The roundtable talks of 1989: the genesis of Hungarian democracy : analysis and documents 9789639241213

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| The Roundtable Talks of 1989 The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

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The Roundtable Talks of 1989 The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy Analysis and Documents

Edited by

Andras Bozoki

. ‘CEU PRESS Central European University Press Budapest

© 2002 by Andras Bozoki Translation © by Orsolya Karacsony, Eniké Koncz, Tamas Magyarics, Brian McLean, Karoly Mike and Agota Révész Published in 2002 by

Central European University Press

, An imprint of the

Central European University Share Company , Nador utca 11, H-1015 Budapest, Hungary Tel: +36-1-327-3138 or 327-3000 Fax; +36-1-327-3183

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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the permission of the Publisher. ISBN 963 9241 21 0 Cloth Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The roundtable talks of 1989: the genesis of Hungarian democracy: analysis and documents / edited Andras Bozok1 p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index ISBN 1. Hungary—Politics and government—1989- 2. Constitutional history—Hungary. 3. Post-Communism—Hungary. 4. Democracy—Hungary. I. Bozoki, Andras. JN2067 .R68 2002 320.9439-—dc2 1

2002000046

Printed in Hungary by Akadémiai Nyomda, Martonvasar

Table of Contents

List of Contributors Vii List ofof Appendices and Tables |XI 1X List Abbreviations Acknowledgments XU Andras Bozoki Introduction XV PART ONE: ANALYTICAL APPROACHES

I. The Politics of the Roundtable Talks 3 Zoltan Ripp Unity and Division: The Opposition

Communist Party 3

Roundtable and Its Relationship to the

Melinda Kalmar From ‘Model Change’ to Regime Change:

The Metamorphosis of the MSZMP’s Tactics

in the Democratic Transition 4]

Andras Bozoki and The Making of a Political Elite: Participants

Gergely Karacsony in the Hungarian Roundtable Talks of 1989 71

2. The Institution-building Process 107 | Rudolf L. Tékés Institution Building in Hungary: Analytical | Issues and Constitutional Models, 1989-90 107 Adam Masat Beyond the One-party System: The Debate

on the “Party Law” 137

System 165

John W. Schiemann The Negotiated Origins of the Electoral

Analyses 191 3. Roundtable Talks in Context: Historical and Comparative

Alan Renwick The Role of Non-Elite Forces in Hungary’s

Negotiated Revolution 191

Janos M. Rainer Regime Change and the Tradition of 1956 211 Andrew Arato The Roundtables, Democratic Institutions

and the Problem of Justice 223

Csaba Békés Back to Europe: The International Background of the Political Transition in Hungary, 1988-90 237

PART TWO: KEY DOCUMENTS |

Andras Bozoki and Zoltan Ripp: Introduction to the Documents 275 1. Proclamation of the Independent Lawyers’ Forum to the

Organizations of the Opposition (March 15, 1989) 279 2. Proposal of the Opposition Roundtable to the Central Committee

of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (April 19th, 1989) 283 3. Agreement on the Commencement of National Roundtable

Talks (June 10th, 1989 ) 287

(June 13th, 1989) | 293

4. Opening Plenary Meeting of the National Roundtable Talks

1989) 311 1989) 313 18th, 1989) 335

5. Agreement among Members of the National Roundtable on the Thematic Structure and Schedule of the Talks (June 21st, 6. Plenary Session of the National Roundtable Talks (June 21st,

7. Plenary Session of the National Roundtable Talks (September

8. Agreement Concluding the Political Reconciliation Talks. June

13th to September 18th, 1989 (September 18th, 1989) 359 Erzsébet Ripp: Chronology of the Hungarian Roundtable Talks.

January 1989—April 1990 365 Andras Bozoki: Biographies of the Key Participants 385

Index 423 Selected Bibliography 411

List of Contributors

Andrew Arato is Professor of Political and Social Theory at the Graduate Faculty of New School University, New York. He is the editor of Constellations, a journal of critical.and democratic theory. His research interests include comparative politics of constitution making, constitutional theory, and problems of U.S. presidentialism. His books include Civil Society and Political Theory (1992), From Neo-Marxism to Democratic Theory (1993), and Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy (2000). Csaba Békés is a historian, senior fellow at the Institute of 1956, and director of the Research Centre of Cold War History. His research focuses on the Cold War in international politics between the 1950s and 1990. His recent books include Zhe Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in World Politics [in Hungarian] published in 1996. He is co-editor of the collection of documents entitled Transition to Democracy in Hungary, 1989-90, available at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C., and at the Institute of 1956, in Budapest. Andras Bozoki is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Central European University and Eétvés Lorand University, both in Budapest. His research interests include democratization, elite change, political ideologies, forms of political change, and the role of intellectuals. His most recent books include Jntellectuals and Politics in Central Europe, of which he was editor, published by the CEU Press in 1999, and the 8 volumes of The Script of the Régime Change: Roundtable Talks in 1989 [in Hungarian], as editor-in-chief

. and co-editor, published in Budapest in 1999-2000. Melinda Kalmar is a freelance historian. Her main research field is the ideology of the Kadar era in Hungary, from its very beginning in the late 1950s until its end in the late 1980s. Her book, Eats and Dowry: Communist Ideology in

the Early Kadar Era {in Hungarian] was published in 1998. She was coeditor of the 8 volumes of The Script of the Régime Change: Roundtable Talks in 1989 [in Hungarian] published in Budapest in 1999-2000. Gergely Karacsony is a Ph.D. candidate in Sociology at the Budapest University of Economics. He is a research fellow at the Median Public Opinion Poll Institute. His research interests include political elites, political public opin-

ion, and electoral behavior. He participated as research assistant in the 8volume-project on the Roundtable talks.

Adam Masat is a student in History and Political Science at the Eétvés Lorand University, Budapest. His main field of interest is the post-communist transition with a special focus on German—Hungarian relations. He participated as a research assistant in the 8-volume-project on the Roundtable talks.

Janos Rainer M. is a historian, Director of the Institute of 1956, and a regular | visiting lecturer at the Department of History at the Eétvés Lorand University. His main research field is the history of communism, especially of political leadership, and the revolution of 1956. His recent books include The Place of the Writer: Debates in the Literary Press, 1950-53. {in Hungarian]

| published in Budapest in 1990, and Imre Nagy, A Political Biography 2 vols [in Hungarian], also published in Budapest in 1996 and 1999.

Alan Renwick is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at St. Johns College, . Oxford, and Lecturer in Politics at Christ Church, Oxford. He has translated Hungarian books into English and has published articles on Hungarian poli-

: tics. The title of his Ph.D. thesis is “Combining rational choice and political culture: Institutional choice in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, 1989-— 1991”.

Erzsébet Ripp is a freelance political scientist. Her research focuses on the Kadar era. She was co-editor of the 8 volumes of The Script of the Régime Change: Roundtable Talks in 1989 [in Hungarian], published in Budapest in 1999-2000. Zoltan Ripp is a historian and a senior research fellow at the Institute of Political History, Budapest. His research interests include contemporary Hungarian history from the 1956 Revolution to the present day. His recent books include Free Democrats: A Historical Sketch of the Politics of the SZDSZ [in Hungarian] published in 1995 and October, 1956 and Power Relations {in Hungarian] published in 1997. He was co-editor of the 8 volumes of The Script of the Régime Change: Roundtable Talks in 1989 [in Hungarian] published in Budapest in 1999-2000.

John W. Schiemann is Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, New York. His research field includes political theory, comparative politics, and democratization in East Central Europe. He has published book chapters and articles on the Roundtable talks in the Journal of Theoretical Politics and the Archives of European Sociology. Rudolf L. Tékés is Professor of Political Science (Emeritus) at the University of Connecticut, in Storrs, Connecticut. His research field include Hungarian politics in the twentieth century, post-communist democratization, and processes of institution-building in new democracies. He has published widely

on these topics in recent decades. His recent books include From PostCommunism to Democracy, published in Bonn in 1990, and Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution, published by the Cambridge University Press in 1996.

List of Appendices and Tables

Hungary, 1989 , XXXII

Appendix 1. The Structure of the National Roundtable Talks in

Appendix 2. Major Agreements and Disagreements between the

MSZMP and the Opposition Roundtable on Political Issues XXXili Tables

Roundtable Talks in East Central Europe in a Comparative Perspective XX Phases of Pluralization and Leaders of the Two Most Influential

Political Groupings (1985-1989) 91

Dominant Political Elite Networks during the Process of Transition 100 Opposition Parties and Their Position at the National Roundtable Talks 101

Significant Elements of the Hungarian Electoral Law of 1989 167

Paths of Regime Change 224 Types of Transition, Constitution Making and Governmental Sructures

in Eastern Europe and South Africa 1989-1997 226

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List of Abbreviations

ASZ — Agrarian Alliance (Agrdarszévetség) ,

AVH — State Defence Bureau (Allamvédelmi Hatésag) BAL — Left Alternative Alliance (Baloldali Alternativa Sz6vetség) BZSBT — Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society (Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre Barati Tarsasag) Demisz — Hungarian Federation of Democratic Youth (Magyar Demokratikus [fjfusagi Szévetség)

DNP — Democratic People’s Party (Demokrata Néppart) EKA — Opposition Roundtable (Ellenzéki Kerekasztal)

Part) |

Fidesz —~ Federation of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokratak

Szévetsége) Fidesz-MPP — Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz — Magyar Polgari

FJF — Independent Lawyers’ Forum (Fiiggetlen Jogasz Forum) FKGP — Independent Smallholders’ Party (Fiiggetlen Kisgazdapdrt) FSZDL — Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions (Fiiggetlen Szakszervezetek Demokratikus Ligdja)

HNF — Patriotic People’s Front (Hazafias Népfront) KDNP — Christian Democratic People’s Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppart)

KISZ — League of Communist Youth (Kommunista Ifjusagi | , Szdvetség)

KSH — Central Statistical Bureau (K6ézponti Statisztikai Hivatal) MDF — Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Forum) MDNP — Hungarian Democratic People’s Party (Magyar Demokrata Néppart)

MDP — Hungarian Workers’ Party (Magyar Dolgozok Partja) MEASZ — Association of Hungarian Resistance Fighters and AntiFascists (Magyar Ellenallok és Antifasisztak Sz6vetsége)

MFT — Mtiinnich Ferenc Society (Miinnich Ferenc Tarsasag) MIEP — Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Magyar Igazsdg és Elet Partja)

MKP — Hungarian Communist Party (Magyar Kommunista Part)

MNOT — National Council of Hungarian Women (Magyar Nok Orszagos Tandcsa)

MNP — Hungarian People’s Party (Magyar Néppdart) MNSZ — Association of Hungarian Women (Magyar Nok Szévetsége) MOL — Hungarian National Archives (Magyar Orszdagos Levéltar) MSZDP — Social Democratic Party of Hungary (Magyarorszagi Szocialdemokrata Part)

MSZMP — Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart)

MSZOSZ — National Alliance of Hungarian Trade Unions (Magyar Szakszervezetek Orszagos Szévetsége)

MSZP — Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Part) MTA — Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Magyar Tudomadnyos Akadémia)

MTI — Hungarian News Agency (Magyar Tavirati Iroda) NDSZ — National Democratic Alliance (Nemzeti Demokrata

; Szdvetség) NKGP — National Smallholders’ Party (Nemzeti Kisgazdapart)

NPP — National Peasants’ Party (Nemzeti Parasztpart) OSZK — National Széchenyi Library (Orszdagos Széchenyi K6nyvtar)

OT — National Planning Bureau (Orszdagos Tervhivatal) SZDSZ — Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokratak Szdvetsége)

SZKH — Network of Free Initiatives (Szabad Kezdeményezések Haldzata)

SZOT — National Council of Trade Unions (Szakszervezetek Orszagos Tandcsa) SZOVOSZ — National Alliance of Co-operatives (Szévetkezetek Orszdgos

Tanacsa) |

TDDSZ — Democratic Trade Union of Scientific Employees (Tudomanyos Dolgozok Demokratikus Szakszervezete)

TIB — Committee for Historical Justice (Térténelmi Igazsdagtétel Bizottsaga)

UMF — New March Front (Uj Marciusi Front)

Acknowledgments

This book grew out of the work of Hungarian researchers into the documentary history of the Roundtable talks of 1989. After two years of intensive research we were able to publish the minutes and all relevant documents of the negotiations, which included not only biographies and a chronology, but also theoretical and historical analyses. Our findings were published in a series of books—8 volumes in total—in Hungarian in 1999-2000. I am, therefore, most grateful to the mem-

bers of our research and editorial team: Marta Elbert, Melinda Kalmar, Béla Révész, Erzsébet Ripp and Zoltan Ripp. Some of them are contributors to this

book also.

Our research into the Hungarian Roundtable talks has been supported by the Political Science Department of the Central European University, the Hungarian National Scientific Research Fund (OTKA), the Fekete Doboz Foundation, and Financial Research Ltd. I also thank colleagues, especially the contributors to the

book, together with Laszl6 Bruszt, Lajos Gecsényi, Andras Gerd, Christian Joppke, Janos Kis, Philippe Schmitter, Gyérgy Szabad, Janos Varga, Peter Wag-

ner, Jacek Wasilewski, Jan Zielonka, and the anonymous reviewers for their ideas, comments and suggestions. The friendly and supportive scholarly community at the European University Institute in Florence created ideal conditions for the completion of my work during my fellowship there in the academic year 2000-01. Finally, I would like to thank Maria Magyar and Richard Rados, both from the CEU Press, and Clifford Chadwick who have helped me to prepare the manuscript for publication. Andras Bozoki

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Introduction: The Significance of the Roundtable Talks

Andras Bozoki ,

This book deals with the history of the 1989 Roundtable talks in Hungary, unfolding and analyzing its history on the basis of primary sources recently published in Hungarian in eight volumes’. The authors of this book are all of the opinion that in Hungary—as opposed to certain other Central European coun| tries—these Roundtable talks amounted to much more than a mere side-show; in fact they constituted the hub of a total revolutionary transformation. The history of the change of regime in Hungary is unintelligible without a clear insight into the history of the Roundtable talks. *k

A change of regime is a political transformation of institutional and revolutionary character which effects a transition from a dictatorial type of political system into a democracy. This involves such aspects as dismantling the old political system and laying down the foundations of a new institutional order, but it does not necessarily include the long process of economic transformation. Democracy in Hungary was instituted first—capitalism came only later. The change of regime as a political

transition can be regarded as complete when the nascent system contains that “minimum of democracy” which Robert A. Dahl described as comprising the following elements: citizenship becomes universally recognized, law-and-order becomes a fundamental constitutional principle, judicial independence is assured, those in power are elected through a democratic process, elections are free and clean, all possess the right to freedom of speech and to alternative sources of information, freedom to assemble, even to form political organizations, and finally, control over the armed forces is exercised by civilians’. Needless to say, the institutions of democracy were not realized in Hungary overnight and we must have a clear view of the problems of the last ten years in Hungary, even of the occasional deficiencies in democracy’. The above criteria were listed to indicate. that the concept of the change of regime (or transition) in

this book is not understood in any broad sense and teleologically, but rather retrospectively. This definition is not contingent on the transformation of political culture, the completion of privatization or the possible ratification of a new constitution—but is used as a synonym for the transformation of political insti-

tutional order. The change of regime in Hungary has—in what historically speaking must be called a very short period of time—by now been completed.

XV1 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

When asked to identify the critical points as well as the starting and closing events of the 1989-90 change of regime in Hungary, most scholars tend to be in agreement. Generally, political analysts regard two program declarations as precursors of the change: that of the manifesto Tarsadalmi szerzédés (Social contract),” drawn up by an influential group within the democratic opposition and the even earlier program entitled Fordulat és reform (Turnabout and Reform),” published mostly by economists in opposition although inside Party ranks. The Tarsadalmi szerzédés was the first to proclaim “Kadar® has to go” but it was moderate enough to envisage no more than a constitutional framework placed as a restraint on the one-party system and did not go as far as to demand its abolition. As far as the actual starting point of the regime change is concerned, it is usually linked with two events: the Lakitelek meeting in September 1987 and the party conference in May 1988 of the ruling Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkdspart, MSZMP). That Lakitelek meeting was the first public, demonstrative step towards the overt formation of political organizations in opposition to the regime.’ Ultimately, it was the coup by the Communist party rank and file which made it possible for politicians more open to change actually to enter what then was the ruling state party.® These reform politicians who

| rose to the antechambers of power took rather a long time to decide whether they favored reforms designed to salvage and “cure” the critically ill regime or whether they preferred “euthanasia” to rid the country of it once and for all. In

any case, the process which reared its head under the circumstances of the Kadarian “mature post-totalitarianism” and started its somewhat halting and groping progress, finally developed into a textbook case of peaceful transition

into democracy. }

The close of the transition—as most authors writing on the period agree—is marked by the local and national government elections of 1990 and the establishment of fundamental, democratic institutions of the new regime (the consti-

tutional court, local authorities, etc.).'° Of all things which took place in the intervening period (from early 1988 to late 1990) only the street demonstrations, the Parliamentary debates, the unseating of representatives and the speeches delivered at assemblies on historical commemorative occasions have been preserved in the memory, and even these were for the most part preserved in the collective memory in the flickering images of television coverage. In order to fill this gap the literature of Hungarian social science has attempted to capture and interpret the transformation—whilst still on the move, as it were—through a number of excellent contemporary analyses,'’ comparative chronologies,’? and the publication and analysis of party documents.” These are complemented by a long, ever-increasing list of analyses and recollections, personal opinions published as memoirs and volumes of conference papers, interview sessions'* and studies of particular political organizations.'” However, what actually was said and by whom at the 1989 Roundtable talks has been preserved only in the “black

box”’® of the change of regime. |

Introduction: The Significance of the Roundtable Talks XVil

The concept of “Roundtable talks” as used in the title of this book, needs a little elaboration. The political use of the phrase “Roundtable” entered the vocabulary of the Hungarian opposition after the Polish Roundtable talks. In Poland in the 1980s there was one single all-encompassing opposition movement— the trade union Solidarnosc (Solidarity)—and by the fall of 1988 the Polish party leadership had had to come to terms with the fact that, without legal recognition for Solidarity, the population at large would not be receptive to the reforms initiated by the Polish United Worker’s Party (PZPR). Therefore, in Poland it was the legalization of the political opposition which became the prerequisite for the liberalization and democratization of the regime, and so it was natural that this should become one of the focal points of the Roundtable talks. All were seated around one huge Roundtable: Communist Party, Government, Solidarity, the Catholic Church, representatives of the State Trade Unions and the Communists’ satellite Parties. The dominant figures within the Polish opposition were very familiar with the events of the democratic transition of 1975-77 in Spain’’ and were attempting to use similarly peaceful means to attain the same goal themselves. The Polish Roundtable talks lasted from early February to early April in 1989 and resulted in the unconditional recognition of Solidarity and the decision to hold “restricted but free” general elections in June 1989.'* Solidarity at the time could afford the luxury of being only one in a mixed company of varying political weight during the talks, as they were well aware that their huge popular support would allow them to revise any Roundtable agreements later— which is precisely what had eventually happened.” In Hungary, however, the Roundtable was set up by the opposition itself and for the purpose of harmonizing the activities of the opposition organizations.

Therefore, at the talks the Opposition Roundtable (Ellenzéki Kerekasztal, EKA)—comprising nine opposition organizations—was only one of the “sides,” the other two being the reigning Communist Party on the one hand and the so-

called “Third Side””’ (comprising organizations close to the Communists) on the other. The founders of the EKA were as follows: the Alliance of Free Democrats

(Szabad Demokratak Szévetsége, SZDSZ), the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society (Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre Barati Tarsasag, BZSBT), the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions (Fiiggetlen Szakszervezetek Demokratikus

Ligaja, FSZDL), the Federation of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokratak Szévetsége, Fidesz), the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Forum, MDF), the Hungarian People’s Party (Magyar Néppart, MNP), the Independent Smallholders’ Party (Fiiggetlen Kisgazdapart, FKGP) and the Social Democratic Party of Hungary (Magyarorszdgi Szocialdemokrata Part, MSZDP). Later, in early June 1989, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppart, KDNP) joined the EKA. The opposition first held their own Roundtable talks and then emerged on to the scene as the Opposition Roundtable, representing a unified position. Thus, in the spring of 1989 the opposition was able to hold bilateral preparatory talks with representatives of the MSZMP and, later that summer, tri-lateral talks on social and political issues with repre-

XVIll The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

sentatives of both the MSZMP and the “Third Side”. Later, however, all of these talks came to be thought of by the public as “Roundtable talks”. **

There are few peaceful and democratic periods to be found in the 20th-century history of Hungary. Scanning the decades of the 20th century for moments of historical significance, it is beyond doubt that the 1989 change ranks as one of the most outstanding events of the century. The dualist regime of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy gave the people peace and prosperity—but it was a liberal, constitutional monarchy and not democracy. Then, in 1914, the country entered the war and, in the chaotic years following defeat, it was rocked by short-lived revolutions (firstly democratic and then antidemocratic) in 1918-19. The peace treaty signed at the Trianon (in Versailles, near Paris) gave Hungary its independence but took away two-thirds of all of its territory. The following years saw a number of politically mixed periods—none of them democratic—under the regency of Miklos Horthy. This era was characterised by a revisionist, “National-Christian” ideology and by semi-democratic,

semi-constitutional traits. Franchise was extended, one opposition party (the Social Democrats) was legalized and people could vote in secret in the bigger cities, although throughout most of the country voting was public and open. It was technically a pluralist, multi-party system, but the elections were always won by the governing party. Freedom of the press prevailed for a time, but the close of the era saw the introduction of censorship. As an ally of Nazi Germany the regime conducted an increasingly severe campaign of discrimination against its own Jewish citizens after 1938. From March 1944 to June 1991, Hungary was occupied by foreign troops stationed on her soil, and so the sovereignty of the country in the political and military sense was restricted fundamentally. In 1944

and early 1945 the country was run by a Nazi puppet government under the name of “The Arrow Cross” and became a theatre of war. The end of the war (yet another defeat) in 1945 marked the commencement of democratic developments which were arrested by Stalinist sovietisation initiated by the occupying powers in 1947-48. Between 1945 and 1947 the regime was based on free elections but could only be called semi-democratic as Soviet . control gave no opportunity to any opposition, forced the major parties to form a Grand Coalition and disenfranchized hundreds of thousands of citizens. Finally, the Communist Party, which had been given control over all the armed forces,

began to clamp down on all adherents to democratic ideals. The Communist dictatorship (under the leadership of Matyas Rakosi and Erné Geré until October 1956 and of Janos Kadar following the 1956 revolution) between the years 1948

and 1962 exercised totalitarian control,” which was only mitigated by the “thaw” of 1953-54 and defeated for a mere 12 days in the revolution of 1956.

The following period, 1963 to 1989, can be described as a softer, posttotalitarian dictatorship, characterized simultaneously by a relative openness to economic reform and by the political monopoly of the Communist Party.”* The

Introduction: The Significance of the Roundtable Talks XIX

twilight of the regime lasted from 1985 to 1989. The “leading forces” of the critically ill regime, i.e. the Communists, were, by 1989, forced to accept the idea of representative democracy. The Communist Party opened negotiations with the opposition, gave up its status as the state party and accepted the new constitution. As the result of the Roundtable talks a democratic Republic was

declared in October 1989. The decade which has passed since the free and fair elections of 1990 was the first to see a truly democratic Hungary during the thousand-year history of the country. From this particular point of view it seems difficult to overestimate the significance of the changes of 1989 and the mature, ready-for-compromise politics

of the sides involved. It is only the first and last decades of the 20th century which have given Hungary a chance—the other eight have often been described by such phrases as “having developed” in a “deformed,” “belated,” “forced” manner, in a “roundabout” way of “contingency paths.” Political parlance reveals a split consciousness—the buzzwords of the era were “dual social structure,” “dual economy,” “split image of society,” “twofold system of values” and so on. The events of 1989 were of international importance, since they marked the collapse of a system that proclaimed itself an alternative to the market economy of democratic societies. The Communist experiment in Central and Eastern Europe was over—and its demise swept like wildfire over the region to reach the Soviet Union itself in 1991. Speaking in terms of global processes, all this fits into a trend of democratization which, in the 15 years after its beginnings in the mid-seventies, saw most countries of Latin America, Southern Europe, Central and Eastern Europe rid themselves of dictatorship.”° The fact that Hungary became one of the new democracies is not attributable

to one single factor. There are numerous internal and external causes which brought about the collapse of the old regime in this particular way and at this particular time. As far as internal causes are concerned, we must stress the impact of the 1956 revolution, the diminishing performance of the economy, the exhaustion of the regime’s social reserves, disintegration of ideology and a willingness to compromise on the part of both the new and the old elite. Among the most important external factors, we must number defeat in the Cold War, the crippling consequences of the arms race, the social and ethnic conflicts which had made the Eastern Bloc burst at the seams, the co-ordinated, evolutionist strategies of the democratic opposition in a number of these countries, the corresponding, human rights-based foreign policies of the Western countries and, finally, the rise to the top of the Soviet hierarchy of First Secretary Gorbachev who introduced a style of politics open to compromise. Taken by themselves, each of these constitutes an important and integral part of the process, but the fact that they occurred more or less simultaneously created highly favorable circumstances for a democratic turn. It is precisely for this reason that we should not overestimate the importance of the Hungarian Roundtable talks: they provided an important link in the great historical chain of events taking place at the turn of the decade. In Poland and

XX The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Hungary it was these talks which led to the changes, but in East Germany and Czechoslovakia they only legitimized and institutionalized the changes after the fact. However, in one way or another, a basic change of regime occurred in all of these countries. The following table offers an overview of the nature and significance of Roundtable talks in various countries in East Central Europe. Table 1. Roundtable Talks in East Central Europe in a Comparative Perspective

Country Time Participants Main Issues _ Result Significance Poland February— Communist legalization of pact, semi-free decisive

April, 1989. Party (CP) Solidarity, elections Catholic rules of transiChurch, Soli- tion, elections darity, etc.

Hungary June—Sept. CP, Opposition rules oftransi- pact, plebiscite, decisive

1989 Roundtable, tion, constitu- free elections Third Side tion-making, elections

Czecho- Nov.—Dec. government, institutionaliza- power-sharing partly deci-

slovakia 1989 CP, Civic tion of changes, free elections sive Forum, Public policy issues against Violence

GDR January-March CP, New policy issues, | powersharing non-decisive 1990. Forum, Civic (failed) consti- no impact on

, orgs. tution making _free elections

Bulgaria January—May Socialist Party —_ constitution- pact, free partly deci-

1990. (ex-com- making, policy _ elections sive

. munists), issues Union of Democratic Forces

- Romania February— National policy issues no impact on non-decisive

March, 1990. Salvation free elections Front, fragmented opposition groups

Source: compiled by the author.

It was only in the GDR and in Romania that Roundtable talks did not play a significant role in the transition process. In East Germany the “GDR-revolution” of the Fall of 1989 was quickly forgotten when the option of German reunification became available. In Romania, the parallel putsch and revolution of Decem_ber 1989 brought a heterogeneous political group to power (the National Salvation Front) led by ex-communist politicians. These were not remotely interested

Introduction: The Significance of the Roundtable Talks XX1

in a power-sharing formula: they used the “Roundtable” merely as a facade for democratization and, in fact, their main concern was to prevent the emergence of democratic pluralism before elections. *

At an early point the formation of the Hungarian Opposition Roundtable could be considered vital from the point of view of self-defence on the one hand (that is, by thwarting the usual Communist strategy of divide-and-conquer which was relying on separate talks) and of the political co-ordination of the opposition on the other hand. Unlike Polish Solidarity, the parties of the Hungarian opposition evolved out of relatively isolated groups and circles within the intelligentsia” and were, therefore, rather weak and vulnerable alone. In the aftermath of the hugely significant demonstration” of March 15, 1989, these circles became aware and confident of their social backing and popular support and, one week

later, on March 22, at the initiative of the Independent Lawyers’ Forum (Fiiggetlen Jogasz Forum, FJF), the Opposition Roundtable was formed.

The process of the Roundtable talks in Hungary can be divided into three easily discernible phases. The first phase lasted from the formation of the Opposition Roundtable to the commencement of National Roundtable Talks, that is, from March 22 to June 10, 1989. The first three months of these talks constitute the second and most decisive phase—that is, the period from June 13 to September 18, 1989. Finally, the third phase of the process commenced after the declaration of the Republic on October 23 and is characterised by such issues as the redefinition of the identity of the Opposition Roundtable, the acceptance of the Government as a negotiating partner and questions closely tied in with the approaching general elections. This phase lasted from November 1989 to April 1990; it saw the Opposition Roundtable gradually lose its political significance and witnessed increasing rivalry between the formerly united factions and or-

ganizations which had participated in it. Those opposition organizations united by the Opposition Roundtable were all in agreement (was unanimously agreed at the founding meeting without a formal vote) that only those organizations could become members which satisfied the requirements that: (1) their goal was to achieve sovereignty for the people, (2)

they refused to share in the privileges of a monopoly of power and (3) they formed no alliance with such entities (i.e. with those in power).”° To ensure maximum unity the participants agreed to a procedural regulation which stipulated that all EKA decisions would be consensus-based, that is, dissent by even one of the participants would veto a decision. This proved to be a great force for cohesion. From this point on all participating organizations had to consider their voting intentions most carefully since any dissenting vote would prevent the Opposition Roundtable from reaching a decision. During its history the EKA had often been pushed to the verge of schism or near disintegration—in some cases the “twelve angry men” continued a heated debate until the last moment and even beyond—but, by and large, the participants understood that the unity of the

XX11 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

opposition was a priceless asset and that destroying this unity carried with it a grave burden of responsibility. However, this did not mean that on questions of internal procedures the members could only cast a “yes” vote. On many occasions they abstained from voting or stipulated that their “no” vote served only to clarify issues within the EKA but did not constitute a veto. This principle of consensus-based decision making—a subtler version of which was extended to the trilateral talks in the summer, although with certain restrictions applied to the organizations comprising the “Third Side”’—had a great impact on the evolving political culture of democracy. The participants in the talks endeavored to make this consensus-based exercise of power principle take hold, even if only to a limited extent, in the new Parliament also. All players in the “negotiated revolution” were convinced that the game was an open one and that the final result could not yet be counted on—as far as the future was concerned, they were wearing a “cloak of ignorance” and were inclined to overensure the success of the democratic transition. To a certain extent everyone involved hoped to win, even if they were to lose the election.”’ Whilst the opposition was using all available means to close ranks and unite their forces, the Communist Party constantly urged bilateral talks. Their idea was of a two-sided conference, a table with the MSZMP at one side and the Opposi-

tion Roundtable at the other. They attempted to dub the negotiations as a “dialogue between the authorities and society.” However, this stance was unacceptable both to the Party as a whole and to those groups close to the MSZMP, who nevertheless wished to distance themselves from the Communists. Consequently, after preparatory negotiations between the two sides, which took place behind closed doors, a compromise was reached on trilateral talks. It was agreed that civilian organizations close to the Communists would constitute a third, unified and independent side at National Roundtable Talks to begin in mid-June. It was also agreed that further groups could take part in the talks only as observers (a “fourth side”) and then only at the invitation of the Speaker of the House. Even though the Opposition Roundtable had good reasons to assume that their constituent organizations enjoyed significant popular support, its claim to legitimacy was as problematic as that of those at the other end of the negotiating

table. As soon as the EKA accepted a curb on the open, public nature of the talks, it had to face the accusation that it was striking an elitist bargain and going over the heads of the people—in other words, that it was trying to share power

with the Communists.” This is why the Opposition Roundtable was so determined from the beginning to emphasize the fact that it had no plans to negotiate on constitutional or economic matters and that it had no mandate from the people

to set up new institutions and offices such as the Constitutional Court or the office of President of the Republic. Its representatives held the view that in these

matters only a newly and freely elected Parliament would be empowered to make decisions. In an attempt to define its own role in the transition, it decided that it ought to take part in the creation of “seminal laws” (e.g. in the Electoral Law or in regulations relating to party financing) which would lead to free elec-

Introduction: The Significance of the Roundtable Talks XXII . tions, since otherwise the Government could submit these to Parliament without opposition—but also that it should assume no further role. By this time the Communists had showed a willingness to go beyond the Polish compromise and to accept the premise that the end result of the negotiations must be a legal guarantee of free and honest elections, a stand which secured for them no advantage whatsoever. At this point the Communist Party had not only accepted a multi-party system, as it did in February 1989, but had also

conceded the point that change might not necessarily take place within the framework of “socialist pluralism”.?” The Communists also realized that for them to have a chance in a truly pluralistic field, their people had to be present in the more important new institutions and offices. This is why representatives of the MSZMP were so keen to bring to the negotiating table the issues of constitutional revision, the electoral system, the powers of the President of the Republic and the establishment of the Constitutional Court. At first, they were also anxious to bring economic matters into the negotiations, but when Rezs6 Nyers was elected head of the party this emphasis was dropped and, as far as their significance was concerned, negotiations on the economy lagged far behind the political talks. At the same time representatives of the MSZMP insisted that agreement on all of these issues was a prerequisite for the successful execution of a peaceful transition. Finally the Opposition Roundtable accepted the proposal to put these items on the agenda, which resulted in the commencement of talks on the economy, a total revision of the old Constitution and the drafting of legisla-

tion beyond the “seminal laws” mentioned earlier.

The period of the trilateral talks in the summer of 1989 was characterized by further disintegration of the MSZMP”’ and further headway made by the opposition parties.*! In the East Central European region, Poland was the only country where the struggle seemed to be decided, whereas in other countries there was no hope of change. Consequently, in the period between the Polish elections and the East German “landslide”—from June to October 1989—-Hungary became the centre of international political attention.** In these few months the only hope of

, advancing the democratic transition lay with the Hungarian Roundtable talks. In this same period, differences of opinion were becoming more discernible

within the ranks of the EKA. There were some issues on which Opposition Roundtable managed to resolve internal differences, even if after lengthy debate, such as the Electoral Law and the issues of political party financing. Then there

were other issues on which the Opposition Roundtable stood united but on which they could not come to an agreement with the MSZMP. Such issues were the abolition of Party control over public service media, the immediate disman' thing of the Workers’ Militia (with no successor organization to replace it), the demand for a full accounting for all Party property (including such as was only managed and not owned by the Party) and the declaration of a ban on organizing political party branches in the work place. As far as the office of President was concerned, there were sharp differences of opinion within the Opposition Roundtable ranks which led to heated debates

XXIV The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

as to when the President should be elected (before or after free elections) and by what method (directly by the people or by the new Parliament). On this issue EKA had been unable to present a united front vis-a-vis the MSZMP from August 1989

and so they continued to delay a decision in this respect. Finally, in midSeptember, the Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) came to a decision that, since highly significant issues remained unresolved in the course of the negotiations, they would refrain from signing the September 18 agreement and would initiate a plebiscite with regard to the unresolved points. These included (1) the accounting for Party property (2) the

dismantling of the Party-controlled Workers’ Militia (3) the ban on political or- | ganizations in the work-place and (4) the time and method for electing a President. This was the very point at which the Opposition Roundtable split in two. The

majority of the signatory parties (BZSBT, KDNP, MDF, MNP) held the view that the agreement merely concluded a phase of the negotiations and there were

no reasons why the talks could not be continued until the unresolved issues could be settled. However, the representatives of Fidesz and SZDSZ saw no real

chance for a negotiated resolution of these issues as the MSZMP had already commenced preparations for the immediate and direct election of the President. Also, at their “congress of reorganization” in October, the Communists continued to advocate their position of allowing political parties into the work-place.

Representatives of the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions (FSZDL) also refrained from signing the September 18 agreement, citing their observer status. Two other parties were also sensitive to the rapid changes in the mood of the people and of their own members, and even though the FKGP was a full signatory and MSZDP had also signed the agreement (with the disclaimer that they had a dissenting opinion on the double issue of the presidential election being direct and taking place before the general elections) they both joined the “coalition” collecting signatures and demanding a plebiscite. As the Opposition Roundtable operated on a full-consensus basis, the veto of even one constituent organization could have prevented agreement. In order to avoid this, a still-debated compromise was made and opposition radicals renounced their right of veto, thus making it possible for the others to sign the agreement. In exchange for this gesture, they were given an opportunity to announce, in front of the television cameras covering the signing of the agreement, their plebiscite initiative, which, in consequence, immediately became an issue of national concern. In this way the moderate and radical wings of the EKA, even if inadvertently, had, in practical terms, encircled the MSZMP. The agreement signed by the moderates and the Communists bound the latter’s hands with regard to the Parliamentary ratification of the “seminal laws” and constitutional modifications. As a result of this, the Third Republic of Hungary was born on October the 23rd, 1989, and, at the same time, the radical parties of the Opposition Roundtable were able to launch immediately their campaign for a plebiscite. As a further consequence, the shortest route to free elections was cleared by the so-called “Four Yes” plebiscite on November the 26th, 1989.

. Introduction: The Significance of the Roundtable Talks XXV It was as the joint result of the September 18th agreement and the successful

November plebiscite that the Opposition Roundtable could fulfil its historic vocation and its original purpose—to lead the country peacefully to free general elections, to the very threshold of democracy. *k

As far as the institutional and political transformation was concerned, the change of regime in Hungary took only a short time. It was free of such compromises as

may have slowed down or distorted the process and it reached its conclusion quickly. It was no revolution in the traditional sense, which is to say that all participants—perhaps having learned the traumatic lesson of the crushed 1956 revolution—wanted to avoid violence at any price. The goal was not to “raze to the ground” all the edifices of the old regime and to build new institutions in their place—but to “reconstruct” as fully as possible the old institutions and make them meet the demands of democracy.” It was more than reform but less than a revolution. As Jon Elster put it, it was not unlike the insanely difficult undertaking when somebody attempts to rebuild the boat whilst sailing on the open sea.” The Hungarian constitutional revolution was a radical one in that it had brought about the change of regime and turned dictatorship into democracy. In formal terms, however, it must be regarded as somewhat conservative since, in order to avoid violence, it worked with the old regime for transformation and, in many cases, it filled old forms with new content. This is why the constitutional revolution could be called a “glorious” one (in the sense in which it was used in 17th century England): that is, since it focused on negotiating changes as opposed to attempting to bring them about by violence.*° It was as lawful and legitimate as the bloodless Hungarian revolution of March—April 1848 or as the oft-cited democratic transition in Spain. Formally speaking, the Roundtable talks could be seen as part of the “social debate” which, according to the tenets of the old regime, had to precede legislation. Therefore, paradoxical though the notion may seem, the forces of democracy got rid of the old regime by sticking to the letter of the Communist constitution.

*,

This book is divided into two main parts. In the more voluminous Part One, scholars of the Hungarian democratic transition discuss the most relevant aspects of the Roundtable talks.*° The first section of Part One deals with the politics of the transition by focusing on the participants: the political organizations, actors, situations and determinants of political choices. In these chapters, Zoltan Ripp and Melinda Kalmar analyze the negotiations from opposing perspectives: whilst Ripp follows the changing tactics and strategies of the opposition towards the Communist Party, Kalmar investigates the transformation of the MSZMP and

analyses the negotiating process from their perspective. These approaches differ | in their points of reference, but both provide balanced accounts of the negotia-

XXV1 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

tions. This section also contains a chapter in political sociology, focusing on the process of pluralisation and changes in the elite, and scrutinising the possible relationship between the social backgrounds of the participants in the talks and their decisions at this crucial historical moment. This chapter was co-authored by Andras Bozoki and Gergely Karacsony. The second section of Part One focuses on issues of institution-building and particularly on the constitution-making process and the creation of “party law” and the electoral system. Rudolf T6kés dissects the constitution-making process and identifies different models used in the course of what became known as “institutional bargaining”. Adam Masat describes the circumstances of the creation of “Party Law,” whilst John W. Schiemann offers a detailed and accurate treatment of the origins of Hungary’s curiously mixed electoral system. The third section of Part One puts the Hungarian Roundtable talks of 1989 into a broader context, employing a variety of different methods and perspectives. Alan Renwick examines the interaction between the elite and non-elite

forces in order to demonstrate the importance of the latter, often neglected, group in the transition process. The historian, M. Janos Rainer, introduces a new perspective when he examines the past through the role of historical memory. He

applies his method in particular to analyze the impact and legacy of the 1956 revolution in the events of 1989. Andrew Arato brings the tools of comparative constitutionalism to the analysis of the Roundtable talks when he compares different processes of democratisation in different post-communist countries, as well as constitutional changes in and outside Europe. In his approach, the Roundtable talks represent a characteristic way of change which makes an impact on post-transition political settings. Finally, in the last chapter of Part One, Csaba Békés analyzes the Hungarian transition by putting this historical case into an international context. In his study he uses the Cold War as his point of departure and examines the Roundtable talks in the light of the fast-changing realities of the last phase of the Cold War against the backdrop of the dissolution of bi-polar global politics. Finally, Part Two contains eight key documents from the Roundtable Talks, introduced by Andras Bozoki and Zoltan Ripp. These documents are taken from that most important period between March 15th and September 18th 1989. They

are accompanied by a detailed chronology of the talks, prepared by Erzsébet Ripp, as well as by biographies of the 40 most important participants, prepared

by Andras Bozoki. At the end of this section, in addition to the notes to the documents, a bibliography aids the reader by providing a detailed literature list for the field.

Florence, May 5, 2001 |

Introduction: The Significance of the Roundtable Talks XXVII Notes 1 Andras Bozoki, Marta Elbert, Melinda Kalmar, Béla Révész, Erzsébet Ripp and Zoltan Ripp (eds.): A rendszervaltas forgatékényve: kerekasztal-targyalasok Magyarorszdgon. 8 vols. [The Script of the Regime Change: Roundtable Talks in 1989] Vols. 1-4. Budapest, Magveté, 1999. Vols. 5-8. Budapest, Uj Mandatum, 1999-2000. Vols 1-4., edited by Andras Boz6éki (editor-in-chief), Marta Elbert, Melinda Kalmar, Béla Révész, Erzsébet Ripp and Zoltan Ripp. Vol. 5, edited by Erzsébet Ripp and Zoltan Ripp. Vol. 6, edited by Melinda Kalmar and Béla Révész. Vol. 7, edited by Andras Bozoki. Vol. 8, written by Marta Elbert and Andras Bozoki. 2 See Robert A. Dahl: Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982. p. 11. For the application of the Dahlian approach to Central and Eastern Europe, see: Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda (eds.): Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe. London, Pinter, 1999. On the broader interpretation of regime change which includes economic and broader in-

ternational political restructuring, see Janos Kornai: “Mit jelent és mit nem jelent a rendszervaltas” [What Is a Regime Change, and What Is Not?] Kritika, August 1997. 2-7, and Richard Rose: “Another Great Transformation” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10. No. 1. January 1999, 51-56. 3 On the theoretical and practical problems of democratic consolidation, see for instance, J. Samuel Valenzuela: “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions” In: Scott Mainwaring et al. (eds.): Issues in Democratic Consolidation. Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1992. 57-104; Guillermo O’Donnell: “Delegative Democracy” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5. No. 1. 1994. 55-69; Larry Diamond: “Is the Third Wave Over?” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7. No. 3. 1996. 20-37. 4 Miklés Haraszti, Janos Kis, Ferenc Készeg and Ottilia Solt: Tarsadalmi szerzédés. [Social Contract] A special issue of Beszéld 1987. See also in Fanny Havas et al. (eds.): Beszélé dsszkiadas, [Beszélé Full Edition] 3. Vols., Budapest: AB-Beszélé, 1992. 755-791. On the historical context of the programme, see Ervin Csizmadia: A magyar demokratikus ellenzék. Monografia. [The Hungarian Democratic Opposition: Monography] Budapest, T-Twins, 1995. 375-395. 5 Laszlé Antal, Lajos Bokros, Istvan Csillag, Laszl6 Lengyel and Gyérgy Matolcsy: Fordulat és reform.[Turnabout and Reform] A special issue of Medvetdnc 1987. 2; On the reform economists, see Laszlo Antal et al.: Lampdsok az alagutban. [Light at the End of the Tunnel] Budapest: Pénziigykutato Rt., Perfekt Rt. 1998. 6 Janos Kadar was the leader of the Communist party in Hungary between 1956 and 1988. He died in July 1989. 7 On the Lakitelek meeting, see: Sandor Agécs and Endre Medvigy (eds.): Lakitelek, 1987. A magyarsag esélyei. A tandcskozds hiteles jegyzékényve. [Lakitelek, 1987. The prospects for Hungarians. The minutes of the meeting.] Budapest, Antolégia-Piiski, 1991. 8 George Schépflin, Rudolf Tékés and Ivan Vélgyes: “Az apparatus lazadasa és valsag Magyarorszagon” Mozgo Vilag, Vol. 16, No. 6. June 1989. 9 This notion was used concerning Hungary by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan: Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidations: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 296-316. 10 On the Hungarian democratic transition see Andras Bozéki: Konfrontdcid és konszenzus: a demokratizalds stratégiai. [Confrontation and consensus: Strategies for democratization] Szombathely, Savaria University Press, 1995.; Laszlo Bruszt: A centralizdcié csapddja. [The trap of centralization] Szombathely, Savaria University Press, 1995.; Terry Cox and Andy Furlong (eds.):

Hungary: The Politics of Transition. London, Frank Cass, 1995; Leslie Holmes: PostCommunism. Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997; Béla Kirdly (editor) and Andras Bozoki (associate editor): Lawful Revolution in Hungary, 1989-94. Boulder, Social Science Monographs distributed

XXVIII The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy by the Columbia University Press, 1995; Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, op. cit.; Adam B. Selig-

man (ed.): The Transition from State Socialism in Eastern Europe: The Case of Hungary. Greenwich CT., JAI Press, 1994.; David Stark and Laszlé Bruszt: Post-socialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property Relations in East Central Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.; Gyérgy Szoboszlai (ed.): Democracy and Political Transformation: Theories and East Central European Realities. Budapest, HPSA, 1991.; Gyérgy Szoboszlai (ed.): Flying Blind: Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe. Budapest: HPSA, 1992.; Rudolf L. Tékés: Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 11 Béla Faragé: “Gondolatok a magyarorszagi alkotmanyozas folyamatarél” [Thoughts on constitution-making in Hungary] Szdzadvég, 1990. No. 1. 213-225.; Elemér Hankiss: East European Alternatives. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990; Sandor Kurtan (ed.): Vor der Wende. Politisches Sys-

tem, Gesellschaft und Reformen im Ungarn der achtziger Jahre. Wien—K6ln—Graz, Béhlau, 1993.; Laszlé Lengyel: Végkifejlet. [Endgame] Budapest, KJK, 1989.; Erzsébet Szalai: Gazdasag és hatalom. [Economy and Power] Budapest, Aula, 1990.; Ivan Szelényi: A posztkommunista atmenet tarsadalmi konfliktusai.[The Social Conflicts of Post-Communist Transition] Budapest, MTA PTI, 1992.; Rudolf L. Tokés: A posztkommunizmusbol a demokraciaba. [From PostCommunism to Democracy] Bonn: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1990. 12 Eva Molnar, Zoltan Nagy and Tamas Vladar (eds.): Féldindulas Kelet-Eurdpdban, 1988-1990. {Landslide in Eastern Europe] Vols. 1-2. Budapest, MTI Sajtéadatbank, 1990.; Lajos Pandi: A kelet-eurépai diktaturak bukdsa. Kronologia, dokumentumok. [The Fall of East European Dictatorships: Chronology, Documents] Szeged, JATE, 1991. 13 Mihaly Bihari (ed.): A tébbpartrendszer kialakulasa Magyarorszagon, 1985—1991. [The Making of a multi-party system in Hungary, 1985-91] Budapest, Kossuth, 1992.; Andras Bozoki (ed.): Tiszta lappal. A Fidesz a magyar politikaban, 1988-1991, [With a clean slate: Fidesz in Hungarian politics, 1988-91] Budapest, Fidesz, 1992.; Mihaly Laki: “Economic Programmes of the ExOpposition Parties in Hungary” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 5. No. 1. 73—91.; Istvan Lazar (ed.): Uj Marciusi Front, 1988. [New March Front] Budapest, Mizsak, 1989.; The programme of the MDF Hite/, Vol 1. No.1.; Anna S. Kosztricz et al. (eds.): A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzokényvei. [The 1989. Minutes of the Central Committee of the MSZMP] Vols. 1-2. Budapest, Magyar Orszagos Levéltar, 1993.; A rendszervaltas programja. [The Programme of the Transition] Budapest: SZDSZ, 1989. 14 Just a few books from the long list: Laszlé Antal et al.: Lampdsok az alagutban. [Light at the end of the Tunnel] Budapest: Pénztigykutatd Rt. 1998.; Andras Balint B.: Gydzelemre sziilettiink. Konya Imre az Ellenzéki Kerekasztalrol. [Born to win: Imre Konya on the Opposition Roundtable] Budapest, Progresszié, 1990.; Mihaly Bihari: Demokratikus ut a szabadsaghoz. [Democratic ‘Road to Freedom] Budapest, Gondolat, 1990.; Zoltan Bird: Elhervadt forradalom. Budapest, Piiski, 1993; Katalin Bossanyi: Szdlamproba. Beszélgetések az alternativ mozgalmakrdl. [Conversations on alternative movements] Budapest, Lang, 1989; Istvan Bodzaban and Antal Szalay (eds.): A puha diktaturatol a kemény demokraciadig. [From soft dictatorship to hard democ-

racy| Budapest, Pelikan, 1994.; Andras Bozéki, Tamas Csapody, Ervin Csizmadia and Mikl6s Stkésd (eds.): Csendes? Forradalom? Volt? [Was it a peaceful revolution?] Budapest, T-Twins, 1991.; Andras Boz6ki: Magyar panoptikum. [Hungarian Waxworks] Budapest, Kavé, 1996; Jézsef Debreczeni: A miniszterelndk. [Prime Minister Jozsef Antall] Budapest, Osiris, 1998; Laszl6 Kasza: Metamorphosis Hungariae, 1989-94. Budapest, Szazadvég, 1994. Zoltan Krasznai: A birodalom romjain. [After the Empire] Budapest, Uj Mandatum, 1996; Tamas Krausz: Megélt rendszervaltas. [Living through a Regime Change] Budapest, Cégér, 1994.; Kalman Kulcsar: Keét vilag kézdétt. [Between two worlds] Budapest, Akadémiai, 1994; Sandor Kurtan, Péter Sandor & Laszl6 Vass (eds.): Magyarorszdag évtizedkényve. [The book of Hungary’s last decade] Vols. 1-2. Budapest, DEMKA, 1998.; Laszl6 Lengyel: Micsoda év! [What a Year!] Budapest, Szépirodalmi, 1991; Laszl6 Lengyel: A rendszervalto elit tiinddklése és bukasa. [The rise and fall of the elites of the regime change] Budapest, Helikon, 1996.; Imre Pozsgay: 1989. Politikuspalya a partallamban és a rendszervaltasban. [1989. A political career in the party state and the transition] Budapest,

Introduction: The Significance of the Roundtable Talks XX1X Piiski, 1993; Sandor Révész: Antall Jozsef tavolrol. [Jézsef Antall from distance] Budapest, Lang, 1995; Anna Richter a: Ellenzéki Kerekasztal - portrévazlatok. [Opposition Roundtable — portrait

sketches] Budapest, Otlet Kft. 1990.; Gaspar M. Tamas: Masvilag. (Otherworld] Budapest, Uj Mandatum, 1994; Mihaly Vajda: A térténelem vége? Kézép-Eurépa 1989. [The End of History? Central Europe, 1989.] Budapest, Szazadvég, 1992. 15 Zsolt Enyedi: Politika a kereszt jegyében. [Politics in the name of the Cross] Budapest, Osiris, 1999; Zoltan Ripp: Szabad Demokratak: Térténeti vazlat a Szabad Demokratak Szévetségének politikajarol, 1988-1994. [Free Democrats: A historical sketch on the politics of the Alliance of Free Democrats, 1988—94.] Budapest, Napvilag, 1995; Wéber Attila: A Fidesz-jelenség. [The Fidesz phenomenon] Budapest, Napvilag, 1996. 16 Literally, since most of the events, including the Roundtable talks, have been recorded by an independent video journal, the Fekete Doboz [Black Box]. 17 Cf. Adam Michnik: Letters from Prison and Other Essays. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. 124—148. On the Spanish transition see, for instance, José Maria Maravall & Julian

Santamaria: “Political Change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy” in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.): Transitions from Authoritarian

Rule: Southern Europe. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. 71-108. , 18 Roger East & Jolyon Pontin: Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe. London, Pinter, 1997; Wiktor Osyatinski: “The Roundtable Talks in Poland” in Jon Elster (ed.): Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. 21— 68; Andrzej Paczkowski: Fél évszazad Lengyelorszag térténetébol, 1939-1989. [A Half-century in the history of Poland, 1939-89] Budapest, 1956-os Intézet, 1997. 19 See for instance, Krzysztof Jasiewicz: “Polish Elections, 1989-1991: Beyond the ‘Pospolite Ruszenie’” in Peter Volten (ed.): Bound to Change. New York: Institute for East-West Studies, 1992. 192—211. Voytek Zubek: Walesa’s Leadership and Poland’s Transition. Problems of Communism, Vol. 45. No. 1. 1991. 69-83. 20 The Third Side (Harmadik Oldal) was composed of the following seven organisations: Alliance of Hungarian Resistance Fighters and Anti-fascists (Magyar Ellenallok és Antifasisztak Szévetsége, MEASZ), Ferenc Miinnich Society (Minnich Ferenc Tarsasag, MFT), United Left Alternative (Baloldali Alternativa Egyesiilés, BAL), National Council of Hungarian Women (Magyar Nék Orszadgos Tanacsa, MNOT) which, during the negotiations, changed its name to Alliance of Hun-

garian Women (Magyar Nok Szdévetsége, MNSZ), National Council of Trade Unions (Szakszervezetek Orszagos Tandcsa, SZOT), Patriotic People’s Front (Hazafias Népfront, HNF), and the successor organisation of the League of Communist Youth (Kommunista Ifjusagi Sz6vetség, KISZ), the Alliance of Hungarian Democratic Youth (Magyar Demokratikus Ifjusagi Szévetség, Demisz). 21 On the characteristics of totalitarian regimes, see Hannah Arendt: The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York, 1963.; Carl Friedrich & Zbigniew Brzezinski: Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. New York, Praeger 1956.

22 On the dominant ideas of the Kadar Era see, Miklos Szabé: “A legitimacié térténeti alakvaltozasai” [The historical transformations of legitimacy] In: M. Szabo: Politikai kulttira Magyarorszagon, 1896-1986. [Political culture in Hungary, 1896—1986] Budapest, Medvetanc, 1989. 275—

306. On the ideology of early Kadarism, see Melinda Kalmar: Ennivalo és hozomany. Budapest, Magveto, 1998.

23 On this, see, Samuel P. Huntington: The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991; Larry Diamond (ed.): The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World. New York: Freedom House, 1992; David Potter et al.: Democratization. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997. 24 On the role of intellectuals in the democratic transition, see Gyérgy Konrad and Ivan Szelényi: “Intellectuals and domination in post-communist societies” in Pierre Bourdieu and James S. Coleman (eds.): Social Theory and Changing Society. Boulder: Westview, 1991; Andras Bozoki (ed.): Jntellectuals and Politics in Central Europe. Budapest, Central European University Press, 1999..

XXX The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy 25 For the best analysis of the demonstration, see Hofer Tamas: “Hare a rendszervaltasért szimbolikus mezben. 1989. marcius 15-e Budapesten” [Fight for the Regime Change on Symbolic Field: March 15, 1989, in Budapest] Politikatudomanyi Szemle, Vol. 1, No. 1. 1992. pp. 29-51. On the role of the non-elite, see Alan Renwick’s chapter in this book. 26 See the minutes of the first meeting of the EKA. In Andras Bozoki et al. (eds.): A rendszervaltas forgatékényve: kerekasztaltargyalasok 1989-ben [The Script of the Regime Change: Roundtable Talks in 1989] Vol. 1. Budapest, Magveté, 1999. 63-75. 27 This uncertainty of the negotiated revolution attracted many scholars to find ways of proper explanation in different methodologies from game theory to path dependency. See, for instance, Adam Przeworski: Democracy and the Market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991; Adam Przeworski: “The Games of Transition” in Scott Mainwaring et al. (eds.): Issues in Democratic Consolidation. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992. pp. 105-152; Josep M. Colomer: “Strategies and Outcomes in Eastern Europe” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6. No. 2. 1995. 74-85; Jon Elster (ed.): Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996; Nancy Bermeo: “Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict During Democratic Transition” in Lisa Anderson (ed.): Transitions to Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. 120-40; Michael D. Kennedy: “Contingencies and the Alternatives of 1989: Toward a Theory and Practice of Negotiated Revolution” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 13. No. 2. Spring 1999. 293-302; Similar investigations concerning the Hungarian case can also be found. See Gabor GyGrivanyi: “A rendszervaltozas jatékai” [The games of the regime change] Politikatudomanyi Szemle, Vol. 2. No. 1. 79-101; Dora Husz: “Elitjatszmak: a posztkommunista elitek kialakulasa” [Elite games: The making of post-communist elites] Politikatudomanyi Szemle, Vol. 6. No. 3. 71-104. Janos Kis: “Between Reform and Revolution” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 12. No. 2. Spring 1998. 300-83; David Stark and Laszl6 Bruszt: Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property Relations in East Central Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Laszl6 Urban: “The Hungarian Transition from a Public Choice Perspective” In Andras Bozoki, Andras KG6résényi and George Schiépflin (eds.): Post-Communist Transition: Emerging Pluralism in Hungary. London, Pinter, 1992. 88-95. 28 This was the viewpoint of Gyérgy Krasso, leader of the radical Hungarian October Party (Magyar Oktober Part, MOP). See, Gyérgy Krasso: “Statarium és happening. (Bozoki Andras interjija)” [Martial Law and Happening. An interview of Andras Bozoki] Mozgo Vilag, Vol. 16. No. 1. 1990. 63-76. 29 Which means that parties can also run in the elections which did not accept socialism, or even strongly opposed it. 30 On June 24, 1989, the composition of leadership of the MSZMP changed. Instead of the centralized power of chief secretary Karoly Grész a collective body was chosen which included Rezs6 Nyers, Karoly Grész, Mikl6s Németh and Imre Pozsgay. The former Politburo was restructured and extended, and from then on it was known as the Political Executive Committee. 31 On June 16, 1989, two hundred thousand people witnessed the reburial of Imre Nagy and his fellow-martyrs on Heroes Square in Budapest. This event later became the symbolic moment of the regime change. The speakers were “S6ers”, such as Miklés Vasarhelyi, Béla Kiraly, Imre Mécs, Sandor Racz, Tibor Zimanyi, all except the young Viktor Orban, representative of Fidesz, who gave a radical speech in the name of Hungarian youth. On July 6th, the legal rehabilitation of Imre Nagy was carried out by the Supreme Court. At the end of July and in early August MDF candidates, with the support of other parties of the opposition, scored important victories in provincial by-elections. 32 In July 1989, US President George Bush visited Budapest, and Rezsé Nyers and Karoly Grosz had negotiations with the Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow. At that time, hard-line communist leaders still firmly controlled the government in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and the GDR.

Introduction: The Significance of the Roundtable Talks XXX1 33 On recent scholarship in revolution, see John Foran (ed.): Theorising Revolutions. London, Routledge, 1997; Noel Parker: Revolutions and History: An Essay in Interpretation. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999; Jaroslav Krejci: “Great Revolutions of the 20th Century in a Civilisational Perspective” Thesis Eleven, No. 62. August 2000. 71-90. Mora Donald and Tim Rees (eds.): Rein-

terpreting Revolution in Twentieth-Century Europe. London: Macmillan, 2001. To the selflimiting character of the regime change, see Andrew Arato: Civil Society, Constitution and Legitimacy. Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 34 Jon Elster: “Constitution-making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea” in Joachim J. Hesse (ed.): Administrative Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. 169-217. 35 Ferenc Fehér & Agnes Heller: Kelet-Eurdépa “dicséséges forradalmai”. [The ‘glorious revolutions’ of Eastern Europe] Budapest, T-Twins, 1992. Literature in elite theory uses the notion of “elite settlement” in such cases, which means that divided elites are willing to renegotiate rapidly the framework of a regime and to restructure the institutional order in a bloodless fashion. Cf. Michael G. Burton and John Higley: “Elite Settlements” American Sociological Review, Vol. 52. 1987. 295~307; John Higley, Jan Pakulski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski (eds.): Post-communist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe. Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998. 36 Previous scholarship on the Hungarian Roundtable talks include Laszl6 Bruszt: “Negotiated Revolution in Hungary” Social Research, Vol. 57. No. 2. 1990. 365-87; Andras Bozoki: “Hungary’s Road to Systemic Change: The Opposition Roundtable” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 7. No. 2. Spring 1993. 276-308; Rudolf Tékés: Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.; Andras Sajé: “Roundtable Talks in Hungary” in Jon Elster (ed.): Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. 69-98. See also notes No. 1 and No. 28.

XXXI11 Appendix Appendix 1. The Structure of the | National Roundtable Talks in Hungary, 1989 1. Plenary Session

(Agreements & Political Declarations) (3 delegates from each participating organization) 2. Intermediate-level Sessions

Political co-ordinating committee Economic and social committee (Defining the rules and principles (Strategic issues in combating

of the democratic transition) economic and social crisis) (2 delegates from each organization) (2 delegates from each organization) 3. Working Committees

1. Political committees (5-5 delegates 2. Economic committees (5-5

from the three sides) delegates from the three sides) 1.1 Constitution drafting (Presidency, 2.1 Debt problem, structural change,

Constitutional Court) inflation

1.2 Legal regulation of political parties 2.2 The social consequences of the

(Party finance, party assets) economic crisis 1.3 Electoral law 2.3 Property reform, privatization 1.4 Revision of the penal code andthe 2.4 Land reform (The problem of

rules of criminal procedure law agricultural co-operatives) 1.5 Liberation and regulation of the 2.5 Principles of budget regulation mass media (Public TV, newspapers)

1.6 Legal guarantees for the 2.6 Anti-monopoly regulations, completion of a non-violent transition market protection to democracy Goodwill Committee (To solve problems in the negotiating process, operating at all levels)

Appendix XXXI11 Appendix 2. Major Agreements and Disagreements between the MSZMP and the Opposition Roundtable on Political Issues

MSZMP Opposition Roundtable 1. The Question of Constitution-making

The office of President of the Republic Only a newly elected Parliament _ should be set up before free elections. should make decisions on the new constitution.

Agreement on modifications to the constitution by the parties; on the legal status of the president and on parliamentary democracy. No agreement as to the time and method of the presidential election. 2. The Question of Political Parties

A multi-party system is accepted and The communist party should account the new political parties can claim for its property to society, and this limited funds from the state budget. property should be distributed equally among the political parties.

Party political activity should be Party political activity should be

allowed in the work-place. banned in the work-place. No agreement on any of these issues. 3. The Question of Electoral Law

The dominance of individual Equal division between individual constituencies over party lists. constituencies (IC) and proportional (party) representation (PR).

5 per cent threshold. 3 per cent threshold. Agreement on electoral law, a two-vote system, parity between IC and PR, county lists, a national compensatory list, a 4 per cent threshold. 4. The Question of Penal Law Similar standpoints.

Agreement on the liberalization of the penal code and the elimination of “political crimes’.

XXX1V Appendix 5. The Question of Media and Publicity Agreement in principle to create an impartial committee to supervise public mass media. No agreement on the membership of this impartial committee, which was never, in fact, established. 6. The Question of Guarantees of a Peaceful Transition

The Worker’s Militia should be kept, | The Worker’s Militia should be

although in a different form. eliminated since democratic parties

| cannot maintain armed forces.

No agreement; the parties agreed in principle that the secret police should be separated from the communist party, although in practice the secret police continued to give information to the MSZMP (later the MSZP) about the activities of the opposition until the January, 1990 wire-tapping scandal.

~ PART ONE

ANALYTICAL APPROACHES

BLANK PAGE

1. THE POLITICS OF THE ROUNDTABLE TALKS

Unity and Division: The Opposition Roundtable and Its Relationship to the Communist Party Zoltan Ripp

Diverse Opposition and the Concepts of Transition If I am to summarise the question of the birth and future of the Opposition Roundtable, I would say that it does not look like a permanent institution. First of all, it restricts the sovereignty of the organizations belonging to the Opposition Roundtable; it restricts them in the process of defining themselves, and the closer we come to elections, the greater is the degree by which they should differ from one another, since they are competitors. What we can see is that differences in opinion are greater among themselves in a number of areas than between the various organiza-

. tions and the MSZMP.

These words were uttered by the secretary of the Central Committee (CC) of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP), Gyorgy Fejti, at the meeting of the CC on May 8th, 1989, when the proposal to create a political reconciliation forum (a national roundtable) was on the agenda.’ Preparations had already been underway for months and Fejti, who was responsible for the preparation of the talks, drew this premature conclusion on the basis of experience there. However, the Opposition Roundtable survived despite all internal dissent and provided an opportunity for the most important opposition organizations to become interlocu-

tors with the Communist Party during the peaceful transition leading towards democracy. Fejti’s words reflected the Communist Party’s negotiating strategy of trying to divide the opposition. On the one hand, the whole nature of the transition could be decided by the success or failure of this attempt to divide the other side; on the other hand, the question of how the opposition organizations defined their relations with the Communist Party was of great importance. Two interconnected processes determined the way leading to negotiations. The leadership of the Communist Party had to realise that there was a need for radical economic and political reforms which transcended the framework of the

existing system, since the system itself, which had plunged the country into a deep financial and economic crisis, was no longer functioning. It was negotiation and compromise which appeared the best solution to the Communist lead-

4 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

ers to carry out the transition—before the emerging opposition groups were to , become too strong. The MSZMP was preparing for a partial loss of power (and responsibility) but it did not wish to hand it all over. The deep crisis, which eroded the regime rapidly, could be denied until the latter part of 1988, and this fact speeded up fragmentation within the MSZMP. A new political and economic elite had taken shape by the end of the 1980s, an elite which

realized that it had a vested interest in implementing radical reforms. The most favorable solution for them was to start the inevitable political transformation and to ensure that a peaceful and gradual version of this process took place. Therefore, the containment of political radicalism was in the interests both of those in power, who were attempting to save the system and who wished to limit changes to the | creation of a “new model’, and of those members of the elite who were interested in organized retreat, in avoidance of any violent redistribution of position, and in capitalizing on the favorable conditions during the time of transition towards a new system. There were many people in the MSZMP besides those who realized the inevitable need for basic changes regardless of their personal interests. One of the decisive elements of the processes leading to negotiations was the emerging special relationship between the MSZMP and the newly organized political forces. The majority of the leaders of the Communist Party were planning a system of alliances, with the help of which they would be able to retain hegemonic power within the framework of “socialist pluralism”. The economic views of the

radical reformers were close to those of the opposition groups which viewed Western-style liberalization as the goal of transition. Nevertheless, their interests regarding the pace of creating a pluralist democracy coincided to a larger degree with those opposition groups which were planning a gradual transition of the political system and which were less radical in their demands. The era of limited economic reforms was for good by the end of the 1980s. There was no alternative to a monetarist handling of the crisis, which was also

advocated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to a vigorous western Orientation, to the attraction of capital, which made changes in the economic structure possible, and—in general—to the liberalization of the economy in a country which was in debt and, therefore, in a dependent situation. Therefore, the main direction of political transition was determined also. However, even the opposition asked itself the question whether it was permissible to have a basic

transformation of the economy—under the leadership of the reform communists—before a democratic settlement of the political situation. The opposition was not united on the questions of the new economic system. The leaders of several opposition organizations cherished illusions concerning the difficulties of

transition and a number of them subscribed to a hazy, “third way” concept, which envisaged a development different from that of the West. The only way to bring about the unity of the opposition was to limit the common goal of remov-

ing political obstacles to the transition towards democracy. The ad hoc crisis therapy and the inevitable liberalization remained the responsibility of the “reform communist” government.

Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division 5 The system had not only sunk into an economic crisis but also into a moral one by the end of the 1980s. Almost no-one took communist ideology seriously, not even those in power. The only way out of this situation was for the leaders of the Communist Party to emphasize the reform-minded nature of the MSZMP itself by relying on the unique past of Hungarian reforms within the Soviet bloc. The leading personalities of the reform wing who came into the foreground after the fall of Kadar in 1988 were to authenticate this new face of the party; personalities such as the father of previous economic reforms, Rezs6 Nyers, Imre Pozsgay, who represented the idea of democratic political transformation and national independence; and Prime Minister Miklés Németh, who represented the new reform-minded generation. All of these were supported by a new phenomenon: so-called reform circles were founded within the local organizations of the MSZMP, indicating the emergence of a radical reform movement which gained more and more ground as one of the factors of the process leading towards democracy.’ The reformers of the establishment and the members of the reform movement alike wished to transform the Communist Party fundamentally, to play a leading

role in the transition relying on the traditions of reforms, and to find an appropriate place among the political forces of the new system. One of the conditions of this endeavor was that the opposition should respect their efforts. The dominant group of these leading reformers was represented by Imre Pozsgay. He had direct contact with by far the strongest opposition organization, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and several so-called historical parties (parties which had been violently banned in 1947-1949); he lent a helping hand in the reorganization of these parties. Another group, represented by the former social democrat Rezs6 Nyers, took part in the formation of the organization called the New March Front (UMF). He wanted to create a framework for talks and co-operation with this organization by involving members of the liberalminded opposition from the very start.’ Local reform forces were seeking contacts separately with the independent trade unions and, at the same time, they also provided direct assistance to the opposition by putting pressure on the lead-

ers of the MSZMP. |

In consequence the emerging opposition organizations had to make clear their relationship with a fragmented Communist Party. It only seemed sufficient to separate the orthodox communists from the reformers. If the opposition organizations wanted to step onto the political stage united, they had to find a common starting point. It was not only the multi-colored nature of the opposition which created problems, but also the fact that the leaders of the individual opposition groups maintained looser or tighter relationships with different groups of the communist reformers. The MSZMP was trying to divide the opposition

since it wanted to hold talks on transition with them separately. What sort of negotiating situation would come into being became a key issue.

The beginning of the Polish Roundtable talks in February 1989 exerted a catalytic effect both on the ruling party and on the opposition. However, the situation of the Polish opposition, centred around Solidarity and legitimized by

6 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

the support of mass movements, was basically different from that of the inde-

pendent organizations in Hungary. |

There were two sizeable opposition groupings during the Kadar era: the liberal-minded democratic opposition was called “bourgeois radical”, whilst the basically third-way popular—national group was termed “national radical.” The handling of the two groups by the MSZMP changed after 1988. The democratic opposition, which radically opposed the system, qualified as the enemy, whilst the other group was euphemistically termed “alternative.” The dominant group of the democratic opposition published a programme entitled Social Contract in 1987, which not only rejected the communist system by calling the demands of the 1956 Revolution “timely”, but also pointed out that a new era had started with the dissolution of the “Kadarite consensus.” However, the compromise proposal included in the program urged the establishment of a controlled but legally-based one-party system. It looked to such as the starting point for an evolutionary development towards pluralistic democracy.” A precondition of the

plan was the ability of the group to force the representatives of power to the negotiating table. However, by the time that this might have happened, events had already overtaken the content of the proposed changes. _ The other opposition group appeared before the public with the co-operation

of Imre Pozsgay. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), which had been founded as an independent movement in the fall of 1987, did not occupy an unambiguous political position. Even one year later, at the time of conversion into an organization, it characterized itself as “neither oppositional nor belonging to the governing party.” Its long-term goals included a democracy based on the principles of self-governance and parliamentary representation.° Nevertheless, these principles, heretical to the Communist Party, seemed to be conducive to a compromise, if its end result were to be some sort of limited pluralism, or perhaps a coalition, which would permit the continued supremacy of the MSZMP. The Democratic Forum—which was far from being united and provided an opportunity for people with different orientations to enter the political arena— was reluctant to provoke the representatives of power, and thus it placed the reform wing led by Pozsgay in an awkward position. Nevertheless, Pozsgay’s position was strengthened by the fact of his influence on the strongest opposition organization, whilst the MDF received protection in the form of the support of one of the most respected reform communists. In late 1988 and early 1989, the Communist Party was preparing to have its own concept of a constitution and bills reforming the public laws accepted, and it endeavored to gain support from outside. However, the wishes of the leaders of the party became illusionary as a result of events simply gathering speed. The March 1989 programme of the MDF suggested that an extraordinary and freelyelected constitutional national assembly be convened. Besides drafting a constitution, this body was also to have created a democratic election law.’ This idea was aired by the leaders of the Forum at a January 1989 meeting with representatives of communist intellectuals. The possibility of a later coalition, thought to

: Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division 7 be inevitable by a number of MDF leaders, also arose during discussion, but the

Forum set free elections as a precondition of its creation.® : A long debate was held within the MDF about the possibility of transforming itself into a party. The populist leaders promoting the “third way” concept wished to preserve the more spiritual coalition movement nature of the Forum. The ostensible leader of the radical right, Istvan Csurka, did not consider the formation of parties and the speedy creation of a multi-party democracy the key issue; he believed that the political activity of the population at large was the most pressing question. This wing of the Forum was not really concerned with the constitutional matters of the transition; instead, it demanded that the Communist Party should renounce power in favor of the real representatives of society. Therefore, it did not plan to hold talks on the transition itself and its rules. The radical right precluded the possibility that a parliament embodying monopolistic power should create a new constitution. The weakness of the

right’s ideas lay in the lack of clear plans regarding the establishment of a constituent assembly. The Democratic Forum, as the opposition organization with by far the largest support, was not especially interested in creating unity on the opposition side because it believed that it possessed the ability to enforce its interests even without this unity. However, it distanced itself from joint opposition action only in cases which seemed to be too risky. The democratic opposition, which enjoyed considerably less support among the people, was left alone several times—e.g., when it organized an anti-government demonstration—for the reasons mentioned above.’ The members of the democratic opposition established a loose organization called the Network of Free Initiatives (SZKH or Network) in early May 1988, and then in November the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) was founded as a liberal party. The originators of the Network believed, before the MSZMP meeting in May 1988 which led to the ousting of Janos Kadar, that the rapid deterioration of the economic and political situation was threatening catastrophe. They expected a long transition in accordance with the realities of the time and continued to insist on the compromise agreement plan of the Social Contract. To achieve this goal it was essential for the opposing parties to decrease their fear of each other and, further, to have members within them who were willing to compromise. The worries of the liberal—radical opposition concerning transition stemmed mostly from the fact that the means of recovery from the deep crisis, and its attendant grave social consequences, had to be accepted by the people at large. They thought that compromise had a double system of conditions: on the one hand, the strengthening of the reform wing of the ruling party, which would

accept the responsibility of the MSZMP for the emergence of the crisis and commit itself to a peaceful solution, and, on the other hand, the determined behavior of the opposition organizations accepted by society.’” The Network was not able to acquire as much social support for its policies

as the MDF had. It seemed that there would be two players in the country’s

8 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

political life: on one side, a gradually eroding MSZMP and on the other, the burgeoning MDF. The idea was also floated that the government—lacking vigorous resolution in the policy area—might be trying to compromise with the moderate opposition, and the democratic opposition, therefore, decided that it would form a party without wasting further time. The two-factor strategy had already crystallized by the time that the SZDSZ was formed in November 1988. On the one hand, it aimed at peaceful transition based on dialogue, whilst, on the other, it made efforts to organize society into a form of “counter-power” and had a radical set of demands which truly signified a new era. For instance, the demand for rehabilitation in respect of 1956 and the introduction of a multi-party system could be included in this context. The first program concept of the SZDSZ, as that of the MDF, still demanded

a constituent assembly.’’ Nevertheless, its ideas regarding transition changed over a few months, and by the beginning of 1989 it favored a compromise for a transitional period. The leader of the party, Janos Kis, spelled out the arguments: there was neither a balance of power nor accepted rules of the political game, and the opposition drew strength primarily from the weakness of the party state rather than from genuine mass support. He feared that insisting on a confrontational line might result in unforeseen government reaction, and, therefore, the SZDSZ wished to progress transition by way of conflict which would make it possible for the communists to retreat step-by-step. It endeavored to facilitate the separation of the various factions within the Communist Party by putting pressure on the party and it also wished to push the reformers towards a policy of compromise.” The Free Democrats’ final version of the scenario of transition was completed by May 1989, when they made their detailed ideas public in a pamphlet entitled The Program of Regime Change." In early March, when the leaders of the Communist Party invited the important parties one by one to hold discus-

sions, the SZDSZ was already making its point on the basis of this concept. According to the Free Democrats, negotiations were needed with the aim of agreeing both on an electoral law appropriate for a pluralist democracy and on the political “rules of the game” in the period leading up to free elections. In other words, they rejected the creation of a new constitution before free elections as well as the establishment of the office of the President of the Republic and the

Constitutional Court. They also considered it essential to publicize the talks, given that neither negotiating party was empowered with the necessary social authorization as far as negotiations deciding the future of the country were con-

| cerned.“

The SZDSZ was already trying to secure its ability to represent and to push through that section of its program demanding the creation of a democratic constitutional state and its ideas concerning the scenario of transition within the framework of united opposition action. There was no doubt that this was the only way for it to acquire the necessary popular support. Moreover, the MSZMP did not really want to win over the Free Democrats as negotiating partners; in

Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division 9 fact, it wanted to isolate them from the moderate opposition which was thought to be more flexible in negotiating a compromise. At first, the Communist Party categorically rejected the Free Democrats’ proposal that the opposition organizations should negotiate with the representatives of power as a coalition bloc." March 15th is the principal national holiday for Hungarians, the anniversary of the Revolution of 1848. This day is a symbol of the struggle not only for civil

rights, but also for national independence. An opposition tradition was taking , shape in the years of communist rule: smaller and larger demonstrations were organized in Budapest separate from the official celebrations and the police did their best to suppress them. However, the situation had changed by March 1989, when the authorities could not, and did not, attempt to prevent a joint demonstration of opposition organizations. The action was a great success and proved the principle of strength in unity. Janos Kis took advantage of the situation and, in a speech delivered in front of the Parliament building, he urged the creation of a coalition of the democratic parties and organizations so that the MSZMP should face a strong rival and negotiator which could not be ignored.'® Four days later a proclamation was accepted at the Free Democrats’ meeting in accordance with the above; this called on independent organizations to establish a roundtable with the intention of joining forces against the Communist Party during a peaceful transition.’” However, it was not this initiative which led finally to the establishment of the

Opposition Roundtable, since another organization, the Independent Lawyers’ , Forum, which was independent from the political parties, released a similar statement, and the Free Democrats thought it wiser to join this initiative.'* Besides the two most significant opposition organizations, the MDF and the SZDSZ, others also appeared on the stage of Hungarian political life. The Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz) had already been founded in March 1988. Its political ideas—concerning a liberal, constitutional state and a market economy— were similar to those of the Free Democrats, whilst their anti-government radicalism was even more marked. Its strategy differed slightly from that of the SZDSZ, although. Fidesz members based their radical anti-government stance on their constitutional rights and behaved as if there were conditions in place characteristic of a normal constitutional state. Their behavior, based on existing laws and manifested in spectacular political actions, severely provoked the leaders of the Communist Party, which is why it was Fidesz which was attacked most brutally.” The Communist Party tried to separate Fidesz, together with the SZDSZ, from the moderate opposition. Fidesz members were not very willing to accept compromise solutions, especially if they believed that such solutions would delay the inevitable changes. At first the Free Democrats did not even want to discuss the transition with the Communist Party and were willing only to co-operate with those opposition forces which shared their views. They initiated the creation of the opposition coalition in order to formulate a common political platform.”° A special group of opposition organizations was constituted by the reviving historical parties. There was an idea among the leaders of the MSZMP that the

10 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

coalition of the years 1945-1947, when the Communist Party ruled together with the Social Democratic Party, the Independent Smallholders’ Party, and the National Peasants’ Party, could be revived. They hoped that it might be better to make a compromise with politicians who had retired from political life during the Kadar era than with the leaders of the new opposition organizations. Sharp conflicts arose within the historical parties during their reorganization, not completely independent of the question of their relationship with the MSZMP. Parties split, rival groups mutually excluded one another, and it was difficult to find

a balance between the older and the new leaders of the parties. These historical parties could rely primarily upon their traditions and the attraction which their names exerted. Hardly anyone knew their leading politicians and they had scarcely any time to work out their programs. They could not cite their opposition activities and, instead, talked of the grievances suffered at the hands of the Communist Party during the liquidation of the multi-party system and the Stalinist terror.

However, the reorganization of some historical parties had certain antecedents. Associations had been formed within the framework of the Patriotic People’s Front led by Imre Pozsgay since the mid-80s which now constituted the bases for the reorganization of parties. First of all, the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre Friendship Society should be mentioned;”! this organization was under the leadership of Karoly Vigh, who had close contacts with Imre Pozsgay. An associa-

tion promoting the heritage of the National Peasants’ Party was also founded within the framework of the People’s Front; from this emerged the Hungarian People’s Party in February 1989. The leading functionaries of the Patriotic People’s Front could be found among its leaders. The situation of the People’s Party was made no easier by. the fact that the heritage of a “third-way”, national radi-

calism was also claimed by the dominant faction of the MDF. Moreover, the party had neither respectable politicians nor a solid intellectual background.

The two most important historical parties, the Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKGP) and the Social Democratic Party of Hungary (MSZDP), both started their political life anew with a number of internal conflicts, which were still going on during the roundtable negotiations. The factions opposing one another not only waged a war for power, but they were also split regarding their relationship with the reformers within the Communist Party. The Independent Smallholders’ Party did not have clear-cut ideas about the nature of the transition. It shared the view of those parties which saw the solution in a constituent assembly.” The FKGP never rejected proposals for negotiations, and so it reacted positively to the proclamation of the UMF, which suggested that a National Committee be called into being for managing the transition. According to a statement issued after a meeting of the leaders of the Communist Party and the Smallholders’ Party on March 4, 1989, the Smallholders’

Party agreed with the proposal of the MSZMP that “all constructive social forces” should participate in future talks and, furthermore, that the negotiations Should concern the electoral system and the principles of the constitution-making process as well as social and economic questions.”> However, many party mem-

Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division 1] bers in the FKGP and in other opposition parties were taken aback when Vince Vor6és delivered a speech at an official celebration on March 15th emphasizing the importance of joining forces at a time when the whole opposition, separately from the representatives of power, was organizing a demonstration.” The temporary success of the Communist Party’s tactics was shown by the

fact that a representative of the other significant historical party, the Social Democratic Party, also spoke at this official celebration. In fact, he emphasized that his action did not signify a joining of the MSZMP, nor did it mean accepting

shared responsibility for the policies of the past decades. The leaders of the Communist Party paid special attention to fostering good relations with the So-

cial Democrats for two reasons; firstly, since the MSZDP had been forcibly united with the Communist Party forty years before, and, secondly, since they wanted to close the gap between the MSZMP and Social Democratic policies with more and more radical reforms.”” The Social Democrats were in a special situation: they constituted the only left-wing party, by definition of the opposition, and so they had to define their relationship with democratic socialism as a goal at the time of the fall of “actually existing Socialism.” Moreover, they had to consider their relationship with the trade union movement which had been integrated into the power structure of the Kadar regime and whose support they now wished to secure for themselves. The social democrats defined themselves unambiguously as being on the side of the opposition, whilst their willingness to negotiate in early 1989 was similar to that of the Smallholders’. This was indicated in the statement issued after talks between the communist and social democratic leaders in early March, in which Party Chairman Andras Révész showed openness towards accepting the position of the MSZMP. He thought it feasible to hold two- or multi-sided negotiations whose goal should be to ensure that “the transition towards parliamentary democracy and the constituent process will be based on the co-operation of constructive social forces.””°

It seemed possible until mid-March for the leadership of the Communist Party to carry its policy through. They wished to manage the transition by basing

it on negotiations with the opposition organizations individually and “pansociety” consultational (i.e. non-binding) roundtable talks. If the MSZMP had been able to have its concept accepted by the multicolored and divided factions of the opposition, which were at an early state of organization, then the party could have expected successful negotiations and—through them—the maintenance of its hegemony. It seemed possible that the new constitution would be written on the basis of the official draft and that the reformed Communist Party would stay in power, naturally as the strongest member of a coalition government, after the extraordinary elections with a democratic franchise. The communist leaders considered radicalism rather than the programs regarding the new political system as being the dividing-line in their relations with the opposition parties. They attempted to prevent the unification of these parties by relying on

the differences among them.”’

12 ' The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

The Unification of the Opposition and Preparation for Talks The representatives of eight organizations met at the invitation of the Independent Lawyers’ Forum (Fiiggetlen Jogdsz Forum, FJF) on March 22nd, 1989. The Opposition Roundtable (Ellenzéki Kerekasztal, EKA) was founded at this ses-

sion.” It was no surprise, after the previously published statements of the MSZMP and the bilateral talks among the different parties, that the Communist Party leadership would soon suggest the establishment of some sort of consultative forum. The opposition had to find answers to at least three, closely interrelated questions: 1) How it envisaged the operation of the Opposition Roundtable and what role it would assign to it during negotiations; 2) What it would like to discuss and with whom; and 3) What kind of relationship it would like to form with the MSZMP and the latter’s satellite organizations.

The representatives of the various organizations arrived at the statutory meeting with different or undeveloped ideas. For the opposition to agree on unambiguous answers to the basic questions, it was necessary that the Communist Party should create a situation with concrete negotiating proposals which put pressure on the opposition. The leaders of the Hungarian Democratic Forum were not very enthusiastic about an organization embodying the unity of the opposition because it might diminish the Forum’s leading opposition role, and the necessity of reconciling

views with others went hand-in-hand with narrowing elbow-room.” It was not, therefore, the major leaders of the party who participated in the talks; although the selection of the delegates proved very fortunate. Gyérgy Szabad and Laszl6 Sélyom, as well as Jozsef Antall, who joined them later, were all firmly committed to the creation of a democratic constitutional state and the : facilitation of a peaceful transition. The official position of the MDF initially declared that there was no need for an overall opposition organization, but only for a consultative forum, which would leave total freedom of action and the possibility of separate negotiating combinations in the hands of the organizations.’ If this concept had prevailed, it would not have unequivocally excluded the previously applied bilateral reconciliation forms upon which the Communist Party had based its plans.** The majority of the opposition parties, similarly to the MDF, did not wish to commit themselves to creating a joint “top” organization from the outset. However, the Free Democrats resolutely suggested close co-operation against the policies of the Communist Party. They succeeded in having their ideas accepted only gradually. At first, they persuaded everyone to agree that, even if they did not call into being a “top organization,” they should hold regular negotiations and the participating organizations should themselves adhere to the positions which had been agreed on by all. The representative of the FKGP pro-

| posed that the positions accepted by all should be declared by all of the organi- | zations in concert. The criteria of belonging to the Opposition Roundtable were also established at the statutory meeting, and it was also decided that compulsory

| . Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division 13 decisions would be agreed on by consensus only; that is, that each organization had the power of veto. It was essential to the relationship of the new organization with the Communist Party that it defined itself as an opposition. It was only from an unambiguously oppositional position that anyone, as a member of the Opposition Roundtable, could convincingly argue in the ensuing debates, and so one of the basic factors of legitimacy inside the organization became opposition to the whole communist regime. Some organizations had to defend themselves because of their “suspicious” connections from the very beginning. The MSZMP—under the leadership of Gyérgy Fejti, who had been authorized to organize the talks—reacted to the birth of a united opposition organization quickly, attempting to disrupt it before it could crystallize. The MSZMP invited randomly-picked organizations, one-by-one, to hold talks, ignoring the other organizations of the Opposition Roundtable. The satellite organizations of the Communist Party, such as the National Council of Trade Unions (SZOT) and the National Council of Hungarian Women (MNOT) were also among those invited. Fejti’s move had exactly the opposite effect from what he had expected. At the March 30th session of the Opposition Roundtable, Balint Magyar managed to have most of the elements of the Free Democrats’ negotiating strategy accepted. The major points of the concept were as follows:

1. It was unacceptable that the Communist Party should determine the participants in, the dates of and the agendas of, the negotiations. 2. Bilateral talks were needed, where both the Communist Party and the opposition should decide themselves which organizations could take their place on their respective sides. In this way it would be certain that the ruling party would not create an artificial “central” position for itself between the opposition and organizations which were even farther to the left than itself.

3. The Opposition Roundtable should demand that it be accepted in this united form as a negotiator and its organizations should reject any separate talks.

4. The opposition should not approach the reform wing of the MSZMP; it should consider the power center of the party as its negotiating partner.

5. Parliament should not pass the new constitution before free elections, whilst the essential laws of the transition could only be introduced into Parliament by the Government after a consensus had been achieved during the talks. 6. The task of the negotiations was to define the rules of transition. 7. Economic questions should not be included in the agenda and all other issues should be avoided on which the opposition was not likely to adopt a unified

position.” |

However, the provocative initiative of the MSZMP brought about a strong sense of solidarity among the organizations of the EKA. They excluded at the outset any negotiations without all of their member organizations. They did not

reject participation in the proposed talks from the first, but they set conditions in |

14 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

their response. These conditions were mainly concerned with the process of drafting a new constitution, the role of the negotiations in respect of law-making, and the bilateral nature of the talks.°* However, the Communist Party did not want to enter into such bilateral talks which could be interpreted as a confrontation between the representatives of power and society, nor did it wish to guarantee that all of the agreements made at the negotiations would be passed by the

legislature”

The MSZMP was still hoping that it would be able to disrupt the unity of the opposition in time. In early April it seemed that these hopes were not totally unfounded. Frailty in the unity of the opposition showed itself not only in the emerging conflict within the Smallholders’ Party when one of the wings of the party was willing to start separate talks with the Communist Party; some of the members of the Opposition Roundtable were behaving at the April 7th meeting as if they had simply not clarified their position a week earlier and as if the MSZMP had met their requirements. The representative of the MDF also leaned towards concessions because he feared that, were negotiations cancelled, the Communist Party might feel itself empowered to have its own constitutional concept passed by Parliament. Nevertheless, the Alliance of Free Democrats and Fidesz still insisted that their conditions should be met in advance. Finally, their position prevailed and no organizations of the Opposition Roundtable appeared at the meeting organized by the MSZMP.*° The failure of the first round of negotiations did not make the MSZMP reconsider its previous policies. Gyérgy Fejti pointed out at a session of the Political Committee on April 19th, 1989, that the opposition politicians, with whom the party had been holding informal talks, were afraid of being isolated inside their Own organizations, and that this was why they did not want to appear to be too conciliatory. They considered the Free Democrats, who urged opposition between the two blocs, the “evil spirit” of the opposition, since it was primarily they who had thwarted the success of the ideas of the Communist Party regarding the roundtable talks.*’ However, the MSZMP had to accept the opposition’s proposal for preparatory talks. The Opposition Roundtable entrusted two scholars of constitutional law, Laszl6 Sélyom and the Free Democrat Péter Télgyessy, with the task. It was Télgyessy who had drafted the section of the SZDSZ program on the transformation of the constitutional system. At the preparatory talks both endeavored to find solutions which would make a clean sweep legally and politically.*®

The proposal of the opposition thwarted the plans of the MSZMP on several points since it effectively comprised the Free Democrats’ concept as described above. At the time of the preparatory talks, one of the sources of conflict lay in the different approaches to the problem of legitimacy. Naturally, the opposition - organizations challenged the legitimacy of the rule of the Communist Party and of the Parliament convoked after the elections of 1985. At the same time they themselves could not claim to be legitimate before free elections, even if they were convinced that their support amongst the electorate exceeded that of the ruling party by a wide margin.

| Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division 15 In the absence of legitimate political forces, it was especially important to establish the legitimacy of the negotiations. In order to do that, the opposition set a target of creating conditions for—and the legal bases of—a constitutional state and relegated everything else to the authority of the new parliament. This basic lack of legitimacy accentuated the need for publicity for the negotiations and for “social control”—the transparency and acceptability of the process. It was important both to conclude the talks as rapidly as possible and to hold elections at

the earliest possible date—for the sake of generating legitimacy. At the same time they wanted to ensure that those conditions would be created with as few compromises as possible. The Hungarian Democratic Forum urged on several occasions, both publicly and in the Opposition Roundtable sessions in April, 1989, that elections be held ahead of time, in autumn. The MDF declared in its statement that it would support such a transitional government which would enact the political program of the MSZMP’s reform wing and which would undertake to hand over power to a

government enjoying the support of the new Parliament in December, 1989.° The Free Democrats, on the other hand, believed that an early election would do more harm than good. They pointed out that it was the hard-liners identified with

Karoly Grész and his followers who were urging an early election, whilst, in opposition to them, Imre Pozsgay and the other reformers wished to have an extraordinary congress before elections, since they expected to prevail over the orthodox wing.*” The Opposition Roundtable was divided over this issue from the beginning. The arguments of the representatives of member organizations were often focused on the relationship with the reform forces of the Communist Party. The problem of the internal division of the Communist Party came into the foreground with the strengthening of the reform wing and the rapid development of the reform movement. Members of the EKA debated whether it would be a good idea to establish separate relations with the various wings of the ruling party and whether it would be worthwhile to hold separate talks with the reformers, thus helping to promote divisions inside the ruling party. The reform communists’ offensive gained momentum inside the MSZMP, but Gyérgy Fejti’s team, which had been empowered to hold the talks, insisted

on the same strategy. They were holding clandestine background talks with leaders of the opposition and were trying to disrupt the unity of the opposition by isolating the radical SZDSZ and Fidesz. The members of the Political Committee hoped that they would be able to make an agreement with the historical parties and perhaps with the MDF, and in this way prepare a coalition to be formed after the election.*’ However, the communist leadership made another tactical mistake when it accepted the Political Committee’s proposal at the May 8th session of the Central Committee, which initiated the establishment of a political reconciliation forum. The decision spelled out suggestions concerning the structure, the agenda, and the participants of the negotiations, despite the fact that the preparatory talks with the opposition had not been concluded.

16 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

The resolution urging this initiative provoked the Opposition Roundtable once again. The question again arose during a debate on a proposal to put the talks on hold until the reformers had taken over the running of negotiations inside the Communist Party. Finally the Opposition Roundtable declared the unilateral initiative of the Communist Party an attempt to break off negotiations and rejected it. However, independent of this initiative, the debate over the potential partners on the governing side was revived among the opposition members. One of the symptoms of the power struggle inside the Communist Party was an informal suggestion—which became public—that the EKA should hold talks on the transition, not as the partner of the Communist Party, but as that of government. The growing prominence of two ministers of state (Imre Pozsgay and Rezs6 Nyers) in the Németh government, which became more and more independent of the party and which promised more and more radical reforms, offered

better prospects of an agreement than the delegation close to First Secretary Karoly Grosz.” If the power-center had been transferred from party to government, the latter might have been able to change the nature of the talks on transition. However, some opposition politicians doubted the reality of such changes and did not really sense a turning point despite the strengthening offensive of the reformers, whereas others urged that the Opposition Roundtable be an active participant in shaping the balance of power within the Communist Party even at the price of building a special relationship with the reformers. They thought that the best solution for the opposition would be to negotiate with Pozsgay’s reform wing. The representatives of the opponents of such a special relationship, above all

the Free Democrats and Fidesz, argued that it would be worthwhile to support a victory of the reformers over the orthodox forces, but the former had to fight their struggle themselves inside the MSZMP: The aforementioned representatives were also opposed to holding talks with the government since supreme power was still in the hands of the Communist Party, and they did not wish to create uncertainties in respect of the front line between power and opposition. This latter position ultimately prevailed in the debates, which meant that the original negotiating strategy of the Opposition Roundtable was maintained.” At the same time, the opposition representatives indicated to the leading reformers that “they would not be opposed” to their joining the talks. In this way the MSZMP failed once more to force the opposition to retreat or _ to disrupt the unity of the Opposition Roundtable as a result of its ultimatum-like initiative. However, it did not see the situation as hopeless and planned new clandestine background talks with certain opposition parties. Fejti still believed that his party had failed because the militant, rigid position of the Free Democrats had prevailed in the sessions of the Opposition Roundtable. Nevertheless, the negotiating position of the Communist Party further deteriorated. The ceremonial reburial of the executed Prime Minister of the 1956 Revolution, Imre Nagy, and of the other martyrs was fixed for June 16th. The Communist Party was pressed to conclude an agreement concerning the start of

Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division 17 the actual talks by this event since an imminent mass demonstration was threatening further deterioration in its position. The hard-liners were forced on to the defensive, and the spreading reform movement and the activities of the leading reformers developed links. A demand for an extraordinary party congress grew stronger; it was a precondition of a drastic transformation of the party and— through it—of the whole political system. The reform movement pressurized the leaders of the MSZMP to start negotiations on the transition and it urged that reform politicians should be the party’s delegates.” In this way the Fejti group, which had been entrusted with the preparations, found itself between the devil

and the deep blue sea.

It was, once again, the position of the Free Democrats which prevailed in the debates of the Opposition Roundtable. At this point Péter Télgyessy and Ivan Petd, as well as the Fidesz leader, Viktor Orban, stood for a welcome to the emergence of the reform circles, although they maintained that they should negotiate only with the official MSZMP delegation. They thought that time was not on the side of the communists and that no concession should be made which might be presented as a product of power politics at the session of the Central Committee in late May.” The hottest debate in the preparatory talks at that time centered on the question of how many sides the table should have. The MSZMP suggested four-sided negotiations as a sign of compromise. According to this idea, the third side of the national roundtable would have been made up of or- _

ganizations which “belonged neither to the MSZMP nor to the Opposition Roundtable” and which would have been invited by the Communist Party. They wished to keep the fourth side for observers who might participate in the debates but who could not vote.”° Fejti already knew by the session of the Political Committee on May 26th, 1989 that they had to act swiftly; otherwise the Communist Party would be made the scapegoat for the failure to establish a national roundtable. Clandestine talks had not produced the expected results, either, and the verbal agreements were all renounced by the representatives of the Democratic Forum, the Hungarian People’s Party, and the Social Democratic Party. The only hope for Fejti was that the representatives of the “moderate opposition” would conclude during the talks that the Free Democrats and Fidesz only wanted publicity but did not wish to

compromise. | :

At the May 31st session of the Opposition Roundtable the relationship with reform communism was again raised during the debate on negotiating strategy. On this occasion it was Viktor Orban who represented the most radical viewpoint. He argued that the views of the reform communists which were similar to those of the opposition rested on totally different bases, which was why there could be no common platform with them. With regard to preparatory talks, the debate touched two critical points: the limits of compromise and the deadline for concluding an agreement concerning negotiations proper. Both sides held trump cards. The position of the opposition was strengthened by the fact that the Communist Party was pressed for time, not only be-

18 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

cause of the reburial of Imre Nagy on June 16th., but also because of President

George Bush’s impending visit, and by the decision of the International Monetary Fund to suspend credit. On the other hand, the MSZMP was able to blackmail the Opposition Roundtable by having the so-called cardinal laws necessary for transforming the political system passed by Parliament without consultation, had the talks not been started immediately. In this situation several members of the opposition believed that it would be wise to accept a June 10th deadline for the preparatory period; negotiations could then be started suitably after the Imre Nagy reburial. Viktor Orban was most opposed to signing anything before the burial since he thought that this would bring about a radical change in the political situation. It was also he who adopted an intransigent position on possible compromises regarding participants in the negotiations and their competence. The SZDSZ seemed to waver briefly when it showed a willingness to respond positively to the government’s proposal for separate talks. In April the Free Democrats had suggested that a government of experts be set up for the period of transition, and, although Mikl6s Németh had rejected the proposal, they believed that the transformation of the government in May and its distancing itself from the Communist Party were hopeful signs. However, the Opposition Roundtable rejected this idea in concert and it was never raised again. It transpired in the concluding phase of the preparatory talks that even Fidesz did not insist rigidly on its anti-compromise position. The success of the tactical maneuvers of the Opposition Roundtable was endangered by the fact that the secret service had passed accurate information to the communist leadership about what had happened at their sessions. After the opposition had ascertained that the MSZMP was unwilling to compromise on certain questions, it attempted to neutralize the unfavorable parts of the agreement as far as possible. It was not able to prevent the satellite organizations of the Communist Party from receiving formally equal status as the “Third Side” at the National Roundtable, but it managed to have the idea accepted that each side should have one single vote and, moreover, that the Third Side was not empowered to veto any agreement concluded between the Opposition Roundtable and the MSZMP. However, the opposition could not prevent the MSZMP from placing economic questions on the agenda of the negotiations. The Opposition Roundtable could be satisfied with the June 10th agreement concluding the preliminary talks. The MSZMP had to accept the most important

elements of the opposition’s policy and, in addition, it had to commit itself openly to a democratic, constitutional state. The opposition succeeded in ensuring that the declared goal of the negotiations was the creation of legal preconditions for the transition and that constitutional changes should not precede the agreement. In this way it prevented the Communist Party from driving its ideas through Parliament by bypassing negotiations. The agreement also declared the principle of consensus and contained political guarantees regarding the validation of future agreements and the peaceful nature of the transition.””

Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division 19 The signed agreement did not yet encompass the more concrete topics of the negotiations and the definition of the structure of the talks, and it was rather vague also about publicity. However, these things could not prevent the convening of the opening session of the National Roundtable talks three days later, an event which marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of the peaceful transition.

Conflicts Within and Without In mid-June 1989, as negotiations proper began, the MSZMP was still in possession of all formal power, but its position was becoming weaker and weaker. The reforms did not slow down erosion; on the contrary, they accelerated the process and the reformers’ position within the Communist Party became stronger. The internal struggles manifested themselves in the transformation of the structure of the leadership also.** The influence of First Secretary Karoly Grész, who did not agree with the radical changes but who did not have enough power to prevent them, gradually declined. The hard-liners attacked Pozsgay for initiating the Movement for a Democratic Hungary,” which attempted to establish contacts among politicians who belonged to different parties. The growing pressure exerted by the reform circles was demonstrated by the fact that the party

leadership could not avoid a demand to organize the congress earlier than planned.” Regarding the roundtable talks, an important decision of the Central Committee named Imre Pozsgay as the Communist Party’s candidate for the Presidency, though the Opposition Roundtable rejected the creation of this position before free elections.”’ The leaders of the Communist Party also had to battle with mutinies by parliamentary representatives since the agreement concluded with the opposition questioned the legitimacy of Parliament and curtailed its authority. Moreover, the opposition continued to attack certain parliamentary representatives by using a legal opportunity for the revocation of a mandate by electors. Outside circumstances also made the position of the MSZMP more difficult. The bloodbath in Tienanmen Square afforded an opportunity to attack all communist regimes. The catastrophic results achieved by the Polish Communists at

the “partly free’ elections which followed the compromise concluded at their roundtable talks gave a warning also. The West supported the Polish and Hungarian reforms—Bush’s visit to these two countries in July signified as much— but it expected substantial reforms in political and economic fields alike as a precondition of actual assistance in the grave economic-financial crisis. Experts within the opposition knew that outside help was indispensable, but such assistance seemed politically unfavorable, if it were to stabilize the position of the reforming Communist Party.’ Those who wished to slow down the reform process could not expect real help from the Soviet Union, either, since Gorbachev had declared reforms an internal issue for Hungary, whilst only vaguely hinting at the necessity of preserving socialism.

20 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Despite being in a tight corner, the MSZMP successfully represented its interests in the next and very important phase of the talks, which was to define the agenda of the National Roundtable and the structure of negotiations. The delegation of the Communist Party tried to incorporate into the discussions the creation of the office of President of the Republic and the Constitutional Court, although the opposition had already rejected this proposal; in addition, it wished to give economic questions equal weight to political ones. It also had definite ideas on the matter of the three-level negotiating structure. It became clear even a few days after the beginning of the National Roundtable talks on June 13th that the members of the Opposition Roundtable were not still united regarding the policy to be pursued vis-a-vis the Communist Party and the means of pressure to be put on the other side. The Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Society, supported by the other parties, attacked the radical activities of Fidesz before the

reburial of Imre Nagy, whilst the Young Democrats (with the help of the SZDSZ) rejected such criticism as intervention in their internal affairs. Whilst speaking about the history of the democratic opposition, Balint Magyar remarked how relative was the validity of the considerations of Realpolitik which had been mentioned by the moderate opposition.” Nevertheless, the radical wing of the opposition did not take up an uncompromising position during the continuing preparatory talks. Balint Magyar gave an account of the agreements concluded there to the Opposition Roundtable and it was decided, firstly, that the issues of creating the office of President of the Republic and the Constitutional Court would be incorporated into the topics for negotiation. The skilful tactics of the MSZMP boxed the opposition into a corner. It was at the insistence of the opposition that a clause had been inserted into the basic agreement which provided that bills within the authority of the National Roundtable but lacking consensus should not be introduced into Parliament. The representatives of the Communist Party interpreted this in a way which would permit anything not incorporated into the topics of the talks to be decided freely by Parliament. Therefore, Balint Magyar justified the inclusion of the question of the office of President of the Republic in the negotiating topics

by pointing out that this was the only way to withdraw the bill from the agenda : of the session of Parliament in late June. At that time it seemed that this compromise did not mean a requirement to agree because there was no suggestion whatsoever that the issues should be discussed as a “package,” that the agreements concluded in the various questions should be linked together.

The delegation of the Opposition Roundtable had to accept the formal equalization of economic issues for similar reasons. This seemed to be the only way for them to influence the laws affecting the institutional system of the economy and the government’s role therein. The attempts of the opposition in this area were primarily negative. They wished to control the process of change in

area of property ownership, changes which threatened that the government would make irreversible decisions for the period following elections. Moreover, it was impossible to come to an agreement on economic matters because the

, Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division 21 economic interests and the economic political goals of the three sides were irreconcilable. Regarding an urgent cure for the crisis and economic liberalization, the opposition had had heated debates with the Third Side rather than with the ideas of the government in the first place.’ Nonetheless, there were sharp divisions of opinion among the various organizations of the Opposition Roundtable and the Third Side also. The opposition not only wished to place responsibility for the crisis on the Communist Party, it also expected that the West’s support of the reforms would be coupled with coercion to implement a political transition as well. At the same time it was in the opposition’s interest to prevent the collapse of the economy since it would have to take into account the legacy of the next government. These contradictions forecast failure for the economic talks. The MSZMP succeeded in persuading the Opposition Roundtable to accept the three-level negotiating structure, that is, the introduction of an intermediate

_ level between the plenary sessions and the talks of the working committees dealing with broader topics. The plenary sessions were designed only to approve agreements formally, whilst the real political debates over the questions which the working committees could not solve were intended to be settled on the intermediate negotiating level. The opposition also realized the rationality of the suggestion, but this meant that the publicity of the talks would be endangered. Although political debate might be undertaken at this intermediate level, it had only the status of working committee, whilst the basic agreement provided that only plenary sessions should be public. This situation gave rise to heated debate from the beginning until the Opposition Roundtable succeeded in making these intermediate sessions public after mid-August. The relationship with the MSZMP divided the opposition from the beginning

of the talks, but these differences became marked in only a few questions— although it is true that they were very important from the point of view of power. The debate appeared hidden inside minor constitutional issues or intermingled with them. The Free Democrats presented the most detailed and coherent program for creating the bases of liberal democracy, and this program was promoted consistently by one of the key players in the talks, Péter Télgyessy. In most cases

the representatives of the Hungarian Democratic Forum sided with him. The debate centered primarily on the degree of acceptable compromise and—in relation to this—the balance of political power, and not on constitutional principles. One of the most important questions of the debate was: to what extent should the opposition take relations within the bastions of power into account and to what

extent could the opposition influence them? The clash between the different strategies appeared as a dilemma between politics of principle and Realpolitik in the debates of the Opposition Roundtable.

No sooner did the actual talks get under way and the various specialized committees dealing with modifications to the Constitution, activities of the parties, the electoral system, criminal law, freedom of information, and guarantees against violent resolutions start to work, than the debate over the relationship with the various wings or individuals of the Communist Party recommenced.

22 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

The most heated debate during negotiations concerned the establishment and duties of the office of President of the Republic, a debate which revealed the differences between the strategies of the various opposition organizations. The views adopted on this question were related to the division of power and ideas relating to a coalition following the elections. It was these differences concerning the head of state which showed most clearly the fault lines among the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable. The Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP)—which was admitted into the Opposition Roundtable in early June—first introduced the motion, at the July

6th session, that no obstacle should be placed to Pozsgay’s early election as President. The representative of the party argued that the opposition would not be able to run a potential rival and that if the election of the President preceded parliamentary elections only by a short time, then the MSZMP might take advantage of its popular politician’s success. The motion was seconded by the BZSBT, and it was even thought possible that some opposition organizations would find in Pozsgay their own presidential candidate. The representative of the Independent Smallholders’ Party thought that the recommendation should be deliberated upon and invoked the example of the Polish transition; what he had in mind was the idea that the Communist Party would hardly accept a deal under which it was certain to lose power.”” The SZDSZ, Fidesz and MDF were all strongly opposed to the proposal. Jozsef Antall in the name of the Forum emphasized that a question of principle was under consideration, and so Pozsgay himself should not be included in the debate. He suggested that the Speaker of the Parliament should fill the position

of head of state during the transition—but with limited authority. Péter T6lgyessy, speaking for the SZDSZ, spoke sharply against the Christian Democrats’ proposal and even questioned their being opposition members. Janos Kis pointed out that the need for stability during the transition period did not justify the early election of a president, and so the principled position should not be yielded at all. He did not exclude the possibility of a power deal but stressed that any deal

concerning positions could be made only in the knowledge of the election results.°° The debate then closed with the acceptance of the motion of the Hungar-

ian Democratic Forum. |

During the next session, issues related to suffrage came to the fore and the major fault-line between the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable was revealed in the course of debate on these questions. The MSZMP had realized, after losing the July by-elections, that its original idea regarding elections would amount to political suicide; it was, therefore, willing to accept the compromise _ proposal of the MDF. However, the historical parties inside the opposition protested.

For two weeks it seemed that the question of the relationship with the MSZMP would not cause friction within the opposition. However, a turning point came on July 21st. The Hungarian People’s Party (MNP) put forward a suggestion at a session of the Opposition Roundtable and justified the motion

Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division 23 with the emergence of a political crisis and the danger of political backsliding.”’ The People’s Party proposed that parliamentary elections be brought forward to December and that, for their sake, the tripartite talks should end by mid-August and the President of the Republic should be elected before the parliamentary elections. A heated debate immediately broke out on the topic. The Christian Democrats not only supported the idea, but they also doubted whether there was

a valid resolution of the Opposition Roundtable rejecting the election of the President before free elections. Fidesz and the SZDSZ did not even want to hear of any re-discussion of the issue, which had already been decided. According to the Free Democrats, no new political situation had emerged and concerns

over political backsliding were baseless. Ivan Peté declared that communist manipulation could be detected behind the suggestion, whilst Balint Magyar pointed out that the real issue was the possibility of Pozsgay’s election as President, and so they could only talk about the question of which party wanted it before free elections. Eventually, the debate was adjourned at the suggestion of the MDF with the resolution that they would adhere to the former common position of the opposition but would not make a final decision regarding the President of the Republic in the committee which dealt with the drafting of the Constitution.”®

The proposal of the People’s Party coincided not only with the question of a

speedy conclusion to the talks, but also with the matter of holding elections ahead of time with the agreement of the Communist Party leadership. This became evident in the July 24th session of the Political Committee also when the state of the roundtable talks was on the agenda. Imre Pozsgay and Gyorgy Fejti

were the key players in conducting the talks and their views determined the MSZMP’s position. Fejti, who was skeptical about the success of the negotiations, wanted to box the opposition into a corner. He believed that a deadline should be set to the agreement because this was the only way to force the opposition to retreat; and if there was no agreement, the communists might stand up from the table claiming that it was not they who had caused the failure. Karoly Grosz suggested that the delegation should insist on its position on questions of party law and the law on suffrage, whilst it might be more flexible on the issue of the President of the Republic. Party Chairman Rezsé Nyers believed that the

question of the President of the Republic was equally important, whilst he warned against an over-rigid and ultimatum-like manner at the talks.” At the end of July, the opposition felt that the communists wished to speed up the talks, and, at the same time, they detected signs of a turn towards hardline politics also. The delegates of the MSZMP in the working committee dealing with party law unexpectedly drew back from the agreements concluded up to that point, rejecting talks on the drawing up of accounts for the property of the MSZMP and their distribution, as well as on the banning of party organizations from the work-place. The members of the Opposition Roundtable interpreted the change in different ways. For instance, the Christian Democrats at once drew the

conclusion that hard-line communists had taken advantage of the absence of

24 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Pozsgay and that this only proved that the reform wing should be strengthened. The Young Democrats came to a diametrically opposed conclusion—namely, that personal guarantees could not be relied upon: if Pozsgay could be replaced

at any time and the views of the MSZMP changed, it was not worth making concessions. Janos Kis, in the name of the Free Democrats, warned that they should not debate who were the “good guys and bad guys” in the Communist Party, but that, instead, they should make it clear that there would be no agreement on this basis. Since Gyérgy Fejti took a rigid position even at the intermediate-level talks in late July, the negotiations on party law were terminated in the committee— that is, what happened was exactly what the leaders of the Communist Party had feared: the chance of agreement was delayed. Now Fejti raised the idea for the first time that they should resolve the impasse by means of a package deal—that is, they should balance the differences with concessions in various other fields and conclude a comprehensive agreement in this way.*’ Soon the technique of

negotiating a package deal became a crucial question. : The MSZMP tried to bring pressure to bear on the other side in a rather different way also. One of the members of the committee which was dealing with the issue relating to the Constitution, the Deputy Minister of Justice, made a Statement to the effect that the government had not withdrawn its bills for ever and that, if negotiations dragged on, it might even leave the negotiating table.

The background of this declaration was that the delegates of the Opposition Roundtable had started to review each paragraph of the existing constitution and

did not consider the government’s draft as the starting point. The opposition wished to have its own concept accepted and insisted that each and every paragraph in the Constitution referring to state socialism should be deleted. This was a very slow process but finally they exceeded their original goals. In practice, although not on paper, a new constitution was born. This achievement, however, was still distant at the end of July. Gyérgy Fejti

tried to obtain an answer to the question whether the opposition was finally willing to discuss the issue of the office of President of the Republic and the establishment of a Constitutional Court. He was obviously aware of the divisions in the Opposition Roundtable on this matter. For the time being he received an official answer: according to the opposition, there was no need for these institu-

tions during the transition period.°' It seemed that the opposition had solidly maintained its original, united position since the organizations wishing to adhere to that position still enjoyed a majority. The question was, however, not settled finally; the debate was merely adjourned.”

Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division 25 Agreement and Breach On August 15th, 1989, the Political Committee of the MSZMP had an exhaustive debate on the state of the roundtable talks and the policy to be pursued. The majority of the communist leaders—Grész and Pozsgay also—hoped that the National Roundtable talks could be concluded quickly. Fejti was skeptical—he thought that‘the opposition was facing an endurance test and that it was not decided what course events would take. The separate talks with some of the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable were still going on in the background, but more effective were Imre Pozsgay’s personal contacts with opposition politicians. With regard to the conflict within the opposition over the question of a Head of State, which had already become public, Pozsgay gave the Political

Committee an account of the proposal under preparation by the Democratic Forum. According to this, the MDF wanted a President of the Republic who would have moderately strong authority, who would be closely controlled and who would be elected not before parliamentary elections and directly by the people. Pozsgay deemed it important to “break the unity of the opposition based on blackmail.” He thought that aspect of the opposition’s strategy detrimental which did not find favor with the reform wing of the Communist Party as a separate factor. He also discussed the issue of potential coalition partners and stated that there would be no coalition offer before the elections, but he also indicated that the MSZMP might select potential partners. He thought it possible to come to an agreement with some parties even if the talks with the whole Opposition Roundtable failed. Fejti was also of the opinion that, if they could not agree, then they should conclude a pact with one part of the opposition and the Third Side. He considered it impossible that they would be able to make an agreement with the Free Democrats and Fidesz, but he believed that if an agreement could be made with the Democratic Forum then the Smallholders’ Party would also change sides. He proposed that they should insist on the position of President of the Republic and

that they should offer the opposition seats in the Constitutional Court in exchange. The Political Committee made some highly important decisions after long debate: the negotiating delegation should come to an agreement on the questions of party law and the law on suffrage, it should recommend the establishment of a Constitutional Court, it should insist on the creation of the office of President of the Republic and the direct election of the head of state. The resolution rejected the opposition’s demand that party organizations leave all workplaces and that the workers’ militia (the party’s own armed force) be immediately disbanded rather than merely transformed.” Very soon important events took place at the Opposition Roundtable session also. Jozsef Antall submitted a package from the Hungarian Democratic Forum which attempted to summarize the different opposition ideas and mould them

into a compromise, so that they would be able to present it at the National Roundtable talks.” Various elements of the package approached the ideas of the

26 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

MSZMP—for instance, the direct election of the head of state—whilst on other points there were still major differences. Its most important aspect, however, was that it followed the same logic as Gyérgy Fejti, who thought the acceptance of a package a possible form of deal. This form precluded a detailed agreement on the issues essential to the transition and made possible only a comprehensive agreement which incorporated the solution of all of the questions under debate. It also included the creation of the office of President of the Republic before the elections, although the opposition had not been willing to discuss this issue at first. J6zsef Antall argued that the only chance of an agreement was to make a deal on all of the questions. However, the Free Democrats, Fidesz and the Social Democrats believed that it would be imperative to have the Party Law and the Electoral Law, indispensable for the transition, accepted; and that the questions on which there was still no agreement could be discussed further. The debate over Antall’s proposal both rearranged and aggravated the fault lines in the Opposition Roundtable. The MNP, the KDNP, the BZSBT, and the KDNP sided with the MDF, whilst the SZDSZ, the MSZDP, Fidesz, and the representatives of the independent trade unions were opposed to the suggestion. They pointed to the connections between the Forum’s proposal and the negotiating strategy of the communists and demanded that they should try to come to an agreement whilst retaining their principles. The Young Democrat Laszl6 Kévér even asked Antall to what extent the Forum had agreed the package with the MSZMP since it was unrealistic if its acceptance could be surmised. The Free Democrat Ivan Pet6 declared that the proposal was not a compromise plan at all, since it offered something to the communists when the opposition did not wish to make any concessions at all. It was an open secret that there were regular talks between Pozsgay and the politicians on one side of the Opposition Roundtable. Trust among the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable declined drastically after mid-August. To make Pozsgay the President of the Republic might have been part of a deal in the interest of peaceful transition, but the Democratic Forum did not dare to make a statement to this effect and insisted on constitutional arguments.” The different positions of the two camps of the Opposition Roundtable rested on different analyses of the situation. The Forum attached greater importance to events inside the Communist Party than did its debating partners and attempted to exert influence on those events through the roundtable discussions. The reformers were likely to win as the Communist Party was preparing for its congress, but it was not a foregone conclusion. The resistance of the hard-liners manifested itself several times during the talks. The MSZMP did not make any compromise regarding the property of the party, the banning of party organiza-

tions from the work-place, or the disbanding of the workers’ militia, though Pozsgay would have been willing to do so. There was also some fear that the parliamentary representatives would mutiny if the roundtable talks dragged on too long and finally the cardinal laws necessary for the transition could not be passed by Parliament. There was, therefore, logic in opposition support for the

Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division 27 Pozsgay wing in the form of acceptable compromises. Naturally, the reform communists also wanted to have a share of power in the new system, firstly, with the help of Pozsgay as President, and, later, as members of a government coalition with their radically transformed party. It was also an open secret that they considered the Democratic Forum as one of their potential partners.°’ The leaders of the Forum were also worried about the international situation; they were not sure that the Brezhnev Doctrine belonged to the past and that the Soviet Union would give the green light to the changes in Hungary.

Both the Free Democrats’ and Fidesz’s approach to, and analysis of, the situation were essentially different. They preferred to concentrate on the dynamics of development and concluded that it was not worthwhile making a shortlived deal at the expense of giving up their principles. They did not think it 1mportant to hold elections by the end of the year, if only because their organizational strength and popular support were lagging behind those of the Communist Party and the Democratic Forum. The Free Democrats were aware of the erosion of the MSZMP and wished to weaken its position even more. They believed that it was not the opposition’s task to support the reformers from outside with concessions given at the talks. They thought that, if the reformers won at the congress in early October, they could make an agreement with them then with better conditions, and that, if the hard-liners prevailed, the concessions would be even more unjustifiable. The radical wing of the opposition thought it a precondition for a real politi-

cal transition that the Communist Party should be excluded from power; they considered it important, therefore, not only not to conclude an agreement with the party but also to weaken its position. They were adamantly opposed to giving the MSZMP an important position in the form of the office of President of the Republic. They endeavored to give as many people as possible the courage to cut

the umbilical cord which attached them to the communist regime and so they regarded the termination of party organizations at the work-place and the disbanding of the workers’ militia as crucial questions. One of the driving forces behind their radicalization was their attempt to prevent a long-term alliance between the so-called national wing of the opposition and the reformers led by Pozsgay. In opposition to the presumed separate deal, they represented the concept of total political transformation, according to which the assertion of their principles established at the beginning of the talks was a precondition for free elections. They thought that if the Opposition Roundtable as a whole insisted on these principles, then the MSZMP might be forced to retreat and only the deadlines set by them would be discarded. Concerning events abroad, they considered as important those which pointed

towards radical changes in the whole region. The communists had suffered a crushing defeat in the elections in Poland, which called into question the entire reason for prearranged positions in the roundtable talks. The formation of the Mazowiecki Government showed that a seemingly logical compromise might lose its validity very quickly; therefore the election of Jaruzelski as President

28 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

was not an example to be followed in Hungary. They wanted to make the public realize that the Brezhnev Doctrine was obsolete and that is why they urged Moscow to denounce the interventions in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.°° The Free Democrats believed that the necessity of recovering from the economic-financial crisis would speed up the process of orienting the country towards the West. The crisis which emerged with the flight of East Germans to Hungary—which happened exactly at the crucial phase of the roundtable talks—

again proved that the Hungarian government preferred the West to its former allies.

The strategy of the two opposition groups had diverged terminally by the time of the intensive phase of talks in mid-August. Although the MDF withdrew its package, Imre Pozsgay declared, in the name of the MSZMP delegation, that

they were only interested in a comprehensive agreement, and so they were treating the partial agreements which had already been concluded as parts of a package. and would introduce them into Parliament only after their final acceptance.®” They set mid-September as the deadline for reaching an agreement. On August 29th 1989, the Opposition Roundtable held a dramatic, ten-hour session, in which the question of the President of the Republic was the center of

discussion. A temporary agreement was made only after a long debate full of turning points and accusations. This stated that the parties would consider whether it was acceptable to them that Parliament should elect a President of the Republic after free elections and—meanwhile—that the Speaker of Parliament should fill this office. Dissolution of the Opposition Roundtable seemed to be inevitable during the debate on several occasions since the Christian Democrats, the Smallholders and the representatives of the People’s Party preferred the direct election of the President before parliamentary elections, whilst the Free Democrats, the Young Democrats, and the Social Democrats vetoed the proposal. The MDF argued that the direct election of the President would settle the dispute because no-one could challenge the decision of the people. By way of contradiction, the representative of the SZDSZ pointed out that the Communist Party did not only want to acquire the office of President; it also wished to have this ambition legitimized by the people and was counting on the support of part of the opposition. Jozsef Antall protested against the allegation that he and his followers would support Pozsgay’s election, but supporters of the direct election of the President did not name their own common candidate who might have stood some chance against the popular reform communist politician. There was no hope that the delegation of the MSZMP would accept the proposal of the Opposition Roundtable regarding the temporary filling of the office until sometime after the parliamentary elections. Moreover, it was not only the issue of the President which gave rise to conflict between the two sides. Several questions had been settled by the committees of the tripartite talks, which had already been approved at intermediate level, but the front lines had hardened their positions on some crucial matters. The MSZMP showed no flexibility on these questions, mostly because of internal conditions within the party. The

Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division 29 reformers were preparing for a crucial conference in which they wanted to create a totally new party and the issue of a negotiated transition was put on the backburner. The fight among the various groups of the Communist Party could not be continued at the National Roundtable and because of this internal instability, the negotiating position of the party had to be approved by the Central Committee.

However, this body gave a green light only to those proposals which did not involve a retreat on crucial questions. Therefore, the delegation of the MSZMP was not willing to make any compromise concerning the property of the party and party organizations in the work-place; and, in addition, Pozsgay was forced to withdraw the promised concessions after the CC meeting of September Ist. The problem of the internal condition of the Communist Party came to the fore again at the September 4th session of the Opposition Roundtable. The fault line inside the opposition appeared not only in the matter of the President of the Republic, but the debate over acceptable and non-acceptable compromises became more and more heated also. Some argued in favor of a speedy agreement

and concessions in the interests of achieving this by saying that, after the expected split of the MSZMP, there might not be one force available which could influence Parliament to ensure that accepted agreements would be enacted into law.’” Communist Party leaders were genuinely concerned about the possibility of collapse of Parliament. In order to avoid this, they deemed it necessary to introduce the essential Bills of Transition at the September session. However, their success was questionable because the MSZMP had decided earlier that it would be willing to settle only for a comprehensive agreement at the National Roundtable, but the radical wing of the Opposition Roundtable adamantly insisted on its position of principle in a few questions. The leaders of the MSZMP knew that time was not on their side. In order to conclude the talks quickly, Pozsgay suggested a splitting of the opposition with the help of their “tactical allies.” Prime Minister Miklos Németh believed that elections ahead of time, in December, were necessitated by the critical state of the economy because strong restrictive measures were preconditions of a hopedfor agreement with the International Monetary Fund.’' Imre Pozsgay informed the members of the Political Committee on September 5th that, on the basis of information gained from certain circles of the opposition, there was hope for a compromise regarding the election of President, in contrast to other questions under debate. In reality the differences of views inside the Opposition Roundtable had not changed at all. On September 11th, one week before the planned signing of the comprehen_ -Sive agreement, a decision concerning the acceptance or rejection of the compromises could not be delayed any longer at the Opposition Roundtable session.

After Antall’s proposal Péter Télgyessy, on behalf of the SZDSZ, and Viktor Orban, in the name of Fidesz, declared that their position was final and there was

no place to go from there. They wanted to prevent a further softening of the , views of the opposition. Télgyessy even indirectly accused the Forum of recommending acceptance of the communists’ views on the questions under de-

30 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

bate.” As they had made their positions of principle clear on several occasions, the representatives of the radical side attempted to prove that too much flexibility would be counterproductive even from a tactical stand-point. They did not accept the argument of the MDF that the communists were willing to conclude an agreement only in the form of a package, since the agreement on the start of talks had produced exactly the opposite. The deadlock was not broken and so what they could agree on at this Opposition Roundtable session was only the creation of the office of President of the Republic; the method and date of the

election, as well as the duration of the term of the President, were left undecided.” A breach was unavoidable. This became clear at the next, particularly hectic, session of the Opposition Roundtable on September 15th. The Free Democrats and the organizations sharing their position had reached the limit of concessions which could be made in the interest of a successful conclusion to the talks and the preservation of the unity of the opposition. The Free Democrats, rigorously sticking to the principles of democracy, could not possibly accept a constitutional solution which threatened to lead development astray in the first and decisive phase of the political transition. It was not only distrust which motivated them. They had strong reasons to assume that the good relations between Pozsgay and the leaders of the Forum might result in an alliance for a longer period of time. In such an alliance, on the one side there would be the reform forces of the old system, supported by a directly-elected president who would enjoy strong legitimacy and, on the other, the strongest party of the opposition and its minor allies. They thought that such a Grand Coalition would marginalize the liberals and prevent liberal-directed development. Moreover, they were opposed to a presidential system which might have evolved in case direct elections were introduced as a matter of principle.” In contrast to this opinion, the MDF and its allies thought that the new compromise could be accepted in the interest of a successful peaceful transition and that with such they could establish the bases of democratic development. They

trusted Pozsgay and saw no danger or any harm to themselves if the people chose him as President in a direct election. However, what was even more important was that they did not want to risk those historic achievements which the Opposition Roundtable had accomplished in creating foundations for a democratic system. They did not give up hope of being able to convince the radical wing of the opposition by emphasizing this point until the very end, but they did not budge from the position which was identified by the peripheral conditions of the agreement with the MSZMP.”° The delegates of the MSZMP also hoped that the radical wing of the opposition would change its mind, their hope being based on the fact that radicals were participating in the work of the sub-committee which was preparing the crucial laws. It is true that, even after the dramatic session of the Opposition Roundtable on September the 15th several arguments were put forward both for and against; both sides tried to suggest compromise solutions so that the achievements of the talks would not be in vain. However,

Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division 31 they could not resolve the basic dilemma. It became obvious that the remnants of

Opposition unity had been destroyed by the differences. : It was Péter Télgyessy who put an end to the hopeless debate, which was revived time and again, when he announced that the Free Democrats would not

sign any agreement which contained a provision for a President to be elected | directly by the people. Jozsef Antall concluded that there was nothing left to do at the current session of the Opposition Roundtable except to declare that the opposition could not achieve a united position. At first, Télgyessy asked that their differences should not be made public before the plenary session which ended the talks. Viktor Orban went further and stated, threateningly, that, if an announcement should be made at any time before the plenary session, his party would make a declaration which would prevent the Opposition Roundtable from signing anything, since the MSZMP would have no-one to make an agreement with. Clearly, he was referring to his party’s power of veto.”° Nothing indicated at the National Roundtable negotiations what was in the offing. Intensive efforts were made for the preparation of an agreement until the very last minute. Those who intended to refuse to sign an agreement were also present at the drafting of the essential Bills of the Transition. The leaders of the MSZMP, especially Imre Pozsgay, expected, despite the bad omens, that the talks could be concluded in the form of a package in accordance with their original plans and that, at worst, the radical wing of the opposition would make a separate statement on some questions. However, this is not what happened. On the day assigned for signing the agreement, September the 18th the Opposition Roundtable first held a discussion. The Free Democrats announced then the form they had chosen for indicating their dissent. Télgyessy pointed out that they had the right to kill the pact with their veto, but that they did not want to prevent any other members of the Opposition Roundtable from signing it. Nevertheless, it was not enough for them to make their dissent public in a clause, they would refuse to sign the agreement and had drafted a statement justifying their decision. Fidesz and the Social Democrats joined the SZDSZ. Jozsef Antall, who represented the other side declared, resignedly, that the Forum would make a separate statement also, and a political struggle started among the members of the Opposition Roundtable. However, the Free Democrats had not played all their trump-cards since they did not announce before the concluding plenary session of the National Roundtable that they would initiate a referendum on the four essential questions remaining open. The signing ceremony of the agreement was televised live. It now transpired that, in front of the whole world, three organizations of the Opposition Roundtable, the SZDSZ, Fidesz, and the League, refused to sign it, whilst the Social Democrats accepted it with the provision that they did not agree with the election of the President of the Republic before parliamentary elections. It was not only the announcement itself but also its manner which created consternation. Péter Télgyessy attacked the representatives of the MSZMP in an even harsher voice than he had done during the talks. He declared that the op-

32 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

position had been able to fulfil its task, the removal of obstacles in the way of a peaceful transition to democracy, only to a limited extent since the leadership of the MSZMP had rejected any substantial compromises, and so it, the opposition, did not see any guarantees that the elections would be truly free. He also announced that they would not prevent the implementation of the agreement, but

that they would like to see the disputed questions decided in a referendum. Laszl6 Kévér on behalf of Fidesz struck a similarly harsh note. That part of the opposition which had decided to sign the agreement was put on the defensive. Gyérgy Szabad and Jozsef Antall were forced to emphasize that, with regard to the issues of the workers’ militia and party organizations in the work-place, they themselves could not possibly take a more radical position, but that they considered the agreement even more important. Imre Pozsgay, who had been visibly shocked by the announcement, also used strong words in rejecting such a belittlement of the achievements of the negotiations, as well as the

impolite rude language used, but he also adopted a similarly harsh tone when criticizing the radical opposition. Finally Télgyessy stated that the Free Democrats did not belittle the achievements—which was exactly why they did not veto the agreement—but that they could not assume responsibility for the possibility that the development might lead to a presidential system and not to a democratic transition. The signing of the agreement then took place in a less than ceremonial

mood.”” |

What followed belonged to a new phase of the transition which witnessed

changes in relations not only between the opposition and the ruling party, but also among the various opposition organizations. The imposition of a referendum carried its own risks, but it provided the only

escape from a situation in which those who had rejected the agreement might have found themselves, if they had had to explain why they were opposed to the

| President of the Republic being elected directly by the people, whereas such an initiative (i.e. the referendum) produced an immediate attacking move and was appropriate enough to make the many who had been watching the talks passively take sides. The referendum offered the only opportunity for the people themselves to legitimize the election of the President by Parliament (in an indirect way) and, at the same time, oppose the reform communist candidate (also indirectly). It soon transpired that the question referring to the election of the President was worded rather misleadingly, with the three further questions serving only as aids to this deceit. The Communist Party had only itself to blame for providing an opportunity to connect the question of the election of the President—on which public opinion was deeply divided—with those of the workers’ militia, party property and party organizations at work-place, on which there was

broad social consensus.

With regard to these latter issues, the parties of the Opposition Roundtable were in agreement and the only controversial question was whether they could sign the agreement at the cost of delaying a decision and risking that the MSZMP would dig its heels in permanently. The signatories to the agreement

Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division | 33 thought that the compromise already accepted was realistic and, moreover, that

, the questions which remained open were not necessarily relevant to the guaranteeing of a peaceful transition and legal conditions for free elections. However, they also recognized that they exerted considerable influence on equal opportunity and, therefore, on the future balance of political power. On the other hand,

the opponents of the agreement hoped—and voiced this hope in a separate | statement—that, after the MSZMP’s congress in early October, the government would introduce a bill into Parliament which would be in accordance with the opposition’s position.” The reform politicians of the MSZMP were planning to disband the Communist Party and to establish a new party. However, before the congress—no matter how much they had committed themselves to a democratic transition— they could not handle the problem. They knew that they should accept the demands of the liberal opposition on the basis of the principles of parliamentary democracy, but at the same time they hoped that their transformed party would remain an element in government after the elections also, and they attempted, therefore, to keep as much of their organizational strength and material superior- . ity as possible. The defeat of the principle of democratic legitimization had serious consequences for the successor party, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), which was formed on October 7th, 1989. At the time of the agreement which brought the National Roundtable talks to

a conclusion it could not be seen what changes would occur—and how quickly—-with the collapse of the East European regimes. It was to be expected that a radical anticommunist phase of the political transition would start with the conclusion of the agreement guaranteeing peaceful transition. The Free Democrats and their allies quickly collected the signatures necessary for the referendum and then the campaign acquired an increasingly strong anticommunist tone.

They attacked the Socialist Party, which had been founded by the reformers and : labelled as the successor party, much more vehemently than they had the Communist Party proper during negotiations. This was the only way for them to en-

sure that the referendum campaign would be victorious and to establish the conditions for later election victory. The SZDSZ did not treat the MSZMP as a monolithic bloc earlier, although it insisted on holding negotiations only with the official party leaders. The Free Democrats thought that the function of the reform movement was to put pressure on the leadership and to make it possible for the MSZMP to implement the negotiated political transition from within. In the spring of 1989, therefore, they

had warned those who were planning to split the Communist Party that they should give up the attempt. In the autumn, at the time when they declined to sign

the agreement, their immediate goal was already total political transition. In order to achieve this they wished to prevent the Socialist Party, which was founded on the ruins of the Communist Party, from acceptance as a legitimate

participant in the political transition. They thought it a precondition of total po- , litical transition that, not only would the orthodox communist party be ousted

34 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

from power, but also that the reform communist—socialist successor party would be compelled to hand over power. Considering contemporary power relations, this, in practice meant the prevention of a coalition with the MDF. The suspicion that such an alliance might be in the offing was well-founded. The member organizations of the Opposition Roundtable which had signed the agreement, and especially the leaders of the Democratic Forum, were closely connected to Imre Pozsgay. Jézsef Antall had been playing a leading role as one of the representatives of the MDF at the roundtable talks, but he did not have - any formal party office. In fact, it was a foregone conclusion within the inner circle of the MDF leadership that he would be nominated party president at the national convention in October 1989, but he had to retain the support of the leaders who maintained close ties with Pozsgay. He himself also established a reasonable relationship with Pozsgay during the informal talks held in the summer.

The MDF found itself in a difficult position after signing the agreement which concluded the negotiations. Even if it were true that compromise was acceptable at the time of signing the document, there was no doubt also that this consideration quickly became outmoded. The struggle during the referendum campaign was not only between representatives of the opposition and power. It was also a new challenge for the MDF to have to face the appearance of the two liberal parties, which resulted in a more balanced power structure within the opposition. The relationship came even more into balance after the MSZDP and then the FKGP also entered the referendum campaign. In parallel with this increasing competition inside the opposition, the relationship of the Forum with the MSZMP, and then with the Socialist Party became more and more prob-

lematic. , .

The MDF reacted to the anticommunist radicalism of the referendum campaign by edging closer to the socialists, if only because it felt that time would vindicate its own prediction, namely that, after the foundation of the Socialist Party, the Németh government would push the abolition of the workers’ militia and of party organizations in the work-place through Parliament. The Socialist Party recommended to its followers that they answer three of the four questions affirmatively at the referendum; it was opposed only to the issue of the election of the President. The national meeting of the MDF on October the 22nd and 23rd left the unambiguous feeling that the Forum was closer to the MSZP than to the liberal opposition.” This feeling was reinforced when the MDF tried to escape from this precarious position by calling for a boycott of the referendum.” At the referendum of November 26th more than 95% of the electorate voted in favor of disbanding the workers’ militia, accounting for party property, and de-politicizing the work-place, but there was only a razor-thin margin on the question of the election of the President. However, this hairsbreadth success

fundamentally changed the political landscape. Support for the socialists plunged. It had long-standing consequences in that the parties rejecting the agreement opened the radical, anticommunist phase of the political transition in

Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division 35 parallel with establishing the essential legal preconditions for a peaceful transition. In this new situation the MDF fought its battle with its increasingly serious rival, the Free Democrats, by adjusting itself to the radical anticommunist campaign. On March 25th, 1990, in the first round of free elections, the MDF received fewer than 4% more votes than the SZDSZ. However, two weeks later, when the majority of seats was decided in the single-member constituencies, the

MDF won 165, the SZDSZ 94, the FKGP 44, Fidesz 22, and the Christian Democratic People’s Party 21 seats. Since, during the campaign, the relationship

with the MSZP was almost wholly identified with the position taken on the question of the totality of the political transition and its quality, each of the opposition forces violently attacked the socialists. The MSZP with almost 11% of popular support and 33 seats in Parliament, which it won in spite of a strident campaign waged against it, was relegated to the role of a small, isolated opposition party. After the elections Jozsef Antall formed a coalition government with the participation of the MDF, the Smallholders’ Party and the Christian Democrats. Beforehand, however, an agreement was concluded as a part of the negotiated transition: the MDF and the SZDSZ, which had been waging a bloody war during the campaign, concluded a pact which provided for modifications to the constitution complementing,” to some extent, what had failed at the roundtable talks.®”

To summarize, one can agree with the conclusion that the signatories to the

agreement guaranteed the incorporation into law of the achievements of the National Roundtable, whilst those who initiated the referendum secured the elimination of uncomfortable compromises. However, the agreement bore the imprint of a separate deal, whilst the referendum bore the marks of a violation of the agreement. This is why any subsequent assessment of the transition must be

characterized by ambivalence. | (Translated by Tamas Magyarics)

Notes 1 A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart K6zponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzdkényvei [The Minutes

of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party in the Year 1989], ed. by Anna S. Kosztricz et al. (Budapest: Magyar Orszagos Levéltar, 1993), vol. 1. pp. 852-872. 2 Patrick O’Neil, Revolution from Within: The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and the Collapse of Communism, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998). 3 The Political Committee of the MSZMP called upon Rezs6 Nyers to give up the organization of the movement in its resolution of March 22nd, 1988. (Beszéld, 1999, No. 9, p. 63.) However, the statement of the Central Committee issued concerning the session of September 27th, 1989 declared the establishment of the New March Front, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, and “other alternative organizations” as “remarkable and something which needs further analysis.” (Népszabadsag, 29th September 1989.)

4 Ervin Csizmadia, A magyar demokratikus ellenzék (1968-1988): Monografia [The Hungarian Democratic Opposition (1968-1988): Monograph] (Budapest: T-Twins 1995), pp. 438-439.

36 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy 5 Miklos Haraszti, Janos Kis, Ferenc Készeg, Ottilia Solt: Social Contract: The Conditions of Pollitical Settlement, in Beszél6 Osszkiadas, vol. 2 (Budapest: AB-Beszélé, 1992), pp. 749-791. 6 The deed of foundation of the Hungarian Democratic Forum. Lakitelek, September 3, 1988. (Hitel,

1988. No. 1, pp. 50-51.) |

7 The programme of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Hitel, 1989. No. 10, pp. 50-52). 8 The minutes of the meeting, in .A demokracia alternativai hazankban [The Alternatives of Democ-

racy in Hungary] (Budapest: Kossuth, 1989). , 9 Its most characteristic example was the anniversary of the 1956 Revolution on October 23rd, 1988 when the MDF called upon its followers to stay away from the demonstration when it heard the news that it had been banned. 10 The Founding Proclamation of the Network of Free Initiatives, Szabad Demokratak, 1989, Nos.

) 1-2, pp. 46-47, and Janos Kis: “What Should We Be Afraid of?” Beszélé Osszkiadas, vol. 3, pp. 217-220. 11 The Programme Concept of the SZDSZ Szabad Demokratak, 1989, Nos. 1-2, pp. 17-18. 12 Janos Kis, “Mit képvisel a Beszé/6?” [What Does the Beszélé Represent?] Szabad Demokratak, 1989, Nos. 102, pp. 5-6. 13 A rendszervaltas programmja. [The Program of Regime Change.] Budapest: SZDSZ, 1989, pp.

22-30, 67-76. 14 The 4th March 1989 Position of the Caretaker Body of the SZDSZ. Magyar Nemzet, March 6, 1989.

15 Report of the meeting: Will There Be a Constructive Opposition? Népszabadsdg, March 7, 1989. 16 Magyar Nemzet, March 16, 1989. 17 “An Open Letter to Our Friends in Hungary”, in Andras Bozoki (editor-in-chief), Marta Elbert,

Melinda Kalmar, Béla Révész, Erzsébet Ripp, and Zoltan Ripp (eds.), A rendszervaltas forgatokényve: Kerekasztal-targyalasok 1989-ben 1. kétet [The Script of the Régime Change: Roundtable Talks in 1989. Vol. 1.] Budapest: Magveté, 1999. p. 57. 18 The demand was drafted by Imre Konya and he made it known at the general assembly of the

SZDSZ, ibid., pp. 54-56. :

19 See the related documents in Andras Bozoki (ed.), Tiszta lappal. A FIDESZ a magyar politikaban

1989-1991 [With a Clean Slate. FIDESZ in the Hungarian Politics, 1989-1991], Budapest: FIDESZ, 1992. 20 Political program statement. Accepted by the congress of FIDESZ, November 20, 1988, ibid., pp. 110-113. 21 Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky was a politician in the Smallholders’ Party before 1945; he lost his life during the German occupation as a participant in the resistant movement. 22 The guiding principles of the temporary leadership of the Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Laborers and Civil Party for the elaboration of the party program. Hitel, 1989, No. 3, pp. 40-41. 23 Népszabadsag, March 6, 1989. 24 Népszabadsag, March 16, 1989. 25 Rezs6é Nyers was speaking about the progressive traditions of the Social Democratic Party in a televised interview on December 19, 1988. 26 Népszabadsag, March 6, 1989. 27 The Political Committee of the MSZMP was discussing the general political situation at its session on 218! March 1989. Gyérgy Fejti, who had been authorized to hold talks, delivered a report on the position of the opposition parties and the policy related to them. He thought that the independent trade unions might be willing to establish a permanent political reconciliation forum, but he considered the concept of the Alliance of Free Democrats to be dangerous. The latter believed that

there was a need for negotiations because neither side was legitimate, but the MSZMP was in need of legitimizing talks to a greater degree, and they wanted to seat the representatives of the society and government opposite each other at the negotiating table. Fejti did not think it likely that the Free Democrats would be able to rally the other parties around themselves, unless the MSZMP was pursuing “a foolish policy.” Magyar Orszagos Levéltar (hereafter: MOL) M-KS-

Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division 37 288. f. 5/1058.—Some documents of the MSZMP are published in Csaba Békés—Malcolm Byrne (eds.): Political Transition in Hungary, 1989-1990. Manuscript for the international conference

held on June 10-12, 1999. (Budapest: National Security Archive—Hideghabort-térténeti Kutat6k6zpont—1956-os Intézet, 1999). 28 For earlier accounts of the Opposition Roundtable see: Anna Richter (ed.): Ellenzéki Kerekasztal:

Portrévdzlatok (Opposition Roundtable: Portraits), Budapest: Otlet, 1990.; Laszlé Bruszt: “Negotiated Revolution in Hungary” Social Research, Vol. 57. No. 2. 1990. 365-387.; Andras Bozoki: “Hungary’s Road to Systemic Change: The Opposition Roundtable” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 7. No. 2. Spring 1993.; Béla K. Kiraly and Andras Bozoki (eds.): Lawful Revolution in Hungary, 1989-94. Boulder: Social Science Monographs distributed by the

Columbia University Press, 1995.; Andras Sajé: “Roundtable Talks in Hungary” in Jon Elster (ed.): Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism. Chicago: University of Chicago : : Press, 1996. 69-98.; Rudolf L. Tokés: Hungary's Negotiated Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.; Erzsébet Szalai: Szerepprdba. (Role Play) Budapest: Szazadvég, 2000.; Andras Boz6oki (ed.): Alkotmanyos forradalom [Constitutional Revolution] in Bozoki et al. (eds.): A rendszervaltas forgatokényve. Vol. 7. Budapest: Uj Mandatum, 2000. 29 The eight organizations were as follows: Hungarian Democratic Forum, Alliance of Free Democrats, Independent Smallholders’ Party, Social Democratic Party of Hungary, Federation of Young Democrats, Hungarian People’s Party, Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society, the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions. (Later, in June 1989, the Christian Democratic People’s Party joined the EKA.) 30 Jézsef Debreczeni, A miniszterelnék: Antall Jozsef és a rendszervaltozas [The Prime Minister:

| Jézsef Antall and the Political Transition], (Budapest: Osiris, 1998.), pp. 52-53. 31 Minutes of the founding session of the Opposition Roundtable, in A rendszervaltas forgatokényve, vol. 1, pp. 63-72. 32 The position of the MDF was not in connection with the negotiating plans of the MSZMP. At the session of the Political Committee on March 21st 1989, Gyérgy Fejti assumed that the Forum was “biding its time”. MOL M-KS-288. f. 5/1058. 33 Balint Magyar’s remarks at the session of the Opposition Roundtable of 30th March 1989, in 4 rendszervaltas forgatékényve, vol. 1. pp. 77-80. 34 The statement of the Opposition Roundtable on 30th March 1989, ibid., pp. 86-87. 35 The statement of the expert of the MSZMP on 6th April 1989, ibid., pp. 90-93. 36 The Minutes of the session on 7th April 1989 of the Opposition Roundtable and its letter to the MSZMpP, in A rendszervaltds forgatoékényve, vol. 1. pp. 94-116. 37 The Minutes of the 19th April 1989 session of the Political Committee of the MSZMP. MOL M— —-« KS -288. f. 5/1062.

38 The negotiating principles of the Opposition Roundtable were summarized in a proposal which

was accepted at the session of 19th April 1989 and sent in a letter to the MSZMP CC, in A rendszervaltas forgatokényve, Vol. 1. pp. 146-148. 39 Magyar Nemzet, April 20, 1989. 40 Balint Magyar gave voice to this opinion. It was later reinforced by Gyérgy Fejti’s contribution to the debate over the draft of the Party Law at the session of the MSZMP’s CC on May 8, 1989, in.A Magyar Szocialista Munkdspart K6ézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzékonyvei, Vol. 1. pp. 777-778.

41 The Minutes of the session of the MSZMP CC Political Committee on May 2, 1989 (MOL M-KS288. f. 5/1063); and the session of the MSZMP CC on May 8, 1989, ibid., p. 854. 42 The proposal was made public in an irregular way, in an interview with the political scientist Laszlé Lengyel, with a suggestion that Imre Pozsgay agreed with it (Magyar Nemzet, May 8, 1989).

43 The debate and decision of the session of the Opposition Roundtable on May 10, 1989, in A rendszervaltas forgatokényve, vol. 1. pp. 233-292.

. 44 The standpoint of the meeting of the reform circles in Szeged, in Attila Agh, Jozsef Géczi, Jozsef Sipos (eds.), Rendszervaltok a baloldalon [The Promoters of Political Transition on the Left: Reformers and Reform Circles, 1988-1989], Budapest: Kossuth, 1999. pp. 201-211.

38 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy 45 A rendszervaltas forgatékényve, Vol. |. pp. 330-341. 46 The resolution of the MSZMP CC on May 29, 1989, in A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart K6zponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzdkényvei, Vol. 1. p. 395. 47 The text of the agreement is Document No. 2 in this volume. 48 The MSZMP CC elected a four-member party presidium at the session of June 23-24, 1989 under the leadership of Rezsé Nyers, whilst the other members were First Secretary Karoly Grosz, Imre Pozsgay, and Miklos Németh. At the same time, the name of the Political Committee was changed and was expanded to include 21 members. A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyz6kényvei, Vol. 2. pp. 1184-1225. 49 The Minutes of the session of the MSZMP Political Committee on June 13, 1989, (MOL M-KS288. f. 5/1068). 50 The resolution of the session of the Central Committee on June 23-24, 1989 set October as the date of the special congress. A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsdganak 1989. évi Jegyzékényvei, Vol. 2. pp. 1091-1183.

51 Gyérgy Szabad repeatedly made this position clear in the letter of intent of the Opposition Roundtable at the plenary session of the National Roundtable talks on June 21, 1989, two days before the session of the CC which made a decision. See Document No. 5 in this volume. 52 Balint Magyar made a remark to Ambassador Mark Palmer referring to this situation when the American diplomat visited the Opposition Roundtable. A rendszervaltas forgatokényve, Vol. 2. p. 36. 53 The session of the Opposition Roundtable on June 15, 1989, ibid, p. 55. 54 Karoly Groész also pointed out at the session of the MSZMP Political Executive Committee on

August 15, 1989 that a “new front” had been opened because, at the economic talks, the Third Side, notably the National Council of the Trade Unions (SZOT) was more an obstacle to the agreement than the opposition. MOL M-KS-288. f. 5/1075. 55 A rendszervaltas forgatokényve, Vol. 2. pp. 290-295. 56 Ibid., pp. 296-298. 57 According to the Hungarian People’s Party, the deterioration of the foreign political conditions _ was marked by strikes and ethnic tensions in the Soviet Union, and the pressure exerted by the orthodox communist countries. They expected increasing social tensions in domestic politics and referred to the combination of communist parliamentary representatives with an aim of dissolving the National Assembly. /bid., p. 476. 58 Ibid., pp. 478-497. 59 The Minutes of the session of the MSZMP Political Executive Committee on July 24, 1989, MOL M-KS-288. f. 5/1072. 60 The session of the National Roundtable talks on July 27, 1989, in A rendszervaltas forgatokényve, Vol. 2. p. 641. 61 Ibid., pp. 647-653. 62 At the session of the Opposition Roundtable on July 27, 1989, the SZDSZ, the MDF, the Independent Smallholders’ Party, and Fidesz voted down the viewpoint of the Hungarian People’s Party, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Society. The Social Democratic Party did not participate in the sessions at that time because of internal conflicts. 63 MOL M-KS-288. f. 5/1075. 64 The text of the package submitted on August 17, 1989, in A rendszervaltdas forgatokényve, Vol. 3. pp. 223-225. 65 The session of the Opposition Roundtable on August 23, 1989, ibid., pp. 252-275. 66 Imre Pozsgay later recalled that he had had regular contacts with the leaders of the MDF during the negotiations, but he denied that they had made a deal. Imre Pozsgay: “Széljegyzetek a rendszervaltas vélt vagy valdsagos titkaihoz” [Marginalia to the Alleged or Real Secrets of the Political Transition] in Sandor Kurtan, Péter Sandor and Laszlé Vass (eds.), Magyarorszag évtizedkényve 1988-1998 [Hungary’s Decade Book 1988-1998], Budapest: DKMKA, 1998, Vol.

2. p. 940.

Zoltan Ripp: Unity and Division 39 67 Imre Pozsgay made a statement on this and the Hungarian press published his interview in Der

Spiegel in Magyar Nemzet, July 4, 1989.

68 The letter of the SZDSZ to Mikhail Gorbachev, which was handed to the Soviet Ambassador to Budapest on August 18, 1989.

69 The session of the National Roundtable talks on August 25, 1989, in A rendszervaltas forgatokdnyve, Vol. 3. pp. 421-423.

70 The remarks made at the session of the Opposition Roundtable on September 4, 1989, in 4 rendszervaltas forgatékényve, Vol. 4. pp. 56—77.

71 The Minutes of the sessions of the MSZMP Political Committee on August 31, and September 5, 1989. MOL M-KS-288. f. 5/1076. and 5/1077.

72 The session of the Opposition Roundtable on September 11, 1989, in A rendszervaltds forgatokonyve, Vol. 4. pp. 274-275. 73 The session of the National Roundtable talks on September 11, 1989, ibid., pp. 317-320. 74 Janos Kis, “1989: A vig esztendé” [A Merry Year] Beszéld, 1999. No. 10. pp. 38-39. 75 Janos Kis wrote that they had wanted to make a compromise even at the last minute. They suggested to the MDF that they would sign the agreement, if the proposal for legitimizing the president with a direct election were abandoned. They believed that, if they could agree in this question, reconciliation in the other three open issues could be continued. Jbid., p. 39. 716 A rendszervaltas forgatokényve, Vol. 4. pp. 380-390. 77 The plenary session of the National Roundtable talks on September 18, 1989; see Document No. 6 in this volume.

78 The statement of the parties which signed the agreement made on September 18, 1989, in A rendszervaltas forgatokényve, Vol. 4. pp. 512-513. 79 Jézsef Antall, who was elected president, declared: “there cannot be a stable coalition serving the interests of the nation without the MSZP now or in the future.” Istvan Csurka commented on the election of Lajos Ftir as the MDF’s candidate for the President of the Republic that he was not chosen against Pozsgay, but beside him so that the people would be able to choose between good and better. Népszabadsag, November 24, 1989. 80 The viewpoint of the presidium of the Hungarian Democratic Forum on November 13, 1989, in A rendszervaltas forgatokényve, Vol. 5. p. 235. 81 lbid., pp. 644-654. 82 Janos Kis, “1989: A vig esztend6” [A Merry Year] Beszél6, 1999. No. 10. p. 43.

BLANK PAGE |

From ‘Model Change’ to Regime Change: The Metamorphosis of the MSZMP’s Tactics in the Democratic Transition

| Melinda Kalmar ...we neither wanted nor want to reorganize or to accomplish pluralism, but rather to find a way of dealing with it ...

Mihaly Jasso, at the February 7th, 1989 meeting of the MSZMP Politburo

Parliamentary or Presidential Socialism _ By the beginning of the 1980s, the communist systems had exhausted their economic reserves, were merely accumulating debt and—as a result of declining living standards—an increase in social tension. Nonetheless, they were rather reluctant to introduce changes—or, in the phraseology of the time, “reforms’”— and did so only at the end of the decade, at a point when a change from the old system to something new seemed inevitable. At the beginning of 1989 Soviet

leaders hired advisers who, seeing that the empire was already on the decline, . worked out various scenarios attempting to predict the events which were soon expected to unfold in the countries of the socialist camp, and whose course the local communist parties would have to control as far as possible. Among these scenarios, those which analyzed the prospects for Hungary and Poland were of

primary importance, since these two countries were already the furthest ad-

vanced toward the implementation of change. , In October 1988 the Soviet party leadership decided to establish a committee

to evaluate the current situation and to develop proposals to co-ordinate the necessary measures for handling the crisis. The International Committee commissioned, among others, the Department of International Relations (DIR) of the CPSU CC and the Bogomolov Institute to provide strategic-political forecasts for the Committee. In their reports, completed in February 1989, the experts of both teams agreed that the economic and political situation in both Hungary and Poland had deteriorated dramatically and that, as a result, the Hungarian Social-

ist Worker’s Party (MSZMP) and the Polish United Worker’s Party (PZPR) would have no choice but to legalize the opposition and to involve some part of it in the exercise of power in some way. They were in no doubt that, in any event, developments were heading towards a multiparty system, but with respect

to pluralism, they hoped that socialism had become so deeply rooted in East-

42 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Central European societies that a rapid transition into something entirely different was not to be expected. Instead, they believed that the transition would most

likely be gradual—or, in the words of the Hungarian party leaders at home, “organic.” The optimal scenario for the Soviets entailed “smooth” democratization, which would take place under the initiation and direction of the communist » party, and which would lead to a mixed economic system and to the involvement, based on mutual negotiations and agreement, of some part of the opposition in the exercise of power. Consequently, the experts from the Soviet leadership would welcome a form of “parliamentary or presidential socialism” in both Poland and Hungary, a new model, based on strong, centralized power, guaranteeing these countries’ further avoidance of foreign policy hostile to the Soviet Union, even within the framework of a multi-party system. In the pessimistic scenario envisaged by the DIR of the CPSU Central Committee these changes

would occur in the form of a reactive process, in which the party would be forced to make more and more concessions, eventually drifting to the periphery of political life. This process would “urge the opposition to make increasingly heavy demands, paving the way for society to abandon socialism.” In evaluating the political conditions at the beginning of 1989, the DIR of the CPSU CC believed that organic development could primarily be relied upon in Poland. Polish society had already become tired of the constant crisis, and thus the PZPR could elaborate a “constructive co-operation” with the opposition. In Hungary, however, the report said, “the situation might develop in quite unexpected directions.” The optimistic scenario produced by the Bogomolov Institute had a similar assessment of the possibility of achieving agreement for managing the crisis in Poland. The pessimistic version, however, also considered it conceivable that roundtable talks might come to a deadlock, and that a protracted crisis would emerge. For this reason, the possibility of being forced to re-introduce martial law could not be excluded. As for Hungary, the institute’s experts believed that the most likely outcome was that the MSZMP’s reformist wing would become stronger within the leadership, and that it would then gradually form a coalition with the social democratic movement. The more pessimistic forecast, on the other hand, predicted that the influence of the conservative forces in the party would grow, that this would significantly reduce the MSZMP’s chances in the forthcoming elections and that one result of this would be to yield the initiator role to the opposition. Consequently, in the first half of 1989, the most important task of the PZPR and MSZMP was to prepare for a partial and “controlled” division of power and to win the opposition’s consent to this in negotiations. A basic precondition of even the most optimistic scenario was to permit opposition organizations to appear as legal negotiators on the political scene. To this effect, the January 10th—11th session of the Hungarian Parliament passed the Law of Public Meetings and Assemblies, which made it possible to establish political parties. In Poland the Central Committee of the PZPR—after negotiating and maneuvering

Melinda Kalmar: From ‘Model Change’ to Regime Change 43 with the opposition for half a year—published its position on the issues of political and trade union pluralism on January 16th-17th, 1989,” thereby acknowledging Solidarity as a legal organization. With the removal of legal obstacles in both

countries, roundtable negotiations could be held with the participation of the newly legalized organizations, and both parties could begin to implement their optimal and most optimistic scenarios.

One-party Pluralism or a Multi-party System The MSZMP’s journey from the declaration of pluralism to the recognition of the multi-party system was by no means spectacular. The policy statement of the 1985 Congress of the MSZMP promised solutions which were optimistic for that period and, under the current circumstances, over-ambitious. Not only did the growth and stabilization predicted at the Congress fail to materialize, but, as a result of continuingly misguided economic policy, in the second half of 1987 even the highest-ranking leaders of the party came to recognize openly that the system was in a state of total and general crisis, and that more radical and serious changes and reforms were required to maintain the socialist structure. To this effect, in December 1987 they recognized that it was impossible to wait until the next scheduled party congress and they decided, in harmony with a similar Soviet decision, to hold a special party meeting.’ Despite the replacement of Kadar and the reorganization of the Politburo, however, the declarations made by this May, 1988 party conference were rather cautious and did not seriously attempt to anticipate events. As a result, they did not appear to pose any danger for the system in the short term. These cautious steps notwithstanding, it was quite clear that the MSZMP had no other choice but to experiment with some kind of a division of power, due to the need to carry out a number of pressing and essentially unpopular tasks in economic management, whilst at the same time trying to maintain social stability and a sense of societal satisfaction. In a first, somewhat Dodonaean and vague attempt to achieve this, the party meeting announced that it envisaged an inevitable establishment of socialist market economy within the social framework of socialist pluralism based on “the leading role of the party.” Underlying this vague statement was an obvious attempt to play for time. Although the leadership of the MSZMP did take some steps towards political reform—as was shown later by the amendment of the constitution and the bills under preparation—they also hoped that in the meantime, with the help of these modified or new laws, the asynchronism between economic and political reform could be maintained in the longer term. In other words, what they hoped for was that, in any event, the economic stabilization program would bring some results, and that, if this could be combined with delayed and limited political reform, then the MSZMP could emerge from the general crisis with no significant loss of prestige and without having to introduce a real division of power. Therefore—in spite of the fact that work on the modernization of the constitution and the intro-

, A4 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

duction of the party law was already underway—until the spring of 1989 the MSZMP had no concrete or final ideas concerning the target of the political transition. Until February 1989 the party leadership held the spoken and unspoken conviction that, in the historically near future pluralism would mean no more than some kind of corporate, nominal division of power within a one-party system. The events which took place in foreign and home policy during the first few months of 1989, however, forced the party leadership to reconsider their position

and to attempt a more straightforward answer to the challenges faced by the socialist camp.

The first obvious turn in MSZMP policy occurred as the result of an “incident” within the party itself, when Imre Pozsgay—capitalizing on the MSZMP’s Central Committee resolution, made at the end of 1988, which made

it possible for party leaders to publicize their views without first requesting permission—made public the position of the “historic sub-committee” working for the Central Committee, relating to 1956. The problem lay not in the content of Pozsgay’s views, since the MSZMP itself also wished to evaluate the issue accurately, and it was for this same reason that, in June 1988, the party leadership commissioned four teams to analyze political, social, and economic processes, and to provide an evaluation of the past also. These internal analyses, however, were never intended to be made public in their original form. Expert analyses usually had to undergo political screening first, so that no one would know what the party knew but only what the party wanted them to know. On January 28th, 1989, Imre Pozsgay violated this unwritten rule of procedure when he announced during an interview with the radio program 168 Ora (168 Hours) that the committee regarded 1956 as “a people’s uprising”. This announcement evoked unexpected, or, at least, seemingly unexpected,

reactions in the Politburo. Almost immediately the debate on the issue was transformed into a debate not only on the past, but on the inevitability of a radical change of views. Perhaps the January Pozsgay announcement was just a pretext on the part of some of the more “initiative-minded” leaders of the MSZMP, but it is a fact that this announcement provoked and catalyzed various developments within the party and thus, indirectly, brought about sudden and ever-increasing changes in Hungarian home policy. When the MSZMP Politburo dealt with the Pozsgay issue at a January 31st special session and at a normal session on February the 7th it became clear that the party leaders did not want to risk openly criticizing Imre Pozsgay for his perverse behavior, since they feared that such a move would reveal that the party no longer had any genuine center. It is most likely that they were afraid that in the “charisma vacuum” following the fall of Kadar, many party members viewed Pozsgay as such a central figure. Therefore, the members of the Politburo came to the conclusion that their official position should be that there was no Pozsgay issue. They discussed in detail what choreography and rhetoric would be appropriate to make the—by now rather unpredictable—Central Committee accept and understand their position on the issue.

Melinda Kalmar: From ‘Model Change’ to Regime Change 45 However, what was striking in the course of events was not this incident, but rather another which occurred at the January 31st Politburo meeting when Rezs6 Nyers suddenly—out of the blue and in the heat of discussion—declared that, as far as he was concerned, he would not object to having a multi-party system. So what we need here is that together with this [that is, the Pozsgay issue—M.K.], we should also somehow take the whole problem, the essence of the concrete problem, to the Central Committee, that is, what should we do now with this one-party system [or] multi-party system. Events have overtaken us by now. I do not see any other possibility than to recognize the multi-party system. But let’s discuss this issue, and if we decide that we do not want to endorse it, then we don’t, and then everyone should decide for themselves, in accordance with their own conscience, whether they can or cannot endorse it politically. I do, to be frank, I’d endorse it, even if you do not agree with it. [...] And someday we will have to do

it anyway”. [...]4 |

This unexpected proposal was quickly followed by a political declaration. At

the February 7th Politburo meeting the agenda dealing with current political issues and the reform of the political system treated as a fact—a reality—the party’s acceptance in principle of the declaration of a multi-party system, and this declaration was then made at the 1989 February 10th—11th meeting of the Central Committee.

Long Transition—a New Model The time of the wait-and-see policy, in place since May, 1988, was therefore over. At the February 7th, 1989, Politburo meeting Imre Pozsgay described the period just past—one of scarcely ten months—as one in which there had been some hope for pluralism within a one-party system, provided that, during the period in question, the various platforms had been given a chance to manifest themselves openly within the party. The pressure of those external “streams” |

which had begun to be organized at that time, however, was so strong that this : chance had been lost for ever. Therefore, in the transitional period which was to follow, estimated to last perhaps five years, some form of multi-party system had to be established which could guarantee the MSZMP’s leading role. This view

met with the support of the whole body. , In accordance with the generally-accepted Soviet scenario for the whole of Eastern Europe, a long transition period was planned—r at least one lasting much longer than that which soon took place in fact did. As for the stages of the transition, there were divisions within the party based on generational differences. Ac- | cording to party leader Karoly Grosz, the first stage was to last until December 1990, which was the scheduled time for the next party congress. Imre Nagy,’ head of the League of Communist Youth (KISZ), who belonged to the younger generation, was already thinking in terms of a new trend—a new discourse, as it were— aimed at transforming society. He, therefore, believed rather that the end of the first

46 _ The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

stage would be in the summer of 1990, when the next parliamentary elections would take place. Members of the body agreed, however, that the second phase of transition would last until the 1995 general elections, and that, in order to implement this schedule, legal and political guarantees should be developed.

It was only Karoly Grész who mentioned the use of non-political instruments, referring to the possibility that he would consider other means also: “{...] there is a power which is capable and willing to take up arms in order to prevent any political transition. One does not need to resort to arms, however, 1n order to change a governmental structure; here political means must be [used].”” The hint

did not produce a lively response and the body continued to think in terms of legal and political solutions. Some believed, however, that as a kind of a legal guarantee, the modernized constitution should also establish the hegemony of the MSZMP, but this proposal was rejected by the more realistic members, who said that this would only exhibit the party’s lack of confidence and would not in fact be able to guarantee anything. With all this in mind, in February, 1989, the MSZMP’s views on necessary political reform were that, in the course of at least five years of transition, the leading social role of the party could be guaranteed primarily through the electoral law, the institution of the presidency, and a two-chamber parliamentary system, which was at that time still considered viable. These views were partly supported and partly amended in the spring of 1989 by the outcome of the Polish roundtable talks and, further, by personal consultations with the leaders of the PZPR in Poland: firstly, in March, by the secretary of the Central Committee, Gydrgy Fejti together with the CC’s “expert”, Andras Toth, and, later, in April, by Imre Pozsgay. In the course of exchanging ideas it transpired that the Polish party leaders also predicted the “deep reform” of the political system to be a long-lasting process, in which social consensus and political stability were both regarded as equally important. For the Polish leaders one guarantee of this long transition would be the two-chamber parliament which could stabilize the balance of forces. A dressrehearsal for a free electoral contest would take place in the senate, whilst the seats in the Sejm would be decided well before the election by means of a process of negotiation and compromise. A further guarantee of a less drastic, and not too rapid, transition would be the introduction of a strong presidential institution.

By that time the Hungarian party leadership had already had a number of full-time specialists dealing with the issues of the political transition, and they— with undoubtedly keen insight—had, very early in the proceedings, expressed their doubts concerning the viability of following the Polish scenario in Hungary. In the notes prepared from these technical exchanges, Gydrgy Fejti and Andras Toth considered a preliminary agreement and a division of seats to be rather risky. Although the leaders of the PZPR hoped that their opposition was not ready to fight the elections, the Hungarian specialists nevertheless believed that, were the PZPR to achieve poor results in the elections, this could corrode the agreement concerning the elections to the Sejm on both political and moral grounds. (This prediction of the Hungarian experts stood the. test of time, despite

Melinda Kalmar: From ‘Model Change’ to Regime Change 47 the fact that the results of the June elections took not only the Polish communist party by surprise, but also the opposition itself.) The MSZMP, therefore, was thinking in terms of different solutions to the problem of guaranteeing its long-term political role. As far as institutional and legal guarantees were concerned, the introduction of the presidential institution was given primary importance by the Hungarian party leaders also, but the concept held by the leadership and by the party’s legal experts working on modifications to the constitution underwent a fundamental change in the period from September, 1988 to the spring of 1989. In September, 1988 it was still possible to conceive the establishment of a presidential system “possibly to the extent” that the posts of State President and Prime Minister would be concentrated in the _ hands of one person, and even in February, 1989, a presidential system in general was discussed at the meeting of the MSZMP CC International, Legal and Administrative Committee. The draft of the constitution completed by the end of January, however—although leaving the issue entirely open—only proposed the establishment of the institution of president with “medium” powers.’ In this way the Hungarian party leadership, increasingly diverging from the Polish solution, instead of introducing a “presidential socialism”, gradually advanced toward the concept of “parliamentary socialism” the exemplar for which was to be the coalition period between 1945 and 1948. Earlier, in anticipation of semi-free elections, a plan for a two-chamber parliament was also considered, but this was quickly rejected by a majority of Politburo members at the May 26th, 1989 meeting, as it was now regarded as foreign to Hungarian tradition as well as both unjustifiable and inadequate in relation to | the size of the country.® They did not exclude the possibility, however, that perhaps two different electoral laws could be elaborated: one for the first transitional phase—for the period of compromise—and another for the later phase when truly competitive elections could take place. Rejection of a two-chamber system, however, did not mean that the Hungarian party had given up on the compromise scenario. On the contrary, this was still considered to be the most promising route towards establishing a new model

based on consensus, albeit in a way different from that of the PZPR. In the MSZMP’s plans the elections were also to have been preceded by negotiation and compromise. However, instead of an open division of seats and the separation of Parliament into two chambers, one based on competitive elections and the other on compromise, the MSZMP offered part of the opposition an informal, quasi-coalition form based on compromise. The leaders of the party hoped that this—according to their plans—essentially communist-led coalition would remind the re-emerging historic parties of a precedent in Hungarian history: a special division of power in the coalition period between 1945 and 1948. This scenario would have been similar to a rewound film and for this reason, in the first half of 1989 the MSZMP entertained very high hopes that its proposal would find support in the opposition. The only thing which was not yet clear was the “technology” through which a durable compromise could be achieved.

48 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Bi- and Multi-lateral Negotiations As early as the beginning of 1989 it became urgent that the Hungarian party leadership, following the example of the Polish talks begun on February 6th, should also initiate similar “consultations” with the opposition organizations, which were at that time labeled as “alternative.” These negotiations, it was also outlined, would serve a double strategy for the MSZMP. This strategy, as formulated in the position plan prepared for the 1989 February 10th/11th meeting of the MSZMP Central Committee, stated that the party was ready to conduct biand multi-lateral negotiations, and one topic on the proposed agenda was precisely “the discussion of the issues concerning co-operation.” Within the framework of multi-lateral talks there was some discussion re-

garding the establishment of a national consensus board, although not in the form which the New March Front (UMF) had proposed'°—and which the party leadership had rejected several times—but in a form which gave a clear and dominant role to the MSZMP. The MSZMP considered these multilateral negotiations to be a forum for consultation which would provide what might be termed a “legitimizing umbrella” for the transition as it proceeded, almost as a symbol of national unity and solidarity. At the same time there was consensus in

the leadership that several inter-party negotiations should also be conducted,

primarily with the re-emerging historic parties, concerning how the “responsibility of governing” could be shared in the first phase of the planned transition. These bilateral negotiations were mostly aimed at finding potential coalition partners who were ready to accept the leading role of the MSZMP and the conditions which were labeled as the MSZMP’s platform. At the February 7th, 1989, meeting of the Politburo this was worded by Miklés Németh in the following way: “We would start talking about what the platform is, or for what [program] we would request a coalition.” These conditions were summarized by the party leadership in the Central Committee’s previously mentioned February, 1989, resolution: 1. Acceptance of the prevailing constitution and laws. 2. Acceptance of the socialist way of social development. 3. Respect for the international alliance obligations of the country, whilst striving for the simultaneous dissolution of the two military blocs. In the spring of 1989 the MSZMP hoped that there would be parties with whom, if the right negotiating strategy were followed, they could achieve agreement on some kind of a popular-democratic quasi-coalition before the general elections, and that there would be some other parties with whom they could cooperate after the elections on some issues.'! In the hopes of the party leaders, both solutions would guarantee that, in the long run, the MSZMP would come out of the inevitable political transition with no heavy loss of prestige and power. Certain paragraphs of the party law then under preparation were also formulated in the spirit of such considerations. Section 2 of Paragraph 6 of the draft made public in April and May of 1989 stated that the budget subsidies for the parties forming electoral alliances should be determined “on the basis of their

Melinda Kalmar: From ‘Model Change’ to Regime Change 49

concordant statement.”!* In this draft the MSZMP wished to demonstrate that among its reform plans it took seriously such legally guaranteed monetary incentives for potential coalition partners—in return for an appropriate trade-off. At the beginning of March semi-official, bilateral negotiations were opened in this spirit and they continued throughout the period of the trilateral talks.’ However, the hopes attached to the bilateral talks were ultimately dashed, since, in addition to the constant pressure of economic processes, two different facets of home policy influenced the expectations of the MSZMP concerning a slow “evolutionary” transition. One was the unexpected collaboration and negotiating tactics of the opposition, whilst the other was dissension in the party leadership and the open attitude and actions of its own internal opposition, or, as it

was often put more succinctly, the dissolution of the party. , Short-lived Negotiations In the weeks following the announcement of a multi-party system in February, 1989, the MSZMP drew the important preliminary conclusions: that, if other parties were to be allowed to exist, then it was quite viable to believe that both the newly formed “proto-parties” and the historic parties would be willing to

discuss the issues related to the drafts of the party bill and the electoral bill. Nonetheless, they still considered the next step to be that of convening a representative meeting, whose function would be consultative and whose participants would be chosen by the MSZMP. The first serious shock-wave struck the leadership of the MSZMP at the end of March or at the beginning of April, when it transpired that the opposition organizations were not only able to show their strength in mass demonstrations, as they did on March 15th, but that they were also determined to join forces— partly giving up their independence for a time—in order to appear as a united negotiating partner against the MSZMP. One very clear sign of this was that, at the beginning of April the Opposition Roundtable (EKA)" refused to attend a meeting organized by the MSZMP, which was to pave the way for future wider negotiations, without the Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz). Moreover, in its press statement the EKA made it clear that those organizations which had been members of the EKA since March 22nd were only willing to negotiate collectively, and they had further conditions to be met as to the competence, form, and themes of the planned meetings.’ The potential success of the planned bilateral negotiations was thus jeopardized, since the participating organizations of the EKA were no longer in a position to conduct open negotiations with the MSZMP. Informal bilateral talks were going on in the background nonetheless, but the MSZMP was now forced to think in terms of co-operation after the elections instead of reaching a coalition agreement beforehand and they attempted, therefore, to prepare the political conditions for this eventuality. Consequently, in the months to come an increas-

50 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

ingly frequent topic of the meetings was the question of infrastructure for the newly formed political parties. At the April 19th Politburo meeting Rezs6 Nyers referred to this new item on the agenda as a potential tool for building confidence: Now, we should offer them something. What can we offer them? Here we have to reckon

with the parties again [that is, the historic parties—M.K.], well, we have to give them something for their infrastructure anyway. I consider it to be a good tool that we have up our sleeves, and the earlier we give it to them, the more we can profit from it. And it will build some confidence too.

The bilateral exploratory talks concerning a coalition were adversely affected

not only by the opposition alliance, but also by the fact that, in the spring the party began to break up into smaller or larger platforms. It was a serious political trauma for the MSZMP leaders that, whilst the opposition was only willing to negotiate within the frameworks which they themselves had set, the reform circles in the party had their first conference in the middle of April in Kecskemét, where the differences of opinion within the party were openly discussed.'° This

swept the MSZMP inevitably towards an extraordinary party congress, and eventually to the break-up of the party. Henceforth the attention of the party leadership was so much engaged by its internal problems—and by the fear that the previously planned long transition could only be accomplished by keeping the party together by any means available—that items dealing with internal party matters dominated the agenda in meetings of various senior bodies and issues concerning the opposition were generally discussed at the end of these meetings, as items under “Any Other Business” reached in the late evening. At the beginning of 1989 the majority of the party leadership believed, or hoped, that the EKA, consisting as it did of different parties and proto-parties, would prove to be a transitional, short-lived alliance which might fall apart as the result of unbridgeable internal conflicts and without outside intervention. Information reaching the MSZMP leadership—the source of which was not identified in the minutes of the meetings—implied that Fidesz, and especially the : radical wing of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZBSZ), fully controlled those EKA member organizations wanting to break out of this situation which had been a burden upon them from the beginning. When describing the situation at the April 19th, 1989, meeting of the Politburo, Gyérgy Fejti made the following comment about the EKA: I believe that we can organize this series of negotiations if we stay calm, firm, and also flexible, for the opposition roundtable is not a stable entity. So, if we had time to wait patiently, their differences of opinion would gain the upper hand, for even now it can be seen that such a roundtable negotiation works against the sovereignty of the organizations as well as against them taking an independent position. We should be very careful not to take any

steps which will bring them closer together; we must, rather, take steps and give signals

which will unwind this bloc. ,

Melinda Kalmar: From ‘Model Change’ to Regime Change 5] What the leaders of the MSZMP underestimated, however, was not only the cohesive power of the opposition but also the potential independent political role of the EKA organizations in the first phase of the planned long transition. The MSZMP leaders viewed these organizations as being still rather weak, lacking a realistic program for government both currently and in the short-term, and having even less experience in running a government. Therefore, if the party had sufficient time, by using its own political experience it could stay on its feet in the race against the opposition. Consequently the main concern for MSZMP in

1989 was time—that is, the question of whether it could keep the economic crisis and the controlled political transition within the desired course; if it could not, then a too-rapid transition and radical changes in political and social conditions might destabilize the country and, in the worst case—as the most pessimistic Soviet scenarios had predicted—might also sweep the party as a whole from the scene. In the spring of 1989, however, the leaders of the MSZMP still hoped that the transition would be comfortably long and negotiations with the opposition

short (concluded by the end of May). The government would then submit slightly modified bills and everything would neatly follow its set course. This hope of the MSZMP was supported by their belief that their position in respect of possible compromise looked much more favorable and promising than that in Poland, since in Hungary it was the political parties who were sitting at the negotiating table, and they thought that agreements achieved with these parties would not bind them to anything. At the April 19th 1989, meeting of the Politburo, Imre Pozsgay stressed that it was important to draw the attention of oppo-

sition members unwilling to negotiate to this point.’” ,

A Stalemate Situation The first time on which the reality of the “flash-talks” concept was questioned was in April and May, when it transpired that both the MSZMP and the EKA were insisting on their own negotiating strategy. The EKA continued to press for bilateral negotiations and only wanted to discuss issues and conditions relating to a constitutional transition, itself leading to democratic elections. Instead of the Party Bill, they wanted to discuss the amendments necessary for the Law of Public Meetings and Assemblies, the issues related to equal opportunity in the media, and guarantees against forcible restoration. In the meantime the MSZMP had still not given up the idea of arranging for a representative form of negotiations, and was still insisting that, in addition to the Party Bill and the Electoral Bill, economic and social issues should also be. included in the agenda of the discussions. Most of all they insisted that the institutions of the Presidency and of the Constitutional Court be accepted within the framework of the constitutional modifications, none of which issues were the organizations. in the EKA willing to negotiate.

52 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Therefore, with each side sticking rigidly to its own position, by late-April or early-May a stalemate had developed. Even worse for the MSZMP was the fact

that the EKA was using the press to publicize its position, in which it openly questioned the legislative legitimacy of Parliament. The MSZMP was understandably embarrassed by this war in the media and

would have preferred to continue the political reconciliation of interests in the less sensational arena of the negotiating table. At the April 19th and May 2nd Politburo meetings the leadership of the party—now apparently accepting that it had to face a well-organized and difficult negotiating partner—deliberated whether it would be possible to find some flexible negotiating tactics which would enable them to continue open talks with the opposition which would not simply be informal meetings but would ultimately represent a national consensus. The MSZMP was all the more interested in such a scenario because it was trying to avoid any responsibility for either interrupting the negotiations which had recently started, or for being the cause of their eventual failure. Such accusations would jeopardize the MSZMP’s role as initiator, which it considered to be one of the preconditions for a successful transition. The party was also afraid that the EKA would view its own position as much better than that which the Polish opposition had been able to achieve and would, perhaps, deliberately play for time, or—as some part of the party leadership suggested—would be destruc-

tive. At the April 19th Politburo meeting Gyérgy Fejti’s comments on the pros- | pects for the negotiations reflected this assumption, saying that some within the EKA believed that the talks were more urgent for MSZMP than for them: Here we can see comparisons being made with the Polish roundtable talks, and they say— this is a fact, by the way—that they themselves have achieved everything that Solidarity was able to achieve over the course of a long series of negotiations. That is, they are already legal, dual publicity is a thing of the past, they have access to the mass media, and what’s more, they have managed to influence public opinion significantly on issues which are still taboo in Poland. Such issues involve the army, the Ministry of the Interior, and the nomenclature, which at that time over there were simply swept off the negotiating table. So some organizations believe that time is working for them, the MSZMP is divided, it will be forced to make further concessions, therefore it seems useful to discredit the negotiating delegation, and shift the responsibility upon us for the slow-down or failure of the negotiations.

Taking everything into consideration, Matyas Szir6és suggested that they should no longer be engaged in trying to loosen the ties of the EKA but should raise the level of the negotiations, continuing them at the highest level of leadership, which, incidentally, was one of the EKA’s ambitions also. In order to break out of this deadlock, they went, one by one, through all the issues which were blocking the start of negotiations, and they came to the conclusion that the preparatory phase should be concluded and genuine talks started as soon as possible. To this effect they decided that they would be flexible on most of the issues. However, the question of the “shape of the table” did not belong here. Although the MSZMP was already willing to make concessions with regard to the representative forum which they preferred, it would by now agree to bilateral nego-

Melinda Kalmar: From ‘Model Change’ to Regime Change 53 tiations in which the MSZMP would be on one side and all the organizations of the EKA on the other.'® At the beginning of May the MSZMP and the EKA organizations, and their respective representatives, conducted bilateral talks almost daily to resolve the situation. According to the documents of the MSZMP’s leading bodies, certain representatives of the historic parties themselves initiated these meetings, pro-

posing trilateral and quadrilateral negotiations to be conducted between the MSZMP and the historic parties.’ For the MSZMP, however, the main goal of the background bilateral talks was to inspire the historic parties, and later the _ Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) also, through their representatives, to make joint efforts to drag the preparatory talks out of this deadlock. The MSZMP was still convinced that the EKA was controlled by the most radical party, the SZDSZ, and that the unbending resistance of the Free Democrats was jeopardizing not only the success of the preparatory phase but the negotiations as a whole and—in consequence—much-desired, future social consensus. Therefore, at the beginning of May, they first requested the negotiating partners to help the EKA find its way back towards the direction of compromise and consensus, but then later, in the middle of May, when the MSZMP resumed intensive bilateral negotiations, they expected their negotiating partners—especially the Social Democrats, but also the People’s Party (MNP), the Smallholders’ Party (FKGP) and the Hungarian Democratic Forum—to distance themselves from the SZDSZ’s position and to come to the negotiating table as “sovereign

partners.”

Competitive Elections In describing the power relationships established by May, 1989, Imre Pozsgay said that the MSZMP could still consider itself to be firmly in the saddle, while the opposition was not yet in a position to have such confidence. During the enforced break caused by the deadlock the MSZMP tried to discover what the negotiating partners expected from the transition and what their negotiating ambitions were, and, at the same time, after weighing this information, the MSZMP also had to determine for itself what it wanted to achieve and what it expected from the new situation. The answer to the first question seemed to be much simpler: the MSZMP knew that the parties and organizations of the Opposition wanted to win as many seats as possible at the elections, and so they would mainly be interested in the Party Bill, and, within this, in the issue of political infrastructure, so that they could run their organizations under reasonable conditions. The other important point in the negotiations for the OR would be the issue of the media, since the opposition obviously wanted as much publicity as possible.

As to the question of what the MSZMP wanted to achieve, at the May 2nd Politburo meeting Gydrgy Fejti laid down, as a minimum program, that in the

54 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

course of negotiations, the most important objective was to restore the shaken legitimacy of Parliament by broadening the social base of legislation. On the other hand, the opposition was expected to commit itself not to exacerbate social tensions in return for a MSZMP guarantee that there would be no attempt to restore the political situation by force. Finally, as far as elections were concerned, MSZMP expected that, following the general election, a government based on a broad consensus could be formed with those who would be willing to enter into coalition. At this time the party leadership—in the interest of exploiting its still-extant but slim advantage—was willing to accelerate the pace of transition, contrary to its intentions at the beginning of the year, and to consider the possibility of early elections.” In this context—considering the pros and cons in relation to the approaching elections and to co-operation with potential partners—the MSZMP came to an important conclusion which determined the fate of the transition fundamentally: notwithstanding the Polish example, it accepted the idea of com-

petitive elections. .

Although the MSZMP had previously declared its endorsement of the concept of free elections, the interpretation of this idea had changed in a matter of merely two months.”” In March this had still meant that quasi-free elections, based on preliminary coalition agreements, would take place, whilst by May this meant genuinely free elections based on the free competition of the parties involved. This was first stated by Rezs6 Nyers at the May 2nd Politburo meeting: Now what can we expect, what can we want? We can no longer push for a preliminary coalition, unfortunately [...] the situation is different. If we had started earlier, maybe it would

have worked, now it does not. So competitive elections, with all of us in the balance. We have to accept this thesis.

At the May 8th MSZMP Central Committee meeting, during discussion of the Party Bill, the issue of the Electoral Bill then under preparation was raised. Some members mentioned the possibility that the MSZMP might still follow the Polish example and try to make a preliminary coalition agreement with the opposition. Gydérgy Fejti, however, who was the political official in charge of the bills in the highest party leadership—and who thus took part himself in the preparation of these bills—did not forget his earlier worries concerning the Pol-

ish solution. He openly objected to this idea: |

Some raised the issue of whether we should aim for elections based on preliminary agreement or on the free competition of the parties. In my view, it is still a reasonable evaluation of the situation to say that neither the political conditions nor the internal situation is ripe for an election based on the classical competition of the parties involved. There is still an extremely slim chance, however, that we could, or should, develop an election system based fundamentally on preliminary agreements between the parties, or, to be more precise, for the reason that such an election, which would otherwise be very easy to prepare technically, would not solve the basic problems, for the validity of such an agreement could be questioned at any time.?3

Melinda Kalmar: From ‘Model Change’ to Regime Change 55

Upon seeing the pressure of current circumstances and, as a result, the changes in the MSZMP’s conception of the transition, some members of the Central Committee now began to talk about the escalation of demands. In this

way the chances of implementing a transition initiated and controlled by the party were still further diminished.

The Parliamentary Palette The exploratory talks concerning coalition remained on the agenda, however, in spite of the fact that, by May, it was quite clear to the MSZMP that, in any case, all of the parties making up the EKA were eager to be “weighed in the balance”

of a competitive election and that for this reason they were not interested in coalition—neither among themselves, nor, least of all, with the MSZMP. At the

May 2nd Politburo meeting Gyérgy Fejti informed members that the lesson learned from the bilateral negotiations was that a coalition agreement with the historic parties was only viable after the elections: For some time the historic parties have played with the idea that it might perhaps be worth forming an alliance with MSZMP for the elections. Today this idea is dead. So now there is no one who wants to form a nation-wide electoral alliance. Everybody wants to be weighed in the balance, for that is what they see to be in their best interest. [...] The way it is with these parties now—and we should understand their position—is that we will see only after the elections. So everything depends on how many votes the MSZMP will be able to collect, what it can raise.

The party leadership believed the party’s electoral target should be 40-45% of the vote, which would be sufficient for a coalition agreement. Meanwhile, after a real assessment of power relationships and the possible consequences of a competitive election, its views on potential coalition partners underwent significant modification. A few members of the party expressed concern regarding the priority given to the historic parties in this respect. Gyérgy Fejti voiced the objection that, as a result of internal conflict, these parties were often represented by people who were rivals within their party, and so it was hard to know whether they were supported by the party’s leadership. He called the attention of the meeting to the contradiction that it was the Alliance of Free Democrats who had the most resolute ideas concerning the negotiations and that it was they, there-

fore, who controlled the Opposition Roundtable. Mikl6s Németh, however, feared that these selective negotiations might prove to be a trap for MSZMP, for, if the EKA learned of such background talks, it would mean losing the possibility of the broad national negotiations only just under preparation.~* Imre Pozsgay—summarizing the conceptual turn concerning potential coalitions—described what the MSZMP considered to be the desirable composition of Parliament. He believed that, instead of striving for coalition with the historic

parties, which were struggling with constant internal conflicts, the MSZMP

56 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

should seek coalition with the Social Democrats, that, in respect of the MDF, some kind of—not yet precisely defined—tolerance was needed, and that, as far as the SZDSZ was concerned—in Pozsgay’s view—they would be a construc-

tive opposition.” ,

Agreement on Starting Negotiations By the end of May, 1989, the MSZMP considered the stalemate to be very serious. The announcements made by the EKA demonstrated that the legitimacy of Parliament could hardly be maintained until the next election, and, as a result, the MSZMP decided that an early election was now a necessity. This, however, was not feasible without prior agreement with the opposition parties. The concerns of the MSZMP were further enhanced by the fact that the June 16th date for the re-interment of Imre Nagy and his fellow martyrs was now quite near. The Committee for Historical Justice (TIB) and the family of Imre Nagy changed their earlier position: they were no longer content to have a ceremony in the cemetery, but also requested that they be laid to rest in state in Heroes’ Square. In anticipation of these events, the MSZMP suggested to the government that they should issue a statement—obviously in addition to the necessary steps to be taken by the Ministry of the Interior—to call upon the whole of society for the spirit of national reconciliation. The leadership of the party could see, however, that this might not be enough to ease tensions in the country, and so it wanted above all to start negotiations with the opposition in the first half of June. Time was not on the MSZMP’s side. They were able to break out of the deadlock when, at the May 26th Politburo meeting, Gyérgy Fejti came forward with a proposal entirely different from their earlier position as far as the most important issue, that concerning the form of negotiations, was concerned. The secretary of the CC, who was playing a leading role in the preliminary harmonization talks, proposed “trilateral-plus-one” negotiations, with the MSZMP and EKA complemented by “independent participants,” and as a fourth side, by observers. “A triangle, an isosceles—I can already see the table”—-said Fejti. His second proposal was that, in any event, they should raise the level of the negotia-

, tions: they should appoint members of the negotiating delegation, in which ex, perts from the MSZMP and from the Government would participate. The delegations, continued the secretary of the CC, would be headed by Imre Pozsgay

, and Rezs6 Nyers, but the participation of Karoly Grosz might perhaps be reserved for the plenary sessions, so that, in case of failure, the presence of the secretary-general would not prove to be a trap for the MSZMP. “Another thing we have to consider 1s whether comrade Grész should also be involved in this. There are arguments for and against, for, if a failure should occur, ‘Here I am to take it’. I don’t think that the secretary-general should assume this responsibility.” The other members of the body also agreed with this basic principle and so

Melinda Kalmar: From ‘Model Change’ to Regime Change 57 they decided that—although the presence of the secretary-general was indispensable for raising the level, and the stakes, of the negotiations—he himself should only appear at the opening session, and then later when agreement had been reached. In the words of Rezsé Nyers: “If, eventually, there is a chance of an agreement, you will be there, but until there is one, you should not be there.””° At the May 26th Politburo meeting Gyérgy Fejti also said that they should call the attention of the opposition to an important provision: the MSZMP’s offer was only valid until the end of the first week of June. If real negotiations failed to begin in the first two weeks, the proposal would become meaningless. In this case, in order to guard against the loss of prestige, MSZMP would evaluate another possibility, of “lower value politically”: the proposal that the government should make public all fundamental laws—several of which had already been made public—and guarantee that the comments made by the various organiza-

tions, either separately or as part of the proposal made by the Opposition Roundtable, would be submitted to Parliament.7’ The Politburo accepted this new approach to the negotiations, but it was also

afraid that if the MSZMP’s new proposal concerning trilateral negotiations,

which might also be acceptable to the EKA, was made public, it would “depreciate” Karoly Groész’s forthcoming talks with the three historic parties: the

Social Democrats, the Smallholders’ Party, and the People’s Party. Yet the MSZMP still viewed negotiations concerning long-term coalition plans as a strategic goal of primary importance, all the more so since they hoped that, by keeping in constant contact with these parties, they might perhaps be able to detach them—and perhaps the MDF also—from the OR, which was conducting a rather rigid policy as an opposition alliance. Therefore—with a view to the special interests of the bilateral talks—the Politburo decided that the new proposal for negotiations would be sent to the EKA only when these inter-party meetings, conducted with the participation of Grész, had already taken place at the beginning of June. Above all, however, they wanted to conceal this tactic of playing for time from the CC, for they believed that everything was “leaked” from there, which was precisely what they did not want. In order to avoid this, they agreed that the CC would be given only the most necessary pieces of information: “Let us agree that we should not say anything concrete to the CC, even if they press us hard”—-said Rezs6 Nyers, concluding the conspiracy. As expected, the EKA received the MSZMP’s new proposal favorably, and soon afterwards, on June 9th, the experts signed the agreement declaring the opening of the real negotiations, followed, on June 10th, by the members of the negotiating delegations. As it later transpired, however, the June agreement had one weak point from the MSZMP’s perspective: whilst it promised that legislation would not precede political agreement, it failed to define or determine an end-point for negotiations. This “mistake” involved the MSZMP in an unwanted, lengthy process of negotiations in which it had to make unforeseen compromises. It was precisely this promise which the MSZMP would later wish to retract during the course of negotiations.

58 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Acceleration By the middle of the summer of 1989 the chances of the MSZMP in the forthcoming elections had deteriorated dramatically. One clear warning sign was the outcome of the June elections in Poland, in which the PZPR performed worse than expected. One month later, in July 1989, mid-term elections were held in Hungary, and in the first round the opposition candidates joined forces and inflicted a defeat on the communist candidates. In the meantime, not only was the unity of the MSZMP not restored, but the party instead became still further fragmented. The 21-member Political Execu, tive Committee, established as successor to the Political Committee (Politburo)

in June 1989, had no other choice but to put on the agenda of its July 24th meeting a discussion of the various policies and tendencies inside the party, since some of these directly involved the highest levels of the party. (The agenda of the meeting included, amongst others, the Movement for a Democratic Hungary, Berecz, and Ribanszky programs.) This further increased tensions already present in the party leadership; the divisions among the four people in the newly established supreme body, the Presidency—Rezs6 Nyers, Karoly Grosz, Imre

Pozsgay, and Miklés Németh—was now clearly irreversible. Another factor deepening the crisis in the MSZMP was that, as a result of Parliament’s dubious legitimacy, certain groups of representatives in the House, especially the county party leaders, were threatening to call for the House’s dissolution. All this encouraged the MSZMP to take a very firm position on the issue of early elections. The government, as well as Prime Minister Miklos Németh himself, wholeheartedly supported the idea of bringing forward the elections, for they believed that some unpopular measures were indispensable for the stabilization of the econ-

omy and for the acquisition of new loans from the West, but they wanted to introduce these measures only after the elections.”° In assessing this domestic situation, the members of the Political Executive Committee agreed that the elections should be held as soon as possible.”’ This, however, caused an abrupt about-turn in their position concerning their negotiat-

ing strategy. Now the MSZMP wished to speed up negotiations, not because it underestimated the strength of the opposition—as they had earlier—but rather because they wanted to hold the elections as early as 1989. The chances of this, however, were rather slim. The elections could not be held in November even if negotiations were completed within a month and the Party could submit to the House the laws it considered fundamental: the Party Bill, the Electoral Bill, the Bill on the Institution of the Presidency, and, maximally, a Bill on the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, the members of the Political Executive Committee believed that, in the hope of holding the elections in December, the negotiating process should be expedited by all means possible, and that the opposition should be informed that the government’s friendly gesture of withdrawing the fundamental laws from Parliament in June did not mean that the negotiations could go on indefinitely. This is because the MSZMP was convinced that the

Melinda Kalmar: From ‘Model Change’ to Regime Change 59 EKA wanted to delay agreement and was demonstrating “obstructive behavior”*”

in order to hinder early elections, since it knew that these were mostly in the interests of the MSZMP.”" Gyorgy Fejti, who primarily acted as executor of political decisions as well as—in the absence of Imre Pozsgay at that time—leader of the MSZMP negotiating delegation, said at the June 24th meeting of the Political Executive Committee that the most important task facing the leadership was to decide finally what it really wanted to achieve, because the negotiating delegation would then shape

its tactics accordingly. If the Committee opted for early elections, it would clearly mean having to accelerate negotiations. In this case, there was no other solution: even if it meant risking the failure of the talks, any disputed item upon which agreement could not be expected—firstly in the matter of the account of MSZMP property—would have to be dropped from the issues to be discussed, since these could not only slow down the process towards an agreement but might also block it. *”

Nevertheless, the Political Executive Committee did not decide when the elections would take place, since both the year-end and the early new year seemed equally suitable. The speaker of the House had objections to a later, March, deadline, asking why Parliament should demonstrate its incapacity by admitting that it could not last for another three months, until the next scheduled elections, when it had been able to survive thus far. Therefore, the Committee left open the issue of the date of the elections, agreeing that a proposal would be made later, depending on how Parliament was able to function. The negotiating delegations were given the specific task of speeding up the process of the trilateral talks, however, and doing whatever they could in order to ensure the political and legal conditions necessary for early elections. To this effect they were to press for the elaboration of the Party and Electoral Bills, as well as the preparation of the Bill on the Institution of the Presidency, so that Parliament could debate them as soon as possible. Two days after the meeting of the Political Executive Committee, on July 26, 1989, the MSZMP delegation informed its negotiating partners in a statement that it was unwilling to discuss the issue of MSZMP property in the framework of the trilateral “reconciliation of interests.” Following this the professional expert harmonization talks in Committee I/2 were broken off, to be resumed only at intermediate level on August 24th.

The Interpretation of Consensus On August 15th the Political Executive Committee of the MSZMP convened for a meeting before resuming the trilateral political talks on August 24th. Accord-

ing to previous practice, the subject of these talks was placed on the agenda under the heading “Miscellaneous” for discussion late in the evening. The order of discussion was changed by an unexpected demand from Gyula Horn. Horn

60 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

said that, whilst the committee was discussing unimportant issues, life was “flying by”. This was how the issue was included in the agenda as the first item, under the heading “current issues of domestic policy.” Nevertheless, by this time

the outcome of the negotiations had become very important indeed for the MSZMBp, since it still cherished some hopes concerning early elections. The best

solution would have been to have Parliament debate those bills which the MSZMP considered to be fundamental at the end of September or at the beginning of October at the latest, so that elections could be held at the beginning of December, inasmuch as the Electoral Law under preparation provided that elections had to be declared within 60 days. The most important condition for elections in December, however, was the rather optimistic schedule of events outlined by the MSZMP in the middle of August with respect to the negotiations. According to this schedule, after August 21st the negotiating partners would hold preparatory talks at expert level; then, on August 24th, a intermediate level

meeting would be held, and on August 26th the negotiations would be concluded. Even in Gyérgy Fejti’s most pessimistic estimate, a further meeting could be held on August 25th, if necessary—and he believed that it would be necessary—and then, finally, on September the Ist the Central Committee could review the outcome of the negotiations and the agreement could be signed on September 2nd. The most important obstacle in the way of implementing this schedule was precisely the same as it had been since the signing of the June 10th agreement: the agreement did not set a deadline for the end of negotiations, and it also failed to state clearly that all three negotiating partners must come to agreement on all fundamental issues before signing the concluding statement. Now it was evident to the MSZMP that the SZDSZ and Fidesz were not willing to come to any compromise on the most hotly debated issues: the issue of party property, the legitimacy of party organizations in the work place, and the institution of the presidency. Therefore, in August the Political Executive Committee tried to find a way to shorten the negotiations and to revise the most important element of the agreement made in June, the one guaranteeing that legislation would not precede political agreement.

One possible solution proposed for interpreting the consensus needed to conclude the agreement was that those bills upon which agreement had already been achieved should be submitted to Parliament, whilst the remaining issues would be postponed. This was not too promising for the MSZMP, since after passing the Electoral Law and the Party Law, the EKA was no longer interested in a rapid acceptance of the law on the Presidency. The MSZMP’s leaders, however, regarded the introduction of the Presidency as a crucial issue in the process of transition even with the President having only “medium” powers. Therefore they were hoping, until the very end of the Roundtable Talks, that behind-thescenes discussions with some of the EKA organizations would result not only in the acceptance of the Institution of the Presidency but also in the election of the MSZMP’s nominee, Imre Pozsgay, as President.

Melinda Kalmar: From ‘Model Change’ to Regime Change 61 The second proposal was that those bills which had been accepted by all the three sides would be submitted to the House as draft texts, whilst, with the remainder of the issues, alternative texts would be distributed among the Members of the House, indicating which version was proposed by the MSZMP. As a sub-

alternative to this proposal, Rezsé Nyers suggested that it would be good to come to an agreement on the Party Bill, the Electoral Bill, and in the optimal case, the Bill on the Institution of the Presidency, although, if this did not succeed, then the MSZMP would submit the latter “out of its position of strength.”

Quiet Diplomacy In the meantime, quiet diplomacy was being conducted behind the scenes, not only with the parties of the EKA but also with representatives of the Third Side. Nevertheless, whilst in spring the MSZMP had wanted to persuade the participating parties in the EKA to try to conciliate the other EKA organizations, so that they would be willing to sit down at the negotiating table, this time the main goal of the background talks was to facilitate the conclusion of the trilateral negotiations as soon as possible. This had to be done in a way which would produce agreement on the Institution of the Presidency, in addition to the two fundamental laws. This former would have to be separated from the rest of the constitutional issues in order to hold presidential and general elections as early as December 1989—if possible, in this order, but, in the worst case, both at the same time. Summarizing the lessons of the background talks, the MSZMP did not exclude the possibility that in case agreement with the EKA as a united negotiating partner failed, then it would try to talk some of the participating organizations into making separate agreements. Reporting on these exploratory talks at the August 15th Political Executive Committee meeting, Gyérgy Fejti said that the MSZMP was “quite close” to making an agreement with three organizations: the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society, and the Christian Democratic People’s Party. Fejti argued as follows: I have to say that we are conducting separate negotiations with these parties. The trouble is that, although we are taking minutes of these meetings, they refuse to sign them. So, these three organizations are all ready to establish the legal preconditions of the elections, which can be declared at any time. So, for the time being, we have left the time of the elections open, but these organizations share our view that by any means possible, the Electoral Law and the Party law must be passed in the September session of Parliament, even if others have a different opinion, and we have to make an attempt to modify the Constitution—either the whole package, or firstly we have to remove the Institution of the Presidency from it. Now, none of the participating organizations intend to destroy the Opposition Roundtable: that is clear. However, no agreement can be made without it: that is also clear. So, it is sure that the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Federations of Young Democrats will not change their

position and so the Opposition Roundtable is now facing a possible rupture, and this is blocking the method of negotiation which we accepted as a compromise.

62 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Gyoérgy Fejti believed that if, despite patient, quiet diplomacy, the party failed to come to an agreement—because the SZDSZ and the Fidesz adhered to their intentions to obstruct the submission of the bills—then the MSZMP should try to reach an agreement with only some of the negotiating partners—with the above-mentioned three organizations and with the Third Side, whose members, reported the secretary of the CC, were also conducting separate talks with the MSZMP. As for the MNP, Gyorgy Fejti said that, because they were currently hesitating, they would change sides: “[If] we can come to an agreement with the Hungarian Democratic Forum, then the People’s Party will surely change sides, and perhaps the Smallholders’ Party will too.””’

A Long Endgame, Special Deals Despite the planned schedule and quiet diplomacy, the negotiations did not come to an end by August 26th. Moreover, eleven more intermediate level political meetings began on August 24th. The MSZMP could exhibit great flexibility in discussing the Electoral Bill, partly because, after the mid-term elections, it had also changed its view on a fundamental issue concerning the electoral system: the ratio of individual and party list seats. One success it could record was that,

according to the agreement, not only those who had received the most votes could run in the second round—as proposed by the EKA—but all who had received 15% of the votes cast. The negotiating partners also managed to reach an agreement on the basic principles of the Party Law after the EKA abandoned its original proposal that there was no need for a separate Party Law, but rather for the amendment of the . Law of Assembly. Still, the most serious internal conflict which the MSZMP had to face over the course of the negotiations related to the Party Law, when, at the August 28th trilateral meeting, Imre Pozsgay promised—without prior agree-

ment—that the party would leave the work-place. Even the members of the Central Committee and those members of the party who were not aware of any inside information were frightened by this possibility, and, more generally, by — seeing how much was at stake in the negotiations. They believed that they no longer exercised any influence over the course of events, and many thought that

the negotiating delegation, and especially Imre Pozsgay, enjoyed too much power. Moreover, at the August 31st special meeting of the Political Executive Committee, some accused Imre Pozsgay of making unfavorable deals in return for the position of President,” given that earlier they had agreed not to make concessions concerning the fundamental issues, that is, they had refused to account for Party property or to leave the work-place, and the position President

was indispensable.*° |

Melinda Kalmar: From ‘Model Change’ to Regime Change 63

Scenarios The negotiations, which the MSZMP regarded as long and drawn-out, ended on September 18th, 1989, and proved to be a partial failure as far as the most important political issue was concerned—the Presidency—due to the unbending attitude of the SZDSZ and the Fidesz. Nor could the opposition feel fully content

with the results, since the MSZMP did not commit itself to dissolving the worker’s militia, and it withdrew its promise to leave the work-place. The most important defect of these negotiations on political transition was that no satisfactory solution was found, either in the course of negotiations or later, concerning the accountability of the Party and of the other former social organizations for their property. At the same time both—or, more accurately—all three sides put great effort, serious resolve, and considerable expertise into this enterprise, and often dem-

onstrated admirable self-restraint and tolerance. As a result of this, the most | important goal, that of the peaceful transition of the system, could still be implemented. This was done with less success than expected for the MSZMP, however, and with more success—at least in the short run—for the opposition. At the beginning of the summer of 1989, the leadership of the MSZMP still entertained some hopes that they could escape the general political, economic, and moral crisis by a change of model, which essentially meant reforming the earlier system and a quasi-division of power. At the June 23rd Central Committee meeting, Prime Minister Miklos Németh was still trying to convince himself and the members of the CC that a change of model was needed in order to avoid

. a regime change or political transition—a demand which at that time was attributed only to the most radical opposition.*° It was also he who believed, even at the beginning of September, that what the Polish lesson demonstrated was that there was no way of establishing a viable government or a viable coalition without the participation of the communist party.”’ In reality, however, it was not possible to implement the optimistic scenario predicted by the Soviets. In this sense, the “scenario” would have meant what it

normally means: a series of actions to be carried out, a series of stories to be presented. Instead, the “pessimistic version” came into being, something which could only forewarn of a series of inevitable events. Although at all times the MSZMP attempted to maintain its role as leader and initiator—or at least to keep up this appearance—it was forced to make constant concessions. This was partly due to internal divisions, partly as a result of assessing the real processes in the country, and partly because of the unexpectedly rapid organization of the opposition and their persistent negotiating attitude. These concessions went far beyond the change of model so strongly desired by the party even at the time of the negotiations, and by the time that the negotiations had come to an end, the socialist system had peacefully passed away, and another one had taken its place. (Translated by Agota Révész)

64 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy Notes 1 Memorandum written for Jakovlev by the Department of International Relations of the CPSU, February 1989; Memorandum written for Jakovlev by the Bogomolov Institute on the Eastern European changes and their impact on the Soviet Union. In: The End of Cold War in Europe, 1989. “New Thinking and New Evidence.” [A Compendium of Declassified Documents Prepared for a] Critical Oral History Conference organised by the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., Musgrove, Georgia, May 1—3, 1998. Document Nos. 23 and 24. 2 On the Polish transition, see Andrzej Paczkowski: Fél évszdzad Lengyelorszag térténetébol, 1939-

1989 [Half a Century of Polish History 1939-1989] Budapest: The 1956 Institute, 1997. pp. 372-378. See also the publications of the conference held between October 20-24 in WarsawMiedszyn under the title “Poland 1986-1989: The End of the System” [Polska 1986-1989: Koniec Systemy. Dokumenty, Institut Studiéw Politycznych Polskej Akademii Nauk.] The National Security Archive, the George Washington University, The Cold War International History Project, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1999; Poland 1986-1989: The End of the System [A Compendium of Declassified Documents and Chronology of Events|, Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, The National Security Archive, the George Washington University, 1999. 3 On the MSZMP’s policy before 1988, see Rudolf Tékés: Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution. Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession, 1956-1990, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 4 Minutes of the January 31, 1989 MSZMP Politburo meeting. Excerpts published in: Csaba Békés, . Malcolm Byrne (editor-in-chief), Melinda Kalmar, Zoltan Ripp, Miklés Vérdés (eds.): Rendszervaltozds Magyarorszagon, 1989-1990 [Political Transition in Hungary 1989-1990. Documents.| National Security Archive, Cold War History Research Center, 1956 Institute, Budapest, 1999. Document No. 11 (manuscript, to be published by Uj Mandatum publisher in Budapest.) 5 Not to be confused with Imre Nagy, Prime Minister of the 1956 revolution, who was executed by the Kadar regime on June 16, 1958. 6 Minutes of the February 7, 1989 MSZMP Politburo meeting. Ibid. Document No. 17. 7 Conception of the Revision of the Constitution. September 20, 1988. In: Kilényi Géza (ed.) Egy alkotmanyelékészités dokumentumai (Kisérlet Magyarorszag uj alkotmanydanak megalkotasara 1988-1990.) [Documents on the Preparation of a Constitution. An attempt to write the new Constitution of Hungary] Budapest: Allamtudomanyi Kutatokézpont, 1991; The Constitution of Hungary. Conception of Regulation. January 30,1989. In: Anna S. Kosztricz, Janos Lakos, Karola Vagyi Némethné, Laszlé Sods, Gyérgy Varga T. (eds.): A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart K6zponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzdkényvei. [The 1989 minutes of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party.] (henceforth: Az MSZMP KB 1989. évi jegyzdkényvei) Vol. 1. Budapest: Hungarian National Archives, 1993. pp. 408-439. The reform of the political system and the concept of division of power as well as the issue of a presidential system were discussed at the February 1989 meeting of the MSZMP CC’s International, Legal and Administrative Committee. Hungarian National Archives (henceforth: HNA) MOL M-KS-288-62/1. 6. e. 8 The Minister of Justice prepared a draft, dated April 10, 1989, concerning a one- or two-chamber parliament. This was then discussed by the MSZMP Politburo at its April 19 and May 26 meetings. Minister of Justice Kalman Kulcsar, Karoly Grosz, Rezs6 Nyers and Pal Ivanyi all argued for a two-chamber parliament. Yet the draft of the bill made public on June 5, 1989 and prepared by the Ministry of the Interior with the contribution of the Ministry of Justice, no longer contained the proposal concerning an upper house. The minutes of the Politburo and the above-mentioned

draft are to be found in: HNA M-KS-288-5/1062 6. e. and 1066 6. e. |

9 Based on a draft prepared by the Politburo, the MSZMP Central Committee published a statement of position entitled “On some current issues concerning the reform of the political system” in the

daily paper Népszabadsdg, February 16, 1989. Published in: Az MSZMP KB 1989. évi jegyzokényvei) Vol. 1. pp. 196-198.

Melinda Kalmar: From ‘Model Change’ to Regime Change 65 10 The New March Front was established in March, 1988 as an intellectual-political movement based on a “peoples front” tradition. In its January 11, 1989 declaration it proposed the elaboration of a “democracy package” and the forming of a National Committee, vested with authority and working publicly, in which all the political and societal organisations in the country would be repre-

sented. The consideration of the UMF’s proposal was obviously problematic for the MSZMP since among the founders of the movement were several party members, including Central Committee and Politburo member Rezs6é Nyers. On February 2, 1989, the representatives of the UME declared to journalists in the Parliament building that, should the February 10 Central Committee meeting not consider their proposal, the UMF would initiate the establishment of the National Committee without the MSZMP. 11 At the April 19, 1989 meeting of the MSZMP Politburo, Gyérgy Fejti commented on the planned coalition ideas as follows: “I would consider it a maximal program if these negotiations took place in the form of a roundtable, with full representation of those involved, and not in a bilateral form, [and] if we could reach an agreement on electoral cooperation with some organizations, or on a platform concerning some questions which might later provide the basis for long-lasting cooperation, including the possibility of a coalition after the elections. I see some willingness in this respect, or a chance of it, mostly in the case of the historic parties, that is, the Social Democratic Party, the People’s Party, and the Smallholders’ Party. Minutes of the April 19, 1989 MSZMP Politburo meeting. Excerpts published in: Political Transition in Hungary 1989-90. Document No. 32. 12 The draft of the party bill was first published in the daily paper Magyar Hirlap on April 19, 1989, and then on May 17, 1989, Népszabadsag published an article saying that the draft had been revised after social debate. The modified version appeared in the May 18, 1989 issue of Magyar _ Nemzet. 13 When working committee No. I/2, which was responsible for the draft of the party bill, discussed the relationship between the state budget and the principles of financing the newly formed parties at its July 21, 1989 meeting, at the proposal of the EKA, the passage mentioned in the text was omitted from the draft and replaced by another—with more legal than political implications. Section 2 of Paragraph 6 then appeared as: “Parties which do not receive 1 per cent of the votes of all those casting their ballots in the elections are not entitled to any state subsidies.” See: Melinda Kalmar—Béla Révész (eds.): A rendszervaltas forgatokényve. Kerekasztal-targyalasok 1989-ben. 6. kétet [The Script of the Regime Change. The Roundtable Talks in 1989. Vol. 6.], Budapest: Uj Mandatum, 2000, Document No. 28. pp. 204-209. 14 On the formation and history of the Opposition Roundtable see Anna Richter: Ellenzéki ' Kerekasztal: Portrévdzlatok. [Opposition Roundtable: Portraits] Budapest: Otlet, 1990.; Laszlé Bruszt: “Negotiated Revolution in Hungary” Social Research, Vol. 57. No. 2. 1990. pp.365-87.; Andras Bozoki: “Hungary’s Road to Systemic Change: The Opposition Roundtable” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 7. No. 2. 1993. pp. 276-308; Rudolf Tékés: Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Andras Sajé: “Roundtable Talks in Hungary” in Jon Elster (ed.): Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. pp. 69-98.; Andras Bozéki, Marta Elbert, Melinda Kalmar, Béla Révész, Erzsébet Ripp, Zoltan Ripp (eds.): A rendszervaltas forgatokényve: Kerekasztaltargyalasok 1989-ben. 1-8. kétet. [The Script of the Regime Change: Roundtable Talks in 1989. Vols 1-8.] Vols. 1-4. Budapest: Magveté, 1999, Vols. 5-8. Budapest: Uj Mandatum, 1999-2000. 15 For the statements of the EKA see Andras Bozoki (editor-in-chief), Marta Elbert, Melinda Kalmar, Béla Révész, Erzsébet Ripp, Zoltan Ripp (eds.): A rendszervaltas forgatékényve: Kerekasztaltargyalasok 1989-ben. 1. kétet. [The Script of the Regime Change: The Roundtable Talks in 1989. Vol. 1.] Budapest: Magveté, 1999. Vol. 1, Documents 8/b. and 11/b. Incidentally, not everyone in the MSZMP leadership took the conditions imposed by the EKA seriously. This is visible in Rezs6 Nyers’s comment, given at the April 19, 1989 meeting of the Politburo, which can hardly be regarded as well-considered: “We should not accept conditions that they want to impose on us. This is totally absurd. But I would not refuse it resentfully, I would simply ignore it. What an idea

66 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy to impose conditions! This is childish, a childish thing to do anyway, and we have to treat them, those people who impose these conditions on us, like children. So we just take no notice of it. Instead, we put forward our own proposals, in a concrete way, with the intention of reconciliation.” Minutes of the April 19, 1989 MSZMP Politburo meeting. HNA M-KS-288. 5/1062. 6.e. 16 The documents of the reform circles are published in: Attila Agh, Jozsef Géczi, Jozsef Sipos (eds.): Rendszervaltok a baloldalon. Reformerek és reformkérék, 1988-1989 [Creators of the Political Transition on the Left. Reformers and Reform Circles, 1988-1989. Selected Documents]. Budapest: Kossuth, 1999. 17 “[...] every bargaining position upon which the negotiations depend is on our side. Let’s put it this way, on the side of the government—because that’s how they define it, that it’s on the government’s side— therefore we, before we agree to start a new cycle of talks, have to prepare a very concrete plan now, a very concrete and resolute plan for ourselves as to what we will propose, and what we will do when, and where the line is drawn that shows how far the negotiations can go. Anyone who can be kept within this boundary may turn out to be a potential coalition partner. Those who cannot are still not outside the law provided they register as a party, but then they define themselves as oppositional from the very beginning [...] But then weighing all this, after making thorough preparations—and not even hiding what we'have up our sleeves, but sticking with what we have firmly—lI believe we ought to, we could carry out a very successful series of negotiations by the end of May.” Minutes of the MSZMP April 19, 1989 Politburo meeting. HNA M-KS-288. 5/ 1062. 6.e. 18 At the April 19, 1989 Politburo meeting, Gyérgy Fejti summarized the position of the MSZMP on this issue as follows: “[...] Two things cannot be done at the same time: to participate at a series of negotiations as both a sovereign organization and as a block [...] So it is acceptable that these

organizations harmonize their positions and nominate representatives to negotiate with the MSZMP. This is possible, but it has the precondition that should the organizations choose to do this, then those organizations to which we have offered a sovereign negotiating position must give up this possibility. The two together won’t work. That is why the form of the table is problematic. It was no accident that our Polish friends—under more pressure that we are now—did not make any concessions on this, and that they did not wish to play the role which the SZDSZ made very clear to us at the first meeting: sitting in the dock and listening to them give us a lecture.” [bid.

19 “Comrade Nyers has noted that the historic parties made some indirect references to the need for such 3- or 4-sided negotiations. We cannot rule this out: on the contrary, we are ready to do so, although this form does not actually compensate for [anything]. Thus, at most, it gives

us a possibility to talk about how we can resolve this stalemate situation.” Gyérgy Fejti speaking at the May 2, 1989 meeting of the MSZMP Politburo. Minutes of the May 2, 1989 MSZMP Politburo meeting. Excerpts published in: Political Transition in Hungary 1989-

| 1990. Document No. 36.

20 “From the reactions, it is quite clear to me that the strong dominance of the Alliance of Free Democrats invariably determines the position of the EKA [...] So, after having looked into it, having dealt with the matter thoroughly, I very seriously raise the proposal that we should conduct detailed negotiations with those organizations with whom our bilateral relations are, or at least so far have been, well balanced—with the Social Democrats, the People’s Party, the Smallholders’ Party, and the Hungarian Democratic Forum— and make them understand that we can only get out of this deadlock situation together if they somehow circumvent the extremely negative posi-

tion of the Free Democrats. I would like the Politburo to see this matter clearly, so that no one may accuse us of engaging in tactics intended to break up the Opposition Roundtable by any means, but today it is clear that if it continues to work composed of the same members and with the same attitude as before, then it is just hopeless to believe that we can reach any compromise after starting the negotiations. [...] I would like to conclude by saying that these bilateral talks, which we decided should be conducted this week if possible, and it would be useful if these organizations recognized their interest in participating as, well, a sovereign negotiating partner.” Gyérgy Fejti speaking at the May 16, 1989 MSZMP Politburo meeting. Minutes of the May 16,

Melinda Kalmar: From ‘Model Change’ to Regime Change 67 1989 MSZMP Politburo meeting. Excerpts published in: Political Transition in Hungary 19891990. Document No. 46. 21 Among the organizations of the EKA, the SZDSZ and the Fidesz were not interested in having early elections, and this was later accepted by the historic parties also, although earlier these parties, who were counting on their historic advantage, had clearly argued for holding the elections in the fall of 1989. 22 In March 1989, the MSZMP issued a communiqué entitled “What does the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party intend to achieve?” In this document, a constitutional multiparty system, “free elections [and] the possibility of a coalition in government” are all mentioned as part of modernizing the system of political institutions. Népszabadsag, March 1, 1989. 23 Minutes of the May 8, 1989 MSZMP CC meeting. In: Minutes of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party 1989. Vol. 1. 1993. p. 837. 24 “In the sense that we should sit down with the historic parties, I agree, but don’t let it turn into a trap—that’s what I want to call your attention to. A trap in the sense that the Opposition Roundtable might kick them out in the sense of that, well, they (the communists) are working again with

the good old salami tactics, and they join them accidentally (sic). So I would also take some counter-steps. Since they initiated it and it’s not certain that it’s a secret, while we sit down with them we should also be sitting down with the others, even in a bilateral manner, and we should be talking about things. I don’t know whether I am right or not, but I can see some strategy in keeping the Opposition Roundtable together.” Comments by Miklés Németh at the May 2, 1989 Politburo meeting. Excerpts published in: Political Transition in Hungary 1989-1990. Document No. 36.

25 “We also have to decide what is in our interest. Whether we should seek contact with fragmentary

| parties drowning in comedy, or with strong organizations which could help stabilize the country. If we manage to reach a good agreement with the Social Democrats, to win the tolerance of the MDF, and to accept the SZDSZ as a constructive opposition—even as a constructive opposition with bourgeois democratic views—then I believe the parliamentary political palette is largely drawn. And this would make the so-called free elections look serious, even at the next elections. But if we have to deal with parties like the People’s Party, or the Smallholders’ Party, with their spiteful dealings inside their own party and with organisations concerned with monuments and the like, then this would become unworthy of us, as a coalition partner, as well. I believe these things should be reconsidered at the negotiations.” Imre Pozsgay’s comment at the May 2, 1989 Politburo meeting.

26 Comments made by Rezs6 Nyers and Gyorgy Fejti at the May 26, 1989 Politburo meeting. Excerpts are published in: Political Transition in Hungary 1989-1990. Document No. 49. 27 The Bill on the Constitutional Court was published in Magyar Hirlap on May 6, 1989, while the draft of the bill modifying the Constitution appeared in Magyar Hirlap and Magyar Nemzet on May 10, 1989. For the party bill, see footnote 9. 28 The information material elaborating the main directions and tools of economic policy in 1990— 1992 was discussed at the same meeting of the Political Executive Committee on July 24, 1989. HNA M-KS-288-5/1072 6. e. 29 Local party organizations also agreed with the idea of early elections. Having learned the lessons of the mid-term elections, these local party organizations woke up and started preparations for the general elections. Report by Karoly Grosz at the July 24, 1989 Political Executive Committee meeting. Ibid.

30 According to the minutes taken at the first meeting of the goodwill committee on July 21, 1989, the MSZMP representative stated: “[The] MSZMP has requested the convening of the goodwill committee, because it believes that the work in the working committees I/1, I/2 and 1/3—work which is of primary importance according to the resolution of the committee responsible for the political transition—is not proceeding at the desired pace, especially given that the government intends to submit these bills to the 1989 September session of Parliament.” (For the minutes of the committee, see A rendszervaltas forgatokényve Vol. 6. Document No. 110.) In contrast, the Op-

68 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy position Roundtable objected to a statement made by Miklés Németh at the meeting of the executive presidency of the National Council of the Patriotic People’s Front, in which he accused the opposition of obstruction. See:“Elaboration of the Hungarian model is the guarantee of progress”. Magyar Nemzet, July 18, 1989. 31 As for early elections, the organizations in the EKA were by no means united on this issue, since the historic parties and the MDF would have liked to see elections take place as early as 1989. This was a constant theme on the agenda of the bilateral talks with the MSZMP. 32 Gyorgy Fejti outlined the course of action as follows: “If possible, we should reduce the number of potential conflict points, which are currently numerous. Just to mention one example: when

discussing the party bill, the opposition insisted at every meeting, and demanded that it be put down in the minutes, that they would not endorse the submission of the bill without having the MSZMP give a full account of its property and without adding to the agenda the issue of redistributing party property. Now, I consider our acceptance of such a position to be entirely impossible before the elections. At this time I’m not able to say when they are going to back down on this point. They will only retreat if there is a final deadline, when negotiations are finished, because at that point we could still leave the negotiating table by saying it was not our fault that no agreement has been reached. [...] Undoubtedly, by this we risk the success of the negotiations, and there is a chance that they might be interrupted. The later we come forward with our demand for early elections, the greater such a danger will be.” Excerpts from the comment by Gyorgy Fejti at the July 24, 1989 Political Executive Committee meeting. HNA M-KS-288-5/1072 6. e.

| 33 “I believe I am not far from the truth if I say that today there is a better chance for separate compromises with the HDF, the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Society, and the Christian Democratic Party than the chance that they are planning confrontation. And what is behind this is not whether they like us or not, but that their political interests lie closer to ours than to those of the Alliance of Free Democrats.” Excerpt from the minutes of the August 15, 1989 MSZMP Political Executive Committee meeting, comment by Gyérgy Fejti. In: Political Transition in Hungary 1989-1990. Document No. 93. 34 Rezsé6 Nyers warned Imre Pozsgay with the following words: “The individual has to, well, lay his life down for his community to some extent. I’m saying this to comrade Pozsgay. But my view Is that comrade Pozsgay can only become state president with the help of the unified support of the MSZMP-—it still won’t be sure, but this way he has a chance, a good chance. We have to do everything we can to help him become the president. But I beg of you, if the MSZMP breaks up, then we can have ardent spirits, intellectual reformers—I’m one of them too, I know their kind very well, I know who they are—well, they will be enthusiastic, they will tour all the cities and villages

of the country, but I say, this will not make comrade Pozsgay president.” Comment by Rezsé Nyers at the August 31, 1989 MSZMP Political Executive Committee meeting. In: Political Transition in Hungary 1989-1990. Document No. 105. 35 In addition to this, Rezs6 Nyers made his position very clear at the earlier meeting of the Political Executive Committee on August 15, 1989, when he said that the armed forces of the country must be left intact, and therefore during the transitional period, the party should maintain the Worker’s Militia at all costs. “As for the Worker’s Militia, I say it may not count otherwise, but for now, I

, say hands off the Worker’s Militia! No, nothing should be given up, not in this period. We will reform the Worker’s Militia afterwards. And this leadership, the problem is with the leadership of the Militia. [...] maybe they are decent people, but power, the chance for a good, easy life, is what can spoil anybody. And that they have a summer resort doesn’t please the people. These resort places, they are no big deal, in a Western country people couldn’t care less, but here, yes. That’s

what we have in our country. Well, there is this resort center of the Worker’s Militia at Lake Balaton, everyone notices this. And they also like hunting, so then hunting, this is also like a red rag to a bull in the eyes of the public. [...] Yes, these hunting lodges do exist, in the first place, and then there are these tiny little resort places, well these are so small. But if it is only a question _ of this, let’s give them up too. If that will improve our moral position, then let’s do it. There are . some plans over there to turn into a limited liability company, you know, these small party resort

Melinda Kalmar: From ‘Model Change’ to Regime Change 69 places in the country. Well, maybe this will solve the problem.” Comment by Rezs6é Nyers at the August 15, 1989 Political Executive Committee meeting. bid. Document No. 93. 36 “We want to change the model because having announced democratic socialism, the MSZMP does not endorse any political transition, it cannot be a partner in implementing it. That’s why we’re changing, and why we have to change the model, so that we can avoid political transition.” In: Az MSZMP KB 1989. évi jegyzékényvei. Vol. 2, p. 1119. 37 With respect to the lessons of the Polish experience, Miklés Németh said at the September 1, 1989

MSZMP Central Committee meeting: “It would not be good if we were taken by surprise, because—as shown by the Polish struggle—no government can be established without communist participation, or PZPR participation, and it’s not possible in Hungary either, however much the MDF and others insist that they are capable of governing and that they will be able to do it.” In: Az MSZMP KB 1989. évi jegyzokdnyvei. Vol. 2, p. 1447.

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The Making of a Political Elite: Participants in the Hungarian Roundtable Talks of 1989 Andras Bozoki and Gergely Karacsony

This chapter seeks to explain the political motivations and actions of the participants in the Roundtable talks on the basis of their antecedents. We are aware of the fact that an analysis of juvenile socialization and prior biography is, on its own, unable to provide a full explanation of political behavior in a given situation. There are political actions which are deducible from previous decisions characteristic and decisive of someone’s biography, but there are others which are not. Presumably, the more “routinized” the way in which institutionalized democratic politics function, the less significant is the role played by political innovation based on experience derived from home and from the broader juvenile community. What may justify our enterprise is our subject: the exceptional historical moment of political transition, which brought to the surface new rival groups and, to some extent, a new political class. This exceptional period saw an increase in the value of prior historical experience and of the symbolic political patterns, which, in the absence of other guiding principles, led the new political actors in a period termed “constitutional politics” by Dahrendorf". The participants in the negotiated revolution of 1989 arrived from several different directions, had followed different ways of life before they met and suddenly, and perhaps unexpectedly even for themselves, found themselves at a historic moment at the negotiating table.” Depending upon how deeply involved they were in the negotiations, they spent weeks or months together, discussing a fundamental transformation of Hungary’s institutional system, and when that moment was over and the change of regime had taken place, their ways parted. Some became members of the new political elite and formed the “créme de la creme” of the new political class; others turned to the economy and the business sector; some returned to their original professions. There were people who changed their lives fundamentally as they had to face new, previously unknown, challenges which broke the bonds of their previous lives. Others considered the whole period—the negotiations themselves, concept-building and political discussions—as a short excursion, which played no particularly significant role in their lives, even in retrospect.

At all events, 1989 proved to be an exceptional year for a change of elite: whilst some used it as a springboard to political power, others enjoyed it as a transient opportunity to bring the spotlight on themselves. For the young it was a

trial game, their first opportunity to flex their political muscle and show their

72 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

potential. For the older it was their swan-song, an opportunity to realize their dreams of the last few decades and to fulfil their careers before finally leaving the stage. For the losers under the Kadar regime, e.g. the earlier deportees, the publicly vilified, those who participated in the 1956 revolution or the dissidents, it provided political satisfaction. Finally, the winners, i.e. the members of the upper economic and political strata of the Kadar regime, were allowed to withdraw quietly from the scene. A detailed analysis of the social and political background of the 573 partici-

pants has not yet been carried out although most of the relevant data are now available. A comprehensive analysis of the composition of the political actors and their groupings would require the scale and dimensions of a separate volume. What, therefore, we can undertake in this essay is to sketch the rough outlines of their social background. We shall make the assumption that the political behavior and manifestations, in their broadest sense, of the political actors who appeared in the given political vacuum were effected more strongly than usual by historically influenced cultural values and traditions “brought from home”. After all, their task in 1989 was not to adapt themselves to an already functioning democratic political system through adopting its own, existing, traditions; but to create a new regime together with its own “new traditions”. The competition to possess the traditions and to make others accept them, and to find the identity of the new democracy was part of the constitutional revolution in 1989, similarly to the institutional transformation in its narrower sense.

In the following, we shall first examine the participants from the parties making up the Opposition Roundtable (EKA)’, after which we shall proceed to analyze those of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP). In the concluding part of our essay, we shall address the connections between the change of the elite and the dynamic of the political transformation.

The Opposition Roundtable Historical Parties The so-called historical political parties were characteristic phenomena of the Hungarian democratic transition. They had been established before communist rule and were reorganized after its loosening in the form of civic organizations and, finally, as reborn parties. These organizations, which, in contrast with the other opposition organizations, defined themselves as parties and referred often to the principle of legal continuity, i.e. that they had never been legally abolished and thus had a right to renew their activities as parties. Four of these parties participated in the National Roundtable Talks: the Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKGP), the Social Democratic Party of Hungary (MSZDP), the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) and the Hungarian People’s Party (MNP), as the legal successor of the pre-1948 National Peasants’ Party.

A. Bozéki-G. Karacsony: The Making of a Political Elite 73 The historical perspective played an important role in the whole of the politi-

cal transition, also. In Hungary, the democratic transformation in the field of thought and vision meant a move not only in the direction of the future but also of the past. After the communist dictatorship the establishment of the new democracy was both a subsequent verification of the democratic traditions of Hungarian political culture and modern Hungarian history, and a “restoration” of an interrupted democratic development which had started decades before. The new beginning meant, to many, the completion of the “old beginning”. The historical parties built bridges between the two distant phases of democratic development not only in cultural and ideological terms but also in terms of

organization and through personal biographies. We must, of course, ask how strong these “bridges” were since they had to span long decades and radical social changes. The unsuccessful attempts of the historical parties, loaded with internal tensions, to create a modern identity already suggest a negative answer. The history of the Independent Smallholders’ Party, which represented the

interests of the land-owning peasantry, goes back to the period preceding the first World War. However, it only acquired a truly important political role in the

aftermath of World War II., when, in the first free parliamentary elections in 1945, it received most of the votes of an electorate fearing a communist takeover. The party united several different political lines stretching from the clerical right to the national left. The latter have been assumed by many to have joined the party on the instructions of the Communist Party, a suspicion which was

probably not completely unfounded. At any rate, it is beyond doubt that the Communists used its inner divisions to wreck the party, which lost its importance completely within a few years. Its main leaders emigrated; others were pushed into the background; whilst those members who had been working on the

Communist take-over spent decades posturing in various representative, but politically insignificant, offices. The latter participated, among others, in the most important Communist satellite organization, the Patriotic People’s Front (HNF), which enabled former functionaries of the Smallholders’ Party to maintain relations with one another’. In the re-organization of the party a prominent part was taken by the one-time

third line of the party, who had survived the involuntarily apolitical decades without major confrontations and in intermediate level positions, waiting for an occasion to revive the party. They had still been young when they had joined the party apparatus and, a few years later, they were to experience the break-up of the party and an interruption of their political career. For them, belonging to the FKGP became the most important element of their social identity, and their political strategy was, first of all, directed towards the earliest possible restoration of the party as an organization. The political transformation did not necessarily mean to them the establishment of democratic rules; more importantly, it was perceived as an opportunity to continue their disrupted political careers within _ the framework of a reorganized party. In this respect, they were not radical, and

were happy to bargain with the MSZMP, even in the absence of the other op-

74 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

position parties. Nevertheless, they presented themselves as representatives of a rural party membership who had been deprived of all their belongings. The cautious veterans (Vince V6rés, Tivadar Partay and others) were persuaded to re-establish the party at the end of 1988 by a group of middle-aged, professional intellectuals. The members of this group came from bourgeois intellectual families, who had been de-classed during the 1950s and exposed to renewed persecution after 1956. After long detours, they had managed to build up ordinary careers by the 1980s, but they had felt always that their “class-alien” origin and non-membership of the Communist Party had blocked their advancement. For all that their real and imaginary interests were attached to a regime ' change and their values differed fundamentally from the already declining dominant ideology, they engaged themselves with great intensity in the work of various Opposition and semi-opposition organizations. Here, they attracted attention

much more by their organizational skills than by their theoretical wellpreparedness. As, in spite of all their active work, they were increasingly squeezed out of the leadership of those organizations which were beginning to take shape, both their courage and pragmatism induced them to create a radical opposition organization. This step, in contrast with, and ahead of, others, defined

itself openly as a political party. :

Those who had come from the more peripheral circles (Imre Boross, Jézsef Torgyan and others) were aware of the intellectual backwardness of the party and could not accept that the old men of the party would hand over the party leadership to themselves. They also knew that only united action by the opposition would provide a chance to negotiate successfully with MSZMP; and they urged, therefore, the party’s active participation in the Opposition Roundtable. They were, consequently, more radical in terms of tactics than the other group within the party; whilst, in terms of political content, they were sometimes more moderate. Confrontation between the two groups accompanied the first years of the party’s history. It was later mellowed by the fact that the anticommunists among the veterans supported the political goals of the middle-aged group, and also that many of the latter realized that their party career should be based on an unconditional loyalty to the old generation, in whom the members had confidence. In some respects the history of the Social Democratic Party of Hungary had been similar to that of the Smallholders’ Party. After a perhaps more vicissitudinous past than that of the latter, it also had been able to become a political factor only as Hungary was regaining her consciousness in the aftermath of the Second

World War. By that time, however, the MSZDP was already divided between classical Social Democratic and Communist positions, and the representatives of the latter contributed considerably to the fact that the recovery of consciousness was soon followed by a new period of horror, the Communist take-over. After unification with the Communist Party in 1948, the ways of the former Social Democrats diverged radically. Some of those who made a career within the state party became unconditional apologists for the Communist terror. Others, above

A. Boz6ki-G. Karacsony: The Making of a Political Elite 75 all Rezs6 Nyers (the last Secretary of the MSZMP and first President of its postOctober ‘89 successor, the Hungarian Socialist Party or MSZP) played a very

important role in introducing the economic reforms of the Communists. The members of the “right wing” of the party, who had rejected its self-surrender, were more disturbing for the system than even the representatives of the bour-

| geois parties. Most of them were forced to emigrate, and several of those who

remained in the country were jailed or, after 1956, hanged. The majority of the re-organizers of the party in 1989 (Tibor Baranyai, Imre Takacs and others) were also former Social Democratic functionaries, in whose political career the most important turning point had been represented by 1948. All of them were born in Social Democrat working-class families and joined the MSZDP as adolescents. The unification of the parties meant a tragic break in

their lives. Whilst the “people’s” social policy enabled tens of thousands of working-class youths to receive university education, they became political “class-aliens”. Their peripheral existence was only aggravated by the persecutions which followed their participation in the 1956 revolution. The wind of political change, however, made them move also.° An opportunity was provided by the so-called New March Front (UMB), an organization called into existence by Rezs6 Nyers, which set itself to build bridges between the Communist Party and the reformist intelligentsia of the Left’. In the shadow of this organization a Social Democratic movement was established by old, and for a long time persecuted, leading Social Democrats, who were consulting continuously with Nyers and were awaiting an opportunity to re-establish the party. Similarly to the Smallholders’ Party, the re-establishment followed the pressure of the middle-aged groups who were appearing around the old men of the party. Many of the former had in 1988 left the Communist Party, towards which their attitude had been rather ambivalent. They knew that the state party would

be unable to renew itself in the direction of social democracy and that the MSZDP would thus have a chance on the democratic Left. Whilst the old social democrats of working-class origin became “class-aliens” during the “dictatorship of the proletariat”, the members of the new generation made their careers during the consolidation which followed the 1956 revolution. As they became better acquainted with social democratic politics in Western Europe, their left-wing identity gradually matured into an oppositional attitude, although, since they did not belong to the “losers” under the old regime, the formation of this opposition

oriented attitude was not without its problems. |

The party’s historical wing consisting of its older members were worried by the presence of former MSZMP members within the party, and they claimed their “historical right” to the leadership of the party. They had devoted their entire lives to social democracy and now felt that they had suffered too much during the previous decades to let former MSZDP members seize the party for themselves. In some cases their fear turned almost into paranoia and they tended to regard every enthusiastic young person as a Communist agent. However, their anti-communism did not stop them from maintaining good relations with several

76 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

leading Communist politicians. The inner conflicts finally led to the secession of the most influential groups and a total loss of significance for the party. Another participant in the negotiations, the Hungarian People’s Party, was established as the legal successor to the National Peasants’ Party which had been

founded in 1938. The NPP was created by middle-class intellectuals, who formed the circle of népi (national populist) writers in the inter-war period. Their goal was to ensure political representation for the peasantry. Although the cultural impact of the movement was exceptionally strong, its intellectual character prevented it from becoming a significant political player. Its populist ideology, now with extremely right-wing and now extremely left, searched for a third way between the allegedly too superficial and individualistic West European societies and the Soviet Union, which they considered excessively collectivist. The Communist collaborators within the party interpreted this in such a way that the necessary premises of a Communist dictatorship should be accepted and, at the same time, one should try to find points outside the sphere of politics at which the system could be made more humane and “livable”. From the 1960s

onwards the representatives of this approach were able to enjoy burgeoning, even if not uninterrupted, careers. They filled leading positions in agricultural co-operatives, state farms, ministerial administrations and in the leadership of the Patriotic People’s Front, whose very function was to meet the claims of certain groups to participate in public life without allowing them to engage in real political decision-making. Whilst the party members who refused to obey the Communists had a chance to experience personally the inhumanity of their methods, the collaborators learned from their own example that small-scale improvements are worth the odium of being accounted “fellow travelers”.* Unlike the Communist reformer intellectuals, the former members of the Peasants’ Party

were not working on the disintegration of the system from inside but were building it from the outside. When the system, however, began to dissolve, they thought the time ripe for presenting themselves as an autonomous political force. Their first step in this direction was the establishment of the Veres Péter Society’, which received support from the Patriotic People’s Front and its leader, the reform Communist politician, Imre Pozsgay. The broader circle around Pozsgay also included the middle-class intellectuals who shared the leadership of the MNP in 1989 with the former members of the National Peasants’ Party. Most of them were first-generation intellectuals born in Budapest, who became members of the Communist Party in the 1970s, 1.e. in their early twenties and at the beginning of their careers. However, their attitude towards

| Communist rule was ambivalent: at once both critical and ready for compromise. Their criticism was not formulated in political terms; it was much more a cultural criticism, which was pacified in a paternalistic fashion by some of the more empathetic representatives of the political leadership, above all Imre Pozsgay. As educators, sociologists or journalists, they were engaged in analyzing and organizing local societies, which pushed the necessity of developing a rational critical attitude towards the existing political system as a whole into the background.

A. Bozoki-G. Karacsony: The Making of a Political Elite T7 Among the historical parties, the Christian Democratic People’s Party was the last one to be reorganized, despite the fact that it is the only party in whose case one can talk of genuine historical continuity. This apparent contradiction is

a consequence of the specific, sub-cultural, character of the party.” Its refounders endeavored to revive and represent not simply a party but an institutionally autonomous Catholic world. Before 1948 this world did exist in Hungary. Although the Communist dictatorship annihilated the institutional system of the Catholic Church almost completely (e.g. the majority of church schools were nationalized), institutional autonomy survived Communist rule—even if at the price of equivocal gestures. Moreover, although the representatives of the Catholic Church kept their distance from opposition initiatives, which had been appearing since the 1970s, it was able to continue to transmit a Weltanschauung which was quite different from the official one.'! The milder political climate of the 1980s made possible the re-establishment of the sub-cultural organizations around the Church. Again, the revivers were supported by the HNF led by Pozsgay. However, despite the recovery of a public life with a Christian spirit, the organizers kept out of the increasingly loud opposition movements. The turning point came in 1988 with the establishment of the Marton Aron Society,’ whose membership no longer consisted exclusively

of extremely cautious, one-time party functionaries but included middle-aged intellectuals responsive to the ideology of Christian Democracy. Once more, it

, was the relatively young who persuaded the hesitant veterans to declare the reestablishment of the party. Consequently, there were basically two generations represented within the reorganized KDNP. The members of the older generation (such as Sandor Keresztes) had earlier participated in the (temporarily) flourishing political life after the Second World War. Their entire life had been attached to the Church and the Christian Socialist organizations around the Church; many found refuge there when they were forced to the periphery of society. The members of the younger generation were born after the World War (e.g. Laszlo Surjan, Gyérgy Giczy) and could, therefore, learn about the meaning of Christian democracy only from

history books and stories told by the older generation. All of them attended Catholic secondary schools and, being in a symbolically oppressed position, they created strong solidarity bonds among themselves. The latent solidarity across the different generations seemed to form a potentially solid basis for a renaissance of Christian democracy in Hungary. By the time, however, that these latent bonds became manifest, it was clear that Christian democracy did not mean the

same thing for everyone: the cover of ideological unity had hidden differing political intentions. When the KDNP was established, the Opposition Roundtable had already

started functioning and so joining it was an obvious step for many within the party. However, the older members were against it: they argued that the party was not yet well enough organized and should, therefore, concentrate on its own

78 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

problems. They believed that the notions of being “opposition”, “right” or “left” need not be applied to their own party, which should aim to create a broad social consensus on the basis of Christian thought and pragmatic political action.’ If

one wants to create such a party, it is, in principle, much more important to strengthen the party organization and the pillar institutions around it than to transform the political field. The representatives of the younger generation finally succeeded and the party joined the Opposition Roundtable. However, the party continued to maintain a very moderate stance, for rapid political transformation would have been just as unfavorable for the re-formation of the CatholicChristian subculture as a political regression.

Three Non-party Organizations: The Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society, The Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions, and the Federation

of Young Democrats }

The member organizations of the Opposition Roundtable also included three civic organizations: the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions (FSZDL, or, the League), the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society (BZSBT), and the Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz). The BZSBT had started as a cultural group aiming at the preservation of traditions and the protection of Hun-

garian minorities abroad; the League had originally been an alternative trade union, whereas Fidesz had been created as a political youth organization. All three organizations played important roles in laying down the road which led to the negotiations. Their strategy, formulated in 1988, was one of a civic

society. As for the dynamic of the transition, the BZSBT and the League endeavored to mobilize the politically passive social groups through broadening civic society and spreading an evolutionist civic strategy.'* By contrast, the lead-

ers of Fidesz believed in rapid, surprise action which would suddenly revive civic society and present the Communists with a fait accompli.’° In 1989, however, the strategy of the civic society seemed increasingly mere tactics compared to the new strategy pursued by the opposition forces: the strategy of united confrontation with the holders of political power.’® Nevertheless, when opposition organizations appeared as representatives of Hungarian society against the MSZMP, this reasoning was both defensible and politically effective. The Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions was established as a

loose association of alternative trade union movements in late 1988. Its most important member organization was the Democratic Trade Union of Academic Employees (TDDSZ), which had been created in response to the politically motivated intimidation of academic research institutes. Since such pressure was exerted mainly upon human and social scientists, the founding members of the organization came almost exclusively from these disciplines.

, The socio-cultural background of this group and the biographies of its members were in many ways similar to those of the dissident intellectuals of the democratic

A. Bozéki-G. Karacsony: The Making of a Political Elite 79 opposition, nor was there a generation gap between them. Most of them had been born in the late 1940s or in the early 1950s. Although nearly all came from intellectual families in Budapest, many started their intellectual careers only after some detours. Their cultural capital, brought from home, and the experience of the years spent in unskilled jobs or as journalist trainees developed in them a desire to understand intellectually and solve existing social problems. As reform-economists or sociologists, they often concluded their analyses with recommendations about what should be done: they felt at home in a dialogue which combined scientific, charitable and political considerations. They tried to remain inside the trenches of the academic institutional system but attempted to help, as much as they could, those members of the democratic opposition who were leading a “free floating” existence.!’ In fact, their active engagement in public life was a reaction to the political attacks against the academic institutional system. The renewed conflict between social scientists and political decision-makers had its roots in the late 1960s. It was then that a new effort of the Communist political ascendancy to gain legitimacy was articulated, which, breaking with the propagandistic image of reality they had formerly insisted upon, tried to rely on a “scientifically founded” modernization program.'* It soon became clear, however, that Hungarian social science would fulfil the expectations of the political power only partially; in several cases, it actually questioned the most important goals of the system concerning legitimacy. The fact that the development of trade union pluralism in Hungary can be attributed to the establishment of an academic trade union is far from being accidental. Although 1988 saw strikes at several points of the country, Hungarian society was not responsive to forms of collective interest enforcement. The articulation and representation of community interests became overwhelmingly the task of the intellectuals and this in its turn became indistinguishable from repre-

senting the interests of intellectuals. Despite its best intentions, the League, joined by reformist pedagogues, and artists and journalists trying to widen the circles of public discussion, was unable to become a real trade union; it remained a lobby group of intellectuals. Although its representatives succeeded in preventing the passing of an anti-democratic strike bill proposed by the government, the League resembled a well-functioning think-tank rather than a trade union. It was not its social weight but the arguments of its experts, which forced the government to retreat. Its activities in the National Roundtable talks were reminiscent only in part of the activities of a trade union. Although the League emphasized strongly the importance of the negotiations about economic matters, it was quick to realize that the most important item on the agenda was the transformation of the political regime and it adjusted itself to this strategy. Since most of the negotiators of the League were also members of the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), it became a supporter of the SZDSZ during the inner polarization process of the Opposition Roundtable.’ The Bajcsy-Zsilinszky° Friendship Society was established with the assistance of Imre Pozsgay’s Patriotic People’s Front at the beginning of 1986. The

80 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Society’s main goal was to revive the national political traditions and draw attention to the problems of the Hungarian minorities beyond the borders of the country. Whilst the League considered social solidarity as the constitutive element of a civic society to be organized in opposition to political power, the representatives of the BZSBT thought that this element should be the consciousness of national identity. The climax of the society’s activities was its dominant role in organizing a demonstration of several thousand people against the destruction of villages in Transylvania in the summer of 1988, with which it was probably helped by its traditionally good relationship with Pozsgay. The BZSBT was established by members of the inter-war generation, who had entered the political arena for the first time in 1944-45 in the colors of the Smallholders’, Social Democratic or the Communist Parties. Most were born into bourgeois, middle-class families, and many in the Hungarian communities of neighboring countries. Not least because of a different family background from that of the mainstream of their generation, they lost any illusions about the new system rather quickly and 1956 found them among the participants in the revolution. This group included the Society’s president, Karoly Vigh, who had established a close relationship with Imre Pozsgay in the 1980s and who was also an old friend of Jozsef Antall (later to become president of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the MDF). Since during most of the negotiations members of

the MDF were also representing the Society, it was not surprising that the BZSBT delegation was the closest political partner of the MDF within the Opposition Roundtable. The Federation of Young Democrats was established by members of various autonomous university clubs in the spring of 1988. It was the first openly political organization to set itself in its foundation charter to break the existing power monopoly of the League of Communist Youth (KISZ) among young. The college students and young intellectuals who founded the federation made no secret of their intention to contribute to the creation of a “new Hungary” which would be fundamentally different from the existing one. Apart from the risk of expulsion, these young people had nothing to lose. Ever since the national meeting of university clubs in 1985 they had been making conscious preparations, not only to replace the generation ahead of them in the professional field, but also to ensure that these changes would have political consequences also. Their professional development was at first accompanied, and then overshadowed, by their maturing as politicians. The world of university clubs, collectivist, controllable and comprehensible only to insiders, was favorable to the verbally talented, ready-for-action, gifted would-be politicians, who were able to exercise a great influence on their peers thanks to their radical behavior”. This group had had no opportunity to take root in the previous system. With few exceptions, the leading figures of Fidesz (Viktor Orban, Laszl6 Kévér and others) were first-generation intellectuals of provincial origin, who had studied at Budapest universities and, as students, had established close links with the

A. Bozoki-G. Karacsony: The Making of a Political Elite 81

democratic opposition: they invited its members to university clubs or even joined in their oppositional activities. Coming from the countryside, mostly from working-class families, they travelled the road of social and geographic mobility upwards into the elite circles within 10 to 15 years. For others, this same journey took several generations. Another important group within Fidesz was formed by young intellectuals coming from smaller towns and whose parents belonged to the local elite; for them it was life in a metropolis, and the university life-style, - which were totally new. Both groups were accepted quickly by the opposition sub-culture in Budapest. The main difference between the two groups was that those with an intellectual background assimilated quickly to this sub-culture, whilst the students of working-class origin were anti-elitist and possessed a more radical rhetoric.

They were also more suspicious of, and ill-disposed towards, the official establishment of the party state, the university leadership and even the opposition elite in Budapest. They did not want to be assimilated into the Budapest elite but rather to surpass it, which is a possible explanation for their subsequent conflicts. Finally, an important, if not determinant, role was played by young Budapest intellectuals of, at least, the second generation. Most of these, however, left the party later. This company, dominated by Budapest university students of provincial origin, was joined by young, non-intellectual groups who were most often termed “lumpen” elements by Communist propaganda. The “Workers’ Group” of Fi: desz consisted of low-skilled or unskilled young people from Budapest with a working- or lower-middle-class background. They formulated radically basic democratic, occasionally populist, demands, not only against the regime and the Communist Party but also towards the Fidesz leadership. At the same time this group was complemented, as a matter of course, by the polyglot children of the educated middle-classes with an intellectual background spanning several generations, who were attracted, first of all, by the fresh voice and the alternative character of Fidesz. They lent a liberal-cosmopolitan character to the movement.

Its characteristic radicalism determined Fidesz’s behavior during the Roundtable talks and the political events influencing them. Fidesz was a sup-

porter of opposition unity but dismissed premature negotiations with the MSZMP and the politics of “national reconciliation” as dictated by the state party and supported by the moderate opposition. They thought that there could be no reconciliation without a break with the past; and, as there had been no such break, the first task was to accomplish this, at least symbolically. This is why the most charismatic member of the organization, Viktor Orban, said at the funeral of Imre Nagy, the reform Communist Prime Minister of the 1956 revolution, that the youth respected Nagy for having been able to break with his Communist conviction for the sake of his people. Undoubtedly, the radical youth of Fidesz respected even more than Imre Nagy those who did not need to become martyrs in order to be justified and who had never served dictatorial ideas in their lives.

82 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

In a disintegrating dictatorship which had lost much of its ideological substance and its penetrating skeptical-cynical intellectual culture, the radical and rational stance of the Fidesz leaders invigorated, became almost an embodiment of “positive thinking”. Their legal and economic professional socialisation played an important part in all of this. They had had an opportunity to acquire the skills of logical reasoning and to learn the references and the cardinal points within the constitution which were relevant to the principles of democracy and to the rule of law. The Fidesz leaders did not refer to any ideologies against the state ideology (which was crumbling away anyway). They referred to rights as opposed to the existing laws. The early Fidesz was both radically and pragmatically liberal. This sounds paradoxical since radical movements tend to be less pragmatic and more ideological in all countries; in fact, they are often even dogmatic. Here, however, radicalism was a radicalism of action rather than of

ideas.

Fidesz representatives at the Roundtable talks adopted a much more restrained voice than the organization’s aggressive base might have suggested. Although representatives of Fidesz who were considered “moderate” participated in the talks also, the restrained voice did not mean a surrender of the organization’s radical program or of its transitional strategy emphasizing the necessity of breaking with the past. Despite their youth, the competence of Fidesz members was questioned by none of the other participants when the negotiating delegations of the working committees were set up.” The goal to be reached during the talks was identical for all Fidesz delegates: they wanted to create conditions in which free elections could be held and to lay down the foundations of a stable, democratic, and constitutional state. The aim was later complemented by a demand that the country must continue to function; a peaceful transition was a fundamental principle for Fidesz, which condemned violence, also. During the Roundtable talks Fidesz became one of the most important strategic allies of the Alliance of Free Democrats. The representatives of the two parties were in agreement about the majority of the points for discussions and the most important basic questions.

The Leading Parties of the Opposition Roundtable: The Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats All contemporary documents and subsequent recollections of the events make it clear that the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats were the two leading parties of the Opposition Roundtable. They were the two most influential parties, which had been created by the social movements of the 1980s (complemented by Fidesz, which had, in some respects, a different character but

which took up a similarly distinctive stance). These movement initiatives transformed into a “forum” (MDF) or a “network” and later an “alliance” (SZDSZ), which in turn became the determinant parties of the emerging Hungarian democracy.

A. Bozoki-G. Karacsony: The Making of a Political Elite 83 The two parties differed culturally to a considerable extent. The main reason for this was to be found in their different answers to the modernization dilemma which had been characteristic of Hungarian political culture for many decades.

Leaders of the Hungarian Democratic Forum considered the népi (national populist) writers’ movement of the 1930s. as their most important intellectual predecessor. The Alliance of Free Democrats, growing out of the democratic opposition of the 1980s, was a successor to the West-oriented, radical-liberal and social democratic, urban intellectual tradition. The népiek (national populists) believed that the best solution to the problems of Hungarian society would be the creation of an original Hungarian way, based on the people’s existing characteristics. The liberal group advocated the introduction of the patterns of the modern civic democracies, which had been developed in the West. Although both groups

had to face the same opponent, the MSZMP and the political system of the Communist dictatorship, this induced them to behave for a long time as merely tactical rather than as truly strategic allies. Both groups represented cultural networks and intellectual circuits present within the Hungarian intelligentsia and, in fact, raised these cultural differences to the level of politics in 1988-89 for the first time. Thanks to its early establishment, the MDF managed to attract the best and most active members of the provincial intelligentsia eager for change and it was thus able to become the most powerful and well-known movement of the new opposition. Following the long, unifying, years of underground activity, the democratic opposition was more radical and its leadership better organized, which made it unable to “open up” quickly. Nevertheless, it managed to use the

Network of Free Initiatives (in short, the Network) and, subsequently, the SZDSZ for gathering around itself a large part of the Budapest intelligentsia, the

best members of the free intellectual professions and the radical provincial groups dissatisfied with the moderate policies of the MDF. Both groups were strong. The MDF had a committed membership and enjoyed wide support whilst the SZDSZ, which was at that time much smaller than the Forum, had a mature concept of the transition. It was decisive for the birth of Hungarian democracy that the two most powerful “tribes””? of the opposition were able to sit down at the negotiating table in the spring of 1989 and reach an

agreement about questions no longer merely tactical but also strategic. The common strategy, the strategy of a peaceful and democratic transition, could be elaborated only within the framework of the Opposition Roundtable. The Hungarian Democratic Forum was created in September 1987 as an intellectual movement adopting the legacy of népi writers.** After one year, the loose intellectual association transformed into an organization, which, according to its founding charter, acknowledged the inevitability of a multi-party system but said it did not want to become a party. Half a year later, in March 1989, however, the MDF changed its point of view and sought the possibility of reconciling its functioning as a movement and as a party. Eventually, it was not before October 1989 that the Forum declared itself a party and the movement wing became just one of the decisive currents within the party.”’ Parallel to this,

84 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

the political self-definition of the MDF changed also. Whereas its founding

charter of 1988 was unwilling to accept “either the label of being progovernment or that of being opposition, or the compulsion to choose between the two at all”,° by March 1989, the Forum had become one of the most important organizations of the EKA. All these events were antecedents of changes in the composition of the Forum’s leading groups. Similarly to the above, the, politically much less significant, Hungarian People’s Party, the “founding fathers” of the MDF were intellectuals educated in the

humanities who endeavored to revive the populist ideology of the inter-war period.*’ Although népi thought was shaken by the fundamental social changes after the Second World War, it survived in its cultural form in works of litera-

ture.°> The most respected populist writers, above all Gyula Illyés, Laszlé Németh and Péter Veres, maintained an ambivalent attitude towards the Kadar regime. Their romantic criticism of Western modernisation and consumer society

unavoidably strengthened the system and often precisely its orthodox, antireform forces. However, they also undermined the foundations of the system’s stability by reviving national traditions and, subsequently, putting on the agenda the long-tabooed problems of the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries. The older members of the MDF’s founding group, among them the poet Sandor

Csoori, the writers Istvan Csurka and Gyula Fekete, and the historian Lajos Fir, had known personally the great figures of the populist writers.”” They were born as

the ‘1920s turned into the ‘30s and grew up in the period when the old Hungary collapsed and the new Hungary, which was in the beginning sympathetic to the social reformist, népi ideology, very soon itself turned into a totalitarian dictatorship. Although some of them fell under the spell of the Communist Party in their youth, 1956 found them on the side of the revolution. They joined the critics of “fridge socialism” in the 1960s but showed an ambivalent attitude towards the democratic opposition, which was born at the turn of the ‘1970s and ‘80s.

The other group of founders belonged to the third, increasingly fragmented, generation of populists. Most of these were first-generation intellectuals who had discovered the works of the populist writers during their university years and became “students of the students”. It was Zoltan Bird who became the leader of this younger group. Bird’s biography, however, differed not only from those of his peers but also from the majority of the populist group. Whilst others were non-party member intellectuals who were often employed in positions inferior to their knowledge and education, he represented the populist cause as a cultural

affairs politician within the trenches of political power. Since 1971, he had worked in the apparatus of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs and became one of the closest colleagues of Imre Pozsgay when the latter was made minister. In the beginning, Bird was considered a representative of Pozsgay rather than what he actually became by 1988: the political reorganizer of the populist tradition.*° Their relationship, however, later turned into a political alliance when the népi camp decided to create its own autonomous intellectual movement, the MDF.

A. Bozoki-G. Karacsony: The Making of a Political Elite 85 After the népiek had lobbied unsuccessfully in 1984 for a periodical of their own and the espousal of the problems of the Hungarian minorities, they sought contact with the democratic opposition and, a year later, participated in the first conference of the opposition, organized under highly conspiratorial circumstances. However, the chances of opposition co-operation vanished temporarily when the publication of the program, Tarsadalmi Szerzédeés [Social Contract],”’ was considered by the populists as a sign of the democratic opposition’s intention to create a fait accompli so that they could rewrite the rules of the game for opposition co-operation. In 1987, the népiek had already decided to call a conference on their own, which was organized more or less openly and to which the then chief secretary of the HNF, Imre Pozsgay, was invited besides the wider populist circle. The meeting in Lakitelek showed the new political strategy of the populists: they were trading off being openly oppositional against publicity and the support of Imre Pozsgay.°* The forum character of the MDF became especially evident during the debates held at the Jurta Theatre in Budapest from the beginning of 1988, which addressed the questions of constitutionality, political reform and the | situation of the Hungarian minorities in front of a growing public. Another event which made the MDF well-known to the public was the demonstration against the plan of the Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaucescu to destroy Transylvanian villages, organized in collaboration with the BZSBT. With the aid of the reformers led by Pozsgay, the MDF became the most important “alternative” organization. There came a moment when it was impossible to know whether the MDF was a card in the hands of its reform-communist patrons or vice versa; it was the leaders of the MDF who were pushing the reform-communist politicians to se- cure subsequent fundamental changes. After the establishment of the Opposition Roundtable in March 1989, however, this question lost its significance. The then leaders of the Forum perceived this as a loss of prestige but they did not want the MDF to stay out of it, which is why they let others represent the MDF in the talks. They did not yet know that they were giving up their chance to direct the political transition and their own party also. Although several prominent members of the népi intellectuals participated in the initial phase of the EKA sessions and negotiations, by the spring of 1989 it was the lawyer Laszl6 Sdlyom and the historian Gyérgy Szabad who were playing the decisive roles. At that time, they had only loose links to the MDF and their biographies and political views also differed from those of the founders. Although Szabad belonged to Csoori’s generation, he had never fallen under the spell of “world-redeeming”, totalitarian ideologies. His openly dem-

onstrated Jewish descent also distinguished him from the populists. Laszlé Sdélyom, who participated in the first EKA session as a representative of the Independent Lawyers’ Forum (FJF), was born into a Catholic, middle-class family who were de-classed in the 1950s. As a well-known law professor, he participated in the founding of several civic organizations of very different profiles, including the liberal Publicity Club (Nyilvanossag Klub), the environmen-

86 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

talist Danube Circle (Duna K@r), the Christian Democratic Marton Aron Society and the Independent Lawyers’ Forum. Sélyom played his most important role in the initial phase of the EKA, during the preparatory talks between the EKA and the MSZMP. In the Roundtable talks, however, it was already Jozsef Antall who was the

most important representative of the MDF. Similarly to Sélyom, Szabad and many middle-age representatives of the FKGP and the KDNP, he came from the

civil-service middle-class of the inter-war period. The communist take-over meant to him more than simply the sinking of his social class: it broke his nascent career into two. Antall had wanted to become a politician all his life, and the political transformation offered him an opportunity to resume his political career, which had been interrupted in his youth. His father was a politician in the FKGP from the early 1940s and distinguished himself by organizing relief funds for prisoners of war who had fled to Hungary during the Second World War and as Minister of Reconstruction immediately after the War. After participating as a young man in the re-establishment of the FKGP in 1956, Antall left public life completely and “survived” the Kadar regime on the periphery of academic life.*° Although he spent his time consciously extending his network of contacts, he

restrained himself from all forms of “public opinion shaping”. As one of his biographers put it, Antall knew a great many people, but no one outside this circle knew him.™*

As a consequence of family tradition and the resulting political contacts, Antall stood close to the old members of the Smallholders’ Party who were working on the resurrection of their party. They had confidence in him because of his father and because his political knowledge was much superior to theirs. Although he had participated in the work of the Kovacs Béla Political Society, which preceded the re-establishment of the party itself, he did not join the reborn party. Very probably, he was aware of the pitfalls which would await him there and could more easily imagine a political career within the MDF. Nevertheless, he maintained his contact with the veterans of the Smallholders’ Party so

that he would be able to organize the right-wing political camp. However, he considered the Smallholders’ Party not only as a potential ally but also as a rival

and so he encouraged its old members to prevent the take-over of the party’s leadership by intellectual groups from outside. At least, this is suggested by the fact that Antall strongly supported the expulsion of intellectuals revolting against the gerontocratic rule of the FKGP. He did this at the beginning of 1989 when he was already openly engaged in MDF politics, but he still preserved his influence as an advisor to the FKGP party president. Antall was also a member of the BZSBT and the Marton Aron Society, the proto-organization of the Christian Democratic People’s Party. When the Christian Democrats finally established their party they actually asked him to become

their operative leader but he refused. When he joined the MDF he knew only Sandor Csoori and Gyérgy Szabad among the leaders of the MDF and the Forum seemed to be on the left rather than the right side of the political spectrum. Nev-

A. Bozoki-G. Karacsony: The Making of a Political Elite 87 ertheless, Antall believed that the Forum would provide the best frame both for organizing the right-wing camp and, simultaneously, securing his own career. It was his performance in the National Roundtable talks, which provided the most important springboard for him. From this, thanks to his network built up over decades, he soared to take the Prime Minister’s seat within a year. Similarly to Antall, the “new boys”, who formed the professional hinterland of the MDF, came to the fore during the roundtable talks. It was there that they established their careers and strengthened their party identity. As with Antall, the members of this group resembled in their social characteristics much more the middle generation of the Smallholders’ Party and the Christian Democratic People’s Party than its populist peers within the MDF. Virtually all of them came from the civil-servant middle-class, which went into decline at the time of their birth. Those born in the 1940s experienced the collapse of the country in the war and the dismissal of their parents from their jobs. As, by the mid-1960s, they no longer counted as “class aliens” at university entrance examinations, they were able to embark upon intellectual careers. Their family tradition ruled out political involvement in the Kadar regime but they avoided also all forms of political resistance. They remained apart from the regime not only politically but also culturally: in their life style and values, among which religion played a central part. It was perhaps not accidental that most of them worked as lawyers: many of them came from old lawyer families and this traditional profession provided them with a decent living, relative freedom and even the possibility of latent opposition. Although they had not made their voice heard before, as soon as it became more or less legally possible, they sought for an opening to engage in politics. In addition to their values, it was their accurate intuition concerning the political situation and, occasionally, chance which opened a way or hem into the MDF. The Alliance of Free Democrats was established in November 1988 as a political party which intended to take on the intellectual legacy of the democratic opposition of the 1970s and 1980s. The inner circles of the democratic opposition (with a decade’s experience of mutual solidarity) had to face the fact at the beginning of 1988 that, if they wanted to achieve success in democratic politics, they would have to transform themselves from a political vanguard into a wider . and looser socio-political association. This first opportunity for this was provided by the Network of Free Initiatives, which was established in May 1988 together with participants in the 1956 revolution, environmentalists, members of religious communities, radical economic reformers, university students and other groups. The Network’s goal was to act as a typical “umbrella organization” and help the process of democratic transformation by covering, uniting and helping the existing, but individually weak, groups and initiatives of civic society. This enabled sympathisers with the democratic opposition to “catch up” with the radicalism of their leaders and join them in a looser form. By accepting similar values, they were then able to develop into a wider organization. For the leaders of the democratic opposition, the

88 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Network turned out to be a new area of political socialization inasmuch as they had to be credible and persuasive in an environment in which they and their antecedents were not necessarily known. Suddenly they had to give speeches in

front of crowds and they had to prove in front of these people that they were , both credible and worthy of respect. By the time that the operational principles took shape, however, it had be-

come clear that this participative way of functioning, based on wide-ranging

negotiations among the member organizations, was too slow and timeconsuming and prevented the group from determining the course of the political processes. In November 1988 the majority of the leaders of the Network thought that the situation was ripe for the establishment of a party and of wider group cohesion, a necessary prerequisite for establishing a party. They believed that, if they failed to take this step, they would become marginalized in the subsequent months. The Alliance of Free Democrats consequently lost a few supporters but increased its capacity for action. The new party clearly committed itself to op-

posing the regime. This stance, declared widely and spreading as a result of growing openness, attracted significant radical groups to the SZDSZ, who included some of those who were beginning to consider the moderate politics of the Forum as too cautious or “double-dealing”. The dissident intellectuals of the democratic opposition had belonged to the rebellious youth of the 1960s and many of their parents had devoted their efforts to a political transformation of a different sort (under a very different emblem)

twenty to twenty-five years earlier, in the second half of the 1940s. Many of them had led middle-class or lower middle-class bourgeois existences, had survived the man-hunt by the German and Hungarian Nazis or had returned from the death camps and, after the Second World War, did not want ever again to fall victim to either Nazism or anti-Semitic prejudice. As for capitalism, they knew only the authoritarian system of the inter-war period; whilst the ideas of liberal-

ism appeared to them as too weak and incapable of self-defense. Having survived a racist regime and experienced its collapse in war, they joined the adherents of the class struggle and of a “people’s democracy” and thus became volunteers for a dictatorship based on class oppression, which replaced the previous one based on racial oppression. As the racist ethno-politics of the 1930s had prevented them from completing their successful assimilation into Hungarians, they wished to find their new identity in the universalistic, socialist ideas which promised a radically new type of humanism. However, by the time that they were able to look around, they had to realize that they could not even trust one another any more, and by the mid-1950s they had simply became either the soldiers or puppets of tyranny. The young people coming from this milieu revolted both against their parents’ participation in the establishment, and against the “petit bourgeois’ practice of the system in the 1960s, which was based on lies and petty collusion with political power. They felt that, whilst Matyas Rakosi, the mad dictator of the 1950s, did not succeed in breaking the backbone of the people, Janos Kadar and

A. Bozoki-G. Karacsony: The Making of a Political Elite 89 his “soft dictatorship” had managed to achieve this. At that time the young were already learning the patterns of revolt from the West: through the New Left, the

cult of spontaneity, Renaissance Marxism, participative democracy, counterculture, sexual revolution, movements expressing solidarity with the oppressed of the Third World and anti-colonialist demonstrations. However, it was the events in Prague in 1968 which proved the turning point within the process of their turning into an opposition. It became clear that the

Soviet power would crush not only the Hungarian revolution in 1956, about | which they themselves perhaps felt ambivalent, but also the peaceful, “velvet”, idealist, reform movement in Czechoslovakia, whose goal was humanistic socialism. From this point, there was no turning back, at least theoretically: the process of becoming an opposition started.*> Many left Hungary but the real adventure was undertaken by those who remained in the country. To some extent they found themselves in a familiar situation: in the vanguard role of a new, marginal sroup. This group was soon declared as opposition, or even as the “enemy”, by the ruling communist party. The most important representative of this group was the philosopher Janos Kis, who was born into an urban middle-class family, almost all of whom had fallen victim to the Shoah. The only survivor of the family, his mother, became a convinced communist and Kis started his studies at a special school for the children of the communist apparatus. Studying philosophy, he became a student of Gyoérgy Markus and, following in his master’s footsteps, searched for the pos-

sibility of resolving the tension between Marx’s politico-economical and (especially early) philosophical writings. This attempt finally led to a break with Marxism. Although Kis had been a member of the MSZMP since 1966, he was expelled, together with many other intellectuals, from the party in 1973 because of his refractory views, and later, he lost his job also. In his inner migration, the esoteric philosopher who contrasted “existing socialism” with humanist social-

ism became the leader of an influential opposition group, later a movement, locating itself within the discourse of human rights. The dissident group led by Kis became a politically significant opposition force only at the beginning of the 1980s when a state of emergency was introduced in Poland, and it published the samizdat publication Beszéld. Until then, it had only been a counter-cultural group conspiring above all in the commotion of house parties, beyond the eyes and ears of the police. Members of this company knew each other very well and were used to working together, but the group was quite closed to the outside world. They had to “open up”, not only in a political, but also in a cultural sense, enabling them to communicate the ideas of human rights, radical democracy and, later, liberalism in an easily intelligible, popular, way to an increasingly wider public. Although the SZDSZ became heir to the democratic opposition in an intellectual and political sense, the establishment of the party in November 1988 was not carried out by the “hard core” of the democratic opposition but by intellectuals who

stood close to the opposition.*° The initiative was taken by a 36-year old sociolo-

90 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

gist, Balint Magyar, one of those who were the most impatient at Network Council

sessions, which lasted for hours but accomplished little. Those who joined the organization in the hope of exercising political influence more effectively were ready to follow the way of party-creation. They feared that they would be left out of the mainstream of political transition, despite the fact that they had been the most resolute in rejecting the Kadar regime. Magyar articulated and amplified their voice, and the majority decided on transformation into a party. The provisional executive body of the SZDSZ, re-elected at the assembly of the delegates in spring, was based on the principle of collective leadership, which led to an increase in the influence of the most active leaders with good organizing skills. Magyar also played an important role in organizing the professionals around

the party. The groups preceding the formation of the SZDSZ were dominated originally by sociologists and philosophers. Those were joined, through the Network, by economists and social scientists, who were looked upon as radical reformers by both their professions and the public, and many of whom would play an important role in the economic working committees of the National

Roundtable. Several of them belonged to the Democratic Trade Union of Academic Employees and stood, in general, close to the social scientists who represented the League. Balint Magyar represented a bridge between the former democratic opposition and the representatives of the various intellectual groups who were now joining the party. As the “éminence grise” of the democratic opposition, Magyar had played a key role in the distribution of the illegal periodical Beszé/é and thus

enjoyed the unconditional trust of the old members of the opposition. His knowledge of social problems, his dynamism and professionalism, especially conspicuous when compared to that of most of the civic movement leaders, made a great impact on the newcomers, who could now feel that they were becoming part of a well-functioning, rising team. Magyar had not lost his job in the Kadar regime and, as a sociologist of agriculture, a documentarian and editor of a periodical, he communicated regularly with members of several different social groups. When it came to organizing the party, he was able to make good use of his network in public life. Between November 1988 and June 1989 Magyar was, perhaps, the most important person in the SZDSZ and this situation changed only because of the return of Janos Kis, who soon assumed the leadership. However, the outstanding figure of the National Roundtable talks was a young constitutional lawyer with his own concept of a new constitution, Péter Télgyessy, who joined the SZDSZ in first only as an expert. Since there was a shortage of lawyers in the professional team of the Free Democrats, the leadership of the party offered work to all lawyers who had come into contact with the party. They were to participate in the working out of the program of political transformation. Those who joined the enterprise were, in the beginning, motivated more by the professional than the political challenge. In no more than two | months Télgyessy was no longer simply one of the party delegates but the political and legal strategist of the liberal-radical opposition.

A, Bozoki-G. Karacsony: The Making of a Political Elite 91 Télgyessy burst into politics from academia and founded his political career by his performance at the Roundtable talks. Although he had participated in working out the discussion paper Fordulat és reform [Turnabout and Reform] and occasionally also at events organized by local organizations of the MDF, his

political antecedents were less significant than those of any other roundtable participant. Nevertheless, he started the negotiations with a mature concept of a new constitution and amazed his fellow party members and negotiating partners by his well-prepared views and vitality. Télgyessy’s dynamic appearance radicalized the politics of the Free Democrats. Even the party leaders who had returned from abroad needed some time to become accustomed to his pace. For example, Janos Kis maintained an expressly cautious political stance for weeks after his return home and, as he said, tried to “pull to the middle” the politics of the SZDSZ. At the same time Télgyessy thought that the situation was already such that Hungary had to go further than the Polish way of covenanted transition. In his views, the party had to distinguish itself clearly from the more moderate, middle-of-the road forces. Although Télgyessy was formally under the control of the executive body of the SZDSZ, there was no one more competent in legal-constitutional questions than he, and his expertise, working capacity and élan made him one of the informal leaders of the SZDSZ within

months. Using his suddenly enhanced prestige, he undertook independent actions , and managed to present even his allies with faits accomplis.*" It did not take long before he outgrew his role as an expert and appeared as a politician willing to face confrontational situations in public. By the summer of 1989 he represented, together with Viktor Orban, the views of the radical opposition at least as much as Jozsef Antall represented the views of the moderate-conservative opposition. In short, the MDF and the SZDSZ had similar problems in creating a democratic political party, but not exactly at the same time. In most of the period between 1988 and 1989, the MDF took the lead, although at some points the SZDSZ seemed to head the race. The MDF was larger and less confrontational, whilst the SZDSZ was smaller and more radical. They had to undergo three distinct phases of party-formation in order to find their place in democratic politics. They were able to find those politicians who could best correspond to the challenges of each phase. We would summarize our argument in Table 1. Table 1. Phases of Pluralization and Leaders of the Two Most Influential Political Groupings (1985-1989)

Time Phase Effective Leaders

MDF SZDSZ

1985-1987 ideological Sandor Csoori Janos Kis

(poet) (philosopher)

1988 organizational Zoltan Bird Balint Magyar (bureaucrat) (sociologist)

1989 constitutional Jozsef Antall Péter Télgyessy (historian) (lawyer)

92 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

In the first period of their development both parties needed a solid idea, an ideological blueprint, an attractive and credible value system. This period was the ideological phase. This was the question of historical injustice, and the problem of Hungarian minorities living outside the borders, for the népi intellectual groups, predecessors of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, represented by the poet, Sandor Cso6ri. For the democratic opposition, the predecessor of the SZDSZ, this idea was human rights, elaborated by the political theorist and philosopher Janos Kis. This phase of pluralization required moral authority in both political camps, and both personalities corresponded well to this task. The second period can be designated the organizational phase, which required active, everyday work to build the party-organization at grassroots level and, at the same time, to open up to the rest of society. This was effectively done by the essayist and cultural bureaucrat, Zoltan Bird (MDF) and the sociologist Balint Magyar (SZDSZ). Finally, when ideology and organization had both taken rooted and been established, it was the phase of negotiations, in other words, the constitution-making phase, which came. Here the political parties had to lay out their scenarios for the regime change, their views on different aspects of the future of their country, and, moreover, they had to reach a modus vivendi, an agreement on the most fundamental issues. Both of the rival parties responded to this challenge of 1989. In this phase, the last before the free elections, J6ézsef Antall, (MDF), and Péter Télgyessy, (SZDSZ), played this role. In 1990, the former became the first Prime Minister of democratic Hungary, whilst the latter led the parliamentary caucus of the strongest opposition party.

The Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party The “other side”, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP), was a distinguished participant in the Roundtable talks in the summer of 1989. As the state party formally still holding monopolistic power, it was forced to assume the role of representing the collapsing communist regime against opposition forces enjoying increasing support from society as a whole. However, the Communist party was no longer a party of the Kadar®® genera-

tion alone. The uneducated or “party school” graduates who had flooded the Stalinist, totalitarian Hungarian Workers’ Party (MDP) at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s had grown too old by the middle of the 1980s. Their place, both at central and local level, was increasingly taken over by the “second communist generation”, 1.e. the generation of the 1960’s and 70’s. This second generation differed fundamentally from the first. They were, above all, less convinced communists in an intellectual-ideological sense, and their communist party membership became a prerequisite of advancement in the party hierarchy, and of _ upward mobility. Whilst the first generation consisted of cadres elevated by the Party, and who were, in consequence, totally indebted to the Party, the members of the second generation joined the Party only during, or occasionally after, their

A. Bozoki-G. Karacsony: The Making of a Political Elite 93

tennis. university studies. To put it simply, the first generation was puritan, uneducated .

and ideological; the second was career-minded, educated and pragmatic. The first generation” considered themselves, at least in the beginning, as revolutionaries even in “everyday life”, whereas the later generation’’ attached increasing importance to professional expertise as well as to political loyalty. The first generation hated capitalism, liberal democracy and the West, whilst the second gen| eration envied them all. The first generation went hunting, the second one played The MSZMP was represented at the Roundtable talks by the second generation. In fact, the negotiations might well have taken place only because the Party was dominated by this pragmatic, reformist, more enlightened, skeptical-cynical generation. Party membership was necessary for members of the second generation in order to advance their careers since they also came from below, were born into relative poverty, and their cultural capital was insufficient to raise them to the intellectual elite of the era. As party members, they were able to take a short cut to the political or economic elite. Their social roots were similar to those of the first generation, the difference between them being that they were able from the beginning to study at university. Their professional education was also valued by the leaders of the Party. The revolutionaries, who were manipulated from above and who brought about the change of regime after the Second World War, were replaced by modernizing reformers who were supported halfheartedly and ambivalently by the old Kadarist establishment. The degeneration of the regime also made their advancement easier, since the leadership hoped that the professionalism of the second generation would be able to rescue the system as a whole. The negotiating delegation of the MSZMP was basically recruited from three places: 1. the party headquarters, 2. the apparatus of the ministries and 3. the secretariat of the Council of Ministers and that of Minister of State, Imre Pozsgay. Accordingly, the members of the working committees were selected primarily by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the MSZMP Gyérgy Fejti, Imre Pozsgay, as a member of the government, and the leaders of the most active ministry, the Ministry of Justice. Delegates from party headquarters participated in all working committees. Their task was to push through the political strategy approved by the party leadership and determined by Gyoérgy Fejti within the negotiating delegation of the _ MSZMP. To some extent, they had to fulfil tasks similar to those of a political officer in the army, although it is a separate issue that the Party had by then disintegrated to such an extent that the majority of these trusted individuals simply did not identify completely with their allotted roles, and preferred professional discussion to the political. The delegates selected from the party apparatus by Fejti tended to represent the harder line within the MSZMP delegation. Never-

the opposition. ,

theless, none of these represented the real hard-liners of the Party’s Central Committee, since the latter objected to the very existence of negotiations with

94 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Paradoxically, the party apparatus was under-represented in the negotiating delegation of the Party, which was dominated by experts who were also party members emanating from different sectors of public administration. Unlike the “volunteers” of the Opposition Roundtable, they had to participate in the roundtable talks as a part of their responsibilities, and were directed by their minister to take their seats behind the “MSZMP” sign. Indirectly, they had to represent the government at the talks. Many of them being apolitical, they found such politicization of their expert role rather unpleasant. Many subsequently objected to having been termed communists and consequently treated by the opposition in the same way as their fellow party delegates. The delegates from the MSZMP to the political and economic negotiations evaluated their own role in the talks somewhat differently and expressed varied views concerning the historical importance of the negotiations. The ministerial delegates to the political negotiations, many of them young legal professionals, perceived the negotiations to be the great lifetime opportunity and would retain pleasant memories of them. By way of contrast, however, the MSZMP representatives from the public administration sector attending the economic negotiations felt that their presence was superfluous and saw it as a burden: many of them had a low opinion of the degree of preparedness of their opposition negotiating partners and sometimes even looked down on them. Finally, a third and smaller group was also present within the MSZMP delegation, consisting of people who were associated with the circle around Imre Pozsgay and Prime Minister Miklds Németh, the secretariats of the Council of

Ministers and of the Minister of State. It was they who emphasized most strongly that they had not been “ordered” to take part in the talks but had “asked” to represent the MSZMP, i.e. their participation was not compulsory. It was characteristic of them in general that they were younger than average and took the pragmatist reform line. On economic matters they often contacted the economists who took part in the negotiations as representatives of the League or of the SZDSZ. Both groups consisted of members of the 1968 generation of reform economists: those who had left the Party in time were now facing those who had failed to do so. At the political negotiations the members of the Third Side stood closest to the position of the Communist Party representatives, whilst those of the radicalliberal opposition stood the farthest. However, at the economic negotiations it was precisely the opposite: the MSZMP stood closer to the delegation of the EKA than to the representatives of the Third Side. The difference can be summarized as follows: whilst the MSZMP, and the most important parties of the EKA, wanted capitalism in economic matters, the delegations from the Third Side were considering various reformed, “people’s democratic” or “third way” models of socialism. The strategy of the MSZMP negotiating delegation was directed above all by two people: Imre Pozsgay and Gyorgy Fejti. In the beginning Rezs6 Nyers also tried to establish contacts with opposition organizations and showed an interest

A. Boz6ki-G. Karacsony: The Making of a Political Elite 95 in the economic negotiations but his interest evaporated quickly after his election as party president at the end of June. Prime Minister Mikl6s Németh was happy that he was able to stay out of the negotiations and did not have to represent the “sinking ship” of the MSZMP. A similar strategy was adopted by the Minister of Justice, Kalman Kulcsar, who also accepted the candidacy of the Patriotic People’s Front for the Presidency of the Republic. He had concrete ideas about insti-

tutional transformation and tried to direct the legal expert delegates of the _ MSZMP from behind the scenes but stayed out of the negotiations personally. Karoly Grész, who became First Secretary after Kadar’s resignation, was present at the opening plenary session but did not appear at the talks afterwards. Visiting local party organisations and preparing for the party congress, Grosz must have

felt, similarly to the other hard-liners in his party, that his hinterland was gradually disintegrating.

Consequently, there remained only Pozsgay and Fejti: two characters who were quite the opposite of each other and yet who, at the same time, complemented each other. Pozsgay was born in 1933 in a small village and into a religious, farmer-craftsman, family.” In his teens, he intended to enter the Church, the classical channel of upward mobility for sons of simple families. However, the communist take-over changed these channels completely. After his “political

awakening”, Pozsgay was the only one amongst his fellow pupils to refuse to , attend religious education and, at only 18 years of age, he became a member of the communist party. A diligent student, he continued his studies at the elite school, the Lenin Institute, and, after receiving his degree, became the director of a Marxism—Leninism Evening University in Kecskemét, a provincial town. Organizing the cultural life of a town gave him his first opportunity to recognize that he could penetrate that cultural field which remained dissociated from poli-

tics, and that he could gain the support of intellectuals by his reform measures. | From the 1970s he tried to achieve the same at national level: as Minister of Cultural Affairs (1976-82) and as President of the HNF (1982-88), the largest, formal non-party organization with its own daily newspaper, Pozsgay built a nation-wide network of supporters around himself. In May 1988, however, he changed roles, and left the Patriotic People’s Front behind. By keeping the circle of support which he had built up there, he became a member of the Politbiiro of the Party and of the government led by the more conservative Karoly Grész and he contributed to the removal of Janos Kadar. At the start of the National Roundtable talks Pozsgay correctly believed that he was able to keep a firm hand on the opposition. He had acquired extensive experience in negotiating with intellectuals holding critical views. He was able to speak their language, many of them respected him, and some even saw him as “a new Imre Nagy” in the second half of the 1980s. With only slight exaggeration, one could state that the majority of participants in the National Roundtable talks had been Pozsgay’s proteges, including the MDF, the MNP, the BZSBT, the populist-reformist groups within the MSZMP, and most of the organizations of -

the Third Side, especially the HNF. ,

96 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Compared to Pozsgay, the Technical University graduate, Gyérgy Fejti, who made an orthodox career in the League of Communist Youth and, subsequently,

in the Communist Party proper, seemed more of a gray, hard-liner and party soldier capable of causing occasional fear. Within his own analytical framework, Fejti reasoned logically and rationally, but his inflexibility prevented him from detaching himself from his original premises. It is no wonder, perhaps, that Fejti, a faithful follower of Karoly Grdész in the 1980s, felt much less relaxed among writers, historians, philosophers and sociologists trying their hand in negotiated politics than in his familiar party apparatus. Pozsgay cleverly exploited his positional advantage in his private game against Fejti and the apparatus, which enabled him to increase his prestige temporarily both in the media and among his negotiating partners from the opposition.”

It is possible that the views of Fejti and Pozsgay did not actually differ so much in substantial questions as the differences in their style and tactics might have suggested. Both accepted the concept of a peaceful transition to a democratic, multi-party system and that of free elections. However, Fejti constantly thought in terms of the existing state party framework and tried to secure the best possible positions for the MSZMP in the process of democratic transition, which he himself accepted also.” If we assume that both of them wanted democracy, ‘ then Fejti envisaged it with the state party and Pozsgay without. However, since the survival of the state party and transition to democracy were clearly mutually exclusive, Fejti was either incapable of grasping the real meaning of democracy or simply did not really want it: he might simply have been willing to risk the

success of the democratic transition in order to secure the survival of the MSZMP. Pozsgay was of the opposite opinion: he was quite willing to sacrifice the Party. His opponents explained this by his ambition to become President of the Republic. In April 1989 Pozsgay was not yet willing to take on the role of

. “the person who would tear the party in two”: he did not support the most radical reformers in the Party in leaving the state party and creating a new, democraticleft party. However, after being selected as the MSZMP candidate for President of the Republic, he became much less loyal to his Party. His opponents claimed that, by this time, Pozsgay perceived the state party as a burden and tried to get rid of it as soon as he could. In this way he assisted in destroying the Party from within. According to this logic, Fejti was correct and Pozsgay was incorrect, since Fejti was a true representative of the Party at the Roundtable talks whilst Pozsgay represented something else, perhaps only himself. However, the state party was not only a burden for Pozsgay, it was a burden for democracy also. Whatever ambitions Imre Pozsgay nurtured to become President of the Republic with wide-ranging authority, it does not affect the fact that, as far as the transformation of the MSZMP is concerned,” he was justified by history.

A. Bozoki-G. Karacsony: The Making of a Political Elite 97

The Dynamic of Political Transformation: Institution Building and Changing the Elite Our investigations so far have shown in outline that the dynamic of political transformation at elite level was connected with certain, overlapping eras and loose groupings, which changed with the various phases of the transition. Differ-

ent protagonists, circles and groups were brought to the surface by changing concepts such as moderate reformism, co-optation strategies, “socialist pluralism’, “model change”, visions of radical reform, negotiated political transition or mass mobilization politics of the “let the people decide” type. Although these scenarios can be separated from one another chronologically also (less radical possibilities were followed by concepts expressing the necessity of more fundamental changes), they often ran parallel to one another. Whilst some groups were still engaged in “trial-and-error” politics, others were already searching for radical solutions to the political crisis. It is beyond doubt, however, that the dynamic of the transition did not leave unchanged how the groups participating in the regime change assessed the situation, defined their political identities and chose their resulting political strategies. In several cases, however, this was actually a result of the fact that the general dynamic was accompanied by changes in the balance of power within organizations. The dynamic of the transition affected not only the relations between organizations but also the composition of the sroups determining the policies of these organizations. The first phase of the political transformation could be best described by the term reform. According to this scenario of finding the best way out of the politi. eal crisis, very moderate political changes should be directed by the communist party co-opting technocrats into its ranks without sharing its power with other | sroups. In a certain respect Hungary’s history since the economic reform of 1968 had been one of reform attempts, started, withdrawn and restarted continuously. However, the political system had remained untouched by these moderate reforms until the middle of the 1980s. Although there had been no fundamental changes in the top leadership of the communist party until 1988, the most important figure of the party’s reformist wing, Imre Pozsgay, had spent this period building up his contact network outside the trenches of political power. It was he who followed a popular front strategy in his contacts with various socio-cultural groups in order to put his reform ideas into practice. It was he who visited various unofficial clubs and supported tradition-preserving circles, moderate social movements and initiatives; above all, it was he who was present at the birth of the MDF, soon to become the largest, “neither opposition, nor pro-government” organization. Inside the state party, Pozsgay temporarily joined forces with Karoly Grosz to overthrow Kadar because he did not enjoy sufficient insider support to carry out his plan alone. To get rid of Kadar, the apparatus had to be mobilized, something at which Grdész was highly competent. Pozsgay was only popular outside the party whilst Grdsz controlled the party machine. Grosz would only have been able to maintain his influence among the wider party

98 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

membership if he had been able to isolate them from the rest of society. In an increasingly open and loose dictatorship, however, the MSZMP was no longer its former self: instead of maintaining the Leninist principle of “democratic centralism”, its members demanded that contacts with society be strengthened. It was no longer possible to control the MSZMP in the old, bureaucratic, way. It was exactly his openness and his good relations with reformist party members and semi-opposition circles outside the party which helped Pozsgay in his successful fight against the hard-liner cadres of the party. The cracks in the fortifications of power became even more numerous after -Kadar’s death. The reformers of the communist party, above all Pozsgay and Nyers, engaged in a political strategy of co-optation. By utilizing their existing relations with oppositional organizations, they tried to bring about a transfer of the political power divided then between them and the Party conservatives to them and their proteges.”” However, their personal ambitions obstructed each other. Although Pozsgay enjoyed more respect outside the Party, he could count on support, above all, among the népi opposition gathering around the MDF. By contrast, Nyers was more widely accepted in the party than Pozsgay, but his influence outside it lay only in the narrow circle of reformist economists and reform communist intellectuals. Thus, it came as no surprise that the MDF was the first opposition organization to protest against the initiative of the New March Front to create a national committee comprising all opposition parties. The scenario of reformist co-optation was finally invalidated by the establishment and consolidation of the Opposition Roundtable in March 1989. The MSZMP, which maintained its domination of official politics despite its inner divisions, no longer faced unorganized opposition groups, easily played off against one another, but a single organization uniting all oppositional groups on a consensual principle. In principle, it was no longer possible for one of the reformers in the Party to have his patrons withdraw from the opposition. If the communists in power wanted to let the opposition participate in solving the crisis, they were able to do so only by engaging in negotiations about a fundamental change in the political system. The logic of co-optation was replaced by the logic of competitive co-operation, in order to go beyond reforms to achieve a change of the political model. In the beginning, many must have thought that the commencement of the negotiations meant that the situation would develop in accordance with Pozsgay’s political goals. Since it was known already at the beginning of the negotiations that the MSZMP would nominate him for President of the Republic, Pozsgay had no scruples about giving concessions to an opposition working on the dethronement of the state party: he could kill two birds with the one stone. Gradually jettisoning the burden of the party, he rose to become would-be president of Hungarian democracy in the making; at the same time, he rightly expected that, in return for the concessions, his supporters in the EKA would not make difficulties about bringing forward the elections for the Presidency. Indeed, the organizations belonging to

Pozsgay’s circle were inclined to accept this compromise. :

A. Bozoki-G. Karacsony: The Making of a Political Elite 99 However, Pozsgay failed to organize these groups around himself and tried to maintain his circle of sympathizers through his personal popularity and a sort of reformist-populist manner of speech, which was made up of elements of the ideas of nation, democracy and socialism, and clearly differed from party jargon. This strategy worked as long as wide fronts and “loose bonds” were needed: in the early phase of political change, during the Gorbachev glasnost. The political climate

might have started to change for the worse when, at the reform assembly in Kecs- | kemét in April 1989, he refused to take on the role of “the person who would tear the party in two”. He suffered his first defeat exactly when he tried to formalize and institutionalize these informal, overlapping, groups in the summer of 1989 in the framework of the Movement for a Democratic Hungary (DMM). As soon as the Movement came into being, it became clear that “the emperor had no clothes” since the DMM was unable to play any significant role in the matter of emerging party pluralism in 1989. If Pozsgay had been elected President, the DMM would have potentially become “the presidential party”, similar to those founded later by Watesa in Poland or Yeltsin in Russia. As it was, however, it remained a circle of sympathizers which would be swept away by political transformation. By the summer of 1989, Pozsgay’s network of friends and sympathizers was

gradually replaced by the circles around Jozsef Antall. The idea of co-operation understood as a model change to “socialist pluralism” was replaced by the idea of regime change, coined first by the SZDSZ, towards democratic and strictly competitive politics. As we have seen, Antall had already been active in 1988 but, having just recovered from his fight for survival, he had initially belonged to the most moderate opposition. His network of contacts included, above all, the old leaders of historical parties (the FKGP, KDNP) and some prominent figures in the MDF and the BZSBT. Antall rose to the leadership of the moderate Right

during the roundtable talks; he controlled and occasionally “disciplined” its : members.’ By having become the leader of the moderate opposition, he occupied a central position between the reformers of the MSZMP and the radical democrats of the Opposition Roundtable. Antall was an anticommunist by principle but a very cautious and tactical politician in practice. He negotiated with Pozsgay but remained loyal to the Opposition Roundtable. Thanks to his central position and authority, his circles were perhaps the widest and the most effective in the decisive months of 1989. Whilst Pozsgay spent the long years from 1985 to 1988 developing his network of contacts according to the strategy of cooptation, Antall accomplished the same by making it impossible for others to bypass him and his party: they became, step by step, the most important political force during the negotiations (Table 2). It was much more difficult for the parties of the radical opposition to develop an efficient, centrist network since their politics were based on the very idea that they should dictate rather than follow the changes. They were opposed to the “peace propaganda” of the MSZMP and endeavored to be always one step ahead of the changing political climate. In fact, Viktor Orban found it very difficult in the beginning to have himself accepted in the restricted atmosphere of the tri-

100 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

partite negotiations since his speech on June 16th, 1989, had earned him the reputation of being an “extreme” radical. Although Orban was supported by the enthusiastic membership of Fidesz, this membership was taken more seriously —

| by the police than by the negotiating partners. The leadership of the SZDSZ, coming from the democratic opposition, were similarly loyal and accustomed to working together. However, they had not had a real opportunity to develop an extensive hinterland. They found sympathizers in the more liberal circles of the recently freed press and maintained a close alliance with the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions. At the roundtable talks, however, the SZDSZ was distinguished above all by Péter Télgyessy, who, like Antall, belonged to the newcomers within his party’s elite, but who, unlike Antall, did not have support-

| ers in other parties. The relationship between the SZDSZ and Fidesz was a “coordinate” one, in contrast to the more asymmetrical relations between the MDF

) ~ and the BZSBT, the MNP or the KDNP. Table 2. Dominant Political Elite Networks during the Process of Transition

Time Political Goal Method Dominant Elite Circle 1987-1988 — reform co-optation surrounding Grosz 1988-1989 model change co-operation surrounding Pozsgay

1989 regime change competition surrounding Antall This handicap of the radical-liberal Free Democrats and Young Democrats might have contributed to the fact that, when these parties found themselves in a _ minority concerning the issues left unresolved at the negotiating table in September 1989 (in particular on the issue of bringing forward the date of the election of a President of the Republic), they tried to break out by appealing to society. They felt that they had nothing to lose. Although they did not want to jeopardize the achievements of the National Roundtable negotiations, they were not willing to accept compromises on several issues which were considered acceptable by the moderate opposition. This was why, making use of a new legal institution introduced as a result of the negotiations, they called for a referendum on the issues on which no consensus had been reached at the negotiating table. The decision of the people at the referendum on November 26th, 1989 justified their endeavors.*’ The relative weakness of SZDSZ and Fidesz in building networks at the elite level was successfully compensated by a direct appeal to the people to achieve more radical, uncompromising methods of change.

Conclusion The literature of democratic transitions usually draws a distinction between moderate and radical opposition, emphasizing that the success of a transition is most certain when the center of the negotiations is occupied by reformers of the decay-

A. Bozéki-G. Karacsony: The Making of a Political Elite 101 ing regime and moderate forces of the rising opposition.** Based mainly on Latin American examples, this approach warns transitional countries against allowing radicalizing opposition forces to take up a too prominent position since it is of the opinion that radical demands may endanger the success of the transition. In Hungary, however, the definition of the content of political change was itself subject to continuous change: the scenarios of reformist co-optation, cove-

nanted model change and negotiated regime change existed simultaneously, almost parallel to one another. As far as differences in opposition behavior are concerned, our findings so far seem to support the observation of Schiemann,” that, in Hungary, there existed three such: the ultra-moderate, the moderate and the self-restraining radical. These we would define in the following way.

e Firstly, the ultra-moderate standpoint, representatives of which might have imagined a model change which would have been, perhaps, as restrained as the Polish pact on “semi-free” elections.

e Secondly, the moderate opposition standpoint, representatives of which would have never abandoned the idea of free elections but would have | shown themselves ready to accept a temporary agreement of the Polish type in order to secure the achievement of this goal. e Finally, the self-restraining radical opposition standpoint whose supporters, unlike the radicals of Latin America, never questioned the achievements of the negotiations or wanted to endanger their codification. They tried, however, to resolve the issues left open at the negotiating table by seeking direct support from society.

The first standpoint was inclined to make strategic, the second tactical concessions. The supporters of the third standpoint feared that tactical concessions might provide their opponents with an opportunity to turn these into strategic advantages. and so, the supporters of the third standpoint, who made several tactical proposals themselves, watched the tactical concessions initiated by the circles of the moderate opposition with suspicion (Table 3). Table 3. Opposition Parties and Their Position at the National Roundtable Talks

Position towards Organization Characteristics the Transition

Ultra-moderates BZSBT center-right, cultural-political association KDNP center-right, historic party, confessional MNP center-left, historic party, populist third way

Moderates | MDF centrist, new party, ideologically mixed FKGP center-right, historic party, agrarian-traditionalist FSZDL new trade union, led by urban intellectuals MSZDP center-left, historic party, internally divided Self-restraining SZDSZ centrist, new party, liberal, former dissidents

Radicals Fidesz centrist, new party, liberal, young professionals

102 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

The success of the regime change in Hungary was a fortunate result of several factors coinciding. Firstly, it was decisive that, as time progressed, the reformers of the MSZMP were increasingly interested in striking a deal with the opposition and mobilized their contacts in this direction. Secondly, the moderate opposition led by Jézsef Antall, Laszl6 Sédlyom and Gyérgy Szabad succeeded in neutralizing the groups of “ultra-moderates” and in driving them into the path of

political transformation, in which they could count on the support of the “selfrestraining radicals”. In this way, radicals and moderates co-operated in transforming the political field’ and were divided by tactical, not strategic, differences. Thirdly, it was important that the success of the referendum initiated by the radicals led by Péter Tolgyessy, Janos Kis and Viktor Orban, enabled them to liberate the moderate opposition from their agreement, an agreement which could have led to a too-early division of power between the opposition and the crucial groups of the old regime before the first democratic elections. It was as a result of all of the factors mentioned above, that the Roundtable talks did not leave a political minefield behind, which would have had to be circumnavigated by future electors. In the elections of 1990 the people were free to decide the

Notes future of their country. ,

(Translated by Karoly Mike)

| Dahrendorf contrasts periods of constitutional politics with periods of normal politics. See: Ralf Dahrendorf: Reflections on the Revolution in Europe. London: Chatto & Windus, 1990. 2 See the biographies of the key participants in this book. For a more detailed list, see Marta Elbert and Andras Bozoki: Portrék és életrajzok. [Portraits and Biogtaphies] in Andrés Bozéki, Marta Elbert, Melinda Kalmar, Béla Révész, Erzsébet Ripp and Zoltan Ripp (eds.): A rendszervaltas Jorgatokényve: kerekasztal-targyalasok 1989-ben. 8. kétet. [The Script of the Regime Change: Roundtable Talks of 1989. Vol. 8] Budapest: Uj Mandatum, 1999. 3 For former studies on the Opposition Roundtable (EKA), see for example: Anna Richter: Ellenzéki Kerekasztal - portrévazlatok. [Opposition Roundtable—Portrait Sketches] Budapest: Otlet, 1990.; Laszlo Bruszt: “Negotiated Revolution in Hungary” Social Research, Vol. 57. No. 2. 1990; Andras Bozoki: “Hungary’s Road to Systemic Change: The Opposition Roundtable” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 7. No. 2. Spring 1993. 276-308. 4 KG6résényi Andras: “The Revival of the Past or New Beginning? The Nature of Post-Communist Politics” in Andras Bozoki, Andras KGrésényi and George Schépflin (eds.): Post Communist Transition: Emerging Pluralism in Hungary. London: Pinter, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. 111-131. 5 Karoly Ravasz: “A Fiiggetlen Kisgazdapart Ujjaalakitasa 1988-89 forduldjan” [The Re-establishment of the Independent Smallholders’ Party at the Turn of 1988-89] Multunk, 1997. 1. To the biography of the leaders of the FKGP between 1944-49, see: Istvan Vida and Vince VGrés: A Fiiggetlen Kisgazdapart képviseléi 1944-49. Eletrajzi lexikon. [Parliamentary representatives of the Independent Smallholders’ Party 1944-49. A Biographical Encyclopedia.] Budapest: ELTE Szo-

cioldégiai és Szocialpolitikai Intézet, 1991. 6 The history of the reestablishment of the MSZDP is poorly documented. We have made use of the very subjective memoirs of Laszl6 Markus: Forog a hinta: Szocdemek 1989-1994. [The Roundabout Revolves Again: Social Democrats 1989—94.] Budapest: Willy Brandt Alapitvany, 1999.

A. Bozoki-G. Kardcsony: The Making of a Political Elite 103 7 The latter included, for instance, the sociologist Elemér Hankiss, the historian Jend Sztics, and the director of the Hungarian Soros Foundation, Miklos Vasarhelyi. 8 About the careers of the leaders of the National Peasants’ Party see: Benké Péter: A magyar népi mozgalom almanachja. [An Almanach of the Hungarian Populist Movement] Budapest: Deak, 1996.

9 Péter Veres was a former president of the National Peasants’ Party.

10 See more about this in: Zsolt Enyedi: Politika a kereszt jegyében. [Politics in the Sign of the

Cross]. Budapest: Osiris, 1999. :

11 See, Enyedi, op. cit.

12 Aron Marton was Bishop of Gyulafehérvar (1938-80) and a leading figure of the Hungarians in Romania. 13 This was the idea that was most reminiscent of the example of the Catholic mass parties at the end

of the 19th century, which considered the social integration of their members rather than their political representation as their primary task.

14 Its classical formulation is to be found in the article “A New Evolutionism” written by Adam Michnik in 1976. In A. Michnik: Letters from Prison and Other Essays. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. pp. 135-45. 15 One of the most successful actions of the early Fidesz concerned the defeat of especially unpopular communist MPs. It was a result of this action that, in the by-elections in the summer of 1989, an opposition politician won a seat in Parliament for the first time in 42 years. See: Andras Bozoki (ed.): Tiszta lappal: A Fidesz a magyar politikaban, 1988-91. [With a clean slate. The Fidesz in Hungarian politics, 1988-91.] Budapest: Fidesz, 1992. pp. 130-133. 16 In Poland, the Roundtable talks resulted in victory for the opposition’s strategy based on civic society. In Hungary, however, they led to the success of a new stage: the strategic unification of the groups of the opposition elite. The Hungarian roundtable talks in 1989 already served as an arena for the emergence of the new, pluralist, political elite and the professional teams around them, rather than as a successful “umbrella organisation” for the civic society triumphing over the party state. The latter was best represented by the overwhelming victory of the Solidarity movement in 1989. See, for example, Janusz Ziolkowski: “The Roots, Branches and Blossoms of Solidarnosc” in Gwyn Prins (ed.): Spring in Winter: The 1989 Revolutions. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990. 39-62. 17 Ervin Csizmadia: A magyar demokratikus ellenzék, 1968-88. Monografia. [The Hungarian Democratic Opposition, 1968-88. A Monography.] Budapest: T-Twins, 1995. 18 A classical critical analysis of the social consequences of the endeavour for legitimacy (the increasing party membership of intellectuals) is to be found in: George [Gyérgy] Konrad and Ivan Szelényi: The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1979.

19 See the essay Erzsébet Szalai: “Szereppréba” [Rehearsal of Roles] in her Uteldgazds: hatalom és értelmiség az allamszocializmus utan. [The Roads Depart: Power and the Intellectuals after State Socialism] Budapest: Pesti Szalon, 1994. 20 Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky was a national-radical politician who was also associated with the circle of népi writers. Later on, he also participated in the politics of the FKGP. Charged with anti-Nazi

activities, he was executed in December, 1944. |

21 For more details, see: Andras Bozoki: “A polgari radikalis kormany” [The civic-radical government] in Sandor Kurtan et al. (eds.): Magyarorszdg politikai évkényve, 1998. [Political Yearbook

of Hungary, 1998.] Budapest: DEMKA, 1999. 272-278. | 22 Viktor Orban himself was one of the few people disputed within the EKA. Some raised the question whether someone with a reputation for being radical rather than ready for compromise should be allowed to participate in the sessions of the working committee I/1 which dealt with constitutional issues.

23 The term “tribe” was first used by for the developing opposition groups by G. M. Tamas: “Szint : vallani” [Showing One’s True Colours] Hitel, March, 1989.

104 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy 24 For the list of the participants in the Lakitelek meeting of intellectuals, at which the establishment of the MDF was decided, and the documented talks given at this meeting, see: Sandor Agdécs and

Endre Medvigy (eds.): A magyarsag esélyei. Lakitelek, 1987. [The Chances of Hungarians, Lakitelek, 1987.] Budapest: Ptiski, 1991. 25 About the process of the establishment of parties, see Ervin Csizmadia: “Utak a partosodashoz: az MDF és az SZDSZ megszervezédése” [Roads to a Multiparty System: The MDF and the SZDSZ in the Making] in: Mihaly Bihari (ed.): 4 tébbpartrendszer kialakulasa Magyarorszagon, 1985— 1991. {The Establishment of the Multi-Party System in Hungary, 1985—91.] Budapest: Kossuth, 1991. pp. 7-39. 26 See the Founding Charter of the MDF, Hitel, November 1988. pp. 50-51. 27 See more about them in: Lengyel, Laszlé: “Alapité atyak” [Founding Fathers] Kritika, September 1993. pp. 3-9.

28 See more about this in: Andras Bozéki: “Vazlat harom populizmusrél: Az Egyesiilt Allamok, Argentina és Magyarorszag” [A Sketch on Three Cases of Populism: the United States, Argentina

and Hungary] Politikatudomanyi Szemle, Vol. 3. No. 3. 1994. 33-69. , 29 For details, see: Zoltan Bird: Elhervadt forradalom. {A Withered Revolution] Budapest: Piiski, 1993 and Zoltan Acs: Kizdrt a part. [The Party Expelled Me] Budapest: Primo, 1988. 30 Zoltan Bird: Sajat ut. [Own Way] Budapest: Piiski, 1988. 31 Tarsadalmi Szerzédés. {Social Contract] A special issue of the illegal periodical Beszél6. 1987. | See also: Fanny Havas et al. (eds.): Beszélé Osszkiadas [The Complete Issues of the Beszél6]. Vol. 3. 32 As president of the HNF, Imre Pozsgay saw to it that the Lakitelek Proclamation was made public.

He smuggled its text into an interview with him in the official newspaper of the HNF, Magyar Nemczet, in November 1987. See Magyar Nemzet, November 14. 1987. 33 In a retrospective article, Ferenc Fehér mentioned Antall’s legendary bon mot, which he had said during the restoration after the 1956 Revolution: “I will sink down and survive them.”

34 Sandor Révész, Antall Jozsef tavolrol. [Jozsef Antall from a Distance] Budapest: Sik, 1995. See also: Jozsef Debreczeni: A miniszterelnok. [The Prime Minister] Budapest: Osiris, 1998.

35 Ervin Csizmadia: A magyar demokratikus ellenzék. Monografia. [The Hungarian Democratic Opposition. A Monography] Budapest: T-Twins, 1995. 36 Members of the democratic opposition were denied passports for a long time, and when one of them did, exceptionally, receive a passport, he was often not allowed to leave the country after his return from abroad. In 1988, however, the Ministry of the Interior allowed many of them to obtain passports so that they could make use of their scholarships abroad or accept invitations from foreign universities. The reason behind this might have been that they preferred to have these people out of the country. / 37 In such very important questions as the Act on the Constitutional Court or the introduction of the institution of “ombudsman”. 38 Janos Kadar, first secretary of the Communist Party, ruled the country between 1956 and 1988. He died in July, 1989. 39 Represented by Kadar himself, Lajos Czinege, Karoly Németh, Zoltan Komécsin and others. 40 Represented by Gyula Horn, Mikl6s Németh, Laszl6 Kovacs, Péter Medgyessy and others. 41 Imre Pozsgay: 1989. Politikai karrier a partallamban és a rendszervaltasban. [1989: A Political Career in the Party State and in the Regime Change] Budapest: Piski, 1993. 42 As Pozsgay went on holiday in July 1989, it seemed that he was not urging a quick conclusion to the negotiations. During his absence, however, the leadership of the MSZMP delegation was taken over by Fejti, and it was only taken back by Pozsgay in the second half of August. Pozsgay stayed away because he wanted to show to his fellow party members and the opposition parties that they would be unable to reach a consensus and that negotiations would slow down without him. He thus wanted to demonstrate that he was the only person who could guarantee the success of a peaceful, negotiated transition. After his return, he did his best to accelerate the pace of the negotiations. In September, however, both of them were present at most of the intermediate level

A. Bozoki-G. Karacsony: The Making of a Political Elite 105 sessions: they watched each other and had their own people report to them separately. By this time, it was Fejti for whom it was less important to demonstrate results and he even left, temporarily, during the most sensitive phase of the talks, in September. Thus, it was finally Pozsgay who tried to hasten the agreement under the pressure of the approaching party congress. 43 Gyorgy Fejti opposed the withdrawal of the MSZMP from the work-place and the demand that, as part of the democratic transition, the state party should account for its property. He wished to discuss these controversial questions as part of a “package”, he disapproved of signing the September 18 agreement without settling the open questions. He was of the opinion that the MSZMP should not sign anything before an agreement was reached since an early compromise would restrict the future negotiating position of the Party. 44 On the history of the Hungarian Communist Party’s successor, the Hungarian Socialist Party in the 1990s, see Attila Agh: “The Partial Consolidation of East Central European Parties: The Case of the Hungarian Socialist Party.” Party Politics, Vol. 1, 1995. 491-514.; Barnabas Racz: “Left Politics in Post-Communist Hungary” in Charles Bukowski and B. Racz (eds.): The Return of the Left in Post-Communist States: Current Trends and Future Perspectives. Northampton, MA.: Edward Elgar, 1999. 59-93.; Andras Bozoki: “ The Hungarian Socialists: Technocratic Modernizationism or New Social Democracy?” in A. Bozéki and John Ishiyama (eds.): Communist Successor Parties in Central and Eastern Europe: Reform or Transmutation?. Armonk, NY.: M.E. Sharpe (forthcoming) 45 In a public event organised by the New March Front, established with the aid of Rezsé Nyers, sociologist Elemér Hankiss gave a lecture concerning his ideas of an emerging great social coalition. This grand coalition between reformers of the party on the one hand, and state bureaucrats, managers of large enterprises and new entrepreneurs on the other, was, for example, warmly welcomed as a political goal. In: Istvan Lazar (ed.): Uj Marciusi Front [New March Front] Budapest, Muzsak, 1989. 46 It happened several times that Antall tactfully reminded representatives of different historical parties that they were sitting at an Opposition Roundtable and not among the reformers of the

| party state. It was he, for example, who convinced Tibor Ftizessy (KDNP) that the attempts to maintain the existing practice of state socialism in Hungary would be very hard to justify by referring to the principle of a Christian, “evangelical socialism”. 47 On the referendum of November 1989, see Adam Masat’s chapter in this book.

48 See for instance, Guillermo O’ Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.): Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 4 Vols. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.; Adam Przeworski: Democracy and the Market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

49 See in detail, John W. Schiemann: Risk, Radicals, and Regime Change. PhD dissertation, New York: Columbia University, 1999. 50 The notion of “transformation of the political field” has been used by David Stark and Laszlé Bruszt to describe transitions. See their book, Postsocialist Pathways. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

BLANK PAGE

2. THE INSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESS

Institution Building in Hungary: Analytical Issues and Constitutional Models, 1989-90 Rudolf L. Tokeés

Introduction The birth of Hungary’s new democracy was a peaceful, yet complex, process. Depending on one’s perspective, the period of gestation could be seen either as long as the history of the nation’s. centuries-old struggle for freedom and independence, or as less than a year (June 1989-—April 1990). It took roughly ten months for the outgoing and incoming political elites to deliver the packaged product, the National Roundtable Agreement, a revised constitution, and free parliamentary elections. Although the Agreement was subsequently amended by political pacts, the essential elements of the new institutional architecture were in place before the formal launching of parliamentary democracy in May 1990. The purpose of this chapter is to rethink and reflect, from the vantage point of the “historical institutional” approach to the study of political change and institution-building, on the regional context, national political dynamics, key accomplishments and the institutional outcomes of the roundtable process and subsequent political agreements of 1989-1990. This objective is justified by three propositions: Firstly, that the substantive legal and institutional products of these founding events, although intended as improvized solutions to current policy dilemmas have, by the late 1990s, become core elements of the nation’s new political architecture. Secondly, that, unknown to the elite negotiators and pactmakers of 1989-1990, the long-term outcome of their agreements, unwritten understandings, and personal expectations laid the foundations of a new, and in some ways sui generis political model.’ Thirdly,—though this matter will not be discussed in this paper,” that this model is neither “Eastern” nor “Western” but a late 20th/early 21st century and still-evolving Hungarian model. The following discussion will be divided into seven sections and will discuss

related themes of analytical considerations, regional East Central European | | roundtable scenarios, and several political and institutional aspects of the Hungarian National Roundtable process.

108 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Institutions: Rules, Customs, and Actors From the perspective of a historical institutionalist approach to the study of political change and interaction among institutions, public actors, and legitimating ideas, the notion of legal continuity—itself a unique and defining aspect of the Hungarian transition’-—can be a useful analytical device with which to explain linkages between political behavior and institutional outcomes.’ Let us specify the terms of the argument. According to Thelen and Steinmo, historical institutionalism is “an attempt to illuminate how political struggles are modified by the institutional setting in which [they] take place.” The main components of inquiry are “formal organizations, informal rules, and procedures that structure conduct.””

Douglas North offers a more comprehensive perspective on the matter. He submits that “institutions are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction... [T]hey structure incentives in human exchanges, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change.” To this he adds a crucial caveat: “...even discontinuous changes (such as revolution and conquest) are never completely discontinuous [and] are the results of embeddedness of informal constraints in societies.”° Matters which come under the rubric of institutions include normative guideposts, such as a constitution; the structuration and hierarchy of political institutions; the division of power among branches of government; the “rules of the political game,” particularly electoral laws and rules governing parliamentary procedures; built-in homeostatic devices, especially provisions for the separation of public and civil spheres by way of judicial review; and, last but not least, legal safeguards and new institutions, such as that of Ombudsman and other parliamentary watchdogs, for the protection of the citizens’ constitutionally guaranteed basic rights. All of these components, particularly the constitution, may be studied either in a time-specific, that is, in a “standstill,” or over time, that is, in an “evolutionary” context. As will be shown below, I chose the latter approach for the analysis of institutional changes in 1989-1990 in Hungary. North reminds us that informal rules constitute unwritten guidelines which constrain the behaviour of public actors in accordance with cultural traditions, elite customs, and accepted terms of public discourse in various political contexts. Informal rules are parts of pre-institutional norms. Or, as Dahl asserts, “Prior to politics, beneath it, enveloping it, restricting it, conditioning it, is the underlying. consensus on policy... [Without] such consensus, no democratic system would long survive the endless irritations and frustrations of elections and party politics.” He concludes that “it is the non-constitutional rules and practices that matter.”’ To

come to the intended point, Dahl’s cautionary insights should be amended by Rockman’s caveats. He submits that “political engineering, unlike physical engineering, is not just the matter of structures. It is also fundamentally a matter of morals, of conditioned habits, and of reciprocities.””

Rudolf L. Tékés: Institution Building in Hungary 109 From the foregoing it might be argued that informal rules are generally derived from two—a “maximalist” and a “minimalist’—components. One 1s a mixture of ideological passions and the objective of interest maximization; the other is cost-benefit-conscious behavior and the pursuit, in the sense of “rational choice” theory, of “feasible” outcomes.” Informal rules not only set consensual boundaries for appropriate personal conduct and collective behavior but, with the benefit of in-built ambiguities, also provide for flexibility in the application of written rules. As will be shown below, the capacity of informal rules to yield desired outcomes in a negotiating environment is greatly enhanced—as it was in

Hungary’s case in 1989-1990—by the actors’ mutually compatible social and | occupational status (shared educational background, ascribed class position, record of previous instrumental-co-operative experience, and so on) and their a priori commitment to an elite-brokered consensual outcome. Other factors promoting consensus among negotiators are shared “moral infrastructure and normative meaning” with respect to “national histories and aspi-

rations.” As Offe explains, “[W]hat the Polish and Hungarian cases seem to : demonstrate is the importance of pre-existing moral and cultural capital as a source of social integration and the most promising starting point of a bottom-up

process of institution building.” The issue of the Hungarian institution builders’ pre-existing values and mor-

als poses a set of analytical imponderables. On the one hand, there were two groups of political, social, and cultural elites committed to the principle of peaceful systemic transformation through negotiation. On the other hand, neither the incumbents nor the “insurgents” had a proper mandate from the public whose interests they claimed to represent. In any case, both sides’ elite status had been derived from their respective positions in the old regime’s nomenclature hierar-

chy. In the summer of 1989 members of each side were, in a sense, “fellow travelers” on the road to Damascus and the Promised Land of parliamentary democracy. This common predicament helped to obliterate moral and ethical distinctions between socialist internationalism and Hungarian patriotism, ruthless opportunism and naive sincerity, pragmatism and idealism. What was missing in Hungary was a kind of “divine intervention” providing for catharsis and common absolution, and hence a clean slate for all concerned.'! In any event, common to both elites were their shared ignorance of and their lack of cultural empathy for the “spirit,” however defined, of a mass democracy of

politically fully empowered citizens. Be that as it may, in Lasswell’s sense all of | | them were “political men” intent on “displacing and rationalizing” their “private motives”—most prominently, the preservation of their elite status—on “public objects,” in this case on an institutional artifact, the National Roundtable.” Procedures are the “way things are done”—-yet again with allowances for the cultural context, which, mainly through custom and precedent, tends to impose rules on overt action in the public arena. On the face of it, the National Roundtable negotiations of June—September, 1989, may be perceived as a multi-player co-operative game; an amalgam of political theatre (the televised opening and

110 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

closing sessions); behind-closed-doors, moot-court-type adversarial confrontations of seemingly irreconcilable policy positions; a university seminar with the polite exchange of learned, expert views among fellow academics; and an unstructured free-for-all in the traditions of an intelligentsia debating society. Although the stakes were extremely high—the nation’s political destiny was on the table—procedural courtesies, such as the rotation of negotiators from the three sides’ in the chair and tripartite venues for the reconciliation of interests—were strictly observed.!? Indeed, were it not for these procedures, the “third side,” the outgoing regime’s “social partners,” would have walked out well before the conclusion of the National Roundtable’s deliberations. Institutions are also interactive components of the national and international socio-economic, legal, and security environments. The context is dynamic and is subject to change—as are institutions which are both the subject and object of endogenous and exogenous change. Longitudinal changes in social stratification, rapid, especially adverse, shifts of macroeconomic indicators, declining performance in political guidance, unresolved leadership conflicts and the erosion of legitimating ideological paradigms are factors with the capacity to challenge the institutional status quo ante and modify the behavior of political actors. Matters are further confounded when the stability of domestic institutions is contingent on exogenous factors, such as the capacity of the regional hegemon to keep the political regime in power and its institutions unchanged. Although the Cold War was winding down in 1989, Hungary was still a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and of Comecon, and was bound by innumerable formal and informal political commitments to the USSR for the preservation of the institutional status quo ante. These, as augmented by the presence of Soviet, de facto occupation, forces, were powerful constraints on the scope of the roundtable agenda. Whereas the outcome of the Polish National Roundtable augured well for the prospects of similar discussions in Hungary, the Berlin Wall was

still there—and so were two neo-Stalinist dictatorships on the northern and southern borders of Hungary. In short, the roundtable negotiations began as an open-ended process which could have resulted in either a cosmetic facelift or in

| drastic and deeply intrusive surgery for “whole body” reconstruction. Both seemed, in June, 1989, to be feasible paths. To summarize the discussion on institution-centered analysis, let us consider Robert Bates’s justification of the same. He submits that “at the core of the new theorizing lies the claim that institutions reconcile rationality on the part of the individual with rationality on the part of the society” and adds that “institutions. are means to resolve collective dilemmas.”’* If by “individual rationality” we understand the negotiators’ shared ambition to obtain rational, that is, optimal yet feasible results for the values and interests they spoke for, and by “societal rationality” the public’s aspirations for social peace and stability after the free elections of 1990, we may have a useful analytical vehicle with which to assess the roundtable process and its long-term impact on Hungarian politics.

Rudolf L. Tokés: Institution Building in Hungary 111

Institutional Change: Policy Precedents and Alternative Blueprints The initial agenda of the Hungarian National Roundtable called for incremental changes to improve and modernize the performance of existing political institutions by adding new elements to the incumbent state administrative elites’ previously implemented and newly conceived standby plans for institutional reform. Previous institutional reforms had been carried out to facilitate the “selling” of the regime’s economic reforms to critical elite groups and the skeptical public. In one way or another, measures such as the empowerment of the ruling party’s transmission belt-type social organizations for the administration of the regime’s social-welfare policies; the granting of operative autonomy to central and local state agencies to address citizens’ concerns; and the broadening of the scope of public participation by way of multi-candidate elections—such as those held in 1985—were prophylactic measures and at the same time conciliatory gestures toward the, hitherto powerless, elite groups and citizens.

By placing—and having the political courage to keep—the notion of “reforms” on the public agenda, the regime sought to preserve the option of “self-renewal” and, with it, its own long-term survival, as an overriding political priority. With the peaceful “leveraged buyout”-type of removal of Janos Kadar from the leadership in May 1988, the process of institutional reform gained new momentum and opened the gates for drastic innovation of all kinds.’ Controlled, within-system changes, though helpful for keeping the public demobilized, gave rise to elite demands for a more thoroughgoing institutional overhaul. Demands for change came from both the “incumbents,” that is, from pro-reform party and state elites, and from the “insurgents,” that is, from the critical, semi-dissident and dissident intellectuals of socialist and liberal democratic persuasion. Pro-reform incumbent and insurgent agendas for institutional change, although originating from opposite ends of the regime’s power structure and differing in terms of scope, emphasis, and proposed timetable of implementation, were compatible components of a yet-to-emerge post-socialist institutional architecture.’® Substantive commonalities included a shared desire for drastic change in the modus operandi of dysfunctional Soviet-style institutions, such as the state’s collective presidency, its politicized judiciary, and its publicly unaccountable central and local bureaucracy. The two sides’ ex ante consensus also included notions of electoral reform and enhanced legal autonomy for economic actors within the state as well as in the emerging private sector. Moreover, there was, particularly among legal scholars, a sense of urgency to modernize and enhance the rule-making competency of the semi-dormant Parliament. The latter was seen as a vastly underutilized institutional asset for the effecting of overdue systemic changes.’ The issue of political representation of group and individual interests touched on the very essence of the institutional logic of the one-party state. The answer to this, traditionally taboo, subject emerged—in an astonishingly nonchalant yet typically pragmatic Hungarian fashion—from the post-Kadar regime’s consent

112 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

to the formation of “social organizations” in the summer of 1988. Thanks to the Communist Party’s reform elites and to the courageous initiatives of resurgent “historic” and new political parties, the regime’s toleration of unauthorized party formation was consolidated in February 1989 into an official endorsement of “political pluralism” in Hungary. By that time, that government had ready-made draft bills for a unicameral Parliament, and for “associations” (including political), as well as a completed draft of a drastically revised constitution.'® The insurgents’ ex ante consensus on necessary changes has been characterized by East European and Western analysts as “self-limiting” with respect to the means for the achievement of the desired political objectives. In my view, the term, particularly the implication that the regime’s “democratic” and reform socialist critics would, if given the opportunity, have promptly embraced Westernstyle liberal democracy, market economy, and mass democracy is substantially flawed. As East European intellectuals on both sides of the political fence, they were central components of the “essential Left” with a profound sense of ambivalence toward capitalism and the unenlightened masses—together with a history of a love-hate relationship with the powers-that-be. As members of an economically privileged, but politically powerless, elite, they, too, shared the mindset of the non-elite homo Kadaricus. It included his and her attachment to the emancipatory and nominally egalitarian ethos of socialism, social justice, state redistribution, and the concomitant disinclination to shoulder the burden of duty of the “rights and duties” matrix of democratic citizenship. Thus, pursuant to the logic of deeply internalized, petty bourgeois cultural habits and, at best pre-democratic, political preferences, the Hungarian insurgents’ “self-limitation”

involved not only the means but the ends also.’”

A prominent, regionally unique aspect of the Hungarian incumbent-insurgent discourse on institutional change was the pragmatic, legalistic, and, in the case of economic policy proposals, technocratic language of interest articulation by both sides. The businesslike tone of such dialogues stemmed in part from the, by the mid-80’s de facto, immunity of elite actors from imprisonment for their political beliefs, and, in part, from all actors’ implicit confidence in the reformability of

the system. In early 1989 “midcourse” correction by way of cosmetic and/or drastic institutional retro-fitting was a feasible option for all concerned. -

National Roundtables: Regional Scenarios The unfolding of political precedents and key events leading up to the commencement of National Roundtable negotiations in Hungary were parts of a regional Central European context of incumbent and insurgent elite efforts to find national solutions to seemingly intractable policy problems in the era of a disoriented regional hegemon under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. At issue is the way in which the Polish, the Czechoslovak, and the Hungarian incumbents sought to come to terms with the new political realities of 1989.

: Rudolf L. Tokés: Institution Building in Hungary 113 Let us begin with Poland. There, from 1986 on, the martial law regime began experimenting with incremental institutional reforms, including that of the elec-

toral system. The insurgents, though internally divided into radical “confrontationist” and “reformist” consensus-seeking factions, remained united and committed to the emancipatory essence of the original Solidarity program. Moreover,

unlike the situation in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Catholic Church (augmented by a Pole as the Roman Pontiff) retained its institutional autonomy, as well as its immense moral influence, over the vast majority of the religiously observant and deeply nationalist citizens. The top leadership was looking for ways in which to come to terms with the opposition, and yet it presided over a

conservative government bureaucracy, a central and “voivodship” party “apparat”, a well-entrenched network of official trade unions, and an equally conservative Sejm.”” On the other hand, the economy was in ruins, the opposition was united, and there was no relief in sight from Moscow. At the end, the Jaruzelski team concluded that the regime had no choice other than to seek a peaceful and negotiated way out of its dismal predicament. What took place in Warsaw between February and early April 1989 was a

path-breaking event which came to serve as a precedent for other national roundtables over the next twelve months. Although the real stake was political power-sharing, particularly the official recognition of Solidarity as a legitimate | representative of the opposition, the Polish National Roundtable’s agenda sought to address a wide range of political, economic, and social issues.”' Of these, only the political aspects, that is, those of electoral reform and union pluralism, were amenable to immediate resolution. In any case, the eventual outcome was shaped by many factors which were unique to Poland and were not duplicated in other roundtable talks during the next twelve months. Of these, at least three warrant consideration. Firstly, although the negotiations took place behind closed doors, the Solidarity leaders sought external legitimation of their bargaining position by holding weekly meetings in a Warsaw cinema and seeking public input into the process. Secondly, whereas “expert” discussions helped to clarify the two sides’ respective positions, substantive decisions could be reached only with the help of third party, i.e. Catholic Church, intermediaries. Thirdly, the issue of power-sharing through a prearranged quota system, namely, free competition for all seats in the Senate and for one-third of those in the lower-house, was made possible by built-in “institutional slack.” With two legislative chambers and four fellow-traveler “opposition” parties already in place, the regime-supervised entry of “another party” seemed to be an acceptable risk to the beleaguered incumbents. The historic credit for initiating and successfully implementing a communist party-state’s transformation into a parliamentary system by peaceful means belongs to Solidarity and to the pragmatic incumbents in Poland. Much of this was made possible by the “Polish exception” in the sense of the enormous grassroots support enjoyed by the insurgent Solidarity well before the commencement of negotiations with the (already-defeated) political incumbents. At the end of the day, it was the

114 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

“strong” Polish society which prevailed over the powerfully entrenched, yet inherently weak, party-state. That said, the Polish precedent, though a factor as a kind of subtext for the antagonists of subsequent roundtable talks in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, was a sui generis proposition which offered few, if any, ready-made solutions for future negotiations in Budapest and Prague.”

The term “Czechoslovak National Roundtable” is a misnomer, since there were two sets of discussions, one in Prague and one in Bratislava, between Vaclav Havel’s Civic Forum and Jan Carnogursky’s Public Against Violence (PAV), and their respective opposite numbers at these venues. Of the two, it was with Havel, in Prague, that the substantive negotiations took place—with a decisive impact on short- and long-term institutional consequences. In any case, the Prague National Roundtable talks of November 26 to December 9, 1989, followed, rather than preceded, the regime’s collapse.”’ By that time, Poland’s Prime Minister was a member of Solidarity, the Hungarian ruling party was dissolved, the Berlin Wall was breached, and the Honecker regime was dethroned. Unlike in Poland and Hungary, the Czech and Slovak “insurgents” were be-

| reft of grassroots support prior to the epic confrontations between the die-hard Husak-Jakes regime and the people on Wenceslaw Square earlier in November. Although the Charter ‘77 group and its sympathizers throughout the country had a splendid record of civil courage in the face of ruthless repression, the movement as such had no readily available blueprint for institutional change. Due to chaos on the streets and the pressure of time to restore a semblance of normality, the Prague National Roundtable was, and could have been nothing other than, a hastily improvised dialogue between the two sides.

As may be judged from the scant—and subsequently, possibly, self-censored—evidence concerning these deliberations,’ and notwithstanding the overwhelming public support for drastic change, the “insurgents” bargaining position was extremely weak. Havel’s message to the incumbents served as a reminder of both sides’ precarious legitimacy. As he put it, unless agreement is _reached “the public [will] overthrow us and nobody knows what will follow.” In any event, it is unclear whether Vaclav Havel, the principal opposition negotiator, spoke for himself and the goals of the intelligentsia-led Charter ‘77 civil rights movement or for an imagined community of Czechs and Slovaks. As may be inferred from the outcome, he did both. On the one hand, he took a strong stance on behalf of “law and order” and respect for state institutions, particularly the office of the president. On the other hand, he sought to assuage the concerns of the hitherto inert and toward the regime ambivalent, public by saying that he had “no wish to punish [the] 1.7 million communists” of Czechoslovakia. More to the point, “Havel stressed that the November revolt was not against the Communists as such, but against the totali-

tarian order.”*° The gist of Havel’s position may thus be described as “institutional continuity and political change by way of selective replacement of top incumbents.” However, the Prague liberals’ fragile negotiating position was significantly undercut by the Slovak “parallel negotiators” insistence on their

Rudolf L. Tékés: Institution Building in Hungary 115 national, and inherently conservative, agenda. Jan Carnogursky’s demand that “the new federal government show [as] many elements of continuity as possible and that this continuity go beyond the next free elections” hinted at profound cleavages within the insurgent camp.7’ In short, a net assessment of the institutional consequences of the Czechoslovak National Roundtable scenario might include factors such as the significant imbalance of forces between incumbents and insurgents; the negotiators’ definition of the institutional requisites of peaceful transition from one political system

to another; shared commitment to the exclusion of non-elite participants from substantive decision-making prior to free elections; and built-in imponderables, such as the Slovak elite’s future adherence to the Prague agreements of November—December, 1989. The crucial point is that the Czech and Slovak elite groups, though living under the same federal institutional roof, had separate and, in institutional terms irreconcilable, agendas on statehood and on the extent to which they might effect an eventual political, economic, and cultural break with the Husak era. For models and precedents of pre-communist statehood, Prague had the | “philosopher king” Tomas Masaryk and the liberal democratic First Republic— both rooted in the rich nonconformist historical and liberal democratic intellectual traditions of a Czech civil society. On the other hand, Bratislava had Father Andrej Hlinka and his wartime fascist Slovak state and, more recently, the reformer Alexander Dubcek and his short-lived “socialism with a human face”— thus an unresolved and volatile legacy of ethno-nationalism and democratic socialism. As will be shown below, the preconditions for a regime change in Hungary were similar to, yet in some ways different from, those of its Central European neighbors. Hungary’s institutional patrimony included both “Polish” and Czech” elements of statehood, elite-led deliberative assemblies, strong attachment to the rule of law, and a heightened sense of national identity, as well as “Slovak” elements of ethnic-linguistic intolerance and a short-lived (1944-1945) relapse to the rule of native fascism. That said, and with the dismal precedent of the attribution of “collective guilt” (hence the post-war mass expulsion of ethnic Germans—men, women, and children—fully endorsed by Czechs and Poles alike) in mind, it appears that no one had a clean slate before the onset of communist rule in this part of the world. All this (and much more) was on the cards

in the winter of 1989-1990. |

The Hungarian National Roundtable: Change in the System or Change of the System? The participants in the National Roundtable had no prearranged agenda, only the stated goal to reach a “political agreement.” On the other hand, it was clear that an agenda, namely the much-discussed matter of institutional reforms, had been there all along. The main question—left unsaid at the outset—was how far they

116 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

might go along the path of reform yet still remain within the increasingly flexible boundaries of the existing political system. Although the negotiators spoke for three distinct elite constituencies—the party, the Opposition Roundtable (EKA), and the regime’s social auxiliaries—and for three seemingly incompatible sets of interests, their shared predicament may be likened to passengers of a boat adrift in a strong current heading toward an uncertain destination. All were “paddling the same boat” but, with respect to a choice between the options of “change in” and “change of” the system, or the boat’s intended destination, the anxious passengers were willing to gamble on radical change. The eventual outcome of the roundtable negotiations depended on the nego-

tiating behavior of key individuals with national constituencies and personal goals of their own, such as Imre Pozsgay; on that of the institutional actors, such as the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP) and the new political parties; and on externally (Moscow, Washington, Bonn) induced shifts in the balance of power between the regime and the opposition.”* These factors, in turn,

also influenced the roundtable participants’ largely hidden, or, at best, only partly articulated, ex ante beliefs (discussed above) and institutional preferences for a yet-to-be born post-communist Hungarian polity. Such beliefs and prefer- ences subsequently evolved into a spectrum of political postures on such preliminary questions of politics as “Who governs?” “By what title?” and “Who guards the guardians?” In any case, and for the time being, each of these factors was weighted in favor of a positive outcome in the summer of 1989. The incumbent party and state political elites were locked in a struggle for power which helped to paralyze the opponents of political pluralism and incremental institutional change within the political establishment. In fact, by his subsequent admission, Imre Pozsgay, the party’s chief negotiator, was working for the destruction of the MSZMP.”’ The EKA’s insistence on negotiating with the party rather than with the state enabled the insurgents to deal with leaders of a demoralized and rapidly disintegrating institution and thus benefit from the conflicting per~ sonal ambitions of its feuding leaders. The opposition’s negotiating leverage was further enhanced by the outcome of four parliamentary by-elections held in July and August. The stock of the, hitherto invisible, opposition parties began to register in the opinion polls. However, it was neither key individuals nor competing institutional participants but an external entity, that is, the state, which was the ultimate guarantor of a positive outcome of the roundtable process. The state bureaucracy, with Prime Minister Mikl6s Németh’s self-designated

caretaker “government of experts” at the helm, helped to level the political playing field in favor of a major overhaul of all political institutions in Hungary. The state’s chosen institutional partner to effect the desired change was Parliament. Following the 1985 multi-candidate elections, the legislative branch (with some behind-the-scenes support from pro-reform state bureaucrats) ceased to be the regime’s obedient “voting machine.” From 1987 on, groups of increasingly assertive party-member and independent MPs sought to promote constituency | interests and those of the MSZMP’s reform-minded elites around Imre Pozsgay.

Rudolf L. Tékés: Institution Building in Hungary 117 The main road markers of the reform socialists’ remarkable record between June 1988 and June 1989 may be summarized as follows: Beginning with its inauguration on November 24, 1998, the Németh government embraced as its own, and promised to implement, the “democracy package”—-a comprehensive list of seventeen items—which a group of independent-minded party and nonparty MPs had submitted to Parliament in June 1988:

e The “democracy package” was submitted barely a month after Kadar’s ousting from the leadership. It was a bold legislative initiative which set the agenda for institutional reform for the next fifteen months. The main items included modification of the electoral law; the establishment of administrative tribunals for election disputes; new House rules for Parliament; the replacement of the Presidential Council by the President of the People’s Republic; a new law to determine the constitutional position of the MSZMP; new laws on association and free assembly; on the trade unions and on human rights; new laws on national minorities, citizens’ initiatives, plebiscites, and local government; new laws on the press and on electronic media, on the establishment of a Constitutional Court and on the office of Ombudsman; and, above all, the drafting and enactment of a new constitution.””

e From early 1989 onwards, the government’s team of legal experts at the Ministry of Justice prepared, obtained party authorization for, and submitted for legislative action a series of bills which sought the enactment of two kinds of law: those designed to reform state institutions and those to bring Hungarian statutes into conformity with previously ratified international agreements on human rights by way of enabling legislation on the same.

e The government’s initiatives yielded a veritable flood of new laws on many subjects in the first half of 1989. Some of these dovetailed—and often preceded—the ruling party’s gradual policy concessions on association, assembly, the right to strike, enterprise reforms, grassroots petitions for the recall of unpopular parliamentary deputies, and the proposing of plebiscites on matters of national importance by citizens’ groups. Much of the rapid and somewhat chaotic parliamentary activity preceding the convening of the National Roundtable on June 13th, 1989, had been part of the government’s campaign to strip the MSZMP of its traditional perquisites of rulemaking and legislative agenda-setting. A related objective was the reassertion, by way of legislative initiatives, of the state’s right to implement drastic economic reforms through new laws and the general budgetary process. Govern-

ment action abolishing party control in personnel matters and bringing the party’s “private army,” the Workers’ Militia, under the control of the Ministry of Defence, completed the process of the state’s emancipation from party domination.

118 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

All of these measures were designed to effect changes in, rather than of, the existing political system. Qualitative systemic changes called for a different kind

of legislative agenda. At issue was the enactment of “fundamental” laws of “constitutional stature,” on such subjects as the Constitution itself, the office of President of the Republic, the Constitutional Court, political parties and party financing, electoral procedures, press and media law, the revision of the Criminal Code, and the establishment of new institutions for the protection of human rights. The Németh government crossed the political-ideological Rubicon in late June, 1989, shortly after the commencement of the National Roundtable process. By withdrawing all previously submitted “constitutional” bills from parliamentary consideration and handing over the entire package for decision by the NRT, the government took the first step toward political pluralism in Hungary. The government’s unilateral empowerment of the National Roundtable negotiators to serve as members of a “parallel Parliament/ ad hoc constituent assembly” enlarged the circle of authorised institution builders and, by administrative fiat, created an instant multiparty system also.

Political Change and Institutional Design: Models in Search of Survival and Stability The task at hand is to assess the contributions of the roundtable process to the crafting of political institutions in post-communist Hungary. It is a challenging enterprise which may, perhaps, be likened to reading passengers’ lips in a moving train passing through a dark tunnel. Although we know, at least in terms of political rhetoric from all sides, what they set out to do before entering the tunnel, as well as what they agreed on at the end, nine years after the fact we still do not know exactly who said—mainly off the record—what to whom, when, and why. Some of the answers may be found in the National Roundtable’s 3,000(+) page-long transcript and appended documentary material as augmented by firstand second-hand commentary by participants and observers respectively.”’

One way to come to grips with the rich, albeit opaque, body of evidence might be found by comparing the “before” and “after” versions of institutional blueprints which came before the negotiators. For the sake of the orderly presentation of evidence, let us assign descriptive labels to each successive constitu-

tional-institutional blueprint. As will appear below, the terms “communist,” “reform socialist,” “transitional,” “democratic” and “democratic-plus” seek to denote the normative essence of each successive institutional blueprint. The chosen vehicle of inquiry will be termed a “constitutional model.” In the context of

the following arguments by a constitutional model, I understand a legalideological artifact, which is designed to translate the framers’ normative preferences and institutional choices into a blueprint for governance. The basic purpose of constitutions is to enshrine ideological core values and institutional ar-

Rudolf L. Tékés: Institution Building in Hungary 119 rangements, particularly the relationships between citizens and state, into a seamless whole of political legitimacy, social stability and economic development. Accordingly, between 1949 and 2000:

e Firstly, came “model C” (Communist), that is, Act XX of 1949, the old communist-era constitution, as amended up to 1989; * e Secondly came “model RS” (Reform Socialist), which was a comprehensive package of legal proposals by academic-bureaucrats of the Ministry of Justice submitted to the Central Committee of the MSZMP in JanuaryFebruary 1989; e Thirdly came “model T” (Transitional), which consisted of Act XXXI of

1989—incorporating the gist of the National Roundtable Agreement, which amended and totally reshaped “model C” and also included additional laws enacted by Parliament in October 1989; e Fourthly came “model D” (Democratic), which incorporated the results of a political agreement between the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) of May 1990, as enacted into law by the freely elected Parliament in the summer of 1990; and e Fifthly came “model D+” which consisted of the sum total of constitutional amendments enacted since the fall of 1990 and of several Acts of Parliament “of constitutional stature” which created new, and reshaped old, institutions. Of the five models, the middle three, that is, RS, T, and D are salient to the matter at hand. a. The RS model originated with a MSZMP Politburo decision of May 31st,

1988, which commissioned a Ministry of Justice-led task-force to “review the constitution” and prepare recommendations for the “guiding principles” of a new constitution.*? The ministry’s report had been scrutinized by a Central Commit-

tee- (CC-) appointed constitutional co-ordinating group, by experts at the Council of Ministers, as well as by legal academics. The task force’s main— stated and unstated—findings may be summarized as follows:

e “Model C” no longer corresponded with Hungary’s new political and socio-economic realities in the late 1980s and became an impediment to evolutionary change in politics, economy, and society. Therefore, it had to be replaced by a new “basic law” and a set of appropriately redesigned old laws, as well as by newly created institutions and regulatory mechanisms. The new constitution was to be a “forward-looking” instrument of a lawgoverned state (jogallam). It was to contain explicit provisions for citizens’ rights, to offer recognition and provide legal protection of newly evolving property relations, and grant significantly enhanced autonomy for the state and its specialized agencies—above all the government. In a somewhat more circumspect manner, although the zero-sum implications

120 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

are unambiguous, the document also called for the deletion of references

| to the MSZMP in the new constitution and banned the “direct use of ' [state] power” by any political party. e In the somewhat opaque, although in certain respects extremely specific, language of the ministry report, the reform socialists’ real intentions become quite clear. What they were saying was that the state, as the embodiment of Hungary’s “thousand year-old legal continuity of [sovereign] statehood,” had to be restored to its proper place at the apex of political

institutions. In a somewhat schizophrenic manner, the report urged the restoration of traditional symbols of statehood, such as the old coat-ofarms (including the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen at the top), but yet sought to retain the designation of the state as a “people’s democracy.” Moreover, to preserve socio-economic stability whilst promoting necessary political change, the state was to be embedded in the context of a rational and transparent system of checks and balances in which each, old and new, component would function in harmony.

e In institutional terms, the RS model called for the full restoration of the traditional pre-communist powers of the prime minister and those of the state bureaucracy; a significant increase in the scope of Parliament’s legis-

lative activity; the creation of the office of President of the Republic, a Constitutional Court, a National Accounting Office, and the office of a Parliamentary spokesperson (Ombudsman) for citizens’ rights.

These proposals, when put in the context of the Hungarian political elites’ still unresolved power struggle for the right to set the terms for changes in (or of) the political system, may be decoded as the incumbent reform-socialist legal technocrats’ responses to the “first question,” that is, “Who governs?” of Hun-

garian transition politics of 1989-1990. Specifically, the constitutional draughtsmen (essentially the Minister of Justice and his two deputies—all law professors) and the socialist reform-elites for whom they spoke sought:

e to preserve the still viable and discard the dysfunctional components of “model C”’;

e to build up Prime Minister Miklos Németh’s position against Party Secretary-General Karoly Grosz and the conservative party “apparat”’; e to strengthen Parliament—although, by rejecting the bicameral option, maintaining its dependence on the government; e to introduce new institutional pillars—the presidency, for Imre Pozsgay, and the Constitutional Court, for members of the incumbent legal establishment; e to preserve the administrative autonomy of corporatist entities, such as the local authorities, the trade unions, the procuracy, and the courts; and e to set terms for the administration of controlled political change by way of constitutional provisions for party pluralism and government-supervised elections.

Rudolf L. Tékés: Institution Building in Hungary 121 Next to a new constitution, the report also listed two kinds of law which needed to be enacted to complete the process of institutional overhaul. The first consisted of fourteen “laws of constitutional stature,” each of which defined or redefined the modus operandi of core institutions and political processes. These were designed to spearhead the process of institutional modernization and political change. The second was a list of sixty-three laws to codify and/or to implement, by way of enabling legislation, the operational intent of the “basic” and the “semi-basic” laws. Left unsaid in the report, but pointed out in the press, was that, during the preceding four decades, the, largely dormant, Parliament had enacted only fiftyodd laws, whilst the country was run on the dubious constitutionality of some

6,500 published (and a great many unpublished) decrees of the Presidential Council, the Council of Ministers, and other government agencies. In any case, the press failed to mention the obvious, namely that all Acts of Parliament and most decrees “with the force of law” had originated with (mainly unpublished) MSZMP Politburo or Secretariat decisions, resolutions, and verbal instructions

to Parliament and government agencies. : The task of bringing the debris of four decades’ of regulatory chaos into legal concordance with the letter and spirit of a new constitution was an inherently unmanageable proposition. Thus, instead of a crash program of legal review and codification (still unfinished ten years later), the proposed implementation of the

RS model focused on the bare essentials—that is, on a dozen or so “fundamental” laws on key institutions with which to preserve legal continuity and yet facilitate institutional change.

Discussion

It appears that the RS model was built on several, albeit unstated, political and legal assumptions. The most important of these was the belief that with the removal of the “loose cannon” ruling party from the constitution, the institutional architecture of existing socialism, with incremental innovations and the instauration of reinvented and replicated ** institutions, was reformable under the auspices of the incumbent s/ate administrative elites. The regime’s scenario—(a)

legislative consideration, (b) (regime-supervised) “public discussion” of proposed legislation, (c) lawmaking and, in the case of a new constitution, (d) a national referendum, and (e) follow-up legislative approval—was predicated on the basis of a three-year process of controlled political change under a Communistdominated multiparty coalition government.” The new constitution was envisaged—though never so stated—as a replica of

the German Basic Law as retro-fitted with a cluster of “semi-basic,” or “fundamental,” laws. The latter were intended to codify the modus operandi of new institutions and to reconfirm the corporatist autonomy of old institutions such as the local authorities, the courts, and the trade unions.

122 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Soziale Marktwirtschaft, as the economic policy corollary of the German institutional template, though very much a part of the reform socialists’ agenda, was smuggled into the report with an awkward formulation: “It must be registered as a constitutional tenet that the Hungarian economy is a market economy which is influenced by socialist socio-economic goals and is one in which the basic task of the state’s economic policy is the promotion, by way of adaptation to conditions of the world economy and to the creation of a [domestic] productivity-oriented economic environment, of a smoothly functioning market.”*° On the other hand, the report’s continued lip-service to the indispensability of central planning raises questions about the real intentions of the RS model. The RS model provided for a strong executive (see above) and severely lim-

ited the scope of legislative authority. As the report put it, “Parliament is the bearer of important entitlements bequeathed to it by [the principle of] popular sovereignty, but it is by no means the sole repository of the sum total of power derived from popular sovereignty... It has no operative role in the guidance of the state.’ However, elsewhere, the very same Parliament was to be endowed with near-veto powers by the requirement of a two-thirds majority of votes to pass, or to amend, fundamental laws. One surmises that the RS model had in _ mind a socialist-dominated legislature and a kind of easy-to-change “rubber constitution” rather than a politically divided, fractious multiparty Parliament. Human rights were a key item in the RS model. In a separate chapter devoted to this matter, the list of rights was construed from two sources. Basic personality and procedural, or the so-called first- and second-generation rights, were to be derived from international norms, such as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and similar charters to which Hungary had adhered and which Parliament had ratified in the preceding four decades. The generous inventory of personal and political rights is supplemented by an even more generous list of “third-generation” social and economic rights. Much of the latter was a carbon copy of welfare rights which one could find in “model C.”

The dilemma of converting the socialist state’s welfare entitlements into guaranteed rights in a “planned-plus-market” mixed economy was finessed by the following formulation: With respect to economic, social and cultural rights, general [constitutional] guarantees are realized in terms of the state’s activities. However, in the course of constitutional deliberations, it will be necessary to review, in view of the available resources, which of the state’s previous obligations can be honored in the future. Instead of the scope of state intervention, it is the legal means with which the state endeavors to realize such rights which ought to be specified.” In short, the regime’s endorsement of the reform-socialist model in February, 1989, marked the beginning of Hungary’s institutional transformation. The RS model was conceived as an open-ended agenda for controlled change in, rather than of, the political system. Yet, as will be shown below, without a planning document of this kind, the NRT might have had an inconclusive “Polish” or, worse, a “Czech” ending rather than a feasible program for peaceful systemic change.

Rudolf L. Tékés: Institution Building in Hungary 123

Transition Contingencies: Provisional or Permanent Institutions? Model T consisted of laws, a written political pact, and informal agreements. Specifically, the model included the revised constitution, several Acts of Parliament enacted between October 1989 and March 1990, the National Roundtable Agreement proper, and various transition-linked confidence-building measures derived from the “spirit” of the Agreement. Let us consider each. In a legal sense, Act XXXI of 1989 was an amended version of Act XX of 1949, that is, model C plus twenty-one modifications between 1949 and 1988. In any case, according to press reports, the October 1989 version changed all but 20 percent of the 1988 text. This is probably true but begs the question as to how much of the 80 percent change should be credited to the RS model and its legislative follow-up prior to the National Roundtable, and how much to the opposition’s efforts at the National Roundtable talks. Upon comparing the text of the Ministry of Justice report of January-February 1989 and that of the interim constitution of October 1989, it appears that about three-quarters of the RS text, with minor changes and the repositioning of several paragraphs, was incorporated into Act XXXI of 1989. On the other hand, it is fair to assume that it was the remaining quarter which contained the new language which was mainly responsible for the reshaping of old, and the creation of new, institutions for a post-communist Hungary. That said, it must be kept in mind that the published text of the National Roundtable Agreement merely lists the subjects of “six legislative proposals”—-one of which was for the amending of the old constitution—but does not provide the agreed language for them. *’ From this, and from interviews with key roundtable negotiators, it may be surmised that some of these “proposals” were, to whatever extent, subsequently modified in the course of parliamentary (committee-level) deliberations in October 1989. This may be yet another reason why the transcript of the National Roundtable’s deliberations was, for the next ten years, unavailable to the Hungarian public. According to the preamble to Act XXXI of 1989, the Act’s principai objectives were the facilitation of “peaceful transition to a constitutional state” and the instauration of a “multiparty system, parliamentary democracy, and socially responsible market economy.” In the following fourteen chapters there is a list of general provisions which included detailed descriptions of the scope of Parliament’s legislative competence and language on the status of MPs, followed by the specification of the modus operandi of new institutions (the Presidency, the Constitutional Court, the office of Ombudsman, and the State Audit Office), that of the government, the military, the courts, and the procuracy, and a comprehensive list of “fundamental rights and duties of citizens.”

124 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Discussion Let us consider the main components of “model T.” It must be stated at the outset that the adjective “transitional,” although an accurate characterization of the Hungarian institution builders’ original intent, is misleading. As will be shown below, the essential structural components of each of the main pillars—the Interim Constitution, Parliament, Government, the Constitutional Court, the office of President, the party- and the electoral system—were “cast in concrete” in 1989. Subsequent modifications, as effected by models D and D+ notwithstanding, the organizational logic and patterns of interaction among all key institutions and the role-driven behavior of top incumbents are, to a decisive extent, still determined by the letter and, in many ways by the spirit of, “model T”. The Interim Constitution was meant to be a provisional charter to provide legal continuity between model RS-cum-National Roundtable Agreement and the convening of a freely elected multiparty Parliament in May 1990. The document as such may be seen as a combination of ideological rhetoric, a nearly completed draft charter of key political institutions, and an exhaustive list of fundamental rights and of the duties of citizens. The purpose of this ideological rhetoric was to neutralize the potential nay-saying (predominantly party-member) MPs and secure their vote for the enactment of new laws. Formulations such as “The Republic of Hungary shall be an independent and democratic constitutional state in

which the values of civil democracy and of democratic socialism prevail” [Section 2 (1)] and “Hungary shall have a market economy also making use of the advantages of planning in which public and private property shall receive equal consideration and protection under the law” [Section 9 (1)] were convenient fig-leaves to legitimate the socialist state’s incumbent administrative elites’ status on the public payroll. i. As an institutional shell, Parliament had been a flexible instrument with the historically proven capacity to function with or without a written constitution

and yet to facilitate legal continuity from one political regime to another. Throughout history, for Hungary’s political classes of the day it was a familiar tool with which to promote and oversee effective governance. Thus the restoration of Parliament’s traditional powers was the principal political payoff of opposition pressure to recapture strategic decision-making from the party-state bu-

reaucracy for the citizens of Hungary. In sharp contrast to the RS model’s grudging concessions to parliamentary sovereignty, the interim constitution provided for a radically different formulation: “Exercising its rights deriving from the sovereignty of the people, Parliament shall ensure the constitutional order of society, and determine the organization, direction and conditions of government” [Section 4 (2)]. Parliament’s legislative powers were further enhanced or, depending on the circumstances, constrained, by new constitutional provisions for the enactment

and/or the amendment of “fundamental” laws and those of “constitutional

Rudolf L. Tékés: Institution Building in Hungary 125 standing.” The very long list of such laws and the requirement of two-thirds majorities of all MPs for passage or amendment [Section 9 (3)] was clearly designed to tie (not only the Németh but the post-election) government’s hands in several policy fields. The same “republican” (in the sense of the French Third and Fourth Republic) spirit motivated the enactment of procedures for a legislative vote of “no confidence” in the government [Section 14 (3a)]. According to this measure, Parliament had the right to force a government to resign but not the responsibility to propose an alternative cabinet. The provision that “Parliament shall decide on the election of a new government within forty days from the approval of the motion of no confidence” [Section 25 (2)] evoked the specter of an Italian-style legislative gridlock and interim governance by the non-elected state bureaucracy. In any case, Parliament’s constitutional charter was simply another

shell still to be given operative meaning with a charter, that is the House Rules, of its own.

ii. The establishment of the Constitutional Court—an institution without precedent in Hungarian jurisprudence—was the reform socialist legal establishment’s answer to a key question of post-communist politics: “Who guards the guardians?” According to the preamble to Act XXXII of 1989, Parliament created a Central Committee “to construct a law-governed state to defend constitutional order and that of the constitutionally guaranteed basic rights, and to make provisions for the separation and mutual balancing of powers.” In lieu of a detailed listing of the Court’s powers and legal perquisites, it should be stated at the outset that the (lame duck) Hungarian Parliament, probably quite unwittingly, created an immensely powerful new political institution of legal oversight with the capacity to control and modify the behavior of institutions and key incumbents in post-communist Hungary.

The Court’s jurisdiction covers four main areas of constitutional review. These are (a) “specific norm control,” that is the adjudication of individual petitions submitted by citizens, organizations, and lower courts; (b) “abstract norm control,” that is, the determination of the constitutionality of laws, ministerial decrees, and regulations issued by other central and local state administrative authorities; (c) “preliminary abstract norm control,” that is, the determination of the constitutionality of bills pending in Parliament (repealed by Act I of 1998); and (d) “abstract constitutional interpretation,” that is, in response to legal queries submitted to the Court, the determination of the constitutionality of the issue at hand and/or that of laws and other regulations that, in the Court’s judgment, pose analogous constitutional issues.”

In an essay on the politics of East European constitution-making Elster submits: “Suppose that a political institution is both a participant in the constitution-making process and is among the institutions to be regulated by the constitution. The interests of that institution will be then to enhance its own position in the constitutional framework, at the expense of the other organs of the state.””° Precisely. However, in the Hungarian case Elster totally misreads the evidence when saying:

126 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

The Hungarian framers abdicated a great deal of their powers to other institutions [that is, outside Parliament], even though they did not have to. The crucial difference was perhaps that, unlike in other East European countries, Hungary never elected a constituent parliament. The Hungarian Constitution was produced a chaud, an emergency operation almost, on a day-to-day basis, by a parliament elected before the transition. Because the institution was in poor repute, and the deputies demoralized, institutional interest had no leverage on the final outcome.” As shown above, much of the interim constitution had been derived from the RS model. It was a product of the old regime’s enlightened legal experts’ vision of a “law-governed” post-communist state, thence the codification of the socialist reform elites’ institutional interests. Moreover, as will be discussed below, the Hungarian constitution-framers’ alleged “abdication of...powers” to extra-

parliamentary institutions was part of the incumbent legal experts’ antirepublican agenda—that of constraining the scope of the decisional competence of elected bodies, especially of Parliament, by a cluster of add-on “non-political” and “expert” semi-autonomous bureaucratic fiefdoms. These included that of Ombudsman (one for the protection of citizens’ rights; another for the protection of national and ethnic minorities); the State Accounting Office, the procuracy, the police, the military, the National Bank, and other non-elected “guardians of public interest” such as the governing bodies of “public service” electronic media.” In other words, contrary to uninformed speculation by Western analysts concerning institutional changes in Hungary, constitution-making was not a dayto-day improvisation and building of a “basic law” from randomly selected statutes and legal norms, but an incumbent Ministry of Justice-supervised effort to

assemble, mainly from prefabricated elements, a legal artifact entitled Act XXXII of 1989. The Central Committee was much more than a fail-safe golden parachute for selected members of the old Communist and non-communist legal establishment. Its charter was also a political agenda for the governance of post-communist Hungary. Some of it may be perceived as a built-in vote of no confidence in institutions of popular sovereignty, particularly Parliament. It seems that this body, with or without proof, was, and has been since 1990, seen by the creatures of Act XXXII of 1989, that is, the justices of the Court, as a potential heir to the institutionalized voluntarism of the old ruling party which could not be trusted to translate its political mandate into legitimate rule making and constitutional governance. In any case, the Court’s self-attribution, in Offe’s terms, of “hyper-rationality””° as the supreme guardian of the public interest may have been evidence of what one might call custodial hubris. On the other hand, it is self-evident that the “fictive notion of transplantation,” in this case of the much-admired German model of constitutional review, served to “hide the [institution-] designers’ real intentions.”*” No one knew what these were in the autumn of 1989. iii, The institution of President of the Republic had been ushered into Hungary by revolutions (1848-849 and 1918), and by political sea changes—as in

Rudolf L. Tokés: Institution Building in Hungary 127 1945-1948. These brief periods, insofar as they created any kind of legal precedent, showed the bearer of this title as more of a figurehead than a “semi-strong” head of state. This tradition was further strengthened by the forty-year history of Hungary’s Soviet-style collective presidency and by the dismal record of the series of political nonentities who chaired this body under Rakosi and Kadar. As indicated above, the reform socialists’ dissatisfaction with the old Presidential Council’s prodigious law-making activities crystallised in the form of a blueprint for the upgrading of this position from that of a substitute for Parliament to that of its constitutionally bounded (and politically subordinated) institutional partner.

As may be inferred from the inconclusive documentary evidence, the presidential portion of the RS model was custom-made for a well-known (and preferably popular) socialist reform politician. In view of Imre Pozsgay’s all-butpublicly-announced candidacy for this position and of his high standing in the polls in the first nine months of 1989, he became the MSZMP’s candidate for the presidency. As his party’s chief National Roundtable negotiator, his asking-price for the regime’s delivering against the opposition forces’ extensive legislative wish-list was their endorsement of his candidacy for President of the Republic. Although Pozsgay had nothing against Parliament and was not particularly interested in the acquisition through this office of “strong,” let alone dictatorial, powers, he insisted on the implementation of the RS model, that is, election by plebiscite rather than by Parliament. In any case, in the summer of 1989 it was not the method of election or, necessarily, the candidate as a person but the incumbents’ insistence that it be held prior to parliamentary elections, which led to | the first (and only) political clash over institutional design in the transition period. The story of the National Roundtable Agreement, which endorsed both the method and the proposed timing of presidential elections, the refusal of the Free Democrats’ and of the Youth Federation’s (Fidesz) to sign the agreement, and the successful four-party (Free Democrats, Fidesz, Independent Smallholders, and Social Democrats) drive to force a plebiscite on this matter, need not be retold here. “8

Whereas the defeat on November 26, 1989, by a narrow margin, of the proposed January 1990 plebiscite for President entailed both short-term electoral

and long-term political consequences, the real analytical issue is that of the precedent set for the direct exercise of popular sovereignty in post-communist Hungary. The institution of the plebiscite was a Soviet import into Hungarian public law. A watered-down version of this institution had been officially sponsored “public debates”—such as those which preceded the introduction of multicandidate elections in 1985—on previously decided, and subsequently implemented, regime policies. The actual participants in these staged affairs were selected representatives of the regime’s corporatist auxiliaries. However, in 1989 the RS model expanded this notion (see Act XVII of 1989) by empowering voters to initiate petitions for the recall of their parliamentary MPs. By October 1989 up to a quarter of the sitting MPs came under such civic scrutiny.

128 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

The roundtable process was an elite affair, as well as a kind of “public debate,” albeit one held behind closed doors. The shared objective of negotiations was to prevent “the man in the street” from interfering with the implementation of elite-brokered political pacts. Although the recall of a few unpopular MPs and the one-time alteration by plebiscite of the presidency-related sections of the National Roundtable Agreement ran counter to the logic of negotiated institutional change, these could be (and were) promptly written off as unplanned, but not fatally damaging, by-products of transition politics. The outcome carried two important lessons for the political classes of post-communist Hungary: firstly, that direct democracy, such as the election of a President by plebiscite, inevitably confers on the chosen person a kind of super-legitimacy which neither parliamentary MPs nor the Prime Minister enjoy and which also runs counter to the elites’ widely shared ex ante consensus on a “weak,” or at most “semi-strong,” office of President of the Republic, and, secondly, that the exercise of direct democracy entailed the introduction of (inherently uncontrollable) public emotions into the constitutionally regulated and elite-managed processes of normal politics. Although the model D constitution paid lip-service to the principle of direct democracy [Chapter I. Par. 2 (2)], the same model provided for the election of President by Parliament [Chapter III. Par. 29/A (1)]. iv. The legal status of political parties and that of electoral procedures was codified in Acts XXXIII and XXXIV of 1989, respectively.” As institutions, political parties and electoral laws (legal, “gate-keeping” mechanisms which provide access to the legitimate exercise of legislative power) are all parts of a symbiotic whole, which the terms political pluralism and multiparty democracy generally denote. As discussed above, the constituent units of the EKA were, for purposes of roundtable negotiation, granted official recognition as parties rather

than as “social organizations” by the regime. The opposition forces’ quasiparliamentary standing was affirmed by the Agreement, which conferred legal immunity from police harassment on all EKA negotiators for the duration of the transition period. With these confidence-building measures in mind, let us consider the parties’ constitutional position in the interim constitution.

' Parties are referred to in Section 2 (3) and Section 3 (1-3) in Act XXXI of 1989. The key provisions are “... no activity, whether of a social or a state organization, or of any citizen, may be aimed at securing or exercising power by means of force, or at the exclusive possession of power”; “... subject to the observance of the Constitution and the constitutional laws, political parties may be freely formed and may freely operate”; “... parties shall take part in forming and expressing the will of the people;” “... parties may not exercise public power directly... no party may control or direct any State organ”; and “... to ensure the effective separation of the parties from State power, the law shall determine the positions and public offices which may not be filled by any member or officer of

any party.” ,

Two issues are worthy of note. Firstly, that the constitutional ban on oneparty rule may be read as normative bias against the formation of a, however

Rudolf L. Tékés: Institution Building in Hungary 129 freely elected, one-party government. When seen in this light, the Hungarian Socialist Party’s (MSZP) landslide electoral victory in 1994 and its control of 54 percent of parliamentary seats, although never challenged by the Constitutional Court, might have been interpreted by that party as excessive—hence the motive to invite the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) to form a coalition government. Secondly, the ban on party affiliation by key officials (save for the cabinet

and officers of Parliament) and of the anointing, with ideologically untainted supra-political status, the heads and key members of institutions such as the Court and a host of semiautonomous agencies of legal-administrative oversight, which although elected by Parliament are profoundly political, is evidence of the reform socialist constitution-framers’ deeply held anti-republican bias. According to the National Roundtable Agreement of September 18, 1989, “[T]he introduction of the multiparty system should not entail greater financial burdens for society than the one-party system.” This quote is highly revealing and merits closer scrutiny. On the one hand, it sought to cover up the enormous

disparity between the resources of the penniless new parties and those of the billionaire (in US dollar terms) MSZMP and its successor, the MSZP. On the other hand, in the name of “equal opportunity” (esélyegyenldség), it perpetuated

and institutionalized the political parties’ financial dependency on the state budget. Moreover, the conceptualization of party-financing (campaign expenses,

salaries of officers, and other operating costs) as a linear extension of the MSZMP’s self-evidently illegitimate expropriation in the preceding forty years of public funds for party purposes, made the new multiparty system appear, in the public eye, as an equally frivolous burden on the state treasury and as a misuse of tax monies. In any case, perhaps the most sensible use of state funds for party financing was to hand out operating subsidies to “also ran” parties which received at least | percent of the popular vote at parliamentary elections. In this

way, all would-be-trouble-making left- and right-wing parties with a large enough membership to mount mass demonstrations became law-abiding financial wards of the state. Unlike the party law with its many legal loopholes for financial mischief, Act

XXXIV of 1989, “On the Election of Members of Parliament” was a wellnegotiated and legally watertight agreement between the regime and the opposi-

tion.” The technical aspects, particularly the nearly impenetrable details of electoral mathematics (on this, see Appendix No. 4 to Article 52, par. d) need not be discussed here. What stands out however, is the Agreement’s signatories’ commitment to two—one self-serving and one prudential—overriding political

objectives. The opposition negotiators were both self-selected and regime- | sanctioned representatives of largely non-existent party constituencies. Their active participation in the roundtable process and signatures—granted or withheld—on the closing document gave invaluable public exposure, thus an early start to six opposition parties and—except for a few independents and one MP from the Agrarian Alliance (ASZ)—all but one party (the Social Democrats) and the MSZMP’s successor party, the MSZP, gained seats in the freely elected Par-

130 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

liament. The 4 percent electoral threshold imposed to make a party eligible to be allocated seats based on regional and national party lists proved to be a critically important screening device to limit the number of parliamentary parties, both preventing political fragmentation and facilitating stable party coalitions. The prudential objective of governability was a shared concern of all roundtable participants, as well as being, probably, the most positive legacy of the roundtable process.

Model D: A New Beginning or Old Wine in New Bottles? The “stability of newly born democratic institutions” and the enhanced “governability” of the Republic were the reasons stated for the conclusion of a political agreement between the winner and the runner-up in the March-April, 1990, free elections.’ The MDF-SZDSZ “pact” was designed to eliminate the old regime’s ideological rhetoric from the text of the Constitution and to free the cabinet government from parliamentary procedural traps which the framers of model T had laid for the executive branch. SZDSZ’s asking-price of the new coalition government’s endorsement of an SZDSZ backbencher’s nomination as President of the Republic seemed, at that time, a fair exchange for the stabilization of the prime minister’s position during the next parliamentary cycle. In any case, unlike the “all-party” National Roundtable agreement, the MDF-SZDSZ agreement was concluded with the exclusion of, and unbeknown to, the other parliamentary parties and became the source of political distrust among all parties—especially between the principals in this affair. Act XL of 1990, “On Amending the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary,” was partly a streamlined, and partly a selectively revised, version of an interim constitution.” Apart from purging from the earlier text all references to socialism, “people’s democracy,” central planning, and the like, the substantive provisions (a) restored to Parliament the right to elect the President of the Republic; (b) stabilized the position of the Prime Minister by making him alone

accountable to Parliament for the performance of his cabinet by way of (successful) submission of a “constructive motion of no confidence” (on four separate occasions within twelve months, together with the election of a new candidate within forty days thereafter); (c) expanded the nominating powers of the President and empowered him, under constitutionally specified circumstances, to dissolve Parliament; and (d) abolished the category of laws denoted as “basic” and “of constitutional stature” and specified twenty legislative subjects requiring a two-thirds majority for enactment into law and for their subsequent amendment. With these constitutional modifications in place and the enactment (with very few changes) of the old regime’s draft bill on the election of councilors and mayors of local authorities (Act LXIV of 1990), the stage was set for “normal politics” and democratic institution-building in Hungary.”

Rudolf L. Tékés: Institution Building in Hungary 131 At this juncture, therefore, an interim balance-sheet on the institutional accomplishments of models RS, T, and D might seem to be in order. Discussion As far as can be determined, each of the three models sought to provide remedies for perceived pathologies of institutional under-performance in respect of political guidance, economic development, and social stability. As the framers of the RS model saw it, ideological voluntarism, malformed institutional design, particularly overlapping and conflicting party and state jurisdiction over policy and

the management of resource allocations, the lack of established participatory mechanisms for the articulation of (mainly economic) interest by organizations and individuals, and the regime’s under-utilization of the law as the instrument of choice for conflict-resolution had been responsible for the decline and impending crisis of existing socialism in Hungary. The proposed remedy called for

an immense, historically unprecedented, codification effort which involved fourteen “fundamental” and sixty-three “other” laws on every conceivable sub-

ject. |

As discussed above, the RS model was open-ended in the sense of including institutional changes, such as the authorization of party pluralism, something which could not be accommodated in an evolutionary “change in the regime” type of political paradigm. The issue of legitimacy, in the sense of the necessity of obtaining public endorsement of the proposed modalities of institutional restructuring, was never articulated in the planning documents—nor was it fully aired in parliamentary discussions on the Németh government’s reform bills. Instead, the framers finessed the issue by talking about a “law-governed state,” whilst controlling the expansion of civic participation in social (and later political) associations and of greater transparency of the legislative process. In any case, the real answer to the, by then admittedly “transitional”, regime’s dilemmas of legitimacy was provided in the (then Interim) Constitution under the rubric of basic political and social rights. To the unstated question “What are the legitimacy alternatives to the ‘here and now’?” the reform socialists’ apparent answer was “there and now.” According to DiMaggio and Powell, “[T]he more uncertain the relationship be-

tween means and ends, the greater the extent to which an organization will model itself after organizations it perceives as successful.””* At issue is the reform-socialist framers’ hidden agenda, that is, the transplantation into Hungary

- of those elements of the German constitutional model which provide, inter alia, , for a full inventory of negative (political liberties) and positive (social and welfare) rights to citizens of a Rechtsstaat, or a law-governed state (jogdllam).

Why Germany and why the German model? Gray’s proposition, “... the German model ... is perceived in Eastern Europe, and even in Russia, as the real success story of the post-war period,”” gives part of the answer. The rest may be

132 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

inferred from the Hungarian state bureaucrats’ admiration for that welladministered state—with its social stability and economic prosperity under the management of an autonomous civil service, independent courts, an efficient procuracy, and, above all, the benefit of solid support from a law-abiding citizenry. These perceptions were rooted both in the risk-averse Beamter mindsets of Kadar’s nomenklatura cadres and in traditional, albeit never fulfilled, Hungarian administrative elite aspirations for such. A “social market economy” (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) and state policies implementing this, were some of the principal legitimacy-building tools of the German model. To the reform socialists, its chief attractiveness lay in the fact that the German model delivered in full on all positive rights which the “real existing” socialist state had promised in its constitution but had proved unable to fulfil. In any case, from the perspective of the viscerally anti-capitalist Hungarian elites—regime and opposition alike—the notion of a social market economy represented the ideal compromise between the, demonstrably bankrupt, centrally planned socialist and the unregulated, “bare-knuckle” world of the classical

capitalist market economy. Their thinking may best be described by citing Gray’s explanation of the rationale of the German economic model. “Market institutions must ... be complemented by other institutions which

- confer on market participants forms of security possessed by them as citizens. Market institutions are not free-standing, but come embedded in other institutions, including those in which government acts to protect citizens from forms of insecurity that market institutions by themselves may create, or are powerless to prevent—a task of the government that is... enshrined in the Basic Law of the German constitution.” The mirage of the instauration of the German model by “institutional design and legislative fiat” °’ yielded yet another mirage: the framers’ deliberate obfuscation of differences between the programmatic and aspirational elements of the citizens’ economic and welfare rights in the transitional, that is, in the interim constitution. The making of unfunded, and, in the given circumstances, economically unsustainable, legal commitments for the delivery of German-style positive rights in a country with the highest, per capita, foreign indebtedness in Eastern Europe (and the highest, per capita, budgetary expenditure for social welfare purposes in Europe) was a shrewd ploy to buy time for the undisturbed transfer of power from one political elite to another. A legitimacy deficit may also be overcome by non-economic means. Appeals to potentially high-resonance public values and beliefs, such as patriotism, national independence, and political justice for every man and woman, were available tools to provide the conspicuously missing moral content in elite discourse on institutional change and political transformation. None of this came to pass in the spring and summer of 1989, and instead, the public was treated to moving, yet carefully orchestrated, spectacles, such as the ceremonial reburial of Imre

Nagy and his fellow victims of post-1956 political repression and the festive instauration of the Republic of Hungary on October 23rd, 1989, the forty-third anniversary of the 1956 revolution. The first sought to evoke the memory of a

Rudolf L. Tokés: Institution Building in Hungary 133 defeated revolution and, thereby, to re-legitimate the reform-socialist antecedents

of the current political leadership. The second was as much the roundtable elite’s—and the Németh government’s—reward to a demobilized public for good behavior, a pre-emptive move to neutralize the man-in-the-street, in case the, hitherto passive, masses should seize the moment and take matters into their own hands. On balance, the political bargain makers—politicians and legal technocrats alike—judged well when choosing to refrain from substituting the (inherently undeliverable) constitutional “bread” for the ideological “circus.” Indeed, the key transition document, the National Roundtable Agreement of September 18, 1989, had nothing to say about either “ideological” or “bread and butter” issues, and so it fell to the outgoing Parliament and to the interim constitution which it spawned to commit the post-communist state to the delivery of both symbolic and substantive legitimacy for the new and the restructured old institutions. In

doing so, the transition elites and their institution-building legal technicians elected to build on loose gravel rather than on the bedrock of authentic legitimacy.

As Przeworski explained, “[C]onsent to democracy is contingent... on the congruence between the moral content of institutions and the basic values of society,” adding that “democratic institutions that fail to provide moral leadership cannot cope with conflicts originating from economic inequality and deprivation.””* Nor could the socialist regime, albeit (that) it had a better grasp, for its resources were insufficient to the satisfaction of what the homo Kadaricus perceived as public and private interest. There is ample survey evidence to suggest that. both had been understood and internalized primarily in economic security-

oriented and institutional stability-oriented survivalist terms.” In this kind of cognitive context institutions as such were devoid of moral authority and were seen mainly as targets of relentless individual and societal rent-seeking behavior under the flag of “realisation of interests”—or érdekérvényesités, in Hungarian. The introduction of a multiparty system was marketed to the Hungarian public with the assurance that it would not “cost more” than had the care and feed-

ing of the MSZMP. The selling of newfangled notions of “democracy” and “market economy” called for a similar commitment. The opiate of cost-free transition from one kind of political and economic system to another could be found in the total omission in all electoral programs of references to forthcoming

and inevitable shortfalls in the state’s satisfaction of citizens’ demands for a better life in an existing parliamentary democracy. Instead, the most frequently used campaign slogans in the January—February 1990 TV programs sponsored by forty-three aspiring political parties spoke of “Hungarian-ness,” “nation,” “freedom,” “Europe,” and “democracy.” “Prosperity,” was the last, and least frequently mentioned, item in this inventory of political goals.

134 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Notes* 1 A case for this proposition is made in Rudolf L. Tékés: Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political Succession, 1957-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 399-440. 2 See, Rudolf L. Tékés: “Democracy in Hungary: Institutional Origins and Legitimacy Dilemmas” Discussion Paper, Collegium Budapest, Institute for Advanced Study. 3 On the notion of legal continuity in Hungarian public law, see Ferenc Eckhart: Magyar alkotmany és

jogtérténet (History of Hungarian constitution and law) (Budapest: Politzer, 1946) and Andras KGrésényi: “K6zj6, kézigazgatas és kormanyzati rendszer: Az allamfelfogdsok térténeti gydkerei Eurépaban” (Public welfare, public administration and governance: conceptions of the state and its historic roots in Europe), in Csaba Gombéar et al, eds., Es mi lesz ha nem lesz? T. anulmanyok az allamrol a 20. szazad végén, (What happens when it isn’t there? Studies on the state at the end of the twentieth century) Budapest: Korridor, 1997. 245—272, especially 265, “Hungarian conceptions of the state in a comparative perspective.” See also, Janos Kis, “Between Reform and Revolution: Three

Hypotheses About the Nature of Regime Change,” in Béla K. Kiraly and Andras Bozoki (eds.): Lawful Revolution in Hungary, 1989-1994, Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1995. 38. 4 Thomas A. Koelble, “The new institutionalism in political science and sociology,” Comparative Politics 27, 2. January 1995. 231-243.

5 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical institutionalism in comparative politics,” in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, (eds.): Structuring Politics. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. The following discussion is based in part on Douglas C. North, /nstitutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.; Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds.): The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analyis Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen: Rediscovering Institutions: The Organisational Basis of Politics New York: Free Press, 1989.; Christopher Clague, “The New Institutional Economics and Economic Development” in Christopher Clague (ed.): Institutions and Economic Development. Growth and Governance in Less-Developed and Post-Socialist States Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. 13-36; and Phillip J. Etherington et al.: “Polity.Forum: Institutions and Institutionalism,” Polity 38, 7. 1995. 38-140. 6 North: Institutions, Institutional Change, 3, 6. 7 Robert Dahl: Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. 132-33, 151.

8 Bert A. Rockman: “Institutions, Democratic Stability and Performance” in Metin Heper, Ali Kazancigil, and Bert A. Rockman (eds.): Institutions and Democratic Statecraft Boulder: Westview Press, 1997. 32.

9 Jon Elster “Introduction” in J. Elster (ed.): Rational Choice New York: New York University Press, 1986. 4.

10 Claus Offe: Designing Institutions for East European Transitions, Public Lecture no. 9, Budapest: Collegium Budapest, 1996. 15-6. 11 As Zygmunt Bauman put it, “...there is a yawning gap between what the elites can offer and what their genuine or postulated constituencies want and expect.” Zygmunt Bauman, “After the patronage state: A model in search of class interests,” in Christopher C. A. Bryant and Edmund Mokrzycki (eds.): The New Great Transformation? Change and Continuity in East-Central Europe (London: Routledge, 1994) 31.

* Parts of this study were written during my tenure as Fellow of Collegium Budapest/Institute for Advanced Study in 1998-1999. I should like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to Professor Janos Kornai for his valuable comments on an earlier version of this study, as well as to Professor

Gabor Klaniczay, Rector of CB/IAS and Dr. Fred Girod, Secretary of CB/IAS, for their generous support of my work at the Collegium.

Rudolf L. Tékés: Institution Building in Hungary 135 12 Harold Laswell: Psychopathology and Politics (New York: Viking Press, 1960), pp. 74-76. 13 The best English language account to date of the roundtable process is by Andras Bozoéki, “Hungary’s Road to Systemic Change: The Opposition Roundtable” in Kiraly and Boz6ki, Lawful Revolution...,

61-92. 14 Robert H. Bates: “Contra Contractarianism: Some Reflections on the New Institutionalism,” Politics and Society, 16. 1988. 387. 15 On “leveraged buyouts” as techniques of within-system change, see Tékés: Hungary's Negotiated...,

280-281. .

16 “Az Uj politizalé szervezetek dokumentumai” (Documents of new political organizations), in Sandor Kurtan, Péter Sandor and Laszlé Vass (eds.): Magyarorszdg Politikai Evkényve, 1988 (Hungarian Political Yearbook, 1988; HPYB hereafter) Budapest: R-Forma Kiado, 1989. 699-796. 17 From a very long list of writings on these subjects, at least five should be mentioned. Mihaly Bihari, Politikai rendszer és szocialista demokracia (Political system and socialist democracy) (Budapest: ELTE, AJTK, 1985); Peter Schmidt: A szocialista rendszer és az allamisdg (Socialist system and statehood), Budapest: Kossuth, 1984.; Tamas Sarkézy: Gazdasdgpolitika, szervezetrendszer, jogpolitika (Economic, administrative and legal policy) Budapest: Kossuth, 1987.; Gyérgy Szoboszlai: Allamisag és politikai rendszer (Statehood and political system) Budapest: Kossuth, 1989.; and Istvan Kukorelli: Az alkotmanyozas évtizede (Decade of constitution-making) Budapest: Korona, 1995. 18 Cf. Kalman Kulcsar: Két vilag kézétt (Between two worlds) Budapest: Akadémiai Kiado, 1994. 101136. The crowning achievement of the regime’s internal reform forces was the annotated text of a re-

vised constitution submitted by the Ministry of Justice, first to the Politburo, then to the Central Committee, HSWP in January-February 1989. See “Az Igazsagtigyi Minisztérium. Magyarorszag Alkotmanya—Szabalyozasi Koncepcié” (Ministry of Justice, Hungary’s constitution—conceptual framework), in Laszlé Sods (ed.): A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzékényvei (Central Committee, Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, Stenographic Minutes, 1989), vol. 1 Budapest: Magyar Orszagos Levéltar, 1993. 409-439. For a full documentary account of the reform socialist project, see Géza Kilényi (ed.): Egy alkotmany-elékészités dokumentumai. (Kisérlet Magyarorszag tj Alkotmanydnak megalkotasaéra, 1988-1990) (Preparatory documents for a constitution. An attempt to craft Hungary’s new constitution) Budapest: Allamtudomanyi Kutat6kézpont, 1991. 19 To an astonishing degree, Western academic writings on the intellectual genesis of dissident and reform ideas in Hungary focus exclusively on the contributions of the “democratic opposition” or, at best, on the works of neo- and post-Marxist sociologists. Rich traditions of nineteenth and twentieth century conservatism, Christian democracy, national liberalism, and middle-class radicalism—let alone seminal works on public law, moral philosophy, and normative legal theory—are totally overlooked. It is odd because most of the Opposition Roundtable negotiators were neither urban radicals nor post-Marxists, but adherents of indigenous ideas of institutional reform and political emancipation.

20 cf: Grzegorz Ekiert, The State Against Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. 257-282; Michael Bernhard: “Reinterpreting Solidarity,” Studies in Comparative Communism Vol. 24, no. 3. 1991. 313-330; and Bartlomiej} Kaminski: The Collapse of State Socialism Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. 21 See Wiktor Osiatynski, “The Roundtable Talks in Poland,” in Jon Elster (ed.): The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 21-69.

1991.

22 Bartlomiej Kaminski: “Systemic Underpinnings of the Transition in Poland: The Shadows of the Roundtable Agreement,” Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1991. 173-190. 23 See Milos Calda, “The Roundtable Talks in Czechoslovakia,” in Elster (ed.): Roundtable Talks, 13577., See also Sharon L. Wolchik: Czechoslovakia in Transition: Politics, Economics and Society. New York: Pinter, 1991. 24 Vladimir Hanzel: Zrychleny tep dejin (The accelerated heartbeat of history) Prague: OK Centrum, 25 Calda, in Elster, Roundtable Talks, 157.

136 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy 26 Ibid., 161. 27 Ibid., 155. 28 Tékés, Hungary’s Negotiated..., 332-47. 29 Beszélé, (Budapest) September 26, 1992, 16-18. 30 Péter Szalay, “Mi van a demokracia csomagtervben?” (What is in the democracy package?), HPYB, 1988, Budapest, 1989. 254-264. 31 See, Andras Bozéki (editor-in-chief), Marta Elbert, Melinda Kalmar, Béla Révész, Erzsébet Ripp and Zoltan Ripp, (eds.): A Rendszervaltas Forgatokényve. Kerekasztal-targyalasok 1989-ben. (Scenarios

for the change of the regime. National Roundtable negotiations in 1989) 8 vols. (4 vols. Budapest: Magveté, 1999, 4. Vols. Budapest: Uj Mandatum, 1999-2000.) 32 Text in Kilényi (ed.): “Egy alkotmany-elékészités” 103-194. 33 Sods, A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart..., 408. See also, Kilényi, (ed.) 8-14. 34 Offe, Designing Institutions..., 16. 35 Cf. Magyar Orszagos Levéltar, (Hungarian National Archives), 288 £4/250 (February 10-11, 1989), 26ff. 36 Sods, A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart..., 415. 37 Ibid., 418. 38 Ibid., 417. 39 See Gyérgy Szabad (ed.): Legislation of the Hungarian Parliament. May 2—December 31 1990. Budapest: Hungarian Parliament, 1993. 141-142.

40 Ibid..142, 41 Text in Constitutional and Legislative Policy Institute (ed.): Alkotmdnyos elvek és esetek (Constitutional Principles and Cases) Budapest: COLPI, 1996. 678-690. 42 Andras Kérésényi: A magyar politikai rendszer (The Hungarian political system) Budapest: Osiris, 1998. 334-336. 43 Jon Elster, “The Role of Institutional Interests in East European Constitution-Making,” East European

Constitutional Review, Vol. 5. No. 1. Winter 1996. 63. . 44 Ibid., 65. 45 Cf. K6résényi: A magyar politikai..., 267. 46 ffe, Designing Institutions..., 22. 47 Ibid., 17.

48 See, Tékés: Hungary's Negotiated..., 362-364. 49 For text of Act XXXIV of 1989, see Gyérgy Szabad: Legislation of the Hungarian..., 151-164. 50 Cf. Gyérgy Szoboszlai: “Valasztasi rendszer és politikai tagolts4g” (Electoral system and political cleavages), in Gyérgy Szoboszlai (ed.): Parlamenti valasztasok, 1990 (Parliamentary elections, 1990) Budapest: Tarsadalomtudomanyi Intézet, 1990, 12-16. See also Matthew J. Gabel, “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws in the 1990 Hungarian Elections,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 27. No. 2 January 1995. 205-214. 51 Text in Magyar Hirlap, May 5, 1990.

52 Text in Gyérgy Szabad: Legislation of the Hungarian..., 10-13. | 53 Ibid., 23-32. See also 33-44. 54 DiMaggio and Powell: New Institutionalism..., 14-15. 55 John Gray: “From Post-Communism to Civil Society: The Reemergence of History and the Decline of the Western Model,” Social Philosophy and Policy Vol. 10. No. 2, 1993. 36. 56 Ibid., 37. 57 Ibid., 39. 58 Adam Przeworski et al.: Sustainable Democracy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 42. 59 Cf. Rudolf L. Tékés: Murmurs and Whispers: Public Opinion and Legitimacy Crisis in Hungary, 1972-1989. Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1997. 52-55. 60 Tékés: Hungary’s Negotiated..., 381.

Beyond the One-party System: The Debate on “The Party Law” Adém Masat

In Hungary a one-party system has been introduced historically, and it is going to stay that way. Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the MSZMP!

Introduction This chapter describes the formulation of the “Party Law’, revealing the achievements of the I/2 Working Committee in the political negotiations of the Hungarian National Roundtable Talks of 1989. This Committee worked out the

details of the restoration of a multi-party system, after four decades of dictator- . ship and one-party rule.

The basis of the one-party leadership was established in Hungary by the foundation of the Hungarian Workers’ Party (MDP) in July 1948, the banning of , other parties and the establishment of the infamous State Defense Authority (AVH). In 1948, on the centenary of the Hungarian Revolution and of the Freedom and Independence War of 1848-1849, its slogans, originally defined by the French Revolution, the ideas of freedom and equality were radically reinterpreted, narrowed down, and then abolished by the exponents of the emerging

communist party rule. .

The state party—first known as the MDP but renamed on October 31st, 1956, as the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP)—kept its monopolistic power until the end of the Kadar regime in the late 1980s; only the revolution of 1956 provided a brief interruption. On October 30th 1956, Prime Minister Imre Nagy announced on radio the banning of the one-party system.” Political pluralism was, however, eliminated in a few days with the help of the intervening Soviet troops, and the hope of consolidating the revolution’s achievements was shattered. The communist regime and the one-party system were restored at the same time. The destabilization and disintegration of the regime started in the second half of the 1980s. The last election law’ before the fall of the communist regime— and the introduction of the national list—made it obligatory to nominate two candidates in each constituency.* The reform was major, but obviously the original function of the legal institution could not succeed in a one-party system. It

138 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

did not offer a real political alternative, only the freedom of choice between the people; candidates had to accept the election program of the Patriotic People’s Front (HNF).” Although, after the election in 1985 63 per cent of representatives were newly elected, nevertheless, 75 per cent were party members.° Students of the Kadar-regime all agree that the systemic crisis became more or less obvious by 1985. It became clear from that year onwards that the regime could not be further reformed. The deepening crisis was marked by the following political events: 1. The results of the non-democratic, but multi-candidate, Par_ liamentary elections in June, 1985.; 2. The renewed criticism advanced by the 13th Party Congress of March 25th—28th, 1985, and by the 8th Congress of the HNF, and, finally, 3. The political dispute among the various opposition groups at the meeting in Monor on the 14th—16th of June of the same year. The democratic opposition, the “national-populist” (népi) trend, the “party opposition” reform wing had been formulating a strong claim for pluralism since 1986. This was basically a claim for the introduction of a multi-party system.’ Members of the Monor meeting only touched on the “taboo” question of the

one-party system.® Two years later, at the September, 1987, meeting in Lakitelek, much stronger criticism was formulated,’ by the foundation of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) when the participants founded a political movement. Two and half years later the MDF, as a party, won the free elections of 1990 and defeated the autocratic MSZMP.’° Although the 1987 program of the democratic opposition, entitled the Tarsadalmi Szerzédés {Social Contract], declared firstly the necessity of removing the party leader, Janos Kadar, as the embodiment of stability, it wished only to maintain the one-party system.'’ The economic reform program, Fordulat és Reform [Turnabout and Reform]'” drawn up by radical reformist economists soon had its “political pair”, Reform és demokracia {Reform and Democracy] drawn up by the political scientist, Mihaly

Bihari. The latter text declared the need for democratic socialism and, at the same time, it acknowledged the political leadership of the communist party.'? In

the second half of 1988 Bihari reformulated his proclamation more strongly, calling for a multiparty-system, but also emphasising the necessity of a gradual, “delayed” introduction.'* By the end of the 1980s there was a clear need within society to abandon the

forty year-old monopoly of power. It became obvious that real change could only be achieved by the declaration of a multi-party system and by free elections which were based on it.’ The national conference of the MSZMP in May, 1988, declared the need for a so-called “socialist pluralism” based on “the leading role

of the communist party”.'° The democratisation of the political system was thought achievable within the framework of the one-party system.’” It was announced several times, even at the meetings of the Central Committee in February, 1988, that the one-party system itself does not exclude the concepts of democracy, the rule of law, and of a Constitutional state, since the development of pluralism is not blocked by the one-party system, but only by its “dysfunction”. The party leadership refused to accept the immediate introduction of a multi-

Adam Masdt: Beyond the One-party System 139 party system. The reasoning was almost invariably the same: “the country is not ready” for its introduction, the “threat exists that the process will become destabilizing and uncontrollable”.’? Most of the members of the MSZMP Politburo in 1988 believed that sham pluralism, the “one-party pluralism”, could be pre-

served and that elections involving genuine competition would be held only in 1995.

In the first few months of 1989 events in foreign and domestic politics forced

the MSZMP to take positive steps to dismantle the one-party system, and the concept of “socialistic pluralism” began to fade. The MSZMP’s Central Committee had to accept the introduction of a multi-party system during its congress on February 10th—1 1th, 1989. At that point Karoly Grész, the secretary-general, briefly laid out the MSZMP’s tactics to be followed in 1989: “...let’s not object to a multi-party system, but let’s think over how the shaping of the multi-party system can be influenced and what we should do to maintain the leading position of the MSZMP in the multi-party system.””’ During one meeting one of the leaders of the League of Communist Youth (KISZ), Imre Nagy, offered an interesting interpretation of this thinking: his remarks indicated another political maneuver, namely that entry into the National Roundtable (where the MSZMP had no privileged position) could be achieved by means of a declaration of a multi-party

system. He added, in a somewhat contradictory way, that the communist party should claim this social compromise as “the basis for negotiations, for its future mandate”. This should contain such crucial institutional powers as decisions in respect of the conditions for elections, the position of the new President, and so on.” These political tactics resulted in the maintenance of power in society and in the transfer of property and assets, the latter opening the way to proposals which the MSZMP made, mainly behind the scenes, during the trilateral meetings. Revelations concerning some transfers of property and assets during the socalled “spontaneous privatization” were usually effective, but these in no way halted the ongoing process of “managerial privatization”.*? The political proposals mainly involved the presidential position of Imre Pozsgay, the reform communist Minister of State, and it is very likely that, in exchange, the MSZMP offered the opposition the party’s withdrawal from the work-place.”*

Act II of 1989 regarding the right of free association was announced and came into force on January 24th, 1989, and allowed the parties to be established,”” although the regulation of party activities was to be covered by another law. This meant, in the narrow interpretation of the MSZMP, that the law on the right of association “did not exclude party foundation, although until the formu-

lation of the new law there could be no legal background to the foundation of

parties”.

140 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

The Stabilization of the Unity of the Opposition Roundtable The MSZMP has its forty years of tradition and it will not change this from one day to the next, first of all since such changes would be

totally disadvantageous and cause a discriminative situation, which the MSZMP could not accept. Gyorgy Fejti, member of the MSZMP Central Committee27

The exclusive power of the state party suffered its first major “attack”, when the opposition merged by the creation of Opposition Roundtable (EKA) and became an institutionalized political power.”® The leadership of the party quickly understood that the declaration of the multi-party system also meant, at the same time,

that the major draft laws (on the Constitution, Party Law and electoral law) could not be presented to Parliament, since they had not been debated by the new parties and by the revived historical parties.” Their objective was to organ-

ize consultative meetings, where they could select the guests. Firstly, the MSZMP’s Central Committee tried to organize a political conciliation forum, to which the five member organizations of the EKA were invited. The first item on the agenda of this meeting was a discussion of Party Law and the party regulations.°’ The EKA decided at its April 7th meeting not to take part in the forum, since one of its members—the Federation of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demok-

, ratdk Szévetsége)—was not invited.*! This absence was very decisive, since the unity of the EKA and its major characteristic, consensual decision-making, became compulsory. One of the main issues in the EKA’s notion of talks was the formation and operation of parties—addressed to the MSZMP’s Central Committee—on April 19th.** The draft of the new Party Law appeared in the daily press on the same day, with the comment that social organizations should forward their comments and remarks to the government-founded Secretariat for the Codification of the New Constitution [Alkotmany-elékészitd Kodifikacios Titkarsag| no later than April 29th, 1989.°° Several organizations objected to the 10-day-deadline. The Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) expressed its dissatisfaction that the government wanted to continue the “usual”, “optional” discussions of Party Law and was unwilling to place it on the agenda for political discussions between the EKA and the MSZMP.™ A modified version of the Party Law appeared in the newspaper Magyar Nemzet on May 18th. The second draft version contained variations of certain articles and paragraphs: it made the formation of new parties easier and set restrictions on party organizations in the work-place. The Working Committee dealing with the law worked on the basis of the draft of May 29th, which represented a step backwards when compared to the earlier one. Parliament originally planed to discuss the Party Law in September,” but the

MSZMP’s Central Committee urged the government to submit the issue to Par-

Adam Masdat: Beyond the One-party System 14] liament earlier. As a result, Parliament, during its session starting on June 27th, wished to pass the draft Bill on Party Law.*’ During the reconciliation talks in preparation for the trilateral meetings it became clear that if “effective negotiations were to begin” and if no agreement could be reached before June 27th, 1989, then Parliament would start its summer break and would only start the discussions in autumn. It was quite obvious that no agreement would be reached

before that time.*®

In the background to all of this lay the re-interment of Imre Nagy, Prime Minister during the 1956 revolution, and his fellow martyrs, all of whom were executed after 1956. Rather apprehensive on this score, and hoping to improve their negotiating position, the MSZMP was keen to reach an agreement on the start of “effective negotiations” before the re-interment.”’ During preparatory talks for the negotiations the EKA representatives were “blackmailed”,” by a threat that, should they not reach an agreement before the start of the negotiations, then, at the end of June, Parliament—along with other basic legislation— would put this draft law on Party Regulation on the agenda.”’ During these preparatory talks Péter Télgyessy (SZDSZ), and Laszl6 Sédlyom (MDF), representing the EKA, objected; in return the MSZMP representatives answered in the following terms: “The representatives of the MSZMP would indicate, that, in case effective

negotiations should start in time, the legislative schedule earlier agreed upon may change. The legislative process cannot precede political agreement.” “”” Therefore, it was also in the interest of the MSZMP to start negotiations be-

fore June 16th. The top leadership of the Party hoped that the start of negotiations would calm that sector of the public concerned about political issues and would also give a signal to the West, proving the seriousness of the state party’s new openness.” The EKA partly succeeded in fulfilling its April 19th concept (modified at the beginning of June) concerning political questions, but in return it had to compromise on three topics. 1. Trilateral negotiations, which involved acknowledgement of the so-called “Third Side’s” full rights at the negotiations.” 2. Negotiations on economic issues*’ and 3. Agreement before the re-interment of Imre Nagy.”®

At the Central Committee meeting on June 13th Gydrgy Fejti expressed clearly his view that the MSZMP, by raising the issue of the possible submission

of the draft laws to Parliament, had, in fact ensured that agreement would be reached before the reburial: “As a matter of fact, there are four draft laws under preparation. The consultation stage for these four draft laws can begin immediately. I would like to inform you that the organizations believe that Parliament is going to discuss these issues on the 27th and so they are ready for talks rapidly on these four topics. I still don’t think that we should force the discussion of these four topics in Parliament on the 27th: we should continue the work cautiously, exhaustively—but, of course, quickly.”47

142 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

During the preparatory meeting for the plenary session on June 21, the MSZMP accepted the withdrawal of the submission of the draft laws.** All difficulties were thus overcome and so the National Roundtable negotiations could begin.

The Formation of the Working Committee for the Preparation of the Party Law We always think of the MSZMP.

Will there be other parties, or not?

| Jozsef Antall (MDF), delegate at the National Roundtable4?

The June 21st agreement on the topics for the talks’ and the work-plan defines the 1/2 Working Committee in the following terms: “legal regulation of the func-

tioning of political parties”.°’ The Committee’s brief did not extend to party administration, although at that time almost all of the organizations functioning as parties understood that the way to equality was through the regulation of party financing.°! The EKA’s point of view from the very beginning was that the Party Law should only regulate functioning and financing, since the right to form a party should be covered by the Bill on Association.” The regulation of functioning and financing of parties meant the formulation of a “Party Law”, and so this was mainly legislative work. The Committee was also responsible for two political questions: party organizations in the work-place and the detailed account of its property and assets holding to be drawn up by the MSZMP, plus the related issue of party financing during the transition period.” The EKA could not achieve any results on these issues until the signing of the agreement on September 18th, 1989. The minutes of 12 meetings of the I/2 professional Working Committee (or sub-Committee) are available.** The three most prominent participants in the Working Committee were Matyas Budzsaklia, (MSZMP), Ivan Petd, (SZDSZ for the Opposition Roundtable) and Edit Réder (HNF, for the Third Side).

| The negotiating delegation of the MSZMP had three origins. Matyas Budzsaklia was at that time deputy Head of Department at the Central Committee. He represented the party headquarters not only on I/2 Committee, but also in the meetings of the Intermediate Level Committee. Tibor Bogdan, deputy Head of Department at the Ministry of Justice, took part in the work of three Committees. In addition to his involvement in I/1 and I/3 Working Committees, he was

quite irreplaceable in the I/2 Committee, as he played the major part in the preparation of the draft Party Law. The EKA decided on the people it would delegate to the Committee on June 28th.*° Ivan Peté (SZDSZ), historian and archivist, took part in the EKA meet-

ings from May 24th, 1989—at the request of Balint Magyar, a fellow party

Adam Masat: Beyond the One-party System 143 member—and later in the Intermediate Level negotiating Committee. Balazs Horvath’s role (MDF), a lawyer from Veszprém (later Minister of the Interior in

the Antall government), is important since he reported on the work of the Committee—obviously with Ivan Peté—at EKA meetings and in the Intermediate Level negotiations. In April, 1989, The National Council of the HNF elected a presidency with 20 members. One of the members was Edit Réder, too. In the first proposal forwarded to the presidency R6der was mentioned as delegated person to the I/1

Working Committee, this may have been due to her membership status at Council of Constitutional Law [Alkotmanyjogi Tandcs|. Réder following her own request became member of I/2 Committee, according to her the regulatory work of the parties was “a greater challenge” for her than Constitutional work, that she was engaged in previously.’’ Réder also represented the Third Side in the so-called Goodwill Committee [Jészolgdlati Bizottsag|. Béla Rabi, also from

the Third Side, was an active member of the I/1, the I/2, the I/3 and the II/4 Working Committees, and took part in the Intermediate Level talks and plenary meetings of the trilateral talks. In general, most members of the I/2 Committee did not know each other personally and a professional homogeneous organization, such as the 1/4 Working Committee became, did not develop. The fact that the EKA and the Third Side

were mainly of the same opinion concerning the matters in dispute with the MSZMP made the talks easier. This was very different from the other Working Committees, where as “the satellite” of the MSZMP, the Third Side made negotiations between the EKA and MSZMP more difficult. There are three distinct periods in the history of the I/2 Working Committee in the creation of the “Party Law”. The first ended on July 26th, 1989, when the representative of the MSZMP announced that the state party was unwilling to render an account of its property and assets holding. The work of the Committee stopped for weeks. In the second period, in August, 1989, several attempts were made to resume negotiations—unsuccessfully, since the MSZMP was still unwilling to revert to its position of July 24th. The third period was the period of negotiations from late August until the agreement was signed on September 18th, when the final draft law covering the functioning and administration of political parties was formulated very rapidly. Some questions remained open after the September 18th agreement (party financing, the MSZMP’s property and

assets account and party organization in the work-place). This is a separate chapter in the political history of 1989, which came to a close in the so-called “Four Yes” referendum.

144 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

The Start of Negotiations By the time it will be finished, we can restore the one-party system: later on we can Stop the parties. This is the perspective of social development. Karoly Grosz, secretary-general, MSZMP58

The I/2 Working Committee held its first meeting on June 30th, 1989. The representatives of three parties agreed on the principles of the negotiations, which did

not differ from the other Committees’ rules of procedure.’ Tibor Bogdan, (MSZMP), from the Ministry of Justice, promised during these meetings that he was going to provide the negotiating parties with the necessary information from the Ministry in respect of the elaboration of the Party Law. The EKA and the Third Side made it clear, however, that it was necessary to know the property

and assets holdings of all organizations for the negotiation of the draft law. These two negotiating parties proposed that they should be informed in detail about the distribution of state funds among social and political organizations.”

e In the second meeting, on July 5th, definite results were achieved. The negotiating parties agreed that Constitutional supervision of party formation and party activities should be regulated by the Constitution and the Law on the Right of Association. During this meeting the parties also agreed on the following: e apolitical party may be founded by a minimum of 10 persons °' e the founders and officials of a political party must be Hungarian citizens” e practicing and Constitutional judges may not be members of any party” e they propose to the I/1 Working Committee the following draft for inclusion in the proposed Modifications to the Constitution: “The program and activities of any social organization may not be aimed at acquiring or utilizing power by violent means, or to such an exclusive degree which causes other parties to terminate, or limit their activity; and may not be used to incite citizens against the Constitution and the Constitutional law.”™*

In the third meeting, on July 10th, 1989, the first major disagreements appeared. The representatives of the EKA and the Third Side proposed that political parties should not be formed or have a local branch in places of work. Delegates from the MSZMP disagreed with this and asked for further discussion of the topic during the coming meetings. On the other hand, agreement was reached on the topic of how to modify the MSZMP’s earlier draft law (on political parties). The three negotiating parties agreed that part of the regulations would be included in the law on the Right of Association and another part—relating to party operation and administration—in a separate law. The negotiators also decided what should be regulated in the Constitution and in the electoral law.” In the meeting on July 17th, the negotiating parties agreed that Party Law should cover social organizations with private membership, and that, at the time

Adam Masdat: Beyond the One-party System 145 of the public announcement of their registration, the organizations must acknowledge their acceptance of the law concerning political party activity and administration.©° At the same time it was proposed that, if a party did not have at

least one Member elected to Parliament in two successive Parliamentary elec-

tions, then that organization’s registration as a party would be cancelled.” Agreement was reached that non-Hungarian citizens might be party members, but could not have the right to propose a candidate or to vote within the party.” Representatives of three negotiating parties agreed at the same time that a party could not be formed in a place of work and could not function there. The delegates of the MSZMP asked that explanatory notes should be included in the standard wording, explaining that parties could not function in workplaces, but that employees from the same workplace could be members of the same organization after working hours in their place of work. Edit Réder announced in the meeting on July 19th that the National Council of Trade Unions (SZOT), to safeguard workers’ interests, was not willing to disclose data, since, in that case, the interests of the employees would be damaged vis-a-vis those of the employers. In connection with the Patriotic People’s

Front, she remarked that they were willing to disclose data, but that information | should also be disclosed about the participating organizations’ support to other organisations, and about the “value of their work for society”. Concerning the successor organization to the League of Communist Youth (formerly the KISZ and from April, 1989, Demisz), she stated that it had disclosed its budget in 1989; it wished to retain 680m Hungarian Forints, and distribute 100m HUF

among different child and youth organizations. . The MSZMP partly and the Opposition Roundtable could not agree fully with the reasoning. The EKA maintained its opinion that “those parties participating in the meetings are aware that they will have to render an account of their property and assets”. The MSZMP and the Third Side—referring to the lack of competence concerning property and assets division and financing questions—proposed further discussion of the topic by the Intermediate Level negotiating Committee.” In the July 21st meeting. negotiations continued concerning the wording of the draft law. The EKA was unsuccessful in having the word political omitted from the whole text of the law. The 4th and 5th sections were mainly listed on the agenda of the meeting since EKA was proposing several modifications in these sections. The negotiating parties agreed on four issues concerning administration in the parties.

In the next meeting, on July 24th, the 1/2 Committee agreed on the issues concerning the dissolution of parties. The negotiating parties formulated their proposal, mainly during this meeting, on the further discussion of property and assets valuation and property and assets division by the Intermediate Level negotiating Committee. Neither the EKA nor the Third Side representatives thought at that time that there could be any retreat; on the contrary, they hoped that negotiations at intermediate-level would bring about some improvement and would allow the points of view of the negotiating parties to converge.

146 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

On the same day the MSZMP delegation handed over, unofficially, the Memorandum which contained the answers to the Minutes of July 5th. One could see from the document that the MSZMP, amongst other things, owned 168

headquarters (office) buildings, 90 holiday resorts, 34 educational establishments, 2 research institutes, 20 educational institutions and 20 publishing houses.” Tibor Bogdan prepared the minutes according to the agreement of July 21st, which was to be enclosed in the proposal addressed to the Intermediate Level negotiating Committee. It contained all topics discussed on which agreement had been reached in the meetings. One might readily suppose that the work of the Committee would continue successfully. It seemed that the MSZMP was willing to render an account of its property and assets holdings and that agreement could be reached on issues of financing in the transitional period and that, in a short period of time, the draft law proposal would be formulated.

| Change in Negotiating Tactics of the MSZMP We believe that none of the forums of the trilateral meetings is entitled to demand that the MSZMP render an account of its property and assets holdings, or to give orders for the redistribution of the property and assets. Gyérgy Fejti, member of MSZMP PB?!

On July 26th an unexpected development occurred. Matyas Budzsaklia announced that he was not going to sign the proposal but would add the following

to the MSZMP’s stated view: ,

... the MSZMP acquired its property and assets—over the last four and half decades— legally and so it is liable to render an account only to its members and it is under no legal obligation to do so to other parties or social organizations.

In this announcement the MSZMP not only stated that it was only willing to render an account of its “legally acquired property and assets” to its members, but also that it was unwilling to support other new parties and social organizations during the transition period. As representative of the EKA, Ivan Peté, and Edit Réder from the Third Side, reacted to this radical change in the MSZMP’s standpoint. Both explained that the content of the memorandum presented by Matyas Budzsaklia was contrary to the MSZMP’s earlier position. Edit Réder expressed as her view of the situation that it could block the reaching of an agreement; Ivan Peto announced that the EKA believed that it was pointless to continue the work of the Committee unless the MSZMP changed its position. Ms Roder argued for the “communizing” of the property and assets of the state party, Mr Pet6d repeated the basic principle, that the political changes should not produce extra costs for society.”

Adam Masdt: Beyond the One-party System 147 The leaders of the MSZMP had obviously changed their view in this respect. In the meeting of the Committee the MSZMP had been willing to render an account of its property and assets, and it was only rejecting the Committee as the competent forum. A few days earlier, in the July 19th meeting, the MSZMP’s negotiating group had made the following statement: In its view the presentation of the requested data cannot block the start of negotiations concerning the wording of the draft law. Most of the marked data is available to the public in the Memorandum, and so the MSZMP’s negotiating group does not refuse to answer. Moreover, it believes that the Party Law should provide, that, prior to registration, a party should render an account of its property and assets. 73

In the meeting of Intermediate Level Political Committee of July 27 Ivan Petd from the EKA reported on the day’s happenings.”” Nandor Bugar gave a speech on behalf of the Third Side, which represented a retreat from the earlier viewpoint presented by Edit Réder.” In his answer Gyérgy Fejti made it clear that the MSZMP was willing to hand over its account of property and assets to the relevant court of justice. He believed that the forums of the trilateral negotiations were not entitled to request such an account from the MSZMP and to decide on re-distribution of the property. He accepted the principle that the building of an infrastructure for the parties should not involve extra costs, but he arrogated the right of the MSZMP to decide on the level of backing offered to other parties and organizations. Following this—after his second speech—he | made it clear that there was no.close connection between the financial status of the MSZMP and the mode of operation of the political parties, that there was no radical change in their point of view but that this was merely made clearer.” Obviously Fejti wanted to display firmness, tempered by apparent flexibility, a pretence of goodwill and a dedication to change.’’ In the Intermediate Level talks of July 27th the parties reached no further agreement on the issue of why the talks of the Working Committee had stopped. It would, in fact, be profitable to halt briefly here in order to examine the July change from a different viewpoint. 1. It is clear that the MSZMP leadership changed its attitude on this issue.” | Clear proof of it lies in the property and asset account which the MSZMP delegation handed out-just two days before the negotiations on the 26th of July.” The change is not connected with the visit of Rezs6 Nyers and Karoly Grosz to Moscow on the 24th—25th of July, or with other foreign or domestic political affairs.*” A new attitude developed unknown to the members of the MSZMP delegation preparing for the meeting of Intermediate-level Political Committee

on the 27th of July, or by Tibor Bogdan. All the signs suggest that it was “someone’s own opinion”. Excluding all the others, and from the documentation, it was obvious that no-one other than Gydrgy Fejti® could have formulated these words. 2. It is quite possible that Fejti changed his approach after he was informed about the handing over of a document by the MSZMP delegation. This is quite

148 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

insignificant since, supposedly, most of the members within the MSZMP agreed with him. The Central Committee itself supported rendering an account of the property and assets to party members, but the MSZMP’s Political Executive Committee wished to indulge in a cover-up when it transpired that the MSZMP had paid no taxes on some of its enterprises until January 1989.” 3. Gyérgy Fejti represented the counterpart to Imre Pozsgay at the meetings.*’ Although our written sources are limited, we know that Karoly Grész and Gydégy Fejti discussed several topics together and did not inform Pozsgay about them. They criticized Pozsgay several times for making announcements on topics without authorization.** On July 6th Pozsgay said, in a meeting of the Intermediate Level Political Committee, that he would go on holiday, and for that reason Fejti would take over as head of the delegation.® Pozsgay traveled to Yugoslavia after the visit by George Bush—for a summer vacation in Istria.*° In the central headquarter of the MSZMP, in the so-called “White House”, it became obvious during the meeting organized for the negotiating delegation of the

state party, that Fejti was to continue the negotiations in a different way from , Pozsgay to date. Pozsgay later admitted that he wanted to be away from the negotiations, but he rejected the criticism of the opposition that the party leadership had left him out of the negotiations for tactical reasons.*’ Is it possible that one of Hungary’s most popular political figures (with good connections with the opposition representatives), the Head of State-in-waiting, had left the political arena for a month during the most important period of political debates simply to go on holiday?®™

4. Let us take a closer look at the reasons. Pozsgay was freed from the problem of these most sensitive, possibly compromising, debates, which could have damaged his reputation within the party leadership or amongst the opposition. Grosz obviously could see that the “uncompromising, rigorous” Fejti should lead the delegation instead of more accommodating Pozsgay, who had informal connections with some members of the opposition. The party apparatus was of the same opinion also, since it wanted to gain time in order to preserve as much as possible. Pozsgay also stated later that he had wanted to preserve his own political capital in the contest to become head of state.®’ There is very little proof of party property and assets being spirited away, but it is worth noting that it was in the interests of the MSZMP to argue in favor of finishing the talks and submitting the draft bill, in this way using tactics which would postpone delicate issues such as accounting for the party’s property and assets. Pozsgay gave two reasons for his leaving the party: 1. His candidacy for the Presidency, 2. his reservations about activities related to the conversion of political power into economic capital, something which was widely practised among

the “smarter” members of the MSZMP.” It is not very likely that a political figure competing for the position of Head of State would go on holiday for a four-week period since his absence from the political scene could damage his popularity. The only exception might occur if it would be clearly disadvantageous for the politician to become involved in some political dispute. That is

Adam Masdt: Beyond the One-party System 149 why Pozsgay thought that, if he had taken part in the debates, it would have caused him uncomfortable problems. The holiday in Istria was favorable for Pozsgay, just as for Grdész and for the party apparatus which supported Fejti’s leadership. The “losers” were the negotiating parties: Fejti, who failed at an early

point and the opposition which, due to Fejti’s inflexible determination, could hardly achieve anything. 5. Based on these facts, in the exchange of roles the deciding factor was not the opposition’s “stubbornness”—as Pozsgay suggested in his criticism of opposition’'—but the struggling reformer Pozsgay between the opposition and the state party, and the need for showing the party’s true colors. Pozsgay was not telling the truth when he said that, “his acceptation had failed and that he had to continue the negotiations”. He stated clearly before his departure that there was no need to stop the negotiations whilst he was away”.”

The Negotiations Continue So my dear comrades we will have to put an end to this property and assets thing, even if there are doubts about it in the movement. We will give a clear and direct answer, according to the earlier rules, we gained it that way, we have not stolen or collected anything. K4roly Grész, the MSZMP’s secretary-general94

The 1/2 Committee stopped working for over three weeks. In mid-August Gyoérgy Szilvasy (MSZMP) indicated the EKA’s intention to continue the interrupted negotiations, based on earlier propositions. On August 18th the MSZMP sent its negotiating terms and conditions to the EKA and to representatives of the

Third Side. The meeting of the Working Committee ended without result on August 21st. The terms and conditions of the MSZMP were not acceptable to the

other two negotiating parties. The EKA and the Third Side confirmed their statements of July 26: it would only make sense to continue talks if the MSZMP returned to its position of July 24. In the Parliamentary meeting of May 10th, Prime Minister Mikl6s Németh indicated that the government was working on a proposition to support finan-

cially the formation of new parties.” In early July it was announced that the amount of this financial backing would be 50m Forints.”° At the July 21st meet-

ing of the EKA Ivan Peté proposed that the account should be frozen since a proposal on its distribution and use had not yet been finalized. It transpired that the person appointed by the Cabinet had, without examining the validity of any request, had already transferred considerable sums to organizations asking for funds. Over 10m Forints were transferred in this way.”’ The Goodwill Committee of the National Roundtable Talks agreed at its July 21st meeting that the account should be frozen until the terms and conditions of the transfer were clearly laid down. The member organizations of the EKA described the amount

150 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

involved in such terms as “charity”, “a little”, “advance payment”. On several occasions they claimed that a multi-party system could not possibly cost more than had the one-party system. In this respect they worked out a proposal dated July 31st to be handed to the Cabinet Office. According to this, the MSZMP and. other “vassal” organizations would receive less support and the EKA organizations should apply for specific sums. These questions were discussed in the Intermediate Level meeting of August 28th. This meeting finalized the list of positions which only non-party members could fill and also decided that, for registration purposes, all parties should prepare an account of their assets. The MSZMP proposed that a deadline be defined for the banning of party organizations from the work-place. Pozsgay suggested, as a compromise, that the state party should withdraw from the courts of justice no later than the date when the new Party Law was to come into force: 1. From Public Administration no later than December 31st, 2. from other work-places no later than July Ist, 1990, and 3. from the Armed Forces no later than December 31st, 1990.8 On August 30th after a long break, the Working Committee meeting produced some results on the issue of party financing. The MSZMP delegation agreed to produce a detailed account of its assets, and the MSZMP donated property to a value of 2.1bn Forints to the government; by doing so it wanted to support the formation of both the new and of the historical parties.” The Third Side and the EKA maintained their stance that Parliament should decide the issue, although the MSZMP could not agree to give further backing from their share of the state budget.'”° Further changes took place at the meetings of the MSZMP Political Executive Committee on August 31st and of the Central Committee in early September. In the former meeting, Imre Pozsgay—returning to the MSZMP’s official view of late July—explained that the MSZMP had acquired “most of its assets from legal sources. Therefore, he concluded, the party was not obliged to render any account of these to the Opposition Roundtable (the forum of the trilateral meetings) but only to the Hungarian nation.'”’ Clearly Pozsgay had not been truthful at the Intermediate Level meeting of August 28th when he claimed: ... for reasons of honesty let’s stick to the point, that the MSZMP should not render an ac-

count of its assets in the political negotiation meetings, but—we accept the Opposition Roundtable’s and others’ points of view—only to the Hungarian nation, and for this purpose Parliament would seem to be the most suitable organization. !02

The day after the Intermediate Level talks, the MSZMP leader, Rezsé Nyers, another member of the Political Executive Committee, claimed, very critically,

that Pozsgay had had no right to express his view on the banning of party organizations from the work-place. Nyers explained in the Budapest Party Committee’s delegate club, that he disagreed with the banning of the party from factories and work-places but accepted that they should not be built into the man-

Adam Masdt: Beyond the One-party System 151 agement of the companies and should not be allowed “double leadership”.'°? On September Ist Pozsgay clarified developments concerning the issue in the trilateral meetings, and, modifying his earlier position, he suggested the following: My opinion is that it would be more favorable for the party’s future to accept the view that, | after the multi-party system comes into being, there could be party organizations in the work-place and elsewhere. These organizations should be outside the work-place, since if not, it would need to be guaranteed that all parties could operate in factories, institu-

tions... 104 }

Only 14 members of the Central Committee supported Pozsgay’s proposal to retreat and the majority supported the other alternative proposed by Géza Kilényi, another delegate from the MSZMP,’” namely, that the parties could form organisations at work-places, as laid down by the management, with three restrictions: 1. They should not be politically active during working hours, 2. They should not be a part of a work organization, 3. They should not interfere in management activities. !°

The decision of the Central Committee of the MSZMP was given to the ne- , gotiating partners by Pozsgay and Budzsaklia in the Intermediate Level talks of , September 4th. Although many, so far undecided, questions were resolved (the acceptance of foreign donations, the banning of party organizations from the armed forces), no real progress was achieved, mainly due to the setback on the question of the party’s withdrawal from the work-place. The EKA published its opinion in the daily Magyar Nemzet, to the effect that, in the MSZMP’s setback, “it perceived the attempt as a threat to the whole democratic transitional period”.'°’ Imre Pozsgay still acknowledged with satisfaction (after the Intermedi-

ate Level talks of September 4th) in the meeting of the Political Executive Committee on September 5th that within the EKA “common sense was winning”, since no “excessive announcements” were being made.” On Friday, September 15th the parties agreed, during their talks, that from both sides 2—2 persons would meet at the weekend and would go through the whole draft law concerning party activities and administration. It is, however, very likely that the meeting took place only on Monday, September 18th. The draft law prepared at the meeting of Working Committee was handed over to the Intermediate Level, where the text was approved. Finally an agreement was reached that the armed forces and police officers could not be occupy higher positions in the parties’ national or local organizations. Pozsgay announced that

the government, in an “attempt to strengthen confidence” would reduce the Worker’s Militia [Munkdsérség] numbers from 60.000 to 40.000.'"” During the I/2 Working Committee’s last meeting the EKA representative announced, that it did not accept the MSZMP’s proposal for a draft account of assets, since, on the basis of this, it would not be possible to have a clear view of the parties’ assets. The negotiating parties agreed on issues concerning party’ financing during the transitional period: 1. The MSZMP would not receive support from the fund established by Parliament 2. A Committee would decide on

152 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

the allocation of support (and on the matter of real estate and the question of legal title) and 3. The members of the Committee would be drawn from the government and from the parties.’"°

Closing of Negotiations The rulers rule by the grace of God, And I was not made president by the grace of God. Imre Pozsgay Minister of State, member of the MSZMP’s Presidency!!!

| The agreement of September 18, 1989—-Gydgy Szabad the MDF negotiator termed it a partial solution—was not signed by the SZDSZ and by Fidesz.'” Péter Télgyessy (SZDSZ) and Laszlé Kévér (Fidesz) explained to the plenary session: 1. the appointing of the President, 2. the dissolution of the Worker’s Militia, 3. the MSZMP’s banning from the work-place and 4. the rendering of an account of the properties of the communist party were such cardinal questions that they would not sign the agreement but would initiate a referendum on these issues.''? The referendum was due to be held on November 26th, on Pozsgay’s birthday. Pozsgay was hoping to be elected by popular vote, which would have been an excellent birthday present. However, this did not happen. The November referendum was valid and successful in all four issues. Over 95 per cent of voters voted for the banning of the party organizations from the work-place, for the MSZMP’s rendering of an account of its assets and for the dissolution of the Worker’s Militia. In the case of the first question the difference was minimal, since a mere 6,101 votes decided when the election of the president would take place.'’* It is important to mention that only this first issue was really decided by the vote. Events moved more quickly in October. The MSZMP’s name was changed to the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) on October 7th and within barely a week it had agreed on the other three issues. On October 13th Kalman Kulcsar, Minister of Justice, announced the official view of the Cabinet. This supported the view that no party organization should be allowed to operate in the work-place. A few days later the opinion

of the Legal, Administrative and Justice Committee (Jogi, Igazgatdsi és Igazsagiigyi Bizottsag) was published; this was identical to the government’s proposal. At that time the leaders of the MSZP still believed that the right to establish a trade-union should be restricted only in the case of state organizations. This meant that they would tolerate other parties forming branches in the work-place. The representatives rejected this absurd idea and, two days later, accepted the end of the era of state party power. Act XXXIII of 1989 (on party activity and administration), in section 2 § Ist paragraph, promulgated the banning of party organizations from the work-place, a ban which came into force on October 30th, 1989. Section 18 § 2nd paragraph decreed a grad-

Adam Masat: Beyond the One-party System 153 ual termination process, namely that party organizations should be banned 90 days before Parliamentary elections.''” Shortly before the close of the trilateral meetings, Zoltan Kirdaly, an independent MP, proposed in his letter to Matyas Sztrés, Speaker of Parliament, that the MSZMP should render an account of its assets to Parliament. Parlia-

ment decided at its September 26th meeting that the Minister of Finance should provide information on the property and assets of the MSZMP, the Workers’ Militia and the various social organizations. The report was available from October, when members of Parliament received the 158-page document. This lengthy document gave a mainly detailed description of the organi-

zation, broken down into years and divisions (local party organizations) mostly expressed in terms of millions and billions of Forints. Laszlo Békesi, Minister of Finance, pointed out in the report that several factors had made the

calculations and the accounting for party assets difficult—namely, that the , Ministry of Finance had received information about the fixed assets of the companies, co-operatives and publicly-financed institutions only from the annual reports of the organizations. The figures in the documents suggested an incredible level of wealth which it was still difficult to grasp. It transpired that

the support which the MSZMP and other social organizations had received since 1968 was about 47,4 billion Forints.'!° It was not possible to hide the fact that taxes amounting to 8,6 billion Forints due from the MSZMP, the KISZ and from companies operated directly by Worker’s Councils had been waived by the state.''’ The steps to create equality amongst parties and organizations taken by the MSZMP seemed totally absurd in relation to this report of the Minister of Finance and to the Party’s property and assets situation.

After the September 18th agreement the Cabinet’s plans concerning the Workers’ Militia’s integration into the army came into the limelight. In the second week of October it seemed that the government would support the idea of forming a National Guard. The government, however, retreated and withdrew its proposal concerning the modification of the National Defense law, and opted for

the immediate banning of the Worker’s Militia.''* Parliament accepted Law XXX of 1989 on an immediate ban on the organization—before the symbolic amendment to the Constitution on October 23rd. An agreement was also reached concerning party financing during the transitional period. Miklés Raft, under-secretary of state, outlined the proposal of the

MSZMP in the September 6th meeting which was held in the Office of the Council of Ministers: Two headquarters to accommodate all(!) of the parties. As this “generous”’’” offer evoked memories of the ghetto, Raft asked the represen-

tatives of the parties not to consider the MSZMP proposal but to submit their claims for office buildings and for money. The next meeting took place, with the

participation of 16 organizations, on October 27th. The original 50m Forints

budget was increased to 100m by a further reduction in support for the MSZMP.'*” However, the claims for financial support still exceeded the resources available by 25m Forints, which was due to somewhat irrational claims

154 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

made by some of the organizations.'*' The problem of office space remained unresolved, since most organizatjons were unwilling to accept being placed with other parties in a common building (in the two headquarters mentioned earlier!). The Cabinet asked for a postponement of the issue until January 31st, 1990, due to the unsettled state of the MSZP. On the other hand, the organizations accepted the normative system of financial support sponsored by Fidesz, the SZDSZ and the MDF. This included the employment of legal standards (relating to registration, membership files, basic rules, leadership appointment), a multi-level, pro-

gressive system in respect of financial norms, with the smaller organizations located in the lowest bracket.'””

Conclusions We left a corpse behind: the party state. However, the nails and the hair of the corpse are still growing even though the body is decaying. Ivan Vitanyi, member of the Reform Alliance of the MSZP

It is a widely known fact, that, during the period October 6th—8th, 1989, two congresses took place in Budapest: the 14th (closing) party Congress of the MSZMP and the Ist Party Congress of the MSZP. The delegates passed a resolution liquidating the (almost 33-year old) MSZMP on October 7th.’”? This decision meant the symbolic end of the one-party system of Kadar which had represented stability and consistency. The Law on the Right of Association of 1989 allowed the formation of parties, but the detailed regulation of their operation was covered by another law. The character of Hungary’s transition is due, among other things, to the fact that, in 1989, neither a one-party nor a multi-party-system was functioning. A nonParliamentary multi-party system did exist, established by the formation of parties from the movements and political groupings developed earlier, and by the formation and reformation of the historical parties in 1989. The general debate over the law on the Right of Association and Assembly was well known to the public, which indirectly assisted the development of a multi-party-system in 1989. At the end of 1988 the MDF considered the development of a multipartysystem as inevitable, still unwilling to operate as a party, and declared itself as party in the Deed of Foundation. The SZDSZ and Fidesz were in the same situation but they did, in fact, operate as parties, without stating this openly in their names. After the decision of the Central Committee, new organizations were developed, which did convey in their names their intention to operate as parties.'** The Roundtable talks operated as a catalyst for the formation and development of the parties, since, during the long period of the talks, several local party organizations and the Opposition Roundtable were formed in towns all over the country. Not only was the parties’ network of professionals built up during this period, it was also possible to test the political abilities of some of the

Adam Masat: Beyond the One-party System 155 leading personalities. This was the time when it was decided who was suitable for a leading position and who for the elaboration of party strategy. At the beginning, the MSZMP leadership thought in terms of “socialist pluralism”, of a political system where the state party maintained its leading role. They believed that it would be possible to placate the opposition by offering concessions, a safety-valve, a “change of model”. It was not in their interest— taking professional views into consideration—to regulate party operations by the Law on Right of Association. “One-party pluralism” would have served well their tactics to gain time and it threatened neither the MSZMP’s workplacebased organizations nor their vast property and assets, which should have been divided among the newly-formed parties. Leaders of the opposition parties discovered that, by joining forces and coming together in the Opposition Roundtable they could force the state party to show its true colors and to start the talks. During the trilateral talks it was the task of I/2 Working Committee to elaborate the Party Law. The three negotiating parties agreed on the “codification” part of the task on important political questions. The divergence of opinion (the party in the work-place, and accounting for party assets) almost brought about an end to the talks. Fundamentally there were three different opinions. The MSZMP wanted to account for party assets only to party members and was unwilling to remove the party from the workplace. It wished to restrict the Right of Association in relation to state organizations and supported the absurd idea that all parties be allowed to “enter” the work-place. By contrast, the EKA had consistently demanded an account of party assets and the banning of party organizations from the work-place. Imre Pozsgay represented a middle way. He thought that, in both cases, the demands of the EKA were justified, but he could not, or would not, identify himself with their demands. He thought that the MSZMP should, in-

deed, account for its assets to the Hungarian people but that the appropriate public forum would be the new Parliament—1.e., following free elections. Pozs-

- gay submitted a compromise proposal concerning party organizations in the work-place, in which he suggested a staged withdrawal of party organizations governed by deadlines. After Nyers and other MSZMP politicians criticized Pozsgay for this proposal, Pozsgay retreated and came up with a rather unclear formula (“there may be factory, workplace and other party organisations, but outside the factory and institution”) which seemed closer to the MSZMP’s position.

The “unfinished” Party Law became part of the agreement of September 18th, 1989, after elaboration by the three negotiating parties. The EKA signatories pursued a realistic policy and valued the results achieved. Those who did not sign the agreement regarded the issues as more important where no agreement was reached and when public opinion polls could be introduced. In the meantime the MSZMP announced its own demise and was forced to retreat on three matters: it published an account of its assets and accepted the disbanding of the Worker’s Militia, whilst the banning of party organizations from the work-place was incorporated in Act XXXIII of 1989 on Party Activity and Administration,

156 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

which was passed into law by Parliament. The successful referendum of November 26th served to confirm the whole situation, although the real decision was made only on the first, cleverly worded issue; it put a symbolic end to dispute, in which the conflict between the MSZMP and the EKA had been the most

significant. ,

~The MSZMP undoubtedly helped in the breakdown of the Kadar regime, and 1989 became not only the year of the collapse of the regime but also of the state party. The vast political and financial capital of the party proved worthless and a distrustful society, its sense of justice violated, delivered its own judgement on the party state and, in 1990, rejected the decades-old system in free elections. (Translated by Orsolya Kardcsony)

| Acknowledgments I am grateful to Tibor Bogdan, Matyas Budzsaklia, Ivan Peté and Edit Réder for their help in opening up the work of the I/2 committee by their comments and also for placing all of the documents at my disposal, I am especially grateful to Andras Bozoki: without his suggestions this paper would not have been prepared.

Notes 1 Speech given by Janos Kadar in 13th party congress in 1985. 2 Nagy, Imre: “A magyar nép nevében”. Vitairatok és beszédek. [“In the Name of the Hungarian

Nation”, Polemical essays and speeches.] 1955-1956. Paris: 1984. pp. 260-261. (Magyar Fiizetek). 3 The Act II of 1983 of the appointing of the Parliamentary representatives and councilors. Promulgated on December 27, 1983. 4 See the 8. § (1) section of the Act—The national list of 35 Parliamentary seats made it possible for prominent personalities of the party to be excused from taking part in the Nomination Committee meetings and to became automatically Members of Parliament. 5 “Of course” in the general preamble to the Jaw meant that the reforms were necessary at that time, but that “at a higher stage of socialist democracy, the legal institution could become unnecessary”. During the 1985 elections it was quite common that in the Nomination Committee meetings most members of the Committee had to be “conscripted”, and it was often asked “why do we need two candidates” (“we know who we are going to vote for”). Istvan Kukorelli: “A valasztasi rendszer

alkotmanyos keretei” [The Constitutional Framework for the Electoral System]. In: Gyérgy Szoboszlai (ed.): Biztonsag és egytittmiikédés [Safety and Cooperation]. Budapest: 1985. pp. 187.;

Péter Szalay: “A jeléltgyiilések néhany tapasztalata” [Some Observations on the Nomination Committee Meetings]. In: Gyérgy Szoboszlai (ed.): Biztonsdg és egyiittmiikddeés [Safety and Cooperation]. Budapest: 1985. pp. 191~-192., and Elemér Hankiss: Kelet-eurdpai alternativak (EastEuropean Alternatives]. Budapest: Kézgazdasagi és Jogi, 1989. pp. 109 and 114 (hereinafter: Hankiss, 1989). 6 See in detail Rudolf Tékés: A kialkudott forradalom. Gazdasagi reform, tarsadalmi dtalakulas és politikai hatalomutddlas [The Negotiated Revolution. Economic Reform, Social Change and Po-

Adam Masdt: Beyond the One-party System 157 litical Succession] 1957-1990. Kossuth, 1998. pp. 272-276. (Later on: Tékés, 1998.); Hankiss, 1989. pp. 106—116.; Istvan Feitl: “Partvezetés és orszaggytilési valasztasok”. [Party Leadership and Parliamentary Elections] 1949-1988. In: Gyérgy Féldes and Laszl6 Hubai (eds.): Parlamenti képviselévalasztasok 1920-1990 [Parliamentary Elections.] Budapest: Politikatérténeti Alapitvany, 1994. pp. 303-305.; Istvan Kukorelli and Péter Schmidt (eds.): Az alkotmanyossag alapjai. Tarsadalom — demokracia — alkotmanyossag. [The Basis of Constitutionalism. Society—Democracy—Constitutionalism]. Budapest: Kossuth, 1989. pp. 146-150.; Jozsef Halasz and Janos Sari (eds.): Allami intézmények a politikai rendszerben [State Institutions in the Political System]. Budapest: Kossuth, 1987. pp. 112—117.; Ervin Csizmadia: A magyar demokratikus ellenzék (1968-1988) [The Hungarian Democratic Opposition (1968—1988)]. Monograph. Budapest: TTwins, 1995. pp. 301-308. (Hereinafter: Csizmadia, 1995.) 7 About the concept of pluralism see Mihaly Bihari: Demokratikus ut a szabadsaghoz [Democratic

Way to Freedom]. Budapest: Gondolat, 1990. pp. 209-211. and Zsuzsa Kerekes: Parlamenti abécé [Parliamentary ABC]. Budapest: Osiris, 1999. p. 101.

| 8 See Csizmadia, 1995. Monografia [Monograph] p. 312. 9 “...when we are talking about pluralism..., we should also consider that in this country neither a one-party system has been introduced as a possible alternative, nor a two-party system, since pluralism means a multi-party system...” See Sandor Agécs, Endre Medvigy (eds.): A magyarsag esélyei. A tanacskozas hiteles jegyzékényve. Lakitelek 1987. szept. 27. [The Chances of the Hungarian Nation The Authentic Minutes of the Talks] Lakitelek—Budapest: Antologia—Ptiski, 1991. p. 86.—See also the speeches of Imre Pozsgay, Mihaly Bihari, Csaba Gombar.

10 See ib. pp. 177-178. |

11 Csizmadia, 1995. Dokumentumok [Documents]. pp. 431-487., and Fanny Havas et al. (eds.): Beszélé Osszkiadas [Republication of Beszél6’s twenty-seven issues between 1981 and 1989, in three volumes]. Vol. 2. pp. 749-791.— See in particular Térvényt a partrdl! [Law about the party!] ibid., p. 437. (p. 759.) 12 Antal Laszl6, Bokros Lajos, Csillag Istvan, Lengyel Laszlé and Matolcsy Gyérgy: Fordulat és reform [Change and Reform]. In: Kézgazdasdagi Szemle, 34 (1987) 6. pp. 642-663. 13 Bihari, Mihaly: Reform és demokracia (Valsag és kibontakozds) {Reform and Democracy (Crisis

and Development)]. Budapest: Eétvés, 1990. pp. 15-102. , 14 See in particular Tervezett és hatarolt tébbpartrendszer — Alkotmanyozoé Nemzetgyiilés (A diktatorikus szocializmusbol a demokratikus szocializmusba dtmenet politikai programja.); Alter-

nativ javaslat az atmeneti iddszak politikai programjara; Kormanyzati reformcentrum és az “atmenet” fobb feladatai. Ib. pp. 182~191., 192~-196. and 197-214.—Maria Ormos and Rezs6é Nyers also supported the proposal of a gradual change to a multi-party system in the meeting of the Central Committee on February 10th, but both of them acknowledged that, under the political circumstances at that time, it was not possible. On the other hand, Nyers explained the necessity for the declaration of a multi-party system in a rather contradictory way in the February 7th ses-

sion of the Central Committee. He called the multi-party system the natural form of a socialist “reinforced people’s democratic” society, whilst he referred to the one-party system as “the revolutionary stage”, the natural form of proletarian dictatorship. S. Kosztricz Anna et al. (eds.): A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart K6zponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzékényvei [The Minutes of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party in the Year 1989]. Vol. 1. Budapest: MOL, 1993. 65. ff. and 75. ff. (Hereinafter: A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart K6zponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzékényvei)—Az MSZMP Politikai Bizottsaganak 1989. februar 7-i tilése. [The Meeting of the Political Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Party of February 7th, 1989] MOL M-KS-288. f. 5/1051. 6. e. 15 Istvan Kukorelli: “Parlament az egypartrendszer utols6(?) évében”. In: Sandor Kurtan, Péter Sandor, Laszlé Vass (eds.): Magyarorszdg Politikai Evkényve 1988. [The Political Yearbook of Hungary] Debrecen: R-Forma, 1989. p. 248.—Az MSZMP javaslata politikai egyezteté forum leét-

rehozdsara [The MSZMP’’s Proposal on the Setting up of a Conciliation Forum], and Az Ellen- , zéki Kerekasztal allasfoglalasa az MSZMP javaslatarol [The View of the Opposition Roundtable

158 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy on the Proposal of the MSZMP]. Andras Bozoki (editor-in-chief), Marta Elbert, Melinda Kalmar, Béla Révész, Erzsébet Ripp, Zoltan Ripp (eds.): A rendszervaltas forgatokényve: kerekasztaltargyalasok 1989-ben [The Script of the Regime Change: Roundtable Negotiations in 1989]. Budapest: Magveté, 1999. Vol. 1. pp. 229-230. (document 19) and pp. 291-292. (document 20/c) (hereinafter: A rendszervaltas forgatékényve [The Script of the Regime Change]). 16 Henrik Vass (ed.): A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart hataérozatai és dokumentumai 1985-1989 [The Resolutions and Documents of The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party Central Committee 1985-1989]. Interart, 1994. p. 442. (Hereinafter: A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart hatdarozatai és dokumentumai 1985-1989.) 17 A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzékényvei. Vol. 1. p. 11.; Vol. 2. p. 1714. 18 See e.g. the remarks of Karoly Grész and Gyula Kallai at the meeting of CC on February 10. A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsagdnak 1989. évi jegyzékényvei. Vol. 1. pp. 12. and 21. 19 Announcement about the meeting of MSZMP Central Committee. 4 Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart hatarozatai és dokumentumai 1985-1989. pp. 556-558. 20 See e.g. the remarks made in the meeting of MSZMP PB on February 7th 1989. MOL M-KS~—288. f. 5/1051. 6. e—”I have noticed that there is agreement, that, in the coming elections, taking into consideration the transitional period, there could not be truly multi-party elections. There is no trick in this. The historical or the newly formed parties are not ready to define themselves, and so society is not ready to judge them realistically.” Interview with Matyas Budzsaklia, Népszabadsag June (1) 15, 1989. 21 A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzdkGnyvei. Vol. 1. p. 12. 22 Remarks made by Imre Nagy in a KB meeting on February 11th. A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzékényvei. Vol. 1. pp. 92-93. 23 See e.g. the case of the famous NEXT 2000 Kft. Népszabadsag, 47 (August 28, 1989) 202. p. 5.; Magyar Nemzet, 52. (September 1989) 205. p. 5. 24 See the meetings of the Political Executive Committee on August 15th and 31st 1989. MOL M — KS — 288. f. 5/1075. 6. e.— See also “Mi van a hattérben?” [What’s in the background?] Magyar Nemzet, 52 (July 29, 1989) 176. p. 4.

25 See 2. § (1 See also Andras Holl6é: Az allamjogtol a jogallamig. (A kézjog “forradalma”’). [From Political Law to Constitutional State (The Revolution of the “Constitutional Law’)]. Budapest: 1993. p. 67 (hereinafter: Holld, 1993).

26 See the viewpoint of MSZMP KB on November 22, 1988. 4 Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart hatarozatai és dokumentumai 1985-1989. pp. 521-522. _ 27 Gyorgy Fejti at the Intermediate Level talks on July 27. A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 2. p. 624 (document 53). 28 See about the formation of the EKA A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 1. pp. 63-75 (document 7); Richter Anna (ed.): Ellenzéki Kerekasztal — portrévazlatok — Opposition Roundtable (Portrait Sketches)]. Budapest: Otlet, 1990. (hereinafter: Richter, 1990); Tékés, 1998. pp. 318-324; Andras Boz6éki: Konfrontaciéd és konszenzus: a demokratizalas stratégiai. [Confrontation and Consensus:

Strategies for Democratisation] Szombathely: Savaria University Press, 1995. 97. (hereinafter: Bozoki, 1995); Vigh, Karoly: “Az Ellenzéki Kerekasztalt6] a Nemzeti Kerekasztalig”. In: Sandor Kurtan, Péter Sandor, Laszlé Vass (eds.): Magyarorszdg Politikai Evkényve 1990. [Budapest:] AulaOMIKK, 1990. 231. and Vigh Karoly: “Az Ellenzéki Kerekasztalrél”. Valésdg, 42 (1999) Vol. 1. 90. (hereinafter: Vigh, 1990. and Vigh, 1999.)

29 See e.g. the remarks of Fejti at Politikai Bizottsag on March 14. MOL M — KS — 288. f. 5/1057. 6. e.

30 A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 1. pp. 88-90. (document 9)

31 Before the forum of April 8, representatives of the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society were telephoned and invited, and the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions was invited by | cable. Of the member organizations only Fidesz was not invited and for that reason it is not sur-

Adam Masat: Beyond the One-party System 159 prising that Fidesz expressed a strong opinion that the EKA should not take part in the talks held in the Academy. See also A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 1. pp. 94-113 (document 11/a); Andras Balint, B.: Gydézelemre sziiletiink... Kénya Imre az Ellenzéki Kerekasztalrol. [Born to Win: Imre Konya on the Opposition Roundtable] Budapest: Progresszid, 1990. 35. Richter, 1990. pp. 17-18., p.13.; Vigh, 1990. p. 233; Vigh, 1999. p. 91.; Gyérgy Fejti: “I had to represent the MSZMP”. In: Sandor Kurtan, Péter Sandor, Laszl6 Vass (eds.): Magyarorszdg évtizedkényve. 1988-1998. Vol. 2. Budapest: Demokracia Kutatasok Magyar Kézpontja Alapitvany, 1998. p. 907 (hereinafter: Fejti, 1998) and Bozoki, 1995. pp. 99-102. 32 A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 1. p. 147 (document 13/c). 33 Térvényjavaslat a politikai partokrél [Draft Law on the Political Parties]. Magyar Hirlap, 22. (April 19, 1989) No. 90. p. 7, and Térvényjavaslat a politikai partokrél [Draft Law on the Political Parties]. Magyar Nemzet, 52. (April 19, 1989) No. 90. p. 5. 34 A rendszervaltas programja. SZDSZ, 1989. p. 143. 35 Magyar Nemzet, 52 (May 18, 1989) No. 114. p. 6. 36 A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 1. p. 72. 37 See Magyar Nemzet, 52 (May 27, 1989) No. 122. p. 3. 38 See the remarks made at the EKA meeting on May 31, 1989. 4 rendszervaltas forgatékényve.... Vol. 1. 410. ff. 39 See Kenedi, 1996. Vol. 2. pp. 230-411. According to the recollections of Péter Télgyessy the representatives of the MSZMP thought about the number of people likely to go to the funeral, that such an enormous crowd “cannot be supervised by the police’’. The reaction is a good example of the fear emanating from the declining power of the state party that the event might bring about the destruction of the legitimacy of the system which had existed for almost three decades. The com-

ment of Péter Télgyessy. See also Télgyessy’s article in April 24, 1999 edition of Magyar Nemzet, and the writings of Janos Rainer M. in the same volume.

40 See e.g. the report of Laszl6 Sélyom and Péter Télgyessy in the EKA meeting on June 4th. A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 1. pp. 468-470, and the remarks of Télgyessy in the meeting of the EKA on June 7th ibid., p. 550. 41 Cf A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 1.2 p. 447. and ibid. vol. 2. p. 27. and p. 134. 42 A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 1. p. 410. —Cp. also ibid., p. 605. (document 31— The Ist point in the agreement’s penultimate paragraph.) 43 It was publicly known that the President of the USA would visit Hungary in the summer of 1989. (See Népszabadsdg, 47. (June 15th, 1989) No. 139. p. 1.) George Bush was in Budapest on July 11th—13th and he met the representatives of the EKA in the Embassy Residence. On the same day Bush met 6 members of Fidesz and six young independent politicians. Andras Bozoki (ed.): Tiszta lappal. A FIDESZ a magyar politikdban 1988-1991. [With a Clean Record. Fidesz in Hungarian

Politics 1988-1991] Budapest: FIDESZ, 1992. p. 805. (hereinafter: Tiszta lappal)—Mark Palmer, the US ambassador to Hungary, twice met representatives of the EKA, on June 15th and June 27th. In both cases reports were made about the meetings by organizations of the Ministry of the Interior, that is to say, the meetings were tapped. Cf. A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 2. p. 55. and p. 220. — About the role of Palmer see e.g. Istvan Bodzaban and Antal Szalay (eds.): A puha diktaturatol a kemény demokracidig. [From Soft Dictatorship to Tough Democracy] Budapest: Pelikan, 1994. pp. 129-131. (hereinafter: Bodzaban and Szalay, 1994). 44 The organizations of the Third side e.g. A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 1. pp. 604—608 (document 31), and Richter, 1990. pp. 294-300. Imre Pozsgay later admitted: we had to accept the idea that the organizations representing the Third Side are independent in 1989. (Imre Pozsgay:

1989. Politikus-palya a partallamban és a rendszervaltasban. Budapest: Ptiski, 1993. p. 146 (hereinafter: Pozsgay, 1993). Gyérgy Fejti on the other hand, after 10 years still thought that the participation of the organizations of the Third Side was necessary due to the balance of power and the diversity of society at that time. Fejti, 1998. p. 907. 45 After the signing of the agreement on the start of the genuine political talks on June 10th, Péter

Télgyessy (SZDSZ) announced that the EKA insisted upon the establishment of 7 Working

160 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy Committees, only one of which would deal with economic issues. See the meeting of the EKA on June 7 (A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 1. p. 564 and Népszabadsdg, 47 (June 12, 1989, No. 136. p. 5). The intention also shows, that—by decreasing the number of economic Working Committees—the EKA wished to avoid sharing the responsibility for the evolving economic situation. See the remarks of Télgyessy at the meting of the EKA on June 9th. A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 1. p. 585. 46 Imre Nagy and the martyrs were reburied on June 16th; the signing of the agreement on the start of the

-NKA negotiations and the opening plenary meeting took place on June 13th. Viktor Orban stated positively in the EKA meeting of May 31st that the agreement should be signed only after the reburial. Péter Télgyessy on the other hand reasoned that concerns about possible events on this day would “weaken” the representatives in power, and so to sign the agreement before June 16th would bring more positive results than later. A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 1. 411.

47 A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 2. p. 141 (document 38/b}—The EKA defined as preconditions for the signing of the agreement at the NKA talks’ on the issues and agenda on June 21st, that they would withdraw the draft laws mentioned above. See the argument of Balint Magyar at the meeting of the EKA on June 20th, ibid., Vol. 2. pp. 119-120. 48 Gyorgy Fejti in the meeting of Politburo on June 13th. MOL M-KS-—288. f. 5/1068. 6.e. 49 Jozsef Antall at the meeting of the EKA on August 29th. A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 3. p. 536 (document 65). 50 A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 2. p. 138 (document 38/a). The Intermediate Level nega-

tions discussed the duties of the I/2 Committee’s task on July 27th. Ivan Peté explained at that time that part of the Committee’s work is to guarantee working conditions during the transition | period, and so the term “working” is a general term and does not refer to the preparation of a concrete draft law. ibid., pp. 628-629. 51 Imre Pozsgay and Gydrgy Fejti suggested several times that equal opportunities can only be under-

stood under legal circumstances. By doing so they rejected the comments of the EKA, that the MSZMP did not intend to create equal opportunities by refusing to render an account of party assets and banning party organizations from the work-place. See e.g. the remark of Pozsgay at the August 28th Intermediate Level negotiations meeting. (ibid., Vol. 3. p. 505.), and the response of Fejti at the September 6th (ibid., Vol. 4. p. 191.) and July 27th meetings (ibid., Vol. 2. p. 630. and p. 635). 52 See the EKA’s announcement on May 24th, ibid., Vol. 1. pp. 392-393. (document 24/c). See also Gyorgy Fejti’s report in the meeting of the Political Committee on May 2nd., MOL M—KS-—288. f. 5/1063. 6.e.

53 The MSZMP recommended several times that the I/2 Committee, together with a special subcommittee, should handle these issues. Due to the break-down in talks this did not come about. See A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 2. 622 (document 53). 54 June 30, July 5, 10, 17, 19, 21, 24, 26, August 21, 30 and September 18 and 20. 55 Regular participants at the Committee meetings were: Zoltan Bodnar, Tibor Bogdan and Ferenc Rakosi (MSZMP); from the EKA member organisations Matyas Eérsi (SZDSZ), Balazs Horvath (MDF), Gyérgy Palos (FKGP), Laszl6 S. Hegediis (MNP), Gyérgy Such (Fidesz), Tibor Vidos (FSZDL); from the Third Side Roza Bota (Demisz), Béla Rabi (Demisz), Ivan Szenes (MEASZ), Tibor Végh (BAL). Other (“non-permanent”) participants: from the MSZMP: Mrs Ban, Gyula Farkas; from the EKA: Daniel Dobozy, Jézsef Koblencz; and, representing the Third Side: Ott6 Gyorgy Hatos, Miklés Talas, Gabor Tatrai. 56 A rendszervaltas forgatékonyve... Vol. 2. p. 228 (document 43). 57 Edit Réder’s personal comment. 58 Karoly Grosz in the meeting of the Politburo. February 28. MOL M-KS—288. f. 5/1054. 6.e.

59 The acceptance of the next presidential institution, the writing of minutes, the issue of publicity,

wording of memos and transcripts, regular consultations with the delegation of the Working Committee, etc.

60 I/2. Jegyzékényv az 1989. janius 30-i targyalasrdl [I/2 Minutes of the Talks of June 30th, 1989]. According to the Minutes of July 5th the EKA asked for an account of the property and assets of

Adam Masat: Beyond the One-party System 161 the MSZMP and other social organizations as at December 31st, 1987 and a detailed description of any changes following that date. (The EKA’s concept of this request for data was based on the MDF’s proposal.) The EKA asked also for the following data: the infrastructure of the organization (phone, telex, fax, etc.); the cars owned by the organizations; scientific institutions, research institutions, schools and their equipment; property, assets and finances in connection with newspaper publication and local media organizations; the press, publishing houses and other assets of the organizations; property and assets, expenses and receipts of other organisations at the disposal of the organizations; foundations, shares, securities, etc.; a detailed statement of the source and application of funds for 1987 and 1988 and the support offered to state-financed organizations— all in detail. 61 The 2. § of May 29th draft law, discussed by the Committee, dealt with three versions A) “For the formation of a party is needed a total of at least 10 thousand founder-members who declare their common will to form the party.”; B) version: “at least 500 founder-members who declare their common will to form the party”; C) version: “at least 10 founder-members”. All three versions were omitted, and Act II of 1989 3. § (4) paragraph on the Right of Public Meetings remained: “For the forming of a social organization at least 10 founder-members are necessary who declare their common will to form the organization, who decide on the fundamental rules and who appoint its administrative and representative body.” 62 Cp. the Act II 8. § (2) paragraph of 1989 of the Right of Public Meeting (effective after October 30th, 1989). 63 Cp. the Constitution 32/A. § (5) paragraph, and 50. § (3) paragraph (effective after October 23rd 1989).

64 1/2. Jegyzékényv az 1989. julius 5-i targyalasrol—Cp. Constitution 2. § (3) paragraph. 65 1/2. Jegyzékdnyv az 1989. julius 10-i targyalasrol 66 Cp. the Act XXXII. 1. § of 1989 of party operations and administration. 67 Cp. ib. 3. § (3) paragraph. 68 Cp. the Act II 8. § (2) paragraph of 1989 of the Right of Public Meeting. 69 I/2. Jegyzékonyv az 1989. julius 19-i targyalasrol. 70 op. cit. 71 Gyérgy Fejti at the Intermediate Level talks on July 27th. A rendszervaltas forgatokényve ... Vol. 2. p. 623. (document 53). 72 This principle had been formulated several times earlier, see e.g. the text of the Minutes of June 5. See also J/2. Jegyzékényv az 1989. julius 26-i targyalasrol. 73 ‘I/2. Jegyz6kényv az 1989. julius 19-i targyalasrol. — See also the evaluation of Ivan Peté at the meeting of the EKA on July 27th. A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 2. 563. ff. 74 A rendszervaltas forgat6kényve... Vol. 2. pp. 620-622 (document 53). 75 The Third Side was not in favor of the publication of the statement of assets.

76 From the original text of the minutes it seems obvious that Fejti often came into conflict with himself. See in particular A rendszervaltas forgat6kényve... Vol. 2. p. 630. 77 See also Zart ajtdk és feltételezések [Closed Doors and Presumptions]. Magyar Nemzet, 52 (July 28th, 1989) No. 175. p. 3., and Mi van a hattérben? [What’s in the Background?] Magyar Nemzet, 52 (July 29th, 1989) No. 176. p. 4. 78 Gyorgy Fejti ten years later, in 1999, denied that the MSZMP had changed its view on the subject. Rendszervaltozas Magyarorszagon 1989-1990. Nemzetkézi kritikai Oral History konferencia. MTA, June 10-11, 1999 (panel 6). 79 It concerns the earlier mentioned Note which contained the answers to the Minutes of the MSZMP of July 5th. See also: A rendszervaltas forgat6k6nyve... Vol. 2. p. 628. 80 Cp. the report of Ivan Peté at the meeting of the EKA on July 27th. A rendszervaltas forgat6kényve ... Vol. 2. p. 563. 81 Matyas Budzsaklia confirmed this in the interview (November 19th, 1999). See also the remarks of Ivan Pet6 at the EKA’s meeting on July 27th. A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 2. p. 563. See the publication of Andras Bozéki publication: Szabadsdg, elvtarsak! [Freedom, Comrades!}

162 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy Andras Bozoki: Magyar panoptikum. [The Hungarian Wax Works] Budapest: Kavé, 1996. pp. 69-71. 82 Later it became clear from the report by Laszl6 Békesi, Minister of Finance, that the party had waived the 8,6 billion (!) HUF tax debt of the KISZ and the companies operating directly under the trade unions. Magyar Nemzet, 52 (October 21, 1989), p. 3. 83 It is enough to refer to the difference in personality of the two politicians, or, simply, that Fejti as regards the cardinal issues (the banning of party organizations from the work-place, accounting for assets) did not agree with Pozsgay. Fejti wrote on the subject: I was surprised to hear the statement made by Pozsgay that, from the beginning, his aim was to break up his own party. My aim was not that, since I had learnt that several forces outside us were ready for that. (...) I am aware, that in this bargaining process such an opinion might have been formed about me—that I was not flexible as a negotiator and that, if Pozsgay had not been so, we would not have reached an agreement. I have reconciled myself to the fact that things were going to be remembered in this

: way, but, as a participant in the events, I can say that this does not reflect reality. Undoubtedly we had, and have, a different temperament and character... Imre Pozsgay was happy to be left out of the conflict, and probably he was right. His ambition was different from mine.” Fejti, 1998. pp. 908-909. See also: A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 2. 566. skk. 84 Statement of Laszl6 Vass (November 30, 1999). See also the opinion of Fejti about informal

communication. Fejti, 1998. pp. 907-908, and memoir of Pozsgay: Pozsgay, 1993. pp. 159.; Pozsgay Imre: Koronatanu és tettestars [Evidence for the State and Accomplice]. Budapest: Korona, 1998. p. 212 (hereinafter: Pozsgay, 1998); Pozsgay Imre: “Széljegyzet a rendszervaltas vélt vagy valds titkaihoz”. [Marginal Notes to the Presumed and Real Secretes of the Change of Regime]. In: Kurtan Sandor, Sandor Péter, Vass Laszlé (eds.): Magyarorszag évtizedkényve 1988-1998. Vol. 2. Budapest: Demokracia Kutatasok Magyar Kézpontja Alapitvany, 1998. p. 940.

85 A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 2. p. 331. (document 46). Pozsgay joined the talks again on August 24. 86 Pozsgay, 1993. p. 156. 87 Ibid., p.158. 88 In the summer of 1989 Pozsgay consistently headed the popularity charts. See AZ MSZMP elnoékségének rokonszenvindexe. [The Popularity Chart of the MSZMP Presidency] Magyar Nemzet, 52 (August 1, 1989) No. 178. p. 1. 89 Pozsgay, 1993. p. 154. 90 Ibid., pp. 154-155. 91 Ibid., p. 158. 92 Ibid. (content quotation).

93 See the minutes of the Intermediate Level negotiations’ meeting on July 6th. A rendszervaltas forgatékényve ... Vol. 2. p. 331 (document 46).—Pozsgay announced at that meeting, that the MSZMP had no intention to close the talks on the final deadline. 94 Karoly Grosz at the meeting of Politikai Bizottsag on May 2nd, 1989. MOL M-KS-288. f. 5/1063. 6.e. 95 See Magyar Nemzet, 52 (May 11, 1989), No. 108. p. 3. 96 According to the exchange rate of 26th June, 1989 US$100 was equivalent to 6,219.80 Forints (100 GBP = 9,636.61 Forints). 97 The MDF and the SZDSZ did not claim support. The Kisgazdapart, and the Magyar Néppart each claimed 3.3m Forints, which they received. “Kik és mennyit kaptak az dtvenmillidbdél?” [Who Received the 50 Million, and Why? ] Magyar Nemzet, 52 (July 22nd, 1989), No. 170. p. 7. 98 A rendszervaltas forgatokényv... Vol. 4. pp. 474-519. (document 64).

6.e.

99 Gyorgy Fejti argued in the PIB’s meeting on August 15th, that if they announced it “heavily blown up” at a press conference, the issue of the MSZMP’s property and assets would be cancelled from the agenda. (He could not foresee his misjudgment.) MOL M~KS-—288. f. 5/1075.

Adam Masat: Beyond the One-party System 163 100 I/2. Jegyzo6kdnyv az 1989. augusztus 30-i targyalasrol. 101 The meeting of Politikai Intézé Bizottsag on August 31st. MOL M-KS—288. f. 11/1076. 6. e.—A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 4. pp. 47-48.

102 Ibid., vol. 3. p. 499. See also A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart K6zponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzokényvei... Vol. 2. p. 1428. The situation current at that time was characterized by the remarks of Béla Katona in the meeting of MSZMP CC in September: “The dispute continues over the issue of whether the MSZMP should render an account of its properties to the Opposition Roundtable, to Parliament, or to the Audit Office? I would like to advise that it should render the account to the party members, as the party members are not aware of [sic!] the MSZMP’s asset position.” A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzok6nyvei. Vol. 2. p. 1503. 103 Népszabadsag, 4. (August 30th, 1989) No. 204. p. 5. 104 A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzékényvei. Vol. 2. pp. 1429-1430 (emphasis by— M. A.) 105 Only one person abstained from voting. 106 See A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzékényvei. Vol. 2. p. 1513, and A rendszervaltas forgatokényve... Vol. 4. p. 166. 107 Magyar Nemzet, 52 (September Ist, 1989), No. 205. p. 5.

5/1077. 6. e. |

108 At the meeting of the Political Executive Committee on September 5th, MOL M-KS-288. f. | 109 A rendszervaltas forgatékényve... Vol. 4. pp. 468-469 (document 77). 110 1/2. Jegyzékényv az 1989. szeptember 20-i targyalasrol. 111 Imre Pozsgay in the February 22, 1992 edition of Népszabadsdg; Pozsgay, 1993. p. 184.

112 The League, referring to its observer status, did not sign the contract. The Social Democratic Party signed only on condition, that it could announce that it did not agree with appointing the President before the Parliamentary elections. The SZOT withdrew in early August from the talks, which is why its signature was missing. See A rendszervaltds forgatokdényve... Vol. 4. pp. 516— 519. (document 79). 113 See ibid., Vol. 4. pp. 500-502 (document 78); Tiszta lappal. pp. 194-204.; Endre Babus: “Népszavazas—1989.” In: Sandor Kurtan, Péter Sandor, Laszl6 Vass (eds.): Magyarorszag politikai évkényve 1990. AULA—OMIKK, 1990. pp. 209-223.; Pozsgay, 1993. pp. 165-166. and pp. 184-186.; Toékés, 1998. 371.; Janos Kis: “A négy ‘igen’ tizenete”. Magyar Nemzet, 52 (December 3, 1989). No. 286. p. 5.; Janos Kis: “1989: A vig esztend6” [The Happy Year]. Beszélé, 4. (1999), No. 10. pp. 39-42; Istvan Kukorelli: “Kormany és kéztarsasagi elndk Ossztizben az aliamf6.” In: Csaba Gombar, Elemér Hankiss, Laszl6 Lengyel, Gyérgyi Varnai (eds.): Kormany a mérlegen 1990-1994. Budapest: Korridor, 1994. pp. 95—96.; Jézsef Debreczeni: A miniszterelnék. Antall Jozsef és a rendszervaltozas. [The Prime Minister: Jozsef Antall and the Political Transition], Budapest: Osiris, 1998. pp. 63-75. és Jézsef Debreczeni: “Antall Jozsef és a négyigenes” népszavazas. Magyar Nemzet, 61 (April 25, 1999), No. 97. p. 16.

114 See the 41/1989. (XII. 27) OGY decision about the result of the referendum. 115 The party organisations had to be banned from the law courts, from the official organisations of Partliament, and from the Public Prosecutor’s department by the time the law came into force, from the departments of public administration no later than December 31st, 1989 and from the armed forces and police no later than December 31st, 1990. Laszlé Kovacs, representative of Pest county, handed in a codicil on October 18th, in which he proposed that in other workplaces the party organisations should be banned no later than June 30th, 1990. Orszdggyiilési Iromanyok. 1985—1990. [Parliamentary Papers 1985-1990] pp. 251-300. No. 300.

(100 GBP = 9,636.61 Forints). |

116 According to the exchange rate of 26 June, 1989 US$100 was equivalent to 6,219.80 Forints 117 Magyar Nemzet, 52. (October 21st, 1989), No. 248. p. 3. 118 Magyar Nemzet, 52. (October 21st, 1989), No. 248. p. 2.

164 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy 119 The terminology was originally used by GyGrgy Fejti, see PIB’s meeting on August 15th,, MOL M-KS-—288. f. 5/1075. 6. e.

120 Emlékezteté a partok és politikai szervezetek képviseldi, valamint a Minisztertandcs Hivatalanak

elndke kézétt 1989. oktober 27-én a partok pénztigyi tamogatasa targyaban tartott konzultaciorol. See also Magyar Nemzet, 52. (October 28th, 1989), No. 254. p. 3. 121 See especially the remarks made in the EKA meeting on November 8th. A rendszervaltas forgatékényve... Vol. 5. 176. skk. (document 82).

122 After October 27th, there were two meetings, the first on November Ist, and a later one on November 3rd. See: A rendszervaltas forgatokényve...,Vol. 5. pp. 200-201. — See also Népszabadsag November 4th edition, the article: a “Bevallani, jaj, de nehéz...” 123 See Emil Kimmel (ed.): Kongresszus ‘89. Kossuth, 1990. Bihari Mihaly: Magyar politika 194-

1995. [Hungarian Politics 194-1995] Korona, 1996. pp. 85-95. and A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart hatarozatai és dokumentumai 1985-1989. pp. 646-648. 124 From the theme’s works see Mihaly Bihari (ed.): A tébbpartrendszer kialakulasa Magyarorszagon. 1985-1991. [The Establishment of a Multi-Party System in Hungary 1985-1991]. Kossuth, 1992.; Tamas Fricz: A magyarorszdgi partrendszer 1987-1995 [The Hungarian Party System 1987-1995]. Cserépfalvi, 1996; Zoltan Ripp: Szabad Demokratak. Térténeti vazlat a Szabad Demokratak Szévetségének politikajarol [Free Democrats. Historical Sketches of the Politics of the Alliance of Free Democrats] (1988-1994). Budapest: Napvilag, 1995; Attila Wéber: A FIDESZ-jelenség [The FIDESZ-Phenomenon]. Budapest: Napvilag, 1996 (Politikatérténeti fiizetek 6), etc.

The Negotiated Origins of the Hungarian Electoral System John W. Schiemann

| So we ourselves went from originally wanting a single member constituency system... to the point that we didn’t know, but we had the feeling, as time went by, that it actually wouldn’t be good for us so let’s push the thing in the other direction. In this question basically the principle of the smallest risk prevailed. MSZMP negotiator Gyorgy Fejti

When, following the conclusion of the Roundtable negotiations, the MSZMPdominated Parliament reluctantly passed the electoral law to be used for the first free Parliamentary elections in over forty years, one representative complained that it was so complicated that “the voters, if they want to understand it, will have to take at least one course on vote calculation.” The deputy was not exaggerating; the electoral system is notoriously complex, electing 386 representatives from three different tiers by means of up to three ballots. It is not simply a mixture of “majoritarian” and proportional principles; it incorporates a host of

other, relatively unusual, elements within the single member constituency (SMC), list, and compensation tiers. This chapter explains why this system emerged from the roundtable talks by analyzing the bargaining process which produced it.’ The discussion will show that the electoral system was the result of a patchwork grafting of different components, rather than a systematically conceived, and coherently designed, grand

plan to meet some imputed societal need. Nor did Hungary’s framers simply attempt to emulate (what they believed to be) the German system (Geddes 1996, 24) or design a system which reflected a popular distaste for political parties (Lijphart 1992). Instead, the Opposition Roundtable (EKA) and the ruling Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP) which negotiated the electoral law in the roundtable talks attempted to design a system which would both maximize the seat shares of their individual parties as well as allocate those seats to top party élites. They pursued these objectives, however, under a thickening veil of “ex ante” uncertainty about “ex post” electoral outcomes. Indeed, this thickening

of the veil during the course of the roundtable caused the MSZMP to hedge its | bets on the global features of the system, combining different sets of rules in order to allocate seats in multiple ways.

The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section I briefly describe the electoral system, desegregating it into its most important individual components.

The next section turns to the bargaining in the roundtable negotiations which produced Act XXXIV of 1989. This section reconstructs the beliefs, preferences,

166 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

and bargaining strategies of the roundtable participants which lay behind the agreements to each of the individual components. The last section summarizes ,

the salient factors behind the choice of the system. The Electoral Law of 1989 Whilst any electoral system is a complex configuration of individual rules, Hungary’s three-level, triple ballot system takes this statement to new heights.” Parliamentary seats are allocated from (1) competition in single member constituencies; (2) competition between parties in regional list voting; and (3) indirect, or compensatory, distribution from a national list. Each Hungarian voter initially receives two ballots, one for the SMC contest in his home constituency and one for the party list competition in his region. SMC competition, then, is the first tier; there are 176 single member constituencies nation-wide. To be eligible, each candidate must obtain 750 nominating signatures. The decision rule for single-member constituencies is a two-round, majority-plurality system; if a candidate receives more than half of the votes cast in the first round, then that candidate immediately wins the seat. Failing this, a second round of balloting is held two weeks later, to which any candidate receiving 15% or more of the vote (but with a minimum of the top three vote winners) advance. Seats in this round are decided by simple plurality; 1.e., the candidate with the most votes wins. The third ballot which Hungarian voters cast is for the next level: that is for regional list voting.’ The twenty regions conform to Hungary’s 19 counties plus Budapest

| and a total of 152 seats are distributed among these multimember constituencies (MMCs) nation-wide. Any party running candidates in one-quarter (although with a minimum of two) of the region’s SMC contests may establish a party list | for that region. Regional seats are initially allocated according to a Droop quota,

meaning that the “purchase price” of a seat in a region is the total number of votes cast in that region divided by the number of seats available plus one (Lijphart 1994, 23). Not all seats will be allocated according to the quota system; in order to distribute (some of) the others, parties with less than the “purchase price” may still receive seats according to a limited “largest remainder” formula. That is, whereas in most systems, all remaining seats would be allocated to parties with the greatest surplus of votes (in descending order) the Hungarian formula limits this distribution by stipulating that a party must at least achieve twothirds of the original quota to obtain a seat in the “remainder” allocation. Any undistributed seats after the remainder allocation are transferred to the third level (the national list) for allotment. A party must operate a list in a minimum of seven regions in order to establish a national list. Seats are distributed from the national list indirectly, based on unused (surplus) votes from the other two levels (SMC contests and regional list voting). The number of a party’s surplus votes assigned for allotment from the national list from the SMC tier is calculated as the national sum of all votes cast in the first round of SMC balloting

J. W. Schiemann: The Negotiated Origins of the Hungarian Electoral System 167

for its candidates who did not succeed in winning the constituency, whether in the first or in the run-off round. This figure is then added to the national sum of remainder votes from the regional list voting, Jess any ‘debt’ owed for seats obtained in territories via the limited largest remainder. In other words, any party awarded a regional seat with less than the Droop quota, but with at least twothirds of it, must make up the difference at the national level; it must “pay for” these ‘cheaper’ regional seats with nationally pooled surplus votes.’ The number of seats to be distributed from the surplus votes is thus variable; to the minimum 58 seats at the national level are added any seats not distributed at the regional level after quota and remainder allocations. Once the total number of seats to be awarded at national level is determined, they are distributed according to the d’Hondt “highest average” method.’ A national threshold of four percent also limited seat distribution in the 1989 system at both regional and national level.° Any party not receiving at least four percent of the national total of all regional

votes cast was ineligible to receive any seats at regional level. Similarly, no party could obtain seats through national, indirect distribution unless it obtained, nationally, at least four percent of the total regional votes cast. The Hungarian system also permits an individual to run simultaneously at all three levels: in an SMC contest, on a regional list and on a national list. The significant elements to

be explained, then, can be summarized in Table 1. ,

General Features | Table 1. Significant Elements of the Hungarian Electoral Law of 1989

SMC 176 seats.

Regional List 152 seats in twenty regions.

National List 358 seats. Candidacy/List Candidacy Rules Nomination/List Requirements

SMCs 750 signatures. Regional List | Candidates in 25% of a Region’s SMCs, with a minimum of 2.

National List Must stand in a minimum of seven Regional Lists. Candidacy A candidate is permitted to run in all three levels simultaneously.

Decision Rules

SMC Two-round majority—plurality: Candidate with 50%+1 of total votes in first round obtains seat; if no absolute majority in first round, then top 3 and all candidates with votes 15% advance to round two, decided by plurality.

Regional List “Droop” quota, plus “largest-remainder” with two-thirds limit. Unallocated seats transferred to National List.

National List D’ Hondt highest-average. Surplus Votes Surplus votes for National List distribution: From losers’ first round votes in SMCs and unused remainder votes in regional list voting. Threshold

Regional List | Minimum of 4% of national total of regional votes. National List Minimum of 4% of national total of regional votes.

168 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Each of these individual rules have differentially distributive effects on the electoral outcome—which of the political parties and individual candidates are awarded Parliamentary seats—and the task is to explain the choice of each rule, a matter to which we can now turn.

Bargaining over the Electoral System | This section reconstructs the bargaining over the most important features of the electoral law between the MSZMP and the EKA in the Middle (Intermediate) and Working (Expert) group (1/3) levels of the roundtable talks.’ For the sake of clarity, I am organizing the discussion according to the description of features in Table 1. The first section explains the agreement to the three-

level, three-ballot hybrid system; succeeding sections examine, firstly, the choice of candidacy and list-standing rules and, secondly, the agreements on multiple decision rules.

General Features: Seats from Three Ballots and Three Levels When negotiations over the electoral system began on July 3rd, the Opposition Roundtable (EKA) agreed to use the draft law drawn jointly by the communist| controlled Ministries of Justice and of the Interior as a basis for the talks.® It was this system which the MSZMP had originally intended to submit to Parliament but was forced to withdraw pending the outcome of the roundtable talks.’ Despite the consensus on using the draft plan as the basis for discussion, when the three sides of the National Roundtable sat down on July 25th to discuss in earnest the most important issues concerning the future electoral system, the only point of agreement was that the future Parliament should be unicameral with approximately 350 seats.’? Echoing the published draft law, the MSZMP proposed to fill eighty percent (300) of the seats by SMC contests and the remainder from a compensatory, national list drawing on unused/surplus votes in the SMCs (1/3 Minutes, July 25, 4). When the MSZMP originally chose this, predominantly majoritarian, system in late May, it hoped to capitalize on well-known MSZMP Parliamentary representatives and politicians on the one hand, and the relative obscurity of (even leading) figures in the opposition on the other."!

Although the EKA presented a united front vis-a-vis the MSZMP in the NRT, the electoral system constituted one of its most internally divisive issues; indeed, “[s]olving this problem was one of the original purposes of the Opposition Roundtable” (Boz6ki 1993, 298). The historical parties, recalling their victories in the 1945 and 1947 list elections, but possessing little more than famous party names and symbols, advocated a pure list system or, as in one Independent Smallholders’ Party “compromise,” a 1/3 SMC, 2/3 list division (FD, July 25, 1989).'* The Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) favored a 75% SMC majority

J. W. Schiemann: The Negotiated Origins of the Hungarian Electoral System 169

system, believing that the majority model would both prevent atomization in Parliament and present the best way to beat the MSZMP. I thought to myself, what is the best way to defeat them, the MSZMPers. And the pure SMC came to me. I thought about the fact that the opposition was terribly divided. It would come

out who is the best [in the] opposition. One. And the one opposition goes into the second round and collects all the opposition votes and then [the MSZMP] will have that 36% of public opinion polls in vain ... the opposition collects all the votes and beats the MSZMP. For me that is why the SMC was politically important.13

Moreover, whilst the SZDSZ as a party was barely known, its abundance of former dissidents and experts would provide it a better chance in contests where individual character counted for more than did party recognition and symbolism (Bozoki 1993, 298-99). Although the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz) feared that its reputation as a radical youth party would hurt it in an SMC system and originally favored a 1947 list-type system, it was persuaded by the SZDSZ’s fears of ungovernability and proposed a more even mixture of the two (Ader 1991, 69).'* The Hungarian Democratic Forum’s (MDF) best strategy was less clear-cut; whilst it did well in a few SMC by-elections, its name was also by far the best known among the opposition parties. Moreover, the MDF representative to the EKA deliberations, Jozsef Antall, was particularly fond of the West German ‘mixed system’ and it was he who proposed a compromise between the two positions (Révész 1995, 36).'° Therefore, for reasons of internal compromise, the EKA proposed a mixed system, with half of the seats to come from SMCs and half from a national list. In contrast to the MSZMP proposal, the seats from the national list would be elected directly under the EKA plan, creating a two-ballot system: one for the SMCs and one for party lists. Although the MSZMP changed its position on the national list in the next expert committee meeting three days later, accepting the two-ballot principle and a directly elected national list, it maintained its demand for the same proportions—300 to 50 (/3 Minutes, July 28, 2).

It did not, however, maintain this demand for long; Parliamentary byelections and public opinion polls on voter preferences in late-July and earlyAugust caused the MSZMP to reconsider its previous confidence in a predominantly SMC system. A series of opposition-instigated recalls and resignations of MPs forced four by-elections on July 22nd. These by-elections were conducted according to the old majoritarian electoral formula (Térvények és Rendeletek [T&R]). 1984). Since there was no provision in this law for a second round, three of the four required repeating due to either low voter turnout (below 50%) or the lack of a majority. In one of the four, however, the candidate supported by

a united opposition trounced the MSZMP candidate with 69.2% of the vote (Magyar Nemzet, July 24, 1989, 4). In two of the three repeat elections on August 5th, the opposition won these SMC contests with 70% and 62% (Magyar Nemzet, August 7, 1989, 1).'° The MSZMP was quick to reconsider the value of

a system that pitted an MSZMP candidate against a single representative of a

170 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

united opposition. Indeed, in his briefing to the MSZMP Central Committee on the status of the negotiations on July 28, Gyérgy Fejti noted, in reference to the debates on the character of the electoral system, that “[w]Je ourselves must fundamentally think through which version has the most political utility on the basis of the experiences of the by-elections, among other things” (Kézponti Bizottsag [KB] Minutes. 1989, 1380). The MSZMP initially hoped to neutralize this problem directly by insisting that a minimum of three candidates should advance to the second round in the SMC contests, where it had good reason to be confident that it would secure a plurality.'’ However, two public opinion polls published on August 11th questioned the safety of this strategy also. Both indicated greater sympathy for the

EKA and its constituent parties than for the MSZMP. According to one, the MDF received 25% and the SZDSZ 10% to the MSZMP’s 13%. To add insult to injury, 38% of MSZMP members reported that they would vote for no-one at all or for the MDF (Népszabadsdg, August 11, 1989, 7). Moreover, one opposition candidate could always withdraw from the second round, again forcing a one-toone contest with all its disastrous consequences for the ruling party. In the light of this new information, the MSZMP began to reconsider the value of a list system. In the words of MSZMP electoral law expert Andras Toth: [T]here were by-elections, two or three. And well, basically it was already clearly perceptible that that logic doesn’t work, that who is known, who isn’t known, who has what kind of results. There was simply a changing motivation in Hungarian society; clearly we too had to re-evaluate ... that system in that form could probably not bring an electoral result, which

would guarantee for a modern left-wing party the proper political weight in the regime _change.!8

Thus, by August 15th, the top leadership of the MSZMP found a 50-50 split between SMC and list seats acceptable and authorized the MSZMP delegation to

| reach an agreement on this, adding that “the question of a proportional division should be handled as a tactical reserve for further negotiations” (Vass 1994, 636).

The goal of this “tactical reserve” was the national compensation list; the MSZMP offered an equal balance between SMC and direct list seats in return for the reinstatement of a 50-seat national compensation list.” Following the SMC by-election debacles, the MSZMP took another look, not only at the direct list, but also at its original proposal of a small compensation list. The MSZMP originally intended the national compensation list as a bone thrown to the opposition and consequently quickly discarded it at the EKA’s insistence on a direct list early on in the talks. By mid-August, however, the MSZMP began to view a compensation list as yet another insurance mechanism—this time for itself. If it was going to lose in the SMCs, then a compensation list would ensure that not all those votes were wasted: “It comes from the logic of the compensation list, since the surplus votes go to the compensation list, it was to save ... everything, every possibility somehow, because the greatest losers get the most from the compensation list. So [the MSZMP] was already counting on this possibility,

J. W. Schiemann: The Negotiated Origins of the Hungarian Electoral System 171

too.””’ Meanwhile, it could still count on proportional representation from the list balloting. In short, therefore,, the MSZMP came to see both directly-elected and compensation list systems as crucial to their political survival and so came out in favor of a three-level system which combined majoritarian and PR elements. The words of MSZMP negotiator Gyérgy Fejti in the epigraph are worth repeating here: So we ourselves went from the position of originally wanting a single member constituency system ... to the point that we didn’t know, but we had the feeling, as time went by, that it actually wouldn’t be good for us so let’s push the thing in the other direction. In this question basically the principle of the smallest risk prevailed.2!

As a consequence, in the August 22 expert committee meeting, the MSZMP proposed in general terms that the future electoral system should contain SMC, remainder-compensation, and direct-list elements. The EKA representatives accepted the three-part system and agreed to refer it up to the Intermediate level for approval and debate on the balance between the levels (1/3 Minutes, August 22, 1). Though they recognized why the MSZMP wanted a compensation list, it served their own interests as well; an indirectly elected list whose order is controlled by the party provides as good a guarantee as is possible that senior leaders succeed in obtaining a seat in Parliament. Moreover, the MSZMP’s request

to reconsider the compensation list gave the EKA leverage for obtaining an equal balance between SMC and direct-list seats. Indeed, in the briefing of the August 22 meeting prepared for the EKA, the Smallholder’s expert, Jozsef Torgyan, noted that in his “judgement, the MSZMP delegation to the talks is much

more willing to discuss the electoral system with flexibility than previously (Torgyan 1989, 1). Thus, when the Intermediate level negotiations on the electoral system resumed three days later, on August 25th, the MSZMP announced that it would “accede” to the EKA demand for a 50-50 split between SMC and list seats. As part of its proposal, however, the MSZMP re-introduced the idea of the national

compensation list, proposing that a future Parliament should consist of 150 members from SMCs, 150 directly voted for on a national list and a further 50 to be allocated from a national compensation list (Politikai Egyezteté Targyaldsok,

} hereafter PET Minutes, August 25, 231). Although the EKA welcomed the 50— 50 split concession and accepted the idea of a national compensation list from the MSZMP, the new three-level system caused two new debates. Firstly, the EKA took issue with the MSZMP’s idea that the directly elected list should be a

national one and countered with one based on the nineteen counties and the capital. Secondly, the MSZMP demanded that the surplus votes to be used for the national list allocation come from the SMC contests only, whilst the EKA hoped to follow the 1945 and 1947 systems, in which surplus votes were taken from the (direct) list balloting. In an attempt to bridge the differences between the EKA and the MSZMP, the Third Side proposed that the MSZMP’s propor-

tions be accepted but that the directly elected list should be county-based. The -

172 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

EKA and the MSZMP agreed to this proposal and to referring the surplus vote issue to the experts for further discussion.” Three days later the experts met again to discuss the “fine-tuning” of the 150—150—50 framework (//3 Minutes, Aug. 28). After some tinkering then, and on September 6th, all three sides agreed to a total of 70 seats in a national list and 152 in both the SMC and (county) list tiers U//3 Minutes, Sept. 6, 4). The intermediate level political committee delegates ratified this proposal later on the same day, directing the experts to proceed to the final codification. Working in concert with experts from the Ministry of the Interior, the experts drafted the final version of the law which was submitted to the MPs in September, 1989, in preparation for the autumn session. The SMC-list division, agreed at the NRT and submitted in the name of the government, met with immediate and vocal opposition from Parliamentary MPs, local councils, organizations and even from individual citizens.”* This did not, in fact, come as much of a surprise either to the opposition or to the MSZMP-led government, as several MPs had already questioned “whether it was worthwhile re-convening [Parliament]” at the end of June when the government withdrew its own drafts so that the NRT could rework them (Orszdgegyiilési Ertesité [OE], June 27, 1989, 4300). There were further rumblings throughout the summer that Parliament might dissolve itself. In the end, however, Parliament convened in mid-October to debate the “cardinal laws” agreed on at the NRT. In the committee meetings preceding the plenary sessions representatives of the opposition and the government lobbied strongly on behalf of the Roundtable draft. Many deputies questioned the legitimacy of the roundtable negotiations and demanded a new round of talks between the National Roundtable and Parliament. The majority of criticism took the form of concrete proposals to raise the number of SMCs and lower the number of seats attainable on the national compensation list. Between the first committee session on October 16th and the final vote on October 20th, MPs submitted no fewer than 10 concrete proposals raising the number of SMCs, whilst many others supported these initiatives in general terms. The majoritarian impulse to change the Roundtable agreement ranged from the extreme (350 SMCs and no lists of any kind) to the moderate (raising the number of both the SMCs and the regional list seats to 172 at the expense of the national compensation list).”* Whilst the MSZMP-led government had expected some resistance from their

rubber-stamp Parliament, they were surprised at its intensity.2” Although the committee’s first position was that Parliament should pass the Roundtable draft as is, without amendments, resistance in the first day of general debate on Octo- | ber 19th forced the committee to debate the proposed amendments once more.”° In the meeting of the Law Committee that evening, the MPs again threatened to

alter the NRT agreement radically. In a hurried series of consultations in the hallway between Télgyessy of the EKA, Prime Minister Mikléds Németh and Interior Minister Istvan Horvath, Télgyessy proposed a compromise which would reduce the seats on the national compensation list by 12 to 58 and add a

J. W. Schiemann: The Negotiated Origins of the Hungarian Electoral System 173

further 12 to the total number of Parliamentary seats in order to raise the original

number of SMC-elected members to 176, keeping the number of regional list seats at 152. Still skeptical that the MPs would accept it, the MSZMP Government agreed to the EKA plan and the next day the Interior Minister offered it to the MPs of the Law Committee as the first of two alternatives. If this were still unsatisfactory, then the second alternative called for enacting the law as it was without the section regulating the seat proportions, substituting for it a clause stipulating that a separate law would regulate the question (Jogi, October 20, 1989, 20). Although the committee agreed to submit both variations to the plenary session, it refused to recommend either. Despite the previously strong resistance, a few hours later a demoralized Parliament accepted the 24-seat increase and passed the 176-52-58 compromise proposal.

Candidacy and List-standing Rules Nomination Requirement for Single Member Constituencies

When the parties to the NRT first addressed the SMC nomination issue in the July 28th working group meeting, MSZMP expert Andras Toth proposed a 1,000 signature requirement, four hundred more than had the original June 5th draft plan (Magyar Nemzet, June 5, 1989, 8). Aware of their organizational weaknesses, the opposition forces countered with an offer of 500 U/3 Minutes, July 28, 2-4). The MSZMP demurred and the EKA maintained its position through to the August 25th PET meeting, where Torgyan pointed out that the EKA proposal was Closer to the June 5th rule than was the MSZMP’s own plan (PET Minutes, August 25, 81). The MSZMP, however, refused to concede and all sides agreed to set the issue aside. With the number of individual constituencies agreed upon at the end of the August 25th PET meeting, the experts again discussed the SMC nomination rule in the August 28th working committee. In this session the MSZMP made a new offer, changing its position from a uniform requirement of 1,000 signatures to 2 percent of the voters in an SMC. Based on the August 25th agreement regarding

150 SMCs, this translated into roughly 800-1000 signatures (/3 Minutes, August 28, 4—6). The opposition responded with a larger concession, offering to meet the MSZMP halfway with 750 signatures as the requirement to register a

candidacy. As a part of the larger, package proposal on boundary rules from each side, these positions were sent to the Intermediate level committee meeting later that same day. Arguing in that session that the opposition had already moved seriously toward the MSZMP position with its proposal of 750 signatures, the EKA representative urged acceptance of this offer. Shortly thereafter, the MSZMP’s Imre Pozsgay agreed to split the difference with the EKA at 750 (PET Minutes, August 28, 13).

174 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Regional List-standing Requirements The requirements for establishing a regional list is a complex issue, and the rules were elaborated whilst it was still unclear whether the PR portion of the system would be composed of numerous regional lists or one national list. Still thinking in terms of a national, directly elected list in the July 28th expert working group meeting, the MSZMP proposed “parties which register at least 100 individual candidates in the capital and at least four counties” (//3 Minutes, July 28, 3). With the nomination requirements for SMCs as yet undecided, this proposal would have required a political party to collect 50,000 to 100,000 signatures nation-wide in order to establish a national list. The EKA adopted the position outlined in the Interior Ministry’s draft, which called for 10,000 signatures nation-wide to stand a national list. In an expert committee meeting several days later, the EKA accused the MSZMP of modifying its position, “with which [the MSZMP] itself does not agree, only so that later it should be able to make showy concessions” (J/3 Minutes, August 1, 3). These positions thus remained unchanged through six expert level meetings and into the seventh on August 22nd. In that meeting the MSZMP modified its position, proposing that a party wishing to establish a (national) list be required to run SMC candidates in a minimum of one-third of the national total of SMCs, with the added restriction that this requirement be fulfilled in the capital and in at least four counties (J/3 Minutes, August 22, 4).?’ Given that the MSZMP was estimating 150 to 175 total SMCs, as was the EKA, the requirement would have meant running 50 to 58 SMC candidates, depending on the final number of individual constituencies. Further, assuming that all sides predicted SMC nomination requirements somewhere between 500 and 1000, the one-third proposal

| would have stipulated roughly 25,000 to 58,000 signatures for a national list, still well above the original 10,000 in the government draft plan. Moreover, the four-county requirement would have placed a significant burden on opposition parties, whose organizational resources were weak outside Budapest.”® When the Intermediate level negotiations resumed on August 24th, the EKA’s Jozsef Torgyan criticized the MSZMP’s departure from the Interior Ministry’s draft plan (PET Minutes, August 24, 32). In the course of the next day’s continuation of the PET talks, Torgyan stated that the MSZMP offer was still unacceptable because such a high number of signatures in effect amounted to pre-election open voting which would provide an opportunity for intimidation. The representative of the Third Side then proposed to make the requirement less than one-third and to eliminate the requirement stipulating that the SMCs be in four counties and the capital. The MSZMP’s Pozsgay immediately accepted, offering one-quarter as a compromise to the EKA (PET Minutes, August 25, 91). This concession further reduced the range to 18,750 to 44,000. When both Torgyan and Boross of the EKA again referred to the original government figure of 10,000, Pozsgay again attempted to distance the MSZMP from the Interior Ministry proposal (PET Minutes, Aug. 25, 94).”” With neither side willing to concede further, the issue was set aside.

J. W. Schiemann: The Negotiated Origins of the Hungarian Electoral System 175

By the next expert level session on August 28th, the nomination problem increased somewhat by an agreement to a three-level system at the close of the last (August 25th) intermediate level session. The experts now had to work out requirements for two different lists. Drawing on the Pozsgay proposal extended in

- the August 25th meeting, the experts from all three sides agreed to apply the one-fourth rule to the county list U/3 Minutes, August 28, 6—7). Therefore, to establish a party list in a regional electoral district, a party was required to register candidates in one-fourth of that district’s SMCs, with a minimum of one for the small counties. The maximum threshold, in terms of the 150—150—50 frame-

work in force at the time, would thus have been in Budapest, where a party would have had to run in seven SMC contests (37,500 signatures) in order to establish a party list.°’ In early September all sides agreed to raise this minimum

number to two at Télgyessy’s urging (PET Minutes, Sept. 6, 31). As we saw, Parliament was primarily concerned with the relationship between the number of SMCs and seats available on the national list, and so this feature—as all other regional list features except the possibility of simultaneous candidacy (to be dis~ cussed below)—passed into law without any Parliamentary changes. National List-standing Requirements

The requirements for establishing a national list for the allocation of seats from surplus votes is closely connected with the rule for standing in a regional party list, as just discussed. If we recall that the original proposals for “list standing rules” concerned national thresholds; the MSZMP demanded 100,000, whilst the EKA insisted on one-tenth of that sum. The MSZMP then conceded twice: firstly, to a 25,000—58,000 range (the one-third rule) and finally to an 18,750-44,000 range (the one-quarter rule). Following this, the three sides decided to institute both a regional and a national list. When on August 28th the experts agreed that a party must put forward candidates in one-fourth of the regions’ SMCs to create a re-

gional list, they decided to apply the same principle to the establishment of a na- | tional compensation list. That is, taking Hungary’s 19 counties (plus Budapest) as the regional basis, a party would have to run lists in at least five districts nationally to claim any seats from the national compensation list 7/3 Minutes, August 28, 8). Given the many sparsely populated counties, three would contain only four SMCs and another four only five. In other words, to establish a national list, a party would have to run candidates in a minimum of five to seven SMCs in five counties. Assuming a 750 SMC nomination requirement, this would have meant a 3,750 to 5,250 signatures threshold, down significantly from the MSZMP’s original pro- — posal. Once again, however, Télgyessy urged a reconsideration of the issue and on August 31st the experts agreed to raise this requirement to seven regional lists for the right to establish a national compensation list, a rule which Parliament retained for the 1990 elections (J/3 Minutes, September 6, 2).°’

176 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Simultaneous Candidacy

An electoral system in which all seats are contested according to a single set of : rules generally contains a default boundary rule which specifies that a person may occupy only one candidate position. In other words, a single individual may run as a candidate in only one electoral constituency, whether individual or multimember. NRT negotiators altered the default value on this rule in order to provide (1) a further guarantee that the leadership of each party would not be excluded from Parliament and (2) a mechanism which would allow weaker parties to carry regional party lists along by heading them with known personalities. The demand to change this rule came from the EKA but met with limited resistance

, from the MSZMP, resulting in the final value—a maximum of four candidacies per person (one SMC, two regional lists, and the national list). Firstly, whilst there were intra-EKA differences on many issues giving rise to many cross-cutting alliances, every organization belonging to the EKA had one common characteristic: namely that, without exception, party delegates to the EKA _ were members of the top leadership of their party. Therefore, although the histori-cal parties first raised the idea, Antall and Szabad of the MDF, Orban and Ader of Fidesz, and Télgyessy, Magyar and Peté of the SZDSZ were not opposed to the idea. As a result the EKA pushed for simultaneous candidacy, arguing openly that the “significance of this is clearly that (1) the smaller political parties/groups want to ensure that their prominent leaders are elected and that (2) attractive individuals can pull the electoral list along” (PET Minutes, August 25, 42-43).°? Moreover, the MSZMP was well aware of the importance of simultaneous candidacy to the opposition. Zoltan Toth, a government expert on the electoral law for the MSZMP, had this to say about the origin of the simultaneous candidacy rule: What was the reason for this? The parties did not have the personnel to run 176 individual candidates, a further group on the regional lists, and a third on the national list. They simply didn’t have that many people.33

Secondly, although it was the EKA which first proposed the idea, simultaneous candidacy did not run counter to the MSZMP’s interests, either in terms of advantage to the opposition or disadvantage to itself. That is, although it might give the small opposition parties an electoral boost by allowing the few known names to underpin otherwise undistinguished party lists, the MSZMP realized that even the most well-known of opposition leaders were relatively obscure, and so severely unfavorable results from the rule were unlikely. Moreover, much of the effect of the rule would be felt in terms of which opposition candidates won a seat in Parliament, rather than whether a particular number gained entry. In a zero-sum electoral game, it was the latter, and not the former, which interested the MSZMP. Secondly, the twin goals of simultaneous candidacy—a guarantee

for the party leadership and the ‘underpinning effect’ of popular figures on lists—were not disadvantageous to the MSZMP either. Indeed, they stood, perhaps, a better chance to make use of these rules than did the opposition. In con-

J. W. Schiemann: The Negotiated Origins of the Hungarian Electoral System 177

trast to the opposition, the MSZMP did have several popular figures who might help to support the party lists. The results of a public opinion poll published on August Ist gave party leaders Imre Pozsgay and Miklés Németh 75% and 77% approval ratings, respectively (Magyar Nemzet, August 1, 1989, 4). Nyers, Horn and other MSZMP reformers also demonstrated relatively high support. More-

over, the SMC losses had revealed the precarious prospects of running in MSZMP color, and simultaneous candidacy provided an extra guarantee against the vagaries of voter preferences in both SMC and list balloting for top party leaders.”

Finally, as discussed above, the MSZMP had grown impatient for concrete results by the second half of August and the simultaneous candidacy issue presented an attractive opportunity for an MSZMP eager to reach an agreement. Moreover, by conceding to the EKA in an issue of paramount importance to it, but of lesser importance to the MSZMP, the latter hoped to make progress in

other areas, including other working committees dealing with other institutions.” . “Tf we can agree in the fundamental matters, it is not worthwhile looking for trouble in questions ... which do not influence the essence of the system ... then why not? This is the ‘why not’ category.”°° Thus, the MSZMP handled this

question as a tactical way of demonstrating compromise, taking a position against it and then agreeing to it in the hopes that it would speed up the talks in other areas, though without the commitment of a promise. In sum, whilst the MSZMP stood to gain from simultaneous candidacy, it had little to lose in terms of seats to the opposition and could thereby both demonstrate its willingness to compromise and secure agreement on an issue important to the opposition, Indeed, the MSZMP had signaled its flexibility toward some form of simultaneous candidacy already in the August 22nd expert-level meeting, prior to the

August 25th agreement on the general proportions of the three tiers. In that meeting the sides agreed in principle to the idea of simultaneous candidacy as they worked out ancillary rules for eliminating the possibility that one person | could claim two (or more) seats. For this ancillary rule the sides agreed that the SMC contests would take priority; any candidate who won an SMC election would take that seat and have his or her name taken off the party list (J/3 Minutes, August 22, 3). When the issue was discussed in the next Intermediate-level meeting on August 25th, the MSZMP retreated somewhat, taking the tougher line that the “parties should decide ahead of time whether they wished to run a candidate in an SMC or on a list” (PET Minutes, August 25, 34). After protesting that the MSZMP had reneged on its previous, implicit acceptance of simultaneous candidacy, the EKA offered the following compromise to the MSZMP: a limit on simultaneous candidacy to four places—in one SMC, on two county , (regional) lists and on the national list. The Smallholders’ representative, Boross, then warned the MSZMP that the four-place limit was the result of a difficult intra-EKA compromise, similar to the fifty-fifty division between list and SMC seats (PET Minutes, August 25, 43). The MSZMP then accepted the EKA com-

promise proposal.”’ |

178 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Parliament, however, did not. Already suspicious of the national list as guaranteeing seats for party leaders, several representatives protested that providing four chances “guaranteed ahead of time that party-selected candidates would be smuggled into Parliament against the will of the people.”** In the course of the plenary and committee debates from the 16th to the 20th of October, more MPs voiced support for an amendment which would limit multiple candidacy at regional level to one list instead of two. Put to an open vote on October 20th, this amendment was passed, allowing simultaneous candidacy in one place at all

three levels (OE. 1989. I1V/62, 5124). Electoral Decision Rules

There are three sets of decision rules in an electoral system: formulae or algorithms translating votes into seats, constituency size, or the number of seats per constituency, and representation threshold requirements. Electoral formulae have significant distributive effects by determining which candidates and parties obtain Parliamentary seats. Constituency size—the number of seats per constituency—also affects the distributive effects of electoral decision rules; indeed, “the size of constituencies is much more important in this. respect than the specific PR formula” (Lijphart 1984, 155). In explaining the origin of the various decision rules used in Hungary’s three-level system, it is, therefore, necessary to examine decisions taken on both the size of the electoral constituencies as well as the decision rule used to decide the seats within them at each level. In addition to these decision rules tied directly to each level, there are two additional rules which affect the final outcome: thresholds or limits set on the representation of smaller parties on the regional and national lists. Each is discussed in turn. Two-round Majority—Plurality System

There are three main types of majority—plurality formulae to decide seats in SMCs (Lijphart 1984, 151). In the simple plurality rule, the candidate with the most votes wins the seat, whether that sum is a majority or plurality. A pure majority system demands that the winning candidate should command a majority, if necessary by holding a run-off, second round in which the top two contenders from the first round compete head-to-head. Finally, there is the majorityplurality system, adopted by France’s Fifth Republic, in which an absolute majority in the first round takes the seat; failing this, a plurality wins the seat in the second, run-off round. In the French system, participation in the second round is restricted to those candidates with at least 12.5% of the vote in the first round. Each system has important distributive consequences; a party with a thirty per-

cent plurality might win in a single-poll, first-past-the-post system, but lose against fewer opponents in a second round among a restricted field where secondary and tertiary preferences can be expressed. Such was the case in Hungary,

J. W. Schiemann: The Negotiated Origins of the Hungarian Electoral System 179

where a ruling, dominant party faced a fragmented opposition, which, nevertheless, represented a threat were it able to unite. As a consequence, the character of the SMC system was one of the most difficult stumbling-blocks on the road to an agreement on the electoral law. The two main features of the system which resulted from the negotiations—the two-round, majority—plurality system and taking the first round as the basis for calculating surplus votes—were closely linked in the roundtable negotiations and will be discussed together also. Indeed, the wrangling over these issues produced the most explicit example of “horse-

system. :

trading” in the entire discussions about the electoral law, and it is this “logrolling” which is responsible for Hungary’s relatively rare majority—plurality The MSZMP looked for this barter deal in the aftermath of its surprising losses in the SMC by-elections of July 22nd; it updated its beliefs on what constituted the best way for it to win in the individual constituencies and changed its

bargaining offer accordingly. (We should recall that the top leadership of the MSZMP selected the draft used as the basis for negotiations with the EKA on May 26th, 1989, two months prior to the by-elections.*’) Experts from both the Interior Ministry and the MSZMP’s own Central Committee prepared several alternative electoral systems for the party to consider: the drafts discussed above and also a two-ballot system divided equally between SMC and list seats and virtually identical to what the EKA later proposed. Gyorgy Fejti, co-ordinator of the MSZMP negotiating team, at that time proposed to the party leadership that it support an SMC system as its main position. The two-ballot system he proposed to rule out, as it was “disadvantageous for the MSZMP.””” The published draft plan called for a two-round, pure majority decision rule in SMCs. That is, any candidate receiving a majority in the first round won the seat; failing this, the top two vote winners in the first round would advance to the second round, where a majority would decide the seat. The draft also stipulated that votes wasted in the first round of SMC competition would be totalled nationally for allocation from

a national list.

When the MSZMP lost the July 22nd by-election against a united opposition (in an SMC contest according to majoritarian rules identical to those which it was proposing), the MSZMP experts moved quickly to change their position. There-

, fore, three days later, in the first meeting of the negotiations on the distributive elements of the electoral system, the MSZMP proposed to alter only one element from the draft—the rule for advancing to the second round—and stated explicitly that its position in all other issues mirrored the draft plan (J/3 Minutes, July 25, 2).”’ According to this amendment, if no candidate received a majority in the first round, then any candidate receiving over 15 percent of the first round votes, but a minimum of three, should advance to round two. Because it was unlikely that, among three or more candidates, any single nominee would be able to attain 50 percent of the first-round votes, and because the MSZMP believed itself capable of taking a plurality contest against a divided opposition, the MSZMP proposed a plurality

decision rule for deciding seats in the run-off round.” , |

180 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Although the EKA immediately protested against this proposed change as a blatant attempt to design the law to the MSZMP’s advantage, the latter maintained its position throughout the August Expert meetings. The EKA, for its part, drew the same conclusion as the MSZMP from the by-election results. In a position paper prepared for the EKA, one of its expert’s, Jozsef Torgyan, noted that “the advantage of this system for us is that, under such rules of the game, an opposition candidate would have to be one of the candidates in the second round and in this way the candidate of the opposition would be pitted against the candidate of the MSZMP, which would surely mean the opposition’s success” (Torgyan 1989, 4). Torgyan went on to declare that the MSZMP’s position was “unacceptable because it would divide the opposition” (Torgyan 1989, 5). This hardening of position among the experts forced the issue up to the Intermediate

Level meeting of August 25th. |

Indeed, Torgyan expected the MSZMP to concede on this point and, therefore, considered “it important to stick to [the] original proposal, emphasizing that the ... draft law serving as a basis for the talks takes our position as its starting point as well” (Torgyan 1989, 5). Thus, when the talks reconvened on the 25th the EKA again charged the MSZMP with altering the second round advancement rule in the light of the by-election results. The MSZMP, however, proved Torgyan’s expectations wrong by refusing to concede, despite its many other concessions in that session.” Surplus Votes

In the meantime a new debate emerged. When, in the August 25th Intermediate level session, the three sides agreed to add a national compensation list level to

the SMC and PR levels, the question emerged as to what should serve as the basis for these surplus votes to be used to allocate seats on the national list. Both the MSZMP and the Third Side, following the government draft plan, argued for employing votes lost in SMC contests for national list allocation, whilst the EKA held that the presence of independent candidates in the SMCs meant that surplus

votes should be drawn from the regional lists. Moreover, departing from the government draft, the MSZMP held that the surplus votes from the SMCs should come from the round in which the seat was decided, the first or second, as the

case may be. ,

This was fundamentally a proposal to take the surplus votes from round two, as the MSZMP (correctly) anticipated that most SMC seats would be decided in the second round. The MSZMP proposed the change because it was confident that its candidates would make the top three in the first round and hence advance to the run-off round. It further assumed that it would pick up at least some second-preference votes in the run-off so that, even if it lost in the second round, it

would be able to increase the total number of votes it sent to the national list. This would mean that, of the seven political parties intending to run in the elections and sitting on the EKA side, up to five would lose all their surplus votes

J. W. Schiemann: The Negotiated Origins of the Hungarian Electoral System 181

from SMCs. Whilst the MDF could reasonably have hoped to make the run-off, the other parties were less sure, and the EKA held out in its demand that the first.

round be used for all SMC contests. When the EKA protested against the MSZMP’s SMC, second round proposal, the Third Side suggested a compromise which would allow compensation from both the list and from the SMCs. The EKA immediately accepted this idea but insisted that the SMC surplus votes come from the first round only. Although the MSZMP maintained that, where seats were decided in the second round, that round should be used as the basis for surplus transfer, it agreed to include also surplus votes from the regional list and proposed to send the entire question back down to the expert working group for more detailed mathematical consideration. The experts made no greater progress than had their Intermediate level counterparts, however, and the question reappeared on the agenda of the August 28th Intermediate level meeting. In his presentation to this meeting on August 28th, the MSZMP expert, Andras Toth, linked together the decision rule for advancing to the second round and the compensation basis to be used for the national list, providing an opportunity for log-rolling which was not overlooked. Going into the meeting, the MSZMP continued to adhere to the 15 percent or “top three” rule for the second round advancement rules and to using the second round as a basis for compensation. The EKA also maintained their demand that only the top two should advance and that only the first round be used for compensation, irrespective of whether a second round was necessary. Following a 5-minute break to think over both issues, Imre Pozsgay of the MSZMP offered to raise the percentage required to advance to the second round to 25 from 15 percent, but retaining the minimum of three candidates. The EKA then requested its own break and came back offering the deal to the effect that it would accept the original MSZMP proposal -of “15 percent/top three” if the MSZMP would accept using, as an SMC compen-

sation basis, only the results of the first round of voting; this the MSZMP accepted (PET Minutes, August 28, 32). With this deal the parties to the roundtable negotiations established several of the key characteristics of the SMC level (the two-round majority-plurality system and the rules for advancing to the second round) as well as a feature profoundly affecting the national list level—using the

first round as the basis for calculating surplus votes—which would later be passed into law unchanged by Parliament. Regional List Decision Rule

Whereas the debate on the decision rule for SMC contests revolved around the plurality-majority formula and took constituency size as given, the decision rule adopted for allocating seats from regional lists emerged as a function of constituency size within the regions. The higher-level agreement to (1) assign approximately 150 seats to the directly-elected list level combined with (2) determination that the direct list system be divided into electoral constituencies based on

182 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

the counties (and Budapest) made it difficult to achieve both proportionality and an equitable seat-to-vote ratio, presenting the experts with a serious problem. If the seat-to-population ratio were to remain proportional across constituencies, then many of Hungary’s sparsely populated counties would end up with short lists, often fewer than five seats. On the, very likely, assumption that there would be more than six parties competing in the elections, it would be impossible to distribute them proportionally. In the August 28th expert working group meeting the EKA’s Péter Télgyessy presented calculations to show that low population density in the provinces would cause serious distortions in assigning seats; in Somogy county, for example, two parties would each receive one seat, although one might have almost three times the number of votes as the first (J/3 Minutes, August 28, 4). Forced to work within the county-based system (and hence low constituency size), on August 31st the EKA proposed a method which would allow most seats to be allocated in the counties, but would prevent small parties from obtaining seats

“on the cheap.” Firstly, the EKA suggested, the divisor to establish the quota should be the number of seats plus one (Droop). Seats unallocated due to parties having vote totals below the necessary quota would then be allocated by “largest remainder” basis to parties in descending order of remainder votes. The second part

of the EKA plan, however, proposed to impose a limit on seats distributed by “largest remainder”; this means that a party would have to attain at least two-thirds of the quota to obtain the seat on the county list. This two-thirds limit was invented by EKA representative Télgyessy to prevent parties from obtaining seats too easily at the county level.® Parties obtaining seats by “largest remainder” would then have to make up the difference from their surplus votes pooled nationally. Should the party be unable to make up the difference nationally, then the seat would remain unfilled (1/3 Minutes, August 31, 2).“° The third element of the EKA proposal is the uniquely Hungarian ‘slipping’ mechanism to dispose of any seats remaining after this “largest remainder” allocation. According to this mechanism, any seats unaHocated after both the quota and (limited) largest remainder distribution are “sent upstairs” to the national list for allocation at that level. The MSZMP requested time to deliberate on this and in their next meeting on September 6th, the experts agreed to send the EKA proposal, with two amend-

ments, to the Intermediate level for ratification. The first amendment specified that seats unfilled in the county due to an inability to compensate nationally would go to the national list for distribution rather than simply remain unfilled. According to the second, votes not used to obtain a seat at regional level would also be transferred, with unfilled seats, to the national pool (J/3 Minutes, September 6, 4). Later that day, representatives from all sides at the Intermediate session agreed to the expert proposal, declaring consensus on the electoral law in all but minor details (PET Minutes, September 6, 41-42; 54-55). At the last expert meeting before the signing of the agreement on September 18th, however, the three sides made a final alteration under pressure from the Third Side, which wanted more seats to be distributed at county level, rather than from the national

J. W. Schiemann: The Negotiated Origins of the Hungarian Electoral System 183

list.‘’ This amendment allowed those parties which obtained seats by “largest remainder” allocation, but which were unable to compensate from their national pool, to receive the seat at the county level nevertheless. In other words, the seat would not be sent “upstairs” to the national list, as called for previously (/3

Minutes, September 18, 4). ,

National List Decision Rule : There was initially little debate over the allocation formula to be used for distributing seats on the national list. The government draft plan called for a Hare quota with “largest remainder” to allocate seats from the national compensation list, and both the MSZMP and the EKA implicitly thought in terms of this formula when they agreed to the three-level system on August 25th.** In a position , paper prepared for the August 31st expert meeting where the EKA laid out its position on decision rules for both the regional and national lists, the EKA proposed to use the Hare quota (//3 Minutes, August 31, Appendix: 2), When the MSZMP agreed to the Hare quota in the September 6th expert committee meeting the question seemed settled without any debate (//3 Minutes, September 6, 45). One week after the formal signing of the agreement, however, the MSZMP announced that it wished to depart from the previous agreement and proposed that the d’Hondt system be employed for the national list in order “to avoid as much as possible ... the ability to obtain.a seat on the national list with too few votes” (/3 Minutes, September 25, 2). When the experts met again one week later they agreed to set up a mathematical subcommittee to examine the question and then propose a solution based on the subcommittee’s recommendation (J/3 Minutes, October 2, 2). The EKA’s representative on this subcommittee was Télgyessy, who felt “let there be proportionality, but beware of proportionality. The d’Hondt favors large parties more.””” It is important to recall that participation in the NRT talks had catapulted the EKA parties to prominence in the national media and that the referendum campaign following the end of the NRT in the autumn of 1989 boosted their publicity even further. As a result, these parties, though smaller than the MSZ(M)P, were larger than the numerous smaller : parties which did not participate at the NRT but which represented competition in the coming elections. Within a proportional system, the EKA parties were not opposed to inclining its distributive bias in favor of larger parties. Thus, with the EKA representative also in favor of a decision rule more advantageous to larger parties, the experts agreed to the d’Hondt system currently used for allocating seats from the national list /3 Minutes, October 9, 8). Thresholds for Regional and National Lists

As the term ‘threshold’ implies, electoral thresholds are generally viewed as a type of boundary rule limiting the number of small parties which achieve representation. This is usually accomplished via some minimum requirement, in per-

184 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

centage terms, of the total votes, usually between one and eight percent, and to this degree it does function as a barrier to exclude smaller parties. In the context of an electoral institution, however, thresholds are more accurately viewed as decision rules. Electoral boundary rules regulate how individuals and political groups come to occupy the position of candidate; decision rules determine which candidates become legislators and the effects of thresholds are felt at this, second stage. Higher thresholds promote governmental stability by reducing Parliamentary fragmentation, but do so at the expense of smaller parties. Thus, whilst large

parties may benefit from high thresholds, they have potentially fatal consequences for small parties and the latter will push for lower thresholds.” The NRT negotiations on the threshold issue mirrored this difference in interests between large and small parties—twice. Each list level—direct and compensation—used a four percent threshold in 1990; thus they constitute two decision rules, not one. They are, however, discussed together because the decision to apply the limit to the national list was based on the regional list limit. Indeed, up to the end of the August 25th Intermediate level session, the negotiators expected to have only one list level and hence only one threshold. Equal concessions by both sides, as well as pressure within the EKA for a low threshold by the historical parties, produced the final outcome of four percent for allocation on both regional and national lists. Even in their most pessimistic predictions, MSZMP negotiators never viewed their party as weak enough to be adversely affected by a high electoral threshold;

they expected the MSZMP to remain a large party and so pushed for a higher limit. Their opposition interlocutors, in contrast, were uniformly small and weak (with the exception of the MDF, who could reasonably expect more than 10% of the future vote). It is important to remember that, although the EKA parties presented a unified negotiating position in the NRT and collaborated in a few byelections, every one of them planned to run independent party lists in the elections. Even in the euphoria following the EKA’s foundation in late-March, there

was never any talk about a unified opposition coalition against the MSZMP, even if they might co-operate in those SMC contests where an opposition candi-

date faced a single MSZMP opponent. As an SZDSZ representative to the EKA/’s deliberations put it: “The Opposition Roundtable is not an electoral coalition and it did not emerge with the demand for a later governing coalition. It is

a community of interests (Richter 1990, 30). Thus, in terms of the electoral threshold, each party had to think about its effect on individual, small parties. The result was the unified EKA position in favor of a lower threshold. Neither version of the June 5th drafts designated a threshold for the fifty-seat compensation list. Once, however, the MSZMP had agreed to a directly elected

, list system, the threshold requirement for being awarded list seats quickly emerged as a contentious issue. Referring to the need for governability, the MSZMP cited the German model and opened with a proposal of five percent (//3 Minutes, July 28, 3). Although all the parties within the EKA were small, save for the MDF, they were, nevertheless, as internally divided on the threshold is-

J. W. Schiemann: The Negotiated Origins of the Hungarian Electoral System 185

sue as they had been on the general proportions of the system. Indeed, the historical parties considered a low threshold to be an integral element of the 1945, 1947 proportional systems to which they were so closely wed. “It was impossible to bring the Smallholders to the conclusion that they should give up the proportional idea” and the situation was the same with the other re-formed historical parties.”’ In contrast, new parties such as Fidesz and the SZDSZ pushed for a higher threshold of five percent from a fear of Parliamentary and governing instability. Nevertheless, they too worried about their own parties’ chances and “that it ended up being four percent, is ... largely due to the Fidesz and SZDSZ fear that they wouldn’t even get into Parliament ... We were afraid of five; in August the SZDSZ rose to two, three percent. It appeared that even four would be hard ...”°? _ Thus, prepared to go to four percent, the EKA invoked the Swedish model and advocated a three percent limit (PET Minutes, July 27, 125). The MSZMP and EKA positions remained unchanged throughout the greater part of August and into the August 25th Intermediate middle-level PET session. After both sides had presented their (unchanged) positions, Torgyan of the EKA argued that the threshold question was too closely tied to the, as yet undecided, questions of the general balance between list and SMC tiers, as well as whether the list would be county or nationally based, and so should be deferred until these questions had been settled (PET Minutes, August 25, 102).°*? The MSZMP agreed. With the broad features of the system agreed upon three days earlier, the experts met on August 28th to discuss the remaining issues, including the threshold for the regional list. The EKA moved in the MSZMP’s direction in this meeting, offering to raise the threshold from three to four percent, requiring a party to have least four percent of all votes cast on regional lists nationally, in order to be

eligible for seat allocation in the region (1/3 Minutes, August 28, 7). The MSZMP agreed to the national requirement for regional allocation, but repeated its demand of five percent. At the end of that session, the experts agreed to include the threshold issue in the PET package proposal containing the SMC and _ list-nomination requirements discussed earlier. In the PET session later the same day, the Smallholders’ Boross argued for the new EKA proposal of four percent, claiming that the opposition had moved significantly toward the MSZMP’s position by “cut[ting] the difference in two” (PET Minutes, August 28, 11). When _ the MSZMP’s Pozsgay agreed on the SMC nomination issue, he requested a delay to the decision on the threshold issue, extracting it from the rest of the. - package. Later, as the EKA discussed the bargain it would offer to the MSZMP on the SMC second round advancement rule, the MSZMP delegation discussed the threshold issue and agreed to four percent. Hence, upon agreeing to the deal with the EKA over the second-round advancement rules in the SMCs and the

surplus vote basis, Pozsgay announced that the MSZMP would accept the EKA’s offer of a four percent threshold also (PET Minutes, August 28, 32). Several days later, the experts agreed to apply the same, national, four percent limit to seat allocation from the national list also (7/3 Minutes, August 31, Appendix,

186 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

p. 2). Although there were some complaints that the threshold was too low in the

Parliamentary committee meetings, there was only one formal amendment to raise it, and this was withdrawn before it came to a vote (Jelentés 289 1989, 11).

Summary If one compares the final product of the roundtable negotiations with the initial preferences of the EKA and the MSZMP, the system which emerged from the NRT and used in the elections of 1990 more closely matched the hybrid system combining half list PR and half majoritarian SMC seats proposed by the EKA than it did the MSZMP’s original draft plan calling for a system with 80% of the seats to be elected in two-round SMC contests and only 20% from PR balloting. Majoritarian electoral systems concentrate power in the hands of the largest par-

ties. Enjoying between 32% and 37% of support between March and July 1989—a relative majority among all political parties—the MSZMP had hoped to compete in elections under a fundamentally majoritarian formula (Tékés 1996, 373). In contrast, an internally diverse opposition coalition proposed a system which would distribute Parliamentary seats more broadly and more proportionally by arranging for half of the seats to be elected from a national list with a high constituency size, and by choosing a “largest remainder” formula and a four percent threshold.

, The MSZMP’s ‘concession’ to the relatively even balance was, certainly, motivated as much by their attempts to hedge against uncertainty following their loss in SMC by-elections as by the necessity to concede to the EKA parties. Unsure ex ante what its ex post position would be, the MSZMP eventually agreed to features which would benefit weaker parties also, such as the national compensation list. When the MSZMP felt that it would have a majority in the elections, it proposed an overwhelmingly majoritarian system which would concentrate power in the hands of the largest party; when it had updated and changed these expectations on the basis of new information, it immediately switched its preferences to a system which distributed political power (Parliamentary seats) more broadly. Hedging against uncertainty explains only the broadest features of the system, however. Once the opposition and the MSZMP had settled the broad out-

| lines of the electoral system and the talks turned to the rules within each level, there was little uncertainty about the distributive effects of, for example, the boundary rules admitting and excluding parties and individuals from candidacy or the decision rules within each tier. Consequently, the opposition parties bargained for—and obtained—lower values on the boundary rules and favorable values on decision rules such as the regional list quota and the basis for compensation votes. The reason why the opposition was able to extract these concessions from the MSZMP is to be found in the ruling party’s impatience to wind

up the talks; the deepening economic and political crisis coupled with the

J. W. Schiemann: The Negotiated Origins of the Hungarian Electoral System 187

MSZMP’s internal collapse made it eager for an agreement as quickly as possible. Meanwhile, the opposition organizations required time to build up their organizations, and their political support grew as the summer wore on, and so they were willing to wait longer for an eventual agreement. Moreover, of the only two features which the MSZMP managed to obtain, one was the result of a deal (the SMC run-off rule) and the other (the d’Hondt method for the national list allocation algorithm) lost its favorable impact with the opposition’s addition of the “slipping mechanism” which added regional seats to the national seat total.” In short, the complex and patchwork Hungarian electoral institution is the by-product of a struggle by leaders of old, reconstituted, and new political parties to maximize their political power in the future Parliament by creating an. institution which they believed would achieve this end. This institution did not, however, emerge from conflicting grand designs. Instead, political actors attempted to cement their distributive advantage rule by rule, in numerous and often creative ways. When, however, their view of their ex post positions became clouded by uncertainty, they reacted in the predicted manner by choosing institutions which would share power in multiple ways.

Notes 1 This chapter is based on a larger study of the choice of political institutions in the Hungarian National Roundtable Talks (Schiemann 1999) as well as a paper with Kenneth Benoit (Benoit and Schiemann 2001). I thank Ken for our many discussions about the Hungarian electoral law and for making an interview with Zoltan Téth available to me. Research for this paper was partly supported by the American Council of Learned Societies, the International Research and Exchanges Board, and the Smith Richardson Foundation. I am also grateful to MTA Politikatudomanyi Intézet, which kindly extended administrative support in 1995 and in 1997. 2 For the text of the law see Magyar Kézlény (October 30, 1989: 1305-29). For more on the opera~ tion and consequences of the system, see Benoit (1998, 1996). 3 Third in type but chronologically cast simultaneously with the first round of SMC balloting. : 4 Another way to think of this is as a ‘negative vote transfer’ from the region to the national level. 5 For an explanation of the d’Hondt system, see Taagepera and Shugart (1989: 32). 6 Act III 1994 raised the threshold to five percent on December 22, 1993. 7 This section is based on archival materials of the National Roundtable Negotiations, collected by Laszl6 Bruszt and David Stark, Institute of Sociology, Budapest. I am grateful to Laszlé Bruszt for making them available to me. The written transcripts to the middle level will be cited as (PET Minutes, date, page number); transcripts to the expert working group will be cited similarly: (J/3 Minutes, date, page number). All page numbers refer to the archival edition. I am also indebted to Marta Elbert for access to Fekete Doboz’s collection of videotapes of the meetings of the Opposition Roundtable, cited here as (F‘D, date of meeting). 8 Published in Magyar Nemzet, June 5, 1989: 8-9. It is clear from both the written transcripts to the

negotiations and interviews with MSZMP and EKA participants that the Third Side could not veto agreements between the EKA and the MSZMP. For this reason I all but ignore them in the analysis of the negotiations which follows. 9 This draft proposal was really two; section two contained two alternative procedures, labeled A

and B. Whilst version A was a relatively straightforward majority system complemented by a small compensation list, version B called for a combination of single and multi-member constitu-

188 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy encies. The latter version was not taken seriously in the NRT or even within the MSZMP. As Istvan Kukorelli, a spokesman and participant for the ‘Third Side’, put it, “there were some decoy proposals, so that there should be a visible alternative... called them decoys.” (Interview, June 20, 1995). Consequently, in what follows “draft plan” refers to the MSZMP’s preferred Version A. 10 The expert level committee worked out most of the procedural details (contained in sections I and III) within the first month (J/3 Minutes, July 20, 1989: 12).

11 Interviews with MSZMP expert Andras Toth, August 16, 1994 and Imre Pozsgay, August 30, 1995.

12 See also the July 10 EKA meeting (FD, July 10, 1989). 13 Interview with SZDSZ expert Péter Télgyessy, August 29, 1994. : 14 Ader was the FIDESZ expert in the I/3 working committee on the electoral law and confirmed this in an interview August 25, 1995, as did SZDSZ expert Péter Télgyessy, July 3, 1995. 15 It should be pointed out that Antall seems to have misunderstood the German system, which is proportional in its distributional effects, not majoritarian, as was the system he proposed. 16 The third election was again invalidated by low voter turnout. 17 The SMC second round advancement rule is discussed in more detail below.

18 Interview, July 21,1995. . 19 Interview with MSZMP expert Zoltan Toth, July 12, 1995.

, 20 Interview with MSZMP leader Imre Pozsgay, August 30, 1995. MSZMP expert Zoltan Téth and negotiator Gyérgy Fejti echoed this statement. Interviews, July 12, 1995 and July 31, 1995, respectively.

21 Interview, July 31, 1995. Imre Pozsgay was just as explicit: “We calculated the possibility that perhaps we were going to be a defeated party, so [the experts] were to create the method of calculation that made it possible for us to lose the least votes, that the rate of votes getting into the dustbin would be the least possible.” Interview, August 30, 1995. 22 The surplus vote basis issue is discussed separately below. 23 For a summary of these non-MP initiatives, see the letter to MPs from the Main Secretary of Parliament, Dr. Istvan Soltész, October 4, 1989. Library of the Hungarian Parliament, Deak Room. 24 See the minutes of the Jogi, Igazgatasi, és Igazsagiigyi Bizottsag sessions on October 16, 17, 19 and 20 (Jogi 1989), the minutes of the plenary sessions on the 19th and 20th (OE. 1989), the reports of the Law Committee numbered 289, 312 and 313, as well as the extensive coverage in the national dailies. 25 Géza Kilényi, Deputy Minister of Justice and a member of the MSZMP Intermediate-level negotiating team until the end of August reported that it was “horribly difficult” to persuade the deputies not to throw out the entire agreement or to resign their seats altogether. Interview, June 19, 1995.

26 Amendments to other rules are discussed below. 27 Recall that at this point, the MSZMP was still thinking in terms of national lists for both direct and

compensation list tiers. |

28 The MDF excepted. 29 It is perhaps worthwhile to clear up a common point of confusion on the relationship between the MSZMP and the government in 1989. Government draft plans, Central Committee briefings, Politburo documents, and interviews make it clear that the MSZMP did in fact make all the crucial political decisions about institutions at least through the conclusion of the roundtable. 30 This is calculated by assuming 28 SMCs in Budapest and 750 signatures for each SMC. The figure 28 for Budapest is drawn from an appendix on the breakdown of electoral constituencies prepared by the Interior Ministry’s Elctoral Office U//3 Minutes, August 31: Appendix). 31 In an interview, Télgyessy claimed that he pushed for a more restrictive limit upon his return from vacation because he feared that the large number of small counties would allow many small parties to establish national lists too easily—increasing the competition among opposition parties for national list seats. As the MSZMP had originally pushed for greater restrictions, it readily agreed to the change. July 3, 1995.

J. W. Schiemann: The Negotiated Origins of the Hungarian Electoral System 189 32 Nor were they mistaken about the need for an insurance mechanism: Télgyessy and Ferenc Készeg of the SZDSZ, Orban and Gabor Fodor of FIDESZ, and Gyérgy Ruttner of the Social Democrats—all top members of their parties and participants in EKA and the NRT—lost in the SMC contests and

were saved by either the regional or the national list (Szoboszlai 1990, 455-599). 33 Interview, July 12, 1995. MSZMP expert Andras Toth echoed this statement in an interview, July 21, 1995.

34 MSZ(M)P leaders Ivan Vitanyi and Magda Kosané Kovacs, for example, lost in their SMC contests but were saved by the national list (Szoboszlai 1990, 458, 539, 598-599). 35 Especially the institution of President of the Republic. In interviews, EKA expert Télgyessy, MSZMP experts Andras Téth and Zoltan Toth, MSZMP negotiator Fejti, as well as Pozsgay himself, all noted that the MSZMP continually attempted to bargain away elements of the electoral law for concessions on the institution of the Presidency. The EKA, however, refused to consider a linking of the Presidency with any other issue. 36 Interview with MSZMP expert Andras Toth, July 21, 1995. The emphasis is T6th’s; he gave “why not’ further emphasis by enunciating it in English the second time. 37 On September 18th, the sides agreed that if a candidate won a seat from a regional list, his/her name would be deleted from the other regional list and the national list (//3 Minutes, September 18, 3). The order of primacy is thus SMC, regional list, national list. 38 Letter from MP Jozsef Polgardi to Matyas Sziirés, President of Parliament, submitting an amendment to the draft electoral law. October 11, 1989, p. 2. Library of Parliament, Deak Room. 39 Though MSZMP’s Pozsgay would later claim in the talks that the government draft was not the position of the MSZMP. 40 “Javaslat a Politikai Bizottsagnak a kéztarsasdgi elndki, orszaggyiilési képviseléi és a tandacstagi valasztasokkal kapcsolatos kérdesekben kialakitand6 allasfoglalasra,” May 24, 1989, Fejti Gydrgy, 105. In MOL 288.f.5/1066.e., PB 1989. May 26, f. 41 Though it would later modify many of the elements in the government draft. 42 As discussed above, the MSZMP later had doubts about the SMC level as a whole and contested a direct PR list level as well. Nevertheless, their first reaction was to alter only the rules of the SMC level.

43 Télgyessy claims that he felt this was a point which was non-negotiable for the MSZMP and to which the EKA would have to concede. Interview, July 3, 1995. 44 This formula produces a slightly lower quota than the Hare quota and hence somewhat more disproportional results because it lowers the number of seats to be allocated by remainder and hence wastes more remainder votes, thereby hurting smaller parties (Lijphart 1994, 23). 45 Interview with Péter Télgyessy, July 3, 1995. That EKA expert Télgyessy is the author of the regional list formula was confirmed in interviews with the two MSZMP electoral law experts as well as top MSZMP negotiators Pozsgay and Fejti. 46 Nor would a by-election be held to fill it. 47 Interview with MSZMP expert Zoltan T6éth by Kenneth Benoit, June 27, 1995. 48 The Hare quota is given by the total number of votes cast in a constituency divided by the number of seats in the constituency (¢q=v/m). See Lijphart (1994, 23). 49 Interview, July 3, 1995. 50 Large parties may benefit, for example, by picking up seats that would have otherwise gone to a locally strong, but nationally weak party. 51 Interview with EKA expert Péter Télgyessy, July 3, 1995. 52 Interview with EKA expert Péter Télgyessy, July 3, 1995. 53 The 150-150-50 division was agreed to only at the very end of this PET session, after the discussion about the threshold. 54 Distributional differences between PR formulae collapse when constituency sizes are high, as was the case with the national list, where the number of seats began at 58 but would grow with unallocated regional list seats. See Taagepera and Shugart (1989) and Lijphart (1994) for the general relationship between constituency size and electoral formulae. For counterfactual computer simulations showing that the allocation formula made little difference on the national list see Benoit and Schiemann (1999).

BLANK PAGE

3. ROUNDTABLE TALKS IN CONTEXT: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSES

The Role of Non-elite Forces in Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution Alan Renwick’

Introduction The democratic transition that took place in Hungary in 1989 has often been styled ‘the negotiated revolution’.” It has been so called because of the fundamental importance of the role played in the transition process by negotiations between the ruling communist party, the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP) and the Opposition Roundtable (EKA). I argue in this paper that, while this appellation is apt, it carries the potential to mislead: it may be taken to suggest that the only important events in the Hungarian transition process occurred at the negotiating table and that the only important actors during that process were those who sat around that table. In fact, this was not the case, and, in fact, Hungary’s negotiated revolution can be understood only if other factors are given a prominent place in the analysis. Many factors, both domestic and international, contributed to the Hungarian

democratic transition. To take only the domestic side as an example, a full analysis of the transition must take into account not only the detailed story of the negotiations and the personalities involved in them, but also the complexities of elite and mass political culture and the specificities of the behavior and opinions of the Hungarian people during the negotiations. Of course, it is not possible for

me to consider all of these factors in the present paper. Instead, I focus only upon the last factor mentioned—the behavior and opinions of the Hungarian : people during the course of the transition. The analysis of the role of non-elite behavior in the Hungarian transition process is important for two reasons. First, that role was significant, but has generally been underplayed. The significance of non-elite behavior will be seen in the remainder of this paper. Most analyses of the Hungarian transition have, however, focused almost exclusively upon the role of elites. Rudolf Tokés, for

example, writes that the Hungarian transition “was managed and brought to fruition by both the outgoing and the incoming political elites of Hungary”.”

192 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Similarly, Robert Jenkins argues that “broad social pressures played only a small role in propelling the Hungarian transition. The events played out mostly at the level of political elites, both within and outside the regime”.” I argue that these accounts give an incomplete picture of the Hungarian transition: in fact, though elites were important, the role of non-elites too is crucial to our understanding of the transition process. Second, the analysis which is presented here ties in to a broader literature on the nature of democratic transition. Much of the international literature on transitions during the last three decades has focused heavily upon interactive games between narrow groups of ruling and oppositional elites.” More recently, however, some authors have argued that this focus has gone too far and that the role of non-elite forces needs to be given greater recognition.° I argue that the Hungarian case gives support to this latter contention. More specifically, I argue that it gives powerful backing to the claim made by Scott Mainwaring, that “a dy-

namic interaction between elites and masses” is a key feature of many democratic transitions.’ I take as the starting point for this investigation one of the most prominent theoretical interpretations of the Hungarian Roundtable negotiations—that given by Laszlé Bruszt and David Stark.* I argue that their analysis, highly instructive though it is, offers only an incomplete account of the processes of 1989. I focus upon what I argue are four lacunae in their account, relating to the evolution of

the negotiating position of the opposition, the evolution of the position of the MSZMP, the relative bargaining positions of these two sides in the negotiations, and the fact that it was possible for the negotiations to proceed throughout the summer of 1989 with little disturbance from outside forces. I argue that these lacunae can, in significant part, be filled if we take into account the activity (and inactivity) of the broader Hungarian public during 1989. I also take the analysis beyond the close of the national roundtable negotiations in September 1989 to include the referendum two months later. It was this referendum which ensured that the institutional framework existed which allowed the first free, democratic elections to take place in the spring of 1990, and that it constitutes, therefore, an important element of the transition story. The two sections which follow will seek to reconstruct the Hungarian transition in order to show the influence of non-elite behavior and opinion upon the processes occurring at the level of elites. In the concluding section, I take the analysis one stage further, seeking a deeper understanding of the significance of the role of nonelites in the transition. That the causal chain which brought about the transition includes elements at the non-elite level does not necessarily imply that the role of non-elites in the process of transition was, in fact, of any great analytical significance. I argue, however, that the role of non-elites in Hungary’s transition was of very great significance. Hungary’s negotiated revolution was the product of a complex interaction of elites and masses operating throughout 1989. Both elite and non-elite forces played a vital part, and, if we are to understand the Hungarian

transition properly, it is hugely important that neither be ignored. |

A. Renwick: Non-elite Forces in Negotiated Revolution 193

Non-elite Forces and the National Roundtable Negotiations Laszl6 Bruszt and David Stark interpret the course of the national roundtable negotiations in the summer of 1989 as having been determined by the fact that both of the important negotiating partners—the Opposition Roundtable (EKA) and the MSZMP—hared a common basic goal: both sought the introduction of full democracy through the mechanism of the roundtable talks. On the side of the opposition, they argue that the EKA went into the negotiations prepared to accept nothing other than complete democratization because its leaders lacked the legitimacy to agree to anything else. They write that it was the very weakness of the opposition that forced it to be uncompromising. With their organizational membership still numbering only in the thousands, and with their strength in society still untested, they could neither make an undisputed claim to speak in the name of society nor anticipate the capacity to call on society to agree to a compromise. For these reasons, the united Hungarian opposition went into negotiations insisting that the goal of any agreement was the establishment of free, open, fully contested, uncompromised elections.?

Meanwhile, they characterize the reform communists who had by this stage taken control of the MSZMP as having decided from the beginning of the negotiations that they too would support a transfer to full democracy, since this gave them the best chance of maintaining their position in the future: If they could seize the high ground as champions of democracy, the reform Communists calculated that, with their hands no longer tied by the Brezhnev Doctrine, they could use their superior resources, organization, and nationally recognized candidates to defeat the opposition in a straight-ahead electoral contest with no strings attached. 10

Thus, the two sides are seen as having agreed on their aims in the negotiations. There is much to recommend this account. It is undoubtedly true that the opposition believed that it lacked the legitimacy that might have allowed it to strike a compromise with the government of the kind that had recently been agreed in Poland. Whereas the revived Solidarity, though much weakened in comparison with the organization of 1980-81, could claim a mass membership and a leader with popularity ratings of almost 80 per cent,'’ the EKA organizations could boast only tiny memberships and leaders whom most of the public did not recognize. The argument that the negotiators of the national roundtable lacked legitimacy was used repeatedly by the leaders of the EKA during the preparatory talks with the MSZMP in the spring of 1989 in their efforts to limit the scope of the discussions,'* and precisely the same thinking was a dominant theme running through the speech given by Imre Konya at the opening session of the national roundtable talks on 13th June.’ Regarding the other side in the negotiations, Bruszt and Stark are again correct in claiming that the broad thrust of the approach of those in control of the MSZMP’s negotiating position was, by June 1989, the acceptance of fully free

194 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

elections.'* There were no hopes that the party would be able to achieve the kind of bargain which had been won by the ruling party in Poland; following the rout of the Polish communists on 4th June, it is not apparent that there was even the desire to do so. Nevertheless, there are at least four important lacunae in this account. Firstly, it does not do enough to explain the strategy adopted by the EKA in its negotiations with the MSZMP. Prior to March 1989, the groupings which were to form the EKA had been largely incapable of concerted action and several of them had sought coalition with the reform communists rather than a one-step transition to democracy. From that time onwards until the conclusion of the national round-

table talks in September, by contrast, their unity, at least in public, was near total. Furthermore, though it may indeed have been felt within the context of the national roundtable talks that the EKA could accept nothing short of full democracy, this was certainly not clear to all of the participants in the EKA until the spring of 1989. Indeed, earlier in the 1980s precisely the same concern that the opposition activists lacked a mandate from society had led the Beszélé circle to the very opposite strategy from the radicalism of 1989: Ervin Csizmadia writes

of Beszélé’s first program proposal’ that it was Jess radical than might have been expected because Beszélé “did not want to place itself in front of public opinion; it deduced its own task from the state of public opinion.” We need to understand why this reversal in the strategy of the opposition took place. Secondly, Bruszt and Stark do not explain how it came about that those in control of MSZMP policy favored the introduction of fully democratic elections. As Bruszt argues, as late as May 1989, even the reformers within the MSZMP wanted to see a compromise solution falling well short of full democratization,’® and at this time it was far from clear that the reformers within the party would be able to prevail over the hard-liners. To understand the position of the MSZMP within the negotiations, we must thus understand both how the reform communists strengthened their position within the party and why they accepted democratization rather than co-optation of the opposition as their goal. Thirdly, the question of the relative bargaining strengths of the two principal sides in the negotiations must be considered. This is not an issue in the analysis presented by Bruszt and Stark, since they describe the two sides as having been striving for the same goals. It would clearly be wrong, however, to suggest that

the negotiations saw no conflict between these two sides. While there was overall agreement on a move to essentially unfettered democracy, there was disagreement on matters of enormous importance for the transition, such as the form of the new electoral system, the process by which the institution of the

presidency should be created, and the future of the party’s assets and of the Worker’s Militia.’ Once the existence of such areas of dispute is recognized, the

question of the relative bargaining strengths of the party and the EKA again becomes an issue which demands investigation. We need to understand why, on most issues, the outcome of the national roundtable discussions was a compromise between the wishes of the EKA and those of the MSZMP.

A. Renwick: Non-elite Forces in Negotiated Revolution 195

Finally, it is important that we ask how it was that the elite negotiating eroups were able to decide the major issues of the democratic transition in negotiations held over a period of three months behind closed doors with almost no interference from outside forces. That is, we must ask how contextual factors

facilitated the course of the negotiations and allowed the negotiated form of transition to achieve success. In what follows I consider each of these four lacunae in turn. I argue that in each case our understanding of the process of the Hungarian transition is greatly increased by the inclusion of the behavior of the wider Hungarian public within the analysis.

The Strategy of the Opposition Roundtable However inevitable it may have seemed in the summer of 1989 that the members of the EKA should act together to push for an immediate transition to full de-

mocracy, in early 1989 that path was far from determined. The two principal groups within the opposition—the ‘democratic opposition’ circle which was to form the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), and the circle of nationalpopulist (népi) writers and others who formed the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)—had been largely incapable of concerted action since the publication of the democratic opposition’s manifesto, Tarsadalmi Szerzédés {Social Contract], in 1987. Further, the difficulties involved in securing co-operation between these

eroups went beyond their historical animosity and their different agendas: a major impediment to their working together was the fact that they had long employed very different tactics in their struggle for change. While the democratic opposition’s approach had long been one of confrontation with the regime, the MDF’s position as an organization of opposition was ambiguous. It avoided the use of the term ‘opposition’, and it sought rather to engineer a partnership between itself and the reform wing of the MSZMP led by Imre Pozsgay. The alliance between reform communists and populist writers had “provided the populists with protection from repression and access to the organizational resources

of the Patriotic People’s Front (HNF), a communist satellite organization, headed by Pozsgay”'® and had thereby “helped upgrade the Populist politicians’ status from that of powerless petitioners to politically sheltered auxiliaries of the ruling party’s nascent reform wing”.'” In the early months of 1989, many within the MDF wished to continue their co-operation with the reform communists, and to achieve regime change through this coalition rather than through co-operation with the other independent organizations. Zoltan Bird, the MDF’s president at the time, opposed the creation of the EKA when Imre Konya first mooted the idea in early March.”° The agreement of these various groups to co-operate together and to adopt a strategy of united opposition to the regime was thus a major step in the process of the transition. It cannot be claimed that that strategy change was universally

196 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

accepted within the opposition at the time—some in the MDF agreed to participation only because they did not expect the initiative to lead very far. All the same, the EKA was able to maintain a strong and united front against the regime all the way through until the end of the national roundtable talks on 18th September 1989. Its unity was maintained in the spring of 1989, despite concerted efforts by the MSZMP to break it up.~’ It was maintained also in the summer, despite sharp disputes between the participants on many issues.” I argue in this section that a significant factor in the creation of the strong EKA was the show of opposition strength made on 15th March 1989, Hungary’s national day, when 100,000 people participated in the events organized by the opposition—up to five times more than were to be found at the official commemoration on the steps of the National Museum.”? I will thus agree with Tamas Hofer’s claim that “the Budapest demonstration was a pivotal event in the political transformation of Hungary, and also of Eastern Europe. It was a watershed in the process of remaking the political field in Hungary. The acceleration of political change immediately after the demonstration signals its importance and impact”.”"

It would be wrong to suggest that the idea of an opposition roundtable arose only in the light of the success of the opposition’s program of events of the 15th

| March. The plans of the SZDSZ to issue a call for such a roundtable were in place before that date, and Imre K6énya, whose invitation to form a roundtable was accepted by the eight organizations, had already discussed the idea with leading figures in those organizations earlier in the month.”” However, considerable impetus to the creation of the EKA was provided by the success of the alternative 15th March commemorations. Having described the perception created by that success that “it had become a real possibility that the miracle could happen”, Konya tells us that “the fact in any case is that, that evening, when [ returned home from the demonstration, I sat down and drafted the invitation ‘to the Hungarian independent organizations’”.”°

Aside from the immediate impact of the excitement of that day, the 15th March events had the lasting effect of demonstrating clearly to those who doubted it that co-operation among the independent organizations was a more promising path than the path of co-operation with the reform communists. The relative numbers attending the different events showed unambiguously who had the backing of the population. Even the presence of reform communists at the official commemorations was insufficient to attract much support. It was evident for all to see that the regime was crumbling and that an alliance with any part of it was not the appropriate way forward. Meanwhile, the power which the opposition forces were able to exert when they worked together was made abundantly clear. Having achieved by far their greatest success to date in co-operation with the other independent organizations, it would have seemed

folly for those organizations which were inclined to do so to have rejected continued co-operation within the opposition in fervor of a return to the fold of the reform communists.

A. Renwick: Non-elite Forces in Negotiated Revolution 197 This connection between 15th March and the adoption of the EKA strategy is clearest in the case of the Social Democratic Party of Hungary (MSZDP), which participated in the official program of events at the National Museum. Following the success of the opposition events, the MSZDP immediately switched strategies, joined in the process of creating the EKA and left its representative, Tamas

Révész, to admit at the first EKA meeting on 22nd March that it had been a “mishap” that his party had celebrated jointly with the MSZMP on the 15th.’’ The direct link is somewhat harder to establish in the case of the MDF, since apparently some within the party’s leadership remained deeply skeptical of the EKA approach long after the roundtable was formed. It is likely, however, that the 15th March events contributed to the sidelining of that opposition within the MDF and to the ever-increasing commitment of the MDF to the EKA approach. At the EKA meeting of 7th April, for example, the MDF’s Istvan Csurka played a decisive role in the EKA’s decision not to attend the MSZMP’s proposed negotiations the following day, despite the fact that some within the MDF feared that staying away could weaken the reform communists within the ruling party. That decision to stay away from the MSZMP’s proposed talks was a powerful indicator of the opposition’s change of strategy compared with early March. _ Prior to 15th March, the opposition groups had been prepared to talk with the regime largely on the regime’s own terms. This had involved two-sided negotiations carried out at the invitation of the MSZMP, in the MSZMP’s headquarters, between the MSZMP and various organizations of its choice. By contrast, after 15th March the EKA would accept negotiations only if they conformed with its

, own conditions. Those conditions were laid down in the EKA’s letter to the MSZMP Central Committee on 30th March,”® and, despite the doubts already mentioned, the EKA stood by those conditions in deciding not to attend the talks on 8th April. It is thus clear that, between early March and early April 1989, the opposition’s self-confidence and determination had increased enormously and that its strategy had become much more radical. The commemorations of 15th March were a major factor encouraging this change. It is also clear, of course, that we

cannot claim that the popular demands expressed on 15th March forced the uniting of the opposition and the adoption of the EKA strategy—but those demands did greatly strengthen the EKA initiative and they did contribute greatly

to its success. It was through a process of interaction between elites and masses , that the strategy of the opposition changed in the spring of 1989.

Changes in the MSZMP, Spring 1989 As Bruszt and Stark have been seen to point out, by the time of the start of the national roundtable negotiations in June 1989, those in control of the MSZMP’s negotiating line had already accepted that the outcome of the negotiations would be an immediate transition to what, in essence, would be full democracy. Before

198 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

this situation was reached, however, two changes had to take place in comparison with the situation in early 1989: the reform communists had to gain the upper hand within the MSZMP; and those reform communists themselves had to accept that genuine regime change rather than reform and co-optation of part of the opposition was the only viable way forward. These two changes occurred over the first half of 1989 and, together, they amounted to a gradual resignation from power on the part of the party which had ruled Hungary for the last forty years. I will argue that, to a large degree, this gradual resignation reflected the fact

that the party was helpless against broader forces working within society at large. Three such forces will be analyzed in particular (though others were also

important): the effect on the party of the events of 15th March; the effect of increasingly intense criticism of the ruling elite from the grass-roots of the party itself; and the effect of expectations concerning the ceremonies of 16th June revolving around the reburial of Imre Nagy. It will be found that each of these had a large role to play in the slow resignation of the ruling elite which has been described. The effects of the first of these factors—the demonstration of 15th March— are to a large extent the reverse-side of what has already been seen in the case of the opposition. Whilst the show of opposition strength on 15th March greatly enhanced the resolve of the opposition, it greatly weakened the hand of the regime. It showed that, were the regime to hold its ground to such an extent that the opposition felt obliged to take the issue to the streets, the regime could not expect to come out victorious. In so doing, it made the position of the conservatives who hoped reform could be kept to a minimal level less credible than it had previously been. As was seen in the previous section, it also demonstrated the strength which the opposition possessed when it chose to unite and to express clearly its oppositional stance. Thus, the strategy of co-optation adopted by some of the reform communists—most notably, of course, by Imre Pozsgay—was rendered less viable. Increasingly, the only reform option available was that of a

complete transition to democracy. )

The months following the events of 15th March saw pressure on the regime not only from the population at large but also from the rank-and-file membership of the party itself. This pressure had been steadily rising since the mid-1980s and had taken a significant step further with the creation of the first ‘Reform Circle’ in Szeged in November 1988.” Further local Reform Circles had been formed apace during the early months of 1989, such that, by the time of their national conference on 21st and 22nd May, they numbered around one hundred. This conference was attended by over 400 delegates and around 3,000 spectators, and called for more internal party democracy, a peaceful change to a legal, constitutional state and the immediate initiation of talks with the EKA.’ At an earlier gathering of the Reform Circles, on 15th April, “the main speakers held the secretary general responsible for the party’s sluggish responses to internal reform initiatives”.”’

A. Renwick: Non-elite Forces in Negotiated Revolution 199 The youth wing of the party, the Communist Youth League (KISZ), was in revolt too. Having lost half its original membership of 800,000, it decided at its meeting of 22nd and 23rd April to disband and form a new organization, the Hungarian Democratic Youth Alliance (Demisz).*” Meanwhile, the mass exodus

of rank-and-file members from the party continued at great speed. Central Committee member Janos Lukacs acknowledged in a press conference at the end of March that the membership total had fallen by 100,000 in the preceding eighteen months to 780,000."

It was in the context of this grass-roots party revolt—and the similar mood in society at large—that the reformers within the party leadership were able to strengthen their position during April and May of 1989. In late April, party Secretary General Gr6ész claimed that he had called, with the support of Prime Minister Németh, for the introduction of a ‘state of economic emergency’, but had been voted down by the Central Committee. Upon hearing these remarks, Németh immediately went on national television to repudiate them.** In the following two weeks, he replaced six cabinet ministers who were close to Grész’ and secured very much greater autonomy for the government from the party’s control.*° This response was possible only because Gr6ész’s remarks ran very much counter to the general mood within the party and among the general public: as Tokés puts it, they “caused national consternation”.’’ They also provoked the most independent-minded action on the

part of the press which had been seen up to that date: the reform-oriented newspaper Magyar Nemzet adopted a campaigning stance in its efforts to find out who was telling the truth.°* Németh took quick advantage of this mood to punish Grész and his supporters. His victory was a significant step in allowing those who wished to see a more conciliatory approach towards the EKA to gain the upper hand. The internal collapse of the ruling party was closely linked also to anticipa-

tion of the approaching reburial of Imre Nagy and others who had been ‘judicially murdered’ in the aftermath of the suppression of the 1956 uprising. This event raised enormous interest at the time—there was extensive coverage of the preparations and extensive reporting of the events of 1956—58 in the press in

the months preceding the ceremony. All members of the political elite recognized the political importance of their own participation at the reburial. The significance of the event to the changes within the MSZMP derived from two factors: anticipation of the events of 16th June itself; and the direct effects of the preparations for those events. As Andras Bozoki emphasizes, the reburial of Imre Nagy and his associates was an event with highly unpredictable consequences, such that “all MSZMP leaders feared that day”.*’ Given the high symbolism of the reburial, “both the reform wing and the conservatives ... saw that, for their own sake, they had to come to some kind of agreement with the Opposition Roundtable... Otherwise, June 16 would turn out to be a serious political defeat”.“” Thus, the mere fact of the approach of the reburial was sufficient to impel the regime to accede to the

200 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

demands of the EKA, in the hope that this would enable the party to salvage some of its reputation on that day. Regarding the process of organizing the events of 16th June, particularly important were the negotiations as to who from within the regime would be permitted to take part in the events. These negotiations were led by the president of the organizing Committee for Historical Justice, Miklés Vasarhelyi. While Vasarhelyi was something of a figure of reconciliation between the regime and the opposition—he had been a founding member of the SZDSZ, but was also a member of Central Committee member Rezsé Nyers’s New March Front (Uj Marciusi Front)—there was no doubting the dominant strand of symbolism, as leading members of the ruling elite pleaded with this former co-defendant of Imre Nagy to be permitted to attend the latter’s funeral. First came the request of the Reform

Circles, made at their May national conference.*! Later came those of Prime Minister Miklés Németh and parliamentary Speaker Matyas Szirés, both of which Vasarhelyi was pleased to grant.** Németh represented the government; Szurés represented Parliament; the party itself, however, was afforded no official place in the ceremonies at all. As Andras K6résényi writes, “the MSZMP never recovered from this humiliation, and psychologically collapsed at this time”.” The expectations of and preparations for 16th June thus created a situation in which the opposition was the leader and the regime followed as best it could. In order not to be left behind entirely at the reburial ceremonies, the MSZMP could do no other than react to the EKA’s demands positively. By the end of May, it had already agreed that the talks would be held, in T6kés’s words, “essentially on the terms which had been proposed by the EKA”.“* Before it was able to persuade the EKA to sign an accord on the formula the talks would take—just six days before Nagy’s reburial—it was forced to make still further concessions. The party had largely capitulated before the talks had begun. The importance of the mass demonstrations of March and June 1989 and of the rising internal dissent within the MSZMP to the changing politics of the MSZMP elite at this time is thus clear. Hard-liners within the party were crippled as it became increasingly apparent that the overwhelming weight of public opinion was against them. The reformers were able to take advantage of this, but they were far from being in control of events: they too had to adapt their strategy to the situation rapidly evolving around them. It is often suggested that the MSZMP’s acceptance of full democracy was

voluntary and that it was not the product of pressure from below. Andras K6résényi, for example, writes that “[t]he Communists resigned under rather weak pressure, because even they themselves had lost their belief in the legitimacy of their rule as well as their self-interest in maintaining it”.” This was true to some extent—the communists were certainly not forced out of power by pressure from the streets. However, it should not hide from us the fact that, until the spring of 1989, even the reform communists sought only a limited form of de-

mocracy, at least over the short term—they sought guarantees which would ensure that their position at the center of power was maintained. Pressure from

A. Renwick: Non-elite Forces in Negotiated Revolution 201 below was important in forcing them to adopt a different path. Just as in the case of the opposition elite, so in the case of the MSZMP, it was a process of interac-

tion between elites and masses that pushed the party towards the negotiating position which it adopted in the summer of 1989.

The Bargaining Strengths of the MSZMP and the EKA in the National Roundtable Negotiations The preceding two sections have argued that the negotiating positions and strategies of the two principal participants in the national roundtable talks were strongly influenced by the preferences of the ordinary Hungarian people—including ordinary party members—as expressed during the spring and early summer of 1989. The outcome of any negotiation is determined, however, not only by the prefer-

ences and strategies of the participants, but also by their relative bargaining strengths. Bruszt and Stark suggest that the most important characteristic of the opposition at this time was its weakness. Yet, there were numerous areas of discussion in which there were substantive disagreements between the EKA and the party, and in many of these—such as the details of the parliamentary electoral system, the question of the institution of the Presidency, and the issue of whether Hungary should continue to be described in its constitution as a socialist state—the outcome of the negotiations was a genuine compromise between the two sides. Indeed, the EKA’s successes suggest that, in fact, its bargaining position was a strong one. Konya concludes that “the aims of the opposition were largely or wholly fulfilled” in the agreement of 18th September.”° Tékés writes of the outcome that “the party tried but failed to outmaneuver the opposition”.*’ The apparent contradiction between Bruszt and Stark’s claim of opposition weakness and the seeming fact of opposition strength needs to be explained. In so doing we can understand what the source of that strength was.

That apparent contradiction can be removed if we understand what kind of “weakness” and what kind of “opposition” Bruszt and Stark refer to when they write that “it was the very weakness of the opposition that forced it to be uncompromising”.*® In reference to the Polish situation they write that, “although Solidarity has been greatly reduced from its much larger base in 1981, its leaders still enjoy the trust of millions of members who accepted its goals through deliberation and identification with those leaders”.*” Thus, Solidarity is characterized as having been entrusted by Polish non-elite society to negotiate on its behalf in the manner it saw fit. The Hungarian opposition elite, by contrast—having, as has been said, only a small membership and a set of leaders possessing only

minimal recognition outside their own narrow circles—had not been so entrusted; it had not been conferred with the right to speak on behalf of Hungarian society. Thus, the opposition to which Bruszt and Stark refer is not the entire universe of opposition to the party-state existing within Hungarian elite and non-elite

202 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

society: rather, it 1s only the elite part of that opposition. And the weakness of this oppositional elite is a weakness vis-d-vis non-elite society, not a weakness vis-a-vis the state: the oppositional elite was unable to make the claim that it was the voice of society as a whole, and was thus unable to strike any bargains in the name of society. Once this clarification has been made, it is possible to reconcile the account given by Bruszt and Stark with the fact that the EKA possessed a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis the party in the talks conducted during the summer of 1989. While the EKA may not have been entrusted to speak on behalf of nonelite society, it knew that, were it necessary to take the issues of the negotiations to the people, it would be able to win overwhelmingly more support than could the regime. Thus, because of the orientation of non-elite society, the oppositional universe as a whole held considerable strength vis-d-vis the regime, enabling the EKA to negotiate with the party from a powerful position. If anything, the weakness of the EKA in relation to non-elite society strengthened it in relation to the regime, since it rendered the EKA unable to bargain away the demands of society at the negotiating table. The strength of the whole opposition which was the backdrop to the strength of the EKA at the negotiations had been seen before: in the negotiations, in the events of the spring and early summer of 1989, which have already been described. It was seen again with the four by-elections held in late July and early August, called as a result of the recall or resignation (in the face of the threat of recall) of the sitting representatives.”’ Three of these by-elections were won by the opposition, despite the presence of reform-communist candidates; the fourth was inconclusive due to low turnout. The elections sent a powerful signal to the negotiators, reminding them of where the population’s sympathies lay. They helped to bolster the confidence of the EKA and contributed further to the crisis of confidence within the MSZMP. Thus, despite the fact that its constituent organizations were, as organizations, very weak, the EKA was able to negotiate from a position of considerable strength. Despite the closed nature of the national roundtable negotiations, they were far from being free from the effects of non-elite pressure.

The Negotiated Revolution: How Could it Happen? I have so far focused upon the particular course taken by the negotiations in the summer of 1989 and have sought to show that the three most important determinants of that course—the negotiating position of the opposition, the negotiating position of the MSZMP and the relative bargaining strengths of the two sides— were, in turn, themselves significantly influenced by the preferences of the Hungarian public as revealed in a series of events and developments from March 1989 onwards. However, we need also to consider more generally what it was which gave the national roundtable negotiations the room to succeed—why no

A. Renwick: Non-elite Forces in Negotiated Revolution 203 alternative strategies appeared in the course of 1989 which might have subverted the efforts of the negotiators. The negotiations lasted just over three months from the opening plenary session on 13th June until the closing session on 18th September. During that time, particularly before the last week of August, very little information filtered into the public domain as to the course which the talks were taking. It is clear that public exasperation at this lack of information was considerable.°! In the context of mounting economic crisis, we might have expected such apparent inertia on the part of the political elite to have led to greater oppositional activity—perhaps even violent oppositional activity—in parts of the

wider public. In fact, no such thing occurred—the population was almost entirely passive throughout the period of the negotiations. Thus, here it was not the public’s activity which influenced the progress of the elite-level developments, but rather the precise reverse—the public’s inactivity and passivity. The reason for this passivity appears clear—all the indica-

tors suggest that the negotiated path was preferred by public opinion over all other alternatives. An opinion poll conducted in May 1989 found that the great majority of respondents—almost nine out of ten—”wanted the country’s leaders to negotiate with the new political organizations and parties”.”” An earlier poll had shown equally high opposition to non-peaceful forms of demonstration and even higher opposition to the creation of armed organisations outside the state

apparatus.” The polling evidence is thus that the overwhelming preference of the population was for peaceful transition. This preference was manifested in practice in the demonstrations of 15th March and 16th June and later in the events surrounding the referendum which will shortly be described: in each case, the participation of the wider public in the transition process was entirely peaceful.

We may seek a deeper explanation for this public passivity in Hungarian political culture and in the comparison of Hungarian political culture and the cultures of other countries where a peaceful transition was not achieved. That task, however, lies beyond the aims of the present article. Here my goal is only to point out that the success of the negotiated revolution—indeed, the possibility of the negotiated revolution—was contingent upon that passivity. Had the public been more inclined to engage in open forms of protest, the negotiations may not have had the time and space which they needed to succeed. What this suggests is

that it was a combination of public passivity and the occasionally manifested capacity for public activity which permitted the Hungarian transition to take the course which it did in the summer of 1989. This is a point to which | shall return to in the concluding section. In the section which follows, I draw the empirical investigation to a close by moving beyond the period of the national roundtable talks and considering what may be learnt from the referendum of November 1989.

204 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Postscript to the Negotiations: The Referendum of November 1989 One last phase of transition politics took place in Hungary after the culmination of the national roundtable negotiations and before the return to normal politics in the run-up to the first free elections in March and April 1990. This was the period of the November referendum. Prior to the calling of that referendum, the democratic nature of Hungary’s new constitutional system was incomplete—the continued existence of the Worker’s Militia, the continued presence of the MSZMP in the workplace and the refusal of the MSZMP to account for its assets meant that a level playing field for the coming elections was not guaranteed, and some argued that early presidential elections, held before the parliamentary elections, would have a similar effect. However, in the process of signature collection for the referendum,

and in the referendum vote itself, the Hungarian public both expressed an unambi- , euous preference for the completion of the democratic transition, and ensured that the transition was in fact completed. The referendum thus constituted an important phase of the transition and it needs to be considered here. The purpose of this section is to draw out the role of the non-elites in the ref- . erendum process. It is true that the initiative to hold the referendum came from

within the leadership of the SZDSZ and the Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz). The SZDSZ stated at the time of the signing of the 18th September accord that it was its intention to organize a referendum “on questions fundamentally decisive to the democratic transition”. It is clear, however, that it would not have done so had it not been certain that it would obtain the support of the people. As has been said already, Hungary’s opposition parties knew at this time that, whenever they should feel obliged to go to the people, they could count on obtaining the people’s support.

Once the petition campaign had been launched, it became clear that the SZDSZ’s confidence had not been ill-judged: within a matter of weeks, 200,000 signatures were collected, twice the number required in order to compel Parlia-

ment to call a referendum.” It was during these remarkable weeks that the regime gave way on the three questions pertaining to the party’s assets, its workplace organizations, and the Worker’s Militia. On 16th October, the Council of Ministers accepted the Justice Minister’s proposal that the Worker’s Militia be disbanded without legal successor.”° On 18th October, the Minister of Justice announced that the government would recommend to Parliament that the operation of party organizations be banned from all workplaces,”’ a proposal that was accepted by Parliament the very next day.°® Finally, on 20th October, the Finance Minister accepted that “since 1977 all of the party’s real estate has been in state possession, and the MSZMP has held it only with the rights of a trustee”.”’ There is no question that the spectacle of queues of people lining up to sign the petition and the regime’s simultaneous retreat on three questions regarding

which it had held out firmly throughout the summer were closely connected. Imre Konya expresses this clearly: “I cannot imagine that, without the process of

A. Renwick: Non-elite Forces in Negotiated Revolution 205 : signature collection, these two questions [those pertaining to the Worker’s Militia and the workplace party organizations] could have been solved with such lightning speed. Parliament felt the pressure, the urging of the people, and decided”. In this way, the resolution of these three crucial questions was determined by mass action on the part of Hungary’s non-elite population. The most important work of the referendum had thus already been done long before the votes were cast on 26th November. In the referendum itself, the verdict of the people on the first three questions was confirmed, with support for the opposition’s position running at around 95 per cent in each.” The question of

the presidency, meanwhile, was decided by the narrowest of margins.” One further point to note regarding the referendum is that of the turnout. Despite the call by what was at the time the largest opposition party—the MDF—to boycott the poll, the turnout was over 58 per cent.” This was higher than that achieved in the recall elections of the summer.™ It indicated that the ordinary voters pre-

ferred to think independently rather than abide by the elite-level politicking which clearly motivated the MDF’s stance towards the vote. In the course of the referendum process, an unambiguous popular wish was expressed for the completion of a full democratic transition. The MSZMP had sought to manipulate the new democratic system in order to improve its chances of holding on to power, and some members of the opposition elite had been prepared to accept its demands. It was popular action—the action of the thousands of signatories to the referendum petition and the millions of voters in the referendum itself— which decided that such limitations upon the democratic transition were unacceptable. Here, perhaps more than anywhere else, the direct influence of non-elite behavior upon the course of the Hungarian transition can be seen.

Interpretations and Conclusions: The Nature of the Elite-Mass Linkage in the Hungarian Transition It has been seen that non-elite behavior exerted a considerable influence over the path taken by the democratic transition in Hungary during the dramatic months of 1989. We need now to consider what the precise nature of that influence was. Non-elite behavior may have been a necessary element in the causal chain which

produced the Hungarian transition, but that fact is compatible either with the non-elites’ having had virtually no true significance in the course of events or with their having had absolutely overriding significance. I will argue here that, in fact, the role of non-elite behavior in the Hungarian transition lay between these extremes. Its influence over events was important, but that influence was exerted only in interaction with the political elites. Thus the picture of dynamic interaction between elites and masses drawn by Scott Mainwaring is found to be a very accurate description of the Hungarian case.

An example of non-elite behavior which was a necessary element of the causal chain but which was nevertheless of very little analytical significance is

206 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

provided by the referendum vote on the timing of the presidential elections in November 1989. That vote was crucial to the causal chain in that, had the majority been on the other side, early presidential elections would have been held and Hungarian political life in early 1990 would have differed substantially from the form which it, in fact, took. (Whether this would have had any major lasting impact upon the nature of Hungarian democracy is a disputed point but is not of any great import to the discussion here.) However, we could hardly attribute any great analytical significance to this vote. The outcome was so close that it may easily have gone the other way. It may have been determined by factors wholly unrelated to the particular matter in hand—for example, as Endre Babus suggests, by the fact that the opposition, unlike the regime, was able to use popular actors in its campaign advertisements.” It would be absurd to suggest that in the vote on the presidential elections the voice of the people was heard and a popular desire for parliamentary governance was expressed. It is clear, however, that non-elite behavior had a much more important role to play in the Hungarian transition than this. In respect of the other three referendum questions, for example, the general desire for a complete transition from communism and the motive force of that desire in producing the policy changes of October 1989 which were described above were both unambiguous. Here, it was not simply the case that the causal path passed through the non-elites: the role of the non-elites themselves in the process was of genuine analytical importance and interest. The same could be said of the other events which have been described in this paper. At the opposite end of the scale from the case of minimal significance lies the case in which popular opinion and behavior alone forced the outcome which was observed. In the case of Hungary this would imply that public opinion alone demanded a full and immediate transition to democracy and that it was able, on its own, to secure the acceptance of this demand. This scenario is consistent with the existence of other elements in the causal chain—for example, with the existence of elite-level negotiations. However, it demands that such negotiations should have been determined entirely by the force of public opinion. Just as in the case of minimal causal significance, it is clear that this end of the scale does not offer an accurate description of the Hungarian transition. Quite apart from the evident fact that the course of the national roundtable negotiations was not determined solely by the pressure of public opinion, it may be noted that, in the early stages of the transition, the majority of public opinion was apparently not even in favor of a transition to full democracy. An opinion poll published in March 1989, for example, found a clear majority in favor of the maintenance of the leading role of the MSZMP.” In light of such evidence, we clearly cannot claim that non-elite opinion and behavior acted alone to produce the transition that was seen. Rather, the Hungarian transition lies between these two poles. Non-elite opinion and the behavior and activities of the political elite interacted in the course of that transition. Neither was dispensable to the process and both were of

A. Renwick: Non-elite Forces in Negotiated Revolution 207 enormous analytical significance. This may be seen most clearly in the interaction between the opposition elite and public opinion. It was the opposition elite which organized the alternative events on 15th March, although the strength of

the popular support for change expressed on that day surprised the elite and encouraged it to radicalize its demands for reform and to express those demands more forcefully. Confirmation that this new approach had strong public backing was given on 16th June, when even larger crowds turned out in support of reform. At the start of this process, public opinion was ambiguous on the question of the extent of change which was desired. Encouraged by events at the elite level, however, that public opinion stood, by the autumn of 1989, quite clearly behind a complete transition—away from communism and towards democracy. It was public opinion—helped along by, but not determined by, the encouragement of the political elite—which ensured that the democratic transition was in fact completed in the referendum in November. A similar interactive process can be seen in the case of the MSZMP. As the weight of popular opinion—both inside and outside the party—turned increasingly against the party’s continued political domination, so the leaders of the MSZMP were forced to accept ever more that they could not hold back the pressure for reform. At the same time, as the party was seen ever more to be crumbling and as the party leadership was seen ever more to lose its self-confidence, so the anti-party sentiment within the population grew. To try to disentangle these processes and claim that one was more important than the other would be fruitless. One final feature of this interactive process was the fact that, for most of the period of transition, the Hungarian public was happy to follow the lead given by the political elites. The preferences of public opinion, and the force which public opinion was capable of exerting, were clear to all participants in the transition process and had a powerful impact upon that process. For the most part, however, the population remained passive. The influence of public opinion was ex- _ erted without the need for prolonged activity on the part of the Hungarian people. The occasional mass action occurring in the streets, in the polling booths and elsewhere were sufficient to push the process along. It was this combination of general passivity and occasional, highly potent activity which allowed the negotiated revolution to occur. Without the pressure of public opinion, the spectacular shift from the gradual reform of the preceding years to the radical transformation—the revolution—of 1989 would not have occurred—at least, not as a result of domestic pressures. However, without the readiness of the population to accept the lead of the political elite, that revolution could never have been executed through the process of negotiation. The passivity of the population as much as its activity was therefore an essential part of the course of events in Hungary in 1989. In order to understand fully the nature of the interaction between elites and masses during the Hungarian democratic transition—in order, that is, to understand why the elites responded to the masses as they did and why the masses

208 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

responded to the elites as they did—-we would have to delve deep into both mass and elite political culture. Only there can we hope to find answers to such questions as why public opinion was so ready to espouse the radicalization of reform over the course of 1989 and why the political elite was so ready to push for that radicalization when the public will for reform was expressed. However, investigation into this vast topic extends far beyond the scope of the present paper. Here my goal has been to show that we cannot understand the nature of Hungary’s democratic transition if we neglect the study of the role of non-elite opinion and behavior in that process. Non-elites played a part of fun_ damental importance in the Hungarian transition. That the transition was negoti-

ated—that it was achieved largely through elite-level talks conducted behind closed doors and out of sight of the Hungarian people—does not imply that the people had no role to play in the chain of events. In fact, the influence of the people on those talks was very considerable. It was only through a process of complex interaction between elites and masses that Hungary’s negotiated revolution could occur.

Notes 1 I am grateful to Andras Bozoki, Gabor Toka and Janos Kis for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 2 See Laszl6 Bruszt, “The Negotiated Revolution in Hungary”, in Andras Bozoki, Andras K6résényi

and George Schépflin (eds.), Post-Communist Transition: Emerging Pluralism in Hungary (London: Pinter, 1992), pp. 30-44. Also (among many others), Rudolf Toékés, Hungary’s Negoti-

ated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political Succession, 1957-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 3 Tokés, op. cit., p. 34. 4 Robert Jenkins, “Society and Regime Transition in East-Central Europe”, in Gyérgy Szoboszlai (ed.), Flying Blind: Emerging Democracies in East-Central Europe (Budapest: Hungarian Political Science Association, 1992), pp. 127-28. 5 For example, Dankwart Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model”, Comparative Politics vol. 2 (April 1970), pp. 337-363, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, one of four volumes of Guillermo O’ Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), and Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 6 For example, Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratisation in Latin America”, Comparative Politics, vol. 22 (October 1990), pp. 1-21, and Scott Mainwaring, “Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues”, in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds.), Issues in Democratic Consolidation (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 294-341. 7 Mainwaring, op. cit., p. 303

8 Laszlo Bruszt and David Stark, “Remaking the Political Field in Hungary: From the Politics of Confrontation to the Politics of Competition”, in Ivo Banac (ed.), Eastern Europe in Revolution (ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 13-55. 9 Ibid., pp. 42-43.

A. Renwick: Non-elite Forces in Negotiated Revolution 209

10 Ibid., p. 43. , 11 David Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland since

1968 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), p. 213. | 12 Bozoki, “Hungary’s Road to Systemic Change: The Opposition Roundtable”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 7, no. 2 (spring 1993), p. 285. 13 He said, for example, “We do not wish to participate in the exercise of power above the heads of | the people and without having been entrusted by the people to do so”. This was a reference to the desire of the EKA to have the subject-matter of the talks limited to those areas that were strictly required for the achievement of the democratic transition (Magyar Nemzet, 14th June 1989, p. 3). 14 This is evident, for example, from the joint statement issued at the signing of the initial accord on 10th June (Magyar Nemzet, 12th June 19839, p. 3).

15 “Hogyan keresstink kiutat a valsagbol” [“How Should We Search for a Way out of the Crisis”], Beszélé 5—6 (1982). 16 Bruszt, op. cit., p. 48.

17 See, for example, Bozok, op. cit., pp. 290-304. 18 Jenkins, Movements into Parties: The Historical Transformation of the Hungarian Opposition, Program on Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper Series No. 25 (Cambridge MA: Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard, n.d.), p. 57. 19 Toékés, op. cit., p. 199.

20 Interview with Konya Imre in Anna Richter, Ellenzéki Kerekasztal (Portrévazlatok) [Opposition Roundtable (Portrait Sketches)] (Budapest: Otlet, 1990), p. 15. 21 See in particular the minutes of the EKA meetings on 30th March and 7th April in Andras Bozoki et al. (eds.), A rendszervaltas forgatokényve: Kerekasztal-targyalasok 1989-ben [The Script of the Regime Change: Roundtable Negotiations in 1989] (Budapest: Magvetd, 1999), Vol. 1, pp. 76-85 and 94-113. 22 At the meeting of 25th July, for example, disagreement over the stance the EKA should adopt of the new electoral system was ended only when it was made clear that a vote against the proposed system was a vote for the break-up of the EKA: no one wanted the latter option, despite the considerable animosity of some participants towards the former (ibid., Vol. 2, p. 536). 23 Magyar Nemzet, 21st March 1989, p. 9; Tékés, op. cit., p. 318. 24 Tamas Hofer, The Demonstration of March 15, 1989, in Budapest: A Struggle for Public Memory, Program on Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper Series no. 16 (Cambridge MA: Minda de

Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard, n.d.), p. 14. 25 Richter, op. cit., p. 15. 26 Andras Balint, Gyézelemre sziiletiink: Kénya Imre Az Ellenzéki Kerekasztalrél [We Are Born to Victory: Imre Kénya on the Opposition Roundtable] (Budapest: Progresszié, 1990), pp. 30-31. 27 Bozoki et al., op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 67; see also Bozoki, “Hungary’s Road to Systemic Change”, p. 283. 28 Bozoki et al., A Rendszervaltas forgatokényve, vol. 1, pp. 86-87. 29 Tokés, op. cit., p. 296. 30 Magyar Nemzet, 22nd May 1989, p. 3; Jenkins, Movements into Parties, p. 48. 31 Tékés, op. cit., p. 324. 32 Ibid., pp. 324-325; Magyar Nemzet, 24th April 1989, p. 3. 33 Magyar Nemzet, 31st March 1989, p. 3. 34 Magyar Nemzet, 24th April 1989, p. 10. 35 He proposed the changes just three days after Grdsz had made his comments (Magyar Nemzet,

37 Ibid. 27th April 1989, p. 3). .

36 Tokés, op. cit., p. 325.

38 “Ki mond igazat?”, Magyar Nemzet, 24th April 1989, p. 10; “Még ma sem tudjuk, kinek van igaza”, Magyar Nemzet, 25th April 1989, p. 8. 39 Bozoki, op. cit., p. 288.

210 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy 40 Ibid., pp. 288-289. 41 Magyar Nemzet, 23rd May 1989, p. 4. 42 Magyar Nemzet, 9th June 1989, p. 3.

43 Andras KG6résényi, “The Decay of Communist Rule in Hungary”, in Andras Bozoki, Andras KGrésényi and George Schépflin (eds.), Post-Communist Transition: Emerging Pluralism in Hungary (London: Pinter 1992), p. 8 (emphasis in original). 44 Tokés, op. cit., p. 328. 45 Andras K6résényi, “The Hungarian Parliamentary Elections, 1990”, p. 72. 46 Balint, op. cit., p. 62. 47 Tokés, op. cit., p. 346.

48 Bruszt and Stark, op. cit., p. 42. | 49 Ibid., p. 52. 50 Magyar Nemzet, 24th July 1989, p. 4, and 7th August 1989, p. 3. 51 See, for example, Magyar Nemzet’s report on a photo-call at the talks at which the participants in the negotiations refused to speak a single word to the reporters present (Magyar Nemzet, 28th July 1989, p. 3). 52 Magyar Nemzet, 21st June 1989, p. 5. The survey was conducted between 23rd and 28th May. 53 Magyar Nemzet, 7th February 1989, p. 4. 54 Magyar Nemzet, 19th September 1989, p. 3. 55 Magyar Nemzet, 25th October 1989, p. 3. 56 Magyar Nemzet, 17th October 1989, p. 3. 57 Magyar Nemzet, 19th October 1989, p. 2. 58 Magyar Nemzet, 20th October 1989, p. 1. 59 Magyar Nemzet, 21st October 1989, p. 3. 60 Balint, op. cit., p. 65. 61 Tékés, op. cit., p. 363. 62 Ibid., pp. 363-364. 63 Jenkins, Movements into Parties, p. 53. 64 Magyar Nemzet, 24th July 1989, p. 4, and 7th August 1989, p. 3. 65 Babus Endre, “Népszavazas — 1989” [“Referendum—1989”], in Sandor Kurtan, Péter Sandor and Laszlé Vass (eds.), Magyarorszag politikai évkényve 1990 [Political Yearbook of Hungary 1990] (Budapest: Aula-OMIKK, 1990), pp. 211-212. 66 Magyar Nemzet, 20th March 1989, p. 4.

Regime Change and the Tradition of 1956 Janos M. Rainer

The past, the historical prototype and traditions have a seminal part to play in legitimising any kind of political system. In Hungary, the most sensitive problem to face the regime in the early Kadar period was coming to terms with its own past, its immediate antecedents in the Rakosi period and the 1956 revolution. However, Janos Kadar’s acquisition of power, whilst still in Moscow, arose out of the defeat of the anti-Stalinist, national revolution and the fight for liberation. He, therefore, preferred to accept continuity with the Rakosi period, whilst trying to erase the stigma whilst this entailed. The traditional Kadarite interpretation of 1956 as a counterrevolution continued to dominate in public utterances until 1989 (apart from oblique references in the arts). Although there had been another type of tradition in society, that of revolution, it had been smothered by the reprisals. From the turn of the 1960s onwards, the two types of tradition existed concurrently, meeting in complete silence, except on ritual occasions. There seemed to be no real need for a past whilst the actual system of conditions for the Kadar system to develop remained: the psychological aftermath of social capitulation in 1957-58,' a milder, but persistent Cold War, and partial legitimacy won by inflating the standard of living. When things began to change in the mid-1970s, Kadar tried first to treat the malaise of his regime by drawing on the concept of a ‘national tragedy’.* There the ‘power-backed’ tradition remained, up until Kadar’s removal in May 1988. The revolutionary tradition was sustained with great intellectual force by the democratic ‘56 emigre community in the West. In Hungary, the silence was broken at the end of the 1970s by the democratic opposition, which tried to put society’s specific image of 1956 into words. Criticism of the regime and a resolve to deprive it of legitimacy were clearly discernible, but efforts to build up the ‘example of ‘56’ into a political prototype and a political tradition were less so.

When Istvan Csurka spoke at Monor in 1985 of the ‘new Hungarian selfconstruction’, he still wanted to build on the mutual reticence dubbed as consent (constrained consent), conscious acceptance of the Kadarite de-politicization of the subject, and deliberate eschewal of public life. Arguing against him, Miklos Szab6 and Janos Kis emphasized the aspect of capitulation, the concession character of the ‘results’ after 1956: ‘The path of self-construction is not a defeat, but an awakening of awareness of rights.’> Two distinct ‘56 political traditions were formulated again at the opposition ‘56 conference in December 1986. One was

212 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

the Imre Nagy-type reforming attitude, still not exceeded, capable of going along with the revolution even to the point of breaking irrevocably with the basic dogmas of the existing regime (Miklés Vasarhelyi). The other was the tradition of worker self-management, built also on the experiences of the Polish revolution in the early 1980s (Janos Kis).* However, the direct political programs put forward in 1987 and 1988 were not built on these potential traditions. They rested on critical analyses of the regime from the angles of economics, sociology and political science, as a sign that the ‘56 tradition did not (indeed self-evidently) offer a guideline for action at that time. At the same time, 1956 was a dominant factor on the symbolic plane of the change of system, when re-examination, re-evaluation and ‘recovery’ of the past became a central topic. Nineteen-fifty-six became an emblem of radical change, although all the participants in the change of system tried to avoid the occurrence

of anything similar to 1956.” The most dramatic and theatrical act during the change of system, and the one which attracted the biggest crowds, was the reburial of Imre Nagy and the ‘56 martyrs, on June 16, 1956. Why did these things

turn out as they did? It was not necessarily because all the participants in the process of transformation wanted it that way. The opposition parties and organizations were working to destroy the legitimacy of the Kadar system. Once it was so enfeebled that the economic crisis, indebtedness, irrevocably falling living standards and looming unemployment

were discussed openly by middle and higher-ranking functionaries, then the critics identified the genesis of the regime as its morally indefensible, inexplicable point. The true badge of the regime and symbol of its history became the dead Imre Nagy, lying in an unmarked grave in Plot 301, in the furthest corner of Rakoskeresztur Cemetery, with several hundred others who had been executed.

Awareness of this broke to the surface in 1983, on the 25th anniversary of Nagy’s death. ‘Nameless mounds, rotting wooden crosses, a jar of flowers, a carnation in a tin can, a wild rosebush. That is all. The rest is utter silence. Imre Nagy, lawful prime minister of the country, and thousands of companions are denied even what a murderous robber receives: a tomb, a stone, a nameplate in the prisoners’ graveyard. Who accepts responsibility for this?’ enquired Miklos Vasarhelyi on the front page of the Paris Jrodalmi Ujsag.° ‘One day he must be buried / and we must never forget / to name the killers by name!’ wrote Gaspar Nagy in a poem, working in the initials of Imre Nagy as the last two letters of each line. This escaped the notice of the editorial censors and the poem appeared in the periodical Uj Forrds in Tatabanya, causing such alarm that the issue was

pulped and the author silenced.’ On the 30th anniversary of the revolution in 1986, the eerie sight of the thick undergrowth of Plot 301 and the sunken depressions as the only marks of where the graves had been dug featured on the BBC news and the front-page of The New York Times. In the spring of 1988, a group of former ‘56 political prisoners and relations

of those executed founded the Committee for Historical Justice (TIB). It addressed an appeal to the Hungarian public, on the 30th anniversary of the Imre

J. M. Rainer: Regime Change and the Tradition of 1956 213 Nagy trial, pressing for the reburial and rehabilitation of those executed and an acknowledgment and reassessment of the whole history of the recent past.> On June 16, 1988, the Hungarian emigre community unveiled a symbolic grave of Imre Nagy and his associates, in the Pére-Lachaise Cemetery in Paris. There was a simultaneous demonstration in the streets of central Budapest, where the protesters called out the name of Imre Nagy. ‘The leaders of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP) themselves are talking about a separation of party and state, about some kind of socialist pluralism. Whatever these words may mean, everyone has to know that there cannot be a real political opening and reconciliation whilst the road to compromise is blocked by the unburied dead,’ Janos Kis remarked in his speech.’ The Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party Politburo agreed on June 14, 1988 that the police should break up the commemoration of Imre Nagy held at the Batthyany memorial lamp in Central Budapest. Gyérgy Fejti, a Central Committee secretary, told the meeting, There are tasks for us to do, above all in party history, in historical studies, to offer a subtler analysis of events and persons, without affecting the underlying judgement of the ‘56 events.

There are also some human points of view to consider, which we have to settle in due course. Now, however, we are not in such a position and perhaps it would not be correct to press forward. We have to return to this in calmer times and think over and settle the issue in a comprehensive way.!0

The party leadership decided that calmer times had come towards the end of the year, after further interventions by the police and the speech by Karoly Grdész at the Budapest Sports Hall, raising the spectre of White Terror. On November 29, 1988, the Political Committee passed a resolution on ‘the settlement of ques-

tions of respect concerning persons convicted of and executed for political crimes connected with the counterrevolutionary events.’ In the debate, Fejti’s kind of ‘comprehensive thinking over and settlement’ gave way to a more modern approach from K4roly Grész: ‘We have to be able to endure and we have to be able to handle’ the problem.” “Handling the problem’ (the key concept in the short-lived Grész period) was to have meant that a senior official of the Prison Service appointed by the Ministry of Justice would simply discuss details of the exhumation and “act of respect” (1. e. a family funeral) with immediate relations. Even the members of the Political Committee did not think this feasible. When the matter came before the Central Committee on December 15th, Gyérgy Fejti pointed out that ‘very precisely definable circles and groups have an interest in placing a different construction on this event, using it and exploiting it politically.” However, he added resolutely, in a novel fashion, that ‘we consider this proposal acceptable nonetheless, and we will have to return later to how the situation created by this move can be handled politically in the appropriate form.’ The passage of time by no means favoured the treatment conceived in advance. The influence of the opposition political movements and, above all, the

214 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

publicity for them increased. Meanwhile, growing numbers of MSZMP members realised that the party was incapable of handling the crisis in the old way. In a

plural structure, it would break up eventually under the weight of its past or evaporate into a vacuum, through the gap in its legitimacy. This gap was supposed to be plugged by the committee considering the historical path followed by the MSZMP. Imre Pozsgay, the Political Committee member overseeing the committee, elevated the question of the revolution and Imre Nagy into a public issue on January 28, 1989, with a statement classifying 1956 as a ‘popular uprising’.’* There followed an explosive reaction which far exceeded the intentions of Pozsgay and his group to build up a new legitimacy (or party legitimacy). Pozsgay made his motives plain at the Political Committee meeting on February 7, 1989, where he said the expression “popular uprising” was especially apt: It does not have an anti-Soviet purport, but it is anti-Stalinist and satisfies at the present those who treasure within themselves another, more extreme version—the idea of a revolution, a national revolution and war of independence, an independence struggle ... This is the conjunction that in my opinion will extricate the party from a concept born of current political necessity, without undermining its whole identity and self-respect, without having to undertake some kind of special examination and reckoning before the whole party ... Hence it is not a question of breaking with the category of counterrevolution, but of its name sometimes being stated clearly as a revolution as well.’!4

Ideas on handling the problem in the longer term were presented at the same meeting by Karoly Grosz: With this structure, with the political burden behind us, and with the mood into which we have been driven and into which we have driven ourselves, will we or will we not be able to

command a majority in elections held in a year’s time ...? A change of social system in Hungary will be accompanied by a civil war... As I see it, there will be no intervention here from the East or from the West. There will be a closed thermos flask here, in which we will have to suffer for our own response, and then no stone will be left standing here. I am convinced of this, because there is a force that will be able and willing to take arms to prevent a change of system... For this reason, I see it as the only way for the political transition to take place on a basis of agreement between the various forces... It depends on our sense of reality whether we find partners with whom, in a coalition structure, we can create a majority, where the foundations of society remain.’ !5

With a slight exaggeration, the story of the Hungarian change of system can be equated with the story of the demise of this ‘problem-handling’ scenario. Within it, the past, 1956 and the Imre Nagy reburial form a case study of the same thing. The MSZMP at the turn of 1988 and 1989 tried to handle the matter as a ‘quasi-moral’, ‘humanitarian’ question. On February 14th, 1989, the TIB reached a preliminary agreement with State Secretary Gyula Borics and Security Service Commander Ferenc Tari at the Justice Ministry that a ‘normal civic funeral’ would be organised on June 16th, 1989.'° This was to have been held at the New Public Cemetery in Budapest, and on April 21st, certain technical details were agreed on the same basis.'’ Meanwhile, the idea had been raised, in

J. M. Rainer: Regime Change and the Tradition of 1956 215 the TIB and opposition political organisations, of holding some kind of demonstration in the city centre, due to the likely historical significance of the occasion and the consequent mass attendance, for which the location and limited capacity of the cemetery were unsuitable. When the plan for the funeral became public, representatives of scores of Western democratic emigre organisations indicated a desire to attend. The state committee keeping the organisation of the event and the associated debates under operative control gave indications of this and requested a political decision.'® Then something unexpected occurred: the monolith fell out with itself. At the Political Committee meeting on April 19, 1989 and the April 28 meeting of the crisis caucus known as the International, Legal and Public Administration Policy

Committee of the Central Committee,’ the government members present (Mikl6s Németh, Gyula Horn and Istvan Horvath), supported by the invited Kalman Kulcsar and by Matyas Sztrés, Speaker of Parliament, opposed a ban on the demonstration. Instead they argued for the legal rehabilitation of Imre Nagy and all those convicted for acts in 1956, and for government attendance at the funeral. The hard-liners were startled and anxious at this prospect. ‘There was no call for this “act of respect” to be broadened and coupled with political, legal rehabilitation,’ Gydérgy Fejti grumbled. According to Sandor Borbély, commander of the Worker’s Militia, ‘Kossuth tér [the square outside Parliament] cannot be a possibility, and neither can H6s6k tere, because they cannot be handled.’

The question of the funeral was also discussed at the May 2nd meeting of the Opposition Roundtable, where Imre Mécs reported on the debate within the TIB. At that juncture, the majority of the TIB leaders and the relatives of those executed still favoured the cemetery as the venue and a ceremony confined to the payment of last respects.””? Mécs, however, argued that ‘people would like to take part in something ...there, they want to conclude a period and look forward

to the new period opening.’ The Opposition Roundtable did not overlook the aspect of an “act of respect” either. As Balint Magyar put it, ‘This mass demonstration has to be held before the funeral, without the coffins, but effectively just before the funeral. For it is not just a matter for the widows, this funeral. It’s a national issue, there’s a nation rehabilitating itself here.’ The attitude of mind characteristic of the negotiated political transition appeared as a sign of the new times. According to Péter Télgyessy, ‘It is very important for them to be a big mass movement. Think of the fact that we'll be negotiating with the MSZMP at

that time... They will keep bringing it up at the negotiations that they have 800,000 members and we have only so many thousand.”*' The debate in the TIB and the opposition parties lasted only a few days.” On

May 18, Imre Mécs announced to the Opposition Roundtable that the plan had changed. The lying in state was to take place in Hésék tere. There would be an opportunity there for mass, demonstrative attendance, whilst the character of the paying of respect would be retained (avoiding a noisy procession with slogans and banners). The difference of views between ‘civil society’ and the political

216 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

sphere appeared only at the embryonic stage. Ultimately, this salient event in the change of system managed at one and the same time to remain a civil ceremony of respect and to become a political demonstration of exceptional force. At the beginning of May, pressure from public opinion led the authorities to agree that the funeral would be a big public occasion. It was noted at the Political Committee meeting on May 2nd that it seemed to be ‘worth issuing a government statement shortly before June 16th laying the emphasis on reconciliation in this question.’** On May 22, Prime Minister Miklés Németh agreed with the representatives of the TIB on the ceremony in H6s6k tere, ‘with great unease and pressing the responsibility onto us,’ as Imre Mécs reported two days later to the Opposition Roundtable.” As a sign of the revolutionary times, the press was told first of the -government’s assent’ and then the opposition parties were briefed. The TIB had agreed with the Interior Ministry and public administrative authorities on the technical details also~’ before the prime minister announced them subsequently to the Political Committee. Those present at the meeting did not even quibble when it was included in the announcement that there would be all-day television coverage.

They were busy pondering instead on how they could obtain the texts of the speeches which would be heard and seen live and how the MSZMP side of Hungary could represent itself at the funeral of Imre Nagy without actually attending. The MSZMP Central Committee debated its statement on Imre Nagy on May 29, 1989, three weeks before the funeral. Some members recognised this as the last opportunity for the party to rehabilitate the executed prime minister without reservations and exercise self-criticism. However, the majority had strong reservations about this. Of the reformers, Maria Ormos, Ivan T. Berend, Béla Katona

and Gyula Horn favored the immediate political rehabilitation of Nagy and pressed for an urgent legal review of the 1958 trial. On the other side were Karoly Grosz, Janos Berecz and the ‘stick-in-the-muds’, who urged ‘caution’ in the name of the party membership (in other words, the orthodox communist

functionaries and activists).22 The outcome was a non-committal statement which sought to create a ‘national day of reconciliation’ out of the reburial, sensing the mortal danger which the occasion posed to the party.” Whilst the MSZMP tried to de-politicize the symbolic field of the transition, the Opposition Roundtable seemed to be trying to politicise the event in the final days before the funeral. There was a big debate about when the forthcoming Na-

tional Roundtable discussions with the state party should begin. Should it be before June 16th or afterwards? Was the atmosphere of anxiety about the 16th not working to the advantage of the opposition by turning public opinion against the party? Would the MSZMP not regain too much composure after the funeral had passed off peaceably?*? Just a couple of days before the funeral, the opposition co-ordination body was divided strongly over whether state leaders, in that capacity, should be allowed to lay wreaths on the bier.*’ Ultimately, it was recognized, in the case of both issues, that such details were of small importance compared with the occasion as a whole. A crowd of 200,000 gathered in Budapest’s Hdésék tere on June 16th, 1989, to pay their last respects to Imre Nagy and

J. M. Rainer: Regime Change and the Tradition of 1956 217

his associates before their reburial. The speakers (Miklés Vasarhelyi, Béla Kirdly, Tibor Zimanyi, Imre Mécs, Sandor Racz and Viktor Orban) praised the dead (the names of all those executed were read out) and spoke of the revolution, but not of continuing or reviving it, but of a peaceful transition designed to attain

the objectives of 1956. The atmosphere was ceremonial, solemn and a little tense,** but there were no incidents. Three days earlier there had taken place the first meeting of the National Roundtable, which was seen by the public as a victory for the opposition. The funeral was attended by the Speaker of Parliament, the Prime Minister and several government ministers, but no-one present imagined that this was designed to make the proceedings semi-official. People were far more inclined to consider that they were witnessing a psychological and historical turning point. ‘The most important factor behind the

collapse [of the old order]... was a moral one,’ Péter Kende wrote a couple of months later. ‘This funeral ceremony was like the elevation of the sacrament, from which the Evil One scuttles whimpering away.’ From a distance of ten years, there is still no more pertinent way of expressing the 1989 reburial of the 1956 tradition and its dramatic effect, but today longer-term effects can be discerned as well. Even a few years before 1989, the majority of Hungarian society

did not utterly oppose the system which had broken the revolution. Then, in 1989, it summoned back memories of events from which it wished to dissociate itself in retrospect, as an actual or potential opponent: the darkest years under the Rakosi system, the few years of Kadarite repression after 1956, and the outcome of October 1956 itself. The funeral of Imre Nagy was a sacred act, which corresponded to that selective recollection and selective, retrospective opposition. However, it probably expressed at least as forcibly the fact that all the main

participants in Hungarian society, as it prepared for the transition, wanted to bury the past. Into Imre Nagy’s grave went the repudiated, disowned early phase

of the Kadar period, to be followed a few weeks later by the golden years of Kadar and by the final phase. The living dead need not be faced any more. The de-legitimising function had been performed. The ‘unidirectional’ memory of this moment of grace gave way to a ‘divergent? memory, in a process which

continues with the cleaving of many other events of 1956. : So the heritage of the revolution played a dual role in the system-changing

process. It appeared as a positive program, as the antithesis of the Soviet/Communist system. It not only robbed the ancien regime of legitimacy, it simultaneously endowed with legitimacy all forces aspiring to more than a reform of so-called socialism. At the same time, 1956 also appeared as a negative program—and in this respect there was agreement among all political forces except for a tiny radical group, including the heirs of the state party. This was the importance of a ‘peaceful transition’, as opposed to the violent revolution of 1956 and its even more violent suppression. The one thing on which the forces changing the system agreed with their opponents was this: anything but a revolution, let it not be like 1956! This largely determined all of what happened to 1956 in 1990 and after.

218 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

By the time of the 1990 election campaign, 1956 was no longer playing a central role. Of the main political parties, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) had cited Imre Nagy among its ideological ancestors in its founding declaration in 1988, but it did not really make use of 1956 for day-to-day political purposes. Its leaders were aware that their radical system-changing program could not be equated with a clear transference of ‘56 into the present, with the political multiplicity of ‘56, or least of all, with its ‘third-road’, socialistic objec-

tives. Imre Mécs, one of the former revolutionaries who joined the party, expressed this by saying that they should not be just ‘56-ers, but ‘89-ers as well, and he placed the accent clearly on the latter. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) in 1989, still strongly ‘third-road’ and socialistic, could easily have identified with the revolution. The founding populist writers embraced the legacy of the revolution, but this aspect paled once Jézsef Antall came into the foreground (although Antall himself had taken part in ‘56, if not in a prominent position.) The radicalism of the revolution did not attract the early MDF, which saw itself as standing between the government and the opposition and preferred to avoid confrontation. As for the right-wing radicals in the MDF, Imre Nagy and the former party opposition remained too communist for them. The Hungarian Socialist (Worker’s) Party (MSZMP, then MSZP) made a final attempt in 1989 to forge a ‘positive’, legitimizing link with 1956. October 23, 1989 was made the ‘Day of the Declaration of the Republic’, the tactic being that if they could not prevent the day being celebrated, let it at least gain some significance which was more to their taste. After the elections, the first act of the country’s first freely elected Parliament was a commemoration of the 1956 revolution.** The new coalition government, headed by the MDF, left the name of Imre Nagy out of the text until the very last minute, as a sign of dissociation from the communist protagonist of the revolution and its left-wing content and interpretation. Even in the summer of 1990, it emerged during the debate on the question of the national coat of arms and the choice of national day, that the government parties were shifting the emphasis

from 1956 and other modern-day democratic traditions to the continuity expressed by the thousand-year statehood of Hungary. Rather than the Kossuth coat of arms used in 1945-49 (and reinstated during the 1956 revolution), the pre-1945, crowned coat of arms of the Hungarian Kingdom was chosen as the country’s official emblem. Instead of March 15th or October 23rd, reminiscent of the revolutions of 1848 and 1956 respectively, August 20th, feast of St Stephen the King, founder of the Hungarian state, was chosen as the state festival. The change of 1944—45, the revolution of 1956 and the whole period up to 1989 were omitted from this continuum. Antall declared in celebratory addresses on October 23rd, 1990 and in 1992, the 35th anniversary of the revolution, that

1956 was part of a ‘great common national mythology, in which ‘there are he- . roes and victims, where there are ordeals’. In this connection, he said, “We must always speak of that which is elevating’ in them. However, Antall continued, it

J. M. Rainer: Regime Change and the Tradition of 1956 219

, does not belong among the periods or events from which ‘deeply analyzed, rational consequences containing merciless lessons’ can be drawn. By the time that the various political forces were developing their ‘concepts’

of 1956 in 1989-90, the shared moral experience of the funeral of Imre Nagy was no longer effective. Nineteen fifty-six was no longer an integrating experience, as it had been during the break-up of the Kadar system. On the contrary, it was a divisive factor in society, or an argument which cropped up during sociopolitical conflicts. A prime example of the latter was the issue which came to be known as the dispensation of justice. When the question of personal and legal

responsibility for conduct of the trials during the Stalinist period and for the massacres of unarmed demonstrators in 1956 arose—in 1989/90—the paradigm of a ‘peaceful transition’ still prevailed. The peaceful and lawful nature of the Hungarian transition undoubtedly allowed the outgoing political elite a ‘free retreat’ and left unpunished those who had persecuted and tortured people under communist rule. This moral deficit bore heavily on the new democracy. Campaigns calling for investigation and even retribution for the ‘crimes’ of the communist period were launched by various political forces, including the MDF and other government parties. These so-called justice campaigns were opposed, of

course, by the communist successor party, and also by the liberals, on the grounds of the principles of the constitutional state and the security of the law. (The latter did so even though most of them agreed with the moral arguments for dispensing justice.) The main public advocates of the dispensation of justice, however, were former participants in the revolution, but this debate was not primarily about ‘56. The basic motive forces behind the issue had to do with dayto-day politics and its suitability as a diversion from the government’s inaction in the face of deep recession. The ‘campaigner’ radicals of the MDF found in the issue an occasion to initiate mass protests and sustain permanent tensions. It also suited the Antall leadership, with its intellectual habit of harking back in history, as a piece of ‘negative mythology’, as well as being a substitute for action on the difficult problems of the day. This was all the more so since everyone remembered what an enormous public response there had been to the facts and data about the reprisals when revealed in 1989. However, these were ineffective or had other effects a couple of years later. As the euphoria over the change of system subsided, the public, socialised under the Kadar system, began to expect practical problems to be resolved. This mood | was reflected in the press and among the opposition. Liberal political thinkers pointed, in agreement, to legal concerns about the dispensation of justice, to the question of the time which had elapsed, and to the difficulties of establishing personal guilt. Meanwhile, they never disputed for a moment the moral justification for dispensing justice. The 1956 tradition became fatally divided along the lines of day-to-day politics, as did the people who had once taken part in the revolution. Those demanding the dispensation of justice took over the veterans’ organizations and simply branded as ‘communists’ those who opposed them. The latter were identified not only with the opposition, but with the pre-1956

220 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

supporters of Imre Nagy and the party opposition, who of course, had long ceased to be communists. Even the liberals, the most committed of warriors against the communist system, were labelled in the same way. The conflict about the dispensation of justice led to a singular new historical dispute over 1956. There began a subsequent construction of a ‘true’ history of 1956, tailored to present-day requirements. This reconstituted history later came to cover the whole period of Hungarian history since 1945. The expositions took place not in the press or the specialist forums of historical studies (which had largely dissociated themselves from these polemics), but in certain programs on public television. The new, true history no longer contained references to revolution, mainly because of its communist, Marxist connotations, but also out of a general conservative aversion to revolution. Instead, 1956 was seen summarily as a national war of liberation, a national struggle against the ‘Russians’, either with no social program or seeking to restore some previous system. This interpretation devalued the role of the party opposition and Imre Nagy. At the same time there arose a very new mythology, of a mass, national battle of resistance to the Rakosi regime. The result is a diffuse, disparate recollection of the 1956 revolution. Interest-

ingly, the dominant ingredient, to this day, is the aspect of 1956 which most people presumably thought of most during the Kadar period. At that time, the vast majority of people had some kind of memory of 1956, which they knew was not the official one and which was close to its very opposite. However, they also

knew that they could not admit this openly. Healthy self-interest, a verifiable instinct for survival—and shame felt at deceit all gave rise to the concept of ‘troubled times’. The personal stories which were fit to be told reflected a tangled, feverish, confused and opaque situation, when life was jerked out of its normal rut for a while. Avowedly or implicitly, normality was represented in these personal memories by ‘existing socialism’. Although the basic facts about 1956 were accessible, despite the deliberate lies of official historical recollection, they proved easy enough to reconcile with the ‘troubled-times’ type of memory. Imre Nagy, for instance, may not have hatched a plot to overthrow the socialist system, but he was presented as an irresponsible, day-dreaming politician devoid of a concept, at best well-intentioned, but quite incompetent, not at all the ‘man for the job’. This is precisely where the ‘troubled-times’ type of memory came up against official recollection. If Nagy (with all the revolutionaries) was not the ‘man for the job’, who was? The response to the question was consistent: it was Janos Kadar, who had started out on November 4th, 1956 and who had reached a ‘golden age’ in the 1960s and 1970s.

Although the freedom of expression after 1989 gave a public hearing to every kind of personal, political and historical interpretation, much of Hungarian society still seems to view 1956 as ‘troubled times’. One, albeit important, rea-

son for this is that the one-time participants have thrown themselves into the aforementioned debate, which many people find a disconcerting spectacle, to say the least. A second reason is that the collective memory compares the ‘troubled-

J. M. Rainer: Regime Change and the Tradition of 1956 221 times’ concept of ‘56 with the calm of the Kadar period. The Kadar period, on the other hand, has been attacked indiscriminately and had its drawbacks emphasised in every official political speech celebrating 1956 to be delivered since

1990. This, quite unnecessarily, breeds antagonism in all those who lived through the Kadar period, more or less in peace and quiet, and who did not especially miss their freedom. The third, and final, reason is society’s sense that the catharsis provided by the Nagy funeral has passed and remains only a memory. Little of the message of ‘56 remains relevant to the issues of today. The new democracy rests on the strongest basis of legitimacy: the sovereignty of the people and free elections. Yet, its representatives still feel and behave as if they needed to take historical arguments into a battle to gain acceptance. This gives a dishonest and anachronistic impression and most members of society are aware of this. Nineteen fifty-six and its immediate history have become incorporated into the historical-cum-political memory in the same way as in the Kadar period. Even if the divide is not so great as it was then, it exists. Indeed, the divide will remain for as long as the national-conservative actors on the stage of Hungarian political democracy think they still need to buttress their legitimacy with historical political arguments, as long as they find a history-steeped mode of address a worthier aspect of the national tradition than a common recollection of all kinds of inhumanity and tyranny, and as long as their left-wing and liberal opponents react to all this, not by openly criticizing such behavior, but in silence, or by taking up the challenge. Notes 1 This concept was expounded by Miklés Szabo at the Monor meeting of the opposition in 1985. 2 Kadar’s speech on his 60th birthday, quoted in Gyurk6, Laszl6, Arcképvadzlat térténelmi hattérrel (Sketch for a Portrait with an Historical Background). Budapest: Magvet6, 1982, pp. 221-2. 3 On the Monor meeting, see Készeg, Ferenc, ‘A vég kezdete?’ (Beginning of the End?). Beszéld (Informant), No. 5, 1999, pp. 65-74. 4 Hegediis, Andras B. (ed.), Otvenhatrol nyolcvanhatban (On ‘56 in ‘86). Budapest: Szazadvég and *56-os Intézet, 1992. 5 The exceptions were a few radical political groups such as the Hungarian October Party of Gyérgy Krass6, which became marginalized for that very reason. 6 ‘Négy névtelen sirhant’ (Four Unnamed Graves), Irodalmi Ujsag (Literary Gazette), No. 1, 1983. The article appeared anonymously. The ascription to Vasarhelyi came later from Tibor Méray, editor-in-chief of the newspaper. 7 Uj Forras (New Source), October 1984. Reprinted in Pomogats, Béla, and Endre Medvigy (eds.),

Ezerkilencszazétvenhat, te csillag. A forradalom és a szabadsagharc olvasékényve (Nineteen Fifty-Six, You Star!—A Reader on the Revolution and Independence Struggle). Budapest: Piiski, 1991, p. 221. 8 Beszélé, No. 25. Reprinted in Beszélé Osszkiadas (Beszélé Collected Edition), Vol. III, pp. 603-4. For the formation of the TIB through the eyes of the state security service, see Kenedi, Janos, Kis allambiztonsagi olvasékényv. Oktober 23.—marcius 15.—junius 16. a Kadar-korszakban (A Little State Security Reader. October 23rd—March 15th—June 16th in the Kadar Period), Vol. II. Budapest: Magveté, 1996, pp. 185-97. For the formation in a broader context, see Hegedtis, And-

222 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy ras B., ‘Az 1956-os magyar forradalom és szabadsagharc reneszansza és a rendszervaltas. Visszatekintés 1988-ra’ (The Renaissance of the 1956 Revolution and Independence Struggle and the Change of System. Looking Back from 1988). In: Evkényv 6 (Yearbook 6). Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1998, pp. 287-95. 9 1958-1988. Tetemrehivds (1958-88. Summoning the Dead), compiled by Janos M. Rainer. Budapest: Bibliotéka, 1989, p. 152. 10 For the extract from the minutes, see Kenedi, op. cit., p. 202. 11 Ibid., p. 225. 12 Ibid., p. 288. 13 Pozsgay chose 1/68 Hours, one of the most popular programs on Hungarian Radio at the time, to announce the conclusion by the committee which he headed that a “popular uprising” had broken out in Hungary in 1956. 14 Minutes of the MSZP Political Committee meeting on February 7th, 1989 (tape transcript). 15 Ibid.

16 Appendix to Interview 152, with Tibor Erdélyi, Oral History Archive, 1956 Institute, Budapest. Memo on the discussion held on February 14th, 1989 at the Justice Ministry. 17 Ibid. Memo on the discussion held on April 21st, 1989. 18 Kenedi, op. cit., pp. 235-7. Report on the preparations for the funeral of Imre Nagy and associates, April, 1989. 19 Ibid., pp. 230-34 and 237-51. 20 This was also apparent at the talks between the Budapest police headquarters and the TIB held on May 11th, 1989. See the report on this in /bid., pp. 272-4. 21 Andras Bozoki et al. (eds.), A rendszervaltas forgatokényve (The Script for the Change of Sys-

tem), Vol. I, pp. 217-19. Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable, May 2nd, 1989. , 22 On the debate, see the Interior Ministry report in Kenedi, op. cit., pp. 274-7. 23 A rendszervaltas forgatokényve, Vol. I, p. 304. Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable, May 18th, 1989.

24 Kenedi, op. cit., p. 257. Meeting of the MSZMP Political Committee, May 2nd, 1989. 25 A rendszervaltas forgatokényve, Vol. I, p. 365. Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable, May 24th, 1989.

26 Magyar Hirlap (Hungarian News), May 24th, 1989. 27 Appendix to Interview 152, with Tibor Erdélyi, Oral History Archive, 1956 Institute, Budapest. Memo on the discussion held on May 25th, 1989. 28 A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzékényvei (The 1989 Minutes of the MSZMP Central Committee), Vol. I. [Budapest, 1990], pp. 1037-80. 29 Jozsef Horvath, head of the III/III security group at the Interior Ministry, declared on May 29th,

1989, to the operational committee preparing for the reburial of Imre Nagy and his associates: ‘The suggestion has begun to be made to society that June 16th has to be considered the day of the burial, of national reconciliation and of consensus.’ See Kenedi, op. cit., p. 310. 30 A rendszervaltas forgatokényve, Vol. I, pp. 412-29. Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable, May 31st, 1989. 31 Ibid., pp. 462~8. Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable, June 4, 1989. 32 The massacre of students demonstrating for democracy in Tienanmen Square in Beijing had taken place only a few days earlier. 33 Kende, Péter, ‘Mit6l omlott 6ssze?’ (What Made It Collapse?). In: A parizsi toronybol. Valogatott politikai irasok 1957-1989 (From the Eiffel Tower. Selected Political Writings 1957-89). Buda-

pest: Cserépfalvi, 1991, p. 154. _ 34 The practice of incorporating outstanding persons and events in legislation is a specific, recurring motif in Hungarian parliamentary practice. For instance, an Act of this kind was passed by Parliament at the end of the 19th century relating to Lajos Kossuth, leader of the 1848-49 revolution and war of independence. Another was passed in March, 1953 in memory of Josip V. Stalin.

The Roundtables, Democratic Institutions and the Problem of Justice Andrew Arato

The wave of democratic transitions between 1989-1993 has fundamentally altered our idea of radical political change. The old figure of revolution, along with the dichotomy of “revolution or reform” seems to be historically exhausted.

We now possess a model of radical transformation that leads to the rapid and complete transformation of regime identity, within an overall framework of legal continuity. Whilst it is true that the famous reforma/ruptura pactada of Spain in 1977 anticipated the new model, it was above all the roundtable agreements of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria and South Africa which demonstrated its applicability to different regions and types of dictatorship. The relative success of democratic institutional design and the improved chances of the consolidation of democracy in all of these countries underscore the world historical significance of the model of change. The model everywhere emerged for initially strategic reasons. Opposition

forces confront the fact that a civil society based on mobilization from below cannot on its own accomplish the transition to democracy as long as authoritarian governments maintain their full control over the organized forces of violence. For democrats, negotiations are a means of dismantling dictatorship for which they are willing to pay a price. On the other side, governmental elites who have lost their legitimacy and their long-term optimism about staying in power seek guarantees for their future political role, as well as security for their persons and property. Both sides have an interest in avoiding a revolutionary clash which

either may win, but in which both can turn out to be losers. The prospect of roundtable negotiations is that both can win by avoiding the destructive friendenemy logic of modern revolutions. What is remarkable about the process is how a mere modus vivendi is transformed into principled support for the constitutional features of modern democracy. Of course governmental actors may initially seek to use the roundtable form , to convert old forms of power monopoly into new ones. When the process turns against them they may retreat and seek “only” consociational guarantees. Weak opposition actors endanger their own future political viability when they grant concessions in this spirit, and thus they cannot do so in good faith. Negotiators of a weakening old regime do better when they shift their preference, their public argumentation and, hopefully, their normative orientation to institutions to which the oppositions (or their parts) are attached for principled reasons and which are most likely to guarantee the future political role and personal security of declining elites. Proportional representation, or mixed electoral systems, and relatively strong con-

224 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

stitutional courts are rarely wanted in the beginning by the rulers of the past, but their representatives can agree to set up these institutions when the logic of negotiation shows the erosion of their preferred conversion strategies. Similarly, the initial wish to guarantee a foothold in power through a strong presidency is inconsistent with the logic of negotiations. Once opposition forces discover that time is on their side, they are less and less likely to concede such an institution which, in their moment of weakness, might have seemed a small price to pay for democratic elections. In the end, increasingly pessimistic former rulers may, as in Bulgaria, abandon the idea of a strong, directly elected presidency. Whilst short-term decisions on the structure of government depend on timing and sequencing (Poland initially wound up with a strong presidency and Hungary almost started with a directly elected, potentially significant one), in the longer term the roundtable countries typically turn out to be parliamentary republics, or semi-presidential ones with very strong parliaments and responsible governments. In the same period most other transition paths produced forms of presidentialism with strong, and even dominant, chief executives along with weak parliaments.

There were of course transition paths in the period between 1989 and the present which were quite different from those typical of Roundtable negotiation and compromise. In a suggestive four-part typology (Table 1), Janos Kis has defined the path of negotiated regime change through the unlikely combination of rupture in legitimacy and legal continuity. Revolution in this scheme is represented by rupture of both legality and legitimacy, whilst reform is depicted in terms of continuity in both dimensions. A fourth possible type, one that he did not historically concretize, is continuous legitimacy in the context of legal rupture. Table 1. Paths of Regime Change

Legitimacy

Legality :

Continuous | Rupture Continuous Reform Regime change

Rupture Revolution from above —— Revolution autogolpe

| | _ Source: Constellations, January 1995 (after Janos Kis)

Reform when it is reiterated can lead to change of identity. Nevertheless, an institution or a group with strong political support can use successive reforms to stay in power even as old ruling structures are formally abandoned. The most successful method for achieving this end is the use of top-down electoral reform to organize elections which are formally competitive, but whose outcome is still

controlled by the ruling institutions of the past. I call this transition path the electoral road, to call attention to the fact that, in themselves, elections may only

lead to “soft” dictatorships or “hard” democracies. Elections organized from

above turn out to be the best way to try consolidating a stage of mere

A. Arato: The Roundtables, Democratic Institutions and the Problem of Justice 225

“liberalization”, an outcome generally considered impossible in the recent literature on the transitions.’ If we count the new states emerging from the ruins of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia separately, there are more examples of the elec-

toral road than of negotiated transition. The preconditions for this version of reformism are viable legitimation claims, whether these draw on older revolutionary or newer nationalist ideologies, or their eclectic combination. The method works, since free elections are highly sensitive targets to political intervention, even without electoral fraud; they can be influenced at the level of electoral rules, finance, and timetables, as well as by controlling access to the media. Of course governments do not always know with certainty whether a regime has sufficient reserves of background legitimacy to successfully institute and manipulate partially competitive elections. In such cases elections only accelerate the process of decomposition, as it happened in Hungary in the mid1980s and in South Africa a few years later. However, whenever a regime has survived, at least two partially competitive, elections only large scale mobilization from below can complete the transition from a soft dictatorship or a hard democracy to a genuine polyarchy. This is what has happened recently in Serbia. Whilst it is generally right to speak of the obsolescence of revolution in this epoch, nevertheless, under the extremely particular conditions of the communistsultanist regime of Romania, a fully-fledged revolutionary rupture of legitimacy and legality did occur in December, 1989 and in the following months. There are regimes, as Linz and Stepan showed when only a violent rupture (internally or externally caused) of both legality and legitimacy can bring the abolition of dic, tatorship.” In such cases, even the historical experience of the negative lessons of revolution will not deter democratic actors from following the path of insurrection, provisional government and constitution-making, legally speaking, ex nihilo. What is nevertheless remarkable in the contemporary period is that, even in several extremely repressive (near “totalitarian’”) settings such as Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, a revolutionary path was avoided. Finally, in Russia, in 1993, a legitimate presidency, elected by means of democratic elections, carried out a coup d’état from above (or: autogolpe) against the legal institutions of the Federal Republic. Even if one sympathizes with Yeltsin _ against his hard-line parliamentary opponents, we must nevertheless be extremely concemed by the path of change which has almost always, from Louis Napoleon to Fujimori, led to authoritarian outcomes. In particular, the creation of a constitution through executive fiat and the open manipulation of plebescitary ratification leads, at best, to a democratic regime with deep legitimation problems. I say “at best’, since the constitutional design in Russia, bearing the marks of the dominant executive, establishes a rather hard version of democracy.

Thus all of the four types which follow from the scheme which varies the two dimensions of legality and legitimacy can be found in the period after 1989. What is striking, however, is the obvious difficulties of consolidating democratic

institutions and the emergence of semi-authoritarian practices in many of the cases which followed reformist, revolutionary and “autogolpist” paths, in com-

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parison to the roundtable or negotiated model (Table 2). Admittedly, in both Slovenia and the Baltic countries the (inherited) republican apparats, themselves in conflict with the central party-state institutions and under strong pressure from powerful popular forces, made possible open democratic elections which led to the creation of democratic institutions and constitutional limitations which resemble those of the roundtable countries. In these states, however, the result de-

pended on the democratic intentions and orientations of important sectors of former ruling elites. In the roundtable countries the outcome depended on the institutional form of the transformation itself: a far more reliable factor than democratic orientation. I see the essence of this form in the representation of societal plurality during the beginning of a new political system. The roundtables are obviously not representative in any sense of picturing society and its interests, or of having received a commission or a mandate from the electorate or its sectors. They are, however, representative—in a purely dramaturgical sense—of making present the conflictual play of societal plurality itself. It is this feature which distinguishes their product from imposition even where, as in the case of the roundtable in Czechoslovakia, one side (here the popular one) would have had the power to impose but chose instead formulas acceptable to its antagonists. The astonishing achievement of the roundtable path of negotiated transitions was to avoid, in the midst of a truly great transformation, the anti-democratic

consequences known both from the history of revolutions and from the more recent pattern of the electoral road so skillfully practiced by the Mexican ruling elite, for example. The roundtables avoided acclaiming themselves as the functionary of the constituent power of the people, and at the same time they wrested

the power to make the constitution from the constituted powers of the old regime. Because of their willingness to subordinate themselves to inherited formal legality, they did not expose their countries to the risks of dual power entailed by the American model of constitution-making through a separate convention facing the inherited legislature, a convention which unilaterally changed the method of constitutional alteration.’ Assuming (as I do) the exemplary character of the American model, it would be difficult to find a better alternative to this than the roundtables which drew their legality from the parliamentary enactment of their work, whilst their new actors operated under a veil of ignorance concerning the outcome of the first democratic elections.’ Finally, under the control and monitoring activities of a self-democratizing civil society and its public discussions, the roundtables managed also to avoid the pattern of semi-corporatist compromise leading to restrictions on democracy. Facing civilian rulers capable of effectively representing their interests in future elections, rather than the military elites of many South American countries who would be both more vulnerable

and more dangerous in the new democracy, democratic oppositions at the roundtables (with the exception of the first case, Poland!) were not forced to make undemocratic concessions to their adversary. However, one problem which the roundtables were not able to resolve fully was the problem of legitimacy, which was the context of their emergence in the first place.”

A. Arato: The Roundtables, Democratic Institutions and the Problem of Justice 229

None of the negotiating partners at the roundtables could play their important historical role as a result of democratic elections, and all of them, and in the end

even the African National Congress (ANC), eschewed revolutionary selflegitimation. Only Solidarity and the ANC had leaderships known to the general

population, and who had distinguished themselves in open, popular struggle against the dictatorships. Even in these two countries, moreover, there were important leaders who were not given powerful positions at the bargaining table. The very nature of the method seemed to suggest elitism and exclusion. The actors often voiced their doubts concerning their own legitimacy, and this is the reason why the representatives of the opposition in Hungary, for example, wished to confine their agreements to a few “organic laws”. Only freely elected assemblies had the right, it was repeatedly said, to do more. Had the participants negotiated only the minimum conditions of democratic elections, their own selfappointment to participate in the power to create constitutions would not have been a problem. However, democratic elections have preconditions which imply yet other presuppositions. Consequently, all the roundtables fell into the way of producing more of a constitutional package than many of the participants on the democratic side were initially comfortable with. From the governmental side, of course, it was important that the guarantees obtained would not be at the disposal of future parliaments or constitutional assemblies. Moreover they controlled the non-democratic parliaments which had the role of formally enacting the agreements, and they thus retained an additional level of control over the process which they would not have in the future. Their evident interest in constitution-making at this early stage contributed to the suspect legitimacy of the draft which emerged. It was of limited help only that the negotiated constitutions were pronounced interim Or provisional. Many commentators understood from the beginning that the interim might become permanent if the subsequent effort did not succeed, and that, in any case, the institutional interests of those elected under a temporary constitution would be in a strong position to re-establish their power in any new draft.° The problem of justice was organically connected to the issue of the legiti-

macy of the roundtables. Evidently, the very functioning of these bodies depended on not raising the question of the guilt and responsibility of the members

of the old regime for the injustices of the past. The guarantees sought by the governmental side had at least the indirect result of placing the persons and property of the members of this side, and their clients, “off limits” to future criminal charges and re-distributive claims. The interim constitutions contained such guarantees, and, moreover, they put members of the old ruling stratum in a good position to fight for them in the new constitutions to be created. Legality is always heavily challenged by demands of substantive justice by innocent victims. The challenge becomes all the more formidable when the legality is continuous with a hated past and when its new constitutional framework has only a doubtful democratic legitimacy.’ As I see it, the roundtables left two difficult dilemmas to the new democra-

cies which they helped to establish, both flowing from the problem of legiti-

230 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

macy. Given the provisional nature of their constitutional heritage and its doubtful legitimacy, it was clear that the process of constitution making would have to continue. The first dilemma was: should the needs of legitimation or the needs of constitutional learning be given priority, even at the expense of the other. If the first, then there was a need to complete constitution-making soon after the first

free election, to overcome the stigma of mere provisionality and to avoid the continued intermingling of constitutional and normal politics; if the second, then the interim constitution should serve for a learning period in which its structural and contextual problems could be exposed and corrected through amendment, and so it would be left to a much later constitution-making round to bring the process to a close. Similarly, given the lack of clarity concerning a method of dealing with past injustice, this problem would have to be raised again. The second dilemma is:

should the requirements of justice be paramount, or should the rule of law be rigidly adhered to. If the first, then special procedures, akin to revolutionary justice, would have to be invented, and fundamental requirements of a modern legal

system concerning the need for pre-existing, clear legal rules and procedures pertinent to the crime—as well as statutes of limitations—would have to be suspended or bypassed; if the second, then grave crimes and human rights violations would have to go unpunished, and perhaps un-remembered. Note that, taken together, the two dilemmas exposed the roundtable settlements to potential second revolutionary challenges which would have vitiated a great deal of what had been achieved. Without constitutional legitimacy and without denying the claims of justice, the compromise agreements could be presented as a conspiracy of the old and new elites in which the price for a democracy which the two could dominate would be the survival of the social powers of the personnel of the old regime. The solutions chosen in both areas were markedly different in the various countries, and we are now in a good position to evaluate the choices made. In the area of constitution-making Poland and Hungary represent one extreme, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia the other, with South Africa indicating the possibility of a synthetic approach. Deliberately or not, the Poles and Hungarians wound up with a gradual, piecemeal process of constitution-making. In Hungary the National Roundtable did produce a more-or-less complete constitution, one which was established through the existing amending power and was understood to be

a provisional one.’ Instead of producing a new constitution, the first freely elected Parliament (through a private agreement between the major government and the major opposition party) chose only to amend once again the interim one, removing, in particular, certain extreme consensus requirements and establishing a stronger executive. In Poland the initial revisions were less complete. After the, probably inevitable, failure of the first, only partially democratic, Parliament to produce a new constitution, the second Parliament produced only an extensive revision, “the Little Constitution”. In both countries, with newly elected Parlia-

ments having again undertaken the task of final drafting and enactment, the

A. Arato: The Roundtables, Democratic Institutions and the Problem of Justice 231

process was still open as late as 1996-1997. Eventual success in Poland, as against failure in Hungary, was conditioned by more favorable parliamentary arithmetic and the greater democratic loyalty of the post-Communist party, in power at that time in both countries. Two other factors played a role in the different outcomes: the, far greater, structural difficulties of the Polish interim constitution, suspended between presidential and parliamentary institutions, and the ability of the Hungarian Constitutional Court in establishing a constitutional tradition through interpretation. It is these last differences which may help the Hungarian new democracy to avoid the negative consequences of weak constitutional legitimacy in the face of a second revolutionary challenge whose energies are now nearly spent. At the other extreme, the Bulgarian and Czechoslovak Roundtables helped to organize free elections to assemblies which would have constitution-making as their major task. In the Czechoslovak (or Czech and Slovak) case this election was, nevertheless, for an ordinary bicameral parliament, which would have to vote on all issues, including constitutional ones, under difficult decision rules. As is well known, under these rules, the Federal parliament was unable to agree on any formula for the continued association of the two republics, whose provincial assemblies subsequently inherited the task of constitution-making for separate countries. Bulgaria, of course, was not a federal republic with a difficult bicameral model of decision making and wound up with a model of constitutionmaking far less restricted than that of Czechoslovakia. Seeking the greatest possible legitimacy for a favorable constitutional synthesis which could be well insulated from radical future changes, the governmental side at the Roundtable successfully proposed that a constituent assembly (the Grand National Assembly), with few prior restrictions, should make the new constitution. The Communist Party could dare to do this only because it was in a position to control the timing, procedures and, to some extent, the outcome of the elections for this assembly. Not only future constitutional learning was thereby compromised. A significant section of Bulgarian politics, far larger than the camp of “second revolutionaries” in Poland and Hungary, refused to recognize the legitimacy of a, technically more than adequate, constitution. Therefore, when the new regime was confronted by its greatest learning crisis in 1996-1997, the difficulty of a dual democratic legitimacy not effectively dealt with in the constitution, the crisis threatened to become one of the whole new order. The opposition, which had acquired the presidency in the most recent democratic election, once again denounced the roundtable and its constitution. Now that this opposition also has parliamentary power, achieved in a constitutional manner, the substantive virtues of the document may nevertheless lead to its reaffirmation, even if the learning problem alluded to has not yet been adequately dealt with. South Africans in 1993 and thereafter had the benefit of being able to learn from previous experience, although it is difficult to say, at least for me, how much direct influence was actually involved. In any case, their solution was, in several respects, synthetic with respect to the extremes depicted so far. Here too,

232 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

the needs of democratic transition were answered by an interim constitution. The agreements, however, incorporated a precise timetable for the production of the

definitive constitution, with built-in penalties for failure. In this way, both learning and legitimacy were taken into account. A series of constitutional principles was to provide a bridge between the negotiating forum and the final constitution; and so many of the guarantees which were preconditions for a peaceful transition could not be abrogated. However, the principles (enforceable through the Constitutional Court) were not so narrowly constructed as to eliminate the freedom of the makers of the new constitution: the choice was open for example between the consociationalism present in the interim constitution and the more individualistic constitutionalism which was in the end established. Finally, although elections were for a bicameral assembly, the constitution-making was organized in French style, with the two chambers sitting together as the National Assembly. This procedure de-dramatized proceedings which did not fall to the temptation to assume an abundance of constituent powers, without shackling the process with excessively difficult bicameral decision rules. Turning to questions of justice, here the roundtable countries, facing similar problems, show less variation. None (fortunately) has opted for revolutionary, substantive justice and none has gravely compromised the rule of law. Taking the promises and mutual commitments of the negotiations seriously undoubtedly played a role. The ability of the former ruling parties to convert themselves into democratic competitors, no longer a threat to the new institutions, was also important. There were, however, variations in connection with the specific role of

negotiated settlements in the results. At one extreme, Poland, where mutual promises and confidence-building were extremely important in a situation with still unknown geo-political risks, something close to Mazowiecki’s thick line was drawn between the future and the past. Periodic efforts to arrange trials for those responsible for martial law failed abysmally. At the same time, in the Czech and Slovak republics, where the roundtable came closest to a mere form used by the opposition, and in Germany, where the agreements became irrelevant in the context of unification, the so-called /ustration procedures and the dismissal of civil service employees were used to punish large numbers of people involved, to widely varying extents, in the injustices of the past. In Germany, moreover, there were attempts to use the criminal law against selected protagonists of the old regime from the Stasi chief Mielke and Honecker himself, to soldiers responsible for border shootings of persons attempting to escape. Evidently both approaches have their problems, and so does the mixed Hungarian model which involved a reluctant and inconsistent process of “lustration” of some office holders, and a few half-hearted trials for supposed war crimes dating back to 1956. Drawing a thick line involves simply forgetting the just grievances from the past, which can never be just. Even if historians and creative writers continue to remember, there is a collective responsibility to the victims which should not be put aside. However, using the employment structure, or manipulating the legal system to allow some trials, inevitably leads to new injus-

A. Arato: The Roundtables, Democratic Institutions and the Problem of Justice 233

tice, and compromises the law itself. Note, for example, that “lustration” processes and civil service dismissals cannot hurt those who have used their earlier position and networks to find employment, indeed positions of power, in the private economy. Note also that, in trials in Germany and Hungary, it has been far easier to prosecute relatively low-level officials who had committed acts of violence on the orders of superiors, than those superiors themselves. Once again, the South African experience, inevitably involving learning from the East European, but also Latin American cases has much to teach us. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission substituted a non-legal public process for criminal procedures. Its aim is, simultaneously, the establishment of a historical record of human rights violations, and the reconciliation of the two sides which violently clashed under the apartheid system. It is this form which is most consistent with the spirit of the roundtable transitions. This is so, since the procedures of the Commission allow, through the promise of amnesty, the full realization of the guarantees given to political forces which were asked to abandon their clear ability to use violence in furthering their political goals. The roundtables, however, never involved the promise that the past will be sealed and that the cries of its victims will be suppressed. The Commission’s work allows the opening-up of this past in a way consistent with the explicit and implicit agree-

ments at the negotiating table. ,

Did the Roundtable model really matter? This question needs to be briefly answered, because there are those who are skeptical about the significance of transition paths altogether. We might first answer that, because of their constitutional results and the political culture of negotiation and compromise which they have fostered, the roundtables made a great contribution to the consolidation of democracy. This answer can be challenged empirically. Whilst it is true that the six (or seven) roundtable countries mentioned here have had conspicuous success in the early consolidation of democracy, the favorable outcomes may be due to other factors such as geography (five out of the seven are Central European), older political traditions (five out of the seven are Catholic or Protestant), or economics (five of the seven have made a success out of the transition to market economies). Democratic consolidation in Bulgaria and South Africa however, which are by now almost undeniable, cannot be explained on these lines. Part of our best explanation of their success (so far!) has had to rely on the appropriateness of the design which emerged from the negotiations and from the subsequent constituent process, and the increasing popular attachment to the main features of this design.

However, the Roundtables matter in another, more abstract but equally important, way. The most difficult question in an age of democratic legitimacy is how to begin, how to establish a new political order. Ancient and modern republicans, as late as Rousseau, resorted to the figure of a foreign legislator to answer this question, conceding in effect that democracy cannot begin democratically. The modern doctrine of the constituent power of the people sought unsuccessfully to give a purely democratic answer to the question of beginnings.’” It

234 | The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

united, in effect, Rousseau’s “legislator” and his “sovereign”. At one logical juncture or another this answer leads to the imposition of rules, or meta-rules, by those who successfully appoint themselves to speak in the name of the people, and with whom a mobilized segment of the population can identify. This solution inevitably comes into conflict with the modern factuality of societal pluralism. Certainly the American model of 1787 pre-supposed societal pluralism and avoided identifying the constitution-makers with sovereignty and the plenitude of powers, by relying on a convention restricted to constitution-drafting, and a demanding model of ratification. As we have seen in Russia in 1993, however, in many settings such a model of two national assemblies carries the danger of dual power and violent confrontation.

The roundtables, by claiming no legitimacy and only an informal role, avoided the danger of dual power. More importantly, given the dominance in European history of the model of the sovereign constituent assemblies speaking, supposedly, in the name of the people, they surpass this explosive alternative in

three respects: 1. They do not assume a mythological answer to the question of beginnings, and they frankly concede the impossibility of purely democratic origins. 2. They do not assume a legal vacuum (another myth) for their operation, and they help to construct a pragmatically viable legality out of the fragments of law available; and 3. They represent, from the outset, not a unitary will, but societal plurality itself. The contribution of the roundtables to an equitable institutional design and the consolidation of democracy ultimately rest on their innovative response to the problem of how to begin a democracy. Their achievement belongs not only to the epoch of the recent transitions to democracy, but to the history of political thought itself. Notes 1 Adam Przeworski Democracy and the Market (Cambridge, 1991) 58-61. Przeworski’s example here is the instability of the abertura in Brazil. How long, however, must a policy succeed for it to

be considered successful? The electoral strategy in Brazil, brilliantly analyzed by Bolivar Lamounier (in “Authoritarian Brazil Revisited: the Impact of Elections on the Abertura” in A. Stepan ed. Democratizing Brazil (Oxford, 1989) gave the military regime ten more years of life. The most successful version in Mexico kept the PRI in power, in a liberalized version of the regime, for more than 20 years. Note that in the 1980s Brazil and Mexico tended to be analyzed in a parallel and open-ended fashion. See the essays of Luciano Martins and Kevin Middlebrook in O’Donnell and Schmitter eds. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Latin America (Baltimore, 1986). On a typology which uses the electoral road see Andrew Arato “Interpreting 1989” in Civil Society, Constitution and Legitimacy (Lanham, Md., 2000). 2 J. Linz and A. Stepan Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Universuty Press, 1996) 5S5ff.

3 Bruce Ackerman We the People. Foundations. v. | (Cambridge, Mass. 1991) I disagree however with Ackerman who, in the Future of the Liberal Revolution (New Haven, 1992), disparages the model of constitution-making through round tables acting through inherited parliaments.

A. Arato: The Roundtables, Democratic Institutions and the Problem of Justice 235 4 I have elsewhere argued that parliamentary constitution-making has a good chance to satisfy demanding requirements for legitimate constitution-making (publicity, consensus, plurality of democracy, legality). One important criterion I stress, the veil of ignorance in the empirical sense, is difficult for ordinary parliaments to satisfy after the first democratic elections. Before democratic elections, however, constitution-making by inherited, authoritarian or semi-authoritarian parliaments has nearly insoluble legitimation problems. Because I presupposed Hungarian developments, I have not sufficiently stressed in my article the role of roundtables in solving this problem. See “Forms of Constitution Making and Democratic Theory” in Civil Society, Constitution and Legitimacy. 5 See Janos Kis “Between Reform and Revolution” Constellations (1995) vol. 1, no. 3.

6 On the South African case see the fine articles (chapters one and four) by Doreen Atkinson in Friedman and Atkinson eds. The Small Miracle (Randburg, 1994). 7 See the fine work by Ruti G. Teitel Transitional Justice (New York, 2000). 8 See my chapters 4, 5 and 6 in Civil Society, Constitution and Legitimacy. On the Polish Roundtable see W. Osiatynski’s article in J. Elster in The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism (Chicago, 1996). For the South African model see Atkinson op. cit. and chapters 1-6; 14— 15 in M. Faure and J-E. Lane: South Africa: Designing New Political Institutions (London, 1996). On Bulgaria see the outstanding Graduate Faculty PhD dissertation (2000) by Ralitsa Peeva. 9 We are now fortunate to have all the necessary documentation as well as outstanding commentary

in A. Bozoki et al. (ed.), A rendszervaltas forgatokényve: kerekasztal targyaldsok 1989-ben in 8 volumes (Budapest, 1999-2000). Bozoki’s own article in volume 7 is still the most insightful single piece on the Hungarian Opposition and National Roundtables. In English, see: Andras Bozoki: “Hungary’s Road to Systemic Change: The Opposition Roundtable” East European Politics and Societies, 1993. Vol. 7. No. 2. The other best work in English is John Schiemann’s comprehensive Columbia University Ph.D dissertation (1999). 10 See Carl Schmitt Verfassungslehre (Berlin, 1989 [1928] ) and Hannah Arendt’s On Revolution

(New York, 1962). My own analysis of this question is in “Forms of Constitution Making and Democratic Theory”.

BLANK PAGE

Back to Europe: The International Background of the Political Transition in Hungary, 1983—90 Csaba Békés

At the end of the 1980s, as had been the case over the past few centuries, the fate _ of East-Central Europe was determined by the superpowers and the realities of world politics. This was not always disadvantageous for each of the countries of | the region; the peace treaties after World War I, for instance, explicitly favored the interests of most of the nations in the region by establishing nation states and by satisfying territorial demands at the expense of the losing countries. In the case of Hungary, however, international politics had an unfavorable impact on the state’s national interests from the 16th century until 1989. The collapse of the 1956 revolution is only the most recent example of the tragic effects of international political trends on Hungarian society. Thus, the political changes of 198990 resulted not only in the establishment of democracy and the restoration of sovereignty, but, for the first time in their lives and after a long period, Hungarians could enjoy a social experience which proved that the rivalry between the superpowers and the conditions of world politics can sometimes exert a positive effect on the enforcement of Hungarian national interests.’

Imperial Status Quo, Imperial Armament When M. S. Gorbachev was elected as secretary. general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in March 1985, he undertook a task no less formidable than that of breathing new life into a socialist economic-political model which had already fallen into serious crisis at both the center of the Soviet Empire and its

East European periphery. It would be interesting to see whether the reforms which Gorbachev introduced or simply envisaged could have proved effective a few decades earlier. By the middle of the 1980s, however, it was all too late.

The arms race with the United States, the need to maintain parity in nuclear strategy, and the expenses of an irrationally oversized imperial periphery (Cuba, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola, etc.) which brought no real profit had

eaten up the economic reserves of the Soviet Union to such an extent that the chances for consolidation were rather slim in a socialist economic system which was, in any event, extremely ineffective. In addition, Gorbachev and his reformer associates did not adequately assess the severity of the approaching cri-

238 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

sis, even though they were aware of its inevitability. Therefore, until 1988, the reforms initially formulated with much caution in terms of “perestroika” and “slasnosty” did not significantly improve either the political conditions or the efficiency of the economy. Although the new leadership had emphasized from the beginning its commitment to establishing a new international order which would replace the old cold war opposition, it failed to make the best of this pos-

sibility by reducing the armament costs of the Soviet Union radically and promptly. While the Soviet-American disarmament talks, which became increasingly intensive starting in the middle of the 1980s, brought a remarkable result in December 1987 with the signing of the INF agreement on eliminating medium-

range and short-range nuclear missiles, until the summer of 1988 the Soviet leadership refused to take any unilateral steps in disarmament.” They failed to do so in spite of the fact that the considerable Soviet advantage, especially in tradi-

tional arms, would have provided an excellent opportunity to reduce military expenses significantly. Moreover, this would also have had a positive effect upon building security and trust between East and West, which Gorbachev regarded as especially important. Because of the resistance of the Soviet military lobby and of conservative members of the leadership, as well as the traditional imperial attitude which also characterized the views of the reformers to quite a large extent, a real change could only take place at the Warsaw meeting of the Political Consultative Body of the Warsaw Pact (WP PCB) on July 15th—16th, 1988. In his address Gorbachev assessed the role of the socialist camp in shaping world politics and its chances for the future as definitely positive. On the other hand, in a closed session of the foreign ministers, Eduard Shevardnadze openly admitted that the Soviet Union was “facing a critical situation,” and that it could no longer afford to run a permanent arms race with the West, given that it exceeded the Eastern block “in every possible respect.” Therefore, he stressed that the termination of the arms race had to be given absolute priority and every chance had to be grasped in order to come to an agreement. With a view to this, the WP PCB decided to speed up preparations for their forthcoming negotiations on conventional arms, to transform the structure and deployment of the armed forces of the WP (exclusively for meeting defensive needs), to develop a more flexible negotiating strategy, and, in particular—after changing its former position—to take unilateral steps towards disarmament. The Committee of the Defense Ministers was then commissioned to consider how the real data on the armies and the armament of the Warsaw Pact states could be made public. Typically, at its special meeting in Prague in the middle of October, 1988, the Committee concluded that admitting the advantage of the WP in a number of fields before the negotiations started would have an unfavorable effect on the position of the alliance. Therefore this step, which was originally intended to strengthen security and confidence, was postponed until March, 1989, when the so-called CFE talks did commence in Vienna.’ The unilateral steps towards disarmament, however, had been announced by Gorbachev well before this time, when he delivered his speech at the UN General Assembly on

Cs. Békés: Back to Europe 239 December 7th, 1988. On this occasion the secretary general of the CPSU announced that the Soviet Union would reduce its armed forces by 500,000 troops and that this would be accomplished by withdrawing some of the forces stationed in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.” This decision, at its own time quite radical but at the same time a rather late one in terms of consolidating the Soviet economy, was not free from inconsis-

tencies, however. This unilateral reduction in the armed forces by no means signified a cut in military spending by the Soviet military leaders. Quite the con-

trary: however surprising it might seem, in the summer of 1988 the Moscow leaders intended to increase the defense budget by 43% (!), including the use of the state reserves also.° The imminent comprehensive modernization program of

NATO caught the Soviets—who wanted to maintain strategic parity at all costs—in a trap out of which the only escape was to carry out the unavoidable reduction simultaneously with, or immediately after, the Soviet army’s accelerated modernization, which would involve extremely large short-term costs. It is quite likely that it was primarily this challenge (or the failure to meet this challenge), rather than the American SDI “Star Wars” program, which eventually brought the Soviet Union to its knees in the arms race, and thus led to the fall of the communist system itself. Although one of the most remarkable results of the Gorbachev reforms was undoubtedly the introduction of pragmatic policy-making and the reduced emphasis upon communist ideol-

ogy in both foreign and home policy, almost nothing was achieved in the area which had otherwise offered the Soviet Union the most profit for the least investment: maintaining, or, rather, reducing the imperial periphery. Gorbachev was ready to replace the Soviet expansionist policy based on supporting the “liberation movements” of the third world with a more up-to-date strategy of exporting the revolution via the appeal of the new socialist model, which—in his hopes—in the meantime had been reformed and made effective. Due to resistance from conservative members of the leadership and the need to consider the prestige of the Soviet Union as a world superpower, however, very few concrete steps were taken in this direction before 1988. Although the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan started at the beginning of that year, to be followed by the departure of Cuban volunteers from Angola in January 1989, these happened all too late. Even in 1989 to finance the imperial periphery, inherited mostly from the Brezhnev era, consumed huge sums (keeping Cuba alive alone cost 27 billion rubles annually), so pushing the economy to the brink of total collapse.’

This inflexible imperial policy, predetermined by ideological considerations which prohibited the timely elimination of most earlier obligations, eventually

led to the loss of Soviet influence over the East Central European region. Fur- | thermore, as a result of constant over-expansion, or exhausting the “action radius”—a problem under which several empires had collapsed before in the course of history, the Soviet Union could eradicate the intolerable economic burden of supporting its allies only through its own dissolution.®

240 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

The Soviet Union and East Central Europe at the End of the 1980s Up to the present, the most important question and the one attracting the greatest attention is: how the Soviet leadership could, eventually, have tolerated losing control of the region previously considered to be of the utmost importance, and for which their predecessors had made great sacrifices for more than four dec-

ades. At the time when Gorbachev rose to power, Soviet policy continued to give the preservation of East Central Europe as a security zone for the Soviet Union the absolute priority it had enjoyed, uninterrupted, since 1945. Initially, , the primary goal of the transitional policy announced by the new secretarygeneral was to make the economic system more efficient and the political system more democratic, albeit in a limited sense. In other words, modernizing the socialist model inherited from the Stalinist era. Gorbachev believed not only that this program could be successfully accomplished in the Soviet Union, but also that the modernization of the system was an “objective necessity” deriving from the essential conditions of the age.’ Sooner or later, he maintained, the countries of East Central Europe would follow this good example of their own accord, since it represented the only possible means of avoiding imminent crisis, or sur-

viving the crisis, once ithad developed. In similar situations, Gorbachev’s forefathers—especially the father of the de-Stalinization campaign, Khrushchev—never bothered to rely on the principle of voluntarism when urging partners to follow the Soviet Union’s good example. Gorbachev, however, had good reasons not to try to impose the reforms on his allies. He regarded political stability as a key factor in accomplishing a success-

ful transition in both the Soviet Union and East-Central Europe. At the same time, the situation was rather confused in this respect. In Hungary and Poland, where commitment to reform was alive even without Soviet influence, the economic conditions, indebtedness, and social dissatisfaction gave cause for serious

alarm as early as the mid-1980s. In the GDR, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, each of which had a more conservative leadership, the political situation seemed much more sound, despite the apparent stagnation. Therefore, imposing the new Soviet policy on these countries would not only have conflicted with the new Gorbachev style, it would also have involved the risk of destabilizing those countries in which this problem, at least, had not existed before. Therefore, in the second half of the decade Gorbachev followed the policy of patient persuasion, and attempted to achieve his goals via frequent bilateral and multilateral talks, personal visits, and public appearances. At these meetings, Gorbachev tried to make it very clear from the beginning that he wanted to establish relations with the Eastern European allies on new foundations, although the principles of such a new policy were not codified in any way or in any particular document for public consumption. With regard to the principles or promises of this policy, there was little new to be offered, given that the Soviet government’s October 30th, 1956 declaration—never cancelled—

Cs. Békés: Back to Europe 241 stated that the socialist countries could “build their mutual relations only on the principles of complete equality, of respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and of non-interference in one another’s internal affairs.”'° This is not to say that Gorbachev, contrary to his predecessors, really took these high principles seriously, or that he was ready to give up the leading role of the Soviet Union within the socialist camp. It is obvious, however, that— contrary to any other former leader—he did seriously believe that a new relationship must be built which was more equal than it had been in the past: one

which could put an end to the Soviet guardianship role,’ one which could achieve real mutuality in the exchange of ideas and experience, which acknowledged the right to find one’s own way within the socialist model in practice as well as in principle, and which could offer the chance of relatively independent policy-making, provided that the alliance system was still respected. One could even say that, between 1985 and 1989, Gorbachev offered the entire Eastern - camp an alliance system for lasting use which the Khrushchev leadership, confused by the events in Poland and Hungary, had regarded as tenable for only a

single day (October 30, 1956), and, even then, only for Hungary.'” | All this did not mean, however, the abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine: that is, the acknowledgement that the Eastern European nations were entitled to a truly free choice, including the elimination of the socialist system and the resto-

ration of parliamentary democracy. This must be emphasized because today some of Gorbachev’s former associates tend to suggest that the Brezhnev doctrine was essentially rejected in 1985-86, or even, as some might argue, in 1981 when a Soviet military intervention in Poland did not take place.’*> Based on currently available sources, however, it can be clearly established that no significant change in Soviet attitude occurred before the middle of 1988. Moreover,

when, in the second half of that year, or at the beginning of 1989, the thesis came to be adopted that, in the case of potential crisis in the socialist countries, the possibility of Soviet military intervention must be excluded, this was formulated in the hope that the outcome of the radical changes would be a new model of socialism, a new model which—thanks to its capacity for renewal and, hence, its popularity among the public—could ensure a dominant role for the communist party in political life even after free elections. All this was closely related to the radical changes which took place in the Soviet Union in the summer and autumn of 1988. The national party conference held in June gave new momentum to “perestroika”, and, from this time on, the major direction of the reforms was increasingly aimed at restructuring the system of political institutions, since the measures which had already been introduced in the field of the economy had produced very poor results. At the end of September Gorbachev strengthened his position within the leadership,'* and, from then on, he enjoyed the unquestionable authority which every secretary-general of the

Communist Party is entitled to have “in times of peace.” During these few months qualitative changes took place in Soviet policy in several respects. The program of modernizing the Stalinist model came to be replaced by an effort to

242 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy : develop a new model of socialism which could possibly blend the most advantageous features of both systems. This “rubber” concept—heavily influenced by the theory of convergence—went through a number of transitions in the coming years. No-one knew what it really involved until it turned out that it was nothing else but capitalism. It was at this time that the Gorbachev—Shevardnadze duet was able to start undertaking their own initiatives; this time without significant obstacles. This

resulted in a real breakthrough in the most important field, that of SovietAmerican relations, and a new relationship between the leaders of the two superpowers began to be established which could not have been conceivable even a few years earlier, when President Reagan called the Soviet Union the “evil empire.”

| Given Gorbachev’s ardent urgings to build a new world order based on trust, mutual security, peaceful co-existence, co-operation, and the elimination of the division of Europe, normalization of relations with the leading powers of Western Europe became extremely important. Although only in the summer of 1989 did the secretary-general pay his crucial visits to London, Paris, and Bonn, the intensive exchange of ideas had began earlier, and serious reservations were replaced by qualitative changes in the attitude of the Soviet government, especially with regard to the FRG. This latter development was, to a large extent, due to the intervention of the Hungarian leadership, which had for some time cultivated excellent relations with the West Germans, and was negotiated by Karoly

Grdész during his Moscow visit in July 1988—at the request of Chancellor Kohl."°

The Only Means: “Floating” the Brezhnev Doctrine As far as East-Central Europe is concerned, there were two fundamental changes in the Soviet policy at this time which had a considerable influence on the fate of the region: the adoption of the principle of “socialist pluralism” and the introduction of a new strategy in the alliance—floating the idea of the Brezhnev doctrine.

At the 1988 June party conference, Gorbachev—without any preliminary theoretical elaboration—declared that any nation had the right to choose its own

social-economic system. Jacques Levesque raises three reasons for the announcement of this very important, albeit far from unambiguous, thesis. In his view, Gorbachev’s major goal was to win the confidence of the West, since, in addition to his position on Afghanistan, Gorbachev’s willingness to tolerate changes in Eastern Europe was the main basis which the West used to judge his true intentions. Another aim was to prepare the Soviet nomenclature and the party apparatus for the changes so that they could condition their old reflexes. A third goal was, possibly, to warn the communist leaders of Eastern Europe that, in the future event of a domestic crisis, they should not expect automatic Soviet

Cs. Békés: Back to Europe 243 aid. This could be conceptualized as a kind of political pressure, whose aim was to nudge the unwilling allies toward adopting reforms.'° Based on currently available sources, it seems quite likely that, in June 1988, these factors had little more than an instinctive rather than a conscious influence upon Gorbachev’s intentions. The most important goal might have been the introduction of a new type of discourse on the increasingly critical topic of the Soviet Union’s relations with the Eastern European states, a discourse which could provide the Soviet reform leaders greater room and opportunity to maneu-

ver than they had possessed before, thus giving them the chance to respond flexibly to the ever-changing situation. The thesis cited above was repeated by Gorbachev and other leaders several times and in several forms over the course of 1988-89, and was very soon supplemented by the promise to cease the use of military force. The essence of these multifunctional declarations, simultaneously addressed to all interested parties and deliberately meant to be ambiguous, was that, although they implicitly rejected the possibility of military intervention, they never stated categorically that the Soviet Union would not interfere with an ally’s domestic affairs, should the political transition, horribile dictu, result in the total abandonment of socialism

and the restoration of parliamentary democracy.’’ In other words, this thesis concerning the free choice of individual countries could be interpreted as being in harmony with one’s own interests and desires, whilst at the same time, given the turbulent circumstances, it could also be interpreted in precisely the opposite way. In addition, all of this was supplemented by a method of “orienting” and sharing confidential information at the highest levels of bilateral relations between each of the East European countries and the Soviet Union. Sometimes this

“dialectical” approach manifested itself in a very concrete form. On Karoly Grosz’s visit to Moscow at the end of March, 1989, for example, Gorbachev stated that “today the possibility of repeating interference into the domestic affairs of other socialist countries must be excluded once and for all,” but on the other hand, he also emphasized that “we clearly have to draw the boundaries,

thinking about ourselves and others at the same time. Democracy is much needed and the interests have to be harmonized. The limit, however is the safeguarding of socialism (emphasis added—Cs. B.) and the assurance of stability.”'® As for how to interpret “the boundaries,” no one in the Eastern bloc had had more experience of this than the Hungarians, as the official explanation of the Soviet invasion on November 4th, 1956, was based on the same logic. According to this, Soviet intervention did not mean a violation of those high principles expounded in the October 30th Soviet government declaration, but, very much to the contrary: those very principles were put into practice. The declara-

tion rejected the idea of intervention only in the case of a socialist country, whereas the developments in Hungary had threatened the existence of the entire socialist system. The initially instinctive, but later increasingly conscious, tactic of floating the thought of the Brezhnev doctrine’’ was successful and effective, at least tempo-

244 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

rarily. It also had a definite stabilizing effect upon the accelerated transition both in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and contributed to a large extent to preserving the peaceful nature of the changes. One can imagine what would have happened to the position of the Soviet reformers, within both the leadership and

society, if a categorical declaration had been made overnight that Eastern Europe, for which the Red Army had shed so much blood, could now determine its own fate freely—including the possibility of the restoration of capitalism. At the same time, floating the Brezhnev doctrine also had the advantage of enabling the Soviet leadership to accustom society, and themselves as well, gradually to the idea that the Soviet Union might have to accept from now on unheard-of radical changes in Eastern Europe. This tactic had a similar stabilizing effect on the transition in the region, and it probably played a key role in ensuring that, apart from the Romanians, the

communist leaders were too unclear concerning Soviet intentions to dare to engage in any kind of repression against the mass movements which emerged in

the autumn of 1989. The same blocking effect deriving from uncertainty can generally be observed in the policy of the opposition forces, although it manifested itself in different forms in the two leading reform countries, Poland and Hungary. At the roundtable talks in Warsaw, which started in February, 1989, the position of Solidarity and its readiness for compromise was strongly influenced by the need to consider the difficulty in assessing the tolerance level of the Soviets. In the June elections held after the preliminary agreement, however, this consideration did not prevent Polish society from giving nearly all its mandates

to representatives of Solidarity, thus inflicting a crushing moral defeat on the communist regime.*” In Hungary, the opposition appeared to be less worried about the Soviet attitude—at least this might have been the impression of a contemporary observer, given that the Opposition Roundtable (EKA), established in March, 1989, was able to come to agreement with those in power at the negotiations, started in June and concluded in September, that a Western-type parliamentary democracy with virtually no limitations and with free elections based on

real competition should be introduced into the country. In fact, an element of uncertainty was always in the air during negotiations. It was no accident that the EKA insisted that one of the six committees discussing the various aspects of the transition be concerned with legal guarantees which could prevent any kind of retreat to the old system.” The deviation from the Polish model and the special nature of the Hungarian transition are clearly demonstrated by the fact that, at the beginning of 1989, the Hungarian leadership was just as interested in eliminating the Brezhnev doctrine

as the opposition, since they hoped to transform the basis of their legitimacy from Soviet support to the potentially positive outcome of the forthcoming elections.” Strangely enough, the opposition expected its political rival, the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP), to provide the external conditions for a peaceful transition and to give them a guarantee that the Brezhnev doctrine was no longer in force. The representatives of the EKA posed an explicit question on

Cs. Békés: Back to Europe 245 this issue to Defence Minister Ferenc Karpati on August 30, 1989, when he gave them confidential information on current military-political issues.”° Beyond all this, from the middle of 1988 to float the idea of the Brezhnev doctrine was virtually the only “weapon” left to the Soviet leadership with which

it could, at least for a short time, have an influence on the political processes running their course in Eastern Europe. After all, by then Gorbachev and his associates had abandoned the possibility of military intervention. Unlike their predecessors, who had much more modest goals, the Soviet reformers striving for a radical reformation of East-West relations and a new world order based on co-operation simply could not afford any kind of armed intervention aimed at restoring order and the old system without jeopardizing the results already achieved. This danger not only would have emerged in world politics, but would also have caused the West to lose its confidence in Gorbachev. This, then, would have meant the collapse of “perestroika”, the program of transformation, Gorbachev’s first priority. It was at this time that the fate of Eastern Europe was subordinated to two factors of a different order: to the highly ambitious goals of the Gorbachev leadership in world politics on the one hand, and to the success of the Soviet transition on the other.”* The latter—based on available sources but in full knowledge of the events to come—might well be called a life-or-death fight for the survival of the Soviet Union. Hence, I believe that the main reason why the Soviet Union agreed to let Eastern Europe go its own way so easily was that this was the first

time since the Russian Civil War that the Soviet state—paradoxically, still a leading superpower of the bipolar world order in a military sense—found itself in a situation in which its own survival was at stake. Giving priority to saving the

imperial “centre” was a logical and necessary step, with respect to which the Eastern European periphery gradually lost its significance. If one tries to find a historical parallel, this could be described as a Brest—Litovsk syndrome. At that critical moment of the civil war Lenin also argued for a peace treaty to be made with the Germans which, while involving the loss of significant territory, would nonetheless preserve the Soviet state. Lenin proved to be right on this point, but, like the Soviet Union itself, his later successor, Gorbachev, was to be overtaken by history.

Soviet Prognoses on Eastern Europe Starting in the beginning of the summer of 1988, the Soviet leadership began to realize that both the Soviet economy and most of the countries in the socialist camp were either in a state of crisis or on the verge of falling into one. In a report made at the beginning of October 1988, Georgi Shahnazarov, Gorbachev’s chief advisor in charge of East European affairs, assessed the situation as follows: the chances are considerable that several socialist countries will soon go bankrupt together, since some of the allies (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Vietnam,

246 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Cuba and the GDR) are “on the brink of monetary insolvency.””° Although sev-

eral of the leaders must surely have already been worried about the situation, Shahnazarov was the first to state the dilemma in such drastic terms: “What shall we do if social instability, which is now taking an increasingly threatening aspect in Hungary, should encroach upon another bout of trouble-making in Poland,

demonstrations of Charter-77 in Czechoslovakia, etc., in other words, do we have a contingency plan in case of a crisis which might encompass the entire socialist world, or a large part of it?”*° Since the question was rhetorical, the adviser suggested that the newly formed International Committee of the CPSU CC should have some analyses carried out of this issue and that the Politburo should discuss the report with experts no later than January, 1989. In fact, by the

beginning of the following year, four reports were completed by the “Bogomolov Institute,” the Department of International Relations of the CPSU CC, The Foreign Ministry, and the KGB. (Thanks to the research of Jacques Levesque, the first three are now public.)”’ In reviewing these reports, we can agree with Levesque’s assessment that the first represents a radical reformist position, the second a centrist one, and the third a combination of conservative and reformist ideas. Thus, these three reports contain significant shifts of emphasis in assessing the potential developments in Eastern Europe.”* However tempting it would be to analyze and compare these documents in detail, for reasons of space I will confine myself to examining those common features which represent the views and prognoses of the experts preparing the decisions (and, indirectly, of the decision-makers also) as tendencies at the very beginning of 1989:

1. In the first two reports the assessment of the situation is identical: the Eastern European countries are in general crisis, and relations between the Soviet Union and its allies have also become critical. 2. In all three reports, the main theoretical objective is to ensure the success of the new model of socialism and to preserve the foundations of this re-

newed system. :

3. At the same time all three reports accept the possibility that the transition might go beyond these lines, which would then lead to the total abandonment of socialism and the restoration of Western-type parliamentary democracy. 4. According to the first two reports, the Soviet Union should not try to pre-

| vent such a development.”

5. Therefore—and even the least reformist Foreign Ministry report agrees on this—the possibility of Soviet military intervention in the case of a crisis in an Eastern European country must be rejected.” 6. According to the first two reports, if socialism is abandoned, Soviet influence could be maintained by a “Finlandization”’’ of the region, with the important modification that the existing alliance system—that is, the Warsaw Pact—should be permanently maintained.”

Cs. Békés: Back to Europe 247 The significance of these analyses lies above all in the fact that they represent the first time that the drastic consequences of abandoning the Brezhnev doctrine

were put in explicit terms (albeit strictly for confidential use): there is a real chance that the transition process in Eastern Europe will lead to the total abandonment of socialism and the restoration of capitalism, and if the situation develops in this way, the Soviet Union should not prevent it. The first two months of 1989, therefore, represented a turning point in the transformation of the Soviet position concerning the fate of Eastern Europe: the period of becoming accustomed to the idea of change was over, and the ball was now in the other court. At the January 21, 1989, meeting of the CPSU Politburo, Gorbachev himself formulated the problem as follows: “The peoples of these countries will ask: what about the CPSU, what kind of leash will it use to keep our countries on? They simply do not know that, if they pulled this leash more strongly, it would break.” As the previous discussion made clear, it is no wonder that they did not know. The last tool in the hands of the Soviet leaders for maintaining their influence on developments in Eastern Europe was to continue floating the Brezhnev doctrine as much as they could. Their explicit aim, therefore, now became the concealment of this secret from the countries’ ruling and opposition parties for as long as possible. Moreover, the leadership continued to attempt to convince themselves and others too that, if radical changes were initiated by the communist party and the transition took place under their control, then the result—even though it might

greatly resemble a Western democracy—could still be called a new model of socialism. Gorbachev himself, however, appeared to view the developments with much less illusion at this stage, and he thought that the historic defeat of social-

ism would be a reality not only in Eastern Europe but in the Soviet Union as well. According to a diary note made by his closest associate, Anatoli Chernayev

on May 2nd, 1989, “He is prepared to go far. [...] His favorite catch-word is ‘unpredictability’. And most likely we will come to a collapse of the state, and something like chaos. He feels that he is easing the levers of power irreversibly, and this realization prevents him from ‘going far’.[...] He has no concept of where we are going.”

The Changes in Eastern Europe and the West Gorbachev’s rise to power, and his reforms and initiatives in the field of international politics and domestic relations, posed great challenges to the Reagan administration which had ruled the US since 1981. Before the Gorbachev era, the American leadership viewed its historical mission to end the Cold War in such a way that the new round of the arms race, which had resumed in the second half of the 1970s, would bankrupt the Soviet Union. The primary means of executing this new strategy would have been the Star Wars (SDI) program. When it be-

came increasingly more obvious, however, especially during 1987-1988, that

248 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Gorbachev’s dynamic personality made him more than just another Khrushchev, and that his initiatives aimed at eliminating confrontation should be taken seri-

ously, another, no less tempting alternative began to unfold. This alternative envisioned the possibility of agreement and long-lasting co-operation which would have made possible radical reduction in armaments as well as international tension. Due to its budget deficit, the United States also had an interest in reducing military spending, although it is quite likely that, if needed, it would have been able to find the necessary resources to finance the SDI program, albeit at considerable sacrifice. Such a pact between the superpowers would have also had the advantage of strengthening the leading position of the US in relation to Western Europe which was unifying into a potential “third power.” The December 1986 summit meeting in Reykyavik between Gorbachev and Reagan can be regarded as a step in this direction, which provoked heated criticism from the United States’ Western allies. The Malta summit between Bush and Gorbachev three years later belongs to this same category of meeting, and is regarded by

many as the concluding act of the Cold War.” In fact, however, the Reagan administration hovered between these two alternative concepts, and it was only after Bush’s inauguration at the beginning of 1989 that a significant step forward was made. No significant change can be discerned in the United States’ Eastern European policy before 1989. This policy involved a different approach to each of the countries of the region, and the goal, realistic under the given circumstances, was to soften and liberalize the communist systems by several means: exerting economic pressure, continuously calling these countries to account for their human rights records, and supporting opposition movements. Strangely enough, during the period between 1985 and the end of 1988, American and Soviet views concerning the desired transition of the region had gradually converged. For the Soviets, more and more matters could be regarded as part of the democratization process and the concept of a new socialist model, whilst, for the Americans there was still not much hope of a radical change in the situation—that is, the restora-

tion of parliamentary democracy. |

The first important change took place in the spring of 1989 when President Bush took office. This was not due, however, to the new leadership taking a completely new approach to the question, but rather to the fact that, in the meantime, a change of historical importance was beginning to emerge in Eastern Europe. At the beginning of February, roundtable talks between the government and the legally-acknowledged Solidarity movement began in Poland. By April they had come to an agreement, and the first “semi-free” elections could be held in June, resulting in a sweeping victory for the opposition, which won most of the seats contested. In Hungary the Central Committee of the MSZMP accepted at its February 10—11 meeting the introduction of a multiparty system, and it also

adopted the position that the 1956 events in Hungary constituted a “popular uprising” and not a “counter-revolution”. In June roundtable negotiations began

between the state party and the members of the Opposition Roundtable. Al-

Cs. Békés: Back to Europe 249 though the position and the social legitimacy of the Hungarian opposition was much weaker than that of the Polish, what was at stake was no less than the total demolition of the party-state, the restoration of the constitutional state, and preparations for free elections.*° Assessing this from the American viewpoint, the most important factor was

that these events, which would have seemed unbelievable even a year before, took place without any Soviet retribution, or even any sign of disapproval. In the spring of 1989 the Bush administration which had just taken office began to accustom itself to the idea that the old American dream originated by President Eisenhower was about to come true: the peaceful self-liberation of Eastern _ Europe with Soviet approval. All that was needed for success was for the United States, and Western Europe in general, to give the Soviet Union—as far as it was possible—the opportunity for a dignified withdrawal from the region.*’ The historical merit of the Bush administration is that it did not cave under pressure, and, in a restrained, cautious manner, waited for the communist systems in Eastern Europe to collapse of their own accord. When visiting Budapest after a trip to Warsaw in July 1989, President Bush explicitly stressed at discussions with the leaders of the Hungarian government and the MSZMP that the United States would show a neutral attitude concerning the Hungarian transition.*® Essentially the same position was communicated at the meeting with the leaders of the opposition, which left President Bush with a rather poor impression. He explained to his associates that “these really aren’t the right guys to be running this place. At least not yet.” At the December, 1989, summit in Malta, Bush outlined the essence of his policy to Gorbachev in very clear terms: I hope you noticed that, while the changes in Eastern Europe have been going on, the United States has not engaged in condescending declarations aimed at damaging [the prestige of]

the Soviet Union. There are people in the United States who accuse me of being too cautious. It is true, I am a prudent man, but I’m not a coward, and my Administration will seek to avoid doing anything that would damage your position in the world. But I was insistently advised to do something of that sort—to climb the Berlin Wall and to make broad declarations. My Administration, however, is avoiding these steps, we are in favor of reserved behavior.””40

Gorbachev’s entrance on to the scene posed a great challenge not only to the United States, but also to Western Europe in at least two respects. One was the security of the Western part of Europe: in other words, the problem of the po-

tential Soviet threat, which, since 1945, had always been a cardinal issue for both Western politicians and the public. The new Soviet policy promising the elimination of confrontation and the peaceful coexistence of the two systems offered a chance for a lasting solution in this respect, especially after December 1988, when the unilateral reduction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact started, and when, in January, 1989, promising talks began in . Vienna concerning the radical reduction of conventional arms in Europe. Gorbachev’s vision of a “common European home” had the direct implication that a

250 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

much less divided Europe could play a more significant role in the bipolar world

order than previously—and with the able support of one of the superpowers. Therefore, Western Europe received the Soviet initiatives with great sympathy, especially during 1988-1989. It is a historical irony that, in the Soviet assessment, the most positive reactions came from the Soviet Union’s two main enemies during World War II: the FRG and Italy.” Since, until 1989, no-one in Western Europe had expected that developments in Eastern Europe could lead to the total collapse of communism, much less the

fall of the Soviet Union, the fate of the region—as had always been the case throughout the previous decades—was logically subordinated to the interests of Soviet relations, which were becoming better and increasingly more promising. The main consideration for politicians interested in the success of “perestroika” was to ensure the security interests of the Soviet Union, and they viewed the maintenance of the Eastern European status quo as its primary guarantee. Although, on moral grounds, they did support developments pointing towards a democratic transition in these countries and the opposition movements fighting for this course, maintaining stability at any cost was of primary importance. This position was not only motivated by concern about the potential Soviet reaction, but also by the worry that the total collapse of the Eastern European countries on the verge of economic bankruptcy might result in social explosions, ethnic con' flicts, etc., which would have a negative influence on Western Europe as well. Such conflicts would endanger the process of integration, and, more importantly, they would jeopardize the stability of the entire continent. Therefore, the leaders of the Western European countries did not simply want to stay neutral, but, rather, they intended to exercise a blocking and moderating effect on the process of Eastern European transition. They envisaged the transition as a slow process which would last for years, much as the communist reformers had originally done. Consequently, when, in the first half of 1989, developments in Hungary and Poland accelerated—partly as a result of the initiatives of the reformers—most Western European leaders judged the pace of transition to be too rapid. They intended, therefore, to exert a moderating influence in two different directions: on the one hand, they periodically assured the Soviet leadership and Gorbachev himself that the West would not interfere with events in Eastern Europe and would not do anything which would cause destabilization in these countries. On the other hand, they sought to convince both the communist and opposition leaders in Hungary and Poland that they should slow down the pace of the changes in order to maintain stability. At his meeting with Gorbachev on June 12th, 1989, in Bonn, Chancellor Helmut Kohl explicitly

stated: “|...] I am not doing anything to destabilize the situation. This applies to | Hungary and Poland, as well. To interfere with anybody’s internal political de-

velopment now would mean to take a destructive line which would throw

Europe back to the times of caution and mistrust.” ,

- At her April 6th, 1989 meeting with Gorbachev in London, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher not only expressed her conviction to the Soviet

Cs. Békés: Back to Europe 251 leader that Jaruzelski was “a prominent and honest politician” who “does everything he can for his country at a very difficult stage in its development,” but she also declared that she had warned the leaders of Solidarity “to seek a dialogue, not limit themselves to confrontation. I said to them that you can never leave the

negotiating chair empty, it would not lead to anything and I can see that they have listened to my advice.” This moderating role was taken so seriously by the West German leadership that, even in the summer of 1989, they believed that the desired stability could only be maintained by avoiding a change of the whole system: that is, the political transition itself. At his meeting with Gorbachev on June 14th, 1989, Helmut

Kohl outlined his position on the Hungarian transition as follows: “We have rather good relations with the Hungarians. However, we also do not want destabilization there. That is why, when I meet with the Hungarians, I tell them: we. consider the reforms which are underway in your country your internal affair, we are sympathetic. However, if you would like to hear our advice, we recommend that you do not accelerate too much, because you might lose control over your

mechanism and it will start to work to destroy itself [emphasis added—Cs.

B.""

The Political Transition and the Foreign Policy of Hungary Since the end of the 1970s Hungarian foreign policy had enjoyed a kind of special, relatively independent status. One important aspect of this special status was that it enabled Hungary to develop intensive economic and political relationships with Western states precisely during those years when, due in part to the gradual alienation of the late 1970s and to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, East-West relations were at a low unprecedented since the Cuban missilecrisis. The Hungarian leadership did not achieve this status against Moscow’s wishes, however, but rather with their knowledge and consent. Kadar managed to convince Brezhnev and his successors that, because of the ever-worsening economic situation, this was the only means of maintaining the stability of the political system in Hungary.

Hungary’s increasing use of Western credit appeared advantageous to the Soviet Union as well, since it indirectly removed burdens from the Soviet economy while the person of Kadar himself guaranteed unquestionable political loyalty to Moscow. This is how Hungary was able to join the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1982. Moreover, as early as 1981 some exploratory talks were already underway concerning a potential agreement with the European Economic Community. This was later prevented, not by the Moscow leadership,. but by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who was worried about the potential negative effect of such a step on his own country’s relations with the Soviet Union. He explicitly talked Kadar out of this plan on his visit to Bonn in

April 1982. During this period, high-level relations with Western countries

252 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

became very intensive. Kadar paid visits to Bonn and to Rome in 1977, to Paris in 1978, to Bonn again in 1982, and to London in 1985. Hungary, in turn, was visited by French Prime Minister Raymond Barre in 1977, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1979, French President Francois Mitterand in 1982, Vice-President George Bush in 1983, and Helmut Kohl, Margaret Thatcher, and Bettino Craxi in 1984. After Poland lost the sympathy of the Western states after the introduction of martial law in 1981, as did Romania due to its repressive policy, Hungary became favorite in the eyes of the West as the most acceptable country of the Eastern bloc. After Gorbachev entered the scene, the situation changed inasmuch as the Soviet leader took over the role of the primary promoter of dialogue between East and West. The initiating and moderating nature of Hungarian foreign policy was preserved, however, although now only as of secondary importance. The first qualitative change in foreign policy—Jjust as in the transition within the country—took place in 1988. This had nothing to do with the removal of Kadar or with the party conference in May, however, but rather with the significant positive changes taking place on the international political stage. This was

the time when a new concept was being outlined which could possibly give Hungary the role of a form of bridge in East-West relations based on a new world order of co-operation. This concept still assumed the preservation of the old alliances (the Warsaw Pact, Council of Mutual Economic Assistance [CMEA]), but it also expected that these organizations would undergo the necessary democratic changes, and that, as a result, they would no longer hinder Hungary in establishing relations with other countries or organizations which would -

satisfy her own national interests. |

The old foreign policy deriving from the 1970s was built on a relative autonomy, which, in simple terms, meant that, whatever is not forbidden is allowed. In turn, the new concept meant—to borrow the terms of the “rules of the road”— that, if a policeman tells you to stop, don’t lose heart, but try to convince him to let you through. Indeed, if you feel it justified, you can even run the risk of later rebuke by ignoring him and simply driving through the intersection. This new, dynamic, and proactive foreign policy was, in practice, aimed at accomplishing a kind of qguasi-neutrality, although this thesis was never articulated in explicit

form either in public or privately. Today, however, we can establish that this characterized the Hungarian efforts between 1988 and the 1990 general elections. The question now is how this new approach exerted its influence in the most important fields as listed below: 1. Hungarian—Soviet relations; 2. the conflicts

with the countries of the Eastern bloc; 3. the issue of reorganizing the Warsaw Pact and the issue of neutrality; 4. the reduction of military forces and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops; 5. the restructuring of the CMEA; 6. opening up towards the West and joining the European integration processes.”°

Cs. Békés: Back to Europe 253 The Moscow—Warsaw-Budapest Triangle

Hungarian—Soviet relations were characterized by a particular dichotomy concerning the questions of “perestroika”, “glasnost”, and reforms in general. Hungary simultaneously played the parts of best student and teacher. It was no accident that Gorbachev’s policy was received most favorably in Hungary, for the Hungarians considered it to be late justification of the reforms which had been going on since the 1960s in adverse Eastern “winds.” After carefully considering Hungarian experiences, the Soviets introduced several innovations and changes, such as reorganizing agriculture, accepting the role of the market to a limited extent, and accepting more than one candidate in general elections. Moreover, in the autumn of 1988, after studying what the Hungarians had accomplished a few months before, different special committees of the CPSU Central Committee

lev. ,

were formed, among them the new International Committee headed by Yakov-

During 1988-1989, an informal Moscow—Warsaw—Budapest triangle was formed, which was referred to in contemporary Hungarian documents as “those in close co-operation.””® The leaders of the three countries tried to harmonize their views on economic and political reforms at bilateral negotiations, and, since they were in numerical minority in the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA, they attempted to establish a unified position within both organizations so that they could exercise pressure on the countries with a conservative leadership. This special relationship most likely made a significant contribution to the positive Soviet attitude and the Soviets’ tolerance of the transition in Hungary and the pioneering efforts of the country’s foreign policy. Close co-operation had its drawback too, however. Co-ordinated action very often meant that the Soviet leadership requested support for a position which, although more progressive than that of the conservative camp, did not fully, or even partially, represent the interests of Hungary, which was well ahead of its partners in the transition process. A significant compromise was imposed on Hungary with respect to the handling of the Hungarian—Romanian conflict, which became public by 1988. In July 1988, Gorbachev explained to K4roly Grosz on his visit to Moscow that the Soviet leadership definitely took Hungary’s side in the debate, but that they could not represent this position officially, because such a move—with respect to the separatist movements and the ethnic conflicts within the empire—could have unforeseeable consequences in terms of the inner stability of the Soviet Union. While Gorbachev was absolutely right

regarding this, he was wrong in persuading the clearly unwilling secretarygeneral to take a step—the meeting with Ceausescu in Arad—which not only destroyed Grész’s prestige as a leader, but also undermined the position of the MSZMP.”” This is because the meeting, which public opinion viewed as a betrayal of Hungarian national interests, “naturally” had to be “sold” as an autonomous Hungarian decision. The only possible explanation for Gorbachev’s ageressive intervention into Hungarian politics is that the Soviet leader was not

254 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

merely worried about the possible outcome of an open endorsement of the Hungarian position, but regarded the mere fact of a Romanian—Hungarian conflict as a source of danger which could further erode the already weak inner cohesion of the Warsaw Pact, and—what was even worse—could easily strengthen centrifugal forces in the multinational Soviet Union itself. It is only in this context that we can understand what made Gorbachev request his close ally to make such an unfortunate compromise with a Romanian leadership which had already accused the Soviet Union of betraying socialism, and of which the Soviet secretary general himself had a very low opinion.” In fact, what was at stake here was no less

than the survival of the imperial center which, as has been seen, was given maximum priority. At the same time, there were two turning points in the Hungarian transition in

which the expectation of Soviet intervention was not fulfilled. In the spring of 1988 the reformers of the MSZMP believed that they could rely upon Soviet support for the removal of Janos Kadar, who now stood in the way of radical change. However, Kadar—after Gorbachev—was still the most respected and

acceptable leader of the Eastern camp in the West. Considering the “competitors,” this was not a remarkable achievement in itself, but it was viewed as such by the Soviet leaders, for whom attempting to improve East-West relations was an important factor. In addition, despite the stagnation under Kadar, the Hungarian transition was still well ahead of Soviet reforms. Gorbachev, in consequence, had no interest in speeding up the reform process in Hungary.”’ Nonetheless, when Karoly Grosz and his associates solved the problem on their

own at the 1988 May party conference, the Soviets simply acknowledged it without a word. The first important development in the course of the Hungarian transition for which there was no Soviet consent was the January 28th, 1989 interview with Imre Pozsgay—or more precisely, his re-assessment of the October, 1956 events

as a popular uprising. This announcement is even more significant when we consider that 1t was also the first “anti-Soviet” move by the Hungarian leadership, since the new interpretation of the events meant that, on November 4th, 1956, the Soviet Union had cracked down upon a democratic national movement and not a counter-revolutionary uprising. This thesis was so far removed from

current Soviet views that, although the 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion was denounced in December 1989, a similar step was never to be taken during the existence of the Soviet Union. Therefore, it would have been a logical step to rebuke the Hungarian leadership. Today we know that a draft letter was written which, on the explicit orders of Gorbachev was never sent to Budapest.” Gorbachev must have understood very well that this genie could never again be ordered back into the bottle, whilst, at the same time, he might have hoped that the MSZMP’s position could be greatly strengthened if the party itself dealt with the matter rather than let the opposition capitalize upon it politically. Moreover, the correct “dialectical” nature of handling the problem made it possible to avoid having to address the direct historical responsibility of the Soviet Union. From a

Cs. Békés: Back to Europe 255 formal aspect, this need was basically met by the text of an announcement issued after the February 10th—11th meeting of the MSZMP Central Committee, declaring that on October 23rd, 1956 a popular uprising broke out, but that, in refer-

ence to the inevitable outcome, by the end of October counter-revolutionary developments had started to unfold. All this coincided with a radical change in the previously-outlined Eastern European policy of the Soviet Union, as a result of which four decades of firm control was replaced by an automatic process whose central element was to float the Brezhnev doctrine and maintain the uncertainty deriving from it. This change was not perceived for some time, even by those involved—which was exactly as intended. We have already discussed Karoly Grész’s experiences in this respect

during his visit to Moscow in March, 1989. The best example of this, almost

insoluble, dilemma which it brought to the Hungarian leaders can be found by | comparing two contemporary statements made by Gyula Horn. As a secretary of state at the Foreign Ministry, Horn said the following in his speech on the sec-

ond day of the February 20th—21st, 1989, meeting of the MSZMP Central Committee: “Today there is no question at all of intervention within the Warsaw Pact—we have long outlived the Brezhnev doctrine—as is well exemplified by the decision on a multiparty system which was our own sovereign decision.”” Four months later, at the end of June, however, Horn, already in the role of foreign minister, cautioned members of the Central Committee against any illusions: “ ... our situation should not be confused with that of any other democratic country. In Hungary there is no rotation in politics. [...] If the MSZMP falls as a governing party, this would be equivalent to a political transition, a different political system. I wonder whether it will be tolerated by the alliance system. I do not think so.”°* That was what a Hungarian politician, who very likely had the most information concerning the intentions of the Soviet leadership, predicted after the victory of Solidarity in the general elections in Poland in June. In a confidential analysis made a few weeks earlier, it was explicitly stated that “the present guarantees do not exclude the possibility that, in case of a retreat to the old system [in the Soviet Union], unilateral or multilateral military action should take place in the name of defending socialism [in Hungary].”> The success of the Soviet tactic is well reflected by the fact that, 10 years after the event, Rezso Nyers regarded July, 1989, and Imre Pozsgay November of the same year, as the point in time when it became clear to them that the Soviets

would not intervene in Hungary, even if the transition was to lead to a total abandonment of socialism.”

Conflicts with Countries of the Eastern Bloc The structure of the conflicts within the Warsaw Pact had changed radically by 1988-1989: the earlier scenario (Romania against the other countries) was replaced by opposition between the reformers and the conservatives. Even in the

256 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

summer of 1989, however, the public had very little knowledge of these conflicts, thanks to the great efforts of the Soviet leaders, who constantly tried to maintain unity by all possible means. Paradoxically, Hungary—known earlier for its loyalty to Soviet interests—simultaneously assumed the double role of leading reformer as well as of primary trouble-maker in the Eastern bloc. This is because Hungary not only came into serious conflict with three of the four conservative countries—Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR—but, even worse, these conflicts took place openly in the public eye. Since 1956, and especially after Nicolae Ceausescu came to power in 1965, the human and collective rights of the two-million strong Hungarian minority were more and more drastically restricted in Romania. The situation became especially serious with the 1972 announcement of the national homogenization program aimed at the total elimination of national minorities and the establishment of a Romanian nation-state. By the end of the 1970s, this had resulted in serious tensions in the relations between the two countries. Since Hungarian attempts to resolve the problem on the basis of bilateral negotiations all met with failure, Hungarian foreign policy tried to achieve, indirectly, international condemnation of Romanian policy in international forums, by placing the issue of human rights in the limelight. This tactic was motivated by two different, but related, factors: on the one hand, it took place at a time when the Western states placed great emphasis on human rights issues and human rights records in Eastern bloc countries; on the other hand, the Hungarian leadership could take advantage of its special position as the country whose internal situation most closely fitted Western expectations during those years. The first open step was only taken in March, 1987, at the Vienna follow-up meeting of the conference on European Security and Cooperation, when Hungary joined the Canadian proposal which was formally aimed at strengthening the rights of European minorities, but which was essentially a call to the participating nations to denounce Romania. The situation became even worse at the beginning of 1988, when Romania launched its so-called “systematization” project, whereby they intended to destroy several thousand villages, whilst, at the same time, masses of Hungarian Romanians started to flee to Hungary because of increasing discrimination. The August 28th, 1988, meeting of the secretaries-general of the two parties in Arad was held under Soviet pressure and initiative—Ceausescu gave the Hungarian leaders two days (!) to consider accepting his offer for negotiations—and did not bring any improvement in relations between the two countries. This unsuccessful action had fatal consequences for the MSZMP, in spite of the fact that afterwards, in the second half of 1988 and in 1989, the Hungarian authorities took a firm stand on defending the interests of Hungarians living in Romania and openly admitted their conflict with the Romanian leadership. The meeting in Arad cast a long shadow over these attempts. It was, therefore, the opposition rather than the ruling party which was able to capitalize on the rehabilitation of national feelings and sentiment.

| Cs. Békés: Back to Europe 257 The last attempt of the Hungarian leadership to resolve the conflict through

bilateral negotiations was made at the session of the Political Consultative Body of the Warsaw Pact at the beginning of July, 1989, in Bucharest. On this occasion, Ceausescu invited MSZMP chairman Rezs6 Nyers, Prime Minister

Mikl6s Németh, and foreign minister Gyula Horn on the spot to an “unofficial” meeting, which the Hungarian delegation—possibly following Soviet advice once again—accepted.”’ Although at the Arad meeting K4roly Grosz had been forced to retreat into a defensive position against the Romanian leader, this time the Hungarians were able negotiate from a quite different position. They imposed conditions on regulating the relations between the two countries: the Romanian side should cease its discrimination against the Hungarian minority as well as its propaganda and military threats against Hungary, it should abort execution of the systematization project in the regions inhab-

ited by Hungarians, it should allow Hungarian cultural products into the country, and it should stop the humiliating harassment of masses of Hungarian tourists at the Hungarian—Romanian border. In addition, Gyula Horn indicated

that, if necessary, Hungary would propose international supervision of the situation of the national minorities and of the systematization plan.°® Although, under the given circumstances, there seemed little hope that the Hungarian demands would be met, in order to continue with the tug-of-war, the negotiating parties agreed to have a meeting of Prime Ministers. Furthermore, they agreed to exchange a parliamentary-local council delegation, with the provision that the Hungarian delegation should have the chance to visit areas inhabited by Hungarians when studying the effects of the systematization plan. None of this materialized, however, because of the events of the autumn and winter of 1989, and a renewal of Hungarian—Romanian relations took place only after the radical events of December, 1989. In 1989, three fundamental questions caused serious tensions in Hungarian— Czechoslovakian relations: the Gabcikovo—Nagymaros dam, the situation of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, and the reassessment of the 1968 intervention. In 1989, the Hungarian government, partly for economic reasons and partly as a result of social pressure which had been intensifying for years, unilaterally halted work on a dam on the river Danube, a construction project based on a contract between the two countries in 1977. Since the Czechoslovakian government—also referring to social pressure—insisted that the dam should be built as planned, a long-lasting conflict on this issue emerged between the two countries which continues to this day. The Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia did not have to endure a drastic policy of discrimination similar to that in Romania, but this by no means signifies that the Hungarians were able to exercise their collective and human rights without restriction. The Hungarian media, which became increasingly independent and outspoken from the beginning of 1989, discussed this issue quite frequently, and so provoked resentment in the Czechoslovakian leadership. Fearing the establishment of a Czechoslovakian—Romanian “axis,” the official Hungarian

258 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

leadership explicitly refrained from addressing this issue, and stressed at the bilateral meetings that its conflict was essentially with Romania.” ?

- The greatest source of tension between the two countries, however, was caused by Hungarian developments concerning the “Prague Spring” and the military intervention in Czechoslovakia. Since their own legitimacy was at stake,

the Czechoslovakian leadership had every reason to be worried. Firstly, they expressed their resentment concerning an interview with Alexander Dubcek aired on Hungarian television.” Then, at the beginning of August, they strongly objected to an interview in which the head of the foreign affairs department of the MSZMP CC envisaged a reassessment of the events of 1968.°' The Czechoslovakian ambassador to Budapest instructed to mediate in the matter, however, also stated, as his private opinion, that the Czechoslovakian leadership would accept a scenario in which, initially, Hungary had supported a political settlement of the problem, and only later, “under international circumstances”, decided to participate in the intervention. The official communiqué issued by the Hungarian party leadership on August 17th did take this proposal into consideration. Whilst the declaration was meant to be cautious, however, the fact that a member state of the Warsaw Pact which had also taken part in the intervention said that it “does not identify with” the intervention no doubt contributed to the destabilization of the Czechoslovakian situation a few months later. Inarguably, the decision which had the greatest impact on the collapse of the Eastern European communist systems was the one which made it possible for

GDR citizens staying in Hungary to leave for the FRG, through Austria, on September 11th, 1989. Paradoxically enough, this German refugee situation was

the only one in which the Hungarian leadership considered itself absolutely innocent, since it had no interest whatsoever in destroying relations with the GDR which were fairly balanced under the given circumstances. Indirectly, however, this conflict was initiated by the Hungarian side when, at the beginning of May, 1989, in accordance with the policy of opening up to the West, Hungary decided to remove its electronic signaling system and barbed-wire—the “iron

curtain”—from the Austro-Hungarian border.” In consequence, tens of thousands of East German tourists traveled to Hungary in the hopes that they would be able to escape through Austria to the FRG via the now open “green border.”” A few hundred people did succeed, although it very soon became clear that the settlement of the problem required political means. The leadership of the GDR demanded that Hungary comply with the 1969 bilateral treaty, on the basis of which, the offenders should have been deported back to their own country. The Hungarian leadership was not willing to do this, and for some time it hoped that the two German states would reach an agreement in order to resolve the crisis. After they failed to do so, and after the Hungarian—East German attempts also

met with failure, Prime Minister Mikl6s Németh and Foreign Minister Gyula Horn discussed the issue on August 25th with Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in the Gymnich castle, where they presented a Hungarian plan, according to which the Hungarian government

Cs. Békés: Back to Europe 259 would make it possible for GDR citizens to leave the country freely.” In some sense, this step did mean a crossing of the Rubicon, for an internal issue of the Eastern bloc was at stake, and, according to the practice of the past two decades, the Soviet Union should also have been consulted on an issue of such great 1mport. By the summer of 1989 it had become characteristic of the radical changes in

international politics that, whilst the Hungarians agreed to the settlement of an issue with a NATO member (the FRG) without consulting the Soviets, Chancellor Kohl, despite his promise to the Hungarians, called Gorbachev to learn what Soviet reaction could be expected concerning the planned Hungarian move. “The Hungarians are good people” was the obscure answer,” and, as it turned out later, it meant Soviet approval of the situation. We still lack an answer as to why Gorbachev reacted so weakly to this rather significant challenge. At this point, not only was the question of Eastern Europe in general at stake, but the German question as well, which, since 1945, had always been regarded as the cornerstone of the foreign policy of any Soviet leadership. Most likely the Soviet leaders—as the other players in the game—did not calculate the potential consequences of such a decision and hoped that, if dissatisfied people left the GDR, it would have a pacifying rather than a destabilizing effect, and could even facilitate the acceleration of the transition in the country in a controlled manner. Nowadays, however, we know that exactly the opposite took place, and that the mass movements emerging in the autumn of 1989 not only led to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the GDR, but also to the achievement of German re-unification without significant restrictions, something which, in the summer of 1989, would have been called illusory by many even in the FRG. As has been seen above, Hungary’s engagement in such open conflicts was not motivated by any intention to raise tension in any of these situations. On the contrary, in all three cases the Hungarian leadership acted only after lengthy agonizing and under the influence of external forces and pressure. All in all, each of these steps in Hungarian foreign policy represented new milestones on the road towards true autonomy; these were the first cases in which the leadership decided to prioritize national interests over those of the alliance (and also of the Soviet Union). All of this, however, had another dimension also: beyond indirectly contributing to the export of “counter-revolution” through her own example as a leading fighter on behalf of reform, Hungary directly accelerated the fermentation process and the destabilization of the communist systems.

The Restructuring of the Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Neutrality After rising to power, Gorbachev not only promised a new relationship with the Eastern European allies, but, from the very beginning, he urged that the mechanism of co-operation within the Warsaw Pact be modernized. To this effect, as |

260 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

early as October, 1985, he proposed establishing a permanent political body whose task would be the improvement of co-ordination between the member states. No significant change was accomplished in the structure of the Warsaw Pact, however, until it was dissolved in 1991. The outcome of spontaneous democratization under the influence of the new Soviet policy of emphasizing the importance of partnership was, amongst others, that, in addition to the traditional dissenter, Romania, the other member states also started to insist upon their own

special interests. Thus, for example, the above proposal—which could have become the means not only of co-ordination but also of centralization—was accepted by the Hungarian leadership, which had been in close co-operation with the Soviet Union continuously, only in July, 1988. Strangely enough, a real debate over the reformat of the Warsaw Pact was initiated by a Romanian motion submitted at approximately the same time. Bas1cally, it suggested that the Political Consultative Body of the Warsaw Pact should be dissolved, and the organization should be turned into an exclusively military alliance.°’ At the Warsaw session of the WP PCB in July 1988, an expert committee was formed to study the questions related to reforming the organization, and, based on this work, the Hungarian leadership had worked out its position by March, 1989. By this time, however, thanks to the political changes in the country, the issues concerning Hungarian relations with the alliance were no longer under the exclusive jurisdiction of the MSZMP. In the spring of 1989, Hungary had a de facto multiparty system; moreover, after the Assembly Act was passed in January, the opposition parties mushrooming all over Hungary could function legally. At the beginning of that year, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) suggested that Hungary should request special status within the Warsaw Pact, and that, following the “French model,” it should not participate in the military cooperation of the organisation. Then, on April 16th, the governing board of the SZDSZ proposed in its statement that the government should declare Hungary’s

neutrality.©”

The tradition of the 1956 revolution, at least in terms of political rhetoric, served as the starting point for nearly all opposition organizations, and, in addition, the November Ist, 1956, declaration of neutrality (which was in force for three days) had an impact on the foreign policy of several parties for some time.’”? Moreover, the only joint declaration concerning the country’s foreign orientation which was endorsed by all opposition organizations over the course of the political transition was Item 12 of the communiqué entitled “What does the Hungarian nation demand,” and which was read out on the national holiday of March 15th, 1989, setting the goal of achieving neutrality. Although this demand could be regarded as more of a-symbolic position based on an emotional approach than of a mature and co-ordinated plan by the opposition, the leadership of the MSZMP had every reason to be concerned, especially since the declaration was also signed by those historical parties with whom they intended to form a coalition after the general elections. While the Hungarian leadership

Cs. Békés: Back to Europe 261 considered neutrality to be a possibility in the long-term, after the dissolution of

the two political-military blocs, in the short-term it did not believe it to be a realistic goal but rather a factor jeopardizing a peaceful transition in the country.’ This was not a groundless view, for, at this stage, the Soviet Union—and more importantly, the Western partners which otherwise supported the Hungarian transition—consistently sent signals warning Hungary that such an endeavor should not expect endorsement in international politics. On Karoly Grdész’s visit to Moscow at the end of March, 1989, Gorbachev stressed that “under present conditions it is the modernization of the Warsaw Pact which should be the main target, and not neutrality.” In April 1989, Volker Rtthe, deputy leader of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group also declared to his Hungarian negotiating partners that, on a number of issues, “the Hungarians entertain illusions, such as the issue of neutrality, Hungary’s rapid withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and instant integration with the West.” Egon Bahr, member of the Presidency of the SDP, warned that “today the Soviet Union recognizes the sovereignty of its allies and allows them to choose their own course of internal development. The line for the Soviet Union is drawn so that this course of development should not endanger the unity of the Warsaw Pact. It is very important that all the Hungarian parties reach a consensus on not going beyond this line.””° | Taking these signals into consideration, the Hungarian leadership essentially took a pragmatic position on the issue of the Warsaw Pact. They reckoned that, on the one hand, the WP—or more precisely, the Soviet nuclear umbrella— would continue to ensure the security of the country, and that, on the other hand, the positive Soviet attitude would enable the country to fulfil its peaceful transition. Thus, the main goal of Hungarian diplomacy should be to ensure the highest possible degree of national sovereignty achievable under the given conditions. As a result, the Hungarian position on the status of the Warsaw Pact gave priority to the benevolent attitude of the Soviet Union, and, although, in any event, Soviet ideas were largely in harmony with Hungarian proposals, Hungarian tactics were aimed at ensuring that the three “reformers” could effectively hold their position against the four “conservatives.” Therefore, they endorsed not only those proposals which were meant to change the political nature of the organization, to improve its efficiency, to strengthen the democratic process of its decision-making, and to eliminate the principle of mandatory consensus, but—against their better judgement—also those which sought the establishment of a permanent political body or the deepening of co-operation between the parliaments of the member states.” From time to time, this compromise-seeking policy also claimed sacrifices. In June, 1988, the Hungarian side submitted a proposal at the Warsaw meeting of the PCB of the Warsaw Pact suggesting the creation of a permanent committee of deputy ministers responsible for humanitarian issues and human rights which would also facilitate the constant supervision and discussion of the situation of national minorities. When it turned out, however, that, on the one hand, the Soviet Union was ready to obstruct the Romanian plan proposing to devote a sepa-

262 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

rate session at the July, 1989, meeting in Bucharest to the issue of endangering the cause of socialism in Hungary and Poland, but that, on the other hand, they also indicated that neither would they support the motion concerning the human rights committee, the Hungarian leadership decided to give up this idea, even though it had been regarded as extremely important.”

Arms Reduction and the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Hungary From the very beginning, the new leadership which rose to power in May, 1988, in Hungary considered the reduction of military spending to be the prime means of surviving the economic crisis. This intention, fortunately, coincided with the

July, 1988, Soviet decision which made it possible to take unilateral steps in arms reduction. This explains why, upon K4aroly Grész’s visit to Moscow, Gorbachev simply acknowledged his declaration that, for economic reasons, Hungary was not able to comply with the agreement on military co-operation in the Warsaw Pact in force until 1990, and at the same time was compelled to reduce its military production by half a billion rubles.” As a result, and without making this fact public, military spending was reduced by some 10 billion forints by the

end of 1988.’” Then, at the end of that year, it was officially announced that Hungary’s 1989 military budget would be reduced by 17% in real terms as compared to the previous year. Since these modest results in the field of reducing military spending could liberate significant financial resources, in August, 1988, the Hungarian leader-

ship indicated to the Soviets that they would gladly play an initiative and coordinating role in the arms reduction of the Warsaw Pact member states.”?> A month earlier, they had already managed to win Gorbachev’s support for a very promising concrete initiative. Hungarian diplomacy, after having consulted with the Italian government (!), suggested that the Soviet Union should offer to with-

draw their air regiments stationed in Hungary, provided that the F-16 fighter planes to be withdrawn from Spain were not re-deployed in Italy. Soviet support

for this intricate political game, however, proved to be insufficient, and this proposal was to meet with failure due to the attitude of the United States.” Another especially important step for Hungarian diplomacy was its August,

1988, public declaration that the forthcoming international agreement on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe should extend to the troops stationed in Hungary in the first phase. This opportunity, however, was only possible if Hungary were to be grouped into the Central European theatre, which could by no means be taken for granted. Since the Warsaw Pact had a decisive advantage in this region, it was in the interest of the organization to put Hungary

into the Southern European theatre so as to improve the ratio figures where NATO had superiority. In that region, however, it was the Western allies who needed to make significant reductions, and so the Hungarian endeavors would have met with utter failure. Although the Hungarians managed to win the Soviet

Cs. Békés: Back to Europe 263

of 1989." |

leadership’s support for their position, the differing interests of the other member states proved to be a significant factor producing uncertainty, even in the spring

It was characteristic of Soviet behavior that Gorbachev reacted positively to Prime Minister Mikl6s Németh’s announcement during his March, 1989, visit to Moscow that the Hungarian government had decided to reduce its army by 30—35% by 1995. He “merely” requested that this be kept secret, since publicizing it would greatly weaken the position of the Warsaw Pact at the forthcoming negotiations on arms reduction in Vienna.” While the reduction of national military spending was motivated primarily by economic considerations, the call for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary mostly served a political cause. The issue was raised, based on the 1988 Soviet announcement that the Soviet Union would withdraw all its forces from foreign soil by the year 2000. Therefore, as early as August and September 1988, Hungarian foreign policy experts tried to convince their Soviet partners that the speedy withdrawal of Soviet troops would have a very positive political, moral, and economic impact on Hungary.” The need for a partial reduction had already been proposed by the Soviets also, as a result of which, in December, 1988, according to the unilateral step mentioned above, it was announced that some 10,000 Soviet troops together with their technical equipment had been withdrawn from Hungary. A simular, partial, withdrawal had already taken place before, in 1958, but it had not resulted in any significant change. The real question was whether the Hungarian leadership could end the Soviet occupation of the country, which had been a major grievance for most of the population for the past four decades. The other important question was whether the MSZMP could capitalize upon this sufficiently in the course of the political transition. As a result of the persistence demonstrated by Hungarian foreign policy-

makers, who consistently attempted to strengthen elements of national sover- } eignty whilst at the same time adjusting their course of action according to Soviet interests, Moscow sent a signal in the middle of May, 1989, that, at the next meeting of the WP PCB to be held in Bucharest, Gorbachev would be ready to start negotiations with the Hungarian delegation on the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops.®? Real negotiations finally took place when Karoly Grész and Rezs6 Nyers visited Moscow at the end of July, when Gorbachev agreed to issue a memorandum stating that, under the appropriate international conditions, the withdrawal of forces already underway might lead to the full withdrawal of the

Soviet troops.’ Further negotiations began between the two governments in August, and, as a result, an agreement was signed in Moscow on March 10th, 1990 on the withdrawal of Soviet troops by June 30th, 1991. The process of the withdrawal was not free of dispute, but the Soviets met the deadline, and the last Soviet soldier left the country on June 19th, 1991. Thus, one year after the inauguration of its first freely elected government, Hungary regained its sovereignty in full.®

264 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

The Transformation of the CMEA As early as the spring of 1988, the Soviet leadership had a very critical opinion of the operation of the CMEA. Gorbachev described the situation at the March 10th meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU as follows:. In COMECON we almost have no trade, only primitive exchange. [...] It has become excessively hard for us to conduct business as we have been doing for these last decades. The program [of socialist integration] is dead.86

Soviet reformers thought the resolution of the CMEA crisis should breath fresh life into the organization in such a way that it would also be capable of responding collectively to the challenges presented by the West European integration to be accomplished in 1992. This did not appear to be an easy task, since very different views existed among the member states concerning the future of the organization. In addition to the three reform countries, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia both supported the transformation, but, apart from the Hungarian leadership, everybody wanted to accomplish the goal by a top-down process—using

political rather than economic means. } By the beginning of 1989, the Hungarian economic transition was so far ahead of the others that a compromise would have seriously jeopardized the success of the Hungarian changes. As the Hungarian leadership was not willing to do so, the March 14th meeting of the Politburo of the MSZMP accepted a resolution which gave priority to opening the country up to the world economy

and trade.®’ One week later, another basic principle was adopted regarding CMEA integration, stating that Hungary was interested in developing cooperation within the CMEA inasmuch as it facilitated opening up the country to the world. As for the concrete Hungarian position, the following principles were __ laid down by the Politburo: 1. The mechanism of co-operation within the CMEA

- must be transformed radically, and, within this framework, co-operation among member states must be built on bilateral and multilateral relations instead of seeking consensus; 2. The development of economic integration is a task to be performed by the member states: Any ideas, endeavors and institutions over and above the participating nations must be rejected; 3. A unified socialist market is a reality only when the national markets are already established, and, therefore, this goal is not realistic at the moment; 4. The CMEA must adopt the principle that “the most important prerequisite for the transformation of socialist economic

co-operation is the modernization of internal market forces building on the

conditions of goods and finance.” The Hungarian leadership firmly adhered to this position throughout the internal disputes concerning the transformation of the CMEA; moreover, at the January 9th, 1990, Sofia summit of the organization, Prime Minister Miklos

Németh made the Cassandra prophecy in the name of the—by then totally autonomous—Hungarian government that, if the CMEA were not capable of total transformation to its very foundations, it was doomed to extinction.

Cs. Békés: Back to Europe 265 Opening to the West and Joining the European Integration The likely integration of Western Europe expected by 1992 presented a serious challenge to Hungarian foreign policy also, for what was at stake was no less than the question of whether it was possible to preserve the extraordinarily good situation acquired earlier in respect of Western relations. If not, then Hungary too—like all the other nations of the Eastern bloc—would have to face the dan-

ger of separation from the Western world. It was viewed as a significant achievement that, thanks to the persistent work of several years, and, most of all, to the efficient support of the Federal Republic of Germany,” Hungary was the

first in the socialist camp to make an agreement concerning economic cooperation and to enter into diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community in 1988. The particularly close and fruitful relationship between the Hungarian and the West German leadership was a positive development with much promise and good prospects for the future, and, as a result, Hungary received altogether DM 2bn credit in 1987-1988 to transform and modernize its economy. In July 1989, the Bundestag, in a symbolic act unique in the Western world, accepted a declaration endorsing the Hungarian democratic transition.” In the spirit of preparing for the situation after European integration, as early as January, 1989, the Hungarian leadership elaborated a detailed analysis and plan concerning the necessary steps to be taken,”’ and at the March 14th meeting of the MSZMP Politburo, priority was given to opening up to the world econ-

tion. |

omy, which essentially marked the beginning of a shift in economic orienta-

This opening up to the West was well served by two successful, pioneering initiatives of Hungarian foreign policy, as a result of which, in February, 1989, Hungary entered into diplomatic relations with South Korea by exchanging ambassadors, and, in September, diplomatic relations, broken off in 1967, were restored with Israel. Both steps had been preceded by lengthy preparatory work, over the course of which Hungary gradually managed to win the approval of the Soviets.” In both cases, the Hungarian leadership expected significant economic advantages from these unprecedented steps of great importance. A precondition with South Korea was the deposit into the Hungarian National Bank of 1-1.5

billion US dollars, which was meant to lessen the liquidity problems of the country.” In the case of Israel, above all, it was hoped that this “historic” act would exert a positive influence on US—Hungarian policy, and, in general, upon Western financial circles, especially the World Bank.

Based on the relations developed in the 1980s, Hungarian diplomacy also made intensive attempts to play a mediating role in promoting East-West rapprochement in 1988-1989. With this knowledge, in the spring of 1988, the Soviets requested the Hungarian leadership to host a conference to be attended by European political parties and which, according to the original idea, would have paved the way for a “second Helsinki” conference proposed by the Soviet Union. The conference, entitled “Europe and the Future of European Co-operation

266 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

on the Eve of the 1990s,” was held in Budapest on May 11th—13th, 1989, and was attended by 23 different parties. The outstanding significance of this conference was that, for the first time, representatives of every major political trend in

the Parliaments of the states participating in the European Security and Cooperation process had a chance to exchange ideas and views in an informal manner: communists, social-democrats, centrists, liberals, Christian democrats and conservatives.” The dialogue between East and West was further intensified by the Warsaw Pact’s adoption of the Hungarian proposal that the representatives of the above 35 states should hold regular summit meetings in the future.

In the spring of 1989 Hungary took steps to pave the way for establishing official relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, after Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Gyula Horn—as the first representative of the Eastern bloc— participated and delivered a speech at the NATO General Assembly in Brussels in November, 1988. In addition, the Hungarian leadership also undertook some rather confidential missions from time to time: Karoly Grész not only lobbied Gorbachev on behalf of West German interests, but earlier, as Prime Minister, he played an important role in facilitating an improvement in relations between Poland and the FRG at the request of Chancellor Helmut Kohl.” Like the physical removal of the iron curtain, there was both symbolic and political significance in the European Council giving Hungary—together with Yugoslavia, Poland, and the Soviet Union—special status as an observer on June 8th, 1989. A few months later, in November, 1989, the Hungarian government submitted its application for membership to the Council. Following the free general elections in the spring, the Council recognized the democratic transition of historical importance in the country, and on November 6th, 1990, Hungary was admitted as a member state. Symbolically speaking, for Hungary this represented the end to an era of four decades of exclusion.

Notes 1 For obvious reasons, archival documents on the international conditions of the period are not yet available to the same extent as the sources of the Hungarian political transition. Thanks to the international research project founded in 1997 by the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C. (Project on Openness in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union), however, significant results have recently been achieved in this field as well. Thus, much has become known about the state of contemporary American policy and even more about the opinion of the Soviet leaders, especially that of Gorbachev and his immediate circle; see: The End of Cold War in Europe, 1989. “New Thinking and New Evidence.” [A Compendium of Declassified Documents Prepared for a] Critical Oral History Conference organized by the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., Musgrove, Georgia, May 1-3, 1998. The sources which published the documents of the political transition are also significant for their examination of the international background of the Hungarian transition. See: A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzokonyvei. [The 1989 Minutes of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s

Cs. Békés: Back to Europe 267 Party, MSZMP] Vols. 1-2., Anna Kosztricz, Janos Lakos, Karola Vagyi Némethné, Laszl6 Sods,

Gyorgy T. Varga, (eds.) Hungarian National Archives, Budapest, 1993, A rendszervaltas forgatékényve. Kerekasztal-targyalasok 1989-ben. [The Script of the Regime Change. The Roundtable Talks in 1989], Vols. 1-9, Andras Bozoki, Marta Elbert, Melinda Kalmar, Béla Révész, Erzsébet Ripp, Zoltan Ripp (eds.), Magvetd (Vols. 1-4) Budapest, 1999, Uj Mandatum (Vols. 5-8) Budapest, 2000. A conference was held in Budapest in June 1999 on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Hungarian political transition; its organizers—the National Security Archives (Washington D.C.), the 1956 Institute, and the Cold War History Research Centre (Budapest)— compiled a collection of documents in English and Hungarian, see: Rendszervdltozads Magyarorszagon 1989-1990/Political Transition in Hungary 1989-1990. Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, Melinda Kalmar, Zoltan Ripp, Miklés VG6rds (eds.); the documents were collected and complied

by: Magdolna Barath, Csaba Békés, Melinda Kalmar, Gusztav Kecskés, Zoltan Ripp, Béla Révész, Eva Standeisky, Miklés Vérés, Budapest, 1999 (manuscript, to be published by Uj Mandatum publisher in Budapest). For recently published Hungarian and Russian sources on Gorbachev’s policy towards Hungary see: Gorbacsov targyalasai magyar vezet6kkel, Dokumentumok az egykori SZKP és MSZMP archivumaibol, 1985-1990 [Gorbachev’s talks with Hungarian leaders. Documents from the archives of the former CPSU and MSZMP, 1985-1990] Magdolna Barath, Janos M. Rainer (eds.) 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 2000.—-No one has yet produced a synthesis of the international context of the Hungarian transition; among the sources used in my paper, mention must be made of Jacques Levesque’s book, which devotes Chapter 7 to the role of Soviet policy played in the Hungarian transition. Jacques Lévesque: 1989, La fin d’un empire:

L’URSS et la liberation de l’Europe de I’Est, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1995. For the English edition, see: Jacques Lévesque: The Enigma of 1989. The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1997. All the following quotations are taken from this edition. 2 Within the Warsaw Pact, only Romania had (for years) urged unilateral steps by the member states, and, in spite of a definite Soviet “request,” it reduced its armed forces by 5% in 1986. 3 Report to the Politburo and the Council of Ministers on the Warsaw meeting of the Political Consultative Body of the Warsaw Pact Member States, July 18, 1988. Hungarian National Archives (hereafter HNA) 288. f. 11/4453 6.e. 4 Comment made by Ferenc Karpati, Minister of Defense, at the November 22, 1988 meeting of the MSZMP Central Committee, HNA M-KS- 288. f. 4/246. 6.e. 5 Altogether, he planned to withdraw some 50,000 Soviet troops from these three countries. The worsening of the political—economic situation in the Soviet Union by this time and, as a result of this, the significantly more flexible attitude of the Soviet leadership, are reflected by the fact that half a year earlier, at the July 1988 Warsaw meeting of the WP PCB, Gorbachev had maintained that the total Soviet reduction could concern only some 70,000 troops and their armament. 6 Comment by Karoly Grosz at the July 22, 1988 meeting of the MSZMP CC, HNA M-KS- 288. f.

5/1031. 6.e. |

7 Notes taken by Anatoli Chernayev at the meeting of the CPSU CC on March 10, 1988, In: The End

of the Cold War in Europe, 1989, document No 4. 8 One proof of the survival of this imperial approach is the fact that although the ten year occupation of Afghanistan cost the Soviet Union 5 billion (!) US dollars per year, for the sake of maintaining Soviet influence, even after withdrawal, the leadership reckoned on an annual cost of 3 billion.— Karoly Grosz’s comment made at the July 12, 1988 meeting of the MSZMP Politburo, HNA MKS-233. f. 5/1031 6.e. 9 Karoly Grész’s comment made at the July 12, 1988 meeting of the MSZMP Politburo, HNA MKS-233. f. 5/1031 6.e. 10 Pravda, October 31, 1956. For a recent English translation of the declaration see: The 1956 Hun-

garian Revolution. A compendium of declassified documents. (eds.) Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, Janos M. Rainer. Budapest, Central European University Press (forthcoming).

268 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy 11 At the November 1986 Moscow communist summit meeting, Gorbachev explicitly emphasised the need to abandon the policy of “guardianship.” —-Comment by Janos K4dar at the November 18, 1986 meeting of the MSZMP Politburo, HNA M-KS-288-5/983 6.e. 12 For Soviet policy concerning the 1956 Hungarian revolution, see: Déntés a Kremlben, 1956. A szovjet partelnékség vitdi Magyarorszdgrol. [Decision in the Kremlin, 1956. The debates of the Soviet Party Leadership on Hungary]. Janos M. Rainer, Vyacheslav Sereda (eds.), the 1956 Institute, Budapest, 1996; The “Malin notes” on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956, translated and annotated by Mark Kramer, CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 8-9, Winter, 1996—Spring, 1997, pp. 385— 410; Csaba Békés: Hideghabort, enyhiilés és az 1956-os magyar forradalom [Cold War, Détente

and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution], Yearbook V. 1996-1997, the 1956 Institute, Budapest, 1997, pp. 201-213. 13 Over the past few years, Anatoli Chernayev and Georgi Shahnazarov have been the primary proponents of this thesis, which they have presented at a number of conferences, including the May 1998 Musgrove conference cited tn note 1. 14 Jacques Levesque, op. cit., pp. 76—77.

15 Karoly Grész’s comment made at the July 12, 1988 meeting of the MSZMP Politburo, HNA MKS-233. f. 5/1031 6.e 16 Jacques Levesque, op. cit., pp. 80-81. For the Soviet Union’s policy in Eastern Europe, see also: Charles Gati: The Bloc that Failed. Indiana Bloomington and Indianapolis, University Press, 1989,

17 One rather characteristic example of this attitude is that at the June 14, 1989, talks between Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl, the Soviet leader stated that the Brezhnev doctrine was no longer in force, only later to maintain that only a new model of socialism would satisfy the interests of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. In: The End of Cold War in Europe, 1989, document No. 42.

18 Report for the members of the Politburo on the visit of Karoly Grész to the Soviet Union on March 23-24, 1989, In: Political Transition in Hungary, 1989-1990, document No. 16. 19 From all this, we can gather that the doctrine linked to the name of Brezhnev after the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia might just as well be called the Khrushchev doctrine, after the crackdown on the 1956 revolution in Hungary. In reality, this thesis is nothing but an organic part of the Stalinist tradition. It is merely history’s irony that Stalin himself never had to resort to it. 20 On the Polish transition, see the publications and lectures of the conference held between October 20-24 in Warsaw—Miedszyn under the title “Poland 1986-1989: The End of the System”: Polska 1986-1989: Koniec Systemy. Dokumenty, Institut Studiéw Politycznych Polskej Akademii Nauk, The National Security Archive, the George Washington University, The Cold War International

History Project, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1999; Poland 1986— 1989: The End of the System [A Compendium of Declassified Documents and Chronology of Events], Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, The National Security Archive, the George Washington University, 1999. The English language manuscripts of the six main conference lectures can be found in the 1956 Institute library in Budapest: Edmund WnukLipinski: Public Feelings in the Years 1986-1989; Piotr Marciniak: Spiral Movement Towards Democracy. Social Pressure and the Fall of the Communist System in Poland (1986-1989); Leszek Gilejko: Party Elites in the Epilogue Period; J Skorzynski: Solidarnosc on the Way to the Roundtable. Political Strategy of the Opposition 1985-1989; Andrzej Friszke: The Origin and the Course of the Roundtable; Antoni Duduek: Decisive Months (Poland, April—August, 1989). 21 The documents of the committee are published In: A rendszervaltas forgatékényve, Vol. 6.

22 According to polls, in the summer of 1989 the MSZMP had reason to expect to win 36-40% of the votes.

23 A rendszervaltas forgatokényve, Vol. 6. document No. 03. : 24 Ibid.

25 G. Kh. Sahnazarov’s preparatory minutes for Gorbachev for the October 6, 1988 meeting of the CPSU Politburo, In: G. Kh. Sahnazarov: Tsena svobodi. Moscow: 1993. pp. 368-369, published

Cs. Békés: Back to Europe 269 in English In: The End of Cold War in Europe, 1989. Document No. 11. Quoted in Jacques Levesque op. cit., p. 86.

26 Ibid.

27 The reports by the CPSU CC Department of International Relations (DIR) and the Bogomolov Institute are published in: The End of Cold War in Europe, 1989, documents No. 23 and No. 24, and reprinted in: The Political Transition in Hungary, 1989-1990, documents No. 9 and No. 13. The report by the Foreign Ministry is reviewed in: Jacques Levesque, op. cit., pp. 107-109. 28 In Chapter 5 of his book, Jacques Levesque analyzes all three reports in detail, op. cit., pp. 93— 109.

29 In the DIR report, this scenario is ranked as the second most desirable. The four scenarios are as follows: 1. a new model of socialism (in the form of “presidential socialism” in the cases of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia). 2. Peaceful restoration of civil democracy. 3. Maintaining the old system. 4. Total collapse and chaos. The Bogomolov Institute report argues quite openly that this direction of development would be explicitly advantageous for the Soviet Union. It was only the Foreign Ministry’s report which maintained that giving up power would result in serious consequences, and that, therefore, the erosion of socialism in the region should not be allowed. (Levesque, op. cit., pp. 108—109.)

30 In the DIR report, a Soviet military intervention would only be justified if “an external military force interfered directly and openly with the domestic affairs and events of a socialist country.” The report also suggests that a sense of “vagueness” should be maintained concerning Soviet intentions. A similar proposal is contained in the Foreign Ministry report. (Levesque, op. cit., p. 109.)

31 The possibility of Finlandisation is discussed implicitly in the DIR report and explicitly in the Bogomolov Institute report. 32 The Bogomolov Institute report regarded only Romania’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact as tenable, as it would not be a great loss for the Soviet Union and, in the words of the memorandum, “in its geopolitical position, the thus isolated Romania will have to consider our interests.” In: The End of Cold War in Europe, 1989, document No. 24. 33 Recorded by Anatoli Chernayev at the January 21, 1989 meeting of the CPSU Politburo. ibid., document No. 20. 34 Ibid., document No. 35. 35 Ibid., document No. 69. 36 On the MSZMP’s policy concerning the transition, see: Rudolf Tékés: Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution. Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession, 1956-1990, Cambridge University Press, 1996; Melinda Kalmar: Chapter In: this volume. 37 On US policy concerning Eastern Europe, see: M.R. Beschloss, S. Talbott: At the Highest Levels, Boston, Little, Brown, 1993; Robert L. Hutchings: American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War. An Insider’s Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989-1992, The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, Washington D.C., The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, London, 1997; George Bush, Brent Scowcroft: A World Transformed. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1998; On the US position concerning the Hungarian political transition, see: Laszl6 Borhi: The United States and the Hungarian transition. Paper presented at the international conference “Political Transition in Hungary 1989-1990” (manuscript). 38 Report on President Bush’s visit to Hungary, July 15, 1989. In: Political Transition in Hungary 1989-1990, document No. 81; report by Rezs6é Nyers at the July 28 Meeting of the MSZMP CC, ~ In: A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzékényvei, Vol. 2, — 1294-1295. 39 M.R. Beschloss, S. Talbott op. cit.. p. 91, cited by Levesque: op. cit.. p. 138. 40 Records made by Anatoli Chernayev on the summit in Malta, December 2 and 3, 1989. In: The End of Cold War in Europe, 1989, document No. 69. 41 Report by Rezsé Nyers at the July 28 Meeting of the MSZMP CC, In: A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzodkényvei, Vol. 2, 1293.

2/0 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy 42 Private talk between Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the FRG, on June 12, 1989, In: The End of Cold War in Europe, 1989, document No. 40. The same was confirmed by French President Francois Mitterand during his conversation with Gorbachev on July 4, 1989 in Paris.

ibid., document No. 43. |

43 Margaret Thatcher’s talks with Mikhail Gorbachev on April 6, 1989. ibid., document No. 33. 44 Private talk between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the FRG, on July 14, 1989, ibid., document 42. Many other documents confirm that this was not merely intended to re-

assure Gorbachev. See e.g. Proposal submitted to the Political Executive Committee of the MSZMP [Western views on the policy of the MSZMP], August 30, 1989. In: Political transition in Hungary 1989-1990, document No. 104. 45 Istvan Horvath, Istvan Németh: Es a falak leomlanak. Magyarorszag és a német egység (19451990). [And the Walls Come Down. Hungary and German Unity (1945—1990)], Magvet6 Publishers, Budapest, 1999, pp. 173-176. Eventually, in 1988, the contract was made and diplomatic relations between Hungary and the EEC were established. 46 In 1998, a research project was initiated to investigate the international background of the Hungarian transition. This project was supported by the Hungarian Program of the Project on Openness in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. In addition to the present author, Magdolna Barath and Gusztav Kecskés conducted work in the Hungarian archives, while Magdolna Barath also worked in the Gorbachev Archives in Moscow. 47 Karoly Grész’s comment made at the July 12, 1988 meeting of the MSZMP Politburo, HNA MKS-233. f. 5/1031 6.e. 48 See e.g. the Report to the Politburo and the Council of Ministers on the Warsaw session of the Political Consultative Body of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, July 18, 1988. HNA M-KS288 f. 11/4453. 6.e. 49 Although the Hungarian leadership had already made it clear that they were ready to negotiate with Romania, by July 1988 they declared that only a meeting between the Prime Ministers would be possible. (In this way, Karoly Grdész could have avoided negotiating personally with Ceaucescu, given that Grész held the positions of both party first secretary and Prime Minister at that time.) Karoly Grosz’s comment at the July 12, 1988 meeting of the MSZMP Politburo, HNA M-KS-233. f. 5/1031 6.e.

50 Ibid. !

51 We now know that, before the MSZMP national party conference in May, 1988 Gorbachev sent KGB head V. A. Krjuchkov to Budapest to meet Kadar. Nothing of their discussion however, has become public to date. So, whilst assumptions that his task was to convince the ageing Hungarian leader to leave may prove to be true eventually, evidence for this can be produced only by the further opening of Russian archives. See: Gorbacsov targyaldasai magyar vezetékkel. p. 25. 52 Levesque, op. cit., p. 130.

53 Gyula Horn’s comment at the meeting of the HSWP CC on February 21, 1989, In: A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzdkényvei , Vol. 1, p. 362. 54 Gyula Horn’s comment at the meeting of the MSZMP Central Committee, July 23-24, 1989, ibid., Vol. 2, p. 1174. 55 Document of the meeting of the International, Legal and Public Administration Committee of the CC of MSZMP held on July 9, 1989, HNA M-KS-288. f. -62/5 6.e. 56 Reply given by Imre Pozsgay and Rezsé Nyers to a question posed by the present author at the international conference “Political Transition in Hungary 1989-1990.” 57 According to the report given by Rezsé Nyers to the MSZMP CC on July 28, 1989, during the visit of the Hungarian leaders to Moscow on July 24-25, 1989, Gorbachev stressed that “you must negotiate.” In: A Magyar Szocialista Munkdspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzokonyvei, Vol. 2, p. 1298.

58 Not much earlier, in March 1989, Hungarian diplomacy officially supported the resolution of the Human Rights Committee of the UN—accepted at the initiative of Western countries—which ordered the investigation of human rights in Romania.

Cs. Békés: Back to Europe 271 59 Report given by Rezsé Nyers to the MSZMP CC on July 28, In: A Magyar Szocialista Munkadspart Kézponti Bizottsagdnak 1989. évi jegyzékényvei, Vol. 2, p. 1300. _ 60 Talks between Rezs6 Nyers and Milos Yakesh at the Bucharest meeting of the PCB of the WP, | memorandum, July 12, 1989. In: Political Transition in Hungary 1989-1990, document No. 80. 61 Memorandum for the Presidency of the MSZMP [Czechoslovakian objections concerning Imre Szokai’s interview], August 14, 1989, ibid., document No. 92. 62 Since, following the resolution of the May 19th meeting of the MSZMP Politburo, a so-called world passport was introduced which allowed any Hungarian citizen to travel freely to any country of the world any number of times, the sealing of the borders lost its significance. Therefore, as early as the summer of 1987, the removal of the technical closing system was proposed, and, starting in the summer of 1988, it was also urged by the Ministry of the Interior. Finally, at the proposal of the Minister of the Interior, Istvan Horvath, on February 28th, 1989, the MSZMP Politburo decided to remove the technical closing system on the Hungarian—Austrian and Hungarian—Yugoslavian borders by 1991. In reality, the work was completed in the summer of 1989. cf.: Istvan Horvath, Istvan Németh, op. cit., pp. 329-332.

63 Before the fall of the Berlin Wall (November 9th, 1989), some 60,000 GDR citizens left for the West through Hungary. ibid., 373. 64 The two German records made of the meeting can be found in: Political Transition in Hungary 1989-1990, document Nos. 99 and 100. 65 Ibid., p. 363. 66 Current questions related to the development of the Warsaw Pact (joint proposal of the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defense), March 6, 1989. Document of the March 13, 1989 meeting of the International, Legal and Public Administration Committee of the MSZMP CC, HNA MKS-288 f.—62/3. 6.e. 67 Proposals of the Romanian Communist Party on the improvement and democratization of the activities of the Warsaw Pact bodies, July 8, 1988. ibid. 68 Ibid.

69 Miklds Szabo: “From Big Elephant to Paper Tiger: Soviet-Hungarian Relations, 1988-1991” In: Béla Kiraly (ed.), Andras Bozoki (associate ed.): Lawful Revolution in Hungary, 1989-1994, Boulder: Social Science Monographs, Highland Lakes, N. J: Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc. distributed by the Columbia University Press., 1995. 395-411. 70 Cf.: “Merre tartsunk? Kiilpolitikank a valtoz6 vilagban.” Kerekasztal-beszélgetés. [Which way to go? Our foreign policy in the changing world. Roundtable talk]. Kritika, 1989. No. 12. 71 Comment by Gyula Horn at the meeting of the MSZMP Central Committee on February 20-21, 1989, In: A Magyar Szocialista Munkdaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzékényvei, Vol. 1, p. 362. 72 Report to the Politburo on Karoly Grész’s negotiations with Mikhail Gorbachev, In: Political Transition in Hungary 1989-1990, document No. 16. 73 Information issued for internal use by the Department of International Relations of the MSZMP Central Committee, HNA M-KS-288—1 1/4508. 6.e.

74 In addition, several Hungarian initiatives were proposed by the foreign ministry and the ministry of defence in the spring of 1989: 1. The Soviet WP communication officers stationed in each of the member states must be withdrawn. Instead, the permanent delegates of the member states staying in Moscow must be given more responsibility in matters of coordination. 2. The passage enforcing the Brezhnev doctrine must be removed from the text of the peace and war resolution of the Unified Armed Forces of the WP. 3. The Military Council must be dissolved. 75 Minutes of the meeting of the May 16, 1989 meeting of the MSZMP Politburo, HNA M-KS-2885/1065. 6.e. 76 On the highest-level Soviet-Hungarian relations, see: Magdolna, Barath: “A “csticsrél” szemlélve: a Szovjetunid és a magyarorszagi atmenet. [Viewed from the “top”: The Soviet Union and the Hungarian transition.] Paper presented at the international conference “The political transition in Hungary 1989-1990.” (manuscript). See also: Gorbacsov targyalasai magyar vezetékkel.

272 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy 77 Karoly Grész’s comment made at the September 27, 1988 meeting of the MSZMP CC, HNA MKS-288. f. 4/242. 6.e. 78 Magdolna Barath, op. cit., p. 4. 79 Karoly Grész’s comment made at the July 12, 1988 meeting of the MSZMP Politburo, HNA MKS-288. f. 5/1031. 6.e. 80 The security situation of the Hungarian People’s Republic and some military objectives. Memorandum by Istvan Féldesi, advisor of the secretary general of MSZMP, March 7, 1989. Document

, of the March 13, 1989 meeting of the International, Legal, and Public Administration Committee of the MSZMP CC, HNA M-KS-288 f.-62/3. 6.e. 81 Records of the negotiations between Mikl6s Németh and Mikhail Gorbachev, Moscow, March 3, 1989, In: Political Transition in Hungary 1989-1990, document No. 22. 82 M. Barath, op. cit., p. 4. 83 Minutes of the May 16, 1989 meeting of the MSZMP Politburo, MOL M-KS-288-5/1065. 6.e. 84 Rezsé Nyers and Karoly Grdész’s negotiations with Mikhail Gorbachev. Report to the Political

Executive Committee of MSZMP, July 30. In: Political Transition in Hungary 1989-1990, document No. 84. 85 On the process of pulling out the troops and the Hungarian—Soviet disputes over the withdrawal,

see: Keleti Gyérgy: Szovjet csapatkivondsok—Magyarorszag katonai fiiggetlenségének térténete—a jugoszlaviai konfliktus. [Soviet withdrawals of troops—the history of the military independence of Hungary—the Yugoslavian conflict], In: Sandor Kurtan et al. (eds.) Magyarorszag politikai évkényve, 1992. [The Political Yearbook of Hungary] Budapest: DKMKA, 1992. pp. 381-409. 86 Notes by Anatoli Chernayev on the meeting of the Politburo of CPSU, March 10, 1988. In: The End of Cold War in Europe, 1989, document No. 4. 87 Minutes of the March 14, 1989 meeting of the MSZMP Politburo, HNA M-KS-288 f.-5/1057. 6. e. 88 Minutes of the March 12, 1989 meeting of the MSZMP Politburo, HNA M-KS-288 f.-5/1059. 6. e.

90 On the role of the FRG in supporting the Hungarian transition, see: Istvan Horvath, Istvan Németh, op. cit., chapters 8, 9, and 10. 91 Ibid., pp. 336-342. 92 Proposal submitted to the MSZMP CC on the political strategy concerning European political and economic development and the issues of integration, January 1989, HNA M-KS-288. f. 5/1051. 6.e.

93 Minutes of the March 14, 1989 meeting of the MSZMP Politburo, HNA M-KS-288. f. 5/1051. 6.e. 94 Even in July 1988, Gorbachev was still stressing to K4roly Grdész that as far as the relations with

} Israel were concerned, “the clocks” must be synchronized; whereas in the case of South Korea he particularly warned against establishing diplomatic relations at the level of embassies —Ka4roly Grosz’s comment at the July 12, 1988 meeting of the Politburo, HNA M-KS-288 f. /5 1031— 6.e. 95 Ibid. 96 Report to the Politburo, May 15, 1989. In: Political Transition in Hungary 1989-1990, document No. 45.

97 Karoly Grész’s comment made at the July 12, 1988 meeting of the MSZMP Politburo, HNA M-KS-288. f. 5/1031. 6. e.

PART Two

KEY DOCUMENTS

BLANK PAGE

Introduction to the Documents Andras Bozoki and Zoltan Ripp

In 1999-2000, the full documentary history of the Hungarian Roundtable Talks of 1989 was published in 8 volumes in Hungarian.’ That collection includes the minutes of the negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable (Ellenzéki Kerekasztal, EKA), the minutes of the trilateral National Roundtable Talks, and other related key documents (manifestos, agreements, etc.). Those volumes will serve as a rich source for historians and political scientists. However, the documents were published in Hungarian, and so we thought it useful to include some of the most important documents, translated into English, in this book. There were two sets of negotiations in Hungary in 1989, of which the first was the negotiations among the eight (later nine) political organizations compris- _—

ing the Opposition Roundtable. These parties created the formal procedures to | achieve the unity of the EKA and also a common concept of strategy for democratic transition. These original decisions fundamentally shaped the behavior of

the Opposition Roundtable during the trilateral negotiations of the National Roundtable Talks, which were held with the (communist) Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart, the MSZMP), and the organisations of the Third Side. At the outset the participants simply delivered somewhat short summaries derived from the meetings of the Opposition Roundtable. | After a few meetings, however, beginning in late April 1989, it was agreed that a team from Fekete Doboz [Black Box], an independent video journal, would record the talks on video for documentary purposes.” Between August, 1989, and April, 1990, audio recordings were also made, all of which made possible an almost total reconstruction of the proceedings. The second set of negotiations was, as we mentioned above, trilateral. Those

talks took place from June, 1989, onwards, with the participation of the MSZMP, the Opposition Roundtable, and the Third Side. The most substantial part of the National Roundtable Talks was the period between June 13th and September 18th, 1989, although, in some working committees the negotiating

partners continued their talks until December, 1989. The negotiations went ahead on three levels and have been recorded in different ways. Full written minutes were taken of the plenary sessions and also of the intermediate-level sessions of the political coordinating committee and of the economic and social committee. The minutes of the “lower level” working committees, however, are much brief. They include simply the agenda of the meeting, the participants, the

276 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

positions of the negotiating parties, and the (largely incomplete) agreements actually achieved.

The eight volumes, published in Hungarian, included the minutes of all meetings of the Opposition Roundtable and of the National Roundtable, based on written sources and on video- and audio-recordings. Students of 1989 could, therefore, acquire a full and accurate picture of the details of that complex negotiating process after reading thousands of pages. In this book, we could not aim to reconstruct that richness and complexity by means of selected documents. The publication of some parts of the minutes would have provided a sense of the atmosphere of the talks, but those details would have been an inadequate guide for all of those interested in the key processes of the transition to democracy in Hungary. This can be better studied from chapters written by experts in the field, whose analyses are based on those original documents. What we could do was to document the key events of Hungary’s covenanted, negotiated revolution: the political initiatives, the negotiating positions of the parties, and the outcome of the negotiations, namely, the agreement of September 18th, 1989. The documents are published in chronological order. From the preparatory period we have chosen to publish two key documents. The first is the Manifesto of the Independent Lawyers’ Forum (Fiiggetlen Jogasz Forum, FJF), written on March 15th, 1989, which asked the independent political organizations to start negotiations with each other on the most crucial issues of the transition to democracy. This Manifesto was instrumental in the formation of the Opposition Roundtable one week later, on March 22nd, 1989. The second document is the declaration of the EKA, written on April 19th, 1989 to the Central Committee of the MSZMP. This crystallized the opposition viewpoint concerning negotiations as against the previous offer by the MSZMP, which had been regarded by the EKA as unacceptable. As a consequence of this declaration, three days later, on April 22nd, representatives of the MSZMP and of the EKA started preparatory talks on future negotiations. Between April 22nd and June 9th, 1989, during the preparatory talks between the EKA and the MSZMP—and during internal discussions—the negotiating parties crystallized their different political stances, and, after long deliberations, succeeded in achieving a compromise between their opposing political positions. The third document published in this volume is a basic agreement between the MSZMP, the EKA and the Third Side, signed on June 10th, on their willingness to negotiate the fundamental issues of the transition. That agreement focused on substantive issues of the future negotiations and did not clarify the structure and other practical details of the negotiating process itself. The latter was agreed by the parties on June 21st 1989, and the text of that agreement is published in the fifth document. During the National Roundtable Talks, there were three plenary sessions. Those sessions served as a forum for the negotiating parties to declare their positions on major issues, to take decisions, and to accept the agreements reached by the intermediate-level sessions. The fourth document contains the minutes of

Introduction to the Documents 217 the June 13th opening plenary sessions in which the various delegations accepted an agreement and publicly stated their initial standpoints for the negotiations. The sixth document shows the minutes of the June 21st plenary sessions where the delegates agreed on the thematics and structure of the talks and also stated their views on agenda-setting issues. Between June 13th and September 18th, 1989, the Opposition Roundtable held 26 meetings, whilst the intermediate-level political co-ordinating committee of the National Roundtable completed 13 rounds of negotiations. At the same time the 6 political working committee of the National Roundtable talks held about one hundred meetings. In this book, obviously, we cannot publish all of those minutes since they occupy some thousand pages. However, we do publish, as the seventh document, the minutes of the September 18th (closing) plenary sessions of the National Roundtable Talks. This final plenary sessions was planned as an expressive public act of the acceptance of the crucial legal and political changes proposed by the negotiating partners. However, in this meeting, broadcast live on Hungarian television, a dramatic turn of events occurred. It became clear that some of the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable would refuse to sign the agreement, since on some questions—primarily, on that of the election of the President of the Republic—they disagreed with the compromise written in the text of the agreement. The text of the September 18th agreement is presented as the eighth document in this book. This agreement made it possible to bring the crucial, constitutional laws to Parliament one month later. By accepting them, paradoxically, this last Parliament of the dictatorship set up the constitutional framework of the new democracy and of the rule of law. Due to the September 18th agreement of the National Roundtable Talks—and also to the results of the so-called “Four Yes” referendum’ held on November 26th, 1989—the legal framework of the multiparty parliamentary democracy was established and free and fair elections—the first for 45 years—could be held. All of the documents are published with editorial notes which aim to put the events into context. Further information can be obtained from the detailed chro-

nology of the talks and from the bibliographies of the key participants. | Notes 1 Andras Bozoki, Marta Elbert, Melinda Kalmar, Béla Révész, Erzsébet Ripp & Zoltan Ripp (eds.): A

rendszervaltas forgatokényve: Kerekasztal-targyalasok 1989-ben. 1-8. kétet [The Script of the Regime Change: Roundtable Talks in 1989. Vols. 1-8.]. Vols. 1-4. Budapest: Magveté, 1999.; Vols. 5-8. Budapest: Uj Mandatum, 1999-2000. 2 Those collaborators of Fekete Doboz, who recorded the talks, were Csaba Batonyi, Andras Dér, Gyorgy Durst, Marta Elbert, Istvan Javor, Ménika Mécs and Laszl6é Pesty. . 3 On the questions and results of the November referendum see the chapter by Adam Masat in this book.

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Proclamation of the Independent Lawyers’ Forum to the Organizations of the Opposition March 15, 1989 (COMMUNIQUE)

Proclamation of the Independent Lawyers’ Forum to Independent Political Organizations in Hungary’ I However “tragic” it is for the nations concerned, and however painful it is for many decent individuals, however difficult it is to ‘admit to our past’, it must be said, for the sake of the future of the nation, that the great historical experiment which was started in 1917 in the name of ‘building socialism’ has collapsed under the weight of the global industrial revolution which unfolded during the last few decades of the 20th century. The fact that all countries concerned had seriously fallen behind the most advanced countries of the world, signals the hopelessness of the enterprise itself, rather than the incompetence of a given political nomenclature. Therefore, any chance for these countries to catch up is conditional on their ability to transform fundamentally their entire social, economic and

political organization. | It is important that it be clearly understood that there can be no economic growth

without the transformation of the political regime, which acts as a yoke on society and the economy alike; therefore, the first step in change is to transform the political structure. In the current situation, comprehensive change has become a prerequisite of the survival of the nation as such, and, therefore, the political change will happen sooner or later, and with or without force, as a natural reflex of national self-defense. As the rift between Hungary and the advanced countries is growing by the minute, there is no time to lose. At the same time, all rational people, and all political forces claiming to have a sense of responsibility for their actions, must try to make this (inevitable) change a peaceful one, as long as there exists even the remotest chance of doing so.

i] One thing is certain: in one way or another, comprehensive transformation will be carried __ out by the Hungarian nation itself, and so it is not possible to attempt to make any agreement about the terms of such a transformation in the form of compromises over the heads of the nation; on the contrary, society must be consulted regarding the “new rules of the game” from the very beginning. It is hard to admit this, but living standards will start to improve only after political change takes place and as an indirect consequence of the change. Yet, knowing their own past, the Hungarian people will accept that fact only if they can influence the terms of the

280 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

change, directly or vis-d-vis a credible institutional framework. It is a strange situation that a ruling political regime should be expected to create—via its institutions—the very laws responsible for dismantling its own political superstructure. In the opinion of the Independent Lawyers’ Forum, this can be done only if the first step to be taken is the replacement of the current Parliament with a democratically elected representative body. One question cannot be avoided: Is there any hope that a change so essential for the survival of the nation will be peaceful? We believe that the answer is “Yes”. Our hope is confirmed by the fact that, in contrast with the 70-year long history of socialism, the situation has changed. During these 70 years, a group of political powerholders—who had taken over the Communist Party after a series of political crises— never ceased to emphasize the infallibility of the political course of ‘building socialism’ as chosen by the Party, even if they also criticized certain ‘distortions’ of the model. However, today’s Hungarian crises are characterized by a lack of faith even on the part of the political power-holders themselves in the viability of the existing political regime.

iil The question is, therefore: What can independent social and political organizations and political parties do to promote peaceful change?

1. They must do everything in their power to speed up the voluntary process of building social institutions, and, as a part of that, to create a distinctive image for their own organization or political party, to disseminate its program as widely as possible and to widen its social base. 2. They must refrain from any political action (e.g. prematurely going into coalition with existing power-holders, making unilateral concessions and engaging in spurious _talks), which could reduce the credibility of the organization itself. 3. They must overcome the inevitable ‘childhood diseases’ of the early stages of a voluntary organization, such as conflicts arising from personal rivalry, and create inner coherence within such organizations through compromises of principle resting on a fundamental agreement about basic theoretical principles. 4. They must continuously consult their counterparts concerning all crucial issues. This is both a necessity and a moral obligation on their part, based on the assumption that, in the current situation, independent institutions inevitably share common interests. 5. In view of their consciously chosen solidarity, itself based on an awareness of their inevitable sharing of common interests, they must prevent any overt or covert attempt by political power-holders to divide them. 6. Until a stronger society effectively takes control over its own life, they must take concerted action, agreed in advance, to exercise permanent pressure on the institutions of political power in order to guarantee the effective involvement of society in decisionmaking and to take transformation to a consistent and successful conclusion. The Independent Lawyers’ Forum’s recommendation to independent political organizations and parties in Hungary is to start talks via their competent political leaders without delay, talks in which they should be driven by a sense of having been given a histori- | cal mission to promote these objectives. The talks should be aimed at formulating a common position on fundamental issues demanding an urgent answer, primarily concerning Electoral Law and the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary.

1. Proclamation of the Independent Lawyers' Forum to the Organizations of the Opposition 281

The Independent Lawyers’ Forum is ready and willing to co-ordinate these talks and to make every effort to reconcile positions and to elaborate the professional aspects of agreed positions as an independent and objective organization. Budapest, March 15, 1989 Electoral Plenum of the Independent Lawyers’ Forum Source: Magyar Nemzet, March 21, 1989

Note 1 This Proclamation was read out for the first time at the Congress of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) on March 19, 1989. The SZDSZ was itself about to issue an open letter suggesting the setting up of a roundtable of independent organizations, but, after having learnt of the Proclama-

tion of the Independent Lawyers’ Forum, the Free Democrats withdrew their own proposal, as suggested by Janos Kis. The Proclamation was first published without date or signature. It was written by Imre Kénya in a single evening, on the eve of the highly successful March 15th demonstration jointly organized by the organizations of the opposition. The document, which was read out at the SZDSZ Congress, was dated March 15th, a date repeated by two other publications (Honpolgar, no. 2 (1989): 4—6; and “Ellenzéki Kerekasztal — Portrévdzlatok.” Edited and interviews by Anna Richter. Otlet Kft. (1990): 287-289). The document was signed by the Electoral Plenum of the Independent Lawyers’ Forum (FJF). The document was officially adopted by the Electoral Plenum of FJF on March 17th. This is when it was agreed to convene a meeting of the 8 organizations, which the FJF deemed to be the most important, on March 22nd. (In Andras Balint B.: Gyézelemre sziilettiink...: Budapest 31). The 8 invitees included: the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre Friendship Society, the Federation of Young Democrats, the Independent Smallholders’ Party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Hungarian People’s Party, the Alliance of Free Democrats, the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions and the Social Democratic Party of Hungary. The March 20th issue of Magyar Hirlap was the first Hungarian national daily to publish a brief report on the FJF’s Proclamation.

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Proposal of the Opposition Roundtable to the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party April 19th, 1989 (LETTER AND COMMUNIQUE)

Proposal of the Opposition Roundtable to the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party Concerning the Roundtable Talks In line with its commitment, the Opposition Roundtable is ready to start effective political discussions with the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP) following a period of serious preparations. We forwarded our proposal concerning the terms and agenda of the Roundtable Talks to the Central Committee of the MSZMP in writing on March 30th, 1989!, but have since received no reply. Given the crises currently threatening to push Hungary to the brink of catastrophe, the obvious failure of the government to control the situation and the danger of restoration by — force, the Opposition Roundtable urges the MSZMP to start talks as soon as possible. Time is running out, and we feel, therefore, that we have to lay down our detailed negotiating position once again, motivated by a desire to start preliminary discussions for the effective talks immediately. In order to create an atmosphere of trust between the negotiating partners, both the MSZMP’s Central Committee and the Opposition Roundtable should make an official declaration before effective talks begin confirming their unconditional commitment to respect constitutional rules. The MSZMP’s Central Committee must acknowledge members of the Opposition Roundtable as legitimate and equal partners in the talks and must also declare that it will not restrict their power to exercise their political rights for any reason whatsoever. The members of the Opposition Roundtable hereby declare that they are committed to achieving their goal, namely the country’s democratic transformation, strictly by legitimate means. At the same time, the MSZMP, for its part, must vow not to use the current Parliament to pass laws which would unilaterally take over Hungarian Common Law, curtail the freedom of democratic political organizations and their participation in elections. We propose that the Roundtable Talks be held in the building of the Hungarian Parliament. The Opposition Roundtable demands that all its member organizations (the BajcsyZsilinszky Endre Friendship Society, the Federation of Young Democrats, the Independent Smallholders’ Party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Hungarian People’s Party,

the Social Democratic Party of Hungary, and the Alliance of Free Democrats as full members, and the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions as an observer) must be allowed to be present, as a prerequisite of the talks.

284 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy The talks will be conducted between the delegations of the MSZMP and the Opposition Roundtable. The parties emphatically declare that these will be bilateral talks, a fact to be signaled by the shape of the negotiating table itself. Representatives of the two negotiating partners will take turns in chairing the meetings every hour, and will also speak in turn. In accordance with the MSZMP’s proposal, the talks will be conducted in the form of full plenary meetings, and work will take place in sub-committees to be set up by the meeting.” A separate sub-committee will be set up to discuss every item on the agenda. We propose that the Parliamentary Office should be responsible for providing any techni~ cal support for the talks. The sub-committees may consult external experts. Any operating expenses, expert fees and other costs, if any, should be financed from the government’s

| central budget. Any agreements formulated by sub-committees must be approved by the full plenary meeting. Any agreements must include the text of any Executive Decrees and Bills of the government. The negotiating partners will exercise political control over the technical aspects of legislative preparations. Authenticated minutes will record the work of the plenary sessions and of the sub-committees and will be confirmed by the signatures of the parties concerned. Full plenary sessions will be open to the general public; whilst a decision concerning the publication of the minutes of sub-committee meetings will be taken after the Roundtable Talks at the discretion of the negotiating partners. The parties will, from time to time, publish a mutually agreed communiqué about the status of the talks. If the parties fail to reach an agreement on the wording of such a communiqué, then both parties will be entitled to issue their own declaration. Such declarations must be published in national daily newspapers, unabridged, and should be publicized on Hungarian National Television and Hungarian National Radio also. Any agreements must be published unabridged; and the parties undertake to respect such agreements. The MSZMP undertakes to present the full text of such agreements to the appropriate, and fully empowered, government agencies, asking them to pass the necessary laws fully in line with such agreements, using the support of its Members of Parliament and party members at the same time, as well as that of its Ministers. Any bills on the agenda of the Roundtable talks must be proposed for social debate during the talks, and any laws in line with agreements reached must come into effect within the restricted deadlines stipulated by such agreements. The political talks between the MSZMP and the Opposition Roundtable will focus not so much on the subject matter of the Constitution, but rather on aspects of transition to constitutionalism. It is our firm belief that the drafting of the Constitution and the creation of the Presidency and the Constitutional Court should be the responsibility of a new, freely elected Parliament. The objective of the talks is to allow the negotiating partners to come to an agreement regarding the laws needed for democratic transition and to set a date for the next parliamentary elections. Consequently, the agenda of the talks includes, for the most part, laws governing the creation of political institutions (sic), the assessment of various political intentions, and measures to promote peaceful transition. The agenda of the talks will include the following: — Rules for the setting up of political parties and their functioning; — Media and information Acts; — The amendment of the Penal Code and of the act on Criminal Proceedings;

2. Proposal of the Opposition Roundtable to MSZMP’s Central Committee 285 ~— Re-regulation of electoral law; — The holding of a referendum;

— The rescinding of laws and decrees hindering the progress of democratic transition; — The creation of guarantees preventing the possibility of any use of force to resolve political conflicts.

Dr Laszl6 Sélyom and Dr Péter Télgyessy have been mandated to communicate our position regarding the status of preparations for the talks, to conduct preliminary discussions and to ratify the minutes drawn up concerning the positions of the negotiating partners. Dr Laszl6 Sélyom and Dr Péter T6lgyessy shall be present as representatives of the Opposition Roundtable and not as representatives of the Lawyer’s Forum. The parties will sign the agreement outlining the terms of the talks at the start of the first effective meeting. The MSZMP’s Central Committee is hereby requested to announce its readiness to join the talks and to accept our initiative to start preliminary discussions as soon as possible.

Budapest, April 19th, 1989 |

Opposition Roundtable

Source: A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyz6konyvei. I vol. Budapest: Hungarian National Archives (1993): pp. 914-915. Contemporary Source: Magyar Nemzet, April 20, 1989.

Notes I See The Declaration of the Opposition Roundtable. March 30th, 1989.

2 See MSZMP’s proposal of March 30th, 1989. ,

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Agreement on the Commencement of National Roundtable Talks June 10th, 1989 (COMMUNIQUE)

Agreement on the Commencement of Effective Political Talks’ I The need to recover from the economic and political crisis faced by the Hungarian nation and to transform power structures democratically calls for a dialogue between all political players who feel responsible for the future of this country. The crisis can be overcome, and political pluralism can be created, only by democratic consensus based on the mutual recognition of the interests and goals of all those concerned, by determination to reach an agreement and by building an atmosphere of trust and self-restraint. The future of the Hungarian nation can be changed for the better by respecting the

Constitution and by firmly rejecting any use of force. It is in our common interest to resolve any social conflicts in accordance with universally accepted European political norms based on general consensus. The transition from a single-party state to a representative democracy, and the introduction of the rule of law is conditional on the holding of free elections. Only the existence of a set of smoothly functioning representative bodies trusted by the people, and a stable and consistent form of government, can prevent a further deepening of the crisis. Peaceful political transition must go hand-in-hand with a relaxation of the economic and political tensions which have been accumulated over the years, and the two must take place interactively. Many examples from our history should warn us that difficulties shared by all can be resolved strictly by way of consensus. All civil organizations and movements must be allowed to participate in the difficult and contradictory transformation process as equal partners. In view of the above facts and circumstances, members of the Opposition Roundtable, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and the joint delegation of other participating organizations, such as the Alliance of the Political Left Alternative, the Patriotic People’s Front, the Alliance of Hungarian Democratic Youth, the Hungarian Resistance and AntiFascist Alliance, the National Alliance of Hungarian Women, the Miinnich Ferenc Society and the National Council of Trade Unions, have expressed their willingness to start effective political talks.2 These organizations, acting as equal partners, adopted the following guidelines for the talks: — national sovereignty is the basis of any political power; no political power-holder can claim to be the sole repository of such sovereignty or of the people’s will, and political power-holders must not seek unconstitutionally to restrict political rights; — the public will must be allowed to express itself in the form of free elections subject to no preliminary restrictions, and the outcome of such elections must be binding for all, and no constitutional political organization must be exempt from that rule;

288 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy — the recovery from crisis, democratic transition and the resolution of political conflicts must take place by peaceful means and without the use of force; and no civil organization must be allowed to have direct control over the armed forces; — an essential prerequisite for the success of constructive political talks is recognition and respect for national interests and the interests of others, and mutual trust granted in advance; — co-operation and agreements must be based on mutually acceptable terms; — no politically motivated exclusionism must be allowed to influence the selection of participants in the talks or the legal status of the negotiating partners, and ensuring the viability of the process must not be neglected; — the talks are aimed at reaching a series of political agreements, outlining the necesSary government measures and bills; and stipulating a deadline for their implementation; but the talks themselves are not intended to have any Common Law function; — for the duration of the talks the negotiating partners will refrain from any unilateral action which could jeopardize the objectives thereof; and legislative work can begin only after political agreements are in place; — all negotiating partners shall have any agreements adopted by their respective organizations, must uphold such agreements in public, and shall use every possible political instrument available to them to execute such agreements.

Il 1. Political reconciliation talks will take place by and among three negotiating partners aimed at reaching a set of political agreements. These are as follows: (a) the Opposition Roundtable (Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre Friendship Society, Federation of Young Democrats, Independent Smallholders’ Party, Christian Democratic People’s Party, Hungarian Democratic Forum, Hungarian People’s Party, Social Democratic Party of Hungary, Alliance of Free Democrats, and the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions as an observer); (b)the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party; and (c)the following civil organizations and movements‘: Alliance of the Alternative Left, Patriotic People’s Front, Alliance of Hungarian Democratic Youth, Hungarian Resistance and Anti-Fascist Alliance, National Alliance of Hungarian Women,

Miinnich Ferenc Society and National Council of Trade Unions. | All three participants to the talks have the same rights in connection with achieving a consensus. All three negotiating partners shall each be represented by one speaker, who will be responsible for expressing a coherent opinion on behalf of the party concerned. The civil organizations and movements listed in Section (c) above, whose joining of the effective talks was approved by the Opposition Roundtable based on a compromise proposal made during the preliminary talks, have welcomed the initiative of the MSZMP and the Opposition Roundtable to hold a constructive dialogue and to reach an agreement, and have expressed their desire to be actively involved in the process. _ The Opposition Roundtable is free to determine the size and composition of its own delegation.’ The civil organizations and movements listed in Section (c) above are free to determine the methodology of reconciling their views and expressing their positions.

3. Agreement on the Commencement of National Roundtable Talks 289 Representatives of the participating organizations hold a letter of mandate, which defines their powers regarding the signing of any agreement. Such representatives are required to present their letter of mandate to the chairman of the plenary meeting. A fourth party to the Roundtable talks will be potential observers, if any. Observers can make their comments to the chairman of the talks in writing, who will then inform the . negotiating partners of the contents thereof. 1. The participants in the talks have agreed to include the following items on the agenda: — defining the principles and rules of democratic political transition; — the strategic tasks of combating economic and social crises. Individual items on the agenda will be finalized during effective talks, in line with the common interests of the parties. 2. The procedures and work schedule of the political reconciliation talks will be as follows: (a) Effective talks will take place in the form of plenary meetings and work in committees. The initial plenary meeting will be held on June 13th, 1989 (Tuesday) in the Hunters’ Hall of Parliament. The plenary meeting will be chaired by the President of Parliament. The representatives of the three participants to the talks will be granted an equal length of time to speak. Participants in the talks shall make a declaration of intent to the plenary meeting and shall proceed to set up working committees®. (b)Sub-committees created to deal with individual items on the agenda will be responsible for making preparations for specific agreements. Work in committees will be governed by the principles applicable to plenary meetings, as required. Individual working committees may set up their sub-committees and invite experts to assist them. (c) Any Bills will be drafted with the assistance of the relevant government agencies. Bills drafted may be submitted for public debate during the political reconciliatory talks. Finalized documents will be adopted by the plenary meeting. Any proposals made by a working committee may be submitted to the plenary meeting after they have been signed by the representatives of the negotiating partners. Any approved documents must be signed by the heads of delegation, who will be responsible for their subsequent publication. Minutes of every meeting will be drawn up, and the negotiating partners may publish them if the talks are interrupted. (d) Decision-making will be based on the principle of sharing common interests and the necessity for consensus. If the parties fail to reconcile their views on any particular detail, but, in the opinion of the negotiating partner concerned, such difference of opinion does not affect the fundamentals of the agreement to be reached, a consensus can be made notwithstanding. (ec) Plenary meetings will be open to the press. However, working committees will sit behind closed doors. Regular and accurate briefings must be given to the public on the state of the talks. The negotiating partners will, from time to time, make a joint declaration to the Hungarian National Telegraphic Agency. Special communiqués may be issued only if talks are interrupted or if the parties fail to work out a joint declaration, but such circumstances will not jeopardize the right of the negotiating partners to give interviews concerning items on the agenda.

290 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy (f) The parties feel it necessary to emphasize that all costs and expenses of the talks must be born by the government central budget. These may include the cost of document handling, photocopying, mailing, the organization of meetings and any expert fees. Budapest, June 10, 1989 On behalf of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party: Gyorgy Fejti On behalf of the Opposition Roundtable: Zsolt Zétényi Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre Friendship Society Laszlo Kéver Federation of Young Democrats

Péter Hardi Independent Smallholders’ Party Gy6regy Szakolczai

Christian Democratic People’s Party Laszlé Solyom Hungarian Democratic Forum Csaba Varga Hungarian People’s Party Tibor Baranyai Social Democratic Party of Hungary Péter Télgyessy Alliance of Free Democrats Imre Kerényi Democratic League of Free Trade Unions, as an observer

On behalf of the Alliance of the Left Alternative, the Patriotic People’s Front, the Alliance of Hungarian Democratic Youth, the Hungarian Resistance and Anti-Fascist Alliance, the National Alliance of Hungarian Women, the Mtinnich Ferenc Society and the National Council of Trade Unions: Csaba Kemény Alliance of the Left Alternative Istvan Kukorelli Patriotic People’s Front Ferenc Gyurcsany Alliance of Hungarian Democratic Youth Imre Kerekes Hungarian Resistance and Anti-Fascist Alliance Mrs Soos Marta Dobos National Alliance of Hungarian Women Ferenc Berényi Miinnich Ferenc Society Mrs Kosa Magda Kovacs National Council of Trade Unions

3. Agreement on the Commencement of National Roundtable Talks 291 Source: Magyar Nemzet; Népszabadsag, (June 12th 1989). Published with facsimile signatures. In Az Ellenzéki Kerekasztal. Edited by Anna Richter. Budapest: Oflet (1990): 294-300.

Notes 1 With a few minor exceptions, the wording of the agreement is identical with that signed on June 9th by Laszl6 Sélyom and Péter Télgyessy on behalf of the Opposition Roundtable, and by Imre Forgacs, Istvan Gyérgy and Andras Toth on behalf of the MSZMP, as members of expert delegations. Hungarian National Archives [MOL] P. 2117, box 7, ref.1.

2 This sentence as adopted at the bilateral talks reads as follows: “In view of the above facts and circumstances, members of the Opposition Roundtable, the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party and the joint delegation of other civil organizations and movements participating in the talks have expressed their willingness to start effective political talks.” 3 This paragraph as adopted at the bilateral talks reads as follows: “An essential prerequisite for the success of constructive political talks is a high level of mutual trust and mutual recognition and respect for the interests of others”. 4 This sentence as adopted at the bilateral talks reads as follows: “other civil organizations and

movements...”.

5 The sentence as adopted at the bilateral talks uses the expression “other” instead of “listed in Section (c) above”. 6 The two sentences in this paragraph were initially part of the same sentence: ‘The negotiating parties shall make a declaration of intent at the initial plenary meeting, and shall proceed to set up working committees.’

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Opening Plenary Meeting of the National Roundtable Talks June 13th, 1989 (NARRATIVE TEXT OF THE VIDEO RECORDING)

Venue: Hunter’s Hall of Parliament Participants:! Matyas Sztirés, Chairman? On Behalf of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party Gyorgy Fejti Karoly Grosz Imre Pozsgay On behalf of the Opposition Roundtable:

Jozsef Antall Hungarian Democratic Forum . Sandor Bacskai Hungarian Social Democratic Party Tibor Baranyai Hungarian Social Democratic Party

Imre Boross Independent Smallholders’ Party Gyula Csomos Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions Istvan Domonkos Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre Friendship Society

Gabor Fodor Federation of Young Democrats Ilona Fonyodi _ Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions

Lajos Fiir Hungarian Democratic Forum

Tibor Ftizessy Christian Democratic People’s Party

Péter Hardi Independent Smallholders’ Party

Imre Kerényi Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions Sandor Keresztes Christian Democratic People’s Party Imre Konya Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions?

Laszl6 Konya Hungarian People’s Party Laszl6 K6vér Federation of Young Democrats Janos Marton Hungarian People’s Party Imre Mécs | Alliance of Free Democrats Laszl6 Morvay Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre Friendship Society

Viktor Orban Federation of Young Democrats Istvan Prepeliczay Independent Smallholders’ Party

Andras Révész Social Democratic Party of Hungary Gyorgy Szabad | Hungarian Democratic Forum Gyorgy Szakolczai Christian Democratic People’s Party

Csaba Varga Hungarian People’s Party

294 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Karoly Vigh Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre Friendship Society Zsolt Zétényi Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre Friendship Society On Behalf of the Third Side to the Talks:

Jozsef Aggod Miinnich Ferenc Society Attila Balint National Council of Trade Unions Ferenc Berény1 Miinnich Ferenc Society Laszlé6 Boldvai Alliance of Hungarian Democratic Youth Laszl6 Csillag Hungarian Resistance and Anti-Fascist Alliance Gyoérgy Drucker Alliance of the Alternative Left Mrs. Lajosné Duschek National Council of Hungarian Women Mrs. Sandorné Fazekas National Council of Hungarian Women

Attila Hajdu National Council of Trade Unions

Istvan Huszar Patriotic People’s Front

Marton Ispanovics Hungarian Resistance and Anti-Fascist Alliance

Lajos Istvan Patriotic National Front Csaba Kemény Alliance of the Alternative Left Mrs. Kosa Magda Kovacs National Council of Trade Unions

Istvan Kukorelli Patriotic People’s Front Imre Nagy Alliance of Hungarian Democratic Youth Béla Rabi Alliance of Hungarian Democratic Youth Sandor Sark6zi Hungarian Resistance and Anti-Fascist Alliance Mrs. Sods Maria Dobos National Council of Hungarian Women

Andras Széchy Miinnich Ferenc Society Andras Varjas Alliance of the Alternative Left Matyas Sziirés: Distinguished negotiating partners, fellow countrymen! Allow me to welcome all participants to the talks. I greet everyone here at this exceptional moment, at the Hunters’ Hall in Parliament. In line with the agreement signed by the negotiating partners on June 10th, 1989, I am opening this meeting* in order to start effective talks between various political parties, organizations, political and social forces who are active in Hungary today, to promote democratic transformation and fundamental renewal. The Hungarian people and Hungarians living in the world at large are now turning their attention to Parliament. Everyone is looking forward to the forthcoming dialogue of Hungarians with Hungarians, which could mark the end of one era and the beginning of a new one, provided that the negotiating partners can find the solutions needed to change the future of the nation for the better and can reach an agreement. The stakes are high, and you, yourselves, as negotiating partners, have a great responsibility. The catastrophe threatening us can be averted, and the national chariot, stuck deeply in a rut, can be lifted from its current position only by means of a joint effort under conditions of political pluralism. We can set the nation on the path of progress and democracy and raise it to European standards only by sticking together. It cannot be done by standing apart or when there is a rift between political parties. Therefore, I sincerely hope that those sitting around this negotiating table will be driven by a sense of responsibility and do everything in their powers to reach an agreement, make a national compromise, bring about reconciliation and join forces in the name of equality, mutual respect and trust. Let the deep crisis that this country 1s facing remind you of the responsibility that you have. These are difficult times, but do not allow the acute feeling of anxiety to suppress

4. Opening Plenary Meeting of National Roundtable Talks 295 , the hope inside which keeps us alive. People are looking to these talks for reassurance amidst the hardships they are facing. The troubles and tensions burdening millions of people can be eased, the complicated tasks of democratic transition can be addressed by joint determination, we can make our common dream of the late 20th century come true and a free and democratic Hungary will be born! Be reminded of the responsibility you have also by the events of this week: the burial of Imre Nagy and his fellow martyrs in the name of serving historical and political justice.> Political talks and a burial: days marked by deep wounds and the desire for reconciliation. It is up to you, as negotiating partners, to show a good example and to demonstrate to the Hungarian people that you not only wish to end the previous regime and start a new era, but that you also possess what it takes to do it. You will have to show that you can break with the past, the rule of the few, the narrow-minded intrigues of power-holders, and the confrontations, and that you are ready to work out agreements to promote the public good, even at the cost of having to suppress your own feelings and personal ambitions. Remember the wise and timely wisdom of Ferenc Deak: “One may put everything at risk for one’s country, but one must never put one’s country at risk.” My dear negotiating partners, I can now announce that the representatives of all political parties and organizations who signed the agreement of June 10th are here today, and that they have presented their letters of mandate. Also present are the observers of several political parties and organizations, who will not actively participate in the talks, but who will nevertheless be able to give us their opinions and comments in writing.° My dear negotiating partners and fellow-countrymen! Allow me now to give the floor to the head of the delegation of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party and its spokesman: Karoly Grész, Secretary-General of the party. Karoly Grész: Ladies and gentlemen, fellow-countrymen! Today’s hectic world is not overfull of hopeful events. Many feel anxiety and uncertainty about the future. Therefore allow me to welcome you here today on behalf of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party with trust and hope. This welcome is extended also to those who will be witnessing the start of effective talks on the television screen, whether in Hungary or abroad. As you know, major differences of opinion arose during the preliminary talks. Naturally, some differences still exist regarding the scope of participants and particular details of the issues to be debated.’ However, our sense of responsibility for the future of the nation—and this is what really matters—has overcome any divisions. Just a few months ago, at the February, 1989, meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, it was decided that we have to seek a peaceful way for transition into a representative democracy based on political pluralism, assuming competition between political parties.? Our decision was in line with the political objectives of all those whose representatives are now sharing the same table. We are responsible for making this enterprise a success not only to the Hungarian people, but also to the international community. The public is both hopeful and concerned about the outcome of this experiment. — Since May 1988, Hungary has been undergoing a transformation of historical magni-

tude.? We are gradually, but at an increasing rate, moving away from a power structure which has already used up all its internal resources and which cannot be tied down to specific detail. This is confirmed by the important steps which have already been taken towards political reform, such as the broadening of civil rights, including the freedom of the press and the freedom of speech,!° the explosive increase in the number of political organizations or the firm resolve realistically to face up to the often hurtful events of the

296 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

recent past.!! It is no exaggeration to say that—and international public opinion will confirm it—-we have done more in one year in this regard than we have done over the previous decades. Let me emphasize that we would not like to overestimate or claim exclusive credit for the achievements made so far in terms of building democratic institutions and the rule of law. In our opinion, these achievements were attributable not only to the real political

acuteness of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, but should be credited to a great ; extent to the work of the civil organizations and movements whose representatives are present here today, and to the constructive approach of the political parties now emerging. We are firmly resolved to break with any remnants of the Stalinist model. The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and other political forces are trying to build a democratic and socialist state based on the rule of law and the will of the people. Economic and political reforms based on general consensus are meant to ensure that we recover from the economic crisis and that the country can start to catch up with the most advanced regions of the world, instead of becoming marginalized without hope of recovery. While pursuing the universal values of peace and humanity, we are also trying to find solutions that are socialist and specifically Hungarian at the same time. We are going to continue to honor our obligations to our political allies, but at the same time we are working to promote the birth of an undivided Europe. Joining forces today for the sake of building a new Hungary does not, of course, mean that we want to share our responsibility [with you] for falling into the existing economic and political crisis. The Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party must accept responsibility for

| its term in government as a political party, and it must draw object-lessons from recent political developments. Any exploration of the past must, first of all, be credible, and we must not substitute a tendency to make simplistic conclusions, to which we were prone in the past, by another schematic approach of a different orientation. Therefore we are going to make it clear what it is that we admit as our own heritage from the past and what we are determined to break with. Don’t forget that our party was the first to suggest that we

should face up to the recent past. ,

We cannot accept a total rejection of the last four decades for several reasons. Firstly,

these four decades were far from being a homogeneous period in Hungarian history. Much talk is heard today about the nadirs and tragedies of this era, but far less mention is made, if any, of the fact that, without the reform endeavours of these past decades, neither the events of May, 1988, nor today’s qualitatively new era would have been possible. It needs to be understood that limited scope, reform politics characterized by compromises and frequent setbacks has finally proven stronger than any retrograde tendencies. The idea of reform has become an integral part of our way of thinking, even if it could not always clear the obstacles in its way either in the domestic or international arena. This country needs to have a credible view of its past also for its national self-esteem. Focusing exclusively on the mistakes and sins committed, only because doing so suits the day-to-day political objectives of some, would seriously threaten our development prospects. There can be no development without us actually believing that our actions can

withstanding. ,

make a difference, and hoping and wanting to make it a success, any uncertainty not-

Objective exploration of the past must include, apart from investigating the causes of the political events giving rise to so much controversy today, and the actions of public figures, an exploration of the causes of the economic crisis we are facing today. National indebtedness, for instance, is a heritage of the past, but it is inter-linked with everything

4. Opening Plenary Meeting of National Roundtable Talks 297 else and determines all other aspects of our life today. Undoubtedly, a number of misguided investment decisions and voluntarily excessive economic development targets contributed heavily to the situation today, but the other side of the coin is—although it does not make things any easier for us—that the vast majority of countries in the world are submerged in a similarly grave economic situation. In many of these countries the communist party is not in power. It must also be understood that the countries which have successfully accomplished economic modernization and structural reform had to live through many conflicts and still experience the fact that development is no stranger to

social conflict. }

The Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party believes it is important for those concerned to debate aspects of economic strategy by recognizing the above. Even in the longer term, our choice of the method of resolving economic and social issues will be determined by the room for maneuver that politicians are left with whilst having to meet the country’s international obligations. Having to break out of a deep economic crisis demands a gov-

ernment with a firm hand, coupled with a motivating social atmosphere and common resolve. Instead of pursuing reform politics in the abstract, what we need is a thorough professional consultation process and an active search for political compromise in order to develop a long-term economic strategy to promote internal stability and dynamic growth. The Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, therefore, believes that the talks should focus in equal measure on issues of economic strategy and transition towards a democratic

state based on the rule of law.!? In doing so, the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party is guided not by a desire to diminish its own responsibility, which would be unrealistic anyway, but much rather by the recognition that peaceful transition to a multiparty state wil not lead to a loss of internal stability and disable both the state and the economy, provided only that a general consensus can be reached on the equitable distribution of the burden. Unless this can be done, the situation will inevitably escalate and lead to a mass of claims arising for compensation, claims which physically cannot be satisfied. An avalanche of claims and protests would cripple the normal functioning of the country as a whole and would threaten political stability, the very basis of economic consolidation. Therefore, we need to consider carefully the extent to which we can increase the burden on individual social groups and what effective economic—and not purely rhetorical— guarantees we can give the people in return for the great degree of trust which we are requesting.

Dear participants! In today’s complex world full of tensions no one can expect to have an easy ride through these talks. It is also likely that we will not reach agreement on all items on the agenda. Yet I believe that we must come to an agreement about the fundamentals at all costs. This is why it is necessary to build these talks on the principle of objectivity and a constructive approach aimed at resolving any problems which might

arise. Let us put off making declarations and engaging in rhetorical contests until the election campaign. I do not think that it would help us to continue to argue about the shape of the negotiating table or the differences in the position of individual negotiating partners. The agreement—signed by all parties concerned—which determines the framework of the effective talks, states clearly that all three parties to the talks have equal rights for achieving a consensus. Consequently, the talks will have to be aimed at working out compromises acceptable to all three sides and a realistic set of plans, to ensure that the new political and economic system can start to function as soon as possible.

298 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy The tasks and principles underlying democratic political transition have already been roughly outlined. The Hungarian Soctalist Worker’s Party agrees that the armed forces should be kept apart from the day-to-day political struggle, and that their actions should be governed by law.!3 Also remember that to stir up emotions against the armed forces does not generally assist peaceful transition. The Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party supports the efforts of political parties to create the necessary infrastructure for the adequate support of political activity. Preparations are well advanced for the most important laws on political transition, including an Act on political parties, an Act on the Constitutional Court, the Act on creating the Presidency of the Republic and the act on the rights of suffrage. Let us start the talks based on any Bills already published.!4 This notwithstanding, any of the negotiating partners can, of course, put forward new proposals. Further preparations will have to be made before strategic issues concerning the overcoming of the economic and social crisis, such as national debt crisis management, structural reform, the related concept of employment policy, the reform of ownership, antiinflationary policy and the fundamental issues of wage- and social policy, can be put on the agenda. Stakes are high. This new phase of the talks must do the groundwork to result in as many mutually acceptable programs on as many issues as possible after the elections. This is an essential prerequisite for having a viable government coalition and for avoiding the degrading of political pluralism into endless petty infighting between Hungarian political parties. Therefore we must concentrate on the things which bring us together rather than on the things which divide. I am convinced that the talks now beginning could be the seed of a viable future coalition and future political alliance. A correct assessment of various interests and political programs would guarantee the success of political co-operation. The Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party has made the first step to move away from a bureaucratic party state and to become a socialist reform party of the political left. For instance, the MSZMP wants to promote performance-based differentials, whilst ensuring that social differences unrelated to performance decrease. Our aim is to promote economic efficiency and to reconcile it with social solidarity. The MSZMP has set itself the target of using private ownership to boost economic performance, whilst maintaining the dominance of efficiently functioning public property. As a legendary leading figure of Austrian social democracy once said, a drop of utopia is necessary even in rational real politics if the goal is to gain support from the community. Today we no longer live in a world of utopia, but it would be a mistake to be pushed to the opposite extreme of abandoning our historical values and looking for merely practical answers to the challenges of today.!> The experience of the more recent and deeper past alike indicates that attempts by socialist countries for renewal can repeatedly end in failure and can even lead to tragic conflict. Prudence and cautious progress should not be mistaken for conservatism. Allow me to quote Ferenc Deak, the wise Hungarian politician, who said that “caution, even if it is taken too far, always deserves attention”. In my opinion, maintaining Hungary’s dynamic stability is both in the national interest, and in that of the international community. Therefore, it is the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party’s proposal that all participants to the political reconciliatory talks should look for ways of constructive co-operation. We might not have joint responsibility for the past, but we do have one for the future.

4. Opening Plenary Meeting of National Roundtable Talks 299 Matyas Sziirés: I thank Karoly Grdész for his declaration of intent. Now I invite the , spokesman of the Opposition Roundtable, Dr. Imre Konya. The floor is yours. Imre Kénya:!° Mr. Chairman! Ladies and gentlemen! By law, Hungary has belonged to the Hungarian people for a thousand years. This remains true, despite the fact that throughout their history the Hungarian people have rarely had the chance to handle their own assets, either as farmers or as free citizens, although they made several attempts to take possession of what belonged to them. Driven by a sense of historical responsibility, and in line with our agreement with the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, we, the delegates of the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable, came to the Hungarian Parliament today to start effective talks with the representatives of the holders of actual political power today, that is, the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, and with the delegates of other organizations which it had invited

to the talks. Let me begin by making it clear that these talks are aimed at ensuring a peaceful transition from a dictatorial power regime to a representative democracy, effectively resting on the will of the people. In these talks we are not seeking to acquire a share | of the political power of those who currently hold it. We do not want to partake of such power over the heads of ordinary people without asking them. Our goal is to make sure that the people of this country can, and do, effectively decide whom and which political organizations they wish to empower to exercise political power between any two elections. For nearly two centuries all progressive trends in Hungary have basically been of a democratic orientation, starting from the reform opposition through national movements, from radicalism through workers’ movements and to Christian democracy. In vain did the repositories of power try to stop them, either by privileges, intervention (from 18491956), deception or by force. They may have been pushed back, but they could not be

eradicated, since every time they needed it, they found reassurance in the people’s yearning for self-governance, and the knowledge that truth was on their side. They knew all along that democracy was the future. We, the Hungarian nation, repeatedly driven into the ground by imperialist, tsarist and despotic intervention, carved up by the Trianon Peace Treaty, and oppressed by Hitlerist and Stalinist dictatorships, must agree on the terms of peaceful democratic transition in order to survive, in order to guarantee human rights, the rights to work and to bread of every citizen of this country, to give this nation self-governance and to give this country independence. Everyone who has an eye to see, who has a sense of reason to judge, must recognize that democracy is not merely the future, that it is already our present. Now our mission is to deliver by peaceful means the objectives of three failed Hungarian revolutions. On June 16th the nation will be commemorating the last heroic act of this kind. The 1956 Revolution was crushed by the Soviet Army, and Hungary’s national committees, worker’s councils and re-emerging parties were liquidated by domestic reaction. The retaliation and revenge which followed

was on an unprecedented scale in modern Hungarian history.

An intimidated people bereft of hope were then tossed a few morsels in concessions as a kind of charity. Some personal freedoms gained recognition and people were generously allowed to create tolerable living conditions for themselves at the cost of selfexploitation. We had to seek our welfare as mere subjects, but we were given no say In the shaping of our future as responsible citizens. Rule over the country remained the domain of the all-powerful. A narrow political elite treated the public domain as their private affair.

300 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy We know where this was all leading to: a non-competitive economy, a paralyzed society, mass poverty and moral deprivation. This is a crisis of the regime, and, therefore, the crisis cannot be eliminated whilst retaining the regime. After being paralyzed for 30 years, society has finally made its voice heard. The birth of independent organizations and widespread action signal that the time has come to take our future into our own hands. It is not merely our moral duty to foster this happening, but it is in the common interest of us all to do so, and, what is more, as many of us believe today, it is an essential prerequisite for our survival as a nation. Representative democracy is a thoroughly tested and reliable instrument for the enforcement of the people’s will. Free elections are a peaceful means of creating the latter. We are convinced that free elections will not only lead to the fundamental renewal of the public sphere and politics, but that they could mark a historic moment in Hungarian national history. We must accept that free elections are possible only in a society which has been freed of its fears and mistrust. It takes time to get rid of fear and mistrust. The burial of the martyrs of the Revolution and the start of the talks could mark the beginning of national reconciliation, but real national reconciliation is possible only after

we bury the dictatorial power regime, and the only way to achieve that is by depoliticizing the armed forces and holding free elections. Therefore, we want to start talks with existing power-holders based on the following principles. Any power rests on national sovereignty. No political entity can claim to be the exclusive repository of sovereignty, and no political entity can declare itself the sole repository of the national will. The nation’s will has to manifest itself at free elections with no predetermined outcome, with the exclusion of no parties and political organizations as long as they accept democratic principles and reject the use of force. Until the political will of society finds expression in the election of members of parliament, such elections should not be preceded by other national elections, e.g. elections for the President of the Republic or local elections. The outcome of free elections must be accepted as binding also by the existing regime, and those now in power must not subsequently try to alter the results in any way. The existence of a strong parliamentary opposition is a pillar of any functioning democracy, whose role is to control the influence of the government. No political party and organization must control the armed forces as their own. Political parties and organizations must not influence the functioning of the armed forces through their membership. No use of armed force is permissible in order to resolve political conflict under any pretext. Any use of force can be constitutionally justified to the extent that it is necessary to avert the use of force. It is not enough to waive the use of force, it is also necessary to exclude the very possibility of the use of force. The Worker’s Militia must be dissolved, the powers of the political police must be limited, the police-force responsible for maintaining public law and order must be put under the control of local municipalities, and the use of fire arms must be publicly controlled. This is the only way to end the fear still lurking in people, and to turn a mere majority into a community of citizens, quiet but not silenced. We, the member organizations of the Opposition Roundtable, see the objective of these talks as regulating the rules of entry for new political players and for their evaluation. At the same time, we are ready to do everything effectively in our power to resolve the conflicts resulting from crisis, but we cannot assume responsibility for the elimination of the economic collapse until the elections, since all that opposition organizations can and want to do—by their very nature—is to exercise control over the actions of those who governed this country for 40 years and brought it to the state it is in today. We realize that

4. Opening Plenary Meeting of National Roundtable Talks 301 the economy is in a state of collapse and that its rubble is burying the livelihood of thousands every day. They, that is we, will not be helped by any sort of social demagogy. The first step towards stopping the nose-dive of the economy is to transform the political system. Finally, we want to make this emphatically clear: the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable did not come to the negotiating table to carve out for themselves a slice of political power, instead they want to create a situation where the people of this country can take governance into their own hands, not by the use of force but by peaceful means. Hungary belongs to its people, consequently the people do not need to repossess by the use of force what is already theirs. All the people have to do is to raise up their heads, organize themselves and take possession of their own country and homeland with the necessary self-consciousness. Matyas Sziirés: Ladies and gentlemen, I thank Dr. Imre Konya for reading out this declaration of intent on behalf of the Opposition Roundtable. I now invite Dr. Istvan Kukorelli, spokesman for the civil organizations and movements calling themselves as the Third Negotiating Partner.

, Istvan Kukorelli: Mr. Chairman! Distinguished political partners! We have suggested, and remain committed to, the idea of this Roundtable, which, let’s face it, has turned out to be quite square-shaped. However, this does not detract from its great significance for peaceful social development. The agreement to which we and yourselves are signatories has been the product of a series of mutual and rational compromises. We cannot use such compromises to create an illusion and we cannot present claims about who should sit where at this table to mislead the opinion of the public, whose eyes are now on us. Having three sides to these talks means a great deal and also conceals a great deal. It clearly underlies the contrast between those in government and those in opposition. Future democracy is hardly possible without an opposition, one which is protected by minority rights. Undoubtedly, the opposition and some other civil organizations lack the necessary economic infrastructure, the creation of which these very talks are meant to foster and the government will have to put in place. At the same time, we have to admit that the present seating arrangement leaves many large social factions un-represented. The country is starting to break up into camps, just to mention a few: civilians who take an interest in public affairs and organize themselves into political parties versus the so called elite, and people who are against the birth of new political parties; residents of the Hungarian capital versus those who live outside it; the wealthy versus the poor. And there are even much deeper social divisions than those. We will have to address these tensions by a joint effort, and we can do so all the more because this Roundtable is also a cross-section of society. Organizations making up the third negotiating partner are not trying to look homogenous. These organizations are independent political organizations representing their own interests, who take a sovereign approach to specific items on the agenda. I know very well that there are few who find anything in common in this multi-faceted group claiming a

role in the talks as an independent formation. We are ready to admit that we are not a homogeneous delegation, but we do, and will continue to, have a high degree of tolerance for each other. And we wish homogenous delegations to experience likewise. What is common to all of us is that we are all dedicated to combating the socio-economic crisis. Another thing which civil organizations of the so called “third side” have in common

is that their primary aim is not fighting to carve out a share of government power but much rather to promote interest protection and to foster the birth of communities. These

302 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

organizations do not strictly think in terms of power politics. Our declared objectives include fighting extremism and maintaining the balance of social centrism. Most organizations of the “third side” share a common negative heritage, namely their

formal role as “fellow-travelers” of the previous political regime. This is why many would have wanted our delegation to sit with the MSZMP. But these opinions neglect to take into account the impact of rapidly changing times, namely the significant changes which took place in power structures. There is no more monolithic party control over our organizations at an institutional level. Our organizations will, of course, continue to have a party affiliation in future, but, having drawn the lessons of the past, they no longer want to function under the exclusive control of any political party. Let’s face it, reformers have a major influence inside these organizations, albeit to a varying extent. It would be an incredibly grave distortion of reality to portray the participants to these talks as the supporters of democracy sitting opposite the opponents of democracy. This is why we want to make it clear that our delegation includes many who are not members of any political party.

Peaceful transition and organic growth cannot happen strictly by the tabula rasa principle. An organic component of transition is the renewal of civil organizations, for which there is a demand from society. The token of the success of these talks is not to dispute each other’s legitimacy, because everyone’s legitimacy here is doubtful. The future will decide who will be upheld and who will fall through the sieve of history. As far as we are concerned, we do not want to play war-games over such arguments; instead we simply accept that all those sitting here represent a smaller or greater slice of society, and that we are all negotiating partners of equal rights. Having a social base is the cornerstone of the honesty and credibility of every political organization. How do we see the main task of these talks? To find ways to avert the historical pitfalls of transition towards political pluralism, representative democracy and the rule of law, and to remove any mines on the way. And it is common knowledge that one should not go to the mine fields in a distressed state. What are these pitfalls? For one thing, existing legislative decision-making processes are definitely a potential pitfall. This is the year of creating the rule of law and constitutionalism, and groups of excellent professionals are coming up with crucial bills, one after another. The government is doing its job. We too should live up to this dynamism, because what is missing is the social groundwork of legislation, and a general political consensus. The Agreement stipulates that legislative work can start only after the political agreements are in place.!’ We agree with that and we propose that the parliamentary debate of any bills already published, including the act on political parties, should wait until the end of the reconciliation process. Instead of rule by decree Hungary needs a legal system built on consensus, because the dominance of legislative acts is the first sign of the rule of law. We are seeking to speed up the creation of a network of legitimate relationships in every sphere of life, because it alone can guarantee the prevention of the abuse of political power and the possibility of restoration. Let’s urge our jointly delegated

committees to work fast and efficiently, and let’s exclude obstructionism and selfcentered party political infighting from our meetings responsible for adopting documents. The legislative process will be crowned by the adoption of a new Constitution, which will be the task of post-elections Parliament. This country does not need a crisis management government, in view of the forthcoming transition, among other things. Compre-

hensive constitutional legislative work can be taken to a successful conclusion if the impetus of political change does not suffer a setback and the more problematic aspects of

4, Opening Plenary Meeting of National Roundtable Talks 303 the publicized concept of the constitution are clarified through debate. These questions : include the following: Who is the subject of constitutional legislation? What does it mean to be sovereign? Who does this country belong to? The other potential pitfall is that social acceptance of the very government bodies who are supposed to rule the country, namely Parliament and the government, has been called into question. At the same time, those who are the target of regular criticism will

have to take crucial economic and political decisions before the elections. It is in the interests of society as a whole to make sure that the country does not become ungovernable by the elections, but instead to help those reform trends which have already been outlined in a country where we are still only guests at present. Let’s foster the profile cleaning of government organizations in the name of using a year for constitution making. The organizations of the “third side” do not reject justified criticism of hastily taken government measures and the behavior of certain politicians, but they do reject the ap-

proach which makes judgements based on abstract values and patterns, rather than a realistic assessment of social structures. With support from society, work in Parliament could also be improved by the time of

the elections. The representatives of new parties, too, could compete for the seats of resigning members of parliament, possibly by ending the institution of shadow parliamen-

tary seats.18 We know very well that Hungarian history has been dominated by the “Kuruc”’ mentality. But it is an illusion to expect that transition to a multi-party system will automatically provide a cure for our social and economic troubles all at once. If any new political entrants decline to manage the crisis which they had not caused, that would mean that we would leave an even greater burden to our children than before. The third potential pitfall is the lack of social receptivity, or the existence of a quiet or silenced majority which we so often talk about these days. Even at this table they are represented as somewhat distant observers of honor. Based on the result, or lack of result, of recent elections, they account for nearly 60% of the population.!? This country is characterized not only by a lack of trust, but also by a deep lack of knowledge: it is difficult to get oriented among all this publicity which has been inundating us for a year now. The existing intellectual crisis, we know very well, is the product of a political course which labeled education, culture and science as “non-productive” fields. It is the government’s responsibility to change that. Our responsibility—among other things—is to try to communicate the real interests of citizens through our involvement in shaping the politics of these fields. It is also our responsibility to communicate to people that the gain to be realized on political and economic reform will not land in our pockets tomorrow. The country is full of great nation-wide and local programs, and the Prime Minister’s program was also received very well.2° A basic historical commonplace is true for Hungary today: no program can be successful without social support and trust. In order to

have those things, we will have to come face to face publicly with the real socioeconomic situation. Every political organization, including ones engaged in social demagogy, target this silent majority. We have great joint responsibility in who will finally get through to them. Let’s hope that sincerity and credible human communication still falls on fertile soil in this country. Apart from avoiding the above pitfalls, the Roundtable talks will have to safeguard the continuity of peaceful transition, this being one of its responsibilities. Firstly, we must publicly and in any laws still to be drafted, reject each and every means and institution of

304 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

direct political struggle. Secondly, we must create political and economic stabilizers. Economic stabilizers could include, for instance, the more equitable distribution of public burdens, while political guarantees could include—and now I can speak only for some of the organizations which I represent—electing the President of the Republic before parliamentary elections take place. _ The organizations of the “third side” agree that the agenda of the talks should focus on two main issues. One is the definition of the principles and rules governing democratic

political transition, and the other is the definition of the strategic tasks of combating economic and social crisis. It would be misconstruing our role to think that we have to come up with an economic and political strategy amounting to something like a government program. It is not what an opening plenary meeting is for, but it is for us to declare publicly our readiness for co-operation and talks. Without making thorough preparations we could not arrive at a common position on these items of the agenda right here and now. All we can say at this point is that the economic and political reform processes cannot be treated separately but only in conjunction with each other. At the same time, I would like to emphasize that most of the organizations making up the “third side” of the Roundtable talks have already made public their position both about economic policy and individual political reforms to be pursued. This Roundtable symbolizes the start of negotiations. Let’s together promote the setting up of similar forums, roundtable discussions for local communities as well. If the work which has been started in several places is not picked up and taken to the very end,

then our talks will be reduced to a dialogue of the elite. | Based on the declarations of intent we heard today it may be concluded that our qualms about each other are fading away. Personally, I see the dissipation of the fears with which no democracy can live together as the greatest achievement of today’s plenary meeting. It feels good to be able to say this before June 16th. The “third side” accepts the terms of the talks and is going to respect procedural rules. We wish all participants to have professional competence, patience and a sense of responsibility during these talks, which we hope will rest on a combination of democratic and patriotic virtues. Matyas Sztirés: Distinguished negotiating partners, ladies and gentlemen! I would like to thank Istvan Kukorelli for the declaration of intent he read out on behalf of the Third Negotiating Partner. I think that, after what has been said before, it is more or less—or even absolutely— clear to all negotiating partners what questions we will have to come closer to during the next few days or weeks, and possibly to reach agreement and consensus on publicly, before the country as a whole. The declarations of intent made inevitably signal that our positions and opinions are at variance to some extent, but this is absolutely natural at the outset of a series of negotiations. By authorization from the negotiating partners, I can now announce that, in accordance with the preliminary agreement, a new plenary meeting will be held in this same location—at the Hunter’s Hall of Parliament—at 17.00 p.m. on June 21st, 1989, during which a specific agreement could be made about the rough thematic structure of the talks, to be refined later on, and on the size of the working committees and negotiating levels. Experts will continue their work, in the course of which all concerns of the negotiating partners can be clarified. Allow me in my capacity—and I am honored to have been selected as Chairman—to wish all negotiating partners and experts patience, success in their work, and, in the name

4. Opening Plenary Meeting of National Roundtable Talks 305 of the nation and the country, I hope that an agreement and understanding will be reached as soon as possible, and on that note I hereby declare this plenary meeting closed. Thank you for attending the first plenary meeting and I look forward to seeing you all at 17.00 p.m. on June 21st in the same place. Good-bye, and thank you!

Source: Narrative of the video recording made by Fekete Doboz. Series 18, tape 15. Fekete Doboz Archives, EKA-NKA Recordings.

Notes 1 Source of the list of participants: a report on the meeting published in Népszabadsag, June 14th, 1989.

2 The President of Parliament chaired the plenary meeting in accordance with the agreement made at the preliminary meeting between the Opposition Roundtable (EKA) and MSZMP. Matyas Szirés

noted in a radio interview on May 23rd, 1989, that he was willing to Act as a mediator for the talks between MSZMP and EKA. EKA’s statement of May 24th welcomed initiatives within MSZMP to start the talks, and noted that EKA “understood” the inclusion in the MSZMP delegation of “high profile representatives of government and Parliament” by authorisation from the Central Committee. Proposal 29 of the MSZMP’s Central Committee of May 29th invited the President of Parliament to chair the plenary meetings of effective talks. (See also: A Magyar Szocialista Munkdspart Kézponti Bizottsdganak 1989. évi jegyzékényvei. | vol. 1084. At the preliminary talks, the EKA adopted this proposal. 3 The Independent Lawyer’s Forum was not a member of the Opposition Roundtable as an organization, which is why Imre Konya represented the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions at the meeting. 4 See Document 3 for the Agreement. 5 Magyar Hirlap (May 24th, 1989) reported on the agreement between the Committee of Historical Justice and the official authorities regarding the key aspects of the burial of Imre Nagy and his fellow-martyrs. Further discussions were held about the details of the burial ceremony. 6 At the June 13th, 1989 meeting of the Politburo of the MSZMP’s Central Committee, Gyérgy Fejti noted that in two days more than 10 organizations had contacted Matyas Sztrés and others, asking to participate in the talks (MOL M-KS-2888. 5/1068.) The Hungarian Pro-Independence Party (MFP) had earlier expressed its disapproval of the talks.. The following is the text of the declaration issued by the latter through the National News Agency of the Hungarian National Telegraphic Agency (MTI): “The MFP would like to make it absolutely clear in the present critical and non-transparent situation which the country and society are facing that any talks aimed at a national consensus are doomed to failure as soon as the focus of debate is shifted to discussing negotiating positions rather than specific programs. This is because negotiating positions are about the ability to do the things which need to be done in order to achieve certain objectives, rather than about the political ambitions of certain individuals and organisations. Yet up until now none of these organisations, the MSZMP included, had given any clear evidence of their ability to take Action. The whole of Hungarian society must face the bitter reality that the mechanisms which could lead to a valid and enforceable decision acceptable to everyone about “who can do what?” are missing. And the people are silent, because this has been their lot for forty years.

The MFP disagrees with the repeatedly expressed intention of the Opposition Roundtable (EKA), claiming to be the sole representative of the Hungarian opposition. For the time being, any

claim about a unified opposition is doubtful. As long as both strive for exclusivity for themselves, we see no substantial difference between the power politics of the MSZMP and the Op-

306 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy position Roundtable. Using arguments based on the size of membership and past privileges is luridly reminiscent of a phase in our history which we are trying to overcome. Furthermore, we believe that it is not a good idea for the MSZMP delegation to include government representatives at the negotiating table. This could be perceived as proof of the survival of the single-party state and it being rejected merely for the sake of rhetoric. Instead, the way forward would be for the Party and the government to participate in the talks as separate entities, while the talks themselves would be about ways to work out and implement specific programs before all those representatives of the opposition and alternative social groups who support such programs, in accordance with the principle of one vote for each organization, primarily for professional reasons and, only to a lesser extent, in consequence of power politics. Calling the involvement of the Miinnich Ferenc Society—our national bogeyman—and other leftist organizations a source of threat to the success of the talks only underlines the weightlessness of the arguments of the Opposition Roundtable, as long as no mention is made about Christian parties and organizations such as the Alliance of Political Prisoners or Worker Solidarity. No wonder that the appearance is created of this being merely a mock reconciliation played over the heads of ordinary people, amounting to no more than the struggle of a newly emerging political elite against an existing elite which has already lost legitimacy but which is nevertheless trying to maintain its hold on it at all costs. If this political tactic could be made to work, it would serve the interests of certain groups, mostly certain industrial and economic leaders, who are personally motivated to maintain existing structures, since restructuring, whilst it would lead to an improvement in living standards, among other things, would also strip them of their current privileges altogether. At present no political organization has any measurable weight in Hungary. This is the first and foremost basic principle based on which the MFP tries to assess the realistic chances for a national compromise. Only talks based on a knowledge of government statistics, conducted with the involvement of all parties concerned, and based on mutual and maximum recognition of other players could result in an exploration of the situation, the working out of solutions acceptable to all, and, finally, to concerted action. Emphatically, and in awareness of its historical responsibility, the MFP wants to draw the attention of Hungarian society as a whole to the fact that the political game played in the name of ordinary people (but which does, in fact, completely ignore them) will end when the patience of people finally runs out, and those who are trying to earn tomorrow’s bread by engaging in empty rhetorical exercises have lost legitimacy, once and for all, to speak in the name of the people. Na-

tional News Agency of MTI, no. 159163, 159176. .

7 The agreement on the detailed thematic structure of the talks and committees to be set up was signed on June 21st, 1989. 8 Resolution of the meeting of MSZMP’s Central Committee held on February 10th—11th, 1989. For the minutes of the meeting see: A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsdganak 1989.

évi jegyzokonyvei. | vol. 1-206. For the official position of the MSZMP’s Central Committee on some timely aspects of the political system see: Népszabadsag (February 16, 1989). The February 20th—2 1st meeting of the MSZMP’s Central Committee adopted the concept of the new Constitution, stating: “In view of the political changes unfolding in Hungary, the creation of political plu-

ralism within the foreseeable future is highly likely, something which should be taken into account for drafting individual provisions for the Constitution.” A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyz6kényvei. vol. 1, p. 414.

9 The MSZMP Congress held on May 20th—22nd, 1988, decided to make a number of important personnel changes: Karoly Grész was appointed Secretary-General of the party, replacing Janos Kadar, who was, in turn, appointed President. Members of the new Politburo assisting the Secretary-General included: Janos Berecz, Judit Csehak, Csaba Hamori, Pal Ivanyi, Janos Lukacs, Miklés Németh, Rezs6é Nyers, Imre Pozsgay, Istvan Szab6 and Ilona Tatai. About the meeting see: A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart orszagos értekezletének jegyz6kényve. 1988. majus 20-22. Budapest: Kossuth K6nyvkiad6, 1988.

4, Opening Plenary Meeting of National Roundtable Talks 307 10 Act I of 1989 on the amendment of the Constitution included the declaration of the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, the right to form associations and hold public gatherings. Act II of 1989 enshrined the right to form associations, and Act III enshrined the right to hold public gatherings. Térvények és rendeletek hivatalos gyiijteménye 1989. Budapest: Kézgazdasagi és Jogi Koényvkiad6. vol. 1, pp. 3—18, 1990.

11 On June 23rd, 1988, the MSZMP’s Central Committee set up a working committee to prepare a comprehensive analysis of three decades of social and economic development and to review the Program of the Party. The committee was headed by Imre Pozsgay. By early 1989, the historical

sub-committee completed its report (Tarsadalmi Szemle, special edition, 1989). In the subcommittee’s assessment, what happened in 1956 was not a counter-revolution but a national uprising. Imre Pozsgay was the first to say this in an interview which he gave to a morning radio news program on January 28th, 1989. Népszabadsdag (January 30, 1989). Subsequently, the February 10th—1 1th, 1989, meeting of the MSZMP Central Committee approved the report of the historical sub-committee and supported the commencement of a debate, whilst emphasizing the importance of further fact-finding analysis. 12 During preliminary talks there was a dispute between the MSZMP and the Opposition Roundtable regarding economic talks. From the very start the MSZMP was trying to treat issues of economic crisis management with the same weight as political aspects. The National Council of Trade Unions (SZOT) was particularly adamant that economic aspects should also be sufficiently in focus.

13 The May 8th, 1989, meeting of the MSZMP Central Committee addressed the future of the Worker’s Militia. The meeting cancelled a previous resolution on Party control over the Militia and put forward a motion transferring control over the Worker’s Militia to the Council of Ministers. A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzokényvei. vol. 1, pp. 847-852, 903-905. 14 According to preliminary plans, the idea was to have the plenary meeting of Parliament starting on June 27th, 1989, to adopt the crucial laws which were the most heavily criticized by the opposition, namely the Act on political parties, the Constitutional Court, the President of the Republic and the coterminous amendment of the Constitution. Two drafts of the Act on political parties had been published, first in the April 19th issue of Magyar Hirlap and \ater—in an amended form—in the May 18th issue of Magyar Nemzet. The Bill on the Constitutional Court was published in the May 6th, 1989 issue of Magyar Hirlap. The Bill on the amendment of the Constitution was published both in Magyar Hirlap and Magyar Nemzet. The June Sth issue of Népszabadsag published three Bills at the same time: the Bill on the election of members of parliament; that on the election

council members. .

of the President and the Deputy President of the Republic; and the Bill on the election of local 15 Bruno Kreisky, the head of the Austrian Social Democratic Party and Chancellor, a collection of whose short writings was published by Kossuth Kényvkiad6 in the so-called “confidential” series, which was distributed to selected readers only. It was entitled “A politikahoz vizidk kellenek.” 16 Many, alongside with Imre Konya, made a contribution to the declaration of intent of the Opposition Roundtable, in the form of written documents, including—according to the June 15th, 1989 meeting of the Opposition Roundtable—Gyérgy Szabad, Péter Télgyessy and Miklos Szabé. As

Imre Konya recollects: “It was suggested that each declaration should be written by several authors, and these should be neatly combined into one. Gyérgy Szabad was one of these authors, the historian Laszl6 Morvay, a member of the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre Friendship Society, also contributed a version, and finally I did too. I was asked to write the final version based on the text contributed by Professor Szabad and to consult the Free Democrats in the process. Consequently,

we arrived at the final wording with assistance from Balint Magyar, Ivan Peté and Péter Télgyessy” [Andras Balint B.: Gydzelemre sziilettiink... Budapest: Progresszié (1990): 50]. The first draft by Gyérgy Szabad has been preserved, with some hand-written notes by the author, according to which the text had been used for the wording of Imre Kénya’s proposal. The following is the text of Gyérgy Szabad’s own proposal:

308 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy “Mr. Chairman! Distinguished participants! Driven by a sense of historical responsibility, and in line with the agreement of June 10th, 1989, we, the delegates of the member organisations of the Opposition Roundtable (list), came here to Parliament today to start effective talks with the representatives of the MSZMP as actual holders of political power, and with the delegates of other organisations which it had invited to the talks. In this joint declaration we wish to make it unambiguously clear that, in our opinion, these talks are aimed at ensuring a peaceful transition—free from any use of force—from the existing single-party state to a regime to be reformed, namely to a representative democracy, effectively restoring on the will of the people and the rule of law. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, we want to emphasize from the very start that, during these talks, we are not seeking to take away political power from its present holders, and we do not want to partake in exercising that power as a result of these talks—over the heads of, and without authorization from, the Hungarian nation— who are far from being indifferent about the transformation process, but who have not been consulted under government law. Our objective in relation to these talks is to put in place the political, moral and technical conditions for holding honest and free elections, to be thoroughly and prudently prepared and devoid of any malpractice. Our goal is to make sure that, indeed, the people of this country can decide, and do effectively decide, whom, and which political organisations they wish to empower to exercise political power between any two elections. However, at the same time we also want to ensure that the electorate do not have to make a random decision, but that they are thoroughly acquainted with the contents of the declarations of intent made by each political formation. We want to allow them to make a detailed assessment, and to evaluate the seriousness of the candidates of such organisations. (An essential prerequisite for so doing, amongst other things, is to allow every formation and candidate to use publicity via the press, radio and television, in addition to the publicity ensured by the meetings themselves.) We want to have a system of elections whereby personal affiliation to, and trust of, individual political formations can live side-by-side. We want to have an election process which is based on the principle of majority, similarly to those enjoyed by institutions of representative democracy, whilst leaving the rights of minorities protected in every respect, and allowing the people’s will to turn a minority into a majority and vice versa, at the next national elections or at the next local council elections. We are convinced that free elections can be kept free from the pressure of those in power, and that the electorate can be kept immune from any infringement of their personal rights and from collective retribution, anarchy and a base desire for revenge only if there is agreement between the opposition and those who previously had a monopoly on the exercise of public power. In this way free elections could, but will not only, lead to a moral reform of the public sphere and politics, but will also be a historic moment in Hungarian national history. We, the democratic organisations of the Opposition Roundtable, aim to create a political consensus (I am deliberately not using the word “compromise”, because we are against confirming

| any political formation in their former privileges, as was done by the Compromise of 1867), and we are doing so in the firm belief that the addressing of questions of government law is an essential prerequisite for recovering from the present political, moral, economic and social crisis, which our country was tossed into by a sometime criminal and sometimes purely incompetent exercise of political power. Whilst remaining committed to the fundamental importance of making a political compromise, we want to emphasise our readiness to participate in the peaceful resolution of the conflicts created by the economic and social crisis during the talks. Obviously we cannot take responsibility for the elimination of the consequences of the collapse of the economy before the elections, but we are ready to make any necessary preparations for active involvement in addressing such socio-economic crises, provided that the existing regime will provide us with the necessary information about the real situation. We are convinced that a general compromise supporting democratic transformation would not only trigger the life reflex of the Hungarian nation, which is currently drifting into a whirlpool of despair, by giving it new hope, and that it would not only channel emotional outbursts threatening

4, Opening Plenary Meeting of National Roundtable Talks 309 to spill over, by transforming them into an instrument of promoting private and public good, but it could even save former political power-holders from much pain associated with the continuing

survival of the remnants of despotism and resulting self-destruction. If we are convinced that democratic transition, supported by a general compromise is a matter of national survival, and if we are also positive that such a development would meet with the approval and, what is more, the support of the democratic regimes of the world and would receive attention from everyone else also, then we must perceive such transformation as the forerunner of the inevitable democratization of our country, whether or not we are ready to admit it. For nearly two centuries all progressive trends in Hungary have been basically of a democratic orientation, starting from the reform opposition through national movements, from radicalism through workers’ movements and to Christian democracy. In vain did the repositories of power try to stop them, either by privileges, intervention (from 1849-1956), deception or by force. They may have been pushed back but they could not be eradicated, since, every time they needed it, they found reassurance in peoples’ yearning for self-governance, the knowledge that truth was on their side and that democracy was the future. We, the Hungarian nation, repeatedly driven into the ground by imperialist, tsarist and despotic intervention, carved up by the Trianon Peace Treaty, and oppressed by Hitlerist and Stalinist dictatorships, must agree about the terms of peaceful democratic transition in order to guarantee human rights, the rights to work and to bread of every citizen of this country, to give this nation self-governance and to give this country independence. Everyone who has an eye to see, who has a sense of reason to judge, must recognize that democracy is not merely the future, but that it is already our present. The member organisations of the Opposition Roundtable hope that all power-holders in this country will—having realized their historical responsibility—shudder from the thought of exposing our long-suffering nation, and this tiny but much beloved country, to the agony of despotic regimes, and will take every chance to foster a democratic transition based on a general compromise.

Last but not least, we would like to emphasize that we want to see open, frank and honest talks, which repay trust by trust. To use a Reform Age slogan, we hereby declare that we do not think that the negotiating table is like a card-table, where one can only win what someone else has lost. This is all the more so, since we want to conclude these talks to the mutual satisfaction of all, whereby the Hungarian people emerge as the winners—at last—and take possession of what is already theirs and theirs alone, that is the right and effective opportunity for self-governance within the context of representative democracy, as was foreshadowed in 1848, 1945 and 1956, and as is now taking root in a modernized form.” 17 See the Agreement signed on June 10th, 1989. Document 3. 18 Act III of 1983 on the election of members of parliament and council members stipulated that the

candidate who received at least 25% of valid electoral votes in his own electoral district, besides the winner of the election, became a shadow member of parliament. Act XI of 1989 amending the Act on elections rescinded this rule. Térvények és rendeletek hivatalos gytijteménye (1989): 28.— A campaign has started to recall several members of parliament, as a result of which some returned their mandates, including Antal Apré, Mrs Ferencné Cservenka, Mihaly Korom, Gyula Varga and Miklés Vida. After such precedents, on July 22nd, 1989, interim parliamentary elections were held in three electoral districts: Géd6II6, Szeged and Kiskunfélegyhaza. 19 On June 3rd, 1989, the electors of electoral district 45 (the 14th district of Budapest) were asked to vote on a motion to recall Member of Parliament Sandor Dauda. The turnout was 43.6%, and of 8,704 valid votes 5,952 supported the motion, while 2,752 voted against. Népszabadsag (June 5th, 1989).

20 A reference to the speech made by Miklés Németh at the May 10th, 1989, meeting of Parliament about changes in the composition of government. The speech was published by several newspapers. See: Magyar Nemzet (May 11th, 1989).

BLANK PAGE

.)

Agreement among Members of the National Roundtable on the Thematic Structure and Schedule of the Talks June 21st, 1989

(MINUTES) | |

Agreement on Certain Aspects of the Thematic Structure and Schedule of the Political Reconciliation Talks This agreement, which was entered into on June 10th, 1989, by and among the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, the Opposition Roundtable and the Third Negotiating Partner comprising civil organizations and movements, outlines the basic principles of the political talks.! Based on these, the three parties to the talks have agreed, as follows, concerning their precise thematic structure, negotiating levels, the rules governing delegation to working committees and observers:

I. Thematic Structure of the Substantive Political Reconciliation Talks:

1. Definition of the Rules and Principles of Democratic Political Transition 7 a) Aspects relating to timing of the amendment of the Constitution, and questions relating to the Presidency of the Republic and the Constitutional Court; b) Legislation on the functioning of political parties; c) Questions of elections and electoral law; d) Principles of the amendment of the Penal Code and of the Act on Criminal Proceedings; e) Questions of information and communication; the new Act on information; f) Creating legal guarantees for preventing recourse to solutions based on the use of force. 2. Strategic Tasks for Combating the Socio-economic Crisis a) Strategic questions concerning economic crisis management (indebtedness, struc-

tural reform, inflation, etc.); | |

b) Social consequences of, and management methods for, the economic crisis; } c) Property reform, and, in particular, conversion from state ownership; d) Questions relating to landed property and the Act on Co-operatives; e) Central government budget reform and the Public Finance Act;

f) Competition law and anti-trust regulations, the removal of legal restrictions on commercial enterprise. It is the responsibility of the committees to segregate the above topics into sub-topics and to refine already approved items, as required by the progress of the talks. Effective discussion of the above will start immediately following the next plenary session. In view of the urgency of topics (a), (b) and (c) concerning political transition, all three sides believe it necessary to afford them urgent attention.

312 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Il. Negotiations will be conducted at 3 levels: — plenary meetings, with a generally declarative, political function;

~ two thematic committees, responsible for co-ordinating the work of experts and

Il. |

the finding of political solutions to resolve differences of opinion; ~ thematic working committees serving as a framework for the work of experts. The two committees will be appointed by delegations to the talks at the June 21st, 1989, plenary meeting,* and will be authorized at the same time to set up the relevant

working committees. The negotiating partners should present to the Chairman of the plenary meeting the lists of committee members and of working committee members continuously, but by June 30th, 1989, at the latest.

The Parties hereby confirm that they desire the plenary meetings to be open to observers. At the same time, they feel that the following criteria of eligibility should be adhered to when inviting observers: The Chairman of the plenary meetings will accept observers of: — de facto organizations generally known to possess a political platform ~ nation-wide organizations, and ~— organizations not represented by any of the negotiating partners. Budapest, June 21, 1989

On behalf of: .

| Istvan Gydrgy

The Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party: Imre Forgacs

| Andras Toth

Gyorgy Szilvasy

The Opposition Roundtable : | Balint Magyar Laszl6 Sélyom Csaba Varga

The Civil Organizations and Movements represented by the Attila Balint

Third Negotiating Partner: Gyorgy Drucker Robert Juhasz Gyorgy Lajtai

' Source: Népszabadsag, June 22, 1989

Notes ,

29th. . :

] See Document 3. 2 The plenary meeting did not make a separate decision concerning the appointment of committees. Committee I, appointed to debate aspects of the political transition, held its first meeting on June 26th, whilst Committee II, responsible for socio-economic issues, held its opening meeting on June

6

Plenary Session of the National Roundtable Talks June 21st, 1989 (MINUTES)

Minutes of the second meeting of the delegations of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, the Opposition Roundtable and of civil organizations and movements, held at the Hunter’s Hall of Parliament at 17.00 on 21st June, 1989 (Wednesday).! Matyas Sziirés, President of Parliament: Ladies and gentlemen! Distinguished negotiating partners! Last week—and this is no exaggeration—the whole country was watching the first plenary meeting of the negotiating partners, the Opposition Roundtable, the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party and the Third Negotiating Partner, (the latter made up of civil organizations and movements), the subsequent meetings of experts and any news from this quarter. * The reburial of Imre Nagy and his fellow-martyrs took place in the name of national reconciliation, which boosted politics and reinforced the nation’s moral fiber.

The very fact that all three parties to the talks will continue their work today in the form of an open plenary meeting, and that the number of those asking for observer status has increased even further,? signals that everyone is aware of their great responsibility to this country and nation. It is generally known that I have convened the next meeting of Parliament for June 27th to discuss the Bills and other motions put forward and to take a decision on them, of course. In connection with the meetings of Parliamentary groups and committees held over the last couple of days, I would like to draw the attention of the negotiating partners present that Members of Parliament have been following the talks very closely. I think it is justified to ask the negotiating partners to repay this attention by informing Members of Parliament in due time and in sufficient detail about the results of the talks and about any suggestions raised during them, and to allow them to formulate their own opinion. It is vital for all concerned to co-ordinate political reconciliatory talks with Parliamentary work.4 Members of Parliament are aware that the talks of the three negotiating partners are likely to determine very largely the social and political setting of their own decisions. In the current situation we have no time to lose, but hastiness and carelessness must not be allowed to dictate our actions either. For this very reason, I am asking you to make it your objective to continue these talks and to take them to a successful conclusion as soon as

possible, and I am doing so in agreement with those who warn us of social tensions and | problems accumulated in the past as being so multifaceted and complex, that resolving

patience. |

them not only calls for a joining of forces, but also that it can take a great deal of time and

The apparent conflict between pressure of time and having to make informed decisions can be resolved by continuing the talks very intensively in committees and meetings of experts.

314 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy Distinguished negotiating partners! In the few weeks since the first plenary meeting, experts in the delegations have agreed the precise thematic structure and negotiating levels of the talks, and the procedure for appointing working committees and for inviting

observers. ,

Now I shall announce the first topic. The substantive political talks are meant to: 1. define the rules and principles of democratic transition as follows: firstly: the time aspects of the amendment of the Constitution, questions relating to the Presidency of the Republic and the Constitutional Court; secondly: legislation on the functioning of political parties; thirdly: questions of elections and Acts on rights of suffrage; fourthly: principles of the amendment of the Criminal Code and of the Code of

Criminal Proceedings; ,

of force. |

fifthly: questions of information and communication; the new Act on information; sixthly: creating legal guarantees to prevent recourse to solutions based on the use

2. On the subject of strategic tasks of fighting the socio-economic crisis: firstly: strategic questions of economic crisis management (indebtedness, structural reform, inflation, etc.); secondly: social consequences of the economic crisis and ways to manage them; thirdly: property reform, particularly the change from state ownership; fourthly: questions of land ownership and the Act on co-operatives; fifthly: central government budget reform and the Act on public finance; sixthly: competition law and anti-trust regulation, removing the legal restrictions on free enterprise. It is the responsibility of committees to segregate the above topics into sub-topics and to further refine those already approved, as required by the progress of the talks. Effective discussion of the above topics is to start immediately following the next plenary meeting. In view of the urgency of items (1), (2) and (3) on political transition, all three sides believe it to be necessary to accelerate work on these. The second group of topics: Negotiations will be conducted at three levels: plenary meetings with a generally declarative and political function; two thematic committees responsible for co-ordinating the work of experts and finding political solutions to resolve differences of opinion; and thematic work committees serving as the framework for experts’ meetings. The delegations will appoint the two committees today and will mandate them to set up working committees. The third group of topics: The parties confirm that they wish to have their plenary

meetings open to observers. At the same time, they feel that the following criteria of eligibility should be observed when inviting observers: The Chairman of the plenary meetings will accept observers only of: — de facto organizations generally known to have a political platform, — nation-wide organizations, and — organizations not represented by any of the negotiating partners. That is all that I wished to say on the subject of the agreement.

Dear negotiating partners! As part of the first group of topics, let us now hear the speeches and representations on defining the rules and principles of democratic transition.

6. Plenary Session of the National Roundtable Talks 315 First, I am inviting Imre Pozsgay, who has been appointed by the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party to present this topic. I give the floor to Imre Pozsgay.

Imre Pozsgay:> Mr. Chairman! Ladies and gentlemen! Speaking on behalf of the MSZMP, I am pleased to conclude that the meetings of experts have led to this plenary meeting, allowing us to demonstrate our joint commitment to progress. I am encouraged to say this, based on the agreements to which Mr. Chairman was referring. Let me also say, specifically in reference to the items noted by Mr. Chairman, that, in line with the preliminary agreement, the MSZMP has respected the understanding

that no legislative work should be carried out and that no legislative Acts should be adopted until a preliminary political agreement is in place. Accordingly, and offering this both as evidence and as an act of good faith, I would like to confirm that we have recommended the government not to debate any critical Bills at the session of Parliament starting on the 27th of this month. Partly, I owe this declaration to our distinguished negotiating partners, and partly, I mean this as an invitation to co-operation.

As far as our respective roles in building democracy in Hungary are concerned, I would like to inform our negotiating partners about the MSZMP’s position. We want to build a political regime where citizens are the source of political will, and where this will is translated into practice via institutions built up from the grassroots and

by the authentic initiative of a civil society. In line with European politics and the experi- : ence of the 20th century, the MSZMP is ready to embrace a system of elections built on the principle of free elections as an—adequate—form of expression of the citizens’ will, and manifested in the contest of political parties. The MSZMP is ready to draw all neces-

sary lessons from its past political practices, by which I mean mostly what is in the MSZMP’s declaration of intent read out at our first meeting, namely that the MSZMP is breaking with the monopolistic way of the exercise of power, which had resulted from an overlap between the single party state and the concept of the ‘state party’ (that is the ruling party being identical with the state), and to face the challenge of having to win the support of citizens in the spirit of the aforementioned pluralism, and strictly by constitutional means, by putting forward a fair political program respecting national interests, and by pursuing a personnel policy in line with that program. This is the most important political aspect, which could probably serve as the basis for a general compromise for us all, and the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party will review its own organization accordingly and will transform it in line with this requirement. In accordance with, and as a consequence of, this approach, other political parties and their programs will be a major challenge for the MSZMP, but such competition will also be a great boon for citizens, since it will allow them to express their will freely and to make a free decision about politics. The regime must be based on mutual tolerance and understanding, from which it follows that the MSZMP is not seeking to impose its own world view and political objectives on society as a whole, either by force or by the use of various coercive measures; instead it is committed to having itself judged by elections. At the same time, the MSZMP does expect and hope that, in the course of such elections, it will be allowed to express its own social program freely and also its own world view and political ideas, just as the other political parties and social movements will be. I think this an important announcement to make about the MSZMP’s political intentions, and we do hope that it will have the desired effect on legislative work and the

316 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

choice of form of government. Consistent with the above principles, the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party believes that the ideal form of government for Hungary at the end of the 20th century would be a government based on the rule of law and constitutional guarantees. In order to be able to govern by the rule of law, urgently needed laws must be passed without delay. There can be no rule of law without making preparations for the amendment of the constitution, and passing Acts on elections, the form of government, the Presidency of the Republic, and the functioning of political parties. The Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party is aware of the paradox of the situation. All the things mentioned before will have to be done in a situation when many dispute the legitimacy of the very legislature which is responsible for passing these crucial Acts. This paradox can only be resolved at the negotiating table, and let me say that we should not try to block the work of legislators. Legislators should be given the green light if we want to save this country from having to embrace the rule of law in a state of hopeless paralysis and threatened by collapse; on the contrary, it should be able to do so with the hope of finally taking responsibility for the future of the nation and the country alike. The negotiating partners, who—as was noted before—carry varying degrees of responsibility, will have to come to an agreement finally about introducing the rule of law and a corresponding form of government. ° Therefore, the talks will have to result in a preliminary political agreement about specific Bills, based on which the government can take any draft legislation to Parliament in line with this agreement, in the hope that—as our Chairman noted before—the Members of Parliament are precisely aware of the political process unfolding in the country at present, and will accept and ratify the agreement reached at the negotiating table. Finally, to conclude this brief introduction and this one announcement among many, let me say that the MSZMP is neither blind nor ill-informed about these talks. It knows very well that, whilst it is taking its policy in this direction—hopefully irreversibly and with firm resolve—there are some political forces in this country who perceive this process as a sign of anarchy, as a sign of the collapse of a well-established universe fitting their ideas, and they are trying to hang on to a world in which they had been brought up and to which their ideals and commitments are anchored. In the name of tolerance, such attitudes should be perceived as an ingredient of open politics, whilst, at the same time, the MSZMP—being bound by its historical responsibility—must be the most adamant of all to combat the advance of such forces and not allow the people to fall victim to political rivalry. We wish political rivalry to find its expression in free elections for the benefit of the nation, whatever the consequences might be. We want to make this happen without a political and power vacuum being created, by keeping transition under control by Parliament and the legislature, and in line with the common will of the negotiating partners. This is what I wanted to add to the declaration of intent which was read out to you a couple of days ago,’ to point this out as a condition preceding progress, and to ask for the support of my negotiating partners on any issues where they see a possibility for taking concerted action. Thank you, Mr. Chairman! Matyas Szirés, President of Parliament: I thank Imre Pozsgay for the declaration. Now I invite the spokesman of the Opposition Roundtable, Professor Gyérgy Szabad. Gyérgy Szabad:® Mr. Chairman! Distinguished conference members! The organizations of the Opposition Roundtable are seeking to lift up the Hungarian nation by making sure that democratic rights are respected, and we are doing this in the sincere hope that

6. Plenary Session of the National Roundtable Talks 317 our peaceful and consistent efforts will be received with understanding and supportive sympathy not only in Hungary, but also in the Eastern and Western hemispheres, and particularly by the people and governments of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and the Soviet Union. As long as it is in our powers, no-one will be disappointed when asking us to repay trust by trust, friendship by friendship and readiness to co-operate with readiness to do likewise, provided that they are offering to do the same for the nation which is trying hard to recover from crisis. Distinguished conference members! As stated in the June 13th declaration of the Opposition Roundtable, we see the objective of the inter-party talks which we are about to embark on, and which, we hope—together with Imre Pozsgay—will continue until an agreement is reached, in bringing about peaceful transition from the currently existing regime based on the single party state to a representative democracy based on the rule of law. Therefore, we will be trying at these talks to promote an agreement to be enshrined in

law, ensuring that representative democracy, the foundations of which had been laid down in 1848 and which we are now trying to revive in a somewhat modernized form, can and will express the will of the nation at truly free elections. This is what our agenda is meant to promote, as our Chairman Matyas Sziirés read out. Regardless of the order of individual items on the agenda, and strictly in accordance with an inner logic, we suggest that we first of all start work on a system of elections.? We also recommend that the Bill to be drafted should ensure on the one hand that every elector can carefully weigh up all alternatives, and thereafter that the elector can decide freely, and in secret, by whom, by what political camp he/she wants their interests and political will to be represented. On the other hand, the new system of elections based on consensus should ensure that all political parties and organizations who are committed to the integrity of the fundamental principles of representative democracy and who reject any interference with the outcome of the elections by the use of force or dishonest means, can delegate nominees under the same democratic terms and can equitably campaign for their election by using legitimate means. The Bill should guarantee the integrity and democratic rules of holding elections, counting votes and announcing results. Amending the Constitution in its present form, as was pointed out by Matyas Szirés, is a pre-requisite for holding free elections. Among other things, we believe that it is inevitable that we replace the clause about single party hegemony in the existing Constitution with one sanctioning a multi-party system, a change which needs to be incorporated in the Bill to be drafted by the talks just beginning. It needs to be pointed out here that the passing of laws ordering the creation of the Presidency of the Republic and the Constitutional Court should also be left to a Parliament created by free elections. This being the case, however, does not mean that we are not ready to work out common basic principles at the inter-party talks, and thereby assist in the legislative work of the new Parliament also in this respect, without creating any

faits accomplis. ,

Furthermore, we believe that the re-incorporation of the principle of political pluralism (i.e. the multiparty system) in the country’s law of governance should be accompanied by a statutory regulation governing the founding of political parties, and the political, legal and material conditions of their functioning. It is important to ensure that those concerned can exercise without restriction their statutory rights for at least 3 months before the forthcoming elections. An appropriate reform of the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure law is vital for ensuring and safeguarding the right of all Hungarian citizens and all legitimate politi-

318 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

cal organizations freely to exercise their rights, namely, to have political freedoms extended, including the termination of the so-called emergency police measures and the revision of existing legislation on a range of offences. In our opinion it is vital to draft new Acts on communication and information, partly to assist voters to vote for those who can best promote their self-identified interests, and

to cast their votes, not as though blindfolded, but being protected as much as possible against demagogic influence. It is necessary, therefore, to draft a Bill to re-regulate and adapt to the requirements of democracy, freedom and public morality the inventory of instruments used by what we may term the ‘mind industry’, in order to ensure that all the political organizations who want to run in the elections have reasonable access to telecommunications, to the press and to the media, without, however, being able to abuse these channels of communication, as far as possible. It should be noted here that we are calling for the timely extension of greater protection for personal rights to include modern information systems also, as soon as possible. Last but not least, we think that safeguarding the freedom and democratic nature of the elections calls for the drafting of laws excluding even the possibility of using force in the public domain, among other things. We see the guarantees of doing so in the precise definitions of the rights and duties of the armed forces of whatever description, particularly those controlled by the national security service, and in creating an air-tight mecha-

nism of constitutional control over their operations and in the de-politicization of the armed forces of every kind. An agreement should be reached about the disbanding of the Worker’s Militia and of other armed support units. The right to bear arms, the service code of every armed force and both military and martial law should be reviewed and amended, as required. These issues should be delegated to a political working committee, to be set up in accordance with Articles 2 and 3 of Chapter 2 of the preliminary agreement of June 9th, 1989.!9 In our opinion the relevant committees should draw up their own work schedules,

as outlined by Mr. Chairman, based on the tasks to be defined in accordance with the above criteria, by taking into account the relevant section of the agreement quoted above, which states that working committees may set up sub-committees and invite experts. Naturally, the above should also apply to the recommended working methods of the economic working committee, noting however that—to our way of thinking—this committee should be responsible first of all for elaborating a comprehensive and realistic— previously missing—economic concept based on available information, to serve as a solid and reliable basis for future legislative work. The Opposition Roundtable is pleased to conclude, based on the latest announcement

made by Secretary of State Imre Pozsgay, that the government is ready to honour the obligation set out in the inter-party agreement of June 9, namely—lI am quoting the text of the agreement—that ‘for the duration of the talks the parties shall not take any unilateral measures which would render the talks unsuccessful’, in other words that no laws must be passed before a political agreement is in place. We are particularly pleased about this announcement, because—as the vast majority of the Hungarian people—the organizations and the representatives of the Opposition Roundtable believe it very important to make these talks a success; and to avoid any unnecessary blame and recrimination. We believe that this is what most of the people want, also.!! Matyas Sziirés, President of Parliament: I thank Gyérgy Szabad for his speech, and now I invite Istvan Kukorelli, spokesman for the Third Party. The floor is yours!

6. Plenary Session of the National Roundtable Talks 319 Istvan Kukorelli: Distinguished negotiating partners! Both public figures and debating partners! As the third negotiating partner, we accept the agenda which has emerged from the preliminary talks and which was read out by Matyas Sziirés. We have nothing to add to it!. We find the underlying concept of Item 6 particularly important, namely the rejec-

tion of any solutions based on the use of force and the use of instruments of direct political conflict. This idea should guide both our actions in the public domain and our future laws. We welcome the announcement made by Imre Pozsgay about the MSZMP not supporting the passing of new laws prematurely.!? Taking out new Bills from the decisionmaking process is neither a political victory nor a political defeat, but rather a sign of

sound political insight. |

Holding elections will be a key milestone along the road to peaceful and democratic political transition, and will also serve as a benchmark for working out a legislative timetable. The maximum and minimum speed of change will both have to be set in relation to this date. Let us see which of the six items on the agenda can be attained by the time of elections, and which will definitely have to be put off until after the elections? We agreed at the opening plenary meeting that the new Parliament to be convened after the elections should be the one to make the decision on the new Constitution, and no major constitutional amendments should be made until that time. Even so, 21 amendments to the Constitution have already been made since 1949. Three significant changes were made only this year. In the absence of a consolidated version of the Constitution, it is difficult to see exactly which effective constitution we are going to celebrate on August 20th. We suggest that we declare August 20th a national holiday of Hungarian statehood, going back to the foundation of the Hungarian state! We suggest that the Act on the Constitutional Court, which should be passed urgently due to the acute need for the Act on Political Parties, should be drafted by Parliament together with the new Constitution. The Constitutional Court, a vital institution of the rule of law underpinned by the separation of powers and impartiality, should be created only after the Constitution is already in place. Arguments can be made for postponing the debate of the Bill on the President of the Republic, and we are willing to accept a compromise on this point. But let us think carefully together, whether we should not make an exception with this Act. Clearly, the new institution of President should be debated in the context of the elections, rather than strictly in the context of the power hierarchy resulting from such elections.!? These are considerations for party politics and should be subordinated to the national interest. In the absence of a clear demarcation line between spheres of interest concerning integration, we must realistically prepare ourselves for the possibility that the country becomes ungovernable. Precisely for this reason we need to put in place some stabilizers. For instance, we have to think about who will conducting coalition talks after the announcement of election results? During the transition period, as in most countries, it is the President’s role to symbolize national unity. _ We would rather not argue for the Act on Political Parties. The need for such an Act first arose even under the single-party regime. We all remember clearly the debate about the Act on Forming Associations. What we are rejecting is not the need to regulate the functioning of political parties, since, in fact, their functioning can and must be regulated, but we feel that it should by done by other laws. .

320 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy The limitations on public authority as defined by the Act on Forming Associations are adequate, and there is no need to regulate the incorporation of political parties by a separate law, whereas the power of incorporation should be left with the competent courts. Regulating the economic activities of political parties should be postponed until after the elections. Here and now we should focus on putting in place the necessary economic infrastructure based on a bilateral and multilateral compromise. We urge and support this process for the sake of all newly emerging independent political organizations. Practical implementation is a government responsibility. Elections have top priority among political reform measures. We are in agreement with Gyérgy Szabad on this point.!4 In our view, local municipal elections should be held after having adopted the new Constitution and the Act on Municipalities, in accordance with the related special law. It is in our common interest to elaborate the Act on Parliamentary Elections as soon as possible. Doing so should take priority over all other topics of the next plenary meetings.

The Third Negotiating Partner supports having a single-chamber Parliament. The nomination process should be allowed to be governed by party politics, whilst not failing to respect the seriousness of the elections, and must not exclude any civil organizations and movements capable of organizing themselves. The system of electoral districts should be a provisional and mixed system, faithfully reflecting the country’s urban development structure. The concept of the single-mandate electoral district based on the principle of majority should be maintained for rural Hungary, where there is practically still no political stratification. The most important thing is to counterbalance the drawbacks of both election systems.

Election campaigning is of outstanding importance, and its code of ethics and the principle of equal opportunity must be enshrined in the new Act. The political impartiality of the organizations in charge of organizing the elections must safeguard its legality. It is not going to be easy to reconcile political differences concerning elections, since an ideal solution will have to be sought for an unstable political environment still in a state of flux. It is illusory to believe that there can be legislative methods which satisfy all political groups and the government in equal measure. We want to emphasize once again that we must put party politics at the service of national interests. A review of existing regulations on criminal acts committed against the state should not be delayed until the new Constitution is adopted. Every single article in the Penal Code should be reconsidered from the point of view of peaceful transition. The right to defense under the law should be given equal weight as public prosecution in the Act on Criminal Procedures, and the use of discretionary norms should be removed from the scope of coercive measures. In the longer run, legal action relating to offences should be removed from the control of public administration and the judicial system. On the subject of the 5th topic on communication and information: legislation is significantly legging behind real-life developments. Mass communication has become a source of power in Hungary, politics is in the public domain, and we see clearly that actual power belongs to those who control information. Act II of 1986 has turned out to be an Act on Journalism, but it has failed to regulate effectively the underlying concepts, for instance, the wording does not even mention “citizens” at all. _ We are urging that these Acts be adopted and suggest that the scope of the regulation be extended beyond the network of agents and include citizens themselves, whose personal rights should be protected. We are under time pressure to clarify the synergy be-

6. Plenary Session of the National Roundtable Talks 321 tween elections and publicity. Finally, we want to emphasize that today we can create our laws in a global political context, without being coerced to opt for a specific model. We have large room for maneuver, because we can learn from everyone and anyone. Let us

be careful not to take any steps that are alien from the organic development of this coun- ] try. In our opinion, Europe is divided into several historical regions, and we must not think that our choice is restricted to one of two models only. Now we have a chance to return to the Hungarian way once again, which does not have any tags attached to it, and we have a chance to avoid Hungarian history running up a blind alley once again. Matyas Sziirés, President of Parliament: I thank Istvan Kukorelli for his statement and now we have heard all statements on the first range of our topics. Can we now, therefore, move on to the second range: statements regarding the strate-

gic tasks for overcoming the economic and social crisis? I first invite Pal Ivanyi, the spokesman of the MSZMP, to make his speech. Pal Ivanyi: Mr. Chairman! Distinguished members of the conference! The MSZMP is committed to reaching an agreement during these talks concerning all vital issues of national concern, in view of the clearly outlined goals of each participant in the talks. We are convinced that the economic crisis and the build-up of social problems could turn into a destabilizing factor capable of jeopardizing peaceful transition to the rule of law rooted

in democratic pluralism. : This is why we think it is both important and inevitable that we include economic issues and aspects of socio-politics on the agenda of the talks. The MSZMP accepts responsibility for the current situation and is not trying to use these talks to transfer part of that responsibility on to others. However the pressure and

the urgency of the tasks which need to be addressed to build a better future—and our sense of responsibility for the future of this nation—demand that we take concerted action in connection with specific tasks. The MSZMP has worked out a program to reform the system of political institutions and to create a socialist type democratic rule of law, but at the same time it deems it equally important to create a viable market economy capable of

integrating into the global economy and ending the deterioration of living standards, governed by rational decisions and based on a mixture of state and private ownership. Translated into economic terms, the rule of law means economic constitutionalism, two principles which both supplement and predicate each other. International experience tells us that having to meet international debt service obligations whilst having to resolve tasks of wide implications at the same time, calls for political concentration. Over the past

15-20 years only those countries were able to meet similar requirements which were either under the rule of a dictatorship or were governed by a wide coalition. There are examples of both. However, let me emphasise that the MSZMP will accept only the democratic rules of the game. The MSZMP believes that recovery from the current economic situation is possible only by pursuing an economic policy open to the external economy, by fostering greater

choice and by promoting the efficiency of production. These are the principles which should underpin the creation of external and internal stability. Necessary and feasible development strategy must follow a growth curve which is open to globalization. The financing requirements of this will have to be created by fundamentally transforming the structure of the national economy and by additional inward working capital injection, rather than by going deeper into debt. The fact that, over the last decade and a half, Hungary had fallen into a debt trap and has also fallen behind other countries in terms of its ability to adapt to a changing macro-

322 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy economic environment, even if not entirely by its own fault, does not excuse the mistakes that were made. Debt crisis is a problem world-wide, and it predominantly hits countries which used to be, and are still, integrated into the global capitalist economic model. Remember that the success of a few countries in the world is fed partly by the economic failures of the rest. In addition to its debt service obligation, Hungary is also burdened by a technological embargo. The latter has been making our historically existing underdevelopment ever deeper and it is still the case today. At the same time, the former socialist economic model could not renew itself from its own resources. This model, which we are now seeking to reform, neglected to cater for the creative individual, it failed to use the autonomy and self-initiative of communities and it excluded competition. This is why we have committed ourselves to making fundamental changes. We are convinced that, if we do everything in our power, and if we consistently press ahead with reform, then the countries of the world who are ready for co-operation will give us a chance to catch up. For this we are jointly responsible. Economic modernization calls for adopting a new economic model. I would like to point out only four of the most important reasons for doing so. Operating the economy based on market principles requires the existence of proprietors capable of making rational decisions and directly affected by their own decisions. We are, therefore, trying to diversify an impersonal and bureaucratic state ownership structure and to lend it a personal aspect. We recognize indiscriminately all forms of ownership. We seek to end the current dominance of state ownership. We are not trying to replace it with private ownership but seeking, rather, to introduce new forms of public property, assuming the right of citizens to become property holders. We are seeking to promote the free and organic development of other forms of ownership. Only the functioning of a diversified market based on the structured co-existence of a variety of forms of ownership can underpin the freedom of enterprise, entrepreneurial attitudes and long-term proprietary interest. Statutory guarantees of this should be put in place. Secondly, our objective is to develop an efficient internal market and to allow market influences to play a role. We see the market as the primary institution capable of integrating the economy. Only if the market is socially ineffective should it be allowed to have recourse to non-market instruments. Market orientation and the acceptance of market values—as a general governing principle of the economy as a whole—goes hand in hand with a demand to the government to rely exclusively on market-conforming instruments. However the functioning, of a market economy does have some negative consequences for society. One is the appearance of a new phenomenon: unemployment. We are putting the emphasis on full employment as much as possible, as well as on the creation of new jobs and retraining. Social safeguards and services will have to be developed for those who become temporarily squeezed out of the labor market. We want to provide protection for the disadvantaged by strengthening the guarantees of a network of welfare institutions. The state will remain a pillar of our social policy. A rational division of labor between central and local organizations should be developed in order to enhance its efficient functioning. We see voluntary organizations of solidarity and mutual support as an essential element of the social protection net. Improving the living conditions of young people, first job seekers, large families, pensioners, people with impaired ability and the severely disadvantaged must be in our focus. Our aim is gradually to curb inflation by relying on the full inventory of anti-inflationary measures. Price increases can be permanently curbed only by facilitating greater choice, by

6. Plenary Session of the National Roundtable Talks 323 promoting profitable production and by operating market mechanisms which do not tolerate excessive costs, rather than by administrative price controls. A working antt-inflationary policy presumes, and demands, the existence of structural policy.

Fourthly, in line with its new roles, the state will have to be the central organizing force, responsible for overseeing the functioning of a healthy economic environment and safeguarding fair competition, putting in place social controls on government spending, co-ordinating central budget expenditure, and ensuring that society can decide for itself how to satisfy its own needs. We want to reform the economic, social and welfare functions of the state in such a way as to reduce significantly the currently inflated role of the central government budget in the centralization and subsequent redistribution of revenues. It has become necessary to reallocate control over public finance between government and Parliament, to modernize the financial management of central budget financed institutions and to put local municipalities on an independent footing. I also agree that there is a need to create a new and comprehensive politico-economic strategy. The political situation is made incredibly difficult by having to work out a consistent reform program and having to eliminate an acute economic and political crisis at the same time. In this situation one of the fundamental issues is: Who will pay the price for the economic change-over and who will be the winners in the process? Both economic and social logic dictate that any resulting burden should not be loaded on those already socially disadvantaged. At the same time, those individuals who show enterprise, create new wealth and perform better than others, should be rewarded by higher living standards for their good performance. The loss of hope by some could be avoided and social values could be reinforced by not aggravating existing social tensions, by refraining from making economically unfounded demands based on party political interests, and, on the other hand, by not demanding that an unreasonable gap is created between income levels. Economic problems are complex and multifaceted. We must talk about them openly and frankly. We will have to come to an agreement for the sake of the people rather than over the heads of the people. We have no illusions. The plank we have to cross is narrow and it will be easy to slip off it, but at least there is a plank to step on. Let us take this opportunity to cross over to the other side! Thank you, Mr. Chairman! Matyas Sziirés, President of Parliament: I thank Pal Ivanyi for his speech, and now I invite Ivan Peté, spokesman for the Opposition Roundtable. The floor is yours! Ivan Peté:'> Mr. Chairman! Distinguished conference members! Initially the Opposition Roundtable was going to focus, during these talks, only on the political aspects of peaceful transition. We wanted to ignore economic issues, not because we thought that the existing regime was good as it stood, or even that it could be improved by making

large of small adjustments. On the contrary, we believe that the economic system in its present form is hardly viable at all. The reason for this is that poor management and generally wasteful practice is a direct consequence of the ownership structure of enterprise which is based on state ownership of the means of production. This leads to major crises in every country with a command economy. The number one cause of this is the growing atrophy of state-owned companies and the declining role which rational economic considerations play in decisions. On the other hand, such companies are characterized by an exceptional ingenuity in blackmailing their “proprietors” by references to the public good, and at the end of the day we end up with having funds misappropriated from the central government budget to cover up for the consequences of poor management.

324 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy Under the existing regime, the cost of paying horrific state subsidies to cover up such losses must be born by society as a whole. In other words, undertakings in state and cooperative ownership are under threat by being at the mercy of their operators without any proprietary control. Private property is also under constant threat, because a state permanently losing out on its own assets can recover its losses only by regularly tapping every other form of ownership. General wastefulness not only undermines the economy, but it also encroaches on public services: education, healthcare and welfare institutions. Of the so called social achievements, only those still survive today which have not yet fallen victim to a wasteful regime, or which privilege influential social groups. Largescale experiments meant to eliminate economic deficiencies whilst maintaining state ownership yielded only temporary and partial results, or failed altogether. Despite being aware of the above, the Opposition Roundtable initially wanted to exclude economic issues from the talks, partly on the assumption that there can be no guarantees that any agreements will be respected until the necessary political guarantees are in place, and partly because it is difficult to separate the government’s operational responsibilities from its strategic tasks with regard to the economy, whereas the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable would rather not take upon themselves any of the government’s responsibilities before the elections and are unwilling to assume responsibility for the consequences of economic collapse without possessing the powers of government. Despite everything, the Opposition Roundtable agreed to include strategic economic issues in the scope of the talks. It was not simply a compromise decision taken for the sake of starting talks so vital to ensure peaceful transition. The Opposition Roundtable decided to do so because it discovered that the MSZMP and its government have been submitting and adopting Bills in Parliament, Bills concerning the system of economic institutions and the power hierarchy, thereby creating a “fait accompli” situation by the time that the democratic elections will be over. The Act on Transformation, which was adopted by the last session of Parliament in the name of ownership reform, is essentially about allowing the holders of key positions in works councils and companies to divide among themselves the rights of disposal over national property, free of charge. Clearly, these processes cannot be controlled or influenced by the same individuals who are directly involved. The ownership structure enshrined by the Act on Transformation irreversibly consolidates the monopolies which exist today, reinforces forms of behavior which are inconsistent with the market, which prevent or distort competition, and which hinder the creation of a truly capital-driven market. Furthermore, this Act supports the transformation into substantive economic power of positions previously acquired mostly on political grounds. The legislative enthusiasm of the government prompted the Opposition Roundtable to start making preparations for Bills on basic economic institutions and aspects of ownership. What will be at stake during the coming months is no less than who will own the land and factories of this country, and whether or not the new ownership system will be at all capable of being efficient and productive. Yet there is no point in starting to debate these questions unless the talks now beginning yield a result both on economic issues and economic legislation before the government submits its own Bills to Parliament, as has already been agreed by the negotiating partners last week and confirmed today once again. Another reason why the Opposition Roundtable agreed that there was a need to discuss economic issues was the recognition that—albeit it was unwilling to accept responsibility for the consequences of the crisis—the population would inevitably suffer the

6. Plenary Session of the National Roundtable Talks 325 consequences. We feel that it is our duty to grasp every chance to prevent impoverishment and to alleviate its consequences. Particular attention should be paid to the prevention of those phenomena, which can cause the greatest damage to existing life styles and can lead to the collapse of traditional social institutions, threatening rapid social marginalization or complete existential collapse. The social policy of the state, which is limited to the redistribution of scarce resources, became alienated and cannot safeguard its citizens from these phenomena, whereas the arbitrary, and often hasty, decisions of government, local municipalities and corporations have reduced to the minimum our ability to

plan ahead, whilst the situation is getting worse by the day. | Any debate about the economic and social consequences of the crisis is possible only if the representatives of the Opposition Roundtable, lacking powers and institutions, also can have access to vital, adequate and precise information which, up until now, has been mostly treated as a monopoly of those in power. Today the problem is not that the government would not see that the transformation of ownership and economic restructuring has become inevitable, alongside with the need to address indebtedness, curb inflation and moderate the adverse impact of the crisis on the population as far as possible, but rather that this government, having been being hijacked by the MSZMP, the apparatus and interest groups dominating individual sectors of the economy, is restricted to expressing the will and interests of the very same forces

which determine its scope for maneuver.

The legislative work of the last few weeks is a good example of why Parliament in its present form cannot control the government’s actions, precisely because it is dominated by the interest groups mentioned above. When the Opposition Roundtable is willing to talk about the economy, it is not seeking to substitute Parliament without being mandated to do so. On the contrary, until the elections it is committed to preventing any decisions serving the interests of narrow groups but capable of having a long-term effect. We have no illusions; nor must we. If we can come to an understanding here about the cornerstones of politics, then our achievements will yield tangible results.in the near future, but if we were to go into a debate about the economy, all we can hope for, at best, is creating the institutions needed for ending the economic nose-dive and our falling, increasingly, behind. With a political understanding leading to free elections, we could get an immediate grip on the present, whereas a purely economic understanding would

guarantee only the future. Thank you. , Matyas Sztirés, President of Parliament: I thank Ivan Peté for his speech. I now invite Laszlo Sandor, representing the Third Negotiating Partner. The floor is yours! Laszl6 Sandor: Mr. Chairman! Distinguished negotiating partners! I welcome you on behalf of the Third Side, who pay a special emphasis on ensuring that the treatment of the social consequences of the economic crisis and the strategic issues of eliminating such

crisis receive the attention they deserve within the thematic structure of the political reconciliation talks. It is our firm belief that, without discussing these topics, the talks, which are aimed at

reaching a political consensus, cannot rest on solid foundations. Conducting the talks along these two major lines is necessitated also by the fact that political reform is inseparable from the social and economic reform process. We should be warned by history that these processes must be developed in conjunction.

| ~ Tam convinced that the majority of society agrees about having these two aspects resolved together, and their trust can be restored only if the two areas are addressed in interaction.

326 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy To conclude my introduction I want to emphasize that the Third Side welcomes, and greatly appreciates, the toleration which the negotiating partners have exhibited during this early phase of the talks, and their sense of responsibility which had manifested itself in the inclusion of this second range of topics on the agenda. Representatives of the Third Negotiating Partner believe that the most urgent tasks include ensuring greater protection for the social groups they represent, such as those on a wage-based income, pensioners, young people, women and local communities, and safeguarding them from the consequences of economic crisis, inflation, job cuts and the shrinking welfare functions of central government. The enhancement of social security demands the reinforcement of institutional guarantees for the elderly, families with several children, young people starting a family, people losing their jobs and people with a reduced ability to work. When developing institutional guarantees for security in earning a livelihood, decision-makers should not try simply to copy models from elsewhere, ones created under different historical and social conditions from ours; instead we must seek solutions adapted to the Hungarian reality, by relying on previous experience. In our opinion it is an unavoidable task for these talks to work out related principles and specific methods. It is perhaps not without point to recall that I was earlier referring to the introduction of wage reform, as requested and worked out by trade unions, and to the implementation

of the social protection net. The Third Negotiating Partner believes that it is both urgent and necessary to work out a crisis management and economic development strategy. We think, of course, that it is the government who should be the one to do so. At the same time, and in our opinion, all organizations and bodies who have their own concept should be allowed to express their views publicly and to put them up for debate, and to reach a social consensus based on the outcome of such debate. We think it would be wrong to treat the tasks related to economic development strictly as a matter of long-term strategy. We believe that an emergency strategy should be worked out both for long-term development and for the immediate treatment of emergency situations, in other words strategic and tactical measures should be considered side by side. In our opinion, today it is not enough to focus on long-term objectives only, because it is also necessary to identify major milestones along the way. Our position is based on the assumption that economic growth is the key to overcom-

ing economic crisis both in the longer and shorter term. We see the mobilization of human resources as an essential component of this process. In line with this, we think that halting the further deterioration of the infrastructure supporting education, healthcare and housing is an essential precondition for developing human resources, and starting its modernization are tasks which cannot be delayed. Fostering the economic self-governance of producers and the participation of workers in corporate governance would—in our opinion—promote the better utilization of human creativity and initiative. There are specific institutional forms of doing so. We think it equally important to create the economic base underpinning the development of local communities and to allow them to utilize resources in an autonomous fashion. Other essential prerequisites of economic development include the exact definition of the causes of national indebtedness, as one of the main causes of economic crisis, explaining the way this self-generating mechanism works and taking tangible action to contain the process. Taking advantage of the possibilities offered by international trade diplomacy should not be neglected either.

6. Plenary Session of the National Roundtable Talks 327 It is obviously vital to take steps to address urgent tasks, transform the structure of the national economy and to create the conditions of lending leverage to the economy and of raising the necessary finance. In connection with this, it will be necessary to reconsider the existing priorities and nature of Hungary’s external economic relations. At the same time, doing so must not lead to a new kind of one-sidedness in economic relations with

countries of either the Eastern or the Western hemisphere, and to underestimating the national interest. The success of structural reform depends on our ability to enhance the employment mobility of the workforce and their ability to adapt. Improving the standards of vocational

training and retraining has outstanding significance—in our view—both in terms of strengthening the employment stability of workers and of the efficiency of employment. Finally, we want to emphasize that the ecological implications of the structural reform of the economy should not be neglected either. I do not simply mean environmental protection here; I am also talking about having to consider the potential economic impact of the environmental industry. The Third Negotiating Partner believes that the minimum program for the talks now beginning is to have a mutual exchange of information and ideas regarding the issues outlined above. However, in addition to ensuring publicity and promoting the dissemination of informing to citizens, the talks will have to culminate in the signing of several agreements about the fundamental economic and social problems faced by society, which

will have to be translated into tangible action. | On the subject of economic and socio-political issues I cannot remain silent about our view that the adoption of basic laws must not happen, and the process must not be predetermined, before the crucial political agreements are in place. Finally, allow me to make a proposal. This series of political reconciliation talks is a

great challenge for us all, requiring self-control and tolerance from everyone. In our opinion, it is time now to put aside games of tactics and obstructionism; and instead place our all-out effort at the service of addressing the problems burdening society. In order for this to happen, negotiating partners will have to demonstrate a readiness for compromise based on mutual understanding and constructive co-operation. We are ready for this. We will try to do everything in our powers to ensure that the talks continue with success. Thank you. Matyas Sztirés, President of Parliament: I thank Laszl6 Sandor for his statement. We have now heard all the statements and I suggest that we now take a short technical break and return to our work with a Questions and Answers session. Let us meet again at 18.25.

(Break) |

Matyas Szirés, President of Parliament: Distinguished negotiating partners! Let us continue with our work... The Questions and Answers session is next. I hope that you were able to collect your ideas during the break. First of all, I shall invite Imre Pozsgay, the representative of the MSZMP, to speak. Imre Pozsgay: Mr Chairman! Distinguished conference members! Allow me to respond briefly, because, after having heard the presentations before, I think that all the conditions are in place for us to go ahead with the talks and to work out the timetable in

328 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy accordance with the extract of the Minutes adopted and signed at the meeting of experts, and to continue systematically debating the issues which GyGérgy Szabad listed in detail in connection with making preparations for legislative work and political talks. Let me just add that, in line with our agreement, by setting up committees we have not, of course, created a new negotiating level or form of consultation; instead these committees will be perceived as a new political party to these talks. This is my interpretation and I would like to proceed and participate in the work accordingly. » Thank you. Therefore, from now on any specific and detailed matters will be referred to the committees. Matyas Sziirés, President of Parliament: I thank Imre Pozsgay. I suggest that now we proceed to offer questions and answers on each group of topics on our agenda individually. Therefore, I ask the MSZMP if there is anyone else who would like to say anything. Pal Ivanyi does. Please... The floor is yours. Pal Ivanyi: Thank you for the opportunity. I, too, will only make a few brief comments about what has been said. Let me start by saying that I accept that the economy is suffering from very extensive and extremely grave dysfunction. This is the very reason why—in our opinion—a change of model has become necessary. However, it sounds exaggerated to stay that the economy is unviable, since Hungary has been meeting its international payment obligations, and a bankrupt economy probably would not be accepted as a partner for international economic relations.!® At present it seems that, all its problems and troubles notwithstanding, the Hungarian economy does qualify as an eligible partner, and this is important. Perhaps being too judgmental does not, and will not, promote such partnerships. On the other hand, I am fully in agreement with the opinion that a fair and objective debate and exchange of information is possible only if negotiating partners can have access to all the information without which such debate would be meaningless. The MSZMP has made the first step by requesting the Central Statistical Office to disclose to the Opposition Roundtable any information produced by it.!” Obviously, we

will need more information beyond that. I too believe it is important. I also agree with the comment, and I think it is important that the creation of laws about-the economy should be preceded by a debate, and it is good if it is, and it is desirable that we reach agreement on as many issues as possible. Finally, I would like to comment on what has been said about the Act on Transformation. I agree that the lack of a complex approach to proprietary reform has left its mark on this particular Act and on legislative work in general. Undoubtedly, two restrictions had to be made when this Act was adopted: firstly, that the Act needs to be fully redrafted and reconsidered when the new Constitution is adopted, and, secondly, that the possibilities outlined by the Act on Transformation can work only under the conditions of full publicity, because all the problems pointed out can be eliminated strictly by having recourse to publicity. The Act on Transformation is not fully sound from an economic point of view; however, the existence of the legal loophole created by the adoption of the Act on Forming Associations did necessitate the adoption of such a temporary Act, and I also share the view that it is only temporary. Naturally I agree with all the topics raised here, although I have not personally commented on them, such as ecology, environmental protection and the human resources infrastructure. I think that these are important questions which are bound to re-emerge during the meetings of experts and during later talks, and we will have to come back to

them. I think that exchanging views is very important. |

6. Plenary Session of the National Roundtable Talks 329 Thank you very much. Matyas Sziirés, President of Parliament: I thank Pal Ivanyi for his comments. Let me ask, is there anyone from the Opposition Roundtable who wants to say anything? Gy6rgy Szabad, please. The floor is yours! Gyorgy Szabad: Distinguished members of the conference! I think that we are going to have frequent arguments during the talks, but let us not start by having an argument; on the contrary, J think that we can afford to face the idea of agreeing with each other. Let me speak very briefly about the significance of everything which was said by Imre Pozsgay about the freedom, impeccability and pragmatic purpose of the forthcoming elections, the significance of which I fully appreciate. Secondly, allow me to stress once again something that I said earlier, namely that we should welcome not just what is being said, but also what is being done perhaps, namely that—by the evidence of the announcement made by Secretary of State Imre Pozsgay— the government has synchronized its legislative work with the talks by giving a green light to the results of these talks being incorporated in future legislation. The government decided not to act prematurely. It was a wise decision both in terms of its substance and as a political message. And let me stress that it was also an act of political integrity, because it signals that the government is taking the agreement signed seriously. T would also like to begin my answer to Istvan Kukorelli on a note of concord, because we are already on the same wave-length on a range of very important issues. Let me emphasize how close our views are to one another on the subject of the Constitutional Court and the Act on Political Parties. As I have already noted, and it was also made clear in our proposal, we believe that the Constitutional Court should be elected by the new Parliament, all the more so, because we do not think it necessary to make the incorporation of political parties a responsibility of the Constitutional Court. If I understood Istvan Kukorelli correctly, than they too agree with me that the incorporation of political parties should not necessarily be made a task of the Constitutional Court. We also agree with the idea that the founding and functioning of political parties can be regulated by amending and extending the scope of the Act on Forming Associations. Let us add that it could have been done already, and there were signs that it would happen when the Act on Forming Associations was submitted and adopted by Parliament at the beginning of this year. I think that, despite there being an agreement

of opinions on this, it would be too early to speak about the possibility of taking a decision now. I think that this question will have to be decided from a practical point of view after everything has been carefully weighed up. In other words, the experts will have to consider what would be more expedient: to pass a new law or to amend and extend the scope of the existing one. The declarations of intent we heard all point in the same direction. There is more ambiguity in our positions on halting work to amend the Constitution. Jt is not because we do not all agree deep down with the idea that this Constitution of so many historical vicissitudes should be finally allowed to rest in peace after so much patching up, and without any further amendment, but because we do fully agree with the opinion at the same time that the new Constitution should be created by the new Parliament, and, what is more, we were among the first to suggest it. However, this being the case, we are faced with a legal case which needs to be addressed, even if just by adding another patch-up. I have stressed it before, speaking about the amendment of the Constitution, for instance, and I will repeat it again: that we have a problem which must be bridged over. The existing Constitution declared the existence of the single-party system

330 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy and the hegemony of that single party, and it is impossible not to record in the Constitution itself that now a multi-party system 1s legalized.

Clearly, there is still a difference of opinion on this point, at least that was apparent from the declarations made, which I hope we can bridge over. And, if I still have some time left, allow me to take up some more of your time. One cannot leave one’s profession behind in the cloakroom upon entering the conference hall. Let me quote, perhaps as an encouragement and perhaps as a confirmation to budding hopes, a fine saying from the Reform Period, namely that we do not want to treat the negotiating table as a card table, where the winnings of one party are determined by the losses of another. I am encouraged to say this partly by the results of today’s conference, because all negotiating partners present always have that most important—albeit invisible—party in mind, and our aim is to ensure that the nation will come out of this process as the greatest winner, the winner of all that we can give to it from the best of our will, here at the negotiating table, at the elections, and amidst the great enthusiasm that will follow. Thank you. Matyas Sziirés, President of Parliament: I thank Gyérgy Szabad for his words. Let me ask if there is anyone else who would like to add anything. Ivan Peto is going to speak. Ivan Peté: After listening to these fine words, which are probably true for the economic talks as well—in fact I do hope that they are—I would just like to make a couple of minor comments. Without wanting to expand on differences of opinion, I think it was clear from the very start, and even before these talks began, that all negotiating partners see the situation differently, but it also became clear to those sitting in this Chamber that we also abound in the willingness which is necessary to take these talks forward; therefore there is no point in expanding on existing differences of opinion and the assessment of the situation. The other thing that I wanted to say, and which was perhaps not discussed enough, or at least did not receive as much attention as it deserves, that, technically, it sounds like a good idea to treat economic and political talks separately, to make sure that one does not get in the way of the other. This is particularly true for economic talks, namely that any

delays in reaching agreements on economic issues should not cause any delay in the agreements concluding political talks, given that any agreement which can be reached within the foreseeable future on the subject of the economy would be limited to making postulates, theses and topics, things which can be addressed by laws. The first two topics listed in the agreement are unlikely to be finally resolved until the time of the elections. Yet, this being the case should not hinder the progress of political talks. The third comment I wanted to make, and there should be no misunderstanding about it, is—as we have already said—that the Opposition Roundtable is obviously reluctant to undertake any government functions or to become involved in the discussion of any issues that are clearly a government responsibility, and this is why we have not talked about some things which we also believe to be vitally important, including environmental protection and the environmental industry, and it might be best not to start discussing them at these talks. The fourth thing I was going to mention—it was perhaps apparent from the speech I made but I would like to confirm it once again—is that the Opposition Roundtable think it is essential to avoid social demagogy—remember that it is us who could make the best use of it but we are going to refrain from doing so, and what is more, we firmly reject it— as it would be highly dangerous in the current situation.

6. Plenary Session of the National Roundtable Talks 331 There is just one last thing, a response to one of the reflections just made, namely that when we are talking about the need to have access to information and a need for basic information, then we do not exactly mean the right to pay for statistical information published by the Central Statistical Office, but what we mean is to have more in-depth information. But this has already been alluded to. That is all. Thank you. Matyas Sziirés, President of Parliament: I thank Ivan Peté for his comments. I would like to ask the Third Negotiating Partner who will speak on their behalf? Imre Nagy will. The floor is yours! Imre Nagy: Distinguished Negotiating Partners! Speaking on behalf of the civil organizations making up the Third Negotiating Partner I do not want to react or respond to the declarations made about political or economic issues. We feel that this [meeting] is not the right time for having a detailed debate, as the talks were specifically set up to deal with anything of this nature. But mention must definitely be made of one thing, in order to confirm the ideas expressed by the speakers before me: during our last meeting, which was also held here, we declared before the widest public, and before the entire Hungarian people watching our readiness to co-operate in the name of responsibility for the nation. Our compatriots, our country, and even the entire Hungarian people and the whole of Europe were watching, filled with hope and expectations. The declarations which were made during these last couple of days and these last few hours of the debate gave evidence of the sincerity of our intentions and our determination to seek a compromise. We have avoided the initial pitfalls and averted the first obstacles, and we have made the first mutual rational compromises to build trust. I mean the inclusion of economic topics on our agenda and the removal from the agenda of the next Parliamentary session of Bills which will first have to be debated by the talks in terms of substance.

I also mean that it is tangible from the statements made here that our opinions have moved closer together on a number of things since the last time. Speaking on behalf of the civil organizations represented by the Third Negotiating Partner, we think that we have been able to come closer, or even express identical opin-

ions, on a number of fundamental issues, which gives us reassurance and grounds to believe that we will be able to discuss effectively any outstanding points of debate, and we will be able to find the solutions which best serve the interests of the nation rather than our own, as Gyorgy Szabad said. Lets work towards this and make progress. Thank you very much. Matyas Sztirés, President of Parliament: I thank Imre Nagy for his comments. Is there anyone else from the Third Negotiating Partner who wants to speak? No, there isn’t. Distinguished members of the conference! We have basically come to the end of our second plenary meeting. It is not for me to evaluate and qualify the work of the negotiating partners. However, I am glad to conclude that, as transpired from the statements, responses and opinions expressed, the parties to the talks have demonstrated mutual good will, a readiness to co-operate and creative intelligence. I think this is important, and it is also important that we have become even more hopeful. I can only strongly welcome what was said by Gyérgy Szabad, namely that, in the final analysis, all negotiating partners will do the right thing if they dedicate their work to making the Hungarian people and the Hungarian nation the winners in these talks, and this is the most important thing.

332 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

The other comment I wanted to make was that, speaking in the name of Parliament and on my own behalf, I would like to confirm once again that we will, of course, continue to do everything for the success of the talks, including taking care of the necessary technical and other conditions. I think this is also a substantial point. Based on the information received from the negotiating partners, | cannot announce a specific date for the next plenary meeting. I think that the experts are going to agree that as well. There is a technical announcement I wanted to make, namely that you will be able to

meet journalists at various premises here in the House of Representatives. The room allocated to the MSZMP, for instance, is Conference Room 56 on the main floor, whereas the representatives of the Opposition Roundtable may use Conference Room 55 on the main floor, and the representatives of the Third Negotiating Partner will meet in Conference Room 54 on the main floor, or they will be able to answer the questions of journalists independently, as the case may be.!® Finally, 1 wish all negotiating partners and all those present to have mutual understanding, and I wish that our entire society and people may benefit from a willingness to co-operate and from the good results. I am asking my fellow Members of Parliament, if they can hear me, to be patient. I wish everyone present a good working session until the next meeting. Good-bye, and all the best! The meeting was closed at 18.55 p.m. Typed and corrected copy.—MOL P. 2117, box 7, ref. 3.

Notes 1 List of participants in the plenary meeting (Source: Népszabadsag, June 22nd, 1989). On behalf of the MSZMP: Janos Berecz, Gyorgy Fejti, Pal Ivanyi, Imre Pozsgay.

On behalf of the Opposition Roundtable: Istvan Domonkos, Laszl6 Morvay, Karoly Vigh, Zsolt Zétényi (BZSBT); Gabor Fodor, Laszl6 Kévér, Viktor Orban (Fidesz); Imre Boross, Péter Hardi, Istvan Perpeliczay (FKGP); Tibor Ftizessy, Sandor Keresztes, Gyérgy Szakolczai (KDNP); Lajos Ftir, Laszl6 Sélyom, Gyérgy Szabad (MDF); Laszl6 Konya, Janos Marton, Csaba Varga (MNP); Andras Révész, Imre Takacs (MSZDP); Balint Magyar, Imre Mécs, Ivan Peté (SZDSZ); Laszl6 Bruszt, Ilona Fonyddi, Imre Kerényi (FSZDL). On behalf of the Third Negotiating Partner: Gyérgy Drucker, Csaba Kemény, Andras Varjas (BAL); Istvan Huszar, Lajos Istvan, Istvan Kukorelli (HNF); Laszl6 Boldvai, Imre Nagy, Béla Rabi (Demisz); Laszl6 Csillag, Marton Ispanovics, Sandor Sark6zi (MEASZ); Maria Dobos, Mrs Lajosné Duschek, Mrs Sandorné Fazekas (MNOT); Jozsef Aggod, Ferenc Berényi, Andras Széchy (MFT); Attila Balint, Mrs Késa Magda Kovacs, Laszl6 Sandor (SZOT). 2 Minutes of the June 21st plenary meeting. 3 The agreement of June 10th defined the observer status as follows: “The fourth side of the negotiating table can be reserved for observers. Observers can make their comments, if any, in writing, addressed to the Chairman of the talks, who in his turn has to inform the negotiating partners thereof.” (Document 3) The eligibility criteria of observers were sct out in the agreement signed before the plenary meeting and subsequently read out by Matyas Szirés. 4 At the June 27th—30th session of Parliament the government withdrew all Bills, the postponement of the debate on which was named by the Opposition Roundtable as a prerequisite for the continuation of the talks. It caused some division between Members of Parliament, as some expressed

6. Plenary Session of the National Roundtable Talks 333 the opinion that this new situation meant curtailing the legislative powers of Parliament. Requested by the Council of Ministers, Imre Pozsgay reported on the state of the political reconciliatory talks, asking Parliament to respect the government’s decision and readiness to co-operate, and to promote national reconciliation by legislative work, and by postponing the submission of crucial Bills to Parliament in a form as they are finalized by the negotiating partners. (Magyar Nemzet, June 28th 1989) 5 The speech (similarly to all others) was recorded in the Minutes not precisely in the form as it was reported by the press. Any discrepancy was attributable to shorthand recording errors or the editing of spoken speech. Any major discrepancy of substance is marked wherever it makes it difficult to understand the meaning. 6 The last two sentences of the speech in its printed form were different from how they were recorded in the Minutes: “Legislators should be given the green light if we want to save this country from having to embrace the rule of law in a state of being hopelessly paralyzed and threatened by collapse. There should be hope that the parties to these talks, who—as was noted at the previous meeting—carry responsibility for this nation and this country—albeit to varying degrees—will finally come to an agreement about introducing the rule of law and a corresponding form of government.” (Népszabadsag, June 22nd 1989). 7 Reference to the speech made by Karoly Grész on behalf of the MSZMP at the June 13th Plenary meeting.

omitted.

8 The wording of the speech resulted from the debate of the June 20th meeting of the Opposition Roundtable. Gyérgy Szabad read out the draft speech at the meeting. 9 The first part of the sentence was omitted from the speech published (the part referring to the speech by Matyas Szirés): Subsequent comments on Matyas Sziirés’s speech have also been 10 The wording of the agreement adopted by the plenary meeting of June 10th was signed in advance (on June 9th) by the members of the delegations responsible for preparing the meeting (see Note 1 to Document 3). The published text of the speech is dated June 10th. 11 The last two paragraphs were omitted from the speech published. 12 This sentence was omitted from the speech published. 13 In early June the HNF and Demisz issued a joint declaration supporting the Autumn election of _. the President of the Republic. Népszabadsdg, June 3rd 1989. 14 The reference to the speech by Gyérgy Szabad was omitted from the speech published. 15 The wording of the speech was finalized before the plenary meeting. The initial wording of Ivan Pet6’s speech was debated by the June 20th meeting of the Opposition Roundtable.

16 On June 6th, 1989, the second phase of the talks started two weeks before those between the Hungarian government and the IMF began. The reason for the talks was Hungary’s failure to fulfil its obligations and the resulting suspension of the disbursement of a short-term stand-by facility by the IMF. The agreement could not be signed until Parliament adopted the government’s draft package. See: “Folytatédnak a targyalasok a Nemzetkézi Valutaalappal.” In Népszabadsag, June 7th 1989.

17 Previously the Opposition Roundtable argued against holding economic talks on the grounds of lack of information. This is why information was offered from the Central Statistical Office.

18 Following the plenary meeting, the Népszabadsdg reporter asked Gyérgy Fejti, Secretary of MSZMP’s Central Committee, to comment on the talks: ‘Allow me to be optimistic enough to say that, of the 12 selected topics, I see none on which no compromise can be reached. The declarations made at today’s meeting, as well as at the opening plenary meeting, have been encouraging. There are still some differences of emphasis, and, as they say, the devil is always in the details.

Therefore | am not trying to create an illusion that it is possible to forge an agreement of equal | depth on every single item of the debate. The three partners to the talks have agreed on a concept whereby they do not necessarily have to close every topic by the time of the elections at any price.

(...) A major benefit from the talks will be that we will not have to start from scratch after the elections, although coalition partners will clearly be sought by a different method.’ Answering the

334 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy journalist’s question, the interviewee noted that, in his opinion, it was essential for the government to withdraw its Bills, as a token of its readiness for the talks, and of its resolve not to push through crucial Bills before the talks are over. (Népszabadsag, June 2nd 1989). The Népszabadsdg reporter asked the representatives of the organisations of the Opposition Roundtable: Imre Konya, Imre Kerényi, Lajos Ftir and Imre Mécs to comment on the declaration by Imre Pozsgay, and stressed, in the article which was subsequently written, the generally positive response. Magyar Nemzet asked Istvan Kukorelli of the Third Negotiating Partner, who said in his answer that the most significant achievement was the withdrawal of Bills already submitted to Parliament, because failure to do so could have blocked the talks. He called it progress that economic and political talks were accepted as equally important. (Magyar Nemzet, June 22nd 1989). The same issue of Magyar Nemzet published an interview with Laszlé6 Sdlyom and Balint Magyar. Laszlé Sélyom stressed that the talks were still in the preparatory phase. ‘I see it as an achievement that economic issues are structured around these forthcoming laws, but at the same time we are determined to revise certain provisions of the Acts on Transformation and on Land. It is likely that the debate on the two general economic topics will be a lengthy one’, he said. Then he went on stressing the importance of MSZMP having changed its initial position on the question of authority, in line with the initial position of the Opposition Roundtable, and so decided to withdraw the Bills which had been submitted to Parliament, Balint Magyar said in an interview: ‘Today’s meeting marked a turning point. Up until now the government was going ahead with its own plans of accelerating the work of legislators, apparently with the intention of consolidating its position by legitimate means under the new circumstances. By contrast, the talks which were started with various organisations of the opposition seemed unimportant, to which the government is now willing to make a sacrifice for the sake of success by agreeing that, in line with the agreement of June 10th, legislation must wait until a political consensus has been reached. This has cleared the way to ending having to undertake politics in the shadow of police truncheons and entering a political arena of competition by democratic and civilized means. | think we have quickly reached a result on fundamental issues. One of them is the system of elections: both parties are thinking in terms of a combination of individual and party lists, whereas the latest draft on suffrage rights has been fundamentally changed since last October and now incorporates many elements which were borrowed from proposals of the opposition. Another friendly gesture is the government’s willingness to postpone local elections until after Parliamentary elections. In addition, I see some hope for the postponement of the inauguration of the Constitutional Court and the election of the President of the Republic until a new Parliament is born.

7

~ Plenary Session of the National Roundtable Talks September 18th, 1989

(MINUTES) | Minutes’ of the plenary meeting of the trilateral political reconciliation talks held at 19.00 on September 18th, 1989, in the Hunter’s Hall of Parliament. Items on the Agenda: Debate on an item referred by the intermediate-level talks to the plenary meeting: An assessment of the general state of public affairs and common law. Signing of the agreement concluding the phase of the political reconciliation talks held between June 13th and September 18th, 1989. Chairman of the meeting: Lajos Horvath, Vice President of Parliament.

Keepers of the Minutes: Mrs. Andrasné Jakab and Erika Kanyar, (Parliamentary audio-typists).

Lajos Horvath, Distinguished negotiating partners! I welcome you on behalf of the administration of Parliament and Matyas Sztirés, the President of Parliament, in his absence’, wishing you a successful meeting (“Good Work!”). According to the report of the intermediate political reconciliation committee exploring the aspects of peaceful transition, the parties are already in agreement regarding the preparations for several Bills. In line with this, the representatives of the three negotiating partners are going to present to today’s plenary meeting the agreements, based on which the government may submit Bills to the next session of Parliament. I think that this is a very significant achievement of the negotiating partners, concluding the work of several months and conducted in the focus of public attention. The talks included 238 meetings of experts and committees throughout the period between June 10th—September 1 8th, taking up nearly 1,000 man-hours in total. A total of 1,304 people attended these talks, 3,439 pages of minutes were drafted in total and the number of Xeroxed pages amounted to nearly 200,000. The not insignificant costs associated with the talks so far have been born by Parliament, and, in addition, 3 conference rooms were put at the disposal of the three negotiating partners in the Parliament building. It is an honor for the House of Representatives to have been chosen for the venue of the talks, and the House of Representatives has been trying to create ideal working conditions. This is what I wanted to say for my part as a technical introduction. I am sure that the participants in the plenary meeting and public opinion are now more interested in specific agreements, therefore—as it was preliminarily agreed—I now invite the representative of the MSZMP, Rezs6 Nyers, to speak. Rezsé Nyers, Secretary General of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party: Distinguished conference members! Ladies and Gentlemen! After three months of tough nego-

336 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

tiations we have reached the conclusion of a phase. We can sign and seal the political consensus on the rules and principles of peaceful transition. This was achieved by joint effort, and demonstrates the constructive approach, the readiness to make an agreement and the self-control of all three sides. We have taken a major step towards building a political regime where citizens are the source of the political will and this will is enforced via a set of authentically empowered institutions built up from the grassroots. The house of Hungarian democracy will be built by us, shoulder to shoulder, by joint effort. Since May 1988 the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party has been consistently marching forward along the path of reform,’ towards its goal of building democratic socialism.

These are history-making times. There is no less at stake than the nation’s future. Preventing the crisis from further deepening requires a change of regime, introducing the rule of law and institutions of modern Parliamentary democracy. This new regime can be built only if based on mutual tolerance and understanding. Let us heed the warning of Lajos Kossuth, who said: ‘Let us not quarrel over what we have been, let us just unite for the sake of what we have to become!’ Having examined the political lessons of the recent past, the MSZMP believes that democracy and the principle of national sovereignty are values which cannot be substituted by anything else. At the same time we think and act in real life terms also. We have to be pragmatic and bear in mind that a change of political regime must not make the country ungovernable. We are all responsible for making sure that the economy will continue to function despite the fundamental changes taking place. There is only one way out of the economic crisis: by radically accelerating the economic reform process, raising the maximum possible amount of external finance, partly by promoting working capital investment. However this cannot be done in the absence of internal stability. A country with a tendency for self-recrimination and political infighting among the parties cannot expect to be regarded as an attractive partner by the governments of advanced countries and to be given a reasonable investment rating by the international world of banking and finance. Thanks to the MSZMP’s reliable and highly co-operative foreign policy, Hungary has deservedly gained the recognition and respect of other countries over previous decades. It is vital, too, that Hungarian foreign policy continues to contribute to European stability

and co-operation in the future. |

The democratic organizations represented here also can make, and have made, a contribution to fostering this tendency. We are deepening our co-operation with the advanced regions of the world, whilst being careful not to allow our loyalty to our allies in the East to be called into question.

When the delegation signed the document on the preliminary agreements,’ the MSZMP was motivated by the goal of changing the earlier ways of exercising power and was less concerned about the manner in which this power will be transferred. Remember, that it was the MSZMP itself which started to dismantle the single party state, and saw its main goal as creating a state based on the rule of law in its place. We are

convinced that creating modern institutions, even by European comparison, will both enhance political stability, enable peaceful transition and lead to a new national compromise. When we achieve multi-party parliamentarism, this does not mean that we will have attained democracy. When we committed ourselves to representative democracy based on pluralism we also aimed for more, and stronger, non-political participation by citizens and for the spread of local government.

7. Plenary Sessions of the National Roundtable Talks 337 In the MSZMP’s view, now that we have closed the first phase of the talks, the time has come to take to Parliament the Bills which we have agreed on. In our opinion Parliament can now fully discharge its historical mission as far as transition to the rule of law is concerned. We find unacceptable the growing campaign of recalling Members of Parliament, since this threatens both a smooth transition and democratic principles, and it jeopardizes work in the House of Representatives.” Holding free elections as soon as possible is in the national interest, but these cannot take place unless the functioning and financial management of political parties is placed on a sound legal footing and is safeguarded by legal guarantees.

The practices pursued by advanced democracies and civil societies warn us not to try to put restrictions on the functioning of political parties unless it is in breach of the requirements of the rule of law. This is why the MSZMP, as a party mostly representing workers, insists that the right to set up associations in the workplace is not limited either by statutes or by law.®

~ The MSZMP holds the institution of the President of the Republic to be a vital one. We believe that holding presidential elections this year is of prime national interest.’ Such elections would calm the country’s increasingly anxious public opinion as it faces parliamentary elections with an unknown outcome and the complications of a potential coalition government. It is also dictated by rationality and tasks related to maintaining and improving the country’s international relations. Parliamentary elections will take place in the foreseeable future in Hungary. I would like to stress once again in the name of my negotiating delegation that our party has undertaken to be judged by democratic elections. Only the free expression of the will of the

people can result in a new Parliament capable of carrying on with legislative work in awareness of its responsibility for the future of he nation and reassured by having the support of the Hungarian people. Depending on the outcome of the elections, the MSZMP is ready to share the responsibility of government with other political parties. Under the current circumstances, political formations are inevitably more prone to isolate themselves from others and to be preoccupied with creating and raising awareness of their own image. Nevertheless, even during the coming few months we should be trying to ensure that the political scene is driven by a sense of joint responsibility and by willingness to work together. We are living in history-making times and, to a great extent, it depends on this audience whether we can take advantage of the unique historic opportunity which has presented itself to us, and whether we can create a democratic state which is based on the rule of law and is committed to modernization. Our socialist reform party of the political left, now being reborn, is mobilizing all its resources in order to take advantage of this historic opportunity and is asking for support from every Hungarian citizen who feels responsible for the future of this country. Thank you for listening.

Lajos Horvath: Thank you. I would like to ask the Opposition Roundtable who is going to speak on its behalf? Péter Télgyessy, the floor is yours. Péter Télgyessy: The Opposition Roundtable have been listening attentively to the Secretary General of the governing party and Gyorgy Szabad will respond on our behalf.

Gyérgy Szabad: Distinguished conference members! Just a few moments ago we were still comparing words and consulting each other about sentences, trying to summarize the specific points of everything on which we could agree. If you recall how we started a couple of months ago, it must be said that we have achieved much of what we had set out to do at that time, although there is still some way to go.

338 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy Hungarian public opinion is going to find out soon what we could agree on and what we have compared our respective positions on, and I hope that the public will see that our efforts were not in vain and that the talks were not conducted over their heads. When these talks started, we said, in one particular phrase, that we did not want to treat this negotiating table as a card table, where the winnings of one party are determined by the losses of the other.® Instead, this negotiating table has been just as we had perceived it at the outset, the very thing into which—hopefully—we have been able to make it: a foundation on which we can build the Hungary of the future. Rezs6 Nyers has quoted Kossuth. Let me respond to him by echoing his own words. ‘As Kossuth said in April 1948, what we have achieved is not everything, but it is—and I would add ‘it could be’—the foundations of our future development.’ What we have created here could be described as a basis for action not only for political parties, and not only for rival politicians, but a basis for the people and its representatives, a modest foundation on which they could build the future house of Hungarian democracy, provided that Hungarian public opinion and Hungarian political groups use it well. Many might say that these foundations are narrow; but we say to them: make them broader! Some might say that the guarantees that we have created for the future of Hungarian democracy at present are insufficient, but we say to them: look after what we have achieved so far and make your own contribution—we will assist anyone who can make these foundations broader and who can take our achievements further for the benefit of this people. All we wanted to achieve was to make people aware of their strength and to make them want to use this strength, and to do so at free elections. We wanted to create the

conditions for a peaceful transition, and, although we might not have been able to do everything all at once, we think that we have done enough to enable the people, now conscious of their strength, to take action—within the limitations of the law—for their own future, after having understood the meaning of democracy and by freely expressing their opinion and will. Probably many of us here will never actively go into politics again, and we will give up our seats to others who are committed to building the future and to continue working on the foundations we created; but we shall be careful not to allow anyone to damage our achievements—whether you want to call these achievements too little or sufficient—the buds of democracy we have laid down to replace autocracy, and we are going to ensure that everything is ready to continue our work. Having fulfilled our mission, now we are withdrawing, but many of us will continue to build on, and to improve on, what we have started, in the hope that both present and

future generations will recognize what we have done, our concern for the nation, our integrity, our respect for the Hungarian and European historical heritage, and the courage

of people willing to take action to create a better, more far-reaching and more efficient | existence for posterity. This is all we wanted to do. We hope that those who will follow in our footsteps can do even better, that they will have even more courage and more creativity than us, and that—standing on solid foundations—they can do even more for a people who are in danger, but—let us hope—who can lift and hold their heads above troubled waters. Thank you for your attention. Lajos Horvath: Thank you. Who wants to speak on behalf of the Third Negotiating Partner? Nandor Bugar: Imre Nagy will speak on behalf of the Third Negotiating Partner.

7. Plenary Sessions of the National Roundtable Talks 339 Imre Nagy: Mr. Chairman! Distinguished negotiating partners! To those of my fellow-countrymen who are watching! In the name of the civil organizations represented by the Third Negotiating Partner I am pleased to welcome the achievements of the talks, the result of much hard work. We declare at this forum—and before the general public—that we support the Bills which were jointly worked out, and their submission to Parliament. We are convinced that these Bills are a sound basis for peaceful transition which is everyone’s desire, and are in line with the real interests of the vast majority of Hungarian society. Similarly, we agree with certain other agreements which cannot be enshrined in law. Before today, and before today’s agreement, preliminary debate dragged on too long and perhaps longer than necessary, but all of us wanted to do a quality and thorough job, which does, perhaps, excuse the lengthiness of the process. Compromises took a long time to be forged, and work went on up to the last minute.” Fortunately, political reconciliation talks accelerated quite well during these last couple of weeks, and in our opinion we should maintain this pace also in the future.!° Distinguished negotiating partners! A couple of months ago a number of organizations—who otherwise disagree about politics and sometimes are in conflict with each other—came together under the watchful eye of our compatriots, to work out by joint effort a rational timetable for peaceful transition, and the rules and guarantees of transition from the ruins of a hardly functioning social practice to a new regime still to be built, desired by everyone, and one which is better suited to the requirements of European development and Hungary’s own past. In other words we have undertaken to create a bridge between the past and the future of Hungary. We need to have a strong and stable bridge. It needs to be stable, because it is going to be crossed not only by a narrow party elite, but by the whole nation. It needs to be stable, because—as can be predicted—there is going to be a great deal of elbowing and jockeying for position, even among organizations who are still on the same side of the table or even in the same seat today. It is important to stress the need to have the courage to appreciate and have respect for the achievements made, as Gyérgy Szabad put it, and I fully agree with him: we have done nothing less than laid down the foundations of the house of future Hungarian democracy. Therefore, we have every reason to be proud, but we must be careful not to overestimate what we have done. I want to stress this, partly because our work was surrounded by much misunderstanding and unfounded illusion at the same time. We had set out to work out a joint proposal for peaceful transition. We joined forces to do a job, to serve a purpose, but not to take decisions. The power and responsibility of decision rests with the legislature and Parliament, and—unlike several of our negotiating partners—we consider Parliament not only to be a legitimate organization, but also a responsible and independent one. We do not, and cannot, have any decision-making powers, because the three organizations sitting at the table do not represent the full cross-section of Hungarian society, and do not reflect its valuable multi-faceted nature and variety. Remember how hard we fought to get ourselves recognized as equal partners against those who insisted on thinking strictly in terms of inter-party talks? And who will represent the interests of the organizations who are not here and of citizens who are not members of any organization? The other fundamental issue to be mentioned right now, is that our work has been directed towards promoting transition and laying down its foundations, rather than towards

340 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy creating the institutions of a democratic Hungary of tomorrow, even if we have started to build some institutions which will probably be of great value in the long-term. In our opinion, parliamentarism is vitally important, alongside with preparing for, and holding, free elections, but all this is but one slice of democracy, and, however important this slice is, it is perhaps not the most important, because the Third Negotiating Partner believes that self-governance and participation in civil organizations is just as important, if not more so. Distinguished negotiating partners! We have created some of the conditions and instruments for peaceful transition, we have agreed about the amendment of the Constitution and, within that, about creating the [Presidency of the] Republic.!! The organizations of the Third Negotiating Partner want to elect a President of the Republic as soon as possible, through direct elections by the people. We have agreed on a modern, but—let us admit—somewhat complicated, system of elections, and, as part of that, we have worked out a solution to allow the participation of civil organizations who do not want to function as political parties.! We have agreed about the rules of the functioning and financial management of political parties,!> and, if Parliament accepts our proposal, the necessary institutional guarantees can be put in place, such as the Constitutional Court!* and the Presidency of the Republic. Therefore, we do have something to protect already, we do have something to stand up for jointly, we do have a common goal to pursue; but there is still some work to be done, and I do not simply mean that we have to follow up on individual Bills, but I am referring to creating any other prerequisites of a peaceful transition, all the more because, in the opinion of the organizations of the Third Negotiating Partner, economic talks had been unduly delayed during the last few months.!° We have to ask these questions if we want to know what could potentially threaten peaceful transition, and what could pose a threat to having future mandates decided at truly free elections. If we were to allow social problems to escalate and if the masses stopped believing in democratic forms of power, then even the most perfect system of institutions would be in vain. Let us remember that

those sitting around this table mostly belong to social groups of the better-off, even if there are differences between them. The other thing which needs to be mentioned is that a decision about future mandates could be made behind the scenes, in the form of indiscriminate fighting over public property, so that, by the time we get to the elections, we would have a regime of unfair practices replaced by an even less fair one, only this time based on private ownership. It might seem like undermining the festive spirit to talk about the tasks still ahead, when we are here to celebrate the signing of this agreement, but we came here not to have a celebration but to continue to take action after having evaluated the results and based on appreciating them. Thank you for your attention. |

Lajos Horvath: Thank you very much. Distinguished negotiating partners! So we have reached a substantial agreement on all major issues, as outlined in the draft agreement ready for signing. I thank everyone for their responsible decision, your statements in relation to them and for your words commending the talks. I now invite the negotiating partners to seal the agreement with their signatures, and I invite Secretary of State Imre Pozsgay to forward the agreement to the government for further action, and I ask all of you to facilitate the enforcement of this responsible and history-making agreement.

Imre Pozsgay: Mr. Chairman! Ladies and gentlemen! I would like to make a pragmatic comment despite the elevated and festive atmosphere, hoping that it will not

spoil the party. Intermediate-level talks referred an important issue to the plenary

7. Plenary Sessions of the National Roundtable Talks 341 meeting, asking us to make an assessment of the general state of public affairs and of common law after the enactment of the Constitution, and, particularly, to make a decision about who should perform the functions of head of state until a President of the Republic is elected. The MSZMP delegation, although its initial position was different, finally accepted the arguments brought forward and recognized the rationale behind the proposals made by the Opposition Roundtable, and we came to the conclusion that the Council of Presidents should resign as soon as the amendment of the Constitution comes into effect, and that the President of Parliament would be the head of state until a President of the Republic is elected, in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions. This is the announcement I wanted to make, and I see it as another contribution based on which these talks may be called successful. Thank you for your attention.

Péter Télgyessy: Jézsef Antall would like to speak on behalf of the Opposition Roundtable. Jézsef Antall: I want to thank Minister Pozsgay for the announcement. | think it was vital to clarify this, because, if we were to breach the Constitution from the very moment of its birth, than this would be hardly a time or place to celebrate. That is what exactly would have happened, and this is why we are especially delighted that the MSZMP delegation has considered and accepted our position both from a common law and a political

perspective in this festive atmosphere. Let us hope that the implementation [of our agreement] will continue in a fair manner, and will be accompanied by similar behavior and similar statements. Thank you! Lajos Horvath: | invite the Third Negotiating Partner to express their view. Imre Nagy: Distinguished negotiating partners! I can make this very brief and concise: the Third Negotiating Partner agrees with the compromise reached on this issue. Lajos Horvath: Thank you! Now I ask you to sign the agreement, please. (Péter Télgyessy puts his hand up). Is something still not clear? Péter Télgyessy: We are just ready to start discussing the most important issue here, and so we are far from being able to talk about a full consensus. Apart from [creating] the Presidency of the Republic, this most important issue is the time and manner of the election of the head of state. The Opposition Roundtable has failed to adopt a common position on this point. Four of the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable have a different view from the other

five organizations.

Five of the nine organizations of the Opposition Roundtable are inclined to accept a direct election and that the time should be before the parliamentary elections. Four organizations find this unacceptable,!° and, therefore, the Opposition Roundtable will from now on proceed in the talks as follows: firstly, those five organizations of the Opposition Roundtable will announce their position on the matter, followed by an announcement by the organization minority. Now I yield the floor to Jozsef Antal. J6zsef Antall: Mr Chairman! Ladies and gentlemen! Following the announcement made by Péter Télgyessy, I am going to read out the position of the five organizations on this particular issue, namely the position of the organizations and parties who approach the whole subject from an angle of consensus, based on the entire process of the talks and the totality of achievements made so far. The organizations who support the idea set out below are as follows: the Bajcsy-

Zsilinszky Endre Friendship Society, the Independent Smallholders’ Party, the Christian ,

Party. , 342 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Democratic People’s Party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Hungarian People’s

Of the other four organizations, one is an observer to the talks, another—the Social Democratic Party of Hungary—occupies a position which is different even from the other three,!7 whereas the remaining two: the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz) have adopted a common position. To summarize: the position of the five organizations—the majority—is as follows. Two organizations, the Alliance of Free Democrats and Fidesz, share an absolutely identical position, while Liga: an observer with no right of veto, and the Social Democratic Party of Hungary will both express a position which is different from that of everyone else. Of course these organizations are going to state their position individually; I shall read out the common position of the majority. Now, therefore, we suggest, based on our copy of the amendment of the Constitution, which was compiled by the Ministry of Justice and based on the outcome of the latest session of the talks, and which is dated September 12th,!® that we incorporate in Paragraph 29(a) and sub-paragraph (1) of Article 15 thereof a reference to having the President of the Republic elected by Parliament for a term of four years in accordance with Act I of 1946. Article 4 should be extended to include a reference to the election of the President of the Republic in accordance with Act I of 1946. Furthermore, Paragraph 3 of Article 29/B, which reads: ‘a constitutional decree governs the election of the President of the Republic’, should be deleted from here and should be treated separately. Consequently, these five organizations want to amend the Constitution by restoring the republic as Hungary’s form of government in the Constitution. It was the Constitution of 1949 which revoked Hungary’s form of government (the republic), once enshrined in the Constitution of 1945 and adopted by the National Council winning the first free elections after the Second World War. I explained the reasoning for this several times before, so now I would rather not go into detail.!? The decision of the Opposition Roundtable is meant to signal that the restoration of, and transition to, the republic as the country’s form of government, and the amendment of the Constitution, will not happen pursuant to a law

created over the heads of people well in advance, but it will happen as a return to the original concept of the republic as created by the National Council, which was elected by the free will of the Hungarian people. This is underlined by the fact that the Act on the Republic goes all the way back to Act III of 1848, which created the common law foundations of modern Hungary and established the concept of the accountability of ministers.79

This is why it was extremely important for us to go back to this Act and to its underlying concept. This is what we mean by a change in the common law foundations. At the same time we appreciate the very difficult situation which transition has created in Hungary, and, naturally, we are committed to this transition being a peaceful one. Throughout its history, transition was always peaceful in Hungary, and even revolutions

were bloodless, as long as there was no foreign intervention. Therefore, we support peaceful transition and are willing to accept the text of the final clause of the agreement to read as follows: ‘If the President of the Republic is to be elected before [electing] the new Parliament, during the period of political transition, then electors shall elect the President in accordance with their general and equal suffrage right by way of a direct and secret [ballot], for a term of four years.’ We will make this exception as part of the global agreement applicable to the period of transition, the subject matter of the entirety of the talks. This is the clause we want to add to the Constitution, based on the assumption that

7. Plenary Sessions of the National Roundtable Talks 343 the existence of a special transition period makes it both possible and necessary to make such a distinction. At the same time, it means—clearly this is the common law interpretation—that, until a new Parliament is elected, a directly elected President of the Republic must perform the functions of the head of state. This President of the Republic to be directly elected will be the candidate of an institution, the Presidency of the Republic, which was once created and then was left unchanged, and which we have now revived within these walls in the name of historical continuity. Furthermore, it should be stipulated that an absolute majority of votes is needed to elect the President of the Republic, assuming at least a 66% (2/3) election turnout. This absolute majority of votes means 50% + 1 vote, and, in accordance with the political agreement, we want to combine this rule with the obligation to call parliamentary elections as soon as a President of the Republic is elected. A new Parliament must be elected within 90 days at the latest after the President of the Republic is elected. In line with the agreement signed, these requirements must be formulated as a separate clause, the precise elaboration of which should be governed by the above. The five organizations and parties have arrived at their decision in awareness of their historical responsibility, in line with the system of values which enabled us to talk to attain the known results. Our position is that, in this case, the President of the Republic to be elected based on the principle of national sovereignty could be directly elected, because, for the time being, representative democracy does not have full legitimacy. This is precisely why we need the President of the Republic to be elected in this way, and we believe that, in a situation when the institutions of representative democracy cannot function in the manner as is envisaged by the amendment of the Constitution, which we hope will be adopted, the Hungarian people should directly decide the outcome. We are convinced that the Hungarian people would never make a bad decision directly. This is why we are ready to accept this principle and to incorporate it as a separate clause in the Constitution. This is the position of the five organizations, and their reasoning in connection with the investiture of the Presidency of the Republic. Thank you. ' Lajos Horvath: Let me add something, before I give the floor to Péter Télgyessy. This announcement and your proposal for adding a separate clause puts me in a difficult situation, particularly because, according to the agreement of June 10th, 1989, the political reconciliation talks are to be conducted between three negotiating partners, and the agreement says nothing about any fractions within any of these.*! Therefore, let me ask if the other four organizations want to make any comment or proposal, because, if they do, then I would like them to make it now, before I give the floor to the other two negotiating partners and ask them to give their opinion. Péter Télgyessy: Speaking on behalf of the Alliance of Free Democrats, I would not only like to express my opinion about the head of state, but also about the whole negotiation process. The national reconciliation talks were initially started to assist the governing party and the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable to clear any obstacles in the way of holding free elections and a peaceful transition to democracy. Now when the draft agreement is ready for signing, we have to conclude that we have done only the smaller part of

our job.22 , |

Our achievements include having drafted the Bill on suffrage rights, that the vast

majority of expressions describing or referring to the single-party state have been deleted

344 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy from the proposed amendment of the Constitution?? and that the proposed amendment of the Penal Code and the Act on Criminal Proceedings bans sanctions for exercising political rights. Our agreements are either based on principles generally accepted by all negotiating partners, as was the case with the proposed reform of the Penal Code, or rest on mutual concessions, as was the case with the Act on Suffrage Rights. At the same time, we have failed to make progress on some other crucial questions, because the current executive

board of the MSZMP have consistently rejected any compromise of substance. The MSZMP refuses to withdraw its organizations from the workplace, refuses to give an account of the assets in its ownership or management,2* refuses to end its control of county level newspapers*° and refuses to consent to having the Worker’s Militia dis-

, banded.

At the same time, the MSZMP insist that the Presidency of the Republic should be created before holding free elections, and that the President should be elected before a new Parliament is created. Under these circumstances, we do not see the freedom of the elections truly guaranteed or that the principle of equal opportunities for all political parties will be respected.

Also, we cannot rule out the danger that the MSZMP will try to smuggle nonparliamentary positions of power into the post-election era, something which can call into question the rule of democratic institutions. For our part, we will not sign the agreement in its present form. However, speaking from a minority position, we do not want to tie the hands of the rest of the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable, and, therefore we hereby waive our right to demand that

. the Opposition Roundtable, as one of the negotiating partners, should make all its resolutions by the unanimous consent of all its members. In this way we will enable any fellow organizations to sign the agreement, if they want to. According to the MSZMP’s proposal, if there are any issues which the parties cannot agree on, the government should take the positions of all parties concerned to Parliament. In our opinion, Parliament in its current composition is not entitled to decide any issues which can affect transition, unless there is consensus relating to them between the governing party and the opposition. These talks had to be held precisely because this Parliament cannot authentically express the people’s will. Therefore, we propose that a referendum should be held on the fundamental aspects of democratic transition.2® The people should decide whether they want to confirm the agreement on its subject matter, and how do they want to address any issues still open.

: First of all, they should be the ones to decide whether they want party organizations to withdraw from the workplace. They should be the ones to say that the President of the Republic should be elected only after free parliamentary elections. They should be the ones to decide whether the MSZMP should disclose records of the assets in its ownership and management and whether the Worker’s Militia should be disbanded. We are calling upon the rest of the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable to join us in calling a referendum. We are calling upon the MSZMP and the Third Negotiating Partner not to block such a referendum. Now the Federation of Young Democrats would like to read out their statement. Laszlé Kévér: The Federation of Young Democrats sat down at the negotiating table in the belief that it could take seriously the statement made by the MSZMP about its readiness to promote political pluralism, the holding of free and democratic elections, and

7. Plenary Sessions of the National Roundtable Talks 345 to restore to Hungarian society the rights to which it is entitled, not as a gift, but which it can claim as its lawful heritage.

However, the negotiating delegation of Fidesz had, sadly, to conclude that the MSZMP did not unconditionally recognize the right of citizens and their organizations to equitable treatment, but, instead, that it constantly tried to make its recognition conditional on the flexibility demonstrated by the Opposition Roundtable in relation to issues which the opposition deemed not to be directly related to peaceful transition. During the talks, the MSZMP’s behavior changed for the worse on several occasions, which made us call into question its good will.*” Nevertheless, the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable—including the Federation of Young Democrats—never abandoned the negotiating table, and made several compromises, being driven by a sense of responsibility to society. The Opposition Roundtable has abandoned its initial position and consented to allowing this Parliament to elaborate the details of the Presidency of the Republic,2° agreed to major concessions concerning the Worker’s Militia”? and the setting up of the Constitutional Court,29 asking for similar concessions in return. Yet the Opposition Roundtable

failed to have the President of the Republic elected after the parliamentary elections, failed to obtain the MSZMP’s consent to having the Worker’s Militia disbanded immedi-

ately and without a legal successor, and, having decommissioned the large number of handguns held by certain social groups, failed to make the MSZMP withdraw from the workplace or to publicly give account of the assets in its ownership and management. In Fidesz’s opinion, all of these are questions which fundamentally affect peaceful transition and the creation of equitable political opportunity and which could also determine the durability of the foundations of future Hungarian democracy in the long run. Fidesz believes that the solutions outlined by the draft agreement are inadequate; therefore, it cannot support such an agreement, and it now associates itself with the statement just read out on behalf of the Alliance of Free Democrats. Lajos Horvath: Does anyone else want to say anything from the Opposition Roundtable? Péter Télgyessy: The representatives of the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions and of the Social Democratic Party want to speak. Istvan Gask6o: On the subject of the Presidency of the Republic, the Social Democratic Party agreed that there is a need for such an institution, as a sign of historical continuity, but it could not accept the exceptional nature of selection and the election of the president of the republic before the free elections. Otherwise it finds the agreement an acceptable compromise, and is ready to accept it in order to enable the enforcement of other agreements serving peaceful transition. Therefore the Social Democratic Party will sign and accept the agreement. At the same time, we want to add a separate clause to the agreement itself, to record our difference of opinion on the election of the President of the Republic. Mihaly Csak6: The Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions participates in the work of the Opposition Roundtable as an observer, as was pointed out before. It participates in the political reconciliation talks in the same capacity. Therefore, our starting point is that it is not up to us to formulate a position on the subject of the President of the Republic, which is par excellence a political issue. We came here to speak up for workers’ interests in connection with any labor issues, and to act as observers during discussions of such issues and to express our opinion. The only item like that on today’s agenda was the question about the MSZMP’s ac-

tivity in the workplace. The position of the Democratic League of Independent Trade

346 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Unions is very clear on this, and it is common knowledge that we do not want the MSZMP to be present in the workplace, precisely because it hinders, and is in the way of, the protection of workers’ interests. Therefore, we are against it, not so much for reasons of party politics, but much rather from the point of view of interest protection. Our position applies not only to the MSZMP organizations in the workplace, but to newly established political parties as well, which might at some time in the future try to build a network of contacts in the workplace and to organize campaigns which could have an effect on trade unions and interest protection. Similarly, we took an interest—even if to a lesser degree—in the MSZMP’s asset management practices. It does not directly concern us, but, given that questions have been raised about the assets of trade unions, we were interested to find out about how these

assets in party ownership were handled, for example. I can tell you that it has been a disappointing example. Our authorized representatives to the talks will, of course, inform their delegating trade unions, and any of their actions and statements made here are conditional on approval or rejection by their membership. The next step for us will be to inform our membership. I hope that we will get their approval, as in everything that we have done so far we had been follow- , ing the resolutions and theoretical instructions of the membership of our trade unions. Therefore, speaking in the capacity of observers, we are not going to sign the documents presented, but, in our opinion, this should not for one moment prevent political parties from doing everything they can on their part; it is up to the political parties concerned. Thank you for the opportunity to be here. Lajos Horvath: Let me ask if there is anybody who would like to say something on behalf of the member organizations of the Opposition Roundtable? Gyorgy Szabad: I would like to respond briefly to what has been said. We have not abandoned any of the postulates of our statement of intent made on June 21st, and the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable have a common position on the essence of the draft agreement, even if their opinions differ on some aspects.! This draft agreement enshrines partial results, and the only differences among the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable is that some of them see these partial results as a basis on which to attain the rest of their goals. Therefore, we need public opinion to understand that any difference of opinion among us is not about the need for democratization in Hungary, but strictly about the methodology to be used, and we do hope that we will meet the other two negotiating partners once again somewhere along the way towards building representative democracy, and that, at that time, we will have the support of all of the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable as well. Thank you for your attention. Lajos Horvath: Does anyone else want to speak on behalf of the Opposition Roundtable? Péter Télgyessy: I would not like to take the debate within the Opposition Roundtable before this plenary meeting, but, nevertheless, we have to conclude that the Alliance of Free Democrats could not sign this agreement because they think that the five organizations who want to sign it have been side-tracked from the original statement of intent. I need to make this absolutely clear, to make sure that we do not end this by saying that it

did not happen. I would like to stress once again that any internal dispute among the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable are not for this plenum. Jézsef Antall: Mr. Chairman! Ladies and gentlemen! The organizations of the Opposition Roundtable are fully in agreement with the opinion that we should not open an

argument here. It is obvious that given the existing differences of opinion and of the

7. Plenary Sessions of the National Roundtable Talks 347 analysis of the situation, there will be both correct and unfair things said outside these

walls, so lets leave it at that. , The other thing I wanted to explain is that the five organizations and parties, which have a generally more positive attitude to the whole agreement, see this agreement as a stepping stone, as a foundation and as an understanding. We can hold the other side accountable only if we have an agreement, and our intention was to agree with you what is fair and to hold you accountable for it. Therefore, we do not want to do anything that could threaten what we have agreed, and which is part of a modern European Hungary now being born, namely a modern European constitution, modern European suffrage rights and a modern European party system. Given Hungary’s external, internal and politico-economic background, we are convinced that other fellow members of the opposition also see it that way, ones which have, perhaps, adopted a different position from ours, but only because they made their decision based on other considerations. Therefore, the Opposition Roundtable is going to continue to function despite any difference of opinion, and we want to make our contribution to future legislative work together. 7 To summarize the above, and specifically for that reason, we are going to join forces again for the sake of what still needs to be done, and we are going to pursue these objectives.

For now I think this is all that needs to be said, and that these five organizations were just as firm as the others on the Worker’s Militia or the withdrawal of political parties from the workplace, as is supported by the resolutions and draft resolutions made, and we are going to stick to that.>* I wanted to stress this to avoid any misunderstanding. I think that now we have a clear understanding of what it is that we do agree on, and what it is that we are at variance about. Thank you. Lajos Horvath: Now I give the floor to the Third Negotiating Partner. Imre Nagy: Mr. Chairman! Ladies and gentlemen! We have been listening closely to representatives of the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable talking about their positions, and we appreciate their frank admission before this plenum of their existing differences of opinion. I would, perhaps, like to add that we do not identify the usefulness and democratism of these talks with full acceptance of the totality of our initial suggestions. In our opinion, it is entirely fair that all sides, all three parties to the talks, should make compromises, because it is the only way to make an agreement, today or in the future.

We are pleased to conclude that the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable— although their opinions do differ and they openly say so—are not trying to block the submission of the relevant Bills to Parliament, and this is what Péter Télgyessy has also confirmed. We agree with what Mr. Jézsef Antall has just said. We see the agreements made so far as a stepping stone also, being aware, at the same time, that we will still have to find a solution to a number of very important issues—as was pointed out in the statement made

at the beginning—including the ones he pointed out himself; and it will have to be a solution for which we can hold each other mutually accountable.

We welcome the fact that yourselves support the continuation of the talks, which means that we can continue the work which was begun on other issues. As far as the question actually being tabled is concerned, namely the proposal for the method of the election of first President of the Republic after the investiture of the Presidency as such, the position of the Third Side has been clear right from the start: we support and demand the direct election of the President of the Republic. We can go along

with the President being elected for four years, and we also support the election of the , President of the Republic before parliamentary elections are held.

348 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy At this time, we would not like to go into an argument about how the President of the Republic should be elected later on, because we firmly believe that this should be decided by the new Parliament which will emerge from free elections within the framework of a constitutional process. Our current opinion is at variance from that expressed by the five organizations of the Opposition Roundtable, but we could leave this question open today,

at least in our opinion. :

Lajos Horvath: Imre Pozsgay of MSZMP is asking to speak. Imre Pozsgay: Mr Chairman! Ladies and gentlemen! The delegation of the MSZMP does not want to join the debate which has arisen within the Opposition Roundtable on a number of issues, but particularly on the assessment of one vital issue. Rather, we would like to focus our comments on the proposal itself, as we have been doing throughout the talks. Yet I have to react to the comments and remarks seeking to belittle the achievements made at this negotiating table. I do not think that the words which were said, solemnly and unambiguously on this very day of our talks to celebrate these achievements had a false ring; I do not think that those who considered and called these important achievements as new foundations for the period of peaceful transition were guided by ill intentions. Let me also say that the greatest concern of the MSZMP delegation is to preserve the dignity of the talks. It could never accept the tone which has been used by the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Federation of Young Democrats on a range of subjects, and particularly on this one. We do not agree that anyone should feel that they have to speak at this table from a judgmental position. We all know and we have all experienced what the tricks of a judgmental mind can do, and it might be true that our side bears greater responsibility to the people than some other groups of citizens, as we have admitted also from the very start, but using the tricks of a judgmental mind—to put it nicely—is an unacceptable negotiating position. If we were to adopt this attitude, then it would be very easy to classify the comments made here today, obviously using publicity for their own purposes—be it on their conscience—as mere political propaganda, but it is up to them, of course.

‘What we were truly shocked, and please do not take this as trying to be clever, that fundamental and crucial proposals were brought forward here, such as suggesting that a referendum should be held about all or most [laws], whereas they could have been mentioned during the initial phase of the talks. We would have been glad to hear of these proposals, and none of us would have refused to discuss them. So who was being misled? Obviously the people were, on whom these talks were forced—because some used various tricks of publicity to compel their attention—and, from what they have seen, public opinion must have concluded that this is a chaotic situation at best. I think this is something else which we have to take into account. Let me mention something else that shocked me: I am concerned that the real problem here is not national sovereignty. My concern is, and do try to reassure me at our next meeting that my concern is wholly unfounded, that the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Federation of Young Democrats have no faith in the next, freely elected parliament either, because, if they had taken its sovereignty for granted, then they would see no problem with the expression of the people’s will and its re-incorporation into the country’s legal system, even if there is no agreement at the negotiating table. I wanted to point this out because I do not think we can afford to embark on peaceful transition with such an attitude of lack of faith and trust, and with such contempt for the people. We are not going to interrogate our negotiating partners about their reasons for having come to this or that conclusion; but, on the subject of this proposal too, our positions have

7. Plenary Sessions of the National Roundtable Talks 349 come closer—although our starting position was different—because we were willing to do so, because we recognized the importance of peaceful transition, because we thought it was important to consider compromise proposals; this is why we find acceptable the position of the five organizations. I need to emphasize once more that we have moved far away from the MSZMP’s initial negotiating position, but we agreed to do so for the sake of peaceful transition that was so frequently talked about at this table, and not in the name of being judgmental, but rather with the willingness to be judged, and we accept this compromise. Thank you very much, this is all I wanted to say. Péter Télgyessy: The Alliance of Free Democrats sat down to this negotiating table in the belief that our mission was to reach an agreement during these talks, based on which we will do everything in our power to make sure that free elections are held in this country at last. At the same time, we cannot endorse by our signature any action that would be tanta-

mount to antedating the powers of the newly and freely elected Parliament of the people. . The truth is that, up to the last minute, we hoped that no really important decision would be made at this table ahead of Parliament being empowered by free elections, and this is why we made major compromises on many crucial issues. As has already been said, we agreed to the setting up of the Constitutional Court, not because we wanted to antedate free elections, but because we too believe that the constitution which was outlined by the talks is, all-in-all, worthy of protection by the Constitutional Court. Similarly, we agreed to have a guardian of civil rights and many other measures.*? At the same time, we cannot take responsibility for agreeing to a manner of presidential election which would take Hungarian history in an entirely new direction, namely, by electing a President before free elections are held. I want to stress that we do not underestimate the achievements made; on the contrary, we waived our veto right precisely in order to enable the rest of our negotiating partners and partner organizations to sign the agreement. We do appreciate the results of the agreement. However, we want to make it clear that we cannot sign an agreement which does not include the withdrawal of the governing party from the workplace and the termination of the dominance of the party-state cascading all the way down to the workplace, | and the disbanding of the Worker’s Militia without a legal successor, but which does, on the other hand, create the institution of head of state. We decided not to take the responsibility on ourselves for the progress of Hungarian , history in a non-democratic direction and away from democratic transition, but towards presidential rule. To summarize: we have tried to allow our negotiating partners to sign an agreement which they find progressive. As we have reservations, we cannot sign it, because this agreement lacks several things which our organization believes must be included in the agreement before we can seal it with our signature. : Laszl6 Kévér: In my opinion, hopefully, this debate will go on for a long time in public forums. I do not want to go into this on behalf of my organization now, but, in the name of the Federation of Young Democrats, I reject Imre Pozsgay’s comment which described the position adopted by the Federation of Young Democrats as a matter of

political concept as contempt for the people. : Imre Pozsgay: Laszl6 Kévér himself entitled me to say so, since he used this same expression about the MSZMP, as is clear from the minutes recording his speech. Lajos Horvath: Is there anyone else who would like to say something? J6zsef Antall: We do not want to continue this argument because it could go on forever. Péter T6lgyessy commented on presidential power. I think no one knows better than

350 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

he that it is simply out of the question that the Presidency, as envisaged by the amendment of the Constitution which was created by joint effort, would work. This is all I wanted to say, let history and the Hungarian people decide. We accept responsibility, they will too, and then we can continue our work. Lajos Horvath: Distinguished negotiating partners! Is there anyone else who would like to say something? (Vo.) Please, ladies and gentlemen! In order to proceed and to take the relevant Bills to Parliament, some kind of an agreement should be signed by those who agree with the ideas of the draft agreement. Therefore, I am asking everyone to act who is willing to do so. Clearly, it is the government’s responsibility to inform Parliament of the existence of conflicting opinions when it puts the Bills before that plenum. Does anyone have any objection to my report? (No.) Then please sign the agreement. (The parties sign the agreement.) Ladies and gentlemen! Distinguished negotiating partners! By having signed the agreement we have ended our work today, and I close this Plenary Session! Typed copy.— MOL P. 2117, box 7, ref. 19.

Notes | Fekete Doboz made a recording of the meeting (Fekete Doboz Archivuma, EKA-NKA Recordings

no. 45, Tape 43). The shorthand minutes based on the video recording were completed or corrected in some places, as the meaning required. Any missing or corrected text is indicated in parentheses, omitting any incorrect text. Participants identified based on the video recording: On behalf of the MSZMP: Matyas Budzsaklia, Jozsef Csikés, Imre Forgacs, Istvan Féldesi, Zoltan Gal, Jozsef Kajdi, Rezsé Nyers, Ferenc Palvélgyi, Imre Pozsgay, Istvan Somogyvari, Andras Toth.

On behalf of the Opposition Roundtable: Jézsef Antall (MDF), Istvan Balsai (MDF), Tibor Baranyai (MSZDP), Sandor Bejczy (FKGP), Imre Boross (FKGP), Mihaly Cs4k6 (FSZDL), Istvan Domonkos (BZSBT), Gabor Fodor (Fidesz), Tibor Ftizessy (KDNP), Istvan Gaské (MSZDP), Miklés Gaspar (KDNP), Jozsef Gehér (BZSBT), Balazs Horvath (MDF), Laszlo Kénya (MNP), Laszlé Kévér (Fidesz), Laszl6 Morvay (BZSBT), Ivan Peté (SZDSZ), Istvan Perpeliczay (FKGP), Laszl6 Sélyom (MDF), Gyérgy Szabad (MDF), Zsuzsa Szelényi (Fidesz), Gabor Szigethy (MDF), Janos Teleki (KDNP), Ivan Timk6é6 (MDF), Jézsef Torgyan (FKGP), Péter Télgyessy (SZDSZ), Csaba Varga (MNP), Karoly Vigh (BZSBT), Laszlé Vitézy (FSZDL), Zsolt Zétényi (BZSBT). On behalf of the Third Negotiating Partner: Mrs Asbot Judit Thorma (MNSZ), Ferenc Berényi (MFT), Nandor Bugaér (HNF), Istvan Darvasi (MEASZ), Csaba Kemény (BAL), Imre Nagy (Demisz), Sandor Sarkiézy (MEASZ), Maria Ugréczky (MNSZ), Mrs Attilané Ujvary (MNSZ).

2 Matyas Sztrés, the President of Parliament headed a delegation on an official visit to the USA between September 14th and 20th, 1989. He met members of the US legislature and government, and also businessmen. On September 18th he met Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary General to the UN.

3 The MSZMP Congress, held from May 20th—22nd 1988, elected Karoly Grész as Secretary General in place of Janos Kadar, and several prominent members of the former party leadership were also dropped from the Politburo. Although the objectives of the Congress included reforming the party and the promotion of economic stability and institutional reforms, in 1989 these endeavors finally resulted in the adoption of political pluralism and of the dissolution of socialism, instead of reform of the party state.

7. Plenary Sessions of the National Roundtable Talks 351 4 The agreement about the commencement of the National Roundtable Talks on June 10th, 1989. See Document 3.

5 The August 9th, 1989 meeting of the Goodwill Committee also addressed the recalling of Members of Parliament. The MSZMP suggested the convening of this meeting, driven by the belief that opposition organizations were making a growing number of statements capable of building a lack of trust in Parliament, and there was a growing number of campaigns to recall Members of Parliament or urging their resignation. At this meeting Gyérgy Szabad denied that organizations of the Opposition Roundtable were fuelling attempts to recall Members of Parliament. The August 9th, 1989, meeting of the Goodwill Committee issued a statement which was published in the August 11th, 1989, issue of Népszabadsag, entitled “Korrekt, megfontolt targyalasokat.” Starting from the second half of August, 1989, there was a further increase in the number of motions to recall Members of Parliament. The September 5, 1989 meeting of the Good Office Committee reconfirmed its previous recommendation about the suspension of recalling Members of Parliament. For the relevant statement of the Goodwill Committee see the September 6th, 1989, issue of Magyar Nemzet. 6 On the subject of the MSZMP’s withdrawal from the workplace, the September Ist, meeting of the MSZMP’s Central Committee reviewed its promise made by Imre Pozsgay at the trilateral talks on August 28th, 1989, on banning party activity in the workplace. This meeting was, however, preceded by a meeting of the Political Steering Committee on August 31st, where Rezs6 Nyers and

Gyorgy Fejti firmly stood up against the MSZMP’s withdrawal from the workplace. MOL MKS-288. 5/1076. 7 The MSZMP set the date for the election of the President of the Republic on November 25th, 1989.

8 The speech was made at the second plenary meeting of the National Roundtable Talks, held on June 21st, 1989. The speech was made by Gyérgy Szabad on behalf of the Opposition Roundtable.

9 As they were determined to sign the agreement on September 18th, the negotiating partners decided at the September 15th meeting of the Intermediate level political reconciliation committee to convene an expert committee for that weekend (Saturday—Sunday), to try to reach agreement by ‘fast-track procedure’ on any issues related to the amendment of the Constitution and the Act on Political Parties, which the negotiating partners had until then failed to agree on. This meeting was followed by an intermediate-level political discussion, and, finally, the present plenary meeting.

10 The trilateral political discussion of July 27th was followed by a break lasting for nearly a month: but after the break intermediate political reconciliation talks were held, virtually without interruption—on August 24th, 25th, 28th and 30th and on September 4th, 6th, 11th, 15th and 18th, 1989,

respectively.

11 A substantive agreement about the Presidency of the Republic was reached at the trilateral political discussion of September 4th, 1989, where Imre Pozsgay announced the acceptance of Act I of 1946 in a modernized form, together with the clause relating to the Commander-—in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

12 At the September 14th meeting of Working Committee I/4 the negotiating partners reached an agreement about the wording of the draft proposal on the right of civil organizations to nominate candidates, which was put forward by the Third Side at the September 15th, 1989 meeting of the trilateral political talks. The negotiating partners adopted this draft proposal; although the Opposition Roundtable did so only on condition that an agreement must be reached also on the Act on Political Parties, in other words, on condition that the Act should give a clear definition of the criteria for nominating candidates. Otherwise, the necessary criteria must be laid down in the Act on the Rights of Suffrage. 13 As far as the Act on Political Parties is concerned, negotiating partners could reach an agreement only about the right to form associations, whereas there were several aspects of the functioning and financial management of political parties, on which no consensus could be reached, including

352 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy the activity of political parties in the workplace and the disclosure by parties of their assets and methods of funding the transition process. Thereafter the statements of the SZDSZ and Fidesz were read out briefly—dealing with these questions, amongst others. 14 The Intermediate-level trilateral political talks held on August 30th, September 11th, 15th and 18th also focused on the Constitutional Court. Finally it transpired that one of those issues had been referred by the meeting of September 15th to the meeting of the ‘fast-track’ Expert Committee I/1 held over the following weekend. A decision was made only on September 1 8th. 15 The Intermediate-level economic and welfare committee of the National Roundtable Talks held its first meeting on June 29th, 1989. The second—and last—meeting was held only on September 20th. In the interim period, subcommittees held meetings and the report of these meetings was read out at the second meeting, as above. 16 The September 11th, 1989 meeting of the Opposition Roundtable voted on the method of electing the President of the Republic. Five organizations voted “yes” for having a “direct vote on a single occasion”, including the BZSBT, the FKGP, the KDNP, the MDF and the MNP; whilst four voted “No”, including the SZDSZ, Fidesz, the MSZDP and the FSZDL. The negotiating partners failed to reconcile their remaining differences of opinion at subsequent meetings, and so they failed to adopt a common position. 17 The Social Democratic Party of Hungary expressed its own separate view later on in the meeting. 18 The Ministry of Justice recommendation of September 12th, 1989 regarding the amendment of the Constitution read as follows: Article 29/A, paragraph (1): The President of the Republic is elected by Parliament for a term of four years. (Instead of holding direct elections.)

Paragraph (4): a clause should be inserted about the election of the President of the Republic _ based on Article 4 of Act I of 1946 (election by Parliament). Article 29/B, paragraph (3): A constitutional act regulates the election of the President of the Republic. (To be deleted from here.) Closing Provisions If the President of the Republic is to be elected before electing the new Parliament during the political transition period, then he shall be elected for a term of four years, pursuant to the general and equitable suffrage right of citizens, by a direct and secret ballot.

Remark: |

An absolute majority (50%+1) of votes is required to elect the President of the Republic, assuming a 66% (2/3) turn-out. The following obligation was undertaken as part of the political agreement: Parliamentary elections will be announced at the same time as electing the President of the Republic, and such Parliamentary elections will have to be held within 90 days of their announcement. This requirement must be included in the clause concerning the transition. 19 The Opposition Roundtable first put forward its proposal regarding the Presidency of the Republic at the August 30th, meeting of the Intermediate-level political reconciliation talks. The proposal was read out by Jozsef Antall. On the previous day, the August 29th meeting of the Opposition Roundtable agreed that the amendment must be in compliance with the principles set out in Act I of 1946. 20 The concept of a responsible government accountable to Parliament was first created by Act III of 1848, i.e. this was the Act which introduced the parliamentary form of government in Hungary. The wording of the Act was published in a reprint edition, entitled 1847/8-ik évi orszaggyiilési

torvényczikkek. Budapest: AK V-Macecenas (1988): 10-16. : 21 “All three participants in the talks have the same rights in relation to working out a consensus. All

three parties shall be represented by one speaker respectively, who will be responsible for expressing a coherent opinion on behalf of the party concerned.” Agreement on the Commencement of the National Roundtable Talks (June 10th 1989). See Document 3.

7. Plenary Sessions of the National Roundtable Talks 353 22 In addition to the statement of the Alliance of Free Democrats see also the statement of the Federation of Young Democrats on the same topic, which was read out by Laszlé K6vér, as well as the special statement of the organizations who signed the agreement. 23 Socialism was one of the terms of ideology which provoked keen debate. The three negotiating partners could agree on a compromise solution at the September 4th, meeting of the Intermediatelevel talks: “The Republic of Hungary is an independent and democratic state based on the rule of law, where the values of civil democracy and democratic socialism are represented side by side.” 24 On the subject of accounting for the assets in MSZMP’s ownership or management, Working Committee I/2 discussed the proposal of the Opposition Roundtable at its August 30th meeting. The Opposition Roundtable put forward this proposal at the September 4th, meeting of the trilateral talks, and it essentially suggested that, by completing so-called “Annex 2”, all political parties—including the MSZMP—should individually disclose their inventory of assets whether in

their ownership or management. Subsequently, Working Committee I/2 discussed questions regarding accounting for assets and party funding only at its September 20th, 1989 meeting. At this meeting the MSZMP made a proposal regarding Annex 2, which the Opposition Roundtable did not find adequate as reflecting all the assets of a political party, including current and fixed assets. 25 On the subject of county-level newspapers, the position of the Opposition Roundtable was identi-

cal with that of the presidium of the MUOSZ, which was published on August 9th, 1989, and which called for greater transparency in the trilateral talks, including the transfer of control over county-level newspapers to the county councils, while ensuring appropriate social control. See “Nagyobb nyilvanossagot a haromoldalu targyalasoknak.” In Népszabadsag, August 10th, 1989. The question of county-level newspapers was discussed by the August 15th, 1989 meeting of Committee I/5, but the MSZMP negotiating delegation rejected the proposal of the Opposi-

tion Roundtable about ending the MSZMP’s monopoly on information, arguing that such newspapers are owned by MSZMP and as such they belong to the competence of Committee I/2. The question of county-level newspapers was raised once again at the October 3rd meeting of the Working Committee. 26 On September 24th the Alliance of Free Democrats announced their intention to call a referendum by starting to collect signatures on the following four questions: 1. Should the MSZMP withdraw from the workplace? Should the MSZMP give a full account of its assets? Should the Worker’s Militia be disbanded? 4. Should the President of the Republic be elected after or before the free elections? The so called referendum of the “four Yes” was held on November 26, 1989.

27 The first major set-back happened on July 26th, 1989, when the MSZMP changed its position on a number of issues in connection with the Bill on Political Parties, and on July 26th suddenly decided not to sign the compromise Bill adopted on July 24th. The next change of a similar magnitude in the MSZMP’s position was the resolution of the Central Committee of September Ist in which it was decided to withdraw the previous compromise proposal of the MSZMP’s negotiating

delegation on the Party’s withdrawal from the workplace. , 28 When the Talks began, the position of the Opposition Roundtable was that the President of the Republic should not be elected before electing a new Parliament. This was officially declared on June 13th, 1989, at the opening plenary meeting of the National Roundtable Talks, as part

of the statement of intent which was read out in the name of the Opposition Roundtable by Imre Konya and confirmed by the statement put forward by Gyérgy Szabad at the second plenary meeting on June 21st. On July 18th, 1989, in line with the resolution of the July 6th meeting of the Opposition Roundtable (EKA), EKA announced its bridging solution concerning the Presidency of the Republic, whereby: “during the transition period the President of Parliament could become an adequate stabilizer, provided that Parliament would recall the Presidential Council, which holds the powers of head of state today, amongst other things. Doing so would practically eliminate the powers of the Presidential Council, which should belong to Parliament, and, in addition, a

354 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy “limited set” of the powers of head of state would be transferred to the Speaker of Parliament.”

“Az Ellenzéki Kerekasztal a kéztarsasagi elndki intézményrdl.” Népszabadsag, July 8th 1989. 29 On September 18th, the day when the Intermediate-level political reconciliation committee held its meeting, the Opposition Roundtable acknowledged the statement made by Imre Pozsgay on behalf of the government, which he described as a trust-building measure. “According to the resolution of the Council of Ministers, the Worker’s Militia is an organization under government control, whose other functions and organization will be defined in detail by the reform of the National Defense Forces. Until that time, the government announces—as a trust-building measure—its decision to reduce the size of the Worker’s Militia from its present 60,000 to 40,000 by 1990. As a further trust-building measure, the Worker’s Militia will cease from military exercises and will also cease its involvement in the protection of law and order and public security, and will surrender its arms to the control of the Ministry of Defense.” The September 20th meeting of Working Committee I/6 came back to this statement. The Opposition Roundtable objected to the fact that Imre Pozsgay called this a trust-building measure in his statement, whilst the deadlines given seemed to contradict that. “The government resolution which was announced on June 30th, 1989 and confirmed on July 17th designated December 3 Ist, 1989 as the deadline for drafting a proposal concerning the future of the Worker’s Militia”. The statement made by the MSZMP at Intermediate-level is in contrast with this, when it talks about reducing the size of the Worker’s Militia from 60,000 to 40,000 by 1990. This sounds very much as though the decision has already been taken that there would still be a Worker’s Militia in 1990.

Consequently, the delegation of the Opposition Roundtable believes that the government should declassify its confidential resolution of June 15th, 1989 about the Worker’s Militia, and

should publicly disclose its content. | For these reasons the Opposition Roundtable propose to hold a referendum—if the Worker’s

| Militia is not disbanded immediately after the September session of Parliament—within 60 days of the end of the parliamentary session.” Az 1/6. szamu munkabizottsag 1989. szeptember 20-i lilésének jegyzokényve: MOL P. 2117, box 13, ref. 418. Parliament adopted a resolution to disband the Worker’s Militia at its session held from October 17th—20th, 1989.

30 Initially, the position of the Opposition Roundtable was that the setting-up of the Constitutional Court should not be discussed as something related to the transition: “It needs to be pointed out here that the laws ordering the creation of the Presidency of the Republic and the Constitutional Court should also be passed by a Parliament to be created by free elections.” (Political statement of intent read out by Gyérgy Szabad on June 21st, 1989.) However, at the trilateral political talks held on September 15th, 1989, the Opposition Roundtable expressed their willingness to accept the setting-up of the Constitutional Court, since several amendments had been made to the Constitution which were worthy of protection. At the same time, the Opposition Roundtable demanded that the institution of the Constitutional Court should be incorporated in the text of the Constitution, when the parties are in full agreement about the Constitution. 31 Gyérgy Szabad was probably referring to the second half of the section about the Presidency of the Republic in the statement of intent which he read out on June 21st, 1989: “the laws ordering the creation of the Presidency of the Republic and the Constitutional Court should also be passed by a Parliament to be born of free elections. This being the case, however, does not mean that we are not ready to work out common basic principles at the inter-party talks, and, thereby, to assist - the legislative work of the new Parliament also in this respect, without creating any faits accomplis. Document 6. 32 At the press conference held on September 19th, 1989, the six political parties who were the signatories of the agreement issued a communiqué, which read as follows: “Communique:

The Agreement of September 18th concluding the trilateral talks was signed on behalf of the

Opposition Roundtable by the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre Friendship Society, the Independent

7. Plenary Sessions of the National Roundtable Talks 355 Smallholders’ Party, the Christian Democratic People’s Party and the Social Democratic Party of Hungary. The following organizations declined to sign the agreement: the Alliance of Young Democrats, the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions, as an observer. The Bills and other agreements worked out by the hard work of several months were all deemed to constitute achievements worthy of being enshrined in the Agreement, all the more since the Government agreed to withdraw its Bills from Parliament for the duration of the parliamentary break. Therefore Parliament would have debated these crucial laws (Bills) in any case at this next session following the break and would have taken a decision on them. Our failure to reach an agreement would have exempted the MSZMP and the Government from fully supporting in Parliament the Bills which were adopted by the trilateral talks. In our opinion, our achievements provide sufficient grounds for signing the Agreement. We can hold the other party accountable only for issues on which we have reached an agreement. We have every right to demand forcefully that the Agreement be respected, something which those who declined to sign have failed to appreciate. What are these achievements? 1. Amending the Constitution, which rescinds the entire Constitution of the Hungarian People’s Republic of 1949 and all its clauses, one which had copied the Stalinist constitution, violating Hungarian national interests and undermining Hungary’s role in Europe. We have eliminated every feature of state socialism from our Constitution and we have created instead a modern European Constitution, which is adapted to Hungarian legal traditions at the same time. Hungary is to become a republic once again, with its form and institutions of government based on Act I of 1964 amending Act II of 1848. Hungarian common law did not recognize absolute monarchy, but rather a combination of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary republicanism, something which is a particular feature of Hungarian history. We have now created the Presidency of the Republic, which—in combination with the traditional European and Hungarian model of ministries—prevents the over-dominance of Presidential power whilst ensuring a power balance. This notwithstanding, we suggested the use of a one-off solution limited to the transition period, namely that the first President of the Republic should be elected directly (by way of a referendum), if his election were to take place before the new Parliament is first convened. We are convinced that the Hungarian people are able to make their independent decision and to express the common will. This is, therefore, a decision for the transition period and, as such, it will have to be incorporated in a final clause. Separate mention should be made of the fact that the amendment of

the Constitution—which was preliminarily approved by all organizations—allows the substitution of the head of state for a maximum of 60 days. Thus, the termination of the Presidential Council in connection with the amendment of the Constitution will call for the provisional transfer of the powers of Head of State, and, during this transition period—politically and legally—no parliamentary elections can be held. Therefore, any organizations who proclaim otherwise are being inconsistent even with themselves. We are focusing on institutions rather than on individuals, and on ensuring the country’s political stability, without which we cannot talk about resolving economic and social problems and cannot win and retain international trust. (We believe that the statement of the Social Democratic Party of Hungary, based on which they signed the Agreement, with the reservation of maintaining their previous position, was fair and correct.) 2. To our mind, another very significant achievement was the Bill on Suffrage Rights and the Bill on the functioning and financial management of Political Parties based on the Act on Forming Associations. Other achievements include the Penal Code and the related Bill on Criminal Proceedings. We have a very good opportunity to continue working on any issues still open. At the

same time, we insist that there should be no involvement of parties in state administration, no party membership for judges, prosecutors, etc. and on the depoliticization of the army and of the armed forces. We are firmly intent upon demanding the general withdrawal of the MSZMP from the workplace. We see a good chance of this happening as a result of the decision of Parliament,

356 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy and following the MSZMP Congress. What is most important is that the other side cannot refuse to honor this demand, as a sign of recognition of the uniform will of the Hungarian people. On the subject of the Worker’s Militia, the achievements made so far are a solid basis for making further progress, as it is the equally firm intent of the signatories—parties and organizations—to do so. We see this political process as a single whole and we have our trust in the inner strength of society and in its ability to enforce its will. This is what we wanted to lend the first impulse to.

Therefore, the signatories made no concessions in reality, rather they made sound compromises in line with the nature of the subject matter at hand. We are convinced that all organizations concerned know this, as, otherwise, they would have done everything to prevent such compromises. Yet they chose to allow this Agreement to be made, whilst reserving to themselves the right of objection and objective criticism, and of independent action. All of us have acted to the best of our beliefs, and we have undertaken to sign this Agreement accordingly and to be responsible for it, and we will most firmly hold the MSZMP to this Agreement.” MOL P. 2117, box 7, ref. 19. In “A satotajékoztatordél: Az Ellenzéki Kerekasztal a megegyezésr6l. A Demokrata Forum nem paktalt le az MSZMP-vel.” Magyar Nemzet, September 20th, 1989. In the letter below (September 20th, 1989) Jézsef Antall, speaking for five organizations of the Opposition Roundtable, asked for new statements to be enclosed with the agreement. ‘Budapest, September 20th, 1989 Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre Friendship Society Independent Smallholders’ Party Christian Democratic People’s Party Hungarian Democratic Forum Hungarian People’s Party Social Democratic Party of Hungary Dear Friends, Pursuant to the trilateral ‘Agreement’ signed on September 18th of this year, the government will submit to Parliament the Bills adopted here, together with any accompanying agreements. The Council of Ministers will consider these Bills at its meeting on September 21st. I was contacted in connection with this, as the EKA representative on the trilateral reconciliation committee, and was asked, urgently, to issue a statement concerning the special statement issued by the Opposition Roundtable during the talks. This means that our position regarding the withdrawal of party organizations from the workplace has been accepted. Our position will be incorporated in a version of the normative text of the Bill on the functioning of political parties, a Bill which will supplement the Act on Forming Associations. Given the pressure of time, I had no time to make preliminary inquiries of the six parties and organizations who signed the agreement regarding their opinion. We did, however, agree to make a statement and we were fully in agreement about its contents. Similarly, I have passed on to you our position regarding the Worker’s Militia for further discussion. Please find enclosed, therefore, a copy of my letter addressed to the six organizations and political parties, in my capacity as representative of the Opposition Roundtable, and a copy of our statement. The head of the MSZMP delegation, Secretary of State Dr. Imre Pozsgay, is going to present this ‘material’ to the Council of Ministers, and so it should be addressed to him. Kindly note the above. (Dr. Jozsef Antall) P.S.: The organizations who did not sign the agreement will be informed of the above informally at the next meeting of the Opposition Roundtable. The following statements were enclosed with this letter: “Statement: The parties to the talks defined and acknowledged the position of the Opposition Roundtable in Section 1 of the ‘Agreement’ concluding Phase | of the trilateral political reconciliation talks

held between June 13th and September 18th 1989, namely, that, in accordance with the letter

7. Plenary Sessions of the National Roundtable Talks 357 written by the head of the MSZMP delegation—Secretary of State Dr Imre Pozsgay—on [September] 14th) (3/b), the separate opinion of the Opposition Roundtable would be attached as a formal statement to the document to be submitted to the Government and Parliament. Regarding the Bill on the functioning and financial management of political parties, a difference of opinion arose, and could not be resolved, about the active presence of political parties in the workplace. The scope of consensual agreements (concerning the party membership of judges and prosecutors, the withdrawal of political parties from state administration, and the depoliticization of the National Army, etc.)—which were accepted also by the MSZMP delegation—did

not, as a rule, cover the workplace, as a consequence of the MSZMP’s position on the subject, with which we are familiar. The recordings and minutes of the statements of the negotiating partners also reflect the position of the Opposition Roundtable on the subject. Nevertheless, it is necessary to repeat, in this statement, the following: — the position of the Opposition Roundtable is to ban political parties from every workplace

without exception; :

— the MSZMP and its legal successors, if any, must—in our opinion—withdraw from every workplace by the close of election nomination lists before the elections, at the latest, and, if the elections are postponed to a later date, then by the time of the announcement of such elections; — in the interim period the MSZMP must cease every activity tantamount to control over the workplace, etc. (see the position of the MSZMP). It line with the position of the Opposition Roundtable, the withdrawal of the MSZMP from the workplace is an essential pre-requisite for holding fair and equitable elections and for liberating society from political pressure. Furthermore, the activity of political parties in the workplace would have a detrimental effect on work and production, which no responsible Hungarian government can afford, especially not today, when foreign investors totally reject the presence of political parties in the workplace. Budapest, September 19th, 1989. The Opposition Roundtable representative on the three-member Coordination Committee : (Dr. Jozsef Antall)” “Statement: Pursuant to the wording of the ‘Agreement’ of September 18th, 1989, based on Section 3/d of

the approved MSZMP proposal concerning the interpretation of the term ‘consensus’, the Oppo_ sition Roundtable remains absolutely determined to maintain its former position on the Worker’s

Militia, as was formally presented in writing in the Intermediate-level political reconciliation committee (please find a copy of this statement enclosed). The Opposition Roundtable accepts the measures described by the MSZMP delegation only as temporary and partial measures, and it believes that the trust-building measures capable of resolving the situation are the ones outlined in the proposal attached. The Opposition Roundtable made its proposal regarding the disbanding of the Worker’s Militia and the transfer of members to the Territorial Home Defense units of the National Army (National Defense Force) on a voluntary (individual) basis, and the taking of any other necessary measures, after having taken into account, and based upon, the concept outlined by the MSZMP delegation in the expert committee. Based upon the measures taken by the Government and the MSZMP to date, the Opposition Roundtable wish to continue the talks. Please attach this Statement as a formal addendum to the Agreement. Budapest, September 19th, 1989. The EKA representative of the Coordination Committee of three members: (Dr. Jézsef Antall)” An additional Appendix to the above Statements: Proposal concerning the disbanding of the Worker’s Militia The MSZMP delegation has presented its concept relating to the disbanding of the Worker’s Militia, according to which the so-called National Militia would be amalgamated into the National —

358 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy Army. In connection with this, and based on the above, the Opposition Roundtable makes the following proposal: 1 To declare the Worker’s Militia disbanded and terminated without a legal successor. 2 As the Act on National Defense permits voluntary army service, including the applicable remuneration payable to army reserve forces, there is no legal impediment to enrolment by in-

dividuals. :

3 In the list of army service categories not specifically defined by the Act, the third is the ferritorial defense unit, the others being combat units. The territorial defense unit is organized by county, and—to the best of our knowledge—has no recruits on its own payroll, but, instead, its scope of duties is exercised by the Worker’s Militia. This unit is responsible for the defense of the hinterland (for the security of public buildings, combating invasion by paratroops, etc). The manning of the territorial defense unit by volunteers would occasion no legal objections and would be fully acceptable, provided that an adequate proportion of such units was derived from the professional army, supplemented by former members of the Worker’s Militia individually (as military volunteers) by way of transfer (in which case their former years of service would be acknowledged) and not by amalgamation as an organization. 4 Naturally, volunteers in the Territorial Home Defense Unit would wear uniform, keep their fire-arms at the army base (including any equipment) and would stop using the distinctive symbols [of the Worker’s Militia]. (Previous Worker’s Militia uniforms and equipment would be transferred for safekeeping to a museum of the workers’ movement or military history). This unit would count as a military unit in every sense, the rules of its deployment and mobilization being governed by the general terms applicable to all other National Army units. 5 Upon transfer, professional service personnel would become subject to the provisions applicable to service staff of the National Army, and their service years would be acknowledged. 6 The rules of calling up reservists for army service are governed by the general provisions of the National Defense Act, and employers would be compensated for any loss resulting from time spent on service.

7 This is notified to garrison territorial defense units at existing army barracks, in order that buildings formerly used by the Worker’s Militia can be utilized for some other governmentfunded purpose.

Other aspects worth investigating include the demilitarization of unnecessarily militarized units (CV (Customs and Excise Militia, Prison Militia, Passport Control Officers and personnel other than the Border Militia etc. [sic!], the disbanding or transformation of paramilitary organizations, and the decommissioning of unnecessarily issued handguns and gun licenses (previously issued to holders of various government and party functions). (Signature: Jézsef Antall)” Attached to the Minutes of the plenary meeting of September 18th, 1989, concluding the trilateral political talks. MOL P. 2117, box 7, ref. 19.

33 On this day, at the September 18th meeting of the trilateral political talks, Istvan Somogyvari informed those present of the agreement made between the three partners at the ‘fast-track meeting’ of Saturday and Sunday, whereby the negotiating partners agreed on the need to have a Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil Rights and mandated the expert committee to work out the details.

At the September 20th, 1989 meeting of Working Committee I/6 the negotiating partners agreed to call for the creation of the institution of Political Commissioner, as defined by the original agreement, for the transition period, if no Parliamentary Commissioner of Civil Rights can be appointed within 30 days of the start of the next parliamentary session. The partners also agreed that the term of office of the Political Commissioner would be ended as soon as the Commissioner under the Civil Law enters into office. In “Az I/6-os szamti munkabizottsag 1989. szeptember 20-1 Ulésének jegyzékényve.” MOL P. 2117, box 13, ref. 412.

8

Agreement Concluding the Political Reconciliation Talks June 13th to September 18th, 1989 September 18th, 1989 (MINUTES)

Agreement concluding the June 13th—September 18th, 1989, phase of the political reconciliation talks. The representatives of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable and the civil organizations and movements of the Third Negotiating Partner declare that the talks, which commenced on June 13th, 1989, have been successfully concluded after a period of three months.

In line with the principles set out in the framework agreement, the talks served to create the political and legal conditions for peaceful transition, to introduce the democratic rule of law based on political pluralism and to seek recovery from the social and economic crisis. 1. The negotiating partners hereby declare that participants have arrived at a political understanding regarding the foundations of a peaceful transition. Their understanding has resulted in the following 6 Bills: — Bill on the Amendment of the Constitution; — Bill on the Constitutional Court; — Bill on the Functioning and Financial Management of Political Parties; — Bill onthe Election of Members of Parliament; — Bill on the Amendment of the Penal Code; — Bill on the Amendment of the Act on Criminal Proceedings. The negotiating partners shall forward the above-listed documents, enclosed as an appendix to the Agreement, to the President of the Council of Ministers as documents expressing their full political understanding. They will ask the President of the Council of Ministers to ensure that the government submits these Bills to Parliament in accordance with Act XI of 1987 on legislation.! The alternative proposals contained in these Bills | shall be accompanied by an authentic account of the position of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party and the Third Negotiating Partner. The negotiating partners acknowledge that, of the various positions reflected in the Bills, that of the Opposition Roundtable is formulated as a formal declaration.

The negotiating partners hereby confirm their decision to have the agreements adopted by their respective organizations, to uphold them publicly and to use every political instrument at their disposal to promote their enforcement. 2. The delegations of the three negotiating partners make a separate political agreement on certain other issues of a nature which do not need to be addressed by a separate statutory provision. The preamble contains, in part, representations made by the negotiat-

360 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

ing partners and, in part, their recommendations to government agencies and judicial authorities. The negotiating partners acknowledge and propose the following:

~ the period of peaceful transition shall start on the commencing date of the talks and shall end on the date of Inauguration of the new Parliament created by free elections, and any political agreements are applicable to this period. ~ participants in the trilateral reconciliation talks shall have political and personal immunity in respect of their actions in connection with the talks. They shall be responsible for any statement made here to their delegating organizations only. (The negotiating partners invite the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Justice,

the President of the Supreme Court and the Chief Prosecutor to ensure that the immunity of those concerned is respected.) — any political discrimination or discrimination in the work-place is in violation of the spirit of the framework agreement, and the philosophy of the negotiating parties concerning the rule of law and the enforcement of civil rights; ~ the suspension of coercive police measures for the duration of the transition period is an important trust-building measure. (The negotiating partners invite the Minister of the Interior to take the necessary action.) ~ in line with the position formally adopted by the Goodwill Committee of the talks, it is necessary to relax the pressure on Parliament and on Members of Parliament. Therefore, it is necessary, as far as is possible, to safeguard Members of Parliament from being unjustifiably recalled and from being unjustifiably urged to resign; 2

~ the multiparty structure underlying political pluralism must not involve materially greater costs for the population than the single party system; ~— the government should expedite its activity aimed at creating equitable conditions for the functioning of new social organizations and parties, and for those wishing to resume their operations. (The parties invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers’ Office to take the necessary measures.) ~ as a sign of financial self-control, the MSZMP shall transfer to autonomous bodies, from its total asset portfolio, buildings to the value of 2 billion forints for public purposes, including those intended to create physical conditions for the functioning of political parties; in addition to this the MSZMP has repaid 50 million forints to the central government budget from its current government budget subsidies; ~ the central budget finance requirement of the parliamentary election campaign is almost 100 million forints, to be allocated among nominees and any nominating parties and organizations on a normative basis. (The negotiating partners invite the Finance Minister to make the above amount available.) ~ the principle of impartiality shall be fully respected by the national media. For this purpose a “Committee of Impartial Information” shall be set up. Its members shall be delegated by the organizations of the three negotiating partners;

~ to promote political stability, the President of the Republic should be elected within the current year. 3 3. The negotiating partners agree that, based on the achievements to date, work needs to be continued to address any still unresolved issues concerning the peaceful transition. Expert committees should endeavor to reach agreement on the following: ~ procedures for the election of the President of the Republic;

~ acode of ethics for elections; ,

8. Agreement Concluding the Political Reconciliation Talks 361 ~ rules of publicity surrounding elections; — the new Act on Information; — the Act on Information Technology; — the Civil Service Act; — aban on discrimination in the work-place in the Labor Code; — issues concerning the transformation of the Worker’s Militia (the proposals of the Opposition Roundtable to dismantle the Worker’s Militia);4 — a waiver of the use of force to resolve political conflicts. Delegations to the plenary meeting mandate the intermediate-level working committee appointed to address the political transition process to sign any agreements necessary for the above.” The representatives of the three negotiating partners hereby declare that the rules and principles intended to ensure peaceful transition are an inseparable part of this political agreement. The negotiating partners hereby confirm by their signature hereunder that they have taken a major step towards the creation of a democratic Hungary based on parliamentary principles, and have changed the future of the Hungarian people for the better. Budapest, September 18th, 1989 On behalf of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party:

Rezso Nyers Imre Pozsgay

| On behalf of the Opposition Roundtable: Dr Karoly Vigh Dr Zsolt Zétényi Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre FriendshipSociety Federation of Young Democrats®

Dr Imre Boross Istvan Prepeliczay Independent Smallholders’ Party

Dr Tibor Fiizessy Dr Janos Teleki Christian Democratic People’s Party

Dr Jozsef Antall Dr Gy6érgy Szabad | Hungarian Democratic Forum

Csaba Varga Laszlo Konya Hungarian People’s Party

Tibor Baranyai Istvan Gasko

Social Democratic Party of Hungary | We disagree with the proposal to elect a President of the Republic before free Parliamentary Elections.’ Alliance of Free Democrats®

On behalf of the civil organizations and movements of the Third Negotiating Partner:

362 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy Dr Csaba Kemény Association of the Political Left Alternative

Dr Nandor Bugar Patriotic People’s Front Imre Nagy Alliance of Hungarian Democratic Youth

Dr Sandor Sark6zi Hungarian Resistance and Anti-Fascist Alliance Mrs Asboth Dr Judit Thorma Alliance of Hungarian Women Ferenc Berényi Miinnich Ferenc Society National Council of Trade Unions? Typed and authenticated copy.—MOL P. 2117, box 7, ref. 19. (All Key Documents were translated by Enikd Koncz)

Notes 1 The October 20th—22nd, 1989, session of Parliament included in its agenda, and its October 17th session adopted, the so-called “crucial Acts” on the amendment of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court, the functioning and financial management of political parties, the election of Members of Parliament, the amendment of the Penal Code and the amendment of the Act on Criminal Proceedings. 2 September 25th, two of the four organizations who signed the agreement addressed the following letter to Members of Parliament: “Ladies and Gentlemen! Honorable Members of Parliament! We, the undersigned, the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre Friendship Society, the Independent Smallholders’ Party, the Christian Democratic People’s Party, and the Social Democratic Party of Hungary, as signatories to the agreement of September 18th, are pleased to inform you of our joint achieve-

ments of these last three months and the most important documents from this period. Our talks were conducted outside Parliament, as the historical parties have already been excluded from, and newly emerged organizations have still not found their way into, political representation. These talks may have been conducted outside Parliament, but not without Parliament. This is why we have been inviting Members of Parliament to attend the talks as observers, and this is why we have set up a meeting with the chairmen of various parliamentary committees. As was demonstrated by the keen and stirring debate which developed at, and following, the signing of the agreement, the signatories assumed a level of risk. In our opinion, it is always easier to continue to deny something, and to be offended, than it is to invite a country in a difficult personal, moral, political and economic situation to opt for peaceful transition and to join in the work which needs to be done, in a situation where we can count on ourselves only: both Hungarians and our compatriots whose mother tongue is another language. We knew that what we were doing was right, since in everyday life the subject matter of our agreements has already become reality. Any

8. Agreement Concluding the Political Reconciliation Talks 363 action is meaningless if our intentions are worth no more than the paper on which they are written, and the people of this country will be able to judge what we have done only if what we have decided becomes reality. During the talks it often seemed that we could not reach an agreement either with the people on our side of the table or with our negotiating partners. We had to rise above the petty interests of our political parties and organizations before we could start acting for the benefit of the nation as a whole. I hope that this will be clear from the documents signed. You are the first to be able to decide in earnest. Your approval will be the first sign that the Agreement does, indeed, live up to our intention to reflect the will of the people and to capture their hearts and minds.

Therefore, we are requesting your assistance, and your vote of approval, to help us to have our proposals enacted into law unimpaired, proposals which we have elaborated by common consent

as a result of the joint effort of many months. These are proposals drafted by the Opposition Roundtable and put forward as our version of individual articles of the crucial Bills submitted [to Parliament] (such as the functioning of political parties in the other work-places, the Worker’s Militia, etc). This would mean that a Parliament created under the political circumstances of 1985 and by elections which were often questioned, could conclude its legislative work at the end of its term of office by passing legal Acts embedded in the process of national reconciliation.” Budapest, September 25th, 1989 3 Prior to the signing of the agreement, the Alliance of Free Democrats announced, at the plenary meeting of the National Roundtable Talks, its decision to initiate a referendum concerning ‘the issues with a fundamental impact on the democratic transition’, such as whether or not party organizations should withdraw from the workplace; whether the presidential elections should be held only after free parliamentary elections; whether or not the MSZMP should give a full account of

the assets in its ownership or under its management; and whether or not the Worker’s Militia should be disbanded. The so-called “Four Yes” referendum was held on November 26th, 1989. The referendum ended with a landslide majority of “Yes” votes supporting the position of those who had called the referendum on three of the four issues, and with a small majority of “Yes” votes on the issue of the election of the President of the Republic. 4 On October 17th, 1989, Parliament discussed and adopted the Bill disbanding the Worker’s Militia. 5 The last meeting of the National Roundtable Talks was held by Intermediate-level Working Committee II, responsible for economic and social issues (on September 20th, 1989), whilst the political reconciliation committee concluded its work as soon as the agreement was signed. 6 The signature was rejected. 7 A hand-written note by MSZDP. 8 The signature was rejected. 9 The signature is missing, as the representative of SZOT (National Council of Trade Unions) had announced, at the August 30th, 1989 meeting of the political reconciliation committee, their decision to withdraw from the talks.

~ BLANK PAGE

Chronology of the Hungarian Roundtable Talks January 1989—April 1990 Erzsébet Ripp

1989

January 10th—11th Parliament modified the constitution and passed a law granting the right to hold public meetings. It also proclaimed the right to form parties, although details

were to be regulated by a separate Party Law. Parliament passed the Law of Assembly. The Minister of Justice announced that a new constitution would be prepared.

January 28th Following the unexpected announcement by Imre Pozsgay of the Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart (Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, MSZMP)—the Revolution of 1956 was first officially termed an “uprising”—disputes arose within the communist party regarding a reassessment of the policy of 1956.

February 6th In Poland roundtable talks started between the authorities and the opposition on political and economic transition. February 10th—11th The Central Committee of the MSZMP resolved that the reform of the political establishment should continue and that a smooth transition to representational democracy was necessary, based on a multi-party system. The CC appointeda __ team to start talks with representatives of different political and social organizations concerning issues of political co-operation.

February 18th ,

Eleven independent political organizations officially welcomed a resolution of the MSZMP’s CC and proposed national roundtable talks in order to settle electoral terms and conditions for the constituent national assembly, with the participation of the MSZMP leadership and democratic political organizations.

366 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

February 20th—2 Ist A meeting of the MSZMP’s CC accepted the concept of the new constitution, which suggested that, whilst the constitution was being drawn up, the introduction of a multi-party system would take place.

March 15th On Hungary’s national holiday about 100,000 people demonstrated in the streets in favor of democracy and freedom. The Independent Lawyers’ Forum appealed

to independent and opposition political organizations, suggesting that they should start negotiating with each other at once and elaborate common points of view concerning the main issues of the democratic transition.

March 22nd The Opposition Roundtable (EKA) was founded on the premises of E6tvés University in Budapest. The EKA was founded by eight organizations: 1. The Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society (BZSBT), 2. The Federation of Young Demo-

crats (Fidesz), 3. The Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKGP), 4. The Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions, 5. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), 6. The Hungarian People’s Party (MNP), 7. The Social Demo-

cratic Party of Hungary (MSZDP), and 8. The Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). These organizations, at the invitation of the Independent Lawyers’ Forum, started conciliatory talks and passed resolutions. As founders of the EKA, 1. They aimed to enforce national sovereignty and the democratic transition of Hungary, 2. They did not wish to share the privileges of a monopoly of power, and 3. They would not conclude alliances with organizations with such aims. In order to achieve their specific aims they agreed to continue political cooperation.

April Sth The end of roundtable talks in Poland.

April 19th An EKA meeting formulated suggestions for negotiations with the MSZMP. The approved text laid out in detail the EKA’s negotiating position.

April 22nd _ The first preparatory talks started between representatives of the EKA and the MSZMP. The EKA wanted bilateral talks, while the MSZMP wanted multilateral talks. The opposition organizations believed that the aim of the talks was to reach a common agreement concerning the law, assuring the necessary preconditions for democratic transition and also a date for parliamentary elections. Constitutional issues, those issues relating to the presidency and the Constitu-

| Chronology of the Hungarian Roundtable Talks 367 tional Court, were regarded as tasks for a new, freely elected Parliament. The MSZMP wished to discuss economic and social problems during the talks.

May 2nd The representatives of the EKA and the MSZMP participated in further prepara-

tory talks. The EKA considered their delegation a unified entity and they selected representatives and their number. The EKA also announced that it was now willing to discuss economic and social issues. The parties agreed that political agreements reached during the talks would contain a draft version of bills necessary for implementation.

May 8th A resolution of the CC of the MSZMP re-introduced a proposal to form a multilateral forum. According to the resolution “the MSZMP regards as independent negotiating parties all organizations—among the membership of the EKA— which respect the constitution and conduct their operations in conformity with the Public Meetings Law.” May 10th A meeting of the EKA announced that the MSZMP had unilaterally ended the talks by virtue of this new statement. It was not willing to accept the EKA as a

May 11th :

unified negotiating party and was using all means possible to have the draft bills passed by Parliament in order to exert the maximum pressure.

The MSZMP’s negotiating advisers, in reply to the EKA announcement, declared that the MSZMP was convinced that democratic transition could only be

assured by multilateral talks and so the formation of a forum which would represent the diverse nature of Hungarian society in the best possible way was neces-

sary. The MSZMP could not accept the opposition’s aim that bilateral talks should continue.

May 16th The presidency of the National Council of Trade Unions (SZOT) announced officially that the trade unions wished to take part in the talks, but that they would not join any of the negotiating parties. In their opinion, the talks should provide a basis for the constitutional, economic work of the government and of the different organizations.

May 20th The draft platform approved by the national meeting of the MSZMP’s reform circle urged the representatives in power to abandon delaying tactics and start effective talks at once with the representatives of the EKA. If the party leadership was not willing to make such a decision, then the Government or Parliament

368 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

should continue the talks in the name of authority. According to the reform circle, agreement should be reached during the talks regarding the fundamental laws, the provision of conditions for democratic transition, the date and system of elections, the distribution of MSZMP property and operational conditions for the emerging parties.

May 24th The EKA declared officially that it was still ready to negotiate with the real holders of power, but that it expected the MSZMP leadership to take steps to continue the talks which the MSZMP had unilaterally suspended. The EKA expressed concern that, whilst delaying political talks, the MSZMP and its government would submit a Transformation Bill and Bills relating to the so-called Fundamental Laws (to Parties and the Constitutional Court) to Parliament and would formulate them unilaterally.

May 29th A meeting of the MSZMP CC approved proposals to re-commence the talks. They now proposed quadrilateral talks, where the third party would comprise organizations outside the EKA and the MSZMP, and where the fourth party would consist of observers with negotiating rights. They proposed a shortening of the preparatory period, so that effective talks could start on June 10th.

May 30th—June 2nd Parliament enacted fundamental economic Bills and modified the Transformation Law, the Law relating to State-owned Companies and Co-operatives and the Land Law. These laws were strongly criticized by the opposition on the basis that they would make “unplanned privatization” possible, that is, state property could be acquired by the management.

June 4th The limited free elections in Poland produced a huge victory for Solidarity.

June 7th At a meeting of the EKA participants were informed about the talks, formulated views on the agreement to shorten the preparatory period, and on issues relating to the opening of the plenary session. The Christian Democratic People’s Party

(KDNP) became a member of the EKA.

June 10 At the headquarters of the MSZMP’s CC the EKA and representatives of the socalled Third Side signed an agreement relating to trilateral talks. The agreement stated that the basis of power was the nation’s will and that the will of the people should be expressed during free elections with no preliminary constraints. The

parties agreed that the democratic transition should be peaceful, without vio-

Chronology of the Hungarian Roundtable Talks 369 lence, and that none of the social organizations should give orders directly to the

armed forces. The MSZMP stated in the agreement that legislation could not precede political agreement.

According to the agreement, three negotiating parties would take part in reaching political agreement: the EKA, the MSZMP, and the Third Side. The latter was composed of seven organizations 1. The Left Alternative Association (BAL), 2. The Patriotic People’s Front (HNF), 3. The Hungarian Democratic Youth Alliance (Demisz), 4. The Alliance of Hungarian Resistance Fighters and Antifascists (MEASZ), 5. The National Council of Hungarian Women (MNOT),

6. The Miinnich Ferenc Society and 7. SZOT. | The negotiating parties placed on the agenda for these trilateral talks definitions of the principles and rules for the realization of the democratic political transition together with the strategic tasks necessary to overcome the economic and social crises. The agreement defined standing orders and a working plan and also arranged publicity for the talks.

June 13th The trilateral, so-called National, Roundtable Talks commenced in Parliament. The opening plenary session was chaired by Matyas Szitrés, the Speaker of Parliament, and the negotiating parties’ letters of intent were outlined by Karoly Grodsz, Secretary General of the MSZMP, Imre Konya, spokesman for the EKA, and Istvan Kukorelli, spokesman for the Third Side.

June 16th |

In Budapest more than 200,000 people took part in the ceremonial reburial of Imre Nagy, the (executed) Prime Minister during the Revolution of 1956, and of other martyrs. This day was the symbolic crux of the Hungarian democratic transition.

June 21st , Representatives of the three parties signed the agreement concerning the issues, negotiating levels, the formation of working committees and concerning observers. The parties laid down six topics for each issue of the talks. According to the agreements, negotiations would start on three levels: 1. In the plenary sessions, which would primarily play a promulgatory, political role, 2. At intermediate level in the political, economic and social committee set up to handle the two issues and 3. At expert level, within the six specialized working committees for each issue.

In the plenary session of the National Roundtable Talks the chairman, Matyas Sztrés informed participants of the content of the agreement. Imre Pozsgay, as the representative of the MSZMP, announced that Parliament should be advised not to proceed with the bills discussed by the opposition in the parlia-

mentary session starting on June 7th, and which concerned the fundamental laws. A preliminary political agreement should be reached during the talks.

370 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Gyoérgy Szabad (MDF), the spokesman for the EKA and Istvan Kukorelli (HNF), the representative of the Third Side expressed their opinion briefly concerning the topics of the talks. Pal Ivanyi (MSZP) outlined in his statement, which concerned the strategic

tasks to overcome the economic and social crises, that the communist party aimed to create a market economy with mixed ownership and that, in order to achieve this, it was necessary to change the economic model. Ivan Peté (SZDSZ)

stated that the EKA had originally wished to create conditions for a peaceful transition, but that it accepted that talks dealing with economic issues were necessary, as it felt that it was obliged to prevent the passing of such laws, which would only serve the interests of a small circle of people and would define to some extent the future after the elections. The EKA believed that the possible slow-down of the economic talks should not prevent the negotiating parties from

reaching political agreements. Laszl6 Sandor (SZOT), the spokesman for the Third Side, thought that the economic and social issues should be thoroughly dealt during the talks.

June 23rd—24th

The MSZMP’s CC formed the party’s Presidency and Political Executive Committee and decided to held a party congress on October 7th. At the same time it decided that Imre Pozsgay would be the candidate for the position of Head of State if Parliament foresaw the introduction of the new Presidential institution.

June 27th Miklés Németh, the Prime Minister announced in the parliamentary session that the government would withdraw those bills whose topics would be discussed during the trilateral talks. Imre Pozsgay for the sake of general national agreement asked Members of Parliament for their support. Parliament passed a resolution that a Bill concerning the introduction of the new institution of the Presidency should be submitted to Parliament by the government no later than the beginning of October.

June 28th The participants in the EKA’s meeting approved the composition of the opposition’s delegation to negotiate in the political working committees. The EKA decided that, concerning three decisive questions which remained in dispute among the organizations, a meeting of the EKA would finally decide policy. These three topics were the institution of the Presidency, the electoral system

and the date of elections. — |

Chronology of the Hungarian Roundtable Talks 371 June 29th During the first intermediate level Economic and Social Committee meeting of the National Roundtable Talks the parties agreed on the setting-up of 6 Economic Working Committees.

June 30th The first meetings of the various working committees were held. The I/1 working committee dealt with current issues concerning amendments, the institution of the presidency, and issues concerning the Constitutional Court, the I/2 working committee dealt with legal regulations concerning the operations of political parties, the I/4 working committee discussed principles concerning modifications to the penal code and the criminal procedure law, whilst the I/5 working committee dealt with questions of information and the I/6 working committee discussed the issue of creating legal guarantees to avoid the outbreak of violence.

July 3rd The I/3 working committee started its work concerning the electoral law and questions relating to the elections.

July 6th A meeting of the EKA decided that the new Parliament should pass a bill concerning the presidency, and that Parliament should also appoint the President. The EKA believed that the stability of the transitional period could be also assured if the duties of Head of State were undertaken by the Speaker of Parliament after the dissolution of the Presidential Council and until the election of the President.

July 10th A meeting of the EKA approved the setting-up of the 6 economic working committees of the opposition delegation. In the meeting a discussion was opened concerning the date of the parliamentary elections and the electoral system.

July 12th Representatives of the EKA met with the US President, George Bush, in Budapest.

July 21st ,

At a meeting of the EKA the MNP proposed that Parliament should appoint the President during its session starting in September. During these discussions representatives of the MNP questioned whether on July 6th any decisions were

made concerning the institution of the presidency at the EKA meeting, and the | KDNP proposed that the matter should be discussed again.

372 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

July 22nd In provincial by-elections candidates from the MDF proved extremely popular. This was the first time for 40 years that Opposition candidates had been able to win election to Parliament.

July 24th |

In a meeting of the MSZMP’s Political Executive Committee, Gyérgy Fejti

urged for the speeding up of the talks and for a clearer definition of the concept of the negotiations. He suggested that the talks should have a final deadline, that this should be announced publicly and that they should be concluded by September. He believed that it was unrealistic to reach a full agreement concerning either the Party Law or Electoral Law. He also thought, that the bills could be submitted to Parliament without full agreement but with indications of the differ-

ing opinions. ,

July 27th At the intermediate level political meeting Gy6érgy Fejti—acting head of the MSZMP’s negotiating committee whilst Imre Pozsgay was on holiday—stated that they did not consider any of the forums of the trilateral talks competent to deal with the property holdings of the MSZMP and, above all, a possible redistribution of this property. The MSZMP did not support the banning of party organizations from work-places. The EKA believed that the MSZMP and the Third Side had changed their earlier views.

| The meeting decided that, if there could be no progress concerning the issues of party property and party financing, the de-politicizing of public services and the issues of party organizations in work-places, there would be no need for meetings of the I/2 committee. Gyorgy Fejti suggested that the talks could be continued on a “package” basis offering mutual concessions.

August 10th Participants in an EKA meeting discussed the tasks related to the electoral sys-

August 15th tem, the publicity for EKA meetings, trilateral talks, press and mass media.

The MSZMP’s Political Executive Committee authorized its delegation taking part in the mid-level negotiations to reach an agreement concerning the Electoral Law and the Party Law. It proposed that its delegation should urge the setting-up of a Constitutional Court, but that, if this were necessary, it should agree to its postponement to the parliamentary session. It thought it important that the new constitution should deal with Communism and that the institution of the Presidency should be created following a referendum. It suggested that, in relation to the questions involved in the setting-up of the institution of the Presidency, the decision should be made at the time of the parliamentary elections. The Commit-

Chronology of the Hungarian Roundtable Talks 373 tee decided that it would support the banning of party organizations from the work-place, but that the conditions for all parties should be based on the equality of rights to establish organizations in the work-place.

August 23rd |

In a private sitting of the EKA constituent organizations the SZDSZ suggested that they should reach agreements in the first place concerning the Electoral Law and Party Law, and that these should be submitted to Parliament in September. According to the SZDSZ it was not necessary to formulate a final view concerning the election of a president at that time, because it could weaken their basis of negotiation. On the other hand, the MDF believed that an agreement should be reached on all important issues with the MSZMP and the Third Side at the same time.

August 24th In the intermediate level political committee meeting of the National Roundtable Talks, consensus was reached concerning modifications to the penal code and the criminal procedure law. They agreed on the definition of the word “political transition”; they gave the political declaration that participants in the political negotiations should suffer no negative consequences due to their political views or activities. In relation to the openness of the trilateral talks an agreement was reached that television should report on the talks each week, and that the midlevel committee meeting would be opened to the press.

August 25th In the intermediate level political talks the parties agreed that, during the elections, one person may be a candidate in an individual constituency, may feature in one or two regional lists and on the national list also. In respect of the individual constituency the collection of a sufficient number of nomination papers is necessary. Matters relating to the elections themselves fell within the compe-

tence of the Supreme Court. The parties discussed possible locations for the collection of nomination papers and methods of checking elections outside the home district. Agreement was reached concerning the introduction of a mixed electoral system under which 150 members would be elected in individual constituencies, 150 would be elected regionally and 50 seats would be allocated to

minorities or fractional groups. : , August 28th

In intermediate level political talks the parties agreed that in constituencies 750 nomination papers would be the requirement for a candidate’s nomination. They also agreed on the conditions for regional and national listings. Having accepted the proposal of the MSZMP, the parties decided that, in case none of the candidates should gain an absolute majority of the votes in the first round, then those receiving at least 15% of the votes could participate in a second round but that,

374 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

in any case, those three candidates with the most votes could take part in the second round. Concerning party law, the participants agreed that judges, and constitutional

judges could not be members of any party and that public prosecutors and professionals dealing with offences against the state could not be members of any party if they had independent authority to sentence the accused to imprisonment. The MSZMP accepted the principles presented by the EKA and the Third Side, according to which party organizations should be banned from the work-place, schools, and various service locations. Deadlines were also proposed for realization.

August 29th At a meeting of the EKA participants discussed issues relating to the banning of party organizations from the work-place, to referring to communism in the constitution, to defining world crises and to regulating a declaration of crisis. In a meeting discussing the institution of the Presidency J6zsef Antall (MDF)

expressed his view that, concerning this question, Hungarian tradition, more specifically Act I of 1946 should provide the basis: according to this Act the president should be appointed by Parliament. However, Antall also believed that, on the first occasion, but exceptionally, the president could be elected directly.

The KDNP, the MNP, the FKGP and the BZSBT favored direct elections— before or at the time of parliamentary elections. The MSZDP believed that the president should only be elected after parliamentary elections. Fidesz maintained its earlier view that the EKA’s authority would end at the time of free elections and so questions relating to the presidency should be discussed by the new Parliament. The FSZDL shared Fidesz’s view. According to the SZDSZ in the tri-

lateral meetings, it was possible to conclude that on this issue there was no common view; on the other hand the MDF believed that, by doing so, the EKA would put at risk the signing of the whole agreement. Rezs6 Nyers, president of the MSZMP, announced that Imre Pozsgay had not been authorized to reach any kind of agreement with the opposition on the banning of party organizations from the work-place during the political talks.

August 30th In intermediate level talks a representative of SZOT announced that her organization would suspend its participation in political negotiations. According to the president of SZOT, political negotiations had become more and more obviously forums for inter-party discussion; it also questioned the equal status of the EKA and the Third Side. Concerning the whole question of the presidency, the EKA proposed that this should be formulated in the constitution on the basis of Act I of 1946, with a codicil to the effect that the president would be appointed following parliamentary elections and that, in the meantime, presidential authority would be exercised by the Speaker of Parliament.

Chronology of the Hungarian Roundtable Talks 375 September Ist The MSZMP’s CC meeting decided that it would maintain the idea of the direct appointment of the head of state—either before or at the time of parliamentary elections, but not later. The CC rejected the idea of banning party organizations from organizations outside state control.

September 4th The MSZMP delegation accepted that the basis for discussion of questions relating to the presidency should be Act I of 1946, but at the same time it maintained its view that the president should be elected before parliamentary elections by referendum. Consensus was reached that the following wording should be included in the constitution: “ The Hungarian Republic is an independent, democratic constitutional state, where the values of civic democracy and democratic socialism prevail.” On the issue of organizations in the work-place the MSZMP, according to a

decision of its CC proposed that party organizations should be banned in the Constitutional Court, the courts, the official institutions of Parliament and the President, the State Audit Office, the Public Prosecutors’ offices, in organizations of public administration, in the armed forces and in the police and security forces. In other work-places parties could establish organizations based on equal conditions for all and on a ban on political activity during working hours and of infiltration into the organization of the work-place and major decisions concerning the activities of the company. The EKA reaffirmed its earlier view and so the parties were unable to reach agreement. Demonstrations started against the Honecker regime in East Germany.

September 6th In an intermediate level meeting in the framework of the trilateral talks all parties accepted the suffrage principles on a consensual basis.

September 8th It was announced during the talks that a regular, weekly program on the trilateral talks had started on Hungarian Television. The EKA asked for more program time for its organizations and suggested that the work of the committee of experts should be made public. Consensus was reached on the establishment of a so-called Committee of Independent Information.

September 11th In an EKA meeting participants decided that the EKA should reaffirm its earlier view that Parliament should elect the president after free elections. At the same - time the MDF proposed that they could accept, on an exceptional basis, a direct election before parliamentary elections, since it was likely that their view would not prevail. The proposal won majority support on a ratio of 5:4, but a veto by

376 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

the SZDSZ, Fidesz and by the MSZDP blocked acceptance. The Free Democrats stated that they would pronounce their opinion only at the end of the talks, when the views of the MSZMP on other questions had already been clarified.

In an intermediate level negotiation committee meeting the parties agreed that the remaining open questions concerning the institution of the presidency, together with others, would be discussed at the end of the talks. The EKA made public its views on the banning of the Worker’s Militia. The government allowed thousands of refugees from East Germany to escape to the West through Hungary.

September 14th Imre Pozsgay stated in his letter to the negotiating parties, that the government should submit to the Parliament the bills withdrawn at the beginning of the talks, so the agreements reached in the meetings should be signed by the plenary ses-

sion to be held on September 18th. According to the MSZMP full consensus should be reached; so agreement would only be reached, if the parties could agree on all questions.

September 15th In an EKA meeting representatives of the SZDSZ suggested that questions should not be included in the agreement on which no consensus had been reached, and it suggested that further talks should be held concerning the banning of party organizations from the work-place. The representatives of Fidesz announced that they did not support the notion that, in relation to any of the outstanding questions, two alternatives could be submitted to Parliament. On the question of the presidential election the proposal of Gyérgy Szabad

_ (MDF) won a majority of votes by 5:4. According to his view, a condition for any preliminary and direct presidential election should be a two-thirds participation ratio and an absolute majority. Should a majority of the votes cast not be achieved, the new parliament could decide between the two best performing candidates. Péter Télgyessy (SZDSZ) stated that his party would not support an agreement allowing the direct election of the president, whilst, Viktor Orban (Fidesz) announced that they would not sign an agreement in favor of presidential elections being held before free elections. Jozsef Antall (MDF) stated that they would maintain their view. The representatives of the SZDSZ and Fidesz asked that a public announcement should be made during the plenary session on September 18th. In that case—although they would not sign the agreement— they would not use their right of veto and so would not prevent other organizations from signing the document. In a trilateral meeting the EKA accepted the establishment of a Constitutional Court. The three negotiating parties decided that, during the following two days, they would try to reach written agreement on all of the remaining open questions.

Chronology of the Hungarian Roundtable Talks 377 September 16th—17th In the Ministry of Justice experts discussed the open questions of constitutional amendment and of the Constitutional Court.

September 18th -

In an EKA meeting participants reviewed the results of the experts’ discussion. Consensus was reached concerning the setting up of the Constitutional Court and of the State Audit Agency and also that the institution of Ombudsman should be included in the constitution. The representatives of the SZDSZ and Fidesz repeated their decision not to sign the agreement in the plenary session. After the expert negotiations on party law the question of the ban on party organizations in the work-place and the question of party property remained open, and so the

FSZDL also decided not to sign the agreement. :

In an intermediate level political committee meeting Imre Pozsgay announced that the MSZMP would hand over property to the value of 2 billion Hungarian Forints to the government by the end of the year, and that parties would be financed from that sum. He announced, as the representative of the government, that, until the modifications to the Criminal Procedure Law came into effect, he would act in accordance with these future modifications. In the meeting consensus was reached on the modifications to the constitution and on the unresolved questions relating to Constitutional Court law.

In a plenary session of the National Roundtable Talks, Imre Pozsgay announced that the MSZMP had accepted the EKA’s proposal that, at the same time as the amendments came into effect, the collective body of the Head of State (the Presidential Council) would resign and that, until the election of the president, the Speaker of Parliament would fulfill the duties of head of state. Jézsef Antall an-

, nounced in the name of five organizations—the MDF, the FKGP, the KDNP, the MNP and the BZSBT—their acceptance that the president—for the first time exceptionally—would be elected directly by referendum before parliamentary elections. According to his proposal, for presidential elections a two-thirds participation ratio and an absolute majority should be required and the new Parliament should be formed within 90 days of the presidential elections.

Péter Télgyessy, the representative of the SZDSZ, announced that no agreement had been reached concerning fundamental questions during the talks. The MSZMP was not willing to ban party organizations from the work-place and had

supported the dissolution of the Worker’s Militia, but they had insisted that presidential elections should be held before free elections. He announced that they would not sign the agreement due to this and he proposed that a referendum be held on fundamental questions of the democratic transition. Laszlé K6vér, as the representative of Fidesz, accepted the SZDSZ’s proposal. Istvan Gask6 (MSZDP) announced that they would sign the agreement as representatives of the social democratic party excluding the section concerning the president. FSZDL representatives, participating in EKA meetings as observers, did not sign the agreement either.

378 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

September 19th The six EKA organizations which had signed the agreement issued separate announcements regarding their views on party organizations in the work-place and on the abolition of the Worker’s Militia.

September 20th The economic and social committee of the National Roundtable Talks held a meeting. The parties reviewed and discussed the work of the six working committees to date and the problems faced by the committee. The participants agreed the official declaration to be submitted to Parliament; in this they had criticized the sale of state property at below market value and its subsequent transformation as being against the national interest; it urged the competent authorities to take the necessary steps.

September 24th The SZDSZ announced publicly the questions to be answered by referendum: “1. Should party organizations be banned from the work-place? 2. Should the MSZMP produce accounts in respect of party property and its distribution? 3. Should the President only be elected after free parliamentary elections? 4. Should the Worker’s Militia be disbanded?” The referendum campaign was supported by Fidesz and the MSZP, and later by the FKGP. September 26th—28th The Parliament passed Law XXV: 1989 on the modifications to the penal code and Law XXVI: 1989 on modifications to criminal procedure.

October 6th-9th The 14th Congress of the MSZMP started. On October 7th the party announced that its history as a state party had ended and it announced also the formation of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) whilst maintaining legal continuity. The meeting continued as the first Congress of the MSZP. The participants agreed

the question, which had remained open following the National Roundtable Talks, concerning the disbanding of the workers’ militia and the preparation of an account of party property: on the other hand, a majority refused to accept a ban on party organizations in the work-place. The congress confirmed the presidential candidacy of Imre Pozsgay. October 17th—20th Parliament passed Amendment XXXI to the Constitution—in practical terms engendering a new constitution. Parliament also passed the Constitutional Court

Law (XXXII), the Party Law CXXXIII) the Election Law (XXXIV)—all of 1989, whilst Law XXXV of 1989 laid down the regulations for presidential elections. Law XXX of 1989 proclaimed the disbanding of the Worker’s Militia which was to have no legal successor. The law concerning party operations and

Chronology of the Hungarian Roundtable Talks 379 finances regulated the preparation of accounts relating to party property and party finances and banned party organizations from the work-place.

October 23rd On the anniversary of the Revolution of 1956, Matyas Szurés, acting president, proclaimed the Democratic Hungarian Republic before a crowd gathered in the square facing Parliament. October 30th—31st Parliament decreed that a referendum should be held on November 26th and also chose the 7th of January, 1990, as the date of the direct election of the president together with a referendum relating to the nation’s arms.

November 2nd The Opposition Roundtable held its first meeting since September 18th. In the first part of the meeting representatives of the opposition parties held talks with Anders Bjérck, the chairman of the Parliamentary General Assembly of the Council of Europe. The EKA elected two of its members by secret ballot to the Constitutional Court. Disputes originated regarding the future operation of the EKA and the reorganization of the National Roundtable Talks.

November 8th At a meeting of the EKA a consensus was reached concerning the question as to whether members should be delegated to the television supervisory board to be set up by the government or should insist on the earlier agreement to the effect that an independent information committee be set up. Dispute continued on the future of the EKA, possible negotiation partners, and a change in the decisionmaking mechanism. Participants in the meeting agreed on the principle of distributing 100 million Forints for party financing.

November 10th The collapse of the Berlin Wall. Transition commenced in Bulgaria with a putsch against the communist party leader, Todor Zhivkov.

November 11th Népszabadsdg published a joint economic document of the MSZP and the EKA, which contained their evaluation of economic policy from 1987 to 1989.

November 13th The national presidency of the MDF published its opinion of the referendum scheduled for November 26th. It urged a boycott of the referendum.

380 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

November 17th :

Demonstrations started in Prague: the beginning of the “velvet revolution” in Czechoslovakia.

November 20th The Council of Ministers signed a decree to establish a supervisory board for Hungarian Radio and Television. The members of the supervisory board were to be nominated by the Prime Minister.

November 21st At a meeting of the EKA agreement was reached concerning the supervisory board for national radio and television: the SZDSZ, Fidesz, the MSZDP and the League insisted on the setting up of an impartial information committee, the FKGP withdrew, and the other organizations delegated representatives to the multi-party supervisory board formed by the government.

November 22nd The various social organizations and movements of the Third Side publicly stated that, in their opinion, the trilateral talks had ended.

November 23rd :

Parliament elected the members of the Constitutional Court.

November 26th 58% of the electorate took part in the referendum. More than 95% voted in favor of the disbanding of the Worker’s Militia, full accounting for party property and the de-politicizing of the work-place. Regarding the election for President the result was close, producing a majority of no more than 6,101 YES votes. The results shattered the hopes of the MSZP in relation to the Presidency and to the election of Imre Pozsgay as president. Roundtable talks started between representatives of government and opposi-

tion in Czechoslovakia.

November 30th At a meeting of the EKA participants reached a consensus that the EKA should operate until the end of the elections, but that it should only play a consultative role. They agreed that the EKA as a unified body would not initiate any further talks. They publicly announced that Parliament should disband itself in its next session, and that parliamentary elections should be held in March 1990.

December 7th In East Germany roundtable talks started between the representatives of government and opposition.

Chronology of the Hungarian Roundtable Talks 381 December 9th The roundtable talks in Czechoslovakia ended.

December 8th-10th | Following a government initiative a three-day national summit conference took place in Parliament. On December the 8th the Council of Ministers, parties and parliamentary leaders held talks, followed on December 9th by the Council of Ministers, Parliament and the social organizations, on December 10th by representatives of the Council of Ministers, of Officers of Parliament and by the heads of the permanent committees of Parliament.

December 21st Parliament announced that the dissolution of Parliament would take effect on March 16th 1990. After this decision Matyas Sztrés announced that parliamentary elections would be held on March 25th, 1990.

December 22nd , The fall of communism in Romania. 1990 January 11th In an EKA meeting and based on information provided by Istvan Fodor, the Speaker of Parliament, talks were held relating to the Bill dealing with the legal status of Members of Parliament, about their salaries and the necessary modifications to parliamentary law.

January 16th |

In Bulgaria roundtable talks started between representatives of government and opposition.

January 17th In a meeting of the EKA representatives of the various organizations met leaders from different religions. During the talks the participants discussed, among many other topics, the status and political representation of churches, the freedom of religion, the law relating to churches, and the restoration of diplomatic relations between the Vatican and Hungary.

March Ist .

Parliament passed a new amendment (Law XVI of 1990), which stipulated the direct election of the president, despite the outcome of the November referendum.

382 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

March 10th In Moscow a Hungarian—Soviet agreement was signed concerning the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces from Hungary by June 30th, 1991.

March 12th Roundtable talks ended in East Germany.

March 18th Free elections in East Germany.

March 25th After 40 years the first free parliamentary elections took place in Hungary. In the first round of elections only 5 candidates were returned from 176 constituencies. In the election lists the MDF won most votes (24,73%), followed by the SZDSZ (21,39%), the FKGP (11,73%) and the MSZP (10,89%). Fidesz won 8,95% and the KDNP 6,46% of the votes. The other parties did not gain the minimum number of votes (4%) required for seats to be allocated to them.

March 27th At a meeting of the EKA participants confirmed that they would continue their work until the inaugural meeting of Parliament.

April 8th In the second round of parliamentary elections almost all constituencies now returned elected members. The MDF won 165, the SZDSZ 94, the FKGP 44, the MSZP 33, Fidesz 22 and the KDNP 21 seats respectively.

April 27th The EKA announced its disbanding. The closing meeting gave instructions concerning the collection of documents from the talks, their placement in the national archives and conditions for research.

April 29th ,

, The MDF and the SZDSZ signed an agreement concerning the stability of democratic institutions and the Public Law-related questions concerning the nation’s governance. In the so-called Antall-Télgyessy Pact the leaders of the two parties agreed that Parliament, after its formation, would pass as soon as possible the

detailed draft amendments to the Pact: they also appointed the President, the Speaker of Parliament, and the first Vice-President.

May 2nd The new Parliament held its inaugural meeting.

Chronology of the Hungarian Roundtable Talks 383 May 14th Roundtable talks ended in Bulgaria.

May 23rd Parliament approved the government program. The coalition government took up office. The government was led by Jozsef Antall and was formed by the MDF, the EKGP, and the KDNP.

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Biographies of the Key Participants | Andras Bozoki

Antall, Jozsef (Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF) Antall was born on April 8th, 1932, in Budapest. He gained degrees in history, Hungarian language and literature, archival, library, and museological studies at

the Edtvés Lorand University in 1962. He was a research fellow at the National | Archives and in the Institute of Pedagogical Sciences and then a teacher at the E6tvés Jozsef High School. In 1956 Antall took part in the reorganization of the Independent Smallholders’ Party and was one of the founders of the Association of Christian Youth. Due to his activity during the 1956 revolution, he was temporarily arrested and later dismissed from his job. Between 1957 and 1959 he taught at the Toldy Ferenc High School, and between 1960 and 1962 he was librarian at the Szab6 Ervin Library in Budapest. After 1964 he was senior research fellow, then deputy director, acting director, and, between 1984 and 1990, director-general at the Semmelweis Museum of Medical History. He was the author of several books on political and medical history.

Antall joined the Hungarian Democratic Forum. (MDF) at the second Lakitelek meeting in September, 1988, when the MDF was founded as a political organization. In 1989 he became a member of the MDF’s central board, and in that summer he participated in the Opposition Roundtable and at the trilateral

National Roundtable negotiations, where he negotiated the framework of the new constitution. In October, 1989, he was elected party president. Between 1990 and 1993 he was one of the vice-presidents of the European Democratic Union. On May 23rd, 1990, he was appointed Prime Minister of the Hungarian Republic, remaining in both of these positions until his death on December 12th, 1993.

Ader, Janos

(Federation of Young Democrats, Fidesz)

Ader was born on March 9th, 1959, in Csorna. He graduated in law and government from the Eétvés Lorand University in 1983. In 1984 he worked for the 6th District Council of Budapest, dealing with issues in state-owned housing. Between 1985 and 1990 he was junior research fellow at the Institute for Sociological Research of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA).

386 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

In September 1987 he participated in the first Lakitelek meeting, when the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) as a movement was formed. In April, 1988, he joined the Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz) and in 1989 he was a participant, representing Fidesz, in the Opposition Roundtable and the National Roundtable negotiating the new electoral law. In the parliamentary elections of 1990 and 1994, he was chief organizer of the campaign. Between 1995 and 1997, and since 1999, he has been vice-president of Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz—MPP).

A Member of Parliament since 1990, he was elected vice-president in 1997 and has been Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament since June 1998.

Baranyai, Tibor (Social Democratic Party of Hungary, MSZDP) Baranyai was born on August 26th, 1925, in Apagy. Between 1945 and 1948 he pursued studies at the College of Social Sciences of the Social Democratic Party. In 1945 he was one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Youth Movement. Also between 1945 and 1947 he worked for the National Council of Trade Unions, and for the periodicals [fjuimunkads and Fiatalok. During the same perod, he was a supplementary MP.

In 1948 he emigrated to Austria and then moved to Switzerland. Between 1949 and 1951 he worked as a tailor in Sweden and then as a printer and correspondent for the Hungarian journal Az Ember in New York. In 1950 he became one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party in exile. In 1951 he settled in Canada, again working as a tailor, store-keeper, dry-cleaner, shop manager, editor, and insurance agent. In 1956 his writings were published in Jrodalmi Ujsdg in Paris and in Népszava in London. In 1964 Baranyai returned to Hungary, and, until 1969, he worked as an electric ironing press operative at the Cloth Cleaning Cooperative, and then finally, until his retirement in 1985, he was employed by the State Insurance Company. In 1989 Baranyai was elected vice-president of Social Democratic Party of Hungary, and, later, to membership of the party presidency. He was editor of the social-democrat Népszava, and was delegated by his party to the negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable and the tripartite talks.

Boross, Imre :

(Independent Smallholders’ Party, FKGP) Boross was born on April 14th, 1926, in Szombathely. He gained a degree in law

from the University of Pécs. Between 1946 and 1948 he was a journalist on Nyugati Kis Ujsdg in Szombathely. In 1951 he was expelled from the National Association of Hungarian Journalists, and until 1958, when was expelled from the Chambers of Lawyers, he worked as a company lawyer. Later he was successively clerk, legal adviser and freelance lawyer. His writings were published in the dailies Magyar Nemzet and Magyar Hirlap.

Biographies of the Key Participants 387 Between 1945 and 1948, the year of his expulsion, Boross was a member of the Independent Smallholders’ Party, in 1988 actively participating in the reorganization of the party. In 1989 he became a prosecutor and was elected a member of the party’s political committee. He was delegated by his party to the negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable and the National Roundtable, where he was involved in negotiations on the framework of the new constitution. In late 1989 he resigned from the Independent Smallholders’ Party and was one of the founder-members of the National Smallholders’ Party (NKGP), a member of the leadership and secretary-general. He resigned from the latter party in February, 1994. In the 1990 elections he was a candidate for the National Smallholders’ Party, and in 1994 for the Agrarian Alliance (ASZ).

Bruszt, Laszlo (Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions, FSZDL) Bruszt was born on April 6th, 1953, in Budapest. He gained degrees from different universities in business management (1974), journalism (1978) and in sociology (1981). Betwen 1974 and 1978 he worked as a production manager at the ElectroAcoustics Factory and then, until 1982, as a journalist specialising in foreign affairs on the editorial staff of the Hungarian News Agency (MTI). Since 1982 he has been a researcher at the Institute for Sociological Research at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA). He attended, as research fellow, Columbia University, New York, in 1984 and the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, in 1987-88. In the 1990s, Bruszt taught sociology at Cornell University in Ithaca, NY, and at the New School University in New York. He is currently associate professor at the Department of Political Science of the Central European University, Budapest, where he served as acting-rector in 1996—97. In 1998-99 he was a visiting scholar at the Institute for Advanced Study in Palo Alto, USA. He has published several books and studies on sociology and political science. In 1988, he was one of the founders of the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions and became one of its representatives. In 1989 he was delegated by the League to the negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable and of the National Roundtable. During the negotiations he was mainly concerned with the problems of the social costs of the economic transformation.

Csako, Mihaly (Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions, FSZDL) Csak6 was born on November 19th, 1941, in Budapest. He graduated in philosophy and Hungarian language and literature from the Faculty of Arts of the Eétvos Lorand University, in 1964. In the later 1960s he also conducted studies at the Centre Européen Universitaire, in Nancy, France.

Between 1964 and 1970 he was assistant professor at the Department of Philosophy of the Eétvés Lorand University and from 1970 until 1980 worked

388 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy , as a research fellow in sociology at the Institute for Social Science of the Central

Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP). In 1981 he was dismissed from the Institute. Between 1981 and 1985 Csak6 worked at the Central Statistical Office (KSH) and also at a research institute, SZAMALK and from 1985 to 1989 as a freelance sociologist. In 1988-89 he taught at the University of California at Berkeley, whilst in 1990 he became visiting scholar at Pittsburgh University. Between 1963 and 1981 he was a member of the state party, the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, but, due to his own, overt solidarity with the Polish Solidarity independent trade union, he was expelled from the MSZMP in 1981. In the 1980s he joined the democratic opposition and in 1988 he was one of the

founder-members of the Democratic Trade Union of Scientific Workers (TDDSZ). Returning from abroad in the summer of 1989 he joined the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions (FSZDL) and as a representative of FSZDL, and of EKA, he participated in the closing plenary session of the National Roundtable talks in September 1989. Between 1990 and ‘92, he served as one of the executives of the League. Since 1989 he has taught at the Institute for Sociology at the Edtvés Lorand University, first as associate professor and later, since 1995, as professor.

Csurka, Istvan (Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF) .

Csurka was born on March 27th, 1934, in Budapest. He gained his degree in drama from the College of Theatrical and Cinematic Arts in Budapest in 1957. During the 1956 revolution he was leader of the college’s armed forces and was, therefore, later under surveillance before being interned to Kistarcsa for six months. He earned his living by writing plays and short stories, writing approximately 20 of each, and he regularly published newspaper articles. In 1972 he started to work for the daily Magyar Nemzet, and was their “feulletonist” until 1986. In 1985 he participated in the Monor meeting of the opposition groups, where he gave a lecture. In 1989-90, he was editor-in-chief of Magyar Forum, and, since

1991, he has been president of the editorial board and executive director of Magyar Forum Ltd. Csurka was a founder of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), participating in the first Lakitelek meeting in September, 1987. Until 1993 he was a member of the MDF and, between 1988 and 1993, a member of the party’s collective presidency. In 1989 he represented his party at the Opposition Roundtable negotiations. In 1991 he was elected a member of the executive board of the presidency and, later, vice-president of the party until December, 1992. In the summer of 1992 he organized his Hungarian Way Movement and started to criticise the Antall cabinet from a more radical rightist position. In 1993 he was

expelled from the MDF. ,

Biographies of the Key Participants 389 In 1993 Csurka founded the far-right Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP), where he first was elected a member of the presidency, then copresident, and, from 1994, president of the party. He was a Member of Parliament from 1990 to 1994 and also from 1998 to the present day. He represented the MDF from 1990-93, MIEP in 1993-94 and also from 1998.

Fejti, Gyorgy (Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, MSZMP) Fejti was born on March 10th, 1946, in Satoraljaujhely. He graduated from the Budapest Technical University in 1969, where he worked as an assistant lecturer

from 1969 to 1972. .

Between 1970 and 1989 he was a member of the state party, the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP). Between 1972 and 1976 he worked for the Central Committee of the Communist Youth Federation (KISZ), from 1976 until 1979 being a secretary of the Central Committee. In 1980-81 he was deputy head of department in the Central Committee of the MSZMP and then, between 1980 and 1984, first secretary of the Central Committee of the KISZ. Between 1984 and 1988 he was first secretary of the Borsod-Abauj-Zemplén county committee of the state party. He was a member of the MSZMP Central Committee from 1980 to 1989 and secretary of the Central Committee from 1987 to 1989. In 1989 he was one of the chief negotiators of the MSZMP delegation at the

communist party. ,

National Roundtable, where he belonged to the more conservative wing of the In the autumn of 1989 he withdrew from political life and has since occupied leading positions in different private firms.

Fodor, Gabor (Federation of Young Democrats, Fidesz)

Fodor was born on September 27th, 1962, in Gyéngyds. He graduated in law and government at the Edétvés Lorand University in 1987. In 1988-89 he was tutor at the Bib6é Istvan College, in Budapest, a self-governing faculty dormitory where students instituted their own educational programmes. Since 1990 he has been assistant lecturer at the Department of Philosophy at the Law Faculty of the E6tvés Lorand University. In March, 1988, Fodor was one of the founders of the Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz). From 1988 to 1993 he was a member of the central board (later the presidium).

In 1989 he was delegated by Fidesz to the negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable and of the National Roundtable. From 1990 until 1993 he was a Member of Parliament representing Fidesz, but in November, 1993, he resigned both from Fidesz and from Parliament.

390 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

From 1994 he has been an MP for the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), since October, 1994, a member of the party, and, from November, 1996, a member of the central board of the SZDSZ.

He was Minister of Education and Culture in the Horn cabinet from July, 1994, until December 1995.

Furmann, Imre (Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF) Furmann was born on October 27th, 1951, in Nyékladhaza. He graduated in law and government from the University of Pécs in 1979. From 1970 until 1974 he worked as storeman, sailor and unskilled worker.

Between 1979 and 1981 he was a lawyer in the public prosecutor’s office in Szerencs and from 1981 to 1986 he was a prosecutor in Miskolc, specializing in juvenile cases. Between 1986 and 1990 he worked as a lawyer, although in the 1980s he was also known in literary circles as a poet. In 1984 he became a member of the Jézsef Attila Circle of Young Writers.

Furmann was one of the founders of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), participating in the first Lakitelek meeting in September, 1987. He organized the MDF in Miskolc and edited the local party journal, Miskolci Forum. Between 1987 and 1994 he was a member of the MDF and between 1989 and 93 a member of the presidency of the party. In 1989 he represented the MDF at the negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable and of the National Roundtable. From 1990 to 1992 he was general vice-president of the MDF and, from 1992 to 1994, he led the Liberal Forum Foundation within the MDF. Since 1994 he has worked once again as a lawyer, specializing in the defence of social and ethnic minorities.

Fir, Lajos (Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF) Fiir was born on December 21st, 1930, in Egyhazasdaréc. He gained his degree

in history from the Kossuth Lajos University in Debrecen in 1954. Between 1954 and 1956 he was assistant professor at the same university. During the 1956 revolution he was secretary of the Socialist Revolutionary

Committee in Debrecen and was later interned for a month. In early 1957 he emigrated to France but returned to Hungary in May of that year. Between 1958 and 1964 he was at first unemployed, then a librarian, an unskilled worker and

then a teacher in an elementary school. Between 1964 and 1987 he was a researcher at the Hungarian Museum of Agriculture and from 1987 to 1990 he held the position of associate professor in the Medieval History Department of the Edtvés Lorand University of Budapest.

He was one of the founder-members of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) participating in the first Lakitelek meeting in 1987. Since March 1989 he

has been a member of the presidium. In 1989 he represented the MDF at the Opposition Roundtable negotiations and those of the National Roundtable. In

Biographies of the Key Participants 391 November, 1989, he was a candidate for President of the Republic of Hungary. Between 1991 and 1993 he was executive president of the MDF and, from 1994 to 1996, he served his party as president. Between 1990 and 1994 he was Minister of Defense in the Antall cabinet and in the Boross cabinet. He was a Member of Parliament from 1990 to 1998. In 1996 he took up the position of Director of the Raday Collection of the Hungarian Protestant (Reformatus) church.

Fiizessy, Tibor (Christian Democratic People’s Party, KDNP) Fiizessy was born on September 14th, 1928, in Sashalom. In 1946-47 he studied at the Theological College in Szeged but graduated in law from the Eétvés Lorand University, Budapest, in 1951. In 1953 he became an assistant clerk at the county court in Székesfehérvar before working as legal advisor at the Koml6 Coal mines, and, later, at the enterprise’s finance department as chief accountant. Between 1962 and 1968 he was public prosecutor at the Budapest Prosecutor’s Office and then, until his retirement in 1989, at the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office. Flizessy was one of the founders of the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) and in 1989-90 was party vice-president. He was delegated by the KDNP to the negotiations of the Opposition and National Roundtables where he was concerned with electoral law and constitutional change. In 1995 he became acting vice-president and, in 1996, vice president of the KDNP. His membership of the party was rescinded in 1998, when inner party conflicts re-emerged after the failure of the KDNP in the elections. Ftizessy was a Member of Parliament from 1990 to 1998, head of the KDNP caucus (1990-1992) and again later, in 1994-95. He was vice-president of Parliament between April 1996 and July 1997, when the KDNP fraction broke up. He was Minister without Portfolio supervising the civilian secret intelligence agencies in the Antall and Boross cabinets between 1992 and 1994.

Gasko, Istvan (Social Democratic Party of Hungary, MSZDP) Gask6 was born on July 21, 1954, in Sajészentpéter. Between 1972 and 1975 he studied at the Telecommunications and Technical College, graduating from the Karl Marx University of Economic Sciences in 1986. Between 1975 and 1990 Gask6 worked as a civil servant at the Hungarian Railway Company. Between 1980 and 1988 he was a member of the state party, the Hungarian

Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP), but in 1989 he became a member of the Social Democratic Party of Hungary (MSZDP), and in 1989-90 was vice president of the party. He was delegated by his party to the negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable and of the National Roundtable. In 1995, however, he resigned from the MSZDP.

392 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Gask6o was one of the founders of the Free Trade Unions of Railway Workers, established in 1989, and he has been president since 1991. In 1993—94, he was vice president of the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions, and, since 1996, president.

Grosz, Karoly (Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, MSZMP) | : Grész was born on August Ist, 1930, in Miskolc. He attended the College of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP) and graduated in 1961. Then he received his degree in scientific socialism at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the Eétvdés Lorand University in 1967. Between 1946 and 1948, he worked as a typographer. In 1950, he was a political fellow of the Central Committee of the state party, the Hungarian Workers’ Party (MDP). Between 1950 and 1954, he was a professional army officer and between 1954 and 1958 he was nominated head of the propaganda office of the MDP and, after November 1956, of the Borsod County Committee of the

MSZMP. Between 1956 and 1989 he was a member of the state-party, the

MSZMP. In 1958-59, he was the executive editor of the daily EszakMagyarorszag. In 1961, he was a political fellow of the propaganda office of CC of the MSZMP. He was the secretary of the MSZMP Committee of the Hungarian Radio and Television between 1962 and 1968. From 1968 to ‘73, Grész was deputy head of department at the propaganda office of the Central Committee. In 1973 he became the general secretary of Fejér County. From 1974 to ‘79 he was the departmental head of the propaganda office of the Central Committee and

then, from 1979 until 1984, he was general secretary of the party in Borsod County, between 1984 and ‘87 general secretary of the party in Budapest. From

September, 1987 until November, 1988, he was president of the Council of Ministers. Between May, 1988 and June, 1989, he was the general secretary of the MSZMP, the successor to Janos Kadar. Between 1980-89, he was a member of the Central Committee of the MSZMP and, between 1985 and 1989, a member of the Politburo. In 1988-90 he was a Member of Parliament. In June, 1989, he participated in the opening plenary session of the trilateral negotiations, representing the MSZMP. In October, 1989, however, he did not transfer his MSZMP membership into membership to the newly-born Hungarian Socialist Party, but, instead, became a member of the Central Committee of the reorganized MSZMP, which was unable to achieve the threshold in the 1990 elections to obtain seats in Parliament. Thereafter Grész withdrew from public life.

He died on January 7th, 1996.

Biographies of the Key Participants 393 Hankiss, Elemér (Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions, FSZDL) Hankiss was born on May 4th, 1928, in Debrecen. He graduated in French and English language and literature from the Eétvés Lorand University, Budapest, in 1950.

Between 1950 and 1953 he worked for Ferunion, a state company. Between 1953 and 1962 he was a junior research fellow at the National Széchényi Library (OSZK), but because of his political activity during the 1956 revolution, he was

jailed for ten months in 1957. Between 1963 and 1965 he was editor at the Europa publishing house and, from 1965 to 1975, he was senior research fellow

at the Institute for Literary Science of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA), and taught at two Hungarian universities. Between 1975 and 1990 he was a senior researcher at the Institute for Sociological Research of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, focusing on the sociology of social values. He has published several books on value research and democratization. Since 1989, he has been professor at the Department of Political

Science at the Eétvés Lorand University. In the late 1980s, and during the 1990s, he carried out research at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D. C., and at the Institute for Advanced Study in Palo Alto, USA; he also taught at Stanford University, Georgetown University, the Central European University (Budapest), and at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. In 1988 he became politically active in the New March Front (UMP), later joining the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions (FSZDL). In the summer of 1989 he represented the FSZDL at the negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable and at the trilateral talks of the National Roundtable. Between July

1990 and January 1993 he was president of Hungarian Television (MTV). In 1995, he founded the civic movement Talaljuk ki Magyarorszagot! (Let’s Invent Hungary!).

Ivanyi, Pal (Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, MSZMP) | Ivanyi was born on August 25th, 1942, in Budapest. He graduated at the Budapest Technical University in 1967. He also received a degree from the MSZMP’s Political School in 1976. In 1961-62 he was an unskilled worker at Csepel Car Factory, but later, be-

tween 1967 and 1976, he was a research engineer, later a deputy head of department, in the same factory. Between 1968 and 1989, he was a member of the state party, the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP) and from 1976 to 1980 he was secretary of the MSZMP at Malév. Between 1980 and 1984 he served as head of department

responsible for economic policy at the Budapest Committee of the MSZMP. From 1984 to 1986 he was deputy head of department in economic policy at the Central Committee of the MSZMP. In 1987-88 he worked as chairman of the executive committee of the Council of Budapest. Between 1987 and 1989 he

394 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

was a member of the MSZMP Central Committee and in 1988-89 a member of the Politburo. In the meantime he served as a secretary of the CC, responsible for economic policy.

| In 1989 he represented the MSZMP at the plenary sessions of the National Roundtable talks, and was also active in leading the MSZMP delegation in the

intermediate-level economic negotiations. ,

Keresztes, Sandor (Christian Democratic People’s Party, KDNP) Keresztes was born on March 9th, 1919, in Magyarokerek. He started his studies at the University of Kolozsvar (Cluj) in the early 1940s, but gained his degree in law from the Univesity of Pécs only in 1962. Between 1945 and 1947 he was a civil servant in the Ministry of the Interior. In November 1944 Keresztes joined the Democratic People’s Party (DNP), and was active in the Christian wing of the anti-Nazi resistance movement. In 1946-47 he was a member of the executive committee and, in 1947-48, a Member of Parliament.

From 1949 to 1959 he earned his living by sock-knitting. After 1950 he worked at the publishing house of the Catholic literary journal Uj Ember, later becoming head of the office. In 1953, he organized Solidarity Home Craft Corporation which offered jobs to the former friars. He was also a legal advisor to the Saint Stephen’s Society. In the 1956 revolution Keresztes was one of the reorganizers of the DNP, participating in the revolutionary committee of Budafok. In 1957 he was interned for four months. In March, 1989, he joined the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) and worked as head of the organizing committee. In 1989-90 Keresztes was president of the party and, from 1990 to 1997, honorary president. In 1989 he participated in the negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable and of the National Roundtable. Between 1990 and 1994 he served as ambassador of the Hungarian Republic to the Vatican and to the Sovereign Order of the Knights of Malta and from 1994 to 1997 he was a Member of Parliament representing the KDNP. Due to internal conflicts within the party he suspended his membership in October 1997.

Kis, Janos (Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ) Kis was born in September 17th, 1943, in Budapest. He graduated in philosophy from the Eétvés Lérand University, Budapest, in 1967. Between 1967 and 1973 he was research fellow at the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA), one of the youngest members of

the Budapest School of philosophy. From 1966 he was a member of the state party, the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP) but was expelled in 1973, laid off from his job and put on the banned list in the course of a political “purification” campaign among philosophers and social scientists. From the mid-

Biographies of the Key Participants 395 1970s onwards Kis was a leading figure in the Hungarian democratic opposition. During the 1980s he was one of the editors of the illegal periodical Beszéld. He

participated in the illegal meeting of different oppositon groups in Monor in 1985, and then co-authored Tarsadalmi Szerzodés (Social Contract), a political program of the Beszélo circle and the democratic opposition in 1987.

In the years of 1988-89, 1998, and 2000, he was visiting professor at the New School University in New York and in 1996 at New York University. He is currently professor at the Department of Political Science of the Central European University, Budapest, teaching political theory and political philosophy. He has published several books on politics, human rights and constitutionalism. In 1988 he was founder and executive of the Network of Free Inititiatives,

and was one of the founders of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). In 1989 he participated in the negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable and of the

National Roundtable. In 1990-91 he was president of SZDSZ and then, until 1999, a member of the party’s national council.

Konya, Imre (Independent Lawyers’ Forum, FJF; Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions, FSZDL) Konya was born on May 3rd, 1947, in Budapest. He graduated in law from the E6tvés Loérand University, Budapest, in 1971. From then until 1973 he worked as an assistant lawyer, and between 1973 and 1990, and also from 1998 to the present, as a lawyer.

He was one of the founders of the Independent Lawyers’ Forum, (FJF) which | was established in November 1988, and later he became the leader of the Forum. In March, 1989, at the proposal of the Forum, the Opposition Roundtable was born. Until June, 1989, Konya led the negotiation sessions. Between July and September, 1989, he was delegated by the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions (FSZDL) to the committee, established by the trilateral political

negotiations, to take the responsibility for elaborating the proposals for the modification of the constitution. Between 1988 and 1996 he was a member of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). In 1990 he was elected to the presidency and in 1993 and 1994 he was vice-president of the MDF. He was a Member of Parliament between 1990 and 1998, and, from 1990 to 1993, head of the MDF caucus. Between December, 1993 and July, 1994, he was Minister of the Interior in the Boross cabinet. In March, 1996, he joined the Hungarian Democratic People’s Party (MDNP), a new party which separated from the MDF but which failed to achieve representation in Parliament in the 1998 elections.

396 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Mrs. Kosa, Kovacs Magda (National Council of Trade Unions, SZOT) Kovacs was born on November 4th, 1940, in Budapest. She started her university studies at the Kossuth Lajos University in Debrecen in 1959 and gained her degree at the Department of Hungarian and French Linguistics and Literature of the Eétvés Lérand University in 1964.

Between 1964 and 1972 she taught in the Leévey Klara High School and worked as a research fellow for the Institute of Literary Studies. Between 1972 and 1974 she was the deputy-director of the High School for Budapest Workers. Between 1967 and 1989 she was a member of the state party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP) and between 1974 and 1977 she worked for the MSZMP Committee of the 9th district of Budapest. Between 1977 and 1985, she was the secretary of the Council of Higher Education of the Teachers’ Trade Union and later she was appointed as a secretary of the central committee of the

same organization. She was a member of the Hungarian and Soviet Circle of Friends and the Presidential Council of the Patriotic People’s Front (HNF). From September, 1985 and March, 1990 she was one of the leaders of the National Council of the Trade Unions (SZOT), and in the summer of 1989 she partici-

_ pated in the National Roundtable as a representative of the SZOT within the Third Side’s delegation.

Since October, 1989, she has been a member of the Hungarian Socialist Party, and between 1996 and 1998 she was executive director of the party. Since 1990 she has been an M.P. and from July, 1994, to October 1995, she was Minister of Labour in the Horn cabinet.

Kévér, Laszl6 (Federation of Young Democrats, Fidesz)

K6vér was born on December 29th, 1959, in Papa. He graduated in law and government from the Eétvés Lorand University, Budapest, in 1986. Between 1984 and 1988, he was a tutor at the Bibdé Istvan College, a self-governing faculty dormitory where students initiated their own educational programs.

In March, 1988, he was one of the founders of the Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz), and, since 1988, he has been a member of the central board (later presidium) of the party. In 1989 he was delegated by his party as negotiator to the Opposition Roundtable and also to the National Roundtable. Since 1990 he has been a Member of Parliament representing Fidesz, and, since 1997, executive vice-president of the party, renamed as Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz—MPP) in 1995. Between July 1998 and January 2000 he was minister without portfolio, supervising the civil secret agencies in the Orban cabinet. Between January 2000 and May 2001 he was president of the Fidesz— MPP.

Biographies of the Key Participants 397 Kukorelli, Istvan (Patriotic People’s Front, HNF)

Kukorelli was born on July 6th, 1952, in Tét. He took his degree in law and government at the Eétvés Lorand University in 1976. Between 1976 and 1999, he worked at the Department of State Law, later renamed Constitutional Law, at the same university. Between 1982 and 1988 he

was assistant professor, from 1989 to 1999 as associate professor, and, since 1999, as full professor. Since July 1999 he has also been a judge of the Hungarian Constitutional Court. Between 1980 and 1985 he was a member of the Pest County committee of he Patriotic People’s Front (HNF), and between 1985 and 1989 a member of the

National Council and of the Secretariat of the HNF. From April to October, 1989, he was executive head of the presidency. He represented the HNF and the Third Side at the National Roundtable negotiations in 1989 and thereafter, between October 1989 and May 1990, he served as executive president of the HNF at which point the organization ceased to exist. Between 1991 and 1995 he was a member of the National Democratic Alliance (NDSZ). Since 1988 he has been a

member of the Independent Lawyer’s Forum and of the Publicity Club.

1977. :

Magyar, Balint

(Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ) Magyar was born on November 15th, 1952, in Budapest. He gained degrees in sociology, history, and English from the Eétvés Lorand University, Budapest, in Magyar worked as a junior researcher at the Eastern European Department of the Institute of World Economy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA). Between 1982 and 1987 he was a research fellow at the Research Institute of the

Cooperatives, where his field of interest was the social history of Hungarian villages. Between 1982 and 1988 he was one of the editors of Medvetdnc, a nonofficial social science journal. From 1988 to 1990 he worked for Financial Re-

search Institute Ltd. and spent a half-year at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D. C., USA. Magyar joined the democratic opposition in 1979 and actively participated in the dissemination of the illegal journal, Beszéld, in the 1980s. In March, 1988, he was one of the founders of the Network of Free Initiatives, and, in November, 1988, of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). In 1989 he participated in the political negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable and of the National Roundtable. In the parliamentary elections of 1990 and 1994, he was chief organizer of

the SZDSZ campaign. |

Since 1990 he has been a Member of Parliament representing the SZDSZ. Between 1996 and 1998 he was Minister of Education and Culture in the Horn cabinet and from June, 1998 until November 2000 he was president of his party.

398 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Marton, Janos (Hungarian People’s Party, MNP) Marton was born on November 28th, 1922, in Sarkad. He had to interrupt his studies in the 1940s when he served in the military between 1943 and 1945. He finally took his degree in 1963 at the Gdd6llé University of Agrarian Sciences.

In 1945 he joined the National Peasants’ Party (NPP) and, in 1945-46, served as secretary of the Csongrad County branch of the NPP. Between 1946 and 1949 he worked for the Hungarian National Centre for Cooperatives and then for the National Alliance of Cooperatives. Between 1950 and 1956 he was a fellow, later agricultural vice-president, at the National Planning Office (OT).

During this period of time he was a member of the state party, the Hungarian Worker’s Party (MDP). Between 1957 and 1986, he was employed by the Research Institute for Agrarian Economics at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) where he served as director between 1971 and 1979, and director general between 1979 and 1986. Between 1972 and 1990 he was a member of the National Council of the Pa-

triotic People’s Front (HNF) and, in 1989-90, executive vice-president of the HNF. In September, 1987, he participated in the first Lakitelek meeting, where the Hungarian Democratic Forum was established as a movement. In 1988-90 he was a Member of Parliament. Marton was one of the founders of the Veres Péter Society in 1988, just as its

successor political organization, the Hungarian People’s Party (MNP), was founded in January 1989. Both organizations aimed to follow the traditions of the NPP. In 1989 he represented the MNP at the Opposition Roundtable negotiations, as well as at the National Roundtable. In 1989-90 he was executive president of the MNP and, in 1991-92, president of the party. Since 1992 he has been advisor to the Hungarian People’s Party, which has failed to achieve parliamentary representation in all three democratic elections to date.

Mécs, Imre (Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ) Mécs was born on September 4th, 1933, in Budapest. He graduated in electrical engineering from the Technical University of Budapest in 1957 but received his degree only in 1975, for political reasons. In 1956, he took an active part in the revolution, and after the collapse, in the intellectual underground. In June, 1957, he was arrested and in May, 1958, was sentenced to death. The sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in February, 1959. In 1963 he was released on amnesty. After his release Mécs worked as an engineer in different technical cooperatives. In the late 1970s Mécs joined the democratic opposition and in 1983 he lost

his job because he had spoken at the burial of a comrade who had also been sentenced to death. Between 1983 and 1990 he was employed as an engineer by the Ganz Company. Between 1984 and 1989 he took part in the Danube Circle Movement. In 1988 he was one of the founders of the Committee for Historical

Biographies of the Key Participants 399 Justice (TIB), and of the Network of Free Initiatives. He was also one of the founders of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) in November, 1988. In 1989 he participated in the negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable and of the National Roundtable. Since 1990 he has been a Member of Parliament representing the SZDSZ.

Nagy, Imre (Hungarian Federation of Democratic Youth, Demisz) Nagy was born on November 16th, 1957, in Sarvar. He received his degree in

mathematics from the Faculty of Natural Sciences at the Edtvés Lorand University. He also studied economics at the Karl Marx University of Economic Sciences between 1980 and 1983. Between 1982 and 1984, he was assistant professor at the Faculty of Electrical Engineering at the Budapest Technical University, and, in parallel, he served as secretary of Communist Youth Federation (KISZ) at the Edtvés Lorand Uni-

versity. From 1984 he worked at the KISZ in different political positions, as deputy head and as head of department. Between 1985 and 1988 he was second secretary and, in 1988-89, first secretary of the KISZ. In April, 1989, the Communist Youth Federation changed its name to the Hungarian Democratic Youth Federation (Demisz). Between April and October, 1989, Nagy was president of Demisz. In this capacity he participated in the National Roundtable talks in the sum-

mediate-level sessions. :

mer of 1989, representing Demisz and the Third Side in the plenary and interBetween 1980 and 1989 he was a member of the state party, the Hungarian

Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP). In 1988-89 he was a member of the MSZMP Central Committee. Since October, 1989, he has been a member of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), where he was a member of the presidency in 1989-90. Since 1990 he has withdrawn from political life and now works as a businessman. Between 1991 and 1994, he was financial director at Danube Ltd. and, since 1995, he has been managing director of Caola Ltd.

Németh, Miklés (Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, MSZMP) Németh was born on January 24th, 1948, in Monok. He graduated from the Karl Marx University of Economic Sciences, Budapest, in 1971. Between 1971 and 1977 he was an assistant lecturer and then a lecturer at the Karl Marx University. In the academic year 1974—75 he studied at Harvard University, at Cambridge, USA, as an IREX scholar. Between 1977 and 1981, Németh was deputy head of department at the National Planning Institute, and then, as a member of the state party, the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP) since 1970, he worked for the department of economic policy of the MSZMP Central Committee. In 1986 he became head of department. Between 1987 and 1988 he was secretary in charge of economic

400 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

policy of the MSZMP CC. From November 1988 to May 1990 he was president of the Council of Ministers and leader of the last communist (in fact, caretaker) cabinet before the régime change. Between 1987 and 1989 Németh was a member of the Central Committee of the MSZMP, and, between 1988 and 1989, a member of the Politburo. He did not participate in the roundtable talks but led the so-called National Summit of political parties in December, 1989, and also in March, 1990. In October 1989,

at the founding congress of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), he was elected to the presidency, only to resign from this position in December. During 1988-91 he was a Member of Parliament representing the MSZMP

(1988-89) and the MSZP (1990-91). Between 1991 and 2000 he worked as a vice-president of the London-based European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Since 2000 he has become active once again in party politics as an influential member of the MSZP.

Nyers, Rezs6 (Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, MSZMP) Nyers was born on March 21st, 1923, in Budapest. He graduated from the Karl Marx University of Economic Sciences. Between 1938 and 1942 he was a type-setter and printer, and, in 1946-47, he

worked for the publishing house, Népszava. ,

In 1940 Nyers joined the Social Democratic Party of Hungary (MSZDP), and in 1947-48 he was deputy secretary, later secretary, of the Pest county branch of the MSZDP, but he joined the newly formed state party, the Hungarian Worker’s Party (MDP), when the social democrats were forced to amalgamate with the communists. Between 1948 and 1954 he was a supplementary member of the

MDP Central Committee and between 1951 and 1954 he was senior head of department in the Ministry of Domestic Trade. In 1954 he was appointed vicepresident of the National Alliance of Cooperatives (SZOVOSZ) and then, in 1957, president. Between July and October, 1956, he was Minister of Food Industry, and after the suppression of the revolution by the Soviets, he served as Commissioner of

Provisions in the Kadar cabinet. Between 1960 and 1962 he was Minister of Finance. He was a member of the state party, the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party

(MSZMP) between November 1956 and October 1989, and between 1957 and 1989 a member of the MSZMP Central Committee. From 1962 to 1974 he was secretary of the MSZMP CC, and in the years from 1962-66 a supplementary member of the Politburo. Between 1966 and 1974 he served as a member of the Politburo. In his various positions he was instrumental in elaborating the socalled New Economic Mechanism. Between 1974 and 1981 he was head of the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA).

In 1988 he supported the New March Front (UMF). In 1988-89 he was Minister of State and, again, a member of the MSZMP Politburo. Between Octo-

Biographies of the Key Participants 401 ber 1989 and May 1990 he was the first president of the Hungarian Socialist

Party (MSZP). ; _ He was a Member of Parliament from 1948 to 1953, and also from 1958 until

Orban, Viktor 1998.

(Federation of Young Democrats, Fidesz) Orban was born on May 31st, 1963, in Székesfehérvar. He graduated in law and government from the Eétvés Lorand University, Budapest, in 1987. He was one of the students of the Bibé Istvan College, a self-governing faculty dormitory where students instituted their own educational programs. Orban was also one of the founders of Szazadvég, an independent journal in social sciences. Between Sep-

tember 1989 and January 1990 he spent a semester at Pembroke College, Oxford, , with a Soros fellowship, where he studied British liberal political theory.

In March, 1988, he was one of the founders of the Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz) and became a member of the central board. In 1989 he participated in the Opposition Roundtable and in the National Roundtable, where he negotiated the framework of the new constitution. On June 16, 1989, he gave a

memorably radical speech at the reburial ceremony of Imre Nagy and other martyrs of the 1956 revolution. Between April, 1993, and January, 2000, he was president of Fidesz, from April 1995 under the name of Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz—MPP). Between 1992 and 2000 he was one of the vice-presidents of the Liberal International. Since 1990 he has been a Member of Parliament, leading the Fidesz

faction between 1990-93. .

Since July 1998, he has been Prime Minister of the Republic of Hungary.

Peté, Ivan | | (Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ) Peté was born on August 29th, 1946, in Budapest. He gained degrees in Hungarian language and literature, as well as in history at the Edtvés Lorand University, Budapest, in 1970. He worked as a researcher at the New Hungarian Central Archives, and, in 1986, he became a senior fellow. Between 1980 and 1989 he was a lecturer at the Karl Marx University of Economics. His field of interest was postwar Hungarian history, particularly economic history. In the 1980s he joined the democratic opposition. In March, 1988, Peto was one of the founders of the Network of Free Initiatives and, in November, 1988, of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). In 1989 he negotiated at the Opposition Roundtable and also, on issues relating to the Bill on Political Parties, at

the National Roundtable. Between November, 1992 and April, 1997, he was president of the SZDSZ. In 1994 he was elected one of the vice-presidents of the Liberal International. Since 1990 he has been a Member of Parliament.

402 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Petrasovits, Anna (Social Democratic Party of Hungary, MSZDP) Petrasovits was born in 1954, in Budapest. She graduated from the Karl Marx University of Economics. Since 1979 she has been a lecturer at the same university, teaching economics of the developing countries. In 1989 she joined the Social Democratic Party of Hungary and, in the summer of the same year, she was one of the negotiators at the Opposition Roundtable. In a short time she became an executive, and then, in the November 1989 party congress, president of the party. In 1992 the national committee of the party divested her of all duties, and she was expelled from the party.

Pozsgay, Imre (Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, MSZMP) Pozsgay was born on November 26th, 1933, in Kony. He studied at the Lenin Institute in Budapest. Between 1956 and 1989 he was a member of the state party, the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP). Between 1957 and 1965 he worked for the

Bacs-Kiskun County Committee of the MSZMP. From 1969 to 1971 he was head of the MSZMP press department and in the period 1971 to 1975 he was deputy editor of Tarsadalmi Szemle. In 1975, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Culture, and in 1980, until 1982, Minister of Culture. Between 1982 and 1988 he was secretary general of the National Council of the Patriotic Peoples’ Front (HNF), and participated at the first Lakitelek meeting in September 1987, From 1980 until 1989 he was a member of the MSZMP Central Committee and, be-

tween 1988 and 1989, a member of the MSZMP Politburo. He headed the MSZMP delegation in the National Roundtable negotiations in the summer of 1989 and played a crucial role in the negotiating process. Between 1988 and 1990 he was Minister of State in the Grész cabinet and also in the Németh cabinet.

In 1989-90 Pozsgay was a member of the presidency of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), and, between May and November, 1990, he was vicepresident. In the autumn of 1989 he was a candidate for the position of President of the Republic, but the result of the “Four Yes” referendum ruled out the possibility of his presidency, albeit by a narrow margin. In November, 1990, he left

the MSZP and, in 1991, he established the National Democratic Alliance (NDSZ). He was one of the executives, and, later, the president of the Alliance, until 1996. In 1997-98 he was a political expert within the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). Pozsgay was a Member of Parliament between 1983 and 1994, representing

the MSZMP (1983-89) the MSZP (1990), and, as an independent MP, the NDSZ (1991-94). In 1990 he was the leader of the MSZP faction in parliament. Since 1991 he has been professor of Political Science at Kossuth Lajos University, Debrecen, and director of the Szent Laszl6 Academy.

Biographies of the Key Participants 403 Prepeliczay, Istvan (Independent Smallholders’ Party, FKGP) Prepeliczay was born on February 16th, 1936, in Miskolc. He graduated from the Technical University of Budapest in 1970 and worked as a technician at the Borsod Coal Mining Co. in 1954—55.

In 1955 he was arrested and sentenced to two years imprisonment for subversive activities. After his release in 1956 he worked as an agricultural electrician, quality controller, and designer. During the 1956 revolution he joined the Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKGP), and after the revolution escaped to the Matra mountains to avoid arrest, returning to Budapest only in 1960. During the sixties he worked as an assistant designer, and in the seventies as a chief designer. Between 1980 and 1989 he was chief designer at the Institute for Design and Technical Architecture. In 1988 he joined the Network of Free Initiatives, and in the same year he was one of the re-organizers of the FKGP. In 1989 he represented his party in the Opposition and National Roundtable negotiations. In 1989-90 he was secretary general of the FKGP. Prepeliczay was a Member of Parliament from 1990 to 1994,

Sandor, Laszlo (National Council of Trade Unions, SZOT)

Sandor was born in 1949, in Zagyvapalfalva. He received his degree as an economist from the Karl Marx University of Economics in 1972. Between 1972 and 1977 he worked, firstly, in the Iron Foundry and Stove Factory, and later, as head of department, at the Enamel Industrial Factory, both in Salgotarjan. Between 1975 and 1989 he was a member of the state party, the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP), and from 1977 to 1980 he was secretary of the MSZMP factory committee. Between 1980 and 1987, he was head of department at the MSZMP committee of Salgétarjan and first secretary

in 1987-88. ,

In 1988 he became economic secretary to the National Council of Trade Unions (SZOT), and in that capacity he represented the SZOT and the Third Side at the pleanary, and economic intermediate-level sessions of the National Roundtable talks in the summer of 1989. Between 1990 and 1993 he was vice-president of the National Association of Hungarian Trade Unions (MSZOSZ), the successor organization to the SZOT. Between 1993 and 1996 he was president of the health insurance section for the

self-employed in social security. Since 1995, he has been president of the MSZOSZ.

404 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Sdélyom, Laszlo (Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF)

Sdélyom was born on December 25th, 1947, in Budapest. He graduated in law from the Janus Pannonius University in Pécs in 1964. In 1965-66 he worked at the Kispest court. Between 1966 and 1969 he was

an assistant lecturer at the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena, and then between 1969 and 1983, a research fellow at the Institute of Legal and Juridical Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA). Since 1983 he has been professor at the Department of Civil Rights of the Faculty of Law, at the Eétvés Lorand University of Budapest. He has published several books in his field. During the 1980s Sélyom was legal advisor to various non-official environmental movements, and was a participant in the Danube Circle. In 1988-89 he was a member of the Publicity Club, the Marton Aron Association and of the Independent Lawyers’ Forum. Sélyom was one of the founders of the Hungarian Democratic Forum as a political organization and represented his party in the negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable and of the National Roundtable in

1989. ,

In 1989-90 he was vice-president, and, between 1990 and 1998, president, of the Constitutional Court. Since 1990 he has taught at the Pazmany Péter Catholic University in Budapest.

Szabad, Gyirgy (Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF) Szabad was born on August 4th, 1924 in Arad, Romania. He graduated in history and archival studies from the Ed6tvés Lorand University, Budapest, in 1950.

Between 1945 and 1949 he worked as a farmer and from 1949 to 1951 he was an assistant archivist at the National Archives. Between 1951 and 1954 he worked as a researcher at the Faculty of Arts of the Eétvés Lorand University, Budapest, and then as a lecturer at the Department of Modern History. Since

1970 he has been professor. His field of research was the transformation of Hungarian civil society in the 19th century, and he has published several books in this topic. Since 1982 he has been a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA). Szabad was one of the founders of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) in their first Lakitelek meeting in September 1987, and between 1989 and 1994, he was a member of the presidency. He represented the MDF in the Opposition Roundtable and in the trilateral National Roundtable negotitions also. Between 1990 and 1996 he was a Member of Parliament representing the MDF, and from 1990 to 1994, Speaker of Parliament. In March, 1996, he joined the Hungarian Democratic People’s Party (MDNP), a new party which broke away from the MDF. Between 1996 and 1998 he was a Member of Parliament for the MDNP.

Biographies of the Key Participants 405 Szabo, Miklos (Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ) Szab6 was born on May 6th, 1935, in Budapest. He gained a degree in history

and Hungarian language and literature from the Faculty of Arts of the Eétvés

Lorand University in 1958.

Due to his political activity during the 1956 revolution he had difficulties in

finding a job after graduation. In 1958-59 he was a teacher in the industrial school in Vac, whilst, from 1959 to 1967, he was librarian at the Institute for History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA). Between 1967 and 1990 he worked at the same institute as a researcher, and then as a senior researcher. In 1987 he received a Soros fellowship and spent a semester in Switzerland. In the 1990s he taught at the Kodolanyi Janos College in Székesfehérvar. He has published two books, and several articles. Between 1998 and 2000 he worked at the Budapest Archives. Szabo joined the emerging democratic opposition in the late 1970s. During the 1970s and 1980s he conducted his famous lecture series in the illegal “flying university” on different topics related to the history of communism. In 1985 he participated and lectured in the Monor meeting of opposition groups. In 1988 he was one of the founders of the Network for Free Initiatives, and also of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). He drafted the Principal Declaration of the SZDSZ. Between 1988 and 1990 he was one of the executives of the party. In 1989 he participated in the negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable and of the National Roundtable. Between 1990 and 1998 he was a Member of Parliament, representing the SZDSZ. He died on September 27th, 2000. |

Szakolezai, Gyérgy :

(Christian Democratic People’s Party, KDNP) | Szakolczai was born on June 28th, 1928, in Budapest. He was a university student between 1946 and 1948 but his studies were interrupted. He was only able to receive his degree in economics from the Karl Marx University of Economics in 1960. Between 1949 and 1951 he worked as an administrator and from 1951 to 1957 as a mechanic. In 1957-58 he worked as a freelance translator. Between 1958 and 1962 he worked as a market researcher and in 1962-63 as a fellow at the Research Institute for the Metal Industry. Between 1963 and 1965 he led the Department of Econometrics in the Ministry of Heavy Industry. Between 1965 and 1975 he headed a department at the System Technics Company. Between 1975 and 1981 he was head of department at the Research Institute for Computer Applications and in 1979 he taught at the University of Texas in Austin. Between 1982 and 1986 he was a senior fellow at the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA). Between 1987 and 1991 he worked as executive director with Econometrics Modeling Ltd. Between 1991 and 1994 he was a ministerial advisor at the Ministry of Economics, and also at the Ministry

406 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

of Welfare. Since 1994 he has been professor at the Budapest Technical University. He has published several articles in his field. Szakolczai belonged to the Christian wing of the anti-fascist resistance in the 1940s. He joined the Democratic People’s Party (DNP) in 1945 and remained a member until the liquidation of the party in 1949. In 1989 he participated in the re-organization of the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) and was a member of the executive committee. In the summer of 1989 he represented the KDNP in the negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable and of the National Roundtable. Due to his conflict with Fiizessy and Keresztes, however, he did not become a Member of Parliament. He led the Christian Socialist Group inside the party. In 1996 he was expelled from the KDNP.

Sztrés, Matyas Szurés was born on September 11th, 1933, in Ptispdkladany. He was a student at the Institute of International Affairs, Moscow, between 1953 and 1959. Between 1952 and 1956 he was a member of the then state party, the Hungarian Workers’ Party (MDP) and between 1956 and 1989 a member of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP). Betwen 1959 and 1962 he was an officer, later a senior officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Between 1962 and 1965 he was third secretary at the Hungarian embassy in Berlin. During the next ten years he worked for the department of foreign affairs of the MSZMP Central Committee, in 1974—75 as deputy head of department. From 1975 to 1978 he was Hungarian ambassador to Berlin, and, between

1978 and 1982, ambassador in Moscow. After his return he was head of the department of foreign affairs of the MSZMP Central Committee. Between 1978 and 1989 he was a member of the MSZMP CC, and, in 1983, he was appointed secretary of the MSZMP CC. In 1989 he joined the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP).

He has been a Member of Parliament since 1985. In 1989 he was elected president of Parliament, and, in this position, he chaired the plenary sessions of the National Roundtable talks in June 1989. From October 1989 to May 1990 he acted as temporary President of the Hungarian Republic. As President, he declared the birth of the Republic of Hungary on October 23rd, 1989. From 1990 to 1994 he was vice-president of the Hungarian Parliament.

Torgyan, Jozsef (Independent Smallholders’ Party, FKGP)

Torgyan was born on November 16th, 1932, in Matészalka. He took his law degree at the Edtvés Lorand University, Budapest, in 1955 and, in parallel to that, he was awarded a diploma from the Liszt Ferenc Music Art College as a violinist.

In 1956, during the days of the revolution, Torgyan joined the Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKGP). In 1957 he worked as an assistant lawyer at the Budapest Court but then he lost his job and, for a few months, was a blue collar

Biographies of the Key Participants 407 worker. He soon returned to his profession, however, and, between 1958 and 1990, he worked again as a lawyer. In 1988 he joined the re-organized FKGP. In 1989 he took part in the nego-

tiations of the Opposition and National Roundtables as a representative of the FKGP, dealing mainly with the new electoral law. In 1990 he was the prosecutor of the FKGP and the president of its Budapest branch. Between April and June 1991 he was co-president of the party, and, since June 1991, he has been president of the party. Since 1990 Torgyan has been a Member of Parliament representing the FKGP, from 1990 to 1998 leading the FKGP caucus. Initially the FKGP was a junior coalition party in the Antall cabinet, but Torgyan decided to lead his party out of the coalition. The FKGP was in opposition between February 1992 and July 1998. From July 1998 to February 2001 Torgyan was Minister of Agriculture and Regional Development in the Orban cabinet.

Télgyessy, Péter (Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ) Télgyessy was born on September 15th, 1957, in Esztergom. He graduated in

law and government from the Eétvés Lorand University, Budapest, in 1981. Since 1981 he has been a research fellow at the Institute of Legal and Juridical Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA), where his field of interest embraced the representation of interests and constitutional law. In 1988-89 Télgyessy prepared the chapter on constitutional law for the political programme of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), and in 1989 he participated in the negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable and in the trilateral National Roundtable negotiations. Télgyessy played a crucial role in the creation of the new constitution, of the new electoral law and of the constitutional court, during the negotiations. In the autumn of 1989 he was the most active supporter of the “Four Yes” referendum campaign against the privileges of the state party. Between 1989 and 1996 he was a member of the SZDSZ, and from November, 1991, until November, 1992, he was president of the party. In 1989-90, and also in 1992-94, he was a member of the central board. In 1994 he disagreed with the

formation of the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition government and left the SZDSZ in 1996.

Between 1990 and 1996 he was a Member of Parliament representing the SZDSZ, and in 1990 he was faction leader of the party. From 1996 to 1998 he was an independent MP and since June, 1998, he has been an MP for the Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz—-MPP). He has not participated strongly in policy formation with the Fidesz—MPP, and has been more influential through his political writings in different daily newspapers.

1985.

408 The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy

Varga, Csaba

(Hungarian People’s Party, MNP) Varga was born on July 17th, 1946, in Budapest. He studied aesthetics and philosophy at the Marxist-Leninist Evening University between 1968 and 1971. He gained a degree in sociology from the Eétvés Lorand University, Budapest, in Between 1968 and 1976 he worked as a cultural manager, a journalist, and as a freelance writer. He became a member of the Hungarian Pen Club. Between

1976 and 1980 he was director of the Young Artists’ Club in Budapest, and between 1984 and 1986 he worked as a senior researcher at the Institute for

Isis Ltd.

Public Culture, where he was involved in village research. In 1987 he was secretary of the Hungarian Pen Club, and, in 1987-88, executive director of Piiski—

Between 1971 and 1988 he was a member of the state party, the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (MSZMP). He joined the Veres Péter Society in 1988, and in February, 1989, he was one of the founders of the Hungarian People’s Party (MNP), becoming party secretary. In 1989 he represented the MNP at the negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable and of the National Roundtable. After the electoral defeat, in July 1990, he resigned from the party. Between 1991 and 1994 he was a member of the Conservative Party. Since 1991 he has been director of The Institute for Strategy Research. He has also been an editor of the journals Konzervativ Szemle (Conservative Review) and Zart Kor (Closed Circle). Vigh, Karoly (Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society, BZSBT) Vigh was born on June 28th, 1918, in Losonc. He took degrees at the University of Pozsony (Bratislava) and at the Pazmany Péter University, Budapest. Between 1942 and 1950 he worked at the Institute of History and from 1950 to 1952 he was senior archivist at the National Archives. Between 1952 and 1957 he headed the Archive of Pest County. From 1958 to 1963 he was senior fellow at the Library of Parliament and, between 1963 and 1967, head of department in the Museum of Contemporary History. From then, until his retirement in 1985, he worked as senior research fellow at the National Museum. Between 1945-48 he was a member of the Hungarian Communist Party (MKP) and then, between 1948 and 1956, a member of the state party, the Hungarian Workers’ Party (MDP). Between 1986 and 1989 Vigh was a foundermember and president of the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society (BZSBT), and, since 1989, its honorary president. In 1989 he represented the BZSBT in the Opposition Roundtable and National Roundtable negotiations. Since 1988 he has also been a member of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF).

Biographies of the Key Participants 409 Vitézy, Laszlo (Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions, FSZDL) Vitézy was born on May 17th, 1940, in Budapest. He studied both direction and camera at the College of Theatrical and Cinematic Art and graduated in 1973. Between 1963 and 1969 he was lighting-effects man at the Budapest Film Studios, and second cameraman at the Hungarian Film Studios. Between 1973 and 1979 he was one of the leaders of the Balazs Béla Studio and director of the Documentary Studio. In 1981 he became director and cameraman at Tarsulas Studio (The Association Studio), and editor—director at Hungarian Television. From the 1970s until 1987, Vitézy was a member of the communist party. In 1988 Vitézy was one of the founders of the Mozgokép Democratic Trade Union. He represented the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions (FSZDL) at the Opposition Roundtable and National Roundtable negotiations. From 1990 to 1993 he served as one of the League’s executives.

Zétényi, Zsolt (Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society, BZSBT) Zétényi was born on August 9th, 1941, in Veszprém. He took a law degree at the Eétvés Lorand University, Budapest, in 1964. Between 1964 and 1968 he worked firstly at the Central District Court of Pest, and later at the Supreme Court. In 1968 he became a researcher at the National Institute of Criminal Studies. Between 1969 and 1990 he worked as a legal advisor, and then as a lawyer. Since 1994 he has again worked as a lawyer. In 1986 Zétényi joined the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society (BZSBT). He soon became its executive director, and, in 1989, secretary general of the Society. Delegated by the BZSBT, he participated in the Opposition and National Roundtable negotiations. Between 1988 and 1995 he was a member of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), in 1993-94 a member of the presidency of the party. From 1990 to 1994 he was a Member of Parliament, representing the MDF.

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Selected Bibliography

Ackerman, Bruce (1991), We the People. Foundations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Ackerman, Bruce (1992), The Future of Liberal Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press. Acs, Zoltan (1988), Kizdrt a part (The Party Expelled Me). Budapest: Primo. Ader, Janos (1991), “Kinek az érdeke? A magyar valasztasi rendszer jellemzése”(Whose Interest Is it? Features of the Election System in Hungary), in Sandor Kurtan, Péter Sandor and Laszlé Vass, eds. Magyarorszag politikai évkényve, 199] (Political Yearbook of Hungary, 1991). Budapest: DRKMKA, 68-74. Agh, Attila (1995), “A Partial Consolidation of East Central European Parties: The Case of the Hungarian Socialist Party” Party Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4, 491-514. Agh, Attila, Jozsef Géczi and Jozsef Sipos, eds. (1999), Rendszervaltok a baloldalon: reformerek és reformkérék, 1988-89 (The Promoters of Political Transition on the Left: Reformers and Reform Circles, 1988-89). Budapest: Kossuth. Agocs, Sandor and Endre Medvigy, eds. (1991), Lakitelek, 1987. A magyarsag esélyei. A tanacskozas hiteles jegyzékényve (Lakitelek, 1987. The Prospects of the Hungarians. The Minutes of the Meeting). Budapest: Antoldégia-Ptiski. Anderson, Lisa, ed. (1999), Transitions to Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press. Antal, Laszl6, Lajos Bokros, Istvan Csillag, Laszlo Lengyel and Gyorgy Matolcsy (1987), Fordulat és reform (Turnaround and Reform). A special issue of Medvetanc. No. 2. Antal, Laszl6 et al. (1998), Lampasok az alagutban (Light at the End of the Tunnel). Budapest: Pénziigykutat6o Rt, Perfekt Rt.

Arato, Andrew (2000), Civil Society, Constitution and Legitimacy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Arendt, Hannah (1958), The Origins of Totalitarianism. Cleveland: Meridian. Arendt, Hannah (1963), On Revolution. New York: Viking Press. Az Igazsagtigy: Minisztérium (1993), “Magyarorszag Alkotmanya — Szabalyozasi Koncepci6” (Ministry of Justice, Hungary’s Constitution—Conceptual Framework), in Laszl6 Sods (ed.): A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsaganak 1989. évi jegyzokényvei (Central Committee, Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, Stenographic Minutes, 1989), Vol. 1 Budapest: Magyar Orszagos Levéltar, pp. 409-439. “Az uy politizald szervezetek dokumentumai” (1989), (Documents of the New Political Organizations), in Sandor Kurtan, Péter Sandor and Laszlé Vass, eds. Magyarorszag Politikai Evkényve, 1988 (Political Yearbook of Hungary, 1988), Budapest: R-Forma Kiado, pp. 699-796.

412 Selected Bibliography Babus, Endre (1990), “Népszavazas — 1989” (Plebiscite, 1989), in Sandor Kurtan ef al., eds. Magyarorszag politikai évkényve, 1990 (The Political Yearbook of Hungary, 1990). Budapest: Aula-OMIKK, 209-223. Balint, B. Andras (1990), Gydzelemre sziilettiink: Konya Imre az Ellenzéki Kerekasztalrol

(We Are Born to Victory: Imre Kénya on the Opposition Roundtable). Budapest: Progresszi0.

Barath, Magdolna and M. Janos Rainer, eds. (2000), Gorbacsov targyalasai magyar vezet6kkel. Dokumentumok az egykori SZKP és MSZMP archivumaibol, 1985—1990

(Gorbachev’s Talks with Hungarian Leaders. Documents from the Archives of the Former CPSU and MSZMP, 1985-90). Budapest: 1956-os Intézet. Bates, Robert H. (1988), “Contra Contractarianism: Some Reflections on the New Institutionalism.” Politics and Society, 16, 387. Bauman, Zygmunt (1994), “After the Patronage State: A Model in Search of Class Inter-

ests,” in Christopher C. A. Bryant and Edmund Mokrzycki, eds. The New Great Transformation? Change and Continuity in East-Central Europe. London: Routledge. Békés, Csaba (1997), “Hideghabora, enyhiilés és az 1956-os forradalom” (Cold War, Détente and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution). Evkényv V. 1996-97 (Yearbook, No. 5. 1996-7). Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, pp. 201-13. Békés, Csaba, Malcolm R. Byrne, editors-in-chief; Melinda Kalmar, Zoltan Ripp, Miklos Vorés, eds. (1999), Political Transition in Hungary, 1989-90. Washington, DC: National Security Archives; Budapest: The Cold War History Research Center. Benké, Péter (1996), A magyar népi mozgalom almanachja (An Almanac of the Hungarian Populist Movement). Budapest: Deak. Benoit, Kenneth (1996), “Hungary’s Two-Ballot Electoral System” Representation, Vol. 33, No. 4, 162-70. Benoit, Kenneth and John W. Schiemann (2001), “Institutional Choice in New Democracies: Bargaining over Hungary’s 1989 Electoral Law” Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 13, No. 2, April. Bernhard, Michael (1991), “Reinterpreting Solidarity,” Studies in Comparative Communism Vol. 24, No. 3, 313-30. Beschloss, M. R. and S. Talbott (1993), At the Highest Levels. Boston: Little Brown. Bihari, Mihaly (1985), Politikai rendszer és szocialista demokracia (Political Systems

and Socialist Democracy). Budapest: ELTE AJTK. | Bihari, Mihaly (1990), Reform és demokracia: valsag és kibontakozas. (Reform and Democracy: Crisis and Development). Budapest: Edtvés. Bihari, Mihaly (1990), Demokratikus ut a szabadsaghoz (Democratic Road to Freedom). Budapest: Gondolat. Bihari, Mihaly ed. (1992), A tébbpartrendszer kialakulasa Magyarorszagon, 1985-1991 (The Making of a Multi-party System in Hungary, 1985-91) Budapest: Kossuth. Bihari, Mihaly (1996), Magyar politika, 1945-1995 (Hungarian Politics, 1945-95) Budapest: Korona. Bird, Zoltan (1988), Sajat ut (Own Way). Budapest: Piisk1. Bird, Zoltan (1993), Elhervadt forradalom. (A Faded Revolution). Budapest: Ptiski. Bodzaban, Istvan and Antal Szalay, eds. (1994), A puha diktaturatol a kemény demokraciaig (From Soft Dictatorship to Hard Democracy). Budapest: Pelikan.

Bossanyi, Katalin (1989), Szdlamproba. Beszélgetések az alternativ mozgalmakrol (Conversations on the Alternative Movements). Budapest: Lang.

Selected Bibliography 413 | Bozoki, Andras, Tamas Csapody, Ervin Csizmadia and Miklés Stikésd, eds. (1991), Csendes? Forradalom? Volt? (Was it a Peaceful Revolution?). Budapest: T-Twins. Bozoéki, Andras ed. (1992), Tiszta lappal: A Fidesz a magyar politikaban, 1988-91 (With a Clean Slate: Fidesz in Hungarian Politics, 1988-91). Budapest: Fidesz. Bozoki, Andras, Andras Kérésényi and George Schépflin, eds. (1992), Post-Communist Transition: Emerging Pluralism in Hungary. London: Pinter, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Bozoéki, Andras (1993), “Hungary’s Road to Systemic Change: The Opposition Roundtable.” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 7, No. 2, Spring, 276-308. Bozoki, Andras (1994), “Vazlat harom populizmusrol: az Egyesiilt Allamok, Argentina és Magyarorszag” (An Outline of Three Cases of Populism: The United States, Argentina, and Hungary). Politikatudomanyi Szemle, Vol. 3, No. 3, 33-69.

Bozoki, Andras (1995), Konfrontacid és konszenzus: a demokratizalds stratégiai (Confrontation and Consensus: Strategies for Democratisation). Szombathely: Savaria University Press. Bozoki, Andras (1996), Magyar panoptikum (Hungarian Waxworks). Budapest: Kavé. Bozoki, Andras (1999), “A polgari radikalis kormany” (The Civic Radical Government), in Sandor Kurtan et al., eds. Magyarorszag politikai évkényve, 1998 (The Political Yearbook of Hungary, 1998). Budapest: DKMKA, pp. 272-78. Bozoki, Andras ed. (1999), Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe. Budapest: Central European University Press. Bozoki, Andras editor-in-chief; Marta Elbert, Melinda Kalmar, Béla Révész, Erzsébet

Ripp and Zoltan Ripp, eds. (1999), A rendszervaltas forgatokényve: kerekasztaltargyalasok 1989-ben (The Script of the Regime Change: Roundtable Talks in 1989). Vols. 1-4. Budapest: Magveto. Bozoki, Andras et al., eds. (1999-2000), A rendszervaltas forgatokényve: kerekasztaltargyalasok 1989-ben (The Script of the Regime Change: Roundtable Talks in 1989). Vols. 5-8, Budapest: Uj Mandatum. Vol. 5. Edited by Erzsébet Ripp and Zoltan Ripp (2000). Vol. 6. Edited by Melinda Kalmar and Béla Révész (2000). Vol. 7. Alkotmanyos forradalom (Constitutional Revolution) edited by Andras Bozoki (2000). Vol. 8. Portrék és életrajzok (Portraits and Biographies) by Marta Elbert and Andras Bozoki (1999). Bruszt, Laszlo (1990), “Negotiated Revolution in Hungary.” Social Research, Vol. 57.

No. 2. 365-87.

Bruszt, Laszl6 and David Stark (1992), “Remaking the Political Field in Hungary: From the Politics of Confrontation to the Politics of Competition,” in Ivo Banac ed. Eastern Europe in Revolution. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 13-55. Bruszt, Laszl6 (1995), A centralizacio csapdaja (The Trap of Centralization). Szom-

bathely: Savaria University Press. /

Burton, Michael G. and John Higley (1987), “Elite Settlements” American Sociological Review, Vol. 52, 295-307. Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft (1998), A World Transformed. New York: Alfred A.

Knopf. ,

Calda, Milos (1996), “The Roundtable Talks in Czechoslovakia,” in Jon Elster (ed.) Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 135-77.

414 | Selected Bibliography Clague, Christopher (1997), “The New Institutional Economics and Economic Develop-

. ment,” in Christopher Clague, ed., Institutions and Economic Development. Growth and Governance in Less-Developed and Post-Socialist States. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 13-36. Colomer, Josep M. (1995), “Strategies and Outcomes in Eastern Europe.” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 2, 74-85. Constitutional and Legislative Policy Institute, ed. (1996), Alkotmanyos elvek és esetek (Constitutional Principles and Cases). Budapest: COLPI. Cox, Terry and Andy Furlong, eds. (1995), Hungary: The Politics of Transition. London: Frank Cass. Csizmadia, Ervin (1991), “Utak a partosodashoz: az MDF és az SZDSZ megszervezodése” (Roads to a Multiparty System: The MDF and the SZDSZ in the Making), in Mihaly Bihari, ed., A tébbpartrendszer kialakulasa Magyarorszagon, 1985-1991 (The Establishment of the Multiparty System in Hungary, 1985-91). Budapest: Kossuth, pp. 7-39. Csizmadia, Ervin (1995), A magyar demokratikus ellenzék (The Hungarian Democratic

Opposition). Vols. 1-3. Budapest: T-Twins. ,

Dahl, Robert A. (1956), Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Dahl, Robert A. (1982), Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy. New Haven: Yale University

: Press.

Dahrendorf, Ralf (1990), Reflections on the Revolution in Europe. London: Chatto & Windus.

Debreczeni, Jozsef (1998), A miniszterelnék:, Antall Jozsef és a rendszervaltozas (The Prime Minister: Jozsef Antall and the Regime Change). Budapest: Osiris. Diamond, Larry ed. (1992), The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World. New York: Freedom House. Diamond, Larry (1996), “Is the Third Wave Over?” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 3, 20-37. Donald, Moira and Tim Rees, eds. (2001), Reinterpreting Revolution in TwentiethCentury Europe. London: Macmillan. East, Roger and Jolyon Pontin (1997), Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Pinter. Eckhart, Ferenc (1946), Magyar alkotmany és jogtérténet (History of Hungarian Constitution and Law). Budapest: Politzer, 1946. Ekiert, Grzegorz (1996), The State Against Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Elster, Jon, ed. (1986), Rational Choice. New York: New York University Press. Elster, Jon (1993), “Constitution-making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea,” in Joachim J. Hesse, ed. Administrative Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 169-217. Elster, Jon (1996), “The Role of Institutional Interests in East European ConstitutionMaking,” East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, Winter 63. Elster, Jon ed. (1996), Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Enyedi, Zsolt (1999), Politika a kereszt jegyében (Politics in the Name of the Cross). Budapest: Osiris. Ethrington, Phillip J. et al. (1995), “Polity Forum: Institutions and Institutionalism,” Polity 8, 7. 38-140.

Selected Bibliography 415 Faragé, Béla (1990), “Gondolatok a magyarorsz4gi alkotmanyozas folyamatardl” (Thoughts on Constitution-making in Hungary). Szazadvég, No. 1, 213-225. Faure, M. and J-E. Lane (1996), South Africa: Designing New Political Institutions. London, Sage.

Fehér, Ferenc and Agnes Heller (1992), Kelet-Eurdpa ‘dicséséges forradalmai’ (The

‘Glorious Revolutions’ of Eastern Europe). Budapest: T-Twins. , Fekete Doboz (1989), Videotapes of the meetings of the Opposition Roundtable. Budapest: Fekete Doboz Alapitvany. Fidesz (1992), “Politikai programnyilatkozat, 1988. november 20” (Political Program Statement, November 20, 1988.) in Andras Bozoki, ed., Tiszta lappal (With a Clean Slate). Budapest: Fidesz, pp. 110-13. Foran, John, ed. (1997), Theorising Revolutions. London: Routledge. Féldes, Gyérgy and Laszlé Hubai, eds. (1994), Parlamenti képviselévalasztasok, 19201990. (Parliamentary Elections, 1920-1990). Budapest: Politikatérténeti Alapitvany. Fricz, Tamas (1996), A magyarorszagi partrendszer, 1987-1995 (The Hungarian PartySystem, 1987-95). Budapest: Cserépfalvi. Friedrich, Carl and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1956), Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. New York: Praeger. Gati, Charles (1989), The Bloc that Failed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Geddes, Barbara (1996), “Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America,” in Arend Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, eds. Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America. Boulder: Westview, pp. 15-42. Gombar, Csaba, Elemér Hankiss, Laszl6 Lengyel and Gy6érgyi Varnai, eds. (1994), Kormany a mérlegen, 1990-94 (Government in Perspective, 1990-94), Budapest: Korridor.

Gray, John (1993), “From Post-Communism to Civil Society: The Re-emergence of History and the Decline of the Western Model.” Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 10, No. 2. Gy6rivanyi, Gabor (1993), “A rendszervaltozas jatékai” (The Games of Transition). Poli-

tikatudomanyi Szemle, Vol. 2, No. 1, 79-101. | |

Gyurk6, Laszl6 (1982), Arcképvazlat térténelmi hattérrel (Sketch for a Portrait with a Historical Background). Budapest: Magvet6. Halasz, Jozsef and Janos Sari, eds. (1987), Allami intézmények a politikai rendszerben (State Institutions in the Political System). Budapest: Kossuth. Hankiss, Elemér (1990), East European Alternatives. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hanzel, Vladimir (1991), Zrychleny tep dejin (The Accelerated Heartbeat of History). Prague: OK Centrum. Haraszti, Miklos, Janos Kis, Ferenc Készeg and Ottilia Solt (1987), Tarsadalmi szerzédés (Social Contract). A special issue of Beszélo. Havas, Fanny et al., eds. (1992), Beszél6 Osszkiadas (Beszélé, Full Edition). Vols. 1-3. Budapest: AB-Beszél6. Hegedtis, B. Andras (1992), Otvenhatrél nyolcvanhatban (On 1956 in 1986). Budapest: Szazadvég and 56-os Intézet. Higley, John, Jan Pakulski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, eds. (1998), Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

416 Selected Bibliography Hofer, Tamas (1992), “Hare a rendszervaltasért szimbolikus mezében: 1989 marcius 15-e Budapesten” (Fighting for a Regime Change on a Symbolic Field: March 15, 1989 in Budapest). Politikatudomanyi Szemle, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 29-51. Hollé, Andras (1993), Az allamjogtol a jogallamig: a kézjog forradalma (From State Law to the Rule of Law: The Revolution in Constitutional Law). Budapest. Holmes, Leslie (1997), Post-Communism. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Horvath, Istvan and Istvan Németh (1999), Es a falak leomlanak. Magyarorszdg és a német egység, 1945-1990 (And the Walls Came Tumbling down: Hungary and the German Unity, 1945-90). Budapest: Magveto. Huntington, Samuel P. (1991), The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Husz, Dora (1997), “Elit jatszmak: a posztkommunista elitek kialakulasa” (Elite Games: The Making of Post-communist Elites) Politikatudomanyi Szemle, Vol. 6, No. 3, 71104.

Hutchings, Robert L. (1997), American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War. An Insider’s Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989-1992. Washington, DC.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Jasiewicz, Krzysztof (1992), “Polish Elections, 1989-1991: Beyond the ‘Pospolite Ruszenie,’” in Peter Volten ed. Bound to Change. New York: Institute for East-West Studies.

Jenkins, Robert (1992), “Society and Regime Transition in East Central Europe” in Gyorgy Szoboszlai ed. Flying Blind: Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe. Budapest: Hungarian Political Science Association, pp. 114—46. Kaldor, Mary and Ivan Vejvoda, eds. (1999), Democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Pinter. Kalmar, Melinda (1998), Ennivalé és hozomany (Food and Dowry). Budapest: Magvetd. Kaminski, Bartlomiej (1991), “Systemic Underpinnings of the Transition in Poland: The Shadows of the Roundtable Agreement. “Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 24, No. 2, 173-90. Kaminski, Bartlomiej (1991), The Collapse of State Socialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Karl, Terry Lynn (1990), “Dilemmas of Democratisation in Latin America” Comparative Politics, Vol. 22, October, 1-21. Kasza, Laszlé6 (1994), Metamorphosis Hungariae, 1989-94. Budapest: Szazadvég. Keleti, Gyérgy (1992), “Szovjet csapatkivonasok — Magyarorszag katonai fiiggetlenségének tdrténete — a jugoszlaviai konfliktus” (Soviet Troop Withdrawals—the History of the Military Independence of Hungary—the Yugoslavian Conflict) in Sandor Kurtan et al., eds. Magyarorszag politikai évkényve, 1992 (The Political Yearbook of Hungary). Budapest: DKMKA, 381-409. Kende, Péter (1991), A padrizsi toronybol: Valogatott politikai irasok 1957-1989 (From the Eiffel Tower: Selected Political Writings, 1957-89) Budapest: Cserépfalvi. Kenedi, Janos (1996), Kis dllambiztonsagi olvasoékényv: Oktober 23. — marcius 15. — Junius 16. a Kadar-korszakban. (A Little State Security Reader: October 23, March 15, and June 16 in the Kadar Era) Vols. 1-2. Budapest: Magveto. Kennedy, Michael D. (1999), “Contingencies and the Alternatives of 1989: Towards the Theory and Practice of Negotiated Revolution.” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 13, No. 2, Spring, 293-302. Kerekes, Zsuzsa (1999), Parlamenti abécé. (Parliamentary ABC). Budapest: Osiris.

Selected Bibliography 417 Kilényi, Géza ed. (1991), Egy alkotmany-elékészités dokumentumai. (Kisérlet Magyarorszag Uj Alkotmanyanak megalkotasdra, 1988-1990) (Preparatory Documents for a Constitution. An Attempt to Craft Hungary’s New Constitution). Budapest: Allamtudomanyi Kutatokézpont. Kimmel, Emil (1990), Kongresszus ‘89 (Congress ‘89). Budapest: Kossuth. Kiraly, Béla K. and Andras Bozoki, eds. (1995), Lawful Revolution in Hungary, 19891994. Boulder: Social Science Monographs, distributed by the Columbia University Press. Kis, Janos (1995), “Between Reform and Revolution: Three Hypotheses about the Nature of Regime Change,” in Béla K. Kiraly and Andras Bozoki, eds. Lawful Revolution in Hungary, 1989-1994, Boulder: Social Science Monographs distributed by the Columbia University Press, pp. 33-59. Kis, Janos (1998), “Between Reform and Revolution” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 12, No. 2, Spring, 300-83. Kis, Janos (1999), “1989, a vig esztend6” (1989, the Festive Year) Beszéld, Vol. 4, No. 10, 39-42. Koelble, Thomas A. (1995), “The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociol-

ogy,” Comparative Politics, 27, 2. January, 231-43. | Konrad, Gyérgy [George] and Ivan Szelényi (1979), The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.

Konrad, Gyérgy and Ivan Szelényi (1991), “Intellectuals and Domination in PostCommunist Societies” in Pierre Bourdieu and James S. Coleman, eds. Social Theory and Changing Society. Boulder: Westview. Kornai, Janos (1997), “Mit jelent és mit nem jelent a rendszervaltas?” (What is a Regime Change and What is Not). Kritika, August, 2—7. Kosztricz, Anna S. et al., eds. (1993), A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kézponti Bizottsdganak 1989 évi jegyzékényvei (The 1989 minutes of the Central Committee of the

MSZMP). Vols. 1-2. Budapest: MOL. |

KGrésényi, Andras (1992), “The Hungarian Parliamentary Elections, 1990” in Andras Bozoki, Andras K6résényi and George Schépflin, eds. Post-Communist Transition: Emerging Pluralism in Hungary. London: Pinter, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 72— 87.

KGrésényi, Andras (1992), “The Revival of the Past or a New Beginning? The Nature of Post-Communist Politics” in Bozoki, Kérésényi and Schépflin, 111-31. KGrésényi, Andras: “K6zj6, kézigazgatas és kormanyzati rendszer: Az allamfelfogasok térténeti gyékerei Eurépaban” (Public Welfare, Public Administration and Governance: Conceptions of the State and its Historic Roots in Europe), in Csaba Gombar ef al., eds. “Es mi lesz ha nem lesz? Tanulmanyok az allamroél a 20. szdzad végén (What Happens When it Isn’t There? Studies on the State at the End of the Twentieth Century). Budapest: Korridor, 1997. 245-72. K6résényi, Andras: A magyar politikai rendszer (The Hungarian Political System) Budapest: Osiris, 1998. Krasso, Gydrgy (1990), “Statarium és happening” (Martial Law and Happening) An interview with Andras Bozoki. Mozgo Vilag, Vol. 16, No. 1, 63-76. Krasznai, Zoltan (1996), A birodalom romjain (On the ruins of the empire). Budapest: Uj Mandatum. Krausz, Tamas (1994), Megélt rendszervaltds (Living through a Regime Change). Budapest: Cégér.

418 Selected Bibliography Krejci, Jaroslav (2000), “Great Revolutions of the 20th Century in a Civilisational Perspective” Thesis Eleven, No. 62, August, 71—90.

Kukorelli, Istvan and Péter Schmidt, eds. (1989), Az alkotmanyossag alapjai. Tarsadalom, demokracia, alkotmanyossag (The Bases of Constitutionalism. Society, Democracy and Constitutionalism). Budapest: Kossuth. Kukorelli, Istvan (1995); Az alkotmanyozds évtizede (A Decade of Constitution Making). Budapest: Korona. Kulcsar, Kalman (1994), Két vilag kézétt (Between Two Worlds). Budapest: Akadémiai Kiado.

Kurtan, Sandor, Péter Sandor and Laszl6 Vass, eds. (1989), Magyarorszag politikai évkonyve, 1988. (The Political Yearbook of Hungary, 1988). Debrecen: R-Forma. Kurtan, Sandor ed. (1993), Vor der Wende. Politisches System, Gesellschaft und Reformen im Ungarn der achiziger Jahre. Vienna: Bohlau. Kurtan, Sandor, Péter Sandor and Laszl6 Vass, eds. (1998), Magyarorszag évtizedkényve (The Book of the Last Decade in Hungary). Vols. 1-2. Budapest: DKMKA. Laki, Mihaly (1991), “Economic Programmes of the Ex-Opposition Parties in Hungary” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 5, No. 1, 73-91. Lasswell, Harold (1960), Psychopathology and Politics. New York: Viking Press. Lazar, Istvan ed. (1989), Uj Marciusi Front, 1988 (New March Front, 1988). Budapest: Muzsak. Lengyel, Laszl6 (1989), Végkifejlet (Endgame). Budapest: KJK. Lengyel, Laszlé (1991), Micsoda év! (What a Year!). Budapest: Szépirodalmi. Lengyel, Laszl6 (1993), “Alapité atyak” (Founding Fathers). Kritika, September, 3—9. Lengyel, Laszlé (1996), A rendszervalto elit tiindédklése és bukasa (The Rise and Fall of the Elites in the Regime Change) Budapest: Helikon. Lévesque, Jacques (1995), La fin d’un empire: L’URSS et la liberation de |’Europe de l’Est. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. In English: The Enigma of 1989. The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. Lijphart, Arend (1992), “Democratisation and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, 1989-91” Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2, 207— 23.

Lijphart, Arend (1994), Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty Seven Democracies, 1945-1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan (1996), Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidations: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Mainwaring, Scott, Guillermo O’Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds. (1992), Issues in | Democratic Consolidation. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Mainwaring, Scott (1992), “Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues” in Scott Mainwaring ef al., eds. Issues in Democratic Consolidation. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, pp. 294-341. Maravall, José Maria and Julian Santamaria (1986), “Political Change in Spain and the

Prospects for Democracy) in Guillerno O’ Donnell ef al., eds. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen (1989), Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: Free Press.

Selected Bibliography 419 Markus, Laszlé (1999), Forog a hinta: Szocdemek, 1989-1994 (The Roundabout Turns Again: Social Democrats, 1989-94) Budapest: Willy Brandt Alapitvany. MDF (1988) “Alapitélevél” (Founding Document). Hitel, Vol. 1, No. 1, 50-51. Michnik, Adam (1987), Letters from Prison and Other Essays. Berkeley: University of California Press. Molnar, Eva, Zoltan Nagy and Tamas Vladar, eds. (1990), Féldindulds Kelet-Eurdpaban, 1988-1990 (Landslide in Eastern Europe). Vols. 1-2. Budapest: MTI Sajtoadatbank. Nagy, Imre (1984), A magyar nép nevében: Vitairatok és beszédek. (In the name of the Hungarian People: Polemical essays and speeches) North, Douglass C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O’Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds. (1986), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Vols. 1-4. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. O’Donnell, Guillermo (1994), “Delegative Democracy” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 1, 55-69. O’Neil, Patrick (1998), Revolution from Within: The Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party and the Collapse of Communism. Cheltenham-Northampton: Edward Elgar. Offe, Claus (1996), Designing Institutions for East European Transitions, Public Lecture no. 9, Budapest: Collegium Budapest. Osiatynski, Wiktor (1996), “The Roundtable Talks in Poland,” in Jon Elster (ed.), The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 21-68. Ost, David (1990), Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland Since 1968. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Paczkowski, Andrzej (1997), Fél évszazad Lengyelorszag térténetébdl, 1939-1989 (A Half-century of Polish history, 1939-89). Budapest: 1956-os Intézet. Pandi, Lajos (1991), A kelet-eurdpai diktaturak bukasa: kronolégia, dokumentumok (The Fall of East European Dictatorships: Chronology, Documents) Szeged: JATE. Parker, Noel (1999), Revolutions and History: An Essay in Interpretation. Cambridge:

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420 Selected Bibliography Racz, Barnabas (1999), “Left Politics in Post-Communist Hungary” in Charles Bukowski and Barnabas Racz, eds., The Return of the Left in Post-Communist States: Current Trends and Future Perspectives. Cheltenham-Northampton: Edward Elgar, 59-93. Rainer, M. Janos (1989), Tetemrehivas (1956-88. Summoning the Dead). Budapest: Bibliotéka. Rainer, M. Janos and Vycheslav Sereda, eds. (1996), Déntés a Kremlben, 1956. A szovjet partelnékség vitai Magyarorszagrol. (Decision in the Kremlin, 1956. The Debates of the Soviet Party Leadership on Hungary). Budapest: 1956-os Intézet. Ravasz, Karoly (1997), “A Ftiggetlen Kisgazdapart ujjaalakitasa 1988-89 forduldjan” (The Re-establishment of the Independent Smallholders’ Party at the Turn of 1988—

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Révész, Sandor (1995), Antall Jozsef tavolrol (Jozsef Antall from a Distance). Budapest: Sik.

Richter, Anna (1990), Ellenzéki Kerekasztal — portrévazlatok (Opposition Roundtable: Portrait Sketches) Budapest: Otlet Kft. Ripp, Zoltan (1995), Szabad demokratak: Térténeti vazlat a Szabad Demokratak Szévet-

ségének politikajarol, 1988-94 (The Free Democrats: A Historical Sketch of the Politics of the Alliance of Free Democrats, 1988-94). Budapest: Napvilag. Rockman, Bert A. (1997), “Institutions, Democratic Stability and Performance” in Metin Heper, Ali Kazancigil, and Bert A. Rockman, eds. Institutions and Democratic Statecraft.Boulder: Westview Press. Rose, Richard (1999), “Another Great Transformation”. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10,

No. |, January, 51-56. | Rustow, Dankwart (1970), “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.” Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, April, 337-63. Sajo, Andras (1996), “Roundtable Talks in Hungary” in Jon Elster ed. Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sarkézy, Tamas (1987), Gazdasdgpolitika, szervezetrendszer, jogpolitika (Economic, Administrative and Legal Policy) Budapest: Kossuth. _ . Schiemann, John W. (1999), Risk, Radicalism and Regime Change: Institutional Choice in Hungary, 1989. Ph.D. Thesis, New York: Columbia University. Schmidt, Péter (1984), A szocialista rendszer és az allamisag (The Socialist System and Statehood). Budapest: Kossuth. Schmitt, Carl (1989) [1928], Verfassungslehre. Berlin. Schépflin, George, Rudolf L. Tékés and Ivan Vélgyes (1989), “Az apparatus lazadasa és valsag Magyarorszagon” (Revolt of the Apparatus and Crisis in Hungary). Mozg6é Vilag, Vol. 16, No. 6. June. Seligman, Adam B. (1994), The Transition from State Socialism in Eastern Europe: The Case of Hungary. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Stark, David and Laszl6 Bruszt eds. (1998),. Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property Relations in East Central Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stepan, Alfred ed. (1989), Democratising Brasil. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Szabad, Gyérgy ed. (1993), Legislation of the Hungarian Parliament. May 2—December 31 1990. Budapest: Hungarian Parliament. Szabad Kezdeményezések Haldézata (1989), “Alapité dokumentum” (Founding Document). Szabad Demokratak, Nos 1-2, 46-7.

Selected Bibliography 421 Szab6é, Miklés (1989), Politikai kultura Magyarorszagon, 1896-1986 (Political Culture in Hungary 1896-1986) Budapest: Medvetanc. Szabé, Miklés (1995), “From Big Elephant to Paper Tiger: Soviet-Hungarian Relations, 1988-1991” in Béla K. Kiraly and Andras Bozoki, eds. Lawful Revolution in Hungary, 1989-1994. Boulder: Social Science Monographs distributed by the Columbia University Press, pp. 395-411. Szalai, Erzsébet (1990), Gazdasag és hatalom (Economy and Power). Budapest: Aula. Szalai, Erzsébet (1994), Uteldgazds: hatalom és értelmiség az dllamszocializmus utan. (The Roads Diverge: Power and the Intellectuals Following State Socialism). Budapest: Pesti Szalon. Szalai, Erzsébet (2000), Szerepproba (Role Play). Budapest: Szazadvég. — Szalay, Péter (1989), “Mi van a demokracia csomagtervben?” (What is in the Democracy Package?), Magyarorszag politikai évkényve, 1988 ((Political Yearbook of Hungary, 1988). Budapest, pp. 254-64. SZDSZ (1989), A rendszervaltas programja. (The Programme of Regime Change). Budapest: SZDSZ. Szelényi, Ivan (1992), A posztkommunista atmenet tarsadalmi konfliktusai (The Social Conflicts of the Post-communist Transition) Budapest: MTA PTI. Szoboszlai, Gyérgy ed. (1985), Biztonsdg és egyiittmiikédés. (Security and Cooperation) Budapest: Hungarian Political Science Association. Szoboszlai, Gyorgy (1989), Allamisdg és politikai rendszer (Statehood and the Political System). Budapest: Kossuth. Szoboszlai, Gyérgy ed. (1990), Parlamenti valasztasok, 1990 (Parliamentary Elections, 1990). Budapest: Tarsadalomtudomanyi Intézet, 12-6. Szoboszlai, Gyérgy ed. (1991), Democracy and Political Transformation: Theories and East Central European Realities. Budapest: Hungarian Political Science Association.

Szoboszlai, Gyérgy ed. (1992), Flying Blind: Emerging Democracies in East Central

Europe. Budapest: Hungarian Political Science Association |

Taagepera, Rein and Matthew S. Shugart (1989), Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven: Yale University Press. Tamas, Gaspar M. (1989), “Szint vallani” (Showing one’s true colors). Hitel, March. Tamas, Gaspar M. (1994), Masvildg (Otherworld). Budapest: Uj Mandatum. Teitel, Ruti G. (2000), Transitional Justice. New York. Thelen, Kathleen and Sven Steinmo (1992), “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds. Structuring Politics. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tokés, Rudolf L. (1990), A posztkommunizmusbol a demokracidba (From Postcommunism to Democracy). Bonn: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Tékés, Rudolf L. (1996), Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political Succession, 1957-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 399-440. Tokés, Rudolf L. (1997), Murmur and Whispers: Public Opinion and Legitimacy Crisis in Hungary, 1972-1989. Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Tokés, Rudolf L (1998), “Democracy in Hungary: Institutional Origins and Legitimacy Dilemmas” Discussion Paper, Collegium Budapest: Institute for Advanced Study.

422 Selected Bibliography | Térvények és rendeletek hivatalos gyujteménye (1983) (An Official Selection of Bills and Resolutions) Budapest: KJK. Urban, Laszl6 (1992), “The Hungarian Transition from a Public Choice Perspective” in Andras Bozoki et al., eds. Post-Communist Transition. London: Pinter, 88—95. Vajda, Mihaly (1992), A térténelem vége? Kézép-Eurodpa, 1989. (The End of History? Central Europe, 1989) Budapest: Szazadvég. Valenzuela, J. Samuel (1992), “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions” in Scott Mainwaring et al., eds., Issues in Democratic Consolidation. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 57-104. Vass, Henrik ed. (1994), A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart hatarozatai és dokumentumai, 1985-1989. (The resolutions and documents of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, 1985-9.) Budapest: Interart. Vida, Istvan and Vince Vérés (1991), A Fiiggetlen Kisgazdapart képviseldi 1944-49. Eletrajzi lexikon. (Parliamentary representatives of the Independent Smallholders’ Party, 1944—9. A Biographical Encyclopedia) Budapest: ELTE Szocioldgiai és Szocialpolitikai Intézet. Vigh, Karoly (1990), “Az Ellenzéki Kerekasztalt6l a Nemzeti Kerekasztalig” in Sandor Kurtan et al., eds., Magyarorszdg politikai évkényve 1990. (The political yearbook of Hungary, 1990.) Budapest: Aula-OMIKK. Vigh, Karoly (1999), “Az Ellenzéki Kerekasztalrél” (On the Opposition Roundtable) Valosag, Vol. 42. No. 1. Weber, Attila (1996), A Fidesz jelenség. (The Fidesz phenomenon) Budapest: Napvilag. Wolchik, Sharon L. (1991), Czechoslovakia in Transition: Politics, Economics and Soci-

ety. New York: Pinter. ,

Zubek, Voytek (1991), “Walesa’s Leadership and Poland’s Transition” Problems of Communism, Vol. 45. No. 1. 69-83.

Name and Place Index

Ackerman, Bruce 234, 411 Balsai, Istvan 350

Acs, Zoltan 104, 411 Banac, Ivo 208

Ader, Janos 176, 188, 385, 411 Baranyai, Tibor 75, 290, 293, 350, 361,

Afghanistan 237, 239, 251, 267 386

Agh, Attila 37, 66, 105, 411 Barath, Magdolna 267, 270-272, 412

Aggod, Jozsef 294, 332 Barre, Raymond 252

Agocs, Sandor xxvii, 104, 157, 411 Bates, Robert H. 135, 412

Anderson, Lisa xxx, 411 Batonyi, Csaba 277

Angola 237 , Batthyany, Lajos 213 Antal, Laszlo xxvii, xxviii, 411 Bauman, Zygmunt 134, 412 Antall, Jozsef xxviii, xxix, 12, 22, 25-26, Beijing 222 28~—29, 31-32, 34-35, 37, 80, 86-87, Bejczy, Sandor 350 91-92, 99-100, 102, 104-105, 142- Békés, Csaba 37, 64, 237, 267-268, 412 143, 157, 160, 163, 168, 176, 218— Békesi, Laszlé 153, 162

219, 293, 341-343, 346-347, 349- Benk6, Péter 103, 412 350, 352, 356-358, 361, 374, 376— Benoit, Kenneth 187, 189-190, 412 377, 382, 383, 385, 388, 391, 407,414 Berecz, Janos 58, 216, 306, 332

Apagy 386 Berend, T. Ivan 216

Apro, Antal 309 Berényi, Ferenc 290, 294, 332, 350, 362

Arad 253, 256, 404 Berkeley 388

Arato, Andrew xxvii, xxx1, 223, 234-235, Berlin 110, 259, 271, 379, 406

411 Bermeo, Nancy xxx

Arendt, Hannah xxix, 235, 411 Bernhard, Michael 135, 412 Asboth Thorma, Judit 350, 362 Beschloss, M. R. 269, 412

Atkinson, Doreen 235 Bihari, Mihaly xxviii, 104, 135, 138, 157,

Austin 405 164, 412, 414 Austria xvili, 258, 271, 317, 386 Biro, Zoltan xxviii, 84, 91-92, 104, 195, 412

Babus, Endre 163, 206, 210, 412 Bjdrck, Anders 379

Bacs-Kiskun county 402 Bodzaban, Istvan xxviii, 159, 412

Bacskai, Sandor 293 Bodnar, Zoltan 160 ; Bahr, Egon 261 Bogdan, Tibor 142, 144, 146-147, 156, Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, Endre 36, 103 160

Balint, Attila 294, 312, 332 Bokros, Lajos xxvii, 157, 411 Balint, B. Andras xxviii, 159, 209-210, Boldvai, Laszl6 294, 332

281, 307, 412 Bonn 116, 242, 250-252

424 Name and Place Index Borbély, Sandor 215 Ceausescu, Nicolae 85, 253, 256-257 Borhi, Laszl6 269 | Central Europe xxvii, xxix, xxx1, 41, 112,

Borics, Gyula 214 115, 209, 262

Boross, Imre 74, 174, 177, 185, 293, 332, Chernaev, Anatoli 247, 267-269, 272

350, 361, 386-387 Clague, Christopher 134, 414

Boross, Péter 391, 395 Cluj-Napoca 394

Borsod-Abatij-Zemplén county 389, 392 Coleman, James S. xxix, 417

Bossanyi, Katalin xxviii, 412 Colomer, Josep M. xxx, 414

Bota, Rozsa 160 Cox, Terry xxvii, 414 Bourdieu, Pierre xxix, 417 Craxi, Bettino 252

Bozoki, Andras xxvi, XXil, XXVil, XXVIII, Croatia 226-227 XXX, XXXi, 36-37, 65, 71, 102-105, Csak6, Mihaly 345, 350, 387-388

134—136, 156, 158-159, 162, 168, Csapody, Tamas xxvili, 413 199, 208-210, 222, 235, 267, 271, Csehak, Judit 306 275, 277, 385, 413, 415, 417, 421-422 Cservenka, Ferencné 309

Bratislava 114-115, 408 Csik6os, Jozsef 350

Brazil 234 Csillag, Istvan xxvii, 157, 411

Brest—Litovsk 245 Csillag, Laszlé 294, 332

Brezhnev, Leonid 27, 239, 241-244, 251, Csizmadia, Ervin xxvii, xxviii, 35, 103—

255, 268, 271 104, 157, 194, 413-414

Brussels 265-266 Csomos, Gyula 293

Bruszt, Laszl6 xiii, xxvii, Xxvill, XXX, Csongrad county 398 xXxx1, 37, 65, 105, 187, 192-194, 197, Csoori, Sandor 84—86, 91—92

200-202, 208-209-210, 332, 387, Csorna 385

413, 420 Csurka, Istvan 7, 39, 84, 197, 211, 388Bryant, Christopher 134, 412 389 Brzezinski, Zbigniew xxix, 415 Cuba 237, 239, 246, 251

Bucharest 257, 262-263 Czech Republic 226, 232 Budapest xxx, 80-81, 114, 150, 159, 166, Czechoslovakia xx, xxx, 28, 89, 112-115,

173-175, 196, 213-214, 216, 249, 223, 225-228, 230-231, 239-240, 253-254, 266, 270, 280, 290, 309, 246, 254, 256-258, 269, 317, 380-381

312, 356-357, 361, 363, 366, 369, Czinege, Lajos 104 | 371, 385, 387-409

Budzsaklia, Matyas 142, 146-147, 151, Dahl, Robert A. xv, xxvii, 108, 134, 414

156, 158, 162, 350 Dahrendorf, Ralf 71, 102, 414

Bugar, Nandor 147, 338, 350, 362 Damascus 109

Bukowski, Charles 105, 420 Danube 257

Bulgaria xx, xxx, 223-227, 230-231, 240, Darvasi, Istvan 350

245, 379, 381, 383 Dauda, Sandor 309

Burton, Michael G. xxx1, 413 Deak, Ferenc 295, 298 Bush, George xxx, 18, 148, 159, 248-249, Debrecen 390, 393, 402

252, 269, 371, 413 Debreczeni, Jozsef xxviii, 37, 104, 163, Byrne, Malcolm R. 37, 64, 267, 412 414 Dér, Andras 277

Calda, Milos 135, 413 Diamond, Larry xxvii, xxix, 414 Cambridge, Mass. 399 DiMaggio, Paul J. 131, 134, 136, 419

Canada 256, 386 Dobos Sods, Marta 290, 294, 332 Carnogursky, Jan 114-115 Dobozy, Daniel 160

Name and Place Index 425 Domonkos, Istvan 293, 332, 350 Finland 246, 269

Donald, Moira xxxi, 414 Florence 387, 393 Drucker, Gyérgy 294, 309, 332 Fodor, Gabor 189, 293, 332, 350, 389-390

Dubcek, Alexander 115, 258 Fodor, Istvan 381

Duduek, Antoni 268 - Féldes, Gydrgy 157, 415 Duschek, Lajosné 294, 332 Féldesi, Istvan 272, 350 Fonyodi, Ilona 293, 332

East Central Europe xx, xxili, xxx, 107, Foran, John xxxi, 415

237, 239-240, 242 Forgacs, Imre 291, 312, 350

East Germany (GDR) xx, xxill, xxx, 28, France 125, 178, 232, 252, 260, 270

223, 226-227, 239-240, 246, 256, Fricz, Tamas 164, 415

258-259, 375-376, 380, 382 Friedrich, Carl J. xxix, 415

East, Roger xxix, 414 Friszke, Andrzej 268

Eastern Europe xxvii, Xxix, Xxx, xxi, 45, Fujimori, Alberto 225 112, 125-126, 132, 196, 209, 226, Fiir, Lajos 39, 84, 293, 332, 334, 390-391

233, 237, 242-248, 250, 256, 259, Furlong, Andy xxvii, 414

266—268, 270 Furmann, Imre 390

Eckhart, Ferenc 134, 414 Fiizessy, Tibor 105, 293, 332, 350, 361,

Egyhazasdaroc 390 391

Eisenhower, Dwight 249

Ekiert, Grzegorz 135, 414 Gabcikovo 257 Elbert, Marta xiii, xxvii, 36, 65, 102, 136, Gabel, Matthew J. 136

158, 188, 277, 413 Gal, Zoltan 350

Elster, Jon xxv, XXiX, XXX, XXx1, 37, 65, Gask6, Istvan 345, 350, 361, 377, 391-392

125, 134-135, 235, 413-414, 419-420 Gaspar, Miklés 350

England xxv Gati, Charles 268, 415

Enyedi, Zsolt xxix, 103, 414 Gecsényi, Lajos xiii

E6rsi, Matyas 160 Géczi, Jozsef 37, 66 Erdélyi, Tibor 222 Geddes, Barbara 165, 415 Estonia 226—227 Gehér, Jozsef 350 Esztergom 407 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich 258 Etherington, Phillip 134, 414 Germany (and FRG) xviii, 88, 121-122, Ethiopia 237 126, 131-132, 165, 184, 225, 232, 242, 245, 250, 258, 265-266, 272

Farag6, Béla xxviti, 415 Gero, Andras xili

Farkas, Gyula 160 Ger6, Erno xviii Faure, M. 235, 415 Giczy, Gyérgy 77

Fazekas, Sandorné 294, 332 Gilejko, Leszek 268 Fehér, Ferenc xxxi, 104, 415 GobdGll6 309, 398

Feitl, Istvan 157 Gombar, Csaba 134, 157, 415, 417

Fejér county 392 Gorbachev, Mikhail xix, xxx, 19, 39, 99, Fejti, Gyérgy 3, 13-15, 17, 23-24, 26, 36— 112, 237-243, 245, 247-251, 25337, 46, 50, 52-57, 59-62, 65-68, 93— 254, 259, 261-268, 270-272, 412 94, 96, 104-105, 140-141, 146-148, Gray, John 131-132, 136, 415 158-163, 165, 171, 179, 188-189, Grosz, Karoly xxx, 15-16, 19, 23, 25, 38,

213, 215, 290, 293, 305, 332-333, 45—46, 56-58, 64, 67, 95-97, 100,

351, 372, 389 120, 139, 144, 147-149, 158, 160, Fekete, Gyula 84 162, 199, 213-214, 216, 242, 253-

426 Name and Place Index Grész, Karoly (cont.) 118, 120, 122-134, 137, 148, 150, 152, 255, 257, 261-263, 266-268, 270— 159, 165-167, 175, 177-178, 181-182, 272, 293, 295, 299, 306, 333, 350, 186-187, 191-192, 195-198, 201—209,

369, 392, 402 211, 213-214, 217-227, 229-232, 235, GyéngyGs 389 237, 239-241, 243-246, 248-266, 268—-

Gyorgy, Istvan 291, 312 271, 276, 279-280, 283-284, 287, 294— Gy6rivanyi, Gabor xxx, 415 304, 308-309, 317, 319, 321, 326, 336,

Gyurcsany, Ferenc 290 338-343, 345, 350, 352-353, 355, 365, Gyurko, Laszl6 221, 415 374-376, 378-379, 381-382, 386-388 Huntington, Samuel P. xxix, 416

Hajdu, Attila 294 Husz, Dora xxx, 416 Halasz, Jozsef 157, 415 Huszar, Istvan 294, 332 . Hamori, Csaba 306 Hutchings, Robert L. 269, 416

Hankiss, Elemér xxviii, 103, 105, 156—

157, 163, 415 Illyés, Gyula 84

Hanzel, Vladimir 135, 415 Ishiyama, John 105 Haraszti, Miklés xxvii, 36, 415 Ispanovics, Marton 294, 332

| Hardi, Péter 290, 293, 332 Israel 265 Hatos, Ottd Gydérgy 160 Istria 149

Havas, Fanny xxvii, 104, 157, 415 Istvan, Lajos 294, 332

Havel, Vaclav 114 Italy 250, 262

Hegediis, B. Andras 221, 415 Ithaca 387 Hegedtis S., Laszlo 160 Ivanyi, Pal 64, 306, 321, 323, 328-329,

Heller, Agnes xxxi, 415 332, 370, 393-394

Helsinki 265

Heper, Metin 134, 420 Jakes, Milos 271

Hesse, Joachim J. xxx1, 414 Jakovlev, Aleksandr 64 Higley, John xxx1, 413, 415 Jaruzelski, Wojciech 27, 251

Hitler, Adolf 299, 309 Jasiewicz, Krzysztof xxix, 416

Hlinka, Andrej 115 Jasso, Mihaly 41

Hofer, Tamas xxx, 209, 416 Javor, Istvan 277

Hollo6, Andras 158, 416 Jena 404

Holmes, Leslie xxvii, 416 Jenkins, Robert 192, 208210, 416

Honecker, Erich 114, 232, 375 Joppke, Christian xiii Horn, Gyula 59, 104, 215-216, 255, 257— Juhasz, Robert 312 258, 265-266, 270, 390, 396-397

Horthy, Mikl6s xviii Kadar, Janos xvi, Xviii, xxvii, Xxix, S5—7, Horvath, Balazs 143, 160, 350 10, 11, 43, 44, 64, 71, 84, 86-88, 90, Horvath, Istvan 172, 215, 270-271, 416 92-93, 95, 97-98, 104, 111-112, 127,

Horvath, J6zsef 222 132-133, 137-138, 154, 156, 211, Horvath, Lajos 335, 337-338, 340-341, 217, 219-221, 251-252, 254, 268,

343, 345-350 270, 350, 392

Hubai, Laszlo 157, 415 Kajdi, Jozsef 350 Hungary xv, xviii, Xix, XX, XXi, XXIV, XXVi, Kaldor, Mary xxvii, 416 XXVIl, XXVIli, XXIX, XXX, XXX1, XXXii, 5,9, Kallai, Gyula 158

19, 27, 28, 35-38, 41-42, 46, 47-48, Kalmar, Melinda xiii, xxv, XXVil, XX1x, 36,

51, 64-69, 71, 73-75, 77, 83-85, 88-— 41, 64, 65, 102, 136, 158, 267, 269, 89, 92, 97-98, 101-102, 105, 107-116, 277, 412-413, 416

Name and Place Index 427 Kaminski, Bartlomiej 135, 416 Kossuth, Lajos 218, 222, 336, 338 Karacsony, Gergely xxvi, 71 Készeg, Ferenc xxvii, 36, 189, 221, 415

Karl, Terry Lynn 208, 416 Kosztricz S., Anna xxviii, 35, 64, 157,

Karpati, Ferenc 245, 267 267, 417

Kasza, Laszlo xxviii, 416 Kovacs, Laszlé 104, 163 Katona, Béla 163, 216 Kévér, Laszl6 26, 80, 152, 290, 293, 332,

Kazancigil, Ali 134, 420 344-345, 350, 377, 396

Kecskemét 95, 99 Kramer, Mark 268

Kecskés, Gusztav 267, 270 Krass6, Gyorgy xxx, 221, 417

Keleti, Gyérgy 272, 416 Krasznai, Zoltan xxvili, 417 Kemény, Csaba 290, 294, 350, 362 Krausz, Tamas xxviii, 417

Kende, Péter 217, 222, 416 Kreisky, Bruno 307

Kenedi, Janos 159, 221—222, 416 Krejci, Jaroslav xxx1, 418

Kennedy, Michael D. xxx, 416 Krjuchkov, V. A. 270

Kerekes, Imre 290 Kukorelli, Istvan 135, 156-157, 163, 188, Kerekes, Zsuzsa 157, 416 290, 294, 301, 304, 318-319, 321, Kerényi, Imre 290, 293, 332, 334 329, 332, 334, 369-370, 397, 418 Keresztes, Sandor 77, 293, 332 Kulcsar, Kalman xxviii, 64, 95, 135, 152, Khrushchev, Nikita 240-241, 248, 268 215, 418 Kilényi, Géza 64, 135-136, 151, 188, 417 Kurtan, Sandor xxviii, 38, 103, 135, 157—

Kimmel, Emil 164, 417 159, 162-163, 210, 272, 411-413, Kiraly, Béla K. xxvii, xxx, 37, 134, 217, 416, 418 271, 417, 421

Kiraly, Zoltan 153 Lajtai, Gyérgy 312 Kis, Janos xiii, Xxvii, xxx, 8, 9, 22, 24, Laki, Mihaly xxviii, 418 36, 39, 89-92, 102, 134, 163, 208, Lakitelek xvi, 85, 104, 138, 385-386, 388,

211-213, 224, 235, 280, 394-395, 390, 398, 402, 404

415, 417 Lakos, Janos 64, 267

Kiskunfélegyhaza 309 Lamounier, Bolivar 234

Kistarcsa 388 Lane, J.-E. 235, 415

Klaniczay, Gabor 134 Lasswell, Harold 109, 135, 418 Koblencz, Jozsef 160 Latin America xix, xxvii, 101, 208, 228,

Koelbe, Thomas A. 134, 417 233

Kohl, Helmut 242, 250-252, 258-259, Latvia 226-227

266, 268, 270 Lazar, Istvan xxviii, 418 Koml6 391 Lengyel, Laszl6 xxvii, xxviii, 104, 157, Komocsin, Zoltan 104 163, 411, 415, 418 Konrad, Gyorgy xxix, 103, 417 Lenin, Vladimir I. 98, 245 Kony 402 Levesque, Jacques 242, 246, 268-270, Konya, Imre xxviii, 36, 159, 195-196, 418

201, 204, 209, 280, 293, 299, 301, Lijphart, Arend 165-166, 178, 189-190,

307, 334, 350, 353, 369, 395, 412 415, 418 Konya, Laszl6 293, 332, 361 Linz, Juan J. xxvii, xxviii, 225, 234, 418

Kornai, Janos xxvii, 134, 417 Lithuania 226-227 .

Korom, Mihaly 309 London 242, 250, 252, 386, 400 K6résényi, Andras xxx, 102, 134, 136, Longstreth, Frank 134, 421

200, 208, 210, 413, 417 Losonc 408

Kosa Kovacs, Magda 189, 290, 294, 332,396 Lukacs, Janos 199, 306

, 428 Name and Place Index | Magyar, Balint 13, 20, 23, 37-38, 90-92, Nagymaros 257 142, 160, 176, 215, 307, 312, 332,334 Nancy 387

Magyarokerek 394 Napoléon. Louis 225 Mainwaring, Scott xxvii, xxx, 192, 205, Németh, Istvan 270-271, 416

208, 418, 422 Németh, Karoly 104 Malta 248, 394 Németh, Laszl6 84

Maravall, José Maria xxix, 418 Németh, Miklos xxx, 5, 18, 29, 38, 48, 55,

March, James G. 134, 418 58, 63, 67, 69, 94, 104, 116-118, 120,

Marciniak, Piotr 268 133, 149, 172, 177, 199-200, 215Markus, Laszl6 102, 419 216, 257-258, 263-264, 272, 306,

Martins, Luciano 234 309, 399-400 Marton, Aron 103 New York 386, 395

Marton, Janos 293, 332, 398 Nicaragua 237 Marx, Karl 89, 220 ~ North, Douglas C. 108, 134, 419

Masaryk, Tomas G. 115 Nyékladhaza 390

Masat, Adam xxvi, 105, 137, 277 Nyers, Rezsé xxiii, xxx, 5, 16, 23, 35-36,

Matészalka 406 38, 45, 50, 54, 57-58, 61, 64-69, 75,

Matolcsy, Gyérgy xxvil, 157, 411 94—95, 98, 105, 147, 150, 155, 157, , Mazowiecki, Tadeusz 27, 232 200, 255, 263, 269-272, 306, 335, Mécs, Imre xxx, 215-218, 293, 332, 334, 350-351, 361, 374, 400-401 398-399

Mécs, Monika 277 O’ Donnell, Guillermo xxvii, xxix, 105,

Medgyessy, Péter 104 208, 234, 418-419 Medvigy, Endre xxvii, 104, 157, 221, 411, O’Neil, Patrick 419

419 Offe, Claus 109, 126, 134, 419

Méray, Tibor 221 Olsen, Johan P. 134, 418

Mexico 228, 234 Orban, Viktor xxx, 17, 18, 29, 31, 80-81, Michnik, Adam xxix, 103, 419 91, 99, 102—103, 160, 176, 189, 217,

Middlebrook, Kevin 234 293, 332, 376, 396, 401

Mielke, Erich 232 Ormos, Maria 157, 216

Miskolc 390, 392, 403 Osiatynski, Wiktor xxix, 135, 235, 419 Mitterrand, Francois 252, 270 Ost, David 209, 419 Mokrzycki, Edmund 134, 412 Oxford 401 Molnar, Eva xxviii, 419

Monok 399 Paczkowski, Andrzej xxix, 64, 419 Monor 138, 211, 221, 395 Pakulski, Jan xxxi, 415 Morvay, Laszl6 293, 307, 332, 350 Palmer, Mark 38, 159

Moscow xxx, 116, 242-243, 251, 253, Palo Alto 387, 393 | 255, 261—263, 270, 382, 406 Palos, Gyérgy 160 Palvélgyi, Ferenc 350

Nagy, Gaspar 212 Pandi, Lajos xxviii, 419 Nagy, Imre xxx, 16, 18, 20, 56, 64, 81, 95, Papa 396 132, 137, 141, 156, 160, 198—200, Paris xviii, 213, 242, 252, 386

212-213-215, 217-222, 295, 305, Parker, Noel xxx, 419

369, 419 Partay, Tivadar 73

Nagy, Imre (Demisz) 45, 139, 158, 294, Pécs 386, 390, 394, 404 331, 339-341, 347-348, 350, 362, 399 Peeva, Ralitsa 235

Nagy, Zoltan xxviii, 419 Perez de Cuellar, Javier 350

Name and Place Index 429 Pest county 400, 408 Rees, Tim xxx, 414 Pesty, Laszl6 277 Renwick, Alan xxvi, xxx, 191 Peto, Ivan 17, 23, 26, 142-143, 146, 156, Révész, Andras 11, 293, 332 160-161, 176, 307, 323, 325, 330, Révész, Béla xiii, xxvii, 36, 65, 102, 136,

332, 350, 370, 401 158, 267, 277, 413

Petrasovits, Anna 402 Révész, Sandor xxviii, 104, 169, 420

Pittsburgh 388 Reykyavik 248

Poland xvii, xx, XXi, XX111, Xxix, 5, 19, 27, Ribanszky, Robert 58

41-42, 46-47, 51-52, 54, 58, 64, 66, Richter, Anna xxix, 37, 65, 102, 158-159,

69, 89, 99, 103, 110, 112-115, 122, 184, 209, 280, 420 193-194, 201, 209, 212, 223-224, Ripp, Erzsébet xiii, xxvi, xxvil, 36, 65, 226-228, 230-232, 240-241, 244— 102, 136, 158, 267, 277, 365, 413 245, 250, 252, 255, 262, 266, 268— Ripp, Zoltan xiil, xxv, XXVi, XXVil, Xxix, 3,

269, 365-366, 368 36, 64, 65, 102, 136, 158, 164, 267,

Polgardi, Jozsef 189 275, 277, 412-413, 420

Pomogats, Béla 221, 419 Rockman, Bert A. 108, 134, 420 Pontin, Jolyon xxix, 414 Réoder, Edit 142-143, 145-147, 156, 160 Potter, Davis xxix, 419 Romania xx, Xxx, 225-227, 240, 252-254, Powell, Walter W. 131, 134, 136, 419 256-258, 260-261, 267, 269-271, Pozsgay, Imre xxvili, xxx, 5—6, 10, 15-16, 317, 381, 404 19, 22-31, 34, 37-39, 44-45, 51, 53, Rome 252 55, 56, 58-60, 62, 68, 76-77, 79-80, Rose, Richard xxvii, 420 84—85, 93-100, 104-105, 115-116, Rousseau, Jean—Jacques 234 127, 139, 148-151, 155, 157, 160, Rtihe, Volker 261 162, 173-175, 177, 181, 185, 188— Russia 99, 131, 220, 225-227, 234, 245,

189, 195, 198, 214, 222, 254-255, 270 270, 293, 306, 315-319, 327-328, Rustow, Dankwart 208, 420 332-334, 340, 348—351, 354, 356— Ruttner, Gyérgy 189 357, 361, 365, 369-370, 372, 374,

377-378, 402, 419 Saint Stephen 120 Prague 114—115, 238, 258, 380 Sajo, Andras xxxi, 37, 65, 420

Prepeliczay, Istvan 293, 332, 350, 361, Sajoszentpéter 391 |

403 Salgotarjan 403 Prins, Gwyn 103, 419 Sandor, Laszl6 325-327, 332, 370, 403 Przeworski, Adam xxx, 105, 133, 136, Sandor, Péter xxviii, 38, 135, 157-159,

208, 234, 419 162-163, 210, 411, 418

Ptispdkladany 406 Santamaria, Julian xxix, 418 Sari, Janos 157, 415

Rabi, Béla 143, 160, 294, 332 Sarkad 398 Racz, Barnabas 105, 420 Sark6zi, Sandor 294, 332, 350, 362

Racz, Sandor xxx, 217 Sarkézy, Tamas 135, 420

Raft, Miklés 153 Sarvar 399

Rainer, M. Janos xxvi, 159, 211, 222, Sashalom 391

267-268, 412, 420 Satoraljatyhely 389

Rakosi, Ferenc 160 Schiemann, John W. xxvi, 105, 165, 187, Rakosi, Matyas xviii, 88, 127, 211, 217 190, 235, 412, 420

Ravasz, Karoly 102, 420 Schmidt, Helmut 251, 252 Reagan, Ronald 242, 247-248 Schmidt, Péter 135, 157, 418, 420

430 Name and Place Index Schmitt, Carl 235, 420 318, 328-333, 337, 339, 346, 350Schmitter, Philippe C. xii, xxix, 105, 208, 351, 353-354, 361, 369, 376, 404, 420

234, 419 Szabo, Istvan 306

Schépflin, George xxvii, xxx, 102, 208, Szabo, Miklés xxix, 211, 221, 271, 307,

210, 413, 417, 420 405, 421 Scowcroft, Brent 269, 413 Szakolczai, Gyérgy 290, 293, 332, 405— Seligman, Adam B. 420 406 Serbia 226—227 Szalai, Erzsébet xxviti, 37, 103, 421

Sereda, Vyacheslav 268, 420 Szalay, Antal xxviii, 159, 412 Shahnazarov, Georgi 245—246, 268 Szalay, Péter 136, 156, 421

Shevardnadze, Eduard 238, 242 Széchy, Andras 294, 332 Shugart, Matthew 187, 190, 421 Szeged 37, 198, 309

Sipos, Jézsef 37, 66 Székesfehérvar 401, 405 Skorzinski, J. 268 Szelényi, Ivan xxviii, xxix, 103, 417, 421 Slovakia 226—227 Szelényi, Zsuzsa 350

Slovenia 226-228 Szenes, Ivan 160

Sofia 264 Szigethy, Gabor 350

Solt, Ottilia xxvii, 36, 415 Szilvasy, Gyérgy 149, 312 Soltész, Istvan 188 Szoboszlai, Gyérgy xxviii, 135-136, 156, Sdélyom, Laszl6 12, 14, 85—86, 102, 141, 189, 208, 416, 421 159, 285, 290-291, 312, 332, 334, Szombathely 386

350, 404 Szucs, Jend 103

Somogy county 181 Szuirés, Matyas 52, 153, 189, 200, 215, Somogyvari, Istvan 350 293-294, 299,301, 304-305, 313, Soos, Laszl6 64, 135-136, 267, 411 316-319, 321, 323, 325, 327-331, South Africa 223, 225-227, 230-231, 233 333, 335, 350, 369, 379, 381, 406 South Korea 265

Southern Europe xix, xxvii, 262 Taagepera, Rein 187, 190, 421 Soviet Union (USSR) xix, 19, 38, 42, 45, Takacs, Imre 75, 332 63, 89, 110-111, 127, 214, 217, 225— Talas, Miklos 160

226, 237-255, 259-263, 265-271, Talbott, Strobe 269, 412

317, 382 Tamas, Gaspar M. xxix, 103, 421

Spain xxv, xx1x, 223, 226, 262 Tari, Ferenc 214 Stalin, Josip V. 110, 211, 214, 219, 222, Tatabanya 212

240-241, 268, 299, 309 Tatai, Ilona 306

Standeisky, Eva 267 Tatrai, Gabor 160 Stark, David xxviii, xxx, 105, 187, 192— Teitel, Ruti G. 235, 421 194, 197, 201—202, 208, 210, 413, 420 Teleki, Janos 350, 361

Steinmo, Sven 108, 134, 421 Tét 397 Stepan, Alfred xxvii, xxvili, 225, 234,418, | Thatcher, Margaret 250, 252, 270

420 Thelen, Kathleen 108, 134, 421

Such, Gyérgy 160 Third World 89 Surjan, Laszlo 77 Toka, Gabor 208 Stikésd, Mikldés xxviii, 413 Timk6, Ivan 350

Sweden 184, 386 Tokés, Rudolf L. xxvi, xxvii, XXVI1li, XXXI,

Switzerland 386, 405 37, 64-65, 107, 134-136, 156-157, Szabad, Gyérgy xiii,12, 32, 38, 85-86, 185, 191, 199-201, 208-210, 269,

102, 136, 152, 176, 293, 307, 316, 421

Name and Place Index 431 Télgyessy, Péter 14, 17, 21-22, 29, 31,32, Vida, Istvan 102, 422 90-92, 100, 141, 152, 159-160, 172, Vida, Miklés 309

174-176, 182, 183, 188-189, 215, Vidos, Tibor 160 285, 290-291, 307, 337, 341, 343- Vienna 238, 249, 256, 263

346, 349-350, 376-377, 382, 407 Vietnam 245 Torgyan, Jozsef 74, 171, 173, 174, 180, Vigh, Karoly 10, 80, 158-159, 294, 332,

350, 406-407 350, 361, 408, 422

Toth, Andras 46, 170, 172, 180, 188-189, Vitanyi, Ivan 154, 189

291, 312, 350 Vitézy, Laszlé 350, 409 Transylvania 85 Volgyes, Ivan xxvii

Toth, Zoltan 176, 187, 189 Vladar, Tamas xxviil, 419

Trianon xviii, 299, 309 Volten, Peter xxix, 416

Vorés, Miklos 64, 267, 412

Ugroczky, Maria 350 Vor6és, Vince 73, 102, 422 Ujvary, Attilané 350

Ukraine 226-227 Wagener, Peter xiii

Urban, Laszl6 xxx, 422 Waisman, Carlos H. 415 USA 159, 228, 237, 239, 248-249, 262 Walesa, Lech xxix, 99 Warsaw 113, 238, 246, 249, 252-255,

Vac 405 259-263, 266-267, 271

Vagyi, Karola N. 64, 267 Washington 116, 266, 393, 397

Varga, Janos xili Wasilewski, Jacek xilti

Varjas, Andras 294, 332 Weber, Attila xxix, 164, 422 Vajda, Mihaly xxix, 422 Wesolowski, Wlodzimierz 415 Valenzuela, J. Samuel xxvii, 208, 422 Western Europe 75 Varga, Csaba 290, 293, 312, 332, 350, Whitehead, Laurence xxix, 105, 208,

361, 408 419

Varga, Gyula 309 Wnuk-Lipinski, Edmund 268 Varga, T. Gyérgy 64, 267 Wolchik, Sharon 135, 422 Varnai, Gyérgyi 163, 415

Vasarhelyi, Miklés xxx, 103, 200, 212, Yeltsin, Boris 99, 225

217 Yugoslavia 148, 266, 271

Vass, Henrik 158, 170, 422

Vass, Laszl6 xxviti, 38, 135, 157—159, Zagyvapalfalva 403

162—163, 210, 411, 418 Zétényi, Zsolt 290, 294, 332, 350, 361, Vatican 381, 394 409 Végh, Tibor 160 Zhivkov, Todor 379

Vejvoda, Ivan xxvii, 416 Zielonka, Jan xili Veres, Péter 84, 103 : Zimanyi, Tibor xxx, 217

Versailles xviit Ziolkowski, Janusz 103 Veszprém 143, 409 Zubek, Voytek xxix, 422

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