Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe: Main Figures, Ideas, and Problems (Contributions to Phenomenology, 113) 3030396223, 9783030396220

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Contributions to Phenomenology 113

Witold Płotka Patrick Eldridge   Editors

Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe Main Figures, Ideas, and Problems

Contributions to Phenomenology In Cooperation with The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology

Volume 113 Series Editors Nicolas de Warren, Department of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA, USA Ted Toadvine, Department of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA, USA Editorial Board Lilian Alweiss, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland Elizabeth Behnke, Ferndale, WA, USA Rudolf Bernet, Husserl Archive, KU Leuven, Belgium David Carr, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA Chan-Fai Cheung, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Sha Tin, Hong Kong James Dodd, New School University, New York, USA Alfredo Ferrarin, Università di Pisa, Pisa, Italy Burt Hopkins, University of Lille, Lille, France José Huertas-Jourda, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada Kwok-Ying Lau, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Sha Tin, Hong Kong Nam-In Lee, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea (Republic of) Dieter Lohmar, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany William R. McKenna, Miami University, Ohio, USA Algis Mickunas, Ohio University, Ohio, USA J. N. Mohanty, Temple University, Philadelphia, USA Dermot Moran, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland Junichi Murata, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan Thomas Nenon, The University of Memphis, Memphis, USA Thomas M Seebohm, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz, Germany Gail Soffer, Roma Tre University, Rome, Italy Anthony Steinbock, Department of Philosophy, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY, USA Shigeru Taguchi, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan Dan Zahavi, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark Richard M. Zaner, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, USA

Scope The purpose of the series is to serve as a vehicle for the pursuit of phenomenological research across a broad spectrum, including cross-over developments with other fields of inquiry such as the social sciences and cognitive science. Since its establishment in 1987, Contributions to Phenomenology has published more than 100 titles on diverse themes of phenomenological philosophy. In addition to welcoming monographs and collections of papers in established areas of scholarship, the series encourages original work in phenomenology. The breadth and depth of the Series reflects the rich and varied significance of phenomenological thinking for seminal questions of human inquiry as well as the increasingly international reach of phenomenological research. All books to be published in this Series will be fully peer-reviewed before final acceptance. The series is published in cooperation with The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5811

Witold Płotka • Patrick Eldridge Editors

Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe Main Figures, Ideas, and Problems

Editors Witold Płotka Institute of Philosophy Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw Warsaw, Poland

Patrick Eldridge Humanities and Languages University of New Brunswick Saint John, NB, Canada

ISSN 0923-9545     ISSN 2215-1915 (electronic) Contributions to Phenomenology ISBN 978-3-030-39622-0    ISBN 978-3-030-39623-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39623-7 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

This volume includes original papers that explore the heritage of early phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe. The editors are grateful to the authors of all chapters for undertaking the project of presenting this heritage. The editors of the volume are also grateful to the editors of the book series “Contributions to Phenomenology”—Nicolas de Warren and Ted Toadvine—for including this project within the series. We are in fact doubly thankful to Nicolas de Warren not just for his editorship but also for the way he encouraged us to explore the legacy of Edmund Husserl in Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Poland Saint John, NB, Canada 

Witold Płotka Patrick Eldridge

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Contents

Introduction: Rediscovering Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    1 Witold Płotka and Patrick Eldridge Early Phenomenology in Prague��������������������������������������������������������������������   17 Hynek Janoušek and Robin D. Rollinger Husserl’s Early Phenomenology and the Ontology of Truth in the Lvov-­­Warsaw School����������������������������������������������������������������������������   35 Dariusz Łukasiewicz Gustav Špet’s “Hermeneutical Phenomenology” Project: His Reinterpretation of Husserl’s Phenomenology��������������������������������������   59 Natalia Artemenko On the Phenomenological Implications of Semyon Frank’s Psychological Philosophy of the Living Soul ������������������������������������������������   75 Alexander Kozin Vasily Sesemann’s Theory of Knowledge, and Its Phenomenological Relevance����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   93 Dalius Jonkus Roman Ingarden’s Early Theory of the Object��������������������������������������������  111 Marek Piwowarczyk Nae Ionescu and the Origins of Phenomenology in Romania����������������������  127 Viorel Cernica Theodor Celms and the “Realism–Idealism” Controversy��������������������������  145 Uldis Vēgners Leopold Blaustein’s Descriptive Psychology and Aesthetics in Light of His Criticism of Husserl ��������������������������������������������������������������  163 Witold Płotka vii

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Life and the Natural World in the Early Work of Jan Patočka (1930–1945)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  187 Karel Novotný The Beginnings of Phenomenology in Yugoslavia: Zagorka Mićić on Husserl’s Method����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  203 Dragan Prole Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  217

Contributors

Natalia Artemenko  Institute of Philosophy, Saint Petersburg State University, St Petersburg, Russia Viorel Cernica  Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania Patrick Eldridge  Department of Humanities and Languages, University of New Brunswick, Saint John, NB, Canada Hynek  Janoušek  Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic Dalius Jonkus  Department of Philosophy, Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania Alexander  Kozin  Centre for Literature and Philosophy, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK Dariusz  Łukasiewicz  Institute of Philosophy, Kazimierz Wielki University, Bydgoszcz, Poland Karel Novotný  Faculty of Humanities, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic Marek Piwowarczyk  Faculty of Philosophy, The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Lublin, Poland Witold  Płotka  Institute of Philosophy, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland Dragan Prole  Department of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad, Novi Sad, Serbia Robin  D.  Rollinger  Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic Uldis  Vēgners  Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, University of Latvia, Rīga, Latvia

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Introduction: Rediscovering Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe Witold Płotka and Patrick Eldridge

Abstract  The main purpose of the contributions collected in the present volume is to explore the legacy of Edmund Husserl’s (1859–1938) idea of phenomenology, its redefinitions, developments, applications, and reevaluations in Central and Eastern Europe in the first decades of the twentieth century. As such, the volume examines and rediscovers the heritage of the phenomenological movement outside Germany, presenting the main figures, ideas, and problems connected to the reception of Husserl’s philosophy in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Yugoslavia before World War II.  Thus, as far as history is concerned, this volume can be regarded as an attempt at retrieving early phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe. This broad formulation of the purpose of the volume, however, requires a twofold clarification: How should we understand ‘early phenomenology’ here? And: Why is the heritage of the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe worth special attention? Keywords  Phenomenological Movement · Eastern EuropeCentral Europe · Husserl The main purpose of the contributions collected in the present volume is to explore the legacy of Edmund Husserl’s (1859–1938) idea of phenomenology, its redefinitions, developments, applications, and reevaluations in Central and Eastern Europe in the first decades of the twentieth century. As such, the volume examines and rediscovers the heritage of the phenomenological movement outside Germany, presenting the main figures, ideas, and problems connected to the reception of Husserl’s W. Płotka (*) Institute of Philosophy, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] P. Eldridge Department of Humanities and Languages, University of New Brunswick, Saint John, NB, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 W. Płotka, P. Eldridge (eds.), Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe, Contributions to Phenomenology 113, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39623-7_1

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philosophy in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Yugoslavia before World War II. Thus, as far as history is concerned, this volume can be regarded as an attempt at retrieving early phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe. This broad formulation of the purpose of the volume, however, requires a twofold clarification: How should we understand ‘early phenomenology’ here? And: Why is the heritage of the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe worth special attention? As Avé-Lallemant (1988, pp. 61–62) observes, the beginning of phenomenology is inseparable from the communal investigations that diverse groups of scholars undertook in reaction to Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen (LU); these first reactions founded what we commonly name the phenomenological movement. In addition, Avé-Lallemant (1988, p. 62) is right in claiming that these beginnings can be reconstructed in “relatively clear outlines.” For instance, there is a wide consensus among Husserl scholars that the phenomenological movement begins with the publication of the LU (e.g., Sokolowski 2001, p. 202; Zahavi 2003, p. 7). This anodyne claim has a useful consequence: we can define the phrase ‘early phenomenology’ as referring to the very first reactions to Husserl’s philosophy, and to the intense discussions and critiques of his project as formulated in the LU. As such, ‘early phenomenology’ typically includes the Munich Circle and Husserl’s students from Göttingen (the Göttingen Circle). Yet this leaves another equally crucial question unanswered: When does early phenomenology end? Here we find sharp disagreement. If we agree that the phenomenological movement goes back to the 1890s, i.e., to the period when Husserl was writing the LU, then does it end in 1916 when Husserl moved to Freiburg im Breisgau—as Mohanty (2008, pp. 402–403) claims— or does it end in the 1920s when Heidegger criticized Husserl’s transcendental philosophy, and reformulated phenomenology as an existential-hermeneutical enterprise—as Spiegelberg (1994, p. 21) claims? Moran and Parker (2015, p. 11) recently formulated the most comprehensive classification of “early phenomenology.” They claim it encompasses five main groups of philosophers: (1) “the students of Theodor Lipps who formed the Munich Circle of phenomenologists,” (2) “Husserl’s original students at Göttingen prior to 1907, the so-called Urschüler,” (3) “the Göttingen Circle, who studied with Husserl, Reinach, and Scheler in Göttingen from 1907 to 1916,” (4) “the students who studied with Husserl in Freiburg from 1916 until he was barred from the university in 1933,” and (5) “a handful of students of Carl Stumpf in Berlin.” This volume adopts Moran’s and Parker’s understanding of “early phenomenology,” however, it offers to extend their classification by adding another group, namely, (6) scholars who interpreted and reacted to Husserl’s philosophy outside Germany before World War II. Of course, the last group would also include thinkers in, say, France (Dupont 2013), or in England (Spiegelberg 1981). This, however, lies outside our interests here. As stated above, the volume investigates the reception of Husserl, or, more generally, of phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe. But this brings us to our second question: Why should one invoke this region here? It seems that what is neglected in a regular reading of early phenomenology, and what, e.g., Moran and Parker’s proposal makes evident, is the fact that this reading

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is almost solely focused on the German tradition of the phenomenological movement. Nonetheless, a survey of Husserl’s students from Göttingen, or from Freiburg, or Stumpf’s pupils from Berlin shows that there is also a group of students from Central and Eastern Europe who later develop phenomenology in their home countries. A short list of these students could include (in alphabetical order), for instance, Leopold Blaustein (1905–1942 [or 1944]),1 who studied under Husserl in Freiburg, though he obtained his doctorate in Lvov under Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938), having also studied under Franz Brentano (1838–1917), and who  later  became a representative of the Polish school of phenomenological aesthetics; Theodor Celms (1893–1988),2 educated in Moscow where he was a participant in Špet’s lectures, and a student of Husserl’s in Freiburg, though he gained his doctorate under Josef Geyser (1869–1948) with a dissertation concerning Kant’s view of concepts, eventually becoming a faculty member at the University of Latvia; Dmytro Chyzhevsky (or Dmitrj Tschizewskij) (1894–1977),3 who studied under Husserl in Freiburg, and later lived in Prague where he was a member of the Prague Linguistic Circle, finally moving to the United States of America to lecture at Harvard University as a professor of Slavic studies; Eugen Enyvvari (1884–1959),4 a student of Husserl’s at Göttingen who analyzed Melchior Palagyi’s (1859–1924) critique of Husserl and Bolzano; Nae Ionescu (1890–1940),5 who attended Husserl’s lectures in Göttingen and later became a faculty member at the University of Bucharest which enabled him to popularize phenomenology in Romania; Roman Ingarden (1893–1970),6 a student of Husserl’s in Göttingen though he obtained his doctorate when Husserl was in Freiburg, and who became a later critic of Husserl’s transcendental idealism and a proponent of ontological phenomenology; Aurel Kolnai (1900–1973), a student of Husserl’s in Freiburg who developed political phenomenology; Alexandre Koyré (1892–1964) who also attended Husserl’s lectures in Freiburg and later developed philosophy in France; Ludwig Landgrebe (1902–1991),7 a close collaborator of Husserl’s in Freiburg who later worked at the German University in Prague, where he completed his habilitation thesis under Oskar Kraus (1872–1942); Zagorka Mićić (1903–1982),8 Husserl’s student in Freiburg, the author of the introduction to Husserl’s philosophy that began the reception of phenomenology in Yugoslavia; Jan Patočka (1907–1977),9 who participated in lectures by both Husserl and Heidegger  On Blaustein’s understanding of phenomenology, see the chapter in this volume.  For more on Celms, see Kūle et  al. (2012). See Husserl’s epistolary exchange with Celms in Husserl 1994b, pp. 63–68. See also the chapter on Celms in this volume. 3  See Tschizewskij’s letter to Husserl in Husserl 1994b, pp. 523–524. 4  On Enyvvari’s connections to early phenomenology, see Varga 2017. 5  See the chapter on Ionescu in this volume. 6  See the rich epistolary exchange between Husserl and Ingarden, in Husserl 1994a, pp. 173–317, and the chapter on Ingarden in this volume. 7  See the Husserl-Landgrebe letters in Husserl 1994b, pp. 247–383. 8  See the chapter on Mićić in this volume. 9  See Husserl’s letters to Patočka in Husserl 1994b, pp. 425–436, and the chapter on Patočka in this volume. 1 2

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in the 1930s in Freiburg and a proponent of asubjective phenomenology; Lev Shestov (1866–1938),10 the Russian-French philosopher who, after his emigration from Russia, corresponded with Husserl; Kurt Stavenhagen (1885–1951),11 who studied under Husserl in Göttingen; Wilhelm Szilasi (1889–1966),12 a close friend of both Husserl and Heidegger’s; Gustav Špet (1879–1937),13 Husserl’s student in Göttingen who developed hermeneutic phenomenology; and, finally, France Veber (1890–1975), a student of Alexius Meinong in Graz, who carried on a discussion with Husserl in the context of his original project in aesthetics.14 Of course, the list is not complete, but it shows, undoubtedly, that Husserl educated and influenced a group of scholars from Central and Eastern Europe who, after their studies in Göttingen or Freiburg, travelled back to their home countries where they in turn developed phenomenology in original directions and inspired others to do the same. Moreover, many of them published texts in their national languages, which makes their contributions decidedly less accessible. Furthermore, most of those works were published before 1939 without new critical editions since World War II. From a strictly historical standpoint, it is understandable why this volume aims to present this complex and rich, though nearly forgotten heritage. Before a closer description of Husserl’s presence in Central and Eastern Europe, it is worth noting that it is not easy to clearly and definitely classify all the above-­ mentioned scholars according to their countries, which is a consequence of the dynamic political changes that took place in this part of Europe in the decades before World War II (e.g., Rothschild 1974; Borsody 1993, pp. 1–130). After all, as far as national borders are concerned, at the very beginning of the twentieth century, Central and Eastern Europe was divided into the Habsburg, Ottoman, Russian and Prussian empires. The demographic situation is  also complex  at this time since these states included a diversity of ethnic groups. After World War I (1914–1918), and the Russian Revolution (1917) this order changed, mainly because of the fall of Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire. This resulted in the (re-)establishment of new countries, including Austria, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Soviet Russia, and Yugoslavia. Moreover, in 1922 Soviet Russia became a part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Again, however, these states were not uniform in terms of ethnic elements. On the contrary, they were multi-ethnic states. E.g., the Czechs, Slovaks and Ruthenes together made up only 69% of the total population of Czechoslovakia; the same held for Poland where Poles comprised 69% of the population (Borsody 1993, p.  3). This order changed once again in 1933 when Hitler came to power, and later when Nazi Germany annexed Austria (1938), and Czechoslovakia (1939). In 1939 the advent of World War II changed Central and

 See Husserl’s epistolary exchange with Shestov in Husserl 1994c, pp. 371–376.  On Stavenhagen’s contribution to phenomenology, see Rozenvalds 2000, and Salice 2017. 12  On Szilasi’s intellectual biography, see Zoltán 2016. 13  See Husserl 1994a, pp. 527–544, and a chapter in this volume. 14  See Komel 2010. 10 11

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Eastern Europe again. Those dynamic changes, of course, are not without significance for the people who lived there, including phenomenologists.15 More importantly, however, the fact that Central and Eastern Europe comprised a mosaic of countries, made it possible for Husserl’s students from Göttingen or Freiburg to develop phenomenology not only in German, but also in their national languages when they moved back to their home countries. Moreover, they confronted phenomenology with new schools in philosophy, e.g., the Prague school in linguistics, the Lvov-Warsaw School in logic,16 or the strain of irrationalism in Russian thought of the nineteenth century. One could argue, then, that what makes Central and East European phenomenology of that time unique and remarkable is that it developed in a permanent dialogue and confrontation with these traditions. Given the plurality of mutual connections and national diversities, one could argue that pre-World War II Central and Eastern Europe provided phenomenology with unique intellectual contexts that redefined the conceptual frameworks introduced in Germany by, i.a., Husserl or Heidegger. In order to understand the heritage of phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe, then, it seems we must enlarge our perspectives by introducing local traditions. Thus we must read the classical analyses of Husserl or Heidegger in the light of their reception in the different countries of Central and Eastern Europe and avoid treating this geographical-historical situation as a monolith. What follows is a clear view of Central and Eastern European phenomenology as a pluralistic movement which we cannot reduce to a few research centres. To understand this feature of the pre-war phenomenological movement, it is worthwhile referring to Milan Kundera’s post-war remarks on Central European culture. In his classic essay “The Tragedy of Central Europe” Kundera (1984, p. 33) observes that Central European countries define their identity in the post-war period as a cultural protest or resistance to communism. As he clarifies, in the context of the centralized Soviet administration, Central European countries aim to assert the independence of their cultural heritage by defending its plurality. Kundera’s diagnosis—which, strictly speaking, concerns the post-war culture of Central European countries—is applicable (of course, with some modifications) also to the heritage of the pre-war phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe. To be precise, while Kundera’s diagnosis concerns the specific historical conditions of Central Europe, it seems we can generalize his interpretation to include the history of phenomenology as well. After a reformulation of Kundera’s position, then, we

 To note only a few examples: Ingarden, who arrived in Göttingen in 1912 from the Habsburgcontrolled Lemberg (which later became Lwów, Poland), could not continue his studies because of the war, and moved to Vienna. Next, Koyré’s studies in Germany were possible because he left Russia in 1920 after the Revolution. In turn, Špet—who remained in Soviet Russia—was a victim of the Great Purge in Soviet Russia, as he was executed in 1937 after being accused of belonging to a monarchist organization. Landgrebe, who could not complete his habilitation degree in Germany, moved to Prague where he collaborated with Patočka. Blaustein died in the Lvov Jewish Ghetto in 1942 (or 1944), killed by the Nazis. 16  See the chapter on the Lvov-Warsaw School and Husserl in this volume. 15

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can regard phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe before World War II as a pluralistic movement, without a clear centre, unlike in Germany where Göttingen and Freiburg im Breisgau were obvious hubs. This lack of a centre, it seems, resulted in pluralistic interpretations and reinterpretations of Husserl which were not dominated by any “standard” reading; in Germany, by contrast, the reception of Husserl was to some extent centralized, or dominated by such a reading. An example of this reading is Husserl’s struggles with his students from Göttingen who did not accept the turn towards transcendental idealism as presented in Ideas I, this one debate dominating the struggle over the meaning of Husserl’s phenomenology in Germany. Decentralization and pluralism makes for a clear contrast and even a defining trait of the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe. Let us also note that Husserl’s thought is present in Central and Eastern Europe not only because of the thinkers who studied directly under him. Let us offer only two examples: Russia and Czechoslovakia. The very first translation of Husserl’s LU—more precisely, the first volume of the book, the “Prolegomena to Pure Logic”—into a foreign language was Russian, already in 1909. E.A. Berstein was the translator and it was published with a preface by the editor, Semyon L. Frank (1877–1950).17 Interestingly, in Poland too there was an effort to translate the book by a group of Twardowski’s students (cf. Głombik 2011, Sect. 1.4.; Płotka 2017, p. 84). In the same year, 1909, Richard Kroner (1884–1974) invited Husserl to work with “Logos—Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur,” where he later published his manifesto “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science.” The journal’s editors were a group of Russian-German philosophers, connected to Neo-Kantianism, including—besides Kroner—Sergei Hessen (1887–1950), Fyodor Stepun (1884–1965), Nicolai von Bubnoff (1880–1962) and Georg Mehlis (1878–1942), who decided to publish the journal simultaneously in German and in Russian (cf. Kramme 1995, 1997). They published six volumes in Russian during the period of 1910–1913. The presence of Husserl’s texts in Russia helped to popularize phenomenology, specifically taking the form of a confrontation with Neo-Kantianism (e.g., Vasily Sesemann [1884–1963]),18 the history of philosophy (e.g., Nikolai Lossky [1870–1965]),19 and the philosophy of religion (e.g., Pavel Florensky [1882–1937]) (cf. Kozin 2007). The very first reactions to Husserl in Prague go back to the dawn of the twentieth century when Carl Stumpf (1948–1936) and Anton Marty (1947–1914), both students of Brentano from Würzburg, began commenting on and criticizing Husserl’s LU.20 Commentary on Husserl’s philosophy continued into the next decade in Prague thanks to the writings of František Krejčí (1858–1934) (e.g., Krejčí 1918). However, interest in Husserl increased considerably in the 1930s when Husserl’s  On Frank’s analysis of the soul as a phenomenological enterprise, see the chapter in this volume.  On Sesemann’s discussion with Neo-Kantianism, and his contribution to phenomenology, see Jonkus’ chapter in this volume. 19  It is worth noting that although Lossky did not study under Husserl, he participated in Husserl’s lectures delivered in 1936 in Prague. Cf. Schuhmann 1977, p. 469. 20  See Janoušek & Rollinger’s chapter on early phenomenology in Prague, in this volume. 17 18

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students, including Patočka and, most notably, Landgrebe, came to Prague. In August 1934, Husserl was asked to write a text on contemporary philosophy which could be presented at the eighth International Philosophical Congress in Prague.21 In response, Husserl wrote a paper “Über die gegenwärtige Aufgabe der Philosophie” (Husserl 1989, pp. 184–221). At that time, Landgrebe continued his collaboration with Husserl in the edition of his unpublished manuscripts, specifically on the edition of Husserl’s texts that he later published in Prague in 1939 as Erfahrung und Urteil (cf. Lohmar 1996; Van Breda 2007, p.  49). The establishment of a new Czech-German philosophical association followed the Congress, namely the Cercle philosophique de Prague pour les Recherches sur l’entendement humain—where Patočka served as the Czech secretary and Landgrebe the German one (cf. Bayerová 1995, pp. 109–110). The association invited Husserl to Prague to deliver a series of lectures. This plan came to fruition in November 1935 when Husserl gave a few talks (cf. Schuhmann 1977, pp. 468–469), later edited as the Crisis, published in Belgrade in 1936 in the association’s journal Philosophia. After his stay in Prague, Husserl became an honourary member of the Cercle philosophique (cf. Husserl 1994d, p. 198). In any case, Husserl’s stay in Prague, as well as the work of his students, made phenomenology a permanent and even central element of the intellectual landscape of Czechoslovakia for years. The presence of Husserl’s thought in Central and Eastern Europe is, then, evident. It shaped or inspired different theories and it resonated in, e.g., aesthetics, epistemology, ontology, philosophy of religion, and psychology. Nonetheless, this rich legacy has thus far been the object of only a few dispersed studies; more importantly, none of them offered a comprehensive outlook on the sources and developments of this legacy. In a word, we ought to rediscover this legacy as a whole. In this context, the present volume contributes to our understanding of the legacy by presenting main figures, ideas and problems connected to it. The book’s structure is largely based on historical order. So, it begins with the important question of the Brentanian context of the reception of Husserl (e.g., Smith 1994), and next it features contributions connected to Husserl’s students from Göttingen and Freiburg, and expands to include scholars who were inspired by phenomenology but did not study directly under Husserl, though they played significant roles in shaping the past and even present understanding of phenomenology in their home countries. This rather uncontroversial historical order also incorporates thematic connections by bringing together papers dedicated to, e.g., epistemology, or aesthetics. We hope that this collection, which critically contextualizes the legacy of the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe, will give an impetus for further studies in this legacy, which still needs to be rediscovered. With that said, let us offer an overview of the chapters in this volume. Here we will not seek to summarize so much as to highlight some of the most striking analyses each contribution offers. As such the following is less of a synopsis and more of

 On the background of the invitation of Husserl, see Schuhmann 1977, pp. 449–454. See also Husserl’s correspondence with Rádl who invited Husserl in: Husserl 1994d, pp. 91–96.

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a record of impressions made by the studies of these remarkable thinkers whose historical situations and native languages have prevented from wider recognition, making it seem as though they were hiding in plain sight. While many historical studies of phenomenology acknowledge a ‘Brentanian pre-history,’ Hynek Janoušek and Robin D.  Rollinger’s contribution “Early Phenomenology in Prague” cash in that prescribed acknowledgement by vividly setting the scene of a debate in Prague between two students of Brentano: the (relatively) orthodox Anton Marty and the heterodox Christian von Ehrenfels. Janoušek and Rollinger highlight the idiosyncrasy of Marty’s division of psychical acts into three classes: presenting, judging, and taking interest. ‘Taking interest’ is comprised of both willing and feeling, which are acts correlated to ‘states of value’ (Wertverhalte). In Marty’s view this latter concept secures the objective foundation of ethics in his descriptive-psychological approach. This peculiar feature of Marty’s thought brought him into conflict with von Ehrenfels, who consciously drained values of any objectivity. Having clarified the debates going on between Brentanians in this context, Janoušek and Rollinger provide us with a nuanced account of the exchange between Marty and Husserl after the publication of the Logical Investigations. While Husserl and Marty’s discussions ranged over diverse topics (nominalism, reflection, perception, general objects) the nerve of their exchange was their differing views on the immanence and transcendence of objects to consciousness. Janoušek and Rollinger’s exposition of this correspondence demonstrates how, while sometimes these thinkers spoke past one another, Marty was also able to push Husserl to clarify some of the most innovative and crucial concepts from the LU. Dariusz Łukasiewicz’s paper “Husserl’s Early Phenomenology and the Ontology of Truth in the Lvov-Warsaw School” is an investigation of the complex elements involved in the alethic absolutism of both Husserl and the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS). Both Husserl and the thinkers of the LWS arrived at a conception of truth as a timeless, relational property between a truth-bearer and a truth-maker, but it is not obvious how they arrived at this conclusion from out of a context dominated by psychologism. As such, Łukasiewicz pursues complex historical questions, such as: What impact did Husserl’s anti-psychologism have upon the LWS? Might there have been mutual interactions between Husserl and the LWS? What ideas developed as independent parallels between Husserl and the LWS? The figure at the centre of these questions is Kazimierz Twardowski. Łukasiewicz’s analysis of Twardowski opens the possibility that Twardowski could have had a hand in informing Husserl’s anti-psychologism. Łukasiewicz then considers how Husserl’s arguments against psychologism in the LU, and the concepts that he developed in light of that (e.g. meaning-intentions, eidetic intuition), influenced Twardowski and the successive generations of the students of the LWS. Łukasiewicz nonetheless finds that this Husserlian influence was decisively shaped by Twardowski’s own views on metaphilosophy. This metaphilosophy provides the background for how Twardowski wrestled with the philosophical difficulties surrounding the contingency and temporality of the act of judging over and against the non-contingency and atemporality

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of truth, which ultimately reveal parallel developments between Husserl and the LWS concerning truth-makers and alethic absolutism. With Natalia Artemenko’s contribution “Gustav Špet’s ‘Hermeneutical Phenomenology’ Project,” we move from phenomenology’s pre-history (populated by figures who studied under Brentano) to its history proper (populated by figures who worked with and under Husserl himself). Given the disparity between Špet’s early work on Husserl and his late works on hermeneutics, language, aesthetics, and psychology, and given the disparity of the scholarly evaluations of the meaning of Špet’s philosophical output, Artemenko offers a unifying interpretation of Špet’s philosophical trajectory. Artemenko argues that there is no profound break between Špet’s phenomenological and hermeneutical phases, and that he did not regard hermeneutics as overcoming phenomenology. In Špet’s hands, hermeneutics was the means for grasping the very essence of phenomenology. Already in Appearance and Sense Špet regarded hermeneutics as offering a necessary correction and expansion of phenomenology, but he always maintained that hermeneutics only gains meaning within a phenomenological program. He found the version of phenomenology advanced in the LU and Ideas I ill-equipped to deal with the aspects of reality that all epistemologically-minded philosophies mishandle: religious, social, and historical phenomena. Against the backdrop of these pervasive-yet-philosophically-­ opaque features of reality, Artemenko traces the outlines of Špet’s crucial but enigmatic concept of the ‘hermeneutical act,’ which Špet developed through his investigation of the connection between intuition and comprehension in Ideas I. Artemenko takes care to set Špet’s own synthesis of hermeneutics and phenomenology off from Heidegger and Gadamer’s, as Špet refused to give up the primacy of phenomenological research into the foundations of knowledge. Alexander Kozin’s contribution “On the Phenomenological Implications of Semyon Frank’s Psychological Philosophy of the Living Soul” provides us with an overview of the Russian philosopher’s work while focusing on the phenomenological elements of his studies of the soul. Frank criticized empirical psychology for the way it atomizes the living soul and he proposed, in contrast, a philosophical psychology that aimed at preserving the soul’s unity while offering various experiential routes to it. Kozin demonstrates how Frank’s emphasis on the soul’s existence as an absolute whole makes him sensitive to certain pathological phenomena, like schizophrenia, which appear to break up that unity (in the case of schizophrenia, by splitting it up into a multiplicity). Kozin highlights parallels between Frank and Husserl’s respective projects throughout, but he cautions us that Frank is not a phenomenologist. While questions concerning the immanence of consciousness and the transcendence of objects are central for Frank, Frank frames the distinction between immanence and transcendence in a unique way. For instance, Kozin highlights Frank’s interest in ‘liminal’ states where consciousness is neither fully withdrawn into itself nor fully engaged in the world. Frank’s view has a certain resonance with the way Bergson distinguishes the superficial and profound egos in terms of their relative proximity to (spatial) reality. The phenomenological import of Frank’s work lies in the way he generates distinctions between consciousness and the soul

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(and related concepts like the ego and the subconscious) in terms of how each relates to the world. With the figure of Vasily Sesemann (largely responsible for bringing phenomenology to Lithuania) we obtain our first look in this volume at the interaction of phenomenology and Neo-Kantianism. In “Vasily Sesemann’s Theory of Knowledge and its Phenomenological Relevance” Dalius Jonkus lays out how Sesemann’s critiques of Neo-Kantianism (who trained under Natorp and Cohen) inclined him towards phenomenology—though to speak of this as a ‘conversion’ would be an overreach. Sesemann regarded intuition as the foundation of knowledge and furthermore considered the natural-scientific conception of knowledge to be overly narrow (i.e. he argued that assuming the natural sciences’ conception of knowledge neglects the philosopher’s responsibility to grasp the essence of knowledge) but he criticized the static nature of Husserl’s early phenomenology. The lack of an account of knowledge’s origin in a world-bound, incarnate, self-aware subject was a serious omission in Sesemann’s view, which in turn has the interesting consequence that he developed certain ideas independently of but parallel to Husserl’s genetic turn. Jonkus demonstrates how Sesemann arrived at his quasi-genetic views through his study of subjective attitudes. The subject’s diverse attitudes and limited perspectives raises the threat that its own finitude excludes it from the cognition of objectivity, that is, truth. Having set up this problem, Jonkus shows us how, according to Sesemann, the subject’s awareness of the finitude of its own particular perspectives generates the consciousness of the possibility of a total view of an object’s essence. That is, Sesemann reconciles the subject’s limited points of view with an insight into the object’s true, total being through an account of the subject’s self-transcendence. Marek Piwowarczyk’s article “Roman Ingarden’s Early Theory of the Object” illustrates how Ingarden’s early ontological analyses prepared the ground for his famous contribution to the realism-idealism controversy. Ingarden’s phenomenological ontology from this early phase stakes out a difficult but intriguing middle position between substantialist and bundle theories of the object, a position not yet available to scholars outside of Poland. Piwowarczyk focuses on Ingarden’s account of the formal properties of real, spatio-temporal, sensible objects. Because phenomenology demands that this sort of object correspond to a theory of perception, Ingarden must carefully separate his account from the empiricist bundle theories. Gestalt theory seems to make for a ready ally here, avoiding the dissolution of the object by having each quality bear the stamp of its synthetic unity. But is this Gestalt itself a quality separate from the other sensible qualities it unites? The threat of infinite regress looms. It is here that Ingarden introduces his novel distinction between ‘property-qualities’ and ‘holistic-qualities.’ Piwowarczyk contextualizes this distinction by comparing it to the classic ‘substratum-property’ and ‘substance-­ property’ distinctions (where the difference between a substratum and a substance is that substances have intrinsic qualities, i.e. natures). This comparative analysis reveals that Ingarden’s early theory of the object is a uniquely sophisticated bundle theory, which attempts to preserve the unity of the object while insisting that we must be able to ‘find’ that unity in the object just like its other intuitable properties.

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Ultimately Piwowarczyk demonstrates how this early ontology provides the decisive context for interpreting Ingarden’s mature, quasi-Aristotelian ontological concept of the ‘constitutive nature.’ Nae Ionescu (who studied under Husserl in Göttingen) introduced phenomenology into Romanian culture not by penning expository texts on Husserl or Scheler but by directly applying phenomenological techniques to problems of metaphysics and theory of knowledge. In his chapter “Nae Ionescu and the Origins of Phenomenology in Romania” Viorel Cernica places Ionescu’s account of the transition from the natural attitude to the philosophical attitude in the foreground, highlighting how this transition for Ionescu was not merely a theoretical exercise, but an experience meant to change how the practitioner made sense of his/her own life. While Cernica is careful to highlight the realist and metaphysical aspects of Ionescu’s thought that create divergences from Husserl, he uncovers covert versions of eidetic intuition and the epoché in Ionescu’s courses. Cernica then turns to a discussion of Ionescu’s original theory of love as an intentional act. Love plays multiple roles in Ionescu’s philosophy. For one, he conceived of knowledge in terms of an intellectual love—a transition from passive sensory experience to the active knowledge of essences as a kind of passionate intensification (here he draws on Husserl’s actionality /non-actionality modification from Ideas I—to be distinguished from the neutrality modification). Love is also key to Ionescu’s philosophy of religion, where love is an intentional experience that concentrates the entirety of the subject’s being into a relationship with God which overwhelms the subject’s own constitutive capacities. This account of love enables Cernica to illuminate Ionescu’s key idea of the ‘passional act’ which reveals both being and nothingness by concentrating all of the subject’s being into its relationship to one object such that all the rest of being seems as though it were nothing. Latvian philosopher Theodor Celms’ book Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls was one of the first and most cogent examples of Husserl’s students’ dismay over the transcendental turn. Uldis Vēgners’ chapter “Theodor Celms and the ‘Realism–Idealism’ Controversy” shows that Celms’ concerns over idealism were not connected to some desire to vindicate realism, but rather to a worry over solipsism. It was not realist phenomenology but Celms’ work on Kantianism and the question of transcendental historicism that led Celms to his critique of transcendental phenomenology. Vēgners shows how Celms adopts a three-prong attack on Husserl’s conception of idealism: first, he argues that phenomenological methodology does not necessitate a turn to idealism; second, he shows that phenomenological idealism cannot establish itself as rigorous science; and third, phenomenological idealism cannot be transcendental in the sense opened up by Kant (on this last point, Celms claims that Husserl’s phenomenology is a Lebensphilosophie in the final analysis). In Celms’ view, the absurdity lies in how phenomenological idealism reduces everything to individual consciousness while refusing to give up the contribution of other consciousnesses, but without being able to conceive of how those would survive the reduction. Interestingly, Vēgners argues that Husserl can respond to Celms’ charges here, but that nonetheless Celms likely had a hand in eliciting the innovations from Husserl which disarmed the critiques over solipsism. While

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Husserl might ultimately have been able to dodge them, these critiques were so incisive and nuanced as to establish Celms’ international reputation, finding supporters in the likes of Pfänder, Geiger, Beck, Ortega y Gasset, and Hartmann. Witold Płotka’s chapter, “Leopold Blaustein’s Descriptive Psychology and Aesthetics in Light of His Critique of Husserl’s Method and Content Theory,” explores the main elements of Blaustein’s understanding of Husserl’s phenomenology and its application in the field of the phenomenology of aesthetic experience. Płotka argues that the way to understand Blaustein’s philosophy is as a mixture of phenomenology and the Lvov-Warsaw School of logic’s analytical approach. After all, Blaustein studied under both Husserl and Twardowski, the founder of the LWS.  Płotka’s chapter tracks Blaustein’s redefinition of phenomenology as a descriptive psychology which at bottom serves to investigate types of lived experiences. This reading of Husserl, of course, arose under the influence of Twardowski, but it also incorporated a series of critical remarks formulated by Blaustein in the context of Husserl’s eidetic method. Given this understanding of phenomenology, Płotka presents Blaustein’s engagement with Husserl’s content theory, where Blaustein tried to show that contents are dependent on the world, rather than on consciousness. The chapter also displays the limits of Husserl’s influence on Blaustein by showing that he did not adopt Husserl’s doctrine of constitution. Interestingly though, Blaustein did adopt this doctrine in his analysis of aesthetic experiences as dynamic processes. Płotka offers an ideal reconstruction of Blaustein’s view of the structure of these experiences as imaginative presentations which serve to represent aesthetic objects. In this regard, Płotka attempts to contextualize Blaustein’s theory by defining the influences of Twardowski, Husserl and Ingarden on Blaustein, while drawing our attention to Blaustein’s novel analyses of aesthetic phenomena, such as listening to the radio or watching a play. Karel Novotný’s contribution “Life and the Natural World in the Early Work of Jan Patočka (1930–1945)” traces the emergence of a philosophy of life in the Czech philosopher’s writings and interprets its significance for his views on transcendental phenomenology. Patočka’s mature views of the life of transcendental subjectivity as one of restless movement stemmed from his early work on the natural world. Novotný displays how Patočka, in his doctoral and habilitation theses, was inspired by Bergson but had methodological reserves over his concept of intuition. It was precisely the genetic dimension of Husserl’s phenomenology that allowed Patočka to descend into the deep sources of life as Bergson wants, but without giving up transcendental rigour. Patočka identified sub-egoic layers of transcendental life (the flow of time; organic drives; non-anthropological, creaturely history) that served as the subjective pole of the living-correlation to the natural world. Patočka deepened this notion of the correlation between living subject and life-world in research manuscripts from the 1940s, which have fascinating parallels to Merleau-Ponty’s work. In these manuscripts Patočka posited that there are always two layers in perception, one determined by the subject’s interest in the objects of its environment and the other determined by a harmonious non-difference between subject and object. In this way Patočka viewed transcendental life as possessing a profound unity with the natural world that is continually interrupted but never disappears.

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The shadow of politics is cast over each of the phenomenologists of these regions and this period, and yet it is clear that there is a dearth of political analyses in this volume. It was Zagorka Mićić who attempted to find sources of political tolerance in the writings of Husserl, her teacher. Dragan Prole’s contribution “The Beginnings of Phenomenology in Yugoslavia: Zagorka Mićić on Husserl’s Method” lays out the anti-nationalist sentiment that Mićić found in phenomenology and brought to the kingdom of Yugoslavia. Prole sketches the political situation into which Mićić introduced Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, attempting to clear a middle ground between the Marxist, surrealist left and the pro-Russian, pro-Orthodox-­ Christianity right. Prole also shows how Mićić had to contend with early religious (Catholic) evaluations of phenomenology. In this context, Mićić clung to methodology as the way to vindicate phenomenology, but in doing so she discovered the insurmountable difficulty of executing the transcendental reduction completely (before and independently of Merleau-Ponty). In this connection, Mićić promoted an irreducibly historical understanding of the ego, which in turn led her to wrestle with the possibility that phenomenology can and indeed must be evaluated from a mundane position (pace Fink). Prole demonstrates how Mićić’s allowance for an historical, mundane position on phenomenology enabled her to offer a more straightforward critical evaluation of phenomenology in the light of the history of modern philosophy, which enabled her to offer a forceful vindication of phenomenology vis à vis positivism, Bergsonism, and Neo-Kantianism. Thanks to the efforts of the contributors to this volume, we hope that these philosophers will be less hidden and thus contribute to a more nuanced, more heterogeneous understanding of the phenomenological movement and reinforce our conviction that phenomenology from its very beginnings has been a supranational community of dedicated thinkers.

References Avé-Lallemant, Eberhard. 1988. Die Phänomenologische Bewegung: Ursprung, Anfänge und Ausblick. In Edmund Husserl und die phänomenologische Bewegung. Zeugnisse in Text und Bild, ed. Hans R. Sepp, 61–77. Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber. Bayerová, Marie. 1995. Místo fenomenologie v českém filozofickém životě. In Česká filozofie ve 20. století. 1. Smĕry, osobnosti, problémy, ed. Jir̆i Gabriel, Lubomír Nový, and Jan Zouhar, 102–111. Brno: VMU. Borsody, Stephen. 1993. The new Central Europe. Boulder: Social Sciences Monographs. Dupont, Christian. 2013. Phenomenology in French philosophy: Early encounters. Dordrecht: Springer. Głombik, Czesław. 2011. Husserl und die Polen. Königshausen & Neumann: Frühgeschichte einer Rezeption. Würzburg. Husserl, Edmund. 1989. Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922–1937). In Husserliana: Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke, ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp, vol. 27. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. ———. 1994a. Briefwechsel. Band III. Die Göttinger Schule, ed. Karl Schuhmann and Elisabeth Schuhmann. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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———. 1994b. Briefwechsel. Band IV. Die Freiburger Schüler, ed. Karl Schuhmann and Elisabeth Schuhmann. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. ———. 1994c. Briefwechsel. Band VI. Die Philosophenbriefe, ed. Karl Schuhmann and Elisabeth Schuhmann. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. ———. 1994d. Briefwechsel. Band VIII. Institutionelle Schreiben, ed. Karl Schuhmann and Elisabeth Schuhmann. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Komel, Dean. 2010. France Veber (1890–1975). In Handbook of phenomenological aesthetics, ed. Hans Rainer Sepp and Lester Enbree, 339–341. Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-90-481-2471-8_67. Kozin, Alexander V. 2007. Iconic wonder: Pavel Florensky’s phenomenology of the face. Studies in East European Thought 59 (4): 293–308. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-007-9035-6. Kramme, Rüdiger. 1995. Philosophische Kultur als Programm. Die Konstitutionsphase des LOGOS.  In Heidelberg im Schnittpunkt intellektueller Kreise. Zur Topographie der “geistigen Geselligkeit” eines “Weltdorfes”: 1850–1950, ed. Hubert Treiber and Karol Sauerland, 119–149. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. ———. 1997. “Kulturphilosophie” und “Internationalität” des “Logos” im Spiegel seiner Selbstbeschreibung. In Kultur und Kulturwissenschaft um 1900. Bd. II.  Idealismus und Positivismus, ed. Gangolf Hübinger, Rüdiger vom Bruch, and Friedrich W.  Graf, 122–134. Stuttgart: Steiner. Krejčí, František. 1918. Filozofie posledních let před válkou. Praha: Jan Laichter. Kundera, Milan. 1984. The tragedy of Central Europe. The New York Review of Books 31 (7): 33–38. Kūle, Maija, Līva Muižniece, and Uldis Vēgners. 2012. Teodors Celms—der berühmteste lettische Philosoph. In Phänomen und Wirklichkeit des Ich. Studien über das subjektive Sein, ed. Celms Theodor, 387–409. Riga: Institut für Philosophie und Soziologie Universitäts Lettlan. Lohmar, Dieter. 1996. Zu der Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk Erfahrung und Urteil. Husserl Studies 13: 31–71. Mohanty, J.N. 2008. The philosophy of Edmund Husserl. A historical development. New Haven/ London: Yale University Press. Moran, Dermot, and Rodney K.B.  Parker. 2015. Editors’ introduction: Resurrecting the phenomenological movement. Studia Phaenomenologica 15: 11–24. https://doi.org/10.5840/ studphaen2015151. Płotka, Witold. 2017. Early phenomenology in Poland (1895–1945): Origins, development, and breakdown. Studies in East European Thought 69 (1): 79–91. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11212-017-9274-0. Rothschild, Joseph. 1974. East Central Europe between the two world wars. Seattle/London: University of Washington Press. Rozenvalds, Juris. 2000. Phenomenological ideas in Latvia: Kurt Stavenhagen and Theodor Celms on Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. In Phenomenology on Kant, German idealism, hermeneutics and logic: Philosophical essays in honor of Thomas M.  Seebohm, ed. Olav K.  Wiegand, Thomas M.  Seebohm, Lester Embree, Joseph Kockelmans, and J.N.  Mohanty, 67–82. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Salice, Alessandro. 2017. Kurt Stavenhagen on the phenomenology of the we. In Empathy, sociality, and personhood. Essays on Edith Stein’s phenomenological investigation, ed. Elisa Magrì and Dermot Moran, 179–192. Dordrecht: Springer. Schuhmann, Karl. 1977. Husserl-Chronik. Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls. Den Haag: Nijhoff. Smith, Barry. 1994. Austrian philosophy: The legacy of Franz Brentano. Chicago/LaSalle: Open Court Publishing Company. Sokolowski, Robert. 2001. Phenomenology in the last hundred years. In One hundred years of philosophy, ed. Brian J.  Shanley, 202–215. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press. Spiegelberg, Herbert. 1981. Husserl in England: Facts and lessons. In The context of the phenomenological movement, ed. Spiegelberg Herbert. The Hague: Nijhoff.

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———. 1994. The phenomenological movement. A historical introduction. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Van Breda, Herman Leo. 2007. The rescue of Husserl’s Nachlass and the founding of the Husserl-­ archives. In Geschichte des Husserl-Archivs/History of the Husserl-Archives, The Husserl-­ Archives Leuven, 39–69. Dordrecht: Springer. Varga, Peter Andras. 2017. Eugen Enyvvari’s road to Göttingen and back: A case study in the transleithanian participation in early phenomenology (with an appendix of Edmund Husserl’s two unpublished letters to Enyvvari). Studies in East European Thought 69 (1): 57–78. https:// doi.org/10.1007/s11212-017-9272-2. Zahavi, Dan. 2003. Husserl’s phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Zoltán, Szalai. 2016. Im Schatten Heideggers. Einführung zu Leben und Werk von Wilhelm Szilasi. Verlag Karl Alber: Freiburg/München.

Early Phenomenology in Prague Hynek Janoušek and Robin D. Rollinger

Abstract  The authors expound on early phenomenology in Prague in two steps. The first step concerns Prague as a central location for the teaching of Brentanian philosophy as it was represented by its orthodox followers (especially Anton Marty), but also by heterodox students of Brentano (especially Christian von Ehrenfels). The second step concerns Marty’s reception of Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations, particularly as this involves the controversy regarding the theory of the immanent object. Keywords  Descriptive psychology · Philosophy of language · Value · Carl Stumpf · Anton Marty · Christian von Ehrenfels · Edmund Husserl · Immanent object

1  Introduction Any historically nuanced introduction to the movement of phenomenology must take into account the preparatory phase involving Husserl’s outstanding philosophical mentors, Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf (see Spiegelberg 1982). The latter, also a student of Brentano, spent a few years teaching in Prague and writing the first volume of his Tone Psychology (Stumpf 1883). He was joined there by another student of Brentano, Anton Marty. Marty in particular spent more than three decades in Prague where he taught, among other subjects, descriptive psychology—the discipline that Brentano also called “phenomenology” or “psychognosy.” Though other students of Brentano likewise attempted to describe consciousness under such titles, in some cases they diverged considerably from him. A case in point is Christian von Ehrenfels who also taught in Prague for a few decades. Thus Prague became a venue for the teaching of both orthodox and heterodox Brentanism.

H. Janoušek (*) · R. D. Rollinger Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 W. Płotka, P. Eldridge (eds.), Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe, Contributions to Phenomenology 113, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39623-7_2

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In the first part of the present chapter, we will outline these two orientations in descriptive psychology, whereas the second part will concern Anton Marty’s reception of Husserl’s Logical Investigations.

2  Orthodox and Heterodox Brentanism For a few decades of the nineteenth century Prague had been an important location for the teaching of Herbartian psychology, but this changed when Carl Stumpf started teaching there in 1879 and was joined by Anton Marty in 1880 (Rollinger and Janoušek 2017).1 Stumpf and Marty had been fellow students of Franz Brentano in Würzburg, both of whom were particularly inspired by the Brentanian thesis that philosophy is methodologically no different from natural science. During Stumpf’s relatively short sojourn in Prague (until 1884), he completed the first volume of his Tonpsychologie (1883), an attempt to apply the principles of Brentanian psychology to the study of auditory phenomena. Marty stayed in Prague until his death (1914). He too was concerned with promoting Brentanian psychology, with an emphasis on philosophy of language (Rollinger 2010). It is especially helpful for us to consider some of the salient aspects of this psychology, especially those exhibited in posthumously published notes from a student.2

1  Herbart’s philosophy—and especially his psychology, aesthetics and pedagogy—had a major impact in the Czech kingdom beginning in 1832. This is when Franz Exner, a follower of Herbart and friend of Bernard Bolzano, became a professor of philosophy in Prague. It continued to exert its influence till the year of the death of a major Czech proponent of Herbart’s system, Josef Durdík in 1902 (cf. Tretera 1990, pp. 209 ff.). Other notable Herbartian thinkers in Prague were: Robert Zimmerman (1824–1898), a former student of Bolzano and professor in Prague, who later became a professor of philosophy in Vienna; Alfred Gustav Lindner (1828–1887) a philosopher of education; and Otokar Hostinský (1847–1910) a professor of aesthetics in Prague. Despite their many differences, the Prague followers of Herbart and Brentano—as well as Bolzano and his students— shared a negative attitude toward the German Idealism of Schelling and Hegel and a sympathy for the natural sciences. In psychology, Herbart’s speculative metaphysics allowed for more experientially based teachings in which experiences were seen as real forces, fusing and inhibiting each other according to mathematically expressible laws. Herbart’s aesthetics stressed the value-character of beauty and its relational form, as he indeed extended this domain into ethics, while his pedagogy concentrated on the psychological formation of knowledge and the moral character of pupils. Prague was thus well prepared for the development of experimental psychology and scientifically oriented philosophy which the followers of Brentano promoted. 2  Though no notes from Stumpf’s lectures in Prague have been preserved, we can be assured that he, like Marty, was teaching orthodox Brentanian doctrines there. For this reason, Brentano very much wanted Stumpf to stay in Prague where he could be effective in conveying such views, whereas Stumpf decided to take a position in Halle. See Stumpf’s summary of the main points of psychology in Rollinger 1999, pp. 285–310, as these are taken from notes in Halle (1887). These exhibit no significance divergences from Marty’s descriptive psychology, although Stumpf does not highlight the distinction between this branch of psychology and the genetic one.

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2.1  Marty and Orthodox Brentanism Marty distinguishes between two branches of psychology, namely descriptive and genetic. This is the same division that Brentano had made under the same names, though Brentano also called descriptive psychology “phenomenology” and finally “psychognosy” (see Brentano 1982). Marty elaborates on the tasks of the two branches as follows: 1. The description of psychical events. Here we must get clear about what inner experience shows, we must come to know the elements from which the whole psychical network is composed, the most important constant connections and also which connections are constantly ruled out. 2. To investigate the laws of coming-about and passing-away of psychical realities. The psychical is included in an eternal shifting and changing. But this shifting is subject to definite laws of coming-about and passing-away and is bound by laws to certain conditions. Though at first glance unregulated, upon closer inspection there emerges an order, the knowledge of which even allows for predictions concerning the occurrence of particular events under particular conditions (Marty 1911, p. 5). Here we are concerned with Marty’s attempt to fulfill the first of these tasks. This attempt is what we could very well call his phenomenology. It is of great value, according to Marty, not only as the foundation for the second task of psychology, but also for the development of the practical philosophical disciplines: logic, ethics, and aesthetics (Marty 1911, pp. 7 ff.). Marty also calls psychical events ‘psychical acts,’ each of which is said to be an instance of consciousness (Bewusstsein). This term is well suited for the description of psychical acts because consciousness is always the consciousness of something. What we are conscious of has what the scholastics called “objective inexistence” or “mental inexistence,” which Marty elucidates as follows: For instance, in the case of hearing, a tone is present to us, and so forth. Each psychical act therefore has an object as its correlate. There belongs to consciousness an object of consciousness as a correlate, something of which one is conscious, and such an immanent object is found in the case of each psychical act. In the case of everything physical, by contrast, nothing of this kind is given. (Motion, extension, etc., for instance, have no object.) They can themselves be an object of consciousness, but they are themselves not a consciousness. They can be a content of consciousness, but cannot themselves have such a content (Marty 1911, p. 11).

Marty, following Brentano (1874), accordingly identifies intentionality (as one says nowadays) as the distinguishing feature of consciousness and moreover described this feature (for a couple of decades) as the mental inexistence of an object. The object that exists in consciousness is thus called the “immanent object” or simply the “content.”3 Every psychical act is moreover an object of consciousness, more

3  At some point in the early twentieth century Marty abandoned this theory of intentionality, though the formulation of his later view on the matter (Marty 1908) would take us too far afield here. For further elaborations on this and Marty’s relevance to phenomenology, see Rollinger 1999, pp. 209–250.

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particularly a “secondary object” of itself, leaving absolutely no room for the concept of the “unconscious” (Marty 1911, pp. 11 ff.). The characterization of psychical acts as the consciousness of something allows Marty to divide psychical acts into three different classes: “presenting, judging, and taking interest” (Marty 1911, p. 16). Much of his phenomenology is concerned with the description of each of these classes, which we will now briefly discuss. This tripartite division was an oddity in German psychology and philosophy during the late nineteenth century, for the usual way of classifying psychical phenomena was in terms of thinking, feeling, and willing. Marty divides thinking into presenting and judging, while he unites feeling and willing into a single class: taking interest. Those who unite presentations in a single class with judgments maintain that a judgment is only a complex of presentations, which is in turn either a combining (affirmation) or separating (negation). Marty appeals to an argument that John Stuart Mill had made in his System of Logic (I.5.1), according to which there are clear-cut examples of combining presentations where a judgment (or belief) does not result. If, for example, one presents a golden mountain, this is an instance of combining the presentation of a mountain with the presentation of gold. Yet, the result is not the judgment that a mountain is made of gold or that a golden mountain exists. Nor does it help to add that the consciousness of objective validity is joined with the combination of presentations, for it is entirely unclear what this means. Moreover, Marty maintains that there are cases in which a judgment does not involve any combination (or separation) at all. One example is inner perception (which is indeed a judgment for Marty), while another is a judgment such as the one expressed by the sentence “It is raining.” Such sentences are called “subjectless sentences” or “impersonals.” While previous philosophers had sought to find a subject in sentences of this kind, Marty rather maintains that they are best understood as expressions of existential judgments without a subject-predicate structure (Marty 1911, pp. 18 ff.; see also the series of articles reprinted in Marty 1918). Indeed, he maintains that all full-fledged judgments, even ones that have the linguistic dressing of subject and predicate, are in fact existential, whether they be affirmative or negative. Affirmative judgments are for him the acceptance of an object, negative ones the rejection of an object. Perceptions, which can be inwardly or outwardly directed, are cases of acceptance. Wherever complex or double judgments, e.g. “This rose is red,” come into play, the predicative structure does play a special role. “This rose” already expresses an affirmative existential judgment, whereas the attribution of red to this rose is an inseparable predicative judgment. By taking such complex judgments as a model for all judgments, philosophers have gone astray in viewing existence as a predicate, or interpreting the “it” in a subjectless sentence as indicating a subject such as the universe or some other mysterious entity. Judgments, as acceptance or rejection, are thus distinct from presentations for Marty. Accordingly, they belong to separate classes of phenomena rather than the single class of thinking. Yet he also maintains that feeling and willing (or volition) belong to a third single class of such phenomena. Just as judgments are based on presentations, the phenomena of taking-interest are likewise based on presentations. They can also be based on judgments, as willing something involves the judgment

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that what is willed can actually be brought about. In all cases, however, we can only divide loving or hating (broadly understood) into the special classes of emotions and volitions (and perhaps others in between) if we acknowledge that they belong to a single fundamental class alongside the class of presentations and the class of judgments. As already mentioned, Marty seeks to establish descriptive psychology as the basis of the practical philosophical disciplines. In view of his threefold classification of psychical phenomena, we can say more precisely that the theory of presentation is to be the foundation for aesthetics, the theory of judgment the foundation for logic, and the theory of taking-interest (or love and hate) the foundation of ethics (see also Brentano 1889). Each of the classes has an ideal corresponding to it: beauty, truth, and goodness respectively. Above all, each of these endeavors are vulnerable to the dangers of skepticism, relativism, and subjectivism since they are intrinsically based on psychology. Marty was indeed fully aware that Husserl had argued that there must be a logic that is not in any way based on psychology, but he was also opposed to Husserl’s conclusion that in this avoidance of psychologism it is necessary to posit meanings and other ideal entities as timeless (Rollinger 1999, pp. 229 ff.). Such a conclusion was for Marty no less reprehensible than the above-mentioned dangers of psychologism. Though he did arrive at the view that there must be contents of judgment (Urteilsinhalte) which he conceived of, in opposition to Brentano’s later view, as non-real and thus comparable to Husserl’s states of affairs (Sachverhalte) or Meinong’s objectives (Objektive) (Meinong 1902), he did not wish to ascribe timelessness to them (Marty 1908, pp. 101 ff., 320 ff.). They do in fact come into being. The being of chair, for instance, comes into being along with the chair, as its non-­ being comes into being when the chair is destroyed. In this way Marty takes up a unique position in his view of the contents of judgments between the extremes of Husserl and Meinong (1894) (who held that they were timeless) on the one hand and of Brentano (who rejected them altogether) on the other. Marty was convinced that the contents of judgment as he understood them secured the objectivity of logic, but he also thought that he secured the objectivity of ethics by positing analogous entities pertaining to the class of taking-interest, so-­ called “states of value” (Wertverhalte) (Marty 1908, pp. 425 ff.). Moreover, as he divided judgments into evident ones and blind ones, he maintained that there is analogy of this division pertaining to ethics, namely acts of taking-interest that are “characterized as correct” and ones that are merely a matter of taste. He was in fact adamant in his opposition to attempts to develop ethics or a general theory of values without the acknowledgment of the analogue of evidence pertaining to goodness.

2.2  Ehrenfels and Heterodox Brentanism While Marty was in Prague teaching such doctrines in descriptive psychology and applying them to various fields of philosophical enquiry, he had to face the harsh reality of another student of Brentano joining his faculty. The colleague in question

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was Christian von Ehrenfels, who diverged from the views of their common teacher in various ways. He became a professor of philosophy in Prague in 1896 and remained there for the remainder of his career (he died in 1932). He was a prominent figure in the eyes of such outstanding students as Emil Utitz, Max Brod, and Franz Kafka. Here we shall give a brief overview of some of the theories that he put forward in his psychology and their application, particularly in the domain of the theory of values. While Ehrenfels was initiated into philosophy through the lectures of Brentano in Vienna, Alexius Meinong’s lectures also deeply influenced him. Though also a student of Brentano and at first a lecturer in Vienna, Meinong took a professorship in Graz, where he developed philosophical views that not only diverged from those of Brentano, but were also met with disgust from him and Marty. Ehrenfels in fact found Meinong a better teacher than Brentano. From his perspective, Brentano was indeed a master of dialectic, who could acutely sum up a large variety of arguments on all sides of a question and eliminate the unsound ones. Nonetheless, Ehrenfels saw Meinong as a genuine seeker of the truth and not merely a clever dialectician. Before Ehrenfels came to Prague, he had already developed an important psychological theory that he continued to teach in later years. This is his theory of “Gestalt qualities” (Ehrenfels 1890). Though Gestalt strictly means only shape or form and might be applied to a rather limited range of phenomena, Ernst Mach (1886) had already been expanded it to include, for instance, tonal shapes. A melody may consist of tones with specific pitches, but the very same melody may be heard in tones with higher or lower pitches. It is the same melody in the sense that the same tonal shape is preserved in spite of the change of the single tones. Such “shapes” or Gestalt qualities, according to Ehrenfels, can be found not only throughout the sensory domain, but also in the psychical domain. While Ehrenfels thus drew from Mach and was accordingly not an orthodox follower of Brentano, he went much farther than this in his two-volume work on the theory of values, which he published shortly after arriving in Prague (Ehrenfels 1896, 1897, 1898). This theory involves a sharp distinction between emotion and volition, which is of course already opposed to Marty’s view that they belong to the same class. Ehrenfels keeps this division in mind while developing a theory that not only concerned ethical, aesthetic or economic values, but values in general. Moreover, in opposition to Brentano and Marty, Ehrenfels develops a theory that does not at all allow emotions and volitions to be “characterized as correct.” In his analysis of values, he begins from the consideration of ordinary language, which gives us the impression that the value of an object is simply one of its properties, just like its color, shape, texture, density, etc. In this case, however, Ehrenfels thinks that we are misled. There is no such value-property of objects  (Ehrenfels 1982). He regards the view that something can be correctly loved or hated as an alternative to the theory of value-properties, though no less objectionable. In the following passage Ehrenfels puts forward his own concept of value: Value is a relation between an object and its subject which expresses that the subject either desires the object as a matter of fact or would desire it should this subject not be convinced of its existence – or that through the presentation of the being of the relevant object, as this

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presentation is as intuitive, vivid, and complete as possible, a state is caused that is higher on the scale of feelings of displeasure-pleasure than the equivalent presentation of the fact in the case of the non-being of the object. The magnitude of the value is proportionate to the intensity of desire and to the distance between the two feelings as these have been characterized (Ehrenfels 1897, p. 65; Ehrenfels 1982, p. 261).

Accordingly, values come into play only in relation to our desires. Ehrenfels leaves absolutely no room for the concept of a value “in itself.” We should note, however, that Ehrenfels does allow for the presentation of the being or non-being of an object as opposed to the mere presentation of the object. In this regard he in fact works with a concept of states of affairs (without using any technical term for this) which indeed becomes crucial to his concept of value, as we can see in the passage above. Ehrenfels describes desires as presentations of states of affairs combined with feelings about these. One desires something when one feels greater pleasure in presenting its being in comparison with presenting its non-being, whereas one is repelled by something when one feels greater pleasure in presenting its non-being in comparison with presenting its non-being. Ehrenfels is not saying that pleasure is the aim of a desire that makes an object valuable, as he indeed rejects psychological and ethical hedonism. Moreover, though Ehrenfels expressed a non-cognitivist theory of values in the above-cited passage, much of his writings on aesthetics (Ehrenfels 1990) give way to a cognitivism of some sort (Reicher 2006, 2009). One of Ehrenfels’ final projects was to promote a vision of the cosmos, in which he posits a metaphysical duality of order and chaos (Ehrenfels 1916, 1948). For him this vision was to be the foundation of a new religion. Though he was no more successful in the promotion of this grand scheme than he was in his advocacy for polygyny (Ehrenfels 1907), his theory of Gestalt qualities continued to resonate in the psychological literature. Moreover, his theory of values, based on the division between feeling and desire, continually found a receptive audience in contrast with rival theories, such as the ones put forward by Brentano and Marty (Eaton 1930; Rollinger 2012; Ierna 2018; Schuhmann 1997).4

3  Initial Reception of Husserl’s Phenomenology in Prague In this part, we will limit ourselves to Marty’s interesting exchange with Husserl, which initiates the reception of Husserl’s phenomenology in Prague. The debate, concerning some essential points of Husserl’s early theory of intentionality, is only rarely discussed in literature (exceptions are Patočka 2006; Mulligan, Schumann in

4  Alois Höfler, yet another heterodox student of Brentano and also a close associate of Meinong, took a position in Prague in 1904, where he was to teach pedagogy until 1907. Due to limitations of space, however, his account of this stay and his difficult relation with Brentano and Marty can only be mentioned here. See Höfler 1921.

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Marty 1990; Chrudzimski 2001). Husserl’s reply to Marty (Husserl 1901b) reveals the distance separating Husserl’s descriptive psychology from Marty’s at the beginning of the twentieth century, and deserves more detailed analysis.

3.1  The Husserl—Marty Debate, Marty’s Critique of Husserl 3.1.1  Defense of Immanent Objects Husserl sent both volumes of the Logical Investigations (Husserl 1900, 1901a) to Marty shortly after their publication. The second volume with its rejection of nominalism and the immanent in-existence of intentional objects especially caught Marty’s attention. In his letter to Husserl from 7 June, 1901, Marty refers to his 1892 review of James’s Principles of Psychology to defend the essential in-­existence of intentional objects. Since for Marty all psychical phenomena are either presentations or based on presentations, an intention (Meinen) involves a presented object. Marty further claims that presentation requires the being of its object. However, sometimes the intentional object—such as a golden mountain—does not actually (wirklich) exist. Therefore, it must exist at least intentionally—as an immanent content of the presentation (Marty 1990, p. 231). We would nevertheless be mistaken if we took the containment of the object within the presentation as a real containment—consciousness does not have real red or hot parts. The immanent object exists merely intentionally, not really, in the presentation. In his review of James’s Psychology, Marty therefore states: Certainly, the mind can present all kinds of things without their being bodily in it … Only a mental immanence, an intentional “containment” is at stake here … Intentional being of that which is presented is simply its being-presented, and this is the correlate of presenting (Marty 2010, pp. 289–290)

But what if we present God or a large number? We cannot properly present these objects. Marty holds that in such cases we present a (relational) surrogate. Here we have a presenting that replaces, i.e. a surrogate, and it can here really be said with James that what the thought is and what it as an equivalent represents are two different things … For the same object can be thought by means of (intrinsically) very diverse improper presentations, as the same presentation can in this manner also, by converse, serve as a surrogate for thinking of very different objects (Marty 2010, p. 290).

Improper presentations thus have their own immanent intentional object as well, namely the relation and (at least) one of its terms: We called [such presentation] a surrogate presentation. This is what it is in the sense that it has in fact a completely different content than the name of its so-called object means, a content which only stands in some relation to that which is designated by the name. This other content, however, will be presented fully and properly (Marty 2010, p. 291).

At the time of his correspondence with Husserl, Marty believed there could be no psychical phenomena without a proper or substituted immanent object.

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3.1.2  Immanent Existence of General Objects Marty sympathetically greeted Husserl’s attack on nominalism, which forms a part of Husserl’s second “Logical Investigation.” Indeed, after reading Husserl’s critique of Cornelius, a defender of a Humeian kind of nominalism, Marty informs Husserl about his own recent exchange with the same philosopher. I have also read with lively interest that part of your work “on modern theories of abstraction”, and I by and large approve of your well-aimed opposition to nominalism with regard to the existence of general concepts. I had already advanced similar reasons against Cornelius with whom I entered into a correspondence about the issue of abstraction soon after publication of his paper … (Marty 1990, pp. 229–230).

The recently published correspondence of Marty with Cornelius (Marty 2017) allows for an interesting comparison of both attacks on nominalism. Firstly, Marty and Husserl reject Cornelius’s claim concerning the reducibility of general intention to intention of a particular object related by similarity to a number of other particulars. Based on this similarity, these objects, Cornelius claims, can be named with the same name. Marty and Husserl point out that, since these groups change in time and are different for different people, the meaning of general names would be different for different people. An absurd relativism would result: For if, in speaking of red, I need to bring to mind only a restricted collective of red objects, this obviously does not always have the same sense, assuming that the meaning of the name red lies in the thought of belonging to this group. That collective will be a different one for different people and also for the same person at different times, and thus the meaning of the name red would also change (Marty 2017, pp. 129–130).

Compare: It would therefore harmonize with the sense of our statement that the assertion of the colour-match had a different sense for each man, and a different sense at different times. It would depend on the “otherwise known contents,” and thus on previously experienced contents, which plainly differ from man to man (Husserl 1901a, p. 304).

Moreover, they hold that a recognition of similarity between objects presupposes a recognition of the aspect in which these objects coincide—and this aspect must be abstract (Marty) or general (Husserl). We must apprehend the different features or moments whereby and wherein similars agree in one case and in the other, for only this here can be that which distinguishes the different similarities. But since this is certainly nothing concrete-intuitive, but rather an abstractum, such as color, red, place, etc., abstraction is also involved here (Marty 2017, p. 130).

Compare: We find in fact that wherever things are alike, an identity in the strict and true sense is also present. We cannot predicate exact likeness of two things, without stating the respect in which they are thus alike. Each exact likeness relates to a Species, under which the objects compared are subsumed (Husserl, p. 242).

Secondly, Marty and Husserl reject Cornelius’s related claim that moments (inseparable parts) “result” from apprehending the similarity of one and the same particular

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object with other particulars that are similar with each other. For example, one and the same object can belong to one group of similar objects with respect to color and to another one with respect to its shape. However, these moments (color and shape as concrete moments of the particular) are only “projected” back onto the particular object which, considered by itself, does not really have any moments. Since the above-discussed general aspect of similarity could not be selected if particulars were simple, reducing moments to relations of similarity fails (Marty 2017, p.  130). Moreover, the relation of similarity between particulars is itself a moment or dependent part of the relational complex; the relation of similarity then clearly does not help us reduce moments as such (Husserl p.  296). Accordingly, moments must be something in individuals. Thirdly, Marty and Husserl argue that nominalism confuses equivocal names with general names. The former cannot explain the latter. The universal name does, to be sure, name many, but it does so through the mediation of the same meaning (i.e. the presentation of something that is again found in all cases of the application in the same manner); the equivocal name, however, names many by mediation of different (though perhaps similar) meanings (Marty 2017, p. 135).

Compare: … for Cornelius, as for such nominalism, general names are in a manner equivocal. Psychological grounds (the theory maintains) limit the application to a class, but the name’s meaning consists in particular similarities experienced from moment to moment, and therefore varies from case to case. The ideal unity of the class sets bounds to this multiplicity of meaning, but it does not and cannot create the single meaning of the univocal concept (Husserl 2001a, p. 305).

Fourthly, the undetermined particular memory image that Cornelius accepts as the substitute for the general object is absurd. Cornelius confuses vagueness with indetermination (Marty 2017, pp.  141–142)—imagination of a concrete particular proves its logical possibility, but a concrete indeterminate (i.e. not concrete) particular is impossible. Husserl gives a similar, but more straightforward argument—an indeterminate particular could have a property a and non-a in the same respect. Contradictory objects would thus be possible. I regard an intrinsically indeterminate and yet intuitive presentation not only as never given, but as absolutely impossible. If something of this sort, e.g. a figure that would have no determinate form and color, could be presented intuitively, how would it be evident that it cannot exist? But this is, as a matter of fact and without any doubt, evident (Marty 2017, p. 142).

Compare: Cornelius thinks that a sensuous triangle can unite contradictory properties … We cannot agree to believe something to be psychologically possible if it is logically and geometrically absurd (Husserl 2001a, p. 307).

There are nonetheless also differences. According to Husserl, to consider general objects as immanent parts of consciousness leads to an absurd hypostatization of general entities. Such a reified general entity is treated as a real part in our

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consciousness. However, real entities are located in time and always concrete. This contradicts their nature. But Marty thinks that Husserl’s critique misses its mark. For Marty, at the time of his exchange with Husserl, general objects have immanent being in consciousness. Thus they cannot be real parts of consciousness in the Husserlian sense of “real” immanence, as he defends it in the first edition of Logical Investigations (see Husserl 2001b, p.  99). Nevertheless, they are still objects of presenting. Surprisingly, Marty leaves untouched Husserl’s attack on the theory of abstraction in the sense of exclusive attention (Husserl 2001a, pp. 266–270). In his letter to Cornelius, Marty defends this theory. If I can “consider a feature while omitting the others,” something universal, to which many things without restriction can correspond, has thereby eo ipso become an object of special psychical occupation (whether this be a special presenting or judging, etc.). The feature is indeed individual only through its concrescence with others; considered in itself, it is a universal (Marty 2017, p. 135).

For Marty, the object of general presentation is an abstract part considered in isolation from its particular context. The young Husserl defended a similar theory of abstraction as “exclusive attention” or “abstraction from particular circumstances” for a while (see e.g. Husserl 2001c, p. 101). However, he soon rejected it: Suppose we concentrate attention on the green of the tree which stands before us. If this can be done, let us increase our concentration till we achieve the complete unawareness of associated aspects … If another object with exactly the same colouring were suddenly substituted, we should see no difference … Would this green, however, really be the same as the other? … Comparison of two concrete, separated phenomena of the same quality, e.g. green, evidently shows that each has its own green (Husserl 2001a, p. 269).

No matter how much we concentrate on an individual feature the individual feature will remain individual. Marty left this charge unanswered. 3.1.3  Marty’s Critique of Husserl’s Theory of Sensory Perception Marty’s views concerning immanent objects led him to reject Husserl’s analysis of sensory perception. According to Husserl, sensory perception is a psychical act in which immanent and non-intentional sensory data (sensory experiences—Erlebnisse) are apprehended (aufgefasst) or interpreted (gedeutet) by the act with a certain sense and in perceptive form. Due to this apprehension, a phenomenal object appears on the “objective side” of the perceptive act in the flow of its sensory adumbrations. However, for Marty, sensory phenomena are intended objects of uninterpreted sensation in the sense of immanent objects. We do not “live through” them, to use Husserl’s language, but they are irreal parts of the act with mere intentional being. Higher order noetic acts interpret simple sensory objects so that, for example, a landscape is presented. Marty thus denies Husserl’s claim that perception must always be apprehension to be intentional. Whether or not we should only call

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interpreted sensation ‘perception’ (Husserl 2001b, p. 341) is for Marty a mere terminological matter: Indeed I believe that in the case of sensation and not only in those cases where an interpretation occurs that a presenting is given and hence also an immanent object. Whether one also commonly calls these presenting and object is irrelevant (Marty 1990, p. 232).

3.2  Husserl’s Defense and His Critique of Marty In the preserved draft of his response, Husserl clarifies some of the most fundamental descriptive results of his Logical Investigations. While much of this critique does affect Marty’s position, some of it misses its target as Husserl keeps using the word “immanence” in his sense of a real part fully contained “in” consciousness, and not in Marty’s sense of an irreal object “in” the presentation. A transcendent object, in contrast, is for Husserl a non-immanent object, and therefore not reducible to real parts of consciousness. Moreover, for Husserl “transcendence” refers to a manner of appearance and not to the independent existence outside of consciousness. Thus, the imagining of Jupiter presents a transcendent object—Jupiter is neither “in” the mind, nor “outside of it” (Husserl 2001b, p.  99). Husserl, of course, knows how Marty uses the word transcendent, but once he rejects Marty’s view, he ignores Marty’s position without further reflection and returns to his own use of the immanent-­transcendent distinction. 3.2.1  Transcendent Objects as Absurd Doubles Husserl rejected immanent objects as a proposed solution to the problem of non-­ existing objects of presentations already in 1894  in his highly interesting manuscript Intentional Objects (Husserl 1994). His letter to Marty repeats its main results. All intentional acts have an object, but we often intend non-existing objects— e.g. fictive or contradictory objects. Some presentations are therefore objectless, so to speak. How can we unite intentionality with this objectlesness? Should we accept that all acts have immanent objects, but only some have transcendent objects as well? This amounts to accepting two kinds of objects. But let us say we present an object, which we currently believe does not empirically exist, and we later learn that the object does actually exist. Did we, in the first case, unknowingly intend a transcendent object? But we meant only the object as not existing. Did a new object appear in the second case? Husserl rejects this. In both cases, we intended the same object, but in two different modes (qualities) of intention. But what kind of being has the non-existing object appearing in imagination or intended in false belief? None, claims Husserl. The “appearing” of an object is bound to the existence of the act of imagination or false belief. There is no distinction between intentional and actual or non-actual objects. The customary talk of merely intentional objects, or even of merely intentional existence, does not signify

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the existence of objects residing, in any literal sense, in the intention, but rather the mere existence of the respective representations together with the non-existence of their objects (Husserl 1994, pp. 474–475).

To posit immanent and transcendent objects as two different kinds of objects is not only wrong, it is also absurd: If I desire a certain dish, then it is not my phantasm or the inner image or something else psychical that is desired, etc. What is desired, loved, hated and judged of is that which is represented; and obviously the represented is, in general, not something immanent (in the literal sense) in consciousness, but rather is the object itself … (Husserl 1994, p. 475).

We clearly desire real food even when the food has not been cooked yet, and therefore does not exist. 3.2.2  N  either Inauthentic Presentation nor Image Presentation Is Based on a Presented Surrogate Husserl introduced his own concept of inauthentic presentation in the sense of representation in 1894 in his Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic (Husserl 1994b). This concept is the early forerunner of the concept of inauthentic, signitive, empty or imagining intentionality that Husserl discusses in the Logical Investigations (Husserl 2001b, pp. 218–225). Husserl’s first, still Brentanian, concept of inauthentic presentations (in the sense of symbolic presentations) worked with the idea that an inauthentic presentation intends an object mediately by intending a known term of a conceptually known relation (Husserl 2003, pp. 205–207). In 1894, however, Husserl sees in representation a fundamental kind of presentation, which does not present inauthentically through a presented relation. In understanding a word or an image we intend what is meant by the word or shown by the image. The word-sound or the material picture is “present,” but not “intuited.” It is as if we pass through the sound or the picture to its “topic” and this topic is the proper object of such a presentation. Thus, as Husserl states in his Psychological Studies, we can look at an arabesque when suddenly we realize it is actually a sign. In that instance in which the arabesque becomes a sign, and thus obtains the character of a representing content, the psychic state of affairs has wholly changed. Indeed we do see the sign. But our focus is not upon it, and we do not intuit it. Similarly … if words have their natural effect, then they are not intuited, although they are heard (Husserl 1994, p. 163).

The letter to Marty is especially remarkable for Husserl’s careful differentiation of his and Marty’s views of inauthentic presenting. Marty claims that every presentation presents an immanent object, either properly or improperly, through a properly presented relational surrogate. But, Husserl argues, a consciousness cannot properly present the relation since one of the terms of the relation is improperly presented. However, if consciousness improperly presents the relational surrogate, then Marty’s explanation begs the question (Husserl 1994c, pp.  79–80). More importantly, in signifying and imagining intentionality, the conceptual presentation of a relation is only an ad hoc result of reflection.

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H. Janoušek and R. D. Rollinger Representations which—whether through an image or through a symbol—do not in any case represent what is immanent in the literal sense. Between image and thing there obtain relationships. But these relationships are nothing within the act of representation—neither as actualized nor as conceptually represented relations. They obtain objectively … Conceptualization of the relation comes forth only upon reflection, only for judgmental activity after the fact. The pure and simple “inauthentic” representation is not a relational representation, and is no relating act, but rather is a characteristic type of consciousness of the object (Husserl 1994c, pp. 478–479).

These presentations in Marty’s sense are, in fact, mere attributive presentations, e.g. “the thing to the right of the corner …” (Husserl 1994c, p. 478). Now, the usual perception of a thing is also an improper presentation, since the hidden sides of the perceived object are merely “signified” by the perceived sides of the object (ibid). Even if Marty were right, claims Husserl, and perception in the ordinary sense consisted of the lower level sensation of immanent objects and their higher order noetic interpretations, the presentation (appearing) of the interpreted object cannot be an improper presentation in Marty’s sense (sensory data are not parts of conceptually grasped relations presenting unseen sides of the object). And the higher order presentation, Husserl contends, would still present a transcendent object in Husserl’s sense. This new [interpretative] act of representation has no immanent object, for the immanent object is an object for the underlying and distinct act of representing. This immanent object is not the referent of consciousness in the representing here at issue, but rather the new or additional act of representing relates to the transcendent object (Husserl 1994c, pp. 478–479).

3.2.3  E  vidence of Reflection Directed to Immanent Objects in Husserl’s Sense One of the most interesting points in Husserl’s reply to Marty concerns how Husserl treats the evidence of psychological reflection on our psychical experiences and their parts. Occasionally, these immanent objects become objects of evident reflective acts. How is this evidence possible if the act or reflection differs from the reflected immanent content? If perception is apprehension, what is apprehended when we, for example, reflectively intend a sensory experience? In the letter to Marty, Husserl insists that in reflection the apprehended and the intended object coincide: … in a narrow range of exceptional cases psychical contents really lived through do themselves become objects of representations; and, indeed, they do so in such a direct fashion that the represented objects are simultaneously the representing contents of the representation (Husserl 1994, p. 479).

In these cases of psychological reflection, the intention is completely fulfilled and we have an experience of evidence. Husserl also suggests that Marty confused this

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presenting with the presenting involved in the supposed intuition of relational surrogate.5 3.2.4  General Intuition Husserl concludes his letter with a short clarification of the intuition of general objects. The general intuition must apprehend an individual object, and yet intend a general one. Once again the individual object is present, but we do not “observe” or perceive this object—we are led “through” it to the general one. That this representation necessarily involves an immanent content in its sense, viz., the red-­ moment, is something I have never denied. But this is not to make the universal into a real psychical element; for the realized is not the universal, but rather it is the immanent content, which is precisely nothing general, but a fleeting aspect of my experience (Erlebnisses). The red in general, the subject of the general judgment, is identically the same whoever it is that may be judging. But each person who judges has his own red-Moment (Husserl 1994c, p. 481).

3.3  Marty’s Reply to Husserl’s Critique Marty replied to Husserl in a second letter. His main points are the following. (a) Marty defends himself against the charge of absurdity resulting from the intentional relation to immanent and not to transcendent objects in Marty’s sense. Every act, according to Marty, primarily and directly presents the object of intention and only secondarily and obliquely itself as presenting (judging, loving or hating) that object. Therefore, in the primary intention, we present an object, and not a “presented object”. The object of the presentation of blue is: blue, not: presented blue. But this is quite compatible with my view that there corresponds to every presentation a correlate which necessarily exists if the presentation exists. For this does not assert that this correlate as such (that is, the presented blue) is the object of my presentation. At all events this is not the case for a primary act of consciousness. A presented object as such is in fact the object of secondary consciousness (Marty 1990, p. 235).

Presumably, Marty is speaking here about our everyday attitude, in which we (falsely and involuntarily) believe that phenomenal objects (e.g. colors) are tran-

5  Husserl’s description of psychological reflection raises doubts. How do we know that the apprehended and intended entity coincide in the reflection? For Husserl, the relationship of the apprehending to the apprehended is a real one (Husserl 1994c, p. 480), the relation of the intention to the intended object a logical one (Husserl 1994c)—a new intentional act of reflection on the coincidence of both would be therefore required, and here starts an infinite regress.

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scendent objects (exist as they are independently of the mind).6 The concept of the presented blue and the question whether the primarily presented blue also has a transcendent being only arises by means of a special (usually scientifically and philosophically motivated) reflection on our inner perception. Such reflection tells us that the blue does not really exist and that consciousness can only improperly present transcendent objects through conceptualizing relations to properly perceived phenomena. (b) Finally, Marty defends his view of improper presentations against Husserl’s charge of the infinite regress (see Sect. 3.2.2 above). A “proper” presentation of the relation of x to A need not involve a proper presentation of A (Marty 1990, p. 235). The object A, as the object of improper presentation, is presented as the correlate of an inessential relation. However, it is not meant only as the correlate of the inessential relation but as the correlate of all its determinations be they essential or inessential, known or unknown.

3.4  Conclusion Since Marty does not respond to any other point of Husserl’s critique, we can state that, as often happens, both thinkers firmly kept their views without considering the finer points of each other’s arguments. However, they were at least pushed to clarify some interesting points of their positions which might otherwise have easily gone overlooked. Interestingly, some aspects of this critique reappear in the works of their students. Thus, in his Prague habilitation Ludwig Landgrebe targeted Marty’s distinction between immanent and transcendent objects (Landgrebe 1934, pp. 47–76) while Oskar Kraus attacked Husserl’s view of perception as apprehension of non-intentional sensory experiences (see his arguments in appendix to Brentano 1995, pp. 307–308). This is, however, a topic for future discussion.

References Brentano, Franz. 1874. Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. ———. 1889. Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. ———. 1966. Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, ed. F. Mayer-Hillebrand. Hamburg: Felix Meiner. ———. 1982. Deskriptive Psychologie, ed. W. Baumgarnter and Roderick Chisholm. Hamburg: Felix Meiner. ———. 1995. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Trans. A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, L.L. McAlister. New York: Routledge.

6  For further interpretation, see Taieb 2017. This text is an outcome of a project of the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic P401/ 15 – 18149S entitled From Logical Objectivism to Reism: Bolzano and the School of Brentano, and realized at the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences. 

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Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz. 2001. Die Intentionalitätstheorie Anton Martys. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62: 175–214. Eaton, Howard O. 1930. The Austrian philosophy of value. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Ehrenfels, Christian von 1890. Über “Gestaltqualitäten.” Vierteljahrrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 14: 249–292. Reprint in Ehrenfels 1988, 128–167. ———. 1897. System der Werttheorie. Vol. I.  Leipzig: Reisland. Reprint in Ehrenfels 1982, pp. 201–404. ———. 1898. System der Werttheorie. Vol. II.  Leipzig: Reisland. Reprint in Ehrenfels 1982, pp. 407–593. ———. 1907. Sexualethik. Wiesbaden: Bergmann. Reprint in Ehrenfels 1988, pp. 265–356. ——— 1916. Kosmogonie. Jena: Dietrichs. Reprint in Ehrenfels 1990, pp. 69–230. English edition: Cosmogony. Trans. Mildred Focht. New York: The Comet Press, 1948. ———. 1982. Werttheorie. Philosophische Schriften, ed. Reinhard Fabian, vol. I. Munich/Vienna: Philosophia Verlag. Höfler, Alois. 1921. Die Philosophie des Alois Höfler. In Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen, ed. Raymund Schmidt, vol. II, 117–160. Leipzig: Felix Meiner. Husserl, Edmund. 1900. Logische Untersuchungen. Vol. I. Halle a. S.: Max Niemeyer. ———. 1901a. Logische Untersuchungen. Vol. II. Halle a. S.: Max Niemeyer. ———. 1901b. Briefwechsel, Band I. Die Brentano Schule, ed. K. Schuhmann, 75–83. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. ———. 1994. Intentional objects. In Early writings in the philosophy of logic and mathematics, 345–387. Trans. D. Willard. Dordrecht: Kluwer. ———. 1994b. Psychological studies in the elements of logic. In Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, 139–170. Trans. D. Willard. Dordrecht: Kluwer. ———. 1994c. Draft of a letter by Husserl to Marty. In Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, 473–481. Trans. D. Willard. Dordrecht: Kluwer. ———. 2001a. Logical investigations, vol. 1. Trans. J.N. Findlay. London/New York: Routledge. ———. 2001b. Logical investigations, vol. 2. Trans. J.N. Findlay. London/New York: Routledge. ———. 2001c. Logik Vorlesung 1896, ed. Elisabeth Schuhmann. Dordrecht: Springer. ———. 2003.  Philosophy of Arithmetic, Psychological and Logical Investigations with Supplementary Texts from 1887–1901. Trans. D. Willard. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Ierna, Carlo. 2018. Christian von Ehrenfels on the mind and its metaphysics. In Philosophy of mind in the nineteenth century, ed. Sandra Lapointe, 214–231. London: Routledge. Landgrebe, Ludwig. 1934. Nennfunktion und Wortbedeutung. Eine Studie über Martys Sprachphilosophie. Halle: Akademischer Verlag. Mach, Ernst. 1886. Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen. Jena: Gustav Fischer. English edition: Contributions to the Analysis of Sensations. Trans. C.M. Williams. Chicago: Open Court. Marty, Anton. 1908. Untersuchungen zur Grundlage der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie. Vol. I. Halle: Max Niemeyer. ———. 1911. Deskriptive Psychologie, ed. by Mauro Antonelli and Johann Marek, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann. ———. 1918. Gesammelte Schriften, vol. II/1, Schriften zur deskriptiven Psychologie und Sprachphilosophie, ed. Josef Eisenmeier et al. Halle a. S.: Max Niemeyer. ———. 1990. Two letters from Marty to Husserl. Trans. K. Mulligan, K. Schumann. In Mind, Meaning, Metaphysics. The Philosophy and Theory of Language of Anton Marty, ed. Kevin Mulligan, 215–236. Dordrecht: Kluwer. ———. 2010. Review: William James, the principles of psychology. In Philosophy of Language in the Work of Anton Marty: Analysis and Translations, ed. Robin D.  Rollinger, 255–300. Amsterdam: New York. ———. 2017. Abstraction and similarity: Edition and translation of the correspondence between Marty and Cornelius, ed., trans. Robin Rollinger. In Mind and Language—On the Philosophy of Anton Marty, ed. Guillaume Fréchette and Hamid Taieb, 105–149. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

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Meinong, Alexius. 1894. Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werth-Theorie. Graz: Leuschner & Lubensky. ———. 1902. Ueber Annahmen, Leipzig: J. A. Barth. Erg.-Bd. [Suppl. Vol.] II of Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane Patočka, Jan. 2006. K filosofovým šedesátinám. S Janem Patočkou o filosofii a filosofech. In Karel Palek, Ivan Chvatík, ed. I. Češi, 607–629. Praha: Oikoymenh. Reicher, Maria. 2006. Austrian aesthetics. In Austrian philosophy and analytic philosophy, ed. Mark Textor, 293–323. London: Routledge. ———. 2009. Value facts and value experiences in early phenomenology. In Values and ontology: Problems and perspectives, ed. Beatrice Centi and Wolfgang Huemer, 105–135. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. Rollinger, Robin D. 1999. Husserl’s position and the school of Brentano. Dordrecht/Boston/ London: Kluwer. ———. 2010. Philosophy of language in the work of Anton Marty: Analysis and translations. Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi. ———. 2012. Marty on intentionality. In Intentionality: Historical and systematic perspectives, ed. Alessandro Salice, 145–174. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. Rollinger, Robin D., and Hynek Janoušek. 2017. The Prague school. In The Routledge guidebook of Brentano and the Brentano school, ed. Uriah Kriegel, 313–322. London: Routledge. Schuhmann, Karl. 1997. The notion of value in Christian von Ehrenfels. In Phenomenology of values and valuing, ed. James G. Hart and Lester Embree, 96–115. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Smith, Barry. 1994. Austrian philosophy: The legacy of Franz Brentano. La Salle: Open Court. Spiegelberg, Herbert. 1982. The phenomenological movement: A historical introduction. Dordrecht: Nijhoff. Stumpf, Carl. 1883. Tonpsychologie. Vol. I. Leipzig: Hirzel. Taieb, Hamid. 2017. Austro-German transcendent objects before Husserl. In Mind and language—On the philosophy of Anton Marty, ed. Guillaume Fréchette and Hamid Taieb, 41–62. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. Tretera, Ivo. 1990. J.F. Herbart a jeho stoupenci na pražské univerzitě. Praha: Univerzita Karlova.

Husserl’s Early Phenomenology and the Ontology of Truth in the Lvov-­ Warsaw School Dariusz Łukasiewicz

Abstract The paper addresses the question of how Kazimierz Twardowski’s metaphilosphy influenced the reception of Husserl’s early phenomenology and the development of the ontology of truth in the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS). To account for these problems, three types of relations between Husserl’s ideas and the philosophy of truth in the LWS are suggested: (a) Husserl’s unilateral influence on the LWS; (b) interactions and mutual dependencies between Husserl and the LWS; (c) parallel development of ideas concerning the ontology of truth, present both in Husserl’s philosophy and in the writings of the most prominent representatives of the LWS. Particular problems addressed in the paper are discussed within this tripartite framework. The key ideas of Twardowski’s metaphilosophy, based on the postulate that philosophy should have a scientific character, are outlined in Sect. 2. Next, Sect. 3 discusses Husserl’s unilateral influences on the LWS; special attention is paid to the ideas which contributed to the emergence of semantics as the theory of relations between meaningful linguistics systems of expressions and the world. The focus on the semantic nature of language allowed for speaking about the truth itself and about its relational nature. In Sect. 4, mutual interactions between Husserl’s philosophy and the LWS are analysed with the focus on the problem of anti-­ psychologism and the impact which Husserl’s anti-psychologism (the first volume of the Logical Investigations) had upon the most prominent representatives of the LWS. It is argued that there may have been an important but somewhat overlooked influence exerted by Twardowski’s work On the Content and Object of Presentations (1894) upon Husserl’s own anti-psychologism. Finally, Sect. 5 is dedicated to the two most significant parallels between Husserl’s early phenomenology and the ontology of truth in the LWS: the ontology of truth-makers (resorting to the notion of state of affairs, Sachverhalt) and the defense of the absoluteness of truth, where truth is understood as a timeless relational property.

D. Łukasiewicz (*) Institute of Philosophy, Kazimierz Wielki University, Bydgoszcz, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 W. Płotka, P. Eldridge (eds.), Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe, Contributions to Phenomenology 113, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39623-7_3

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Keywords  Husserl · Lvov-Warsaw school · Twardowski · Metaphilosophy · Ontology of truth · Alethic absolutism

1  Introduction This paper concerns the question of how Kazimierz Twardowski’s metaphilosphy influenced the reception of Husserl’s early phenomenology and the development of the ontology of truth in the Lvov-Warsaw School (henceforth LWS).1 To account for these problems in an orderly way, I suggest three types of relations between Husserl’s ideas and the philosophy of truth in the LWS: (a) Husserl’s unilateral influence on the LWS; (b) interactions and mutual dependencies between Husserl and the LWS; (c) parallel development of ideas concerning the ontology of truth, present both in Husserl’s philosophy and in the writings of the most prominent representatives of the LWS. I will address particular problems in the paper within this tripartite framework (in Sects. 4 and 5, respectively). Section 2 will outline the key ideas of Kazimierz Twardowski’s metaphilosophy, which is based on the postulate that philosophy should have a scientific character. Next, Sect. 3 will discuss Husserl’s unilateral influences on the LWS; here I will pay special attention to the ideas which contributed to the emergence of semantics as the theory of relations between meaningful linguistics systems of expressions and the world. This focus on the semantic nature of language allowed these thinkers to speak about the truth itself and about its relational nature. In Sect. 4, I will analyze the mutual interactions between Husserl’s philosophy and the LWS, with a focus on the problem of anti-­ psychologism and the impact which Husserl’s anti-psychologism (laid out in the first volume of Logical Investigations) had upon the most prominent representatives of the LWS at that time (Kazimierz Twardowski and Jan Łukasiewicz). I will argue that there may have been an important but somewhat overlooked influence exerted by Twardowski’s work On the Content and Object of Presentations (1894) upon Husserl’s own anti-psychologism. Finally, Sect. 5 will be dedicated to two highly significant parallels between Husserl’s early phenomenology and the ontology of truth in the LWS. The first concerns how the ontology of truth-makers resorts to the notion of the state of affairs (Sachverhalt), and the second consists in the defense of alethic absolutism (the idea of the absoluteness of truth), where truth is conceived as a timeless relational property. At this point, it seems appropriate to clarify what ‘the ontology of truth’ means. In this notion, the truth is understood (following Aristotle and Scholastics) as a form 1  The idea to consider the theory of truth in the LWS in relation to the metaphilosophical views of Twardowski and his followers was suggested by Jan Woleński (1989, p. 41; 2010, p. 417). Woleński writes that the Platonist philosophy of logic and mathematics typical of Jan Łukasiewicz and Alfred Tarski is part of their worldview and does not belong to logic or mathematics itself. However, to my knowledge, there have been no attempts to explore the ontology of truth in the LWS through the lens of early Husserl’s phenomenology.

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of correspondence between the mind and the world. The ontology of truth involves three basic problems: (1) the problem of the truth-bearer, (2) the problem of the truth-maker, and (3) the problem of the relation between the two. Regarding the third issue, namely the relation between truth-bearers and truth-makers, Sect. 5 of this paper will focus solely on the question of whether the truth-making relation is eternal (timeless) or temporal (time-dependent). Before beginning a systematic analysis of the above-mentioned problems, some brief historical remarks on the LWS are in order. The LWS was one of the first branches of analytic philosophy in the world; it was founded by Kazimierz Twardowski, who was one of Franz Brentano’s disciples.2 The most significant achievements of the LWS belong to mathematical logic and include Alfred Tarski’s semantic theory of truth, Jan Łukasiewicz’s contribution to propositional calculus and many-valued logics, and Stanisław Leśniewski’s system of mereology, to mention a few.3 Twardowski himself was not a logician, but the LWS had a key role in the development of mathematical logic in Poland. It is worth mentioning, however, that among Twardowski’s disciples there were not only logicians, but also psychologists, philosophers or phenomenologists inspired directly by Husserl’s philosophy. The leading figure in the latter group was, of course, Roman Ingarden, whom Twardowski encouraged (in 1911) to study phenomenology under Husserl’s supervision in Göttingen.4 In 1934–1939, after Ingarden had obtained a professorship at Jan Kazimierz University in Lwów, he gathered a group of people who were interested in phenomenology and formed the phenomenological branch of the LWS.5 The main interest of the present paper, however, is not the question of how Husserl’s early phenomenology influenced the phenomenological movement in Poland. As stated above, the paper will concentrate on the problem of Husserl’s impact on the 2  Peter Simons characterizes the place of Twardowski among Brentano’s students thus: “Of those students of Franz Brentano who went on to become professional philosophers, Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938) is much less well-known than his older contemporaries Edmund Husserl and Alexius Meinong. Yet in terms of the importance of his contribution to the history of philosophy, he ranks among Brentano’s students behind at most those two, possibly only behind Husserl” (Simons 2009, p. 1). Twardowski’s life and his main achievements are outlined by Anna Brożek (2014), while Jan Woleński (1989) offers the classic exposition of the LWS. 3  For more on significant contributions to mathematical logics made by members of the LWS, see Woleński (1989). 4  There was a long, collegial but difficult and often tense relationship between Husserl and Twardowski (the correspondence has survived). The relationship between Husserl and Twardowski could be the topic for another paper. One may also argue that Ingarden was hardly Twardowski’s disciple—on the contrary, this was a source of tension. However, I assume in this paper that the nature of the relationship between the two philosophers and their views give us a reason to regard Ingarden as Twardowski’s disciple. Surely, Ingarden did not belong to the closest ranks of Twardowski’s disciples and followers but he shared with Twardowski many essential philosophical views concerning metaphysical realism, the intentional nature of mental acts, and the classic conception of truth. The LWS was not free from any “tensions” among its members and the “tensions” between Twardowski and his pupils, for example, between Twardowski and Jan Łukasiewicz, might be also the topic for another paper. 5  See Płotka (2017), Woleński (2010, 482).

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development of the ontology of truth in the LWS, and to what extent this impact may have been shaped by the metaphilosophy of Kazimierz Twardowski.

2  Twardowski’s Metaphilosophy The main postulate of Twardowski’s metaphilosophy is that philosophy should be regarded as a science, and the best guarantee of the scientific character of philosophy is Brentanian descriptive psychology.6 Another very important postulate says that only those philosophical statements which are formulated in a clear and precise language can be verified through internal or external experience. If statements are clear and precise enough, they can make premises of logical (deductive or inductive) reasoning. Statements which have sufficient experiential evidence or result from formally valid and sound inferences are justified, and, as Twardowski put it, they “have the power to enslave human minds” (Twardowski 1965, p. 382). That power rests on their being true or at least highly probable. Such statements constitute science, and scientific knowledge is of the greatest cognitive value. Vitally important for our further consideration are Twardowski’s understanding of metaphysics and his views on the scope and place of metaphysics in scientific philosophy. It is interesting that until 1902, Twardowski regarded metaphysics as dealing with the existence and nature of God and the immortal soul as part of scientific philosophy (Twardowski 2009 [1895]). Later, he changed his views regarding the scope of metaphysics; all “theological” parts of traditional metaphysics were removed from scientific philosophy and relegated to the domain of ‘worldviews,’ understood as a private system of beliefs (Twardowski did, however, set some restrictions on beliefs belonging to a personal worldview; the most important are internal consistency and coherence with scientific knowledge; cf. Brożek 2014, p. 43). According to Twardowski’s later conception, metaphysics as a science should deal with the theory of relations (Verhältnisse) and the theory of objects. He classified all objects into existent and nonexistent, possible and impossible, real and unreal, simple and composite (1977 [1894]). The founder of the LWS held this view on the scope of metaphysics until his death in 1938, and one can say that it became a standard view on metaphysics among his disciples. In 1934, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (who was Twardowski’s son-in-law) published an article entitled “Logiczny antyirracjonalizm w Polsce” (“Logical anti-­ irrationalism in Poland”), where he expressed ideas on rationality which were close to Twardowski himself and to other members of the LWS. In the article, Ajdukiewicz emphasizes the importance of clarity and precision in formulating philosophical statements; only those statements can be accepted which are sufficiently justified and inter-subjectively verifiable. He underlines that statements based on, or

6  The most comprehensive study on Twardowski’s metaphilosophy, provided so far, is to be found in Kleszcz (2013).

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referring to, mystical experience or eidetic insights (Wesensschau) cannot be considered part of science (Ajdukiewicz 1988, p. 30). This manifesto of logical anti-­ irrationalism—or “logical rationalism,” as it was later called—denies religious experience any role in providing justification for beliefs; furthermore, it also discredits the basic phenomenological methods of attaining truth about essences. Nonetheless, it would be misleading to regard the LWS’s metaphilosophical program as anti-metaphysical in the sense suggested by the logical positivists from the Vienna Circle. In the LWS, problems of traditional metaphysics such as the existence of God or ideal structures (Plato’s ideas, Husserl’s essences, moral values) were deemed scientifically undecided, but they did not view them as cognitively nonsensical. In this context, Twardowski’s notion of ‘anti-metaphysicism’ needs to be explained. He understood ‘metaphysicism’ as constructing theoretical systems based on premises which are not clearly formulated or well justified (Woleński 1989, p. 38). As I see it, Twardowski’s anti-metaphysical attitude was not only a result of his distaste for German idealism, but it was also grounded in epistemological evidentialism. According to the latter view, one is allowed to accept only beliefs supported by evidence, and the strength of one’s assertion is proportionate to the strength of evidence supporting a given belief; one has no right to beliefs unsupported by any evidence. John Locke introduced this evidentialism into modern European philosophy, combining it with individual moral responsibility; it was later transmitted with the empiricist tradition up to the twentieth century (cf. E. Łukasiewicz 2018). Twardowski’s anti-metaphysicism had its roots and rationale in modern evidentialism, but it did not lead to the exclusion of all kinds of metaphysics. Moreover, many of Twardowski’s students (Łukasiewicz, Czeżowski, the Cracow Krakow Circle) accepted the project of building an axiomatic metaphysics.7 The idea was that such deductive systems have a hypothetical epistemic status only; they cannot be verified or corroborated by any empirical data (Smith 1994, p. 157). For Twardowski, descriptive psychology provided the guarantee of the scientific character of philosophy (including metaphysics in its limited version), and served as a basis for philosophy. Thus, in Twardowski’s views, methodological psychologism was connected with anti-metaphysicism and evidentialism.8 We must underline that  Cf. Łukasiewicz (2017) and Łukasiewicz and Łukasiewicz (2018).  There is much more to say about the types of psychologism; the basic distinction is between methodological and ontological psychologism. Methodological psychologism says that descriptive psychology is (should be) a useful tool for philosophy, whereas ontological psychologism in logic and mathematics claims that logic and mathematics are dealing with mental “immanent” objects or contents of consciousness, and therefore, logic is a branch of psychology. Thus, judgment is a product of judging, number is a product of counting, and so on. Ontological and methodological psychologism were views held by most scholars in the nineteenth century. Husserl defended psychologism in logic and mathematics in his habilitation from 1891 titled Philosopie der Arithmetik (Philosophy of Arithmetic. Psychological and Logical Investigations). Husserl’s early psychologistic position in the philosophy of logic and mathematics is discussed in David. W. Smith (2007, pp. 93–94). It is helpful for our research to make an additional distinction within the framework of ontological psychologism between the psychologism of the contents of mental 7 8

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he did not reject the existence of God, divine providence, the immortality of the human soul or ideal, timeless objects, but he questioned the possibility of providing any scientific argument for the existence of such entities. That is why he excluded such “metaphysical objects” from the scope of interest of scientific philosophy. As we will see below, this exclusion of ideal objects from scientific philosophy had important consequences for the ontology of truth in the LWS.9 However, before we discuss the problem of the ontological status of truth-bearers and truth-makers in the LWS in more detail, we must address certain aspects of Husserl’s influence on the philosophy of truth and, in particular, on the emergence of semantics in the LWS in Sect. 3.

3  H  usserl’s Unilateral Influence on the LWS: Philosophy of Truth and Semantics Husserl’s major contribution to the development of philosophy of truth in the LWS concerns the following issues: (a) the theory of semantic categories, (b) the conception of meaning-intention, (c) intuitionist formalism, and (d) axiological intuitionism. The notion of semantic categories, which Husserl introduced and analyzed in the third chapter of Logical Investigations (Husserl 1900 [1901]), played some role in Stanisław Leśniewski’s overcoming the liar paradox, and it stimulated the growth of categorical grammar.10 Leśniewski himself described the circumstances in which his concept of semantic categories developed as follows: In 1922 I outlined a concept of semantical categories as a replacement for the hierarchy of types, which is quite unintuitive to me. Frankly, I would still today feel obliged to accept this concept even if there were no antinomies at all. From a formal point of view, my concept of semantical categories is closely related to the well known type theories …, especially with regard to their theoretical consequences. Intuitively, however, the concept is more easily related to the thread of tradition running through Aristotle’s categories, the parts of speech of traditional grammar, and Husserl’s meaning categories (1992, pp. 411–412).

acts and the psychologism of the objects of mental acts. This distinction makes it possible to differentiate between ontological anti-psychologism of contents and anti-psychologism of objects. One should stress that the two types of psychologism—methodological and ontological—are logically independent, which means that methodological psychologism does not imply ontological psychologism. As we will discuss below, one can combine the ontological psychologism of contents and the anti-psychologism of objects. Twardowski himself subscribed to such a “mixed” position. 9  It is worth noting that Twardowski did not follow Franz Brentano regarding the status of metaphysics; the latter was a philosophical theist and considered theological problems part of philosophy. 10  Husserl’s role in the development of Leśniewski’s theory of semantic categories is discussed in more detail in Smith (1994, pp. 193–194); see also Woleński (1999b).

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The problem with the liar paradox was one of the reasons why philosophers at the beginning of the twentieth century were reluctant to analyze the concept of truth. Leśniewski’s solution of that paradox was based on the distinction between language and metalanguage, and this distinction in turn was founded on the notion of semantic categories comprising linguistic expressions. However, Leśniewski’s theory exerted no influence on Husserl’s philosophy. One should add here that Husserl’s influence on Leśniewski’s theory was only partial as he admits in the above quotation; Leśniewski refers first to Aristotle, traditional grammar and, only finally, to Husserl. Polish philosophers and logicians (Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski) borrowed the notion of meaning-intention (Bedeutungsintention) directly from Husserl. Ajdukiewicz referred to meaning-intentions in 1931 (1965, p. 116 [1931]), and Czeżowski did so in 1949 in his textbook Logika (Woleński 1989, p. 234). The concept of meaning-intention was important in discussions about truth because, according to this view, a linguistic sign (name) refers directly to its objectual correlate (referent) and is not itself the object of the intention (i.e. a sign is semantically transparent). The capacity of linguistic expressions to be directed toward the world was a condition for understanding truth in terms of a relation between language and the world. The next of Husserl’s influences on the LWS was his intuitionist formalism, which Stanisław Leśniewski and Alfred Tarski (among others) had defended.11 Intuitionist formalism in philosophy and theory of logic is a view that formal deductive systems are not sets of meaningless signs. Husserl insisted that linguistic expressions (along with some basic laws of logical grammar) must be construed as inherently meaningful. It is true that neither Leśniewski nor Tarski mention Husserl while speaking about the meaningfulness of formal systems, but, as suggested by Woleński (1999a, p.  113), Leśniewski’s intellectual biography provides evidence supporting the thesis about Husserl’s role in the formation of intuitionist formalism in Poland. As mentioned above, Husserl influenced the change in Tadeusz Czeżowski’s views about the nature of experience and knowledge. After the Second World War, Czeżowski, who was one of Twardowski’s closest disciples, came to the conclusion that, next to introspection (he held Brentanian views regarding the role of inner experience) and sense perception, there is an axiological, i.e. moral and aesthetic, experience, an intuition of values (Czeżowski 1948). Having extended the scope of experience, Czeżowski defended the view that there are moral and aesthetic truths. In 1948, Czeżowski refers explicitly to Husserl’s doctrine of Wesensschau as a valuable philosophical idea. The idea of an axiological insight was important for Czeżowski because he wanted to build ethics as an empirical science; moral judgments based on particular intuitions of values were to be the premises of logical  In 1930, Alfred Tarski writes: “my personal attitude … agrees in principle with that which has found emphatic expression in the writings of S. Leśniewski and which I would call intuitionistic formalism” (Tarski 1983, p. 62). Tarski’s mention of Leśniewski can be treated as an indirect reference to Husserl.

11

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inferences ultimately leading to true general moral principles.12 One should stress that Czeżowski’s adoption of axiological insights was not in conflict with Twardowski’s and Ajdukiewicz’s logical rationalism; Czeżowski underlined that moral statements (judgments expressed in sentences) are verifiable; they can be verified by confronting them, in changing circumstances, with other persons’ judgments. He was convinced that there is a class of unchanging moral truths accepted always, everywhere and by everyone (Czeżowski 1948). The phenomenological inspiration in Czeżowski’s defense of absolute moral truths based on moral intuition was not the only source of influence; Twardowski too was an alethic and moral absolutist, as were other members of the LWS.  However, Czeżowski’s reference made directly to Husserl is, in this respect, significant and noteworthy. One might conclude that Husserl’s influence upon the philosophy of truth in the LWS involved primarily two domains: semantics and axiology. He provided important ideas concerning how to speak about truths without the threat of antinomies and how to base ethics on justified and rational moral beliefs. At this point, one could ask about Husserl’s anti-psychologism and its role in the development of logic in Poland. Undoubtedly, Husserl’s ideas contributed to the separation of logic from psychology, and this, in turn, led to the development of semantics as the theory of how words are related to the world. What was most important for that separation of logic from psychology, and the advance of logic, was Husserl’s rejection of psychologism, which Twardowski and his disciples adopted. That anti-psychologistic turn proved vitally important for the further development of mathematical logic in Poland In the context of the emergence of anti-psychologism, the following question arises: was Husserl’s influence on Twardowski a one-way relation, or could we claim that there was a two-way influence and that Twardowski somewhat contributed to Husserl’s anti-psychologism? In Sect. 4, I will argue that it is at least possible that Twardowski’s ideas inspired Husserl’s refutation of ontological psychologism (psychologism of objects); since Husserl’s anti-psychologism may have been influenced by Twardowski’s views, we will discuss the issue under the label of interactions between Husserl’s phenomenology and the LWS.

4  I nteractions Between Husserl’s Logical Investigations and Twardowski’s Ontology of Mind There are two interpretations concerning the role that Husserl’s critique and rejection of psychologism played in the development of logic and ontology of truth in Poland. According to the first (Woleński 1999a), Husserl’s argumentation against psychologism in his Logical Investigations (1970 [1900]) first convinced Twardowski to reject psychologism (in its ontological version) and then his 12

 For more on this idea, see Łukasiewicz (2008).

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disciples, including Jan Łukasiewicz. Twardowski himself admitted in his Selbstdarstellung (1926; cf. Brożek 2014) that it was Husserl’s argumentation which convinced him to abandon psychologism around 1902.13 According to the second interpretation, Husserl rejected his psychologistic stance after he had read Twardowski’s habilitation On the Content and Object of Presentations (1977 [1894]).14 The key role in that rejection can be attributed to Twardowski’s distinction between an act’s content and its object (we will call the content-object distinction COD, for brevity).15 Twardowski argues that a mental act and its content are always psychic events occurring in time as real parts of the stream of consciousness, but objects of mental acts are never mental or psychic; they are not part of consciousness.16 There is no need to recall here all of Twardowski’s arguments in favour of the COD, but we must raise one issue. Twardowski shows that the content and the object of an act cannot be identical because an act and its content have properties which are different from the properties of an object; for instance, the presentation of a square is not a square itself.17 It was Władysław Tatarkiewicz (1886–1980), the eminent historian of philosophy, closely related to Twardowski’s school, who first noted that Twardowski’s idea of COD from 1894 inspired Husserl to reject psychologism (Tatarkiewicz 1958, pp. 300, 495–496). Also, according to Tatarkiewicz, the COD stimulated the beginning of Husserl’s phenomenology.18 Tatarkiewicz supports this claim with a simple line of reasoning: if objects of mental acts are ontologically distinct from acts (and their contents) themselves, then logical truths (the laws of logic) are not part of psychic processes, but are related to ideal concepts and

 Twardowski meant ontological psychologism rather than methodological psychologism; see the terminological issues below. 14  Husserl wrote a review of Twardowski’s work in 1896; thus, the founder of phenomenology must have known Twardowski’s book very well. 15  The very distinction was not new and had been known before Twardowski, but he was the first to expose it so clearly and to defend it by providing strong arguments. 16  Two additional remarks are in order. Firstly, Twardowski did not use the term “stream of consciousness”; this terminology was first used by William James. The second remark is that Twardowski’s COD went with another important view in which Twardowski directly opposed Bolzano’s idea of objectless presentations. By objectless presentations Bolzano meant acts intending nothing. Twardowski provided an ingenious analysis of the word “nothing” and demonstrated that the word “nothing” is no name, and there are no acts intending nothing. Thus, no act can be objectless. 17  For more detail about this, see Grossmann (1974) and Woleński (1999b). 18  It is unquestionable that Twardowski’s work (1894) had an important role in the emergence of Husserl’s early phenomenology and Meinong’s theory of objects (Grossmann 1974, p.  48; Paczkowska-Łagowska 1980, p. 96; Chrudzimski 2007, pp. 116–117). However, it is interesting that Roman Ingarden—the most eminent Polish phenomenologist and a direct pupil of Husserl— agreed only with the thesis that Twardowski’s work from 1894 influenced the beginning of Husserl’s phenomenology but not with Tatarkiewicz’s position that it had also contributed to Husserl’s rejection of psychologism (Ingarden 1966, p. 25). Ingarden argued that the COD was well known earlier and almost commonly accepted; hence, Twardowski’s arguments in defense of his COD from 1894 had no true impact on Husserl’s anti-psychologistic turn. 13

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states of affairs; therefore, logic cannot be part of psychology.19 In this context it is worthwhile quoting Husserl’s own report from 1913 concerning Twardowski’s work: In more recent times one often hears it proclaimed as a great step in advance that now at last the basic distinction between act, content and object has been achieved. The three words in this setting have almost become catchwords, especially since the publication of Twardowski’s fine treatise … Meanwhile, though the author’s merit in having discussed in a penetrating way certain current confusions, and exposed their latent fallacies, is undoubtedly a great one, it must still be said that in regard to the clearing up of the essential concepts involved he has not taken (and we do not impute any blame to him on this account) any considerable step beyond what was well-known (despite their carelessness and confusion) to the philosophers of former generations. Prior indeed to a systematic phenomenology of consciousness no radical progress was possible (Husserl 1931 [1913], pp. 361–362; page references are to the English translation).

Thus, if one considers Twardowski’s autobiography from 1926 and Husserl’s less than effusive opinion from 1913 (as well as some statements from Ingarden),20 it may seem that Tatarkiewicz’s claim about Twardowski’s significant contribution to the emergence of Husserl’s anti-psychologism is simply mistaken. Of course, it is true that the COD was known and used before Twardowski, and its traces can be found in the works of Benno Kerry, Alois Höfler and Robert Zimmermann. Furthermore, the idea has appeared and reappeared, since the time of Aristotle at least, in terms of a very general distinction between subject and object.21 But, let us repeat, none of these philosophers provided so clear and broad an argumentation for the COD as Twardowski did in 1894. It is also remarkable that Husserl changed his views about psychologism soon after Twardowski’s work appeared, and he mentioned that change for the first time in 1894 in his paper Intentionale Gegenstände (Husserl 1894). We must also remember that in (1894) Twardowski concentrated his attention on acts and objects of presentations, not judgments. The laws of logic or ideal states of affairs are objectual correlates of acts of judgments. But one cannot exclude the possibility that Husserl, inspired by Twardowski’s COD, simply extended the scope of the COD beyond presentations and their objects, and he included ideal (timeless) states of affairs as correlates of judgments and their contents.

 It is beyond the scope of the paper to investigate in detail possible reasons standing behind Tatarkiewicz’s claim, but it is assumed that an opinion formulated by a person standing in a close relation to Twardowski and his disciples is interesting and worth considering. 20  Cf. Ingarden (1966, p. 25); also: footnote 17 above. 21  Robert Zimmermann, Bolzano’s disciple, was an official supervisor of Twardowski’s doctoral dissertation in Vienna, because Brentano was not allowed to be a professor at the university at that time (the reason for that was Brentano’s marriage; Austrian law prohibited anyone who was once a Roman Catholic priest from marrying, as was Brentano’s case). Also, Zimmermann authored an important textbook for secondary schools published in 1853 which was, in part, influenced by Bolzano. This is important because Bolzano decisively rejected psychologism in logic and mathematics, and he defended a Platonist ontology of ideal concepts, propositions and truths in themselves (Bolzano 1972). One might suppose then that Zimmermann could also have influenced Twardowski’s view on the COD. 19

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Thus, a general picture of the interaction between Husserl and the LWS with respect to anti-psychologism might be drawn as follows: Twardowski’s COD influenced Husserl to reject psychologism (or: ontological psychologism, at least), and next, the Husserlian anti-psychologism inspired Twardowski to abandon his own psychologistic stance about logic and its relation to psychology. Twardowski’s anti-­ psychologism, in turn, influenced Jan Łukasiewicz to reject psychologism, who was Twardowski’s closest pupil, the first to develop mathematical logic, and who in turn taught Alfred Tarski.22 This general picture requires, however, some additional comments. Twardowski (1894) conceived the content of presentation as an entity totally accessible to inner perception (introspection). He also understood the content of an act as the meaning of its linguistic expression (name). The content as an empirical, temporal being comes into existence and then ceases to exist. If someone is thinking about a unicorn, it is temporal; the person cannot do it eternally. The content of presentation is always particular, which means that it exists at a given time and is possessed by a given person under a particular set of circumstances. This temporal and particular nature of the content raises the problem of how to explain the very possibility of objective knowledge and communication. Twardowski’s COD allows for the rejection of ontological psychologism with respect to objects of presentations, but not with respect to contents of acts. One may pose the question of why Twardowski, after introducing the COD, did not reject the psychologism of the contents of acts. This is an intriguing problem, particularly if one takes into account that Twardowski knew Bernard Bolzano’s Platonist philosophy of logic and mathematics very well.23 An answer to this question might be the following: philosophy should be a science, and psychology is the best available guarantee of the scientific nature of philosophy. The basic tool of psychology is inner perception; what exists, and can be acknowledged as existent, must be given in inner perception. But what is given in inner perception is always a particular, temporal content; inner perception cannot contain timeless Platonic forms, the “ideale Bedeutungen” or “truths in themselves” that Bolzano discusses. Twardowski may have regarded that part of Bolzano’s views as speculative metaphysics, rooted in medieval scholastic philosophy.24 In 1912,  Regarding the interconnections of ideas between Twardowski and Jan Łukasiewicz, Jacek Jadacki writes that “it was thanks to Twardowski that Jan Łukasiewicz became an antipsychologist” (2009, 190). 23  Twardowski cited Bolzano on 19 pages in his work On the Content…, while he quote Brentano on 8 pages (Kant likewise); however, Twardowski never referred to the Bolzanian Platonist theory of “truths in themselves.” 24  In 1910, Twardowski published an essay about medieval philosophy based on his lectures held in 1905–1906 in Lwów. He was very critical of medieval philosophy’s dependence on religion and its lack of any significant scientific achievements (Twardowski 1910). It was a typical view of many scholars at the time about the philosophy of the Middle Ages; A. Kenny comments on this: “Not so long ago, in many universities, courses in the history of philosophy went straight from Aristotle to Descartes, leaping over late antiquity and the Middle Ages. There was a widespread belief in academic circles that medieval philosophy was not worth studying. This belief was not usually based on any close acquaintance with relevant texts: it was more likely to be an unexamined inheritance 22

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Twardowski published his well-known work, “O czynnościach i wytworach” (1999 [1912]), where he defended the view that the content of a presentation is not a particular, individual entity (taken in concreto) but rather a set of properties resulting from an abstraction carried out upon individual contents, which are largely similar to one another. He calls the result of that abstraction carried out upon particular mental contents a “product” (“judgment” in the case of an abstraction made upon particular acts of judging). These abstract contents (products) are, in Twardowski’s opinion, susceptible to linguistic expression and, through language, they are accessible to others in the process of communication; also, they achieve stability by being founded in an objective linguistic system.25 The distinction Twardowski (1912) made between a particular/individual content of an individual mental act and an abstract content (i.e. meaning, conceived of as properties shared by particular individual contents) sets the borderline between psychology and logic. Psychology is concerned with individual, episodic events (acts/ events of judging), and logic deals with universals (propositions), or ‘products’ in Twardowski’s new terminology, which are grounded in real, psychic events.26 Finally, when examining Husserl’s role in the rejection of psychologism by the leading members of the LWS, it is worth noting how Jan Łukasiewicz reacted to Husserl’s Logical Investigations; this may shed some light on the philosophical climate in Twardowski’s school.27 To start with, let us consider the view Arianna of religious or humanist prejudice” (Kenny 2007, p. 257). 25  This solution to the threat of the psychologism of contents is not commonly and fully accepted. Maria van der Schaar, for instance, observes that: “Because for Twardowski meaning is ultimately explained as an abstraction upon (products of) individual acts, his semantics does not escape psychologism. In contrast to Husserl’s semantics, Twardowski’s notion of meaning is (partly) explained in naturalistic terms in so far as a judgment-product is the meaning of a sentence only if that sentence is able to cause a similar judgment in those who perceive that sentence” (2006, pp. 46–47). 26  It is worth noting that Twardowski, following Brentano, accepted the thesis that mental acts have by their very nature a property of being directed toward an object (called intentionality). The intentionality of consciousness is a primitive fact which is simply given in inner perception and explains how the human mind works in the world. A description of how the mind works discloses that there are various kinds of intentional acts; there are acts directed toward individual things (tables, horses) and acts directed toward general objects such as triangles, squares, or “peculiar” objects such as a round square or a unicorn. It was typical of Twardowski’s theory of intentionality that he never regarded general, contradictory and fictitious objects as having any form of being. They do not exit (to exist = to exist in time), and they have no ideal being, that is, they do not belong to any ideal realm of objects (for instance, to a Fregean third world). Thus, according to Twardowski’s theory of intentionality, all acts are intentional; there are no objectless intentional acts; not all objects exist; for every object x (existent or nonexistent) it is true that it has properties: there are no objects without properties. Husserl vehemently criticized Twardowski’s view; Husserl claimed that for any object x it is necessarily true that x has properties only if x exists or obtains, where obtaining is a kind of ideal, timeless form of being. Twardowski, let us repeat, never accepted the ontology of timeless objects, because they are not present in inner (or outer experience). If philosophy is to be a science, and for Twardowski this was a crucial postulate, it cannot accept anything that is not given in experience; and timeless objects are not given in temporal mental events. 27  Cf. Betti (2006).

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Betti (2006) expresses, based on J. Łukasiewicz’s own claims (see below), namely that neither Twardowski nor Husserl played a decisive role in the development of Łukasiewicz’s ontological and methodological anti-psychologism.28 The thinkers who exerted the greatest impact upon the young and brilliant logician from Lwów were Gottlob Frege and Bernard Bolzano (Betti, 2006, pp. 62–63). J. Łukasiewicz’s remarks from his Pamiętnik (Memoires) written in 1949 (published in 2013) tend to support this thesis: The first volume of Husserl’s Logical Investigations made a big impression in Lvov, especially on me. I had been disliking the psychologism cultivated by Twardowski already for a long time, now I had detached myself completely from it. … the second volume of Husserl’s logical investigations disappointed me. It contained again that certain murky prattle which was driving me away from all German philosophers. I was astonished that there could be such a difference between two volumes of the same work. Later I convinced myself that in the first volume of the Logical Investigations it was not Husserl talking to me, but only someone much greater than he, whom Husserl exploited in his book, and this was Gottlob Frege (Łukasiewicz 2013; English translation after Betti 2006, pp. 62–63).

However, even though Jan Łukasiewicz himself, many years after his anti-­ psychological turn, described his philosophical development in the way reported above, one must keep in mind that he always regarded a meaningful sentence as the primary truth-bearer, not an ideal timeless proposition or the Fregean Gedanken.29 It is also worth remembering here what Jan Łukasiewicz wrote in 1937 about the ontological status of logic: In concluding these remarks I should like to outline an image which is connected with the most profound intuitions which I always experience in the face of logistics [mathematical logic]. That image will perhaps shed more light on the true background of that discipline, at least in my case, than all discursive description could. Now, whenever I work on even the least significant logistic problem—for instance, when I search for the shortest axiom of the implicational propositional calculus—I always have the impression that I am facing a powerful, most coherent and most resistant structure. I sense that structure as if it were a concrete, tangible object, made of the hardest metal, a hundred times stronger than steel and concrete. I cannot change anything in it; I do not create anything of my own will, but by strenuous work I discover in it ever new details and arrive at unshakable and eternal truths. Where is and what is that ideal structure? A believer would say that it is in God and His thought (quotation after Woleński 1989, 195; italicization D.Ł.).

How to interpret these seemingly contradictory theses? The first, suggested by Betti and Łukasiewicz’s own words, is that there are ideal timeless structures/truth-­ bearers (Bolzanian “truths in themselves”) and the second is that meaningful sentences are the primary truth-bearers. This question about Łukasiewicz’s position can

 In 1904, Łukasiewicz held a lecture on ani-psychologism, and in 1907, he published a famous paper on the relation between logic and psychology, in which he presented his arguments against psychologism, similar to Husserl’s but formulated in a clearer form (Łukasiewicz 1961 [1907]). 29  Let us quote Artur Rojszczak’s meticulous analysis of J. Łukasiewicz’s views on the truth-bearer: “Following Aristotle, he [J. Łukasiewicz] distinguishes between a mental state of belief (or state of conviction) immanent to the mind on the one hand, and its counterpart as the meaningful sentence which is assertive or negative judgment uttered in words” (Rojszczak 2005, 195). 28

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be answered if we keep in mind Twardowski’s metaphilosophical program. Jan Łukasiewicz was a Christian believer who demonstrated his loyalty to the Roman-­ Catholic Church in public, and who believed that logic and mathematics have their foundation in the divine mind. But he treated such public comments on metaphysics as merely “private confessions of a philosopher,” as part of his worldview, not a scientific thesis. The scientific method, based on mathematical logic and rigorous deductive inference, does not allow one to accept beliefs rooted in religious faith. Thus, despite his critical approach to Twardowski’s early ontological and methodological psychologism, and despite his religious worldview which was close to Twardowski’s,30 Jan Łukasiewicz maintained the view that only meaningful sentences are truth-bearers. We can conclude this part of our consideration by saying that Husserl’s ontological anti-psychologism influenced Twardowski’s own views about the status of logic in relation to psychology and the views of his disciples, but this influence was limited, mediated and determined by Twardowski’s metaphilosophy. It would be difficult to categorically deny that the COD in Twardowski’s version from 1894, which Husserl knew very well, had no impact on Husserl’s own approach to psychologism; it is at least conceivable that Tatarkiewicz’s hypothesis is correct and Husserl did change, or modify, his beliefs about psychologism under the influence of Twardowski’s work.

5  P  arallel Development of the Ontology of Truth in Husserl’s Early Philosophy and in the LWS 5.1  Truth-Makers There are two conceptions directly connected with the ontology of truth which appeared among Brentano’s disciples and which deserve special attention: the ontology of states of affairs and the absoluteness of truth (alethic absolutism). The former plays a crucial role in the philosophy of truth because the state of affairs (Sachverhalt) is conceived of as a truth-maker for a truth-bearer in an alethic relation of truth-making. It was Husserl who, in his early phenomenology, introduced the notion of truth-maker (Wahrmacher) by which he meant states of affairs.31 Twardowski never elaborated any theory of states of affairs as Husserl, Meinong and, most notably, Adolf Reinach (one of Husserl’s disciples) had done. But one must say that the “logic” of Twardowski’s COD led him (in the years 1894–1897)  See more on this topic in Brożek (2014).  Husserl speaks about a “wahrmachenden Sachverhalt” in §39 of The Sixth Logical Investigation (Logical Investigations 1901/1970, vol. II, p. 767). It is also worth mentioning that the notion of Sachverhalt appears in 1894 in Husserl’s work Intentionale Gegenstände (1979). Carl Stumpf had shaped the technical meaning of Sachverhalt as a judgment-content, but not as a judgment-object, in 1888, and Husserl probably knew this because he attended Stumpf’s lectures (Smith 1988, p. 19).

30 31

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to the notion of states of affairs. However, in my view, Twardowski’s metaphilosophy inhibited the development of a full-fledged ontology of states of affairs in the LWS; we will consider this problem below in more detail. The COD stimulated Twardowski to think about relational judgments and judgments about the past and future. In 1894, Twardowski accepted Brentano’s theory of judgment, according to which all judgments are reducible to existential judgments, and the latter consist in the affirmation or rejection of a simple or complex object of presentation. The judgment “God exists,” if true, consists in affirming God as an object of the presentation of God, and the content of this judgment is God’s existence. In case of the judgment “The king Casimir the Great existed,” the object of this judgment is the king Casimir the Great. According to Brentano’s theory of intentionality, the object of this judgment exists now—at the moment when the event of presenting (thinking about Casimir the Great) happens. The Polish king is present in the immanence of consciousness, and as a present being he exists “now.” However, for Twardowski, such a solution was impossible because of his COD. The object of presentation is never present in consciousness because it is not part of the mental world, and therefore, one cannot say that it exists “now.” There is no Polish king now, the king Casimir the Great included. Thus, the two judgments: “God exists” and “The king Casimir the Great existed” cannot be interpreted in the same way, as Brentano’s theory postulated, as it did not differentiate between the content and object of presentation. Another problem following from Twardowski’s COD theory and the intentionality thesis concerns judgments about relations (relational judgments). Let us consider the judgment: “There exists an intentional relation between the presentation of the unicorn and the object of this presentation.” According to Brentano’s theory of judgment, one should assume that the object of the judgment in question is a complex (a whole) whose parts are the presentation of the unicorn and the object, i.e. the (immanent) unicorn itself. The judgment content would be the existence of the complex, composed of the presentation of the unicorn and the unicorn itself. It would follow from this that the unicorn exists, provided we understand a complex object as a mereological object (as a whole with all its material parts). Again, such a conclusion would be acceptable for Brentano who did not distinguish clearly and sharply between mental contents and non-mental objects of acts. Twardowski could not accept the conclusion that the unicorn exists because there is no unicorn in the real world of physical objects, and according to the COD, there cannot be any mental unicorn in the consciousness of a thinking subject (the content of a presentation of the unicorn has no features of the unicorn itself). Therefore, Twardowski came to the conclusion that the object of a relational judgment is not a mereological complex, and the nature of judgment need not always consist in affirmation (or negation) of simple (God) or complex objects of presentations. The above discussed difficulties concerning judgments about past objects and relations compelled Twardowski to search for another theory of judgment, different from Brentano’s orthodox existential theory (often called the “idiogenic” theory of judgment). The result of Twardowski’s investigations was a substantial revision of the classic Brentanian theory of judgment; he suggested introducing relational

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judgments as a distinct category. According to Twardowski’s new account of judgments, not all judgments are reducible to existential ones. The linguistic form for a relational judgment can be the sentence “A has b,” which asserts the relationship of an object A’s having the property b.32 Arianna Betti and Maria van der Schaar write on this topic: The problem of judgments about non-present objects as a special kind of non-existents is a strong reason for Twardowski to acknowledge another type of judgment next to existential ones (Twardowski 1894/1895, p. 119). If ‘Once there was a king’ is not to be contradictory, the content of this judgment cannot be the existence of an object. There must be judgments whose content is the “subsistence of a relationship, without consideration for the existence of the members of the relationship” (Twardowski 1894/1895, pp. 32f). Existing can be only objects [sic] which come into and go out of being; subsisting, on the contrary, are unchanging objects with no temporal determinations; relationships are construed as timeless objects whose ‘members’ may be objects which are past” (Betti, van der Schaar 2004, p. 10).33

According to Twardowski’s new theory of judgment, the content of a relational judgment is not the existence of a relationship but its subsistence (das Bestehen). The crucial point of this new approach to judgments is the assumption that the object of a relational judgment is not a mereological complex (a whole ordered by a part-whole relation) but some new ontological entity. That is why one is allowed to say that relations do not exist (to exist = to exist in time), but that they subsist. The subsistence of a relationship does not imply the existence of any of its terms (relata). According to this theory, the content of the judgment “God exists” is the existence of God, and the content of the judgment “The king Casimir the Great existed” is the subsistence of the relation of contemporaneousness between the king Casimir the Great and a certain period of time in the past (1310–1370). The object of the latter judgment is the relation of contemporaneousness between the king Casimir the Great and a certain period of time in the past (1310–1370). In a letter to Meinong from 1897, Twardowski summed up his views on judgments and their objects as follows: The main idea I have is: in every judgment we may distinguish 1. act (affirmation or denial) 2. content: the existing, the being there, the subsisting (Das Existieren, Vorhandensein, Bestehen) 3. object (the judged state of affairs (der beurteilte Sachverchalt) = either an absolute datum or a relation or both together. Example: ‘God exists’: object: God; content: existence; act: affirmation. Or ‘Two times two is four’: object: equality between the product of two times and four; content: the existence (subsistence) of this equality. Act: affirmation. I believe to attain [sic] two things with this theory: 1. A liberation for all theories of judgment of the unclarity that pertains to the concept of existence, 2. A unification of the Brentano–Meinong–Höfler–theory with the theory of Sigwart, where these three moments (act, content, object) are clearly distinguished (act=consciousness; content=objective validity; object: that what [sic], according to Sigwart, is unified in the presentations (Twardowski 1897, pp. 143, 144; quotation after Betti, van der Schaar 2004, pp. 11–12).34  An illuminating analysis of the ontology of states of affairs, including Twardowski’s views from 1894–1897, has been provided by Arianna Betti and Maria van der Schaar (2004, pp. 1–20). 33  Twardowski explained how to understand the relation asserted in the judgment “A has b” by an example of a causal relation: “A causes b”, which means “A has the property of being a cause of b.” 34  Regarding Twardowski’s proposal laid out in the letter to Meinong, B. Smith writes: “Twardowski, 32

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There are two points which should be emphasized regarding Twardowski’s ontology of states of affairs or relations. The first point is that Twardowski’s ideas concerning the ontology of judgment did not influence other Brentanians (see below); these ideas resulted from Twardowski’s own reflections on judgment in the context of his COD from 1894. The second point is that he never developed the ontology of states of affairs as Husserl, Meinong, Reinach and Ingarden did.35 In his lectures on the theory of cognition held in 1924–1925, Twardowski returned to the “old” Brentanian existential theory of judgment, criticized Russell’s theory of judgment and states of affairs (facts), reduced all judgments to existential form, and defined truth by the existence of objects (simple or complex) given in presentation.36 In these lectures, he says nothing about subsistence, states of affairs or objectual correlates of judgments. Moreover, as Betti and van der Schaar noted, there is an open question of whether and to what degree Twardowski in 1897 understood relationships (Verhältnisse) in the same way as Husserl and, later, Reinach conceived states of affairs.37 I suggest that there was a conflict between Twardowski’s ontology of truth following from the COD and his metaphilosophy based on descriptive psychology. If one accepts the COD and all its implications, then a new ontological

however, does take the decisive step of recognizing a special object of the judging act, in addition to the judgment content” (1994, p.  174). Smith also underlines that Twardowski’s ideas about objectual correlates of judgments were not known to Husserl and to other Brentanians, except for Meinong. In B. Smith’s opinion, the most important impact Twardowski made upon Husserl was the work On the Content and Object of Presentation from 1894, and in particular, the theory of parts and wholes, which Husserl developed later on in The Third Logical Investigation, as well as the theory of modifying adjectives. Arianna Betti evaluates Twardowski’s early influence on the development of metaphysics (but, let us stress, not on the development of the ontology of states of affairs) as follows: “Content and Object was a fundamental contribution to the renaissance of Aristotelian metaphysics—metaphysics in the sense of a general theory of objects—which led to both Meinong’s theory of objects and to Husserl’s formal ontology of parts and wholes in the Third Logical Investigation. The story continues, later, with Leśniewski’s mereology and Ingarden’s ontology” (Betti 2010). None of these scholars claim that Twardowski had any role in the emergence of Husserl’s ontology of states of affairs. 35  Reinach elaborated the most sophisticated phenomenological theory of state of affairs in his 1911 Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils (1982). 36  Twardowski writes: “An affirmative judgment is true if its object exists, a negative judgment is true if its object does not exist; an affirmative judgment is false if its object does not exist, and a negative judgment is false if its object does exist” (Twardowski 1975, p. 268; translation DŁ). 37  Betti and van der Schaar discuss certain pros and cons regarding the question of how to understand Twardowski’s “relations” (Verhältnisse). They make a list of arguments against the thesis that for Twardowski relationship = state of affairs in Husserl’s sense: (1) Twardowski never used the term “state of affairs” in a technical way; (2) each judgment is always based on a presentation, and therefore, a relation is always only the object of presentation and not a special additional object of judgment; (3) relations are always positive, never negative (negation is in an act, and not in the object or in the state of affairs); (4) the object of the existential judgment “God exists” is God, and not any special propositionally articulated entity like “that the God exists” or “the existence of God;” (5) Twardowski did not explain what the relation between a relationship (Verhältnisse) and its constituents could be (Betti, van der Schaar 2004, pp. 16–17).

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category—state of affairs—is needed. But if one accepts the state of affairs as something different from all that exists, then one needs to speak about timeless ideal beings as states of affairs. According to Twardowski, however, there is no room in science and scientific philosophy for entities lying beyond inner or outer experience, and timeless objects are beyond human experience.

5.2  Alethic Absolutism The second parallel between Husserl’s phenomenology and the philosophy and ontology of truth in the LWS concerns the absoluteness of truth (alethic absolutism). Both Husserl in his early writings and the members of the LWS accepted alethic absolutism.38 In 1900, Twardowski published his article “O tak zwanych prawdach względnych” (the article appeared also in German, in 1902).39 Twardowski’s paper did not attract the attention of any German philosophers, but it exerted great influence upon his disciples in Poland.40 Twardowski characterizes absolute truth as follows: Those judgments which are unconditionally true, without any reservations whatsoever, and regardless of any circumstances, which are thus true always and everywhere, are absolute truths. Those judgments which are true only under certain conditions, with some reservation, owing to certain circumstances, are relative truths; hence such judgments are not true always and everywhere (quotation after Woleński 1989, pp. 46–47)

In other words, an absolute truth is a judgment which is always true, everywhere, for everyone, regardless of any circumstances.41 By judgment, Twardowski means here  There were few but significant exceptions among the representatives of Twardowski’s School regarding alethic absolutism. Edward Poznański and Aleksander Wundheiler rejected the classical conception of truth; they accepted an epistemic notion of truth which reduces truth to the acceptance of a theory by a community of competent experts (Woleński 2016, 97). 39  This article appeared in Księga Pamiątkowa Uniwersytetu Lwowskiego ku uczczeniu pięćsetnej rocznicy fundacji Jagiellońskiej Uniwersytetu Krakowskiego (reprinted in Twardowski 1965). In 1902, the article was published in German under the title „Über sogenannte relative Wahrheiten” in Archiv für systematische Philosophie (reprinted in Pearce, Woleński 1988); the English translation, entitled “On so-called relative truths” was published in Brandl, Woleński (1999a). 40  T. Kotarbiński questioned the absoluteness of truth in 1912, when he was considering the problem of human creativity and J. Łukasiewicz discussed it in the philosophical context of human freedom (Woleński 1990; Łukasiewicz 2011). However, it is rather an uncontroversial view among contemporary scholars that the most significant achievement of the LWS was Alfred Tarski’s semantic theory of truth presented in “The Concept of Truth in the Languages of Deductive Sciences” ([1936] 1983). In this work, Tarski (who was a direct disciple of J. Łukasiewicz and S. Leśniewski) defended the absoluteness of truth in the sense given to this concept by Twardowski himself. Peter Simons argues, contrary to many contemporary commentators, that Tarski did not define truth relative to a model, or interpretation, but simpliciter as Twardowski did himself in 1900 (Simons 2009, 4). 41  Woleński and Simons (1989) provides a more detailed exposition and analysis of Twardowski’s theory of truth. 38

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a particular, temporal, episodic, mental event, and not something like Bolzano’s ideal, timeless Satz an sich or Husserl’s ideale Bedeutung. Here we ought to recall Husserl’s understanding of the absoluteness of truth, which he first laid out in 1900 in the first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen: What is true is absolutely, intrinsically true: truth is one and the same, whether men or non-­ men, angels or gods apprehend and judge it. Logical laws speak of truth in this ideal unity, set over against the real multiplicity of races, individuals and experiences, and it is of this ideal unity that we all speak when we are not confused by relativism (Husserl 1970 I, p. 140).

And he continues: Each truth, however, remains in itself what it is, it retains its ideal being: it does not hang somewhere in the void, but is a case of validity in the timeless real of Ideas (Husserl 1970, I, p. 149)42 [my italicization].

Both Husserl and Twardowski defended the absoluteness of truth and laid out arguments demonstrating the logical incoherence of various kinds of relativism, which was a very popular view among philosophers at the time. For Twardowski, the reason why relativists reject the absoluteness of truth is a conceptual confusion which they notoriously make between elliptic sentences and judgments.43 We must stress that Twardowski, like Husserl, defended the absoluteness of all kinds of truths, not only sentences including indexical expressions but scientific statements and moral judgments. Moreover, Twardowski’s alethic absolutism was not based on the Platonist ontology of timeless truth-bearers (which he rejected due to metaphilosphical principles which we discussed above). There arises an interesting historical question about possible influences and connections in that respect between Twardowski and other thinkers. Peter Simons suggests that Twardowski’s absolutism may have been inspired by Bolzano, whose work was well known to Twardowski. On the other hand, we must acknowledge that Twardowski does not mention Bolzano anywhere in his paper from 1900 (Simons 2009, p.  6); nevertheless, it is conceivable that Bolzano somehow inspired Twardowski. The person who was undoubtedly under Bolzano’s great influence was Husserl, as evidenced by his own remarks in the Logical Investigations (1970, vol. I, pp. 223–224). It is also worth remembering that Twardowski did not entirely share Brentano’s view on truth; he did accept the latter’s definition of truth based on Aristotle’s  Compare Husserl’s position with Bolzano’s. Bolzano says: “The word proposition, because of its origin from the verb ‘to posit’, does indeed remind one of an action, of something that has been posited by someone. But we must abstract from this in the case of truths in themselves. They are not posited by anyone, not even by the divine understanding. It is not the case that something is true because God recognizes it as such; on the contrary, God recognizes something as being of a certain nature because it is so” (Bolzano 1972, pp. 33–34). 43  If we take the sentence “it rains,” it can be true for one person and false for another, but Twardowski’s argument against relativists was that “the completion of that sentence by adequate spatio-temporal indicators makes that sentence express an absolutely true judgment” (Woleński 1989, p. 47). 42

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notion—the so-called weak version of the classical definition of truth (Woleński and Simons 1989, p.  393; D. Łukasiewicz 2007)—but he rejected Brentano’s idea of truth’s dependence on time.44 However, contrary to Barry Smith’s opinion that for Twardowski in 1900 truth was a “timeless relation” (Smith 1994, p. 163), I find it rather improbable that Twardowski, in his paper from 1900, could indeed conceive of truth as a timeless relation. It is difficult to understand how the truth-making relation could be timeless if the truth-bearer—a particular judgment and one of the terms of truth-making relation—exists in time only temporarily.45 Regardless of how one defends Twardowski’s ontology of truth and its coherence, it is unquestionable that his view on alethic absolutism was an original achievement at the time, quite independent of Husserl’s absolutism, which was based on a fully Platonist ontology of truth. Husserl’s ontology of truth was fully Platonist because truth-bearers are ideal meaning-entities (propositions), truth-­ makers are ideal states of affairs, and thus, it is understandable how the truth-­making relation itself can be timeless. The Platonist ontology of truth was not acceptable to Twardowski, whose scientific metaphilosophy prohibited him from acknowledging any timeless entities. In sum, Husserl’s most significant impact on the philosophy of truth in the LWS consisted in his contribution to the separation of logic from psychology. Also, he stimulated the emergence of a relational ontology of truth based on the distinction between two ontologically distinct realms of truth-bearers, on the one hand, and truth-makers, on the other. However, Twardowski’s strong attachment to scientific metaphilosophy inhibited any development of an idealistic ontology of propositions and states of affairs in his own philosophy and in the philosophy of the LWS. Acknowledgments  I would like to express my gratitude to Elżbieta Łukasiewicz for both reading and improving the paper.

 B. Smith writes: “The divergence between Brentano and Twardowski turns on the fact that what is real may change, and this implies on Brentano’s account that there may occur changes in the truth-values of corresponding judgments. … As Brentano puts it, the truth of a judgment about what is real ‘is conditioned by the existence, the coming into being, or the passing away, of the reality to which the judgment pertains.’ Hence: ‘Without itself undergoing any change, the judgment will gain or lose its truth if the reality in question is created or destroyed’. Truth, accordingly, is not a timeless property of judgments—a conclusion which is taken by Brentano to imply that God, too, if he is omniscient, must exist in time, since the knowledge of which judgments are true and which false must change from moment to moment” (Smith 1994, pp. 160–161). 45  This does not mean that Twardowski’s alethic absolutism has to collapse. Peter Simons argues that it is possible to defend the absoluteness of truth as Twardowski did in 1900, and to stand on the ground of the naturalistic ontology; both the truth-bearer (an episodic mental event) and the truth-maker (the way the world is at a given time t) are temporal (Simons 2009, p. 9). 44

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Gustav Špet’s “Hermeneutical Phenomenology” Project: His Reinterpretation of Husserl’s Phenomenology Natalia Artemenko

Abstract  Over the past several decades, the figure of Gustav Špet (1879–1937) has grown unceasingly in prominence, and the significance of his work in contemporary philosophy has increased accordingly. Alongside this process has been another, equally relentless one—that of the elaboration and enrichment of our conceptions of this philosopher’s creative character, as well as of the nature and essence of his philosophy. Špet is set to become yet another major figure in the synthesis of the humanities that emerged during the first half of the twentieth century. From the point of view of historical fact, Špet’s involvement with the phenomenological movement is limited to him being Husserl’s student in Göttingen from 1912–1913, and to their subsequent written correspondence. Appearance and Sense, his monograph devoted to the problems of phenomenology, was published in 1914. The interweaving of phenomenology and hermeneutics that occurred in Appearance and Sense allowed Špet to reveal the very essence of phenomenology, the exact essence which, according to him, Husserl was unable to unveil. Here he relied on hermeneutics to present phenomenology in a fundamental way. In this text, hermeneutics and phenomenology are bound tightly together, and they intersect constantly. Following A. Savin, we endeavour to justify the thesis that hermeneutics only gained meaning within the scope of his phenomenological program, and as such for Špet himself hermeneutics most likely served to provide a detailed commentary of his phenomenological research with no independent significance of its own. Keywords  Hermeneutics · Phenomenology · Gustav Špet · Alexei Savin · Husserl · Phenomenological program · Rigorous science

N. Artemenko (*) Institute of Philosophy, Saint Petersburg State University, St Petersburg, Russia © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 W. Płotka, P. Eldridge (eds.), Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe, Contributions to Phenomenology 113, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39623-7_4

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For several decades the figure of Gustav Špet (1879–1937) has grown unceasingly in prominence and the significance of his work in contemporary philosophy has increased accordingly. Alongside this process, there has been another equally unceasing one going on: the elaboration and enrichment of our notions of the philosopher’s creative character as well as of the nature and essence of his philosophy. For a long time these notions remained superficial. Špet’s grandson, Michael K. Polivanov, who was also his first biographer, succinctly characterized him as a “Russian Husserlian.” This sacrosanct formula found strong consensus among those familiar with Špet’s name and legacy, including Russian philosophers living in exile, Soviet and foreign experts on Russian thought, even those who once knew him personally and valued his philosophy, such as B. Asmus or P. Popov, along with his surviving students. This widely approved formula, however, was abandoned more or less as soon as detailed research into the philosopher’s work began. That Špet’s early creative work (including 1914s milestone Appearance and Sense) lies in the wake of phenomenology is, of course, undeniable, although even here there were already some noticeable deviations from the classical doctrine as presented in Husserl’s Logical Investigations and Ideas I. His subsequent work, on the other hand, began to be actively align itself with a panoply of other lines of thought. In his later work other scholars and thinkers found independent views of hermeneutics, semiotics, structuralism, as well as profound and original elaborations on almost the entire gamut of the humanities, from logic to philosophy of language, from psychology to aesthetics. The next stage in the reception of Špet’s works is characterized by a lack of basic unity, given the variety of subjects, the wide range of ideas discussed in the studies of his oeuvre, the pluralism of scholars’ attitudes and the diverse trends of their elaboration. During this period, different and quite divergent evaluations of Špet’s philosophy coexisted in the scholarly literature. Scholars claimed to find the essence and main substance of his thought in phenomenology, hermeneutics, logic, psychology, linguistics… But now this stage has also passed. The way to a new consensus, to a mature perception of Špet’s thought began with the acknowledgement that no single area or discipline of the humanities can encapsulate the totality of Špet’s thought (Denn et al. 2014). Špet is set to become another major figure in the synthesis of the humanities that emerged during the first half of the twentieth century. Horuzhy (2010) states that at the heart of his project there is an epistemic core, which Špet formed through enhancing the phenomenological attitude (Einstellung) with the hermeneutic one, a beholding aided by comprehension (Einsicht) (cf. Shpet 1992, p. 35, my translation). Characteristic of his approach, Shpet claims that “[i]t is not enough for philosophy just to see an ‘eidos’ in reflecting on consciousness, it also should be comprehended, which is achieved in the act of its determination (judgment)” (Shpet 1917, p. 57, my translation). S. Horuzhy, for instance, believes that the two cognitive paradigms form a flexible combination in Špet’s work, in which each may come to the foreground depending on the area of its application, i.e., the phenomenological attitude would be ascendant in a description of the phenomena of consciousness,

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while the hermeneutic attitude would take precedence in a description of social phenomena (such descriptions were prevalent in the philosopher’s later works). As Horuzhy tells us, “while the first [paradigm] could only be inherently Husserlian (however, with serious amendments made, considering Špet’s immanent criticism of Husserl), the second [paradigm] was original, fashioned by Špet himself on the basis of his work on the major reconstruction of the hermeneutic discourse” (Horuzhy 2010, p. 130, my translation). Špet was sensitive to the transformation of hermeneutics into a new philosophical direction with its own logic and its own research methods, and it was this sensitivity that enabled him to make a significant contribution to the elaboration of hermeneutics. Until he was officially rehabilitated in 1956, there was practically no mention of Špet’s name in print in Russia. By that point it was not possible to restore the memory of him in public consciousness, which had been subjugated by the inertia and fear of the Stalin era. Spiegelberg makes just a single cautious mention of Špet in his lengthy work on the history of the phenomenological movement (Spiegelberg 1960), which reads, “Špet seems to be the best expert on Husserl’s phenomenology and its best conveyor” (Spiegelberg 1960, p. 622). At the time, Špet was generally known as an author of works on the history of Russian philosophy rather than as an original interpreter of phenomenology advancing a hermeneutical approach (Scanlan 1970). As for Western Europe and the United States, the situation began to change slowly after 16 scholars made presentations on various aspects of Špet’s oeuvre at a conference dedicated to his works held in Germany in June 1986. Since that time, interest in Špet’s work remains healthy, while the flow of research literature devoted to him has been increasing. From the point of view of historical fact, Špet’s involvement with the phenomenological movement is limited to him being Husserl’s student in Göttingen from 1912–1913, and to their subsequent written correspondence. Appearance and Sense, the monograph devoted to the problems of phenomenology, was published in 1914. Špet completed this work in Göttingen on October third, 1913. At the time, Špet maintained very intense communication with Husserl (they used to meet almost every day), and other phenomenologists (M. Scheler, J. Hering). His communication with Husserl and the Göttingen phenomenologists, as well as his reading of Ideas I (1913), undoubtedly influenced Gustav Špet’s intellectual journey. Appearance and Sense—the book which, incidentally, Špet dedicated to Husserl, sending him an autographed copy—gives testimony to this fact. Later, Husserl sent the book to Jan Patočka who, in his turn, donated it to the Husserl Archives in Louvain, Belgium. There is not, however, sufficient evidence to allow us to talk of G. Špet’s influence on the phenomenological movement in its historical elaboration. On December 14th, 1913, Špet writes in a letter to Husserl: Phenomenology is not just the basis of theoretical sciences (logical, ontological, even empirical) but it is also the basis of any practical and axiological knowledge in the broadest sense and, moreover, the basis of “life” and “the philosophical life” as a whole. … Could it be that within the phenomenological attitude, we are not going also to describe and analyze experiences (Erlebnisse), like the experiences of St. Theresa or J. Böhme, or of St. Thomas’ [Aquinas] conversations with God? (Shpet and Gusserl’ 1996, p. 125, my translation)

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Shortly after this letter, he launched his own hermeneutic-phenomenological project, laying its foundation in such a way that would allow the possibilities of description to spread to new social and cultural realms of being, so that the scope of reality, the scope of problems accessible for analysis, would not be narrowed, but expanded to their fullest extent. And while he did not concern himself with undertaking the tasks set out in this letter, by no means did he think that they should be withdrawn. The “historical problem,” i.e., the problem of historical knowledge, of history as a science, which Špet worked on from 1912 to 1913, served as the philosophical context for Appearance and Sense. Judging by his letters, at this time he was also working on the second volume of his thesis History as a Problem of Logic: Critical and Methodological Research (published in 1916), specifically on a chapter concerning the methodology of history in the nineteenth century, as well as on chapters concerning Dilthey, Sigwart, Wundt and Rickert. These same authors appeared in Appearance and Sense along with Husserl, and in many respects set the tone for Špet’s declaration in that letter to Husserl. The problem of social being posed in Appearance and Sense did not emerge by accident, but stemmed from Špet’s search for an answer to the question: “In what way is historical knowledge possible?” This question occupied the foreground of his thought as he was working on the first volume of History as a Problem of Logic, with the subtitle “Materials.” There he stated that the historical problem demands its own semiotic and hermeneutic epistemology. These ideas to a large extent set the direction for Špet’s thought as implemented in Appearance and Sense, but he did not want to express them in a positive form, “keeping the Pythagorean silence” (Shchedrina 2005, p. 326) and giving no “endings” in his books, following the advice L. Shestov gave him. And only in the seventh chapter, “Sense and Comprehension,” did he finally express the question of sense and the question of comprehending social being in a positive form, and he aimed these very questions at Husserl. This chapter—which set the vector of Špet’s subsequent philosophical movement—came to its full, mature, logical expression in his later work The Internal Form of the Word (1927). This work, although it investigates different material with different language, actually poses the same questions as those outlined in Appearance and Sense. Appearance and Sense should nevertheless be considered Gustav Špet’s major work, not only because it is his first book, but because it provides the basis and interpretive keys to all his other works. Moreover, published in 1914, Appearance and Sense became the first Russian language text in which Špet analytically and critically delivered the contents of the first volume of Husserl’s Ideas I (1913). Inter alia, it is significant and interesting because it represents one of the first reactions to the programmatic work of transcendental phenomenology. Yet the genuine distinctive feature of this text resides in the fact that it goes much further than reconstruction and criticism of Husserl’s project, offering, albeit in very general terms, its own version of an inner transformation of phenomenology, a transformation aimed at a consistent and absolute foundation of the basic principles of phenomenological philosophy. Here we should acknowledge the special nature of the historical stage of the phenomenological movement’s elaboration, which we may call “pre-­ institutional.” Phenomenological philosophy, despite the great scope of its research

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and the work already done, still remained at the stage of general programs and elaboration of basic methodological principles. It had not yet gained the influence in contemporary philosophizing that it would acquire in the coming decades. This circumstance ensured a particular freedom in reception and criticism, of which Špet took full advantage. Moreover, the fruitfulness of Špet’s interpretation of Husserl was facilitated by his position as an “outsider,” a researcher not shackled by institutional constraints or disciplinary frameworks. However, the fact that the book was written in Russian turned out to be a serious obstacle to the reception of Špet’s theoretical innovations in the context of the “phenomenological movement,” which subsequently became international. Subsequent historical events, along with the tragic fate of Špet himself (he was arrested in 1935, exiled, and executed in 1937) would render this obstacle altogether insurmountable. The interweaving of phenomenology and hermeneutics that occurred in Appearance and Sense allowed Špet to reveal the very essence of phenomenology, the exact essence which, according to his words, Husserl was unable to unveil. And here he referred to hermeneutics in order to present phenomenology in a basic and essential way. In this text, hermeneutics and phenomenology are bound tightly together, and they intersect constantly—but this claim is not self-evident and demands clarification. Before 1914 (the year Appearance and Sense was published), Špet was of the belief that Husserl had already accomplished the formation of a true positive philosophy. There remained just a few “corrections” to be made to his phenomenology to arrive at a “basic science of philosophy,” basic both for philosophy in general and for all concrete sciences. But even during his work on Appearance and Sense, Špet began to have his doubts not only about the supposed impeccability of phenomenology’s methodological techniques, but also the absolute clarity of all methods of research. These doubts were primarily associated with the problems of the comprehension of sense, and the structure of the comprehending activity. So he undertook a systematic investigation of the problems of hermeneutics, and expounded the results of this research in his book Hermeneutics and Its Problems, completing a manuscript in 1918 which, due to circumstances beyond the author’s power, would not be published in his lifetime. At various times, scholars have advanced competing claims about the total consistency of all Špet’s works on the one hand (i.e., of the bond uniting all Špet’s writings), and about a “turning point” which occurred in the elaboration of Špet’s oeuvre on the other hand (for instance, the thesis of the so-called “hermeneutic turn,” which resulted in the hermeneutical period succeeding the phenomenological one). In January 2014, the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences organized a roundtable dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the first publication of Appearance and Sense with the theme “G. Špet’s Appearance and Sense. The Book and Its Significance for the Intellectual Culture of the twentieth Century”. Maryse Dennes, who translated Appearance and Sense into French, noted that, It was precisely in Appearance and Sense that Špet referred to hermeneutics, in order to expand the phenomenological approach in its entirety. Špet’s interest in hermeneutics was rooted in his desire to contemplate the essence of phenomenology. That is exactly why he

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N. Artemenko turned to Dilthey’s works on the process of time. It does not imply that a new period in his work started from that very moment. It simply means that, in referring to Dilthey, Špet continued to elaborate the approach which he had already outlined analyzing Husserl’s Ideas I but, this time, he aimed to reveal the essence of hermeneutics. The same thing happened when Špet turned to the Humboldt’s ideas concerning the problematics of the internal form of the word. Yet, as I see it, Špet could already be considered a hermeneut in Appearance and Sense, due to the fact that, in trying to comprehend the essence of phenomenology and put forward the problem of the structure of word and expression he, if I may say so, demanded a hermeneutic effort from his reader as well (Denn et al. 2014).

Anna Han, an editor of the Hungarian translation of Špet’s Appearance and Sense, mentioned that Špet made a kind of “hermeneutical correction” to Husserl’s phenomenology. An early phenomenological stage of Špet’s philosophical elaboration, presented in his book Appearance and Sense (1914), and in the article Consciousness and Its Owner (1916), indicates that the philosopher was not content with just an attempt at instilling Husserl’s phenomenological thinking into the Russian philosophical tradition, as he also implemented the practice of critically interpreting Husserl’s teachings in accordance with the cultural demands of his era. It seems that Špet made the ‘hermeneutic correction’ of Husserl’s phenomenology exactly in the spirit of the existential and philosophical demands of the Russian cultural environment at the beginning of the twentieth century, contemporary to him (Denn et al. 2014).

Ulrich Schmid, who translated the introduction to Appearance and Sense into German, tells us: The merit of Špet resides in the expansion of Husserl’s phenomenology, which he did by introducing the hermeneutic dimension. Cognition, according to Špet, always implies the comprehension of the text, which is not given simply by chance. Špet demanded, just as Husserl did, a strict philosophical method that would exclude all accidents in comprehension. Therefore, he anticipated the ideas which, in time, were given their final expression by Hans-Georg Gadamer: “We must seek comprehension based on methodological awareness, not just exercising anticipations, but being aware of and controlling these anticipations in order to achieve genuine comprehension, coming from things” (Gadamer 1986, p. 274, my translation) (Denn et al. 2014).

There is an interesting problem behind all these estimations indicating, perhaps, some difference in the metalanguages for talking about Špet—let us attempt to clarify this problem. In the context of the history of philosophy, the elaboration of Špet’s thought is indeed often regarded as a transition from phenomenology to hermeneutics. Such a standpoint has become long established and, over 30 years of the thematic, historical, and philosophical elaboration of Špet’s philosophy, this view has acquired those elements of obviousness, automatism and self-evidence that are inherent to any traditional standpoint. Today, I think that any specialist in this historical and philosophical area, if asked what they knew about Špet’s philosophy, would answer that Špet was a Russian student of Husserl (the founder of phenomenology) who later experienced a “hermeneutic turn,” abandoned phenomenology, and afterwards devoted himself to the elaboration of an original philosophy of language. It is noteworthy that the vast majority of experts on Špet’s philosophy would give an answer essentially similar to this one.

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O.  Mazaeva, in her review of the history of the study of Špet’s philosophical thought, has clearly demonstrated that the historical and philosophical research into the elaboration of Špet’s thought has, from the very day it began up until now, predominantly represented Špet’s philosophy of language based on a contemplation of his hermeneutics. In her 2010 article “On the History of the Research into Špet’s Legacy (Discussing Problems of Philosophy of Language),” Mazaeva wrote: Discussion of the problems of philosophy of language in G. Špet’s work remained dominant at the conference in Lausanne (2005), Bordeaux (2007), and Tomsk (2008). The philosophy of language is the focus of a variety of G. Špet’s projects. During the period from 1914–1916, after his transition to hermeneutical problems, he turned to various aspects of the philosophy of language in his works. Špet devoted Hermeneutics (1918) to research into the problem of understanding, moving from Origen to Dilthey and Georg Simmel, paying attention to innovations in the philosophical ideas of a number of philosophers, including T. Reid, who contributed to the elaboration of analytic philosophy. In Hermeneutics, we can distinguish an already present and persistent motif of the ‘internal form of the word’, which became the title for his work written 1927, and the leitmotif for the philosopher’s entire future oeuvre (Mazaeva 2010, pp. 172–173).

Olga Mazaeva is among those researchers who regard Špet’s transition from phenomenology to hermeneutics as a historical and philosophical problem, but not as a fact or a commonplace. In particular, she rightly believes that discussions of the correlations of hermeneutics and phenomenology, of consciousness and language in both contemporary philosophy and in studies of Špet’s oeuvre, still remain unresolved. In this regard she states, “… phenomenology should hardly be considered as a ‘transient and decreasing value’ which can be dispensed with in due course; I do not think that all of its resources have been exhausted or, perhaps, even detected” (Mazaeva 2010, p. 173). Alexei Savin, in his article “A Phenomenological Interpretation of Špet’s Hermeneutics” (Savin 2015), made the incisive observation that “the interpretation of the development of Špet’s thought as a transition from phenomenology to hermeneutics was conditioned by the history of the perception of his philosophy. It appears that such an interpretation was a result of transferring the history of its perception into the history of its elaboration” (Savin 2015, p. 343). Savin explained his thesis in the following way: because Špet’s philosophy became primarily the subject of issue-related studies conducted by philologists, in particular the Western slavists, his analysis of the word, considered from the perspective of linguistic problems (semiotics), was considered to be his most interesting and significant contribution. Accordingly, they regard Špet’s Hermeneutics and Its Problems as the philosophical justification of a philological (historical, legal) hermeneutics, and as for his phenomenological works, particularly Appearance and Sense, they consider those to be a preparatory period for this achievement. When philosophers began their research into the development of Špet’s thought, they inherited this philological interpretation of the elaboration of Špet’s thought. This explanation found support in both the objective chronology of Špet’s works (Appearance and Sense [1914] preceded Hermeneutics and Its Problems [1918]), and in the broader “linguistic turn” in European philosophy, in the shift from phenomenology to hermeneutics, from Husserl to Heidegger and Gadamer (Savin 2015, p. 344).

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Savin tells us that this situation became clear after publication of Heidegger’s The Hermeneutics of Facticity (1988) and the publication of Canadian historian of philosophy J. Grondin’s works in the 1990s and early 2000s; these demonstrated that Gadamer’s Truth and Method was not based on Being and Time, with its recognition of the phenomenological method, but precisely on The Hermeneutics of Facticity with its declaration of the separation between hermeneutics and phenomenology. Jean Grondin wrote, In his [Heidegger’s] thought, hermeneutics is elevated to the center of philosophical concern. It is true, however, that Heidegger’s hermeneutics long remained hidden, despite the appearance of Being and Time. He developed his hermeneutic initiatives during the early twenties in the course of lectures entitled Hermeneutics of Facticity, without, however, publishing his inquiries in this area. … So there is a good deal of evidence suggesting that Heidegger’s real hermeneutics is to be found in the early lectures. These provided substantial impetus for the subsequent development of hermeneutics, especially Gadamer’s (Grondin 1994, pp. 91–92).

In 1923 Heidegger claimed in The Hermeneutics of Facticity that phenomenology “can no longer be saved.” We could say, following A. Savin, that in light of Heidegger and Gadamer’s hermeneutics, phenomenology can (and should) be overcome because of: (1) Heidegger’s critique of the idea of intuition; (2) the question concerning Being and the interpretation of understanding as Dasein’s way of being; (3) Heidegger’s explication of pre-understanding structures; (4) Gadamer’s disclosure of prejudices as a condition for understanding; (5) Gadamer’s detection of the applied structure of the understanding. It seems that all this richness and depth was opposed, on the side of Husserl’s phenomenology, by the hermeneutically superficial analysis of expression and designation’s noetic-noematic structures. It is the little that phenomenology can contribute to study of sense and its comprehension. On the basis of an actual, chronological conjunction between the trajectory of Špet’s philosophical development and the general trend in European philosophy, Špet is routinely treated as a Russian harbinger of Heidegger’s1 and Gadamer’s hermeneutics—as a figure who had his roots in phenomenology, just as they did, but who subsequently overcame it. But does the semantic history coincide with the actual history and chronology? In the above-mentioned article, A. Savin posited that Špet’s hermeneutics, semiotics

1  Regarding Heidegger, we should put a special focus on the figure of Špet. After all, Heidegger was the thinker who proposed a radical revision of the subject, method, and implementation of philosophical work. He was, on the one hand, fashioning his ontological project in close connection with the traditional views which had already become thoroughly obscured in his day, and in a break with the tradition and a claim to a fundamentally new initiation, on the other hand. These claims Heidegger made, which might seem excessive, were in fact partly justified, due to the fact that one of the major questions that agitated Heidegger throughout his intellectual life was the question of what philosophy is. So Heidegger’s destruction of the philosophical tradition, the destruction which was this tradition’s only means of survival, emerged as a result of the attempts made to answer this central question. All the above makes us think of Špet, as both thinkers believed that the revival of genuine philosophy is possible through returning to its origins and to real philosophical problems.

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and philosophy of language acted as a detailed commentary, as a clarification and deepening of his phenomenological research, and, accordingly, that the elaboration of the hermeneutic problematics, semiotics and philosophy of language had a dependent—albeit important—significance within the scope of his phenomenological program. His argument is persuasive. A. Savin states that Hermeneutics and Its Problems represents the analysis of the history of hermeneutics performed with phenomenological instruments and for phenomenological purposes (Savin 2015). Regarding method, we can characterize this work by the following: (1) Antipsychologism; (2) the distinction between the object and the act of understanding, based on Husserl’s idea of intentionality; (3) The distinction between formal and material ontology (which Špet expressed through a distinction between the doctrine of the understanding as such, and its application to specific content, or through the corresponding operation of detaching the “material” characteristics of the understanding, which are inherent to philological, historical, and legal hermeneutics). Regarding the work’s purpose, it demonstrates how it is possible to explicate the sense of an object and conditions of its comprehensibility in the light of the problem of the correlation between constitutive reason and constituted reality. Let us note that all these methods and goals were also characteristic of Husserl’s Ideas I (1913). Špet just aspired to implement and develop these purposes (in both Appearance and Sense and Hermeneutics and Its Problems) as he believed that Husserl had not elaborated them amply enough, although he was going in the right direction. Accordingly, the elaboration of a “layer” of expression (sign) as the seat of the reason (“logos”) became significant for phenomenological philosophy. The phenomenological explication and understanding of expression (sign) became the cornerstone of his hermeneutics (Savin 2015, p. 346). According to Špet, the function of the bond between reason and reality and, consequently, the function of the critique and justification of reality, are fulfilled by the mind, or spirit, whose way of being is comprehending, i.e. the hermeneutic act. Spirit comprehends reality as an ideality situated in history and in its specificity, i.e., in its sociocultural environment (“environment as an objective fact”). For Špet the decisive problem for hermeneutics was the problem of the historical understanding (“comprehension”) of “social environment as an objective fact,” and it remained so for him to his last works. He treats this problem phenomenologically as a being an issue of “how pre-givenness is given.” This givenness can be of a very peculiar character, for example, “givenness in the mode of eluding,” or “in the mode of concealing.” However Špet has never denied that consciousness, spirit, has direct access to reality, i.e. to the “social environment as an objective fact.” Špet, just as Husserl and phenomenology in general, could never talk of the “scalene esprit of consciousness” (in the words of V. Bibikhin), seen in the works of Heidegger and Gadamer, with their concept of life-experiences preceding the aesthetic or historical consciousness (concerning art, traditions) (Savin 2015, p. 347). From the standpoint of phenomenology, which Špet adhered to in his hermeneutical studies, pre-givenness is always initially given in some way to consciousness and the question is to comprehend how it is given (comprehended), and to explicate the manner of its givenness. This formulation of the question is also typical of the late Husserl, i.e. as

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Husserl sought the manner in which the lifeworld as a whole is given (let us recall, that among the functions of the lifeworld in Husserl’s phenomenology, there is a “function of the ground,” i.e. the condition of every givenness and every comprehending). Throughout all of his works Špet holds that the act of comprehending life as a whole, and comprehending any relative wholeness (seizing its sense), is intuition, is a special kind of contemplation, which is indeed typical of phenomenology but is contrary to Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s hermeneutics (Shpet 1991, pp.  156–162; 2005, pp. 169–175). According to Špet, the process of comprehension—the hermeneutic act—is ultimately accomplished in “communication,” the activity that forms the fabric of communal life and shapes specific communities. In studying communication, It is not a matter of psychology, not a matter of how this apprehension and understanding of the “communication” “develops,” but of the wonderful thing that makes this communication possible. … Phenomenological analysis by itself embraces every division of psychology and holds this wonderful uniting of individuals as one ‘act’ among a multitude of others. For [if] there are no “solitary prisons” like those of which Sigwart speaks. Absolute social solitude, “solitary confinement,” is the destiny not of the individual, as such, but only of the insane. To forfeit the faculty of intelligible intuition, of comprehension, even granted the full perfection of experiencing and ideal intuitions, means to go mad—the sole means of escape from the social union. (Shpet 1991, p. 160; 2005, p. 173)

The above passage means that the philosophical tradition, in trying to comprehend how we approach reality, only manages to give naïve accounts of experiential and ideal intuitions, as it inexplicably considers an already-accomplished comprehension (i.e. special hermeneutic intuition) to be the foundation of reality’s givenness. The philosophical tradition has failed to make hermeneutic intuition the subject of philosophical research. For this reason, from Appearance and Sense onwards, Špet viewed the history of philosophy through the prism of a struggle between realism and nominalism with the aim of revealing both this omission of the hermeneutic act in the philosophical tradition and the subtle, implied presence of the hermeneutic dimension in it. The latter aspect of his historical reflection can be captured in the question: “Is it possible that the philosophical tradition, though it neither realized the fundamental roles of comprehending and beholding for perceiving reality nor understood comprehension in its essence, has not felt in any way its presence or its influence?” To answer this question, Špet refers to the history of hermeneutics in order to detect the ways the philosophical tradition presented its views of comprehending. Relying on research into the history of hermeneutics, Špet was trying to phenomenologically define its place and function. Špet applied a phenomenological critique to the history of hermeneutics as a way of revealing the fundamental philosophical meaning​​ of hermeneutic problematics; these historico-phenomenological investigations also had a heuristic meaning for developing the concept of comprehension. Moreover, Špet saw that such a heuristic meaning of hermeneutics and its problematics were beset by the misconceptions of his predecessors, which he could diagnose through

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phenomenological critique, so Špet, through these examples, clarified what comprehending is not and how it should not be philosophically treated. In Appearance and Sense, Špet revealed the hermeneutic dimension of phenomenology through his critique of Husserl’s version of phenomenology. But before talking about the core of his criticism of Husserl, we will try to justify the thesis that, for Špet, hermeneutics only gained meaning within the scope of his phenomenological program, and as such for Špet himself hermeneutics most likely served to provide a detailed commentary of his phenomenological research with no independent significance of its own. We think that what Špet found most inspiring in phenomenology was the idea of a completely new fundamental science. An extraordinary pathos permeates the opening pages of Appearance and Sense. The reader cannot help but notice the enthusiasm with which they were written. We think that what prompted the theme and the enthusiasm of the opening pages of Appearance and Sense is precisely the idea of the fundamental science that Husserl proclaimed. In Husserl’s Ideas it sounded especially, remarkably distinct. Špet considered Husserl’s idea of fundamental knowledge productive; he agreed with it. As for the line of philosophers who pursued the ideals of rigour and sought to fix the uniformity of scientific language (Descartes—Bolzano—Brentano— Husserl), apparently this he found unattractive. Obviously, Špet was deeply immersed in the tradition of humanistic thought (Dilthey, Schleiermacher) by the time he read Ideas: the materials he prepared for the lectures of 1911–1912 quite clearly prove it. Dialectics and criticism are the elements absolutely essential for such humanistic thought. They gave him some kind of “immunity” from some of Husserl’s ideas, and a distance in relation to phenomenology. On top of that, Špet remained outside the context of the phenomenological discussions of that time, which was not a disadvantage for him. This very lack of common context enabled him to clarify and push the problems Husserl introduced to their fullest extent. Let us note that in his interpretation of this work, Špet seems to be in a similar situation to the one Husserl was in when he started his path in philosophy. Being a logician and a mathematician in his approach to philosophical problems, the Husserl of 1880–1890 was not entirely an “insider” among philosophers. But this situation gave him a certain freedom, and partly explained the freshness and novelty of his solutions. So, what does militate against the common belief that Špet combined phenomenological and hermeneutical approaches in Appearance and Sense? “Špet resorted to hermeneutics in order to make use of phenomenology,” stated Maryse Dennes (Denn et al. 2014). But what was his reason for doing so, given that phenomenological analysis in itself does not indispensably require a hermeneutic approach? Otherwise, we would have to admit that Husserl, for some reason, did not see this possibility, which would be especially problematic if we agree that the “interlacing of phenomenology and hermeneutics” helped Špet to disclose the essence of phenomenology. What does it mean to rely upon hermeneutics in order “to expand the phenomenological attitude to its fullest extent”?

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Many attempts to justify the hermeneutic quality of phenomenology in Špet’s interpretation begin by quoting the opening lines of his work. The opening discussion of hermeneutics repeatedly attracts the attention of Maryse Dennes: Even in the introduction the author referred to phenomenology from the standpoint of hermeneutics by asking questions about comprehension and interpretation, “to penetrate into the very sense of phenomenology itself as it is revealed above all in its manner of formulating questions and, though to a lesser degree, in its solutions to these questions” (Shpet 1991, p. 5; 2005, p. 43). … Therefore we can conclude that the introduction to phenomenology is possible through the hermeneutic approach: it is necessary to enter into phenomenology in order to explain phenomenological experiences, and only by explaining them is it possible to gain insight into phenomenology (Denn 2009, pp. 84–85).

Of course, Husserl himself sometimes uses the words “comprehension” or “interpretation,” and it is possible also to come across such words as “interpreting” and “explication” in his texts. At one point he even uses the following peculiar metaphor, “to read our experience of the world, syllable by syllable.” Repeatedly, especially in his later years, he would also speak of “understanding the genuine sense” of his phenomenology. However, the use of these words has no special “hermeneutic experience” behind it. I. Mikhailov notes that it should strike us as strange to always start talking of “hermeneutics” straight after encountering the words “understanding,” “reading,” “interpretation;” to speak of “phenomenology” whenever the word “description” is heard; and it seems strange to immediately speak of “anthropology” at the least mention of the word “man” (Denn et al. 2014). However, the real problem for “Špetology” lies precisely in the idea of the conjunction of phenomenology and hermeneutics. What else is there to indicate the real existence of a problem? Let us suppose that Špet has found some conjunction between the phenomenological and hermeneutical methods, although in both cases the way they should be comprehended is not yet quite clear. However, provided that we are speaking of a real synthesis, if there were any possibility of conjoining the two philosophical methods, why did Špet make no use of it? V. Molchanov rightly draws attention to the fact that subsequently Špet became engaged in completely different matters, abandoning, as it seems, phenomenological problematics. This becomes evident through the topics he ceased to mention, i.e., he stopped discussing the reduction, the problem of the absoluteness of consciousness, noesis, noema, etc. But what definitely remained was the idea of a fundamental ​​ science, which would be so basic a science as to be “a-theoretical,” in the sense of preceding any theory. Husserl, however, treated these provisions as being merely “preparatory;” they just preceded the actual phenomenological theory. But it was precisely the constant reflection on this idea which attached a hermeneutic character to phenomenology (Denn et al. 2014). We could also put it the following way: Špet was looking for a “point of conjunction” between his former philosophical beliefs and those which he discovered in Husserl’s Ideas I. Or, to put it yet another way: Špet was looking for a possible point of transition, presumably to a system—an even more radical one—that would provide a new ground for knowledge. It was while he was searching for a point of conjunction between the various philosophical methods that he came to the “hermeneutic approach.”

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The discourse on the synthesis of hermeneutic and phenomenological methods became entrenched in contemporary literature partly through the work of Ricœur. Ricœur repeatedly regarded their synthesis as an “inoculation” of the phenomenological method with the hermeneutic problematic (Riker 2002, p.  33). Since that time, the practice of speaking of “hermeneutic phenomenology” has become established (and we use it in the title for the present article rather in a critical sense). Špet, like so many others, read Husserl’s Ideas I in light of his own specific aims he was pursuing. Like Heidegger, Špet wanted much more from phenomenology than the version proposed by Husserl could offer. Both philosophers wished to create a philosophy that was even more fundamental, and even more transparent in its structure. But eventually, they obtained different results. So, what does this all imply? It points to the fact that we face a “hermeneutic” transformation of phenomenology in very special and exceptional cases, when we deal with even more radical philosophical problems. Any project in search of ultimate foundations acquires hermeneutical features wherever there is an attempt to implement it in the most consistent way. If a philosopher is aware of the impossibility of axiomatically or dogmatically laying the foundation of knowledge, then each time he must confront a “reality” of a very special kind, it must co-determine his/her philosophical search at every step. The history of Western European thought offers three clear “categories” of such exceptional, problematic types “reality,” i.e., historical, linguistic and religious. Consistent reference to each of these has persistently given a powerful impetus to the elaboration of hermeneutics, i.e., religion in the Middle Ages, the contemplation of history and historicity at the turn of the nineteenth century, and the rediscovery of language as a central problem in the twentieth century. It was the latter which became a motive for the turn towards hermeneutics, already noticeable in Špet’s Appearance and Sense. There he discovered the paths leading to it from within phenomenological problematics, through a close observation of the link between “intuition” and “comprehension.” It is among the central problems of Appearance and Sense. He understands that without specifying the correlation of these elements, his fundamental project can not be accomplished. Špet’s attempt to consistently implement the foundationalist project of phenomenology necessarily led him to hermeneutics. In this sense, his turn to the problem of history in his later works was also quite natural. Yet in this case we are referring not to the conjunction or the synthesis of phenomenology and hermeneutics and not to the “hermeneutic turn.” Hermeneutics here, if you will, has the role of a “path” for clarifying the phenomenological program, i.e., hermeneutics does not “overcome” phenomenology, on the contrary, he applies hermeneutics for phenomenological purposes. Therefore, in Appearance and Sense, Špet was primarily engaged in preparing his project of a universal justification of knowledge. In later years he elaborated this project through different material, employing a different philosophical language. As we come to a close, we would like to dwell on Špet’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology as such. It seems that the starting point of this criticism is his problematization of the central phenomenological concept of constitution, presented in Husserl’s Ideas I, and in particular, its constituent concepts of noema, intuition, and

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sense. All of Špet’s phenomenological innovations, including the discovery and subsequent elaboration of the hermeneutic dimension of consciousness and life, arose after this problematization. These innovations include the following [and here we could agree with A. Savin (2015, p. 349)]: (1) The transition from an object-­ centered to a sense-oriented understanding of noema; (2) The discovery of social intuition (the “hermeneutic act” or “comprehension” understood in terms of the correlation between the “comprehending” and the “comprehended”) which is an intuition of a special kind, parallel but irreducible to sensory experience and essential contemplation. Špet also demonstrates the crucial role of social intuition (comprehending) in life and cognition. (3) A transition, stated in the article “Consciousness and Its Owner” (1916), from understanding the “I” as empty, without content, the mere pole of acts (akin to the constitutive, i.e., transcendental “I” that Husserl described in Ideas I) to the idea of “I” as bearing a personality and engaged in social life. It is worth quoting Savin at length here: It seems to me that the source of all these changes lies in the fact that Špet revealed an implied, ethno-cultural, historical layer (Unterschicht) of constitution, a layer which is a universal and fundamental component of all constitution. This layer provides the ability to comprehend the sense of an object. Špet, in Appearance and Sense, points to the universality of birth [shared by all humanity] as the basis of any comprehension, and he treats the world as the horizon of things, “pre-given” through practical handling. The methods of handling become acquired through intra-species communication, which ensures trust in the world (Vertrautheit mit “der” Welt) and promotes inter-generational connection. The genesis of the original trust in the world through the course of “communication,” which manifests itself in the natural attitude, became the key issue for Špet. Through this theme, the problem of comprehending the sense of an object turned into the question of the origin of the unity of the world, as the universal horizon of semantic connections, and into the question of what kind of “communication” lies at the basis of the unity of the world, at the basis of the possibility of the sense of objectivity, and at the basis of the unity of the “I” (Savin 2015, pp. 349–350).

In our opinion, sense2 in Špet’s philosophy possesses not just an intersubjective nature, but at the same time a generative, practical and, finally, historical nature. Sense is an element of comprehension between man and mankind; that is, sense connects man with his contemporaries, as well as with departed and future 2  Anna Han notes, “In the course of interpreting Husserl’s phenomenology of consciousness, Špet made two critical corrections to this system in his Appearance and Sense. … Špet saw a void in Husserl’s doctrine which consisted in the fact that he had not emphasized social existence as a special kind of existence and had not elaborated a phenomenological method of describing it. According to Špet, phenomenology as such would have experienced certain modifications and obtained some new cultural perspectives with the elaboration of such a method. The second critical correction Špet made pertains to the definition of the category of ‘sense’. Špet believed that, while describing the logical sphere as pertaining to a specific act within the whole of intentional experience, Husserl defined notion (that which expresses the meaning), but he did not define sense. According to Špet’s philosophical reasoning, sense represents not an abstract, logical area of an object but its inherent characteristic, an essential feature of the real being of an object. Therefore, the main question concerns the way in which an object can reveal sense, concealed within as the truth in…” (Denn et al. 2014).

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generations and with the world at large. Therefore, in Špet’s view, the phenomenological comprehension of the origins of comprehension as such (social intuition, comprehending, i.e. hermeneutics as a component of the phenomenological contemplation of life) fulfills the intention of philosophy as such, since philosophy is destined to comprehend the origins of the world, the common life of people, and man’s place in it. Through Appearance and Sense Špet sought to prepare his project of a universal justification of knowledge. In later years he elaborated it through different problems, different content, employing a different philosophical language.

References Denn, Mariz. 2009. Novyi vzglyad na germenevtiku cherez tvorchestvo Gustava Shpeta [A new view of hermeneutics through Gustav Špet’s oeuvre; in Russian]. In Tvorcheskoe nasledie G.G. Shpeta v kontekste sovremennogo gumanitarnogo znaniya. Pyatye shpetovskie chteniya. G.G. Shpet / Comprehensio. Pyatye shpetovskie chteniya [G.G. Špet’s oeuvre in the context of the contemporary humanitarian knowledge. Špet G.G. Comprehensio. The fifth Špet conference], ed. by Olga Mazaeva, 84–85. Tomsk: Natsional’nyi issledovatel’skii Tomskii gosudarstvennyi universitet. Denn, Mariz, Anna Khan, Igor’ Mikhailov, Viktor Molchanov, Nelli Motroshilova, Tomas Nemet, Boris Pruzhinin, Alexei Savin, Fransuaza Tepp, Ul’rich Shmid, and Tatiana Shchedrina. 2014. Kniga “Yavlenie i smysl” Gustava Shpeta i ee znachenie v intellektual’noi kul’ture XX veka (materialy konferentsii-kruglogo stola) [Book Appearance and Sense by Gustav Špet and its value in intellectual culture of twentieth century (conference-round table proceedings); in Russian]. Voprosy filosofii 5: 129–171. http://vphil.ru/index.php?option=com_ content&task=view&id=960. Accessed 29 October 2018. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1986. Wahrheit und Methode. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. Grondin, Jean. 1994. Introduction to philosophical hermeneutics. Trans. Joel Weinsheimer. New Haven/London: Yale UP. Horuzhy, Sergei. 2010. K predelam fenomenologii: Shpet, Gusserl’ i intentsional’nost’ v mire dukhovnoi praktiki [To the limits of phenomenology: Špet, Husserl and intentionality in the world of spiritual practice; in Russian]. In Gustav Shpet i ego filosofskoe nasledie. U istokov semiotiki i strukturalizma [Gustav Špet and his philosophical heritage. At the origins of semiotics and structuralism], ed. by Mariz Denn, 130–143. Moscow: ROSSPEN. Mazaeva, Olga. 2010. K istorii issledovaniya tvorcheskogo naslediya G.  Shpeta (obsuzhdenie problem filosofii yazyka) [On history of the research of Špet’s legacy (discussing problems of philosophy of language); in Russian]. Tomsk State University Journal Series Philosophy, Sociology, and Political Science 4 (12): 172–173. Riker, Paul. 2002. Konflikt interpretatsii. Ocherki o germenevtike [The conflict of interpretations: Essays in hermeneutics; in Russian]. Moscow: Kanon-Press-TS. Savin, Аlexei. 2015. Fenomenologicheskoe istolkovanie germenevtiki Shpeta [Phenomenological interpretation of Špet’s hermeneutics; in Russian]. In Fenomenologo-ontologicheskiei zamysel G.G.  Shpeta i gumanitarnye proekty XIX-XX vv.: G.G.  Shpet/Comprehensio. Shestye shpetovskie chteniya: sbornik statei i materialov mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii (1–7 iyunya 2015 g.) [G.G. Špet’s phenomenological-ontological conception and humanitarian projects of 19-20th. G.G. Špet. Comprehensio. The sixth Špet conference: Conference proceedings (1–7 of June, 2015)], ed. by Olga Mazaeva, 342–352. Tomsk: Izdatel’stvo Tomskogo Universiteta. Scanlan, James P. 1970. Nicholas Chernyshevsky and philosophical materialism in Russia. Journal of the History of Philosophy 8 (1): 65–86.

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Shchedrina, Tatiana, ed. 2005. Gustav Shpet: Zhizn’ v pis’makh. Epistolyarnoye naslediye [Gustav Špet: Life in letters. Epistolary heritage; in Russian]. Мoscow: ROSSPEN. Shpet, Gustav. 1917. Mudrost’ ili razum? [Wisdom or reason?; in Russian]. Mysl’ i slovo 1: 1–69.  ———. 1991. Appearance and sense. Phenomenology as the fundamental science and its problems. Trans: Thomas Nemeth. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. ———. 1992. Rabota po filosofii [Work on philosophy; in Russian]. Nachala 1: 31–50. ———. 2005. Yavlenie i smysl. Fenomenologiya kak osnovnaya nauka i ee glavnye problem [Appearance and sense. Phenomenology as the basic science and its main problems; in Russian]. In Mysl’ i slovo. Izbrannyye trudy [Thought and word. Selectas], ed. Gustav Shpet. Мoscow: ROSSPEN. Shpet, Gustav, and Edmund Gusserl’. 1996. Otvetnye pis’ma G. Shpeta [Gustav Špet’s answerring letters; in Russian]. Logos 7: 123–133. Spiegelberg, Herbert. 1960. The phenomenological movement. A historical introduction. Vol. 1. The Hague: Nijhoff.

On the Phenomenological Implications of Semyon Frank’s Psychological Philosophy of the Living Soul Alexander Kozin

Abstract  In this chapter, I introduce the philosophy of Semyon Frank. Specifically, I would like to focus on his work that deals with the life of the soul. In comparison to the earlier and later periods of his work, which examines the objective world and the outside of being, respectively, Frank’s study of the soul falls into the middle period of his philosophical career, when he actively developed what I consider an analogue of phenomenological psychology. His method, inclusive of some basic phenomenological tenets, is not only so unique as to warrant a study of itself but is also highly suitable for the examination of the soul as a phenomenon grounded in experience. As a result of his examination, Frank presents the soul as an immaterial absolute whole. As such, it governs the subject’s ‘ego’ and at the same time is shaped by the subject as an extension of the material world. With this, the living soul is simultaneously constitutive and constituted by the subject, while remaining an independent whole. Keywords  Soul · Psychological phenomenology · Consciousness · World Spirituality

1  Introduction Among the early Russian phenomenologists, Semyon Frank stands on the margins. Granted, the entire number of Russian phenomenologists who can be fully associated with Husserl and his original (i.e.) early phenomenology—represented by Logical Investigations and the three volumes of Ideas—is but a few. Among them, only Gustav Špet, who studied under Edmund Husserl, can be called a phenomenologist in the strict sense. The others, for example, Boris Jakovenko, Nikolai Lossky, Pavel Florensky, Semyon Frank and Aleksey Losev, can be only remotely ­considered

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phenomenologists. There are several reasons for this scarcity of Russian ­phenomenologists: on the one hand, both the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century in Russia were marked by the advent of religious philosophy (for example, Nikolas Berdyayev, Vasily Rosanov, Vladimir Soloviev), which literally marginalized all other strands of philosophy. It was therefore in the shadow of Russian religious philosophy and its thematics that philosophers like Frank developed their ideas. On the other hand, the turmoil of the 1917 October Revolution and the subsequent purges of intellectuals who did not share the communist ideology, but decided against immigration, made it almost impossible to have a proper phenomenological school (for example, Špet himself was arrested several times and finally executed in 1937). This does not mean however that only Marxism could be taught in the Soviet Union. Classical philosophy remained accessible. For an example  consider Aleksey Losev, whose almost complete concentration on Ancient Greek philosophy early in his career did not only allow him to survive the Bolshevik purges but made him achieve an exceptional notoriety in that field during the Soviet period. The rest of the early twentieth Russian philosophers were either destroyed as independent thinkers by the monopoly of Marxism or were persecuted, physically exterminated, or forced into immigration, as was the case with Semyon Frank. Nonetheless, one cannot call Frank a philosophical dissident. Nor, I would like to emphasize it again, can we define him as a strict phenomenologist. His project of reforming gnoseology by turning it into first philosophy as well his emphasis on philosophical psychology as an alternative to traditional ontology are only associatively close to phenomenology. Yet, this association is sufficiently strong as to illuminate a phenomenological strand in his work to which I wish to dedicate this chapter. Semyon Frank was born in Moscow in 1877 into a well-off Jewish family: his father was a doctor, and his grandfather was an influential merchant. Frank studied at Moscow University in the faculty of law. Shortly after graduation, he received an opportunity to study law in Germany, where he spent several years, first in Berlin and then in Heidelberg. While in Germany, he became interested in sociology, psychology, and philosophy. Upon his return he received a position at the University of Saratov and was soon promoted to the position of Professor of Philosophy. His first and second books, An Object of Knowledge. About the Grounds and Limits of Abstract Knowledge (1915, Petrograd) and The Soul of Man. An Experiment in Introducing Philosophical Psychology (1917, Moscow), were conceived in Saratov but completed and published in Moscow where he held the position of Professor of Philosophy. In 1922, after he turned down an offer from the authorities who wanted him to teach Marxism, he was deported from Soviet Russia and moved first to Germany, then to France and finally to London, where he lived until his death in 1950. His other major works written in exile include The Spiritual Foundations of Society (London, 1930), The Imperceptible (1939, Paris), and God is With Us (London, 1944). As we can see from the titles of his late works, Frank remained an adept of Christian idealism, which he approached from psychological and sociological perspectives. According to Nikolai Lossky, Frank belongs to the same school of thought as Lossky himself: intuitivism. In this chapter I challenge that attribution,

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arguing that Frank’s main allegiance throughout his philosophical career was indeed philosophical psychology. In my argument I rely primarily on Frank’s 1917 work The Soul of Man. In my view, this work demonstrates that what Lossky calls intuitivism Frank actually conceived of as a phenomenological (not just philosophical) psychology, with the main subject of his study being the individuated soul, which he approached as a phenomenon, albeit in a highly original manner.1

2  Toward a Phenomenology of Soul Frank begins his introduction to The Soul of Man with a strong critique of empirical psychology, which he finds to be the main culprit for abandoning the problem of the human soul. With this Frank does not deny the benefits of psychological knowledge per se. However, he prefers to seek for this knowledge in the concept of human experience as was once fruitfully done by Plato, Aristotle and St. Augustine. Without experience, the phenomenon of the soul degenerates into “soul-related factors,” leading to psychological atomism and presenting psychology as a natural science, a “physiology” (Frank 2015, p. 10). For Frank, the soul, as the subject of true psychology, belongs to inner life. In contrast, objective psychology, or psychophysics, undermines the foundation of the soul: the world and the experience thereof. By ‘true psychology’ Frank means a discipline which is tied to the humanities rather than the social sciences. To this effect, Frank gives two examples: an immediate apperception of the soul in another human being upon an initial encounter and the description of the soul in such writers as Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Flaubert, Ibsen and some others. The behavior of abnormal people can serve as further evidence that the soul, independently of the ‘broken’ body, exists; it shines through and becomes visible already because the body does not act in a familiar way. This point brings Frank in a productive proximity to Lossky, both of whom considered soul to be pregiven and thus a part of the world. At the same time, Lossky firmly grounds his intuitivism in a mystical metaphysics.2 Frank on the other hand sees in intuitivism a way to investigate the life of the soul in its connection to the psyche and the totality of the world at large. This does not mean that Frank dismisses religion altogether. On the contrary, in line with Lossky, he claims that religion opens a way to the soul; hence, the importance of religious consciousness for Frank. Citing Sacred Scripture, Frank calls religious consciousness true self-consciousness: “Only the religious man is endowed with living consciousness; only the religious man is able of experiencing ‘the life of the soul’” (2015, p. 13). No self-reflection is possible without perceiving ‘selfhood’ 1  Frank considers two of his earlier works, An Object of Knowledge, The Soul of Man, and one middle-period work, The Imperceptible, as a trilogy. At the same time, he admits that An Object of Knowledge is a preliminary study for The Soul of Man, while, upon inspection, it becomes obvious that his last work is but an expansion of the second book. 2  For more on intuitivism, see Lossky 1991, pp. 236–261.

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as a special object, which is firmly planted in the world of one’s inner life, where perception and a specific reality form an inseparable whole. In this manner Frank associates philosophical psychology with religious intuition. At the same time, Frank does not insist that philosophical psychology can or should replace scientific knowledge because Frank conceives of psychological philosophy as a science, similar to how Husserl conceived of his phenomenology. Frank’s critique of the natural sciences and positivism at large sounds also quite similar to Husserl’s last published work The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Only by way of rational description can one reach the living soul. The kind of rationality that Frank espouses is, however, peculiar in that it is an abstract rather than evidence-­ based rationality. Yet, only this kind of rationality tied to an individual life can aspire to be called objective. Neither the normative basis of a specific social order nor traditional scientific methods can provide objective truth about the soul. By ‘objective truth’ Frank means a combination of responsibility and piety. These two pillars ensure that the philosopher of the soul achieves his goal of understanding its life. The term ‘rationality’ brings Frank in proximity to Husserl, who proffered a similar notion: it is a form of disclosing a phenomenon without relying on natural scientific instruments. Frank’s subsequent critique of pseudo-scientific romanticism and mysticism extends his previous problematization of positivism, neither of which is able to offer the kind of rationality that could make up a science for the study of soul. Even such philosophical giants as Nietzsche and Berdyaev represent for Frank nothing more than “philosophical decadence” (2015, p. 19). Thus, Frank holds that Nietzsche puts an excessive emphasis on morality and ‘values,’ while Berdyaev tends to an aesthetic way of philosophizing that Frank finds inappropriate for the study of primordial phenomena, such as the soul. A true philosophy of the soul should reorient itself away from the notions of imagination, prayer, faith, and the religious canon, and focus primarily on life, fecundity, and experience, though this by no means should be equated with vitalism. It is the latter terms that should define the philosophy of the soul, in order to allow the philosopher to become acquainted with the essence the soul. Although it is tempting to make a connection between Frank’s concept of essence and that of Husserl’s, this connection will be spurious at best. Frank clearly understands essence as a whole, which is immanent, inaccessible, and imperceptible; hence, his refusal to enter debates about metaphysics or ontology. In this regard, Frank argues that, although the question of metaphysics hovers over any discussion of the soul, we can bypass it on the basis of a mutually exclusive conclusion: either the soul has nothing to do with true being, having no essence and being a thing-in-itself, or it is an immanent phenomenon. In either case, it will be unreachable to experience. By refusing to approach the soul as a phenomenon outside of our comprehension, we can avoid, Frank writes, the entanglements which consistently accompany metaphysical debates about the soul. Instead, if we approach the soul as a phenomenon relative to an observer, moreover, as an individuated phenomenon, we can dismiss rational psychology, which had long been destroyed by Kant anyway, and offer experience as the soul’s key foundational strait. Through experience we can obtain not only the sense of the soul but its essence. For an example Frank gives us the mundane experi-

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ence of encountering an unfamiliar human being, who immediately emits a sense of his soul. One does not even have to enter into a heart-to-heart conversation with this human being to obtain his or her soul’s sense or “essence” (Frank 2015, p. 25). A piece of art, for example, music, can disclose the soul of its author as well. The same kind of disclosure occurs with the help of self-reflection at an older age, when a sum of experiences collected by this or that human being opens the essence of his or her soul as one undivided whole. The human soul is therefore a whole, and it is already because of its singular existence that it cannot be approached from the perspective of any one of its components, for the soul has no isolatable parts. The soul is a self-sufficient whole. We have already noted that literature can aid intuition in the study of the soul, but, as Frank reminds us, we should rather look into actual histories of living beings and the entire historical complex that participates in the formation of a community. The parallels with some phenomenological interpretations of history are striking here.3 Frank himself distinguishes between history as a science and human history approached as a multiplicity of constantly changing emotional states that form and transform an individual human being, culminating in the very whole of the life of the soul that can be so easily determined at first contact between human beings. Importantly, the life of the soul “cannot be given as a moment but only as a whole” (Frank 2015, p. 29). This whole stands for the entire process of a human life, therefore precluding its dismemberment into separate moments. Through acts of memory, it might indeed appear that the reality of a human life progresses in a stepwise fashion, and that it is constituted by individual moments or events. In fact, these events do not exist on their own, but are always rooted in an uninterrupted duration. Frank’s idea of temporality shall remind us of Husserl’s famous description of temporality as a continuum, which is comprised of moments pointing back to the past (retention), and moments pointing forward to the future (protention). Between the two is the primordial impression. Frank describes these moments as “the actual experience,” “the remembered experience,” and “the anticipated experience” (Frank 2015, p. 30). The significant difference, as far as Frank’s philosophy of soul is concerned, is that he posits an ever-diminishing presence of the soul: as time goes by, the bright life of one’s soul turns into a dim strip that nonetheless still allows an attentive observer to ‘see’ one’s soul. With this description, he modifies Husserl’s notion of ‘continuum,’ presenting it as finite, with three different moments being unevenly distributed in the course of one’s life. We can only guess whether, for Frank, a certain moment becomes more present with time, while another less so. In any case, the soul is “the wholeness of life” (Frank 2015, p. 31). It is not anything that exists in its own dimension; it is not unreachable or mysterious. On the contrary, it is always with us, defining our presence at every moment, directing and completing us. The role of psychology in studying the soul is indispensable, yet Frank puts strict limits on its value. First, as I noted earlier, Frank insists on

3  For example, David Carr argues that history is akin to storytelling if we are to replace writing history with narrating it (Carr 2004, p. 147).

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s­ eparating empirical psychology and philosophical psychology. According to Frank, empirical psychology is not just a continuum of positivist (naturalist) thought, whose focus is the description of “objective reality” (Frank 2015 p. 41). Where it concerns the soul, such a description is incapable of producing a convincing account of human (spiritual) phenomena, such as love, hate and sorrow. Being a natural science, empirical psychology does not understand such phenomena, as it replaces them with the external, expressive side of the human being. Empirical psychology approaches the human being as a subject who observes, registers and presents his or her observations as facts of the real world. This perspective presupposes the division between object and subject, whose soul is not a living phenomenon, but a reflection of his or her inner state. This view, Frank argues, destroys the living subject: “Only the entire multiplicity of phenomena, including love and hate, acceptance and denial, longing and indifference, constitute that very life that can be observable in actual experience and thus describable” (Frank 2015, p. 45). For empirical psychology, all these so-called phenomena are but symptoms of some inner disorder. Although Frank does not speak about abnormality directly, he alludes to how abnormality is actual rather normal for a person who experiences love or is suffering, testifying to the fact that life in its entirety cannot be reduced to “psychological vivisection” (Frank 2015, p. 45). The philosophical psychology of the soul is capable of bypassing the division between normality and abnormality by turning to the humanities (history, sociology, economy, politics, ethnography). More importantly, the new philosophy that discards the separation between the subject and the object by replacing this division with the notion of objective directionality or intentionality seems to be the most promising for the recovery of psychology and gnoseology. In this regard, Frank briefly mentions the work of Husserl who, he claims, reformed the Würzburg school of psychology. However, the actual reform took place in large part owing to the work of Franz Brentano, who, according to Frank, drew on medieval philosophy, which considered the human soul as a living being, whose life “relates the subject to the world and to being” (Frank 2015, p. 47). Only the soul is capable of endowing human identity with an inner life of its own, albeit, again, not independently of the outer world, but firmly embedded in it. All meaning comes from that world. In addition to Brentano and Husserl, Frank finds it necessary to mention Dilthey, who defined the original program of psychology as a science based on “true observation grounded in  inner understanding (Verstehen)” (Frank 2015, p. 49). In sum, the new philosophy, that is, phenomenology and Brentanian/Dilthean psychology form the basis of Frank’s philosophical psychology, which seeks to determine the parameters and character of soul, its nature and its essence. The method that allows us to acquire such a determination is observation in the true sense of the word, that is, immanent understanding of the self-perceiving inner life of the subject in its essence, in contrast to the ‘outer’ objective knowledge that empirical psychology provides. Importantly, Frank repeats, philosophical psychology does not separate itself from other types of understanding, such as those involved in mathematics, aesthetics, ethics, and religious philosophy; in other words, the basic forms and varieties of philosophy. This introduction is only a preliminary ontology that must be supplemented with a

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detailed description of the world of the soul, its features, its wholeness, and its ­content. Of special interest are the relations of soul to consciousness, knowledge, and the body. These are the issues I would like to tackle in the rest of this chapter. In my exposition I will follow, albeit not to the letter, Frank’s own explanatory structure, which is divided into two parts: the relation of the soul to the world and the subjective life of the soul.

3  The World of the Living Soul4 Frank’s investigation of the living soul begins quite differently from how the early Husserl organizes his descriptive phenomenological method, starting not with the intrinsic components of the soul but with the place of the soul in the world at large.5 It is hard to overestimate the importance of the notion of ‘world’ in phenomenology: not only the later Husserl, but Heidegger, and Schutz, among many others, considered this concept as central for understanding the human being. Frank’s approach to this concept is not strictly speaking phenomenological, yet, as we have already noted above, certain parallels exist and direct references to Husserl (granted, limited to Logical Investigations) are sufficiently frequent. One such reference concerns Frank’s determination of the problematics of his investigation into the relationship between the living soul and the world. The main problem identified by Frank lies in defining the boundaries that separate the living soul from the objective world. The phenomena of the soul are certainly different from other phenomena available to human perception. It is hard to imagine, says Frank, that a ‘tree’ (his example) that we perceive, does not exist, according to the idealist philosophical interpretation, or, on the contrary, as the materialists have it, that it exists independently of our existence, since we indeed can ‘see’ it as being there. At the same time, this question is only pertinent if we divide the world into the ‘perceptual’ and the ‘non-perceptual’ (imaginary), so to speak. In order to overcome this dualism, Frank suggests that we should turn to the “new philosophy of Edmund Husserl” (2015, p. 57). This philosophy provides a fruitful concept of consciousness, which Frank relates to the living soul as a specific sphere of human existence. It is due to acts of consciousness that we become related to the material world; however, the analytic component of Husserl’s philosophy disallows him from considering specific 4  The Russian term ‘life of soul,’ as I have translated it literally from the original, presents syntactical problems in English when it is embedded in a sentence. Therefore, I would like to replace this term with a more stylistically fitting one: ‘the living soul.’ However, whenever I can, I use both terms interchangeably. 5  I should note that Husserl reversed his position on his method later in his career. In The Crisis, his last published work, he is quite explicit about the primacy of the world in a sequentially organized phenomenological examination because “all that is together in the world has a universal immediate or mediate way of belonging together; through this, the world is not merely a totality [Allheit] but an all-encompassing unity, a whole (even though it is infinite)” (Husserl 1970, p.  31; author’s italics).

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p­ henomena of the soul, such as morality, patriotism, and, most importantly, love and hate, for the latter are produced by experiences within the soul and not in connection to external reality. According to Frank, one way to resolve this predicament could be the functional psychology developed by Stumpf, though this does not mean abandoning classical phenomenology (Husserl, Lossky, and Pfänder).6 In the absence of a developed phenomenological psychology, Frank creates what he named philosophical psychology, designed as a method.7 The union of philosophy and psychology allows Frank to create a model that is simultaneously inclusive of objective or external content as well as the content that is inalienable from the soul which constitutes the ‘underneath’ of consciousness. This relation—between consciousness and soul—allows two types of contents to co-exist without excluding each other. While consciousness seeks objective content, for it is grounded in sensory perception, the living soul and its phenomena (e.g., desire) are more deeply embedded in one’s life, and, although both are produced by experience, the character of this experience is sufficiently distinct as to allow us to imagine a model that features two spheres that, together, determine one’s life. Unlike Lossky’s attempt to present these spheres schematically, for Frank, consciousness and soul are interconnected in the manner of Platonic spheres, one of which embraces all that one perceives (the outer sphere), and the inner sphere that determines the meaningfulness of the perceptual content while also including the phenomena of the soul (i.e. psychical contents) as well as those contentless states that characterize the life of soul. The latter are also phenomena in that they appear but are not immediately given to consciousness in terms of a noematic pole, using Husserl’s language, for their source is the living soul as a whole. Among such quasi-­ phenomena we can count states, such as irritation, or even abstract phenomena, such as sound and color, whose subject is not presented in situ; these should be considered as borderline phenomena whose location is the in-between of consciousness and soul. The difficulty of defining love or hate comes precisely from the soul’s non-noematic givenness, (i.e.) its inaccessibility; however, borderline states are more accessible and their relation to the proper phenomena of the soul gives us an assurance that, for example, love, is as ‘real’ as amorous experiences. Frank’s example of falling asleep and dreaming provides strong evidence concerning the correlation between the two spheres. When one is falling asleep, he or she is falling into a state of undifferentiated being where the real, the unreal, the past and the future coalesce in the same way, where perceptual objects (e.g., dark

6  There is a clear understanding on the part of Frank that although Husserl cannot be involved in his study of the soul for the reasons stated above, the potential of Husserl’s phenomenology allows us to approach the soul using all the instruments of classical phenomenology. 7  It is also worthwhile to remember that in The Crisis, Husserl points to psychology as one of the two ways into phenomenology. In this sense, one may say that Frank anticipated Husserl’s appreciation of psychology as a discipline adjacent to phenomenology by its purpose and method. For more on Husserl’s description of psychology as a way into phenomenology, see Husserl 1970, pp. 191–257.

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shadow) become one with non-perceptual ones (e.g., monster), that is, as ­phenomena of the soul they can be experienced as a totality (e.g., fear). From these examples, we can see how neither the objective world nor the inner world of a person can fully account for this transitional state of falling into a dream. We commonly label such objects and such states as abnormal. This term gives us another connection to Husserl. For Husserl, abnormal phenomena are given as ‘inaccessible’ to ordinary consciousness rather than ‘broken’ or ‘incomplete.’8 Frank’s approach to abnormality is similar as it also defines abnormality in terms of limits or “borders” rather than deviation (Frank 2015, p. 70). These phenomena are in direct relation to the soul. Frank’s terminology regarding this relation is peculiar, for the phenomena of the soul relate to the soul not by way of a causal connection or mechanism, but spontaneously by way of some primordial force. It is tempting to say, with Husserl, that they are connected ‘pre-predicatively,’ or, with the ancients, ‘elementally,’ but this is would not be exactly in line with Frank’s idea. The phenomena of the soul move, or rather flow. The spontaneity of this movement means two things: (a) the phenomena of the soul can rely on the outside factors, but they can also run independently of them, as would deep depression, which yields unhappiness without necessarily having a recourse to something specific, and (b) the phenomena of the soul run slower or faster at irregular intervals. The best example in this respect is absent-­ mindedness, which is responsible for stalling our attention toward and thwarting our interest in one topic or another. The spontaneous movement of the living soul also explains the ‘just-so’ states of being, when a person is not particularly sure about what it is that he desires or how he or she feels himself. Even those people, whose stability and self-assurance seem to be beyond doubt, may commit horrific acts of other- or self-destruction. We often call these acts ‘acts of passion,’ where passion is the very essence of the living soul. Obviously, the concept of passion has many meanings: we commonly ascribe individual heroic deeds as well as dramatic transformations of entire human civilizations to passion. As far as the soul is concerned, the spontaneity of its life often results in inner conflicts, which fall out of its control, thus putting into question the role of reason and self-control. Despite our attempts to regulate our behavior, a human being cannot help but perform instinctual and involuntary acts, for example, in the midst of a tense conversation, one might accidentally spit on his or her interlocutor, not to mention giving in to certain calls of the body, regardless of the public or formal requirements of a situation. Despite the accidental nature of this kind of behavior, we often consider it inappropriate. In fact, this behavior is not an antipode of reasonable behavior. In both cases, we are dealing with the work of passion, which dictates this or that action without, however, justifying it by either a social imperative or the inability to control one’s self in the face of the demands of a sick body or disturbed mind. The living soul does neither offer reasons or excuses, nor does it serve as a guide, for it is ‘blind,’ to use Frank’s words. This blindness rarely 8  For example, a person who needs glasses does not experience their vision as incomplete, but once the person obtains glasses, they come to see what was previously inaccessible to them. See Husserl, Ms. D 13 II, 206b, in Steinbock (1995, pp. 146, 297).

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reveals itself. In this regard, the benefit of irrational and often self-destructive ­passions lies in their ‘eye-opening’ effects, which display the fragility of the outer shell of normative behavior, for this shell does not protect the self at those times when, like magnetic storms on the sun, the soul ‘produces’ those passions that even a highly rational being is simply unable to quell. Like the sun, to continue the analogy, the soul may appear to be too remote to produce any destructive or constructive effect; yet, it is undeniably the core of human life, approached as a whole. Moreover, this core has a life of its own, its own world, whose “conditions are absolutely irrelevant, even senseless, on any other plane of being” (Frank 2015, p. 88). All this, Frank concludes, is not a pure hypothesis, but a result of distilled experience. One last example in this respect is very close to the author of this chapter, who is interested in the phenomenon of child’s play. According to Frank, the world created by a child in play is a world filled with those emotions, which despite their remoteness from the reality experienced by an adult, nonetheless, shall be considered as ‘possible’ human emotions. These emotions appear to belong to imagination because they are not grounded in reality. However, for Frank, these emotions are not only real, they are the very emotional states that reveal the passions of the soul in the same way art does. This example leads Frank to differentiate between two types of consciousness: knowledge and “being for oneself” (Frank 2015, p. 94). Unlike knowledge, which sets up strict boundaries, ‘being for oneself’ is ‘transparent’ because it does not limit us by the need to have an object. This kind of consciousness exists, but its existence is not directed by attention. If we return to the earlier description of the two foundational spheres of life—consciousness and soul—we must also remember Frank’s description of the in-between that connects the two without delineating them in some kind of abstract or, on the contrary, mechanistic fashion, but connects them by an openness, which at the same time is not an emptiness. This openness can be compared to a ‘no man’s land.’ Characterized as such, one can see how the in-­ between is a fillable presence; it becomes filled as soon as the soul moves us in this or that direction. Frank’s earlier reference to falling asleep gives us an example for this type of consciousness, which defies knowledge and its objectivity by being in transition, as it were. In addition, there is another kind of consciousness which is reminiscent of the Freudian concept of the ‘ego.’ Unlike object-oriented consciousness and the realm of the soul (or the open consciousness that indicates the living soul), Frank singles out the ‘ego,’ considered as the consciousness of one’s self, as a ‘special type’ of consciousness, whose parameters do not allow it to fit into the previous model of the two adjacent spheres. Frank’s ‘ego’ stands apart, as it were. Its function is to consolidate or ‘compress’ the openness of object-less consciousness in a kernel. With the help of this kernel, a person controls their desires regardless of their moral tenor. Both good and bad intentions rise from the energy provided by this core. Importantly, a person’s ‘ego’ makes the life of the soul accessible; its accessibility is valid only for self-determination. In other words, it is a form of self-­ consciousness that allows us to obtain an idea of our character and, to an extent, evaluate it. In this regard, Frank’s concept of the ‘ego’ explains the phenomenon of conscience and, in passing, the phenomenon of spirituality.

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Spirituality is a part of the living soul as much as conscience is; yet, unlike conscience, which stands ‘apart,’ spirituality relates to the living soul directly. It creates a lining, so to speak, which envelops the living soul, protecting it from destruction. Spirituality is also a way to the soul, although this way cannot lead to the full understanding of the soul, for it is never fully accessible to experience. Being the source of all meaningfulness, the living soul is the ‘embryo and substratum’ of all kinds of consciousness. Despite Frank’s continuous critique of materialism, idealism and empiricism, I would like to underscore that his concept of the living soul does not deny spatio-temporal existence.9 When the living soul appears, it does so only momentarily as the origin of life. The originarity of the living soul turns into an independently existing reality. As such, it is the carrier of a special power, or potency. This power is the connecting tissue that allows us to experience all three kinds of consciousness not in a stepwise fashion, but “qualitatively” and as a whole (Frank 2015, p. 126). This means that the living soul pulls together all the infinite multiplicity of experience. In this regard, one should note that the notion of the subconscious plays a particular role in Frank’s model of the life of a human soul: “the subconscious (here, Frank is intentionally using Freud’s terminology, replacing his own term ‘the unconscious’) is indeed a type of consciousness, albeit extremely poorly delineated” (2015, p. 128). In other words, our access to the subconscious is minimal. If we return to the representation of Frank’s relations between different kinds of consciousness as coalescing spheres, with the soul laying at the core, the subconscious has the right to claim its own world; yet, the position of this world would still be marginal and its phenomena perceived as if coming from the ‘outside.’ With Plato, Frank calls the subconscious ‘dark,’ contrasting it with the consciousness of spirit, which is most empowered by the soul and therefore generates the most light. What is at stake for Frank in making multiple distinctions between and among different senses of consciousness, is their mutual contribution to how we understand ‘being for oneself’ not as an imaginary but an absolute and undeniable phenomenon that every human being is fated to experience, and indeed experiences most strongly in the form of anxiety before death; hence, another unexpected link to Heidegger and his famous dictum from Being and Time. It is being for oneself that, with participation of each kind of consciousness as well as the subconscious, illuminates the living soul which alone designates the being of a person. Frank does not make quantitative or gradational distinctions between types of consciousness and the subconscious, and so the phenomena they produce cannot be differentiated as strong or weak. For Frank, all the states of the living soul can manifest themselves to consciousness or to subconsciousness alike, regardless of their intensity, or, as the above, the ‘power’ they exert. Of course, from an everday standpoint, certain passions seem to be destined for the expressive side of our being (for example, it is indeed difficult to imagine rage totally detached from all external reality), while

9  For a contemporary interpretation of the soul’s existence in time and space, see Edward Casey (1991, pp. 263–289).

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others stay in abatement, unfolding in the manner of fantasies, which appear as if tied to the work of the subconscious, especially, in dreaming. Nonetheless, Frank does not accept this distinction, insisting that rage can be sublimated in an unconscious state as much as other fantasies (here, Frank references Freud as the inventor of the method of unconcealing the concealed). Consider, in this regard, a fit of rage that becomes manifest in day dreaming, which is both fantastical and embedded in our experience of external reality. Through his discussion of different kinds of consciousness and their relations to the living soul, Frank ends up with two crucial concepts: One is consciousness, or “the experience of the actual subjective reality” (Frank 2015, p. 140). The other is the living soul whose life belongs to a unique world; although it is connected to consciousness, since it is its core, we can approach it as an independent phenomenon with its own features and components.

4  De-objectifying the Living Soul The descriptive method Frank selects for this part of his study presupposes the return to the living soul in terms of its temporal and spatial modes of existence, which tend to be either objectified or mystified. Consider the difference between a real object, say a tree, and the perception of that tree. Our perception of this object has a specific independently set duration, which may vary significantly. Since one would not claim that the duration of the perception is intrinsic to the object, one could state that the perception is both measurable (we commonly differentiate between a glance and a stare, thereby assigning to the two kinds of visual perception its own duration) and immeasurable because objective or linear time does not apply to emotional states. A similar dilemma characterizes spatial parameters of all soul-­ generated phenomena. According to Frank, since human beings are embodied creatures, all these phenomena “belong to space” (Frank 2015, p.  145). Yet, by themselves, they cannot be mathematized, as, for example, rage cannot be calculated. One may say that rage has a shape, but the only definition possible here is going to be highly subjective, pointing to works of literature and visual arts. An image of rage can be produced, but it will not be sufficient to represent the phenomenon in its entirety. An artist may find a formerly hidden feature of rage in his or her image but rage itself stands outside of the spatio-temporal grid. The objective world and our means of exploring it ‘objectively,’ create the illusion that we can apply all kinds of measuring tools to consciousness and, by association, to the living soul. In fact, the living soul does not have any familiar temporality or spatiality; we can only make conjectures about the soul’s time and space by registering changes in our emotional states. The wholeness of the living soul, its uninterruptable continuity and absolute solidity, prevent a philosopher from looking at the living soul as an open space where some type of action takes place. The nature of the living soul should rather be compared to the liquid state of some matter. It moves; it produces waves and ripples; it has depth. At the same time, it is formless and bottomless. It would not be prudent to try to apply the rules of logic to

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describe this kind of phenomenon. At best, from the perspective of logic, one can say that the living soul is ‘potentiality.’ What Frank means by ‘potentiality’ is the ability of the soul to affect the state of consciousness to a degree. It is therefore through consciousness that we receive indications about the soul’s ‘liquidity,’ as it were. Even when we encounter a mentally ill person who enacts multiple personalities, we still deal with one soul in its absolute and undivided wholeness. The many identities of a schizophrenic patient then must be defined as his or her many states. Even here we can only speak of the difference between and among these states as distinctions within the soul. As for the ‘volume’ of the living soul, something that is absolute and infinite cannot have volume or boundaries. Actual experiences accumulated during someone’s life do not literally expand his or her soul; all they give us is a clue about “potential infinity” (Frank 2015 p. 159). This or that experience is a point that marks our lives. In this regard, for Frank, experience is being, but being is nothing in particular. This view warrants Frank to replace the word ‘infinite’ with the Leibnizean term ‘indefinitum,’ which is inclusive of God and all that there is in the world. However, Frank’s description of the living soul as being outside of time and space while also being deprived of any kind of materiality does not explain its affectivity. What is there in the living soul that responds to the ego’s controls, as Frank puts it, and at the same time affects it? The answer to this question is as paradoxical as the above description of soul’s indefinitum in relation to the subject. Before trying to provide an answer to this question with Frank, it might be helpful at this point to recover the relational structure that connects one’s ego to his or her living soul. If we consider the ego to be at the core of our consciousness, governing what Frank calls self-consciousness, then the living soul is connected to consciousness by way of the ego that determines the inner life of the soul. In contrast to the inner life stands objective consciousness, which passively perceives the outside world through ‘images’ given to us by different senses. However, as something irreducibly elemental, the soul is not attached to anything in particular; its relations to consciousness and subconsciousness are based on the change of emotional states and ‘moments.’ This independence of the living soul does not, however, prevent it from participating in the development of the ego. Although undoubtedly abstract, the notion of the ego fits nicely into Frank’s model where he assigns to the living soul the role of the mover that shapes the ego by giving it a direction. With this, the living soul still remains elemental, which brings Frank to compare it with the beginning of being, light, and intelligence. At the same time, as elemental, the ego cannot guide the living soul. The ego can only keep the soul within, prevent it from escaping, so to speak. This is the extent of its controls. Directionality is thus the only feature of the living soul that allows us to call it affective and consider it within the framework of developmental psychology: “A person is born with a certain set of goals and intentions” (Frank 2015, p. 210). On the basis of those, he or she forms the primary core for the ego. The notion of directionality in the empirical sense brings us back to consciousness and self-­ consciousness, which ‘know’ from early on what the emerging ego desires and lines

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up its preferences in accordance with these desires by attending to those ‘things’ that the ego finds attractive, while disregarding those things that it finds repulsive. It is tempting to include the body and its ‘mechanics’ into an explanation of this directionality, as Frank’s contemporaries did. After all, to a great extent, the body determines our sensory potential. Take, for example, a disabled person, such as someone who cannot walk or who is blind. Clearly, the sense of direction when it comes to general values and goals will be affected by the person’s disability. Frank agrees that there is an impact here, but only in the secondary round of development. A difference in the form of embodiment will not affect the life of the soul, for “it is the primary form, governing the life of the soul from within on the grounds of the first instance” (Frank 2015, p. 212). For example, there are psychopathological states which are typically referred to as cases of ‘loss of will.’ Frank describes their symptoms as a sequence of shapeless stillness and shapeless motion. In these cases, we witness the loss of direction and consequently the primary function of the soul, but this does mean that the soul does not exert any effect on the ego. It is just that the dynamism of the living soul develops concentrically, without expressing itself in the actions assumed by the ego. Frank has already described a more drastic situation that dealt with the schizophrenics, who fluctuate in their waking life between two or more personalities. Frank asks whether this means that the ill person’s consciousness is split, with the soul setting two directions for it. His answer is the denial of such a split. Following Freud, Frank suggests the concept of an inner conflict that could explain the splitting effect, but even given that the living soul may produce conflicting determinations, it remains a stable and absolute whole, or “a real active instance, which is logically different from the material it forms” (Frank 2015, p. 216). Its potential or potentia, as Frank puts it, is ‘creative,’ using Bergson’s term. Referring to Aristotle’s De Anima, Frank calls potentia the living soul’s ‘acting nature,’ emphasizing its ability of being dissolved in the natural world. The chaotic composition of this divided ‘world’ is akin to the living soul’s primordial state. Our ability to endow this world with desires, goals and drives, that is, make sense of it, corresponds to the ability of the living soul to produce coherent and regular events that allow us to pass judgement on people’s characters, differentiating them as particular individuals. In a manner similar to his previous description of the soul in motion, which has the ability to produce ‘waves,’ Frank later adds another characterization of the developmental effects of the soul, namely, ‘strata,’ which emerge from the conflict between the chaotic and formative movements of the soul. Unlike waves, however, strata shape the ego by building it up, following a certain direction, adding new traits and modifying existing ones. The initial character traits are usually latent: only the primary core of the living soul participates in their development. Subsequent developments are of a higher order and “belong to the life of a community or socium” (Frank 2015, p. 222). The difference between the affects of the lower order and those of the higher order justify the difference between lower and higher types of ego. This difference is a dialectical struggle grounded in the vitality of the living soul. Frank uses familiar examples to this effect, for instance, the ambivalence we feel when an action leads to a conflict between purely egotistical

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concerns (for example, ‘I don’t want to go to work, I’m too tired!’) and higher social imperatives (for example, ‘But work is my social responsibility!’). By way of arguing with Kant, Frank notes that it is more than just the expression of one’s pure will that determines a person’s choice. From our experience, we can infer the notion of a ‘suprasensual’ will, whose activity points back to the formation of the living soul; this is manifest especially strongly during one’s infancy and childhood, during which time the will is characterized by the kind of sensuality that drives his or her actions without, however, allowing the infant or child to rely on the senses for an account of these actions. One can further explain this notion by referring to a kind of infantile mysticism: the child experiences things beyond the sensual realm, yet these things form an inalienable part of the child’s ‘reality’—something that the adult would not be able to experience, unless, and only to a limited extent, we are dealing with so-called ‘mystics.’ There is also the spiritual will that governs our most selfless acts, such as those committed in the name of saving a community rather than oneself. We should not, however, idealize the latter kind of will, as Kant did, because it does not appear in abstraction but is tied to the living soul. Moreover, according to Frank, the spiritual kind of will confirms the wholeness of the soul and, on a different level, the wholeness of the ego. Unsurprisingly, Frank excludes rationality from the acts of the spiritual will. The spiritual side of the living soul follows the path of goodness, in the Platonic sense of the Good. It leads us to fulfill our duty (in the broad sense of the word) and our fate. Human fate is under guidance from the living soul in a way reminiscent of the ancient Greek gods, who were believed to be patrons for humans, who determined their fate and watched them fulfil it. In the spiritual realm, the living soul is the light of knowledge. As such, a truly spiritual person can achieve the truth in its most advanced state, as the absolute truth. In turn, the absolute truth will be given to him or her as a revelation, which is only possible if the living soul has developed the ego to the heights of sublime existence. Importantly, to finish this discussion, the two kinds of wills co-exist in the living soul without contradicting each other. Any conflict between them does not affect the primary core of the living soul, which remains absolutely and undividedly whole. Developing a spiritual stratum means that the soul becomes illuminated as if from within. As his investigation concerning the life of the soul nears its end, Frank openly acknowledges the religious implications of the word ‘spirituality.’ His earlier uses of the terms ‘Light’ and ‘God’ also indicate that the sphere which brings out the living soul and its subject most strongly is spirituality in general and religious spirituality in particular. From this point of view, Frank’s attempt to introduce the body into the life of the soul is not very convincing; if it has any value for this discussion, it is only because it is phenomenological in substance. Frank’s phenomenological insight here deals with his insistence that the body localizes soul. In other words, it determines the position of the living soul in time and space. At the same time, the living body is a part of the empirically accessible objective world. From this description, it seems to follow that body is grounded in the soul, or that the soul is a transcendental concept, while the body is an empirical one. From the contemporary phenomenological literature, we know that the role of the body is much more extensive than was once thought. One experiences his or her own body

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as both an absolute, qualitative living whole and simultaneously as thing-like matter (Leib and Körper as Husserl calls them). It is hard to deny that the body can be independent from the soul under certain circumstances. However, the biggest impact of the body upon the soul is that the body endows the soul with historicity. Time and space which help the body position the soul are also historical time and one unique space. The co-dependence of these structures, due to their opposition to each other, should be somehow conflictual. For Frank, however, there is no conflict here.10 I would like to end my exposition on this note and close the article with a discussion of his phenomenological approach to the phenomenon of the living soul.

5  Conclusion In this article I investigated Semyon Frank’s philosophy of the soul, with the key focus being on the traces of phenomenology in his unique method. While Frank never called himself a phenomenologist, his early training in Germany, and subsequent references to Brentano, Husserl and Bergson, among others, point to the possibility that Frank’s philosophical psychology is more phenomenological than it seems. What has become clear after the analysis of his middle work The Soul of Man is that Frank should not be considered as just a potential phenomenologist but as a potential phenomenological psychologist, who, it is worth remembering, was also a trained sociologist. No wonder then that Frank employs a wide variety of mixed methodological tools some of which may be associated with phenomenology, for example: multifaceted description of the phenomenon; exposition of different senses of the phenomenon; emphasis on the primacy of experience in the formation of the living soul. Today, phenomenological psychology is experiencing a renewal, so one can speak of emotional acts, rather than emotional states.11 Frank makes a number of references to emotions; therefore, it could be interesting and prudent, as a future project, to investigate his ‘philosophy of emotions.’ Frank approaches the subject of his study (the life of the soul or the living soul, as I chose to rename his key concept for both stylistic and semantic reasons) as a phenomenon of the world. Without using the phenomenological method or procedures directly, Frank alludes to them when he examines different facets which are tied to different kinds of consciousness, and which are built with great precision on psychological and philosophical grounds. By ‘precision’ I mean Frank’s consistent dismissal of the traditional Kantian interpretation of the soul as well as his staunch critique of empirical psychology and, in anticipation, cognitive psychology. His examination presents several models for the life of the soul, from the mundane perspective, where soul belongs to the accessible external world, to a holy kind of soul. In identifying the qualitative difference between and among different ‘beings’ of the

10 11

 Hence the difficulty of considering Frank a Neo-Platonist, as Solywoda (2008).  For philosophical views of emotions, see Landweer and Renz (2012).

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living soul, Frank privileges its spiritual being, which not only connotes the living soul’s enlightenment, but also allows the person to retain a strong ego that the living soul can directly guide, without any confusion about the future it seeks to realize, as is proper for a being that has yet to show itself.

References Carr, David. 2004. Phenomenology and historical knowledge. In Phenomenology: Critical concepts in philosophy, ed. Dermot Moran and Lester Embree, 146–158. London: Routledge. Casey, Edward. 1991. Spirit and soul. Dallas: Spring Publications. Frank, Semyon. 2015. The soul of man. Moscow: Terra Publishing House. [in Russian]. Husserl, Edmund. 1970. The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. Trans. David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Landweer, Hilge, and Ursula Renz, eds. 2012. Handbuch Klassische Emotionstheorien: Von Platon bis Wittgenstein. Berlin: De Gruyter. Lossky, Nikolaj. 1991. Collected works. Moscow: Logos. Solywoda, Stephanie. 2008. The life and work of Semën L. Frank. Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag. Steinbock, Anthony. 1995. Home and beyond. Generative phenomenology after Husserl. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Vasily Sesemann’s Theory of Knowledge, and Its Phenomenological Relevance Dalius Jonkus

Abstract  In his philosophical research, Vasily Sesemann proved that the natural sciences were not the sole domain of knowledge. He criticized Neo-Kantian philosophy and argued that the subject of knowledge could not be an abstract scientific mind. Cognition involves direct intuition. The knowing subject acts directly in the world, which is why knowledge is always related to attitudes. A person knows himself not as a theoretical object, but as a non-objectifiable, personal life. Therefore, man must follow not only reflective knowledge, but also pre-reflective self-­ consciousness. The knowledge that an incarnate and worldly, agential subject can be connected not only to conscious activity, but unconscious activity as well. Sesemann rejected the Neo-Kantian reduction of being into logical thinking. He argued that rationality is always related to irrationality, and pure knowledge is related to attitudes. I first discuss how Sesemann understands intuition and criticizes the naturalistic account of scientific knowledge. I then analyze how Sesemann’s theory relates knowledge to attitudes. Finally, I discuss the genesis of knowledge as the transcendence of one’s point of view and how objectifying knowledge is related to linguistic expression and in this context argue that Sesemann’s analysis of knowledge is similar to Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. Keywords  Knowledge · Phenomenology · Neo-Kantianism · Attitude · Self-­ consciousness · Intuition · Objectification

1  Introduction Vasily Sesemann was born in 1884 in Finland (which at the time was part of the Russian Empire). From childhood he spoke three languages: German, Swedish and Russian. Sesemann studied philosophy at St. Petersburg University with Nicolai Lossky and in Marburg with the Neo-Kantians Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp. D. Jonkus (*) Department of Philosophy, Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 W. Płotka, P. Eldridge (eds.), Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe, Contributions to Phenomenology 113, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39623-7_6

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Upon his return to St. Petersburg, Sesemann taught philosophy and classical languages until the outbreak of World War I, after which he became a volunteer in the Russian army (from 1914 to 1915). From 1915 to 1917 he taught philosophy as a Privatdozent at the University of St. Petersburg, and from 1918 to 1919 at the Viatka Pedagogical Institute. From 1922 to 1923 he held a teaching position at the Russian Institute in Berlin. In 1923 he accepted an invitation to teach at the University of Lithuania in Kaunas and became a professor there. Later (in 1940) the university moved to Vilnius, where he taught until 1950, when he was arrested and spent 6  years in the Gulag. After being released he was rehabilitated and worked as a professor of philosophy until his death on March 23, 1963 in Vilnius. One could say that the reception of phenomenology in Lithuania is first and foremost connected with Vasily Sesemann’s attempt to incorporate Husserlian phenomenology into his own philosophy of critical realism. Interpreters of Sesemann’s philosophy relate his critical realism to Neo-Kantianism (Botz-Bornstein 2006), but in my opinion Sesemann’s attitude is clearly more associated with the phenomenological tradition rather than the Neo-Kantian one. Sesemann criticizes the Marburg Neo-Kantians on the basis of the phenomenological description of knowledge. Sesemann repeatedly gave positive assessments of phenomenology and often called the method he used phenomenological. But his own approach to phenomenology was nevertheless critical. In discussing this critique, we should begin by distinguishing the phenomenological method from phenomenological philosophy. We should also note that Sesemann recognized the importance of phenomenology for the descriptive study of knowledge. On the other hand, he immediately refers to the shortcomings of the phenomenological approach. His main criticism of phenomenology is that it isolates knowledge and explores it separately from the concrete situation in the world. This is required by the phenomenological method, which must reveal the structure and essence of pure knowledge. Therefore, according to Sesemann, phenomenology is not interested in the origin of knowledge; it does not analyze how specific circumstances affect knowledge and what its purpose is (Sesemann 1987, p. 212). The second criticism relates to the fact that the phenomenological analysis of knowledge isolates it and abstracts it from the specific environment of concrete life. According to Sesemann, it is up to philosophical anthropology to reveal these specific conditions of knowledge, because it studies the relationship between a human organism and its environment, which influences a human’s will, instincts, feelings and thoughts, all of which are factors for knowledge. Despite his comments, Sesemann formulates a positive phenomenological research program. Phenomenology must reveal both the structure of pure knowledge and explain knowledge’s place and task in human life and culture (Sesemann 1987, p. 213). The formulation of the pure knowledge problem is related to Kantian philosophy. Kant, in his Critique of the Pure Reason, studied the structure of knowledge. Neo-­ Kantian philosophy took over and extended the intentions of this study. The Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism emphasized the natural sciences, which best meets the requirements of pure knowledge. Marburgians argued that knowledge must be purified by removing the last remains of an empirical relationship with the world. Only non-contingent, pure subjectivity can be the true subject of knowledge, which

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reveals the world’s final and objective logical laws. The Neo-Kantians of Marburg understood pure knowledge in accordance with the example of the natural sciences, where the subject of knowledge does not participate in existence, but contemplates it without taking any position in relation to it. According to the Marburg Neo-­ Kantians, pure knowledge must rely on the construction of the reality of the world as it is. Phenomenological philosophy pursued another path. In search of access to the world’s reality, phenomenology did not accept natural sciences as pure knowledge to the extent they were disconnected from real existence in the world. Husserl criticized the prevailing naturalism and objectivism in the natural sciences as a false model of knowledge. According to him, the subject of knowledge must be restored to direct experience of the living world, and only on the basis of it, can the subject confirm the legitimacy of any knowledge. But phenomenology does not rule out the idea of ​​pure knowledge. It is true that pure knowledge, in the opinion of the phenomenologists, cannot be equated with direct experience, which supporters of scientific naturalism also deny. Nevertheless Husserl showed that it is possible to reveal the pure forms of knowledge by inquiring into what is given in direct experience. In order to reveal the pure structures of knowledge, it is not necessary to deny the real conditions of knowledge and the subject’s own attitudes. The structure of pure knowledge in an empirical situation can be realized by implementing the methodical procedures of the phenomenological reduction. The analysis of knowledge is then only possible as a reflection of the genesis of knowledge. How does Sesemann’s theory of knowledge appear in this context? Sesemann published his scientific works in three languages: Russian, German, and Lithuanian. His publications appeared in little-known scientific journals, so his philosophical views were not deeply analyzed. Sesemann analyzed the problem of knowledge in several articles written in German, “Objectifying and non-objectifying knowledge” (“Über gegenständliches und ungegenständliches Wissen,” 1927a), “Rationality and irrationality” (“Rationales und Irrationales,” 1927b), “On the problem of pure knowledge” (“Zum Problem des reinen Wissens,” 1927c), as well as in his lectures published in the Lithuanian language Gnoseology (Gnoseologija, 1931) and in the article “New directions in contemporary gnoseology” (“Mūsų laikų gnoseologijai naujai orientuojantis,” 1935). First of all, I will discuss how Sesemann understands intuition and criticizes the natural-scientific model of knowledge. Then I will analyze how Sesemann’s account relates knowledge to attitudes. Finally, I will discuss the genesis of knowledge as the transcendence of one’s point of view and how knowledge is related to linguistic expression, and argue that Sesemann’s analysis of knowledge is similar to Husserl’s genetic phenomenology.

2  Intuition as the Foundation of Knowledge Sesemann formulated his own theory of knowledge on the basis of the phenomenological description of cognition. He understands phenomenology as a philosophical study that relies only on what is given in experience, thereby avoiding mere

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theoretical constructions. However, according to Sesemann, the description of experience and what is given in experience should neither be simplified nor distorted, as happens in empiricism. The phenomenological description of experience must not only reveal the specific data of cognition, but also the general structure of cognition (Sesemann 1987, p. 212). Sesemann distinguishes two stages of knowledge: intuition and formulated knowledge. Since science is impossible without concepts and judgments expressed in a logical form of cognition, scientific knowing is a form of formulated knowledge. Yet according to Sesemann, formulated knowledge is not the primary form of cognition, but a derivative one. All knowledge starts with intuition (Sesemann 1987, p. 222). Like Husserl, Sesemann understands intuition as a direct givenness of an object, which precedes logical judgments or concepts. All theoretical and logical forms of cognition must be supported and verified by this primary intuition. However, like Husserl, Sesemann admits that intuition cannot be understood as a pure act of vision. A phenomenological concept of intuition includes all kinds of sensory and non-sensory experience, inner and outer perception, real and ideal cognition. The transition to grammatical and logical forms of propositions is the second stage of cognition as a formulated knowledge. Sesemann’s philosophy is connected not only with Husserl’s phenomenology, but also with the Russian tradition of intuitionism. First of all, we should note that Sesemann’s teacher at the University of St. Petersburg was Nikolai Lossky (1870–1965). In Lossky’s intuitionism direct givenness and the evidence of intuition are confirmed through the correlation between the act of consciousness and the object. Furthermore, phenomenology is not based on representation, but on presentation—the direct givenness of things to the openness of consciousness. This element of phenomenology was well understood by another Russian philosopher Gustav Špet (1879–1939), who in his book Appearance and Sense (1913) wrote: The corner-stone of the entire edifice of phenomenology is that it firmly establishes a presentativism of everything that exists in all of its species and forms for our consciousness. It strikes a blow equally against both phenomenalism and Kantian dualism. The principle of all principles remains the sole criterion for establishing any form or species of being. The actual realization of this principle leads to absolute evidence, to the source of a control on statements about this being. In this way every sophistic construction of what exists “on its own” is destroyed. An analysis of the immediately and originally given leads to an affirmation of an absolutely given something in immanent perception, and thereby all the efforts of relativism to reduce philosophy to nothing are neutralized. After this the rigorous correlativity of object and consciousness serves as a sufficient guarantee of success with regard to an assertion about relations and forms of any genus of being. … The living and productive method of description does not support any theoretical constructions. Rather it finds an inexhaustible field for the application of its forces in the sole immediate source of and application for any creative work at all, viz. in intuition (Shpet 1991, p. 170).

Sesemann also takes into account another important concept in phenomenological research: the thesis of the intentionality of consciousness. Intentionality means that the subject is actively directed towards the object. Nonetheless, one can also attribute to intentional cognition a passive receptiveness or openness to the perception

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of the object (Sesemann 1987, p. 223). Sesemann is right to stress that intentionality has different qualities. Cognition cannot be satisfied with the initial intuition. In that same intuition lies the implicit desire to absorb the initial cognition, to develop it and express it in linguistic or symbolic form (paintings, drawings, gestures, movements). In addition, intuition can be divided into various complementary acts that are linked to the very unity of the object. To illustrate this point, Sesemann focuses on the processual nature of cognition: when we see some object in the dark, in the beginning it is vague and insufficiently defined. The intentionality of the act of cognition implies the necessity of fleshing out the object by examining or even feeling it. The object thereby gradually reveals its properties—its sturdiness, smoothness, roundness, and weight which allows one to ultimately determine that the object is a stone (Sesemann 1987, pp. 223–224). This is an interesting example in that it points to the impossibility of a pure, isolated intuition. The perception of an object is under the influence of the entirety of the experience that we have already acquired in connection with this object or objects of its class. Experience actualizes the properties of the object that are currently relevant in a particular situation. The direction that the process of cognition takes depends on the overall orientation and aims of the mind as well as on how the attention is directed. For instance, one and the same object (a skillfully made dagger) can be seen aesthetically as a work of art, scientifically as historical evidence of the past, and pragmatically as a tool to perform a certain action. The different aims that consciousness sets for itself are related to the fact that intuition cannot highlight the whole field of experience with the same intensity. Intuition has a center and a periphery. We see the object clearly when it is given in the thematic center of intuition. However, when it appears in the periphery, it becomes the background and loses its clarity and distinctness in the dark depths of consciousness (Sesemann 1987, p. 225). In Sesemann’s epistemology, intuition corresponds to the phenomenological interpretation of direct experience. By defining intuition as that which provides the primary data for cognition, Sesemann avoids the extremes of empiricism and intellectualism. Empricisim places the knowledge of essences and ideal structures of cognition itself beyond the reach of consciousness. Intellectualism underestimates the role of sensory perception and so cognition becomes a pure exercise in construction. Emphasizing the importance of intuition, Sesemann follows the phenomenological method of describing concrete factual data interrelated with transcendental structures of experience. He interprets experience as an intentional process of proceeding from one intuition to another. Phenomenological analysis cannot limit itself to only one isolated intuition since every intuition possesses a potential transition to another intuition; every separate intuition preserves an interconnection with one’s integral intentional life. Sesemann illustrates this idea with the example of perception. If intuition were limited to just one directly given aspect of the thing, then it would be impossible to understand the sense of the thing as an objective reality. Contemplating a book lying in front of me, I see not only those aspects, which are given explicitly; through the use of intuition I also conceive of those characteristics, which are given only implicitly. As Sesemann writes: “This means that my

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perception consists not only of what is given to me directly, what I see here and now, but that it also manages to comprise what is not currently manifest to me but is part of the integral whole of the object” (Sesemann 1987, p. 226). Analysis of this example, according to Sesemann, shows that perception and, in a wider sense, any intuition, do not end with the immediate impression; intuition goes beyond its own borders and requires continuation in other acts of experience. It turns out that knowledge of a thing cannot be limited to any single aspect or any single act of intuition. Every separate aspect of the perceived object, just as every separate act of perception and cognition, is implicated in the integral pictures of the world and the integrity of conscious life that is the contemplation of it. Here we stumble against what Husserl called life’s theological character. Sesemann defined this intentionality of knowledge as “a requirement for universality that is already present in initial intuition” (Sesemann 1987, p. 228). Sesemann complies not only with Husserl’s guidelines for the concept of intuition, but because he recognizes that intuition is not completely pure, Sesemann determines intuition and the concept of intentional cognition in a direction that tends toward Heidegger’s and Scheler’s. One could argue that the linking of intuition with interpretation and understanding happens gradually on the basis of turning to the analysis of being in the life-world.

3  Critique of the Naturalistic Account of Scientific Knowledge Sesemann criticizes the theory of knowledge, which settles for studying pre-­ established forms of knowledge from the empirical sciences instead of embarking on a more radical exploration of the essence of knowledge. In this way, philosophers uncritically take over the existing attitudes of the sciences and, at the same time, agree with the supposition that scientific knowledge and knowledge taken universally are one and the same thing. Sesemann recommends caution with respect to such hasty conclusions, as the empirical sciences are far from presenting a coherent and widely acceptable model of cognition. Knowing differs not only in a variety of directions, which are emphasized in different sciences, but also in attitudes which are different in the natural and human sciences. Philosophers can create a concept of knowledge based on either one model or the other. But the real discovery of the essence of knowledge, according to Sesemann, is possible only by refusing an orientation towards the positive sciences. Sesemann warns us against deducing the essence of knowing from any one specific knowledge, and recommends that we understand each specific knowledge in the light of the phenomenological discovery of a universal essence of knowledge (Sesemann 1927c, p. 205). Sesemann emphasizes that the natural sciences take the act of vision as the paradigm of objective cognition, because sight is the most objective form of sensory perception. It keeps the distance between the subject and the object. The subject does not engage in a more intimate relationship with the object and leaves it

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unaffected (Sesemann 1927c, pp. 208–209). This kind of cognition seeks to eliminate the real subject from the process of knowing. Natural sciences are based on the supposition of desubjectification, because they understand objectivity as the elimination of any subjectivity from knowledge. The naturalistic account of scientific knowledge adheres to a narrow-minded understanding of the concept of objectivity, which Husserl criticized as a superstition embedded in objectivism and naturalism. Sesemann, in support of such a critique of objectivism, notes that objectivity not only remains ignorant of the essence of the subject, but also of those specific objects to which the subject’s activity is directed: Die naturwissenschaftliche Erkenntnis erkauft ja ihre strenge “Objektivität” und Unabhängigkeit vom realen “psychologischen” Subjekt einzig und allein damit, daβ sie aus dem Sein, das sie zu erfassen sucht, von vorn herein alle Bezogenheit auf das reale Subjekt ausschaltet. Diese Ausschaltung erstreckt sich nicht nur auf das Individuell-subjektive, auf all die zufälligen, sachlich nicht begründeten Momente und Veränderungen, die jedes einzelne empirische Subjekt unvermeidlich in das erfaβte Objekt hineinträgt, sondern—und das ist der springende Punkt—auf das Wesen des Subjektes, sofern es eben mehr als bloβes naturhaftes gegenständliches Sein ist, d.h. auf die gesamte Seinssphäre, die sich in den realen Haltungen und Einstellungen des Subjektes manifestiert und nur an ihnen und durch sie erfaβt werden kann. Es handelt sich hier also auch nicht bloβ um ein Absehen von den Akten des Subjektes (seinen Haltungen, Einstellungen), sondern auch um ein Auschaltung alles dessen, worauf diese akte gerichtet und wodurch sie sachlich ontisch fundiert sind (Sesemann 1927c, p. 213, emphasis mine).1

According to Sesemann, we must understand the concept of objectivity beyond the narrow perspective of the naturalistic account of scientific knowledge. A concept of objectivity that is predicated on the complete elimination of the subject’s participation is not adequate for human sciences. Moral, religious, and aesthetic phenomena cannot be known as though they were a part of physical nature. According to Sesemann, human phenomena and values can be known only by those who are able to experience them or perceive how others can experience them. Unlike the natural sciences, which removes the subject and prevents him from participating in knowing things, the human sciences require the subject‘s direct involvement. Moral, religious and aesthetic values ​​provide a specific kind experience. This experience may vary depending on the kind of values we are experiencing. Yet to attain knowledge of values, the participation of the subject itself (described in terms of its positionality or its attitudes) becomes crucial. According to Sesemann, the position describes the subject’s involvement with the experienced being, and the attitude emphasizes the subject’s (voluntary or involuntary) orientation and openness to those regions of being, in which the subject participates (Sesemann 1927c, p. 210.) In stating that it is impossible to know the essences of value-phenomena if one ignores the subject’s

1  The crucial passage: “Scientific knowledge acquires a strict ‘objectivity’ and independence from the real, ‘psychic subject’ purely because it eliminates [ausschaltet] any relation to the real subject from Being, which is what it seeks to cognize from the very beginning, any relation to the real subject. … This is not about a simple refraining disassociating from the subject’s acts (its positions and attitudes), but about eliminating everything that these acts are aimed at, i.e., what they are objectively and ontically founded on” (translation mine).

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position and his empathy, Sesemann relies on the phenomenological studies of Max Scheler and Dietrich Hildebrand. Basing himself on the differences between the natural and human sciences, Sesemann proposes to divide knowledge into objectifying and non-objectifying branches. Objectifying knowledge corresponds to the objective criteria of the naturalistic account of scientific knowledge, where a subject does not directly participate in the existence of the objects it knows but maintains its distance from them. Non-objectifying knowledge bases itself on the subject’s experiences through which moral, religious and aesthetic objects are given. Sesemann presents several characteristics of non-objectifying knowledge. First, the form of non-objectifying knowledge relates to the pre-theoretical posture of the subject, which implies the subject’s participation in the phenomenon. Secondly, non-objectifying experience is self-­ conscious. The experiencing ego cannot be dissociated from the experience itself, but participates in it immanently. If the ego is separated from this experience, then the experience itself is destroyed. Sesemann states: Die wesentliche Schwierigkeit, die dem Erlebniswissen aus dem inneren Beteiligtsein des Subjektes am Objekt erwächst, besteht nämlich darin, daβ das erlebende Ich vom Erlebnis selbst nicht geschieden, sondern ihm immanent ist und aus ihm auch nicht, ohne das Erlebnis als solches aufzuheben, herausgelöst werden kann. Daher vermag auch das Subjekt um das Erlebnis und seinen Gehalt nur insofern zu wissen, als es um sich selbst weiβ; d. h. alles Erlebniswissen ist mit unmittelbarem Selbstbewuβtsein und Selbsterfassen wesensgemäβ verknüpft und nur in Form solch eines Selbsterfassens möglich. Das Wissende ist hier immer zugleich auch das Gewuβte und im Gewuβten, ohne sich in die dualität von einander gegenüberstehenden Subjekt und Objekt zu spalten (Sesemann 1927c, p.  212, emphasis mine).2

Non-objectifying knowledge is not only directed at the object, but also at the experience itself. The latter is a pre-reflective and non-objectifying form of self-­ consciousness, in which the subject of the experience itself does not become an object. The non-objectifying knowledge of self-consciousness cannot be a knowledge formed by concepts. Conceptually formed self-knowledge is possible, but only when we pass from pre-reflective knowledge to the objectifying knowledge of the subject through acts of reflection. How does Sesemann describe the slide from non-­ objectifying knowledge to the objective? First of all, we should note that by describing non-objectifying knowledge as pre-reflective—which in turn serves as the basis for reflectively formed knowledge—Sesemann expands the division of objectified and non-objectified knowledge. Non-objectified, direct knowledge of the world’s phenomena is like a practical orientation in a world that does not require theoretical reflection. In this sense, non-­ objective knowledge is a pre-scientific and pre-theoretical way of participating in phenomena, which also includes direct self-understanding. Objectified knowledge in this respect corresponds to the natural scientific way of knowing, which adheres 2  The crucial passage: “Therefore, the subject can also know about experience and its contents only if it knows itself, i.e., any knowledge of an experience is essentially related to immediate selfconsciousness and self-awareness, and only such a form of self-awareness is possible” (translation mine).

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to the separation between the subject and the object as well as the requirements of conceptually formed knowledge. Objectified knowledge can help non-objectified knowledge to acquire a conceptual form by artificially and even forcibly transforming this direct, non-reflective knowledge into reflectively mediated knowledge (Sesemann 1927c) But can it be said that objectified knowledge is more universal and more in line with the requirements of pure knowledge than non-objectified knowledge? Sesemann responds negatively to this question and points out three disadvantages of objective knowledge: First, objectified knowing cannot claim to be universal, because it is directed to specific layers of being and cannot include the totality of being. Secondly, since objectified knowledge is not universal, we cannot consider it as absolutely final and adequate knowledge. Thirdly, objective knowledge cannot claim to be the paragon with respect to other ways of knowing, because not only is its relation to being limited to a particular range of objects selected in a particular way, but on the side of the subject it also implies a particular conscious position and attitude (Sesemann 1927c, p.  214). These conclusions are important in that they show the difference between Sesemann’s position and the Neo-Kantian position of logical idealism. Particularly noteworthy here is his observation that the naturalistic account of scientific knowledge is based upon a certain position and attitude of the knowing subject, though the natural sciences themselves cannot reflect on this subject’s position. The methodology of the naturalistic account of scientific knowledge does not allow us to take into account how the subject is involved in knowing phenomena and to what objects and aspects of being its attention is drawn. In other words, the naturalistic account of scientific knowledge itself does not adhere to a rigorous definition of objectivity and universality, as it claims. It is only possible to fully realize the naturalistic way of knowing in a world that has no subject and nothing subjective in general. The naturalistic account of scientific knowledge, like other possible ways of knowing, inevitably follows restrictive attitudes on the basis of which the field of objective research is established. So kommen wir also zu dem Schluβergebnis: aller Mechanizismus und Positivismus beruht, sofern er die einzige wissenschftlich begründete Weltanschauung zu sein beansprucht, auf einer Verkennung seiner eigenen Bedingtheit und Gebundenheit an die gegenständliche Einstellung, die nur eine unter vielen möglichen Einstellungen ist, d. h. also er beruht auf einer unbrechtigten Identifizierung des gegenständlichen Wissens mit dem reinen oder absoluten Wissen (soweit er ein solches überhaupt anerkennt) (Sesemann 1927c, p. 216).3

Sesemann’s analysis shows that the naturalistic account of scientific knowledge cannot claim exclusivity, because like other forms of knowledge, it is based on attitudes. The naturalistic account of scientific knowledge denies these suppositions, and on the other hand, we cannot discover them using the naturalistic methodology.

3  “Thus, we conclude: any mechanicism or positivism—to the extent that it claims to be the sole, scientifically based worldview—does not acknowledge that it is conditioned by and yoked to the objectifying attitude, which is only one of many possible attitudes; i.e., it bases itself on the illegitimate identification of Objectifying knowledge with pure or absolute knowledge (to the extent that it acknowledges such a thing at all)” (translation mine).

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4  Attitudes, Point of View and the Genesis of Knowledge Sesemann seeks to investigate the essence of knowledge because he is not satisfied with the reduction of knowledge to one or another method of scientific cognition. Traditionally, we have regarded the modern knowledge of nature as true knowledge, and are content to raise such knowledge as an example for any and all knowledge— as if only such knowledge could guarantee objectivity and complete independence from subjective suppositions. Sesemann’s analysis has shown that removing the concrete subject from the process of knowledge and ignoring its orientation towards a world in which there is nothing subjective brings us no nearer to guaranteeing knowledge’s full independence from suppositions. Sesemann argues that scientific knowledge is related to attitudes without which it would not be possible to distinguish the specific fields of objects to which such knowledge is directed. The question is, is there any possibility of knowledge without suppositions? According to Sesemann, “presuppositionless knowledge” does not mean that such knowledge lacks rudimentary or fundamental principles. This only means that such principles must be self-justifying and meet the requirements of sufficient foundation (Sesemann 1927c, p. 221). Sesemann seeks to discover the self-evidence of the foundations of pure knowledge, which Husserl relied on in his project of pure phenomenology. Both of these thinkers reject the attempt to reduce knowledge to a naturalistic account of scientific knowledge and they emphasize that naturalism’s supposed access to reality is not the disclosure of reality as it is in itself, but the construction of knowledge based on specific suppositions and attitudes. Sesemann, like Husserl, thinks that the problem of pure knowledge can only be solved by contemplating the suppositions and positions implicit in knowledge. According to Sesemann, attitudes are characteristic not only of everyday pre-­ theoretical knowledge, but also of scientific knowledge. The naturalistic account of scientific knowledge does not deny its relationship with attitudes, and in the field of human sciences, this supposition of attitudes is more easily captured. Researchers in the human sciences use different attitudes depending on which objects and which areas of knowledge they are focusing on. Sesemann claims that there are many attitudes that may be connected with or contrary to each other. Here, the positivist attitude denies the non-objectifying religious, aesthetic and ethical attitudes. However, tension exists between non-objectifying attitudes as well. A religious attitude may be closer to ethics, and the latter may oppose the aesthetic. One attitude may be dominant in relation to other attitudes, or one attitude may supplement another by forming a joint structure. The objectifying attitude holds a special position among the other attitudes, because it is not just dominant in the natural sciences. It coincides with natural knowledge of the external world more broadly construed. On the basis of Lévy-Bruhl’s anthropological studies, Sesemann concludes that such an objectifying knowledge of the world is characteristic only of European culture. In other words, the objectifying attitude dominates in those cultures that are affected by the “modern” worldview: Nur für den europäischen Menschen ist die rein gegenständliche Einstellung die natürliche und vorherrschende; nicht aber für den primitiven Menschen, wie es Levy-Brühl in seiner

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fundamentalen Untersuchung über das Denken der Naturvölker gezeigt hat. Im primitiven denken kommt nicht rein gegenständlichen Einstellung eine viel gröβere und umfassendere Rolle zu (Sesemann 1927c, p. 219).4

It is impossible to attain pure knowledge if one does not take into account the attitudes that serve as the basis of the concrete act of knowing. Real knowledge cannot escape attitudes. Sesemann notes that in the process of knowing, attitudes do not just play negative, restrictive roles, but also make a positive contribution. A change in attitude opens up posibilities for new perceptions (Sesemann 1927c, p.  225). Such a dual assessment of the attitude enables a new understanding of the conditionality of pure knowledge. From the standpoint of tradition, it seems that pure knowledge is only possible when it is disconnected from subjective attitudes. According to Sesemann, this is impossible, because every act of knowing that a finite human being executes is bound to a certain point of view. The world opens up from a certain point of view. This means that the point of view not only opens up, but also limits the view. The point of view is dependent upon the standpoint. This kind of standpoint acts as though it denies all other points of view. It is only possible to overcome this limitation of the standpoint by overcoming our own suppositions and moving towards another standpoint that can supplement my own. Such an implication of one view in the next one allows us to come closer to an all-­ encompassing view. However, according to Sesemann, the implication of one view in another cannot be understood as a purely logical combination of two views. Here we speak about the connection of gnoseological attitudes where one relation with the object supplements another. Der “Standpunkt” ist aber ein spezifisch gnoseologischer, nicht logischer Begriff, dessen Funktion darin besteht, die Abhängigkeit des Wissens sowohl vom Gegenstande als auch vom Subjekt zu bestimmen. Vom Gegenstand—sofern jeder “Aspekt” desselben (soweit er überhaupt Erkenntniswert besitzt) im Gegenstande selbst gegründet ist und den Gegenstand selbst, wenn auch perspektivisch und unvollständig, darstellt. Vom Subjekt—sofern eben der Aspekt den Gegenstand nie rein und ganz wiedergibt, sondern immer nur in perspektivischer Abschattung, immer nur in gewissen durch den Standpunkt des Subjekts bedingten Ausschnitten (Sesemann 1927c, pp. 222–223).5

This connection between the subject’s standpoint and the givenness of the object itself (its aspect, or profile), is crucial. Like most phenomenologists, Sesemann emphasizes the perspectival nature of the standpoint, but he does not consider it to 4  “A purely objectifying attitude is only natural to and predominant among Europeans; it is not so for primitive peoples, as Levi-Brühl demonstrated in his fundamental study of the thinking of primitive peoples. Purely objective attitudes do not play such a comprehensive and significant role in primitive thinking” (translation mine). 5  “However, the ‘point of view’ is a specific gnoseological—not logical—concept, whose function consists in determining, knowledge’s dependence upon both to the object and to the subject. It is dependent upon the object because every ‘aspect’ of it (to the extent it bears any value for cognition) is rooted in the object and represents the object itself, albeit perspectivally and incompletely. It is dependent upon the subject because the aspect of the object is never purely and perfectly reflected, but is always perceived as an adumbration manifesting itself within a perspective, always only ever in specific profiles, determined by the subject’s point of view” (translation mine).

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be absolute. He does not understand the standpoint subjectively, but uncovers the transcendental relation between perspective and the object experienced with it. The givenness of the object is correlated to the position of the subject and therefore the latter is not “merely” subjective. The change in the aspect of an object correlates with the change in the points of view of the subject. The subject positively overcomes the limitations of the single, momentary point of view, because moving to another point of view and combining it with the previous one does not entail rejecting or cancelling what the subject earlier perceived as the aspect of the object itself; rather the previous aspected is retained while another aspect is added to it. Sesemann writes: Mit der Einsicht in das Standpunktliche eines Standpunktes ist daher immer auch die Möglichkeit gegeben seine Beschränktheit zu überwinden und zu einem anderen Standpunkt überzugehen (Sesemann 1927c, p. 223).6

This process of knowledge, wherein one point of view is connected to another, wherein one aspect of the object complements another, does not preclude the possibility of knowing the totality of the object. Sesemann states that in knowledge the whole is given first. Sesemann’s statement that the point of view or attitude in knowledge does not preclude the possibility of revealing the object’s true being, or essence, can be compared with the phenomenological account of eidetic intuition, as Scheler formulates it. Scheler analyzes the perception of the object starting from the total perception of its essence, rather than from a discrete point of view: Frage ich z. b.: was ist gegeben, wenn ich einen körperlichen materiellen Würfel wahrnehme, so ist die antwort, es sei gegeben “die perspektivische Seitenansicht” oder gar “die Empfindung” dieser, eine grundirrige. “Gegeben” ist hier der Würfel als ein ganzes—nach irgendwelchen “seiten” oder gar “ansichten” ungeteiltes—materielles Ding einer ­bestimmten räumlichen Formeinheit. Daβ faktisch der Würfel nur visuell gegeben ist, daβ weiter visuelle Elemente im Gehalt der Wahrnehmung nur solches Punkten des Sehdinges entsprechen, die seiner perspektivischen Seitenansicht angehören, davon ist keine Spur “gegeben”—so wenig wie die chemische Zusammensetzung des Würfelinnern “gegeben” ist (Scheler 1916, p. 51).7

One could argue that with respect to knowledge, it is impossible to reconcile limited viewpoints with the insight into an essence. However, phenomenologists reject this kind of approach, which is characteristic of empiricists. Eidetic intuition does not require one to reject points of view. In knowledge, one needs to reflect on the subject’s attitudes and understand how, in holding a certain point of view, one can

6  “The insight into the perspectivality of a perspective there always implies the possibility to overcome its limitation and to transition to another view point” (translation mine). 7  “In seeing a materially extended cube, for example, I can ask what is given. It would be basically erroneous to answer that the perspectival side of the cube is given, or even that the ‘sensations’ of it are given. The ‘given’ is the cube as a whole—as a material thing of a certain spatio-formal unity that is not split up into ‘sides’ or ‘perspectival aspects.’ That as a matter of fact the cube is only visually given, and that visual elements in the content of perception correspond only to such points of the seen thing—of all this, nothing is ‘given,’ just as the chemical composition of the cube is not ‘given’” (Scheler 1973, p. 55–56).

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transcend it, either by using a single aspect to realize the total essence or by revealing that essence in the genesis of cognition. As we have already mentioned, Sesemann states in many of his texts that intuition always transcends itself, because it is not satisfied with such givenness an object, which is defined by some particular aspect within a horizon. Therefore, attitudes and viewpoints in knowledge do not solely constrain knowledge but also offer a possibility of a certain insight. Zudem ist auch nicht zu vergessen, daβ der Einstellung im Erkennen nicht nur den gesichtskreis des Subjektes ein, macht es nicht nur gewissen Phänomen gegenüber blind, sondern öffnet ihm anderseits auch den Blick für bestimmte Gegenstandsbereiche, macht es also für gewisse Erkentnisse empfänglich (Sesemann 1927c, p. 225).8

Sesemann thus shows that pure knowledge, although possible only as an aspiration, does not entail the expulsion of subjective attitudes. The aim of pure knowledge is consistent with specific attitudes if we reflect upon them. The knowing consciousness must confront its own conditionality and one-sidedness, because that is how it can overcome the limitations of its knowledge and even mobilize the significance of its attitudes for knowledge. According to Sesemann, the self-transcendence of knowledge does not proceed in one direction, but in several. In this way, it can reveal more than some single aspect of an object. Sesemann associates self-­ transcending knowledge not only with eidetic intuition, but also with Hegelian dialectics (Sesemann 1935a). He associates knowledge’s ability to overcome its limitations with the concept of positive negativity. Negation is positive in a Hegelian sense, exactly because the denial of the limits of knowledge reveals opportunities at a new level of knowledge and at the same time preserves the experience gained during the previous stage. The movement inherent in knowledge is impossible without such a positive negativity, because without it we could not understand how the static knowledge acts directed towards the individual aspects of an object can contribute to the genesis of knowledge, which is directed at the totality of the being. Therefore, knowledge, as the realization of knowing the totality of the being, cannot be limited by empirical conditions, because it is teleologically oriented to universality, which goes beyond empirical constraints. A particular act of knowing constantly encounters dialectical tension between the final point of view and the unlimited process of discovering the universal essence. According to Sesemann, knowledge must be directed not only at the object, but also at the subject. Knowledge is inseparable from self-reflection. Knowledge of one thing or another necessarily implies a relationship with the very act of knowing. Therefore, knowledge, according to Sesemann, always implies the correlation between the content of knowledge and the act of knowing (Sesemann 1927c, p. 228). One could say that the empirical limitations on knowledge act as an incentive for the knowing subject to negate those limitations in a positive sense. These

8  “It should not be forgotten that attitudes do not play a strictly negative but also a positive role in the cognitive process. It not only limits the subject’s field of vision, not only rendering it blind in relation to certain phenomena, but also opens the possibility for him to see specific fields of objects, to be receptive to specific cognitions” (translation mine).

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limitation are negated and overcome not only in relation to objects of knowledge, but also in relation to consciousness itself. Phenomenological reflection expands the limits of consciousness itself, even enabling one to gain knowledge of the unconscious: Die eigentümliche Macht des Wissens manifestiert sich nicht bloβ darin, daβ es auf ein ihm transcendentes Ansichseiendes gerichtet ist, sondern auch darin, daβ es zugleich die Fähigkeit besitzt, sich selbst zu transcendieren, sich selbst zu negieren, ohne jedoch sich dadurch zu annulieren, ohne dadurch aufzuhören zu sein, was es ist. Daher sind solche Begriffe, wie das Unerkennbare, Undenkbare, Unbewuβte u. dgl. m. durchaus mögliche und sinvolle Begriffe, mag auch die genaue Fixierung ihres Sinnes jedesmal eine besondere phänomenologische Untersuchung erfordern (Sesemann 1927c, pp. 231–232).9

Sesemann analyzed the theme of consciousness in his study on objectifying and non-objectifying knowledge (Sesemann 1927a). Sesemann argued that unconsciousness becomes a problem when philosophy comes to the question of how consciousness is given to itself. Because consciousness can be conscious to different degrees, the subject can realize its acts more or less consciously. Therefore, Sesemann acknowledges the existence of the unconscious, but only as the plane of consciousness itself. The subject can transform himself, reflect on what was unconscious and thus develop self-knowledge (Jonkus 2015).

5  The Limits of Objectifying Knowledge and Language Sesemann criticizes natural-scientific knowledge as being incapable of comprehending the totality of being while claiming to give final answers about the reality of the world. He showed that the naturalistic account of scientific knowledge bases itself upon an objectifying attitude of knowledge that does not allow for the discovery of knowledge‘s presuppositions. However, Sesemann does not reject the objectifying attitude of knowledge as completely inappropriate. The objectifying attitude is characteristic of theoretical knowledge, which requires explication through concepts. According to Sesemann, knowledge gains real value when it can be communicated. The subject can only accomplish this when it transforms its intuition into a theory which has a logical form. The appearance of a logical form is related to the linguistic organization of knowledge. Only in accordance with an objectifying attitude can thinking and knowledge be materialized in language. On the other hand, Sesemann states that when thinking and knowledge turn into objectified forms of language, there is a new danger. Language seems to acquire autonomy from

9  “The peculiar power of knowledge is manifested not only by its being directed to a transcendent being-in-itself, but also by its ability to transcend itself, to negate itself, but without being destroyed, without ceasing to be what it is. Therefore, concepts such as ‘unknowable,’ ‘unthinkable,’ ‘unconscious’ and the like are perfectly possible and meaningful, even if the precise determination of their meanings in each case each time requires special phenomenological study” (translation mine).

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thinking and begins to restrict it. Therefore, the objectification of knowledge, by providing the necessary logical-linguistic form, conceals many challenges and dangers within it. Freilich ist die Abhängigkeit zwischen gegenständlichen Denken und Erkennen einerseits und dem Sprachbewuβtsein andererseits keineswegs ein schlechthin einseitiges. Erwächst auch die sprachliche Form aus dem gegenständlichen Bewuβtsein, so wirkt sie doch auch wiederum auf die Entwicklung des gegenständlichen Denkens zurück. … Die sprache, die ursprünglich die Stützpunkte für die freie Entfaltung des denkens darbieten sollte, wird nun zur drückenden Fessel (Sesemann 1927c, pp. 328–329).10

According to Sesemann, we can only contemplate the relationship between objectifying and non-objectifying attitudes by inquiring into the problem of linguistic expression. The linguistically formed knowledge we acquire in the objectifying attitude is a conceptual expression of givenness. According to Sesemann, in order to understand conceptually expressed knowledge, we must execute the intention that actualizes meaning. One can understand concepts only if one understands the phenomena that the concepts indicate. The relationship between objectifying and non-­ objectifying attitudes manifests itself as a relationship between conceptually formed knowledge and direct intuition. In other words, when reading philosophical texts, we must learn to intuit, in experiences of direct givenness, what conceptual expressions indicate symbolically. Sesemann states: Das Stilproblem ist für die Philosophie nicht ein peripherisches; wie es ein solches für die Wissenschaft ist, sondern ein tief innerliches, das mit dem Wesen der Philosophie sachlich verkettet ist. Der sprachliche Ausdruck, sofern er nur begriffliches Zeichen ist, vermag immer nur eine gegenständliche Erkenntnis mit gröβerer oder geringerer Adäquation wiederzugeben und zu fixieren; nicht aber ein wesenhaft ungegenständliches Wissen. Sobald ein solches in Frage steht, kommt es nicht nur darauf an, dasselbe inhaltlich zu fixieren, sondern zuallererst auf die Einstellung hinzuweisen, die den Zugang zu dem intendierten Sein eröffnet, ja noch mehr—diese Einstellung lebendig fühlbar zu machen, sie gleichsam in statu nascendi zu reproduzieren (Sesemann 1927c, p. 340).11

We must not regard a linguistic expression as an independent reality, but only as a symbolic reference to the experiences lived through in the relevant attitude. Language reveals the phenomena themselves by specifying the attitudes through  “Without a doubt, the dependence that exists between objectifying thinking and knowledge on the one hand and linguistic consciousness on the other is by no means one-sided. While linguistic form arises from out of objectifying consciousness, the linguistic form also affects the development of objectifying thinking. … Language, which was originally the starting point for the free development of thinking, is now turning into the chains that bind it” (translation mine). 11  “The problem of style to philosophy is not peripheral to philosophy (as it is to science), but a profound and even central problem, which is thematically and firmly connected to the essence of philosophy. The linguistic expression, to the extent it is merely a conceptual sign, can only more or less adequately reproduce and fix objectifying knowledge, but it is essentially incapable of doing this for include essence of non-objectifying knowledge. As soon as it is a question of the latter, the conversation is about the latter, it is not a matter of fixing its content, it is important not only to capture it richly, but above all of pointing to the attitude that opens up access to the intended being, and, indeed further, of making that attitude palpably intuitive, more—it is necessary to allow to experience this attitude live, as if reproducing it ins status nascendi” (translation mine). 10

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which they are available. The symbolic form of expression is only a way and means of reaching non-symbolic, direct givenness. The style of language must reproduce the appropriate attitudes. We can connect this understanding of language to the way Sesemann criticizes the notion of knowledge as a representation of reality. According to Sesemann, the representative model of knowledge always relies on the possibility of comparing representations with the object being represented, otherwise the difference between the representation and the represented object could not be determined. Knowledge cannot be understood as a reflection of reality. Sesemann emphasizes that the phenomenological concept of intentionality overcomes the dualism of immanence and transcendence. Sesemann refuses to identify knowledge with the objectifying attitude and states that what becomes manifest in representations is the presentation of the object itself, and not its duplicate (Sesemann 1927c, p. 334). The conclusion that Sesemann formulates essentially coincides with the position of transcendental phenomenology. Philosophy has to maintain that objects can be directly given as themselves, and not as duplicates. In his view, every intuition, as a direct experience of the object’s essence, is not the final discovery of it, but is always a movement transcending the last perspective toward the discovery of its final meaning. In recognizing the priority of intuition, philosophers must acknowledge that one intuition can be clarified only through another intuition and that any representation is also an imperfect presentation of the essence of the object. According to Sesemann, when we identify natural-scientific knowledge with objectifying knowledge, the latter gradually loses its connection with being. The speculative nature of science and the contradiction between its objectified forms and the reality of direct experience lead to a cultural crisis that Sesemann reflects upon more extensively in his study Time, Cultures and the Body (1935b). In this study, Sesemann discussed the objectivizations of time and the body that are characteristic of contemporary culture. Sesemann connects this trend of objectifying knowledge to the positivist conception of science. The most important criticism that Sesemann gives of positivism is that he is not able to reconcile scientific knowledge with the direct experience of phenomena. Positivism reduces phenomena to objects. As already mentioned, Sesemann criticizes natural-scientific knowledge’s exclusive orientation towards objectifying knowledge, because this knowledge fails to reflect on its ontological presuppositions. This inner contradiction in scientific knowledge can be overcome only by ontology, which supplements objectifying knowledge with non-objectifying knowledge. Sesemann treats non-objectifying knowledge as a primal relation to reality. Objectifying knowledge is based on non-objectifying knowledge and therefore must be aware of this relationship and reflect on it. On the other hand, we can only describe non-objectifying knowledge by invoking an objectifying attitude (Sesemann 1930, p. 131). Sesemann seeks to combine the finitude of the subject with the possibility of universal knowledge. Therefore, knowledge, in his opinion, must include both planes. Knowledge must maintain direct contact with being and at the same time reveal universal meaning. Empirically, such knowledge is only partially possible. Sesemann states that the position of the subject is eccentric. This means that the

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subject continually transcends its attachment to the centre. The subject is not the center of being, because it occupies a certain position in relation to being. Sesemann describes the eccentricity of the subject as the irrationality inherent in knowledge. Objectifying knowledge must constantly return to non-objectifying direct participation in being, which cannot be fully rationalized and expressed in logical concepts. Furthermore, we can associate the irrationality of eccentric knowledge with self-­ knowledge, given that rational self-reflection relies on direct and pre-reflective self-­ consciousness. According to Sesemann, objectifying knowledge is necessary, but insufficient. It must constantly return to direct and non-objectifying self-­ consciousness as an absolute reference point.

6  Conclusions Sesemann solves the classical problem of knowledge by seeking to combine the finitude of the subject with the possibility of universal knowledge. Sesemann’s position is close to the phenomenological tradition, which raises the question: how is it possible to combine pure knowledge with the attitudes of knowing? Sesemann states that we transcend and overcome the finitude of the subject of knowledge by recognizing the eccentricity of the subject itself. Subject have the ability to change and reflect the attitudes of knowledge. Objectifying knowledge is necessary, but insufficient; it must be based on the subject’s non-objectifying, direct participation in phenomena. Sesemann rejects the characteristic Neo-Kantian orientation towards the natural sciences and objectifying knowledge. The naturalistic account of scientific knowledge cannot reveal all of the ontological suppositions of knowledge. Unlike Natorp, Sesemann does not ground knowledge in an objectifying reflection but in a direct, non-objectifying self-consciousness. The ultimate support of knowledge is in pre-reflective self-consciousness, which coincides with practical self-­ knowledge. Sesemann’s distinction between objectifying and non-objectifying knowledge is close to the distinction in Husserl’s phenomenology between the naturalistic and personalistic attitudes. Sesemann understands knowledge not as a static state, but as a dynamic, endless process. Pure knowledge is the ultimate and regulatory aim of knowledge, which combines the opposites of objectifying and non-­ objectifying knowledge. I associate Sesemann‘s position with phenomenological philosophy, as he diverges considerably from his teachers, Cohen and Natorp. Sesemann’s connection with Neo-Kantianism is most noticeable when he explains pure knowledge as an endless task. Using this idea, he modifies Husserl’s static phenomenology as it was formulated at an early stage. But in a paradoxical way, this modified version of phenomenology, in my opinion, is very close to Husserl’s own late project of genetic phenomenology, which Husserl developed within roughly the same timeframe. Sesemann, like Husserl or Scheler, says that knowledge begins with intuition. Any conceptual knowledge is possible only by continually returning to direct pre-reflective experience. Yet, objectifying language is required to describe our non-objectifying relationship with being. Still, conceptual language refers to

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and reproduces the attitudes of non-objectifying experience. These insights, taken together, allow Sesemann to treat the concept of intuition as an overcoming of the representationalist model of knowledge.

References Botz-Bornstein, Thorsten. 2006. Vasily Sesemann: Experience, formalism, and the question of being. Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi. Jonkus, Dalius. 2015. Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness and the unconscious (Moritz Geiger and Vasily Sesemann). Studia Phenomenologica 15: 225–237. Scheler, Max. 1916. Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus 1. Halle: Max Niemeyer. English trans. Manfred S.  Frings. In Formalism in ethics and non-formal ethics of values.  Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973. Shpet, Gustav. 1991. Appearance and Sense. Phenomenology as the Fundamental Science and Its Problems. Trans. Thomas Nemeth. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Sesemann, Vasily. 1927a. Beiträge zum Erkenntnisproblem. Über gegenständliches und ungegenständliches Wissen. Lietuvos universiteto Humanitarinių mokslų fakulteto raštai 2: 69–142. ———. 1927b. Studien zum Erkenntnisproblem. Rationales und Irrationales. Humanitarinių mokslų fakulteto raštai 3 (4): 127–192. ———. 1927c. Zum Problem des reinen Wissens. Philosophischen Anzeiger 2 (2): 204–235; 2 (3): 324–344. ———. 1930. Beiträge zum Erkenntnisproblem 3. Das Logisch-Rationale. Eranus 1: 129–195. ———. 1935a. Zum Problem der Dialektik. Blätter für Deutsche Philosophie 9 (1): 28–61. ———. 1935b. Laikas, kultūra ir kūnas: Šių dienų kultūros uždaviniams pažinti. Kaunas: Spaudos fondas. ———. 1987. Gnoseologija. In Raštai. Gnoseologija, ed. by Albinas Lozuraitis, 209–334. Vilnius: Mintis.

Roman Ingarden’s Early Theory of the Object Marek Piwowarczyk

Abstract  Roman Ingarden is one of the most well known phenomenological ontologists. Yet his phenomenological ontology is very different from Heidegger’s. Ingarden rather follows Husserlian formal ontology and, in a wider perspective, post-Brentanian theories of the object. He held that one of the tasks of a proper theory of the object was to overcome the empiricist bundle theories. His mature neo-Aristotelian substantialism is a strong response to empiricism. Ingarden began working out his position very early on. In his phenomenological manifesto—The Aims of Phenomenologists—he sketched a theory of the object as an alternative to the simple bundle theory of Ernst Mach and his followers. This early doctrine is the topic of the current chapter. I present this theory, classify it in contemporary terms and compare it to his mature substantialism. My thesis is that Ingarden’s early view is a sort of sophisticated bundle theory or a sui generis doctrine which should be placed somewhere between sophisticated bundle theories and full-blooded substantialism. In The Aims the basic structure of a thing is a Gestalt-qualities structure, differing in many respects from a subject-properties structure. Keywords  Ingarden’s early phenomenology · Theory of the object · Substances · Properties · The subject-properties structure · Gestalt · Constitutive nature · Phenomenological ontology

1  Introduction Roman Ingarden’s phenomenology is relatively well known to English speaking scholars. His main works have been translated into English or were written originally in German, which enabled their wider reception. The theories he is famous for are a subject of many extensive studies and smaller articles as well. He was initially known for his work in aesthetics but now his ontology and epistemology are also M. Piwowarczyk (*) Faculty of Philosophy, The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Lublin, Poland © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 W. Płotka, P. Eldridge (eds.), Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe, Contributions to Phenomenology 113, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39623-7_7

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topics of study in international literature.1 Unfortunately his ethics are still only available to Polish scholars. In the context of our book, the problem with Ingarden’s early philosophy—i.e. his philosophy from 1914 (when he started to work on his dissertation on Bergson) to 1939 (the beginning of World War II)—is that in principle it is almost the same as his mature thought. Of course it is not so elaborated, so precise, so expanded as his later thought. Yet Ingarden’s early writings contain the germ of most of the ideas he developed in his magnum opus The Controversy over the Existence of the World (Spór o istnienie świata; Ingarden 2013, 2016). There are no sharp breakthroughs of his thinking and the year 1939 is only an artificial boundary between his early and mature doctrines. No wonder: his thinking was always dominated by the realism-­ idealism controversy and his early works were planned as prefatory studies for the final examination of this controversy. Ingarden started to analyze the controversy very early on. In the summer of 1918 he wrote an extensive letter to Husserl (lost in WWII but reconstructed by Ingarden and published in Polish). The letter contains the earliest preliminary formulation of the philosophical project Ingarden developed in the interwar period (Ingarden 1976). This initial project included both epistemological and ontological aspects. The first component consisted in the examination of external perception. The Polish phenomenologist was convinced Husserl committed some mistakes in his analysis of the noema−noesis correlation. Ingarden supposed that “the flowing field of impressions” is the ultimate source of noematic senses. This was consistent with the results of his doctoral dissertation on Bergson (Ingarden 1922). Roughly speaking, noematic senses were interpreted as “categorial forms,” which prompted Ingarden to undertake ontological considerations. However the problem of “ontological form” was only one of the issues Ingarden wanted to discuss. The second was the question of the possible relations between pure consciousness and the external world. In the aforementioned letter, the Polish phenomenologist sketched the first list of such relations (Ingarden 1976, p. 436). In 1919 Ingarden published The Aims of Phenomenologists (Dążenia fenomenologów) which can be considered a manifesto of his philosophical identity (Ingarden 1919a, b). In general, the paper was a presentation of the main topics of Husserl’s phenomenological project. Witold Płotka has made a concise list of these: “(1) Husserl’s early psychologism in his Philosophie der Arithmetik, (2) the critique of psychologism in logic, (3) the phenomenological requirement to limit analysis to direct experience, (4) the descriptive manner of investigation, (5) the a priori basis of the analysis of essences, and (6) a transcendental reformulation of phenomenology by the method of reduction that avoids the petitio principii problem” (Płotka 2017, p.  85). Ingarden’s original contribution was a quite peculiar theory of the object, which will be the topic of this chapter.

1  See for example: Chrudzimski (1999, 2005); Malherbe and Richard (2016); Mitscherling (1997). For selected bibliography see Thomasson (2017).

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In the next few years Ingarden became increasingly convinced that ontology (and not, say, epistemology) was a proper way to ponder the realism-idealism controversy.2 His post-PhD thesis (Habilitationsschrift)—Essential Questions (Essentiale Fragen)—was devoted to the problem of natures, essences and ideas (Ingarden 1925). In this work he defends an Aristotelian distinction between natures and properties. He also provides a—very original and sophisticated—theory of ideas, with a central thesis on the two-sidedness of ideas. According to this doctrine, the idea ‘man’ is not itself a man, nor is it endowed with intellect or senses. Yet all these qualities (or rather their ideal counterparts) are contained in the content of the idea. The idea of man qua idea has its own nature (being an idea of man) and properties (being atemporal, non-spatial and so forth). In the article Remarks on the Idealism-Realism Problem (Bemerkungen zum Problem “Idealismus-Realismus”) Ingarden presented the ontological re-­ formulation of the controversy, provided his meta-ontology, distinguished three domains of ontology (existential, formal and material), and introduced four pairs of so called existential moments: originality/derivativeness; autonomy/heteronomy; separability/inseparability; independence/dependence (Ingarden 1929). Existential moments are varieties of existential conditioning allowing for a more precise analysis of the possible relations between consciousness and the world (Ingarden 1931b). One of the existential moments is heteronomy. In the case of heteronomous objects, their qualities are not really embodied in them but are assigned to them by external sources. If such a source is, say, the consciousness creating a fictional object like Sherlock Holmes, then objects created this way are called “purely intentional objects.” In conscious acts we ascribe some features to Sherlock but they are not really embodied in him—they remain merely ascribed. Ingarden was convinced Husserlian idealism consists in the thesis that the external world is heteronomous with respect to pure consciousness. This is why he tried to find essential differences between the idea of a real object and the idea of a purely intentional object. Heteronomy/autonomy is not the only difference. Intentional objects have a peculiar formal structure: they are two-sided, but not in the same way as ideas. Because fictional characters were paradigm cases of intentional objects, Ingarden focused on the ontology of literary works of art. He published the result, The Literary Work of Art (Das literarische Kunstwerk; Ingarden 1931a), in 1931. He further developed his formal ontology in On the Formal Structure of Individual Objects (Vom formalen Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes; Ingarden 1935). Ingarden provided an extensive analysis of the fundamental formal structure of the object. He examined the subject-propert structure, the part-whole structure, the relations between the concept of a constitutive nature and the concept of Gestalt, he analyzed the concept of material stuff and introduced the categories of ‘enduring object,’ ‘process,’ and ‘event.’ All these doctrines of Ingarden’s early phenomenology are present (sometimes in the same verbal form) in his mature writings and thus are quite well known not

 See his letter of 28th March 1922 to Twardowski (Ingarden and Twardowski 2016, pp. 207–212).

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only to Polish scholars but also to a wider community of phenomenologists and analytic philosophers (in fact the latter seem to be more interested in the Ingardenian legacy than phenomenologists). This is why I decided only to sketch them above and to focus on the topic unknown to non-Poles, i.e. Ingarden’s early thoughts on the formal structure of object. This doctrine is quite original and differs from the mature one. I would like to stress that Ingarden’s theory of the object is an important component of his existential ontology since it constitutes the heart of his anti-idealistic project. In the aforementioned letter, Ingarden says to Husserl that “The VI. Investigation is ailing (and that is the most important deficiency) from a consideration of the essence of the ‘object’” (Ingarden 1976, p.  421). In Intuition and Intellect in Henri Bergson (Intuition und Intellekt bei Henri Bergson) Ingarden postulated that phenomenology should elaborate the theory of basic categorial structures of objects (Ingarden 1922, pp.  398–401). The Aims of Phenomenologists contains the first attempt to sketch such a theory.

2  The Theory of the Object in The Aims of Phenomenologists In The Aims Ingarden always considers an object to be a correlate of conscious acts. Sometimes we have problems distinguishing whether Ingarden is talking about our cognition of objects (especially sense perception) or about objects themselves. There are places (Ingarden 1919b, pp. 328–329) where he considers a content of perception and discusses how its structure corresponds to the structure of the object (of course Ingarden knew Twardowski’s distinction between content and object of presentation). Nevertheless he presents his first theory of the object which contains the germ of some basic theses of his mature doctrine, although the core idea of this early conception is distinct from the notion of the object we can already find in Essential Questions (published 6 years later). Objects of sense experience are real, and objects of a priori cognition are ideal. Ideal objects can be general (the idea of man, the idea of square) or individual (all congruent squares whose sides are 2 cm long). Real objects exist in time and are spatial or spatially located or stand in a loose relationship with space (Ingarden 1919b, p. 321). Such objects can be processes or objects in a narrow sense (things like trees, chairs, tables, stones, flowers, dogs). They begin and cease to exist, they can change and so on. Ideal objects exist neither in space nor in time. They are eternal and immutable. When Ingarden is talking about objects, he usually has in mind real objects in a narrow sense. In this chapter, I will consider only such objects. There are three contexts in which we can place some passages about the formal structure of objects in The Aims. The first is the problem of the principle of direct experience, the second is the issue of a priori cognition and the last one concerns the constitution of a thing out of its profiles (Husserl’s Abschattungen). The first context is the most important. Ingarden presents the standard account of Husserl’s principle of all principles: “that a direct experience is always the ultimate

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source and basis of cognition and all theories” (Ingarden 1919a, p. 134). Experience is understood here as “such a cognitive act in which an object itself is given originally (‘personally’) or—as Husserl says—is ‘self-given in the flesh’ (leibhafte Selbstgegebenheit)” (Ingarden 1919a, p. 136). There are many types of direct experiences corresponding to the many types of objects. One of the aims of phenomenologists is “to ‘experience’ i.e. to reach the immediate data of given objects of the investigation and to subordinate to them, i.e. grasp them in such a way and in the same limits, in which these data present themselves” (Ingarden 1919a, p. 137). This aim requires a neutral starting point. We should neutralize all theories, assumptions and concepts concerning the object under investigation. The principle of all principles also favors descriptive and eidetic analyses of data over genetic analyses. The latter consists in the discovery of hypothetical causes of an experienced object i.e. an object insofar it is present to consciousness. This causal approach was typical of the scientific atomistic psychology of the nineteenth century with its psycho-physiological theories of perception, which took physical causes of cognition (for example light waves) and laws of association as its basic explananda. Experienced objects were derivative then; they were cross-sections of “objective” physical, physiological and psychological processes. Moreover, what was really causally explained were particular distinct impressions, sense qualities, Lockean ideas—considered as atoms of psychic life; bricks out of which everything present in consciousness is built. It is not without reason that Ernst Mach—the most prominent representative of this trend—called them “elements.” Objects were merely collections of such isolated elements. Ingarden fought with passion against this doctrine (in his terminology: the class theory of the object: we would say: the bundle theory) during his whole career. Indeed, this is the leitmotiv of his early conception of the object. Phenomenologists reject both the application of the scientific method within philosophy and the positivistic (or empiricist) theory of the object as a bundle of qualities. For: If we do not take into account investigations of “objective [causal] processes” and if we fully and adequately investigate the data of immediate experience, we can convince ourselves that objects of this experience are to some degree simple data, which cannot be reduced to some quantity of elements contained in them. Of course it is possible to distinguish several elements in the whole object but the sum of these elements is not identical to a simple form [postać] of the whole object. On the contrary: we should grasp the whole if we want to distinguish the elements (moments) contained in it and understand how they are contained in it. Due to this fact [of non-identity of the whole and its elements—M.P.] the multifarious wealth of objects is not reducible to a few simple elements out of which everything can be built (Ingarden 1919a, p. 140).

It is easy to see that Ingarden is appealing to the basic idea of Gestalt psychology, which seems to be a good choice: Gestalt psychology was an enemy of psychological atomism and a natural ally of all antireductionist theories of the object. In the 1963 version of The Aims, Ingarden added a few phrases to the quoted passage that even emphasize the affinities between his doctrine and Gestalt theory. In the corrected version we can read that objects “are not bundles but certain wholes which bear upon themselves the mark of a synthetic quality, which is not a plurality of

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simple qualities” (Ingarden 1963, p. 298). We can distinguish different qualities in an object but “in a peculiar way they melt together with each other and are not identical to a simple element but usually bear the unique mark of the whole thing” (Ingarden 1963, p. 298). It perfectly corresponds to the definition of the harmonious unity that Ingarden provides in The Essential Problem of Form and Basic Concepts of Form (Esencjalne zagadnienie formy i jej podstawowe pojęcia; Ingarden 1946) and repeated in The Controversy: Harmonious unity obtains between two entities (material moments), a and b, when they do not indeed have to be together but do in fact exist in the unity of a whole [and] their coexistence necessarily implies the emergence in the same whole of a third entity (moment), c, that encompasses them both, but at the same time leaves undisturbed the peculiarity and otherness of each of them: a and b shine through so-to-speak via the moment that is grounded in them, and that encompasses them, whereby this latter [c] is the predominant moment in the whole constituted in this manner, and brands this whole in a unifying and holistic manner (Ingarden 2016, p. 60).

Ingarden explicitly calls this emergent quality the “Gestalt” (Ingarden 2016, p. 61). Notice that the Gestalt is a quality supposed to unify some qualities that are independent, at least in principle.3 As a response to the class (bundle) theory of the object, Ingarden’s early conception was an attempt to reconcile plurality and unity and can be seen as a solution to the one over many problem, for Gestalts play the role of Husserlian moments of unity. Indeed Huserlian formal ontology (from the Logical Investigations) was probably a direct inspiration for Ingarden. An object is then understood in terms of a specific whole. Parts of such a whole are united by another part. Yet Ingarden also regarded his conception as a doctrine concerning the relationship between object and its properties: On the one side, an object occurs in a peculiar quale, and on the other side its properties occur in their own proper qualia. The first quale is called a holistic quale. For example, when we perceive a table, by which we work every day, then this object—grasped as a whole—in a sense bears the holistic quale “my table.” The occurrence of that quale is only to some extent dependent on properties occurring in a given perception. On the other side we discern several properties of the table: “wooden,” “quadruped,” “varnished.” Each of these properties occurs in its own “property-quale” (Ingarden 1919a, p. 150).

The distinction “holistic quale/property-qualia” plays an important role in Ingarden’s concept of partial identification. The same holistic quale can occur together with different property-qualia. Partial identification consists in a new perception of the object enjoying the same holistic quale but with different property-qualia. Note that according to Gestalt theorists, the same Gestalt can be grounded in different qualities which, to use Ingarden’s idiom, shine through it. Thus an object can change its property-qualia and save its identity through time which would be impossible, according to Ingarden, in the class theory of the object where all qualities are equally important. Yet the change of property-qualia is not absolutely free: “there is a definite regularity determining what property-qualia are needed if a certain ‘holistic quale of object’ is to occur as a datum of immediate experience” (Ingarden 1919a,  Ingarden thought there are possible Gestalts grounded in mutually dependent qualities.

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p.  150). It is also possible that some holistic qualia need a rigid set of property-­ qualia. Then such objects are immutable (here Ingarden probably has ideal objects in mind). To know an object is not to know its causes but to see it in its holistic quale and to understand the law which governs its coexistence with property-qualia. Grasping the holistic quale is also the first stage of knowledge concerning the species to which an object belongs. Objects belong to certain kinds not because they have some common properties but due to the kinship between their “holistic forms”: “Concrete content of the whole of the object determines the species” (Ingarden 1919a, p. 140). Classification of objects is not free, unlike in the case of the bundle theory where we do not have any rule governing which properties we should select to form species-concepts. For phenomenologists, species are not statistical notions. These considerations lead us to the second aforementioned context: the problem of a priori knowledge. This knowledge is the cognition of the object’s essence. Ingarden follows Husserl and distinguishes individual essences, possessed by individual objects, and general, ideal (non-spatiotemporal) essences that individual essences instantiate. His notion of the individual essence is his original contribution to the issue of a priori knowledge. Ingarden distinguishes intrinsic and relational properties of the object (Ingarden 1919b, p. 322). The latter are partially determined by relations obtaining between objects, the former are independent of such relations. Having this distinction in mind, he defined the essence of the real object as follows: By the essence of some real object I mean this complex of its intrinsic properties, inseparable from each other, which form together some simple quale, making an object “this object” and without which an object would not be so (Ingarden 1919b, p. 323).

Notice that in the space between the first and the second parts of The Aims Ingarden changed his mind about the status of property-qualia: they are not independent of each other but mutually inseparable. To my knowledge, this is Ingarden’s first definition of essence. It is worth emphasizing that the essence is not just the holistic quale, as it also contains some properties. It will be a stable element of Ingardenian formal ontology that some properties besides the basic characteristic of a thing (later called “a constitutive nature”) belong to the essence, although he gradually limited the scope of such properties. The last important thesis about the structure of objects concerns types of elements which can be discerned within the object. When we constitute the object of experience out of its profiles, we discern in the content of perceptual acts not only some sensible qualities but also non-qualitative forms in which these qualities occur. The first is a unifying form of sensible qualities. Say an object given in a series of profiles has a color of slightly different shades in each profile. These different appearances are unified by ascribing one quality to the object. In different regions of a red shining surface, we can see many different shades of redness, and even of other colors, but we ascribe a unified redness to the whole surface. This moment of unification is a formal moment of the property “being red.” Ingarden calls it “a qualitative form” (Ingarden 1919b, pp.  327–328). There are also moments

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determining the categorial structure of an object, for example a form which makes some quality a property: The red color as such and red color as a property of some object are not identical, even if we have “the same” shade of redness in both cases. What makes a difference between them is a different categorial form. When we are perceiving the red color as a property of an object, we are perceiving it in a peculiar form, belonging to it only because it is a property of an object. This form is not perceived in itself when the color is perceived (Ingarden 1919b, p. 329).

The mode of existence is another formal element of the object. Some objects can be given as real (existing in the objective, external world), others as a delusion, others as possible, as ideal and so on. Thus an object has a material-formal structure. Qualities are material elements of objects and can be of two types: holistic quale and property-qualia. Qualitative forms, categorial forms and modes of existence are formal elements of the object. It is interesting that Ingarden in his early ontology considered modes of existence as formal aspects of the object, since later he divided Husserlian formal ontology into two parts: formal ontology and existential ontology and distinguished between forms and modes of existence (Ingarden 1929).

3  How to Classify the Early Ingardenian View? I do not think it will entail an anachronism to place the early Ingardenian doctrine on a map of contemporary theories of the object. In handbooks of ontology or metaphysics we can find three standard views concerning the structure of objects: bundle theories, substratum theories and substance theories.4 According to the bundle theories, an object is a collection of properties. They are basic elements of reality q—the alphabet of being. Usually they are in principle understood as independent of each other, i.e. they can travel from one object to another. Bundle theories are one-category ontologies. Properties are what really exist and objects are only groups of properties. Their grouping together obtains due to a special relation called compresence or consubstantiation, which is considered an additional element of an object. Since such a relation must be compresent with other elements we need a higher level compresence which is responsible for coexistence of the first level compresence with properties. This operation must be iterated. Thus we have the first crucial problem for bundle theories: vicious regress of compresence relations. Bundles are conceived as nothing over and above properties. Their criteria of identity are extensional. A bundle A is identical to a bundle B if A contains the same properties as B and vice versa. All properties are equally important in determining the identity of a bundle. Therefore a bundle cannot lose or gain new properties while retaining its identity. This is the second crucial problem of bundle theories: bundles cannot change. The change consists in the replacement of one bundle by another.  See Loux 2006, Chap. 3; MacDonald 2005, Chap. 3.

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To solve these problems, some philosophers have worked out sophisticated versions of bundle theories. The most well known is Peter Simons’s nuclear bundle theory (Simons 1994). Simons appeals to some Husserlian formal concepts. To put it briefly, according to this theory there are two spheres within a bundle: a nucleus and a halo. The first is constituted by properties (individual properties, called tropes—Simons is a nominalist) which are mutually, rigidly dependent on each other. A halo is composed by properties which are rigidly dependent on a nucleus. Yet a nucleus is only generically dependent on properties from a halo. This means that a nucleus can coexist with different properties of the same type. Thus a bundle can lose and gain some properties—and the second problem is resolved. Moreover, relationships obtaining between properties are not additional elements of a bundle but are forms of immediate coexistence—they are “ties that bind” (Simons 2005). In this way the first problem is resolved. Substratum theories are two-category ontologies. We have both properties and subjects of properties, called substrata. There are many possible varieties of substratum theories: with objects as substrata; with objects as “substrata  +  properties;” with properties independent of substrata, with properties dependent on substrata and so on. Substrata considered without properties are ‘bare’ in a specific sense. Substrata, in abstraction from all properties, have no intrinsic content. Even if they are dependent on properties, they do not have in themselves their own qualitative content. Substrata are considered principles of individuation and in this function can be called ‘bare particulars.’ Thus philosophers who do not believe in universal properties usually reject them. But even if properties are universals, it is hard to understand why substrata can serve as principia individuationis. For the problem of individuation arises partially from the consequences of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles: if two objects are indiscernible then they are one and the same object. This is why we need something that makes a difference between them and substrata enter the stage. Yet substrata are equally bare and seem to be indistinguishable, so they are doubtful candidates for principles of individuation. A more important objection against substrata concerns the problem of change. We can see that objects of our direct experience begin and cease to exist. They also change and changes they undergo obtain in a certain order. Yet note that substrata, as bare, are perfectly compatible with all properties, so they seem to be indestructible. They can survive any change. Moreover, a bare substratum cannot be a source of order in which changes obtain. Similar doubts arise with respect to the thesis (maintained only by some substratists) that substrata are dependent on properties: if they are bare, there is no basis for such dependence. Substance theories of objects try to overcome these problems. According to them, an object is a subject of properties. Yet a subject has its own qualitative equipment called an ‘essence’ or ‘nature.’ A subject considered in abstraction from properties is not bare. A nature is not an additional property of an object but is its most basic characteristic. Objects are what they are due to their natures. In this sense, natures constitute objects and properties only give them additional characteristics. We can say that properties only modify objects which are already constituted by

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natures. All properties are rigidly inseparable from a subject and a subject is rigidly or generically inseparable from some properties. Yet subjects enjoy a stronger ontological status than all properties. A nature also determines the natural kind to which an object belongs. Classical Aristotelians were convinced that, in the case of material substances, a subject is itself composed of substantial form and prime matter. The concept of prime matter is very similar to the concept of an inseparable, bare substratum. The difference between substantialism of this sort and substratum theories consists in the status of a substantial form, which is not a property. Yet the form somehow inheres in prime matter and this is why we are tempted to reduce it to a property. Contemporary Neo-Aristotelians usually do not believe in prime matter and for them subjects are just essences or natures (substantial forms). The rejection of prime matter makes this kind of substantialism apparently similar to sophisticated bundle theories. The difference lies in the role of natures. The object’s nature determines the individual identity of an object and makes it one object. Properties are only ways that determine how an object is and do not destroy its oneness. On the contrary: a nature (a subject) is the principle which binds properties around itself. The subject is something over and above its properties. Bundles are still pluralities of properties, even if the properties are closely connected, because a bundle is nothing over and above properties. As I mentioned above, Ingarden tried to work out a theory that would be a real alternative to the class theory of the object. It is easy to see how the class theory is a variety of the simple bundle theory. Substantialism is the strongest rival of simple bundle theories. But I would like to emphasize that an attempt to overcome the latter does not automatically lead to substantialism. At first glance, Ingarden’s early theory seems to be a sort of substantialism, but there are reasons to doubt this. Ingarden is seeking the real unity of an experienced object. This unity is provided by the holistic quale which binds some set of properties. The holistic quale also performs some functions which substantial natures perform: it is responsible for the object’s belonging to a given species and makes an object “this object”. Yet in the 1919 version of The Aims of Phenomenologists, Ingarden does not say that an object is a subject of properties which is qualified by a holistic quale. Although he uses the term “property” he does not consider it in terms of the subject-­ property dichotomy. Properties are properties of an object because we can find them within an object, and not because they inhere in a subject. We cannot say that properties modify a holistic quale. In the 1963 version Ingarden added a remark that suggests he wanted to bring his early theory closer to his mature one (Ingarden 1963, p. 345). He says that if there is a form “accruing to a subject” (a form essential to a property) then there must be a form “being a subject of” a property. Yet in the original version we do not find any suggestion that an object is a subject of properties. In the early doctrine, an object is conceived rather in terms of a specific whole. Ingarden states this explicitly and uses terminology connected with such an understanding of the object: “holistic quale,” “partial identification” and so on. An object is composed of some qualities but one of them plays a special function with respect to the whole and with respect to the other qualities. Thus the 1919 theory of the

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object is rather an extreme variety of a sophisticated bundle theory (successfully meeting all objections against simple bundle theories) or it is a sui generis theory which should be placed somewhere between sophisticated bundle theories and substantialism. To grasp this, let us compare the early doctrine with his mature ontology of the subject-properties structure, which he sketched in Essential Questions then developed in On the Formal Structure, and fully expressed in The Controversy.

4  Constitutive Natures Versus Gestalts In the early 1920s Ingarden was interested in the problem of identity. He planned to write a book devoted to this issue and to present it as a Habilitationschrift. Because of personal problems and lack of time (he worked at a secondary school as a math teacher) Ingarden decided to extend a part of the planned work5 and publish it as Essentiale Fragen. There are three such essential questions: about individual identity of something; about the essence of something; about the kind to which something belongs (Ingarden 1925, p. 147). Ingarden provided detailed analyses of these questions and worked out theories of individual objects, of essences and of ideas. When I am asking “What is this?” or “Who is she?” I am asking about the individual identity of a thing. The identity is not understood here as a relation “=”, nor as identity through time but as, say, that what a thing is; thing’s “whatness.” CSI agents try to find identity conceived this way. The correct answer to such a question should refer to something which determines the individual identity of object. CSI agents appeal to the results of DNA investigations but for ontologists this is not enough: all my hairs plucked off my head have the same DNA as I have but they are not me. An ontologist looks for something that is peculiar only for one object. This is the object’s constitutive nature. What is this? In Essential Questions Ingarden was under the influence of Jean Hering’s Remarks on Essences, Essentiality and Ideas (Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee). In accordance with the French phenomenologist, he accepted the Aristotelian distinction between ti einai and poion kai poson einai (Ingarden 1925, pp. 147–155). This is the fundamental distinction between what an object is (that it is [this] horse or [this] man, or [this] cat) and how an object is (that it is respectively: strong, musical, nimble). Roughly speaking ti is an Aristotelian essence and poion kai poson are Aristotelian qualities and quantities (accidents). The order of ti einai is the order of the individual identity of a thing. Thus the question “What is it”? is the question about this order. The answer to this question must appeal to something which determines the individual identity, which makes an object “this” object. Ingarden called such a factor “a constituting nature” of the object. Factors which determine how an object is (or what it is like) are called properties. 5  See his letters to Twardowski (of 27th January 1923 and of 18th February 1923)—Ingarden and Twardowski 2016, pp. 232–235, 237–241). See also Ingarden 1999.

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A constitutive nature is not a primitive thisness of the object but it has a qualitative character. In the case of, say, Bucephalus, it is “this horseness”. A constitutive nature must be particular, although it can be perfectly similar to other natures (natures of other horses) or, speaking in the spirit of Ingardenian Platonism, it can be an instantiation of the same ideal quality as other natures. Properties are also particular. To this extent, the doctrine from Essential Questions is similar to the doctrine from The Aims. We have many qualities within an object and one of them performs a distinguished role of making an object what it is. The constitutive nature, or its determinable qualitative aspects, also determines the kind(s) to which an object belongs. Yet the nature can be complex. Of course the parts of a nature are abstract moments and not concrete “pieces”. Nevertheless, properties cannot be even abstract parts of a nature. Nature and properties belong to two different irreducible ontological orders of the thing’s characteristics. All parts of a nature are determinable qualities which belong to the ti einai order. In the case of a horse it is for example animality, physicality (being a physical thing) and so on. They correspond to ideas of higher levels of generality. In contrast to a holistic quale, a constitutive nature does not have to be simple. As mentioned above, Ingarden had the tendency to reinterpret his earlier theses in light of his mature theories but when he compares holistic qualia with natures, he is less straightforwardly revisionist. In the Polish version of Essential Questions he added the following remark: The quale I was talking about there [in The Aims] is just that what I call here “an individual nature constituting an object”. But today I would not say that this quale must be simple in all objects, nor that it is formed by intrinsic properties. Today I see the relation between the nature of an object and its intrinsic properties differently (Ingarden 1972, p. 348 ff.).

According to the new theory, a constitutive nature determines so called the absolutely intrinsic properties of an object, understood here as properties which do not depend on the environment and which an object possesses in all circumstances. Some of the absolutely intrinsic properties were said to “equate to” a nature, to be equivalent to it. For example: a particular squareness as the nature of an individual ideal square is balanced by equilaterality, parallelity and equiangularity. If something has the nature ‘squareness,’ it must have all these properties and vice versa: the coincidence of these properties is grounded in the fact that a given figure is a square. These properties are enough to equate to squareness in the sense that they are enough if the squareness is supposed to appear. A square also has other absolutely intrinsic properties, which are implied by those which equate to a nature (for example, having two diagonals which intersects at a straight angle). A nature, together with all the intrinsic properties that are equivalent to it, forms the essence of an object. An essence is the ontological ground for a definition of a thing (Ingarden 1925, pp. 164–173). A nature also determines the types and scopes of acquired properties and externally conditioned properties. They are still intrinsic but they are dependent in some respects on external circumstances. A nature is compatible with any property

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belonging to such a scope (for example, a man is compatible with different shapes), so an object can lose and gain such properties. Ingarden’s road to this classification of intrinsic properties was rather long: he finally stated it explicitly in The Controversy (Ingarden 2016, pp. 342–355). But more important is that Ingarden was a full-blooded substantialist since the time of the Essentiale Fragen. Thus for him, a constitutive nature was a characteristic of a subject of properties. Ingarden used to say that a constitutive nature directly qualifies a subject and this is the reason why it can be indirectly qualified by properties. An object has the subject-properties structure due to its constitutive nature. We should remember that, for Ingarden, to be an object in the strict sense is to be a subject of properties. A constitutive nature makes an object just be an object, it gives it an “objectual” character. Of course the subject-properties structure is a formal structure but form is determined by ontological matter (qualities)—and a constitutive nature is a thing’s basic matter (Ingarden 1935, pp.  52–81; Ingarden 2016, pp. 71–111). One can wonder why I have classified the mature Ingardenian theory as substantialism. Does he not postulate a bare substratum when he says that a nature qualifies a subject? What is qualified here if not a bare substratum? Ingarden gives additional grounds for such an interpretation in Vom formalen Aufbau often using the phrase Gegenstandsubjekt—a subject of the object. Yet this reading of Ingarden’s ontology is incorrect. First, Ingarden rejected the notion of prime matter as an “empty fiction.” Notice, however, that prime matter and bare substratum are close relatives and in fact one can interpret traditional Aristotelianism as a substratum theory that endorses the notion of an inseparable substratum. Second, Ingarden was strongly convinced that all moments of an individual object are particular. He could not understand how any moments could be immanent universals i.e. how they could be literally common to many separable beings. Therefore he did not need substrata as bare particulars. Even if he searched for a principle of individuation he did not understand it as something which individuates immanent universals. Rather he was looking for a principle of distinctness and experimented with the Scotist notion of haecceity, conceived as a unique quality—some constitutive natures could be such haecceitates. Objects which do not enjoy such natures are individuated by a special moment called simply “individuality” but this moment is not a subject of properties (Ingarden 2016, pp. 395–410). In my personal opinion, from the systematic point of view, the question of individuation becomes a pseudo-problem with Ingardenian ontology. If there is no place for bare substrata in Ingarden’s philosophy, then the nature itself is a subject. Being a subject is only a formal function and it is fulfilled by a nature. If we abstract from all properties and from the function of being a subject, we are left with a nature, not with a bare substratum. The function in question is non-qualititative, but this fact does not imply that a subject is non-qualitative. A subject is just a subject not because of its intrinsic character but because it stands in a special relationship to properties. If we were to consider a nature in abstraction from the role it plays, then it seems to be just a regular quality that falls under the category of properties. Yet in fact natures can be instantiated only as subjects of

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properties. In this sense, a nature constitutes a subject or directly qualifies it. This direct qualification (or constitution) is identity. The thesis that a nature constitutes a subject (one of the basic theses of Ingardenian substantialism) is absent from The Aims. To be a Gestalt grounded on some qualities does not mean to be a subject of these qualities. Moreover the function of Gestalt as Gestalt is different that the function of a constitutive nature. Gestalts are not automatically constitutive natures. There are some possible Gestalts which are themselves properties grounded in other properties. For example, a particular facial expression is such a Gestalt. Being a moment of unity is not the same as being a subject of unified qualities. Even if a constitutive nature is a Gestalt, that it performs the role of a subject does not necessarily follow from its being a Gestalt (Ingarden 1935, pp. 61–65). Ingarden emphasizes that in The Controversy when he compares the concept of nature and the concept of Gestalt: It will perhaps contribute to clarifying the concept of constitutive nature if we relate it to the concept of “Gestalt.” It is tempting to identify the two, this because in both cases we have a qualitative determination of the whole of an individual object. … If the Gestalt determines the whole of the individual object, then it obviously cannot be reduced to one of the characteristics accruing to it, nor is it identical with their collective ensemble. For even if they made up its substructure [podbudowa, Unterbau] reducing it would not be possible in view of its specificity. But the object’s properties need not generally comprise the foundation of the Gestalt …. It does not follow from the fact that the Gestalt—when it is the nature of an object—stamps the whole of the object, that the properties of this object had to comprise qualitative foundation. Formal-ontological circumstances speak against the relation between a Gestalt and its foundation being identical with the relation between the nature of an individual object and its properties. The qualitative substructure of the Gestalt does not stand in the form of properties of this Gestalt. … But should the Gestalt be identified with the constitutive nature? That has to be denied. There are surely cases where constitutive natures are at the same time Gestalts, just as there are Gestalts that are at the same time constitutive natures. But this is not always a case …. A Gestalt must first take on the formal function—which belongs to its essence anyway—of determining directly a subject belonging to an object in order to become a constitutive nature. For, it is precisely this formal function that decides whether a qualitative moment is or is not the “nature” of something. Also the relation that obtains between the Gestalt and the primal qualities that found it is not to be identified … with the relation between the constitutive nature of an object and the properties that accrue to the latter. … the Gestalt-character of the Gestalt is not to be identified with the form of the constitutive nature (Ingarden 2016, pp. 91–92).

This long quotation is probably the best evidence that Ingarden’s early theory of the object, in which the Gestalt–qualities relation is dominant, differs from his mature substantialism. On the ground of the latter, properties are forms in which a subject is embodied. In this sense they modify a subject, i.e. they modify a nature although they do not destroy its identity. Socrates cannot exist as a pure human being. Indeed he existed as a wise, corpulent and healthy human being. His wisdom, corpulence and health are accidental forms of his humanity. In a sense, properties give expression to and shape a subject (Ingarden 2016, p.  75). This same relation does not obtain between a Gestalt and the qualities it is grounded in. Nevertheless, the early theory was the first important step towards Ingardenian substantialism.

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5  Conclusion Ingarden’s early works are studies intended as a preparation for the ultimate solution to the idealism-realism controversy. Almost all mature Ingardenian doctrines have their origins in writings published in the interwar period. Yet his youthful theory of the object is quite different from the substantialism he developed later. According to this doctrine, an object is a whole composed of qualities, united by one of them. Such a unifying quality is called a holistic quale and has all the features traditionally ascribed to Gestalt. Thus the basic form of an object is the Gestalt-­ underlying qualities structure. It is a sort of sophisticated bundle theory or a sui generis doctrine which shares some characteristics with both bundle theories and substantialism. He ultimately abandoned this theory and replaced it with a sort of neo-Aristotelian concept of the object. Acknowledgments The project is financed by the National Science Centre, Poland (no. 2017/27/B/HS1/02455).

References Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz. 1999. Die Erkenntnistheorie von Roman Ingarden. Dordrecht: Springer. ———, ed. 2005. Existence, culture, and persons. The ontology of Roman Ingarden. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. Ingarden, Roman. 1919a. Dążenia fenomenologów. Przegląd Filozoficzny 22: 118–156. ———. 1919b. Dążenia fenomenologów. Dokończenie. Przegląd Filozoficzny 22: 315–351. ———. 1922. Intuition und Intellekt bei Henri Bergson. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung 5: 285–461. ———. 1925. Essentiale Fragen. Ein Beitrag zum Wessensproblem. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung 7: 125–304. ———. 1929. Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus-Realismus. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung 11: 159–190. ———. 1931a. Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft. Halle: Niemeyer. ———. 1931b. Niektóre założenia idealizmu Berkeleya. In Księga Pamiątkowa Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego, 215–258. Lvov: Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne. ———. 1935. Vom formalen Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes. Studia Philosophica 1: 29–106. ———. 1946. Esencjalne zagadnienie formy i jej podstawowe pojęcia. Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 1946: 101–164. ———. 1963. Dążenia fenomenologów. In Z badań nad filozofią współczesną, ed. Roman Ingarden, 269–379. Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. ———. 1972. O pytaniach esencjalnych. In Z teorii języka i filozoficznych podstaw logiki, ed. Roman Ingarden, 327–507. Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. ———. 1976. The letter to Husserl about the VI. [Logical] Investigation and “idealism.” Analecta Husserliana 4: 419–438. ———. 1999. Dzieje mojej “kariery uniwersyteckiej.” Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 27: 183–201. ———. 2013. Controversy over the existence of the world, vol. I.  Trans. Arthur Szylewicz. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

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———. 2016. Controversy over the existence of the world, vol. II.  Trans. Arthur Szylewicz. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Ingarden, Roman, and Kazimierz Twardowski. 2016. Korespondencja Romana Witolda Ingardena z Kazimierzem Twardowskim. Kęty: Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki. Loux, Michael J. 2006. Metaphysics. A contemporary introduction. London/New York: Routledge. Macdonald, Cynthia. 2005. Varieties of things. Foundations of contemporary metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell. Malherbe, Olivier, and Sébastien Richard. 2016. Forme(s) et modes d'etre: L’ontologie de Roman Ingarden/Form(s) and Modes of Being: The ontology of Roman Ingarden. Bruxelles: Peter Lang. Mitscherling, Jeff. 1997. Roman Ingarden’s ontology and aesthetics. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. Płotka, Witold. 2017. Early phenomenology in Poland (1895–1945): Origins, development, and breakdown. Studies in East European Thought 69 (1): 79–91. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11212-017-9274-0. Simons, Peter. 1994. Particulars in particular clothings: Three trope theories. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 553–575. ———. 2005. The ties that bind: What holds individuals together? In Substanz. Neue Überlegungen zu einer klassischen Kategorie des Seienden, ed. Kathe Trettin, 229–243. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann. Thomasson, Amie. 2017. Roman Ingarden. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, ed. Edward N.  Zalta. Stanford, CA: Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ fall2017/entries/ingarden/.

Nae Ionescu and the Origins of Phenomenology in Romania Viorel Cernica

Abstract  The author attempts to describe and explain the original situation regarding the phenomenology, in Romanian philosophy in the first decades of twentieth century. Nae Ionescu introduced a method of philosophizing using some techniques belonging to phenomenology, especially to Husserl’s works (Logical Investigations, Ideas I and II, Cartesian Meditations etc.). In fact, he used some phenomenological concepts—intentionality, phenomenological method, intuition, etc.—in a ‘technical’ kind, in order to approach certain themes from the history of metaphysics: essence of the world and ego, God existence, knowledge constituting, thing and object, things and essences, subject and object of knowledge, relationships between contemplation, imagination, and reason, etc. In this paper, all such themes are interpreted from a perspective that allow to emphasize, on the one hand, their similarities with certain phenomenological concepts, and on the other hand, the phenomenological technics used by Ionescu in order to approach them. So, the intentionality, in Husserl’s concept, is applied to certain topics; also, the neutrality modification, epoché, eidetic intuition, non-actionality modification, etc. are also applied to different topics in many contexts of his works (in fact, his courses at University of Bucharest published by his students). Also, in the problem of relation between being and nothingness that is possible on the basis of the “passional act” Ionescu conceives this latter concept in analogy with Heidegger’s concept of state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit). All such connections are described and interpreted in such a way that the unity of Ionescu’s conception to be illustrated. At the end of article, along with some original contributions in phenomenology belonging to some Romanian thinkers from the same period (interwar), some direct Ionescu’s influences to certain Romanian philosophers are mentioned. Keywords Trăire (Erlebnis, experience) · Virtuality · Non-actionality modification · Essence · Eidetic reduction · Love · Intentionality

V. Cernica (*) Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 W. Płotka, P. Eldridge (eds.), Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe, Contributions to Phenomenology 113, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39623-7_8

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1  Introduction In Romania, phenomenology has its origins in the first decades of the twentieth century, and from the beginning it advanced in two main directions: (1) presentations of and commentaries on phenomenological authors and ideas: Nicolae Bagdasar (1928, on Husserl), Mircea Vulcănescu (1929, on Scheler), Iosif Brucăr (1933a, on Husserl), Constantin Floru (1934, on Husserl), Camil Petrescu (1938, on Husserl), etc.; (2) original contributions on the basis of phenomenological techniques, “theories,” and ideas: Nae Ionescu, Lucian Blaga, Camil Petrescu, I. D. Gherea, and Constantin Noica. These two directions of research are still clearly recognizable and productive in contemporary Romanian philosophy. Nae Ionescu was one of the first philosophers who introduced phenomenology into Romanian culture and used a method of philosophizing closely related to phenomenology, though he is not a phenomenologist in the strict sense. In fact, he taught courses on metaphysics and theory of knowledge at the University of Bucharest during interwar period (1919–1938). It is known that Heidegger’s version of phenomenology, unlike Husserl’s, proposed an anti-metaphysical discourse, and oriented the activity of philosophizing in a horizon dominated by the methodological conflict between these two philosophical domains. That is why there is a problem in evaluating the content of Ionescu’s courses and his attitude towards the act of philosophizing as phenomenology. Nevertheless, it is possible to connect these two elements—the content of the courses and the philosopher’s attitude—in such a way that a phenomenological meaning can emerge, even when we are only analyzing the classic themes of metaphysics. This is the case with Ionescu’s style of philosophizing (Aslam 2010), but it is also the case with Husserl’s and a number of his followers’ philosophical approaches, e.g., Husserl (1982), Fink (1995), or Levinas (2011). In this respect, we can cite an affirmation Husserl made himself: “All phenomenology is … metaphysics” (Cairns 1976, p. 46). Ionescu’s activity of philosophizing is related to the “second” attitude towards the world (which includes both “sensible/actual reality” and “symbolic/virtual reality”) and towards one’s own ego. This second attitude can only be adopted by applying the epoché, because one must remove one’s prejudices regarding the world—sensible/actual reality. In phenomenological terms, the natural attitude must be converted to the “phenomenological” one. Ionescu, however, does not call his “method” phenomenological; in fact, he was convinced that he was strictly using metaphysic techniques. He has an attitude similar to Husserl’s attitude at the beginning of Cartesian Meditations, where he claims that we must remove all our convictions if we want to philosophize in a radical way. Even if Ionescu does not call his operation an epoché, he sometimes distinguishes between his method of philosophizing and those used by other philosophers (from Romania or abroad) who do not pass beyond their “natural” beliefs. Moreover, this second attitude (philosophical as such for Ionescu, phenomenological for Husserl) becomes the starting point for a reconstruction (a reconstitution) of the first reality, which belongs to the natural attitude. After applying an epoché regarding all “natural” judgments (prejudices,

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beliefs), “natural” reality is reconstituted in accordance with a new attitude that is primarily characterized by the novelty of all kinds of judgments. During that period Ionescu also taught courses on the Theory of knowledge, Logic, and the History of Logic. Yet he approached all these themes in a metaphysical manner. He had a good relationship with logic—especially with formal logic [Logistik]—and the theory of knowledge, because he had studied and defended a doctoral thesis on the philosophy of logic in 1919, at the University of Munich: Die Logistik als Versuch einer neuen Begründung der Mathematik/Formal Logic as a New Attempt to Ground Mathematics (Ionescu 1993). Paying attention especially to Russell’s and Couturat’s logic, he did not employ any clear phenomenological method in this text. Nevertheless, he mentioned Husserl’s Logical Investigations, which he had known from his philosophical studies at the University of Bucharest, from his professor Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, and he formulated some simple observations about it (Ionescu 1993, p. 30, Mezdrea 2015, pp. 225–6). Before then, Ionescu had followed certain lectures that Husserl held at the University of Göttingen during in his first stay in Germany, 1913–1914 (in the period of Ideas), until the beginning of World War I, when he returned to his country for military service. The second stay in Germany would be from 1916 to 1919, but at the University of Munich (Ionescu 2006, pp. 87, 93, 141) (Husserl himself left Göttingen in 1916). In connection with the place of logic in Ionescu’s research and teaching, we must point out that in his course on Logic in 1927–1928, in the final lecture of that course—“Ştiinţă, logică, filosofie”/“Science, Logic, Philosophy”—the author claims that the method he used to teach the topics in the syllabus is related to Husserl’s phenomenology, because, like Husserl, he did not work on “the concrete phenomenon,” but on “the eidos, Wesen.” His statement notwithstanding, we know phenomenology works both on the concrete phenomenon and its eidos! Even if the metaphysical facet of the courses on Logic (and History of Logic) is obvious, the influence of phenomenology is clear too. He executes a kind of epoché in order to open a way towards what Ionescu called “essences.” But he applies the epoché as such, in the phenomenological sense (Husserl 1983, p.  32), in the courses on Metaphysics, in order to open a way toward a “symbolic/virtual reality,” the object of metaphysics that is totally different from common reality (the reality of common sense, of the natural attitude). Before this moment, in his Course on the Philosophy of Religion, which he held in 1924–1925, one finds the same idea regarding “immutable essences,” now correlated with religious phenomena. He affirms that we must use the phenomenological method in the philosophy of religion as a way to approach the essence of religious phenomena. His goal is to construct a “phenomenology of religion” because only in this way can we grasp the essence of religion (Ionescu 2000, pp. 113, 127). In both cases, the author refers to the eidetic phenomenological method, and to the phenomenological constitution of a specific object. In his next courses, Ionescu will return to this idea about essences and the significance of their manifestation, first in the context of logic and philosophy of religion, in order to then charge them with metaphysical meanings in a “theory” rather ontological. Therefore, concerning Ionescu’s philosophy and its connection to phenomenology, one can say he uses some phenomenological concepts—intentionality,

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phenomenological method, intuition, etc.—not in a conceptual order, but rather in a ‘technical’ one (in the sense of techniques). For instance, he does not stop to offer a theory of intentionality at a certain point in his courses; rather he applies it to a certain topic, e.g., to the act of faith and its corresponding object. Neutrality modification, epoché, eidetic intuition, non-actionality modification, etc. are concepts that Ionescu uses technically (as a true “method” of philosophizing) many times without emphasizing or even mentioning them. As we proceed we must pay attention especially (though not exclusively) to Ideas I, pointing out the connection of Ionescu’s philosophy to early phenomenology, because precisely during the period when Husserl was reflecting on and writing Ideas I (and Ideas II), the Romanian thinker was attending his courses (on the Theory of Knowledge) at the University of Göttingen. This direct connection to Husserl’s ideas influenced, I think, the path Ionescu chose in his own way of philosophizing, which is, in fact, a philosophical project with certain phenomenological elements, which his disciples (some important philosophers among them) continued after his death, in 1940.

2  Phenomenological Techniques in the Structure of a Metaphysical Theory of Knowledge In the structure of Ionescu’s philosophy, the fundamental concept is “trăire” (which translates the German term Erlebnis; in English, experience). He claims: “philosophy or philosophizing is an act of life, an act of experience [trăire]” (Ionescu 2005/1928, p.  14; See also Ionescu 2000/1919, p.  86; 2005/1925, p.  169; 2005/1929–1930, pp. 208–218; 2005/1937, p. 355). This term appears in Ionescu’s search for a definition of metaphysics that reveals its practical meaning and in his attempt to construct a “theory” about the possibility an individual has to find meaning in his/her life. And in both situations, it has a direct relationship with phenomenology. Therefore, experience (trăire/Erlebnis)—understood sometimes as a “direct intuition” (Ionescu 2005, p. 215)—is a key piece in the Romanian philosopher’s conceptual order, where the outside world is simultaneously the primary ontological and epistemological problem: why does experience come about, how, and with what consequences for our life (Ionescu 2005/1929–1930, p. 219)? At first glance, this term comes from hermeneutics, especially from Dilthey’s schema of the hermeneutical method: Erlebnis—Ausdruck—Verständnis/experience—expression—understanding (Dilthey 1927). Yet, there are some elements belonging to Husserl’s early phenomenology, up to and including Ideas I, 1913 (and even the Cartesian Meditations, first edition in French: 1931) which one can clearly identify in Ionescu’s philosophy (from his courses taught at the University of Bucharest, which represent about the whole of his philosophical work), but which he nonetheless uses in a highly original manner. Most of the significant features of Ionescu’s texts are closely related to elements of the phenomenological method and attitude as related to different metaphysical

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topics on the one hand—reality, existence, object, image, ego, world, identity, structure, substance, attribute, reason, intuition, understanding, evidence, action, knowledge, love, etc.—and, on the other hand, the way those themes reveal a philosophical conception of the human being. In the Metaphysics courses he is interested in achieving two main tasks, both of them related to certain aspects of phenomenology: (1) to establish a definition of metaphysics, with the goal of underlining some essential functions of this philosophical discipline for human life; in the final analysis, it is about a “theory” of metaphysical knowledge, i.e., a theoretical philosophy; (2) to construct an “existential program,” which, if one follows and performs it, may reveal the sense of his/her own life; here the real problem is to undergo a metaphysical experience, i.e., an applied philosophy. Both problems are, of course, theoretical, but they open a way to a kind of life that is similar to the reconstruction of the world after the epoché has suspended all “objective” judgments about common reality. The first task is the main theme in almost every courses except the penultimate one (1936–1937), which was published very late (1996) with the title Treatise on Metaphysics. We can include many courses in the first group (Diaconu and Mezdrea 2005), even if some of them, looking at their topics, seem to belong to other philosophical domains (philosophy of religion, history of philosophy, theory of science, etc.). Looking at Ionescu’s courses, one can see him applying a method of description to the ideas he treats, but only in connection with a method of constitution concerning the acts by which the ideas are thought or lived. Such a methodological set up is closely related to phenomenology, for all representatives of Husserl’s school share it—including Heidegger to a certain extent. Transcendental phenomenology not only has the descriptive aspect (describing intentional acts and their objects), but the constitutive aspect too, insofar as description itself is an experience (Erlebnis). Husserl affirms this complex method in his Ideas I (1913), and its corresponding philosophical title is ‘transcendental idealism.’ Ionescu uses this combined technique of philosophizing about traditional topics while paying attention to the different experiences that reveal them: logical experiences, religious experiences, aesthetic, ethical, etc. Beyond these very general similarities between Ionescu’s philosophy and phenomenology, it is possible to find some thematic or technical elements from Husserl and Heidegger’s phenomenologies in Ionescu’s thought. Finding these elements will be the further object of my presentation.

2.1  A  ctuality and Virtuality: The Non-actionality Modification (Inaktualitätsmodifikation) Knowledge is neither a simple sensible nor rational connection between a subject and an object, as representatives of the theory of knowledge have claimed at least in the modern period of the history of philosophy. Rather, it is a complex act that includes in its structure many facets of the subject—the cognitive, affective,

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volitional, etc. In his first lecture at the University of Bucharest—The epistemological function of love—at the start of the university year in 1919, Ionescu expresses an idea that he will pursue across his whole university career: that knowledge is love, i.e., it implies an affective dimension, as knowing is, in fact, a ‘warm’ experience. Without such affectivity, knowledge is impossible, or rather its own nature is not fulfilled. In fact, there is a hierarchy of acts of knowing, the highest level being the knowledge of God, which implies a fulfilled experience, something similar to Spinoza’s idea of amor Dei intellectualis (intellectual love of God).1 Of course, the object of knowledge is usually just as important as the subject. It can sometimes be even more important, as is the case with the knowledge of God. In order to ascend this hierarchy and grasp the ultimate object—God—it is necessary to pass through and beyond ‘sensible reality.’ For the true object of knowledge has to do with a ‘virtual reality,’ a world of essences, which Ionescu characterized in philosophical terms related to both Platonism and phenomenology, though he rejected both influences. We cannot really know something in any other way than by orienting our minds towards a general world of essences, which in comparison with the primary sensible reality is only a virtuality and not an actuality. What is this? There is a general world (of essences) that has a ‘pure form of existence.’ It is not a reality but a potentiality, not something actual, but rather virtual; it is not an accomplished thing, but a principle (rule) of accomplishing (Ionescu 2005, pp. 167–173). In fact, knowledge is constituted only in this way: by putting together the object of knowledge and its corresponding essence, its actuality and its correlated in-actuality, in an epistemic relationship that keeps both of them in an indissoluble unity. Finally, for Ionescu it is about a play of ‘actionality’ and ‘non-actionality,’ similar to how Husserl’s presents the non-actionality modification (Inaktualitätsmodification).2 Formally, virtuality (or in-actuality) in Ionescu’s theory is basically the same as Husserl’s non-actionality (Inaktualität) from Ideas I (Husserl 1983, §35). They share some ontological (constitutive) and epistemological (regulative) functions—if we may adopt Kantian terms. Nevertheless, we cannot neglect an important difference: for Husserl Inaktualität is of the same nature as Aktualität, though it does not perform the same functions in constituting the object of a conscious act, while Ionescu’s actuality is a species of reality absolutely different in nature to in-actuality. Ionescu treats it as an ontological problem, because he is interested in a reconstruction of the world, of the being of the world, in contrast to Husserl who is interested in the problem of knowledge (the intelligibility of the world). Ionescu does not pursue this as a goal in itself, but rather in order to find the ontological presuppositions for knowledge, the main problem for him being, as for Husserl, the consequences that certain ontological principles have for knowledge. Husserl describes the process of constituting of an object as an intentional, conscious act, which can undergo the non-actionality modification (per, as I mentioned,

1  Here Ionescu cites Spinoza as he attempts to explain his thought concerning the epistemological function of love (see Ionescu 2000, p. 86). 2  The concept expresses in Husserl’s Ideas I a kind of description of a perceptive act.

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in Ideas I), and his first examples refer to perception. In fact, all intentional acts (of consciousness)—intentionale Erlebnisse—have two modes: one of them an actual mode, which defines its actionality; the other is in-actual, characterized by its non-­ actionality. Perception, for example, has, on the one hand, a part that forms its “object,” and on the other hand, an obscure part, composed of different sensible elements, which forms its “field of perception,” or “background of intuition” (Husserl 1983, p. 70). Any part can at any moment be an actual, ‘actional’ object, having its own in-actual partner, and at another moment it can be in-actual with respect to some other actual thing, and this process of conversion between actual and in-actual characters represents the main feature of the non-actionality modification. This rule intervenes in the constitution of any object of an intentional conscious act. Ionescu’s concept of virtuality and its functions in his applied sort of phenomenology are rooted in this non-actionality modification. Husserl says: “the universal essential [my emphasis] property pertaining to consciousness is still preserved in the modification” (i.e., non-actional consciousness is still intentional consciousness) (Husserl 1983, p. 73). So, there are essences that hold sway over the structure of each intuition and they form a true ‘world’ of essences if we think them autonomously. Of course, in Husserl this has an epistemological and not an ontological sense, while Ionescu gives precisely an ontological meaning to his talk of a ‘world of essences.’ Moreover, Husserl connects the essences of actional and non-actional content to each conscious act, while Ionescu connects essences to concepts (as he does things with sensible intuitions). With his theory about a world of essences, his aim is to indicate and describe the object of metaphysics. Because metaphysics is itself a kind of knowledge, and the latter implies love—in fact, experience, Erlebnis—an essence is something in itself, an object of ‘reality.’ It is also simultaneously an object of knowledge (through the corresponding concept) and of experience, for any human being. Just in this respect the essence receives a “non-actional” function. For it can—or it must—becomes “actionality” in order to constitute, accomplish, an object, i.e., it comes from the possibility (non-actionality) to a reality (the actionality of an “object”). It is about a play of essence between non-­ actionality and actionality by which its own “virtuality” is attracted in the constituting of an object in its “reality.” Even without the distinctions that Husserl makes between actionality and non-­ actionality as elements of the structure of any conscious act, we can still interpret Ionescu’s proposal from a phenomenological perspective: he draws essences out from their ties with certain elements in the structure of knowledge—which support the phenomenon of the non-actionality modification—and holds that they form a “world” (as the true object of metaphysics). Essences are, in fact, general entities. Only concrete (sensible) things exist as actual (as a valid reality). General entities do not exist as things; they have a different “nature” in comparison with the latter. But it is precisely because of them that things exist, and “I” am something, in my own identity. The general is the mark of identity, at least for each of us, Ionescu claims. Therefore, the general is both “principle of knowledge,” and “principle of existence,” due to its “substantial” constancy, its incorruptibility (Ionescu 2005,

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p. 169). The ontological character of this discourse about essences as general entities that are responsible for the existence of individual entities cannot be found as such in Husserl’s texts. Husserl held that essences are correlates of intentive acts (intentive mental processes) of consciousness; and in turn he studied the essences of these acts and their components that are “a priori included in the essences with unconditional necessity” (Husserl 1983, p. 73). Husserl takes essences into account in his phenomenological determination of the activity of knowing because to each “mental process” corresponds an essence that is intuitively grasped. In both philosophical reconstructions of the connection between the ego and the world, virtuality (or non-actionality) has the same characteristics, although they have an important ontological function in Ionescu’s conception, and a cognitive one in Husserl’s philosophy. This similarity is evidence of the phenomenological character of Ionescu’s philosophy, where actuality (actual reality) and virtuality (virtual reality) are thought and realized. Negation has a special role in Ionescu’s philosophical project. In order to reach symbolic reality, it is necessary to deny sensible reality. This operation has a theoretical meaning as well as a strictly terminological one: “virtuality” and “actuality” are the terms used to indicate the object of sensible experience (actuality) and the object of metaphysical experience (virtual reality). We can observe this potential of negativity in some of Husserl’s disciples: in Fink’s meontology, i.e., the theory of the “meontic object” (Fink 1995/1932), in Heidegger’s method of destruction (Heidegger 1985/1927), or, later, in Levinas’ theory of the Other (Levinas 2011/1961). These developments show that Husserl’s ideas concerning the ontological topic of the connection between ego and the world have such a potential. All of these post-Husserlian theories start from the way in which the author of the Ideas raises the issue of the object (physical thing, intuitive object, etc.) and its original unity with conscious acts, and especially confront the many issues that the concept of the transcendental ego raises. So, in continuity with Husserl, they posit an “I” that has a certain originality as well as a constitutive ego whose “nature” is obscured. This “nature”—the Origin, the principle, etc.—has to be thought negatively, i.e., in a meontological mode (Fink), or even in a metaphysical way, since the absolute transcendence of the other is as real, true, and necessary as the ego (Levinas). Ionescu too reasons in these negative terms when he investigates how one can surpass the sensible world toward the symbolic one, in order to establish the essential ego (“I”) and its fitting world—both elements being necessary to open a path for philosophizing.

2.2  Image, Object, Thing; About a Kind of Eidetic Reduction The role of negation in Ionescu’s philosophical project does not allow us to claim that, because consciousness’ relationship to the actual is unfulfilled, its relationship to virtuality is fulfilled. Apparently, Ionescu thinks along the same lines as Nietzsche: to deny all in order to be able, in the end, to affirm life (as something that

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continually returns to itself). In fact, he deems that both “realities” (sensible and virtual) remain what they are: a particular reality, even if someone reaches the virtual reality by leaving the actual. Our attitude towards both of these is a necessary component for how we perform or live in one of them. This is why something determined as an act, or an operation of our conscious attitude, corresponds to one of the other of them. In fact, the author privileges a parallelism between ego and world (in its two hypostases, as actual and virtual reality), i.e., on the one hand, there is intuition and (physical) thing, and on the other hand, conceptual thinking and essence. He begins and ends his reflection with the idea of such a difference. But does this concern an epistemological, or an ontological difference? I think the implied difference has both ontological and epistemological facets— not only in Ionescu’s philosophy, but in phenomenology as well. Such an idea comes up against even some phenomenologists’ opinions, who claim that Husserl’s thought is predominantly epistemological (while Heidegger and other phenomenologists’ thought is ontological). In fact, Husserl continually implies in his phenomenological theories of knowledge certain ontological suppositions (and conversely, Heidegger, in his “fundamental ontology,” merges epistemological meanings with ontological ones). It is not possible to keep our philosophical meanings pure and unmixed; as soon as we focus our attention on the world, we also turn our gaze to our own ego (“I”), whether we are following the method of phenomenology or of Ionescu’s philosophizing act. No doubt, Ionescu regarded the existence of an exterior thing (and ultimately, of the world) as being in a partnership with a subject in the structure of any act of knowledge, from the standpoint of ‘sensibility.’ The ‘natural attitude’ accords with this relation, and its certainty relies on the evidence of outside existence in conjunction with the consciousness of self. The latter comes after my ego learns about something that is outside, but is present in an unfulfilled manner, which is the case at the beginning of any given subjective act (not just in the act of knowing). So, there are two different lines of existence: consciousness (as a subjective plane of existence that includes the “logical world,” or the domain of knowledge, etc.) and existence external to consciousness (or factual reality), each of them with its own “nature.” Also, both include individual elements and general ones, and this is why there is also a similarity concerning their structure. Individual real facts correspond to empirical impressions, and those general entities we call essences—as I mentioned above—to concepts. There are three conditions for existence: the logical condition (it is something non-contradictory), the psychological condition (it appears as something possible for our consciousness), and the metaphysical condition (it is something outside of our consciousness). Ionescu, then, formulates a realist ontology that seems to have no relation with Husserl’s or Heidegger’s early phenomenology. On the one hand, such a model of philosophizing leads towards a metaphysics that also includes a theory of knowledge at the level of sensibility. On the other hand, there are two ideas in this theory that are closely related to phenomenology: (1) a correspondence—just an accordance—between an “essence” and a concept, which is similar to the intentional relation between act and object; (2) the idea of an intuition of

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essence that is similar to eidetic intuition in Husserl’s phenomenology, at least concerning the objectivity of this conscious act. The theory of essences can be considered as a “general eidetic science,” which includes some conceptual layers depending on the generality of essences and concepts. Perhaps the most important fact for this kind of ontology—conceived only from the perspective of a theory of metaphysical knowledge—is the correspondence between essences and concepts in a scheme of intentionality. Both—essences and concepts—are autonomous and belong to different domains of existence: essences to virtual reality, whereas concepts belong to (acts of) knowledge, as different contents of consciousness. Concepts enter into a relation; concepts grasp something other than themselves, namely, essences. Knowing essences is only possible by way of intuition, not a sensible intuition, but rather an “eidetic” one, although Ionescu does not ascribe an authentic role to imagination in this respect, as one finds in Husserl’s texts on this theme. Despite this lack, the Romanian philosopher uses the method of eidetic intuition (connected to its form described in Logical Investigations, II and VI) in his theory of the relations between the general and the particular, and especially in his theory of the imagination as a conscious act that constitutes three kinds of objects (images): simple images, images for ideal objects, and images for real objects (Ionescu 2005, pp. 161–166; 335–336). This latter sort of object is also related to Husserl’s distinction between “immanent” and “actual objects” (immanente und wirkliche Objekte) from his Logical Investigations, V, §9–§21  (Husserl 2001), and Ideas I, §90 (Husserl 1983). For Ionescu there are three species of object: images, ideal objects, and real objects, and these represent the key concepts in Ionescu’s theory of metaphysical knowledge. He takes objects to be “contents of consciousness,” or as “facts of the soul depending on our consciousness” (Ionescu 2005, p. 162). However, one must not confuse an object with a thing (which has its own nature, different from that of the object). Many objects can be constituted by our consciousness, and so with respect to consciousness they possess some objectivity—and to that extent they are something—but only the ones that have a correspondent thing in external reality (“existence”). Objects, as contents of consciousness, do not have reality other than as conscious facts. They can be deemed correlative objects of certain conscious acts (albeit they seem to be only objects of imagination). If we search for a suitable model for how to philosophize in this metaphysical framework, phenomenology clearly suggests itself. Nevertheless, Ionescu does not identify, described and think of these acts in the perspective of their correlation with certain objects; but, on the other hand, Ionescu does give pride of place to the object, and this accords to the Husserlian practice of focusing on the intentional object and using it as the “transcendental clue” (transzendentaler Leitfaden) for the phenomenological description of its correlated constituting acts (Husserl 1982, Second Meditation, §21, p. 50). The differences between these three species of objects depend on their relationships with things in the external world. Each of them does, however, appear as an intentional object, closely related to a specific conscious act. Nevertheless, all of them have a single origin: the imagination. Therefore, they are “objects” of consciousness. Outside of consciousness there is “existence” and between

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consciousness and existence there are certain relationships. For instance, some images are “closed in themselves,” as is a “winged horse.” Others have a function of “transcendence,” i.e. they have a relationship to something outside of them, but in such a way that the latter is constituted by an image, which means that the image effectively forms something outside of it; for instance, a postulate of geometry through which a world is created: the world of geometrical figures and their relationships. The third category of images is characterized by its connection to the external world (true existence, for Ionescu), for example, a ‘piece of chalk.’ To sum up, existence includes simple images (locked in themselves), ideal objects (constituted by formal images), and real objects (which are put in a correspondence with certain images). The second category is closely related to a procedure of “forming” a new world, as in applying an “eidetic reduction,” per the phenomenological method. Of course, the other two categories are also related to such a method, but to a lesser extent than the case of images of ideal objects. Geometrical forms are constituted precisely through the activity of our consciousness and on the basis of a kind of image. These images correspond initially to possible “objects” and they further constitute them as such. The objectivity of objects so constituted depends entirely upon imagination and its play—its consciousness of their possibility—to give them form. Here we could speak of ‘creation’ rather than constitution, or, in Ionescu’s terms, a “symbolic causality” (sometimes also called “metaphysical causality”) which is completely different from “natural causality” (operative in “actual” reality and the object of science). This sort of causality is the true path from actual reality to virtual reality. It has only an imaginative nature and constitutes the process through which ideal images appear and form (constitute) their own ideal objects. The domain of the latter is not limited to geometrical objects. It includes all “virtual object,” i.e., virtual reality which in turn includes a hierarchy where the highest ‘object’ is God. Although God is in the domain of virtuality, God is not like all the other objects, because God is active, and constitutes a “subject,” which is not the case with any other ideal object. God is objective not only as a common ideal object, and not only because our “productive” imagination forms God; rather God exists and can at any time also be considered a “real object.” Such an idea brings us to the domain of a “phenomenology of religion.”

2.3  C  ontemplation and Love; Intentional Act and Phenomenological Method When we search for a clear application of some phenomenological techniques in Ionescu’s courses on metaphysics—the goal of this paper—the result is altogether astonishing: although his discourse belongs to a metaphysical way of philosophizing, he carries it out with phenomenological techniques from Husserl’s toolbox. The surface of his discourse can deceive us, because the terms belong to traditional metaphysics, the problems come from the history of philosophy, and the arguments

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are rather speculative. But at its core, we can easily find direct relations between these terms, problems, arguments and phenomenological techniques, especially the epoché,3 eidetic intuition, and the transcendental reduction taken in a general sense. For example, talking about the methods of metaphysics, accepting the idea that knowledge is its main aim, Ionescu claims that love is a kind of knowledge. He conceives of love precisely as an intentional act (Ionescu 2000, pp.  128–134; Ionescu 2005, pp. 88–93). His first discussion of love belongs to a course on the philosophy of religion, the central topic of which is God, and naturally, the main problem concerns how we reach out to God through an intentional religious act. Just in this place Ionescu’s discourse constitutes itself properly as a phenomenology (of religion). Ionescu uses the structure of intentionality to establish man’s transcendence beyond his “actual world,” in fact, beyond his concrete forms of psychical existence. Generally speaking, Ionescu does not treat acts and their corresponding objects as being fundamentally grounded in perceptual experience—with the exception of “real objects” which imply such an experience, but are not reducible to it. And ideal objects come from the imagination—from its “representations”—except God, who implies the whole being of a “subject,” comprising affectivity, imagination, logical acts as well as aesthetic and moral acts. Discussing the “existence” of God and his relations with people, Ionescu proposes a phenomenology of religion that has two characters: “it will be the key for what is really constitutive in people’s religious life, but, at the same time it will be the key for determining the scope of what is a properly religious life and what is not” (Ionescu 2000, p. 127). The main goal of such a discipline is to establish the universality of the religious act, and, paradoxically, its specificity. On this basis one can experience its power to reach out to something as its own “object.” The presupposition of the phenomenology of religion is the idea that the religious act is a noetic one, i.e., a logical act, not a psychological one, the author says, and we can say: it is an intentional act. First of all, consciousness finds laid before it a world of experience (in fact, “actual realty”), but this world must be overcome and the possibility of doing so depends on the intentionality of the religious act (Ionescu 2000, pp. 128–134). In fact, each act of the soul is intentional, but only the religious one passes beyond its own “subjective” limits, and thus from “sensible reality” to “virtual reality,” whereas all other acts remain with their objects, within sensible reality. The religious object has a constitutive preeminence; this object is even the absolute. It is not conditioned and, consequently, it is not constituted as such by its corresponding (religious) act as any other object is. In fact, the religious act constitutes a certain “subject” with its own specific intentional acts, and as such 3  A special note regarding the operational meaning of this term is necessary: Ionescu uses the epoché—without actually using the term itself—as a phenomenological technique (from Ideas I, §32), and he also uses the concept of the natural attitude (from Ideas I, §27-§32) in his definition of philosophy (as something accomplished in an act of living) and in his “theory” that the “metaphysician” projects his own “spiritual” reality onto “objective” reality, suspending all suppositions regarding the outside existence of this latter reality (Ionescu 2005, p. 14).

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the absolute object exists not only by virtue of ‘my’ intentional act, but also by virtue of ‘its own.’ Drummond observes that the term absolute appears in three contexts in Husserl’s writings: epistemological (absolute evidence, absolute knowledge), ontological (the whole that is not a moment in constituting another whole), and phenomenological (consciousness which is self-contained), which participate in a semantic unity (Drummond 2008, p. 31). Is there a relation between Ionescu’s concept of the absolute and the ones from Husserl’s texts? I think the epistemological meaning is active in the Romanian philosopher’s phenomenology of religion. In fact, in this context it concerns the “absolute evidence” that is acquired in religious experience, which has its foundations in an intentional object (which, among “objects,” is the only absolute). Insofar as it is absolute, it overwhelms the intentional act, rules over it, and this is why the knowledge of it is absolute. A common intentionality, even if it emphasizes the reciprocity with its own object, is not under the rule of something absolute. But Husserl himself clearly distinguishes between the constitution of a natural object (of “material nature”) where one rule among others is causality, and the constitution of the “personal Ego,” who owns the motivation that corresponds to causality but supposes a reciprocal intentionality, just in the case of Ionescu’s idea on the mutual constituting of the ego and divine absolute (Husserl 1989, § 56, pp. 231–259). This analysis of constitution is used even today in phenomenology: e.g., in Marion’s studies of saturated phenomena. I am not attempting to legitimize Ionescu’s discourse about the absolute as an object of the religious act by reference to certain phenomenological investigations. But we can trace the development of a phenomenological concept or technique to exemplify a moment from the history of phenomenology with which Ionescu’s ideas meet. The limit of Ionescu’s phenomenology of religion regarding its object, in comparison with what we name “early phenomenology,” is clear: he holds that religious experience intends an absolute ‘object,’ which has, somehow, an independent existence, separate from the subject or from his/her consciousness. Nevertheless, this object is active just for such a subject and both work to constitute themselves in a reciprocal relationship. The fulfilment of the religious act requires that “my appeal to God answers God’s appeal to me,” so that only the “religious act has two directions, two active poles” (Ionescu 2000, p. 132). Therefore, this object is the living God, not the God of metaphysics that functions as a limit-concept, which our speculation posits. The religious act is a unity of these two poles. But there is not a true balance within this unity: in fact, the subject (human being) is under the reign of the object (God). However, through the concrete constitution of the unity of both poles of the religious act, this unity itself becomes the absolute. Consciousness, in its religious act, ascends to such a dignity.4 Of course, there is a condition: this unity requires that the subject totally engage his/her whole being in the task of living for and loving God, to continually approach God. For the religious act—in its experiencing and

4  Two final paragraphs of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations are expressed, I think, precisely in this tone.

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knowing—is personal, and a human’s entire being is concentrated in love, so that, “the first element in religious knowledge is of an emotional nature” (Ionescu, 2000, p. 165). Of course, this act can remain unfulfilled or, even if it is fulfilled it can lose its unity, which means a breaking of the “spiritual balance.” In his course Philosophy of Religion from 1924 to 1925 (from which I cited above), the Romanian philosopher constructs a theory of the differences between scientific, philosophical, and religious consciousnesses, and deals with the emotional and social facets of the religious act, concluding that the human mind possesses a receptive function suitable to God as the object of the religious act, which always possesses two poles, with both poles in constant activity. At the same time, he separates the religious experience from metaphysics, drawing it nearer to Rudolf Otto’s idea of “creature-­ feeling” and the affective-rational structure of religious experience. In fact, he includes a clear difference between religious, moral, and metaphysical life. All the final ideas are consequences of a phenomenological determination of the religious act along with its corresponding object.

2.4  B  eing and Nothingness; the Transcendental Function of the Passional Act In his first courses on metaphysics in particular, Ionescu attempted to open the problem of being. But one must wait until his penultimate course to find a sketch of an ontology (1936–1937). His approach there to ontology is particularly significant for his relationship with phenomenology. In this context, the Romanian philosopher considered both being and nothingness and binds them together through the concept of the ‘passional act’ as a living act or experience. We cannot easily or straightforwardly establish a direct relation with Heidegger’s What is Metaphysics?, though there is strong motivation to do so, by virtue of the theme, or problem that both philosophers engage. In any case, Ionescu neither cites nor refers to Heidegger in this context. Yet in interpreting the text (specifically, select chapters from the aforementioned course) it seems only natural to make certain connections with the “ontology” (or meontology) from the German philosopher’s text. The reader’s first thought may be to connect Ionescu’s concept of the passional act with Heidegger’s concept of state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit). Yet despite a thematic similarity, there is a deep difference between these two concepts: the passional act indirectly constitutes the nothing, and not directly as through the state-of-mind of anxiety. The passional act does focus on something—a thing that, so determined, is a being—and this is experienced, not simply thought. By such an experience, the nothing emerges as something other than what is now experienced. I reduce the whole of existence. How? Through a lived act, not a logical one. It is impossible for me to perform such an operation through a logical act, simply because my being cannot live in all things at the same time. … In its living (experience), my Being focuses on certain centers and lives them so intensely, that beyond this for it nothing happens. … The living act is a passional act. (Ionescu 2005, p. 356)

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The transcendental function of such an act expresses itself ontologically: being emerges in the same moment with its opposite, nothingness. Somehow, being is primary because it can objectify itself as a lived (experienced) object, albeit it can be also thought (as an object of thinking). Yet, the origin of nothingness is precisely this passional act through which someone experiences the being as a determined object. In fact, being is determined through a reduction: “a total reduction of existence to a part of existence” (Ionescu 2005, p. 355). First, this reduction concerns consciousness since it begins with a passional act, and passion is included in consciousness (though it is not a cognitive act). We might say that this is similar to Heidegger’s conception of the relationships between anxiety and the nothing. Second, the reduction concerns meontology because its object is the nothing. The living act (experience) of reducing the whole of existence to a part and, further, to the nothing, is an intentional act. Being remains in two hypostases: it is Being in itself, and being as an object (determined being, or a being amidst beings). The first is and has a unity, while the second only has a unity. To have a unity means to be a determined being, i.e., to have an unrepeatable ontological identity. Such a unity is not a “mathematical,” but an ontological one, what Ionescu calls “quality”; this latter unity cannot be repeated, while the first can. To be a unity means to pass beyond any determination excepting the fact to be a unity. A thing that has a unity cannot be repeated because its own quality—to be a unity—is just its identity as a determined being, as an individual. If being appears as a “quality” of an object then it is not repeatable insofar as the object is an individual. In general, qualities are “objects” for a lived experience and their unrepeatability concerns how they do not change, despite the fact that each of them may be instantiated in many objects (Ionescu 2005, pp. 358–359). But in order to understand such a paradox, we have to take the “quality” in those two hypostasis in which the unity appeared: to be and to have a quality. On the one hand, there is something as the red; it is a quality for many things, is repeatable. On the other hand, something has a quality (“this apple is red”) and this fact is the object of a lived experience; now the quality is unrepeatable. In the same context, Ionescu states that “existence is being in time” (2005, p.  372), though he makes no reference to phenomenological theories of time (Husserl, Heidegger), despite a terminological similarity. Existence needs a form, that is time, to which some hypostases belong: historical, physical, psychological, metaphysical time, all of them different from eternity. Ionescu uses all these ideas to construct metaphysics as an ontology of the human being, within the framework of a theory of religious phenomena.

3  I nfluences and Philosophical Consequences of Contact with Phenomenology Ionescu’s philosophy to a certain extent influenced how some Romanian philosophers went on to frame their own interrogations, problems, and investigations. In this respect, certain philosophical styles and works belonging to Noica (2009),

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Vulcanescu, Eliade, or Cioran—who were his disciples—must be taken into account. But I would also like to mention that Nae Ionescu advised some of his young pupils in the 1930s to go to German universities and specifically Freiburg in order to study phenomenology with Husserl and Heidegger (for instance, Constantin Floru and Dumitru Amzăr). The relationships between Ionescu and the aforementioned philosophers constitute a true “school” of Romanian philosophy. All important historians of Romanian philosophy from the last decades have endorsed this view. We must further investigate the underlying unity of this school, because it seems to have only an “existentialist” orientation. Perhaps the phenomenological concepts, ideas, and techniques gleaned from Ionescu’s texts would be able to show other meaningful facets of membership in this school. Besides, in Romanian philosophy, especially during the interwar period, there were some reconstructions of phenomenology inspired directly by Husserl’s early work, which we must at least mention in this study. For example, Camil Petrescu (1938) published an article about Husserl’s phenomenology, but also a paper on the “doctrine of substance” published in fragments in 1940, and in an integral edition after second world war. There he critiques Husserl’s transcendental method and proposes another one, called the “substantialist method,” which nevertheless remains very closely related to phenomenology. Petrescu’s doctoral thesis (1937) deals with a phenomenology of the theatre, seeking to answer questions regarding what theatre is and what is specific to this art form. I. D. Gherea’s “Reconstruction of Common-Sense Concepts” (1938, 1939) is significant for its relation to Husserl’s phenomenology. There, through the phenomenological reduction, Gherea explicitly attempts to constitute all the main concepts used in our everyday life starting from transcendental consciousness. We can also interpret some of Lucian Blaga’s texts through a phenomenological lens, e.g., the first two works from his system (1931–1933), which together with the final volume form the Trilogy of Knowledge (Brucăr 1933b).

4  Conclusion I argued that Nae Ionescu is one of the first thinkers to introduce the phenomenological style of philosophizing into Romanian philosophy. He used phenomenological techniques, concepts, ideas, but also analyses and problems from the horizon of Husserl’s (especially) and Heidegger’s philosophies, i.e. from what we now call early phenomenology. The most significant fact in this regard is his attitude towards the world, i.e. his preoccupation with the transformation of a natural attitude into a philosophical (phenomenological) one. In thinking through concrete answers to various problems, he frequently opens up a phenomenological perspective: in problems of knowledge, of religious experience, of logic, of ontology/meontology, etc. These are the facets of his philosophy to which I paid attention in this paper, but other aspects can be mentioned, perhaps even in order to become objects of future research: (1) the interpretation of the relationship between a “content of

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consciousness” and an exterior object that appears within the “neutrality modification” (Neutralitätsmodifikation) (Ionescu 1991b: Course of metaphysics. Theory of Metaphysical Knowledge. 1. Mediate knowledge (1929–1930), Ch. III); (2) the outline of a theory of inter-subjective constitution (from the same course, especially Ch. XI) as the basis of community (Ionescu 1999: penultimate course of metaphysics, 1936–1937, cap. V); (3) Ionescu’s opinion that one’s general orientation in philosophy ought to stem from the question ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’ and how this would relate to Heidegger’s interpretation of such a question.

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Ionescu, Nae. 1991. Curs de metafizică. Teoria cunoştinţei metafizice. 2. Cunoaşterea mediată [Course of metaphysics. The theory of metaphysical knowledge. 2. Mediate knowledge] (1929–1930). București: Editura Humanitas. ———. 1993. Neliniştea metafizică [Metaphysical worry]. Bucureşti: Fundaţia Culturală Română. ———. 1999. Tratat de metafizică [Treatise of metaphysics] (1936–1937). București: Editura Roza Vânturilor. ———. 2000. Curs de filosofie a religiei. 1924–1925 [Course of philosophy of religion. 1924–1925]. Opere I. Cursuri de metafizică, 1 [Works I. Courses of metaphysics, 1]. București: Editura Crater. ———. 2005. Opere II. Cursuri de metafizică, 2 [Works II. Courses of metaphysics, 2]. Bucureşti: Editura Roza Vânturilor. ———. 2006. Scrisori şi memorii [Letters and memories]. Bucureşti: Editura Muzeul Literaturii Române şi Editura Roza Vânturilor. Levinas, Emmanuel. 2011. Totality and infinity. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. Mezdrea, Dora. 2015. Nae Ionescu. Biografia. Vol. I. Ediţia a doua, revăzută şi adăugită [Nae Ionescu, Biography. Vol. I, second edition, revised]. Bucureşti: Editura Muzeul Literaturii Române. Noica, Constantin. 2009. Becoming within being. Trans. Alistair Ian Blyth. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. Petrescu, Camil. 1937. Modalitatea estetică a teatrului. Principalele concepte despre reprezentaţia dramatică şi critica lor [Aesthetic modality of theatre. Main concepts about dramatic representation and their critique]. Bucureşti: Editura Fundaţia pentru Literatură şi Artă “Regele Carol II.” ———. 1938. Husserl. O introducere în filosofia fenomenologică [Husserl. An introduction to phenomenological philosophy]. Bucureşti: Editura Societăţii Române de Filosofie. Vulcănescu, Mircea. 1929. Max Scheler (1874–1928). Arhiva pentru ştiinţa şi reforma socială 8 (1–3): 369–392.

Theodor Celms and the “Realism– Idealism” Controversy Uldis Vēgners

Abstract  It was in his research manuscripts from 1905, also known as the Seefelder Blätter, where Edmund Husserl for the first time introduced the idea of the phenomenological reduction. The introduction of this idea, which he developed and refined years to come, marked the beginning not only of an important turn in Husserl’s philosophy toward transcendental phenomenology, but also the advent of a growing frustration and critique even among Husserl’s own students. The discussion about the ontological status of reality is otherwise known as the realism–idealism controversy. One of the first critiques in a published form came from the Latvian philosopher and Husserl’s student in Freiburg, Theodor Celms, in his book Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls (1928). The current chapter will present a historically contextualized account of Celms’ contribution to the realism–idealism controversy, including his relationship with the phenomenological movement, main points of his critical interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, and the following reception of his work. Keywords  Theodor Celms · Edmund Husserl · Phenomenology · Transcendental phenomenology · Idealism · Realism · Phenomenological reduction · Intersubjectivity · Solipsism

1  Introduction It was in his research manuscripts from 1905, also known as the Seefelder Blätter, where Edmund Husserl introduced the idea of the phenomenological reduction for the first time. The introduction of this idea, which Husserl developed and refined for years to come, marked the beginning of an important turn in Husserl’s philosophy toward transcendental phenomenology. The phenomenological reduction not only opened up a new and fruitful way of approaching phenomena, but also provoked the U. Vēgners (*) Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, University of Latvia, Riga, Latvia © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 W. Płotka, P. Eldridge (eds.), Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe, Contributions to Phenomenology 113, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39623-7_9

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so-called realism–idealism controversy. The whole controversy between realism and idealism, as initiated by Husserl’s critics, revolved around the question concerning the ontological status of the world. The current chapter will present a historically contextualized account of the contribution to the realism–idealism controversy from Husserl’s student, Latvian philosopher Theodor Celms, including his relationship with the phenomenological movement, main points of his critical interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, and the following reception of his work. Celms was born June 14th, 1893  in Valka, Russian Empire (now Latvia). He began his academic life with studies in Moscow, but in 1922 he went to Germany to study with Husserl in Freiburg (1922–1923, 1925). He defended his dissertation on Kant at the University of Freiburg in 1923 under the supervision of Geyser, but seemed, at first, to be devoted to Husserl’s transcendental project. In 1927 Celms wrote his habilitation thesis Prolegomena zu einem transzendentalem Historismus at the University of Latvia, in which he interpreted Husserl’s phenomenology as transcendental historism.1 Around the same time, however, a fundamental shift occurred in Celms’ thought. In 1928 he published Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls which provided a reader not only with an extensive interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology as ontological idealism, but also with an extensive and multifaceted criticism. The book brought Celms international recognition. “Celms became famous as one of the deepest critics of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, as one who tried to find a way out of phenomenology’s discrepancies” (Kūle 1998, p. 295). Celms’ critical interpretation of Husserl was well received, especially among the realist phenomenologists such as Alexander Pfänder, Moritz Geiger, and Johannes Daubert. His book was also translated and published in Spanish in 1931. Until World War II, Celms’ academic carrier was tied to Latvia. In 1936 he took a professorship in systematic philosophy at the University of Latvia, but before that he earned his second doctorate at the university in order to qualify for the position. In 1943 he published his second major philosophical work Subjekt und Subjektivierung: Studien über das subjektive Sein. In 1944 Celms and his family emigrated to Germany. From 1944 to 1949 Celms worked at the University of Göttingen, and from 1946 to 1949 he also taught at the Baltic University in Pinneberg. In 1949 Celms was offered a full professorship at the University of Cologne but he declined the offer as he decided to leave war-torn Germany to emigrate to the USA, where he obtained a teaching position at Augustana College in Rock Island, Illinois from 1949 to 1963, but taught part-time even after retirement from 1967 to 1975. In the USA Celms worked on several research manuscripts, one of which was Phänomen und Wirklichkeit des Ich. Studien über das subjektive Sein, published posthumously in 2012. Celms died on 14 February 1989 in Austin, Texas.2

1  It is noteworthy that Celms uses here a German term Historismus (historism) and not Historizismus (historicism). For more about the distinction between historism and historicism, see Parker (2013, p. 125) and Kūle et al. (2009, pp. 195–196). 2  For more information, see Kūle et al. 2009.

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2  Celms’ Criticism in Context The realism–idealism controversy or, as Avé-Lallemant (1975) calls it, the Freiburg-­ München antithesis, formed a body of published works beginning in the mid-­twenties, with Celms being among the first of Husserl’s students to publish “the most direct” (Gubser 2014, p. 66) critical work on Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. As Rozenvalds (1993a, p. 14) puts it, Celms was known “as one of the sharpest critics of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology before World War II.” However, the controversy did not explode suddenly; it smouldered for more than two decades before it reached the point of published criticism (Avé-Lallemant 1975, p. 22). The beginnings of the controversy can be traced as far back as 1904 (Avé-­Lallemant 1975, pp. 25–26; Gubser 2014, p. 64) which marked not only the moment when the paths of Husserl and Munich phenomenologists began to intertwine, but also the moment the Munich phenomenologists began to suspect that Husserl had taken a path that significantly deviated from the Logical Investigations in the direction of idealism. “The drift became palpable in the 1907 lecture ‘The Idea of Phenomenology’ and undeniable in the first volume of Ideas in 1913, which publicly announced Husserl’s new transcendental phase” (Gubser 2014, p. 64; see also Avé-Lallemant 1975, pp. 25–26). However, it was not until 1925 that the controversy first became manifest in published works, pioneered by Jean Hering and followed by Celms, Pfänder, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Maximilian Beck, Edith Stein, Max Scheler and Roman Ingarden (Avé-Lallemant 1975, p. 26). Although the controversy was primarily about the ontological status of reality, it was also about the meaning of phenomenology, its aims and scope, as well as about the exact meaning of Husserl’s phenomenological idealism which implied providing answers to questions like: How radical was Husserl’s transcendental turn away from the ideas presented in his Logical Investigations? Was Husserl a realist or idealist, and what kind of realist or idealist? Was Husserl at all interested in or his phenomenology capable of dealing with ontological questions concerning reality? All of these issues are as acute now as they were back then, and Celms discussed them extensively in his Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls. Because Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls provided an extended critique of Husserl’s phenomenological idealism that was well received by the members of the realist phenomenologists like Pfänder, Geiger and Daubert, and because Celms also contributed an article “Lebensumgebung und Lebensprojektion” to the Pfänder-Festschrift (T. Celms 1933), his name appears in connection with realist phenomenology (see Rozenvalds 1993a, p. 15; Rozenvalds 1993b, p. 10; Spiegelberg 1994, p. 253; Luft 1997, p. 62; Moran and Parker 2015, p. 21). However, Celms’ relationship with phenomenology is not a straightforward one, as he is also positioned in the literature at the periphery of the Freiburg group (see Spiegelberg 1994, pp. 164, 240, 253; see also Waldenfels 1992, p. 42; Avé-Lallemant 1975, p. 24), or even ranked among Kantians or critical realists (see P.  Celms 1994, p.  64; Dāle 1943, p.  123; Rozenvalds 1993a, pp.  15–16; Rozenvalds 2000, pp.  72, 77–78). There is a good reason to put Celms’ name among the Freiburg phenomenologists, because Celms was Husserl’s student in Freiburg in 1922–1923 and 1925, and his correspondence with Husserl between 1925 and 1926 (Husserl 1994, pp. 65–67), as

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well as his habilitation work (Prolegomena zu einem transzendentalen Historismus, 1927)3 suggest how close Celms was to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology from 1925 (and possibly earlier) to 1927. It is also justifiable to claim that Celms was close to Kantian philosophy. Celms had a long-standing interest in Kantian philosophy as his studies in Moscow (1917–1920),4 his dissertation on Kants allgemeinlogische Auffassung vom Wesen, Ursprung und der Aufgabe des Begriffes (supervised by Geyser and defended in 1923), and his participation in Jonas Cohn’s and Heinrich Rickert’s lectures and seminars show (T.  Celms n.d.; Notizen, 1972 p.  3).5 Additionally, in the 1930’s Celms published a number of book reviews in such journals as Deutsche Literaturzeitung, Baltische Monatshefte, and Philosophia (Beograd), most of which were about books that contained interpretations of Kantian philosophy (Rozenvalds 1993a, pp. 17–18; Kūle et al. 2009, p. 226). Taking all that into account, Rozenvalds’ suggestion that Celms’ critical interpretation of Husserl is “in close connection with the Kantian tradition” (Rozenvalds 2000, p. 72) comes as no surprise. Later in his life Celms expressly positioned himself as a critical realist (P. Celms 1994, p. 64). It is hard to say at which point exactly in his life Celms started to lean toward critical realism, but it might have happened as early as 1927, soon after he had written his habilitation thesis. His studies in Freiburg under the supervision of Geyser, a critical realist, and his work from the 1930s bear witness to a growing influence of Nicolai Hartmann6 and Oswald Külpe7 on his philosophy. Celms’ 3  It is unfortunate, though, that the habilitation work that Celms defended at the University of Latvia has been lost, and all that is left is a draft of a review by Celms’ colleague at the University of Latvia, Rūdolfs Jirgens (Jirgens). 4  One of his professors was the Russian Neo-Kantian Georgy Chelpanov (Георгий Иванович Челпанов) (Kūle et al. 2009, p. 38). 5  A document titled “Notizen über einen Besuch bei Theodor Celms in seinem Haus in Rock Island, Illinois, 3420–9½ Ave., am 12.8.72 (10–20 Uhr). CELMS’ WEG ZUR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHÄNOMENOLOGIE” has been provided by Theodor Celms’ son Peter Celms and his wife Barbro Celms. Although the authorship of the document is not indicated, there are several clues that suggest that it was Herbert Speigelberg who made the visit to Celms and took the notes. Firstly, Spiegelberg himself writes that he visited Celms at his home in Rock Island, Illiniois and during that visit Celms put a philosophical autobiography at his disposal (Spiegelberg 1994, pp. 266–267). Secondly, the passage that Speigelberg dedicates to Celms in his monumental work on the phenomenological movement includes information that is also present in the document. E.g., that Pfänder and Geiger with whom Celms was not personally acquainted at the time were impressed by Celms’ book; or that Husserl told Celms that his criticism was too severe and he still felt he would be able to prove the way to idealism through phenomenology (Spiegelberg 1994, p. 253; Notizen, p. 5). 6  Although Celms does not refer to Hartmann in his book about Husserl, he does so in all of the subsequent major scientific works, like Subjekt und Subjektivierung (1943), the posthumously published work Phänomen und Wirklichkeit des Ich. Studien über das subjektive Sein (2012), his unpublished manuscripts Zum Problem des Nichtmystischen Irrationalismus (incomplete) and Philosophie der Mathematik written in the USA. 7  Celms’ book Subjekt und Subjektivierung (1943) is built upon Oswald Külpe’s distinction between subjectification and objectification (Subjektivierung und Objektivierung). A manuscript Phänomen und Wirklichkeit des Ich. Studien über das subjektive Sein, on which Celms worked during the last decades of his life and was published posthumously in 2012, was a continuation of the work presented in Subjekt und Subjektivierung.

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preoccupation with and interest in the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity was neither fleeting nor superficial, but defined his philosophical research for much of his life. And taking into account how extensively and meticulously Celms already dealt with the distinction between immanence and transcendence and the question of the reducibility of transcendence in his Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls, it is entirely possible that Celms was already a critical realist when he wrote the book. Thus, when Celms engaged with phenomenological work and identified himself as a phenomenologist, he did not side with the realist phenomenologists, but rather stood on the opposite side of the realism–idealism controversy. However, when Celms did side with the realist phenomenologists in the controversy, he actually might not have been a phenomenologist anymore, but rather a critical realist (see also Rozenvalds 1993a, pp. 15–16). An important question in this context is: what was it that led Celms to turn away from transcendental phenomenology? How did Celms, once Husserl’s devoted disciple, become one of his severest critics of that time? Although the philosophical background and motives which led Celms to this turn and, as consequence, to this critical interpretation of Husserl are in need of further research, there is one possible answer that Celms himself gives, namely that the turn was a consequence of his realization that Husserl’s phenomenology does not lead to transcendental historism as he previously believed when writing his habilitation thesis, which in turn triggered a thorough critical reflection on Husserl’s phenomenology in general (Notizen, 1972 pp. 3–4). However, suggestions have been made about what might have influenced Celms’ turn. One suggestion is that it might have been his colleague at the University of Latvia Rūdolfs Jirgens’ highly critical review of his habilitation thesis (Vēgners 2012, pp. 54–55). But it might also be Celms’ exposure to Kantianism and critical realism in general that might have contributed to this turn. Geiger, Rickert, Natorp, Hartmann, August Messer, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Nikolai Lossky have been suggested as possible influences (Parker 2013, p.  127; Tremblay 2016). What is striking, is that within the list of the possible influences on the turn in Celms’ philosophy, there is not one realist phenomenologist.

3  C  elms’ Critical Interpretation of Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism In Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls Celms (1993, p. 31)8 sets out “to clarify the essence of Husserl’s phenomenological idealism and its relationship with the phenomenological method.” His ambition is to settle the discussions between the adherents and opponents of phenomenology. Opponents, Celms (1993, p. 36) notes, too often lack a sufficient understanding of Husserl’s phenomenology, while adherents of phenomenology often lack sufficient self-criticism. Celms sees himself  References will be made to Rozenvalds’ edition of Celms’ work, published in 1993.

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in the role of an arbiter, an objective moderator who, while having an extensive knowledge of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, is capable of reflective distance and unbiased critical assessment. Besides Husserl’s published works such as the revised second editions of the Logical Investigations (Husserl 1913a, b, 1921), Ideas I (Husserl 1913c), and Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft (Husserl 1910) Celms in his interpretation relies also on lectures and seminars in which he participated from 1922 to 1925 in Freiburg, lecture manuscripts from 1910, 1922, 1923/24,9 as well as what he learned in private conversations with Husserl (T.  Celms 1993, p. 34). To clarify the essence of Husserl’s phenomenology Celms deals with three key questions, which he uses as guidelines for his interpretative project (1993, p. 31). First, he asks: is phenomenological idealism a logical consequence of the phenomenological method? Second, he asks: does phenomenological idealism live up to Husserl’s own ideal of philosophy as the highest and most rigorous of sciences which aim to achieve pure and absolute knowledge? And third, he asks: is phenomenological idealism transcendental in the sense commonly understood since Kant? The problem of solipsism plays an important role in Celms’ interpretation and criticism of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. This problem, to a large extent, stems from two core interpretative assumptions about transcendental phenomenology that Celms repeatedly expresses in his book. The first core interpretative assumption is that Husserl reduces everything to an individual consciousness (T. Celms 1993, pp. 131, 137, 139–140, 142, 183, 187–188). This means that Celms has a psychologistic understanding of the Husserlian transcendental ego, an interpretative approach Celms shares with Southwest Neo-Kantians (Parker 2013, pp.  103–104). The second core interpretative assumption is that Husserl rejects solipsism, i.e., the idea that only one individual consciousness exists, and considers “the solipsistic interpretation of his philosophy as a complete misunderstanding” (T. Celms 1993, p. 87; see also T. Celms 1993, pp. 139–140, 164, 165). As we will show, Celms employs these two core assumptions not only to argue for the difference between phenomenological method and phenomenological idealism, but eventually also to declare the whole of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to be an ontologically incoherent and confused philosophical project that in no way could lay claim to the title of philosophy as rigorous science.

3.1  From Method to Idealism? The first key question Celms takes on in his critical interpretation of Husserl is whether phenomenological idealism is a logical consequence of the phenomenological method? He takes Husserl’s phenomenological method to consist of eidetic

 Parker (2013, pp. 124–125) has done excellent work identifying these manuscripts.

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description (Wesensdeskription) and the adoption of the phenomenological attitude (phänomenologische Einstellung) (T. Celms 1993, p. 36) with the latter being more important than the former (T. Celms 1993, p. 53). Celms defines the phenomenological attitude in terms of the “reduction of objective moments to the corresponding modes of consciousness based on intuition” (1993, p. 55; see also 1993, p. 62). As such it is achieved through phenomenological reflection, which, in comparison with natural reflection, “is fulfilled intuitively, that is, interested only in what is immanent” (T.  Celms 1993, p.  68). Phenomenological reflection is not directed toward objects or transcendence as in the direct attitude; instead it focuses on how objects are given intuitively in consciousness or immanence. If phenomenological reflection is carried out consistently, Celms emphasizes, there can be no attitude, no position taken about transcendences posited in reflected lived experiences (1993, pp. 68, 69). The ontological status of transcendence lies outside the scope of the phenomenological attitude. This refraining from any position-taking with respect to transcendent moments, Celms adds, is also called the phenomenological εποχη (1993, p. 69). However, Celms’ interpretation of the phenomenological method does not end here, as he directs his reader’s attention to a fundamental ambiguity in the term ‘phenomenological reduction’ (phänomenologische Reduktion) that, as he observes, makes it very difficult to understand Husserl’s line of thought in general and his method in particular (T. Celms 1993, pp. 83, 86). On the one hand, Husserl understands reduction in terms of consideration (Zurückführung der Betrachtung), on the other hand, he uses it to refer to reduction in terms of being (Zurückführung des Seins) (T. Celms 1993, p. 83). For the sake of clarity, Celms calls the first one ‘phenomenological reflection,’ but for the other he reserves the term ‘phenomenological reduction.’ According to E.  Avé-Lallemant (1975, pp.  32–33), Conrad-Martius independently of Celms made a fully analogous distinction (see also Rozenvalds 2000, p. 76). However, as Avé-Lallemant (1975, pp. 33–34) notes, in comparison to Celms, she explores yet another attitude, which is a hypothetical positing of real being that leads to ontological phenomenology. To justify his principal distinction, Celms pursues two lines of argumentation (1993, pp. 85–87). The first argument tries to demonstrate that phenomenological reflection and phenomenological reduction are different because in each of them different suspensions (Ausschaltungen) are at work. In phenomenological reflection, one turns away from transcendence toward immanence, which is characterized by refraining from any position taking, judgement about or interest in the reducibility or non-reducibility of transcendence. In the phenomenological reduction, on the other hand, one turns to transcendence in order to integrate its meaning of its being (Seinssinn) into immanence. It entails the judgment that transcendence is nothing but the result pure consciousness’ constituting activity. The second argument for the distinction between phenomenological reflection and phenomenological reduction tries to establish a difference in their scope (Umfang). What Celms has in mind here is the extent to which transcendence can be reduced to each of these cognitive activities (Erkenntnisaktionen) (1993, p.  87).

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Celms makes a distinction between the scope of reflection (Reflexionsumfang) and the scope of reduction (Reduktionsumfang). For Celms, the scope of reflection comprises all transcendence, because it is possible—in principle and without exception—to intuitively go back from the transcendent moments to the modes of consciousness in which they are manifested. However, the same is not true for the phenomenological reduction. And it is here that Celms relies heavily on the two core assumptions, namely, that Husserl’s transcendental idealism reduces everything to individual consciousness and, at the same time, rejects solipsism. Celms makes two points in favour of his interpretation, both connected to the issue of solipsism. First, Celms writes that if the scope of the reduction comprised all transcendence, it would imply that phenomenology would be absolutely solipsistic, but Husserl himself denies this (1993, p. 87). Second, Celms argues that, as transcendences, the being of the other pure I-subjects (die fremde reine Ichsubjekte), including God, cannot be reduced to consciousness (1993, pp. 87–90). Thus Celms has come to the point of answering the first key question, whether phenomenological idealism is a logical consequence of the phenomenological method, and his answer is negative. Phenomenological reflection takes no position on the ontological status of transcendence and therefore stands above the idealism– realism controversy. The phenomenological method per se is beyond the idealism– realism question and thus can be approved by both idealist and realist camps (T. Celms 1993, pp. 83, 91). As Juris Rozenvalds (2000, p. 77) claims, Celms understands phenomenology as descriptive psychology that is limited to the study of consciousness (see also Vēgners 2012, pp. 58–64).

3.2  Highest and most Rigorous of Sciences? Being indifferent to the idealism–realism question, Celms concludes that the phenomenological method on its own “cannot constitute a philosophy, because philosophy must categorically cast its judgment on transcendence too (if philosophy is to become an absolutely universal science about anything and everything, as Husserl himself always emphasizes …)” (1993, pp. 90–91). For phenomenology to become philosophically significant, Celms (1993, p.  91) maintains, phenomenological methodology must be linked with the question concerning the reduction, whose answer will lead us to either an idealist or realist position. According to Celms, if theoretical thinking is to be universal and philosophically significant, it has to be ontologically engaged and decide either in favour of idealism or realism. Thus Celms sets out to find out an answer to the second key question, i.e. whether phenomenological idealism lives up to Husserl’s own ideal of philosophy as the highest and most rigorous of sciences by tracing how Husserl justifies his ontological move from phenomenological reflection toward idealism. And here, once again, Celms’ interpretation and criticism draw heavily upon the two core assumptions.

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3.2.1  Reduction of the Physical World First, Celms deals with the possibility of the reduction of the physical world. In Celms’ view (1993, pp.  131, 137), Husserl’s most important argumentation in favour of physical things’ reducibility and therefore of idealism is concentrated in Chapter Three of Part Two of Ideas I (§§47–55). Celms pays special attention to parts of §§47 and 49 as they, according to Celms, provide two distinct and fundamental idealist arguments.10 All other arguments, considerations and findings in other works and parts of Ideas I Celms brushes aside as either less important and dependent on the two fundamental arguments (T. Celms 1993, pp. 131, 137–138), or as merely apparently idealistic (T. Celms 1993, pp. 128–131). According to Celms, the first fundamental argument is located in §47, in which Husserl argues that physical things cannot be thought of and can have no possible meaning without any reference to consciousness, that they are what they are only as experiencable physical things (Husserl 1983, p.  106; Husserl 1913c, pp.  88–89). Celms launches a set of arguments against it, and what is interesting is that from all four arguments only the first one does not involve the issue of solipsism. According to the first argument, the fact that a thing is grasped in thinking does not mean that it is constituted in it (T. Celms 1993, pp. 138–139). The remaining three arguments, by drawing an analogy between physical things and other egos, try to prove the existence of physical things out of the existence of other egos. If one rejects solipsism, and Celms is convinced that Husserl does, one at least in principle has to also recognize the possibility of physical things existing apart from consciousness (T. Celms 1993, pp. 139–141). Celms finds the second of Husserl’s fundamental arguments for idealism in §49 (Husserl 1983, p. 111; Husserl 1913c, pp. 92–93). As Celms (1993, pp. 141–142) understands it, Husserl takes consciousness and reality to be so cardinally different that it makes it impossible for them to exist side by side, contingently relating to each other. The only possible relation between them is that reality is a being for consciousness. Celms agrees that there is some weight to this argument and is even willing to go so far as to admit that the problems that beset dualism are one of the strongest arguments in favour of idealism in general. However, Celms does not see it as an argument that would speak in favour of Husserl’s phenomenological idealism, due to the two core assumptions that dominate Celms’ interpretation of Husserl. Celms claims that a transcendental philosophy that speaks about general supra-­ individual consciousness can use this argument, while transcendental phenomenology cannot, as it speaks about individual consciousness, while rejecting solipsism. This puts Husserl in a position where he is forced to discard this argument in favour of his idealism, because even if there are no things apart from individual consciousness, Husserl agrees that there are still other egos. And, Celms concludes, if one concedes something apart from (individual) consciousness, there is nothing in

 In his review of Celms’ book, Patočka (1999, p. 424) insists that Husserl’s well-founded justification of the reducibility of physical being is in no way limited to these two chapters of Ideas.

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principle that stands in the way of granting also things an existence apart from consciousness. Celms’ conclusion is that Husserl’s case for idealism in relation to the physical world is deeply problematic, but Husserl’s transcendental idealism becomes even more problematic when it comes to other egos. 3.2.2  Reduction of the Other I’s Turning to the question of whether the other egos can be reduced, Celms first lays out Husserl’s conception of intersubjectivity, which is based on harmonious empathic experience.11 In his interpretation he mostly relies on Ideas I, and, while he recognizes that Husserl has not paid much attention to the issue in this work, he believes that it is still enough to extrapolate the basics of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity. It is worth mentioning that even Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, almost half of which is dedicated to the problem of intersubjectivity, did not change Celms’ view on the issue (Rozenvalds 2000, p. 78). For Celms (1939, p. 156) the Cartesian Meditations12 provided nothing radically new, and therefore he saw no reason to reconsider his interpretation and criticism. Celms (1993, p. 152) is interested in whether it is possible for Husserl’s initial, methodologically solipsistic approach to make a passage to an intersubjective approach, or if it is doomed to remain solipsistic. Celms claims that what Husserl speaks about is “intersubjectivity as it is presented in solus ipse” (Intersubjektivität, wie sie im solus ipse vorgestellt wird), but the question is, Celms ask, how is it possible to go from this kind of intersubjectivity to a “genuine intersubjectivity” (Intersubjektivität im eigentlichen Sinne), i.e., to an “intersubjectivity of subjects ‘in-themselves’ who are not reducible to each other” (Intersubjektivität von aufeinander nicht reduzierbaren Subjekten ‘an sich’) (T.  Celms 1993, p.  161)?13 And Celms’ claim is that the only way for Husserl to make the move from experienced solipsistic intersubjectivity to genuine intersubjectivity is to accept the metaphysical premise of pre-established harmony (1993, p. 163). Here, again, Celms’ interpretation relies on the two core assumptions. On the one hand, Husserl rejects solipsism, on the other hand, he takes every individual ego to be a monad, an absolutely closed and self-sufficient monad without any possibility of causal interaction. Therefore the only way all the egos can reach each other is through “a harmony as predetermined accordance of empathically shaped presentations of the other I’s in one’s own absolutely enclosed I with the I’s themselves, how they exist

 For a more extended treatment of Celms’ interpretation and criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology in relation to the issue of solipsism, see Parker (2013, pp. 123–144) and Vēgners (2011). 12  Celms refers here to Alexandre Koyré’s edited French translation of Cartesian Meditations (Husserl 1931). 13  A similar concern was later raised by Nikolai Lossky (Lossky 2016, pp. 180–181; Parker 2013, p. 139). 11

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‘in-­themselves’” (T. Celms 1993, p. 163). However, this solution, Celms continues, is no solution at all. One of the problems, according to Celms, is that the premise of pre-established harmony cannot yield genuine intersubjectivity, which implies (a) more than one I, with each of them being or principally being able (b) to be aware of and (c) to act upon each other (T. Celms 1993, 168). As Husserl’s egos are absolute and cannot affect each other, “[t]he passage from individual solus ipse to a plurality of solus ipse is not at all an overcoming of solipsism, it is, as already stated, an extension of a monistic solipsism into a pluralistic one” (T. Celms 1993, p. 168). The second problem is connected to how scientific and plausible the premise of pre-established harmony itself is. According to Celms it is “a metaphysical premise that by no means can be viewed as a rigorously scientific proposition” (T. Celms 1993, p. 161). Besides, Celms adds, the degree of plausibility (Wahrscheinlickeitsgrad) of this ‘philosophical belief’ (philosophischer Glaube) is very low (1993, p. 173). Celms concludes that Husserl’s phenomenological idealism can in no way satisfy the quest for philosophy as rigorous science (1993, pp. 173–174). However, as Celms sees it, the failure is not Husserl’s alone, but rather characterizes all attempts to come to absolute knowledge. Philosophy as rigorous science is, and remains, an ideal, a regulative idea for any philosophy. All that philosophy can hope for are certain possible solutions and philosophical beliefs that cannot obtain ultimate proof or justification.

3.3  What Idealism? Celms’ last key question is whether phenomenological idealism is transcendental in the sense of the word as it is commonly understood since Kant? For Husserl, as Celms understands it, the term transcendental means everything that pertains to the possibility and cognizability of transcendence for consciousness (1993, pp. 188–189). However, Celms notes, transcendental idealism in the Kantian sense is something different. To show that Husserl’s phenomenological idealism is not transcendental in the Kantian sense, Celms lays out three core ideas that are present in all forms of transcendental idealism but are absent in Husserl’s phenomenological idealism (1993, pp. 188–192). First, transcendental idealism recognizes only a ‘constructivist’ conception of truth; second, the transcendental subject is nothing real and therefore has no existence and temporality; and third, the transcendental subject is supra-temporal, and there can only be numerically one, self-identical transcendental subject. Phenomenology, on the other hand, has first, a dual conception of truth (a constructivist and a demonstrative [abbildend] or revelatory [enthüllend] one); second, pure consciousness as a flux of lived experiences has existence in immanent time; and third, there is a plurality of pure subjects. Instead of being transcendental philosophy in the Kantian sense, Celms suggests, Husserl’s idealism can be better described as a sort of Lebensphilosophie, an absolute biographism, and a spiritual metaphysics. It is a Lebensphilosophie because

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pure consciousness is “an absolutely intimate facticity of lived experience (Erlebnisfaktizität)” (T. Celms 1993, p. 183) that has in itself a dimension of irrationality (T.  Celms 1993, pp.  185, 186) and is governed by an immanent destiny (Schicksal) or fate (Geschick) that cannot be further traced back to anything beyond the immanence of pure consciousness. He compares it to Bergson’s évolution créatrice and durée réelle (T. Celms 1993, pp. 184–186). Celms’ dismissiveness toward the idea of a pure life, with its immanent destiny, reveals how radically Celms’ position has changed from the period of his habilitation work, when he was fascinated by phenomenology’s interest in absolute concrete life and saw that as an advantage over all other forms of transcendentalism, including the Kantian (1993, p. 186; see Husserl 1994, p. 66). Celms labels Husserl’s phenomenology as an absolute biographism (absoluter Biographismus), which he juxtaposes to immanent historism (immanenter Historismus). He makes this distinction with reference to his habilitation work and, especially to the claim made there about phenomenology leading to a transcendental historism (transzendentaler Historismus),14 a philosophical position which defends the thesis that the pure flow of consciousness is a transcendental-historical process that encompasses all individual flows of consciousness and constitutes the real, worldly being of things (Notizen, 1972 p. 3). Now Celms has changed his mind and insists that transcendental phenomenology has nothing to do with transcendental historism, because Husserl reduces everything to individual and mutually inaccessible pure consciousnesses, but history in the proper sense is supra-individual, in which all the separate individuals are just moments of an overarching unity (1993, pp. 187–188). Finally, Celms calls Husserl’s phenomenology a spiritual metaphysics. This term comes from Celms’ understanding of transcendental philosophy,15 which considers any non-transcendental philosophy a metaphysics. Additionally, as Husserl’s idealism is opposed to materialism, we can call it a spiritual metaphysics. Although Celms admits that Husserl has overcome sensualism and psychologism, his phenomenological project is still a Berkleyan and Leibnizean kind of spiritualism in a crucial sense (1993, pp. 195–196). Celms’ first conclusion about Husserl’s phenomenology is that Husserl begins with the ideal of absolute knowledge only to give it up in order to avoid solipsism (1993, p. 196). Second, Husserl’s phenomenology contains heterogeneous elements that are mutually contradictory: “In Husserl’s phenomenological idealism we find combined: Husserl’s intuitivism and absolute presuppositionlessness with the absolute discursivism [Diskursivismus] of the Marburg school and the presupposition of pre-established harmony by Leibniz; and together with all that there is also a Kantianism that is hostile to metaphysics together with a spiritual metaphysics”

 The terms ‘immanent historicism’ and ‘transcendental historicism’ mean one and the same thing for Celms (Notizen, 1972, p. 4). 15  Celms uses the term neuere Transzendentalphilosophie, but from the context of the book one can guess that what Celms has in mind is also called Neo-Kantianism. 14

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(T. Celms 1993, p. 198).16 Celms’ final judgment about phenomenological idealism is that it is just a phenomenologically and transcendental-philosophically refined Leibnizean spiritualism (1993, pp. 198–199).

4  Reception of Celms’ Critical Interpretation Celms’ book attracted attention among many phenomenologists early on, and he received favourable feedback and reviews, especially from those who in their philosophical projects embraced realism. When Celms first published his work in 1928 he sent it to Husserl, Pfänder and Geiger. The last two, with whom he had no previous contact, responded that they fully agreed with Celms and invited him to visit them in case he had plans to come to Germany. In the summer of 1929 Celms went to Heidelberg to participate in Heinrich Rickert’s seminar and took Pfänder and Geiger up on their invitation. Geiger had dedicated one of his seminars to Celms’ book, but Pfänder was of the conviction that Celms’ criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology was irrefutable and had already sent a favourable review of Celms’ book to Deutsche Literaturzeitung (Notizen, 1972 p.  4). In his review, Pfänder (1929, pp. 2048–2049) praised Celms for his thoroughness, precision and clarity, and considered it to be the best account of Husserl’s phenomenology. He concluded his review writing: “The book is too substantial and sound to simply dismiss it with an explanation that the exposition is based on misunderstandings and a lack of knowledge about the further development of phenomenology” (Pfänder 1929, p. 2050). Another realist phenomenologist who read Celms’ book was Johannes Daubert, whose own discussion of Ideas was indebted to Celms (Schuhmann and Smith 1985, pp. 765–766).17 Beck (1930, p. 97), like Pfänder, spoke highly of Celms’ book for its precision, clarity and thoroughness, and deemed it to be the best exposition of Husserl’s philosophy thus far, which had managed to show the contradictions inherent to phenomenology. Jan Patočka (1999, pp. 422–424) in his review18 published in 1933, shared his overall assessment of Celms’ book with Pfänder and Beck, characterizing it as a valuable contribution that standed out for its thoroughness, clarity, and intimate knowledge of Husserl’s still unpublished thought. Patočka agreed with Celms on the point that Husserl’s phenomenology was not an absolute philosophy, but thought that Celms’ interpretative construction of Husserl’s phenomenology in some points was too formal and nitpicking, and insisted that still Husserl had to be credited with a number of significant developments in philosophy.  Reinach also claimed the Marburg school influenced Husserl. He blamed the Marburg school for Husserl’s turn away from the Logical Investigations (Avé-Lallemant 1975, p. 25). 17  After the World War I Daubert withdrew to a farm and lost contact with the new generation of phenomenologists, but kept in touch with Pfänder (Schuhmann and Smith 1985, p. 764), therefore it is likely that it was Pfänder who introduced Daubert with Celms’ book. 18  First published in Česká mysl in Czech (Patočka 1933). 16

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Celms’ book also caught the attention of Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset. On his recommendation the book was published in Spanish in 1931, translated by José Gaos (Notizen, 1972 p. 5; see also Guerrero 2017, p. 37). Celms found out about the published translation only after the fact (Notizen, 1972 p. 5). Two decades later after the first publication of Celms’ book, Nicolai Hartmann, who agreed with Celms that the phenomenological method was neutral with regard to the ontological question of idealism–realism (Notizen, 1972 p. 5), wrote in his recommendation letter for Celms in 1949: “Celms became especially well known in Germany in 1928 through the publication of his book in German, Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls (The Phenomenological Idealism of Husserl). This book is not just an exposition of the system but is an original investigation into the systematic assumptions of Husserl’s phenomenology, and contributed a great deal to the clarification of the issues in theoretical philosophy at the time” (Hartmann 1949). In short, Celms’ book was generally well-received, but what about Husserl, the target of Celms’ critique? As is known, once published, Celms sent a copy to Husserl and on his way home from Rickert’s seminar in Heidelberg in 1929 Celms visited him. Husserl received him cordially as always before, but during the visit Husserl expressed his opinion that Celms’ criticism was “too sharp and he still nurtured a firm hope to be able to give a justification of his conviction about the possibility of a purely phenomenological way to idealism in the nearest future” (Notizen, 1972 p. 5). And it seems that Husserl might have made good on what he told Celms. Although Husserl made no explicit references to Celms, at least some parts of the texts dealing with the issue of solipsism and the explication of the meaning of transcendental idealism that Husserl worked on in the years following the publication of Celms’ book might be written in response to Celms’ critical interpretation. One of the texts that has been recognized in the literature as a likely response to Celms is the ‘Fifth Meditation’ from the Cartesian Meditations (Parker 2013, p. 90; Guerrero 2017, p. 41), though there are also certain passages from the related Paris Lectures and Husserl’s Epilogue to the Ideas that might be a response to Celms (Parker 2013, pp. 91, 92). Parker (2013, p. 130) argues, first, that at least theoretically Husserl had time to read Celms’ book before he started his work on the Paris Lectures in January 1929 and later when he worked on the Cartesian Meditations. Second, Husserl had read Celms’ book meticulously as the annotations in Husserl’s copy of the book suggest (Parker 2013, pp.  130–131). Third, although Husserl does not explicitly refer to Celms in these texts, “the clarificatory remarks Husserl makes concerning the divergence between his method and that of Descartes, his relationship of phenomenology to the transcendental idealism of Kant, the discussion of the problem of solipsism, and the allusions to Leibniz, while not new to Husserl’s writings, are presented in a manner which might lead one to think that he is responding to Celms” (Parker 2013, p.  130). Thus, for example, the seemingly grave objection against phenomenology from an anonymous critic with which Husserl begins his ‘Fifth Meditation’ quite closely echoes Celms’ objection that Husserl’s phenomenology is solipsistic and as such cannot reach the other egos as they are in-themselves, beyond how the transcendental ego intends them and therefore cannot claim to be a

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universal science that deals not only with subjectivity but also with objectivity. Husserl, playing out the argument of the anonymous critic, asks: “When I, the meditating I, reduce myself to my absolute transcendental ego by phenomenological epoché do I not become solus ipse …?” (Husserl 1982, p.  89; 1973, p.  121) He continues: “But what about other egos, who surely are not a mere intending and intended in me, merely synthetic unities of possible verification in me, but, according to their sense, precisely others?” (Husserl 1982, p. 89; 1973, p. 121) According to this objection, the problem of the objective world that transcends the immanence of the transcendental ego goes beyond the reach of phenomenology (Husserl 1982, p. 90; 1973, p. 122). And the similarity between Celms’ critical interpretation and the objection that Husserl entertains in the ‘Fifth Meditation’ becomes even more striking at the end of the meditation where Husserl returns to the objection and its implications of the incapability of phenomenology to solve the problems of the objective world. The charge against phenomenology, using Husserl’s own phrasing, is that: “without admitting that it does so, it lapses into a transcendental solipsism; and the whole step leading to other subjectivity and to genuine Objectivity is possible only by virtue of an unacknowledged metaphysics, a concealed adoption of Leibnizian traditions” (Husserl 1982, p. 148; 1973, p. 174). Husserl’s line of defence is based on undermining the very assumption that he seeks to solve the problem of solipsism by leaving the transcendental attitude and using metaphysical constructions, or that he is even forced to do so if his philosophy is to hold on to the claims of universality (Husserl 1982, p.  148; 1973, p.  175). In the ‘Fifth Meditation’ (Husserl 1982, p. 90; 1973, p. 122) and the Paris Lectures (Husserl 1998, p. 34; 1973, p. 34) Husserl very clearly refuses the very notion of approaching the problem of intersubjectivity and the whole problem of solipsism with dialectic arguments and metaphysical hypotheses. Phenomenological monadology, as Husserl writes, “is not a metaphysical construction, but a systematic explanation of the meaning that the world has for all of us prior to any philosophizing” (Husserl 1998, p. 36; 1973, p. 36; see also Husserl 1982, pp. 148, 150–151; 1973, pp. 175, 176–177). Of course, as Husserl admits, phenomenology does not exclude any metaphysics, but “only that type of metaphysics which deals with naive and contradictory objects” (Husserl 1998, p.  38; 1973, p.  38; see also Husserl 1982, p.  139; 1973, p.  166). According to Husserl, all the attempts to establish intersubjectivity with the means of metaphysical dialectic arguments are doomed to failure, and he wants to make it clear that his transcendental idealism is fundamentally different from other forms of idealism (Husserl 1998, pp. 33–34; 1973, pp. 33–34). Compared to the intensive first wave of responses, the interest in Celms’ book decreased significantly as years passed by. As Parker (2013, p. 123) notes, history has not been so kind to Celms’ critical interpretation, as “protracted discussions of Celms’ critique of Husserlian phenomenology are scarce”, but at least some level of renewal of the interest in Celms can be seen, starting around the 1990s. Celms’ interpretation and criticism of Husserl have been presented or discussed by Thomas Seebohm (1962), Richard H.  Holmes (1975), James Mensch (1988), Rozenvalds (1993a, b, 2000), Sebastian Luft (1997), Kūle (1998; Kūle et  al. 2009), Ella Buceniece (2002), Kevin Mulligan (2003), Vēgners (2011, 2012), Parker (2013),

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and Guerrero (2017). Nevertheless, a more comprehensive appreciation of Celms’ philosophy, his critique of Husserl, and his relationship with phenomenology still calls for a more thorough historical and systematic research.

5  Conclusion Celms’ work is significant in the phenomenological movement not only because he was among the first to publish an extensive and detailed interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, but also in that he was one of the first who brought up the charge of solipsism against it. As Parker (2013, p. 123) notes: “Despite the lack of attention paid to Celms in contemporary literature on Husserl, in his work we find the first systematic presentation of one of the most common criticisms of pure phenomenology, namely, that it cannot escape the solipsistic starting point from which it begins.” And, similarly, Guerrero (2017, p. 42) writes that even if one disagrees with Celms’ criticism against Husserl regarding the solipsism issue, his significance lies in the fact that he was among the first who identified the problem, and as such he can be seen as a precursor of a whole line of critical thought in continental philosophy in the twentieth century. Even if the relevance of Celms’ contribution today might not lie in the interpretation he gives in his book about Husserlian phenomenology, it definitely lies in the questions that he posed there. The ontological status of reality, the meaning of phenomenology, its aims and scope, as well as the exact nature of Husserl’s phenomenological idealism, are questions that are still open and up for debate.

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Mulligan, Kevin. 2003. Searle, Derrida, and the ends of phenomenology. In John Searle, ed. Barry Smith, 261–286. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Notizen. 1972. Notizen über einen Besuch bei Theodor Celms in seinem Haus in Rock Island, Illinois, 3420 – 9½ Ave., am 12.8.72 (10 – 20 Uhr). CELMS’ WEG ZUR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHÄNOMENOLOGIE. Unpublished intellectual autobiography. Rock Island, IL. Parker, Rodney. 2013. Husserl’s transcendental idealism and the problem of solipsism. Doctoral dissertation. London (Ontario, Canada): The University of Western Ontario. Patočka, Jan. 1933. Theodor Celms: Husserls phänomenologischer Idealismus. Riga, 1928. Česká mysl 29: 58–59. ———. 1999. Rez. Theodor Celms: Husserls phänomenologischer Idealismus, Riga 1928. In Texte-Dokumente-Bibliographie, 422–424. Alber, Oikoymenh: Freiburg–Prag. Pfänder, Alexander. 1929. Celms T.  Der Phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls. Acta Universitatis Latviensis XIX, 1928. – Riga, 1928. S. 251–439. Deutsche Literaturzeitung 43: 2048–2050. Rozenvalds, Juris. 1993a. Theodor Celms (1893-1989). In Profesors Teodors Celms. Biobibliogrāfiskais rādītājs, 13–18. Rīga: Latvijas Universitāte. ———. 1993b. Teodors Celms: 1893  - 1989. In Profesors Teodors Celms. Biobibliogrāfiskais rādītājs, 5–12. Latvijas Universitāte: Rīga. ———. 2000. Phenomenological ideas in Latvia: Kurt Stavenhagen and Theodor Celms on Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. In Phenomenology on Kant, German Idealism, Hermeneutics and Logic, ed. O.K.  Wiegand, R.J.  Dostal, L.  Embree, J.  Kockelmans, and J.N.  Mohanty, 67–82. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9446-2_5. Schuhmann, Karl, and Barry Smith. 1985. Against idealism: Johannes Daubert vs. Husserl’s ideas I. Review of Metaphysics 38: 763–793. Seebohm, Thomas. 1962. Die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Transzendental-Philosophie. Edmund Husserls Transzendental-Phänomenologischer Ansatz, dargestellt im Anschluss an seine Kant-Kritik. Bonn: Bouvier. Spiegelberg, Herbert. 1994. The phenomenological movement: A historical introduction. Third revised and enlarged edition. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Tremblay, Frédéric. 2016. Nikolai Lossky’s reception and criticism of Husserl. Husserl Studies 32 (2): 149–163. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-015-9181-5. Vēgners, Uldis. 2011. Theodore Celms’ critique of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology in the context of the problem of solipsism. Humanities and Social Sciences Latvia 19: 143–157. ———. 2012. Theodore Celms’s critique of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Quaestiones Disputatae 3: 48–64. https://doi.org/10.5840/qd2012315. Waldenfels, Bernhard. 1992. Einführung in die Phänomenologie. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

Leopold Blaustein’s Descriptive Psychology and Aesthetics in Light of His Criticism of Husserl Witold Płotka

Abstract  The author offers a critical discussion of the main concepts, arguments, and problems formulated by Leopold Blaustein—a student of Twardowski and Ingarden—who also studied under Husserl in Freiburg. Blaustein’s philosophy arises as a mixture of phenomenology and the Lvov-Warsaw School of logic’s analytical approach. This study shows how Blaustein redefined phenomenology as a descriptive psychology which serves to investigate types of lived experiences. Given this understanding of phenomenology, the author presents Blaustein’s engagement with Husserl’s content theory, where Blaustein tries to show that contents are dependent on the world, rather than on consciousness. The author seeks to display the limits of Blaustein’s reading of Husserl by showing that he did not adopt Husserl’s doctrine of constitution. However, Blaustein adopts this doctrine in his analysis of aesthetic experiences as dynamic processes. The study reconstructs Blaustein’s view of the structure of these experiences as imaginative presentations which serve to represent aesthetic objects. In this regard, the author defines the influences of Twardowski, Husserl and Ingarden on Blaustein. Keywords  Eidetics · Content theory · Aesthetic experience · Descriptive psychology · Leopold Blaustein · Roman Ingarden · Edmund Husserl

W. Płotka (*) Institute of Philosophy, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 W. Płotka, P. Eldridge (eds.), Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe, Contributions to Phenomenology 113, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39623-7_10

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1  Introduction In three letters written between 1925 and 1927 to Roman Ingarden (1893–1970),1 Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) mentions Leopold Blaustein (1905–1942 [or 1944]), and in two of them Husserl asks Ingarden to give Blaustein his regards. Moreover, in another letter from 1927 written to Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938), Ingarden (2016, p. 351) reports his personal exchanges with Husserl, and he notes that Husserl remembers Blaustein “very well.” Yet contemporary Husserl scholars—with few exceptions (e.g., Miskiewicz 2009; Pokropski 2015)—have altogether forgotten Blaustein. Given that Blaustein’s original contribution to phenomenology and his developments in aesthetics (e.g., the analysis of the experience of listening to the radio and watching a piece of theater) are rather unknown, the main aim of this study is to present and discuss Blaustein’s understanding of Husserl’s phenomenology, its original reformulations, and its developments in confrontation with descriptive psychology. Why study Blaustein today? What makes his contribution to phenomenology valuable? Blaustein studied in Freiburg im Breisgau in 1925. He also studied from 1923 to 1927 in Lvov under Ingarden, Twardowski, and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890–1963). Both Twardowski and Ajdukiewicz were prominent members of the Lvov–Warsaw School. Given that Blaustein completed his doctoral dissertation on Husserl’s theory of the act, content, and object of presentations under Twardowski, his philosophy is an original mixture of phenomenology and the Lvov-Warsaw School’s analytical approach,2 leading some scholars (Woleński 2010, p. 23; Ptaszek 2011; Pokropski 2015, p. 94) to label his philosophy as “analytical phenomenology.” Other scholars binds his “analytical phenomenology” rather  with the heritage of early phenomenology (Miskiewicz 2009). This study, then, is an attempt to explore how phenomenology can be reinterpreted in confrontation with the analytical approach. But the main aim of this study is to present how we can define Blaustein’s position in the context of the phenomenological movement, mainly in connection with Husserl’s philosophy and, to a lesser extent, with Ingarden. At the beginning, however, it is worthwhile shedding more light on Blaustein’s life.3 He was born in 1905. Blaustein studied at the Faculty of Philosophy at the John Casimir University in Lwów (Lvov, Lviv) roughly between 1923 and 1927. As already noted, he studied there under Ingarden, Twardowski, and Ajdukiewicz. After Twardowski’s recommendations, Blaustein studied in Freiburg im Breisgau in the summer semester of 1925 under Husserl. He received a doctoral degree in 1927,

1  Husserl mentions Blaustein in letters from June, 27 and December, 10, 1925, and from April, 9, 1927. Cf. Husserl 1994, pp. 226, 228, 232. 2  Concerning Twardowski’s influences on Blaustein see Smith 1994, p. 157 and Płotka 2020. See also the epistolary exchange between Blaustein and Twardowski in Jadczak 1994. 3  A short presentation of Blaustein’s biography can be found in Jadczak 1997, pp.  171–180; Miskiewicz 2009; Ptaszek 2011; and Pokropski 2015, pp. 93–94. A bibliography of his works can be found in Dąbrowski 1981.

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and later in 1927–1928 he spent some time in Berlin where he worked on the revision of his dissertation (Jadczak 1993, p. 23). In Berlin he met Carl Stumpf, and moreover he studied Gestaltpsychologie under Max Wertheimer and Wolfgang Köhler. Blaustein’s philosophy was influenced mainly by the heritage of descriptive psychology (cf. Płotka 2020) and less by Gestaltpsychologie, however, he referred to some ideas of Stumpf, Wertheimer and Köhler. At the same time he was not satisfied with the naturalistic background of experimental psychology and claimed that is has to supplemented by descriptive approach. Blaustein’s dissertation was ­published in 1928 under the title Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia [Husserl’s theory of the act, content, and the object of presentation] as the very first monograph on Husserl published in Poland (Płotka 2017, p. 86). Although Blaustein was very active in Lvov’s philosophical circles, he did not obtain a position at the university. Instead, he taught in high schools, held courses for philosophy teachers, and coordinated the Philosophical Contest for high school students (Kotarbiński 1993, p. 11). Because of these duties, in the 1930s he published a few short books on pedagogy and education. On June 30th, 1930 Blaustein married Eugenie Ginsberg. Interestingly, Eugenie also studied under Twardowski, and she completed her doctoral dissertation in 1927 on the concepts of existential dependence and independence. In 1939 Blaustein completed his magnum opus— written in German—Die ästhetische Perzeption, but the book, as well as its manuscript, were lost during World War II (Dąbrowski 1981, p. 245). Ingarden (1946, p. 335) notes that Blaustein died probably in 1942, killed with his wife and their son by Nazis in the Lvov Jewish ghetto. Other scholars (Jadacki 1993, p. 161; Rosińska 2001, p. 16; 2005, p. ix) note, however, that it is also probable that he killed himself in 1944. The present study offers a critical discussion of the main concepts, arguments, and problems Blaustein elaborated in his theories of method, content, and aesthetic experience. My aim is to situate Blaustein within the phenomenological movement, especially in the context of both Husserl and Ingarden’s theories. I will also consider the question of Twardowski’s possible influences. To do so, first, I will present Blaustein’s view of method, and his rejection of eidetics and transcendental phenomenology. According to Blaustein, eidetics falls prey to the petitio principii error since it cannot be justified by explaining the status of essences. In turn, transcendentalism is not an alternative because it leads towards idealism. The only option is to develop phenomenology as a descriptive psychology that investigates types of lived experiences. Given this understanding of the phenomenological method, I will, second, reconstruct Blaustein’s main arguments against Husserl’s content theory. Blaustein’s key insight into the problem of content is that it is rather a part of the phenomenal world, than a moment of consciousness. This reading of Husserl, however, is questionable, and for this reason, third, I will formulate a possible Husserlian response to Blaustein’s critique. At bottom, this response aims at deepening the doctrine of constitution and Husserl’s overcoming of the descriptive–psychological level of analysis. Nonetheless, though Blaustein rejects the theory of constitution in the content theory, he adopts it in his aesthetics. Therefore, finally, I investigate Blaustein’s understanding of aesthetic experiences, and I sketch Blaustein’s view of

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the structure of these experiences as imaginative presentations which serve to represent aesthetic objects. As I will try to show, Blaustein’s aesthetics arises in discussion with Twardowski, Ingarden, and Husserl.

2  Towards a Reformulation of the Phenomenological Method Tadeusz Kotarbiński (1886–1981) (1993, p. 11), a student of Twardowski, describes Blaustein as “[a] good expert in Husserl.” Indeed, Blaustein studied in Freiburg im Breisgau in the summer semester of 1925 when Husserl held the Einleitung in die phänomenologische Psychologie lecture series, and a seminar Übungen in der Analyse und Deskription rein geistiger Akte und Deskription rein geistiger Akte und Gebilde (Schuhmann 1977, pp. 289–290).4 Blaustein participated in both classes, and he was aware of the significance of the lectures; he claims, for instance, that only on the basis of these lectures, is one able to understand Husserl’s view of psychology in its relation to philosophy, and to respond adequately to the realism-­ idealism controversy (Blaustein 1930a, p. 235; 2013, p. 225).5 In this context, he emphasizes that the difficulty in understanding Husserl’s position follows from a difficult method. Blaustein’s elaboration of Husserl’s method led him to a revival of descriptive psychology, reinterpretation of eidetics, and a rejection of transcendental methods. At bottom, Blaustein (1928, p. 60) presents a standard interpretation of the phenomenological method as a change of attitude with the consequence that one modifies the general thesis of the natural attitude. The thesis, to be precise, becomes a lived experience. By virtue of the reduction, the research field for phenomenology is pure consciousness, and the main question concerns the essence of immanent experiences. Next, Blaustein argues that the essence is available only to eidetic intuition, and not to empirical perception. So far, then, he follows Husserl’s phenomenology as presented in Ideen I. However, during two lectures from April 28th, and May 9th in 1928, given at meetings of Polish Philosophical Society, Blaustein formulates a series of critical comments concerning Husserl’s method. Blaustein (1928–1929, p. 164b) starts with a distinction between two concepts of phenomenology, i.e., in the narrow sense, understood as a descriptive science of ideal essences of lived experiences of pure consciousness (which becomes available after

4  The text of the lectures is available as Hua IX, pp. 3–234. Unfortunately, Blaustein’s name cannot be found in “Quästurakten,” which makes it impossible to verify in which lectures Blaustein participated. Given, however, that the summer semester 1925 began in May, and Husserl mentioned Blaustein as late as his letter to Ingarden from June, 27, 1925 (cf. Husserl 1994, p. 226), it is possible that Blaustein participated in the second half of Husserl’s lectures and seminars which ended on July 30th. I am thankful to Thomas Vongehr for this remark. 5  In the context of the realism-idealism controversy, Blaustein refers to Celms 1993, originally published in 1928.

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performing reduction). In a broader sense, it refers to discipline(s) that investigate(s) ideal essences as such (Blaustein 1928–1929, pp. 166a–166b). In his opinion, however, the status of essences understood as general objects is questionable. To show this, Blaustein (1928–1929, pp. 164b–165a) formulates five charges that concern (1) logical, (2) epistemological, (3) ontological, (4) psychological, and (5) methodological issues. To begin with the (1) logical point of view, he states that a correct definition of essences presupposes their existence, but the question of the being or non-being of essences does not concern logic; therefore, the question requires a different perspective. Next, (2) concerning epistemological issues, Blaustein claims that only eidetic intuition (Wesenschau) enables one to comprehend essences. Nonetheless, in his view, eidetic intuition is a kind of schematic representation,6 which, even if it adequately represents some features of an object, one cannot be entirely sure whether the representation is indeed accurate. Moreover, (3) considering ontology, it is unclear, and even intuitively unknown, how one is able define the existence of general objects. According to Blaustein, only perception makes understandable the meaning of the word “existence,” i.e., as “self-givenness.” Eidetic intuition, in turn, is not a form of perception. However, (4) considering a psychological perspective, there is no doubt that there are intentions directed towards general objects. This “empirical fact” requires, of course, a closer inspection—a description of objects correlated with certain psychic acts, as such a proper description would concern the acts themselves (Blaustein 1928–1929, p. 165a). Finally, (5) from a methodological viewpoint, the existence of general objects has a hypothetical status. Nonetheless, it is hard to say whether such a hypothesis is necessary for the explanation of certain states of affairs. Given all these charges and doubts, Blaustein concludes that all eidetic ontologies, both formal and material, are empty, and for this reason it is questionable whether phenomenology can serve as the basis for empirical sciences (Blaustein 1928–1929, p. 165b). To sum up: eidetics falls into the petitio principii error since it is not justified in explaining the status of essences. How, then, is phenomenology possible at all? Against this background, Blaustein redefines phenomenology as descriptive psychology. In his opinion, instead of talking about ideal essences, a phenomenologist should investigate types, understood as the lowest species. If this is the case, “phenomenology is possible only as an empirical and descriptive science of types (the lowest species) of lived experiences of pure consciousness, [s]ince any direct investigation into higher species which are not bound strictly by inductive generalization lacks the certitude necessary for science” (Blaustein 1928–1929, p.  165b). Here, introspection and “retrospection” replace

6  According to Blaustein’s (1930c, p. 57) general description, a schematic representation is a quasiadequate representation, i.e., a representation in which only a few elements of the content are related to the object. A more precise definition states that “A represents … schematically B for X, if A represents naturally (reconstructs in intuition) B for X, A is intuitively given, but B not, so the presenting content of A is not comprehended as an appearance of B” (Blaustein 1931b, p. 107).

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eidetic intuition, however, this means that such a phenomenology lacks any value, and can be replaced by empirical sciences. Twardowski (1997b, p.  30) observed that only Ingarden talked with Blaustein after his lecture. This is not surprising if one bears in mind that, as early as in 1927, both scholars discussed the petitio principii error in studies of consciousness (cf. Twardowski 1997a, p. 305). In this vein, Kuliniak et al. (2016, p. 114) claim that Blaustein’s critique in his talks was directed not at Husserl, but rather towards Ingarden. Later, on December 6th, 1928, Ingarden (1928–1929, pp. 167a–168a) presented a talk on “Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism,” which was a direct response to Blaustein. There Ingarden focuses on the question of the reduction and tries to show that pure consciousness does not exist in the same way as the world. For this reason, contra Blaustein, consciousness cannot be an object for natural sciences. In any case, Blaustein did not accept Ingarden’s position, and he reputedly proposed using “Ockham’s razor” on Ingarden’s contention that ideas were general objects and metaphysical entities (Blaustein 1930b, p. 454; 1935b, p. 101a). For Blaustein, an entity which mediates between consciousness and the world cannot be comprehended as an essence. He clearly expresses this criticism in his discussion of Husserl’s theory of the noema. For Blaustein (1928, p. 91), the relation between the noema and the intentional object is vague. The noema cannot be an ideal entity, since as such it cannot be a part of lived experience. Therefore, such ideal entities have to be replaced by psychic phenomena. Rosińska (2001, p. 61) claims that Blaustein was obsessed by the idea of method. For him, phenomenology had to be developed as descriptive psychology. In his view, descriptive psychology adopts the quasi-mereological terminology of wholes and parts in order to describe different types of consciousness as given in introspection (cf. Rybicki 1975, pp. 69, 73). The beginning of this method is a description of natural psychological wholes, understood as psychic phenomena before any operation of abstraction (Blaustein 1935a, p. 34). Psychology, then, describes first and foremost lived experiences, which are the direct objects of introspective acts. As such, it does deliver preliminary observations which, in turn, can be the basis of further research and more complicated scientific procedures. Blaustein uses this way of developing psychology in his polemics with Irena Filozofówna (1931a, b) who claims that Blaustein did not take the propositional form into consideration, and its dominant role in cognition. In his response, Blaustein (1931c, p. 183–184) claims that representations do not include propositional form since they do not bind a certain object with its features, as a proposition does. Moreover, in Blaustein’s opinion Filozofówna’s charge is rather a hypothesis that does not find its descriptive-­ psychological justification, or foundation. In this regard Blaustein differentiates between description and hypothesis. Where a description concerns direct lived experiences, a hypothesis is an abstraction that does not refer to psychic phenomena. Again, however, for Blaustein descriptions require further argumentative procedures. For this reason, Blaustein will refer to arguments in his polemics with Husserl’s theory of act and content.

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3  B  laustein’s Critique of Husserl’s Theory of the Act, and the Content Blaustein presents a thorough critique of Husserl’s theory of content in his doctoral dissertation—Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia [Husserl’s theory of the act, content, and the object of presentation]—which appeared in 1928.7 The book is divided into three complementary parts: (1) a historical reconstruction of the problem of the act, content, and object of presentations before 1900 (Blaustein refers in this context to Bolzano, Brentano, Cornelius, Höfler, Meinong, Twardowski, and Zimmermann); (2) a presentation of Husserl’s theory, based mainly on the Logical Investigations, and to a lesser extent on Ideen I; and finally (3) a critical elaboration of Husserl’s theory of the act of presentations, and his theory of the content of presentation. Let us turn to the last part of the book and investigate Blaustein’s critique of Husserl’s act theory and his elaboration of the content theory. Blaustein (1928, p.  65) summarizes Husserl’s theory of the act and object of presentations with the following five claims: (1) consciousness is the source of psychic lived experiences as a coherent, and continuous stream or flow; (2) lived experiences comprise both intentional acts and sensations; (3) intentional acts are apprehensions, or interpretations of sensations; (4) a differentiation between sensation as apprehended as the determination of an object, and sensation as the content of an act is unjustified; and finally (5) a differentiation between sensations and an object’s properties is necessary. His critique goes through each point, and takes the form of an elaboration of Husserl’s arguments. As Blaustein (1928, p. 66) claims, the first thesis—though partly justified8—falls into a vicious circle since lived experiences are defined as consciousness, but consciousness is defined as (a set of) lived experiences. Immanent perception does not help us to solve this problem since this notion is—according to Blaustein (1928, pp. 66–67)—also based on the notion of lived experience for Husserl. Moreover, Blaustein holds that Husserl was wrong to include sense data among lived experiences. This stance is connected with Blaustein’s discussion of the second thesis. He claims that Husserl’s arguments are not conclusive, and in addition one is able to formulate counterarguments which show absurd consequences to Husserl’s thesis. Following Blaustein (1928, p. 66), lived experiences cannot be comprehended as both intentional acts and sensations since, whereas the former is characterized by its reference to the ego (Husserl

7  Pokropski presents a summary of Blaustein’s work with an overview of his argument, Pokropski 2015, pp. 95–100. 8  Although Blaustein questions Husserl’s definition of “consciousness” as “a set of lived experiences,” he does not reject the view that consciousness is a whole comprehended as continuous flow. Blaustein held this position throughout his entire career. Cf. Blaustein 1937b, p. 443.

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characterizes them as “ichlich”),9 the latter is alien to the ego (“ichfremd”). In a word, sense-data do not belong to the ego, and hence to consciousness. It is possible, of course, to defend Husserl by claiming that sense-data are a part of lived experiences since they are interpreted, and comprehended, though interpretation is a function of intentional acts. Therefore, it seems that sense-data are part of lived experiences. After all, both intentional acts and sensations are given as evident. For Blaustein (1928, pp. 67–68), however, this argument is invalid, because one cannot be justified in claiming that if something is evident, it is necessarily a part of consciousness. Furthermore, Husserl does not accept Ingarden’s (1921) distinction that intentional acts are lived through (durchlebt), while sense-data are just experienced (erlebt).10 The second thesis does not hold even if one—following Husserl—were to argue that intentional acts and sensations fall under the single category of “lived experience” because they both exist in subjective time. In response, Blaustein (1928, p. 69) states that the relation between lived experiences and time is questionable: it is not clear whether something is a lived experience because it is in subjective time, or rather that a time is subjective if it comprises lived experiences. In a word, it is impossible to define subjective time without lived experiences. As already claimed, Husserl’s second thesis is false also because of possible counterarguments that expose the absurd consequences of this standpoint. According to Blaustein (1928, pp. 69–70), Husserl ascribes time to lived experiences on the one hand, and space to sense-data on the other. But if lived experiences are psychic phenomena, they cannot include non-psychic component of space, i.e., physical phenomena. Otherwise, lived experiences would be spatial, this conclusion, however, is absurd (Blaustein 1928, p. 71). According to Blaustein (1928, p. 73), the third thesis is valid, but imprecise. Here intentional acts serve as the interpretation, or apprehension of sensations, and in doing so, acts intend the object. Sensations are understood in this context as the presentational content. But, Blaustein argues, one can be directed towards the content itself without aiming at the object, as happens in simple experiences, or perception of color marks. If this is the case, a simple apprehension can take place without interpretation. As a result, Blaustein (1928, p. 74) proposes to limit Husserl’s apprehension (Auffassung) to simple experiences, whereas the interpretation (Deutung) of sensations only arises in higher-order acts which aim at an object.

9  Blaustein (1928, pp. 66, 71)—and following him Pokropski (2015, p. 97)—connects this description with Husserl, but it does not appear in either the Untersuchungen or Ideen I. Blaustein refers here rather to Husserl’s lectures on phenomenological psychology, given in summer semester 1925, in which Blaustein participated. Cf. Hua IX, pp. 130, 136, 140, 168, 210, 212–214, 242. 10  As Ingarden puts it, “[j]edenfalls sind die Empfindungsdaten—und in noch höherem Maße die Ansichten verschiedener Stufen—Inhalte, die den Bewußtseinsakten auf bestimmte Weise gegenübertreten und selbst (in sich) nicht bewußt sind. D.h. ihre Seinweise ist die des Erlebtwerdens und nicht die des Durchlebens. Die Seinsweise des Erlebens der Empfindungsdaten dagegen ist die des ‘Durchlebens’” (Ingarden 1921, p. 562).

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Blaustein’s critique of the fourth thesis follows from his view of sensations as alien to the ego. For Husserl, a differentiation between sensation as an element of apprehension and sensation as content is unjustified, because one cannot differentiate living-through (Durchleben) a sensation and experiencing (Erleben) a sensation. For Blaustein (1928, p. 78), by contrast, sensations are not a part of consciousness; rather they belong to the phenomenal world. Blaustein develops the latter notion in his discussion of the fifth thesis. Husserl’s distinction between sensations and objects is based on the second thesis that sensations are included in lived experiences; if so, objects are intended via sensations. Blaustein’s counterargument here is complex. He states namely that sensations do not belong to lived experiences, but to the world understood as the phenomenal world. According to Blaustein (1928, pp. 74, 76–77), the world is divided into two parts: the phenomenal and the material world. The former is defined as a set of presentational content that is interpreted as a visible side—at a certain moment in time—of the latter side, i.e., a set of material things. The phenomenal world, then, is the world of sense-content, colors, sounds, smells, etc. which are placed in a two-dimensional space. One experiences the phenomenal world as complexes of presentational contents which are interpreted as objects, visible phenomenal things (Sehdinge) which, in turn, are distinct from material things since, as Blaustein (1928, p. 76) puts it, “[p]henomenal objects exist not in the material world, but in the phenomenal world which presents the material world.” Sensations for Blaustein (1928, p.  77) are adumbrations of a material object’s properties, and simultaneously they are elements of phenomenal objects which represent material objects. As Pokropski (2015, p. 97) emphasizes, “Blaustein does not elaborate the further metaphysical consequences of this claim and restricts his investigations only to the phenomenological and descriptive level,” however, we see that Blaustein’s position has more of an ontological than purely a phenomenological character. In any case, if sensations belong to the phenomenal world, Husserl’s last thesis is false. Given that Blaustein completed his dissertation under Twardowski, it is not surprising that the background of his critical elaboration of Husserl is Twardowski’s (1977) theory of the content and object of presentations.11 While considering the relationship of the content and act of presentations, Twardowski (1977, pp. 15–16) draws an analogy between presentations and painting: the content can be understood as both the picture and the depicted object—the subject matter which is put on canvas. The content, then, is a dependent part of the psychic phenomenon by virtue of which the presentation refers to an object, which, in turn, is transcendent to the act of presenting. Here the content is understood as a mental picture that mediates the mind’s directedness towards the object. In Blaustein’s view, Husserl’s concept of content is ambiguous, and as such it lacks the clarity of Twardowski’s distinctions. Accordingly, a general notion of contents includes, following Blaustein, all “lived experiences, i.e., everything that is a real part with other parts” (Blaustein,

 On Twardowski’s theory of the content, act, and the object of presentations, see Smith 1994, pp. 156–157, and Cavallin 1997, pp. 51–74, 84–96.

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1928, p. 26) of consciousness. According to Blaustein (1928, p. 64), Husserl operates with three specific notions of “content”: (1) as intentional content, (2) as presentational content, and (3) descriptive content, whereas intentional content has six different meanings: (i) intentional object, (ii) the act’s matter, (iii) intentional essence, (iv) meaning essence, (v) ideal meaning, and finally (vi) fulfilled ideal meaning.12 Blaustein (1928, p. 82) states that the most important notion of content is intentional content understood as the act’s matter. He disagrees with the view that matter can be identical (identisch, dieselbe) in different acts; at least one can say that the matter is the same, but never identical. After all, the act’s matter is a psychical entity, and for this reason it is particular, not something universal that could be instantiated in different acts. Otherwise, one would have to comprehend the matter as an ideal part of the act, but that means that ideal matter cannot be a real part of the psychic phenomenon. Blaustein (1928, pp. 84–85) holds that Husserl’s notion of presentational content obscures the distinction between the matter and quality. Understood as presentational content, sensations are supposedly parts of the act, but they are non-­intentional at the same time. To avoid this confusion, Blaustein again suggests excluding the notion of sensations from the domain of consciousness’ acts. In this context, Blaustein (1928, p. 88) proposes to keep only the distinction between the matter and quality as sufficient to define the descriptive content of the act. Finally, Blaustein (1928, p. 90) defines the act as a composite of the quality and the matter (i.e., the intentional content) that is connected with the presentational content, which in turn is not a part of the act but the phenomenal world, and which refers to the intentional object. As it seems, here the presenting content serves as mediating entity that gives the mind a directedness to an object.

4  A Husserlian Response to Blaustein’s Critique Although Husserl did know Blaustein’s book,13 he did not respond to Blaustein’s critique. Ingarden’s short review of Blaustein’s book does furnish us with some clues as to how Husserl might have reacted. For Ingarden (1929, p.  315; 2013, p.  220) Blaustein confuses two Husserlian theories, from the Investigations and Ideas I. For this reason, according to Ingarden (1929, p. 316), Blaustein fails to take

 For a presentation of Husserl’s theory of content, see Szanto 2012, pp. 208–251.  Twardowski (1997b, p. 50) notes that on January, 8, 1929 Blaustein showed him a post card from Husserl in which he did thank him for Blaustein’s book. Indeed, Husserl possessed a copy of Blaustein’s book in his private library. The book contains Blaustein’s handwritten dedication: “Herrn Geheimrat Prof. Dr. Edmund Husserl, dem großen Philosophen, dessen Werke auch in meinem Leben ein entscheidender Bildungsfaktor war, übersende ich mit den Ausdrücken der Verehrung diesen bescheidenen Versuch, in die Gedankenwelt der Logischen Untersuchungen einzudringen” (Husserl-Archives, BP 18). I am thankful to Thomas Vongehr for this remark. A correspondence between Husserl and Blaustein was lost during World War II.

12 13

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Husserl’s theory of constitution into account. It is false that Husserl comprehended perceptual sense-data as two-dimensional, and that he wanted to include sense-data within consciousness. At the same time, Blaustein goes too far in claiming that sense-data are inherent to the world. That the object is constituted means that it is established in a correlation with consciousness according to the object’s essence. Blaustein, then, fails to recognize the constituted character of the world. He views the world as divided into phenomenal and material parts. Ingarden’s critique also concerns Blaustein’s reading of Husserl’s notion of the noema; he shows that Blaustein did not take this element into his consideration of Husserl’s theory of content (cf. Pokropski 2015, p. 101). If Ingarden is right—and I think that his core argument effectively deals with the better part of Blaustein’s critique—one can conclude that Blaustein’s misreading of Husserl’s theory of constitution follows from two different but intertwined issues, i.e., (1) from his understanding of Husserl’s method, and (2) his misinterpretation of immanent content. Both issues concern the question of how phenomenology overcomes the charge of psychologism, and ceases to be merely descriptive psychology. Blaustein is right in defining the phenomenological method as a change of attitude, but he fails to recognize the status of essences. If he defines essences as general objects, and as timeless objectivities, he omits Husserl’s description—clearly expressed in Husserl’s 1925 lectures on psychology in which Blaustein participated—of the correlative structure of consciousness as directed towards ideal, though irreal objectivities (Hua IX; Husserl 1962, p. 26). Essences are rather constituted in a dynamic process Husserl calls “eidetic variation.” One can, of course, comprehend the concept of variation as an elaboration of the concept of eidetic intuition as defined in the “Sixth Logical Investigation,”14 but that continuity does not justify the claim that Husserl held a Platonic concept of essences throughout his entire career (cf. Kockelmans 1995, pp. 137–138). It is just the opposite. Husserl rejected a naïve concept of static essences in favor of the dynamic concept of constitution. A few remarks are necessary here. First, an essence is not a separate object, distinct from the real one; rather, as Husserl (Hua XLI; Husserl 2012, p. 33) puts it, the real object is the object of its essence. Here the essence is given as an “invariant” of possible changes, which means that the essence is ‘general’ not by virtue of an abstraction from real objects, as Blaustein suggests, but rather because the essence concerns possible structures of the object (Hua IX; Husserl 1962, p.  85).15 This means that the essence is given as a set of possible variations of the phenomenon, but the phenomenologist does not have to present all possibilities; what is crucial here is rather phenomenologist’s awareness that all possible variations are essential for the given phenomenon and its essence. Therefore, essences are constituted by consciousness and given in the modi of the “and so on” (und so weiter) (Hua IX; Husserl 1962, p. 77), i.e., one does not have to present all variations. What is presented in eidetic variation is not an abstract and timeless object, but a possibility.

14 15

 This thesis was formulated by Tugendhat (1970, p. 145), and repeated by Smith (2007, p. 329).  More on Husserl’s eidetics, see Sowa 2010, 2012.

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Thus, eidetic variation yields a general character not due to its object, but because of the character of the presentation of the object. It is not the case that essences are transcendent timeless object, but rather they are constituted in possible repetitions. Finally, the object of eidetic variation is evident since one is able to constitute it “again and again” (immer wieder) (Hua IX; Husserl 1962, p. 73; Hua XLI/Husserl 2012, pp. 101, 110, 224, 258–259, 365) in the operation of variation (cf. Welton 2000, p. 187). Here, then, essences do not have the metaphysical status of general objects, as Blaustein suggests; they are purely descriptive objects instantiated by eidetic operations. In a word, they are constituted, and do not simply exist. As it seems, Blaustein’s misreading of Husserl’s doctrine of essences is connected to his view of content and its role in Husserl’s Investigations. Blaustein (1928, p. 1) explicitly defines the aim of his dissertation as an attempt to “expound Husserl’s theory of the act, content, and object of presentations, which he presented for the first time in his Logische Untersuchungen.” One can explain this purpose by the fact that the Investigations was a popular book during Twardowski’s seminars.16 Nonetheless, Blaustein neglects important changes Husserl introduced in the second edition of the book from 1913, which results in a misinterpretation of phenomenology’s relation to psychology. After all, phenomenology is an eidetic discipline that describes essences, primarily the essence of consciousness. But what is the object for phenomenological description? Blaustein, as stated above, lists three notions of “content”: (1) intentional content, (2) presentational content, and (3) descriptive content. However, he does not mention “real” and “phenomenological” content. In the “Fifth Logical Investigation” Husserl (Hua XIX/1; Husserl 1984, p. 382; 1970, p. 97) defines the real content of experiences as their phenomenological content, and defines phenomenology as an eidetic discipline that does not ask about empirical relations. But when Husserl (Hua XIX/1; Husserl 1984, p. 24, footnote) in the first edition of his Investigations defines phenomenology as a descriptive psychology, he in fact suggests that it is interested in real content. To avoid contradiction in this regard one can argue that phenomenology investigates intentional content which is not the real part of the act. If this is the case, however, the consequence seems to be that the object is beyond the limits of phenomenological description, and is placed in the ideal sphere (Drummond 1990, p. 38). What is lacking in the first edition of the Investigations is a clear breakthrough in comprehending real contents as objects for phenomenology. In a word, the Investigations require the phenomenological reduction. Finally, in the second edition (from 1913) of his Investigations, Husserl consequently replaced the word “psychic” in the phrase “the psychic content” by the word “phenomenological.”17 The change is not merely a terminological change. It is rather connected with a deeper problem of how to understand phenomenology itself. If phenomenology concerns real content it is nothing but descriptive psychology. Only from the transcendental point of view one can interpret the act as a noetic-noematic correlation. Husserl states this explicitly

16 17

 On the relationships between Husserl and Twardowski, see Schuhmann 1993 and Cavallin 1997.  Cf. Hua XIX/1, pp. 48, 67, 134, 167, 201–202, 222, 237, 353, 358, 374, 386, 392, 411–412.

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in a footnote from the second edition of the Investigations which comments on a fragment from the first edition where he claims that he overcame psychologism by distinguishing real and intentional content. He writes: In the First Edition I wrote “real or phenomenological” for “real.” The word “phenomenological” like the word “descriptive” was used in the First Edition only in connection with real (reelle) elements of experience, and in the present edition it has so far been used predominately in this sense. This corresponds to one’s natural starting point with the psychological point of view. It became plainer and plainer, however, as I reviewed the completed Investigations and pondered on their themes more deeply—particularly from this point onwards—that the description of intentional objectivity as such, as we are conscious of it in the concrete act-experience, represents a distinct descriptive dimension where purely intuitive description may be adequately practiced, a dimension opposed to that of real (reellen) act-constituents, but which also deserves to be called “phenomenological.” These methodological extensions lead to important extensions of the field of problems now opening before us and considerable improvements due to a fully conscious separation of descriptive levels (Hua XIX/1; Husserl 1984, p. 411, footnote; 1970, p. 354, footnote 24).

Contra Blaustein, then, content is available not solely to descriptive psychology, but to purely descriptive phenomenology, which comprehends lived-experiences in terms of the noetic-noematic correlation, and not as real experiences. Blaustein, it seems, was unable to contribute to this aspect of Husserl’s phenomenology because of a confusion between the intentional and real content. Blaustein presupposes that the intentional content is the real content. On the contrary, Husserl’s attempts from the second edition of the Investigations make it clear that the differentiation is necessary to go beyond the descriptive level of psychology, and do pure phenomenology. To be clear, Blaustein fails to ascribe the intentional content to the essence of the act, and instead allies it with the real part of the act (as part of the phenomenal world).

5  B  laustein’s Theory of Imaginative Presentations and Its Relevance for Aesthetics Blaustein (1937c, p. 399; 1938a, p. 4; 2005, pp. 4, 136) defines “aesthetic experiences” as complex acts which are founded on perception, and as such they have a primarily passive character. Beyond perception, aesthetic experiences also consist of feelings, judgments, and volitional acts which all constitute subject’s reaction to the aesthetic object. Though the experiences are mainly passive, the subject is, as Blaustein (1928, p. 6; 2005, p. 5) puts it, “strictly active,”18 and as a result of its activity the aesthetic object is constituted. Therefore, the object is not given simpliciter, rather it arises in a correlation with the subject’s reaction. Thus, the object can demand an adequate presentation. Here, however, a crucial question comes to the  Dziemidok (1980, pp.  93, 106) emphasizes that Blaustein—contra, for instance, Ingarden— accentuates the subject’s active role in aesthetic experience. In turn, for Ingarden, the aesthetic experience is determined by the structure of the object.

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fore: what kind of presentations are involved in aesthetic experiences? Blaustein (1928, p. 2) begins his dissertation with a suggestion that the critique of Husserl’s theory of presentations can be useful for several branches of philosophy and psychology, including aesthetics. In addition, at the very end of his book, he declares that the analysis of Husserl’s theory is a starting point for a systematic descriptive-­ psychological analysis of aesthetic presentations (Blaustein 1928, p. 95). Blaustein’s doctrine of aesthetic presentations is an original elaboration of Twardowski’s, Husserl’s, and Ingarden’s doctrines of presentational content, which enables one to describe aesthetic experiences, such as listening to the radio, or watching a theater piece (Rosińska 2001). Blaustein develops his theory of presentations within the conceptual framework of Twardowski’s view of concepts and intuitions.19 According to Twardowski (1965, p. 114), one is able to present an object in two ways: (1) by concepts, if one just thinks of it, or (2) by intuition, if the object is intuitively present, i.e., given in the experience. In this context, Twardowski claims that there are objects which cannot be imagined—in the sense of its intuitive givenness—however, one can think of them by concepts, e.g., one cannot intuitively present to him- or herself a chiliagon, i.e., a polygon with 1000 sides, but one can refer to it by its concept. Twardowski (1965, p. 125) defines intuition—understood as a form of presentation—in quasi-­ mereological terms as a whole which contains its parts; to be precise, intuition is a synthesis of sensations. There is a triple function of sensations in experience: sensations can be original, reproductive, or created. Accordingly Twardowski (1965, p.  127) distinguishes three forms of intuition: (1) perceptive intuition where the synthesis concerns actual sense-data, (2) reproductive intuition where the synthesis has a “reproductive” character, e.g., in remembering something, and (3) creative intuition where the synthesis does not consist of what was sensorially, actually experienced. According to Blaustein, however, Twardowski’s classification is built on a vague criterion, just like the basic opposition between concepts and intuitions. Blaustein (1930c, pp. 12–13; 2005, p. 46) shows that the criterion cannot be a quality of the presenting act, since—as he claims—a quality has the same function in both concepts and intuitions, i.e., it serves to represent objects. Moreover, it cannot be a presenting act’s matter since one can refer to the same matter in different acts of perception, reproduction, or creation. To avoid these problems, according to Blaustein (1930c, p. 14; 2005, p. 47), Twardowski would have to elaborate on the notions of the “presentational content” as well as the “intentional object.” The plurality and complexity of aesthetic experiences demands this elaboration. As stated, Blaustein held that aesthetic experiences are founded on perceptual acts which, in turn, are defined as a synthesis of sense-data. In this context, Blaustein (1931a, p. 122; 2005, p. 22) defines presentational content as a quality of sense-data

 Chudy presents Blaustein’s theory of presentations in the context of Twadrowski’s, Ingarden’s, and Husserl’s theories, however, mainly with regard to the question of cognitive acts. Cf. Chudy 1981, pp. 170–216.

19

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and its complexes. Its function consists in presenting the intentional object. The presenting relation consists in being an appearance of the thing (Stępień 1974, pp. 32–33). What Blaustein refers to here is the fact that contents can refer to different objects, because sense-data is given differently in different acts. With this in mind, Blaustein (1931a, pp. 124–128; 2005, pp. 24–27) distinguishes three forms of intuition: (1) perceptual intuition where the presenting content is a function of “original sensory contents,” and it characterizes the function as strictly intuitive; (2) secondary intuition where sense-data can be either (a) reproduced (e.g., in the act of remembering), or (b) created (e.g., in the act of imagining, say, a centaur), and (3) imaginative intuition. The last form of intuition is instantiated by imaginative presentations in which the presentational content is a function of “original sensory contents,” however, the presentation so-to-speak duplicates the object as both intuitively given in perception and imagined. Blaustein (1937c, pp.  400–401; 2005, pp. 136–137), of course, is perfectly aware that, given the various kinds of works of art, there are respectively different forms of intuition at play in the domain of aesthetic experiences. So, if the work of art is so-to-speak static, like a painting or a sculpture, only perception and perceptual presentation can be at play. However, even here additional signitive presentations and intentions can modify further experiences, for instance, if someone realizes that he or she comprehends objects as possessing a symbolic meaning. If so, a contemplation becomes a dynamic process that is happening in time. In this context, Blaustein (1931b, pp. 5–8; 2005, pp. 72–74) would speak of signitive presentations, where symbolic presentations play a crucial role. Another example of a dynamic work of art is a literary work of art which, according to Blaustein (1931b, pp. 8–9; 2005, pp. 74–75), requires schematic presentations (non-intuitive intentions towards its object). Finally, a movie, a theatrical piece, or a radio performance are dynamic works of art which require intuitive presentations. Exactly in this context Blaustein (1937a) refers to imaginative presentations. Let us look closer at this element of Blaustein’s theory. If someone watches a play, Shakespeare’s Hamlet say, he or she apprehends the actors who perform the different roles as quasi-real objects. To do so, the imagined object (e.g., Hamlet) constituted in the imaginative presentation is given at once as intuitive (the real movements and words of the actor on the stage) and non-intuitive (Hamlet’s existential reflections in the castle). We have Shakespeare’s Prince Hamlet of Denmark, nephew of King Claudius, and son of Gertrude, which is a fictional entity. What is intuitively given, then, is only the reproducing object (again, actor’s activity at the stage), which founds the imaginative object, which is non-intuitively given (again, actor as Hamlet); both, however, refer to the reproduced object, either the fictional or the real one (again, Hamlet as described by Shakespeare). With this in mind, Blaustein (1938a, pp. 14–15; 2005, pp. 10–11) notices an important phenomenological difference: perceptual acts found imaginative acts, but inasmuch as presentational content in perceptual acts present their reproducing objects adequately, in imaginative acts the contents cannot present the imaginative object adequately. If one sees the actor who plays Hamlet, the presenting content of this act refers adequately to the actor as the actor, but can we then say they present the actor

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as Hamlet either adequately or inadequately? As Blaustein puts it, presentational contents present the object in imaginative presentations only quasi-adequately.20 The object of imaginative presentations, then, is accessible due to a specific attitude. It is true that, following Miskiewicz (2009, p. 186), “[f]or Blaustein, perceiving an object is always observing an object with a certain attitude.” Blaustein (1930c, p. 15) differentiates between (1) natural, (2) imaginative and (3) signitive attitudes. Here one comprehends the object (1) as reproducing, (2) as imaginative and (3) as reproduced respectively. If one observes Hamlet in the theater, then, he or she can turn either (1) to the actor as actor, (2) to the actor as Hamlet, or (3) to Hamlet as a fictional entity who does not exist in the real world. It seems that Blaustein’s differentiation between natural and imaginative attitudes corresponds to some extent to the de re and de dicto intentionalities.21 In any case, the difference is clear: the reproducing object is present in the same surrounding world as the viewer is, namely, in the theater; the imaginative object—as grasped in the imaginative attitude—is present in the world inherent to the work of art, say, a castle in Denmark; but the reproduced object—at least, in the present example—is not real. E.g., Hamlet whose actions are performed on the stage is dying not in the theater, but in the castle, just as Shakespeare wrote about this. To explain how imaginative objects are given, Blaustein (1930c, pp.  23–24; 2005, pp.  54–55) writes of quasi-real objects. For him, imaginative intuition is the act which creates quasi-real objects if the subject adopts the imaginative attitude. Blaustein (1938a, p. 13; 2005, p. 10) characterizes the object as given in a quasi-spatiality and a quasi-time (cf. Rosińska 2001, pp. 70–71). In other words, what a viewer is looking at is simultaneously the stage in the surrounding world and the quasi-world—which Blaustein also calls the imaginative world. What he or she apprehends in a given moment depends on his or her attitude towards the object.22 As a result, Blaustein assumes the imaginative act as directed towards its objects has the structure as shown in the Schema 1. According to Blaustein (1930c, p. 39), the imaginative object is not an illusion since the imaginative attitude presents the object as quasi-real, which means that within the limits of the quasi-world presented in the work of art, the object is true. To elucidate this feature of imaginative presentations, Blaustein refers to Meinong, on the one hand, and to Ingarden, on the other. Following Meinong (1910), Blaustein states that the relation between the subject and the object—at least if one considers the imaginative attitude—should be described as an assumption. This means that 20  By “quasi-adequate” presentations Blaustein (1930c, pp. 55–56) means presentations in which any element of the presenting content refers to the element of the intentional object, but of which the content is only an appearance. For this reason, a quasi-adequate presentation binds any element of the content with the element of the object as a substitute. 21  Cf., e.g., Mohanty 1985; Drummond 1990, pp. 19–20. 22  Blaustein (1930c, p. 17; 1937c, p. 403; 1938a; 2005, pp. 7, 49–50, 140) claims that the imaginative world is always given to the subject in a certain relation to the subject’s body, at least in two dimensions: (1) the work of art is always perceived from a certain point of view, and ongoing contemplation requires bodily movements, and (2) the objects presented in the dynamic work of art, say, a movie, are given from a certain perspective, and the perspective is assumed to be the viewpoint of perceiver’s body as if he or she were there.

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the reproducing object

the world theimaginative imagined object qua the fictional object the imaginative object

the reproduced object, either real, or fictional

the real world

refers to

represents in the natural attitude represents in the imaginative attitude

the presentational content

synthetizes

the act of the imaginative presentation

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Schema 1  The structure of the imaginative presentation (Blaustein)

one does not apprehend the actor on the stage with a belief that the actor is identical with the performed character. Rather it is assumed that this is the case, and thus the character the actor embodies is quasi-real. For this reason, a person in the theater does not have any claims that the theater play refers to the real and actual situation, say, Hamlet’s actual death. Again, he or she is simply in the imaginative attitude. However, one can ask whether any judgments about the quasi-real objects can be true or false anyway? To answer the question, Blaustein (1937c, p.  402; 2005, p. 139) refers to Ingarden and his concept of quasi-judgments.23 If the person claims, for instance, that “Hamlet is dying,” when the actor performs Hamlet’s death, the judgment is true within its reference to the work of art one is experiencing. To go one step further, Blaustein’s view of imaginative objects can be regarded as an elaboration of Ingarden’s theory of purely intentional objects.24 In a review of the German edition of Ingarden’s Das literarische Kunstwerk, Blaustein (1935b, p.  101b) explicitly proposes a revision of Ingarden’s theory of purely intentional objects by adapting it to the imaginative intuition. So, the imaginative object is a purely intentional object since (1) it is founded on an imaginative presentation, and without that presentation there can be no imagined objects at all; (2) it can be produced by aesthetic experience; but (3) it can lose its connection with the imaginative intuition, and, as a result, it can become an object of derivative intentionality, e.g., one can describe “his” or “her” imaginative object in, say, a novel (Ingarden 1964, pp. 115–121; 2013, pp. 147–152); and finally (4) it requires the existence of something else, e.g., the theatrical performance. However, what differentiates Blaustein’s imaginative objects from Ingarden’s purely intentional objects is its psychic involvement. Whereas for Blaustein the object is strictly a psychic phenomenon, for Ingarden it is purely intentional, and only indirectly can it be connected to the psyche.  On Ingarden’s aesthetics, and his theory of fiction, see Seifert and Smith 1994; Mitscherling 1997.  More on an application of Ingarden’s theory of purely intentional objects to cultural objects, see Thomasson 2005. 23 24

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In his doctrine of imaginative presentations, Blaustein (1930c, p. 23, footnote, 2005, pp. 54–55, footnote) refers also to Husserl’s famous discussion of Albrecht Dürer’s “Knight, Death and the Devil” engraving from Ideas I (Hua III/1; Husserl 1995, pp. 251–252; 1983, pp. 261–262). Husserl distinguishes (1) the physical thing (Bildding), e.g., canvas, (2) the thing depicted in the painting (Bildsujet), and (3) the picturing picture-object (Bildobjekt) which both demands and enables picturing. In Blaustein’s view, the imaginative object is not identical to Husserl’s “picture-object” (Bildobjekt) since Blaustein holds that the Bildobjekt is reproduced. For Husserl, “picture-objects” are visual objects (Sehdinge) which in turn refer to imaginative objects. By contrast, Blaustein asserts that the imaginative object is the object synthesized on the basis of original sense-data, but is not given as the perceived object, but rather as the imagined one. So, the difference between Blaustein and Husserl consists in the status of the imaginative, or picturing object: whereas for Blaustein the picture-object is the object given in perception, for Husserl, it is a mediating object which enables picturing. To be clear, for Blaustein (1930c, p. 34; 2005, p. 62) sense-data are identical in the imaginative and perceptive presentations. What is different are presentational contents. Thus, in this sense, new contents are created in the imaginative presentation, which are available due to the change of attitudes. Finally, it is worth noting that Blaustein employs his theory of imaginative presentations as the basis for his descriptive-psychological analysis of a viewer in the cinema (1933; 2005, pp.  92–127), or a listener to the radio (1938b; 1939; 2005, pp. 145–196).

6  Conclusion Some scholars, e.g., Dąbrowski (1981, p. 244), or Pokropski (2015, p. 94), claim that it would not be correct to characterize Blaustein as a phenomenologist. Indeed, he was skeptical about Husserl’s eidetic and transcendental phenomenology, and he did not agree with some points of the content theory as presented in the Investigations. Instead, under Twardowski’s influences, Blaustein defined his philosophical project as descriptive psychology (cf. Płotka 2020). However, as I have attempted to show in this study, Blaustein’s original doctrines of method, content, and aesthetic experience—though “heretical” against Husserl (cf. Galicka 2017, p. 113)—were developed in a perennial dialogue with him and Ingarden. After all, references to Husserl and Ingarden can be found not only in his earliest writings (e.g., Blaustein 1928), but also the later studies (e.g., Blaustein 1937c, pp. 401–402; 1938a, p. 7; 1938b, p. 10, 25; 2005, pp. 6, 138–139, 152, 164). Of course, Blaustein’s texts do not simply repeat what can be found in the Husserlian corpus; some of them even misread Husserl. But given the overall structure of Blaustein’s works, and the general character of his analyses which are developed as detailed descriptions of lived experiences, I think that it is justified to call Blaustein a phenomenologist. His texts, as it seems, throw new light on a possible understanding of descriptive methods, but his greatest contribution is to the analysis of aesthetic experiences, adding the kind of

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nuances that make phenomenological observations so philosophically fruitful. Hence, Blaustein’s studies suggest rich lines of analysis one might take in pursuing such topics as art and aesthetic experience. How, then, one can define Blaustein’s contribution to phenomenology? Miskiewicz (2009, p. 184) sees Blaustein’s main original addition as “enriching Husserl’s conception of intuitive content by introducing an aspect pertaining to the modality of the act of presentation (or imagination, memory etc.).” The modality follows from a certain attitude that the subject takes while experiencing the object. This notion of attitude, besides matter, and quality, helps to describe the constitution of aesthetic objects. After all, if the content represents the object simpliciter, its aesthetic value does not arise; only if the content is grasped in a different attitude, labeled by Blaustein as the imaginative attitude, does the object appear as aesthetically valuable. Therefore, “what is interesting and truly original about Blaustein is his observation that whether an object, or one of its determinations, is effective or fictive, for instance, is a function of the way in which the matter of the act specifies the qualities of the object, that is, it is a function of the ‘grasping attitude’” (Miskiewicz 2009, pp. 184–185). In this study I tried to show that Blaustein’s concept of the imaginative attitude is strictly connected with his view of phenomenology as descriptive psychology, and with the critique—though questionable—of Husserl’s theory of content. Yet Blaustein is not consistent in his refusal of transcendental phenomenology. Whereas—while commenting on Husserl—he denies that object is constituted, in his aesthetics he accepts this view. As a result, Blaustein holds a radically active understanding of aesthetic experiences where the object is given due to the constitutive functions of consciousness. The object of aesthetic experience is quasi-real, and as such it is comparable to Ingarden’s purely intentional object. Of course, there are differences between Blaustein and Ingarden, since whereas the former is focused on experiences and tries to describe them adequately, the latter is more interested in the work of art itself and its structure (Rosińska, 2001, p. 91). In any case, it is hard to claim that Blaustein’s position can be defined outside the phenomenological point of view. Acknowledgments The project is financed by the National Science Centre, Poland (no. 2017/27/B/HS1/02455).

References Blaustein, Leopold. 1928. Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia. Lvov: Nakładem Towarzystwa Naukowego z Zasiłkiem Ministerstwa Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego. ———. 1928–1929. Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii. Ruch Filozoficzny 11: 164b–166b. ———. 1930a. Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia. Przegląd Humanistyczny 5 (2): 233–242. Reprinted in: Blaustein, Leopold. 2013. Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia. In Polska fenomenologia przedwojenna. Antologia tekstów, eds. Dariusz Bęben, Marta Ples-Bęben, 223–233. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.

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Life and the Natural World in the Early Work of Jan Patočka (1930–1945) Karel Novotný

Abstract  This article is a brief overview of Jan Patočka’s early interpretation of phenomenology in his academic writings based, on the one hand, on his 1931 doctoral dissertation and his 1936 habilitation thesis, and, on the other hand, on his first critical revision and his own conception of transcendental phenomenology put forward in an important group of manuscripts written between 1940 and 1945, which have recently been published in his Collected Works. The article examines these texts closely and focuses on Patočka’s attempts to link phenomenology with a philosophy of life. Important motifs that shaped Patočka’s philosophy beginning in the early 1940s were his reflections on the sources of evidence in life, the unity of the world in the life of transcendental subjectivity and a “deeper life-correlation” with nature. Keywords  Life · World · Evidence · Subjectivity · Inwardness · Sensing

1  Introduction Jan Patočka’s phenomenological philosophy gravitates around several themes; nevertheless, his interpretation of phenomenology in a more narrow sense is doubtless connected with just one theme in particular—the “natural world.”1 As is well known, Jan Patočka is the author of the first monograph on this theme that Husserl had 1  The terms “natural concept of the world” or “natural world” are associated with the influence of Richard Avenarius on the development of phenomenology in the work of its founder Edmund Husserl or with the evolution of the concept of the “natural world” in the work of authors who followed Husserl, from some of his former assistants, including Martin Heidegger, Eugen Fink and Ludwig Landgrebe, to Aron Gurwitsch, Alfred Schütz, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Klaus Held today.

K. Novotný (*) Faculty of Humanities, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 W. Płotka, P. Eldridge (eds.), Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe, Contributions to Phenomenology 113, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39623-7_11

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opened up for phenomenology, and he devoted his habilitation thesis, The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem, published in 1936, to it (Patočka 2008, pp. 129–261).2 Patočka’s concept of the natural world, however, also involved philosophical explorations beyond the frontiers of phenomenology. In addition to phenomenology’s central theme of appearance, in his first texts we already begin to find references to a life that is not merely a life of consciousness, as in Husserl. Such references point to a life entering the world and its “light,” but only indirectly, through expression. The objective meanings that consciousness constitutes hint at a life that is not itself manifest, which remains anonymous, but is nonetheless the subjectively experienced basis of the expression of things and the world. Although the motif of life pervades Husserl’s late exploratory manuscripts, where not only the notion of the lifeworld, but also that of the living present and the life of transcendental subjectivity play a central role, references to life in the work of Patočka—who was acquainted with Husserl’s late manuscripts on these themes and had the opportunity to discuss them with Husserl and his personal assistants, Ludwig Landgrebe and Eugen Fink—position him outside the framework of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. We might say—at least with regard to the issue of the natural world which was so central to Patočka’s interpretation of phenomenology—that he took a “Lebens-philosophical” stance from the very beginning and attempted to link it to Husserl’s framework. This is particularly evident in his early work, where Henri Bergson’s influence is apparent, but we can find a similar constellation of concerns—that is, references to life as the ultimate source of meaning—in his later works as well. In Patočka’s work, we can trace an intense interest in phenomenology back to his study residence in France, in February 1929, when he attended Husserl’s Paris lectures. Even before the issue of the natural world or lifeworld became a central focus of his—and Husserl’s—attention in the mid-1930s, he had already devoted himself to the notion of evidence in his doctoral thesis, where the contrasting approaches of phenomenology and philosophy of life come together. In the following sections, I will offer a brief overview of three early systematic projects; the first two correspond to Patočka’s doctoral dissertation (1931) and habilitation thesis (1936) mentioned above, dedica entirely to Husserl’s phenomenology. I devote the third section to a discussion of Patočka’s own studies on the concept of the world carried out from 1940 to 1945, which—by contrast with his habilitation thesis—went quite far beyond a mere interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy, and are important if we want to understand the development of Patočka’s own later philosophical outlook.3 2  Recently translated into French (Patočka 2016a), and into English for the first time in 2016 (Patočka 2016b) by Erika Abrams. Her translations have been the main source of Patočka’s international reception, thanks to which Patočka is part and parcel of the corpus of contemporary phenomenological philosophy. 3  Studies on the Concept of the World (Patočka 2014, pp. 17–173) was the title of the most extensive manuscript of the group. As regards both synoptic interpretations of Patočka’s phenomenological

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2  Life and Evidence in Knowledge Patočka’s doctoral dissertation, The Concept of Evidence and Its Significance for Noetics, presented at Charles University in 1931, offers, in its two parts, a systematic and an “historical” discussion of the problem of evidence. Throughout the dissertation, he based his discussion on two opposing—albeit in his eyes complementary and mutually enriching—approaches to the concept of evidence. In the first part, Patočka distinguishes the approach of the inventor from that of the systematician; in the second, historical part he distinguishes between a rationalist conception of evidence and an empirical one focused on its genesis. Then, at the end of this part, he gives a systematic interpretation—and was the first in the Czechoslovakia to do so—of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy, endorsing his project in no uncertain terms.4

2.1  Intuition and the Idea of the Whole If knowledge is thinking based on reasons, then justification is “a search for the meaning of the whole” (Patočka 2008, p. 15). If the truth of the knowledge of reality is to be founded on evidence, it must, of course, “arrive at the manifestation of being itself in its essence;” the truth is possible only on the basis of the manifestation of being: “For me, this discovery of being is evidence,” writes Patočka (2008, p. 16). However, through manifestation “external being becomes inherently ‘inner;’ for me, the meaning of the existence of the being coincides with its being” (Patočka 2008, p. 16). Thus, in the context of the process of knowing, the idea of ​​the manifestation of truth (in the sense of the “subjectivization of being”) becomes a relation to a whole based on evidence that itself refers back to the whole because without a relation to it, it is not possible: “Life from beginning to end is a series of existences for me, and if I recognize them, I must aim at them as a whole; through the subjectivization of being, truth therefore necessarily becomes… the idea of ​​the whole of thought” (Patočka 2008, p. 16). If the whole is always ideal in nature and truth is always holistic in nature, why then are the efforts of the philosophical systematicians—who focus on the ideal structure of knowledge—problematic? The reason is the systematicians’ tendency philosophy and partial studies on individual topics, the secondary literature is relatively rich, and this is also true (though to a lesser extent) of the interpretation of his works published in the 1930s. However, the early works and reflections of Jan Patočka—such as Studies on the Concept of the World—which survived in manuscript form and have only recently been published (Patočka 2014, pp. 9–327), are quite naturally only beginning to be interpreted. See an updated overview of the secondary literature at the Jan Patočka Archive web site, http://www.ajp.cuni.cz. 4  However, other authors have mentioned Husserl’s lectures and publications in the territory of the former Czechoslovakia, such as professors František Krejčí and Jan Blahoslav Kozák at Charles University, professor Vladimír Hoppe at Masaryk University in Brno, and professor Josef Tvrdý at Comenius University in Bratislava, among others.

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to regard their own structures as reality. Even Bergson cannot help us here: the relationship of evidence to reality that is lost in the systematicians’ efforts cannot be regained by basing it on a Bergsonian intuition, if that intuition is supposed to be based on an intuitive fusion with the creative process whereby reality itself is generated. According to Patočka, intuition conceived in this manner would lead to the “eternal relativity of the noetic process” (Patočka 2008, p. 29). That is why Patočka is drawn to Husserl and expressly objects that Bergson relativizes the ideal aspects of our experience, thereby burying “a trust in the idea—that is, in the firm architecture of the world and of life that belongs to the very essence of life” (Patočka 2008, p. 99 n.). Under Bergson’s influence, Patočka understood the fact that this architecture carries within itself a concrete life in the form of an idea as a task—not as a givenness that would only refer to previous a priori truths or an otherwise pre-existing order of reality—meaning that life itself, the ultimate basis of truth, escapes every such architecture, however much it might find its true expression in it. Phenomenology is the transcendental philosophy of the conditions of possibility of reality. While it is not based on the structure of these conditions but rather on the evidence for them, it is methodologically limited to intuiting the relevant general structures and essences.5 In order to emphasize the difference between phenomenology and classical, rationalist transcendental philosophy, Patočka’s interpretation of Husserl emphasizes a theme related to a specific, Lebensphilosophie-based reading of his “positivism or empiricism,” according to which “evidence means simply living truth” (Patočka 2008, p. 105). From this reading it follows that in the end “the meaning of things lies in how we live them”: For it is in life itself that we shall find the ultimate criterion of knowledge in all its diversity; here we have access to something that is not mere manifestation … What is at issue, therefore, is understanding the meaning of life, and the meaning of being opens up to us directly within it. (Patočka 2008, p. 106, my emphasis).

To what extent is Patočka embracing Husserl here, and to what extent does he adopt a different stance? He criticizes Bergson for situating the “creative element”—creative being itself—“again on the side of the subject”: “we again arrive at the contradictory idea of a connection between a creative and a contemplative act, at the denial of a purely ideal being or an identification of it with the real” (Patočka 2008, p. 99). Patočka argues against this, asking, “… what then is life aside from philosophizing,” if the philosopher once again “has privileged access, according to Bergson, to knowledge that is inaccessible to all others”? “Thus,” he goes on, “Bergson turns away from his own starting point, which is the very basis for these considerations”— Patočka’s own considerations—“which is to say from the view that life always carries its own truth within itself, and philosophy is only concerned with clarifying that truth, defending it against confusion, and attaining a more profound consciousness” (Patočka 2008, p. 99). 5  “Phenomenology cannot tell us what is real, but only what reality is, what conditions must be fulfilled in order for something to be considered as real” (Patočka 2008, p. 118).

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It seems then that in his earliest philosophical project, Patočka is interested in making a connection between a certain kind of transcendental idealism, like the one Husserl is developing, and a certain realism (“though we are not speaking here of a realism in the etymological sense of the word,” he clarifies [idem]), which, on his reading, does not even seem alien to Husserl. Thus, Husserl’s project of transcendental eidetics—with its Platonist elements that Patočka concurs with—is connected with a complementary attempt to descend to the deeper sources of life; this is typical of Bergson’s intuition, but also, in a different sense, of Husserl’s reflexive philosophy as Patočka presents it—that is, in opposition to the constructive methods of rationalist idealism.6

2.2  Conclusion: The Living Source of Rationality It would thus appear that investigating and fixing the solid “essential structures of consciousness” through reflection—the aim of phenomenology (Patočka 2008, p.  107)—does not present an obstacle to apprehending the meaning of life, but rather leads to it, according to Patočka. For Bergson, on the contrary, this apprehension was a matter of “living and fleeting but powerful evidence,” which is the only thing close to “the reality that, as freely creative, keeps the world from falling into death” (Patočka 2008, p. 97). Evidently, Patočka understands Husserl’s project and presents it programmatically as, among other things, an attempt to achieve the same proximity to life by other, more appropriate means. Nevertheless, he concludes his early text in a way that calls into question such a smooth transition from Bergson to Husserl. In my view, the first sentences from the very conclusion of Patočka’s dissertation convey this clearly: There is certainly something that cannot be rendered into a clear and distinct idea, that can only be lived and intuited, but that cannot be brought under the definitive light of reason. It is from this darkness that ideal being is really born, as Bergson maintains. Real being is in ideal being and we are in the real. Knowledge is the natural course of our existence towards the idea, a manifestation, as we have claimed above, of the kinship of our being with the idea. Only here do we satisfy our desire for unity, wholeness, and infinity, which is in reality as its purest core … The efforts of mankind’s best spirits have been, I believe, devoted to providing evidence that this desire is not fantasmagoric, but the deepest reality, which also has a real object, however. Husserl was one such spirit (Patočka 2008, p. 119).

The first two sentences summarize the part of his project devoted to Bergson’s “metaphysical genesis” (Patočka 2008, p. 97) of intellectual knowledge from the sources of life that remain inaccessible to that rational, systematic and eidetic knowledge. In this respect, Patočka places himself from the outset at a certain distance from the intellectualism of Husserl’s program, which is based on the eidetic 6  This demand could find a ready answer in Husserl’s late genetic phenomenology, though Patočka would not be more closely acquainted with it until he became a direct student of his in 1933, when he arrived in Freiburg with a Humboldt Foundation scholarship.

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and phenomenological reductions—a distance that will reappear in his articles dating from the mid-1930s (cf. Novotný 2012, pp. 103–137). Still, it is in Husserl himself that Patočka finds “the only solid opposition to the intellectual despair that follows close on the heels of transcendental intellectualism, for which the subject is hermetically sealed off from true reality” (Patočka 2008, p. 119). What he finds and values in Husserl is not rationalism, but that which connects him with Bergson: a genetic approach to the problem of the knowledge of truth based on evidence. This is how we interpret his closing endorsement of Husserl—that is, of “a method that may not have led to a ready-made philosophy, but which is perhaps the most promising of all present-day philosophies” (Patočka 2008, p. 119). In view of what we have been able to glean about the direction of Patočka’s early project, which places “trust in the idea” of the whole of thought, and seeks to purge the “solid architecture of the world and of life” from the intellectualist constructions of rationalism, it is Husserl’s method of genetic phenomenology that opens the door to the reality of life.

3  T  he Unity of the World Based on the Life of Transcendental Subjectivity The problem of the disintegrating unity of the world is the starting point of The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem, Patočka’s habilitation thesis published in Czech in 1936 (Patočka 2008, pp.  129–261). It is a response to the crisis of European humanity, and ties in directly to the publication of the first part of Husserl’s final text, The Crisis of European Sciences, published in Philosophia (Husserl 1970) in 1936. In his thesis, Patočka appropriated Husserl’s current research in transcendental genetics related to the problem of the life-world, which at that time was at the center of his thinking7; however, he situates it in the context not only of Husserl’s more recent philosophy but also in that of a more general, systematic, and historical-­ philosophical context—and in some places he also indicates his own position on certain open questions, which will be of particular interest to us. Already in the 1930s, in Patočka’s habilitation thesis, we can find well-informed explorations into the thematic areas of Husserl’s thought, which point ahead to his 1940–1945 manuscripts. Its five parts deal with the following thematic areas: I. “The conflict between the naive and the scientific world” (Patočka 2016b, p. 52), i.e. the transition from an acknowledgement of the crisis of life (its alienation in the 7  Although Patočka only refers explicitly to one of Husserl’s manuscripts on the issue of horizonality (Patočka 2008, p. 2016, note 213), he had dozens of them at his disposal. The list of all the manuscripts in Prague that Ludwig Landgrebe transcribed in the mid-1930s, a large portion of which were preserved at the Cercle philosophique de Prague and transferred to Patočka’s “Strahov estate,” is documented by Hans Rainer Sepp (Hagedorn, Sepp 1999, p. 206). On Patočka’s “Strahov estate,” see Filip Karfík (Karfík 2006, pp. 31–63).

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naturalistic self-conception of the scientific picture of the world) to the transcendental stance; II. the epoché and the reduction as a method, a way to reveal the origin of the experience of the world in the “field of subjectivity in the transcendental—i.e., universal—sense” (Patočka 2016b, p.  53), the gateway to transcendental-­ phenomenological metaphysics as a “doctrine of constitution” (Patočka 2016b, p. 52) of the world; III. an attempt to “clarify the genesis of the conscious formations presented to the transcendental consciousness as thetic experience” (Patočka 2016b, p. 63), “an attempt at a constitutive sketch of the genesis of the naïve world” (Patočka 2016b, pp. 66 et seq.); IV. a sketch of a philosophy of language and speech (Patočka 2016b, pp. 85 et seq.); and V. his conclusion, containing what is for us a key reference to “the task of interpreting all existence from the inner sources of life itself” (Patočka 2016b, p. 114). To supplement our analyses here, we will, in the following section, also note the particular character of Patočka’s interpretation of Husserl’s thinking in his academic works, in order to assess the extent to which he refers to the life-philosophical basis of his early project in the 1940–1945 manuscripts.

3.1  Objectives and Tasks of the Project In Husserl’s late texts, his new introduction to transcendental phenomenology relies on a distinction between the natural world and the scientific picture of the world. In Husserl’s constitutive analysis, the scientific conception of the world shows itself to be dependent on the natural, pre-theoretical, pre-givenness of the world. Husserl demonstrates the non-originality of the scientific conception of reality by means of a phenomenological investigation into how the idealizing acts of a theoretical consciousness—just like practical acts—are generated on the presupposed basis of the natural world. In the first part of his book, Patočka situates Husserl’s approach in the context of both historical and contemporary attempts to rehabilitate the natural conception of the world over and against the artificial dualisms of modern philosophy. The final part of this section, in which he summarizes his own “proposed solution” to the problem of “achieving the unity of reality,” is important. In it we may observe the characteristics of the phenomenological approach, which we will examine below. In addition, we will also find him taking a stance on the limits of phenomenology. What interests us is Patočka’s own stance here, from which he refers to and engages Husserl. Given his thesis that “the activity of creative life will go on in us forever” and that the “end result of [his] analyses” is that “metaphysics is possible as a conscious reliving of the whole of reality” (Patočka 2016b, p.  21), Patočka formulates his conclusion on the status of the transcendental-genetic doctrine of constitution as follows: “… in our human situation, we can carry out this enormous task [the conscious reliving of the whole of reality] only in a region that may not even include the whole of human history. Indeed, when can we be certain to have truly understood extrahuman life?” (Patočka 2016b, p. 21).

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The task Patočka thereby posits in his habilitation, along with Husserl, is thus “more modest”; it is a matter of attaining insight, through reflection, into “the activities of the ultimate, independent subjectivity”, based on the overall scheme of the universe that surrounds people (Patočka 2016b, p.  4). The aim in so doing is to prove that the unity of the world lies not in a unity of matter, but in a unity of spirit: “The unity underlying the crisis cannot be the unity of the things composing the world; rather, it must be the dynamic unity of the acts performed by the mind or spirit” (Patočka 2016b, p. 3). In the chapter titled “Anticipating Our Own Proposed Solution” on the problem of the unity of the world, Patočka writes: “it becomes clear that the transcendental, i.e., preexistent subjectivity is the world. The task of philosophy is the reflective apprehension of this process” (Patočka 2016b, p. 20). On this account, the world is considered to be a process, an occurrence of meaning and not an enormous, all-­ encompassing “thing,” inasmuch as the world for transcendental phenomenology is “a meaning created in an eternally flowing activity” (Patočka 2016b, p. 20). The method for this reflective apprehension is provided by the theory of the epoché and the phenomenological reduction, which Patočka applied most systematically in the second part of his habilitation thesis (Patočka 2016b, pp. 23–51). In it, his concern is to show, on the one hand, the continuity and novelty of this issue in the context of the idealistic tradition of the philosophy of subjectivity and, on the other hand, to defend his new transcendental position from certain systematic objections.8

3.2  T  ime and Organic Life-Tendencies in the Constitution of Meaning Of special interest for our selective presentation of Patočka’s interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology is the way Patočka presents the fundamental layers of the relationship between human and world, and how these layers may be exhibited from the standpoint of a transcendental-genetic reduction. In the third part of his habilitation thesis, Patočka leaves us with no doubt as to what he regards as the ultimate ground of the transcendental subjectivity in which he situates the source of the unity of the world as the universal horizon of all events. It is time in the original sense: “In time we are standing, so to say, at the ground of subjectivity” (Patočka 2016b, p. 69), he writes, for “transcendental consciousness is the flow of time, it is time” (Patočka 2016b, p. 69). For Patočka, “… the creation of reality” occurs in the concrete present, “and creation is precisely time” (Patočka 2016b, p. 69). Such was the 8  In addition to an article by Eugen Fink for Kant-Studien (Fink 1933), he also cites Fink’s Transzendentale Methodenlehre—i.e., the Sixth Cartesian Meditation (Fink 1988), though he finds the issue “still at the very beginning of its development” (Patočka 2016b, p. 48). Considering the synoptic nature of this article, however, it is not the place to deal with Patočka’s interpretation of the theory of transcendental reduction in detail. Cf. Novotný (1999a, b).

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metaphysical “universal ground” [common to both Bergson and Husserl, according to Patočka (2016b, p. 71)], which made an intentional-analytical approach to the unity of the world and the genetic reconstruction of its constitution possible. The concrete present that comprises the “actual phase” of the flow of time along with “its retentional modifications and the corresponding anticipations” is therefore “constantly present” in “the whole of the constitutive process” (Patočka 2016b, p. 69). The task is now to elucidate “at what fundamental levels and in what acts of subjectivity” (Patočka 2016b, p. 53) the relationship of man to his world is established. Patočka divides the presentation of his conception of this ​​ constitutive process into the “description of the situation of man in the world”—where he writes in the first place about man’s corporeality as a fundamental component of his finitude—and then a description of a “fundamental connection” that is “always present and operative in life,” “a so to say automatic linkage which binds” all our experiences “into a unified whole” (Patočka 2016b, p. 54), without which “we would have individual things, but we would not have the world” (Patočka 2016b, p. 54). We already encounter the world at this level “not simply” as a “totality of existing things but first of all” as “a function which makes it possible for us to have such a growing reality in our consciousness,” a “function which first allows us to possess a unitary reality” and which therefore doubtless deserves “to be called ‘the world’ in the most original sense” (Patočka 2016b, p. 54).9 More detailed, and interesting for our purposes, is chapter “Attempt at a Constitutive Sketch of the Genesis of the Naive World.” Here Patočka highlights Husserl’s formulations, which, as he himself writes, “directly invite a comparison of the phenomenological conception of original time with Bergson’s.” According to this interpretation, “life-relations,” “life-possibilities,” and “life- or organic tendencies” are what originally articulate the sensory chaos of sensualism. In a genetic archeology we can assume that these tendencies lie at the lowest level of experience, as they give some primordial organization to the diversity of qualities, which can then serve the higher, objectivating acts of consciousness (Patočka 2016b, p. 68). This primordial articulation happens by means of “impersonal”, anonymous, corporeally functioning “organic tendencies of life.” In this way, Patočka takes up the theme of instinctual intentionality, which he undoubtedly encountered in Husserl’s late manuscripts; at the same time, he might have drawn a connection with Bergson in this respect as well. Nevertheless, this emphasis on organic tendencies and needs, on the embodiment of a functioning transcendental subjectivity which we would like to ascribe to a certain “Lebens-philosophical” stance, does not alter the fact that

9  From the point of view of his interpretation of the phenomenology of the natural world, it is important to mention the theme of moods or attunement that Patočka touched on in this context and which does not make substantial reference to Husserl. Patočka characterizes it here without reference to any particular author, so that a mood is “always one’s own, inner ‘state,’ but also at once colours our material surroundings, as if they were participating in it” (Patočka 2016b, p.  197). Heidegger is cited in Patočka’s habilitation thesis in five places, in other contexts. Cf. also Ludwig Landgrebe’s own originary habilitation thesis from 1932 Der Begriff des Erlebens (Landgrebe 2010), in which moods play a significant role and which has survived in Patočka’s Strahov Estate.

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the life of transcendental subjectivity is not simply a qualitative process, a flow in which reality itself would be given,10 for its “function is precisely to constitute a horizon of possible becoming, a horizon of possible qualitative changes” (Patočka 2016b, p. 69). Since the qualitative “sense-datum itself is possible only on the basis of a temporal horizon and, hence, by virtue of an extrasensual structure”—the structure of horizonality, whose “genuine ground” is the “original time-consciousness with its triad of protention, presence, and retention”—Patočka believes he has demonstrated the anti-sensuality of sensualism, which wants to deduce “the whole range of psychical life from sense-data” (Patočka 2016b, p. 71). The analysis of perception forms the point of departure because it is “the fundamental layer of experience, on which all the other modes of thetic life repose and to which they refer” (Patočka 2016b, p. 68). Within perceptual experience it is possible to distinguish “presentation and articulation” for the purpose of phenomenological genesis. Here presentation refers to original time-consciousness which forms the horizon of every objectivity’s possible existence. Articulation refers to the organization of givenness into objective identities and first takes place as the “genesis of qualitative diversity”; it is “the expression of certain original tendencies” (Patočka 2016b, p. 71) that ground the “life-relation” to objects as the “possibilities of action they represent for us” (Patočka 2016b, p. 68). According to Patočka, however, presentation and articulation are “phenomena that presuppose one another” (Patočka 2016b, p. 68), and here we see how original Patočka’s interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental-genetic phenomenology is: in the functioning of transcendental life at the lowest levels of constitution he already observes the mutual dependence of the extrasensual form of time and the organic, instinctive tendencies of life. These tendencies refer to the meaning of non-human life, which necessarily escapes the phenomenological method of reflective self-­ apprehension of consciousness, even though it too is only one of innumerable expressions of life. Then, in the final passages of Patočka’s book, following this investigation into the limits of phenomenology, we read that its task is “to carry out first of all a detailed analysis of all human experience,” but a second task is that of universal history, “which comprises the history not only of mankind but of all creatures.” This second task involves “an interpretation of the whole world process on the basis of the fundamental structures of possible subjectivity,”—that is, on the basis provided by Husserl’s phenomenology. However, Patočka’s emphasis is on the word “interpretation,” which we regard as a step beyond Husserl once again towards Bergson, because Patočka writes, literally, that “such a historicization of the universe could be termed creative evolution” (Patočka 2016b, p. 114). It is the creative evolution of life that “the whole universe goes through” and includes “the activity of constitution, up through the highest accomplishments of conscious creation in human  “For Bergson a sensed quality is a merging of the movement of one’s own life and that of an other,” Patočka notes in “The World and Objectivity,” a manuscript dating from the early 1940s (Patočka 2014, p.  62). Patočka also orients his own investigations beyond the framework of Husserl’s phenomenology in this direction. See the third part of this paper, below.

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history” (idem). Nonetheless, it is not possible to merge with it intuitively or apprehend it reflectively; instead, it is necessary to go beyond the methods of both Husserl and Bergson and interpret the meaning of life. In this respect, we may see a continuity with Patočka’s early starting point with the two sources of evidence: in life, which is not reducible to a rational eidetic structure, and in the idea of the world as a whole manifesting itself. The task is ultimately that “of interpreting all existence from the inner sources of life itself,” and Husserl’s phenomenology remains a suitable point of departure for him—that is, if “the very idea of constitution—this profound, key metaphysical idea—guarantees the unity of the life process in all its most varied manifestations and products, and teaches us to turn to the forces of inwardness …” (Patočka 2016b, p. 114, the final sentence of the book). And it is this concept of inwardness that will be crucial in Jan Patočka’s third systematic project from the early 1940s, which was preserved in his Strahov estate.

4  O  verview of the First Revision of Transcendental Phenomenology: The Concept of Inwardness Patočka outlines his first systematic review of the phenomenological stance in his above-mentioned manuscripts from the early 1940s.11 He explicitly sets forth his major shift away from Husserl in the manuscript titled “World and Objectivity”: “Since our conception of transcendental phenomenology has undergone a fundamental change—given that on the frontier of the human understanding of things we glimpse a pure nature, pristine, an undifferentiation between subject and object enclosed within itself—its relationship towards other aspects of the philosophical issues must be revised as well” (Patočka 2014, p. 64). This is a step towards nature, which some of Husserl’s reflections tend toward, but which Husserl could not perform in his own work, for essential reasons, i.e. the impossibility of going beyond a universal correlationism. That is why Patočka writes of a “fundamental change”—and we are speaking here of a shift away from Husserl, but based on his own genetic transcendental phenomenology. In this context, Patočka notes that “… talk of ‘merging’ with nature can have quite a concrete meaning … after all, sensualism (on the level of object-object polarity) too refers to a deeper unity over and above the subject-object opposition. For if it is nothing other than the reflected glow of what inwardness itself is able to experience, if it is nothing other than a projection of experience, what other meaning would it have than that of a basic record of identity?” (Patočka 2014, p. 139). Filip Karfík was the first to present a systematic outline of this notion. In the first part of his book on Patočka, Phenomenology and Metaphysics, he characterized Patočka’s early philosophy in general as “aiming toward a philosophy of life” (Karfík 2008, p. 35) and particularly the project he was pursuing in the early 1940s  See footnote no. 3 above. The English translations of excerpts from these manuscripts presented in this paper are by Ivan Gutierrez.

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as “a philosophy that objectivizes that which is not objectifiable, the ‘non-objective’ inwardness that is realized as life, or rather as the history of nature and man” (Karfík 2008, p. 35).12

4.1  The Subjective Life of Inwardness The continuity between the project we are trying to introduce briefly here and the habilitation project mentioned above is obvious: Patočka is attempting to establish “on a new foundation” the classical aspect of a new philosophy, “so that the subjective might become the basis of the objective, if the attempt of ancient metaphysics to understand the subject objectively were to founder” (Patočka 2014, p.  14, my emphasis). It is a “journey inside oneself,” a radical effort at a “human understanding of the ultimate foundations,” an effort to break off all attempts at what we would call today the naturalization of consciousness, where “everything human is afflicted by a derivedness” from the “constructions” of the universe (Patočka 2014, p.  12). In these manuscripts, Patočka’s descent into a non-objective inwardness aims, among other things, to restore in a revised form the idea of the “performance” or synthesis that is at the heart of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, and that revision is carried out precisely under the banner of a search for a deeper life-correlation between inwardness and outwardness, subjectivity and nature. With respect to the subjective pole of correlation, Patočka characterizes inwardness as a restless internal interest, a “restlessness … in and from itself” (Patočka 2014, p. 19). Instead of being based on the imagination, like the classical idealistic subject or, on the contrary, just reacting mechanistically to outer stimuli, inwardness is seen as a life “movement” that precedes the “actions” of the ego—and such a pre-­ egoic movement or the motions of the inwardness of life are “the most basic components of the ego” (Patočka 2014, p. 19 n.): This restlessness in itself, this “no” at every moment of life, may itself be something wholly internal, but at the same time it is a condition for the possibility of a relation to something external, in itself lacking any distance, is a condition for the possibility of all distances. A real relationship can only arise where there is something non-existent in itself as a calm presence, not in an external sense, a relation as a supplementary determination of things, but rather pertaining to being, not a relation as an attribute, but as “substance” itself … Thus, our own life is not a mere “process” but an event in the sense of a story and a performance— it is a drama in the most original sense: issuing from the inside out, from a rest-lessness, from an internal “no,” an event rising up from an inner “need”. (Patočka 2014, p. 20)

 As regards another of Patočka’s systematic projects, beginning in 1934 he begins to reflect on the philosophy of history, which would constitute another, no less central line in his life’s work. Martin Heidegger had an undeniable influence on these reflections. (Cf., for example, Novotný 1995, 2012, pp. 103–137 and Karfík 2008, pp. 171–193.) However, our paper, in keeping with the conception of this volume, is limited to the reception of phenomenology in the narrower sense.

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Here, it is important to note the emphasis on a certain “autonomy” with regard to the dynamism of life whose negativity—the “need” mentioned above—stems from its attachment to itself. Out of this self-attachment it fashions an inwardness as something “completely internal” that is in and of itself “without any distances.” This moment, this attachment of life to itself, lacking the very possibility of distance, is the extreme boundary of the subjective pole of the life-correlation, as if by means of a correlation with the outside, inwardness were escaping into itself—and yet that is precisely what the yearning for escape, for the other, for the world is based on. The possibility of a relation to the other is based on this disquieting need, consisting in a self-attachment “without the possibility of escape.” This is one moment of the deepening correlation between experience and its environment. The answer to the question of how to break through toward the “non-objective and non-objectifiable” source of all meaning, toward “the inside of inwardness,” is therefore: “Only he who conquers meaning—i.e., himself, in the end—through an extreme investment of the self may have clarity regarding the meaning of inner life and therefore its content as well. And since it is life that makes sense to beings, if at all—what ‘being’ is for in the first place—it is only from this initial position that we may proceed to the central philosophical problem” (Patočka 2014, p. 48).

4.2  The Life-World and Its Inwardness As we have said above, life is the self’s movement outwards, a movement that the self’s own inwardness participates in, and it unfolds in such a way that the exteriority it aims at has meaning for it. The meaningfulness of exterior-objectivity has its condition of possibility in the fact that the “meaning” of objectivity, both in its entirety and in its particulars, is already opened up in a certain sense beforehand. And it is precisely the world’s manner of openness that we must now characterize more closely, now that we have expressed the foundation of the possibility of the subject’s relation to the outside from the point of view of its inwardness. The question is how to conceive of this foundation. The answer is obvious, given what we have already read in different places: it must be “a basis that is alive and whose innermost being—life—must have some degree of affinity with the character of the living” (Patočka 2014, p. 52). What is new here with regard to what I mentioned in the second part of this paper is his conception of “sensory experiencing.” Now, the sensory contact between our life and what Merleau-Ponty calls le sensible testifies to the basic identity manifesting itself in harmony with nature, which is not only a “projection of experience,” but “pristine, an undifferentiation between subject and object enclosed within itself,” the “harmony of a double indifference” in sensitivity. Patočka acknowledges this dimension of aisthesis unequivocally in his conception of its originality, which he also attempts to characterize further as “a fundamental understanding of the living.” What is at stake here is not only a deeper life-correlation, but the sensory coincidence of the double non-difference of subject

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and object: sensation, sensory perception, is originally a “sympathetic coinciding.” Patočka does not abandon Husserl’s thesis regarding the mutual harmonic communication between transcendental subjectivities in the unity of the transcendental “we,” but he wants to establish it on a deeper life-basis, “transforming” it into the idea of the “harmonious coincidence” of nature and “inwardness” and from “inwardness” and nature on the basis of the original non-difference of subject and object: “… the basic layer of aisthesis is this very harmony, sympathy: perception, in its essence, is a sympathizing, a participation in a life that transcends us” (Patočka 2014, p. 63). The view, expressed, for example, in sect. 13 of his “Study of the World-Concept” is key: “the sensual world is a predominantly expressive phenomenon. … Behind every impression that is present – or in itself, to put it more precisely – presence is something like an ‘inwardness’ as against a ‘mere exterior,’ as life against its gesture, as a meaning that can be discerned in a mere text” (Patočka 2014, p.  98). Patočka then summarizes his interpretation in the following passage, with which he concludes sect. 14: There is a double mode of viewing everything that surrounds us; then, in our experience, this double mode is laid upon itself. One mode is a view from ourselves, from our intentions, purposes, life-relations. This view shapes matters of practical necessity and is indifferent to their internal structures and transformations. The other mode is a view from the things themselves, an “uninterested” view or, if there is an interest, it is not an interest in mere control over an object, but an interest in its reaction; it is here that expression arises. Everything that enters into experience has this double character, involving its own expression and its inclusion in the sphere of alien interests. (Patočka 2014, p. 106)

Nevertheless, it is true that this foundation—the harmony or “uniformity” of life— does not fulfill our relation to the world, because “only exceptionally is our life harmoniously embedded in the life of nature, merging and harmonizing with it;” man is a being that is alive “owing to its own internal possibilities” in a “discrepancy with life in general.” This also corresponds to the double character that Patočka attributes to the problem of expression at the close of his summary. For man, the world is constituted as his own world and he is in essence a being that relates to the world. That is why man does not normally understand things “in themselves but in relation to himself,” he writes in “World and Objectivity,” the manuscript we have been basing our considerations on: “Thus, every mere, sympathetically permeated aesthetic ‘datum’ must also be subject to a synthetic ‘interpretation’ that turns it into a moment of our environment, a component of our situation—in short, something founded in our world and relative to it” (Patočka 2014, p. 63). Patočka introduces his Studies on the Concept of the World by clearly endorsing Husserl’s perspective when he writes that “at the very center of the world” belongs a “unity of experience” which develops in the “uniformity of all horizonal consciousness”: “The original world is thus the world of experience, my world” (Patočka 2014, p. 81). What is new here in Patočka over and against Husserl is not only a deeper life-foundation (through a correlation with the environment, in the identity or “non-difference of subject and object” proper to sensory experiencing), but also an attempt to shed light on the possibility of a relation bridging “the rift

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between our own [inward] being and that of the other” (Patočka 2014, p. 82). And linked with this is the view of nature as being enclosed within itself, nature as that from which we have emerged, a view that leads Patočka to differ from Husserl.

5  Conclusion The texts from the 1960s and 1970s that garnered Patočka the most fame as an original philosopher with innovative views of the natural world and the movement of human existence were grounded in a novel interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental-­ genetic phenomenology. This interpretation, in turn, only came after Patočka’s repeated attempts to link phenomenology with a philosophy of life, which we find at the beginning of his intellectual trajectory. Patočka’s reflections on the sources of evidence in life, on the unity of the world in the life of transcendental subjectivity, and the “deeper life-correlation” he mapped out in his early systematic projects of the 1930s and early 1940s, were formative for his further philosophical development. He took them up again in the mid-1950s and especially in the 1960s, by developing the motif of a life-movement, where the “first movement” is the cosmic harmony of life and he never rejected the belief that this dimension enabled a relation with the world. However, in his philosophy, it is the movement of spirit on the boundary of this correlation that is essential. There, he finds “an unfulfillment by means of infinity.” Whether this infinity designates life, nature or the world in a deeper, cosmic sense or some other sense, the exercise of this relationship, the “spiritual” existence of man, implies as a condition of its possibility the finitude of embodied life, the pain of the body’s separation and its yearning for a convergence that remains unfulfilled and whose restlessness transforms “mere” life into human life. Acknowledgments  Translated from Czech by Ivan Gutierrez. The translation was supported within the framework of institutional support for the Long-Term Development of Research Organizations provided by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports to the Faculty of Humanities, Charles University (2018).

References Fink, Eugen. 1933. Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik [The phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl in contemporary criticism]. Kant-Studien 38: 321–383. ———. 1988. Die Idee einer transzendentalen Methodenlehre [The idea of a transcendental theory of method]. In VI. Cartesianische Meditation, Husserliana-Dokumente, ed. Hans Ebeling, Jann Holl, and Guy Van Kerckhoven, vol. 2. Dordrecht: Springer. Hagedorn, Ludger, and Hans Rainer Sepp, eds. 1999. Jan Patočka: Texte—Dokumente— Bibliographie. Freiburg/Munich: Verlag Karl Alber.

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Husserl, Edmund. 1970. The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. An introduction to phenomenological philosophy. Trans. David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Karfík, Filip. 2006. Jan Patočkas Strahov-Nachlass und sein unvollendetes opus grande [Jan Patočka’s Strahov estate and his unfinished magnum opus]. In Jan Patočka, Andere Wege in die Moderne [Other paths to the modern age], ed. Ludger Hagedorn, 31–63. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann. ———. 2008. Unendlichwerden durch Endlichkeit: Eine Lektüre der Philosophie Jan Patočkas [Through Finitude to Infinity: A Reading of the Philosophy of Jan Patočka]. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann. Landgrebe, Ludwig. 2010. In Der Begriff des Erlebens: Ein Beitrag zur Kritik unseres Selbstverständnisses und zum Problem der seelischen Ganzheit [The concept of experience: A contribution to the critique of our self-understanding and the problem of the soul’s wholeness], ed. Karel Novotný. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann. Novotný, Karel. 1995. Dějinnost a svoboda: Heidegger a Patočkova raná filosofie dějin [Historicity and freedom: Heidegger and Patočka’s early philosophy of history]. Reflexe 14: 2.1–2.3. ———. 1999a. L’Esprit et la subjectivité transcendantale: Sur le status de l’époché dans les premiers écrits de Jan Patočka [Spirit and transcendental subjectivity: On the status of the epoché in the first writings of Jan Patočka]. Etudes Phénoménologiques 25: 23–37. ———. 1999b. Erscheinung des Ganzen: Jan Patočkas phänomenologische Philosophie der 30. Jahren [The appearance of the whole: Jan Patočka’s phenomenological philosophy in the 1930s]. In Jan Patočka: Texte—Dokumente—Bibliographie, ed. Ludger Hagedorn and Hans Rainer Sepp, 136–169. Freiburg/Munich: Verlag Karl Alber. ———. 2012. La genèse d’une hérésie: Monde, corps et histoire dans la pensée de Jan Patočka [Genesis of a Heresy: World, Body and History in the Thought of Jan Patočka]. Paris: Vrin. Patočka, Jan. 2008. Přirozený svět: Texty z let 1931–1949 [The natural world: Writings from 1931–1949]. In Sebrané spisy 6: Fenomenologické spisy I, ed. Ivan Chvatík and Jan Frei. Prague: OIKOYMENH. ———. 2014. Nitro a svět: Nepublikované texty ze 40. let [Inwardness and world: Unpublished writings from the 1940s]. In Sebrané spisy 8/1: Fenomenologické spisy III/1, ed. Ivan Chvatík, Jan Frei, and Jan Puc. Prague: OIKOYMENH. ———. 2016a. Le monde naturel comme problème philosophique. Vrin: Trans. Erika Abrams. Paris. ———. 2016b. The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem. Trans. Erika Abrams. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

The Beginnings of Phenomenology in Yugoslavia: Zagorka Mićić on Husserl’s Method Dragan Prole

Abstract This contribution discusses Introduction into Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology, published in Belgrade 1937, by his student Zagorka Mićić, which was one of the first introductory works on Husserl in Europe. What she found fruitful in Husserl’s thought was the idea that phenomenology does not uncover the existing world in a new way but uses a novel method to uncover a different, new world. The basic thesis of her interpretation is that methodology is the red thread that connects various phenomenologists whose philosophies, apart from method, have very little in common. Mićić saw phenomenology’s core strength as consisting in the plurality of possibilities for the development and use of its method. She saw phenomenology’s prime advantage in the way it grants the possibility of independent development, through a non-dogmatic, free approach to phenomena. Unlike the speculative, purely conceptual approach to philosophical problems, phenomenology was keen, above all, to dive deep into the actual facts. In addition to her exhaustive representation of the methodological specificity of transcendental phenomenology, and her strictly philosophical portrayal of phenomenological thinking, Zagorka Mićić displayed the philosophical and historical importance of the phenomenological understanding of humanity, and how its new ideal promotes tolerance. Owing to her personal encounters and conversations with the founder of phenomenology, Mićić was especially able to demonstrate the political importance of Husserl’s concept of “absolute evil”, which appears where egoism transforms into ruthlessness towards others. Keywords Mićić · Phenomenology · Reception · Methodology · Reduction · Criticism

D. Prole (*) Department of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad, Novi Sad, Serbia e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 W. Płotka, P. Eldridge (eds.), Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe, Contributions to Phenomenology 113, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39623-7_12

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1  Ideological Reception: The Factious Spirit of Philosophy The early reception of phenomenology in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was marked by an unusually strong ambivalence. On the one hand, some met it with indifference, and on the other some greeted it with euphoric expectations and almost boundless hope. Decisive rejections of phenomenology as a pointless and meaningless craze arose simultaneously with expressions of belief in its capacities to enable new, more responsible and integral forms of humanness. At one end of the spectrum, there were diagnoses of complete failure, and at the other claims that strengthened hope for the future. It is as if the degree of intellectual openness for new philosophical ideas, or readiness to try something unknown and new was a decisive precursor for determining whether one accepted or dismissed phenomenology. Where a strong bond with traditional philosophical orientation was present or where radical ideologies were in focus, phenomenology did not stand a chance. Apart from philosophical orientation, political attitude was also a deciding factor in the degree of interest in phenomenology and any realistic possibilities for its acceptance. Husserl’s student, Zagorka Mićić, educated in Freiburg, was part of an inner circle of his students. Interestingly, it was she who on more than one occasion pointed out the actual existence of the partisan spirit in philosophy. Only naïve or utopian representations could construe the philosophical scene as neutral, impassive, and free. It was, in fact, burdened by ideological quarrels, by the association or non-association with certain academic circles, and by inherited squabbles between various orientations. Both philosophical discussions and party quarrels equally exhibited the notion that, in the world of democratic contest, the cards had been dealt long ago. When stances and positions have already been taken, new thoughts can become interesting only if they reaffirm or verify already-held commitments or strengthen already embraced ideas. However, by the same token it loses its freshness and becomes a part of the commonplace. We cannot shake the feeling of kinship between Heidegger’s Neugier and the way in which Mićić perceives the everyday institution of philosophy: “Those ways have a pre-defined perception of the world, usually a dogma, and their whole examination does not attempt to find anything new, but to enable the widest possible affirmation of one’s original stance” (Mićić 1937, p. 159). In line with party conventions, the left-leaning intelligentsia exclusively respected and accepted, in principle, the teachings of modern materialism and dialectic methodology. The surrealist group added to that the mixture of Freud and Breton. Hence that faction was not willing to consider phenomenological thought, which it defamed as yet another form of perverted bourgeois idealism. Without much thought, the avant-garde intellectual Rade Drainac went so far as to accuse phenomenology of representing a subtle, camouflaged fight against the best and newest in the modern: “under the pretext of phenomenological observation, which gives it the character of ‘solemnity’ and ‘scrupulous’ philosophizing, these (idealistic) ideas wage a refined and despicable war against modern progress” (Drainac 1936, p. 3). The mere mention of ‘phenomenology’ in this context transforms its meaning, so that it no longer resembles its former self, and relates to something completely different. As an

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example, the surrealist duet of Koča Popović and Marko Ristić invoked Husserl’s philosophical project in the title of their book—Blueprint for a phenomenology of the irrational (1931)—but in the very first sentence affirmed an idea that could hardly be reconciled with Husserl’s phenomenology: Thought is a product of matter (Popović and Ristić 1931, p. 7). It is to be expected that the attempts to restore the spirit of classical philosophical rationality and to promote the ideals of strict science in modern terms did not mean much to the authors who, more than others, respected the masters of doubt: Marx and Freud. In a word, phenomenology for surrealists was not a terminus technicus, but a popular moniker, a word that sounds good to the modern ear, and can easily be associated with any content. Instead of ‘phenomenology,’ they could have written ‘philosophy’ or even ‘poetics,’ without changing their meaning in any significant way. In any case, the avant-garde artists did not consider connecting phenomenology with any sort of transcendental idealism. Idealism is empty, meaningless; it tries to establish its foundations in the sky of ideas: “all that spiritual-idealistic philosophizing has tried in vain to build an airy world of unreal and absolute existence, above what could be perceived as truly real though science” (Popović and Ristić 1931, p. 92). Unlike the avant-garde leaning leftists, conservative and right-wing thinkers turned their heads towards Spengler’s bestseller, The Decline of the West, which presented the possibility of European restoration after the downfall of Western civilization on the model of Dostoevsky’s orthodox Christianity. Those who cared primarily for tradition and the beliefs of our fathers could find in Spengler’s work an unexpected alignment with their own ideological designs. For them, salvation from the European crisis and disorientation depends on the peculiar combination of the new, innovative, and creative with the old, tried, and true. Vladimir Vujić, who translated Spengler into Serbian, points out in his foreword the necessity of a break with Kantianism and an abandonment of metaphysical ways of thinking. However, far more significant than this philosophical orientation is the arrival of a new Christianity from Russia, which bore witness to the October Revolution not too long ago. It may sound paradoxical, but Vujić, like Spengler, was convinced that the arrival of a new Christianity from the Soviet Union was certain and inevitable and— it was only a matter of time. It would be tied to the ‘real’ Russian culture, and would be much closer to early Christian ideals than Rome or Wittenberg could ever be. In the end, without knowing that he was writing one of the first lines in anticipation of post-colonial thought, Vujić greeted the abandonment of Western European cultural forms, which for him marked the end of eurocentrism: “we see the collapse, at last, of the egocentric and vain idea that the European man is the center of the world, and that his history is the history of the world” (Vujić 1937, p. 9). In the imaginary middle ground between the radical left and radical right on the spectrum of the Yugoslav intellectual scene, there were thinkers who were interested in phenomenology. At first, those were the ones who in their everyday lives recognized the accomplishment of Nietzsche’s philosophical imperative: the Umwertung aller Werte. Wherever the vital interest for Nietzsche’s nomadic thought was present, there was a sense that the world was a part of a process whose end has

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yet to be determined. Through that lens, we can see how philosophical ideas had not yet received their final form and had yet had their final say. In his foreword for Zagorka Mićić’s book about Husserl’s phenomenology, Eugen Fink pointed out that the problem with understanding phenomenology lay mainly in the neglect of teleology. A thought that develops quickly, inevitably hides its goals and purposes, but only because it has yet to become aware of them itself. Unlike the philosophical system that knows right at the very beginning where it originates from, where it will go, and where it will end, phenomenology is a philosophy-in-the-works. Development and work imply uncertainty, and not a stroll down familiar paths. According to Fink, Husserl’s phenomenology represents the practical realization of Nietzsche’s nomadic call to philosophers to leave behind the mainland and boldly go to sea, that is, adopt a thinking without foundation: “not even to the original thinker are the direction, way and goal of his exploration known; he abandons land, where the ends of paths are known, and gives himself to the force of his problem” (Fink 1937, p. II). One thing was certain—the awareness of a general upheaval was omnipresent. The former orientations and beliefs started to lose their appeal, making way for new values and ideals. One of those ideals entailed that one’s nation and religion no longer had much meaning, and that man’s nationality could only be ‘mankind.’ Such ideas were close to Husserl’s open internationalism, that is, the European supranational spirit of exchange and community. Miloš Đurić was the leader of a generation that matured after the Great War, convinced that they were in the midst of a cultural and civilizational upheaval, whose outcome will be unprecedented: “Traditional forms are collapsing, and crisis and upheavals are arising, which, based on the significance of the motivations they cause, have never been seen in the history of culture” (Đurić 1922, p. 70). In this spirit of proclaiming an unparalleled cultural shift, phenomenology promised the end of immature prejudice, with a methodology that provided a long-term strategy for dealing with naïve conventions. The embers of enlightenment have been stoked anew, and a new philosophical optimism was born: “what was specific about phenomenology was that it sought, in the direct examinations of problems, new possibilities and brought optimism to philosophical work. In phenomenology’s favor was the fact that the spiritual situation of the first decades of the 20th century no longer believed in the mere appropriation of inherited forms. True emancipation was rather conditioned though the aura of the new beginning” (Safranski 1994, p. 93). In Yugoslavia, and Europe as a whole there was no lack of individuals interested in philosophy, who connected this aura with phenomenology more than with any other academic movement.

2  Theological Reception: Pro et Contra Introducing Husserl’s phenomenology to Yugoslavia drew remarkably intense interest from theologian—the theological reception of Husserl during the 1920 was almost equal to the philosophical, as philosophical reactions did not outnumber

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theological ones. Even though Husserl’s phenomenology had, since the early days, drawn two noteworthy Catholic thinkers (Jean Hering, later professor of the New Testament at the Theological College in Strasbourg and Edith Stein, whom John Paul II canonized as a saint in 1998), and even though the Göttingen school of phenomenology was exclusively Catholic (Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Max Scheler, Gerda Walther), the associates of the Sarajevo-based Jesuit paper Život (Life) reacted to the arrival of phenomenological philosophy with great suspicion. The editor of the journal, Ante Alfirević, saw the voice of longing in phenomenology, the other side of the authentic Christian need for salvation and for cleansing the corrupt and unclean. In this way, he foresaw Albert Camus’ explicitly secular and much more popular thesis that phenomenological thought hides the desire to go back to the homeland in which we were not born. If “above all, a man’s thought is his nostalgia” (Camus 1942, p. 70), then it, naturally, could not have originated in a Catholic but only a Protestant atmosphere. Phenomenology’s nostalgia, according to the Sarajevo Jesuits, has its roots in the awareness that one inhabits the wrong place, or belongs to something that is neither true nor original, but distorted and false. In a word, the foundations of phenomenology are not philosophical, but are much closer to the elementary desire for a return to an authentic Christian experience of the world. From there, it is not surprising that this desire originated in a circle of thinkers who directly experienced the “crumbling of Lutheran-Kantian chains” (Alfirević 1925, p. 244). Alfirević did not finish his thought, and it remained unclear whether salvation from decay necessarily requires phenomenology to abandon itself, and, as in Edith Stein’s case, become the most sacred way of confessing the Catholic faith. If phenomenology embodies the Protestant longing for the truth and the real world, which could be easily interpreted in the spirit of a return to the shelter of the Catholic Church, we could have expected at least the Jesuits to give it a warm welcome. Instead, it met with a taciturn and dispassionate reception. The fact that the Novi Sad gymnasium professor, Svetislav Banica, noted a shift in Max Scheler’s opus after the Great War, which “bears a mark of Catholicism, as he found in Christianity the sum of all positive values of Europe, and he expected Europe’s salvation in religious restoration” did not help (Banica 1931, p. 280). The key theological distinction between the infinity of the creator and the finitude of creation was the driving factor in the Jesuits’ skeptical reception. They could not accept Husserl’s idea that transcendental subjectivity represents the absolute source of all being. Leaning on the old, proven dogmas, according to which nothing human can be absolute, Alfirević was convinced that our thinking is inevitably unreliable, limited and finite, and so Husserl in fact does not know what he is talking about when he persistently calls for a turn to absolute subjectivity. Furthermore, phenomenology, according to the Sarajevo Jesuit, lacks precisely what Husserl considered its greatest advantage. The project, whose goal is to establish “a true philosophy, whose idea is to reach absolute knowing in which the roots of phenomenology hide” (Husserl 1913, p. 5) is, according to Alfirević, deprived of the elementary epistemological assumptions it needs to establish a sustainable bridge between the subjective life of consciousness and outer reality. Based on that view, the Jesuit made an incorrect prediction that “it will not last long and the

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philosophical republic will renounce phenomenology” (Alfirević 1925, p. 244). The Jesuit theologian Vilim Keilbach repeated Alfirević’s condemnations of phenomenology, pointing to a single problem, which was to become commonplace in the early discussions of phenomenology in Yugoslavia. He constantly referred to the contradictions between the phenomenological premise of presuppositionless philosophy and its realization in the framework of a self-avowed transcendental idealism. An epistemology that would truly be rid of assumptions, according to Keilbach, should not be founded on the typically transcendental, purely formal understanding of logic and would have to be explained through arguments that have nothing to do with any heritage or tradition (Keilbach 1932, p. 44). After Husserl’s death, Keilbach wrote a text with a much more affectionate tone for the founder of phenomenology, but the advantages of phenomenology were only seen in terms of its victory over modern psychologism, and in its approach to the scholastics: “phenomenological philosophy has, very much so, approached the Aristotelian-scholastic objectivism. The use of the phenomenological method on the problems of Aristotelian-scholastic philosophy led to their revival and deepening” (Keilbach 1939, p. 244). All in all, the scope of phenomenology had been reduced to “refreshing” and modernizing the approach to scholastic themes and problems. The change in Keilbach’s criticism was probably motivated by Heidegger’s Habilitationsschrift on Duns Scotus. It remained unclear as to how the traditional problems can be deepened if the method for doing so is completely unfounded or unsubstantiated, both ontologically and epistemologically. Unlike his Catholic colleagues, the orthodox theologian Pero Jovanović assessed phenomenology’s relevance for theology in a completely different manner. Instead of representing the superior position of the critic, which takes satisfaction in whining over the ontological and epistemological unsustainability of the critiqued, Jovanović asserts a completely new and bold idea that the reality of religious life “can and should be examined only though phenomenological means” (Jovanović 1938, p. 48). Given that the whole of religious reality can be reduced to experiences which are neither stable nor predictable, but are in a constant temporal flux, Jovanović recommends the phenomenological method as the best philosophical approach to the religious consciousness’ experiences. Instead of trying to measure the overall ontological capacity of phenomenological thought, Jovanović rather tried to apply the phenomenological method where it was best suited – to the analysis of everything that happens in the consciousness of the believer. If we try to avoid the artificial construction of an already idealized religion, if we really care to describe the essence of religious life, then we must keep with the real stream of consciousness, and that is exactly what the phenomenological method does. The content of Husserl’s principle of all principles lies in the descriptive representation of the essential laws of its objects, as they are appearing, and exclusively within the bounds in which they are given. Husserl has, according to Jovanović, finally provided the methodological collateral needed for the scientific treatment of religion, which will no longer be based on either unfounded assertions or hostile critiques: “it is very likely that phenomenology will be the corner stone of

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the scientific understanding of religion, that it will remove all inappropriate claims made on it, and attacks on it, and that it will show its reality in its true colors, showing it as it is” (Jovanović 1938, p. 48). The terminology that Jovanović uses portrays him as a careful, devoted reader of Husserl’s Ideas I. It is a shame that he most probably was not familiar with the content of Heidegger’s lectures from 1927 and 1928, as they were published in 1969 in the Archives of Philosophy journal under the title Phenomenology and theology. It should be noted that he found his own position to be very close to the thesis that Jean Hering advocated during the 1920, which had a significant role in phenomenology’s theological turn. That thesis claims that phenomenology can only be a descriptive follower of religiosity established in conscious experiences, but it cannot be their catalyst, nor can it provide any type of support during the challenging or developing of religious sentiments. In a word, phenomenology can describe the religious sentiment that already exists. It cannot create or instigate a religiosity that would not exist without it: “only a religious man can have access to the phenomenon of believing, since without it he is relieved of any data he could descriptively accept” (Prole 2018, p. 256).

3  Zagorka Mićić: A Genuine Phenomenologist The Yugoslav reception of phenomenology in the interbellum period was predominantly related to one of the first European introductions to Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. The book was published in Belgrade 1937, by his student Zagorka Mićić. The author was not solely interested in Husserl’s writings; she believed that becoming a genuine phenomenologist requires going beyond philosophical texts, even if they were written by Husserl himself. In her short introduction Zagorka openly stresses the advantages of her own approach and the merits of her introduction. First, she had a “great number of Husserl’s works at her disposal as the source and the control of research” (Mićić 1937, p. 4).1 Second, she described the insights gained in personal communication and exchange with the founder of phenomenology. Her final advantage was her unrestricted ability to consult a wealth of Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts, in a way that supposedly made understanding his thought far easier. Her first article on Husserl’s phenomenology was published in 1933, in the Misao (Thought) magazine, under the title Phenomenology in Modern German Philosophy. Unlike most of her compatriots at the time, Mićić insisted, from the very start, on the innovations that Husserl’s philosophy brought. Instead of fitting it into an already existing philosophical orientation, it would be far more productive, according to Mićić, to acknowledge that phenomenological thought is completely 1  Though it seems strange to suggest that Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts “controlled” her text, we must bear in mind the cultural situation of interbellum Yugoslavia. Considering the critiques she faced and the difficult status of female philosophers in this context, to invoke Husserl’s indirect control over her text was part defense and part act of humility.

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novel in the way it is based on the object of its examination and its methodology. Phenomenology does not uncover the existing world in a new way; it uses a novel method to uncover a different, new world. The basic thesis of her interpretation of phenomenology is that methodology is the red thread that connects various phenomenologists whose philosophies, apart from that, have very little in common. Mićić saw phenomenology’s core strength as consisting in the plurality of possibilities for the development and use of its method. She saw its prime advantage in the way it grants the possibility of independent development, through a non-dogmatic, free approach to phenomena. Unlike the speculative, purely conceptual approach to philosophical problems, phenomenology was keen, above all, to dive deep into the actual facts. One can establish the autonomy and objectivity of philosophical knowledge solely through the neutrality of the phenomenological approach. Developing phenomenological ideas “requires complete concentration and long exercise, as it is not easy for a man to rid himself of prejudice and bias. Tradition is a heavy burden on our knowledge, which makes it difficult to see things neutrally, as they are given” (Mićić 1933, p. 114). In the following year, Zagorka Mićić defended her thesis The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade. Previously, she had studied in Freiburg at the same time as Jan Patočka, Eugen Fink, Roman Ingarden, Ludwig Landgrebe and Fritz Kaufmann were studying there. She was accepted and warmly welcomed into Husserl’s inner circle, and frequently attended the seminars and meetings held in his apartment. The carte postale dated the tenth of July, 1934, which Husserl sent from the Kappel spa, near Lenzkirch, attests to this: “We most certainly have not forgotten you. Your intellect, your jovial personality, which spreads around like some enjoyable song—that is You. I did not expect that you would develop into a real phenomenologist at home, with such energy and vigor, and organizational work, given the turbulent political situation” (Šajković 2003, p. 20). She published an expanded edition of the dissertation 3 years later, in 1937, as Mićić thought it important to include ideas from Husserl’s later works, that is, the first two chapters of The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. These were published in the meantime, in 1936 in Belgrade, in the Philosophia journal which Arthur Liebert, a former president of the Kant Society (Kant Gesellschaft), started and edited.

4  A “Non-phenomenological” Book of Phenomenology If we ask ourselves what makes Zagorka Mićić’s interpretation special, and what makes it different from the many other prominent interbellum readings of Husserl, then we must focus on two themes: the actual practice of phenomenological philosophizing and the relationship of phenomenology and language. It turns out that for Mićić they represent but two sides of the same coin, two moments of the same action. We can observe Mićić’s sense for the specificities of phenomenology in a rare selfcriticism, found in the final chapter, under the title Problems of Phenomenology. For

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Mićić, the problems she considers in that chapter were not external; she recognized them as the problems in her own work. Husserl’s fallacies and inconsistencies were not to blame here, but the specific nature of phenomenological thought: “it can be said that this book of phenomenology is quite non-­phenomenological. All our presentations are primarily those of guidance” (Mićić 1937, p. 133). We can trace the paradox of phenomenology to the fact there is no way of addressing it externally. Showing the path, in the case of phenomenology, cannot be accomplished by simply describing the path, or by just being aware of its specificities and minute details. One cannot describe or imagine the path of phenomenology before the one doing the describing or imagining has traversed it. Mićić’s book is self-consciously non-phenomenological, as its intention is not to present and demonstrate phenomenology in practice, but to create interest in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and to facilitate her readers’ understanding thereof. Even though the author does not try to present her own phenomenological attempts and trials, the experience of dealing with actual phenomenological philosophizing is clearly felt there. For instance, the focus of her descriptions never ceases to highlight the insurmountable tension between the mundane and the transcendental. Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s famous thesis from the foreword to the Phénoménologie de la perception that “the greatest lesson of reduction is the impossibility of a complete reduction” (Merleau-Ponty 1945, p. VIII), is explicitly present in Zagorka Mićić’s book. It presents a trace of her personal experience and the challenges that she encountered while practicing the phenomenological method: “The complete enactment of the phenomenological reduction is very difficult. Phenomenology has to constantly do battle against itself, its habits, to guard itself against using any premise based on knowledge within the dogmatic or natural attitude. It is not easy to preserve that utter purity across the continuous experience which a phenomenologist studies, and not fall under the influence of believing in the ‘existence of the world.’ That purity must be maintained, as phenomenology claims to be the ‘first philosophy’ and claims to enable a complete critique of our natural experience and scientific knowledge, that is, of the mind” (Mićić 1937, p. 70). Among the more interesting moments is the relationship between the personal history of the philosopher and his transcendental subjectivity. If we adhere to Husserl’s basic methodological requirement, our personal mundane experiences should not leave a mark on our transcendental insights. Because of this, Heidegger and Ebinghaus claimed that the pure ‘ego’ has the repression of historicity to thank for its existence and it exists solely as the abstract subject of theoretical acts (Pöggeler 1999, p. 26). Joining humbly those of Husserl’s disciples who decried the non-historical (hence unacceptable) starting position of phenomenology, beyond time and society, Zagorka Mićić indirectly implied the necessity of exchanging the transcendental ego for the historical ego: “the question of what influence a person’s actual history has on the very form of her experience is not very clear or resolved, but it is crucial for transcendental observation itself” (Mićić 1937, p. 140). If transcendental consciousness must be cleansed of all things mundane, does that imply a complete indifference of phenomenology to the actual political, social and economic constellations of intersubjectivity? Such a conclusion caused discomfort and disquietude for Zagorka Mićić.

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Zagorka Mićić’s key contribution concerning the relationship between the transcendental and the mundane emerges most clearly when we consider how she diverges from the ideas of her colleague Eugene Fink. Even though many layers of her description of Husserl’s phenomenology are based on two of Fink’s articles (The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism and What Does Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology Want?), it is possible to distinguish her individual insights. The position of the mundane, everyday attitude must be a relevant starting point when examining the realistic aims of any transcendental philosophy. Thus, according to Mićić, the source of the transcendental is not within itself, but comes from the existential, which admittedly Husserl also noted in the Encyclopedia Britannica article: “the transcendental problem derives the means of its solution from an existence-stratum which it presupposes and sets beyond the reach of its inquiry” (Farber 1966, p. 38). It looks as though Husserl’s student, like Plato, believed that reaching the phenomenological, or philosophical attitude, does not have a purpose in itself, but is a reaction to non-philosophical ideas, to the world from which philosophy started and from which it was initially separated. Mićić was convinced that phenomenology must therefore be allowed to be evaluated from the position of the mundane: “Unlike Dr. Fink, we believe that a single, mundane critique of phenomenological philosophy is possible, when it is weighed by its general results used for knowing the world, and for its role in the history of philosophy” (Mićić 1938, pp. 538–539). She set down the conclusions of her book apodictically. They leave no room for doubt. Using the imperative style which was usually foreign to her, Mićić claimed that every criticism of phenomenology must question three aspects of the reduction. The first concerns how realistic the possibility of excluding the general thesis of the natural attitude is; if it is not entirely possible there can be no neutrality of the phenomenological view. The second relates to the question of the field of transcendental experience. Mićić asks if it is really new, or are we, in our stream of consciousness, through the reduction, only approaching it from a new angle? The third aspect of the reduction that necessarily leaves room for thought and criticism, deals with the translation from the transcendental I to the transcendental We. Regarding the relationship between phenomenology and language, in the second volume of the Logical Investigations, Edmund Husserl begins by noting that the creation of pure logic cannot trace its origin back to formal logic. On the contrary, it must begin in an analysis of language. Phenomenological examinations of language represent the integral part of logical research—a tutorial without which logic would be forever doomed to “stabbing in the dark.” Since it is the linguistic expression that forms a phenomenological unity with the fulfilment of meaning, that is, with knowing in a phenomenological sense, Husserl’s fundamental insight was that without the analysis of expressions, there would be no knowledge in the modern sense of the word. It seems that this insight, together with the questions related to practice of phenomenological thought, was crucial for the formation of Zagorka Mićić’s work.

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5  Phenomenology: A Synthesis of Modern Philosophy Unlike her contemporaries, who constantly complained that Husserl’s claims about the complete independence of phenomenology were empty verbal constructs, since it seemed firmly stuck in the tradition of transcendental verbalism and owed most of its ideas to Descartes and Kant—Mićić rather tried to find the place of phenomenology within the framework of modern thought. She could also point to the personal conversations she had with Husserl, showing that understanding phenomenology without reference to the history of philosophy, could provide only an inept and inadequately founded view of phenomenology. On the contrary, the emergence of phenomenology is not a coincidence; it has its necessary historical, philosophical but also cultural preparations. Mićić makes the subtle suggestion that the spirit of modernity is exemplified in the process of civilization emancipating itself from its natural condition. If the origin of phenomenological thought is in the radical break with the natural attitude and its general thesis, then a complex process of civilization was necessary for it to see the light of day: “Husserl thinks that phenomenology and its method could have appeared only now, due to its incompatibility with and distance from the natural way of thinking. It is difficult, it takes time to get into it, as it requires absolute concentration and much exercise” (Mićić 1937, p. 32). It is therefore very impressive to see the calm and composure this young girl demonstrated after the fierce attacks on her book about phenomenology, which Momčilo Selesković published in 1938 under the catchy title Husserl’s Three Fallacies. Selesković was also German-educated, a far more experienced professor, and “now a renowned specialist in Kant’s philosophy” (Witlund-Fantini 2007, p. 35). He attacked phenomenology, claiming it represents nothing more than: “an assemblage of verbal constructions with an evident and complete lack of self-­ criticism—something phenomenology persistently talks about, but only in the manner of someone desiring what he does not have: like a sick man talking of health, or a poor man of wealth” (Selesković 1938, p. 354). In her reply, Mićić claimed that what is usually a matter of pride for a culture (the richness of its traditions, its inherited knowledge etc.), cannot be seen as an advantage from the standpoint of phenomenology; such depth of cultural tradition is more of a flaw that prevents understanding. The phenomenological imperative of beginning anew, making a new start, its avant-garde echo of abandoning the outdated, and to make a conquest of the promising, must be present as a moment of one’s personal experience of thinking. Otherwise, there will be no reward for one’s efforts to think, to enter into the understanding of phenomenology: “For the modern man who is spiritually formed, in an established culture, with the knowledge and experience of many generations, this original experience is not easily accessible and often requires a certain methodical effort […] phenomenology as a philosophy has placed before itself the task of exploring the sources of knowledge of the world” (Mićić 1939, p. 533). Mićić was no doubt indebted to Fink’s systematic text The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism for the evidently gentle tone she maintained, which is astonishingly calm in light of the criticism to which she was

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responding, as this article offered answers to a vast array of diverse critiques aimed at phenomenological philosophy. Fink’s key idea, which concisely responds to all opponents of phenomenology, simply stated that, for phenomenology, an external criticism is not possible, as it cannot be approached without adopting and practicing phenomenological methodology: “there is no phenomenology that has not passed through reduction. That which usually wants to characterize itself as phenomenology, but avoids reduction, is a principally mundane philosophy, a dogmatic one (phenomenologically understood)” (Fink 1966, p. 105). In the foreword to Mićić’s book, Fink summarizes and simplifies his idea: “One cannot speak of the reduction without performing the reduction itself” (Fink 1937, p. IV). Being aware of the difficulties of the reduction, Zagorka Mićić, without much fanfare, boldly went into a mundane critique of phenomenology from the standpoint of a modern history of philosophy, with the intent of revealing that the program of phenomenology is systematic and that its development requires an historical-­ philosophical perspective, as it represents a synthesis of modern philosophy. In a word, it “broadly encompasses all the scientific ideas of modern philosophy” (Mićić 1937, p. 22). With the purpose of explaining the historical assumptions of phenomenology, the first chapter is dedicated to the presentation of the philosophical specificities of Neo-Kantianism, positivism, and Bergson’s philosophy. According to Zagorka Mićić, the great neo-Kantian schools had their greatest opponent in the fashionable psychologistic attempts at founding logic and epistemology. Husserl’s phenomenology adopted the neo-Kantian idea of the independence of philosophical problems and their ineradicable difference from psychological research. Husserl’s phenomenology also has the positivists to thank for consistently highlighting the difference between the originary activity (like perception) and that which is an addendum to awareness (its convictions, goals, ideals, values, etc.). Husserl will also adopt James and Avenarius’ term ‘pure experience,’ which will become crucial when talking of the phenomenological reduction. This term entails the separation of the original and the derived. Phenomenology is mainly interested in approaching the original facts, as they are given without our processing, interpretation or evaluation. Later conscious procedures, and acquired schematics, through which the given is categorized and put under value systems, remain beyond Husserl’s interests. The reduction of the entire field of experience, of both real and possible experience, implies a focus on the elementary facts of conscious life, in the intentional difference between a conscious act and its object. The new idea that phenomenology brings is that it tries to describe and present the core laws of spiritual life, consciousness, and the subjectivity of consciousness (Husserl 1968, p. 516), but by concentrating on the stream of consciousness, or, as William James put it: “the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material to our later recollection with its conceptual categories” (James 1912, p. 93). Phenomenology had Bergson to thank for its idea of origin, which should not be searched for anywhere but in the “intuitive deepening of awareness into one’s own life” (Mićić 1937, p. 20). After non-phenomenological book on phenomenology we face the second paradox that Mićić describes. It relates to the status of the term of subjectivity. On the one hand, its diagnosis is that phenomenology represents the final consequence of

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modern subjectivism, but at the same time, she wonders if the name for the term subjectivity is the most appropriate one? Subjectivity is without doubt burdened with multiple meanings which have nothing to do with phenomenology. She recommends understanding that term in the sense of the unbreakable bond between awareness, experience, and the world. In addition to her exhaustive representation of methodological specificity of transcendental phenomenology’s methodological specificity, and the strictly philosophical portrayal of phenomenological thinking, Zagorka Mićić stressed the philosophical and historical importance of a phenomenological understanding of humanity, or a new ideal imbued with broad tolerance. Owing to her personal encounters and conversations with the founder of phenomenology, Mićić was especially capable of demonstrating the political importance of Husserl’s concept of “absolute evil,” which appears where egoism morphs into ruthlessness towards others: “Following that same path, nationalism could create a very unhealthy foundation, since it is, in fact, nothing less than a degenerate egoism” (Mićić 1973, pp. 140–141). Bearing in mind the argumentation of the Vienna Lecture, the concept of evil in Husserl’s thinking amounts to a biased rationality. Mićić translates this into political reality, arguing that this superficial and biased rationality brings about a perverted relationship between—and disrespect for—one national community and its other, surrounding communities. If Husserl could have lived for 10 more years, he would have seen how Mićić’s interpretation sought to inaugurate a dramatic shift in phenomenology. From a politically distanced theoretical philosophy, phenomenology would have turned into a highly sophisticated political philosophy. It is a pity that Husserl’s followers and devotees have mostly overseen the capacities of phenomenology to become a leading political philosophy of our time (Klaus Held is a rare exception, and of course Hannah Arendt, within the movement broadly conceived). What can we learn from the reception of phenomenology in interbellum Yugoslavia? The process of establishing and recognizing a phenomenology as one of the most important philosophical orientations within contemporary philosophy was neither predetermined, nor certainly given. The representatives of the first generation of Husserl’s students pointed out convincingly that a philosophy which introduces a new beginning exceeds everything that precedes it. Consequently, phenomenology could not be assessed and evaluated from the former point of views that do not respect and appropriate its specific methodological and ontological demands.

References Alfirević, Ante. 1925. Fenomenologija. Život 6 (4): 240–248. Banica, Svetislav. 1931. Filozofsko delo Maksa Šelera. Letopis Matice srpske 105 (328): 279–280. Camus, Albert. 1942. Le Mythe de Sisyphe. Paris: Gallimard. Drainac, Rade. 1936. Povodom novih fenomenoloških filosofema. Slika aktuelnih događaja 2: 3.

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Đurić, Miloš. 1922. Filozofija panhumanizma. In Jedan pokušaj nove jugoslovenske sintagme. Beograd: Knjižarnica Rajković/Đuković. Farber, Marvin. 1966. The aims of phenomenology. The motives, methods, and impacts of Husserl’s thought. New York: Harper. Fink, Eugen. 1937. Predgovor (Foreword). In Fenomenologija Edmunda Huserla. Studija iz savremene filozofije, II–IV. Beograd: Izdanje knjižare Pelikan. ———. 1966. Studien zur Phänomenologie 1930–1939. Den Haag: Nijhoff. Husserl, Edmund. 1913. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie I. Halle: Max Niemeyer. ———. 1968. Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925. In Husserliana: Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke, ed. Walter Biemel, vol. 9. Den Haag: Nijhoff. James, William. 1912. The thing and its relations. In Essays in radical empiricism, ed. Ralph Barton Perry, 92–122. New York: Longmans. Jovanović, Pero. 1938. Zagorka Mićić, Fenomenologija Edmunda Huserla. Studija iz savremene filozofije, Beograd: Izdanje knjižare Pelikan. Svetosavlje 7 (1): 45–48. Keilbach, Vilim. 1932. Husserlova fenomenologija. Život 13 (1): 35–44. ———. 1939. Fenomenološka filozofija. Povodom obljetnice smrti Edmunda Husserla (1859–1938). Hrvatska smotra 7 (5): 235–244. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1945. Phénoménologie de la percepcion. Paris: Gallimard. Mićić, Zagorka. 1933. Fenomenologija u savremenoj nemačkoj filozofiji. Misao 15 (42): 111–123. ———. 1937. Fenomenologija Edmunda Huserla. Studija iz savremene filozofije. Predgovor napisao Eugen Fink. Beograd: Izdanje knjižare Pelikan. ———. 1938. Kritika i saznanje. Povodom članka “Huserlove tri zablude” [Criticism and knowledge. On the occasion of the article “Three errors of Husserl”]. Srpski Književni Glasnik, Nova serija, LIII, (7): 532–539. ———. 1973. Sećanja na susrete s Huserlom. Književna kritika 4 (2): 135–144. Pöggeler, Otto. 1999. Heidegger und seine Zeit. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag. Popović, Koča, and Marko Ristić. 1931. Nacrt za jednu fenomenologiju iracionalnog. Beograd: Nadrealistička Izdanja. Prole, Dragan. 2018. The theological turn of phenomenology as return: Hedwig Conrad-Martius and Max Scheler Versus the Husserlian secular breakthrough. Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 17 (2): 253–267. Safranski, Rüdiger. 1994. Ein Meister aus Deutschland. Heidegger und seine Zeit. München: Carl Hanser Verlag. Šajković, Radmila. 2003. Zagorka Mićić—povodom stogodišnjice rođenja. Theoria 46: 17–26. Selesković, T. Momčilo. 1938. Huserlove tri zablude. Srpski Književni Glasnik 53 (5): 353–360. Vujić, Vladimir. 1937. Osvald Špengler i njegovo delo (Foreword). In Propast zapada: nacrti za istoriju morfologije sveta, ed. Olswld Spengler and Preveo Vladimir Vujić, 5–18. Beograd: Književne Novine. Witlund-Fantini, Anne-Marie. 2007. Danica Seleskovitch. Interprète et témoin du XX siècle. Laussanne: L’Âge d’Homme.

Index

A Actuality, 131–134 Aesthetics, 3, 4, 7, 9, 12, 18, 19, 21–23, 41, 60, 67, 78, 80, 99, 100, 102, 111, 131, 138, 164–181, 200 Ajdukiewicz, K., 38, 39, 41, 42, 164 Aquinas, Saint Thomas, 61 Aristotle, 36, 40, 41, 44, 45, 47, 53, 77, 88 Augustine, 77 Augustine of Hippo, 77 Avenarius, R., 187, 214 B Banica, S., 207 Beck, M., 12, 147, 157 Berdyaev, N., 76, 78 Bergson, H., 9, 12, 88, 90, 112, 114, 156, 188, 190–192, 195–197, 214 Blaustein, L., 3, 12, 164–181 Böhme, J., 61 Bolzano, B., 3, 18, 43–45, 47, 53, 69, 169 Brentano, F., 3, 6, 8, 9, 17–19, 21–23, 32, 37, 40, 44–46, 48–50, 53, 54, 69, 80, 90, 169 Bundle theory, 10, 115–117, 119–121, 125 C Camus, A., 207 Celms, T., 3, 11, 12, 145–160, 166 Chyzhevsky, D., 3 Cohen, H., 10, 93, 109 Communication, 45, 46, 61, 68, 72, 200, 209 Comprehension, 9, 60, 62–64, 66–68, 70–72

Conrad-Martius, H., 147, 151, 207 Consciousness, 8, 17, 39, 60, 77, 84, 87, 96, 112, 133, 150, 165, 188, 207 Constitution, 12, 71, 72, 114, 124, 129, 131, 133, 137, 139, 143, 165, 173, 181, 193–197 Content, 12, 19, 36, 62, 81, 100, 113, 128, 164, 199, 205 Cornelius, H., 25–27, 169 Czeżowski, T., 39, 41, 42 D Daubert, J., 146, 147, 157 Descartes, R., 45, 69, 158, 213 Descriptive psychology, 12, 17–19, 21, 24, 38, 39, 51, 152, 164–181 Dilthey, W., 62, 64, 65, 69, 80, 130, 149 Direct experience, 95, 97, 108, 112, 114, 115, 119 Drainac, R., 204 E Eidetic intuition, 8, 11, 104, 105, 130, 136, 138, 166–168, 173 Eidetic reduction, 134–137 Eidetics, 165–167, 173, 191 Enyvvari, E., 3 Epoché, 11, 128–131, 138, 159, 193, 194 Essences, 9–11, 39, 60, 63, 68, 69, 78–80, 83, 94, 97–99, 102, 104, 105, 107, 108, 112–114, 117, 119–122, 124, 129, 132–136, 149, 150, 165–168, 172–175, 189, 190, 200, 208

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Index

218 Evidentialism, 39 Experience, 11, 19, 38, 61, 77, 95, 99, 109, 112, 115, 130, 151, 164, 188, 207 F Fink, E., 13, 128, 134, 187, 188, 194, 206, 210, 212, 214 Florensky, P., 6, 75 Frank, S., 6, 9, 75–91 Frege, G., 47 Freud, S., 85, 86, 88, 204, 205 Fundamental ontology, 135 G Gadamer, H.-G., 9, 64–68 Geiger, M., 12, 146–149, 157 Gestalt, 10, 22, 23, 113, 115, 116, 121–125 Geyser, J., 3, 146, 148 Ginsberg, E., 165 Göttingen Circle, 2 Grondin, J., 66 H Hartmann, N., 12, 148, 149, 158 Heidegger, M., 2–5, 9, 65–68, 71, 81, 85, 98, 128, 131, 134, 135, 140–143, 187, 195, 198, 204, 208, 209, 211 Hering, J., 61, 121, 147, 207, 209 Hermeneutic attitude, 61 Hermeneutic turn, 63, 64, 71 Hermeneutics, 4, 9, 60–73, 130 Hessen, K.–S., 6 Historical knowledge, 62 Historical reflection, 68 Höfler, A., 23, 44, 50, 169 Husserl, E., 1, 5, 17, 36, 60, 75, 95, 112, 128, 145, 164, 187, 204 I Idealism, 3, 6, 11, 18, 39, 76, 85, 101, 113, 131, 146–160, 165, 168, 191, 204, 205, 208 Immanence, 8, 9, 24, 27, 28, 49, 108, 149, 151, 156 Immanent object, 19, 24, 27–31, 39 Ingarden, R., 3, 5, 10–12, 37, 44, 51, 111–125, 147, 164–166, 168, 170, 172, 173, 175, 176, 178–181, 210 Intentional objects, 24, 28, 136, 139, 168, 172, 176, 178, 179, 181

Intentionality, 19, 23, 28, 29, 46, 49, 67, 80, 96–98, 108, 129, 130, 136, 138, 139, 179, 195 Intersubjectivity, 154, 155, 159, 211 Introspection, 41, 167, 168 Intuition, 8–12, 31, 41, 42, 47, 66, 68, 71, 73, 78, 79, 95–98, 104–109, 114, 130, 131, 133, 135, 136, 138, 151, 166, 167, 173, 176–179, 189–191 Intuitivism, 76, 77, 156 Ionescu, N., 3, 11, 128–143 J Jakovenko, B., 75 James, W., 24, 43, 214 K Kant, I., 3, 11, 45, 78, 89, 94, 146, 150, 155, 158, 210, 213 Kantianism, 11, 149, 156, 205 Keilbach, V., 208 Kerry, B., 44 Köhler, W., 165 Kolnai, A., 3 Koyré, A., 3, 5, 154 Krejčí, F., 6, 189 Kroner, R., 6 Külpe, O., 148 Kundera, M., 5 L Landgrebe, L., 3, 5, 7, 32, 187, 188, 192, 195, 210 Languages, 4–6, 8, 9, 18, 22, 27, 36, 38, 41, 46, 52, 60, 62, 64, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 82, 93, 95, 106–109, 193, 210, 212 Leśniewski, S., 37, 40, 41, 51, 52 Lived experience, 12, 141, 151, 155, 156, 165–171, 175, 180 Locke, J., 39 Losev, A., 75, 76 Lossky, N., 6, 75–77, 82, 93, 96, 149, 154 Love, 11, 21, 80, 82, 131–133, 137–140 Łukasiewicz, J., 36, 37, 39, 43, 45, 47, 48, 52 Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS), 5, 8, 12, 36–54, 164 M Mach, E., 22, 115 Marty, A., 6, 8, 17–32

Index Marxism, 76 Mathematical logic, 37, 42, 45, 47, 48 Mehlis, G., 6 Meinong, A., 4, 21–23, 37, 43, 48, 50, 51, 169, 178 Merleau-Ponty, M., 12, 13, 187, 199, 211 Messer, A., 149 Metaphilosophy, 8, 36, 38–40, 48, 49, 51, 54 Metaphysics, 11, 18, 38–40, 45, 48, 51, 77, 78, 118, 128–131, 133, 135, 138–141, 143, 155, 156, 159, 193, 197, 198 Mićić, Z., 3, 13, 204–215 Mill, J.S., 20 Monadology, 159 Munich Circle, 2 N Natorp, P., 93, 109 Natural attitude, 11, 72, 128, 129, 135, 138, 142, 166, 178, 211–213 Natural world, 12, 88, 187–201 Naturalism, 95, 99, 102 Neo-Kantianism, 6, 10, 13, 94, 109, 156, 214 Neutrality modification, 11, 130, 143 Nietzsche, F., 78, 134, 205, 206 Noema, 70, 71, 112, 168, 173 Noesis, 70, 112 Non-actionality modification, 11, 130–134 O Object, 12, 19, 36, 67, 76, 96, 112, 129, 149, 164, 197, 208 Ontology, 7, 8, 10, 11, 36–54, 67, 76, 78, 80, 108, 111, 113, 114, 116–118, 121, 123, 135, 136, 140–142, 167 Ortega y Gasset, J., 12, 158 Otto, R., 140 P Palagyi, M., 3 Patočka, J., 3, 61, 153, 157, 187, 210 Pfänder, A., 12, 82, 146–148, 157 Phenomenological methods, 39, 66, 71, 72, 81, 90, 94, 97, 129, 130, 137–140, 149–152, 158, 165–168, 173, 196, 208, 211, 214 Phenomenological reduction, 95, 142, 145, 151, 152, 174, 192, 194, 211, 214 Phenomenological reflection, 106, 151, 152 Plato, 39, 77, 85, 212 Popović, K., 205

219 Positivism, 13, 78, 101, 108, 190, 214 Post-colonial thought, 205 Potentiality, 87, 132 Prague Linguistic Circle, 3 Principle of all principles, 96, 114, 115, 208 Psychognosy, 17, 19 Psychologism, 8, 21, 39, 42–48, 112, 156, 173, 175, 208 Pure consciousness, 112, 113, 151, 155, 156, 166–168 Pure experience, 214 Pure knowledge, 94, 95, 101–103, 105, 109 Purely intentional object, 113, 179, 181 R Rationality, 38, 78, 89, 95, 191–192, 205, 215 Realism, 11, 37, 68, 94, 146, 148, 149, 152, 157, 191 Reid, T., 65 Reinach, A., 2, 48, 51, 157 Rickert, H., 62, 148, 149, 157, 158 Ricœur, P., 71 Ristić, M., 205 Rosanov, V., 76 S Scheler, M., 2, 11, 61, 98, 100, 104, 109, 128, 147, 207 Schleiermacher, F.D.E., 69 Selesković, M., 213 Self-consciousness, 77, 84, 87, 100, 109 Semiotics, 60, 62, 65, 67 Sense, 9, 22, 39, 60, 75, 96, 112, 128, 150, 166, 187, 205 Sesemann, V., 6, 10, 93–110 Shestov, L., 4, 62 Sigwart, C., 50, 62, 68 Simmel, G., 65 Simons, P., 37, 52–54, 119 Social life, 72 Solipsism, 11, 150, 152–156, 158–160 Soloviev, V., 76 Soul, 9, 38, 76, 79, 85, 87, 136 Spengler, Oswald Arnold Gottfried, 205 Špet, G., 3, 4, 9, 60–73, 75, 76, 96 Stavenhagen, K., 4 Stein, E., 147, 207 Stepun, F., 6 Stumpf, C., 2, 3, 6, 17, 18, 48, 82, 165 Subjectivity, 12, 94, 99, 149, 159, 188, 192–198, 201, 207, 211, 214 Szilasi, W., 4

Index

220 T Tarski, A., 36, 37, 41, 45, 52 Tatarkiewicz, T., 43 Theory of knowledge, 10, 11, 93–110, 128–141 Time-consciousness, 196 Trăire (experience), 130 Transcendence, 8, 28, 95, 108, 134, 137, 138, 149, 151, 152, 155 Transcendental ego, 134, 150, 158, 159, 211 Transcendental experience, 212 Transcendental idealism, 3, 6, 131, 146, 149–159, 168, 191, 205, 208 Transcendental phenomenology, 11–13, 62, 78, 108, 131, 145–150, 153, 156, 160, 165, 180, 181, 188, 193, 194, 197–201, 210, 215 Transcendental reduction, 13, 138, 194 Transcendental turn, 11, 147 Transcendentalism, 156, 165 Transcends, 9, 28, 62, 78, 105, 112, 131, 159, 165, 188, 205 Truth-bearers, 8, 37, 40, 47, 48, 54

Truth-makers, 8, 9, 36, 37, 48–52, 54 Twardowski, K., 3, 12, 36, 42, 114, 164, 165 V Veber, F., 4 Vienna Circle, 39 Virtuality, 131–134, 137 von Bubnoff, N., 6 von Hildebrand, D., 100 von Ehrenfels, C., 17, 22, 23 von Humboldt, F.W.H.A., 64, 191 Vujić, V., 205 W Walther, G., 207 Wertheimer, M., 165 Wundt, W., 62 Z Zimmermann, R., 44, 169