Duty, virtue and practical reason in Kant's metaphysics of morals 9783487421520, 3487421526

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REASON AND NORMATIVITY Edited by Ana Marta González and Alejandro G. Vigo

Vicente de Haro Romo

Duty, Virtue and Practical Reason in Kant᾿s Metaphysics of Morals

OLMS

Reason and Normativity Razón y Normatividad Vernunft und Normativität A Series on Practical Reason, Morality, and Natural Law Escritos sobre razón práctica, moralidad y ley natural Schriftenreihe zu praktischer Vernunft, Moralität und Naturrecht edited by / editado por / herausgegeben von Ana Marta González / Alejandro G. Vigo

Vol. / Band 11

Georg Olms Verlag Hildesheim ¿ Zürich ¿ New York 2015

Vicente de Haro Romo

Duty, Virtue and Practical Reason in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals Translated into English by Erik Norvelle

Georg Olms Verlag Hildesheim ¿ Zürich ¿ New York 2015

This work and all articles and pictures involved are protected by copyright. Application outside the strict limits of copyright law without consent having been obtained from the publishing firm is inadmissible. These regulations are meant especially for copies,translations and micropublishings as well as for storing and editing in electronic systems. Das Werk ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen.

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.

© Georg Olms Verlag AG, Hildesheim 2015 www.olms.de E-Book Umschlaggestaltung: Inga Günther, Hildesheim Alle Rechte vorbehalten ISBN 978-3-487-42152-0

CONTENTS Preface..............................................................................................................

7

Abbreviations.................................................................................................

9

General Introduction......................................................................................

11

Chapter 1 Ends, Maxims and Duties............................................................................ 1.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 1.2 The end as matter of the maxim....................................................... 1.3 The possibility of an end that is a duty............................................ 1.4 Structure, function and generality of the maxims.......................... 1.5 The distinction between will and faculty of choice (WilleWillkür).................................................................................................

21 21 25 37 43 59

Chapter 2 The Transition trom the Critique of Practical Reason to the Doctrine of Virtue...................................................................................................... 2.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 2.2 From critique to system..................................................................... 2.3 The supreme principle of virtue....................................................... 2.4 The three formulations of the categorical imperative and the principle of virtue............................................................................... 2.5 The principle of virtue as a synthetic a priori proposition........... 2.5.1 The empirical content presupposed in the Doctrine of Virtue.................................................................................... 2.5.2 Anthroponomy, autonomy and autocracy............................

106 114

Chapter 3 The Doctrine of Virtue.................................................................................. 3.1 Introduction: virtue, vice and absence of virtue............................. 3.2 The necessity of virtue and its theoretical presuppositions.......... 3.2.1 Virtue in the face of radical evil.............................................. 3.2.2 The virtuous Gesinnung as necessary condition..................... 3.3 The aesthetic prenotions of the receptivity of duty....................... 3.3.1 Moral feeling..............................................................................

121 121 134 134 145 151 151

69 69 73 81 97 104

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Contents

3.3.2 The moral conscience.............................................................. 3.3.3 Love for neighbor and philanthropy..................................... 3.3.4 Respect for oneself................................................................... 3.4 The moral prerequisites for virtue.................................................... 3.4.1 Moral mastery of oneself......................................................... 3.4.2 Moral apathy.............................................................................. 3.5 Principles of the pure Doctrine of Virtue....................................... 3.5.1 The appropriate ground for each duty of virtue.................. 3.5.2 The critique of Aristotle: the virtuous mean versus the ethics of maxims...................................................................... 3.5.3 The duties of virtue and the human capacities for their fulfillment.................................................................................. Chapter 4 The Duties of Virtue..................................................................................... 4.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 4.2 Duties to oneself................................................................................. 4.2.1 The apparent antinomy of the duties to oneself.................. 4.2.2 Perfect duties to oneself.......................................................... 4.2.3 Imperfect duties to oneself...................................................... 4.3 Duties to others................................................................................... 4.3.1 To other human beings............................................................ 4.3.2 With regard to non-human beings: the amphiboly of the moral concepts of reflection.................................................. Chapter 5 Methodology of Virtue.................................................................................... 5.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 5.2 Ethical instruction: issues of exposition, dialogue, catechesis and casuistry........................................................................................ 5.3 Ethical asceticism................................................................................ 5.4 The “Fragment of a Moral Catechism”...........................................

160 170 173 175 176 180 185 186 188 198 201 201 208 208 220 249 255 255 281 295 295 296 306 309

Conclusions....................................................................................................

315

Bibliography...................................................................................................

325

Index of Names.............................................................................................

339

PREFACE

This volume is an abbreviated, improved and updated version of my doctoral dissertation, defended at the Universidad Panamericana on February 3, 2012. During my doctoral research I was blessed and honored with the supervision of Dr. Alejandro G. Vigo, to whom I wish to reiterate my thanks for his intellectual guidance and his teachings on Kant, but above all for his example of personal and philosophical integrity and his rigorous and deep philosophical thought. I must also thank Dr. Rocío Mier y Teran, Dr. Héctor Zagal, Dr. Luis Xavier-López Farjeat and Dr. Alberto Ross, all of whom are friends and teachers; and in the institutional realm, I owe thanks to the Universidad Panamericana and the Universidad de Navarra. It was at the latter institution that I was twice received as a visiting scholar, and was generously welcomed by Dr. Alejandro Llano, Dr. Ángel Luis González and Dr. José María Torralba. I am tremendously grateful to all of these philosophers. I am also grateful to another philosopher, Erik Norvelle, who translated the book to English with great accuracy. I have corrected the errata and issues of lack of precision that I discovered in that first version. I have also abbreviated certain passages that were somewhat repetitive. Neither the hermeneutic orientation and specific argumentation regarding the duties of virtue nor my situating of the Tugendlehre within the framework of Kant’s practical philosophy have undergone any substantial changes in comparison with how I dealt with them in the first version of this text. However, I have updated the critical apparatus, and in particular I have incorporated a “dialogue” with the new commentary edited by Andreas Trampota, Oliver Sensen and Jens Timmermann (Kant’s Tugendlehre: a Comprehensive Commentary, De Gruyter, Berlin, 2013). This dialogue did not force me, however, to make any fundamental changes in the orientation of my own commentary on the Doctrine of Virtue. In order to shorten the text, and also to consolidate its argumentation, I have eliminated two rather extensive passages from the original

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Preface

dissertation. The first was a digression where I dealt (referring to Beatrice Longuenesse and her splendid study Kant and the Capacity to Judge) with the formation of empirical concepts in kantian epistemology. Further on, I made another excursus where, in regard to the duties related to the use of the sexual faculties, I paid extensive attention to Kant’s justification of marriage as the moral context for the exercise of sexuality. After eliminating these digressions, the text has turned out to be a commentary that more closely follows the strict order and content of the Tugendlehre, although chapters 1 and 2 in particular seek to go beyond a mere commentary and provide a systematic consideration of Kant’s practical philosophy as a whole. I wish to dedicate this book to those to whom I dedicated my original dissertation: to Casandra, to my parents, sisters, grandparents and to my uncle Albert and his family. It is because of them that everything makes sense.

ABBREVIATIONS

ApH AP Mrongovius GTP GMS IGA KpV KrV KU MAM MdS Ped Refl RGV UvR VzM

Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht Anthropologie (C.C. Mrongovius) Über das Gemeinspruch, das mag in der Theorie richtig sein taugt aber nicht für die Praxis Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht Kritik der praktischen Vernunft Kritik der reinen Vernunft Kritik der Urteilskraft Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte Metaphysik der Sitten Pädagogik (Rink) Reflexionen Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft Über ein vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu lügen Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie (Collins-Menzer [Mrongovius])

All of Kant’s works are cited, as is habitual in the academic world, by the page numbers of the edition of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften herausgegeben von der Königlich Preuβischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1900 and later), currently the German Academy of Sciences. As is usual, the KrV will be cited according to its two editions (A-B) while the Reflexionen will be cited by the corresponding number. The VzM that I use in this book is that of Collins, completed by Menzer in the light of the manuscript of C. C. Mrongovius. The translations that I use are specified in the bibliography at the end of the book, and are also indicated in the footnotes to textual citations. In the case of the Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre, the basic text to which this monograph is dedicated, I have used the new edition of

10

Abbreviations

Bernd Ludwig (Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 2008), accompanied by the introduction by Ludwig himself together with a study by M. Gregor.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The reception of Kant’s ethics, during his own lifetime and up to the present time, has been paradoxical. On the one hand, the philosopher from Königsberg has been recognized as one of the greatest moral philosophers in the Western tradition. On the other hand, his ethics are often considered to be a series of unsustainable theses. His ethical thought has been discredited via generalizations and caricatures that are frequently mutually inconsistent (for instance, he is accused of an inhuman rigor in the application of the test of the categorical imperative, and at the same time he is –incredibly– accused of having laid the foundations for contemporary moral relativism; it has further been said that the maxims are easily manipulable and that any action can be validated by this test). Those new to the subject may well feel disoriented at seeing this kind of presentation of one of the greatest thinkers in the history of ethics. I worry that their disillusionment could end up affecting their ideas about philosophy in general. None of these positions can hold up, however, at least not without certain adjustments required after an attentive reading of Kant’s moral works on their own. Nor, in particular, will they hold water after an interpretation of his texts that takes into account their internal relations over the totality of his texts, providing their reading is undertaken with that minimum of rigor and hermeneutical charity that should characterize any authentically philosophical encounter. Even so, some of these prejudiced approaches can at least be better understood –even if they cannot be justified– if one takes into account the fact that, among Kant’s moral works, the best known is the Groundwork, and that, in the best of cases, the critics also read the Critique of Practical Reason, two texts which are both at the level that Kant considered to be “propaedeutic” for the later development of his moral system, which would be brought to fruition in a “metaphysics of morals”. This book seeks precisely to present an integral interpretation of Kant’s moral thought, via a monographic study of his final moral work:

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the “Metaphysical Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue” (Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre),1 which is the second part of the Metaphysics of Morals (Metaphysik der Sitten), published in 1797, seven years before Kant’s death. I propose in this book to analyze the relations of this work with its predecessors (beginning with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, next the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment, up to Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, without neglecting the Lectures and the Reflections. I will also pay attention to certain architectonic analogies with the works that have to do with the theoretical use of reason, specifically the Critique of Pure Reason). I will first take advantage of certain passages in the Doctrine of Virtue in order to sketch out what we can call a “kantian theory of action”, after which I will comment on the rest of the Tugendlehre in order to analyze what could be characterized as Kant’s “material ethics”: the system of the duties of virtue, or of the “ends that are duties”, in the philosopher’s own words. I do not intend in this monographic study to present an apology for the ethical thought of Kant, although as the reader will see, the integral reading that I propose responds in good measure to the misunderstandings I mentioned above, and will also offer elements in order to confront objections of greater weight and pertinence. I will also, in my discussion of the concrete duties of virtue, refute the “formalist” vision of kantian ethics. In my approach to the Doctrine of Virtue I will also delve into the fundamentals of Kant’s theory of moral judgment, which is not specifically developed in any of his works but which is indispensable for understanding his thought. Recently, the brilliant analysis by Barbara Herman (whose works2 offer various heuristic keys that I will take into

1 As Günter Zöller correctly notes, in “Idee und Notwendigkeit einer Metaphysik der Sitten” (included in Kant’s Tugendlehre: a Comprehensive Commentary, ed. by Andreas Trampota, Oliver Sensen and Jens Timmermann, De Gruyter, Berlin, 2013, p. 21), the title of both the Doctrine of Virtue and the Doctrine of Right make clear that Kant is only speaking of principles (Anfangsgründe). In both topic areas, the incorporation of the empirical conditions of realization of their respective duties means that a complete metaphysical treatment is impossible, and it is only possible to indicate principles for each type of obligatoriness and its application. 2 Concretely and principally: Morality as Rationality: a Study of Kant’s Ethics, Harvard Dissertations in Philosophy, Garland Publishing, 1990; The Practice of Moral Judgment, Har-

General Introduction

13

account in this book) has offered a certain reconstruction of the kantian theory of moral judgment, although her work lacked exegetical intentions. In this book I will follow her suggestions by making more references to the text of Kant himself. Thus, I will defend the position that what Kant states in the Doctrine of Virtue is perfectly consistent with his moral philosophy as presented in the Groundwork and the second Critique, against those who suggest that he “regressed” to classical ethics in the last period of his intellectual production. The Metaphysics of Morals was undervalued right from the time of its initial publication due to the supposed “senility” of its author. It is true that Kant could not pay as much attention to the edition of this work as he did to prior publications (and it is for this reason that there are certain problems of compagination in the Doctrine of Right or Rechtslehre, the first part of the treatise, and certain inconsistencies between the General Introduction and the actual development of the work).3 However, the Metaphysics of Morals had been conceived, in its general lines, long before, and it offers crucial elements for understanding the application of the moral principle that Kant had isolated and identified beginning in the Grundlegung, and whose pretensions to validity and effectiveness he had justified in his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. In the Tugendlehre Kant does not return to a pre-critical morality: on the contrary, beginning with his a priori grounding of ethics he proceeds to a consideration of rational agency, attentive to the fundamental characteristics of human nature. He thus applies the categorical imperative to the consideration of concrete duties, which he calls “duties of virtue” (Tugendpflichten), insofar as they require moral fortitude in order to carry vard University Press, Massachusetts, 1993; and Moral Literacy, Harvard University Press, New York, 2007. 3 Although these problems principally affect the Rechtslehre and not the Tugendlehre, which is the focus of this book, I have written my study using the corrected edition of Bernd Ludwig, the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre (Metaphysik der Sitten: Zweiter Teil), Mit einer Einführung “Kant’s System der Pflichten in der Metaphysik der Sitten” von Mary Gregor, herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Bernd Ludwig, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1990. For the English translation, I will use that of Mary Gregor, The Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge University Press, 1991, although I will modify it at certain points, which I will indicate in each case, and I will always compare the cited English texts with Ludwig’s edition.

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them out, and which involve a kind of “moral jurisprudence” at the distinct levels into which he structures the maxims by which human action acquires intelligibility and can be morally evaluated. In this way, the monographic study that I present here also demonstrates that the label of “deontologism” –if it is understood as being opposed to an “ethics of virtue” or an “ethics of goods”– is not an adequate characterization of Kant’s thought, which, through the lens of his views on duty, also offers an understanding of virtue and a structured and hierarchical system of ends –of goods– that reason itself shows to be obligatory for the human faculty of choice. Some commentators have recently attempted to present kantian ethics as a kind of “virtue ethics”. My intention in this work is instead to relativize the application of these categories and promote the study of what is specific to Kant’s ethics without the distortion and leveling that these “labels” generally impose. It seems to me that the Metaphysics of Morals has been broadly ignored, and even more so in the Spanish-speaking world in which I normally work. In the German language, on the other hand, the majority of the bibliography on Kant’s ethics takes it into account –and there are studies that have focused on it specifically, such as that of Andrea M. Esser,4 among others, and in English there is the foundational monographic work by Mary Gregor5 along with other studies that are more recent.6 The truth, however, is that –as Gregor herself has noted– if critics had paid more attention to the Metaphysics of Morals, and specifically to the Doctrine of Virtue, certain confusions could have been avoided from the start, such as those regarding kantian “ethical formalism” or about how

4 ESSER, Andrea Marlen, Eine Ethik für Endliche: Kants Tugendlehre in der Gegenwart, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 2004. 5 GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom, A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, Blackwell, Oxford, 1963. 6 E.g. Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays (ed. Mark Timmons), OUP, New York, 2002; Kant’s Ethics of Virtue (Betzler, ed.), Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2008 and BAXLEY, Anne Margaret, Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010. Also Kant’s Tugendlehre: a Comprehensive Commentary, ed. by Andreas Trampota, Oliver Sensen and Jens Timmermann, De Gruyter, Berlin, 2013 with collaborations in English and German, as the product of international collaboration and three colloquia held in Munich in 2008 and 2009.

General Introduction

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the test of the categorical imperative should be used.7 In the Tugendlehre Kant himself had already applied his moral principle to the derivation and systematical exposition of a material ethics that is without a doubt worthy of being taken into consideration. The Metaphysics of Morals shows, in addition, how a kantian theory of moral judgment does not entirely depend upon the categorical imperative: it also requires certain prior contributions from the theory of action, an analysis of the sensible reception of moral motivation and the conditions of human agency – which are always “incarnate”, social, communicative and also always finite and fallible. It requires a consideration of moral deliberation in all its breadth, which is undertaken in concrete and particular contexts and institutions. In addition, it demands self-transparency as being the primordial task of human beings, whose vocation to self-knowledge is not ultimately distinguishable from the search for wisdom and from taking executive control, in a non-delegable way, of one’s own existence. In the first chapter of this work I offer a –necessarily general– vision of the kantian theory of action. Concretely, I look at the relation between maxims and ends, and the possibility of an end of human volition that is determined a priori to be obligatory: an end that ought to be held to be such. This is the general result that I draw from the General Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals. For this purpose, I also will reflect broadly on the structure and finality of maxims and on a distinction proper to the Metaphysik der Sitten: that which exists between will (Wille) and the faculty of choice (Willkür). Kant’s distinction in this regard establishes two planes which, despite being contextually identifiable in his prior moral works, are only specifically detailed in this work, and which permit a clearer understanding of autonomy and freedom itself, understood as the effective determination of the reason in our faculty of desiring. The second chapter explains the passage from the categorical imperative to what Kant calls the “supreme principle of virtue”, which will function as the principle of derivation for the concrete duties of virtue in the unfolding of the Tugendlehre. I will deal with the issue of how the “metaphysics of morals” qua discipline was planned beginning with 7 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom, A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. xi.

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Kant’s first ethical works from his critical period, as well as what differences there are between this initial plan and what he actually carried out in the text of 1797. I will also permit myself a digression in order to explain in what sense the so-called “supreme principle of virtue” is deduced from the categorical imperative. I will briefly discuss which of the formulations of the categorical imperative this supreme principle of virtue must be derived from, and I will explain two more specific concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals: those of autocracy and anthroponomy, in the light of their relationships, in order to better and more clearly understand basic concepts in Kant’s moral thought, such as the ideal of autonomy. In the third chapter I will deal with the kantian idea of virtue (Tugend): its logical opposition to moral weakness or the mere absence of virtue (Untugend) and its real opposition with vice (Laster). Virtue is characterized by Kant as being a moral principle intimately linked with struggle, and in this connection I will make a detour into Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason in order to briefly discuss the topic of radical evil in Kant, and how virtue opposes itself to this propensity towards egoism and selfdeception in a diachronic, progressive and asymptotic manner, in the forging of moral character itself. In the light of the text of the Religion I will also touch on the topic of the Gesinnung or fundamental disposition of the soul, which is presumed to be virtuous when one speaks of concrete virtues, and which will oblige me to distinguish between various levels of maxims and motivations in order to explain the subtleties of the kantian theory of moral imputation. In this same third section, I will discuss one of the most important topics involved in the study of the Tugendlehre: that of the “aesthetic prenotions [Vorbegriffe] for the receptivity of duty”. Moral sentiment, the conscience (in its moral sense, i.e. as Gewissen), the love for one’s neighbor and self-esteem or respect for oneself: I will study these dispositions as being preconditions for the identification of what is morally relevant and for the exercise of moral judgment, which is much more completely understood from this perspective than via an exclusive attention to the test of the universalization of the categorical imperative. These aesthetic prenotions will be shown to be analogous to the rules of moral salience that Barbara Herman has shown to be necessary for the application of the categorical imperative.

General Introduction

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I will also study the moral prerequisites of virtue, interpreting them as consisting in the demand for self-mastery and moral apathy that Kant established. These must be interpreted carefully in order to avoid the usual excesses that are fostered by a certain Stoic rhetoric used by Kant himself in regard to affective phenomena. He calls them the “principles of the pure doctrine of virtue”, which are a series of theses that he identifies as being proper to ancient ethical systems and which must be adequately reinterpreted and resituated within the framework of transcendental philosophy. Here I will assume a critical posture with respect to certain theses that Kant attributes to Aristotle without understanding the depth and detail with which these topics are handled by the Stagirite. Instead of merely indicating the limits of Kant’s understanding of Aristotelian ethics, I am interested in highlighting how both philosophers come to surprisingly similar conclusions, even though Kant did not recognize them as they were filtered through the teachings of later philosophers. The fourth chapter will deal with the concrete duties of virtue: divided into duties to oneself and duties to others, with each of these subheadings divided in turn into perfect and imperfect duties. This terminology can appear confusing because Kant is the inheritor of a long moral tradition that uses the terminology of perfect and imperfect duties,8 and he in turn reformulates these criteria, which in addition are not seamless or perfectly determinative.9 It can nonetheless be said –as I will show in greater detail in the body of this book– that perfect duties are those which do not admit of greater latitude (Spielraum) than that of the formation of their own concept –the what of the duty, and therefore tend to be negative duties, i.e. which only indicate what must not be done, while imperfect duties refer to having an end, and therefore admit of an interpretative latitude regarding the how, to whom, when and in what degree, etc., 8 This point is well explained by KERSTING, Wolfgang, Kant über Recht, Mentis, Paderborn, 2004, pp. 202-209, who shows how the distinction is presented in Grotius, Puffendorf, Leibniz, Wolff and Thomasius. I do not agree completely, however, with his interpretation of the distinction between ethics and law (cf. p. 224), as the reader will see immediately. 9 I will show, over the course of this book, how Kant himself relativizes this criterion by providing various reasons for why it is possible a duty can be classified as being imperfect.

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and which therefore tend to be positive and meritorious when fulfilled. At the crossroads of these and other criteria –duties to oneself and to others / perfect vs. imperfect duties / internal vs. external duties / duties whose fulfillment is and is not meritorious, etc.– we discover one of the difficulties of composition in the Metaphysics of Morals, and which needs to be dealt with starting here: in the General Introduction to the work, Kant appears to interpret perfect duties as broadly corresponding to those of the Doctrine of Right, while imperfect duties correspond to ethics and therefore to the Doctrine of Virtue. In the body of the work, however, only perfect duties with regard to others are specifically legal: the perfect virtues with regard to oneself are treated instead as specifically ethical. This can be criticized as being a theoretical inconsistency, or, as certain authors do, one can speak of perfect duties to oneself as ius latum. My posture in this book will be quite different: In the system of duties, the difference between ethics and law does not consist in there being two different list of concrete duties, but rather in two perspectives about the motivational aspect of the fulfillment of duty. The ethical duties are those which are fulfilled by the motivational force of the duty as a result of a consideration of its maxims, and thus virtue is self-coercion (Selbstzwang), insofar as no one external can force agents to have ends that they do not give themselves. On the other hand, legal duties (Rechtspflichten) are those which can be assigned norms for the external realization of the action. The motivational factor is not determined in this way, and thus it can consist in external coercion, legitimized by the role that the State fulfills by regulating the external freedom of individuals; the juridical laws thus take control of the initial self-suppressive tendency that freedom has in the state of nature.10 In regard to this motivational criterion that refers to two distinct types of obligatoriness and coercion, there do not exist two parallel lists of duties. Rather, there is a play of perspectives that permits all legal duties to be converted into ethical duties when they are fulfilled due to a moral motivation: not because of fear of sanction but because of the strictly ethical duty to act according to the law. Over the course of this book I will return to this line of interpretation 10 On this point I follow FRIEDRICH, Rainer, Eigentum und Staatsbegründung in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2004, p. 27 and above all VIGO, Alejandro G., “Ética y Derecho según Kant”, in Tópicos, n. 41 (December 2011), pp. 105-158.

General Introduction

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concerning the distinction between ethical and legal duties, in the light of the analogy that Kant himself makes with the relations between space and time in order to show how all that is legal can also be ethical (just as all that which is known in space is also known in time), but not viceversa. For the moment I have only sought to clearly delimit the “terrain” of this work: my book is concerned with the duties of virtue, including perfect duties to oneself. These duties, because they are not subject to external coercion, are ethical duties, despite their relatively “negative” or narrow character. However, insofar as they do not directly presuppose an obligatory end they are not, in the most strict sense, duties of virtue.11 I will therefore study the duties to oneself in an integral fashion, and I will confront the objections of those who say that there is a hidden contradiction in the very concept of duty to oneself, and will explain the response that Kant provides to this difficulty. In dealing with the perfect duties to oneself, I will investigate such interesting topics as the prohibition of suicide and of lying –a topic which is highly controversial among scholars of Kant’s moral philosophy– and the duties regarding sexuality, among others. I will also discuss the imperfect duties to oneself, and the preponderant role of the faculty of judgment (Urteilskraft) in the handling of these duties (even though this faculty is called upon in the handling of both types of latitude). As the reader will see, the perfect duties also have an associated casuistry, because it is the faculty of judgment that has to determine which cases fall under its concept. Following this, the book will deal with the duties to others: those to other human beings (duties of love and respect, perfect and imperfect 11 I am aware that, for questions of brevity, I am simplifying this discussion. On this topic, the reader may consult the texts of Ludwig and of Schadow in Kant’s Tugendlehre: a Comprehensive Commentary, pp. 59-84 and pp. 85-112. Both are in agreement that the distinction is rooted in the Triebfeder, i.e. in the motivational factor. Ludwig splendidly clarifies how the other criteria (whether the duty is meritorious or not, internal or external, perfect or imperfect, etc.) are subordinated to the motivational criterion or to the form of constraint (cf. pp. 64-65). He also notes that the distinction between internal and external constraint leads us to two pure concepts of reflection (cf. p. 64). For his part, A. Trampota, in the same volume (cf. p. 151) also emphasizes that the distinction between the Rechtslehre and the Tugendlehre is not that of two lists of duties, but rather of a change in perspective that he calls a metabasis eis allo genos, basing himself on a passage in the Vorarbeiten.

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relatively and respectively), and those to (or, more precisely, regarding) non-human beings (nature, non-rational animals, God himself). This last topic raises one of the most interesting questions in the Tugendlehre due to the systematic analogies it contains: that of the amphiboly of the moral concepts of reflection, the treatment of duties with regard to God and nature, and how Kant shows that in the final analysis these are duties to oneself. Finally, Chapter 5 will deal with the methodology of virtue in the Tugendlehre, that is, with the doctrine of method in this work, which is divided into instruction and asceticism, and which also shows interesting architectonic analogies to both the second Critique as well as to other kantian works. Kant is touching here on the primordial socratic question about how to acquire and transmit virtue, i.e. whether it can in fact be taught, or at least learned. In this section I will examine the famous “fragment of a moral catechism”, interpreting it –in the light of what is presented in the rest of the work– as being an instrument for the training and exercise of moral judgment. I would like to reiterate that my primary intention is to present Kant’s moral thought as an integral whole, and to show that classifying it as a “formal ethics”, in addition to implying a contradiction in adjecto, is ultimately unjustifiable from the hermeneutic point of view and barren from the perspective of an authentic philosophical weighting of his thought. Another issue will be to look at the specific arguments that support each duty of virtue. These are, without a doubt, on occasion dubious and always open to argument, but they represent one of the most interesting and solid intellectual efforts in the work, if what we are looking for are criteria for orientation in the exercise of moral judgement.

CHAPTER 1 ENDS, MAXIMS AND DUTIES

1.1 Introduction As I have already mentioned, this book on Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue must confront various difficulties, including the obscurity of the text, the lack of precision on the part of Kant in his use of certain concepts, the discussion about the modifications in his ethical proposal over the course of his various works,1 etc. More importantly, however, I will investigate a number of misunderstandings, strangely widespread, regarding fundamental characteristics of the kantian moral theory. Here, one of the principal sources of confusion is the doubt about the role of ends or objectives of action in the kantian explanation of moral action. Unfortunately there are interpretations in circulation –including in nonintroductory texts– which state that the use of the categorical imperative as the test of morality presupposes a renouncing of the teleological character of the action. This would be nonsense, however, since actions cannot even be conceptualized as such without the inclusion of the ends that the agent seeks, within a broader context of meaning. In addition, it would imply total negligence on Kant’s part regarding the consequences of the action, whether or not they were sought intentionally as ends or simply originated by our will as a noumenal cause that is inserted into the phenomenal world.

1 Cf. for example HELLER, Ágnes, Crítica de la Ilustración: las antinomias morales de la razón, translated by G. Muñoz and J.I. López Soria, Ed. Península, Barcelona, 1984, pp. 21-96. Heller holds that there are “two ethics” in Kant, and while she claims that his thought proceeds by incorporating and correcting a single understructure that remains unchanged, in the same text she states later that the Metaphysik der Sitten involves “the abandonment by Kant of the ethics of pure morality”. In this chapter and the one that follows I will show that this interpretation is false: there is considerable continuity between the Groundwork, the Critique of Practical Reason and the Metaphysics of Morals, whose second part I study in this book.

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Although Kant insists that the consequences of the action cannot be the determining criterion of morality, a close reading of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten) or of the Critique of Practical Reason (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft), will be sufficient to demonstrate that these consequences –and the purpose of the action as the consequence that is concretely sought, i.e. as its finality– are neither ever denied nor sidestepped in the case of action simpliciter, nor in the case of the perfectly moral action that is oriented through the wellknown test offered by the categorical imperative. The teleological character of all human action that can be conceived as such is made even clearer in the Metaphysics of Morals, both in the General Introduction –as Barbara Herman has emphasized2– as well as in a concrete way in the Doctrine of Virtue. In this work, in contrast to his earlier moral works, Kant no longer seeks to isolate and defend the a priori principles of morality, but rather to derive concrete duties from them and explain the necessity of virtue in their fulfillment in a diachronic and progressive sense. In order to present the material aspect of ethics in the Tugendlehre, he pays close attention to specifying the distinction and mutual relations between the matter and form of the maxims of action. For this reason the Doctrine of Virtue is a text that must be taken into account if one seeks –as seems to me to be necessary for a complete understanding of kantian ethics– to discern the fundamental kantian concepts of a theory of action,3 as an indispensable requirement for the understanding of his moral proposal. My purpose in this first chapter is not to offer a complete panorama of what we would today call the kantian theory of action. Nor will I study the functioning of the categorical imperative as the criterion of moral judgement.4 I will, however, study the rudiments of the kantian Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, The Practice of Moral Judgment, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1993, p. 11. 3 Kant clearly, however, does not set out a full theory of action, and only deals with those concepts that relate to what we would call today “action theory” in relation to morality, as he explains at MdS 211. This is commented on by Höwing in “Das Verhältnis der Vermögen des menschlischen Gemüts zu den Sittengesetzen”, Kant’s Tugendlehre. A Comprehensive Commentary, pp. 25-58. 4 When I discuss the distinction between duties in the following chapter, I will begin with the interpretation that considers the test of universalization as a specific test for the 2

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conception of the relation between action, motives and ends, as well as their articulation in what Kant would call a maxim (Maxime), and the distinct degrees of generality in which these can present themselves. This latter point has been the focus of a large part of the discussions in the specialized literature of late (frequently oscillating between maxims qua general policies of action or Lebensregeln, on the one hand, and the concrete maxims referring to each action in particular, on the other), and it seems to me to be fundamental to avoid exclusive positions that would make the kantian proposal concerning action somehow incompatible with his proposal for moral evaluation via the categorical imperative. That is to say, I will discuss the issue of the structure and degree of generality of the maxim, and will show that it is sufficient for the moral evaluation that the test of universalization offers. As I will show in the following chapter, the supreme principle of virtue specifically presupposes the requirement of having maxims of ends,5 and as a result I think it is important, in this first section, to both explain the finalistic character of action in Kant, as well as to show that this character is contained in the maxims qua subjective principles of acting.

internal consistency of actions. In this context, morally reprehensible action is shown, when universalized, to be in contradiction either with itself or with rational agency in general. I will not touch on the defense of this interpretation of the universalization test as a detector of performative contradictions, which is one of the most commonly criticized points in kantian ethics (in my view, unjustly so). In contrast, as will be seen, I will focus on a different criticism: that which concerns the input to this universalization procedure: that is, the correct formulation of the maxims. 5 As we will see, every maxim has ends; nevertheless, Kant uses the expression Maxime der Zwecke in order to emphasize that, in the case of ethics, he does not abstract from the fundamental motivation that adopts the ends as such. This is in contrast to the legal sphere, where maxims of action are employed, insofar as there is a methodological abstraction from the consideration of these internal fundamentals for determination. Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 81. Later in this same chapter I will speak about the “concrete maxims of action”; of course, every maxim concerns action and is oriented to ends, but I will discuss this point in order to distinguish particular, instantiated maxims from those which are instead general or that constitute “life stances”. I trust, then, that the use of the expressions “maxims of action” and “maxims about ends” will be understandable by their context, given that every maxim presupposes both elements.

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I will also investigate, in a more detailed discussion, the more or less frequent objection that the maxims, qua subjective principles of action, are manipulable in their form,6 which would compromise the usefulness of the categorical imperative (whose functioning depends on them) as a criterion of morality and as the principle of derivation of duties. All of this, as I have said, is facilitated by a reading of the Metaphysik der Sitten, specifically of those pages of the General Introduction and the specific introduction to the Tugendlehre, where Kant offers a kind of recounting of the fundamental definitions for his practical philosophy. In this way, I will posit the elements that I mentioned earlier as being necessary in order to make the transition from the kantian understanding of action in general to his treatment of virtuous moral action, and at the same time I will begin my interpretation of the Doctrine of Virtue by following, in a relative fashion, the order found in the work itself.7 This is MacIntyre’s objection, as expressed in A Short History of Ethics, Routledge, London, 1966, p. 197: “...with sufficient ingenuity almost every precept can be consistently universalized. For all that I need to do is to characterize the proposed action in such a way that the maxim will permit me to do what I want while prohibiting others from doing what would nullify the maxim if universalized”. Heller voices the same objection in her Crítica de la Ilustración: las antinomias morales de la razón, p. 65, and is also similar to what bothers Anscombe in “Modern Moral Philosophy”, in Virtue Ethics (ed. by Roger Crisp and Michael Slote), OUP, Oxford – New York, 1997, p. 27; “His rule about universalizable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it”. As I will show in this section, the problem is that Anscombe bases herself on the claim that an action can be described in many equally valid ways, which is not the case for Kant, for whom the action must be described, for the purposes of its moral evaluation, precisely according to the way it is desired. 7 In this first chapter I will focus on the General Introduction to the MdS and the Specific Introduction to the Tugendlehre, and will only follow the order of the Tugendlehre in a relative fashion, because until chapter IV I will not discuss in any great length those paragraphs that specify which ends are also duties –i.e. the perfection of oneself and the happiness of others– and what these ends presuppose. In chapter IV of this book, in turn, I will deal with the derivation of duties related to each one of these obligatory ends. For the moment, I will only discuss those passages and definitions which are necessary for an understanding of the teleology of action incorporated in moral deliberation, of the structure and generality of the maxims, and of the distinction between Wille and Willkür. The ordering of topics in my discussion will also differ from that of the Doctrine of Virtue insofar as I will leave the distinction between will and the faculty of choice for the 6

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Another of the points where the Tugendlehre is both consistent with Kant’s earlier ethical works and offers greater clarity than they do is that regarding the distinct levels where the will can be analyzed. The first level is that of Wille as practical reason (praktische Vernunft), i.e. will insofar as it is determined by reason itself and as a result legislates for itself. The second level is that of the faculty of choice (Willkür) qua subjective factor, oriented to action in pursuit of concrete ends, and receptive to the inclinations and impulses of the sensibility at the same time that it is determinable by the higher lawgiving level. I will also explain this crucial distinction between Wille and Willkür, and will show that, although it is already operative and contextually identifiable in the GMS and the KpV, in the Tugendlehre this explicit discernment of levels permits me to completely refute some of the strongest criticisms against kantian morality, such as that which labels it as being unable to see that there is freedom (and therefore ascription and imputability) in morally bad actions, insofar as they are determined by the blind impulses of the sensibility. The difference between will and the faculty of choice will permit me to clarify the interpretative ambiguities that have given rise to this kind of objection. 1.2 The end as matter of the maxim Now that I have discussed –in the introduction to this book– the criterion of distinction between the Rechtslehre (Doctrine of Right) and the Tugendlehre, it should be clear already that the ethical perspective of the Doctrine of Virtue focuses precisely on that aspect of action that law end of the chapter, while Kant treats it in the General Introduction to the MdS, prior to the rest of the notions that I will focus on in this section. I will follow this order in order to maximize clarity, since the topic of the maxims also appears in the GMS and the KpV, and as a result can offer a path of argumentation that is more accessible at this moment in the book. In addition, I see it as crucial, at the beginning of this book, to deal with the misunderstandings that concern the supposed non-teleology of moral action. My ordering is also the most logical, since the first chapter will discuss the relationship of the categorical imperative with the supreme principle of virtue, which first requires an understanding of this principle –whose formulation involves maxims of ends– and, only later, of the Wille-Willkür distinction as an element of the deduction of this principle.

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avoids in a methodological abstraction: normativity regarding the matter of the maxim of action, i.e. regarding its ends. Tugendlehre focuses precisely on what a subject gives him or herself as ends, since no external coercion is possible here, but only a virtuous self-coercion. Law is not, per se, interested (at least in a primary and direct way) in the ultimate motivation of the maxim, and therefore does not provide norms for ends, but rather it begins with the ends already given,8 i.e. those which are already actually sought by agents, and limits them only in function of the exterior concordance of external actions with the liberty of others. Kant reiterates this difference in the following passage, which should be sufficient in order to suggest the role that these ends play in moral deliberation. The Doctrine of Right is related only to the formality of external freedom (external concordance with oneself when one’s maxim is converted into a universal law), that is, with right qua law. On the contrary, ethics still offers a matter (an object of free choice), which is an end of the pure reason, and which at the same time presents itself as an objectively necessary end, i.e. as a duty for the human person.9 It is precisely because of this difference that (as I will have occasion to explain in greater depth later) the supreme principle of Right is analytic (for from the concept of external freedom there follows the necessity of its non self-suppression via the external constriction that the legal provides), while the principle of virtue is synthetic: for the latter implies that normativity is above the ends.10 In this same passage the allusion to 8

p. 40.

Cf. FRIEDRICH, Rainer, Eigentum und Staatsbegründung in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten,

9 MdS 380. I cite the translation of Mary Gregor, The Metaphysics of Morals, CUP, Cambridge, 1991. The italics are Kant’s own in all of the citations of this work. 10 Mary Gregor insists that in reality the entire Metaphysics of Morals involves a kantian emphasis on the teleology of action, given that the application –both in law and in ethics– of the categorical imperative is made precisely via the notion of end: in the Rechtslehre external freedom is precisely the freedom to seek these ends via action; in the Tugendlehre on the other hand Kant is not speaking of ends already given, but rather about the ends that ought to be taken as such. Thus, I reiterate that the difference does not regard a sphere of discourse attentive to the teleology of action and another which is not attentive in this way. Rather, it has to do with whether one begins from ends in order to seek maxims that are reconcilable in their external exercise with the will of the other, or

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the faculty of choice (Willkür) must be emphasized, i.e. the allusion to the will understood at the level where it is sensibly affected and is effectively oriented to the attainment of particular ends in the action, as I will also discuss later in other sections of this book. The end, then, which is treated here as pertaining to the faculty of choice, pertains in the first instance to pure reason, as this same passage indicates, insofar as the latter –in its practical use, as will– is what determines the former, moving it to adopt ends, such that they are demanded by reason itself and not by sensible inclinations. It is important to indicate here that this represents a difference concerning the need and legitimacy of ends, and not concerning which ends are those that the faculty of choice proposes, since materially these ends can coincide (and indeed in many cases do coincide, as I will show in detail) with those that human nature itself proposes (by way of the natural dispositions in the human being).11 To take advantage of an example that Kant himself uses in numerous passages: the preservation of one’s own life, which is an end we ought to have, is at the same time an end of our natural inclinations in ordinary circumstances. The crucial difference, however, is that these kind of ends are not proper to the moral perspective as natural or given, but rather as being duty-imposed, because they are demands of the pure practical reason. The fact that these ends are demanded by reason itself is not only not opposed to the moral law as expressed in the categorical imperative –as is claimed by those who see the imperative as an unreal demand for action stripped of ends– but indeed is required as a condition of effectiveness by morality itself, as Kant notes directly afterwards:

whether one begins from the duty in order to derive their obligatory ends. Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 28. 11 Later, I will return in the following chapter to the enumeration and division of these dispositions (Anlagen), as Kant gives them in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason and other texts, and in parallel with what is presupposed in the Doctrine of Virtue. In that chapter I will also discuss the relation of application between these empirical conditions of human nature and duty as demanded a priori but applied and specified as a duty of virtue precisely in these conditions.

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“For since men’s sensible inclinations tempt them to ends (the matter of choice) that can be contrary to duty, law-giving reason can in turn check their influence only by a moral end set up against the ends of inclination, an end that must therefore be given a priori, independently of inclinations”.12 Thus pure reason, in order that it also be practical, must be able to propose ends to the faculty of choice, i.e. to determine its maxims. The categorical imperative is not just a test that discards maxims that cannot be rationally willed as universal laws, but is also a principle of derivation of duties and of formation of a “moral jurisprudence”, in the sense in which it is the source of moral maxims that operate at various levels of generality. From these maxims, at the same time, subordinate maxims are derived whose use reverts interpretatively back upon the more general principles.13 I will explore the concepts of “maxim” and “faculty of choice” more deeply in the following sections. At this point I turn to the presuppositions of the previous citation: the reason that is the crucial necessitator for ends proper to reason qua the condition of necessary –even if not yet sufficient– possibility of a moral deliberation is not that of any reinforcement of moral motivation via objects of the faculty of choice. Indeed, Kant disapproves of any such reinforcing because it impedes the purity of moral intention. Rather it is something prior and more relevant: it is the confirmation of a feature of action that is pre-moral, something which is simply a structural aspect of action in itself, for without ends there is no rational action. The kantian vision of rational action is strictly propositional and teleological in the case of moral action because it is also so in action simpliciter. This presupposition of Kant’s moral philosophy is in operation at the basis of MdS 380-381. Observe that Kant speaks of “derivation” (Ableitung) and not of “deduction”. As WOOD, Allen emphasizes in Kantian Ethics, CUP, Cambridge – New York, 2008, p. 60, and as I will make clear over the course of this book, while the supreme principle of virtue is deduced from the categorical imperative, the concrete duties of virtue under it and its maxims are derivative in a much broader sense, an hermeneutic sense, which takes into account the material conditions of human existence and agency and considers them reflexively in the process of determination of moral duties. 12 13

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the Doctrine of Virtue and is what permits the ethics of duties, already laid out in the Groundwork and in the second Critique, to be constituted here as a system of ends, and as a doctrine of the virtues or moral strengths that the attainment of these ends demands. The fact that every action has an end,14 understood here as the state of things that rational action seeks to promote via a practical principle, has already been expressed in the GMS, in the KpV, and reiterated in the Critique of Judgement (Kritik der Urteilskraft).15 This affirmation is repeated On occasion critics have caricatured Kant’s ethics, not by claiming that moral action does not have an end in his theory, but rather by holding that moral action, i.e. action carried out according to duty, has as its end duty itself. This conception is criticized insofar as it is apparently vacuous and irrefutable. Nevertheless, once the distinction of planes is made between the end (Zweck) as a state of things to be attained with action, and the motive or foundation of determination (Bestimmungsgrund) as a second-order determination that justifies the postulation of a given end qua end, one can see how every action must have its own end, and that the latter is always subjectively good. However, if the end is postulated as having duty as its foundation of determination, it is also objectively good. Thus one can say that duty is the formal ratio of moral action, rather than its end; cf. RIVERA, Faviola, Virtud y justicia en Kant, Fontamara, México, 2003, pp. 68-70. (In the English-language literature this distinction is frequently given as acting “from” duty vs. acting “for the sake of” duty, in order to better express the kantian term aus Pflicht; cf. BARON, Marcia W., Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, Cornell University Press, Ithaca – London, 1995, p. 12). I would like to also clarify that affirming that every action has an end does not signify that this end is something produced by it. Rather, the state of things to attain by the action can be making the action itself more possible, or a subjective state of the agent, etc. (in which case one can say, without negating the teleological character of the action, that the action is performed for itself). 15 Cf. GMS 399, 400, 416, 427, 441, KpV 21, 34, 58, 62 and KU 196. Cf. also WOOD, Allen, “Ethics as a System of Ends” in Kant’s Ethical Thought, CUP, Cambridge – New York, 1999, p. 326, for a brief recounting of all these mentions as the groundwork for what will be developed in the Tugendlehre. I do not see how Wood can think it pertinent to state that the Doctrine of Virtue, because it is teleological, can also be considered to be consequentialist. The non sequitur seems evident to me, even if one takes the term in a broad sense. The author notes in any case that the consequentialism of the Tugendlehre would be of a peculiar variety, which would not involve any calculation of ends nor a maximization of benefit (in the case of the imperfect, broad and meritorious duties), and that the spirit of kantian ethics is clearly far from being crassly consequentialist. I hold, for my part, that this label is totally inappropriate and gives rises to numerous misunderstandings. Rather than just being caused by a lack of understanding on the part of the author (who, furthermore, has a rather empiricist and consequentialist outlook regarding 14

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so often and so clearly that it is truly surprising that there still are people who think that Kant proposes that there can be action without finality, although it seems that a similar confusion has its roots as far back as his argument with Garve, reflected in the Gemeinspruch.16 The teleological condition of human action is also implicit in the also frequently reiterated kantian definition of the end (Zweck) that the introduction to the Tugendlehre takes pains to re-emphasize, and which is perfectly compatible with what Kant has expressed in earlier ethical works: “An end is an object of the faculty of choice (of a rational being) by whose representation an action oriented towards producing this object is determined”.17 Observe that this definition is also consistent with GMS 427, where, in order to prepare the second formulation of the categorical imperative (the formulation where humanity is an end in itself), Kant establishes a minimum set of notions belonging to what today we would call “action theory”. His purpose, in this passage, is to show that there must be an end that is not the means for anything else in order that the categorical mandate be possible. Therefore he defines will (Wille) as the faculty of rational beings to determine themselves in accordance with the representation of laws, and with the end (Zweck) as that which serves the will as Kant’s ethics, making the criteria of moral progress depend too much on certain social dynamics, as we will see further along), Wood’s view is the product of an unfortunate reduction of language prominent in certain Anglo-American circles, and which seems to limit all ethical proposals to one of the sides of a false disjunction: either deontologism or consequentialism. As I hope to make clear over the course of this book, I hold this disjunction to be mistaken and believe that Kant’s position is, in any case, irreducible to either of these alternatives. On the other hand, DEAN, Richard does see this point, as is clear in The Value of Humanity in Kant’s Moral Theory, OUP, Oxford – New York, 2006, p. 154. 16 This is suggested by GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 76. Indeed, although in his conversation with Christian Garve, Kant seeks primarily to clarify that he has not denied that happiness is the natural end of man, he also makes certain clarifications about the fact that he has not denied in general that every human action has a purpose, which seems to have been suggested by Garve, cf. GTP, 279. 17 MdS 381.

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the objective foundation of its self-determination.18 In sum: the end is, in this primary sense, among the effects of the action i.e. that state of things towards which the volition and the action itself point. On the basis of the definition of the faculty of desire as a capacity for being the cause of the reality of the objects of representations,19 one sees that the effect is precisely that telos represented. It specifies volition and action (all actions, and therefore also the morally qualified action). Nevertheless, as I will show further on, when one speaks of the structure of the maxims, this same end can be both determined and specified by that which constitutes it as such: the motive or, better still,20 the ground of determination (Bestimmungsgrund) that constitutes it as such an end. When I give the catalogue of the fundamental elements of the kantian 18 Cf. GMS 427. The list of notions which I will return to later in this book, as being constitutive elements of maxims– is completed with the concepts of means (Mittel), motivating force of desire (Triebfedern), motives (Bewegungsgrunde) and effects of the action (Wirkungen). 19 Cf. KpV 9, n.4. 20 Marcia W. Baron suggests that speaking of “motives” within the framework of the kantian theory of action in order to refer to the Bestimmungsgründe is imprecise and risky. This is because the notion of motive seems to allude to a force, to an aspect of causality with a certain deterministic nuance, which might in turn have a certain empiricist connotation that blurs the distinction whereby practical reason acts according to the maxim. Cf. BARON, Marcia W., Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, p. 134 and p. 189. Kant also, on occasion, uses the term “Bewegungsgrund” (cf. the passage already cited, GMS 427), which is usually translated as “motive”; in addition, as SCHWARTZ, Maria indicates in Der Begriff der Maxime bei Kant: Eine Untersuchung des Maximenbegriffs in Kants praktischer Philosophie, Lit-Verlag, Berlin, 2006, p. 16, n. 20, in some of the Reflexionen Kant equates the Bestimmungsgründe with the Motiven, in contraposition to the Stimuli. In addition, Herman uses the term “motive” even when she attributes the greater part of the misunderstandings regarding the “deontologism” of Kant’s ethics to empiricist confusions about his theory of motivations; cf. HERMAN, Barbara, The Practice of Moral Judgment, p. vii. I will, therefore, sometimes use the English term “motive”, but with the awareness that it never refers to any “blind” force that operates behind the rational determination of action that the maxims presuppose. Pace Baron (p. 190), furthermore, I hold that the concept of “motive” cannot be substituted for that of “maxim”, since as I will show later on the factor of the ground of determination is only one of the elements that integrate and articulate the maxims. It is reductionist, as I will show in a later section when I discuss the maxims as subjective principles of acting, to speak of intentions or motivations as being synonymous with maxims.

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conception of action I will also describe the dynamic between them, showing that if the end determines volition and action by means of the representation of a law, this end is at the same time determined by the motive, via an interest of reason itself. As a result, the possibility of opting for the law or for the sensible inclinations as the Bestimmungsgründe, or better yet, as I will show, of subordinating one to the other, represents the most inalienable manifestation of practical freedom (and thus also represents the requirement for a concept of transcendental freedom):21 “Now I can indeed be constrained by others to perform actions that are directed as means to an end, but I can never be constrained by others to have an end; only I myself can make something my end”.22 This is the interior character of the freedom that the legal deliberation of the Rechtslehre cannot attain in its abstraction of internal wellsprings of action. In fact, the capacity to propose ends for oneself is precisely equivalent to acting rationally and therefore is, in ethical works like the anthropological texts of Kant, the fundamental distinction characteristic of humanity.23 The fact that the human being does not act simply according to laws, as does the rest of nature, but rather according to the representation of the law –i.e. the will, a capacity to be moved by the reason in a given way24– permits the person to choose between the grounds of determination of his or her action (Bestimmungsgründe). Human beings are thus not limited to the ends of nature, but can choose the proper object (Objekt, Gegenstand) of their free actions as their purpose or end (Zweck).25 I will return later to the intrinsically free character of the rational adop21 For Kant’s discussion of how it cannot be known in experience but is nonetheless necessary as a condition for practical freedom, cf. KrV A535 B562. For the problem about its possible separation in the Canon of Pure Reason, cf. ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, CUP, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 56ff and TORRALBA, José María, Libertad, objeto práctico y acción: La facultad del juicio en la filosofía moral de Kant, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 2009, pp. 40ff. 22 MdS 381. 23 Cf. MdS 392. This is one of the ideas that Kant clearly receives from Cicero, via the translation of the De officiis by Christian Garve; cf. MELCHES GILBERT, Carlos, Der Einfluß von Christian Garves Übersetzung Ciceros ‘De officiis’ auf Kants “Grundlegung zur Metaphysyik der Sitten”, S. Roderer Verlag, Regensburg, 1994, p. 84. 24 Cf. GMS 412, 427; KpV 32. 25 Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Morality as Rationality. A Study of Kant’s Ethics, p. 2.

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tion of ends26 and to the integration of this finalistic character of action in the properly moral plane. For now I will simply note that some paragraphs later Kant reiterates the definition of end and indicates explicitly that it is indispensable for action: “Every action, therefore, has its end; and since no one can have an end without himself making the object of his choice into an end, to have any end of action whatsoever is an act of freedom on the part of the acting subject, not an effect of nature. (...) For since there are free actions there must also be ends to which, as their objects, these actions are directed”.27 In fact, if for Kant acting rationally involves acting according to principles, this, says the Critique of Practical Reason, implies at least prescribing “the action as a means for the effect considered as intention (Absicht)”.28 Action in Kant is, therefore, always understood causally or intentionally, such that the end is the sought-after effect, and acting rationally means acting according to a rule that guides causality towards this end. The second Critique is exceptionally clear with regard to the fact that all action

26 As Gregor notes, this fundamental freedom also pulses within the Doctrine of Right: another person may obligate me to perform or not perform an action as a means for attaining his or her ends, but cannot obligate me to make those ends my own –the incorporation of ends in this way is only possible on the plane of benevolence, when I freely make the ends of another my own. In fact, in order for an action to be mine, the end must be self-imposed (and only in this way is the action imputable). The external constriction that defines legal duties in the Rechtslehre is, in this sense, relative (for if it were absolute, we would be in the terrain of physical movements and of deterministic events, and not in the sphere of rational action): external coercion does not determine our ends, but rather it affects their internal determination due to fear of punishment, thereby presupposing certain important natural ends for the choice of our actions. In fact, the determination of the action and of its end is performed in a single act, but the adoption of the end is a determination performed by the internal grounds of determination and therefore corresponds more properly to the realm of the Doctrine of Virtue. Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 65. 27 MdS 385. 28 Cf. KpV 20.

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presupposes an end, even if the latter is not what finally determines its moral qualification.29 The “hylemorphism of action” that our philosopher defends is thus already integrated. Kant uses the notions of “form/matter” in an analogical sense, i.e. in the logical sense of “factor of determination/determinable element”. As I will discuss in a later section, at diverse levels of generality, what he is proposing is that the end or object of an action is considered to be the matter of its maxim, and the principle with which the ground of determination is expressed –i.e. the fundamental adoption of a posture regarding whether to follow one’s sensible inclinations or the moral law– is the form of the maxim itself. Of course, there are relations of mutual influence between these aspects, since not every end corresponds to any given ground of determination, or vice-versa. Even though it is the ground of determination that which, in the final instance, has moral character, there are ends that cannot be taken as good or permissible under any motivational deliberation, in the same way that in the kantian perspective an end cannot have authentic moral value (moralisches Wert) if it is not motivated internally by the law as ground of determination, i.e. by a law that is dictated by the reason qua practical. Therefore a good will (ein guter Wille) is the only thing which is good without restriction. In Kant’s earlier works (the GMS and the KpV), in his quest to isolate the a priori principle of morality and rescue it from naturalist reductionisms, he had insisted that it is the form of the maxim that determines morality, i.e. the motivation or foundation of determination and not the ends. In the MdS, in turn, and specifically in the Tugendlehre, he dedicates himself to explaining the teleological condition of acting, describes the consequences of the fact that rational action is always for a purpose, and shows that to the form of a maxim of duty there correKpV 34. I cite the translation of Thomas Kingsmill Abbott: “Now, it is indeed undeniable that every volition must have an object, and therefore a matter; but it does not follow that this is the determining principle and the condition of the maxim; for, if it is so, then this cannot be exhibited in a universally legislative form, (...). The matter, then, of the maxim may remain, but it must not be the condition of it, else the maxim could not be fit for a law. Hence, the mere form of law, which limits the matter, must also be a reason for adding this matter to the will, not for presupposing it”. 29

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spond certain concrete ends or material aspects which, insofar as they follow from the form of the duty, become obligatory, both in the limitative as well as in the positive and purpose-oriented sense.30 The hylemorphism of action according to Kant, therefore, not only offers a vision of all the elements of rational acting, but also proposes a particular dynamic between them, and thus permits making the leap from ethics as a system of duties to ethics as a system of ends31 and as a doctrine of those virtues that are linked with them. The MdS, in its totality, as a certain commentators have already indicated, is precisely concerned with ends. It responds to the questions: what ends must I propose for myself? (in the Tugendlehre) and how must I act in order that the attainment of my ends does not enter into conflict with the ends of others? (in the Rechtslehre).32 It is also worth noting, as a correction to another of the caricatures of kantian ethics that are incredibly common, that deliberation about ends as an intrinsic element of action, even in the case of very limited complexity, presupposes that in every action there exists a relationship of means subordinated to these ends. This implies that the maxim must be tested for rationality –prior to any moral evaluation, at the level of a premoral consistency proper to action and volition– by an imperative: the hypothetical imperative, which demands the desiring of the means if the end is rationally desired.33 Thus, the absurd and simplistic interpretation of Kant’s ethics –where the agent chooses, in an exclusive disjunction, between acting according to the hypothetical imperative or according to the categorical imperative– can be totally rejected. Any action –as rational– is specified by its directionality towards an end, and thus presupposes the willing of the means that are appropriate for that end; in this sense, this is required by the hypothetical imperative in general. The foregoing also clearly applies to the moral evaluation of action. The action, in order to be permissible, in addition to being approved of by the hypothetical

Cf. GMS 431. As developed in LANGTHALER, Rudolf, Kants Ethik als System der Zwecke: Perspektiven einer modifizierten Idee der moralischen Teleologie, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1991. 32 Cf. RIVERA, Faviola, Virtud y justicia en Kant, p. 85. 33 Cf. GMS 414-415, KpV 25 and KU 172. 30 31

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imperative at the technico-pragmatic level, must also be authorized by the categorical imperative at the moral level. Finally, it must be noted that deliberation about the ends of action also involves explaining the hierarchies among them, the “nets” in which they exist, the subprojects and means that they involve and, as I have already stated, the demand for rational coherence with regard to the willing of the appropriate means for a given end. All of this applies to action per se, and also to moral action specifically: in the case of the latter there is also the duty to adopt certain ends, as I will discuss in detail later. The end is that consequence of the action which is sought by means of the action itself. It must not be forgotten that there are other consequences of the action that its maxim must consider. In case these consequences are not foreseen by the action, they can be reconsidered as part of the situational context of a later maxim of response, or else a broader maxim understood as a policy of responsibility concerning the non-desired consequences of the action, and which is in turn equally subject to the categorical imperative.34 The conclusion of this section should have been clear, right from the first passages cited from the Doctrine of Virtue: for Kant, every action has an end and is determined and specified by it, even if that end can simultaneously be determined by second-order motives that are, in the final instance, the form of the action and the determining element of its moral qualification.35 Even more: this should have been clear from a reading of Kant’s earlier ethical works, but these have nevertheless been interpreted in imprecise and often non-viable ways, probably because of Kant’s intention –which is paradigmatic in the Grundlegung– to isolate the factor of determination of morality.36 My insistence in this section on the For a demonstration that kantian ethics includes the elements necessary for handling all the consequences of the action –including those which are desired, those foreseen, and those unforeseen– cf. HERMAN, Barbara, “What Happens to the Consequences? Some Problems of Judgement in Kantian Ethics”, in Pursuits of Reason: Essays in Honor of Stanley Cavell (Cohen, Guyer and Putnam, eds.), Texas Tech University Press, Lubbock (Texas), 1993, pp. 105-120. 35 Cf. KpV 27. 36 Cf. PATON, Herbert J., The Categorical Imperative, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1967, p. 47. Paton insists that the Grundlegung must be read with attention paid to Kant’s purpose of “isolating” the aspect of moral determination. In addition this methodological 34

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teleology of the action will be repeated, some pages later, when I will look at the structure of the maxims, since these always involve ends. In fact, as Gregor indicates, this is what it means to act on the basis of maxims, and thus rationally: to act with directionality towards an end.37 Thus it is possible to equate what has been said in GMS 384, where Kant holds that human action is that which is performed in accordance with a maxim, with what he says in MdS 482, where he affirms that specifically human action is that which is directed towards an end: they are two ways of expressing the same idea. Acting according to a maxim is to propose an end for oneself, and in doing so, as we will see, one simultaneously enters the terrain of evaluation by means of objective practical principles.38 As I will show in the following chapter, where I analyze the deduction of the supreme principle of virtue, this teleological character of human action will serve somehow as a middle term in the relationship between duty and the obligatory end,39 for obviously the fact that every action supposes an end will explain why the categorical imperative also presupposes obligatory ends. 1.3 The possibility of an end that is a duty The General Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals offers what Kant calls “preliminary concepts”40 which are common to both the Doctrine of Right as well as to the Doctrine of Virtue. One of the first notions offered here is that of obligation (Verbindlichkeit), the highest level of factor can be seen in KpV 92, when Kant indicates that he has acted like a “chemist” by separating the rational from the empirical. Cf. also BARON, Marcia W., Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, p. 147. 37 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 38. 38 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 86. 39 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 28. 40 Cf. MdS 221.

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practical necessity, that is, that necessity which is proper to free action under the moral law of the reason as expressed in the categorical imperative. In his explanation of this concept, Kant reminds us of the role that the end or matter of the maxim plays with regard to the categorical imperative: “A categorical (unconditional) imperative is one that represents an action as objectively necessary and makes it necessary not indirectly, through the representation of some end that can be attained by the action, but through the mere representation of this action itself (its form), and hence directly”.41 Thus, Kant reiterates the fundamental achievement of the Grundlegung: distinguishing the hypothetical imperatives (technical or pragmaticprudential) from those which are categorical, by the fact that these latter are not conditioned –and in this sense are not mediated in their practical necessity– by the representation of the end. They instead make the action necessary immediately and unconditionally in its form, i.e. in its aptitude for being universalizable, due to being determined not by egoistic inclinations but rather by the moral law of the pure practical reason. The teleological determination of action is thus assumed, incorporated, in this second-order determination. The possibility, therefore, for our reason to place itself above the ends given and their internal requirements –the means– in order to evaluate them from a higher point of view is presupposed in what Kant understands by freedom: “The ground of possibility of categorical imperatives resides in the fact that they do not refer to any other determination of the faculty of choice (by means of which determination a purpose can be attributed), but rather only to its freedom”.42

MdS 222. MdS 222: “The ground of the possibility of categorical imperatives is this: that they refer to no other property of choice (by which some purpose can be ascribed to it) than simply to its Freiheit”. 41

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I will return to this General Introduction to investigate the distinction between Wille and Willkür. I now turn to the Specific Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue, where Kant takes up again the topic of freedom in a strong sense (both negative, qua possibility of overcoming the sensible impulses, as well as positive, qua autonomy), a freedom that is presupposed by the confrontation of human agents by the categorical imperative. It is important to highlight here that we are dealing now with human agents and not with rational subjects in general, since one of the first notes in the Tugendlehre indicates this transition explicitly. If the imperative (qua coercion or constraint)43 already presupposes fallible agents right from its formulation as such (since for holy wills the moral law would not be formulated as an imperative), the Tugendlehre gets even more specific, formulating the concept of duty as a constraint that, in this point of the exposition: “...does not apply to rational beings as such (there could also be holy ones), but rather to men, rational natural beings who are unholy enough that pleasure can induce them to break the moral law, even though they recognize its authority; and even when they do obey the law, they do it reluctantly (in the face of opposition from their inclinations), and it is in this that such constraint properly consists”.44 Given, then, that the specifically human consists in the capacity to adopt ends with practical freedom, and that in the human condition itself there is a constraint of duty insofar as it confronts us by means of the categorical imperative, Kant can conclude that we have a capacity for adopting ends from duty, in the strong sense of moral action being performed strictly aus Pflicht: “Now I can indeed be constrained by others to perform actions that are directed as means to an end, but I can never be constrained by others to have an end; only I myself can make something my end. But if I am under obligation to make my end something that lies in concepts of 43

379. 44

Kant himself treats the meanings of Nötigung and Zwang as being very close in MdS MdS 379.

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practical reason, and so to have, besides the formal determining ground of choice (such as Right contains), a material one as well, an end that could be set against the end arising from sensible impulses, this would be the concept of an end that is in itself a duty”.45 This is how ethics –in the strict sense of the term, as Kant uses it in these passages, in a manner distinct from its usage in the Rechtslehre– is constituted as a system of ends of the pure practical reason (als das System der Zwecke der reinen praktischen Vernunft).46 If external constraint regarding ends is impossible, internal constraint is morally necessary. Therefore an end that I propose for myself can at the same time be a duty: ethical coercion is self-coercion (Selbstzwang), which, as Kant himself indicates at the end of the cited passage “is altogether consistent with freedom”, since humans are more free the more they constrain themselves by way of the representation of duty.47 We have here, then, an integral vision of human action that integrates all its constitutive elements, but in a hierarchical sense –as determined by the pure reason– it implies that it is duty that determines the ends.48 These ends, in turn, determine the guiding maxims, such that it becomes possible for the supreme principle of virtue to in turn make demands regarding the following of determined maxims which are in accordance with the categorical imperative.49 Kant moves to block a possible misunderstanding. In reality all ethical obligations –according to the definition offered at the beginning of this section– demand the strength of virtue for their accomplishment, but not all ethical demands are duties of virtue. This is precisely because the name “duties of virtue” (Tugendpflichten) corresponds only to those duties that point towards the obligatory ends of the faculty of choice, MdS 381. 381. 47 Cf. MdS 382n. 48 This is clearly explained in HERMAN, Barbara, Morality as Rationality. A Study of Kant’s Ethics, p. 144 and p. 185. 49 MdS 382: “In ethics, the concept of duty leads to ends, and the maxims that are related to the ends that we should give ourselves must ground themselves by attending to moral principles”. 45

46 MdS

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towards ends that are duties, which Kant’s earlier reflections have made it possible to conceive of. These will be later concretized only in the search for self-perfection and in the promotion of the happiness of the other. I will explain this point in some detail later. For now, it is important to emphasize that carrying out anything demanded by the categorical imperative demands, in a broad sense, moral strength, but if it does not point to morally obligatory ends of the faculty of choice, it is not what Kant calls a duty of virtue.50 What I think Kant had in mind when making this distinction is that the notion of virtue (Tugend) as well as that of end (Zweck) and, as we will see, that of the maxim (Maxime) as well, can all be considered at two distinct levels. One is that which is involved in the specification of those ends that are duties, which is the level corresponding to the faculty of choice and the determination of concrete maxims of action regarding the willing of these ends. The other level, prior to this previous one and more basic, and in fact the condition of possibility of its imputation and qualification, is that of the Gesinnung or basic orientation of the will towards the moral law. This is discussed in depth in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, and I will discuss it later myself.51 This intention or radical disposition –we can even call it existential, as I will show later– is considered to be virtuous (tugendhafte Gesinnung) insofar as it is the “fundamental option” of the will to choose the good, the unconditionality of the law, the subordination of the sensible impulses to the fulfillment of duty and thus to tend towards the realization of the summum bonum. The tugendhafte Gesinnung will thus permeate all the Tugendpflichten, making them possible, insofar as these latter must be carried out on the basis of a full understanding of the unconditionality of the law and thus strictly for the sake of duty (aus Pflicht). The fact that virtue must be moral strength is derived precisely from the conditions of the Gesinnung that are discussed in Religion: it is radical evil –the omnipresent possibility of subordinating the moral law to the sensible inclinations by incorporating the latter in the maxims of action– which must be resisted via a progressively acquired strength of the maxims according to duty. This is how Cf. MdS 383. Later I will also discuss the problems involved in an adequate translation of the term Gesinnung. 50

51

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the classical notion of virtue is integrated into the framework of Kant’s practical philosophy.52 The tugendhafte Gesinnung or fundamental virtuous disposition of the soul, nevertheless, is not sufficient in the case of the human being. The requirements that I have already mentioned regarding rational action require us to translate this disposition into ends and, even more, that there be ends that according to their concepts are duties. Furthermore, in this sense there must be ultimate ends, since if all ends are relative and susceptible to be considered as means for other ends, the categorical imperative would be impossible, since every act of will would be conditioned.53 This brings us again to the second formulation of the categorical imperative, already found in the Grundlegung, i.e. to the wellknown formula of humanity, which will be crucial for the entire development of the Tugendlehre. If already in the GMS persons –those beings graced with dignity (Würde), i.e. able to perform moral actions– were ends in the sense of limiting all action, in the Doctrine of Virtue Kant emphasizes their character as ends in a positive and proactive sense. Therefore, if the formula of humanity demands treating humanity, in oneself and in others, as an end and not merely as a means, in the Tugendlehre the ends that are duties are concretized via the promotion of one’s own good and of the happiness of the other.54 While I will discuss these ends specifically in chapter IV (where I will also indicate why there is an asymmetry between the demand for perfection and for happiness), what I want to emphasize here is that it is precisely these ends that are constituted as a general maxim, from which subordinated concrete maxims flow in regard to each of the duties of virtue. “The concept of an end that is at the same time a duty, i.e. which belongs specifically to ethics, is the only one that provides grounds for a law for the maxims of actions, insofar as the subjective end (that every person has) is subordinated to the objective end (which everyone must In chapter III I will deal with the notion of “virtue” in a specific way, and I will go into detail about its character as fortitudo moralis. As a result I will not spend any more time on it at this point in my argument. 53 Cf. MdS 385. 54 Cf. MdS 387-389. 52

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propose to themselves as such). The imperative «you must propose this or that to yourself as an end (for example, the happiness of the other)» refers to the matter of the faculty of choice (to an object)”.55 I believe that, having arrived at this point in Kant’s explanation, it is clear why the Tugendlehre offers a “material” ethics that not only is compatible with the so-called “formal” ethics found in the GMS and the KpV, but is also required by the latter as a systematic complement to the critical and foundational moment. It is a requirement of Kant’s conception of rational action itself, and of the application of an ethics envisioned as being for all rational beings but in the concrete conditions and circumstances of human beings. From what has been stated up to this point it follows, then, that what Kant understands as “ethics” in a strict sense in the Tugendlehre is rational deliberation that dictates laws. Not laws for action regarding external interactions, as Right does, but rather for the maxims of the actions insofar as they must adopt obligatory ends. 1.4 Structure, function and generality of the maxims As Barbara Herman has recently emphasized,56 there is a common criticism that holds that the “formalist” and “deontological” ethics of Kant imposes universal laws, slighting the individual and sidestepping his or her particular conditions. This critique collapses of its own weight in the face of a careful consideration of the maxim57 as the unit of intelligibility Cf. MdS 389. Kant’s italics. In both the previously cited The Practice of Moral Judgement, and in the previously referred to Morality as Rationality. A Study of Kant’s Ethics. 57 According to Rüdiger Bubner (cf. “Noch einmal Maximen”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 46, 4, 1998, pp. 551-561) and Maria Schwartz (cf. Der Begriff der Maxime bei Kant: Eine Untersuchung des Maximenbegriffs in Kants praktischer Philosophie, p. 25), the term “maxim” appears in Boethius’ translation of Aristotle, in the context of the logical distinction between propositio maior and minor in syllogisms. The propositio maxima is, in this context, that which cannot be doubted, or which in fact is not doubted, in order to initiate the argument. Bubner states that the concept of maxim entered into 17th century French moral theory, already in use in the practical sense of a brief expression of practical knowledge, the condensation of a teaching derived from experience. Thus, Kant 55 56

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of an action, which is precisely where the individualizing and circumstantial conditions demanded by Kant’s critics are gathered. In this section I will explain precisely what a maxim is, its structure and its reach, with the dual intention of responding to these objections as well as of laying the grounds for an analysis of the Tugendlehre, since this text constitutes precisely the “moment” of kantian ethics where he specifically lays down rules for the maxims of actions. Thus, in the General Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant did not hesitate to reiterate the subjective character of the maxims he had already described in his previous works. The maxim, as Bittner notes, is initially subjective in all its aspects: in its reach in accordance with its content, in its source –which is the faculty of choice, as we will see– and in its authority.58 The fact that various maxims fall under a single practical law (under the principle that converts certain actions into duties) does not mean that all maxims are made equivalent in an impersonal or decontextualized form: “A rule that the agent himself makes his principle on subjective grounds is called his maxim; hence different agents can have very different maxims with regard to the same law”.59 could have taken the concept from Émile or from the New Heloise by Rousseau, where it appears in the sense of a general practical rule. But, Bubner notes, the concept is also used by Wolff and Baumgarten; Bubner thinks that it is Baumgarten and not Rousseau who passes the concept on to Kant. In either case, what should be clear is that Kant uses the term “maxim” in a peculiar way. It should also be noted that the remote logical origin of the term is what suggests that a well-formulated maxim can be restructured in the manner of an Aristotelian practical syllogism, as Lewis White Beck emphasizes; cf. A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1973, p. 81. This issue is commented on in greater depth by PLACENCIA, Luis, “Kant y la voluntad como razón práctica”, Tópicos, n. 41, December 2011, pp. 63-105. 58 Cf. BITTNER, Rüdiger, Doing Things for Reasons, OUP, Oxford – New York, 2001, pp. 44ff. 59 MdS 225. Here Kant speaks of maxims as subjective rules, just as he does in GMS 438, where he refers to them as self-imposed rules (sich selbst auferlegten Regeln). Maxims are in fact presupposed by all rational willing, since they comprise the very intelligibility of the willing in question. Concerning this definition of maxims, cf. TORRALBA, José María, “La teoría kantiana de la acción. De la noción de máxima como regla autoimpuesta a la descripción de la acción”, Tópicos, n. 41, December 2011, pp. 17-61.

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This contextualized and particularized character of the maxim should not be sidestepped, nor is it lost via the universalization that is involved in the first formulation of the categorical imperative. In this regard the Tugendlehre is particularly clear. In the case of the moral action validated by the test of universalization what is achieved is that the subjective rule also becomes objective. Thus, the maxim can function simultaneously as a principle for the actions of a particular agent, given his or her particular conditions, and as a universal law.60. The specific introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue, in order to later specify this sphere of discourse in contrast to that of Right, insists that both are defined with regard to the law, but in the case of ethics it “is to be thought as the law of your own will and not of will in general”.61 I will not delve here into the concept of general will that is proper to the Rechtslehre. What is interesting for the purposes of this book is that Kant places an emphasis on this admission of the law into the subjective realm in the case of ethics: the only constraint to be allowed is self-constraint, because ethics gives laws for the maxims of actions, which are always subjective and instantiated. “Maxims are here regarded as subjective principles which merely qualify for a giving of universal law”.62 The fact that he is speaking of ends that are at the same time duties does not involve the annulment of subjective ends; rather, Kant clarifies that: “[one] establishes a law for the maxims of actions by subordinating the subjective end (that everyone has) to the objective end (that everyone ought to make his end)”,63

60 PATON also discusses the subjective maxim extensively in The Categorical Imperative, p. 56. Cf. also MdS 225. It should be noted that in this passage Kant is speaking of the maxim as a subjective practical principle, just as he does in KpV 19. As can already be guessed, in the concept of “maxim” one sees intersecting the semantic fields of the expressions “principle”, “practical rule” and, in the case of maxims validated by the categorical imperative, “law” as well. 61 MdS 389. 62 MdS 389. 63 MdS 389.

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and thus, in the dynamics of virtue, the objective end is assumed subjectively as well. I will separate myself from the Tugendlehre for a moment in order to make certain clarifications that I believe are necessary regarding the concept of the maxim. I stated earlier that the subjective principle of acting need not cease to be subjective in order to also be objective, insofar as it is validated by the categorical imperative. In my discussion of the concept of “maxim” in what follows, I will follow the interpretation that Barbara Herman offers in her work entitled Morality as Rationality. Herman emphasizes that the very definition of “maxim” is connected with our faculty of choice, liberum sed sensitivum. The maxim, because it is a subjective, rational principle of action, distinguishes our acting from irrational animal behavior. In addition, it simultaneously separates it from the divine will (not subject to the affections of the sensibility and, therefore, not subjective but rather always objective in its determinations).64 The notion of maxim corresponds, therefore, to an intermediate kind of being: it presupposes the mediation of reason, and therefore always involves a certain degree of generality and a pretension to being lawlike, while at the same time it takes in the impulses of the sensibility as incentives (Triebfedern) for the action, thus functioning simultaneously as principle of motion and as the rational ground that is expressible in a proposition. This is why, as Schwartz has emphasized, one must not forget the ambivalence that is implicit when one says that the maxims are Grundsätze.65 It is through the maxims that, according to Kant, a Denkungsart, a fundamental mode of thinking, is constituted, and in this way character is understood as the capacity to act according to maxims.66 Herman makes it clear that maxims are the apparatus that Kant uses in order to establish a formal relation between the elements of volition. Rather than focus in depth on the examples of maxims that Kant offers Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Morality as Rationality. A Study of Kant’s Ethics, p. 7. This is also emphasized in BECK, Lewis White, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, p. 77. 66 Cf. BUBNER, Rüdiger, “Noch einmal Maximen”, p. 552. This is the fundamental issue in MUNZEL, G. Felicitas, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character: The Critical Link of Morality, Anthropology and Reflective Judgement, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1999. Cf. e.g. p. 68. 64 65

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in his various works (which are always disconcerting, because they function at different levels of generality, and they frequently leave some of their structural elements implicit), what the American author proposes as a heuristic key in dealing with them is to keep in mind what a maxim is for. That is, she seeks to clarify their structure in the light of the fact that that the maxim is the unit of intelligibility of an action for an evaluation of its basic rationality, and in the final instance, its morality, insofar as this is the highest form of rationality.67 Thus the maxim must present the action that the agent desires in such a way that the structure of his or her volition is made sufficiently explicit. It must show how certain characteristics of the situation or context of the agent are presented to him or her as reasons for acting, in addition to showing what is to be done via a rule or principle and, finally –implicitly or explicitly– with what purpose it is to be done. In sum, Herman proposes that a complete maxim must include a minimal description of the desired action, the circumstances in which it is desired, together with the relevant motivational aspects for the agent and the expected result of the action’s execution.68 The end is what the action seeks to achieve; the motive is what moves the agent to propose this end to him or herself –that is, what makes it appear as good, as a reason to act. It thus explains the interest– the incentive that is rationally assumed because it is in the maxim– that the agent has in the end, and although in some cases the motive and the end coimply each other (for seeking an immoral end necessarily contains the motivation of love for oneself), this cannot always easily be known. They should nevertheless be distinguished as far as possible, because not doing so leads to the very common error of believing that when Kant confronts the maxims with the categorical imperative he is demanding that we propose our moral acting as an end to ourselves and not the specific object of the actions. For instance, some critics object to kantian morality because they think he is claiming that helping someone for the sake of duty (aus Pflicht) would imply thinking about the duty and not about the good of the person benefited. This objection involves a simplification of the distinct ex67 68

Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Morality as Rationality. A Study of Kant’s Ethics, p. 28. Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Morality as Rationality. A Study of Kant’s Ethics, p. 33.

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planatory and justificatory levels of action that Kant, in reality, does in fact contemplate in his moral proposal.69 I hold therefore that the maxim must be understood as being a proposition with a formal structure of the type “I do (or want to do) X in situation Y”. From this one can derive the practical rule “I should do X in situation Y” insofar as X and Y are always potential action-types and situation-types and the particular conditions of the action can be included in Y.70 It must be emphasized that in Y the factor of motivational determination is included, as I have already highlighted as being fundamental for moral evaluation, since it is for this motive that the end of X is sought (a motive that is also implicit in the understanding of X and therefore is not specified in the formula). In many examples of concrete maxims of action it is not easy to distinguish this ground of determination (Bestimmungsgrund) from the end (Zweck), but the latter is that which has a closer relation to action and is that from which the means follow: the end determines the means and specifies the action, and the ground of determination in turn determines the end as such. Certain elements in the maxim can, of course, be omitted as being obvious, familiar or understandable in themselves. For example, it is not necessary to specify in the maxim “go to the store for ice cream” the conditioning expression “provided that you want ice cream”; similarly, with the maxim “take the car to the auto shop if it breaks down”, it is not necessary to explain that the end sought is the repairing of the car. Kant omits these factors in the examples he offers, especially in the GMS and the KpV, something which disconcerts those scholars who seek a fixed structure for the maxim instead of focusing on its fundamental disposition. In other cases – and this is reflected in Kant’s examples in the Grundlegung– the motive must in fact be explained, insofar as the action and its ends can be the same in two very different maxims. This is the case with the example of helping when moved by sympathy, which is conditioned in turn by 69 For a discussion of these objections, cf. HERMAN, Barbara, The Practice of Moral Judgement, pp. 25ff. 70 Therefore, because it is a practical and subjective rule, the maxim must be formulated in the first person. In this regard, cf. TIMMERMANN, Jens, Sittengesetz und Freiheit. Untersuchungen zu Immanuel Kants Theorie des freien Willens, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2003, p. 151.

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whether sympathy is present, or of helping simply because it is my duty, i.e. in an unconditional manner. We can, at this point, characterize this minimum functional disposition of the maxims as a limit to the “malleability” that MacIntyre, Anscombe and other authors object to, as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. The manipulation of maxims is limited by a double necessity, according to Herman: 1) the inclusion of the motive when it is required to specify the true end of the maxim, and thus to specify the action at the same time, and 2) the necessity of respecting ordinary intuitions in the description of an action. Even if (2) seems to be a rather weak guarantee, I believe that it should also be taken into account with the limitations I indicate in what follows. In order to formulate the objection about the plasticity of the maxims two things must be presupposed: that the agent can describe the action however he or she wants, and that many of these divergent descriptions or maxims could be applied to the same action with the same expectations of validity.71 Nevertheless, Kant starts with the assumption that the maxim must express the action just as it is desired, and in this sense, once the agent has desired something it is no longer legitimately in his or her power to describe the end sought by the action in two equally valid forms. To indicate another state of things as an end (even if the action also generates the other state, but where the latter is distinct from that which determines the action qua such an action), is simply a lack of truthfulness –towards others, or at least towards oneself– since it is presupposed that at least at one level the rational agent knows what he or she is doing. In cases of doubt, Herman suggests, in order to approach the question of what the maxim for a given action is, there exists a method of counterfactual questions, of the type “would I continue to desire X if...?”.72 This method would in principle permit the agent to 71 Cf.

HERMAN, Barbara, Morality as Rationality. A Study of Kant’s Ethics, pp. 62ff. Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Morality as Rationality. A Study of Kant’s Ethics, p. 64. When I turn to the mandate of self-knowledge in the Tugendlehre, as well as when I delve into the issue of the methodology of virtue that Kant discusses towards the end of the work, it will become clear how part of the practice of moral judgement and of the task of selfknowledge consists precisely in this kind of counterfactual question in order to advance in the purity of the moral intention (even if, however, there can never be any absolute certainty about the intention, not even from the first person perspective). This can also 72

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distinguish, among all the consequences of an action, that which is the end sought. This will permit recognizing in the end the motive that operates at the origin of the volition. It is the motive that, via an interest, determines the end, and in addition determines whether a given end is at the same time the means for another later end or is sought for itself. In this way one can recognize, with respect to each action, that there is only one correct description, insofar as it includes the characteristics and consequences that in fact correspond to the motivation of the agent.73 This is the strong sense in which a maxim is the principle of the action in just the way that the action is desired. As Herman indicates, agents, insofar as they are rational, once having desired something, cannot then describe the thing desired in any manner that they wish. Their end is the state of things that in fact they sought, for a particular motivation in agreement with a principle, with the result that their having the principle as such is only expressed in one maxim, the maxim that they have as their own. There is only one maxim appropriate for each action, if the latter is considered as it is desired: the maxim demonstrates the intelligible character of the action precisely through the principle by which the action is desired.74 be fostered via a certain maieutic that Kant himself had in mind in his ideal of ethical instruction. 73 My intention here is only to refute the thesis that there would be more than one maxim that is appropriate for a concrete action. Another issue is that of moral overdetermination, which can only exist with regard to incentives (Triebfedern), not with regard to Bestimmungsgründe, but with regard to that which is incorporated as a motive in the maxim, cf. HERMAN, Barbara, The Practice of Moral Judgement, p. 12. One can speak of overdetermination when there are various motivational factors, each of which can be sufficient by itself to cause the action but nevertheless occur together. Although this is not the place to discuss this issue in detail, I will mention here that the description of such an overdetermined volition would, in principle, require a complex maxim. This does not, however, prove anything against the assertion that for each concrete action there corresponds only one maxim, i.e. that which expresses the action just as it was desired. Nor will I look here at those actions where more than one end is sought, where to each objective there corresponds a distinct maxim that must be evaluated separately, even though the external behavior, coincidentally, is the same for the distinct ends that the agent proposes to him or herself. 74 Cf. LEYVA, Gustavo, “Immanuel Kant: la razón de la acción”, in Filosofía de la acción (Gustavo Leyva, ed.), Síntesis, Madrid, 2008, p. 326.

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The criterion of detail that is required for each maxim is thus given by the volition of the agents themselves, who always aspire to justify themselves to themselves: the maxim of each action must include all those particular conditions that could make the agents believe that their case could be exceptional. For the formulation of the maxims, then, Kant begins with a restatement of this tendency to consider oneself to be an exception, given that the agent always has at least a minimum consciousness of what is demanded by the duty. The objection regarding the supposed plasticity of the maxims is based on a lack of understanding about what they are and what these subjective rules of acting express. As Herman notes, at the base of this objection is the temptation to see action as an event that is unlinked from the desire of the agent: only as seen in this way can an action admit many equally valid descriptions. Even if there are contexts and circumstances in which actions can be seen from this perspective (for in a certain but not absolute sense75 this occurs in Right), this is not the case when they are seen in regard to their moral evaluation. Therefore it is important not to forget what the original purpose of the expression of the rationality of the action via maxims was.76 On the basis of what has been stated up to now, I believe it should be clear that the crucial point for understanding the maxim of an action does not depend on the quantity of individual details that are included in it or not, but rather on the relationship that these data have with the volition of the agent. An irrational desire can be expressed by a maxim that presents itself prima facie as incomplete (e.g. “talk to those I encounter on the road”), as being too general (“do not ever eat what I want to”) or as too specific (“take a five minute break, starting at eleven in the morning But not in an absolute sense, because it is clear that from the juridical perspective as well the action must be considered to be voluntary, i.e. as emanating from a maxim. This is the case even though its ground of determination is not what is evaluated at the legal level, but only the external consequences that impact the coordination of the external freedom of the diverse agents in a community. Law must present the action as being imputable, and in addition must typify it as a casus datae legis, which presupposes a minimal recognition of intentions –of maxims– after the external act. It does not, however, judge these intentions directly but rather only their manifestation in the realm of the coexistence between the agents. 76 Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Morality as Rationality. A Study of Kant’s Ethics, p. 70. 75

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on the dot when it rains”). However, this is not necessarily the case, since under certain circumstances (emergency situations or the presence of higher order commitments, for instance) or in the framework of certain social conventions, it can be sufficient to satisfactorily express the motivational orientation after an action has been performed. I would like to also emphasize that in the maxim, as we have analyzed it, there frequently exists a component that is already evaluative: the relation between the end and the means that are subordinated to it. As one can see, this is a practical necessity, albeit a conditioned one: that of the appropriateness of the means to the end, and this is evaluated on the first determining plane of the action. On the second plane, on the other hand, i.e. that of the relationship between the end and the ground of determination, there exists an ethico-normative condition: a posterior qualification of the good, in this case unconditioned, which will be that which is recognized via the use of the categorical imperative as a principium diiudicationis.77 I must also say something with regard to the discussion about whether the maxims that can be evaluated with the test of universalization are the concrete and particular maxims of each action, or whether it is instead only those maxims that express general policies, which are broad rules that concern life projects or general principles of action having to do with relatively general conditions. The formulation of the problem arises from the distinct levels of generality at which Kant’s examples of maxims move, as he presents them over the course of all his works.78 Authors such as Höffe,79 Bubner,80 Baron81 and at one point

Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, The Practice of Moral Judgement, p. 222. As SCHWARTZ highlights in Der Begriff der Maxime bei Kant: Eine Untersuchung des Maximenbegriffs in Kants praktischer Philosophie, pp. 19-24, the problem has been apparent since GMS I. If in GMS 400 the maxim was defined as the subjective principle of desire, in 397 Kant speaks of the maxim of caring for one’s own life (sein Leben zu erhalten) and states that it only has moral value if the action is performed for the sake of duty itself. In 400, however, he speaks of the maxim of respect (Achtung), thereby changing planes, since the first example concerned a concrete action and the second is a fundamental option regarding the moral law; this is the same sense in which he speaks of a “Maxime eines reinen Willens” in KpV 74. These latter two references, as I will make clear in the following paragraphs, are to a second-order maxim; the first reference, in contrast (or 77 78

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O’Neill,82 have affirmed that only those maxims understood as Lebensregeln can be morally evaluated via the categorical imperative.83 The generality of the precept would avoid the inclusion of trivial data in the maxims, and in this sense, according to these authors, it would facilitate their universalization. Furthermore, some authors have sought to use this conception of the maxims in order to rehabilitate Kant’s practical philosophy by bringing it closer to Aristotle’s, or even to certain ethical proposals of a communitarist slant.84 Herman, on the other hand, in seeking to do justice to the role that Kant assigned to the maxims (as she does in a relative manner in Morality as Rationality), and in attempting to present a plausible proposal concerning the categorical imperative as a moral criterion (as she does in The Practice of Moral Judgment), defends the position that the maxims must concern concrete actions, although there are also maxims at the general level of the Lebensregeln. My interpretation seeks to be inclusive and to respond at the same time to what Kant himself understood, in all its breadth, by the term that of the unfulfilled promise in GMS 403, for instance) is to a concrete first-order maxim regarding an action and a specific inclination. 79 Cf. for example, HÖFFE, Otfried, “Kant’s Principle of Justice as Categorical Imperative of Law”, in Kant’s Practical Philosophy Reconsidered, Papers Presented at the Seventh Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter (Yirmiahu Yovel, ed.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989, p. 152. 80 Cf. For example BUBNER, Rudiger, “Noch einmal Maximen”, pp. 551-561. 81 Cf. For example BARON, Marcia W., Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology, p. 133. 82 Onora O’Neill holds that the maxims that can be passed through the categorical imperative are those than express specific intentions of action, as she comments in her book Acting on Principle: an Essay on Kantian Ethics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1975 (published under her maiden name, Nell). Later, she agrees with the interpretation that only those maxims are useful for the test of universalization which express general policies of action, as stated in her chapter “Kant After Virtue”, in Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy, CUP, Cambridge, 1999, p. 156. 83 In the critical literature in Spanish, Dulce María Granja supports a version of the maxims where only those which are most general are evaluated through the test of universalization; in this she follows Höffe and Bittner, cf. GRANJA, Dulce María, “Mal radical y progreso moral: ¿conceptos incompatibles en la teoría kantiana de la acción?” in Filosofía de la acción (Gustavo Leyva, ed.), pp. 365ff. 84 This is expressly stated by BUBNER, Rudiger, “Noch einmal Maximen”, p. 558.

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“maxim”. In developing my position I will rely on Herman, as well as other authors who distinguish the two levels of maxims of action, such as Maria Schwartz, Jens Timmerman and José María Torralba. It is true that, in one sense, maxims are prior to action, but their logical priority does not mean that they should be assumed explicitly to be general rules of life. Some of them are, and therefore they of course determine the more concrete maxims of action that fall under them, thereby precisely forming part of the structure of the motives that are put into play in each particular action.85 Thus, there are maxims at various levels of generality. In order that a maxim can function as an element in moral evaluation, it cannot be merely a general policy that –because it does not take into account the precise circumstances and the concrete aspects of the action– could be correct in itself and still lead the agent to a morally reproachable action.86 The idea of the Lebensregeln can be preserved and systematically integrated into this interpretation, which is more closely tied to the literal sense of Kant’s texts.87 It can even be taken to an extreme limit of generality in the sense of the maxim of the fundamental Gesinnung, as Kant himself proposes in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, which I will discuss later.88 In addition, the fundamental determination of the will concerning either the priority of the law or the incorporation of sensory stimuli in our maxims can be considered to be a decision –even if Kant’s transcendental perspective demands that it be a peculiar, atemporal deci-

Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Morality as Rationality. A Study of Kant’s Ethics, p. 46. This is also noted by SCHWARTZ, Maria, Der Begriff der Maxime bei Kant. Eine Untersuchung des Maximenbegriffs in Kants praktischer Philosophie, p. 65: from a general policy of the sort that Höffe gives as examples (“I want to be a person that helps”, or “I want to increase my talents”) certain particular actions may be derived that are immoral, but nevertheless, since they have no appropriately instantiated maxim, they cannot be evaluated by means of the categorical imperative. 87 TIMMERMANN, Jens, in Sittengesetz und Freiheit. Untersuchungen zu Immanuel Kants Theorie des freien Willens, pp. 155-175, also makes it clear that the posture of authors like Bittner, Höffe, O’Neill et al., who regard the maxims only as Lebensregeln is unilateral, and is far from the texts of Kant themselves. It impoverishes his theory in regard to the possibility of moral evaluation of concrete actions. 88 Cf. RGV 25. 85 86

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sion89– and therefore he would speak of a single maxim that can be virtuous or vicious.90 A general maxim does not determine actions, but instead determines other maxims.91 This is why the chain of intentions articulated in maxims can be taken to infinity, and is why Kant had to propose a fundamental, inscrutable transcendental decision that would permit the intelligibility of the series, and above all, the moral imputation of the action. What is interesting, then, regarding the various levels of generality of the maxims is the way in which they relate to each other. The maxims of action fall under those maxims which represent general life policies and which in a certain sense cause them, not in a temporal way but in a logical and motivational manner, since a general maxim forms part of the motives that underlie more concrete maxims. In turn, the general maxim of life can be recognized by means of these concrete maxims. When the maxim of a concrete action is marked as immoral with regard to a particular action, then the general maxims that underlie it are also prohibited.92 In turn, in order to be able to test the universalizability of a maxim in a trustworthy way it is necessary to have a certain idea of which more general maxims this principle can be comprehended within. This is even necessary in order to understand the action itself as an instance of a concrete type (e.g. it is necessary to distinguish between a general maxim of beneficence and another of self-interest in order to recognize an act as in principle manifesting solidarity). As a result, it is often the case that in order to recognize the motivational factor of an action one needs to go back and forth between the different degrees of generality at which that action can be considered.93 This is in fact how the faculty of judgement itself functions. Cf. ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, pp. 47ff. This is explained well in TORRALBA, José María, Libertad, objeto práctico y acción. La facultad del juicio en la filosofía moral de Kant, p. 131 and p. 146. 91 Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Morality as Rationality. A Study of Kant’s Ethics, p. 52. 92 This can be seen in the example in KpV 28; cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Morality as Rationality. A Study of Kant’s Ethics, p. 56. 93 Herman even suggests that in the case of the “moral fanatic” that Kant criticizes in MdS 408, the agent described there is not “excessively virtuous” –which for Kant would be absurd– but is rather an agent who is unable to make his/her general maxims interact 89 90

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It is for this reason that I see the division that Schwartz makes between first-order maxims (the maxims of action) and second-order maxims (Lebensregeln) as being highly useful. Indeed, she suggests that the text of Kant where the distinct levels of maxims and their hierarchization can be recognized is found precisely in the Doctrine of Virtue, as part of the explanation of why this ethical sphere moves between principles and casuistry. But ethics, because of the latitude it allows in its imperfect duties, inevitably leads to questions that call upon judgement to decide how a maxim is to be applied in particular cases, and indeed in such a way that judgement provides another (subordinate) maxim (and one can always ask for yet another principle for applying this maxim to cases that may arise). So ethics falls into a casuistry.94 For Schwartz, the minimal structure of the maxims of action or of the first order is always H (Handlung) – Z (Zweck). In a maxim, the action is presented as being directed towards an end, and thus underneath a maxim of action practical precepts can also still be present (particular imperatives that relate the willing of this specific end with the use of equally specific means). Schwartz recognizes that this minimal structure presupposes that the motive by which Z is adopted as an end must be known, i.e. the motive for desiring Z. This is obligatory for moral evaluation, even if only implicitly so95 –this is consistent with the minimal set of elements in a maxim that I enumerated previously. The author insists that it is totally impossible to not consider the motives and circumstances of an action in a valid description of it. In fact, these elements with particular ones. As a result, he or she would always act on the basis of a too-general maxim, which is unreasonable even when this maxim in question is that of complying with duty. Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Morality as Rationality. A Study of Kant’s Ethics, p. 60. The moral fanatic would be blind to particular cases, due to always generalizing his or her maxim in the direction of a policy that, because it lacks necessary subtleties, ends up being inadequate. Part of having a well-formed moral criterion, then, would involve knowing how to recognize when there are relevant moral questions in play, which would in turn demand attention to particularity. It also demands, as we will see upon investigating the “aesthetic prenotions of the receptivity of the soul to the concepts of duty in general”, a series of receptive dispositions on the part of the moral agent. 94 MdS 411. 95 Cf. SCHWARTZ, Maria, Der Begriff der Maxime bei Kant. Eine Untersuchung des Maximenbegriffs in Kants praktischer Philosophie, p. 70.

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are contained in the same concepts that Kant uses to specify the action. This also applies to the proposal for the structuring of a maxim of type S (Situationstyp) – H (Handlungstyp), which is employed at other levels of generality.96 The end and its motivations are included here in the situation-type or else in the concept of the action itself qua action of such-and-such a type. With either structure, all the examples that Kant offers of maxims can be formulated either motivationally or teleologically.97 As I have said, Schwartz’s second-order maxims, like the Lebensregeln, can be carried to such a degree of generality that they result in a limit condition –since the maxims cannot be generalized ad infinitum– i.e. that condition which Schwartz calls the die existenzielle Wende, the existential turn. This is the fundamental maxim of the Gesinnung or original disposition of the soul –where the fundamental option for morality comes to be, according to Kant– and which is discussed specifically in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason.98 The Gesinnung of the agent also has a maxim, as we have said, because it involves a decision: as Kant states in GMS 400, one can opt to always follow one’s own inclinations, or else, as in MdS 392, one can opt always to fulfill duty for duty’s sake. This is the most radical subjective ground of action, and thus is the most general and fundamental maxim. It is necessary in order to make imputation of action possible, and would not be rational in the case of an infinite regress in the generality of the maxims. Schwartz indicates that when the Gesinnung allows inclinations to overcome the law, it takes on the H-Z structure again, making one’s own happiness into the end (in the S-H form, S should be understood as indicating a situation in which one’s own happiness can be promoted).99 In contrast, the highest maxim that chooses duty (die oberste Maxime des Guten), according to this author, will 96 Cf. SCHWARTZ, Maria, Der Begriff der Maxime bei Kant. Eine Untersuchung des Maximenbegriffs in Kants praktischer Philosophie, p. 99. 97 Cf. SCHWARTZ, Maria, Der Begriff der Maxime bei Kant. Eine Untersuchung des Maximenbegriffs in Kants praktischer Philosophie, pp. 77ff, where the author studies in depth nine kantian examples of maxims at distinct levels and grades. 98 Cf. RGV 25ff. 99 Cf. SCHWARTZ, Maria, Der Begriff der Maxime bei Kant. Eine Untersuchung des Maximenbegriffs in Kants praktischer Philosophie, p. 134.

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not allow itself to be structured exactly in the same way, insofar as it does not instrumentalize the action in order to achieve an end, although this does not mean that it does not have one. As I have already discussed, for Kant reason is always teleological, and the ends that it has in its practical use have a priority over those which only have a theoretical use. Nevertheless, this involves a special finality, a finality without means, in the sense that the actions are not conditioned to promote any particular state of things: virtuous actions are not performed in order to fulfill the ends of reason, but rather the end signaled by the interest of reason is fulfilled in them: the Kingdom of Ends.100 This intended explanation of the structure of the maxims of action does not fully resolve the problem of their availability for moral evaluation; it seems to me that this is also not what Kant is seeking. It is true that for full knowledge of the maxim and its evaluation in the light of the categorical imperative it is necessary that the agent recognize the real motive that brings him or her to pursue the given end, which can be very difficult if the end is not accepted, if the action is overdetermined, if there is an unconscious dynamic in play, etc. Nevertheless, as Herman indicates, this is not a problem with the kantian account of action, but 100 This is a case of a finality of reason that lacks means, in the sense of a finality that is above all conditioning factors, and is suggested in the following note from the GTP, which derives from the controversy with Garve: “there cannot be a will that is completely lacking ends, although it is true that, when it is a case only of the legal coercion of actions, one must prescind from the ends, and the law constitutes the only determining ground of the will. But not every end is moral (for example that of our own happiness is not), but rather it is a moral issue that an end of such a type must be disinterested; and the demand for an ultimate end proposed by the pure reason, an end that comprises the set of all the ends under a principle (that is, a world as the supreme good, also possible thanks to our cooperation) is a demand of the disinterested will, which goes beyond the observance of formal laws and reaches the realization of an object (the supreme good) ... among men, the motive that is based on the idea of the highest good possible in the world –thanks to our cooperation– would also not be that of seeking in the world one’s own happiness, but rather it is only that idea as an end in itself; and therefore, the seeking of its attainment as a duty. For this idea does not contain a perspective of happiness simpliciter, but only the perspective of a proportion between happiness and the dignity of the subject, whatever it is. But a determination of the will that self-limits itself to such a condition and which ties to it its purpose of belonging to a similar totality is not an interested determination”. GTP 279-280.

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rather a real and omnipresent problem, whose existence Kant admits to as far back as the Grundlegung.101 The fact that self-knowledge is something to be accomplished and not something given is not a flaw in the theory of maxims.102 If the theory is limited in its applicability to what agents know about themselves and their motivation, this would also be compatible with the first command of the duties to oneself that Kant presents in the Tugendlehre: the socratic mandate of self-knowledge.103 1.5 The distinction between will and faculty of choice (Wille-Willkür) I will finish this chapter on preliminary notions with one of the clearest contributions of the Metaphysik der Sitten to the totality of Kant’s practical philosophy, a contribution that I have already mentioned in various of the annotations I have made earlier: the explicit distinction between levels in the faculty of desire (Begehrungsvermögen): that of will (Wille) and that of the faculty of choice (Willkür). This distinction already functions implicitly in the Grundlegung and in the second Critique. On occasions Kant refers to it in the context of the pure will (reine Wille),104 in order to specify it at the lawgiving level (which is that which can also be identified with the pure practical reason) and to distinguish it from the executive level. The distinction also comes into play on other occasions, where it can be inferred from the context of Kant’s argumentation. In these works, when he talks about the Willkür it does not appear that the term is used in a way that clearly distinguishes it from the legislative will.105 Allison notes that this distinction even appears as early as the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant digresses in order to clarify that our faculty of choice is free even though it is sensible –it is affected by the passions, as Cf. GMS 407. HERMAN emphasizes the same point in The Practice of Moral Judgement, p. 224. 103 Cf. MdS 441. 104 Cf. For example, KpV 55. 105 Cf. SCHWARTZ, Maria, Der Begriff der Maxime bei Kant. Eine Untersuchung des Maximenbegriffs in Kants praktischer Philosophie, p. 14. Kant discusses Willkür in GMS 428 and 451, and in KpV 22, 32 and 33 he appears to use the term more when he is dealing with the grounds of determination that act on the will. 101 102

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opposed to what happens in animals, where it is determined by the passions.106 What is clear, however, is that without this distinction (or at least its implicit presence), the notion of autonomy would be contradictory.107 José M. Torralba, for his part, has emphasized in a lucid fashion how the distinction between will and faculty of choice allows Kant to articulate two distinct planes in his understanding of action: that which goes from the will to the faculty of choice, and that which goes from the latter to the action via the maxim. Torralba takes full exegetic advantage of this distinction between planes.108 The passage that explains this division in the faculty of desire –and which at the same time distinguishes both planes from the mere, ineffectual desire that this faculty also produces– already appears in the first paragraphs of the General Introduction to the MdS. I will cite the passage at length first, in order to later analyze its concrete affirmations one by one: “The capacity for desiring in accordance with concepts, insofar as the ground determining it to action lies within itself and not in its object, is called the capacity for doing or refraining from doing as one pleases. Insofar as it is joined with one’s consciousness of the capacity to bring about its object by one’s action it is called the capacity for choice; if it is not joined with this consciousness its act is called a wish. The capacity for desire whose inner determining ground, hence even what pleases it, lies within the subject’s reason is called the will. The will is therefore the ca106 Cf. KrV A534 B562. Indeed, this passage from the Antinomy of Pure Reason is almost identical to the passage in MdS where he proposes the existence of arbitrium liberum in the human being, although the text in KrV still does not distinguish Wille from Willkür with such clarity. Cf. ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 55. 107 I will return to this necessary distinction of planes in my treatment of the duties to oneself, a point where Kant reinserts the duality necessary in order to understand autonomy via a distinction between homo noumenon and homo phaenomenon. Cf. MdS 418. An agent imposes certain mandates on him or herself as a result of what the third formulation of the categorical imperative states. In order to understand how these mandates have their force, one must consider how our humanity is legislative in its reason, as well as how it is obedient, insofar as it is sensible and executive. 108 Cf. TORRALBA, José María, Libertad, objeto práctico y acción: La facultad del juicio en la filosofía moral de Kant, pp. 56ff and pp. 95ff.

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pacity for desire considered not so much in relation to action (as the capacity for choice is) but rather in relation to the ground determining choice to action. The will itself, strictly speaking, has no determining ground; insofar as it can determine the capacity for choice, it is instead practical reason itself”.109 The passage explains that it is speaking of the faculty of desire “in accordance with concepts” in order to distinguish the human case from that of the animal: the fact that human beings do not act according to laws, but rather according to their representation via concepts, is what permits us to not be determined by our appetite for pre-established ends and to freely adopt our own instead. To the degree that these ends are within the reach of our causal capacity, we can speak of a relation with the faculty of choice (Willkür) and no longer of a mere desire (Wunsch). This latter act might seem to be foreign to the Begehrungsvermögen, but nonetheless, as Kant makes clearly shortly afterward, both the Willkür and the Wunsch can be determined by the will and can thus be contained under it.110 In fact, as we will see, part of the importance of virtue qua fortitudo is that it makes ends become possible for us and hence become objects of the faculty of choice, ends which would otherwise remain mere desires. In the virtuous person, furthermore, as Gregor emphasizes, the influence of the Wille over the Willkür is broadened, and in this sense one speaks of willpower, which in reality is the strength of the will as determinant of the faculty of choice.111 Will (Wille) thus has two senses. The first is broad and includes both choice and desire. In earlier works it was used while distinguishing planes only via the context or additional specifications (pure will, e.g. or will as identifiable with practical reason). The second is the strict sense, that of MdS 213. I have chosen to refer to Willkür as “faculty of choice” rather than as “capacity of choice”, but Gregor’s translation does not. 110 Cf. MdS 213. Thomas Höwing in “Das Verhältnis der Vermögen des menschlichen Gemüts zu den Sittengesetzen”, pp. 43-44, explores the idea that Wunsch is the act of the faculty of Willkür. 111 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, “Kants System der Pflichten in der Metaphysik der Sitten”, included together with the introduction by LUDWIG, Bernd, “Einleitung zu Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre”, in Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre. 109

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the will as lawgiving and determining, i.e. as the capacity for imposing principles.112 The faculty of choice (Willkür), on the other hand, is directly related with the object that prompts the action: this is the effective faculty of desire: executive and empirically affected. In the case of the human being, it is at once a battleground between the determination of reason –instantiated in the legislative will– and the impulses of the sensibility. As a result the maxims of action, arising from the faculty of choice, incorporate these factors within themselves.113 As a result, what in earlier works was a relation of the will with itself now unfolds into Wille and Willkür; both point to the human faculty of desire, but seen from distinct perspectives. The faculty of choice has a more direct relationship with the object, and is affected by the sensibility (qua pleasurable or painful) and thus by the feeling of respect (Achtung, which is precisely what produces the moral law at the level of the legislative Wille and which in the faculty of choice can be considered as the cause and motor of actions with moral value).114 As a result it is at the level of the faculty of choice that the agent can subordinate the demands of the sensibility to those of reason –or vice versa– and in this sense it is here that negative freedom is found (qua independence with regard to sensible things). This negative freedom, in turn, when it allows itself to be informed by the will, becomes positive freedom (autonomy): “The faculty of choice that can be determined by the pure reason is called «free will». That which is only determinable by the inclination (sensible impulse, stimulus) would be animal capacity of choice (arbitrium brutum). The human faculty of choice, however, is certainly affected by the impulses, but is not determined by them, and thus it is not in itself pure (i.e. without an acquired rational habit), although it can be determined to actions by a pure will. The freedom of the faculty of choice is its independence from any determination by sensible impulses; this is its negaCf. MdS 214. Cf. SCHWARTZ, Maria, Der Begriff der Maxime bei Kant. Eine Untersuchung des Maximenbegriffs in Kants praktischer Philosophie, p. 17. 114 Cf. PATON, Herbert J., The Categorical Imperative, p. 67, where he emphasizes the role of the Achtung as being generated by the Wille, and which is the determinant of the Willkür. 112 113

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tive sense. The positive sense is: the capability of the pure reason to be practical of itself”.115 In regard to this quote, I wish to highlight the reference to a “rational acquired habit”, which comes close to the notion of virtue that I will explore in chapter III. This citation provides us with guidance in the debate about whether Kant admits virtue as being a habit or not, which arose as a result of the passage –to be discussed later– where he rejects it as being a mechanical process. Returning to the Wille / Willkür distinction, the will (Wille) is here characterized as the faculty of desire qua practical reason, and thus corresponds with law, i.e. the objective principle of acting. The faculty of choice (Willkür), on the other hand, is, so to speak, the faculty of the maxims.116 The will in this strict sense cannot, then, be called free, insofar as it is necessary as lawgiving and there is no question of asking whether there can be any coercion in it; only the faculty of choice is free, strictly speaking. The freedom of the faculty of choice, as Schönecker,117 Engstrom118 and Allison discuss it –and as was already present in inchoate form in the canon of pure reason– is precisely practical freedom, that which is known by experience, even abstracting from its transcendental significance, although this transcendental freedom is what, in the final instance, makes possible practical freedom itself.119 On this point, Kant is obliged to clarify the concept of the freedom of the faculty of choice even further, because in order to allow the agent to incorporate the priority of duty in the maxims, or else to give priority to sensible impulses, he seems to be forced to define the freedom of the faculty of choice as mere indetermination (libertas indifferentiae), as the

115 MdS 213. This distinction between negative freedom and positive freedom is discussed in GMS 446 and KpV 33. 116 Cf. MdS 226. 117 Cf. SCHÖNECKER, Dieter, Kants Begriff transzendentaler und praktischer Freiheit, W. de G., Berlin, 2005, p. 168. 118 Cf. ENGSTROM, Stephen, “The Inner Freedom of Virtue”, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays (Mark Timmons, ed.), OUP, Oxford – New York, 2002, p. 295. 119 Cf. KrV A802 B830 and ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 55.

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“faculty of choosing to act according to or against the law”.120 Nevertheless, to define the faculty of choice in this way Kant would have to include this indetermination in the definition of its concept, which he resists doing: freedom cannot consist in acting against reason itself. In Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason Kant makes it clear that the human faculty of choice always has the possibility of choosing evil. The agent can give priority to purely subjective incentives over objective ones and thereby distance him or herself from the proper finality of the practical reason. This is a mystery that in fact cannot be inferred from the makeup of any of the person’s dispositions or faculties. It is something that without a doubt is given in experience, but which cannot be included in the concept of faculty of choice. Instead, a “blind spot” in the explanation must be acknowledged: this blind spot affects both our understanding of the fact that reason can determine the faculty of choice, as well as our understanding of its impotence in the case of immoral action. Therefore, the depths of freedom remain unsounded, and Kant has to resort to an epistemological distinction in order to explain that the concept of choice cannot include the experience of freedom, in the sense of indetermination: “But freedom of choice cannot be defined –as some have tried to define it– as the capacity to make a choice for or against the law (libertas indifferentiae), even though choice as a phenomenon provides frequent examples of this in experience. For we know freedom (as it first becomes manifest to us through the moral law) only as a negative property in us (...). But we cannot present theoretically freedom as a noumenon, that is, freedom regarded as the capacity of man merely as an intelligence, and show how it can exercise constraint upon his sensible choice; we cannot therefore present freedom as a positive property. But we can indeed see that, although experience shows that man as a sensible being has the capacity to choose in opposition to as well as in conformity with the law, his freedom as an intelligible being cannot be defined by this”.121

120 121

MdS 226. MdS 226.

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Such a definition, adds the thinker from Königsberg, would be a “bastard” one (definitio hybrida),122 because it would include in the concept of “faculty of choice” an aspect of its exercise that cannot be an essential datum of it, and would indeed falsify the definition itself.123 Barbara Herman explains this point a little further on: acting badly is not a capacity, but rather an incapacity (Unvermögen), because our freedom, at the level of the faculty of choice, must be defined in terms of action directed by the moral law. This is not an obstacle to choice being used badly, but such a bad usage would not enter into its definition, as in the case of professors who are authorized to grade their students according to their merits: they are not authorized to grade the students according to their own preferences or any other criterion, although they can in fact do so. The definition of this capacity (or norm-constituted power, as Herman calls it) is not neutral, and even applies to defective actions, indicating them in a privative fashion.124 And this is precisely the case with the definition of the faculty of choice. It seems to me that, with this clarification, Kant at bottom is using the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon in order to defend the concept of freedom –which for him is paradigmatically normative125– from an unsatisfactory interpretation that involves mere indetermination. This indetermination is something that must remain within the limits of

Cf. MdS 227. This is apparently overlooked when it is simply said that, for Kant, the Willkür would be “per se neutral with regard to the good and the bad”, as GRANJA, Dulce María states in “Mal radical y progreso moral: ¿conceptos incompatibles en la teoría kantiana de la acción?”, pp. 365ff. This text is otherwise highly recommended, and applies the kantian distinction between these planes in an appropriate way. However, the following nuance must be taken into consideration: the faculty of choice presents itself in this way, but according to Kant it cannot be so defined. 124 Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Moral Literacy, Harvard University Press, New York, 2007, pp. 248-258. In addition Höwing, in “Das Verhältnis der Vermögen des menschlichen Gemüts zu den Sittengesetzen”, p. 47, emphasizes that a faculty must always be defined in function of its successful exercise even when it may be deficient in its actual results. 125 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 67. 122 123

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our experience of freedom as it presents itself to us, but which cannot reflect the truest character of this condition. With the distinction between Wille and Willkür, and this final clarification regarding the fact that in our experience the faculty of choice manifests itself to us as indifferent, although it cannot be defined in this way, the objection fails.126 It cannot sustain the claim that Kant only recognizes as free those actions that are determined by the pure practical reason, i.e. those which are morally good, such that bad actions would be, insofar as they are determined by sensible impulses, beyond any moral evaluation and thus beyond any imputation.127 The faculty of choice presents itself to us as free in an initial sense of indeterminateness just insofar as it can always choose to subordinate the incentives of the sensibility to the unconditionality of the law, or conversely, it can consider itself to an exception to the mandate of the law and subordinate it to sensible impulses. It is free in an even stronger sense –that of autonomy, or as I will discuss later, at least of autocracy– when it subordinates itself to the determination of the will qua practical reason, i.e. lawgiving reason. As Allison indicates in Kant’s Theory of Freedom, and as can be derived from what was stated earlier concerning the maxims, it is also the case that when the agent succumbs to the dictates of the sensibility he or she does so in a free manner. This is because, since the agent is a rational human being, he or she must incorporate these sensible impulses in the maxims128 in a fully responsible way, even though a mystery always remains regarding why the propensity is always present to incorporate egoistic motives into our maxims. This mystery in the plane of transcen126 This criticism comes from Reinhold (cf. HÖWING, Thomas, “Das Verhältnis der Vermögen des menschlischen Gemüts zu den Sittengesetzen”, p. 48), and is also put forth by other authors such as PRAUSS, Gerold, in Kant über Freiheit als Autonomie, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt, 1983, pp. 75ff. A discussion of why Kant is not susceptible to this criticism, thanks to the distinction between Wille and Willkür, is insightfully presented in LEYVA, Gustavo, “Immanuel Kant: la razón de la acción”, p. 351. 127 The objection bases itself on GMS 447: “A free will and a will that is subject to moral laws are the same thing”. Nevertheless, it remains clear that the will qua free is properly the faculty of choice, and that the faculty of desire, as related to moral laws, is the will in the strict sense. 128 Cf. ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 5.

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dental freedom does not mean denying that the practical freedom of the faculty of choice is also exercised when the agent does not act well, i.e. when he or she freely incorporates the incentive of the sensibility in the maxim without giving priority to the interest of the reason in the moral law.129 There is no rational action that is not imputable in the human being, even that action which is prompted by radical evil and which degrades our humanity, if it is admitted into the maxim –or incorporated, as Allison prefers– where the maxim is understood as being a subjective parameter of intelligibility in the action. There is always, beyond any mere renunciation of responsibility over the action, a contradiction or inconsistency in the expression of freedom by the agent.130

Cf. ENGSTROM, Stephen, “The Inner Freedom of Virtue”, p. 296. In addition to resolving this problem regarding the imputability of immoral action with his distinction between Wille and Willkür, Kant also clarifies certain other theoretical issues. Among these, Schwartz enumerates the following: a) an explanation of why the free faculty of choice is what is determined by the will, and therefore why, in certain passages, freie Willkür and freier Wille are used as equivalents (e.g. MdS 213, 226 and KpV 29); b) it allows for a better understanding of self-determination; c) it gives a resolution of why it is the faculty of choice that mediates between the sensations of pleasure or displeasure (Lust/Unlust) and the action itself, and d) it provides an understanding of why the grounds of determination of the will in KpV 20 and KpV 41 are treated in MdS (214, 218) as being the grounds of the faculty of choice: in a strict sense, the will is not determined by these motives but rather, qua practical reason, it determines itself. Cf. SCHWARTZ, Maria, Der Begriff der Maxime bei Kant. Eine Untersuchung des Maximenbegriffs in Kants praktischer Philosophie, p. 15. Given the distinction between Wille-Willkür, it also becomes easy to understand the difference between the use of the concept of Triebfeder as that which affects the faculty of choice, and of Interesse as the objective ground of the reason, where the latter is already incorporated in the maxim that emanates from the faculty of choice. I will specifically discuss this concept later. It also becomes clearer in what sense the moral sentiment of respect –Achtung, which also plays a crucial role in MdS and which I will discuss at an appropriate time– is a moral incentive (moralische Triebfeder) for the faculty of choice, insofar as the latter is determined by the representation of the moral law. 129

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CHAPTER 2 THE TRANSITION FROM THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON TO THE DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE

2.1 Introduction Another reason why the Metaphysics of Morals never received due attention is its complex relationship with Kant’s earlier texts: the MdS was to be understood as representing his fully complete system of ethico-moral thought, while the prior works were understood by Kant himself as being preparatory moments necessary for laying groundwork and performing critique. The GMS of 1785 and the KpV of 1788, have been vastly more studied, commented and discussed than what could be called the “material” or “applied” ethics1 of Kant found in the MdS, first pubBefore continuing, I would like to deal with a possible objection. As PATON, Herbert J., The Categorical Imperative, p. 31, makes clear, Kant seems on occasion to interpret that which is proper to the MdS as being “applied ethics”, and at other times, he seems to assign that which is proper to the Anthropology to that heading. Authors such as LOUDEN, Robert B. (Kant’s Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings, OUP, Oxford – New York, 2002, p. 3) hold that Kant’s true applied or material ethics would be his anthropology, because the MdS “uses the minimum of empirical information possible”. Louden speaks of up to eleven “levels of purity” that make up a kantian continuum that would range from pure ethics to anthropology (with the intermediate steps being those corresponding to rational beings, finite rational beings, human beings, to other hypothetical species, and so on successively until reaching casuistic judgements in a specific situation). As I will discuss at the end of this section, I do not believe that the MdS uses a minimum of empirical information, but rather it uses a normative image of the human being, as opposed to an image of the human being as he or she is de facto. This image is centered on essential characteristics that permit Kant to still speak of universal duties and not of aspects proper to subgroups, or of particular aids and obstacles in specific contexts. These essentialia are only recognized in experience, and in this sense, the MdS constitutes an applied ethics; however, it is also a material ethics in the sense that it prescribes concrete duties and specific virtues that correspond to empirically-given conditions. Anthropology does in fact involve more empirical detail, but it is not yet properly an ethics, and much of the data it offers is beyond what corresponds to transcendental philosophy per se. 1

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lished in 1797 and later published in a second edition in 1803. If this connection is not understood properly, the MdS can appear to be a retreat into an acritical morality, even one that is heteronomous, a mere echo of classical references that would not have too much to do with the radical demand for autonomy as Kant discusses it in the Groundwork or in the Critique of Practical Reason itself.2 As Lara Denis has emphasized, this can be reformulated in exactly the opposite sense: the Metaphysics of Morals is rich in anthropological details and therefore is close to Kant’s Lectures on Ethics, and thus permits us to interpret the latter better and integrate them into an overall understanding of the kantian corpus.3 But above all, as I have already tried to make clear, it is not possible to fully understand the GMS or the KpV without taking into account the concrete application of the moral law in the real conditions of the human being, as it is analyzed in the MdS.4 As I have mentioned earlier, the Rainer Friedrich, whose study –contrary to mine– focuses instead on the Rechtslehre, also mentions certain possible causes of the neglect that fell upon the Metaphysics of Morals. First of all, it was overshadowed by Fichte and by Hegel, and right from the time of its publication it was considered to be a work of lesser quality. Later, the Neokantianism of the 19th century did not change this negative judgement about the MdS much. This was in large part, Friedrich states, because they were disquieted by Kant’s taking the side of prima occupatio in the Rechtslehre, a position which is difficult to reconcile with the position that was dominant at the time, which would instead justify property on the basis of work. Cf. FRIEDRICH, Rainer, Eigentum und Staatsbegründung in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 2. Bernd Ludwig, in the “Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue” that he includes in his new edition of the Metaphysik der Sitten, notes that the lack of respect for this kantian work was so radical that during the entire 20th century only the monograph of Mary Gregor dealt with it in any depth. Cf. LUDWIG, Bernd, “Einleitung zu Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre”, p. xvi. 3 Cf. “Introduction” to Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide (Lara Denis, ed.) CUP, Cambridge – New York, 2009, p. 1. 4 Mary Gregor begins her study of the Tugendlehre, entitled Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, precisely by noting that a greater attention to this text would have prevented the arising of formalist confusions about the interpretation of the philosophy of Kant, or the attempt to apply the categorical imperative as a strictly logical contradiction. Nor would there have been so many proposals by various scholars that “imagine” how the imperative could be applied, given that the MdS gives Kant’s own application of this moral test. Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. xi. 2

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1797 work shows signs of a hasty editing and problems of composition, and produces certain exegetical perplexities, although this occurs less in the Tugendlehre than in the part corresponding to the Rechtslehre.5 However, it is possible to demonstrate its connections (not merely possible, but real) with the earlier works, and one can at the same time understand these connections in the light of the originally preparatory and groundlaying role these works were originally conceived for.6 In so doing, one can appreciate the MdS in an appropriate manner, and as I will demonstrate in this section and throughout the entire book, far from Kant’s supposed “senility” at the moment of its editing7 being a valid explanation of the rather “uncritical” nature of the work, this notion is nothing but a misunderstanding. My intention in the following section will be first to bring together and comment on certain passages in the GMS and the KpV where Kant announces the systematic development of the MdS and hints at its character and importance.8 This will require me to make certain clarifications Ludwig notes that, as opposed to what occurred with the Rechtslehre (in whose publication other editors intervened and produced inconsistencies that Ludwig’s edition seeks to correct), the terminological, syntactic and ordering problems in the Tugendlehre (e.g. the inconsistency between the different divisions of duties) are due to the fact that Kant had already worked on several texts and lectures about virtue, and in the Tugendlehre they overlap. Cf. LUDWIG, Bernd, “Einleitung zu Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre”, p. XXIII. Ludwig’s explanation seems plausible to me, both because of the differences between the subdivision proposed in the Introduction and the actual presentation of the topics in the Tugendlehre, as well as because of certain terminological variants. Nevertheless, with my interpretation I am committed to a hermeneutic that emphasizes the greatest consistency possible, without giving up the right to reject one or another of Kant’s affirmations as obsolete or residual when the evidence appears to suggest this. In so doing, I am seeking to understand how the Tugendlehre is consistent with the rest of the MdS and with his overall moral and theoretical philosophy. 6 This is suggested by Allen Wood, in “The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy”, p. 20, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays, who proposes that –methodologically speaking– one should read both the Grundlegung and the second Critique in the light of the Metaphysics of Morals. 7 This is the explanation given by Schopenhauer, who was particularly bothered by the Rechtslehre, cf. SCHOPENHAUER, Arthur, Werke in fünf Bänden, Haffmanns Verlag, Zürich, 1988, vol. I, pp. 529-626. 8 For an excellent review of the “history” or “pre-history” of the composition of the Metaphysics of Morals –a history of successive delays, accompanied by various changes in 5

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about the kantian meaning of a “pure” discipline and what “a priori” knowledge is, as well as to head off a possible confusion about Kant’s understanding of the “application” (Anwendung) of the categorical imperative. In so doing I will defend the continuity of Kant’s project of moral philosophy and the agreement and complementarity, as mentioned above, between the Metaphysics of Morals as an explanation of the system of duties and obligatory ends, and the earlier works with their character of being preparatory, in a fundamental and critical sense, to the full development of this system. Afterwards I will deal specifically with the relationship between the categorical imperative as a fundamental expression of the moral law, and the supreme principle of virtue, which Kant uses to articulate his treatment of ethical duties. I will relate the supreme principle of virtue to the categorical imperative, and will show how the role of ends in the Metaphysics of Morals is determined by the rigorous demand for universality and autonomy that is fundamental to Kant’s ethics. As a result, I hope to demonstrate that there is no contradiction at all between this work and the critical requirements of his earlier moral works; on the contrary, there exists a complementarity that the preceding works themselves demand, if they are understood properly. When Kant states that the supreme principle of virtue, as opposed to the principle of juridical obligation laid out in the Rechtslehre –which can be considered to be analytic– is a synthetic a priori proposition, he presents the necessity for a transcendental deduction that legitimates it on the basis of the fundamental principle of morality expressed in the categorical imperative. I will seek to discover whether this relationship can in fact be understood to be a transcendental deduction, by attempting to reconstruct a particular argument that Kant gives in a rather abrupt form. Towards the end of this section I will also make some comments on the role of the principle of virtue, and will seek to explain their relation with the categorical imperative in its three principal formulations, which already appear in the GMS as being three distinct expressions of a single moral law (the well-known formula of universalization, the formula of Kant’s conception of the project itself– cf. KUEHN, Manfred, “Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: the History and Significance of its Deferral”, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, pp. 9-32.

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humanity and the formula of autonomy in a kingdom of ends). Although four or even five formulations of the imperative could be enumerated,9 I will stick to these three formulations, which are those most commonly recognized as being clearly distinguished by Kant himself. There is only one categorical imperative, and in order to defend its unity I will provide some clarifications about how the three formulations should be understood (which, even if they are not fully equivalent, are indeed complementary and co-extensive), some of which are frequently misinterpreted. The imperative varies its form in accordance with the emphasis on the form, matter and the complete determination of the law that demands obedience of us through the imperative. Given this complementary between the formulations, the supreme principle of virtue must express them and apply them all in consistent ways, although it may allude in a clearer and reiterated way to specific formulations, as in fact happens. 2.2 From critique to system One of the first ideas that is discussed in the Grundlegung –Kant’s first great ethical work, although it was the product of a relatively lengthy reflection on its subject area10– is the distinction between the rational and empirical part of morality. This is a gap which, as I will show, comes to fruition precisely in the Metaphysics of Morals, where it takes on a role that is not what is seems to be suggested by the first mention of this concept: “We may call all philosophy empirical, so far as it is based on grounds of experience: on the other band, that which delivers its doctrines from a priori principles alone we may call pure philosophy. When the latter is merely formal it is logic; if it is restricted to definite objects of the understanding it is metaphysics. In this way there arises the idea of a twofold As PATON does, in The Categorical Imperative, p. 129. In his courses, Kant dealt with questions of moral philosophy, basing himself on Baumgarten’s Etica Philosophica (of 1740) and the Initia Philosophicae Practicae (1760), beginning in 1756. Cf. CORTINA, Adela, “Estudio preliminar a la Metafísica de las Costumbres”, in Metafísica de las costumbres, Tecnos, Madrid, 2005, p. xvii. 9

10

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metaphysics –a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals. Physics will thus have an empirical and also a rational part. It is the same with ethics; but here the empirical part might have the special name of practical anthropology, the name morality being appropriated to the rational part”.11 In this passage there are already some questions about the role that Kant foresaw for the Metaphysics of Morals when he wrote the Groundwork, which was to serve as a preparation for the former. It has been suggested that this corresponds with what is normally called “morality”; but is it a pure philosophy, without any admixture of any content provided by experience?12 In fact, just as the cited passage foresees, the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View of 1785 presents a kind of study of moral character that pays more attention to empirical issues.13 On the other 11 GMS 388. I use the translation by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, London, 1895. On the division between pure and empirical moral philosophy, cf. also Refl. 6618. 12 This is the same idea of the metaphysics of morals as an absolutely pure type of knowledge that already appears in the first Critique, cf. KrV A841/B869 and in certain of the Reflections, e.g. 6822. 13 I will not focus on the possible difference between “practical anthropology” or “anthropology in a practical sense” and “moral anthropology”, since Kant does not clarify it in the GMS, although some seek to interpret MdS 217 as referring to this division. In this passage, Kant affirms that the metaphysics of morals should not be mixed with moral anthropology, which has lead authors like WILSON, Holly L., in “Kant’s Integration of Morality and Anthropology”, Kant-Studien, vol. 88, 1997, p. 88, n. 4, to infer that, since practical anthropology is in fact linked in some way to the metaphysics of morals, the moral anthropology referred to cannot be the same thing. As a result, she supposes that the latter would be based on a principle of the practical reason, while practical anthropology would be based on a theoretical principle of teleological judgement. SCHMIDT, Claudia M., in “The Anthropological Dimension of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals”, in Kant-Studien, vol. 96, 2005, p. 66, affirms, in the light of the same passage, that practical anthropology is not moral anthropology, because the latter would in fact just be an empirical science, while the former is not. Neither of these positions seems convincing to me, insofar as the only thing Kant indicates in MdS 217 is that moral anthropology and the metaphysics of morals should not be confused in an indiscriminate fashion. However, he does not deny that the metaphysics of morals is what regulates practical anthropology in a normative fashion, as something which arises reflexively from the empirical data that the latter offers (as I will explain further on). Therefore, it is possible that Kant was not thinking of a radical difference between practical and moral anthropology.

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hand, the Metaphysics of Morals, as I will discuss in depth, represents the application of the moral imperative to the conditions of rational action, precisely as required by human nature. The duties of virtue in particular will respond to certain of the most fundamental characteristics of human existence (finitude, corporeality, etc.), which can only be recognized in experience. The Metaphysics of Morals does not focus on the most specific characteristics –age, sex, race, other groupings– that the Anthropology does in fact pay attention to. Hence, the MdS is an “anthroponomy” to be applied to human life as known through anthropological description,14 as I will discuss further on in this book. Nevertheless, it does not correspond to a totally pure discipline, as the GMS appears to have predicted.15 Further along, the GMS again states that the metaphysics of morals is a pure rational discipline, totally separate from anything empirically derived.16 Mary Gregor holds that this confusion arises because Kant, in In this regard I am in agreement with LOUDEN, Robert B., Kants Impure Ethics, p. vii, who holds that Kant is referring to the same notions when he speaks of practical anthropology, moral anthropology or just plain anthropology. I will, nevertheless, take into account the issues raised by the two authors I cited previously regarding whether the empirical data that Kant has in mind may be merely facts that are considered in a mechanical fashion and which lack any normative meaning. 14 Cf. MdS 217. I will go into this issue more deeply later. Cf. also Refl. 6706 and 7203, where Kant is speaking of anthropology as “subjective practical philosophy”, a sister to morality, while the latter in contrast does reach the level of objectivity. And finally cf. VzM 244-245. 15 This apparent “change of mind” in Kant, from what was foreseen as a metaphysics of morals in GMS to what he actually developed in the MdS, is even more disconcerting if, as Wood does, one bears in mind a letter written from Hamann to Herder, prior to the publication of the MdS, where Hamann affirms that in the MdS Kant would discuss what “man is, and not what he ought to be” (in WOOD, Allen, “The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy”, p. 1, n.1). Thus, although in the GMS Kant spoke of the project of a pure discipline, it would seem (at least if Hamann did not misunderstand Kant’s intentions) that at some point Kant planned on writing an MdS in the style of the Practical Anthropology. What is clear, however, is the MdS ended up having the character of an intermediate work, a transition (Übergang), as I will discuss later. For another commentary on Kant’s original plans for the MdS as an absolutely pure ethics, cf. ANDERSON, Georg, “Kants Metaphysik der Sitten – ihre Idee und ihr Verhältnis zur Ethik der Wolffschen Schule”, Kant Studien. vol. 28, 1923, pp. 41-61. 16 Cf. GMS 409.

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the editing of his works, does not always pay attention to the distinction (first found in the KrV)17 between a pure knowledge (totally independent of experience, both in the contents of its concepts as well as in the connection between them) and a priori knowledge (that in which the connection does not depend on experience, but which exists among elements that contain empirical data).18 If one does not bear this distinction in mind, one can fall into the misunderstanding I have alluded to regarding what the role of a metaphysics of morals would be, and whether in fact the 1797 volume in fact fulfills the function planned for it in the critical works. Indeed, the MdS discusses the “pure” part (pure in a broad sense, but imprecisely so with regard to the distinction made in the KrV) of moral philosophy, because it offers moral laws that are universal and necessary a priori, but which involve crucial empirical concepts about the human being. Even so, on the basis of Kant’s own philosophical coordinates, it is called “metaphysical” with complete precision, because as he states in the MdS itself, it offers “a system of a priori knowledge from concepts alone”.19 The content of the duties –both juridical ones as well as those pertaining to virtue– that are derived in the MdS have to do, in their material aspect, with experience, although their concepts are related to each other (via the form of duty) independently of experience. In later passages of the GMS Kant will insist on the idea of a metaphysics of morals as being pure knowledge: “For the metaphysic of morals has to examine the idea and the principles of a possible pure will, and not the acts and conditions of human volition generally, which for the most part are drawn from psychology”.20 Cf. KrV B3. Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom, A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 4-5. 19 MdS 216. 20 GMS 390. Concerning the use of the term “psychology” (Psychologie) and its relationship with anthropological knowledge in Kant, cf. BORGES, Maria de Lourdes, “Psicologia empírica, Antropologia e Metafísica dos Costumes em Kant”, in Kant e-Prints, vol. 2, n. 1, 2003. 17 18

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It is also probable that the confusion derives in part from Kant’s concern, which is predominant in the Grundlegung, to emphasize with absolute clarity that the laws of morality are those of reason itself, and do not derive from mere empirical generalizations. This, then, is the reason for his rather imprecise emphasis on the “pure” character of the metaphysics of morals.21 In this same introductory work, as we have seen, there are certain apparent problems regarding the identification of the level of abstraction with regard to the empirical elements that would be required by a metaphysics of morals. In addition, Kant has decided not to apply the categorical imperative, which would offer illumination and confirmation but which would also involve a certain risk of distracting the reader as a result of this application. Indeed, it would tempt him or her to leave unconsidered a more formal justification of the test of morality.22 Nevertheless, Kant alludes to the well-known division of duties into perfect and imperfect, with the clarification that this division will be dealt with at length in the Metaphysics of Morals, and he also is already using the distinction between duties to oneself and to others.23 I believe that the critical point for reconciling the MdS with Kant’s previous allusions to it means keeping in mind, as Gregor notes, that in fact in the Grundlegung his interest concerns his attempt to unlink himself from naturalist sentimentalism. This in turn generates a certain lack of precision regarding how he presents the metaphysics of morals as a discipline: a priori, without a doubt, but not pure in a strict sense, according to his own annotation in the KrV, as I have already cited.

21 In fact, as Wood indicates in “The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy”, p. 2, the very use of the term Metaphysik in order to name the text as well as the discipline that Kant sketches out beginning in the epoch of the GMS, has precisely to do with Kant’s rejecttion of the moral sentimentalism of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, which he had known about from 1760 and which he rejected in his Essay of 1762. The fact that what we now call “ethics” was understood as a metaphysics of morality presupposes above all that it enjoyed independence from the immediacy of sentiment. 22 GMS 392. 23 Cf. GMS 421. The comparison between what is affirmed in the GMS about the division of duties and the complex execution of this division in the MdS will be a subject of later discussion in this book. In 421, in fact, Kant clarifies that his mention here of the division is tentative (beliebig).

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I believe that the clarifications provided up to now will permit us to discover a guiding thread amongst the three senses that Schönecker, in his study entitled Kant, Grundlegung III: Die Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs, attributes to the expression “Metaphysik der Sitten”:24 (1) as an a priori ethics, (2) as a system of duties in the realm of Right and in the realm of virtue, as Kant explains in his 1797 volume, and (3) in accordance with the perspective of the second part of the Grundlegung. Here, according to Schönecker, Kant establishes the elements necessary for the intended deduction of freedom and of the categorical imperative that would then be attempted in GMS III. On the basis of these clarifications about the a priori character, albeit not strictly pure, of the MdS, one can see that the a priori system sketched out in the Prologue to the GMS does not contradict the exposition of duties in the MdS. In addition, I suggest that independently of the outcome of the supposed “deduction” attempted in GMS III, this deduction need not result in a totally pure discipline (in the strict sense),25 precisely because it is a deduction in the Cf. SCHÖNECKER, Dieter, Kant, Grundlegung III: Die Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs, Verlag Karl Alber, Freiburg – München, 1999, p. 399. 25 Schönecker himself admits that in the attempt at deduction in GMS III, which is the principal object of his study, Kant cannot develop a deduction in a strict sense, in the way that he could do in the speculative realm. For Kant, in GMS III, it was sufficient to undergird the possibility of the categorical imperative, i.e. the expression of the moral law that presents itself as an imperative precisely in the face of a consideration of fallible human nature. The imperative, in contrast to what occurs in the theoretical realm, prior to its deduction does not even have its own possibility guaranteed (in the theoretical realm, synthetic a priori judgements are real, and only an explanation of how they are possible is required; the categorical imperative, on the other hand, must first be analyzed as to whether it is possible). Cf. SCHÖNECKER, Dieter, Kant, Grundlegung III: Die Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs, pp. 401ff. In this present chapter I will discuss the deduction of the supreme principle of virtue on the basis on the categorical imperative. Therefore, Schönecker’s observations concerning the somewhat less demanding character of a deduction in the practical realm are relevant. Nevertheless, I will not take a stand about the success or failure of the deduction of the categorical imperative in GMS III –or even whether this deduction is actually attempted– since this is a posterior question from the architectonic point of view, and in this sense, it is extraneous to this book. Nor will I take any position on the supposed change of posture in the KpV where morality is presented as a Faktum in which freedom is also recognized, apparently without any “deduction” involved. In the MdS the categorical imperative is taken for granted (and in this sense, in addition to the greater chronological closeness, it would be closer to the definiteness of the Critique of 24

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realm of the practical. It may still be the case, however, that Kant still had, at the time of writing the GMS, a vague idea of the specific character of the metaphysics of morals. This is why I conclude that the tension between the works prior to the MdS and the contents expressed in the latter work, despite being real and needing interpretative clarification, does not detract from the fundamental unity of Kant’s practical philosophy, on the basis of which I intend to analyze the contents of the Tugendlehre. Another element to take into account, amongst the mentions in the GMS concerning what a metaphysics of morals should be, is that on various occasions Kant assigns it an analogous role –already perceptible in the parallelism of the title– to that which the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft plays in the theoretical realm. As with the MdS, these constitute the system in the ambit that corresponds to it, once the pertinent critical clarifications have been made. The analogy is supported in the MdS itself.26 Gregor affirms that in this architectonic analogy with the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, there is already the suggestion that there is an application of an a priori form to contents coming from experience (that is, with the mention of this similarity Kant would be clarifying in which sense it would be a pure metaphysics of morals). Natural metaphysics, which occupies the place of the MdS from the perspective of theoretical reason, has both a transcendental part as well as a consideration of nature qua corporeal and thinking that attends to empirical data,27 which would also explain the intermediate character of the MdS.28 Georg Anderson makes the same point, emphasizing that if in Practical Reason): it begins with its legitimacy, and this is why it acts as a touchstone for the deduction of the principles of virtue and of Right. 26 Cf. MdS 468. 27 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 12ff. 28 Its character as an intermediate between two poles: the first pole is constituted by the groundlaying works (the Critique of Practical Reason, on the one hand, and on the other the GMS –which has to do with the categorical imperative in the abstract, as an expression of a moral law that is one and the same for any rational creature). The second pole is, as we will see further on, the body of empirical data that is offered in the Anthropology. The intermediate step is taken via the material ethics, concerning the duties of justice and of virtue, and which are explained in the MdS. This would be the transition

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the MdS the door is opened to the empirical it is because in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant had already admitted something similar.29 It is clear that it is precisely its relation to the empirical that explains why the classification and enumeration of duties in MdS cannot be complete. It is, nevertheless, an absolutely necessary level both for the determination of those actions that the practical judgement performs in its determining role, as well as for the formation of moral concepts by the practical, reflecting judgement. Pure reason cannot be practical without this mediating role, synthetic but a priori, that is played by the supreme principle of virtue and the duties that are associated with it. The Grundlegung, in sum, remains somewhat unclear in its ambiguous characterization ante litteram of the metaphysics of morals. The latter, on the other hand, is primarily dedicated to the explanation of the categorical imperative as a test that will guarantee the autonomy, the nondetermination of our maxims by their matter –their ends– but rather by the form of duty, which is universal insofar as it is rational. I will not, for the moment, go into those previews that the GMS offers about the criterion for the division of duties. The KpV, for its part, is focused on the explanation of how it is possible that there be a pure practical reason, and also explicitly clarifies that it does so without reference to human nature, which is only empirically knowable. As a result it renounces the particular determination of duties as human duties, and their later subdivision which requires knowing the human being “according to his actual nature, at least so far as is neces(Übergang), to use the expression that Kant himself would later use in the relevant passages of the Opus Postumum having to do with the passage from natural metaphysics to physics. For certain suggestions about this Lehre des Übergangs, cf. KÖNIG, Peter, “§§ 1831, Episodischer Abschnitt, §§ 32-40”, in Immanuel Kant: Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre (Otfried Höffe, ed.), Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1999, pp. 133-153. König suggests that there are other transition moments internal to the Rechtslehre and the Tugendlehre: the episodic sections. In regard to the Doctrine of Virtue, which is our topic, the episodic section at MdS 442-444 concerns precisely the passage from a Tugendlehre to a Religionslehre. I will deal with this issue when I discuss the amphiboly of the moral concepts of reflection). 29 Cf. ANDERSON, Georg, “Kants Metaphysik der Sitten – ihre Idee und ihr Verhältnis zur Ethik der Wolffschen Schule”, p. 46.

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sary with respect to duty”.30 This is left, says the same passage from the Prologue to the second Critique, to the system of science, i.e. to the metaphysics of morals, which thus becomes better described and even appropriately demanded as necessary. Therefore, the derivation of duties corresponds to the MdS, which necessarily proceeds on the basis of a priori principles in order to be able to normatively apply the duties to purely subjective conditions and thus formulate duties. The principles, however, are also necessarily receptive of experience in order to be able to establish a practical bridge –while also indicating those ends which are duties– between nature and freedom. 2.3 The supreme principle of virtue Kant makes clear, in the Specific Introduction to the Tugendlehre that, when considered as mere conformity of the will with duty, virtue is unitary (and our obligation or commitment to it, at the fundamental level of the Gesinnung is also unitary, a Tugendverpflichtung).31 However, one can consider the ends of the actions that the duty demands, and since these are multiple, one can speak of diverse virtues, and therefore the maxims for obtaining these ends would presuppose diverse duties of virtue (Tugendpflichten).32 Later I will look into this topic further, in relation to the radical unity of the virtues and their multiplicity owing to the distinct objects of the faculty of choice. For the time being, then, I will focus on the fact that, just after making this clarification, Kant formulates the supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue (das oberste Prinzip der Tugendlehre), and thus synthesizes in some way the variety of ends and duties under a single fundamental proposition. I think it is crucial to focus on this principle, and indeed Kant himself highlights it via its strategic location in the Tugendlehre. It has nevertheless been overlooked by certain commentators who sometimes opt, even KpV, 8. I use the translation of Abbott. As FRIEDRICH emphasizes in Eigentum und Staatsbegründung in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 38, to have a tugendhafte Gesinnung is not a duty of virtue, but rather is the fundamental conditioning disposition of every concrete duty of virtue. 32 Cf. MdS 395. 30 31

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when studying the MdS itself, to proceed in the derivation of duties directly from the categorical imperative to the concrete duties of virtue, leaving aside the principle that Kant establishes as being closer to these duties. Some others, such as Andreas Trampota, think that there is no deduction of the principle of virtue and of those ends that are duties, and that the latter are only postulated as a counterweight to the ends of the inclinations.33 I believe there is indeed a deduction, but in a rather lax sense, as I will show. The principle is the following: “Act in accordance with a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have”.34 The first thing to highlight is the formulation of the principle as an imperative, in second person, having the same character of immediate and unconditional command that is present in the three classical formulations of the categorical imperative. In addition, there is an allusion to the law and to the universality that is also demanded by the pure practical reason in the fundamental moral imperative. This is why the principle of virtue could be considered yet another formulation of the categorical imperative.35 Nevertheless, Kant himself establishes this principle at a different level that is somehow subordinated to the fundamental categorical imperative that expresses the moral law, but more concrete than the latter, more attuned to finite human nature, and already explicitly purpose-oriented via its expression in terms of ends.36 Cf. TRAMPOTA, Andreas, “The Concept and Necessity of an End in Ethics”, in Kant’s Tugendlehre. A Comprehensive Commentary, p. 149. 34 MdS 395. 35 See for example WARD, Keith, The Development of Kant’s View of Ethics, Blackwell, Oxford, 1972, pp. 99-100. BAUM, Manfred, for his part, in his “Prior Concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals”, in Kant’s Tugendlehre: a Comprehensive Commentary, p. 116, states, in an affirmation that I would nuance a little more, that Kant tends to speak of “moral laws” in plural, and that he understands them to include not only the categorical imperative but also the supreme principles of right and of virtue as well as those norms that derive from them. 36 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 29. Gregor notes correctly that the principle of virtue is not just another formulation of the categorical imperative, and therefore has to be deduced from the latter. On the other hand, the concrete duties of virtue that I will be concerned with in the upcoming chapters would be derived (abgeleitet) duties, which presupposes a certain relationship with an original (ursprünglich) virtue from which they 33

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The treatment of the categorical imperative in the Grundlegung seeks precisely to show that the ends provided to the will are not what determine the morality of the action. In the Metaphysik der Sitten, on the other hand, Kant returns his attention to the ends, exploring the consequences of the fact that human action is structured teleologically and oriented towards purposes. He thus recognizes the ends as an intrinsic element of moral action, since they are intrinsic to action simpliciter, as I discussed in the previous chapter. This is why in regard to this principle of virtue he speaks specifically of a maxim of ends (Maxime der Zwecke). I therefore hold that the categorical imperative and the principle of virtue should be seen as distinct and as applicable to different levels: the categorical imperative applies to an undifferentiated level which is proper to duty in general, and the principle of virtue applies to the level of the adoption of concrete ends, even though the imperative does not cease to give form to these ends. In contrast to the principle of Right, which would seem to follow analytically from the categorical imperative without any need for a deduction of any kind, the supreme principle of virtue does demand deduction, as I will show, insofar as it is a synthetic a priori principle. Kant offers this deduction in a passage that seems abrupt and rather obscure: “What, in the relation of man to himself and others, can be an end is an end for pure practical reason; for pure practical reason is a capacity for ends generally, and for it to be indifferent to ends, that is, to take no interest in them, would therefore be a contradiction, since then it would not determine maxims for actions either (because every maxim of action contains an end) and so would not be practical reason. But pure reason can prescribe no ends a priori without setting them forth as also duties, and such duties are then called duties of virtue”.37 The passage is, without a doubt, difficult, and nevertheless Kant refers to it as a deduction, with the result that it cannot be said –as certain commentators do– that Kant does not deal explicitly with the relationare derived: this is the Tugendverpflichtung that the supreme principle of virtue expresses. For this sense of “derivation”, cf. PATON, Herbert J., The Categorical Imperative, p. 134. 37 MdS 395.

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ship between the general categorical imperative and this subsidiary principle.38 The relation is made explicit in the very moment in which the latter is deduced from the former.39 What is required is to distinguish the different grades of reach and the diverse levels at which this deduction operates, which I will seek to do in what follows. Insofar as it is related to the categorical imperative, and thus belonging to the sphere of what “ought to be”, the principle of virtue does not admit to any empirical proof, since no content of experience can be pointed to as sufficient backing for the mandate to act according to a maxim of ends that can be made into a universal law. This is even clearer in the face of the difficulty of recognizing, in a positive sense, when an action has been performed because of the correct ends and with a pure motivation. Nevertheless, the principle admits the deduction referred to in the MdS in the sense of an accreditation of its legitimacy. This deduction thus has a legal sense, as is well known in kantian philosophy, i.e. that of a recognition of its pretensions to validity which is close to, albeit not identical to, the sense of the transcendental deduction of the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason.40 Cf. RIVERA, Faviola, Virtud y Justicia en Kant, p. 63. Longuenesse, Beatrice, in contrast, in “Moral Judgement as a Judgement of Reason” in Kant on the Human Standpoint, CUP, Cambridge – New York, 2005, pp. 248-249, does understand that the principle of virtue, as deduced from the categorical imperative, avoids the possibility that the latter might be considered suspiciously vacuous (the obligation to simply desire a law) and relates it to ends and motivations. 39 On this point, cf. also ROULIER, Scott M., Kantian Virtue at the Intersection of Politics and Nature. The Value of Soul-Making, University of Rochester Press, New York, 2004, p. 19. 40 Cf. KrV A84 B 116-117. The KrV precisely explains the transcendental deduction using a legal example from the formal laying of a claim to rights, from the formulation of a legal demand. The pretensions of validity of a demand, since they are not justified immediately by experience, necessarily require a deduction. I note here that in the case of the MdS the deduction is not identical to that of the KrV, for reasons that I will explain shortly. The other places in the Metaphysics of Morals where deductions of concepts or principles are offered are all in the Rechtslehre: Kant deduces the legal possession of external objects, their original acquisition and their acquisition by contract. Concerning Kant’s recognition that deduction is a legal concept, cf. also BECK, Lewis White, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, p. 170. Kant’s transcendental deductions are not logical deductions. As Dieter Henrich has emphasized, the logical notion of deduc38

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In the “Deduction of the principles of the pure practical reason” in the KpV, Kant makes it clear that a deduction in the practical sphere tion was neither the only nor the most common sense of the word in the academic language of the 18th century. On the contrary, the concept was seen in the light of its etymology –deducere, bring something towards something else– without even strictly referring to a discourse or thought. In academic publications, the most frequent sense was the juridical or legal one, that of the quid juris, and from the end of the 14th century the Deduktionschriften abounded, which kings and their functionaries published and disseminated in order to justify their position in territorial controversies. In times nearer to those of Kant, the most famous writer of deductions was J.S. Pütter, coauthor with Achenwall of Ius naturae, the manual of lectures on Law that Kant used and whose terminology permeates the Rechtslehre (although the manual would be published under the name of Achenwall alone beginning with the third edition). As Henrich himself emphasized, Pütter’s deductions were frequently concise and brief, and were accompanied by a summary, a Kurzer Begriff, which is the same thing that Kant did in his transcendental deduction of the categories in the KrV (B 168). For Pütter and Achenwall a deduction sought to show how acquired (as opposed to natural) rights could be said to exist, by seeking out the origin of the stipulated possession (of rights, titles, goods, etc.). This process of legitimization by way of explaining the origin characterizes the kantian deduction accurately as well, as I will show. Henrich affirms that Wolff also used the concept in this sense. Kant, therefore, takes over this use of the term and as a result does not seek to make his deductions into a chain of logic nor an exhaustive tracing-back to the genesis or constitution of the fact or idea that he seeks to legitimize. He does, however, seek to understand them sufficiently in order to relate them to the elemental demands of reason, and as a result this relation would be transcendental. His deductions, as a result, are a particular kind of “proofs” (probationes), and should be contrasted with the results obtained in other areas of philosophy. This is why his deductions are not at the beginning of his works, but rather are inserted in the midst of various elements that the deductions require, as in fact occurs in the MdS. While I will not spend too much time on this point, which would demand going into depth about certain elements of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, I do wish to note that this characterization of the deductions –in which I have followed Henrich, and which establishes them as being founded on a partial knowledge of meaningful characteristics of the origin of a given item of knowledge; in this case, of the recognition of the supreme principle of virtue– is intimately linked with the kantian notion of reflection (reflexio, Überlegung). This latter notion refers to the fundamental operation, undertaken by the faculty of judgement, that permits us to understand what is specific to the operations of knowledge. Reflection, qua transcendental, relates concrete knowledge with its corresponding faculties. As a result, deductions, as Kant views them, are constructed on the basis of reflective knowledge. Cf. HENRICH, Dieter, “Kant’s Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First Critique”, pp. 34-42.

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halts upon coming to certain fundamental faculties or forces, at the point where in fact there is no deduction if we understand this term in a strict sense.41 As I will show next, the very thing that the KpV is pointing out occurs in the access to the principle of virtue: the deduction halts where it signals the necessary finalistic and purpose-oriented character of the human will. I will also seek to show in what follows that, although in this point it is only the teleological structure of the faculty of choice that is deduced, it also involves fundamental conditions of rationality, i.e. the interest of reason. Certain commentators have suggested that both this supreme principle of virtue as well as the corresponding principle in the Rechtslehre have no firm relation to the categorical imperative. It would instead be a matter of classical inheritances (the very well-known influence of the translation of the De officiis by Christian Garve)42 which, according to this reading, would not be entirely reconcilable with Kant’s critical philosophy.43 Precisely in order to clear up these misunderstandings I feel it is necessary to take care in order to show the importance of the principle of virtue in kantian thought: its crucial role in the transition from the for41 Cf. KpV 46-47. Cf. In addition LONGUENESSE, Beatrice, Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason, trans. from French by Charles T. Wolfe, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1998, p. 44, n.3: a transcendental deduction is a deduction insofar as it is a legitimization, and it is transcendental insofar as it depends strictly on conditions that are a priori with respect to any representation whatsoever. I believe, therefore, that Kant is making this clarification with regard to deductions in the practical realm because they only derive in a necessary manner from the teleological character of the faculty of desiring itself. That is, if the transcendental deductions are not of this type in a strict sense when they refer to the practical use of reason, it would be because of this nuance regarding their transcendental condition. On this point see also SCHÖNECKER, Dieter, Kant: Gundlegung III: Die Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs, p. 401. 42 For a brief but excellent discussion on this influence in Kant, and with some general commentaries that are pertinent to the Stoic influence in his ethics, cf. MELCHES GILBERT, Carlos, Der Einfluß von Christian Garves Übersetzung Ciceros ‘De officiis’ auf Kants “Grundlegung zur Metaphysyik der Sitten”. 43 Thus, e.g. DUNCAN, A.R.C., Practical Reason and Morality, Nelson, London, 1929. As Ward makes clear, postures like that of Duncan frequently arise because of giving systematic priority to the GMS instead of giving the same interpretative weight to the MdS; cf. WARD, Keith, The Development of Kant’s View of Ethics, p. 102.

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mal discussion of the test of morality and its use as a principle of derivation of duties and of moral deliberation, and it is for this reason that I support a reconstruction that involves all levels. Mary Gregor, in her “Kants System der Pflichten in der Metaphysik der Sitten”, offers a reconstruction of the argument: a. There is a categorical imperative that is an unconditional law for action. b. No action can lack an end, where the latter is indicated in the maxim of the action (in such a way that reason cannot determine the actions if it does not establish their ends on the basis of reason itself). c. In conclusion, if there is a law for action, there must be a law for the maxims, and thus there is at least one end that is a duty to have. This justifies the fact that the principle demands acting “according to a maxim of ends such that having those ends can be a universal law for everyone”, and justifies virtue as being the necessary strength for carrying out this maxim.44 Even if this is the order that Gregor gives to the elements of the deduction, it is still possible to lay out the argument in a more ordered and formal manner in order to demonstrate its consistency as a modus ponens: a. No action lacks an end, and therefore in order to determine the action one must establish its end by determining the maxims. As a result it follows that if there is a law for action, this law determines the maxims and thus the ends. (if P → Q) b. There is a categorical imperative that is a law for action (P) c. The categorical imperative, as a law of action, is also a law for the maxims and determines ends (Q), which are therefore unconditioned: it is a duty to hold them as such. It seems to me that Gregor’s reconstruction is broadly correct and follows the letter of the passage in Kant. I nevertheless propose a more 44 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, “Kants system der Pflichten in der Metaphysik der Sitten”, included together with the Introduction by Ludwig in Metaphysic der Sitten, p. li. A similar reconstruction is suggested in PATON, Herbert J., The Categorical Imperative, p. 156.

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ambitious reconstruction,45 and in the reverse direction, not going, as Gregor’s does, from the universality of the categorical imperative to the particularity of the determination of ends for virtuous maxims, but rather proceeding from the teleological structure of the faculty of choice –which generates the maxims– to the general concept of the interest of reason. This reconstruction reveals the linkage to ends that not only belong to our concrete maxims of action, but also to the categorical imperative itself, and in the final instance, to the teleological structure of human reason and the basis of the kantian affirmation of the superiority of the practical use of reason. 1. Action as oriented to ends on the basis of the maxims of the faculty of choice. The first level or stratum (in a reflexive sense in this discussion) that must be considered in the deduction of the supreme principle of virtue is Kant’s recognition –so frequently forgotten by those who caricature his ethics as a purely formal proposal– that every action is oriented to an end. Qua rational action, it must always be so oriented, as we saw in the preceding chapter. This was recognized by Kant beginning in the works prior to the MdS, but in this latter work it is emphasized. 2. The will as oriented to ends. What is clear is that, while the MdS already operates with the distinction between Wille and Willkür, the passage of the deduction of the supreme principle of virtue speaks instead of practical reason.46 As a result it is to this latter in its totality –for the Eisenberg indicates that Gregor’s reconstruction seems unsatisfactory, although he does not give any reasons for this position. I believe that he is holding fast to the text of MdS 395, but that one does not do justice to the passage if one does not take into account other moments of the Tugendlehre where Kant commits to a teleological vision that is even more profound than that of the effectiveness to the faculty of choice. Cf. EISENBERG, Paul, “From the Forbidden to the Supererogatory: the Basic Ethical Categories in Kant’s Tugendlehre”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 3, num. 4, October 1966, p. 263. 46 This is overlooked by those who, like F. Rivera, affirm schematically that the categorical imperative refers to the pure will, and the supreme principle of virtue only refers to the faculty of choice. Cf. RIVERA, Faviola, Virtud y justicia en Kant, p. 65. It is true that in general the MdS is more attentive to the distinction –explicit in that work– between Wille and Willkür; and that the principles that are subsidiary to the categorical imperative interpret the faculty of choice as being affected by the sensibility, and thus they have 45

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moment, one can think of it as equivalent to the will, provided that one keeps in mind that the moral law is already given by the reason above all– to which the necessary reference to ends is ascribed. As Gregor notes, the necessity of an end for the effectiveness of the practical reason does not involve a flaw in the formality of the principle;47 the practical reason is teleological of itself. Esser also emphasizes, in the study by him cited earlier, that on this point Kant is treating reason as practical, i.e. as will, and this involves considering it as a Zwecksetzung-Vermögen, a faculty specifically oriented to giving ends.48 As I have already stated, and which I will reinforce in what follows, this must be understood from the perspective that this “giving of ends” submits itself to the moral law via the categorical imperative. In addition, it presupposes that there must be ultimate ends, ends that are not means for other ends. With this issue settled, I can begin to approach the specifically moral dimension of the problem. As can be seen, here we have the teleological structure of the action being assumed on the moral plane, which is also teleological. Since the practical reason is concerned with the ends in the determination of the maxims, these latter must be such for everyone (by the application of the categorical imperative: at this point Kant makes a transition to the terrain of moral evaluation via the fundamental test for it). The ends, as a result, would be considered as objectively valid, or as Esser says, they cease to be considered from a purely empirical perspective and are present via the self-determination of the will, via autonomy, thus constituting the rational matter of desire.49 Insofar as they are objectively valid, and already fully in the moral terrain –in the kantian terminology of the MdS, the specifically ethical more “entrance” (Eingang) into human psychology as principles of application. Nevertheless, the concrete passage that contains the deduction is linked immediately with the practical reason, and not the faculty of choice. 47 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 89. 48 Cf. ESSER, Andrea Marlen, Eine Ethik für Endliche: Kants Tugendlehre in der Gegenwart, p. 252. 49 Cf. ESSER, Andrea Marlen, Eine Ethik für Endliche: Kants Tugendlehre in der Gegenwart, p. 252.

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field, since we are dealing with morality in the maxim of the agent itself– these ends, in the face of our nature as affected by sensible impulses, appear to us as obligatory, as ends that can in fact not be held but which it is our duty to have as such. This is what Kant is referring to when he notes, towards the end of his “deduction”, that “pure reason can prescribe no ends a priori without setting them forth as also duties, and such duties are then called duties of virtue”.50 3. Reason itself as teleological. In the plane of the Begehrungsvermögen in which we are now moving, we should recall that this faculty of desiring is active, and in its own way it is spontaneous, as opposed to that which is merely given, in passive form, in the perceptions (Empfindungen). Nevertheless, this faculty is determined by principles of the reason (Vernunft), which is practical reason (praktische Vernunft) precisely as such. It is precisely this determination that functions as the transcendental horizon of practical effectiveness, within which actions either do or do not reach their ultimate end, their true end. Axel Hutter indicates, in his volume Das Interesse der Vernunft, that it is precisely this determination by principles that Kant calls the interest of reason (Vernunftinteresse)51 which he presents as teleological, explaining the teleology of the levels that are inferior to those I have explored up to now. It is precisely the interest of reason52 which, according to Hutter, acts as a guiding thread or Leitfaden for kantian transcendental philosophy, MdS 395. Cf. HUTTER, Axel, Das Interesse der Vernunft: Kant ursprüngliche Einsicht und ihre Entfaltung in den traszendentalphilosophischen Hauptwerken, Meiner, Hamburg, 2003, p. 67. Also ZÖLLER, in “Idee und Notwendigkeit einer Metaphysik der Sitten”, in Kant’s Tugendlehre. A Comprehensive Commentary, who does in fact deal with this issue, putting the Tugendlehre into direct relation with the topic of the Vernunftinteresse. Cf. pp. 33-37. 52 Hutter himself clarifies the history of the term: on the basis of the clear Latin origin of the German word Interesse –an “intermediate being” or tension with regard to something, inter-esse– Hutter insists that the concept of interest is linked with the human condition itself. The term originated with Roman law and successively broadened after that, until in the modern era it left behind its original exclusively economic-legal meaning and also took on an anthropological and progressively moral use. The concept of interest appears in the philosophical literature in Hobbes, Locke, Hutcheson and Hume, and in France with Rochefoucauld, Helvetius and Rousseau. Nevertheless, Kant would be the first to work with it systematically, and to give it such a strong relevance that the concept 50 51

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and is what accounts for the primacy of the practical use of reason over the theoretical. As Kant indicates beginning with the KrV, the end of reason itself is attained in its practical use, not in its theoretical exercise.53 In fact, the very idea of the “use” (Gebrauch) of reason already has a practical dimension, and it should therefore be noted that it is precisely from the practical point of view itself that the distinction is made between the various uses, and is systematically justified.54 This is an interest which is proper to reason and internal to its specific concept, and which reason places within its most fundamental freedom and fosters from its own self. The first sense of the negative freedom of the human being, i.e. his or her separation from a complete determination by natural inclinations, is rooted precisely in reason’s fostering its own interest, on its own behalf.55 This transcending of natural inclinations is at the center of Kant’s practical philosophy: the Grundlegung itself recognizes the difference between inclination and interest as being fundamental.56 It suggests that moral interest consists in respect of interest would be the guiding thread for the entire transcendental philosophy, in Hutter’s view, which I follow here. cf. HUTTER, Axel, Das Interesse der Vernunft. Kant ursprüngliche Einsicht und ihre Entfaltung in den traszendentalphilosophischen Hauptwerken, p. 150. In chapter III of the KpV, “On the Incentives of Pure Practical Reason”, Kant already speaks of interest as a concept that arises from the idea of an incentive of the will qua rational. It is precisely there that he associates this concept with that of the maxim, given that in order to speak of an interest of reason, one must speak of a maxim that proposes the greatest good (summum bonum) as its end. In the classification of Schwartz that I discussed earlier, it would be a second order maxim, one that expresses the virtuous Gesinnung. It is also in the KpV’s “Dialectic” that Kant states that the interest of the reason qua practical is the attainment of the supreme good. The other faculties of the soul, which also have a specific interest insofar as they are ruled by a principle, submit themselves to the practical reason. For all interest is, in the final analysis, practical. The practical interest of reason enjoys primacy. 53 Cf. KrV B XXI and B824. As Hutter himself emphasizes, it appears that Kant’s awareness of this primacy of the practical use of reason is emphasized in the 2nd edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. 54 Cf. KrV A 841, B 849 and HUTTER, Axel, Das Interesse der Vernunft. Kant ursprüngliche Einsicht und ihre Entfaltung in den traszendentalphilosophischen Hauptwerken, p. 30. 55 Cf. KrV B 772 and HUTTER, Axel, Das Interesse der Vernunft. Kant ursprüngliche Einsicht und ihre Entfaltung in den traszendentalphilosophischen Hauptwerken, p. 33. 56 Cf. GMS 413.

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for the law,57 insofar as the law, from the point of view of autonomy – speaking now of the positive freedom of reason– is what is strictly proper to reason, a Selbstzweck, above the external interests (fremden Zwecken) of the inclinations.58 In summary, if we are not satisfied with the teleological character of the faculty of reason, which the MdS itself makes evident, but instead we penetrate into the allusion to the practical reason made in the passage we are now discussing, we can attain, through this progressive reflection itself, to the reason’s own interest. In addition, we now have at hand the complete map of the teleological structure of Kant’s practical philosophy. The ends of reason, which therefore are duties and which are attained via virtue, point not only to the purpose-oriented capacity of the faculty of choice, but also reveal the very structure of reason. Thus, the concrete interests are called interests of reason insofar as they participate in the fundamental orientation of the will to the highest good, which is the interest of reason. It is because this also applies at the most radical level of reason that reason itself finds its own interest in respect for the law, in the summum bonum as a perfect synthesis of happiness and virtue, in the Kingdom of Ends, interpreting it as its strictly proper end,59 which determines the will and is thus practical reason. The will can determine the faculty of choice, which then, even though it is sensitivum, is liberum, as we have seen that the MdS also teaches.60 As a result it does not allow itself to be determined on the basis of sensible inclination, but instead is teleologically linked to the pure object of the will in strictly moral action. On the other hand, if the faculty of choice decides –via a fundamental orientation of the Gesinnung, which I will discuss later in the book– to follow the ends of the inclination in its maxim, it allows itself to be determined only by the object of the inclination. All of this comCf. GMS 401. Cf. HUTTER, Axel, Das Interesse der Vernunft. Kant ursprüngliche Einsicht und ihre Entfaltung in den traszendentalphilosophischen Hauptwerken, p. 150. 59 I provide this enumeration in that order, and without clarifying the links between its elements for the time being. I will discuss their interconnection when I deal with the relation between the three formulations of the categorical imperative, which I will do in a later section. 60 Cf. MdS 213. 57 58

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prises the schema of moral action, “superimposed” on the teleological structure of all action simpliciter, which is where we began this part of our discussion. It seems to me that, having explored this teleological framework of the kantian theory of action and its moral articulation, the deduction of the supreme principle of virtue becomes more eloquent. As Gregor emphasizes, the next hinge of the deduction is based on the fact that by the very nature of human action, the categorical imperative cannot determine actions without determining ends.61 As I have shown, the ultimate basis for this is that reason itself has its own end, and the concrete ends that the faculty of choice proposes for itself are framed within this horizon of meaning. Therefore, when one analyzes the categorical imperative in the light of the teleological character of human action, one attains a derivation of the categorical imperative itself, which incorporates ends and thus generates its own maxims reflexively. The determination of the action and the determination of its end are performed in the same action, an act of internal freedom –I may be obligated externally, as is presupposed in the Rechtslehre, to act or not to act, but nobody can force me to make the ends of others my own or renounce my own. In this sense the endsduties that the principle of virtue imposes are autonomous: they follow from the practical reason, and only admit the self-constraint that distinguishes the duties of virtue from legal duties. In this deduction, which leads to ends that are at the same time duties, Kant is concluding at base that there is no inconsistency between the internal freedom involved in the choice of an end and the self-constraint involved in the concept of duty itself.62 The intermediate role of the MdS, which I have discussed earlier, becomes clear in the deduction of the principle of virtue: Kant arrives at it via a simultaneous consideration of the categorical imperative and of the characteristics proper to human action. “Above” this principle, in a metaphorical sense, there remains the categorical imperative itself, although 61 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 31. 62 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 67.

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the latter is also not totally separated from the conditions of the human agent. Recall that if the moral law is presented as an imperative, it is precisely because it manifests itself restrictively to finite and fallible beings that are not fully rational. At this intermediate point one encounters the principle of virtue, which is still more incarnate insofar as it takes on the ends proper to human nature considered generally. The next step of this journey –which I discuss now in its determining direction, beginning with the imperative and moving towards the consideration of sensible human nature, although as I have already mentioned it can also be transited in an inverse, reflective manner– is the derivation of duties on the basis of the principle of virtue. Here elements are added that are even more specific to human beings, and which relate to their mortality, their corporeality, etc. Note that here one is speaking of a “derivation” (Ableitung) and no longer of a deduction. Even if one understands deduction as I have discussed above, i.e. as a “legal” setting out of pretensions to validity and not as a logical procedure, the passage from the supreme principle of virtue to the duties of virtue, in particular, is even more flexible and undetermined. It has more the character of an “interpretation” of this principle, of an application that is in no way logical or mechanical, but rather is a contribution of the faculty of judgement. As I will show later, the virtues that Kant will enumerate and explain presuppose, in their turn, the purposes of each of the human dispositions and faculties.63 In order to conclude this discussion of the deduction, we must keep in mind the affirmation of an earlier passage, MdS 385, which clarifies the necessity for ultimate ends proper to the practical reason in the demand for completeness and fullness in the series of ends: “For since there are free actions there must also be ends to which, as their objects, these actions are directed. But among these ends there must be some that are also (i.e., by their concept) duties. For were there no such ends, then all ends would hold for practical reason only as means to other ends; and since there can be no action without an end, a categorical imperative would be impossible. This would do away with any doctrine of morals”.64 63 64

Cf. WARD, Keith, The Development of Kant’s View of Ethics, p. 109. MdS 385.

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Gregor sees this passage as a complement to the deduction of the principle of virtue: if there were no necessary end (an end of reason), there would be no necessary actions, but instead only those motivated by inclinations. In addition, there would be no obligatoriness, nor would the categorical imperative be possible, but rather only hypothetical imperatives and prudential counsel.65 If one keeps in mind the different levels implicit in the deduction of the principle of virtue, one will recall that not all ends (at the level of the teleology of action) are obligatory, but only those which give completeness to the series. In turn, the maxim of this series displays such generality that it includes beneath itself the rest of our duties as humans (as I will discuss in a later section, these duties include our own perfection, the promotion of the happiness of others, and those duties which are derived from these). I have said “our duties as humans” because it is precisely our humanity that is the positive value that the supreme principle of virtue affirms of itself. Kant says, in a passage that comes immediately after the statement and deduction of the principle of virtue: “In accordance with this principle man is an end for himself as well as for others, and it is not enough that he is not authorized to use either himself or others merely as means (since he could then still be indifferent to them); it is in itself his duty to make man in general his end”.66 Having come to this point, I believe it necessary to reiterate that Kant uses the concept of end (Zweck) in two distinct ways, although they are evidently related to each other (insofar as in both cases one is dealing with objective determinations of the faculty of choice).67 The term is 65

p. li.

Cf. GREGOR, Mary, “Kants system der Pflichten in der Metaphysik der Sitten”,

66 MdS 395. For the relationship of this passage with the deduction of the supreme principle of virtue, cf. also KORSGAARD, Christine, “Kant’s Formula of Humanity”, in Kant-Studien, vol. 77, 1986, p. 186. And concerning the passage and its relation to the formula of humanity of the categorical imperative, cf. TORRALBA, José María, Libertad, objeto práctico y acción. La facultad del juicio en la filosofía moral de Kant, p. 297. 67 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 83-84. Cf. also KORSGAARD, Christine, “Kant’s Formula of Humanity”, p. 185.

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used both in order to allude to the state of things that an action seeks to cause, as well as to allude to what in other philosophical contexts would be called an absolute or unconditioned “value”, and which Kant, in the Grundlegung, affirms as being deserving of dignity (Würde).68 This second sense paradigmatically appears in the formula of humanity,69 although in a restrictive manner, as a limit to what is valid for actions involving rational beings. Kant thinks, as he makes clear in the Doctrine of Virtue, that given the purpose-oriented character of the practical reason, a response also corresponds to this end in a positive sense. As a result, even though he reiterates that the categorical imperative is formal and independent of ends, he also affirms that there is a demand for a positive participation in the attainment of the highest good.70 Here Kant touches on the two senses of “end”: first, virtuous actions have human being as their final end –this is the “moral ontology” of Kant– which in turn has the dignity of an end in the second use of the term. The promotion of the highest good includes all the senses of the concept of end, insofar as it incorporates the intentions of the action, assuming its teleological character in the framework of moral evaluation. It involves both the promotion of the ends of others (their happiness, according to Kant’s conception) and our capacity to attain our own ends (our own perfection) together with a restriction of those of our actions that affect and/or instrumentalize the humanity of others or ourselves.71 In a certain manner, Kant had already sketched out the idea of a system of rational ends, dictated by the pure practical reason, in his earlier works. For instance, he writes on this topic of the highest good in the KpV and touches on it in the third formulation of the categorical imperative in the GMS, where he mentions the notion of a kingdom of ends. As a result, he states, Cf. GMS 434. Cf. GMS 429. 70 Trampota sees this clearly, and notes that in GMS 437 Kant seems to suggest that the person should be considered as an end only in a negative or limitative sense. The misunderstanding is more easily resolved in the light of these passages of the Tugendlehre. Cf. “The Concept and Necessity of an End in Ethics”, pp. 134-141. 71 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 85. 68 69

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“we shall be able to conceive all ends combined in a systematic whole (including both rational beings as ends in themselves, and also the special ends which each may propose to himself)”.72 Note how again, in the positive attempt to attain ends, all the uses of this concept are incorporated. As Allen Wood emphasizes, this is possible because in the final analysis all these ends are melded together in the dignity of the rational being as end in him or herself.73 This idea brings us to the necessity for a clarification of the relations between the diverse formulations of the categorical imperative, and between the imperative and the supreme principle of virtue. 2.4 The three formulations of the categorical imperative and the principle of virtue As can be surmised from the above, of the three formulations of the categorical imperative, at least as they are presented in the Grundlegung, the one that is most clearly related to the supreme principle of virtue is the second, the so-called formula of humanity. The ends which are at the same time duties, as stated earlier, are those that promote the rational being as an end in him or herself, as a being with dignity. Some commentators, such as Faviola Rivera, also hold that it is the second formulation of the categorical imperative from which one can, in a positive sense, derive the ends that constitute the maxims of virtue.74 Rivera believes, nevertheless, that the three classical formulations of the categorical imperative are not mutually equivalent, given that Kant himself recognizes that the second (the formula of humanity) and the third (the formula of autonomous acting with regard to a kingdom of ends) are more accessible from a subjective point of view. Although I agree that there is no perfect equivalence, it seems to me that if Kant emphaCf. GMS 433: “...ein Ganzes aller Zwecke (sowohl der vernünftigen Wesen als Zwecke an sich, als auch der eigenen Zwecke, die ein jedes sich selbst setzen mag), in systematischer Verknüpfung (...) gedacht werden können...”. 73 Cf. WOOD, Allen, Kant’s Ethical Thought, p. 326. 74 Cf. RIVERA, Faviola, Virtud y justicia en Kant, pp. 73-74. 72

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sized this clarification, it is precisely because the formulations are linked to a single moral law and are coextensive and equal in their capacities to derive duties from this law. This can easily be overlooked because of the greater proximity between the second and third formulations, which, being explicitly teleological can be understood more easily. I think that each of these three formulations should be interpreted on the basis of the affirmation of the relations between them, which thus concedes the greatest possible intelligibility to the unity of the imperative that Kant himself seeks to defend. It should be recognized that in the Tugendlehre it is the formula of humanity that appears to be the most fecund formulation, above all in the derivation and diversification of concrete duties. The corresponding passage in the MdS 395, makes this very clear, and as I have said, Kant makes this clarification having just formulated and justified the principle of virtue. In contrast, in regard to the principle of Right in the Rechtslehre, this latter principle seems to be closer to the first formulation of the categorical imperative, i.e. the test of universalization, precisely as formal and as lacking any allusion to ends. However, this is with the restriction that the principle of Right does not make any allusion to maxims –as does in fact occur with the first formula of the imperative– but only to external actions. The principle of Right would be, then, a restricted and exteriorized version of the first formulation. For Rivera, the fact that in the Tugendlehre Kant gives priority to the second formulation of the categorical imperative is relevant, because in this way the Doctrine of Virtue is converted into the bastion that prevents kantian ethics from being interpreted as procedimentalism: the formula of humanity and the material ethics that follow from it are the best refutations of the supposed kantian heritage of postures such as those of Rawls and Habermas.75 Without entering into the discussion about the supposedly kantian basis of these theories, I do wish to remark on the various indicators, in the text of the MdS itself, that show that in fact the second formula of the imperative is the most fecund in the derivation of duties. It is true, moreover, that in the Grundlegung itself, it is just after Kant’s statement of the formula of humanity76 that he mentions that the 75 76

Cf. RIVERA, Faviola, Virtud y justicia en Kant, p. 194. Cf. GMS 429-10.

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duties to be inferred from the imperative are obligatory both with regard to oneself and with regard to others.77 For all these reasons Paul Guyer also affirms that the duties of virtue depend fundamentally on the formula of humanity, given that treating human beings not just as means, but always as ends, involves understanding them as agents capable of free and rational action and not compromising their possibilities of action as such. In the final instance, the formulation precisely promotes action that has these characteristics, both towards others and towards oneself.78 Although Guyer admits that there are occasional uses of the formula of universalization in the MdS, and that the universality of duties is latent in the whole discourse, he reiterates that it is the second formulation which Kant uses systematically in the derivation of the duties of virtue.79 H. J. Paton80 holds to the same position that John Rawls, oddly enough, does in his “constructivist” interpretation of kantian ethics, which also involves a reading of the Tugendlehre.81 Allen Wood also insists on the preponderance of the second formula with regard to the duties of virtue: he notes that the formula of universalization is used in the Tugendlehre, but is only explicit in the justification of the duty of beneficence.82 This is more correct, he holds, than saying, as does Korsgaard, that all the duties of virtue are derived from the formula of humanity.83 The reason, states Wood, is that the Tugendlehre is about positive ends, while the test of universalization is more directly linked with those maxims of action that should be prohibited. Nevertheless, I will show how the Doctrine of Virtue also includes (albeit in a somewhat improper form) negative duties and explicit and relevant prohibitions. Connecting these ideas with the deduction of the principles discussed Cf. GMS 430, n. Cf. GUYER, Paul, Kant, Routledge, London – New York, 2006, p. 242. 79 Cf. GUYER, Paul, Kant, p. 260. This position is also held by HELLER, Ágnes, Crítica de la Ilustración: las antinomias morales de la razón, p. 95. 80 Cf. PATON, Herbert J., The Categorical Imperative, p. 171. 81 Cf. RAWLS, John, “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy”, in Kant’s Transcendental Deductions (Eckart Förster, ed.), Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1989, p. 89. 82 Cf. MdS 393 and 453. Cf. WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 167. 83 Cf. KORSGAARD, Christine, “Kant’s Formula of Humanity”, p. 197. 77 78

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above, Wood himself notes that since it is analytic, the principle of Right in the Rechtslehre depends on the first formula of the imperative, which is formal and presents neither content nor ends. In contrast, the supreme principle of virtue would depend on the second and third formulations, i.e. on the formulas that include within themselves, and in a manner oriented towards purposes, that which a rational being must desire as a universal law.84 An author that has dealt in great detail with the role of the formula of humanity, Richard Dean, also holds that the derivation of duties in the MdS is performed strictly on the basis of this second formulation,85 although he does not agree with B. Herman,86 A. Wood or P. Guyer, who believe that on this point Kant’s ethics is a “value ethics”. For Dean, the condition of humanity as being an end in itself can be supported by a more traditional deontological reading of Kant’s ethics, and he holds that from the second formulation one can derive every duty via the sentiment of respect (Achtung).87 According to this author, this sentiment is directed towards a good will (and thereby, simultaneously, towards the moral law and towards those human beings that have good will). I will not go into the issue of whether kantian ethics can be interpreted in terms of “value”, although as I have said, the important point is to maintain the necessity of persons being ends in themselves, and his proposal of the dignity of the human being qua moral subject. For the moment I will be content with noting that, although this emphasis on the formulation of humanity enjoys textual and argumentative support, it is possible to consider the other enunciations of the categorical imperative as being involved in the transition to the MdS. This is because even Kant himself insists that any one formulation leads to the

Cf. WOOD, Allen, “The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy”, p. 7. Cf. DEAN, Richard, The Value of Humanity in Kant’s Moral Theory, p. 137. 86 This also suggests that the principle of virtue is a “version” of the formula of humanity; cf. HERMAN, Barbara, The Practice of Moral Judgement, p. 133. 87 I will not attempt to go into greater detail here regarding the importance of respect in Kant’s ethics, because I will do so in the section dedicated to the aesthetic dispositions of receptivity to duty, the point in the MdS where Kant explains respect as a moral feeling. 84 85

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others, and therefore a proper understanding of his moral philosophy requires them to be inseparable. Indeed, all the interpretations I have mentioned of the Doctrine of Virtue have in their favor that, in the process of the derivation of duties, in nearly every one of the cases Kant makes use of the value of humanity that is to be fostered in oneself and in other persons.88 Nevertheless, this well-supported affirmation of the priority of the second formulation of the categorical imperative in the Tugendlehre admits of certain nuances. First of all, one must bear in mind that already in the GMS Kant, both implicitly and explicitly, gives priority to the first formulation, to the test of universalization.89 This could be explained by the more formal character of the GMS, and it would be even more understandable that he would compensate for this formalism by emphasizing the formula of humanity in the MdS. Nevertheless, as I have already noted, in the Grundlegung Kant affirms that the three formulations of the categorical imperative are linked to one single moral law, and even that the third contains and assimilates the other two in a dialectic fashion.90 In addition, in a note to the GMS, Kant distinguishes between the categorical imperative and the “Golden Rule” of the moral tradition, which it can be easily confused with. In so doing he indicates that the problem of the Golden Rule is that it does not allow for grounding duties to oneself, nor does it give sufficient backing to the duties of love to others.91 Even though Kant clarifies this later after his enunciation of the formula of humanity, the confusion that could arise between the Golden Rule and the imperative obviously alludes to the first formulation, which means a contrario sensu that the test of universalization, which on this point is distinguishable from at least one possible interpretation of the Rule,92 can in fact provide grounding for these duties, and therefore plays a role in the task that will later be the focus of the MdS. Cf. MdS 237, 423, 425, 427, 429, 436, 444, 456, 459, 462. Cf. GMS 437. 90 Cf. GMS 436-437. For a reiteration of this point, cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Moral Literacy, p. 57. 91 Cf. GMS 430, note in 30. 92 For a suggestive philosophical analysis of the Golden Rule, which is also attentive to its similarity (in some of its possible interpretations) to Kant’s moral proposal, cf. 88

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Another point to emphasize is that, as we have seen, even the enunciation itself of the supreme principle of virtue reproduces –even at the syntactic level– the formula of universalization of the categorical imperative, although it makes explicit mention of the maxims of ends. Hence the autonomous condition of these ends on the part of the reason cannot fail to be connected with the formulation of autonomous action with regard to a Kingdom of Ends. In fact, the formulation involving the Kingdom of Ends is also particularly close to the supreme principle of virtue, the same closeness that one detects if one recalls that this third formulation explains the Kingdom of Ends (Reich der Zwecke) as a systematic connection of all the ends, both those of rational beings, which are ends in themselves, as well as those ends that each of these beings can propose for him or herself.93 We see here the idea of a system of ends, not only through the relations between persons, but also in the relations among the ends that these persons can propose for themselves, whether they be merely permissible ends or whether they are imposed by the reason, i.e. ends that are duties: which is the topic of the Tugendlehre. In the final instance, the posture of those who affirm that in the Tugendlehre only the formula of humanity is at work seems to me to be incorrect, because the formula of humanity is supported in turn by the formula of universality, as is made clear in the Grundlegung. This point is highlighted by Oliver Sensen, who has insisted that the legitimacy of the second formulation of the categorical imperative, just as it is expressed in the GMS, does not rest on a separate discourse about values, but rather on the universalization itself proposed in the first formulation of the imperative as a law that enjoys practical-moral necessity.94 Barbara Herman also insists that a consideration of obligatory ends in kantian ethics does not presuppose in any way an independence or disconnection with respect to the RICOEUR, Paul, “Entre filosofía y teología: la regla de oro en cuestión”, in Amor y Justicia, Caparrós, Madrid, 1993, pp. 51-65. 93 Cf. GMS 433. 94 Cf. SENSEN, Oliver, “Dignity and the formula of Humanity”, in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide (Jens Timmermann, ed.), CUP, Cambridge – New York, 2010. The same point is made by Onora O’Neill, in “Rationality as Practical Reason”, in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, OUP, Oxford – New York, 2003, pp. 95105.

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demand for universalization. The fact that in its practical applications the second formula of the categorical imperative is more fecund does not mean, theoretically, that the latter can be separated from the formula of universality, on the basis of which Kant justified his own position in the Grundlegung.95 For all these reasons, I believe that a reading of each of the three formulations should be attempted that permits placing it into relation with each of the other two. It seems to me that in so doing, the categorical imperative is revealed to be even closer to the application that Kant intends to give it in the MdS. In fact, the most teleological of the three formulations, that which alludes to the Kingdom of Ends, is indicated by Kant himself as the complete determination of the categorical imperative (insofar as the formula of universalization has more to do with its form, and the formula of humanity, with its matter).96 This third formulation is that in which one sees most clearly the kantian harmonization between the deontological aspect, if one wishes to call it thus, and the teleological aspect of ethics,97 which will be completely in evidence in the MdS: the same ethics that is a system of duties is also a system of ends.98 This is also the 95 Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, “The Difference that Ends Make”, in Perfecting Virtue, New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics (Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth, eds.), CUP, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 96-101. 96 Cf. GMS 436. This same passage explains, on the basis of the categories of quantity, that the formal aspect of the categorical imperative, which is made visible in the formula of universalization, corresponds with the unity of the moral law. On the other hand, the material aspect reflected in the formula of humanity implies plurality, and the Kingdom of Ends involves “progress” towards totality, that is, plurality thought of as unity. There has been very little work done on the categories of freedom, understood as modes of the category of causality; in this regard I highly recommend the detailed study by TORRALBA, José María, Libertad, objeto práctico y acción. La facultad del juicio en la filosofía moral de Kant, pp. 228ff. 97 It is for this reason that those who, like Ágnes Heller, do not see the formula of the Kingdom of Ends as an enunciation of the categorical imperative are unable to see the compatibility and mutual reference that exist between the critical and systematic parts of kantian morality, and end up dissociating them; cf. HELLER, Ágnes, Crítica de la Ilustración: las antinomias morales de la razón, p. 89. 98 Cf. VAN IMPE, Stijn and VANDENABEELE, Bart, “Intentionality, Normativity and Communality in Kant’s Realm of Ends”, in Racionalidad práctica: intencionalidad,

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formula where one sees most clearly the intersubjective dimension that Kant’s concept of person demands: the recognition of the rational being as end in him or herself is linked with the presupposition of a plurality of rational beings able to propose ends for themselves. This is why the Kingdom of Ends involves the demand to consider maxims always from one’s own point of view and at the same time from the point of view of any other rational being, considered also as a lawgiver like oneself.99

2.5 The principle of virtue as a synthetic a priori proposition In the passage that immediately follows the deduction of the principle of virtue, Kant retrospectively affirms that the principle of the doctrine of right is analytic.100 What interests me here is that Kant affirms that, on the contrary, the principle of the Tugendlehre is synthetic, precisely because it involves a reference to ends. It is also a priori and therefore con-

normatividad y reflexividad, (Mario Silar and Felipe Schwember, eds.) Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico, Pamplona, 2009, pp. 125-133. Allen Wood also insists that the formula of the Kingdom of Ends gives the lie to the untenable reading of Kant as an individualist; cf. WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 79. Nor should it be forgotten that in GMS 434 Kant appears to give greater relevance to the Kingdom of Ends when he affirms that morality consists in the reference that every action has to this ideal of the practical reason. 99 Cf. GMS 438. In this interpretation of the formula of the Kingdom of Ends there can be detected what Alejandro G. Vigo highlights in “Autorreferencia práctica y normatividad” in Racionalidad práctica. Alcance y estructuras de la acción humana (Ana Marta González and Alejandro G. Vigo, eds.), Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 2010, pp. 197-223: in the moral law itself there is an irreducible tension between individuality –the personal and non-transferrable demand for obedience to the law, the unrepeatable and unique character of the agent who confronts that demand– and the universality that is also proper to the law, i.e. the plurality of subjects that fall under its scope and their fundamental equality. The two poles of this tension are the obverse and inverse of the same phenomenon: the demand for alterity materialized in objective rules for self-understanding, which are overwhelmingly found in the normative perspective on action, and even more so at the strictly moral level. 100 I have already made a number of comments regarding the supposedly analytic character of the supreme principle of Right.

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verts these ends into duties. Kant affirms that the possibility of this synthesis is contained in the deduction that I have already discussed.101 In this contrast with the principle of Right, what one obtains by adding the consideration of ends is not being limited to the realm of external freedom. Rather, one enters into internal freedom –for when speaking of ends one speaks also of maxims, of the maxim of every agent independently of his or her external execution of it– and thus one arrives at that possibility of self-constraint that virtue demands. The following passage synthesizes this particular condition of the principle of virtue and at the same time definitively makes clear that the incorporation of ends does not contradict the autonomy of the will, insofar as the will is what determines the ends, and not vice versa: “In the imperative that commands the duty of virtue one also adds to the concept of self-constraint that of end. Not that end which we have, but that which we ought to have, and therefore, that which the practical reason has in itself, and whose supreme and unconditioned end (but which, nevertheless, is always a duty) is given as follows: that virtue be its own end and that it be its own recompense”.102 In the words of Kant himself, in another passage from the same work, what are being related here are the end and the duty, such that the maxim is not just in accordance with duty, but rather that it is a maxim of the duty. It is generated from the duty itself, strictly speaking aus Pflicht, and in this way one arrives at ends founded on morality as such. In a certain way, this itinerary is the opposite to that of the Rechtslehre, where the exercise of external freedom can be derived from subjective ends, always provided that they are determined a priori to be able to coexist with the ends of others.103 As one can see, the synthetic a priori character of the principle of virtue derives from the peculiar hylemorphism that Kant uses to explain rational action. If one conceives of the categorical imperative as a form, and the ends of virtue as matter determined by that form, the imperative Cf. MdS 396. MdS 396. Cf. also Refl. 6606. 103 Cf. MdS 382. 101

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complies with the demand –already made explicit in the Grundlegung104– to serve as a principle of derivation of duties. Furthermore, this does not exclude its serving as a principle of deliberation with regard to concrete cases:105 on the contrary, it allows it to apply to these cases with a view to the empirical conditions in which they present themselves. The GMS itself already noted that while the categorical imperative is not based on any property of human nature,106 the duties that follow from it are always synthetic a priori, insofar as they refer to the sensible world.107 It seems to me that the consistency and continuity among Kant’s moral works becomes progressively more strongly supported the more one delves into the Metaphysics of Morals. The synthesis between ends and duties, then, reaches its fulfillment in the consideration of this supreme principle of virtue as being a synthetic a priori proposition. The ends of a rational being correspond with those of its own nature, which are not duties because they are natural, but rather because of their determination by the practical reason itself.108 In this way, Kant, without giving into heteronomy, brings in a good part of the “material” content of classical ethics and, as can be seen in his treatment of various concrete virtues, the specifically Christian tradition of ethics as well. 2.5.1 The empirical content presupposed in the Doctrine of Virtue We will not have fully understood this principle of virtue as a synthetic a priori proposition until we have also explained which empirical concepts Kant has in mind in this particular “application” of the categorical imCf. GMS 421. In this regard, I do not understand why Herman seems on some occasions to propose a disjunction: either the imperative as the principle of derivation of duties, or as an algorithm of moral deliberation. Deriving duties is precisely what facilitates moral deliberation and places judgement within the context of its practical use, which is the element of Kant’s philosophy that Herman best explains; cf. HERMAN, Barbara, The Practice of Moral Judgment, p. 132. 106 Cf. GMS 425. 107 Cf. GMS 454. 108 Cf. WARD, Keith, The Development of Kant’s View of Ethics, p. 111. 104 105

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perative to human nature. I believe that this application not only involves a determination, on the part of the categorical imperative and with regard to natural characteristics, but also that the opposite direction must be considered, the reflection by which these empirical aspects feed back upon the categorical imperative. One might say that the empirical constitution of the human being, though it does not determine the moral law, does determine how the latter is presented to finite and fallible agents like us humans, and thereby creates a theoretical space for the appearance of the concept of virtue. It is because the materiality and finitude of the human person impact on the intelligible plane of freedom that Kant proposes the principle of virtue as a principle of maxims, through whose ordering and accumulation one establishes a species of moral “jurisprudence” and an interpretation of virtue as moral strength. This is why the empirical characteristics that I will discuss in what follows have a systematic importance that is greater than that which one might imagine if one were only to consider them as de facto conditions to be determined by the universality of the moral law. Manfred Baum recognizes this point in his recent work on the Tugendlehre: if the categorical imperative determines the principle of virtue in terms of its validity, and the latter is the source of the various duties of virtue, it is from experience that the moral concepts are derived that are implicit in the duties of virtue and that give them their content.109 The set of empirical characteristics that operate as notes proper to human nature in the Tugendlehre will only be confirmed in the specific treatment that Kant gives each of the duties of virtue, which is what I will be discussing in upcoming chapters. I can nonetheless at this point outline the framework that defines this discussion of human nature and indicate the kantian texts where they are discussed individually. Some commentators have indicated that the issue related to the sensibility that distinguishes the supreme principle of virtue from the categorical imperative is that of time. Indeed, the dynamic proper to the concept of virtue implies the passage of time, temporal progress in the attainment of ends, and even the temporal and successive generation of maxims of ends which are oriented, in their turn, towards the attainment 109

Cf. BAUM, Manfred, “Prior Concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals”, p. 126.

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of the ultimate end of reason, which confronts us as a project in time.110 Nevertheless, the fact that it can be a universal law to have certain “maxims of ends” presupposes –because of the finite condition of the human being– the passage of time in the attainment and succession of these objects of action. It seems clear to me that the point of view of the Tugendlehre presupposes the capacity to act in time –which also highlights the fact that kantian practical philosophy is based on time qua something given in an intersubjective form. The relevance of the consideration of time in the Tugendlehre is, furthermore, architectonically parallel to the spatial consideration presupposed in the Rechtslehre. It further explains Kant’s own analogical illustration that establishes the relations between the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue as being proportional to the relations between space and time as pure forms of the sensibility.111 However, in reality, Kant establishes this analogy only in order to clarify the relations between law and ethics: he seeks to show how, from the ethical point of view, juridical duties are taken on as indirect duties of virtue via the virtuous duty to act in accordance with the law.112 Thus, everything that is a legal or juridical duty –again, from the ethical point of view, because from the strictly legal point of view this is unnecessary– is also taken as ethical, in the same way that everything that external sense grasps as a pure form of sensibility –as being in space– is also grasped by the internal sense –as being in time.113 In this way the kantian

110 Cf. e.g. RIVERA, Faviola, Virtud y justicia en Kant, p. 72, or SCHMIDT, Claudia M., “The Anthropological Dimension of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals”, p. 79. In addition HELLER, Ágnes, in Crítica de la Ilustración: las antinomias morales de la razón, p. 81, emphasizes that what is “new” in the MdS with respect to earlier works is its consideration of time, although Heller does not interpret it as that to which the categorical imperative applies, but rather as part of this “second” kantian ethics, which, as I have noted, is not distinct from that which he distinguishes as being first. 111 Cf. MdS 214. 112 Cf. MdS 219. 113 The analogy, nevertheless, in its function of clarifying the relations between what is studied in the Rechtslehre and what is studied in the Tugendlehre, is only partial, since it is only from the ethical and first person perspective that legal duties can be taken on as part of the duty to act according to law. For just as in the realm of the theoretical reason, everything

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analogy seeks to clarify the complex relations between duties of Right and duties of virtue, which are complex precisely because their mutual co-involvement and the differences between them depend on the motivational point of view, respectively ethical or legal, from which one considers them. It is not sufficient to merely indicate the temporal character of human existence in order to explain the diversification of ends, and therefore of duties, that are related to the principle of virtue in order to generate an a priori system of virtues. Since Kant himself admits that the Tugendverpflichtung is unitary in itself, but in the face of the diversity of ends it is multiplied into Tugendpflichten,114 it should be recognized that the mere integration of time –qua pure form of sensibility and the “place” where experience and human perfection come to be– is insufficient: further elements obtained from experience about human nature are necessary. While for Kant the concept of human nature is empirical, it can be integrated reflectively via certain a priori procedures and thereby take on moral and normative relevance. As Schmidt emphasizes, the Tugendlehre in fact operates with more empirical data than mere temporal transcurrence. In order to pursue the end of one’s own perfection –which I will discuss specifically, along with its divisions, in a later section of the book– it is also required that there be a recognition of the difference between the animal, intellectual and moral aspects of our human nature, as well as of the relations that hold that is grasped and structured in space is in the same way grasped in the pure internal form of the sensibility that is time. In order to derive greater philosophical benefit from this analogy, one could, nevertheless, also add that just as in theoretical philosophy time incorporates everything which is spatially structured, at the same time it requires spatiality in order for it to act as a reference and be able to “date” or determine its own changes in internal states, as Kant explains in the Refutation of Idealism (Cf. KrV B275 and VIGO, Alejandro G. and JÁUREGI, Claudia, “Algunas consideraciones sobre la refutación del idealismo”, in Revista de Filosofía, II, n. 1, May 1987, pp. 29-41). Ethics also requires a determination of legal duties in order to externalize itself. For if external freedom is not guaranteed via the rational compatibilizing of actions in the realm of Right, the conditions will not exist for the development of the duties of virtue: neither for the development of one’s own perfection nor for the fostering of the happiness of the other. 114 This point seems to be missed by Ernst TUGENDHAT, according to whom Kant is only interested in the unity of virtue and not the diversity of its self-unfolding; cf. Lecciones de Ética, trans. by L. R. Rabanaque, Gedisa, Barcelona, 1997, p. 103.

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between these elements of our humanity. In addition one must consider all these human conditions in the plane of intersubjectivity, i.e. how we as human agents affect one another, with the result that there is a connection between duties to oneself and duties to others. The same author notes that the general duty of promoting the happiness of others, for example, demands empirical concepts that allow an articulation of the different sources of satisfaction that are appropriate for the human being. The appropriateness to each case of each of these sources is highly variable, since they depend on circumstances as well as the expectations and the receptivity of other people. The Tugendlehre functions, then, with concrete empirical concepts in order that purpose-oriented action may orient itself towards satisfying the desires of others that arise from nature or culture, so that the sources of self-esteem, benefit and harm can be identified that are relevant for oneself and for others.115 This necessity to refer to concrete features of human nature can help us to better understand the place occupied by texts such as Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, the Lectures on Pedagogy and the writings on philosophy of history, in the overall structure of Kant’s thought. In fact, in the Tugendlehre the perfect duties of the human being to oneself are divided, principally, into those that are of concern to him or her qua animal being116 and those that are of concern “only as a moral being”.117 The imperfect duties that human beings have to themselves are divided in a similar manner, although in this second case it must be added that the duty to develop one’s own natural perfection is pragmatic.118 All of this seems to correspond, in some sense, with the dispositions (Anlagen) that are described in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason: i.e. the disposition to animality, to humanity and to personhood.119 These three dispositions constitute the original orientation of the human being towards the good, even if in the first two there also exists the possibility of evil (which is not explained by the natural disposition itself, and which Kant Cf. SCHMIDT, Claudia, M., “The Anthropological Dimension of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals”, pp. 8-81. 116 Cf. MdS 421ff. 117 Cf. MdS 429ff. 118 Cf. MdS 444ff. 119 Cf. RGV 26. 115

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deals with separately, as I will discuss later). One can also contrast the division of duties in the MdS with the list of dispositions given in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, which is a work that, in dealing with what is specifically human, does not delve into the animal aspect of our nature and instead focuses on specifically human capacities in the technical, pragmatic and moral realms.120 Following Wilson’s suggestions, one could also add to this list, above all that which regards the duties of virtue to others, the human disposition to unsociable sociability that is found in the Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose.121 For his part, Schmidt emphasizes that, for example, the traits of the human condition collected in the text entitled Conjectural Beginning of Human History (in which Kant presents an interpretation of Genesis, with a view to explaining the development of morality)122 are particularly similar to those considered in the MdS as the ground for deriving the duties of virtue. The text discusses –as preconditions to moral development that are present in the empirical character of the human species– the animality of human beings, the physical and psychological similarities of their members, their sexed condition and their inclination to live in community. He also notes our capacity to manipulate objects and our dependence on nature in our physical, sensible and emotional aspects, but at the same time he highlights the rational and imaginative faculties that make us unique among the living beings on the Cf. ApH 322 and WILSON, Holly L., “Kant’s Integration of Morality and Anthropology”, p. 99. Wilson is in disagreement with A. Wood, who in his work Kant’s Ethical Thought comments specifically on these determining empirical characteristics for Kant’s ethics. Wood appears to reduce anthropology to human sociability and even seems to want to use this sociability as the basis for morality, making all that is strictly moral and intelligible dependent on that which is empirical and historical. It will not, therefore, be a point of minor interest to recall here that morality does not depend on the empirical-anthropological conditions that I am enumerating, but rather that it is discovered by reflection on the basis of these conditions and is applied to them in a normative fashion. 121 Cf. IGA 20, and WILSON, Holly L., “Kants Integration of Morality and Anthropology”, p. 102. 122 As Kant predominantly and programmatically does with Scripture, which he interprets through what one commentator has called the “principle of moral relevance”; cf. LEMA-HINCAPIE, Andrés, Kant y la Biblia: principios kantianos de exégesis bíblica, Anthropos, Barcelona, 2006. 120

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planet, and which give us the ability to plan a wide variety of objects and goals for ourselves, even to choose our own form of life. This same text from the Conjectural Beginning notes –and here the connection with the Tugendlehre is clear– that human beings can, above all, develop their capabilities in order to better achieve their ends,123 although this same development also increases their ability to control or destroy other beings, including other human beings. Schmidt holds that these are precisely the characteristics or traits that can be seen after the “application” proper to the MdS and the system of duties that follows it.124 It seems to me that, although it is true that in the Conjectural Beginning Kant comments on all the human traits mentioned, the purpose of his essay is instead a philosophical appropriation of the Scriptures in order to show how conformity with Providence is reasonable, as it acts over the course of human events in their totality (since according to Kant, there is a continual advance towards moral betterment at the species level, though not at the individual level).125 As a result, one ought not to think that it is only in this text that there appears an empirical description of human nature as Kant presupposes it in the Tugendlehre. I do not think it is necessary to choose between either of these texts as being the single source that one should consult for the concepts that Kant has in mind when he formulates the supreme principle of virtue with a vision of human nature in mind.126 Even if the relationship with Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View is perhaps the most immediate, it is also possible to see Kant as having in mind all the traits of the human condition that he discusses in the cited texts and in certain others. He can even be seen to be referring to those characteristics that prephilosophical experience

Cf. MAM, 109-123. Cf. SCHMIDT, Claudia M., “The Anthropological Dimension of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals”, pp. 82-83. 125 Cf. MAM, 109-123. 126 In this regard I agree with LOUDEN, Robert B., in Kant’s Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings, p. 26, who emphasizes that there is no single text that can be considered “the” kantian anthropology, since even in the Lessons on Physical Geography one can encounter relevant observations. 123 124

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and ordinary understanding in the practical terrain –which I have also noted as having a closeness to moral philosophy– see as being fundamental: for example, mortality, vulnerability, human perfectibility, etc.127 In this way, it is not only a question of finding parallel texts in the kantian corpus. Rather, what is relevant is that these are empirical concepts which in this way acquire a certain normative relevance, insofar as the categorical imperative is presented as a principle of virtue, and virtue –as I will discuss extensively further on– is precisely the strength needed for following the maxims that seek to adapt these empirical human conditions to the demands of the moral law. Holly L. Wilson has also shown that, in order for this relationship of the principle of virtue with the empirical aspects of human nature to be possible, and therefore to permit the derivation and diversification of the duties of virtue, we have to see these aspects not as mere mechanical facts in the sensible world, but also from the intelligible point of view. Kant’s is an anthropological-reflective vision that permits us to discover, in the permanent traits of human beings, both what we are as well as what, in an inchoate fashion, we ought to be. This is the perspective from which Kant is considering human dispositions in the Tugendlehre,128 as becomes clear in the passage where he states (on the occasion of discussing sexual instincts as ends of nature) that in order to understand the duties of virtue one must investigate the connections between the instincts and their effects from a teleological perspective –after the fashion of the natural teleology described in KU 372: “Each of these is a natural end, by which is understood that connection of a cause with an effect in which, although no understanding is as-

127 In this sense, I appreciate Guyer’s explanation of the empirical factors that are most relevant, insofar as the moral law has to apply to free, incarnate beings; cf. GUYER, Paul, “Kant’s System of Duties I: the Duties of Virtue”, chap. 7, in Kant, pp. 249-250. Guyer calls (p. 255) that of the MdS an “anthropological realism”. 128 Gregor also makes this same point in Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 132, as does LOUDEN, Robert B., Kant’s Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings, p. 17.

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cribed to the cause, it is still thought by analogy with an intelligent cause, and so as if it produced men on purpose”.129 Kant considers human nature teleologically, as he makes clear in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, which, in contrast to anthropology in the physiological sense, deals not only with what human beings are, but also with what they should do with themselves.130 Thus, it must be kept in mind that, even if from the genetic point of view a teleological nature provides objects and orientation to the practical use of reason, from the transcendental point of view it is the practical interest and moral ends of reason that justify this teleological vision of nature, which will always be presupposed in a practical approach.131 It seems to mean, therefore, that this is what occurs with the anthropological traits already commented on that appear in texts like Idea for a Universal History... and the Conjectural Beginning…132 2.5.2 Anthroponomy, autonomy and autocracy In order to close this chapter and set the stage for a study of the various Tugendpflichten in their specificity, I will make certain observations on two “new” concepts in the kantian conception of morality, which appear in the MdS and which, when taken into account, resolve many of the perplexities and tensions that certain commentators have criticized in Kant’s practical philosophy. These are the concepts of “anthroponomy” (Anthroponomie) and “autocracy” (Autokratie). In clarifying the meaning of this latter term, I will also discuss a contribution from the Tugendlehre to the MdS 424. Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 133, where she comments specifically on this passage and its relation to the KU. 130 Cf. ApH 119. 131 Cf. GONZÁLEZ, Ana Marta, Culture as Mediation. Kant on Nature, Culture and Morality, Olms, Hildesheim, 2011, p. 218. 132 Cf. for example, the first principle given in IGA, according to which all the natural dispositions of a creature are destined at some point to develop completely and with a view to an end, or the eighth principle, which enunciates the well-known idea of the astuteness of nature in the execution of a hidden plan, which is also teleological. 129

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understanding of a concept that, in contrast, is well known in the literature on Kant but often misinterpreted: the concept of autonomy (Autonomie). This concept appears, as I have already shown, at crucial moments of the critical and systematic development of ethics in Kant, and especially in the third formulation of the categorical imperative. The concept of “anthroponomy” summarizes what I have discussed in this chapter in regard to the relation between ethics and anthropology, and to the normative value of the concept of “human being” and the teleological consideration of human faculties and dispositions. If any commentator is concerned about why Kant does not use the categorical imperative in the texts where he offers empirical data about human beings, such as the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,133 the answer is, as we have seen, that a teleological consideration of the data offered in these texts is in fact in direct relation to the categorical imperative –and with the principle of virtue that is deduced from it– precisely via the mediation that is offered by the Metaphysics of Morals. Even though one could debate, and with good reason, many of the specific points that Kant makes about differences between human groups, between the sexes, psychological and physiological observations, etc., it seems inaccurate to therefore hold –as do R. R. Aramayo and C. Roldán in some of their works134– that the universalist ethics of Kant is undermined by sup133 This is what Louden, following Brandt, does in Kant’s Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings, p. 73. 134 Cf. ARAMAYO, Roberto R., “El dilema kantiano entre antropología y ética”, in Ética y Antropología: un dilema kantiano (Roberto Aramayo and Faustino Oncina, eds.), Comares, Granada, 1999, pp. 23-41 and Concha ROLDÁN, “Del universalismo ético kantiano y sus restricciones antropológicas”, in Ética y antropología: un dilema kantiano, pp. 4368. Aramayo holds that for Kant “anthropology and ethics are something like the horns of a dilemma, two poles that mutually repel each other and which seem to him to be absolutely irreconcilable with each other” (p. 40). The good will, in the face of empirical conditions, according to this author, “often becomes bad precisely because of this profound disdain towards the consequences generated by its acts” (p. 40). In the final analysis, according to this article, Kant’s morality is seen to be “perfectly incapable of resolving in practice our least conflictive moral problems”. As I have attempted to show over the course of this book, I hold that all of these theses are totally unjustified: I believe that the problem has arisen for the author because he attempts to relate the foundational works of kantian ethics, such as the GMS and the KpV, with the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, without taking into account the crucial role that the MdS plays in the

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posed anthropological errors. Rather, it is the indubitable essentialia of the human being, as considered in the MdS, that permit an adequate weighting of the fecundity of the categorical imperative, insofar as Kant himself affirms the normative character of what is stated in the MdS. The passage that affirms this point begins by reiterating the comparison that I have mentioned before, that just as there is a transition (Übergang) from the metaphysical consideration of nature to its empirical study in physics as a natural science, so there is in a practical sense a transition from principles to human experience, and this transition is effected by the metaphysics of morals: “But just as there must be principles in a metaphysics of nature for applying those highest universal principles of a nature in general to objects of experience, a metaphysics of morals cannot dispense with principles of application, and we shall often have to take as our object the particular nature of man, which is known only by experience, in order to show in it what can be inferred from universal moral principles. But this will in no way detract from the purity of these principles or cast doubt on their a priori source. This is to say, in effect, that a metaphysics of morals cannot be based upon anthropology but can still be applied to it”.135 In this way, the metaphysics of morals constitutes the “middle theory” in the kantian practical philosophy: it is the zone of encounter where duty provides norms for actions and at the same time is backfed and profiled by the human conditions of action, thereby translating the universal principles of practical rationality to the concrete circumstances of the human agent. The idea of the operative human person in this work is, therefore, normative: that of a rational, free, finite being in a constant struggle with a mysterious, constantly present predisposition to subordinate the law to his or her sensible inclinations –radical evil– but also with an ever-present intervention by the conscience that causes reexposition of kantian anthroponomy. In regard to Roldán, it seems to me that she does not identify the relevant essentialia of the human being that Kant has in mind for the conformation of duties in the Metaphysics of Morals. 135 MdS 216-217.

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cognition of the unconditionality of the law and causes the human being to be moved by the respect that that law inspires. This is how Kant understands that the normative relation of the homo noumenon to the homo phaenomenon –the same that exists in the dynamic of virtue qua moral strength– constitutes an anthroponomy: “Any high praise for the ideal of humanity in its moral perfection can lose nothing in practical reality from examples to the contrary, drawn from what men now are, have become, or will presumably become in the future; and anthropology, which issues from merely empirical knowledge, can do no damage to anthroponomy, which is laid down by a reason giving laws unconditionally. And while virtue (in relation to men, not to the law) can be said here and there to be meritorious and to deserve to be rewarded, yet in itself, since it is its own end it must also be regarded as its own reward”.136 This is, then, the term that Kant has coined in order to illustrate the intermediate position of the metaphysics of morals as an application of the universal principles of ethics to the fundamental traits of the human condition. It is an application that functions as a rule, one that is crucial insofar as it permits Kant’s proposal to include a priori duties that apply to all rational beings. These duties are fulfilled in the tendency towards ends that are at the same time duties, via virtues that presuppose the strength to act according to the maxims of duty.137 With regard to this condition of autonomy, paradigmatically expressed in the third formulation of the categorical imperative together with the consideration of the Kingdom of Ends, the Tugendlehre also provides a clarification that we cannot overlook: it discredits all those objections against Kant’s ethics that concern the obligatoriness that a moral proposal may have in which human reason itself gives itself the law. The division of the human into homo noumenon and homo phaenomenon –which I will return to in my treatment of the duties to oneself, given that it is key MdS 405-406. Cf. TORRALBA, José María, Libertad, objeto práctico y acción. La facultad del juicio en la filosofía moral de Kant, p. 300, on the Metaphysics of Morals as a study which is at once anthroponomic and eleutherological. 136 137

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to establishing their possibility– should already make it clear that we are not dealing here with a morality that is self-imposed in the more elemental sense of the expression, and which would therefore make it easily manipulated and lacking real normative meaning. But Kant makes the point even more clear when he indicates, when laying out the “Preliminary Concepts” of the Metaphysics of Morals, the sense in which the human being is his or her own lawgiver, i.e. in which sense human beings are autonomous: “One who commands (imperans) via a law is the lawgiver (legislator). He is the author (autor) of the obligation in accordance with the law, but not always the author of the law. In the latter case the law would be a positive (contingent) and chosen [willkürlich] law that binds us a priori and unconditionally by our own reason can also be expressed as proceeding from the will of a supreme lawgiver, that is, one who has only rights and no duties (hence from the divine will); but this signifies only the Idea of a moral being whose will is a law for everyone, without his being thought as the author of the law”.138 The final clarification avoids heteronomy, while the earlier part of the passage explains –against all the simplistic objections that even go so far as to claim Kant is some kind of moral subjectivist (or even relativist)– that human beings are autonomous precisely insofar as they, due to their reason, oblige themselves to fulfill the moral law, but not insofar as that law is promulgated by human beings themselves. Rather, the law is given by reason in a transcendental sense, and therefore it must be seen as though it proceeded from a divine will, as I will discuss further along when I investigate the amphiboly of the moral concepts of reflection.139 Having made this clarification (which, I insist, only involves a reiteration of Kant’s posture as laid out over the course of all his moral works), I want to note that the MdS itself requires our concrete experience of autonomy. Given that this does not occur in a vacuum, but rather it always MdS 227. This is an idea I will return to when I discuss precisely this amphiboly. Concerning the passage just cited, cf. WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 112, who comments carefully on it in order to explain the kantian idea of autonomy in a very pertinent fashion. 138 139

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derives from radical evil as a constant temptation for the agent to consider him or herself to be an exception to the moral law, therefore strength of will is required to impose on oneself the obligatoriness of duty. We cannot speak, therefore, of a complete autonomy of our practical reason, and as a result Kant has recourse to the concept of autocracy in order to refer to one’s confronting one’s own inclinations: “For holy finite beings, on the other hand, i.e. those that are not even tempted to violate duty, there is no doctrine of virtue, but only the doctrine of morals. This latter doctrine presupposes the autonomy of the practical reason, while the former presupposes at the same time an autocracy on the part of practical reason itself, i.e. a consciousness of the capacity to overcome one’s own inclinations, which are rebellious against the law. This is a consciousness that, even if it is not perceived immediately, is correctly derived from the moral categorical imperative, such that human morality, in its highest grade, can certainly not be anything other than virtue”.140 The passage, as highlighted by König and Baxley,141 is crucial: the concept of autocracy implies the idea of a practical reason that is empirically conditioned, but that can overcome sensible stimuli in order to

140 MdS 383. In this passage, Kant uses the term in a way that is relatively distinct from how he uses it in the political-legal context of the Rechtslehre (MdS 339). Here in this first part of the MdS “autocracy” refers to a special sense of monarchy (i.e. the case in which the ruler enjoys all powers, rather than just enjoying supreme power), and as a result it apparently alludes to an all-embracing power. In ethics, however, as we have seen, it refers instead to an always finite effectiveness in action that counters many sensible temptations, although it is always also susceptible to increasing itself via growth in the virtue understood as fortitudo moralis. I believe that the notion that is common to these two uses of the concept of “autocracy” is that in both cases the power of mastery is effective. This is coherent with what is contained in the Lectures on Ethics (Vorlesungen über Moralphilosophie), where Kant is already using the term, according to what is found in the manuscripts that Collins and Menzer have published. In these lectures, “autocracy” is the power of the human soul to bend all capacities and every situation to his or her faculty of choice, via the inner coercion and despite all those obstacles that one might imagine: that is, the term alludes to the effectiveness of one’s mastery over one’s self. 141 Cf. BAXLEY, Anne Margaret, Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, p. 53.

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carry out what is demanded by the law.142 Or as Lara Denis has made clear, if autonomy refers to lawgiving, autocracy refers to execution. This is also noted by Baxley. The difference between the two concepts is not merely modal, i.e. it is not the distinction between a capacity and its realization in the case of finite and imperfect rational beings.143 This distinction still, however, captures the fact that autonomy is the necessary condition for autocracy, but it is not a sufficient condition for it: to realize this effectiveness in one’s self-mastery one needs precisely to acquire virtue. Scott Roulier highlights this difference: autonomy refers to self-governance itself, while autocracy refers to the effective power over one’s self.144 Timmermann, for his part, nuances this statement: the kantian use of this concept of autocracy does not at all displace the centrality of autonomy in the central points of the derivation of duties. Attributing autocracy to the human will only implies a recognition that the latter is at a middle point between full autonomy and absolute heteronomy, but autonomy continues to be the measure by which the autocratic human person should orient him or herself, just as Kant insists in the Critique of Practical Reason.145 We have come, then, to the point in which this study, because of its logical structure and its following of the text of the Tugendlehre, must confront Kant’s own definition of virtue and its theoretical presuppositions. I will deal with precisely this issue in the next chapter.

Cf. VzM 362-363. In 378 Kant also speaks of autocracy as mastery of one’s own body. As Beatrix Himmelmann has emphasized, autocracy understood in this manner is not only necessary for morality, but also for the prudential quest for happiness; cf. Kants Begriff des Glucks, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2003, p. 159. 143 Cf. DENIS, Lara, “Virtue and its Ends” in Kant’s Tugendlehre. A Comprehensive Commentary, p. 165 and BAXLEY, Anne Margaret, Kant’s Theory of Virtue. The Value of Autocracy, pp. 57-59. 144 Cf. ROULIER, Scott M., Kantian Virtue at the Intersection of Politics and Nature. The Value of Soul-Making, p. 22. 145 Cf. KpV 31; cf. TIMMERMANN, Jens, Sittengesetz und Freiheit. Untersuchungen zu Immanuel Kants Theorie des freien Willens, p. 33. 142

CHAPTER 3 THE DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE

3.1 Introduction: virtue, vice and absence of virtue Although in the preceding chapters I have discussed virtue (Tugend) as being the moral strength for fulfilling the maxims of ends that reason imposes as duties, it is here that I will focus on the definitions that Kant offers of virtue in the Specific Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue, with which Kant begins the second part of the Metaphysics of Morals. I will also investigate the real opposition of virtue and vice as well as the logical contradictory of virtue, which is not vice but rather the mere absence of virtue. In addition, I will enter into a number of nuances in regard to these oppositions. The first definition that Kant offers of virtue refers to the fact that, once we have determined what our duty is, we must take into consideration the subjective obstacles that their fulfillment implies for a nonholy will, i.e. that of human beings. These obstacles are presented and confronted in a diachronic and projective manner, as Kant makes clear prior to proposing the definition that we are concerned with here: “Impulses of nature, accordingly, involve obstacles within man’s mind to his fulfillment of duty and (sometimes powerful) forces opposing it, which he must judge that he is capable of resisting and conquering by reason not at some time in the future but at once (the moment he thinks of duty): He must judge that he can do what the law tells him unconditionally that he ought to do”.1 As one can see, the temporal element, which implies that the moralization of the human soul is a project, is explicit in this passage. The allu-

1

MdS 380.

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sion to the kantian principle of “ought implies can” is also clear.2 And virtue, as Kant notes in the same locus, is the mode in which one can comply with duty. He presents it to us as strength in the following of the maxims in order to confront and defeat that propensity to evil (Hang zum Bösen) which inclines us to act out of self-love and makes it difficult to subordinate this egoism to the moral law. The context of moral action and the formation of character in Kant is never, first off, neutral: it always presupposes the temptation to act immorally, and resistance will always involve elements of conflict. This is why, as Allison highlights, when Kant alludes to virtue he almost always likens it to health.3 It is only in this way that one can explain the necessity for this capacity and readiness (Fertigkeit), for this courage and strength (Tapferkeit) which defends our inner freedom when directed by a principle. It is a matter of controlling, and not suppressing, the inclinations. The temptation to allow the latter to undermine the freedom of the faculty of choice is always present, but it is not a matter of annihilating the inclinations, but rather to reduce their power and confront them, thus establishing ends for the faculty of choice according to an a priori moral principle. As I will discuss later, one indication that a person has attained a certain control of an inclination is that they carry out the duty with pleasure. Thus, although Kant does not say so clearly, this point of his moral doctrine is directly occupied with the acquisition of a good character, i.e. with the development of a good will.4 Kant thus describes virtue as a moral force of the will, and even alludes to the etymological relationship between Tugend and taugen, i.e. between “virtue” and “being good for something”, or being useful for some purpose.5 Kant frequently uses war metaphors in order to explain

2 Cf. STERN, Robert, “Does Ought Imply Can? And Did Kant Think It Does?” in Utilitas, vol. 16, n. 1, March 2004, pp. 42-61. 3 Cf. ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 163. 4 SULLIVAN, Roger makes this clear in An Introduction to Kant’s Ethics, CUP, Cambridge – New York, 1994, p. 74. 5 Cf. MdS 390. Cf. also BAXLEY, Anne Margaret, Kant’s Theory of Virtue. The Value of Autocracy, p. 84; and for the greek resonances of this idea, cf. ENGSTROM, Stephen, “The Inner Freedom of Virtue”, p. 289.

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his vision of virtue.6 However, as I will discuss at the appropriate time, this should not lead the reader to a merely “energetic” understanding of kantian virtue, as though there were always a conflict between reason and inclination that would be resolved by a vectorial analysis or an opposition between forces. Instead, his model of formation of character allows reason to permeate the inclinations themselves and thus offers to the moral agent the prospect of a self-transparency and psychic harmony which go beyond the mere stage of moral continence even if they are never complete nor guaranteed. As Jeanine Grenberg has emphasized, this good character presupposes having maxims of action that are derived from the supreme principle of virtue. In turn, these effectively influence our actions and are sustained in a correct manner, while at the same time they generate “moral jurisprudence”, thereby setting down precedents that are concretized in more specific maxims and which pervade the emotional life of the agent.7 The maxims that emanate from the supreme principle of virtue (and ultimately, therefore, from the categorical imperative, as I have already shown) function as principles of acquisition of virtue. This, in turn, is the force that guarantees that the person effectively acts according to that maxim, as I will describe in more detail in the following chapters of this book.8 The necessity of virtue is thus formulated in agonistic terms: “Now the capacity and considered resolve to withstand a strong but unjust opponent is fortitude (fortitudo) and, with respect to what opposes the moral disposition within us, virtue (virtus, fortitudo moralis)”.9

6 Cf. MdS 376, 380, 405. Cf. On this point also see BAXLEY, Anne Margaret, Kant’s Theory of Virtue. The Value of Autocracy, p. 119 and pp. 123-136. 7 Cf. GRENBERG, Jeanine, Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption, and Virtue, CUP, Cambridge, 2005, p. 68. 8 I believe that it is because of the element of “force” and “effectiveness” that virtue connotes that in some of his Reflections Kant states that it is “morality in ability”, i.e. a reconciliation of both levels. Cf. Refl. 6792. 9 MdS 380.

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In classical ethics (aristotelian andreia, for example),10 fortitude is above all seen as being in opposition to external dangers and threats to one’s life. Now, however, it is interiorized in the form of moral convictions –above all stoic and judeo-christian– that converge in this kantian posture. Thus in the MdS fortitude represents a kind of courage in the struggle against the propensity towards moral evil. Virtue, therefore, will always be fortitude,11 and as a result this latter occupies in some way the transversal role that, in classical ethics, was played by phronesis, i.e. a specific virtue that is at the same time the basis for the other virtues. This becomes even clearer in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, when Kant notes that fortitude imposes order on virtue.12 This –at least tendential– prioritizing of strength is a characteristic of the ethics of Modernity, in their assimilation of the judeo-Christian tradition, as well as a certain kind of neo-stoic ethics.13 Cf. EN 1115a 5ss. This point is investigated by ENGSTROM, Stephen, “The Inner Freedom of Virtue”, pp. 289ff. 12 Cf. RGV 57 and O’NEILL, “Kant’s Virtues”, p. 84, n. 12. It seems to me that O’Neill understands this point correctly, although it is unfortunate that her text gets bogged down in a critique of the kantian vision of virtue, where she contends that it is too internal and incommunicable. Her discussion seems to not hit home, however, even if we admit that Kant’s ethics runs the risks that face all ethics of intention and moral disposition. I believe that it is undeniable that there is, at the moment of performing moral evaluation, an opacity in both the first and third person that means that it is unavoidable that self-knowledge be something that must be achieved and not something merely given, in the first person case. In the third person case, in turn, this also means that one must be especially cautious in judging the morality of the acts of others. I will return to the topic of self-knowledge when I study the conscience as a precondition for the receptivity of duty and the first command of reason in the duties to oneself, as set out in the Tugendlehre. 13 Cf. MELCHES GILBERT, Carlos G., Der Einfluß von Christian Garves Übersetzung Ciceros ‘De officiis’ auf Kants “Grundlegung zur Metaphysyik der Sitten”, pp. 22-28, where the author explains that Kant gives priority to stoic influences in the principal traits of his concept of virtue. Concerning stoic influence in the practical philosophy of Kant in general, cf. SANTOZKI, Ulrike, Die Bedeutung antiker Theorien für die Genese und Systematik von Kants Philosophie. Eine Analyse der drei Kritiken, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2006, pp. 150158. Santozki (p. 162) notes how, in regard to practical philosophy, Kant’s Leitautoren are in fact Plato –from whom he had to separate himself in his specific rejection of “mysticism” concerning the summum bonum– and the Stoics –whose rigorism he fully takes on 10 11

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Virtue, then, presupposes that we are able to perform a certain selfconstruction on the basis of our personality alone, to exercise control over our inclinations in accordance with the demands of duty, i.e. aus Pflicht, and finally to build our own character through the progress of this self-constraint. While indeed every human being has the capacity (Vermögen) for self-control in the abstract, fortitude (Tapferkeit) of character is acquired solely by an asymptotic process of self-discipline. As a result, if all rational beings, as a result of being such, have an autonomous practical reason, only those beings that foster virtue in themselves achieve the autocracy that I have discussed previously.14 As I have already mentioned, autonomy is the necessary but not sufficient condition for the acquisition of this fortitude or autocracy. The capacity for self-constraint is not sufficient for a good life if it is not strengthened by an acquired power, which in turn is obtained only via its exercise in the moment and in the circumstances in which the inclinations are effectively resisted. This acquisition of moral strength is a requirement for authentic internal freedom: if external freedom is assured via the independence from unjust compulsion on the part of others, which is what grounds the Rechtslehre, the Tugendlehre is especially concerned with obtaining an internal independence in regard to the equally unjust oppression of our inclinations, which represent aggressors against our moral disposition. The Doctrine of Virtue, as Gregor emphasizes, begins with the idea that in allowing ourselves to be carried along by inclinations, which are affected by the propensity to evil and are therefore subject to an egoistic love for oneself, we are in reality not our true selves, and this is why in the search for autonomy we are always called to resist these inclinations.15 This is the commitment that is expressed in the most general maxim of virtue, the tugendhafte Gesinnung, which I will discuss a little further along: it is the maxim that contains in a general fashion the priority of the moral law with respect to the inclinations of self-love. This commitwhile also distancing himself from them in order to embrace the Christian doctrine of the highest good. 14 Cf. ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 164. 15 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 68 and MdS 379n and 380.

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ment of virtue is related to all our ethical obligations, even if on the second plane in which we speak of virtue, i.e. that of the duties associated specifically with an obligatory end (the possibility of which I have explored in the previous chapter), only those strengths are virtues which are linked to that matter or object of the faculty of choice that is a duty to possess and hold. Thus, the single obligation of virtue (Tugendverpflichtung, obligatio ethica) that is expressed in the most general maxim of action (Gesinnung) is in a certain sense broader than the concrete list of particular obligations that Kant gives as duties of virtue (Tugendpflichten, officia ethica sive virtutis). At the level of these latter there is a diversity (Vierzahlen) of concrete virtues related to specific emotional reactions or to particular contexts of action. The fulfillment of these various duties involves a strengthened Gesinnung, i.e. one that is virtuous; it presupposes the unity of the mandate to “comply with all duties out of duty” (alle Pflichten aus Pflicht zu erfüllen). If, materially, there exist various maxims of virtue, and thus various virtues, formally speaking there is only one: to act according to duty out of love for duty.16 The particular virtues, on the other hand, which are already susceptible to being enumerated in concrete fashion, are in their turn diversified among themselves by the diverse objects that they concern: “Only an end that is simultaneously a duty can be called a duty of virtue. As a result there are various such duties (and also various virtues). However, on the basis of the former (those ethical duties that do not refer to a determined end, but rather to the formality of the moral determination of the will) only one duty can be conceived of, although it is valid for all actions (only one virtuous intention)”.17 Via the coordination of these two planes of the Tugendverpflichtung and the diverse Tugendpflichten, Kant suggests a solution to the problem – 16 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, “Kants System der Pflichten in der Metaphysik der Sitten”, in Ludwig, p. lxi. 17 MdS 383. I have frequently chosen to retain the German word Gesinnung in order to avoid confusion. This is in order to avoid difficulties with translating the term, as I will discuss in a later section, where I will focus on this concept in particular.

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which was already discussed in ancient ethical texts– of the diversity of the virtues and their necessary deep unity. If, as I have said before, the Doctrine of Virtue is the place where Kant proposes his own model of character formation, the virtues cannot be isolated capacities that are totally disconnected from each other. Kant himself reiterates in various passages that the moral life must have an absolute unity, and in fact unity is one of the ideals that are active in the system of ends and virtues that he proposes in the MdS18 (and indeed in all his philosophical works). Classical conceptions tend to resolve this problem of the linkage between virtues either with a recourse to the relationship between the different parts of the soul in which each virtue has its effect (in the more platonic traditions) or via a recourse to a situated rationality that is unique in being prudential and diverse in regard to the context of its application (the object and the emotion that it awakens in the agent; this is the aristotelian option).19 Thus these traditions propose the analogy of the “interconnected vessels” of human perfections in order to explain a certain de facto imbalance between them, and at the same time to make possible an understanding of how one virtue connects with others and indeed requires, at a certain degree of excellence, the others as well. Kant resolves this tension via a single Tugendverpflichtung that is expressed in diverse forms in the face of the different objects that present themselves as obligatory ends to the faculty of choice. The presentation of these ends (above all, in regard to imperfect duties) is variable, depending on the context and on circumstantial aspects. Hence, it is understood that in regard to certain of them fortitude does not get exercised at the same level as in regard to others. For example, in principle one can fully realize the virtues associated with the quest for one’s own perfection, and nevertheless there can be a deficient situation in regard to the quest to foster the happiness of others. Nevertheless, the relations internal to the vir18 Cf. SULLIVAN, Roger, An Introduction to Kant’s Ethics, p. 150. Cf. also the text by MELCHES GILBERT, Carlos, Der Einfluß von Christian Garves Übersetzung Ciceros ‘De officiis’ auf Kants “Grundlegung zur Metaphysyik der Sitten”, pp. 22-28, where the author demonstrates beyond any doubt that the kantian solution to the problem of the unity or diversity of virtues is strongly marked by stoic influences. For further confirmation of this stoic influence on Kant’s idea of virtue, cf. also Refl. 6584 and 7237. 19 Cf. EN 1144b33.

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tues, and even the necessity for some of them in order to attain to others (I will discuss further on how, for example, in a certain sense fulfilling the duties to oneself is the condition of possibility for the fulfillment of duties to others), are explained by the unity of the virtuous Gesinnung. This Gesinnung furthermore also unifies these concrete duties with duty in general, and is expressed in the previously discussed supreme principle of virtue: “Virtue, understood as conformity of the will with every duty, founded on a firm intention, is strictly unitary, as is all that is formal. However, upon taking into account the end of the actions which is simultaneously a duty, i.e. the matter which we must propose to ourselves as an end, it is clear that there can be more virtues, and the obligation with respect to the maxim of pursuing it is called the duty of virtue; therefore, there are many duties of virtue”.20 This same criterion is that which functions in order to distinguish vices among themselves, each one of which, as I will show, is the real opposite of the corresponding virtue. Upon analyzing the list of virtues that Kant proposes, it becomes clear how some of them are formulated as way of preventing a possible vice, and as a result this opposition is operative in the kantian system of virtues and duties itself. This is why Kant also discusses a diversity of vices, even though the propensity to evil is unitary, i.e. a single maxim that commands the subordination of the following of the law to self love: “Conceiving a plurality of virtues (which turns out to be unavoidable) is simply a matter of conceiving distinct moral objects, towards which the will finds itself led by the unique principle of virtue; the same thing occurs with the vices that are opposed to it”.21 Mary Gregor does not connect this distinction of planes between the single tugendhafte Gesinnung and the various Tugendpflichten with the issue of the radical unity of the virtues, as I myself propose to do. Gregor limits 20 21

MdS 395. MdS 406.

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herself to distinguishing between the fact that there is one virtue according to its form –the general strength to perform the duty out of duty– and the fact that there are many virtues according to their matter, i.e. according to the diverse objects of moral choice and the distinct inclinations that must be confronted. The formal aspect of virtue, the fundamental virtuous disposition, arises from internal freedom and at the same time makes it possible and strengthens it.22 This seems to me to be correct, albeit limited in its scope, since the analytic method that Kant follows in laying out his system of virtues is not the best possible one for dealing with the transversal relations between them. Therefore she does not take advantage of the distinction of planes between the Tugendverpflichtung and the Tugendpflichten, and as a result the problem of the radical unity of the virtues remains unresolved.23 Jeanine Grenberg, on the other hand, interprets in an appropriate fashion the distinction between these two planes precisely as being a strategy for defending the radical unity of the virtues, which is the key to the kantian theory of the configuration of character.24 The same author 22 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 71. 23 There are even those, such as Tugendhat (Lecciones de Ética, p. 103) who hold that Kant was not at all interested in the diversity of the virtues, but rather only in virtue as being unitary insofar as it is related to character and thus the good will. As I will discuss in some detail, I hold for my part that this posture is erroneous. 24 Cf. GRENBERG, Jeanine, Kant and the Ethics of Humility. A Story of Dependence, Corruption, and Virtue, p. 8 and pp. 72-87. This author enumerates the various alternatives, within the kantian framework, for defending the unity of the virtues. Kant certainly attributes unity to them insofar as they all derive from the same rational principle. At the level of the Gesinnung, Greenberg notes, there is only one moral object (the law), only one moral sentiment (respect) and only one end (that which is marked by the interest of reason). This does not mean, however, at the level of the diversity of ends and virtues, that the conceptual determination of each virtue is linked to that of the others, or that, de facto, if one has one of the virtues, all the others are necessarily possessed. Kant is thinking of a complete moral progress, which takes in all the dimensions of character and of action, even if it is unreachable and unending. To have a virtue in a perfect manner would indeed imply having all the others at the same level of perfection. In the reality of never-ending moral progress, the discontinuities are, however, explicable. Barbara Herman also sees that the interconnection between Tugendverpflichtung and Tugendpflichten resolves the issue of the radical unity of the virtues; cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Moral Literacy, p. 104.

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insists that the diverse Tugendpflichten, specified according to their objects or according to the inclination that they resist, each involve the progressive interiorization of a maxim that accords with each duty. As a result, in Kant’s view acquiring a virtue would be equivalent to moving from having a moral disposition to having a virtuous disposition, and this latter would be the strongest and strictest sense of what it means to have a maxim.25 In this sense, the self-construction of virtue is at once, and always, cultivation and perfecting of our humanity, and therefore should not be seen only in a negative light.26 I follow Gregor, in contrast, in emphasizing that there is another ambivalence in the kantian discussion of virtue: in certain passages he speaks of virtue as a specific object of choice –when what one wants is to be virtuous– while in the rest of the Tugendlehre he speaks of virtue as a mode of desiring another concrete thing. For example, when one attempts to aid another person in a virtuous manner, in which case the matter of the maxim is the good of the person helped and not virtue in and of itself. Virtue is, then, is only the matter of the maxims in a very restricted manner: instead, in a broader sense, it is that moral fortitude that is present in every moral determination of the faculty of choice that exists by and for the moral law.27 Having mentioned the vice (Laster) in the last citation, I would like to clarify the opposition that Kant attributes to it with regard to virtue. He makes a specific observation about this in section II of the Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue, and it seems to me that to properly understand this passage one must again bear in mind the diversity of the levels of discourse that Kant is maintaining regarding this issue:

Cf. GRENBERG, Jeanine, Kant and the Ethics of Humility. A Story of Dependence, Corruption, and Virtue, p. 84. 26 Cf. GRENBERG, Jeanine, Kant and the Ethics of Humility. A Story of Dependence, Corruption, and Virtue, p. 85. 27 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 170-171, and MdS 395 and 406. 25

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“Virtue (= +a) is opposed to negative lack of virtue (moral weakness = 0) as its logical opposite (contradictorie oppositum), but it is opposed to vice (= a) as its real opposite (contrarie s. realiter oppositum)”.28 Thus, if the virtues are modes of moral fortitude, their logical contradictory is not vice (Laster, understood here as the assimilation of moral evil in the maxim itself), but rather the mere lack of virtue (Untugend) or weakness.29 Nevertheless, as Gregor points out, if we look for a real opposition at this level of the concrete and differentiated duties of virtue, this virtue is not found in the mere lack of moral strength, but rather in the possession of a maxim of indifference towards the obligatory end, or else a maxim which subordinates it to the ends of egoism.30 An intermediate position at this level of the diversity of vices or virtues, however, is possible. On the other hand, at the level of the Gesinnung no neutrality is possible: either one follows the maxim that subordinates self-love to respect for the moral law, or one follows the propensity that permits the inclinations to impose themselves on the reason. The presence of this propensity –moral evil, which I will talk about a little later, in seeking to clarify the resistance that it offers to virtue– makes it impossible that

28 MdS 384. This is another of the ideas that would be worth tracing in Kant’s precritical ethics: as emphasized by P. A. Schillp, in his pre-critical essay on negative magnitudes Kant explains how a vice or demerit is not merely a lack of virtue, but is precisely a negative determination. Animals, for instance, have a lack of virtue but not a demerit, precisely because there is no moral law within them, nor any moral feeling at all. Cf. SCHILPP, Paul Arthur, La ética precrítica de Kant, trans. by J. Muñoz and E.C. Frost, UNAM, Mexico City, 1997, p. 69. 29 Even though it seems to me that this should be evident, given his explanation of what virtue is, I wish to emphasize here that the mere possibility that there can be a good will without virtue shows that these two notions should not be identified, although the first is always presupposed by the second. On this topic, cf. WOOD, Allen, “Kant and Agent-Oriented Ethics”, in Perfecting Virtue, p. 60. 30 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 100. Cf. also ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 168 and MUNZEL, G. Felicitas, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character. The Critical Link of Morality, Anthropology and Reflective Judgement, p. 144. Munzel –as we have already seen Schilpp doing– comments on the real opposition between virtue and vice in the light of Kant’s essay on negative magnitudes.

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there be a neutrality, i.e. a mere absence of virtue that does not thereby constitute vice. That is, in the plane of multiple, concrete virtues that are specified by their objects and expressed in maxims of ends, it is possible that at a given moment the fortitude required by the moral law may not have been acquired. This does not necessarily imply that the agent is vicious. It is clear however, that if virtue is related with the fulfilling of a perfect duty, the omission of the latter may be, of itself, vicious. Also, when Kant distinguishes between duties of love and of respect, he indicates that omitting the former implies no vice, although it does show a lack of virtue, but omitting the duties of respect is in fact vicious, as I will show later. Nevertheless, the vices are the real enemy of the carrying out of what is commanded by the moral law and of the formation of a character in agreement with what is demanded by duty. As a result the conflict is with the vices and with the inclinations which, affected by radical evil, allow them to enter into the maxims of the faculty of choice: “Vices, incubated in those intentions which are contrary to the law, are the monsters that the human being must fight against. Thus moral strength, understood as courage (fortitudo moralis), also constitutes the supreme, and indeed only, warrior honor of the human being. In addition it is called true wisdom, that is, practical wisdom, because it makes its own the final end of human existence on this earth”.31 The affirmation that virtue is practical wisdom complements the following brief definitions that Kant adds to his discussion: “Virtue is the strength of man’s maxims in fulfilling his duty”,32 and “Virtue signifies a moral strength of the will”,33 as well as the definition in extenso that has now become more understandable, since its elements have been explained.

MdS 405. I wish to indicate my reservations regarding translating “gesetzwidriger Gesinnungen” as “intentions which are contrary to the law”. The translation of Gesinnung, as we will see, is indeed difficult. 32 MdS 394. 33 MdS 405. 31

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“Virtue is, therefore, the moral strength of a man’s will in fulfilling his duty, a moral constraint through his own lawgiving reason, insofar as this constitutes itself an authority executing the law”.34 I believe this quote correctly sums up the kantian vision of virtue. The italics placed by Kant himself highlight that his vision of virtue belongs not to the a priori principles of morality but rather to the anthroponomy that is proposed in the MdS, i.e. a normative vision of human beings on the basis of their essential characteristics, and which at the same time forms the “material” part of the ethics of duty. It is also important to emphasize the self-constraining character of the specifically ethical sphere, and the fact that virtue is a matter of the faculty of choice, i.e. that it arises from the influence of the lawgiving practical reason on the maxims of action and therefore on the concrete exercise of our freedom of choice.35 Finally, I wish to highlight Kant’s comparison of the faculties of the soul (Gemüt) with lawgiving and legal institutions (legislative power, executive power), an analogy that goes back at least to Plato and which he received from late Scholasticism, via the Schulphilosophie.36 Having discussed the definitions that Kant offers of virtue, and its relationships with moral weakness and vice, in the next sections I will MdS 405. Lara Denis summarizes the diverse definitions of virtue discussed up to now in five points: virtue is force, self-constraint (autocracy), moral disposition, conformity of the will with duty, and its own end and recompense. Cf. DENIS, Lara “Virtue and its Ends”, in Kant’s Tugendlehre. A Comprehensive Commentary, p. 159. 36 For a tracing of the path taken by this type of analogy and other concepts relating to duty, starting with Scholasticism, passing through the Schulphilosophie and ending with Kant, cf. HRUSCHKA, Joachim, Das deontologische Sechseck bei Gottfried Achenwall im Jahre 1767. Zur Geschichte der deontischen Grundbegriffe in der Universaljurisprudenz zwischen Suarez und Kant, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1986. The historical journey also includes Grotius and Puffendorf. The reader may also consult SCHNEEWIND, J.B., “The Misfortunes of Virtue”, in Virtue Ethics (Roger Crisp and Michael Slote eds.), pp. 178-200, where in addition a historical tracing of the notions of perfect and imperfect duty is provided. Concerning the specific point of the legislative power and the executive capacity, see the analysis of Thomas Aquinas, explained in ENRÍQUEZ, Teresa, De la decisión a la acción: Estudio sobre el Imperium en Tomás de Aquino, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 2011. 34 35

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focus on certain elements that have already come up in my earlier reflections. For if virtue is understood as strength in the face of the moral enemy, it is necessary then to clarify as much as possible the condition of radical evil, that mysterious propensity to evil that virtue confronts and in the light of which it is recognized. This will require me to briefly return to the Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, and will permit me to complete my discussion of vice as the real opposite of virtue. I have also spoken, in various stages of my argument, of the transcendental plane of the Gesinnung or fundamental disposition of the soul, whose maxim must be virtuous in order to be able to speak of virtue in an absolute sense: I will also look into this issue in greater depth. 3.2 The necessity of virtue and its theoretical presuppositions 3.2.1 Virtue in the face of radical evil Although the condition of radical evil is not an issue that Kant deals with directly in the Tugendlehre,37 we have already seen how the propensity towards evil (Hang zum Bösen), which takes form in moral weakness or in the acquisition of maxims that are indifferent towards those ends that are duties, is precisely what virtue must confront and comprises the resistance in the face of which this fortitudo moralis must test itself.38 The InI have had serious doubts, therefore, in regard to the appropriateness of this brief excursus regarding radical evil in the present work. Despite the necessary limits of these reflections, and of the methodological risk that they involve, I have been convinced by Jeanine Grenberg’s argument that if one does not understand the enemy that kantian virtue is confronting then one does not understand his notion of virtue itself. Cf. GRENBERG, Jeanine, “What is the Enemy of Virtue?”, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, pp. 152-169. 38 In fact, it could be said, as Jeanine Grenberg does, that what is proper to Kant’s treatment of virtue is its beginning with a consideration of the most dependent and corrupt dimensions of human nature and action, but which ends with the proposing of a model of character formation that presupposes a being with dignity who is able to live up to it. Grenberg herself gets enmeshed in a discussion about whether this starting point involves a limitation, since Kant himself speaks more in terms of improvement and moral progress and not “moral excellence”. Grenberg holds that it is vital to clarify what kind of excellence is possible in finite and dependent beings, and that human beings find 37

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troduction to the Doctrine of Virtue begins precisely by exploring this opposition.39 The passage cited at the beginning of this chapter makes it clear, but it is still necessary to attempt a causal explanation of these obstacles. As Grenberg emphasizes, and as I will show in greater detail, given that we have the moral incentive of respect always influencing our faculty of choice by way of the moral conscience, it seems necessary to explain why we do not always follow this incentive. A real, effective force must be identified, i.e. a “real opposite” (remember that the mere lack of virtue is only its logical opposite) that explains resistance to the good – and thereby, the need for virtue seen as strength.40 It will also be necessary to clarify whether, and in what sense, nature can be made responsible, for in the Anthropology and in Religion its dispositions have been acknowledged to be fundamentally good. However, in some expressions in the Doctrine of Virtue they appear to be identified as the enemy to be defeated by moral fortitude.41 In order to clarify the passage I will make a brief excursus through the initial sections of Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, where, even if the question of radical evil is not fully explored, at least the phenomenon is clarified in such a way that the recourse to virtue is justified as a moralizing strategy of the human soul. We are in the presence, then, of the “moral monsters” that the Doctrine of Virtue speaks of in its own agonistic terms.42 Already in the prologue to the second edition of Religion, Kant notes that it maintains continuity with popular morality, and does not depend on the aprioristic analysis proper to the KpV. Nevertheless, it is necessary to maintain the critical distinction between virtus phaenomenon (the promptness to and capacity for realizing actions that are in conformity with duty) and the virtus noumenon (that which arises from the authentic a sufficiently high ideal in the possession of a character that is able to respond appropriately to the propensity to evil that we all have as an interior enemy. Cf. GRENBERG, Jeanine, Kant and the Ethics of Humility. A Story of Dependence, Corruption, and Virtue, pp. 4953. 39 See note 383 and MdS 380. 40 Cf. GRENBERG, Jeanine, “What is the Enemy of Virtue?”, p. 156. 41 Cf. For example, MdS 380, 384 and 394. These expressions are commented on and contextualized in GRENBERG, Jeanine, “What is the Enemy of Virtue?”, p. 169. 42 Cf. MdS 405.

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disposition of the soul –Gesinnung– of effecting actions out of love for duty itself –aus Pflicht).43 This distinction shows the continuity of Religion with the Doctrine of Virtue. The observation that follows on this same prologue, nevertheless, appears to conflict with this continuity, since in the Religion, Kant notes that a metaphysics of morals cannot admit middle terms regarding morality, either in actions (adiaphora)44 or in human character, since this would mean losing the strength of the principles.45 In this regard, at least one passage of the Tugendlehre appears to suggest, as I will show further on, that there are in fact adiaphora. In Religion, evil is the absence of good, and therefore a maxim must be proper to the one or to the other: an adiaphoron would be beyond any and all obligatory precepts, whether prohibitive or permissive.46 It seems to me, however, that in the context of the prologue and of the observation Kant makes in Religion, and also in the light of what is indicated in the first section of the treatise, dedicated to the propensity to radical evil, one can defend the continuity with the Doctrine of Virtue. However, it must be made clear that an action that is indifferent with respect to the duties of virtue (which, as I mentioned earlier, are only those which refer to specifically obligatory ends for the faculty of choice) may not be indifferent from the perspective of a consideration of morality in general. There are adiaphora regarding the concrete duties of virtue, i.e. actions that do not fall under any of them specifically. This, nevertheless, does not mean that they are not under the jurisdiction of the Tugendverpflichtung in general: the adiaphora are such, not because they are not subject to moral judgement, but rather because, once the judgement has been performed, it indicates that they are indifferent with regard to any moral Cf. RGV 14. The issue of the possibility of the adiaphora is clearly received by Kant from the stoic tradition; cf. SANTOZKI, Ulrike, Die Bedeutung antiker Theorien für die Genese und Systematik von Kants Philosophie. Eine Analyse der drei Kritiken, pp. 181-182. Santozki emphasizes that Kant does not mention the adiaphora when he discusses those things that are only conditionally good (as opposed to the unconditioned good of a good will) at the beginning of the Grundlegung, but he does not highlight the fact that the Tugendlehre does refer explicitly to the classical term. 45 The same idea seems to be present in Refl. 6784. 46 Cf. RGV 22-23 and PATON, Herbert J., The Categorical Imperative, p. 40. 43

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prohibitions or obligations. As a result, it can be held at the same time that, in accordance with what is demanded at the level of the most general maxims, nothing is outside of the realm of morality, as well as that, against moral fanaticism, there are concrete actions that are adiaphora, i.e. morally indifferent.47 The focus of Religion is that of the level proper to the Gesinnung, of the disposition or fundamental option that is expressed in a highly generalized maxim, which I will discuss in depth in the following section.48 In this light of this disposition there is nothing that is indifferent, for at that fundamental level there is in fact no middle term or space for indifference at all, and since moral character depends on this supreme maxim, there is also no room for intermediate options in the character of the person. Once the theoretical continuity has been re-established between both texts, it is in the section on the propensity to evil where we find an explanation of the necessity of virtue qua moral strength. It is a propensity (Hang), according to Kant, and not a determination, because it deals with a possibility, i.e. with an inclination as contingent.49 It is, nevertheless, an innate condition, a universal and ever-present possibility, and therefore is radical.50 However, because it is contingent it is also possible to think of it 47 Along these lines, cf. Refl. 7031, which indicates that it is under the praeceptiva law that actions are determined as being practically necessary (obligatory), impossible (prohibited) or permitted qua adiaphora morale. 48 It seems to me to be a key issue, in this sense, to pay attention to Kant’s note 12 in Religion, where he makes it clear that in the “effective doing and not doing” there is a mean between the extremes of morality. However, this is only the case for phenomena and is subject in the final judgement to the determination of the Gesinnung, in which there are, indeed, no adiaphora. On this point, EISENBERG, Paul, “From the Forbidden to the Supererogatory: the Basic Ethical Categories in Kant’s Tugendlehre”, pp. 256-258 is in agreement. This point is also explained with great clarity in GRANJA, Dulce María, “Mal radical y progreso moral: ¿conceptos incompatibles en la teoría kantiana de la acción?”, pp. 365-371. 49 Cf. RGV 28-29. A propensity is the internal ground of a possible inclination. For a discussion of what a propensity is and its difference from an inclination, cf. WUERTH, Julian, “Moving Beyond Kant’s Account of Agency in the Grounding”, in Perfecting Virtue, p. 152. 50 It can be said that it is radical in a qualitative fashion, but not quantitatively, for it is not the case that the faculty of choice always subordinates the moral law to the in-

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as an acquired propensity, which is the key for being able to maintain a theory of imputation in those acts that are held to be under the maxim of this propensity to moral evil. Kant indicates that the propensity to evil exists in three degrees: 1. A fragility (Gebrechlichkeit, fragilitas) that involves weakness in the following of good maxims that are effectively adopted, but over which the inclination nonetheless imposes itself: Kant’s example is the wellknown passage of the apostle Paul.51 Behind this degree of propensity to evil there is the well-known philosophical issue of akrasía, which for Kant means that the moral incentive presents itself as being weaker than the inclination.52 Further, in the light of the definitions of virtue that we have analyzed, there is an overlap, when one speaks of the relationship with concrete ends, with the mere lack of virtue (Untugend), understood as weakness. This lack of virtue is compatible in principle with a good will and with the possession of good maxims for action; nevertheless, this same lack of moral strength is an expression of freedom, and therefore is imputable.53 In addition, this weakness predisposes the person to self-deception and can, therefore, become a qualified evil. At the level of the Gesinnung, which is what Kant is discussing in the text of Religion, this level is no longer characterized as a mere lack of virtue, but rather as the first among the degrees of radical evil, for the reasons adduced earlier.

clinations. Rather, it always has the propensity to do so in some sense, a propensity which cannot be eliminated, and therefore it is attributed to the “roots” of freedom. Cf. MICHALSON, Gordon E., Fallen Freedom. Kant on Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration, CUP, Cambridge, 1990, p. 52. 51 Cf. Romans 7:15. 52 Cf. RGV 29. This topic of akrasía in Kant is also treated in an initial way in GMS 413, and is emphatically reiterated in MdS 437. Broadie and Pybus, in an interesting article on this subject, demonstrate that the cases of moral weakness in Kant do not involve a failure of the moral law in the generation of respect. Instead, they imply a failure in the determination of the will by respect qua moral feeling, or alternatively and better, in the determination of the will qua executive instance. Cf. BROADIE, Alexander and PYBUS, Elizabeth M., “Kant and the Weakness of Will”, Kant-Studien, vol. 73, n. 4, 1982, pp. 406-412. 53 Cf. ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 169.

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2. A second degree of evil is that of impurity (Unlauterkeit, impuritas, improbitas), which consists in the mixture of moral and immoral motives. This mixture was reviled by Kant beginning in the GMS54 and discredited as a pedagogical strategy for moralization, at least in his moral theory posterior to the Vorlesungen. In this case the maxim of action can be morally acceptable, and following it can even involve a strong adhesion, but it fails in the demand that the moral law simpliciter be a sufficient motive for action, and therefore the morally good action is exposed to the contingency of material and circumstantial motivations. I will discuss further along how one of the imperfect duties to oneself, that of holiness, precisely confronts this impurity and demands the complete sufficiency of the moral motive. This demand of purity should not make one lose sight of the distinct motivational planes at which the action must be explained, as I have already shown in a prior chapter. Indeed, the duty of purity does not immediately eliminate the possibility of the overdetermination of moral action (the existence of other motives, with the moral motive being sufficient for action). Stated even better, the incorporation of the moral motive – qua second-order motive –within other motivations – of the first order – in which it is interiorized thus constitutes a deliberative field that is per se limited and preformed by morality.55 None of this contradicts the “purity” that Kant demands in the morally good action. 3. The third degree of the propensity to evil is that of malignity or evil (Bösartigkeit, vitiositas, pravitas) and consists in the adoption of evil maxims, in which the moral motivation is explicitly subordinated or postponed with respect to the grounds of non-moral determination: this is the case where the Gesinnung is corrupted. It is the case that virtue can be used against the first two levels of evil, on the basis of a fundamental disposition of a good soul, in order to forge character and purify our grounds of determination. However, in this third case there is instead a need for a revolution at the level of the Gesinnung. This does not, howevCf. GMS 390. Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, “Making Room for Character”, in Moral Literacy. I believe that Kant notes this virtuous “pre-formation” of the inclinations on the part of morality in Refl. 6619. 54 55

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er, contradict the fact that, in regard to what concerns us here, this revolution can only be encouraged by fighting in the terrain of the acquisition of virtue. For the moment, it is clear that it is the two first levels that the moral strength of virtue can respond directly to, and that this fortitude continues to be demanded even in the case of the third level of evil. With regard to these grades in the propensity to evil, I would like to emphasize that in all three degrees there is guilt (even if Kant indicates that only in the third is there dolus or perfidy)56 and that this guilt derives in good measure from the form in which these degrees of propensity affect the moral judgement. This point seems to me to be particularly important, because in the light of the fact that all moral evil implies the phenomenon of self-deception (evil is never desired for evil’s sake, since this would imply a demonic faculty of choice that is discounted by Kant himself),57 it is possible to appropriately interpret the indications in the Tugendlehre with regard to the duty of veracity to oneself and the characterization of the moral conscience. I will discuss this topic further on, when I deal with the aesthetic disposition of receptivity to duty and to the duty of self-knowledge.58 It is for this reason, as I will seek to defend in the corresponding section, that Kant points to lying as being a violation of the duty to oneself, insofar as the maxim of deceit tends to become interiorized and ends up promoting that self-deception that always accompanies moral evil as such. I will also show, when I comment on MdS 431, that it is for this reason that the propensity to self-deception is also associated with the propensity to evil by way of biblical references. In addition, as M. Gregor59 indicates, it is only because of this self-deCf. RGV 30. Cf. RGV 35. 58 Dulce María Granja explains with great clarity that radical evil involves a subtle mechanism of self-deception, insofar as the agent considers him or herself to be an exception to the moral law. Granja relates this, as I will also do in the following sections, with the kantian demand for self-knowledge. Cf. GRANJA, Dulce María, “Mal radical y progreso moral: ¿conceptos incompatibles en la teoría kantiana de la acción?” in Filosofía de la acción, p. 379. 59 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 154. 56 57

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ception that the moral conscience and the moral law that confronts us are silenced by self-love, which is sufficient for the human being’s letting him or herself be controlled by the inclinations.60 Beginning with the first degree of moral evil, the weakness of the will, there exists a certain self-deception, as Broadie and Pybus have emphasized: in the face of our moral position, we tend to present the maxim of our action to ourselves as an exception, or else as if our motive itself were acceptable to the moral judgement.61 Impurity in moral motivation is equally deceptive, because we can even feel a false moral satisfaction for performing actions that are in conformity with duty but which were not performed strictly aus Pflicht and therefore lack authentic moral value. Even in malignity, as the most extreme degree of evil possible for humans, there exists a component of self-deception, insofar as the agent considers the generation of morally condemnable maxims to be good, which, says Allison, is the tribute that even the worst of vices pays to virtue. This is why even in extreme cases of corrupted character a good will and a moral battle by means of virtue can still be demanded.62 The kantian proposal concerning virtue is, therefore, also an ideal of self-transparency: moral strength presupposes, prior to anything else, that one have the strength to not deceive oneself in regard to one’s own grounds of determination, and to also not believe oneself to be justified.63 The kantian theory of imputation64 demands that the propensity itself, which precedes all and any act, be itself an act. It is through freedom that the faculty of choice admits a supreme maxim that subordina-

60 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 155 and RGV 30 and 38. 61 Cf. BROADIE, Alexander and PYBUS, Elizabeth M., “Kant on the Weakness of Will”, p. 411. 62 Cf. ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, pp. 159-160. Grenberg also comments on the self-obscuring character of moral evil; cf. GRENBERG, Jeanine, “What is the Enemy of Virtue”, p. 162. 63 Cf. RGV 76. 64 In order to trace the evolution of this point within kantian thought, cf. VzM 288298.

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nates the sensible inclinations to the law or vice versa. If one admits the evil maxim that conditions the moral law, the resulting act is a peccatum originarium,65 and it is through this maxim that concrete evil acts are performed: i.e. vice or peccatum derivativum.66 This original propensity cannot be extirpated, and therefore is radical, atemporal and intelligible, persisting at least as a possibility, contingent but innate,67 conceived of as contracted and therefore culpable. Furthermore, it is natural, but in a sense in which it is not opposed to freedom, but rather as subjective conditioning factor of the exercise of this freedom.68 It is in this context that vice, understood as a phenomenon, can be defeated by virtue. The ground of radical evil is not attributed to the sensibility of the human being or to his or her natural inclinations; this is why Kant does not fall into contradiction with his proposal that our diverse dispositions (Anlagen) are good in themselves.69 Religion reiterates that the inclinations have no per se relationship with evil. The principal argument for this point is that, since these inclinations are connatural, if they were the explanation for evil, evil would not be imputable. Nor is the lawgiving reason the cause of moral corruption, since this would make the human being into a diabolic being, who would act in an evil way for the sake of evil itself. As I have already pointed out, Kant rejects this possibility because it would imply the complete sterility of the moral law in our

Michalson has emphasized that Kant, by using the expression peccatum originarium, is relating his theory of moral evil with the biblical narrative and Christian tradition, even though Enlightenment thinkers like Diderot and Rousseau had rejected them. Michalson also insists that Kant’s position regarding evil is fundamentally Augustinian. Cf. MICHALSON, Gordon E., Fallen Freedom. Kant on Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration, p. 16. 66 RGV 31. 67 The combination of these two traits is probably the most complex of all those in the series of paradoxes concerning moral evil. Cf. MICHALSON, Gordon E., Fallen Freedom. Kant on Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration, p. 31. 68 Cf. MICHALSON, Gordon E., Fallen Freedom. Kant on Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration, p. 62. 69 For a comparison with the description of these same Anlagen in other texts of the kantian corpus, cf. MUNZEL G. Felicitas, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character. The Critical Link of Morality, Anthropology and Reflective Judgement, p. 111. 65

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action.70 Even the person who is evil at the level of Bösartigkeit, who completely subordinates the moral incentive to inclination, avoids choosing evil for its own sake. Therefore, I reiterate that just as with evil persons located at the lesser degrees of malignity, those who suffer Bösartigkeit deceive themselves: they hold themselves to be justified. The only a priori explanation that Kant can offer regarding the propensity to evil (inaccessible to experience, and which confirms the Faktum of evil but not its ground) is the tendency to incorporate the impulse of sensibility in our maxims (which is not demanded by the sensibility itself, understood in the abstract). This impulse presents itself as a possible sufficient motive for rational agency, and therefore conditioning and subordinating the moral ground of determination, because of the weakness of human nature.71 Thus, we again are brought back to the kantian theory of action and of rational motivation in order to ground radical evil in the ever-present possibility of subordinating moral law to sensible impulse. The propensity to evil is precisely a propensity to invert the hierarchy of rational motivations, which, qua possibility, cannot be eliminated, but can be overcome via the freedom that virtue offers. Virtue –here, once again, understood as Tugendverpflichtung– is the correct adjustment of the Gesinnung to the law of duty.72 Virtue, in turn, is the firm purpose of acting aus Pflicht when it becomes a readiness or facility for such action (Fertigkeit).73 Virtue is, then, ability for recuperating the purity of the ground of determination of action: having a virtuous character means that the law is a sufficient motive for the faculty of choice, with the person embarked on a road of infinite progress that presupposes the progressive “sanctification of the maxims”, as I will discuss in a moment. Kant holds that for the human being regeneration is always possible, even for the person who has most strongly absorbed evil maxims and self-deception into his or 70 Cf. RGV 30 and 35-37. Cf. on this issue ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 150 and CARD, Claudia, “Kant’s Moral Excluded Middle”, in Kant’s Anatomy of Evil (Anderson-Gold, S. and Muchnik, P., eds.), CUP, Cambridge – New York, 2010, p. 76. 71 Cf. MICHALSON, Gordon E., Fallen Freedom. Kant on Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration, p. 30. 72 Cf. RGV 192. 73 Cf. RGV 48.

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her character. For instance, certain passages of Religion demand a “revolution” of the heart74 and appear to even suggest the necessity of divine grace for this to take place,75 but with regard to the human being qua rational agent the only thing that is appropriate is to offer the resistance of virtue. However, there still remains the possibility that what for us –at the level of the faculty of choice and the concrete maxims of action– is a progressive struggle for virtue may be seen at the intelligible level of the Gesinnung as in fact a revolution of the heart.76 In sum: Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason does not offer a fully sufficient etiological explanation of the possibility of moral evil,77 and I suspect that this can be explained by the very delimitation suggested by its title. In any case, moral evil is consistent with the unknowable aspect of human freedom itself.78 His text limits itself to a few 74 Regarding this “revolution” understood as conversion or rebirth, cf. MICHALSON, Gordon E., “Kant, the Bible and the Recovery from Radical Evil”, in Kant’s Anatomy of Evil, pp. 57-73. 75 Cf. RGV 75. In this regard, the reader can also consult VzM 252, 294, 309, 349350. Kant has been strongly criticized concerning the issue of grace (e.g. by Barth and by Michalson) and has been classified as Pelagian, even though his posture in this regard is fundamentally orthodox and indeed even closer to Catholicism than to Lutheranism, as demonstrated by the excellent and convincing article by MARIÑA, Jacqueline, “Kant on Grace. A Reply to his Critics”, Religious Studies, vol. 33, 1997, pp. 379-400. 76 Cf. MICHALSON, Gordon E., Fallen Freedom. Kant on Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration, p. 110. Michalson also emphasizes that, by insisting on the always-present possibility of moral regeneration, Kant is taking Erasmus’ side against Luther in the discussions amongst reformers on fallen human nature; cf. p. 75. 77 Hence, some of the criticisms directed at Kant’s position are completely off base, insofar as they suppose that he is attempting to give a complete explanation of evil. On this point, cf. LOUDEN, Robert B., “Evil Everywhere. The Ordinariness of Kantian Radical Evil”, in Kant’s Anatomy of Evil, pp. 93-115. 78 Cf. GMS 459 ff. The relative ambiguity of Kant when he discusses the etiological explanation of evil has given rise to an interesting debate amongst his commentators. H. Allison, for example, holds that on the basis of certain kantian passages, the ultimate reason for radical evil is our finiteness, with the result that the confirmation of the existence of evil is synthetic a priori. This would explain, according to Allison, how it is that our Gesinnung cannot be either holy or perfect, but only virtuous: negating evil would be like negating finitude itself, and would therefore be equivalent to the “moral fanaticism” criticized in KpV 84 and 86. Cf. ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 155. Allen Wood, on the other hand, holds out for an explanation of radical evil in which a crucial

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points, in particular confirming this evil as being a matter of fact, but also as being contingent and therefore imputable. Kant also negates its attribution to the sensibility or to the natural constitution of human beings, and instead attributes it to an intriguing propensity to disturb the hierarchy of the grounds of determination of rational action. This is sufficient for Kant to be able to explain the necessity, at least at the level of the first two degree of evil and the virtus phaenomenon, of a fortitude, of a readiness to resist and to struggle morally against this interior enemy: that is, the necessity of virtue understood as it has been defined in the Tugendlehre. 3.2.2 The virtuous Gesinnung as necessary condition In earlier chapters I have already introduced the topic of the Gesinnung or fundamental disposition of the soul.79 The kantian theory of action, articrole is played by “sociable unsociability” (an expression that I will discuss later and which appears in IGA 20): it is competition and interpersonal conflicts that would, in the final analysis, explain the possibility of moral evil. A point in favor of Wood’s argument is that, as I will discuss when looking at the system of virtues and their corresponding vices in the MdS, the vices that are most reviled by Kant are precisely those which are linked to rejoicing in the evil that befalls others, envying others, etc. Cf. WOOD, Allen, Kant’s Ethical Thought, and “Kant and the Intelligibility of Evil”, in Kant’s Anatomy of Evil, Jeanine Grenberg, in an interesting study on this issue, proposes that both perspectives can be unified; cf. GRENBERG, Jeanine, Kant and the Ethics of Humility. A Story of Dependence, Corruption, and Virtue, pp. 31-42 and above all, for a discussion of this particular issue, see RGV 93ff. Another attempt to reconcile both postures can be found in MUCHNIK, Pablo, “An Alternative Proof of the Universal Propensity to Evil”, in Kant’s Anatomy of Evil. 79 There are those who translate the term Gesinnung as “intention” (Spanish “intención”; this is what García Morente does, who also oscillates between the expressions “moral sense”, “moral disposition of the soul” and “moral sentiment”) or else as “humor” (Aranguren; in Spanish, “talante”). Others (cf. BILBENY, Norbert, Kant y el tribunal de la conciencia, Gedisa, Barcelona, 1994, p. 114 and p. 115) propose the translation of “moral attitude”, in order to emphasize that it is not a matter of a concrete intention but rather of a stable moral disposition that is not limited to a determined object. It is because of the difficulty of encountering a precise translation that I have been simply using the original German term. On the problems with translating Gesinnung into English, the reader can consult MUNZEL, G. Felicitas, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character. The Critical Link of Morality, Anthropology and Reflective Judgement, pp. xvi-xvii. Maria Schwartz, who, as I

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ulated via maxims, demands a decision, and therefore a maxim that is supreme (oberste Maxime) in terms of generality, and fundamental in terms of the orientation towards good or towards evil: the subordination of the sensible impulses to the moral law or vice versa.80 This maxim is, therefore, that of the Gesinnung, understood as an action, as a fundamental option and as the supremely general limit for the theory of action that makes the maxims into the “semantic unit” of the intelligibility of rational action.81 This particular act is treated in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, and this text’s understanding of it is presupposed in the characterization of virtue that Kant offers in the Metaphysics of Morals. In Religion Kant establishes that the fundamental decision that defines a Gesinnung is unique and refers to the use of freedom considered in a globalized, total manner. Since this decision is presupposed in all concrete and particular acts, it must be conceived of as atemporal; nevertheless, as I have emphasized, it is still considered to be a free act and therefore is imputable. As in the case of the issue of radical evil, with which it is intimately linked (since it is by radical evil that our Gesinnung can be corrupted, such that we consider ourselves exceptions to the moral law, or we justify giving priority to our sensible impulses), we once again come up against the limits of the comprehensibility of freedom ithave already discussed, provides an understanding of the Gesinnung as a maxim via a detailed structuring of the diverse levels of generality that maxims can possess, notes that in certain passages (GMS 435, KpV 56, RGV 23 and 37), Gesinnung is used as practically equivalent to Maxime. This is despite the fact that in reality it should refer only to the most general maxims, which are proper to the existenzielle Wende that the kantian theory of action undergoes in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Cf. SCHWARTZ, Maria, Der Begriff der Maxime bei Kant. Eine Untersuchung des Maximenbegriffs in Kants praktischer Philosophie, pp. 129ff. 80 In GMS 400 there is an example of this supremely general maxim, in this case with a corrupt Gesinnung: the maxim of always following one’s own inclinations. In MdS 392, on the other hand, Kant speaks of the maxim of always following the law. RGV 31 explains that in this fundamental decision one sees reflected the complete moral structure of each agent. 81 For a deeper discussion of these supreme maxims, and why there are only two options for a maxim for the fundamental disposition of the soul, cf. TIMMERMANN, Jens, Sittengesetz und Freiheit. Untersuchungen zu Immanuel Kants Theorie des freien Willens, p. 153. Timmermann suggests (n. 3) that Kant has postulated this thesis of the only two possible supreme maxims for human behavior beginning with KrV A 850 B 878.

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self: we cannot know the ground of this disposition of the soul nor can we explain it or derive it from any act that takes place in time. This is why this Gesinnung can be considered to be “natural” for the human being, even though in fact it forms part of the kingdom of freedom, and is even, in a certain way, fundamental and prior to anything that is decided in the realm of free actions.82 Allison notes that, just as with the distinction between will and faculty of choice that I have already examined, the issue of the Gesinnung is proper to the MdS and to Religion, and is one of the key points made in these later kantian works.83 In the continuum between the various degrees of generality of the maxims, this fundamental option’s maxim establishes a limit that is at once logical and a requirement of imputability. The Gesinnung is a disposition of the agent that underlies every particular decision and which is reflected in each of them. It could well be called “character”, provided that it is not confused with the empirical character forged over time via the virtus phaenomenon, Gesinning would in any case be intelligible character. This disposition, then, underlies every particular decision and is reflected in each of them. It is, therefore, the ultimate subjective ground of the choice of maxims.84 It cannot be denied that there is a certain tension between the simultaneous affirmations that this fundamental decision is freely assumed as the form of moral self-constitution, and that this Gesinnung is always already decided at the moment of acting (and it is in this sense that it is said to be atemporal). Allison suggests that the conflict or tension seems to occur between the free formation of character –in which Kant considers there to be the possibility of a kind of conversion, in addition to a demand for moral progress– and a kind of moral fatalism or a “fundamentally Sartrean project”.85 The Gesinnung involves a radical Denkungsart, i.e. the definition of intelligible character and of a fundamental way of thinking regarding the moral law that belongs to each agent individually. It is not, however, precisely a matter of a kind of aristotelian hexis, because it does not presuppose a modulation of affectivity, which for Kant Cf. RGV 31. Cf. ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, pp. 93ff. 84 Cf. RGV 25. 85 Cf. ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 139. 82 83

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is more proper to empirical character, which in turn forges a Sinnesart, a configuration of feeling. Nor is the Gesinnung a fundamental project along the lines of an existentialist posture, because, just as every act and object of choice, it is an effect of the Willkür, it therefore falls under the normativity of the law that is given to it by the Wille, i.e. practical reason itself. Neither can it be said to be a fatalistic determinism, because the relation between the maxim of the Gesinnung, the Lebensregeln under it and the concrete maxim of each particular action is a relation of logical subordination, not of causal predetermination. As Allison indicates, probably the best manner of understanding the Gesinnung is as a postulate of practical reason; that is, at the same time, the condition of the possibility of imputation and of a life that is conceived of through moral categories. Furthermore, it is the explanation of the possibility of evil and of the necessity and possibility of virtue.86 Nevertheless, it must be admitted that Kant’s thesis is obscure. It is at the halfway point between a systematic demand, a logical requirement, a reactualization of the bíos aíresis of the platonic myth of Er,87 and perhaps a particular version of the controversial theological issue of the fundamental option.88 The kantian idea of the Gesinnung is one of the most complex matters in the practical philosophy of the thinker of Königsberg. This is a limit issue, mixed up with the very mystery of freedom itself; as Sullivan notes, it follows that because the Gesinnung is a supreme maxim, it will be incomprehensible to a certain point. Explaining it would involve seeking a ground of decision that is prior to its very self, which would be contradictory.89 The conversion or revolution of heart that Kant holds is necessary for moral rehabilitation90 occurs precisely at the level of the Gesinnung qua fundamental disposition of the soul. On Cf. ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, pp. 142-144. Cf. Rep. X, 617d-619b. 88 In regard to this polemic, and about how one can understand and use the concept of a fundamental option in moral theology without incurring in the error of a theory of the sole fundamental option, the reader can consult NELLO FIGA, Antonio, Teorema de la opción fundamental. Bases para su adecuada utilización en teología moral, Editrice Pontificia Universitá Gregoriana, Roma, 1995. 89 Cf. SULLIVAN, Roger, An Introduction to Kant’s Ethics, p. 138. 90 Cf. RGV 47. 86 87

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the other hand, at the level of the lesser maxims contained in the Gesinnung, as I have discussed previously, what is required is the struggle of virtue.91 The most that can be said about this fundamental orientation of the Gesinnung is that it can be virtuous, if it gives priority to the law, vicious if it allows the egoistic stimulus to rule, and that it cannot be diabolic. Furthermore, the fundamental determination of the soul is always unknowable from the third person perspective, and always doubtful and with elements of opacity even from the first person point of view, a fact that should never be lost sight of in the exercise of moral judgement. This, as I will discuss, coincides with the fact that the moral conscience (Gewissen) judges the agent him or herself and the maxim as well –not the intentions of others. It is that which fundamentally accuses and punishes or absolves the agent, but does not reward him or her (at most, the agent will be conceded a kalte Billigung: a cold sense of approval), insofar as it is never possible to totally discount the hidden presence of some motivation of self-love in the taking on of the maxim in question. As I have already suggested, virtue is the path of moral progress, but not of the transformation of the fundamental disposition of the soul: in the words of Kant in Religion, the virtus phaenomenon that the empirical character forges is only a change in behaviors, not in the “heart”. The latter requires a conversion in the Gesinnung: a Gesinnungswandel. Despite being mysterious in its origins, it is always possible, since, as I have already mentioned, for Kant that which must be done can be done.92 It is not entirely clear what Religion allows us to discern regarding this moral conversion. In addition to its undeniable theological echoes, a conversion of this kind seems to admit the necessity of a certain participation of grace, as I have already mentioned.93 It thus appears to allude to a merely intelligible fact, to a particular atemporal act of the pure will. This Cf. ROULIER, Scott M., Kantian Virtue at the Intersection of Politics and Nature. The Value of Soul-Making, p. 4. 92 Cf. RGV 50 and SCHWARTZ, Maria, Der Begriff der Maxime bei Kant. Eine Untersuchung des Maximenbegriffs in Kants praktischer Philosophie, p. 135. 93 Although this point, of course, can be debated, as does SCHWARTZ, Maria, in Der Begriff der Maxime bei Kant. Eine Untersuchung des Maximenbegriffs in Kants praktischer Philosophie, p. 136. 91

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is not a question of a slow change, but of a transformation that Kant himself describes as a rebirth or a new creation. Although I will not go into any detail regarding this topic of a revolution in the fundamental disposition of the soul, I do wish to emphasize that this kantian vision of “moral conversion” does not at all involve a lessening of the value of virtue. Given that the Gesinnung is atemporal, our task in the face of this transcendental decision is, as Kant hastens to add in Religion,94 above all one of expelling evil via virtue. As a result it is not mere prudential selfcontrol, but is rather a principle of internal freedom, although it requires a particular Gesinnung that configures a manner of thinking –a Denkungsart– in which the elements of right moral judgement are fully assumed and interiorized. Later I will study the kantian critique of the viewpoints on virtue that see it as a mechanism or a becoming accustomed, and will investigate in which sense it can be admitted that virtue is a habit from the point of view of the philosopher from Königsberg. For the moment, what must be emphasized is that Kant denies that virtue responds to any mechanical process, precisely because it requires a tugendhafte Gesinnung. This virtuous disposition is above any and all processes of empirical conditioning and therefore forms part of the intelligible world, i.e. that realm where freedom originates.95 Only when behavior emanates from this Gesinnung in a freely chosen manner can it be imputable; only that strength which reflects the deep tugendhafte Gesinnung is authentic virtue. This, I believe, is clearly expressed in the following passage of the first section of the ethical doctrine concerning method in the Tugendlehre: “For man’s moral capacity would not be virtue were it not produced by the strength of his resolution in conflict with powerful opposing inclinations. Virtue is the product of pure practical reason insofar as it gains ascendancy over such inclinations with consciousness of its supremacy (based on freedom)”.96 Cf. RGV 190n. I will discuss later how this kantian idea that virtue can only be such insofar as it is informed by the correct Gesinnung, i.e. the one that prioritizes the moral law, leads him to critique Aristotle’s notion of habit, which Kant sees as a mere mechanical habituation. 96 MdS 477. 94 95

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There is much that can be said about the kantian ideas that, having been set out in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, underlie the position taken in the Doctrine of Virtue. However, I will stop here regarding this point in order to return to the text of the MdS, and will focus on the conditions that Kant establishes, at the aesthetic level, for the acquisition of virtue. 3.3 The aesthetic prenotions of the receptivity of duty In my opinion, we are entering into the most important of all the topics discussed in the Introduction specifically dedicated by Kant to the Doctrine of Virtue. This section requires certain conceptual clarifications concerning the title itself: “aesthetic prenotions concerning the receptivity of the soul to the concepts of duty in general” (Ästhethische Vorbegriffe der Empfänglichkeit des Gemüts für Pflichtbegriffe überhaupt). Kant speaks here of “pre-notions” or “pre-concepts” (Vorbegriffe) in the sense of prior requirements for the subjective reception of duty.97 But one could also speak of “preconditions” for the receptivity of duty. It is not a case, then, of the moral principle understood objectively (which the GMS has already discussed, as does the KpV, in a way that is closer to what I am discussing now, due to its consideration of the feeling of respect). Rather, the issue concerns the conditions that make human beings able to recognize this moral principle and act in consonance with it. The character of these requirements or presuppositions for the apprehension of our duties is clarified both by reference to the aesthetic (ästhethisch) sphere as well as by reference to the receptivity (Empfänglichkeit).98 The meaning of the first term is clarified through the coincidence 97 Ina Goy, in “Virtue and Sensibility”, in Kant’s Tugendlehre: a Comprehensive Commentary, p. 186, suggests that by saying that these prenotions are aesthetic one makes it redundant to say that they are prenotions. Her alternative hypothesis is that Kant is referring instead, with the term Vorbegriffe, to the fact that they are preparatory issues to a doctrine of virtue. I believe that it can be shown that they are pre-concepts or pre-notions in both senses. 98 Hutter emphasizes, referring to ApH 140, that the term Empfänglichkeit in Kant always implies a receptive dimension, while the term for faculty, Vermögen, is gram-

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of both: “aesthetic” alludes to that which has to do with the receptivity of our soul (Gemüt).99 matically related to activity (because of its relationship with mögen, [in the sense of “may” or “might be”]). The aesthetic predispositions are not faculties, because they are principally receptive and because they are not subject to the faculty of choice of the agent. Cf. HUTTER, Axel, Das Interesse der Vernunft. Kant ursprüngliche Einsicht und ihre Entfaltung in den traszendentalphilosophischen Hauptwerken, p. 100. ZÖLLER, Günter makes the same point in “Idee und Notwendigkeit einer Metaphysik der Sitten”, in Kant’s Tugendlehre. A Comprehensive Commentary, p. 29. Having mentioned this terminological clarification on Hutter’s part, I would like to note that Kant is not strict in his use of terminology, and there are moments when he speaks of passive faculties while using terms relating to the active ones. For instance, the sensibility is sometimes indicated as being a Fähigkeit, for example in KrV A19, B33: “Die Fähigkeit (Rezeptivität) Vorstellungen durch die Art, wie wir von Gegenständen affiziert werden, zu bekommen, heißt Sinnlichkeit”; in other contexts, however, he alludes to it as a Vermögen. 99 It is in this same sense, in fact, that he uses the term in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the KrV, where he describes the conditions of possibility of sensible perception (space and time as pure forms of the sensibility). Nonetheless, it should not be understood as being reducible to sensation, but rather to the subjective sensibility and receptivity in general. Nor should one fall into a misunderstanding about KU, a work where it is easy to think that the aesthetic refers only to the realm of natural and artistic beauty, because in reality it refers to the receptive-subjective aspect of the capacity of judgement, i.e., to feeling (Gefühl) in a full sense. As Wieland has emphasized, Kant’s use of the term “aesthetic” should not be confused with a supposed science or systematic study of the beautiful –which Kant’s own thought shows to be impossible, given the lack of concepts in the judgement of taste. Nor should it be reduced to a doctrine of sensation, but rather it refers in a broad way –and in accordance with its original etymology, aisthesis– to sensibility, including the area of feeling or sentiment. He gives the example of the judgement of taste and of beauty, because this is where the link between this realm of feeling and that of the faculty of judgement (Urteilskraft) is most clearly seen. In the case of the judgement of taste, given the lack of concepts, the a priori emotional aspect is more evident, insofar as the sentiment is generated by a modification of the subject him or herself, as being fully subjective. In fact, the object only functions in the manner of a “trigger” in order to unchain the free play of faculties that characterizes this evaluative experience of beauty. This is, indeed, the experience of a reflexive contribution of the judgement, an effect of the reflecting judgement connected with some external empirical object but not determined by it, but rather accompanied by a corresponding Gefühl, more notorious due to the lack of a corresponding concept. Nor is it a question here of a sentiment that is determined by the empirical, but rather of a receptivity generated by the moral law itself within our soul. By means of this receptivity the law is effective in confronting and motivating the soul, from the point of view of the human being as a being that does not move on the basis of mere abstract reasons. Rather, the person always

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One might think that the necessity of these aesthetic preconditions involves a concession, on Kant’s part, to empiricism. But, as Barbara Herman insists, this objection involves a confusion: what critical ethics defends is the non-empirical character of the moral law in regard to its authority, not in regard to its efficacy.100 As a result, these prenotions are not in any way contradictory to what is proper to kantian ethics. And this is also why Kant, in emphasizing the reflexive element of the aesthetic predispositions for the receptivity of duty, notes that “consciousness of them is not of empirical origin; it can, instead, only follow from consciousness of a moral law, as the effect this has on the mind”.101 This clarification seems to me to be very relevant: in function of the perspective from which they are contemplated, these predispositions can be seen as natural (in the sense of always being given a priori, and contained within the concept of human nature). In addition, they can be seen as the subjective aspect that makes metaphysical experience possible –the insertion of the intelligible into the phenomenal. This is what is presupposed by the Faktum of reason, insofar as it is precisely through these predispositions that morality presents itself to the subject and allows him or her to know freedom. As a result, the aesthetic predispositions for the receptivity of duty represent a nodal point in Kant’s overall philosophy: a junction between nature and freedom. Baxley also makes a similar point when he notes that in the aesthetic prenotions it is impossible to separate reason and sensibility, and proposes to understand them as sui generis volitional tendencies.102 Thus, Kant can define these “prenotions” as “predispositions (praedispositio) of the soul, aesthetic but naturally affected by the concepts of duty”.103 I reiterate that it is worth emphasizing this recognition on Kant’s part of the “natural” character of these dispositions. If, as I discussed in finds his or her action linked to the sphere of emotivity. Cf. WIELAND, Wolfgang, Urteil und Gefühl: Kants Theorie der Urteilskraft, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2001, p. 39. 100 Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Moral Literacy, p. 11. 101 MdS 399. 102 Cf. BAXLEY, Anne Margaret, Kant’s Theory of Virtue. The Value of Autocracy, p. 146. I find, however, the expression “volitional tendencies” to be a bit vague. 103 MdS 399.

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the previous chapter, the Gesinnung is the most general maxim in the realm of freedom, and the systematic demands of the kantian theory of action require that he interpret it as an atemporal and fundamental decision, we find ourselves then at the other extreme of the spectrum of Kant’s thought: at the quasi-naturalizing extreme. This shows us that the philosopher from Königsberg (just as other great moral philosophers have done, e.g. as Aristotle did with his recourse to natural virtues)104 recognizes the necessity for a series of natural conditions, universal and always pre-given to the moral agent. Furthermore, in principle these conditions can be presupposed to be indispensable elements that make moral judgement possible. They are, therefore, natural dispositions in regard to their possession, but the consciousness of them is reflexive, as shown by the above passage, and is present when the moral law confronts them. They thus simultaneously constitute the subjective flip side to the fact of reason itself (understood as what is done by the reason).105 There is, therefore, no duty to acquire them (since this would generate a regression ad infinitum in Kant’s argument: how could the duty to acquire them be recognized, if it is through them that duty is recognized?), given that we rely on them “naturally”. However, within the framework of free and therefore of imputable action, there is a duty to cultivate them, to form them and foster their effectiveness: “There is no obligation to have these because they lie at the basis of morality as subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty, 104 For this comparison, cf. PÉREZ QUINTANA, Antonio, “Una disposición natural al bien”, in Ética y antropología. Un dilema kantiano (Roberto Aramayo and Faustino Oncina, eds.), p. 95. 105 Concerning the Faktum of reason, cf. KpV 31, 42, 43, 47, 55, 91, 104; cf. also BECK, Lewis White, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, p. 166. I will not delve into the issue of the Faktum in any great depth, but I note that I consider it to be possible in two senses: as a datum absolutum –insofar as it is real– and also in the sense of a genitivus explicativus: as product of the activity of reason itself. Concerning this and its relationship with the topics dealt with in this book, cf. WIMMER, Reiner, “Homo noumenon: Kants Praktisch-Moralische Anhtropologie”, in Kant’s Metaphysik und Religionsphilosophie (Norbert Fischer, Hg.), Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 2004, pp. 347-390 and also TIMMERMANN, Jens, Sittengesetz und Freiheit. Untersuchungen zu Immanuel Kants Theorie des freien Willens, p. 38.

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not as objective conditions of morality. (…) To have these predispositions cannot be considered a duty; rather, every man has them and it is by virtue of them that he can be put under obligation”.106 Once again, it seems to me to be tremendously suggestive that Kant would recognize this natural element, subject to reflexive elaboration, in the material, diachronic and effective aspect of his ethics. Kant is recognizing here that, for the finite being that is the human person, the realm of emotion, of receptivity, and even in a way that of vulnerability, cannot be sidestepped in moral considerations. Even if it seems to me that this should have clear beginning with the treatment of the feeling of respect in the KpV, it is the Tugendlehre that most clearly and frankly deals with the issue, precisely by way of these aesthetic predispositions for the receptivity of duty. It is also clear from these passages that, as Paul Guyer has stated, the Metaphysics of Morals offers an inquiry into what we call today the “psychological” aspect of the ethics of duty.107 These pre-ethical capacities, which are always present a priori in the moral agent, in some way cover this issue in Kant’s ethical framework. As a result, his explanation about the possession of these capacities is not transcendental, but rather is natural and perhaps even psychological, although the capacities themselves permit a transcenddental approach to the practical realm. Therefore I also would like to reiterate that having these predispositions makes possible the living-out of the Faktum of the practical reason referred to in the KpV. Because they are receptive to the moral law, they have a transcendental facet that makes it possible to insert the plane of the intelligible –that of the horizon of meaning– into the plane of natural causality.108 It seems to me that, in the light of these passages the discussion about whether Kant believes in the importance of feeling as an evaluative element in moral judgement can be considered to be resolved, an MdS 399. Cf. GUYER, Paul, Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality, CUP, Cambridge – New York, 1996, p. 365. 108 Cf. VIGO, Alejandro G., “Handlung als Kausal- und Sinnzusammenhang. Programmatische Überlegungen zu Kant”, promanuscriptum. 106 107

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in a more forceful way than can be attained in the frequent discussions concerning the possible overdetermination of the maxims109 or the supposed coldness in the moral examples that Kant offers in the GMS. The answer is clearly positive: feeling does not determine the objective morality of actions, but does constitute the subjective possibility of the apprehension of the moral principles and of their effectiveness in the motivation of acts. I return now to what is most closely related to this study of the Tugendlehre: the fact that these aesthetic prenotions can be cultivated. In fact, it is a duty to cultivate them, and as a result these predispositions make up the condition of possibility for speaking of formation of character in kantian ethics, i.e. of an intellectual process voluntarily directed to molding the temperamental and affective dispositions from the position of freedom. A free moral character –not referring now to the transcendental level of the Gesinnung, but rather to the practical character that Kant proposes in the Anthropology– is formed by way of the acquisition of virtues, and thus permits the progressive, diachronic and formative aspects of Kant’s ethics to come to the fore. As a result, his ethics can only be accused of formalism, atemporality and vacuity from a very partial and incorrect perspective. The formation of character is compatible with the perspective of an ethics of maxims because it permits a kind of “moral jurisprudence”. This is due, as I have already noted, to their diverse degrees of generality and due to the force with which the person gives assent to the most general maxims that are in accordance with the moral law. In turn, when this jurisprudence affects the aesthetic preconditions of the subject in a stable way, it gives rise to virtue and a well-formed character. In return, it will be from this character that the maxims of action em109 In fact, I believe – as does GRENBERG, Jeanine, Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption, and Virtue, p. 95 – that the discussions on the possible overdetermination of the maxims of action in Kant can be seen to be superfluous in the face of the theory of virtue that he presents in the Tugendlehre. Once virtue has been assumed, it no longer makes sense to discuss whether in the moral maxim one can add an affective motivation to the strictly rational motivation that functions as the Bestimmungsgrund of moral action. This is because virtue already presupposes that reason has become internalized and assumed into the affect in the character of the virtuous person, and therefore in the person him or herself. Concerning this overdetermination, the reader can also consult HERMAN, Barbara, The Practice of Moral Judgement, chap. I.

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anate (and it is for this reason, as I will show, that the duty of selfknowledge demands reflection and critical self-distance not only regarding one’s own actions but also concerning one’s own character).110 It also seems to me that, with his treatment of these aesthetic prenotions, Kant is offering what some commentators have seen as being necessary so that the categorical imperative can function adequately as a principle of moral deliberation. For this purpose, the maxims to be evaluated by the imperative must be adequately formulated, and this presupposes certain capacities for identifying aspects and rules that have moral relevance (what Herman calls rules of moral salience).111 As I will show, Kant offers a commentary regarding these capacities at precisely this point of the Tugendlehre. In his analysis they divide into the following types: moral feeling (moralisches Gefühl), the moral conscience (Gewissen), love for other people (Liebe des Nächsten) and respect for oneself or selfesteem (Achtung für sich selbst – Selbstschätzung). I will deal with each of these in a brief fashion, with the exception of the moral conscience, which requires a somewhat broader treatment. 3.3.1 Moral feeling The reflexive character of this disposition becomes clear from the very first lines with which Kant describes it: he describes it as a natural capacity for receptivity, but whose alteration follows on the moral law 110 This topic is handled with great clarity in GRENBERG, Jeanine, Kant and the Ethics of Humility. A Story of Dependence, Corruption, and Virtue, p. 98. 111 Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, The Practice of Moral Judgement, chap. IV. Ana Marta González also emphasizes that these rules of “moral relevance” correspond with the aesthetic prenotions for the receptivity of duty; cf. GONZÁLEZ, Ana Marta, Culture as Mediation. Kant on Nature, Culture and Morality, p. 280. The same point is suggested in TORRALBA, José María, “La teoría kantiana de la acción. De la noción de máxima como regla autoimpuesta a la descripción de la acción”, pp. 17-61. For his part, LOUDEN, Robert B., Kants Impure Ethics, p. 22, also alludes to the presuppositions noted by Herman, and emphasizes that their use presupposes knowledge that constitutes normative meaning about the world and about the human being. I have already discussed the need for these kinds of empirical knowledge. For a nuanced critique of the “rules of moral salience” proposed by Herman, cf. FRIERSON, Patrick, “Kantian Moral Pessimism”, in Kant’s Anatomy of Evil, pp. 33-56.

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and not vice versa. As a result, his treatment in the MdS can be seen to be fully in continuity with what was stated in earlier moral works and with his critical approach as a whole. Certain commentators have even stated that the respect (Achtung) of the Groundwork and of the Critique of Practical Reason112 corresponds with this moral feeling. However, in the concept of respect Kant sums up and synthesizes a complex effect of pleasure (due to the recognition of the intelligible world) and of pain (because of our instability and finitude in the face of this world). In the concept of moral feeling, as it is presented in the MdS, these two factors are analyzed separately and in relation to our affectivity in general.113 Cf. KpV 76, GMS 400. Cf. GUYER, Paul, Kant and the Experience of Freedom. Essays on Aesthetics and Morality, p. 358. The analysis and explanation that Kant provides of moral feeling in the MdS, when he could have passed it over as having been covered in the KpV, can be explained as stemming from Schiller’s famous critique, to which Kant would be responding in the Doctrine of Virtue. This would then serve as justification for his detailed discussion of the moralisches Gefühl. This is the suggestion Mary Gregor makes, in her introduction to the edition of Bernd Ludwig, p. xxxiv, n. 5. Timmermann agrees that Kant’s treatment of moral feeling in the Tugendlehre is broader than that of the Achtung für Sittengesetz in the rest of his moral works, because in the passage from the MdS he includes an approach to the presence of pleasure or displeasure due to the possession of virtue or its lack (cf. TIMMERMANN, Jens, Sittengesetz und Freiheit. Untersuchungen zu Immanuel Kants Theorie des freien Willens, p. 190, n. 3). Similarly, L. W. Beck recognizes that the treatment in the MdS is clearer: although the discussions of respect in the KpV and the MdS are perfectly consistent among themselves, there is an emphasis on receptivity –Empfänglichkeit– as potentiality, as opposed to the state of consciousness in act when a person is interrogated by the moral law. Beck also notes that Kant seems to call it respect (Achtung) when what he wants to emphasize is the effect it has in humbling egoism, and he calls it moral feeling (moralisches Gefühl) instead when he wants to highlight its positive side and its capacity for fulfilling the moral law. (Cf. BECK, Lewis White A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 222-224). Other authors, such as the French hermeneutical philosopher Paul Ricoeur, have focused on this passage, emphasizing that in it Kant does justice to the receptive-sensible aspect of respect as a motive in human conduct, although Ricoeur reproaches Kant for not having made sufficient use of this recognition (cf. RICOEUR, Paul, Finitud y culpabilidad, Taurus, Madrid, 1982, pp. 96-97). Other authors have replied that Kant does in fact do justice to this aspect of a theory of motivation, e.g. PÉREZ QUINTANA, Antonio, “Una disposición natural al bien”, p. 120. Cf. finally GUYER, Paul, “Moral feelings in the Metaphysics of Morals”, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, p. 138, where he investigates deeply the more developed moral psychology offered in the Tugendlehre as opposed to what is present in earlier works. One of the 112 113

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This sense of respect, qua feeling, alludes to an affection that is offered precisely in terms of pleasure (Lust) or displeasure (Unlust). As the effect of a reflexive contribution, it is generated in the comparison between that which is mandated by the law and the maxim of the action itself, and therefore the comparison is ultimately with oneself: moral feeling is “the susceptibility to feel pleasure or displeasure merely from being aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the law of duty”.114 This capacity to be affected by the comparison between what is mandated by the law and the maxim of our action was already presupposed in Kant’s treatment of respect in the KpV, where he states that respect as a moral feeling is the law itself considered through its subjective aspect.115 However, in this earlier text he does not analyze it in the way that he will in the Doctrine of Virtue. Just as he remarks concerning the feeling of respect in the second Critique, in this case he will reiterate that it is a question of a feeling that does not provide grounding for moral evaluation, for nothing is permitted, prohibited or obligated simply because of the effect that it generates in human sensibility (for from Kant’s point of view, such an interpretation would consign the result of moral evaluation to the terrain of the contingent and the empirically affectable). Rather, the moral feeling follows on this evaluation and is determined by it. Kant therefore meets head-on the possible confusion between the empiricist proposal of a “moral feeling” –which would allow for distinguishing good from evil via a certain kind of perception that is not founded on a

reasons for this progress in Kant’s thought is that this moral feeling is integrated into a “phenomenological etiology of action” and placed in relation to the other aesthetic preconditions enumerated. 114 MdS 399. 115 Cf. KpV 76. Timmerman emphasizes that the problem with the feeling of respect is precisely that, qua feeling, it cannot be fostered by the faculty of choice alone. This is resolved by the aesthetic precondition that presupposes that all rational agents have the disposition towards respect originally within themselves in a natural manner. This in turn permits the cultivation and strengthening of respect, precisely via good actions, i.e. via virtue, in a to-and-fro or virtuous circle between the aesthetic precondition and the moral action itself. Cf. TIMMERMANN, Jens, Sittengesetz und Freiheit. Untersuchungen zu Immanuel Kants Theorie des freien Willens, pp. 193-199.

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previous judgement of reason– and his own admission of a moral feeling. He does it via a necessary terminological justification: “It is inappropriate to call this feeling (Gefühl) a moral sense (ein moralischer Sinn), for by the word “sense” is usually understood a theoretical capacity for perception directed toward an object, whereas moral feeling (like pleasure and displeasure in general) is something merely subjective, which yields no knowledge. (...) But we no more have a special sense for what is (morally) good and evil than for truth (…). We have, rather, a susceptibility on the part of free choice to be moved by pure practical reason (and its law), and this is what we call moral feeling”.116 Thus, one must speak of feeling because, as Kant makes clear in the KU, this feeling refers to an internal alteration of the subject itself, i.e. to an experience which is originated by a reflection in which the relations are revealed that exist between the faculties of the subject, and does not refer to the knowledge of an external object. Thus, moral feeling is susceptibility for the mandate of the law and is not a kind of intuition regarding evil and good that would function “behind” this law. 3.3.2 The moral conscience I have stated previously that in my opinion the section on the aesthetic prenotions for the receptivity of duty is the crucial point in the Specific Introduction to the Tugendlehre, and one of the most important issues raised in the MdS. At this point I will enter into a discussion of the most interesting and important of these prenotions: the moral conscience,117 as it is treated in the key passage for the development of a theory of the moral conscience (Gewissenslehre) in Kant. MdS 400. I will not pause here to distinguish between the moral conscience (Gewissen) from what we can call the “theoretical” conscience (Bewußtsein), which would require me to delve into both apperception –as the transcendental self-consciousness that can accompany all representations– as well as the empirical or psychological self-consciousness that is present in the following of the internal sense. This would take me too far from the objectives of the present work. Nevertheless, I encourage interested readers to consult BILBENY, Norbert, Kant y el tribunal de la conciencia, p. 25. 116 117

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This theory faces several difficulties. First off, Kant’s treatment of the conscience in the MdS is laconic, and he does not tease out its relation to the faculty of judgement as one would expect him to. Secondly, there is a need for certain terminological and conceptual clarifications that, when lacking, can generate serious confusions about what Kant has said (as happens where he affirms that there is no such thing as an erroneous conscience). And thirdly, above all, there is the problem that the notion of moral conscience in Kant has evolved in a specific manner, beginning in his precritical works and the Lectures on Ethics, continuing with what he writes in Religion, and culminating in the Doctrine of Virtue, where the issue receives its greatest concretion.118 I will not discuss the topic of the evolution of the notion of conscience in Kant in extenso; I will merely point out, by way of authors such as Norbert Bilbeny and Wilhelm Heubült, the relevance of one of the lectures on moral philosophy given between 1773 and 1777, as an antecedent to the treatment of conscience in the Tugendlehre. In this lecture, the conscience appears as an instinct (Instinkt) which passes judgement on the person him or herself according to moral laws.119 This might 118 As I will show in what follows, Kant had already discussed the conscience prior to the Tugendlehre; this corrects Allen Wood, who in “The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy” (p. 17) states that of the four subjective preconditions of receptivity for duty, respect is the only one which Kant had dealt with prior to the Metaphysics of Morals. In this sense, Esser’s treatment is better, as found in ESSER, Andrea M., “The Inner Court of Conscience, Moral Self-Knowledge and the Proper Object of Duty”, in Kant’s Tugendlehre. A Comprehensive Commentary, pp. 275-281, where the author goes over what Kant has said about the conscience in the rest of his corpus and compares it with his discussion of the issue in the Tugendlehre. I do not, however, agree with him regarding the idea that the role of conscience in kantian ethics is marginal, as I will show in what follows. In addition, there are certain Reflections that deal with the topic of the moral conscience. See, for example, 6584 (the Gewissen compares actions with the principles that should guide them), 6678 (where Kant speaks, in accordance with what he says in the Lectures, of conscience as a moral instinct, and the same goes for 6863 and 7181), 6815 (to have a conscience is to be sincere in the imputation of one’s own acts, and he gives the image of a tribunal where the conscience acts as the jury, the understanding is the lawgiver, the faculty of judgement is the accuser and the attorney, and reason is the judge), and 7167 (where he insists on distinguishing the reproaches of the moral conscience from the recriminations of wisdom, which can be just as bitter as the former). 119 VzM 97, 351, 353. In the same Lectures, he seems to also contemplate the characterization of the conscience as a Trieb or impulse, although with the clarification that it is

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seem very confusing, and could, via a radical misunderstanding, lead to turning Kant –at least the precritical Kant– into one more empiricist that would make moral judgement depend on a merely empirical condition. Nevertheless, as Paul Arthur Schilpp has correctly noted in his study on the precritical ethics of Kant, his treatment of the conscience as an instinct only means what I have already sketched out: that it is a matter of a pre-existing disposition that serves as a starting point for human beings. As a result, we can take it as a given that all human beings possess it, and that it is not a matter of something we can decide, but rather of something that we always encounter as being present prior to making any decision or moral evaluation.120 In response to the question of why, at the time when he wrote the Tugendlehre, Kant had forged the specific concept of the “aesthetic prenotions”, the answer is that he was seeking greater clarity in his discussion of the specificity of irreducible phenomena, such as the moral conscience.121 This “instinct” in the Lectures is already functioning as a tribunal or internal forum,122 and not merely in order to determine the morality of an

not an impulse that can be voluntarily exercised. Fichte would later speak expressly of the conscience as a moralischer Trieb and would radicalize Kant’s treatment of the conscience in various ways, to the point where he states that it is the demand of the conscience that forces us to believe in the reality of the world and other moral agents (for in Kant the reality of the external world does not count as a practical postulate of this type). In addition, Fichte would pass directly from the level of this conscience qua moral impulse to the level of Right and of the State in a different manner from that of Kant, who in this respect maintains the distinctions between the planes in a clearer fashion. All of this is discussed in VIGO, Alejandro G., “Conciencia moral y destinación del hombre. La radicalización de un motivo kantiano en el pensamiento de Fichte”, in In umbra intelligentiae: Estudios en homenaje al Prof. Juan Cruz Cruz (Ángel Luis González and María Idoya Zorroza, eds.), EUNSA, Pamplona, 2011, pp. 873- 894. 120 Cf. SCHILPP, Paul Arthur, La ética precrítica de Kant, p. 203. 121 This is why Anderson notes that it was only in the MdS, with the entirety of the conceptual apparatus that Kant had at hand in this work, that he could adequately develop his theory of the moral conscience; cf. ANDERSON, Georg, “Kants Metaphysik der Sitten – ihre Idee und ihr Verhältnis zur Ethik der Wolffschen Schule”, p. 60. 122 This is, of course, a paradigmatically kantian metaphor, which does not mean that he is confusing the plane of moral judgement with the legal plane –as certain of his critics

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action that has been performed or is to be performed. Rather, it serves to accuse and carry out a sentence, setting out guilty verdicts and demanding repentance and retribution to the degree that is possible. Thus, the conscience is not the law (which is given by the practical reason in its legislative purity, Wille), but is rather the tribunal in which the maxim of action is compared with that law. In fact, in judging actions according to their purity of intention, the conscience serves as “the divine tribunal in us” (göttlicher Gerichtshof in uns),123 from which we can never escape. I would like to emphasize here that there is a paradox concerning an instinct that could reach this relevance and that is characterized by terms that could suggest a supernatural grounding for the moral judgement, but which Kant does not in fact commit himself to. What is divine about the tribunal of the conscience is its irreducibility and its authority in the evaluation of the internal disposition, of the Gesinnung. It is not the case that it is the Divinity itself that is examining our disposition, but rather it is a matter of conceding a divine authority to this judgement, an issue I will return to when I discuss the “amphiboly of the moral concepts of reflection” in the MdS itself. I will not spend any more time on what Kant says between 1773 and 1777, nor can I enter into any more depth regarding the mentions of the conscience in the Critique of Pure Reason or in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason,124 or its apparent absence in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In regard to the mentions of the moral conscience in the Lectures, I will only emphasize that Kant has an interest in distinguishing the have asserted– either in this context or in that of the Critique of Pure Reason. Concerning the judicial metaphors in Kant, the reader can see WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 185. 123 Cf. VzM 296. Andreas Noordraven has indicated that this courtroom metaphor regarding the moral conscience is present in Baumgarten as well as in a number of stoic sources, and may even go back to greek tragedy. Cf. NOORDRAVEN, Andreas, Kants Moralische Ontologie. Historische Ursprung und systematische Bedeutung, trans. Kirstin Zeyer, Könighausen & Neuman, Würzburg, 2009, p. 270, n. 70. 124 I refer nonetheless to KpV 98, where Kant speaks of the conscience as of a marvelous capacity within us; to RGV 185, where he speaks of the orienting character of the conscience; and particularly to RGV 77 and 146n., where the same courtroom metaphor appears as is found in the MdS. See also Ped. 495. For a commentary on these passages, see MUNZEL, G. Felicitas, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character. The Critical Link of Morality, Anthropology and Reflective Judgement, p. 215.

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moral conscience, which is not a faculty, since we cannot exercise it at will, nor is it something accidental or external: this is why Kant explores the possibility of treating it as a natural instinct. In what follows I will show how he resolves this problem in his final position regarding Gewissen. In order to explain this mature posture and maintain, for methodological reasons, our discussion within the limits of what Kant writes in the Metaphysics of Morals, I turn to the striking definition that Kant provides in the corresponding section of the Doctrine of Virtue, and on which I will focus: “For conscience is practical reason holding man’s duty before him for his acquittal or condemnation in every case that comes under a law. Thus it is not directed to an object but merely to the subject (to affect moral feeling by its act), and so it is not something incumbent upon one, a duty, but rather an unavoidable fact”.125 The last sentence clarifies and consolidates again the traits of all of these aesthetic prenotions, which are particularly relevant in the case of the conscience. It is a question of natural capacities that are reflexive and transcendental in their exercise,126 and that cannot be demanded as duties because this would result in an infinite regress, given that they themselves are requirements for the subjective reception of duties. It also clarifies the relationship with the prenotions discussed previously: it is the judgement of the conscience, which accuses and condemns or absolves of responsability, that is received in the moral feeling as pleasure in the case of an absolution (Lossprechen) or as displeasure and repentance in the case of a condemning verdict (Verurteilen). This is what is specific-

MdS 400. It seems likely to me that it is because of this bivalence that Heübult chooses to distinguish two aspects of the moral conscience as Kant presents it in the Tugendlehre: there is a Gewissenanlage and a Gewissenfunktion insofar as there is a passive dispositional element (one cannot choose to listen to the conscience or not), and also an active function of the practical judgement. Cf. HEÜBULT, Willem, Die Gewissenslehre Kants in ihrer Endform von 1797. Eine Anthroponomie, Bouvier, 1980, and BILBENY, Norbert, Kant y el tribunal de la conciencia, p. 65, n. 155. 125 126

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ally practical for Kant regarding the Gewissen, which, although it is considered to be a kind of Bewußtsein,127 does not therefore lose its practicalexecutive and self-referential specificity. Gewissen is a type of Selbstbewußtsein that presents itself as though it were a courtroom128 and determines the moral feeling. In fact, as Paul Guyer suggests, it is probably because the conscience affects the moral feeling that it can be considered to be an aesthetic prenotion, since the other three elements of this group –the moral feeling itself, love for the other, respect for oneself– are properly feelings, but the conscience per se is not.129 It is its judgement that manifests itself to the moral feeling in terms of pleasure or displeasure. No rational being is exempt from this judgement of the conscience, and as a result Kant hastens to provide a necessary clarification: when one speaks of someone that lacks a moral conscience, what is being referred to is an agent that does not take the judgements of the conscience sufficiently into consideration, but not somebody who lacks it completely, in which case one could not demand that he or she have it.130 The first sentence of the quotation is perhaps the most relevant. The conscience is identified as one of the two senses of the practical rea-

Cf. MdS 438. It was this courtroom metaphor –and Kant’s assertion of a universal normativity– that Heidegger rejected when discussing the kantian notion of Gewissen, which seemed to him to trend towards reification, as explained in VIGO, Alejandro G., “Heidegger: Sein und Zeit 54-60. La atestiguación, en el modo de ser del Dasein, de un poder-ser propio y el estado de resuelto”, in Ser y tiempo de Martin Heidegger. Comentario introductorio a la obra (Luis César Santiesteban, ed.), ALDVS, México DF, 2013. pp. 325-426. For another commentary on the critique of Heidegger regarding the metaphor of the internal forum in Kant, the reader can consult WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 186. 129 Cf. GUYER, Paul, “Moral feelings in the Metaphysics of Morals”, p. 137. The question of why the conscience, which is in one sense practical reason itself, is included in this set of dispositions that are otherwise affective, is also raised by GOY, Ina in “Virtue and Sensibility”, p. 189. 130 Cf. MdS 400-401. The irreducibility and universality of the conscience in moral agents, and the fact that it always makes its voice heard, even when an agent is so corrupt that he or she no longer pays attention to its mandates, allows us to understand a little better the possibility of a “revolution of the heart”, which Kant speaks of and which I have already discussed briefly. Cf. MUNZEL, G. Felicitas, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character. The Critical Link of Morality, Anthropology and Reflective Judgement, p. 159. 127 128

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son:131 but not with the lawgiving sense, but rather the judicial.132 However, it is not so in the sense of a faculty of the moral principles, but rather in the sense of the faculty of judgement that can, on the one hand, be applied to the concrete case (in a determining sense) as well as to moral deliberation on the basis of a given action (in a reflexive sense). Above all, in the face of erroneous understandings of autonomy in Kant that confuse it with some kind of arbitrariness or consensualism, I would like to point out that the moral conscience does not give law but rather it shows it and applies it in each case. The act of this moral conscience has to do, then, with the maxim of the act to be judged, with the moral law, and with the evaluative function of the agent. It thereby presents itself at various levels of reflexivity, both the logical (the comparison between the act and the law) as well as the transcendental (the comparison with the faculties of the agent that judges and/or deliberates, with this latter type of comparison being the most relevant, and which thus emphasizes the character of the conscience, which is above all concerned with the agent him or herself). It is because of this double reflexivity that in Religion, the Gewissen is characterized as the “faculty of moral judgement that judges itself”.133 I will not go into the possible divisions of the moral conscience here (Kant himself sidesteps the issue in MdS, although in the lecture I alluded to earlier he follows the classical treatment and makes certain comments on the scrupulous, lax, petty conscience, etc.).134 In the Tugendlehre, 131 This is shown by POGGE, Thomas W., “The Categorical Imperative”, in Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein kooperativen Kommentar (Otfried Höffe, ed.), Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt, 1989, pp. 172-193. 132 Fasching suggests that we understand moral action in Kant by situating the moral conscience as a [judicial] institution, while virtue –and the autocracy that it generates– should be seen as executive, while the moral law –the categorical imperative– is legislative. Cf. FASCHING, Maria, Zum Begriff der Freundschaft bei Aristoteles und Kant, Königshausen & Neumann, Band LXX, Würzburg, 1990, p. 169. 133 RGV 186. ESSER, Andrea M. in “The Inner Court of Conscience, Moral SelfKnowledge and the Proper Object of Duty”, p. 277n, holds that this definition is problematic. As I have argued here, for me it is striking and clear. It is probably that it is precisely because Esser does not admit a relationship between Gewissen and Urteilskraft that he sees the role of the conscience as being marginal in Kant’s philosophy. 134 Cf. VzM 354-356.

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the German thinker limits himself to noting that, given the definition proposed for the moral conscience, it is absurd to speak of an erroneous conscience (irrendes Gewissen). The argument is the following: “For while I can indeed be mistaken at times in my objective judgement as to whether something is a duty or not, I cannot be mistaken in my subjective judgement as to whether I have submitted it to my practical reason (here in its role as judge) for such a judgement; for if I could be mistaken in that, I would have made no practical judgement at all, and in that case there would be neither truth nor error”.135 In contrast to what he stated in lecture mentioned above, Kant here understands the erroneous conscience in a very limited sense, and this is what he is rejecting. He is not affirming the infallibility of the objective moral conscience, but rather he is just defending the transparency and immediacy of the conscience regarding its own reflexive-transcendental act:136 if I am mistaken about what the conscience judges, I am nonetheless not mistaken about its having judged, by comparing the maxim with the practical reason itself, subjecting it to its tribunal. As Roger Sullivan also notes, what can be said to be erroneous in the conscience is what it considers, in a given moment, to be true in regard to moral judgement. This judgement, however, is not seen to be erroneous in the moment of judgement itself –probably because of the influence of affects or passions or because of the lack of a virtuous character. Nevertheless, the conscience always implies certitude in regard to whether the moral judgement itself has been performed.137 Or, stated in other words: it is reason that is re-

MdS 401. In TORRALBA, José María, Libertad, objeto práctico y acción. La facultad del juicio en la filosofía moral de Kant, pp. 377-378, this is explained as follows: “The conscience in Kant is not a judgement about the concordance of a case with the rule, since this task corresponds to another institution of the practical faculty of the judgement. The conscience is situated, so to speak, at a ‘metalevel’ of the judgement concerning action, whose only mission is to judge whether all the necessary care has been taken in the objective process of judging”. 137 Cf. SULLIVAN, Roger, An Introduction to Kant’s Ethics, pp. 107ff. This is also explained in MUNZEL, G. Felicitas, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character. The Critical Link of 135 136

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sponsible for truth and for the binding character of the law, and the conscience only takes into consideration the assent and attention that we give the law, and in that sense it cannot be erroneous.138 It should not be forgotten that, even etymologically (Gewissen – Wissen, cum-scientia), the conscience presupposes an act of knowledge, and indeed there is no false knowledge, since the notion of knowledge itself presupposes truth. In an analogical fashion, if the act of the conscience is the judgement that judges itself, there is no judgement that can be said to derive from an erroneous conscience, since in that case there would not be any process of judgement at all. This, clearly, does not imply infallibility with respect to the contents of the moral judgement directed at the action and its objects. In this way, Kant’s position bears no relation to a supposed self-sufficiency of the subjective moral conscience, which in fact must always obey the objective criterion of the moral law.139 This is the only way to make sense of the duty that Kant links to the Gewissen qua aesthetic prenotion: since acting according to the conscience is something that must be presupposed in the understanding of duties, but that it is not a duty itself, “for if it were, there would have to be yet a second conscience in order for one to become aware of the act of the first”. The only duty related to this notion is that of the formation of the conscience and of paying attention to its commands: Morality, Anthropology and Reflective Judgement, p. 223 and WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 190. 138 Cf. BILBENY, Norbert, Kant y el tribunal de la conciencia, p. 61. 139 However, it should be observed that, as Bilbeny emphasizes, the conscience as subjective judgement plays a crucial role in the distinction between an action undertaken for love of duty, aus Pflicht, and another that is merely in conformity with it, Pflichtmäßig. The moral conscience is precisely that interior condition of the full observance (Befolgung) of the law. Cf. BILBENY, Norbert, Kant y el tribunal de la conciencia, p. 51. For his part, Andreas Noordraven indicates that speaking of the moral conscience as an aesthetic prejudgement involves certain risks: that of considering it to be merely passive, for instance, which would go against the idea of autonomy. However, Kant does so because he can in this way emphasize that the conscience is always something pre-given, and thus oppose himself to postures such as those of Montaigne, Helvetius and Mandeville, who had argued for an understanding of the moral conscience as being completely formed by society and education. Cf. NOORDRAVEN, Andreas, Kants Moralische Ontologie. Historische Ursprung und systematische Bedeutung, p. 272, n. 75 and p. 273, n. 76.

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“The duty here is only to cultivate one’s conscience, to sharpen one’s attentiveness to the voice of the inner judge and to use every means to obtain a hearing for it (hence the duty is only indirect)”.140 That is to say, compliance with this duty of cultivation is a requirement for compliance with the rest of the duties. The way to comply with this duty will become clearer when I enter into the discussion of duties to oneself, and in particular the “the duty to oneself considered as one’s own innate judge”,141 and of the first mandate of the duties to oneself: that of self-knowledge.142 After I have discussed these duties, it will also be clearer how the reflexive division occurs in the courtroom situation that was referred to in the definition of the moral conscience, as well as its relation with the faculty of judgement. In addition, once I have explored the issue of mastery of oneself and of apathy as requirements for virtue, it will become clear how to attain greater objectivity in the content of the judgement of the moral conscience, though not in the reflexivity of the act of the conscience itself.143 Finally, I would like to indicate here that Kant’s treatment of the moral conscience as one of the aesthetic prenotions for the receptivity of duty reinforces the hypothesis that these prenotions are, at the same time, a series of natural conditions that are pre-given and that are the subjective dimension that makes possible the Faktum of the reason. The conscience, as I have shown, is in some sense the practical reason itself, the forum in which we recognize ourselves as moral and, thus, being free.144

MdS 401. The relationship between the conscience qua aesthetic prenotion and this duty in particular is studied by GUYER, Paul in “Moral Feelings in the Metaphysics of Morals”, p. 144. 142 Cf. infra and MdS 437-442. 143 Cf. Infra and MdS 407-410. 144 Cf. FASCHING, Maria, Zum Begriff der Freundschaft bei Aristoteles und Kant, p. 168. 140 141

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3.3.3 Love for neighbor and philanthropy What in MdS 399 is called “love for neighbor” (Liebe des Nächsten), is reformulated in the corresponding subtitle in MdS 401 as “love of human being” (Menschenliebe). This section begins with a clarification that is frequent in Kant’s works: love, understood as a mere passive affection, cannot be obligatory or seen as a duty because it is not within the reach of the faculty of choice, but rather is something that simply happens. On the other hand, doing the good –properly speaking, beneficence, and by extension, benevolence– is a duty: “Love pertains to sentiment, and not the will, and I cannot love because I want to, but even less can it be the case that I should (be obligated to love); as a result, any duty to love would be an absurdity. But benevolence (amor benevolentiae), understood as action, can be subjected to a law of duty”.145 This is because, as I have explained earlier, duty presupposes constraint and coercion (Zwang – Nötigung, which in this passage are used as equivalents)146 and “what is done by coercion is not done by love”,147 Kant is opposed to the common notion of a duty to love, in this sense, either other human beings or God–given this understanding of love as something passive and spontaneous which, because it is not free, cannot be obligatory and which would lack any normative component. Nevertheless, and again in continuity with what Kant stated in earlier moral works, he recognizes the existence of a “practical love”, neither passive nor pathological, that can also be called beneficence or, in a broader sense, as in this passage, benevolence (Wohlwollen). This latter is a duty,

MdS 401. I cite the translation of Gregor word for word, although I believe it is risky to translate Empfindung as sentiment, since it can be confused with Gefühl: it seems to me that the issue here is the passivity and receptivity of that type of love which is not practical and therefore cannot be demanded. It is even perhaps the case that the mere understanding of this kind of love implies its passive character. 146 MdS 401. 147 MdS 401. 145

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and can even be considered the paradigmatic instance of a duty to others, as I will show. What does this concrete duty have to do with the aesthetic prenotions for the receptivity of duty?148 In a passage that is crucial for the understanding of the his proposal of character formation, Kant affirms that we have a natural disposition such that, when we practice beneficence frequently, we also develop a kind of love at the level of the affectivity, thus making possible and strengthening this maxim of beneficence: “Beneficence is a duty. If someone practices it often and succeeds in realizing his beneficent intention, he eventually comes actually to love the person he has helped. So the saying «you ought to love your neighbor as yourself» does not mean that you ought immediately (first) to love him and (afterwards) by means of this love do good to him. It means, rather, do good to your fellow man, and your beneficence will produce love of man in you (as an aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general)”.149 The cited passage is very important in regard to the general objective of the Tugendlehre: in this passage it is made clear that action performed for love of duty has a reflexive effect on the affectivity, by forming a character that fosters moral action itself.150 This is how Kant makes 148 The question was raised by Baxley, who emphasized that love for neighbor does not seem to follow as immediately from the receptivity of the moral law as do the conscience or the moral sense, but rather only in a more extended sense. This author, however, justifies the appearance of love for neighbor in the section on the aesthetic prenotions in the same way that I will seek to do myself. She emphasizes the dynamic of assimilation of a “pathological” or sentimental love on the basis of the maxims of practical love, and thereby a fundamental dynamic for the formation of character. Specifically, she states, this dynamic operates for the fulfillment of the duties to others, the duties of love in particular. Cf. BAXLEY, Anne Margaret, Kant’s Theory of Virtue. The Value of Autocracy, p. 152. 149 MdS 402. The same idea is seen in VzM 417. 150 It is the capacity for this incorporation of the moral motive in the affectivity that constitutes the “aesthetic prenotion” in a strict sense. As a result, I do not agree with TIMMERMANN, Jens who in “Duties to Oneself as Such”, in Kant’s Tugendlehre. A Comprehensive Commentary, p. 210n, states that love for neighbor should be excluded from the Vorbegriffe, because it is a consequence of beneficence and not a precondition for it. What

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room in his ethical proposal for the Christian duty to love one’s neighbor and, thereby, a free and thus moral consideration of love itself. In the light of this treatment of love, the controversial examples of the Groundwork should be reinterpreted. As I have indicated, it should always be remembered that Kant’s purpose is to isolate the a priori moral principle and not a complete description of the possible motivations of the moral act or the possible perspectives for weighing it. The misanthropic benefactor that is postulated in the most polemical of these examples, according to what is set out in the Doctrine of Virtue, if he or she were to continue doing the good the person would end up having his or her affectivity molded to conform to this philanthropy. Any notion that Kant is cold and rigorist cannot be sustained after a global interpretation of his ethics that integrates the Tugendlehre. It should also be noted that this inchoate proposal of “affectivity formation” is dealt with in terms of habit or capacity (Fertigkeit), which I will discuss later,151 since Kant only admits that virtues can be acquired by way of habituation under certain circumstances that assure that the process is not mechanical, but rather is free and rationally guided on the basis of maxims. This is why I have spoken in parallel of a certain “moral jurisprudence” in the maxims of action and of an effective formation of character. I will discuss all of this later, when I comment on the corresponding passage; what should be noted here, however, is that Kant does consider virtue to be a moral habit, although it must first be clarified what he understands habit to be. When I discuss duties to others, I will delve more deeply into this practical love that involves feedback into the sensibility, in particular its concretion in the duties of beneficence, gratitude and sympathy. I will also, therefore, touch on the vicious character of misanthropy and its associated vices. In addition, I will discuss the suggestive dialectic that Kant proposes between love and respect as elements to be harmonized in human relations, and which find their perfect equilibrium in the ideal relationship of friendship. For the time being, what I wish to emphasize is that there is a natural aesthetic disposition to make practical love a hais a precondition is the very possibility of generating love reflexively as a result of beneficence. 151 Cf. infra and MdS 407.

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bit, a conformation of our affectivity that also fosters a love that we can call “sentimental”, and which aids in the fulfillment of duty. It is, however, not as an “overdetermining” factor, but at the very least it serves as a receptivity for the understanding of what the other person needs and feels, and as a feeling that can be permeated and formed by the moral engine of respect. In this way it constitutes itself as a moral motivation in itself within the deliberative field of the virtuous agent. 3.3.4 Respect for oneself Again, it should be noted that, although the subtitle of MdS 402-403 only says “About Respect” (Von der Achtung), the passage deals with what was earlier specified as being respect for oneself or self-esteem (Achtung für sich selbst – Selbstschätzung). This is relevant in order to not confuse what is dealt with here, i.e. the last of the aesthetic conditions for the receptivity of duty, with respect as dealt with in the GMS and KpV: i.e. the moral feeling, generated a priori by the reason and thanks to which the reason is effectively practical (and of whose receptivity I have spoken in the section concerning the first of the aesthetic prenotions). In the Tugendlehre Kant is speaking of the appreciation of oneself that every moral agent has and that should be appropriately cultivated.152 This should also not be confused with the maxim of love for oneself (Eigenliebe),153 which, in a more egoistic sense, can overcome the moral motive and therefore is the maxim of ethically bad actions, i.e. of those actions attributed to our propensity to evil (Hang zum Bösen). It is, I repeat, an esteem for one’s own humanity, of one’s own moral capacity, which is what Kant means when he speaks in the KpV of self-approval (Selbstbilligung). This self-approval represents the positive side of the feel-

152 The distinction is appropriately emphasized in GUYER, Paul, “Moral Feelings in the Metaphysics of Morals”, p. 130. 153 Cf. KpV 73, where Eigenliebe indicates the egoistic sense of self-love, i.e. of arrogance. In contrast, one can speak of a natural Selbstliebe, oriented towards happiness and controllable by respect and therefore reconcilable with reason and with morality. Eigenliebe, on the other hand, must be humbled by respect. Cf. ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 123.

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ing of respect,154 and must be presupposed for the fulfillment of the duties to oneself155 (which are, at the same time, the condition of the fulfillment of the duties to others, as I will show in a later section). Therefore, we are once again in the presence of a basic capacity that cannot be demanded as a duty because this would imply an infinite regression: “[I]t is not correct to say that a man has a duty of self-esteem; it must rather be said that the law within him unavoidably forces from him respect for his own being, and this feeling (which is of a special kind) is the basis of certain duties, that is, of certain actions that are consistent with his duty to himself. It cannot be said that a man has a duty of respect toward himself, for he must have respect for the law within himself in order even to think of any duty whatsoever”.156 The importance of this aesthetic prenotion will be clearly seen when I discuss the very possibility of duties to oneself, and their priority with respect to the duties to others. If our own value as rational and moral beings did not have some effect on our affectivity, we could not recognize what is ethically relevant in our dealings with ourselves –and this, in turn, would make us incapable of recognizing what is morally relevant in our dealings with others.157

154 Cf. KpV 71-89, the section on the motors of the pure practical reason, and the bivalence of Achtung insofar as it humbles the pretensions of self-love and at the same time elevates the moral agent, via this Selbstbilligung, due to being able to be confronted by morality itself. Cf. also BAXLEY, Anne Margaret, Kant’s Theory of Virtue. The Value of Autocracy, p. 153. 155 This is emphasized in DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, Garland Publishing, New York, 2001, pp. 82-83. 156 MdS 402-403. 157 For a comparison between this moral self-esteem in Kant and the aristotelian treatment of love for oneself (which, in the Stagirite, is also the condition for love for others), cf. DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, pp. 209210. Denis refers to EN 1166a1-5, 1169a5-20 and to 1168b15-25, where this love of self is also distinguished from egoism. According to this author, self-esteem as an aesthetic prenotion and the duties to oneself in the Doctrine of Virtue share many attractive traits with this love for oneself in aristotelian ethics.

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As Jeanine Grenberg –who has written on the idea of an ethics of humility in Kant– has shown, this aesthetic disposition is the basis for the ability to understand how the correct form of self-esteem can later be seen as a duty. This self-esteem consists precisely in a humility that is based on a recognition of the moral law, and not on a comparison with other persons, which can corrupt rational action both because of arrogance as well as because of a lack of the self-esteem necessary in order to attain moral ends.158 Other commentators have also showed how, without this healthy esteem of self on the part of the moral agent, it would be impossible to understand Kant’s treatment of the concrete duties of sympathy and benevolence, among other duties of virtue directed towards others.159 I will, therefore, delve more deeply into the difference between self-esteem –necessary for morality– and egoistic self-love when I discuss the duties to oneself, and will show that moral treatment of oneself is not limited to pragmatic-prudential considerations. 3.4 The moral prerequisites for virtue I will again separate myself from the strict order of Kant’s own discussion in the Tugendlehre, which, after the section on the aesthetic predispositions for the receptivity of duty, explores the abstract principles of the pure doctrine of virtue. I have left for later the discussion of these principles because it seems to me that, after having clarified the aesthetic requirements for the receptivity of morality, what is proper here is to continue in the sphere of discourse linked with the sensibility and the affectivity. However, this is undertaken at the level of those pre-requisites that are moral, and which are thus free and ought to be acquired, as opposed to those aesthetic capacities that should be taken as given precisely in the sense of the always receptive dimension that is a requirement for the experience of the Faktum of the practical reason. Kant discusses these prerequisites in an observation concerning the principle of internal freedom (Prinzip der inneren Freiheit). I call them prereCf. GRENBERG, Jeanine, Kant and the Ethics of Humility. A Story of Dependence, Corruption, and Virtue, p. 44 and p. 92. 159 Cf. PÉREZ QUINTANA, Antonio, “Una disposición natural al bien”, p. 111. 158

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quisites although the philosopher from Königsberg only refers to them as “two elements” (zwei Stücke) necessary for internal freedom.160 I use the plural because he mentions this duality, although at bottom it seems to me that it is a matter of only a single moral prerequisite seen, respectively, in its positive aspect (the capacity to master or dominate oneself in the face of the affects and passions that impede moral reflection or corrupt it internally) and in its negative aspect (not allowing oneself to be affected by these wellsprings of the sensibility: what Kant calls moral apathy).161 This condition is just as required as are the capacities for receptivity that I discussed in the prior section. However, it cannot, as they do, be taken as being discounted in their availability. Rather, it implies a moral duty in the demand for compliance and, at the same time, is a presupposition of the complete fulfillment of the rest of the duties. Only the soul of the person who is owner of him or herself – who is apathic in the moral sense – merits being called noble (edel, erectus) and not abject (unedel, abiectus).162 Only that person who exhibits this self-mastery is in the condition to adequately exercise his or her capacity for moral judgement. 3.4.1 Moral mastery of oneself If earlier I spoke of the cooperative dimension of the sensibility in kantian moral philosophy (on condition of this latter being fundamentally configured by the moral feeling or respect that arises a priori from the very presence of the law in the reason), this is the point at which Kant confronts those phenomena of the emotivity that represent obstacles of various kinds and resistance to the fulfillment of duty. The most basic classification is that brought into play in this passage of the MdS: here he presents a division of these phenomena into affects (Affekte) and pasIn the Lectures (465), Kant indicates that stoic “calmness” (which, as I will show, corresponds with these prerequisites to be treated) is not properly a virtue but rather only an instrument at the service of virtue. 161 In fact, this unity of the two elements was already suggested by GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 73. 162 Cf. MdS 407. 160

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sions (Leidenschaften).163 This is a division that was already present in the Anthropology and in the Critique of Judgement.164 While affects ought to be repressed (zähmen), passions should be dominated or mastered (beherrschen); this is explained by their different distortive influences on moral deliberation: “Affects and passions are essentially different from each other. Affects belong to feeling insofar as, preceding reflection, it makes this impossible or more difficult. Hence an affect is called precipitate or rash (animus praeceps), and reason says, through the concept of virtue, that one should get hold of oneself. Yet this weakness in the use of one’s understanding coupled with the strength of one’s emotions is only a lack of virtue...”.165 The clarification that the affects belong to sentiment does not mean that the passions do not have any reference to the affectivity. The difference is that the passions are incorporated into the maxim and therefore form part of a rational articulation of actions, although not at the full level of rationality that morality demands. Thus, it seems to me that 163 Cf. MdS 407, ApH 268, RGV 29n, 93; see also SHERMAN, Nancy, Making a Necessity of Virtue, CUP, Cambridge – New York, 1997, p. 165. I will not go deeply into the difference between affect and passion in Kant; nevertheless, I refer the reader to the passage in the Anthropology where he makes it clear that the affect is a kind of agitation that impedes reflection and moral deliberation. By it a present and particular kind of necessity is imposed; the concrete feeling that is imposed is not even compared with the totality of sentiment –i.e. a reflective level is not even reached as a result of this agitation. On the other hand, passion determines from within the overall sentimental disposition of the agent as it incorporates itself into the maxims. According to the Anthropology itself, there are passions whose origin is natural and others that are of a cultural and social origin. These latter seem to be the most disruptive with regard to moral deliberation because they silently make our own will become subject to that of others. This “social” dimension of evil, where the influence of Rousseau is notable, has been highlighted above all by Allen Wood. 164 Cf. KU 121, 132 and 272. The Critique of Judgement speaks of the affects and the passions as possible limits to freedom; this explains why the Doctrine of Virtue interprets apathy as the moral condition of virtue itself, and then within the system of duties, the duty of self-mastery. Cf. also TIMMERMANN, Jens, Sittengesetz und Freiheit. Untersuchungen zu Immanuel Kants Theorie des freien Willens, p. 7. 165 MdS 407-408.

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what Kant wants to say is that the affects correspond only to the sphere of feeling. From there, they can exercise a prohibiting or distorting influence on moral judgement, and therefore virtue means having the strength to contain them (fassen) or repress them (zähmen). Virtue does not, however, annihilate affect, which might make one think that in some cases this might not be possible (and therefore could not be demanded) or simply might not be required by duty. It is even the case, as I have noted, that the basic affective responses might be molded by the reason such that some level of affect (the empathic reactions, for example, that arise from active beneficence after a certain time) might even be favorable for moral action. What is damaging is to follow this affect, which is superficial and momentaneous, as the ground of determination for action: this would imply weakness but not qualified evil: “[Weakness or lack of virtue] is something childish and weak, which can indeed coexist with the best will. It even has one good thing about it: that this tempest quickly subsides. Accordingly a propensity to an affect (e.g., anger) does not enter into kinship with vice so readily as does a passion”.166 As can be seen, the distinction that I drew before between lack of virtue (Untugend) and vice (Laster) comes into play here. Giving oneself up to the affects involves a lack of strength, i.e. the sensible motive imposes itself instead of the rational motivation. Passion, on the other hand, is an affective distortion that is incorporated into the maxim of rational action, making the reason into an instrument for obtaining a sensible end deriving from self-love. As a result it can be called rational only within certain limits, insofar as it is not compatible with the ultimate teleological structure of reason that I outlined earlier: i.e. it does not favor the interest of reason.167 This incorporation into the structuring plane of raMdS 408. The passions imply reflection and reasons, but not the full use of reason, or at least not reason in Kant’s strong sense of this expression. The passions use the strengths of the soul in a direction that is contrary to the interest of reason, and since these forces are what should foster morality, the problem that the passions pose is more serious than that of mere affects. The passions instrumentalize reason. Nevertheless, insofar as there 166 167

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tional action allows passion to have a more lasting and profound influence; it involves a lower intensity but a greater premeditation, to the point that it generates its own (false) principles or criteria of acting: “A passion is a sensible desire that has become a lasting inclination (e.g., hatred as opposed to anger). The calm with which one gives oneself up to it permits reflection and allows the mind to form principles upon it and so, if inclination lights upon something contrary to the law, to brood upon it, to get it rooted deeply, and so to take up what is evil (as something premeditated) into its maxim. And the evil is then properly evil, that is, a true vice”.168 Various conclusions can be drawn from this passage: the kantian model of action theory that I have described earlier is reinforced,169 where the maxim includes within itself the ground of determination, which could be that of the priority of the moral law above the sensible appetites, or, as in this case, that of an appetite that ends up subordinating or instrumentalizing reason. The deliberated (vorsätzlich) character of this incorporation is an effect of transcendental freedom, and, therefore, is imputable. As I have stated before, this gives rise to vice, understood as the real opposite of virtue. Avoiding it presupposes a resistance to the pernicious influence of the affectivity, such that: “Since virtue is based on inner freedom, it contains a positive command to a man, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his (reason’s) control and so to rule over himself, which goes beyond forbidding him to let himself be governed by his feelings and inclinations (the duty of apathy); for unless reason holds the reins of government in exists responsibility for having given way to passion, they are imputable. Cf. TIMMERMANN, Jens, Sittengesetz und Freiheit. Untersuchungen zu Immanuel Kants Theorie des freien Willens, pp. 7-10. Because of the fact that they instrumentalize reason, passions not only contradict ethicalness, but they also instrumentalize the prudential calculus that is directed towards happiness, as Kant notes in Refl. 6610. In the Reflections it is also clear that passion is more damaging than affect because it suppresses the imperium mentis (cf. 7197). 168 MdS 408. 169 Cf. supra.

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its own hands, man’s feelings and inclinations play the master over him”.170 Internal freedom, then, is threatened both by affects as well as by passions, and thus there can be recognized in kantian ethics a way of dealing with behaviors in which the judgement is correct but strength is lacking in following it, to the point that the affectivity can end up affecting and distorting judgement itself. As I have mentioned above, Kant admits the phenomenon of akrasía, of the lack of self-mastery (Unbeherrschtheit).171 Therefore, in what follows I will deal with the negative aspects of the command that assures interior freedom–which, as I have already stated, seems to me to be the same command as that of selfmastery, but seen from the point of view of passivity. This is the mandate of apathy (Apathie), in which the stoic influence on Kant is evident, and during the treatment of which the philosopher of Königsberg proposes the distinction between true and false virtue. 3.4.2 Moral apathy The first clarification made by Kant in this regard is that “moral apathy”172 should not be understood as meaning lack of feeling (FühllossigMdS 408. Cf. TIMMERMANN, Jens, Sittengesetz und Freiheit: Untersuchungen zu Immanuel Kants Theorie des freien Willens, p. 145. 172 Of course, this is another of the points in the Tugendlehre where it is reasonable to see a stoic influence on Kant. Cf. HIMMELMANN, Beatrix, Kants Begriff des Glucks, p. 137. As Nancy Sherman has emphasized (cf. Making a Necessity of Virtue, pp. 116ff), all of Kant’s moral works, and even the one which we are investigating now, show the presence of a certain stoic rhetoric that makes it difficult to positively evaluate the emotions or to recognize their evaluative function. Nevertheless, this closeness to stoic apatheia should be nuanced. In the first place because in the KpV Kant distances himself from stoic ethical self-sufficiency in his analysis of the highest good, and secondly because – and this is particularly evident in the Doctrine of Virtue– the kantian posture is not completely anti-sentimentalist. Indeed, he admits affective reactions that favor virtue and which it is therefore a duty to cultivate. Kantian apathy, as Sherman herself recognizes, as opposed to the stoic version, proposes an absence of sentimentalism and of tyrannical emotions rather than an absence of sentiment or emotion simpliciter. It seems to me that this is how one should interpret what Kant says in his discussion of the sentiment of 170 171

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keit) nor a subjective indifference to the objects of the faculty of choice (Gleichgültigkeit in Ansehung der Gegenstände der Willkür). As a result I must again emphasize that it is not a matter of eliminating every affective response qua affective, nor to attain an inhuman unavailability regarding those objects that generate emotional reactions. Kant suggests that such a coldness would be, rather than a moral disposition that makes it possible to fulfill duty in general, a weakness (Schwäche), and in order to distance himself from this posture he indicates in his subtitle that he is referring to a kind of apathy, necessarily presupposed by virtue, but considered to be a kind of strength (als Stärke betrachtet).173 Thus, once again it needs to be made clear that Kant is not proposing a moral position in which only the rational motive is present and affectivity is avoided.174 The only thing that is required as a necessary condition for the acquisition of virtue is that the feeling that emanates from reason itself, i.e. respect for the moral law, be the ground of determination (Bestimmungsgrund) for the moral action, as I explained earlier. It thus follows that it is also necessary that this feeling, self-generated by reason, be maintained above any other emotional reaction, which must in turn be subordinated to it and permeated by it. These reactions are not, however, thereby annulled in their specificity. Furthermore, and in particular, this moral feeling must dominate those emotions that threaten interior freedom. Finally, this “apathy” must be understood as a resistance to these other emotions that can perturb the primacy of the moral feeling: sympathy as a duty to others in MdS 456-457. Sympathy understood as a capacity to share the sentiment of another can be founded on practical reason and therefore be free (communio sentiendi liberalis), or else it may be merely a pathological reaction after the manner of a contagion (communio sentiendi illiberalis, servilis). If the latter should be avoided, the former is obligatory, and it is for this reason that later, in the same passage, Kant applauds the stoic wise man who rejects the pathological reaction, but who holds that there is an indirect duty of fostering the natural sentiment of compassion and even to expose oneself to those places and contexts that awaken it. I will deal with this issue in greater depth in my discussion of the duties of virtue that presuppose this kind of reaction, which is both sentimental and practical. In regard to Kant’s closeness to the stoics, Sherman herself provides another nuance: while for the stoics uncontrolled passion threatens our happiness, for Kant it attacks our interior freedom and, in this way, our dignity as well (cf. SHERMAN, Nancy, Making a Necessity of Virtue, p. 166). 173 Cf. MdS 409. 174 This is the strongly held position of WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 147.

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“This misunderstanding [which confuses apathy with lack of sensibility and therefore is held to be a weakness] can be prevented by giving the name «moral apathy» to that absence of affects which is to be distinguished from indifference, because in cases of moral apathy feelings arising from sensible impressions lose their influence on moral feeling only because respect for the law is more powerful than all such feelings together”.175 At this point in his argumentation Kant explicitly admits that not all affective reactions are contrary to duty: he even mentions a certain moral enthusiasm (Enthusiasmus) that favors interest in the good. In the face of these emotional conditions, however, moderation (Mäßigung) is recommended, because in the end permitting this feeling to become a complete factor of determination of conduct implies, in the final analysis, permitting that a sentimental factor –and therefore a factor with a high degree of contingency and variability– become the determining aspect of the action: “the affect is a phenomenon that shines one moment and produces fatigue, even when it is excited by the representation of the good”.176 It is only by confusing this affective reaction with true virtue that the expression that indicates someone as being “too virtuous” (allzu tugendhaft) will make sense, given that this kind of enthusiasm does in fact require measure.177 I would like to emphasize that it only requires moderation and not annihilation as a motivational factor, contrary to certain rigorist and extremely intellectualist visions of the kantian moral theory. This moderation also has an aspect of resistance, given that many emotional reactions, including moral enthusiasm itself, tend to take total control of the faculty of choice. As a result, as Gregor notes, moral apathy (considered as the negative aspect of internal freedom) presupposes a certain discipline in the face of all those emotions that involve this risk. MdS 408. MdS 408. 177 Unregulated moral enthusiasm would generate that moral fanaticism that, as I have noted, Kant despises as being a perversion of the moral judgement. One must respect the law not because it attracts, but rather because it commands, orders and generates that consciousness of subordination that is due to the law. On this point, cf. ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 123. 175 176

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This is the case even when in principle they are directed towards the good. In this way, moderation makes possible the positive aspect of interior freedom, which is the effective capacity to determine the faculty of choice on the basis of rational motives.178 The affects (Affekte) in a momentary fashion, and the passions (Leidenschaften) in a more persistent way, respectively impede or distort moral deliberation, and apathy involves eliminating them qua obstacles or distortions and not qua emotional reactions per se. I emphasize again that Kant admits that there are emotions which –once they have been permeated by respect, or, one might say, “moralized” via the injection of the moral motive that virtue presupposes– favor or are even necessary for the recognition of the appropriate context for the fulfillment of a given duty of virtue in particular: these are emotions, then, which are consistent with interior freedom, provided that they follow on the rational ground of determination.179 Maria Fasching is very clear about the fact that the moral apathy that Kant proposes in the Tugendlehre is neither weakness nor indifference, but rather the independence of the faculty of choice attained via discipline. As a result, she holds, this apathy can be compared even with aristotelian sophrosyne: it is a virtue that makes the other virtues possible by guaranteeing the equanimity that is necessary for the correct exercise of the moral judgement.180 Returning to “moral enthusiasm”, which would seem to be an emotion that is favorable to the fulfillment of duty, even here moderation 178 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 73. 179 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 74 and SHERMAN, Nancy, Making a Necessity of Virtue, p. 158. In order to develop this idea, it would be worth exploring a difference suggested in ApH 235, where Kant appears to distinguish between sensibility (Empfindsamkeit) and sentimentality (Empfindelei): the former is properly practical, because it permits deciding whether a determined state of pleasure or displeasure affects the faculty of choice, while the latter is a weakness that brings with it a lack of interior freedom. The sensibility, of itself, is “virile” and also implies the capacity to understand the strength or weakness of others. Cf. SHERMAN, Nancy, Making a Necessity of Virtue, p. 168. 180 Cf. FASCHING, Maria, Zum Begriff der Freundschaft bei Aristoteles und Kant, p. 162.

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and relative apathy are needed. This is because if these emotional reactions are not controlled, in addition to creating the risk of contingency implicit in a feeling that is not internally structured by reason, they can degenerate into what Kant calls, precisely at this point in the Tugendlehre, “fictitious virtue” or fantasy virtue (phantastisch-tugendhaft). Fantasy virtue is a pathology of the moral judgement which, according to the characterization that the philosopher from Königsberg offers in this passage, undermines other positions he takes regarding ethics and duty: “But that man can be called fantastically virtuous who allows nothing to be morally indifferent (adiaphora) and strews all his steps with duties, as with man-traps; it is not indifferent to him whether I eat meat or fish, drink beer or wine, supposing that both agree with me. Fantastic virtue is a concern with petty details [Mikrologie] which, were it admitted into the doctrine of virtue, would turn the government of virtue into tyranny”.181 Kant takes up the critique of pettiness concerning duty, which he has already characterized in certain prior comments, and undermines any extreme rigorist interpretations of his thought. He also reinterprets, as I have already discussed, the stoic concept of the adiaphora, in order to refer to those actions that are not prohibited or proscribed by any duty in particular. Nevertheless, as I have already stated, they are not totally indifferent in the framework of a supremely general maxim that accounts for the global conduct of a moral agent: there is no indifference at the level of the Gesinnung.182 The risk is not only that of misinterpreting the enumeration and classification of duties, but also that of generating the attitude of pharisaism that Kant had condemned ever since the Groundwork. The pharisaic attitude can be fostered by concentration on irreleMdS 409. As MELCHES GILBERT, Carlos emphasizes in Der Einfluß von Christian Garves Übersetzung Ciceros ‘De officiis’ auf Kants “Grundlegung zur Metaphysyik der Sitten”, p. 28, Kant’s referent in these passages regarding apathy is without a doubt stoic philosophy, but in the german author the opposition between virtue and sensible inclination is softened, since in kantian ethics the sensible affections must be subordinated and not completely eliminated. O’Neill takes the same position in “Kant’s Virtues”, p. 84. Ina Goy, in “Virtue and Sensibility”, p. 204, states that Kant, on this point, follows moderate stoics like Cicero. 181 182

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vant details, and is the result of a particular evaluation of moral conduct that distracts from the consideration of those maxims that are in fact pertinent. Pettiness about duty can also make duty into something odious,183 and, therefore, can be counterproductive in various ways. 3.5 Principles of the pure Doctrine of Virtue I will now investigate what Kant calls “General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in Handling a Pure Doctrine of Virtue” (Allgemeine Grundsätze der Metaphysik der Sitten in Behandlung einer reinen Tugendlehre). As Georg Anderson has emphasized, if the aesthetic prenotions are concepts that are constitutive of what Kant proposes in the MdS, these principles of the pure doctrine of virtue are, in contrast, for him the guarantees of the scientific and critical development of the work. It is for this reason that when he discusses them he will attempt to make clear the difference between his moral system and the classical philosophy that preceded him.184 As I will show, the insistence on the “purity” of these principles is due to the fact that, according to Kant, they allow the resolution of the confusion of planes that is produced ex hypothesi by certain ideas of virtue that he attributes to ancient moral philosophy (I note that, at least in certain points of contention, the interlocutor in question is Aristotle). The three apothegms (Apophthegmen) attributed to the ancients that the philosopher from Königsberg seeks to debate in this section are the following: 1. There is only one vice and one virtue. 2. Virtue consists in following the middle road between two opposed vices. 3. Virtues (like prudence) must be learned from experience.185 This is how Kant will present the point in MdS 485, where he speaks of a “secret hatred” of the mandate of virtue (geheimen Haß gegen das Tugendgebot) fostered by “monastic asceticism” (Mönchsasketik), which I will discuss when I enter into the issue of ethical asceticism in the Metaphysics of Morals. Cf. also PATON, Herbert J., The Categorical Imperative, p. 261. 184 Cf. ANDERSON, Georg, “Kants Metaphysik der Sitten – ihre Idee und ihr Verhältnis zur Ethik der Wolffschen Schule”, pp. 51-52. 185 MdS 405. 183

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3.5.1 The appropriate ground for each duty of virtue In regard to the first apothegm, it is not clear exactly who Kant is referring to. It can be surmised, however, that he is thinking of the platonic and aristotelic idea that the virtuous disposition of character can be summed up in a “virtue of virtues”, which would be either justice understood in its broadest sense, or else prudence. We have already seen how Kant is not completely distanced from the idea of a radical unity of the virtues, grounded, in this case, in the unity of the Tugendverpflichtung, of the commitment to virtue that is presupposed by a Gesinnung that is appropriate for the moral law. In fact, Kant even seems to be an inheritor of the socratic-stoic tradition that defends the unity of virtue,186 although I reiterate that this is at the level of the Gesinnung, insofar as the virtues are diversified by the matter that is presupposed by their diverse contexts of application. As a result, it seems that instead of seeking to completely refute this first apothegm, Kant brings it up in order to reformulate it: what the ancients intended by saying that there is only one virtue is that for each duty of virtue, there is only one unique ground of obligation (ein einziger Grund der Verpflichtung). In the Grundlegung Kant had already affirmed that the fulfillment of duty is not favored by subordinate motivations external to the moral law itself, and in fact the case is the opposite, given that this would sully the purity of the intention. This thesis is grounded on the kantian theory of action in which, as I explained in an earlier section, a single ground of determination (Bestimmungsgrund) can always be isolated for each maxim of action on the basis of counterfactual reasoning. At this point in the Tugendlehre, then, Kant extends and clarifies his posture: it is not possible to encounter more than one valid rational proof for each duty. In contrast to mathematical proofs, notes Kant, in regard to the grounds of obligation, these moral proofs involve a precise concept and not a construction out of or accumulation of concepts, and therefore do not admit a plurality of proofs.187 When more than one ground of obligation is 186 For a discussion of the similarities and differences between the kantian and stoic positions on this issue, cf. SANTOZKI, Ulrike, Die Bedeutung antiker Theorien für die Genese und Systematik von Kants Philosophie. Eine Analyse der drei Kritiken, pp. 187-189. 187 Cf. MdS 403.

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adduced, this reveals that either “we still do not have any valid proof, or else there are various and different duties that have been considered to be one”.188 Each duty has, then, a single conceptual justification proper to it. At the level of these justifications, there can arise a conflict in one’s moral deliberation, however not at the level of duty properly speaking, but rather of the rationes obligandi. Stated in another way, here Kant excludes the method of argumentation by accumulation from strict ethical argumentation, instead demanding precision with respect to the correspondence between the grounds of the duties and the duties in themselves: “If, for example, someone wants to draw a proof for the duty of truthfulness first from the harm a lie does to other men and then also from the worthlessness of a liar and his violation of respect for himself, what he has proved in the first case is a duty of benevolence, not of truthfulness, and so a duty other than the one for which proof was required”.189 As I will show in a later section, in this concrete case Kant will opt for the ground of obligation based on respect for oneself, and as a result truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit) will be considered a duty to oneself; on the other hand, to be concerned about the effect of the lie on other people corresponds to a duty to others. To seek a juxtaposition of both grounds of obligation or to hold that one supports the other in a context of moral persuasion is, for Kant, an antiphilosophical (unphilosophisch) position, since it would presuppose disloyalty and a clever trick in order to fool the interlocutor. On the basis of the parameters of argumentative rigor that are proper to kantian ethics, the sum of multiple insufficient grounds cannot make good the lack of single ground that possesses the required certitude. I would like to highlight in the treatment of this first apothegm how it is that Kant takes advantage of the classical tópos in order to reinterpret it with a view to meeting his own argumentative needs. There is also an implicit criticism of the means of moral persuasion (Überredungskunst), which leads us to 188 189

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the ethical doctrine of method that I will study towards the end of this book. 3.5.2 The critique of Aristotle: the virtuous mean versus the ethics of maxims The second apothegm, which holds that virtue is a middle ground between opposed vices, is taken by Kant –as he himself notes– from certain famous maxims of Roman authors.190 It is clear, then, that in this passage, as in others from his practical philosophy, the philosopher of Königsberg does not go directly to Aristotle in order to evaluate his moral theory. Nevertheless, in MdS 404 he refers explicitly to the Stagirite in order to state that “the well-known principle (Aristotle’s) that locates virtue in the mean between two vices is false”.191 As Rogelio Rovira has noted,192 this criticism of Aristotle’s principle of mesótes explains why, upon developing the classification of the material principles of morality in the Critique of Practical Reason,193 Kant does not take the aristotelian posture into consideration. In some of the Reflections, Kant apparently attempted to reinterpret the principle of mesótes in terms of his own theory of action,194 based on the maxim as the element of rationality in the determination of how to act. However, in the Doctrine of Virtue he rejects this principle, both in its negative aspect (“not too much, not too little”) as well as in its positive formulation (the identification of virtue as the observance of a middle term between two vicious Virtus consistit in medio (similar to Horacio, Epistulae I, XVIII, 9), medium tenuere beati, medio tutissimis ibis (Ovidio, Metamorfosis, II, 137), omne nimium vertitur in vitium, vitiosum est ubique, quod nimium est (Séneca, De tranquilitate animi, IX, 6), est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines quos ultra citraque nequit consistere (Horacio, Sermones I, 106-107), insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus iniqui, ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam. For these references, cf. p. 260, n. 2 of the Spanish translation by Cortina and Conill, and ROVIRA, Rogelio, “¿Una sabiduría insulsa? Sobre la crítica de Kant al principio aristotélico de la mesótes”, in Isegoría vol. 27, 2002, p. 241. 191 MdS 404. 192 Cf. ROVIRA, Rogelio, “¿Una sabiduría insulsa? Sobre la crítica de Kant al principio aristotélico de la mesótes”, p. 329. 193 Cf. KpV 39-40. 194 Cf. Refl. nos. 6625 and 6760, and ROVIRA, Rogelio, “¿Una sabiduría insulsa? Sobre la crítica de Kant al principio aristotélico de la mesótes”, p. 240. 190

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opposites). The example Kant uses in order to attack the aristotelian principle is that of the virtue of “good management” (gute Wirtschaft) as standing in opposition to waste (Verschwendung) and avarice (Geiz). He makes this comparison both in MdS 404 (the passage that speaks about the second universal principle for a Doctrine of Virtue) as well as in MdS 433 (the passage which deals with avarice in particular as one of the vices that affect the human being qua moral being). In both moments of his argumentation, Kant seeks to show that the aristotelian principle is insufficient for determining the difference between virtue and vice: “Let good management, for instance, consist in the mean between two vices, prodigality and avarice: As a virtue, it cannot be represented as arising either from a gradual diminution of prodigality (by saving) or from an increase of spending on the miser’s part (...) For the same reason, no vice whatever can be defined [erklärt] in terms of going further in carrying out certain aims than there is any purpose in doing (e.g., Prodigalitas est excessus in consumendis opibus) or of not going as far as is needed in carrying them out (e.g., avaritia est defectus etc.)”.195 The choice of example is significant. What Kant is attempting to do in these lines is to show that the criterion of mesótes is unsatisfactory because it seeks to determine the difference between virtue and vice quantitatively. The difference between thrift and avarice cannot be derived via increase or diminution, but rather by the diverse determination of each action as expressed in the maxim and evaluated in the light of the moral law. As a result, the principle of mesotés cannot, even in a case that is relative to the use and distribution of quantifiable goods, make clear what virtue is and differentiate it from vice. Kant makes clear, again with the same example, how one must distinguish virtue and vice by way of the quality of their maxims in their relationship to the law, and not by one’s degree of fulfillment of them: “What distinguishes avarice (as a vice) from thrift (as a virtue) is not that avarice carries thrift too far but that avarice has an entirely different principle (maxim), that of putting the end of economizing not in enjoy195

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ment of one’s means but merely in possession of them, while denying oneself any enjoyment from them. In the same way, the vice of prodigality is not to be sought in an excessive enjoyment of one’s means but in the bad maxim which makes the use of one’s means the sole end, without regard for preserving them”.196 Rovira sums up the kantian opposition to the principle of mesótes in three objections that synthetize what Kant says both in the passage from MdS 404 as well as that from MdS 433. Although his synoptic treatment is very useful and close to the text of the Metaphysics of Morals, I believe there are at least five distinct arguments that Kant makes in order to distance himself from the principle in question. The first objection –I discuss them in thematic order and not as they appear in the Tugendlehre– refers to the nature of virtue. According to Kant, the principle of mesótes would erroneously describe the being of the virtuous disposition, given that, along an axis where vices are at the extremes, one could not become their opposite except by way of virtue (als durch die Tugend).197 If virtue were placed, in fact, on the same plane (qualitatively speaking) as the vices, and the difference were only a matter of degree in how one carries out a determined behavior, this would mean that virtue would be considered to be a diminished vice: “virtue would be simply a diminished, or rather a vanishing, vice. The result, in the present case, would be that the real duty of virtue would consist in making no use at all of the means to good living”.198 A second objection, still inchoate, is that which holds that the aristotelian principle would be inapplicable, given that in order to recognize the midpoint as such, one would have to preconceive of the extremes as being such, and as a result one could not know a priori what the virtuous middle is if one could not identify the vicious extremes, which would be

MdS 404n. Cf. MdS 432. 198 MdS 432. 196 197

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a petitio principii: “who will specify for me this mean between the two extremes?”.199 A third argument, very similar to the second, holds that the principle itself is a tautology:200 “What does it mean «to do too much»? Answer: to do more than is good. What does it mean «to do too little»? Answer: to do less than is good. What does it mean to say: «I ought (to do or to refrain from something)»? Answer: that it is not good (that it is contrary to duty) to do more or less than is good. If that is the wisdom in search of which we should go back to the ancients (Aristotle), as to those who were nearer the fountainhead (...) then we have made a bad choice in turning to its oracle”.201 The principle in question, now treated as ne quid nimis, would be, particularly for the last two reasons, a “trivial wisdom” (eine schale Weisheit).202 A fourth problem that Kant believes he has identified is that of speaking of good or evil, virtue or vice, as though they were opposite poles (contrarie oppositis), when in fact they are contradictory (contradictorie oppositis) and therefore one cannot speak of a midpoint between them –the case that the thinker of Königsberg now returns to is his moral example par excellence: between truthfulness and lying (Wahrhaftigkeit–Lüge) there is no middle term.203 Even if there are pairs of moral concepts that in fact presuppose a mere opposition (Kant mentions the opposition between 199 MdS 404n. Cf. ROVIRA, Rogelio, “¿Una sabiduría insulsa? Sobre la crítica de Kant al principio aristotélico de la mesótes”, p. 242. 200 This is the argument that appears in the Lectures (277). 201 MdS 433n. In the part of this passage that I am not quoting here, Kant again quotes the Latin apothegms on which, in the final analysis, he depends for his understanding of the principle in question; it is clear that, even when he mentions Aristotle, his quarrel is with these second-hand positions. As I will discuss at the end of this section, and as Rogelio Rovira has correctly pointed out, it seems to me that Kant is able to refute an elemental interpretation of the tópoi that he cites repeatedly, but is not able to refute the principle as it is authentically stated in Aristotle’s ethical works. 202 Cf. MdS 404. 203 Cf. MdS 433n. and ROVIRA, Rogelio, “¿Una sabiduría insulsa? Sobre la crítica de Kant al principio aristotélico de la mesótes”, p. 243.

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frankness – Offenherzigkeit – and reserve – Zurückhaltung), between the two one does not decide to act virtuously or viciously. Rather, one decides to apply a virtuous maxim in an area which, as I will discuss when I investigate the imperfect duties, admits of latitude and therefore “only from the viewpoint of the faculty of judgement can one decide what must be done”.204 The search for the midpoint in this terrain is no longer properly that which distinguishes virtue from vice, and this is why Kant also refers to the cases in which this search itself constitutes prudence (prudens), even perhaps in the degraded sense of the term: as a purely pragmatic calculation, not a moral one, that even comes close to spinelessness (gescheuten).205 From this kantian digression I rescue, however, the fact that beginning here he is setting the stage for the broad and latitudinarian character of the imperfect duties, and he is making explicit the fact that, in them, one turns to an evaluation performed by the faculty of judgement (Urteilskraft) and not to a rule. In fact, as I will discuss a bit further on, on this point Kant is not so far from the true prudential inspiration (I am now using “prudence” in the aristotelian sense, as phronesis, and not as a pragmatic calculation or Klugheit, in a sense that is very common in Kant) that operates behind the genuinely aristotelian principle of mesótes. I believe I have identified a fifth kantian objection in his note to MdS 433n, where he claims to find in the criterion of mesótes the implication that virtue itself could never be excessive: “For really to be too virtuous – that is, to be too attached to one’s duty – would be almost equivalent to making a circle too round or a straight line too straight”.206 Although a point by point comparison between Kant’s proposal and aristotelian ethics is not within the scope of this book, I note nonetheless that, as more than one commentator has emphasized,207 the kantian criMdS 433n. Cf. MdS 433n. 206 MdS 433n. 207 Cf. ROVIRA, Rogelio, “¿Una sabiduría insulsa? Sobre la crítica de Kant al principio aristotélico de la mesótes”, pp. 245ff; cf. also SHERMAN, Nancy, Making a Necessity 204 205

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tique is devastating to an elemental and manual-derived version of the ne quid nimis, but it does not correspond to what Aristotle in fact says, nor does it do justice to the Stagirite’s theoretical ethical proposal. Kant is presupposing that the principle of mesótes is purely quantitative, generating a merely gradual difference between virtue and vice. The action indicated by this principle would therefore correspond more to mediocritas than to the mesotés indicated by the Aristotelian phrónesis or by the corresponding kantian Urteilskraft. Kant is not aware of the nuance that makes virtue the result of what ontologically would be a midpoint but axiologically would be an extreme: an extreme in regard to the perfection of the operation. Nor does he recognize that Aristotle limits and clarifies the use of the principle of mesótes and makes it depend on a prior formation of moral concepts, and therefore cannot be applied in all cases.208 The philosopher of Königsberg is closer to Aristotle on this point than he himself thinks, because the Stagirite knows that there are concepts that are linked with moral absolutes, and about which it is inappropriate to ask for a midpoint. In sum, Kant does not recognize the aristotelian proposal of prohairesis which, in its search for the virtuous midpoint, achieves what Kant would call a moral discernment between maxims of action. Beyond the principles for a pure doctrine of virtue, but regarding this same point of divergence between the kantian and aristotelian ethical proposals (and even in the context of what is explained or left inchoate in the Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue), I would like to look into a certain kantian ambiguity regarding whether one can speak of virtue as a habit at the same time (as I have shown that Kant does in the MdS) as one speaks of it as being strength, a stable mode of being, a determined form of thinking (Denkungsart) and the moral jurisprudence that is implied by the incorporation of our concrete moral judgements in broad maxims of actions. In principle, and in the light of what I have presented in this book concerning virtue as an interjection of a moral motive and as the formation of a character directed by a virtuous Gesinnung, there seems to be no obstacle to speaking of virtue in terms of habit. Neverof Virtue, p. 162 and BAXLEY, Anne Margaret, Kant’s Theory of Virtue. The Value of Autocracy, p. 171. 208 Cf. EN 1106b36.

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theless, Kant seems reticent right from the start due to the risk that, he thinks, this approach could cause for the principle of internal freedom of action: “An aptitude (habitus) is a facility in acting and a subjective perfection of choice. But not every such facility is a free aptitude (habitus libertatis); for if it is a habit (assuetudo), that is, a uniformity in action that has become a necessity through frequent repetition, it is not one that proceeds from freedom, and therefore not a moral aptitude”.209 As can be seen here, one can identify the manual-derived aristotelian treatment of the principle of mesótes as being the target of Kant’s criticisms (which are not pertinent in the face of the richness of the original aristotelian proposition). Similarly, a certain impoverishment of the term “habit” can be seen in his warnings regarding the term “habit” and his concern that it might be interpreted as being an unfree and mechanical self-training.210 In Aristotle, virtue (areté) qua moral habit (hexis) always presupposes deliberation in the process of its acquisition, just as is presupposed in the entire process of reiteration and progressive strengthening of action. Areté, therefore, is always a hexis proairetike.211 Translated inMdS 407. TIMMERMANN, Jens (cf. Sittengesetz und Freiheit: Untersuchungen zu Immanuel Kants Theorie des freien Willens, pp. 177-181) refers to Ped. 475, 478 and 481 and to ApH 147 n. as being other passages where Kant insists that acting well cannot ever mean acting on the basis of custom (assuetudo) but must always mean acting according to maxims. Of course, according to the kantian position, to have character is precisely a matter of acting in conformity with maxims, and in this case, the requirement is more precise: to act according to firm and universalizable maxims (a mechanical habit would not be virtuous, since it would involve acting always in the same way without being sensitive to the changes in circumstances). 210 The possibility of becoming mechanically accustomed, within the framework of Kant’s theory of action, is explained very well in ENGSTROM, Stephen, “Reason, Desire and the Will”, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, p. 40, and TIMMERMANN, Jens, Sittengesetz und Freiheit. Untersuchungen zu Immanuel Kants Theorie des freien Willens, p. 177. 211 Cf. EN 1105b. The element of practical reason that aristotelian virtue involves is also treated in EN 1107a1 and 1144b31. The process of acquisition of virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics involves a certain mechanical habituation, but is framed within an integral and cognitive formation of the desires that presupposes a particular perception, a deter209

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to kantian terminology, Aristotle proposes that the habitual states that constitute virtue are always determined from the position of the practical reason (and therefore are not a mere Sinnesart, but rather they also involve a Denkungsart).212 As a result, Kant’s criticism of “mechanical” habit does not touch Aristotle, although it does impinge on certain aristotelians, from whom Kant has taken this conception as though it were proper to the Stagirite.213 The kantian project is close to the authentically aristotelic one insofar as both propose the formation of character over time via choices and specific actions undertaken on the basis of a critical rationality. Nevertheless, Kant is the recipient of a decadence in classical ethics associated with instruction via manuals, and as a result he is unaware of the original aristotelian project. He is bothered, therefore, by the fact that habitus can indicate a custom that is unlinked from any moral judgement and any free decision, and which is, therefore, assimilable to a mere technical effectiveness or purely physical training: mined belief and a concrete intention. Areté informs the perception itself of the virtuous agent in such a way that he or she can recognize when a specific ethical response is required in a particular context. As I have sought to explain in earlier sections, the aesthetic preconditions of the receptivity of duty, which are pre-given but open to formation and the cultivation of virtue, play a role that is analogous to this perception of moral relevance. Virtue in Aristotle can, in a first approximation, be a mere mechanical habituation in terms of instruction (didaskálikos) in the principles of morality, but in their maturity they require consciousness. In fact, they require that the good be chosen for itself (proairoumenos di’auta) –here again there is a clear proximity to Kant– and that the action be carried out with firmness (cf. EN 1105a30). Aristotelian virtue always involves cognitive and affective factors and a repetition that is not evaluated via a quantitative criterion, but rather via a qualitative one (cf. EN 1103b7-12, 1104a27) and thus Aristotle holds that there can be progress in terms of a critical-reflexive appropriation of virtue. All of this is clearly explained in SHERMAN, Nancy, The Fabric of Character, OUP, Oxford, 1989, and is also dealt with in LOUDEN, Robert B., Kant’s Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings, p. 43. 212 The idea is from SHERMAN, Nancy, Making a Necessity of Virtue, p. 160, n. 97. 213 Cf. ENGSTROM, Stephen, “The Inner Freedom of Virtue”, pp. 293, 306-307, 311, who comments that in this critique Kant is thinking specifically of Cochius, and explains why Kant distances himself from this conception of habit. Another kantian commentator who recognizes that this criticism does not affect Aristotle is WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 145.

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“For moral maxims, unlike technical ones, cannot be based on habit (since this belongs to the natural constitution of the will’s determination); on the contrary, if the practice of virtue were to become a habit the subject would suffer loss to that freedom in adopting his maxims, which distinguishes an action done from duty”.214 This kantian wariness regarding the possible closeness of habit to mechanical custom prevents him from defining virtue as a habit simpliciter, but nonetheless allows him to admit that virtue is a habit in a restricted and qualified sense.215 This approach, in turn, guarantees the freedom of the moral action itself at the same time that it allows for the process of strengthening that occurs through habituation. Allen Wood has emphasized that it is for this reason that Kant insists on the expression habitus libertatis and instead associates the Latin term assuetudo with the mechanical process of becoming accustomed to something, and which he disallows as being the ratio of virtue.216 Therefore, the characterization of virtue as a habit has to overcome the exteriority of the act217 and must allude to an internal determination of the will in which the agent acts out of love for the law itself, out of duty (aus Pflicht). In turn, this determination must be generated by an action of the will (Wille) –understood as a lawgiving capacity– and not by a mere mechanization of the faculty of choice (Willkür), which is the executive capacity of action:

214 215

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MdS 409. This conditioned acceptance of the concept of habit can already be seen in VzM

Cf. WOOD, Allen, Kant’s Ethical Thought, p. 331. In this regard, cf. by the same author, “Kant and Agent-Oriented Ethics”, p. 70. 217 However, there is a passage where Kant himself seems to be upholding a merely external action as a path of habituation that favors a moral disposition: ApH 252, where he notes that smiling or changing one’s physical position (taking a seat) can help to produce a change in one’s mood. Kant admits at that point that emotions can be altered “from outside in” and therefore the “mechanical” element of habituation is not entirely to be rejected. Cf. also ApH 151 and SHERMAN, Nancy, Making a Necessity of Virtue, p. 170. 216

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“Hence virtue cannot be defined as an aptitude for free actions in conformity with law unless there is added «to determine oneself to act through the thought of the law», and then this aptitude is not a property of choice but of the will, which is a capacity for desire that, in adopting a rule, also gives it as a universal law. Only such an aptitude can be counted as virtue”.218 As Gregor indicates,219 in the context of a conception of habit as a mechanical accustoming, it would be contradictory to speak of virtue as being a habit: moral strength would lose any and all moral value if the presence of the moral law qua ground of determination were not presupposed. Virtue for Kant is not merely a facility or aptitude for carrying out an action in conformity with the law, but is also the strength for determining action on the basis of the thought of the law itself, that is, aus Pflicht. Gregor also comments that the general approach of the Tugendlehre, and in particular regarding the duties of broad fulfillment or imperfect duties, requires a flexibility in the exercise of moral judgement that would be opposed to habit understood as a rigid mode of acting. A mechanical habit of this kind would not be able to respond to new circumstances of action, to those conflicts that do not arise between duties per se, but do arise between diverse grounds of obligation, nor could it respond to the perplexities of moral casuistry, etc. As a result, even if in these passages Kant is inexact and unjust in his criticism of Aristotle, his specifications are fundamental for showing that we are dealing here with a space for moral judgement, and not with a rigid model of duties or virtues. This kantian specification explains why in certain passages of the Tugendlehre, there appears to be a rejection of the view that virtue is a habit simpliciter, and why at other moments of Kant’s argumentation –and in view of his general focus on virtue as a process of moral strengthening and character formation– it is described as a habitus libertatis. On this point, as with the former issue of the principle of mesótes, kantian ethics appears to be much closer to the aristotelian position than Kant himself MdS 407. Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 71 and p. 72. 218 219

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(limited by the manual-derived version of the Stagirite’s ethics) seems to have been aware, and certainly closer than what the greater part of contemporary interpretations admit even today.220 3.5.3 The duties of virtue and the human capacities for their fulfillment The third of the universal principles for the pure Doctrine of Virtue is that which is opposed to the thesis that virtue must be learned from experience.221 It is worth remembering here that this too is an element of the kantian critique of ancient ethical systems. As Kant states in the Critique of Practical Reason, and in an especially clear manner in the Lectures, he reproaches the moral systems of Antiquity for their “lack of purity”, i.e., for being founded on empirical observation of the human being and therefore “accommodating virtue to the weakness of the human being”.222 He contrasts this with Christian morality, which is strictly pure and is the only ethical system that meets the demand presented to it by the philosopher of Königsberg. Here Kant is seeking, as he has done since the GMS and the KpV, to distinguish the properly moral level of evaluation, emphasizing that the standard for virtue must not be obtained through experience. Instead, as I have noted in the first chapters of this book, it must be derived from the practical reason itself in its lawgiving role. It is through the derivation and application of this lawgiving reason to the essential characteristics of the human being that a normative idea of humanity is generated. This is how an anthroponomic perspective avoids the risk of a representation of virtue that conforms itself to what is known and empirically attributed to the human person. On the contrary, Kant holds that “if something ought to be done, it can be done”,223 and this is why the establishment of Faviola Rivera, for example, has with good reason criticized the imprecise posture of authors like J. Annas, who affirm that at base Kant does not do justice to virtue because of his rejection of habit (cf. RIVERA, Faviola, Virtud y justicia en Kant, p. 114, n. 39). 221 Cf. MdS 405. 222 Cf. VzM. 251, 294, 301. 223 On how one should –and one should not– understand this kantian principle, cf. the book already referred to by STERN, Robert, “Does ‘Ought Imply Can’? And Did 220

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the duties of virtue from the perspective of the practical reason itself demands from the man or woman a ceaseless search for moral perfection. One must not allow oneself to become adapted to the behavior that human beings in fact display: “Ethical duties must not be determined in accordance with the capacity to fulfill the law that is ascribed to man; on the contrary, man’s moral capacity must be estimated by the law, which commands categorically, and so in accordance with our rational knowledge of what men ought to be in keeping with the Idea of humanity, not in accordance with the empirical knowledge we have of men as they are”.224 In the lines cited one can see Kant’s insistence on the a priori grounding of moral judgement, a position also presented in the GMS and the KpV. At the same time one also sees, in his application of this principle, the difference between anthropology and anthroponomy that I have discussed in earlier chapters. Nevertheless, he does not thereby deny that the essentialia of the human being should be considered in the formulation of the ideal on whose basis the duties of virtue should be measured: these characteristics are constitutive of this normative idea of humanity. The only thing that Kant establishes here is the criterion for moral judgement. This a priori criterion is necessary if, as Kant will state in his treatment of the imperfect duties to one-self, it is required not only that human persons care for their natural and moral capacities, but also that they perfect and develop all their talents to the highest degree possible, aspiring both to perfection in rational agency as well as perfect purity –holiness– in their moral motives. Kant Think It Does?”, pp. 42-61. Stern alludes precisely to this passage of the Tugendlehre as one of those that clarify the use of the principle in question. For his part, Robert Louden notes that in order to adequately understand the principle one must take into account the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. This is because Kant presents the imperfect duties such that they are open to a continual and asymptotic process of perfection, which can demand the fulfillment of the duty in its purity, and which is not merely in conformity with the capacities of the agent as they present themselves at a given moment. Cf. LOUDEN, Robert B., Kant’s Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings, p. 9. 224 MdS 404-405.

CHAPTER 4 THE DUTIES OF VIRTUE

4.1 Introduction In the first chapters of this book, I outlined the justification for there being ends of the faculty of choice that are also duties, and that the capacity or moral strength for fulfilling them should be understood as virtue in general, and as virtues in plural on the basis of the diversity of the objects they refer to. Before proceeding to comment on each of the duties of virtue –and the vices opposed to them– it remains necessary to establish which ends are those that are also duties. Kant only indicates two: “They are one’s own perfection and the happiness of others. They cannot be interchanged, converting one’s own happiness, on the one hand, and the perfection of others, on the other hand, into ends that would be of themselves duties for one and the same person”.1 Although this affirmation first appears in the specific Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue, I have not brought it up until now due to its immediate connection with the division of the duties of virtue into duties to oneself and duties to others. Clearly, the end that is one’s own perfection will be the orientative criterion for the duties to oneself: both for the perfect or negative duties –which, as I have shown, can be classified instead as duties of justice, but Kant himself develops them as duties of virtue– as well as for the imperfect or positive duties. And the happiness of others will be the end that explains and gives meaning to each of the duties of virtue to others, both perfect and imperfect.2 MdS 385. Concerning the asymmetry that exists between the duty to seek one’s own perfection as a duty to oneself, and the duty to promote the happiness of others, as an imperfect –and therefore potentially infinite– duty to others, in an interpretative schema that 1 2

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It is clear that the second criterion that distinguishes among duties, both those that are perfect –fundamentally negative– and those that are imperfect –almost always positive3– is the margin of latitude, of the “space of play” (Spielraum) that each duty allows.4 As I will show, all the duties of virtue require the capacity of judgement in order to be applied to a given action, and in this sense all of them, even the perfect duties, provide for a certain margin of interpretation. Although suicide and lying are absolutely prohibited, for instance, only the faculty of judgement can determine, on the basis of data coming from experience and recognizable traits via reflective capacities that go beyond mere determination on the basis of rules, what suicide consists in, since not every intervention in one’s own death constitutes suicide –and what lying consists in– for not all false speech is a lie. The imperfect duties offer, in addition, a second margin of flexibility and a second type of latitude, insofar as –and this does not imply that there are exceptions to the obligatoriness of the maxim– in these duties the faculty of judgement must determine the how, the when, and the how much for the action by which the duty is fulfilled. As a result, in regard to these duties what is obligatory is to have the end (and, therefore, to act in a certain manner and in a concrete fashion, in order to permit this broad maxim to be limited by other maxims –fundamentally, those of the

contrasts what Kant says with the ethics-metaphysics of Lévinas, cf. FISCHER, Norbert and HATTRUP, Dieter, Metaphysik aus dem Anspruch des Anderen: Kant und Lévinas, Schöningh, Zürich, 1999, pp. 178-196. 3 In the Introduction to this book I indicated the relative value of these distinctions for an understanding of the kantian system of duties and ends. I will not return to that point now; however, this relativity becomes even more marked if one considers that determined contexts of action or social institutions can make a duty that is, in principle, imperfect into something perfect. For instance, promoting the education of children moves from being a maxim of ends with a meritorious character, to being demandable as a concrete act when one is a father, or when one attains a position in the Department of Education, etc. On this point see WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 169. 4 On how this Spielraum invokes the participation of the faculty of judgement, cf. TORRALBA, José María, Libertad, objeto práctico y acción. La facultad del juicio en la filosofía moral de Kant, p. 306. Torralba himself summarizes the history of the division of duties into perfect and imperfect up the point where Kant receives it in pp. 308-312.

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perfect duties– and thereby to avoid possible conflicts between duties in the weighting of the grounds of obligation).5 Kant pauses to explain why those ends that are also duties are not interchangeable: that is, why one’s own happiness and the promotion of perfection in others are not ends that are duties. To set up one’s own happiness as an obligatory end would be impossible, given that everyone in fact desires that, and “what everyone already wants for themselves in an inevitable way is not contained in the concept of duty”,6 given that duty implies coercion or constraint. One’s own happiness is not, therefore, a direct duty, although it can certainly be an indirect duty. This is because when we attain our own moral perfection, we realize that “adversities, pain and poverty are great temptations towards transgressing one’s own duty”7 and therefore, it is part of every person’s moral interest to avoid them and therefore struggle for one’s own welfare. The end here, however, is not happiness in itself, and what is obligatory is rather the overcoming of any condition that could provide an obstacle for the morality of the subject. This point is worth noting here, nonetheless, in order to emphasize the indirect moral connotation that one’s own happiness can acquire in Kant’s moral philosophy. On the other hand, one should not forget that seeking the happiness of others implies a “permission” from the practical reason to promote one’s own happiness as well, as a function of the principle of equity that is presupposed in the demand for universalization of all maxims.8 5 Kant alludes to this second margin of latitude in certain Reflections, e.g. 6652. He also makes it clear that a maxim of an imperfect duty is not limited for just any kind of reason, but rather only because of another obligatory maxim of a narrower character; cf. Refl. 6701. 6 MdS 386. For a commentary on this issue, cf. GREGOR, Mary, “Kants System der Tugenpflichten”, p. l. 7 MdS 388. 8 Cf. MdS 451. On this point, see HIMMELMANN, Beatrix, Kants Begriff des Glucks, p. 138 and also DENIS, Lara, “A Kantian Conception of Human Flourishing”, in Perfecting Virtue, p. 187. In this article Denis defends the claim that this kantian conception of personal perfection is less prescriptive and restrictive than the aristotelian, insofar as the Stagirite seems to define the perfect life in a narrow way –that of contemplation– and makes it depend on certain external ends in addition to the moral and intellectual virtues. The kantian conception of fullness or perfection, according to Denis, is more flexible.

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What is more difficult to understand is why Kant holds that the perfection of other people could never be seen as an obligatory end. The argument seems to be that the latter would be an end that is not achievable, and therefore cannot be a duty: “For the perfection of a man, as a person, consists just in this: that he himself is able to set his end in accordance with his own concepts of duty; and it is self-contradictory to require that I do (make it my duty to do) something that only the other himself can do”.9 Thus, the argument does not seem to be that it would be undesirable to take on the moral perfection of other people as a purpose, due to the possible paternalism or intervention in the autonomy of the other person that this could involve. Rather, it is completely impossible to achieve this perfection through anything other than the choice and virtue of that other person, and therefore it would be absurd to consider it a duty. What is difficult to accept about this explanation is that it would then put the entire kantian program of moral education –as it is developed in the doctrine of method in the KpV, for example, and particularly in that of the MdS itself, in which Kant even offers a fragment of a moral catechism, to say nothing of the Lectures on Pedagogy and certain other texts– at risk of utterly lacking any point.10 Therefore, certain commentators have doubted whether Kant’s arguments hold water in discarding the perfection of others as an obligatory end.11 Nevertheless, I think that Kant’s argument can be defended if one redefines the project of moral education in the light of the impossibility of attaining the perfection of another person. This does not, of course, mean renouncing a collaboration in achieving that end, or to persuade MdS 386. The problem is raised in LOUDEN, Robert B., Kant’s Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings, p. 53. 11 Denis thinks that it is very difficult to give a sufficient reason for why the perfection of others is not an obligatory end; cf. Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, p. 135. O’Neill also asks the same question, cf. “Kant’s Virtues”, in How Should One Live. Essays on the Virtues (Roger Crisp, ed.), OUP, Cambridge – New York, 1996, pp. 77-97. 9

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that person to seek it him or herself, or offering the person theoretical knowledge that would aid in its attainment, etc.12 It is one thing to provide the conditions so that another person may perfect themselves morally –including necessary persuasion, conversations that promote the use of the faculty of judgement, examples that illustrate the attainability of duty, etc. It is quite another to take the other person’s place in the non-delegable active effort and choice that he or she ought to undertake in order to, from the point of view of that person’s autonomy, form good maxims and develop a moral character. The first act is obligatory; the second is impossible. As I will discuss in the final chapter of this book, the ethical pedagogy that Kant proposes in the Doctrine of Virtue is profoundly socratic. The idea of moral education that he sets out is that of a maieutics in which –after the moral subject has passed certain dogmatic and memorization stages that are merely inevitable introductory steps– the subject develops his or her own capacity for judgement. This means that the other person becomes able to give his or her own assent to the relevant concepts and judgements, thereby becoming the agent of his or her ethical self-perfecting, in a way that is perfectly coherent with the ideal of autonomy.13

Louden comments on the difference between unilaterally “perfecting” others and helping them to develop their own predispositions, collaborating in the formation of their character, in the control of their inclinations, by offering examples –and further along I will discuss the limits of this latter moralizing strategy– as well as providing moral catechesis. Cf. Kant’s Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings, pp. 58-59. Cf. also Ped. 481-490. 13 In addition, although there is no duty to obtain the moral perfection of others, there is a duty to not give rise to scandal or to be a bad example; cf. MdS 464. However, Kant seems to indicate that the fulfillment of this duty cannot be judged only by social conventions, but rather must involve an authentic concern for avoiding any action that could attract others towards doing evil. In the same way, in the Lectures, he notes that scandala data, i.e., scandals resulting from someone misinterpreting my actions, are not imputable, while scandala accepta are; cf. 334-335, 411-412. Therefore this would be an imperfect duty, difficult to comply with because other people can be scandalized for many reasons, some of them even accidental; indeed, people can be scandalized by that which is not a vice but only seems to be. Lara Denis comments on this passage (cf. Moral SelfRegard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, p. 128) and relates it to what St. Thomas Aquinas says on the same topic in S.Th. II, q. 43. 12

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In addition to clarifying the non-interchangeability of obligatory ends, Kant seeks to head off possible confusions in the understanding of each one of them. In regard to perfection, it should be remembered that in the KpV Kant discards this ideal as a fundamental metaphysical principle of morality, thereby separating himself from Wolff and the Schulphilosophie.14 Now, however, he takes it up again and inserts it into its proper place in transcendental moral philosophy –i.e. as an end that derives its obligatoriness from the supreme principle of virtue and therefore, in the final instance, from the categorical imperative itself. Kant nonetheless makes it clear that he is not referring to perfection in the sense of the quantitative totality of that which is diverse, but rather as the concordance of a thing with its end, and therefore, as teleological.15 Therefore, what this obligatory end specifically involves for the human being is: “...cultivating one’s capacities (or natural predispositions), the highest of which is understanding, the capacity for concepts and so too for those concepts that have to do with duty. At the same time this duty includes the cultivation of one’s will (moral cast of mind), so as to satisfy all the requirements of duty”.16 In this way, we are dealing with culture as an end, the development of humanity in ourselves.17 This is not because it is beneficial from the Cf. GUYER, Paul, “Kantian Perfectionism”, in Perfecting Virtue, pp. 194-213. Cf. also HIMMELMANN, Beatrix, Kants Begriff des Glucks, pp. 58-59, where the author notes that in his precritical writings Kant had already accepted that there is a duty to attain one’s own perfection, in the sense that Wolff taught. Certain of the notes in the Reflections reveal his concerns regarding this wolffian principle of perfection; cf. e.g. Refl. 6980, where he is seeking to offer some kind of content to the precept Perfice te; or 7254, where he comments on the inanity of the precept if it is not made concrete in an ideal of perfection. In the Reflections one also encounters the clear idea that it cannot be a duty to attain the moral perfection of another person, insofar as every person must make judgements, in an active and non-delegable way, on the basis of his or her particular situation, in regard to what is morally good; cf. 6657 and 7264. 15 Cf. MdS 386. 16 MdS 387. 17 In KU 431, culture is defined as the capacity to attain any end in general, while in Refl. 6593, Kant speaks of culture as an art that works on the inclinations, an art that coincides with nature and improves it. Once again we find that the natural-teleological element is 14

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technical-prudential point of view, but rather because it is obligatory from the moral point of view. In addition it is a matter of the perfecting of the Gesinnung, in the sense of its purity and its motivational effectiveness regarding actions through the moral feelings. This end will become more concrete during the discussion of the perfect and imperfect duties to oneself. The other obligatory end, i.e. that which grounds the duties to others, is that of promoting the happiness of others. The argument that supports it is easy to identify, and it can even be directly related with each of the formulations of the categorical imperative. It clearly follows from the formula of humanity, which obligates one to consider other people as ends, with in addition in the positive sense of fostering the ends that they set for themselves; the formula of the Kingdom of Ends also points in the same direction. And the formula of universalizability is applied when one thinks about the fact, hardly mentioned at all, that all of us seek our own happiness, which is permissible only insofar as we follow a maxim of also fostering the happiness of others, i.e. of fostering the attainment of their morally permissible ends: “When it comes to my promoting happiness as an end that is also a duty, this must therefore be the happiness of other men, whose (permitted) end I thus make my own end as well. It is for them to decide what they count as belonging to their happiness”.18 In this way the obligatory ends for the human faculty of choice are established. They are not disconnected among themselves nor are they simply two ends in parallel: as is obvious, there exist connections between them, since in order to foster the happiness of others one must work on one’s own perfection, and this latter goal –at its moral peak– is both something more than an exposition of and something less than a grounding for kantian duties: it is an orientative criterion, a guiding thread. In the light of this duty one can also interpret Refl. 7239: “sequere naturam, h.e. ad fines naturae totius contende”. Concerning nature –seen from the teleological perspective– as a “school” and guiding thread for culture and moralization, cf. KrV A817 B845. Cf. also GONZÁLEZ, Ana Marta, Culture as Mediation. Kant on Nature, Culture and Morality, pp. 147-148. 18 MdS 388.

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not reached without becoming sensitive to the needs of others.19 As Barbara Herman states, through these obligatory ends a deliberative framework is developed within which other ends and discretional activities will be adopted (of which, clearly, there is no list or complete catalogue).20 As a result, these ends delimit a model of human life and offer content to the understanding that moral agents have of themselves as ends in themselves. The obligatory ends offer a guide to the choice and justification of actions, as well as for the development of cognitive faculties and emotional capacities; they are indispensable elements for orientation in the exercise of moral judgement. Therefore, Herman says, with these obligatory ends kantian ethics reaches a “holism of the moral” and offers a concretization of the good qua object of the practical reason: the good as specified in terms of ends and principles of action that are in agreement with the condition of rational beings like humans.21 In what follows I will discuss the duties of virtue that are related to them: first, the duties to oneself –perfect and imperfect, both, I repeat, part of the Tugendlehre– and afterwards the duties to others. 4.2 Duties to oneself 4.2.1 The apparent antinomy of the duties to oneself We are now entering into a topic about which, I believe, the Tugendlehre is most notoriously consistent with the fundamental concepts of Kant’s moral philosophy as he expressed them in the Grundlegung and the second Critique. The second formulation of the categorical imperative, in commanding the recognition of the dignity of human beings both in the

Cf. GONZÁLEZ, Ana Marta, Culture as Mediation. Kant on Nature, Culture and Morality, p. 52. 20 Therefore WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 144, insists that in Kant there is no list of “cardinal virtues”, since the manner of concretizing obligatory ends varies by context and person. 21 The text where Herman explains these ideas is excellent; cf. “The Difference that Ends Make”, in Perfecting Virtue, p. 113. 19

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person of the other as well as in that of oneself,22 provides the foundation for the necessity of duties to oneself (gegen sich selbst), even if it does not explain these duties in a detailed or hierarchical manner. It also grounds those duties that are commanded to others (gegen die anderen). In addition, the kantian ideal of autonomy should have made it clear that, insofar as moral obligations are derived from the practical reason itself qua legislative, the moral agent is already being considered from two perspectives: that of the lawgiver him or herself, and that of the person that submits to that lawgiving. As a result, one can imagine duties to oneself without renouncing the character of practical necessity and passive constraint that are implicit in the concept of duty. In the Tugendlehre, Kant establishes with complete clarity the necessity and even the priority of the duties to oneself, distancing himself from the defective treatments of the issue in previous thinkers.23 Nevertheless, Kant’s postulation of duties to oneself has been the target of many criticisms. Some authors insist that the one who imposes an obligation can at the same time liberate from the obligation, and as a result a commitment to oneself cannot strictly speaking be a duty. As a result, they hold, the kantian exposition falls into a confusion, since the philosopher from Königsberg is speaking of a demand of self-interest but is cloaking it in the language of duty.24 Along this line of thought, the concept of duty to oneself would turn into a kind of “voluntary obligation”, and therefore intrinsically contradictory, and the type of practical necessity that could be present in one’s dealings towards one’s own person would be inscribed purely within the plane of the prudential. These critics insist that morality is necessarily social and that duties are acquired only via implicit or explicit contracts that are recognized by Cf. GMS 429. Kant himself, in VzM 340, notes that nothing had been so poorly studied in manual-based philosophy as the duties to oneself. The reproach appears to be directed at Gellert and Hutcheson. 24 This is the posture taken by Marcus George Singer, in his book Generalization in Ethics. An Essay in the Logic of Ethics with the Rudiments of a System of Moral Philosophy, Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1963, pp. 312-318. Singer recognizes that he has been influenced on this point by Stuart Mill (On Liberty, chap. IV, para. 6) and in turn he has had an influence on authors such as Bernard Williams and others; all of these scholars are opposed, for similar reasons, to the idea of duties to oneself. 22 23

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the other party, such that one would require an element of real alterity that duties to oneself cannot provide. In addition, from the utilitarian perspective, which has its roots in the treatise On Liberty of J. Stuart Mill, the duties to oneself appear to be paternalistic. This is because through them the individual obligates him or herself to promote ends that he or she can simply reject. In addition, one runs the risk that certain social institutions might seek, with the argument of helping the individual to fulfill these duties towards him or herself, to interfere with this space of individual freedom.25 None of these criteria, in my opinion, has gone as deep as is necessary into the kantian defense of duties to oneself, nor has anyone sufficiently taken into account the defense found in the tradition that precedes Kant. This earlier tradition in fact supports a moral treatment of one’s own person in terms that are strictly normative and not utilitarian.26 What is clear is that Kant himself anticipated27 the objections that would later be adduced against his concept of duties to oneself, and he couches his discussion in terms of an appearance of antinomy or of an apparent (Anschein, scheinbar)28 antinomy: “If the I that imposes obligation is taken in the same sense as the I that is put under obligation, a duty to oneself is a self-contradictory concept. For the concept of duty contains the concept of being passively constrained (I, the same subject, am bound). But if the duty is a duty to myself, I think 25 Cf. DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard: Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, pp. 2-6, where the author summarizes all these objections to the concept of duty to oneself. 26 For example, the aristotelian treatment of friendship with oneself in EN 1169a, or in the passage where Thomas Aquinas discusses the love that a virtuous person should have towards him or herself, S.Th. I, q. 100, a. 4. 27 Singer does not mention the fact that Kant himself had anticipated these criticisms of duties to oneself, which suggests that Singer did not take into account the treatment of duties in the Tugendlehre, but rather only the examples in the Grundlegung, which are the ones he cites and analyzes individually; cf. Generalization in Ethics: an Essay in the Logic of Ethics with the Rudiments of a System of Moral Philosophy, p. 317. 28 As TIMMERMANN, Jens explains in “Duties to Oneself as Such”, pp. 207ff, the antinomy is only apparent. In contrast to the antinomies of the KrV or the KpV, in this case the thesis is completely refuted and no longer preserves any status nor does it exercise any kind of attraction, as the antinomies in a strict sense do.

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of myself as binding and so as actively constraining (I imposing obligation). And the proposition that asserts a duty to myself (I ought to bind myself) would involve being bound to bind myself (a passive obligation that was still, in the same sense of the relation, also an active obligation), and hence a contradicttion”.29 Following Kant himself, I will primarily investigate this possible contradiction, although in this section I will also look at certain other aspects that complement his response to these objections (for example, the response to the objection concerning the possible paternalistic element in these duties or the supposed absence of sanction). The philosopher of Königsberg is conscious of this apparent contradiction, which, if it were to hold, would manifest itself in the also contradictory conception of a “voluntary obligation”: “[T]he one imposing obligation (auctor obligationis) could always release the one put under obligation (subiectum obligationis) from the obligation (terminus obligationis); so that (if both are one and the same subject) he would not be bound at all to a duty he lays upon himself. This involves a contradiction”.30 As I indicated at the beginning of this section, and which I also noted in regard to some of the objections, the kantian response to this apparent antinomy depends on a double consideration of the moral agent, the same distinction that I have touched on earlier between the homo phaenomenon and the homo noumenon.31 In the specific passage where Kant MdS 417. MdS 417. 31 Concerning this distinction and its operativity in the justification of the duties to oneself, cf. RICKEN, Friedo, “Homo noumenon und homo phaenomenon: Ableitung, Begründung und Andwendbarkeit der Formel von der Menschheit als Zweck an sich selbst”, in Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein kooperativer Kommentar (Otfried Höffe, ed.), Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M., 1989, pp. 234-252. Concerning how this distinction dilutes an antinomy, cf. also TIMMERMANN, Jens, “Kantian Duties to the Self, Explained and Defended”, Philosophy, vol. 81, 2006, pp. 505-530. What is certain is that the distinction should not be improperly constructed or understood as being a distinction between two distinct “agents” or two diverse “worlds” in which the agent should act, as 29 30

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dissolves the antinomy, the homo noumenon is characterized in more precise fashion as the human being considered strictly in his or her personhood, and therefore not only as an animal gifted with reason (vernünftiges Wesen). Such an animal could be limited to the instrumental use of reason for purposes of any end whatever; the human being, on the other hand, is treated as a rational being (Vernunftwesen), who is confronted by the practical reason in his or her internal freedom: “When man is conscious of a duty to himself, he views himself, as the subject of duty, under two attributes: first as a sensible being, that is, as man (a member of one of the animal species), and second as an intelligible being (...) he is regarded as a being that can be put under obligation and, indeed, under obligation to himself (to the humanity in his own person). So man (taken in these two different senses) can acknowledge a duty to himself without falling into contradiction (because the concept of man is not thought in one and the same sense)”.32 And of course, this is the same dualism that the authors referred to above refuse to admit. Nevertheless, as Lara Denis emphasizes in her book Moral Self-Regard: Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, it seems to me that on the basis of an adequate understanding of the categorical imperative’s formula of humanity, a duality of perspectives can be defended, even what we might call a “minimum” one. This duality explains the undeniable fact that in fact certain actions are not appropriate to the dignity of the agent and, nevertheless, the agent can find him or herself inclining towards such actions and as a matter of conscience must selfconstrain in order to avoid them. Alternatively –in the case of the imperfect duties– there are actions demanded by the dignity of the agent, who must coerce him or herself to resist the inclinations that would otherwise

McCARTY, Richard surprisingly does in Kant’s Theory of Action, OUP, Oxford 2009. WOOD, Allen makes it clear that the issue is one of two perspectives and not of two distinct worlds in Kantian Ethics, p. 120. 32 MdS 418.

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lead the agent to omit these actions.33 The formula of humanity is the only one among the three expressions of the categorical imperative that explicitly distinguishes duties in relation to their objects: it divides duties between those to oneself and those to others.34 As a result, what I have explained in earlier chapters becomes clear, i.e. that the supreme principle of virtue can be deduced from the categorical imperative and that the formula that is most expressly related with it is that of humanity. Kant states, in a note to his discussion of the antinomy, that the concept of duties to oneself is made manifest in ordinary language: “So when it is a question, for example, of vindicating my honor or of preserving myself, I say «I owe it to myself». Even in what concerns duties of less importance –those having to do only with what is meritorious rather than necessary in my compliance with duty– I speak in the same way, for example ‘I owe it to myself to increase my fitness for social intercourse and so forth (to cultivate myself)’”.35 This morally necessary end of human action necessarily includes, therefore, the agent him or herself –and as I will show, it includes the agent in a prioritized way, as the condition of fulfillment of the duties to others. As Denis emphasizes, by incorporating imperfect duties, the theory of the duties to oneself avoids the criticism of rigorism or moral fanaticism. By presupposing the dynamic of the acquisition of virtues Timmermann emphasizes the same point: the idea of duality, at least of perspectives, is not so strange, because it is always present whenever we judge our own selves. Cf. TIMMERMANN, Jens, “Kantian Duties to the Self, Explained and Defended”. 34 Cf. DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard: Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, p. 79. 35 MdS 418n. Singer, who as I have shown leads the charge of those who object to the idea of a duty to oneself, recognizes that this type of expression forms part of ordinary language, but he insists that it must be understood in a metaphorical way. In reality, what it seeks to express is a firm determination to do something, a prudential policy or perhaps a right to do something, but not a self-referential obligation; cf. Generalization in Ethics: an Essay in the Logic of Ethics with the Rudiments of a System of Moral Philosophy, pp. 313314. I call attention to this point in order to emphasize the fact that here Kant concedes greater validity to ordinary speech than his critics do. This is a consequence, I think, of the fundamental correctness and reliability of the gemeine Verstand in regard to the practical use of reason. 33

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and the formation of character, Kant’s theory also evades the narcissistic preoccupation about one’s own morality and incorporates affective reactions within moral action. In addition, it should not be forgotten that the fact that they are duties to oneself does not exclude their application in the social arena, with all the considerations that this entails.36 In Kant’s discussion of these duties to oneself, he does not confuse prudential or strategic concerns with what is demanded by morality, and it is even the case that the latter can demand something that goes against one’s own interest. Nor is it a matter of a vision that depends on a pure and exclusively social/consensualist or contractualist conception of morality,37 but rather of an ethics of what is due to an absolute good, as in the case of the agent’s humanity itself. As duties of virtue, and therefore as resulting from a strictly free acceptance of maxims of ends, the duties to oneself also do not run the risk of moral paternalism that bothers certain utilitarian authors. Above all, the supposed contradiction does not exist, because the duties to oneself are not “voluntary obligations”: one cannot choose to free oneself from the duties to oneself.38 Lara Denis, who provides detailed arguAs a result I do not agree with those authors who illustrate the duties to oneself via the allegory of Robinson Crusoe and those duties that one would have in utter solitude. The duties to oneself are not proper to any class of ethical solipsism, as DURÁN CASAS, Vicente explains well in Die Pflichten gegen sich selbst in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten, Peter Lang, Frankfurt a. M., 1996, p. 254. In addition, BARON, Marcia W. communicates this notion clearly in Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, p. 13. 37 This is in contrast to what scholars such as TUGENDHAT, Ernst, in Lecciones de Ética, p. 146, say: according to them, duties to oneself are contradictory. It seems to me that it is because of this basic error in his understanding of Kant’s posture on duty that Tugendhat denies that the categorical imperative can be applied in certain contexts (cf. p. 133). In contrast, POTTER, Nelson discusses this issue in the correct light in “Duties to Oneself, Motivational Internalism and Self-Deception in Kant’s Ethics”, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays, p. 372. In addition, Margaret Paton refutes this line of criticism, although her article focuses more on the GMS than the MdS; cf. PATON, Margaret, “A Reconsideration of Kant’s Treatment of Duties to Oneself”, The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 40, n. 159, April 1990, pp. 222-233. 38 In fact to say, as an argument against the duties to oneself will, that these duties can be eliminated or evaded by the agent him or herself, is a petitio principii: rather, if they are in fact duties, this would be impossible, or stated with greater precision, illegitimate. In this regard, cf. TIMMERMANN, Jens, “Kantian Duties to the Self, Explained and 36

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ments against the objections that have been raised against the duties to oneself in kantian ethics, rejects still other possible complaints against these duties. For instance, she defends the position that they do not involve fanaticism of any type, due to the latitude and flexibility that, in differing measures, all the duties of the Tugendlehre have. It is precisely for this reason that Kant’s text includes casuistic sections. Nor is there any kind of unhealthy introspection in the idea of duties to oneself, nor any kind of narcissism. Kant anticipates these perversions of reflection in the Anthropology39 and, in addition, points out that perfect self-knowledge is impossible and that the fulfillment of the duties to oneself does not excuse the agent from fulfilling the various duties to others. Nor is there any kind of schizophrenia or internal antagonism in the moral agent, because the apathy and self-mastery that are demanded by kantian ethics are nothing other than guarantees of interior freedom and of an adequate deliberation. They do not exclude –as I will show– either personal affects or those emotions that are compatible with this interior freedom. Nor is there, finally, any boredom or homogeneity; on the contrary, the duties to oneself ensure the diversity of personal identities.40 In the final instance, as this commentator indicates, the only way to negate the duties to oneself is to negate the idea that the rational nature of the agent him or herself merits the same respect as the humanity in others. This is not a stratagem in order to justify egoistic interests, which as such, in fact, do not need to be justified.41 The accusation of paternalism against duties to oneself is easily refuted by noting that in being duties of virtue they only in fact allow self-constraint. Despite all the criticisms, I hold that the duties to oneself are in fact one of the greatest kanDefended”, and DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard: Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, pp. 225-230 for a complete vindication of the duties to oneself against the various criticisms that have been put forward. Concerning the impossibility of arbitrarily “freeing oneself” from the duties to oneself, cf. also HILL, Thomas E. Jr., “Kant’s Tugendlehre as normative Ethics”, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, pp. 234-255. 39 Cf. ApH 112-113. 40 Cf. DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, pp. 178185; cf. also MdS 409, 452 and 456-458. 41 Cf. also WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 171.

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tian contributions towards our understanding of practical-moral rationality.42 And moreover: without duties to oneself, it would also not be possible to speak of duties to others.43 Kant clarifies this even before he develops the division of the duties to oneself and its concrete subsections: “For suppose there were no such duties [of the person to him or herself]: then there would be no duties whatsoever, and so no external duties either. For I can recognize that I am under obligation to others only insofar as I at the same time put myself under obligation, since the law by virtue of which I regard myself as being under obligation proceeds in every case from my own practical reason; and in being constrained by my own reason, I am also the one constraining myself”.44 After what has been said up to now, it becomes clear the duties to others depend on the duties to oneself. The obligations of the agent towards his or her own dignity preserve his or her aptness for the fulfillment of other duties of whatever type: the duties to oneself are the requirements for the conservation of interior freedom and of the person’s capacities as a rational agent and as a moral being. It would even be impossible to identify and recognize the duties to others as being such without preserving and strengthening the conditions of receptivity of duty and the faculties involved in moral judgement. The complete fulfillment of the duties to other persons is obviously conditioned by the progress and integrity of morality, and hence not only by the perfect duties to oneself, but even by the imperfect duties.45 42

229.

Cf. DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, pp. 226-

43 This is why Timmerman notes that the thesis of the apparent antinomy disappears by way of a reductio ad absurdum: the consequence of asserting that there are no duties to oneself would be unacceptable, since it would imply denying all duty as such. Cf. TIMMERMANN, Jens, “Duties to Oneself as Such”, p. 211. 44 MdS 417-418. On this same idea, cf. VzM 341. Timmerman considers the passage to be a reductio of the thesis that denies the possibility of the duties to oneself; cf. “Kantian Duties to the Self, Explained and Defended”, p. 510. 45 Cf. DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, pp. 157160.

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As I will discuss in a future section, even though the duties to oneself are in this sense necessarily prior to the duties to others, in some cases a particular vice with regard to others –as do the vices against the duties of love: envy, ingratitude and malice– attacks one’s own moral self-esteem, fosters self-deception and impedes the development of one’s capacities as an agent. This is emphasized by Kant himself.46 Above all, the justification of the duties to oneself is the logical and systematic consequence of an ethics of autonomy like Kant’s. As Klaus Steigleder has emphasized, with all due nuances, it could be held that every duty is in the final instance a duty to oneself, insofar as the agent “owes it” (schuldet) to his or her own practical reason.47 Jens Timmermann and Nelson Potter take the same position.48 This is because, in the final analysis, duty in kantian ethics does not involve an agent that is external to one’s own identity. This is also true when in its matter the duty refers to other persons.49 Even so, one can distinguish specific duties that only have as their object the humanity in oneself and not in anyone else. These are duties that are particularly singled out as self-referential.50 Cf. MdS 458-461. The vice of envy, for example, is notoriously at once the cause and the effect of an inadequate understanding of oneself, and of an improper comparison with other human beings in place of an appropriate comparison of one’s own moral status with the law of practical reason. Malice and ingratitude are also due to this cause, as Kant interprets them. I will discuss this in a later section. Cf. also DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, p. 132. 47 Cf. STEIGLEDER, Klaus, Kants Moralphilosophie. Die Selbstbezüglichkeit reiner praktischer Vernunft, J. B. Metzler Verlag, Stuttgart, 2002, p. 263. 48 Cf. TIMMERMANN, Jens, “Kantian Duties to the Self, Explained and Defended”, and POTTER, Nelson, “Duties to Oneself, Motivational Internalism and SelfDeception in Kant’s Ethics”, p. 377. 49 On this point, cf. the excellent discussion by VIGO, Alejandro G., “Autorreferencia práctica y normatividad”, p. 219. This is what, it seems to me, Guyer does not understand when he seeks to argue that in Kant there is no priority of the duties to oneself with respect to the duties to others; cf. GUYER, Paul, Kant and the Experience of Freedom. Essays on Aesthetics and Morality, p. 329. 50 Andrew Reath holds that one should avoid simply thinking that “all duties are duties to oneself” because this would mean forgetting that, in the duties indicated as referring to others, it is the dignity of those others that suffice as their ground. Nevertheless, he himself recognizes that in some sense, all ethical duties imply a self-reference, not qua ground of the obligation, but insofar as they require self-constriction, which is what 46

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As has already been mentioned, these duties to oneself presuppose care for and fostering of one’s own natural capacities, insofar as they serve moral purposes, and of one’s strictly moral capacities in and of themselves. Care is presupposed by the perfect, or negative, duties to oneself. At the same time, these latter duties are divided into those that protect the merely natural capacities of the human being (duties of the person to him or herself qua animal being, or rather, as a moral being that takes charge of the animal dimension of his or her existence) and those that protect the person’s own moral dispositions (the human being considered strictly as a moral being).51 All of these duties are present and at the same time culminate in the duty of the human being to oneself as one’s own innate judge, which is the duty that connects with the issue of conscience that I have already discussed, in regard to its dimension of aesthetic precondition. In turn, the formation of and attention to the conscience is assumed, and selfknowledge is seen as the first command of all the duties to oneself. Thus, this last section brings together and elevates all that has been said regarding the perfect duties to oneself, in a project of self-gnosis that presupposes and at the same time fosters the establishment of the conditions for the adequate functioning of the faculty of judgement. Later, Kant dedicates a significantly reduced space to the development of the imperfect or positive duties to oneself. The first of these is the duty to develop one’s own natural perfection, which he notes as being oriented towards pragmatic ends and which includes the dimensions of the soul and the spirit, as well as the entire semantic field of culture. Afterwards, the duty to improve one’s own moral perfection is discussed. In the light of the antecedents provided to the Metaphysics of Morals by the scholastic manual-based moral philosophy and its rationalist counterpart, it must be emphasized that the duties to oneself do not has been demonstrated here as possible –with the division between homo phaenomenon and homo noumenon– and as necessary, given the demand for autonomy. Cf. “Self-Legislation and Duties to Oneself”, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Interpretative Essays, pp. 349-370. 51 Manfred Kuehn notes that Kant owes this distinction to Baumgarten, whose influence is also detectable in the kantian treatment of the majority of the concrete duties to oneself. Cf. KUEHN, Manfred, “Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: the History and Significance of its Deferral”, p. 18.

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have the principle of their division in the distinction between soul and body. As I have discussed, there is only one objective-formal principle that distinguishes between restrictive and positive duties. In addition, there is one subjective principle according to which the animal aspect is considered in its relations with personality, or where the latter is analyzed in an exclusive manner as being the ground of morality. Kant’s reasons for discarding the division of duties between those relating to the body and those which relate to the soul are linked to the critique of rational psychology in the Critique of Pure Reason. Even though he allows for the theoretical use of this distinction for certain practical uses, he does not admit that there are two substances that would be the elements of moral obligation: “The subject that is bound, as well as the subject that binds, is always man only, and though we may, in a theoretical respect, distinguish soul and body from each other, as natural attributes of man, we may not think of them as different substances putting him under obligation. (…) Neither experience nor inferences of reason give us adequate grounds for deciding whether man has a soul (in the sense of a substance dwelling in him, distinct from the body and capable of thinking independently of it, that is, a spiritual substance), or whether life may not well be, instead, a property of matter”.52 It is clear, then –as it will also be in the case of Kant’s treatment of concrete duties– that in the Doctrine of Virtue he rejects, at least from a practical point of view, any kind of anthropological dualism understood in a basic form. Instead, the only duality is that of perspectives, i.e. that of homo phaenomenon versus that of homo noumenon. With this rejection Kant rejects a rudimentary perspective in which it would be the soul that obligates the body and the inclinations related to it. As I have shown, the inclinations are not evil in themselves, nor do they explain the propensity to evil that conditions the law towards incorporating the maxim of egoism. Nor is the body the repository of those rights that are generated along with duties when the body becomes incorporated as an object of 52

MdS 419.

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morality: “it is still inconceivable that man should have a duty to a body (as a subject imposing obligation), even to a human body”.53 4.2.2 Perfect duties to oneself54 In this way, and beginning not with what is most important but rather with what is the most basic condition of rational agency,55 Kant establishes self-conservation in his or her animal nature as the first duty of the human being to him or herself. To understand the “animality” referred to here, recall the distinction between the dispositions (Anlagen) towards animality, humanity and personhood that I have already discussed in the context of my citations of Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason.56 Animality is “original” in us, and is implicated in the very possibility of

53 MdS 419. Kant’s annotation here is probably a critique of Wolff and Baumgarten, who held that there did in fact exist duties to the body; cf. ANDERSON, Georg, “Kants Metaphysik der Sitten – ihre Idee und ihr Verhältnis zur Ethik der Wolffschen Schule”, p. 57. Kant himself, following Baumgarten, had at one point held that there were a set of duties to one’s own body; cf. VzM 378-379. 54 As I explained in the Introduction, I believe that the location of the perfect duties to oneself in the body of the text of the Doctrine of Virtue is correct, even though it does not completely agree with what Kant prefigures in the Introduction to the overall work, where these duties, because they are perfect, seem to better correspond to the Rechtslehre. As I mentioned at the time, the criterion for distinguishing between the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue is external coercion as a motivational factor in the first group, while, in turn, the distinctive trait of the duties corresponding to the second group would be the fact that self-constraint is their only possible motivational factor. As will become evident in the section on the perfect duties to oneself, these duties do not admit of external coercion – for how could the suicidal person be externally coerced, given that no punishment can persuade such a person to not take his or her life if he or she has already decided to commit suicide? As a result, these are duties of virtue. Therefore I do not fully agree with DURÁN CASAS, Vicente, Die Pflichten gegen sich selbst in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 43ff. However, Durán Casas admits that the perfect duties to oneself only correspond to law in a ius latum manner. 55 Regarding the basic and fundamental condition of the perfect duties to oneself in general – those relating to our animal nature and those relating to our moral condition – cf. DENIS, Lara, “Freedom, Primacy and Perfect Duties to Oneself”, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, p. 170. 56 Cf. supra and RGV 26.

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human nature, according to the relevant related passages.57 As with the rest of the dispositions Kant discusses, it is fundamentally oriented towards the good, and even towards collaboration with the practical reason. As I will show, the human being has inclinations (to survival, for example, or to the conservation of the species or life in society) that, in general, point in the same direction as that which the duties of virtue command. This is so even though they are not the ground of these duties58 –they cannot be, because animal impulses can also err and function in a direction that is opposite to what is commanded by reason.59 I have already explained that throughout the Tugendlehre a teleological vision is operating, such that nature establishes ends that reason recognizes as duties, and thus both planes merge. Animality is understood here precisely from a teleological perspective of nature that I will be able to analyze more concretely once I have broadly characterized the duties included in this group. Gregor suggests that the perfect duties to oneself can be summed up in the formula mens sana in corpore sano, provided that health is understood in a broad and normative sense, as being constituted by order and harmony between all the components of human nature.60 She also emphasizes that these duties are prohibitions of maxims that run counter to one’s personality and humanity by affecting one’s own animal nature.61 Cf. RGV 26. Cf. KU 432. This is how Kant incorporates the “convenienter natura vivere” of the stoic doctrine of oikéiosis into his own moral system: nature gives a certain indication to moral duties, but it itself remains subordinated to the properly moral perspective. Regarding the stoic origin of this idea, cf. SANTOZKI, Ulrike, Die Bedeutung antiker Theorien für die Genese und Systematik von Kants Philosophie. Eine Analyse der drei Kritiken, p. 172, although Santozki does not take the MdS into consideration and therefore sees the relationship between stoic oikéiosis and kantian formal ethics as being one of opposition, exclusively in the light of the GMS and the KpV. Concerning this same point, cf. MELCHES GILBERT, Carlos, Der Einfluß von Christian Garves Übersetzung Ciceros ‘De officiis’ auf Kants “Grundlegung zur Metaphysyik der Sitten”, p. 19 and p. 25. 59 Cf. DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, pp. 97-99. 60 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 129, n.5. 61 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 130. 57 58

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They are maxims of either total (in the case of suicide) or else partial self-destruction (in the case of mutilation, intemperance, drunkenness, etc. which destroy, at least for a time and in a partial manner, our capacity for reflective action; this would be the case for masturbation as well,62 in accordance with the conception that Kant has of its effects upon natural capacities). In all of these cases Kant is speaking of actions that are, in the final instance, irrational, where a physical capacity is directly affected –and therefore, indirectly, a capacity for moral action is also affected. Because he starts with perfect duties, Kant’s discussion proceeds by enumerating the acts or vices that are against this self-conservation,63 and it justifies the prohibition of each of these acts or vicious maxims on the basis of the supreme principle of virtue (and thus, in the final instance, on the basis of the categorical imperative).64 4.2.2.1 Arguments against suicide and self-mutilation Kantian arguments against suicide are particularly interesting, since in the occidental moral tradition what has been frequent is to argue against selfinflicted death by alluding to a duty tos God or to society; this is how the

Whose negative effects are only briefly mentioned in Ped. 497. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 130. S.J. Kersten (cf. “Treating Oneself merely as a Means”, in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue [Monika Betzler, ed.], Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2008, pp. 215-218) suggests that Kant’s ideas regarding the harmful effects of sexual self-satisfaction derive from a contemporary book, Onanism, by S. A. D. Tissot (1766), where the author states that masturbation causes weakness, gastric problems, lack of breath and memory problems, and creates indifference towards celibacy and towards marriage. Even if we admit that Kant had these supposed physical effects in mind, he himself recognizes that it is difficult to prove the evilness of these acts (cf. MdS 425) and instead does so, not by enumerating physiological reactions, but rather by emphasizing that in these acts the agent uses him or herself purely as a means for pleasure and thus commits a crime that is even worse than suicide, insofar as the latter at least requires courage, while sexual self-satisfaction is a mere passive giving up of self to sensible stimuli. 63 Cf. DENIS, Lara, “Freedom, Primacy and Perfect Duties to Oneself”, p. 177. 64 Cf. MdS 421. 62

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socratic argument runs, for example.65 Kant leaves open the possibility that the person who commits suicide fails in his or her duty to others, but here this is nothing but a concomitant consideration: “Killing oneself is a crime (murder). It can also be regarded as a violation of one’s duty to other human beings (the duty of spouses to each other, of parents to their children, of a subject to his ruler or to his fellow citizens, and finally even as a violation of duty to God, as man’s abandoning the post assigned him in the world without having been called away from it). But since what is in question here is only a violation of duty to oneself, the question is whether, if I set aside all those relations, man is still bound to preserve his life simply by virtue of his quality as a person”.66 The other element that draws attention in Kant’s argument against suicide is the critique of the stoics, to whose ethics he is, at other points and in certain fundamental intuitions, clearly indebted. In regard to suicide, Kant reproaches the stoic ideal of the wise man, stating that, if one truly believes that the human person can value anything (the tranquility of the soul, ataraxía, rationality itself) above life itself, this should generate such a respect for the practical reason in which the human being

65 Cf. Phaedo 61d-62c. Note how in the following passage Kant alludes to the socratic argument in his own treatment of the topic. Other examples of this type of argument can be found in Epictetus Diss. I, 9 and 24 and Marcus Aurelius, Medit, VII, 45. In VzM 372375 Kant uses this traditional argument. Nevertheless, in VzM 342-343 he had already established that God prohibits suicide because it is hateful, and not the other way around. As a result, its immorality must be demonstrated not by the teological argument but rather by the performative contradiction that it involves, and because it annuls the condition of fulfillment of all duties (cf. 369-370). 66 MdS 422. The possibility, which here is treated as marginal, of failing in one’s duty to God is mentioned, I think, in order to establish a contrast with the traditional arguments against suicide. As I will discuss in a later section, in the amphiboly of the moral concepts of reflection, there do not properly exist any duties to God, but rather there exists a mode of fulfilling all duties as if they were divine commands. In addition, in the Reflections Kant notes that there is a prohibition of suicide insofar as it violates one’s own dignity, but not as a transgression against God; cf. Refl. 6801: suicide contradicts the internal value of the person and of his freedom.

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participates, that it would precisely make the decision to take one’s own life inadmissible: “But there should have been in this very courage, this strength of soul not to fear death and to know of something that man can value even more highly than his life, a still stronger motive for him not to destroy himself, a being with such powerful authority over the strongest sensible incentives, and so not to deprive himself of life”.67 In my opinion, Kant offers two arguments against suicide in the Tugendlehre: one that coincides with that offered in the Grundlegung and another that is proper to the work from 1797. Both seem to me to be solid and convincing, and together, the argumentation is stronger than that of the GMS.68 The first is that of the non-instrumentalization of one’s own life, which, since it corresponds to the existence of a moral being, is an end in itself. Thus, its annihilation cannot be justified by reference to the negative conditions in which one lives (as is indicated in the Groundwork),69 nor in the face of any other circumstances, just as Kant states in the Doctrine of Virtue: MdS 422. Concerning the weak points of Kant’s argument against suicide in the GMS, cf. HOERSTER Norbert, “Kants kategorischer Imperativ als Test unserer sittlichen Pflichten”, in Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie II (Manfred Riedel, ed.), Verlag Rombach Freiburg, Freiburg, 1974, pp. 455-475. However, I do not agree with the author’s criticisms of the categorical imperative as being a principle at a disadvantage with respect to the utilitarian principles of generalization. 69 Cf. GMS 422, where Kant shows that suicide is prohibited via the first formula of the categorical imperative. What I would like to highlight regarding this argument is that the motivation of the person committing suicide is “being fed up with life” (ein Überdruß am Leben). As a result the possibility is left open for a self-sacrifice that ought not to be classified either as suicide or as culpable. Kant also emphasizes that here suicide is being used as a paradigmatic example of a perfect duty to oneself, generated by the contradiction “in thought” of the maxim upon being universalized. Cf. also GMS 429, where a parallel argument is in fact made that is derived from the formula of humanity, and which, according to what is stated here, is also present in the Doctrine of Virtue. Kant also speaks in this second passage about suicide as an action aimed at “escaping from a painful state” (um einen beschwerlichen Zustande zu entfliehen). Here he expressly states that he will not delve into the distinction regarding the amputation of members, exposure to 67 68

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“To annihilate the subject of morality in one’s own person is to root out the existence of morality itself from the world, as far as one can, even though morality is an end in itself. Consequently, disposing of oneself as a mere means to some discretionary end is debasing humanity in one’s person (homo noumenon)”.70 The second argument, found only in the MdS, is based on the notion that life is the condition of possibility of fulfilling all duties, and to renounce life would also mean voluntarily renouncing the duties that must be performed during its course, which would imply an optional alternative to practical-moral obligatoriness. The idea that it would be permissible would thus be contradictory to morality in itself: “Man cannot renounce his personality as long as he is a subject of duty, hence as long as he lives; and it is a contradiction that he should be authorized to withdraw from all obligation”.71 As can be seen, these arguments against suicide are not substantively based on a teleological consideration of human tendencies. Gregor highlights this point, indicating also that with subsequent duties this role changes and generates certain philosophical problems.72 Barbara Herman, for her part, holds that the treatment of suicide in the Tugendlehre is better than that of the Grundlegung and more suggestive, for although it is a perfect duty or duty of omission, because it is a duty of virtue it refers to maxims and not to actions, and as a result it can be characterized as a “duty of omission governed by the obligatory end of perfection”. As a result, it can be considered to be derived from a “contradiction in will” and not from a “contradiction in conception”, according to the criteria

dangers, etc., because this corresponds precisely to the system of morality, reinforcing what I stated earlier about Kant’s full consciousness of the meshing of the formal principle of ethics with the concrete duties that are derived from it. 70 MdS 423. 71 MdS 422. 72 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 139.

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established in the GMS.73 What is audacious about this reading is the interpretation of the prohibition of suicide as the open demand of a maxim of appreciation of life with respect to perfection. Stated in another way, it is a maxim of “non-suicide” justified by the obligation to aspire to moral perfection.74 Kant considers self-mutilation as a kind of partial suicide: through it one attacks the practical capacities of the human person and therefore also attacks one’s moral expression and the absolute value of practical rationality. Destroying an organ in one’s own body, notes Denis, implies for Kant that one is treating oneself, considered as a whole, as a relative value: to use a part of one’s own body in an instrumental fashion involves treating the organ as an object.75 In addition, in so doing, the agent eliminates a part of his or her capacity to propose and reach ends and therefore eliminates an aspect of rational agency and personality. Because this is the ground of obligation, the moral concept of self-mutilation does not include the act of allowing one of one’s organs to be removed in order to preserve one’s life (perfectly compatible with the formula of humanity)76 or of prescinding from a part of the body that is not properly an organ (such as hair, although Kant gives a number of curious precautions against its arbitrary styling).77 In this passage Kant’s clarification shows the operativity of the faculty of judgement in the formation of moral concepts, and also follows his discussion with a casuistic section which, in regard to these concrete duties, appears for the first time in the structure of the Doctrine of Virtue. This section will, from now on, accompany his discussion of each of the groups of duties treated. The presence of casuistic questions, which Kant Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Morality as Rationality. A Study of Kant’s Ethics, p. 201. The same thing seems to be suggested by GREGOR, Mary, “Kants System der Tugenpflichten”, p. lxii. 75 Cf. DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, p. 101, and VzM 124. 76 Cf. DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, p. 102. 77 Cf. MdS 423. The kantian examples of mutilation can seem surprising: for example, among them Kant mentions giving or selling a tooth for its implantation. In the consideration of these examples, one must consider the historical context and the risk for health in general that, at that time, was involved in the extraction of a tooth. 73 74

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provides even for perfect duties (as is the case here), shows that the restrictive duties also allow for a certain latitude, because they are determined by the faculty of judgement. However, this latitude is less than that for the imperfect duties, given that it is only a question of defining the what, and since they are negative duties it is not necessary to determine the how, how many, etc. This is because the very moral concept itself (in this case, that of mutilation or suicide) presupposes judgement and a process of reflection in its delimitation.78 Kant does not resolve the moral dilemmas that he brings up in the casuistic sections79 (he speaks about the usefulness of reflection and discussion about these cases in his section on the methodology of virtue, which I will study in the following chapter). However, in this specific section he appears to make it clear that he is in fact dealing with suicide from the point of view of its maxim. Hence, not every act by which an agent takes his or her own life should be considered a morally imputable suicide, but rather this will depend on the intention and on the circumstances included in the maxim of action. For instance, the concept of “suicide” does not include sacrifices undertaken for the good of others, or for one’s own country, or risks taken in order to preserve one’s own life. For Kant, not every Selbstöttung or Selbstentleibung is Selbstmord,80 and once again this determination in each case requires the intervention of the faculty of choice. Thus, in principle he would not classify as suicide a self-inflicted death with the aim of saving one’s country or the human race as a whole, taking a poison in order not to confront unjust condi78 Cf. STEIGLEDER, Klaus, Kants Moralphilosophie: die Selbstbezüglichkeit reiner praktischer Vernunft, p. 268. 79 STEIGLEDER, Klaus, Kants Moralphilosophie: die Selbstbezüglichkeit reiner praktischer Vernunft, p. 267, mentions that Kant’s response to these concrete cases would be helpful for the contemporary discussion about active and voluntary euthanasia. DURÁN CASAS, Vicente holds that, while in the casuistic sections of the Tugendlehre Kant tends to leave certain questions open while resolving others in a tentative manner, in the case of the questions about suicide he does not seem to resolve any of them; cf. Die Pflichten gegen sich selbst in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 239. 80 For a discussion of how not every Todschlag is Mord, cf. Refl. 7296, VzM 371-372 and GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 135.

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tions in the case of being taken prisoner, the self-sacrifice of a person with rabies in order to not infect others, or taking the risk of inoculating oneself with a vaccine: there could at least be held to be attenuating aspects in cases like these.81 The judgement, oriented by the categorical imperative, can treat acts like those enumerated here as being permissible, and/or can redescribe them under other categories. This moral reflection, founded on the understanding and extension of the moral concept in question, should be considered in the context of all the duties of Kant’s classification. 4.2.2.2 The duty of chastity This is also the case in the next duty to oneself, i.e. that of chastity (Keuschheit), where again Kant is speaking in terms of restrictive, perfect duties. In this case the duty is opposed to the act of dishonoring oneself by as a result of licentiousness (Wohllust). Failing in this duty consists in using one’s sexual faculties while having only animal pleasure in mind, instead of with the goal of preserving the species. Licentiousness, or the impulse towards carnal pleasures, unlinked from the purposes of nature and of the conditions placed thereupon by the faculty of reason, would degrade the humanity in one’s own person82 and therefore goes against the duties to oneself. 81 Cf. MdS 423-424. Kant appears to be referring to the same latitude for moral judgement in VzM 156-157, where nevertheless he goes further, treating the act of not defending one’s life as being permissible (although one cannot end it oneself) if preserving one’s life would involve dishonor or a coercion to act wrongly. Cf. DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, p. 101, STEIGLEDER, Klaus, Kants Moralphilosophie. Die Selbstbezüglichkeit reiner praktischer Vernunft, p. 266 and DURÁN CASAS, Vicente, Die Pflichten gegen sich selbst in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 216. Kant is clear here that the faculty of judgement, in its reflective use, must determine the limits of the concept of suicide itself. His justification of this point seems to me to be to be sufficient, and maintains the moral element in the evaluation of the immorality of taking one’s own life. Therefore, I disagree with Allen Wood’s criticism regarding precisely this question in WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 173. 82 Lara Denis emphasizes that Kant’s treatment of the duties relating to sexuality is paradigmatic in regard to its dependence on the formula of humanity of the categorical imperative; cf. DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, p. 82.

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Of course, the teleological concept of nature that is operating in the justification of this duty is obvious –as opposed to what occurred with the argument concerning suicide. In addition, it appears to go beyond the methodological limits imposed by critical philosophy on knowledge of natural finality. In reality, this teleological notion of nature does not only operate in regard to this duty, but also in the majority of the duties to oneself that follow, insofar as one is an animal and also a moral being. The MdS is not, however, the only kantian work on practical philosophy where natural teleology plays an argumentative role of some relevance.83 What is clear, as I have already stated, is that in the Doctrine of Virtue Kant is already relying on the Critique of Judgement and its justification of the reflective-teleological judgement,84 according to which one can postulate the finality of natural beings as an aid for the systematic and harmonious understanding of their constitution and of their relations with other beings. In his treatment of chastity as protection against the dishonor arising from voluptuosity, he makes explicit his recourse to natural teleology in the context of a reflective judgement.85 I hold that this is how natural ends operate as premises for Kant’s arguments, in particular for the derivation of the duties to oneself. In fact, Kant establishes, as a lower limit for the fulfillment of chastity, the Cf. for example GMS 395. Cf. KU 377. 85 MdS 424. We cannot understand our impulses nor the organic constitution of living beings without thinking of their connection teleologically, in the manner of a heuristic key for the use of related concepts. This kantian technique can be understood in a strong sense, whereby the natural ends referred to in his arguments assume a direct normative relevance and act as the principal grounds of obligation. They can also be understood in a weaker manner, such that the authority of natural ends in the justification of duties would be limited and their consideration would be subordinated to the conditions of rational agency. This would be a role that is instead expository, and would involve connecting the intuition with what is grounded a priori, or else treating the grounds of obligation as though they were merely indicative of the most general maxims for assuring the preservation of the integrity of our human nature. Once again, it seems to me that the role of this natural teleology is that of establishing certain things as ends, while it will be the a priori reason that establishes them as duties, while both flow together in the delimitation of obligatory ends, i.e. of those ends that are duties. The confluence of these planes, which in principle are distinct, is no doubt connected with the stoic theory of oikeiosis. 83 84

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duty to not act contrary to the natural end of the cohabitation of the sexes, which is procreation.86 The natural-finalistic character of the action that falls under the principle is not entirely convincing.87 Kant himself suggests this when he recognizes that: “But it is not so easy to produce a rational proof that unnatural, and even merely non-purposeful, use of one’s sexual attribute is inadmissible as being a violation of duty to oneself”.88 Thus, assuming that the acts prohibited here are anti-natural, it stills remains to be proven that they are immoral. For this purpose Kant introduces as a basis for his proof the fact that in these licentious acts the human person “surrenders his personality (throwing it away), since he uses himself merely as a means to satisfy an animal impulse”.89 In any case, as Thomas E. Hill Jr. has highlighted, it is clear that the use of natural teleology in the Tugendlehre –independently of whether it plays a stronger or weaker role in each concrete argument– it is not in any sense a return to a pre-critical ethics. Rather, it involves the intent to articulate and direct natural ends on the basis of principles of the pure practical reason.90 The derivation of the duty, therefore, once again proceeds fundamentally from the categorical imperative in its second formulation, and seeks to protect the personhood of the human being, understood as the capacity to respond to practical reason, which is in turn the basis for our dignity as ends in themselves. Carnal pleasure, unlinked from the finality of the preservation of the species or infringing any other of the conditions that are imposed by the practical reason in order for an end to be

Cf. MdS 426. Timmons emphasizes that Kant himself is conscious of the limits of this argument in “The Perfect Duty to Oneself as an Animal Being”, in Kant’s Tugendlehre. A Comprehensive Commentary, p. 238. 88 MdS 425. 89 MdS 425. 90 Cf. HILL, Thomas E. Jr., “Kant’s Tugendlehre as Normative Ethics”, pp. 234-255. 86 87

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permissible, would convert the human being into a mere means or a thing, thus contradicting respect for oneself.91 Kant appears to be too rigorist in issues of sexual morality when he holds that licentiousness, according to its form or intention, appears to surpass suicide in its degree of violation of duty, insofar as the latter, in contrast to the former, demands courage and is not a passive giving in to sensible stimuli.92 I wish to emphasize that this is only according to its form and is not the conclusion of the moral judgement in its totality, which, as Kant himself indicates in the casuistic section, must take into account, in issues of sexual morality, diverse circumstances. He even indicates areas in which specific permissive laws are applied (making use of the sexual faculties within a marriage in the case of sterility, for example).93 Mary Gregor affirms, along the same lines as what I have suggested, that in the duty to chastity and the prohibition of actions like masturbation,94 the natural-teleological argument meshes with what is commanded by the practical reason. The kantian prohibition would depend to a certain degree, then, on an empirical consideration that indicates that sexual self-satisfaction weakens human faculties and causes a mental state that is inconsistent with morality by prejudicing respect for oneself.95 What is odd is that, however debatable Kant’s posture might be with regard to natural effects in particular, this argument is –and Gregor emphasizes this as well– a definitive refutation of the frequent criticism of kantian ethics on the basis of a supposed marginalization of consequences in moral judgement. In his discussion of the duty to chastity it is clear that these consequences are included in the maxim, and this is why all those conducts are rejected that are seen as prejudicial to our natural

Cf. MdS 425. Cf. MdS 425. 93 Cf. MdS 426. 94 The prohibition of which also appears in VzM 391. 95 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 139. 91 92

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capabilities, precisely on the basis of the consequences of those conducts.96 The importance of the duty of chastity is explained by the ambivalence that the philosopher of Königsberg identifies –appropriately, in my view– in the exercise of our sexual faculties.97 On the one hand, in them the natural end of the conservation of the species is achieved, and this natural teleology has moral relevance. On the other hand, the pleasure associated with sexual inclinations is more than sensible, and proceeds from the faculty of desire (Begherungsvermögen) and this is why it can be converted into a passion (Leidenschaft) that is difficult to control. Above all, the moral risk of the sexual inclinations consists in the propensity to the instrumentalization of the person in a sexual relation –and not only of the other person, but also of oneself. 4.2.2.3 The duty of temperance The last of the duties to oneself grouped together with the obligations that consider the human being simultaneously as animal and as a moral being is that of temperance, which prohibits the clouding of one’s mind due to excess in consumption of alcohol or food. We have seen how Kant handles the teleological consideration of nature, and we have also seen how he applies the principle of virtue in order to demonstrate that all those behaviors are prohibited that involve the destruction of one’s own capacity for rational agency and that attack the value of humanity in oneself. On this basis, the justification of this final perfect duty to oneself is quite evident. Kant insists that it is not a matter of judging intemperance in terms of its disagreeable or prejudicial consequences for health, because this would be a merely prudential reasoning and would not be the ground of a direct duty.98 In Kant there is no glorification of the body for its own sake, and as a result there are no duties to the body as such; the moral failure in intemperance consists in that it impedes Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 147. 97 Cf. STEIGLEDER, Klaus, Kants Moralphilosophie. Die Selbstbezüglichkeit reiner praktischer Vernunft, p. 265. 98 Cf. MdS 427. 96

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practical reason, making impossible the integration of our animal nature with our rational condition.99 Of course, Kant begins his argument with the fact that it is impossible to establish a fixed measure regarding eating or drinking: the moral criterion is based on the fact that one abuses these means of attaining pleasure when, because of their consumption, “one inhibits or exhausts the faculty of using them intellectually”.100 The philosopher of Königsberg adds, sensibly, that alcoholism or drunkenness (Versoffenheit) and gluttony (Gefräßigkeit) make the agent unable for a time to “perform actions that require agility and reflection in the use of one’s forces”.101 One thus infringes a duty to oneself when one attacks one’s own capacity for rational agency. In all of these cases of abuse, internal freedom is placed at risk. Kant knows that food, alcoholic drinks and other substances (he mentions opium in particular) can generate addiction and force the user to increase his or her consumption. In addition, in some cases they foster avoidance of reality and produce weakness in all the faculties of the human being.102 Again, his discussion includes a perhaps surprising nuance when he notes that gluttony is at a disadvantage with alcohol consumption, since it involves a complete passivity of the senses and does not stimulate the imagination, something that intoxicating beverages in general do.103 Nevertheless, as can be seen in the casuistic section, this is not the only factor to be considered, but rather there is also the issue of the abject state that every addiction can generate, if the substance in question favors social connection, frankness and communication, etc. Again, as in the case of the counterintuitive comparison between suicide and licentiousness, it seems to me that Kant is highlighting a concrete aspect of the issues involved in moral judgement in order to avoid evaluative indifference in regard to certain topics. He does not, in my opinion, thereby wish to say

The is emphasized by DENIS, Lara in Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, p. 99, n. 28. 100 MdS 427. 101 MdS 427. 102 Cf. MdS 427. 103 Cf. MdS 427-428. On this point, cf. also VzM 381. 99

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that deliberation or the moral sentence itself are applied without considering the rest of the elements of the case. Although it is not necessary to insist too much on this point, now that we have left behind the reductionist interpretations of kantian ethics, Lara Denis reiterates that Kant’s sensible treatment of this duty of temperance is not in any way opposed to moderate enjoyment in eating and drinking, nor does it fall into rigorism or pettiness at all. Neither does he fail to emphasize the positive element in social gatherings or the social and intellectual value of banquets, although he notes that they can end up being invitations to intemperance.104 As is evident, the duties explained up to this point consider the human being qua moral being with an animal nature. The following group of perfect duties to oneself arises from a consideration of the human being only as a moral being, although affected by the propensity towards evil, with the result that the good must be represented as self-constraint, i.e. precisely as duty. 4.2.2.4 The duty of truthfulness and the risk of self-deception Since he is dealing with negative duties, Kant again proceeds by enumerating the acts or the vices that the duty restricts. The first violation of the human being’s duties to him or herself qua moral being is also the most serious: lying (die Lüge). The issue is particularly controversial in kantian ethics, due to the absolute prohibition of lying in the Groundwork and above all due to the discussion generated around the essay On a Supposed Right to Lie for Altruistic Motives, published in the same year as the Tugendlehre (1797) and written in response to a criticism by Benjamin Constant. Nevertheless, I will focus first of all on what Kant concretely says about lying in the Doctrine of Virtue, emphasizing those aspects proper to the treatment of the topic in that text. Only later will I relate it to certain ideas that arise in the discussion concerning what Kant says in others of his published works, i.e. in the Lectures and in the highly cited and controversial essay I have mentioned.

104 Cf. DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, p. 100, MdS 428, in the casuistical questions.

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The first thing to be emphasized is that, counter to what the moral tradition that was dominant up to Kant’s time said, and to what Kant himself has said in other passages, in the Doctrine of Virtue lying is interpreted as an infraction of the duties to oneself.105 I hold that this is why in the Tugendlehre Kant makes an immediate clarification that does not appear in other texts, i.e. the distinction between external and internal lies: “Lying (aliud lingua promptum, aliud pectore inclusum gerere) (…) A lie can be an external lie (mendacium externum) or also an internal. By an external lie a man makes himself an object of contempt in the eyes of others; by an internal lie he does what is still worse: He makes himself contemptible in his own eyes and violates the dignity of humanity in his own person”.106 Two ways of thinking about lying that are not pertinent here must be discarded: first, Kant does not deal with how a lie affects others (he deals in the Rechtslehre107 with the case of an infraction against the external freedom of others, such as a fraud or false declaration); secondly, he does not take into consideration the damage that may in fact be the outcome for the liar him or herself, since in that case it would be a merely prudential issue.108 Given that not all external lies are sanctionable, and that there are lies that properly correspond to the realm of ethics and its selfconstraint, the passage in the Tugendlehre that deals specifically with this vice is not very clear in regard to whether it is the external or the internal lie that is a violation of the duty to oneself. My interpretation is that in Kuehn emphasizes that this is one of the differences between Kant and Baumgarten, for whom lying –and avarice– are infractions of the duties to others. Cf. KUEHN, Manfred, “Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: the History and Significance of its Deferral”, p. 27. In Kant’s Reflections, lying already appears as an infraction against the duties to oneself; cf. 6801 and 7082. The argument is that lying makes respect for humanity impossible in the realm of communication. As I will show, this reasoning in the Reflections bears certain similarities with what is stated in the Doctrine of Virtue. 106 MdS 429: The quote in parentheses is from the Roman historian Gaius Salustius Crispus (Sallust), although in other citations it appears as “…aliud clausum in pectore, aliud in lingua promptum habere”. 107 Cf. MdS 238. 108 Cf. MdS 429. 105

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this part of the text Kant is primarily interested in the internal lie, understood as that lie which is directed towards oneself. I base my interpretation on the fact that the three duties of the human person to him or herself considered qua moral being have to do with self-knowledge: sincerity with oneself, the recognition of one’s own needs, and one’s own courage. In the very architecture of the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant’s review of these duties concludes with the treatment of a fundamental duty to selfknowledge that belongs to the human being as his or her own innate judge; moreover, it corresponds with that first command of the duties to oneself: the socratic gnothi seáuton. This is why both Mary Gregor and Lara Denis emphasize that, among the perfect duties to oneself, the first command, rather than being against lying per se, is against self-deception.109 Why, then, does Kant in this passage make allusion to what the person says or expresses to another?110 Furthermore, as I will discuss later, why does he make reference to the communication of thoughts as the télos of language? My position is that Kant is working under the supposition that internal lying and external lying lead to each other. In fact, at the end of the section on lying, he insists that lack of veracity with oneself is worthy of the greatest reprehension, because, among other reasons, “it also propagates to other human beings”.111 Even more importantly, there also exists a road in the opposite direction: when one lies externally, when one violates the “supreme principle of truth”,112 as Kant calls it, one subordinates the mandate of the practical reason to obtaining a benefit or to the demands of self-love, and under this maxim it is probable that the agent will end up lying to him or herself. Nelson Potter interprets in the same sense Kant’s argument about lying as an infraction of the duty to oneself: Kant sees lying as a propensity towards self-deception.113 Stéfano Bacin, on the other hand, thinks that Cf. DENIS, Lara, “Freedom, Primacy and Perfect Duties to Oneself”, p. 178 and GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 153. 110 Cf. MdS 429. 111 MdS 431. 112 MdS 431. 113 Cf. POTTER, Nelson, “Duties to Oneself, Motivational Internalism and SelfDeception in Kant’s Ethics”, p. 376. 109

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the point is not the danger of self-deception; rather, when one lies –externally or internally– one harms one’s own honor.114 Lara Denis, for her part, agrees with what I have said here, insofar as the argument from the “natural purpose” of language (which, as I will discuss, Kant brings into the discussion) would not of itself justify seeing veracity as being a duty to oneself. In addition, she notes the limited argumentative use of natural teleology in kantian ethics. Therefore, she explores the alternative that I have proposed here, according to which Kant would be thinking that external lying leads to internal lying, and therefore to an opacity in one’s judgement of oneself. This interpretative alternative, she thinks, is still too indirect. She concludes that perhaps lying is an infraction against oneself simply because in so doing one shows contempt for one’s own rational capacity.115 Her posture seems to me to be an insufficient explanation, and is at least as indirect as mine. In addition, it seems to me that these passages of the Doctrine of Virtue have to be read in close relation with what Kant has stated about self-knowledge as the first command of all the duties and about the moral conscience as an aesthetic prenotion of the receptivity of duty. Furthermore, there is the point I will discuss later, i.e. the duty of the human person in the role of being his or her own judge. In this context, to affirm that what is vicious about lying to oneself is precisely that it impedes self-knowledge and perverts the juridical process in one’s own conscience seems quite plausible to me. Perhaps the “weak” part of my interpretation is that it rests partially on a fact that is in principle psychological: the tendency of the liar to end up believing in his or her own lies or to lie to him or herself after having lied systematically to others. Nevertheless, as I have shown, this type of anthropological consideration is not foreign to the MdS, nor can it be avoided in the application of moral principles. This interpretation is, in my judgement, the only one that sufficiently explains why lying is seen to go against the duties to oneself in the systematic development of the Tugendlehre. It seems to me that in part of Kant’s reasoning in support of what he says in the MdS against lying, he follows the same general lines that he Cf. BACIN, Stéfano, “The Perfect Duty to Oneself Merely as a Moral Being”, in Kant’s Tugendlehre. A Comprehensive Commentary, p. 251. 115 Cf. DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, p. 93. 114

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presents in other texts: lying destroys the dignity of the human being. A maxim that includes lying is non-universalizable –the performative contradiction of such a maxim is particularly clear116– and, when it involves another person, it instrumentalizes him or her and attacks his or her value as a per se end. Moreover, when the lie is directed towards oneself, it also harms dignity. Kant’s recourse to the teleology of language, in my opinion, is subordinate to the other grounds of obligation discussed earlier: “[Lying] is an end that is directly opposed to the natural purposiveness of the speaker’s capacity to communicate his thoughts, and is thus a renunciation by the speaker of his personality and such a speaker is a mere deceptive appearance of a man, not a man himself”.117 The examples of internal lying that Kant describes in the Doctrine of Virtue are particularly sensitive: that of the person who lies to him or herself about his or her own faith in God “in order to win His favor in case He should exist”,118 and that of the person who, because of weakness, justifies his or her good desires to him or herself as though they were meritorious acts.119 In both cases it is a matter of self-deceptions that go against the conditions of objectivity of the moral judgement and affect the purity of intention that is part of the maxims. Gregor moves in the direction of this interpretation when she notes that in the Tugendlehre, the discussion of lying as a moral fault has three fundamental elements: the action defined as such, the attitude that accompanies it, and the self-deception that it involves. She insists that, if self-deception is in fact the basis of one’s deception of others, the kantian argument about lying would be more solid and its extreme rigor would be more justified.120 She refers to the passages in Religion where Kant presents radical evil itself in terms of a fundamental self-deception, Cf. GMS 422, 429-430. MdS 429. 118 MdS 430. 119 Cf. MdS 430. 120 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 153 116 117

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and he describes the propensity to this internal lying in biblical terms, which are also repeated in the Tugendlehre.121 I would like to reiterate that, if my hypothesis is correct and exterior lying involves a maxim that will ultimately affect sincerity with oneself, this fact can explain Kant’s emphasis on the prohibition of lying, and his rejection of the supposed right to “white lies” or philanthropic falsehoods.122 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 155-156 and RGV 38. On this issue I agree with Gregor. On the other hand, DURÁN CASAS, Vicente defends the position that the justification of the duty not to lie qua duty to oneself rests on what Kant notes concerning the teleology of the human communicative capacities, what he calls the Sprachmaschinenargument. Cf. Die Pflichten gegen sich selbst in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 264. In addition ENSKAT, Rainer (“Ist die Moral strukturell rational? Die kantische Antwort”, in Racionalidad práctica: Alcance y estructuras de la acción humana, pp. 97-121) has developed an argument based on a passage in the Anthropology (ApH 332, where Kant speculates about how a species of rational beings that could not express their thoughts would behave, and on this basis he draws counterfactual conclusions about the human capacity –in principle only a technical one that is morally neutral– to silence them). According Enskat’s argument, communicativity is the most elemental form of practical rationality, and as a result lying would be the ratio of all moral evil (since it perverts this communicativity). If we accept this hypothesis, it would explain Kant’s mention in the Tugendlehre of the Sprachmaschine argument and the radicalness of the prohibition of lying. Nevertheless, as I have tried to suggest over the course of this book, and as I will continue to do in the exposition of the duties of virtue that still remain to be discussed, I hold that it is not necessary that lying be the ratio of all moral evil. Rather, it is sufficient to admit that in all moral evil there is a component of self-deception, i.e. of internal lying. In addition this view explains the radicalness of the kantian position regarding this issue (and it also explains the risk for ethics of a disruptive natural dialectic, as Kant warns in GMS 403), without a commitment as dubious as that which Enskat takes on in his characterization of evil. 122 In addition it must be noted that, in the essay where he discusses this topic, no matter how counterintuitive his examples might be, they derive from a strict theory of imputation (legal imputation, in this case, since the essay takes that perspective; cf. ÜvR 426-427. Cf. in this regard the excellent article by REATH, Andrew, “Agency and the Imputation of Consequences in Kant’s Ethics”, in Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory, OUP, Oxford, 2006, pp. 250-269). According to this theory, the person who lies must make him or herself responsible for the consequences of the lie, whereas the person who follows the law and tells the truth is not responsible for any undesirable consequences that might arise as a result. In any case, I believe it is important to emphasize that what Kant is denying is a supposed right to philanthropic lying, but he does not completely avoid the role of the reflective judgement in the formation of the concept of what 121

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In sum: the treatment of lying in the Doctrine of Virtue explains it as being disruptive insofar as it consists in, or leads to self-deception, which is particularly grave insofar as it is the condition of performability of all immoral maxims, even if it is not necessarily its ratio. Thus, as Michael K. Green has pointed out,123 if the Tugendlehre says that knowing oneself is the first and most important of all duties, what is opposed to it is precisely self-deception and not ignorance. This, then, is how one should read the passage of Religion where Kant states that interior falsehood is the ground and foundation of evil,124 as well as the other passages of this work and of the MdS itself where he alludes to lying in biblical terms.125 Self-deception can occur in several ways, which Green lists in his text: by considering oneself an exception to the law; thinking that there is a greater latitude than there really is in a given precept, or misinterpreting this latitude; formulating the maxim falsely (I have already stated in what sense this can be avoided in the kantian theory of action, but even so I note that sincerity with oneself is necessary); distracting oneself with diversions or with a petty discourse in order to avoid appearing before the tribunal of the conscience; fulfilling only the letter of the law while lacking the correct motive; comparing oneself advantageously with others instead of doing so with the purity of the moral law; etc. Green also notes must be typified as lying (the latitude here is analogous to that which I spoke of when discussing suicide). Kant’s Lectures have already opened the door to kinds of falsehood that are not necessarily lies (cf. VzM 446-448), and the casuistic section in the Tugendlehre suggests that there are falsehoods that should not be classified as lies. He then reiterates that when there is in fact a lie, falsehood brings with it imputability with regard to the consequences of the deception. In addition, as Hofmeister emphasizes, in no part of Über ein vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu lügen does Kant state that one must tell the truth to a potential murderer. Instead, he limits himself to insisting that the moral law continues to apply in this case, such that what is to be done must be judged morally and not just according to criteria of efficacy. The same commentator emphasizes that, in order to properly interpret the intention of what Kant says in his polemical essay against Constant, one must read it from the perspective of the Tugendlehre, published in the same year and more clear in regard to the duty to veracity. Cf. HOFMEISTER, Heimo E. M., “The Ethical Problem of the Lie in Kant”, in Kant-Studien LXIII, 1972, pp. 353-368. 123 Cf. GREEN, Michael K., “Kant and Moral Self-Deception”, Kant-Studien, vol. 83, 1992, pp. 149-169. 124 Cf. RGV 42n. 125 Enskat also comments, for example, on MdS 429 and 431.

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that, as I will discuss later in this book, arrogance and false humility are cases of self-deception. In fact, as we can verify, in all vices there is an element of this culpable opacity. 4.2.2.5 The duty against avarice The next perfect duty of the human being considered only qua moral being is that of the prohibition of avarice (Geiz). Kant makes clear that he is not referring to greedy avarice (habsüchtigen Geiz, which is the disposition of the person who wants to increase his or her wealth beyond the limits of necessity), which would go against the duty of beneficence and whose prohibition is linked to a duty to others. Nor is he discussing miserly avarice here (Knickerei) or stinginess (Knauserei), which instead violate the duties of love to others. As a perfect duty to oneself, Kant is discussing the prohibition of that avarice that involves the “restricting one’s own enjoyment of the means to good living so narrowly as to leave one’s own true needs unsatisfied”.126 When I discussed the kantian criticism of Aristotle, I cited part of Kant’s argumentation in this section of the Tugendlehre, since this is precisely the duty that he takes advantage of to insist that the difference between a virtuous and another vicious action does not depend on the principle of mesotés. Rather, it depends on the maxims of the virtue and the respective vices, and this is how one distinguishes being appropriately spendthrifty from being avaricious.127 As a result, it is appropriate here to emphasize that the vice of avarice is pointed out as such, and is prohibited because it presupposes “the principle of possessing means for all sorts of ends, but with the reservation of being unwilling to use them for oneself”.128 This goes against the internal rationality of the action but also against its external rationality, because the agent thus deprives him or herself “of the comforts necessary to enjoy life; and this is directly contrary to duty to oneself with regard to the end”.129

MdS 432. Cf. supra. 128 MdS 432-433. 129 MdS 433. 126 127

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It should be noted that this latter delimitation can be problematic, insofar as the enjoyment of existence does not form part of the ground of the duty. The perfecting of oneself and the fostering of the happiness of others are ends that are duties, but the seeking of one’s own happiness or welfare cannot be. The avaricious person –in this concrete case– seems to violate his or her own welfare, but does not violate practical reason itself, or his or her own dignity as an agent. Nevertheless, Kant makes a comment in the casuistic section that shows how the prohibition of avarice is specifically moral, rather than prudential or strategic. He probes to discover the maxim that underlies this excessive care concerning the means of subsistence, and shows that this maxim does in fact violate interior freedom and goes against human dignity: “But miserliness is not just mistaken thrift but rather slavish subjection of oneself to the goods that contribute to happiness, which is a violation of duty to oneself”.130 Lara Denis notes, with regard to this duty against avarice, that the inversion that this vice involves amongst ends and means, and the resulting submission of our practical reason to material things, are so evidently vicious that the only way in which avarice can maintain itself as a vice is due to the human tendency to self-deception (i.e. considering the accumulation of goods to be a preventive measure, a discipline, or even a virtue).131 Denis’s commentary seems to me to be important, due to what I have insisted on throughout this book: the understanding of the Tugendlehre as a project of self-knowledge, and of virtue as a struggle for selftransparency. 4.2.2.6 The duty of true humility The last of the perfect duties to oneself that is described briefly in the Tugendlehre (since, as I will show, the duty to self-knowledge is not classiMdS 434. Cf. DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, p. 96 and n. 24. The point emphasized by Denis can be even more solidly supported with what Kant himself states in VzM 400-406 regarding the risk that the avaricious person might appear to be virtuous in the eyes of others. Cf. Also GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 159 and WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 173. 130 131

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fied as just one more perfect duty, but rather as the apex and synthesis of all the duties to oneself) consists in the prohibition of false humility (humilitas spuria). This –the prohibition of servile behavior or false humility and its difference from authentic humility– is a topic that has been investigated little in kantian studies. Nevertheless, it is relevant because it points to the fundamental duty of self-knowledge, since it is partly on the basis of one’s self-perception that one establishes moral relations with others. A good part of the vices are also generated in this way. Furthermore, it connects in an evident way –although all the duties to oneself do this more or less implicitly– with self-esteem as an aesthetic disposition for the receptivity of duty, as I have already discussed.132 In addition, it is a topic that Kant had already discussed in his Lectures.133 It is for all of these reasons that Jeanine Grenberg has proposed an entire reading of Kant from the point of view of humility.134 In addition, for the same reasons Jens Timmermann takes humility as a paradigmatic example in order to demonstrate the relevance of the duties to oneself.135 This is one of the duties that is most clearly derived from the second formula of the categorical imperative: “But man regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical reason, is exalted above any price; for as a person (homo noumenon) he is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself, that is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world. He can measure himself with every other being of this kind and value himself on a footing of equality with them. (…) Humanity in his person is the object of the respect which he can demand from every other man, but which he must also not forfeit”.136

Cf. supra. Cf. VzM 341, 348-349. 134 Cf. GRENBERG, Jeanine, Kant and the Ethics of Humility. A Story of Dependence, Corruption, and Virtue. 135 Cf. TIMMERMANN, Jens, “Kantian Duties to the Self, explained and defended”. 136 MdS 434-435. 132 133

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False humility directly attacks the dignity of the humanity in the person him or herself. It either involves humiliating oneself in the face of another, with hidden intentions, i.e. degrading oneself in order to acquire the favor of the other, or else it is generated by an inadequate comparison with regard to the other person.137 With great psychological acuity, Kant notes that spurious humility derived from a comparison with other human beings is nothing other than arrogance, for by it one seeks to be equal to or superior to others precisely in regard to that humility and to thus acquire a higher value than they have.138 As Lara Denis highlights, false humility is servility, and it is false not only because one perhaps does not feel humility, but also because in any case it would be a humility born of an erroneous comparison, and put into practice with a mistaken criterion: a comparison with another person and not with the moral law in itself.139 In contrast, true humility (humilitas moralis) arises, not from a comparison with other human beings, but rather from a comparison with the moral law, and if done with sincerity and rigor, this comparison should reduce arrogance. Moreover –precisely in the same duality of reactions implicit in the sentiment of respect itself– it guarantees us at the same time a correct moral self-esteem, since it shows us to be capable of such internal legislation.140 Cf. MdS 435-436. Cf. MdS 435. 139 Cf. DENIS, Lara, Moral Self-Regard. Duties to Oneself in Kant’s Moral Theory, p. 89, nn. 3 and 4. I will not delve here into the examples that Kant gives regarding servile attitudes (Kant is opposed, for example, to kneeling before any other person or even in front of religious objects) because, as Durán Casas comments, Kant’s general treatment of the issue of servility is convincing and solid even without recourse to his examples, which evidently are very culturally and contextually dependent; cf. DURÁN CASAS, Vicente Die Pflichten gegen sich selbst in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 289. For a discussion of these servile attitudes from Kant’s point of view, the reader may consult also GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 161. 140 Cf. MdS 436. As SHERMAN, Nancy has shown (“Aristotle, the Stoics and Kant on Anger”, in Perfecting Virtue, pp. 215-240), the duty of true humility presupposes, for Kant, that certain emotional reactions of indignation and irritation are justified in the face of actions that attack one’s own dignity. On this issue Kant separates himself from stoic 137 138

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4.2.2.7 The duty of the human being as his or her own innate judge I will now move on to the most interesting of all the duties to oneself: that which in good measures summarizes and brings to a head Kant’s treatment of the ends linked to the care of one’s own dignity and moral capacity, i.e. the duty of the human person to him or herself “considered as his or her own innate judge” (als den angeborenen Richter über sich selbst). This is the section that offers greatest concretion to the Gewissenslehre that I discussed earlier in the context of the conscience as the aesthetic precondition of the receptivity of duty. Here Kant proposes the mandate of self-knowledge that permits forming the moral conscience and that obligates the person to constantly struggle to identify and eliminate –in an asymptotic manner– any impure motivations in the maxims of action. It is, at the same time, the most clearly socratic chapter of the Doctrine of Virtue (even if, as I have attempted to demonstrate, the entire work is socratic). As a result, it serves as the ultimate justification of the method that Kant proposes in the final part of the book. In addition, it is the section that connects with the transition (Übergang) represented by the episodic section concerning the amphiboly of the moral concepts of reflection. This is a crucial passage for the connection between ethics and religion, and I will delve into it after my analysis of the duties to others, so as to dedicate the necessary attention to it. In regard to the moral conscience, this passage establishes a connection between the interior tribunal of the conscience and the faculty of judgement that is more explicit than that resulting from the aesthetic preconditions: “The internal imputation of a deed, as a case falling under a law (in meritum aut demeritum), belongs to the judgement (iudicium) which, as the subjective principle of imputing an action, judges with rightful force whether the action as a deed (an action coming under a law) has occurred or not. Upon it follows the conclusion of reason (the verdict), that is, the connecting of the rightful result with the action (condemnation or acquittal). All of this takes place before a tribunal apatheia, and it is once again evident how affective reactions can take on a function in kantian ethics.

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(coram iudicio), which, as a moral person giving effect to the law, is called a tribunal (forum)”.141 The Gewissen is precisely the subjective principle of imputation of the action, and therefore can be identified with an instance of the Urteilskraft, as I have mentioned in earlier passages. This explains, as I have also discussed previously, why there cannot be an erroneous conscience, given that the subjective imputation is performed or is not performed. The conscience in this sense is a term “of success” with respect to an interior certainty of having compared the action with the law, even if it is the understanding –the faculty that could be in error in this regard– that establishes the contents of this linkage. Thus, the moral conscience, which cannot err, does not completely represent the space in which this entire juridical process takes place, nor does it substitute for all the faculties and contents involved in this process. Rather, it alludes to the interior confirmation that this process has been carried out: “Consciousness of an internal court in man (‘before which his thoughts accuse or excuse one another’) is conscience”.142 Kant reiterates what he had stated earlier when he characterized the conscience as an aesthetic predisposition of the receptivity of duty: it is not a matter of something arbitrarily developed by the agent, but rather of something incorporated into his being. The title of the current section of the Tugendlehre, in turn, refers to the innate character of this internal judgement. In addition, the philosopher of Königsberg reiterates that as a result no human being lacks conscience, although in the condition of depravity one can cease to pay attention to its dictates.143 He thus concludes with a forceful definition of the moral conscience: “it is the inner judge of all free actions”.144 Again, as he has done in various other places in the Doctrine of Virtue, he faces the problem that this judge is, in one sense, oneself, and in another sense, it must be another person, another moral being that can act as a judge who has “all power MdS 438. MdS 438. The citation internal to the text is from St. Paul; it corresponds to the Epistle to the Romans 2:15. 143 Cf. MdS 438. 144 MdS 439. 141 142

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(in heaven and on earth)”.145 However, the existence of this source of divine justice cannot be affirmed in any other way than for practical purposes, in the manner of a postulate. Thus, in a way that is perfectly consistent with the postulates of the KpV, and which also makes explicit the connection between the Metaphysics of Morals and Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, Kant establishes the play of perspectives of the amphiboly of the moral concepts of reflection.146 Through this dual perspective, one can see in the judge of the conscience both one’s own identity (which is, therefore, autonomous) as well as the practical demands of a transcendent being: “[C]onscience must be thought of as the subjective principle of being accountable to God for all one’s deeds. In fact the latter concept is always contained (even if only in an obscure way) in the moral selfawareness of conscience. (...) The concept of religion is here for man only ‘a principle of estimating all his duties as divine commands’”.147 I will analyze this amphiboly in greater depth after discussing the duties to others. For the moment, I simply wish to highlight the fact that the duty of the human person as judge of him or herself therefore involves this perspective of fulfilling all duties qua divine commands. However, it also involves that self-knowledge that is the necessary condition –as I have shown over the course of this book– for the adequate formulation of the maxims, i.e. of the counterfactual exercise that is presupposed by the identification of the grounds of determination themselves. In this way, therefore, self-knowledge is the condition of the very operativity of the categorical imperative and of an appropriate humility, of care for one’s life and of its means, and of truthfulness; all these ends are demanded by the dignity of the human being qua gifted with practical reason. Therefore, he describes it as the “first command of all duties MdS 439n. In which one cannot be, in my opinion, reduced to the other. Therefore I do not completely agree with the approach of SCHWARZ, Gerhard, Est Deus in nobis. Die Identität von Gott und reiner praktischer Vernunft in Immanuel Kants “Kritik der praktischen Vernunft”, Verlag TU Berlin, Berlin, 2004. 147 MdS 439-440. 145 146

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to oneself” (ersten Gebot aller Pflichten gegen sich selbst),148 i.e. the Delphic principle: “This command is ‘know yourself (scrutinize, fathom) yourself’ not in terms of your natural perfection (your fitness or unfitness for all sorts of optional or even commanded ends) but rather in terms of your moral perfection in relation to your duty. That is, know your heart–whether it is good or evil, whether the source of your actions is pure or impure. (…) Moral self-knowledge, which seeks to penetrate into the depths (the abyss) of one’s heart that are quite difficult to fathom, is the beginning of all human wisdom. (...) (Only the descent into the hell of self-knowledge can pave the way to godliness)”.149 This duty can be seen as having characteristics of an imperfect duty, insofar as it can never be completely satisfied and demands, more than mere fulfillment, a constant struggle and asymptotic progress. As I will show later in this book, in speaking of the duty of one’s own moral perfection, Kant indicates that it is an imperfect duty precisely for this reason. In addition, this duty of self-knowledge can be seen as restrictive with regard to the two postures which, on the basis of what I have discussed up to this point, can be seen as equally reproachable: that of contempt for oneself due to a contempt for humanity as a whole, and that of indulgent self-esteem.150 148 MdS 441. My proposal is that the title should be taken literally, including both the perfect duties to oneself as well as the imperfect duties, even if the topic is explained prior to the analysis of the positive duties in the Tugendlehre itself. 149 MdS 441. This last phrase is a reference to Hamann, according to BORGES, Maria de Lourdes, “Psicologia empírica, Antropologia e Metafísica dos Costumes em Kant”, p. 2. 150 Cf. MdS 441. The kantian argument against anyone who would despise him or herself out of contempt for humanity in general is particularly severe: this posture is contradictory, because “it is only through the noble predisposition to the good in us, which makes man worthy of respect, that one can find a man who acts contrary to it contemptible” (MdS 441). I believe that this objection is applicable to all the forms of misanthropy and nihilism that seek to base themselves on human corruption and the experience of evil: if it were not the case that human dignity existed and the good were real, these reproaches due to corruption and evil would not even be thinkable, and as a result the mis-

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If, as I have suggested, this first command of self-knowledge applies to all the duties to oneself, it is thus also the condition of fulfillment of the duties to others and therefore of duty in general. The duty to oneself as one’s own innate judge can be, as Thomas E. Hill Jr. has correctly seen, a second-order duty that embraces all others, and the same must be said of self-knowledge itself –and of the duties, as I will discuss further along, of struggling to be holy and perfect. These are duties of virtue that are focused on seeking virtue in itself.151 The location of this passage concerning the duty of the human being as his or her own innate judge, at the end of the section about the perfect duties to oneself, and just before Kant’s treatment of the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection, can be explained by the fact that the command rounds out his theory of moral conscience, demanding a constant self-examination for the purpose of achieving full adaptation to the law: “Impartiality in judging ourselves in the light of the law, and sincerity in confessing to ourselves our own courage or lack thereof, are duties towards oneself that are derived in an immediate way from the first command of self-knowledge”.152 4.2.3 Imperfect duties to oneself As I have already discussed, Kant dedicates a considerably smaller space to the imperfect or positive duties to oneself in comparison with what he says concerning the perfect duties.153 The maxims in which the imperfect anthrope and the nihilist fall into a performative contradiction simply by formulating their own position. 151 Cf. HILL, Thomas E. Jr., “Kant’s Tugendlehre as Normative Ethics”, pp. 234-255. The problem is resolved by considering these to be “metaduties”, as indicated by STRATTON-LAKE, Phillip in “Being Virtuous and the Virtues: Two Aspects of Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue”, in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, p. 101, which is consistent with the fact that a duty of virtue (that of perfection or that of sanctity) seems to be identifiable with the Tugendverpflichtung in general. 152 MdS 441-442. 153 Durán Casas suggests that this is so because the foundation of the imperfect duties to oneself is already present in the Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue; cf. DURÁN CASAS, Vicente Die Pflichten gegen sich selbst in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 328.

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duties to oneself are concretized are extremely general, and this is why Kant almost limits himself to merely stating them. There is a duty to oneself of the development and increase (Entwicklung und Vermehrung) of one’s natural perfection: this is understood to include cultivation (Anbau) of the faculties of the spirit, the soul and the body (Geistes-, Seelen-, und Leibeskräfte),154 i.e. of the capacities linked to the reason, understanding and matter of the human being, respectively.155 As I have already noted, the overall effort to form these faculties should be called culture (Kultur). As Ana Marta González emphasizes in her work Culture as Mediation. Kant on Nature, Culture and Morality, the use of the term Kultur in Kant co-implies civilization (from which it will be demarcated later, in the 19th century, when “culture” is seen as connected to something which is properly spiritual, in a socialized sense closer to Bildung), and fundamentally signifies a mediation between nature and morality. Therefore, culture is identified with humanity as the second of the dispositions (Anlagen) enumerated in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, where it is placed at an intermediate stage between animality and personhood.156 As González emphasizes, it is perfectly appropriate that culture appears as a duty in the Tugendlehre, given that the development of virtue presupposes a complete transition from animality to humanity.157 In addition, the Critique of Judgement defines culture as the Gregor clarifies what each of these groups or types of faculties are referring to: the Geisteskräfte are understanding, judgement and reason, while memory and imagination are Seelenkräfte. These latter, just as with the powers of the body, must be oriented and subordinated to the higher powers, those of the spirit. Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 166-167. 155 For a comparison between these duties of natural perfection (divided into those relative to the spirit, the soul and the body) with the aristotelian distinction between types of goods, cf. SHERMAN, Nancy, Making a Necessity of Virtue, p. 142, n. 52. It should be remembered that already in GMS 423 the duty of developing one’s own talents, i.e., the duty of culture, appears as exemplifying the application of the categorical imperative. Cf. GONZÁLEZ, Ana Marta, Culture as Mediation. Kant on Nature, Culture and Morality, p. 57. 156 Cf. RGV 26. 157 Cf. GONZÁLEZ, Ana Marta, Culture as Mediation. Kant on Nature, Culture and Morality, pp. 13-18. González emphasizes also that this duty points towards a qualitative and not quantitative perfection (it does not demand the realization of all the possibilities of personal growth –at least not in the individual. Rather, it is licit to expect this type of 154

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aptitude of a rational being for any end in general, and therefore for the ends of freedom.158 In this sense, as Roulier also notes, possessing culture is not to possess virtue, since culture admits of moral ambiguities and even involves certain obstacles to the fulfillment of duty. Nevertheless, culture smooths the road to moralization insofar as it transcends nature by way of skill and discipline.159 Therefore, in this case the promotion of culture itself can be considered in a broad sense to be a duty of virtue. Returning to the concrete passage of the Doctrine of Virtue, it is noteworthy that Kant affirms, right in the title of the section itself, that this consideration of natural human capacities is from a “pragmatic point of view” (in pragmatischer Absicht). In what follows he clarifies that this does not involve a consideration of the empirical advantages that the development of nature may bring with it, but rather a strictly moral commitment: “Hence the basis on which man should develop his capacities (for all sorts of ends) is not regard for the advantages that their cultivation can provide; for the advantage might (according to Rousseau’s principles) turn out on the side of his crude natural needs. Instead, it is a command of morally practical reason and a duty of man to himself to cultivate his capacities”.160 The passage merits several comments: first, it embodies a pragmaticmoral perspective and not a pragmatic-prudential one. This demonplenitude to result from the moral progress of the species as a whole– albeit only a morally harmonized development). Cf. p. 50. And the same author lucidly notes that, in contrast to what occurs in the texts on Philosophy of History or even in the KU, where the human being is seen more as a “moment” of cultural becoming, it is in the Doctrine of Virtue that culture is treated from a perspective that is more properly practical, while the human being is treated as an agent of culture; cf. p. 315. 158 Cf. KU 431 and GONZÁLEZ, Ana Marta, Culture as Mediation. Kant on Nature, Culture and Morality, p. 182. 159 Cf. ROULIER, Scott M., Kantian Virtue at the Intersection of Politics and Nature. The Value of Soul-Making, p. 94. 160 MdS 444-445.

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strates the broad semantics of “the pragmatic” in Kant161 and reinforces our idea of the reflexive incorporation of pragmatic anthropology within the moral plane. It also explains the ground of determination of these duties to develop one’s own natural perfection: the human being must strengthen his or her capacity to attain those ends that are possible for his or her faculty of choice, and thus must develop his or her rational agency beyond that needed for basic necessities.162 Because this is a broad duty, doing so involves a great latitude (“some among them more than others, insofar as men have different ends”), for each moral agent freely determines how and in what measure he or she must cultivate each of these capacities, thus affecting the obligatoriness of the duty in terms of the maxim and not concrete actions. This becomes even clearer as a result of what Kant adds next: “Which of these natural perfections should take precedence, and in what proportion one against the other it may be a man’s duty to himself to make these natural perfections his end, are matters left for him to choose in accordance with his own rational reflection about what sort of life he would like to lead and whether he has the powers necessary for it”.163 The passage is valuable insofar as it refutes the impression that I have referred to on various occasions, i.e. that of a Kant who drains the life from vital choices in regard to duties and prohibitions. In the quote just cited he explicitly affirms that, as a result of the broad policy of perfecting one’s own natural being, the faculty of judgement can choose a concrete path to follow by considering which will be more pleasant, and may 161 As R. Louden indicates, in Kant can one can identify at least four senses of the term “pragmatic” (pragmatisch): 1. as that which leads to attaining one’s own ends, whatever these might be; 2. as that which constitutes prudence –Klugheit– i.e., which is conducive to happiness as an end that can be assumed to be present for every rational being; 3. as that which the human being does and must do for him or herself; 4. as that which does not merely involve schooling but rather one’s entire life. The latter two senses already include the moral perspective within themselves. Cf. LOUDEN, Robert B., Kant’s Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings, p. 69. 162 Refl. 7162 appears to relate this duty of the cultivation of one’s own talents with the biblical parable of the “buried talents”. 163 MdS 445.

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take this into account in the calculation of the skills necessary for each option of cultural growth. These duties are paradigmatic, therefore, in regard to the margin that the imperfect duties leave to the faculty of choice.164 Herman emphasizes that this duty of developing one’s own talents also involves a constant self-examination: even those agents who believe they need no further talents or any posterior development of those already possessed are still morally obligated to re-examine themselves and to admit that, as human beings, they are finite and dependent, and that their capacities are always incomplete with regard to all the ends that are possible.165 The same author also notes that it is easy to confuse the duty to develop one’s own talents with a pragmatic-prudential demand and to lose sight of its strictly moral character. Kant’s treatment of this duty –as is also the case with the duty of beneficence, which I will discuss in turn– is one of the moments of his ethics in which a “utilitarian” or consequentialist reading is tempting. Nevertheless, Herman shows that this is an incorrect reading: strictly speaking, it would not be prudentially irrational to follow the maxim of not fostering one’s own talents, just as it would also not necessarily be irrational to live with a maxim of not helping others. Rather, it is a moral duty to struggle to perfect oneself –and to help others– because the categorical imperative shows the opposing maxims to be “contradictions in the will”: the agent must desire, rationally, and in the context of a consideration of the finite and imperfect conditions of human life, a world in which he or she can develop such 164 Cf. WOOD, Allen, Kant’s Ethical Thought, p. 329: it is this breadth of the duties of virtue that refutes the criticisms that WILLIAMS, Bernard aims at Kant (expressed in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Routledge, London, 2006): in kantian ethics there is no renunciation of a fundamental personal project of identity and life. Other authors criticize the same point in Kant’s ethics, and in the ethics of the modern era in general (cf. STOCKER, Michael, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories”, in Virtue Ethics, pp. 66-78.) At least in Kant, it is clear that the broad duty to foster one’s own perfection is open to all possible ends. It permits, for example, one’s being called to a specific profession or vocational preference, and thus synthesizes both the pragmatic and moral aspects and provided a wide margin for the decisions that must be taken in the light of reflective judgement, as GONZÁLEZ, Ana Marta emphasizes (cf. Culture as Mediation. Kant on Nature, Culture and Morality, pp. 59-62). 165 Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Morality as Rationality. A Study of Kant’s Ethics, p. 239.

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talents and provide aid to those who need it. The derivation and justification of these duties is not, therefore, utilitarian in any sense.166 The second part of this brief section regarding the imperfect duties to oneself deals with the duty to elevate one’s own moral perfection (Erhöhung der moralischen Vollkommenheit).167 This duty has two faces, the first of which is subjective: that of purity (Lauterkeit), i.e. that the law be sufficient as a motive, without mixing in other intentions, acting strictly aus Pflicht.168 The second is objective: that of perfection (Vollkommenheit, i.e. the consideration of the complete duty and its full realization).169 This is summed up, respectively, in the evangelical maxims: “be holy”170 and “be Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Morality as Rationality. A Study of Kant’s Ethics, p. 240. However, in conformity with what I have already indicated it is clear that teleology does play a certain role in these duties; cf. DURÁN CASAS, Vicente, Die Pflichten gegen sich selbst in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 318-319, where the author even states that this is the most “aristotelian” part of the kantian system of duties due to its teleological consideration. The fact that Kant does not justify any of his duties on the basis of utilitarian reasoning is discussed in TIMMERMANN, Jens, “Why Kant Could not Have Been a Utilitarian”, Utilitas, vol. 17, n. 3, November 2005, pp. 243-264. 167 I would like to clear up a possible confusion: moral perfection, in the strict sense, is not included in the duty to promote one’s own culture that I have just spoken of. For Kant, as I have said, culture fosters humanity but cannot lead of itself to personhood (the third of the Anlagen in RGV 26). It does not itself attain to morality, since morality is rooted in the will, which is beyond the civilizing mechanisms of nature and of culture itself: acting aus Pflicht transcends the dynamic of culture. Cf. GONZÁLEZ, Ana Marta, Culture as Mediation. Kant on Nature, Culture and Morality, p. 123. 168 Cf. BARON, Marcia W., Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, p. 158. Baron defends a model of “overdetermination” of moral action, where one can have the motive of duty united with other motives, provided that each one of them is sufficient for the performance of the concrete action. This is not opposed to purity in the Gesinnung, which does not demand that the agent prescind from all other motives. Rather, it only requires being prepared for eliminating other motives in the face of the unconditionality of the motive of duty. I will not go into depth in this explanation of “overdetermination” because as I have already said, I think, with Barbara Herman, that rather than speaking of motives in parallel to that of duty, it is fruitful to explore how moral motivation permeates the entire deliberate field of the agent, making the other motives an expression of morality. Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, “Making Room for Character”. 169 Cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 170. 170 Cf. MdS 446, Leviticus 19:2, 1 Peter 1:16. In certain of the Reflections Kant talks about these ideals of sanctity and perfection: e.g. 6611 and 6634 (where he insists that 166

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perfect”.171 From the objective perspective, this duty of being perfect is, precisely, perfect, insofar as the idea that it proposes as an end is demanding and complete. From the subjective point of view, however, it is a duty that is paradigmatically imperfect and typically conceived of from the point of view of the asymptotic dynamic of infinite growth in virtue.172 Considered integrally, this duty is, therefore, the “imperfect duty to be perfect”.173 4.3 Duties to others 4.3.1 To other human beings In contrast to the duties to oneself, in the section on duties to others Kant does not feel obligated to resolve any antinomies regarding their these ideals are necessary so that the human being does not claim the pretext of an incapacity for being moral). Cf. also ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 172. Allison comments on how this search for sanctity by way of virtue is crucial in the postulate of the immortality of the soul in the KpV. He also holds that this “duty of sanctity”, which is perfect in its quality but broad due to human imperfection, is inconsistent precisely because it is broad: were this so, all duties would be imperfect due to this very instability of human beings. Allison thinks that Kant makes this distinction in an ad hoc fashion in order to justify his peculiar treatment of sanctity as a duty. Gregor highlights the same point (cf. GREGOR, Marie, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 173). For her part, Maria Fasching comments also on the linkage of this duty of sanctity with the postulate of the immortality of the soul; cf. FASCHING, Maria, Zum Begriff der Freundschaft bei Aristoteles und Kant, p. 156. BECK does the same in A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, p. 267. 171 Cf. MdS 446, Matthew 5:48. Thomas Hill, in “Imperfect Duties to Oneself”, in Kant’s Tugendlehre. A Comprehensive Commentary, pp. 304-305, also refers to 1 Peter 1:16 and Philippians 4:8. Cf. BARON, Marcia W., Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, p. 6. Baron emphasizes that this duty of one’s own perfection is “slightly” less broad and more rigorous than that of helping others. 172 Paton notes that Kant’s recognition that these duties are imperfect is sufficient for distancing him from a rigorist ethics “in stoic fashion”. He can thus be seeing as proposing a more human ethics, in which one is already fulfilling one’s duty by moving towards perfection and sanctity and struggling to attain them; cf. PATON, Herbert J., The Categorical Imperative, p. 216. 173 MdS 447.

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existence, and immediately proceeds to give a criteria for subdivision that only applies to this set of duties. Here he distinguishes between duties that are meritorious or supererogatory (verdienstlich) and those that are owed (schuldig).174 Even if the terminology is somewhat confusing, the ratio that separates one from another is very simple: a meritorious duty to someone else obligates that other person towards the agent as well, while the duty that is owed does not in itself generate any legitimate expectation of reciprocity on the part of the person who is the recipient of the action.175 Thus, for instance, a favor generates an obligation of gratitude on the part of the person who receives the favor, and is therefore an action whose fulfillment is meritorious on the part of the benefactor. On the other hand, abstaining from showing contempt for another person is owed and does not authorize the agent to expect any gratitude for so doing. A second criterion of subdivision –which, in my opinion, overlaps with the former and is neither identical nor completely parallel to it– is the following: duties to others are accompanied by two fundamental feelings: love176 and respect.177 In regard to the appearance of these feelings One can certainly, as Cortina does, translate schuldig by “obligatory”. Nevertheless, this would generate a confusion, since the meritorious duties, qua duties, are also obligatory. I have chosen to translate schuldig as “owed” (just like Gregor does) in order to emphasize that we are dealing with duties that the other person in question has the right to demand of me, duties which are in that sense demanded or due to the other person. This is opposed to the duties of love, which are meritorious or “supererogatory” precisely insofar as they are not morally demandable by the other (at least on the part of any other individual human being in an undetermined general context). By choosing these terms, I am also in a certain sense taking a position with respect to the discussion about whether kantian ethics permits a consideration of supererogatory actions. This discussion is between HILL, Thomas E., Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1992, pp. 147-175, and BARON, Marcia W., Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, pp. 32-72. 175 Cf. MdS 448. 176 For a review of the use of the concept of love (Liebe) in kantian ethics, starting with the Lectures and including in particular this passage of the Tugendlehre; cf. HORN, Christoph, “The Concept of Love in Kant’s Virtue Ethics”, in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, pp. 147-172. Horn explains very well how, moving in the realm of the transcendental topics –which I will discuss in a later section– Kant reinterprets the biblical mandate of loving one’s neighbor via his concept of “practical love”, which makes love, qua pathological 174

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in kantian discourse,178 it is immediately clear that in both cases he is already speaking of “practical feelings”, informed by the moral law. It is therefore also evident that respect here is not exactly the subjective aspect of the moral law that is discussed in the KpV, which functions as a fundamental motor of all moral action. Rather, it is something more restricted,179 which can be present in distinct proportions with regard to love and which, like love, regulates the relations between human beings: “[Love and respect, as duties to others,] can be considered separately (each by itself) and can also exist separately (one can love one’s neighbor though he might deserve but little respect; and can show him the respect necessary for every man regardless of the fact that he would hardly be judged worthy of love). But they are basically always united by the law into one duty, only in such a way that now one duty and now the other is the subject’s principle, with the other joined to it as accessory”.180

principle, into something which is chosen in freedom and which is morally significant. He also connects love as the principle of a subtype of duties with love for neighbor as an aesthetic prenotion (as I have already discussed), and shows that love understood in this way is a complement of respect and not a substitute for it or something that contrasts with it. 177 Already in Refl. 6601 Kant is exploring the relationship between love and respect qua sensations. In this passage he holds that respect is superior in regard to the approval of what is respected, but love more effectively grounds the inclination. In addition, he establishes a certain asymmetry, insofar as we seek more to be respected than to be loved, but we are more inclined to love the other person than to respect him or her, because in love one perceives ones own preferences, which in the case of respect are limited. 178 In VzM 407 Kant is already speaking of love and respect as being distinct and perhaps complementary natural impulses. 179 This is pertinently clarified in GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 181, n.1, and is also commented on by GUYER, Paul in Kant, p. 255. 180 MdS 448. Schönecker comments usefully on what is signified by accesorisch, and compares this accessory union of the general cases with the intimate union that is presupposed in the duty of friendship, which I will discuss later. Cf. SCHÖNECKER, Dieter, “Duties to Others from Love”, in Kant’s Tugendlehre. A Comprehensive Commentary, pp. 314-328.

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The argument, therefore, for affirming that in these passages Kant is speaking of respect in a restricted sense is that respect can fail to be present in a case of practical-moral love, or it can be present in diverse proportions, while when it is understood as it is in the KpV it is the condition or motor for any maxim of moral action. This does not presuppose that we are dealing with two senses that are mutually disconnected. Respect, as an accessory feeling in the maxims involved in the relations between human beings, is an effect of respect in general for the moral law; it is the same as with that love which is properly practical-moral. I see this difference reflected in the fact that, further along, Kant speaks of respect between human beings as observantia, while in the KpV the equivalent of Achtung in a strong and fundamental sense is reverentia.181 The restricted sense of Achtung in this passage becomes clearer when Kant develops an analogy with the laws of attraction and repulsion in the physical world, and speaks of love in the sense of closeness and of respect –in this restricted and concrete usage– as being the force that causes distancing.182 Kant refers to this dynamic of attraction and repulsion as involving a tension between two “great moral forces” (großen sittlichen Kräfte) and affirms that it would be catastrophic for morality if one of the two were to disappear. It is evident that the equilibrium proposed between love-closeness and respect-distance (an equilibrium that reaches its apex in the relation of friendship, as I will show) is necessary for the dynamic of “sociable unsociability” that Kant finds in human nature.183 181 Cf. MdS 449-450. It seems to me that Marcia Baron does not clearly demarcate this distinction between the two senses –one fundamental and another derived– of respect. As a result, she problematizes the duties of love and respect in the Tugendlehre through what she calls “puzzles”, e.g. whether they are feelings or maxims, whether love does not already presuppose respect in order to be so called, whether in reality respect presupposes distance, etc. Her treatment of these duties is more defensible when establishing the difference between reverentia and observantia, following what Kant himself suggests. Cf. BARON, Marcia W., “Love and Respect in the Doctrine of Virtue”, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays, pp. 391-407. The difference, in contrast, is correctly stated in DARWALL, Stephen, “Kant on Respect, Dignity and the Duty of Respect”, in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, pp. 176-197 and in PATON, Herbert J., The Categorical Imperative, p. 65 n. 2. 182 Cf. MdS 449. 183 This is emphasized by BARON, Marcia W., “Love and Respect in the Doctrine of Virtue”, p. 392.

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Respect, in this restricted sense, as one of the moral forces, implies maintaining a certain distance –as is obvious, not in a merely physical sense– in order to not invade the personal “space” of those around us and to avoid using them solely as means and not as ends in themselves: love involves a closeness in regard to intimacy and knowledge in order to be able to take on the friend’s permissible ends as one’s own.184 One can find an apparent contradiction in Kant’s discussion of this topic: in MdS 448 he states that “love and respect are the feelings that accompany the carrying out of these duties [to others]”185 while further on he says that he does not understand love here “as a feeling (ästhetisch)”.186 Nevertheless, I would like to reiterate that this can be resolved by recourse to what I discussed earlier, in the section on the aesthetic prenotions for the receptivity of duty: Kant, in the Doctrine of Virtue, commits himself to an incorporation of the affectivity at a practical level. As a result, love is not considered in a merely passive fashion, i.e. as an agreeable sensation that is present or not and which we cannot be morally obligated to have. Instead, it is viewed as a maxim that one interiorizes and that ends up molding the character, and thereby the affective response, of the agent. It is a question, here, of feelings that are already moral, of an affectivity that is already formed under the conditions of morally correct maxims, and this is why one can speak of a duty to love and respect others. The kantian distinctions of this section can thus coincide: the duty to love one’s neighbor is broad compared with that of respecting him or her (because the first is positive and the second negative).187 Fulfilling 184 Concerning this point, see SWANTON, Christine, “Kant’s impartial Virtues of Love”, in Perfecting Virtue, p. 242. Swanton seeks to resolve the issue raised by Baron about whether love and respect are in fact opposites by insisting on their possible harmony. It seems clear to me that, in regard to moral forces, there is a relative opposition that is precisely what generates the equilibrium point in friendship, in a way that is exactly analogous to how one achieves a balance between gravitational forces in the physical laws of matter. 185 MdS 448. 186 MdS 449. 187 The distinction is already sketched out in Refl. 7264. Clearly, the duties of respect are not negative in the same sense as the legal duties are, given that in addition, as I discussed earlier, they are intermixed with the duties of love in various proportions in our

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the first is meritorious; fulfilling the second is not, and therefore it is called here, in an analogous way, schuldig: owed or due. Clearly, in a basic sense of the term, both duties, qua duties, are morally obligatory. 4.3.1.1 Duties of love Kant speaks of an “ethical law of perfection: love your neighbor as yourself”.188 I would like to reiterate that in order to speak of love as a duty, one must interpret it as a practical-moral love, which enters into the affective aspect of benevolence by way of action according to a maxim of beneficence. Thus, Kant distances himself from the solipsistic, misanthropic and anthropophobic postures that he enumerates and condemns.189 Love, therefore –as one can confirm via a study of the concrete duties of love that Kant discusses– is not, in this sense, a substitute for respect qua Achtung or moral sentiment. Instead, it is a derivative of the latter understood as reverentia, and is at the same time a complement of respect seen as observantia or as intersubjective distance. Neither is it a product of a kantian repentance with regard to the unicity of respect qua motor of the practical reason; rather, it is a mere recognition of those affective reactions that, being permeated by the moral motive, make the demand of the duty come closer to our moral intuitions. This is, I believe, how the concept of Liebespflichten should be understood in the Tugendlehre, and also how I believe other late passages in the kantian corpus should be understood.190 In alluding to love as the necessary complement of duty – Ergänzungstück– these passages do not involve a contradiction with pure ethics but rather the plain and simple recognition of the role of affecttivity in human nature.191

intersubjective relationships. On this point, cf. GREGOR, Mary, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 183-186. 188 MdS 450-451. 189 Cf. MdS 450. 190 For an exploration of the kantian mentions of the “duties to love” in other works prior to the MdS, such as the GMS itself, the reader can consult SCHÖNECKER, Dieter, “Duties to Others from Love”, p. 311. 191 Cf. ED, 338; cf. also ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 166 and LEYVA, Gustavo, “Immanuel Kant: la razón de la acción”, p. 342.

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I would like to insist on the importance of the dynamic that Kant introduces: beneficent action is converted into benevolence, and practical love –doing good to others– feeds back upon affectivity and thereby generates a sentimental love, which, because of its free and strictly moral origin, is not totally pathological. Because doing the good (from a place of complete freedom) leads to loving (in the sentimental or affective sense), that which is pathological can be taken in, elevated and transformed by the practical. The inclination is formed on the basis of maxims and nature is molded on the basis of freedom.192 What can be seen in this dynamic, as Barbara Herman highlights, is that desires can be rationally formed and developed, permeated with practical rationality. Kantian ethics is, therefore, more than an exercise of the strength of the rational against desire: it is a complete proposal for the formation of character.193 As I mentioned earlier in this work, in the derivation of the duties of love Kant uses the formula of universality (specifically, in the derivation of the duty of benevolence or beneficence). This is despite the fact that, as I have discussed, his most frequent practice in the Doctrine of Virtue is to derive duties from the formula of humanity. I also noted that these formulations cannot be separated and that it is better to view duties as flowing from the categorical imperative as an integral whole. The argument for beneficence, which is parallel to that in the GMS,194 albeit significantly more developed and better explained, can be confused with a pragmatic-utilitarian approach. However, it refers instead to helping others as a condition for rational action and therefore as something from which one cannot prescind when universalizing the maxim itself: “I want everyone else to be benevolent toward me (benevolentiam); hence I ought also to be benevolent toward everyone else. But since all others with the exception of myself would not be all so that the maxim would not have within it the universality of a law (…) the law making benevolence a duty will include myself, as an object of benevolence, in the command of practical reason. (…) [The duty of benevolence] permits you Cf. FASCHING, Maria, Zum Begriff der Freundschaft bei Aristoteles und Kant, p. 172. Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Moral Literacy, p. 10. 194 Cf. GMS 422. 192 193

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to be benevolent to yourself on the condition of your being benevolent to every other as well”.195 What Kant is doing in these lines is to prepare his explanation of how it is possible that one can be asked to love one’s neighbor as oneself if the immediacy of one’s own being marks a difference that cannot be overcome in regard to the degree of interest taken in one or another maxim. He is not denying that there is a gradation of interest in one’s relationships with other people –and which forms part of the latitude that is proper to the maxim of the imperfect duty. On the contrary, he recognizes the difference in degrees of interest in regard to beneficent action without thereby allowing the criterion of universalizability to be affected: “For in wishing I can be equally benevolent to everyone, whereas in acting I can, without violating the universality of the maxim, vary the degree greatly in accordance with the different objects of my love (one of whom concerns me more closely than another)”.196 This clarification should be unnecessary, given that an ethical proposal as sophisticated and solid as Kant’s will obviously take account of the fact that the maxim of beneficence must make distinctions. Beneficence is more obligatory and even more effective amongst those people who are closest to the agent, both because of the reach of his or her actions, the knowledge that the agent may have of the necessities of the possible beneficiaries, participation in common institutions and the obvious dependence on context for the moral significance of an action.197 In addition, I have already discussed the fact that Kant dedicates a brief section to indicating that the principles of duty should be tipified in order to be distinctly applied according to the different circumstances and state of the persons affected by the action. Nevertheless, in the face of criticisms that attribute to kantian ethics an inhuman impartiality that is unable to justify the preference for one’s own family members and for those people closest to one, it must be insisted that what the test of the categorical MdS 451. MdS 452. 197 Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Moral Literacy, pp. 205-207. 195 196

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imperative demands is impartiality in the judgement. On this basis, in turn, one can admit –and in fact must admit– that partiality that is necessary in human feeling and action. The criticisms of kantian impartiality fail due to not distinguishing these two planes.198 In fact, for Kant, as Allen Wood indicates in his focus on the characterization of the duties of love and respect, the closer the relation is with a given person, the more strict my duties are with him or her. In fact, their fulfillment may even extend to being owed and not merely meritorious as a function of these degrees of closeness and intimacy.199 This is correctly noted by Barbara HERMAN in The Practice of Moral Judgement, chaps. II and IX, and by Marcia W. BARON, in “Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics, and the ‘One Thought Too Many’ Objection”, in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, p. 262. Baron holds that the fact that the rational justification is impartial does not mean that one is acting on the basis of a neutral impartiality; on the contrary, one can say from an impartial point of view that what is due is to act in a non-impartial way on the basis of love or friendship, for instance. And thus kantian ethics can explain the fact that, at a certain level, I do good to those who are mine because they are mine (cf. pp. 251-252) at the same time that I avoid letting this allow me to fail to fulfill the duties to others to whom I am not related in the same way. I agree with VOGT, Katja Maria (“Duties to Others: Demands and Limits”, in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, pp. 241-242) that this special benevolence towards those who are close to us that Kant admits is part of the legacy of the stoic notion of oikeiosis, although I do not see, as does Vogt, that this is deficiently integrated into kantian ethics. Perhaps the current of moral philosophy that does in fact incur in an excessive demand for impartiality is utilitarianism; in any case, this criticism definitively does not apply to kantian morality. 199 Cf. WOOD, Allen, Kant’s Ethical Thought, p. 328 and ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 195. It is clear that the duties of love presuppose a dimension of partiality that Kant accepts and justifies. Nevertheless, Christine Swanton has attempted to also emphasize that, at least in certain cases in which the duties of love can be invoked, this partiality cannot be justified by just any type of reason: he holds, for example, that not forgiving someone because of some personal attraction to or lack of intimate relationship with them would be immoral; hence forgiveness, understood as a duty of love, would also have an aspect of “impartiality”. Cf. “Kant’s Impartial Virtues of Love”, pp. 241-259. His conclusion, which I find interesting, is that there are certain duties of love that are impartial (beneficence, gratitude, forgiveness, the cultivation of sympathy, courtesy, friendliness); others involve taking someone’s part (family relations, friendship), while others are intermediate (affability and hospitality, for example). Clearly the maxims of a duty that involves taking someone’s part –for example, those towards one’s own parents– limit maxims of impartial love, such as those of beneficence towards strangers. This shows, therefore, that it is not a matter of a conflict between duties nor of making 198

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4.3.1.1.1 The duty of beneficence The concrete duties of love are divided, in turn, into three: that of beneficence (Wohltätigkeit), that of gratitude (Dankbarkeit) and that of sympathy (Teilnehmung). In regard to the first, I have already noted that it feeds back into affectivity and also generates a benevolence understood as a rejoicing in the happiness of others. And, as I have also already discussed, the argument is the same as that of the Grundlegung. It is an argument that has at times been confused with a kind of utilitarian calculus, although in fact it refers not to the consideration of an advantage that the agent may gain in the future, but rather to an attention to the universal conditions of human action.200 These conditions are always limited in their reach, and thus require for their constitution a framework of collaboration –or, considering the latitude of the maxim, at least a framework of non-indifference– in order to attain their ends: “For every man who finds himself in need wishes to be helped by other men. But if he lets his maxim of being unwilling to assist others in turn when they are in need become public, that is, makes this a universal permissive law, then everyone would likewise deny him assistance when he himself is in need, or at least would be authorized to deny it. Hence the maxim of self-interest would conflict with itself if it were made a universal law, that is, it is contrary to duty. Consequently the maxim of common interest, of beneficence toward those in need, is a universal duty of men, just because they are to be considered fellow men, that is, rational beings with needs, united by nature in one dwelling place so that they can help one another”.201 I would like to highlight two brief comments by Kant himself concerning this duty of beneficence. In the case of rich people –defined as exceptions to some of them, but rather a weighting of the rationes obligandi of each of their normative pretensions in order to define what the single duty is. Cf. p. 247. 200 The fact that the argument is not utilitarian in any respect is clearly explained by Lewis White Beck; cf. A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, p. 162. HERMAN, Barbara dedicates an entire chapter to proving this point in The Practice of Moral Judgement, ch. III. 201 MdS 453.

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those who possess means that exceed their own necessity– beneficence is no longer to be considered as meritorious.202 Instead, it must be exercised as if it were an obligatory duty that should not humiliate the person benefitted or make him or her feel obligated; Kant even suggests that the beneficent act should be performed in secret, and calls this disposition true moral wealth.203 The second observation is that which he makes in the context of the casuistical questions regarding this duty: he states that the limit of beneficence is where we ourselves end up needing the beneficence of others.204 This, of course, refers to the duties to oneself, and in addition is the logical consequence of the demand for universalization of the maxim of action. He shows, in addition, how one maxim can limit another, thus avoiding a conflict between duties, indicating how in each circumstance the distinct grounds of obligation are articulated. This does not mean that making the correct decision ceases to be a complex issue in certain contexts, in the face of grounds of obligation that are in dispute: rather, this must be resolved by the faculty of judgement in each case.205 202 Similarly, in the Lectures (416, 455) Kant make it clear that beneficence towards the poor, rather than being meritorious, is an act of restitution of what corresponds to them as human beings: if there were justice, Kant notes, there would not be any poor people. For an interpretation and contextualization of these passages, and in order to weight the possibility of differing readings of Kant with regard to social justice, the reader can consult WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 199. 203 Cf. MdS 453. Kant notes further along that in circumstances where there is a great economic gap caused by bad government, inequality in fact obligates the rich to practice beneficence. In such a situation this duty perhaps no longer merits the name of “beneficence”, and should not be considered to be meritorious or as something which one can brag about. Instead, it should be seen as a matter of strict justice and the fulfillment of something which is owed; cf. MdS 454. 204 Cf. MdS 454. 205 This is why, in Kant, strictly speaking, there is no conflict of duties, but rather there is only one duty, and the conflict exists at the level of the rationes obligandi. This is because moral judgement only establishes one duty for each situation of action, by means of a maxim that incorporates in itself all the morally relevant characteristics of this situation, weighting the various demands in relation to one another and limiting the subordinate maxims according to their priority and posteriority. Thus, for instance, in the face of the disjunctive duty to save one or another person in a situation of danger, the maxim can be established to save as many people as I can, although evidently preference is to be giv-

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This kantian argument to support the duty of beneficence is especially eloquent in regard to the integration of one’s own permissible ends with those ends that are obligatory: his reasoning does not begin with the imposition of an end that is separate from those that the agent already has, but rather it shows how pursuing the ends that in fact one already has involves recognizing the need for help from others and, therefore, admitting the moral necessity of the disposition to help other people. This type of integration between the ends of each agent and the ends that are duties, says Herman, is the key for understanding the structure of character in Kant’s ethical proposal.206 4.3.1.1.2 The duty of gratitude The duty of gratitude, according to Kant’s definition, is that of honoring (Verehren) a person who has done us good.207 It must be distinguished from a mere prudential maxim –gratiarum actio est ad plus dandum invitatio– that seeks future benefits.208 Kant is quite concerned, as I have already discussed, about the consequence of the action in the recipient: one must be careful that the person benefitted not feel humiliated and that he or she can feel gratitude without also feeling hurt in his or her pride.209 This is understandable if one keeps in mind what was discussed earlier in regard to the vices that follow from an insufficient moral selfen to family members and people close to me, if only these latter can be saved. Concerning the difference between duties and rationes obligandi and the concordance between the grounds of obligation; cf. VzM 259, 261 and Refl. 7225 and 7266. And in regard to the manner in which Kant “dissolves” the possibility of conflict between duties, an excellent explanation can be found in TORRALBA, José María, “La teoría kantiana de la acción. De la noción de máxima como regla autoimpuesta a la descripción de la acción”, pp. 17-61. 206 Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Moral Literacy, p. 12, n. 25. 207 Cf. MdS 454-455. 208 For a brief commentary regarding the maxim of gratitude as a non-prudential attitude, cf. BAXLEY, Anne Margaret, Kant’s Theory of Virtue. The Value of Autocracy, p. 160. 209 Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Moral Literacy, p. 35. Helping another person and avoiding that he or she feels humiliated are not, says Herman, two distinct actions, but a single one, performed with sensitivity to the circumstances and the context of the beneficent action.

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esteem: it is precisely from comparisons that are inappropriate and disadvantageous that many morally invalid maxims follow. Nevertheless, it is not for the sake of an equality of dignity between agents that Kant proposes a retributionist model of aid to others, nor does he lose sight of the logic of gratitude and of the recognition that these duties presuppose. He himself insists that in reality it is impossible to make recompense via retribution for a benefit received, because the giver has the merit of having helped first.210 The importance of this duty of gratitude qua duty of love, and therefore qua meritorious and non-demandable, lies in the fact that it refutes certain criticisms of kantian ethics that accuse it of being a strictly retributionist theory, or of having a too-juridical character.211 Kant’s treatment of gratitude as a duty gives the lie to these impressions. There is no “payment” that is sufficient to recompense the person who gives first, which also opens the kantian theory to a consideration of pietas as a virtue of gratitude and love in the presence of those benefactors to whom it is impossible to make retribution (one’s parents, one’s homeland or nation, etc.). In addition, as Nancy Sherman emphasizes, the treatment of the duty of gratitude is one of the sections where the antisentimentalist “stoic rhetoric” of Kant is least present, because this virtue not only demands concrete actions but also the demonstration of sensibility (Zärtlichkeit) and the cordiality of a good moral disposition (Innigkeit der wohlwellenden Gesinnung).212

Cf. MdS 455 and VzM 261. Kant himself states that a grateful moral disposition (Gesinnung) can also be called recognition (Erkennlichkeit). 211 For an explanation of this critique, as derived from the hegelian arguments against Kant’s ethics, cf. AMERIKS, Karl, “The Hegelian Critique of Kantian Morality”, in New Essays on Kant (Bernard den Ouden and Marcia Moen, ed.), Peter Lang, Frankfurt a. M. – New York, 1987, p. 183. 212 Cf. MdS 455 and SHERMAN, Nancy, Making a Necessity of Virtue, p. 153. The importance of the duty of gratitude is emphasized in one of the Reflections (6588), and in 6602 Kant insists that in order to be able to fulfill this duty one must in fact feel good, which is yet another confirmation that for him the exercise of virtue does not involve a self-torturing asceticism. 210

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4.3.1.1.3 The duty of sympathy Finally, sympathy as a feeling is also a duty: that of rejoicing with others and suffering with them, on the basis of moral reasons. These are reactions of an aesthetic type, says Kant, given by the nature of human beings –the reference to the aesthetic predispositions for the receptivity of duty is obvious– but they must be formed and strengthened, which is a duty in order to foster beneficence. I note that the three duties of love to others are related to one another in the following way: beneficence is a duty on the part of the agent; gratitude is the corresponding duty on the recipient’s part, and sympathy is the feeling that must foster the maxim of beneficence. Sympathy is simultaneously understood as an aesthetic capacity –initially passively received– of the human soul, both formed and fostered by the beneficent maxim, and thereby reaches the level of an active disposition. Allen Wood has insisted that it is precisely in the treatment of this duty of sympathy that we see that the caricature of a cold, emotionally disconnected Kant is false. Kantian sympathy, or Teilnehmung, as a participation in the feelings of others, corresponds in good part, and in a rational and constructive manner, with what today we call empathy.213 Kant understands sympathy in an active manner, calling the disposition to it humanity (humanitas, Menschlichkeit). It must thereby surpass a mere receptivity for the common feeling of happiness or sorrow (humanitas aesthetica) –which is not free and is almost like a contagion or affection of compassion (Mitleidenschaft)– and must instead become a practical humanitas. In contrast with aesthetics, the practical side of sympathy is regulated by reason –and by respect in a strong sense, i.e. that of reverentia, as the proper motor of the practical reason. It makes space, for example, for Kant’s affirmation that when another person suffers and it is impossible to liberate him or her from that suffering, it makes no sense to increase the evil in the world by letting it affect us ourselves.214 Thus, fostering sympathy as a feeling is a duty; nevertheless, there is no sentimental posture that would contradict what Kant states in the Cf. WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 177. Cf. MdS 457. Concerning this relatively polemical passage in Kant, cf. BARON, Marcia W., Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, pp. 207-216. 213

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KpV and the GMS. There is not even a tension with the examples of the GMS which, seeking to isolate the principle of morality, talk about agents who lack sympathy who act only on the basis of the motive of duty.215 Hence, when sympathy appears in the MdS in the field of moral deliberation, Kant is not seeking thereby to make it a substitute for duty; rather, he discusses practical sympathy as being a derivative of duty. By feeding back on the affectivity –an affectivity already provided by the nature of the capacity to empathize with other living beings, not only humans, as I will discuss in a later section– sympathy generates epistemic skills, allowing us to better know the needs of others –for instance, it functions like a perceptive capacity in situations of moral relevance216– and thereby makes possible a better fulfillment of the duty of beneficence.217 Sympathy qua duty or practical humanitas involves a feeling that has already been cultivated, already permeated by respect and thus rationally directed. As a result, it is an indirect duty to achieve it: “...It is therefore a duty not to avoid the places where the poor who lack the most basic necessities are to be found but rather to seek them out, and not to shun sick-rooms or debtors’ prisons and so forth. (...) For this is still one of the impulses that nature has implanted in us to do what the representation of duty alone would not accomplish”.218 The last phrase must be correctly interpreted: it is not a kantian expression that denies the achievements of the Critique of Practical Reason in regard to the sufficiency of duty as a motive for action on the basis of its subjective aspect –the feeling of respect arisen a priori in the face of the law. Rather, the phrase has a more limited reach: that of the receptivity 215 Cf. principally GMS 398. For an analysis of these examples, cf. BAXLEY, Anne Margaret, Kant’s Theory of Virtue. The Value of Autocracy, p. 36. Baxley also refers to GMS 399 and 458 and to KpV 84. 216 Baxley sees this clearly; cf. Kant’s Theory of Virtue. The Value of Autocracy, p. 164. The author emphasizes the role of sympathy as an “epistemic support” for the duty of beneficence in particular. GUYER, Paul also moves in this interpretative direction in “Moral Feelings in the Metaphysics of Morals”, p. 147. 217 This is also clear in Allison, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 119. 218 MdS 457.

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proper to the aesthetic predispositions. Without sympathy it would be impossible to perceive the necessities of others as being morally relevant and to act in consequence, and therefore we would not be able to fulfill our duty in this regard. In a strict correspondence with the three duties of virtue that refer to others, Kant mentions three vices of misanthropy: envy (Neid, opposed to benevolence), ingratitude (Undankbarkeit) and rejoicing in the evil that befalls others (Schadenfreude). The three arise –and this is very clear in Kant’s treatment– from a failure in one’s own moral self-esteem, as a result of which we tend to compare ourselves with others –when in fact we should only be comparing ourselves with the law. In addition, it leads to a dynamic of the imagination which, by seeking contrast and attempting to avoid thinking that we are inferior to others, generates suffering in the face of the good that befalls others (invidentia), ingratitude (hatred upon seeing oneself as inferior to one’s benefactor) and rejoicing in the evil that befalls another.219 All of these occur in a more serious degree if in addition to generating a misanthropic affective disposition we allow ourselves to engage in concrete corresponding behaviors.220 In Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason these are precisely the three vices qualified as being diabolic, insofar as, even though they arise from our natural competitivity –our sociable unsociability– they go beyond this to constitute themselves –in a “rousseaunian” twist in Kant’s thought– as the paradigmatic vices of culture.221 These are, furthermore, shameful vices, and as a result Kant suggests at the beginning of the section dedicated to them that frequently these 219 A note in the Reflections appears to refer specifically to the vice of rejoicing in the evil that occurs to others; cf. Refl. 6900. 220 Cf. MdS 458-452. In Kant’s treatment of these vices one can clearly see the presence of Rousseau: evil proceeds from a comparative dynamic between human beings and from the incapacity to discover one’s own inner value apart from the approval of others, and from a contrast with the vital and moral situation of one’s fellow humans. 221 Cf. RGV 27. Although I cannot go in depth into this subject, Kant offers certain elements for going further in this “rousseaunian” direction. For instance, he sees that these vices are not just proper to culture, but they can even be the very motor of culture, insofar as competitiveness and its characteristic anxiety serve as fundamental motives; cf. GONZÁLEZ, Ana Marta, Culture as Mediation. Kant on Nature, Culture and Morality, pp. 2728. Concerning these vices, the reader can also consult VzM 380, 431, 436, 438-441.

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vices, understood as evils in the treatment of others, are joined to the veil of self-deception: they are defaming (niederträchtige) vices –and therefore they also violate the duty to oneself.222 This kantian annotation reinforces my interpretation of lying as an infraction against a duty to oneself: it is because of its natural dynamic of fostering self-deception that lying corrupts the very conditions of moral judgement. In the case of the defaming vices, therefore, the first thing we have to do is make them transparent. Here we return to self-knowledge as the first of all duties: confronting the human agent with his or her own moral reality. 4.3.1.2 Duties of respect The observantia demanded in relations with others is the recognition of their dignity, and as a result the duties associated with it are derived clearly from the second formulation of the categorical imperative.223 As I have discussed, the duties of love are positive and broad, while those of respect –understood as observantia– are negative and strict. This is why in this section Kant, rather than speaking of virtues in themselves, will characterize the vices to which respect is opposed. All of them are vices of disdain (contemnere, Verachtung), which is “contrary to duty in all circumstances, because one is dealing with human beings”.224 The duty of virtue, then, is explained negatively here, via the prohibition of the maxims of arrogance (Hochmut),225 speaking ill (Afterreden) and mockery (Verhöhnung). In contrast to the omission of the duties of love –which is only

Cf. MdS 458. However, as I have discussed in another section, this does not exclude the other formulations of the categorical imperative. In fact SENSEN, Oliver (in “Duties to Others from Respect”, in Kant’s Tugendlehre. A Comprehensive Commentary, pp. 352-353) argues that the duties of respect are related to each other by way of the formula of universalization. 224 MdS 463. 225 Gregor emphasizes that in order to talk about this vice of disdain, Kant uses the term Hochmut, the equivalent to superbia, and distinguishes this vicious “pride” from Stolz which, on the other hand, is “pride” in the sense of respect for oneself and therefore is closer to Ehrliebe or Ehrbarkeit. Cf. Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 188. 222

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a lack of virtue– these constitute vices and evils that are forbidden per se.226 In a manner similar to what I discussed regarding the vices opposed to the duties of love, with these vices of disdain the immoral motive at bottom is frequently the effect of unhealthy comparisons between human beings. One should only weigh one’s own value in comparison with the moral law, but instead humans enter into competition via the web of relationships proper to “social unsociability”. Therefore, arrogance is characterized as the demand that other people value themselves less in comparison with ourselves.227 On the other hand, speaking ill of others or “murmuring” –which is different from calumny or defamation insofar as the latter can have legal sanctions as their consequences– consists in saying things that affect the respect shown to others.228 In turn, mockery or sarcasm –which are different from joking, because joking does not incorporate into its maxim the end of depriving the other person of the respect they deserve229– convert the weakness of the other person into an object of fun.230 Cf. supra, chap. III, where Kant explains that the lack of virtue is the logical contrary of virtue, but only vice is its real contrary. 227 Cf. MdS 465. 228 Cf. MdS 466. 229 Cf. MdS 467. Kant makes the same clarification in VzM 458. Antonio Valdecantos has written an article to comment on the moral prohibition of mockery in Kant. Valdecantos emphasizes that it does not seem important to Kant whether the person doing the mocking is correct in her or her judgements or not; the maxim is equally evil because of the disdain that it involves towards the humanity of the person mocked. Valdecantos recognizes that in Kant there are distinctions according to the intention, and that one should not confuse joking (Scherz) or retorsio iocosa with the ill-willed Verhöhnung. Cf. VALDECANTOS, Antonio “La Burla según Kant”, in Apología del arrepentido y otros ensayos de teoría moral, Antonio Machado Libros, Madrid, 2006, pp. 119-163. I do not agree with him, however, when he affirms that in order to respect humanity Kant suggests “closing one’s eyes” in order to not see it in its degradation. I think, on the contrary, that what Kant seeks is that one be able to see the human being in the depth of his or her being, in his or her personhood, in his or her capacity to be interpellated by the moral law, and that it is from this special lucidity, and not from a hypocritical “as if”, that respect for humanity and for every human being in particular arises. 230 Sensen notes that in these vices there is a progression from bad to worse: if via arrogance one seeks to consider others as inferiors, via defamation one allows another 226

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In regard to arrogance per se, Kant makes a remark that is relevant for one of the theses that I have sought to defend in this book: the subjective configuration that leads a person to fall into the vice of arrogance reflects a mechanism of self-occlusion and of compensation, since the person who behaves in an arrogant fashion secretly perceives in him or herself an indignity that could come to light given the correct circumstances. Thus, in the arrogant person there is an attempt at deception of others as well as of self-deception, and this is why Kant characterizes it as infamous or wicked (niederträchtig), the same term that, as I have discussed, he uses to characterize the liar and the misanthrope. This fact reinforces the idea that truthfulness in the Doctrine of Virtue is presented, insofar as it is a duty to oneself, precisely with the intention of virtuously confronting these mechanisms of self-occlusion.231 There is a final observation that is pertinent to make with respect to the duties to others. Kant notes that in the metaphysics of morals, just as in the metaphysics of nature, one can make a transition to a series of cases presented in experience and which, despite not constituting a complete a priori classification, and not being parts of the system in their own right, can help to orient the moral judgement as corollaries of the application of ethics, as well helping with the teaching of morality. Thus, the metaphysics of morals is also typified –Kant, in an analogous sense even says that it is schematized– via a series of duties of virtue that attend person to do it, and via ridicule one enjoys the denigration of the person who is held in contempt. Cf. SENSEN, Oliver, “Duties to Others from Respect”, p. 360. 231 In this section Kant also includes an interesting observation about how respect for others includes a particular form of observantia that is particular to the intellectual relations founded on the logical use of reason. Just as we speak today of the hermeneutical principle of charity, Kant notes that in intellectual dialogue one must not show contempt by censuring the arguments of the other person falsely or offensively. On the contrary, one must always presume that there is something true and intelligible in every judgement, without that implying that one must cease to be conscious of possible error in the grounds of that judgement; cf. MdS 463. The only commentaries I have encountered regarding this passage in the secondary literature are those offered by Munzel (who relates this “charitable disposition” towards the arguments of the other person with the socratic character of kantian thought; cf. MUNZEL, G. Felicitas, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character. The Critical Link of Morality, Anthropology and Reflective Judgement, p. 288) and, briefly, GREGOR, Mary (Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 189).

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to the distinct state of human beings (in regard to purity or corruption, in regard to education or ignorance, in regard to preferences, age, sex, state of health, etc.).232 We find ourselves, therefore, within the limits of the application of the categorical imperative to anthropological data collected through experience. This application occurs at the level of concrete duties, required in distinct contexts of action and instantiated and individualized by those very contexts. 4.3.1.3 The dialectic between love and respect: the kantian theory of friendship In a manner similar to what one finds in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, the basic ethical doctrine in the Doctrine of Virtue culminates with a philosophical reflection on friendship.233 If Aristotle stated that friendship is a virtue or an accompaniment of virtue,234 Kant will say bluntly that it is a duty of virtue, and in fact that in friendship one finds the most intimate union of love and respect (innigsten Vereinigung der Liebe mit der Achtung). These are understood, as I have already indicated, as particular feelings and in a specific sense, whereby they regulate the closeness and distance between human beings under the moral law. Earlier it was said that, normally, one of these feelings is present in greater proportion than the other. In this way, among the many possible combinations of love and respect and in their diverse gradations,235 friendship constitutes the perfect equilibrium and optimal relationship between these components. Therefore Kant immediately clarifies its character as an ideal: “It is easy to see that this is an ideal of each participating and sharing sympathetically in the other’s well-being through the morally good will that unites them, and even though it does not produce the complete happiness of life, the adoption of this ideal in their disposition toward each Cf. MdS 468-469. Allen Wood holds that Kant is the first major philosopher to have granted such importance to friendship in his moral theory since Aristotle. Cf. WOOD, Allen Kant’s Ethical Thought, p. 275. 234 Cf. EN 1155a4. 235 This is explained with great clarity in PATON, Herbert J., “Kant on Friendship”, in Friendship. A Philosophical Reader (Neera Kapur Badhwar, ed.), Cornell University Press, Ithaca (New York), 1993, pp. 133-154. 232 233

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other makes them deserving of happiness; hence men have a duty of friendship”.236 In the KrV Kant carefully clarifies what an ideal237 is and discusses its difference from an idea: specifically, he calls friendship an ideal. It remains to be clarified whether what he is talking about is the ideal of the friend or of a concrete relationship.238 It does not depend, then, on the factual reality of the friendship, since Kant clearly acknowledges the difficulties which face a human relationship in the quest to achieve this kind of perfection.239 These include uncertainties in mutual beneficence, the proportion and equilibrium that require love and respect between the friends, the difficulties arising from allowing your friend to correct you, even when the friend has the duty to do so because he or she is doing so for your good and motivated by love, etc.240 One need not renounce the ideal of friendship, however, as Maria Fasching has emphasized, because MdS 469. Cf. KrV A 574 B 602. In regard to its practical use, the reader may consult PATON, Herbert J., The Categorical Imperative, p. 187. For his part, Allen Wood comments that Kant’s ethics is fundamentally an ethics of principles, but this does not mean (in contrast to what some think) that therefore it is not also an ethics of ideas that are made concrete in ideals. His moral theory thus reintegrates and relocates within itself this aspect of an “ethic of ideals” that is seen as characteristic of ancient moral thought. Cf. WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 155. 238 Cf. KrV A804 B832. Kant also speaks of friendship as idea in VzM 423. Paton suggests that if Kant speaks of friendship here as idea it is because it is presupposed that he is speaking of the perfect relationship of friendship, which is strictly moral and not based on pleasure or utility. Kant is thus presupposing the aristotelian types of friendship that he shows himself to understand well in the Lectures (cf. PATON, Herbert J., “Kant on Friendship”, p. 136; cf. also VzM 424). Concerning the use of ideals in ethics, cf. WOOD, Allen, “Kant and Agent-Oriented Ethics”, p. 84. In addition, in Refl. 6611 Kant explains the ideal as the concretization of an idea or the representation or fiction that corresponds to an idea. 239 Gregor states that Kant emphasizes the difficulties in order to distance himself from the romantic treatment of friendship, which would have appeared naive to him; cf. GREGOR, Marie, Laws of Freedom. A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 199. 240 Cf. MdS 469-471. Paton comments on these difficulties that attend upon the friendship relation; cf. PATON, Herbert J., “Kant on Friendship”, pp. 140-141. 236 237

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the quest for holiness of the will is manifested in it.241 This quest, as I have already discussed, is demanded even if its endpoint is unattainable by human finitude. In addition, as Munzel highlights, by struggling to asymptotically approach the ideal of friendship in our interpersonal relationships we avoid falling into the vices of misanthropy discussed in an earlier section.242 In sum, the ideal of friendship forms part of the ideal of the Kingdom of Ends,243 and represents, in a certain fashion, an “advance glimpse” of it: it is a concrete instance of human harmony and of how one can overcome the competitive and dehumanizing dynamics that I have already discussed, and which generate vices due to the tension of sociable unsociability.244 For her part, Beatrix Himmelman emphasizes that the practical ideas in Kant’s thought are concrete manifestations of the interest of reason that permit a systematic unity. Specifically, the kantian idea of friendship is particularly important because it permits considering friendship as both a pragmatic-practical idea (oriented towards attaining happiness) as well as a practical-moral idea (like those of health and perfection), and as a result can serve as a connection or transition between them.245 Friendship, therefore, must by rights be practical and not merely aesthetic: it must not be solely based on pleasure but rather also on moral principles. Furthermore, it must not pursue reciprocal utility, given that this would result in a lack of respect between the friends, and it must contain the “sweetness of the sentiment of reciprocal possession” (der Süßigkeit der Empfindung wechselseitiges Besitzes) without thereby being re-

241

15.

Cf. FASCHING, Maria, Zum Begriff der Freundschaft bei Aristoteles und Kant, pp. 14-

Cf. MUNZEL, G. Felicitas, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character. The Critical Link of Morality, Anthropology and Reflective Judgement, p. 157. 243 Cf. WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 78. Wood himself notes that the other instance in which the Kingdom of Ends is concretized or advanced is, for Kant, the religious community. 244 Marcia Baron comments on the topic of friendship in relation to sociable unsociability in BARON, Marcia W., “Friendship, Duties Regarding Specific Conditions of Persons and the Virtues of Social Intercourse”, in Kant’s Tugendlehre. A Comprehensive Commentary, p. 371. 245 Cf. HIMMELMANN, Beatrix, Kants Begriff des Glucks, p. 217. 242

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duced to only being an affect that might be ephemeral and blindly chosen.246 It is because of all these complexities that Kant even refers to an expression that he attributes here to Aristotle, “My dear friends, there is no such thing as a friend!”.247 In the final instance, these difficulties are linked to the paradoxical human condition of “unsociable sociability”.248 The ideal of this harmony, nevertheless, is sufficient for determining friendship to be a moral duty, towards which one must always tend in the asymptotic dynamic of virtue. Indeed, the philosopher of Königsberg seems open to the possibility of a friendship with those who are apparently vicious, due to his recognition of the lack of competence of an external observer to judge their deepest intentions. In fact, he only proposes avoiding those relationships where the vice is a scandal.249 Cf. MdS 471. In Kant, however, just as in Aristotle, there is no closing off of the possibility that a virtuous friendship may also be pleasant and or useful; Cf. FASCHING, Maria, Zum Begriff der Freundschaft bei Aristoteles und Kant, p. 182. 247 In the Lectures, he attributes this phrase to Socrates (VzM. 424). Michael Oviedo states that it should be attributed to Aristotle instead, because of the insistence of the Stagirite that true moral friendship is rare; cf. EN 1056b25. In addition, Kant could have gotten the idea that the expression is aristotelian from Montaigne, Ensayos I, ch. 28 (Océano, Barcelona, 1999, p. 97), although without a doubt this kind of friendship does in fact exist for Aristotle. Plato, in the Lysis, is perhaps more sceptical in this regard; cf. OVIEDO, Michael, “Plato’s Lysis and its Influence on Kant and Aristotle”, Master of Arts Thesis, Texas A&M University, Texas, 2008, pp. 57-58. Oviedo’s thesis is suggestive –he even notes that Kant would probably have preferred the discussion in the Eudemian Ethics over that of the Nicomachean because of the ideal character of the virtue (cf. p. 60). However, he commits certain serious errors in his interpretation of kantian ethics. Among others, he expresses doubt that Kant can ethically justify the partiality that is due the friend (cf. p. 87) – which, as I have mentioned, is without a doubt justified in kantian ethics, and even demanded. He also denies that kantian friendship is directed towards the friend him or herself (cf. p. 88) – it would be a friendship “because of the moral law”, a disjunction that I have also shown to be false in this book. 248 Paton comments that the necessity for equity in order that there be an authentic relationship of friendship is already contained in Aristotle’s treatment, while the emphasis on respect as a necessary condition for this relationship can be found in the De amicitia of Cicero; this emphasis is also characteristically kantian. Cf. PATON, Herbert J., “Kant on Friendship”, p. 137. 249 Cf. MdS 474. Concerning this point cf. also VzM 418. In this openness to morally imperfect persons I see one of the advantages of Kant’s treatment of friendship over the 246

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Kant speaks of love as a force of attraction between persons –sociability– and of respect, in the restricted sense I have already discussed of observantia, which provides the necessary distance for respecting the private life of the other person, which is needed in turn by unsociability. Fasching insists, however, that Kant’s treatment of friendship as a perfect harmony between these two moral forces can be summed up as a full union of love and respect: respect can be seen as the minimum form of love and the latter, in turn, as the full realization of respect. This idea seems to me to be worthy of consideration, although as Fasching herself recognizes, Kant insists on not losing sight of the fact that the maxim of love is meritorious while respect is owed (schuldig, in the sense in which the other person can legitimately demand its fulfillment). Another way of viewing the relation, as the author herself indicates, would be by indicating that love presupposes respect, in the same way that friendship already presupposes a minimally ordered society.250

aristotelian. Of course, as Sherman indicates, these advantages are due to the fact that in the final analysis Kant is a Christian, and therefore there is a consideration of respect for human dignity that is lacking in Aristotle. In turn, this permits him to propose a friendship that is even broader than Aristotle’s and which is more independent of circumstances and of shared contexts; cf. Making a Necessity of Virtue, p. 185. Maria Fasching’s study (FASCHING, Maria, Zum Begriff der Freundschaft bei Aristoteles und Kant) is dedicated precisely to a comparison between the aristotelian and kantian theories of friendship. She sees in Aristotle an emphasis on the formative function of friendship that is not so clearly present in Kant (cf. p. 16, cf. also EN 1172a10), but she emphasizes that in both authors friendship can be seen as the “virtue of virtues” insofar as it presupposes authentically moral characters in a perfect relationship (cf. p. 83). In addition, for both authors, the true proof of friendship is the attitude of disinterested aid in times of necessity (cf. p. 183). Fasching also notes that, even though kantian friendship is not “elitist”, as it is in Aristotle, the demands of understanding and of discretion that it involves do require a relative equality of the intellectual level between the friends (cf. p. 181). For his part, Silvestre Marcucci emphasizes, relying on the Lectures on Ethics, that Kant, unlike Plato and Aristotle, promotes a notion of friendship that honors diversity. Thus, it can exist not only between philosophers or intellectuals or between persons with the same characteristics, but even between people who are very different in their occupations, interests or traits; cf. “Moral Friendship in Kant”, in Kant-Studien, vol. 90, 1999, pp. 434-441, and for his textual support, cf. VzM 426-430. 250 Cf. FASCHING, Maria, Zum Begriff der Freundschaft bei Aristoteles und Kant, pp. 176178.

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It is in this point of obligatory sociability where Kant also introduces the virtues of living in community or social virtues (Umgangstugenden), giving an accessory character in the duty to reciprocal communication, sociability, the spirit of conciliation, proper treatment of others and decorum, “and so to associate the graces with virtue. To bring this about is itself a duty of virtue”.251 This does not negate in any sense the spirit of kantian ethics, which rests on invisible intentions and internal dispositions, and in which these external forms are only adornments (parerga, Beiwerke). But, following the same interpretative line that I have discussed, Kant explains the progressive and diachronic dynamic by which these “appearances” approach truth, embedding themselves into character and fostering the formation of virtuous maxims by way of secondary virtues such as affability, courtesy and hospitality.252 Manners and rules of courtesy are, in principle, only an external form of respect. They should be obvious concretions of the formula of humanity of the categorical imperative and expressions of recognition of dignity, although they can simply be faked or mechanically repeated. Even so, insofar as they can also be interiorized, they are, by right, a moral issue and part of moral education.253 Before finishing the specific treatment of the duties to others, I wish to emphasize that Kant also dedicates a number of lines to “Ethical DuMdS 473. I would like to emphasize the use of the term Grazien, which probably involves an allusion to Schiller’s criticisms of Kant, to which he explicitly responds in Religion and implicitly replies in certain passages of the Doctrine of Virtue, as I will discuss in a later section. Schiller uses both the term Anmut –already present in the title of the work– as well as the word Grazie. He uses the first to speak of grace in a strict sense and the second in a more generic sense. Cf. notes 15 and 16 of the Spanish translation in SCHILLER, Friedrich, De la dignidad y la gracia, trans. Juan Probst and Raimundo Lida, Editorial Nova, Buenos Aires, 1962, p. 82. 252 Cf. MdS 473-474. Also in Refl. 6760 Kant notes that certain manners correspond to virtue, along with a certain purity and order in their appearance. Kant makes the same point in ApH 283, where he states that courtesy and manners dress virtue, and in VzM 419, 456. As social virtues, they are commented on by PATON, Herbert J., “Kant on Friendship”, pp. 144-145. 253 On this point, cf. FRIERSON, Patrick, “The Moral Importance of Politeness in Kant’s Anthropology”, Kantian Review, 9 (2005), pp. 105-127. Cf. also HERMAN, Barbara, Moral Literacy, p. 314. In fact, I believe that courtesy must be seen as part of culture, here understood as an imperfect duty to oneself. 251

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ties of Men toward One Another with Regard to Their Condition” (ethischen Pflichten der Menschen gegeneinander in Ansehung ihres Zustandes). This short section should be sufficient to definitively dispel the objections that certain moral theoreticians have made about Kant in regard to his supposed blindly impartial application of the categorical imperative. Kant himself notes that the treatment of these particularities does not form part of the system of pure ethics nor of the principles of the doctrine of virtue: “They are only rules modified in accordance with differences of the subjects to whom the principle of virtue (in terms of what is formal) is applied in cases that come up in experience (the material). Hence, like anything divided on an empirical basis, they do not admit of a classification that could be guaranteed to be complete”.254 Nevertheless, it is clear that this partial and special application of the categorical imperative –which is impartial in judgement, but which can of course conclude to the necessity of partiality in the maxim of action, and even its moral necessity– is contemplated as a typification. Kant shows himself here to be a philosopher of ethical application, but who is nevertheless conscious that a moral system cannot be laid out case by case. Rather, one can only mention certain cases after the fashion of notes or corollaries.255 In any case, however, he is not proposing a blind impartiality or an inhuman legalism, as some critics have accused him of doing.256

MdS 468. Cf. MdS 469. Concerning the place of these duties that attend to the state of the person in Kant’s ethical system, cf. LOUDEN, Robert B., Kant’s Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings, p. 14. And concerning how Kant contemplates the relations of “partiality” validated by the categorical imperative, cf. WOOD, Allen, Kant’s Ethical Thought, p. 328. 256 In fact, the table of the categories of freedom that Kant offers in KpV 66 already allows for the judgement to establish specific duties according to the state (Zustand) of the agent and other human beings. Cf. Also BECK, Lewis White, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, p. 148 and TORRALBA, José María, Libertad, objeto práctico y acción. La facultad del juicio en la filosofía moral de Kant, p. 259. 254 255

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4.3.2 With regard to non-human beings: the amphiboly of the moral concepts of reflection In the preceding discussion, I have separated myself −for reasons of clarity− from the order of presentation of the Tugendlehre itself. I did not deal at the time with the episodic section placed by Kant precisely at the end of his discussion of the perfect duties of the human being to him or herself. I will take up this issue now. This section is entitled “The Amphiboly of the Moral Concepts of Reflection”: it deals with the analysis of the subjective phenomenon by which one takes as a duty to others −to nature, to non-human animals or to God− what is in fact a duty to oneself. The term “amphiboly” (Amphibolie) refers, in the first place, to the aristotelian theory of argumentation.257 In the overall kantian corpus, the necessary reference point is the Critique of Pure Reason, in which he discusses, at the end of the Transcendental Analytic, an “amphiboly of the concepts of reflection due to the confusion of the empirical use of the understanding with the transcendental”. This is a very interesting appendix in the discourse of the KrV, where Kant seeks to explain Leibniz’s category mistake258 regarding the relationships between concepts, which the latter had taken to be relations between things: he is confusing the pure object of the understanding with the phenomenon. In order to 257 Sophistical Refutations, 165b22ff and 166a7ff (recall that this text can be considered to be Book XI of the Topics, and as a result the kantian relationship between amphiboly and topic is unassailable). There “amphiboly” refers to the equivocity of expressions. Cf. LEITNER, Henrich, Systematische Topik: Methode und Argumentation in Kants kritischer Philosophie, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg, 1994, p. 297. The aristotelian topic, as I will discuss, allowed the avoidance of misunderstandings caused by these equivocations, via the determination of a general argumentative place that specifically highlights the ambiguity. 258 This is what it is called by NOORDRAVEN, Andreas in Kants Moralische Ontologie. Historische Ursprung und systematische Bedeutung, pp. 73-74. For his part, Peter Reuter explains it as deriving from the ontologization of a methodological difference; cf. REUTER, Peter, Kants Theorie der Reflexionsbegriffe. Eine Untersuchung zum Amphiboliekapitel der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg, 1989, pp. 206-208. The amphibolic error in KrV exists because the concepts of reflection have two levels: one that is logical-formal with methodological restrictions, and another having to do with objective or referential comparison, and sliding from one to another is always possible.

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clear up this category mistake –which, as I will discuss, is not just any mistake, but a possible transposition related to the transcendental tópoi– it is necessary to undertake a transcendental reflection. In contrast to a logical reflection that is merely a comparison between the content of the concepts, a transcendental reflection is “the consciousness of the relationship that exists between given representations and our different sources of knowledge”.259 Transcendental reflection, then, relates the content of items of knowledge with their origin in the sensibility or understanding, distinguishing the concepts of things in the abstract with respect to effective knowledge of them in the application of the categories to intuitions given spatio-temporally. By determining in this way what cognoscitive faculty a given concept belongs to, one avoids equivocations such as those that occur, according to Kant, with the Leibnizian principle of indiscernibles. Leibniz wished to determine the identity of a thing by way of the coincidence of the notes of its concept, but he failed to consider that by being given as an intuition in space, the spatial difference is sufficient to indicate that two things are distinct, even though they coincide in their conceptual notes.260 By following Kant’s critical methodology, one avoids errors regarding each of the pairs of the concepts of reflection (identity-difference, concordance-opposition, interior-exterior, matter-form). I would like to reiterate that the application of these concepts cannot be established by a mere comparison of the concepts that are below them, but rather only by a transcendental reflection.261 In this way, Kant can speak of a transcendental place as being the site that corresponds to a concept according to its origin in the sensibility or in the understanding, and of a transcendental topic as the way of determining this origin –and its pretensions of validity with respect to the reality of its object– according to rules.262 In sum: the transcendental topic is a

259 KrV A260 B316. Cf. also VIGO, Alejandro G., “Reflexión y Juicio”, Diánoia, vol. 51, n. 57, November 2006, p. 31. 260 Cf. KrV A263 B319. Cf. also LONGUENESSE, Beatrice, Kant and the Capacity to Judge. Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 132-133. 261 Cf. KrV A262 B318. 262 Cf. KrV A 268 B324.

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transcendental reflection that is methodologically structured in order to impose rules of application on the use of concepts of reflection and thereby avoid possible confusions.263 Kant’s particular and fecund reading of the argumentative tradition in his allusion to the topics is striking.264 As Henrich Leitner has demonstrated, Kant understood deeply the aristotelian idea of the topic as an art of discovering loci communes, understanding the latter as general points of departure from which one considers and argues an issue, and on the basis of which one can resolve a possible ambiguity in argumentation.265 The aristotelian topics precisely teach one to think from various points of view and thereby to encounter ways of dealing with each problem on the basis of premises having verisimilitude and without falling into contradiction.266 Clearly –both in the KrV as well as in the Tugendlehre– Kant converts this aristotelian “argumenttative topics” into a transcendental topics that demands the transcendental reflection explained earlier. This is because one must determine either the faculty by which one acquires knowledge Cf. REUTER, Peter, Kants Theorie der Reflexionsbegriffe. Eine Untersuchung zum Amphiboliekapitel der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 208. 264 In regard to his having received this notion through Cicero and roman rhetoric, cf. LEITNER, Heinrich, Systematische Topik. Methode und Argumentation in Kants kritischer Philosophie, p. 263. Clearly, the presence of aristotelian logic in the kantian understructure can be seen via the distinction between Analytics and Dialectics, which Kant receives from the same tradition, although mediated by the Schulphilosophie, as Leitner comments; cf. p. 285. In addition, Reuter (REUTER, Peter, Kants Theorie der Reflexionsbegriffe. Eine Untersuchung zum Amphiboliekapitel der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 215) notes that Baumgarten and Lambert worked with this tool from the aristotelian tradition. 265 Cf. LEITNER, Heinrich, Systematische Topik. Methode und Argumentation in Kants kritischer Philosophie, p. 217. Leitner himself makes it clear that the tópoi should not be confused with endoxa: the latter are the expression of the former, and it is in the possible collision of the endoxa where one invokes the capacity to locate oneself within the topic in order to prove that they do not contradict each other via the assumption of another “argumentative place” or point of view. Cf. also Top. I, 14, 105b21-23, where one finds an example of this locating of a problem within a topic –and this is relevant in regard to the assimilation that Kant performs of these ideas– i.e. an apparent conflict of duties (whether one should obey one’s parents or the law). 266 Cf. LEITNER, Henrich, Systematische Topik. Methode und Argumentation in Kants kritischer Philosophie, pp. 225-231 and Top. I, 100a18-21. 263

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or the origin of the legitimacy of duties (respectively).267 But in both cases, the tópoi are general points of view that allow for orienting the judgement in a particular area of knowledge. They are not concrete premises in an argumentation, but rather are perspectives268 for the grounding of a relative demand for validity, and their “episodic” place –both in the KrV as well as in the MdS– allows Kant to maintain himself in between Analytic and Dialectic, mixing the analytic character of the former and the critical weighing of the second.269 As Alejandro Vigo has demonstrated, the transcendental topic in play in the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection would go beyond the application of the categories, instead constituting the specific kantian reinterpretation of the classical theory of the transcendental metaphysical notions.270 For the practical use of reason, and to explain the passage of the Doctrine of Virtue at hand, the relevant issue is that the analysis of the amphiboly permits unmasking illusions that are rooted in one’s own subjectivity and which generate false principles.271 But it is also worth emphasizing that the clarification of these “misunderstandings” does not involve a rejection simpliciter of the previous perspective, but rather its limitation –Leibniz’s principles are correct in the domain of the comparison of concepts among themselves. In the same way, in the amphiboly of the moral 267 Cf. LEITNER, Henrich, Systematische Topik. Methode und Argumentation in Kants kritischer Philosophie, p. 298. and REUTER, Peter, Kants Theorie der Reflexionsbegriffe. Eine Untersuchung zum Amphiboliekapitel der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 212. 268 Concerning how the reflective judgement permits this play of perspectives, cf. HUTTER, Axel, Das Interesse der Vernunft. Kant ursprüngliche Einsicht und ihre Entfaltung in den traszendentalphilosophischen Hauptwerken, pp. 175-176. 269 Cf. VIGO, Alejandro G., “Reflexión y Juicio”, pp. 27-64, and more specifically, p. 30. Cf. also LEITNER, Henrich, Systematische Topik. Methode und Argumentation in Kants kritischer Philosophie, p. 307. Leitner goes further than what I have stated here and suggests that the entirety of the KrV can be read as a systematic transcendental topic, basing himself on KrV B 109 and B 324. He thus defends a topical-dialectical understanding of the critical method, relying also on Kant’s mentions of the necessity of a logical “pluralism”, and on his particular use of metaphor (in particular, courtroom metaphors), in addition to the fact that Kant’s table of the categories itself can be seen, precisely, as a systematic topic. 270 Cf. VIGO, Alejandro G., “Conceptos trascendentales, reflexión y juicio. Sobre el §12 de la DTB de la Kritik der reinen Vernunft”, pp. 73-110. 271 Cf. KrV A280 B336.

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concepts that I will discuss in what follows, we must discover how to position ourselves in the transcendental topics such that, without denying that there are relative duties of virtue (in Ansehung) regarding nature, non-human animals or beings beyond our experience, such as God, one nevertheless clarifies that they are not duties to them (gegen), but rather duties generated by the normative character that humanity has in the agent him or herself: they are duties, in the final analysis, to oneself.272 Peter König has emphasized that this amphiboly of the moral concepts of reflection has a parallel in a section which is also episodic in the Rechtslehre, and that the systematic function of both passages is that of a transition (Übergang) between the rational and the empirical, and/or between the rational and the statutory. In both cases the episodic sections would contain, therefore, a Lehre des Übergangs, and in the concrete case of the Tugendlehre, the amphiboly of the moral concepts of reflection would explain the transition between a Doctrine of Virtue in general and a Religionslehre.273 I will confirm König’s stance when I deal with that part of the amphiboly that specifically is about our apparent duties to God. There are two conditions for speaking of a duty to (gegen) someone:

The distinction between duties to or towards someone (gegen) and duties with respect to someone or something (in Ansehung) can be used beyond the framework of the amphiboly of the moral concepts of reflection, in order to clarify aspects of the explanation of all duties in the kantian ethical system, and even to generate certain hypotheses. This is what, for instance, Robert N. Johnson does, in indicating that lying, as it is treated in the Tugendlehre, is in fact a duty to oneself but in the majority of cases with respect to others. (I myself have insisted that in the Doctrine of Virtue Kant is emphasizing above all the risk of self-deception, but Johnson’s example continues to be valid). On the other hand, the cultivation of sympathy can be considered a duty to others but with respect to oneself. Finally, the duty of promoting the happiness of others would be a duty with regard to others and to others, understood in the sense of a particular kind of “group right”, but on whose basis no individual person can demand its fulfillment. Cf. JOHNSON, Robert N., “Duties to and Regarding Others”, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, pp. 192-209. 273 Cf. KÖNIG, Peter, “§§ 18-31, Episodischer Abschnitt, §§ 32-40”, pp. 133-153, p. 147. Of course this is the explanation that is appropriate to the architectonic position and “episodic” character of the amphibolies. As a result, I do not follow Guyer (GUYER, Paul, Kant and the Experience of Freedom. Essays on Aesthetics and Morality, p. 324) regarding a supposed kantian vacillation about whether to include these duties as imperfect duties. 272

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“Hence the constraining (binding) subject must, first be a person; and this person must, second, be given as an object of experience, since man is to strive for the end of this person’s will and this can happen only in a relation to each other of two beings that exist (for a mere thought-entity cannot be the cause of any result in terms of ends)”.274 Given these two conditions, only the human being is able to obligate another human being: the obligation in an active or passive sense is always with regard to humanity. The amphiboly arises when one confuses a duty with respect to (in Ansehung) with a duty to (gegen).275 Thus, there will be duties with regard to nature and animals, but not to them. All religious duties would be, duties to oneself instead of duties to God. However, these duties would necessarily involve a consideration of the normative pretensions of all duty, as if they were legitimized by the divine will.276 As Barbara Herman emphasizes, this kantian strategy should not be interpreted as a “limitation” of the moral recognition of the relevance of nature, animals or the divine. Instead, it should be read as a demonstration of the reach of the ends that are duties, some of which also involve a certain relationship –albeit indirect– with objects that in principle lie outside of their normative reach.277 4.3.2.1 Duties with regard to infrahuman beings: kantian ecological theory Kant divides his argument regarding infrahuman beings into two parts: first, regarding inanimate nature, he states that to destroy it without justification is opposed to the duty that the human being has to him or herself:

MdS 442. Cf. MdS 442. That is to say: the amphiboly presents itself when the ground of duty is confused with the terminus obligationis. Cf. DURÁN CASAS, Vicente, Die Pflichten gegen sich selbst in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 160. 276 On the basis of what is indicated in the Lectures, it appears that Kant is thinking precisely about distancing himself from Baumgarten, who would have committed the “grievous error” of having proposed duties to nature, to non-rational animals and to God (cf. VzM 413, 460). 277 Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Moral Literacy, p. 272. 274

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“...it weakens or uproots that feeling in man which, though not of itself moral, is still a disposition of sensibility that greatly promotes morality or at least prepares the way for it: the disposition, namely, to love something (e.g., beautiful crystal formations, the indescribable beauty of plants) even apart from any intention to use it”.278 There is a duty with regard to inanimate nature, which in reality is a duty to oneself, because the spiritus destructionis directed towards nature affects one’s affective dispositions (about which I have spoken earlier). These dispositions, even if they do not constitute the criterion of morality itself, do permit the receptivity of the concept of duty and the identification of morally relevant circumstances, and their care and cultivation, as I have also discussed, are indeed morally obligatory. The kantian argument is an enthymeme, which I would suggest should be reconstructed in the following manner: a. In nature one encounters pure beauty –which is a symbol of morality, according to the KU, precisely in the sense that I will shortly clarify.279 We therefore tend to affirm it and value it for itself (which, even if it is not a moral act in itself, predisposes us to morally good intentions and teaches us to love something apart from its instrumental value), b. to unjustifiably destroy the animal kingdom involves attacking the affective disposition that permits us to love something for its own sake and is, therefore, c. ∴ immoral. With respect to animals,280 the preceding argument should be taken into account along with another one, based on the similarities between MdS 443. Cf. KU 351-354 and CHARPENEL, Eduardo, “Pensar la moral desde la belleza: una lectura del parágrafo 59 de la Kritik der Urteilskraft”, in Tópicos, n. 41, December 2011, pp. 183-219. 280 While in certain moments of his argumentation, in this passage and in others, Kant calls animals “things”, I would emphasize that he clearly distinguishes them from inanimate things and non-sentient living beings. Priscilla Cohn emphasizes that there is a kind of hierarchy: direct duties to human beings with regard to animals, and yet more indirect with regard to plants and inanimate things; cf. “Kant y el problema de los derechos de los animales” in Esplendor y miseria de la ética kantiana (E. Guisán, ed.), Anthropos, Barcelona, 1988, p. 198. I do not, however, agree with her general perspective in this article, which in certain points equates the moral situation of animals with that of a newborn child who has not yet displayed his or her rationality (p. 202). Here she is not taking into 278 279

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animal sensibility and properly human sensibility. It is in the face of these similarities and analogies –which Kant was more conscious of than we usually think281– that “violent and cruel treatment of animals is far more intimately opposed to man’s duty to himself, and he has a duty to refrain account the fact that this newborn status clearly does not negate personhood qua disposition and rationality qua faculty in kantian philosophy. She then attempts to defend direct duties to animals on the basis of a questionable use of the categorical imperative (mistreating animals would generate a world that I cannot rationally desire if I universalize the maxim, because it would exclude the possibilities of affection and animal company; similarly, there would also be imperfect duties to animals, because without the promotion of their life the world would be less rich and varied; cf. pp. 206-209). Cohn forgets that the unconditioned value that the categorical imperative promotes, qua unconditioned command of the practical reason, is that of humanity itself, and not that of affects or diversities of any type. 281 This is brought to light by Patrick Kain, in an excellent article based on the Lectures on Physical Geography of Kant and on certain other passages. Kant was conscious of the distinct grades of “intelligence” (in an analogous use of the term, and with the caveat that it is not the same intelligence as reason or self-consciousness) and even of “moral dispositions” (in an even more improperly analogous of the term) in various animal species (cf. KU 464), and in fact comments extensively on them. According to KU 387, 401, 762, animals are not understandable from a mechanical perspective, but rather only from an organic and therefore teleological perspective. They have an immaterial soul (KrV B 419, KU 460) and capacities of sensation and choice (MdS 442), and this is why they awaken in us feelings such as love and sympathy, which as I have shown over the course of this book are morally relevant feelings. It is precisely for this reason that Kant raises the problem of the amphiboly of the moral concepts of reflection in relation to the treatment that we wish to give animals. The fact that love and sympathy do not distinguish between animals and human beings can make us forget that animals, since they do not have a conscience nor do they act under the moral law (KrV A802 and B830) are not subjects of rights in a strict sense. Kain concludes, nevertheless, that in the light of the explanation of the amphiboly, there remains a series of duties with regard to animals that hardly demand less from our treatment of them than what is demanded by the ecological theories that criticize Kant. Cf. KAIN, Patrick, “Duties Regarding Animals”, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: a Critical Guide, pp. 210-233. Another author who clearly points out the richness of the ecological outlook in kantian moral philosophy is Scott ROULIER, Kantian Virtue at the Intersection of Politics and Nature. The Value of Soul-Making, pp. 130-146. Roulier demonstrates the absurdities that certain eco-centric or radical ecological postures fall into and emphasizes the value of the humanistic approach of Kant in regard to the care of the environment and of non-rational animal life. A brief analysis of Kant’s posture in regard to our “analogies” with animals can be found in WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 104.

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from this”.282 Given that the closeness between animal affectivity and our own should awaken our sympathy and compassion –affective reactions that do not make any distinction between animals and human beings in regard to their object283– animal mistreatment involves an attack against the very same sentimental dispositions which, as I have shown, cooperate with moral intentions. Therefore, one can even speak of a duty of gratitude with regard to animals, which “belongs indirectly to man’s duty with regard to these animals; considered as a direct, duty, however, it is always only a duty of man to himself”.284 The practical use of the transcendental topic is evident. The kantian proposal also stands out as a fundamentally humanist posture that provides grounds for actions and attitudes with respect to nature and with respect to sentient beings in particular, without at all making the human being equivalent to the rest of natural beings or with irrational animals.285 MdS 443. In regard to this and the analogies between animals and human beings, cf. DENIS, Lara, “Kant’s Conception of Duties Regarding Animals: Reconstruction and Reconsideration”, in History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 17, n. 4, October 2000, pp. 405-423 and SÁNCHEZ MADRID, Nuria, “Si un caballo pudiera captar el pensamiento ‘yo’... (AA XXV: 854). Consideraciones sobre la presencia del animal en la biología gris de Kant”, E-prints, UCM, ID 8031. 284 MdS 443. Kant’s arguments are fundamentally the same in the Lectures, where in addition he offers two examples of how care for animals fosters our moral sensibility. The first is an anecdote about Leibniz, whom he characterizes as a good man because of his care even for insects, and the second relates to the fact that English legislation did not allow butchers or surgeons to form part of juries because of the pernicious effects on their moral receptivity of their being accustomed to pain. Cf. VzM 458-460. 285 As certain authors from the “deep ecology” movement seek to do, without realizing that this animalization of the human being eliminates all ecological duties, since if we are not above the rest of natural beings we cannot be commanded to take responsibility for them. Oliver Sensen suggest that, at base, Kant’s argument puts the burden of proof on those who wish to argue that animals have rights; cf. SENSEN, Oliver, “Dignity and the Formula of Humanity”, p. 114. What Lara Denis indicates is also interesting: some psychological scholars have held that Kant is right about whether to teach children to avoid cruelty and treat animals with kindness, because this increases their empathy with human beings as well; cf. DENIS, Lara, “Kant’s Conception of Duties Regarding Animals: Reconstruction and Reconsideration”, pp. 405-423, which in turn refers to ASCIONE, Frank R., “Enhancing Attitudes about Humane Treatment of Animals: Generalization to Human-Directed Empathy”, Anthrozoos, vol. 5, 1992, pp. 176-191. On the other 282 283

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4.3.2.2 Duties with regard to superhuman beings: the fulfilling of duties as divine mandates This second aspect of the amphiboly obliges me both to cite the episodic section –MdS 442-444– as well as to refer to certain kantian notes at the conclusion of the Doctrine of Virtue – 486-491. As is obvious, if the duties with regard to nature and to animals are not duties to them, insofar as they are not people –i.e. they do not fulfill the first of the conditions of moral obligation– in this second case what is not fulfilled is the second condition: God is not a possible object of experience. From the theoretical point of view, the idea of God is a necessary regulative idea for understanding “the finality of the world in its totality”,286 and from the perspective of the practical use of reason his existence can be postulated in order to understand the synthetic connection of the summum bohand, I believe that Korsgaard is totally mistaken when she attempts, based on Kant’s arguments, to defend the position that an animal “matters for itself”, insofar as it has a certain self-perception. Korsgaard says that when we think something is naturally good for an animal, we think this “from the point of view of the animal itself”, which –I hold– only demonstrates that we have an inclination to anthropomorphize our objects of knowledge (in this case this is a tendency reinforced by the real analogies between animal life and human life). Strictly speaking we can never know what the point of view of the animal is, if it even makes sense to speak of such a thing. Korsgaard holds that the categorical imperative confronts human beings and commands us to perform obligatory actions with regard to ends in themselves, but these ends are not only human, and therefore animals would be –according to her– ends in themselves constituted as such by human ethical legislation. I believe this is impossible within the kantian ethical space: we are ends in ourselves because we are able to legislate for ourselves, and those beings that are not capable of this –including animals, as Korsgaard herself appears to concede– are therefore not objects of respect in a strict sense, because although they can have a high value, they do not have dignity. Cf. KORSGAARD, Christine, “Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals”, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Delivered at U. of Michigan, Feb. 6 2004, pp. 79-109. I agree, on the other hand, with Vicente Durán Casas, when he argues that although Kant did not have in mind that there might be duties with regard to the environment and to animals with grounding in the duties to human beings of future generations, his ethics creates the basis, through his treatment of the duties to others, for this way of seeing our relationship with infrahuman beings. Cf. DURÁN CASAS, Vicente, Die Pflichten gegen sich selbst in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 159. Regarding the value of animals as beings unable to impose ends upon themselves, cf. also Refl. 7305. 286 MdS 443.

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num.287 However, because his reality is not given to us in experience, we cannot take for granted what his will is. As a result, therefore, it cannot have a normative character simpliciter with respect to the system of duties: “We likewise have a duty called the duty of religion, that is, the duty to «recognize all our duties as though they were (instar) divine mandates». But this is not the consciousness of a duty towards God”.288 Again, it is necessary to locate oneself in the appropriate transcendental “topos” in order to understand the origin of the legitimacy of this set of duties: there are no duties to God, because we do not know his will by experience, at least not within philosophical ethics, although within the context of a revealed religion we might have such knowledge. However, even in ethics we must apply the idea of God in a practical sense that encompasses all our moral duties.289 The justification of this perspective is offered in the conclusions of the treatise, where Kant insists that a religious doctrine, understood as being a doctrine of duties to God, is not to be denied but remains beyond the formal limits of moral philosophy.290 This conclusion appears to have been put forward in view of the prior philosophical tradition, and perhaps concretely of Wolff’s ethical system, where these duties to God are integrated into the body of ethical

Cf. KpV 124-132. MdS 443. Ricken gives an interesting analysis of this passage: the Latin term instar is not precisely an “as if” but rather is a “likewise”. This supports my contention that the amphiboly is not a mere misunderstanding to be clarified, but rather consists in the coexistence of two perspectives or tópoi. Cf. “Die Religionslehre als Lehre der Pflichten gegen Gott liegt auβerhalb der Grenzen der reinen Moralphilosophie”, in Kant’s Tugendlehre: a Comprehensive Commentary. 289 It is interesting to emphasize that already in the Lectures (337) Kant uses the term “amphiboly” in order to refer precisely to the confusion on the part of a person who does not see worship as a means to foster true moral religion and considers it an immediate service to God. 290 In a note to the Reflections one can find Kant expressing doubts about this issue: even though he does not affirm that there are no direct duties to God, in these notes Kant explores limiting them to passive internal duties. Cf. Refl. 7038. 287 288

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science.291 Kant reiterates his rejection of this approach, and explains why the topic makes it possible to see all duties as if they were divine: “The ground on which man is to think of all his duties in keeping with this formal aspect of religion (their relation to a divine will given a priori) is only subjectively logical. That is to say, we cannot very well make obligation (moral constraint) intuitive for ourselves without thereby thinking of another’s will, namely God’s (of which reason in giving universal laws is only the spokesman)”.292 Thus we have the alterity that, in the development of the Tugendlehre, was justified by the division between homo noumenon and homo phaenomenon. This division is operative in the very idea of self-legislation and moral coercion, and is particularly important in the justification of the duties to oneself and in the development of the kantian theory of moral conscience. Here it assumes the form of the postulate “as if were divine” of the command of the law.293 In addition, Kant’s distinction assumes that this topical perspective is necessary given our subjective constitution, and legitimates the approach whereby, in a certain sense, one thinks of the moral conscience in particular as if it were the voice of God in us. This is also generally true for our natural disposition, and is reflected in the aesthetic preconditions for the receptivity of duty.294 This does not invali291 Cf. ANDERSON, Georg, “Kants Metaphysik der Sitten – ihre Idee und ihr Verhältnis zur Ethik der Wolffschen Schule”, pp. 56-57. For his part, Kuehn refers instead to Baumgarten; cf. KUEHN, Manfred, “Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: the History and Significance of its Deferral”, p. 17. In RICKEN, Friedo, “Die Religionslehre als Lehre der Pflichten gegen Gott liegt auβerhalb der Grenzen der reinen Moralphilosophie”, p. 411, the author states that Kant is opposing both of them. 292 MdS 487. 293 A partial approach to this idea can be found already in VzM 263. 294 Cf. Concerning this point cf. SCHWARZ, Gerhard, Est Deus in nobis: Die Identität von Gott und reiner praktischer Vernunft in Immanuel Kants “Kritik der praktischen Vernunft”. FRIEDRICH, Rainer notes (Eigentum und Staatsbegründung in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 30, n. 141) that this as if does not negate the internal character of the duties of virtue, insofar as the divine aspect from this perspective of the transcendental topic is the obligatoriness of the mandate and not the law in itself, whose ground is found strictly in the practical reason itself.

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date the other topical position according to which one must avoid the misunderstanding of conceiving of God as yet another subject of reciprocal duties: “But this duty with regard to God (properly speaking, with regard to the Idea we ourselves make of such a Being) is a duty of man to himself, that is, it is not objective, an obligation to perform certain services for another, but only subjective, for the sake of strengthening the moral incentive in our own lawgiving reason”.295 Objective duties to worship God may exist in revealed religion, admits Kant, in which God is present in experience either mediatedly or immediately; however, this lies beyond the bounds of pure philosophical ethics. Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason is not a treatise that integrates fully either into pure philosophical ethics or, therefore –and paradoxically– into mere reason, but rather presupposes a transition between the philosophical approach and revealed doctrines. Thus it “implies the concordance of pure reason [with these doctrines] (i.e. that they do not contradict each other)”.296 Therefore, Religion must confront the paradoxes that Kant notes at the end of the Metaphysics of Morals: can divine justice exist, given that our relationship with God must be one of love? can our actions harm the divinity? Is it necessary that there be an innocent expiatory victim given the goodness of the Creator? etc.297 The Doctrine of Virtue, for its part, since it is a philosophical ethical work, only reaffirms that this issue goes beyond its own limits.298

MdS 487. MdS 488. The relationship and differences between what Kant states regarding the Religionspflicht in the Tugendlehre and the viewpoint proper to Religion, are commented on by RICKEN, Friedo in “Die Religionslehre als Lehre der Pflichten gegen Gott liegt außerhalb der Grenzen der reinen Moralphilosophie”, pp. 422-423. 297 Cf. MdS 488-491. 298 Cf. MdS 491. 295 296

CHAPTER 5 METHODOLOGY OF VIRTUE

5.1 Introduction As Barbara Herman has written, if one reads the pertinent passages carefully, one will see that Kant has much more to say regarding moral education than is normally recognized.1 Specifically, the ethical doctrine of the method of the Tugendlehre has to do with the acquisition of virtue, and in this sense corresponds to the methodologies with which Kant normally ends his critical works, and more specifically, it is very close to that of the KpV.2 In that work he makes it clear that a doctrine of method from a practical perspective consists in the explanation of the “mode in which we can give the laws of pure practical reason access to the human mind and influence on its maxims, that is, by which we can make the objectively practical reason subjectively practical also”.3 However, he also recognizes that in that book he has only set down the most general maxims of a moral methodology,4 which suggests that the Doctrine of Method in the MdS will seek to be more concrete. In the Doctrine of Method of the second Critique he mentions the need for a moral catechism, thus prefiguring the fragment that would later appear in the Metaphysics of Morals.5 The section in the Doctrine of Virtue is divided into two parts: ethical didactics –which explain how one must teach virtue, in what sense the Tugendlehre is precisely a Lehre, i.e. a doctrine, and proposes by Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Moral Literacy, p. 11. Concerning the Methodenlehre of the KpV, cf. KOPPER, Joachim, “Die Bedeutung der Methodenlehre”, in Kant’s Metaphysik und Religionsphilosophie, pp. 391-407, although I am not sure about his conclusions concerning the intentions of Kant in the doctrines of method in each of the three Critiques. 3 KpV 151. 4 Cf. KpV 161. 5 Cf. KpV 154. 1 2

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way of example a fragment of a proposal for a moral catechism– and ethical ascetics, which instead explain the rules and conditions for the exercise of virtue. Instruction is justified, says Kant, by the concept of virtue itself, which implies that it be acquired and not innate.6 Virtue can only be understood as the achievement of a virtuous Gesinnung and as its strength. Morality must be interiorized in maxims in order to constitute a Denkungsart that has been freely acquired. Therefore, it is obligatory and possible to teach it.7 Nevertheless, teaching is insufficient, insofar as it is limited to representations of duty: therefore ascetics is necessary, which involves exercise and cultivation: “for one cannot straightway do all that one wants to do, without having first tried out and exercised one’s powers”.8 5.2 Ethical instruction: issues of exposition, dialogue, catechesis and casuistry Kant begins by stating that the Doctrine of Virtue must be methodical and systematic, in order that it is presented as a science.9 He then describes the forms that its exposition can take. There are a number of terminological variants relating to this point that I will attempt to clarify: Cf. MdS 477. Teaching it, however, (as I stated above, when I discussed why the moral perfection of the other can never be my own duty) does not involve substituting or eliminating the active performance in first person that the person being educated must undertake in order that this educational process may attain authentically moral ends. Kant seems to waver about this in certain of his Reflections, where he evokes the socratic problem about the possibility of teaching virtue; cf. Refl. 6828, where he appears to state the problem, and 7185, where he appears to admit that virtue can be taught provided that one presupposes the existence of moral feeling in the person being educated, and one proceeds via precepts, imitation and permanent exercise. The point is to recognize that the teaching of virtue is in no way opposed to the demand for autonomy: the facultas is one thing, and the strength necessary for its exercise is quite another; cf. DÖRFLINGER, Bernd, “Ethische Methodenlehre: Didaktik und Asketik”, in Kant’s Tugendlehre. A Comprehensive Commentary, p. 387. 8 MdS 477. 9 Cf. MdS 478. 6 7

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a. Listening-based, or dogmatic exposition,10 which is that method in which only the teacher speaks and the students are merely passive listeners. b. Erotetic exposition: that in which the teacher poses questions to those who are being taught. This, in turn, can take two forms: b.1. Dialogic or Socratic:11 the teacher questions the students’ reason, and they in turn, in principle, can ask questions or develop arguments. In this way, one develops the disposition to possess certain concepts through a dialogue about concrete cases that strengthens the students’ ability to judge. The socratic roots of this form of teaching are undeniable: the instructor proceeds as a “midwife of the pupil’s thoughts”,12 and at the same time he or she learns how to question. Here Kant quotes the aphorism docendo discimus, and suggests that this dialogic instructional form encourages the teacher him or herself to develop morally via reflection and the generation of that iudicia praevia that both students and teachers can apply to new thoughts and ideas.13 b.2. Catechetical: the teacher does not question the student’s reason, but rather his or her memory, and therefore the student does not ask questions in return. The teacher must have at hand precise expressions that can be easily memorized and which he or she can “obtain in methodical fashion” from the student.14 According to Kant, this method would be the most appropriate form for the beginning student. Even though in the abstract it would be better to use the dialogical-socratic 10 He refers to this as a methodology based on “listening” in MdS 478 and in MdS 479 he calls it dogmatic. For other passages where the distinction between listeningbased and erotetic instruction appears, and for the subdivisions of the latter, cf. LOUDEN, Robert B., Kant’s Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings, p. 50. 11 In MdS 478 he calls it dialogue, whereas in MdS 479 he calls it socratic dialogue. Concerning the socratic inspiration of this ideal of dialogical training of the faculty of judgement, cf. also Ped. 477 and MUNZEL, G. Felicitas, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character. The Critical Link of Morality, Anthropology and Reflective Judgement, p. 278 and pp. 313-321. 12 MdS 478. 13 Cf. MdS 478. 14 Cf. MdS 479.

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method, at the outset the student does not even know how he or she should ask questions.15 The initial necessity, then, of catechetical instruction explains why the philosopher pays attention to the usefulness of a “moral catechism”, understood as the “basic doctrine of all the duties of virtue”.16 Its content can be developed on the basis of the most ordinary understanding but should not be mixed with a religious catechism, which should be presented separately in order to avoid compromising the purity of the moral principles as well as that of the religious beliefs in question.17 It is worth emphasizing, then, that Kant proposes that moral teaching should begin with the catechetical method18 and not with a dogmatic method. This latter method is purely expositive, while the catechetical 15 Ana Marta González emphasizes, with Kant’s Pedagogy in mind, that his educational project does not exclude a certain amount of mechanical “training” provided that afterwards the teacher encourages the students to learn to think; cf. Culture as Mediation. Kant on Nature, Culture and Morality, p. 39. 16 MdS 479: “Grundlehre der Tugendpflichten”. 17 Cf. MdS 478-479, cf. also MdS 486-491. The Lectures on Pedagogy –which should be read with due caution since they are not a first-hand kantian text, even though he did authorize their publication– also state that the catechesis model is more appropriate for the teaching of revealed religion, while ethics, in contrast, demands a socratic method instead. However, Kant appears to also admit that with ethical instruction a certain use of the catechetical method is legitimate, provided that a fundamentally socratic methodology guides it. Concerning the care needed when referring to the Lectures on Pedagogy edited by Rink, the reader can consult MUNZEL, G. Felicitas, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character. The Critical Link of Morality, Anthropology and Reflective Judgement, p. 255 n. 2. Regarding how the methodology of the MdS can serve as an element of contrast and an interpretative key for reading the Pedagogy (the same thing can be done with the Methodenlehre of the KpV), cf. LOUDEN, Robert B., Kant’s Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings, p. 35. 18 Therefore, what Allen Wood asserts in Kant’s Ethical Thought, pp. 151-152, is completely false: he claims that Kant totally rejects catechetical instruction (which might perhaps be said of dogmatic education) and exclusively defends a socratic moral education. This latter is no doubt superior, but requires catechesis as a previous stage. Kant is very conscious of the imitative aspect of human nature, above all in the early stages of the formation of judgement, and his views can be seen in several points of his explanations. This is noted, precisely in regard to these passages of the Doctrine of Virtue, in LOUDEN, Robert B., Kant’s Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings, p. 49.

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method, at least in its form, involves a more active participation of the student. It also provides better preparation to the student, so that, in a second moment, the teacher can move on to using the socratic-dialogic method, which works to strengthen the faculty of judgement19 and therefore fosters the correct application of the criterion of morality and the fulfillment of the duties of virtue. Kant’s proposal for moral education reinforces the idea of an ethics which is fundamentally intersubjective, where acting in a fully rational manner always involves inserting oneself into a rational dialogue with others; this is why the dialogical formation is privileged.20 It is worth remembering here that in his lectures on anthropology, Kant lists as one of the most effective strategies for moralization “the chat among friends” about morality. He thus emphasizes the moral fecundity of friendship, as I discussed in the previous chapter, but above all he recognizes the reflexive utility of the dialogical stimulation of thought.21 The same is true of the Critique of Pure Reason, which emphasizes the usefulness of the discussion and analysis of contradictory positions in order to perfect reason.22 In addition, in the Critique of Practical Reason he states that the Doctrine of Method proposes “...to make the judging of actions by moral laws a natural employment accompanying all our own free actions (...) and to make it as it were a habit, and to sharpen this judgement [by questioning]”.23 This is an affirmation that reinforces the centrality of dialogical-moral education in Kant, and reiterates what I have already stated in previous

19 The fact that the Methodenlehre is precisely directed towards the formation of the faculty of judgement, which is necessary to provide for the Spielraum that is required by the duties of virtue, is commented on in DÖRFLINGER, Bernd, “Ethische Methodenlehre: Didaktik und Asketik”, p. 383. 20 Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Moral Literacy, p. 53. 21 Cf. AP Mrongovius, 113. 22 Cf. KrV A747 B775, cf. also GONZÁLEZ, Ana Marta, Culture as Mediation. Kant on Nature, Culture and Morality, p. 208. 23 KpV 159.

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sections regarding the ambivalence of the term “habit” in Kant, which, however, is used legitimately in the sense of habitus libertatis. The purpose of these didactic reflections is the formation of the faculty of judgement in order that it can be later exercised in a moral context. Kant confirms this point towards the end of this section, when he speaks of the necessity of casuistic questions.24 He thereby also retrospectively justifies their inclusion in each of the discussions of the duties of virtue in the Tugendlehre. Kant is not perfectly precise in his terminology here, and calls the casuistical exercises a moment of “moral catechetical instruction”, while according to his earlier classification, it is rather a moment of dialogical instruction. He does, however, emphasize the fact that in the exposition of the cases what is being exercised is the understanding of the students, and therefore the instructor should use trick (verfängliche) questions: “The advantage of this is not only that it is a cultivation of reason, most suited to the capacity of the undeveloped (since questions about what one’s duty is can be decided far more easily than speculative questions), and so is the most appropriate way to sharpen the understanding of young people in general. Its advantage lies especially in the fact that it is natural for a man to love a subject which he has, by his own handling, brought to a science (in which he is now proficient); and so, by this sort of practice, the pupil is drawn without noticing it to an interest in morality”.25 Above all, Kant can be seen to be justified in having included, in the discussion of each and every one of the duties of virtue –including those Enskat emphasizes this, insisting that if one wishes to understand how moral judgement functions in Kant, one must pay close attention to the casuistic exercises he proposes; cf. “Autonomie und Humanität – Wie kategorische Imperative die Urteilskraft orientieren” in Systematische Ethik mit Kant (Hans-Ulrich Baumgarten and Carsten Held, eds.), Karl Alber, Freiburg – München, 2001, p. 101. Regarding the casuistical exercises, the reader can also consult O’Neil, “Instituting Principles: Between Duty and Action”, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Interpretative Essays, pp. 331-347 and MUNZEL, G. Felicitas, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character. The Critical Link of Morality, Anthropology and Reflective Judgement, p. 318. 25 MdS 483-484. 24

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which are negative or perfect, both tooneself as well as to others– these sections of casuistic questions. Not all the questions raised in them appear to suggest a direction for their resolution, however, and in certain cases they can even draw the reader into cases of authentic moral perplexity.26 The idea is to form the faculty of judegment, not only in order that it can make judgements in a realm of deliberation that it is already familiar with, but also so that it can make judgements in the face of new moral circumstances. Kant shows this interest in flexibility and the capacity for innovation in moral judgement when he distances himself from a mechanical theory of habit (although, as I have shown, he mistakenly attributes this theory to Aristotle) because someone trained in this way is unable to react to new circumstances of practical-moral relevance. The catechetical-dialogical method, by inserting the student into the logic of giving and asking for moral reasons, and by raising casuistical questions for his or her resolution, fosters attention to the possible changes in circumstances of moral relevance. Hence, Kant’s approach protects the students’ judgement from a certain conformity to “bourgeois” norms, exemplified in the buildup of uncritically accepted behaviors.27 The casuistic questions are not part of the system, but are instead his own notes, their function corresponds with ethical instruction. Thus, even though they are included in the Doctrine of the Elements, their importance for fostering progress in the faculty of judgement is, for Kant, beyond all doubt.28 26 As I have discussed over the course of this book, Kant does not leave the casuistical questions “open” in all cases: on various occasions he offers indications for their resolution. W. I. Matson insists that one can disagree with the resolutions to the casuistic questions that Kant offers. Specifically, Matson criticizes the argument against suicide from the GMS and the arguments against lying found in Über ein vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu lügen as being counterintuitive, all without taking the Tugendlehre into consideration. He claims, nonetheless, that kantian moral theory need not stand or fail with the conclusions to certain cases that Kant offers; cf. “Kant as a Casuist”, in Journal of Philosophy, vol. 51, 1954, pp. 855-860. 27 Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Moral Literacy, p. 109. 28 Cf. MdS 411. Concerning the place of casuistry in the formation of the judgement, cf. LOUDEN, Robert B., Kant’s Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings, p. 52. Concerning how the casuistical exercises help to form the faculty of judgement in its moral use, and how this is similar to the functions of phronesis according to Aristotle, cf. WOOD, Allen, “Kant and Agent-Oriented Ethics”, p. 79. And concerning the casuistical

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The instructional order presented here –from catechetical erotetics to dialogical erotetics, which also incorporates casuistics– is also that which Barbara Herman finds among the distinct didactic methodologies proposed by Kant, although she adds certain other elements.29 Moral education, then, must begin with the memorization of rules but progresses towards the formation of the faculty of judgement via dialogue and interpersonal examination of questions. The rules learned are thus no longer memorized lessons, but rather are orientative criteria for the judgement, and help the student go deeper into the rationality that undergirds them.30 Kant makes two observations prior to moving on to the analysis of moral asceticism: one that refers to the use of examples, and secondly he presents a fragment of a moral catechism. I will discuss certain aspects of the contents of this fragment of a moral catechism towards the end of this chapter –after having dealt with the issue of asceticism– and as a result I will not delve into this issue now. In regard to the use of examples, this is dealt with by Kant as an experiential or technical means for educating in virtue. First, following a footnote by the philosopher of Königsberg himself, we must distinguish between an example that is a Beispiel and one that is an Exempel:

articles and how the latitude involved in them calls on the faculty of judgement and therefore, even though it appears in the Elementarlehre, forms part of the content of the Methodenlehre, cf. LUDWIG, Bernd, “Die Einteilungen der Metaphysik der Sitten im Allgemeinen und die der Tugendlehre im Besonderen”, in Kant’s Tugendlehre. A Comprehensive Commentary, p. 82. 29 Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Moral Literacy, pp. 131ff. The author states that moral education should first be catechetical, in order to make the motive of duty clear; afterwards it should be erotetic, teaching the students to distinguish real virtue from false and to take on the motive of duty in all its strength, rejecting the pretensions of validity of non-moral incentives. It is in this way that moral judgement is exercised. Finally –and this is what Herman adds, going beyond what is explicitly proposed by Kant in the methodology of virtue– moral education must offer tools for the formation of a “community of moral judgement” and of institutions that promote obligatory ends. In addition, critical tools are necessary for the continued perfecting of these institutions, as well as the formation of a spirit of political-legal participation that favors the dynamic of a “sociable unsociability” that progressively generates the conditions for a morally better world. 30 Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Moral Literacy, p. 116.

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“Beispiel [instance], a German word, is commonly used as synonymous with Exempel [example], but the two words really do not have the same meaning. To take something as an example and to bring forward an instance to clarify an expression are altogether different concepts. An example is a particular case of a practical rule, insofar as this rule represents an action as practicable or impracticable, whereas an instance is only a particular (concretum), represented in accordance with concepts as contained under a universal (abstractum), and is a presentation of a concept merely for theory”.31 As Louden correctly notes,32 Kant himself –even in the Doctrine of Virtue itself– does not rigorously follow this terminological distinction and often uses the term Beispiel in situations that are properly practical. This occurs even when he states that it is the fact that the teacher “behaves in an exemplary manner”33 that is the element that shows the student that duty can be obeyed.34 Kant begins from the anthropological fact of the human tendency to imitate (Nachahmung) and, therefore, from its educational use: “imitation is the first determination of his will to accept maxims that he afterward makes for himself”.35 The usefulness of examples, understood as proposals of a model for imitation is, nevertheless, very limited, as Kant had recognized as far back as the Grundlegung.36 MdS 480n. Cf. LOUDEN, Robert B., “Making the Law Visible: the Role of Examples in Kant’s Ethics”, in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: a Critical Guide, p. 75, n. 16. 33 MdS 479: “das gute Beispiel an dem Lehrer selbst (von exemplarischer Führung zu sein)...”. 34 This grasping of the performability of duty via an Exempel is a feature of the faculty of judgement in its reflective use, as noted by TORRALBA, José María, Libertad, objeto práctico y acción. La facultad del juicio en la filosofía moral de Kant, p. 360. 35 MdS 479. This is why Louden emphasizes that –both in the Doctrine of Method of the Metaphysics of Morals as well as in that of the Critique of Practical Reason– Kant recognizes the need to make morality perceptible prior to exercising judgement itself in moral issues. Cf. Kant’s Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings, p. 49. 36 Cf. GMS 406-408: ethics cannot be derived (entlenhen) from examples. The same limitation is noted in Refl. 6898. Cf. in this regard PATON, Herbert J., The Categorical Imperative, p. 25. 31 32

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In order to judge an example, one must already have the necessary parameters, and as a result the example itself cannot serve as a criterion of morality.37 In addition, this would not be consistent with the quest for autonomy. This is because the example illustrates maxims of action that conform to duty but which are not yet for the sake of duty, and therefore as a didactic strategy suffers the same lack that –in a way I have already reviewed critically– Kant accuses the aristotelian ethical theory of habit of suffering. The example involves the Sinnesart, not the Denkungsart. Thus, it presupposes the establishment of an inclination that does not proceed directly from the subjective autonomy of the practical reason, and therefore implies a certain rigidity and a certain automatism that would prevent the student from developing maxims of virtue.38 In addition, to hope that the practical example would be what moves the student to act virtuously runs the risk of generating the competitive passions that were specifically prohibited as vices in the treatment of the duties to others: envy and arrogance, for example. Kant knows about the violence implicit in the imitation and comparison that occurs between human beings, and is aware of its disruptive subjective effects on morality: “...a teacher will not tell his naughty pupil: Take an example from that good (orderly, diligent) boy! For this would only cause him to hate that boy, who puts him in an unfavorable light”.39 In fact, it is this type of comparison between human beings that generates unsociable sociability and, as I have discussed, comparisons of this

Cf. LOUDEN, Robert B., “Making the Law Visible: the Role of Examples in Kant’s Ethics”, p. 64, where the author notes that this carefulness about the use of examples is socratic and refers to Euthydemus, 5d. Concerning the limited moral utility of examples, the reader can also consult VzM 332-334. 38 Cf. MdS 479-480. 39 MdS 480. The same idea is expressed in VzM 359, 437. Concerning these “passions” proper to unsociable sociability, cf. SHERMAN, Nancy, Making a Necessity of Virtue, p. 266. 37

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kind are at the root of the vices that affect intersubjective relations.40 Therefore, Kant limits the applicability of practical examples to the confirmation of the practicability of duty: “A good example (exemplary conduct) should not serve as a model but only as a proof that it is really possible to act in conformity with duty”.41 Hence, in terms of the content of moral perfection, no human being should be presented as a model, but rather only the moral law itself: “So it is not comparison with any other man whatsoever (with man as he is), but with the Idea (of humanity), with man as he ought to be, and so comparison with the law, that must serve as the constant standard of a teacher's instruction”.42 The use of examples should not, therefore, encourage comparisons with other human beings: in and of itself, comparison attacks one’s own dignity, which is precisely an absolute value, i.e. incomparable. Herman emphasizes that teaching children to understand their value as ends in themselves, and not in comparative terms with regard to others, also influences the idea of happiness that they can form for themselves in the future. Kant sees this idea, precisely because it is indeterminate, as especially susceptible to all kinds of influences.43 As Rivera explains well, virtue presupposes the value of treating other human beings as equals, without seeking superiority over others nor fearing being treated as an inferior. In large part, evil maxims –those that subordinate the moral law to egoism– arise from the ease with which we compare ourselves with other persons by the use of contingent criteria, instead of measuring our own value with respect to the moral law.44

This point, and concretely the last text cited, are frequently taken advantage of, as was to be expected, by Allen Wood, who is the principle defender of the “social” interpretation of evil in Kant, as I have mentioned. Cf. WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 156. 41 MdS 480. Louden calls this a proof in the anthropological sense; cf. LOUDEN, Robert B., “Making the Law visible: the Role of Examples in Kant’s Ethics”, p. 73. 42 MdS 480. 43 Cf. HERMAN, Barbara, Moral Literacy, p. 198. 44 Cf. RIVERA, Faviola, Virtud y justicia en Kant, p. 143. 40

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In sum, as Louden affirms,45 the use of examples in a moral context should never be foundational, but rather merely technical and anthropological, in the sense in which they are not criteria of morality but rather only of the performability of duty. Instead, examples should just take advantage of the natural tendency of human beings to imitate others in the first stage of moral education, so that later the teacher can work on forming the capacity of judgement of the student and motivate him or her to use it in an autonomous fashion. This is why in the KrV Kant speaks of examples as being “training wheels” or a prosthetic aid to the power of judgement.46

5.3 Ethical asceticism Baxley has suggested that the complete section on ascetics towards the end of the Doctrine of Virtue could be a response to the well-known criticisms of Kant by Schiller in his On Grace and Dignity.47 In the face of Schiller’s rejection of a “gloomy” or emotionless fulfillment of duty, which would be radically opposed to any and all inclinations and stripped of the “graces” (understood as aesthetic elements that arise from the reconciliation between nature and freedom), Kant explores two dispositions of the soul, bravery and joy, that should accompany the exercise of

45 Cf. LOUDEN, Robert B., “Making the Law Visible: the Role of Examples in Kant’s Ethics”, pp. 79-80. 46 Cf. KrV A134 B174. 47 Cf. BAXLEY, Anne Margaret, Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, p. 104. This is how Allen Wood reads this passage; cf. “Kant and Agent-Oriented Ethics”, p. 80. Cf. also ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 182, where the author summarizes the responses that Kant offered Schiller in his late works. If in the KpV there is an implicit response to Schiller in the criticism of moral fanaticism, in the Tugendlehre he responds by showing the interaction of the affective aspect of the moral agent with the motive of duty. In his discussion of asceticism in the MdS he emphasizes the joy that accompanies virtue, while in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason he responds to Schiller in a rather more conciliatory tone, affirming that the differences between them are rooted more in the manner of exposition.

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virtue.48 Indeed, the rules of the exercitiorum virtutis in Kant presuppose that: “But what is not done with pleasure but merely as compulsory service has no inner worth for one who attends to his duty in this way and such service is not loved by him; instead, he shirks as much as possible occasions for practicing virtue. (...) Something must be added to it, something which, though it is only moral, affords an agreeable enjoyment to life. This is the ever-cheerful heart, according to the idea of the virtuous Epicurus. For who should have more reason for being of a cheerful spirit, and not even finding it a duty to put himself in a cheerful frame of mind and make it habitual, than one who is aware of no intentional transgression in himself and is secured against falling into any?”.49 Baxley comments on this lauding of Epicurus,50 and insists that this joyfulness at the fulfillment of duty on the part of the kantian moral subject demonstrates that virtue in Kant is much more than mere aristotelian continence.51 I emphasize that the origin of this joy is properly the 48 Nancy Sherman, on the other hand, insists that this “joy of duty” would have come to Kant by way of Pietism; cf. SHERMAN, Nancy, Making a Necessity of Virtue, p. 124. 49 MdS 484-485. This same reference regarding the “joyful heart” that Epicurus defended appears in Refl. 6616 and 6831. In the Reflections Kant insists that this type of “moral joy” can be greater than that which arises from egoism and that the good must always be undertaken with joy; cf. 6964 and 6989. 50 Who Kant had already defended in his Lectures (250), arguing that historically his critics had misinterpreted his doctrine of interior satisfaction and the joyful heart. 51 Cf. BAXLEY, Anne Margaret, Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, pp. 102- 103. ENGSTROM, Stephen emphasizes the same point in “The Inner Freedom of Virtue”, p. 307 and p. 314, as does WOOD, Allen, Kantian Ethics, p. 150. In addition, Grenberg indicates that the ideal of the virtuous person in Kant goes beyond aristotelian continence, although it cannot attain the moral perfection that is attained by being outside the reach of any temptation to transgress one’s duty. Cf. GRENBERG, Jeanine, “What is the Enemy of Virtue?”, pp. 167-169. The same thing is suggested by WOOD, Allen, “Kant and Agent-Oriented Ethics”, p. 75. For her part, as Baxley herself notes (cf. p. 74), Korsgaard thinks that Kant equates virtue and continence, although she does not criticize him for doing so; cf. KORSGAARD, Christine, “From Duty and For the Sake of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good Action”, in Aristotle, Kant, and the

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fulfillment of duty for the sake of duty itself, and as a result joy is derived from the observance of the moral law but does not represent its purpose. Certain ethical currents, however, misinterpret this distinction, and make the obtaining of moral contentment the end and/or criterion of good action.52 In addition it is worth emphasizing here that, in a section entitled “ethical gymnastics”, Kant insists on the joyful character of the virtuous person and reaffirms his opposition to what he calls “monastic asceticism” (Mönschasketik), which is that of those who, without repentance (ohne bereuen) seek only the expiation of faults. This is a maxim that, according to Kant, “cannot produce the cheerfulness that accompanies Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty (Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting, eds.), CUP, Cambridge, 1996, p. 223. Baxley comments (cf. pp. 80-81) on how Kant cannot admit, from the perspective of his understanding of human nature, the ancient ideal of a moral perfection that is reachable in this life. In such a state –as with the aristotelian spoudaios– there would be no temptations nor any inclinations for transgressing one’s duty, and therefore duties would not be seen as constraining in the least degree. For Kant, seeing this ideal as reachable in this life would involve –according to Baxley– a risk of self-deception and a confusion between a human will capable of virtue and the divine will. Thus, she establishes the following kantian moral typology: 1. Holiness of the will: that which has no sensible nature –as is the case of the divine will– or, even if such an agent were to possess sensibility, that agent would have no propensity towards evil (as would be the case with a perfectly holy finite will); 2. Virtue: the strength possessed by the person who successfully confronts his or her own propensity to evil and is not seriously tempted to transgress the moral law –he or she is able to follow duty joyfully and has formed his or her sentiments and affectivity in order to foster action for the sake of duty; 3. Continence: the disposition of the person who imperfectly manages his or her propensity to evil, but resists it in general; 4. Incontinence or weakness of the will: characterizes the person who succumbs to temptation even though he or she identifies that temptation on the basis of a correct moral judgement; and 5. Vice: the state of the person who generates and follows morally evil maxims –even if, given the self-deceiving character of radical evil, he or she holds them as being good, for the vicious will is not diabolic, following evil qua evil. Baxley’s moral typification seems to me to be acceptable, although it does not correspond exactly with kantian terminology nor with the degrees of evil that I covered earlier in my discussion of Religion. For a review of the moral type of the continent person in Aristotle, cf. EN 11521a. For a different point of view about the sense in which Kant is less “optimistic” than Aristotle in regard to moral perfection, cf. SHERMAN, Nancy, Making a Necessity of Virtue, p. 136. 52 This is nicely clarified by BECK, Lewis White, in A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, p. 216.

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virtue, but much rather brings with it secret hatred for virtue’s command”.53 The joy of an asceticism that is correctly understood, thinks Kant, arises from the recovery of internal freedom, the same freedom that is attained under the stoic principle of withstanding contingent evils and abstaining from superfluous delights (assuesce incommodis et desuesce commoditatibus vitae).54 Kant calls this asceticism, following the famous platonic analogy from the Gorgias, an ethical dietetics (Diätetik) and a gymnastics (Gymnastik).55 Attaining the joy that accompanies virtue by means of them is something meritorious and exemplary.56 Even so, this joy is a sign or mark of virtue (Zeichen) and therefore an indication of the success –at least of a relative kind– of the asceticism that leads us to that virtue. Again, however, it is not something essentially constitutive of virtue, which appears to distinguish Kant’s vision of virtue from Schillerian graces.57 5.4 The “Fragment of a Moral Catechism” As I have already mentioned, Kant had already commented in the Critique of Practical Reason on the usefulness of a moral catechism for exercising the judgement of the students and thereby directing them towards rectitude.58 Although the “Fragment of a Moral Catechism” that Kant MdS 485. Dörflinger insists that repentance is even a duty, but this does not imply falling into a monastic asceticism; cf. “Ethische Methodenlehre: Didaktik und Asketik”, pp. 409-410. 54 Cf. Horace, Ep. I, 1, 60ff. 55 Cf. MdS 485; cf. The analogy of philosophy and politics as arts of caring for the soul in comparison with gymnastics and dietetics as arts of caring for the body, in Gorgias, 462d-465d. 56 Cf. MdS 485. 57 Cf. ALLISON, Henry, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, p. 182 and BAXLEY, Anne Margaret, Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, p. 103. 58 Cf. KpV 154. Kant mentions this same necessity in Ped. 495. In the Reflections, there appears a sketch of the moral catechism of the MdS (a sketch dated to the omega phase, i.e. approximately in the same time frame as the publication of the two parts of the Metaphysics of Morals). This sketch displays the same argumentative procedure as the catechetical fragment that was in fact published in the MdS (the student is asked about happiness, 53

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offers by way of example at the end of the Doctrine of Virtue corresponds, qua catechetical, to the didactic methodology that I earlier labeled as (b.1), the text contains elements more proper to (b.2), i.e. to the dialogic-socratic methodology. From the beginning Kant indicates that “the teacher elicits from his pupil’s reason, by questioning, what he wants to teach him”,59 and later reiterates that if the student does not know how to respond to a question, the teacher should guide his or her reason.60 If this were a merely catechetical exercise, it would be entirely on the basis of memorization. In contrast, the responses of the student idealized here are not mere repetitions of formulas or moral definitions, but rather they contain a reflective element that suggests that Kant is at the same time exemplifying several of the didactic strategies classified earlier.61 The argument expressed in this illustration of catechesis is a synthesis of kantian ethics, beginning from a definition of happiness as that state in which all the desires of the agent are satisfied, and demonstrating –in similar fashion to what he does in the Grundlegung with the argument of the impartial spectator62– that the moral conscience of the disciple could not admit of a distribution of happiness that is indifferent to moral merit.63 The criterion of this merit is reason itself, which demands of the student that he or she limit and overcome his or her inclinations. Embodying confidence in the common understanding of duties, or –what is equivalent– a confidence in the moral conscience of any non-educated agent, the kantian catechism confronts the student with the question of

about the conditions for being worthy of it, about the moral law and about duty, although the fragment does not extend to the point of the argument for the existence of God). Cf. Refl. 7315. Concerning the role of the moral catechism in the formation of the judgement, cf. LOUDEN, Robert B., Kant’s Impure Ethics: from Rational Beings to Human Beings, p. 25. 59 MdS 480. 60 Cf. MdS 480. 61 This does not imply that, as material for moral instruction, the Catechism cannot be used in a purely catechetical, dialogical or even dogmatic manner. 62 Cf. GMS 393. 63 Cf. MdS 480-481.

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the morality of lying. The response is particularly relevant for emphasizing one of the points that I have attempted to make clear in this book: “The student: I ought not to lie, no matter how great the benefits to myself and my friend might be. Lying is mean and makes a person unworthy of happiness. Here is an unconditional necessitation through a command (or prohibition) of reason, which I must obey; and in the face of it all my inclinations must be silent”.64 In addition to reinforcing the idea of the centrality of the prohibition of lying in kantian ethical thought, this passage strengthens the interpretative proposal that I have laid out regarding the duty of truthfulness, by calling lying mean (niederträchtig). This is a term that, as I have tried to demonstrate, in the exposition of the Doctrine of Virtue connotes the vicious character of self-deception and complacency regarding oneself, which are the ultimate consequences of the maxim of lying, and is a possible explanation of why lying is an attack on the duties to oneself and not on those to others. The catechetical dialogue continues by emphasizing that the necessity to act in conformity with reason is called duty, and that in its radical fulfillment lies the condition for being worthy of happiness. The student, nevertheless, reflexively recognizes that this deservingness does not of itself make it certain that one will, in fact, participate in happiness: “For it is not always within our power to provide ourselves with happiness, and the course of nature does not of itself conform with merit. Our good fortune in life (our welfare in general) depends, rather, on circumstances that are far from all being in man’s control. Thus, our happiness continues to be only a desire, which could never become a hope were another power not to intervene”.65

64 65

MdS 481. MdS 482.

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Thus, he introduces into this didactic fragment a summary and simplified version of the postulate of the practical reason regarding the existence of God, just as he does in the KpV.66 God must exist in order to realize the synthesis between virtue and happiness that reason demands and that an impartial spectator –and also the moral conscience of the student– would recognize as necessary. What is odd in the “Fragment of a Moral Catechism” is that the argumentation concerning the postulate appears to be underpinned by the admission of a certain cosmological argument or a certain “natural teleology”, which Kant places into the mouth of the student as a corollary to his acceptance of the practical necessity of the existence of God: “For we see in the works of nature, which we can judge, a wisdom so widespread and profound that we can explain it to ourselves only by the inexpressibly great art of a creator of the world. And with regard to the moral order, which is the highest adornment of the world, we have reason to expect a no less wise regime, such that if we do not make ourselves unworthy of happiness, by violating our duty, we can also hope to share in happiness”.67 Even though this admission of a certain “natural theology” is placed in the mouth of the student and may represent an imperfect moment in the deeper exploration involved in moral instruction, it can also be understood as a confirmation of the teleological judgement demanded in the KU,68 and also as the limited acceptance on Kant’s part of this type of teleological argumentation. Lewis White Beck states, in fact, that in this catechetical fragment one can find the final kantian version of the argument for demonstrating the existence of God and emphasizes that it is teleological.69 It seems to me, in fact, that it is a moral-teleological

66 Cf. KpV 132-134. DÖRFLINGER, Bernd in “Ethische Methodenlehre: Didaktik und Asketik”, p. 398, highlights the fact that the catechism coincides with the postulates. 67 MdS 482. 68 Cf. KU 459-485. 69 Cf. BECK, Lewis White, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, p. 277.

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argument, in that order, if one carefully follows the reasoning expressed in the fragment.70 Finally, Kant reminds the reader that the catechesis must touch on “all the articles of virtue and vice”71 and that it must not mix didactic argumentation with persuasion via the mentioning of pragmatic advantages and disadvantages that might follow from behavior in conformity with duty or contrary to it: “man’s consciousness of his own nobility then disappears and he is for sale and can be bought for a price that the seductive inclinations offer him”.72 He also notes that this kind of teaching must be performed by taking into consideration the possible diversity of ages, sex and position73 and that at the end the teacher must insist to the students that no adversity can take away from them the consciousness of their capacity for fulfilling duty. Thus, in the same way that he had insisted on this point in the Critique of Practical Reason,74 in the Doctrine of Virtue he insists on the feeling of exaltation that the human being experiences on recognizing that he or she is able to fulfill the moral law: “...the very incomprehensibility in this self-knowledge must produce an exaltation in his soul which only inspires it the more to hold its duty sacred, the more it is assailed”.75

70 Concerning how the argument from “physical theology” is compatible with the properly moral character of the postulates of the KpV, cf. HIMMELMANN, Beatrix, Kants Begriff des Glucks, pp. 220-221. 71 MdS 482. 72 MdS 483. 73 Cf. MdS 483. 74 Cf. the conclusion of the KpV (151-153). 75 MdS 483.

CONCLUSIONS

One of the ideas that I would like to suggest, having finished my study of the Doctrine of Virtue, is that it would be more appropriate to read the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason in the light of the second part of the Metaphysics of Morals. An integral reading of the kantian moral system strongly refutes many of the objections that are so often raised against Kant’s ethics: its supposed formalism and inability to take into account the consequences of actions, its claimed radical opposition to the affective aspect of morality or its treatment of the necessary partiality involved in moral deliberation, etc. In the first section of this book I indicated that in the General Introduction to the Metaphysik der Sitten and in certain passages of the particular introduction to the Tugendlehre, Kant offers the rudiments of a theory of action that is strictly teleological, both at the level of the concrete maxims of action as well as at the level of pure reason itself, which also has its own interest. As a result, therefore, once the categorical imperative has been applied as the principle of moral determination, one can determine those ends that are duties, obligatory ends. I also discussed the structure of the maxims in their role as the subjective principle of action, and above all I sought to demonstrate that kantian ethics is not defenseless in the fact of the problem of the possible manipulation or defective formulation of a maxim. On the contrary, if one considers that the maxim must be formulated precisely as it is desired, one must accept that there only exists one correct maxim for each intention of action. It is certainly the case that, in order for the moral judgement – oriented by the categorical imperative– to be able to determine the morality of the maxim, there is required not just a minimum of understanding of what the agent him or herself is doing (this is obviously required by the imputation itself of the action as rational), but also a minimum commitment to truthfulness with oneself, to an effort to understand oneself in the ethical sense. This, nevertheless, says nothing against the categorical imperative as a principle of moral deliberation. On the contrary: it is perfectly compatible with kantian ethics as a project of self-knowledge

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and self-realization, which is precisely how I have presented it in this book. At the end of the first chapter I discussed a distinction proper to the Tugendlehre: that between will and faculty of choice (Wille-Willkür), which makes explicit a differentiation of levels that was already operative implicitly in Kant’s earlier moral works. In addition, it permits a clearer understanding of his ideal of autonomy, in addition to undermining the objections relating to the imputability of morally bad actions. This distinction is another example of how the Tugendlehre should be utilized in order to illuminate what Kant has said in earlier works, where his effort was focused on isolating the principle of morality. His attempt to demonstrate that reason is in fact practical can make the reader lose sight of the details of the kantian understanding of rational action, as well as of the participation of diverse faculties, at distinct levels, in the determination and evaluation of action. Kantian moral theory, from the perspective of this integral interpretation, shows itself to be able to give an explanation of the perplexities of an agent who always has ends that are previously given, an agent that queries him or herself about the moral quality of these ends, and who always deliberates from within a situation and context in which he or she is actively involved. This deliberation is sensitive to what the agent thinks of him or herself and of the interconnection of his or her projects, and is most reliable when the person him or herself has a sharp perception of what he or she wants, of his or her surroundings, and of what the action is able to transform within him or her. In the second chapter of this book I studied the transition from the categorical imperative to the subordinated maxim that structures the derivation of the concrete duties of virtue: the “supreme principle of virtue”. I commented on the various passages in prior works where Kant laid the bases for a metaphysics of morals in order to show that this transition is something necessary and that it was already prefigured at far back as the Grundlegung, in the conception that Kant had of the diverse disciplines to be integrated and coordinated in practical philosophy. Afterwards I analyzed this supreme principle of virtue and dealt with how it is “deduced” on the basis of the categorical imperative. In this same second section I concluded that the supreme principle of virtue is related to the three principal formulations of the categorical

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imperative: first, it presupposes a universalization of the kind demanded in the first formula; secondly, it consists in the dignity of humanity as something to be respected (in a limiting sense) and to be fostered (in a proactive sense) just as the second formulation established; and thirdly it explicitly proposes the coordination of the legitimate ends of all moral agents just as is required in the formula of autonomy and the Kingdom of Ends. Even though the formulation of humanity is that which is most frequently used (although not exclusively so) in the development of the concrete duties of virtue, I believe that a greater coherence and coimplication is possible between the distinct formulations of the categorical imperative in its relationship with the “material” part of kantian ethics. The second chapter ended with a review of several concepts: that of anthroponomy, as being proper to the normative consideration of the anthropological essentialia; and that of autocracy as a concretion of the ideal of autonomy in a situation like that of the human agent. Such an agent is rational but fallible, good in his or her natural dispositions but radically tending towards self-deception and self-oriented action, and therefore must struggle morally in order to attain full dominion over him or herself. Thus, another of the principal conclusions of this book is that in kantian ethics there exists an explicit and vivid recognition of human finitude and dependence, of the obstacles that the good intention has to overcome and of the fact that the ideal of autonomy does not involve a total self-possession on the part of the moral agent. Instead, the agent must engage in a constant struggle in order to make his or her own, from the stance of reason, that which is presented as given in the human constitution and in the context of his or her action. The third chapter of this work was directly concerned with the kantian definition of virtue, its contrast with lack of virtue and with vice, and the theoretical presuppositions necessary to understand it in depth as a moral disposition towards struggle. These presuppositions include the propensity towards radical evil as the inner enemy which the agent must defeat, and the Gesinnung or fundamental disposition of the soul that virtue involves and that must be manifested in every concrete action. In order to explain these presuppositions I delved into certain key passages of Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Here I concluded that the kantian treatment of the propensity towards evil in Religion is perfect-

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ly consistent with what is laid out in the Tugendlehre, and that Kant is particularly conscious of the limits (explicit in the very title of the work) that this approach to the foundations of human freedom involves. The same goes for the explanation of the Gesinnung qua supreme maxim of the determination of the will. In this third section I dealt with one of the most interesting passages in the MdS and in Kant’s moral texts as a whole: that of the “aesthetic prenotions for the receptivity of duty”. I believe this passage is very important, because thanks to this recognition of the fact that certain pregiven natural capacities are necessary for the identification of what is morally relevant and for the correct application of the categorical imperative, Kant’s ethical system is shown to be much broader and more inclusive than the mere presentation of the categorical imperative as being the principle of morality. By means of the aesthetic prenotions, the experience of the Faktum of reason is satisfactorily rooted in human nature: nature and freedom merge in these aptitudes for the receptivity of duty, and as a result the world is never morally neutral for the human agent, but is always charged with value and permeated with normative considerations. Among these aesthetic prenotions, I have emphasized the moral conscience (Gewissen), whose treatment in the Tugendlehre reaches its final and most perfect form (as Heübult has emphasized). This predisposition is no longer an imprecise instinct but rather is a natural capacity for attending to reason in one’s interior forum, and which must always be presupposed as being given (and therefore there is no literal moral unconscious). Its merely reflexive form has been convincingly clarified by Kant (and therewith the impossibility of an erroneous conscience), and its autonomy and final authority in the subjective plane are necessarily unlinked from the absurd criticism of those who interpret the autonomy of the kantian conscience as a self-sufficient and relativist arbitrariness. On the contrary: it is reason that dictates the law and the faculty of judgement that applies this law to the concrete case, and the moral conscience consists in that judgement applied to itself (and therefore Kant defines the Gewissen as sich selbst richtende moralische Urteilskraft). This condition of the judgement gives testimony to the scrupulousness (Gewissenhaftigkeit) with which the practical reason considers –retrospectively or before the fact– the moral permissibility of its maxims of action.

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Under the same third subheading Kant also discusses the moral prerequisites for virtue, understanding these as moral dominion of oneself and moral apathy. In this regard, I conclude that despite a certain stoic rhetoric that Kant is prone to, his ethical thought is not as cold and insensitive as many of his interpreters have accused it of being. He explicitly distinguishes moral apathy considered as strength from that insensitivity that would be the product of weakness and blindness to morally significant aspects of the world and human interaction. In kantian ethics the emotions must be incurporated into the plane of freedom, and must even be cultivated in order to form part of the that substructure that helps in the performance of concrete virtues. They thus cease to be merely passive phenomena or effects of natural causality and become modes of perceiving necessity in morally directed action and of manifesting respect as the motive of morality. Kant’s ethics are thereby shown to be a project of character formation and not merely a list or catalogue of duties. They constitute a framework of deliberation for moral judgement, and not simply a mechanism of deduction of abstract obligations. In this part of the book I also dealt with what Kant calls “principles of the pure doctrine of virtue”, which are the conditions for a scientific treatment of virtue. Via these principles Kant seeks to distance himself from what seems to him to be an unsatisfactory treatment of moral virtue on the part of ancient philosophy, and he therefore raises some criticisms of concrete apothegms received from the philosophical tradition. In my discussion of these arguments, I have showed that Kant links the apothegms with Aristotle unjustly. In reality the ethics of the Stagirite coincides in a surprising fashion with Kant’s own in areas as significant as the necessity of free and rational deliberation for the development of virtuous habits, the qualitative and non-quantitative character of the criterion of mesotés and the normative element required by an anthropological and ethical consideration of conduct. Kant’s criticisms instead affect only the impoverished, manual-based version of ethics that the philosopher of Königsberg had had as his source for Peripatetic thought, but they do not touch Aristotle’s own arguments. The fourth chapter was dedicated to the system of the duties of virtue. I interpreted –following Kant’s presentation in extenso in the body of the Tugendlehre, although not in his introduction to the work– the perfect duties to oneself as being duties of virtue (and not as legal duties, despite

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the possibility of misinterpretation): they allude to maxims of ends, and therefore any external coercion is impossible. Once again, the kantian system of ethics showed itself to be more a model for formation of the judgement than as a list of concrete duties or two distinct catalogues of them. Once I had established this point, the section focused on obligatory ends: one’s own perfection and the happiness of others. It clarified the fact that they are not interchangeable and then proceeded to the discussion of the concrete duties of virtue: first, the duties to oneself (perfect and imperfect) and then the duties to others (perfect duties or those of respect, and imperfect duties or those of love). In regard to the duties to oneself, prior to anything else I had to make an argument for their possibility, in the face of objections from various authors that considered them to be impossible (or, alternatively, lacking any meaning). Some critics argue that they depend on a contractual conception of duties and thus require real alterity, while others hold that the agent’s behavior with regard to him or herself is merely prudential or strategic. Employing the distinction between homo noumenon and homo phaenomenon, I showed that these duties are in fact possible. In addition, I explored the nature of duty per se, which is always self-referential, because it is the practical reason of the agent him or herself that originates the obligatoriness. In this way, I was able to conclude that in one sense all duties are duties to oneself, although some are also to others: this is the deepest meaning of moral autonomy. The dignity of the agent him or herself –and the undeniable fact that human beings have the propensity to act in ways that are not in conformity with this dignity– show that the perfect and imperfect duties to oneself are both possible and, in a practical sense, necessary. In this context I studied the prohibition of suicide, of self-mutilation, of the immoral exercise of the sexual faculties, of intemperance, of avarice, of false humility or servility and of lying. In all of these cases, Kant’s treatment of the corresponding duties of virtue is accompanied by a casuistical section, which shows that their morality is a matter of evaluating the maxims themselves and not the resulting actions considered in their exteriority. In turn, this explains the properly ethical character of the perfect duties to oneself, as well as the necessary involvement of the faculty of judgement in order to determine the cases that fall under these principles, since, as I showed, not all self-inflicted death is suicide, nor all

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false speech lying. In regard to these perfect duties an initial kind of latitude or Spielraum is shown to exist (distinct from that which exists for the imperfect duties, which not only must have their concept determined by the faculty of judgement but must also be determined in regard to their how, when, how much, etc.). I paid particular attention to the treatment of lying, since I hold that what Kant says in the Tugendlehre in regard to his controversial position helps to clarify what he states in other works (in particular, in his response to Benjamin Constant, published in On a Supposed Right to Lie for Altruistic Motives). In regard to this point, I concluded that the Doctrine of Virtue focuses on “internal lying” or self-deception and its relationship with external lying –one always leads to the other. Therefore, there exists an imperious moral necessity for telling the truth, without which, as I have stated, the test of the categorical imperative and moral deliberation in a broad sense are impossible. If the Critique of Pure Reason begins its argument by declaring that the most important business (Geschaft) of reason is self-knowledge,1 the Doctrine of Virtue makes the same point in the moral context, which explains Kant’s radicalness with regard to the demand for truthfulness. Following this I focused on the imperfect duties to oneself: the duties of perfection and holiness, their relationship with other kantian passages (paradigmatically, with the postulates of the KpV) and their open and asymptotic character, in addition to their connections with the moral duty to broaden the culture of the human faculties, thereby permitting a posterior moralization of character. After this section I moved on to the treatment of the duties to others, and concluded that Kant’s division into duties of respect and duties of love operates with concepts that are subordinated to that of respect in a broad sense (Achtung qua reverentia, which has priority with regard to respect understood as observantia). In this way, Kant integrates into his consideration of these interpersonal duties the feelings that move the agent towards closeness with other human beings and towards maintaining the necessary distance with them, which he describes via a clear analogy to the forces of attraction and repulsion that operate in the physical world. The analogy extends to the dynamic of sociable unsociability that he discus1

KrV A XI.

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ses in others of his works. In addition to explaining the specific arguments that support each of these duties (or the prohibition of the corresponding vices in the perfect duties), I explained and commented on the kantian theory of friendship as a dialectic and ideal equilibrium between love and respect. Here I concluded that, just as did Aristotle, Kant sees friendship as a moral ideal in human relations: friendship is an instance of and participation in the Kingdom of Ends in itself. Moreover, the kantian treatment of friendship involves an open and egalitarian spirit that allows one to see it as surpassing aristotelian friendship. After studying the duties to oneself and to others, I moved into the discussion of the episodic section –located between the sections on these two types of duties in the Tugendlehre itself– called “On the Amphiboly of the Moral Concepts of Reflection”. In order to give a sufficient explanation of this topic, I referred to Kant’s discussion of the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection at the end of the Analytic in the Critique of Pure Reason: in this way I was able to clarify that this amphiboly involves a misunderstanding that must be deactivated by reference to a transcendental topic. In a practical sense, this reference permits distinguishing duties that in principle seem to be directed to other beings (non-human beings: nature in general, non-rational animals, God and spiritual beings) but in the final analysis are duties to (gegen) oneself, although in regard to (in Ansehung) these extrahuman realities. The pretensions of validity of these duties, therefore, are relocated in the transcendental topic. In so doing I again emphasized the play of perspectives involved in the system of duties in Kant, who takes on what he received from the tradition and relocates it according to the demands of critical philosophy and its transcendental turn. In regard to the duties refering nature in general and non-rational animals, I hold that the kantian posture can well be taken advantage of, for it recognizes the value of inorganic nature beyond its instrumental character, and it highlights the analogies of human affectivity with that of other sentient beings. On the basis of these analogies and on the feelings that make no distinction between humans and animals, Kant argues that mistreatment of animals affects the moral sensibility of the agent, and as a result there exist duties with regard to these beings. Despite that fact that in the final analysis these are duties to oneself, we nonetheless see the laudable humanist grounds of kantian ecological theory, which demand no

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less than do other sensible ecological positions today in terms of having a consciousness of the needs of the environment and the other sentient beings on the planet. Kant is, however, far from the position of those “radical” or “deep” ecologists who seek to equate the value of humanity with that of irrational beings and who, thereby, paradoxically undermine the basis for human responsibility to the environment and lesser beings. Regarding the duties with regard to God and spiritual realities, one must keep in mind that Kant is working, in the Doctrine of Virtue, at the strictly rational or philosophical level. He makes the connection with natural and revealed religion in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, which, from a certain interpretative posture, can be read precisely as the hinge that permits meshing the rational with the revealed and the statutory. Religion shows –from the perspective of strict rationality– that the moral experience of the human being demands a transcendental response or complement which, in Kant’s opinion, only the revealed religion of Christianity can offer. In the Doctrine of Virtue he does not go so far: here one can only reach the understanding that, rather than particular duties to God, all duties must be seen as divine mandates, and this is what the “duty of religion” consists in. The final chapter dealt with the methodology of duty with which Kant closes the Tugendlehre, in perfect architectonic consonance with the composition of his Critiques. I emphasized above all its closeness with the Doctrine of Method in the KpV, and also certain aspects of its similarity with what is stated in the Lectures on Pedagogy concerning the formation of moral character. Kant’s moral theory lays the basis for a style of moral education, a model of formation of character and a concrete and demanding exercise of the faculty of judgement in order to give the human agent the most favorable conditions possible for his or her ethical deliberation. This is how the “Fragment of a Moral Catechism” that accompanies the Doctrine of Virtue should be understood, as well as Kant’s own observations about the use of the practical example (Exempel) and about casuistical questions as providing a space for the exercise of the Urteilskraft. Finally, I was able to conclude that, in the light of what Kant establishes in his “ethical ascetics”, his proposal for moral formation goes beyond mere aristotelian continence. Even though he recognizes that there always exists a propensity towards evil, and that virtue never ceases

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to be a moral disposition that engages in combat, he also admits that virtue can come to be so interiorized in maxims that the good person can achieve a special joy in the fulfillment of duty. This moral enjoyment is the greatest manifestation of that good will that, at the beginning of the Grundlegung, Kant showed to be the only unrestricted good in the world and outside of it. Again, the caricature of a formalist kantian ethics, cold, insensitive and inhumanly rigorist, must be discarded in the face of what is actually proposed by the greatest philosopher of Modernity. I reiterate what I stated in the Introduction: this book does not seek to be an apology for kantian ethics, even though an integral reading of Kant’s moral philosophy necessarily brings with it a disarticulation and discrediting of those objections and prejudices that have most frequently been levied against a meager and disfigured version of what the philosopher in fact proposes. Nor have I sought to interpret kantian ethics as being an “ethics of virtue” or “of character”, but rather I have tried to separate myself from these generalizations in order to study his work in its specificity. In the ethics of Kant, speaking of duty, virtue and practical reason means to speak of freedom in its most profound sense: that of autonomy. It is to also speak of a commitment to the intelligibility of the world in the most demanding sense possible: that which is proposed by the postulates of the practical reason and the hope of final justice. It is to speak, finally, of reality itself as a stage for human action that is never morally neutral nor lacking meaning. Kant’s moral philosophy –despite its debatable aspects and the difficulties attending its clarification– reminds us that nothing is trivial, nothing is in vain: that the human is important. This is, without a doubt, one of the most fundamental convictions underlying the philosophical vocation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Texts of Kant For the basic text of Kant’s Tugendlehre, I have used: Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre, Metaphysik der Sitten. Zweiter Teil, neu herausgegeben von Bernd Ludwig, mit einer Einführung “Kants System der Pflichten in der Metaphysik der Sitten” von Mary Gregor, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1990. For the other kantian texts (see Abbreviations), I have used: Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften herausgegeben von der Königlich Preuβischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (later the Preuβischen Akademie der Wissenschaften; Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Deutschen akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR, Berlin-Brendenburgen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften), 1900ff.

2. Translations of Kant used For the basic text of Kant’s Tugendlehre, I have used: The Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Mary Gregor, New York, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991. For the Critique of Practical Reason, I have used: Thomas Kingsmill Abbott translation, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1889.

3. Secondary Literature and other Sources ALLISON, Henry, El idealismo trascendental de Kant: una interpretación y defensa, Anthropos-UAM, Barcelona, 1992.

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INDEX OF NAMES

Achenwal, G. 8440 Allison, H. 3221, 5589, 59, 60106, 63, 66 s., 122, 12514, 13130, 13853, 141, 14370, 14478, 147 s., 173153, 182177, 254170, 260191, 263199, 268217, 30647, 30957 Ameriks, K. 267211 Anderson, G. 7515, 79, 8029, 162121, 185, 22053, 292291 Annas, J. 198220 Anscombe, G. E. M. 246, 49 Aramayo, R. R. 115 Aranguren, J.L. L. 14579 Aristotle 17, 4357, 53, 15095, 154, 185, 188, 191, 193 ss., 197, 241, 274, 277, 277246, 277247, 277249, 301, 30128, 30751, 319, 322 Ascione, F. R. 289285 Bacin, S. 236, 237114 Baron, M. W. 2914, 3120, 3636, 52, 21436, 254168, 255171, 256174, 258181, 258183, 259184, 263198, 268214, 276244 Baum, M. 8235, 107 Baumgarten, H. U. 4357, 7310, 163123, 21851, 22053, 235105, 283264, 286276, 292291 Baxley, A. M. 146, 119 s., 1225, 1236, 153, 171148, 174154, 192207, 266208, 269215, 269216, 306 s., 30957 Beck, L. W. 4357, 4665, 8440, 154105, 158113, 254170, 264200, 280256, 30852, 312 Bilbeny, N. 14579, 160117, 161, 164126, 168138, 168139 Bittner, R. 44, 5383, 5487

Borges, M. de L. 7620, 248149 Brandt, R. 115133 Broadie, A. 13852, 141 Bubner, R. 4357, 4666, 52, 5384 Card, C. 14370 Charpenel, E. 287279 Cicero, M. T. 3223, 184182, 277248, 283264 Cochius, L. 195213 Cohn, P. 287280 Constant, B. 234, 239122, 321 Cortina, A. 7310, 256174 Darwall, S. 258181 Dean, R. 2915, 100 Denis, L. 70, 120, 13335, 174155, 174157, 2038, 20411, 20513, 21025, 212 s., 21334, 214, 21438, 21540, 21642, 21645, 21746, 22055, 22159, 22263, 226, 22881, 22882, 23399, 234, 236 s., 242, 244, 289283, 289285 Diderot, D. 14265 Dörflinger, B. 2967, 29919, 30953, 31266 Duncan, A. R. C. 8643 Durán Casas, V. 21436, 22054, 22779, 22881, 239121, 244139, 249153, 254166, 286275, 289285 Eisenberg, P. 8845, 13748 Engstrom, S. 63, 67129, 1225, 12411, 194210, 195213, 30751 Enríquez, T. 13336 Enskat, R. 239121, 240125, 30024 Epictetus 22365 Epicurus 307, 30749 Erasmus 14476

340

Vicente de Haro Romo

Esser, A. M. 14, 89, 161118, 166133 Fasching, M. 166132, 169144, 183, 254170, 261192, 275, 276241, 277, 277246, 277249, 278 Fichte, J. G. 702, 161119 Fischer, N. 2012 Friedrich, R. 1810, 268, 702, 8131, 292294 Frierson, P. 157111, 279253 García Morente, M. 14579 Garve, C. 30, 58100 Gellert, Chr. F. 20923 González, A. M. 114131, 157111, 20617, 20819, 250155, 251158, 253164, 254167, 270221, 29815, 29922 Goy, I. 15197, 165129, 184182 Granja, D. M. 5383, 65123, 13748, 14058 Green, M. K. 240 Gregor, M. 133, 14, 157, 235, 2610, 3016, 3326, 37, 61, 61109, 65125, 702, 704, 75, 7618, 77, 79, 8236, 87 ss., 93, 9362, 95, 9567, 9671, 113128, 114129, 125, 12616, 128, 12922, 130 s., 140, 14160, 158113, 176161, 182, 183178, 183179, 197, 2036, 221, 22262, 225, 22674, 22780, 231, 23296, 236, 238, 239121, 242131, 244139, 250154, 254169, 254170, 256174, 257179, 259187, 271225, 273231, 275239 Grenberg, J. 123, 129, 13025, 13026, 13437, 13438, 135, 13541, 14162, 14478, 156109, 157110, 175, 243, 30751 Grotius, H. 178, 13336 Guyer, P. 99 s., 113127, 155, 158113, 165, 169141, 173152, 20614, 21749, 257179, 269126, 285273 Habermas, J. 98 Hamann, J. G. 7515, 248149 Hattrup, D. 2012 Hegel, G. F. W. 702 Heidegger, M. 165128

Heller, Á. 211, 246, 9979, 10397, 108110 Helvetius, C. A. 9052, 168139 Henrich, D. 8440 Herder, J. G. 7515 Herman, B. 12, 16, 22, 3120, 3225, 3634, 4048, 43, 46 s., 4869, 49 ss., 5277, 53 s., 5591, 5592, 5593, 58, 59102, 65, 100, 10190, 102, 10395, 106105, 12924, 13955, 153, 156109, 157, 208, 225, 22673, 253, 254166, 254168, 261, 162197, 263198, 264200, 266, 267209, 279253, 286, 295, 29920, 30127, 302, 30230, 305 Heubült, W. 161, 164126, 318 Hill, T. E. Jr. 21438, 230, 249, 255171, 256174 Himmelmann, B. 120142, 180172, 2038, 20614, 276245, 31370 Hobbes, Th. 9052 Hoerster, N. 22468 Höffe, O. 52, 5383, 5486, 5487 Hofmeister, H. E. M. 239122 Horacio 188190 Horn, C. 256176 Höwing, Th. 223, 61110, 65124, 66126 Hruschka, J. 13336 Hume, D. 9052 Hutcheson, F. 7721, 9052, 20923 Hutter, A. 90, 9153, 9154, 9155, 9258, 15198, 284268 Jáuregi, C. 108113 Johnson, R. N. 285272 Kain, P. 288281 Kant, I. 11-28, 2914, 30, 3120, 32-49, 5161, 63-66, 67130, 69-83, 8440, 85 s., 87101, 103-122, 1238, 124, 126-130, 13128, 13130, 132-140, 142-151, 15299, 153-176, 177163, 178, 180-199, 201, 2024, 203-206, 208-224, 226-253, 254166, 254167, 254170, 255, 256176,

Index of Names 257177, 257178, 258-271, 272226, 272229, 273-284, 285272, 286, 287280, 288, 289284, 289285, 291-310, 312 s., 315 s., 318-324 Kersten, S.J. 22262 Kersting, W. 178 König, P. 7928, 119, 285 Kopper, J. 2952 Korsgaard, C. 9566, 9567, 99, 289285, 30751 Kuehn, M. 718, 21851, 235105, 292291 Lambert, J.H. 283264 Langthaler, R. 3531 Leibniz, G. 178, 281 s., 284, 289284 Leitner, H. 281257, 283, 283264, 284267, 284269 Lema-Hincapie, A. 111122 Lévinas, E. 2012 Leyva, G. 5074, 66126, 260191 Locke, J. 9052 Longuenesse, B. 8438, 8641, 282260 Louden, R. B. 691, 7413, 112126, 113128, 115133, 14477, 157111, 194211, 198223, 20410, 20512, 252161, 280255, 29710, 29817, 29818, 30128, 303, 30325, 30437, 30541, 306, 30958 Ludwig, B. 1911, 61111, 702, 715, 8744, 12616, 30128 Luther, M. 14476 MacIntyre, A. 246, 49 Mandeville, B. 168139 Marcucci, S. 277249 Marcus Aurelius 22365 Matson, W. I. 30126 McCarty, R. 21131 Melches Gilbert, C. 3223, 8642, 12413, 12718, 184182, 22158 Michalson, G. E. 13750, 14265, 14267, 14268, 14371, 14474, 14475, 14476 Montaigne, M. de 168139, 277247

341

Muchnik, P. 14478 Munzel, G. F. 4666, 13130, 14269, 14579, 163124, 165130, 167137, 273231, 276, 29711, 29817, 30024 Nello Figa, A. 14888 Noordraven, A. 163123, 168139, 281258 O’Neill, O. 53, 5487, 10294, 12412, 184182, 20411 Ovidio, 188190 Oviedo, M. 277247 Paton, H.J. 3636, 4560, 62114, 691, 739, 8236, 8744, 99, 13646, 185183, 255172, 258181, 274235, 275237, 275238, 275240, 277248, 279252, 30336 Paton, M. 21437 Pérez Quintana, A. 154104, 158113, 175159 Placencia, L. 4357 Plato 12413, 133, 277247, 277249 Pogge, T. W. 166131 Potter, N. 21437, 217, 236 Prauss, G. 66126 Pütter, J.S. 8440 Pybus, E. M. 13852, 141 Rawls, J. 98 s. Reath, A. 21750, 239122 Reinhold, K. L. 66126 Ricken, F. 21131, 291288, 292291, 293296 Ricoeur, P. 10192, 158113 Rivera, F. 2914, 3532, 8438, 8846, 97 s., 108110, 198220, 305 Rochefoucauld, F. de 9052 Roldán, C. 115 Roulier, S. M. 8439, 120, 14991, 251159, 288281 Rousseau, J. J. 4357, 9052, 14265, 177163, 251, 270220 Rovira, R. 188, 190, 191199, 191201, 191203, 192207 Sallust (Gaius Salustius Crispus) 235106

342

Vicente de Haro Romo

Sánchez Madrid, N. 289283 Santozki, U. 12413, 13644, 186186, 22158 Schadow, S. 1911 Schiller, F. 158113, 279251, 306 Schilpp, P. A. 13128, 13130, 162 Schmidt, C. M. 7413, 108110, 109, 110115, 111 s. Schneewind, J. B. 13336 Schönecker, D. 63, 78, 8641, 257180, 260190 Schopenhauer, A. 717 Schwartz, M. 3120, 4357, 46, 5278, 54, 56 s., 59105, 62113, 67130, 9052, 14579, 14992, 14993 Schwarz, G. 247146, 292294 Seneca 188190 Sensen, O. 102, 271223, 272230, 289285 Shaftesbury (A. A. Cooper) 7721 Sherman, N. 177163, 180172, 183179, 192207, 194211, 195212, 196217, 244140, 250155, 267, 277249, 30439, 30748, 30751 Singer, M. G. 20924, 21027, 21335 Socrates 277247 Steigleder, K. 217, 22778, 22779, 22881, 23297 Stern, R. 1222, 198223 Stocker, M. 253164 Stratton-Lake, P. 249151 Stuart Mill, J. 20924, 210 Sullivan, R. 1224, 12718, 148, 167 Swanton, C. 259184, 263199 Thomas Aquinas 13336, 20513, 21026 Thomasius, Chr. 188 Timmermann, J. 4870, 5487, 120, 14681, 154105, 158113, 159115, 171150, 177164,

178167, 180171, 194209, 194210, 21028, 21131, 21333, 21338, 21643, 217, 243, 254166 Timmons, M. 23087 Tissot, S. A. D. 22262 Torralba, J. M. 3221, 4459, 54, 5590, 60, 9566, 10396, 117137, 157111, 167136, 2024, 265205, 280256, 30334 Trampota, A. 1911, 82, 9670 Tugendhat, E. 109114, 12923, 21437 Valdecantos, A. 272229 Van Impe, S. 10398 Vandenabeele, B. 10398 Vigo, A. G. 1810, 10499, 108113, 155108, 161119, 165128, 21749, 282259, 284, 284269 Vogt, K. M. 263198 Ward, K. 8235, 8643, 9463, 106108 Wieland, W. 15299 Williams, B. 20924, 253164 Wilson, H. L. 7413, 111, 111120, 113 Wimmer, R. 154105 Wolff, Chr. 178, 4357, 8440, 206, 22053, 291 Wood, A. 2813, 2915, 716, 7515, 7721, 97, 99 s., 10398, 111120, 118139, 13129, 14478, 161118, 162122, 165128, 167137, 177163, 181174, 195213, 196, 2023, 20820, 21131, 21541, 22881, 242131, 253164, 263, 265202, 268, 274233, 275237, 275238, 276243, 280255, 288281, 29818, 30128, 30540, 30647, 30751 Wuerth, J. 13749 Zöller, G. 121, 9051, 15198