalism in a more comprehensive way than Constantinople in 1872, whereas he distinguishes between two different kinds of nationalism: one ethnic, and the other imperial or civilizational. Following Hovorun, the former helps shaping an ‘imagined community’ (cf. Benedict Anderson), which shares the same language, culture, and ethnic origin. The latter also forms an imagined community, but in this case the community may include several languages and cultures, as well as people with different ethnic backgrounds. Such a group places a greater value on its belonging to a common political milieu — in other words, an empire. When there is no acknowledged empire, people still want to think that they belong to a common ‘civilization’. This sense of imperial or civilizational identity may lead, according to Hovorun, to imperial civilizational nationalism — a feeling of superiority over other civilizations. The 2016 Council dealt with a different sort of nationalism and did so from a different perspective. Following Hovorun, the Pan-Orthodox Council in Crete addressed not only ethnic, but also — and primarily — civilizational nationalism. It both reaffirmed the condemnation of ethnic nationalism, by endorsing the Council of Constantinople of 1872, and tackled a particular instance of imperial-civilizational nationalism, the ‘Russkiy Mir’ (the ‘Russian World’), which was in a way an unnamed target of the Council of Crete, along with the Russian Orthodox Church, which was suspected to be behind the absence of the other three churches from Crete (Antioch, Bulgaria, Georgia). Hovorun even believes that the ­Pan-Orthodox Council of Crete implicitly condemned ‘Russkiy Mir’ and the imperialcivilizational nationalism, inspired by a universal vision of Christian mission in the modern world, appealing in favor of his argument to the fact that the Council of Crete in 2016,



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In fact it is both paradoxical and alarming what happened in the Orthodox world few years after the condemnation of ethno-phyletism in the Council of Constantinople. While the conciliar condemnation was supposed to belay the expansion of ethno-phyletism among the Orthodox, it happened exactly the opposite, i.e., the emergence and multiplication of national churches, and this time with the forced approval and official recognition of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. After the self-proclamation of the autocephaly of the Church of Greece in 1833 recognized by Constantinople in 1850, the Orthodox Church of Serbia obtained its autocephaly in 1879, the Orthodox Church of Romania in 1885, the Orthodox Church of Albania in 1937, while the Orthodox Church of Bulgaria (which was involved in the ethno-phyletism conflict with Constantinople) asked for forgiveness and obtained its recognition as autocephalous church by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1945 (receiving also in 1961 by Constantinople the patriarchal honor and status). The emergence of the Orthodox diaspora in the Western Europe, the Americas and Australia, as a result of the dramatic events and political changes in the beginning of the 20th century, and the creation of the parallel national-based jurisdictions, confirmed the national fragmentation and Balkanization of Orthodoxy, creating a situation which cancels the ­principles of Orthodox ecclesiology, and the unity of the church. Unfortunately with regard to the above, i.e., the issue of Orthodox Diaspora, the Holy and Great Council did not progress substantially (the uncanonical situation with the parallel ecclesiastical jurisdictions remained essentially intact), while it did not enter at all to the issue of Autocephaly, and the related one of ecclesiastical nationalism and ethnophyletism which lays behind of many problems the Orthodox churches are facing today, since these issues were not finally included in the agenda of the Council.70 The relevant conciliar document on Orthodox unlike that of Constantinople in 1872, was not attended exclusively by Greek-speaking churches. Also, unlike the Council of 1872, the 2016 Pan-Orthodox Council did not pursue the political agenda of any particular state. These and other factors made, following ­Hovorun, the 2016 Council correspond more closely to the ideal nature and purpose of Orthodox councils than even the Council of 1872. While Hovorun’s analysis is extremely interesting and stimulating, it seems not to ­paying so much attention to the lack of textual/conciliar evidences in support of it, whereas it underestimates the ambiguity of the conventional Orthodox discourses against ethnophyletism often delivered by pro-nationalistic bishops or even territorial churches! 70   Following Gallaher’s witness (‘The Orthodox Moment’ [see n. 7], p. 67), who joined the Holy and Great Council in his capacity as member of the communication team, ‘even at one point it seemed as if the Council would draft an anathema against ethno-phyletism led by Constantinople, Cyprus and Alexandria though it was blocked in the end by the

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Diaspora dealing with the burning issue of the canonical organization of the Orthodox Church beyond the traditional Orthodox settings, approved, with some minor amendments, the respective documents on the Orthodox Diaspora and the Rules of Operation of Episcopal Assemblies in the Diaspora (which do not abolish the parallel ecclesiastical jurisdictions, but try to manage them in a way so as to bring the bishops together within a unified structure, increasing thus Orthodox cooperation), submitted by the fourth Pre-Conciliar Pan-Orthodox Conference (Chambésy, 2009), and by the sixth Synaxis of Primates of the Autocephalous Orthodox Churches (January 21-28, 2016). If the conciliar document on Orthodox Diaspora and the confirmation of the establishment of the Assemblies of Orthodox Bishops could be considered as a step towards the conformity to the principles of Orthodox ecclesiology,71 the wider problem of Orthodox nationalism (including the problem of the strong ties or even of confusion between ethnicity and religion, ethnic/national identity and ecclesial identity, which characterizes the Orthodox world in its entirety), and of Orthodox Statism (including the close relationship or even dependence on and annexation of the

primate of Romania. None of this was public. It was all in house and therefore completely lost to the public and of course the Western media who with notable brilliant exceptions — Tom Heneghan of Reuters writing for The Tablet — constituted a paragon of Orientalism’. Slightly different, and more politicized, is the information provided by the Bulgarian Mihail Matakiev: ‘During the Pan-Orthodox Council in Crete in June 2016, the ­Serbian Patriarch Irinej and the Romanian Patriarch Daniel responded negatively to only one of the proposals made by the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, namely to condemn nationalism in the Church which Bartholomew obviously saw as a Russian strategy to undermine Orthodoxy. The idea of condemnation of nationalism proved a serious problem for several Balkan churches unable to see further than the end of their nose. The misuse of nationalist ideas by the Balkan churches is a fact well known to analysts in Moscow and since the 19thc. it has been used cleverly to provoke internal conflicts in the Balkans only to weaken the region and make it an easy prey to Russian imperialist colonial interests’. M. Matakiev, ‘The Pan-Orthodox Council in Crete (2016) and the Related Intrigues on the Balkans (in the Context of the Hybrid War)’: http://bulgariaanalytica.org/en/2017/ (accessed 3 March 2018). 71   Cf. Encyclical of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church, I, 5: ‘The principle of autocephaly cannot be allowed to operate at the expense of the principle of the catholicity and the unity of the Church. We therefore consider that the creation of the Episcopal Assemblies in the Orthodox Diaspora, comprising all the recognized canonical bishops, who in each area are appointed to their respective assembly, and who remain under their canonical jurisdictions, represents a positive step towards their canonical ­organization, and the smooth functioning of these assemblies guarantees respect for the ecclesiological principle of conciliarity’: https://www.holycouncil.org/-/encyclical-holycouncil (accessed 3 March 2018).



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Orthodox churches to the ‘Orthodox’ States, and their instrumentalization for the sake of their respective national States),72 even after the Holy and Great Council, it remains a major challenge for the unity of the Orthodox Church, and its witness in the today’s world. This was made clear by the way they behave the Orthodox churches which did not make it to the Council of Crete (with the exception may be of Antioch), and the role played by the political powers in that decision not to go in Crete. This nationalization, politization, and finally annexation of the Orthodox churches to their respective national States, attributed by some to the lack of a genuine sense of primacy,73 or to the polycentric system of ecclesiastical administration and the multiplication of (national) autocephalies which characterizes Eastern Christianity especially since the time of Enlightenment,74 are interpreted as a sign of an internal secularization of Orthodoxy (the entry of the spirit of this world into the mentality of Christians). Therefore, ‘the most serious sign of secularization (laicization) of the Church in a negative sense is when it forgets its eschatological identity. Then it makes concessions to the state, nation or politics’.75 Needless to say how harmful for Pan-Orthodox unity and church catholicity is this ethnic fragmentation and Balkanization of Orthodoxy, and how pity was the decision to finally leave out of the agenda of the Council the issue of autocephaly, and therefore to miss the opportunity of a serious discussion on national or State-based ecclesiology. The above remarks do not aim at condemning or refusing the autocephaly status granted already on a national basis, but at reflecting ­seriously on the relevance of this ecclesiological model to the principles of Orthodox ecclesiology and the local church, and on the viability of the model of collectivistic religions (which regards not only Orthodoxy, but also other Christian traditions and other ‘Christian’ countries too76) 72   Cf. D. Džalto, ‘Nationalism, Statism, and Orthodoxy’, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 57 (2013), pp. 503-523. Cf. P. Kalaitzidis, ‘Church and State in the Orthodox World: From the Byzantine “Symphonia” and Nationalized Orthodoxy, to the Need of Witnessing the Word of God in a Pluralistic Society’, in Religioni, Libertà, Potere: Atti del Convegno Internazionale Filosofico-Teologico sulla Libertà Religiosa, Milano, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore e Università degli Studi, 16-18 Ottobre 2013, ed. E. Fogliadini (Milan, 2014), pp. 39-74. 73   Cf. Metropolitan John Zizioulas of Pergamon, ‘Primacy and Nationalism’, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 57 (2013), pp. 451-459. 74   Makrides, ‘Le concile panorthodoxe de 2016’ (see n. 1), pp. 15-16. 75   Bishop Maxim of Western America, Diary of the Council (see n. 7), pp. 134-135. 76   Cf. above footnote 68, and the study by Jakelić, Collectivistic Religions (see n. 68).

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to the wider developments in the global scale.77 In any case, there is no hope of moving beyond our ethnic divisions, and the present ecclesiological fragmentation, without a brave spirit of self-criticism, without the theological deconstruction of all the respective ethno-religious myths and narratives. It is possible to encounter this self-criticism in theological essays with or without focus to the Holy and Great Council78 or even in official discourses at the opening session of the Council like the one of the Archbishop of Cyprus (see previous pages), but unfortunately it is hard to identify something similar in the official conciliar documents. Hopefully, the next Holy and Great Council will explicitly deal with the crucial issue of ecclesiastical nationalism and ethno-phyletism! 5.2.  Orthodox Fundamentalism If nationalism is considered as one of the most serious threats for the unity of the Orthodox Church, Orthodox fundamentalism is a second one,79 as it became clear by the withdrawal of some Orthodox churches   On this see in addition, P. Kalaitzidis, ‘Ecclesiology and Globalization: In Search of an Ecclesiological Paradigm in the Era of Globalization (After the Previous Paradigms of the Local, Imperial, and National)’, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 57 (2013), pp. 479-501. 78  Like the following quotation by Archdeacon John Chryssavgis (Chryssavgis, ‘Toward the Great and Holy Council: Retrieving a Culture of Conciliarity and Communion’ [see n. 16], pp. 325-326): ‘Despite justifications or vindications, we must candidly admit that our Churches have flagrantly diverged from the canonical and ecclesiological principles of two millennia. For a Church that prides itself on tradition, surely it is embarrassing to defend our contention and competition on the basis of preference for ethnic fascination, preeminence of historical foundation, or predilection for numerical force. We must frankly admit that we are relentlessly enticed by the ideologies of pan-Hellenism, pan-Slavism, and pan-Arabism. I appreciate that we should embrace the broader social and cultural, even the political and financial, dimensions of global immigration. But our ultimate vision should always remain ecclesiological’. 79   Bathrellos, ‘Le Saint et Grand Concile: Présentation et appréciation’ (see n. 7), p. 354. See on Orthodox fundamentalism and ant-ecumenism, N. Asproulis, ‘“Orthodoxy or Death”: Aspects of the Greek Religious Fundamentalism during the 20th and 21st centuries and a Possible Way Out’, in Tradition, Secularization and Fundamentalism, eds. G. E. Demacopoulos and A. Papanikolaou (New York, forthcoming); G. E. Demacopoulos, ‘Orthodox Fundamentalism’: blogs.goarch.org/blog/-/blogs/orthodox-fundamentalism/ (accessed 3 March 2018); P. Ladouceur, ‘Neo-Traditionalism in Contemporary Orthodox Theology’: https://www.academia.edu/28965905/_Neo-Traditionalism_in_Contemporary_Orthodoxy_Conference_of_the_Orthodox_Theological_Society_in_America_Crete_ 2016_Post-Conciliar_Reflections_Holy_Cross_Greek_Orthodox_Seminary_Brookline_ MA_September_29_to_October_1_2016/ (accessed 3 March 2018); V. Makrides, ‘Orthodox Christian Rigorism: A Multifaceted Phenomenon’: https://publicorthodoxy. 77



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from the Council of Crete. In fact, it is hard not to link this withdrawal with Orthodox fundamentalism and anti-ecumenism, since one serious reason for it was the approved (even by these churches which finally did not make it to Crete!) final pre-conciliar document titled ‘Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World’, adopted unanimously in the fifth Pan-Orthodox Pre-conciliar Conference in Chambésy, Geneva, in October 2015.80 Without entering here into the details of this document, one can say that it is a quite moderate, even a conservative text, which highlights from the outset (§ 1) the central place occupied by the Orthodox Church in matters relating to the promotion of Christian unity within the contemporary world. It further reminds the participation of the Orthodox Church in the ecumenical movement since its inception, as well as its leading and active role in the movement for the restoration of Christian unity, being the consistent expression of the apostolic faith and Tradition in a new historical context (§ 4). In its final wording approved by the Council of Crete the final conciliar document, which also bears the title ‘Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World’,81 refers to the Orthodox Church as ‘the One, Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church’ (while, significantly enough, in the 1986 Pre-conciliar document (§ 1) it was mentioned that the Orthodox Church ‘in its profound conviction and ecclesiastical self-consciousness that it constitutes the bearer of and witness to the faith and tradition of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church’). org/2016/09/06/orthodox-christian-rigorism-a-multifaceted-phenomenon/ (accessed 3 March 2018). Cf. P. Kalaitzidis, ‘Theological, Historical, and Cultural Reasons for Anti-ecumenical Movements in Eastern Orthodoxy’, in Orthodox Handbook on Ecumenism: Resources for Theological Education – ‘That they all may be one’ (John 17:21), eds. P. Kalaitzidis, T. FitzGerald, C. Hovorun, A. Pekridou, N. Asproulis, D. Werner, G. Liagre, Regnum Studies in Global Christianity (Volos/Geneva/Oxford, 2014), pp. 134152. An international conference on ‘Orthodoxy and Fundamentalism’ took place in Belgrade, Serbia, on May 10-13, 2018. The conference was organized by the Volos Academy for Theological Studies in co-operation with the Institute for the Study of Culture and Christianity (Belgrade, Serbia); the Orthodox Christian Studies Center of Fordham University (New York); the Chair of Orthodox Theology of Münster University (Germany); the Romanian Institute for Inter-Orthodox, Inter-Confessional and Inter-Religious Studies (INTER, Cluj-Napoca, Romania); St Andrews Biblical Theological Institute (Moscow, Russia); Sankt Ignatios Orthodox Theological Academy (Stockholm, Sweden); the ­European Forum of Orthodox Schools of Theology (EFOST, Brussels, Belgium), and the Center for Philosophy and Theology (Trebinje, Bosnia-Herzegovina). 80   For the text of this final pre-conciliar document see, https://www.holycouncil.org/-/ preconciliar-relations/ (accessed 3 March 2018). 81   For the text of this final conciliar document see, https://www.holycouncil.org/-/ rest-of-christian-world/ (accessed 3 March 2018).

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After a Christological, Trinitarian, and Sacramental foundation of unity, the final conciliar document states that this unity is contained in the Holy Scripture and the Holy Tradition, and manifested through the apostolic succession and the patristic tradition (§ 2), while it stresses the indissoluble link existing between true faith and sacramental communion, as this was clearly expressed by the Ecumenical Councils of the ancient church (§ 3), which are considered to be the basis for achieving the ­restoration of Christian unity (§ 5). The issue at stake in this final document of Crete in June 2016, as well as in the final pre-conciliar document adopted in Geneva in October 2015, was the crucial problem of the relationship between the canonical and the charismatic boundaries of the church, and more precisely the use of the term ‘church’ with respect to the non-Orthodox churches and Christian bodies. Most of the Orthodox churches which finally did not attend the Great Council (such as the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Church of Georgia), and some of the Orthodox churches present in Crete (mainly the Orthodox Church of Greece and, to some extent, the Orthodox Church of Serbia), expressed reservations about the ecclesiality of the non-Orthodox churches, and therefore asked not to use the term ‘church’ for these churches. The compromise reached in the Council of Crete in the article 6 of the document under discussion, while being quite paradoxical, or even contradictory, it, however, preserves the use of the term ‘church’ for the non-Orthodox churches: ‘In accordance with the ontological nature of the Church, her unity can never be perturbed. In spite of this, the Orthodox Church accepts the historical name of other non-Orthodox Christian Churches and Confessions that are not in communion with her, and believes that her relations with them should be based on the most speedy and objective clarification possible of the whole ecclesiological question, and most especially of their more general teachings on sacraments, grace, priesthood, and apostolic succession’. Besides the serious terminological and logical difficulty with regards to the relationship between ‘historical name’ and ‘historical existence’, or ‘historical name’ and ‘ontological nature’, as well as the evident ­ambiguity concerning the recognition of ecclesiality as regards the other Christian churches and Christian bodies implied by the wording ‘the Orthodox Church accepts the historical name of other non-Orthodox Christian Churches and Confessions that are not in communion with her’, one could also refer to the paradox reality of certain Orthodox churches, like the Orthodox Church of Greece, which expressed this kind of reservations. The latter, submitted to the Council of Crete a proposal of



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amending the pre-conciliar document ‘Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World’, which refuses to use the term ‘church’ for the non-Orthodox churches, and therefore negates their ecclesiality, while it always used to address the non-Orthodox churches as churches, participated in the World Council of Churches and the Conference of European Churches from their inception (in 1948 and 1959 respectively), accepted for decades or even for more than a century already to perform mixed marriages (and therefore implicitly it recognizes the ecclesiality of other churches), and it signed important texts of doctrinal and theological agreement in bilateral dialogues with the Oriental Orthodox Churches, the Old Catholic Church, the Roman Catholic Church or the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches. More seriously, from a moral point of view, this attitude of some Orthodox churches towards the Western Christian churches supposedly imposed by ­theological and ecclesiological reasons, contradicts openly the fruitful cooperation with these non-Orthodox churches in the domain of education, development, humanitarian and financial assistance, and more.82 82  Probably, the most characteristic examples are that of the Orthodox Church of Greece and the Orthodox Diocese of Bačka (Novi Sad) in the Orthodox Church of Serbia. The former, while during the relevant discussions at the Holy and Great Council was asking not to use the term ‘church’ for the non-Orthodox ecclesial bodies, and was attempting to convince the other Orthodox churches present at the Council for the validity of its arguments, it did not hesitate during the same period, or some weeks later, to issue press releases for its fruitful cooperation with the Evangelical churches in Germany, and the Lutheran Church in Norway! The latter, and more precisely its bishop Irinej Bulović, a distinguished figure of the Serbian public arena, and a preeminent theologian and university professor, refused to sign the conciliar document under discussion (‘Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World’), while after the Council he spread all around the Orthodox world an ‘Open Letter’ in different languages (Greek, French, Russian, etc., but paradoxically neither in Serbian nor in English) entitled ‘Why I Refused to Sign the Document Entitled “Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World”’. As explained by bishop Irinej himself in that ‘Open Letter’ (in French translation), ‘La raison la plus grave, cependant, pour laquelle je n’ai pas signé, c’est, selon moi, le contenu du texte pour le moins ecclésiologiquement ambigu et suspect, sur certains points s’approchant des frontières de l’hétérodoxie. Son caractère problématique ne se focalise pas seulement dans sa proposition plus discutable et qui a provoqué les plus nombreuses objections et réfutations des Pères conciliaires, selon laquelle l’Église Orthodoxe reconnait […] “l’existence ­historique des autres Églises et confessions chrétiennes” et laquelle a été remplacée, à l’instigation de l’Église de Grèce, par cette phrase que l’Église Orthodoxe accepte “l’appellation historique des autres Églises chrétiennes et confessions”. […] Je pense personnellement que, dans ce cas précis, nous devions réserver le terme Église seulement au catholicisme romain (qui, étrangement, n’est pas mentionné dans le texte isolément, alors qu’il est jusqu’à satiété la référence du Conseil Œcuménique des Églises) parce que la querelle dogmatique de plus d’un millénaire entre eux et nous n’a pas été tranchée jusqu’à présent au niveau d’un Concile Œcuménique, sinon uniquement dans les Conciles

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The account of this very difficult — probably the most difficult and critical moment — of the Council of Crete proposed by Brandon Gallaher is highly revelatory for the mentality and the mind of some Orthodox bishops and churches: Some hierarchs, principally from the Church of Greece but joined by the Church of Serbia and a few from the Church of Cyprus led by the noted conservative Greek theologian Metropolitan Hierotheos (Vlachos) of Nafpaktos (b. 1945) attacked the use of ekklesia for the heterodox. They said that it was dogmatically and historically impossible to refer to the nonOrthodox by the name (‘church’) that was solely reserved for the Orthodox Church which is the true and only Church. After much extended debate, Metropolitan John (Zizioulas) of Pergamon (b. 1931) intervened. Along with Metropolitan Emmanuel (Adamakis) of France (b. 1958), one of the most dynamic Orthodox bishops in the Church today, Zizioulas was sitting side-by-side with Patriarch Bartholomew. Zizioulas showed in Patristic literature from pre-schism times down to the writings of modern ‘fathers’ that the Orthodox Church has always referred to the bodies of those Christians who are not Orthodox as ‘churches’. Ekklesia is not a magic word that makes heterodoxy into Orthodoxy. He then paused and asked those who pseudo-œcuméniques de Lyon et de Ferrare-Florence. En principe, cependant, – au moins théoriquement – il est permis de nourrir l’espoir que l’un ou l’autre des futurs Conciles Œcuméniques s’occupera du thème de cette division de position et que se produira la levée des “pierres de scandale” que sont le Filioque et la primauté postérieure et hypertrophiée en même temps que la fameuse “infaillibilité” de l’évêque de Rome. Dans cette perspective seule, il serait possible qu’il y ait une raison [de parler] d’Église de l’ancienne Rome, dont les différences dogmatiques, à savoir les déviations triadologiques et les innovations ecclésiologiques, ne sont nullement [encore] relativisées ni abandonnées ni, tant s’en faut, ignorées ou amnistiées. Il faut remarquer d’autre part que les communautés ecclésiastiques qui, avec la Réforme, sont issues de Rome par apostasie, se sont éloignées encore plus – et s’éloignent encore continuellement, hélas, jusqu’aujourd’hui de plus en plus – autant de l’Église de Rome que de notre Église’. Cf. Evêque I. de Batchka (Patriarcat de Serbie), ‘Pourquoi je n’ai pas signé le texte du Concile réuni en Crète à propos des relations de l’Église Orthodoxe avec le reste du monde chrétien’: https://www.egliserusse.eu/blogdiscussion/Lettre-de-l-eveque-Irenee-de-Batchka-a-propos-du-Concile-de-Crete-Pourquoi-jen-ai-pas-signe-le-texte-du-Concile-reuni_a4834.html/ (accessed 3 March 2018). Cf. https://orthodoxie.com/leveque-irenee-de-backa-eglise-orthodoxe-serbe-pourquoi-jenai-pas-signe-le-texte-conciliaire-relations-de-leglise-orthodoxe-avec-le/ (accessed 3 March 2018). After such a strong and exclusivist ecclesiological assertion, one cannot but wonder for the invitation sent by bishop Irinej to the Conference of European Churches (CEC) to gather in his diocese (Novi Sad) for its General Assembly (May 31–June 7, 2018), in other words to a Conference constituted not only by Orthodox, but also by Anglican, Protestant, and Old Catholic churches, precisely by these churches which, following the reasoning of bishop Irinej of Bačka, do not deserve the name of churches! Cf. on bishop Irinej’s and other Serbian bishops refusal to sign the conciliar document ‘Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World’, the web pages of the Russian Church: http://www.pravoslavie.ru/english/95222.htm/, http://www.pravoslavie.ru/ english/94770. htm/. Cf. also Makrides, ‘Le concile panorthodoxe de 2016’ (see n. 1), p. 18.



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were attacking the use of this term for the non-Orthodox: ‘The question now is whether those who have attacked the use of “church” for the ­heterodox are willing to take the next rational step in their argument: “Will you anathematize the Holy Fathers?” for it is they who use this term of “church” for the non-Orthodox’. There was dead silence in the Council chamber and the Patriarch called for a pause to the proceedings. After this stand-off between Metropolitans Hierotheos and John Zizioulas, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew requested the two to come up with a compromise wording the following day.83

It is very disappointing that this more or less conservative in spirit document, in which even the world ‘ecumenism’ has disappeared at the explicit request of the Russian Orthodox Church, was the main reason for the withdrawal of at least three out of the four Orthodox churches which did not participated in the Council of Crete, while it was not finally signed by a considerable number of Orthodox bishops.84 But the problem is not only the withdrawal of the term ‘ecumenism’ itself from the ­document under discussion, or its more exclusivist ecclesiological wording in comparison with that of 1986 (the Orthodox Church ‘as the One, Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church’, instead of the previous more open wording, saying that the Orthodox Church ‘constitutes the bearer of and witness to the faith and tradition of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church’). The whole text reflects an exclusivist mind,85 while upon its reading it becomes clear that mainly and primarily it addresses the conservative Orthodox, and much less the faithful of other churches, the Christian ‘other’ or the ecumenical partners whom it was also 83   Gallaher, ‘The Orthodox Moment’ (see n. 7), pp. 48-49; cf. Melloni, ‘Le Saint et Grand Concile de Crète’ (see n. 5), p. 334. Gavrilyuk (‘Orthodox Council Bridges Tensions’ [see n. 7]), who joined also the Council of Crete as member of the communication team, refers to the same debate in the following terms: ‘This tension became particularly acute when, during the discussion of the document ‘Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World’, a number of delegates objected to the use of the term ‘church’ in reference to non-Orthodox Christians. Among others, the delegates of the Church of Greece noted that such a use could be so controversial as to potentially lead to schism. At this point, Archbishop Anastasios of Albania, who emerged as one of the most effective mission-minded voices at the council, appealed to the delegates not to give in to fear and intimidation. For his part, Metropolitan John Zizioulas, who represented the Ecumenical Patriarchate, noted that the application of the term ‘church’ to non-Orthodox Christians was sanctioned by past use going back to the 11th century. Addressing the delegates, Metropolitan John asked, ‘Is this assembly prepared to anathematize the Church Fathers [for using the term “church” in reference to non-Orthodox]?’. 84   See for example http://orthochristian.com/94770.html/. 85   ‘La faille principale de ce document réside dans une tendance à un exclusivisme et à un triomphalisme orthodoxes’. Bathrellos, ‘Le Saint et Grand Concile: Présentation et appréciation’ (see n. 7), p. 355.

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s­upposed to address. It seems to me that an attempt was made by the document to save and to confirm synodically the Orthodox participation in the ecumenical movement from the attacks it receives the last decades by ultra-conservative, zealot and fundamentalist circles as well as by monastic milieus, which refuse any dialogue or cooperation with the Christian West. This is not an isolated phenomenon, since this spirit of compromise between conservative and progressive tendencies characterize several of the final conciliar documents, seeking to preserve the unity of the Orthodox Church.86 The same spirit of compromise seems also to prevail to the solution given to the issue of ecumenical observers. Between the proposal of the open-minded who wished the observers to be present and active during the Holy and Great Council, and the conservative who attempted to totally exclude them from the Council, the compromise reached finally, allowed them attending the opening and the closing sessions of the Council, and to organizing tourist visits in Crete during the rest of the Council. Even if with this solution we avoided the worst scenario, the fact is that it remains far both from the ecumenical ethos of Orthodoxy, and from the practice of a whole century of ecumenical understanding and fruitful exchange. For this it suffices to remind the place and the role played by the ecumenical, and especially of the Orthodox observers in the Vatican II or the way in which distinguished Orthodox theologians received to the Lambeth Conferences in the Anglican Communion. Again, in this case too, the most conservative Orthodox churches succeeded themselves to impose beforehand, if not their views, for sure many restrictions and introverted decisions, deciding at the last moment to not make it for the Council of Crete.87

86   Noble, ‘Le Grand Concile panorthodoxe’ (see n. 49), p. 350; cf. Melloni, ‘Le Saint et Grand Concile de Crète’ (see n. 5), p. 335. 87   If Thöle (‘Le saint et grand Concile de l’Église orthodoxe’ [see n. 7], p. 30), and Sotiropoulos (‘Assembling in Council’ [see n. 8], p. 34) approach positively the solution found to the issue of ecumenical observers, and interpret it as a sign of openness, Metropolitan Kallistos Ware from his side (‘Reflections on the Holy and Great Council’ [see n. 7], pp. 131-132) dares to adopt a more critical stance: ‘Another point was the nonOrthodox observers, with Cardinal [Kurt] Koch [president of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity], they were only allowed to attend the opening and closing sessions ... I thought that was a pity. At Vatican II, the non-Catholic observers attended all meetings ... of course, they couldn’t speak or vote, but they were there. We should’ve incorporated the observers. Instead they were simply taken off on cultural tours to visit monuments in Crete. Well, they hadn’t come for that purpose, and I think they were ­obviously somewhat disappointed. I think we shouldn’t have been so closed’.



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However, this exclusivist spirit is not only reduced to some texts or official documents, but marked further the general Orthodox attitude, which is characterized by a persistent ambiguity with regards to the Orthodox participation in the Ecumenical movement.88 Thus, despite the institutional participation of almost all the canonical autocephalous Orthodox churches in the Ecumenical movement and their fruitful and constructive contribution to many crucial issues; despite the leading role of distinguished Eastern Orthodox theologians in promoting ecumenical understanding and theological reflection towards Christian unity, it seems that from the Orthodox side, especially in the monastic milieus, the low clergy and the grassroots, there has been always a standing suspicion to, if not an open rejection of the ecumenical movement. ‘The argument that was put forward in order to override these reactions was that the Orthodox participation will be a witness to the undivided church of the first millennium and an invitation of return to its tradition and roots’, consecrating in practice a defensive and apologetic Orthodox stance regarding the participation in the ecumenical movement.89 Moreover, the ‘Message’ of the Council confirms and even reinforces this tendency when it understands the dialogue with the non-Orthodox as an opportunity for the remainder of the Christian world ‘to know more precisely the authenticity of the Orthodox Tradition, the value of patristic teaching and the liturgical life and faith of the Orthodox’, whereas it repeats (because exactly of the reactions of the ultra-conservative groups) the so-evident reality that ‘the dialogues conducted by the Orthodox Church never imply a compromise in matters of faith’.90 According to the remark of the Hussuite theologian and Pastor Ivana Noble, this understanding of ecumenical dialogue ‘does not presuppose any reciprocity (sc. with the non-Orthodox) to the extent that one of the parties of the (sc. ecumenical) dialogue realizes the eschatological fullness’.91 88   Here I draw on the analysis found in my paper ‘Theological, Historical, and Cultural Reasons for Anti-ecumenical Movements in Eastern Orthodoxy’ (see n. 79), pp. 134-152, especially pp. 135-141. 89   S. Agourides, ‘Κριτικὴ ἀξιολόγηση τῶν θεολογικῶν μας ζητημάτων σήμερα’ [Critical Evaluation of the Current Theological Issues], in id., Ὁράματα καὶ Πράγματα [Visions and Acts] (Athens, 1991), p. 195, English transl. provided by Kalaitzidis, ‘Theological, Historical, and Cultural Reasons for Anti-ecumenical Movements in Eastern Orthodoxy’ (see n. 79), p. 135. 90   ‘Message’, § 3. Cf. a similar reasoning and wording, albeit in a more extended form in the ‘Encyclical’ (VII, 20: ‘Church: Witness in dialogue’). 91   Noble, ‘Le Grand Concile panorthodoxe’ (see n. 49), p. 350. The absolute ecclesiological exclusivism (the Orthodox Church ‘as the One, Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church’) is positively evaluated by Thöle (‘Le saint et grand Concile de l’Église ortho-

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Certainly the Orthodox constantly appealed to the need for all Christians (the Orthodox included) to return to the tradition of the undivided Church, but by identifying this tradition exclusively with the Eastern Church, and by assigning to the other Christian churches and Confessions a status of deficient or partial ecclesiality, they finally came to imply or to suggest the exclusivist ecclesiological model of the return of all to Orthodoxy. As a result of this defensive attitude, with some rare exceptions, the general rule was that, while they were fully participating in the ecumenical meetings and discussions, the official ecumenical representatives of the Orthodox churches systematically avoided to speak for these meetings to a wider audience within their churches, as they never openly addressed their flock or their theological students issues and concerns commonly raised with other Christians during the ecumenical gatherings. The official Orthodox representatives used to follow for decades a dual language: one ecumenical ad extra, and one conservative and defensive (but not principally anti-ecumenical or fundamentalist) ad intra. As a result of this ambiguity, despite the initial positive attitude of Eastern Orthodoxy towards ecumenical movement, the Orthodox faithful remained alienated from, and finally became suspicious against the search for Christian unity and the efforts towards ecumenical understanding, a suspicion characteristically expressed at the higher lever, i.e., at the Holy and Great Council of Crete. Unfortunately, the same applies as regards the preparation of the Holy and Great Council which lasted for decades: having followed a more or less bureaucratic pattern of organization, the whole preparation process was kept at the academic level of the experts and the high clergy, and did not reached the Orthodox faithful at large, and the wider Orthodox auditory (except may be the ‘Diaspora’ settings), which in most of the cases remained estranged, indifferent and in some cases hostile to the whole process, since it was quite seldom for

doxe’ [see n. 7], pp. 34-35), who sees in it an affinity with the genuine Lutheran approach as expressed in the article VII of the Confession of Augsburg. For a critique of the exclusivist understanding of Orthodox ecclesiology, cf. S. Tsompanidis, ‘The Church and the Churches in the Εcumenical Μovement’, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 12 (2012), pp. 148-163; id., ‘Orthodoxe Kirche und ökumenische Bewegung nach der heiligen und großen Synode’, Orthodoxes Forum, 31 (2017), pp. 81-88; A. Vletsis, ‘Orthodox Ecclesiology in Dialogue with Other Understandings of the Nature of the Church’, in Orthodox Handbook on Ecumenism (see n. 79), pp. 639-646.



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ecclesiastical authorities to recall the Holy and Great Council, and to promote a discussion around it.92 This reality, however, did not come out of the blue. While pre-conciliar meetings abound from year to year, the fundamentalist and anti-­ ecumenical camp in Orthodoxy, which strengthened day by day, intensified its combat to — as it is noted — ‘put an end to the betrayal of Orthodoxy and its ecumenical downward slide’. The rapidly increasing today fundamentalist groups all over the Orthodox world are calling us not only to show hostility to every notion of rapprochement with other Christians; but mainly to express ecclesiastical disobedience followed by the breaking of canonical links with local bishops, which according to them, they ‘are heretics or apostates’. As I argued at the 2012 St. Sergius conference on the Forthcoming Council of the Orthodox Church, In these circumstances, it is quite clear to me that no synodical decision, not even a pan-Orthodox one, whether it concerns the common calendar, fasting, the recognition of baptism in other Christian Churches, the so-called ‘diaspora’, and so on, can be accepted at the practical level if it has not previously obtained the support of these ultra-Orthodox movements and of their monastic allies, for as long as these movements continue to exercise a sort of spiritual and ecclesial patronage over the Orthodox worldwide, a sort of universal authority over and above local Churches and jurisdictions.93

It is unfortunately what happened exactly before and after the convention of the Council with the activity of the fundamentalist and monastic groups all around the Orthodox world, and especially within Greece, and to that Orthodox churches which did not finally attend Crete. In fact, these activities seem to be to a great extent behind the decision of the Orthodox Churches of Bulgaria and Georgia to withdraw from the Holy and Great Council of Crete.94 It is positive and encouraging, however, that against all these manifestations of ultra-conservative, zealot and fundamentalist spirit the Holy and Great Council adopted a firm and clear position of disapproval and condemnation, through the conciliar document on ‘The Relations of the 92  Cf. Yangazoglou, ‘Μετὰ τὴν Ἁγία καὶ Μεγάλη Σύνοδο τῆς Ὀρθόδοξης Ἐκκλησίας’ (see n. 52), p. 60. Cf. also Papathanasiou, ‘Les douleurs des orthodoxes, des douleurs d’enfantement?’ (see n. 30), pp. 16-17. 93   Kalaitzidis, ‘Concluding Reflections’ (see n. 48), p. 296. 94  For the activity of these fundamentalist groups in Bulgaria, and their influence on the relevant decision of the Orthodox Church of Bulgaria, see Arnaudov, ‘Apport et réception du Saint et Grand Concile orthodoxe de Crète’ (see n. 30), p. 383.

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Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World’ and the ‘Encyclical’, endorsing and supporting at the same time, interfaith dialogue and peaceful coexistence. Fundamentalism, and religious based violence and fanaticism are clearly distinguished both from the core of ‘the ­phenomenon of religion’ the Gospel’s spirit, and the authentic ecclesial tradition. As stated in the ‘Encyclical’ (VI, 17), We are experiencing today an increase of violence in the name of God. The explosions of fundamentalism within religious communities threaten to create the view that fundamentalism belongs to the essence of the phenomenon of religion. The truth, however, is that fundamentalism, as ‘zeal not based on knowledge’ (Rom 10:2), constitutes an expression of morbid religiosity. A true Christian, following the example of the crucified Lord, sacrifices himself and does not sacrifice others, and for this reason is the most stringent critic of fundamentalism of whatever provenance. Honest interfaith dialogue contributes to the development of mutual trust and to the promotion of peace and reconciliation. The Church strives to make ‘the peace from on high’ more tangibly felt on earth. True peace is not achieved by force of arms, but only through love that ‘does not seek its own’ (1 Cor 13.5). The oil of faith must be used to soothe and heal the wounds of others, not to rekindle new fires of hatred.95

Furthermore, the conciliar document on ‘The Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World’ does not leave any room for the justification of Orthodox fundamentalism and anti-ecumenism, since it unequivocally states that, The Orthodox Church considers all efforts to break the unity of the Church, undertaken by individuals or groups under the pretext of maintaining or allegedly defending true Orthodoxy, as being worthy of condemnation. As evidenced throughout the life of the Orthodox Church, the preservation of the true Orthodox faith is ensured only through the conciliar system, which has always represented the highest authority in the Church on matters of faith and canonical decrees (Canon 6, 2nd Ecumenical Council).96

5.3.  Orthodoxy and Modernity/Post-modernity Several scholars have discussed the issue of the encounter between Orthodoxy and modernity/post-modernity at the Council of Crete. Some of them are inclined to see Crete as a first attempt towards such an encounter (thanks to the discussion of timely issues or to the considerable   ‘Encyclical’, VI, 17; cf. ‘Message’, 4.   ‘The Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World’, § 22.

95 96



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potential to address today’s societal challenges),97 while others consider that the Holy and Great Council, both during the pre-conciliar stages and its conciliar sessions, did not ultimately dare to overcome a mere antiWesternism by entering to a serious discussion of the challenges posed by Western modernity, whereas it opposed the consequences the latter implies (individualism and political liberalism, human rights, secularization, church-State separation, and post-Christian pluralistic societies, ­bioethics and new ethical norms, etc.).98 It is commonly held that, for primarily historical reasons, the Orthodox world did not organically participate in the phenomenon of modernity. Orthodox Christianity did not experience the Renaissance, the Reformation, or the Counter-Reformation, religious wars or the Enlightenment, the French or the industrial revolution, the rise of the subject, human rights, or the religiously neutral nation-state. What has been recognized as the core of Western European modernity seems to have remained alien to Orthodoxy. The crucial issue under discussion can then be summarized as follows: Can Orthodoxy find its place in the modern world without sharing this history of modernization and this modernization process? Can a Pan-Orthodox Council really address the issues and challenges of 21st century without dealing with the still pending relationship of Orthodoxy with modernity/post-modernity, and secularization? To put it another way: Can Orthodox Christian theology operate outside of the traditional contexts of agrarian societies of the past from where it borrows its forms and representations, its liturgical symbolism, its rhetorical examples used in preaching, its structure of church administration and especially its ideas about the relationship between the sacred and the secular, religion and politics, the church and society? Has Orthodox Christianity accepted the vested individual human rights that come with modernity and their consequences in the religious, social and­ cultural fields? Or do we Orthodox long for the organizational schemes and structures of our glorious past (the Byzantine/imperial in particular)? Are we turning away from the achievements of modernity and interpret97   See for example, ‘Comparaison n’est pas raison…’ (see n. 49); Thöle, ‘Le saint et grand Concile de l’Église orthodoxe’ (see n. 7), p. 37; Sotiropoulos, ‘Assembling in Council’ (see n. 8), pp. 35-36; Ruffieux, ‘Un concile inachevé’ (see n. 38), pp. 394-395. 98   Makrides, ‘Le concile panorthodoxe de 2016’ (see n. 1), pp. 22-24; Kattan, ‘Le concile de Crète: En espérant que nous apprenions’ (see n. 50), mainly pp. 12-15. Cf. Chryssavgis, ‘Toward the Great and Holy Council: Retrieving a Culture of Conciliarity and Communion’ (see n. 16), p. 330. For the issue of Orthodox anti-Westernism, cf. the collective volume, Orthodox Constructions of the West, eds. G. E. Demacopoulos and A. Papanikolaou (New York, 2013).

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ing even post-modernity itself as the revenge of the church and religion against modernity — mimicking, at this point, the anti-modernist reaction of the Roman Catholic Church before it came into terms (mostly after the Vatican II) with the new reality, and decided to deal with modernity in a dialogical way?99 A set of more practical questions, following from these fundamental issues is: Are Christology and the theology of the person conceivable within the context of modernity and its logic, and in the light of the explorations of psychoanalysis? What is the relationship between religion and politics, between Orthodoxy and politics, Orthodoxy and democracy, church identity and political/national identity in the context of modernity/post-modernity? What is the message, the language of the church and theology in the era of post-modernity and multiculturalism? What is Orthodoxy, in the final analysis: an ethno-religious ideology, inextricably linked to social and cultural anachronisms, in other words a religion of the past struggling for the preservation of ‘historical privileges’? Or a way of life for the present and the future, addressed to all human beings and ecumenical/cosmic in its dimension? In fact, modernity and post-modernity (or late modernity) and the wider framework they define, constitute the broader historical, social and cultural environment within which the Orthodox Church is called to live and carry out its mission; it is here that it is called upon time and time again to incarnate the Christian truth about God, the world and humanity. Certainly, modern Orthodox theology, inspired mainly by the spirit of the Fathers, reformulated during the 20th century an admirable theology of the Incarnation, of ‘assuming flesh’. However, its position on a series of issues basically involving aspects of the modernist condition, but also the core of its ecclesial self-understanding, has often left this otherwise remarkable theology of Incarnation in abeyance and socially inert, ­making thus difficult to communicate its message to the modern/postmodern world, a world marked by secularization. 99   Cf. for the present discussion, P. Kalaitzidis, Orthodoxy and Modernity: An Introduction (Athens, 2007); English transl. E. Theokritoff, forthcoming by St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, New York; cf. also id., ‘Orthodox Christianity and Islam: From Modernity to Globalization, from Fundamentalism to Multiculturalism and to the Ethics of Peace’, in Just Peace: Orthodox Perspectives, ed. S. Asfaw, A. Chehadeh and M. Gh. Simion (Geneva, 2012), pp. 201-221, on pp. 204-205; id., ‘Orthodoxie und Moderne’, Transit: Europäische Revue, 47 (2015), pp. 76-89; id., ‘Orthodoxie et modernité: Une relation en suspens?’, Travaux et Jours. Revue interdisciplinaire de l’Université Saint-Joseph de Beyrouth, 91 (2017), pp. 27-46.



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The latter, according to the perceptive remarks of the French Orthodox theologian Olivier Clément in conversation with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, is simultaneously the daughter of Athens and of Jerusalem […] It would be false and dangerous to see only the negative aspects of secularization, to denounce them and to dream of a ‘new’ Christianity. In the secularized world, which will certainly endure, even if only as a rampart against the assault of fanaticism, one can certainly find traces of its Greek and biblical origins. Respect for the ‘other’, freedom of the spirit, the best in a pluralistic democracy […] — all of this, says Bartholomew, is rooted in the biblical revelation of the person and the distinction made by Christ between the Kingdom of God and the kingdom of Caesar.100

What is then required is not a repetition and a perpetuation of the denial and the reticence often adopted by the Orthodox in their stance towards modernity, but a creative encounter and a serious theological dialogue with whatever challenges modernity poses, a ‘re-orientation [of modernity] from inside’, to use the fine expression of the late Patriarch Ignatius IV of Antioch. ‘From inside’ because, as this outstanding hierarch of blessed memory reminds us, modernity, in spite of its negative aspects (a nihilistic spirit, lack of meaning, worship of such idols as image, the market, eroticism and drugs, an incapacity to achieve a just redistribution of wealth etc.) was born out of Christianity, flesh of its flesh. In particular, many of the achievements of modernity (technological progress, uniqueness of human person, spiritual freedom, distinction between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of Caesar) are inconceivable without their biblical or Christian preconditions, echoing in this regard ideas we found in Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and Olivier Clément. ‘Re-orientation’, because this Orthodox Arab Patriarch believes that modernity lacks an ‘oriental’ dimension; that despite its achievements, it still needs to be inoculated and enriched with a ‘creative ­spirituality’, namely those vital elements of Eastern Christian theology which seems to lack. These elements are, on the one hand, the theology and the spirituality of the divine energies and the transfiguration of the universe in the Risen Christ — a theology which was not able to spread and have influence beyond monastic circles on account of the Turkish occupation — and on the other, the patristic understanding of being as

100  Clément, Conversations with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I (see n. 3), pp. 158, 162.

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communion and the ontological foundation of love (modeled after the Holy Trinity).101 It is expected and hoped that the Orthodox Church, faithful to a renewed theanthropism and an authentic theology of Incarnation, and inspired by the vision and the experience of the Resurrection, will internalize the tradition, the boldness and the mind of the Fathers and the grand theological syntheses, they worked out, and will enter into dialogue and even attempt a new synthesis with the best insights and achievements of modernity, making use of the encounter between East and West. As Metropolitan John (Zizioulas) of Pergamon, perhaps the most ­distinguished living Orthodox theologian, notes very characteristically on this point: History cannot be repeated and reconstituted intact. Nostalgic voices for a return to Byzantine forms of art are abundant today among the Orthodox. We do not intend to offer here any support to such voices: our modern world has passed through changes that make a return to the past impossible, and therefore undesirable. Theology today must use the past with respect, for it has indeed managed to overcome paganism […] But it must try to adjust [the past] to the present by creatively combining it with whatever our contemporary world has achieved or is trying to achieve in all areas of thought — science, art, philosophy and the rest.102

In the light of the above preliminary considerations, I am inclined to say that in my view the more serious problem is that the first Pan-Orthodox Council of Modern Times was convened and held with a pre-modern, dated agenda. I do think that the Council of Crete did not touch, and discuss in depth the wider crucial and still pending issue of the relationship between Orthodoxy and Modernity, although many of the problems facing today by the Orthodox Church are clearly part of this problematic or ambiguous relationship. This ambiguity and Orthodoxy’s problematic relationship with modernity is going through the majority of conciliar documents as evidenced for example in the text entitled ‘The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World’, and a fortiori the ‘Encyclical’, ‘The Importance of Fasting and its Observance Today’, and the ‘The Sacrament of Marriage and 101   Ignatius IV, Patriarch of Antioch and all the East, Orthodoxy and the Issues of Our Time, transl. S. O’Sullivan (Tripoli, 2006), pp. 222-224. 102   Metropolitan John of Pergamon, ‘Preserving God’s Creation’ (Part 1), Sourozh, 39 (1990), pp. 1-11, on p. 11; King’s Theological Review, 12 (1989), pp. 1-5, on p. 5; reprinted in J. D. Zizioulas, The Eucharistic Communion and the World, ed. L. B. Tallon (London/New York, 2011), chapter 8, p. 153.



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its Impediments’. If the former (on mission) provoked different kind of reactions, both positive and critical,103 the latter (Encyclical, Marriage, Fasting) attracted a mere negative critic. It is encouraging that the concern about mission is of central interest for the Holy and Great Council as it is evidenced in few conciliar documents — and not only in the document dedicated to mission. It is highly significant both in theological and ecclesiological perspective that for the Council of Crete mission, i.e., the announcement and proclamation of the Gospel, and its witness to the world, belongs to the core of ecclesial identity, and it is not considered as a parochial element which is added a posteriori to the identity of the church: ‘The apostolic work and the proclamation of the Gospel, also known as mission, belong at the core of the Church’s identity, as the keeping and observation of Christ’s ­commandment: “Go and make disciples of all nations” (Matt 28:19). This is the “breath of life” that the Church breathes into human society and makes the world into Church through the newly-established local Churches everywhere. In this spirit, the Orthodox faithful are and ought to be Christ’s apostles in the world’. That’s why, the conciliar document continues, ‘the re-evangelization of God’s people in contemporary secularized societies, as well as the evangelization of those who have not yet come to know Christ, is the unceasing duty of the Church’.104 But this missionary task, this openness of the church to the world is closely link to the Eucharist, understood as a ‘liturgy after the Liturgy’, as a witness which is called to exceed the liturgical or the narrow ­religious framework, and to spread extra muros the ‘good news’ of the new and transfigured life in Christ: ‘Participation in the holy Eucharist is a source of missionary zeal for the evangelization of the world. By participating in the holy Eucharist and praying in the Sacred Synaxis for the whole world (oikoumene), we are called to continue the “liturgy after the Liturgy” and to offer witness concerning the truth of our faith before God 103   For a positive assessment of this conciliar document cf. D. Keramidas, Orthodoxy and Gospel in the 21st Century: Testing Missionary Self-awareness (Thessaloniki, 2017), especially pp. 89-124 [in Greek]; P. Vassiliadis, ‘Orthodox Christian Witness in Light of the Holy and Great Council. “Liturgy after the Liturgy” as a way of re-evangelism’: blogs.auth.gr/moschosg/2016/08/31/ (accessed 3 March 2018) [in Greek]. For critical views cf. among others mainly, Kattan, ‘Le concile de Crète: En espérant que nous apprenions’ (see n. 50), pp. 12ff.; Makrides, ‘Le concile panorthodoxe de 2016’ (see n. 1), pp. 21-22; Bathrellos, ‘Le Saint et Grand Concile: Présentation et appréciation’ (see n. 7), pp. 356-357: ‘Il s’agit du plus long de tous les documents. Il contient bon nombre de pensées magnifiques, mêlées à beaucoup de platitudes’. 104   ‘Encyclical’, II, 6. Cf. ‘Message’, 2.

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and mankind, sharing God’s gifts with all mankind, in obedience to the explicit commandment of our Lord before His Ascension: “And you shall be my witnesses in Jerusalem and in all Judea and Samaria and to the end of the earth” (Acts 1:8)’.105 As it is clearly stated from the outset at the ‘Message’, the theological foundation for such a dialogue with, and witness to the world, is the firm certainty nourished by the Apostolic, and the Patristic tradition ‘that the Church does not live for herself. She transmits the witness of the Gospel of grace and truth and offers to the whole world the gifts of God: love, peace, justice, reconciliation, the power of the Cross and of the Resurrection and the expectation of eternal life’.106 The document on mission it opens (in its ‘Introduction’) to a theological perspective that highlights God’s kenotic love for the world as exemplified in the person of His Son Jesus Christ, and experienced in the body of Christ, the church, which is the image of the Trinity in history, and in the eschatological vision of the Kingdom of God; in other words the vision of a new world of justice, peace, unity, and reconciliation, where every kind of death will be defeated. Following again the ‘Introduction’ of this conciliar document, the church foretastes this eschatological expectation of a new creation, of a world transfigured, in the Eucharist, the sacrament of unity par excellence, since the latter brings together (1 Cor 11:20) ‘the scattered children of God (Jn 11:52) without regard to race, sex, age, social, or any other condition into a single body where there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female (Gal 3:28; cf. Col 3:11)’.107 It also experiences this foretaste in the countenance of its saints who, ‘through

105   ‘Encyclical’, II, 6. Cf. the analogous wording of the ‘Message’, 2: ‘Participating in the Holy Eucharist and praying for the whole world, we must continue the “liturgy after the Divine Liturgy” and give the witness of faith to those near and those far off, in accordance with the Lord’s clear command before His ascension, “And you shall be my ­witnesses in Jerusalem and in all Judea and Samaria and to the end of the earth” (Ac. 1: 8)’. For ‘liturgy after the Liturgy’ cf. I. Bria, Liturgy after the Liturgy: Mission and Witness from an Orthodox Perspective (Geneva, 1996); Archbishop Anastasios Yannoulatos, Mission in Christ’s Way: An Orthodox Understanding of Mission (Brookline MA, 2010). 106   ‘Message’, Introduction. Cf. Anastasios (Yannoulatos) Archbishop of Tirana and All Albania, Ἐγρήγορση: Χρέος τῶν Ὀρθοδόξων (see n. 45), pp. 246, 256. Archbishop Anastasios, who seems to be the drafter of the conciliar ‘Message’, notes that many of the sections on mission (like the ones discussed here) included in the conciliar documents have been proposed and been accepted following proposals of the Orthodox Autocephalous Church of Albania, cf. Anastasios (Yannoulatos) Archbishop of Tirana and All Albania, Ἐγρήγορση: Χρέος τῶν Ὀρθοδόξων (see n. 45), pp. 254-256. 107   ‘The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World’, introduction.



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their spiritual struggles and virtues, have already revealed the image of the Kingdom of God in this life, thereby proving and affirming that the expectation of a world of peace, justice, and love is not a utopia, but the substance of things hoped for (Heb 11:1), attainable through the grace of God and man’s spiritual struggle’.108 In this light, and following the same theological line which implies both the tension, and the synthesis between eschatology and history, the conciliar document on mission reminds us that the church cannot remain indifferent to the problems of humanity in each period. On the contrary, the conciliar document continues, the church shares in our anguish and existential problems, taking upon herself — as the Lord did — our suffering and wounds, which are caused by evil in the world and, like the Good Samaritan, pouring oil and wine upon our wounds through words of patience and comfort (Rom 15:4; Heb 13:22), and through love in practice. The word addressed to the world is not primarily meant to judge and condemn the world (cf. Jn 3:17; 12:47), but rather to offer to the world the guidance of the Gospel of the Kingdom of God — namely, the hope and assurance that evil, no matter its form, does not have the last word in history and must not be allowed to dictate its course.

The same conciliar document (again in its ‘Introduction’) defines the non aggressive character of Orthodox mission, and its respect for personal and cultural otherness: The conveyance of the Gospel’s message according to the last commandment of Christ, Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you (Matt 28:19) is the diachronic mission of the Church. This mission must be carried out not aggressively or by different forms of proselytism, but in love, humility and respect towards the identity of each person and the cultural particularity of each people.

Socially sensitive, the relevant conciliar documents on mission do not fail: to highlight the negative role of social injustice and economic inequality in the various conflicts, and in the phenomenon of mass migration of large segments of population;109 to link the ever intensifying refugee and migrant crisis, with political, economic and environmental causes, and to remind that the Orthodox Church has always seen, and continues to see in the person of those who are persecuted, in danger or in need,  Ibid.   Ibid., F, 2-3.

108 109

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the person of God Himself (Matt 25:40);110 to criticize the increasing gap between rich and poor due, among others, to the financial crisis, which results in its turn from the unbridled profiteering by some representatives of financial circles;111 to highlight the spiritual dimension of the ecological crisis, and to link it with the consumerist spirit, and the sin of greed, proposing repentance and ascetical ethos as ways to go out;112 to emphasize the importance of universal solidarity with the poor and the marginalized, and with all people in need, including the sick, the disabled, the elderly, the persecuted, those in captivity and prison, the victims of destruction and military conflict, those affected by human trafficking and modern forms of slavery. Following the relevant conciliar documents ‘the Orthodox Church’s efforts to confront destitution and social injustice are an expression of her faith and the service to the Lord, Who identifies Himself with every person and especially with those in need: Inasmuch as you did it to one of the least of these my brethren, you did it to me (Mt 25:40)’.113 In addition it is reminded that ‘at no time was the Church’s philanthropic work limited merely to circumstantial good deeds toward the needy and suffering, but rather it sought to eradicate the causes which create social problems’.114 Unfortunately this open-minded theological and dialogical spirit, the spirit of the humble service and ecclesial witness to the modern world does not characterize all the sections of the conciliar document on mission or of the other conciliar documents dealing with modern issues, which quite often, in contradiction to what has been mentioned just above (‘the word addressed to the world is not primarily meant to judge and condemn the world’), it seems to judge and condemn the modern world, and to reflect the ambiguous and problematic relationship of Orthodoxy with modernity (as it also reflects the correlative attempt for a compromise with the conservative). This ambiguity is repeatedly exemplified at the occasion of the discussion of crucial modern issues such as seculari110   ‘Encyclical’, VI, 19. Cf. ‘The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World’, F, 1. With respect to this section of the conciliar document, Bishop Maxim of Western America, Diary of the Council (see n. 7), p. 116, notes the following: ‘Some paragraphs — like the one that points to exile as eschatological hospitality, modeled after Christ the Savior (Matt. 25:40) — carry a theological seal which can “speak” to every man’. Cf. analogous remarks in Melloni, ‘Le Saint et Grand Concile de Crète’ (see n. 5), p. 335. 111   ‘The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World’, F, 4. 112   Ibid., F, 10. Cf. ‘Message’, 8. 113   ‘The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World’, F, 1, 5. Cf. ‘Encyclical’, VI, 19. 114   ‘Encyclical’, VI, 19.



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zation, church-State relations, human rights and human dignity, religious freedom, globalization, social justice and more, evidenced in the different conciliar documents — mainly in the ‘Encyclical’, and ‘The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World’ (see above). When these conciliar documents (but also the document on marriage), approached the challenges facing the Orthodox, ‘and attempted to provide some answers, they did it most of the time with superb, which does not translate any willingness to open up to the new experiences of people or to assimilate them. Indeed, the style of the texts of the Council of Crete, in general, is a dense Orthodox ecclesiastical style “possessing” the truth, which intends to teach the world and re-evangelize it, instead of taking advantage of the experiences of those who live in it’.115 In these documents, therefore, secularization is listed among the ­consequences of evil, along with violence, moral laxity, and other detrimental phenomena such as the use of addictive substances and other addictions especially in the lives of certain youth; racism; the arms race and wars, as well as the resulting social catastrophes; the oppression of certain social groups, religious communities, and entire peoples; social inequality; the restriction of human rights in the field of freedom of conscience — in particular religious freedom; the misinformation and manipulation of public opinion. More broadly secularization is seen as a threat for Christian faith and moral/familial values, or as something foreign to normative Christian tradition.116 The same applies as regards church-State relations. While the ‘Encyclical’ appeals to the famous New Testament quotation suggesting the clear distinction between State and religion, Caesar and God, it longs, however, for a new ‘symphonia’, for a re-activation or re-establishment in today’s post-modern pluralistic societies of this byzantine political model, without any previous critical reflection neither of the character and the nature of the modern State, nor of the theological assessment of the political Byzantine model, as it was the case, for instance, with Fr. Georges Florovsky.117 As suggested by the ‘Encyclical’, ‘the local Orthodox Churches are today called to promote a new constructive   Kattan, ‘Le concile de Crète: En espérant que nous apprenions’ (see n. 50), p. 13.   ‘Encyclical’, III, 7; IV, 9; V, 10; ‘The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World’, B, 2; F, 7, 9, 13. 117   See among others, G. Florovsky, ‘Antinomies of Christian History: Empire and Desert’, in Christianity and Culture, Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, 2 (Belmont MA, 1974), pp. 67-100, on pp. 97, 77, 99-100. Cf. id., ‘Christianity and Civilization’, ibid., pp. 121-130, on p. 130. 115 116

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s­ ynergy with the secular state and its rule of law within the new framework of international relations, in accordance with the biblical saying: ‘Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the things that are God’s’ (cf. Mat 22:21). This synergy must, however, preserve the specific identity of both Church and state and ensure their earnest cooperation in order to preserve man’s unique dignity and the human rights which flow therefrom, and in order to assure social justice’.118 Moreover, while human rights are at first recognized ‘as a response to contemporary social and political crises and upheavals and in order to protect the freedom of the individual’, they are thereafter, in most of the cases, accepted either in a communitarian perspective or are associated with a culture of ‘rights’, an extreme individualism and egocentric spirit which is against the spirit of communion, as a perversion which functions ‘at the expense of the social content of freedom and leads to the arbitrary transformation of rights into claims for happiness, as well as the elevation of the precarious identification of freedom with individual license into a “universal value” that undermines the foundations of social values, of the family, of religion, of the nation and threatens fundamental moral values’.119 118   ‘Encyclical’, VI, 16. For a constructive critique of the ‘symphonia’, as the most adequate political vision of the Orthodox see, Kalaitzidis, ‘Church and State in the Orthodox World’ (see n. 72); id., Orthodoxy and Political Theology (Geneva, 2012). Cf. also, M. Hjälm, ‘The Role of the Church in Financial Crises: The Final Break with the Idea of Symphonia’, Journal of the Eastern Christian Studies, 69 (2017), pp. 125-136. 119   ‘Encyclical’, VI, 16. Cf. ‘Message’, 10, where human rights are considered to ‘seek to protect the citizen from the arbitrary power of the state’, and which, without been refused, they are however transcended by the Orthodox ideal of love, the ‘greatest of all’. Cf. also critical remarks by Kattan, ‘Le concile de Crète: En espérant que nous apprenions’ (see n. 50), pp. 13-14. It is worth noting that the only official Orthodox document before the Council of Crete relating to our discussion, i.e., the 1986 declaration on justice and human rights by the Third Pre-Conciliar Pan-Orthodox Conference, did refer to human rights in a positive way, stating among other things that ‘Orthodox Christians experience divine condescension every day and fight against every form of fanaticism and bigotry that divides human beings and peoples. Since we continuously declare the incarnation of God and the deification of humanity, we defend human rights for every human being and every people. Since we live with the divine gift of freedom through Christ’s work of redemption, we are able to reveal to the fullest the universal value that freedom has for every human being and every people’. See Episkepsis, 17 (1986), issue 369, December 15, 1986. In addition Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew in his book Encountering the Mystery: Understanding Orthodox Christianity Today (New York, 2008), pp. 120-144, has offered a positive approach to human rights. Cf. also Archbishop Anastasios (Yannoulatos), Facing the World: Orthodox Christian Essays on Global Concerns, transl. P. Gottfried (Crestwood NY, 2003), esp. chap. 2, pp. 49-78: Orthodoxy and Human Rights: On the universal declaration of human rights and the Greek Orthodox tradition. For a positive assessment of human rights from an Orthodox point of view cf.



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This one-sided negative or at last ambiguous understanding of secularization, and human rights is quite far from the more balanced approaches of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew or of the late Patriarch Ignatius of Antioch (regarding modernity) we have already seen in previous pages, where, along with the problems, and the dangers they also value the positive aspects.120 The same ambiguous or even negative approach is also found in the conciliar documents with regards to globalization. The later is considered to be responsible for the powerful shocks provoked to the economy and to society on a world-wide scale, as well as for ‘the new forms of systematic exploitation and social injustice’. It has led to ‘the weakening K. Delikostantis, Τὰ δικαιώματα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου: Δυτικὸ ἰδεολόγημα ἢ οἰκουμενικὸ ἦθος [Human Rights: Western Ideology or Ecumenical Ethos?] (Thessaloniki, 1995); id., ‘Human Rights and Orthodoxy: Remarks on Christian Freedom and Autonomy’, in The Idea of Human Rights: Tradition and Presence. Proceedings of an International Conference Held in Prague, ed. J. Halama (Prague, 2003), pp. 67-84; id., ‘Orthodoxy Facing the Modern Secular State’, in Political Theologies in Orthodox Christianity: Common Challenges – Divergent Positions, eds. K. Stoeckl, I. Gabriel, A. Papanikolaou (London/New York, 2017), pp. 243-251. For an overview of the discussion on Orthodoxy and human rights cf. the collective volume, Orthodox Christianity and Human Rights in Europe: A Dialogue between Theological Paradigms and Socio-Legal Pragmatics, eds. E.-A. Diamantopoulou and L.-L. Christians (Brussels, 2018). Especially for Russian Orthodoxy cf. K. Stoeckl, The Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights (Abingdon/ New York, 2014). It is worth noting that the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew in his lecture at Adenaouer Foundation in Berlin (June 2017) publicly criticized those Orthodox theologians or intellectuals (notably Christos Yannaras) who opposed human rights and promote anti-Western ideas among the Orthodox: https://www.patriarchate.org/-/rededes-okumenischen-patriarchen-bartholomaios-konrad-adenauer-stiftung-berlin-01-06-2017-/ (accessed 3 March 2018). 120  Clément, Conversations with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I (see n. 3), pp. 158, 162: ‘Secularization, therefore, is simultaneously the daughter of Athens and of Jerusalem […] It would be false and dangerous to see only the negative aspects of secularization, to denounce them and to dream of a “new” Christianity. In the secularized world, which will certainly endure, even if only as a rampart against the assault of fanaticism, one can certainly find traces of its Greek and biblical origins. Respect for the “other”, freedom of the spirit, the best in a pluralistic democracy […] — all of this, says Bartholomew, is rooted in the biblical revelation of the person and the distinction made by Christ between the Kingdom of God and the kingdom of Caesar’. Cf. Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, Encountering the Mystery (see n. 119). Cf. also Ignatius IV, Patriarch of Antioch and all the East, Orthodoxy and the Issues of Our Time (see n. 101), pp. 222-224. In trying to understand the clear contradiction between these two official Orthodox attitudes towards modern issues, we should take into account the strong­ pressures exercised by the Russian Church during the last stages of the pre-conciliar process, and the concessions made by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and other Orthodox churches in order for the former to take part in the Holy and Great Council. We know afterwards that finally the Russian Church did not keep its promise to fruitfully cooperate towards Pan-Orthodox unity and Orthodox global conciliarism!

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or complete reversal of social acquisitions [...], widening thus the gap between rich and poor, undermining the social cohesion of peoples and fanning new fires of global tensions’. Globalization is also criticized for implying ‘the principle of the “autonomy of the economy” or “economism”, that is, the autonomization of the economy from man’s essential needs and its transformation into an end in itself’. According to the ­conciliar document, the church therefore, ‘proposes a viable economy founded on the principles of the Gospel, and thus guided by the words of the Lord, “man shall not live by bread alone” (Luke 4.4)’. In the light of the above we understand why the church, following the ‘Encyclical’, ‘does not connect the progress of mankind only with an increase in living standards or with economic development at the expense of spiritual values’.121 Unfortunately, this fair conciliar critique of the harmful effects of ­globalization at the economic and social realm, and the defense of the weak which translates in the today’s context the Gospel’s concern for the neighbor, and for the victims of history, is associated with an overall negative stance towards cosmopolitanism and globalization and their supposed destructive consequences on the cultural ground, as well as with a culturally — and not theologically — based defense of the national and cultural traditions, of the ethno-cultural, and even the local identities.122 We can then read that ‘it (sc. globalization) has planned the gradual neutralization of the impediments from opposing national, religious, ideological and other traditions [...]. In opposition to the levelling and impersonal standardization promoted by globalization, and also to the extremes of nationalism, the Orthodox Church proposes the protection of the identities of peoples and the strengthening of local identity’.123 121   ‘Encyclical’, VI, 15. Cf. ‘The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World’, F, 2-4; ‘Message’, 9. 122   Here again the same question (cf. above footnotes 119 and 120) arises, which refers to the compatibility of this one-sided negative conciliar critique of globalization with the more balanced and nuanced approach of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew as characteristically evidenced in his book Encountering the Mystery (see n. 119), in which globalization is linked not only to poverty, but it is also associated with ecumenicity, or presented as an old phenomenon, and a two-edged sword (pp. 158-163). In this light it is hard not to seen this apparent contradiction, and the final conciliar document as a result of compromise with the conservative elements of Orthodoxy, the Russian Orthodox Church and its satellites, and the Orthodox Church of Greece which is significantly and diachronically marked by an ethnocentric, anti-cosmopolitanism, and anti-globalization discourse. 123   Cf. ‘Encyclical’, VI, 15. The same paragraph goes further and offers the Orthodox alternative to the standardization and homogenization of globalization: ‘As an alternative example for the unity of mankind, she proposes the articulated organization of the Church



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One step further, the conciliar document on mission confirms the wellknown in Orthodoxy sacralization of national or local traditions: ‘The Church is concerned about the ever-increasing imposition upon humanity of a consumerist lifestyle, devoid of Christian ethical principles. In this sense, consumerism combined with secular globalization tends to lead to the loss of nations’ spiritual roots, their historical loss of memory, and the forgetfulness of their traditions’.124 The conciliar text does not define these ‘spiritual roots’ of the nations, why and upon which theological criteria these roots are considered as sacred, why the loss of the ‘historical memory’ is an ecclesial concern, and if there is any distinction between ‘traditions’ and ‘Tradition’. It does not, therefore, seek for a balance between local and global and a necessary fusion of local and universal elements, which is the main challenge for Orthodoxy,125 but it favorites, or rather sacralizes the former, while delegitimizing ecclesiastically and theologically the latter. In doing so the conciliar document repeats what I have called elsewhere ‘ecclesiastical culturalism’, i.e., the problematic, from a theological point of view, mixture of theological and cultural elements, theological and cultural criteria, in other words the understanding of faith, and the church event in terms of culture and ethno-cultural heritage.126 In fact, Orthodoxy has been much identified with local traditions, ­customs, and national narratives that it seems to having lost the awareness of catholicity and universality, and to having been reduced to the realm of custom, ancestral heritage, and ethno-cultural identity, ­re-ordering the priorities vis-à-vis the theological and cultural criteria in on the basis of the equality of the local Churches. The Church is opposed to the provocative threat to contemporary man and the cultural traditions of peoples that globalization involves’. 124   ‘The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World’, F, 7. Cf. ‘The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World’, F, 5; 8; ‘Encyclical’, VI, 13. 125   Cf. Makrides, ‘Le concile panorthodoxe de 2016’ (see n. 1), p. 9. 126   Cf. further on this and more bibliographical references in P. Kalaitzidis, ‘La relation de l’Église à la culture et la dialectique de l’eschatologie et de l’histoire’, Istina, 55 (2010), pp. 7-25, especially pp. 15-25; id., ‘The Eschatological Understanding of Tradition in Contemporary Orthodox Theology and Its Relevance for Today’s Issues’, in The Shaping of Tradition: Context and Normativity, ed. C. Dickinson (Louvain/Paris/Walpole MA, 2013), pp. 297-312, especially pp. 309-310; id., ‘New Wine into Old Wineskins? Orthodox Theology of Mission Facing the Challenges of a Global World’, in Theological ­Education and Theology of Life: Transformative Christian Leadership in the 21st Century. A Festschrift for Dietrich Werner, eds. A. Longumer, P. H. Huang and U. Andrée (Oxford, 2016), pp. 119-147, especially pp. 141-142. Cf. also G. Papathomas, ‘Culturalisme ­ecclésiastique: L’aliénation de la culture et l’anéantissement de l’église’, Année canonique, 51 (2009), pp. 61-67; reprinted in Episkepsis, 41 (2010), pp. 20-25.

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favor of the latter. Self-content, we Orthodox refer to — or perhaps even boast about — Byzantinism, Greekness, Holy Russia and the Third Rome, the Serbian people as the servant people of God, Antiochian uniqueness and Arabhood, the Latin features of Romanian Orthodoxy, etc. It is clear that the vast majority of Orthodox have exchanged the ecclesial sense of ‘belonging’ for an ethno-cultural or societal one, and have identified the structures and authoritarian models of a patriarchal society with the golden age of the church and ‘Christian’ culture. Historical Orthodoxy’s connection with a particular place and culture, or with a particular nation, appears to be among the more serious — but unfortunately not the only — obstacles in Orthodoxy’s attempt to address the new challenges brought about by globalization, which so frightens the Orthodox. It is worth mentioning here the thought of the French professor and political scientist Olivier Roy,127 an expert in political Islam and religious phenomena. According to Roy, in globalization — with satellite TV, internet, and virtual networks — religions that are overly connected or identified with a particular place or culture, such as Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, face greater difficult to adapting themselves to the surrounding setting. Conversely, religious traditions that are noted for their mobility, their disconnection from any particular culture, and from being entrapped by narrow geographical limits, such as Evangelical Protestantism and Salafi Islam, move with greater ease and have greater ‘success’ in the ‘free’ religious market. The implications here are obvious and alarming, especially for the Orthodox, and for those who insist in identifying religion with ethno-cultural identity and beliefs. In this perspective we should notice that, contrary to the trend in other Christian — or, more broadly, religious — traditions, in which there is a push for the incorporation to a particular culture (inculturation), in the case of the Orthodox peoples, with their well-known close bonds (even to the point of identification in some cases) between church and nation, and between church and local traditions, what seems to be required most urgently is a disengagement from these particular cultures and local traditions (deculturation), a re-ordering of priorities vis-à-vis the theological and cultural criteria, a new balance between the local and the universal, between the particular and the catholic. Moreover, we cannot address today’s global challenges when as Orthodox we are constantly and persistently refusing the reality of globalization, a fact which in my understanding betrays a lack of aware  See O. Roy, Holy Ignorance: When Religion and Culture Part Ways (London, 2010).

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ness regarding the world in which we are living today! There is a ­predominant anti-globalization discourse in many Orthodox settings (as well as in many Christians of other traditions), but when the Orthodox (with some exceptions) speak against globalization or call for resistance, they do not invoke theological arguments or criteria, but cultural and national ones, arguments in favor of the defense of national independence, language and identity, otherwise being in danger. At the same time, however, they neglect to point out the negative financial and social consequences of globalization upon the poor and the marginalized (the relevant conciliar documents fortunately do!). I am aware of the Christian anti-globalization movements, like AGAPE (Alternative Globalization Addressing People and Earth),which act and struggle against global capitalism at an ecumenical level.128 On the other hand, however, I always supported the idea that we cannot refuse the today’s world, and the on-going reality of a global world beyond borders and national limitations, which in these precise aspects echoes very much the wider socio-cultural context in which the Gospel was originally preached, and Christianity was prevailed. It is one thing to cope with the changing of the negative effects of globalization, to go against the injustice and economic exploitation at the global level, and it is another thing to simply refuse the reality of globalization, and the world in which we live. Let’s now turn to another aspect of the ambiguous relationship between Orthodoxy and modernity as evidenced in the conciliar documents of Crete. Following some critical remarks, the conciliar documents on fasting and marriage are marked by a legalistic language and spirit which Orthodoxy is supposed to reject, and which Orthodox theology (both in its neo-patristic and the Russian school versions) worked out to overcome during the 20th century. These documents are more or less characterized by a conservative spirit, which makes it difficult to address today’s ­complex challenges. On the issue of fasting for example: it seems that the initial reason for the inscription of this topic in the agenda of the Council, i.e., the adaptation of the fasting prescriptions to the conditions of modern life, and particularly of the ‘Diaspora’, and more broadly to 128   Cf. World Council of Churches, AGAPE: A Background Document (Geneva, 2005). For an Orthodox assessment of and participation to the AGAPE process see S. Tsompanidis, ‘The Ecumenical Process of AGAPE: An Orthodox Perspective’, in A Testimony to the Nations: A Vigintennial Volume Offered to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew (Thessaloniki, 2011), pp. 905-923.

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the people leaving outside the context of Eastern Mediterranean (such as in Africa for example) was lost, while the logic of the strict observance of the traditional rules prevailed, without any historical and contextual analysis of these rules or any honest attempt to connect fasting with the condition of people in post-modernity (urbanization, mobility, etc.).129 It is not then incidental that the Council did not pay attention to the proposal of a group of young theologians from Serbia, Greece, and America, brought to the Council of Crete in the relevant session by two Serbian bishops of the young generation, Grigorije of Herzegovina and Maxim of Western America. Although the text has been strongly supported, it has not however, been accepted as or incorporated in the conciliar document on fasting.130 Some extracts of the statement of these young theologians are highly revelatory of their theological vision and orientation: The way we fast nowadays (when we only eat certain types of food and avoid others) has annulled all other kinds of fasting, which are found in the tradition of fasting and which demonstrate the creative nature of Christian fasting (for example, in our tradition we find: 1. complete abstinence from eating, 2. fasting until mid-afternoon, 3. eating less in order to save money for charity, or 4. abstaining not from food, but from favorite activities, etc.).   What mattered was the reason for fasting, not the duration, which was directly dependent on that reason. Also, the real meaning of fasting lay not in the type of food, but on abstinence. But unfortunately, very often, delicious and luxurious dishes are welcomed by our Church as fasting food, provided they do not contain prohibited ingredients. In this way the Church enables rich Christians to be good Christians, who can fast for months using different types of very expensive food; while poor Christians become bad Christians because sometimes they take some cheese or eggs, if they cannot afford to eat Lenten foods for more than six months every year, or only two or three types of food which they can afford. […]   Also, fasting as we now understand it, with the fasting periods on which the Church insists (which is more than half the year), on the one hand, is not really possible for many categories of Christians (for example, the old and the sick), who, on the other hand, being Christians, want to fulfill the commandments of their Church. As such, we create an inner conflict in these people without reason. […]

129  M. V. Kolovopoulou, ‘“Ἡ σπουδαιότης τῆς νηστείας καὶ ἡ τήρησις αὐτῆς σήμερον”: Δρώμενα ἀπὸ τὴν πορεία πρὸς τὴν Ἁγία καὶ Μεγάλη Σύνοδο τῆς Ὀρθοδόξου Ἐκκλησίας’ [The Importance of Fasting and Its Observance Today. Highlights on the Way to the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church], Theologia, 87 (2016), pp. 195-206. 130   Cf. Bishop Maxim of Western America, Diary of the Council (see n. 7), pp. 55ff.



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  Moreover, it is of special importance that, as late as the 12th century, the Byzantine canonist Theodore Balsamon insisted that only the fasts of Wednesday, Friday, and Great Lent were the obligatory ones, established by the Holy Canons, whereas all the others were not obligatory. Therefore, the history of our Church shows that multiplying and extending the fasting periods has never been a unanimous and unquestionable practice. Long fasting, equally with ‘long prayers’, is not necessarily a token of piety; it may well be reason enough for condemnation (suffice it to compare Christ’s words in the Gospel of Mark 12:40; and Luke 20:47).131

In the same line, the young professor of Canon Law at the Faculty of Orthodox Theology of Belgrade University Dr. Rastko Yovic, while respecting fasting as obligatory for the faithful practice, discusses, ­however, the negative consequences caused by this practice in the church life, as for example: the cultic, individualistic understanding of Eucharist with no relation to the world; the negative outcome for church life and theology due to the emphasis on food as the most important value in the spiritual struggle; the consequences that obligatory fasting implies for Christian identity, when the latter is stripped to an identity defined merely by food. For all these reasons, Yovic thinks that the church should advocate fasting but no longer as an obligatory practice.132 However, the conservative or legalistic orientation of this conciliar document, by leaving the final arrangement of the relevant regulations to the discernment of territorial churches, did not prevent any post-conciliar decisions from having a clearly renovative character. The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria, for example, the missionary Church par excellence in Eastern Orthodoxy, decided recently to proceed to the necessary adaptations to the rules of fasting for the African Orthodox, and to re-activate the order of female deaconesses for the needs of its

131   For the text of this statement cf. ibid., pp. 55-57. The same text is also available at: https://panorthodoxcemes.blogspot.gr/2016/06/statement-of-representatives-of-serbian.html/ (accessed 3 March 2018). For additional critical engagements with the conciliar document on fasting see: https://panorthodoxcemes.blogspot.gr/2016/06/fasting-reaffirmed.html/ (accessed 3 March 2018); https://panorthodoxcemes.blogspot.gr/2016/06/reflection-onimportance-of-fasting-and.html/ (accessed 3 March 2018). For a robust theological critic of the ‘chemical’ and ‘dietary’ understanding of fasting regardless of its existential and social meaning, cf. A. N. Papathanasiou, ‘Christian Fasting in Postmodern Society: Considering the Criteria’, St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 60 (2016), pp. 249-268. 132  Cf. R. Yovic, ‘The Importance of Fasting and Its Observance for Tomorrow’, ­special issue: ‘The Holy and Great Council’, Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai Theologia Orthodoxa, 62 (2017), pp. 103-114.

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missionary and pastoral work, encouraging thus or even inspiring analogous movements within other territorial Orthodox churches.133 A parallel trajectory could be observed as regards the conciliar document on marriage. Here again it is clear that seeking a compromise with the conservatives (the majority of whom did not finally make it to Crete!), the document is marked by an overall defensive anti-modern spirit, while the initial reason for discussing this topic and for including it in the agenda of the Holy and Great Council, i.e., the second marriage of the widow clergy, has been completely lost!134 Despite the fact that this last particular issue was not discussed during the relevant session of the Council, since for many years now it has been already disappeared from the agenda of the Council, it seems that Ecumenical Patriarch ­Bartholomew did not hesitate to refer to it at different occasions during the time of the Council, encouraging thus further discussion on this and other related issues, as noticed by Archdeacon of the Ecumenical Patriarchate John Chryssavgis: ‘His All-Holiness was still bold enough to raise various issues about marriage and married clergy, stating that the Church needs at some point to deal with these questions in one way or another. And it should deal with them with the spiritual and pastoral sensitivity that is deserving of its clergy’.135 Another aspect of this pending issue with modernity as regards matters of sexuality and marriage is the perplexity and even the oversimplifi­   Cf. ‘Τὸ Πατριαρχεῖο Ἀλεξανδρείας γιὰ Διακόνισσες καὶ Ἁγία Σύνοδο’ [The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria on the Issue of Deaconesses and the Holy and Great Council]: http://www.romfea.gr/epikairotita-xronika/11485-to-patriarxeio-­ alejandreias-gia-diakonisses-kai-agia-sunodo/ (accessed 3 March 2018); P. Vassiliadis, ‘The Revival of the Order of Deaconess by the Patriarchate of Alexandria’: https://publicorthodoxy.org/2017/11/17/support-alexandria-deaconess/ (accessed 3 March 2018). It is a matter of discussion to which extent these recent Orthodox initiatives on re-instituting the order of female diaconate influenced or favored by analogous movements in the Roman Catholic Church. 134   Cf. Chryssavgis, ‘Looking Back at the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 11): ‘Yet, we should also remember that some of the original documents (such as the ones on regulations of fasting or impediments of marriage) were not intended to be general treatises or vague pietisms on these subjects. The document on fasting was supposed to consider how the context of mission or diaspora might affect rules of fasting, while the document on marriage was supposed to consider problems related to mixed marriages and divorce, as well as the marriage of former monastics and re-marriage of widowed clergy. It is disappointing that most of our church leaders still respond to critical human — and especially sexual — issues with silence or denial. Thankfully, however, the Holy and Great Council correctly decided to resolve these issues within the context of “the Holy Synod of each autocephalous Orthodox Church according to the principles of the holy canons and in a spirit of pastoral discernment”’. 135   Chryssavgis, ‘Looking Back at the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 11). 133



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cation by which the conciliar document addresses the challenge of the new ethical norms, and new forms of partnership. Commenting for example on the way the ‘Encyclical’ and the conciliar document on Marriage approach the family as an ideal social structure, and the related new social phenomena of civil unions,136 Orthodox theologian of Lebaneese origin Assaad Elias Kattan maintains that, [sc. these texts] they try to deal with certain modern challenges with a mentality of past centuries, as if there were, in the Orthodox understanding, a societal model unique that can not be questioned or changed, the very one that was the characteristic of rural societies that predominated in periods prior to modernity. […]. These texts insist […] on ‘the family’ as an ideal social structure, but without taking into consideration the thousands of Orthodox women who raise their children alone, in Russia and in the Balkans. They refrain from informing us if this ‘new’ model of society is covered by the definition of the family or if it is ‘abnormal’. In the same way, the texts of the council avoid addressing the problem of cohabitation (sc. cvil unions) as well as the education of children outside the marital institution, except by rejecting all this in the sphere of ‘sin’, ignoring the fact that thousands of young Orthodox engaged in their Church in Europe, Russia and the United States live today in collective cells existing outside the circle of religious marriage.137

However, despite this overall conservative orientation of the document on marriage and the other related issues, and the concessions made in the pre-conciliar stage to the Orthodox Church of Georgia (such as the many restrictions or prohibitions regarding mixed [a marriage between an Orthodox and non-Orthodox Christian] and interfaith marriages [a marriage between a Christian and non-Christian] or the entering into a marriage after monastic tonsure [a marriage of a former monastic]) in order for the Georgian Church to sign the relevant document and to take part in the Holy and Great Council, the Spirit did not cease to surprise us, and to open new chapters that the Council of Crete itself did not dare to do. One first example is the final conciliar document on marriage, and more specifically the issue of mixed marriages. While the prohibition of such marriages is maintained according to canonical akribeia,138 the final decision as to the exercise of ecclesiastical oikonomia ‘must be considered by the Holy Synod of each autocephalous Orthodox Church 136  ‘Encyclical’, III, 7; ‘The Sacrament of Marriage and its Impediments’, I, 10. Cf. also ‘The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World’, F, 14. 137   Kattan, ‘Le concile de Crète: En espérant que nous apprenions’ (see n. 50), p. 13. 138   ‘The Sacrament of Marriage and its Impediments’, II, 5, i.

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according to the principles of the holy canons and in a spirit of pastoral discernment’.139 More significant is the silence of the final conciliar document as regards the confession of children born in mixed marriages. As noticed by Metropolitan Kallistos Ware in an interview: ‘in the ­preliminary document dealing with marriage the question of “mixed ­marriages” was mentioned, and it was said that in the case of mixed marriages that the children should always be brought up Orthodox. Now that stipulation was deleted, and I think it was sensible to say that in the end we have to leave this to the conscience and decision of the parents, rather than make demands before people are married’.140 A second highly important example is a Pastoral Letter issued on December 2017 by the Conference of the Orthodox bishops in Germany, addressed to the Orthodox youth of the country, which copes with the sensitive issues of love, sexuality and marriage. The importance and novelty of this Letter issued in German, English and different other ­languages spoken by Orthodox people living in Germany, resides in the fact that it is the first official Orthodox document which does not condemn homosexuality, approaching it in a mere pastoral way, while it seems to be open to responsible pre-marital sexual relations.141 According to the relevant — not to say prophetic — remark by Archdeacon John Chryssavgis, ‘the way that Orthodoxy handles modernity — in the light as in the wake of the Great Council — is profoundly ­relevant for its resonance in the public square’.142 In my understanding this is the main challenge Orthodoxy is called to deal with in the upcoming years. The respective answer depends on which world, and on the audience to whom the message is addressed: to the outdated and bygone world of the agrarian traditional societies, and the so-called Orthodox empires or monarchies; or to the people of modernity and post-modernity who, despite the end of religiously organized societies initiated by the Enlightenment and modernity, continue to seek for the true God, and thirst for the genuine spiritual life as well as for the liberating message of the Gospel.   Ibid., II, 5, ii.   ‘Reflections on the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 7), pp. 126-127. 141   See the English version of the text ‘A Letter from the Bishops of the Orthodox Church in Germany to Young People concerning Love – Sexuality – Marriage’, posted at the website of the Orthodox Bishops’ Conference in Germany: http://www.obkd.de/Texte/ Brief%20OBKD%20an%20die%20Jugend-en.pdf/ (accessed 3 March 2018). Except the German, the same text is also published in the same website in Greek, Arabic, Russian, Romanian, and Bulgarian. 142   Chryssavgis, ‘Toward the Great and Holy Council: Retrieving a Culture of Conciliarity and Communion’ (see n. 16), p. 330. 139 140



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6. Synodality/Conciliarity and Pneumatology One thing that became clear due to the debate around the convention or the postponement of the Synod is the famous conciliarity or synodality, supposed to characterize the life and theology of the Orthodox Church. The latter is proud to refer to itself as ‘the Church of the conciliar tradition’, as ‘the Church of the seven Ecumenical councils’ or as ‘the Church of the Holy Spirit’ who guides and inspires it, and who preserves its unity. Thus, in the dominant Orthodox discourse, conciliarity is taken for granted, and it further becomes a particular confessional mark, an identity marker for Eastern Orthodoxy, a reason for collective self-pride and self-admiration.143 The distance, however, between a rhetorical or formal and real or authentic synodality remains important, even after the convocation of the Holy and Great Council.144 At the same time, genuine conciliarity is practically absent from all aspects of the actual ecclesial life of the Orthodox Church. Conciliarity and all-level-synodality did not find their place not even during the preparation of the Holy and Great Council, which in most of the cases remained an affair of the bishops and of the ecclesiastical bureaucracy. As it has been mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the Council of Crete was prepared and took place in the absence of the laity, the women, and the youth, and even in the absence of the lay theologians, insofar as a minority of them ­participated as advisors officially representing their churches. A worth noting statistic data can shed more light on what I am trying to discuss here. It seems that the majority of the Orthodox churches which attended Crete, did not took full benefit from the possibility given by the Regulations and Procedures of the operation of the Holy and Great Council regarding lay participation.145 Few lay people served as advisors 143   Cf. J. Chryssavgis, ‘On the Great Council of the Orthodox Church’: https://www. firstthings.­com/web-exclusives/2016/02/on-the-great-council-of-the-orthodox-church/ (accessed 3 March 2018); Hovorun, ‘Conciliarity and the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 13), p. 97. 144   ‘Une Église, qui se vante d’être l’Église des Conciles, a été confrontée à de terribles difficultés pour rassembler enfin – au bout de combien de temps! – un Concile pan­ orthodoxe, qui à cause de ces difficultés a bien failli ne pas se tenir’. Papathanasiou, ‘Les douleurs des orthodoxes, des douleurs d’enfantement?’ (see n. 30), p. 16. Cf. Kattan, ‘Le concile de Crète: En espérant que nous apprenions’ (see n. 50), pp. 11-12; Bathrellos, ‘Le Saint et Grand Concile: Présentation et appréciation’ (see n. 7), p. 355. 145   ‘Organization and Working Procedure of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church’, article 3.2: ‘The delegations may be accompanied by special consultants — clergy, monastics or laypeople — but their number may not exceed six (6). Invitations are also extended to three (3) assistants (stewards) for each autocephalous Orthodox Church’.

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representing their churches at the Council, and among them very few were women, with very characteristic cases, in this regard the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Orthodox Church of Albania.146 In relation now to the issue above, what strikes the careful observer of the conciliar process is the fear before the Spirit, the fear of everything which was not pre-arranged and agreed beforehand. Almost all the Orthodox churches, but especially the ones which finally made the choice not to participate in the Council, constantly asked to agree on everything before the Council, to elaborate the documents and conciliar texts in advance, leaving thus nothing to the inspiration of the Spirit! The main mission of the Council would then be to confirm and to sign what had been already agreed upon in advance during the preparation process, along with a nice family photo at the end! The fear of the unpredictable, and of the new and unknown, lay behind not only of the decision of these churches of not attending Crete, but also to the extremely long ­pre-conciliar process (in opposition to the very brief duration of the Council itself), and to the impossibility of changing the agenda of the Council, or to introduce new topics. As it has been rightly noticed by the Greek theologian Georgios ­Vlantis, already since the decision (2014) of the Orthodox Primates to convene the Holy and Great Council the anti-ecumenist groups all over the Orthodox world reacted fiercely against this great conciliar event and they systematically tried to prevent the faithful from a positive reception of its fruits. This behavior reflects profound radicalization processes ­taking place within many Orthodox churches, characterized by fervently anti-western, anti-ecumenist and anti-modern populist rhetoric. The ­traditionalist reactions against the Council reveal a Pneumatological ­deficit in the ecclesiology of the fundamentalist groups: a fear against the Holy Spirit, against its dimension as creator spiritus, against the novum the Holy Spirit can offer to the church.147 Following the penetrating and stimulating analysis of the Russian ­historian, research fellow, and lecturer at the Museum of the Russian Icon in Moscow Sergei P. Brun, who sees the fear against the Holy Spirit

146  A. N. Papathanasiou, ‘Ἀνασύσταση ἢ πράξη ποὺ διακονεῖ τὴν Ἀνάσταση’ [Reconstitution or an Act that Serves the Resurrection?], Frear, 21 (March 2018), pp. 130-135. 147   G. Vlantis, ‘Die Angst vor dem Geist: Das Heilige und Große Konzil und die orthodoxen Anti-Ökumeniker’, Ökumenische Rundschau, 66 (2017), pp. 32-41.



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also in the decision of the four Orthodox churches to withdraw from the Council, which is called ‘synodophobia’ or rather ‘pneumatophobia’, it is a strange malady, a desire to continue living in their accustomed regional and geopolitical blocks and rivalries, to conduct innumerable consultations and pre-conciliar meetings, which resemble UN or G8 ­ ­negotiations, rather than the meetings of bishops hailing from one Church and believing in the one Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. It is a desire to do whatever it takes to abstain from gathering together on Pentecost, and from calling their gathering a council. For, if we do manifest that we are bishops of one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church, gathered together for a council, we might extend our invitation to another delegate — the Holy Spirit — who, amidst the arguments and rivalries, will still guide the Council, as was done in the centuries past. The invocation of the Holy Spirit is a risk, for it may guide the Church through schism and division, through arguments and change, far beyond its comfort zone. […] Such perspectives cause ­nothing but fear and denial from many of the faithful. It is a genuine phobia of conciliarity and thus of the Holy Spirit.148

Beyond wishful thinking and doxological discourses, what happened in Crete helped us understanding better that we need to self-critically discuss and further reflect on conciliarity and its relation to primacy, and to Pan-Orthodox unity. This is a crucial, but still pending discussion. The Orthodox use to speak a lot on conciliarity, but miss the genuine conciliar praxis, and functional conciliar structures. Before feeling really proud, for our conciliar spirit and tradition, it would be better for us Orthodox, to find ways to seriously reflect on, and act according to ­conciliarity. I think that the Holy and Great Council of Crete and its pre-conciliar process will remain a great and decisive moment in the Orthodox­ conciliar tradition, not only for it was the first conciliar meeting of this caliber after many centuries, but also thanks to the conciliar awakening it provoked. At the same time, however, it ‘was an exercise and opportunity for the fourteen autocephalous Orthodox Churches to ­ ­demonstrate their readiness and willingness to assemble as one, united Church’. They apparently, however, ‘failed this test’.149 Again, what lies behind this failure is the lack of a genuine conciliar spirit and the relation of the latter to primacy, as well as the question and the challenge of the Orthodox leadership.

  Brun, ‘Pneumatophobia’ (see n. 60).   Chryssavgis, ‘On the Great Council of the Orthodox Church’ (see n. 143).

148 149

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The Council of Crete was the first Great Council of the Eastern Church not convoked by an Emperor. As it is well known, ecumenical councils were summoned by the Roman/Byzantine emperor and attended by papal legates. But since the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and the disappearance of the Orthodox emperor, the Orthodox behave as orphans, and look desperately for a new emperor or a tsar who will not only arrange secular affairs, but will also put an order in the affairs of the church and in the ecclesiological ataxia experienced by the Orthodox for at least one century. We Orthodox have been identified so much with Byzantium and its secular and religious structures, that the fall of the Byzantine empire seems to having left an incurable wound, while the greatest difficulty appears trying to move beyond this historical trauma. It has been incredibly difficult for us not only to find our way outside the framework of the empire and monarchy by divine right, but also to envision new ecclesiological models relevant to our Orthodox Tradition, and at the same time compatible with the democratic era and the modern/postmodern mind we experience in our life according to the world or according to the flesh. We thus perpetually yearn for this now lost pre-modern form of political organization, whereas at the ecclesiological level the absence of an emperor lays behind of the ethnic/national rivalries, and inter-church tensions.150 Being for more than 1.000 years the Imperial Church of the Eastern Christian Roman Empire, and after the experiences of the Muslim Ottoman, and the Orthodox Tsarist empires, the Eastern Orthodox Church is called in the today’s post-modern, post-colonial, and post-totalitarian world to assume the entire responsibility of its ecclesial and spiritual life. And apparently this responsibility and maturity lead it to feel perplexed and embarrassed! Under these circumstances marked also by the emergence in the 19th century of the Orthodox Balkan nation-states and ‘the multiplication of autocephalous (self-governing) Orthodox churches, and in the absence of an emperor or the pope, simply bringing all autocephalous churches together became a major challenge, given the forces that have been pulling Orthodox Church leaders apart for centuries’.151 But having convened a Council without an emperor does not automatically mean that the church avoids political influences, although ‘the 150   Cf. Kalaitzidis, ‘La relation de l’Église à la culture et la dialectique de l’eschatologie et de l’histoire’ (see n. 126), pp. 16ff.; id., ‘Ecclesiology and Globalization’ (see n. 77), pp. 489-490. 151   Gavrilyuk, ‘Orthodox Council Bridges Tensions’ (see n. 7).



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absence of the Church of Russia (sc. from the Council of Crete) and the three churches which remain politically very close to it, emptied the Council of its political stakes and played a liberating role’.152 Behind the participation or the abstention of the Orthodox churches from the Council of Crete, one can easily identify political influences and even pressures,153 and recognize the pro-Western or the pro-Russian orientation of these churches. Thus, if the Church of Constantinople needs the Western support in order to survive within the hostile context of the Islamist and nationalistic Modern Turkey, by keeping its preeminent role within the Orthodox world, it becomes more and more clear that the Russian Orthodox Church is identified with the foreign policy of the Russian state, by sacralizing the famous idea of the ‘Russian World’ (‘Russkiy Mir’).154 In addition, it also promotes the idea of a new, politico-cultural divide between East and West, a ‘new inter-Orthodox cold war’, according to which against the moral decline of the latter due to the liberal democracy, to individualism and secularism, to the ‘idolatry of human rights’, and the legislation on homosexuality and same-sex marriages, the former is supposed to remain faithful to the traditional Christian and family values, and to the communal spirit, promoting thus a more healthy and coherent social life.155 As aptly put it by Metropolitan Chrysostomos Savvatos, the above reactions […] confirm more or less an inter-Orthodox ‘cold war’ between an ideological way of life that is expressed in the heart of the East through certain positions and views, and a fearful reaction against every   D. Struve, ‘À nos lecteurs’, Le Messager orthodoxe, 161 (2016), pp. 1-2, on p. 2.   As it was also the case with the convocation and the unfolding of the great Ecumenical Councils. 154   On the geopolitical dimensions and parameters of the Holy and Great Council, except the chapter by V. Pneumatikakis in the present volume, see N. Kazarian, ‘New Orthodox Geopolitics’: https://publicorthodoxy.org/2016/01/06/new-orthodox-geopolitics/ (accessed 3 March 2018); Matakiev, ‘The Pan-Orthodox Council in Crete (2016)’ (see n. 70; Bishop Maxim of Western America, Diary of the Council (see n. 7), pp. 131-132, 135-136; Makrides, ‘Le concile panorthodoxe de 2016’ (see n. 1), p. 15. As for the ideology of the ‘Russian World’ and the close ties of the Russian Church with the (new) ­Russian empire, cf. C. Hovorun, ‘Interpreting the “Russian World”’, in Churches in the Ukrainian Crisis, eds. A. Krawchuk and T. Bremer (Basingstoke, 2016), pp. 163-171; S. Chapnin, ‘A Church of Empire: Why the Russian Church Chose to Bless Empire’, First Thinks, November 2015: https://www.firstthings.com/article/2015/11/a-church-of-empire/. 155   Cf. Metropolitan Chrysostomos Savvatos, ‘The Positions “For” and “Against”’ (see n. 45), pp. 61, 65-67; A. Papanikolaou and G. E. Demacopoulos, ‘Putin’s Unorthodox Orthodoxy’: http://blogs.goarch.org/blog/-/blogs/putin-s-unorthodox-orthodoxy?p_p_ auth=IpTqHq5b/ (accessed 3 March 2018); Matakiev, ‘The Pan-Orthodox Council in Crete (2016)’ (see n. 70). 152 153

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model of Western society. […] some Orthodox churches reject any ‘liberal’ form of society, with the argument that Orthodoxy is endangered, and that the ecclesiastical way of life will be eroded.   In addition, they believed that the decisions of the Council should provide a bulwark against every tendency towards the Westernization of life and human society, especially in Orthodox lands.   Some Orthodox churches of Eastern Europe sought the introduction of an ‘Orthodoxy’ of an ideological form, with the veneer of theological ­affirmation, which can be preserved and at the same time that expresses a model of life with religious understanding and social dimensions. […] through the adoption of an understanding of religious conservatism, the Orthodox Church should be transformed from the Church into a sect, an ideological group, and that the members of the Church should not be understood as the faithful, but as followers. The second element is the principle that everything Western and new is to be thrown out, because they are believed to alter the ideal of the Orthodox Christian, whom they regard as the ‘God-ordained people of God’, ‘the new nation’, ‘the chosen people of God’, while all other peoples, the Westerners, because of their religious diversification, have no place in the reality of salvation, and are thus outcast and condemned. This anti-Western ecclesiastical style emphasizes an ­ideological model and a religious ‘exclusivity’ of Orthodoxy as an ideology, and not as a way of life. At the same time, it believes that only the Eastern way of life is traditional, and is the only one that provides meaning to this life and the future life.   This perspective seeks to be confirmed by the current reactionary position that is stirred up (especially through the question of the convening of the Holy and Great Council) by a Manichean, divisive, and polarized state, which behind the scenes seems to be inspired by the ‘well-known’ ecclesiastical ‘twin’ that (as much politically as ecclesiastically) uses ways and methods of acquiring power and leadership in the corresponding spaces and in the creation of zones of influence.156

Some of these ideas described above, especially the ones related to traditional or family values, secularization, and human rights can be now found in the conciliar documents, especially in the ones on ‘The Sacrament of Marriage and its Impediments’, and ‘The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World’, as the Russian Orthodox Church showed a particular interest during the pre-conciliar process to include these issues in the conciliar documents. It goes without saying that this development is a successful move of the Russian foreign policy, to the degree it promotes its own anti-European, and anti-Western agenda. At the same time, however, it is not necessarily a success of the Russian 156   Metropolitan Chrysostomos Savvatos, ‘The Positions “For” and “Against”’ (see n. 45), pp. 61-62.



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Orthodox Church, which even during the period of the political ‘cold war’ made every possible effort to keep alive communication and­ contacts with both Western churches, and Orthodox living in the West. Besides, as I already tried to remind, political/State interests and ecclesial priorities do not coincide, while genuine Orthodoxy is not identified with cultural Orthodoxy. Therefore, it is not without relevance to our discussion to say that the Russian Orthodox Church (along with Metropolitan Hierotheos Vlachos of Naypaktos and Agios Vlassios from the Orthodox Church of Greece) unfolded every possible effort to remove from the pre-conciliar final documents any reference to the concept and the theology of personhood and otherness, mainly inspired by Metropolitan John D. Zizioulas’ relevant writings.157 The same Church, during the last revision and update of the pre-conciliar documents, insisted on the omission of a whole section in the pre-conciliar document of 1986 entitled: ‘The Contribution of the Orthodox Church to the Realization of Peace, Justice, Freedom, Brotherhood and Love among Peoples and the Elimination of Racial ­Discrimination and of any other kind’, issued at the Third Pre-conciliar Pan-Orthodox Conference, in Chambésy, Geneva. In that document, and in the section F entitled: ‘Racial Discrimination and of any other kind’, in the articles 2 and 3, we could read the following: 2. A special point should be made in this place concerning the attitude of Orthodox towards racial discrimination. This attitude is clear: Orthodoxy believes that God ‘has made from one blood every nation of men to dwell on all the face of the earth’ (Acts 17:26) and that in Christ ‘there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus’ (Gal. 3:28). Steadfast in this faith, the Orthodox Church does not accept racial discrimination of any kind, because it presupposes a value demarcation among the human races and involves degrees in rights. Nevertheless by declaring an urgent necessity to abolish all discrimination and to offer possibilities for development to all the inhabitants of the earth from all points of view, it does not limit itself only to the removal of all discrimination on the colour of the race that we come across in different regions of our planet, but it extends itself also to fighting against discrimination against different (sc. any kind of) minorities. 3. A minority, either religious or linguistic or national should have the ­benefit of its specificity. The freedom of man is connected with the freedom of the community to which he/she belongs. Each community should evolve 157  Cf. mainly J. D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood NY, 1985); id., Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church (London/New York, 2006).

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and develop according to its own features. In this case, pluralism should regulate the life of all countries. The unity of a nation, country or state should be understood as the right of all human communities to be different.

All these verses have now been deleted from the final pre-conciliar and conciliar documents, because many church representatives, and not only the ones of the Russian Orthodox Church, were threatened that although without any evident link to the issue, they could, however, be considered as supportive of homosexuality, the homosexuals, and sexual minorities.158 7. In Place of Conclusion If ‘the end is where we start from’,159 then we can understand why ‘the meaning and the conciliar hypostasis of the Holy and Great Council has to come from the future’, in other words that the post-conciliar period will confirm or reject the conciliar character of the Council of Crete,160 and why the end (in our case the issue and process of reception) is what will justify the beginning. In fact, the Orthodox Church cannot be considered any more the same after June 26th, 2016, i.e., after the day when the so much awaited Council of Crete come to an end.161 The Orthodox people experience this reality in every place, and more and 158   The fear of openly and honestly discussing the issue of homosexuality played its role in the implicit refusal of the Holy and Great Council to consider the ‘Open letter’ of Orthodox homosexuals asking for a more inclusive theologically and pastorally approach to the issue at stake. Cf. ‘Open letter from the European Forum of LGBT Christian Groups to the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church, gathered at Crete, June 2016’, in ‘For I am Wonderfully Made’: Texts on Eastern Orthodoxy and LGBT Inclusion, eds. M. Cherniak, O. Gerassimenko, and M. Brinkschröder (n.p., 2016), pp. 298-301. For the changing attitude of Christianity during the first centuries of our era on the issue of sexuality and the related morality, cf. G. Skaltsas, ‘Τὸ ἄφυλο τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ἡ ἀνθρώπινη σεξουαλικότητα: Ἱστορικὴ μελέτη στὴ θεολογικὴ σκέψη τῶν πρώτων χριστιανικῶν αἰώνων’ [The Genderless of God and Human Sexuality: A Historical Study on the ­Theological Thought of the Early Christian Centuries], in Φύλο καὶ Θρησκεία: Ἡ θέση τῆς γυναίκας στὴν Ἐκκλησία [Gender and Religion: The Role of Women in the Church], eds. P. Kalaitzidis and N. Ntontos (Athens, 2004), pp. 87-141. 159   T. S. Eliot, Four Quarterts (London, 1979), p. 42. Cf. Metropolitan John (Zizioulas) of Pergamon, ‘“The End Is Where We Start From”. Reflections on Eschatological Ontology’, in Game Over?, Reconsidering Eschatology, eds. C. Chalamet, A. Dettwiler, M. Mazzocco and G. Waterlot (Berlin/Boston MA, 2017), pp. 259-278. 160   Bishop Maxim of Western America, Diary of the Council (see n. 7), passim; Jeftić, ‘Foreword’ (see n. 1), pp. 9-10. 161   Jeftić, ‘Foreword’ (see n. 1), p. 7.



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more frequently, whereas at the same time they feel confused with respect to the conciliar character of that Council, its meaning and importance within the Orthodox Tradition. They are struggling with the synodal inertia on the global level, the parochial spirit they experience for centuries, and the great expectations cultivated during the 20th century for an Orthodox conciliar renewal. They are still trying to measure which are the achievements, the challenges, and the still pending issues.162 I think, I concerned myself much with all these issues throughout the present study, trying to honestly and critically engage with them, and avoiding either to dissimilate the problems and the pending issues or ‘making the perfect the enemy of the good’, that is in our case undermine the significant steps and achievements undertaken up to day. A great opportunity offered by the Holy and Great Council was the fact that an important number of Orthodox theologians and lay people, before and after the convening of the Council (but almost exclusively outside the framework of the Council, since the lay participation was not approved!) took the floor and intervened in the mass media, the ecclesiastical fora, at round tables and conferences, and the more academic theological journals, ­aiming at a honest and self-critical but yet optimistic engagement with the agenda and the course of the official proceedings of the Council, such as the following, What eventually developed (sc. at Crete) was a true conciliar event — but even then, a different picture of conciliarity emerged than most people had expected. That picture is not triumphalist. Not all challenges were met with success. In some respects, the Council failed. In other respects, the miracle of conciliarity transformed challenges into opportunities. […]   Despite […] failures, it is worth emphasizing that the participants of the Pan-Orthodox Council have lived through an experience that no member of the Orthodox Church has for centuries. The Council at Crete turned out to be different from what both optimists and pessimists had expected. […]   The Council at Crete was a true conciliar event. Now that it is over, pain and anxiety have given way to hope that Orthodoxy can overcome its partisanship and paralysis. The Council revealed not so much the doxa of Orthodoxy, as its real condition. Modern Orthodoxy is complicated. It is 162   ‘Pending Issues and Future Challenges after the Convening of the Holy and Great Council’, is the title of the paper I presented in the major international conference of Orthodox Schools and Institutes of Theology on the theme: ‘The Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church: Orthodox Theology in 21st Century’, May 21-25, 2018 at the University of Thessaloniki, under the auspices of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, with representatives from Orthodox churches, and academic institutions all over the world, in order to critically explore and discuss the significance and the consequences of synodality for the Church and society in a pluralistic world.

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challenged and challenging. The Council allows us to realize more ­adequately what we are as Orthodox. We understand our limitations, but we also see the way to overcome them. The Council will make us humbler in our relations with our non-Orthodox Christian brothers, but it has not humiliated us before them’.163

Now that the Holy and Great Council ended, two appear to be the main challenges for the Orthodox Church: a) the question of its reception by the people of God, and its impact on the ecclesial life, spirituality, and the theology of the Orthodox churches, as well as the attitude of the Orthodox churches which did not take part in the Council as regards the Conciliar decisions and official documents. Are they going to reject them or they will try to deal with this challenging issue by way of accommodation? How easily the leadership of these churches will justify against their respective flock both the decision not to go to Crete, and the possible rejection of the conciliar documents they have initially approved (during all the pre-conciliar stages and processes)? As it has been rightly pointed out, The leaders of the local Orthodox churches that skipped the council and remained in ‘splendid isolation’ will now face the necessity of assessing eight documents that the council authorized without their participation. Six of these documents — on mission, fasting, autonomy, Diaspora, marriage and ecumenism — have been discussed for decades by all churches and were passed by the council with only minor amendments. The absentee churches would find it hard to make convincing arguments against these documents, which their leaders had previously endorsed and which they could have amended had they had come to the council. This means the Council of Crete has unleashed centripetal forces that decrease the chances of isolationism in the future.164

Patriarch Kirill of Moscow few months after the conclusion of the Holy and Great Council argued that ‘we honor the event that took place on Crete. We certainly have our own reservations and amendments. Our Biblical-Theological Commission has certainly studied the documents adopted by the Crete Council and has prepared amendments to them’. According to him, the future Primates’ Meeting should study them in detail in order to be able to make its own proposals. ‘We consider the Crete Council to be part of the process. Today, in the absence of a whole 163   C. Hovorun, ‘A Blessedly Unpredictable Council’: https://www.firstthings.com/ web-exclusives/2016/07/a-blessedly-unpredictable-council/ (accessed 3 March 2018). 164   Gavrilyuk, ‘Orthodox Council Bridges Tensions’ (see n. 7).



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number of churches, we should avoid dramatizing the whole thing. We are on the way to a (pan-Orthodox) Council, which is going to be ­convened according to all the rules and in due form and which will present commonly agreed on Orthodox documents to the world’, Patriarch Kirill concluded.165 What does this statement mean regarding the stance of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC)? Is it going to look for a possible positive issue to this problem, as for instance to accommodate its future participation in the next Great and Holy Council which is expected to be held in Romania? If it is easy to understand both the political and ecclesiastical reasons for which this Church insists that Crete was not the Holy and Great Council but a step towards it, it is not so evident to foresee or to anticipate the final stance of the ROC and the outcome of this theologico-political debate. It should be taken for granted that, with the exception of the extreme fundamentalist circles and the monastic milieus — which follow their own agenda, and refuse in advance any dialogue and cooperation with the Western Christian churches — , the conservative Orthodox, and the Orthodox churches which did not make it to Crete, will be influenced by the ROC in their final decision regarding the conciliar character of the Council of June 2016, and their ­participation in the future Holy and Great Councils. Of course, beyond or even before of all these questions of church policy, what will finally matter with regards to the issue of reception (as it was always the case with the Eastern Church) is the way in which the people of God will react against the Council of Crete, its positive or negative stance towards this conciliar event. The Great Council at Crete already envisioned convening regular PanOrthodox Councils every seven or ten years, while participants or defenders of the Council of Crete like Metropolitan Kallistos Ware declared: ‘My hope is that this will be the first in a series of meetings. In 10 days we cannot expect the Orthodox Church to solve all its problems, and I hope there could be regular meetings of the Holy and Great Council, perhaps every three years, perhaps every seven years. […] So I think we should think it not in terms of an isolated event, but of a process’.166 Paul L. Gavriluyk, a fervent advocate of the Council, on the other hand maintains that,

  Cf. press information at: http://tass.com/society/913681/ (accessed 3 March 2018).   ‘Reflections on the Holy and Great Council’ (see n. 7), p. 126.

165 166

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the strength of the Orthodox Church could be made perfect in the weakness of its central administration. Unlike the head of the Roman Catholic Church, no Orthodox primate can make a conciliar decision universally binding by virtue of his own authority. In Orthodox ecclesiology, such authority belongs to the bishops gathered at a Pan-Orthodox Council, as long as their decisions are properly received by the people of God. We are only at the initial stages of such a reception. We will find out whether the Council of Crete is truly ‘Holy and Great’, or merely a prelude to something holier and greater, and perhaps something that will eventually involve other Christian churches in the years ahead’.167

b) a second important challenge is the overcoming of the formal/­ rhetorical synodality and conciliarity for the sake of a genuine one, in others words the move towards an authentic ‘conciliarizing’, since we do not conciliarize once and for all, but ‘we need to preserve the steps we occupy’.168 In other words, genuine conciliarity is not a given reality, but one that is to be sought for through an intensive ecclesial, theological, and catechetical work. To this end it is crucial to reflect on the idea that, although completed, the Council ‘needs to stay open’. Not in the sense ‘that we are supposed to have a second session in a few years time’,169 or that the Council is an ‘open event’, i.e., an unfinished council, a ­conciliar event without conclusion;170 but in the sense that we are in via/process, we are learning conciliarity,171 and that we should keep alive and revive the dynamic of the conciliar and ecclesiological awakening developed during the pre-conciliar and the conciliar process, a dynamic which to a great extent seemed previously to be lost. Many scholars and clerics, while highlighting and defending both the historic character, and true conciliarity of the Council of Crete, used also to declare that Crete should be seen as the first step towards an institutional revitalization of Orthodox conciliarity, and a closer ­cooperation between Orthodox churches, a revitalization taken place in the context of the post-modern globalized societies.172   Gavrilyuk, ‘Orthodox Council Bridges Tensions’ (see n. 7).   Bishop Maxim of Western America, Diary of the Council (see n. 7), p. 97. 169   Jeftić, ‘Foreword’ (see n. 1), p. 9. 170   For a critique of this idea from a historical and theological point of view, cf. Bishop Maxim of Western America, ‘Synodality: A Misinterpreted Vision’ (see n. 16), pp. 106107; id., Diary of the Council (see n. 7), pp. 86-88. 171   Behr, ‘The Holy and Great Council 2016’ (see n. 6), p. 21. 172   Ruffieux, ‘Un concile inachevé’ (see n. 38), p. 394; Noble, ‘Le Grand Concile panorthodoxe’ (see n. 49), p. 351; Bathrellos, ‘Le Saint et Grand Concile: Présentation et appréciation’ (see n. 7), pp. 357-358; Cf. Kattan, ‘Le concile de Crète: En espérant que nous apprenions’ (see n. 50), pp. 14-15. 167 168



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The overcoming of the formal, rhetorical and static understanding of synodality (synodality taken for granted, and as a particular confessional mark, an identity marker for Eastern Orthodoxy, or a reason for collective ecclesial self-pride), which is part of a wider triumphalist Orthodox discourse, is not only a sine qua non prerequisite towards an authentic conciliarity, or just a demand for genuineness and faithfulness to the Orthodox Tradition; it is also an absolutely indispensable and urgent prerequisite, and an inviolate condition for the Orthodox Church, in order for it to participate in the century in which we live and not to find an easy and safe shelter in the past. Without this element, one should not expect any true renewal of ecclesial life and theological thought; the church cannot pray, dialogue, or struggle ‘for the life of the world’, and open up itself to the world (as the ‘Message’ of the Council put it in its ‘Introduction’), nor can any genuine discourse take place regarding the Eucharistic and the eschatological consciousness of the people of God. To paraphrase the conclusion from the Opening Address to the Council of Crete by His Beatitude the Archbishop Anastasios of Albania, ‘the Holy and Great Council, after its conclusion, is called to manifest in the contemporary world a dynamic Orthodox tradition, open to the searchings of humanity, constantly inspired by the surety of the Cross and Resurrection and radiating the truth and love and beauty of Orthodoxy’.173

173   Archbishop Anastasios of Tirana and All Albania, ‘Address at the Opening Session of the Holy and Great Synod, 19 June 2016’ (see n. 30).

POURQUOI EST-IL SI DIFFICILE D’AVOIR UNE ÉGLISE ORTHODOXE UNIFIÉE DANS LA DIASPORA? RÉFLEXIONS GÉOPOLITIQUES À PARTIR DU CAS FRANÇAIS Vassilis Pnevmatikakis

Introduction En ce qui concerne l’évolution historique de la diaspora orthodoxe en France, les années 1960 et 1970 furent une période charnière. Quarante ans après les bouleversements géopolitiques qui avaient forcé des ­centaines de milliers d’orthodoxes à émigrer en Occident (la chute des Empires russe et ottoman notamment), la situation ecclésiologique de la diaspora orthodoxe, à savoir l’existence non canonique de plusieurs évêques et juridictions ecclésiastiques en un lieu, fut mise en question. Après des décennies de divisions et de ruptures pour des raisons nationales et idéologiques, l’enjeu majeur pour les orthodoxes de la diaspora était maintenant la quête de l’unité. Au début des années 1960, les membres d’une nouvelle génération d’orthodoxes francisés, venant de juridictions différentes, se réunirent en France pour défendre une identité orthodoxe commune au-delà des clivages ethnopolitiques. Mus par une approche ecclésiologique qui mettait l’accent sur l’unité de l’eucharistie, de la hiérarchie et du territoire et stimulés par le lancement du processus préparatoire du Concile panorthodoxe, censé donner une réponse canonique au problème de la diaspora, ces jeunes orthodoxes s’engagèrent dans un mouvement en faveur de l’unification juridictionnelle des Églises orthodoxes en Europe occidentale. Ce mouvement inter-juridictionnel fut notamment traduit par la mobilisation de nombreux réseaux de laïcs. Créés en France et s’étendant sur une bonne partie de l’Europe occidentale, ces réseaux transversaux œuvrèrent systématiquement pour le rapprochement entre les orthodoxes des différentes juridictions et incitèrent leurs évêques à mettre en place des instances de coopération interorthodoxe. Car pour ces jeunes orthodoxes engagés, la multiplicité des juridictions et le manque d’unité des

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orthodoxes dans la diaspora mettait en péril l’existence même de l’Église orthodoxe en Occident.1 En 1976, les membres du mouvement fédérateur appelé «Fraternité orthodoxe en Europe occidentale» adressèrent un message aux évêques de la première Conférence panorthodoxe préconciliaire, tenue à Chambésy, près de Genève: La multiplicité des juridictions ecclésiastiques en Amérique, en Australie et en Europe occidentale s’explique certes par des raisons historiques et par le souci pastoral des Églises-mères envers les ‘émigrés’. Mais il est clair que les Orthodoxes sont actuellement de plus en plus ‘implantés’ dans les pays de la Diaspora et que dans ce contexte, la superposition de différentes juridictions sur un même territoire ne trouve plus aucune raison d’être.2

Aujourd’hui, plus de quatre décennies plus tard, après d’innombrables consultations, réunions d’experts, commissions préparatoires, conférences préconciliaires et assemblées des primats, ainsi qu’un Saint et Grand Concile de l’Église orthodoxe, tenu finalement en juin 2016, les jeunes orthodoxes des années 1970 ont les cheveux blancs mais la question de la diaspora n’est toujours pas résolue. Selon la décision du Concile: «[…] durant la présente phase, il n’est pas possible, pour des raisons historiques et pastorales, de passer immédiatement à l’ordre canonique strict de l’Église, c’est-à-dire qu’il y ait un seul évêque dans un même lieu».3 La non-résolution du problème de la diaspora orthodoxe, que tout le monde s’accorde à considérer scandaleux du point de vue canonique et ecclésiologique, nous amène inévitablement à nous demander s’il constitue effectivement un problème. Car s’il était réellement un problème, il aurait déjà eu des effets néfastes sur l’Église. Et pourtant, cela ne semble guère être le cas. Au contraire, plus de quarante ans après le message adressé à la première Conférence préconciliaire, l’Église orthodoxe en Occident semble prospérer. Ces dernières années, de nouvelles paroisses, communautés et missions ont été établies, de nouveaux séminaires fondés et de nouvelles 1   Cf. «Charte du Comité de coordination de la jeunesse orthodoxe en France (1971)», Contacts, 24 (1972), pp. 171-177, p. 173. 2   «Gravité de la situation ecclésiologique dans la Diaspora orthodoxe (un appel de la Fraternité orthodoxe en Europe occidentale à la 1ère conférence préconciliaire)», Service Orthodoxe de Presse, 13 (1976), 12, pp. 9-11, p. 9. 3   Décision du Saint et Grand Concile de l’Église Orthodoxe tenu du 16 au 27 juin 2016 à l’Académie orthodoxe de Crète sur le thème de la Diaspora orthodoxe, p. 1.



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cathédrales construites à travers toute la diaspora orthodoxe. Quant au juridictionnalisme orthodoxe, il n’a jamais été plus fort. Aujourd’hui, les évêques orthodoxes en Occident sont plus nombreux que jamais. En d’autres mots, bien que fragmentée en une multitude de communautés séparées et de juridictions superposées, l’Église orthodoxe dans la diaspora ne semble guère en péril. Au contraire, elle continue de se développer, d’acquérir toujours plus de visibilité et de faire partie intégrante du paysage religieux en Occident. Les jeunes français des années 1970 avaient tort alors de réclamer l’unité de leurs Églises? L’unité n’est pas la condition nécessaire de la survie et de l’épanouissement de l’Église? Se peut-il que l’unité ne soit pas réellement voulue par les orthodoxes? Pour répondre à ces questions, je vais essayer de développer ma réflexion autour de trois axes thématiques. Premièrement, je vais aborder les questions du nationalisme religieux et de l’idéologisation des divisions orthodoxes en Occident. Deuxièmement, je vais démontrer que le manque d’unité ecclésiastique dans la diaspora est aussi le résultat d’une confrontation de différentes visions ecclésiologiques opposées ainsi que de rapports de force à l’intérieur du monde orthodoxe. Troisièmement, je vais réfléchir sur la manière dont l’Église orthodoxe s’ancre sur le territoire et réussit ou échoue à y fonder son unité. Tout au long de cette entreprise, je vais puiser dans l’histoire et l’actualité de la diaspora orthodoxe en France. 1.  Phylétisme,

juridictionnalisme et dynamiques géopolitiques

La raison pour laquelle l’Église orthodoxe contrevient aux règles de sa propre ecclésiologie dans la diaspora se trouve dans l’influence qu’a historiquement exercée sur l’organisation de l’Église le phylétisme, une idéologie essentiellement politique. Introduite au cours du 19ème siècle dans les Balkans agités par les luttes nationales des peuples orthodoxes contre l’Empire ottoman, cette idéologie a autorisé l’organisation de l’Église sur une base ethnoculturelle, de sorte que sur un territoire donné il pouvait y avoir plusieurs juridictions ecclésiastiques parallèles. Selon le Concile de Constantinople de 1872, convoqué précisément pour statuer sur la question, le phylétisme autorise qu’il y ait sur un territoire «autant de patriarches, de métropolites, d’évêques, de ­ curés, qu’il y a des ethnies» et que chacun d’eux, ait sous sa juridiction

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pastorale «les troupeaux qui résident dans le même territoire et qui ont la même origine et la même langue».4 C’est de cette façon que «les juridictions des différentes autorités ecclésiastiques suprêmes de ces ethnies se superposent, se mêlent et se confondent, tout en ayant chacune la prétention d’exercer l’autorité canonique de l’endroit».5 Si le phylétisme a pu être résolu dans les Balkans du 19ème et du début du 20ème siècle par la création d’États nationaux et l’octroi du statut ­d’autocéphalie aux Églises orthodoxes nationales fondées à l’intérieur des nouvelles frontières politiques, l’idéologie phylétique n’a pas disparu pour autant. En déplaçant l’exercice du pouvoir ecclésiastique du territoire, facteur d’unité, aux personnes, acteurs de mobilité et porteurs d’identités multiples, le phylétisme s’est donné un nouveau champ d’application en Occident, dans l’espace de la diaspora orthodoxe; un espace où la forte mobilité des personnes et la diversité ethnoculturelle changent la perception du territoire en tant que principe unificateur et la soumettent à des interprétations identitaires.6 Ainsi, la juridiction des Églises orthodoxes en Orient ne se borne plus à l’intérieur de leurs limites ecclésiastiques mais suit la mobilité de leurs fidèles à l’étranger, accompagne ces derniers dans l’émigration et les utilise comme justification pour l’établissement de structures ecclésiales pratiquement partout dans le monde. Par conséquent, dans l’espace de la diaspora, où se rassemblent des orthodoxes d’origines différentes, les communautés ecclésiales qui y existent sont divisées en juridictions nationales, rattachées aux Églises nationales d’origine. À cause de cette pluralité d’Églises phylétiques en un seul lieu, il n’est donc plus possible de parler d’Églises orthodoxes «locales» ou «territoriales» en Occident mais d’Églises nécessitant un attribut national afin d’être identifiées. Ainsi on parle de l’Église grecque, russe, serbe, roumaine ou antiochienne en France. Chacune de ses Églises utilise sa propre langue, suit ses propres ­traditions, se soumet à l’autorité de son Église d’origine, entretient des relations avec les autorités diplomatiques de son pays d’origine, bref, elle constitue une diaspora ethno-religieuse dont la vie est liée de manière plus ou moins étroite à celle d’une certaine Église, d’une certaine Nation 4   N. A. Daldas, «Le statut de la diaspora orthodoxe», Istina, 40 (1995), pp. 386-404, p. 395. 5  Ibid. 6   Cf. B. Badie, La fin des territoires: Essai sur le désordre international et sur l’utilité sociale du respect (Paris, 1995), pp. 126-127.



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ou d’un certain État d’origine. À cet égard, le cas du diocèse de Chersonèse du patriarcat de Moscou en France est parlant. En décembre 2016, le patriarche Cyrille de Moscou se rendit en France pour consacrer la nouvelle cathédrale du diocèse de Chersonèse à Paris. Située quai Branly, dans le 7ème arrondissement de la capitale française, entre la Tour Eiffel et l’Hôtel des Invalides, la nouvelle cathédrale russe Sainte-Trinité est une église imposante. Sa construction fut l’aboutissement d’un accord franco-russe conclu entre l’ancien président français Nicolas Sarkozy et le président russe Vladimir Poutine en 2007. La cathédrale fait partie d’un vaste complexe de plus de 4000 mètres carrés dont la construction a été entièrement financée par le Kremlin. Le complexe, inauguré en octobre 2016, appartient à l’ambassade de la Russie en France. Il comprend un centre culturel russe, une maison paroissiale, un pôle éducatif bilingue franco-russe ainsi que les bureaux du service culturel de l’ambassade de la Russie. Pendant des décennies, l’église-cathédrale du diocèse de Chersonèse avait été abritée dans un petit immeuble du 15ème arrondissement parisien dont aucun élément architectural ne marquait son usage cultuel. Cette ancienne cathédrale était un lieu de culte au caractère et aux proportions particulièrement modestes; elle fut fondée par des émigrés russes il y a plus de 85 ans dans les locaux d’un ancien garage aménagé. La nouvelle cathédrale par contre, par sa position centrale au sein d’un quartier classé au Patrimoine mondial de l’Unesco et par son intégration dans un complexe culturel au caractère diplomatique, apporte à l’Église orthodoxe de Russie une nouvelle visibilité dans l’espace urbain parisien. Sa construction s’inscrit en outre dans un processus de réorganisation et de développement du diocèse de Chersonèse initié par Moscou il y a plus de dix ans. Ce processus, dont le but est de faire du petit diocèse de Chersonèse le visage français d’une orthodoxie russe en pleine expansion, s’est notamment traduit par la fondation d’un séminaire orthodoxe russe en région parisienne, par le lancement du projet de construction d’une église russe à Strasbourg ainsi que par l’acquisition et la restauration, après une longue bataille judiciaire, d’une majestueuse cathédrale russe du début du 20ème siècle à Nice, dans le sud de la France. Souvent, cette extension de la juridiction et de l’influence du patriarcat de Moscou sur le territoire français suscite des réactions de la part des orthodoxes liées à la cathédrale Saint-Alexandre-Nevski de la rue Daru, l’autre cathédrale russe de Paris. Regroupés depuis les années 1930 au sein d’un archevêché autonome dans l’obédience du patriarcat de

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Constantinople (Istanbul), les orthodoxes de la rue Daru jugent l’Église de Russie conservatrice et trop politisée, voire nationaliste. Pour ces orthodoxes, la mission historique de la diaspora orthodoxe ne consiste pas à affirmer une certaine identité ethno-religieuse mais à contribuer à l’édification d’une Église orthodoxe multiculturelle en Occident. Cette divergence fondamentale explique en grande partie le fait que l’orthodoxie russe en France reste partagée entre l’obédience de Moscou et celle de Constantinople. En 2003, un appel à l’unité des tous les orthodoxes russes d’Europe occidentale lancé par le patriarche de Moscou reçut un accueil très mitigé.7 En fait, les divisions juridictionnelles au sein de la diaspora orthodoxe ne sont pas toujours d’ordre national. Du fait que la présence orthodoxe en Occident est issue de migrations de nature essentiellement politique, l’affiliation juridictionnelle a été très souvent revêtue de significations idéologiques. Pendant de longues décennies par exemple, la diaspora orthodoxe russe en France avait été partagée entre trois juridictions différentes: celle du patriarcat œcuménique de Constantinople, celle du patriarcat de Moscou et celle de l’Église orthodoxe russe hors-frontières (basée à New-York). Des divergences doctrinales n’existant pas entre ces trois groupes, la division juridictionnelle des orthodoxes russes de France avait été le résultat ses désaccords des émigrés à l’égard de la situation politique de la Russie soviétique. Plus précisément, elle avait été le résultat d’une cristallisation juridictionnelle de trois approches de l’Église et de ses rapports avec l’État. La partie de l’émigration russe qui a gardé ses liens juridictionnels avec le patriarcat de Moscou représentait les tenants d’une vision selon laquelle l’Église devait obéir au pouvoir politique, car celui-ci venait de Dieu. À l’opposé, l’Église russe hors frontières, composée essentiellement de monarchistes durs, considérait que l’Église était inconcevable en dehors de l’État, l’arrangement donc du patriarcat moscovite avec le régime soviétique athée était un compromis de l’Église russe avec les «forces du diable». Enfin, l’archevêché de la rue Daru représentait une partie plus ou moins modérée de la diaspora, partisane des sphères distinctes pour l’Église et l’État.

7   L’issue de cette affaire reste ouverte du fait qu’en novembre 2018 le patriarcat de Constantinople a pris la décision de dissoudre l’archevêché de la rue Daru.



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L’histoire de la diaspora orthodoxe russe de France est en grande­ partie l’histoire des relations conflictuelles entre ces trois juridictions. Car, en revendiquant le droit d’existence d’une identité orthodoxe russe authentique en dehors de l’obédience du patriarcat moscovite, les deux juridictions russes réfractaires associèrent la notion de la juridiction ecclésiastique avec l’idée qu’elles se faisaient de la Nation et de l’Église de la Nation, transformant de cette façon une confrontation politico-idéologique en querelle ecclésiastico-juridictionnelle. Il est alors évident que si, dans les Balkans du 19ème siècle, on fondait de nouvelles juridictions ecclésiastiques orthodoxes pour conforter les nouvelles idéologies nationales dominantes de l’époque, dans la diaspora du 20ème siècle, la fondation d’une nouvelle juridiction, ou le passage d’une communauté d’une certaine juridiction à une autre, constituait un acte de rébellion contre une idéologie nationale dominante. Une pareille divergence identitaire se manifesta clairement lors du litige autour de la propriété de la cathédrale russe Saint-Nicolas de Nice, qui opposa la Fédération de Russie et le patriarcat de Moscou à l’archevêché russe de la rue Daru. Pour certains, cette affaire fut l’expression locale d’un antagonisme symbolique plus large opposant deux visions de l’orthodoxie russe en Occident. L’une, défendue par la rue Daru, opte pour une présence orthodoxe autonome en Europe occidentale et insiste sur le caractère universel de l’orthodoxie, dont l’organisation doit reposer sur le principe de la liberté de l’Église face au pouvoir politique.8 L’autre, souligne le caractère national de l’orthodoxie russe en Occident, favorise la subordination de l’Église russe de la diaspora au centre national moscovite et est en faveur des relations étroites de l’Église avec le pouvoir politique. Historiquement, des divergences idéologiques de cet ordre ont existé dans la plupart des Églises orthodoxes en Occident, avec des résultats plus ou moins surprenants. Au cours de la période communiste en ­Roumanie par exemple, les orthodoxes roumains de France avaient été partagés entre deux juridictions différentes: celle du patriarcat roumain, minoritaire, et celle du Synode russe hors frontières, plus nombreuse. Le caractère décidément monarchiste et anticommuniste du Synode russe hors frontières avait attiré dans ses rangs l’émigration roumaine de France, elle aussi farouchement anticommuniste, malgré le fait que le Synode russe n’était pas reconnu par les autres Églises orthodoxes. 8   D. Struve, «L’affaire de Nice a une valeur symbolique au-delà des implications locales», Service Orthodoxe de Presse, 348 (2010), pp. 31-33, spéc. p. 32.

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Dans la diaspora en fait, chaque juridiction ou affiliation juridictionnelle correspond à une certaine identité. Et comme la diaspora orthodoxe est structurée de façon à permettre des changements de juridiction, il y a eu en Occident, et plus particulièrement en France, toute disposition possible: plusieurs juridictions orthodoxes russes parallèles, une juridiction russe pour les Roumains, une juridiction roumaine pour les Français, une juridiction russe dans la juridiction grecque, des Français dans la juridiction serbe, des Géorgiens dans la juridiction grecque etc. 2. De nombreuses églises orthodoxes, de nombreuses ecclésiologies? En 2011, lors d’une conférence donnée à l’Académie ecclésiastique de Saint-Pétersbourg, le métropolite Hilarion de Volokolamsk, chef du Département des relations extérieures du patriarcat de Moscou, parla de la question de la diaspora en ces termes: Le patriarcat de Constantinople, sur la base d’une interprétation très élargie du 28e canon du IVe concile œcuménique, insiste sur son droit propre de se charger, de façon privilégiée, de la responsabilité pastorale de toute la diaspora orthodoxe.   Selon le point de vue de la partie constantinopolitaine, le 28e canon du IVe concile œcuménique dispose que «quelque région se trouvant au-delà des frontières d’une Église orthodoxe établie est soumise à l’Église de Constantinople».   Selon le point de vue de l’Église orthodoxe russe, «aucune des Églises orthodoxes locales […] n’a une juridiction particulière, exclusive et globale sur l’ensemble de la diaspora orthodoxe; l’immixtion de l’une des Églises orthodoxes dans le développement de la diaspora ecclésiale des autres Églises est rejetée».9

Ce qui ressort sans ambiguïté de la conférence du métropolite Hilarion est que les patriarcats de Constantinople et de Moscou font une interprétation totalement différente du droit canon en matière d’organisation de la diaspora orthodoxe. A l’origine de cette divergence se trouve le 28e canon du IVe Concile œcuménique de Chalcédoine (451) qui accorda au siège constantinopolitain le droit d’ordonner les évêques des «pays barbares» des anciens diocèses du Pont, de l’Asie et de la Thrace, dans la partie orientale de l’Empire romain.

9   Métropolite Hilarion (Alfeyev), «Le saint et grand Concile de l’Église orthodoxe», Irénikon, 84 (2011), pp. 203-244, pp. 225-226.



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La divergence entre Constantinople et Moscou sur le canon 28/IVe se trouve au cœur des antagonismes interorthodoxes autour de la diaspora. De ce fait, elle a profondément marqué le processus préconciliaire. Souvent, les Églises ayant des positions similaires à celles des deux patriarcats en compétition se sont rangées dernière eux dans le but de servir leurs propres intérêts. En 1977 par exemple, suite à la première Conférence panorthodoxe préconciliaire, cinq Églises furent chargées d’étudier le problème de la diaspora: les patriarcats de Constantinople, d’Antioche, de Moscou, de Roumanie et l’Église autocéphale de Grèce. Le patriarcat de Constantinople et l’Église de Grèce n’ayant pas­ soumis de rapports, un texte fut rédigé à la place par le patriarcat d’Alexandrie. Dans son rapport, Alexandrie reprenait l’interprétation constantinopolitaine du canon 28/IVe et exprimait une position identique à celle de Constantinople. Après cela, les patriarcats d’Antioche, de ­Moscou et de Roumanie se réunirent pour s’opposer à la thèse des Églises hellénophones et soutinrent que la lecture constantinopolitaine du droit canon était un pur anachronisme.10 Le rapport du patriarcat de Moscou en particulier fut très franc dans ses formulations à l’égard de Constantinople: «La raison de l’affaiblissement de l’unité de l’Orthodoxie est le chauvinisme national qui tend, sous prétexte d’universalisme chrétien, à s’opposer au droit des autres Églises d’exercer leur autorité sur leurs propres diasporas».11 La polémique se poursuivit aux réunions de la Commission interorthodoxe préparatoire chargée d’étudier la question de la diaspora. En 1990, lors de la réunion de la Commission, le représentant de l’Église russe soutint que le caractère supranational supposé du patriarcat œcuménique était en réalité une invention pour cacher les visées territoriales de Constantinople12 tandis qu’un autre membre de la délégation russe ajouta que le désir de Constantinople de déterminer la vie de la diaspora russe était une sorte de phylétisme grec.13 Côté roumain, un prêtre issu de la diaspora était plutôt partagé:

10   Paul, archevêque de Carélie, «Suggestions en vue de résoudre le problème de la diaspora», Le Messager orthodoxe, 86 (1980), pp. 58-76, p. 66. 11  Ibid. 12   Secrétariat pour la préparation du Saint et Grand Concile de l’Église orthodoxe, Commission interorthodoxe préparatoire du Saint et Grand Concile (10-17 novembre 1990) sur la question de la Diaspora (Chambésy/Genève, 1990), p. 128. 13  Ibid., p. 177.

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Comme théologien j’arrive peut-être à comprendre que, du point de vue canonique, je dois appartenir au Patriarcat œcuménique, mais comme prêtre je suis sûr que mes fidèles ne le comprendront pas facilement. Le lien avec l’Église-mère était le seul qui nous liait à notre pays. Je vous prie de tenir compte que nous pouvons difficilement renoncer à l’aide de l’Église-mère et au lien avec elle.14

Aujourd’hui, la discorde autour du canon 28/IVe fait partie d’un débat plus large à propos des conditions d’application du droit canon dans l’Église orthodoxe. Les règles canoniques qui régissent la vie de l’orthodoxie étant restées pratiquement inchangées depuis le 9ème siècle, il y a souvent des désaccords entre ceux qui absolutisent leur contenu indépendamment du contexte historique et ceux qui en rejettent certaines comme inapplicables dans les conditions actuelles.15 Pour l’approche géopolitique, l’importance des querelles ecclésiologiques ne concerne pas la question de savoir quelle Église aurait raison ou tort dans son interprétation du droit canon. Pour la géopolitique, l’importance de ces querelles réside dans le fait qu’elles expriment des rapports de force et des antagonismes entre les différents acteurs ecclésiastiques. Ainsi, lorsque les Grecs, rangés derrière l’Église de Constantinople, disent que la juridiction du patriarcat œcuménique16 a été définie par les Conciles œcuméniques tandis que celle des nouveaux patriarcats, y compris celle du patriarcat de Moscou, le fut par décision du Synode constantinopolitain,17 ils utilisent le droit canon pour revêtir l’Église de Constantinople d’un prestige et d’une autorité incontestables sur le plan ecclésiologique. Et cela ne peut que jouer en faveur du siège constantinopolitain dans son antagonisme avec Moscou. De cette manière, l’ecclésiologie et le droit canon sont instrumentalisés pour servir les stratégies des acteurs ecclésiastiques. L’enjeu en l’occurrence est d’étendre l’influence d’un patriarcat orthodoxe en Occident. D’autres fois, l’enjeu est d’assurer la survie d’un patriarcat en danger. Souvent au cours du 20ème siècle, la fondation de structures ecclésiales  Ibid., p. 157.  L. J. Patsavos, «Le Droit Canon orthodoxe au sein de la diaspora: Théorie et Praxis», dans Rapport à la mémoire du métropolite de Sardes Maxime (1914-1986), t. IV (Chambésy/Genève, 1989), pp. 211-226/474, p. 214. 16   Ainsi que celle des autres anciens patriarcats d’Alexandrie, d’Antioche et de Jérusalem. 17   Cf. P. Rodopoulos, «La Diaspora orthodoxe d’un point de vue ecclésiologique et canonique», dans Mélanges en l’honneur du métropolite de Kitros Barnabé (Athènes, 1980), pp. 321-333, pp. 324-325 et 327-328. 14

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dans la diaspora a été d’une importance décisive pour certains patriarcats orthodoxes. Cela fut tout particulièrement le cas pour le patriarcat de Moscou au cours des premières années du régime soviétique mais aussi pour l’Église de Constantinople après la fondation de la République turque et la perte brutale de ses diocèses en Asie Mineure. «Votre Sainteté, Dieu nous a arraché les Eparchies en Asie Mineure mais maintenant Il nous offre la possibilité d’en fonder de nouvelles en Europe. […] Il ne faut pas manquer cette occasion», argumentait au début des années 1920 auprès du patriarche œcuménique un professeur du séminaire orthodoxe de Halki, sur l’île de Heybeliada, au large d’Istanbul.18 Aujourd’hui, une bonne partie des diocèses du patriarcat de Constantinople se trouvent en Occident. En grande partie, c’est ce réseau ­diocésain mondial comprenant des éparchies influentes et riches comme celle des États-Unis et d’Europe occidentale qui assure la pérennité du patriarcat œcuménique en Turquie. On comprend donc que l’Église constantinopolitaine revendique une juridiction exclusive sur l’ensemble des communautés orthodoxes de la diaspora. 3.  La diaspora orthodoxe: Une territorialisation inachevée En majeure partie, les mouvements inter-juridictionnels des années 1960 et 1970 doivent leur développement aux jeunes orthodoxes de l’époque qui voulaient rompre avec les antagonismes interorthodoxes des générations précédentes. En même temps, ces mêmes mouvements furent l’aboutissement d’un long processus de prise de conscience ecclésiologique qui s’était opéré au sein de la diaspora orthodoxe russe de France depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Le point de départ de ce processus fut la victoire soviétique de 1945 qui marqua l’abandon définitif du rêve de retour en Russie pour nombre d’émigrés russes de France. Privés définitivement de la «Sainte Russie», les russes de l’émigration devaient réinterpréter leur religion dans le ­nouveau contexte de la diaspora. Pour répondre à ce besoin identitaire, ils se tournèrent vers l’histoire et les Pères de l’Église. 18   C. Kallinikos, «La nécessité et l’importance de l’établissement des nouveaux métropoles et exarchats du Patriarcat œcuménique en Europe», dans Texts and Studies, éd. Archevêque de Thyatire et de Grande-Bretagne, t. I (Londres, 1982), pp. 38-45, spéc. p. 38.

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Ce retour aux sources du christianisme, cette «nostalgie des origines», comme dirait Mircea Eliade,19 se traduisit par la quête des formes d’organisation ecclésiastique les plus originelles, celles qui pourraient exprimer le sens de l’Église dans le contexte de la dispersion. Au sein de l’émigration russe surgit alors un intérêt particulier pour l’ecclésiologie.20 Dans les années 1950, cet intérêt conduisit au développement d’une approche eucharistique de l’ecclésiologie orthodoxe. Proposée par Nicolas Afanassieff, prêtre et professeur d’histoire ecclésiastique à l’Institut de théologie orthodoxe Saint-Serge de Paris,21 cette approche plaça au centre de la problématique ecclésiologique la célébration de l’eucharistie et démontra que c’est sur la base théologique de celle-ci que s’est historiquement structurée l’organisation de l’Église. Selon la thèse d’Afanassieff, à partir du moment où une communauté chrétienne célèbre l’eucharistie en un lieu, elle possède les mêmes qualités d’unité et de plénitude que l’Église universelle dans son ensemble. Pour l’ecclésiologie eucharistique, la catholicité de l’Église ne se trouve pas dans la somme des Églises locales particulières mais à l’intérieur de chacune d’entre elles: dans chaque lieu où l’eucharistie est célébrée «l’Église une» se manifeste. Inspirée des assemblées eucharistiques de l’Église primitive, l’ecclésiologie eucharistique devint pour les orthodoxes de France un idéal, un archétype. Elle devint l’expression de l’Âge d’or de l’Église mais aussi le moyen de réalisation du paradis hic et nunc, ici et maintenant, à travers l’organisation de l’Église.22 En plus, par l’accent qu’elle a mis sur le territoire en tant que base d’unité de la communauté des fidèles en tout lieu et en tout temps, ­l’ecclésiologie eucharistique conduisit à une nouvelle conception du ­territoire national français comme terre orthodoxe. Pour la nouvelle génération d’orthodoxes francisés qui succéda à celle des premiers émigrés, la France avait le droit d’être considérée terre de l’Église orthodoxe au même titre que les pays orthodoxes d’Orient. L’enjeu était d’exprimer une nouvelle territorialité orthodoxe, née en Occident, et d’instituer un 19   Cf. M. Eliade, La nostalgie des origines – Méthodologie et histoire des religions (Paris, 1971). 20   G. Basioudis, «Un aspect de la problématique ecclésiologique contemporaine: L’autocéphalie et la manière de la proclamer», Kath’Odon, 10 (1995), pp. 95-102, spéc. p. 95. 21   Cf. N. Lossky, «La présence orthodoxe dans la ‘diaspora’ et ses implications ecclésiologiques, de même que celles des Églises orientales catholiques», Irénikon, 65 (1992), pp. 352-362, p. 356. 22   «Le culte eucharistique sur terre n’est pas une réalité parallèle à celle aux cieux, il est le culte céleste lui-même», J. Zizioulas, L’Eucharistie, l’Évêque et l’Église durant les trois premiers siècles (Paris, 1994), p. 74.



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territoire ecclésiastique sien; de passer du territoire symbolique de la dispersion et de l’appartenance communautaire à un territoire institutionnel. Ce n’est pas un hasard que dans de nombreux articles de la presse orthodoxe de l’époque on emploie systématiquement le verbe «bâtir» pour parler de la fondation d’une Église orthodoxe locale en Occident; effectivement, on ne bâtit que dans un endroit que l’on considère sien ou que l’on veut s’approprier. L’adoption par les orthodoxes de France de l’approche eucharistique comme base de leur identité ecclésiologique fut un tournant dans l’histoire de la diaspora orthodoxe. Premièrement, elle conduisit au développement d’une conscience de localité et d’enracinement des orthodoxes sur le territoire de leur dispersion. Deuxièmement, elle permit le développement d’une conscience de plénitude et de catholicité ecclésiastiques. Désormais, l’Église orthodoxe en France ne serait plus une Église en exil, une partie périphérique, voire marginale, de l’Église orthodoxe, mais une Église de lieu à part entière, «l’Église une». Les nouveaux défis posés désormais aux orthodoxes de France seraient de dépasser la désunion des générations précédentes, de mettre en place de structures favorisant l’unité et de revendiquer un statut d’autonomie vis-à-vis des Églises-mères d’Orient. L’Église orthodoxe en Occident, pensait-on dans les années 1970, était en train d’arriver à maturité. Et pourtant, malgré l’euphorie générale, toutes ces attentes furent déçues. D’un point de vue géopolitique, on pourrait soutenir que l’absence d’unité dans la diaspora orthodoxe est une question de territoire. En Orient en fait, où la formation de la plupart des Églises orthodoxes nationales fut le corollaire de la constitution d’États nationaux au cours du 19ème, l’Église orthodoxe a développé une conception de territoire construite idéologiquement à partir du territoire national. Ainsi, le territoire de chaque Église orthodoxe en Orient s’identifie soit au territoire politique de l’État national soit à l’étendue géographique de la Nation. Le monde orthodoxe en Orient ressemble à un ensemble d’espaces ethno-ecclésiaux clos qui se fondent sur le principe d’exercice d’une juridiction ecclésiastique exclusive. Dans la diaspora par contre, la formation de l’Église orthodoxe suivit une trajectoire différente: l’Église ne s’est pas constituée à partir d’un territoire politiquement cloisonné et culturellement exclusif mais sur la base d’un processus dynamique de dispersion transnationale.23 Ainsi en Occident, le territoire de l’Église orthodoxe n’a pas de limites claires, il 23   Entendu ici comme un corps diasporé composé de membres de différentes nationalités cf. W. Milles et G. Sheffer, «Francophonie and Zionism: A Comparative Study in Transnationalism and Trans-statism», Diaspora, 7 (1998), pp. 119-148.

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prend souvent des formes réticulaires et est par conséquent marqué par des discontinuités et des contradictions. En plus, en raison du caractère extraterritorial des dynamiques qui l’affectent et des pouvoirs qui la traversent, la diaspora orthodoxe est soumise à un processus constant de déterritorialisation et de reterritorialisation qui entrave considérablement l’établissement d’une solide conscience territoriale en son sein. Les vagues migratoires issues de la chute du Mur de Berlin par exemple amenèrent en France des personnes qui ne comprenaient pas du tout le français et à qui la problématique de l’Église locale était étrangère. L’arrivée de ces nouveaux émigrés, pour lesquels l’Église était principalement le lieu du souvenir de la patrie quittée, perturba fortement l’équilibre fragile entre la francophonie et les différentes traditions nationales au sein des paroisses du pays et créa de nouvelles dynamiques identitaires orthodoxes. Conclusion La paroisse des Saints Martin et Silouane à Metz, dans l’est de la France, fut initialement fondée en 1990 par les fidèles d’une juridiction orthodoxe française appelée Église Catholique Orthodoxe de France (ECOF). Au début des années 2000, la paroisse passa sous la juridiction de l’Église orthodoxe roumaine tout en gardant sa spécificité française. Mais depuis quelques années, la majorité de ses fidèles sont d’origine géorgienne.24 Pour un orthodoxe venant de Roumanie, de Russie ou de Grèce, avoir une paroisse orthodoxe francophone dépendant d’une juridiction roumaine, dédiée à la fois à un saint d’Occident et un saint russe et célébrant ses fêtes patronales avec des danses et des plats traditionnels géorgiens serait peut-être déconcertant. Mais en France c’est cela en grande partie la réalité de l’Église orthodoxe; une réalité qui met en lumière toute la complexité des transformations identitaires qui s’opèrent au sein d’un corps de fidèles en situation de diaspora. Réussir l’unité dans le cadre d’une réalité aussi complexe et diverse requiert une compréhension profonde des dynamiques qui la traversent. 24   Interview avec le prêtre Marc-Antoine Costa de Beauregard, doyen du Doyenné de France de la métropole orthodoxe roumaine d’Europe occidentale et méridionale, le 29 octobre 2013, à Louveciennes.



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Or, les Églises-mères se trouvent dans l’incapacité de comprendre réellement les synthèses identitaires opérées au sein de la diaspora qui dépassent le cadre d’une approche simpliste identifiant l’utilisation d’une langue liturgique à l’attachement à une identité ecclésiastique «nationale». De ce fait, elles ont fait preuve d’une volonté de manipulation et de contrôle sur toute idée d’unification juridictionnelle des orthodoxes en Occident. Dans la configuration géopolitique actuelle, où les patriarcats orthodoxes ont retrouvé leur liberté et où l’instrumentalisation idéologique de l’Église par l’État est un enjeu identitaire majeur dans les pays à majorité orthodoxe, l’intérêt des Églises-mères pour leurs communautés à l’étranger a un caractère à la fois ecclésiastique, politique et symbolique. Il est lié aux antagonismes entre les Églises nationales pour l’affirmation de leur prestige sur la scène internationale, à l’importance des réseaux des diasporas dans la promotion des intérêts des États nationaux et à l’affirmation des identités qui contribuent à la consolidation idéologique des sociétés postcommunistes. En même temps dans la diaspora, les Églises orthodoxes se montrent incapables de se produire en tant qu’institution territorialement construite, unique et cohérent, ce que justifie la pérennisation du pouvoir extraterritorial des Églises-mères sur elles. Dans ce cadre, l’unification de la diaspora orthodoxe semble aujourd’hui aussi lointaine qu’avant la tenue du Concile panorthodoxe, tant attendu.

APPROCHE CANONIQUE SUR LES DÉFIS ACTUELS DE LA DIASPORA DANS L’ÉGLISE ORTHODOXE Patriciu Vlaicu

La problématique de la diaspora dans l’Église orthodoxe est souvent présentée comme l’une des plus sensibles,1 source de désordres canoniques,2 de rivalités et d’égoïsme identitaire. Les aspects ethnoculturels qui lui sont spécifiques et le non-respect du principe du mono épiscopat territorial3 sont perçus comme une déviation de la véritable tradition. Dès mon arrivée en en France, en 1997, j’ai été interpellé par cette manière d’aborder ce sujet. Au fur et à mesure de mes responsabilités pastorales et administratives dans la diaspora orthodoxe, je me suis rendu compte que cette réalité pastorale est perçue par le biais de préjugés et malentendus. La diaspora dans l’Église orthodoxe est une réalité très complexe qui nécessite un meilleur encadrement canonique mais elle offre aussi des opportunités qui peuvent nous aider à avancer dans plusieurs aspects pastoraux et de dialogue avec la société et les autres confessions. Parmi les opportunités que la diaspora nous offre, nous trouvons aussi celle de mieux prendre connaissance des richesses des différentes traditions de l’Église orthodoxe, de répondre aux provocations de la modernité et de la globalisation, d’apprendre à apprécier la communion liturgique panorthodoxe et à être conscients de la responsabilité pastorale dans le milieu multiculturel. Il est certain que cette réalité atypique nous présente des défis importants, mais comme dans tout contexte pastoral, l’Église peut trouver les 1   Le Métropolite Antoine Bloom fait une radiographie de cette situation au milieu du 20e siècle, dans A. Bloom, «Les problèmes de la Diaspora orthodoxe», Contacts, 20 (1968), pp. 224-227. 2   En ce sens voir N. Lossky, «La présence orthodoxe dans la ‘diaspora’ et ses implications ecclésiologiques, de même que celles des Églises orientales catholiques», Irénikon, 65 (1992), pp. 352-362, p. 352. 3   Voir Éditorial, «Gravité de la situation ecclésiologique dans la Diaspora orthodoxe (un appel de la Fraternité orthodoxe en Europe occidentale à la 1re conférence préconciliaire)», Service Orthodoxe de Presse, 13 (1976), pp. 9-10; «Message final du 13e Congrès orthodoxe en Europe occidentale adressé à Sa Sainteté le patriarche œcuménique Bartholomée Ier», Contacts, 61 (2009), pp. 357-358.

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meilleures solutions pour donner des réponses cohérentes dans l’unité du témoignage. Comme le titre l’annonce, en ce qui suit je vais tenter d’apporter ma contribution pour une approche canonique sur les défis actuels de la diaspora dans l’Église Orthodoxe. Pour avancer, je vais faire quelques remarques d’ordre terminologique avant de mettre en évidence des aspects d’ordre canonique concernant ce sujet, en accordant une attention spéciale au document du Saint et Grand Concile réuni en Crète en 2016. Ensuite, je vais mettre en évidence quelques défis et perspectives. 1. Clarifications d’ordre terminologique La terminologie utilisée pour notre sujet pose en elle-même quelques problèmes et nécessite des clarifications. Nous observons qu’il y a plusieurs formes de constitution et de manifestation de la diaspora, avec des particularités qui la qualifient du point de vue sociologique et culturel. 1.1.  La diaspora et les diasporas Il n’y a pas unanimité en ce qui concerne l’étymologie du mot diaspora. Certains considèrent qu’il est entré dans les langages modernes par la traduction du mot hébreu galout, dans son acception classique, lié au peuple juif se trouvant en captivité hors Palestine.4 D’autres montrent qu’il a son origine dans la traduction des termes hébraïques dans la ­Septante, qui expriment non pas le peuple en captivité, mais le peuple dispersé5 au-delà de son territoire traditionnel, qui se caractérise par une résistance à l’inculturation et le rêve du retour.6 La Septante traduit par diaspirein l’action divine de dispersion et celle de réunir les dispersés; spirein (semer) et diaspirein (disséminer) montrant non seulement une

  L. Askenazi, La parole et l’écrit: Penser la vie juive aujourd’hui (Paris, 2005), p. 365.   Voir J. Vandervost, «Dispersion ou Diaspora», in Dictionnaire de la Bible. Supplément, II (Paris, 1912), col. 432-445. 6   Voir A. Medam, «Diaspora / Diasporas. Archétype et typologie», Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 9 (1993), pp. 63-64. 4 5



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réalité sociologique dans laquelle l’humain se trouve, mais aussi une action providentielle.7 Si nous mettons ensemble le terme hébreux et le terme grec, on peut observer que le sens de diaspirein peut contenir le sens du mot galout, mais sans l’épuiser. Dans le cas du peuple hébreu, la diaspora ethnique est plus ou moins identique avec la diaspora religieuse. On peut parler de la même situation pour les diasporas de certains peuples, mais dans le contexte multi­ confessionnel, les diasporas ethniques sont divisées en plusieurs diasporas ethno-confessionnelles ou même sans appartenance religieuse. Si plusieurs diasporas ethno-confessionnelles sont regroupées dans des entités structurées, nous pouvons parler des diasporas confessionnelles. 1.2.  Les diasporas ethnoculturelles et la diaspora orthodoxe La diaspora ethnoculturelle couvre une réalité sociologique à l’extérieur du pays d’origine, caractérisée par les particularités liées à l’identité du peuple en cause. La communauté confessionnelle peut rester isolée dans le cadre de la diaspora ethnique où elle peut s’intégrer du point de vue social, mais en gardant ses particularités. En ces conditions, dans le temps, nous pouvons observer une dissolution des éléments spécifiques à la diaspora ethnique, et la mise en évidence des particularités de la diaspora confessionnelle. Si l’identité d’une confession est marquée par un contexte régional spécifique, la dispersion de la communauté religieuse à l’extérieur de cette région donne naissance elle aussi à une diaspora cultuelle, qui peut être liée à la diaspora ethnique ou se manifester distinctement. C’est le cas des communautés arméniennes8 ou anglicanes9 qui vivent au-delà des régions traditionnelles, des communautés orientales, ou même des communautés catholiques. Si dans une région spécifique pour une communauté confessionnelle vivent des communautés ethniques différentes de ces mêmes confessions, sans structure organisationnelle commune, 7  Pour aller plus loin voir C. Chivallon Cean, «Diaspora: ferveur académique autour d’un mot», in Les diasporas dans le monde contemporain, éd. W. Berthomière et C. Chivallon (Paris, 2006), pp. 1-5. 8   Voir J. Mecerian, «Un tableau de la diaspora arménienne», Proche-Orient Chrétien, 12 (1962), pp. 21-51. 9   Pour comprendre la dispersion anglaise voir T. Bueltmann, D. T. Gleeson, D. M. Macraild, Locating the English Diaspora, 1500-2010 (Liverpool, 2012).

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nous ne parlons pas d’une diaspora confessionnelle mais de diasporas ethno-confessionnelles. Ces clarifications sont nécessaires pour comprendre la définition ­donnée à la diaspora orthodoxe par le professeur Gregorios Papathomas, un de ceux qui ont travaillé le plus sur ce sujet, qui définit la diaspora orthodoxe comme étant «le corps de chrétiens orthodoxes vivant en dehors de leurs Églises territoriales d’origine et surtout en dehors de toutes les Églises territoriales orthodoxes».10 C’est en ce sens qu’est ­utilisé ce terme par les documents préparatoires du Saint et Grand Concile et par le document du Concile de Crète de 2016. Nous pouvons conclure que la diaspora orthodoxe est constituée par des communautés orthodoxes de diasporas ethniques situées dans des pays où il n’y a pas d’Églises orthodoxes autocéphales reconnues par toute l’orthodoxie. Cependant elle intègre aussi des personnes et communautés de l’Église orthodoxe en ces régions même si elles sont parfaitement intégrées dans leurs pays respectifs. Ainsi, dans la diaspora orthodoxe nous identifions d’une part des personnes et communautés attachées au statut sociologique et culturel d’une diaspora, avec un lien dominant avec le pays d’origine, la langue d’origine, et marquées par l’espoir de retour, et d’autre part des personnes qui ne font pas ou ne font plus partie de la diaspora ethnique et qui se trouvent dans la diaspora orthodoxe seulement car n’y a pas d’organisation orthodoxe locale en ces régions. En prenant compte de ces aspects, nous observons des éléments qui distinguent à l’intérieur de la diaspora orthodoxe deux catégories de ­communautés. Dans la première nous pouvons inclure celles qui ont les caractéristiques spécifiques de la diaspora ethnique. Dans la deuxième nous pouvons intégrer les communautés qui se sont distancées du désir de retour, et assumant pleinement l’intégration sociale et culturelle dans le pays d’accueil, vivant l’orthodoxie en gardant éventuellement des éléments d’expression liturgique et certaines traditions. Dans la catégorie intégrée dans la diaspora ethnique, les fidèles se nomment en mettant en avant l’élément ethnique Roumains, Russes, Grecs-orthodoxes. Au fur et à mesure de l’intégration, à partir de la deuxième génération, ils arrivent à inverser la perspective en mettant en avant l’élément confessionnel, et se nomment orthodoxes- Russes, Grecs ou Roumains.

10   Voir G. D. Papathomas, Le Corpus Canonum de l’Église Orthodoxe, (1er-9e siècles) Le texte des Saints Canons ecclésiaux (Thessalonique, 2015), p. 1073.



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1.3.  Le dynamisme institutionnel, face au principe territorial Dans le processus d’organisation de la diaspora orthodoxe, l’Église utilise ses moyens pour une organisation canonique en faisant preuve de dynamisme institutionnel. Unanimement assumé est le fait que l’organisation ecclésiale a été structurée dès les premiers siècles en lien avec le principe territorial, non pas pour conditionner la mission par la territorialité mais parce qu’à l’époque, la territorialité offrait un critère d’unité pour l’organisation et la mission. Dans des circonstances typiques, ce critère s’avère être, même aujourd’hui, très important, et à l’intérieur des Églises autocéphales il fonctionne sans faille. En même temps, l’Église a la possibilité de constater dans des circonstances spéciales que le territoire n’est pas un critère suffisant. Elle cherche donc à se doter d’autres moyens organisationnels. Le Christ a envoyé ses Apôtres et disciples pour baptiser les peuples et non pas pour bénir les territoires. De nos jours, dans le contexte de la globalisation, à l’époque des amplifications du phénomène de la ­mobilité des personnes et des nouvelles migrations, nous constatons que le territoire n’a plus la même signification.11 Il reste un critère d’unité, mais ne doit pas dominer le critère pastoral. En même temps, les arguments pastoraux ne doivent pas troubler l’unité du témoignage de l’Église dans la société. On peut observer cette subordination du principe territorial aux exigences pastorales dès le début du christianisme. Dès les premiers siècles, il y avait des évêques élus selon des critères ethniques qui avaient dans leur charge la mission parmi les peuples migrants. Au Synode de Nicée en 325 a participé Théophile, évêque des Goths.12 En Espagne sont mentionnés les Synodes des Wisigoths13 et le même type de synode existait chez les Gaules.14 Saint Augustin parle de synodes généraux, 11   B. Badie, La fin des territoires: Essai sur le désordre international et sur l’utilité sociale du respect (Paris, 1995), pp. 44-48. 12   Voir Ch. J. Hefele, Histoire des Conciles (Paris, 1869), p. 261. 13   Voir «Spanish Abbots and the Visigothic Councils of Toledo», in Spanish and Portuguese Monastic History 600-1300, Variorum Reprints, 5 (Londres, 1987), p. 142. 14   Prof. Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet montre les principales caractéristiques de la vie conciliaire en France et l’existence des conciles nommés «nationaux». Voir Prof. Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet, «Les Évêques, les papes et les princes dans la vie conciliaire de France du IVe au XIIe siècle», Revue historique de droit français et étranger, 69 (1991), pp. 1-16. Le Professeur Nicolae Dura met en évidence la dimension ethnique de l’organisation de l’église dans son ouvrage Le régime de la Synodalité selon la législation canonique conciliaire, œcuménique du Ier millénaire (Bucarest, 1992), pp. 415-417.

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nationaux et provinciaux, affirmant que les synodes nationaux rassem­ blent les archevêques et évêques d’un royaume ou d’une nation, et ils sont présidés par les primats ou patriarches.15 La notion même de Patriarche est liée aussi à celle d’une famille ethnique.16 La conversion des Francs et Wisigoths à la foi chrétienne et la conversion de leurs dirigeants ont donné naissance à une organisation qui prend en considération les éléments d’ordre ethnoculturel. En ce sens, le régime des Wisigoths en Espagne est représentatif, avec des synodes qui réglaient, de manière autonome et sans l’intervention romane, la vie de cette communauté.17 En Orient, nous avons aussi des situations atypiques qui structurent la mission parmi les peuples migrants en doublant le principe territorial avec la disponibilité pastorale.18 Dans les diocèses d’Asie, du Pont et de Thrace, pour assurer la mission parmi les peuples barbares, l’Église décida de leur accorder une sollicitude pastorale distincte. Les Canons 2 du IIe Concile œcuménique et 28 du IVe Concile œcuménique témoignent sur cette pratique. Ortiz d’ Urbina en parlant du canon 2 II.ec, et des Églises des barbares situées à l’Extérieur de l’Empire, souligne que ces Églises ont été liées aux grandes Églises mères qui les ont évangélisées: l’Église éthiopienne était liée à l’Église d’Alexandrie, et l’Église Perse était liée à l’Église d’Antioche.19 Le canon 28 du IVe Synode œcuménique confirme que les communautés barbares ont été retirées de la juridiction territoriale métropolitaine, en se trouvant directement sous l’autorité du patriarche qui ordonnait leurs évêques. 28 IV Ec: «les métropolitains des diocèses du Pont, de l’Asie (proconsulaire) et de la Thrace, et eux seuls, ainsi que les évêques des parties de ces diocèses occupés par les barbares, seront sacrés par le saint siège de l’église de Constantinople». Dans le canon 39 du Synode in Trullo nous avons un autre exemple qui parle de la solution canonique identifiée à l’occasion de la dislocation des chypriotes dans un autre territoire. Le peuple ainsi déplacé acquiert 15   Voir D. Bouix, Du Concile provincial, ou Traité des questions de théologie et de droit canon qui concernent les conciles provinciaux (Paris, 1850), p. 10. 16   Voir V. Peri, «La dénomination de patriarche dans la titulature ecclésiastique du IV au XVI siècle», Irénikon, 64 (1991), pp. 359-361. 17   Yves Congar affirme cela dans L’Église de Saint Augustin à l’époque moderne (Paris, 1997), p. 51. 18   Voir P. L’Huillier, «L’Unité de l’Église au plan local dans la diaspora», Contacts, 30 (1978), pp. 399-409, p. 403. 19   O. de Urbina, Nicée et Constantinople (Paris, 1963), pp. 214-215.



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le caractère d’Église distincte de celle du territoire duquel elle a été dis­ loquée. Ce canon n’exige pas que les immigrants soient intégrés dans l’Église territoriale où ils sont arrivés, mais, étant donné que ce peuple avait une tradition d’organisation ecclésiale de prestige, l’évêque de l’église ethnique immigrante reçoit même le droit de consacrer l’évêque du territoire respectif.20 On constate donc qu’il y a des exemples clairs qui montrent que l’Église a toujours su trouver des solutions pastorales pour que les situations qui ne peuvent pas être intégrées dans la rigueur canonique soient traitées avec sollicitude, étant donné que la mission de l’Église n’est pas de conquérir des territoires mais d’apporter la bonne nouvelle à tous les peuples. L’Église a su intégrer les exceptions en les qualifiant par rapport à la normalité canonique. Si l’exception ne portait pas atteinte à la doctrine et elle s’avérait nécessaire du point de vue pastoral ou ­missionnaire, on n’hésitait pas à la mettre en pratique.21 2. La diaspora orthodoxe Concile de Crète

selon le document du

Saint

et

Grand

En revenant à la situation actuelle, nous constatons qu’en deux décennies après 1989, les réalités sociologiques des diasporas ont changé d’une manière totalement imprévue. Ainsi ce qui paraissait en train d’entrer dans une certaine normalité22 s’est avéré entrer dans un nouveau temps de provisorat, d’une durée difficile à évaluer.23 20   Canon 39 V-VI ec: «Notre frère dans l’épiscopat Jean, le pasteur de l’île de Chypre, s’étant réfugié avec son peuple de son île dans la province de l’Hellespont... nous décidons, que les privilèges accordés à son siège par les pères inspirés de Dieu, qui se réunirent la première fois à Éphèse, restent inchangés; en sorte que la Nouvelle Justinianopolis ait les droits de la ville de Constantia, et l’évêque très aimé de Dieu qui y sera établi à l’avenir, présidera à tous les évêques de la province de l’Hellespont … Quant à l’évêque de la ville de Cyzique, il sera soumis au pasteur de la dite Justinianopolis à l’instar de tous les autres évêques de la province qui sont sous l’autorité de Jean le pasteur très aimé de Dieu, lequel, si c’est nécessaire, promouvra même l’évêque de la ville de Cyzique». Voir P. L’Huillier, The Church of the Ancient Councils: The Disciplinary Work of the First Four Ecumenical Councils (Crestwood NY, 1996), pp. 115-119. 21   Le Patriarche Photius montre qu’on peut parler d’économie canonique seulement s’il s’agit d’une application limitée dans le temps. Voir Ad Amphilochiam quæstio I , 14 (PG 101, col. 64-65). 22   Pour voir une analyse en ce sens, voir O. Clément, «Avenir et signification de la diaspora orthodoxe en Europe occidentale», Contacts, 30 (1978), pp. 259-283. 23   Pour donner un exemple, la communauté roumaine en Europe Occidentale avant 1990 était d’environ 300.000 personnes organisées dans une trentaine des paroisses, et

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En prenant conscience la réalité actuelle, dans les dernières étapes de la préparation pour le Saint et Grand Concile de l’Église orthodoxe, il a été décidé de présenter une organisation de la diaspora orthodoxe, dans un esprit d’application de l’économie canonique au niveau organisationnel, en soumettant au Concile de Crète en juin 2016 le document intitulé La diaspora orthodoxe. Il est important d’observer que le titre parle d’une réalité d’ordre pastoral et missionnaire évaluée unitairement. Tout en affirmant l’existence des circonstances complexes, la décision conciliaire montre son objectif d’instituer des moyens organisationnels pour préserver au mieux possible l’unité de l’Église, sans perdre de vue les besoins pastoraux spécifiques. Sans vouloir faire une analyse exhaustive de ce texte, je vais mettre en évidence quelques éléments en essayant de comprendre leur portée et mieux cerner leur application. 2.1. Le Concile de Crète donne une organisation canonique à la diaspora orthodoxe Peut-on considérer que l’Église orthodoxe est, même après le Concile de Crète, en quête d’une organisation canonique de la diaspora orthodoxe? Qu’est-ce que nous comprenons par une organisation canonique? Il faut préciser que du point de vue orthodoxe, canonique n’est pas seulement ce qui est mentionné par les canons, mais ce qui est en conformité avec la conscience canonique de l’Église. La conscience canonique de l’Église est mise en évidence par la sensibilité qui assure la cohérence entre ce que nous croyons et ce que nous vivons en tant que membres du corps du Christ. Les actions et les formes d’organisation des communautés et de relations entre les communautés sont canoniques si elles sont décidées par l’Église, au service de la mission dans l’unité du témoignage, en se fondant sur une cohérence doctrinale et canonique et dans la manifestation de l’unité pour le salut du peuple. Par opposition, toute forme d’organisation, même la plus respectueuse de la lettre des canons, n’étant pas capable de soutenir la mission et les besoins pastoraux, dans l’unité du témoignage ne peut pas être considérée comme canonique.

maintenant il y a en Europe, à l’extérieur de la Roumanie, plus de 3 millions de Roumains orthodoxes organisés dans à peu près 750 paroisses. Le cas de la diaspora roumaine n’est pas singulier, tous les pays de l’Europe de l’Est étant dans une situation semblable.



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Qui a la compétence de se prononcer sur la canonicité ou la normalité canonique? Si chacun, même évêque ou primat, fait une analyse individuelle des problèmes avec lesquels l’Église se confronte dans le quotidien, il existe la possibilité que les solutions identifiées soient marquées par un certain subjectivisme. C’est pour cette raison que la tradition ­canonique identifie le Concile en tant qu’instance compétente pour résoudre tous les problèmes auxquels se confrontent l’Église. Le canon 37 des Apôtres dit en ce sens: «Que deux fois par an se fasse un synode des évêques et qu’ils examinent entre eux les vérités de la vraie foi et résolvent les difficultés qui surviendraient à l’Église». C’est dans la conciliarité que les difficultés peuvent être résolues. Le canon 19 IVec montre qu’à cause de la perte de la rythmicité des­ réunions synodales les difficultés ne sont pas dépassées dans l’Église. Donc, la meilleure manière de retrouver la normalité canonique est ­d’organiser la conciliarité/synodalité de l’Église dans le rythme imposé par les problématiques à régler. Pour des problèmes qui concernent les Églises autocéphales, il faut réunir des synodes de ces Églises. Pour les problèmes d’intérêt panorthodoxe, il faut se réunir chaque fois que le besoin se présente, dans le cadre des Saints et Grands Conciles. Cette possibilité a été déjà annoncée en Crète dans le message qui stipule que le Saint et Grand Concile va se réunir régulièrement. Dès son premier article, le document de Crète concernant la diaspora orthodoxe souligne la détermination des Églises autocéphales d’organiser cette réalité ecclésiale «conformément à l’ecclésiologie orthodoxe, à la tradition et au praxis canonique de l’Église orthodoxe». Les Églises autocéphales dans la communion conciliaire définissent une réalité ecclésiale nommée «diaspora orthodoxe», incluant les réalités pastorales des régions extérieures à leurs territoires canoniques. Ça veut dire que l’Église fait preuve d’un dynamisme institutionnel24 en se dotant des moyens nécessaires pour que la pastorale exercée dans ces régions se réalise en exprimant le plus possible l’unité de l’Église orthodoxe et la cohérence avec la tradition canonique. On peut se demander si l’application de l’économie ecclésiale est une manifestation en dehors de la canonicité ou à l’intérieur de celle-ci.

24  Pour comprendre le lien entre la nature de l’Église et son organisation, voir A. Schmemann, «Église et organisation ecclésiale», Le Messager orthodoxe, 146 (2008), pp. 45-47.

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Je considère que l’application de l’économie ecclésiale se manifeste à l’intérieur de la canonicité. Le dynamisme institutionnel assumé ­conciliairement par l’Église, qui prend en considération des particularités pastorales et missionnaires, ne peut pas être considéré comme étant à l’extérieur de la canonicité. Autrement, l’Église serait en contradiction avec elle-même. L’économie canonique, vecteur de dynamisme institutionnel, affirme des critères d’exception qui donnent canonicité à une organisation qui n’est pas rigoureusement intégrée dans l’ordre canonique traditionnel, mais qui assure une évolution en ce sens. Pour pouvoir parler d’économie canonique, il est important de clarifier d’abord ce qu’est l’ordre canonique strict, et ensuite mettre en évidence la manière dans laquelle se manifeste l’exception. 2.2. Le dynamisme institutionnel et le problème d’identification de l’ordre canonique strict Le paragraphe 1b. du document de Crète précise: «Il a été aussi constaté que durant la présente phase il n’est pas possible, pour des ­raisons historiques et pastorales, de passer immédiatement à l’ordre canonique strict de l’Église sur cette question». Ainsi, en affirmant des critères d’exception, l’Église identifie 13 régions du monde, à l’extérieur des territoires des Églises autocéphales où sont constituées des Assemblées d’évêques dont la mission est de témoigner l’unité de l’Église au service de l’œuvre pastorale. Un des premiers constats de cette attitude est qu’en affirmant l’application de l’économie canonique, les Églises orthodoxes assument ­unanimement qu’aucune d’entre elles ne peut revendiquer la juridiction territoriale sur ces régions. Cette conclusion est soutenue aussi par le fait que le document synodal concernant l’Autonomie et la manière de la proclamer, paragraphe 2 (e) affirme expressément que la diaspora échappe à une organisation sous forme d’Église autonome, et en ces régions, l’autonomie ecclésiale peut être octroyée seulement par la voie du consensus panorthodoxe obtenu par le Patriarcat œcuménique selon la pratique panorthodoxe en vigueur. Un passage très important dans ce document est la première partie de ce paragraphe dans lequel l’ordre canonique strict est identifié avec l’exigence «qu’il y ait un seul évêque dans un même lieu».



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La référence directe au canon 8 du Concile de Nicée de 325 est é­ vidente. Le document laisse sous-entendre que la rigueur canonique est donnée simplement par le principe du mono-épiscopat territorial sans faire référence à la perspective de l’établissement des Églises locales. S’agit-il d’une simple omission? Peu probable. Je pense qu’il s’agit d’une omission voulue, étant donné que la problématique de l’Église locale provoque par elle-même un vif débat dans l’Église Orthodoxe. En même temps la référence singulière au mono-épiscopat territorial crée une incohérence canonique. On peut se demander si nous ne restons pas dans le même désordre canonique dans le cas où nous avons un seul évêque dans un lieu mais lié à un critère ethnique. Si dans une ville d’une région nous avons un seul évêque mais il est grec, serbe, russe ou roumain, membre d’un synode qui se trouve à l’autre bout de la terre, peut-on parler de rigueur canonique? Si un australien baptisé dans l’Église Orthodoxe en Australie, dans une région où il y a un seul évêque, du Patriarcat de Serbie, en tenant compte du fait que pour être un fidèle de l’Église orthodoxe en Australie ce fidèle est attaché canoniquement à l’Église de Serbie, peut-on parler d’ordre canonique stricte? L’acribia sur ce sujet ne peut être autre que l’organisation des églises locales, où chaque fidèle est intégré dans la communion ecclésiale au-delà de ses origines ethniques. C’est en ce sens que le canon 8 du premier Concile œcuménique doit être interprété.25 On constate donc que par ce document, l’Église orthodoxe affirme que dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, pour le bon déroulement de l’œuvre pastorale, l’Église accompagne le principe territorial d’éléments qui prennent en considération les aspects ethnoculturels. L’Économie canonique est assumée au service de l’unité, et en ce sens il est précisé que «Les Assemblées épiscopales visent à dégager la position commune de l’Église orthodoxe sur diverses questions. Cela n’empêche nullement les évêques membres, qui continuent de rendre compte à leurs propres Églises, d’exprimer les opinions de leurs Églises devant le monde extérieur».

25   Voir J. Meyendorff, «Un seul évêque dans la même ville: Canon 8 du Premier Concile Œcuménique», Contacts, 37 (1962), pp. 23-33, p. 23.

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2.3.  Les Assemblées épiscopales et le dynamisme institutionnel Même si la réalité des assemblées épiscopales en diaspora a été a­ ssumée tacitement par l’Église orthodoxe dans la deuxième partie de du XXème siècle, c’est seulement au Concile de Crète que cette institution obtient un statut de canonicité exprimée synodalement, en continuité avec les décisions des étapes préparatoires. Concernant ces Assemblées, dans le paragraphe 2b du document il est précisé qu’elles «seront composées de tous les évêques de chaque région, qui se trouvent en communion canonique avec toutes les très saintes Églises orthodoxes et seront présidées par le premier parmi les prélats relevant de l’Église de Constantinople et, en l’absence de celui-ci, conformément à l’ordre des diptyques. Elles auront un Comité exécutif formé des premiers hiérarques des diverses juridictions qui existent dans la région». Par ces affirmations est confirmée la coresponsabilité de tous les évêques orthodoxes, sur la présidence non-juridictionnelle du premier évêque dans les diptyques. Le document précise aussi: Ces Assemblées épiscopales auront pour travail et responsabilité de veiller à manifester l’unité de l’Orthodoxie et à développer une action commune de tous les orthodoxes de chaque région pour remédier à leurs besoins pastoraux, représenter en commun tous les orthodoxes vis-à-vis des autres confessions et l’ensemble de la société de la région, cultiver les lettres théologiques et l’éducation ecclésiastique, etc. Les décisions à ces sujets seront prises à l’unanimité des Églises représentées dans l’assemblée de la région.

Dans son sixième paragraphe, le document montre qu’en ce qui concerne «les questions d’intérêt commun qui, sur décision de l’Assemblée épiscopale, nécessitent d’être examinées à l’échelon panorthodoxe, le président de celle-ci se réfère au Patriarche œcuménique pour que suite soit donnée selon la pratique panorthodoxe en vigueur.» Ainsi nous observons encore une fois qu’il est affirmé que la diaspora orthodoxe est organisée dans le souci de préserver l’unité du témoignage de l’Église orthodoxe. Le dernier paragraphe du document souligne que les Églises autocéphales s’engagent à ne pas entraver le processus de réglementation de façon canonique la question de la Diaspora, et feront tout leur possible pour faciliter le travail des Assemblées épiscopales et pour rétablir la normalité de l’ordre canonique dans la Diaspora. Le texte donne comme exemple en ce sens l’engagement des Églises autocéphales de ne pas donner des titres déjà existants aux hiérarques.



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3. Les défis et perspectives concernant la diaspora orthodoxe Comme je l’ai déjà mentionné, dans son premier article, le document du Concile de Crète affirme que «... toutes les très saintes Églises orthodoxes ont la volonté unanime que le problème de la Diaspora orthodoxe soit résolu le plus rapidement possible et que celle-ci soit organisée conformément à l’ecclésiologie orthodoxe, et à la tradition et la praxis canoniques de l’Église orthodoxe». De cette formulation on déduit que les Églises autocéphales sont conscientes que la problématique de la diaspora ne peut pas être traitée avec superficialité. En même temps, comme nous l’avons déjà montré, la diaspora orthodoxe peut justifier une organisation distincte seulement si l’organisation selon les principes ecclésiologiques et la rigueur canonique n’est pas possible. 3.1. La distinction entre régions de la diaspora orthodoxe et nouveaux territoires L’identification des régions de la diaspora orthodoxe présente par ellemême un grand défi pour notre Église. La diaspora orthodoxe est-elle dans le même contexte ecclésiologique ou canonique partout dans le monde? Comment identifier un nouveau territoire par rapport au territoire canonique ou par rapport à la diaspora orthodoxe? Le document de Crète précise que dans la diaspora orthodoxe il y a 13 régions: Canada; États-Unis d’Amérique; Amérique latine; Australie; Nouvelle Zélande et Océanie; Grande Bretagne et Irlande; France; ­Belgique, Hollande et Luxembourg; Autriche; Italie et Malte; Suisse et Lichtenstein; Allemagne; Pays scandinaves (hormis la Finlande). En regardant cette liste nous observons qu’elle utilise la même terminologie pour designer tout territoire hors des Églises Autocéphales. Peut-on considérer que toutes ces régions font partie de la même catégorie? Même si les canons de l’Église ne parlent pas de l’organisation de l’Église dans les nouveaux territoires, il faut comprendre que la collection des canons n’est pas un codex de droit qui donne l’encadrement exhaustif des structures ecclésiales. La collection des canons s’est développée à l’intérieur de l’Empire byzantin en prenant en considération ce contexte. En même temps le canon 17 IV ec. parle du fait que si un évêque exerce sans trouble son autorité sur des paroisses pendant 30 ans, ces paroisses doivent être considérées comme étant définitivement dans sa juridiction.

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Peut-on identifier en ce canon un exemple concernant la procédure ­d’implantation d’une juridiction dans un nouveau territoire? Il est difficile de donner une réponse affirmative, mais il est difficile aussi de ne pas constater que ce canon offre une réponse à la manière dans laquelle un nouveau territoire, non-organisé ou délaissé, peut entrer dans la ­juridiction canonique d’un diocèse. 3.2. Le problème de la co-territorialité avec l’Église catholique romaine Nous constatons aussi qu’une partie des lieux désignés comme étant de la diaspora orthodoxe se trouvent dans les régions qui, avant Le Grand schisme étaient sous la juridiction de l’Église de Rome. Étant donné que le dialogue théologique orthodoxe-catholique est en déroulement, il est compréhensible que pour les territoires qui sont considérés comme étant traditionnellement dans la juridiction du Patriarcat de Rome, l’Église Orthodoxe ait adopté une attitude d’attente, espérant qu’à un moment donné l’unité sera restaurée. Par conséquence, tant qu’il n’y a pas un consensus sur l’unité de la foi, la normalité canonique de la juridiction territoriale du Patriarcat de Rome ne peut pas être assumée par les communautés orthodoxes et l’organisation actuelle de la diaspora peut être assumée comme une solution de transition, en application de l’économie canonique au niveau organisationnel. 26 En ces conditions, l’unité du témoignage orthodoxe est rendue visible par l’organisation des ­assemblées d’évêques, selon les prescriptions du document du Concile de Crète. Après la restauration de l’unité, la structure synodale générale compétente pourrait définir la normalité canonique et clarifier les ­modalités de cohabitation des communautés des différentes traditions qui se manifestent sur le même territoire.

26   Plusieurs réflexions concernant l’avenir de la Diaspora ont été réalisées en Occident. Voir en ce sens C. Andronikof, «L’avenir de l’Orthodoxie en Occident», Le Messager orthodoxe, 79 (1978), pp. 3-25, et S. Verkhovskoy, «Pour une Église locale unie en Europe occidentale», Le Messager orthodoxe, 77 (1977), pp. 3-6.



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3.2.  Réflexions sur l’avenir de la Diaspora orthodoxe Beaucoup attendaient le Saint et Grand Concile de l’Église orthodoxe pour qu’une solution conforme à l’ecclésiologie orthodoxe et à la rigueur canonique soit trouvée. Même si beaucoup sont déçus en considérant que le document de Crète n’apporte pas les éclaircissements attendus, je considère que le Saint et Grand Concile a apporté une réponse à long terme à cette question. Maintenant il est plus clair que l’Église ne peut pas donner une nouvelle organisation canonique de la diaspora sans évaluer l’impact pastoral et missionnaire. Les réalités socio-culturelles doivent être prises en considération et l’œuvre pastorale doit être soutenue par tous les moyens dont l’Église dispose. L’accompagnement des fidèles par des pasteurs qui comprennent leurs aspirations et besoins est très important. En même temps, les assemblées des évêques de la diaspora doivent œuvrer d’une manière plus efficace. La présidence de ces assemblées par le métropolite du Patriarcat œcuménique ne doit pas être comprise comme étant le signe d’une attitude juridictionnelle du Patriarcat de Constantinople sur les communautés de l’extérieur des Églises autocéphales. C’est dans la coresponsabilité que le premier trône de l’Église orthodoxe va devoir consolider sa fonction de vecteur d’unité. Je considère que grâce à une meilleure communication et à une meilleure clarification de la fonction canonique du primat, les assemblées des évêques de la diaspora orthodoxe vont avoir une plus grande importance dans la manifestation de l’unité de l’action pastorale et du témoignage. Même si l’Église considère diaspora orthodoxe toute région qui n’est pas intégrée dans une église autocéphale, dans l’avenir il est nécessaire de faire la distinction entre l’organisation par économie des communautés des diasporas ethnoculturelles, et les communautés qui ne se considèrent pas ou ne se considèrent plus en tant que diasporas. Cette distinction doit ouvrir la possibilité de création des nouvelles Églises locales. Les réalités ecclésiales des États Unis, Canada, et Amérique Latine, Asie, Australie et Nouvelle Zélande nécessitent des réponses qui ne peuvent pas être données dans le même registre que pour l’Europe. Dans les régions qui n’ont pas fait partie du Patriarcat de Rome, l’Église Orthodoxe pourrait distinguer entre les communautés stables qui peuvent assumer une organisation locale et les communautés marquées par les particularités ethnoculturelles, qui se considèrent encore en tant que diaspora, liées aux Églises mères. Dans ce cas, le document concernant l’autonomie ecclésiale approuvé en Crète pourrait inspirer des solutions

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canoniques pour que les communautés qui peuvent assumer le statut d’Église locale, sans distinctions d’ordre ethnique, soient organisées dans une ou plusieurs Métropoles autonomes en chemin vers un statut d’autocéphalie. Conclusions En guise des conclusions, je souligne quelques aspects importants mis en évidence par mon analyse. 1. Il est essentiel de comprendre que la diaspora orthodoxe n’est pas seulement un contexte problématique, mais aussi un cadre providentiel de rencontre et de communion, qui peut nous aider dans le progrès de la communion panorthodoxe. 2. Il faut prendre en considération le juste rapport entre les notions dérivées du nom «diaspora». La diaspora orthodoxe est fondée sur des diasporas orthodoxes qui sont elles-mêmes sorties des diasporas nationales en intégrant aussi des personnes autochtones. La Diaspora orthodoxe n’est pas seulement porteuse des identités ethnoculturelles, mais elle est aussi la dissémination de l’Église orthodoxe au-delà des territoires des Églises autocéphales dans un contexte confessionnel diversifié.27 3. L’organisation de la diaspora orthodoxe doit être assumée comme manifestation de l’économie canonique sur le chemin de la normalité canonique. L’économie canonique exprimée par l’organisation unitaire de la diaspora à l’aide des assemblées des évêques ne doit pas se montrer comme une manière d’éviter la mise en pratique des principes canoniques consacrés. L’Économie canonique est elle aussi un principe canonique qui donne la possibilité de préserver l’orthodoxie, le témoignage et l’unité de l’Église dans des circonstances particulières. 4. L’Église doit prendre en considération les particularités des communautés qui se considèrent diaspora, attachées à des valeurs ethno­ culturelles non pas pour cultiver l’égoïsme et l’antagonisme, mais pour valoriser les sensibilités traditionnelles afin que les fidèles arrivent à valoriser l’orthodoxie au-delà des aspects culturalistes. Si l’Église ne prend pas en considération les sensibilités de base des peuples, 27   C. Argenti, «L’Orthodoxie en Occident face aux confessions occidentales dans un monde sécularisé», Messager de l’Exarchat du Patriarche russe en Europe occidentale, 115 (1987), pp. 24-27.



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s­ urtout ceux qui se trouvent en situation de migration, d’autre mouvements religieux profiteront et les orthodoxes attachés à leur langue et identité nationale peuvent être des proies faciles pour le prosélytisme surtout des communautés évangéliques. En tant que conclusion générale, j’apprécie le temps que nous vivons comme étant extrêmement important pour la consolidation de la canonicité dans l’Église. La vie conciliaire de l’Église est celle qui doit résoudre ce rapport entre économie canonique et normalité canonique à l’aide des principes consacrés.

ANTI-ISLAMIC NARRATIVES OF MIDDLE EASTERN DIASPORA CHRISTIANS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK Andreas Schmoller

1.  Introduction Anti-Islamic rhetoric is widespread among Middle Eastern Christians. This subjective impression stems from fieldwork experience with ­diaspora communities and will be discussed here mainly in the context of diaspora. Notwithstanding it is clear that anti-Islamic views are not absent in the homelands but the basis for expressing them is fundamentally different when inter-religious coexistence is a matter of necessity. Not to forget that for some Middle Eastern church leaders and Christians in their traditional homeland coexistence and dialogue with a Muslim majority is a question of religious and/or political conviction. Living and staying among Muslim brothers and sisters is then connected to a mission Christians have to contribute to an Islamic society, one that is torn apart between different Muslim factions and therefore in the need of reform.1 One could argue that such an approach is nonetheless relying on assumptions about an inherent nature of Islam. Regardless of the fundamental attitude towards Islam — friendly or hostile — Middle Eastern Christians make distinctions between different forms of Islam and groups of ­Muslims. All in all Islam is a central marker in defining boundaries between Us and Them. The extend of anti-Islamic speech in quantitative and qualitative terms — without accounting the shades of grey that might be made — has not only puzzled me as a researcher entering the field as a new comer in 2014. Discussing research experience with colleagues and observers of the communities I became aware that I was not the only one who did make this experience and, furthermore, others as well did 1   See i.e. L. R. Sako, ‘Ne nous oubliez pas!’: Entretien avec Laurence Desjoyaux, with the assistance of P. Barbarin (Montrouge, 2015); M.-H. Robert and M. Younès (eds.), La vocation des chrétiens d’Orient: Défis actuels et enjeux d’avenir dans leurs rapports à l’islam; actes du colloque international à l’Université Catholique de Lyon (26-29 mars 2014), Chrétiens en liberté (Paris, 2015).

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not how to fully understand it. The short cut explanation that Middle Eastern Christians of the diaspora are sharing highly ‘islamophobic’ ­attitudes like a high percentage of citizens in their host societies is neither helpful in that respect nor adequate from an analytical perspective. Alignments to the right-wing activism warning against Islam as a general threat certainly exist among Middle Eastern Christians diaspora in terms of civil organizations and political involvement of individual church leaders.2 This clearly needs to be discussed and addressed in future research. I will demonstrate however that analyzing anti-Islamic narratives of Middle Eastern Christians solely within the discursive framework of islamo­ phobia represents an insufficient reading and to a certain degree a Eurocentric misreading of discourse as a social practice. After conducting twenty-five life story interviews with lay community members of Middle Eastern Churches, numerous other interviews with church leaders and community activists, reading biographical accounts and studying two diaspora communities I consider that anti-Islamic narratives are complex in their meaning as they are related to different experiences and contexts. This and the sad fact that voices of Middle Eastern Christians are easily put to use for political right-wing propaganda have convinced me of the scholarly and socially relevance of touching upon the role of anti-Islamic narratives of Middle Eastern diaspora Christians. Drawing from the advantage of open interviews with a life story approach this paper ­analyzes these expressions detached from a political agenda.3 The narrative perspective highlights the aspect of performed identities in stories whereas discourse is about constantly redefining meaning.4 I will explore narratives as ways to organize experiences and practices of belonging. These will include experiences of exclusion such as, racialization and religious discrimination in their host societies. These experiences contain discourses such as that on Islam, integration, religion and identity. In a 2   With regard to the Copts there are good surveys by: L. Guirguis, Les coptes d’Égypte: Violences communautaires et transformations politiques (2005-2012), Terres et gens d’islam (Paris, 2012); E. Iskander, Sectarian Conflict in Egypt: Coptic Media, Identity and Representation, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics (Hoboken NJ, 2012). 3   I conducted thirteen interviews with Syriac and twelve with Coptic Christians. Age distribution in the sample: 20s (9), 30s (2), 40s (3), 50 (2), 60s (6), 70 (2), 80 (1). The length of the interviews varied from forty-five minutes to two and a half hours. People (including third parties) referred to in interview transcripts and other data forms have been anonymized at the point of transcription by using pseudonyms for all data that might allow identification. 4   Here and in the following see F. Anthias, ‘Where Do I Belong? Narrating Collective Identity and Translocational Positionality’, Ethnicities, 2 (2002), pp. 491-514, p. 499.



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nutshell I will argue that negotiating boundaries including Islam as a marker is primarily an issue of negotiating their relations to the Western societies they live in by defining a relational position of belonging that I will characterize as ‘translocational’. References to the Islam discourse is a social practice to express communality with fellow Christians in a more nuanced way than a solely Eurocentric perspective allows us to grasp. The article will proceed with a presentation of the theoretical framework in order to explain the relation of narratives and discourses they contain. This will be followed by a discussion of the most central ­discourses — and the overlapping of them — that appear in connection with the expression of anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic views. To answer the central question I will examine several examples of biographical ­narratives as a place to negotiate belonging. In order not to overemphasize the context of host society experiences the second part of this paper will include other contexts of such experiences that narrative analysis touches upon but would require a broader cross-disciplinary perspective including psychology for full exploration in future research. The study is based on findings from fieldwork in the Syriac Orthodox and Coptic Orthodox communities in Austria carried out in 2014 and 2015 as part of the grant project Narrative der Diaspora–Orientalisches Christentum des Nahen Ostens in Österreich funded by the Anniversary Fund of the Österreichische Nationalbank. The local focus on Austria entails some particularities that will be discussed; nonetheless it can be assumed that the case study is comparable to many other European and Non-European contexts. 2. Narratives and Discourses — A Theoretical Framework Reconstructing Experiences

for

Narratives are a central way by which people ‘make sense of experience and communicate it to others’.5 Analyzing narratives is about explaining how people ‘create and use stories to interpret the world’ based on their experiences and embedded in the cultural world they live in. The cultural world does not only comprise shared conventions of style and emplotment of narratives but also social realities people live with. And this is where discourse starts to play a role within narratives.   L. Abrams, Oral History Theory (London, 2010), p. 106.

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According to the social scientific use of the concept, discourse is constitutive in the sense that ‘it constructs social reality and relationships’.6 Not only constitutive, discourse is also functional, it is about power or in a weaker sense about ‘interests of social actors’.7 Discourse can be understood as a social practice that reproduces society, imagined groups but also aims at social change.8 Social identities are constructed through discourse if we accept the constructivist nature of discourse theory ­formulated by Foucault who already saw discourse ‘as a defining aspect of social relations’.9 Taking as an example the role of religion in current Western societies we can observe that religion discursively is constructed ‘either as a solution to social problems or as a social problem itself’.10 In such a discourse social identities are created with religion as a marker between ‘healthy’ non-religious people and potentially problematic ­religious people. This being said it becomes clear that this paper is based on a discursive understanding of religion acknowledging that it is not ‘something that is simply found “out there”; rather, “religion” is something that is “created” through cultural and communicational processes’.11 The religious field is the place where definition and boundaries of religion and religious agencies are negotiated from many religious and non-religious sides. The same applies to Islam, Christianity, identity or integration to name the central discourses that are interrelated and ­relevant for our analysis. Narrations of Middle Eastern Christians derive from these available hegemonic or dominant discourses and help to order experiences of inclusion and exclusion. This is the basic framework for the analysis of expressed anti-Islamic views in the broadest sense. In that respect it is clearly necessary to distinguish two concepts that often are used lightly and almost synonymously: narrative and discourse. Whereas narrative are characterized by the telling of the story — and thus 6   T. Hjelm, ‘Discourse Analysis’, in The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion, eds. M. Stausberg and S. Engler, Routledge Handbooks (London/ New York, 2011), pp. 134-150, p. 135. See also T. Taira, ‘Making Space for Discursive Study in Religious Studies’, Religion, 43 (2013), pp. 26-45. 7   Hjelm, ‘Discourse Analysis’ (see n. 6), p. 135. 8   See N. Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Oxford, 1992); J. Potter, Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric, and Social Change (London, 1996), p. 105. 9   Ibid., p. 136; M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison (Paris, 1975). 10  Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (see n. 8), p. 144; T. Hjelm, ‘Religion and Social Problems: A New Theoretical Perspective’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, ed. P. Clarke (Oxford, 2009), pp. 924-941. 11   F. Wijsen and K. von Stuckrad, ‘Introduction’, in Making Religion: Theory and Practice in the Discursive Study of Religion, eds. F. Wijsen and K. von Stuckrad, Supplements to Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, 4 (Leiden, 2016), pp. 1-11, p. 3.



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comprise more than just the content of a story — discourse refers to the message which is delivered through all kinds of communication modes, narratives being one of them. Therefore narratives contain discourses. Narrators experience the world partly through discourses delivered through media, conversation etc. They relate to them in narratives, implicitly or explicitly. Reconsidering the mentioned example we observe that religion is not always presented as a social problem or the contrary but the discussion in a way is framed by the idea of religion as a social reality that creates or solves problems and therefore gives a specific view of religion that excludes other perceptions. Narratives and discourses are to be distinguished yet they are also interwoven. Abrams suggests that ‘it might be helpful to think of the narrative as the structure and of the discourse as the message within it’.12 This discursive approach to narratives provides a central key to understanding how Middle Eastern Christians deal with the social realities they experience through discourse. Discourses are about power and minorities normally are not in position of power but in a challenge to negotiate belonging and identity in a particular context. I assume that they experience some discourses as dominant in their constitutive ­character of establishing ‘one version of the world’ where people are positioned in a certain way and expected to see things in a certain way. Discourse is also about what remains unsaid or unsayable. ‘Therefore, discourses are organised around practices of exclusion’.13 These theoretical definitions are important to bear in mind; it is necessary, however, to note that the following discussion is not about following one discourse such as the discourse of religion or discourse on Islam in an embodied collection of narrations. I suggest approaching the narrative material from a narrative perspective that highlights narrations as the main means ‘to communicate experience, knowledge and emotions’.14 This means that emphasis should be on the study of social practices that are expressed in a discursive variety and construct new meanings.15 I clearly assume that discourse analysis in the other sense is not the appropriate approach to explore anti-Islamic attitudes of Middle Eastern Christians. The focus on narration provides us with a view on identities that is relational and contradictory and that in fact contains many norma Abrams, Oral History Theory (see n. 5), p. 110.   Taira, ‘Making Space for Discursive Study in Religious Studies’ (see n. 6). 14  Abrams, Oral History Theory (see n. 5), p. 109. 15   This is inspired by the instructive article of Taira, ‘Making Space for Discursive Study in Religious Studies’ (see n. 6). 12 13

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tive comparisons drawn from dominant discourses, but they are better understood as views that have a highly intersectional quality reflecting the importance of social positions, social divisions and identities.16 Therefore I also suggest disentangling the meaning of the two terms of ‘identity’ and ‘belonging’. The emphasis of the second notion lies in the ‘experiences of being part of the social fabric and the ways in which social bonds and ties are manifested in practices, experiences and emotions of inclusion’.17 Belonging is negotiated through multiple boundaries especially in a social place where religion is strongly interwoven with (neo-)ethnic differences, social bonds (as, for example, to the Christian fellows in the homeland) or racialization (i.e., wrongly identified as ­Muslim in the host society). Therefore it is important to see belonging as a contextual narrative construction as taking place in terms of ‘trans­ location’. Belonging is narrated from different locations and contexts ‘in terms of a range of social positions and social divisions and identities’.18 If we want to fully acknowledge that belonging to a Middle Eastern Christian diaspora is complex due to historical legacies and present challenges we have to analyze the forms of belonging by carefully listening to the particular views that community members develop when they talk about Islam, religion or identity. In the following section I will give examples that show that discourses of integration, religion and Islam are used frequently by Middle Eastern diaspora Christians in biographical interviews. What is striking is the overlapping of these discourses through which the texts respond to power relations, express experiences of success and participation but also experiences of exclusion.

16   Anthias, ‘Where Do I Belong?’ (see n. 4); Floya Anthias, ‘Thinking through the Lens of Translocational Positionality: An Intersectionality Frame for Understanding Identity and Belonging’, Translocations, Migration and Change, 4 (2008), pp. 5-20. 17   F. Anthias, ‘Intersectionality, Belonging and Translocational Positionality: Thinking about Transnational Identities’, in Ethnicity, Belonging and Biography: Ethnographical and Biographical Perspectives, ed. G. Rosenthal (Berlin, 2009), pp. 229-249, p. 234. 18   Ibid., p. 234.



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Part I: Integration and Exclusion 1. The Overlapping of Integration and Islam Discourse In the data generated through life story interviews with Middle Eastern Christians in Austria ‘integration discourse’ can be identified as one of the central references. As mentioned I do not work with a definition with the contested concept of ‘integration’ that is substantial in political debate on migration and minorities, I am interested in the discursively reshaped meaning of ‘integration’. Three elements appear constantly: Proficiency in the language of the host society, success in job life and the shared Christian religion are common elements to express and ‘demonstrate’ integration. The latter does not afford hardship. It is a cultural thing to be Christian, in an essentialized view, Copts fit well in an Austrian ­society that is perceived as Christian: ‘Somehow you felt more comfortable here, more Christian than in the rest of Europe’, explained one Copt who came to Austria in the 1970s echoing the image of Austria as one country where Christianity is particularly strong through the importance of the Catholic Church.19 This concept of ‘integratedness’ combines ­economic and cultural assimilation as core facets. As a general rule Middle Eastern Christians from the early migration waves to Austria would highlight the Christian character of Austrian ­culture and express strong identification with its values.20 This integration concept can be linked to the discourse on non-integrated Muslims or Turks. Indeed some Middle Eastern Christians reproduce this discourse by explicitly cultivating the features of hardship by labelling them as Christian virtues in opposition to ‘lazy’ Turks, Arabs or Muslims that abuse the social welfare system in European countries. Elias, a Coptic Christian born in Vienna, negotiates his position between Austrian

19   For a historically nuanced discussion on the Catholic and Anti-clerical traditions in Austria I recommend E. Bruckmüller, ‘Katholisches an und in Österreich’, in Öffentliche Religionen in Österreich – Politikverständnis und zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement, eds. J. Nautz, K. Stöckl and R. Siebenrock, Edition Weltordnung – Religion – Gewalt (Innsbruck, 2013), pp. 17-54. 20   Furthermore it is remarkable that many 1st generation Copts who arrived between the 1950s and 1970s give an image of the first Coptic diaspora as an ‘invisible community’. Keeping a low social profile was presented as a deliberate choice in order to avoid the impression on behalf of the host society to be not integrated into Austrian society. This changed only in the 2000s when the Church was officially recognized as religious organization in Austria.

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society and other migrants by picking up this wide-spread hardship-­ success narrative: I know a Turk, I know him from soccer. He once worked 20 hours per week for Obi [do-it-yourself-store, AS]. After a while he left. He doesn’t work anything. Like his father who is unemployed since twelve or fifteen years. I asked him if he was happy with his life. He replied that ‘as long as the state gives us money for doing nothing, it’s okay’. Doing nothing, I don’t know. I know it might sound arrogant but compared to that I feel better, having an education and having a job.21

Narratives like these are indicative of an increasingly overlapping of integration and Islam discourse. This has been described as a trend in Western societies that has increased considerably in the aftermath of 9/11.22 In concrete terms, this means that issues of integration are more and more negotiated against the background of confessional affiliations:23 Host societies connect issues of integration and of security with Islam by stereotyping foreigners of Muslim background.24 Apart from that, right-wing parties have been the driving force behind debating Islam by ‘framing liberal norms as being synonymous with European values’ opposed by illiberal values of immigrants with predominantly Muslim background.25 The idea of Islam as an intolerant religion is not only shared by nationalist parties but also by segments of generally anti-­ religious movements that have gained momentum in Austria as will be discussed further below. Austria has a long and strong tradition of xenophobic discourses in political debates that have increasingly taken an

  The English reflects the at times substandard language of those being interviewed.   Out of the many studies about the effects of 9/11 on Arab-Americans see, e.g., N. Abraham, S. Howell and A. Shryock (eds.), Arab Detroit 9/11: Life in the Terror Decade, Great Lakes Books (Detroit MI, 2011); A. Jamal and N. Naber, Race and Arab Americans Before and After 9/11 (Syracuse NY, 2008). Both include contributions about Arab Christians in the post-9/11 context. 23   D. Halm, Der Islam als Diskursfeld: Bilder des Islams in Deutschland (Wiesbaden, 2008), p. 27. 24   In their study on Islam debates in the media Dolezal, Helbing and Hutter have ‘observed an unexpectedly sharp increase in the prevalence of the “terrorism/fundamentalism” issue in Austria and Germany’ between 2001 and 2007. M. Dolezal, M. Helbling, and S. Hutter, ‘Debating Islam in Austria, Germany and Switzerland: Ethnic Citizenship, Church-State Relations and Right-Wing Populism’, West European Politics, 33 (2010), pp. 171-190, p. 186. 25   J. Mourao Permoser and S. Rosenberger, ‘Religious Citizenship Versus Policies of Immigrant Integration: The Case of Austria’, in International Migration and the Governance of Religious Diversity, eds. P. Bramadat and M. Koenig, Migration and Diversity, 1 (Kingston ON, 2009), pp. 259-289, p. 283. 21

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anti-Islamic turn in the 2000s.26 This combination of xenophobia with anti-Islamic views as predominant elements of an integration discourse is reflected in the narration of Elias: How often I was thrown into a drawer; I mean how often I was considered to be a Muslim, and automatically I was associated with bad things. I have always responded, ‘I am no Muslim, I am Christian. I am Coptic Orthodox’. And from there, I think, religion started to play a big role in my life.

Without over-emphasizing the argument, discursively the logic of deidentification from Muslims and reference to anti-Islamic stereotypes is connected to the widespread conflation of integration problems and Islam. Discrimination however is not only a discursive event it is a direct experience. People are racialized due to their names or their appearance regardless of their confessional identity. Being victims of islamophobia or xenophobia themselves in the host society Middle Eastern Christians make the experience that notwithstanding their image of fitting well into the Austrian (‘Christian’) host society, they are not recognized in their distinct identity and therefore can feel excluded or at least wrongly identified. This is reflected in narratives that oscillate between positive identifications with the host society and frustrations that result from racialization and discrimination. I assume that what makes the Middle Eastern Christian experience different from those of their Muslim migrant fellows is that they are not represented in a sort of counter-narrative within the overlapping discourses of Islam and integration. One way to react to the risen anti-Islamic discourse on behalf of the concerned Muslim minorities is the Islamophobia discourse.27 This is a strategy that has been established in the discursive field of debating Islam in order to gain strength and power against the criticism and defamation of Islam in Western ­society. Analysts say that it has been the most central strategy of Muslim actors in the post 9/11 period of facing Anti-Islamic discourse that was in fact applicable to immunise against it. This has been called ‘discursive assimilation’, meaning that issues of the host society are incorporated into own positionings.28 At the same time cultural differences are considered to have become more visible partly as a consequence of general 26   S. Rosenberger and L. Hadj-Abdou, ‘Islam at Issue: Anti-Islamic Discourse of the Far Right in Austria’, in The Far Right in Contemporary Europe, eds. B. Jenkins, E. Godin and A. Mammone (New York, 2008), pp. 149-163. 27  Halm, Der Islam als Diskursfeld (see n. 23), p. 27. 28  Ibid.

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economic crisis that particularly concern migrant groups. With the experience of economic exclusion within these predominantly Muslim migrant groups the turn to the cultural capital (=Islam) as the last resource is highlighted. As a consequence Muslims have become emotionally more vulnerable to criticism and vilification. Middle Eastern Christians also turn to their cultural capital but they do not have the same discursive opportunities to react to discrimination and racialization. They sometimes consider that Muslim migrants are better represented by the media and have a better lobby in the society whereas Middle Eastern Christians are often overlooked.29 The idea of invisibility as a distinct group is often expressed as a comparison between Christians and Muslims suggesting that Muslim migrants have advantages. One respondent, Isabelle, also referred to the legal status of Islam in Austria allowing for religious instructions in State school in order to express disagreement on how other minorities are recognized: I think that Austrians and the State are too social, because they receive people perfectly, and it is simple here, to live one’s culture here as a ­foreigner, and to love one’s culture. No problem. But it goes too far, if you look at specific domains, the Muslim communities for instance that go into school and do everything. That goes too far, it’s exaggerated. But apart from that, it’s great.

Like in other multiculturalist oriented countries the Austrian constitution favors an inclusive model of religious diversity that accords recognition and privileges to certain religious organizations on a legal basis.30 This includes Islam as a consequence of historical contingency of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that recognized Islam as religion in 1912 after the annexation of the province of Bosnia-Herzegovina.31 Based on the Law of Recognition dating from 1874 recognized religions should enjoy the same rights as the until then privileged Catholic Church in order to establish equality of treatment by the state of religious communities. The privileges that are accorded with the official recognition by the ­Austrian state include amongst others the right to religious education in 29   Already analyzed by H. Armbruster, Keeping the Faith: Syriac Christian Diasporas (Canon Pyon, 2013); U. Plessentin, ‘Die zivilgesellschaftlichen Potentiale der SyrischOrthodoxen Kirche’, in Religiöse Netzwerke: Die zivilgesellschaftlichen Potentiale religiöser Migrantengemeinden, ed. A. Kenneth Nagel, Kultur und soziale Praxis (Bielefeld, 2015), pp. 117-146. 30   R. Potz, ‘State and Church in Austria’, in State and Church in the European Union, ed. G. Robbers (Baden-Baden, 22005), pp. 229-258. 31   From here I follow Mourao Permoser and Rosenberger, ‘Religious Citizenship Versus Policies of Immigrant Integration’ (see n. 25), p. 265.



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State schools financed by the State. This internationally outstanding legal status granted to Muslims on the basis of their religious membership gives strong authority as well as public and political recognition to ­religious leadership. 2. Experiencing Exclusion through the Discourse of Religion On the other hand analysts see a major contradiction between this legal recognition and a strongly exclusionary integration policy and discourses.32 Middle Eastern Christians to a large extend also experience this contradiction. Some of Middle Eastern Churches have been recognized by the Austrian State such as the Syriac Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic and the Coptic Orthodox Church and the young generation benefits from the same privileges such as denominational religious instruction in state schools.33 This clearly resonates in many of the narratives on strong ­identification with the host society. This appreciation of official and legal status however is relativized with regard to the role of religion in society. Young Syriacs and Copts who were born in Austria and went to school here deplore that in Austria in general religion is absent and even ridiculed. Yasemine, a Syriac Orthodox teenager, said: I have the impression, that the Austrians that I know, are not very religious. Of course there are some who would put a neckless with a cross and claim that it is important, but those I know from my class, they are not interested in religion, and they laugh about it. So, I do not take them seriously.

Whereas there is little doubt today that religion has been re-politicized in many countries and therefore seems to be back, sociologists of religion explain that the significance of religion in people’s life is drastically shrinking in younger cohorts.34 Discourse on religion in general and Christianity in particular have moved towards very critical positions. In countries like Austria scandals of child abuse contributed among other issues to a general negative image of the Catholic Church and — as nuances are not necessarily made in that domain — Christianity as such.   Main argument of ibid.   On the issue of church recognition see A. Schmoller, ‘Structures of Belonging and Relations: The Syriac Orthodox and the Coptic Orthodox Church in Austria’, in Middle Eastern Christian Identities in Europe, eds. F. McCallum et al. (forthcoming). 34  For a good comparative study and theoretical discussion see D. Pollack and G. Rosta, Religion in der Moderne: Ein internationaler Vergleich, Schriftenreihe Religion und Moderne, 1 (Frankfurt a.M., 2015). 32 33

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In many narratives Middle Eastern Christians express their belonging to the faith community in relation to experiences of exclusion. Elisabeth, a second generation Coptic Christian in her 20s, reflects how she came even closer to the Coptic parish in consequence of being considered as an alien by her peers, which reflects the discourse of religion as a social and mental problem: The fact that we cannot have relationships; for them this is abnormal. They judge you as completely immature. And, my god, if you haven’t had a boyfriend so far; how is that possible? And certainly you won’t have any experience. It hurts. It’s immediate labelling. And no, you should keep away from her, she has to be very stupid and she doesn’t know anything. And that we don’t go out at night and don’t drink alcohol. So I say to myself, we can do better things than going out. But good, you’re excluded from quite a lot of things.

Anti-religious claims have been getting stronger in Austria since the 2000s particularly from Atheist associations that demand strict separation of Church and State following an international trend that has been called New Atheism.35 It is common in this movements that they attribute a negative role to religion as such and in particular to monotheistic ­religions — Judaism, Christianity and Islam — for their alleged intolerance that fuels radicalization and violence. In general this discourse on religion is framed by a secular approach to religion that either discusses the negative or positive effects of religion as such or of one religion (= Islam) in particular. There are those social and political forces arguing that religion as a factor of social conflicts per se should be kept out of politics. For instance when reports on Islamic indoctrination in private Muslim Kindergartens in Vienna reached the public at the height of the refugee crisis of 2015/16, deputies of the social democrats tried to deal with the issue by calling for a minimal role of religion in such ­education whereas conservative and right-wing politicians blamed the left municipality for keeping a blind eye when it comes to the danger of radical Islam. Opponents of the strict secular approach are found in two different camps. On the one hand, those who agitate for the status quo of the cooperative model of Church-State-relations arguing that religious institutions (of all denominations-including Islam) generally contribute positively to society and on the other hand, those who try to distinguish which religion(s) or religious traditions are to ‘return’ into Western 35   A good survey and theological discussion in German is provided by G. M. Hoff, Die neuen Atheismen: Eine notwendige Provokation (Kevelaer, 2009).



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s­ociety and which one not by calling for the defence of the Christian Occident or the enlightened Jewish-Christian Western culture against the threat of ‘islamization’.36 No matter which position is put forward, pro- or post-secularization, pro-religion or pro(-Jewish-)Christian and anti-Islam (the former strongly advocated by the leaders of the big Christian churches, the latter by right-wing extremists of the FPÖ), ­religions are debated in a secularist frame about the ‘harm’ or ‘benefits’ of religion or certain religions or certain forms of religion.37 The struggle about religion is a combat about meaning and in this discursive field Middle Eastern Christians shape meanings of their ­individual and collective experiences.38 Narratives of experiences of exclusion on the basis of their religious convictions and religious identity often bring them closer to other religious people of other faiths including Muslims. Yasmine narrates the difficulties religious people encounter when they speak about religion in school: For Austrians it is very unusual to be really religious ... Some are very surprised if you tell them that you go to church every Sunday... As we talked about it in school, that I go to church and that this is important to me, many said that they don’t think religion to be important. And my other friends, with whom I am often, they are very religious, but they are Muslim. We don’t make differences here, we talk about it openly. We don’t criticize the other religion, we mutually accept us as we are and that is very important in our friendship.

Elias’ narration reflects how his experience with Islam is split between the negative discourse on Islam as ‘religion of conquest’ (Eroberungs­ religion) and personal experience of understanding that stems from shared religiosity. His positioning is interesting in that respect as it makes

36   Dolezal, Helbling and Hutter, ‘Debating Islam in Austria, Germany and Switzerland’ (see n. 24). 37   W. B. Drees, ‘“Religion” in Public Debates: Who Defines, for What Purposes?’, in Religion: Beyond a concept, ed. H. de Vries, The Future of the Religious Past, 1 (New York, 2008), pp. 464-472. 38   Dolezal, Helbling and Hutter, ‘Debating Islam in Austria, Germany and Switzerland’ (see n. 24), p. 177: ‘It is important to note that […] the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) […] rarely mentioned the Christian heritage in their agitation. The FPÖ, in ­particular, was traditionally a secular and anti-Catholic party, and it was not until the mid-1990s that it integrated a commitment to Christianity in its manifesto. For this reason, for a long time religious practices did not play a prominent part in their agitation against foreigners’.

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a nuanced distinction between his personal friendships without de-identifying with his father who is very negative about Muslims: R: There are Muslim, I know some of them, who say ‘I am not that kind of guy who wants to impose my religion on others’. […] I have Muslim friends that say, ‘No, it’s not like that. You have your faith und you live it and I have my faith and I live it’. And on that basis we understand each other very well. I know, that he understands that religion is important to me, and I understand him too, that religion is important to him. I: And you can talk about faith then with them? R: Yes, yes, not with many. But I have three to four Muslim friends with whom I can talk about that openly. We understand each other. I: And is it important for your life that you experience that? R: Certainly, my father hardly experiences anything like that and now is very negative about Muslims. I think I would be more cynical about ­Muslims if I didn’t had such friends.

Notwithstanding the important role of personal friendships with Muslims in the host society Middle Eastern Christian often take a contra­ dictory position if they talk about Islam as such. They would carve out Islam as the religion that creates social problems in the host society where as Christianity contains the features that are the backbone of the tolerant west. One important element in such narratives concerns the role of Quran as being the immediate source of violence and consequently terrorist jihadists are representing the ‘true Islam’. The account of Hannah, a first generation Syriac Christian in her ­seventies from Syria, is exemplary in that respect: They [terrorists, AS] do what is written in the Quran. That’s the way it is, I guess. They haven’t just fallen from the sky, from nowhere. No, they just do what is written. Because I have read the Quran in Arabic. I understand Arabic, I have graduated from Highschool, I have studied at University. I know what is in the Quran, I understand every word. What they do is exactly what is said in the Quran.

I would characterize the mode of this narrative as resistance. The respondent resists the verdict of being taken not serious for what she is saying by emphasizing education and language skills. I suggest that the resistant mode echoes the experience of being excluded or voiceless in a dominant discourse on Islam.



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3. Post-Migration Experiences and Strategies: Minoritization and Stratified minoritization Summarizing, one possible way to understand anti-Islamic expressions of Middle Eastern Christians is to see them as an expression of experiences with islamophobia, xenophobia and anti-religious forms of secularism in the host society that strongly connects issues of migrants with that of Islam, and/or of religion with social problems.39 This means that minorities react to the minoritization of a group in a society as ­negative — Muslims as potentially difficult to integrate, illiberal and dangerous — by externalizing the own group out of the minoritized group by defining it as a distinct group with positive traits. This trend has been described as ‘stratified minoritization’ or ‘serial minoritization’ meaning that ‘minority groups define themselves in hierarchical relation to other minority groups’.40 With other words, minoritization that ­stigmatizes one minority group is the basis for other minority groups who in reaction ‘align themselves with a dominant majority and/or in opposition’ to the other groups.41 As we have seen narratives of Middle Eastern Christians clearly reflect this inclination by stressing religious sameness and associating it simultaneously with the ideal of social values such as family, education and professional success. Similarly to the pattern of stratified minoritization Middle Eastern Christians to some extend reshape the dominant discourse on religion when they draw the boundary of good or bad not between religion and secularism but between Christianity and Islam. These processes are not unique to the Austrian case of Middle Eastern Christian but have been observed in other case studies. Yasmeen Hanoosh for instance analyzed a similar trend within the Chaldean diaspora in Michigan where activists try to portray ‘Chaldeanness’ in accordance with the ‘“white” American mainstream’.42 In a recent study on Christian refugees that arrived in Europe since the turmoil in Syria started I 39   F. McCallum and A. Hunter, ‘Translocation of Prejudice: Middle Eastern Christian Islamophobic Discourse in the UK’ (Paper presented at the International Islamophobia Conference, Salzburg, October 09, 2014). 40   S. Koshy, ‘Morphing Race into Ethnicity: Asian Americans and Critical Transformations of Whiteness’. Boundary 2, 28 (2001), pp. 153-194, here p. 155. 41   A. Chaudhuri, ‘Multiculturalism, Minoritization and the War on Terror: The Politicization of Hinduism in North America’, Journal of Postcolonial Writing, 4 (2012), pp. 252-264, p. 255. 42  Y. Hanoosh, The Politics of Minority: Chaldeans between Iraq and America ­(Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2008), p. 320.

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r­ecognized the same pattern in biographical accounts.43 This connection of religiosity and hardship was most strongly encapsulated in the short note by an Syriac pharmacist from Aleppo eager to restart a new career after the traumatic flight to Europe: ‘I make my effort and then I pray, not only stay at home and pray’. Through this religious reflection, ­hardship and ambition to succeed in life are in a way encoded as­ Christian religious identity. This is relevant for a discursive understanding of religion that is not cut off from worldly concerns as in Western understandings. For religious people religion makes a difference — in the particular example it is part of the post-refuge strategy to readapt — and that is not acknowledged in the Western understanding of secular citizenship where religious difference is rejected as irrelevant and sameness is emphasized.44 Part II: Diaspora Concerns and the Legacy of the Past So far focus has been on host society experiences and its discursive constitution. Narratives however also allow looking on the articulation of collective identities through the transmission of memories. Narratives do not reflect personal experiences but also articulate collected stories, stemming from experiences and narratives of the social group that have remained meaningful to the existence of the group.45 In the second part of this paper I attempt to extend this perspective by including the role of memory politics, collective memory and inter-generational experiences with regard to the maintenance of binary in- and out-group perception with regard to Islam.

43   A. Schmoller, ‘“Now My Life in Syria Is Finished”: Case Studies on Religious Identity and Sectarianism in Narratives of Syrian Christian Refugees in Austria’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 27 (2016), pp. 419-437. 44   L. Paulsen Galal and S. Lei Sparre, ‘“We’re Not All the Same”: Experiences of Freedom and Confinement among Christians of Iraqi Origin in Denmark’ (Paper presented at the Annual BRISMES Conference 2015: Liberation?, London, June 26, 2015). 45   Inspired by Ö. A. Cetrez, ‘The Psychological Legacy of the Sayfo: An Inter-generational Transmission of Fear and Distrust’, in Let Them Not Return: Sayfo the Genocide of the Assyrian, Syriac, and Chaldean Christians in the Ottoman Empire, eds. D. Gaunt, N. Atto and S. O. Barthoma, War and Genocide, 26 (New York, 2017), pp. 178-204, on p. 184.



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1. The Quest for Recognition of Difference: Identity and Minority Rights Discourse The described minoritization of Muslims in Western societies that has increased since 9/11 has been referred to as ‘new Orientalism’. According to Said the legacy of Orientalism consists in ‘ongoing and intensified discourse on the inherent character of Islam and its supposed “nature”’.46 If we recur to Orientalism in order to frame essentialized views of Islam in the West this should also remind us about the historical impact of orientalists in the Middle East for the evolution of collective identity of Middle Eastern Christians. Orientalists projected their imaginations about the purest and most original form of Christianity, something they missed in the West.47 Furthermore European archeologists and missionaries ­sparkled ethno-religious identities such as a Coptic or a cross-denominational Assyrian identity among local Christian communities creating ­origins that went beyond the cradle of Christianity and de-marked the Christian autochthonous population from the Muslim Arabs.48 Without going into details it is important to note that boundaries between ethnic and religious groups were hardened due to European involvement and Mandate policies in the (Post-)Ottoman period.49 In that process we can discern the role of objective cultural markers such as religion, language or territory and subjective factors such as external authorities or elites or indigenous elites that were involved in the modern creation of ethnoreligious self-consciousness of Middle Eastern Christians that are on the basis of in-group identity discourses today.50 They all involve Islam as a boundary marker between members (Assyrian, Chaldean, Syriac, ­Coptic) and non-members. Such ‘historical narratives’ are powerful tools 46   Chaudhuri, ‘Multiculturalism, Minoritization and the War on Terror’ (see n. 41), p. 254. 47   B. Heyberger, Les chrétiens du Proche-Orient: De la compassion à la compréhension, Manuels Payot (Paris, 2013), pp. 8-11. 48   For the Assyrians/Syriacs see: H. G. B. Teule, Les Assyro-Chaldéens: Chrétiens d’Irak, d’Iran et de Turquie, ‘Fils d’Abraham’ (Turnhout, 2008); For the Copts: V. Ibrahim, The Copts of Egypt: The Challenges of Modernisation and Identity (London, 2 2013). 49  K. Firro, Metamorphosis of the Nation (al-Umma): The Rise of Arabism and Minorities in Syria and Lebanon, 1850-1940 (Brighton, 2009). Some go as far as claiming that colonial powers ‘invented’ the minorities. See B. T. White, The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria (Edinburgh, 2011). 50   C. Enloe, ‘Ethnicity and Religion’, in Ethnicity, eds. J. Hutchinson and A. Smith, Oxford Readers (Oxford, 1996), pp. 197-202.

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for maintaining collective identities of Middle Eastern Christians until ­present in a diaspora context.51 The shortcomings of this assessment from a post-colonial area studies perspective on the political history of the Arab world will be discussed below as they exclude the socio-psychological dimension of collective experience and transmission of discrimination and violence. We have made the point above that the overlapping discourses of ­integration and Islam have facilitated their emphasis of sameness in their host societies with regard to religion and social identities. This is seemingly contradictory to the expressed wish of the groups to maintain their distinctiveness but if one looks closer it is not. As Hanoosh has analyzed for the Chaldeans in the US the use of group ethno-religious names such as Chaldeans works as a vehicle to express both, sameness and ­difference.52 It relates the members of the group to Catholicism or to Christendom but at the same time it comprises the concept of representing one of the ‘oldest’ Christian tradition on Earth, ‘a unique brand of Christianity that is almost as old as Jesus himself (recall, the Chaldean patriarchs trace their lineage to St. Thomas (c.33-77 AD), a contemporary of Jesus)’.53 Identity discourses of diaspora communities in so far are connected to the integration discourse discussed above. Group activism strongly tends to use ‘primordialist’ understandings of identity in their attempt to retain a sense of roots among community members. If we assume that there is a correlation between the importance of group identity and experiences of exclusion as is suggested often in the study of the linkage of religion/culture in migration than the role of such identity discourses is crucial for Middle Eastern Christians in several respects.54 First of all it responds to the mentioned need to ‘expel the Muslim Other symbolically’ in a polarized host society in the sense of stratified minoritization.55 Second the experiences of exclusion in the host society strengthen the need to search for other symbols of identifica51   G. B. Botros, ‘Religious Identity as an Historical Narrative: Coptic Orthodox Immigrant Churches and the Representation of History’, Journal of Historical Sociology, 19 (2006), pp. 174-201. 52   This double ambition, seemingly paradox, is not that different from back in the homeland even though the references have changed. For Egypt look L. Paulsen Galal, ‘Coptic Christian Practices: Formations of Sameness and Difference’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 23 (2012), pp. 45-58. 53  Hanoosh, The Politics of Minority (see n. 42), p. 319. 54   See Anthias, ‘Where Do I Belong?’ (see n. 4), p. 491. 55   This is an expression of Stuart Hall I borrow here from a quotation in Hanoosh, The Politics of Minority (see n. 42), p. 319.



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tion. Those are found in the Christian fellows in the traditional homeland that are victims of Islamist discrimination and persecution.56 The described historical narrative in that sense serves to underline this­ linkage, that on an experienced level is also one of concrete family and kinship bonds and inter-generational social memory. A third expression of exclusion concerns the lament about the ignorance in the West about persecutions of Christians in the Middle East. Narrations on this issue are mostly very emotional and draw a strong boundary between the Western host society and the Middle Easter Christians as a transnational and cross-denominational community. Lydia, a second generation Syriac Orthodox woman in her twenties complained in an interview conducted in November 2014: I would wish that the Austrian society would express more civic courage for the Christians in the Orient. I witness this again and again, now as ISIS is an issue, I tried, many of my fellow Christians (fellows) tried to get the media on this, but they didn’t care at all. […] And then this thing happened with the Yezidi and it was in the media the next day. So if it is not about Christians it’s in the media immediately. ‘Muslims have been killed!’, ‘Yezidi have been killed!’, ‘Buddhists have been killed!’ But they don’t care about Christians who have basically the same faith as this country and I find this really disturbing; because, I don’t understand it, well, that’s what annoys me a lot.

The lack of recognition therefore concerns the community of Middle Eastern Christians that are often referred to as Oriental Christians (orientalische Christen) in Austria. The fellows in the Middle East are not recognized by the Western societies in a similar way like those ­fellows in the diaspora. This experience discursively is constituted by countering the Western Human Rights discourse on minority rights and protection of minorities. Needless to say that there is a global discourse of multiculturalism shaped by international organizations such the United Nations or the European Union that champions the idea that ‘respect of minority rights’ are ‘one of the requirements of a decent and modern state’.57 In the Arab world however this discourse for various reasons has remained ‘a taboo topic in many countries’.58 This is partly related to the 56   In a similar way Muslims in Western societies due to marginalization express a strong identification with Palestinians seen as victims of Israeli policy. See J. Rybak, ‘“Unheilige Allianzen”: Antisemitismus und Projektionsbedürfnisse im Kontext der Gaza-Protestbewegung in Deutschland’, Chilufim, 18 (2015), pp. 151-200, p. 158. 57   W. Kymlicka and E. Pföstl, ‘Introduction’, in Multiculturalism and Minority Rights in the Arab World, eds. W. Kymlicka and E. Pföstl (Oxford, 2014), pp. 1-24, p. 3. 58   Ibid., p. 3.

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manipulation of minority issue in the history of European involvement in the region as much as the widespread image that authoritarian regimes have accorded minority rights in order to buy allegiances.59 Consequently they are seen as part of authoritarian structures rather than as an element of democratization. Middle Eastern Christians themselves still often deny the minority status for themselves as they associate it with the second class status dhimmis were submitted to in the Ottoman millet system. Diaspora communities of Middle Eastern Christians such as the Copts were the first to adopt the Western understanding of minority rights as a way to enhance protection and participation of indigenous peoples. 60 Syriac Christians in Austria and Germany who predominantly originate from the Tur Abdin region in Turkey have witnessed that German and Austrian policy via Turkey was strongly influenced by economic interests and diplomatic retention with regard to delicate issues such as recognition of the genocide on Armenian, Assyrian/Syriac Christians and/or the respect for minorities in Turkey.61 Until the year 2015 both governments renounced to use the word genocide in declarations about the Aghed and the Sayfo.62 In the international genocide discourse using the G-word symbolically means that the genocide is recognized as historical and legal fact.63 Finally, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Ottoman genocide, a shift in the wording has taken place in context of deteriorating relations between European countries and Turkey. This formal ­recognition of the genocide on the Armenians, Assyrians, Syriacs and Chaldeans is a milestone for the communities and a new chapter in the diaspora led policy of recognition. But the long experience of being denied the status of recognition due to political reasons is still vivid. The perception persists — in the homelands as well as in the diaspora — that discrimination and persecution of a minority group is not taken serious if it concerns Christians.64   From here I follow ibid., pp. 3-13.   G. Delhaye, ‘La réponse des États à la dissidence diasporique: Le cas de l’Égypte face au militantisme copte aux États-Unis’, in Loin des yeux, près du cœur, eds. S. Dufoix, C. Guerassimoff-Pina and A. de Tinguy [Collection académique] (Paris, 2010), pp. 323-341. 61  Armbruster, Keeping the Faith (see n. 29). 62   For Germany this is brilliantly discussed by Y. Robel, Verhandlungssache Genozid: Zur Dynamik geschichtspolitischer Deutungskämpfe, Schriftenreihe Genozid und Gedächtnis (München, 2013). 63   Ibid., p. 74. 64   With regard to this recent fieldwork in Syria and Iraq has been done by M. Barber, ‘They that Remain: Syrian and Iraqi Christian Communities amid the Syria Conflict and the Rise of the Islamic State’, in Christianity and Freedom. Volume II: Contemporary Perspectives, eds. A. D. Hertzke and T. S. Shah, Cambridge Studies in Law and Christianity (New York, 2016). 59 60



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2. Overlapping Experiences Traumas)

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Exclusion, Vulnerability (and

This accusative moral discourse on Western responsibility for minority as being one who uses double-standards and therefore lacks universality in the application of minority protection is often structured through narratives about comparisons of privileges Muslim minorities enjoy in the west whereas the persecuted Christians in Muslim countries are not supported. Simona, a Syriac Christian in her forties combines these two elements: Respondent: I want, God says ‘love your enemies like yourself’, so I love; and the Muslim people, it is [pause] well I put God aside a bid here. They [the Muslims] they have full liberty here and they are not thankful, really… Interviewer: For the liberties? Respondent: Yes, liberty and money and financial aid, and, they are received with open hands and nonetheless they cut off your hands here [makes gesture] and I find that Austria should take care a little of the Christian majority, the Christian people, who need it, really. There are so many in Syria, in Iraq, in Egypt, people, Christian people, who need it, they have lost much, so so much; they have deep scars in their souls, in their hearts, they need support but not the Muslims who come here and then create unrest; and it will not be better here.

Simona locates the We of her transnational community outside of the host society that rejects them and instead tries to include the Muslim Other. Remark, that before she starts to tell her story she frames it as one that is not strictly in line with her Christian beliefs. Through this she refers to a religious discourse about the difference between Christianity and Islam that is shared often by Middle Eastern Christians, Christianity as being the religion of love and non-violence. From the experience with this particular interview I became aware that a psychological approach would also be required if one wants to analyze this account. The description of the vulnerability of Christians in the Middle East — is described in a religious but yet secular framed language of wounds that need healing — and appears as a projection of deep personal wounds connected to experiences of exclusion and non-recognition in the diaspora. Considering the development of a person and their ‘ability to function in the world’ we can see clearly — as Floya Anthias emphasizes — that ‘claims to identity as well as feelings of commonality and otherness are important aspects of social relations and for individuals themselves’.65 Middle Eastern Christians in the diaspora are deeply   Anthias, ‘Where Do I Belong?’ (see n. 4), p. 496.

65

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c­ onnected through bonds of family, religion and/or language to their ­fellows in the Middle East. The turmoil in the region with its peak of the self-acclaimed Islamic State expulsing Christians from their ancestral lands has affected many families and caused strong communal concerns and challenges.66 This commonality aligns them to their community leaders and to the realm of recognition policy and alienates them from the host society that seems not to recognize their status and support their claims.67 According to Bourdieu experience ‘is produced in relation to recognizing ourselves in public discourse’.68 Generally Middle Eastern Christians recognize themselves in public discourse as the un-recognized leading a counter-discourse on the margins. This creates the experience of the misrecognized We as a distinct identity that stands together. Identity is claimed here on the basis of victimization. This victimization of the group uses strong binary boundaries between Us and Them. The consciousness of belonging to a vulnerable culture historically is related to persecutions such as the Sayfo or more recent persecutions (i.e. during the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq).69 Psychologically this has been analyzed as transgenerational transmission of trauma in comparison to third generation of holocaust survivors.70 The trauma of the Sayfo caused anxieties that resulted in social norms that were transmitted in the education of the next generation.71 In this process feelings of being under threat became enrooted in the lives of descendants but also the wider community as the mental structure of the social 66   Barber, ‘They that Remain’ (see n. 64); A. Bandak, ‘Reckoning with the Inevitable: Death and Dying among Syrian Christians during the Uprising’, Ethnos, 80 (2015), 5, pp. 1-21; F. Balanche, ‘Un scénario à l’irakienne pour les chrétiens de Syrie’, in La vocation des chrétiens d’Orient (see n. 1), pp. 27-44; C. Leonhardt, ‘Die orthodoxen Christen in Syrien und Libanon: Zwischen Assad und Islamisten’, DOI-Kurzanalysen, August (2014), http://www.deutsche-orient-stiftung.de/de/publikationen-de/doi-kurzanalysen. 67  On the regained importance of religious leadership through different societal ­processes also see F. McCallum, Christian Religious Leadership in the Middle East: The Political Role of the Patriarch (Lewiston NY, 2010). 68   P. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Cambridge, 1990). I owe the reference to Anthias, ‘Where Do I Belong?’ (see n. 4), p. 497. 69   With regard to the Sayfo the most important overall study has been presented by D. Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I (Piscataway NJ, 2006). 70   See G. Rosenthal, ‘Die Shoah im intergenerationellen Dialog: Zu den Spätfolgen der Verfolgung in Drei-Generationen-Familien’, in Überleben der Shoah – und danach: Spätfolgen der Verfolgung aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht, ed. A. Friedmann (Wien, 1999), pp. 68-88; D. de Levita, ‘Transgenerationelle Traumatisierung’, in the same volume, pp. 89-99. 71   Cetrez, ‘The Psychological Legacy of the Sayfo’ (see n. 45).



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in-group of Assyrian/Syriac Christians was marked. Patterns of behavior such as ‘Don’t trust Muslims’ or religious meaning-making of the past (‘[…] killed, because they were Christian’) were intensified.72 Önver Cetrez has argued that the strong dichotomic distinctions between Us (Christians) and Them (Muslims, Kurds, Turks, Arabs) resulting from the transmission of fear and distrust can become dysfunctional socially, politically and psychologically.73 This dichotomization of images creates a culture connoted with processes of projection, externalization, distortion and stereotyping. Furthermore, not only does this construct a wrong image of the other, as a consequence it also builds up a wrong image of the self, ‘vulnerable’, and the ‘victims’ of history.74

The recent developments in the Middle East, particularly in Syria and Iraq, including such crimes as those of the ‘Islamic State’ against Christians and Yezidi in the summer of 2014 relate in a specific way to the stories of the Sayfo and have reactivated fear and distrust, new traumata add to old historic traumata that have not been healed. ‘Fear is expressed in culture-specific ways’, explains Cetrez by giving the diaspora related example of externalization of fear ‘exercised through warnings against’ assimilation and the loss of culture.75 This finally brings us back to the issue about the linkage of migration and religion/culture by adding an important dimension to this phenomenon. In doing so we potentially avoid the over-emphasis of host-society experiences of exclusion constituted through various discourses. This is also important with regard to the strategies of survival of ­Middle Eastern Christian refugees in Europe. Distrust and fear have ­travelled with them and strategies to cope with them are yet to be tested. In my study on Syriac Christian refugees in Austria I found that the externalization of fear merged with the above analyzed stratified minoritization. Framed by a narrative of cultural genocide, that tells the decline and end of Christianity in its craddle, the threat of demographic ‘islamization’ is extended to Europe. Philip, a Syrian Christian refugee from Qamishli arriving in Vienna in late 2014, expresses the loss of trust,

 Armbruster, Keeping the Faith (see n. 29).   Cetrez, ‘The Psychological Legacy of the Sayfo’ (see n. 45). 74   Ibid., p. 194. 75   Ibid., p. 195. 72 73

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although peaceful co-existence with Muslim communities in his hometown is central in his biography: Europe is going to change in the future […] People have to open their eyes, really, it’s time now to open their eyes, they have to see the reality of [pause], I will say, the Islam, okay. I’m not so racist, but because of this concept and this principle in Islam we get the war and the people every day are killed … . People get killed in the name of religion. We lived together peacefully, as I said you, really, but now I can’t, I really can’t, because — did you see what happened in Mossul, ISIS. I’m Christian and my neighbor is Muslim. When ISIS get the control on the city, in that moment that changed to […] I don’t know, he killed his neighbor Christian or he just forced him to leave. I don’t know how people can change so fast.

Concluding Remarks There is no simple explanation to the importance of anti-Islamic expressions among Middle Eastern Christians. My main argument was that approaching the phenomenon uniquely as a political alignment with islamophobia discourse is misleading. We could speak of a domestication of prejudices. The narrative perspective is a far more appropriate key to get access to the complex issues of identification and negotiating belonging in a diaspora context of groups with an ethno-religious consciousness and heritage. I demonstrated that experiences of exclusion such as minoritization and religious exclusion are ascribed meaning in reshaping and adopting dominant discourses such as on integration, religion, identity that constitute these experiences. However it became clear that negotiating group boundaries in a secular world is not only a matter of responding to discourses and personal experiences in a host society. Without essentializing narratives also contain collected stories that stem from inter-generational transmission. Individuals explain their lives through the inherited stories that help to bridge the past and the present and help to sustain the existence of a group.76 In that respect the role of culture as a means to externalize fear and distrust have been noted. This study was based on research with different Middle Eastern ­Christians, Copts and Assyrians/Syriacs. It appears that some narratives resemble in the discursive ascription of meaning of exclusionary experience beyond denominational or geographical origin. At the same time it 76   This insight again is owed to Cetrez, ‘The Psychological Legacy of the Sayfo’ (see n. 45).



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clearly is indicated to continue research with an approach of comparing group experiences in order to explore the significance of collective memory processes that frame the meaning-making of experiences. ­ Acknowledging the complex ‘legacies’ that are associated with dicho­ tomic Us and Them boundaries analyzed here there are no simple suggestions to be made of how to change the discursive realities. Discourses do not stop, only they negotiate meaning constantly. This study has shown that it is not only a memorial heritage or inter-generational trauma that shapes anti-Islamic narratives. It is also related to the negotiation of religious identity in general, Christian identity in particular that individuals of these communities struggle with in our Western societies.

SYRIAC THEOLOGICAL TRAINING IN THE WEST IN THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION AND ADAPTATION Aho Shemunkasho

Introduction Studying the present situation of Syriac Christianity, analysing and defining the challenges and opportunities that it faces today is as important as studying its rich historical past, on which great work has already been done. Gaining knowledge about the heritage of the Syriac tradition contributes to understanding the current situation. Equally analysing the present situation should help us define which elements of the past are of great importance for the identity of Syriac Christians today on the one hand, and on the other hand which elements can realistically be kept alive and developed in the future. Because of the political situation of Syriac Christians in their homeland and due to immigration and integration in the West, new challenges and opportunities appear, and both have and will have a great impact on shaping a new form or forms of Syriac Christianity, certainly of the Syriac Orthodox Christians. With an awareness of the present situation, the University of Salzburg started offering an international academic programme Master of Arts in Syriac Theology in October 2015, which gives the opportunity for students to study Syriac Christianity for two years intensively. At the same time, also in Salzburg, the Syriac Orthodox Patriarch, Mor Ignatius Aphrem II, opened a new Patriarchal Seminary called Beth Suryoye for students, who would like to gain knowledge of Syriac Christianity as a living spiritual tradition and who would like to train to become priests, teachers and pastoral workers. Both, the MA and the theological seminary are unique in Europe. Both have to do with the new opportunities and challenges that Syriac Christians are facing in their homeland, as well as in Europe in the 21st Century. This article highlights the need for the establishment of the master programme and the theological seminary in Salzburg, and reflects on the integration and adaption of Syriac theological training in the Western education system as a response to current challenges. The following points are based both on analysing the situation of the Syriac Orthodox

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Church and on my own experience as a member of this church, immigrating as a child to the West and going through the process of integration for almost four decades. 1.  Integration in Europe The need for a theological training centre for Syriac Christianity, particularly for the Syriac Orthodox Church can only be understood if we take recent history into account. With migration to the West and integration in the new home land, Syriac Christians found a lot of opportunities to settle and establish themselves in freedom, both as individuals, and as a religious and ethnical community. As individuals most of the Syriac Christians managed successfully to learn the local language, find a job, and settle into the new society, getting on well with their neighbours and colleagues. Often they are presented as an ideal model for integration, particularly by politicians. In order to keep their religious, language and cultural traditions alive, they established churches, monasteries and dioceses according to the church hierarchy; and as nation and an ethnic group they became culturally active in establishing clubs, associations and various foundations. All these became possible because of political and religious freedom in the West. Nevertheless, the process of integration as a community in the West is still ongoing. It offers many new opportunities, but it also presents challenges. Certainly it is an ongoing process of enculturation and ­adaptation of the Syriac Christian community to Western socio-cultural society. On this journey the question arises, which elements of the traditional identity, culture, language and religion will remain more or less genuine, and which are going to be altered or disappear in time? This process is a challenge par excellence between isolation and integration, particularly for a historical community, an ethnic nation and an apostolic church that survived centuries and millenniums, but in the 21st century finds itself in the process of being extinguished in the homeland of its forefathers, and looks for survival and protection in the West. 2. Loss of the Famous Traditional Education Centres Middle East

in the

Traditionally, the clergy and teachers were trained in monasteries and local church schools. Up until the 13th and 14th centuries some of the



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schools were not just important in training the students in theological discipline, but also in the history, philosophy, rhetoric, science and arts of late antiquity. The Syriac Christians can look back to a number of famous schools, such as of Edessa, Nisibis, Qeneshrin, Telada, that produced a large number of outstanding scholars and served the society in an excellent way in their time. Today it is a joy and richness to look back at such an enormous heritage, but at the same time it is also painful and sad that such recognized schools and universities of the Syriac tradition belong only to the past and no longer to the present in Syriac Christendom. Over the centuries, due to the course of history, Syriac Christianity lost its famous schools, and teaching became gradually limited to basic education. Particularly after the Sayfo, at the end of the Ottoman Empire, the whole function of the church on an international and also national level collapsed. Decades later people were still fighting to survive physically, to escape persecution, famine and hunger. And still the situation of the Syriac Christians in the Middle East has not improved, but is in the process of dramatically changing for the worst, although there is still hope of improvement (in the long term). Politically, there is not a single state in the Middle East that is founded in the homeland of the Arameans, Assyrians or Chaldeans that puts the case of the Syriac Christians on its agenda, except Lebanon where the Maronites are present as an integral part of the state. 3. Education in Turabdin If one looks at the situation of education in Turabdin in the middle of the last century, one can be sure that the number of Syriac people who managed to go to any school was certainly limited to less than 10 percent. Active clerical formation and theological training in most of the monasteries and villages ceased. Generally the number of teachers, priests and monks was limited, and far more limited was the number of those who had received a solid training. Access to literature was also limited. Libraries were destroyed and a huge number of manuscripts were lost, and hardly any published Syriac book reached ordinary people in Turabdin. The culture and region that once was entirely Christianised became invisible to the world, but the Christian values and Syriac Christianity were kept alive particularly through the liturgy and tradition. The priests held daily prayers and celebrated the Holy Qurobo Aholoyo faithfully

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according to the tradition. Due to the political situation and lack of training and formation, knowledge of early Syriac Christianity, its golden age and renaissance was limited. Also knowledge of classical Syriac was gradually limited to a basic performance of the liturgy. Obviously, I am talking about the average level. Evidently, there were some exceptions, a few scholars who were trained very well and were aware about what was going on on an international level, such as Patriarch Aphrem Barsoum (1933-57), Bishop Hanna Dolabani (1947-69), and Abdulmesih Qarahbashi (1903-83). General education in Turabdin started improving slightly in the 1960s and 1970s. In Turabdin the monasteries of Dayr Zafaran and Mor Gabriel played an important role, as well as the newly re-established ‘Sunday’ schools in Midyat, Mardin and in some villages, such as Mzizah, although Syriac was officially forbidden. At this time state schools, at least­ primary schools, were also established for the first time in the villages. 4. Patriarchal Theological Seminary in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria In comparison, the situation in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria was better. The Christians there had better access to education and also ran some of their own schools, such as in Hasakeh, Aleppo, Beirut and in North Iraq. But the Lebanese war, Iraqi wars, and now the Syrian war have not provided long term stability to settle and develop a proper clerical formation and theological training, certainly not on an academic level according to Western standards which the community desperately needs. By leaving Dayr Zafaran after seven centuries and removing the Patriarchal see to Syria in 1933, first to Homs and then to Damascus, the Patriarchate made a great effort to establish a long lasting Patriarchal Seminary. Due to political instability this Seminary moved many times between Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. It started in Zahleh, Libanon in 1939; in 1946 it moved to Mosul, Iraq; back to Zahleh in 1962; and then in Atshaneh in 1968, but because of the Lebanese war the ­students were sent home in 1978; it finally moved to Damascus in Syria in 1984, and to Maarret Sayednaya in 1996. Despite the political situation where the Patriarchal Seminary did not have the legal status of a university, the Syrian Orthodox Patriarchate put a lot of effort into providing excellent teaching. Mor Ignatius Zakka I (1980-2014) strengthened the theological seminary and sent many students abroad for further education, but the degree from the Patriarchal



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Seminary has not been accepted in the most Western universities. Most of the students were challenged because of the Western languages, theology and high academic standard in the universities. For a long time Western literature on Syriac Studies was not properly accessible in the East and therefore the result of Western academic research on Syriac literature did not play a relevant role in the Syriac orthodox monasteries and seminaries before immigration to Europe. Coming to Europe, some of the students as well as the clergy and­ ordinary people were often surprised to find excellent Syriac scholars in the West, who were specialised in the Syriac language and theology. Likewise, European scholars, as well as ordinary people, were surprised and often excited to meet Christians from the Middle East, who still spoke Syriac, a form of Aramaic, the language of Jesus. Thus, meeting each other provided an enrichment on both sides. 5. Migration to Europe – Opportunities and Challenges In the 1970s and 1980s the Christians of Turabdin began to arrive in the West and had to integrate themselves in Europe. At the beginning, they were challenged to learn the local languages and cope with the new homeland. They suffered a lot in the process of obtaining asylum until 1985, because most Europeans were not aware of the existence of Christians in Turabdin and had never heard of their persecution. Only in the middle of the 1980s were they understood and received permission to stay in Europe. Until the end of 1970 there were very few priests in Europe. Church services were held in Catholic or Evangelical churches, but then their own churches were built and established. Since most of the priests did not receive a proper theological education and formation, they were not prepared for a theological discourse in the West. Most of them found it difficult to get involved in a proper intellectual theological discussion with the Western Christians, and both sides had the feeling of not being able to understand one another. Syriac Christians in Turabdin were familiar with some form of inter-religious discourse with Islam and also with Yezidis according to the tradition, but they had no experience of the modern Western comparative theological approach. At the beginning, ecumenical meetings and prayers remained on a superficial level, often just singing the Lord’s Prayer in Aramaic, or read-

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ing the Gospel, sometimes also speaking about life and work in the homeland. The responsibility of Western Christians to Western Society as a whole, the challenge of the political, social, cultural, ethnic and moral issues were different from the worries of the Syriac Christians, who were more concerned both with their future in the homeland and in the West. In the 1980s and 1990s the main concerns for them were threefold: Regarding their legal status, would they be allowed to stay in the European countries? On the community level, would they be able to establish churches and cultural centres, where they could pray and hold their meetings? And on a personal level, would they succeed in learning the language, finding a job and finding accommodation for their families? Success in all these three areas was already visible in the 1980s, and soon they realised that their future would be in Europe. 6. The Need for Educated Clergy The first Syriac-orthodox archbishop for the whole of Central Europe and the Benelux countries was Mor Julius Yeshu Cicek (1979-2005), who encouraged and helped wherever he could, to establish parishes and ordain priests. Most of those he ordained were students from Turabdin and the communities were pleased to have a parish and a priest to say the service regularly on Sundays. Next to moral qualities and liturgical competence, the main qualifications asked for were the competences needed for internal affairs, such as good social and communication skills and knowledge of the mentality of the people from different villages, tribes and groups. Also the issue of identity and name division (Arameans and Assyrians) played an important role. It was difficult to measure these competences and there was nowhere to train students and prepare them for priesthood. Therefore, people with various skills were ordained, some of them were of good level, others were strongly challenged by some internal matters they were confronted with and still find it difficult to ­manage and run a parish, or to provide a good pastoral service. The youth was always in the focus of discussion. Everyone realised that the children and youth growing up in Europe needed special care to bring them up in the culture, language and religion of their forefathers, but often realised the efforts they put in were not and still are not enough to make the new generation feel at home in the Syriac church and culture. There is still a high percentage of Syriac Christians actively attached to the church, language and culture, but one has to keep in mind that in



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Turabdin almost everyone was actively involved in church life. This decreased gradually and is still in the process of decreasing. On the other side, the need to have priests who were also able to deal with external affairs became gradually evident: priests who spoke the local languages; who could communicate and work at the local, ­provincial and national levels, interacting with the state and other denominations and religions, whether in the field of pastoral, social or legal work in the context of intercultural, ecumenical or interreligious matters. As long as there is no education system and training, it remains difficult to find candidates to become priests or teachers who are rooted in the Syriac church and are familiar with Syriac theology, and at the same time can respond to the new challenges in Western pluralistic society. Through recent immigration the number of Syriac Orthodox Christians in Central Europe, the Benelux, the Scandinavian countries, and in Great Britain has grown to over 350.000. There are seven dioceses in Europe, divided into about 150 parishes. Accordingly, there are over 150 priests ministering. A large number of the priests are already in their 70s and 80s and are supposed to go into retirement. Already in each of the seven dioceses there are parishes looking for some new candidates to be ordained as priests, and until 2030 an estimated 80 new priests are needed for pastoral ministry. The situation is similar in the USA, Canada, Latin America and Australia. Furthermore, new educated priests are also needed for the other churches of Syriac tradition. 7. The Need for Teachers and Scholars In the West there is a great need for training teachers for religious education and Syriac language for both public schools and Sunday schools. Language courses are offered in every parish and in some social clubs. In the Sunday schools, the focus has been always to teach catechesis and the liturgical hymns to the children and youth. In addition, some countries permit the teaching of Syriac as a native language or allow religious education in the state schools. Sweden is known for its support for ethnical groups and accordingly the government provides financial support to teach Syriac in the kindergartens and schools. Up until 2004, language classes also took place in the Netherlands in public schools, but it was stopped apparently for financial reasons. Although this has not been the case in Austria and Germany yet, legally it is possible to obtain permission to teach Syriac as a native language in public schools, if there

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are qualified teachers with an academic certificate. However, both Austria and Germany finance Syriac Orthodox religious education in public schools. In both countries together there are about 60 teachers involved in teaching religious education. Thus, in the near future hundreds of qualified teachers for religious education and Syriac language in both state and Sunday schools are needed. In order to promote the integration of Syriac Christianity along with its rich tradition in the West, more academic research is needed. In the past, the research focussed very much on patristic and linguistic studies. There is a need to make the result of such work accessible to the living community as heirs of Syriac Christianity and to adapt it according to their need. For instance, a new translation of liturgical texts should aim to be used in the liturgy in English, Dutch, German, French or Swedish. Furthermore, the socio-cultural aspects and non-theological science have to be taken into consideration. In order to promote academic work in all fields of Syriac Studies there is a great need for the establishment of an interactive library, where all existing material can be collected, archived and made accessible to the academic world. 8.  Syriac Monasteries in Europe as Centres of Education Theological education is an essential part of a church. Clergy and laity are aware of this. The call to establish a theological seminary has been present in the Western diaspora since the 1980s. Syriac Christians expected Mor Julius Yeshu Cicek to establish a theological seminary at Mor Ephrem Monastery in the Netherlands. In order to recruit students he sometimes put a note in the diocese magazine Qolo Suryoyo and invited students to come to study. A few individuals were trained and became monks, nuns, and priests. Although Mor Julius actively helped other theological seminaries in the Middle East and India, for unknown reasons he never found himself in a position to establish a proper theological seminary at Mor Ephrem Monastery. When Mor Jacob of Serugh Monastery in Warburg, Germany, was established in 1996, the aim was to use it as a theological seminary and not as a bishop’s residence. At the beginning, every year there were up to 20 students; some of them were very well trained in the Syriac language, bible and liturgy, and intellectually they were capable of continuing their studies at university. Unfortunately, due to internal tensions within the Syriac diocese of Germany, the students left the monastery in



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2001 and no one came afterwards. Now Mor Philoxenus Matias Nayis, the archbishop of Germany, has got five or six students studying in ­Warburg, but they are also helping with the administrative work of the monastery and the diocese. So far to my knowledge, there are no proper plans for creating a proper infrastructure for a theological seminary in Warburg. In 1996, when the monastery of Mor Augin at Arth, Switzerland, was bought from the Capuchins and renovated in 2010, the emphasis was on establishing a Qliriqoyto, a theological seminary, but so far only a few students have gone there for a short time. One of the main reasons for not having a proper theological seminary and students is related to finance. Establishing a proper theological­ centre according to Western academic standards, the employment of academic and administrative professionals, along with creating and running reading rooms, libraries and offices would exceed the financial budget of each diocese. Alternatively, there was and is the possibility of working with the universities and collaborating with the sister churches in creating an academic infrastructure and a curriculum for Syriac theology. There have been discussions and interest in collaborating with the universities of Nijmegen in the Netherlands, Uppsala in Sweden, and Eichstätt, Göttingen, Münster and Paderborn in Germany. Among others, in all these universities some Syriac students have studied and made contact with the professors there and there are still some students studying there benefitting from what the universities offer. 9.  Salzburg as a Centre for Syriac Theology When I presented the Salzburg theological project to Mor Ignatius Zakka I in 2008, his first comment was, ‘For a long time I have expected, that one of our bishops would do this in Europe’. After exchanging the first official information through letters between Patriarch Ignatius and the Archbishop of Salzburg, Dr. Alois Kothgasser, the first Patriarchal delegation under the leadership of Mor Philoxenus Mattias Nayis and Mor Polycarpus Dr. Augin Aydin, arrived in Salzburg January 11th, 2011. The Catholic archdiocese of Salzburg was asked to support the project in offering a house to be used as a seminary. March 28th, 2012, another delegation led by Mor Gregorios Yuhanna Ibrahim from Aleppo and Mor Polycarpus Dr. Augin Aydin visited the Minister of Education, Prof. Dr.

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Karlheinz Töchter in Vienna who was asked to provide a professorship for Syriac Theology. Another meeting of the delegation took place with the Head of the University of Salzburg, Prof. Dr. Heinrich Schmidinger on November 14th, 2013, discussing the possibility of establishing a professorship and creating a master course for Syriac Theology. As a result of these discussions, the professorship started in October 2014, the master course and the seminary Beth Suryoye in October 2015. Thus, the Syriac theological project in Salzburg started in cooperation with the Austrian ministry of science, the University of Salzburg, the Syriac Orthodox Patriarchate and the Archdiocese of Salzburg. To date 20 students are enrolled in the master course, 16 of them are living in the seminary Beth Suryoye, and about a dozen prominent external scholars are visiting Salzburg regularly to promote the master course with their excellent teaching. Up until now the students have come from India, the Middle East and Europe. As the ‘Master of Arts in Syriac Theology’ is structured according to the European master programmes, it was approved by the Senate of the Paris-Lodron-University Salzburg on March 10th, 2015. It fulfils all the criteria of the University of Salzburg according to the regulation of 2002 (Universitätsgesetz 2002 – UG BGBI.I Nr. 120/2002). With the completion of 120 ECTS points the University of Salzburg awards the graduates the degree of ‘Master of Arts’. The master programme is open to everyone who fulfils the criteria of admissions, having a BA degree and evidence of the required language skills. It provides qualified academic training for theologians belonging to all churches of Syriac tradition, so that they can work as priests, pastoral workers, teachers and catechumens. The study programme is also designed for graduates of all humanities, coming from other cultural and religious backgrounds, who would like to specialise in Syriac theology and literature. The hope is that they can continue their academic career and begin doctoral and post-doctoral studies. This can be in any relevant field of theology, history, philosophy, archaeology, Semitic, Oriental and socio-cultural studies. The study programme is divided into seven modules, focusing on Syro-Aramaic language and literature (1); biblical exegesis (2); ecclesiastical history (3); liturgy and sacraments (4); spirituality and monasticism (5); systematic theology and patristic studies (6); and practical theology including pedagogy of religious education, pastoral work and canon law (7). In addition, the students have to choose two elective courses and write a master thesis.



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The aim of the master programme is to acquire competence in SyroAramaic language and literature, become familiar with exegetical methods and interpret Scripture based on Syriac theology, reflect critically on past and present ecclesiastical events, and study theological questions in the contemporary context. With the skills of understanding and reflecting upon the complex historical and contemporary developments of Syriac Christianity in the home countries and in the diaspora, students learn to critically analyse ecclesiastical practices and to adapt and develop them according to the Syriac tradition in the current context. Furthermore, the students are made familiar with modern religious pedagogics and methods of teaching religious education in schools, so that they can develop and run classes in relegion. For further information on the learning outcomes and competences to be acquired see the curriculum on the website (www.uni-salzburg.at/syriac). The theological seminary Beth Suryoye is located on the river Salzach, close to the Theological Faculty. The building was already mentioned in the 13th century, but its current architectural structure goes back to the 18th century. The house can accommodate up to 28 students, and has a chapel for daily prayers, a common kitchen, a dining room, and a seminar room. A library with a second seminar room is planned. The house with all its facilities and the marvellous large garden offers a great opportunity for living, studying and praying. Through the daily practise of Syriac liturgy, the spirituality, and the use of Syriac, the students experience Syriac theology as a living tradition. In addition to the master course, they learn to take part in the ­liturgy. In this way, they improve their language skills and also gain experience of how to deliver a sermon and reflect on theological topics they chose freely. Furthermore, the common prayers, meals and work in the house offer the opportunity for the students to experience community life with responsibility for each other. Since the students come from different cultural backgrounds and various churches, their life is enriched with ecumenical and inter-cultural discussions.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Daniel Galadza is Assistant Professor at the Chair of Liturgical Studies and Sacramental Theology, Catholic Theology Faculty, University of Vienna Basilius Jacobus (Bert) Groen is Professor (emeritus) of liturgical studies and sacramental theology, as well as director of the Institute for Liturgy, Christian Art and Hymnology, at the University of Graz, Austria, where he also held the UNESCO Chair of Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue in Southeastern Europe. Pantelis Kalaitzidis is the Director of Volos Academy for Theological Studies, Volos, Greece, Lecturer at the Hellenic Open University, Athens, Greece, and a Research Fellow at the KU Leuven, Belgium Astrid Kaptijn is Professor of Canon Law at the University of Fribourg CH Vassilis Pnevmatikakis is an independent scholar living in Paris Andreas Schmoller is a member of the Centre for the Study of Eastern Christianity, University of Salzburg, Austria Aho Shemunkasho teaches at the Centre for the Study of Eastern Christianity, University of Salzburg, Austria Herman Teule is the former Director of the Institute of Eastern Christianity (IVOC) at the Radboud University Nijmegen The Nether­lands, and Professor emeritus of the KU Leuven Joseph Verheyden is Professor of New Testament Studies and the Director of the Louvain Centre for Eastern and Oriental Christianity (LOCEOC) at the KU Leuven, Belgium Patriciu Vlaicu is Assistant Professor of Canon Law at the Faculty of Orthodox Theology of the Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-­Napoca, Romania