Due Process: Nomos XVIII 9780814768884

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DUE PROCESS NOMOS

XVIII

NO M O S

y 195 8 (reissue in preparation)

I Authorit

y 195 9 (reissue in preparation)

II Communit

y 196 0 (reissue in preparation)

III Responsibilit

y 196 2 (reissue in preparation)

IV Librar

e Publi c Interes t 196 2 (reissue in pre-

V Th

paration) VI Justic

e 1963 , reissue d 197 4

VII Rationa

l Decisio n 196 4 n 196 6 (reissue in preparation)

VIII Revolutio

y 196 7 (reissue in preparation)

IX Equalit

X Representatio XI Voluntar

y Association s 196 9

XII Politica

l an d Lega l Obligatio n 197 0

XIII Privac

y 197 1

XIV Coercio X V Th

n 197 2

e Limit s o f La w 197 4

XVI Participatio XVII Huma XVIII Du

n 196 8

n i n Politic s 197 5

n Natur e an d Politic s 197 7 e Proces s 197 7

XIX Anarchis

m (in preparation)

X X Constitutionalis

m {in preparation)

NOMOS XVIII Yearbook o f the American Societ y fo r Political an d Lega l Philosoph y

DUE PROCES S Edited b y J. R O L A N D P E N N O C K Swarthmore

College

and J O H N W . C H A P M A N University

of Pittsburgh

New York: New York Universit y Pres s • 1977

Due Process: Nomos XVIII edited b y J. Rolan d Pennoc k an d John W . Chapma n Copyright © 1977 b y New Yor k Universit y All rights reserved. No par t of this publication ma y be reproduced o r transmitted i n any for m o r by an y means, electronic or mechanical, includin g photocopy , recording, or any informatio n storag e an d retrieva l system, without permissio n i n writing fro m th e publisher Library of Congress Cataloging i n Publicatio n Dat a Main entry under title: Due process. (Nomos 18 ) Includes bibliographical reference s an d index . 1. Due proces s of law—United States—Addresses , essays, lectures. 2. Due process of law—Addresses, essays, lectures. I . Pennock , James Roland . II. Chapman , John William , 1923 - III . Series . KF4765. A75D8 347'.7 3 76-4051 1 ISBN 0-8147-6569- 6 Printed in the United State s of America

PREFACE

Due proces s of la w i s a concept—or a t leas t a n idea—tha t ha s playe d a mos t importan t rol e i n America n constitutiona l la w fo r th e pas t century. Durin g tha t perio d it s pat h ha s negotiate d man y turnings , as Charle s Miller' s essa y i n thi s volum e details . Bu t a t thi s particular stag e i n ou r history , i t ha s take n o n specia l interes t an d significance. Th e concep t o f "substantive " du e process , fo r a lon g time moribund , ha s receive d increasin g attention , sometime s unde r the guis e o f "equa l protections. " A s mor e an d mor e o f th e Bil l o f Rights ha s bee n "incorporated " int o th e Du e Proces s claus e o f th e Fourteenth Amendment , increasingl y th e Cour t ha s turne d it s attention t o th e exploration , elucidation , an d definitio n o f "funda mental rights " no t expressl y se t fort h i n thos e amendments , o r elsewhere i n th e Constitution , bu t presumabl y include d i n th e "liberty" ter m o f th e Du e Proces s clause . Also , durin g thi s perio d o f growing judicia l sensitivit y t o "rights " an d t o "fairness, " th e concept ha s bee n broadene d i n a t leas t tw o directions . It s applica tion ha s bee n extende d i n ol d area s an d i t ha s bee n applie d t o ne w areas—e.g., t o th e procedur e t o b e use d fo r suspendin g a publi c school pupi l fo r misconduct . Moreover , i t ha s bee n increasingl y vn

Vlll

Preface

used a s a concep t o f fairnes s i n area s no t a t presen t regulate d b y law. Doubtless , i t was fo r such reason s a s these tha t th e membershi p of th e Societ y selecte d th e topi c o f Du e Proces s fo r th e subjec t o f it s meetings i n 1973 . These meeting s wer e hel d i n Decembe r i n Ne w Orlean s i n connection wit h th e meeting s o f th e America n Associatio n o f La w Schools. Wit h on e exception , th e participant s i n th e progra m o f those meeting s ar e contributor s t o thi s volume , althoug h i n severa l cases th e conten t o f thei r origina l paper s ha s bee n considerabl y expanded o r otherwis e altered . I n addition , thre e othe r scholar s have mad e majo r contribution s t o th e volume : Kearns , Miller , an d Marshall. The genera l pla n o f th e boo k i s a s follows : afte r a n introductor y chapter b y on e o f th e editors , Par t I i s devoted t o historica l (Miller ) and comparativ e (Marshall ) dimension s tha t wer e missin g i n th e necessarily compresse d progra m o f th e meetings . Part I I comprise s si x paper s explorin g th e natur e an d th e rationale o f du e proces s fro m a variet y o f point s o f view . I f testimony wer e neede d a s t o th e richnes s o f th e concep t an d o f th e modes of justification fo r it , here i t is . Although thre e of these paper s originated a s comment s o n tw o o f th e others , onl y on e retain s tha t form o r substance, tha t o f Pincoff s o n Michelman . I f a logicall y bes t way o f orderin g thes e paper s i s t o b e found , i t ha s elude d th e editors. Pincoffs' s comment s o n Michelma n apart , tw o o f th e paper s are perhap s les s technical , mor e broadl y philosophica l tha n th e others. On e o f these , tha t o f Scanlon , seek s t o sho w th e exten t t o which du e proces s claim s ar e derive d fro m mora l principle , especially th e principl e tha t arbitrarines s shoul d b e avoided ; an d how far , o n th e othe r hand , the y depen d upo n th e requirement s fo r prudently designe d institutions . Th e other , tha t o f Kearns , argue s that du e proces s i s a requiremen t o f system , wholl y remove d fro m moral precepts . I t ha s seeme d bes t t o allo w thes e tw o paper s t o bracket th e othe r contribution s t o thi s part , al l o f which , includin g those b y Gre y an d Resnick , i n on e wa y o r another , accep t th e conventional wisdo m tha t du e proces s i s intimatel y relate d t o morality. Part II I i s devote d t o som e o f th e mor e extende d application s o f the ide a o f du e process , t o wha t ma y properl y b e calle d "politica l due process. " Thus Geral d Krame r devote s hi s ful l attentio n t o th e

Preface

IX

"due" implementatio n o f th e majority-rul e principle . I t turn s ou t that, among the various ways in which the majority principle can be formulated, som e ar e mor e "reformist " o r "activist, " a s compare d with others that might properly be designated "conservative"—eve n as with du e proces s of law. Arthur Kuflick , no t s o muc h takin g of f where Krame r end s a s takin g of f i n a retrospectiv e directio n fro m where Krame r begins , examine s th e philosophica l base s fo r th e majority principl e itself . Thi s investigatio n eventuall y lead s hi m t o the conclusion tha t ther e i s no such thin g a s the majority principle , although (and because) rul e by th e majority ma y b e construed an d supported in many different ways , no one of which is appropriate in all contexts. Richard Epstei n als o deals , i n larg e part , wit h politica l du e process i n hi s discussio n o f votin g procedure s fo r th e discover y o f majority rul e i n th e contex t o f collectiv e bargaining . H e link s political an d legal due process by injecting the interestin g ide a tha t courts might consider invalidating votin g procedure s established b y legislatures for trade unions, when the y clearl y violate th e majorit y principle. Professor Bruc e Ackerman , o f th e Yal e La w School , wa s chair man of th e Progra m Committe e fo r th e meeting s tha t gav e ris e t o this volume. T o him , and o f cours e t o th e contributors, th e editor s owe a deep debt of thanks.

J. W. C. J. R- P .

CONTENTS

Preface vi

i

Contributors xii

i

Introduction x

v

J. ROLAN D PENNOC K

PARTI 1 Th e Fores t o f Du e Proces s o f Law : Th e America n Constitutional Traditio n 3 CHARLES A . MILLE R

2 Du e Proces s i n Englan d 6

9

GEOFFREY MARSHAL L

XI

CONTENTS

Xll

PART I I 3 Du e Proces s 9

3

T . M . SCANLO N

4 Forma l an d Associationa l Aim s i n Procedura l Du e Process 12

6

FRANK I . MICHELMA N

5 Du e Process , Fraternity , an d a Kantia n Injunctio n 17

2

EDMUND L . PINCOFF S

6 Procedura l Fairnes s an d Substantiv e Right s 18

2

THOMAS C . GRE Y

7 Du e Proces s an d Procedura l Justice 20

6

DAVID RESNIC K

8 O n De-Moralizin g Du e Proces s 22

9

THOMAS R . KEARN S

PART II I

9 Du e Proces s i n a Noniega l Setting : A n Ombudsman' s Experience 25

7

DAVID J . DANELSK I

10 Som e Procedura l Aspect s o f Majorit y Rul e 26

4

GERALD H . KRAME R

11 Majorit y Rul e Procedur e 29

6

ARTHUR KUFLI K

12 Votin g Theory , Unio n Elections , an d th e Constitutio n 33 RICHARD A . EPSTEI N

3

CONTRIBUTORS

DAVID J. DANELSK I Government, Cornell University RICHARD A . EPSTEI N Law, University of Chicago THOMAS C . GRE Y Law, Stanford University THOMAS R . KEARN S Philosophy, Amherst College GERALD H . KRAME R Political Science, Yale University ARTHUR KUFLI K Philosophy, University of North Carolina

Xlll

XIV

GEOFFREY MARSHAL L Political Science, Queens College, Oxford FRANK I . MIGHELMA N Law, Harvard University CHARLES A . MILLE R Government, Lake Forest College EDMUND L . PINGOFF S Philosophy, University of Texas DAVID RESNIC K Government, Cornell University T. M . SCANLO N Philosophy, Princeton University

Contributors

INTRODUCTION J. ROLAN D PENNOC K

I The meanin g o f th e phras e "du e proces s o f law " take s u s dee p into history , dee p int o philosophy , and , wer e i t t o b e full y expounded—which i s impossible—fa r int o th e future , fo r i t i s evergrowing. It s root s gro w ou t o f a n intriguin g blen d o f histor y an d philosophy—a blen d also , a s Charle s Mille r remarks , "o f politica l symbolism an d lega l efficacy , bot h aide d b y semanti c open ness"(infra). As i s wel l known , th e phras e "du e proces s o f law " became th e officia l Englis h translation , enshrine d i n numerou s reissues of Magna Carta , of the original per legem terrae, "b y th e la w of the land. " It was intended t o guarantee—at leas t t o the barons— the common-la w right s o f Englishmen . Thes e right s wer e bot h procedural (th e righ t t o tria l b y one' s peers ) an d substantiv e (various liberties and rights of property). The baron s were demanding justice, and justice is not confined t o matters of procedure. Even John Rawls' s insistence tha t hi s theory is a procedural on e does not really contradict this point, for what he is seeking is a system of rules that hav e th e best chance o f achieving result s tha t accor d wit h ou r intuitive idea s o f substantiv e justice. 1 Moreover , eve n thes e rule s xv

XVI

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must b e subject, t o b e consistent wit h Rawls' s ow n reasoning—t o th e continuing proces s o f reflectiv e equilibrium . Th e illusor y natur e o f the procedural-substantiv e distinctio n i s mor e full y discusse d b y Miller i n Chapte r 1 . The foreshortene d ter m "du e process " omits a significan t phrase , "of law." We generall y thin k o f th e complet e phras e a s emphasizin g the word s "due " and "process" ; bu t i t woul d appea r tha t th e word s "of law " are equally significant . I n short , i t ma y no t b e enoug h tha t the proces s i n questio n i s historically sanctioned , o r even tha t i t als o be fair ; i t mus t als o b e a legal process, one tha t conform s t o th e ide a of law , governmen t b y rules , nonarbitrariness. 2 In medieva l times , whe n virtuall y al l la w wa s customar y law , an d when custo m wa s though t b y it s ver y natur e t o embod y huma n reason (havin g passe d th e tes t o f time) , th e ide a o f la w tha t wa s no t "legal" normall y di d no t arise . Tha t ha d t o awai t no t onl y th e ris e of statutor y la w (whic h i n th e earl y day s was , theoretically , a t least , declaratory only) , bu t th e ide a o f la w a s th e comman d o f th e sovereign, somethin g tha t wa s mad e rathe r tha n discovered , a deliberately man-mad e creatio n rathe r tha n th e produc t o f accre tion. La w o f this kind, no t sanctifie d b y tradition , b y th e fac t tha t it s origins wer e enshroude d i n th e immemoria l past , lacke d th e presumption o f validit y tha t attache d t o customar y law . Whethe r its provision s wer e i n accordanc e wit h "du e process " wa s n o longe r self-evidently true . The fac t tha t somethin g bor e th e titl e o f la w an d had gon e throug h th e standar d proces s b y whic h la w wa s mad e wa s no longe r sufficien t t o guarante e i t th e cache t o f "du e process. " In England , however , a s Geoffre y Marshal l recall s t o u s i n Chapter 2 , th e ide a tha t a n ac t o f Parliamen t migh t stil l b e lackin g in du e proces s di d no t com e t o prevail . Fo r to o long , on e ma y conjecture, Parliamen t ha d bee n see n a s th e grea t protecto r agains t the possible arbitrarines s o f the roya l prerogativ e fo r it t o be though t of a s th e autho r o f arbitrar y actions . Moreover , Parliamen t ha d i n its favo r th e fac t tha t i t wa s itsel f traditionall y a court ; th e Hig h Court o f Parliament . Also , th e dominanc e o f utilitaria n philosoph y was no t hospitabl e t o claim s o f natura l la w o r natura l right . Bentham ha d declare d al l tal k o f "natura l rights " t o b e "nonsens e on stilts. " Utility looke d t o th e goo d o f th e whole , wit h littl e regar d for claim s b y individual s o r minoritie s agains t th e expressio n o f th e majority.

Introduction

xvn

In America , o n th e othe r hand , th e colonia l assemblie s an d thei r successors, th e stat e (an d federal ) legislatures , ha d a differen t immediate background . The y ha d bee n subjecte d t o legislativel y imposed taxe s tha t the y considere d illegal . Thi s an d othe r experi ences o f wha t the y considere d arbitrar y governmen t le d the m t o make wid e resor t t o th e rhetori c o f rights ; firs t common-la w right s or "the right s of Englishmen, " an d the n "natura l rights. ,, I t wa s th e philosophy o f Lock e ("constitutionalize d natura l law, " i n Miller' s apt phraseology ) rathe r tha n tha t o f Bentha m tha t prevaile d o n thi s side of th e water. Sinc e "du e proces s o f law " first gained currenc y i n connection wit h th e assertio n o f right s an d o f check s o n govern ment, an d indee d i s phrase d fo r tha t purpose , it s us e a s a limitatio n on governmen t i n al l it s branche s cam e naturall y i n thi s country . For thes e an d perhap s stil l othe r reasons , then , th e traditiona l assertion o f th e individua l right s no t t o b e deprive d o f life , liberty , or propert y withou t du e proces s o f la w wa s mad e applicabl e i n th e United State s t o government s a s a whole , an d specificall y t o legislatures. But I hav e digressed . T o retur n t o th e them e I wa s pursuing : th e roots o f du e proces s gro w ou t o f a blen d o f histor y an d philosophy . The Suprem e Court' s first sta b a t definition , i n th e Murray case, 3 sought t o ti e th e concep t exclusivel y t o th e commo n law , a s tha t body o f la w wa s accepte d i n thi s country . Bu t hardl y a generatio n had gon e b y whe n i t wa s force d t o retrea t fro m tha t overrestrictiv e concept. 4 Fro m tha t tim e forward , historica l preceden t wa s n o longer a necessar y conditio n o f du e process. 5 A variet y o f stream s o f thought, som e ne w an d som e traditional , fe d th e strea m o f evolvin g due proces s interpretation. Al l sough t "justice. " But wha t i s justice? A venerabl e historica l traditio n come s dow n t o u s unde r th e nam e of natura l law , wit h it s mor e moder n offshoo t o f natura l rights . I n England today , th e ter m "natura l justice " i s perhap s t o simila r effect, bu t i s les s freighte d wit h history . Justic e Frankfurter , frequently attacke d b y Justice Blac k fo r importin g int o du e proces s interpretation th e "accordionlike " qualitie s o f natura l law , i n fac t attempted t o combine histor y an d discretion. 6 H e sough t th e bes t o f the "Anglo-Saxo n tradition, " bu t a t th e sam e tim e attempte d t o blend i t wit h a sympatheti c sensitivit y t o curren t trend s o f though t regarding justice. O r perhap s wha t hi s ethica l antenna e sense d wa s what Edmun d Cah n calle d th e "sens e o f injustice. " 7 Justice Black' s

xviii

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attempt t o escap e judicial discretio n b y wa y o f histor y wa s doome d to failure . Althoug h h e eventuall y wo n th e particula r battl e wit h Frankfurter ou t o f whic h originall y aros e thei r differenc e regardin g the tes t fo r du e process , i t wa s Frankfurter' s insistenc e tha t th e meaning o f due proces s was no t al l t o b e foun d i n th e explici t word s of th e Constitutio n tha t wo n th e day. 8 Although th e historica l traditio n wa s individualistic , providin g a framework fo r lega l defense s agains t al l form s o f arbitrar y govern mental action , i t containe d n o formul a fo r growth . Ye t suc h a formula wa s wha t wa s neede d fo r th e ver y first tes t o f th e historica l formula tha t confronte d th e Court , th e substitutio n o f indictmen t by "information " fo r th e traditiona l gran d jury . (Thi s wa s th e Hurtado case, alread y referre d to. ) Justic e Matthew s di d no t reall y articulate a mean s fo r gettin g fro m ther e t o here ; h e simpl y denie d the exclusivit y o f th e historica l tes t an d the n advance d th e tes t o f "fundamental fairness " a s a n alternative . Apar t fro m ou r intuitiv e understanding o f th e concept , "fairness " provide s u s wit h n o philosophical basi s fo r it s elucidation. Th e literatur e o f justice, fro m Plato an d Aristotl e t o date , is , of course, voluminous an d apt . I t wil l not b e reviewe d here . I t ma y b e useful , however , t o refe r t o tw o relevant moder n traditions . On e o f the m i s especiall y usefu l fo r relating a particula r clai m t o a particula r lega l syste m an d fo r providing fo r th e gradua l developmen t o f th e concep t o f du e process. Withou t goin g bac k t o Montesquie u an d hi s predecessors , this traditio n i s mos t convenientl y an d properl y relate d t o Hegel . He an d hi s jurisprudential successors , Savigny , Puchta , an d Kohler , saw la w generall y a s reflectin g th e spiri t o f th e peopl e fro m whic h i t sprung.9 Thi s spiri t wa s infuse d wit h rationality , o f course , bu t it s rationality wa s relate d t o th e needs , customs , beliefs , an d stag e o f development o f a particula r people . I t wa s tha t o f incrementall y developed adjustment s t o nee d an d evolvin g sens e o f righ t rathe r than tha t o f th e excogitate d effort s o f legislator s t o provid e th e solutions t o problem s an d t o la y dow n genera l rule s no t imme diately growin g ou t o f th e necessit y t o solv e a particula r "trouble case." 10 Edmund Cahn' s "sens e o f injustice, " t o whic h referenc e ha s already bee n made , likewis e stresse s th e importance , fo r th e development o f jus t law , o f traine d minds , sensitiv e t o evolvin g ethical concepts , grapplin g wit h individua l case s demandin g deci -

Introduction

xix

sion. Frankfurte r ha s alread y bee n mentione d a s a Suprem e Cour t Justice wh o appealed , fo r th e prope r interpretatio n o f du e process , both t o Anglo-Saxo n tradition s an d t o curren t concept s o f right . One ma y als o cit e Holme s a s a believe r tha t standard s o f justic e evolve wit h th e growt h o f civilization .

II Curiously enough , i t ma y ye t b e tru e tha t i t i s Kan t rathe r tha n Hegel wh o ha s provide d u s no t onl y wit h th e mos t usefu l standar d of justice bu t als o wit h a standar d tha t a t th e sam e tim e allow s for , and naturall y lead s t o furthe r developmen t o f th e concept . Kant' s second form o f hi s Categorica l Imperativ e ha s bee n show n t o len d itself well fo r this purpose. Th e ide a o f respect fo r persons—or, i n th e Kantian formulation , th e propositio n tha t n o ma n shoul d b e treated a s a mean s only—provide s th e foundation . Fro m i t follo w the ideal s o f libert y an d equality. 11 Whethe r o r no t on e derive s a complete theor y o f justic e fro m thes e concepts , the y d o provid e a basis fo r criticizing th e justice o f an y particula r se t o f institution s o r rules fo r distribution , whethe r i t b e slaver y o r som e fa r mor e sophisticated se t o f rule s tha t allow s som e me n powe r ove r other s with n o advantag e accruin g t o th e latter . B y fa r th e mos t complet e elaboration o f a theor y o f justic e base d upo n thes e Kantia n principles i s that o f John Rawls. 12 Not onl y i s a centra l concep t o f du e process—tha t o f fairness identical wit h Rawls' s basi c definitio n o f justice , bu t th e parallel s extend muc h further . Th e historica l developmen t o f th e concep t i n this country , a s detaile d b y Miller , appear s largel y t o b e i n accordance wit h Rawls' s theory . Th e rul e o f law , itsel f essentia l t o liberty, i n Rawls' s words "requires som e for m o f due process : tha t is , a proces s reasonabl y designe d t o ascertai n th e truth , i n way s consistent wit h th e othe r end s o f th e lega l system , a s t o whethe r a violation [o f law ] ha s take n plac e an d unde r wha t circum stances." 13 Althoug h Rawl s himsel f use s th e ter m "du e proces s o f law" onl y i n connectio n wit h procedura l matters , i t i s clea r tha t most i f not al l o f th e development s o f substantiv e du e proces s coul d be explained an d justified b y referenc e t o hi s theory . Rawl s believe s that justice require s equa l opportunit y t o secur e th e primar y socia l goods o f libert y an d opportunit y an d th e base s o f self-respect. 14

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Both th e incorporatio n o f th e freedo m o f expressio n provision s o f the Constitutio n unde r th e du e proces s claus e an d th e reallocatio n of legislativ e seat s i n pursui t o f th e goa l o f "on e person , on e vote " exemplify th e sam e proces s o f seekin g th e Kantian-Rawlsia n goal s of libert y an d equalit y b y wa y o f th e du e proces s clause. 15 One final remar k i n thi s connection . I t i s interestin g t o not e tha t the wa y th e Cour t goe s bac k an d fort h betwee n rigi d rule s an d th e concept o f fairnes s o r th e sens e o f justice, i s reminiscen t o f Rawls' s method o f "reflective equilibrium. " In fact , i t migh t b e sai d tha t th e judicial method—especiall y i n du e proces s cases — is th e metho d o f reflective equilibrium . Fo r Rawl s thi s mean s stakin g ou t a positio n with regar d t o th e "origina l position, " derivin g rule s fro m it , comparing the m an d th e result s t o whic h the y lea d t o ou r intuitiv e judgments o f justic e an d then , i f a conflic t i s found , modifyin g either th e origina l propositio n o r th e intuitiv e judgment, a s rationa l reflection seem s t o dictate . For the Court, t o tak e a dramatic instance , on e ma y star t wit h th e rule tha t libert y o f contrac t i s par t o f th e libert y protecte d b y th e due proces s claus e an d tha t an y la w tha t interfere s wit h tha t libert y must b e presume d t o b e i n violatio n o f du e proces s unles s a stron g public interes t t o th e contrar y ca n b e shown . Afte r roughl y hal f a century, thi s rule (or principle ) gav e wa y t o a simple presumptio n o f legislative validity . I t ma y b e wort h remindin g ourselve s o f ho w thi s change cam e about . Th e emphasi s o n freedo m o f contrac t ha d le d the Cour t t o outla w legislatio n regulatin g hour s o f labo r an d minimum wages . A s belie f i n laissez-fair e gav e wa y t o fait h i n governmental regulation , thi s interpretatio n o f th e Du e Proces s Clause cam e increasingl y int o conflic t wit h curren t view s o f justice. The impac t o f th e Grea t Depressio n finally force d th e Cour t t o reverse itself , replacin g th e rul e (o r principle ) tha t gav e priorit y t o freedom o f contrac t b y a simpl e presumptio n o f legislativ e validity . Here th e Court' s sens e o f th e requirement s o f justic e i n particula r cases cause d i t t o chang e it s rul e an d it s hierarch y o f value s (equivalent t o a n alteratio n o f th e assumption s abou t th e "origina l position" fo r Rawls) . More recently , i n th e ligh t o f furthe r experienc e an d th e continuing developmen t o f idea s an d ideals , th e proces s ha s bee n reversed. Thu s th e Court' s evolvin g concep t o f th e righ t o f privac y has le d i t t o invalidat e legislatio n prohibitin g abortions . Her e th e

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principle (fo r Rawls , rea d "assumptio n regardin g th e 'origina l position' ") was used t o correct (in thi s case invalidate) a particula r piece of legislation that presumably expressed the intuitions of right that prevaile d amon g man y people . Her e th e Cour t appear s t o b e attempting partly to reflect changes in ideas of right that have taken place and partly to bring about suc h changes. Interaction betwee n historica l an d analytica l o r philosophica l conceptions of the Due Proces s Clause ar e illustrated b y th e case of Apodaca v. Oregon, holding that the Clause's requirement o f a jury trial for all but petty offenses doe s not require a unanimous verdict , although tha t requiremen t ha d grea t historica l sanctio n an d ha d theretofore bee n thought t o be part of the due process concept. 16 Finally o n thi s point , i t i s undoubtedl y tru e that , i n it s deliberations o n particula r cases , th e Cour t ofte n goe s throug h th e process of reflective equilibrium. It may "try on" a particular way of deciding a case , no t lik e wha t i t sees , an d the n find a wa y o f reaching a resul t tha t suit s i t better . J . Woodfor d Howard , Jr. , reports such an instance in the case of Mr. Justice Black. In the case of Colegrove v . Green , Black originall y side d wit h Frankfurte r an d was appointe d t o writ e th e opinio n o f th e Court . I n th e cours e o f writing it , h e becam e convince d tha t hi s origina l positio n wa s wrong. H e joined th e dissenters , writin g a n opinio n tha t gav e n o hint of the process he had gone through. 17 Ill Leaving Rawl s and th e broader question o f th e relatio n betwee n due proces s an d theorie s o f justice , i t ma y b e usefu l t o g o a bi t further i n suggesting some of the interestin g question s suggeste d b y the dialecti c o f th e law' s developmen t wit h respec t t o th e Du e Process Clause . O n th e procedura l side , especially , histor y ha s played a n importan t bu t diminishin g role ; "diminishing " a s sensitivities t o th e requirement s o f huma n dignit y hav e developed . Ways by which careful analysi s of concepts can furthe r thi s growth are well illustrate d b y David Resnick' s contribution t o this volume, with it s interestin g proposal , growin g ou t o f hi s analysis , fo r th e equalization of "counsel-power" as between ric h and poor . On th e substantive sid e o f due process , we hea r very littl e toda y (from the Supreme Court) about the right to contract freely , bu t we

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hear a grea t dea l abou t th e righ t o f privacy , th e righ t t o travel , an d other "fundamenta l rights.' ' Som e member s o f th e Cour t subsum e these right s (a t leas t i n certai n o f thei r applications ) unde r th e Du e Process Clause , harkin g bac k t o th e righ t (freedom ) o f parent s t o have thei r childre n educate d i n school s o f thei r ow n choosin g (subject t o certai n limitations). 18 Other s find the m i n o r abou t th e Ninth Amendment. 19 Whateve r constitutiona l provisio n i s relie d upon, th e ultimat e justificatio n i s generall y foun d i n a blen d o f history, idea s o f natura l right , an d th e closel y relate d philosophica l concept o f respec t fo r persons . B y whateve r test , th e Cour t seek s a "sense o f right " tha t ca n comman d a broa d consensus . Once thes e right s ar e "found " (o r a t an y rat e denominate d a s rights), wha t ar e th e limit s o f regulation ? T o wha t extent , i f any , and b y wha t justification s ma y the y b e abridged ? I n general , th e Court seldo m i f ever hold s right s t o b e absolute , Justice Blac k t o th e contrary notwithstanding , excep t i n th e cas e o f suc h second-orde r rights a s th e righ t no t t o b e deprive d o f libert y "arbitrarily, " whic h is virtuall y a synony m fo r "withou t du e proces s o f law. " 20 Rather , rights ar e stron g bu t rebuttabl e presumptions. 21 I n thi s case , however, th e presumptiv e righ t tha t coul d no t b e rebutte d wa s tha t of th e stat e (schoo l board ) t o requir e a teache r t o tak e leav e o f absence afte r si x month s o f pregnancy , regardles s o f he r abilit y t o perform he r job. Th e righ t tha t wa s denied , i t wil l b e noted , wa s that o f governmen t t o exercis e a certai n power ; no t a righ t o f individuals. However , thi s i s bu t th e obvers e o f th e righ t o f th e individual no t t o b e subjecte d t o suc h a regulation . Whe n a presumptive righ t mus t yiel d t o a la w tha t meet s th e standard s o f due process , thi s standar d i s variousl y formulated . Th e olde r phraseology i s "i f th e mean s ar e rationall y relate d t o a legitimat e end" or to a "valid publi c purpose. " More recently , th e Cour t tend s to spea k i n term s o f a "compellin g stat e interest, " 22 a t leas t wher e what i t hold s t o b e a "fundamenta l right " i s concerned . All o f thes e substantiv e du e proces s case s involv e th e weighin g o f claims of right. Sometime s i t i s the weighing o f an individual' s clai m against society' s clai m o n hi s ow n behalf . Thu s th e validit y o f law s requiring cyclist s t o wea r cras h helmet s pit s th e rider' s righ t t o freedom agains t hi s safety . Bu t generall y i t i s a questio n o f th e claims o f a specifie d individua l o r individual s agains t th e claim s o f society (tha t i s t o say , o f any particula r individua l agains t a n

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indeterminate numbe r o f unspecifie d individual s withi n th e pol ity). 23 Th e Cour t may , a s it frequentl y does , attemp t t o simplif y th e problems o f weighin g (o r "balancing" ) b y designatin g certai n claims o f right a s "fundamental, " wit h greate r o r les s basi s i n th e Constitution itsel f fo r thi s distinction , an d b y insistin g tha t th e public interes t b e especiall y "compelling " i n suc h instances . Bu t such devices , whethe r o r no t the y ar e helpful , ca n no t concea l th e fact o f balancing . It ma y b e a matte r o f weighin g th e valu e (bot h t o himsel f an d t o society) o f a n olde r person' s clai m t o retai n hi s job pas t a specifie d age limi t a s agains t th e cos t (agai n bot h individua l an d social ) o f the likelihoo d o f unfai r determination s bein g mad e i f eac h cas e i s decided "o n it s merits." Here, t o b e sure , various procedura l device s (productivity tests , medica l examinations ) ma y b e utilize d a s protections agains t unfairness , thu s bringin g i n procedura l du e process i n support o f substantiv e du e process . Bu t eve n thi s does no t end th e matter . I t migh t b e tha t fo r mos t individual s th e psychi c cost o f a determination i n hi s individua l cas e tha t h e i s no longe r fit to hol d hi s jo b woul d b e greate r tha n th e cos t t o hi m o f a n automatic, "arbitrary " rule tha t free s hi m fro m riskin g th e stigm a o f a determinatio n mad e o n th e fact s o f hi s particula r case . I kno w n o judicia l decision s i n whic h court s hav e take n int o account al l o f the type s of considerations enumerate d above . (An d i t would b e eas y t o ad d othe r relevan t considerations. ) Th e poin t o f these remark s i s simpl y t o sugges t tha t an y final determinatio n o f what i s due proces s i s in a measure arbitrar y (i n spit e o f th e fac t that , as Scanlo n argues , i t i s th e natur e o f du e proces s t o eliminat e arbitrariness), tha t relevan t consideration s ar e distribute d ou t fro m the cente r i n widenin g circles , an d tha t ho w fa r the y shoul d b e pursued i s a matte r o f judgment , on e fo r whic h court s wil l sometimes follo w a fairl y clea r consensu s an d sometime s see k t o create one . I n th e word s o f Charle s Curtis , the y ma y find "immanent law " o r the y ma y legislate. 24

IV These remark s abou t th e selectio n o f level s o f relevanc y lea d u s well int o th e nex t topi c fo r comment . Ca n a developmenta l theor y of du e proces s b e "value-free" ? Ca n i t b e "neutral" ? Nonactivist ?

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Passivist? Consideratio n o f th e case s o f Frankfurter , th e relativist passivist, an d Black , th e absolutist-activist , shoul d serv e a s warning s against hast y answer s t o thes e questions . I n th e abstrac t i t woul d appear tha t a judge wh o sough t t o pla y a modes t rol e woul d see k anchorage i n the firmes t rule s possible, whil e a n activis t woul d chaf e at thei r restrain t an d striv e fo r discretion . Bu t Black , detestin g th e uses t o whic h discretio n ha d bee n pu t i n th e past , i n du e proces s cases particularly , sough t securit y agains t wha t h e considere d t o b e this abus e o f powe r b y relyin g o n th e incorporatio n theory , whic h gave somewha t mor e specificity . Thi s mov e enable d hi m t o b e a n activist a t leas t i n importin g int o th e Du e Proces s Claus e o f th e Fourteenth Amendmen t th e mor e specifi c libertie s o f th e Firs t Amendment. Frankfurter , stron g believe r i n judicia l modest y though h e was , wa s a n inveterat e balancer . Th e la w fo r him , an d especially th e Constitution , wa s no t a code, no t a matte r o f cut-and dried rule s an d formulas . Rathe r th e judicial craf t require d readin g a tex t o r a preceden t i n th e ligh t o f history , an d i n th e ligh t o f hi s interpretation o f th e Anglo-Saxo n sens e o f justice an d decency . A developmenta l theor y o f du e process , an d it s practitioners , must mak e us e o f values , an d the y mus t selec t value s an d weigh t them agains t othe r values . (Blac k clearl y di d s o despit e al l hi s attempts t o faste n hi s position s t o th e word s o f th e Constitution. ) This selectio n ca n b e "neutral, " i n th e sens e o f bein g uninfluence d by th e biase s o f th e member s o f th e Court , onl y i f th e latte r hav e some objectiv e standard . If , fo r instance , the y ca n find a "sens e o f right" of the community o r of th e nation , the y nee d no t impor t thei r own persona l values . O r i f the y adop t som e Kantia n formul a o r Kantian-derived formula , a la Rawls , the y ma y possibl y approac h neutrality. I n practice , however , the y ca n d o n o mor e tha n striv e i n one o r another o f these directions , eve n i f the y conside r neutralit y a s a desirabl e goal . Also , i t woul d see m tha t a Cour t tha t i s tryin g t o "develop" th e concep t o f du e process , whethe r i n th e directio n o f the nationa l spiri t o r consensus o r o f som e theor y o f justice, mus t b e in som e measur e activist . On e doe s no t pursu e a goa l withou t activity—and activism . Clearly du e proces s of la w i s a concept tha t defie s bot h Blackston e and Austin . I t calls fo r other tool s tha n th e readin g o f histor y an d o f statutes. I t call s fo r th e exercis e o f discretion . I t i s open-ended . Th e courts may , indee d must , see k a n ethica l consensus . Perhap s the y

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may eve n appea l t o wha t Ghai m Perelma n call s a "universa l audience," 25 thoug h generally the y must be content with standards of righ t tha t ar e mor e culture-bound . Why , perhap s alon g wit h seeking the standards of a "universal audience " and with appeals to the ethica l idea s o f thos e wh o hav e though t mos t abou t suc h problems, they must also seek out consensu s i s amply illustrate d b y the recen t histor y o f th e Suprem e Court' s constitutiona l exegesis . The pus h fo r equality tha t s o largely characterized th e work o f th e Warren Court 26 o n th e whol e struc k a responsiv e chor d i n th e American public . Nowher e wa s this fac t mor e clearl y eviden t tha n in the first big decisions on legislativ e reapportionment . Thi s was a subject about which a strong reaction migh t hav e been anticipated , considering th e vested interest s o f th e politician s i n th e statu s quo . But effort s t o revers e th e Court' s actio n b y constitutiona l amend ment were singularly unsuccessful , eve n i n Congress. Development s regarding th e right s o f th e accuse d als o foun d wid e suppor t whe n they were directed towar d equalizing th e right s of the ric h and th e poor. Finally , eve n th e grea t mov e fo r desegregatio n an d th e strengthening o f civi l right s generally , bitterl y oppose d thoug h i t was in most parts of the South, showed genera l support throughou t the country i n numerou s ways , especially b y th e successio n o f civi l rights acts enacted by Congress subsequent to the first desegregation decision. In part , n o doubt , th e Cour t wa s finding a laten t consensus ; i n part, i t wa s creatin g one . Bu t als o i n du e time , i n th e latte r tw o areas mentione d abov e i n particular , i t go t to o fa r ou t i n fron t o f whatever consensu s ha d bee n emerging . I n The Self-inflicted Wound, Fred P . Graham, Jr., has strikingly tol d th e stor y of how th e Cour t got to o fa r removed fro m it s powe r base s i n publi c opinio n an d i n Congress. An d i t i s unnecessar y t o not e th e backlas h produce d b y certain busin g decisions . I n bot h cases , th e Cour t ha s no t onl y checked it s forwar d momentum ; bu t ha s als o retreate d somewha t from the positions to which i t had appeare d t o be headed. 27 A lack of popular support, a lack of agreement abou t th e relativ e weight to be attributed t o certain valued circumstances (e.g., school integration versus "neighborhood" schools) may take various forms, reflect itsel f i n a variet y o f ways . Popula r sentimen t ma y b e expressed b y wa y o f bumpe r stickers , letter s t o Congressmen , th e ballot box , school boycotts , or violence. Congressmen ma y move for

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impeachment o r refus e t o increas e judicial salarie s an d perquisites . Some o f thes e activitie s ma y b e clearly see n a s expressions o f a sens e of right , an d other s ma y appea r rathe r t o b e expression s o f self interest, wit h littl e regar d fo r theorie s o r feeling s o f justice. Court s must b e concerne d wit h both . I n considerin g wha t proces s i s "due " at an y give n tim e an d place , a pragmati c concer n fo r ho w fa r th e Court ca n g o i n makin g la w an d hav e i t stil l workabl e als o ha s it s place.

V Distinguishable—but barely—fro m th e questio n o f th e meanin g o f due process , whic h ha s bee n th e subjec t o f th e discussio n u p t o thi s point, i s tha t o f wher e th e concept—an d th e lega l requirement—i s applicable. Mos t generally , t o b e sure , i t i s applicabl e t o th e polit y and t o lesse r association s withi n th e state . I t incorporate s aspect s o f justice, fairness , an d rationality . Whil e i t deal s wit h relation s amon g people, especiall y i n th e contex t o f th e exercis e o f authority , i t doe s not cove r th e ful l rang e o f huma n relations . I t woul d appea r tha t due process , especiall y wit h respec t t o it s procedura l aspect , i s les s appropriate o r value d les s highl y a s on e approache s th e extremitie s of associationa l relations . Thus , fo r a ver y clos e community , th e requirements o f du e proces s ar e bot h unnecessar y an d s o crud e an d mechanical a s actuall y t o har m th e socia l (o r communal ) fabric . The greate r th e mutua l trust , th e les s the nee d t o depend upo n fixed procedures and th e mor e suc h procedure s interfer e wit h th e nuance s of fraternal relations . This poin t i s mad e explici t b y Davi d Danelsk i in hi s discussio n o f th e ombudsman' s rol e i n a universit y setting , where i t i s th e breakdow n o f consensu s an d mutua l trus t tha t ha s led t o th e deman d an d nee d fo r legalisti c (du e process ) procedures . In thi s connection , too , th e Roth case, discusse d i n thi s volum e b y Danelski, Grey , Michelman , an d Pincoffs , i s o f interest . Th e question i s whethe r a nontenure d teache r i n a stat e college , wh o i s not rehired , i s entitle d t o a statemen t o f th e reason s wh y hi s o r he r employment wa s no t continued . Whil e th e Cour t di d no t uphol d Roth's clai m a s a matte r o f du e process , tw o o f th e author s mentioned lea n i n th e directio n o f feelin g tha t i t woul d b e prope r t o insist o n suc h a requirement . ( A third , Michelman , als o appear s t o feel tha t th e procedur e ough t t o b e followe d bu t fear s tha t fo r th e

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courts t o requir e i t woul d probabl y defea t it s purpose. ) Ye t non e o f these author s suggest s tha t th e deman d fo r a ful l statemen t an d discussion o f reason s woul d b e legitimat e i n th e cas e o f a n unsuccessful applican t fo r th e positio n i n question ; an d i t seem s t o be implie d tha t the y woul d distinguis h hirin g an d no t rehiring . Why? Perhap s th e perso n wh o i s no t hire d i s harme d les s tha n th e one wh o i s not rehired ; but i t i s by n o mean s clea r tha t thi s is alway s the case . Possibly mor e t o th e poin t i s th e fac t tha t th e perso n wh o i s no t rehired wa s alread y par t o f th e relevan t association . Th e associatio n of whic h h e wa s a par t i s no t suc h a tigh t communit y a s t o rende r due proces s inappropriate , bu t on e consistin g o f person s sufficientl y committed t o continue d associatio n t o cal l fo r th e applicatio n o f due proces s standards . Th e mer e applicant , o n th e othe r hand , ha s not ye t entere d int o th e association i n question. Eve n wit h respec t t o him, o f course , th e la w may , an d ofte n does , impos e constraint s o n the hirin g entity . Thu s far , thes e constraint s hav e bee n legislativel y imposed an d d o no t appea r t o b e judicially require d a s par t o f du e process i n th e absenc e o f legislatio n (excep t fo r th e cas e o f nondiscrimination o n ground s o f race , religion , o r se x b y a publi c employer). No r hav e the y bee n extende d t o th e requiremen t tha t reasons b e stated . I n Michelman' s terms , ther e i s not eve n a shado w of entitlemen t t o ge t th e job i n th e firs t place , althoug h ther e ma y be (in th e case of public institutions , a t least ) som e embryoni c mora l entitlement t o a direc t confrontatio n fo r th e discussio n o f reason s i n the cas e o f nonrenewal . Gre y woul d distinguis h betwee n interes t (which th e applican t migh t hav e t o a greater extent tha n th e perso n not rehired ) an d constitutiona l right . Th e latter , which migh t deriv e from genera l recognitio n o f a mora l claim , doe s no t exis t i n Roth, o r at leas t ha s no t bee n recognize d b y th e Court . H e note s tha t thi s may b e considered a s an instance , perhap s a reemergence , o f th e ol d privilege-right distinction . Let m e elaborat e an d sharpe n th e issu e somewhat . Edmun d Pincoffs woul d mak e th e entitlement t o an explanatio n fo r nonreap pointment deriv e fro m Kant' s Categorica l Imperative , i n th e for m that n o ma n shoul d trea t anyon e a s a mer e means . A difficult y wit h this derivation i s that i t doe s no t provid e fo r the distinctio n betwee n hiring an d rehiring . Michelma n apparentl y woul d mak e suc h distinctions, i n general , depen d upo n intuite d mora l entitlement s

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based upo n genera l understanding s an d mora l feelings , althoug h i n the cas e o f Roth , fo r th e prudentia l reaso n mentione d above , h e reluctantly accept s th e conclusio n arrive d a t i n Roth. My suggestio n i s tha t thes e understanding s an d feelings , i n turn , derive from , o r ar e conditione d by , th e natur e o f th e bon d unitin g the individual s i n question , th e intensit y o r exten t o f communit y feeling. Thi s theor y woul d accoun t fo r ou r finding o f a mora l entitlement t o som e statemen t o f reason s i n Roth, whil e denyin g i t t o the nonhire d applicant . I t woul d als o accoun t fo r ou r erstwhil e feeling tha t du e proces s require s les s i n th e wa y o f procedura l protection fo r alien s (a t leas t wher e thei r righ t t o remai n i n th e country i s concerned) tha n fo r citizens . Toda y perhap s w e ar e mor e willing tha n onc e wa s th e cas e t o conside r commo n residenc y (without regar d t o citizenship ) a s a sufficien t bon d t o trigge r ful l due proces s protection . A t th e sam e tim e w e stil l distinguis h between th e residen t alie n an d th e would-b e resident , th e applican t for permissio n t o immigrate . T h e latter , thoug h w e certainl y recognize hi m a s a person , i s no t (pace Pincoffs) entitle d t o hearing , reasons, or othe r accoutrement s o f du e process , i f he i s denied a visa . In case s ope n t o dispute , then , th e righ t t o du e proces s ma y b e derived fro m respec t fo r th e personalit y o f a fello w membe r o f a polity o r othe r associatio n shor t o f a n intimat e community . Case s where ther e i s a clea r deprivatio n o f life , liberty , o r propert y ar e no t open t o dispute ; the y nee d no t rel y upo n thi s theory , althoug h i t would surel y apply . An d mor e directly , the y ma y rel y upo n ou r intuitions o f mora l entitlement . Ye t surel y som e mor e reliable , som e more objectiv e tes t woul d b e desirabl e wher e i t ca n b e found . Michelman himself , i n discussin g th e cas e o f publi c housing , advances one . H e suggest s tha t housin g i s provide d fo r th e need s o f the housed , bu t tha t job s ar e mad e availabl e fo r th e need s o f th e state. Thi s i s a usefu l distinction , especiall y fo r th e purpos e o f determining th e degre e o f formalize d du e proces s tha t i s appropri ate. Bu t i t doe s no t hel p m e wit h m y desir e t o provid e a minimu m of explanatio n fo r Roth an d ye t no t th e fulle r hearin g t o whic h a n occupant o f publi c housin g o r a perso n denie d unemploymen t compensation would , i n m y view , b e entitled . Here , i t seem s t o me , another distinctio n i s useful . (Perhap s i t ma y b e viewe d a s onl y a n extension o r elaboratio n o f Michelman' s distinction. ) I refe r t o th e

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kind o f fact s appropriat e fo r th e administrativ e authorit y t o tak e into account. One important—ofte n crucial—typ e o f fac t tha t i s relevant i n th e nonrehiring case is at the same time so indeterminate a s to render a judicialized procedur e out o f place. The educational administrator , as to some extent wit h othe r employers, 28 i s looking fo r the perso n best qualified fo r the job. H e is ever seeking to improve his staff. H e may, therefore, no t rehir e an employee simpl y becaus e h e has good reason t o believ e tha t h e ca n replac e him/he r with a bette r one . This ma y see m a hars h standard , i n it s effects , bu t i t i s generall y accepted a s require d b y th e need s o f th e institution , a t leas t fo r a probationary period. At the same time, it is apparent tha t th e mere acceptance o f thi s standar d place s grea t limit s o n wha t ca n b e accomplished b y any requirement o f a statement o f reasons. It may be, a s Grey argues, that th e fundamental variabl e here is the extent to whic h publi c recognitio n o f a mora l righ t t o th e benefi t ha s solidified; and that the legislature is merely reflecting tha t fact when it specifies mor e precisely th e conditions fo r entitlement i n th e cas e of unemploymen t "insurance " tha n i t doe s i n th e cas e o f welfar e "benefits." Al l o f thi s i s intende d t o b e suggestiv e rathe r tha n complete, fo r Scanlo n seem s clearl y t o b e righ t i n arguin g tha t many consideration s influenc e th e decision a s to where du e proces s is required. It ha s alread y bee n intimated , however , tha t i t i s no t jus t a question o f wher e du e proces s i s required ; i t i s als o a questio n o f what proces s i s "due," or how muc h du e proces s i s required unde r given circumstances . Thu s I hav e suggeste d earlie r tha t nonhirin g and nonrehirin g ar e t o b e distinguishe d b y th e tes t o f intimac y o f association, implyin g tha t somethin g i n th e wa y o f du e process—i n this instance , som e statemen t o f reasons—i s calle d fo r i n th e latte r but not i n the former case. On th e other hand, I have suggested, in the precedin g paragraph , a t leas t i n certai n type s o f nonrehirin g cases, including the Roth type , that th e kinds of facts relevant t o the determination d o no t submi t themselve s easily , i f a t all , t o norma l due proces s procedures . I n fact , a statemen t o f reason s might , rightly, tur n ou t t o b e substantiall y vacuous . Nonetheless , I a m inclined t o believ e tha t th e perso n aggrieve d i s entitle d t o suc h a statement, and whatever discussion tha t ma y call forth , if he desires

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it. Wit h thi s understanding , I believ e ther e i s n o inconsistenc y between th e tw o kind s o f test s I hav e proposed .

VI These remark s hav e bee n largel y confine d t o du e proces s a s i t operates i n th e America n syste m o f government . Severa l o f th e papers i n thi s volum e t o whic h a t leas t passin g referenc e ha s bee n made abov e rightl y conside r th e concep t i n a broade r context . Scanlon, i n particular , sketche s a mor e inclusiv e theory . Fo r him , one mus t loo k t o th e natur e o f th e authorit y o r th e institutio n i n question befor e h e ca n tel l jus t wha t i s entaile d b y du e process' s limitations upo n arbitrariness . Thi s take s hi m int o wha t h e describes a s a "gra y are a betwee n consideratio n o f right s an d considerations o f publi c policy. " Thi s are a i s perhap s hardl y different fro m wha t I wa s discussin g i n th e paragrap h befor e this , just a s his theor y o f th e "natur e o f th e institutio n test " bear s at leas t some resemblanc e t o m y earlie r discussio n o f degree s o f associatio n and type s o f du e process . This referenc e bac k t o th e earlie r discussio n o f degree s o f association no t onl y suggest s tha t w e hav e com e ful l circle ; i t als o provides a lin k t o Kearns' s discussio n o f du e proces s i n term s o f th e requirements fo r th e maintenanc e o f system . Kearns' s ide a o f "de moralizing" du e process , o f relatin g i t t o syste m rathe r tha n t o persons, run s counte r t o muc h o f wha t ha s bee n sai d i n th e preceding page s (althoug h les s so , a s I hav e remarked , t o th e firs t part o f thi s chapter ) and , indeed , t o muc h o f wha t ha s bee n sai d elsewhere i n th e volume . Bu t i t i s intriguing , an d i t i s perhap s unfortunate tha t th e othe r contributor s t o th e volum e hav e no t ha d an opportunit y t o reac t t o it . Perhap s tha t woul d cal l fo r anothe r volume—one i n which , i t woul d b e hoped , Kearn s woul d exten d hi s discussion t o a consideratio n o f ho w (an d whether ) hi s theor y coul d apply t o substantiv e du e process .

NOTES 1. Joh n Rawls , A Theory of Justice(Cambridge, Mass. : Harvar d Univer sity Press , 1971) , esp. Chapter II. 2. Fo r a n elaboratio n o f thi s point , se e J . Rolan d Pennock , "Law' s

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Natural Bent, " Ethics, 7 9 (1969) , pp . 222-28 . An d se e Scanlon' s discussion, infra. 3. Murray' s Lesse e v . Hoboke n Lan d & Improvemen t Co . (1856) , 1 8 How. 272. 4. Hurtad o v. California (1884) , 11 0 U. S . 516. 5. Sinc e Powel l v . Alabama (1932) , 287, U.S . 45 , i t i s no longe r even a sufficient condition . 6. Rochi n v . Californi a (1952) , 34 2 U. S 16 5 (Frankfurter' s majorit y opinion and Black' s concurring opinion). 7. Edmun d Cahn , The Sense of Injustice (Bloomington , Ind. : Indian a University Press , 1949). 8. Note , for instance, the return to substantive du e process in Clevelan d State Boar d o f Educatio n v . LaFleu r (1974) , 4 4 U.S . 632 , no t t o mention Ro e v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113 . 9. Th e sam e theme , wit h a decentralizin g twist , i s provide d b y Hug o Krabbe's "sense of right of the community." See his The Modern Idea of the State, tr . Sabin e an d Shepar d (Ne w York : Appleton-Century , 1930), pp. 83-98 and Chapters V an d VI. 10. Th e phras e i s Kar l Llewellyn's . H e use s i t i n a discussio n o f ho w customary law develops out of particular cases in primitive tribes; but it reflect s als o hi s philosoph y o f la w mor e generall y an d als o tha t o f his judicial hero , Benjami n Cardozo . Se e K . N . Llewelly n an d E . Adamson Hoebel , The Cheyenne Way (Norman, Okla. : Universit y o f Oklahoma Press , 1941), p. 286. 11. Se e R . S . Downi e an d Elizabet h Telfer , Respect for Persons (London : Allen & Unwin, 1969 ) and Edmun d PincofTs' s essay i n this volume. 12. Rawls , A Theory of Justice.See especiall y pp . 251-5 7 fo r Rawls' s ow n discussion of how hi s theory of justice derive s from Kant . 13. Ibid. , p. 293. The whole of Sec. 38, on "The Rule of Law," is relevant in this connection. 14. Ibid. , p. 62. Rawls also include s i n thi s listin g "income an d wealth. " Thus far, at least, thi s aspect of justice i s not though t o f as subject t o judicial application except as it may bear upon the most fundamenta l rights, such as the right to have effective acces s to the courts (right t o free counsel fo r indigents accused o f crime—or seeking a divorce). 15. Th e fac t tha t som e o f th e decision s tha t exemplif y thi s trend , including th e legislativ e apportionmen t cases , hav e nominall y bee n accomplished b y wa y o f th e Equa l Protection s Claus e i s of n o grea t significance i n vie w o f th e fac t tha t th e Cour t ha s no w include d s o much o f th e substanc e o f th e latte r i n th e former . I t woul d appea r that almos t anythin g tha t i s constitutionally lackin g i n equalit y ca n as well b e hel d t o b e "arbitrary " unde r th e Du e Proces s Clause . Cf .

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Cleveland Stat e Boar d o f Educatio n v . LaFleu r (not e 9) , whic h wa s argued a s a n "equa l protection " cas e an d decide d a s a "du e process " case. 16. Apodac a v . Orego n (1972) , 40 6 U.S . 404 . 17. "O n th e Fluidit y o f Judicia l Choice, " Amer. Political Science Rev., 6 2 (1968), pp . 43-56 , 48 . (I n thi s cas e [32 8 U.S . 549] , th e Cour t hel d th e issue o f congressiona l reapportionmen t t o b e nonjusticable. ) Howar d cites othe r instance s o f justice s reachin g thei r ultimat e conclusions , sometimes despit e thei r ideologica l orientations , onl y afte r "tortuou s processes o f reflectio n an d interchange . . . . " P . 56 . 18. Meye r v . Nebrask a (1923) , 26 2 U.S . 390 . 19. Se e Goldberg' s concurrin g opinio n i n Griswol d v . Conn . (1965) , 38 1 U.S. 497 . 20. B y wa y o f contrast , on e ma y cal l attentio n t o th e theor y o f Rober t Nozick. Fo r him , substantiv e right s t o property , fo r instance , ar e based entirel y upo n entitlements . Anyon e wh o ha s acquire d propert y in accordanc e wit h th e principl e o f justic e i n transfe r i s absolutel y entitled t o tha t property . N o proces s fo r takin g i t awa y i s "due. " Robert Nozick , Anarchy, State and Utopia (Ne w York : Basi c Books , 1974), p . 151 . 21. Justic e Stewar t an d a majorit y o f th e Court—admittedl y i n a slightl y different context—g o s o fa r a s t o hol d tha t a statut e tha t create s a n "irrebuttable presumption " o f righ t violate s th e Du e Proces s Clause . See Cleveland State Board of Education v . LaFleur, not e 10 . 22. Th e latte r formulatio n i s primaril y foun d i n opinion s cas t i n term s o f "the equa l protectio n o f th e laws, " bu t i t als o ma y b e foun d i n du e process cases , fo r instanc e i n th e cas e o f th e pregnan t schoolteache r referred t o abov e (not e 10) . 23. T o clarif y stil l furthe r wha t ma y b e involve d i n a clai m o f individua l right agains t "society, " not e tha t i t ma y b e a questio n o f m y (o r anyone's) interes t i n havin g a fai r trial , shoul d I b e accuse d o f crime , against m y interes t i n deterrin g would-b e criminals . Fo r usefu l distinctions regardin g variou s type s o f balancing , se e Scanlo n (Chap ter IV , below ) o n aggregat e balancing , individua l probabalisti c balancing, an d persona l balancing . 24. Charle s Curtis , Lions under the Throne (Boston : Houghto n Mifflin , 1947). 25. Chai m Perelman , Justice (Ne w York : Rando m House , 1967) , Chapte r V, especiall y p . 82 . 26. Se e Phili p B . Kurland , Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court (Chicago: Universit y o f Chicag o Press , 1970) .

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27. O f course , "th e Court " i s no t th e sam e Court ; bu t fo r presen t purposes, the question of whether the constraints were anticipatory or produced b y new appointments i s of no importance. 28. On e migh t thin k als o o f a la w firm's decidin g whethe r o r no t t o continue the services of an associate, or of a judge's (if a one-year rule had not been established) deciding whether to continue a law clerk, or of a legislator and his legislative assistant .

1 THE FORES T OF DUE PROCESS O F LAW: THE AMERICA N CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIO N 1 CHARLES A . MILLE R

The protea n traditio n o f American du e proces s o f la w confirm s i n the lif e o f th e la w wha t seventee n volume s o f N O M O S hav e demonstrated i n scholarship : tha t fundamenta l politica l an d lega l ideas, lik e grea t work s o f art, resis t final definitio n an d perhap s final understanding. Whethe r on e accept s th e jaundice d remar k o f Thomas Ree d Powel l tha t "du e proces s i s a s du e proces s does, " o r the mor e respectfu l vie w o f Feli x Frankfurte r t o th e sam e effect , tha t due proces s ha s a "blesse d versatility, " a stud y o f th e America n tradition yield s fe w veritie s bu t man y varietie s o f du e process. 2 Th e idea o f du e proces s tha t last s i s tha t o f individua l freedo m fro m arbitrary governmen t imposition . I t i s a n ide a tha t assume s th e existence o f conflict s betwee n th e governmen t an d citizen s an d th e resolution o f thos e conflict s throug h lawfu l proceedings . I n practice , the varieties of due proces s hav e depende d o n th e ris e and declin e o f social interest s an d o n society' s changin g perception s o f wha t i s arbitrary, unfair , o r unjust . Thes e ar e th e genera l an d hardl y remarkable lesson s o f a stud y o f du e proces s o f la w a s a centra l concept i n th e America n constitutiona l tradition .

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Why du e proces s ha s becom e suc h a concep t is , in hindsight , als o not difficul t t o say . A s wil l becom e clear , du e proces s i n th e American traditio n i s a blen d o f politica l symbolis m an d lega l efficacy, bot h aide d b y semanti c openness. 3 Th e chronologica l progression o f thi s essa y permit s a n appreciatio n o f thes e abstrac t features o f du e proces s i n associatio n wit h th e concret e element s that hav e entere d th e du e proces s tradition . Th e historica l perspec tive als o afford s th e opportunit y t o distinguis h wha t i s current fro m what i s recurrent i n du e proces s thinking . Further , a historica l vie w shows due proces s a s a n exampl e o f th e metho d o f th e commo n law , both becaus e i t ha s evolve d slowl y an d becaus e it s developmen t ha s been s o thoroughly i n th e hand s o f th e judiciary. Finally , th e histor y of du e proces s i s a mode l o f th e paralle l an d interrelate d evolution , through a singl e phrase , o f lega l idea s connecte d wit h socia l interests.4

I. FRO M MAGN A CART A T H R O U G H T H E BIL L O F RIGHT S The sourc e o f th e concept—thoug h no t th e phrase—"du e proces s of law " i s th e origina l Magn a Carta. 5 Th e Charte r o f 1215 , b y which Kin g John agree d t o feuda l right s insiste d o n b y th e baron s of Runnymede , containe d sixty-thre e chapters . I n Chapte r 3 9 th e king promise d tha t No fre e ma n shal l b e take n o r imprisone d o r disseise d o r outlawed o r exiled o r in an y wa y ruined , no r wil l w e g o o r sen d against him , excep t b y th e lawfu l judgmen t o f hi s peer s o r b y the la w o f th e land. 6 The ke y phras e i s "b y th e la w o f th e land"— per legem terrae. Lik e other word s an d phrase s i n Chapte r 39 , it s earl y thirteenth-centur y meaning i s no t definite. 7 Historian s generall y explai n "law " a s a contrast t o th e decree s of King John, an d "o f th e land " as a contras t with restricte d bodie s o f la w suc h a s o f th e kin g {lex regnum appear s elsewhere i n Magn a Carta) , o r o f Eas t Anglia , o r eve n maritim e law. I n vie w o f wha t th e phras e an d concep t became , i t shoul d b e noted tha t "la w o f th e land " include d bot h substantiv e an d pro cedural aspects. 8 Whateve r i t wa s i n contras t to , th e "la w o f th e

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land" was th e customar y la w o f England . A s Si r Matthe w Hal e ex plained i n th e lat e seventeent h century , "Sometime s 'ti s calle d Le x Angliae. . . . Sometime s 'ti s called Le x e t Consuetud o R e g n i . . . ; but most commonl y 'ti s called , Th e Commo n Law , o r th e Commo n Law o f England. . .. " 9 Thi s broa d understandin g o f per legem terrae is characteristic o f it s successor phrase , "du e proces s of law, " as well . The late r identificatio n o f th e first expressio n wit h th e secon d no t only enhance d th e constitutiona l statu s o f Magn a Cart a b y tyin g the Charte r t o commo n law , bu t simultaneousl y gav e t o th e common la w th e blessin g o f th e politicall y unassailabl e charter . Within a yea r an d a hal f o f th e ceremon y a t Runnymede , Kin g John wa s dead . Becaus e o f th e personalize d natur e o f feuda l government an d th e stil l unsettle d situatio n amon g th e baron s an d the roya l representatives , Magn a Cart a wa s reaffirme d unde r th e boy kin g Henr y II I i n 1216 . Thi s reaffirmatio n wa s th e first o f ove r thirty reissue s o f th e charte r durin g politica l crise s o r change s o f reign b y successiv e Britis h monarch s i n th e nex t tw o centuries . These periodi c confirmation s hav e a regularize d America n legac y i n the constitutionall y prescribe d presidentia l oat h o f offic e t o "pre serve, protec t an d defen d th e Constitution"—th e "suprem e la w o f the land. " In th e reissu e o f th e Charte r i n 122 5 (als o unde r Henr y III) , Magna Cart a wa s reduce d fro m sixty-thre e t o thirty-seve n chapters , and th e futur e du e proces s clause, stil l per legem terrae, migrate d fro m Chapter 39 t o Chapter 29 . It i s Chapter 2 9 whic h i s most commonl y referred t o i n late r writin g (e.g. , b y Si r Edwar d Cok e i n th e seventeenth century) . A doze n year s late r th e nam e "Magn a Carta " was first officiall y applie d t o th e document. 10 "Process o f law " i s first recognizabl e a s a la w Frenc h phrase , process de ley, i n a Britis h lega l documen t o f th e earl y fourteent h century. 11 No t lon g afterward , i n th e 135 4 reissu e o f th e charte r under Edward III , Magna Cart a appear s officiall y i n Englis h fo r th e first time . I n Chapte r 29 , i n plac e of per legem terrae, are th e word s "by du e proces s o f th e law. " B y th e en d o f th e fourteent h century , Magna Carta , throug h it s repeate d confirmations , ha d becom e th e accepted basi c symbo l o f Britis h constitutionalism . Th e du e proces s clause, ne w i n English , wa s th e charter' s centra l admonitio n agains t arbitrary government . During th e fifteenth an d sixteent h centuries , thoug h mentione d

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in statute s o r compilation s o f statutes , Magn a Cart a an d du e process la y fallo w i n Britis h constitutiona l disputes . Fortescu e use d it i n hi s opinions , bu t no t i n hi s treatises. 12 I n th e seventeent h century, however , th e Charte r an d th e claus e suddenl y blossome d again. 13 Unde r th e scholarl y an d politica l influenc e o f Cok e an d other lawyers , Magn a Cart a wa s revive d an d transforme d int o a source o f libertie s fo r al l Englishme n (no t jus t th e barons ) agains t the monarchy. 14 I n th e Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, Coke examine s Magn a Cart a chapte r b y chapter . Chapte r 29 receive s th e lengthies t treatmen t b y far , fo r "upo n thi s Chapter , as ou t o f a roote , man y fruitful l branche s o f th e La w o f Englan d have sprung. " 15 H e translate s per legem terrae as "b y th e Commo n Law, Statut e Law , o r Custom e o f England, " bu t note s tha t "th e true sens e an d expositio n o f thes e words " ar e "withou t du e proces s oflaw."^ Coke's illustration s o f du e proces s o f la w ar e predominantl y procedural: indictment , presentment , warrants , writs . Bu t h e speak s also of "liberties " of Englishme n guarantee d b y th e chapter , amon g which i s th e freedo m fro m monopoly. 17 I n 1628 , th e sam e yea r th e Second Institute was published , Cok e prepare d th e Petitio n o f Right , which quote d du e proces s and law-of-the-lan d languag e fro m "th e great charte r o f th e libertie s o f England. " The petitio n charge d tha t recent execution s an d imprisonment s ha d violate d thes e clause s o f Magna Carta . Just whe n th e idea s o f th e Petitio n o f Righ t exerte d thei r mos t dramatic effec t an d th e Stuart s wer e depose d fro m th e monarchy , the idea s an d languag e o f Magn a Cart a Chapte r 2 9 entere d American constitutiona l documents. 18 I n 1641 , th e Massachusett s Body o f Liberties , prepare d b y me n fleeing th e turmoi l o f th e English Civi l War , state d tha t life , honor , arres t an d punishment , family, an d good s wer e t o b e protecte d "b y som e expres s la w o f th e country." A fe w decade s later , th e fundamenta l law s o f Ne w Jerse y and Pennsylvani a provide d fo r th e protectio n o f lif e an d libert y i n the phrase s o f Magn a Carta. 19 In th e 1760s , afte r th e Stam p Act , an d a s i f i n anticipatio n o f a n American nee d fo r a n authoritativ e contemporar y statemen t o f citizens' rights, Blackston e summe d u p an d a t th e sam e tim e expanded th e idea s o f Chapte r 2 9 an d du e proces s o f law . I n arranging hi s "three absolut e right s of individuals, " h e followe d th e

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order o f Lock e i n justifyin g th e existenc e o f th e state—fo r th e protection o f life, liberty, an d property : (1) "th e righ t o f persona l securit y [which ] consist s i n a person' s legal an d uninterrupte d enjoymen t o f hi s life , hi s limbs , hi s body , his health , an d hi s reputation. " (2 ) "th e persona l libert y [which ] consists i n th e powe r o f locomotion , o f changin g situation , o r moving one's person t o whatsoever plac e one's own inclinatio n ma y direct, withou t imprisonmen t o r restraint , unles s b y du e cours e o f law;" (3 ) "th e thir d absolut e right , inheren t i n ever y English man, . .. o f property: which consist s in th e fre e use , enjoyment, an d disposal o f al l hi s acquisitions , withou t an y contro l o r diminution , save only by the law s of the land. " 2 0 The blen d o f du e proces s idea s an d phrase s i n Blackston e i s i n keeping with bot h th e centrality an d th e ineffabilit y o f the concept . Personal securit y include s lif e a s well a s other protections . Persona l liberty include s travel , bu t als o th e protectio n o f th e criminall y accused b y du e cours e o f law . Propert y right s ar e als o absolute , though the y ma y b e bot h regulate d an d diminishe d b y law . Th e plural "law s o f th e land, " use d i n som e earl y America n stat e constitutions a s well , indicate s particularity , a s i n th e cas e o f statutes, and stands in contrast t o the general, undifferentiated bod y of judge-made commo n law . Among th e law s of the land , as is clear elsewhere i n Blackston e an d i n America n constitutiona l practice , are law s on taxation , eminent domain , an d th e polic e power . Whil e Blackstone's lis t thu s correspond s t o life , liberty , an d property , o n inspection hi s discussio n als o yield s a divisio n betwee n natura l rights an d crimina l rights ; an d thi s manne r o f considerin g du e process finds its way int o th e America n tradition , too . In thei r constitutiona l argumen t agains t kin g an d parliamen t between th e Stam p Ac t an d th e Revolution , America n colonist s referred t o th e commo n law , Magn a Carta , an d Coke , bu t no t a s often a s on e migh t expec t o n th e basi s o f th e substanc e o f tha t heritage.21 The mor e conservative hope d i n th e early years to retai n the concret e heritage . Joh n Adams , fo r instance , argue d tha t th e Stamp Ac t wa s "directly repugnan t t o th e Grea t Charte r itself. " 22 The mor e libera l argument , reflecte d i n Jame s Wilso n an d Joh n Dickinson, argue d b y analog y an d becam e mor e significant i n th e 1770s: Americ a neede d it s ow n Magn a Cart a i n th e for m o f a written constitutio n fo r th e colonies. 23 The Declaratio n o f Resolve s

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of th e Firs t Continenta l Congress , adopte d i n th e fal l o f 1774 , state d that th e representative s acte d th e wa y "Englishmen , thei r ancestor s in lik e case s hav e usuall y done, " deducin g thei r right s "b y th e immutable law s of nature, th e principle s o f th e Englis h constitution , and th e severa l charter s o r compacts " o f th e colonies . Amon g th e rights deduce d wer e "tha t the y ar e entitle d t o life , libert y an d property," an d "tha t th e respectiv e colonie s ar e entitle d . . . t o th e great an d inestimabl e privileg e o f bein g trie d b y thei r peer s o f th e civinage, accordin g t o th e cours e o f th e [common ] law. " 2 4 The firs t constitutio n o f a n independen t America n state , tha t o f Virginia i n June 1776 , rearrange d th e du e proces s idea s onc e more . The firs t hal f o f tha t constitutio n wa s it s Bil l o f Rights , drafte d b y Thomas Jefferson . I t contain s th e tw o element s o f du e proces s thought—natural right s an d crimina l rights—bu t cleanl y separate d from eac h other . Sectio n 1 of th e Virgini a Bil l o f Right s declare s a s an "inheren t right " of ma n "th e enjoymen t o f lif e an d liberty , wit h the mean s o f acquirin g an d possessin g property , an d pursuin g an d obtaining happines s an d safety. " Sectio n 8 contain s th e right s o f th e accused i n a crimina l prosecution : notice , specificity , confrontation , witnesses, speed y trial , n o compulsor y self-incrimination , impartia l jury o f twelv e men , an d "tha t n o ma n b e deprive d o f hi s liberty , except b y th e la w o f th e lan d o r the judgment o f hi s peers. " 25 Wha t Magna Cart a ha d implicitl y joine d i n Chapte r 29 , life , libert y an d property wit h du e proces s o f law , th e Virgini a Bil l o f Right s distinguished, promulgatin g Lockea n politica l theor y a t th e outse t and standard s fo r crimina l procedur e later . Jefferson refine d th e languag e o f Sectio n 1 of th e Virgini a Bil l o f Rights withi n a fe w week s an d produce d th e phrasin g o f th e Declaration o f Independence : unalienabl e right s t o life , liberty , an d the pursui t o f happiness. 26 Althoug h tria l b y jury i s mentioned , th e Declaration doe s no t spea k o f "la w o f th e land " o r "du e proces s o f law." The omissio n o f "law o f th e land " is understandable, sinc e th e point o f th e Declaratio n wa s t o declar e a ne w lan d whic h coul d no t yet hav e agree d o n an y law . Du e proces s o f law , however , i s th e implicit subjec t o f th e bul k o f th e Declaration , th e grievance s against kin g an d parliament . State constitution s adopte d i n th e month s followin g th e Declara tion contai n bot h th e languag e an d idea s o f du e process . Article s 8

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and 9 o f th e constitutio n o f Pennsylvani a o f Augus t 1776 , fo r example, elaborat e bot h side s o f th e socia l compac t whil e declarin g rights o f th e inhabitants : . . . every membe r o f societ y hat h a righ t t o b e protecte d i n the enjoymen t o f life , libert y an d property , an d therefor e i s bound t o contribute hi s proportio n toward s th e expens e o f tha t protection. . . . Bu t n o par t o f a man' s propert y ca n b e justl y taken fro m him , o r applie d t o publi c uses , withou t hi s ow n consent . .. no r ca n an y ma n b e justl y deprive d o f hi s libert y except b y th e law s o f th e land , o r th e judgment o f hi s peers . The constitution s o f Marylan d an d Nort h Carolin a (Novembe r and Decembe r 1776 ) contai n Chapte r 2 9 o f Magn a Cart a verbatim , using "la w o f th e land " rathe r tha n "du e proces s o f law " wording . The Vermon t constitution , adopte d i n Jul y 1777 , i s a mode l compilation fro m th e previou s constitutiona l handiwork . It s right s are bot h "inheren t an d unalienable" ; the y includ e "enjoyin g an d defending lif e an d liberty ; acquiring , possessin g an d protectin g property, an d pursuin g an d obtainin g happines s an d safety. " Vermont follow s th e crimina l procedur e articl e o f Virgini a (th e proto-Fifth Amendment ) a s well a s the socia l compac t an d incipien t just compensatio n clause s o f th e Pennsylvani a constitution . Late r New Englan d constitutions , particularl y thos e o f Massachusett s (1780) an d Ne w Hampshir e (1784 ) ar e i n th e sam e mold . Al l us e "law o f th e land " language , a s doe s th e Northwes t Ordinance : "N o man shal l b e deprive d o f hi s libert y o r property , bu t b y th e judgment o f hi s peers , o r th e la w o f th e land. " 2 7 The Federa l Constitutio n o f 1787 , thoug h securin g severa l personal right s tha t ca n b e associate d wit h du e process—th e habea s corpus, contract, e x pos t facto , an d bil l o f attainde r clauses—di d no t establish a bil l o f right s comparabl e t o thos e i n th e stat e constitu tions. Th e principa l reaso n fo r thi s omission i s that th e Philadelphi a Convention wa s framin g a governmen t t o b e limite d bot h i n theor y to enumerate d power s an d i n practic e t o relativel y littl e citize n contact wit h th e nationa l establishment . I n addition , th e delegate s were exhauste d afte r a summer' s wor k o n th e fram e o f governmen t itself. An d eve n if , a s som e member s propose d nea r th e en d o f th e

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debates, tim e ha d bee n se t asid e t o develo p a bil l o f rights, th e diversity o f stat e view s o n th e subjec t woul d almos t surel y hav e le d to problem s i n draftin g an d i n ratification. 28 In th e sprin g o f 178 9 Jame s Madiso n introduce d i n th e Firs t Congress th e amendmen t t o th e Constitutio n whic h becam e th e Fifth. I t brough t togethe r i n a concis e phras e element s o f du e process tha t ha d bee n scattere d i n recen t constitutiona l documents : "No perso n shal l b e . . . deprived o f life , liberty , o r property, withou t due proces s o f law. " Madiso n als o introduced , bu t th e Hous e o f Representatives di d no t approve , ne w languag e t o b e interpolate d in th e Preamble : "Tha t Governmen t i s institute d an d ough t t o b e exercised fo r th e benefi t o f th e people ; whic h consist s i n th e enjoyment o f lif e an d liberty , wit h th e righ t o f acquirin g an d usin g property, an d generall y pursuin g an d obtainin g happines s an d safety." 29 Thi s statement , whic h i f i n th e Preambl e woul d no t hav e been "law, " i s adapte d fro m th e natura l right s sid e o f du e proces s ideas, whil e th e Fift h Amendmen t du e proces s claus e appear s i n th e context o f right s fo r person s accuse d o f crime . This distinctio n aid s i n understandin g th e first o f severa l point s worth notin g abou t th e Fift h Amendment ; namely , tha t th e Declaration's "pursui t o f happiness " ha s bee n replace d b y "prop erty." Th e substitutio n ma y b e explaine d b y th e fac t tha t th e "happiness" phraseolog y ha d jus t bee n propose d b y Madiso n fo r the Preamble . Bu t i t i s als o a recognitio n tha t th e Constitutio n i s a legal, rathe r tha n a purel y politica l document . Judicia l interpreta tion o f "pursui t o f happiness " woul d b e n o eas y task , especiall y a s the traditio n o f Britis h la w fro m Magn a Cart a throug h Blackston e used du e proces s wordin g whil e pursui t o f happines s cam e fro m Lockean philosophy . Further , compare d t o 1776 , th e framer s o f th e Constitution ha d a nonrevolutionar y temper : property , no t happi ness, deserve d specia l attention . A second chang e i n th e Fift h Amendmen t fro m th e mos t commo n previous wordin g i s tha t "la w o f th e land " ha s bee n replace d b y "due proces s o f law. " A s th e principa l constitutiona l model s a t th e time use d th e forme r phrase , du e proces s wordin g seem s t o deserv e some explanation . Th e historica l record s ar e no t helpfu l i n thi s regard, bu t th e Constitutio n itsel f contain s th e phras e "la w o f th e land," an d thi s ma y offe r a clue . I t i s a reasonable , thoug h b y n o means certai n inferenc e tha t a s "la w o f th e land " ha d alread y bee n

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employed wit h on e meanin g i n th e Supremac y Clause , i t woul d b e misleading t o endow i t wit h anothe r meanin g i n th e Fift h Amend ment. Th e law-of-the-lan d claus e i n Articl e V I place s federa l written la w (Constitution , laws , an d treaties ) abov e stat e constitu tions and laws . The term "law" in the phrase "law of the land" (an d elsewhere i n th e Constitution ) therefor e refer s t o positiv e enact ments (excep t wher e explicitl y qualified , a s i n th e referenc e t o common la w i n th e Sevent h Amendment) . Ye t "law " i n Magn a Carta's la w o f th e lan d wa s no t restricte d to—i n fac t probabl y di d not even refer to—positiv e law, but rathe r mean t common law . This, too, ha d t o b e treate d circumspectl y i n th e Constitution , sinc e th e framers neithe r desire d no r anticipate d a federa l commo n la w "o f the land. " Still , federa l crimina l trial s ha d t o b e conducte d according t o law . "Du e proces s o f law " wa s th e mos t appropriat e language t o use in th e circumstances . A final observatio n o n du e proces s i n th e Fift h Amendmen t concerns it s locatio n i n th e Bil l o f Rights . Th e du e proces s claus e seems to be a general clause, certainly mor e general tha n th e clauses on self-incriminatio n an d jus t compensation , whic h immediatel y precede an d follo w it . Bu t i t i s jus t becaus e du e proces s i s surrounded bot h withi n th e Bil l o f Right s an d withi n th e Fift h Amendment b y other , mor e specifi c clauses , tha t i t i s difficul t t o construe it s general term s with th e generality man y peopl e (and th e American constitutional tradition ) hav e accorded it . To judge b y it s location—and thi s become s mor e importan t whe n considerin g th e meaning o f due proces s i n th e Fourteent h Amendment—th e federa l due proces s claus e i s neithe r a n introductio n t o no r a concludin g summary o f specific guarantee s fo r person s accuse d o f crimes. 30 One thing about th e Bill of Rights was certain, though no t alway s explicit. Th e guarantee s applie d t o th e federa l government , no t t o the states . Th e First Amendmen t alon e i s clea r o n this : "Congres s shall mak e n o law . . ." The remainin g provision s ar e writte n i n th e passive voice, or nearly so. 31 But th e histor y of their adoption leave s no doubt tha t th e first Congress intende d the m t o apply t o federal , and no t stat e officials . B y virtu e o f hi s longevity , i f nothin g else , John Marshal l wa s the apt perso n t o state this officially i n Barro n v . Baltimore (1833) , a cas e i n whic h th e owne r o f lan d take n b y th e city t o improv e it s harbo r facilitie s wa s denied relie f unde r th e just compensation claus e of the Fift h Amendment. 32

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II. T H E NINETEENT H CENTUR Y T H R O U G H T H E FOUR TEENTH A M E N D M E N T During th e first hal f o f th e nineteent h centur y th e traditiona l understanding o f du e process / law-of-the-land terminolog y wa s advanced throug h argument , commentary , an d decisio n i n th e developing America n constitutiona l law . Danie l Webster , defendin g the "old " Boar d o f Trustee s o f Dartmout h Colleg e i n 1819 , stated , "By th e la w o f th e lan d i s mos t clearl y intende d th e genera l law ; a law, whic h hear s befor e i t condemns ; whic h proceed s upo n inquiry , and render s judgmen t onl y afte r trial." 33 Justic e Story , i n hi s Commentaries on the Constitution (1833 ) cite s Lor d Cok e and , i n on e o f the briefes t discussion s o f an y constitutiona l matte r i n hi s tw o volumes, conclude s tha t th e du e proces s claus e "i n effec t affirm s th e right o f tria l accordin g t o th e proces s an d proceeding s o f th e common law. " 3 4 The tw o majo r federa l constitutiona l case s whic h addresse d directly th e meanin g o f th e du e proces s claus e ar e Corfiel d v . Coryell, decide d b y Justice Bushro d Washingto n a s circuit judge i n 1823, an d Murray' s Lesse e v . Hoboke n Lan d an d Improvemen t Company, decide d b y a unanimou s Suprem e Cour t i n 1856 , th e opinion writte n b y Justic e Benjami n Curtis. 35 Corfield , a n out-of stater attemptin g t o tak e oyster s i n Ne w Jerse y waters , claime d th e privileges o f a stat e citize n unde r th e privilege s an d immunitie s clause o f Articl e IV , Sectio n 2 . Justic e Washington , denyin g th e claim, define d privilege s an d immunitie s i n term s o f "fundamenta l principles." Thes e principles , thoug h no t explicitl y associate d wit h the du e proces s clause , ar e a remarkabl e compendiu m o f du e process/law-of-the-land ideas . The y includ e "th e enjoymen t o f lif e and liberty , wit h th e righ t t o acquir e an d posses s propert y o f ever y kind, an d t o pursu e an d obtai n happines s an d safety" ; th e righ t o f habeas corpu s an d acces s t o civi l proceedings , an d th e righ t o f suffrage—all subjec t t o limit s unde r la w an d fo r th e goo d o f th e whole. 36 The breadt h o f thi s view , presente d b y a membe r o f th e natural law generatio n o f th e lat e eighteent h century , mus t b e contraste d t o the mor e narro w scholarly , legalistic , an d historica l vie w o f Justic e Curtis i n Murray's Lessee, three decade s later . Th e differenc e i n th e legal clai m presente d explain s muc h o f th e specifi c distinction s

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between th e opinions . Bu t th e contras t reflect s a s wel l contendin g styles o f constitutiona l interpretation , wit h th e mor e constricte d style o f Curti s th e produc t o f a n er a o f greate r lega l formalism . I n this case , th e federa l Treasur y proceede d administrativel y agains t its forme r collecto r o f custom s i n Ne w Yor k fo r retainin g fo r personal us e nearl y $1. 5 millio n i n federa l revenue . Th e specifi c issue was whether titl e t o th e Hackensac k Meadows , onc e owne d b y the custom s collector , ha d passe d t o th e perso n t o who m th e collector ha d sol d th e propert y o r t o th e compan y whic h ha d purchased th e lan d fro m th e government , whic h ha d i n effec t seize d it t o hel p recou p it s ta x losses . Justice Curti s first state d a principl e of du e proces s interpretation : History , particularl y th e Britis h common la w practic e beginnin g wit h Magn a Carta , rathe r tha n th e courts o r Congress , define s du e process . Examinin g th e histor y o f British summar y proceeding s fo r th e collectio n o f crow n debts , Curtis conclude d tha t judicia l powe r was , i n thi s instance , no t a requirement o f du e proces s o f law , an d tha t th e governmen t ha d therefore proceede d legitimatel y i n th e case. 37 Although Corfield an d Murray's Lessee establis h a n endurin g contrast wit h respec t t o th e metho d o f interpretin g du e process , the y are alike i n arising fro m circumstance s involve d wit h propert y right s rather tha n crimina l procedure . Murray's Lessee in particula r i s onl y ostensibly abou t lega l procedure , an d i t i s thi s sid e o f du e process / law-of-the-land, th e sid e o f propert y right s and , t o a considerabl e degree, natura l rights , whic h i s th e genuin e America n "contribu tion" t o th e du e proces s tradition . The protectio n t o propert y afforde d b y th e du e proces s claus e must b e understoo d primaril y i n term s o f socia l an d economi c history rathe r tha n i n term s o f lega l form . Suc h protectio n doe s ru n through th e standar d historica l signpost s o f Magn a Cart a t o Blackstone an d th e pre-180 0 America n constitutiona l documents . But i t doe s no t ente r th e mainstrea m o f America n la w unti l th e litigation o f larg e economi c interest s become s important ; an d eve n then, owin g t o th e backgroun d o f th e clause , i t enter s unde r th e auspices of constitutional provision s othe r tha n du e process . Indeed , so lon g a s du e proces s languag e applie d onl y t o th e federa l government and , a t leas t initially , onl y t o judicial proceeding s (a s i s suggested b y it s locatio n i n th e Fift h Amendment) , thi s i s quit e understandable. Prio r t o th e Civi l War , th e federa l governmen t

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enacted littl e legislatio n tha t directl y affected , o r a t leas t directl y injured property . States , o n th e othe r hand , i n particula r throug h the promotio n o f transportatio n enterprises—bridges , turnpikes , canals, harbors , railroads—took , o r allowe d other s t o take , property , issued bonds , grante d franchise s an d privileges , an d i n genera l vested lega l right s i n corporations. 38 Legislatures , especiall y o f th e Jacksonian persuasion , sometime s revoke d thes e grants , an d stat e courts attempte d t o protec t propert y throug h jus t compensatio n and sometime s law-of-the-lan d clauses. 39 Th e U.S . Suprem e Cour t developed th e contrac t claus e fo r th e sam e purpose. 40 Although th e backgroun d i n propert y right s i s undoubtedl y present, i t i s th e socia l refor m movements , beginnin g i n th e 1830 s and crestin g i n th e 1850s , tha t le d t o lat e nineteent h centur y du e process usage . Du e proces s idea s evolve d bot h i n an d ou t o f cour t and wer e fuse d int o a ne w ideolog y o f highe r law . Th e du e proces s phrase, whic h ha d sprun g fro m an d ha d usuall y bee n considere d i n the context o f specific lega l rights , now acquire d philosophica l force . Just a s seventeent h centur y Britis h an d eighteenth-centur y Amer icans ha d transforme d Magn a Cart a fro m a baronia l agreemen t into a declaratio n o f right s fo r al l men , s o th e refor m movement s encouraged th e moder n metamorphosi s o f du e proces s fro m com mon la w procedur e t o highe r la w substance . In particular , th e temperanc e an d abolitionis t movements , i n court case s i n th e mid-1850s , forwarde d th e developmen t o f th e ne w due process . Wynehame r v . Ne w York , decide d i n 1856 , struc k down a n extrem e stat e temperanc e law , a statut e whic h forbade , virtually forthwit h an d wit h onl y triflin g exceptions , th e sal e o r possession o f intoxicatin g liquor. 41 Th e vot e wa s five t o three , an d the seriati m opinion s o f th e majorit y b y n o mean s argu e fro m th e same grounds . Bu t tw o point s stan d out . First , th e la w i s invali d under th e stat e constitution' s du e proces s claus e fo r it s destructio n of previousl y acquire d an d uncompensate d property . Du e proces s o f law i n thi s sens e wa s interprete d a s a blen d o f e x pos t fact o an d jus t compensation provisions . Second , th e stat e cour t hel d i t wa s a judicial—not a legislative—functio n t o determin e wha t lega l proces s is due process , or when a perso n ma y constitutionall y b e deprive d o f property. The abolitionists ' argument s abou t du e proces s ar e mor e sus tained an d complex , an d wer e fo r a lon g tim e historicall y sub -

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merged. 42 Wha t rise s abov e th e surfac e i s a statemen t b y Chie f Justice Tane y i n th e Dred Scott decision. 43 Tane y invoke d th e Fift h Amendment du e proces s claus e i n suppor t o f th e Suprem e Court' s invalidation o f th e Missour i Compromise , whic h forbad e th e introduction o f slave s int o states , wit h th e exceptio n o f Missouri , north o f th e parallel formin g tha t state' s southern boundary . I n tha t respect, wrot e Taney , th e ac t denie d slaveholder s travelin g awa y from th e Sout h thei r propert y withou t du e proces s o f law. 44 I n a fifty-four-page opinion , th e du e proces s argumen t occupie s les s tha n a paragrap h an d i s employe d fo r illustrativ e purpose s only . I n constitutional histor y th e referenc e ha s usuall y bee n regarde d a s a sport, a n almos t accidenta l precurso r o f late r nineteent h centur y substantive du e process . Bu t althoug h fleetingly deal t wit h i n Dred Scott, due proces s i s firml y roote d i n th e controvers y ove r slavery. 45 As i n th e Wynehame r case , an d indee d i n virtuall y al l earl y "substantive" du e proces s cases , th e du e proces s argumen t nee d no t be understoo d i n th e rigi d perspectiv e o f late r theory . Th e Missour i Compromise, i n thi s vie w an d i n judicial eyes , deprive d a perso n o f his propert y withou t du e proces s precisel y becaus e legislativ e rathe r than judicia l proces s ha d decide d th e matter . I t was , therefore , a violation o f separatio n o f power s theor y t o depriv e slav e owner s without a judicial determination . I t wa s also , i n thi s sense , a trul y procedural issue , thoug h certainl y wit h substantiv e results . Further , Justice Curtis' s dissenting rebutta l t o Taney' s du e proces s argumen t paralleled hi s opinio n fo r th e Cour t i n Murray' s Lesse e v . Hoboke n Land and Improvemen t Co . of th e previou s year. His interpretation o f due proces s i s exclusivel y historical—h e refer s fou r time s t o Magn a Carta in his one pag e treatment—an d exclusivel y procedura l a s well. 46 Neither Taney no r Curtis, however, hin t a t th e contemporary an d complex politica l usag e bein g mad e o f du e proces s languag e an d ideology. Bu t Howar d Ja y Graha m show s ho w "zealots , reformers , and politicians—no t jurists—blaze d th e path s o f substantiv e du e process," an d ho w Lockea n phraseolog y an d idea s rathe r tha n a specific Magn a Carta-Fift h Amendmen t traditio n le d t o identifyin g substantive du e proces s wit h constitutionalize d natura l law. 47 Fro m the abolitionis t poin t o f view , th e du e proces s claus e grante d slave s their physica l liberty , o r a t leas t protecte d th e childre n o f slave s i n their natural-bor n liberty. 48 Lockea n theor y an d du e proces s likewise protecte d slave s fro m bein g deprive d o f th e propert y

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produced b y thei r labor. 49 Thi s natura l la w interpretatio n o f du e process o n th e par t o f th e abolitionist s wa s me t b y a positiv e la w interpretation fro m th e slaveholders . Th e tw o side s were engage d i n the traditiona l America n practic e o f turnin g a disput e ove r socia l policy int o a contes t fo r th e sanctio n an d publi c acceptanc e o f a particular constitutiona l meaning. 50 Th e slaveholders ' interpreta tion o f du e proces s wa s tha t b y positiv e la w slave s wer e property , and b y positiv e la w (an d Blackstonia n theory ) th e righ t o f locomotion o f slaveholders wit h thei r propert y wa s par t o f liberty. 51 The irreconcilabilit y o f thes e interpretation s o f du e proces s give s further meanin g t o th e fac t tha t Dred Scott wa s no t successfu l i n settling a mora l issu e b y lega l o r constitutiona l means . Whe n th e Civil Wa r wa s constitutionalize d b y th e Thirteenth , Fourteenth , and Fifteent h Amendments , however , du e proces s wa s reintroduce d into constitutiona l language , bu t i n a wa y an d wit h result s tha t bypassed th e antebellu m dispute . The origins , language , an d consequence s o f Sectio n 1 o f th e Fourteenth Amendmen t ar e th e mos t tangle d i n American constitu tional history . Th e reason s for th e complicate d origin s an d languag e are, in brief , these . A t leas t thre e distinguishabl e kind s o f histor y ar e important i n studyin g Sectio n 1 : th e understandin g an d expecta tions o f member s o f Congres s an d other s involve d i n draftin g an d ratification; th e genera l social , moral , an d politica l aim s o f th e abolitionist movemen t whic h Sectio n 1 reduce d t o constitutiona l terminology; an d th e evolvin g lega l significanc e o f th e ke y term s o f the section. 52 Thes e differen t histories , separatel y o r together , poin t to n o unambiguou s meanin g o f th e section . No r doe s th e languag e of th e amendment , whethe r take n a s isolate d word s an d phrase s o r viewed a s a web o f relate d concepts . Th e relations , i n particular , ar e intricate. The y includ e th e distinctions , i f any , betwee n Unite d States an d stat e citizenshi p (sinc e th e firs t sentenc e o f Sectio n 1 refers t o bot h kind s o f citizenshi p an d th e secon d sentenc e onl y t o United State s citizenship) ; th e meanin g o f "N o State " an d it s connection wit h th e powe r o f Congress unde r th e fift h sectio n o f th e amendment t o enac t appropriat e enforcemen t legislation—tha t is , the problem s o f "stat e action " an d congressiona l authorit y versu s judicial interpretation ; and , mos t importan t here , th e relatio n o f Fourteenth Amendmen t languag e an d it s meanin g t o identica l

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phrases use d earlie r i n th e Constitution : th e privilege s o r immu nities an d du e proces s clauses. 53

III. SUBSTANC E A N D P R O C E D U R E U N D E R T H E OL D COURT The constitutiona l consequence s o f Sectio n 1 o f th e Fourteent h Amendment ar e eve n mor e unrul y tha n it s origi n an d language. 54 The firs t Suprem e Cour t interpretatio n o f th e Fourteent h Amend ment—the Slaughterhous e Cases—raise s man y o f th e issue s tha t collect aroun d du e proces s of law fo r the followin g sixt y years. 55 Th e case ha s severa l strands , on e o f whic h wa s a sentimen t agains t monopolies tha t Lor d Cok e ha d associate d wit h th e "la w o f th e land" in th e seventeent h centur y an d whic h th e ag e o f Jackson ha d made standar d i n America n politics . Bu t th e monopolist s wo n i n the case , fo r th e Reconstructio n governmen t o f Louisian a ha d established a slaughterhous e monopol y fo r it s friends , an d th e Supreme Cour t woul d no t restor e a livelihoo d t o it s enemies , a group o f souther n whit e rebe l butchers . T o reac h thi s conclusion , the Cour t too k u p tw o issue s apart fro m it s interpretation o f Sectio n 1 o f th e Fourteent h Amendment . Th e firs t wa s whethe r th e natur e of th e federa l unio n ha d change d a s a resul t o f th e Civi l Wa r an d the Fourteent h Amendment ; th e answe r t o th e inquir y wa s tha t i t had not . Th e secon d was , wh o wa s t o b e th e beneficiar y o f th e Fourteenth Amendment ; th e answe r wa s freedmen , primarily — certainly no t Ne w Orlean s butchers . A s t o Sectio n 1 , bot h majorit y opinion an d th e chief dissent, Justice Field's , devoted mos t attentio n to th e privilege s o r immunitie s clause , th e Cour t virtuall y throttlin g the provisio n a t infanc y throug h th e concep t o f "dua l citizenship, " under whic h ther e wer e fe w benefit s o f nationa l citizenship. 56 Th e two opinions effectuall y ignore d du e proces s by treatin g i t a s simila r to privilege s o r immunities . It i s th e dissen t o f Justic e Bradle y i n th e cas e whic h eventuall y triumphed, fo r i t concentrate s o n th e ne w du e proces s clause . Bradley's premis e contradicte d th e Court's . "It i s futile t o argue," he wrote, "that non e bu t person s o f th e Africa n rac e ar e intende d t o b e benefited b y thi s amendment . The y ma y hav e bee n th e primar y cause o f it s adoptio n bu t it s languag e i s general. " 57 Quotin g fro m

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Magna Cart a Chapte r 2 9 an d referrin g t o Blackstone' s "absolut e right" o f property , Bradle y ha d develope d a du e proces s argumen t on behal f o f the Ne w Orlean s butchers . H e regarde d "liberty " as th e right t o choos e a n occupatio n an d "property " a s th e occupatio n itself, thu s alterin g th e mor e accepte d meaning s o f libert y a s th e absence o f physica l restrain t an d propert y a s rea l estat e o r goods . Bradley's opinion , thoug h no t directe d a t th e situation s whic h aros e in th e followin g decades , i s expansiv e enoug h t o embrac e them . I n the word s o f th e leas t o f th e dissentin g justice s i n th e case , Noa h Swayne, th e Civi l Wa r amendments shoul d b e raise d "t o th e dignit y of a ne w Magn a Carta. " 5 8 As th e idea s an d interes t i n substantive-economi c du e proces s developed i n th e lat e nineteent h century , th e traditiona l us e o f du e process wa s no t se t aside . Tha t us e did , however , chang e directio n from th e pat h marke d ou t i n 185 6 i n Murray's Lessee. Th e ne w procedural du e proces s did no t rel y o n Britis h history . I n Hurtad o v . California th e appellant , convicte d o f murder , claime d th e Four teenth Amendmen t du e proces s clause wa s violated b y th e provisio n of th e state constitution permittin g tria l afte r "information " filed b y a prosecuto r rathe r tha n afte r indictmen t b y th e time-honore d grand jury. 59 Upholdin g th e state , th e Suprem e Cour t abandone d the principl e o f interpretatio n i n Murray's Lessee, th e principl e tha t due proces s b e bot h explicate d an d confine d b y history . I n a n opinion characterize d b y seemin g sensitivit y t o historica l change , b y sweepingly humanisti c view s o n jurisprudenc e an d society , an d b y confidence i n th e destin y o f th e Unite d States , Justic e Stanle y Matthews presente d on e o f th e Court' s mos t note d statement s o n due process , nevertheles s denyin g th e clai m o f th e crimina l defen dant. Arguin g tha t thoug h Magn a Cart a migh t requir e gran d jur y proceedings, th e Fourteent h Amendmen t nee d not , Matthe w wrote : . . . owing t o th e progressiv e developmen t o f lega l idea s an d institutions i n England , th e word s o f Magn a Chart a stoo d fo r very differen t thing s a t th e tim e o f th e separatio n o f th e American colonies , fro m wha t the y represente d originally . . . . The Constitutio n o f th e Unite d State s wa s ordained , i t i s true , by descendant s o f Englishmen , wh o inherite d th e tradition s o f English la w an d history ; bu t i t wa s mad e fo r a n undefine d an d expanding future . . . . 60

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Rejecting fo r due process "the unchangeableness attribute d t o th e laws o f th e Mede s an d th e Persians, " an d noting , therefore , th e "difficulty i f no t impossibilit y o f framin g a definition " fo r th e concept, Matthew s hel d du e proces s mus t b e determine d b y a "gradual proces s o f judicial inclusio n an d exclusion, " drawin g o n "the best ideas of all systems and o f every age." Due process, he said, was lik e th e commo n law , it s inspiratio n comin g "fro m ever y fountain o f justice." 61 The singl e dissente r i n Hurtado was Justic e Harlan . Wit h ac customed vigor , h e me t th e majorit y o n tw o grounds ; histor y an d the constitutiona l text . Whil e th e majorit y ha d abandone d th e specific requirement s o f Britis h lega l traditio n becaus e time s ha d changed, Justice Harla n clun g t o thos e requirement s becaus e the y were "settle d usage s an d modes " o f Englis h la w "no t unsuited " t o American condition . Fo r thi s position , Harla n adduce d clea r support fro m America n authoritie s suc h a s Jame s Wilson , Kent , Story, Shaw, and Justice Fiel d (wh o did no t participat e i n th e case ) as wel l a s th e Court' s approac h i n Murray's Lessee. Textually , th e majority ha d claime d tha t i t was "forbidden t o assume" any par t o f the Fift h Amendmen t "superfluous, " an d hence , s o lon g a s bot h Fifth an d Fourteent h amendment s containe d du e process clauses, so long a s th e tw o clause s mean t th e sam e thing , an d s o lon g a s th e Fifth Amendmen t bu t no t th e Fourteent h Amendmen t explicitl y required gran d jury indictment i n capital cases , then th e Fourteent h Amendment du e proces s clause lef t ope n th e possibilit y o f prosecu tion o n informatio n alone . T o thi s argumen t Justic e Harla n coul d reply only tha t th e framer s o f the Fift h Amendmen t kne w tha t du e process encompassed th e grand jury provision , but wante d t o "avoid the possibility" tha t Congres s woul d tampe r wit h it. 62 The significanc e o f Hurtado, emphasized b y th e dissen t an d confirmed b y th e subsequen t histor y o f procedura l du e proces s litigation, i s it s focu s o n certaint y withi n th e law. 63 Th e majorit y was willin g t o resolv e th e cas e o n th e sid e o f uncertainty , whethe r with regar d t o th e tensio n betwee n stabilit y an d chang e i n a lega l system; th e adequat e notic e t o affecte d persons—citizens , lawyers , judges—of wha t th e la w mean s an d requires ; o r th e degre e o f latitude possesse d b y th e justice s i n interpretin g th e Constitu tion. Thes e issue s arise persistentl y i n late r case s o f procedura l du e process as part o f the search fo r standard s unde r du e proces s of law,

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and althoug h Justic e Harla n an d hi s successor s suc h a s Justic e Black hav e neve r mad e th e la w stan d still , the y hav e presse d fo r certainty i n th e la w i n suc h a fashio n a s t o forc e thei r opponents , such a s Justic e Frankfurte r an d th e secon d Justic e Harlan , t o develop increasingl y carefu l statement s o f du e proces s a s a n evolutionary concept. 64 In th e middl e o f hi s Hurtado opinion, Justice Matthew s wrot e tha t due proces s o f la w wa s "no t alien " t o th e cod e "whic h ha s give n u s that fundamenta l maxi m o f distributiv e justice— suum cuique tribuere."65 Wit h thi s rhetorica l reac h bac k t o th e Cod e o f Justinian, a natural la w definitio n o f justice, an d perhap s th e lega l though t o f Aristotle, Matthew s felicitously , thoug h probabl y no t purposely , considered a s a whol e wha t wa s soo n t o b e separate d i n du e proces s thought, procedur e an d substance . Th e Hurtado cas e wa s a t leas t a matter o f process , bu t suum cuique tribuere an d distributiv e justice ar e at leas t a matte r o f substance . Tha t a conceptua l divisio n betwee n procedure an d substanc e i n du e proces s wa s no t a n assumptio n o f the er a i s eviden t i n tw o case s relate d t o Hurtado. I n Davidso n v . New Orleans , fro m whic h Matthew s too k th e metho d a s wel l a s th e phrase "gradua l proces s o f judicia l inclusio n an d exclusion, " th e Court hel d tha t s o lon g a s a n officia l assessmen t o n lan d coul d b e challenged i n court , an d wa s no t mad e final b y legislativ e o r executive actio n alone , du e proces s standard s ha d bee n met. 66 Du e process, therefore, mean t essentiall y tha t th e court s wer e t o hav e th e final word , whethe r ove r propert y claim s o r procedura l ones. 67 Although assertin g i n Davidson tha t i t ha d th e las t wor d i n du e process cases, the Cour t professe d reluctanc e t o speak it . Contrastin g nearly a centur y o f desuetud e o f th e Fift h Amendmen t du e proces s clause wit h th e curren t docke t "crowde d wit h case s i n whic h w e ar e asked t o hol d tha t Stat e cour t an d Stat e legislature s hav e deprive d their ow n citizen s o f life , libert y o r propert y withou t du e proces s o f law," the Cour t note d tha t "ther e exists som e strang e misconceptio n of th e scope " o f th e Fourteent h Amendmen t provision. 68 A s i t turned out , however , ther e wa s not . Justic e Bradley , wh o though t and probabl y care d mor e abou t th e meanin g o f du e proces s tha n any othe r nineteenth-centur y justice , adde d a concurrin g not e i n Davidson objecting t o th e Court' s parsimoniou s vie w o f it s wor k an d emphasizing th e propert y right s involved . A s i n th e Slaughterhous e Cases, it wa s Bradle y wh o saw , i f he di d no t significantl y determine , the futur e o f du e proces s litigation . H e propose d tha t Fourteent h

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Amendment du e proces s b e interprete d t o includ e a just compensa tion requiremen t fo r th e states. 69 An d h e explaine d wha t wa s involved i n just compensatio n adjudication : "Respec t mus t b e ha d to th e caus e an d objec t o f th e taking , whethe r unde r th e taxin g power, th e powe r of eminent domain , o r the powe r o f assessment fo r local improvement s [th e Davidson situation] o r none o f these : and . . . if found t o b e arbitrary, oppressiv e an d unjust , i t ma y b e declare d t o be no t 'du e proces s o f law. ' " 70 With on e importan t exception , Justic e Bradley' s statemen t i s a virtual tabl e o f content s o f th e relatio n o f du e proces s t o propert y for th e nex t sixt y years , an d tha t exception—polic e powe r legisla tion—may b e covere d b y hi s phras e "o r non e o f these. " 71 Wha t united th e takin g case s wit h th e polic e powe r case s i s tha t bot h required th e justificatio n o f "publi c purpose " fo r thei r constitu tionality. Whe n th e Suprem e Cour t uphel d stat e pric e regulatio n i n Munn v . Illinoi s (1877) , i t di d s o o n th e groun d tha t grai n warehousing wa s a "busines s affecte d wit h a publi c interest, " therefore subjec t t o polic e powe r legislatio n an d immun e fro m a challenge unde r du e process. 72 T o assur e th e immunity , th e Cour t felt require d t o sa y tha t i t wa s no t th e busines s o f th e judiciar y t o supervise suc h regulation , rathe r thi s wa s a matte r t o b e take n u p a t the polls. 73 But thi s was 187 7 an d i n th e contex t o f Granger reforms . Two year s later , i n Davidson, i n th e contex t o f municipa l rea l estat e assessment, th e Cour t insiste d tha t proces s wa s no t du e unles s accompanied b y judicial oversight . The cas e tha t bes t unite s protectio n fo r corporat e propert y wit h power fo r th e courts unde r due proces s of la w i s the Minnesot a Rat e Case o f 1890 , i n whic h th e justice s rejecte d a stat e commission' s determination o f railroa d rates. 74 I n a sentenc e o f conjunctiv e equipoise betwee n substanc e an d procedure , th e Cour t held : If the compan y i s deprived o f th e powe r o f charging reasonabl e rates fo r th e us e o f it s property , an d suc h deprivatio n take s place i n th e absenc e o f a n investigatio n b y judicial machinery , it i s deprive d o f th e lawfu l us e o f it s property , an d thus , i n substance an d effec t o f th e propert y itself , withou t du e proces s of law . . . , 75 For goo d measure , an d t o secur e mor e firmly i n a developin g jurisprudence corporat e right s agains t popula r legislatures , Justic e

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Blatchford complete d th e sentenc e b y holdin g th e Minnesot a la w also i n violatio n o f th e equa l protectio n clause . The Court' s initia l uneas e abou t ho w t o faste n it s constitutiona l faith t o th e constitutiona l tex t i s reflecte d i n Thoma s M . Cooley' s Constitutional Limitations, th e mos t influentia l treatis e o n constitu tional la w o f th e era . A s severa l stat e court s prio r t o th e Civi l Wa r had done , Coole y adduce d principle s o f governmen t an d societ y t o forbid certai n restriction s o n propert y regardles s o f du e process : The bil l o f right s i n th e America n constitution s forbi d tha t parties shal l b e deprive d o f propert y excep t b y th e la w o f th e land; bu t i f th e prohibitio n ha d bee n omitted , a legislativ e enactment t o pas s on e man' s propert y ove r t o anothe r woul d nevertheless b e void . I f th e ac t proceede d upo n th e assumptio n that suc h othe r perso n wa s justl y entitle d t o th e estate , an d therefore i t wa s transferred , i t woul d b e void , becaus e judicia l in it s nature , an d i f i t proceede d withou t reasons , i t woul d b e equally void , a s neithe r legislativ e no r judicial , bu t a mer e arbitrary fiat. 76 Property neede d mor e tha n nontextua l lega l guide s fo r it s protection. I t als o needed , an d received , th e justices ' fait h i n burgeoning capitalism . Thi s fait h th e jurists had , buttresse d b y th e distorted absorptio n o f Locke , Ada m Smith , an d Darwin . Th e reformation o f du e proces s i n late-nineteenth-centur y Americ a t o serve ne w socia l an d economi c interest s i s comparable , perhaps , t o the transformatio n o f Magn a Cart a i n th e mid-seventeent h centur y from a feuda l agreemen t t o a n instrumen t o f th e middl e clas s fo r political change . Bot h generation s foun d a usable—indeed , nearl y the same—political-lega l banne r fro m th e pas t an d raise d i t agains t a differen t win d t o wage thei r own campaigns . Just a s natura l right s were unite d wit h th e positiv e Magn a Cart a right s o f Englishmen , the natura l la w wa s allie d wit h th e positiv e right s o f du e proces s t o defend America n privat e enterpris e agains t publi c encroachment. 77 In ligh t o f th e alread y generou s scop e o f du e proces s o f law , late nineteenth-century substantiv e o r economi c du e proces s wa s n o illogical development . Bu t t o succee d i t neede d tw o lega l refine ments tha t earlie r though t an d litigatio n di d no t sufficientl y provide, th e "corporat e person " an d "freedo m o f contract. " Th e

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problem o f th e corporat e perso n ha s bee n full y explicate d b y Howard Ja y Graha m an d ca n b e briefl y state d here. 78 Th e first section o f th e Fourteent h Amendmen t protect s "citizens " i n thei r privileges an d immunities , bu t "persons " agains t du e proces s an d equal protectio n violations . Textually , therefore , "persons " an d "citizens" ar e no t th e same , an d "persons " i s withou t doub t th e broader term . Th e questio n is : ho w broad ? "Citizen " itself , ha d already bee n hel d t o includ e corporation s unde r Articl e II I o f th e Constitution concernin g federa l cour t jurisdiction , thoug h no t under th e federa l comit y (privilege s an d immunities ) claus e o f Article IV. 79 Although "person " could easily be restricted t o natura l persons, an d therefor e ad d t o citizen s onl y alien s i n definin g th e scope of its coverage, it was not forbidde n b y history or precedent t o include artificia l person s a s well. 80 O n th e othe r hand , whil e th e Joint Committe e o f the Thirty-eighth Congres s had purposel y used "persons" rathe r tha n "citizens " fo r th e du e proces s an d equa l protection clauses , th e citizenshi p an d privilege s an d immunitie s clauses were inserted o n th e floor of the Senate ; consequently i n th e drafting histor y of Section 1 there is no direct relation o f "citizen" t o "person" a t all . A s t o why an d ho w th e "constitutiona l corporat e person" developed , Graha m full y refute s th e implication s an d "recollections" o f Rosco e Conklin g arguin g befor e th e Suprem e Court i n th e 1880s , tha t twent y year s earlier , th e drafter s o f th e amendment, whateve r the y wrote , intende d corporation s t o b e included unde r "person. " Althoug h thi s argumen t i s mos t simpl y labeled a lie , Graha m concede s i t wa s nearl y inevitabl e tha t corporations woul d benefi t fro m du e proces s protection. 81 One o f th e du e proces s benefit s develope d b y th e Cour t fo r corporations wa s "liberty o f contract." 82 Thi s libert y wa s base d o n a presume d parit y o f bargainin g powe r betwee n employe r an d employee, o r betwee n buye r an d seller , guaranteein g bot h partie s substantive du e proces s "liberty " agains t polic e powe r legislation . The concep t wa s inaugurate d i n a Ne w Yor k cas e o f 1885 , I n r e Jacobs, which held legislatio n prohibitin g th e manufacture o f cigars in tenemen t house s unconstitutional. 83 Th e la w wa s hel d t o infringe, substantivel y an d unconstitutionally , o n th e freedo m o f workers t o practic e thei r trad e wher e the y wished . Severa l year s later libert y o f contrac t wa s shepherde d int o federa l constitutiona l law b y Justic e Peekha m o f Ne w York . I n 189 7 h e wrot e fo r th e

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Court tha t a Louisian a insuranc e la w violate d th e Fourteent h Amendment du e proces s claus e b y deprivin g a loca l fir m o f it s liberty t o purchas e insuranc e a s i t wishe d ou t o f state. 84 Peckha m defined th e ne w right : The libert y mentione d i n [th e Fourteenth ] amendmen t mean s not onl y th e righ t o f th e citize n t o b e fre e fro m th e mer e physical restrain t o f hi s person , a s b y incarceration , bu t th e term i s deemed t o embrac e th e righ t o f th e citize n t o b e fre e i n the enjoymen t o f al l hi s faculties;.. . t o pursu e an y livelihoo d or avocation , an d fo r tha t purpos e t o ente r int o al l contract s which ma y b e proper , necessar y an d essential . . . ." 8 5 With a unanimou s Cour t behin d him , Justic e Peckha m neatl y collapsed th e libert y an d propert y element s o f du e proces s terminol ogy int o on e principle . Libert y originall y relate d t o imprisonment ; contract relate d t o property. Boun d togethe r i n a short phras e i t wa s difficult t o recogniz e wha t ha d happene d t o th e operativ e term ; fo r in th e Court' s argument , th e phras e a s wel l a s th e significanc e o f "without du e proces s o f law " ha d vanished . Notwithstandin g th e Court's bo w t o th e polic e powe r an d it s distinctio n betwee n in-stat e and out-of-stat e contracts , Allgeyer stand s fo r th e propositio n tha t almost n o proces s o f la w coul d constitutionaliz e thi s o r comparabl e restrictions o n th e libert y o f contract . In Lochne r v . Ne w York , decide d eigh t year s afte r th e Louisian a insurance case , th e Cour t wa s presse d b y fou r dissenter s t o justif y the ne w liberty , an d modifie d th e ide a considerably. 86 Th e Ne w York la w restrictin g th e hour s whic h baker s coul d wor k woul d hav e been valid , th e Court admitted , i f only i t ha d demonstrate d " a mor e direct relation , a s a mean s t o a n end " i n it s provisions. 87 Th e majority agree d tha t th e end s o f wholesom e brea d an d health y bakers wer e legitimat e ones . Indeed , th e Cour t ha d alread y uphel d an hour s la w a s a vali d exercis e o f th e polic e power ; bu t tha t wa s i n mining, a mor e dangerou s occupation , an d that , th e Cour t implied , made a constitutiona l difference. 88 A dissen t b y Justice Harla n me t the Cour t o n it s ow n means-end s ground . Justic e Holme s directl y attacked th e propriet y o f th e Court' s inquir y onc e th e en d o f th e legislation wa s deemed constitutional . Hi s tes t fo r th e deprivatio n o f liberty withou t du e proces s o f la w wa s whethe r " a rationa l an d fai r

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man necessaril y woul d admi t tha t th e statut e propose d woul d infringe fundamenta l principle s a s the y hav e bee n understoo d b y the tradition s o f our peopl e an d ou r law. " 89 I t wa s a ver y difficul t test t o meet. 90 The demis e o f libert y o f contrac t i n th e Constitutiona l Revolu tion of 193 7 was not justified o n the basis of Holmes's latitudinaria n view o f du e process . No r di d i t com e abou t simpl y throug h th e marshaling of data i n Brandei s briefs . Further , th e Court continue d to hol d tha t libert y i n du e proces s o f la w mean t mor e tha n th e absence o f physica l restraint , s o i t di d no t retur n t o th e traditiona l meaning o f th e term . Bu t i n acquiescin g t o libert y a s a n economi c right Chief Justice Hughes deliberately shifte d th e Court's emphasi s from libert y fo r th e individua l t o protectio n fo r th e community . "Liberty i n eac h o f it s phases, " h e noted , "ha s it s histor y an d it s connotation." 91 Whil e libert y i s at hear t individual , i t i s neverthe less safeguarde d "i n a socia l organizatio n whic h require s th e protection o f law agains t th e evils which menac e th e health , safety , morals an d welfar e o f th e people." 92 Adoptin g th e ostensibl e standard o f Lochner, bu t basin g i t o n th e wide r premis e occasione d by th e Depression , Hughe s conclude d tha t "regulatio n [o f liberty ] which i s reasonable i n relatio n t o it s subjec t an d i s adapted i n th e interest o f th e communit y is du e proces s o f th e law. " 93 I n a fe w sentences, Hughe s ha d recognize d th e natur e an d realitie s o f constitutional chang e an d ha d transforme d constitutiona l liberty — at leas t wit h regar d t o social welfare legislation—fro m a n individua l right t o a communit y responsibility . IV. CIVIL LIBERTIES , DOUBL E STANDARDS , AND INCORPORATIO N During th e decade s tha t du e proces s libert y expande d fro m a safeguard agains t arbitrar y incarceratio n t o a prohibitio n agains t "unreasonable" economic and socia l legislation, th e Suprem e Cour t began t o appl y th e Fourteent h Amendmen t libert y t o th e freedom s protected b y the First Amendment a s well. This expansion o f liberty on a secon d fron t wa s accepted—indeed , unintentionall y encour aged—by th e justices inten t o n utilizin g freedo m o f contract. A t th e same time it was consciously, if sometimes reluctantly, forwarde d b y those justices, i n particula r Justice Brandeis , wh o foun d distastefu l

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the mean s b y whic h th e "ne w liberty " wa s achieved. 94 Severa l case s of th e 1920 s mar k th e Court' s pat h t o th e protectio n o f substantiv e civil libertie s unde r th e Fourteent h Amendmen t du e proces s clause . In a cas e o f 1920 , whe n th e Cour t uphel d th e powe r o f a stat e t o punish a perso n fo r speakin g agains t America n participatio n i n th e World War , Brandei s dissented : " I canno t believ e tha t th e libert y guaranteed b y th e Fourteent h Amendmen t include s onl y libert y t o acquire an d enjo y property. " 95 Th e followin g year , whe n th e Cour t denied powe r t o a stat e t o restric t th e injunctiv e powe r o f Court s i n labor disputes , Chie f Justic e Taf t ha d recours e t o natura l la w language agains t fou r dissenters : "[T ] legislativ e powe r o f a Stat e can onl y b e exerte d i n subordinatio n t o th e fundamenta l principle s of righ t an d justic e whic h th e guarant y o f du e proces s i n th e Fourteenth Amendmen t i s intended t o preserve. " 96 Throughou t hi s dissent i n th e case , Justic e Brandei s deliberatel y an d repeatedl y characterized th e righ t t o carr y o n busines s a s "liberty o r property, " thus accustomin g hi s colleague s t o thin k a s favorabl y towar d othe r kinds o f "libert y rights " as the y di d towar d propert y rights . Not lon g afterward , Justic e McReynolds , wh o coul d no t abid e Brandeis, brough t t o frui t th e see d hi s brothe r ha d planted . Holdin g invalid a stat e ba n agains t th e teachin g o f moder n foreig n languages t o schoolchildren , McReynold s wrote : Without doubt , [Fourteent h Amendmen t liberty ] denote s not merel y freedo m fro m bodil y restrain t bu t als o th e righ t o f the individua l t o contract , t o engag e i n an y o f th e commo n occupations o f life , t o acquir e usefu l knowledge , t o marry , establish a hom e an d brin g u p children , t o worshi p Go d according t o th e dictate s o f hi s ow n conscience , an d generall y to enjo y thos e privilege s lon g recognize d a t commo n la w a s essential t o th e orderl y pursui t o f happines s b y fre e men. 97 This breathtakin g propositio n no t onl y brough t togethe r traditiona l property (contract ) an d libert y (sprea d o f knowledg e an d religion) , it als o include d natura l la w (th e family) , th e commo n law , privileges an d immunitie s beyon d du e process , an d a genera l blessing fo r "th e pursui t o f happines s b y fre e men. " Although adopte d i n thi s informa l manne r b y ver y divergen t justices, a n expande d notio n o f du e proces s libert y unde r th e

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Fourteenth Amendmen t ha d no t ye t bee n officiall y authorize d b y the Court . Thi s happene d i n 192 5 whe n th e Cour t explicitl y recognized tha t th e Firs t Amendmen t wa s vali d agains t th e state s under th e Fourteent h Amendmen t du e proces s clause. 98 Th e development i n Gitlo w v . Ne w Yor k immediatel y dre w a shar p attack fro m th e constitutiona l schola r Charle s Warren . Warre n argued no t onl y tha t i t wa s historicall y unjustifie d t o us e th e du e process clause , o r it s "liberty, " t o decid e case s o n freedo m o f expression, bu t tha t i t wa s textuall y illogica l an d worse , fraugh t with danger . "I t i s hardly conceivable, " h e wrote , "tha t th e framer s of [th e Fifth ] Amendment , havin g alread y provide d i n th e Firs t Amendment a n absolute prohibition on Congres s t o tak e awa y certai n rights, woul d i n th e [same ] Amendmen t declar e o r impl y tha t Congress might take awa y th e sam e right s b y du e proces s o f law. " " The crucia l assumptio n i n Warren' s argument , o f course , i s th e identity o f meanin g o f th e Fift h an d Fourteent h Amendmen t du e process clauses . Whil e thi s i s sensibl e a s a n assumption , i t turn s ou t not t o predic t wha t happened . S o lon g a s th e Fift h Amendmen t clause di d no t permi t an y diminutio n o f th e Firs t Amendmen t applied t o th e federa l government , th e meanin g o f th e Fourteent h Amendment claus e migh t b e enlarge d t o include , t o an y degree , First Amendmen t right s applie d t o th e States . Civi l libertarians , i f they wer e intereste d onl y i n results , nee d no t hav e worried. 100 Justice Brandeis , mor e sensitiv e t o th e curren t o f constitutiona l reasoning tha n Warren , mad e th e doctrina l lea p th e nex t year : Despite argument s t o th e contrar y whic h ha d seeme d t o m e persuasive, i t i s settle d tha t th e du e proces s claus e o f th e Fourteenth Amendmen t applie s t o matter s o f substantiv e la w as well a s t o matter s o f procedure . Thu s al l fundamenta l right s comprised withi n th e ter m libert y ar e protecte d b y th e Federa l Constitution fro m invasio n b y th e States . Th e righ t o f fre e speech, th e righ t t o teac h an d th e righ t o f assembl y are , o f course, fundamenta l rights. 101 By th e en d o f th e 1920s , therefore , politica l liberal s ha d joine d economic conservative s i n expandin g th e du e proces s claus e s o tha t the Suprem e Cour t coul d protec t Firs t Amendmen t freedom s unde r the sam e languag e tha t i t protecte d corporat e property .

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If th e chie f du e proces s issu e i n th e earl y 1930 s wa s ho w t o contain substantiv e du e process , th e issue s i n th e tw o decade s following th e constitutiona l revolutio n o f 193 7 wer e th e degre e t o which economi c du e proces s ha d bee n lai d t o res t an d th e wa y i n which th e ne w liberty , th e applicatio n o f th e Bil l o f Right s t o th e states, cam e t o tak e it s place. 102 Persona l libertie s no t onl y crep t u p to economi c libertie s a s th e object s o f Suprem e Cour t favor , bu t quickly overtoo k them . Thi s raised—an d stil l raises— a theoretica l problem i n due proces s adjudication . What , i f anything, justifies th e distinction betwee n propert y an d persona l rights ; and, assumin g th e distinction, wha t justifie s differen t standard s o f judicia l revie w fo r them? Thi s i s th e proble m o f th e doubl e standard. 103 Th e cas e which bes t symbolize s th e tur n fro m th e ol d t o th e ne w er a an d establishes th e doubl e standar d i s Unite d State s v . Carolen e Products Co . (1938). 104 I n thi s cas e Justic e Ston e fo r th e Cour t accepted th e extrem e an d essentiall y impossibl e t o mee t standar d o f Justice Holme s i n judging economi c legislation : a la w wa s constitu tional unles s it s provision s preclude d th e assumptio n o f restin g o n a rational basis . A t th e sam e time , i n hi s well-know n footnot e 4 , th e Justice outline d area s o f litigatio n i n whic h ther e woul d b e n o presumption o f constitutionality . Th e footnot e forecas t th e genera l direction o f th e Cour t fo r th e nex t thirt y year s i n civi l right s an d civil liberties. 105 The Ne w Dea l Cour t ha d littl e troubl e suddenl y rejectin g economic du e proces s argument s tha t ha d hel d forc e fo r hal f a century. 106 Freedo m o f contract , busines s affecte d wit h a publi c interest, "reasonable " regulation , judicia l determinatio n o f a "fai r return o n a fai r valu e o f property " i n rat e making—al l o f thes e constitutional concept s vanished . A s Hug o Black , th e Ne w Dea l legislator pu t i t afte r a quarte r centur y a s Justice: There wa s a tim e whe n th e Du e Proces s Claus e wa s use d b y this Cour t t o strik e dow n law s whic h wer e though t unreason able, tha t is , unwis e o r incompatibl e wit h som e particula r economic o r socia l philosophy . . .. Th e doctrin e tha t prevaile d in Lochner , Coppage , Adkins , Burns , an d lik e case s . . . ha s long sinc e bee n discarded . . . . Whether th e legislatur e take s fo r its textboo k Ada m Smith , Herber t Spencer , Lor d Keyne s o r some othe r i s n o concer n o f ours. 107

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Where economi c activitie s wer e concerned , th e constitutiona l la w o f due proces s essentiall y gav e wa y t o administrativ e law. 108 Bu t th e remaining areas—procedura l du e proces s fo r person s accuse d o f crimes, an d th e ne w civi l libertie s substance—flourishe d a s neve r before. At abou t th e tim e tha t th e Carolene Products case distinguishe d s o sharply betwee n economi c an d civi l liberties , Palk o v . Connecticut , through Justic e Cardozo , propose d a distinctio n withi n civi l liber ties: betwee n thos e libertie s whic h were , an d thos e whic h wer e no t "of th e ver y essenc e o f a schem e o f ordere d liberty. " 1 0 9 Thi s elusiv e doctrine—and t o a larg e exten t th e classificatio n whic h accom panied it—becam e th e Court' s "standard, " slowl y abandone d ove r the nex t thre e decades . Th e cor e o f th e essenc e la y wit h freedo m o f expression. Outsid e th e essenc e la y mos t federa l protection s fo r criminal defendants , includin g th e jur y tria l an d th e righ t agains t being compelle d t o testif y i n one' s ow n case. 110 The analytica l approac h t o th e "incorporation " o r absorptio n o f the provision s o f th e first eigh t amendment s unde r th e du e proces s clause o f th e Fourteent h wa s dramaticall y supplemente d i n 194 7 b y Justice Black' s essa y o n th e inten t o f th e framer s i n Adamso n v . California. 111 Adamson revive d th e disput e begu n i n Hurtad o v . California, wher e Justic e Harlan' s dissent , lik e Justic e Black's , argued tha t whatever , indee d precisel y whatever , th e Bil l o f Right s requires o f th e federa l governmen t th e Fourteent h Amendmen t requires o f th e states , becaus e member s o f th e Thirty-nint h Con gress intended i t tha t way . Th e bitin g repl y o f Justice Frankfurte r t o this argumen t i s summed u p i n a sentence : Those readin g th e Englis h languag e wit h th e meanin g whic h i t ordinarily conveys , thos e conversan t wit h th e politica l an d legal histor y o f the concep t o f due process , thos e sensitiv e t o th e relations o f th e State s t o th e centra l governmen t a s wel l a s th e relation o f som e o f th e provision s o f th e Bil l o f Right s t o th e process o f justice , woul d hardl y recogniz e th e Fourteent h Amendment a s a cove r fo r th e variou s explici t provision s o f th e first eight Amendments. 112 As i n Hurtado, th e jurisprudentia l nu b o f th e Adamson dispute i s the issu e o f certaint y i n th e law . Wit h it s flawed details , Justic e

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Black's approac h is , i n theory , th e mos t "certain. " Du e proces s i n the Fourteent h Amendmen t mean s exactl y wha t th e first eigh t amendments mean . Th e possibilitie s fo r bein g les s certai n ar e numerous. Justice s Murph y an d Rutledg e advocate d "incorpora tion plus, " by whic h Justice Black' s definition woul d b e a minimu m that migh t b e exceeded. 113 Justic e Frankfurter , basicall y followin g Cardozo, an d succeede d b y th e secon d Justic e Harlan , hel d tha t Fourteenth Amendmen t du e proces s shoul d neithe r "comprehend " the specifi c provision s o f th e Bil l o f Right s no r b e confine d b y them. 114 Finally , Justic e Brenna n ha s propose d a "nearl y certain " method throug h "selectiv e incorporation, " accordin g t o whic h no t everything i s take n ove r fro m th e Bil l o f Rights , bu t wha t i s absorbed i s absorbed intact. 115 Only Justic e Frankfurter' s approach , a s h e insisted , correspond s with th e histor y o f du e process . S o lon g a s constitutiona l litigatio n exists, ther e will b e n o static an d "true " meaning o f any provisio n o r of al l o f th e Bil l o f Right s t o carr y ove r int o th e Fourteent h Amendment. I n addition , sinc e mos t o f th e recen t du e proces s case s originate i n stat e courts , th e directio n o f incorporation—fro m th e Bill o f Right s t o th e Fourteent h Amendment—ha s los t it s meaning . Instead o f federa l case s supplyin g a standar d fo r case s tha t com e from th e states , th e situatio n i s no w on e o f interactio n o f th e stat e cases buildin g upo n eac h othe r o r eve n contributin g t o nationa l standards. Finally, i n historica l perspective , th e incorporatio n controvers y i s now moot , fo r tw o reasons . O n th e on e hand , th e outloo k o f Justice Frankfurter ha s been vindicated . T o paraphras e Holmes , th e histor y of due proces s ha s bee n tha t o f experience , no t logic . Du e proces s i n regard t o th e relatio n betwee n th e Bil l o f Right s an d th e Fourteent h Amendment ha s develope d it s ow n requirement s independen t o f formulas o f incorporation . I t ha s no t becom e fixed. O n th e othe r hand, Justic e Blac k seem s vindicate d a s well , fo r wit h almos t n o exception th e first eigh t amendment s ar e no w th e principa l standard fo r Fourteent h Amendmen t adjudication. 116 This doe s no t mea n tha t du e proces s theor y i s of n o use . No r hav e we reache d th e situatio n i n whic h Justic e Black' s goal s hav e bee n achieved b y Justic e Frankfurter' s methods . Black' s ai m wa s no t merely th e extensio n o f right s fo r thos e accuse d o f crime ; no r wa s Frankfurter's metho d a kin d o f judicial uncertaint y principle . Blac k

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firmly believe d tha t hi s literal approac h t o constitutional exegesis — and i n this the incorporation controvers y wa s only on e aspect—wa s best fo r American constitutiona l governmen t because , i n theory , i t left sovereignt y wit h th e people , diminishe d th e politica l powe r o f the judges, an d kep t th e Constitutio n predictabl e fo r litigant s an d plain for citizens. And Frankfurter, always arguing that flexible due process was far from being without standards, firmly believed , in his words, that the "history of liberty has largely been the history of the observance o f procedura l safeguards. " 117 Th e contrastin g theorie s and interest s of th e tw o justices, then , ar e importan t a s contemporary evidence of the dialectic o f due process . So long as men attac h fundamental juridica l value s t o "du e proces s o f law, " th e phras e with its evolving legal implications remains vital to the resolution of constitutional problems. 118 V. TH E DU E PROCES S TRADITIO N AN D RIGHT S FO R NEW INTEREST S The Supreme Court's effacement o f substantive du e process afte r 1937 wa s i n man y way s complete. 119 Bu t ultimatel y a reactio n began, emergin g fro m an d reaffirmin g principle s an d practice s o f the American constitutional traditio n whic h wer e independent o f a specific due process history as well as of the constitutional revolutio n of th e 1930s . Wha t th e traditio n provide d wa s th e righ t o f th e judiciary, wit h th e taci t approva l o f th e people , t o chec k electe d legislatures and executives. Thus , although th e Court' s due proces s destruction o f social welfar e legislatio n ha d straine d th e legitimac y of it s exercis e o f judicia l revie w generally , tha t exercis e ha s remained, i n fac t flourished, i n tw o form s relate d t o th e ol d du e process. One form has been th e transfer of due process discussion t o other constitutiona l language . Thi s ha s avoide d unpalatabl e phra seology but has accomplished what jurists unrestrained by historical consciousness could certainly have explained and evolved under due process o f law . Th e secon d for m retain s du e proces s languag e bu t refines i t t o tak e account , a s due proces s alway s has , of contempo rary social interest s and needs. The us e o f alternativ e languag e fo r du e proces s purpose s illus trates a common phenomeno n i n th e developmen t o f lega l institu tions. Assumin g tha t "du e proces s purposes " exist, fo r exampl e t o

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protect veste d right s o f property , the n othe r constitutiona l provi sions—ex pos t facto , obligatio n o f contracts , an d th e just compensa tion clauses—hav e alread y bee n show n t o b e a t leas t partia l substitutes fo r th e du e proces s clause . A t th e sam e time , differen t social interests—sometime s eve n incompatibl e one s suc h a s slaver y and abolitionis m o r employe r versu s employe e interests—hav e gravitated to , i f no t clutche d at , du e proces s languag e fo r thei r constitutional justification . Th e relationshi p betwee n constitutiona l language an d th e interest s claimin g constitutiona l protectio n i s a complex one . Language , a s language , ma y b e mor e o r les s specifi c and therefor e see m mor e o r les s suite d t o coverin g certai n kind s o f claims. But shoul d claim s alway s b e decide d unde r th e provision , o r b y the concept , that , i n terms , seem s mos t apt ? Yes , i f w e wis h t o confine th e cas e t o th e clause ; no , i f w e hop e t o expan d th e cas e t o other claims . Mor e importan t tha n th e unglosse d word s o f th e tex t is curren t constitutiona l practice , whic h i n tur n i s affecte d b y historical usage . Whe n a social clai m seek s constitutional protection , lawyers an d judge s ar e inevitabl y affecte d b y th e contemporar y juristic Weltanschauung. I t seem s likely , fo r instance , tha t onl y a t th e time o f it s ratificatio n an d agai n sinc e th e mid-1960 s woul d th e Ninth Amendmen t hav e appeare d a feasibl e constitutiona l claus e under whic h t o clai m an y right s a t all , an d tha t now—bu t no t then—could i t b e relate d t o concept s aki n t o du e process . Whethe r language o r historica l contingenc y play s th e principa l rol e i n associating socia l interes t wit h constitutiona l phraseology , th e du e process clauses and th e principle s developed unde r the m provid e th e best exampl e o f thi s associatio n i n th e America n experience . For on e thing , th e asymmetr y o f th e Constitutio n regardin g prohibitions agains t stat e an d federa l actio n ha s le d t o som e linguistically peculia r practice s wit h th e du e proces s clauses . Th e strain o f judicially enforcin g forma l federalis m ha s ha d th e effec t o f using thes e clause s a s shield s behin d whic h othe r provision s o f th e Constitution ca n b e relocated , s o tha t standard s ar e th e sam e against bot h state s an d nation . Thi s ha s bee n discusse d abov e wit h respect t o movin g th e Bil l o f Right s "forward " int o th e Fourteent h Amendment. O f equa l interes t i s th e fac t tha t th e contrac t claus e and th e equa l protectio n clause , bot h explicitl y applicabl e onl y

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against th e states , hav e rathe r openl y bee n applie d agains t th e federal governmen t a s i f the y wer e include d i n Fift h Amendmen t due process. 120 Prior t o 1937 , substantiv e du e proces s purpose s wer e sometime s advanced b y other , mor e direct , means . I n th e first chil d labo r case , the Cour t hel d tha t Congres s ha d overru n th e limit s o f it s authorit y under th e commerc e claus e an d invade d state s rights. 121 I n th e second chil d labo r case , th e Cour t hel d tha t Congres s ha d uncon stitutionally use d th e federa l taxin g powe r i n pursui t o f th e sam e goal. 122 Thes e ground s n o longe r suffice. Ye t i n maintainin g a national econom y throug h interpretatio n o f th e commerc e claus e against th e states , th e Cour t ha s sometime s seeme d t o permi t th e continuation o f substantiv e du e proces s judgments. 123 Simila r substantive du e proces s situation s hav e arise n unde r th e equa l protection clause. 124 Twenty-five year s afte r th e constitutiona l victor y o f th e Ne w Deal, a justice—apparentl y approvingly—referre d t o "th e presen t Court's allerg y t o substantiv e du e process." 125 I n th e ensuin g decade, however , th e allerg y ha s bee n treated , albei t i n par t allopathically throug h othe r constitutiona l clauses . A s Josep h Tussman an d Jacobus tenBroe k suggeste d i n 1949 : "Du e Proces s is , after all , a weapo n blunte d an d scarre d i n th e defens e o f property . The presen t Court , conscious o f it s destiny a s the special guardia n o f human o r civi l right s ma y wel l wis h t o develo p som e alternativ e t o due proces s a s a sanctuar y fo r thes e rights . Th e equa l protectio n clause ha s muc h t o recommen d i t fo r thi s purpose. " 12 6 Ye t despit e the extensiv e us e o f th e equa l protectio n claus e sinc e th e 1950 s t o accomplish aim s whic h earlie r migh t hav e bee n achieve d throug h due proces s reasoning , du e proces s adjudicatio n continue s t o thriv e well beyon d th e spher e o f crimina l procedure . Th e coverin g reaso n for thi s i s tha t sinc e Magn a Cart a du e proces s ha s afforde d protection t o individual s agains t arbitrar y an d "unjust " govern ment actio n i n a wa y tha t equa l protection , wit h it s origin s i n th e abolitionist movement , ha s not . Bu t tw o significan t contemporar y trends explai n more . First, a s th e activitie s o f governmen t hav e expande d i n th e area s of welfare , housing , medicine , an d employment , th e potentia l fo r arbitrary officia l actio n ha s als o increased . Ther e i s muc h mor e t o

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be protecte d against . An d thi s protection , i n th e for m o f fai r administrative procedur e o r just legislativ e classification , i s typicall y a lega l mean s t o securin g mor e substance—tha t is , mone y o r it s equivalent—or fo r achievin g th e opportunit y t o secur e mor e sub stance. Judges ma y valu e procedur e fo r its own sak e and fo r the sak e of a lega l system , bu t litigant s hav e th e substanc e o f case s i n mind . As i t i s th e governmen t rathe r tha n privat e enterpris e whic h legall y controls thi s ne w substance , a n importan t distinctio n exist s betwee n the ne w propert y an d th e old , one whic h allow s th e Cour t t o believ e it i s no t returnin g t o it s forme r stanc e bu t i s instea d reemphasizin g the traditiona l meanin g o f du e process , protectio n o f citizen s fro m arbitrary governmenta l action. 127 Du e proces s adjudicatio n o r it s equivalent, then , ha s reentere d th e field o f substance . Wit h regar d to the new property , du e proces s ha s usually followe d th e traditiona l path o f fai r procedur e whil e equa l protection , concerne d wit h rational (sometime s "reasonable" ) classificatio n ha s bee n refine d with concept s suc h a s "suspec t criteria, " an d "compelling " stat e o r "fundamental" persona l interests. 128 The secon d reaso n fo r th e continue d expansio n o f du e proces s adjudication i s an increasin g sensitivit y t o individua l huma n claim s against society , no t onl y wit h regar d t o th e ne w property , bu t als o i n criminal procedure , th e "ne w substance " o f privacy , refinement s o f first amendmen t rights , an d area s no t formerl y governe d b y con stitutional law . Th e though t an d languag e o f substantiv e du e process ha s bee n applie d t o governmen t intrusion s int o genuinel y private activities , se x an d marriage . Procedura l right s hav e bee n extended t o realm s identifiabl e b y traditiona l stat e contro l ove r th e parties (juvenil e offenders , aliens , prisoners , menta l patients , mili tary personnel) , b y ne w claim s base d o n th e interes t a t stak e (righ t to travel , professiona l licensing , an d job retention) , o r b y a gropin g attempt t o hol d bac k th e tid e o f McCarth y ism i n th e 1950 s an d 1960s. 129 Du e proces s decision s hav e force d th e revisio n o f admin istrative procedure s an d hav e bee n th e mai n lega l impetu s t o th e development o f publi c defende r office s throughou t th e country . Th e expansion o f du e proces s withi n th e lega l syste m ha s als o encour aged—in par t becaus e o f potentia l lega l consequences—th e consciou s development o f du e proces s standard s i n man y nongovernmenta l organizations suc h a s educationa l institutions .

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In th e course of the cases dealing wit h th e ne w propert y an d othe r recently fashione d rights , th e Cour t ha s ofte n reworke d distinction s traditionally though t importan t i n constitutiona l law . Th e mos t important set s o f distinction s ar e betwee n procedur e an d substanc e and betwee n libert y an d property . All case s hav e substantiv e outcome s n o matte r ho w judge s an d lawyers se e th e issu e unde r discussion. 130 Th e effec t tha t procedure s have o n outcom e i s obviou s whe n on e consider s wha t i s mean t b y "parliamentary strategy, " a n activit y dominate d b y lawyers . Al though on e coul d argu e fo r th e outcome-neutralit y o f procedur e o n the groun d tha t som e recognize d standard s ar e necessar y t o reac h any substantiv e outcom e tha t wil l b e accepte d a s legitimate , particular procedure s d o hel p determin e particula r outcomes . An d not onl y doe s procedur e significantl y determin e substance , bu t th e reverse ma y b e true , a s well . A s th e ol d economi c du e proces s case s demonstrate, th e mor e highl y value d a substantiv e end , th e mor e rigorous th e procedure s i n it s protectio n ar e likel y t o be. 131 Contemporary constitutiona l la w ha s als o ha d t o cop e wit h th e liberty-property distinction . Th e "ne w property " ha s le d th e Cour t explicitly t o bin d th e tw o concept s together . Justic e Stewart , citin g Locke an d Blackston e fo r support , wrot e fo r th e Cour t i n a du e process cas e o f 1972 : . . . the dichotom y betwee n persona l libertie s an d propert y rights i s a fals e one . Propert y doe s no t hav e rights . Peopl e hav e rights. Th e righ t t o enjo y propert y withou t unlawfu l depriva tion, n o les s tha n th e righ t t o spea k o r th e righ t t o travel , i s i n truth a "personal" right, whethe r th e "property " i n questio n b e a welfar e check , a home , o r a saving s account . I n fac t a fundamental interdependenc e exist s betwee n th e persona l righ t to libert y an d th e persona l righ t i n property . Neithe r coul d have meanin g withou t th e other. 132 The realms , classifications , an d doctrine s o f contemporar y du e process ma y aris e fro m contemporar y socia l needs , bu t onl y livin g jurists ca n articulat e the m i n constitutiona l law . Durin g hi s servic e on th e Suprem e Court , Justice Frankfurte r wa s th e mos t thoughtful , if adulative , du e proces s justice. 133 Bu t i t i s th e secon d Justic e

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Harlan, Frankfurter' s les s passionat e successo r t o th e guardia n o f the tradition , wh o develope d th e mos t comprehensiv e moder n vie w of du e proces s o n th e Court . Harlan's du e proces s though t i s distinguishe d b y thre e charac teristics. First , i t take s meticulou s accoun t o f th e rol e th e concep t has playe d i n constitutiona l history , wit h regar d bot h t o th e jurisprudential dispute s tha t hav e surrounde d i t an d it s persisten t function o f protectin g importan t socia l interest s i n differen t eras . Second, whil e insistin g tha t du e proces s i s a broa d idea , Harla n sharply distinguishe s i t fro m relate d clauses , suc h a s equa l protec tion and—alon g wit h Frankfurter—prefer s no t t o innovat e wit h other constitutiona l clause s o r concept s whe n th e du e proces s tradition provide s a solution. 134 Tie d t o n o tradition , othe r constitu tional clause s woul d b e a t th e merc y o f ephemera l Cour t majoritie s and migh t suddenl y ad d o r subtrac t larg e area s o f la w fro m constitutional protection . Finally , an d mos t striking , Harla n i s th e first justice sinc e 193 7 clearl y t o hol d tha t du e proces s shoul d no t b e restricted t o procedur e bu t shoul d als o protec t "fundamental " substantive rights , suc h a s privacy , i n particula r wit h respec t t o marriage an d sex . Othe r justices hav e no w accepte d thi s approach , as th e abortio n case s o f 197 3 mak e plain. 135 With th e abortio n cases , du e proces s ha s no t gon e ful l circle—o r even i n a seventy-five-yea r epicycle . Th e crucia l constitutiona l language i s th e same , bu t th e equall y crucia l socia l contex t ha s changed. Th e traditio n o f du e process , precisel y becaus e i t i s a tradition o f socia l though t an d practic e a s wel l a s a meanderin g stream o f judicial precedents , continue s t o provid e th e material s fo r determining wha t claim s an d interest s deserv e protectio n fro m governmental action . I f th e futur e i s lik e th e past , du e proces s language an d idea s wil l accompan y th e developmen t o f lega l concepts an d litigatio n i n ne w area s o f socia l concer n a s wel l a s i n recurring one s suc h a s economi c crise s an d crimina l justice . Women's right s an d environmenta l protectio n ar e tw o area s i n which th e du e proces s traditio n ma y contribut e t o rapidl y develop ing bodie s o f law . It wa s agains t a du e proces s claim , th e righ t t o a n occupation — the pursui t o f happiness—tha t th e Suprem e Cour t onc e agree d tha t states coul d prohibi t wome n fro m practicin g law. 136 I t wa s i n spit e of th e du e proces s claim , b y corporations , tha t th e Cour t uphel d

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welfare legislatio n designe d t o protec t women. 137 I n th e 1970 s th e principal argumen t fo r th e Equa l Right s Amendmen t ha s als o involved th e due process tradition an d i t has squarely oppose d it . I n the first place , due proces s and equa l protectio n d o no t contai n th e specific conten t desired—equalit y betwee n sexes . Second , du e pro cess i s usually , an d ha s bee n regardin g th e claim s o f th e women' s rights movement , a slow-movin g instrumen t o f socia l an d lega l change. These, of course, are normall y considere d th e virtue s of du e process: nothing specific, nothing fast , rathe r society's evolving sense of fairness . Opponent s o f th e amendment , therefore , apar t fro m views they ma y hol d o n th e "role" of women, loo k t o due proces s of law a s th e mode l fo r constitutiona l developmen t an d ar e a t hear t afraid o f th e year s o f judicially create d confusio n likel y t o resul t from a ne w an d unqualifie d principl e o f fundamental law . The contemporar y la w o f th e environment , propelle d b y social , political, an d economi c forces , an d develope d fro m other , estab lished areas of law ranging from nuisanc e t o admiralty, i s also likely to confront th e du e proces s tradition. 138 Judges ar e understandabl y reluctant t o prescribe polic y i n an are a whic h i s technical, normall y the provinc e o f legislature s o r agencies , an d almos t surel y no t bes t dealt wit h piecemeal . Bu t a s the y recogniz e tha t environmenta l litigation i s often base d on an attritio n strateg y of procedural battle s in a substantiv e war , judges hav e no t bee n reluctan t t o enforc e th e standards o f du e process , usuall y throug h administrativ e law. 139 The mixin g o f procedur e wit h substanc e i s wel l illustrate d i n th e Mineral Kin g case, in which th e Sierra Club was denied standin g t o sue th e Secretar y o f th e Interio r i n orde r t o preven t commercia l development i n a national wildernes s area. 140 Th e dissen t o f Justice Blackmun relie d o n th e Administrativ e Procedur e Ac t i n a n attempt t o secure the club a hearing . Justice Dougla s propose d tha t the environmen t itself—rivers , forest , animals—b e give n substantiv e rights i n court. 141 Bot h ar e du e proces s arguments . Th e old fashioned substantiv e du e proces s approac h wa s suggeste d i n 197 0 by a United State s District Cour t judge who, while dismissing a case for lac k o f jurisdiction, foun d tha t unde r th e Fourteent h Amend ment du e proces s clause "eac h o f u s i s constitutionally protecte d i n our natural an d persona l state of life and health " from environmen tal pollution. 142 The mos t significan t discussion s o f constitutiona l du e proces s i n

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recent years , whil e refinin g th e subjec t wit h ne w perspective s an d distinctions, al l procee d fro m th e vie w tha t unde r "du e proces s o f law" fal l th e basi c issue s o f America n constitutiona l governmen t and th e functio n o f th e judiciary . I n vie w o f th e histor y o f du e process an d th e socia l interest s an d lega l doctrine s tha t hav e transiently o r permanentl y becom e associate d wit h it , thi s i s no t remarkable. Fro m it s inceptio n i n Magn a Carta , du e proces s o f la w has attempte d t o provid e a standard , bot h a s nor m an d a s emblem , for resolvin g instance s o f th e persistin g confrontatio n betwee n m a n and hi s government . T h e recen t discussions , lik e earlie r one s fro m Coke throug h Frankfurter , mak e du e proces s centra l t o th e rul e o f law an d t o society' s sens e o f justic e an d fundamenta l values . Whether viewe d i n term s o f fai r procedures , claim s t o propert y an d to variou s liberties , o r th e assignmen t o f role s an d limit s t o th e courts, th e languag e an d idea s o f du e proces s hav e offere d guid ance. 1 4 3 T o courts , commentators , an d commoners , th e hol d o f du e process o f la w i s a blen d o f histor y an d reason , a s Justic e Frankfurter said , thoug h o n anothe r plan e i t migh t b e describe d a s a compoun d o f habi t an d imprecis e language . Eithe r way , du e process o f la w consist s i n th e politica l an d lega l doctrine s tha t hav e developed, an d i n som e case s undergon e demise , i n it s name ; o f ordinances an d ruling s tha t protec t individual s an d group s fro m arbitrary impositions ; an d o f argument s fo r politica l reform , socia l and economi c justice , an d th e prope r plac e o f court s i n a constitu tional system . Wit h it s historica l an d ethica l connotations , du e process of la w bring s togethe r per legem terrae wit h suum cuique tribuere. The durabilit y o f du e proces s ove r seve n an d a hal f centuries , a s phrase an d idea , i s a tribut e t o a law-minde d peopl e whos e traditions hav e enjoye d continuit y an d whos e aspiration s fo r a jus t life ar e consciousl y an d finely attune d t o th e relatio n betwee n individual fulfillmen t an d socia l welfare . NOTES 1. I owe th e "forest " imag e t o Walto n Hamilton' s stud y o f substantiv e due process , "The Pat h o f Du e Proces s of Law " an d Thoma s More' s insight on procedura l du e process : "This country's plante d thic k wit h laws from coas t t o coast . . . and i f you cut the m dow n . . . d'you reall y think yo u coul d stan d uprigh t i n th e wind s tha t woul d blo w then? " Hamilton's articl e i s i n Conyer s Rea d (ed.) , The Constitution Recon-

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sidered (Ne w York : Columbi a Universit y Press , 1938) , pp . 167-90 . More's line s come fro m Rober t Bolt , A Man for All Seasons (London : Heinemann, 1960) , p . 39 . Fo r it s source , se e Willia m Roper , Life of More (Early Englis h Tex t Societ y Edition , London : Oxfor d Univ . Press, 1935) , pp . 41-42. This referenc e wa s kindl y supplie d b y R . S . Sylvester, executive editor of the Yale Edition of the Works of St. Thomas More. 2. T . R. Powell is quoted in Howard Jay Graham, Everyman's Constitution: Historical Essays on the Fourteenth Amendment, the "Conspiracy Theory" and American Constitutionalism (Madison : Stat e Historica l Societ y o f Wisconsin, 1968) , p. 590; Felix Frankfurter , "Socia l Issue s befor e th e Supreme Court," 22 Yale Rev. 476, 490 (1933). 3. Th e combinatio n i s reflecte d i n a new s story . I n th e sprin g o f 1974 , when th e Hous e Judiciar y Committee' s impeachmen t inquir y wa s temporarily thwarted by the White House, the committee extended a subpoena deadline . Representativ e Barbar a C . Jordan, a membe r o f the committe e wh o ha d visite d th e Nationa l Archive s t o commun e with th e constitutiona l parchmen t i n preparatio n fo r he r task , defended th e extension: "It has been our practice since the beginnin g to giv e th e Presiden t no t du e proces s bu t du e proces s quadrupled. " New York Times, Apri l 26, 1974 , p. 1. 4. Charle s H. Mcllwain discusse s general reason s for retaining constitutional terminolog y t o cove r change s i n constitutiona l functio n an d purpose in "Some Illustrations of the Influence o f Unchanged Name s for Changing Institutions," in Paul Sayre (ed.), Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies (Ne w York : Oxfor d Univ . Press , 1947) , pp. 484-97. Arthur O. Lovejo y migh t ter m the inquir y her e one of philosophical semantics— a stud y o f th e sacre d word s an d phrases o f a perio d o r a movement , wit h a vie w t o a clearing u p o f thei r ambiguities , a listin g o f thei r variou s shades o f meaning , an d a n examinatio n o f th e wa y i n which confuse d association s o f idea s arisin g fro m thes e ambiguities hav e influence d th e development o f doctrines, or accelerated th e insensibl e transformatio n o f one fashio n of though t int o another , perhap s it s ver y opposite . I t i s largely becaus e o f thei r ambiguitie s tha t mer e word s ar e capable o f thi s independen t actio n a s force s i n history . A term, a phrase , a formula , whic h gain s currenc y o r acceptance becaus e o f on e o f it s meanings , o r o f th e thoughts whic h i t suggests , i s congenia l t o th e prevalen t beliefs, th e standar d o f value , th e taste s o f a certai n age ,

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may hel p t o alte r beliefs , standard s o f value , an d tastes , because othe r meaning s o r suggeste d implications , no t clearly distinguishe d b y thos e wh o emplo y it , graduall y distinguished b y thos e wh o emplo y it , graduall y becom e the dominant element s of its signification . The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Ne w York : Harpe r and Row , 1960) , p. 14. 5. Th e standar d works , al l entitle d Magna Carta, ar e b y Willia m Shar p McKechnie (Glasgow , 1905) , Henr y Elliot t Maide n (ed. ) (London , 1917), Fait h Thompso n (Minneapolis : Univ . o f Minnesot a Press , 1948), and J. C. Holt (Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965). See also Charles H. Mcllwain , "Due Process of Law in Magna Carta," 14 Colum. L. Rev. 27-51 (1914) . 6. Th e Lati n reads : "Nullus liber homo capitur, vel imprisonetur, aut dissaisiatur, aut utlagetur, aut exultetur, aut aliquo modo destruatur, nee super urn ibimus, nee super eum mittemus, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem terrae." The computation an d possible significance o f the fact that the words of Chapter 39 lie precisely in the middle of the Magn a Carta ar e presente d i n Gottfrie d Dietze , Magna Carta and Property (Charlottesville: Univ . Pres s o f Virginia , 1965) , p . 30 , n . Rodne y L . Mott note d tha t th e expressio n "b y th e law s o f th e Empir e an d th e judgment o f hi s peers " ca n b e foun d i n a n eleventh-centur y edic t of th e Hol y Roma n Emperor , bu t i t ha s n o know n connectio n with Chapte r 39 . Due Process of Law (Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill , 1926), p. 1. 7. Richar d L. Perry succinctly lays out alternative meaning s in Sources of Our Liberties (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964) , p. 6, n . 13. 8. Mcllwain , "Due Proces s of Law" (note 5), pp. 46-47. 9. The History of the Common Law of England (publishe d posthumously , 1713), ed. Charle s M. Gra y (Chicago: Univ. o f Chicago Press , 1971) , p. 36. 10. Alber t B. White, "The Name Magna Carta," 30 Eng. Hist. Rev . 47275 (1915 ) an d 3 2 Eng . Hist . Rev . 554-5 5 (1917) . Als o Ivo r Jennings, "Magna Cart a an d Constitutionalis m i n th e Commonwealth, " i n William H . Dunham , Jr. , e t al. , The Great Charter (New York : Pantheon Books , 1965) , p. 75. 11. Ibid. , p. 26. Dunham judges this "perhaps" the first use of due process of law in a constitutional context . 12. Se e generally Max Radin , "The Myth of Magna Carta, " 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1060-9 1 (1947) . 13. Se e generall y Mauric e Ashley , Magna Carta in the Seventeenth Century (Charlottesville: Univ. Pres s of Virginia, 1965) .

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14. A baronia l invocatio n appear s i n Elizabetha n literature . Shake speare's Duke of Clarence speaks to one of the murderers sent against him b y hi s nephew , th e would-b e Richard : "Befor e I b e convic t b y course of law /To threate n me with death is most unlawful." Richar d III, I.iv.192 . Th e pla y wa s writte n i n th e 1590s , bu t it s settin g i s somewhat ove r a century earlier. 15. Edwar d Coke, Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (4th ed., London, 1671) , p. 46. 16. Ibid. , pp. 46, 50. 17. Ibid. , p. 47. "No man shall be . .. dispossesse d of his Freehold (that is ) lands, or livelihood, or of his liberties, or free customes, that is, of such franchises and freedomes , an d fre e customes, as belong t o him b y hi s free birthright , unless e i t b e b y th e lawful l judgment, tha t is , verdict of his equals (that is , of me n o f his own condition ) o r by th e La w o f the Lan d (tha t is , t o spea k i t onc e fo r all ) b y th e du e course , an d processe o f th e Law... . Generall y al l monopolie s ar e agains t thi s great Charter, because they are against th e liberty and freedom o f the subject.,, 18. Th e bes t collectio n o f material s i s Perry , Sources of Our Liberties. Al l quotations i n th e tex t fro m document s antedatin g th e Constitution , unless otherwis e noted , com e fro m Perry . Se e als o H . D . Hazeltine , "The Influenc e o f Magn a Cart a o n America n Constitutiona l De velopment," 17 Colum. L. Rev. 1-33 . (1917); and A. E. Dick Howard , The Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America (Charlottesville: Univ. Pres s of Virginia, 1968) . 19. Th e Ne w Jersey document, bu t no t th e Pennsylvani a one , contains a "due course of law " clause. Willia m Penn , who drafte d th e Pennsyl vania Fram e o f Government , probabl y prepare d th e Concession s o f West Ne w Jersey a s well. I n 168 7 Pen n wa s responsibl e fo r th e firs t publication of Magna Carta in the colonies. Perry, Sources, pp . 180-88, 204-21. 20. * 129, 134 , 138. 21. See , generally , Bernar d Bailyn , The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge , Mass. : Harvar d Universit y Press , 1967) . Fo r the American Bicentennia l th e British Parliamen t offere d a n origina l Magna Cart a t o b e displayed i n th e Capitol . Congres s accepte d th e offer i n a joint resolution : "In drafting th e Constitutio n an d th e Bil l of Right s o f th e Unite d States , ou r foundin g father s sough t t o guarantee t o th e peopl e th e freedo m o f th e church , a n independen t judiciary, the right to a speedy trial, and the concept of due process of law, which principle s wer e clearly derive d fro m Magn a Carta. " New York Times, Octobe r 26, 1975 , p. 22. 22. Henr y Steel e Commage r (ed.) , Documents of American History

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(5th ed. ) (Ne w York : Appleton-Century-Crofts , 1949) , vol . I , p . 57 . 23. Bailyn , Ideological Origins, p . 173 , n . 24. Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States (Washington, D.C. : Governmen t Printin g Office , 1927) , pp . 1-5 . 25. I n Magn a Carta , th e orde r i s "judgmen t o f hi s peer s o r la w o f th e land." The reversa l ma y b e a n accident . Th e origina l orde r reappear s in th e Northwes t Ordinance . Th e significanc e o f th e orde r i s difficul t to perceive . 26. O n th e formatio n o f th e Declaratio n generally , fro m it s idea s t o it s composition, se e Car l Becker , The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas (New York : Knopf , 196 6 [orig . 1922]) . Jus t as the protectio n o f property— a functio n o f th e state—ca n b e trace d t o Locke's politica l theory , th e pursui t o f happiness , a fundamenta l human right , ca n b e foun d i n hi s mora l theor y (Essay on Human Understanding). The clos e relationshi p betwee n th e tw o i s evident late r in du e proces s case s o n th e righ t t o pursu e a lawfu l calling . Se e generally Howar d Mumfor d Jones , The Pursuit of Happiness (Ithaca : Cornell Univ . Press , 196 6 [orig . 1953]) . 27. Du e proces s provision s i n stat e constitution s (unti l 1968 ) ar e collecte d in Howard , The Road from Runnymede, pp . 479-82 . 28. Hamilton' s defens e o f th e omissio n o f a Bil l o f Right s a t th e en d o f The Federalist is onl y i n par t disingenuous . H e argue d tha t an y lis t o f rights woul d impl y tha t th e ne w federa l government , instea d o f bein g restricted, retaine d th e authorit y t o delimi t an d defin e rights ; tha t is , it woul d b e abl e t o control thos e area s o f activit y no t explicitl y state d as rights . No . 84 . Th e Nint h an d Tent h Amendment s ar e a n attemp t to mee t Hamilton' s argument . Fo r th e complication s associate d wit h one righ t tha t migh t hav e bee n elaborate d i n a Bil l o f Rights , th e right t o a jur y tria l i n civi l case s guarantee d i n Articl e III , se e Federalist No . 83 , an d compar e th e Sevent h Amendment . 29. Perry , Sources, p . 422 , fro m Gales , Debates, I . 433-34 . 30. I t i s quit e probabl e tha t th e orde r o f clause s i n th e Bil l o f Right s wa s not a s carefull y conceive d a s late r legalisti c mind s ten d t o expect , o r as wa s th e origina l constitutiona l text , whic h benefite d fro m a Committee o n Style . Withi n th e Bil l o f Right s a s a whole , th e provisions relatin g t o crimina l la w ar e no t gathere d together . Withi n the Fift h Amendment , th e clause s see m almos t randoml y collected , although on e coul d argu e tha t the y deliberatel y begi n wit h guaran tees fo r crimina l trial s alone , g o throug h a guarante e whic h i s applicable i n bot h crimina l an d civi l situation s (th e du e proces s clause) an d conclud e wit h a noncrimina l provisio n (jus t compensa tion). A s ratified , th e du e proces s claus e i s locate d almos t precisel y i n

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the middl e o f th e Bil l o f Rights , b y a wor d coun t fro m eithe r end . This middl e positio n i s surely a n accident , however , sinc e originall y the clause was in the seventh of twelve amendments, not at the end of the fifth o f te n amendments . Nevertheless , a middl e positio n ma y have a kind of architectonic significance, regardles s of its origin. This, at least , i s th e subjec t o f th e speculatio n o f Gottfrie d Dietz e o n th e location of per legem terrae in Magna Carta. See Dietze, Magna Carta and Property. 31. Onl y th e Sixt h an d Tent h Amendment s us e th e activ e voic e grammatically, an d eve n the y ar e unclea r a s t o th e sourc e o f th e guarantees. But we ought not charge a generation of men accustome d to natura l right s declarations wit h deliberat e ambiguit y bor n o f ou r own positivistic mod e of reading legal documents . 32. 7 Pet. 243. 33. Dartmout h Colleg e v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 581 (1819) . 34. Sec . 1789 . 35. Th e citation s ar e 6 Fed . Cas . 546, No. 3230, E. D. Pa. , and 1 8 How . 272. 36. 6 Fed . Cas . at 552-53 . " [T]he reac h o f Fourteent h Amendmen t du e process . . . wa s suggested, " wrot e th e secon d Justic e Harlan , " . . . lon g before th e adoption o f tha t Amendmen t [namel y to ] thos e concepts whic h ar e considere d t o embrac e thos e right s * which ar e fundamental; whic h belon g . . . t o th e citizen s o f al l fre e govern ments.' Corfiel d v . Coryell.... " Dissentin g i n Po e v . Ullman , 36 7 U.S. 497,541 (1961) . 37. Hanni s Taylor , a constitutiona l authorit y o f th e earl y twentiet h century, strongl y condemne d bot h Curtis' s metho d o f constitutiona l interpretation an d his historical scholarshi p i n the case. "Due Proces s of Law : Persisten t an d Harmfu l Influenc e o f Murra y v . Hoboke n Land and Improvement Co., " 24 Yale L . J. 353-6 9 (1915). 38. I n an early Supreme Court case, a justice defined a vested right as one which entitle d a citize n "t o d o certai n action s o r t o posses s certai n things, according to the law of the land. "Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 394 (1798) (emphasis supplied). 39. A n earl y exampl e i s Nort h Carolin a v . Foy , 2 Hayw . (N.C. ) 31 0 (1804), in which a state court held void under a law of the land clause the repeal of a land grant. Several ideas come together in the case: the vested right s o f property , retrospectiv e legislation , an d la w designe d not fo r genera l purpose s bu t t o reac h (o r punish ) a name d part y (hence usurping the function o f the judiciary). See, generally, Edward S. Corwin, Liberty against Government: The Rise, Flowering and Decline of a Famous Juridical Concept (Bato n Rouge : Louisian a Stat e Univ . Press ,

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1948), Chapter 3, "Liberty into Property, Befor e th e Civil War"; and Wallace Mendelson , " A Missin g Lin k i n th e Evolutio n o f Du e Process," 10 Vand. L . Rev. 125-3 7 (1956) . 40. Th e clos e connectio n o f thes e constitutiona l idea s wa s manifes t a s early as the Northwest Ordinance . I n Article I I of the Ordinance, th e law o f th e lan d claus e (du e process ) an d th e jus t (ther e "full" ) compensation claus e appea r i n th e sam e sentence , a s the y d o i n th e Fifth Amendment , an d ar e followe d immediatel y b y th e prohibitio n of al l law s tha t "i n an y manne r whateve r interfer e wit h o r affec t private contracts." 41. 13N.Y . 378 . 42. Th e arguments are the subject of decades of research by Howar d Jay Graham, whose studies are relied upo n here . See Graham, Everyman's Constitution (Madison: Stat e Historica l Societ y of Wisconsin, 1968) , in particular Chapte r 5 , pp . 242-65 , whic h appeare d originall y a s "Procedure t o Substance—Extrajudicia l Ris e o f Du e Process , 1830 1860," 40 Calif. L . Rev. 483-500 (1952-53). 43. Scot t v . Sandford, 1 9 How. 393 (1857). 44. 1 9 How., at 450. 45. Taney' s argumen t wa s no t unprecedente d eve n i n Suprem e Cour t opinions. Justice Henr y Baldwin , a learne d an d acerbi c Jacksonian, had writte n i n dissen t i n a slaver y cas e o f 1841 : "Being propert y b y the la w of any state , the owners ar e protected fro m an y violation s o f the rights of property by Congress under the Fifth Amendment o f the Constitution," Groves v. Slaughter , 1 5 Pet. 449, 515. As Baldwin di d not specif y wha t i n the Fifth Amendmen t h e had i n mind , one could support hi s statemen t b y th e just compensatio n claus e a s wel l a s b y the due process clause, though slaves would not have been "taken" for a publi c purpose , i n the standar d sens e o f th e term . Substantiv e du e process i s als o implicitl y recognize d i n th e wartim e proposa l o f Lincoln that owners be compensated fo r the emancipation o f slaves. 46. 1 8 How . a t 626-27. 47. Everyman's Constitution, pp . 250, 258, 249. 48. I n 178 3 Chie f Justice Gushin g o f Massachusett s ha d interprete d th e declaration o f his state's constitution tha t "all me n ar e born free and equal" to prohibit being born into slavery. See Walker v. Jennison, in Commager (ed.), Documents of American History (5th ed.) , p. 110 . 49. E.g. , James G. Birney , in 1837 ; see Graham, Everyman's Constitution, p . 232. Se e als o Theodor e Weld , "Th e Powe r o f Congres s ove r th e District o f Columbia, " 1837 , printe d a s a n Appendi x i n Jacobu s tenBroek, Equal Under Law (New York : Collier Books , 1965) , pp. 24380, esp. pp. 271-72.

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50. Cf Arthu r Bestor , "Th e America n Civi l Wa r a s a Constitutiona l Crisis," 69 Am. Hist. Rev . 327-52 (1964). 51. Tha t th e Sout h ha d n o doubt s abou t it s view s i s manifes t fro m th e constitution o f th e Confederacy , i n whic h Art . 1 , Sec . 9 , CI . 1 6 i s identical t o th e Fift h Amendment . Th e fourt h claus e o f th e sam e section prohibits "impairing th e right of property i n negro slaves." 52. Sectio n 1 : "All persons born or naturalized i n the United States , and subject t o th e jurisdiction thereof , ar e citizen s o f th e Unite d State s and of th e State wherei n the y reside . N o Stat e shall mak e or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the Unite d States ; no r shal l an y Stat e depriv e an y perso n o f life , liberty, o r property , withou t du e proces s o f law ; no r den y t o an y person within it s jurisdiction th e equal protectio n o f the laws." 53. Th e languag e i s not actuall y identical . Th e du e proces s clause shift s from th e passiv e voic e o f th e Fift h Amendmen t (wit h "federa l government" presume d t o b e th e subject ) t o th e activ e voic e i n th e Fourteenth ("No r shal l an y stat e deprive....") . I n th e Fourteent h Amendment privilege s o r immunitie s clause , th e "or " replace s th e "and" o f Articl e IV . Th e distinctio n betwee n privilege s and immunities an d "privilege s or immunities" ha s ha d n o lega l significance , whether or not i t has more than an accidental historica l explanation . 54. Howar d Jay Graham asserts that federal and state due process clauses "have bee n th e source s an d base s o f a t leas t one-third , an d durin g certain critical periods , possibly mor e tha n one-hal f o f our aggregat e constitutional litigation. " Everyman's Constitution, p . ix; see also p. 587. An indicatio n o f th e significanc e o f th e du e proces s clause s ca n b e seen i n th e five editions , spannin g hal f a century , o f th e Librar y o f Congress publicatio n Constitution of the United States of America (Annotated), i n whic h th e du e proces s clause s hav e ha d competitio n fro m only th e commerc e claus e (whic h wa s accorde d mor e spac e onl y i n the first edition). Th e numbe r o f page s devote d t o th e du e proces s clauses, an d th e percentag e thi s numbe r i s o f th e tota l page s i n th e various editions, are as follows: Edition 1923 1938 1953 1964 1973

Pages 68 212 189 224 190

Percent of Volume 8 17 14 13 9

The percentag e figures appea r t o b e correlate d wit h th e "truth "

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concerning th e relativ e importanc e o f du e proces s issue s i n the n current constitutiona l law ; th e historica l accumulatio n o f substantiv e due proces s case s an d rule s i n th e lat e 1930s ; th e impres s o f th e du e process scholarshi p o f th e volume' s editor , Edwar d S . Corwin , beginning i n 1938 ; th e ris e o f th e equa l protectio n claus e a s th e swiftest curren t i n th e strea m o f constitutiona l litigatio n fro m th e 1950s on ; an d th e dispersio n i n late r volumes , t o othe r portion s o f th e Bill o f Rights , o f th e discussio n o f specific issue s tha t ma y formall y b e litigated unde r th e Fourteent h Amendmen t du e proces s clause . Another, perhap s les s telling , indicatio n o f th e declin e o f du e process a s a categor y o f though t i s it s disappearanc e a s a mai n entr y in th e International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968) i n compariso n to th e article , b y Rober t E . Cushman , i n th e Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1931 ) (vol . 5 , pp . 264-68) . I n th e I.E.S.S., Rober t G . McCloskey discusse s du e proces s unde r "Constitutiona l Law : Civi l Liberties" (vol. 3 , pp . 307-12) . 55. 1 6 Wall. 3 6 (1873) . Th e Slaughter-Hous e Case s ar e th e startin g poin t of Walton Hamilton' s scholarl y journey o n "Th e Pat h o f Du e Proces s of Law, " cite d above , not e 1 . 56. Th e Cour t utilize d Justice Bushro d Washington' s broa d definitio n o f privileges an d immunitie s i n Corfiel d v . Coryell , thoug h no t t o defin e the phras e generally , a s migh t b e expected , but , unhistorically , t o distinguish broa d Articl e I V stat e privilege s an d immunitie s fro m narrow, Fourteent h Amendmen t federa l privilege s o r immunities . On th e fortune s o f th e privilege s o r immunitie s claus e se e Arnol d J . Lien, Concurring Opinion (St. Louis : Washingto n Univ . Studies , 1957) . 57. 1 6 Wall , a t 123 . 58. 1 6 Wall , a t 125 . Concerne d mor e wit h th e Court' s discriminatio n against souther n rebel s tha n wit h closel y reasone d analysi s o f th e ne w constitutional clauses , Swayn e probabl y unconsciousl y reflecte d th e dominant though t o f hi s tim e b y holdin g t o traditiona l du e proces s reasoning whil e subsumin g Bradley' s though t unde r th e innovativ e equal protectio n language . " 'Due proces s o f law, ' " Swayne said , "i s th e applicatio n o f th e la w as i t exist s i n th e fai r an d regula r cours e o f administrativ e procedure . 'The equa l protectio n o f th e laws ' place s al l upo n a footin g o f lega l equality an d give s th e sam e protectio n t o al l fo r th e preservatio n o f life, liberty , an d property , an d th e pursui t o f happiness. " 1 6 W a l l , a t 127. Whe n whit e southerner s regaine d contro l o f th e Louisian a government an d abolishe d th e slaughterhous e monopoly , th e Su preme Cour t hel d unanimousl y tha t th e late r ac t di d no t depriv e th e formerly privilege d butcher s o f thei r libert y o r propert y withou t du e

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process of law. Butchers' Union Slaughterhouse v. Crescent City Livestock Landin g Co. Il l U.S . 74 6 (1884). 59. 11 0 U.S. 516(1884). 60. 11 0 U.S., at 529, 530-31. 61. 11 0 U.S. , a t 531 . Justic e Matthew s quote d th e rul e o f "gradua l process of judicial inclusion and exclusion" from Justice Miller for the Court in Davidson v . New Orleans , 96 U.S. 97, 10 4 (1878); 11 0 U.S., at 534. 62. Harla n pointed out, however, that when the Fourteenth Amendmen t was adopte d al l state s require d gran d jur y indictment s i n capita l cases. Thus, aside fro m Britis h histor y indictmen t seeme d par t o f th e understanding of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment . 63. Earl y confirmation s o f th e Hurtado approach, accompanie d b y Harlan's continued dissents alone, are Maxwell v . Dow, 17 6 U.S. 581 (1900), and Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S . 7 8 (1908). 64. I f due process were considered no t unde r th e aspec t o f predictabilit y but unde r tha t o f veracity, tha t is , not accordin g t o th e characte r o f the determinin g proces s bu t accordin g t o th e qualit y o f wha t i s determined, the n th e disput e betwee n th e Cour t an d th e dissen t i n Hurtado i s whethe r gran d jur y indictmen t i n fac t lead s t o factuall y more justified prosecution s tha n doe s a n informatio n proceeding ; o r perhaps whethe r thi s wa s tru e i n th e cas e a t hand . I f th e disput e i s seen in this fashion, however, and the modern terminology of Herbert Packer is applied to it, Hurtado's and Harlan's side seems to represent the "due process model" of criminal procedure, while the Court's side is th e "crim e contro l model. " Se e Packer , The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanfor d Univ . Press , 1968) , pp. 149-73 . This i s so because the due process model, i n Packer' s explication, i s disposed t o distrust th e efficac y o f officia l fact-findin g a s wel l a s t o b e skeptica l "about the morality and utility of the criminal sanction," p. 170 . It is therefore dispose d t o find o r creat e eve r mor e "rights " fo r crimina l defendants. 65. 11 0 U.S., at 531. 66. 9 6 U.S . 97(1878). 67. Th e significanc e o f a judicial determinatio n o f du e proces s o f la w i s not merel y tha t court s asser t powe r fo r themselves , bu t tha t a n historical proble m i s laid t o rest. The problem , i n th e Court's words, was this: The due process clause "which th e great baron s of Englan d wrung fro m Kin g John a t th e poin t o f th e swor d . .. mean t . .. th e ancient customary law s of the English people , or laws enacted b y th e Parliament o f which thos e baron s were a controlling element . I t was not i n their minds . .. t o protect themselve s agains t th e enactment o f

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laws b y th e Parliamen t o f England. " 9 6 U.S . a t 101-02 . Tha t n o "parliament" existed in 121 5 did not disturb, or was not known to the Court. Th e Court' s conclusor y answe r t o th e proble m tha t a legislative bod y determine d wha t wa s or was not du e proces s of law , was tha t America n du e proces s clauses woul d b e "ineffectual " i f no t applied t o stat e legislature s an d uphel d b y courts . The chie f ste p t o this conclusion, which the Court perhap s felt uneas y elaborating, was that judicia l review , separatio n o f power s theory , an d check s an d balances, alread y authorize d court s t o examin e legislativ e an d executive action. There was no reason why due process, including th e "law" according to which due process was to be granted, should be an exception t o suc h judicia l examination . J . A. C. Gran t write s tha t "random decisions" prior to the Civil Wa r held tha t du e proces s was no limit on the legislature, "a statute, whatever its content, necessarily being par t o f th e 'la w o f th e land / an d henc e du e proces s o f law. " "The Natura l La w Backgroun d o f Du e Process, " 31 Colum . L . Rev . 56, 66 (1931). But mentioning "the great principles of Magna Carta," Justice Stor y wrote th e dominan t vie w fo r the Court i n 1829 : "That government can scarcely be deemed free , where the rights of property are left solel y dependen t upo n th e wil l o f a legislativ e body , withou t any restraint. " Wilkinson v . Leland , 2 Pet. 627, 657. Two year s afte r HurtadOy i n a leading equal protectio n clause case, the Court, speaking again throug h Justic e Matthews, combine d proces s an d property . Yick Wo v. Hopkins held that a law "fair on its face and impartial i n appearance" violated the Constitution if it was administered "with an evil eye and an unequal hand. " 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886). The Court's citations i n suppor t o f thi s holdin g abou t procedur e dea l exclusivel y with property rights. 68. 9 6 U.S. , at 103-4 . 69. H e thus raised, although no t explicitly, the relation of the Fifth t o the Fourteenth Amendment . Representativ e Bingha m o f Ohio, a leading member o f th e Joint Committe e o f Fiftee n o n Reconstruction , ha d tried an d faile d t o inser t a jus t compensatio n claus e int o th e Fourteenth Amendment . Graham , Everyman's Constitution, p . 33 . Thi s deliberate omissio n migh t hav e bee n invoke d t o exclud e a jus t compensation interpretatio n o f th e ne w du e proces s clause. Bu t a s it involved a property rather than a personal right, the argument woul d have been futile a t the time. Recall , on the other hand, the successfu l use of this kind o f textua l exegesi s b y th e majorit y i n th e case o f th e grand jury indictment . 70. 9 6 U.S . a t 107-8 . 71. Bradley' s particula r branche s o f governmen t "taking " wer e th e

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subject o f score s o f du e proces s case s i n th e Suprem e Cour t unde r th e due proces s clause . Fo r a leadin g cas e relatin g just compensatio n an d due proces s t o th e taxin g power , se e Henderso n Bridg e Co . v . Henderson, 17 3 U.S . 59 2 (1899) . Just compensatio n requirement s fo r eminent domai n wer e first applie d t o th e state s unde r th e equa l protection rathe r tha n th e du e proces s clause . Reaga n v . Farmers ' Loan & Trus t Co. , 15 4 U.S . 362 , 38 8 (1894) . Bu t shortl y afterwar d Justice Bradley' s du e proces s vie w o n th e matte r wa s adopted . Chicago, B.&Q . R.R . Co . v . Chicago , 16 6 U.S . 22 6 (1897) . I n general , see th e exhaustiv e stud y b y Rodne y G . Mott , Due Process of Law: A Historical and Analytical Treatise on the Principles and Methods Followed by the Courts in the Application of the (( Law of the Land" (Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill, 1926) . Howard Ja y Graham , i n "Th e Economi c an d Constitutiona l Significance o f Frontie r Ta x Titles , 1800-1890, " explore s th e rol e o f the lan d ta x ba r i n th e developmen t o f substantiv e du e process . According t o Graham , thi s bar , "lik e th e antislaver y an d th e railroa d and Chines e habea s corpu s bars , pioneere d substantiv e du e proces s and equa l protection. " Everyman's Constitution, p . 500 . Th e origina l setting was the Illinoi s Militar y Trac t i n th e decade s prio r t o th e Civi l War, wher e ta x rate s wer e ofte n specifi c an d regressive ; penalties , dates, an d paymen t procedures , capricious ; an d record s i n confusion . Out o f litigatio n ove r th e taxe s cam e th e influentia l Tax Titles (1855 ) by Rober t S . Blackwell , a n Illinoi s lawyer . I t wa s Blackwel l wh o molded th e case s o f severa l state s int o a theor y protectin g lan d ownership fro m arbitrar y legislation , an d thu s contribute d t o th e ne w due process . 72. 9 4 U.S . 113 . Fo r background , se e Harr y N . Scheiber , "Th e Roa d t o Munn: Eminen t Domai n an d th e Concep t o f Publi c Purpos e i n th e State Courts, " 5 Perspectives in American History, 329-40 4 (1971) ; als o J. A . C . Grant , "Th e 'Highe r Law ' Backgroun d o f th e La w o f Eminent Domain, " 6 Wis . L . Rev . 67-8 5 (1931) . 73. Justic e Fiel d (with who m Justice Stron g agreed) dissente d agains t thi s doctrine, a s wel l a s agains t th e outcom e o f Munn— "subversive o f th e rights o f privat e property. " 9 4 U.S . a t 136 . Sinc e th e Slaughterhous e Cases fou r year s earlier , however , Fiel d ha d learne d tha t du e process , rather tha n privilege s o r immunities , wa s th e appropriat e constitu tional claus e t o tak e a stan d on . Hi s goa l wa s unchanged . Th e libert y and propert y whic h du e proces s protected , lik e th e earlie r privileg e o r immunity, wa s th e pursui t o f happiness , a person' s righ t "t o pursu e such calling s an d avocation s a s ma y b e suitabl e t o develo p [one's ] capacities, an d giv e t o the m thei r highes t enjoyment. " 94 U.S . a t 142 .

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Although Fiel d i s th e archetypica l judicia l protecto r o f propert y rights throug h du e process , h e wa s also , particularl y a s circui t justic e in California , a guardia n o f huma n right s throug h du e process . See , generally, Graham , "Justic e Fiel d an d th e Fourteent h Amendment, " in Everyman's Constitution, pp. 98-151 . Fiel d wa s als o no t a principle d opponent o f th e exercis e o f th e polic e powe r agains t corporations . Se e his opinio n fo r a unanimou s Cour t i n Missour i Pacifi c Ry . Co . v . Humes, 11 5 U.S . 51 2 (1885) , i n whic h h e quote s an d affirm s th e Court's Davidson languag e abou t litigants ' "strang e misconceptio n o f the scope " o f du e process ; and , contrar y t o th e implicatio n o f Bradley's concurrenc e i n Davidson, whic h woul d us e du e proces s t o protect agains t "arbitrary , oppressive , an d unjust " laws , Fiel d held , i n Humes, tha t i f law s wer e "withi n th e legitimat e spher e o f legislativ e power" an d enforce d wit h "securit y o f privat e rights " i n mind , the n "the harshness , injustice , an d oppressiv e characte r o f suc h law s wil l not invalidat e the m a s affectin g life , liberty , o r propert y withou t du e process o f law. " 11 5 U.S . a t 520 . 74. Chicago , M . & St . P . Ry . Co . v . Minnesota , 13 4 U.S . 418 . 75. 13 4 U.S . a t 458 . Justice Bradle y dissented , protestin g tha t th e Cour t in effec t ha d overturne d Mun n v . Illinois . "Th e importan t questio n always is, " h e wrote , "wha t i s th e lawfu l tribuna l fo r th e particula r case?" 13 4 U.S . a t 465 . Hi s answe r i n thi s cas e was , a s th e Cour t ha d asserted i n Munn, th e legislature . Se e als o Smyt h v . Ames , 16 9 U.S . 446 (1898) , th e cas e i n whic h th e Cour t stipulate d a particula r accounting metho d fo r determinin g "unreasonableness " o f rate s an d thereby deprivatio n o f propert y withou t du e proces s o f law . 76. Cooley , Constitutional Limitations (6t h ed. ) (Boston , 1890) , p . 208 . Cooley wa s b y n o mean s oppose d i n principl e t o restriction s o n private propert y i n behal f o f th e publi c welfare . See , generally , pp . 429-509, "O f th e Protectio n t o Propert y b y 'Th e La w o f th e Land. ' " For th e governmen t t o tak e propert y fro m A an d giv e i t t o B ha d violated natura l la w o r th e Constitutio n fro m th e beginning . Calde r v. Bull , 3 Dall . 386 , 38 8 (1798) ; Davidso n v . Ne w Orleans , 96 U.S . 97 , 102 (1878) ; Thompso n v . Consolidate d Ga s Utilitie s Corp. , 30 0 U.S . 55, 79-8 0 (1937) . A s a justic e sai d i n dissen t agains t upholdin g a federal la w i n 1917 : "Suc h legislation , i t seem s t o me , amount s t o th e taking o f th e propert y o f on e an d givin g i t t o anothe r i n violatio n o f the spiri t o f fai r pla y an d th e du e proces s clause. " Wilson v . New , 24 3 U.S. 332 , 37 0 (Justic e Day) . 77. Se e generall y Sidne y Fine , Laissez Faire and the Welfare State: a Study of Conflict in American Thought, 1865-1901 (An n Arbor : Univ . o f Michiga n Press, 1956) ; Loren P . Beth , The Development of the American Constitution, 1877-1917 (Ne w York : Harpe r & Row , 1971) ; an d Charle s Grov e

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Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts (Cambridge : Harvar d Univ. Press , 1930) , esp. Chapters V-VII , o n du e proces s and natura l law. 78. Graham , Everyman's Constitution, pp . 23-95, 367-437. 79. Louisvill e R.R. v . Letson, 2 How. 497 (1844) hel d tha t a firm ma y be sued in federal court s where it is incorporated regardles s of where the stockholders live. Graham reports on the unsuccessful attempt s of outof-state insuranc e companie s t o utiliz e th e comit y claus e agains t discriminatory stat e legislatio n i n th e 1850s . Everyman's Constitution, p . 75. 80. Fo r th e us e o f "person " t o includ e corporatio n unde r th e equa l protection clause , se e Sant a Clar a Count y v . Souther n Pacifi c Ry . Co., 11 8 U.S . 394 , 396 (1886) ; fo r th e "corporat e person " under th e due process clause see Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 12 9 U.S. 26, 28 (1889). The Cour t held i n th e abortion cases of 197 3 tha t Fourteenth Amendmen t du e proces s "person " doe s no t includ e th e unborn. Ro e v. Wade, 410 U.S . 113 , 156-59. 81. Tha t histor y was on th e side of the corporations i s evident bot h fro m the fac t tha t corporation s ha d functionall y replace d person s a s th e dominant controller s o f property , an d tha t corporat e interest s ha d become s o powerfu l i n America n society . Afte r fifty year s o f th e constitutional corporat e perso n whe n Justice Blac k (late r joined b y Justice Douglas ) unsuccessfull y trie d t o hal t th e tid e o f history , th e Court pai d hi m littl e attention. Connecticu t Genera l Co . v. Johnson, 303 U.S . 77 , 8 3 (1937 ) (Black , dissenting) ; Wheelin g Stee l Corp . v . Glander, 33 7 U.S . 56 2 (1949 ) (separat e opinio n b y Justic e Jackso n and dissent of Justices Douglas and Black). 82. Th e Cour t wa s aide d b y constitutiona l commentators . Se e Clyd e E . Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts: The Influence of Thomas M. Cooley, Christopher G. Tiedeman, and John F. Dillon upon American Constitutional Law (Berkeley : Univ. o f Californi a Press , 1954) . I n general , se e Margaret Spahr , "Natura l Law , Du e Process , an d Economi c Pres sure," 24 Am. Pol . Sci. Rev. 332-5 4 (1930). 83. 98N.Y . 98 . 84. Allgeye r v. Louisiana , 16 5 U.S . 578 . The interstat e commerc e aspec t of the case was not crucia l i n th e holding . Th e Cour t ha d hel d thre e decades earlie r tha t th e interstat e insuranc e busines s coul d b e regulated b y state s i n disregar d o f apparen t commerc e claus e problems. Pau l v . Virginia, 8 Wall. 16 8 (1868). 85. Allgeye r v. Louisiana, 16 5 U.S. a t 589. 86. 19 8 U.S. 45(1905). 87. 19 8 U.S. at 57. 88. Holde n v. Hardy, 16 9 U.S. 36 6 (1898).

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89. 19 8 U.S . a t 76 . 90. Th e leadin g contemporar y examinatio n an d critiqu e agains t th e Court's doctrin e wa s Rosco e Pound , "Libert y o f Contract, " 1 8 Yal e L. J. 454-8 7 (1909) , reactin g agains t th e transfe r o f libert y o f contrac t from th e Fourteent h t o th e Fift h Amendmen t du e proces s claus e i n the federa l "yellow-dog " contrac t case , Adai r v . Unite d States , 20 8 U.S. 16 1 (1908) . Bu t a powerfu l warnin g agains t uncontaine d constitutional use s o f "liberty " ha d bee n issue d i n 189 1 b y Charle s E . Shattuck, "Th e Tru e Meanin g o f th e Ter m * Liberty' i n thos e Clause s in th e Federa l an d Stat e Constitution s whic h Protec t 'Life , Liberty , and Property, ' " 4 Harv . L . Rev . 365-92 . Shattuc k argue d fo r a restrictive, tha t i s traditional, us e of libert y o n th e ground s tha t i t ha d always referre d t o physica l restrain t i n a crimina l process ; tha t i t would, i f broadened t o includ e religiou s liberty , necessaril y impl y tha t such a libert y coul d b e limite d s o lon g a s i t complie d wit h du e proces s requirements; an d tha t societ y shoul d no t b e hindere d fro m meetin g the evil s o f moder n workin g condition s b y reworke d constitutiona l language. The Lochner majority's implie d invitatio n t o prov e th e validit y o f the means-en d relationshi p le d t o th e Brandei s brie f an d th e upholding o f a n Orego n hour s la w fo r women . Mulle r v . Oregon , 20 8 U.S. 41 2 (1908) . A la w o f th e sam e stat e applicabl e t o al l worker s wa s upheld i n Buntin g v . Oregon, 24 3 U.S . 42 6 (1917 ) b y th e sam e means . But th e Brandei s brief , thoug h acknowledge d b y th e Cour t fo r it s aid , was n o guarante e o f constitutiona l vindication . I n Adkin s v . Chil dren's Hospital , a five-man Cour t returne d t o Lochner, stressing tha t "freedom o f contrac t i s th e genera l rul e an d restrain t th e exception. " 261 U.S . 525 , 54 6 (1923) . Th e dissent s i n Adkins parallele d thos e i n Lochner. Chie f Justice Taft , a s Harla n earlier , wa s concerne d wit h th e "evils o f th e sweatin g system. " Justice Holme s note d tha t "libert y o f contract" wa s no t Fourteent h Amendmen t languag e bu t ha d bee n developed "withi n ou r memory. " "I t is, " h e continued , "merel y a n example o f doin g wha t yo u wan t t o do , embodie d i n th e wor d 'liberty.' " 261 U.S. , a t 562 , 568 . 91. Wes t Coas t Hote l Co . v . Parrish , 30 0 U.S . 379 , 39 1 (1937) . Nebbi a v . New York , 29 1 U.S . 50 2 (1934) , i n endin g th e constitutiona l usefulness o f th e doctrin e o f a busines s "affecte d wit h a publi c interest," foreshadowe d West Coast Hotel o n du e process ; bu t Roberts' s opinion i n Nebbia doe s no t matc h th e swee p o f Hughes' s i n th e late r case. 92. 30 0 U.S . a t 391 . 93. Ibid . (Emphasi s added. ) Suc h languag e wa s no t invente d b y Hughe s for th e occasion . A s associat e justic e i n 191 1 h e ha d writte n fo r a

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unanimous Court , i n a railroa d injur y case : "Libert y implie s th e absence of arbitrary restraint , no t immunit y fro m reasonabl e regula tions an d prohibition s impose d i n th e interest s o f th e community. " Chicago, B. & Q. R . Co. v. McGuire, 319 U.S. 549, 567. A year prior to West Coast Hotel, Justice Stone , dissenting , ha d depicte d th e consequences o f th e freedo m o f contrac t theor y an d state d th e solution: "There is a grim irony in speaking of the freedom of contract of those who, because of their economic necessities , give thei r services for less than i s needful t o kee p bod y an d sou l together . Bu t i f thi s i s freedom o f contract n o one ha s ever denied tha t i t i s freedom whic h may be restrained, notwithstanding th e Fourteenth Amendment, b y a statute passed in the public interest. " Morehead v . Tipaldo, 298 U.S . 587,632(1936). 94. Brandei s wa s evidentl y tor n betwee n wantin g t o excis e th e du e process clause fro m th e Constitutio n entirel y becaus e o f th e har m i t had worke d o n socia l legislatio n a t th e hand s o f th e judiciary, an d recognizing tha t th e claus e migh t ye t b e canalize d i n tha t are a through the technique of the Brandei s brie f while bein g developed t o promote first amendmen t liberties . For the Justice's view i n 1924 , see Louis L. Jaffe, "Wa s Brandeis an Activist? The Search fo r Intermediate Premises, " 8 0 Harv . L . Rev . 986 , 98 9 (1967) . Thi s wa s a t th e height o f th e controversy ove r a constitutional amendmen t propose d by Senato r LaFollett e whic h woul d hav e permitte d a two-third s congressional vot e t o overtur n a Suprem e Cour t decision . Th e purpose wa s t o restrai n th e Court' s us e o f substantiv e du e process . Felix Frankfurter, in an anonymous New Republic editorial at the time, supported the amendment: "We have had fifty year s experiment wit h the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . The due process clause ought t o go." Frankfurter, Law and Politics (Ne w York : Harcourt , Brace , 1939) , p . 16. A n exampl e o f Brandeis' s "brief " at th e tim e i s hi s unsuccessfu l attempt t o persuad e th e Cour t tha t a state coul d prescrib e standar d weights fo r brea d withou t deprivin g companie s o f propert y withou t due process. Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (dissent). 95. Gilber t v. Minnesota , 25 4 U.S. 325, 343. 96. Trua x v. Corrigan, 257 U.S . 312 , 329 (1921). 97. Meye r v. Nebraska, 262 U.S . 390 , 399 (1923). 98. Gitlo w v . Ne w York , 26 8 U.S . 652 . Gitlow overturne d a passin g remark t o the opposite effect whic h th e Court ha d issue d thre e years earlier. Prudentia l Lif e Insuranc e Co . v . Cheek , 25 9 U.S . 530 , 54 3 (1922). 99. "Th e New 'Liberty' Under the Fourteenth Amendment," 30 Harv. L. Rev. 431, 441 (1926) . (Emphasis i n original.) 100. Warre n recognized , thoug h h e di d no t advocate , tw o othe r avenue s

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that woul d mor e cleanl y secur e th e Firs t Amendmen t freedom s against stat e infringement : a reversa l o f Barro n v . Baltimore , an d a new understandin g o f th e privilege s o r immunitie s claus e o f th e Fourteenth Amendment . Justic e Brandei s ha d propose d a varian t o f this secon d cours e o f reasonin g i n Gilber t v . Minnesota , 25 4 U.S . 325 , 337 (1920 ) (dissent ) b y wa y o f th e privilege s an d immunitie s claus e o f Article IV . 101. Concurrin g i n Whitne y v . California , 27 4 U.S . 357 , 37 3 (1927) . 102. See , generally , Henr y J . Abraham , Freedom and the Court: Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States (2 d ed. ) (Ne w York : Oxfor d Univ . Press, 1972) , pp . 29-88 , "Th e Bil l o f Right s an d It s Applicabilit y t o the States. " A boo k o f enormou s industr y tha t cover s th e transitio n period i s Virgini a Wood , Due Process of Law 1932-1949; The Supreme Court's Use of a Constitutional Tool (Baton Rouge : Louisian a Stat e Univ . Press, 1951) . Th e principa l chapter s o f th e boo k discus s du e proces s and th e Firs t Amendment , socioeconomi c legislation , crimina l pro ceedings, administrativ e actions , an d th e taxin g power . 103. Rober t G . McCloskey , i n "Economi c Du e Proces s an d th e Suprem e Court: A n Exhumatio n an d Reburial, " 196 2 Sup . Ct . Rev . 34-62 , concludes tha t th e Court' s complet e abandonmen t o f economi c du e process wa s largel y a reactio n t o th e earlie r extremis m o f th e conservatives. Th e bod y o f McCloskey' s essa y i s a discussio n o f attempted distinction s betwee n economi c an d civi l rights . Amon g th e points raise d ar e these : tha t perhap s th e Cour t shoul d decid e i n neither area ; tha t limit s o n expressio n ma y "imping e o n th e huma n personality mor e grievousl y tha n d o law s curbin g economi c liberty " (p. 45) ; tha t mos t men , however , woul d find a righ t t o wor k a t leas t a s vital a s th e righ t t o speak ; tha t socia l progres s o r self-governmen t depends o n freedo m o f expression ; tha t th e Suprem e Cour t ma y b e peculiarly ill-equippe d t o decid e economi c cases ; tha t a numbe r o f cases (e.g. , o n picketin g an d occupationa l licensing ) mi x th e tw o areas; an d tha t th e Cour t ma y hav e sufficien t constitutiona l an d political burden s withou t reenterin g th e provinc e o f economi c du e process. 104. 30 4 U.S . 144 . 105. Th e thre e paragraph s o f th e footnot e indicate d tha t th e Cour t migh t not presum e th e constitutionalit y o f governmen t act s i n th e followin g areas, whic h wer e essentiall y noneconomic : specifi c prohibition s o f the Constitution ; restriction s o n th e politica l proces s (e.g. , voting , expression, an d politica l organization) ; an d act s directe d a t religion s or minorities . 106. Stat e courts, however , di d no t a t th e tim e an d hav e no t sinc e followe d

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the nationa l Court' s capitulation . Se e th e revie w article s [note ] "Stat e Views o n Economi c Du e Process : 1937-1953, " 53 Colum . L . Rev . 827 45 (1953) ; an d Monra d G . Paulsen , "Th e Persistenc e o f Substantiv e Due Proces s i n th e States, " 34 Minn . L . Rev . 91-11 8 (1950) . A wide ranging an d thoroug h discussio n tha t focuse s o n on e stat e i s Han s Linde, "Withou t 'Du e Process' : Unconstitutiona l La w i n Oregon, " 4 9 Ore. L . Rev . 125-87(1970) . 107. Ferguso n v . Skrupa , 37 2 U.S . 726 , 729 , 730 , 73 2 (1963) . Se e als o Justice Frankfurter , concurrin g i n America n Federatio n o f Labo r v . American Sas h Co. , 33 5 U.S . 538 , 542-5 7 (1949) , i n whic h th e forme r New Dea l advise r distinguishe d economi c legislation , whic h th e courts shoul d no t meddl e with , fro m "matter s lik e censorshi p o f th e press or separation o f Church an d State , i n which history , throug h th e Constitution, speak s s o decisively a s t o forbi d legislativ e experimenta tion." 33 5 U.S . a t 550 . 108. "Th e onl y relevan t functio n o f la w i n dealin g wit h thi s intersectio n o f government an d enterprise, " wrot e Justice Frankfurte r i n 1939 , "is t o secure th e observance o f thos e procedura l safeguard s i n th e exercis e o f legislative power s whic h ar e th e histori c foundatio n o f du e process. " Driscoll v . Ediso n Ligh t an d Powe r Co. , 30 7 U.S . 104 , 12 2 (concur ring). Justic e Cardozo , fa r les s charitably , wrot e tha t a regulator y commission mus t se t revenu e "somethin g highe r tha n th e lin e o f confiscation. I f thi s leve l i s attaine d . . . ther e i s no t denia l o f du e process thoug h th e proceedin g i s sho t throug h wit h irregularit y o r error." Wes t Ohi o Ga s Co . v . Publi c Utilitie s Commission , 29 4 U.S . 63,70(1935). 109. 30 2 U.S . 319 , 32 5 (1937) . Althoug h Justic e Cardozo' s discussio n i s elaborate an d renowned , i t pay s littl e attentio n t o tw o issue s whic h would see m t o b e o f importance , th e relatio n betwee n th e Fift h an d Fourteenth Amendmen t du e proces s clauses , an d th e significanc e o f federal privilege s an d immunitie s i n th e determinatio n o f constitu tional requirement s o n th e states . 110. Anothe r schem e fo r classifyin g right s ha d bee n propose d a t th e tur n of th e centur y i n th e Insular Cases. There , th e Cour t note d a distinction betwee n "natural " an d "artificial " rights , bot h i n th e Constitution, bu t th e latte r peculia r t o America n jurisprudence . Among th e natura l right s liste d wer e Firs t Amendmen t freedoms , Fourth an d Eight h Amendmen t immunities , acces s t o th e courts , an d the righ t t o du e proces s o f law . Artificia l right s include d th e franchis e and unidentifie d "particula r method s o f procedure. " Downe s v . Bidwell, 18 2 U.S . 244 , 282-8 3 (1901) . Howeve r distinguished , th e tw o grades o f right s se t th e scen e fo r a doubl e standar d withi n th e

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province o f civi l liberties , th e contemporar y ide a o f "preferre d freedoms." Se e Rober t B . McKay , "Th e Preferenc e fo r Freedom, " 3 4 N.Y.U.L. Rev . 1182-122 7 (1959) . A fe w month s befor e th e Palko doctrin e wa s announced , Chie f Justice Hughe s ha d achieve d substantiall y th e sam e resul t withou t relying o n th e Bil l o f Rights . H e wrot e simply , "Freedo m o f speec h and o f th e pres s ar e fundamenta l right s whic h ar e safeguarde d b y th e due proces s claus e o f th e Fourteent h Amendment . . . ." Dejong e v . Oregon, 29 9 U.S . 353 , 36 4 (1937) . Thi s lef t ope n th e possibilit y tha t criminal procedur e right s wer e als o fundamental . Th e Fourteent h Amendment en d o f th e funne l ca n als o b e opened , a s Justice Dougla s has noted : "Th e Cour t ha s frequentl y reste d stat e fre e speec h an d fre e press decision s o n th e Fourteent h Amendmen t generall y rathe r tha n on th e Du e Proces s Claus e alone. " Lehma n v . Shake r Heights , 41 8 U.S. 298 , 30 5 n . 1 (1974) (concurring) . 111. 33 2 U.S . 46 . Se e th e rebutta l o f Charle s Fairman , "Doe s th e Fourteenth Amendmen t Incorporat e th e Bil l o f Rights ? Th e Origina l Understanding," 2 Stan . L . Rev . 5-13 9 (1949) , an d generally , th e introduction b y Leonar d Lev y t o The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights: the Incorporation Theory (Ne w York : D a Cap o Press , 1970) . Justice Blac k wa s neve r convinced . Se e hi s concurrin g opinio n i n Duncan v . Louisiana , 39 1 U.S . 145 , 162-7 1 (1968 ) an d th e chapte r "Due Proces s o f Law " i n hi s A Constitutional Faith (Ne w York : Knopf , 1969), esp . pp . 33-34 . 112. 33 2 U.S . a t 63 . Whethe r intende d a s a condensatio n o f th e Bil l o f Rights o r not, th e migratio n o f th e du e proces s claus e fro m a comple x context t o a simple r on e i n th e Constitutio n i s reminiscen t o f Magn a Carta's combinin g Chapte r 3 9 an d 4 0 o f th e documen t o f 121 5 int o Chapter 2 9 o f th e 122 5 an d late r version s o f th e Charter . In hi s positio n o n th e righ t o f th e state s t o develo p crimina l procedures differen t fro m eac h other , tha t is , o n th e positiv e valu e o f federalism, Justice Frankfurte r wa s influence d b y th e ol d Court' s du e process tendencies . H e ha d agree d wit h a n opinio n o f Justice Jackso n a fe w yea r earlier : "Th e us e o f th e du e proces s claus e t o disabl e th e States i n th e protectio n o f societ y fro m crim e i s quit e a s dangerou s and delicat e a us e of federa l judicial powe r a s t o us e i t t o disable the m from socia l o r economic experimentation. " Ashcraf t v . Tennesse e 32 2 U.S. 143 , 17 4 (1944 ) (dissent) . 113. Dissentin g i n Adamson at 123-25 . Justice Douglas , wh o concurre d wit h Justice Blac k i n Adamson, later sai d o f Justices Murph y an d Rutledge : "Perhaps the y wer e right. " Do e v . Bolton , 410 U.S . 179 , 212, n . (1973 ) (concurring).

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114. 33 2 U.S . a t 66 . Se e als o Frankfurter , "Memorandu m o n 'Incorpora tion' o f th e Bil l o f Right s int o th e Du e Proces s Claus e o f th e Fourteenth Amendment, " 7 8 Harv . L . Rev . 746-8 3 (1965) . Th e "Memorandum" i s fo r th e mos t par t a compilatio n o f cases . 115. Se e Loui s Henkin , "'Selectiv e Incorporation ' i n th e Fourteent h Amendment," 7 3 Yal e L.J . 74-8 9 (1963) . I n a comprehensiv e articl e that appeare d shortl y afte r th e Adamson cas e wa s decided , Joh n Raeburn Gree n anticipate d muc h o f Brennan' s positio n an d Henkin' s critique. "Th e Bil l o f Rights , th e Fourteent h Amendmen t an d th e Supreme Court, " 4 6 Mich . L . Rev . 869-91 0 (1948) . Se e als o Justic e Frankfurter i n Adamson, 332 U.S . a t 65 . 116. On e exception , traditionall y hel d u p a s proof tha t th e tota l incorpora tion theor y wa s no t reall y sensible , i s th e righ t preserve d b y th e Seventh Amendmen t fo r a jury tria l i n federa l civi l suit s i n whic h th e value i n controvers y exceed s twent y dollars . Two o f th e significan t overrulings , nationalizin g th e Bil l o f Right s by absorbin g int o th e Fourteent h Amendmen t formerl y unabsorbe d provisions, or , mor e accurately , formerl y unabsorbe d interpretations , concern th e righ t t o counse l i n felon y case s (Gideo n v . Wainwright , 372 U.S . 33 5 [1963 ] overrulin g Bett s v . Brady , 31 6 U.S . 45 5 [1942]) , and th e righ t t o introduc e int o tria l evidenc e unconstitutionall y seized (Map p v . Ohio , 37 6 U.S . 64 3 [1961 ] overrulin g Wol f v . Colorado, 33 8 U.S . 2 5 [1949]) . I n th e righ t t o counse l case , th e flexibility o f Justice Frankfurter' s du e proces s theor y permitte d i t t o "catch up " t o Justic e Black' s goals ; a t leas t Frankfurte r i s reported , from retirement , t o hav e agree d wit h th e ne w outcome . Anthon y Lewis, Gideon's Trumpet (New York : Rando m House , 1964) , p . 222 . The Cour t provide s a summar y o f incorporate d provision s an d cases i n Dunca n v . Louisiana , 39 1 U.S . 145 , 147-4 9 (1968) , probabl y the final cas e t o tak e up , ful l scale , throug h fou r opinions , th e variou s incorporation arguments . A s Justic e Blac k state s i n hi s dissent , although absorptio n o r incorporatio n ha s bee n fough t almos t ex clusively i n term s of due process , i t i s as historical—no t t o say logical — to invok e th e privilege s o r immunitie s claus e fo r th e purpose ; onl y th e burden o f the Slaughterhous e Case s ha s kep t i t fro m risin g t o thi s end . Justice Harlan' s dissen t i n Duncan i s th e mos t balance d an d com prehensive discussio n o f th e incorporatio n proble m an d Fourteent h Amendment du e proces s t o b e issue d fro m th e Court . Explaining , bu t opposing, bot h th e selectiv e an d tota l incorporatio n approaches , Justice Harla n accepte d th e "gradua l view " a s th e mainstrea m o f Court preceden t an d constitutiona l history , th e vie w o f Davidso n v . New Orleans , Maxwel l v . Dow , Palk o v . Connecticut , an d Justic e

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Frankfurter i n Adamso n v . California . Th e importan t poin t abou t th e relation betwee n th e Bil l o f Right s an d th e Fourteent h Amendmen t due proces s clauses , wrot e Harlan , u is th e fac t tha t th e Bil l o f Right s is evidence , a t variou s points , o f th e conten t American s find i n th e term 'liberty ' an d o f America n standard s o f fundamenta l fairness. " 391 U.S . 145 , 17 7 (1968) . An importan t recen t disput e ove r incorporatio n continue s th e particular issu e o f Duncan— whether stat e jury tria l requirement s mus t be identica l t o federa l requirements , i n thi s instanc e whethe r th e jur y must b e unanimou s t o convic t i n a crimina l case . Wit h respec t t o federal juries , th e Sixt h Amendmen t i s silent . Fou r member s o f th e Court hel d tha t neithe r th e Sixt h no r th e Fourteent h Amendmen t requires unanimity . Fou r member s hel d tha t th e Sixt h Amendmen t does an d therefor e th e Fourteent h Amendmen t must . Justice Powell , in th e traditio n o f Justice Frankfurte r an d th e secon d Justic e Harlan , argued tha t Fourteent h Amendmen t du e proces s i s no t identica l t o the meanin g o f th e Bil l o f Rights . H e therefor e provide d th e crucia l vote, holdin g tha t du e proces s di d no t requir e unanimit y i n stat e criminal trials , bu t tha t th e Sixt h Amendmen t require d i t i n federa l courts. Johnson v . Louisiana , 40 6 U.S . 35 6 (1972) . 117. McNab b v . Unite d States , 31 8 U.S . 332 , 34 7 (1943) . 118. Wallac e Mendelson , Conflict in the Court (Chicago: Univ . o f Chicag o Press, 1961 ) presents , i n shar p terms , th e jurisprudentia l contras t between Justice s Blac k an d Frankfurter . 119. No t onl y di d th e America n judiciar y finally reac t agains t substantiv e due process , bu t othe r countries , i n th e cours e o f draftin g thei r constitutions, als o reacte d agains t it . O n th e on e han d the y feare d th e development o f a comparabl e judicia l power , an d o n th e othe r the y had a n interes t i n socialis m o r socia l welfar e legislatio n whic h th e American framers—an d America n judges—definitel y di d no t share . No matte r ho w benig n th e phras e looked , o r how confine d t o crimina l proceedings it s ancestry , du e proces s o f la w ha s no t ha d th e allur e fo r others tha t i t ha s ha d i n th e Unite d States . In England , wher e on e migh t hav e though t du e proces s woul d thrive, th e phras e "ha s receive d practicall y n o judicial constructio n i n litigated cases. " Hugh Evande r Willis , "Due Proces s of La w unde r th e United State s Constitution, " 7 4 U . Pa . L . Rev . 331 , 334 (1926) . Whe n other countrie s hav e frame d constitutiona l documents , th e America n experience wit h du e proces s ha s le d t o carefull y circumscribin g o r avoiding th e phras e altogether . Wallac e Mendelson , i n "Foreig n Reactions t o America n Experienc e wit h 'Du e Proces s o f Law, ' " 4 4 Va. L . Rev . 493-50 3 (1955 ) systematicall y present s man y o f thes e

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instances. H e quote s Lor d Bryc e defendin g a du e proces s claus e fo r the Governmen t o f Irelan d Bil l i n 189 3 i n languag e tha t make s on e wonder abou t Bryce' s understandin g o f America : "W e ar e dealin g with words which hav e received i n the Courts of the United State s a perfectly clear , perfectl y uniform , perfectl y definite , an d perfectl y unambiguous construction. " Ibid. , p . 495 . Th e bill , wit h it s du e process clause, was not enacted. Prime Minister Asquith, on the other hand, oppose d a du e proces s claus e wit h fa r mor e insigh t abou t American practice s (an d afte r twent y year s mor e history) . Du e process language , h e argue d i n th e debat e ove r th e Governmen t o f Ireland Bill of 1914 , is "full o f ambiguity abounding with pitfalls and certainly provocativ e o f ever y kin d o f frivolou s litigation . . .. I f yo u introduce int o you r Bil l a limitatio n o f thi s kin d . .. yo u ar e reall y enthroning th e judiciary a s th e ultimat e tribuna l o f appeal. Ther e i s no question whatever about that. Look at what is going on now in the United States. " Ibid., p. 496. The claus e i n th e draf t constitutio n fo r Indi a wa s modifie d fro m "life or liberty without due process of law" to "life or personal libert y except accordin g t o procedure established b y law. " Ibid., p . 497. Fo r Felix Frankfurter' s rol e i n droppin g th e du e proces s claus e fro m th e draft o f th e India n constitutio n se e B . Shiv a Ra e (ed.) , India's Constitution in the Making (Madras : Orien t Longmans , 1960) , p . 303 , cited i n Theodor e L . Becke r (ed.) , Political Trials (Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill, 1971) , p. 39 n. Property had already been deleted from the clause i n th e socialist-leanin g constitution , an d no w th e ghos t o f liberty o f contrac t wa s exorcised. On e delegat e t o th e constitutiona l convention said of the first wording: "This clause may serve as a great handicap fo r al l socia l legislation , fo r th e ultimat e relationshi p between employe r an d labour , fo r th e protectio n o f children an d fo r the protectio n o f women. " Quote d i n Willia m O . Douglas , We the Judges (Garde n City , N.Y. : Doubleday , 1956) , p . 27 3 n . Th e India n Supreme Cour t ha s hel d tha t th e "deliberat e omissio n o f th e wor d 'due* lent strength t o the contention tha t th e reasonablenes s o f a law was no t a justiciabl e questio n unde r th e India n Constitution. " Nobushige Uka i an d Nathanie l L . Nathanson , "Protectio n o f Prop erty Rights and Due Process of Law in the Japanese Constitution," 43 Wash. L . Rev. 1129 , 113 3 (1968). Fo r commentary o n du e proces s of law in British colonies which became independent nation s in the midtwentieth century, see Thomas M . Franck , "Due Proces s in Developing Nations," in Bernar d Schwart z (ed.) , The Fourteenth Amendment: A Century in American Law and Life (New York : Ne w Yor k Univ . Press , 1970), pp. 192-203.

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The Israeli draft constitutio n states : "No one shall b e tried save by due proces s of law, " restricting th e phras e t o it s traditional use . Th e West Germa n Basi c Law , drafte d unde r American , i f no t Ne w Dea l eyes, separate s an d clarifie s th e concept s o f propert y an d liberty . Article 1 4 states : "Propert y an d th e righ t o f inheritanc e ar e safe guarded. Their scop e an d limitation s ar e determined b y legislation. " (Although th e second sentence seems intended t o qualify an d explai n the first , th e us e o f "legislation " woul d see m a t th e sam e tim e t o restrict th e judiciary.) Traditiona l du e process , o n th e othe r hand , reads this way (Articl e 104) : "The freedo m o f th e individua l ma y b e restricted only on the basis of a formal la w and onl y wit h due regard to the forms prescribed therein . .. . " The Japanese Constitutio n o f 1946 , drafte d unde r th e supervisio n of Genera l MacArthur' s lawyers , i s eve n mor e influence d b y th e American experience . Fo r instance , th e "righ t t o ow n o r t o hol d property i s inviolable" (Article 29) , but th e "right t o life , libert y an d the pursui t o f happines s shal l b e th e suprem e consideratio n i n legislation and in other governmental affairs , to the extent tha t it does not interfer e wit h th e publi c welfare. " (Articl e 13) . Th e traditiona l due proces s concern read s (Article 31); "No perso n shal l b e deprive d of lif e o r liberty , no r shal l an y othe r crimina l penalt y b e imposed , except accordin g t o procedur e establishe d b y law. " Se e Uka i an d Nathanson, "Protection o f Property Rights, " esp. p. 1131. In 1974 , whe n Australi a debate d th e desirabilit y o f adoptin g a national bil l of rights, one of its most prominen t jurists (and frien d o f Felix Frankfurter) , forme r Prim e Ministe r Si r Rober t Menzies , "questioned whethe r Australian s woul d lik e t o hav e thei r right s guaranteed b y 'somewha t vagu e phrases, ' interprete d b y judge s i n accordance largel y wit h thei r ow n politica l convictions . Moder n experience i n th e Unite d State s ha s show n th e broadl y expresse d guarantees o f individua l right s hav e recentl y bee n interprete d b y their Supreme Court in the light of the political and social concepts of the judges, whos e judgments will , i n ver y truth , b e legislative. " New York Times, Marc h 24, 1974 , p. 10. 120. In th e Lega l Tende r Cases , th e Cour t hel d invali d o n contrac t grounds (a s wel l a s o n independen t Fift h Amendmen t du e proces s grounds) th e issuanc e o f greenback s durin g th e Civi l War . Hepbur n v. Griswold , 8 Wall . 603 , 622-23 (1870 ) (overturne d i n Kno x v . Lee , 12 Wall . 45 7 (1871)) . Whe n th e Court , throug h Justic e Brandeis , unanimously overturne d Ne w Dea l legislatio n grantin g mortgag e relief to farmers in the guise of a bankruptcy act , it also in effect rea d the contract claus e into the Fift h Amendment . Louisvill e Joint Stoc k

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Land Ban k v. Radford , 29 5 U.S . 55 5 (1935) . On th e other hand , th e Court held the New Deal gold clause legislation constitutiona l i n part on th e opposit e reasoning—th e absenc e o f a federa l contrac t clause . Norman v . Baltimore an d Ohi o Rr . Go. 294 U.S . 240 , 306-11 (1935) . In Choat e v . Trapp, 22 4 U.S . 66 5 (1912) , th e Cour t hel d tha t a privilege o f ta x exemptio n onc e grante d b y th e federa l governmen t could no t b e rescinde d becaus e o f th e du e proces s clause : th e exemption amounted to a contract, which was property and had to be treated as such under substantive du e proces s As to equal protection , the Court i n the Japanese Evacuatio n case s was faced with determining whether race was a constitutionally vali d means of classification b y the federal government . Chief Justice Ston e noted: "Th e Fift h Amendmen t contain s n o equa l protectio n claus e and i t restrain s onl y suc h discriminator y legislatio n b y Congres s a s amounts t o a denia l o f du e process. " Hirabayash i v . Unite d States , 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). But his following sentences show how weak a reed thi s argumen t was , an d Justic e Murphy , whos e attentio n t o detail di d no t alway s matc h hi s vision o f a democratic society , spok e in dissent o f th e "equal protectio n o f th e laws , as guaranteed b y th e Fifth Amendment. " Koremats u v . Unite d States , 32 3 U.S . 214 , 23 5 (1944). In the school desegregation cas e from Washington, D.C. , the Court wrote: "Th e concept s o f equa l protectio n an d du e process , bot h stemming fro m ou r America n idea l o f fairness , ar e no t mutuall y exclusive." Discriminatio n migh t "b e s o unjustifiabl e a s t o b e violative of due process." In the circumstances, since the Constitutio n prohibited the states from maintainin g raciall y segregated schools, "it would b e unthinkabl e tha t th e sam e Constitutio n woul d impos e a lesser duty on th e Federa l Government. " Boilin g v . Sharpe , 34 7 U.S . 497, 499 (1954). See also Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S . 163 , 168 (1964), Shapiro v . Thompson , 39 4 U.S . 618 , 641-4 2 (1972) , Frontier o v . Richardson, 411 U.S . 677, 680 n. 5 (1973), and Johnson v . Robinson , 415 U.S . 361, 364 n. 4(1974). 121. Hamme r v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S . 251 (1918) . 122. Baile y v . Drexel Furnitur e Co. 259 U.S . 20 (1922). 123. Justic e Black, dissenting in such a case in 1949 , wrote: "The judicially directed marc h o f th e du e proces s philosoph y a s a n emancipato r o f business fro m regulatio n appeare d arreste d a fe w year s ago . Th e appearance was illusory. That philosophy continues its march." Hood v. DuMond, 336 U.S . 525, 562. 124. I n Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots, 330 U.S. 552 (1947), the Court agreed tha t Ne w Orlean s por t pilot s coul d continu e t o choos e thei r

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associates essentiall y b y nepotism , keepin g other s fro m suc h employ ment. Se e als o Railwa y Expres s Agenc y v . Ne w York , 33 6 U.S . 10 6 (1949), i n whic h th e Court , an d Justic e Jackson , concurring , discus s the difference s betwee n du e proces s an d equa l protection . Th e "ne w substantive equa l protection " i s discussed i n th e tex t below . 125. Justic e Whit e dissentin g i n Robinso n v . California , 37 0 U.S . 660 , 68 9 (1962). 126. "Th e Equa l Protectio n o f th e Laws, " 3 7 Calif . L . Rev . 341 , 36 4 (1949). Fo r discussio n i n historica l perspective , se e Wallac e Mendel son, "Fro m Warre n t o Burger : Th e Ris e an d Declin e o f Substantiv e Equal Protection, " 6 6 Am . Pol . Sci . Rev . 1226-3 3 (1972) . Als o Kenneth L . Kars t an d Harol d W . Horowitz , "Reitma n v . Mulkey : A Telophase o f Substantiv e Equa l Protection, " 196 7 Sup . Ct . Rev . 39 80. Fo r discussions o f other substitute s fo r due proces s se e [Note ] "Th e 'New' Thirteent h Amendment : A Preliminar y Analysis, " 82 Harv . L . Rev. 1294-132 1 (1969) ; Willia m O . Bertelsman , "Th e Nint h Amend ment an d Du e Proces s o f Law—Towar d a Viabl e Theor y o f Un enumerated Rights, " 37 U . Cin . L . Rev . 777-9 6 (1968) ; an d Phili p B . Kurland, "Privilege s o r Immunitie s Clause : 'It s Hou r Com e Roun d at Last? " 197 2 Wash . U.L.Q . 405-20 . "[OJnl y th e privilege s o r immunities claus e speak s t o matter s o f substance, " Kurlan d notes , "certainly th e languag e o f du e proces s an d equa l protectio n doe s not." p . 406 . 127. Charle s A . Reich , "Th e Ne w Property, " 7 3 Yal e L.J . 733-8 7 (1964) , i s the mos t influentia l statement . Reic h organize s moder n instance s o f government contro l o f wealth an d argue s fo r th e developmen t o f lega l and constitutiona l theor y t o protec t persona l libert y i n th e fac e o f thi s control. Tw o year s earlier , Arthu r S . Mille r propose d a simila r development i n "A n Affirmativ e Thrus t t o Du e Proces s o f Law? " 3 0 Geo. Wash . L . Rev . 399-42 8 (1962) . Hi s argument , too , wa s base d o n the expansio n o f governmenta l authority . Se e als o Archibal d Cox , "Constitutional Adjudicatio n an d th e Promotio n o f Huma n Rights, " 80 Harv . L . Rev . 91-12 2 (1966) ; Willia m Va n Alstyne , "Th e Demis e of th e Right-Privileg e Distinctio n i n Constitutiona l Law, " 8 1 Harv . L. Rev . 1438-6 4 (1968) , o n a "demise " necessar y befor e th e ne w property coul d b e protected ; Jame s J . Graham , "Povert y an d Substantive Du e Process, " 1 2 Ariz . L . Rev . 1-3 4 (1970 ) whic h discusses bot h th e ol d substantiv e du e proces s an d th e contemporar y reactions t o i t b y Justice s Black , Douglas , an d Harlan ; an d th e exhaustive note , "Th e Growt h o f Procedura l Du e Proces s int o a Ne w Substance: A n Expandin g Protectio n fo r Persona l Libert y an d a 'Specialized Typ e o f Propert y . . . i n ou r Economi c System, ' " 66 Nw .

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L. Rev . 502-5 3 (1971) . A critica l examinatio n o f th e argument s i n these articles , suggestin g amon g othe r thing s tha t equalit y an d th e material well-bein g o f societ y ar e no t philosophicall y o r practicall y compatible goals , i s Ralp h K . Winter , Jr. , "Poverty , Economi c Equality, an d th e Equa l Protectio n Clause, " 197 2 Sup . Ct . Rev . 41102. 128. Leadin g case s includ e Shapir o v . Thompson , 39 4 U.S . 61 8 (1969 ) (one-year residenc y requiremen t fo r welfar e eligibilit y i s invalid) ; Sniadach v . Famil y Financ e Corp. , 39 5 U.S . 33 7 (1969 ) (hearin g required befor e wage s ca n b e froze n unde r a garnishmen t law) ; Goldberg v . Kelly , 39 7 U.S . 25 4 (1970) ; (hearin g require d befor e welfare benefit s can be terminated); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S . 371 (1971) (court fees must be waived for indigents seeking a divorce); U.S. Dept . o f Agricultur e v . Moreno , 41 3 U.S . 52 8 (1973 ) (foo d stamps canno t b e denie d individual s o n th e groun d tha t the y liv e with person s no t legall y relate d t o eac h other) . Justic e Marshall , concurring i n a cas e decide d wit h Moreno, note d tha t hi s analysi s combined "elements traditionally invoke d in what are usually treated as distinct classes of cases, involving due process and equal protection . But th e elements o f fairnes s shoul d no t b e s o rigidl y cabined. " U.S . Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S . 508, 519 (1973). The Sniadach cas e differs fro m th e others listed her e in that th e suit is between private parties. No state largess is involved. Bu t one of the parties, th e creditor, relie d o n a stat e la w t o enforc e a contract, an d the Court, having regard for the ne w property, moder n equalitarian ism, an d th e claim s o f th e poor , decide d tha t th e la w coul d no t b e invoked without adhering to due process requirements. I n general see Allison Dunham, "Due Process and Commercial Law, " 1972 Sup. Ct. Rev. 135-55 . 129. Amon g th e recen t argument s i n du e proces s adjudicatio n i s tha t o f the "irrebuttable presumption." This presumption, by creating a class of persons from which no individual can escape through a demonstration of the presumption's inapplicability i n a particular case, violated current due process standards that a governmental rul e must hav e an individualized rationa l relationshi p t o a valid stat e interes t an d tha t there b e n o "reasonabl e alternativ e means " fo r achievin g th e sam e end. Se e Vlandi s v . Kline , 41 2 U.S . 441 , 452 (1973 ) an d Clevelan d Board o f Educatio n v . LaFleur , 41 4 U.S . 63 2 (1974) . Becaus e a n irrebuttable presumptio n establishe s a class o f persons, equal protec tion reasoning might also have been developed t o meet the argument. The irrebuttabl e presumptio n discussio n ma y fad e fro m constitu tional law , however. See Weinberger v . Salfi, 422 U.S . 74 9 (1975).

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Among th e mos t disma l du e proces s decision s ar e thos e mad e during th e McCarth y er a affectin g aliens . See , e.g. , Justic e Jackson' s discussion o f procedura l du e proces s i n Shaughness y v . Mezei , 34 5 U.S. 206 , 218-24 (1953 ) (dissent) , an d th e severa l opinion s i n Flemin g v. Nestor , 36 3 UJS . 60 3 (1960) , a cas e whic h held , agains t essentiall y substantive du e proces s arguments , tha t socia l securit y right s ar e no t vested. Walte r Gellhor n analyze s a n extensiv e catalo g o f du e proces s problems associate d wit h "Th e Righ t t o Mak e a Living " i n hi s Individual Freedom and Government Restraints (Bato n Rouge : Louisian a State Univ . Press , 1956) , pp . 105-51 . Erwi n N . Griswold , The Fifth Amendment Today (Cambridge : Harvar d Univ . Press , 1955 ) i s a n eloquent statemen t o f th e du e proces s traditio n focuse d o n th e protection o f person s calle d befor e legislativ e investigatin g com mittees. 130. A goo d exampl e o f th e rules-outcom e proble m i n constitutiona l la w i s the determinatio n o f whic h jurisdiction , an d therefor e whic h rules , control a case . See , e.g. , Alfre d Hill , "Th e Eri e Doctrin e an d th e Constitution," 53 Nw . L . Rev . 427 , 449-56 (1958) . Fo r another are a o f law, se e Edmun d M . Morgan , "Rule s o f Evidence—Substantiv e o r Procedural?" 1 0 Vand . L . Rev . 467-8 4 (1957) , whic h propose s tha t judges mol d "outcom e determinativ e rules " t o pee r throug h th e haz e of th e procedure-substanc e relationship . I n spit e o f intimat e connec tion wit h eac h other , procedur e an d substanc e ar e stil l distinguishe d in lega l an d mora l philosophy . See , e.g. , Joh n Rawls , A Theory of Justice (Cambridge : Harvar d Univ . Press , 1971) , p . 59 . 131. Th e deat h penalt y case s o f 197 2 ar e a n instructiv e exampl e o f th e procedure-substance proble m i n civi l liberties . Furma n v . Georgia , 308 U.S . 238 . Fiv e justices hel d capita l punishmen t unconstitutional , but thre e o f the m foun d th e defec t i n procedur e (capriciou s imposi tion o f th e deat h penalty ) an d tw o o f the m i n th e substanc e (n o procedure coul d sav e th e deat h penalty) . Firs t Amendmen t provision s are als o perplexing , fo r bot h a s right s an d i n lawsuit s the y see m t o have th e attribute s o f procedur e a s wel l a s substance . I s fre e speec h a valuable righ t fo r substantiv e o r procedura l reasons ? I f th e Cour t hears a cas e o n th e regulatio n o f loudspeaker s i n publi c parks , i s i t deciding substanc e o r procedure ? Th e traditiona l distinctio n i s no t very usefu l here , an d jurists hav e devise d othe r categorie s o f analysi s in suc h cases . See , generall y Henr y P . Monaghan , "Firs t Amendmen t 'Due Process, ' " 83 Harv . L . Rev . 518-5 1 (1970) . 132. Lync h v . Househol d Financ e Corp . 40 5 U.S . 538 , 552 . I t woul d b e easy t o see the distinctio n betwee n huma n an d propert y right s i n suc h a cas e vanis h i n th e fac e o f a n analysi s base d o n "whos e rights?" —

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formerly th e rights of the wealthy, no w th e right s of the poor . This is not th e languag e th e Cour t normall y speaks , however , eve n thoug h cases fro m Griffi n v . Illinois , 35 1 U.S . 1 2 (1956 ) t o Sa n Antoni o School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S . 1 (1973) focuse d o n poverty as a definin g characteristi c unde r eithe r th e du e proces s o r equa l protection clause . Libert y an d propert y ar e treate d a s separate , though related , concept s i n contemporar y mora l theory . See , e.g. , Rawls, A Theory of Justice,p . 60. 133. Frankfurte r wrot e o n du e process—procedura l du e process—often , particularly during the middle years of his Court tenure. The flavor of what h e believed , an d ho w h e wrote , apar t fro m th e applicatio n t o particular circumstances suc h a s right t o counsel o r the introductio n into tria l o f unconstitutionally-seize d evidence , ma y b e appreciate d from thes e passages: The histor y o f America n freedo m is , in n o smal l measure , the histor y o f procedure. . . . Judicial revie w o f [th e du e process] guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendmen t inescapa bly imposes upon thi s Court a n exercise of judgment upo n the whol e cours e o f th e proceeding s i n orde r t o ascertai n whether the y offen d thos e canon s o f decenc y an d fairnes s which expres s th e notion s o f justic e o f English-speakin g peoples eve n towar d thos e charge d wit h th e mos t heinou s offenses. Malinsk i v . Ne w York , 324 U.S . 401 , 414, 416-17 (1945) (concurring). Due process of law . .. convey s neither formal no r fixed no r narrow requirements . I t i s the compendious expressio n fo r all those rights which th e courts must enforce becaus e the y are basic to our free society. But basic rights do not becom e petrified a s o f an y on e time , eve n though, a s a matte r o f human experience, some may not too rhetorically b e called eternal verities . I t i s of th e ver y natur e o f a fre e societ y t o advance in its standards of what i s deemed reasonabl e an d right. Representing as it does a living principle, due process is not confined withi n a permanent catalogu e o f what ma y at a give n tim e b e deeme d th e limit s o r th e essential s o f fundamental rights . Wol f v . Colorado , 33 8 U.S . 25 , 2 7 (1949). Representing a profound attitud e o f fairness betwee n ma n and man , an d mor e particularl y betwee n individua l an d government, "du e process " i s compounde d o f history ,

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reason, th e pas t cours e o f decisions , an d stou t confidenc e i n the strengt h o f th e democrati c fait h whic h w e possess, . . . Joint Anti-Fascis t Refuge e Committe e v . McGrath , 34 1 U.S. 123 , 16 2 (1951 ) (concurring) . Due proces s i s tha t whic h comport s wit h th e deepes t notions o f wha t i s fai r an d righ t an d just . Selesbe e v . Balcom, 33 9 U.S . 9 , 1 6 (1950 ) (dissent) . On Frankfurter , se e Loui s H . Pollak , "Mr . Justic e Frankfurter : Judgment an d th e Fourteent h Amendment, " 6 7 Yal e L J . 304-4 3 (1957); an d Richar d G . Stevens , "Reaso n an d Histor y i n Judicia l Judgment: Mr . Justic e Frankfurter' s Treatmen t o f Du e Process, " unpub. diss. , Univ. o f Chicago , 1963 . 134. A s t o th e equa l protectio n clause , Harla n evidentl y feare d th e consequences o f fastenin g decision s o n a particula r socia l valu e whic h the Cour t wa s embracing , namel y equality . Se e William s v . Illinois , 399 U.S . 23 5 (1970) . Harlan' s concurrin g opinio n i n th e birt h contro l case, Griswol d v . Connecticut , 38 1 U.S . 47 9 (1965) , relie d o n th e sutstantive du e proces s ground s o f privac y an d rejecte d th e pen umbral right-emanatio n theor y o f th e majority , th e Nint h Amend ment emphasi s o f Justice Goldber g concurring , an d th e restrictiv e du e process view s o f th e dissenters . Justic e Frankfurte r ha d warne d against th e "mischievou s uses " t o whic h a revive d privilege s o r immunities claus e migh t b e pu t i n case s whic h h e fel t amenabl e t o due proces s adjudication . Adamso n v . California , 33 2 U.S . 46 , 6 1 (1947) (concurring) . Se e als o hi s concurrin g opinio n i n Unite d State s v. Lovett , 32 8 U.S . 30 3 (1946) , arguin g fo r a du e proces s solutio n t o a case whic h th e Court , throug h Justice Black , decide d unde r th e bil l o f attainder clause . Fo r a discussio n o f procedura l du e proces s b y Justic e Harlan, se e hi s separat e opinio n i n R e Gault , 38 7 U.S . 1 , 68-7 2 (1967). 135. Ro e v . Wade , 41 0 U.S . 113 . See , generally , Richar d A . Epstein , "Substantive Du e Proces s b y an y Othe r Name : Th e Abortio n Cases, " 1973 Sup . Ct . Rev . 159-85 . Justice Harlan' s mos t extensiv e discussio n of du e process , includin g hi s ne w substantiv e du e process , appear s i n Poe v . Ullman , 36 7 U.S . 497 , 539-5 5 (1961 ) (dissent) . Thi s antedate s the ris e o f th e "ne w property " rights . Justic e Stewart , concurrin g i n the abortio n cases , recognize d th e forc e o f Harlan' s view s whe n h e wrote tha t althoug h th e Cour t ha d "purporte d t o soun d th e deat h knell fo r the doctrine o f substantive du e process " a decade earlier , an d although h e himsel f ha d trie d t o kee p th e knel l ringing , h e ha d become convince d tha t a ne w right—th e righ t o f a woma n t o contro l

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her body—neede d recognitio n unde r du e process . Ro e v . Wade , 41 0 U.S. 113 , 16 7 (1973 ) (concurring) . Laurenc e Trib e believe s tha t th e dissents i n th e abortio n case s ca n b e rea d i n suc h a wa y tha t "th e Court i s evidently unanimou s i n accepting a fairly sweepin g concep t of substantive due process, although various Justices continue to resist that characterization." Tribe, "Toward a Model o f Role s in th e Du e Process of Life an d Law, " 87 Harv . L . Rev. 1 , 5 n. 27 (1973). Chief Justice Burge r an d Justice Rehnquist , th e dissenters , surel y are amon g th e resisters . Se e Chie f Justic e Burger' s dissen t i n Einsenstadt v . Baird , 40 5 U.S . 438 , 46 7 (1972 ) an d th e dissent s o f both justice s i n Vlandi s v . Kline , 41 2 U.S . 44 1 (1973) . Justic e Douglas, in the abortion cases, mentioned three kinds of rights that he thought wer e covere d b y th e Nint h Amendment , th e "Blessing s o f Liberty" i n th e Preamble , an d "liberty " i n th e Fourteent h Amend ment. They ar e a compendium o f contemporary right s outside o f th e new property : "th e autonomou s contro l ove r th e developmen t an d expression o f one' s intellect , interests , tastes , an d personality" ; "freedom o f choic e i n th e basi c decisio n o f one' s lif e respectin g marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, an d the education an d upbringing o f children" ; an d "freedo m t o car e fo r one' s healt h an d person, freedo m fro m bodil y restrain t o r compulsion , freedo m t o walk, stroll , o r loaf. " Do e v . Bolton , 41 0 U.S . 179 , 211-1 3 (1973 ) (concurring). 136. Bradwel l v. Illinois, 1 6 Wall. 13 0 (1873). The Court treate d th e claim under the privileges or immunities clause rather than th e due process clause, but referre d t o the Slaughter-Hous e Cases , just decided , fo r a discussion of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment generally . 137. Mulle r v . Oregon , 20 8 U.S . 41 2 (1908) , deviate d fro m i n Adkin s v . Children's Hospital , 26 1 U.S . 52 5 (1923 ) an d returne d t o i n Wes t Coast Hote l Co . v . Parrish , 30 0 U.S . 37 9 (1937) . Th e protectiv e legislation, considere d a victor y fo r wome n a t th e time , ha s bee n called int o questio n b y th e women' s right s movemen t becaus e i t discriminates between sexes. 138. See , generally, Ronald E. Klipsch, "Aspects of a Constitutional Righ t to a Habitable Environment : Toward s a n Environmenta l Du e Process," 49 Ind. L . J. 203-3 7 (1974) . 139. A n example i s Citizens t o Preserv e Overton Par k v . Volpe , 40 1 U.S . 402 (1971). 140. Sierr a Club v. Morton, 405 U.S . 72 7 (1972). 141. Fo r hi s argument , Justice Dougla s relie d o n Christophe r D . Stone , "Should Tree s Hav e Standing?—Towar d Lega l Right s fo r Natura l Objects," 45 S . Cal. L . Rev. 450-501 (1972) .

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142. Judg e Willia m D . Murra y i n Environmenta l Defens e Fund , Inc . v . Hoerner Waldorf Corp. , No. 1694 , D . Mont. , Aug . 27,197 0 ( 3 Env . L . Reptr. 20794) . A n importan t aspec t o f propert y an d th e environment , traditionally relate d t o due process , i s discussed fro m Magn a Cart a t o the presen t i n Fre d Bosselman , e t al. , The Taking Issue: An Analysis of the Constitutional Limits of Land Use Control (Washington, D.C. : Counci l on Environmenta l Quality , 1973) . When privat e propert y an d America n foreig n polic y clas h an d result i n cour t cases , "th e takin g issue " ma y aris e i n anothe r context . For th e history , se e Willar d Bunc e Cowles , Treaties and Constitutional Law: Property Interferences and Due Process of Law (Washington , D.C. : Public Affair s Press , 1941) . A brie f discussio n whic h doe s no t anticipate th e expansio n o f du e proces s o f la w i n foreig n affair s i s Louis Henkin , Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (Mineola , N.Y. : Foundation Press , 1972) , pp . 255-57 . Thi s i s confirmed wit h respec t t o the expropriatio n o f American-owne d propert y b y foreig n govern ments i n violatio n o f internationa l la w i n Banc o Naciona l d e Cub a v . Sabbatino, 37 6 U.S . 39 8 (1964 ) i n whic h th e Cour t decided , eigh t t o one, no t t o examin e th e validit y o f th e taking . 143. Fou r o f thes e commentarie s deserv e mentio n fo r thei r rang e o f considerations. Althoug h the y ar e no t explicitl y buil t o n on e another , they demonstrat e a n evolutio n fro m Judg e Willia m Hastie' s us e o f traditional categorie s t o propos e ne w human-right s distinction s i n 1956; throug h Leonar d G . Ratner' s ne w categorie s whic h mak e orde r out o f due proces s goal s an d adjudication , an d Harr y H . Wellington' s perception o f th e bearin g o f du e proces s o n th e constitutiona l "allocation o f competences " amon g agencie s o f government ; t o Laurence H . Tribe' s full-scal e proposa l tha t du e proces s b e see n a s th e guide t o a "role-allocatio n model " i n societ y a s a whole . Th e references ar e Hastie , "Judicia l Metho d i n Du e Proces s Inquiry, " i n Arthur E . Sutherlan d (ed.) , Government Under Law (Cambridge : Harvard Univ . Press , 1956) , pp . 326-44; Ratner , "Th e Functio n o f th e Due Proces s Clause, " 11 6 U . Pa . L . Rev . 1048-111 7 (1968) ; Well ington, "Commo n La w Rule s an d Constitutiona l Doubl e Standards : Some Note s o n Adjudication, " 8 3 Yal e L . J . 221-31 1 (1973) ; an d Tribe, "Towar d a Mode l o f Role s i n th e Du e Proces s o f Lif e an d Law," 8 7 Harv . L . Rev . 1-5 3 (1973) , an d "Structura l Du e Process, " 10 Harv . Civ . Rights-Civ . Lib . L . Rev . 269-32 1 (1975) .

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An America n constitutiona l lawye r migh t wel l b e surprise d a t th e elusiveness o f reference s t o th e ter m "du e proces s o f law " i n th e general bod y o f Englis h lega l writing . W e al l recal l (dimly ) it s occurrence i n th e Petitio n o f Righ t i n 162 8 where i t i s linked t o "th e law o f th e land, " a s i t wa s b y Si r Edwar d Coke , wh o spok e o f "th e process o f th e law"—tha t whic h i s carried ou t "i n du e manne r o r b y writ original l o f th e commo n law. " l Toda y on e finds n o spac e devoted t o du e proces s i n Halsbury' s Laws of England, in Stephen' s Commentaries, o r Anson's Law and Custom of the Constitution. Th e phras e rates n o entr y i n suc h work s a s Stroud' s Judicial Dictionary o r Wharton's Law Lexicon. So i t become s a nic e questio n wha t item s i n the lega l an d constitutiona l arrangement s o f th e Unite d Kingdo m might bes t b e discusse d unde r th e du e proces s rubric . Natural justic e i s perhap s to o narro w fo r th e purpose , an d th e rule o f la w to o broad . Nevertheless , th e rul e o f la w probabl y come s nearest t o th e mark . Whe n Dice y popularize d th e phras e i n th e 1880s, it s implication s wer e primaril y th e absenc e o f arbitrar y power o r wid e discretionar y authority . I t als o entaile d th e rejectio n of an y exemptio n fo r particula r classe s o f person s fro m th e dut y o f 69

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obedience t o th e la w whic h govern s citizen s i n general . I n th e 1970 s these question s hav e take n o n a ne w twist . T h e king' s prerogativ e and specia l command s n o longe r threate n th e equa l rul e o f law , bu t other agencie s an d group s hav e lai d claim s t o prerogative s an d powers tha t ma y b e equall y difficul t t o reconcil e wit h th e univer sality o f lega l obligation s an d th e regula r an d certai n applicatio n o f legal principles . Whether w e thin k o f th e rul e o f la w o r o f du e process , w e coul d probably agre e tha t it s element s consis t a t leas t o f th e following : fairness, impartiality , independence , equality , openness , rationality , certainty, an d universality . Parcelin g ou t th e territor y thus , w e ca n at leas t se t of f o n a lightnin g tou r o f th e juridical landscape , pickin g out ne w addition s t o th e skylin e an d markin g th e oddit y o f som e o f the existin g configurations .

I. FAIRNES S The impositio n o f fairnes s b y lega l rule s i s a for m o f restraint , an d since constitutionalis m i s alway s a compromis e betwee n restrain t and liberty , w e migh t expec t fairnes s t o involv e conflic t wit h othe r social value s tha t involv e freedo m fro m restraint . O n e aspec t o f th e contest i s th e fai r tria l versu s fre e speec h dilemma . I n som e ways , a t least, th e balanc e i n th e Unite d Kingdo m ha s obviousl y bee n pushed furthe r i n th e directio n o f protectio n fo r th e tria l proces s than i t ha s i n th e Unite d States . T h e poin t wa s underline d i n 197 3 by th e decisio n o f th e Hous e o f Lord s i n Attorney-General v . Times Newspapers.2 Th e Times se t ou t t o publis h a serie s o f article s o n th e manufacture an d marketin g o f th e dru g thalidomide . On e o f th e articles wa s objecte d t o b y th e manufacturers , th e Distiller s Company. Wha t precisel y wa s it s subjec t matte r i s no t know n sinc e it wa s hel d tha t it s publicatio n woul d hav e constitute d a contemp t by prejudicin g th e tria l o f pendin g action s agains t th e manufac turers. Th e Times argue d i n it s defens e tha t thoug h ther e wa s a public interes t i n th e fai r administratio n o f justice, ther e wa s als o a competing publi c interes t i n fre e discussio n which , eve n i n th e la w of contempt , ough t t o b e weighe d b y th e court . The argumen t seem s t o hav e surprise d Lor d Widger y i n th e Hig h Court sinc e h e suggeste d tha t th e balancin g o f interest s migh t b e a suitable for m o f activit y fo r a n administrativ e bod y bu t wa s no t

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appropriate fo r a cour t exercisin g a judicial function . Thi s straight batting jurisprudence faile d t o carr y th e da y o n appeal , an d whe n the cas e reached th e Hous e o f Lords , Lor d Rei d an d hi s colleague s were prepared t o accept tha t a balance had t o be struck between th e two form s o f publi c interest . Bu t Lor d Simo n added—oddly—tha t the balanc e coul d no t b e struc k ane w i n eac h individua l case . (Where else could i t be struck?) When proceeding s were pending th e paramount interes t la y i n protectin g th e du e administratio n o f justice; this being necessary i n th e word s of Lord Cros s to prevent a gradual slid e toward s tria l b y newspape r o r television . S o n o balance cam e dow n i n favo r o f th e Times, and th e articl e remaine d unpublished. On anothe r par t o f th e contemp t front , however , thing s hav e gone better fo r th e right s of the individual . Direc t contempt s i n th e face o f the court 3 see m n o longe r t o b e viewe d wit h th e traditiona l severity. I n 197 0 a grou p o f Wels h Nationalis t protester s wh o san g and scattere d leaflet s i n cour t wer e merel y boun d ove r and release d after a n appeal. 4 I n earlie r times , missil e throwin g i n cour t ha d more serious consequences as in the case recorded b y Samuel Pepys : "A prisone r bein g condemne d a t Salisbur y fo r a matte r . . . whil e they wer e considerin g t o transpor t hi m t o sav e hi s life , th e fello w flung a great ston e at th e judge, tha t misse d hi m bu t brok e throug h the wainscote . Upo n thi s h e ha d hi s han d cu t of f an d wa s hange d presently." 5 The threa t o f libe l action s a s wel l a s th e contemp t dange r remains, however, a n obstacl e t o th e freedo m o f pres s investigatio n and publication . I t seems ; fo r example , quit e probabl e tha t i f British newspaper s ha d bee n face d wit h th e situation a s it appeare d to th e Washington Post in June 197 2 afte r th e Watergat e break-in , they woul d hav e foun d i t impossibl e t o publish a n analogou s serie s of articles . The impendin g tria l o f th e burglar s woul d hav e place d severe restraint s o n an y inquir y int o th e backgroun d o f th e affai r and n o doubt (sinc e distributors ar e equally i n peril with journalists and publishers ) a grea t man y dangerou s page s woul d hav e ha d t o be tor n fro m importe d copies 6 o f Time, Newsweek, an d othe r incautious alien publications. Secretaries of State, attorneys-general , and publi c officials woul d als o have bee n a t leas t as free a s ordinar y citizens t o sue for defamation . It i s perhap s jus t conceivabl e tha t th e America n doctrin e lai d

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down i n New York Times v . Sulliva n an d it s successor s operate s a little hardl y whe n sprea d ove r ever y possibl e categor y o f publi c servant, bot h electe d an d nonelecte d (no t al l o f who m hav e th e elected politician' s capacit y an d a publi c platfor m fo r counter speech tha t i s sometime s advance d a s a partia l rational e fo r th e freedom t o denounc e publi c officers) . Afte r all , th e doctrin e o f personal liabilit y o f publi c official s fo r thei r wrongfu l act s migh t suggest th e reciproca l entitlemen t t o th e ordinar y remedie s avail able t o fello w subjects . Nevertheless , th e balanc e struc k i n Britai n between fre e commen t an d th e protectio n o f reputatio n i s certainl y over-tender o f bot h publi c an d privat e susceptibilities . Even a loca l governmen t authorit y ha s bee n hel d entitle d t o defend it s reputation . I n 197 2 th e Counci l o f th e seasid e resor t o f Bognor Regi s successfull y sue d a n outspoke n criti c o f it s policies . The defendan t ha d accuse d th e Counci l o f undemocrati c behavio r and "To y Tow n Hitlerism. " Damage s o f 200 0 pound s wer e awarded agains t him , an d hi s cost s wer e i n th e regio n o f 30,00 0 pounds. 7 Almost ever y day , moreover , newspaper s carr y smal l inside-pag e items recountin g th e paymen t o f wha t ar e usuall y calle d "un disclosed sums " i n settlemen t o f action s fo r defamator y report s whose offens e i s generall y som e mino r factua l misstatemen t o r incautious inference . Th e Times o f Jul y 31 , 1974 , fo r example , records tw o suc h episodes . I n one , th e publisher s o f th e New Statesman offe r damage s an d th e cost s o f th e actio n fo r publishin g a suggestion tha t Beaverbroo k Newspaper s ar e intendin g t o ceas e publication o f th e Daily Express ( a particularl y incestuou s exampl e of watchdo g no t bitin g watchdog) . I n th e othe r case , th e Guardian expresses regre t an d make s amend s fo r criticizin g a televisio n program whic h wa s attribute d t o th e wron g televisio n company . I n the sam e issue , a (mercifull y unsuccessful ) attemp t i s reporte d t o commit a journalis t an d newspape r edito r t o priso n fo r contemp t allegedly committe d i n reportin g th e tria l o f seve n wome n charge d with causin g a disturbanc e i n a publi c house . On e offendin g headline ha d referre d t o a "Women's Li b bar-roo m battle, " bu t th e Lord Chie f Justice, afte r du e consideratio n o f a n applicatio n b y th e defendants, rule d tha t th e imputatio n wa s unlikel y t o influenc e th e course o f justice.

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II. IMPARTIALIT Y A N D INDEPENDENC E One topi c give n adde d interes t b y recen t America n constitutiona l history i s th e independenc e o f th e processe s o f justic e an d thei r divorce fro m politica l influenc e o r control . I t i s surprisin g tha t s o fundamental a n issu e shoul d remai n on e o f th e gra y area s o f ou r constitutional law , thoug h ther e ar e a numbe r o f fir m convention s in existence . I n bot h Britai n an d America , th e actua l an d potentia l involvement o f senio r member s o f th e executiv e governmen t i n activities tha t ma y brin g the m int o conflic t wit h th e la w make s i t necessary t o hav e a s muc h clarit y a s possibl e abou t th e exten t t o which thos e wh o ar e i n charg e o f th e machiner y o f prosecutio n an d investigation ma y pursu e thei r activitie s unde r a guarante e o f immunity fro m interference . Th e practica l issue s o n whic h ques tions aris e ar e th e institutio n o r cessatio n o f crimina l investigations , the institutio n an d withdrawa l o f prosecutions , th e grantin g o f immunity fro m prosecution , an d th e genera l policie s an d method s adopted i n th e enforcemen t o f th e law . I n term s o f th e traditiona l categories o f politica l science , thes e ar e i n principl e executiv e functions. Bu t th e discomfor t o f tha t descriptio n i s tha t i t suggest s that executiv e polic y i s ultimately a matte r fo r decision b y executiv e politicians an d tha t ther e shoul d b e som e for m o f accountabilit y t o elected person s fo r decision s tha t ma y hav e importan t politica l consequences. Wha t ha s happene d i s tha t a curiou s an d uncertai n compromise ha s bee n struc k betwee n thes e conclusion s an d a no t fully worke d ou t vie w tha t la w enforcemen t ough t t o shar e som e o f the characteristic s o f th e judicia l function—tha t i t shoul d no t b e subject t o eithe r legislativ e accountabilit y o r executiv e control . Th e implication i s tha t eithe r th e la w enforcemen t functio n shoul d b e a sui generis function standin g outsid e th e legislative-executive-judicia l trinity, o r tha t i t shoul d benefi t fro m som e for m o f interna l separation o f function s withi n th e executiv e branch . In Englan d th e attorne y genera l i s on e o f th e Queen' s minister s who share s th e collectiv e politica l responsibilit y o f th e administra tion an d i s responsibl e t o Parliamen t fo r th e advic e give n t o th e cabinet an d fo r th e action s take n i n hi s name . H e ma y b e questioned i n th e Hous e o f Common s o n th e reason s fo r hi s decisions t o authoriz e o r t o withdra w prosecutions . Bu t ca n th e

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cabinet an d Prim e Ministe r direc t hi m t o exercis e hi s power s i n a particular way ? O n e answe r i s tha t i t woul d no t b e illega l t o d o s o or t o dismis s th e attorne y genera l fo r failur e t o compl y wit h a collective decisio n o f th e cabinet . T h e sanctio n would , a s fo r an y other minister , b e remova l fro m office , formall y b y th e Crown , o n the advic e o f th e prim e minister . I n 191 9 Attorne y Genera l Si r Gordon Hewar t sai d tha t i n relatio n t o prosecution s fo r suc h offenses a s seditio n th e questio n o f prosecutio n wa s on e o f polic y and on e fo r th e consideratio n o f ministers . I n 192 4 th e Labou r cabinet o f Ramse y MacDonal d issue d a n instructio n tha t n o prosecution o f a politica l characte r wa s t o tak e plac e withou t cabinet sanction . Since 1924 , however , whe n MacDonald' s governmen t fel l ove r the issu e o f suspecte d politica l interferenc e t o secur e th e withdrawa l of a prosecution , th e receive d conventio n ha s bee n tha t i t ca n neve r be th e righ t o f a cabine t t o vet o o r t o insis t upo n a prosecutio n though i t i s permissibl e an d eve n a matte r o f dut y fo r th e attorne y general t o see k th e view s o f minister s wher e matter s o f publi c polic y are involved . Suc h a consultatio n occurre d whe n Mr . Heath' s Attorney Genera l Si r Pete r Rawlinso n decide d agains t proceedin g with charge s agains t th e Palestinia n Leil a Khale d fo r offense s committed i n th e cours e o f a n attempte d aircraf t hijacking . I t i s no t clear whethe r consultatio n o n th e publi c polic y aspect s wit h political colleague s implie s tha t suc h colleagues ' view s shoul d b e sought o n th e desirabilit y o f prosecutio n o r whethe r th e consulta tion shoul d b e merel y directe d t o assessin g th e politica l conse quences o f prosecutio n whic h th e attorne y genera l mus t the n weig h in th e balance . A t an y rate , i t wil l b e insiste d tha t th e decisio n mus t be his . If on e wer e t o searc h fo r a possibl e lega l basi s fo r suc h independence, i t migh t b e tha t th e cas e i s stronge r wher e statute s make th e assen t o f th e attorne y genera l o r th e directo r o f publi c prosecutions (wh o work s unde r hi s direction ) necessar y t o th e institution o f a prosecutio n tha n wher e th e attorne y genera l i s exercising hi s prerogativ e powe r t o sto p proceeding s o n indictmen t by enterin g a nolle prosequi. In th e latte r case , th e prerogativ e i s tha t of th e crow n an d th e crow n b y conventio n i s advised o n th e exercis e of th e prerogativ e b y ministers . Luckily England , unlik e Scotlan d an d th e Unite d States , ha s no t

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embraced th e notio n tha t th e prosecutio n functio n ough t t o b e monopolized i n th e hand s o f stat e officials . I n principl e (thoug h there ar e no w man y statutor y exceptions) , anyon e ma y star t a prosecution. A strikin g exampl e occurre d i n 197 4 a t th e tim e o f th e general election . Polic e Constabl e Joy, a policema n o n traffi c patrol , reported a well-know n loca l politicia n fo r a numbe r o f traffi c offenses. Hi s superio r office r decide d no t t o prosecute , bu t P.C . Joy , though charge d wit h a breac h o f polic e discipline , insiste d o n bringing th e prosecutio n himsel f an d obtaine d a conviction . O f course th e principl e o f constabular y independenc e run s wide r tha n the prosecutio n function , embracin g la w enforcemen t decision s generally. I n 196 8 i n R . v . Metropolita n Polic e Commissione r ex parte Blackburn th e Maste r of th e Roll s sai d tha t "ever y constabl e i n the lan d . . . i s independen t o f th e executive . . . . No ministe r o f th e crown ca n tel l hi m h e mus t o r mus t no t kee p observatio n o n thi s place o r that , h e mus t o r mus t no t prosecut e thi s ma n o r that—no r can an y polic e authorit y tel l hi m so . Th e responsibilit y i s o n him . He i s answerabl e t o th e la w an d t o th e la w alone. " 8 Th e lega l an d historical foundation s o f thi s thesi s ar e debatable , bu t i t ha s bee n moderately successfu l i n keepin g politic s ou t o f la w enforcement .

III. EQUALIT Y A N D UNIFORMIT Y Blackburn raised a numbe r of point s about th e equa l applicatio n o f law an d abou t discretio n i n enforcement . Ther e i s roo m fo r puzzlement here . Unifor m enforcemen t canno t mea n automati c prosecution o f every offense , sinc e n o societ y ha s enoug h policemen , and becaus e offense s var y fro m th e murderou s t o th e trivial . Ther e must b e discretio n i n disposin g o f scarc e polic e resource s t o mee t these inheren t difficultie s i n th e impositio n o f lega l sanctions . Ye t i t seems intolerabl e i f thos e whos e dut y i t i s to appl y th e la w pic k an d choose th e law s tha t the y thin k i t necessar y t o enforce. Thi s seem s t o be anothe r dilemm a o f du e process . In 195 1 Si r Hartle y Shawcross , attorne y genera l i n th e Attle e government, said , "I t ha s neve r bee n th e rul e i n thi s countr y . . . that suspecte d crimina l offense s mus t automaticall y b e th e subjec t of prosecution. Th e publi c interes t i s the dominan t consideration. " 9 It ha d bee n suppose d unti l recentl y tha t prosecutor y discretio n could no t b e challenged . Bu t i n 196 8 Mr . Raymon d Blackbur n

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upset tha t assumptio n b y askin g fo r a n orde r t o compe l th e Metropolitan polic e commissione r t o withdra w a polic y instructio n which lai d dow n tha t n o actio n wa s t o b e take n t o detec t offense s i n licensed club s agains t th e Betting , Gamin g an d Lotterie s Ac t o f 1963 unles s ther e ha d bee n complaint s o f cheatin g o r evidenc e tha t criminals wer e regularl y usin g a particula r club . A s a result , polic e observation stopped , an d a n importan t sectio n o f th e ac t wa s no t i n fact enforce d i n Londo n gamin g clubs . Thi s wa s a polic y decisio n that th e exercis e o f enforcemen t was , i n th e uncertai n stat e o f th e law, a n inefficien t us e o f polic e manpower . Mr. Blackburn , however , too k th e vie w tha t th e polic e ha d n o such powe r t o mak e a genera l decisio n no t t o enforc e a particula r part o f th e law . Th e polic e capitulate d an d withdre w th e polic y instruction s o Mr . Blackbur n di d no t ge t hi s mandamus . Th e Cour t of Appea l mad e i t clear , however , tha t the y woul d hav e bee n prepared i n a suitabl e cas e t o enforc e th e performanc e o f a dut y t o enforce th e law . What woul d b e a suitabl e cas e i s unclear. Tw o separat e issue s ar e raised. On e i s whether th e polic e ow e a duty t o th e publi c t o enforc e the la w an d whethe r a decision no t t o prosecut e i n a particula r cas e can b e a breac h o f such duty . Th e othe r issu e i s whether a breac h o f duty ca n b e inferre d merel y b y reaso n o f ther e bein g a genera l policy o f nonprosecutio n i n particula r type s o f case . Thi s latte r vie w would bea r a plausibl e resemblanc e t o th e genera l rul e tha t a bod y on who m a discretio n i s conferre d mus t exercis e i t an d no t disabl e itself fro m exercisin g judgment i n eac h cas e b y a self-fettering polic y rule. Perhap s thi s amount s onl y t o sayin g tha t ther e i s nothin g objectionable abou t formulatin g policie s fo r th e exercis e o f discre tion provide d tha t th e bod y o r perso n exercisin g th e discretio n i s prepared i n eac h cas e t o conside r whethe r ground s exis t fo r makin g an exceptio n t o th e policy . The Court , however , di d no t commi t itsel f t o thi s view , an d various example s wer e mentione d o f prope r genera l policie s i n prosecution an d nonprosecutio n matters . Instance s cite d wer e th e nonprosecution o f attempte d suicid e (whe n suicid e an d attempte d suicide wer e crimes ) an d th e nonprosecutio n o f certai n classe s o f juvenile sexua l offenses . O n th e othe r hand , sai d Lor d Denning , a decision b y a chie f polic e office r no t t o prosecut e an y perso n fo r stealing good s wort h les s tha n 10 0 pound s woul d b e improper , an d

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it would appea r tha t th e cour t coul d counterman d it . Wha t i t seem s to amoun t t o i s tha t ther e i s a clea r discretio n t o formulat e policie s of nonprosecutio n bu t th e discretio n i s no t a n absolut e one . Th e police ow e a dut y t o th e publi c t o enforc e th e la w an d i n prope r cases (whic h remai n uncertain ) citizen s wit h zea l an d mone y enough ca n compe l th e performanc e o f thi s dut y i n th e courts. 10 In th e absenc e o f an y constitutiona l guarante e o f equa l protec tion, substantiv e equalit y i n Englis h la w i s a fragmentar y topic . Two essay s i n establishin g equalit y i n particula r area s ar e th e Rac e Relations Act s o f 196 5 an d 196 8 an d th e equa l opportunitie s legislation designe d t o preven t certai n kind s o f discriminatio n against women . Th e 196 5 Ac t deals , amon g othe r things , with racia l incitement; whil e th e 196 8 legislatio n seek s t o preven t discrimina tion i n th e suppl y o f goods , service s an d facilitie s wher e suc h discrimination i s base d upo n ground s o f color , race , o r ethni c o r national origins , an d wher e th e service s i n questio n ar e supplie d t o the publi c o r an y sectio n o f th e public . Man y o f thes e term s hav e posed difficul t question s o f statutor y interpretation, 11 bu t a mor e fundamental difficult y ha s bee n th e draftin g o f th e act s s o a s no t t o conflict to o dramaticall y wit h existin g concept s o f ownership , disposal, an d right s t o propert y an d privacy . Consequently , th e exceptions an d propose d exception s t o th e scop e o f th e legislatio n are o f som e interest . The rac e relation s legislatio n doe s no t exten d t o th e employmen t of persons i n a private household , residentia l occupatio n o f premise s shared wit h th e owners , sleepin g an d sanitar y facilitie s o n ship s o r aircraft, th e sal e o f house s b y thei r owners , an d job s requirin g special attributes . I t i s a curiou s featur e o f th e legislatio n tha t though discriminator y act s i n thes e area s ar e no t unlawful , th e intention t o perfor m the m canno t b e advertised . S o althoug h i t i s lawful t o emplo y Chines e waiters , Scottis h cooks , an d Balines e dancing girls , on e canno t sa y i n publi c prin t tha t tha t i s wha t on e intends t o d o b y wa y o f advertisin g th e vacancy . Still furthe r an d bette r entertainmen t ha s bee n furnishe d b y th e attempt t o legislat e fo r sexua l equality . Proposal s publishe d b y th e Conservative governmen t i n 197 3 relate d onl y t o employment . They mad e provisio n fo r five probabl e an d thre e possibl e exception s from th e scop e o f th e act , namely : (1 ) wher e th e natur e o f th e jo b requires i t t o be performe d b y a ma n o r a woma n (e.g. , modelin g a t

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least som e kind s o f clothing) ; (2 ) wher e a ma n o r a woma n i s required fo r purpose s o f authenticit y (e.g. , castin g a pla y abou t heavyweight boxing) ; (3) wher e th e employmen t involve s maintain ing a tea m includin g person s o f eac h se x (staffin g a dancin g academy?); (4 ) wher e singl e se x employmen t i s legitimatel y relate d to th e natur e o f th e institutio n (e.g. , femal e domesti c staf f i n a convent—but a wid e field fo r argumen t i s indicated) ; (5 ) wher e there i s communal livin g accommodatio n (n o mentio n o f aircraf t o r ships here) ; (6 ) wher e i t woul d b e offensiv e t o publi c tast e o r decency fo r a ma n (o r a woman ) t o d o th e jo b ( a grammaticall y obscure proposa l whic h seem s t o indicat e tha t onl y hermaphrodite s need apply) ; (7) wher e stron g custome r o r client preference s exis t i n the provisio n o f persona l service s (possibl y thi s include s massag e parlors bu t exclude s stripteas e establishments) ; an d (8 ) wher e twenty-five o r fewe r person s ar e employed . In 197 6 th e Labou r governmen t enacte d proposal s broadl y following thos e suggeste d b y it s predecessor s i n office . Th e Se x Discrimination Ac t i s somewha t broader , however , i n tha t i t prohibits discriminatio n o n th e ground s o f marita l statu s a s wel l a s sex. Meanwhile , som e institution s hav e no t waite d fo r th e imposi tion o f lega l sanction s befor e liberalizin g thei r establishments. I t ha s been reporte d i n th e pres s tha t on e Scottis h gol f clu b ha s alread y amended it s rule s t o provid e tha t "ladie s ma y pla y withou t restriction durin g th e hour s o f darkness. "

IV. RATIONALIT Y One migh t perhap s hav e expecte d th e givin g o f reason s fo r decisions t o figure mor e prominentl y tha n i t doe s i n th e notion s o f due proces s and natura l justice. Equality , fairness , an d justice impl y that lik e case s shoul d b e treate d alike . An d ho w ca n i t b e determined tha t case s treate d alik e ar e i n fac t alik e i f no ground s ar e suggested fo r equatin g the m o r distinguishin g the m fro m simila r but distinc t cases ? Som e hav e indee d suppose d tha t th e righ t t o a reasoned deciso n wa s on e o f th e principle s o f natura l justice , alon g with th e righ t t o a hearin g an d th e absenc e o f bias . Th e Repor t o f the Britis h Committe e o n Ministers ' Power s o f 193 2 (o f whic h Si r William Holdswort h an d Harol d Lask i wer e part-authors ) sai d tha t it u may wel l b e argue d tha t ther e i s a thir d principl e o f natura l

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justice, namel y tha t a part y i s entitle d t o kno w th e reaso n fo r th e decision b e i t judicial o r quasi-Judicial. " 1 2 I t ma y wel l b e argue d also, o f course , tha t ther e i s a right—natura l justic e apart—t o hav e reasons give n fo r a n administrative decision . Bu t non e o f thes e propositions seem s t o hav e bee n universall y admitted . On e possibl e reason i s tha t th e greate r par t o f decision s i n Englis h court s woul d on suc h a vie w b e give n i n disregar d o f natura l justice , sinc e the y are give n b y magistrates , wh o generall y d o no t giv e reasone d decisions bu t (unles s statin g a cas e fo r appellat e purposes ) simpl y find defendant s guilt y o r no t guilty . Fo r tha t matte r , s o d o juries . Many magistrate s woul d thin k i t impossibl e t o giv e reason s whic h went beyon d sayin g tha t on e witnes s wa s believe d an d anothe r not . Still, tha t i s no t alway s th e reason , an d i f i t is , i t coul d possibl y b e stated i n term s tha t di d no t obviousl y imput e perjur y t o th e losin g party. Similar issue s aris e wher e decision s ar e give n b y administrativ e tribunals, suc h a s rent , nationa l insurance , socia l security , o r valuation tribunals . Her e a statutor y obligatio n wa s place d b y th e Tribunals an d Inquirie s Ac t o f 195 8 o n tribunals , an d i n minister s making decision s afte r th e holdin g o f a publi c inquiry , subjec t t o th e specification o f reason s bein g restricte d o n ground s 6 f nationa l security. I f th e governmen t wishe s t o exemp t an y clas s o f suc h decisions fro m th e necessit y t o giv e reasons , i t mus t consul t a statutory body—th e Counci l o n Tribunals—whic h ha s se t it s fac e against givin g suc h exemptions . Tribunal s considerin g conscientiou s objectors' applications fo r exemption fro m militar y servic e wer e on e such case. Of the m th e counci l said , "In ver y man y case s th e reason s given b y th e tribuna l woul d no t an d indee d coul d no t amoun t t o more tha n a statemen t tha t th e tribuna l accepte d o r rejecte d th e truth an d sincerit y o f th e applicant' s o r appellant' s objectio n o n grounds o f conscience . Bu t . . . w e coul d no t regar d th e givin g o f even s o limite d a statemen t o f reason s a s unnecessary. " 1 3 Th e sam e view wa s take n o f variou s categorie s o f arbitrators . S o i f quasi judicial an d administrativ e officer s ca n articulat e thei r reasons , why, w e ma y wonder , shoul d justice s o f th e peac e la g behind ? Clearly, question s ma y aris e abou t wha t constitute s a reaso n (distinguish betwee n "no t a satisfactor y reason " an d "no t a reaso n at all") . Bu t n o insolubl e difficultie s hav e ye t emerged. 14 One are a i n whic h reason s fo r actio n hav e traditionall y no t bee n

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forthcoming i s tha t i n whic h prerogativ e power s hav e bee n exer cised b y minister s an d civi l servants . Example s ar e th e grantin g o f honours b y th e Crown , th e exercis e o f th e prerogativ e o f merc y (before th e abolitio n o f capita l punishment) , th e contro l o f immi gration an d th e issuin g o r refusa l o f passports . I n al l suc h case s on e theoretical an d convenien t pretex t fo r nonreasone d decisio n ha s been tha t i n theor y th e decision s ar e thos e o f th e Quee n who m i t would b e disrespectfu l t o cross-examine. Th e realit y i s of course tha t ministers advis e th e Crow n an d ar e capabl e o f explaining , i f the y wish, o n wha t principle s advic e ha s bee n given . I n immigratio n matters, statute ha s take n ove r fro m th e prerogative . Instruction s t o Immigration officer s ar e no w publishe d togethe r wit h th e relevan t legislation an d regulation s an d a syste m o f appeal s tribunal s exists . Passports, however , lik e patronage , remai n i n th e are a o f inef fability. N o reason s ar e give n fo r refusin g them , an d ther e i s n o appeal agains t refusal . Thei r statu s i s perhap s odd . Thoug h purchased fo r money , the y bea r th e word s "Thi s passpor t remain s the propert y o f He r Majesty' s Governmen t i n th e Unite d Kingdo m and ma y b e withdraw n a t an y time. " Tha t ma y simpl y b e bluste r by He r Majesty' s Principa l Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Foreig n Affair s ( a capacity fo r bluste r no w bein g on e o f th e requirement s fo r th e job), but a t an y rat e h e ma y certainl y choos e no t t o rene w passport s when the y expire . Luckily , n o suc h documen t a s a passpor t i s needed b y a Britis h subjec t t o leav e th e country , thoug h th e polic e might dela y hi m lon g enoug h t o mis s hi s flight b y pretendin g t o believe hi m t o b e a n alien .

V. OPENNES S Many thing s ma y b e contraste d wit h an d sometime s conflic t wit h openness—for exampl e security , secrecy , confidentiality , an d pri vacy. Al l o f thes e hav e entere d i n variou s way s i n Britai n an d America int o th e argumen t abou t th e limit s o f executiv e privilege . The resul t o f recen t adjudication s i n Britai n ha s bee n t o brin g th e law int o a stat e no t to o differen t fro m tha t whic h ha s emerge d fro m United State s v . Richar d M . Nixon . Ther e ma y b e com e reaso n t o assert indee d tha t n o suc h thin g a s executiv e privileg e exist s t o b e claimed b y th e crown . I n th e first place , th e crow n i s no t th e sovereign; second , n o separatio n o f power s argumen t fo r inheren t

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executive authorit y ca n b e adduced; an d third , th e court s see m no w to hav e suggeste d tha t wha t wa s traditionall y dubbe d "crow n privilege" i s a misnomer. 15 Th e privileg e o f objectin g t o th e production o f evidenc e i n cour t i s no t confine d t o th e crow n o r t o documentary evidenc e i n th e possessio n o f th e crown . I t seem s t o b e merely a n aspec t o f public polic y tha t a claim fo r th e confidentialit y of evidenc e shoul d sometime s b e uphel d i n th e courts . However , where minister s d o mak e suc h claim s the y ar e n o longe r regarde d b y the court s a s conclusive . I n Conwa y v . Rimme r 1( J i t wa s hel d tha t there wa s a residuar y powe r t o inspec t document s privatel y i n orde r to strik e a judicial balanc e betwee n th e interest s o f th e partie s an d the genera l interes t i n th e administratio n o f justice . I n tha t case , confidential report s o n polic e officer s an d o n crimina l investigatio n were i n issue . Othe r recen t cases 1 7 hav e involve d confidentia l information give n t o governmen t agencie s suc h a s th e Gamin g Board an d th e commissioner s o f custom s an d excise . Information furnishe d i n confidenc e t o governmen t b y privat e bodies i s on e categor y o f informatio n likel y t o figure i n a n a prior i catalog o f materia l whic h ca n reasonabl y b e exclude d fro m genera l statutory provision s abou t publi c acces s t o officia l information . A committee unde r th e chairmanshi p o f Lor d Frank s 1 8 ha s recentl y compiled suc h a list . Th e committe e wa s se t u p a s th e resul t o f almost universa l disquie t abou t th e provision s o f th e existin g Official Secret s Acts . I n general , thes e mak e i t a n offens e fo r anyon e holding a governmenta l offic e t o communicat e an y informatio n obtained i n th e cours e o f hi s dut y t o anyon e (fo r exampl e t o revea l the tim e a t whic h te a i s take n i n th e Hom e Office) . I t i s als o a n offense fo r any perso n t o receive suc h informatio n havin g reasonabl e grounds t o believ e tha t i t ha s bee n communicate d i n contraventio n of th e Act . In 197 1 ther e occurre d o n a mino r scal e a Britis h versio n o f th e Pentagon Paper s affair . A secre t diplomati c an d militar y repor t o n the Nigeria n civi l wa r prepare d fo r th e Foreig n Offic e wa s leake d and publishe d i n th e Sunday Telegraph. The autho r o f th e report , a journalist t o who m h e ha d give n it , an d th e edito r o f th e Sunday Telegraph wer e charge d unde r th e act . N o on e havin g bee n discovered breakin g int o thei r psychiatrists ' offices , th e cas e wa s allowed t o g o t o th e jur y whic h afte r a stron g directio n fro m th e judge acquitte d al l thre e defendants . I n hi s summin g up , Caulfiel d

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J. strongl y suggested , tha t th e documen t i n questio n di d no t endanger nationa l security , tha t th e government' s cas e wa s " a barren waste, " an d tha t Sectio n 2 o f th e Officia l Secret s Ac t migh t have reache d retiremen t ag e an d shoul d b e pensione d off . Its successo r ma y wel l b e a ne w Officia l Informatio n Act . Th e Franks Committee' s suggestio n i s tha t crimina l sanction s shoul d b e confined t o a number o f specified categorie s o f informatio n compris ing: (1 ) defense , security , foreig n relations , currency , an d foreig n reserves; (2 ) cabine t documents ; (3 ) informatio n facilitatin g crimi nal activity ; (4 ) informatio n supplie d i n confidenc e t o th e govern ment b y privat e individuals ; an d (5 ) officia l informatio n use d fo r private gain . Onl y materia l classifie d a s "Top Secret " or "Secret" o r "Defense Confidential " woul d b e protecte d i n th e first category, an d a minister' s certificat e tha t th e informatio n wa s correctl y classifie d at th e relevan t tim e woul d b e bindin g o n th e court . There ar e sign s tha t civi l servant s hav e foun d thes e proposal s to o much t o swallow . The y hav e bee n hear d complaining—i n th e nices t possible way—tha t considerable—no t t o sa y insuperable—difficultie s may arise , fo r example , i n definin g communicabl e an d incom municable form s o f economi c an d diplomati c information . Over precipitate—not t o sa y reckless—actio n seem s unlikel y t o commen d itself, therefore , give n th e nee d t o conside r th e matte r wit h du e deliberation, fro m al l it s aspect s an d i n prope r perspective .

VI. CERTAINT Y There i s muc h t o b e sai d fo r th e vie w tha t th e rul e o f la w i s bes t protected b y a clea r enunciation o f publi c rights . Th e questio n the n arises why th e English , wh o hav e no t bee n backwar d i n claimin g t o have rights , hav e nevertheles s faile d t o ge t themselve s a prope r Bil l of Right s an d consistentl y displa y ver y littl e eagernes s t o hav e one ? The traditiona l argument s have , afte r all , bee n muddle d an d unpersuasive. Ther e wa s Dicey' s contras t betwee n right s an d remedies (thoug h remedie s are rights). Ther e wa s als o th e allegatio n that Englis h la w doe s no t favo r th e positiv e statemen t o f right s a s distinct fro m th e negativ e procedur e o f leavin g wid e area s o f behavior legall y unconstrained . Tha t wa s neve r reall y tru e an d i s becoming les s so. We have , fo r example, th e righ t t o strike , th e righ t to picket , an d th e righ t t o vote .

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Other element s i n th e oppositio n t o Bill s o f Right s hav e bee n a supposed distast e fo r Europea n an d America n politica l machiner y and th e belie f tha t t o commit onesel f t o a formal statemen t o f right s implicitly suggest s th e notio n tha t suc h right s migh t b e suspende d (though i t i s no t clea r wh y th e enactmen t o f fundamenta l right s suggests i t an y mor e tha n th e enactmen t o f anythin g else) . I t i s als o the cas e tha t Bill s of Right s impl y judicial revie w an d that , a s ever y English schoolbo y knows , lead s t o undemocrati c obstructio n o f legislation desire d b y th e people . It ma y wel l be , however , tha t postwa r development s i n Europe , the Commonwealth , an d th e Unite d State s hav e weakene d th e psychological resistanc e o f Englishme n t o forma l constitutiona l guarantees an d t o judicia l review . Th e Commonwealt h i s ful l o f Bills o f Right s drafte d i n par t b y Englis h draftsmen . Th e Europea n Human Right s Conventio n i s now , thoug h circuitously , availabl e for use b y citizens of th e Unite d Kingdom . I n addition , th e imag e o f judicial revie w i n th e Unite d State s ha s bee n transforme d fo r man y by th e libertaria n maneuver s o f th e Suprem e Cour t durin g an d even sinc e th e Warre n era . A Cour t tha t cut s dow n executiv e privilege, undermine s capita l punishment , safeguard s contraceptiv e supplies, guarantee s abortio n an d protects , th e career s o f pregnan t servicewomen seem s fa r remove d from , th e Nin e Ol d Mal e Chau vinists whos e pedanti c notion s o f du e proces s endangere d th e Ne w Deal. S o perhap s th e tim e i s ripe fo r a serious attemp t t o protec t ou r own right s an d libertie s whils t th e opportunit y offer s an d th e sovereignty o f Parliament, onc e suc h a lio n i n th e path , i s beginnin g to loo k unstead y o n it s feet . At leas t thre e questions , however , nee d t o b e distinguished . First , are ther e seriou s o r numerou s invasion s o f civil , politica l an d administrative right s i n th e Unite d Kingdom ? Second , shoul d wha t is wrong b e pu t right b y mor e piecemea l legislation , b y adoptio n o f the Europea n Huma n Right s Conventio n a s a parliamentar y enactment, o r b y a new , home-grow n statemen t o f fundamenta l rights? Third , ho w shoul d an y suc h legislation , i f adopted , b e enforced an d entrenche d agains t repeal , infringement , o r evasion . Then ther e is the questio n o f measurin g an d expressin g th e degre e of absolutenes s o f th e protecte d rights . Ho w far , fo r example , nee d the freedo m o f speec h b e explicitl y qualifie d b y th e nee d fo r regulation o f judicial proceedings , th e nee d fo r impartialit y i n radi o

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and televisio n broadcastin g an d th e protectio n o f reputation , livelihood, an d literar y copyright , a s wel l a s b y a n inherentl y unspecifiable grou p o f circumstance s man y o f whic h hav e no t ye t arisen. The proble m occur s righ t acros s th e spectru m o f right s an d liberties. Everyon e (well , almos t everyone ) i s against sin , discrimina tion, censorship , an d th e like , an d i n favo r o f openness , freedom , equality, an d natura l justice. Bu t ho w fa r shoul d th e qualifications , modifications, limitations , an d exception s t o thes e desirabl e gen eralities b e se t ou t i n th e legislation ? Coul d an y committe e o r assembly tha t on e ca n envisag e i n th e Britis h Isle s eve r happil y agree abou t wha t thes e elaboration s an d modification s shoul d be ? Since th e answe r i s obviousl y no , w e see m impelle d toward s th e view tha t al l mus t b e lef t t o judicial interpretation . Thi s present s u s with a dilemma, sinc e such a course implie s tha t w e shoul d abdicat e to futur e judicia l instinct s th e settlemen t o f majo r question s o f principle abou t th e meanin g an d applicatio n o f rights . Equality o r equa l protectio n i s on e field wher e almos t nothin g i s settled b y th e genera l enunciatio n o f principle . Th e statemen t tha t there shoul d no t b e discriminatio n conceal s bot h th e issu e a s t o which criteri a ar e legitimat e base s fo r discriminatio n betwee n groups o f citizen s an d a n importan t questio n abou t th e exten t t o which th e relevan t enforcibl e obligation s shoul d b e place d upo n everybody o r onl y upo n stat e o r governmen t agencies . I t seem s pleasant t o decre e tha t n o on e shal l b e disadvantage d o n irrelevan t grounds; bu t th e propositio n tha t th e la w shoul d no t discriminat e does no t i n itsel f conclusively establis h eithe r tha t nobod y should , o r that th e la w shoul d b e use d t o punis h al l discriminator y activities . No on e believe s tha t ther e ar e n o area s i n whic h privat e choic e should b e tolerate d i n th e interest s o f freedom . Bu t whic h ar e the y to be ? Paradoxically , ther e i s perhap s mor e chanc e o f suc h issue s being genuinel y debate d i n a judicia l foru m tha n i n a demo cratically electe d legislature , whic h i s where ideall y the y ough t t o b e debated. Thoug h mos t me n ar e move d b y fashion , ideology , self interest, an d self-importanc e ther e i s probabl y mor e o f eac h i n th e latter plac e tha n i n th e former . Th e bes t argumen t fo r a Britis h Bil l of Right s i s tha t i t i s impossibl e t o overestimat e th e collectiv e partisanship an d irrationalit y o f Member s o f Parliament .

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VII. UNIVERSALIT Y In explainin g th e rul e o f law , Dicey' s Law of the Constitution stressed th e ide a o f universa l applicatio n o f th e law . "Ever y ma n whatever hi s ran k o r conditio n i s subject t o th e ordinar y la w o f th e realm. . . . Wit h us, " h e added , "ever y officia l fro m th e Prim e Minister dow n t o a constabl e o r a collecto r o f taxe s i s unde r th e same responsibilit y fo r ever y ac t don e withou t legitimat e justifica tion a s any othe r citizen." 1 9 Bu t b y 191 4 Dice y wa s complainin g o f the tendenc y t o diminish th e spher e of th e rul e o f la w b y conferrin g special power s an d exemption s o n variou s administrativ e bodie s and o n th e crown . A t on e poin t h e remark s tha t th e equa l rul e o f law wa s expose d t o a ne w peril , quotin g Si r Frederic k Pollock , wh o in 190 8 ha d writte n tha t "Th e Legislatur e (had ) though t fit b y th e Trade Dispute s Act , 1906 , t o confe r extraordinar y immunitie s o n combinations o f bot h employer s an d workmen. " 2() The Trad e Dispute s Ac t o f 190 6 i n fac t effectivel y immunize d trade union s fro m tor t liability . Damag e cause d b y withdrawa l o f labor or the effect s o f picketin g wa s primaril y i n contemplation , bu t the ac t wen t ver y wide . I n th e secon d editio n o f hi s Law and Opinion in England, Dicey pointe d ou t tha t "i f a Trad e Unio n possesse d sa y of 20,000 pounds , causes a libe l t o b e publishe d o f A, a n employe r o f labor, o r B , a workma n wh o refuse s t o joi n th e union , o r excite s some fanatica l ruffian s t o assaul t A o r B , neithe r A no r B ca n maintain a n actio n agains t th e union. " A s th e resul t o f th e Trad e Union Ac t o f 1913 , whe n union s wer e authorize d t o appl y thei r funds t o politica l objects , i t migh t be , Dice y thought , tha t the y could freel y publis h libel s o n parliamentar y candidate s o f whos e politics the y disapproved. 21 Since 191 4 n o politica l part y ha s bee n ver y successfu l i n regulating trad e unio n activities . Th e Labou r Party , o f course , ha s an inheren t constitutiona l disinclinatio n fo r an y suc h activity . Nevertheless, i n th e decad e sinc e 1965 , bot h partie s hav e fel t th e need an d bot h hav e failed . I n 196 9 afte r th e repor t o f th e Donova n Royal Commissio n o n Trad e Unions , th e Labou r Part y ha d a pla n for legislation. I t wa s designe d t o avoi d unofficia l an d wildca t strik e action b y providin g fo r cooling-of f period s an d t o giv e th e government power s t o requir e unio n ballot s befor e strike s involvin g

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serious threat s t o th e economy . I t wa s a moderat e enoug h plan , bu t the prim e ministe r an d hi s cabinet wer e tol d t o abando n i t an d the y did so . In 197 1 th e Conservativ e governmen t enacte d a mor e com prehensive measur e int o la w a s th e Industria l Relation s Ac t t o encourage th e makin g o f bindin g collectiv e agreements , an d t o se t up a n industria l relation s cour t t o enforc e a cod e o f fai r practic e fo r employers an d employees . Th e majo r trad e union s decline d t o accept th e ac t o r an y suc h act . Som e trad e unio n leader s sai d tha t though passe d b y Parliamen t i t wa s no t a la w a t all . Whe n order s were mad e b y th e Nationa l Industria l Relation s Cour t agains t "unfair industria l practices, " th e transport , engineering , an d dock ers' union s di d no t obe y them . Whe n th e Amalgamate d Engineer ing Unio n wa s fined a tota l o f 130,00 0 pound s fo r contempt , i t refused t o pay . S o a n anonymou s an d mysteriousl y philanthropi c group o f employer s pai d th e fines, thu s vicariousl y (an d mirac ulously) purgin g th e engineers ' contempt . Whe n docker s wer e imprisoned fo r contemptuou s disobedienc e o f cour t order s 2 2 an d a general strik e wa s threatene d urgen t step s wer e take n t o find grounds fo r releasin g th e docker s fro m jai l an d fo r pretendin g tha t their contemp t (whic h wa s greate r tha n ever ) ha d vanishe d away . When miner s an d powe r worker s struck , armie s o f coa l miner s invested powe r stations , defie d th e polic e an d engage d i n large-scal e illegal picketin g 2 3 an d intimidation . Some, thoug h no t all , trad e unio n leader s mad e i t clea r tha t the y were no t prepare d t o tolerat e conservativ e policie s o r a conservativ e government an d woul d sto p th e countr y t o prov e it . Unde r th e threat o f a n indefinit e miners ' strike , th e electorat e too k th e hint , stood dow n th e conservativ e government , an d engage d Mr . Wilso n to pa y th e money , switc h o n th e lights , an d repea l th e Industria l Relations Ac t a s bein g a wicke d an d arrogan t attemp t t o meddl e with th e prerogativ e powe r o f th e union s i n industria l affairs . Nobody i n eithe r part y ha s manage d t o explai n wha t els e wa s wrong wit h th e Industria l Relation s Act . Nevertheless, th e worl d i s now no t wha t i t was , an d w e ar e awar e that ther e ar e a numbe r o f thing s tha t trad e unio n leader s d o no t like. They d o no t lik e collective agreement s solemnl y entere d int o t o be treate d a s i f the y wer e intende d t o b e bindin g o r enforceable .

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They d o no t lik e t o se e picket s wh o ac t illegall y subjecte d t o lega l penalties. The y d o no t lik e worker s o r citizen s wh o declin e t o liste n to pickets, and the y ar e inventin g a ne w la w t o allo w picket s t o sto p and detai n nonlisteners . The y d o no t lik e cartoon s i n newspaper s that misrepresen t th e motive s o f trad e unionists . The y d o no t lik e regular contribution s t o newspaper s b y writer s wh o ar e no t members o f th e Nationa l Unio n o f Journalists . The y d o no t lik e incomes policie s tha t limi t wag e bargainin g thoug h income s policie s that limi t price s ar e acceptable . The y d o no t i n genera l lik e right wing economic policie s or right-wing government s an d migh t no t le t the electorat e hav e on e eve n i f th e electorat e want s on e (thoug h they d o no t g o s o fa r a s t o say—a s d o th e militan t member s o f th e National Unio n o f Students—tha t right-win g speaker s shoul d b e physically prevente d fro m makin g speeche s tha t advocat e provoca tive o r reactionar y policies) . In 197 4 som e nove l dislike s wer e mad e know n an d supporte d b y the threa t o f "blacking" or industrial action . Ther e wer e attempt s t o remove privat e patient s fro m hospital s operatin g unde r th e Na tional Healt h Servic e an d threat s t o tak e actio n t o preven t th e building o f privat e hospitals . I n Australi a ther e were—possibl y double-edged—threats t o preven t Mr . Fran k Sinatr a fro m returnin g to th e Unite d States . S o fa r n o actio n ha s bee n take n t o forc e th e abolition o f privat e education , firs t clas s railwa y carriages , o r trip s to th e seaside . Any practica l assessmen t o f du e proces s i n Englan d mus t tak e account o f thes e developments . I n Dicey' s analysi s o f th e nine teenth-century constitution , th e privilege s o f th e crow n constitute d an awkwar d exceptio n t o th e universa l applicatio n o f th e rul e o f law. Toda y th e crow n i s n o longe r a n over-might y subject , bu t th e trade union s collectively hav e inherite d th e roya l prerogative . Socia l customs als o hav e change d i n a manne r appropriat e t o thi s transformation o f th e politica l system . I n al l rank s o f libera l an d polite societ y criticis m o f th e monarch y a s a palpabl e socia l evi l (comparable perhap s t o swea t shop s o r tuberculosis ) i s acceptabl e and commonplace . O n th e othe r han d an y suc h denunciatio n of , say, th e Transpor t an d Genera l Workers ' Unio n woul d b e though t impolitic an d vulgar . Th e implication s d o no t mak e fo r light headedness abou t th e futur e o f du e proces s i n England .

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NOTES 1. 2 Inst . 50 . Cok e wa s commentin g o n chapte r 3 9 o f th e Magn a Carta : "No fre e ma n shal l b e take n o r imprisoned o r disseised o r outlawed o r exiled o r anywise destroyed ; no r will w e sen d upo n him , unles s b y th e lawful judgmen t o f hi s peers , o r b y th e law of the land" (lex terrae). Pollock an d Maitlan d su m u p th e impor t o f th e charter a s being "tha t the kin g i s an d shal l b e belo w th e law. " History of English Law Vol . 1 , p. 173 . A s t o wha t wa s intende d b y chapte r 39 , se e W.S . McKechnie , Magna Carta (1905 ) pp . 441-4 3 an d C.H . Mcllwain , "Du e Proces s o f Law i n Magn a Carta, " 1 4 Colum . L . Rev . 27-5 1 (1914) . 2. Attorne y Genera l v . Time s Newspaper s Ltd . [1973 ] 3 al l E.R . 54 . 3. Som e doub t exist s a s t o th e meanin g o f thi s expression . I n June 197 4 an attemp t t o introduc e laughin g ga s int o a courtroo m throug h a ventilation shaf t wa s hel d no t t o b e a contemp t committe d i n th e fac e of th e court . Balog h v . St . Alban s Crow n Cour t Time s La w Rep . 4 July 1974 . 4. Morri s v . Crow n Offic e [1970 ] 2 Q.B . 114 . 5. The Diary of Samuel Pepys Vol. VII I (ed . R . Latha m an d W . Matthews ) p. 429 . Th e judg e happene d t o b e leanin g o n hi s elbo w a t th e tim e and i s reporte d t o hav e said , "I f I ha d bee n a n uprigh t judge , I ha d been slain. " 6. Prudenc e no w frequentl y dictate s thi s practic e a s th e resul t o f a prosecution i n 1957 . Th e Quee n v . Griffith s ex-parte Attorney Genera l [1957] 2 Q.B . 194 . 7. Bogno r Regi s U.D.C . v . Campio n [1972 ] 2 Q.B . 169 . 8. R. v . Metropolita n Polic e Commissione r ex parte Blackbur n [1968 ] 2 Q.B. 118 . Cf . Repor t o f th e Roya l Commissio n o n th e Polic e 196 2 (Cmnd 1728) ; G . Marshal l Police and Government 1965 Chap . I ; an d J.LJ. Edward s The Law Offices of the Crown 196 6 Chaps . 1 0 an d 11 . 9. 48 3 H . C . Deb . 5s . col . 679 . 10. Mr . Blackbur n returne d t o th e charg e i n 197 3 wit h a furthe r (unsuccessful) attemp t t o compel th e stricte r enforcement o f obscenit y laws. R. v . Metropolita n Polic e Commissione r ex parte Blackbur n (No . 3) 197 3 2 W.L.R . 43 . 11. E.g. , o n th e meaning s o f "nationa l origin " an d "sectio n o f th e public," se e Ealin g Boroug h Counci l v . Rac e Relation s Boar d [1972 ] A.C. 342 ; Rac e Relation s Boar d v . Charte r [1973 ] 2 W.L.R . 299 ; Race Relation s Boar d v . Appli n [1973 ] Q.B . 815 ; Rac e Relation s Board v . Docker s Labou r Clu b an d Institut e [1974 ] 2 W.L.R . 166 . A t the tim e o f writin g a n amende d Rac e Relation s Ac t ha s bee n introduced int o Parliament , i n par t t o revers e decision s i n th e court s on "nationa l origin " an d t o cove r discriminatio n b y privat e clubs .

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12. Cm d 4060 (1932) p . 80. 13. Repor t on the Council o n Tribunals 1959 , pp. 65-66. 14. I n som e case s i t ha s bee n hel d tha t th e givin g o f inadequat e o r unintelligible reasons does not comply with the statutory duty t o give reasons. See Re Poyse r and Mills ' Arbitration [1964 ] 2 Q.B. 46 7 an d Givaudan v . Ministe r o f Housin g an d Loca l Governmen t [1967 ] 1 W.L.R. 250 . French Keir Developments Ltd . v. Secretary of State fo r the Environment (Th e Times, 1 5 October, 1976) . 16. Conwa y v. Rimmer [1968] A.C. 910. 17. R . v . Gamin g Boar d ex parte Benaim an d Khaid a [1970 ] 2 Q.B . 41 7 Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners [1972] 3 W.L.R. 870. 18. Departmenta l Committe e o n Sectio n 2 o f th e Officia l Secret s Act , 1911 Cmnd . 5104(1972). 19. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10t h ed. ) p . 193. 20. Ibid. , p. 204. The citatio n fro m Polloc k i s from Law of Torts (8t h ed . 1908) p. v. 21. Law and Opinion in England (2 ed. 1914 ) pp . xlv an d xlviii . 22. Churchma n v . J.S.S.C. Times Law Rep. 15 June 1973 . 23. Th e right to picket does not imply a permission physicall y t o obstruct persons o r th e highway . Piddingto n v . Bate s [1961 ] 1 W.L.R. 162 ; Tynan v . Balmer [1967] 1 Q.B. 91; Hunt v . Broom e [1973] 2 W.L.R . 773; Kavanagh v . Hiscoc k [1974 ] 2 W.L.R. 422.

3 DUE PROCES S T. M. SCANLON »

In thi s pape r I wil l offe r a genera l accoun t o f ho w th e absenc e o f "due process " can giv e ris e t o legitimat e claim s agains t institutiona l actions. I wil l b e concerne d particularl y t o sho w i n wha t way s claims t o du e proces s ar e grounde d i n mora l principle s o f politica l right an d ho w fa r the y depen d rathe r o n strategi c judgments abou t the pruden t desig n o f socia l institutions . M y accoun t wil l provid e a demarcation o f th e are a withi n whic h du e proces s claim s ar e appropriate—an are a muc h broade r tha n "stat e action"—an d provide a t leas t a roug h framewor k fo r determinin g whe n give n procedures ar e adequat e response s t o thes e claims . I wil l als o offe r an accoun t o f substantive du e proces s and undertak e t o explain wh y it i s tha t whe n a lega l righ t t o du e proces s i s recognize d courts , i n enforcing thi s right , wil l fin d themselve s makin g substantiv e a s wel l as merel y procedura l decisions . The accoun t I will offe r stick s close t o th e truis m tha t du e proces s is concerne d wit h protectio n agains t arbitrar y decisions , an d on e can fin d a plac e i n m y accoun t fo r man y o f th e phrase s tha t hav e been use d i n interpretin g th e Fift h an d Fourteent h Amendment s t o the Unite d State s Constitution . Bu t whil e I wil l hav e a certai n 93

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. M . SCANLO N

amount t o sa y i n th e abstrac t abou t th e rol e o f court s i n providin g and enforcin g du e process , m y accoun t i s a philosophica l an d no t a legal one . I t i s grounde d i n a conceptio n o f th e mora l requirement s of legitimac y fo r socia l institution s an d no t o n wha t th e la w o f th e United State s o r an y othe r countr y actuall y is . I hop e tha t wha t I have t o sa y ma y b e o f som e us e i n lega l argument s abou t constitutional right s t o du e proces s o f law , bu t I hav e no t undertaken t o defen d m y theor y a s a n interpretatio n o f th e constitution.

I The requiremen t o f du e proces s i s on e o f th e condition s o f th e moral acceptabilit y o f thos e institution s tha t giv e som e peopl e power t o contro l o r interven e i n th e live s o f others . Institution s create suc h powe r i n severa l ways . The y d o s o directl y b y givin g some th e authorit y t o comman d other s an d providin g th e forc e t o compel obedienc e t o thes e commands . Les s directly , bu t n o les s effectively, institution s giv e som e peopl e a measur e o f contro l ove r others b y securin g thei r contro l ove r resource s o r opportunitie s tha t are importan t ingredient s i n th e kin d o f lif e tha t peopl e i n th e society wan t t o live . I hav e referre d t o thes e form s o f contro l i n terms tha t emphasiz e thei r negativ e an d threatenin g aspects , bu t they ar e a n aspec t o f socia l lif e on e coul d no t reasonabl y see k t o avoid altogether . T o begi n with , som e dependenc e o f thi s kin d i s i n a trivia l sens e unavoidable . T o th e exten t tha t an y on e perso n ha s the righ t an d abilit y t o determin e ho w som e choic e i s t o b e made , others are t o that degre e "subject t o hi s will." In addition , nontrivia l forms o f authorit y ar e importan t an d valuabl e mean s t o man y social goals . But eve n i f right s an d power s givin g som e peopl e a measur e o f control ove r other s mus t b e a featur e o f an y plausibl e syste m o f social institutions , th e wa y i n whic h thes e right s an d power s ar e distributed i s on e o f th e feature s o f socia l institution s tha t i s mos t subject t o mora l criticis m an d mos t i n nee d o f justification . Questions o f due proces s becom e interestin g onl y o n th e suppositio n that suc h justifications ca n b e given . Th e importanc e o f du e proces s arises fro m th e fac t tha t thes e justification s ar e i n genera l limite d and conditional . Eve n a person' s right s t o mov e hi s bod y an d t o

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dispose o f hi s possession s a s h e see s fit ar e limite d b y requirement s that h e no t brin g specifie d kind s o f har m t o others . Mor e interestingly, th e authorit y o f publi c official s is , typically , no t onl y limited (e.g. , b y thei r jurisdiction) bu t als o conditional . Thu s the y are empowere d no t simpl y t o disburs e a certai n benefi t o r impos e a certain burde n bu t rathe r t o d o s o provided certai n specifie d conditions ar e met . Fo r example , th e authorit y o f a judge t o orde r penalties o r fines, an d th e authorit y t o issu e o r revok e license s ar e both o f thi s form . Authorit y no t tie d t o specia l justifying condition s is in fac t quit e rare. (Perhaps th e presidentia l powe r t o pardo n i s a n example.) This conditiona l characte r i s typica l no t onl y o f th e authorit y o f public official s bu t als o o f tha t o f person s occupyin g position s o f special powe r i n nongovernmenta l institution s suc h a s schools , colleges, and businesses . Schoo l administrator s hav e th e authorit y t o suspend o r expe l student s o n academi c o r disciplinar y ground s an d to impos e othe r disciplinar y penalties . Employer s hav e th e righ t (absent specifi c contractua l bars ) t o fire worker s whe n thi s i s required b y consideration s o f economi c efficiency , an d perhap s als o when i t i s necessary a s a mean s o f discipline withi n th e firm. I n eac h case, thes e limit s an d condition s o n a give n for m o f authorit y flow from th e natur e o f th e justification fo r tha t authority . Th e authorit y of schoo l administrator s an d employer s i s presumabl y t o b e defended o n th e groun d tha t i t i s crucial t o th e effectiv e functionin g of these enterprises. 2 Bu t ther e woul d b e n o prospec t o f constructin g on thi s basis a defense fo r unconditional authorit y t o fire o r suspen d someone fo r an y reaso n whatever ; e.g. , becaus e yo u didn' t lik e hi s looks, hi s politics , o r hi s religion , o r becaus e h e wa s unwillin g t o bribe you . But onc e d e fact o powe r t o suspen d o r fire i s conferred , on e ma y ask wha t reaso n ther e i s t o believ e tha t i t wil l no t b e exercise d i n these unjustifiabl e ways . Thus , beyon d th e requiremen t o n institu tions tha t th e powe r the y confe r b e morall y justifiable , ther e i s th e further mora l requiremen t tha t ther e b e som e effectiv e guarante e that thes e power s wil l b e exercise d onl y withi n th e limit s an d subject t o th e condition s implie d b y thei r justification . I n som e cases, nothin g nee d b e don e t o provid e suc h a guarantee . I t ma y happen that , give n th e motive s an d th e scruple s whic h thos e i n a particular positio n o f powe r ca n b e expecte d t o have , an d give n th e

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structural feature s o f thei r positio n (e.g. , th e competitiv e pressure s active o n them) , ther e i s littl e reaso n t o expec t tha t the y wil l ac t outside thei r authority . Wher e thi s i s no t th e case—whe n obviou s temptations o r eve n jus t clea r opportunitie s fo r laxnes s o r ca priciousness exist—a n effectiv e counte r ma y b e provide d b y a syste m of retrospectiv e justice , levyin g penaltie s fo r th e imprope r us e o f power an d requirin g compensatio n fo r thos e injured . Beyond (o r i n additio n to ) this , furthe r guarantee s ma y b e provided b y introducin g specia l requirement s o n th e wa y i n whic h those wh o exercis e powe r mak e thei r decisions . Du e proces s i s on e version o f thi s latte r strategy . I t aim s t o provid e som e assuranc e o f nonarbitrariness b y requirin g thos e wh o exercis e authorit y t o justif y their intende d action s i n a publi c proceedin g b y adducin g reason s of th e appropriat e sor t an d defendin g thes e agains t critica l attack . The ide a o f such proceeding s presupposes , of course, publicl y know n and reasonabl y specifi c rule s wit h respec t t o whic h officia l action s are t o b e justified . The authorit y t o decid e whethe r th e reason s advance d ar e adequate ma y b e assigne d t o differen t person s o r bodie s b y differen t procedures. I f th e ground s an d limit s o f a give n decisio n maker' s authority ar e wel l know n an d take n seriousl y i n a community , the n even a hearin g procedur e tha t allow s hi m t o presid e an d pronounc e the verdic t ma y b e a nonnegligibl e chec k o n th e arbitrar y us e o f hi s power sinc e h e wil l presumabl y plac e som e valu e o n no t bein g publicly see n t o flout th e accepte d standard s fo r th e performanc e o f his job. Bu t i n genera l th e assurance s provide d b y a syste m o f du e process wil l b e credibl e onl y i f ther e i s th e possibilit y o f appea l t o some independen t authorit y whic h ca n invok e th e coerciv e powe r o f the stat e t o suppor t it s decisions . Appeal t o the court s offer s greate r assuranc e agains t arbitrariness , in part , becaus e o f the expectatio n tha t th e judge wil l b e les s a part y to th e origina l disput e tha n th e decisio n make r himself , bu t als o because a judge i s presume d t o hav e a greate r commitmen t t o a n ideal o f procedura l justic e an d a greate r long-ter m stak e i n hi s reputation a s a make r o f decision s tha t ar e wel l founde d i n th e relevant rule s an d principles . A t eac h stag e i n th e appeal s proces s other tha n th e last , thes e factor s o f persona l motivatio n wil l b e supplemented b y th e mor e explici t threa t o f bein g overruled . Whe n we reac h th e ultimat e lega l authority , o f course , w e wil l i n practic e

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be relying on persona l commitment , pride , an d aspiratio n alon e an d on th e existenc e o f a publi c conceptio n o f th e groun d an d limit s o f this authority , whic h serve s a s a basi s fo r publi c approbatio n o r disapprobation o f th e wa y i t i s exercised .

II Due proces s i s onl y on e o f th e strategie s throug h whic h on e ma y seek t o avoi d arbitrar y powe r b y alterin g th e condition s unde r which decision s ar e made . I t ma y b e contraste d wit h strategie s tha t seek t o mak e powe r les s arbitrary b y makin g th e motive s wit h whic h it i s exercised mor e benign ; fo r example, b y allowin g decision s t o b e made b y electe d representative s o f thos e principall y affected . Rul e by suc h electe d representative s i s a n acceptabl y nonarbitrar y for m of authority i n a give n situatio n t o the exten t tha t i t i s reasonable t o believe tha t th e comple x o f motive s unde r whic h representative s act—the desire to be reelected, th e nee d fo r financial support , loyalt y to an d share d feeling s wit h one' s regio n o r group , th e desir e t o b e a "good representative " i n th e generall y accepte d sens e o f thi s phrase , the desir e t o b e esteeme d i n th e societ y o f representative s an d politicians, etc.—wil l ad d u p t o produc e decision s reasonabl y i n accord wit h th e right s an d wishe s o f thos e governed . As I hav e mentioned , th e mechanism s o f a syste m o f du e proces s also depend s upo n motives—e.g. , o n th e professionalis m ofjudges — but suc h a syste m nee d no t i n genera l attemp t t o influenc e th e authority whos e decision s i t i s suppose d t o contro l i n favo r o f th e interests o f th e affecte d parties . Indeed , th e notio n o f du e proces s i s most ofte n invoke d i n case s (suc h a s th e employmen t cas e discusse d above, o r case s o f schoo l o r priso n discipline ) wher e i t i s assume d that th e decision-makin g authorit y whos e action s ar e t o b e checke d will b e move d (quit e properly ) b y consideration s largel y separat e from th e interest s of the person s mos t directl y affected . Th e ide a o f a right t o du e proces s i s thu s muc h broade r i n applicatio n tha n tha t of a righ t t o participatio n o r representation ; i t involve s th e recognition o f thos e subjec t t o authorit y a s entitle d t o deman d justification fo r it s use s an d entitle d t o protectio n agains t it s unjustified us e bu t no t necessaril y a s entitled t o share i n th e makin g of decision s affectin g them. 3 The fac t tha t impositio n o f du e proces s requirement s thu s

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involves minima l alteratio n i n th e establishe d relation s o f powe r makes i t a particularl y eas y remed y fo r court s t o invoke . It s acceptability i s als o increase d i n a societ y lik e ou r ow n b y th e extraordinarily hig h publi c regar d fo r lega l institution s an d th e procedures tha t ar e typica l o f them . Give n thes e fact s on e migh t expect tha t insofa r a s i t fall s t o th e judiciary t o dea l wit h importan t social conflict s th e remed y o f due proces s i s likely t o be ove r utilized . I hav e no t attempte d t o sa y wha t th e right t o du e proces s is . Th e moral basi s o f m y accoun t o f du e proces s lie s i n somethin g lik e a right, namel y th e ide a tha t citizen s hav e a legitimat e clai m agains t institutions whic h mak e the m subjec t i n importan t way s t o th e arbitrary powe r o f others . Bu t i t i s no t eas y t o sa y i n genera l whe n those wh o hav e suc h a clai m ar e entitle d specificall y t o wha t I hav e called a mechanis m o f du e process . I describe d abov e a rang e o f controls o n th e exercis e o f powe r extendin g fro m case s i n whic h authority ca n b e regarde d a s self-policin g t o system s o f retrospectiv e justice t o system s o f du e proces s wit h increasin g level s o f judicia l review. Moral principle s o f politica l philosoph y d o no t determin e whic h of thes e mechanism s i s required i n an y give n case . Thi s i s a questio n of strateg y tha t ca n b e answere d onl y o n th e basi s o f a n analysi s o f the factor s activ e i n a particula r setting . Th e situatio n i s analogou s to th e cas e o f representation . On e migh t se t fort h a s a principl e o f political philosoph y tha t just institution s shoul d provid e mean s fo r people t o participate effectivel y i n decisions affectin g the m provide d that powe r i s distribute d equall y an d tha t it s exercis e wil l no t enable som e t o override th e right s of others. Bu t politica l philosoph y can tel l u s littl e abou t wha t kind s o f participator y and/o r represen tative institution s wil l satisf y th e requiremen t o f effectiv e an d equa l participation i n a give n case . Th e choic e o f suitabl e form s ma y depend o n loca l tradition , th e distributio n o f economi c an d socia l power i n th e society , th e natur e o f othe r primar y divisiv e conflicts , and othe r variables . In decidin g whethe r mechanism s o f du e proces s ar e require d an d in assessin g th e adequac y o f particula r mechanism s th e mai n questions see m t o b e these : (1) Ho w likel y i s it tha t a give n for m o f power—i f unchecked will b e use d outsid e th e limit s o f it s justification ?

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(2) Ho w seriou s ar e th e harm s inflicte d b y it s misuse ? (3) Woul d du e proces s b e a n effectiv e chec k o n th e exercis e o f this power ? (4) Woul d th e cost s of a requiremen t o f due proces s i n case s o f this kin d b e excessive ? I s th e additiona l effectivenes s o f du e process ove r othe r form s o f contro l wort h th e additiona l cost ? The cost s a t issu e her e wil l include , i n additio n t o th e dela y o f decisions an d th e cost s o f mountin g th e procedure s themselves , th e personal an d socia l cost s o f depersonalizin g decision s an d reducin g them t o rule s an d procedures . Due process , a s I hav e characterize d it , wil l b e mos t effectiv e where ther e exis t reasonabl y clear , generall y understoo d standard s for exercis e o f th e authorit y i n question , standard s whic h ca n serv e as th e backgroun d fo r publi c justificatio n an d defens e o f decisions . As th e relevan t standards—an d eve n th e startin g point s fo r argu ments fo r and agains t th e propriet y o f a give n decision—becom e les s and les s clear, th e constraints o n th e decisio n make r i n a due proces s proceeding becom e progressivel y weaker , an d th e powe r o f thes e decision maker s itsel f come s t o see m mor e an d mor e arbitrary . Th e same thin g ma y b e tru e whe n th e relevan t standards—whil e quit e precise—become les s and les s generall y understoo d unti l finall y the y are th e preserv e o f a smal l grou p includin g onl y th e hearin g examiners, thei r staff , an d th e mai n combatants . The variatio n i n th e form s o f du e proces s mechanis m tha t see m appropriate t o differen t situation s i s no t du e solel y t o th e differen t ways i n whic h effectiv e protectio n agains t arbitrar y decision s ca n best b e given . Th e procedure s wit h whic h w e ar e familia r i n civi l and crimina l trials , disciplinar y proceedings , an d administrativ e hearings serv e a variet y o f differen t function s i n additio n t o th e general on e o f providin g protectio n agains t arbitrar y power ; an d some o f th e feature s o f thes e proceeding s ma y b e explaine d b y thes e additional purposes . Thus , fo r example , man y hearing s ar e no t merely fact-findin g o r rule-applying mechanisms ; the y als o serv e a n important symboli c functio n a s publi c expression s o f th e affecte d parties' right t o demand tha t officia l act s b e explaine d an d justified . If th e hearin g i s t o serv e thi s function , th e procedure s followe d should b e one s tha t tak e th e complainants ' objection s seriousl y an d place the m o n a pa r wit h th e claim s o f authority . Thi s provide s a n

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argument fo r adversary proceedings , fo r the righ t t o counsel, an d fo r the right s t o cal l witnesse s an d cross-examin e opposin g witnesse s which g o beyon d whateve r advantage s thes e procedure s ma y hav e as mechanism s fo r ensurin g a "correc t outcome. " 4 A n argumen t o f this kin d i s a t it s stronges t i n th e cas e o f a crimina l tria l o r othe r proceedings i n whic h a person i s accused o f wrongdoing. A n accuse d person ha s a n interes t i n havin g th e opportunit y t o respon d t o th e charges agains t hi m an d t o presen t wha t h e take s t o b e th e bes t defense o f hi s action . Thi s interes t woul d no t b e me t merel y b y ensuring tha t al l th e fact s an d th e relevan t lega l argument s i n th e defendant's favo r wil l someho w b e brough t befor e th e court . Ther e is a crucia l differenc e betwee n havin g thes e fact s presente d an d having the m presente d a s a defens e b y th e accuse d o r b y someon e speaking fo r hi m wit h hi s consen t an d participation . T o th e exten t that thi s interes t i s a componen t i n th e rational e fo r th e procedure s of a criminal trial , i t woul d b e a mistak e automaticall y t o tak e thes e procedures a s a mode l fo r wha t du e proces s require s generally . A differen t mi x o f purposes i s represented i n disciplinar y proceed ings i n a schoo l o r university . Official s o f a n educationa l institutio n have, i n additio n t o genera l dutie s t o trea t student s comin g befor e them fairl y an d no t t o us e thei r powe r i n a n arbitrar y manner , special fiduciary obligation s t o b e concerne d wit h it s students 5 intellectual an d persona l needs. 5 I t i s therefor e no t sufficien t merel y that disciplinar y proceeding s follo w clea r an d fai r rule s an d tha t accused student s b e informe d o f thei r right s an d give n th e opportunity t o rebu t charge s agains t them . Th e institutio n ma y als o be itsel f obligate d (i n a wa y tha t th e stat e i n a crimina l tria l i s not ) to investigat e case s wit h th e ai m o f uncoverin g evidenc e favorabl e to th e defendant . I t shoul d als o undertak e t o infor m a n accuse d student o f th e variou s alternative s ope n t o hi m an d counse l hi m i n deciding wha t cours e t o follow. 6 On e woul d expec t t o se e thes e special obligation s reflecte d i n difference s betwee n th e procedure s followed i n case s o f studen t disciplin e an d i n case s wher e facult y members o r other employee s fac e dismissal . Bu t th e requirement s o f due process i n thes e case s ar e th e same. 7

Ill I hav e describe d du e proces s a s on e o f th e condition s fo r th e moral legitimac y o f power-conferrin g institutions . Suppos e tha t a

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right t o due proces s as I have describe d i t wer e t o b e recognize d a s a legal righ t withi n a give n lega l system . Wha t migh t a cour t b e deciding i n determinin g i n a certai n cas e tha t thi s righ t ha d bee n violated? Ther e see m t o b e thre e possibilities : (1) Th e cour t ma y decid e that , give n th e natur e o f th e authority i n question , th e natur e o f th e harm s likel y t o resul t from it s imprope r use , an d th e likelihoo d o f it s bein g use d improperly, procedura l safeguard s ar e require d tha t wer e no t followed i n th e give n case . Her e th e cour t i s appraisin g th e decision-making proces s fro m th e outsid e i n it s capacit y a s th e guarantor o f th e lega l righ t t o (procedural ) du e process . (2) O n th e othe r hand , th e cour t ma y decid e tha t whil e th e procedures followe d i n th e give n cas e wer e formall y adequat e the reasonin g accepte d i n thes e tribunal s wa s fault y o r i n an y case insufficien t t o justif y th e decisio n i n questio n o n th e required grounds . Her e th e cour t i s playing a rol e a s one o f th e appeals stage s i n a n establishe d syste m o f due process . Whethe r judicial authorit y t o mak e decision s o f thi s kind i s required a s a deterrent agains t tendentiou s verdict s a t earlie r stage s i s itsel f a question o f procedura l du e proces s o f typ e (1) . (3) Finally , th e cour t ma y decid e that , whil e th e procedure s followed i n th e give n cas e wer e formall y adequat e an d th e reasoning offere d i n suppor t o f decision s unexceptionable , th e rules that wer e applied i n thes e proceeding s mus t themselve s b e rejected becaus e the y excee d th e assigne d authorit y o f th e decision make r i n question . Suc h rule s (e.g. , th e disciplinar y code o f a school , prison , o r labo r union ) migh t b e struc k dow n on th e groun d tha t thei r enforcemen t woul d infring e som e specific constitutiona l guarante e (e.g. , som e Firs t Amendmen t right), bu t thi s i s just on e wa y i n whic h i t migh t b e show n tha t a give n rul e exceede d th e authorit y o f th e agenc y i n question . This sam e conclusio n coul d als o b e reache d b y arguin g that , given th e natur e o f th e institutio n i n question , th e give n rul e could no t possibl y b e take n a s par t o f it s writ . This thir d cas e i s substantiv e du e proces s a s I understan d it . Substantive du e proces s decision s i n thei r mos t characteristi c an d controversial for m ar e thos e base d no t o n an y explici t constitutiona l limitation bu t rathe r on appea l t o th e natur e o f th e authorit y whos e

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power i s i n question . Th e notio n o f th e natur e o f a n institutio n i s one likel y t o rais e lega l an d philosophica l eyebrows . I t appear s t o b e an attemp t t o resolv e lega l o r mora l issue s b y appea l t o definitions , and i t i s ap t t o provok e question s a s t o wher e suc h definition s ar e supposed t o com e from . Surely , i t wil l b e urged , socia l institution s do no t hav e "essences " whic h ca n b e discovere d an d use d a s th e basis fo r authoritative resolutio n o f philosophica l o r lega l controver sies. Bu t a n importan t socia l institutio n enablin g som e t o wiel d significant powe r over others i s unlikely t o exist withou t som e publi c rationale—at th e ver y leas t a n accoun t pu t fort h fo r publi c consumption o f wh y thi s institutio n i s legitimat e an d rational . Thi s will includ e som e conceptio n o f th e socia l goal s th e institutio n i s taken t o serv e an d o f th e wa y i n whic h th e authorit y exercise d b y participants i n th e institutio n i s rationall y relate d t o thos e goals . I f the institutio n i s no t merel y rationalize d b y thos e wishin g t o maintain it s power, bu t i n fac t generall y accepte d a s legitimate the n some conceptio n o f thi s sor t wil l b e fairl y generall y accepte d i n th e society an d rendere d coheren t wit h othe r aspect s o f th e prevailin g views. Suc h a conceptio n ma y b e mor e o r les s clearl y articulated . I t is almost certai n t o b e vagu e an d incomplet e i n som e area s and ma y be graduall y shiftin g an d changing . Bu t somethin g o f thi s kin d wil l almost surel y exis t an d ca n serv e a s a basi s fo r argument . In a n argumen t o f th e kin d I hav e i n mind , a n appea l t o th e current conceptio n o f a n institution—eve n i n it s cleares t an d mos t explicit features—nee d no t b e final. On e mus t als o b e prepare d t o defend th e social goal s appeale d t o as i n fac t valuabl e an d t o defen d the form s o f authorit y define d b y th e institutio n a s rationa l mean s to thos e goal s an d a s acceptabl e give n th e cost s the y involve . Whe n a defens e o f thi s kin d i s give n withi n th e contex t o f a du e proces s proceeding, th e socia l goal s an d judgment s o f relativ e valu e t o which i t appeal s mus t themselve s b e defende d b y appea l t o contemporary standard s (o r b y a n argumen t abou t wha t standard s in th e relevan t are a ough t t o b e give n othe r belief s an d value s people i n th e societ y hold. ) 8 Bu t whil e th e limit s o f debat e ar e i n this sens e se t b y prevailin g views , th e fac t tha t th e dominan t conception o f a n institutio n i s no t take n a t fac e valu e bu t mus t b e shown t o b e coheren t an d consisten t wit h othe r socia l value s provides a measur e o f independenc e an d allow s fo r criticis m through whic h th e prevailin g conceptio n o f a n institutio n ca n b e extended, clarifie d an d altered .

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Appeals o f thi s sort t o th e natur e o f social institution s li e behin d many quit e convincing commonsense politica l arguments , and eve n though ou r conception o f an institutio n i s often partl y i n doubt an d in place s controversia l suc h appeal s ca n yiel d quit e definit e conclusions. I t seem s t o m e clear , fo r example , tha t a labo r unio n could no t us e it s powe r o f expulsio n t o collec t due s t o b e use d t o support a particula r religiou s grou p bu t tha t i t could , a t leas t i n some cases , compe l due s member s t o pa y t o suppor t a politica l candidate o r party . An d thi s conclusio n follows , I think , fro m ou r conception o f the natur e an d purpose s o f a unio n rathe r tha n fro m any specific constitutiona l o r statutor y limitation . Such argument s b y appea l t o the natur e o f an institutio n occup y a kin d o f gray area betwee n consideration s o f rights an d considera tions o f goo d policy . Take , fo r example , th e questio n o f academi c freedom. I t seem s to m e tha t th e doctrin e o f academic freedo m ha s its basi s i n th e ide a tha t th e purpose s o f academi c institution s ar e the purs'ui t an d teachin g o f th e trut h abou t certai n recognize d academic subject s a s define d b y th e prevailin g canon s o f thos e subjects.9 Relativ e t o thi s conceptio n o f th e purpose s o f academi c institutions, i t i s rational tha t the y b e organized i n suc h a wa y tha t the primar y motivatio n o f scholar s an d teacher s wil l b e t o repor t and t o teac h whateve r appear s t o the m t o b e th e trut h abou t thei r subjects. I n particular , i f teachers an d scholar s ar e subjec t t o powe r which i s likel y t o b e use d t o influenc e the m t o teac h an d repor t doctrines favore d b y certai n peopl e whethe r o r no t thes e doctrine s appear t o the m t o b e th e trut h abou t thei r subjects , the n i t i s rational (provide d th e cost s ar e no t to o high ) t o shiel d the m fro m this power . The doctrin e o f academi c freedo m i s generall y defende d a s on e such shield. The restraints it imposes on the authority o f administra tors an d trustee s ove r teacher s ar e directl y tie d t o a particula r conception o f th e purpose s o f an academi c institution . The y woul d make no sense (or only a different an d mor e limited kin d o f sense) as applied t o a religious school whose main purpos e was the dissemina tion o f a particula r fait h o r t o a schoo l founde d fo r th e purpos e o f offering a n educatio n whic h include d a nonstandar d versio n o f some recognize d subject , e.g. , biolog y withou t evolutio n o r som e unorthodox versio n o f history . As I hav e describe d it , academi c freedo m appear s mor e a s a counsel fo r th e rationa l desig n an d wis e administratio n o f certai n

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kinds o f academi c institution s tha n a s a matte r o f right . Bu t suc h a counsel o f rationalit y ma y b e transforme d int o a righ t throug h th e application o f a genera l mora l o r lega l principl e o f du e process , limiting th e authorit y o f academi c official s t o thos e power s an d prerogatives tha t ar e consisten t wit h an d rationall y relate d t o th e rationale fo r an d purpose s o f thei r institutions . T o defen d th e righ t of academi c freedo m s o conceived , on e mus t b e prepare d t o defen d the relevan t kin d o f academic institution s a s worth havin g an d thei r activities a s wort h th e cost s o f safeguardin g the m throug h thi s means. Decisions o f substantiv e du e proces s an d decision s o f procedura l due proces s bot h involv e appea l t o a conceptio n o f th e institution s in question , thei r rational e an d purposes . I n makin g a procedura l due proces s decisio n o f th e firs t typ e describe d above , a cour t mus t estimate th e ris k tha t th e powe r exercise d b y a n institutio n wil l b e used i n way s tha t g o beyon d it s authority. Th e cour t mus t therefor e employ, a s a standard, som e conceptio n o f what tha t authorit y is . I n making a decisio n o f substantiv e du e process , however , a cour t goe s further an d appeal s t o suc h a conceptio n i n orde r itsel f t o declar e a particular exercis e o f powe r illegitimate . The distinctio n betwee n substantiv e du e proces s decision s an d procedural du e proces s decision s ma y see m t o coincid e wit h tha t between judicia l scrutin y o f rule-makin g authorit y an d judicia l scrutiny o f rule-applyin g authority , bu t th e tw o distinction s ar e no t the same . Rule-makin g authorit y ma y com e unde r judicial scrutin y on ground s fallin g clearl y withi n wha t I hav e calle d procedura l du e process. Ther e ma y b e seriou s doubt s whether , i n a particula r situation, give n rule-makin g powe r wil l b e use d onl y i n a nonarbi trary fashion , an d specia l procedure s fo r th e makin g o f rule s ma y b e required t o insur e this . Wha t i s specia l abou t substantiv e du e process scrutin y i s no t tha t i t i s directed t o th e limit s o f rule-makin g authority bu t rathe r tha t i n exercisin g i t court s directl y appl y a conception o f wha t th e rule s o f a particula r institutio n ma y o r ma y not be . The potentiall y controversia l ground s o n whic h substantiv e du e process decision s ma y b e based— a conceptio n o f th e natur e an d purposes of a particula r institution—ar e thu s alread y presuppose d by decision s o f procedura l du e process . Nonetheless , decision s o f substantive du e proces s deserv e t o b e considere d a mor e controver -

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sial form o f judicial activity , fo r i n makin g the m court s exercis e a further an d mor e intrusiv e for m o f authorit y ove r th e institution s concerned. Whethe r i t i s prope r fo r court s t o exercis e thi s kin d o f authority, i s itsel f a questio n o f procedura l du e proces s [typ e (1) ] i n the broa d sens e I hav e described . I n it s favor , on e migh t maintai n that judicial oversigh t o f rule-makin g an d rul e applyin g procedures , however careful, i s empty a s a protectio n agains t arbitrar y authorit y if th e authoritie s i n questio n ar e fre e t o mak e an d appl y whateve r rules the y wish . Thi s woul d b e a n overstatement . Stron g traditions , the opinio n o f a publi c informe d b y a clea r conceptio n o f th e limit s of th e authorit y i n question , an d th e likel y resistanc e o f thos e affected b y arbitrar y rule s al l ma y provid e som e chec k o n rule making authority , a chec k whos e effectivenes s ma y b e enhance d b y an enforce d requiremen t o f appropriat e rule-makin g procedures . But thes e sam e factor s als o provid e a check o n th e manne r i n whic h rules ar e applied , an d thi s chec k i s no t alway s sufficient , eve n whe n the relevan t procedura l safeguard s ar e observed . Thi s i s show n b y the fac t tha t i n a t leas t som e case s w e thin k tha t court s shoul d hav e the powe r no t onl y t o requir e du e proces s a t th e leve l o f origina l decisions bu t als o t o revers e th e result s o f suc h procedure s whe n they ar e clearl y misapplication s o f th e relevan t rules . Thu s th e argument tha t substantiv e du e proces s i s sometime s calle d fo r i s parallel t o th e argumen t tha t procedura l du e proces s o f typ e (2 ) described abov e i s sometimes calle d for . It i s ver y implausibl e t o sugges t that , whil e th e threa t o f arbitrariness fo r whic h th e secon d for m o f procedura l du e proces s i s a possibl e remed y ofte n occurs , th e correspondin g threa t o f misus e of rule-makin g authorit y neve r exists . Bu t eve n wher e thi s threa t exists, i t i s a furthe r questio n whethe r substantiv e judicial revie w i s called for , o r even effective , a s a protectio n agains t it . One reaso n fo r doubting it s effectiveness rest s on skepticis m abou t arguments b y appea l t o th e natur e o f a n institution . I f suc h arguments ar e though t t o b e insubstantia l rhetoric—no t argument s at al l bu t a mod e o f discours e i n whic h ther e ar e virtuall y n o usefu l standards an d i n whic h almos t anythin g ca n b e defende d wit h equal plausibility—the n a proces s o f revie w base d o n suc h argu ments woul d itsel f constitut e a highl y arbitrar y for m o f authority , perhaps a s arbitrar y a s tha t whic h i s sough t t o b e checked . I hav e expressed above , an d trie d t o defen d b y example , th e vie w tha t fo r

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most significan t socia l institution s "th e natur e o f th e institution " i s something on e ca n argu e abou t i n a rationa l way . Bu t eve n i f thi s i s conceded, ther e ma y b e objection s t o empowerin g judge s t o strik e down rule s o r othe r enactment s of , e.g. , privat e association s o n th e basis of the court's judgment tha t thes e fal l outsid e o f and canno t b e defended b y appea l t o th e curren t conceptio n o f th e natur e o f th e organizations i n question . I t ma y b e though t preferabl e t o allo w organizations (throug h mean s meetin g procedura l du e proces s standards) t o defin e an d alte r thei r ow n purpose s an d rationale . Crudely described , wha t i s a t issu e her e seem s t o b e a questio n o f balancing—of finding th e prope r trade-of f betwee n th e goa l o f protecting peopl e fro m arbitrar y regulation s an d requirement s an d that o f allowin g the m t o associat e fo r commo n purpose s an d defin e the term s of thei r own association . I will hav e mor e t o say abou t thi s problem an d abou t th e claim s o f institutiona l autonom y i n th e nex t section.

IV I hav e argue d tha t th e basi s o f du e proces s requirement s lie s i n a condition o n th e legitimac y o f power-conferrin g institutions . Sinc e the stat e i s onl y on e suc h institutio n amon g many , i t follow s tha t the rang e o f possibl e applicatio n o f du e proces s requirement s i s much broade r tha n th e exten t o f "stat e action. " Thi s conclusio n seems t o m e t o b e i n accor d wit h ou r intuition s abou t particula r cases. I n considerin g right s t o du e proces s i n case s o f suspensio n o r expulsion o f students , fo r example , i t seem s arbitrar y t o distinguis h between institution s o n th e basi s of whether o r not the y receiv e stat e or federal funds . Thi s seem s arbitrary , first, becaus e th e ver y seriou s dislocation o f a student's caree r whic h i n ou r societ y ca n resul t fro m expulsion fro m colleg e i s not significantl y differen t i n th e tw o cases . Nor i s th e likelihoo d o f arbitrar y actio n b y administrator s actin g i n the absenc e o f procedura l safeguard s les s i n on e cas e tha n th e other . Given th e importanc e attache d t o gainin g admissio n t o college , an d the lac k o f rea l bargainin g powe r o n th e par t o f applicants , student's freedo m o f choic e i n decidin g wha t colleg e t o atten d ca n scarcely b e expected t o serve a s an effectiv e chec k o n administrator' s authority, an d th e decisio n t o atten d a particula r schoo l ca n scarcely b e take n a s authorizatio n o f whateve r power s th e admin -

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istrators o f tha t schoo l ma y wis h t o claim . A t an y rate , ther e seem s to b e littl e differenc e wit h respec t t o thes e matter s betwee n privat e and publi c institutions . But whil e judicial enforcemen t o f du e proces s requirement s doe s not see m t o m e t o b e limite d t o cases of state action , ther e doe s see m to m e t o b e a n are a o f activity , whic h migh t b e calle d th e spher e o f purely voluntar y organizations , withi n whic h du e proces s require ments appl y onl y wit h reduce d force . I n thi s sectio n I wil l attemp t to characteriz e thi s are a mor e clearl y an d examin e th e way s i n which th e claim s o f du e proces s see m t o b e reduced. 10 I wil l als o indicate ho w th e notio n o f stat e actio n retain s som e conten t an d force eve n thoug h i t doe s no t mar k th e oute r limit s o f du e proces s enforcement. Even give n th e similaritie s note d above , th e differenc e betwee n state-supported institution s an d privat e institution s migh t stil l b e crucial fo r du e proces s i f th e cost s o f imposin g du e proces s requirements o n th e tw o kind s o f institution s wer e significantl y different. But , a t leas t a s lon g a s w e confin e ou r attentio n t o procedural du e process , an d a s lon g a s w e ar e concerne d wit h colleges an d universitie s i n th e traditiona l sense , thi s i s no t th e case . One ca n imagin e a religiou s schoo l i n whic h th e tenet s o f th e fait h required relation s o f authorit y whic h woul d b e entirel y inconsisten t with du e proces s requirement s o f th e usua l kind . I n suc h a case , th e cost o f imposin g du e proces s right s woul d b e quit e high , amountin g to th e seriou s alteration , i f no t th e destruction , o f value d aspect s o f institutional life . A schoo l o f thi s kin d woul d b e extremel y specia l i n offering no t merel y educatio n o f th e kin d require d fo r th e career s a t which mos t member s o f th e societ y ai m bu t rathe r a specia l for m o f life chose n fo r it s ow n sak e b y thos e fe w wh o happe n t o valu e it . Those wh o atten d suc h a n institutio n thu s accep t it s requirement s voluntarily i n a stronge r sens e tha n thos e wh o accep t th e require ments of , say , Princeto n o r th e Universit y o f Michiga n o r Harvar d Law School , institution s whic h ar e principa l mean s o f acces s t o some o f th e mos t highl y desire d position s i n th e society . But a s fa r a s th e weakenin g o f procedura l du e proces s require ments is concerned, i t i s the forme r feature—th e direc t clas h betwee n the form s o f du e proces s an d th e goal s o f th e institution—rathe r than it s hig h degre e o f voluntarines s tha t i s crucial. Fo r eve n wher e institutions ar e thoroughl y voluntary , i f th e cost s t o individual s o f

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the misus e o f officia l authorit y ar e hig h an d th e chanc e o f suc h misuse significan t the n ther e wil l b e a prim a faci e cas e fo r procedural du e proces s safeguards . I n th e presen t example , thi s prima faci e cas e i s overridde n b y th e unusuall y disruptiv e conse quences o f du e proces s forms . In voluntar y institution s o f thi s kind , i t i s at leas t partl y accurat e to se e th e authorit y o f institutiona l officer s t o order , discipline , an d expel member s a s arisin g fro m a contract , an d t o se e th e limit s an d conditions o f thi s authorit y a s fixed b y th e term s on whic h member s (voluntarily) enter . Sinc e eve n ful l voluntarines s a t tim e o f entr y into membershi p doe s no t preclud e grea t inequalit y i n th e powe r unilaterally t o interpre t an d ac t o n th e term s o f th e membershi p "agreement," th e nee d t o impos e procedura l du e proces s i s no t eliminated b y th e voluntar y natur e o f th e institution . But substantiv e du e proces s i s ver y different . I t amount s t o th e power o f a court t o arriv e a t a n independen t judgmen t o f th e limit s and condition s o f th e authorit y o f th e grou p an d it s officers , a judgment base d o n a conception o f th e natur e o f the institutio n tha t need no t b e determine d b y th e understandin g o f it s members . Where a n institutio n i s trul y voluntary , thi s represent s a seriou s inroad int o th e freedo m o f individual s t o ente r int o suc h arrange ments a s the y wis h an d t o defin e th e term s o f thei r ow n association . But fe w o f th e mos t significan t institution s o f societ y ar e voluntary i n thi s stron g sense . Whe n institution s ar e no t full y voluntary, ther e ar e limit s o n th e degre e t o which i t i s permissible t o allow presen t member s o r presen t officer s freel y t o determin e th e conditions unde r whic h other s ma y hav e acces s t o th e benefit s thei r institution provides . Thes e limit s ar e i n par t determine d b y th e nature o f th e institutio n i n th e sens e describe d above . Let m e retur n t o th e cas e o f traditiona l college s an d universities . Some limit s o n change s i n universit y requirement s an d policie s ma y arise fro m th e requiremen t o f fai r warnin g an d th e obligatio n t o comply wit h th e legitimat e exception s o f student s alread y enrolled . In determinin g wha t expectation s ar e (o r were ) legitimate , w e ma y appeal t o "the ide a o f a university " a s i t wa s understoo d a t th e tim e these student s enrolled . Her e appea l t o th e natur e o f a n institutio n helps u s t o fill i n a vagu e o r incompletel y articulate d agreement . But th e ide a o f a universit y ma y b e invoke d i n a stronge r sens e i n

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setting th e limit s o n requirement s fo r admissio n o r requirement s that ar e t o appl y onl y t o student s wh o enrol l i n th e future . It seem s a t th e outse t tha t almos t an y requirement s o f thi s kin d would b e immun e fro m substantiv e du e proces s revie w provide d they were plausibl y relate d t o norma l educationa l purpose s o r coul d be brough t unde r th e headin g o f educationa l experimentation . Fo r requirements tha t ar e evidently idl e o r perverse , th e matte r i s not s o clear. I a m thinkin g her e o f suc h thing s a s a polic y o f restrictin g admission t o person s ove r si x fee t tal l o r a universit y polic y requiring freshme n t o spea k onl y whe n spoke n t o an d t o serv e a s lackeys t o olde r student s an d faculty . If w e thin k tha t court s shoul d no t interven e t o revie w an d possibly strik e dow n suc h policies , thi s i s presumabl y becaus e w e feel tha t freedo m t o tr y out ne w an d differen t educationa l form s i s a good thing , tha t competitiv e pressure s betwee n institution s wil l curb excesses , an d tha t th e existenc e o f man y comparabl e alterna tive institution s prevent s idiosyncrati c policie s adopte d b y on e school fro m imposin g a very hig h cos t o n would-b e applicants . Suc h considerations ar e crucia l t o th e cas e fo r noninterventio n give n th e place universitie s occup y a s mean s o f acces s t o th e mos t desire d positions i n ou r society . I f thes e condition s shoul d fai l t o hold—i f certain restriction s o n admissio n unrelate d t o plausibl e academi c purposes shoul d ceas e t o b e merel y th e idiosyncrac y o f a fe w particular institution s amon g man y an d shoul d com e t o b e quit e general, thereb y effectivel y excludin g a grou p o f peopl e fro m university educatio n an d al l thos e career s t o whic h i t i s th e mai n avenue o f approach—the n th e cas e fo r judicia l interventio n o n substantive du e proces s ground s woul d b e strong . This i s what ha s happene d i n case s o f discrimination . Wha t onc e was o r migh t hav e bee n a n idl e preferenc e whic h som e institution s could b e allowe d t o cate r to—lik e a preferenc e fo r peopl e ove r si x feet tall—come s t o hav e unacceptabl e consequence s onc e i t become s a genera l pattern . Thi s preferenc e the n cease s t o b e a n acceptabl e ground fo r admission s decisions . Antidiscriminatio n judgment s o f this kin d ca n b e see n a s substantiv e du e proces s decision s base d o n arguments abou t th e natur e o f a n institutio n i n th e sens e discusse d above. Th e judgmen t tha t universit y admission s officer s canno t follow a white-onl y polic y i s base d o n th e judgmen t tha t a

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university canno t tak e bein g a n all-whit e institutio n a s on e o f it s defining purposes . I t canno t d o s o becaus e th e cos t o f allowin g educational (an d other ) institution s s o t o define themselve s is , in th e circumstances, unacceptable . Wha t i s th e cost ? I t is , first, tha t a whole grou p o f peopl e wil l b e effectivel y blocke d fro m importan t areas o f socia l life . O f course , an y se t o f criteria—i f uniforml y employed b y al l th e institution s i n a give n categor y (e.g. , al l universities)—will ac t a s a ba r t o som e "group, " namel y thos e wh o fail t o mee t thes e particula r criteria . Perhap s an y suc h exclusion , when i t i s sufficiently uniform , alway s represent s a cos t whic h mus t be considered. Bu t i t i s crucial t o th e cost s typica l o f cases strikin g u s as discrimination tha t th e criteri a o f exclusion expres s attitude s tha t are demeanin g t o thos e toward s who m the y ar e directed . Onc e circumstances aris e i n whic h suc h attitude s ar e widesprea d an d have bee n generall y acte d upon—once , tha t is , discriminatio n o f a certain kin d ha s becom e a problem—the cos t o f allowing institution s to defin e themselve s a s excludin g th e grou p discriminate d agains t become ver y high . Thi s ma y provid e ground s fo r refusin g t o allo w institutions s o t o defin e themselve s eve n i n area s o f nationa l lif e i n which suc h a definitio n woul d pos e n o threa t o f systemati c exclusion. Fo r example , i t woul d no t b e acceptabl e t o for m a lily white professiona l sport s tea m i n 197 5 eve n thoug h thi s woul d pos e no threa t t o blac k athletes . The conclusio n o f a substantive du e proces s argumen t o f thi s kin d barring institutiona l discriminatio n agains t black s i s no t tha t institutional policie s mus t b e "colo r blind. " A universit y admittin g blacks onl y woul d no t b e objectionabl e o n th e ground s I hav e mentioned: ther e i s at presen t n o ris k of whites bein g exclude d fro m higher educatio n generall y o r fro m an y importan t rang e o f institu tions withi n it . A polic y o f excludin g white s nee d no t b e base d o n antiwhite attitudes , and , eve n i f i t were , th e threa t pose d t o thei r self-respect an d standin g i n th e societ y woul d b e insignificant . Finally, a n institutio n wit h suc h a polic y coul d conceivabl y b e thought t o serv e significan t cultura l value . ( A simila r asymmetr y exists i n th e Unite d State s o f 197 5 betwee n institution s excludin g women an d institution s fo r wome n only. ) I hav e suggeste d tha t th e conclusio n o f a substantiv e du e proces s argument agains t discriminatio n i s t o b e state d negativel y a s th e judgment tha t ther e are certain purpose s whic h institution s ma y no t

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be allowe d t o adop t a s par t o f thei r definin g rational e o r t o appea l to i n justifyin g thei r policies. 11 I t migh t b e suggeste d tha t suc h judgments coul d a s wel l b e state d positivel y as , fo r example , th e judgment tha t universitie s mus t emplo y onl y admissio n criteri a rationally relate d t o thei r central academi c purpose . I want t o mak e two comment s abou t thi s alternativ e formulation . First, if this requirement i s understood narrowly , a s the claim tha t since th e centra l purpos e o f universitie s i s education , the y mus t employ academi c excellence , demonstrate d o r projected , a s thei r sole criterio n fo r admission , the n th e proposa l i s on e tha t ha s neve r been impose d an d shoul d no t be . Obviously , college s an d univer sities shoul d b e abl e t o choos e thei r ow n specia l characte r an d b e free i n choosin g student s t o supplemen t strictl y academi c criteri a with othe r desiderat a relate d t o th e kin d o f institutio n the y wis h t o be. Substantiv e du e proces s decision s whic h rule d ou t thi s kin d o f variation, eve n t o th e exten t o f requirin g tha t nonacademi c criteri a be restricte d t o a tie-breakin g rol e i n admissions , woul d b e mistaken. Thi s shows , I think , tha t th e correc t argument s mus t b e understood negatively—a s rulin g out certai n purpose s an d standard s rather tha n demandin g others . Second, i t i s a mistak e t o thin k tha t criteri a o f academi c excellence ar e themselve s sacrosanct . I hav e stresse d th e fac t tha t universities ar e gateway s t o th e mos t generall y desire d position s i n our society . Criteri a o f academi c succes s bea r som e relatio n t o plausible efficiency-base d criteri a fo r selectio n t o thes e positions . But thi s connectio n certainl y ca n be , an d fo r man y position s n o doubt commonl y is , overrated . I n an y event , th e genera l us e o f standard academi c criteri a fo r admissio n t o colleges , universitie s and professiona l school s ha s costs , bot h i n tendin g t o preserv e som e forms o f discriminatio n an d i n creatin g it s ow n for m o f stratifica tion, an d thes e hav e t o b e weighe d agains t it s valu e a s a mean s t o increased efficiency . I a m no t her e arguin g tha t thi s balancin g comes ou t agains t academi c criteria . I am onl y pointin g ou t tha t th e standard o f meri t whic h the y represent , whil e i t ma y hav e grea t appeal bot h fo r it s ow n sak e an d a s a hard-wo n refug e fro m arbitrary an d discriminatin g practices , stil l ha s t o b e defende d a s worth th e cost s i t involves. 12 Let m e summariz e th e discussio n o f thi s section . Ther e i s a n important distinctio n betwee n thos e institution s o f a society tha t ar e

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truly voluntar y an d thos e that , becaus e the y ar e th e mean s o f acces s to benefits desire d b y mos t i n tha t society , ar e so important t o lif e i n the societ y tha t thei r powe r canno t plausibl y b e justified merel y b y saying tha t anyon e wh o doe s no t wis h t o dea l wit h the m o n thei r own term s ma y simpl y refrai n fro m dealin g wit h them . Obviously , an institutio n tha t i s trul y voluntar y a t on e tim e ca n ceas e t o b e s o at anothe r a s condition s an d more s change . Perhap s college s an d universities wer e onc e trul y voluntar y i n ou r society ; no w the y ar e not. Procedura l du e proces s requirement s appl y t o voluntary a s wel l as t o nonvoluntar y institutions , bu t fo r substantiv e du e proces s th e distinction i s crucial. Th e authorit y tha t trul y voluntar y institution s have ove r thei r member s ca n plausibl y b e see n a s derive d fro m consent, an d thei r mor e genera l justification lie s simpl y i n th e valu e of allowin g individual s t o associat e fo r whateve r purpose s the y ma y choose. 13 But a s an institutio n cease s t o b e trul y voluntar y an d come s t o b e the mechanis m fo r providin g som e importan t good , som e furthe r justification fo r it s powe r i s required . Thi s justificatio n typicall y rests on th e institution' s rol e i n providin g th e goo d i n question , an d the authorit y o f individual s withi n th e institutio n mus t the n b e defended a s par t o f a rationa l an d acceptabl e mechanis m fo r providing tha t good . Thus , i n th e cas e o f nonvoluntar y institutions , there arise s bot h a cas e fo r an d a basi s fo r criticis m o n substantiv e due proces s grounds . Bu t thi s doe s no t mea n tha t a cour t woul d b e justified i n imposin g o n an y suc h institutio n it s conceptio n o f wha t is require d b y th e centra l functio n o f tha t institution . Institutiona l autonomy an d variet y amon g institution s providin g th e sam e goo d remain importan t values . Eve n wher e institution s o f a certai n kin d are no t full y voluntary , th e abilit y o f individual s t o choos e amon g various institution s o f thi s kin d ma y constitut e a n adequat e safeguard agains t capriciou s restriction s o r unwarrante d require ments. Bu t whe n th e exercis e o f institutiona l autonom y lead s t o systematic exclusio n o r t o th e impositio n o f othe r unacceptabl e social cost s the n judicia l interventio n ma y b e calle d fo r t o delimi t the purpose s wit h respec t t o whic h institutiona l policie s ar e t o b e justified. A remar k o n "stat e action. " Th e stat e i s a nonvoluntar y institution o f th e stronges t kind . Everyon e i n th e societ y i s subject t o its requirements , an d mos t ar e require d t o suppor t it s activitie s

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whether the y wis h t o or not. Th e activitie s o f th e state , however , ar e varied. Som e o f these , whe n considere d wit h respec t t o thei r particular purposes , ar e i n themselve s wha t I hav e calle d nonvolun tary institution s (state-supporte d universitie s ar e a n example) ; others ar e mor e aki n t o voluntar y institution s (nationa l park s an d the suppor t o f scholarl y researc h see m t o m e t o fal l int o thi s category). 14 But al l o f thes e activities , sinc e the y ar e supporte d b y ta x money , are th e undertaking s o f a particula r nonvoluntar y institution . Accordingly, the y ar e subjec t t o condition s an d limitation s flowing from th e natur e o f thi s institution , condition s an d limitation s tha t may no t appl y t o othe r (voluntar y o r nonvoluntary ) organization s pursuing th e sam e purpose s (e.g. , nonpubli c universities , privat e recreational areas , o r foundation s fo r th e suppor t o f scholarl y research). Thus , fo r example , tax-supporte d institution s ma y b e barred fro m adoptin g religiou s o r politica l activitie s a s par t o f thei r function eve n thoug h comparabl e privat e institution s ma y d o so , and tax-supporte d institution s ma y b e subjec t t o especially stringen t requirements o f fairnes s i n th e distributio n o f thei r benefits . Thes e conditions an d limitation s coul d b e enforce d unde r th e headin g o f substantive du e proces s a s applie d t o th e particula r nonvoluntar y institution o f th e state . But , sinc e th e stat e i s only on e nonvoluntar y institution amon g many , thi s i s a specia l cas e o f substantiv e du e process. T o sho w tha t substantiv e du e proces s applie s t o a give n institution on e nee d no t sho w tha t i t i s a n activit y o f th e stat e bu t only tha t it , lik e th e state , shoul d b e recognize d a s no t trul y voluntary.

V Probably th e mos t controversia l substantiv e du e proces s decision s are thos e i n whic h a cour t overturn s th e actio n o f a legislature . According t o th e genera l framewor k presente d i n Sectio n III , suc h a decision coul d tak e eithe r o f tw o forms : th e piec e o f legislatio n might conflic t wit h a specifi c constitutiona l prohibitio n o r i t migh t be foun d t o exceed th e authorit y o f th e legislatur e i n a mor e genera l sense a s determine d b y a n argumen t abou t th e natur e o f legislativ e authority. Decision s o f th e first kin d are , i n themselves , relativel y uncontroversial; althoug h th e wa y i n whic h I hav e presente d the m

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may see m od d insofa r a s i t suggest s tha t an y instanc e o f judicia l review i s an exampl e o f substantiv e du e process . I wil l retur n t o thi s point. Decision s o f th e secon d kin d ar e subjec t t o th e tw o objection s to substantiv e du e proces s discusse d above—skepticis m abou t argu ments appealin g t o th e " n a t u r e " o f an institutio n an d th e belie f tha t institutional autonom y i s preferabl e t o th e impositio n o f judicia l authority—which appl y her e i n slightl y modifie d for m an d wit h apparent adde d strength . The first objectio n appear s t o b e strengthene d becaus e th e question a t issu e ha s becom e no t merel y whethe r ther e i s som e ground o n whic h claim s abou t th e natur e o f a n institutio n (i n thi s case th e natur e o f th e legislatur e an d it s power ) ca n rationall y b e established bu t rathe r whethe r suc h claim s ca n b e establishe d b y appeals t o an d interpretatio n o f th e Constitution . Afte r all , i t i s th e Constitution whic h i s supposed t o defin e th e limit s o f governmenta l authority, an d whic h therefor e ough t t o b e th e onl y groun d o n which a cour t ca n delimi t tha t authority . T h e secon d objectio n i s also strengthened , sinc e wha t i s t o b e overridde n b y a substantiv e due proces s decisio n i s no w no t merel y th e desir e o f som e smal l group o f peopl e t o b e allowe d t o associat e fo r thei r ow n purpose s but a decisio n o f th e legislatur e which , afte r all , i s supposed t o b e the politica l voic e o f al l th e people . If w e wer e t o stipulat e fo r th e momen t tha t th e du e proces s clauses o f th e Constitutio n ca n b e take n t o requir e du e proces s i n the sens e I hav e outlined , the n w e migh t tak e a shor t wa y wit h th e first objection . Fo r o n thi s assumptio n substantiv e du e proces s arguments o f th e kin d I hav e describe d woul d be , i n a forma l sense , arguments abou t wha t th e Constitutio n require s jus t a s muc h as , say, argument s abou t freedo m o f speec h are : i n eac h cas e ther e i s a brief constitutiona l formula . I n bot h cases , th e subjec t a t issu e concerns th e distributio n o f authorit y (i n th e cas e o f th e Firs t Amendment, authorit y t o regulat e expression , i n th e othe r case , authority mor e generally) . I n neithe r cas e doe s th e Constitutio n literally specif y wha t constitute s a n acceptabl e syste m o f authorit y of th e relevan t kind . Thus , i n applyin g eithe r formula , a cour t mus t be workin g wit h som e conceptio n o f authorit y no t explicitl y supplied b y th e Constitution , an d i t mus t defen d thes e conception s as tenabl e unde r prevailin g conditions , arguin g b y appea l t o th e

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Constitution an d t o generall y accepte d principle s o f politica l morality. 15 There are , o f course , a numbe r o f difference s betwee n th e tw o cases I hav e jus t compared . On e particularl y relevan t her e i s th e difference i n scop e o f th e tw o principles . Freedo m o f expressio n i s a fairly specifi c question , an d onl y on e o f man y wit h whic h th e Constitution deals . Bu t substantiv e du e process , a s I hav e describe d it, deal s wit h th e basi s an d bound s o f authorit y i n al l branche s o f government (an d eve n outsid e o f it) , i.e. , wit h th e subjec t matte r o f the Constitutio n a s a whole . S o i t seem s tha t eithe r substantiv e du e process argument s ar e jus t argument s abou t wha t th e res t o f th e Constitution a s a whol e requires , i n whic h cas e th e du e proces s clauses ad d nothin g t o th e res t o f th e Constitutio n beyon d procedural guarantees , o r els e th e authorit y t o mak e substantiv e due proces s decision s open s th e doo r t o genera l theoretica l argu ment abou t wha t th e power s o f governmen t ough t t o be , i.e. , t o judicial revisio n an d extensio n o f th e Constitution . Obviously th e Constitution , whic h embodie s fundamenta l politi cal principle s o f ou r society , play s a centra l rol e i n substantiv e du e process argument s a s I hav e describe d them . Bu t i n orde r t o decid e which o f th e alternative s jus t presente d follow s fro m m y vie w on e would hav e t o know ho w fa r th e form s o f argument I have describe d are include d withi n a n adequat e accoun t o f th e method s o f constitutional interpretation . Fo r thi s on e woul d requir e a genera l theory o f constitutiona l adjudication , whic h I canno t provide. 16 But argument s agains t substantiv e du e proces s decision s an d i n favor o f judicial modest y vis-a-vi s legislativ e judgment s hav e ofte n been pu t forwar d no t jus t a s argument s abou t wha t ou r Constitu tion and lega l tradition s requir e bu t a s arguments i n politica l theor y about wha t constitute s a prope r distributio n o f authorit y i n a democratic system. 17 S o considered , thes e argument s fal l withi n th e framework I have bee n presenting : A s I have alread y remarked , th e question the y ar e concerne d wit h i s a questio n o f procedura l du e process of type (1) (a s indee d ar e all question s abou t th e propriet y o f various form s o f judicia l review) . Thes e argument s ma y b e ap proached withi n m y framewor k b y considerin g th e fou r question s presented above , thes e bein g (1 ) th e likelihoo d o f misus e 1 8 o f th e power i n question ; (2 ) th e magnitud e o f th e harm s involved ; (3 ) th e

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degree t o whic h substantiv e du e proces s revie w woul d offe r a n improvement, an d (4 ) th e cost s involve d i n invokin g it . Questions o f type s (1 ) an d (2) , abou t th e likelihoo d o f legislativ e excess an d th e degre e t o whic h legislativ e self-restrain t ca n b e relie d upon, pla y som e rol e i n argument s agains t substantiv e du e process , as d o question s o f typ e (4) , concerne d mainl y wit h th e los s o f popular sovereignt y t o a dictatoria l judiciary . Bu t th e mos t prominent rol e ha s bee n playe d b y question s o f typ e (3) : i s substantive du e proces s revie w itsel f a n acceptabl y nonarbitrar y form o f authority ? Thi s questio n divide s int o two : Ar e ther e acceptably clea r standard s fo r substantiv e du e proces s arguments ? And i s ther e sufficien t reaso n t o thin k tha t court s wil l b e hel d t o these standard s i n makin g thei r decisions ? Her e th e relatio n between "interpretatio n o f th e Constitution " an d wha t I have calle d "argument abou t th e natur e o f a n institution " come s t o b e o f putative importanc e a s a matte r o f politica l theor y a s well a s of law . For the ide a behin d som e argument s agains t substantiv e du e proces s in thi s mor e extende d for m seem s t o b e tha t judicia l revie w i s a n acceptably nonarbitrar y for m o f authorit y onl y insofa r a s i t consist s in th e applicatio n o f reasonabl y specifi c constitutiona l formulas . This ide a ma y sometime s b e motivate d b y th e vie w tha t i n reaching substantiv e du e proces s decisions a court mus t eithe r b e (a ) applying som e relativel y clea r constitutiona l formula ; o r (b ) regis tering wha t i t take s t o b e prevailin g publi c opinion ; o r (c ) enactin g into la w it s ow n persona l philosophica l views . I t i s the n maintaine d that, sinc e (c ) i s unacceptabl y arbitrar y an d (b ) somethin g bette r done b y a n electiv e representativ e bod y tha n b y a court , (a ) represents th e onl y acceptabl e alternative . Th e strengt h o f thi s conclusion depends , o f course , o n ho w th e notio n o f "application " as use d i n (a ) i s understood . I canno t her e g o int o th e questio n o f whether ther e i s a plausibl e interpretatio n o f (a ) tha t woul d encompass wha t i s generall y accepte d a s legitimat e constitutiona l adjudication i n non-du e proces s area s ye t exclud e th e kin d o f reasoning I hav e describe d i n discussin g substantiv e du e process . I have maintaine d abov e tha t i f (a ) i s interprete d narrowly , the n (a) , (b), an d (c ) d o no t exhaus t th e relevan t alternatives . I t i s possibl e t o argue rationall y abou t th e acceptabl e distributio n o f authorit y i n society, an d th e requiremen t tha t a cour t resolv e issue s b y engagin g in publi c debat e o f thi s kin d ma y i n som e instance s b e a les s

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arbitrary metho d o f decisio n tha n th e alternativ e o f unrestraine d legislative authority . Of course , i f courts hav e th e authorit y t o reac h decision s o n thi s ground, i t i s likely tha t the y wil l sometime s d o i t wrongly . Bu t on e cannot infe r fro m th e fac t tha t certai n decision s ar e egregiousl y wrong that the y would bes t b e avoided b y th e adoptio n o f a forma l principle (e.g. , a principl e o f judicial modesty ) barrin g court s fro m undertaking such decisions at all . Such a principle i s analogous t o a formal principl e of legislative behavior , say , one requiring represen tatives t o vot e th e expresse d wishe s o f thei r constituent s or , alternatively, permittin g the m t o vot e thei r ow n consciences . Individual decision s ca n b e outstandingl y wron g o n substantiv e grounds withou t violatin g an y suc h forma l principle. 19 Suc h a principle ha s t o b e argue d fo r o n genera l ground s o f th e kin d jus t discussed b y showin g that , give n th e condition s unde r whic h decisions ar e made , th e pressure s o n decisio n maker s an d th e methods ope n t o them , th e adoptio n o f th e principl e i s a neede d curb o n arbitrarines s o r a valuabl e contributio n t o th e efficienc y o r reliability o f the process. Rather tha n pursu e thi s genera l controvers y an y further , le t m e close b y considerin g on e specia l cas e o f th e argumen t fo r judicia l modesty. O n m y view , substantive du e proces s decisions involv e a n element o f balancing. In reachin g such a decision a court ma y ofte n have t o decide, e.g., whethe r th e instrumenta l valu e o f allowing a n institution t o operat e i n a certai n wa y o r t o pursu e a particula r purpose justifies allowin g i t t o exercis e a certai n for m o f authorit y despite th e cost s o f it s doin g so . I t i s ofte n maintaine d tha t suc h questions ar e one s whic h a representativ e bod y i s particularl y designed t o resolve , an d tha t a court , i n undertakin g t o reweig h a balancing decisio n previousl y arrive d a t b y th e legislature , i s either inefficiently undertakin g t o ac t a s a bette r baromete r o f publi c feeling tha n th e legislatur e i s o r els e placin g it s ow n preference s above thos e o f the peopl e a s a whol e i n a wa y tha t i s repugnant t o democratic principles . I wan t t o maintain , agains t thi s argument , that question s properl y resolve d b y balancin g com e i n differen t forms, an d tha t fo r som e balancin g question s ther e i s bot h a n acceptable metho d o f judicial determinatio n an d a reaso n wh y thi s method shoul d b e preferred t o purel y legislativ e resolution . In th e sens e i n whic h th e ter m "balancing " i s used i n mos t lega l

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(and som e philosophical ) theory , almos t anythin g ca n b e "bal anced" agains t almos t anythin g else . Wit h n o clai m t o exhaustive ness (o r eve n t o mutua l exclusiveness) , le t m e roughl y distinguis h three differen t form s o f decisio n makin g i n whic h competin g considerations ar e balance d agains t on e another . T h e first , whic h I will cal l "aggregativ e balancing, " i s th e for m typica l o f traditiona l utilitarian arguments . I n thi s form , th e su m o f th e advantage s o f those wh o ma y b e expecte d t o gai n fro m a particula r ac t o r polic y i s compared t o th e su m o f th e disadvantage s o f thos e wh o wil l los e b y it. I t i s an essentia l mar k o f aggregativ e balancin g tha t th e outcom e can alway s b e influence d b y alterin g th e number of peopl e o n eac h side, e.g. , b y sufficientl y increasin g th e gainer s o r decreasin g th e losers. One metho d o f individua l decisio n makin g tha t i s paralle l t o aggregative balancin g a s a metho d o f socia l choic e migh t b e calle d "individual probabilisti c balancing. " Her e a singl e person , whe n faced wit h a choic e betwee n alternativ e action s leadin g t o uncertai n outcomes, considers , fo r eac h alternative , th e su m o f th e value s fo r him o f th e outcome s associate d wit h tha t alternative , discounte d i n each cas e b y th e probabilitie s h e assign s t o thes e outcome s actuall y occurring. H e the n choose s th e alternativ e wit h th e greates t su m o f values. Thus , fo r example , a perso n considerin g th e desirabilit y from hi s poin t o f vie w o f variou s policie s concernin g polic e searche s may tak e int o account , fo r eac h policy , th e contributio n tha t polic y will mak e t o hi s safet y balance d agains t th e negativ e valu e h e attaches t o bein g searched , thi s discounte d b y th e likelihoo d unde r that polic y o f hi s bein g subjecte d t o suc h a search . If , a s ma y b e th e case i n thi s example , a larg e numbe r o f peopl e thin k i t extremel y unlikely tha t th e disadvantageou s consequence s o f a give n polic y will actuall y accru e t o them , whil e thi s probabilit y i s muc h highe r for a certai n muc h smalle r group , then , i f eac h perso n reache s hi s decision o n th e basi s o f individua l probabilisti c balancin g an d th e group decisio n i s made b y majorit y vote , th e resul t i s likely t o b e th e same a s i f aggregativ e balancin g wer e used . I sugges t tha t ther e ar e question s which , intuitively , strik e u s a s questions o f balancin g bu t fo r whic h suc h aggregativ e argument s d o not strik e u s a s appropriate . The y ar e no t appropriate , fo r example , as a wa y o f decidin g wher e th e lin e betwee n reasonabl e an d unreasonable searche s an d seizure s i s t o b e drawn . Surel y thi s lin e is

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arrived a t b y a kin d o f balancing , an d thi s i s a balancin g whic h involves th e relativ e strength s o f people' s interests . Thi s i s shown b y the fac t that , a s customs an d pattern s o f lif e change , i t ma y becom e proper to dra w thi s lin e differently ; th e differenc e reflectin g change s in th e valu e peopl e plac e o n keepin g variou s area s o f thei r live s fre e from intervention . But neithe r aggregativ e consideration s no r estimate s o f proba bility ar e relevan t t o th e kin d o f balancin g tha t i s involved here . T o strike th e relevan t kin d o f balance , a perso n mus t as k himsel f no t what hi s chances ar e of being searched , bu t wha t he would accep t a s adequate justification fo r havin g a certai n interventio n int o hi s lif e actually take place . Let m e cal l thi s "persona l balancing. " Her e w e ar e typicall y balancing, o n th e on e hand , th e importanc e o f th e benefit s t o b e gained b y allowin g official s t o exercis e a certai n power , e.g. , th e power t o carr y ou t searche s unde r specifi c conditions . Determina tion o f thi s valu e ma y involv e som e aggregation , sinc e w e ar e concerned no t wit h wha t wil l b e gaine d b y allowin g a searc h t o b e carried ou t o n a singl e particula r occasio n bu t th e valu e o f havin g such searc h powe r i n general. 20 O n th e othe r hand , w e hav e th e value t o an individual o f bein g fre e fro m thi s kin d o f invasion . Her e we ar e dealin g no t wit h th e valu e t o an y particula r individua l bu t with a "normal " value—th e valu e mos t peopl e i n th e societ y woul d assign t o bein g fre e fro m suc h searches . If we were all perfec t utilitarians , the n perhap s th e questio n pose d in persona l balancin g i s on e w e woul d settl e b y aggregativ e balancing. Bu t utilitarianis m i s no t a n adequat e accoun t o f ou r normal outlook . Ther e i s certainl y a n are a o f publi c polic y choice s within whic h aggregativ e consideration s ar e generall y thought , perhaps correctly, t o have a dominant role . I t seem s appropriate , fo r example, tha t th e goa l o f bringin g th e greates t benefi t t o th e greatest numbe r shoul d guid e decision s a s t o ho w fund s availabl e for medica l researc h ar e t o b e allocate d amon g th e campaign s against variou s diseases . Bu t a particularl y hig h rati o o f benefit s t o burdens woul d not , I think , generall y b e take n a s i n an d o f itsel f sufficient t o justif y a polic y o f compulsor y orga n donatio n (wit h monetary compensation ) o r a polic y givin g medica l authoritie s th e right t o compel participatio n i n (no t a t al l dangerou s bu t somewha t unpleasant) medica l experiments .

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Now ther e i s n o reaso n wh y legislature s coul d no t reac h judgments o f th e nonaggregativ e kin d I hav e bee n callin g persona l balancing. Bu t ther e i s goo d evidenc e fo r thinkin g tha t the y characteristically operat e i n a fashio n mor e likel y t o yiel d aggrega tive judgments . Certainl y thi s seem s t o b e tru e o f th e behavio r o f many legislature s i n civi l libertie s matters . But , eve n give n well founded suspicio n o f legislativ e judgment s i n area s wher e persona l balancing i s calle d for , a cas e fo r givin g final judgmen t i n thes e areas t o th e court s require s som e accoun t o f ho w judge s ar e equipped t o d o better . What a cour t mus t as k i n thes e case s i s whethe r th e benefit s tha t are take n a s ground s fo r a particula r exercis e o f authorit y ar e reall y sufficient t o justify it , give n th e valu e peopl e generall y se t o n bein g free fro m intervention s o f th e kin d i n question . I n determinin g wha t this valu e is , judges nee d no t refe r primaril y t o thei r ow n taste s an d values. Ampl e evidenc e i s availabl e i n th e length s t o whic h peopl e generally g o i n thei r privat e live s t o protec t themselve s agains t suc h interventions, th e way s i n whic h the y reac t whe n the y suffe r them , and th e kind s o f lega l remedie s (claim s fo r damages , etc. ) tha t the y consider appropriate . Whe n thi s evidenc e make s i t clea r tha t th e value place d o n bein g fre e fro m intervention s o f th e give n kin d i s indeed ver y high , the n a cour t ha s a n objectiv e basi s o n whic h t o claim tha t th e authorit y t o carr y ou t suc h intervention s canno t b e justified b y margina l consideration s o f socia l advantag e (e.g. , th e expectation o f a slight increas e i n convictions fo r certain crimes) . A n argument o f thi s for m woul d see m t o m e t o support , fo r example , due proces s decision s o f th e kin d sometime s base d o n th e tes t o f "conduct tha t shock s th e conscience " whil e avoidin g th e subjectiv e aura o f tha t slogan . Wha t i s relevan t i s no t tha t a give n exercis e o f authority (e.g. , certai n searches ) outrage s a judge, bu t rathe r tha t i t should outrag e anyon e becaus e th e ground s o n whic h i t purport s t o be justifie d manifestl y fai l t o matc h th e valu e w e ourselve s demonstrably plac e o n bein g fre e fro m suc h interventions . Arriving a t a judgment b y th e metho d I have suggeste d i s not th e same thin g a s makin g a n estimat e o f publi c opinion . Publi c opinio n may clearl y b e tha t th e la w i n questio n shoul d b e passed . I n th e kind o f argument I am suggestin g a court woul d offe r evidenc e fo r a claim abou t th e valu e mos t peopl e demonstrabl y d o se t o n th e sanctity o f th e relevan t aspect s o f thei r live s an d argu e that , give n

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what thi s valu e is , the proffere d justificatio n fo r th e la w i n questio n does no t hol d up . The conclusio n t o b e draw n i s that publi c opinio n and th e judgmen t o f th e legislatur e reflecte d a n unacceptabl e willingness t o se t a lowe r valu e o n th e concern s o f th e assignabl e minority wh o woul d suffe r fro m thi s la w tha n the y d o o n thei r own , i.e., t o engage i n aggregativ e balancin g i n a case i n whic h thi s i s no t an appropriat e method . What i s th e are a withi n whic h i t i s prope r fo r a cour t t o loo k behind expresse d preference s an d mak e judgments o f thi s sort ? On e answer i s tha t i t consist s o f thos e case s i n whic h th e burde n o f a piece o f legislatio n i s bein g born e b y a clearl y identifiabl e minorit y that i s unlikel y t o b e abl e t o defen d itsel f effectivel y i n legislativ e decision makin g (th e classica l "discret e an d insula r minority" 2 1 ); but befor e thi s criterion become s applicabl e on e must , o n th e vie w I have sketched , alread y hav e determine d tha t th e questio n a t issu e i s one o f balancin g an d tha t i t i s on e fo r whic h persona l balancin g i s the require d form . Bu t whic h question s ar e these ? Here I hav e n o clear-cu t answer . On e natura l suggestio n i s tha t personal balancin g i s require d wher e right s ar e a t issue , bu t I a m unsatisfied wit h thi s answe r fo r severa l reasons . First , som e issue s o f rights ar e no t question s o f balancin g a t al l bu t rathe r argument s o f principle whic h mar k th e limit s o f permissibl e balancing . Second , within thes e limit s i t i s no t clea r tha t ever y questio n o f balancin g that concern s th e subjec t matte r o f a recognize d righ t i s on e fo r which purel y aggregativ e method s ar e inappropriate . I t ma y be , fo r example, tha t "th e greates t happines s o f th e greates t number " i s a proper groun d fo r settlin g som e polic y question s abou t th e regula tion o f expressio n bu t no t th e prope r groun d fo r others . Obviousl y this questio n o f limits—a s wel l a s th e definitio n o f persona l balancing itself—requir e furthe r clarificatio n befor e thi s distinctio n can b e considered a n adequat e theoretica l device . I offer i t her e i n a tentative wa y a s a n exampl e o f ho w th e judicia l balancin g tha t would form a par t o f substantiv e du e proces s decision s a s I hav e described the m migh t b e distinguishe d fro m th e kind s o f balancin g properly reserve d t o legislatures . I hav e trie d her e t o giv e a genera l accoun t o f du e proces s an d t o show ho w muc h o f wha t seem s t o fal l unde r thi s headin g ca n b e traced t o a singl e intuitiv e idea—th e unacceptabilit y o f arbitrar y power—which constitute s it s mora l foundation . I n givin g a n exposi -

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tion an d anatom y o f th e ide a o f du e proces s a s I understan d it , I have probabl y give n mor e emphasi s t o th e appea l o f thi s notio n than t o it s problem s an d dangers . (Thi s i s particularl y tru e o f m y discussion o f substantiv e du e process. ) Thi s emphasi s i s perhap s th e natural tendenc y i n a theoretica l discussion , wher e intellectua l coherence i s a n overridin g goa l an d wher e relativel y littl e ca n b e said abou t question s o f strateg y an d politica l judgment . T h e fac t that th e notio n o f du e proces s i s so situated a s naturall y t o serv e a s a point o f conflic t betwee n th e pur e demand s o f justificator y co herence an d th e rea l worl d o f politica l institution s i s n o doub t on e reason wh y thi s notio n continue s t o b e a subjec t o f interes t an d a n object o f intens e controversy .

NOTES 1. I n revisin g thi s pape r I hav e benefite d fro m th e response s o f th e commentators an d discussant s a t th e meetin g a t whic h th e first version of the paper was delivered and fro m comment s by members of the Society fo r Ethica l an d Lega l Philosoph y an d member s of Ronal d Dworkin's semina r o n th e philosoph y o f law , al l o f whom hear d late r versions. I a m gratefu l t o th e member s o f thes e audience s fo r thei r patience an d help , an d especiall y t o Bruc e Ackerma n an d Ronal d Dworkin fo r man y helpfu l discussion s o n th e subjec t o f thi s article. 2. O f cours e on e als o ha s t o justify having suc h institution s give n thei r costs. 3. Contras t Selznick , Law, Society and Industrial Justice p. 275: ". . . there is latent i n th e la w o f governanc e [a s exemplifie d b y du e process ] a norm o f participation. . . . a legal orde r shoul d b e seen a s transitiona l to a polity. " 4. Th e inadequacie s o f a purel y instrumenta l justificatio n fo r tria l procedures i s pointed ou t b y Laurence Tribe i n "Trial b y Mathemat ics," 84 Harv . L . Rev . 1329-93 . 5. Se e W . A . Seavey, "Dismissa l o f Students : 'Du e Process, ' " 7 0 Harv . L. Rev . (1957 ) 1406-10 ; also , th e unsigne d not e "Judicia l Contro l o f Actions o f Privat e Associations " 7 6 Harv . L . Rev . (1963 ) 983-1100 , esp. pp. 100 2 ff.; and Z . Chafee, "Th e Interna l Affair s o f Association s Not fo r Profit, " 4 3 Harv . L . Rev . (1930 ) 993-1029 . I a m gratefu l t o Owen Fiss , who calle d m y attentio n t o th e las t tw o article s afte r th e original versio n o f this paper ha d bee n written . 6. Thi s implie s tha t wha t woul d normall y b e regarde d a s fai r adversar y

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proceedings ma y no t b e enough . I t i s sometime s suggeste d that , fo r reasons lik e thos e considere d here , adversar y procedure s ar e no t appropriate a t al l fo r universit y disciplin e an d tha t somethin g mor e like traditiona l avuncula r "dean' s justice " bette r allow s fo r th e appropriate combinatio n o f concerne d investigation , persona l coun seling, an d renderin g o f justice . Bu t th e potentia l fo r arbitrarines s here is apparent and familiar. One obvious alternative i s a division of labor between (probabl y adversary ) tribunal s t o apply th e rule s an d separate officials t o counsel an d assist i n uncovering th e facts. 7. A n alternativ e explanatio n o f thes e difference s woul d b e tha t du e process itself require s somethin g differen t wher e th e accuse d person s are young . Bu t th e specia l obligation s o f schoo l official s see m t o g o beyond wha t genera l paternalisti c argument s ar e usuall y take n t o require. 8. A class of arguments of this form i s discussed i n Section V below . 9. Canon s which ma y themselve s b e revised an d altere d o f course. Th e following discussion draws on my essay, "Academic Freedo m an d th e Control o f Research " i n E . Pincoff s (ed.) , The Concept of Academic Freedom pp . 237-54. 10. Fo r a discussion of the law relating to voluntary associations, in which many o f th e intuitiv e distinction s use d her e ar e clearl y an d percep tively drawn, see the sources referred t o in note 5 above. By distinguishing , i n th e followin g discussion , betwee n "purel y voluntary" institutions and institutions that are "not fully voluntary " I do not mean t o suggest tha t thos e who participate i n institution s o f the latte r sort, e.g. a s students i n universities , do s o involuntarily. Al l I am saying about suc h institutions i s that, given th e costs of refusal t o participate i n them , th e authorit y the y exercis e ove r thei r member s cannot b e defende d simpl y b y appea l t o th e members ' consen t a s expressed i n their willingness to "join". 11. M y analysis of discrimination i s in this way similar to that offered b y Ronald Dworki n i n hi s "Th e Righ t t o G o t o La w School—Th e DeFunis Case," New York Review of Books 23 (Feb. 5, 1976 ) pp . 29-33. But I do not proceed, as he does, from a general theoretical distinctio n according to which all preferences t o associate with or not to associate with others are suspect. 12. Se e Thomas Nagel , "Equa l Treatmen t an d Compensator y Discrimi nation," Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (1973) 348-63. 13. I n deciding ho w larg e a pric e nonmember s ma y b e aske d t o bea r i n order that we can associate fo r our own privat e purposes one may , of course, have to take into account wha t thos e purpose s are. The poin t

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is only tha t wit h respec t t o th e substanc e o f it s power over members, the particular purpose s o f a voluntar y associatio n d o no t hav e th e sam e justificatory rol e a s the y d o i n th e cas e o f nonvoluntar y institutions . 14. Som e clarificatio n o f th e natio n o f a voluntar y institutio n i s needed . Our concer n i s wit h form s o f powe r som e peopl e ar e abl e t o wiel d over others , an d withi n a singl e institutio n severa l differen t form s o f power ma y b e involved . Thus , fo r example, a social clu b exercise s on e form o f powe r ove r members , anothe r ove r thos e wh o see k member ship, an d anothe r ove r it s employees. Wit h respec t t o th e firs t two , i t i s a purel y voluntar y institution ; wit h respec t t o th e las t no t so . Thus , the governmenta l agencie s referre d t o ar e lik e voluntar y organization s in th e powe r the y hav e ove r beneficiarie s bu t lik e businesse s o r othe r employers i n thei r authorit y ove r thos e the y hire . What abou t research-supportin g agencie s lik e NS F an d NEH ? Ar e the recipient s o f thei r grant s lik e beneficiarie s o r lik e employees ? Th e answer t o thi s questio n depend s o n th e rol e suc h suppor t ha s i n th e economy o f th e relevan t branc h o f academia . I f grant s provid e temporary suppor t fo r break s withi n othe r long-ter m employment , they see m t o belon g t o th e voluntar y sphere ; bu t no t s o i f the y constitute continuin g suppor t withou t whic h a caree r o f researc h i n the fiel d woul d b e economicall y impossible . 15. Her e I a m clos e t o th e distinctio n betwee n concept s an d conception s drawn b y Ronal d Dworkin . Se e hi s article , "Nixon' s Jurisprudence, " New York Review of Books (May 4 , 1972) , pp . 27-35 . 16. Appea l t o such a theor y woul d als o b e require d t o decid e whethe r th e alternatives presente d ar e fairl y described . Fo r a theor y o f adjudica tion tha t seem s t o encompas s muc h o f th e kin d o f argumen t I hav e been describing , se e Ronal d Dworkin , "Har d Cases, " 8 8 Harv . L . Rev. (1975 ) 1057-1109 . 17. Insofa r as these ar e distinct. O f course , argument s o f th e latte r sort ar e apt t o pla y a n importan t rol e i n argument s abou t wha t ou r constitution an d politica l syste m requires . Her e I a m proposin g onl y to pursu e th e question s o f politica l theor y withou t inquirin g int o ho w they figure i n thi s large r argument . 18. Ther e i s her e a sligh t proble m o f circularit y i n th e interpretatio n o f (1). Sinc e wha t i s at issu e i s th e exten t o f legislativ e authorit y an d th e degree t o which th e wor d o f legislature s i s final, w e canno t presuppos e agreement o n wha t constitute s misus e o f legislativ e power . I n orde r for th e argumen t t o proceed , therefore , w e hav e t o suppos e tha t ther e is at leas t som e agreemen t o n th e kind s o f legislativ e actio n whic h ar e highly undesirabl e an d which , i f frequent , woul d a t leas t rais e questions abou t th e acceptabilit y o f legislativ e authority . (Som e suc h

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agreement seem s generall y t o b e asserte d b y proponent s o f judicia l modesty who , whil e arguin g agains t judicia l intervention , usuall y profess t o deplore th e legislatio n unde r attack. ) 19. Thi s i s true , I woul d argue , o f th e famou s substantiv e du e proces s cases of the Lochner era. The view of liberty and o f freedom o f contrac t on whic h the y are base d coul d no t b e given a coherent defens e o f th e kind require d fo r a substantiv e du e proces s decision o n m y account . 20. Th e questio n i s one of allocation o f competences; hence , in th e term s of Charle s Fried' s distinctio n ("Tw o Concept s o f Interests : Som e Reflections o n th e Suprem e Court' s Balancin g Test, " 7 6 Harv . L . Rev. [1963 ] 755-78) , w e ar e concerne d wit h a balancin g o f interest s rather tha n o f wants. My distinction i s not th e same as Fried's, since I am concerned wit h what i s balanced agains t th e benefit s o f allocatin g a competenc e i n a give n way . Bu t anothe r centra l distinctio n i n Fried's article (p. 771), that betwee n a court's assigning itself a certain role and it s playing that role , appears to be the same as the distinctio n drawn abov e betwee n du e proces s decision s o f typ e (1 ) an d thos e o f other types . 21. Cf . footnot e 4 of Justice Stone' s opinion i n U.S . v. Carolene Product s Co, 30 4 U.S . 14 4 (1938) a t 152 .

4 FORMAL AN D ASSOCIATIONA L AIM S I N PROCEDURAL DU E PROCESS * FRANK I . MICHELMA N

I. D U E P R O C E S S A S F O R M A L A N D N O N F O R M A L EXPLANATORY PROCEDUR E One familia r notio n o f du e proces s i s tha t o f a n obligatio n o n th e part o f thos e wh o mak e decision s abou t th e concern s o f othe r individuals t o engag e i n explanator y procedures—procedure s i n which agent s stat e reason s fo r thei r decision s an d affecte d indi viduals ar e allowe d t o examin e an d contes t th e proffere d reasons . Perhaps als o a n impartia l arbite r o r judge ma y rende r judgment a s to th e adequac y o f th e reasons . A potentiall y adequat e reaso n ca n typically b e divide d int o tw o parts : (1 ) a genera l precept , rule , o r maxim whic h i s suppose d t o guid e o r gover n th e agent' s decisio n and action , an d (2 ) a specifi c ground— a fac t i n whic h th e affecte d individual someho w figures—whos e recognitio n supposedl y deter mines th e agen t t o ac t unde r hi s cite d precept . T h e individua l ca n challenge eithe r th e correctnes s o f th e precep t o r th e existenc e o f th e ground. Explanatory procedure s ma y b e eithe r forma l o r nonformal . A procedure i s forma l insofa r a s i t focuse s o n th e questio n o f lega l

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justification—and lay s th e agent' s decisio n ope n t o reversa l b y a n arbiter or judge i n cas e th e agen t ca n poin t t o no tru e groun d whic h justifies th e actio n unde r som e legall y vali d precept. 1 A nonforma l procedure doe s no t ai m a t suc h third-part y revie w o f challenge d action fo r lega l adequacy . I n a nonforma l procedure , th e individua l questions th e validit y o f th e agent' s precep t (i f a t all ) unde r som e criterion othe r tha n legality—prudence , morality , fairness , o r what ever; o r h e ma y d o neither , merel y hearin g th e agen t ou t an d accepting o r concurrin g i n th e action . A nonforma l procedur e may—but nee d not—utiliz e a n impartia l thir d part y an d involv e th e parties i n movement s bearin g som e superficia l resemblanc e t o thos e occurring withi n a forma l procedure . I f a thir d part y participates , his rol e wil l no t b e th e arbitra l on e o f imposin g o n th e partie s hi s considered vie w o f thei r respectiv e rights , thoug h h e ma y b e aske d to expres s a view . A n importan t par t o f hi s rol e ma y b e t o hel p ensure tha t th e agen t disclose s hi s rea l reason s fo r acting. 2 Thi s sor t of explanator y procedur e migh t b e calle d quasi-formal . An obviou s purpos e o f forma l explanator y procedure s i s vindica tion o f th e privat e claim s o f individual s t o hav e wha t belong s t o them unde r th e law. 3 Wha t o f nonformal , includin g quasi-formal , procedures? Wha t compellin g purpose s migh t the y serve ? Suc h procedures see m responsiv e t o demand s fo r revelation and participation. They attac h valu e t o th e individual' s being told why th e agen t i s treating hi m unfavorabl y an d t o hi s having a part in the decision. The individual ma y hav e variou s reason s fo r wantin g t o b e tol d why , even i f he make s n o clai m t o legal protection , an d eve n i f no furthe r participation i s allowed him . Som e o f thos e reason s ma y pertai n t o external consequences : th e individua l ma y wis h t o mak e politica l use o f th e information , o r us e i t t o hel p war d of f har m t o hi s reputation. Ye t th e informatio n ma y als o b e wante d fo r introspec tive reasons—because , fo r example , i t fills a potentiall y destructiv e gap i n th e individual' s conceptio n o f himself . Similarly , th e individual ma y hav e variou s reason s fo r wantin g a n opportunit y t o discuss th e decisio n wit h th e agent . Som e pertai n t o externa l consequences: th e individua l migh t succee d i n persuadin g th e agen t away fro m th e harmfu l action . Bu t agai n a participator y oppor tunity ma y als o b e psychologicall y importan t t o th e individual : t o have playe d a par t in , t o hav e mad e one' s ap t contributio n to ,

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decisions whic h ar e abou t onesel f ma y b e counte d importan t eve n though th e decision , a s i t turn s out , i s th e mos t unfavorabl e on e imaginable an d one' s effort s hav e no t prove d influential. 4 A deman d fo r nonforma l procedure s migh t issu e fro m a certai n kind o f idea l conceptio n o f socia l relation s an d politica l arrange ments, expressin g revulsio n agains t th e though t o f lif e i n a societ y that accept s i t a s norma l fo r agent s representin g th e societ y t o mak e and ac t upo n decision s abou t othe r member s withou t ful l an d fran k interchange wit h thos e othe r members , a kin d o f accountabilit y t o them eve n i f no t lega l accountability . A nonforma l vie w o f a n explanatory procedur e woul d thu s recogniz e a communa l o r fraternal aspec t o f socia l lif e o f whic h a purel y forma l view , strictl y concerned wit h ensurin g tha t th e privat e entitlement s o f individual s will b e respected , ma y remai n oblivious. 5 The rol e o f th e mediato r (o r whoever ) i n a quasi-forma l procedure, whil e i t ma y b e a ver y usefu l one , i s plainl y no t essentia l to servin g th e nonforma l aim s o f revelatio n an d participation . T h e point o f settin g u p a mode l o f quasi-forma l procedure s involvin g a n impartial thir d party , i n a mediatin g rol e bearin g som e analog y t o that o f th e judge o r hearin g office r i n a forma l procedure , i s merel y to call attentio n t o th e possibilit y tha t explanator y procedure s o f th e sort w e ten d t o associat e wit h du e proces s ca n an d sometime s d o simultaneously serv e bot h th e proprietar y aim s o f formalit y an d th e relational aim s implie d b y revelatio n an d participation . I n an y explanatory procedure , forma l o r not , th e affecte d individua l obtains a more-or-les s trenchan t statemen t o f th e official' s reason s for treatin g hi m unfavorabl y an d ha s a n opportunit y t o participat e in a determinatio n o r th e appropriatenes s o f thos e reasons—a t leas t under th e criterio n o f legality , an d perhap s als o unde r criteri a o f prudence o r fairness . (Th e latte r sor t o f criteri a wil l com e int o pla y even i n a forma l procedure , insofa r a s th e lega l standar d purport s t o incorporate thos e others. ) If i t i s tru e tha t explanator y procedure s o f th e typ e broadl y connoted b y "du e process " ca n serv e nonforma l (communal , interpersonal) a s well a s forma l (possessive , privatistic ) aims , an d w e are no t a prior i dispose d t o sa y tha t forma l aim s ar e mor e importan t than nonforma l ones , the n wha t shoul d w e mak e o f th e vie w tha t the constitutiona l guarant y o f du e proces s doe s no t exten d t o al l cases of unwelcom e officia l decision s abou t individuals , bu t operate s

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only whe n suc h decision s aris e i n circumstance s rip e fo r forma l procedures—that is , where i t seem s prim a faci e tha t th e onl y legall y valid precept s t o whic h th e officia l coul d plausibl y appea l woul d s o limit hi s availabl e justification s tha t i t make s sens e t o thin k o f asking a n arbite r t o decid e whethe r justification actuall y exists ?

II. SOM E THEORETICA L NOTE S Before goin g on , I wan t t o stipulat e clearl y th e sens e i n whic h I mean t o use th e notion o f "formality" i n thi s essay. I am predicatin g formality o f explanatory procedures , no t o f entire lega l orders , usin g formality a s a nam e eithe r fo r a n attribut e o f explanator y pro cedures or for a way o f interpretin g suc h procedures . I n thi s usage , a procedure i s forma l insofa r a s it s poin t o f purpos e i s t o vindicat e legal entitlement , t o secur e t o a n individua l tha t whic h i s rightfull y his; an d w e regar d a procedur e formall y insofa r a s w e thu s constru e its purpose. 6 I a m no t usin g formalit y a s a nam e fo r som e clas s o f ideal conception s o r heuristi c model s o f th e whol e lega l order . Thu s formality i s no t synonymou s wit h lega l positivism, 7 say , o r wit h th e libertarian visio n o f a rechtsstaat. s Yet ther e is on e o f thes e globa l model s o r visions , recognizabl y positivistic an d libertarian , wit h whic h th e forma l vie w o f explana tory procedure s seem s t o b e linked. 9 Th e mode l embodie s a goa l o f freedom measure d i n par t accordin g t o whethe r an d ho w thor oughly w e ma y b e imagine d t o hav e consente d i n advanc e t o wha t appear a s constraints o r harm s impose d o n u s b y others . Accordin g to th e model , al l allowabl e impairment s o f ou r immediat e freedo m are clearl y se t ou t i n genera l rule s emanatin g fro m a legislativ e sovereign whos e rule-enactment s ca n b e see n a s someho w embody ing ou r mor e fundamenta l an d comprehensiv e consent . Th e rule s thus hav e a doubl e aspect . B y thei r ver y effec t o f stakin g ou t th e limits of each person' s guaranteed freedom , the y als o stake out zone s of autonom y wherei n eac h i s protecte d fro m exposur e t o unpredic table, arbitrar y o r discretionar y interferenc e b y others . In thi s model , th e only , bu t necessary , jo b o f judge s i s t o mak e sure tha t th e rule s ar e applied a s enacted. I f th e sovereig n says—an d we tak e i t seriously t o mean—tha t w e ar e fre e t o do o r t o hav e thi s o r that unles s such-and-such a fac t i s present, the n th e mode l demand s that impartia l officer s hav e th e las t wor d abou t whethe r enjoymen t

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of thi s o r tha t ha s bee n denie d despit e th e absenc e o f such-and-such . The mode l require s confirmatio n fro m outsid e th e aren a o f disput e that th e rule s bein g applie d ar e th e one s whic h th e sovereig n ha s legislated. I t thu s generate s wha t w e ma y cal l a modes t judicial role . This modes t judicia l rol e provide s th e lin k betwee n th e liberal positivist mode l (i f s o w e ma y cal l it ) an d th e forma l vie w o f explanatory procedures. 10 Sinc e (b y definition ) a forma l procedur e aims a t th e securin g o f entitlements , th e decision s issuin g fro m formal procedure s mus t b e ope n t o criticis m i n term s o f som e se t o f objective criteria . Unles s ther e ar e objectiv e standard s i n term s o f which decision s ca n b e counte d correc t o r incorrect , i t i s har d t o se e in wha t sens e w e ca n sa y tha t a decisio n serve s t o secur e t o a n individual tha t whic h i s rightfully his . T h u s th e rol e o f renderin g decisions i n forma l procedures—whic h w e ca n cal l th e judicial r o l e must consis t o f decidin g i n accordanc e wit h criteri a externa l to , an d capable o f contradicting , th e judge's own , Olympia n o r manageria l view o f wha t i s best. 11 Rule s suppose d t o emanat e fro m a legitimat e sovereign coul d apparentl y suppl y th e necessar y criteri a fo r deter mining correc t decisions , an d th e judge-as-rule-applier i s an appeal ing—or a t an y rat e a n immediatel y accessible—interpretatio n o f th e judicial role . In thi s essa y I shal l cit e som e dat a whic h see m t o suppor t th e hypothesis o f a lin k betwee n th e forma l interpretatio n o f explana tory procedure s an d adherenc e t o th e liberal-positivis t mode l o f a legal order. 12 Bu t I d o no t wan t t o sugges t tha t suc h linkag e a s ther e may b e i s a n analytica l trut h implici t i n th e concepts , a s dis tinguished fro m a n historicall y contingen t matte r o f lega l culture . At least , I wan t t o leav e ope n a t thi s poin t th e possibilit y o f restraints o n judicial decision s (o r specification s o f th e judicial role ) which ar e nonpositivisti c ye t sufficientl y objectiv e t o allo w on e properly t o spea k o f th e proceeding s i n whic h thos e decision s ar e rendered a s forma l i n th e sens e o f bein g aime d a t securin g entitlements. Fo r I shal l als o b e citin g dat a whic h I thin k sugges t a connection betwee n th e formalit y o f explanator y procedure s an d nonpositivistic conception s o f lega l order. 1 3 I find i t har d t o portra y thes e nonpositivisti c conception s wit h any clarity. 14 Ye t th e oppositio n betwee n formalit y an d nonfor mality, a s predicate d o f explanator y procedure s rathe r tha n o f whole lega l orders , seem s t o m e quit e clear . T h e forma l perspectiv e

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is tha t o f th e isolate d individua l intereste d i n gettin g wha t i s his , while th e nonforma l perspectiv e i s tha t o f a grou p membe r interested i n hi s relationships wit h fello w member s o f th e group . I t might b e sai d tha t formalit y i s th e standpoin t o f a n individua l momentarily regardin g other s solel y a s mean s t o hi s ends , whil e nonformality i s the standpoint o f an individua l steadfastl y demand ing t o be treated a s an en d an d no t solel y a s means. 15 On th e surface , a t least , th e tw o perspective s d o no t appea r mutually exclusiv e o r competitive . Rather , the y see m togethe r t o give a binocular view. Formality's aims and use s interpenetrate wit h those o f nonformality . Formality—th e articulatio n o f dispute s int o claims an d counterclaim s o f entitlement—ma y b e pu t forwar d a s a good way of coping with man y problem s of group life. 16 Yet system s largely characterize d b y formalit y wil l often—fo r goo d an d under standable reasons—entitl e certai n classe s of person s t o settl e certai n classes of disputes b y act s of discretion, an d thu s produc e situation s in whic h demand s fo r nonforma l procedure s ca n b e expecte d t o arise.17 I n sum , th e tw o perspective s ar e coexisten t an d apparentl y inseparable. Whether th e tw o are at som e level or in some sense also contradictory o r incompatible i s a question I shall b e able neither t o ignore no r finally t o answer. 18 III. THE POSITIVIS M LATEN T I N TH E SUPREM E COURT'S DOCTRIN E O F ENTITLEMEN T TRIGGER S Consider Boar d o f Regent s v . Roth. 19 A stat e colleg e officia l declines t o rene w th e expirin g one-yea r probationar y contrac t o f a novice professo r an d als o refuse s t o stat e an y reason , muc h les s afford th e professo r an y opportunit y t o prob e o r contest th e reason . The professo r i s thus barre d fro m al l participatio n i n th e decision — which th e Suprem e Cour t aptl y say s i s o f "majo r concern " t o him20—and ca n lear n nothin g abou t wha t (i f any ) suppose d shortcomings o n hi s part entere d int o it . Th e Cour t conclude s tha t the professo r ha s n o constitutiona l du e proces s righ t t o an y explanatory procedure . Th e du e proces s guarant y pertain s t o deprivations o f "life, liberty , o r property" ; and , say s th e Court , no t every conceivably unwelcom e impac t o n an individual , authore d b y a governmen t official , necessaril y amount s t o an offens e agains t an y of that majesti c trinity . Specifically , nonrenewa l o f a pretenur e one year teaching contract i s not suc h a deprivation. I t accordingly i s an

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impact whic h stat e official s ma y enginee r withou t eve r stagin g an y hearings o r othe r explanator y procedures . Due proces s right s ar e thu s mad e t o depen d upo n preexistin g legal entitlements . Thes e entitlement s ar e no t absolut e claim s whic h override al l possibl e counterarguments , bu t rathe r ar e claim s triggering requirement s fo r som e sor t o f justification—wher e justi fication mean s a n objectivel y verifiabl e accoun t o f a person' s conduct o r th e circumstance s attendin g it , th e trut h o f whic h wil l absolve conduc t o f legall y wrongfu l qualit y despit e it s harmfulnes s to another . A n entitlemen t i s thus treatmen t whic h on e perso n ma y not lawfull y withhol d fro m (impos e upon ) another , a t th e former' s discretion. Entitlement' s antithesi s ca n b e conceive d a s a legall y valid rul e sayin g tha t treatmen t i s t o b e accorde d o r not , accordin g to th e actor' s effectivel y irrefutabl e judgmen t o r preference. 21 Some entitlement s ar e trace d directl y t o th e Constitution , per haps a s component s o f th e "liberty " mentione d i n th e du e proces s clause. (Example s recognize d b y th e Suprem e Cour t i n th e Roth decision includ e fre e speech , reputation , an d permissio n t o practic e a profession. ) 2 2 Othe r entitlement s ("property" ) originat e i n stat utes, i n administrativ e promulgation s authorize d b y statute , o r i n judge-made commo n la w o f equa l dignit y wit h statute ; o r the y ma y originate i n specia l transaction s acquirin g th e forc e o f la w ("con tract") unde r som e maste r rul e itsel f roote d i n statute , commo n law , or th e Constitution . Obviously, a du e proces s guarant y governe d b y a n entitlemen t trigger i s wel l fitted—in fac t perfectl y fitted—to a strictl y forma l interpretation o f explanator y procedures . Jus t a s obviously , tha t very perfectio n o f fit mean s tha t th e entitlement-tie d guarant y i s haphazardly suite d t o a nonforma i interpretation . Wheneve r a n entitlement beckons , a n explanator y procedur e wil l b e required , and nonforma i a s wel l a s forma l aim s ma y b e incidentall y served . But i n othe r cases , wher e n o plausibl e prim a faci e entitlemen t stands betwee n a n individua l an d th e prospec t o f palpabl e h a r m Professor Roth' s case , fo r example—th e entitlement-triggere d du e process guarant y ignore s nonforma i aim s whic h migh t hav e bee n served b y explanator y procedures . Now i t seem s perfectl y possible—an d i t ha s i n fac t happened — that court s migh t rea d th e du e proces s guarant y t o requir e official s to offe r explanator y procedure s t o individual s expose d t o har m b y

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official actions , despit e concessio n o n al l side s tha t relevan t entitle ment i s lackin g an d th e procedur e wil l thu s b e formall y pointless. 23 We wan t t o kno w wh y th e Suprem e Cour t shoul d hav e rejecte d thi s possibility. I t seem s likel y tha t th e rejectio n woul d i n som e wa y reflect a commitmen t o n th e Court' s par t t o a modes t judicial role . No doub t th e locatio n "du e process " i s ample enoug h t o encompas s nonformal aims , and thos e aim s hav e widesprea d recognitio n i n ou r culture. Ye t the y ar e fuzz y notion s nowher e explicitl y recognize d i n the Constitution , s o tha t t o foun d a du e proces s doctrin e upo n the m would smac k o f judicial creativit y o r "activism. " On th e othe r hand , a guarant y o f explanator y procedure s whenever—but onl y when—ther e ar e entitlement s plausibl y seekin g vindication, thoug h itsel f no t quit e explici t i n th e Constitution , seems t o commi t th e judiciar y t o th e recognitio n o f n o claim s o r values sav e thos e fro m tim e t o tim e foun d explici t i n th e sovereign' s laws. Procedur e a s th e handmaide n o f substantiv e right s thu s seem s a minimalis t interpretatio n o f du e process. 24 But thi s i s s o onl y i f i t b e assume d tha t th e metho d o f determining right s i n th e futur e serie s o f guarantee d forma l proceedings wil l b e o f th e relativel y passiv e typ e associate d wit h positivistic model s o f lega l order . I f th e right-findin g i n thos e proceedings wer e t o b e attende d b y a degre e o f activis m mor e characteristic o f nonpositivis t conceptions , the n th e decisio n t o restrict th e procedura l du e proces s guarant y t o situation s i n whic h rights ar e claime d woul d b e a confuse d wa y o f honorin g a commitment t o judicial modesty . Thu s th e Roth decision, i f we tr y t o explain i t i n term s o f suc h a commitment , exemplifie s th e connec tion I hav e suggeste d betwee n th e forma l perspectiv e o n explana tory procedure s an d th e positivis t mode l o f lega l order . An d wha t other explanatio n i s there ? The recen t decisio n i n Arnet t v . Kenned y 2 5 migh t appea r t o rais e doubt abou t th e thesi s tha t th e Cour t ha s a positivis t mode l a t leas t vaguely i n min d whe n i t assert s th e dependenc y o f procedura l right s on th e pursui t o f plausibl e entitlements , bu t th e appearanc e i s misleading. Arnett involved a statut e whic h (a ) purporte d t o protec t tenured publi c employee s agains t dismissa l excep t o n certai n enumerated grounds , thu s creatin g a n entitlement ; bu t (b ) i n th e same breat h curtaile d acces s t o explanator y procedure s i n suppor t of th e entitlement . Si x justice s agree d tha t th e constitutiona l righ t

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to forma l procedure s woul d necessaril y obtai n onc e th e statutor y entitlement wa s established , despit e explici t legislativ e intentio n t o qualify th e entitlemen t b y restrictin g acces s t o supportiv e explana tory procedures. 26 No w thi s conclusion o f th e si x justices migh t see m inconsistent wit h th e propose d interpretatio n o f th e Roth decisio n a s deriving fro m a judicial disinclinatio n t o enforce right s o r value s no t clearly enshrine d i n positiv e law . A procedura l du e proces s righ t s o derived migh t see m t o carr y th e seed s o f it s ow n destruction , sinc e there i s alway s th e possibilit y o f jus t wha t occurre d i n th e Arnett case: th e legislature , duly actin g i n accordanc e wit h th e form s whic h mark it s output s a s th e consensua l emanation s o f a legitimat e sovereign, declare s tha t n o explanator y procedure s nee d b e afforde d when violation s o f certai n statutor y protection s ar e claimed . T h e answer i s tha t unde r th e implici t positivis t model , th e legislature' s legitimate provinc e extend s onl y t o issuanc e o f thos e general , substantive rule s whic h se t th e bound s o n ou r zone s o f a u t o n o m y more, tha t th e legislature' s legitimac y eve n i n tha t restricte d spher e presupposes th e availabilit y o f forma l explanator y procedures , o f adjudication, t o assur e tha t th e genera l rule s ar e followed . T h e views o f th e si x justices i n Arnett thu s accor d wit h th e model. 2 7 IV. A D M I N I S T R A T I V E D U E P R O C E S S U N D E R T H E DOCTRINE O F ENTITLEMEN T TRIGGER S Viewing Roth' s cas e a s a whole , on e canno t sa y tha t h e wa s denied al l acces s t o forma l procedure s t o assur e th e lega l validit y o f his treatment . I t i s no t quit e true , afte r all , tha t th e officia l i n Roth totally refuse d t o nam e a groun d fo r hi s nonrenewa l decision . T h e ground h e name d was , i n effect : " I choose (or I judge it best), fo r reasons I won' t g o int o bu t whic h satisf y me , no t t o rene w you r contract." I n tenderin g thi s ground , th e officia l als o implicitl y cite d as hi s maxi m o r rule : "Rene w ter m teachin g contract s o r don' t renew them , a s yo u i n you r discretio n choos e (o r judg e best). " 2 8 The litigatio n culminatin g i n th e Suprem e Court' s decisio n pro vided Rot h wit h ampl e opportunit y t o contes t th e validit y o f thi s rule, whic h th e Court , i n effect , hel d valid. 29 Thi s conclusio n mad e formally pointles s a hearin g o n th e realit y o r accurac y o f th e ground, sinc e i t wil l alway s b e incontestabl y tru e tha t a n officia l ha s some reaso n whic h satisfie s hi m fo r doin g a s h e does . Roth's clai m t o a forma l procedur e wa s thu s satisfie d b y th e

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hearing give n hi m by judges o n hi s complain t agains t th e conduc t o f officials. An d i t i s generall y th e cas e tha t suc h direc t judicia l resolution, whe n available , wil l perfectl y satisf y th e forma l aim s o f due proces s althoug h th e official s themselve s hav e previousl y refused al l direc t interchang e wit h affecte d individual s concernin g the reason s fo r thei r actions . On e therefor e wonder s wha t th e Roth decision leave s o f th e notio n o f constitutionall y require d administrative du e proces—th e notio n tha t official s themselves mus t provid e affected individual s wit h explanator y procedure s an d tha t thei r failure t o do thi s is itself a constitutional groun d fo r judicial reversa l of their actions. 30 Suc h a discrete requiremen t o f administrativ e du e process migh t see m t o ascrib e valu e directl y t o th e explanator y transaction betwee n th e officia l an d th e concerne d individual ; th e doctrine migh t seem , tha t is , t o hav e i n vie w th e nonforma l aim s o f revelation an d participation. 31 Bu t i f so , th e doctrin e ma y no t survive Roth. There i s no eviden t reaso n wh y a doctrin e havin g suc h aims should operat e onl y when entitlement s ar e at stake . As we hav e seen, th e crucia l plac e o f entitlemen t i n a du e proces s doctrin e restricted t o forma l aim s i s a n analytical , a logica l truth ; bu t a crucial plac e fo r entitlemen t i n a du e proces s doctrin e havin g nonformal aim s i s a mystery . Other possibl y persuasiv e account s o f administrativ e du e proces s rights ar e likewis e threatene d b y th e theor y o f entitlemen t trigger s propounded i n th e Roth decision . Som e hav e though t tha t admin istrative du e proces s shoul d b e understoo d a s servin g th e goa l o f enlightened decision , b y minimizin g th e chance s o f officia l actio n which—had th e tru e fact s an d al l th e relevan t consideration s bee n brought out—woul d hav e bee n rejecte d a s on th e whol e mistake n o r imprudent, irrespectiv e o f whethe r a reviewin g cour t coul d sa y tha t any entitlement s wer e violated. 32 Someon e might , fo r example , suggest thi s a s a reaso n fo r judicia l impositio n o f a du e proces s requirement i n regar d t o decision s b y publi c schoo l administrator s about assignin g student s t o variou s stud y program s o r "tracks, " where i t i s exceedingl y har d t o find a lega l entitlemen t t o b e assigned t o an y particula r program. 33 Suc h a suggestio n seem s gravely threatene d b y th e Roth decision . Now i n context s suc h a s schoo l assignment , a presen t lac k o f trenchant, objectiv e standard s fo r appraisin g particula r decision s may mak e on e questio n whethe r explanator y interchange s betwee n

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officials an d passionatel y intereste d individual s wil l i n fac t lea d immediately t o mor e pruden t an d enlightene d decision s tha n woul d result withou t them . Eve n so , on e migh t expec t tha t suc h inter changes ove r a serie s o f case s woul d contribut e t o th e eventua l emergence o f standard s shar p enoug h t o mak e proceeding s thereaf ter genuinel y an d worthil y formal. 34 Thi s migh t occu r throug h case by-case evolution , a s decision s i n th e serie s see k principle d explana tion i n term s o f coherence wit h on e another ; o r on e migh t anticipat e the interventio n o f legislativ e authorit y afte r knowledg e an d insigh t developed throug h th e interchange s ha d ripene d t o th e poin t o f adumbrating standard s bot h pruden t an d objectivel y compelling . Thus on e migh t argu e fo r a constitutiona l righ t t o explanator y procedures a t th e adminstrativ e stage , regardin g th e procedure s no t as a devic e fo r securin g extan t entitlement s bu t rathe r a s a protecte d mode o f acces s t o a political , quasi-legislativ e proces s tha t migh t create entitlements. 3 5 Nor nee d suc h a n argumen t impl y a righ t o n th e par t o f citizen s that administratio n shoul d always b e drive n a s fas t an d a s fa r a s possible toward s th e formulatio n o f entitlements ; o r tha t realm s o f official discretio n ar e always disfavored ; o r that , i n short , th e Constitution enshrine s th e rechtsstaat ideal. T h e argumen t ha s forc e if only w e believ e tha t ther e ar e some situations i n whic h a n intuitio n can aris e o f newl y developing , thoug h stil l inchoate , "norm s affecting interest s widel y agree d t o b e fundamental, " an d tha t du e protection fo r those interests , i n those situations , call s fo r placin g decision maker s "unde r a n obligatio n t o resolv e [eac h relevan t dispute] o n it s ow n terms , actin g a s appear s jus t i n th e circum stances, bu t responsibl e fo r ultimatel y articulatin g som e coheren t explanation fo r th e decisio n reached . . . . [T]h e perso n responsibl e for decisio n woul d thereb y ente r int o a dialogu e abou t wha t rules, " reflecting wha t "ne w mora l consensus, " shoul d eventuall y prevail. 3 6 Such a political-right s interpretatio n o f administrativ e du e pro cess share s tw o importan t attribute s wit h th e otherwis e radicall y different nonforma l interpretation . First, th e political-right s theory , like th e nonforma l aim s theory , i s a t odd s wit h th e doctrin e o f entitlement triggers . Ther e i s n o reaso n wh y politica l right s respecting administrativ e rul e makin g shoul d operat e onl y i n particular context s o f administrativ e actio n directl y affectin g indi viduals who m on e coul d plausibl y thin k o f a s already the bearer s o f

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relevant entitlements. 37 Second, reading th e politica l right s theor y into th e Constitution' s du e proces s clause s require s n o les s a strai n on judicia l modest y tha n doe s findin g ther e a n ascriptio n o f transcending valu e t o nonforma l aims. 38 Within th e Roth framewor k a n entitlement-triggere d administra tive du e proces s righ t migh t perhap s b e understoo d a s a hand maiden t o the main , forma l du e proces s righ t o f judicial resolution designed t o conserv e societa l resource s b y filtering ou t pett y case s and shapin g u p mor e substantia l ones , befor e thei r entr y int o th e expensive an d heavil y proceduralize d judicia l forum. 39 Bu t i t i s hard t o se e th e doctrin e i n thi s economi c versio n a s a constitutiona l right, which court s are to secure t o an insisten t individua l despit e th e legislature's contrar y economi c judgment , o r whic h federa l court s are t o secur e t o individual s despit e contrar y judgment s o f stat e legislatures an d stat e courts . An entitlement-triggere d constitutiona l righ t t o forma l explana tory procedure s a t th e administrativ e leve l ca n perhap s bes t b e rationalized a s eithe r a supplemen t o r a surrogat e fo r a righ t t o direct judicia l resolution . O n thi s view , administrativ e du e proces s requirements aris e ou t o f a n understandin g tha t judicia l resolutio n by itsel f (eve n assumin g tha t th e legislatur e ma y no t withhol d i t altogether) 40 ofte n canno t adequatel y serv e th e forma l aim s o f du e process. B y legislativ e fiat o r b y institutiona l nature , court s find themselves wit h limite d abilitie s t o reexamin e officia l fact-findings , as wel l a s officia l judgment s unde r comple x lega l precepts . T o thi s extent entitlement s ar e cruciall y a t ris k a t th e poin t o f administra tive decision : th e ne t o f judicial revie w i s ofte n to o coars e t o catc h all administrativ e lega l error . A possibl e respons e i s t o exten d th e requirement o f forma l procedur e t o th e administrativ e leve l wher e the potentiall y conclusiv e determination s ar e bein g made. 41 I t i s believed, moreover , tha t a cour t ma y b e bette r abl e t o detec t th e taint o f biase d fact-findin g o r incorrec t standard s whe n i t sit s i n review o f a forma l recor d mad e a t a forma l agenc y hearin g tha n when i t attempt s direc t resolutio n o f th e controvers y betwee n agency an d affecte d individual. 42 Thes e woul d b e reason s wh y courts woul d requir e legislature s t o provid e fo r forma l administra tive procedure s wheneve r the y choos e no t t o provid e fo r judicia l review tigh t enoug h t o satisf y forma l aims .

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V. T H E "RIGHT-PRIVILEG E DISTINCTION " RESUSCITATED So far , th e thesi s guiding ou r discussion o f procedura l du e proces s law ha s bee n tha t th e Roth doctrine , conditionin g procedura l right s upon th e pursui t o f entitlement , reflect s a n exclusivel y forma l (rights-centered) vie w o f th e aim s o f explanator y procedures ; tha t the doctrin e als o reflect s a commitmen t t o a modes t judicia l role ; and tha t thi s vie w an d thi s commitmen t sugges t th e Court' s adherence t o a positivis t mode l o f lega l order , t o whic h the y together bea r a coheren t relationship . Fro m her e on , I shal l b e questioning on e par t o r anothe r o f thi s thesi s whic h u p t o no w ha s stood u p prett y well . Earlier I suggeste d tha t th e coherenc e o f th e Court' s positio n would b e undermine d i f i t turne d ou t tha t th e metho d o f determining whe n entitlement s exist , s o a s t o trigge r procedura l rights i n particula r cases , wa s t o b e noticeabl y activist. 43 M y position i n thi s section an d th e nex t tw o i s tha t i t doe s tur n ou t tha t way. Not s o lon g ago , i t wa s though t b y man y tha t th e Fift h an d Fourteenth Amendment s conferre d a genera l entitlement , goo d against publi c officials , no t t o b e visite d wit h significan t har m o f any kin d fo r n o ascertainabl e o r plausibl e reason. 44 Th e du e proces s clauses wer e though t t o protec t person s agains t har m fro m "irra tional" officia l acts , whil e th e equal-protectio n guarant y wa s thought t o protec t agains t "arbitrar y an d capricious " impositio n o f harm o n selecte d individual s o r groups . Th e genera l entitlemen t resulting fro m suc h doctrine s I shal l hencefort h cal l th e rationalit y entitlement. It i s a t leas t a possibl e inferenc e fro m th e Roth decisio n tha t th e rationality entitlemen t doe s no t attac h t o al l significan t harm s which stat e official s ma y impos e o n individuals. 45 I f a professor' s interest i n renewa l o f hi s teachin g contrac t wer e protecte d b y eve n such a thi n entitlement , th e decision' s apparen t logi c woul d furthe r entitle hi m t o explanator y procedure s i n whic h th e official s o f hi s college woul d b e require d t o stat e a reaso n o r reason s fo r an y nonrenewal decision , h e woul d hav e a n opportunit y t o challeng e both th e genuinenes s an d th e rationalit y o f thos e reasons , an d a n

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impartial hearin g office r o r judge woul d decid e whethe r ther e wer e real reason s whic h wer e rational. 46 Of course , a nake d rationalit y entitlemen t migh t i n realit y provide n o measurabl e securit y fo r stat e colleg e professors . A requirement o f rationalit y doe s see m t o se t some objective bound s o n official action , insofa r a s w e tak e th e requiremen t t o focu s o n th e plausibility o f belie f i n a n asserte d causa l relationshi p betwee n th e challenged officia l actio n an d th e end s o r purpose s posite d fo r officials b y legislation . Bu t thes e bound s ar e unlikel y t o b e noticeably constraining . Eve n i f (contrar y t o experience ) w e imag ine a legislatur e providin g a clear statement o f a uniqu e educationa l purpose, th e rang e o f plausibl e implementin g judgment s whic h officials migh t make , accordin g t o th e situation , woul d probabl y b e very broad. 47 Thus , i f th e ai m o f forma l procedure s i s t o vindicat e entitlements fo r th e sak e o f realizin g suc h persona l securit y a s th e positive la w mean s o r i s abl e t o bestow , w e ca n se e wh y th e rationality entitlemen t standin g b y itsel f migh t fai l t o trigge r procedural du e proces s rights . But court s hav e no t alway s bee n conten t t o leav e th e rationalit y entitlement thu s nake d o f protection . Whe n inten t o n protectin g persons agains t highl y discretionar y officia l interference , court s hav e found way s of doing so . Occasionally the y ma y invalidat e legislativ e programs i n whic h the y ca n find n o clea r an d uniqu e statemen t o f a purpose, capabl e o f groundin g worthwhil e curb s o n officia l discre tion; 48 mor e often , the y wil l rea d suc h statement s int o legislatio n which doe s not, a t leas t t o th e nake d eye , see m t o contain them. 49 I n addition, the y ma y refus e t o suppor t officia l interferenc e wit h individual activitie s o r enjoyment o f benefit s unles s official s hav e se t about t o defin e wit h precisio n thei r conceptio n o f appropriat e means an d t o embod y thos e definition s i n genera l rule s whic h effectively stak e ou t zone s o f individua l autonomy. 50 Such a strateg y i s potentiall y adaptabl e t o protec t th e job s o f state-college professor s havin g n o contractua l tenure . Th e un doubted an d centra l legislativ e purpos e o f gettin g an d keepin g abl e teachers an d scholar s coul d b e judiciall y erecte d int o th e onl y purpose whic h ma y coun t i n contrac t renewa l decisions . Colleg e officials coul d b e judicially require d t o enunciat e generall y applica ble criteri a fo r evaluatio n o f teachin g an d scholarl y performanc e

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and promise , wit h sufficien t precisio n t o mak e a forma l procedur e really worthwhil e whe n nonrenewa l impends. 51 Th e Roth decisio n indicates tha t th e court s wil l no t deplo y an y suc h antidiscretio n strategy i n orde r t o protec t th e jobs o f colleg e teachers . But doe s th e decisio n mea n t o d o awa y entirel y wit h tha t par t o f due proces s doctrine tha t protect s agains t uncontrollabl y discretion ary incursion s upo n a broa d arra y o f interests , includin g som e no t within th e selec t categor y o f civi l right s an d libertie s accorde d special statu s b y th e Constitutio n (th e categor y containin g freedo m of speec h an d association , freedo m fro m governmenta l searches , th e privilege agains t self-incrimination , freedo m o f interstat e travel , access t o th e franchis e o n a n equa l footing , an d s o forth) ? Conside r govern men tally subsidize d housin g fo r person s wit h restricte d incomes. A t on e tim e i t wa s commo n fo r lease s i n suc h housin g t o stipulate tha t the y wer e goo d fo r a limite d ter m suc h a s thirt y days ; that the y woul d b e automaticall y renewe d fo r a n additiona l ter m unless official s gav e notic e o f intentio n no t t o renew ; an d tha t th e decision whethe r o r no t t o rene w wa s withi n officia l discretion . I n offering suc h nonentitlin g leases , official s wer e though t t o hav e bee n acting quit e withi n th e authorit y grante d the m b y legislation . Ye t i t has bee n th e prevailin g vie w o f lowe r federa l court s tha t th e du e process claus e override s th e antientitlemen t stipulations , establish ing a n entitlemen t t o indefinit e continuatio n o f occupanc y i n th e form o f a requiremen t tha t termination s b e justifiable o n ground s o f the occupant' s (o r applicant's ) lac k o f nee d fo r th e housing , propensity t o abus e it , o r perhaps , inabilit y t o pa y enoug h t o kee p the projec t solvent. 52 An d o f cours e alon g wit h thi s constitutionall y rooted entitlemen t cam e a procedura l du e proces s righ t t o forma l procedures wheneve r nonrenewa l impended. 53 Entitlement ha s eve n bee n importe d int o th e admission s stag e o f public housing . Thoug h ther e b e a clea r exces s o f applicant s ove r available accommodations , an d a deart h o f substantivel y rationa l selection criteri a capabl e o f eliminatin g th e excess , roo m stil l remains fo r th e thinnes t entitlemen t o f all : th e righ t no t t o b e disadvantageously treate d b y som e official' s personall y arbitrary , whimsical, o r vindictiv e choice ; an d s o a t leas t on e cour t ha s demanded tha t official s devis e an d promulgat e a se t o f impersona l criteria an d procedure s (suc h a s queue s an d lotteries) , adherenc e t o

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which i s susceptibl e t o objectiv e determinatio n i n forma l pro cedures. 54 I wan t t o insis t tha t thes e housin g entitlement s ar e roote d i n judicial application s (s o t o speak ) o f th e du e proces s claus e an d no t in legislation , althoug h som e courts hav e modestl y purporte d t o find their source s i n th e obviou s purpos e o f th e housin g statute s t o provide subsidize d housin g fo r thos e wh o nee d it. 55 Th e troubl e with appealin g t o statutor y purpos e a s th e sourc e o f entitlemen t i s simply tha t ther e i s n o necessar y o r eve n compellin g inferenc e o f entitlement fro m purpose . A legislatur e ma y wel l entertai n th e purpose o f providin g shelter—an d eve n secur e tenur e o f shelter—fo r the needy , an d ye t conside r tha t a regim e leavin g leas e term s t o local officia l discretio n i s bes t adapte d t o achievemen t o f it s whol e constellation o f purpose s (whic h perhap s includ e th e creatio n an d maintenance o f a sociable , mutuall y supportiv e communit y o f tenants; o r th e maintenanc e o f a non-stressfu l environmen t fo r management). 56 A compariso n wit h th e Roth case i s instructive . N o doubt al l woul d admi t tha t i n authorizin g th e employmen t o f teaching personne l fo r a stat e college , th e legislatur e probabl y ha s among it s purposes th e rewar d o f meritoriou s servic e b y extensio n o f employment, an d maintenanc e o f institutiona l stabilit y b y continu ing th e employmen t o f staf f member s wh o d o goo d work . Bu t fro m these purpose s n o inferenc e o f entitlemen t i s drawn , on e suppose s because ther e ar e othe r purposes , too , an d th e legislatur e coul d wel l conclude tha t a regim e o f discretio n i s o n th e whol e preferable . Taken together , th e housin g an d th e publi c employmen t case s suggest thi s possibility : whe n legislatio n place s variou s benefit s within reac h o f individual s withou t meanin g o r purporting t o creat e even th e thinnes t o f entitlements , th e court s wil l rea d th e du e process clause s t o mak e entitlement s ou t o f som e o f thes e benefit s though no t al l o f them . I f so , i t seem s that , pace Professo r Va n Alstyne, th e "right-privileg e distinction, " lik e Frodo , lives; 57 onl y the lin e i s n o longe r drawn , a s onc e i t seeme d t o be , betwee n th e private an d publi c sectors—betwee n "th e limite d powe r o f th e stat e 'reasonably' t o regulat e activitie s conducte d b y privat e mean s without substantia l assistanc e b y government " an d "th e unlimite d power o f th e stat e t o regulat e advantage s supplie d b y governmen t without obligation. " 58 Publi c housin g an d publi c employmen t ar e

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both o n th e public-secto r sid e o f th e ol d line—bu t publi c housin g (once th e progra m ha s bee n established ) i s a righ t protecte d b y substantive an d procedura l du e process , includin g void-for-vague ness doctrine , whil e publi c employmen t remain s a bar e privilege. 59

VI. E N T I T L E M E N T A N D BENIG N D I S C R E T I O N We hav e observe d tha t court s hav e bee n pron e t o brin g th e ful l apparatus o f forma l du e proces s t o bea r whe n government s an d their official s se t abou t t o assig n subsidize d housin g billets , bu t no t when the y assig n jo b billets . Ar e th e courts , then , engage d i n som e antipositivistic comparativ e evaluatio n o f th e mora l weight s o f people's claim s t o housin g an d t o jobs? O r ca n thi s judicial behavio r perhaps b e explaine d o n technica l an d prudentia l ground s tha t would obviat e resor t t o suc h a thesis ? It ma y strik e u s a s obviousl y impractica l an d undesirabl e t o devise a se t o f formalisticall y usefu l lega l precept s t o protec t th e teacher's interes t i n hi s job, thoug h quit e eas y t o d o thi s o n behal f o f the housin g occupant . Certainl y a genera l inclinatio n t o th e forma l outlook woul d no t rul e ou t suc h differentiations . T o accep t the m i s simply t o recogniz e that , whateve r th e value s o f privat e securit y an d the rul e o f law , thes e value s d o no t completel y obliterat e thos e o f discretion an d prudence . I t seem s manifestl y desirabl e t o confe r upon man y official s a breadt h o f discretio n an d flexibility o f response tha t woul d evidentl y b e defeate d b y an y attemp t t o defin e their authoritie s i n a finit e lis t o f maxims , jointl y capabl e o f determining correc t decisions . The cas e o f teache r employmen t seem s illustrative . O n e ca n sa y that i t i s desirabl e t o allo w administrator s grea t flexibility in , say , allocating existin g an d anticipate d resource s amon g teachin g an d other needs , amon g teachin g i n on e o r anothe r field an d o f on e o r another styles , amon g scholarshi p an d othe r needs , an d amon g scholarly effort s i n variou s fields an d o f variou s styles ; an d i n adjusting thes e allocation s fro m tim e t o tim e i n ligh t o f change s i n the overal l resourc e picture , student-bod y composition , educationa l ideals, an d s o forth . Consideratio n o f regiona l an d social-grou p representation ma y als o b e though t relevan t an d important , a s ma y concerns abou t compatibilit y an d mutuall y supportiv e relation s among fello w member s o f th e institution . A rul e allowin g th e

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administrator sometime s t o reserv e th e questio n o f contrac t renewa l to hi s legall y unfettere d discretio n i s a devic e fo r conferrin g an d protecting th e requisit e flexibility an d prudentia l sensitivity . Suc h a rule wil l b e neede d fo r thi s purpos e insofa r a s th e allocationa l an d other judgments havin g t o b e mad e canno t b e reduce d t o a formul a lending itsel f t o usefu l statemen t i n th e form o f objectiv e grounds . At th e sam e time , on e migh t believe , strai n o n eve n a sternl y rule oriented mode l i s no t unbearabl e because , whil e th e officia l i s no t the sovereig n whos e genera l enactment s embod y ou r consent , h e i s not rendere d unaccountable—h e canno t ove r th e lon g ru n ac t quit e arbitrarily—because hi s overal l missio n i s wel l enoug h understoo d that hi s succes s o r failur e a t i t ove r tim e wil l b e subjec t t o effective , if inarticulate , legislativ e an d politica l judgment. 60 The interestin g questio n i s no t whethe r a goo d cas e ca n thu s b e made fo r benig n discretio n i n teache r hirin g an d retention , bu t whether th e cas e woul d appea r markedl y les s goo d a s applie d t o tenant selectio n an d retentio n i n subsidize d housing , wer e ther e no t at wor k som e mora l intuition s abou t entitlements . Th e housin g context invite s consideratio n o f factor s suc h a s sociability , com patibility, an d mutua l support ; mixture , homogeneit y an d variety ; deservingness; specia l consideratio n fo r thos e speciall y o r unfairl y burdened b y othe r societa l act s o r practices ; representatio n an d equitable distributio n acros s commonl y identifie d socia l groups ; and fiscal soundness . Al l thes e factors , an d perhap s others , migh t well see m t o ente r int o an d constitut e a prudentia l proble m no t satisfactorily reducibl e t o a structure d se t o f maxim s an d grounds . Of cours e maxim s coul d alway s b e stated , bu t thei r appropriat e combinational properties—weights , priorit y relations , an d s o forth — would likel y see m opaqu e t o anythin g approachin g formular y expression. Tha t i s th e wa y i t woul d seem , I suggest , wer e i t no t fo r our intuitio n tha t the drivin g ai m o f th e housin g progra m i s t o satisfy th e jus t claim s o f thos e lef t i n nee d o f adequat e housing . Perhaps i t i s thi s intuitio n whic h make s u s fee l tha t al l precept s fo r assigning housin g billet s ar e inapposit e excep t precept s o f relativ e need s o simpl e an d straightforwar d tha t the y ca n fram e a forma l entitlement. 61 An d b y th e sam e token , wha t leave s u s s o ope n t o conviction o f th e benignit y o f official discretio n i n th e assignmen t o f teaching job s ma y b e th e absenc e o f an y comparabl e intuitio n regarding them .

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VII. M O R A L E N T I T L E M E N T S Judicial response s t o du e proces s claim s i n th e housin g an d othe r welfare context s thu s d o sugges t th e working s o f a legall y inchoat e entitlement t o b e adequatel y house d o r whatever—a n entitlemen t rooted i n mora l consciousnes s o r i n systemati c mora l theor y whic h may serv e a s a n idea l backdro p agains t whic h th e lega l orde r i s viewed an d comprehende d bu t whic h i s imperfectl y represente d i n the actua l lega l order . Thoug h court s a s suc h ar e incapabl e o f ful l and direc t recognitio n an d enforcemen t o f th e righ t (the y canno t bring abou t th e provisio n o f ideall y require d housin g whic h th e political orde r fail s t o provide) , the y ar e quit e abl e t o recogniz e an d act o n th e entitlemen t onc e embodie d eve n imperfectl y i n legislativ e action. 62 It i s becaus e w e experienc e housin g claim s a s appeal s t o mora l entitlements tha t du e proces s i n th e housin g contex t ha s a clear , conventional, forma l significanc e o f vindicatin g private , possessiv e claims regarde d a s rights . No t onl y doe s du e proces s promis e t o avoid a certai n numbe r o f erroneou s determination s tha t n o entitlement existe d unde r th e politica l order' s actual , i f inadequate , translation o f th e condition s o f th e idea l entitlemen t int o statutor y rules o f admissio n an d exclusion . Du e proces s als o t o som e exten t controls th e conten t o f th e rule s and th e metho d o f thei r administra tion. Beyon d thes e effect s ther e do , o f course , remai n number s o f cases i n whic h th e judiciall y modifie d statutor y entitlemen t i s admittedly withhel d becaus e o f th e politica l order' s failur e t o provide necessar y wherewitha l whic h th e judiciar y i s incapabl e o f exacting. But eve n a s t o thes e cases , ther e seem s t o b e som e expectatio n that du e proces s probin g o f financial standards , priorit y groupings , and s o fort h wil l ten d t o minimiz e th e n u m b e r o f suc h case s an d even fee d helpfull y bac k int o th e politica l sid e of th e problem. 6 3 T h e emergence o f du e proces s i n th e public-housin g contex t thu s seem s consistent wit h a genera l conceptio n o f du e proces s a s a devic e fo r helping t o secur e t o individual s thei r privat e rights . Ye t th e ultimat e perception o f th e righ t seem s t o b e roote d i n mora l consciousness—i n supposedly share d values—an d no t i n positiv e law . But i f ther e exist s withi n judicia l consciousnes s som e inchoate , conception o f a socia l ideal , capabl e o f provokin g judge s t o injec t

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the regim e o f du e proces s int o th e administratio n o f publi c housin g programs, wh y doe s i t no t similarl y provok e judge s t o insistenc e upon th e legalizatio n o f stat e personne l administration ? Th e deceptively simple-lookin g answe r ha s alread y bee n suggested : tha t the prevailin g mora l consciousnes s doe s no t sens e i n a job, a s i t doe s in a housin g accommodation , a n arrangemen t whic h exist s fo r th e sake of it s holder , i n orde r t o satisf y on e o f hi s basi c needs. 64 I t i s b y no mean s impossibl e t o thin k o f jobs tha t way—perhap s a s niche s i n the ecolog y o f socia l functio n an d servic e providin g a n indispens able ingredien t o f self-respect. 65 Bu t i t seem s w e d o no t thin k o f jobs that wa y now , a t leas t no t usuall y o r primarily . I sa y thi s answe r i s deceptivel y simpl e becaus e additiona l explanation i s require d a s t o wh y a nonrenewe d employee' s need s for revelation an d participation—as distinguished fro m hi s nee d fo r a job—are no t themselve s adequat e t o prope l a morall y responsibl e judiciary t o th e exactio n o f explanator y procedure s unde r th e du e process clause . I wan t t o postpon e furthe r discussio n o f tha t question. 66

VIII. FAK E ENTITLEMENT S In th e thre e precedin g section s I hav e contende d tha t court s sometimes gran t enforcemen t o f forma l procedura l right s i n suppor t of entitlement s whos e ultimat e source s li e beyon d th e positiv e law . If tha t i s so, then th e doctrin e o f Roth, tyin g procedura l right s t o th e assertion o f entitlements, canno t b e explaine d simpl y a s a n implica tion of some general positivisti c bia s i n ou r legal culture . I now wan t to continu e questionin g th e thesi s tha t purel y formalisti c an d positivistic outlook s li e behin d th e judicia l respons e t o procedura l due proces s claims , b y suggestin g tha t judicia l decision s honorin g such claim s ma y sometime s b e prompte d b y nonforma l sympathiz ing wit h demand s fo r revelatio n an d participation , eve n whe n ostensibly respondin g t o demand s fo r forma l protectio n o f en titlements. In th e housin g cases , fo r example , i t ma y wel l b e tha t ther e ha s sometimes occurre d a proces s somethin g lik e th e following : (1 ) nonformal sensitivitie s prope l a deman d fo r explanatory procedure s for person s facin g denia l o f housing , an d so—throug h th e doctrina l linkage o f du e proces s wit h entitlement—sugges t a n entitlemen t t o

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housing; 67 (2 ) onc e th e notio n o f a housin g entitlemen t i s stirre d i n this wa y b y nonforma l sympathies , procedure s i n th e housin g context attrac t a forma l significance—a s wel l a s a nonforma l one — because th e entitlemen t i s reall y fel t t o exis t althoug h it s existenc e cannot b e demonstrate d unde r th e positiv e law . Th e tota l effec t i s that nonforma l sensitivitie s wor k throug h formalisti c habit s o f min d to hel p produc e judicia l interventio n o n behal f o f mora l en titlements. 68 If the forma l outloo k hel d exclusiv e swa y ove r th e lega l mentality , the Suprem e Court' s Roth formula couplin g explanator y procedura l rights wit h entitlemen t coul d hav e onl y on e meaning—coul d argue , so to speak, i n only on e direction . Entitlemen t woul d b e th e ground , procedural right s th e consequent ; entitlemen t th e premise , pro cedural right s th e conclusion ; entitlemen t th e independen t variable , procedural right s th e dependent . I f yo u woul d deman d explanator y procedures, yo u mus t first find entitlement . But i f the forma l outloo k reign s onl y ove r our manne r o f speakin g and arguing , i f i t canno t preven t inarticulat e subversio n b y fuzzy , nonformal aim s which w e als o entertain, the n th e argumen t bindin g entitlement t o explanator y procedur e ma y ru n a s wel l i n th e opposite direction . T o sa y tha t i f yo u woul d insis t o n explanator y procedure yo u mus t first find entitlemen t woul d no w b e t o spea k with a forke d tongue ; fo r nonforma l aim s migh t promp t insistenc e on explanator y procedure s i n variou s setting s irrespectiv e o f entitle ment's prio r presenc e there , an d thoug h a nee d t o find (tha t is , t o invent) entitlemen t woul d stil l exist , tha t nee d woul d b e impose d (rather tha n expressed ) b y th e verba l formula s o f formalis t logi c which i s reall y besid e th e point . Jus t becaus e ou r way s o f thinkin g about procedura l right s are so habituate d t o th e forma l vie w (a s ou r ways o f thinkin g abou t lega l orde r ar e habituate d t o th e positivis t model), judicia l impositio n o f explanator y procedure s i n an y context wil l mak e u s feel , mak e u s suppose , tha t a n entitlemen t i s present. I f the entitlemen t ha s n o fairl y detectabl e sourc e i n positiv e law, th e forc e o f th e inarticulat e nonforma l impuls e wil l hav e opened a chin k i n th e positivis t armo r o f judicia l modesty . Th e result ma y b e judicial recognitio n o f a mora l entitlement . O r i t ma y be th e hatchin g o f a fak e entitlement—a n entitlemen t whic h n o on e really credit s a s suc h an d whic h serve s n o offic e excep t t o provid e the necessar y groun d fo r demande d procedura l rights—an d th e fak e

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entitlement, onc e born , ma y emerg e fro m it s shadow y origin s t o exert stil l furthe r pressur e o n judicial modesty . What abou t thos e schoo l "tracking " case s I mentione d earlier ? The argumen t i s made , wit h fai r hop e o f judicial acceptance , tha t the du e proces s claus e forbid s assignmen t o f publi c schoo l student s to specia l programs , includin g lowe r tracks , withou t revelatio n b y officials o f thei r reason s an d provisio n t o parent s o f ampl e oppor tunity t o discus s an d challeng e th e ground s an d underlyin g maxims. 69 Perhap s suc h a developmen t i n th e la w wil l eventuall y founder o n th e Roth decision, bu t tha t i s fa r fro m certain. 70 I t seem s at leas t equall y likel y tha t nonforma l aim s wil l prevail . Du e proces s may b e hel d applicabl e becaus e th e court s kno w tha t w e simpl y d o not wan t t o liv e i n a societ y tha t wil l permi t it s official s t o mak e such decision s without ful l interchang e wit h th e intereste d parties. 71 But unde r th e verbal logi c of Roth, and th e formalisti c habi t o f min d it exemplifies , advocate s an d court s wil l als o hav e t o cit e entitle ments no t t o b e assigne d t o lowe r track s unles s certai n supposedl y objective ground s (eve n i f ver y vagu e one s lik e "need " o r "suit ability") exist. 72 Th e court s wil l hav e t o sa y tha t thes e decision s are , at leas t i n principle , subjec t t o judicia l review—an d revie w no t limited t o policin g agains t racia l discrimination , punishmen t o f fre e expression, an d th e like . Such revie w wil l b e o f dubiou s propriet y unde r prevailin g conceptions o f judicia l role , an d th e court s wil l kno w it. 73 Som e courts ma y nevertheles s genuinel y attemp t it . Other s ma y mak e a pro form a pretens e o f it . Neithe r solutio n comport s wit h positivisti c strictures o r wit h judicia l modesty . On e wonder s whethe r th e tru e course o f judicial responsibilit y woul d no t b e t o recogniz e explicitl y what everyon e knows : tha t ther e ar e value s i n consultatio n an d interchange wit h affecte d individual s quit e discret e fro m th e ai m o f protecting thei r substantive lega l rights—value s whos e potentia l i n a given situatio n nee d no t depen d o n whethe r an y entitlemen t i s a t stake; an d tha t thes e value s wil l irresistibl y expres s themselves , through judicia l decisio n i f th e legislature s an d official s wil l no t heed them . Tha t woul d leav e th e court s i n th e uneas y positio n o f deciding, cas e b y case , with n o simpl e rul e t o appea l to , whether th e situation i s suc h a s t o requir e judicia l exactio n o f explanator y procedures; bu t i t woul d reliev e court s o f a n insupportabl e assump tion o f substantiv e revie w powers. 74

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The proble m pose d b y th e school-classificatio n case s i s that , except fo r th e righ t no t t o b e assigne d fo r illici t reasons, 75 ther e i s n o readily detectabl e entitlemen t attache d t o assignmen t int o o r ou t o f various public-schoo l programs. 7 6 A reaso n ther e i s n o suc h entitlement seem s t o b e tha t n o on e i s ye t capabl e o f statin g acceptable restriction s o n officia l discretio n i n thi s are a whic h ar e also objectivel y trenchan t enoug h t o suppor t genuinel y judicia l oversight. A s lon g a s thi s incapacit y persists , i t i s mer e speculatio n that judges ar e likelie r tha n schoo l official s t o achiev e goo d results — to mak e beneficial , o r prudent , o r fai r assignments. 77 Fo r tha t matter, i t i s mer e speculatio n t o thin k tha t official s wil l d o a faire r or mor e pruden t j o b i f require d t o revea l an d defen d thei r decision s in detaile d face-to-face , embarrassin g an d potentiall y insultin g confrontations wit h emotionall y involve d parents. 7 8 Nevertheless, th e convictio n remain s tha t t o allo w official s t o proceed i n suc h a matte r withou t suc h interchang e wit h thos e directly an d vitall y affecte d woul d b e unacceptable . I s no t a t leas t a part o f th e reaso n fo r thi s convictio n tha t suc h officia l behavio r would hav e a meanin g tha t clashe s unbearabl y wit h a preferre d conception o f socia l an d politica l life , i n whic h self-respec t i s recognized a s th e fundamenta l h u m a n goo d tha t socia l lif e affects ? Such a convictio n ca n wel l groun d a commitmen t t o transaction s akin t o administrativ e du e process , withou t a t al l implyin g a commitment t o lega l justificatio n an d judicia l review . Ye t th e strictly forma l vie w o f procedures , legall y codifie d b y th e Roth decision, require s tha t som e entitlemen t b e posite d i n orde r t o ground a commitmen t t o intrinsicall y value d interchange . T h e requirement o f interchang e i s the n explaine d b y referenc e t o th e otherwise meaningles s entitlement , an d it s ow n meanin g thereb y falsified.

IX. T H E P R O B L E M O F N O N F O R M A L R I G H T S Why fal l int o thes e circumstances ? Wh y no t jus t admi t tha t nonformal aim s ma y sometime s dictat e judicia l enforcemen t o f a constitutional guarant y o f explanator y procedur e althoug h n o substantive entitlemen t i s involved? W e ar e bac k t o th e questio n lef t hanging earlier. 79 W e hav e t o dea l wit h a majo r paradox . M a n y have viewe d wit h alar m wha t strike s the m a s a du e proces s

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"explosion" i n contemporar y law . Th e "legalization, " "formaliza tion," or "proceduralization " o f relation s an d transaction s tha t ha d in th e past bee n treate d wit h supposedl y benig n informalit y i s felt t o bear deleteriou s consequence s fo r th e institution s containin g thos e relations an d transactions. 80 Thi s experienc e o f rampan t legaliza tion seem s t o reflec t a n increasingl y anomi c worl d i n whic h privat e entitlement backe d b y forma l procedur e apparentl y arise s t o fill a vacuum lef t b y th e witherin g o f tha t certai n spiri t w e ma y cal l community. W e ma y sens e tha t ther e ar e othe r an d bette r way s than entitlement-cwm-forma l procedur e t o "manage " suc h problem s as pupi l placemen t an d teache r contrac t renewal ; an d a t th e sam e time w e ma y sens e an d regre t tha t ou r socia l lif e progressivel y lose s touch wit h thos e othe r ways . The "othe r ways " ar e typifie d b y th e sor t o f huma n o r mora l concern that , I have suggested , ma y ofte n b e see n a s th e tru e ai m o f administrative du e process . Bu t ho w coul d th e forma l lega l orde r act o n thi s premise ? Ever y judg e seem s t o b e Kin g Midas , converting whateve r transactio n h e touche s int o a n entitlemen t which ma y b e coi n o f th e positivist-formalis t real m bu t i s also , perhaps, poiso n t o th e communitaria n spirit . Within th e forma l vision , wha t i s a right t o du e process , i f no t itself a privatistic , possessiv e entitlement ? A du e proces s entitlemen t is a concessio n t o it s holde r o f contro l over—on e migh t a s wel l sa y ownership of—bit s o f th e behavio r o f th e relevan t officials . Hi s assertion o f contro l ove r thos e bit s o f behavio r connote s hi s objectification o f tha t behavior , hi s makin g o f i t a means , it s becoming a n instrumen t o f hi s t o b e deploye d i n th e pursui t o f hi s own ends . O n suc h ground s i t ca n b e argue d tha t a du e proces s entitlement ca n only hav e forma l aims ; tha t i t canno t conve y th e nonformal, th e interpersona l meaning s o f revelatio n an d participa tion, howeve r muc h revelatio n an d participatio n ma y b e acciden tally draw n int o th e forma l procedura l model , becaus e a n officia l whose explanation s an d interchange s hav e bee n requisitioned b y someone wh o assertedl y owns those element s o f hi s behavio r just wil l not b e engagin g i n th e kind s o f act s whic h carr y th e interpersona l meanings tha t (possibly ) w e year n for . I f suc h a thin g a s a right t o nonformalistic du e proces s is conceivable, i t mus t b e a right o f a sor t of whic h w e (o r I ) d o no t no w hav e a n adequat e idea , a righ t existing outsid e th e formalist-positivis t framework , a clai m o r driv e

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or valu e havin g a mandator y quality , yes , bu t no t ultimatel y dependent upo n judicia l coercio n becaus e grounde d i n share d values. 81 Insofar a s w e fin d ourselve s trappe d b y insuperabl e skepticis m about suc h possibilities , I thin k w e mus t admi t tha t judicia l recognition o f procedura l dutie s i n case s lik e Roth' s ca n lea d onl y t o aimless an d perhap s destructiv e exaction s o f ari d procedura l performances. 82 And , thu s trapped , w e woul d conclud e tha t th e Court judge s correctl y whe n i t decline s t o exac t procedura l perfor mances excep t i n suppor t o f recognize d entitlements . This wil l surel y strik e som e reader s a s concedin g to o much . The y will sa y tha t t o a worthwhil e degre e th e aim s o f revelation , certainly, an d eve n (a s th e cas e o f collectiv e bargainin g suggests ) those o f participation , ca n b e achieve d throug h procedura l engage ments tha t ar e forthcomin g onl y i n respons e t o threat s o f lega l force , in a worl d quit e empt y o f communit y o r share d values . Perhap s so , but th e matte r i s far fro m clear . T h e collectiv e bargainin g cas e ma y show n o mor e tha n tha t wher e partie s shar e a predispositio n towar d mutuality i n decisio n making , bor n o f a commo n experienc e o f pas t cooperative relation s an d a commo n interes t i n futur e ones , government ca n assis t th e partie s i n carryin g ou t thei r tru e purpose s vis-a-vis on e anothe r b y providin g a cod e fo r bargaining. 8 3 A s fo r legally compelle d disclosur e o f th e reason s fo r harmfu l decision , tha t can doubtles s succee d i n pryin g loos e reason s i n a for m somewha t serviceable fo r th e protectio n o f entitlements . Bu t whethe r reason s supplied unde r threa t o f lega l retributio n ca n a t al l satisf y th e internal nee d fo r revelatio n mus t b e seriousl y doubted . I f wha t th e affected individua l want s i s authentic, hones t communicatio n o f th e truth concernin g th e imag e other s hol d o f him , the n th e pinched , clipped, strained , an d anxiou s statement s t o b e expecte d i n respons e to judicia l order s t o spea k ar e likel y t o distor t tha t trut h i n way s important bu t undetectible , an d ar e mos t unlikel y t o carr y th e rin g of authenticity . If I a m correc t i n suspectin g tha t th e nonforma l aim s o f explanatory procedure s resis t effectiv e enforcemen t i n th e guis e o f rights i n a forma l lega l order , the n ho w coul d th e sam e no t b e tru e of judicial attempt s t o enforc e wha t I hav e characterize d a s mora l entitlements a s i n th e cas e o f housing ? Wh y i s th e notio n o f a mora l entitlement, enforceabl e a s a lega l righ t i n a forma l lega l order , no t

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thoroughly self-contradictory ? Th e questio n i s most acut e i f w e tak e it tha t th e mora l entitlemen t t o housin g draw s o n a belie f tha t protection o f eac h person' s self-respec t i s a preeminen t ai m o f society. 84 Th e ide a o f nurturin g self-respec t throug h provisio n o f material good s clearl y entail s a notio n o f entitlement, ye t als o seem s ultimately incompatibl e wit h resor t t o external enforcement . I t i s a n idea tha t leave s th e housin g progra m teeterin g o n th e knif e edg e between whimsica l charit y an d begrudgin g concessio n t o externa l force.85 I t seems, like th e ide a o f th e humanisti c aim s o f explanator y procedures, t o deman d a nonpositivisti c conceptio n o f judicial role , one roote d i n a belie f i n share d values , i n whic h th e judge's par t i s that o f catalyzing , evoking , an d formulatin g th e community' s conscious recognitio n o f value s an d right s whic h th e communit y i s forever, i f inexplicitly , engage d i n collectivel y evolving. 86 Perhaps i t i s jus t becaus e publi c housing—thoug h no t a publi c job—strikes u s a s havin g bee n provide d fo r th e privat e goo d o f th e occupant, tha t judicia l forc e ca n b e use d t o exac t procedura l performances whe n housin g i s a t stak e withou t seemin g t o contra dict eithe r th e interpersona l aim s o f du e proces s o r th e prevailing , positivistic conceptio n o f th e judicia l role . Th e individua l mos t obviously an d directl y claim s lega l ownershi p o f a n interes t i n housing, no t i n a n official' s behavior ; an d h e claim s legal ownership of the interest , no t a n objective , mora l righ t t o it . Th e legall y contingent clai m o f ownershi p mask s th e objectiv e mora l clai m which ma y underli e it . An d becaus e th e official' s procedura l dutie s appear t o b e incidenta l t o th e litigant' s deman d fo r housing , th e judicial ac t o f enforcin g thos e dutie s nee d no t totall y voi d the m o f nonformal significance . Let m e tr y to draw togethe r som e theme s o f thi s essay b y posin g a rather obviou s hypothetica l case . Suppos e a statutor y schem e fo r public employmen t make s a n explici t differentiatio n betwee n "probationary" o r "term" teachers , a s t o who m n o limit s ar e se t o n official discretio n t o declin e rehirin g fro m yea r t o year , an d "tenured" o r "regular " teachers , a s t o who m th e onl y expresse d limit o n officia l discretio n t o terminat e a t th e en d o f a yea r i s a n unadorned requiremen t o f "cause " fo r suc h terminatio n (an d i t i s clearly understoo d tha t caus e include s institutiona l circumstances , such a s budgetar y exigency , castin g n o reflectio n o n a terminate d teacher's characte r o r competency) . Unde r th e Roth decision , i s on e

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of thes e so-calle d tenure d teacher s entitle d t o forma l explanator y procedures when th e responsibl e officia l propose s t o terminate a t th e end o f th e current year ? Sinc e ther e i s a statutory entitlement , albei t the meres t o f rationalit y entitlements , th e answe r appear s t o b e yes . But sinc e (a s Roth als o appear s t o establish) 87 th e interes t i n bein g employed b y th e state i s not on e o f thos e interest s (like tha t i n bein g housed b y th e state) whic h onc e place d withi n reac h b y legislatio n i s translated b y th e du e proces s claus e int o a "right/ ' o r "property, " there i s no apparen t basi s fo r judicial deploymen t o f anti-vaguenes s doctrine t o force th e entitlement int o a formalisticall y cognizabl e se t of narrow rule s o r criteria limitin g officia l discretio n t o terminate. 88 Now a judicially require d explanator y procedur e unde r th e nake d "cause" (rationality ) entitlemen t coul d serv e onl y nonforma l aims , not forma l ones. 89 Bu t wha t o f th e contentio n tha t a judiciall y exacted explanator y procedur e i s antithetica l t o nonforma l aims ? I f that contentio n i s correct , the n i n thi s case , althoug h th e verba l logic o f Roth woul d requir e th e cour t t o orde r official s t o gran t a n explanatory session , tha t sessio n woul d b e bot h formall y futil e an d nonformally destructive . What, then , ar e w e t o mak e o f thi s case ? I ca n thin k o f tw o way s out. First, w e migh t softe n th e thesi s tha t a judiciall y demande d explanatory procedur e absolutel y canno t serv e nonforma l aims . Instead, w e coul d sa y tha t unde r th e habitua l intuition s o f contemporary lega l culture , ther e i s potential contradictio n betwee n judicial deman d an d nonforma l aims , sufficien t t o explai n wh y a court wil l not , o n it s own , rea d th e du e proces s claus e t o authoriz e judicial exactio n o f explanator y procedur e wher e ther e i s n o entitlement t o b e vindicate d o r forma l ai m t o b e served . Thi s leave s it ope n fo r th e cour t t o orde r suc h procedur e whe n th e legislature , by explicitl y creatin g eve n a translucentl y thi n entitlement , ha s indicated it s vie w that , i n th e specifi c typ e o f contex t i n question , a legally exacte d quasi-forma l procedur e woul d provid e worthwhil e service t o nonforma l aim s despit e th e potentia l contradiction . Second, w e migh t sa y tha t th e legislature' s explici t creatio n o f th e thin "cause " safeguar d i s enoug h t o dra w th e public-jo b interes t into th e spher e o f mora l entitlements . B y enactin g th e thi n entitlement, th e legislatur e migh t b e though t t o acknowledg e th e community's sens e tha t th e job i s fo r th e sak e o f th e teache r a s wel l as fo r th e goo d o f th e state ; an d tha t acknowledgemen t migh t b e just enoug h t o stimulat e a furthe r intuitio n tha t person s hav e a

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moral righ t t o respectabl e employmen t jus t a s the y hav e a mora l right t o adequat e housing . T h e cour t migh t the n g o on an d giv e ful l due proces s protectio n t o th e job righ t jus t a s i t ha s fo r th e housin g right, includin g th e us e o f antivaguenes s doctrin e t o forc e th e explanatory procedur e int o a formall y trenchan t shape . W h a t seem s to m e extremel y interestin g i s tha t eithe r o f thes e tw o way s ou t involves th e fran k acceptanc e o f associationa l a s wel l a s possessiv e ends a s partiall y determinativ e i n du e proces s adjudication . NOTES * This paper was first prepared fo r deliver y a t th e December , 197 3 meetin g of th e America n Societ y fo r Politica l an d Lega l Philosophy . Revisio n during th e sprin g an d summe r o f 197 4 brough t th e pape r t o substantiall y its presen t state , wit h a vie w t o publicatio n i n lat e 1974 . I hav e no t attempted an y major revisio n o f the pape r t o take account o f development s occurring durin g th e intervenin g delay s i n publication . Amon g relevan t articles publishe d durin g tha t period , Leonar d Rubenstein , "Procedura l Due Proces s an d th e Limit s o f th e Adversar y System, " 1 1 Harv . Civ . R . Civ. Lib . L . Rev . 4 8 (1976) , an d Davi d Kirp , "Proceduralis m an d Bureaucracy: Du e Proces s i n th e Schoo l Setting, " 2 8 Stan . L . Rev . 84 1 (1976), ar e tw o tha t see m especiall y german e t o matter s treate d herein . During th e sam e period , th e Unite d State s Suprem e Cour t ha s hande d down a numbe r o f decisions bearin g significantly o n thes e matters , amon g them Gos s v . Lopez , 41 9 U.S . 56 5 (1975) ; Pau l v . Davis , 9 6 S.Ct . 115 5 (1976); Hampto n v . Mo w Su n Wong , 9 6 S.Ct . 189 7 (1976) ; Bisho p v . Wood, 9 6 S.Ct . 207 4 (1976) ; Hortonvill e Joint Schoo l Dist . v . Hortonvill e Education Assoc. , 96 S.Ct . 230 8 (1976) ; Meachu m v . Fano , 96 S.Ct . 253 2 (1976); Massachusett s Boar d o f Retiremen t v . Murgia , 9 6 S.Ct . 256 2 (1976). I have tried t o call attentio n t o thes e authoritie s a t th e appropriat e points wherever I could d o so by brie f addition s t o th e footnotes . 1. Th e definitio n doe s no t stipulat e tha t th e precep t mus t b e a simpl e rule susceptibl e o f mechanica l application , no r doe s i t incorporat e any particula r theory , suc h a s lega l positivis m i n som e on e o f it s variants, o f ho w t o understan d lega l validity . Th e precep t ma y b e a complex o f nonrul e standard s (policie s an d principles ) whos e resul tant vecto r i s somehow t o b e found ; an d th e precept' s sourc e ma y b e something othe r tha n th e comman d o f a positivisti c sovereign . See , generally, Ronal d Dworkin , "Th e Mode l o f Rules, " 3 3 U . Chi . L . Rev. 14(1967) . 2. Se e Lon Fuller , "Mediation—It s Form s and Functions, " 44 So . Calif. L. Rev . 305, 309(1971). 3. Tw o widely noted contemporar y statement s of the dependency o f th e

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formal rul e of law on procedural due process are Charles Reich, "The New Property," 73 Yale L.J . 73 3 (1964), and J. Skelle y Wright, Book Review, 81 Yale L.J. 57 5 (1972). See also Anthony Amsterdam, "The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrin e i n th e Suprem e Court , 10 9 U . Pa . L . Rev. 6 7 (1960) . A particularl y eloquen t elaboratio n o f th e them e i s the dissenting opinion o f Justice Brenna n i n McGautha v . California, 402 U.S . 183 , 270 (1971) . Jerry Mashaw , "Th e Managemen t Sid e o f Due Process : Som e Theoretica l an d Litigatio n Note s o n th e Assurance o f Accuracy, Fairness , and Timeliness i n th e Adjudicatio n of Social Welfar e Claims," 59 Cornell L . Rev. 72 2 (1974), proceedin g from th e premis e tha t th e ai m o f procedural du e proces s i s accuracy in th e determinatio n o f claims , suggest s tha t i n som e circumstance s courts shoul d requir e no t onl y provisio n o f hearing s i n individua l cases bu t als o us e o f managemen t device s t o monito r th e genera l quality o f agenc y decisions ; an d als o suggest s tha t demonstrabl y successful us e of such devices might excuse th e agency fro m providin g individual hearings . Id . a t 807 . Thi s essa y wil l sugges t reason s fo r caution i n appraising th e latter suggestion. 4. Se e Laurence Tribe, "Technology Assessment an d the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, " 46 So. Cal. L. Rev. 617, 63 1 n . 4 7 (1973) ; Note , "Th e Suprem e Court , 197 3 Term, " 88 Harv. L . Rev . 41 , 8 9 (1974) ; Rober t Summers , "Evaluatin g an d Improving Lega l Processes— A Ple a fo r 'Process Values,' " 60 Cornel l L. Rev . 1 , 20-2 1 (1974) . Stephe n Subri n an d A . Richar d Dykstra , "Notice an d th e Righ t t o B e Heard : Th e Significanc e o f Ol d Friends," 9 Harv . Civ . Rts . La w Rev . 449 , 454-7 4 (1974) ; compar e Goss v . Lopez , 41 9 U.S . 565 , 59 5 & n . 1 8 (1975 ) (Powell , J. , dissenting); Donald Griffi s an d John Wilson , "Constitutiona l Right s and Remedie s i n th e Non-Renewa l o f a Publi c Schoo l Teacher' s Employment Contract, " 2 5 Baylo r L . Rev . 549 , 57 0 (1973) : "Th e hearing is designed to present an opportunity for reconciliation where a mistak e ha s bee n made , fo r explanatio n wher e reason s fo r non retention ar e demanded , an d fo r a n exchang e o f view s wher e differences o f opinion exist." This notion of participation correspond s to th e value s o f civility , dignity , self-respect , an d self-expressio n which, accordin g t o Edwar d Daue r an d Thoma s Gilhool , "Th e Economics o f Constitutionalize d Repossession : A Critiqu e fo r Pro fessor Johnson an d a Partia l Reply , 4 7 So . Cal . L . Rev . 116 , 147-4 9 (1973), ough t t o b e counte d amon g th e benefit s o f procedura l du e process. The notio n o f participatio n shoul d b e sharpl y distinguishe d from the idea, developed at id. 144-47 , of hearing rights as themselves a for m of power deployable i n the pursuit o f one's private goals. 5. I n speakin g o f a "society " an d o f "socia l life, " I refe r t o an y grou p

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(including bu t no t limite d t o stat e o r nation ) encompassin g bot h a representative agen t an d a n adversel y affecte d othe r member , suc h that the agent (and those whom h e represents) and the other member are connected by their prior joint engagement in a common, mutually beneficial activit y or arrangement requirin g for its success the support and participatio n o f both . Unde r thes e circumstances , I sugges t without offerin g an y defens e o f th e suggestion , refusa l o f revelatio n and participatio n t o thos e adversel y affecte d b y officia l actio n wil l seem especially outrageous. The suggestion i s consistent wit h th e fac t that constitutional dutie s to provide due process are imposed onl y o n governmental agents, those representing legally organized civil society at large . Whoeve r i s adversel y affecte d b y th e act s an d decision s o f such an agent i s almost certainl y a fellow membe r of the represente d group. In othe r cases, th e relatio n o f fello w membershi p ma y o r ma y no t exist. Sinc e i t ma y not , a flat constitutiona l dut y t o provid e explanatory procedure s ma y b e inappropriate . I f i t does , th e group' s own charter is available fo r imposing th e duty; or perhaps the courts will exten d th e constitutiona l dut y b y analogy . Fo r a somewha t different explanatio n o f th e restrictio n o f constitutiona l du e proces s obligations to government agents, see Stephen Subrin and A. Richard Dykstra, "Notice and the Right t o be Heard," 9 Harv. Civ . Rts. Law Rev. 449, 458-59 (1974). (For the thoughts set forth i n this footnote, I am indebte d t o comment s b y Professor s Bruc e Ackerma n an d Leo n Lipson of the Yale Law School; but the y cannot b e held accountabl e for my reworking of their suggestions.) 6. Thi s seems to me an apt usag e of "formal." The procedur e i s treated as a for m (o r method ) potentiall y containin g (o r leadin g to ) th e substance (o r result ) o f a determinatio n o f entitlements . Whe n procedures are nonformal, ther e is no discrete substance to which they bear a form:substance relationship . 7. See , e.g. , Herber t Hart , The Concept of Law (Oxford : Oxfor d Univ . Press, 1961). 8. See , e.g. , Friedric h Hayek , The Constitution of Liberty, esp. ch . 1 3 (Chicago: Univ. o f Chicago Press , 1960). 9. Thi s is the model portrayed in Duncan Kennedy, "Legal Formality, " 2 J. Lega l Studie s 351 (1973). 10. Compar e Boar d o f Regent s v . Roth , 40 8 U.S . 564 , 57 7 (1972) : "T o have a propert y interes t i n a benefi t [s o a s t o b e entitle d t o explanatory procedure s when officials threate n to disturb or withhold the benefit] a person must hav e mor e than a n abstract nee d or desire for it . . .. I t i s a purpos e o f th e ancien t institutio n o f propert y t o protect thos e claim s upo n whic h peopl e rel y i n thei r dail y lives ,

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reliance tha t mus t no t b e undermined . I t i s a purpos e o f th e constitutional righ t t o a hearin g t o provid e a n opportunit y fo r a person t o vindicat e thos e claims. " 11. Se e Charle s Fried , "Tw o Concept s o f Interest : Som e Reflection s o n the Suprem e Court' s Balancin g Test, " 7 6 Harv . L . Rev . 75 5 (1963) ; Ronald Dworkin , "Th e Mode l o f Rules, " 3 3 U . Chi . L . Rev . 1 4 (1967). 12. Se e pp . 131-137 . 13. Se e pp . 138-148 . 14. On e suc h conceptio n migh t se e th e judicial rol e a s essentiall y tha t o f allocating an d delimitin g decisiona l role s an d competencies— a rol e objectively constraine d b y a requiremen t tha t th e resultin g collectio n of role s and competencies , includin g thos e unambiguousl y define d b y constitutional an d vali d statutor y material , constitut e a coheren t system. Se e Charle s Fried , supra note 11 ; Laurence Tribe , "Foreword : Toward a Mode l o f Role s i n th e Du e Proces s o f Lif e an d Law , 8 7 Harv. L . Rev . 1 (1973). Se e als o Laurenc e Tribe , "Way s No t t o Thin k About Plasti c Trees : Ne w Foundation s fo r Environmenta l Law , 8 3 Yale L . J. 1315 , 1338-4 1 (1974) . 15. Thi s formulatio n i n Kantia n term s wa s first suggeste d t o m e b y a draft o f Professo r Edmun d PincofF s comment s whic h appea r i n thi s volume i n Chapte r 5 . 16. Se e Lo n Fuller , "Mediation-It s Form s an d Functions, " 4 4 So . Calif . L. Rev . 305 , 32 8 (1971) . I t i s no t m y purpos e t o disparag e th e virtue s of formality , entitlement , property , privacy , an d security . Perhap s thi s is th e plac e t o not e tha t th e privat e entitlement s whic h forma l procedures hel p secur e ar e no t al l o f materia l qualit y o r essentiall y economic value . Fo r example , th e righ t t o worshi p freel y i s suc h a n entitlement. So , fo r tha t matter , i s th e righ t unde r certai n circum stances t o a formal explanator y procedure . An d s o would b e th e right , if ther e wer e one , t o nonforma l explanator y procedures . Se e pp . 149 50, infra. 17. Se e pp . 142-43 , infra. Fo r th e sens e i n whic h I us e th e wor d "discretion," se e not e 21 , infra. 18. Se e pp . 150-53 , infra. 19. 40 8 U.S . 564(1972) . 20. Id . a t 570 . 21. Fo r fulle r discussio n o f thi s concep t o f entitlemen t se e Fran k Michelman, "Th e Suprem e Cour t an d Litigatio n Acces s Fees : Th e Right t o Protec t One' s Rights-Par t II, " 197 4 Duk e L . J. 527 , 541-44 . See als o th e discussio n b y Circui t Judg e Hufstedtler , dissentin g i n Geneva Tower s Tenant s Org . v . Federate d Mortgag e Investors , 50 4 F . 2d 482 , 493-9 6 (9t h Cir . 1974) . Th e lega l precep t limitin g discretio n

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need no t tak e th e for m o f a "per se" rul e allowin g o f mechanica l application. I t ma y b e a precep t callin g o n a perso n t o exercis e judgment, suc h a s b y "weighing " o r otherwis e combinin g a numbe r of relevan t considerations . A s lon g a s th e require d exercis e o f judgment i s reasonabl y ope n t o possibl e judicia l contradiction , ther e is an entitlement . It will b e seen tha t I am usin g "discretion " here i n a rathe r "strong " sense, thoug h no t quit e i n th e stronges t sens e o f decisio n utterl y unbound b y authority , compar e Ronal d Dworkin , "Th e Mode l o f Rules," 3 3 U . Chi . L . Rev . 14 , 32-3 6 (1967) . Doubt s hav e recentl y been expresse d a s t o whethe r i t i s prope r o r illuminating , whe n speaking judicial discretion , t o distinguis h tha t stronges t sens e o f th e word fro m th e slightl y les s stron g sens e I inten d here : tha t o f judgment restrained , i f a t all , onl y b y complexe s o f standard s which , even i f i n principl e objectiv e an d determining , ar e s o intricat e an d opaque tha t honest , persisten t disagreement s ar e inevitabl e concern ing thei r correct applicatio n t o particular cases . Se e Ken t Greenawalt , "Discretion an d Judicia l Decision : Th e Elusiv e Ques t fo r th e Fetter s that Bin d Judges, " 7 5 Colum . L . Rev . 359 , 368-7 0 (1975) ; Noe l Reynolds, "Dworki n a s Quixote, " 12 3 U . Pa . L . Rev . 57 4 (1975) . 22. Som e recen t decision s o f th e Suprem e Cour t hav e suggeste d tha t th e only "liberties " accorde d substantiv e protectio n b y th e Constitutio n are thos e specificall y mentione d in , o r directl y inferrabl e from , constitutional text s apar t fro m th e du e proces s clause, an d thos e (suc h as equa l votin g rights ) though t derivabl e fro m th e whol e constitu tional plan . See , generally , Sa n Antoni o Indep . Schoo l Dist . v . Rodriguez, 41 1 U.S . 1 (1973) . Ye t th e interest s i n reputatio n an d practice o f one' s trad e o r profession , include d b y th e Roth opinio n among th e "liberty " entitlements , d o no t fit thi s conception . Ther e remains a t wor k a broader , thoug h no t ver y wel l defined , concep t o f constitutionally protecte d liberty , wel l illustrate d b y languag e fro m Meyer v . Nebraska , 26 2 U.S . 390 , (1923) , quote d i n th e Roth opinion , 308 U.S . a t 572: ". . . the righ t o f th e individua l t o contract, t o engag e in an y o f th e commo n occupation s o f life , t o acquir e usefu l knowledge, t o marry , t o establis h a hom e an d brin g u p children , t o worship Go d accordin g t o th e dictat e o f hi s ow n conscience , an d generally t o enjo y thos e privilege s lon g recognize d . . . a s essentia l t o the orderl y pursui t o f happines s b y fre e men. " Compar e Hampto n v . Mow Su n Wong , 9 6 S . Ct . 189 7 (1976) . Bu t compar e Pau l v . Davis , 96 S . Ct . 115 5 (1976) ; Meachu m v . Fano , 9 6 S . Ct . 253 2 (1976) . 23. A clea r exampl e i s Drow n v . Portsmout h Schoo l Dist. , 43 5 F.2 d 118 2 (1st Cir . 1970) , cert, denied . 40 2 U.S . 97 2 (1971) . Bu t compar e Drow n v. Portsmout h Schoo l Dist. , 45 1 F . 2 d 110 6 (1s t Cir . 1971) .

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24. A simila r explanatio n i s offere d i n Comment , "Entitlement , Enjoy ment, an d Du e Proces s o f Law, " 197 4 Duk e L . J . 89 , 103 , 1 1 7 - a n essay generall y wort h consultin g o n th e entitlement-trigge r theor y o f the Roth decision . Compar e th e Court' s statemen t tha t "ou r analysi s of th e respondent' s constitutiona l right s i n thi s cas e i n n o wa y indicates a vie w tha t a n opportunit y fo r a hearin g . . . woul d no t b e . . . wise . Fo r i t i s a writte n Constitutio n tha t w e apply . Ou r rol e i s confined t o interpretatio n o f tha t Constitution. " 40 8 U.S . a t 578-79 . 25. 41 6 U.S . 134(1974) . 26. Th e statut e i n Arnett provide d fo r a full , forma l hearin g bu t onl y after the dismissa l ha d bee n consummate d an d ha d take n effect . Thre e justices though t tha t Congres s wa s fre e t o creat e procedurall y qualified "entitlements " quit e a s i t sa w fit t o do . Si x justice s concluded tha t Congres s coul d no t rul e ou t acces s t o forma l procedures t o protec t whateve r entitlement s i t migh t create , bu t tw o of th e si x though t tha t a postdismissa l hearin g woul d suffice ; an d s o the Governmen t wo n th e case . 27. Compar e Laurenc e Tribe , "Structural Du e Process, " 1 0 Harv . Civ . R . Civ. Lib . L . Re v 269 , 277-80 (1975) . I t i s true , a s pointe d ou t i n Note , "The Suprem e Court , 197 3 Term, " 88 Harv . L . Rev . 41 , 87 (1974) , a t 87, tha t th e legislatur e ca n alway s cas t limitation s o n procedura l rights i n th e for m o f restricte d definition s o f substantiv e rights , e.g. : "Employees ma y no t b e dismisse d excep t whe n eithe r (i ) there exists such caus e a s will promot e th e efficienc y o f th e servic e o r (ii) the agency head has declared in writing tha t suc h caus e exists. " But i t doe s no t follow , a s th e cite d Not e argues , tha t th e onl y interest serve d b y rulin g ou t th e for m o f legislatio n involve d i n Arnett, which separatel y assert s first th e substantiv e righ t an d the n th e procedural limitation , "woul d b e t o requir e greate r cando r whe n a legislature sough t t o limi t th e exten t o f a n entitlement, " o r tha t th e doctrine o f th e si x justices i n Arnett i s inconsisten t wit h Roth, se e id . a t 87-88. Withi n th e mode l o f lega l orde r portraye d i n th e text , claus e (ii) i n th e hypothetica l statut e presente d abov e i s invalid, excep t insofar a s th e Cour t would , a s i n Bisho p v . Wood , 9 6 S . Ct . 207 4 (1976), constru e i t t o signif y tha t th e statut e a s a whol e reall y mean s to leav e th e questio n o f dismissa l t o th e agenc y head' s unfettere d choice an d s o (despit e th e appearance s create d b y claus e (i) ) create s no entitlemen t a t all . Th e doctrin e o f th e si x justice s thu s ha s th e quite significan t effec t o f forcin g th e legislatur e t o choos e betwee n (a ) a nonentitlemen t regim e o f unfettere d officia l choic e (a s i n Roth an d Bishop, supra) an d (b ) substantiv e restriction s o n officia l choice , accompanied b y whateve r procedura l right s du e proces s requires . Fo r related criticis m o f th e positio n o f th e thre e Justice s i n Arnett, se e

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Comment, "Fea r of Firing: Arnett v . Kenned y an d th e Protectio n o f Federal Caree r Employees," 1 0 Harv. Civ . R . Civ . Lib . L . Rev . 472, 478-87 (1975). 28. Tha t is , as long a s the reason s fo r no t renewin g d o no t fal l withi n a select group of illicit reasons . See note 46, infra. 29. Tha t is, the federal-court litigatio n over procedural due process rights incidentally provide d th e du e proces s hearin g t o whic h Prof . Rot h was constitutionally entitled i f he wished to challenge th e substantive validity o f th e regim e o f unfettere d officia l discretion . Cf . "Th e Supreme Court, 197 3 Term," 88 Harv . L. Rev. 41, 87 (1974). 30. Compar e Note, "Specifying th e Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limit s o n th e Us e o f Interes t Balancing, " 88 Harv . L . Rev . 1510, 151 7 n . 35 (1975). 31. Se e Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F. 2d 939,944 (5th Cir. 1970), affirmed, 408 U.S . 59 3 (1972). The cour t ther e say s tha t th e poin t o f a forma l administrative hearin g "i s no t . . . jus t t o accommodat e cour t procedures. Mor e importantly , i t i s th e proces s bes t calculate d t o reach a fai r accor d an d t o settl e th e problem s whic h hav e arise n between th e parties . Afte r all , th e candi d settlemen t o f difference s that arise between men is the essence of the civil justice fo r which w e strive." 32. Se e Note , "Specifyin g th e Procedures, " 88 Harv . L . Rev . a t 151 7 n . 35, 154 1 n . 135 . 33. Davi d Kirp , "School s a s Sorters : Th e Constitutiona l an d Polic y Implications o f Studen t Classification, " 12 1 U . Pa . L . Rev . 705 , 77 9 (1973); Paul Dimond , "The Constitutiona l Righ t t o Education: Th e Quiet Revolution, 24 Hastings L. J. 1087,1114 , 1119-20 , 1127 (1973); Merle McClung, "Do Handicapped Childre n Hav e Lega l Righ t t o a Minimally Adequate Education, " 3 J. La w & Educ. 15 3 (1974). Th e three cite d article s represen t stron g effort s t o construc t lega l argu ments fo r procedura l right s respectin g schoo l classificatio n an d assignment. Non e reall y make s a confiden t clai m t o hav e locate d substantive entitlement s respectin g assignmen t t o one "track " rather than another. See, e.g., Kirp, at 747-48 , 752-54. But see id. a t 776-78, discussing th e stigmatizin g effec t o f "slow learner " assignments, an d compare note 74, infra. 34. Se e David Kirp , William Bus s and Pete r KurilofF, "Legal Refor m o f Special Education : Empirica l Studie s an d Procedura l Proposals , 6 2 Calif. L. Rev. 40 (1974). 35. Consistentl y with such a view of the office o f explanatory procedures , Kirp e t al . sugges t libera l allowanc e o f interventio n i n individua l proceedings by private or governmentally sponsored advocacy groups. The individual' s righ t t o quasi-adjudicativ e procedure s i s thu s

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partially translate d int o wha t look s mor e lik e a n interes t group' s political right to quasi-legislative procedures—or , to use the appropriate lega l wor d of art-rule makings . Se e id . a t 78-81 , 95, 120-21 , 126, 131, 137-38. Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and Bur r v. Ne w Rochell e Municipa l Housin g Authority , 47 9 F . 2 d 1165 (2d Cir. 1973) , may reflect a similar view. 36. Laurenc e Tribe, "Childhood, Suspect Classifications , an d Conclusiv e Presumptions: Thre e Linke d Riddles, " 3 9 L . & Contemp . Prob . 8 (1975). Fo r furthe r elaboratio n o f thi s argumen t fo r "interchang e between stat e an d citizen " a s instrumenta l i n " a lega l syste m tha t aspires not to be frozen in time," see Tribe, "Structural Du e Process," 10 Harv. Civ . R . Civ . Lib. L . Rev. 269, 304-310, esp. at 307 (1975). 37. Wit h respec t t o tha t versio n o f th e political-right s theor y tha t woul d require interchange s onl y i n situation s foun d t o b e instinc t wit h inchoate norm s respectin g "interest s widel y agree d t o b e fundamen tal," one migh t wan t t o say tha t a court' s ver y ac t o f classifyin g th e case a s on e o f tha t sor t i s tantamoun t t o detectin g th e case' s involvement of an entitlement. Bu t discerning a pressing need now t o address th e questio n whethe r i t i s tim e fo r som e entitlemen t t o b e brought int o bein g canno t b e th e sam e thin g a s discernin g a n entitlement's presen t existence . Moreover , th e sor t o f "entitlement " we woul d hav e i n min d her e i s hardl y harmoniou s wit h th e positivistic vie w o f th e judicia l rol e which , I hav e suggested , bes t promises to explain the entitlement-trigger doctrine. See pp. TAN 19 25, supra. 38. Se e p . 133 , supra. A s th e tex t indicates , th e political-right s theor y entails a number of empirical assumption s an d valu e judgments tha t cannot clai m an y clea r constitutiona l certification : e.g. , interchang e promotes prudence; rules protect som e interests better than discretion does; certain interest s (an open an d evolving set) are "fundamental. " 39. Cf . Note , "Procedura l Du e Proces s i n th e Contex t o f Informa l Administrative Action : Th e Requirement s fo r Notice , Hearin g an d Prospective Standard s Relatin g t o Polic e Selectiv e Enforcemen t Practice," 5 3 B.U . L . Rev . 1038 , 105 9 (1973) . Anothe r suggeste d explanation fo r a judicially impose d requiremen t o f forma l explana tory procedures at the administrative leve l is that such procedures are much cheape r fo r th e affecte d individuals—an d i n tha t sens e muc h more accessible to them—than court litigation usuall y is . See Lamb v. Hamblin, 5 7 F.R.D . 58 , 63 (D . Minn . 1972) ; Note, 5 Conn . L . Rev . 685, 690 n . 26 (1973). Bu t ho w ca n on e square such a reading of th e due process clauses, as displaying suc h sensitivity t o the unfairness o f financial barrier s t o litigation , wit h th e Suprem e Court' s recen t decisions allowin g th e exclusio n b y cour t fee s o f ordinar y civi l

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litigants wh o canno t affor d t o pa y th e fees ? See , generally , Fran k Michelman, "Th e Suprem e Cour t an d Litigatio n Acces s Fees : Th e Right t o Protec t One' s Rights " Par t I , 197 3 Duk e L . J. 1153 ; Par t II , 1974 Duk e L . J. 527 . 40. Whethe r th e du e proces s claus e confer s a righ t to judicial review, a s distinguished fro m a broade r clai m t o forma l explanator y procedure , is a questio n tha t remain s unresolved . See , e.g. , Ortwei n v . Schwab , 410 U.S . 656 , 662-6 3 (1973 ) (Dougla s J., dissenting) . 41. See , e.g. , Willne r v . Committe e o n Character , 37 3 U.S . 96 , 104- 5 (1963); Escaler a v . Ne w Yor k Cit y Housin g Authority , 42 5 F.2 d 853 , 866 (2 d Cir . 1970) , cert , denied , 40 0 U.S . 85 3 (1970) ; Townle y v . Resor, 32 3 F . Supp . 56 7 (N.D . Cal . 1970) . Lam b v . Hamblin , 5 7 F.R.D. 5 8 (D . Minn . 1972) , indicate s tha t on e reaso n fo r readin g du e process t o requir e a n administrative-leve l forma l procedur e i s tha t i n some case s i t wil l b e too late, b y th e tim e th e cas e ca n b e litigate d i n court, t o protec t th e claime d entitlemen t a s full y a s th e Constitutio n requires. 42. Se e Wayn e McCormack , "Th e Purpos e o f Du e Process : Fai r Hearin g or Vehicle fo r Judicial Review, " 5 2 Texa s L . Rev . 1257 , 126 3 (1974) ; Note, "Specifyin g th e Procedure s Require d b y Du e Process : Towar d Limit o n th e Us e o f Interes t Balancing, " 8 8 Harv . L . Rev . 1510 , 154 0 (1975). 43. Pp . T A N 24-25 , supra . 44. See , e.g. , Willia m Va n Alstyne , "Th e Demis e o f th e Right-Privileg e Distinction i n Constitutiona l Law, " 8 1 Harv . La w Rev . 143 9 (1968) . Compare Green e v . McElroy , 36 0 U.S . 474 , 496-9 7 (1959 ) (dictum) ; Dixon v . Alabam a Bd . o f E d u c , 29 4 F.2 d 15 0 (5t h Cir . (1961)) . Se e also Hampto n v . Mo w Su n Wong , 9 6 S . Ct . 256 2 (1976) . 45. Bu t se e Thompso n v . Gallagher , 48 9 F.2 d 44 3 (5t h Cir . 1973) ; Note , "Substantive Du e Process : Th e Exten t o f Publi c Employees ' Protec tion fro m Arbitrar y Dismissal, " 12 2 U . Pa . L . Rev . 164 7 (1974) . 46. I t migh t see m tha t i n case s suc h a s thi s th e ever-lurkin g possibilit y o f violation o f specifi c constitutiona l guarantie s woul d lea d t o result s hard t o distinguis h i n practic e fro m recognitio n o f a rationalit y entitlement. Th e professo r i s entitle d no t t o hav e a nonrenewa l decision base d o n "invidious " (e.g. racial ) discrimination , o r o n hi s having exercise d certai n constitutionall y protecte d right s suc h a s tha t of fre e speech . A cour t woul d entertai n a sui t o n hi s behal f complaining o f suc h a reaso n fo r nonrenewal , an d awar d hi m relie f i f he coul d sho w tha t suc h a n illici t reaso n wa s i n fac t operative . Se e Perry v . Sindermann , 40 8 U.S . 59 3 (1972) . Bu t ho w i s he t o show this , when th e officia l i s legall y fre e t o terminat e hi s service s fo r n o reaso n at all ? (O n thi s questio n se e generall y Willia m Va n Alstyne , "Th e

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Constitutional Right s o f Teacher s an d Professors, " 197 0 Duk e L . J . 841,858-79.) Simply i n orde r t o avoi d th e emasculatio n o f th e righ t no t t o suffe r nonrenewal fo r variou s illici t reasons , a cour t migh t requir e th e official t o stat e reason s fo r th e nonrenewa l decision , onc e th e complainant ha d produce d evidenc e fairl y raisin g a suspicio n o f illici t motivation. An d i f th e reason s offere d b y th e officia l appeare d t o b e either fals e i n fac t o r aimlessl y irrational , th e cour t coul d the n conclude tha t th e rea l reaso n wa s th e illici t on e an d gran t relief . Se e Comment, "Th e Scop e o f Judicial Revie w o f Probationar y Teacher s Dismissal i n California : Critiqu e an d Proposal, " 2 1 U.C.L.A . L . Rev . 1257 (1974) . Sinc e thes e ar e just th e condition s o n whic h relie f woul d be grante d i f a rationalit y entitlemen t itsel f wer e recognized , wha t difference doe s recognitio n o f a rationalit y entitlemen t make ? Th e easiest answe r i s tha t i t make s a differenc e wheneve r th e pictur e lack s any plausibl e suggestio n o f a n illici t motive , capabl e o f shiftin g t o th e official th e burde n o f producin g rationa l reason s fo r hi s action . Insistence o n a prim a faci e showin g o f illici t motiv e befor e th e officia l is require d t o stat e reason s seem s t o b e th e mos t importan t practica l consequence o f th e doctrin e tha t th e contract-renewa l interes t i s no t itself propert y protecte d b y a rationalit y entitlement . Se e Boar d o f Regents v . Roth , 40 8 U.S . a t 57 5 n . 14 . 47. Cf . Drow n v . Portsmout h Schoo l Dist. , 45 1 F.2 d 110 6 (1s t Cir . 1971) . 48. E.g. , Smit h v . Goguen , 9 4 S . Ct . 124 2 (1974) ; Papachristo u v . Jacksonville, 40 5 U.S . 156 (1972) . Bu t compar e Parke r v . Levy , 41 7 U.S. 733(1973) . 49. Se e Ken t v . Dulles , 35 7 U.S . 11 6 (1958) ; cf . Unite d State s Civi l Serv . Comm'n v . Nationa l Ass' n o f Lette r Carriers , 41 3 U.S . 54 8 (1973) . 50. Se e Rape r v . Lucey , 48 8 F.2 d 74 8 (1s t Cir . 1973) . Compar e Hampto n v. Mo w Su n Wong , 96 , S . Ct . 189 7 (1976) . I n Raper, th e cour t indicated it s vie w tha t th e official' s obligatio n t o articulat e hi s maxims wa s implici t i n th e state' s statutor y schem e o f administrativ e review. Bu t th e federa l court' s competenc y t o adjudicat e th e cas e rested o n a clai m tha t Fourteent h Amendmen t du e proces s right s were bein g violated . 51. I do no t sugges t tha t th e result s woul d b e necessaril y happ y ones . Se e pp. T A N 59-61 , infra. 52. Lope z v . Henr y Phipp s Plaz a Sout h Inc. , 498 F.2 d 93 7 (2 d Cir . 1974) . See Thoma s v . Housin g Authorit y o f Littl e Rock , 28 2 F . Supp . 57 5 (E.D. Ark . 1967) ; Thompso n v . Washington , 49 7 F.2 d 62 6 (D.C . Cir . 1973); Shor t v . Fulto n Devel . Co. , Inc. , 39 0 F . Supp . 51 7 (S.D.N.Y . 1975); cf . Hammon d v . Housin g Authorit y o f Lan e County , 32 8 F . Supp. 58 6 (D . Ore . 1971) . Compar e Fletche r v . Housin g Authorit y o f

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Lousiville, 491 F.2 d 793 (6th Cir. 1974) , vacated and remanded, 95 S . Ct. 2 7 (1974), basin g a simila r conclusio n o n activis t statutor y interpretation. Bu t cf. Mannin g v . Sa n Francisc o Housing Authorit y (N.D. Cal . Civ . No . 74-026 6 (1974) ) (housin g authorit y ma y enforc e rule excluding minors on grounds of legal incapacit y t o enter binding rental agreement). 53. See , e.g., Caulde r v. Durha m Housin g Authority , 43 3 F.2 d 99 8 (4t h Cir. 1970) , cert , denied , 40 1 U.S . 100 3 (1971) ; Davi s v . Toled o Metrop. Housin g Authority , 31 1 F . Supp. 79 5 (N.D . Ohi o 1970) ; cf . Neddo v. Housin g Authority o f Milwaukee, 33 5 F . Supp. 139 7 (E.D. Wis. 1971) . Se e als o Aguiar v . Hawai i Housin g Authority , 52 2 P.2 d 1255 (1974); Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2 d 853 (2d Cir. 1970) , cert, denied, 400 U.S . 853 (1971). 54. Se e Holme s v. Ne w Yor k Cit y Housin g Authority , 39 8 F.2 d 26 2 (2 d Cir. 1968) ; cf. Hornsb y v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964) . But see Spady v. Mt. Vernon Housing Authority, 34 N.Y. 2d 573, 354 N.Y.S. 2d 945, 310 N.E. 2d 542, cert, denied, 95 Sup. Ct. 243 (1974), holding that a public-housing applicant has no right to an evidentiary hearin g to challenge revocatio n o f eligibility o n ground s of a prior arrest an d addiction record. 55. Se e McQuee n v . Druker , 31 7 F . Supp . 112 2 (D . Mass . 1970) ; Joy v . Daniels, 47 9 F.2 d 123 6 (4t h Cir . 1973) ; cf. Genev a Tower s Tenant s Org. v . Federate d Mortgag e Investors , 504 F.2 d 48 3 (9t h Cir . 1974) ; Thompson v . Washington , 49 7 F.2 d 626 , 632-3 8 (D.C . Cir . 1973) ; Marshall v . Lynn , 497 F.2 d 64 3 (D.C . Cir . 1973) . Bu t cf . Paulse n v . Coachlight Apartment s Co., 507 F.2 d 401 (6t h Cir . 1974) . 56. Se e th e dissentin g opinio n o f Hustedtler , J. , i n Genev a Tower s Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974), at 496-98; Note, "Legislative Purpose , Rationality , an d Equa l Protection," 8 2 Yal e L . J . 12 3 (1972) . Davi d Kirp , "School s a s Sorters: Th e Constitutiona l an d Polic y Implication s o f Studen t Classifications," 12 1 U . Pa . L . Rev . 705 , 78 3 (1973) , say s tha t "comfort [of officials].. . does not deserve to be treated as a legitimate interest." Yet, why doesn't it ? 57. Pace, too , the Supreme Court. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571 : ".. . [T]h e Cour t ha s full y an d finally rejecte d th e woode n distinction betwee n 'rights ' an d 'privileges ' tha t onc e seeme d t o govern th e applicatio n o f procedura l du e proces s rights. " Compar e Comment, supra not e 24, at 98. 58. Willia m Van Alstyne, "The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinctio n in Constitutiona l Law, " 81 Harv . L . Rev . 1439 , 144 2 (1968) . Fo r an argument tha t recen t Suprem e Cour t decision s hav e deepl y erode d the position, seemingly established by Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254

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(1970), tha t benefit s unde r statutor y welfar e program s ar e "rights " rather tha n "privileges, " se e Barbar a Brudno , "Fairnes s an d Bu reaucracy: Th e Demis e o f Procedura l Du e Proces s fo r Welfar e Claimants," 2 5 Hasting s L . J. 81 3 (1974) . 59. Som e passage s i n J. Skelle y Wright , Boo k Review , 8 1 Yal e L . J. 57 5 (1972), sugges t tha t th e lin e migh t b e draw n betwee n thos e public sector program s whic h d o an d thos e whic h don' t hav e a "regulatory " aim o r impac t o n affecte d individuals . Id . a t 588-89 . Wher e th e program ha s "regulatory" elements— a purpos e o f "bringing] primar y conduct int o conformanc e wit h agree d upo n societa l norms"—bot h efficiency an d freedo m ma y sugges t a stron g nee d fo r genera l rule s clearly state d i n advance . Whateve r th e meri t o f thi s approach , i t doesn't see m tha t i t woul d exclud e publi c employmen t fro m th e due process protecte d category . Wh o doubt s tha t officia l discretio n t o terminate o r continu e th e employmen t o f a stat e colleg e teache r contains regulator y elements ? See , e.g. , Hortonvill e Joint Schoo l Dist . v. Hortonvill e Educatio n Assoc , 9 6 S . Ct . 230 8 (1976) . 60. Moreover , i t ma y wel l b e argued tha t discretio n ca n compet e strongl y with rulednes s a s a wa y o f pursuin g consistenc y an d nonarbitrariness . "While [per se] rule s d o preven t relianc e o n 'trivial ' differenc e o f fac t and othe r irrelevan t an d imprope r factors , the y als o preven t consid eration o f materia l difference s o f fac t an d othe r relevan t an d prope r factors. Consistenc y canno t b e define d i n term s o f th e [per se rule s themselves], bu t i n term s of th e statute' s purpose s an d ho w th e result s reached i n case s t o whic h th e rul e applie s compar e t o th e result s reached i n al l othe r case s decide d unde r th e relevan t discretionar y power." Abraham Sofaer , "Judicia l Contro l o f Informa l Adjudicatio n and Enforcement, " 7 2 Colum . L . Rev . 1293 , 132 6 (1972) . Compar e Laurence Tribe , "Structura l Du e Process, " 1 0 Harv . Civ . R . Civ . L . Rev. 269 , 284-8 5 n . 4 7 (1975) . I n Hortonvill e Join t Schoo l Dist . v . Hortonville Educatio n Assoc. , 9 6 S . Ct . 230 8 (1976) , th e Cour t indicated it s receptivenes s t o th e creatio n o f discretionar y regime s b y holding, o n highl y debatabl e facts , tha t th e Wisconsi n legislatur e ha d granted unfettere d discretio n t o Wisconsi n schoo l board s t o fire teachers wh o wen t ou t o n strike . 61. Se e pp . 140-4 1 & n . 52 , supra, Laurenc e Rothstein , "Busines s A s Usual? Th e Judicial Expansio n o f Welfar e Rights, " 50 J. Urba n La w 1, 11-1 2 (1972) , cite s an d discusse s welfare-la w case s t o suppor t th e proposition tha t "th e righ t t o lif e i s s o fundamenta l tha t i t canno t b e burdened b y eligibilit y condition s unrelate d t o th e nee d o f th e recipient." Ther e i s n o explici t constitutiona l guarant y o f suppor t fo r life. Se e Dandridg e v . Williams , 39 7 U.S . 47 1 (1970) . A remarkabl e exampl e i s provide d b y th e food-stam p cases , U.S .

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Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno , 413 U.S . 528 (1973), and U.S . Dept . of Agriculture v . Murry , 413 U.S . 508 (1973) . I n thes e case s th e ver y legislation authorizin g distributio n o f th e benefi t als o specificall y denied eligibility to certain classes of applicants. The Court, invokin g the du e proces s an d equa l protectio n clauses , invalidate d th e statu tory exclusion s becaus e the y wer e no t tightl y enoug h relate d t o a n applicant's need fo r food. Se e also note 68, infra. 62. Compar e Fran k Michelman , "I n Pursui t o f Constitutiona l Welfar e Rights: One Vie w o f Rawls ' Theory o f Justice," 12 1 U . Pa . L . Rev . 962, 997-101 0 (1973) . A "mora l entitlement " correspond s t o th e second of the two senses of "right" distinguished b y Barbara Brudno, "Fairness an d Bureaucracy : Th e Demis e o f Procedura l Du e Proces s for Welfare Claimants," 25 Hastings L. J. 813, 821-22 & n. 28 (1974), while positivisti c entitlement s correspon d t o th e first sense . A comparison o f section s V-VI I o f thi s pape r wit h sectio n VI I o f Professor Grey' s contributio n t o thi s volum e wil l revea l importan t similarities i n ou r views, while not e 1 7 of hi s paper identifie s a basi c difference. 63. Fo r an apparent instance of such feedback, involving equal protectio n rather than due process, see Justice v. Board of Educ, 351 Supp . 125 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1972 ) (schoo l lunc h program) . Compar e Pau l Dimond , "The Constitutional Righ t t o Education: The Quiet Revolution, " 24 Hastings L. J. 1087 , 119-20 , 1127 . 64. Bu t compare Hampton v . Mow Su n Wong, 96 S. Ct. 189 7 (1976) . I n his opinion for the court in Lopez v. Henry Phipp s Plaza South , Inc., 498 F . 2 d 93 7 (2 d Cir . 1974) , Judge Friendl y surmise d tha t "[t]h e [governments] whic h hav e extende d ai d t o lo w an d middl e incom e housing hardly expected tha t a tenant coul d b e evicted a t th e end o f his ter m simpl y a t th e landlord' s whim , whe n substitut e housin g could b e obtained , i f a t all , onl y wit h delay , disruptio n i n livin g habits an d expense. " Sure enough. Bu t Judge Friendl y wa s engage d in distinguishin g th e cas e befor e hi m (involvin g subsidized-housin g nonrenewal) an d th e Roth case ; and wha t h e doesn't explai n is : Why not make the same surmise about governmenta l expectation s respect ing th e ground s o n whic h jobholders migh t b e "evicted " fro m thei r jobs? 65. Se e the dissents of Justice Marshal l i n Board of Regents v. Roth , 408 U.S. 56 4 (1972) , and Massachusett s Boar d o f Retiremen t v . Murgia , 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2571-72 (1967). In Norlander v. Schleck, 345 F . Supp. 595, 59 9 (D . Minn . 1972) , th e cour t wondere d "whethe r . . . th e opportunity to be fairly considered for public employment, so as to be able t o subsis t an d mak e a livin g . . . [does ] no t ris e t o th e sam e heights a s a conditionall y bough t stov e . . ." (referring t o Fuente s v .

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Shevin, 40 7 U.S . 6 7 (1972)) . Compar e th e suggestio n tha t ther e i s a "common law " right , unde r "th e la w o f privat e associations, " no t t o be arbitraril y expelle d fro m membershi p i n a n organizatio n (includ ing a university)—th e suggestio n emphasizin g tha t th e doctrin e protects membershi p as such (a "personality " interest ) an d no t merel y some linke d proprietar y o r economic interes t (suc h a s a clai m t o som e share o f th e organization' s assets) . Note , "Judicia l Revie w o f th e University-Student Relationship : Expulsio n an d Governance, " 2 6 Stan. L . Rev . 9 5 (1973) . Wha t i s i t tha t a cour t woul d d o i n recognizing th e existenc e o f suc h a righ t a s a matte r o f "commo n law," whic h i s an y differen t fro m wha t a cour t woul d d o i n recognizing a "mora l entitlement " t o a publi c job ? 66. A possibl e answe r whic h seem s t o m e inadequat e i s tha t th e nonrenewed employe e wil l typicall y hav e relinquishe d hi s procedura l claim i n advance . I t i s eas y enoug h t o imagin e Professo r Rot h "waiving" hi s futur e procedura l claims , a s par t o f th e sam e transac tion—acceptance o f a ter m contrac t wit h n o trac e o f commitmen t t o renewal—which result s i n hi s havin g n o lega l entitlemen t t o kee p hi s job. Th e professor , fo r reason s o f hi s own , choose s t o accep t a jo b clearly marke d b y it s exposur e t o th e ris k o f unilateral , unexplaine d nonrenewal. H e s o choose s eve n thoug h ( I cheerfull y assume ) h e might hav e foun d instea d anothe r jo b explicitl y safeguarde d b y a commitment t o explanator y procedures . Thi s cas e i s the n clearl y distinguishable fro m th e public-housin g case . Th e occupant' s clai m t o the housing , an d it s actua l accessibilit y t o him , aris e ou t o f an d ar e framed b y hi s immediat e nee d fo r housin g an d inabilit y t o obtai n i t elsewhere. Unde r thos e circumstance s o f stat e monopolization , th e occupant canno t b e said t o hav e voluntaril y relinquishe d an y clai m t o explanatory procedure s b y acceptin g a leas e whic h purport s t o negat e those claims . Se e Aguia r v . Hawai i Housin g Authority , 52 2 P . 2 d 1255, 126 8 (Hawai i 1974) . There ar e severa l difficultie s wit h thi s explanatio n o f th e Roth decision, a s on e whic h doe s no t s o muc h den y a du e proces s righ t t o nonformal explanator y procedure s a s avoid s th e questio n throug h a finding o f waiver . Firs t an d leas t interestingly , ther e i s n o indicatio n at al l i n th e Court's statemen t o f the fact s o f any conscious , deliberate , relinquishment b y Rot h o f an y futur e clai m h e though t h e migh t have t o explanator y procedure s i n cas e o f nonrenewal . Simpl y a s a matter o f precedent , Rot h canno t b e hel d t o hav e "waived " an y nonformal du e proces s claims , unde r th e Court' s demandin g stan dards fo r waive r o f futur e procedura l rights , a s reflecte d i n Fuente s v . Shevin, 40 7 U.S . 6 7 (1972) , an d D.H . Overmye r Co . v . Fric k Co. , 40 5 U.S. 174(1972) .

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Second, i f person s i n Roth' s positio n di d ordinaril y hav e a consitutional righ t t o nonforma l explanator y procedure s (whic h i s just th e questio n w e hav e unde r consideration) , fo r a governmenta l agency t o conditio n it s offe r o f employmen t o n th e applicant' s agreeing t o forg o tha t righ t i n th e futur e woul d pos e a seriou s constitutional issu e (concernin g a n "unconstitutiona l condition" ) never noticed o r discussed i n th e Roth decision. See , e.g., "Entitlement , Enjoyment, an d Du e Proces s o f Law, " 197 4 Duk e L . J. 89 , 99-101 ; cf . Arnett v . Kennedy , 41 6 U.S . 13 4 (1974) , discusse d a t pp . T A N 25-27 , supra. Third, mos t fundamental , an d deservin g o f muc h mor e though t and discussio n tha n I ca n her e give : ther e i s a seriou s questio n whether a doctrine o f waiver—o f contractual relinquishmen t o f claim s which ma y becom e apposit e o n som e futur e occasion—ca n appl y a t all t o a "fraternal " clai m suc h a s tha t t o nonforma l explanator y procedures. Ho w ca n a perso n mak e a legall y bindin g advanc e relinquishment o f hi s claim t o b e treate d a s an en d rathe r tha n purel y as a means ? Ho w ca n anothe r perso n presum e t o tak e lega l advantag e of th e purporte d waiver ? The proble m i s not tha t th e ac t o f takin g th e waiver seriousl y woul d pu t on e i n th e positio n o f treatin g th e perso n who mad e i t a s a mer e means—fo r tha t coul d b e sai d wheneve r w e demanded performanc e o f another' s contractuall y bindin g promise , and i t woul d apparentl y b e wron g (o r a t leas t contradictory ) o n mos t such occasion s insofa r a s ou r willingnes s t o ente r int o th e agreemen t in th e first plac e wa s a n ac t o f respec t fo r th e other' s autonomou s personality an d a refusa l t o contrac t woul d hav e bee n th e opposite . But i n thi s cas e th e contractua l commitmen t i s on e whereb y th e one wh o make s i t treat s himself as a mer e means—tradin g awa y no t just a portio n o f hi s futur e freedo m o f actio n bu t hi s ver y clai m t o b e treated a s a full y value d person . I n tha t respec t th e waive r seem s distantly aki n t o voluntary , contractua l enslavement . Th e proble m i t raises i s als o aki n t o tha t whic h th e Suprem e Cour t ha s confronte d when person s hav e purporte d t o waiv e procedura l right s whic h ar e theirs a s crimina l suspect s o r accuseds . Th e Cour t display s extrem e reluctance t o find effectiv e waive r whe n th e righ t i s seen a s bearing o n the fairnes s o f th e guilt-determinin g procedure , rathe r tha n a s protecting som e discrete , possessiv e interes t o f th e right-holder's . Se e Schneckloth v . Bustamonte , 41 2 U.S . 21 8 (1973) . 67. Interactio n o f forma l wit h nonforma l aim s seem s t o occu r i n Judg e Wyzanski's opinio n i n McQuee n v . Druker , 31 7 F . Supp . 112 2 (D . Mass. 1970) . I n th e cours e o f concludin g tha t th e housin g subsid y statutes impl y a n entitlemen t t o continued occupanc y whic h support s a du e proces s clai m t o forma l explanator y procedure s i n cas e o f

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proposed eviction , th e opinio n ascribe s t o th e legislatur e th e followin g perceptions: "[I] n man y case s th e tenan t an d hi s neighbor s hav e com e to conside r hi m a s a citizen o f th e housin g project' s community , a s h e is a citize n o f city , county , commonwealth , an d country . I f h e i s evicted capriciousl y bot h h e an d hi s neighbor s wil l fee l a sens e o f injustice. Thi s wil l creat e a n atmospher e o f hostilit y t o th e manager s of th e projects , an d ma y dete r desirabl e person s wit h a feelin g o f independence fro m applyin g fo r or renewin g leases . Ther e wil l b e les s basis fo r treatin g a publi c housin g projec t a s a ventur e i n participa tory democracy , an d a s a counterweight t o th e anomi e an d alienatio n often characteristi c o f moder n urba n communities. " 68. Compar e Rober t O'Neil , "O f Justic e Delaye d an d Justic e Denied : The Welfar e Prio r Fai r Hearin g Cases, " 197 0 Sup . Ct . Rev . 160 , 163 . Consider U.S . Dept . o f Agricultur e v . Murry , 41 3 U.S . 50 8 (1973) . This decisio n invalidate d a statutor y provisio n denyin g eligibilit y fo r food stamp s t o household s containin g person s ove r eightee n claime d as ta x dependent s b y othe r persons . Th e Cour t hel d tha t th e statut e set u p a "conclusiv e presumption " o f lac k o f need , an d thu s violate d the du e proces s right s o f claimant s t o individualize d determination s of thei r actua l need . No w th e Cour t ha d previousl y mad e plai n it s view tha t ther e i s n o constitutiona l entitlemen t t o sustenanc e i n an y positivistic sense , see Dandridge v . Williams , 39 7 U.S . 47 1 (1970) ; an d there wa s n o statutor y entitlemen t apar t fro m th e ver y statut e containing th e challenge d "conclusiv e presumption. " B y it s decisio n in Murry, th e Cour t effectivel y recognize d a mora l entitlemen t no t t o be denie d stamp s (tha t is , food ) excep t o n th e sol e groun d o f lac k o f need. An d th e Court' s relianc e o n a procedura l du e proces s theor y (a s distinguished fro m th e mor e obviou s theor y tha t th e challenge d eligibility criterio n wa s a n arbitrar y classificatio n violativ e o f th e equal protectio n guaranty ) suggest s tha t wha t provoke d th e Cour t t o detect th e mora l entitlemen t wa s a nonforma l reactio n agains t th e viciousness o f a regim e whic h wouldn' t eve n bothe r t o ask claimant s whether the y wer e really "eligible" o r not . Compar e Laurenc e Tribe , Foreword: "Towar d a Mode l o f Role s i n th e Du e Proces s o f Lif e an d Law," 8 7 Harv . L . Rev . 1 , 4 9 n . 22 4 (1973) ; Laurenc e Tribe , "Structural Du e Process, " 1 0 Harv. Civ . R . Civ . Lib . L . Rev . 269 , 28 8 n. 54(1975) . Also relevan t t o th e speculations i n m y tex t ar e decisions i n whic h i t seems tha t statutor y entitlement s to explanatory procedures (bu t not , s o far a s appear s explicitly , t o an y substantiv e protections ) wer e judicially translate d int o rationalit y entitlements . Se e Scheelhaas e v . Woodbury Centra l Communit y Schoo l Dist. , 34 9 F . Supp . 98 8 (N.D .

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Iowa 1972) ; Mil-Ka-K o Researc h & Devel . Corp . v . OEO , 35 2 F . Supp. 16 9 (D.D.C. 1972 ) (semble). 69. See , e.g. , Davi d Kirp , "School s A s Sorters : Th e Constitutiona l an d Policy Implication s o f Studen t Classification, " 12 1 U . Pa . L . Rev . 705, 775-93 (1973). 70. Th e argumen t ha s alread y foun d judicia l acceptanc e a s applie d t o assignment t o special programs , e.g., fo r the "retarded" or those wit h "learning disabilities," more patently and pointedly stigmatizing than assignment t o a middl e o r lowe r "track. " Se e Mill s v . Bd . o f Educ , 348 F . Supp . 86 6 (D.D.C . 1972) ; Pennsylvani a Assoc , fo r Retarde d Children, 334 F . Supp. 125 7 (E.D . Pa . 1971 ) (consent decree) ; Merle McClung, "D o Handicappe d Childre n Hav e Lega l Righ t t o a Minimally Adequate Education, " 3 J. La w & Educ. 15 3 (1974). 71. Compar e Davi d Kirp , Willia m Bus s an d Pete r Kuriloff , "Lega l Reform o f Specia l Education : Empirica l Studie s an d Procedura l Proposals," 62 Calif . L . Rev . 40 , 12 8 (1974): "Parents hav e a stron g interest in knowing facts that vitally affect thei r child's education an d future," irrespective of any forma l right s they ma y have. 72. Compar e id . a t 137 : "Unless a decision i s predicated o n identifiabl e and reasonabl e criteria , th e requiremen t o f procedura l protectio n becomes an elevation of meaningless formality. " 73. Compar e Norlander v. Schleck, 345 F . Supp. 595, 599-600 (D . Minn. 1972): "This holdin g i s i n n o wa y intende d t o restric t th e abilit y o f the City of St. Pau l t o determine th e fitness of applicants, nor does it impose any duty upon the city t o hire any particular person. What i s required i s timel y notic e o f th e basi s o f decision s an d a reasonabl e opportunity fo r refutation. " A substantiv e requiremen t tha t official s made a good-fait h effor t t o provid e th e mos t suitabl e o r beneficia l education, cf. Rous e v. Cameron 37 3 F.2 d 451, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1966) , doesn't see m t o hel p much , althoug h a t leas t on e knowledgeabl e observer is more optimistic. Se e Merl e McClung, supra a t 163-66 . 74. Pau l Dimon d seem s to agree that any judicially enforceabl e substan tive right would be "chimerical" except in rare and extreme cases. See Paul Dimond , "Th e Constitutiona l Righ t t o Education : Th e Quie t Revolution," 24 Hastings L.J. 1087 , 1125-2 6 (1973). Thus he favors a procedural du e proces s righ t whic h court s coul d enforc e (an d whic h Dimond hope s woul d g o fa r t o avoi d substantiv e maltreatment ) without an y commitment t o judicially reviewabl e substantiv e duties . See id . at 1108n . 89, 1110 , 1119-20 , 1121 , 1122. But thi s i s just wha t the Roth doctrine seems to rule out. One might want to contend tha t assignment t o any track below the highest i s s o stigmatizin g a s t o affec t th e reputational entitlemen t

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upheld, a s a par t o f Fourteent h Amendmen t "liberty, " i n Wisconsi n v. Constantineau , 40 0 U.S . 43 3 (1971) , an d reaffirme d i n th e Roth opinion, 40 8 U.S . a t 573 , (dictum) , an d i n Gos s v . Lopez , 41 9 U.S . 565 (1975) . See , e.g. , Davi d Kirp , supra a t 776-78 . But see Pau l v . Davis, 9 6 S . Ct . 11 5 (1976) ; Bisho p v . Woo d 9 6 S . Ct . 207 4 (1976) . But i n term s o f stigma , a distinctio n betwee n assignmen t t o a n intermediate o r lowe r trac k an d nonrenewa l o f a professiona l teacher's contrac t seem s fragil e indeed . I n fact , th e hig h likelihoo d o f some stigm a i n th e nonrenewa l situatio n ma y b e what move d th e Roth court t o sugges t ( a suggestio n implicitl y confirme d b y th e opinio n i n Goss v . Lopez ) tha t th e Constantineau reputational entitlemen t come s into pla y onl y whe n th e challenge d officia l actio n involve s a n explici t branding o f a n individual . 75. Se e not e 46 , supra. 76. Se e Davi d Kirp , Willia m Bus s an d Pete r Kuriloff , supra not e 71 , a t 118-19; " . . . [I] f th e complain t o f th e studen t an d hi s parent s i s tha t reassignment t o a specia l progra m deprive s th e chil d o f 'regular ' education, i t i s no t clea r tha t ther e i s an y deprivatio n o f a vital , protectible interest . I t i s clea r tha t th e chil d i s receivin g somethin g different. Bu t i s i t more , o r less , o r i s th e chang e neutral? " 77. Davi d Kirp , Willia m Bus s an d Pete r Kuriloff , supra not e 71 , a t 122 , say tha t "i t i s clear . . . that classificatio n decision s a t th e presen t tim e are mad e b y person s wh o hav e interest s whic h ofte n conflic t wit h those o f th e chil d an d whic h ar e likel y t o shap e som e decision s improperly." Whe n tha t i s true , i t seem s t o offe r a goo d reaso n fo r requiring impartia l decision , thoug h no t fo r creatio n o f a judiciall y enforceable entitlement . Th e reason s give n fo r believin g i t tru e see m not t o appl y t o "track " assignment s withi n th e rang e o f program s provided fo r "normal " students . Se e id . a t 47-48 . Allowance mus t als o b e mad e fo r case s i n whic h eithe r th e professed ground s o f a give n assignment , o r th e actua l result s o f a series o f assignments , indicat e tha t a "suspec t classification " i s (o r very likel y is) a t work . See , e.g. , Willia m Clune , "Wealt h Discrimina tion i n Schoo l Finance, " 68 Northwester n L . Rev . 651 , 653-5 7 (1973) . When disfavore d treatmen t i s dealt ou t o n th e basi s of membershi p i n groups traditionall y susceptibl e t o politica l abus e an d stigmatization , or it s distributio n suspiciousl y correlate s wit h suc h membership , judges d o hav e a n institutiona l advantag e ove r administrator s precisely becaus e o f th e judiciary's insulatio n fro m politica l account ability; an d i t ma y wel l b e appropriat e i n suc h case s fo r judge s t o insist tha t th e discriminatory treatmen t b e abandoned unles s i t ca n b e convincingly justifie d b y noncontroversia l considerations . See , gen -

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erally, John Ely, "Legislative and Administration Motiv e in Constitutional Law, " 79 Yal e L . J. 120 5 (1971) . Moreover , I d o no t rul e ou t that group s enjoyin g thi s for m o f specia l judicia l protectio n migh t include, in addition racia l an d ethnic minorities , person s marke d b y certain forms of physical, emotional, o r intellectual abnormality . Se e Note, "Mental Illness : A Suspec t Classification?, " 83 Yal e L . J. 123 7 (1974). Still , an importan t residu e o f case s wil l remai n t o whic h th e statement i n my text i s fully applicable . 78. Se e David Kirp, William Buss and Peter Kuriloff, supra note 71, at 7981. 79. Compar e p. 145 , supra. 80. E.g. , Justice Powell dissentin g in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S . 565, 594-97 (1975). 81. Compar e Laurence Tribe, "Structural Du e Process, " supra not e 68, at 312. 82. Bu t compar e O'Neil , "O f Justice Delayed, " supra not e 68 , a t 91-92 , "Protests against th e system and its policies may well be diverted int o more constructiv e channel s b y creatin g a n opportunit y t o confron t one's accuser s an d vindicat e one' s interest s i n a presumabl y neutra l forum." 83. Compar e Ian Macneil, "The Man y Future s of Contract," 47 So . Cal. L. Rev. 691, 723-25, 738-40 (1974). 84. See , generally , Joh n Rawls , A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard Univ . Press , 1971). 85. Compar e Goldber g v . Kelly , 39 7 U.S . 254 , 26 5 (1970) : "Publi c assistance i s no t mer e charity. " Se e als o Immanue l Kant , The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue sees. 23, 31 (J. Ellington trans . 1964) . 86. Se e Laurenc e Tribe , "Way s No t t o Thin k Abou t Plasti c Trees, " 83 Yale LJ. a t 1338-39 . 87. Se e pp. 139-40 , supra. 88. Se e pp. 139 , supra. 89. Se e pp. 139 , supra.

5 DUE PROCESS, FRATERNITY, AN D A KANTIAN INJUNCTIO N EDMUND L . PINCOFFS

It i s impossibl e t o legislat e decenc y i n huma n relations . Decenc y generally require s tha t a ma n seriousl y an d adversel y affecte d b y a n official's decisio n b e tol d wh y th e decisio n wa s mad e a s i t was , an d that h e b e allowe d t o contes t th e reasonin g tha t supposedl y justifie s the decision . Professo r Michelma n abl y exhibit s th e difficultie s tha t arise i n th e attemp t t o reduc e thes e requirement s o f decenc y t o a se t of entitlement s unde r th e constitution . O n th e on e hand , th e requirements, tacitl y acknowledge d t o b e seriou s an d central , cannot b e locate d amon g constitutiona l entitlements ; o n th e othe r hand, a "modest " cour t wil l no t simpl y tak e th e requirement s a s a basis fo r decision . Th e consequenc e i s a Swis s chees e argumen t fo r heretofore undiscovere d entitlements—a n argumen t tha t mask s th e sub ros a inventio n o f entitlements unde r th e pretenc e o f discoverin g them. Immodest y i s no t avoided , bu t onl y concealed . In thes e brie f comments , I wil l argu e tha t th e requirement s o f revelation t o th e perso n affecte d o f reason s fo r th e advers e decision , and o f hi s participatio n i n th e decisio n b y contesting , i f h e wants , the reason s given , hav e a recognizabl e an d soli d mora l ground . 172

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Michelman hint s a t wha t suc h a groun d migh t b e whe n h e suggest s that allowin g official s t o procee d withou t interchang e "woul d hav e a meanin g tha t clashe s unbearabl y wit h a preferre d conceptio n o f social an d politica l life , i n whic h self-respec t i s recognize d a s th e fundamental huma n goo d whic h socia l lif e affects " {Supra, p . 148. ) But Michelma n doe s no t (althoug h h e doe s a grea t dea l else ) analyze th e conception o f self-respect involved , no r attemp t t o sho w how an d wh y i t i s fundamental . To lin k m y scattere d remark s t o Michelman' s paper , I wil l focu s on Roth, 1 and , i n general , o n problem s o f interchang e betwee n th e administrator an d th e perso n adversel y affecte d b y th e administra tor's decision . I wil l assum e fo r th e sak e o f argumen t tha t Justic e Douglas, i n hi s minorit y opinion , i s wron g i n insistin g o n th e relevance o f th e questio n whethe r Roth' s freedo m o f speec h ha s been infringed . Th e questio n I wan t t o discus s i s no t whethe r i t i s possible t o reconcil e th e deman d fo r revelatio n an d participatio n with th e Constitution ; bu t rathe r wha t ca n b e sai d o n mora l grounds fo r th e valu e o f revelatio n an d participation , whethe r th e grounds tha t ca n b e adduce d ar e instrumenta l o r noninstrumenta l ones. Fo r simplicity , I wil l confin e mos t o f m y remark s t o participation, sinc e whateve r lin e o f reasonin g justifies participatio n (the opportunit y t o contes t th e official' s reasoning ) wil l justif y revelation t o th e perso n affecte d o f th e official' s reasons . As I understan d participation , i t require s tha t a perso n wh o believes tha t h e ma y b e seriousl y an d adversel y affecte d b y som e adminstrative actio n b e give n a fai r opportunit y t o examin e critically th e argument s b y whic h th e administrato r justifies takin g that action , an d t o present counterargument s intende d t o sho w tha t the actio n i s unjustified . I n examinin g th e administrator' s argu ment, h e may , a s Michelma n notes , question th e validit y o f th e rul e or maxi m adduce d a s groun d b y th e administrator , th e ap plicability o f th e groun d t o himself , give n th e circumstances , an d the administrator' s understandin g o f th e fact s o f th e cas e tha t together mak e u p th e circumstances . Now suppos e tha t ther e i s a t presen t n o likel y wa y t o sho w tha t Roth i s constitutionall y entitle d t o contes t th e administrator' s decision. Suppos e tha t wha t Michelma n call s "judicia l modesty " rules ou t attempt s t o includ e participatio n unde r th e libert y o r property provision s o f th e Fourteent h Amendment . I s ther e a well -

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founded argumen t tha t a les s modes t cour t migh t rightl y accept ; a n argument tha t woul d avoi d th e arbitrar y assumption s concernin g the relativ e weight s t o b e assigne d t o "interests " agains t whic h Justice Stewar t rightl y protests ? Let u s g o bac k t o Roth. Assistan t Professo r Rot h i s not , admit tedly, entitle d t o a n extensio n o f hi s contract . H e doe s wan t reason s why hi s contrac t i s no t bein g extended , bu t th e presiden t refuse s t o give hi m reasons . Rot h actuall y though t tha t th e rea l reason s ha d t o do wit h hi s politica l view s and activities , an d h e wante d th e ground s of thi s indefensibl e lin e o f reasonin g exposed . Bu t tha t i s irrelevan t for th e purpose s o f ou r discussion . Fo r th e purpose s o f ou r discussion, i t doe s no t matte r wha t us e Rot h want s t o mak e o f th e president's reasons , o r whethe r h e want s t o mak e an y us e a t all . O f course, Rot h want s mor e tha n reasons ; h e want s th e opportunit y t o contest th e soundnes s o f th e argumen t whic h lead s t o th e conclusio n that h e shoul d no t b e continue d i n hi s post . ("Soundness " her e ha s to d o wit h mor e tha n th e trut h o f th e premise s an d th e validit y o f the argument , sinc e ther e i s als o th e questio n whethe r th e proffere d argument i s th e rea l argument , th e argumen t b y whic h th e president wa s i n fac t persuaded ; an d wit h whethe r tha t argumen t i s a soun d one. ) Shoul d Rot h b e give n reason s an d th e opportunit y t o contest them , an d i f s o why ? Michelman trace s ou t som e line s o f argumen t tha t migh t see m t o show tha t Rot h i s no t entitle d t o reasons , but , a s h e holds , non e o f them seem s ver y persuasive . A frequen t argument , no t mentioned , but ultimatel y unpersuasiv e too , i s tha t t o collec t togethe r an d present t o Rot h th e differen t reason s fo r whic h differen t colleague s and administrator s wer e unwillin g t o continu e him , woul d b e gratuitously offensiv e an d damagin g t o hi s self-image—gratuitousl y offensive an d damagin g becaus e th e collectio n o f reason s take n together migh t see m t o reflec t a derogator y valuatio n no t share d b y any individua l wh o ha d vote d fo r noncontinuanc e fo r som e o f th e reasons i n th e collection . Yet , i f thi s dange r wer e pointe d ou t t o Roth, an d h e insiste d nevertheles s tha t reason s b e given , i t woul d seem tha t thi s consideratio n woul d no t provid e adequat e ground s for withholdin g th e reason s which , together , hav e persuade d th e president tha t Rot h shoul d no t b e continued . (Th e questio n whether th e reason s shoul d b e give n i n writin g give s ris e t o th e

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additional, als o ultimatel y unpersuasive , argumen t tha t suc h a lis t of reasons , becomin g a par t o f th e recor d t o whic h administrator s may i n futur e refe r i n answerin g inquiries , ma y b e professionall y damaging. Her e again , i f Rot h want s t o tak e th e risk , thi s consideration ha s littl e weight. ) But i f ther e ar e n o ver y persuasiv e argument s wh y Rot h shoul d not b e given reasons , are there an y argument s wh y h e should—o r ar e we t o leav e i t tha t i t i s just intuitivel y obviou s tha t h e i s morall y (even i f not legally ) entitle d t o reasons ? Ar e w e t o sa y tha t o f cours e he shoul d b e give n reasons—an d a chanc e t o contes t them—ou t o f simple decency ? O r tha t i n a n idea l communit y h e woul d b e give n reasons? Or that t o refus e t o give hi m reason s an d a n opportunit y t o contest the m woul d b e unthinkable ? Non e o f thes e remark s woul d be ver y helpful . Non e o f the m give s reason s fo r th e givin g o f reasons; al l see m lik e way s o f avoidin g th e kin d o f accoun t whic h must b e give n t o thos e wh o ar e impresse d wit h th e nee d fo r officia l efficiency, fo r gettin g o n wit h whateve r th e tas k ma y be . Yet th e president , lik e an y publi c official , i s a Janus-figure . H e must spea k no t onl y t o thos e whos e interes t i s i n th e mos t effectiv e use of hi s resource s fo r th e advancemen t o f public education , bu t h e must als o spea k t o thos e wh o questio n th e acceptabilit y o f hi s policies. Th e latte r ar e th e boundar y makers , and , almos t inevita bly, th e restrainers . The y spea k o f justice an d humanit y an d insis t that effectivenes s alon e i s no t enough . Ye t i f anythin g i s t o b e accomplished, i t i s clea r tha t th e presiden t mus t no t b e to o muc h restrained, mus t no t b e boun d t o atten d t o ever y cr y o f injustic e o r inhumanity n o matte r whose , n o matte r ho w unreasonable , n o matter ho w publicized , n o matte r ho w prolonged . I f entitlemen t seems th e wron g handl e o n thi s proble m i t ma y b e becaus e entitlement tie s to o closel y t o property , an d propert y is , a s Michelman an d th e Cour t agree , no t easil y stretche d t o cove r Roth's deman d fo r reasons . Anyway , propert y right s ar e externa l i n a wa y tha t Roth' s rights—i f h e ha s rights—ar e not . I f th e universit y wants t o tak e a man' s hom e fo r a parkin g lot , h e stand s t o suffe r a loss at th e hand s o f a n organizatio n an d a n enterpris e o f which h e i s no part . H e ha s mad e n o prio r agreemen t tha t i n an y wa y qualifie s the clai m tha t h e i s bein g harmed . Bu t Rot h i s a par t o f th e enterprise, an d h e ha s entere d int o a n employmen t agreemen t tha t

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explicitly say s tha t h e i s hire d fo r on e year , an d tha t offer s hi m n o assurance o f consideratio n fo r continuance . How , then , i s h e harmed b y th e refusal—o r failure—t o rene w hi s contract ? It coul d b e argue d tha t h e i s not , becaus e hi s nonrenewa l i s a n easily predictabl e outcom e o f a n agreemen t int o whic h Rot h freel y entered; a n agreemen t i n whic h ther e i s nothin g morall y question able, lik e th e agreemen t t o becom e a n indenture d servant . I n agreeing t o a one-yea r contract , Rot h agree d tha t th e contrac t would no t b e fo r mor e tha n on e year . Th e har m lie s no t i n nonrenewal bu t i n th e refusa l t o giv e reason s fo r nonrenewal . Rot h knew tha t a renewa l wa s a possibility—perhap s eve n a likelihood . Why, then , wa s h e no t renewed ? Th e contrac t was , afte r all , probationary. Wa s th e judgment tha t h e wa s i n som e wa y deficien t or at fault , o r was i t tha t h e simpl y di d no t measur e u p t o th e talen t available? O r di d i t hav e nothin g t o d o wit h an y o f thes e matters , having t o do , rather , wit h budgetar y problems , o r wit h th e balancing o f facult y betwee n department s an d colleges ? Rot h would see m t o hav e a mora l righ t t o kno w whethe r hi s propose d nonrenewal implie s tha t h e i s i n som e wa y a t faul t o r deficient ; an d the presiden t woul d see m t o hav e a mora l dut y t o mak e know n t o him, upo n request , whethe r th e nonrenewa l implie s fault , an d i f so, what th e faul t i s supposed t o be . Bu t wha t i s require d i s at leas t th e sketch o f a n argumen t t o sho w tha t th e asserte d righ t an d dut y d o obtain, tha t the y ar e no t derivabl e fro m merel y prudentia l grounds , and tha t the y ar e nonetheles s wel l founde d o n a t leas t on e mora l principle tha t ca n la y clai m t o universa l validity . Somewhat t o m y ow n surprise , I find tha t I a m driven , i n m y analysis o f th e mora l right s an d dutie s tha t obtai n betwee n Rot h and hi s presiden t t o th e secon d formulatio n o f th e Kantia n categorical imperative ; th e formulatio n tha t command s u s neve r t o treat anyone—includin g ourselves—a s a mer e means . Thin k o f th e Kantian comman d a s bein g justified an d a t th e sam e tim e clarifie d by th e examinatio n o f a numbe r o f varyin g paradigm s o f treatin g persons a s mer e mean s t o som e end . On e paradig m tha t migh t b e offered i s precisely th e cas e i n hand . I f the presiden t i s assessed—an d assesses himself—solel y o n ground s o f hi s efficienc y i n attainin g th e complex en d o f a n adequat e educationa l opportunit y fo r thos e wh o are qualifie d t o tak e advantag e o f it , the n h e regard s himsel f a s a

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mere means , an d a t th e sam e tim e regard s Rot h an d hi s colleague s as mer e mean s t o th e attainmen t o f educationa l opportunity . Now , suppose tha t th e presiden t fail s t o rene w Rot h becaus e h e believe s that Rot h i s a poo r teacher , bu t a t th e sam e tim e h e refuse s t o giv e Roth an y reaso n fo r hi s nonrenewal . H e ma y attemp t t o justify hi s failure t o provid e reason s o n ground s o f efficiency . I t woul d tak e a great dea l o f tim e fo r hi m o r som e dea n o r committe e t o giv e ever y discontinued professo r wh o requeste d i t a lis t o f reasons—especiall y when th e givin g of reasons i s likely t o lea d t o a hearing , an d possibl y to a lawsuit . A t th e sam e time , h e know s tha t Roth' s conceptio n o f himself an d o f hi s ow n wort h i s tie d u p wit h Roth' s conceptio n o f himself a s a professiona l teacher . H e als o knows—o r woul d b e justified i n assuming—tha t Rot h i s th e produc t o f a cultura l tradition an d a n educationa l proces s i n whic h b y detectin g an d overcoming fault s on e improve s one' s performances . Bu t i f Rot h i s not informe d o f hi s fault , h e i s treate d a s a mer e means ; h e i s eliminated, lik e a fault y machin e part , fro m a n organizatio n tha t will henceforth , supposedly , functio n bette r withou t him , an d i n that n o furthe r though t i s give n t o Roth' s interes t i n correctin g hi s own performance . There doe s no t see m t o b e a goo d argument , o n ground s o f efficiency alone , wh y Rot h shoul d b e give n reasons . (Ther e would b e an argumen t fo r revealin g t o Rot h th e faultines s o f hi s performanc e as a teache r i f h e wer e t o b e retained. ) I t migh t b e hel d tha t th e president should—o n prudentia l ground s mor e widel y conceived — inform Rot h o f hi s fault s a s a teacher , eve n i f Rot h i s no t t o b e renewed. I t migh t b e argue d tha t th e president' s objectiv e i s t o advance th e interest s o f education , an d tha t h e woul d d o s o b y offering Rot h criticis m an d advice . Bu t i n thi s wid e an d nebulou s responsibility ver y littl e leverag e coul d b e foun d fo r th e clai m tha t Roth ha d an y mora l clai m o n th e president . Th e givin g o f reason s to Rot h i s the n o n a pa r wit h a hundre d othe r thing s tha t th e president ca n d o tha t da y t o advanc e th e genera l caus e o f educational opportunity . H e ma y rightl y believ e tha t h e ca n achieve mor e b y tendin g t o hi s dutie s o n a n accreditin g committee , or by writin g letter s t o foundations , tha n b y passin g th e tim e o f da y with Roth . Of course , Rot h ma y hav e grave r doubts . H e ma y wonde r

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whether h e ha s bee n foun d deficien t i n qualitie s tha t reac h farthe r than hi s professiona l life . H e ma y wonde r i f h e ha s bee n judge d lazy, intemperate , crude . Wha t kin d o f fello w d o the y thin k tha t h e is, anyway ? H e ha s bee n assessed , an d h e ma y hav e bee n foun d wanting. Has h e bee n foun d wanting , and , i f so , wantin g what ? Surely, i f h e i s no t t o b e treate d a s a mer e means , h e i s owe d th e reasons tha t h e requests . But hi s bein g owe d reason s i s bu t a smal l distance—i f i t i s an y distance—from hi s bein g owe d a hearin g i n whic h h e ca n examine , and challenge , wha t i s sai d b y th e president—i n whic h h e ca n participate i n th e decisio n tha t concern s himself . T h e presiden t i s not treatin g Rot h a s a n en d i n himsel f i f h e give s reason s t o th e board o f regent s i n executiv e session , o r t o a n electe d facult y committee pledge d t o secrecy . Hi s reason s canno t b e couche d i n a n official jargo n a s unintelligibl e t o Rot h a s Hindi . Bu t th e direc t wa y to ascertai n thei r intelligibilit y t o Rot h i s t o allo w Rot h t o examin e them. Th e reason s mus t no t b e vagu e o r ambiguou s beyon d comprehension. Here again , i f th e "reasons " ar e t o coun t a s reasons , Rot h woul d seem t o b e th e likel y perso n t o as k th e question s tha t wil l allo w them t o qualify . T h e presiden t ca n hardl y b e allowe d t o b e th e authority o n whethe r th e reason s h e give s ar e vague , fo r h e ma y believe i t i n th e interes t o f efficienc y o r i n hi s ow n interes t t o spea k vaguely, and , thus , evasively , an d i n thi s wa y t o slid e b y hi s obligation t o Roth . No r shoul d th e presiden t b e th e authorit y o n whether hi s reasons contradic t on e another , thu s reducin g reason s t o nonreasons, no r o n whethe r th e conclusio n tha t Rot h shoul d no t b e renewed follow s fro m th e reason s h e gives . Eve n i f th e presiden t were t o decid e wha t i s a reaso n an d whethe r th e reason s give n ar e consistent, an d whethe r th e conclusio n follows , ther e woul d stil l b e the possibility , i n th e absenc e o f a hearing , that , give n th e circumstances, Rot h wa s justified i n teachin g a s h e did , o r tha t ther e was a vali d excus e fo r hi s havin g taugh t badly . It i s no t necessary , then , t o suppos e tha t ther e i s valu e i n shee r participation. Participatio n ma y b e instrumentall y valuable , bu t instrumental t o th e achievemen t o f a mora l purpos e tha t i s itsel f impossible t o describ e i n instrumenta l terms , th e purpos e o f treatin g a ma n no t a s a mer e mean s bu t a s a n en d i n himself . Thi s i s no t t o

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say tha t ther e is no intrinsi c valu e i n participation . I would prefe r t o say tha t ther e ma y be , bu t tha t th e mora l valu e o f participatio n turns o n it s relation t o a mora l end . Thi s relationshi p o f instrumen tality i s no t th e sam e kin d a s tha t betwee n th e president' s raisin g money an d educationa l opportunit y fo r all . W e migh t sa y tha t participation i s a n instrumen t b y whic h th e valuatio n o f person s a s ends in themselve s i s expressed. I t i s as if th e Kantia n principl e wer e determinable i n an y numbe r o f ways, bu t participatio n i s one o f th e ways i n whic h i t ma y becom e determinate . I t doe s no t follo w tha t mere participatio n i s o f valu e (thoug h i t ma y hav e value) , bu t rather follow s tha t participatio n i s morall y valuabl e t o th e degre e that i t make s determinat e th e mora l principl e tha t w e shoul d neve r treat a ma n a s a mer e means . If, wit h Michelman , w e tak e self-respec t t o b e th e "fundamenta l human good, " the n th e treatin g o f person s a s end s i n themselve s will, I suppose , b e a psychologicall y necessar y conditio n fo r th e generation o f self-respect . Bu t I suspec t tha t i t woul d b e bette r t o say tha t th e fundamenta l good , i f ther e i s one, i s a stat e o f affair s i n which eac h perso n i s respecte d a s a n en d i n himself . The n self respect wil l no t b e delusory . One wa y o f makin g determinat e th e determinabl e Kantia n injunction i s throug h a contrac t theory , lik e John Rawls's , i n whic h the socia l bargai n i s carefull y draw n unde r condition s designe d t o guarantee, o r at leas t mak e likely , tha t n o individua l wil l b e a mer e means t o others ' ends, and , positively , tha t h e wil l b e treate d a s a n end i n himself . Whethe r suc h a theor y ca n b e incorporate d int o th e framework o f la w I hav e n o idea ; ye t th e theor y jus t might , i n it s essentials, expres s a consensu s a s t o th e direction s i n whic h th e Kantian principl e shoul d lea d us . Bu t i t i s quit e conceivabl e t o m e that w e shoul d procee d les s systematically , buildin g u p a s w e g o along a se t o f paradigm s fo r practice s tha t shoul d b e avoide d a s treating person s a s mer e means , an d no t a s end s i n themselves . Michelman ha s a goo d dea l t o sa y abou t th e "fraternal " o r "communal" valu e o f revelatio n an d participation . Th e Kantia n principle suggest s on e formulatio n o f wha t tha t valu e migh t consis t in (expande d impressionisticall y i n Kant' s discussio n o f a "kingdo m of ends") . Communit y consist s i n this : tha t n o on e ca n rightl y complain o f bein g used by another . Thi s i s a narro w an d negativ e

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kind o f definitio n o f community , bu t fo r tha t ver y reaso n i t ma y have considerabl e powe r a s a shape r o f th e practices , lega l o r nonlegal, b y whic h w e live . I t set s bound s o n ou r treatmen t o f eac h other, bound s t o whic h w e ca n appea l i n differen t ways : b y hint s o f moral insensitivity , b y tal k o f rights , or by appea l t o th e law . I t doe s not provid e a positiv e goal—define d i n attitudina l o r institutiona l terms—but proceed s instea d t o refin e ou r sens e o f wha t i t i s t o use another perso n o r oneself . The obviou s safeguar d agains t suc h us e i s tha t th e perso n ente r meaningfully int o th e consultatio n abou t wha t i s t o b e don e t o him , for him, with him . Revelatio n t o hi m o f the reason s fo r th e propose d action, an d hi s participatio n i n th e assessmen t o f thos e reason s ar e then necessar y condition s o f meaningfu l consultation—consultatio n that i s no t merel y a blin d fo r actio n tha t take s n o accoun t o f him , his interests , hi s desires . Of course , non e o f thi s i s muc h hel p i n drawin g a lin e betwee n morally an d legall y impermissibl e us e o f a person . Ye t on e suggestion ma y b e offered . Th e kind s of us e on whic h legislativ e an d judicial though t shoul d focu s ar e thos e i n which , b y th e rule s o f a practice, allocation s ar e made , b y someon e i n authority , o f wha t people desire , o r wha t the y wan t t o avoid . I t i s thi s authoritativ e distribution tha t i s th e prope r subjec t o f legislatio n an d o f judicia l review. I do no t se e why , give n thi s context , th e judge canno t mak e use, i n reviewin g administrativ e decisions , o f a networ k o f analog y with undispute d paradigm s o f using persons. On e kin d o f paradig m may b e provide d i n Roth, wher e reason s ar e no t revealed , an d n o opportunity fo r consultatio n i s provided . Revelation t o a perso n o f th e reason s fo r a n advers e decision , an d allowing hi m a n opportunit y t o contes t thos e reason s ar e ways , then, o f showin g forth , o f exhibitin g a principl e o n whic h commu nity ma y b e built . I t i s a rathe r specia l communit y i n tha t it s ties ar e not merel y thos e o f natura l affectio n o r concern , o f loyalty , o r o f respect fo r authority . Fraternit y an d communit y wil l not , b y themselves, b e enough . Fraternit y ca n b e exclusionar y an d blin d i n its loyalty; communities ca n b e frivolou s i n purpos e o r mean i n thei r personal relations . Decency require s tha t me n wh o hav e a grea t dea l t o los e fro m a n official decisio n b e give n a n opportunit y t o contes t it . Bu t th e

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decency i n question i s not a matte r o f small courtes y o r of propriety . It is , rather , th e decenc y tha t prevail s whe n a communit y i s s o governed tha t n o ma n nee d fea r tha t h e wil l b e treate d a s a mer e means.

NOTE 1. Boar d of Regents v. Roth , 408 U.S . 564 (1972).

6 PROCEDURAL FAIRNES S AN D SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT S THOMAS C. GREY

This essa y i s a roug h attemp t t o sketc h som e o f th e genera l contours o f th e concep t o f procedura l fairness . Procedura l fairnes s i s a concep t i n som e respect s broade r an d i n other s narrowe r tha n du e process o f law . O n th e on e hand , norm s o f procedura l fairness— a moral concept—appl y t o processe s use d i n decidin g nonlega l disputes. Thu s a parent' s decisio n o f a disput e betwee n childre n might violat e notion s o f fai r procedur e i f th e paren t listene d t o onl y one sid e o f th e disput e befor e decidin g it . O n th e othe r hand , procedural fairnes s doe s no t includ e thos e fundamenta l substantiv e rights whic h i n ou r constitutiona l la w ar e enforce d i n th e nam e o f due process—right s suc h a s th e freedom s o f speec h an d religio n insofar a s the y restrai n stat e governments , o r th e right s o f libert y and privac y usuall y characterize d a s aspect s o f substantiv e du e process. In general , however , i t seem s clea r tha t th e basi c cor e o f wha t lawyers cal l "procedura l du e process " i s forme d aroun d th e popula r conceptions o f procedura l fairnes s manifeste d i n th e commo n judgments o f conventiona l morality . O f course , th e lega l doctrine s of du e proces s ar e fa r mor e detailed , ramifie d an d precis e tha n ar e 182

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lay notion s o f fai r procedure . Bu t wher e th e la w o f du e proces s departs fro m th e broa d outline s o f th e moralit y o f procedura l fairness, producin g result s strongl y contrar y t o widel y share d intuitive judgments , i t seem s righ t t o presum e tha t i t ha s gon e astray.

I Procedural fairnes s ha s bot h a loos e an d a stric t sense . I n it s loos e sense, th e ter m include s certai n rule s an d principle s applicabl e t o dispute-settling procedure s tha t ar e designe d t o protec t substantiv e rather tha n procedura l values . I hav e i n min d example s suc h a s these: th e crimina l defendant' s privileg e no t t o testify ; th e rul e excluding fro m evidenc e a priest' s testimon y abou t a penitent' s confession; th e rule s prohibitin g th e us e o f evidenc e extracte d b y physical o r psychological abuse ; an d rule s prohibitin g o r restrainin g the us e o f evidenc e obtaine d b y invasion s o f privac y o r trespasses . These ar e no t rule s and principle s o f procedura l fairnes s i n th e stric t sense i n whic h I shal l us e th e ter m i n thi s paper . The y ar e procedural standard s onl y i n tha t thei r primary (o r sole) applicatio n is t o dispute-settlin g procedures . Unlik e rule s an d principle s o f procedural fairnes s i n th e stric t sense , the y ar e no t aime d a t producing mor e accurat e o r fai r decisions o f thos e disputes . The y ar e rather designe d t o protec t variou s substantiv e right s an d interest s from th e invasion s t o whic h the y woul d b e subjec t i f th e strictl y procedural aim s o f correc t fact-findin g an d rule-applyin g wer e pursued single-mindedl y (o r subjec t onl y t o prudentia l constraint s of cost) . These rule s o f du e proces s (i n th e loos e sense ) ma y ver y ofte n clash wit h value s o f stric t procedura l fairness . Th e poin t ca n perhaps b e see n mos t clearl y whe n a crimina l defendan t migh t b e exculpated b y a priest' s testimon y abou t matter s reveale d t o hi m i n someone else' s confession. Her e th e principl e tha t a defendan t mus t have compulsor y proces s t o compe l relevan t testimon y i n hi s favo r (a principl e o f procedura l fairnes s i n th e stric t sense ) clashe s wit h the priest-peniten t privileg e ( a principl e o f du e proces s i n th e loos e sense—substantive du e process , I shoul d say , base d o n value s o f privacy an d religiou s freedom). 1 I believ e tha t procedura l fairnes s lend s itsel f t o coheren t analysi s

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as a singl e concep t onl y i f i t i s take n i n th e stric t sense . Thi s i s s o because i n it s loose r sens e i t encompasse s al l th e substantiv e right s which ma y b e threatene d i n th e pursui t o f accurat e an d correc t adjudication o f disputes . Ye t ther e i s n o limi t i n principl e t o th e number an d variet y o f suc h potentiall y threatene d substantiv e rights. I n th e cas e o f eac h o f them , th e consideration s favorin g thei r protection i n th e procedura l contex t wil l b e essentiall y th e sam e a s those favorin g thei r protectio n generally . I f procedural fairnes s wer e given s o broa d a sense , i t woul d thu s embrac e al l conceivabl e substantive mora l an d lega l rights , an d ther e coul d b e n o prospec t of giving i t intelligibl e consideratio n a s a separate an d finit e concep t on it s ow n account. 2

II The rule s an d principle s o f procedura l fairnes s (i n th e narro w sense) al l ar e designe d t o promot e th e correc t decisio n o f disputes. 3 All o f the m ten d t o ensur e tha t fact s wil l b e foun d mor e accuratel y or tha t evaluation s wil l b e mad e mor e reasonabl y an d impartiall y than woul d b e th e cas e i f the y wer e no t i n force . Consider, fo r example , th e rule s o f fai r procedur e applicabl e i n criminal trials . Th e judg e mus t b e impartial , judgmen t mus t b e based o n swor n testimon y o r othe r reliabl e evidence , th e defendan t must hav e counsel , h e mus t b e abl e t o call witnesse s i n hi s favo r an d cross-examine th e witnesse s agains t him , an d s o on. These rule s hav e as thei r objec t th e preventio n o f th e convictio n o f innocen t defendants becaus e o f th e malice , prejudice , carelessness , laziness , haste, o r excessiv e zea l o f la w enforcemen t officials. 4 Th e simila r rules of du e proces s applicabl e i n civi l trial s ar e likewis e designe d t o lessen th e likelihoo d o f erroneou s decisions , a s ar e th e les s elaborat e rules applicabl e i n man y administrativ e proceedings . But th e value s o f procedura l fairnes s d o no t impos e upo n dispute settling mechanism s a n impossibl e counse l o f perfection . Dispute s should no t b e decide d wrongly , bu t o n th e othe r han d the y mus t b e decided, an d decide d a t a cos t commensurat e wit h wha t i s a t stak e in th e dispute . Accuracy-promotin g mechanism s mus t no t b e imposed beyon d th e poin t a t whic h th e cost s o r delay s the y involv e outweigh th e benefit s fro m th e additiona l accurac y the y secure . Recognition o f thi s poin t introduce s th e balancin g elemen t inevita -

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ble i n judgments o f procedura l fairness . Accurac y mus t b e balance d against cost . Or , to put i t mor e precisely , principle s o f fai r procedur e promote accurac y subjec t t o th e prudentia l constraint s o f cost . A furthe r qualificatio n mus t b e made . Principle s o f procedura l fairness ar e no t designe d t o promot e accurac y i n th e abstrac t o r t o advance th e pursui t o f trut h i n general . Fo r example , th e rule s o f fair procedur e applicabl e t o crimina l trial s ar e al l designe d t o reduce th e likelihoo d o f erroneou s convictions. A crimina l procedur e which resulte d i n to o man y innocen t defendant s bein g convicte d would o n tha t accoun t b e unfair . Bu t w e woul d no t condem n a s violative o f du e proces s a n apparatu s o f crimina l procedur e whic h resulted i n to o man y acquittal s o f th e guilty . W e migh t sa y tha t i t did no t sufficientl y advanc e th e abstrac t caus e o f publi c justice , though w e would mor e likel y condem n i t as lax o r inefficient, ba d a s a matte r o f polic y rathe r tha n unjust . Consider a principl e o f fai r crimina l procedur e tha t quit e obviously retard s rathe r tha n advance s th e overal l accurac y o f th e criminal process . Th e requiremen t tha t guil t b e prove d beyon d a reasonable doub t certainl y produce s mor e erroneou s acquittal s tha n it prevent s erroneou s convictions . Indeed , i t i s ofte n paraphrase d into a numerica l form tha t dramatize s th e point : "Bette r tha t te n (or five, o r twenty ) guilt y me n b e acquitte d tha n tha t on e innocen t man b e convicted. " Th e principl e i s clearl y base d o n a relativ e assessment o f th e substantiv e interest s a t stak e i n a crimina l trial : while i t i s important a s a matte r o f public polic y (o r even o f abstrac t justice) t o punis h th e guilty , i t i s a ver y grea t an d concret e injustic e to punis h th e innocent . In th e norma l civi l la w suit , ther e i s n o suc h asymmetry . Th e interests o f fairnes s li e i n seein g tha t th e disput e i s correctly decide d according t o accuratel y foun d facts , subjec t t o th e prudentia l constraints o f cost . Ther e i s n o greate r injustic e i n a n erro r on e wa y than th e other . Accordingly , procedura l fairnes s require s tha t th e facts b e foun d b y a preponderanc e o f th e evidence . A mil d preference fo r th e statu s qu o dictate s tha t th e defendan t shal l wi n i f the evidenc e i s i n equipoise . I n respec t t o matter s suc h a s th e righ t to counsel an d th e righ t t o call witnesses , bot h partie s hav e th e sam e rights. However, eve n outsid e th e crimina l process , judgment s o f pro cedural fairnes s ma y b e asymmetrical . A n exampl e occur s i n th e

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administration o f publi c assistanc e (o r welfare ) programs . Fo r mos t of th e histor y o f welfar e i n thi s country , thes e program s hav e bee n administered subjec t t o virtuall y n o requirement s o f du e process . Welfare authoritie s decided—ofte n o n a n entirel y informa l basis — which applicant s shoul d b e approve d an d ho w muc h the y shoul d receive. Onl y i n th e las t fe w decade s hav e legislature s an d welfar e bureaucracies establishe d forma l procedure s designe d t o reduc e th e risk o f erroneou s denial s o f publi c assistance , thoug h thes e sam e procedures hav e typicall y bee n a t leas t equall y wel l designe d t o prevent erroneou s determination s o f eligibilit y an d overpayments . A fe w year s ago , th e Suprem e Cour t wen t beyon d thi s an d decided, a s a matte r o f constitutiona l du e process , tha t befor e a welfare recipien t coul d hav e hi s gran t discontinue d o n th e groun d that h e ha d becom e ineligible , h e mus t b e offere d th e righ t t o contest th e findin g o f ineligibilit y a t a n administrativ e hearing. 5 This requiremen t wen t beyon d th e establishmen t o f forma l pro cedural equalit y betwee n th e stat e an d th e welfar e recipient . A s a dissenting opinio n i n th e cas e noted , th e stat e wa s force d t o continue payment s t o recipient s i t ha d determine d t o b e ineligibl e until i t coul d establis h thei r ineligibilit y a t a hearing , eve n thoug h there wa s ver y littl e practica l likelihoo d tha t i t coul d recove r th e payments mad e i n th e interi m t o ineligibl e recipients. 6 T h e majorit y of th e Cour t di d no t den y tha t thi s woul d b e a consequenc e o f it s decision, bu t argue d tha t th e particularl y hars h consequence s o f erroneously denyin g welfar e benefit s t o thos e wh o wer e eligibl e justified thi s specia l impositio n o n th e state—i n thi s context , unlik e almost an y other , temporar y terminatio n o f benefit s deprive d th e recipient o f "th e ver y mean s b y whic h t o live " an d rendere d hi s situation "immediatel y desperate. " 7 Give n thi s consideration , th e Court conclude d tha t i t wa s necessar y t o depar t fro m th e norma l procedure o f requirin g a n allege d oblige e t o tak e affirmativ e actio n in orde r t o compe l paymen t fro m a n allege d obligo r wh o denie s th e obligation.

Ill In th e crimina l prosecution , th e typica l civi l suit , an d th e administrative determinatio n o f th e eligibilit y o f welfar e recipients , the principle s an d value s o f procedura l fairnes s ar e invoke d onl y t o

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protect th e claim s of individual s t o correct decisio n o f th e disput e i n question. "Individuals " here ma y includ e institution s whe n the y ar e subject t o th e decision s o f other , authoritative , institutions . Thus , a corporation ma y clai m th e protectio n o f du e proces s i n a lawsuit , and eve n a natio n ma y d o s o i n a disput e befor e a n internationa l tribunal. Bu t institutions—o r eve n natura l persons—ma y no t invok e the value s o f fai r procedur e o n thei r ow n behal f wit h respec t t o disputes tha t the y hav e authorit y t o decide : a stat e i n a crimina l prosecution; a corporatio n i n th e interna l disciplin e o f it s employ ees; o r a paren t i n hi s dealing s wit h hi s children . Principles o f du e proces s operat e a s a n externa l mora l o r lega l check upo n th e decisio n procedure s adopte d b y authoritativ e deciders o f disputes . The y provid e a counterweigh t t o th e natura l interests o f thos e decisio n makers . I n th e crimina l process , th e natural interest s o f th e stat e ten d towar d th e punishmen t o f offenders an d th e avoidanc e o f cost . Du e proces s check s ar e thu s required t o safeguar d th e mor e fragil e interes t o f th e defendan t i n the assuranc e tha t h e wil l no t b e punishe d unles s guilty . I n th e typical civi l lawsuit , th e interes t o f th e stat e a s a neutra l third-part y adjudicator betwee n privat e disputant s i s i n minimizin g th e cos t o f decision. Thus , principle s o f du e proces s ar e require d t o protec t th e interests o f th e disputant s i n th e correc t adjudicatio n o f thei r particular claims . I n th e welfar e case , th e court s have , i n imposin g special constraint s o f du e proces s o n th e bureaucracy , reveale d thei r judgment tha t administrativ e official s ar e naturall y incline d t o protect th e publi c purs e throug h summar y procedure s an d substan tive presumption s agains t eligibility . A paren t decidin g a disput e between childre n ma y unconsciousl y lea n towar d on e chil d o r ma y be to o muc h influence d b y hi s natura l desir e t o hav e th e disput e quickly settle d t o tak e sufficien t car e tha t i t b e settle d right . I n thi s context, th e tug s o f conscienc e provide d b y th e extralega l principle s of fai r procedur e ten d towar d restoratio n o f th e prope r equilibriu m of th e competin g factors .

IV It i s not alway s th e cas e tha t whe n a n institutio n make s a decisio n affecting th e interest s o f a n individual , principle s o f du e proces s apply t o th e decisio n procedure s adopte d b y th e institution . Th e

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point i s illustrate d i n th e constitutiona l contex t b y th e Suprem e Court's decisio n i n th e cas e o f Boar d o f Regent s v . Roth. 8 I n tha t case, a universit y teache r wa s employe d unde r a one-yea r contract . The teache r wa s informe d tha t hi s contrac t woul d no t b e renewe d when i t expired . H e argue d tha t du e proces s require d tha t h e b e told th e reason s wh y hi s contrac t woul d no t b e renewe d an d give n the opportunit y t o contes t th e validit y an d applicabilit y o f th e grounds fo r th e decisio n a t a hearing . The Suprem e Cour t rejecte d hi s argument . T h e Cour t concede d that Rot h ha d a stron g interes t i n bein g continue d i n hi s employ ment, bu t nevertheles s conclude d tha t th e decisio n t o dro p hi m could b e mad e entirel y unconstraine d b y an y requirement s o f procedural du e process . T h e Cour t reasone d tha t Rot h ha d n o claim o f entitlemen t t o renewa l o f hi s teachin g contract . I f Roth' s original contrac t ha d provide d tha t h e woul d b e rehire d fro m yea r to yea r unles s affirmativ e caus e appeare d t o terminat e hi s employ ment, h e woul d hav e ha d a sufficien t clai m o f entitlemen t t o requir e the notic e an d hearin g h e sought . T h e sam e woul d hav e bee n th e case i f a stat e statut e ha d require d tha t universit y teachers , onc e hired, coul d no t b e le t g o except fo r cause . Bu t i n th e absenc e o f an y such statutor y o r contractua l provision , th e expiratio n o f Roth' s contract lef t hi m wit h n o lega l clai m t o continue d employmen t a t the university—howeve r stron g hi s persona l stak e i n retainin g hi s job. Implicit i n th e Court' s decisio n i n Roth i s th e premis e tha t th e Constitution permit s th e stat e t o hir e Rot h i n th e first plac e withou t giving hi m an y assuranc e o f j o b tenure . Similarl y implici t i s th e premise tha t a stat e universit y nee d no t hir e a n applican t howeve r well qualifie d h e ma y be . T h e Constitutio n create s n o substantiv e entitlement eithe r t o continuatio n o f a j o b onc e th e ter m o f th e employment contrac t run s out , o r t o th e creatio n o f a n employmen t relationship a t th e behes t o f an y particula r applicant . I f th e Constitution di d embod y an y suc h substantiv e entitlements , thos e entitlements woul d hav e supporte d Roth' s clai m t o th e benefit s o f procedural du e process . It i s ver y ofte n th e cas e tha t a n individua l stand s i n Roth' s situation. H e ha s a stron g stak e o r interes t i n a decisio n tha t a government officia l ha s authorit y t o rende r favorabl y t o him . Yet , because th e individua l ha s n o clai m o f entitlemen t t o a favorabl e

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decision, canon s o f procedura l fairnes s ar e inapplicabl e t o th e decision-making process . A s Roth' s cas e shows , applicant s fo r government jobs , o r holder s o f governmen t job s whos e contractua l terms hav e ru n out , ar e typicall y i n thi s position . As anothe r example , on e migh t conside r a prisone r wh o applie s for executiv e clemency—pardo n o r commutatio n o f sentence . I t goe s without sayin g tha t th e applican t ha s a stron g interes t i n th e outcome o f th e decisio n o n hi s application . Ye t i t seem s certai n tha t the court s woul d no t requir e th e decisio n t o b e mad e unde r an y constraints o f procedura l fairness , an d tha t the y woul d giv e a s thei r reason th e absenc e o f an y plausibl e clai m o f entitlemen t t o clemency o n th e prisoner' s part . In Roth' s cas e an d th e prisoner' s case , man y o f th e condition s favoring applicatio n o f principle s o f fai r procedur e suggeste d earlie r do obtain . Th e official s wit h powe r t o rehir e Rot h o r pardo n th e prisoner ma y hav e inclination s natura l t o person s i n thei r position s militating agains t th e carefu l an d individualize d consideratio n o f the factor s supportin g a decisio n favorabl e t o th e individua l applicant. Suc h official s ar e bus y people , an d i f lef t unchecke d b y special procedura l restraints , ar e surel y likel y t o tak e th e pat h o f least resistanc e an d giv e relativel y casua l attentio n t o th e individua l factors involve d i n eac h case—attentio n mor e casua l tha n a postulated impartia l idea l observe r migh t thin k appropriate , give n the intensit y o f th e individua l interest s a t stake . Al l thes e condition s are present , bu t wha t i s lacking—an d wha t th e Suprem e Cour t found presen t i n th e otherwis e simila r cas e o f th e welfar e recipient' s claim t o continue d publi c assistance—i s a clai m o f entitlemen t o n the par t o f th e individua l t o th e benefi t h e seeks . In th e welfar e case , th e Cour t foun d tha t th e requisit e clai m o f entitlement arose , no t ou t o f an y substantiv e constitutiona l require ment guaranteein g welfar e benefits , bu t ou t o f statute s providin g that publi c assistanc e payment s shoul d b e mad e i n define d amount s to applicant s meetin g define d conditions. 9 I n th e absenc e o f a constitutional requiremen t o f welfare , thes e statute s wer e adopte d by legislature s whic h ha d ver y broa d discretio n ove r thei r substan tive terms , an d indee d ha d discretio n t o establis h n o welfar e program a t all . Apparently, i t i s th e establishmen t o f substantiv e lega l rule s governing th e bestowa l o f governmenta l benefit s whic h create s

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entitlements t o thos e benefits , an d whic h thu s trigge r constitutiona l rights t o procedura l fairnes s i n thos e applicant s wh o ca n mak e colorable claim s tha t unde r th e rule s the y ar e eligibl e fo r th e benefits. Thu s i f th e officia l wit h authorit y t o rehir e Rot h ha d bee n subject t o rule s settin g fort h th e condition s o n whic h probationar y teachers wer e t o b e continue d i n employment , th e court s woul d have impose d independen t constitutiona l standard s o f procedura l fairness o n th e procedur e throug h whic h th e decisio n applyin g thos e rules was made. 1 0 Similarly , i f the exercis e o f th e executiv e clemenc y power wer e subjec t t o substantiv e rules , th e procedure s throug h which pardon s wer e grante d an d denie d woul d b e subjec t t o constitutional judicia l revie w fo r fairness . In m y view , ther e i s a parado x here . T h e Constitutio n i s indifferent t o th e ver y intens e an d ye t fragil e interest s o f applicant s for governmen t jobs o r fo r clemenc y a s lon g a s th e official s i n charg e of decidin g o n thos e application s ar e lef t unguide d b y substantiv e rules governin g thos e decisions . T h e Constitutio n i s indifferen t t o whether thos e decision s ar e subjec t t o substantiv e rules . I f such rule s are adopted , th e Constitutio n i s almos t entirel y indifferen t t o thei r content. 11 T h e Constitutio n i s eve n indifferen t t o th e questio n whether th e benefit s i n questio n ar e availabl e a t all . Bu t i f th e benefits ar e mad e available , an d th e condition s fo r bestowin g the m are define d b y rules , th e Constitutio n closel y constrain s th e discretion o f th e rule-makin g authoritie s t o desig n th e procedure s under whic h individua l claim s fo r th e benefit s i n questio n ar e granted o r rejected . The parado x i s this. Legislativ e procedura l desig n respond s t o th e same competin g consideration s o f individua l interest , cos t an d administrative flexibility whic h gover n th e substantiv e decisio n whether t o provid e benefits , a t wha t leve l t o provid e them , an d ho w closely t o cabi n administrativ e discretio n b y legislativ e rules . I n th e substantive desig n o f programs , th e politica l branche s o f govern ment ar e lef t quit e fre e t o strik e thei r ow n balanc e amon g thes e competing considerations . Fo r instance , i n Roth' s case , th e legisla ture wa s fre e t o gran t som e jo b securit y t o teacher s i n Roth' s position o r (a s the y decide d i n fact ) t o gran t none . Presumabl y i t was though t tha t th e publi c interes t i n flexibl e an d discretionar y decisions wit h respec t t o probationar y teacher s outweighe d th e individual interes t i n job security . On th e othe r hand , th e legislatur e migh t hav e decide d t o gran t

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some substantiv e jo b securit y t o teachers—requiring , fo r example , that thei r contract s shoul d b e renewe d unles s caus e coul d b e show n why the y shoul d not . A t th e sam e time , th e legislatur e migh t hav e wanted t o confin e th e effec t o f thi s standar d t o it s restrainin g influence o n th e judgment o f universit y officials , believin g tha t th e apparatus o f forma l hearing s t o determin e whethe r caus e wa s indeed presen t wa s no t wort h it s cos t i n time , money , an d los s o f flexibility. A s presentl y interpreted , constitutiona l du e proces s would disabl e th e legislatur e fro m adoptin g thi s combinatio n o f substantive entitlemen t wit h flexible administration , whil e leavin g it fre e t o dispens e wit h th e substantiv e entitlemen t altogether. 12 Why shoul d thi s b e so ? In explaining thi s paradox, i t does not suffic e t o mak e referenc e t o the importanc e an d fragilit y o f th e individua l interest s a t stake . B y hypothesis, thos e interest s ar e no t sufficien t t o requir e th e benefit s t o be grante d a t all . No r doe s i t suffic e t o adver t t o th e inclination s o f officials t o sligh t thos e interest s i n thei r decision s whethe r o r no t t o grant th e benefits , whe n thos e inclination s ar e a s muc h presen t when bestowa l o f th e benefit s i s no t governe d b y rules . Indeed , th e rule-making authoritie s ar e lef t wit h ful l discretio n t o sligh t thos e interests a s muc h a s the y wis h i n establishin g th e substantiv e term s of th e rule s governin g th e bestowa l o f benefits . It i s temptin g t o resolv e th e parado x legalistically ; t o argu e tha t the Constitutio n require s fai r procedure , bu t no t clemenc y o r jo b security o r welfare . I thin k man y lawyer s an d layme n alik e woul d not pres s th e inquir y beyon d tha t response . Bu t th e temptatio n t o rest o n th e constitutiona l tex t i n justifying judicia l revie w confine d to th e fairnes s o f th e procedures unde r whic h substantivel y optiona l benefit program s ar e administere d shoul d b e resisted . The trut h i s tha t nothin g i n th e languag e o r historica l back ground o f th e constitutiona l du e proces s clause s require s o r eve n strongly suggest s suc h review . Th e constitutiona l tex t forbid s deprivation o f "life, libert y o r property withou t du e proces s o f law. " Historically, th e rights of life, liberty , an d propert y wer e regarde d a s natural (an d constitutional ) right s whic h th e legislature s coul d neither creat e no r destroy . Th e characterizatio n o f legislativel y created benefit s lik e jo b tenur e o r welfar e payment s a s property much les s lif e o r liberty—woul d no t hav e occurre d t o th e framer s o f our du e proces s clause . Traditionally, benefit s suc h a s these—benefit s whic h government s

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can gran t o r withdra w i n thei r discretion—hav e bee n describe d a s "privileges" rathe r tha n rights , an d a s suc h outsid e th e protectio n o f the du e proces s clauses . Wher e ther e wa s legislativ e discretio n t o create an d defin e th e substantiv e term s o f a benefi t program , ther e was equa l legislativ e discretio n t o giv e structur e t o th e procedure s under whic h tha t progra m wa s administered . Wit h respec t t o suc h discretionary programs , th e proces s establishe d b y th e authorit y with th e discretio n t o defin e th e progra m wa s th e onl y proces s which wa s " d u e . " Modern court s hav e rejecte d thi s traditiona l positio n an d th e "right-privilege distinction " tha t underlie s it . Bu t thei r rejectio n cannot b e base d o n th e languag e o r th e historica l meanin g o f th e due proces s clauses . I t mus t b e justifie d b y argument s fro m contemporary mora l ideal s implici t i n th e genera l concep t o f procedural fairness . An d thos e argument s mus t confron t th e para dox presente d b y constitutiona l indifferenc e t o th e substantiv e content an d indee d t o th e ver y existenc e o f benefi t programs , combined wit h dee p constitutiona l concer n fo r th e procedure s through whic h thos e program s ar e administere d onc e established .

V As a first approac h t o th e paradox , on e migh t argu e tha t i t i s no t the conten t bu t th e sourc e o f th e program s whic h give s specia l forc e to th e requiremen t tha t the y b e accuratel y enforced . Statute s suc h as thos e creatin g j ob securit y o r establishin g a welfar e progra m ma y not themselve s b e require d b y justic e o r morality , bu t the y hav e been passe d b y a democraticall y electe d legislature , an d a s suc h represent th e popula r will . O n thi s view , whic h stem s fro m notion s of th e separatio n o f powers , du e proces s constraint s ar e designe d t o prevent th e circumventio n o f th e legislativ e wil l b y bureaucrat s o r executive official s throug h th e kin d o f careles s o r intentiona l misapplication o f statute s whic h ca n b e cause d o r permitte d b y excessively informa l procedures . This attemp t t o justify revie w fo r procedura l fairnes s a s a devic e to protec t legislator s fro m bureaucrat s canno t withstan d analysis . Any procedur e invalidate d o n ground s o f du e proces s ha s itsel f bee n either mandate d directl y b y th e legislatur e itself , o r create d b y executive official s unde r expres s o r implie d legislativ e authority .

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Procedures lackin g suc h legislativel y grante d authorit y ar e unlawfu l without referenc e t o constitutiona l du e process ; the y ar e invali d because the y violat e statutor y law . Du e process—i f i t i s t o b e th e vital notio n i t ha s bee n i n ou r constitutiona l law—mus t b e a restraint o n legislativ e a s wel l a s o n executiv e procedura l design . Further, norm s o f du e proces s ar e no t applicabl e onl y t o th e enforcement o f democraticall y promulgate d substantiv e laws . Eve n a dictato r ma y establis h substantiv e law s th e administratio n o f which ca n b e criticize d a s procedurall y unfair . Hi s substantiv e criminal cod e migh t no t b e ver y differen t fro m ou r own ; bu t i f i n trials o f allege d offenders , evidenc e wa s take n i n secret , th e judg e was dependent o n th e executive , an d th e defendan t wa s no t allowe d to b e heard , th e dictato r woul d b e subjec t t o legitimat e criticis m fo r procedural injustic e a s wel l a s fo r undemocrati c rule . T h e sam e point ca n b e mad e wit h respec t t o th e applicatio n o f norm s o f procedural fairnes s i n th e man y situation s wher e th e applicabl e substantive norm s ar e no t legislate d o r promulgate d a t all ; as , fo r example, whe n a paren t decide s a disput e betwee n childre n o r indeed wheneve r customar y substantiv e norm s ar e applied . I t is , i n short, simpl y no t usefu l t o regar d procedura l du e proces s merel y a s an aspec t o f th e theor y o f separatio n o f powers , o r a s a protectio n o f government b y popula r consent .

VI A secon d approac h woul d trea t th e specia l concer n fo r procedura l fairness a s base d o n th e moralit y o f contractua l obligation . Wher e substantive norms—whateve r thei r sourc e o r status—gover n a dis pute, the y generat e i n th e partie s t o th e disput e th e legitimat e expectation tha t thes e norm s wil l b e accuratel y applied . Eve n i f th e substantive rule s ar e themselve s onl y th e produc t o f a legislativ e balancing o f conflictin g interests , o r indee d eve n i f thei r conten t i s quite arbitrar y an d devoi d o f an y intrinsi c mora l force , th e frustration o f th e expectatio n tha t the y wil l b e followe d i s fel t a s injustice. Moralit y doe s no t requir e m e t o hel p m y neighbo r mov e his furniture , eve n thoug h h e woul d b e happie r i f I did ; bu t i f I promise t o hel p hi m an d the n d o no t (withou t adequat e excuse) , I have wronge d him . Similarly , th e constitutio n ma y no t requir e governments t o gran t jo b tenur e t o thei r employee s o r welfar e

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payments t o thei r need y citizens , bu t statute s establishin g suc h programs creat e expectation s whic h i f frustrate d trigge r a universa l sense o f injustice . Du e proces s norm s the n operat e t o enforc e a kin d of "truth-in-lawmaking, " t o preven t frustration , throug h undul y inaccurate procedures , o f expectation s generate d b y substantiv e norms whic h b y thei r term s guarante e benefits . Here w e hav e a plausibl e accoun t o f ho w i t ca n b e unjus t t o create a benefi t progra m an d the n no t implemen t i t wit h sufficientl y accurate procedures , eve n thoug h i t woul d no t b e unjus t t o hav e n o such progra m a t all . An d th e accoun t meet s th e objection s whic h defeated th e "separatio n o f powers " accoun t o f procedura l fairness . It justifie s du e proces s a s a restrain t o n legislativ e a s wel l a s executive power , sinc e i t ca n b e invoke d wher e a legislatur e create s a substantiv e entitlemen t bu t the n mandate s procedure s inadequat e to ensur e it s sufficientl y accurat e administration . I t explain s th e applicability o f standard s o f due proces s t o substantiv e norm s whos e source confer s o n the m n o specia l legitimacy— a tyran t a s wel l a s a democratic legislatur e ca n creat e promiselik e obligation s b y issuin g a la w establishin g a welfar e syste m o r guaranteein g j o b securit y fo r employees. Nevertheless, th e promissor y theor y doe s no t adequatel y resolv e the parado x o f du e process . I f w e thin k o f a benefi t progra m established b y la w a s a promis e o r se t o f promise s establishin g right s in th e beneficiaries , wh y shoul d w e loo k onl y t o th e substantiv e provisions o f th e la w definin g th e progra m a s term s o f th e promise ? The progra m establishe s no t onl y substantiv e entitlements , bu t als o procedures fo r determinin g i n individua l case s whethe r th e substan tive term s ar e met . Governmen t employee s ma y no t b e fired excep t for cause—a s determine d b y th e followin g procedure . Peopl e meeting certai n condition s ar e entitle d t o welfare—a s determine d b y the followin g procedure . Now imagin e a du e proces s attac k chargin g tha t th e procedure s are error-prone , s o tha t th e expectation s generate d b y th e progra m will b e unfairl y frustrated , th e promis e wil l b e broken . W h a t i s th e promise? I s i t tha t every claiman t wh o i n fac t meet s th e term s o f th e program wil l receiv e th e benefit ? N o on e coul d sensibl y rea d i t tha t way; a procedur e coul d no t possibl y b e devise d whic h woul d b e wholly error-free . O n th e othe r hand , th e term s o f th e progra m itsel f "promise" onl y tha t person s wil l receiv e th e substantiv e benefits ,

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subject t o th e error rate on e woul d expec t t o resul t fro m applicatio n of th e procedure s establishe d b y th e statute . Ye t thi s promis e wil l invariably b e kep t i f th e statut e i s enforce d accordin g t o it s terms . And i f th e statutoril y prescribe d procedure s ar e no t complie d with , we agai n nee d n o concep t o f du e proces s o r fairnes s t o fin d the m illegal—they violat e th e term s o f th e statut e itself . It migh t b e argue d tha t I hav e pose d a fals e dilemm a i n describing a statute a s promising eithe r a n (impossible ) foolproo f se t of procedure s o r simpl y th e enforcemen t o f it s ow n procedura l terms. Perhap s popula r expectation s d o no t for m aroun d th e actual , highly technical , procedura l term s o f statutor y programs , althoug h they d o aroun d th e basi c substantiv e terms . A benefi t progra m might b e though t t o generat e th e expectatio n tha t it s substantiv e terms wil l b e enforce d wit h a "normal " o r "reasonable " degre e o f accuracy i n application . Th e standar d o f normalit y woul d b e determined b y referenc e t o th e sort s o f procedura l safeguard s commonly provide d fo r alread y existin g program s o f a simila r type . The mora l forc e o f tha t standar d i s agai n promissory—whe n a ne w statutory righ t i s established , it s beneficiarie s ca n fairl y expec t tha t it wil l b e enforce d wit h th e degre e o f accurac y an d formalit y o f procedure wit h whic h the y hav e bee n accustome d i n thei r simila r previous dealing s wit h th e state . The y canno t fairl y b e expecte d t o look t o "th e fin e print"—tha t is , th e statute' s ow n specification s o f procedure—and t o modif y thei r genera l procedura l expectation s accordingly. The difficult y wit h thi s suggestio n appear s whe n on e probe s mor e deeply int o th e factor s tha t mus t b e considere d i n makin g th e judgment wha t i s a "normal " leve l o f procedura l formalit y fo r th e administration o f a give n statutor y benefit . Whe n on e trie s t o asses s how muc h an d wha t kin d o f procedur e woul d "normally " b e attached t o th e adjudicatio n o f claim s t o a statutor y benefit , on e searches fo r som e othe r benefi t lik e i t i n relevan t way s i n orde r t o establish a standard . Wha t ar e th e prope r criteri a o f similarity ? What othe r benefit s woul d on e compare , fo r instance , t o thos e created b y a statutor y welfar e program ? Som e migh t fin d th e mos t relevant compariso n i n privat e o r institutiona l charit y programs , which ar e generall y regarde d a s providin g benefit s a s a matte r o f grace wit h virtuall y complet e freedo m o f choic e i n th e donor— a comparison whic h woul d sugges t tha t ver y fe w o r n o procedura l

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protections ar e require d i n welfar e programs . Other s migh t argu e that th e relevan t compariso n i s t o othe r economi c subsidie s established b y law , suc h a s thos e fo r farmer s o r th e maritim e industry. Stil l other s woul d argu e tha t becaus e error s agains t welfare claimants , a s distinguished fro m othe r subsid y beneficiaries , will lea d t o rea l miser y an d degradation , th e relevan t compariso n i s to th e crimina l law , wher e th e mos t rigorou s procedura l safeguard s are erecte d agains t th e undeserve d miser y whic h result s whe n a defendant i s falsel y convicted . Agains t this , i t ca n b e urge d tha t th e welfare progra m implicate s a fa r mor e significan t publi c interes t than doe s th e crimina l proces s i n simple , inexpensiv e an d informa l procedures—perhaps becaus e o f th e grea t numbe r o f ver y simila r claims, perhap s als o becaus e i n welfar e program s mone y spen t o n cumbersome procedure s mean s les s mone y t o b e spen t directl y o n the need y recipients . My poin t i n listin g thes e argument s i s neithe r t o b e exhaustiv e nor t o endors e an y o r al l o f them ; bu t rathe r t o poin t ou t tha t th e quest fo r a "normal " leve l o f procedura l formalit y i s by n o mean s a simple factua l inquiry . I t i s rathe r a n exercis e i n evaluation ; a search fo r th e reasonabl e o r appropriat e leve l o f procedure , whic h must tak e accoun t o f th e value s tuggin g i n favo r o f greate r o r lesse r procedural formality . Othe r thing s bein g equal , th e stronge r th e substantive cas e fo r th e benefi t bein g provide d t o thos e claimin g it , the stronge r th e cas e fo r procedure s designe d t o preven t erroneou s denials o f th e benefit . I n th e limitin g cas e o f a benefi t whic h ha s behind i t n o independen t clai m o f right—s o tha t apar t fro m th e statute guaranteein g it , no one ha d an y case fo r havin g i t provided it seem s tha t i t woul d b e impossibl e t o determin e a "normal " o r "reasonable" leve l o f procedur e whic h it s recipient s coul d properl y expect. I n th e cas e o f suc h a benefit , th e onl y procedur e tha t coul d reasonably b e expecte d woul d b e tha t procedur e actuall y specifie d in th e statute . Such ma y actuall y b e th e la w wit h respec t t o th e procedur e constitutionally require d befor e a n alie n ca n b e exclude d fro m th e United States . Postulatin g tha t admissio n o f alien s t o thi s countr y was a privileg e t o which th e alie n ha d n o clai m o f righ t whatever— a pure matte r o f grac e o n th e par t o f th e Unite d State s government — the Suprem e Cour t ha s held , i n rejectin g a constitutiona l challeng e to th e exclusio n procedures , tha t "whateve r th e procedur e autho -

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rized b y Congres s is , i t i s du e proces s a s fa r a s a n alie n entr y i s concerned." 1 3 I repea t thi s passag e no t t o endors e it s soundnes s i n context, fo r I believ e tha t th e alie n seekin g entr y i n th e actua l cas e in question—th e alie n brid e o f a n America n soldier—ha d a constitu tional clai m t o entry behin d he r lega l clai m unde r th e statute . Bu t i f we gran t th e Court' s premise—tha t he r onl y clai m o f righ t t o entr y arose fro m th e substantiv e term s o f th e immigratio n statute— I ca n see n o groun d fo r disputin g th e Court' s conclusio n tha t th e procedure provide d i n tha t sam e statut e fo r adjudicatin g tha t ver y claim wa s th e onl y procedur e sh e coul d reasonabl y expect . In general , th e promissor y theor y o f procedura l fairnes s is , like th e separation o f power s theory , inadequat e t o resolv e th e parado x o f due process . Upo n analysis , i t turn s ou t tha t judgment s o f th e appropriate leve l o r procedur e require d i n th e administratio n o f a benefit progra m mus t var y accordin g t o judicia l evaluatio n o f th e force o f th e substantiv e cas e fo r providin g th e benefi t i n th e first place. I t thu s remain s a puzzl e wh y specia l constitutiona l norm s o f justice shoul d b e applie d t o th e procedure s unde r whic h suc h benefits ar e provided , bu t th e substanc e an d eve n th e existenc e o f the benefi t program s themselve s ar e lef t t o th e discretio n o f th e legislative authority .

VII In m y view , th e parado x o f procedura l fairnes s a s I hav e state d i t is no t resolvable . A decisio n t o trea t a legislativel y create d benefi t program a s subjec t t o th e constitutional-mora l constraint s o f du e process, whil e regardin g th e substanc e o r existenc e o f th e progra m as a matte r o f legislativ e grace , woul d b e simpl y a n unjustifiabl e anomaly. T o pu t th e poin t anothe r way , th e ol d doctrin e o f th e "right-privilege" distinctio n wa s i n substanc e correct . I t shoul d (an d covertly stil l does ) contro l th e applicatio n o f norm s o f fai r procedur e to legislativ e benefi t programs . Using th e exampl e o f welfar e benefits , le t m e explai n wha t I mean b y thi s perhap s somewha t startlin g assertion . I f I a m correc t in m y thesis , th e applicatio n o f norm s o f procedura l fairnes s t o welfare decision s mean s tha t th e court s regar d claim s t o welfar e benefits a s claim s o f substantiv e righ t wit h a basi s beyon d th e welfare statute s themselves . Th e overridin g o f legislativ e j u d g m e n t

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as t o th e prope r procedur e fo r administerin g welfar e program s means tha t th e court s regar d th e substance of th e welfar e program s a s no longe r entirel y a matte r o f legislativ e discretion , subjec t t o legislative alteratio n a t wil l an d indee d t o legislativ e withdrawal . Surely thi s conclusio n i s contradicte d b y th e emphaticall y proclaimed judica l positio n tha t th e substanc e o f welfar e program s is no t subjec t t o probin g judicia l review , an d b y th e genera l understanding tha t ther e i s no judicially enforceabl e "constitutiona l right t o welfare." 14 Surel y i f a legislatur e repeale d it s welfar e program altogether , th e court s woul d no t requir e i t t o reenac t th e program an d enjoi n i t t o rais e ta x money s t o suppor t it . Surely , th e objection continues , whe n th e court s spea k o f a n "entitlement " t o welfare a s th e groun d fo r judicial scrutin y o f th e procedure s use d i n the program , the y refe r onl y t o th e fac t tha t th e legislatur e ha s chosen t o structur e th e substanc e o f existin g welfar e program s through reasonabl y definit e rule s governin g eligibilit y an d benefit s provided. Let m e tak e th e las t poin t first, t o explai n wha t I mea n b y th e existence o f a substantiv e righ t t o welfare . A right—a s I mea n th e concept—is mor e tha n a legislativel y create d entitlement . T o illustrate th e point , conside r th e followin g example . Suppos e tha t a legislature, unhapp y wit h th e procedura l restraint s place d upo n it s welfare progra m b y th e courts , sough t t o escap e fro m thos e restraints b y removin g th e entitlemen t elemen t fro m it s program . As a first effor t i n thi s direction , th e legislatur e migh t simpl y designate th e welfar e progra m a s on e designe d onl y t o expres s public charit y o r generosity , an d no t t o confe r an y entitlemen t t o benefits o n th e eligibl e recipients . Rule s governin g eligibilit y an d amount o f paymen t coul d b e redefined—perhap s b y wa y o f a statutory preamble—a s n o mor e tha n interna l directive s fro m th e legislature t o th e executive , designe d t o channe l th e publi c charit y in th e wa y mos t desire d b y it s collectiv e donors , th e taxpayers . I thin k mos t constitutiona l lawyer s woul d agre e tha t a legislatur e would no t (an d shoul d not ) b e allowe d t o escap e th e constitutiona l requirements o f du e proces s i n welfar e administratio n b y thi s kin d of purel y forma l recastin g o f it s welfar e laws . Bu t t o reac h thi s conclusion, on e mus t abando n th e premis e tha t th e legislatur e ha s plenary contro l ove r th e substanc e o f th e program . Ther e i s nothin g impossible i n logi c o r unprecedente d i n practic e abou t a legis -

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latively create d program , structure d b y interna l directive s t o it s administrators, whic h incidentall y confer s benefit s o n individual s who hav e n o legall y enforceabl e entitlemen t t o thos e benefits. 15 I f a legislature woul d no t b e allowe d t o recharacteriz e it s welfar e program int o thi s mol d an d thereb y escap e th e impositio n o f th e restraints of fair procedure b y th e judiciary, a first substantive chec k on legislativ e discretio n i n th e nam e o f a righ t t o welfar e ha s bee n imposed. Now suppos e tha t th e legislature—frustrate d i n it s first attempt t o escape th e judicia l requirement s o f du e process—take s th e furthe r step of repealin g th e substantiv e provision s governin g eligibilit y an d benefit levels . Th e legislatur e might , fo r example , repos e i n a commissioner o f welfar e authorit y t o dispens e u to person s who m h e in hi s absolut e discretio n determine s t o b e need y an d worth y o f public assistance , suc h sum s a s h e i n hi s absolut e discretio n determines t o b e appropriate. " Suc h legislatio n woul d remov e an y entitlement t o welfar e benefit s b y convertin g th e state' s welfar e program int o one ungoverne d b y substantiv e standards . I n m y view , it woul d no t an d shoul d no t work , an y mor e tha n di d th e purel y verbal attemp t t o legislat e awa y th e entitlemen t statu s o f welfar e benefits. The mos t likel y outcom e o f thi s statut e woul d b e tha t th e commissioner woul d enact , i n th e for m o f administrativ e guideline s or regulations, rule s t o determin e wh o shoul d b e eligibl e fo r welfar e and fo r ho w much . Thes e rule s woul d perhap s closel y resembl e th e preexisting statutor y framework . Bu t whethe r the y di d o r not—an d whatever effort s wer e mad e t o labe l th e rule s "internal " o r "administrative"—they woul d an d shoul d b e treate d a s substantiv e standards definin g th e entitlemen t t o welfare , an d du e proces s constraints woul d b e impose d o n thei r administration . Th e court s would, I think , sa y tha t th e replacemen t o f statutor y standard s b y "internal" regulation s wa s n o les s futil e i n destroyin g th e entitle ment statu s o f th e benefit s tha n ha d bee n th e forma l statutor y preamble. In th e unlikel y even t tha t n o suc h regulation s o r guideline s wer e adopted, anothe r aspec t o f du e proces s doctrin e would , I believe , b e brought int o play . I f th e decision s o f th e commissione r followe d n o standards, a n applican t denie d benefit s could , I think , successfull y challenge th e denia l o n th e basi s tha t i t wa s arbitrary . Suc h a

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challenge—which i n ou r constitutiona l traditio n woul d fal l unde r the rubri c o f du e process—woul d no t b e base d o n a clai m o f procedural unfairnes s i n th e relativel y confine d sens e o f tha t concept I hav e bee n developing . I t woul d b e a clai m o f substantiv e injustice—substantive du e process—agains t th e lawles s administra tion o f th e welfar e program . A cour t acceptin g th e argumen t woul d order tha t th e progra m b e administere d accordin g t o ascertainabl e standards—which the n woul d themselve s trigge r th e requirement s o f fair procedur e i n thei r application . If I a m righ t i n m y assessmen t o f ho w court s woul d dea l wit h these legislativ e attempt s t o remov e th e "entitlement " natur e o f welfare benefits , m y argumen t reveal s a n importan t respec t i n which welfar e benefit s ar e a kin d o f constitutiona l "right " no t entirely subjec t t o th e substantiv e contro l o f th e legislature . Fo r i t i s by n o mean s th e cas e tha t ever y benefit—eve n ever y importan t benefit—bestowed b y governmen t woul d b e treate d i n th e sam e way. Fo r instance , th e powe r o f executiv e clemenc y i s almos t invariably exercise d withou t th e guidanc e o f substantiv e rules , under th e virtuall y absolut e discretio n o f th e relevan t authorities . Similarly, th e hirin g o f publi c employee s i n th e firs t instanc e nee d not a s a matte r o f constitutiona l requiremen t b e carrie d ou t according t o rule s an d standard s whos e applicatio n i s the n subjec t to judiciall y impose d requirement s o f fai r procedure . Conversely , even i f publi c hirin g were internall y directe d b y guideline s statin g criteria fo r personne l official s t o us e i n hirin g applicants , th e court s would I thin k no t trea t thes e regulation s a s creatin g entitlement s t o be hire d i n thos e meetin g th e criteri a se t forth , entitlement s enforceable i n proceeding s subjec t t o th e constraint s o f constitu tional du e process. 16 On th e othe r hand , i t mus t b e concede d tha t welfar e i s not a full fledged, judiciall y enforceable , constitutiona l right . A legislatur e balked i n it s attemp t t o ge t fre e o f procedura l restriction s impose d on it s welfar e progra m woul d retai n th e powe r t o reduc e th e cos t o f that progra m b y cuttin g benefit s acros s th e board , reducin g th e number o f recipients , o r eve n eliminatin g th e welfar e progra m altogether. Th e court s woul d no t closel y scrutiniz e th e step s take n and th e line s draw n i n suc h a substantiv e cost-cuttin g program—a t least suc h i s presen t constitutiona l doctrine . The reason s fo r th e courts ' reluctanc e t o interven e wit h th e

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substance o f welfar e program s i n thi s wa y lie , I believe , i n th e courts' presen t judgmen t o f th e prope r limitation s o n thei r institu tional competenc e an d authority . Eve n i f the y considere d tha t som e guarantee o f minimum materia l suppor t fo r thos e unabl e t o suppor t themselves wa s a fundamenta l individua l right— a righ t properl y deserving o f constitutiona l status—the y migh t quit e properl y thin k it was a right beyon d thei r power t o enforce agains t infringemen t b y direct legislativ e withdrawa l o f funds . A t least—i n th e extrem e cas e of tota l legislativ e withdrawa l fro m publi c assistance—enforcemen t of th e righ t t o welfar e woul d requir e th e judiciar y t o orde r th e disbursement o f larg e sum s o f publi c money , t o draf t a comple x scheme o f socia l legislation , an d t o forc e th e collectio n o r diversio n of massiv e ta x revenues . Non e o f thes e task s ar e withi n ou r traditional conceptio n o f th e judicia l role , an d tha t institutiona l consideration woul d probabl y preven t straightforwar d judicia l protection o f th e righ t t o welfare . On th e othe r hand , judicia l enforcemen t o f th e requirement s o f the rul e o f la w an d o f procedura l fairnes s i n th e structur e an d th e administration o f welfar e program s ar e quit e reasonabl y withi n traditional conception s o f th e judicial role . Th e differenc e i s on e o f degree rathe r tha n kind—enforcemen t o f forma l procedure s doe s cost publi c money—an d i t woul d be , I think , a mistak e eithe r t o predict o r inflexibl y t o prescrib e tha t th e court s neve r mov e o n t o scrutinize th e substanc e o f welfar e programs . I n th e meantime , however, th e righ t t o welfar e remains—wit h it s partia l judicia l enforcement, confine d t o th e procedura l realm—a s a n obligatio n o f government mor e stringen t tha n a mer e privilege , an d indee d a s a kind o f "shado w constitutiona l right." 17

VIII Let m e tr y t o summariz e th e genera l conceptio n o f procedura l fairness suggeste d an d tentativel y sketche d i n thi s essay . Procedura l fairness involve s a specia l mora l concer n fo r th e correc t an d accurate decisio n o f dispute s whic h affec t substantiv e rights . It s norms impinge fro m th e outside o n decisionmakin g institutions , an d require o f thos e institution s mor e concer n fo r th e substantiv e right s which woul d b e threatene d o r infringed b y erroneou s decision s tha n the institution s (o r officials ) woul d otherwis e b e incline d t o show ,

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given th e natura l balanc e thos e institution s ar e likel y t o strik e between th e competin g claim s o f accurat e decision , cost , an d institutional self-interest . It make s sens e t o impos e specia l procedura l control s fro m outsid e the authoritativ e decision-makin g institution—whethe r throug h th e moral chec k o f conscience , o r th e externa l institutiona l chec k o f judicial review—onl y whe n th e substantiv e righ t place d a t hazar d has it s sourc e outsid e th e decisionmakin g institutio n itself . T h u s "entitlements" create d onl y b y th e decisionmakin g institution' s ow n rules shoul d no t b e protecte d b y externa l restraint s o f procedura l fairness. These , i n th e ol d terminolog y o f th e law , ar e "mer e privileges." Th e kind s o f substantiv e right s whic h properl y trigge r due proces s restraint s ar e categorica l mora l right s or , i n th e lega l context, right s wit h a hierarchica l statu s abov e th e rule s o f th e decision-making institution . I n th e usua l case—wher e th e decision making institution' s authorit y derive s fro m th e legislature—th e onl y substantive right s havin g thi s statu s ar e constitutiona l rights . Som e constitutional substantiv e right s ma y b e judiciall y enforce d largel y or onl y throug h procedura l du e proces s constraints , becaus e institu tional constraint s o n judicia l powe r preven t thei r mor e direc t enforcement. I hav e no t her e attempte d t o appl y m y analysi s acros s th e boar d to al l thos e interest s whic h i n recen t year s hav e bee n foun d t o trigger th e constitutiona l protectio n o f procedura l du e process . Perhaps wit h respec t t o som e o f thos e interest s i t wil l tur n ou t tha t the characterizatio n o f the m a s constitutiona l rights—o r a t leas t a s "shadow" o r nascen t constitutiona l right s lik e th e righ t t o w e l f a r e is implausible . Bu t i f m y suggeste d approac h is misguided , wha t I have describe d a s th e parado x o f procedura l fairnes s remain s t o b e resolved.

NOTES 1. Som e principle s o f du e proces s hav e a dua l basis . Thus , coerce d confessions ar e exclude d fro m evidenc e i n par t becaus e the y ar e unreliable—a consideratio n based o n value s o f procedura l fairnes s i n the stric t sense . Bu t eve n wher e reliabl e evidenc e corroborate s th e accuracy o f a coerce d confession , i t i s still exclude d a s th e illici t frui t of polic e conduc t violatin g th e substantiv e right s o f th e defendant —

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rights which were violated before , and independen t of , th e attempt t o use the confession i n evidence. 2. I t seems to me that Professo r Michelman , i n his stimulating pape r in this volume , ma y b e urgin g th e recognitio n o f a substantiv e righ t when h e suggest s tha t wher e a n officia l decisio n injure s a n indi vidual's vita l interests , minimu m standard s o f courtes y an d decenc y should require that the official discus s the decision with the individual before i t i s made—eve n wher e suc h discussio n coul d no t serv e procedural value s becaus e ther e exis t n o externa l standard s t o distinguish a "correct " fro m a n "incorrect " decision . O n th e othe r hand, som e o f th e example s h e adduce s o f non-instrumenta l pro cedural rights seem to me better analyzed as procedural protections of inchoate substantiv e constitutiona l rights . Se e Sectio n VI I an d not e 17, infra. 3. I confin e mysel f i n thi s pape r t o th e norm s o f fairnes s governin g adjudicative dispute-settling—instance s wher e a n authoritativ e deci sion-maker applie s preexistin g norm s t o th e fact s o f a dispute d situation i n order to determine wh o i s right an d wh o i s wrong. Fo r a useful discussio n o f thi s an d othe r form s o f disput e settling , se e M . Golding, Philosophy of Law (Englewoo d Cliffs , N.J. : Prentice-Hall , 1975), pp. 105-25. 4. Cf . Stanle y v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,656 (1972): "One might fairly say of th e Bil l o f Right s i n general , an d th e Du e Proces s Claus e i n particular, tha t the y wer e designe d t o protec t th e fragil e value s o f a vulnerable citizenr y fro m th e overbearin g concer n fo r efficienc y an d efficacy tha t ma y characteriz e praiseworth y governmen t official s n o less, and perhap s more, than mediocr e ones." 5. Goldber g v. Kelly, 397 U.S . 25 4 (1970). 6. Id . at 277-78 (Black, J., dissenting) . 7. Id . at 264. 8. Boar d of Regents v. Roth , 408 U.S . 564 (1972). 9. Goldber g v. Kelly, supra, note 5, a t 562. 10. Cf . Perr y v . Sindermann , 40 8 U.S . 59 3 (1972) ; Arnet t v . Kennedy , 416 U.S . 134(1974) . 11. On e mus t sa y "almos t indifferent " becaus e ther e ar e som e constitu tional restraint s o n th e substantiv e provision s governin g eve n th e most discretionary benefit programs . Thus the y may not discriminat e on grounds of race or religion. Perhaps in general benefit s ma y not be denied o n ground s whic h ar e wholl y whimsica l an d arbitrary . However, thes e program s nee d no t b e administere d accordin g t o stated and definite standard s or rules. 12. Thi s i s essentiall y th e holdin g o f Arnet t v . Kennedy , 41 6 U.S . 13 4

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(1974). Th e doctrin e i s reaffirmed i n Bisho p v . Wood , 9 6 S.Ct . 207 4 (1976), thoug h i t seem s t o m e t o hav e bee n seriousl y misapplie d i n that cas e fo r th e reason s se t fort h i n th e dissentin g opinion s o f Mr . Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice White. 13. U.S . ex rel Knauffv. Shaughnessy , 33 8 U.S . 537, 544 (1950). 14. O n the refusal to give substantive scrutiny to the provisions of welfare laws, the leading case i s Dandridge v . Williams, 397 U.S . 471 (1970) . 15. Welfar e programs themselves were until very recently regarded in this light. Fo r a recen t recognitio n tha t rule s structurin g benefit s d o no t necessarily confe r entitlement s o n thos e wh o woul d receiv e th e benefits i f the rule s were correctly applied , se e Paramoun t Convales cent Cente r v . Departmen t o f Healt h Car e Services , 12 5 Cal . Rptr . 265 (1975) . I n tha t case , applicable stat e la w provide d tha t th e stat e Department o f Health Car e Services "shall" enter into a contract fo r extended car e service s unde r th e Medicar e progra m wit h ever y nursing hom e whic h seek s suc h a n arrangemen t an d whic h meet s certain qualit y standards . Th e departmen t refuse d t o rene w a contract, an d di d no t provid e a hearin g o n th e questio n o f whethe r the nursing hom e me t th e standards. The Californi a Suprem e Cour t rejected th e nursin g home' s argumen t tha t thi s violate d procedura l due process , holdin g tha t th e purpos e o f th e mandator y provision s was not to create an entitlement i n the nursing homes, but rather was to protect patient s b y assuring them o f financial assistance . 16. Th e courts would treat "internal" guidelines as not intended t o create entitlements i n th e recipient s an d henc e no t triggerin g du e proces s constraints; cf . Paramoun t Convalescen t Cente r v . Departmen t o f Health Car e Services, 12 5 Cal. Rptr . 26 5 (1975) . 17. Compar e th e discussio n i n thi s sectio n wit h Professo r Michelman' s analysis of due process as applied t o public housing in Sections V an d VII o f hi s pape r i n thi s volume . Ou r approache s t o thes e analogou s problems ar e simila r i n importan t respects , an d ou r conclusion s ar e very muc h th e same. We d o remai n i n disagreemen t o n a n importan t point—whethe r principles o f fai r procedur e ar e invariabl y mean t t o protec t substan tive rights. I believ e tha t the y are ; se e Sectio n I , supra . Professo r Michelman argues that the requirements of due process rest at crucial points no t o n thei r tendenc y t o preven t error s violatin g substantiv e rights, bu t o n intrinsicall y procedura l value s o f revelatio n an d participation, founde d ultimatel y i n fraterna l ideals . Th e centra l example h e adduce s i n favo r o f hi s position—th e requiremen t o f fai r procedures fo r makin g trackin g decision s i n th e school—seem s t o m e better explaine d a s anothe r instanc e o f a n inchoat e o r nascen t

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substantive constitutiona l right , her e th e righ t t o a n adequat e education. Se e Sa n Antoni o Independen t Schoo l Distric t v . Rodri guez, 411 U.S . 1 , 25 n . 6 0 (1973) ; an d cf . id . a t 110-11 7 (dissentin g opinion o f Marshall , J.) . I n m y view , ideal s o f fraternit y o r community have a place in the argument, but that place comes in the important support they offer to the substantive rights in question. See Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 2 8 STAN . L. REV . 877 , 894-897 (1976) .

7 DUE PROCESS AND PROCEDURA L JUSTICE DAVID RESNICK

Due proces s i s a fundamenta l constitutiona l principl e i n Amer ican jurisprudence . I t appear s i n crimina l law , civi l law , an d administrative law ; i t applie s t o th e action s o f suc h divers e group s as th e police , administrativ e agencies , legislativ e bodies , an d court s of law . A s a descriptiv e concept , i t ha s bee n use d t o explai n an d organize a grea t variet y o f existin g lega l rule s an d procedures ; a s a normative principle , i t ha s bee n use d t o justif y existin g rule s an d procedures an d t o generat e ne w ones . A s par t o f ou r Constitution , i t has bee n responsibl e fo r th e creatio n o f ne w lega l rights . I n th e name o f du e process , court s hav e recentl y forbidde n a numbe r o f customary practice s i n th e field o f crimina l law ; i n th e past , the y have employe d th e concep t t o nullif y socia l an d economi c legis lation. Due proces s i s an extraordinaril y ric h an d intricat e lega l concept ; as suc h w e woul d expec t tha t a n adequat e analysi s woul d b e a difficult task . T h e inheren t difficult y i s compounded b y th e fac t tha t due proces s i s a peculiarl y America n phenomenon : n o othe r lega l system ha s anythin g quit e lik e it . Du e proces s i s a lega l principl e which ha s bee n shape d an d develope d throug h th e proces s o f 206

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applying an d interpretin g a writte n constitution . A n explanatio n o f the centralit y an d pervasivenes s o f du e proces s i n America n jurisprudence involve s complicated issue s in th e histor y o f America n constitutional law . Despit e it s complexit y (o r perhap s becaus e o f it ) due proces s i s a fit subjec t fo r philosophica l analysis . Th e questio n I explore i n thi s pape r is : wh y doe s ou r sens e o f justice requir e du e process? T o answe r i t I trea t du e proces s a s a specia l notio n o f justice tha t arise s fro m th e applicatio n o f genera l principle s o f justice t o th e exercis e o f politica l authority . Because o f ou r politica l tradition , i t i s natura l t o thin k o f du e process as a right guarantee d t o individual s b y th e Gonstitition . Bu t what i s it a right to ? I t seem s t o b e a right t o a procedure , a righ t t o have one' s treatmen t determine d accordin g t o som e prescribe d method; an d th e mora l basi s o f suc h a lega l o r constitutiona l righ t would appea r t o res t o n th e ide a tha t citizen s hav e a righ t t o b e treated justly b y th e state . Bu t suc h a n analysi s i s in itsel f confusing . What i s th e relationshi p betwee n a righ t t o a procedur e an d a righ t to b e treate d justly ; ho w ca n th e fac t tha t a prescribe d procedur e was followe d i n a particula r cas e effec t th e justice o f it s outcome ? I take i t tha t th e righ t t o a procedure i s puzzling becaus e wha t w e have a righ t t o i s certai n state s o f affairs ; w e hav e a righ t t o jus t treatment b y th e state , an d th e proces s b y whic h suc h treatmen t i s accorded individual s woul d see m t o posses s n o independen t mora l value. Th e concep t o f du e proces s provide s criteri a fo r assessin g th e justice o f a procedure , bu t wha t seem s t o matte r i s th e results . Ho w can injustic e b e les s unjus t merel y becaus e certai n procedura l rule s have bee n followed ? I f I fin d mysel f rottin g i n prison , totall y innocent, ye t dul y convicte d an d sentence d fo r a crim e I di d no t commit, ho w ca n th e fac t tha t I hav e bee n accorde d al l m y procedural right s mak e an y differenc e t o me ? I hav e bee n deprive d of my liberty ; whether o r not thi s has bee n don e wit h al l th e nicetie s of du e proces s seem s irrelevant . Th e stat e ha s treate d m e unjustly ; by imprisonin g m e i t ha s violate d m y righ t t o liberty . Thus a n assertio n o f a n individua l righ t t o a procedur e mus t i n some sens e b e a deman d fo r jus t treatmen t b y th e state . If , i n addition t o th e traditiona l individua l right s o f life , liberty , an d property, w e asser t th e righ t t o a procedure , th e justificatio n fo r asserting th e righ t t o i t shoul d b e tha t it s recognitio n b y th e stat e prevents ye t anothe r for m o f unjus t individua l treatment . Th e

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interesting featur e o f suc h a n explanatio n i s tha t i t interpret s unjus t treatment b y th e stat e a s th e violatio n o f a persona l o r individua l right; i f my righ t ha d no t bee n violated , the n I woul d no t hav e bee n treated unjustly . Yet i f we reflec t o n wh y th e violatio n o f a n individua l righ t b y th e state i s a typ e o f unjus t treatment , i t appear s tha t th e righ t t o du e process i s rathe r differen t fro m th e right s t o life , liberty , an d property. Th e righ t t o liberty , fo r instance , doe s no t entai l tha t every deprivatio n o f persona l libert y b y th e stat e i s unjust ; imprisonment a s a crimina l penalt y i s certainl y permissible . T h e right t o libert y limit s th e action s o f th e state ; i n effect , i t divide s al l possible deprivatio n o f liberty b y th e stat e int o just deprivation s an d unjust deprivations . Onl y unjus t deprivation s ar e instance s o f unjust treatment , an d onl y thes e deprivation s ar e referre d t o a s violations o f th e righ t t o persona l liberty . T h e assertio n o f th e righ t to libert y entail s tha t ever y deprivatio n o f libert y stand s i n nee d o f justification; bu t th e crucia l poin t i s tha t ther e ar e standard , familiar, establishe d way s i n whic h suc h justifications ar e obtained . In th e cas e o f th e righ t t o du e process , somethin g rathe r differen t seems t o b e goin g on ; ther e i s n o jus t wa y i n whic h th e stat e ca n deprive a perso n o f du e process ; ever y deprivatio n o f du e proces s i s by definitio n a violatio n o f th e righ t t o du e process . Thi s i s no t t o deny tha t w e ca n imagin e circumstance s whic h woul d justif y suc h deprivation—say, durin g wartim e emergencies—bu t i t woul d b e bes t to describ e suc h case s a s justifiable unjus t treatment . Ther e are , o f course, analogou s argument s i n respec t t o othe r rights , ye t ther e ar e a grea t numbe r o f perfectl y ordinar y circumstance s i n whic h th e state deprive s person s o f life , libert y an d propert y withou t treatin g them unjustly . T h e righ t t o du e proces s a s a principl e rathe r tha n a right; a principl e whic h i s use d t o generat e a numbe r o f specifi c rights, procedures , an d practices . Thi s principl e i s grounde d i n a common an d publi c sens e o f justic e whic h itsel f i s ope n t o philosophic reflectio n an d analysis . T h e warran t fo r suc h a n approach arise s directl y fro m a n analysi s o f du e proces s a s a lega l principle. Justice Frankfurte r provide d a ver y illuminatin g analysi s along thes e lines : But "du e process, " unlik e som e lega l rules , i s no t a technica l conception wit h a fixed conten t unrelate d t o time , plac e an d

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circumstances. Expressin g a s i t doe s i n it s ultimat e analysi s respect enforce d b y la w fo r tha t feelin g o f just treatmen t whic h has bee n evolve d throug h centurie s o f Anglo-America n consti tutional histor y an d civilization , "du e process " canno t b e imprisoned withi n th e treacherou s limit s o f an y formula . Representing a profoun d attitud e o f fairnes s betwee n ma n an d man, an d mor e particularl y betwee n th e individua l an d government, "du e process " i s compounde d o f history , reason , the pas t cours e o f decisions , an d stou t confidenc e i n th e strength o f th e democrati c fait h whic h w e profess. 1 In Rochi n v . California , Frankfurte r presente d hi s mos t complet e account o f th e du e proces s claus e o f th e Fourteent h Amendment . He argue d tha t du e proces s restricts th e manne r i n whic h state s ma y enforce thei r penal codes . Conviction s canno t b e obtaine d b y mean s which . . . offen d thos e canon s o f decenc y an d fairnes s whic h expres s the notion s o f justice o f English-speakin g people s eve n towar d those charge d wit h th e mos t heinou s offenses . Thes e standard s of justic e ar e no t authoritativel y formulate d anywher e a s though the y wer e specifics . . . . Du e proces s o f law , a s a histori c and generativ e principl e preclude s defining , an d thereb y confining, thes e standard s o f conduc t mor e precisel y tha n t o say tha t conviction s canno t b e brough t abou t b y method s tha t

Perhaps ou r sens e o f justic e require s du e proces s becaus e du e process i s a mean s fo r achievin g th e purpose s o f a just lega l system . Due proces s ma y b e though t o f a s a deman d tha t a procedur e conform t o th e requirement s o f forma l justice , an d forma l justic e i s a basi c featur e o f ou r ide a o f th e rul e o f law . John Rawl s define s a legal syste m a s " a coerciv e orde r o f publi c rule s addresse d t o rational person s fo r th e purpos e o f regulatin g thei r conduc t an d providing th e framewor k fo r socia l cooperation. " 3 H e suggest s tha t the ide a o f th e rul e o f la w link s u p wit h ou r sens e o f justice becaus e the concep t o f forma l justice , understoo d a s th e regula r an d impartial administratio n o f publi c rules , whe n applie d t o a lega l system, become s th e rul e o f law . H e argue s tha t w e ca n accoun t fo r

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various precept s o f justic e associate d wit h th e rul e o f la w b y referring t o th e ide a o f a lega l order : If law s ar e directive s addresse d t o rationa l person s fo r thei r guidance, court s mus t b e concerne d t o appl y an d t o enforc e these rule s i n a n appropriat e way . A conscientiou s effor t mus t be mad e t o determin e whethe r a n infractio n ha s take n plac e and t o impos e th e correc t penalty . T h u s a lega l syste m mus t make provision s fo r conductin g orderl y trial s an d hearings ; i t must contai n rule s o f evidenc e tha t guarante e rationa l pro cedures o f inquiry . Whil e ther e ar e variation s i n thes e pro cedures, th e rul e o f la w require s som e for m o f du e process : tha t is, a proces s reasonabl y designe d t o ascertai n th e truth , i n way s consistent wit h th e othe r end s o f th e lega l system , a s t o whethe r a violatio n ha s take n plac e an d unde r wha t circumstances . Fo r example, judge s mus t b e independen t an d impartial , an d n o man ma y judge hi s ow n case . Trials mus t b e fai r an d open , bu t not prejudice d b y publi c clamor . T h e precept s o f natura l justice ar e t o insur e tha t th e lega l orde r wil l b e impartiall y an d regularly maintained. 4 Rawls als o refer s t o th e precept s o f natura l justic e a s "guideline s intended t o preserv e th e integrit y o f th e judicia l process. " T h u s i t would see m tha t a judicia l proces s whic h i s administere d i n accordance wit h th e precept s o f natura l justic e woul d hav e th e virtues o f impartialit y an d regularity ; i n effect , i t woul d confor m t o the requirement s o f forma l justice . Ye t th e criteri a o f forma l justic e are no t th e onl y one s whic h w e appl y t o a judicia l process . I t i s perfectly intelligibl e t o as k whethe r particula r outcome s o f a judicia l procedure ar e just . W e fee l tha t forma l justic e i s no t alway s equivalent t o substantiv e justice , a n impartia l outcom e i s no t th e same thin g a s a correc t outcome . I f w e tr y t o explai n du e proces s simply i n term s o f forma l justic e w e ar e righ t bac k wher e w e starte d from. Ho w ca n th e fac t tha t a n outcom e i s formall y jus t mak e a n unjust outcom e les s unjust ? In anothe r sectio n o f A Theory of Justice, Rawl s provide s a ver y illuminating discussio n o f variou s type s o f procedura l justic e an d clearly bring s ou t th e limitation s o f th e concep t o f forma l justice . He define s tw o mai n type s o f procedura l justic e i n term s o f th e wa y

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in whic h the y emplo y criteri a fo r jus t outcomes . A procedur e conforms t o th e notio n o f pur e procedura l justic e whe n ther e i s n o criterion fo r th e righ t o r just outcom e independen t o f applyin g th e procedure itself ; i f th e procedur e ha s bee n properl y followed , an y outcome i s just. A n exampl e i s a numbe r o f person s engagin g i n a series o f fai r bet s i n whic h th e distributio n o f mone y afte r th e las t bet i s mad e i s considere d fai r whateve r i t happen s t o be . Pur e procedural justic e require s tha t th e backgroun d condition s b e fair , and th e procedur e fo r determinin g result s mus t actuall y b e carrie d out. Rawl s contrast s pur e procedura l justic e wit h tw o othe r notion s of procedura l justic e whic h h e call s perfec t procedura l justic e an d imperfect procedura l justice ; bot h entai l th e existenc e o f a n independent criterio n fo r determining outcomes . The y diffe r i n tha t perfect procedura l justic e i s a procedur e whic h alway s achieve s th e just outcome , wherea s imperfec t procedura l justic e obtain s whe n there i s n o feasibl e mean s fo r guaranteein g suc h a desirabl e stat e o f affairs. Th e exampl e h e use s t o illustrat e th e concep t o f imperfec t procedural justic e ha s ver y obviou s implication s fo r understandin g due process : Imperfect procedura l justic e i s exemplifie d b y a crimina l trial . The desire d outcom e i s tha t th e defendan t shoul d b e declare d guilty i f an d onl y i f h e ha s committe d th e offens e wit h whic h he i s charged . Th e tria l procedur e i s frame d t o searc h fo r an d to establis h th e trut h i n thi s regard . Bu t i t seem s impossibl e t o design th e lega l rule s s o tha t the y alway s lea d t o th e correc t result. Th e theor y o f trial s examine s whic h procedure s an d rules o f evidence , an d th e like , ar e bes t calculate d t o advanc e this purpose consisten t wit h th e othe r ends o f th e law . Differen t arrangements fo r hearin g case s ma y reasonabl y b e expecte d i n different circumstance s t o yield th e righ t results , not alway s bu t at leas t mos t o f th e time . A trial , then , i s a n instanc e o f imperfect procedura l justice . Eve n thoug h th e la w i s carefull y followed, an d th e proceeding s fairl y an d properl y conducted , i t may reac h th e wrong outcome. A n innocen t ma n ma y b e foun d guilty, a guilty ma n ma y b e se t free . I n such case s we spea k o f a miscarriage o f justice : th e injustic e spring s fro m n o huma n fault bu t a fortuitou s combinatio n o f circumstance s whic h defeats th e purpos e o f th e lega l rules. 5

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Since a tria l i s a cas e o f imperfec t procedura l justice , w e hav e a way o f accountin g fo r th e fac t tha t accordin g a n individua l al l hi s due proces s right s ca n stil l lea d t o a n unjus t result ; du e proces s o f law i s not a perfec t process . Sinc e w e hav e a n independen t criterio n for outcomes , w e ca n explai n wh y a n outcom e tha t meet s al l th e requirements o f forma l justic e i s no t necessaril y actuall y just . Bu t this raise s anothe r problem ; sinc e w e hav e a n independen t criterio n for just outcomes , i t i s certainl y possibl e tha t a just outcom e coul d be achieve d b y mean s o f a procedur e whic h violate s du e process : a person coul d receiv e a n unfai r trial , b e declare d guilty , an d i n fac t actually b e guilty . No w w e ar e face d wit h th e opposit e difficulty ; why shoul d w e conside r a n outcom e unjus t becaus e i t ha s no t bee n achieved b y mean s o f du e process ? Before proceeding , I shoul d lik e t o clarif y a n ambiguit y i n th e meaning o f outcome s whic h stand s i n th e wa y o f a n adequat e solution. Rawl s describe s a wron g outcom e i n th e followin g way ; ". . . an innocen t ma n ma y b e foun d guilty , a guilt y ma n ma y b e se t free. I n suc h case s w e spea k o f a miscarriag e o f justice . . . . " Th e ambiguity turn s o n whethe r b y "outcome " w e mea n a n assertio n o r an action ; whethe r wha t w e hav e i n min d ar e verdict s o f guil t o r innocence, o r action s take n b y th e stat e suc h a s imprisonin g a person o r settin g hi m free . I t woul d see m mor e appropriat e t o labe l actions a s tru e miscarriage s o f justice. We ma y ten d t o ignor e suc h a distinctio n becaus e w e simpl y assume tha t th e appropriat e action s follo w automaticall y upo n a verdict. Ye t i t i s certainl y possibl e tha t a jury ma y reac h th e righ t verdict an d th e stat e tak e th e wron g actions ; punishin g a perso n despite a n acquittal , an d vic e versa . This , o f course , introduce s another typ e o f injustice . I n an y case , i n orde r t o remov e thi s ambiguity, whe n I refe r t o action s take n b y th e stat e suc h a s depriving particula r person s o f life , libert y o r property , I shal l cal l such action s "treatments. " I shal l us e "findings " t o refe r t o outcomes i n th e narrowe r sens e o f verdicts , judgments, an d th e like . The plausibilit y o f usin g a tria l a s a n exampl e o f imperfec t procedural justic e an d claimin g tha t th e criterio n fo r a jus t o r correct outcom e i s independent o f applying th e procedur e itself , an d thus sharpl y distinguishin g i t fro m pur e procedura l justice, turn s o n taking outcome s i n th e narro w sens e o f "findings. " T o sa y tha t th e desired outcom e i s a declaratio n o f guil t i f and onl y i f th e defendan t

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committed th e offens e wit h whic h h e i s charged , assume s tha t b y outcome w e mea n th e assertio n o f a propositio n tha t i s either tru e o r false. A finding doe s no t becom e tru e o r correc t b y virtu e o f th e operation o f a procedure ; i f i t i s true , i t i s tru e independen t o f th e procedure itself . If w e us e "outcome " i n th e broa d sens e o f harmfu l treatment s that th e state intentionall y inflict s o n individua l citizens , i t i s clearly not th e cas e tha t suc h treatment s ar e just treatment s independen t o f procedure. Du e proces s o f la w require s tha t th e procedur e fo r determining outcome s mus t actuall y b e carrie d out , an d tha t th e procedure itsel f mus t contai n certai n basi c features . Du e proces s i s a necessary, bu t no t sufficien t conditio n fo r just treatments . Th e fac t that du e proces s i s a necessar y conditio n fo r just treatment s entail s that th e absenc e o f du e proces s i s a sufficien t conditio n fo r unjus t treatment. W e migh t sa y tha t an y treatmen t tha t woul d hav e bee n just accordin g t o a n independen t criterio n fo r assessin g outcomes , i s in fac t unjus t i f performe d withou t employin g a n appropriat e judicial process . I t i s not th e cas e tha t followin g a certai n procedur e transforms wha t woul d otherwis e hav e bee n a n unjus t treatmen t into a just treatment . Suc h a n erro r arise s fro m a mistake n belie f i n the efficacy o f th e concep t o f forma l justice itself . I t i s the absenc e o f formal justice tha t transform s wha t woul d otherwis e hav e bee n jus t treatment int o unjus t treatment . If th e foregoin g accoun t i s plausible , the n th e wa y t o uncove r th e moral valu e o f followin g a procedur e i s no t t o as k ho w followin g procedure ca n mak e som e palpabl y unjus t treatmen t les s unjust ; rather, w e ough t t o inquir e wh y no t followin g o r violatin g a procedure make s a treatmen t unjust . We ca n se e tha t du e proces s i s a necessar y bu t no t sufficien t condition fo r jus t treatmen t b y analyzin g th e wa y i n whic h w e employ a judicial procedur e tha t meet s th e criteri a fo r du e proces s in orde r t o provid e a justificatio n fo r th e intentiona l harmfu l treatment o f individua l person s b y th e state . I t i s prima faci e wron g to depriv e a perso n o f life , liberty , o r property , an d suc h depriva tions mus t b e justified i n ever y particula r case ; i f du e proces s o f la w is absent, the n ther e i s n o goo d reason—o r goo d enoug h reason—fo r believing tha t a particula r individua l actuall y deserve s suc h treat ment. Th e nee d fo r a justification help s t o explai n wh y du e proces s requires a procedur e whic h combine s aspect s o f bot h pur e pro -

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cedural justic e an d imperfec t procedura l justice : a procedur e provides a justification o r good reaso n fo r asserting tha t a particula r treatment i s just i f and onl y i f i t i s actually performe d i n th e prope r manner. Procedural justic e a s justification i s analogou s t o th e ol d analysi s of knowledg e a s justified tru e belief ; i n case s o f intentiona l harmfu l treatment o f individual s b y th e state , t o asser t tha t a perso n ha s been treate d justl y i s lik e assertin g correctl y " I kno w tha t p i s th e case." In orde r t o know/? , i t i s necessar y tha t p i s true, tha t I believ e p, an d tha t I hav e som e justification fo r holdin g thi s belief . T o sa y "I kno w th e ca t i s on th e mat, " i t mus t b e tru e tha t th e ca t i s indee d on th e mat ; bu t th e mer e fac t tha t i t is , i s no t sufficien t fo r a first person assertio n o f knowledg e sinc e al l sort s o f thing s ar e tru e abou t the worl d o f whic h I hav e n o knowledg e whatsoever . I mus t believ e that th e ca t i s o n th e mat , bu t a tru e belie f i s no t ye t knowledge . I must hav e a justification fo r holdin g suc h a belief ; I must b e abl e t o provide reasons , an d thes e reason s mus t b e o f th e righ t sor t an d must relat e t o th e trut h o f th e belie f I a m asserting . Leaving asid e al l th e standar d objection s t o th e analysi s o f knowledge a s justified tru e belief , I thin k i t i s still fruitfu l t o sugges t an analogou s analysi s o f just treatment , i n th e sens e o f intentiona l harmful treatmen t o f a n individua l b y th e state . Just treatmen t ca n be analyze d a s justified deservin g treatment ; th e concep t o f deser t corresponds t o th e trut h valu e o f proposition s abou t th e world . I n respect t o punishment , th e criterio n fo r deser t i s tha t a perso n committed a n offens e agains t th e crimina l code . O f course , w e ar e assuming a just lega l syste m tha t incorporate s th e precept s o f justice in respec t t o punishment . Th e notio n o f deser t i n thi s sens e reflect s the independen t criterio n fo r correc t outcome s tha t characterize s imperfect procedura l justice. Du e proces s describe s a procedur e tha t justifies outcome ; i t provide s reason s fo r asserting tha t th e treatmen t a perso n receive s i s th e treatmen t h e deserves . Th e notio n o f justification account s fo r th e wa y i n whic h du e proces s i s a for m o f pure procedura l justice. Th e procedur e mus t b e carrie d ou t i n orde r to provid e a justification, an d al l outcome s o f suc h a procedur e ar e equally justified . Bu t suc h justification s ar e no t absolut e sinc e th e procedure i s not infallible ; a t best , suc h justification provide s a hig h degree o f certainty .

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In describin g ho w w e acquir e empirica l knowledg e w e sometime s refer t o formulating a hypothesi s an d testin g it ; testin g describe s th e procedure w e emplo y i n orde r t o verif y o r falsify an y hypothesis , th e test provide s a justificatio n fo r assertin g tha t th e hypothesi s i s probably tru e o r probabl y false . Thoug h w e ma y loosel y spea k o f falsification a s i f th e tes t o r crucia l experimen t make s a hypothesi s false, wha t make s i t eithe r tru e o r fals e ar e th e fact s o f th e world . Other thing s bein g equal , th e bette r th e falsificatio n procedure , th e greater warran t w e hav e fo r believin g tha t a hypothesi s i s false . W e might thin k o f accusatio n a s a hypothesi s abou t deser t an d a judicial procedur e a s a way o f verifying o r falsifying it . The outcom e of a procedur e i n th e narro w sens e i s a finding; i n th e cas e o f a criminal tria l a finding o f guilt y i s equivalen t t o assertin g tha t a n hypothesis i s tru e "beyon d a reasonabl e doubt. " Sinc e a n appropri ate actio n follow s automaticall y fro m th e finding accordin g t o a simple descriptio n o f a judicia l procedure , w e coul d sa y tha t a person punishe d afte r bein g dul y trie d an d convicte d i s bein g treated justly "beyon d a reasonabl e doubt. " Such a n analysi s point s t o th e crucia l rol e o f procedur e i n providing a hig h degre e o f confidenc e i n th e justic e o f outcomes ; other thing s bein g equal , th e highe r th e standard s o f proo f th e greater th e confidenc e w e ma y plac e i n guilt y verdict s o r negativ e findings. Ye t sinc e a procedur e itsel f i s a n institutio n o r syste m o f public rule s w e migh t sa y tha t forma l justic e understoo d a s th e regular an d impartia l administratio n o f thes e rules , mus t als o b e taken int o accoun t whe n assessin g th e effectivenes s o f a procedur e i n terms o f it s rol e a s providin g justificatio n fo r inflictin g harm . Th e standards o f proo f togethe r wit h forma l justic e determin e th e subjective probability , o r degree o f confidence, tha t w e ma y plac e i n the correctnes s o f eac h outcome . On e basi c mora l justificatio n fo r employing a procedur e i s that i t mus t b e th e cas e tha t a perso n wh o is deprive d o f life , libert y o r propert y b y th e stat e i s ver y likel y t o deserve suc h treatment . Thu s ou r concer n wit h th e subjectiv e probability o f correc t outcome s reflect s a requiremen t o f moralit y and no t simpl y efficienc y o r rationality . To thin k o f du e proces s merel y i n term s o f justification tie s i t to o closely t o th e notio n o f mora l certainty . I t obscure s th e wa y i n which w e emplo y a procedur e a s a mean s fo r applyin g rule s

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correctly, an d no t simpl y t o provid e a reaso n fo r believin g tha t rule s have bee n applie d correctly . Fo r example , w e migh t hol d tha t an y judicial proces s tha t i s applie d properl y serve s t o provid e goo d reasons fo r believin g tha t a particula r actio n take n b y th e stat e i s correct; ye t judicia l processe s migh t functio n ver y differentl y i n respect t o th e wa y i n whic h the y assur e tha t rule s ar e applie d correctly. W e migh t dra w a distinctio n betwee n tw o type s o f judicial procedure ; a du e proces s procedur e an d a judicia l revie w procedure. ( I trus t suc h a distinctio n i s a t leas t a t hom e i n administrative la w i f no t i n crimina l law. ) A du e proces s procedur e is one tha t require s fai r notic e an d a fai r hearin g befor e a n actio n i s taken; a judicia l revie w i s a n appea l procedur e tha t occur s afte r a determination i s made . I f applie d correctly , bot h type s o f pro cedures ca n serv e t o justif y action s i n th e sens e tha t the y provid e good reason s fo r believin g tha t a particula r harmfu l actio n i s justified. Althoug h the y bot h attemp t t o minimiz e errors , the y operate ver y differently ; a du e proces s procedur e attempt s t o avoi d errors, whil e judicia l revie w attempt s t o correc t them . Needles s t o say, th e rea l worl d effect s o f adoptin g a procedur e tha t i s applie d before a n actio n i s performe d diffe r sharpl y fro m th e effect s o f a procedure tha t i s applied afte r th e action . In orde r t o clarif y th e wa y a procedur e operate s a s a mean s fo r applying rule s correctly , w e migh t thin k o f th e justificatio n fo r employing a procedur e a s analogou s t o th e justificatio n fo r usin g a postal scale . Assum e tha t w e wan t t o affi x th e correc t postag e o n a number o f letters ; th e rule s fo r correc t postag e requir e tha t a lette r that weigh s mor e tha n on e ounc e hav e a blu e stamp , an d on e tha t weighs les s than on e ounc e hav e a re d stamp . Conside r th e followin g description o f th e practic e o f affixin g postag e stamps : w e first pu t a letter o n a scale , the n rea d th e scal e i n orde r t o find ou t whethe r i t weighs mor e o r les s tha n on e ounce : i f i t weigh s more , w e pu t o n a blue stamp ; i f less , a re d stamp . Befor e weighin g a letter , i t i s eithe r true o r fals e tha t i t weigh s mor e tha n on e ounce , an d i t i s either tru e or fals e tha t i t require s a blu e stamp . Puttin g a lette r o n a scal e doe s not mak e i t weig h mor e tha n on e ounce , no r doe s i t requir e a blu e stamp becaus e th e scal e read s mor e tha n on e ounce . T h e weigh t o f a letter depend s o n wha t i s pu t inside , th e postag e o n th e regulation s of th e posta l service . Similarly , wha t make s a perso n guilt y o f

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committing a n offens e i s his actions ; th e rule s o f a crimina l cod e ar e what make s hi m deserv e punishment . Mor e precisely , a crimina l code define s wha t action s ar e t o coun t a s offens e an d th e penalt y appropriate t o variou s offenses . If w e wer e aske d t o justif y th e us e o f a scal e i n th e practic e o f affixing postag e stamps , w e migh t repl y tha t i t i s obviousl y necessary t o weig h a lette r i n orde r t o affi x th e correc t stamp . Similarly, w e migh t sa y tha t a judicial proces s i s necessar y i n orde r to appl y a cod e o f crimina l justice. Ye t i n bot h case s thi s necessit y i s not a logica l necessity . W e d o no t mea n tha t i t i s impossibl e t o pu t on th e correc t stam p withou t weighin g th e letter . I f w e dispens e with th e scal e entirel y an d affi x stamp s randomly , i t i s stil l th e cas e that a lette r tha t weigh s mor e tha n on e ounc e an d ha s a blu e stam p on i t ha s th e correc t postage . W e emplo y a scal e i n orde r t o maximize th e numbe r o f letter s wit h correc t postage : w e attemp t t o minimize o r eliminat e errors . Sinc e th e purpos e o f determinin g th e weight o f a lette r befor e affixin g a stam p i s t o eliminat e errors , w e would prefe r a mor e accurat e weighin g devic e t o a les s accurate one . Though pickin g a lette r u p i n you r han d an d estimatin g it s weigh t is bette r tha n randoml y affixin g stamps , i t woul d b e preferabl e t o employ a scale . Yet th e degre e o f accurac y nee d no t b e greate r tha n that require d fo r ou r purpose . I hav e trie d t o sugges t tha t on e fundamenta l mora l justificatio n for requirin g du e proces s i s tha t du e proces s minimize s th e numbe r of unjus t treatments ; i t i s no t simpl y a jus t o r h u m a n e wa y o f depriving person s o f life , libert y o r property . T o th e exten t tha t du e process require s a n accurat e judicia l process , i t fulfill s tw o morall y valuable functions : i n term s o f subjectiv e probabilities , i t maximize s correct outcome s an d minimize s errors . T h e fac t tha t intentiona l harmful treatment s ar e th e outcome s o f a procedur e tha t accord s with du e proces s give s u s bot h a n assuranc e tha t th e numbe r o f unjust treatment s wil l b e a s fe w a s possibl e an d warrant s confidenc e that thos e wh o ar e harme d actuall y deserv e t o be . But du e proces s als o involve s th e justic e o f th e procedur e itself . Accuracy i s not th e onl y valu e tha t w e wis h t o maximize ; w e d o no t evaluate th e justice o f a procedur e merel y i n term s o f it s abilit y t o achieve correc t outcomes . Du e proces s i s suppose d t o expres s ou r feeling tha t conviction s ough t no t t o b e obtaine d i n way s tha t

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offend ou r sens e o f justice; fidelity t o th e idea l o f du e proces s show s our dee p commitmen t t o th e value s o f fai r pla y an d fai r treatment , and s o forth . We migh t tr y t o accoun t fo r suc h intuition s b y thinkin g o f the m as a n appea l t o th e ol d maxi m tha t th e end s d o no t justif y th e means. T h e traditiona l wa y o f posin g th e means/end s proble m tha t leads t o a conclusio n i n accor d wit h th e maxim , entail s a n argumen t to th e effec t tha t certai n efficaciou s mean s fo r achievin g desirabl e o r morally desirabl e end s ough t no t t o b e employe d o n mora l grounds . For example , assum e tha t w e wis h t o choos e betwee n tw o pro cedures A an d B, eac h o f whic h provide s th e sam e hig h degre e o f reliability i n th e sens e tha t the y bot h minimiz e th e numbe r o f innocent peopl e declare d guilty . B i s a mor e accurat e procedur e because i t convict s a greate r proportio n o f thos e wh o actuall y commit offenses . Othe r thing s bein g equal , i t woul d b e rationa l t o prefer B t o A; bu t i f B achieve s thi s resul t b y employin g certai n morally undesirabl e means , the n othe r thing s ar e no t equal . I f i t employes torture , coerce d confessions , illegall y seize d evidence , an d the like , the n w e ough t t o choos e A. It i s possible fo r th e stat e t o increas e th e numbe r o f convictions b y employing method s tha t entai l morall y o r legall y undesirabl e consequences. Thes e method s d o no t affec t th e reliabilit y o f th e outcome; w e d o no t thin k tha t a perso n convicte d b y mean s o f illegally seize d evidenc e i s les s likel y t o hav e committe d a n offens e because th e stat e employe d suc h evidenc e t o obtai n conviction . W e feel tha t th e mora l cost s o f suc h practice s fa r outweig h an y possibl e benefits; al l sort s o f practice s fa r outweig h an y possibl e benefits ; al l sorts o f practice s tha t w e conside r violation s o f du e proces s see m t o be o f thi s sort . W e migh t thin k o f doubl e jeopardy , privilege d communications, th e righ t no t t o b e compelle d t o testif y agains t yourself, o r you r spouse , exclusionary evidentiar y rules , and s o forth . The mora l cost s o f practice s prohibite d b y th e concep t o f du e process ma y b e analyze d an d explaine d i n numerou s ways . W e sometimes refe r t o du e proces s i n term s o f procedura l safeguards ; t o the exten t tha t thes e safeguard s ar e distinc t fro m thos e tha t protec t the integrit y an d reliabilit y o f th e judicial proces s itself , the y protec t other mora l value s an d preven t o r discourag e agent s o f th e stat e from engagin g i n practice s tha t hav e morall y undesirabl e conse quences o r effects .

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Since n o jus t procedur e woul d contai n thes e practices , w e ca n consider the m a s constraints ; i n thi s sense , du e proces s require s judicial procedur e consisten t wit h th e othe r ends o f th e lega l system . We migh t lum p thes e morall y objectionabl e practice s togethe r under th e notio n o f unjus t procedura l practices . Unjus t procedura l practices ar e thos e wit h morall y undesirabl e consequences ; th e justification fo r excluding the m fro m an y just procedur e i s indepen dent o f thei r effect s o n outcomes . Thoug h th e criterio n fo r determining whethe r a particula r procedura l practic e i s unjus t i s distinct fro m thos e entaile d b y th e concep t o f a jus t outcome , w e might stil l fee l tha t the y affec t th e mora l valu e o f outcomes . Sinc e we fee l tha t just result s ough t t o b e achieve d b y just means , w e wil l say tha t i f unjus t mean s ar e employe d a n outcom e become s tainte d with injustice . In contras t t o unjus t procedura l practices , ther e i s anothe r larg e category o f practice s relate d t o procedure s tha t offen d ou r sens e o f justice. Thes e depen d upo n th e structura l feature s o f th e procedur e itself and relat e t o th e criteri a fo r just outcomes . Fo r example, i t i s a violation o f du e proces s fo r a judge t o hav e a pecuniar y interes t i n the outcom e o f th e case ; i f a judge's salar y depend s directl y o n th e conviction rat e o f thos e wh o ar e trie d i n hi s court , the n i t i s reasonable t o assume tha t correc t outcome s ar e les s likely. Similarly , if a defendan t i s no t allowe d sufficien t tim e t o prepar e a defense , given th e natur e o f ou r adversar y syste m o f crimina l justice , i f h e i s found guilty , w e fee l les s tha n full y confiden t i n suc h a verdict . I t i s reasonable t o assum e tha t h e migh t hav e bee n foun d innocen t wer e it no t fo r th e fac t tha t h e coul d no t pu t u p a goo d defense . W e demand a publi c tria l becaus e w e fea r a secre t tria l migh t ver y wel l be use d b y th e stat e a s a mean s fo r convicting innocen t persons . W e want a publi c tria l t o assur e u s tha t th e outcome s ar e no t a n expression o f th e privat e passion s an d prejudice s o f thos e entruste d with th e administratio n o f th e crimina l justic e system . Ye t w e als o want t o assur e tha t a tria l i s insulate d fro m publi c prejudic e an d passions; thu s w e hav e rule s abou t pretria l publicity , chang e o f venue, selection s o f juries, an d th e like . A perso n convicte d o f committin g a n offens e agains t th e crimina l code i s suppose d t o b e guilt y beyon d a reasonabl e doubt . Ye t th e presence o f certai n practice s i n a judicia l proces s ar e sufficien t t o raise reasonabl e doubts ; thes e practice s ar e themselve s ground s fo r

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doubt. The y offen d ou r sens e o f justic e becaus e the y affec t th e degree o f certaint y whic h w e fee l i s require d i n orde r t o inflic t harmful treatmen t o n individuals . W e migh t cal l suc h practice s unfair procedura l practices ; the y diffe r fro m unjus t procedura l practices becaus e th e criteri a fo r fairnes s ar e no t independen t o f th e effect suc h practice s ar e though t t o hav e o n outcomes . I f unjus t procedural practice s mak e outcome s undeserving , w e migh t sa y th e unfair procedura l practice s mak e a n outcom e unjustified . We ma y not e tha t th e notion s o f unfai r procedura l practice s an d unjust procedura l practice s ar e no t mutuall y exclusiv e categories ; they refe r t o th e type s o f argument s an d consideration s whic h ar e appealed. A particula r practic e ma y b e though t violativ e o f du e process o n bot h grounds . Fo r example , w e ca n argu e tha t tortur e i s a practic e whic h canno t b e tolerate d i n an y civilize d syste m o f criminal justice ; i t i s a morall y abhorren t wa y o f collectin g evidence, i t violate s th e sanctit y o f th e person , i t degrade s bot h th e victim an d torturer , an d s o on . I n thi s sense , tortur e i s a n unjus t procedural practice . Ye t i t ca n als o b e argue d tha t th e evidenc e received throug h tortur e i s likel y t o b e biase d an d unreliable ; i f w e appeal t o suc h considerations , the n w e ar e conceivin g o f tortur e a s an unfai r procedura l practice . Thus , i f du e proces s expresse s ou r sense o f justice, the n a particula r practic e ma y ver y wel l b e offensiv e in tw o essentiall y distinc t ways . What count s a s a n unfai r practic e depend s upo n th e typ e o f procedure w e emplo y an d th e assumption s w e mak e abou t th e wa y in whic h i t operates . I trie d t o distinguis h suc h practice s fro m thos e I hav e calle d unjus t procedura l practice s becaus e i n th e latte r case , we fee l tha t an y gai n i n efficiency , i n term s o f monetar y cost , increase o f convictio n rate s an d th e lik e i s no t a sufficien t justification fo r employin g them . T o sa y the y offen d ou r sens e o f justice i s t o sa y the y ar e someho w wron g i n themselve s an d trade offs i n term s o f other benefit s ar e impermissible . I n th e cas e o f unfai r practices, th e justificatio n fo r prohibitin g the m i s i n term s o f thei r effect o n th e reliabilit y o f outcomes . I shoul d lik e t o argu e tha t the y do no t hav e th e sam e status , o r rathe r ough t no t t o have . Especiall y when i t come s t o unfai r procedura l practice s ou r sens e o f justic e may no t b e th e mos t reliabl e guide . The maxi m tha t justic e require s th e appearanc e o f justic e i s perfectly rationa l becaus e give n wha t w e kno w abou t h u m a n natur e and ou r experienc e o f th e worl d th e outcome s o f a procedur e tha t

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appears t o b e unfai r i s les s reliable , i t i s mor e ope n t o doubt ; i f i t i s the cas e tha t a tria l doesn' t loo k fair , o r a judge appear s t o b e partia l to on e side , an d th e like , thi s create s a reasonabl e presumptio n tha t the outcom e ma y no t b e correct , o r eve n warrant s th e belie f tha t i t is probabl y incorrect . T o som e exten t ou r sens e o f justic e i s historical; th e fac t tha t certai n feature s o f a procedur e offen d ou r sense o f justic e ma y b e merel y a reflectio n o f ou r familiarit y wit h procedures o f a certai n type . At thi s poin t w e ma y summariz e th e result s o f ou r discussio n an d relate th e analysi s o f just treatmen t a s justified deservin g treatmen t and th e analysi s o f du e proces s a s excludin g unjus t procedura l practices an d unfai r procedura l practices . Thi s enable s u s t o presen t in somewha t abstrac t for m a mora l theor y o f du e proces s tha t show s that whe n th e stat e inflict s har m upo n a n individua l b y deprivin g him o f life , libert y o r propert y du e proces s i s require d i n orde r fo r such treatment s t o b e just . 1. Procedure s ar e i n accor d wit h du e proces s i f an d onl y if , they ar e no t unjus t an d no t unfair . 2. Jus t harmfu l treatmen t i s justifie d deservin g harmfu l treatment. 3. I f som e procedur e use d i n obtainin g a harmfu l treatmen t i s unfair, the n tha t harmfu l treatmen t i s undeserved . 4. I f som e procedur e use d i n obtainin g a harmfu l treatmen t i s unfair, the n tha t harmfu l treatmen t i s no t justified . 5. I f du e proces s doe s no t obtai n wit h respec t t o som e harmfu l treatment, the n som e procedur e use d i n obtainin g tha t harmful treatmen t i s eithe r unjus t o r unfai r (b y 1) . 6. I f du e proces s doe s no t obtai n wit h respec t t o som e harmfu l treatment, the n tha t harmfu l treatmen t i s unjus t (b y 2 , 3 , 4,5). 7. I f a harmfu l treatmen t i s just, the n du e proces s obtain s wit h respect t o tha t harmfu l treatmen t (b y 6) . After settin g fort h th e abov e theor y o f du e proces s tha t i s intended t o describ e an d accoun t fo r ou r mora l intention s abou t procedural justice , I no w tur n t o a discussio n o f a specifi c typ e o f procedural fairness . I d o s o i n orde r t o sho w ho w w e ca n procee d beyond th e observatio n tha t du e proces s require s tha t a procedur e

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be accurat e an d tha t fairnes s i s tie d t o accuracy . Onc e w e thin k o f fairness a s itsel f ope n t o reflectio n an d investigation , w e ca n se e ho w the concep t o f du e proces s i s relate d t o othe r mora l an d lega l problems. By labelin g a s unfai r practice s tha t affec t th e reliabilit y o f outcomes i n th e sens e tha t the y increas e th e likelihoo d o f errors , I suggest tha t a procedur e compose d exclusivel y o f fai r practice s i s thought t o b e a n accurat e procedure . Par t o f th e reaso n tha t accuracy i s tie d t o fairnes s ca n b e explaine d b y th e fac t tha t w e employ a n adversar y system . A n adversar y procedur e i s on e typ e o f competitve zero-su m gam e i n whic h fairnes s i s a fundamenta l condition fo r achievin g correc t outcomes . W e migh t thin k o f a priz e fight, o r a race , o r a ches s game , an d th e like . T he rule s o f th e gam e define on e typ e o f fairness ; a violatio n o f th e rule s give s on e sid e a n unfair advantage . Ther e ar e als o backgroun d condition s tha t require tha t th e participant s ar e roughl y equa l i n way s relevan t t o the game ; i t i s unfair , i n thi s sense , t o matc h a heavyweigh t wit h a lightweight, a ches s maste r wit h a novice , an d s o on . I f th e background condition s o f fairnes s ar e no t met , ther e i s n o contest . The outcom e i s a foregon e conclusion ; th e competitio n doe s no t achieve it s purpose . I f w e assum e th e purpos e o f a prizefigh t i s t o discover wh o i s th e bette r boxer , the n i f w e pi t a heavyweigh t against a lightweigh t an d h e win s b y a knockout , thi s doe s no t reall y prove anything ; similarly , i f tw o heavyweight s fight an d on e ha s a horseshoe conceale d i n hi s glove , the n th e outcom e i s equall y worthless. Anothe r basi c assumptio n i s tha t th e outcom e i s achieve d through competition , no t cooperation ; tha t th e fight i s no t fixed; that bot h side s tr y a s har d a s possibl e t o wi n withi n th e rules . Fairness i s a structura l requiremen t fo r suc h contests ; i n orde r t achieve thei r purpose s th e rule s themselve s mus t b e fair , th contestants equall y matched , an d bot h side s mus t pu t u p a fai fight. O u r syste m o f crimina l justic e require s fairnes s i n orde r t achieve it s purpose : In th e Anglo-America n traditio n w e emplo y a n adversar y system—a syste m base d upo n th e ide a tha t trut h wil l emerg e out o f th e struggl e betwee n tw o contestin g partie s presentin g their cas e t o a n impartia l tribunal . Eac h man' s lawye r wil l d o his bes t t o establis h a cas e fo r hi s clien t an d destro y th e cas e

o e r o

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that hi s opponen t i s tryin g t o make . Th e syste m i s a commit ment t o th e notio n tha t th e righ t resul t wil l emerg e ou t o f conflict. Suc h a syste m wil l wor k onl y i f th e tw o contestin g parties ar e relativel y equal . Obviously , i f on e sid e i s muc h stronger tha n th e other , a correc t determinatio n wil l no t com e out o f th e conflict, bu t onl y th e answe r tha t powe r ca n impose . It i s fundamentally importan t t o kee p th e side s i n th e crimina l case equal i f the system i s to work. Anythin g tha t tend s t o buil d up on e sid e a s oppose d t o th e other , o r anythin g tha t tend s t o weaken on e side , i s detrimenta l t o th e adversar y system. 6 We migh t conside r th e righ t t o counse l i n thi s fashion , a s a n emerging historica l awarenes s tha t fairnes s i s require d fo r th e reliable operatio n o f ou r adversar y syste m o f crimina l justice . Consider th e followin g explanatio n fo r th e inclusio n o f th e righ t t o counsel i n ou r Constitution : Originally i n England , a prisone r wa s no t permitte d t o b e heard b y counse l upo n th e genera l issu e o f no t guilt y o n an y indictment fo r treaso n o r felony . Th e practic e o f Englis h judges, however , wa s t o permi t counse l t o advis e wit h a defendant a s t o th e conduc t o f hi s cas e an d t o represen t hi m i n collateral matter s an d a s respect s question s o f la w arisin g upo n the trial . I n 169 5 th e rul e was relaxe d b y statut e t o th e exten t o f permitting on e accuse d o f treaso n th e privileg e o f bein g hear d by counsel . . . . I n th e ligh t o f thi s commo n la w practice , i t i s evident tha t th e constitutiona l provision s t o th e effec t tha t a defendant shoul d b e "allowed " counse l o r shoul d hav e a righ t "to b e hear d b y himsel f an d hi s counsel, " o r tha t h e migh t b e heard b y "eithe r o r both, " a t hi s election , wer e intende d t o d o away wit h th e rule s which denie d representation , i n whole o r i n part, b y counse l i n crimina l prosecutions , bu t wer e no t aime d to compe l th e Stat e t o provid e counse l fo r a defendant. 7 Gradually thi s righ t ha s bee n expande d int o a dut y t o provid e counsel i n criminal case s if a person lack s sufficient mean s t o emplo y his own . I n recen t time s th e right s o f th e indigen t hav e greatl y increased a s du e proces s ha s becom e linke d wit h equa l protection . In Griffi n v . Illinois , Mr . Justice Blac k ha s argued :

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Providing equa l justic e fo r poo r an d rich , wea k an d powerfu l alike i s a n age-ol d problem . Peopl e hav e neve r cease d t o hop e and striv e t o mov e close r t o tha t goal . Thi s hope , a t leas t i n part, brough t abou t i n 121 5 th e roya l concession s o f Magn a Carta: "T o n o on e wil l w e sell , t o n o on e wil l w e refuse , o r delay, righ t o r justice . . . . N o fre e ma n shal l b e take n o r imprisoned, o r disseised , o r outlawed , o r exile d o r anywis e destroyed; no r shal l w e g o upo n hi m o r sen d upo n him , bu t b y the lawfu l judgmen t o f hi s peer s o r b y th e la w o f th e land. " These pledge s wer e unquestionabl y step s towar d a faire r an d more nearl y equa l applicatio n o f crimina l justice . I n thi s tradition, ou r own constitutiona l guarantee s o f du e proces s an d equal protectio n bot h cal l fo r procedure s i n crimina l trial s which allo w n o invidiou s discrimination s betwee n person s an d different group s o f persons . Bot h equa l protectio n an d du e process emphasiz e th e centra l ai m o f ou r entir e judicia l system—all peopl e charge d wit h crim e must , s o fa r a s th e la w i s concerned, "stan d o n a n equalit y befor e th e ba r o f justic e i n every America n court. 8 This argumen t als o appeal s t o fairness , bu t a differen t sens e o f fairness. Th e ric h ca n affor d a lawyer ; therefor e the y ca n provid e themselves wit h a fai r trial . Bu t th e poo r cannot . A fai r tria l ough t to b e availabl e t o everybody , ric h an d poo r alike ; it' s no t fai r tha t the poo r canno t ge t a fai r trial . W e ough t t o ai d th e indigen t defendant i n orde r t o overcom e th e morall y undesirabl e conse quences o f economi c inequalities . Th e dut y t o provid e counse l fo r those i n nee d migh t b e defende d i n humanitaria n terms ; i t woul d be simila r t o a n argumen t tha t th e stat e ough t t o provid e medica l services t o th e poo r i n orde r t o preven t needles s suffering . W e fee l that n o on e shoul d b e deprive d o f th e service s o f a physicia n merel y because h e i s to o poo r t o affor d one . W e migh t provid e simila r arguments fo r ai d t o dependen t children , housing , food , an d th e like. Th e clai m i s tha t ther e ar e certai n basi c good s an d service s which everyon e i s entitle d to ; suc h claim s appea l t o th e concep t o f distributive justice. I t i s th e mora l dut y o f societ y t o provid e som e minimal amoun t o f thes e good s t o thos e wh o canno t affor d t o purchase the m o n th e fre e market ; al l other s ar e expected t o expen d their ow n resource s an d provid e themselve s wit h whateve r amoun t of thes e good s the y desir e an d ca n afford .

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Yet i f w e tak e seriousl y th e clai m tha t a n adversar y procedur e i s the mos t accurat e an d reliabl e one , rathe r tha n seein g th e provisio n of ai d t o th e indigen t a s a requiremen t o f distributiv e justice o r a s a goal o f equa l treatmen t fo r th e ric h an d poo r alike , w e ca n argu e that th e basi c reaso n fo r th e stat e providin g suc h service s follow s directly fro m th e justificatio n fo r a syste m o f crimina l justice . Assume a societ y o f rationa l self-intereste d egoisti c individual s wh o wish t o maximiz e th e valu e o f thei r individua l life , liberty , an d property. Al l the y desir e fro m th e stat e i s security ; thei r crimina l code reflect s thi s basi c aim . I t forbid s action s tha t depriv e person s o f these basi c goods . Punishment s ar e conceive d o f a s rationa l deterrents; th e mor e sever e penaltie s ar e reserve d fo r mor e seriou s offenses. Ther e ar e tw o way s a perso n ma y b e deprive d o f thes e basic goods ; a s th e victi m o f a crim e o r a s th e recipien t o f punishment. I f w e defin e unjus t action s a s th e wrongfu l takin g o f life, liberty , o r property , ther e ar e tw o type s o f injustice ; crime s an d mistaken punishments . If I a m a rando m perso n livin g i n suc h a society ; I a m intereste d only i n securit y an d d o no t particularl y min d gainin g fro m injustice. Ye t i t woul d see m tha t i t i s i n m y interes t t o minimiz e th e number o f unjus t acts . I f I a m concerne d wit h th e valu e o f m y individual life , liberty , an d property , the n I a m harme d b y ever y unjust conviction ; ther e i s a finite probabilit y tha t I mysel f ma y b e the innocen t victim . Furthermore , unjus t conviction s increas e th e rate o f crimes; i f an innocen t perso n i s convicted an d punished , the n there mus t b e som e guilt y perso n wh o i s not , an d h e wil l probabl y go o n t o commi t furthe r crimes . A s a rational , self-intereste d perso n I hav e n o mor e desir e t o convic t a n innocen t ma n tha n t o se e a guilty on e g o free ; I hav e a n interes t i n accurat e punishments . Since I believ e i n rationa l deterrenc e theor y a s a justification fo r punishment I a m als o oppose d t o on e perso n o r clas s o f person s getting a harshe r o r lighte r punishmen t tha n tha t provide d fo r b y a rational crimina l code . T he reaso n I would choos e a syste m i n whic h a mor e sever e penalt y i s provided fo r a mor e seriou s offens e depend s upon th e followin g argument : i f tw o crime s o f differin g seriousnes s such a s murde r an d robber y receive d th e sam e penalty , the n ther e would b e n o incentiv e fo r a crimina l t o choos e th e lesse r crim e rather tha n th e greater . I f a perso n want s t o stea l something , an d it' s somewhat easie r t o shoo t hi s victim, the n ther e i s no reaso n no t to . I f one clas s o f persons—say , th e poor—alway s ge t a mor e sever e

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penalty, i f the y receiv e th e penalt y fo r murde r thoug h the y merel y commit robber y the n the y ma y a s well murder . Similarly , i f anothe r class—the rich—alway s ge t a lighte r penalty , i f the y receiv e th e robbery penalt y fo r murder , the n simila r consequence s follow . Thus i n respec t t o a perso n accuse d o f committin g a crime , m y interest certainl y doe s no t li e exclusivel y o n th e sid e o f th e prosecution; I wan t t o convic t hi m onl y i f he' s guilt y a s charged , and I do no t wis h hi m t o receiv e a harshe r penalt y tha n h e deserves . If i t i s th e cas e tha t th e adversar y syste m i s th e mos t reliabl e one , i t would see m tha t th e interest s o f th e peopl e li e o n bot h sides—o r rather neithe r side . This argumen t provide s a justificatio n fo r providin g counse l t o indigent defendants , bu t i t doe s mor e tha n that . Assuredl y attorney s differ i n skill ; th e tim e an d resource s the y ca n devot e t o a cas e certainly affec t th e outcomes . Othe r thing s bein g equal , i t woul d seem tha t a highl y skille d attorne y backe d wit h resource s fo r investigating cases , callin g exper t witnesses , an d th e like , greatl y increases th e probabilit y o f someon e wh o i s guilt y gettin g a n innocent verdic t o r a les s sever e sentenc e tha n h e woul d deserv e given th e seriousnes s o f hi s offense . Bu t certainl y n o socia l benefi t i s achieved b y allowin g wealth y criminal s t o hav e suc h advantages ; i f the ric h alway s o r ver y ofte n ge t lighte r sentence s tha n thos e required b y a rationa l syste m o f deterrents , the n ther e woul d see m to b e ver y goo d reaso n fo r deprivin g the m o f th e benefit s o f thei r wealth b y insulatin g th e syste m o f crimina l justic e fro m suc h disturbing influences . Fro m th e viewpoin t o f society , ther e i s suc h a thing a s permittin g individual s t o provid e themselve s wit h to o much lega l talen t an d services ; sinc e th e rule s o f crimina l procedur e are constructe d i n suc h a wa y tha t correc t result s emerg e onl y whe n the side s ar e roughl y equall y matched , an d th e rule s ar e draw n fo r the averag e case , the n th e ric h ca n easil y tak e unfai r advantag e o f such a lega l system . If justice ough t no t t o b e fo r sal e t o th e highes t bidder , i t woul d seem t o follo w tha t w e ough t t o abolis h th e privat e practic e o f criminal la w a s w e kno w it ; th e privat e practic e o f crimina l la w no t only provide s les s tha n equa l justic e fo r th e poor , i t provide s mor e than equa l justice fo r th e rich . I f w e believ e i n th e adversar y syste m of justice , wh y no t hav e tw o distric t attorneys ; on e fo r th e prosecution an d on e fo r th e defense ? I f I trus t a publi c officia l t o

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prosecute case s i n m y name , wh y shouldn' t I trus t on e t o defen d cases? I f publi c prosecutor s ca n b e vigorou s an d skille d advocate s for on e side , wha t prevent s publi c defender s fro m performin g similarly fo r th e othe r side ? I t certainl y canno t depen d merel y o n who pay s thei r salaries ; judges ca n b e fai r an d independen t arbiter s and ye t dra w thei r salar y fro m th e state . We alread y fun d tw o ou t o f the thre e actor s i n a publi c trial—wh y no t fun d th e third ? I f w e adopt suc h a schem e th e innocen t woul d no t b e impoverishe d b y the cos t o f defendin g themselves ; th e ric h woul d ge t a slightl y les s competent defens e an d th e poo r a slightl y bette r one . Justice woul d be bette r served , an d th e onl y loser s woul d see m t o b e crimina l lawyers an d ric h criminals . Wh y no t prohibi t th e privat e acquisitio n of th e service s o f a crimina l lawyer ; i n th e nam e o f du e process , fairness, an d equa l protectio n o f th e laws , I cal l fo r th e abolitio n o f the privat e ownershi p o f th e mean s o f protection . Yet prohibitin g th e privat e acquisitio n o f th e service s o f crimina l lawyers nee d no t entai l endin g th e privat e practic e o f crimina l law . There i s a differenc e betwee n th e publi c provisio n o f a servic e an d public funding ; i t ma y b e mor e desirabl e t o emplo y a syste m o f assigned counse l i n al l crimina l cases , thu s avoidin g th e evil s o f bureaucracy, careerism , politica l pressure , civi l servic e mentality , and th e like . Thes e consideration s migh t als o tel l agains t havin g a public prosecutor ; perhap s i t woul d b e bes t t o rel y o n th e privat e sector exclusively , an d emplo y a syste m o f assigne d counse l fo r bot h sides i n al l cases . Thes e question s rais e issue s o f publi c polic y an d economics tha t canno t b e deal t wit h here . I n an y case , th e concep t of equal justice an d du e proces s provide s goo d reason s fo r withdraw ing th e service s o f defens e attorney s fro m th e fre e market , fo r no t permitting difference s o f wealt h t o affec t th e qualit y o f justice.

NOTES 1. Join t Anti-Fascis t Refuge e Committe e v . McGrath , 34 1 U.S . 12 3 (1951). 2. Rochi n v . California , 34 2 U.S . 43 2 (1957) . Fo r a n accoun t o f Frankfurter's view s on due process, see Clyde Jacobs, Justice Frankfurter and Civil Liberties (Berkeley: Universit y o f California Press , 1961) . 3. Joh n Rawls , A Theory of Justice (Cambridge : Harvar d Universit y Press, 1971) , p. 235.

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4. Ibid. , pp . 238-39. 5. Ibid. , pp . 85-86. 6. Steinber g an d Paulsen , " A Conversatio n wit h Defens e Counse l o n Problems o f Crimina l Defense, " 7 Prac . La w 25 , 26 (1961) , cite d i n Monrad G . Paulse n an d Sanfor d H . Kadish , Criminal Law and its Processes (Boston: Little, Brown an d Company , 1962) . 7. Bett s v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 8. Griffi n v . Illinois, 351 U.S . 1 2 (1955).

8 ON DE-MORALIZING DU E PROCES S THOMAS R . KEARN S

I. INTRODUCTIO N We are inclined t o believe tha t man y lega l doctrine s originate i n morality; tha t the y are , mor e specifically , simpl y th e resul t o f applying th e demand s o f moralit y t o th e lega l context . Thi s supposition probably has a certain historical validity. I t seems likely that i n fashionin g certai n lega l doctrines , legislators , judge s an d legal scholar s actuall y se t abou t t o discer n th e requirement s o f morality a s the y pertai n t o th e law . Ther e is , i n an y case , considerable evidenc e o f thi s kin d o f effort i n connectio n wit h du e process, th e doctrin e whos e relatio n wit h moralit y i s th e mai n subject o f thi s paper . Bu t th e historica l poin t i s no t m y concern . What interest s me is a conceptual matter ; specifically, whethe r du e process i s bes t understood—a s i s commonl y supposed—i n term s o f certain moral requirements applied t o the law. How du e proces s i s bes t understoo d obviousl y depend s o n th e kind of understanding on e seeks . Thus, a n accoun t o f th e origins o f due proces s would surel y b e closely tie d t o certain mora l concerns , far mor e s o tha n a lega l accoun t capabl e o f explainin g an d predicting today' s requirement s i n detail . S o I a m oblige d t o sa y 229

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what kin d o f an accoun t I seek, an d tha t i s not easy . Roughly , wha t I want i s a statemen t o f th e basi c o r underlyin g them e o r concern o f due process . Suc h a statemen t woul d provid e a n answe r t o th e almost philosophical-soundin g question , "What , finally (ultimately , really), i s du e proces s al l about? " I t woul d als o compor t wit h th e general contour s o f du e proces s a s the y appea r i n Anglo-America n law; but , unlik e a strictl y lega l account , i t woul d not , a s regard s details, have t o b e predictivel y powerful . Fa r mor e importan t i s tha t it b e persuasiv e o r normativ e i n character , indicatin g a pat h alon g which du e proces s migh t b e developed , providin g a basi s fo r deciding so-calle d har d o r ope n cases , eve n identifyin g area s fo r gradual revision . Al l o f thi s i s vague , bu t i t succeed s i n placin g th e account i n th e righ t conceptua l domain , th e on e i n whic h i t seem s quite intelligibl e t o asser t (o r deny ) tha t du e proces s i s mainl y o r essentially a mora l doctrine . Perhaps i t i s appropriat e t o as k now , i n a preliminar y way , wh y anyone migh t tak e exceptio n to , migh t doubt , thi s seemingl y innocuous thesi s linkin g th e cor e o f du e proces s wit h morality . Disagreement abou t th e pertinen t requirement s o f moralit y aside , applying mora l precept s t o anythin g a s complicate d a s a lega l system i s almos t neve r a simpl e matter . An d par t o f th e reaso n fo r this is that ou r mora l rule s and principle s apply, i n th e first instance , not t o normative systems , bu t t o persons . Betwee n th e law , on e kin d of normativ e system , an d persons , ther e obviousl y ar e substantia l differences. Bu t th e mora l impor t o f thes e differences—an d s o th e way ou r standar d mora l concern s shoul d b e asserte d o r secure d i n connection wit h socia l structure s lik e th e law—i s b y n o mean s obvious. Indeed , i t migh t wel l b e tha t th e pictur e o f applyin g ou r usual mora l commitment s directl y t o normativ e system s actuall y tends t o imperi l th e mora l end s w e hop e t o achieve . In th e presen t study , I sketc h thre e "moral " model s o f du e process, thre e possibl e account s tha t deriv e fro m differen t way s o f applying certai n fundamenta l mora l concern s t o th e law' s activities , especially wher e unfavorabl e actio n agains t assignabl e member s i s contemplated. Bu t alon g th e wa y I also propose a n "amoral " model , one tha t purport s t o discove r th e underlyin g them e o f lega l du e process i n certai n qualitie s o f normativ e system s generally , qualitie s having t o d o wit h thes e structures ' specia l virtue s an d vul -

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nerabilities as vehicles for effective collectiv e action. I conclude with a brie f assessment of the moral implication s o f such an account . II. MORALLY RESPONSIV E SYSTEM S Collective action, suitably directe d b y a system of standing rules, is often mor e efficient an d i n othe r way s mor e rational , eve n mor e satisfying, tha n isolated , individua l effort . Bu t participatio n i n normative systems involves conspicuous dangers. By definition suc h systems requir e authoritie s t o make , interpre t an d enforc e rules . They thus involve a concentration o f power capable of abuse, easily capable o f inflictin g considerabl e har m o n assignabl e individuals . Normative system s are morally worrisome. Presumably, substantiv e harms—harm s flowing fro m a system' s decisions to seek this or that end—are to be guarded agains t mainl y by procedura l stricture s determinin g ho w decision s shal l b e take n and wh o shal l b e a part y t o them . Bu t ther e ar e als o procedura l harms, injurie s a normativ e syste m ca n inflic t o n assignabl e individuals b y th e wa y i t implement s decision s unfavorabl e t o it s members. Fro m thi s perspective , a n accoun t o f du e proces s woul d characterize th e procedura l harm s agains t whic h a system' s mem bers should be protected. The tas k ma y no t see m particularl y demanding , especiall y i n light o f the relatively wea k constraints I have place d o n what shal l count as an acceptable account of due process. One proposal readil y comes to mind. It is a familiar imperativ e of interpersonal moralit y that action s know n o r believe d t o b e harmfu l t o others—eve n i f finally justified—must b e undertake n wit h specia l sensitivit y an d care. Fo r example , if , fo r wha t I believ e i s a greate r good , I contemplate breakin g a promise , I mus t b e especiall y carefu l tha t the fact s ar e a s I suppose , tha t I understan d th e impac t o f m y breach on my promisee, and so on. Moreover, I may even be obliged to discus s th e matte r wit h tha t person , t o explai n wha t i s a t stak e and, wher e appropriate , issu e a n apolog y o r i n som e othe r wa y made amends . Wh y no t straightawa y appl y th e analogue s o f thi s requirement t o th e conduc t o f normativ e systems ? Here , surely , i s the beginning o f a promising statemen t o f the rational e underlyin g due process of law.

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But th e matte r i s no t quit e thi s simple . A s betwee n persons , i t i s tolerably clea r who ar e th e intende d beneficiarie s o f thi s imperative , and i t i s tolerabl y clea r wha t kind—i f no t th e degree—o f car e i s contemplated. Thes e thing s ar e decidedl y unclea r whe n th e impera tive i s applie d t o normativ e systems . First , man y o f th e slight s an d insensitivities agains t whic h th e paren t imperativ e i s directe d presuppose certai n kind s o f relationship s betwee n persons , certai n kinds o f intimac y an d knowledge , tha t ar e largel y an d understand ably lackin g i n connectio n wit h normativ e systems . Fo r example , these systems are by definitio n rule-governe d enterprise s an d ten d t o be inherentl y distan t an d impersonal . Th e possibilit y o f sufferin g certain kind s o f harm s a t th e hand s o f thes e system s i s therefor e minimal o r nonexistent . What harm s does this "transplanted " imperativ e pic k out ? Con ceivably, on e o f the m i s th e impersonalit y o f normativ e systems ; this, afte r all , i s a familia r defec t o f man y interpersona l relation s and surely i t can b e overdone i n connection wit h normativ e systems . But thi s only bring s t o min d a secon d unclarity ; th e exten t t o whic h essentially privat e sensibilitie s shoul d b e se t asid e i n favo r o f a collective good , a goo d i n whic h everyon e presumabl y ha s hope s o f sharing bu t whic h migh t b e impede d o r might no t materializ e a t al l if th e procedura l stricture s ar e to o tight . The obviou s poin t o f th e foregoin g remark s i s tha t normativ e systems involv e complexitie s no t presen t a t th e interpersona l level , complexities regardin g th e identit y o f th e partie s t o who m mora l constraints ar e suppose d t o appl y an d th e wa y i n whic h th e severa l parties and thei r several interwove n interest s should b e disentangle d and assessed . A cal l (modele d o n interpersona l relations ) fo r specia l sensitivity an d car e wher e a normativ e syste m contemplate s o r take s unfavorable actio n agains t assignabl e members , i s jus t no t ver y illuminating.

III. T H E MORA L INTEGRIT Y O F SUBJECT S A simpl e adjustmen t migh t substantiall y improv e th e suggestion . Thus, howeve r comple x normativ e system s are , n o matte r ho w many partie s ar e involve d an d howeve r intricat e thei r interactions , we ar e alway s dealin g finally wit h persons . An d eve n thoug h normative system s ar e no t person s an d so , perhaps , ar e no t th e

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immediate subject s o f morality , an d eve n if , wha t ha s no t bee n shown, normativ e system s someho w hav e protectibl e interest s no t reducible withou t remainde r t o th e merel y aggregate d interest s o f their members , i t i s certai n tha t a system' s procedure s shoul d no t compromise th e statu s o f it s member s a s mora l agents . Thus , th e moral integrit y o f persons , eve n o f person s wh o ar e member s o f normative systems , i s somethin g tha t canno t b e override n b y o r sacrificed t o som e collectiv e good , fo r o n th e existenc e o f tha t integrity ever y othe r valu e surel y depends . Perhap s here , then , i s a way t o hol d th e complexitie s o f normativ e system s a t bay , t o indicate a kind o f mora l minimu m whic h i s neither obscure d b y th e previous problem s no r susceptibl e t o thei r corrosiv e powers . Here th e ti e betwee n du e proces s an d moralit y i s mad e a t a ver y elemental level , conceptuall y prio r t o th e appearanc e o f suc h complicating thing s a s th e share d end s an d comple x strategie s underlying som e normativ e systems . Fo r thi s vie w remind s u s tha t persons ar e th e immediat e subject s o f moralit y an d unles s thei r status a s mora l agent s i s protected , furthe r mora l concern s ar e largely idle . Thus , befor e encounterin g th e complexitie s tha t troubled u s with th e firs t formulation , i t ma y b e possibl e t o mar k off a domai n o f essentially privat e interest s tha t ca n plausibl y la y clai m to mora l primacy . Th e interest s suggeste d b y th e notio n o f a mora l agent ar e sufficientl y wel l define d t o indicat e a numbe r o f pro cedural imperative s fo r th e conduc t o f normativ e systems . More over, thi s perspectiv e respect s th e distinctio n betwee n a system' s procedural an d substantiv e qualities . Jus t a s mora l agent s hav e a capacity t o d o evi l a s wel l a s good , a normativ e syste m tha t i s procedurally impeccable—eve n fro m th e propose d poin t o f v i e w might nonetheles s b e substantivel y reprehensible . Enoug h ha s bee n said t o warran t developin g th e vie w somewha t mor e fully . How a normativ e syste m mus t conduc t it s affair s i f i t i s t o respec t and protec t it s member s a s mora l agent s i s indicate d reasonabl y well b y reflectin g o n wha t i s involve d i n bein g a mora l agent . T o begin with , mora l agent s ar e i n som e sens e rational , the y ar e capable o f perceivin g thei r action s a s bein g o f thi s kin d o r that , an d they ar e concerned t o mak e sens e o f thei r lives, t o pla n an d organiz e their activitie s an d effort s i n way s the y judg e t o b e sensibl e an d satisfying. The y als o hav e a certai n amoun t o f self-respect— a sens e of persona l wort h o r dignity—an d the y hav e a t leas t a minima l

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regard fo r others , including , I should think , a dispositio n t o hono r o r respect wha t the y tak e t o b e th e equa l wort h o f al l othe r mora l agents. Ther e i s n o nee d t o insis t o n exactl y thes e elements , fo r w e are concerne d her e simpl y t o sketc h a basi c perspectiv e o r them e fo r due process . Surely , a t thi s level , considerabl e variatio n i s compati ble wit h wha t I propos e t o cal l th e Mora l Integrit y vie w o f du e process (hereafter , MI) . Some o f th e implication s o f M I i n term s o f specifi c du e proces s requirements ar e fairl y clear . I t is , I think , apparen t tha t M I woul d require normativ e system s t o conduc t thei r business , a t leas t fo r th e most part , b y mean s o f rules , rule s tha t ar e no t change d to o frequently, ar e generall y prospectiv e (no t retroactive) , intelligible , properly "noticed, " consistent , performable—i n a word , b y mean s o f followable rules. 1 I n n o othe r wa y ca n th e rationalit y o f mora l agent s be respected . I t i s als o tolerabl y clea r tha t consideration s o f dignit y and rationalit y would—t o mentio n a fe w items—requir e a hearin g where assignabl e individual s ar e t o suffe r deprivation s o f life , libert y or property , especiall y wher e thes e ar e allegedl y justifie d i n term s o f some collectiv e good , enjoi n th e us e o f stomac h pump s t o obtai n evidence, direc t publi c housin g official s t o giv e reason s fo r evictions , bar unreasonabl e searche s an d seizures , an d rejec t nearl y al l form s of compulsor y self-incrimination . No r i s i t difficul t t o se e tha t M I would issu e i n proscription s agains t doubl e jeopard y an d sugges t the importanc e o f providin g lega l service s fo r indigen t crimina l defendants. I n sum , i t appear s tha t b y referenc e t o concern s o f dignity an d rationality , th e Mora l Integrit y vie w i s entirely capabl e of reproducin g o r accommodatin g th e familia r contour s o f pro cedural du e process . I shoul d emphasiz e tha t M I indicate s tha t du e proces s i s t o b e thought o f a s th e protecto r o f a certai n domai n o f inviolable , essentially personal , private , bu t stil l profoundl y moral , values . T h e values i n questio n ar e persona l becaus e the y lin k u p i n obviou s way s with eac h person' s ow n statu s a s a mora l agent ; the y ar e mora l because the y ar e element s o f wha t i s involve d i n bein g a mora l agent an d als o becaus e the y expres s value s tha t person s must , a s moral agents , respec t i n on e another ; finally, th e value s ar e privat e because unlike , say , friendshi p o r trut h telling , the y mak e n o essential referenc e t o other s no r t o an y collectiv e good . Aspects o f M I wer e adumbrate d almos t twent y year s ag o i n

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Sanford Kadish' s helpfu l stud y o f du e process. 2 Ther e Kadis h maintained tha t du e proces s i s "mor e a mora l comman d tha n a strictly jura l precept " 3 an d it s objec t i s t o restric t "th e manne r i n which governmenta l powe r i s exercised upo n th e individual , eve n i n an are a o f legitimat e concern . . . ." 4 Eve n mor e specifically , Kadis h insisted tha t du e proces s i s concerne d t o preserv e "th e intrinsi c dignity o f th e individual.'' 5 Thoug h h e isolate s fo r separat e treatment a concer n t o maximiz e th e reliabilit y o f guilt-determina tion processes , i t i s easy t o se e ho w thi s concer n migh t b e viewe d a s merely a par t o f th e large r concer n t o protec t individua l dignity . And fro m her e i t obviousl y i s no t fa r t o MI . These brie f remark s ar e intende d t o indicat e tha t th e Mora l Integrity vie w give s ampl e expressio n t o ou r dee p mora l concer n that individual s no t b e overru n i n th e pursui t o f collectiv e goods , that protection s agains t certai n kind s o f intrusion s o n th e huma n spirit, o n a n individual' s mora l integrity , ar e o f utmos t importance , almost n o matte r wha t thei r cos t i n term s o f externa l good s o r th e common welfare . Th e vie w als o seem s t o b e consonan t wit h muc h legal rhetori c an d wit h th e law' s genera l requirement s an d i t enjoy s the suppor t o f a t leas t on e prominen t lega l theorist . Moreover , M I indicates tha t th e concern s underlyin g du e proces s ar e no t confine d to th e law , that , i n fact , the y surfac e whereve r collectiv e good s ar e sought b y mean s of rule-governed activit y an d a system's procedure s create a ris k o f mora l har m t o assignabl e individuals . Th e notio n i s thus mad e availabl e t o thos e who , lik e myself , woul d conten d fo r due proces s i n nonlega l settings , bu t woul d insist , o f course , tha t th e law's particula r requirement s ar e ofte n inappropriat e elsewhere .

IV. OBJECTION S T O M I Despite thi s suppor t fo r MI , th e vie w i s finally unacceptable , perhaps especially fro m th e mora l poin t o f view. Th e primar y objec t of socia l moralit y i s t o guid e an d harmoniz e huma n interest s an d efforts, particularl y t o eliminat e needles s an d self-destructiv e con flict i n th e interaction s o f person s i n socia l settings . Normativ e systems, perhap s mor e s o tha n th e unhelpfull y genera l an d gen erally inelasti c edict s o f a share d socia l morality , ar e th e majo r mechanism w e hav e fo r achievin g thi s direction , thi s integratio n o f human activity . The y are , therefore , muc h to o importan t t o b e lef t

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outside o f ou r mora l reckoning , thoug h ho w the y ar e t o b e take n into accoun t i s not a t al l certain . Bu t w e shoul d resis t th e suggestio n implicit i n M I that , a s regard s thei r manne r o f conduct , normativ e systems ca n an d shoul d b e though t o f a s person s t o who m th e requirements o f interpersona l moralit y migh t b e applie d directly . First, thi s perspectiv e i s likel y t o encourag e sensitivit y t o a system's wa y o f proceedin g whic h migh t b e morall y offensiv e a s between person s bu t whic h i s quit e unobjectionabl e a t th e leve l o f normative systems . Tact , fo r example , i s generall y require d o f persons i n thei r dealing s wit h on e another , bu t no t o f normativ e systems. Similarly , bu t mor e importantly , a s betwee n persons , impersonality, tha t is , a refusa l t o atten d to , t o tak e int o account , what i s specia l o r idiosyncrati c abou t thi s o r tha t person , i s ofte n quite objectionable . Bu t i n certai n context s an d i n certai n respects , this i s a decide d virtu e o f normativ e systems . Second, th e perspectiv e i s starkl y silen t abou t problem s peculia r to normativ e systems , problem s whos e resolutio n migh t sometime s best b e accomplishe d procedurall y an d i n way s tha t a t first glanc e might see m patentl y unacceptabl e i n term s o f huma n dignit y an d moral agency . Fo r example, person s who , relativ e t o thei r respectiv e preference-rankings, ar e equall y committe d t o a certai n en d an d who ar e thereb y draw n int o membershi p i n a syste m tha t promise s to advanc e tha t end , ma y discove r t o thei r collectiv e disma y irreconcilable commitment s an d view s abou t how th e share d en d should b e pursued . And—a t leas t sometimes—thi s proble m o f aggregating individua l preference s compel s normativ e system s t o impose requirement s tha t i n som e relativel y clea r sens e ar e irra tional fo r everyon e involved. 6 I n sum , th e sensibl e identificatio n o f the requirement s o f mora l agenc y ma y depen d substantiall y o n familiarity wit h variou s qualitie s an d problem s peculia r t o norma tive systems . I t therefor e ma y no t b e possible , a s M I casuall y suggests, t o discove r th e morall y appropriat e procedura l constraint s on normativ e system s b y attendin g exclusivel y t o th e notio n o f a moral agent . Bu t wha t els e shoul d b e take n int o accoun t M I doe s not say . Third, M I mus t b e faulte d becaus e i t seek s t o groun d respec t o r support fo r th e requirement s o f du e proces s eithe r i n th e ris k eac h person run s a s a membe r o f a normativ e syste m o f sufferin g a n unacceptable privat e har m (publicl y inflicted ) o r i n whateve r

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empathy ca n b e engendere d fo r othe r member s wh o stan d t o suffe r such harms . An d thi s i s lamentabl e becaus e i t tend s t o emphasiz e the contras t betwee n collectiv e an d essentiall y privat e matters , between variou s join t goal s an d th e merel y "shared " concer n tha t each perso n ha s fo r hi s ow n mora l integrity . An d i t emphasize s thi s contrast withou t identifyin g th e tension s i t ma y reflec t o r giv e ris e to, an d withou t indicatin g how , i f a t all , thos e tension s migh t b e averted o r ameliorated . Fro m th e perspectiv e M I provides , th e requirements o f du e proces s hav e mor e th e fee l o f minima l law s o f warfare tha n th e procedura l framewor k o f a constructiv e undertak ing. Moreover , implici t i n th e vie w i s th e entirel y gratuitou s assumption tha t th e mora l statu s o f person s i s tolerably wel l define d without an y referenc e a t al l t o normativ e systems , withou t referenc e to th e extensio n o f rationa l behavio r mad e possibl e b y suc h systems,7 withou t referenc e t o th e pleasure s o f trus t an d participa tion an d th e adjustmen t o f aim s an d mean s tha t thi s ma y entail . Here, obviously , th e secon d an d thir d objection s joi n force s t o challenge Mi' s eas y suppositio n tha t th e notio n o f a mora l agen t i s entirely separabl e fro m th e notio n o f a normativ e system .

V. A N AMORA L ALTERNATIV E To introduc e a radica l alternativ e t o th e Mora l Integrit y view , i t is helpfu l t o retur n briefl y t o Kadish' s pape r an d t o not e tha t he , too, finally rejecte d thi s essentiall y individualistic , privat e perspec tive. Fo r him , du e proces s controvers y emerge s mainl y a t th e juncture o f opposin g values , tw o value s i n particular , individua l dignity an d maximall y reliabl e determination s o f guilt. 8 H e would , it seems , firmly resis t m y casua l suggestio n tha t th e tw o value s might b e merge d unde r a slightly enlarge d conceptio n o f individua l dignity. Th e basi s fo r tha t resistanc e i s evidently t o b e gleane d fro m two examples , th e first o f which , however , i s quit e weak . I t consist s of th e observatio n tha t a ful l complemen t o f procedura l safeguard s in connection wit h juvenile offender s o r the mentall y il l ma y ten d t o undermine rehabilitativ e interests. 9 I am no t satisfie d tha t th e latte r interests clas h wit h a concer n fo r huma n dignity—a t worst , ther e i s here only a n uncertaintl y abou t th e bes t wa y t o protect tha t dignity , but possibl y I hav e misunderstood . I n an y case , Kadish' s secon d example make s wha t I tak e t o b e th e stronge r point , fo r h e note s

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that, thoug h th e reliabilit y o f governmenta l discharge s o n ground s of disloyalt y woul d doubtles s improv e i f judicia l hearing s wer e required, a t stake , too , ar e importan t interest s o f th e government , for exampl e t o b e ri d o f harmfu l employee s an d t o protec t th e identity o f valuabl e informers. 10 These tw o example s captur e th e cor e o f Kadish' s vagu e bu t stil l suggestive remark s tha t "th e ultimat e natur e o f th e impass e o f al l procedural du e proces s issue s ma y b e th e same : preservin g th e integrity o f a democrati c communit y withou t imperilin g othe r legitimate values/ ' n Th e differen t kind s o f value s ar e no t identi fied, thei r possibl e relationship s ar e no t detaile d an d th e mai n concern i s t o characteriz e du e proces s controversie s rathe r tha n t o illuminate directl y th e natur e o f du e proces s itself . Bu t i f govern mental interest s o f th e kin d referre d t o i n th e secon d o f Kadish' s examples ar e indee d th e prope r concer n o f du e process , the n i t i s certain tha t th e Mora l Integrit y vie w i s unacceptabl y narrow . Tha t MI is too narrow , is , I believe, a conclusion Kadis h woul d staunchl y support. Unfortunately, Kadish' s stud y i s no t ver y helpfu l abou t wha t should b e done , abou t th e consideration s tha t shoul d com e int o play, whe n dignit y an d reliabilit y clash . H e observe s tha t th e personal an d socia l impac t o f a proceeding' s determination s (o r misdeterminations) ca n b e mor e o r les s serious , mor e o r les s important o r harmful , an d h e offer s th e sensibl e suggestio n tha t th e process tha t i s du e o r appropriat e migh t var y accordingly. 12 Bu t such observation s d o no t amoun t t o a n accoun t o f du e process , no t even o n m y lenien t descriptio n o f what migh t qualif y a s an account . There is , fo r example , nothin g her e tha t approache s a unifie d rationale o f du e proces s i n term s o f whic h th e relevan t variation s among variou s proceeding s migh t b e identified , th e relevan t partie s and interest s distinguishe d an d related , an d a genera l bu t stil l informative analysi s generate d o f th e interaction s betwee n partie s and betwee n apparentl y competin g values . Moreover , th e blanke t contrast betwee n persona l an d socia l concern s contain s n o sugges tion a t al l tha t du e proces s migh t b e peculiarl y tie d t o th e specia l ways tha t normativ e system s (i n thi s case , th e law ) serv e an d threaten bot h persona l an d socia l value s an d th e interaction s between them . Th e ai m o f muc h o f th e subsequen t discussio n i s t o present an d argu e fo r just suc h a view .

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VI. THE IDE A O F SYSTE M Normative system s manag e t o exten d th e possibilit y o f rationa l action mainl y b y coordinatin g huma n effor t an d b y (a t leas t partially) tyin g dow n th e future. 13 Fo r th e mos t part , thi s structur ing of presen t activitie s an d disposition s an d futur e state s o f affair s is accomplished b y promulgating an d publicizin g and i n other way s supporting a syste m o f rules . Th e effor t i s als o promote d b y anticipating an d respondin g resourcefull y t o change s i n interests , needs o r circumstance s affectin g th e system' s primar y aims . No t infrequently thi s require s tha t rule s b e changed , sometime s ab ruptly, sometime s withou t prope r notice . Plainly , thes e strategies , these contribution s t o a rationa l collectiv e undertaking , interac t with on e another , sometime s i n wrenchin g opposition— a natura l upshot o f th e ques t fo r coordinate d stabilit y whic h i s someho w flexible as well. Moreover, eac h o f thes e element s singl y contain s th e seed s o f additional tensions. Thus, members of every normativ e syste m hav e substantially differin g set s o f interests , aims , o r needs , s o i t i s practically unavoidabl e tha t huma n activitie s coordinate d b y standing rule s wil l no t displa y a n entirel y fai r o r just allocatio n o f benefits an d burdens . Similarly , th e futur e ca n b e tie d dow n an d reliable expectation s create d onl y i f a t leas t som e relativel y minor , incidental adjustment s o r correction s ar e foregone ; rule s tha t ar e altered to o much or too rapidly los e their capacity t o guide conduc t and t o promot e th e genera l end s o f stability , predictabilit y an d reasonable confidenc e abou t som e o f th e spatiall y an d temporall y distant doing s o f others. 14 Finally , anticipatory , resourcefu l re sponses t o change s affectin g a normativ e system' s primar y end s require authoritie s wh o ar e no t mer e caretaker s bu t wh o are , instead, wielders of considerable discretionar y power . Here, then , o n th e ver y surfac e o f normativ e systems , ar e som e powerful indication s tha t w e ar e oblige d t o tolerate , fo r example , some disagreeably disparat e treatmen t o f a system' s members , som e individuals' losses recouped b y n o one, though suffere d i n th e nam e of th e collectiv e effort , an d som e intrinsicall y uncontrollabl e powe r in th e hand s o f ever y system' s authorities. 15 Moreover , notoriou s problems associate d wit h aggregatin g persona l preference s rais e serious doubts about th e underlyin g notio n o f collective rationality .

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And, wha t i s no t a n entirel y separat e point , i t i s almos t inevitabl e that a system' s primar y end s ten d t o functio n t o som e exten t a s ideals, creating , i n th e presenc e o f discretionar y powers , specia l danger o f selectiv e enforcemen t o f th e system' s rule s an d othe r abuses o f authorit y no t easil y detecte d no r convincingl y demon strated i n particula r cases . The foregoin g i s mean t t o sugges t tha t ther e ar e inheren t o r natural proclivitie s o f normativ e system s which , i f no t carefull y curtailed wil l destro y wha t I propos e t o cal l system, namely , tha t ensemble o f properties o f normative system s tha t tend s t o mak e suc h structures reasonabl e an d effectiv e mechanism s t o obtai n th e specia l benefits o f relativel y long-ter m collectiv e effort . I have i n mind , a s a prominent (bu t b y n o means ) sol e constituen t o f thi s ensemble , th e sizable discretio n a t th e disposa l o f ever y system' s officials . Eve n i f this discretion coul d b e eliminated, i t would b e a mistak e t o do so ; it would crippl e a system' s capacit y fo r adaptive , resourcefu l pursui t and developmen t o f it s basi c end s an d s o depriv e i t o f a primar y virtue o f normativ e system s generally. 16 O f course , officials ' discre tion remain s a familia r an d reasonabl e basi s fo r concern , sinc e i t is , experience shows , a powerfu l temptatio n t o wrongdoing . Bu t th e crucial poin t i s this: ther e i s no wa y t o eliminate th e dange r o r eve n to monito r i t effectively , withou t destroyin g it , fo r discretio n i s mos t valuable i n connectio n wit h matter s tha t ar e no t easil y o r wisel y subjected t o rules . Discretion i s thu s a n essentia l featur e o f system . I t contribute s substantially t o th e capacit y o f normativ e system s t o respon d effectively t o th e unexpected , t o smoot h ou t an d t o allocat e sensibl y unanticipated benefit s an d burdens , an d s o on . Bu t th e risk s ar e rampant. I n sum , discretio n i s a dangerou s virtue , confrontin g u s with th e frustratin g tas k o f defendin g agains t i t withou t doin g i t harm. At a mor e genera l level , governanc e b y standin g rule s (a s opposed, say , t o short-live d edict s o r momentar y directives ) i s another crucia l featur e o f system . Throug h rules , member s o f a normative syste m ca n maximall y contribut e t o an d participat e i n the upsho t o f coordinated , collectiv e effor t an d the y ca n enjo y a s well th e importan t benefi t o f reasonabl e foreknowledg e abou t certain o f thei r ow n activitie s an d th e activitie s o f others . Plainly , not al l structure s fo r coordinatin g huma n activit y ca n b e counte d

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on fo r such virtue s (the errati c directive s o f a despot, fo r example). 17 Of course , ther e i s a certai n tensio n i n al l o f this , fo r i t ha s alread y been contende d tha t flexibility i s a virtu e o f normativ e systems . So , without pretendin g t o solv e th e problem , i t shoul d b e note d i n passing that—t o th e exten t tha t th e developmen t o r evolutio n o f a rule o r se t o f rule s ca n b e anticipate d b y it s addressees—th e possibility o f effective , nondisruptiv e complianc e i s enhanced . It shoul d als o b e note d tha t th e benefit s o f governanc e b y rul e tend t o b e maximize d wher e individua l member s compl y i n th e belief tha t the y an d other s stan d t o gai n thereb y an d eac h i s confident tha t other s shar e thi s view . I n fact , i n al l o f thes e matters , second-order effect s ar e o f specia l importance. 18 Thus , i t i s no t enough that , i n fact , a system i s impeccabl y rulis h o r has exemplar y (say, easil y anticipated ) developmenta l patterns . Member s mus t themselves hav e confidence tha t thi s is so and the y mus t believ e tha t one anothe r believe s i t a s well . Finally , an d mos t importantly , wit h respect t o th e entir e ensembl e o f qualities , member s mus t b e confident the y wil l receiv e a n earl y warning o f an y seriou s erosion o f system—ideally, earl y enoug h t o permi t withdrawal , t o minimiz e private losses , to avoi d th e ris k o f special , disproportionat e harm s t o themselves.

VII. T H E MAINTENANC E O F SYSTE M The purpos e o f introducin g th e ide a o f system an d o f discussing a few o f it s constituent s ha s bee n t o dra w attentio n t o som e o f th e dominant strategies , virtue s an d danger s peculia r t o normativ e systems an d t o indicat e tha t th e achievemen t o f syste m i s bot h th e means b y whic h th e specia l benefit s o f collectiv e effor t ca n b e realized an d th e sourc e o f specia l danger s agains t whic h adequat e provision i s no t onl y advisabl e bu t i s positivel y promotiv e o f a system's undertaking . Thi s comple x o f consideration s provides , I believe, th e materia l fo r a genuine alternativ e t o th e Mora l Integrit y view o f du e process . Boldy stated , th e primar y concer n o f du e proces s i s th e mainte nance o f syste m (t o b e distinguishe d from , thoug h relate d to , th e overall succes s o f thi s o r tha t normativ e system) . I t consist s largel y of a se t o f procedure s designe d t o assur e member s tha t the y wil l b e amply informe d abou t th e conditio n o f system , that , fo r example ,

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officials an d other s wil l b e suitabl y compelle d t o confron t openl y and publicl y th e troublesom e implication s o f a system' s operations , including, amon g othe r things , it s leve l o f effectivenes s relativ e t o stated aims , th e occurrenc e o f unauthorize d change s i n thos e aims , dangerous accumulation s o f power , an d unacceptabl e harm s t o assignable individuals . Obviously , ther e ar e man y goo d reason s fo r insisting o n procedure s suc h a s these , bu t fro m th e perspectiv e o f th e view o f du e proces s bein g develope d here , th e overridin g considera tion i s this : onl y i f suc h provision s ar e mad e ca n member s reasonably an d confidentl y suppos e tha t thei r collectiv e aim s ar e being pursue d throug h th e us e o f system , tha t th e potentia l advantages o f thi s mod e o f grou p actio n ar e indee d i n th e offin g (o r that the y ar e a t leas t bein g activel y pursued) , an d tha t ther e exis t suitable safeguard s agains t th e considerabl e risk s involved . Wher e reasonable ground s fo r thi s confidenc e ar e lacking , member s ca n safely assum e tha t th e primar y advantage s o f normativ e system s ar e not i n fac t available . And , a s wa s indicate d above , thi s assumptio n tends t o b e powerfull y self-fulfilling . This accoun t o f du e process , wha t I shal l cal l th e Maintenanc e o f System vie w (hereafter , MS) , presuppose s tha t w e hav e a t ou r disposal satisfactor y way s o f detectin g i n advanc e an y threatenin g inroads agains t syste m and , a s a relate d matter , tha t ther e ar e persons suitabl y motivate d an d properl y informe d t o issu e reliabl e warnings abou t th e conditio n o f system . Fortunately , ther e are , i t seems, fe w difficultie s here . First , a ful l stud y o f normativ e s y s t e m s something goin g wel l beyon d thes e sketch y efforts—woul d ampl y detail numerou s point s o f primar y concer n o r interest , point s o f special danger , o r specia l value , o r both . Eve n th e presen t effor t ha s indicated enoug h abou t normativ e system s t o mak e i t obviou s tha t they (especiall y lega l systems ) ten d t o involv e a n accumulatio n o f power th e abus e o f whic h coul d easil y b e maske d if , say , certai n forms o f compulsor y self-incriminatio n wer e i n an y wa y tolerated . Similarly, i t i s clear tha t a n importan t defens e agains t abus e o f thi s power i s assuranc e tha t officia l directio n i s mainl y b y mean s o f rules—as oppose d t o momentar y directives—fo r th e latte r ar e no t s o easily assimilate d b y th e privat e plan s o f addressee s an d the y thu s tend t o b e disruptiv e an d t o stan d i n greate r nee d o f coerciv e support. Th e way s thi s tend s t o increas e th e danger s o f lif e i n a normative syste m nee d no t b e rehearsed . Second, a s regard s th e availabilit y o f motivate d an d informe d

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parties to activate the appropriate warnings, the answer seems to be relatively simple : a t th e point s judge d especiall y precariou s fo r system, ther e wil l invariabl y b e person s wh o dee m themselve s seriously aggrieve d an d wh o wil l therefor e b e ampl y motivate d t o invoke whateve r procedure s ar e mad e availabl e t o challeng e an d publicize worrisome or otherwise important aspect s of the collective undertaking. Person s who mee t thi s description ca n safely b e relied on t o elicit stead y disclosure s regardin g th e condition o f system. A t the same time, of course, they can be relied on to promote th e wellbeing o f system . I t shoul d b e note d i n passin g tha t M S make s i t quite understandable why due process might com e to be thought o f as procedure s fo r th e protectio n o f assignabl e individual s agains t whom th e syste m contemplate s som e harm , for , accordin g t o MS , aggrieved persons are relied on to process the system. This sharpens the issu e betwee n M S an d othe r account s o f du e process : fro m th e perspective of due process, which should be adopted as basic: (a) th e protection of persons in the face of (perhaps finally justified) harm , or (b ) th e maintenanc e o f system , whic h fo r th e mos t par t only relies o n th e threa t o f persona l har m t o promot e enforcemen t o f rules that ar e themselves designed , a s their first function, t o servic e system? Additional reason s for preferring (b ) ar e detailed below . Our discussio n t o thi s poin t make s i t reasonabl e t o believ e tha t MS would reproduce many of the rules familiarly though t o f as the protections o f procedura l du e process . I t i s easy enoug h t o see , fo r example, tha t th e protectio n o f syste m require s variou s form s o f participation, revelation , an d justification; demand s prope r notic e of officia l action ; preclude s compulsor y self-incrimination , an d s o on. I n fact , a t thi s leve l o f generality , an d especiall y i n connectio n with the law, the Maintenance of System and Moral Integrity views of du e proces s ar e no t easil y distinguishe d b y pointing t o specifi c differences i n thei r respectiv e requirements . Bu t th e differenc e i n underlying rationale s i s nonetheles s pronounced . Fo r example , th e importance o f conformit y betwee n officia l actio n an d announce d rule woul d b e explaine d o n M I i n term s o f a n allege d connectio n between rules, reasons, and morality. By contrast, MS would simpl y point t o th e logica l connectio n betwee n rule s an d system . Th e conceptual gul f between the two views is thus substantial. Bu t there are als o som e ver y importan t practica l differences , especiall y a t what migh t b e termed th e motivationa l level . The Mora l Integrit y vie w take s a s it s poin t o f departur e a n

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assumed antagonis m betwee n collectiv e undertaking s an d th e preservation o f one' s statu s a s a mora l being . I t i s thu s concerne d t o identify unacceptabl e harm s an d t o adop t procedure s t o guar d against them . O n thi s view, th e proces s a syste m owe s it s member s i s what i s require d t o protec t the m a s mora l agent s fro m harm s th e system migh t otherwis e inflict . Th e perspectiv e woul d see m t o encourage a relativel y stati c regar d fo r essentiall y privat e worth , shared i n b y a system' s member s onl y i n tha t eac h perso n insist s o n it i n hi s ow n case . By contrast , M S emerge s fro m th e qualitie s o f syste m tha t mak e collective effor t attractiv e bu t ar e themselve s peculiarl y liabl e t o degeneration an d abuse . Du e proces s i s thu s conceptuall y tie d t o normative system s an d wha t i s du e i s t o b e discerne d b y attendin g to th e specia l requirement s o f system . Th e dominan t concern , then , is t o proces s system , t o institut e procedure s tha t wil l atten d t o th e special vulnerabilitie s o f syste m whil e preservin g it s valuabl e capacity t o coordinate action , t o reinforc e o r amplif y th e efficac y o f individual effort , t o respon d adaptivel y an d resourcefull y i n th e fac e of changin g circumstances , interest s o r needs . O f course , th e vie w i s by n o mean s obliviou s t o th e severa l way s tha t person s ar e a t ris k a s members o f a normativ e system ; indeed , th e vie w explicitl y seek s t o identify thos e risk s an d t o gai n members ' confidenc e regardin g th e condition o f syste m b y variou s procedura l devices , device s tha t simultaneously enhanc e th e system' s prospect s a s regard s it s basi c aims. Implicit i n th e foregoin g i s th e dee p motivationa l contras t between th e tw o view s tha t I allude d t o above : th e Mora l Integrit y view point s t o th e possibilit y o f harm s t o onesel f o r els e relie s o n a degree o f empath y fo r th e harm s other s migh t suffer , wherea s M S emphasizes th e direc t interes t eac h membe r ha s i n th e concern s o f due process , fo r i t show s ho w thes e concern s ar e relate d t o th e well being o f member s an d o f syste m an d t o th e overal l succes s o f th e collective undertaking . Mor e pointedly , M S make s i t possibl e t o se e demands fo r du e process , one' s ow n a s wel l a s others' , a s somethin g other tha n a charg e o n th e commo n good , o r somethin g othe r tha n what mus t b e tolerate d s o tha t essentiall y privat e harm s ca n b e avoided o r redressed . I n sum , i t appear s tha t th e latte r vie w doe s a superior jo b o f conceptuall y linkin g du e proces s an d normativ e systems, o f identifyin g a t leas t som e relativel y objectiv e considera -

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tions indicatin g th e appropriat e conten t o f du e process , an d o f making availabl e motivationa l suppor t fo r th e concern s o f du e process tha t i s both privatel y compellin g an d properl y supportiv e o f the collectiv e enterprise . Against M S i t i s likel y t o b e objecte d tha t b y focusin g o n system , justice i s no t don e th e commonplac e belie f tha t du e proces s i s predominantly a mora l precept ; an d failur e i n thi s regar d i s surel y objectionable, perhap s callin g int o questio n whethe r th e vie w i s genuinely abou t du e proces s a t all . Moreover , eve n i f th e objection s against th e Mora l Integrit y vie w ar e wel l taken , ther e ar e othe r ways t o lin k du e proces s an d morality . I propos e briefl y t o examin e two suc h alternative s befor e confrontin g th e suggestio n tha t M S seriously de-moralize s du e process .

VIII. T H E INTERACTIONA L VIE W It migh t b e though t tha t th e notio n o f syste m i s entirel y superfluous, tha t a morall y compellin g pictur e o f du e proces s migh t be draw n directl y fro m som e fairl y simpl e presupposition s pertain ing t o certai n essentia l interaction s betwee n a system' s official s an d its subjects . Th e require d interaction s occu r i n tw o ways : on e objectively, b y mean s o f rules , an d th e othe r subjectively , b y mean s of certai n share d intentions , purpose s o r goals . Plainly , interactio n by rul e i s possible , a s wa s note d before , onl y i f th e rule s ar e b y an d large followable ; i f the y ar e publicized , no t change d to o frequently , not impossibl e t o perform , consisten t wit h on e another , intelligible , prospective rathe r tha n retroactive , an d s o on . Unles s th e conditio n of followabilit y i s met , conduc t canno t b e subjecte d t o th e governance o f rules ; subject s canno t guid e thei r conduc t b y reference t o wha t i s no t followable . O f course , followabl e rule s nee d not b e followed . Som e motiv e mus t b e a t hand , and , excep t fo r dominantly coerciv e systems , thi s wil l usuall y tak e th e for m o f a second interactio n betwee n officials , namely , a commitmen t t o certain share d aim s o r goal s whic h official s see k t o promot e b y means o f th e rule s the y formulate . At thi s point , al l tha t i s neede d i s th e confidenc e o f th e pertinen t parties tha t th e announce d rule s wil l indee d b e applie d i n th e manner indicate d an d tha t thos e rule s will b y an d larg e b e observe d by th e person s t o who m the y ar e addressed . Presumably , on e

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element o f the neede d confidenc e depend s o n th e fac t tha t th e ac t o f promulgating a publi c rul e ha s a socia l meaning ; tha t it s addressee s can depen d o n it , tha t i t is—i n effect—an invitatio n t o the m t o orde r pertinent aspect s o f thei r live s i n accor d wit h it s direction . A s regards th e othe r sid e o f th e relationship , perhap s th e followin g observation suffices : b y participatin g i n a system , b y sharin g i n it s benefits o r by indicatin g a claim t o those benefits , subject s expres s t o officials an d t o on e anothe r thei r commitmen t t o th e system' s underlying aims ; the y thu s indicat e a preparednes s t o subjec t pertinent aspect s o f thei r conduc t t o th e governanc e o f rules. 19 Surely i t i s no t farfetche d t o sugges t tha t thes e interaction s between an d amon g subject s an d official s yiel d a networ k o f interlocking expectation s havin g al l o f th e mora l impor t o f th e promissory configuration s the y closel y resemble . Moreover , som e o f these interaction s quit e obviousl y presuppos e tha t certai n basi c requirements o f du e proces s ar e satisfied ; th e implication s o f "governance b y rule " ar e alon e enoug h t o ensur e thi s result . I t would seem , then , tha t th e Interactiona l View , a s I shal l cal l i t (hereafter, IV) , hold s promis e o f providin g a compellin g mora l foundation o f du e process . But I V i s no t withou t it s defects . Perhap s th e mos t seriou s on e i s that i t appears t o limi t th e protection s o f due proces s t o what ca n b e gleaned fro m th e presupposition s o r implication s o f th e notio n o f governance b y rule . An d i n thi s ther e seem s t o b e nothin g tha t would, fo r example , ba r th e us e o f stomac h pump s a s a wa y t o obtain evidence , preclud e othe r objectionabl e kind s o f compulsor y self-incrimination, includin g outrageou s searche s an d seizures , o r entitle on e t o a hearin g whe n propert y i s t o b e take n fo r th e publi c good. Th e proble m i s this : I V sketche s th e basi s fo r reciproca l restrictions o n subject s an d officials , bu t thos e restriction s pertai n mainly an d onl y generall y t o th e nee d t o observ e announce d rules . They are , therefore , almos t completel y uninformativ e abou t th e special way s i n whic h a system , eve n b y rule , might , bu t shoul d not , impinge o n it s members . I n sum , I V seem s t o b e mor e promisin g a s an accoun t o f th e principle s o f legalit y tha n a s a n accoun t o f du e process. Fo r th e latte r purposes , I V i s just to o limited. 20 I can imagine , however , a slightly les s literal understandin g o f th e Interactional View , emphasizin g th e fac t tha t th e vie w dispense s

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with al l reference s t o system , tha t i t focuse s instea d o n identifyin g and attachin g mora l significanc e t o th e severa l importan t way s tha t officials an d subject s mus t interac t i n normativ e systems . Thi s characterization ha s th e appealin g qualit y o f remindin g u s tha t normative system s ar e comprise d o f persons , bu t i t shoul d als o remind u s o f th e considerabl e perplexit y tha t official s an d subject s themselves hav e abou t thei r respectiv e responsibilitie s an d rightfu l expectations. Fo r example, mos t participant s i n normativ e systems officials an d subject s alike—understan d tha t subject s ma y appropri ately b e require d t o suffe r certai n kind s o f officia l conduc t th e private analogue s o f whic h woul d almos t certainl y b e morall y objectionable. Bu t ther e i s muc h dispute , muc h uncertainty , abou t particular case s an d abou t kind s o f harms . B y eliminatin g al l reference t o syste m an d b y representin g official s an d subject s a s morally interchangeabl e unit s wh o jus t happe n t o b e differentl y situated i n th e backgroun d structure , I V woul d see m t o b e unilluminating a s regard s mora l issue s tha t ar e peculia r t o norma tive systems , fo r example , a s regard s whethe r a consistent , morall y defensible syste m migh t i n specia l case s plac e official s an d subject s under contrary directives , say, confer a right o n subject s t o do X bu t mandate official s t o tak e som e unfavorabl e actio n agains t thos e wh o do X. 21 Thoug h suc h a n issu e surel y ha s bearin g o n matter s o f du e process (eve n o h IV' s narro w characterizatio n o f thi s domain) , I V i s totally uninformative . The perspectiv e provide d b y th e Interactiona l Vie w doe s mak e i t relatively eas y t o se e tha t seriou s tension s migh t aris e betwee n essentially privat e concern s an d th e achievemen t o f th e share d end s out o f whic h a give n normativ e syste m emerges . Bu t th e vie w seem s to b e fa r mor e informativ e abou t th e existenc e condition s o f suc h systems tha n i t i s helpfu l abou t th e ongoin g problem s involve d i n understanding an d effectivel y resolvin g th e tension s allude d t o above. I t seem s bette r suite d t o explainin g th e basi s o f officials ' an d subjects' interlockin g obligation s i n som e properl y processe d syste m than i n identifyin g an d accountin g fo r th e restriction s tha t suc h a system woul d observe . Moreover , I V i s misleading. I t simpl y ignore s the importan t fac t tha t th e ide a o f an officia l i s conceptually tie d t o the ide a o f a normativ e syste m an d t o th e achievemen t o f share d goals i n a very specia l way . Tha t wa y includes , o f course, th e ide a o f

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governance b y rule , bu t b y flexible rule , an d sometime s unrulishly , as M S rightl y emphasizes . I n brief , i t seem s tha t th e situatio n i s fa r more complicate d tha n th e Interactiona l Vie w ca n accommodate .

IX. T H E MORA L AGEN T VIE W In searc h o f a n underlyin g rational e fo r du e process , an d a s a n alternative t o MS , w e hav e considere d tw o way s o f linkin g du e process an d morality . On e wa y treate d du e proces s a s th e pro cedures a normativ e syste m mus t observ e i f th e mora l agenc y o r moral integrit y o f it s member s i s t o b e respected . Th e othe r wa y focused o n certai n quasi-promissor y configuration s (associate d wit h the attemp t t o realiz e certai n share d end s b y mean s o f rules ) tha t emerge fro m th e essentia l interaction s o f a system' s official s an d subjects. I n bot h o f thes e efforts , th e directive s o f interpersona l morality wer e applie d directl y t o person s an d t o normativ e system s in a n attemp t t o discove r ho w th e latte r shoul d b e require d t o behave. Bu t possibl y ther e i s anothe r wa y t o mak e thi s determina tion, nonetheles s preservin g som e interestin g lin k wit h morality . It i s undeniabl e tha t normativ e system s ar e no t person s an d i t might b e contended , contrar y t o th e previou s efforts , tha t th e substantive provision s o f interpersona l moralit y canno t b e applie d directly t o normativ e systems . However , grantin g thi s doe s no t foreclose th e possibilit y o f linking du e proces s and morality , fo r eve n if the only moralit y w e hav e i s interpersonal i n character, w e ar e no t restricted t o usin g it s substantive provisions . Thus , th e difference s between normativ e system s an d person s ar e no t s o grea t a s t o mak e the followin g questio n absurd : wha t qualities—presumabl y ex pressed i n term s o f variou s way s o f conductin g business—woul d normative system s hav e t o hav e i f the y wer e t o maximiz e thei r resemblance t o mora l agents ? Th e answer , derive d fro m ou r standard notio n o f a mora l agent , woul d describ e th e requirement s of du e process , o r s o th e Mora l Agen t vie w (hereafter , MA ) woul d propose. In connectio n wit h MI , i n ou r effor t t o determin e wha t i s required o f normativ e system s t o respec t th e mora l statu s o f thei r members, w e ha d occasio n t o conside r th e natur e o f a mora l agent . The element s identifie d ther e ca n b e cite d again , thi s tim e t o la y th e

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foundation fo r a brie f sketc h o f th e qualitie s tha t a normativ e system woul d hav e i f its resemblance t o mora l agent s o f a kin d wer e to b e maximized . I t wa s propose d tha t mora l agent s ar e i n som e sense rational , tha t the y ar e capabl e o f perceivin g thei r action s a s being o f thi s kin d o r that , an d tha t the y ar e concerne d t o mak e sense o f thei r lives , t o pla n an d organiz e thei r activitie s an d effort s in way s though t t o b e sensibl e an d satisfying . The y als o hav e a certain amoun t o f self-respect , a sens e o f persona l wort h o r dignit y and the y hav e a t leas t a minima l regar d fo r others , including , probably, a dispositio n t o hono r o r respec t wha t the y tak e t o b e th e equal wort h o f all othe r mora l agents . A s before , ther e i s no nee d t o insist o n exactl y thes e elements . Wha t w e see k no w i s som e indication o f th e for m thes e qualitie s woul d tak e i n connectio n wit h normative systems . Presumably, respec t fo r othe r mora l agent s woul d appea r a s a high degre e o f congruenc e betwee n officia l actio n an d announce d rules an d woul d includ e variou s mechanism s fo r ensurin g member s an appropriat e leve l o f participatin g i n th e system' s activitie s an d providing explanation s o f an d justification s fo r action s propose d o r taken. Th e concer n t o understan d sel f an d other s woul d probabl y also b e reflecte d i n systemati c an d pervasiv e effort s t o gathe r information regardin g circumstances , need s an d interest s o f a system's members , an d t o fashion , o n a n ongoin g basis , a publi c statement o f th e system' s dominan t aims . O f specia l importance — also strongl y associate d wit h th e requiremen t o f respec t fo r others would b e a pervasive , probin g effor t t o detect a system's interaction s with othe r systems , an d a n effor t t o understan d an d t o tak e int o account thei r implication s fo r a system' s ow n member s an d fo r th e members o f othe r systems . M A appear s t o b e especiall y effectiv e a t focusing attentio n o n th e clashin g obligation s an d tangle d loyaltie s that interactin g system s ca n creat e fo r thei r members . Th e Mora l Agent vie w woul d n o doub t issu e i n procedure s t o scrutiniz e thi s interplay, requiring , perhaps , th e developmen t o f a fairl y com prehensive vie w abou t th e relativ e importanc e o f th e end s o f variou s normative system s an d abou t th e way s importan t conflict s shoul d be resolved . Effort s t o comply wit h thi s requiremen t can , I think, b e counted o n t o generat e man y o f th e familia r provision s o f pro cedural du e process . Finally , a syste m migh t b e though t o f a s

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rational (thoug h no t necessaril y reasonable ) t o th e exten t tha t i t act s purposively, wit h a n end-in-view , an d a commitmen t t o som e degree o f efficienc y i n connectio n wit h selecte d ends . All o f thi s i s admittedly quit e vague , bu t i t illustrate s wel l enoug h the procedura l pattern s tha t a normativ e syste m woul d hav e t o exhibit wer e it , a s M A requires , t o maximiz e it s resemblanc e t o moral agents . T o th e exten t tha t thes e pattern s overla p wit h th e standard requirement s o f du e process , ther e i s suppor t fo r th e contention tha t M A provide s a suitabl y "moralized " accoun t o f du e process. What ca n b e sai d abou t thi s vie w o f du e process ? It s strength , I think, revolve s aroun d th e attentio n i t directl y accord s normativ e systems a s morall y significan t unit s o n th e socia l scene . I t doe s thi s primarily i n tw o relate d ways . First , i t remind s u s tha t althoug h normative system s ar e no t persons , the y ar e manage d b y persons ; they ar e susceptibl e t o strikingl y simila r kind s o f mora l deficiencie s (a narro w egoism , fo r example) , an d the y ar e entirel y capabl e o f inflicting seriou s mora l har m o n others . Second , th e vie w support s our firm convictio n tha t anythin g tha t affect s ou r live s s o directly , powerfully an d purposivel y a s normativ e systems , mus t someho w b e held responsibl e fo r it s activitie s an d thei r consequences . I t mus t b e subject t o mora l assessment , eve n if , a s M A suggests , som e kin d o f elaborate analog y i s required t o prepar e i t fo r ou r mora l apparatus , to mak e tha t syste m o f consideration s applicabl e t o thes e comple x social structures . But th e view' s strengt h i s als o it s weakness , o r s o i t seem s t o me . When w e spea k o f holdin g a normativ e syste m responsibl e fo r it s activities, w e mean—o r shoul d mean—tha t w e shal l rejec t effort s o n the par t o f a system' s official s t o escap e responsibilit y fo r thei r actions b y makin g uncritica l referenc e t o th e system' s ends . There is , however, n o nee d t o hol d normativ e system s responsibl e directly , whatever tha t migh t mean ; indeed , th e attemp t t o d o s o b y perceiving system s a s mora l agent s o f a kin d i s quit e likel y t o hav e the untowar d consequenc e tha t normativ e system s wil l themselve s come t o b e regarde d a s rightholders , a s claimant s agains t thei r members, i n somethin g othe r tha n th e fiduciary capacit y w e normally attribut e t o them . An d wha t i s tru e i n thi s regar d hold s overall i n connectio n wit h th e effor t t o conceiv e o f normativ e systems a s mora l agent s o f a kind . Thes e system s ar e dangerou s

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enough withou t strainin g t o se e the m i n thi s light , a s entitie s tha t may compet e o n equal mora l footin g wit h persons . Arguably, m y suggestio n tha t M A woul d plac e person s an d system o n equa l mora l footin g i s entirel y gratuitous . I t i s fai r t o note, however , tha t M A provide s n o ground s fo r an y othe r assumption. Havin g prepare d normativ e system s a s mora l agents , the vie w woul d appea r t o sto p disappointingl y shor t o f providin g any guidanc e regardin g th e interaction s o f system s an d subjects , evidently leavin g t o som e regio n o f morality , o r t o som e mora l doctrine othe r tha n du e process , th e entir e tas k o f unraveling , assessing an d integratin g th e tangle d interest s tha t typif y lif e i n a rule-governed enterprise . I f so , M A manage s t o fashio n a lin k between du e proces s and moralit y onl y b y leavin g i n utte r darknes s the mora l issue s tha t probabl y matte r mos t i n normativ e systems ; for example , ho w th e sometime s clashin g interest s o f assignabl e members and th e system' s declared end s are t o b e resolved. Finally , embedded i n MA' s basi c strateg y i s th e amiabl e bu t disputabl e assumption tha t substantiv e an d procedura l issue s ar e neatl y separable: tha t th e assignmen t o f value s t o conflicting interest s ca n be mad e withou t referenc e t o procedura l provisions , an d tha t th e adequacy o f procedures ca n b e determined withou t attentio n t o th e way conflicting value s are assessed . X. CONCLUSIO N The foregoin g material s explore d thre e way s o f understandin g due proces s i n term s o f morality: b y conceivin g o f it s requirement s as designe d t o respec t th e mora l integrit y o f a system' s member s (MI); t o fulfil l th e quasi-promissor y implication s o f seekin g share d ends b y mean s o f rule s (IV) ; an d t o qualif y normativ e system s themselves a s mora l agent s o f a kin d (MA) . Th e view s hav e bee n faulted o n a variet y o f grounds : fo r relyin g to o strongl y o n th e separability o f substanc e an d process ; fo r inadequatel y motivatin g support fo r du e proces s claims ; fo r distortin g th e identity , nature , and interaction s o f th e partie s involve d i n normativ e systems ; an d for failin g t o direc t attentio n t o an d illuminat e thos e specia l qualities o f normativ e system s tha t mak e the m o f suc h grea t practical an d mora l importance . Bu t I suspec t tha t non e o f thes e objections i s conclusiv e agains t th e proposal s a t whic h the y hav e

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been levelled . I t migh t wel l b e tha t a t an y give n tim e th e requirements o f du e proces s ar e indee d th e outcom e o f a n ongoin g battle betwee n privat e an d collectiv e interest s an d tha t i t i s a virtue—not a defect—o f th e Mora l Integrit y vie w tha t i t highlight s this fact , remindin g us , perhaps , tha t th e protection s du e proces s affords depen d finally o n th e powe r an d persistenc e o f persona l vigilance an d concern . Moreover , I hav e n o doub t tha t fa r mor e than thre e way s coul d b e foun d t o moraliz e du e process . Still , th e problems discusse d i n connectio n wit h thes e thre e view s provid e some reaso n fo r thinkin g tha t th e underlyin g effort , th e attemp t t o explicate du e proces s a s a direc t derivativ e o f morality , i s mis directed. This , anyway , i s th e dominan t them e o f thes e concludin g remarks. It is , I think , quit e understandabl e tha t w e shoul d tur n t o morality i n hope s o f findin g th e basi c them e o r tas k o f du e process . Normative systems , th e onl y kin d o f entit y t o whic h th e notio n o f due proces s ha s application , ar e capabl e o f causin g grea t harm , a capacity, experience shows , tha t ha s bee n realize d al l to o frequently . Fortunately, however , the y ar e manage d b y person s and , lik e persons, the y ar e amenabl e t o huma n regulatio n an d control , though mos t easily , perhaps , i n connectio n wit h th e way s decision s are made an d implemented . I t would b e foolish , then , t o allo w thes e powerful structure s t o exer t thei r forc e wit h mora l abandon . Lik e persons, the y mus t b e brough t unde r th e stricture s o f morality , a t least a s regard s basi c operatin g procedures . If th e foregoin g sketc h ha s an y validity , th e deman d fo r a mora l explication o f du e proces s trade s heavil y o n a n analog y betwee n normative system s an d persons , a n analog y tha t i s quit e compellin g until th e attemp t i s made t o discern i n an y detai l just wha t moralit y requires o f a system' s procedures . Then , a s wa s remarke d a t th e outset o f th e presen t investigations , th e difference s betwee n person s and system s loo m large : unlik e persons , normativ e system s ar e comprised o f persons ; unlik e persons , normativ e system s hav e n o value asid e fro m thei r contribution s t o th e well-bein g o r happines s of persons , an d s o on . Surel y thes e an d othe r difference s ar e amon g the things tha t imperil , a t th e ver y outset, an y effor t t o provide wha t I hav e calle d a "moral " accoun t o f du e process . But I suspec t ther e i s a furthe r an d deepe r difficult y confrontin g such efforts . I t ha s t o d o wit h th e fac t that , thoug h normativ e systems ar e no t persons , the y ar e nonetheles s a functiona l uni t o f

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dominant importanc e o n th e socia l scene . I n fact , the y ar e th e primary mechanis m w e hav e fo r advancin g a centra l concer n o f morality, th e coordinatio n an d harmonizatio n o f huma n energies , efforts an d plans . Issue s o f metaphysica l reductionis m aside , w e shall, I suspect , los e touc h wit h wha t i s morall y mos t importan t about normativ e system s i f we insis t o n thinkin g o f the m a s person s of a kind o r as mere complexes o f variously situate d persons , some o f them officials , other s subjects . Onl y whe n the y ar e perceive d a s systems o f flexible rules—muc h i n nee d o f resourcefu l managemen t and developmen t an d greatl y dependen t o n a fragil e networ k o f confidences linkin g subjects an d officials—i s i t possibl e t o discern th e special causa l an d conceptua l tie s betwee n procedura l du e proces s and th e centra l aim s o f moralit y generally . I f I a m righ t abou t this , then wha t seem s bot h mor e pressin g an d mor e promisin g tha n a moralized accoun t o f du e process , i s a deepene d understandin g o f the working s o f normativ e systems , especiall y o f th e natur e o f system and th e condition s require d fo r it s emergenc e an d maintenance . Presumably, tha t understandin g woul d indicat e th e kind s o f procedures normativ e system s shoul d observe . I t woul d als o provid e the basi s fo r informed , particula r mora l jdugment s abou t th e impact o f a particula r system' s procedures . As I hav e argue d thoughou t thi s paper , th e Maintenanc e o f System accoun t i s thus properl y inten t o n understandin g th e specia l strategies, virtue s an d vulnerabilitie s typicall y associate d wit h normative system s an d t o indicat e thereb y th e procedure s neede d t o maintain an d promot e system . I t i s clear , though , tha t M S thu s forgoes th e ide a o f shapin g a system' s procedure s s o a s t o brin g i t directly unde r morality' s rule . Doe s i t als o de-moraliz e du e process ? Only, I think , conceptually , fo r it s contribution t o th e mora l virtue s of normativ e system s an d t o th e qualit y o f live s live d therei n promises t o b e greate r tha n wha t coul d b e expecte d wer e w e t o accept th e guidanc e o f th e moralize d accounts . An d i t i s a goo d thing t o improv e th e mora l qualit y o f normativ e systems , eve n i f that involve s de-moralizin g a concept .

NOTES 1. Th e lis t i s borrowed fro m Lo n Fuller' s specification o f th e principle s of legality i n The Morality of Law (New Haven : Yale University Press , 1964), p . 39 . Th e suggestio n tha t mos t o f th e entrie s pertai n t o

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followability come s fro m Davi d Lyons' s paper , "Th e Interna l Moral ity o f Law/ ' Aristotelia n Societ y Proceeding s 1970-71 , 105 , 109 . 2. Sanfor d Kadish , "Methodolog y an d Criteri a i n Du e Proces s Ad judication—A Surve y an d Criticism, " 6 6 Yal e La w Journa l (1957) , 319-63. 3. Ibid. , p . 341. 4. Ibid. , p . 340 . 5. Ibid . 6. Se e Kennet h J . Arrow , The Limits of Organization (Ne w York : W.W . Norton & Co. , Inc. , 1974) , Chapte r I , especiall y pp . 24-25 . 7. Ibid. , p . 16 . 8. Kadish , "Methodolog y an d Criteria, " p . 347 . 9. Ibid. , p . 348-49 . 10. Ibid. , p . 347 . 11. Ibid. , p . 343 . 12. Ibid. , p . 35 0 ff. 13. Arrow , 77? * Limits of Organization, Chapters I an d IV . 14. Fuller , The Morality of Law, pp . 79-81 . 15. O n th e eliminability o f discretion see , generally, Kennet h Cul p Davis , Discretionary Justice (Illin i Books , 1971) ; Kadis h an d Kadish , Discretion to Disobey (Stanford : Stanfor d Universit y Press , 1973) , an d Dunca n Kennedy, "Lega l Formality, " 2 J. Lega l Studie s (1973 ) 351 . 16. Kadis h an d Kadish , Discretion to Disobey, Chapter s 1 and 4 . 17. Se e Fuller , The Morality of Law, Chapte r II . 18. Se e Davi d K . Lewis , Convention: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvar d Universit y Press , 1969) . 19. Thi s discussio n i s largel y a ne w applicatio n o f Fuller' s treatmen t o f the principle s o f legality . Hi s purpose s ar e differen t fro m thos e bein g attributed t o th e Interactiona l Vie w an d th e criticism s o f tha t view , adduced subsequentl y i n th e text , d o no t appl y t o Fuller' s efforts . 20. Again , Professo r Fulle r bear s n o responsibilit y fo r thi s nove l applica tion o f hi s wor k o n th e principle s o f legality . 21. W e ofte n suppos e tha t "whe n a n individua l ha s correctly decide d tha t he ough t t o d o X , the n an y higher-orde r judgment abou t hi s decisio n to d o X o r hi s ac t o f actuall y doin g i t ough t t o licens e o r approv e of , rather tha n disapprov e o f o r penalize , th e decisio n and/o r th e ac t itself." This, wha t migh t b e calle d th e "reflectio n principle, " ha s bee n challenged b y Rol f Sartoriu s i n "Individua l Conduc t an d Socia l Norms," Ethic s Vol . 8 2 (1972) , 200-218 , principl e state d a t p . 204 .

9 DUE PROCESS IN A NONLEGAL SETTING: AN OMBUDSMAN' S EXPERIENCE DAVID J. DANELSKI

As a universit y ombudsman , I wa s especiall y intereste d i n Fran k Michelman's an d Edmun d Pincoffs' s discussio n o f th e mora l an d legal requirement s o f du e proces s i n case s lik e Rot h v . Boar d o f Regents. 1 Severa l person s i n Roth' s positio n hav e sough t m y hel p a s ombudsman i n th e pas t tw o years , and althoug h onl y a fe w o f the m had thei r contracts renewed , al l o f the m wer e give n reason s fo r thei r terminations. Thi s indicate s tha t th e standard s o f du e proces s i n some nonlega l setting s diffe r fro m judicia l du e process . Fo r aca demic ombudsmen , thos e standard s ar e muc h lik e th e standard s discussed b y Michelma n an d Pincoffs . Th e observation s tha t follo w are base d o n m y experienc e a s a n ombudsman . (1) I t i s a mistak e t o dwel l solel y o n th e lega l aspect s o f du e process, particularl y i n case s lik e Roth's , fo r seldo m ar e suc h disputes settle d i n courts . I n fact , th e lesso n o f Roth i s tha t i n suc h cases th e judicial rout e i s a dea d end . Eve n i f Roth had offere d hop e of lega l redress , fe w professor s i n Roth' s positio n woul d g o t o cour t because o f th e cost s involved . Typicall y the y woul d g o t o nonjudi cial agencie s fo r help—facult y academi c freedo m committees , th e American Associatio n o f Universit y Professors , o r a n ombudsman' s

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office—because thos e agencie s ar e mor e likel y tha n court s t o settl e such matter s quickl y an d economically . T h a t i s on e o f th e reason s for th e dramati c increas e i n th e numbe r o f ombudsmen' s office s i n American college s an d universitie s i n recen t years. 2 Another reaso n i s tha t th e vas t majorit y o f complaint s abou t institutional injustic e ar e no t susceptibl e t o judicia l resolution . Although ombudsmen' s procedure s ar e extralegal , the y ar e influ enced b y lega l notion s o f due process . This i s due i n larg e par t t o th e facts tha t du e proces s i s a lega l concep t an d tha t man y ombudsme n are traine d i n th e law . Whe n a du e proces s questio n i s raise d wit h them, th e initia l question s the y ar e ap t t o as k are : D o I hav e jurisdiction? Ha s notic e bee n given ? Ha s ther e bee n a n opportunit y for a hearing ? The n the y ask : Eve n i f al l th e lega l requirement s o f due proces s hav e bee n met , i s th e procedur e fair ? T h e questio n o f fairness rathe r tha n legalit y i s crucial i n everythin g a n ombudsma n does. Bu t wha t ar e th e standard s o f fairness ? I n seekin g t o answe r this question , Michelman' s an d Pincoffs' s idea s ar e ver y useful . (2) Mos t ombudsme n woul d readil y accep t Michelman' s para digm o f du e process . M y ow n procedur e include s it s basi c element s of revelation , participation , an d justification . I n som e ways , ombudsmen ar e i n a bette r positio n tha n judge s t o guarante e thi s conception o f du e process . Lik e judges , the y ar e independen t an d impartial. But—unlik e judges—the y d o no t hav e th e powe r o f binding decision ; thei r powe r i s base d o n mora l authorit y an d persuasion. An d unlik e judges , the y participat e activel y i n th e settlement process ; the y ac t a s investigators , mediators , an d coun selors. The y canno t contro l th e outcom e o f th e settlemen t process , but the y ca n insis t tha t i t b e fair . The genera l procedur e i n m y offic e i s a s follows : (a) Complaint. T h e typica l cas e begin s wit h a complaint . An y person wh o feel s tha t h e o r sh e ha s bee n treate d unfairl y b y anyon e in th e universit y communit y ma y mak e a complaint . T h e righ t t o complain i s i n m y opinio n essentia l t o du e process . T h e complain t procedure i n m y offic e differ s fro m th e complain t procedur e i n courts i n th e followin g respects : First , i t i s informa l an d virtuall y costless. N o traine d intermediary—e.g. , a lawyer—i s necessary , an d no forma l statemen t nee d b e made . Second , complaint s ar e mad e confidentially an d th e identit y o f person s makin g the m i s no t disclosed unles s the y consent . Third , sometime s I initiat e th e

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complaint process . I ma y rea d abou t som e universit y actio n tha t o n its fac e seem s unfair , o r hea r abou t i t fro m a thir d part y an d as k t o see the partie s involved . Fourth , i n som e cases , the principa l effec t o f making a complain t i s catharsis. I n discussin g thei r complaints , i t i s not uncommo n fo r complainant s t o sho w ange r o r othe r emotion . For som e o f them , th e matte r end s there , an d the y as k tha t n o action b e take n o n thei r complaints . Usuall y al l o f th e element s o f Michelman's du e proces s paradig m ar e present—a t leas t incip iently—at th e complain t stage . Revelatio n (thoug h ofte n in complete) usuall y occur s prio r t o complaint , th e ombudsman' s interview wit h th e complainant involve s participation , an d justifica tion i s usuall y discusse d i n th e interview . Sometime s I provid e th e university's justificatio n fo r a n actio n o r rule , illustrat e i t b y discussing simila r cases , and , i f asked , giv e m y opinio n abou t th e matter. Afte r th e initia l interview , occasionall y a complain t wil l b e withdrawn becaus e th e complainan t i s persuade d tha t th e univer sity i s justified i n it s action . (b) Investigation. The purpos e o f investigatio n i s t o determin e the fact s underlyin g th e complain t an d i f possibl e t o settl e th e matter a t thi s stage . Frequentl y investigatio n disclose s fact s no t given b y th e complainant , an d typicall y th e sam e fact s ar e see n differently b y th e partie s t o a dispute . Usuall y I conduc t th e investigation myself , an d i f ther e ar e document s relevan t t o th e dispute, I star t wit h them . I hav e acces s t o virtuall y al l record s an d persons i n th e university . Tw o element s o f Michelman' s paradig m are uppermos t i n m y min d durin g investigations : revelatio n an d justification. I seek fact s t o communicate t o th e complainan t s o tha t revelation ca n b e a s complete a s possible, an d I seek justification fo r the actio n take n o r contemplate d b y th e university . I n a cas e o f nonrenewal o f a n appointmen t o f a professor , I as k th e departmen t chairman o r dea n wh y th e actio n wa s taken . I f th e complainan t suspects tha t hi s o r he r contrac t i s no t bein g renewe d fo r a specifi c reason—e.g., politica l views , poo r teaching , o r a personalit y con flict—I ask whethe r ther e i s an y basi s fo r th e suspicion . Generall y I use th e complainant' s statement s t o m e a s hypothese s t o b e verified . Occasionally th e perso n o r office agains t who m a complaint i s mad e concedes tha t i t i s valid o r a t leas t partiall y valid . I n suc h cases , th e complaint i s easil y settled . Althoug h fact s ca n b e ascertaine d mor e or les s objectively , justificatio n tend s t o b e subjective . Partie s t o

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disputes usuall y understan d this . I n dispute s betwee n student s an d instructors, th e facult y sometime s ask s m e wha t I thin k i s fair , saying beforehand tha t h e or she will abid e b y m y determination . I n some cases , investigatio n show s tha t n o fact s suppor t th e complain t or tha t th e university' s actio n i s justified. I n thos e case s complaint s are usuall y withdrawn . (c) Participation. I encourage complainant s t o participat e i n th e settlement o f thei r ow n complaints . On e o f th e mai n purpose s o f participation, i n m y view , i s th e restoratio n o f relation s tha t mak e the universit y a community . Face-to-fac e discussio n o f complaint s by parties—wit h a n ombudsma n actin g a s mediato r o r observer — often establishe s a factua l basi s fo r settlement , a s well a s th e rule s o r principles governin g th e matter . Conflic t i s common i n thi s phas e o f the settlemen t process , fo r case s i n whic h th e complain t i s concede d to b e vali d o r partly vali d ar e normall y settle d durin g investigation . In m y view , suc h conflic t i s usefu l i n restorin g relation s becaus e i t often bring s represse d feeling s an d grievance s int o th e ope n s o tha t they ca n b e deal t wit h objectively . I t als o permit s th e person s involved t o kno w an d understan d eac h othe r better . I n case s i n which on e o r mor e o f th e partie s refus e t o meet—o r case s i n whic h such meeting s ar e unnecessary—complainan t participatio n i s vi carious, an d I ac t a s a go-between . I f initia l participatio n doe s no t lead t o settlement , sometime s other s ar e brough t int o th e process , and resolutio n o f th e disput e i s attempte d a t a highe r leve l o f th e university administration . Participatio n i s usuall y informal , bu t i n some case s forma l resolutio n i s sought b y resortin g t o a n establishe d grievance procedur e o r arbitration . (d) Settlement. Justificatio n i s crucia l t o settlement . I f th e university canno t justif y actio n regarde d a s unfai r b y a complain ant, settlemen t invariabl y favor s th e complainant . Whe n th e university clearl y justifie s it s action , settlemen t seldo m favor s th e complainant. I f I believ e tha t justification i s clear , th e complainan t usually accept s it . I n case s wher e th e proffere d justificatio n i s unclear o r arguable , I attemp t t o wor k ou t a compromis e settle ment. I n seeking common groun d o n whic h al l ca n stand , I take int o account th e emotiona l dimension s o f th e dispute . I assum e tha t th e parties hav e throughou t acte d i n goo d faith . Wher e possible , I vie w the disput e a s base d o n mistak e an d misunderstanding , an d I avoi d assignments o f blame . I d o m y bes t t o presen t settlement s s o tha t

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they ar e face-saving . I f I d o no t thin k th e justification proffere d i s adequate, I advis e agains t settlemen t an d see k t o mov e th e disput e to anothe r leve l o f th e university , an d i n som e case s eve n ou t o f th e university. I n other words, I seek anothe r roun d o f participatio n bu t with additiona l person s participating . Whe n al l procedure s ar e exhausted an d th e complain t i s rejected , I d o m y bes t t o ge t th e complainant t o accep t th e outcome . I offe r wha t emotiona l suppor t I ca n an d sugges t way s o f copin g wit h th e outcome . I regar d acceptance o f a settlemen t a s importan t s o tha t th e disput e end s and th e person s involve d ca n g o o n workin g an d livin g wit h eac h other. Th e guarante e o f ful l du e process—revelation , participation , and justification—make s i t easie r fo r th e complainan t an d th e university t o accep t a n advers e settlement . A perso n whos e com plaint i s rejecte d know s a t leas t tha t h e o r she ha d a chanc e t o lear n in detai l th e reason s fo r advers e action , tha t ther e wa s a n opportunity t o participat e i n th e resolutio n o f th e dispute , an d tha t an ombudsma n wa s willin g t o hel p a t ever y stag e o f th e process . Cases o f complet e rejectio n o f a complain t occur , bu t no t fre quently. Th e vas t majorit y o f complaint s resul t i n settlement s tha t the partie s ca n accept . (e) Review. Th e investigation , attempt s a t settlement , an d settlement o f eac h complain t ar e recorde d an d late r reviewe d systematically t o determin e th e cause s o f complaints , particularl y recurring complaints . Tha t ofte n require s furthe r investigation , an d that investigatio n usuall y result s i n recommendation s t o person s and group s i n th e universit y wh o hav e policy-makin g responsibility . The mai n purpos e o f thi s stag e o f th e procedur e i s t o us e constructively th e knowledg e obtaine d i n settlin g complaints , t o reduce th e numbe r o f complaints b y eliminatin g thei r causes, an d t o make th e universit y a mor e effectiv e an d mor e just institution . (3) Pincoffs' s discussio n o f th e Kantia n principl e tha t on e shoul d never trea t humanity—whethe r i n onesel f o r another—a s a mer e means i s centra l t o m y work . I us e th e principl e i n makin g arguments tha t I hop e wil l b e th e basi s o f a settlement . I n case s lik e Roth, I appeal t o th e principl e precisel y a s Pincoffs did . I regard i t a s the basi c nor m fo r m y behavio r a s a n ombudsman . No t onl y i s th e principle th e bes t mora l basi s fo r action , i t i s i n m y opinio n als o th e best practica l basi s fo r effectiv e disput e settlement . I t i s perhap s easier t o settl e dispute s politically—b y influencin g th e behavio r o f

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parties t o them . Bu t th e lin e betwee n suc h influenc e an d manipula tion i s thi n o r nonexistent . I f a settlemen t i s manipulated , i t i s no t likely t o b e a s endurin g a s on e chose n freel y b y th e partie s t o a dispute. Further , I fee l tha t trus t an d confidenc e i n m e a s a n ombudsman ar e crucia l i n settlin g disputes , fo r the y enhanc e th e moral authorit y o f m y office . T h e bes t wa y t o ear n th e trus t an d confidence o f partie s t o dispute s i s t o hel p the m bu t no t t o mak e decisions fo r them . T h e principl e operate s i n case s i n whic h I canno t obtain wha t th e complainan t wants . I n case s lik e Roth, I ca n obtai n due proces s fo r th e professor , bu t wha t h e o r sh e reall y want s i s a job. I f th e university' s decisio n i s negativ e afte r investigatio n an d settlement, I d o no t fee l m y responsibilit y i s discharged. I d o wha t I can fo r th e professor , no t onl y t o hel p hi m o r he r accep t th e settlement, bu t eve n t o find a ne w job . Som e migh t sa y tha t goe s beyond th e scop e o f m y office , bu t i f on e accept s th e Kantia n principle, ther e i s n o convenien t stoppin g place . Mora l considera tions ma y requir e behavio r tha t goe s beyon d th e requirement s o f one's office . I stres s tha t I a m describin g m y wor k i n idea l terms . I admi t tha t my behavio r a s ombudsma n doe s no t measur e u p t o thi s ideal , bu t insofar a s i t doe s not , m y procedur e fail s t o attai n th e hig h leve l o f fairness tha t i t should , an d thu s I a m no t a s effectiv e a s I coul d be . (4) Althoug h I agre e wit h Pincoffs' s statemen t tha t a colleg e o r university presiden t i s no t morall y boun d t o atten d t o ever y cr y o f injustice i n hi s o r he r institution , th e questio n remains : doe s th e institution hav e a n obligatio n t o se e tha t someho w th e crie s fo r justice receiv e attention ? Befor e th e judicia l specialist s emerge d i n the West , crie s o f injustic e wer e hear d b y kings . Thi s wa s a time consuming tas k tha t coul d hav e bee n handle d mor e efficientl y b y others, an d eventuall y thi s governmenta l functio n wa s delegate d t o persons w e kno w no w a s judges . Ther e ha s bee n a paralle l development i n recen t year s i n th e establishmen t o f ombudsmen' s offices i n bot h publi c an d privat e institutions . T h e reason s fo r thei r establishment ar e bot h practica l an d moral . On e o f th e reason s fo r the importanc e o f ombudsme n i s tha t the y ar e guarantor s o f du e process. I t i s true, a s Pincoff s point s out , tha t Rot h ha d a contrac t o f employment fo r on e year ; bu t i f hi s universit y ha d a n ombudsman , he ha d a righ t unde r hi s employmen t contrac t t o avai l himsel f o f

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that ombudsman' s services , whic h mean s tha t ver y likel y h e woul d have receive d al l element s o f Michelman' s du e proces s paradigm . He ma y o r ma y no t hav e ha d hi s contrac t renewed , bu t i t i s quit e likely h e woul d hav e bee n give n th e reason s fo r th e university' s action.

NOTES 1. 40 8 U.S . 564(1972). 2. I n 1974 there were ombudsmen's offices i n more than 10 0 colleges and universities in the United States .

10 SOME PROCEDURAL ASPECT S O F MAJORITY RUL E GERALD H. KRAMER

I. I N T R O D U C T I O N The ide a o f du e proces s i n th e broades t sens e entail s som e notio n of procedura l fairnes s o r appropriateness ; or—perhap s mor e accu rately—of appropriat e procedure s an d safeguards , properl y applied , having bee n use d i n th e proces s o f reachin g a decisio n o r outcome . These safeguard s an d principle s rang e fro m broa d principle s t o quite specifi c an d technica l procedura l rules . The particula r bod y o f rules embodie d i n ou r presen t understandin g o f th e concep t i s th e product o f a n historica l evolutionar y proces s i n whic h i t ha s undergone successiv e modificatio n an d refinement . A somewha t analogou s bod y o f principle s an d custom s exist s i n the politica l domain , wher e th e rule s o f orde r o f parliamentar y procedure hav e becom e th e establishe d basi s fo r th e conduc t o f deliberative assemblies , i n whic h th e clas h o f divergen t individua l views an d interest s mus t b e someho w reconcile d an d translate d int o a collectiv e decision . Thes e rules , too , ar e th e resul t o f a lon g evolution, i n whic h judicia l revie w ha s playe d a n importan t role . The root s o f th e moder n rule s o f orde r g o bac k t o eighteenth century codification s o f th e custom s an d practice s whic h ha d evolved i n th e Britis h Hous e o f Commons. However , th e subsequen t 264

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common la w o f parliamentar y procedur e fo r voluntar y nongovern mental assemblie s ha s develope d int o a se t o f procedure s whic h differ i n man y essentia l respect s fro m thos e o f officia l parliamentar y or legislativ e bodies . W e shal l b e exclusivel y concerne d her e wit h the rule s fo r voluntar y groups , a s codifie d i n variou s handbook s o f parliamentary procedure . The pape r i s organize d int o thre e parts . I n th e first, w e examin e the somewha t elusiv e concep t o f th e majorit y principle . I n this , w e can imagin e ourselve s i n th e positio n o f a benevolen t despot , wh o wishes t o respec t th e majorit y principle ; or , alternatively , o f a cour t reviewing th e decisio n o f som e assembly , t o ensur e i t doe s indee d reflect th e wil l o f th e majority . I n eithe r cas e w e suppos e complet e and accurat e knowledg e o f ever y citizen' s preference s fo r th e alternatives i s availabl e an d focu s o n th e questio n o f wha t choic e accords wit h th e majorit y principle . Th e answe r i s no t obvious , an d despite th e importanc e o f thi s issu e fo r democrati c theor y an d fo r legal revie w base d o n th e principl e o f majorit y rule , th e questio n i s one whic h ha s no t receive d a grea t dea l o f attentio n b y politica l philosophers. W e shal l revie w severa l possibl e formalization s o f th e majority principl e an d conside r som e broade r aspect s an d implica tions o f thes e differen t formulations . In a democrati c assembly , decision s ar e mad e b y th e member s themselves, no t b y a benevolen t despo t actin g i n thei r behalf . T o make thes e decision s a particula r voting procedure mus t b e employed , whereby individual s ma y registe r thei r ow n preferences , an d thes e votes ar e aggregate d int o a collectiv e decision . Ther e ar e man y possible suc h method s o f votin g whic h us e som e for m o f majorit y rule i n countin g vote s t o arriv e a t a decision . I n Par t II I w e shal l review severa l commo n ones , includin g thos e presentl y favore d b y current parliamentar y practic e (th e "admissible " procedures) , an d some other s whic h hav e bee n explicitl y o r implicitl y abandone d during th e evolutio n o f th e moder n rule s o f order . I n th e final Par t IV, w e examin e ho w thes e differen t votin g procedure s functio n i n practice, an d particularly , whethe r the y lea d t o decision s consisten t with th e majorit y principle .

II. T H E MAJORIT Y PRINCIPL E The majorit y principl e ha s playe d a centra l rol e i n th e develop ment o f current parliamentar y procedure , a fundamental tes t o f an y

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practice bein g whethe r i t facilitates , o r frustrates , realizatio n o f th e majority wil l i n th e cours e o f a n assembly' s deliberations . Bu t thi s general premise , thoug h ofte n invoke d i n parliamentar y law , i s no t a self-eviden t o r precis e test . T o mak e i t usabl e fo r ou r purposes , w e first nee d a carefu l characterizatio n o f th e somewha t subtl e concep t of "th e majorit y will. " The genera l ide a o f th e majority' s wil l i s clear enoug h whe n ther e are onl y tw o alternatives : i f th e assembl y i s unabl e t o achiev e a complete consensu s afte r reasone d consideratio n o f th e tw o course s of action , the n whicheve r cours e i s favore d b y th e large r numbe r i s the wil l o f th e majority . I n thi s cas e th e concep t i s unambiguous. 1 The notio n i s muc h les s clea r whe n th e choic e involve s thre e o r more alternatives . T o illustrat e som e o f th e problem s an d ambigu ities surroundin g it , conside r a simpl e exampl e o f a n assembl y confronted wit h thre e alternatives : A , B , C (whic h migh t b e thre e candidates competin g fo r a singl e office , o r thre e mutuall y inconsis tent propose d course s o f action) . Le t u s suppose tha t afte r discussio n and consideratio n o f thei r merits , attitude s toward s th e alternative s crystallize int o thre e mai n patterns : ther e i s on e factio n whic h favors A ove r B , an d B ove r C ; anothe r grou p whic h consider s C best an d B secon d best ; an d finally a contingen t whic h rank s the m B, C , A . W e ca n summariz e thes e thre e preferenc e ordering s thus :

Ranking o f Alternatives:

A B C I 40

Faction: Size:

C B A II 35

B C A III 25

Figure 1 What i s th e majorit y wil l here ? Thi s evidentl y depend s o n th e relative size s o f th e factions . I f one o f them—say , grou p I—containe d more tha n hal f th e membership , the n it s preference s woul d constitute th e majorit y will . I n tha t case , it s highes t rankin g alternative ( A i n th e example ) shoul d b e adopted . T o pu t thi s ide a in mor e genera l terms , i f ther e i s som e singl e alternativ e whic h i s ranked firs t b y a majorit y o f voters , w e shal l sa y ther e exist s a

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majority wil l i n favo r o f tha t alternative , accordin g t o th e absolute majority (AM) criterion . The Condorce t Criterio n The difficult y wit h th e absolut e majorit y criterio n i s tha t quit e often n o alternativ e wil l satisf y it . Thi s wil l b e s o i n th e exampl e above, unles s on e o f th e faction s happen s t o contai n ove r hal f th e membership. As the number o f alternatives and faction s increases , it is increasingl y unlikel y tha t an y singl e alternativ e wil l b e ranke d first b y a majority . Th e A M criterio n i s thu s a fundamentall y conservative one, which i n man y situation s will not yiel d a majorit y will. A les s conservativ e principl e ca n b e describe d a s follows . I n th e above example, alternative B is preferred t o A by factions I I and III ; hence (if th e size s of th e faction s ar e a s give n i n Figur e 1 ) B would defeat A in a direct pairwis e vote. B would als o defeat C i n a direc t vote (vi a faction s I an d III) , an d C i n tur n woul d defea t A (vi a factions I I an d III) . Th e patter n o f pairwis e vote s ca n b e sum marized thus :

Figure 2

The pairwis e vote s her e lea d t o a consisten t rankin g o f th e alternatives ( B over C , C ove r A) . The highest-rankin g alternative , B, can defea t eac h o f the other alternative s i n pairwis e votes, and i n that sens e ther e exist s a majorit y wil l i n favo r o f it . I f ther e exist s such a n alternativ e whic h canno t b e defeate d i n an y pairwis e vote , we shal l sa y ther e exist s a majorit y wil l fo r it , accordin g t o th e

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Condorcet criterion (C). Whe n a n alternativ e satisfie s th e Condorce t criterion, w e ca n spea k o f th e majority will , bu t no t o f th e majority's will; sinc e differen t majoritie s wil l for m (I I an d II I o r I an d III , i n the exampl e above ) t o defen d i t agains t it s possibl e rivals . Not e als o that thi s criterio n require s onl y tha t ther e b e a n alternativ e whic h can defea t al l other s i n pairwis e votes , an d henc e ca n b e satisfie d even i f th e pairwis e vote s fai l t o yiel d a consisten t rankin g o f th e remaining alternative . It i s clear tha t a n alternativ e whic h satisfie s th e absolut e majorit y criterion necessaril y als o satisfie s th e Condorce t criterion , an d tha t the convers e nee d no t b e true , a s th e exampl e o f Figur e 2 shows . The Condorce t criterio n i s thu s les s conservativ e tha n th e Absolut e Majority principle . Nevertheless , i t share s wit h th e A M criterio n th e same basi c shortcoming ; tha t i n som e situations , i t wil l fai l t o yiel d any clea r majorit y will . W e ca n sho w thi s wit h th e followin g example, agai n involvin g thre e alternative s an d thre e factions : Ranking o f Alternatives: A

C BA CB I 03

Faction: I Size: 4

B C A I II 03

I 0

Figure 3 Here w e find A preferre d t o B b y I an d II ; B t o C b y I an d III ; an d C preferre d t o A b y faction s I I an d III . Thu s th e pairwis e vote s wil l yield thi s pattern :

Figure 4

The pairwis e vote s lea d t o a n inconsistency , o r cycle; an d ther e i s no alternative whic h satisfie s th e Condorce t criterion , sinc e eac h ca n b e defeated i n som e pairwis e vote .

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Cyclical Majoritie s an d th e Majorit y Principl e Such "cyclica l majorities " ar e no t mer e logica l possibilities , o f infrequent occurrenc e an d littl e consequence . The y d o occu r empirically, hav e bee n observe d i n suc h area s a s th e U.S . Congress , university senat e elections , an d committee s o f variou s kinds . I t i s difficult t o ge t accurat e quantitativ e estimate s o f thei r empirica l frequency, sinc e man y potentia l cycle s wil l g o unnotice d simpl y because th e usua l votin g method s d o no t involv e enoug h paire d comparisons t o reveal thei r existence. I n th e exampl e o f Figur e 3 , fo r example, an y tw o vote s ar e consistent, an d th e cycl e i s revealed onl y by introducin g a previousl y defeate d alternativ e agai n an d takin g a final vote . Fo r k alternatives , a successio n o f k-\ pairwis e vote s wil l permit the m al l t o b e considered , an d th e survivin g alternativ e wil l be a n apparen t winner ; ye t a t leas t one—an d perhap s a s man y a s k2—additional vote s (dependin g o n th e orde r o f voting ) woul d b e needed t o ensur e tha t thi s alternativ e satisfie d th e Condorce t criterion. Mos t commo n votin g procedure s d o no t requir e thes e additional vote s t o b e taken , an d henc e wil l concea l an y cycle s tha t may b e present . Ther e hav e bee n attempt s t o assess , o n a prior i theoretical grounds , th e "probability " o f a cyclica l majorit y fo r varying number s o f voter s an d alternatives . Thes e calculation s assume tha t ever y possibl e individua l rankin g i s equall y likel y fo r each voter , an d tha t ther e i s n o correlatio n amon g voters ' prefer ences. The y indicat e tha t th e probabilit y o f fulfillin g th e Condorce t criterion range s fro m .8 0 fo r five alternative s an d five voters , t o . 5 for te n alternative s an d man y voters , an d approache s zer o a s th e number o f alternative s increases . N o doub t thes e result s exaggerat e the prevalenc e o f cycles , sinc e som e consensu s wil l generall y exis t (i.e., ther e wil l b e som e correlatio n amon g vote r preferences) , an d on man y issue s preference s wil l b e structure d t o som e degre e (i.e . al l orderings wil l no t b e equall y likely) . Nevertheless , th e probabilisti c calculations—other theoretica l considerations—an d th e scant y em pirical evidenc e currentl y availabl e al l sugges t tha t cyclica l major ities ar e b y n o mean s uncommon . When the y ar e present , the y ma y hav e seriou s practica l an d strategic ramifications . Equall y important , the y hav e importan t normative implications . Th e A M an d Condorce t formalization s o f the majorit y principl e ar e incomplete, fo r i n cyclica l majorit y situations suc h a s that describe d i n Figur e 3 , the y wil l fai l t o yiel d a

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majority will . I n suc h cases , th e majorit y principl e become s inapplicable, an d provide s n o guidanc e fo r collectiv e decision . A conservativ e wh o believe s collectiv e actio n ough t t o b e take n only whe n ther e i s a clea r an d compellin g mandat e t o abando n th e status qu o shoul d fin d thi s incompletenes s o f th e majorit y principl e attractive, an d argu e tha t i n situation s wher e n o majorit y wil l exis t the presumptio n shoul d b e fo r inactio n an d th e statu s quo . (O n thi s basis, he migh t eve n argu e fo r th e mor e restrictiv e absolut e majorit y principle ove r th e les s restrictiv e Condorce t formulation. ) Th e consequences fo r judicia l revie w o f parliamentar y proceeding s ar e more ambiguous , thoug h equall y important . I f a n assembly' s decision wa s challenge d o n th e ground s tha t i t di d no t represen t th e majority will , a cour t migh t interpre t thi s broadl y t o mea n tha t th e decision i s invali d unles s i t ca n b e show n t o satisf y th e majorit y principle. I n thi s case , th e incompletenes s o f th e abov e criteri a clearly produce s th e sam e conservativ e bia s i n favo r o f inactio n i n cases wher e n o majorit y wil l exists . A narrowe r interpretatio n o f th e challenge, however , migh t permi t th e decisio n t o stan d unles s i t ca n be shown tha t i t fail s t o satisf y th e majorit y principle , an d tha t som e other actio n o r decisio n does . O n thi s interpretation , th e in completeness o f th e majorit y principl e create s a presumptio n i n favor o f th e challenge d decision . A s w e shal l see , i n case s wher e n o majority wil l exists , th e natur e o f th e decisio n unde r mos t pro cedures depend s t o a larg e exten t o n th e orde r o f voting—o r agenda—which wa s use d t o reac h it ; so , i n thes e cases , th e narrowe r interpretation o f revie w i s i n effec t biase d i n favo r o f thos e individuals o r group s responsibl e fo r th e agenda . I n tha t sense , incompleteness stil l produce s a conservativ e bias , thoug h o f a somewhat differen t sort . For a democra t o f mor e reformis t o r activis t persuasion , th e incompleteness o f th e criteri a considere d s o fa r ma y see m a seriou s defect. Fo r o n thi s view , th e purpos e o f majorit y rul e i s t o choos e that cours e whic h bes t accord s wit h majorit y sentiment—withou t any presumptio n i n favo r o f th e statu s quo , o r o f impose d o r manipulated decision s controlle d b y a few . T h u s a prope r formula tion o f th e majorit y principle—o n thi s view—ough t t o b e completel y decisive, i n th e sens e o f alway s yieldin g a majorit y will , an d no t permitting th e statu s qu o o r othe r action s t o prevai l b y default .

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Some Les s Conservativ e Criteri a Let u s therefor e examin e som e possibl e extension s o f th e majorit y principle. On e possible—thoug h partial—extensio n ca n b e base d o n the patter n o f pairwis e votes . Wit h fou r o r mor e alternatives , th e majority preferenc e relation s migh t fal l int o variou s patterns :

(II)

(i)

(iii) Figure 5 In (i) , A i s a majorit y winne r an d satisfie s th e Condorce t criterion , even thoug h ther e i s a cycl e amon g th e lower-rankin g alternatives . The situatio n i s differen t i n (ii) , wher e ther e i s a clea r majorit y loser— D—but n o majorit y rankin g o f th e othe r alternatives . I n (iii ) there i s a subse t o f alternatives , {A , B , C ) , eac h o f whic h ca n defea t

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every alternativ e no t belongin g t o th e subset , bu t again , ther e i s n o clear majorit y wil l amon g th e member s o f thi s set . I n thes e las t tw o cases, th e majorit y preferenc e relatio n provide s a partial—but incomplete—resolution t o th e choice ; an d a plausibl e extensio n o f the majorit y principl e i s t o requir e tha t th e choic e b e consisten t with thi s partia l structure . W e ca n mak e thi s requiremen t precis e a s follows. Suppos e ther e exist s a subse t M o f th e outcomes , wit h th e following thre e properties : (a) M contain s a t leas t on e outcome ; (b) a t leas t on e outcom e i s no t containe d i n M ; (c) an y outcom e i n M defeat s an y outcom e no t i n M . Then w e shal l sa y ther e exist s a majorit y wil l fo r M , accordin g t o the Cyclical Condorcet (CyC ) criterion . Though th e Cyclical Condorce t criterio n i s a generalizatio n o f th e C an d A M principles , ther e ar e stil l situations , suc h a s thos e o f Figures 3 an d 4 above , i n whic h ther e i s no majorit y wil l unde r an y of these thre e criteria . Thu s th e Cy C principle , thoug h mor e genera l than th e othe r two , i s still incomplet e an d i n tha t sens e conservative . A common votin g principl e whic h i s not conservativ e i n thi s sens e is tha t o f relative majority—o r plurality—rule . Accordin g t o thi s relative majority principle (RM) , th e alternativ e whic h i s ranke d first by th e greates t numbe r o f voter s i s th e majorit y will , eve n i f th e number favorin g i t i s les s tha n a n absolut e majority . I n th e cyclica l majority exampl e o f Figur e 3 , alternativ e A woul d b e chose n unde r this criterion, sinc e i t i s favored b y mor e voter s (40) tha n i s B (30) o r C (30) . Clearl y th e R M principl e alway s yield s a majorit y wil l (tie s are possible, thoug h unlikel y i f the numbe r o f voter s i s large), so i t i s indeed complete . Election s t o governmenta l office s an d position s o f various kind s ar e ofte n base d o n pluralit y o r relativ e majorit y electoral rules ; bu t i n parliamentar y proceedings , court s hav e consistently hel d plurality-typ e electio n rule s t o b e invalid , o n th e grounds tha t the y permi t a minorit y t o decid e th e issu e an d thu s violate th e fundamenta l principl e o f majorit y rule . A rathe r differen t extensio n o f th e Condorce t criterion—whic h might wel l satisf y lega l interpretatio n o f th e majorit y principle—ca n be formulate d i n term s o f "special " majorit y rule . B y a special majority w e mea n a majorit y o f siz e greate r tha n a certai n fractio n of th e assembly , suc h a s two-thirds , three-quarters , o r whatever .

Some Procedural Aspects of Majority Rule 27

3

Any numbe r X which lie s betwee n x h and 1 defines a particular typ e of specia l majority . Specia l majorit y rul e doe s no t i n itsel f circum vent th e cyclin g problem , fo r i t ca n b e show n tha t fo r an y A < 1 , there wil l exis t situation s i n whic h ever y alternativ e i s defeate d b y some othe r alternative . Fo r an exampl e wit h th e (rathe r large ) valu e X = 3 4 (rul e b y three-fourth s majorities ) conside r th e followin g situation: Ranking B

Faction I

C CD DE EF FA AB I

D E F A B C I II

E F A B C D II

F A B C D E VV

A B C D E F V

I

Figure 6 All faction s ar e o f equal size , eac h containin g \ o f th e membership . If we examine th e variou s pairwis e votes , we find tha t A i s preferre d to B b y faction s I I throug h VI , an d henc e b y \ o f th e voters . Thu s A defeat s B . I n th e compariso n betwee n A an d C , A i s preferre d b y factions II I throug h VI , whic h contai n onl y % of th e membership . Since thi s i s les s tha n th e require d majorit y o f % , A doe s no t defea t C, no r doe s C defea t A . Thu s som e o f th e pairwis e contest s wil l b e indecisive unde r specia l majorit y rule . I f we procee d throug h al l th e other pairwis e comparisons , w e find th e 3 A majorit y preferenc e relation i s a s follows :

Figure 7

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GERALD H . KRAME R

Thus ever y alternativ e i s defeate d b y som e othe r alternative , an d the specia l majorit y relatio n cycles . Suc h cycle s ar e possibl e fo r an y value o f A less tha n 1.0 . On th e othe r hand , fo r an y give n situatio n ther e wil l b e some special majorit y rul e whic h doe s no t cycle . A s a n illustration , consider again th e situatio n o f Figure s 3 and 4. Simpl e majorit y rul e (A — V2) cycle s there , bu t i f w e choos e th e valu e A = % , we find th e following:

Figure 8 Here i n th e compariso n betwee n A an d C , neithe r defeat s th e othe r by th e require d % majority . Thu s ther e i s n o cycle , an d th e alternative A satisfie s a Condorcet-lik e condition , o f no t bein g defeated b y an y othe r alternative . I f w e chos e a large r value—sa y A = %— none of the alternative s woul d defeat—o r b e defeate d by—an y other: hence , ever y alternativ e woul d satisf y th e conditio n o f bein g undefeated, s o thi s specia l majorit y rul e woul d permi t to o man y "ties" t o b e o f muc h help . However, a sharper—ye t stil l complete—criterio n ca n b e obtaine d by choosing, in an y situation , A*, th e smallest value o f A at which on e of th e alternatives i s undefeated. W e shal l sa y ther e exist s a majorit y will i n favo r of tha t alternative , b y th e special majority (SM) criterion . If th e situatio n i s suc h tha t th e ordinar y Condorce t criterio n i s satisfied, thi s valu e wil l tur n ou t t o b e V2 , so th e S M an d Condorce t criteria agree . I f A* < lA, the n an y smalle r valu e A