The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918, Volume 2 [Reprint 2016 ed.] 9781512807530

Citation preview

Sty? Paaaing of % ífajisburg Monarrijjj 1314-131B

Passing ijiapslmrg

nf

%

ittunarrbg

1314-101B VOLUME TWO

BY

ARTHUR J. MAY Professor of History in the University of

Rochester

Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania Press

© 1966 by the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania Published in Great Britain, India, and Pakistan by the Oxford University Press London, Bombay, and Karachi Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number: 64-22874

7463 Printed in the United States of America

Contents VOLUME n 14. Trials of Togetherness

497

15. The Unending Debate

532

16. Setting the Stage

559

17. The Dark and the Bright

589

18. Inside Austria

637

19. Hungary in Travail

682

20. The End Approaches

716

21. Avalanche

760

22. Epilogue

809

Bibliography

827

Index

849

Abbrfuialimts ttt Notes AZ

— Arbeiter Zeitung (Vienna)

BM

— Berliner Monatshefte or Die

Kriegschuldfrage

F.O. — Foreign Office Papers in Public Record Office (London) JMH — The Journal of Modern History KSF

— see, BM above

NFP — Neue Freie Presse (Vienna) Ö M — Istvan Tisza, összes Munkäi (Collected ( 6 vols., Budapest, 1924-37). ÖR

— Österreichisches

P.A. —

Works)

Rundschau

Politische Archiv in Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv (Vienna)

14. Sriata of

MEETING AT BAD KREUZNACH ON M A Y

1 7 AND 1 8 ,

1917,

top Austrian and German statesmen approved a wideranging agenda of war aims.1 In return for renunciation of pretensions to Russian Poland in favor of Germany, the Dual Monarchy would be allowed a free hand in dealing with Rumania. Additionally, Austria-Hungary would acquire Mt. Lovcen and a coastal strip of Montenegro, bridge-heads on the northern border of Serbia, and what remained of Montenegro and Serbia, as well as northern Albania, would become dependencies of Vienna; promises to Bulgaria of Serbian Macedonia and the southern Dobrudja would be faithfully fulfilled. Czernin had grave reservations on certain of these points, especially the aggrandizement of Germany to the east; yet, as always, he was handicapped because he was lead1

Fischer, op. cit., pp. 441-467; Epstein, be. cit. 30ff.

497

498

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

ing from weakness. Reluctantly, he yielded, and he induced his Austro-Hungarian colleagues to acquiesce. Despite public professions to the contrary, the policymakers of Vienna cherished in fact dreams of territorial expansion, modest though they were compared with the annexationist ambitions of their Berlin counterparts. Late in May the Neue Freie Presse and Pester Lloyd, prompted possibly by the Ballplatz, repudiated the notion that the Monarchy would not consider peace unless assured of foreign soil, yet they insisted that "our Gibraltar, Mt. Lovcen," could not be relinquished nor could Rumania have exclusive control of the eastern end of the Danube. For not a few Austro-Hungarian minds, the "no annexations" formula possessed an elastic quality; the former ambassador in Washington, Baron Constantin von Dumba, for instance, favored peace by negotiation, yet he wanted "a decisive weakening of our turbulent neighbor," Serbia, by annexing an enclave around Belgrade. Among Magyar annexationists, Count Stephen Bethlen claimed most of Serbia and Dr. Edmund Palyi brought out a pamphlet, "Ungarn nach dem Kriege," in which he advocated that all the South Slavs should be integrated with Hungary in the manner of the attachment of Galicia to Austria.2 Resenting deeply the subordination of his realm to Germany, Emperor Charles, under the aura of the Sixtus adventure and perhaps affected by Socialist peace demonstrations on May day of 1917, gave his feelings unbridled rein in a remarkable communication to Czernin. "A brilliant German victory would be our ruin," he observed. "Germany has always felt that if things go badly Austria can furnish objects of compensation. Peace on the basis of the status quo would be best for us, for then Germany would not be too arrogant and we should not have broken irrevocably with the Western Powers, who are not in any 2 NFP, June 24, 1917; Fiirstenberg to Bethmann-Hollweg, June 1, 1915. F.O., 553/293.

Trials of Togetherness

499

real sense our enemies." If necessary to save the Monarchy, he now reasoned, the quest for peace should be pressed without the consent of Berlin. The way to salvation, the tormented sovereign believed, was "peace without annexation, and after the war, as a make-weight, an alliance with France as well as with Germany. . . . " 3 In a speech from the throne, opening the Austrian parliament on May 30, 1917, the Emperor stated that the Monarchy was ready to bring the war to an honorable conclusion at any time in collaboration with her allies. This passage was welcomed in Germany as indicating that no substantial differences separated the Central Powers and that Entente hopes of splitting the alliance were groundless—fantastic.4 On the other side, Ambassador Hohenlohe in Berlin constantly reminded German civilian officials of the worsening conditions in AustriaHungary and of the necessity of bringing the war to a speedy end; the prime task of diplomacy, he averred, was to find a way to open up peace discussions with the Entente.8 2. Inside the Quadruple Alliance, all was by no means tranquil. More than once, friction between Bulgaria and Turkey provoked in turn tension between Vienna and Berlin, and the Ballplatz opposed, besides, Bulgarian claims to Albania, while the Germans thought of Bulgaria as an area of potential trade expansion as well as a bridge to Turkey. It was feared in Vienna that the Germans might support Bulgarian ambitions in Albania in order to consolidate the good will of Sofia and to lessen pressure upon territory coveted by Turkey.6 3 Karl M. von Werkmann, Deutschland als Verbündeter (Berlin, 1931), pp. 170-172. 4 Hohenlohe to Czernin, June 2, 1917, P.A., Preussen, Berichte, 1917. 5 Hohenlohe to Czemin, July 17, 27, 1917, ibid. 6 Hohenlohe to Czemin, Ap. 18, 1917, ibid.

500

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

The resistance of the German high command to a search for a quick, honorable peace sorely tried Czernin's patience. On June 12, 1917, he lamented to Conrad that the Monarchy was the helpless vassal of Ludendorff and had to go on fighting so long as Berlin wished; his dream of a peace of understanding had been shattered, he said, by the German commanders.7 It was profoundly annoying, moreover, to hear baseless rumors emanating from Germany of Ballplatz faithlessness to the alliance, and Berlin was requested to spike these stories. On their side, the Germans, irritated by reports that the Danubian Monarchy was willing to make a separate peace with the enemy, requested Vienna to apply greater vigor and resourcefulness in counteracting that variety of Entente propaganda.8 A new strain was laid upon the coalition by a sensational Reichstag Peace Resolution of July 19, its antecedents and its sequel. Leading the maneuver that mounted to a climax in the Resolution was Matthias Erzberger, prominent Catholic deputy, shrewd, realistic, a political intimate of Bethmann, and in close touch with the Hapsburg court, Czemin, and the Vatican. Once an arch-annexationist, Erzberger had experienced a radical change of heart by the spring of 1917 and wheeled into a "peace without victory" posture; Entente gold, according to groundless whisperings believed by millions of his countrymen, had wrought the conversion.9 In point of fact, his thinking was affected by Czernin's anguished memorandum of April 12 on domestic conditions in the Monarchy, and by growing pessimism on the ability of the submarine to overpower Britain swiftly. The time had come, Erzberger concluded, to seek an Regele, Conrad, pp. 424-425. Czemin to Larisch, June 14, July 6, 1917, P.A., Preussen, Weisungen, 1917; Wedel to Ballplatz, July 9, 1917, P.A., Preussen Varia, 1917. 9 Epstein, Erzberger, pp. 172-173. 7 8

Trials of Togetherness

501

honorable compromise without annexations or indemnities, and he said just that in a confidential speech on July 6 to the main committee of the Reichstag; news of his views leaked out, precipitating discussion on war purposes that led up to the dismissal of Bethmann as chancellor.10 Gustav Stresemann remarked that the Erzberger exposition made a profound impression because it reflected a widespread attitude, and he too doubted whether Britain could be forced to sue for peace. Bowing to an ultimatum of Ludendorff, in effect, William II meekly acquiesced in the retirement of Bethmann as chancellor, and, after considering Biilow, among others, as his successor, appointed Dr. Georg Michaelis, a Prussian civil servant. Spoken of as the darling of the high command, Michaelis, in the sea of diplomacy, resembled a fish out of water. Undeterred, the Reichstag approved the Erzberger proposals by a thumping margin of 214 to 116. Phrased in rather contorted language, the Resolution seemed to disavow territorial acquisitions and monetary reparations, and in spirit, at any rate, it approached the Wilsonian doctrine of peace without victory; however interpreted, the Resolution could not be squared with the Kreuznach Accords on war aims. The episode as a whole, dramatized by the withdrawal of Bethmann, upset the cabinet of Vienna, which held the ex-Chancellor in high esteem as the exponent of moderate war aims, and as a devoted, proven friend of the Double Monarchy. Ambassador Honenlohe kept the Ballplatz intimately posted on the unfolding Berlin crisis, relying heavily for information upon talks with William II; the Austrian repeatedly interjected his rooted conviction that the Central Empires must seek a prompt end to hostilities, and he bluntly stressed that Biilow as chancel1 0 For an animated, first-hand account of the Erzberger speech and the ensuing controversy, consult Ralph H. Lutz, et. at. (eas.), Hans Peter Hanssen, Diary of a Dying Empire (Bloomington, Indiana, 1955), pp. 201-231.

502

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

lor would be utterly anathema.11 It was felt in Vienna that Michaelis would be merely a caretaker chancellor, as indeed he proved to be. Both in Austria and in Hungary the dramatic events in Berlin reinforced the conviction that the insistence of the German Command upon annexations blocked the road to an early termination of the war. If Czernin really scented in the Reichstag Resolution an opportunity for progress toward a compromise settlement, that calculation was dashed when Michaelis expressed approval of the Resolution, "so far as I understand it."12 After days of wavering, Michaelis had in fact aligned himself firmly on the side of Ludendorff and Company in the matter of war objectives. In a panoramic appraisal of the situation of the Central Empires, the new Chancellor warned that the Monarchy should not count upon further economic help— the national economy could satisfy the needs of Germany, but no more. On tactical grounds Michaelis opposed a second overture for peace to the enemy, since a move of that sort would be interpreted as weakness. Praising the toughness of the alliance, he dismissed the possibility of one partner seeking a separate peace, though discussions by one ally for a general peace would always be welcome. When Czernin inquired whether a return to prewar frontiers would form an acceptable starting point for peace pourparlers, Michaelis replied that Berlin would doubdess wish to retain control of Courland, Lithuania, part of occupied Poland and France, and to tie Belgium to Germany by a military and economic convention; the Monarchy was reminded that it might expand at the expense of Rumania. Official Berlin, that is to say, was standing pat on the Kreuznach Accords of three months earlier, in total disregard of the Reichstag Resolution.13 1 1 Hohenlohe to Czernin, July 11 (2 reports), 12, 13, 14 (2 reports), 16, 1917; P.A., Geheim, XLVII/3-19. 1 2 Czernin to Hohenlohe, July 25, 1917, P.A., Geheim, XLVII/3-21. 1 3 Michaelis to Czernin, Aug. 17, 1917. Lutz, The FaU of the German Empire, I, 417-420.

Trials of Togetherness

503

3. In the second half of the war, as in the first, and continuing indeed until the armistices of November, 1918, the future of the Polish-peopled areas produced endless negotiation, controversy, and intrigue between Vienna and Berlin. Given the sharp cleavages between the two allies, divergencies of opinion among Hapsburg policymakers, and disparate factionalism among politically articulate Poles, it is quite impossible to convert the jagged cliffs of the Polish problem into a velvety historical narrative.14 Before becoming ruler, Emperor Charles showed precious little interest in the destiny of the Poles. At a crown council of January 12, 1917, the Polish question, as noted before, was reviewed. Czernin spoke up for the incorporation of Russian Poland in the Monarchy and Prime Minister Clam favored a united Poland under the Hapsburgs, but Tisza roughly dissented, holding as earlier that a third member might line up with Austria on contentious issues and thus Hungary would be subjected "to an alien will"; extreme finesse must be exercised in Polish matters, lest Germany be alienated, Tisza counselled;15 support for the Austro-Polish formula predominated, however, in the council. Thoughtful suggestions on handling the Poles passed to the Ballplatz from Ladislas Skryzinski, an earnest exponent of the Austro-Polish plan. What he recommended in essence was the formation of a Polish cabinet with a regent, appointed by the two emperors, and a sort of assembly or senate. A Polish army, too, should be organized, and the soldiers asked to take an oath simply to "Fatherland and crown"; time and again he warned that Berlin was working to undermine Austrophil sentiments among the Poles.1' 14 Czemin, op. cit., pp. 273-280; Werner Conze, Polnische Nation und Deutsche Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg (Cologne, 1958), pp. 243 ff. is Tisza to the Emperor, Jan. 13, 1917, OM, VI, 127-129. 1 6 Von Gagem to Czemin, Feb. 23, 1917, P.A., Schweiz, Berichte, 1917.

504

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Shortly after the March revolution, the provisional government of Russia promised to respect the independence of a Polish state, consisting of territory where Poles formed a majority, which should be attached to Russia by a military pact. Nonetheless, conservative Poles and devout Roman Catholics did not cast away their antiRussian convictions, and others, encouraged by Central Power propaganda, dismissed the Russian pledge as meaningless, since the new regime in the east would not last very long. Certain Polish spokesmen repudiated the conception of a Poland confined to areas ethnographically Polish, as was true, for example, of the philosopher Vincent Lutoslawski, who claimed Lithuanian and Ukrainian districts as indispensable for the security and economic viability of a new Polish state; to regard Ukrainian territory as Russian seemed to him a falsification of history and ethnography. Lutoslawski spoke the mind of extreme Polish patriotism when he demanded "all that has been seized since 1772. The partitions of Poland were a crime of the same kind as the invasion of Belgium or the sinking of the Lusitania." Seeking to conciliate Polish feelings, Vienna in May, 1917, appointed in place of the unpopular General Carl Kuk, Count Stanislaus Szeptycki, brother of the Uniate metropolitan of Lemberg (Lvov) and reputedly a blackand-yellow loyalist, as governor of the Austro-Hungarian zone of Polish occupation. The new viceroy enlarged Polish representation in the civil service and prohibited export of provisions; Hapsburg agents reported that though the popularity of the Austro-Polish solution was rising, a counter-current in favor of a Polish republic was likewise making headway. 17 As explained earlier, an advisory council of state for Russian Poland had been created in January, 1917, with Pilsudski heading the military department. Council mem17

Conze, op. cit., pp. 286-287.

Trials of Togetherness

505

bers wished their body to be invested with effective political power, tantamount to autonomy, but that was further than the Central Powers were willing to go, though they authorized the council to draft an instrument of government for the new Poland.18 Professors in the Universities of Cracow and Lemberg and a company of hundreds of priests adopted resolutions imploring Poles in the Austrian parliament to work for a united Poland (which they did), and they demanded, too, guarantied access to the Baltic Sea. Little success had been achieved in the principal objective of the Central Empires among the Poles; that is, enrollment of manpower for the fighting services. In April, 1917, Vienna placed the Polish legions under German commanders, but promised that they would constitute the nucleus of a national army. Pilsudski, who for months had been quarreling with Austrian officialdom, declared that the Poles must have an independent military force directed by Poles, and he balked at taking a military oath which did violence to his position. As proof of the intensity of his feeling, Pilsudski resigned in July, 1917, from the state council, and appealed to Poles not to volunteer for the army; whereupon the Germans arrested him and his principal lieutenant, Sosnowski, and imprisoned them in Germany until the close of the war. Already a legend, Pilsudski acquired the aura of a martyr to the Polish national cause. The legions were dissolved, the Polish soldiers of Austrian citizenship being brigaded into the Hapsburg forces. In protest against military policies, the Polish council quit (August 25) en masse; but the next month, the Central Powers set up a regency, empowered to organize a Polish cabinet and in other ways to make preparations for a national government. The regency consisted of the 1 8 Ugron to Czernin, May 1, 1917, and Czemin to Hohenlohe, May 9, 13, 1917, P.A., Geheim, X L V I I / 3 - 1 8 ; Hausner, op. cif., pp. 106-128.

506

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

mayor of Warsaw, Prince Andrew Lubomirski, Archbishop Aleksander Kakowski of Warsaw, and a conservative, Count Joseph Ostrowski, sometime chairman of the Polish delegation in the Russian Duma, but now a Germanophile. Though not the first choice of Vienna, Professor Jan Kucharzewski was picked as prime minister; he was an honest, forward-looking lawyer, better at writing history than at making it. A Russian Pole by birth, during the war he had resided in Switzerland where he carried on propaganda for an independent Poland, but after the November Declaration of 1916 he became a devoted follower of the Central Powers. Kucharzewski chose a cabinet largely of technical specialists, lawyers and engineers unaffiliated with any political faction, though inclined to be sympathetic to Austria.19 From the outset the regency regime was a phantom—all decisions were subject to veto by representatives of the Central Empires, and yet more than mere beginnings were made in constructing a Polish national frame of government. 4. Pulling and tugging over the Polish question between Vienna and the Germans proceeded apace. By the Kreuznach Accords of May 18, 1917, the Ballplatz had signed away claims to Russian Poland in favor of Germany on the assumption that the latter in return would relinquish part of Alsace-Lorraine to France, and thus smooth the path to peace, but that bargain was still-born. So in the autumn of 1917, statesmen of the two countries reverted to the Austro-Polish solution, Germany to be rewarded in the form of new military and economic pacts with the Monarchy and to obtain frontier rectifications—an elastic phrase—in Russian Poland. Czernin protested that the boundary changes demanded by Ludendorff and 19

Conze, op. cit., pp. 314-318.

Trials of Togetherness

507

Company covering a third of occupied Poland, would amount to a new partition, which was wholly unacceptable to the Ballplatz; yet a tentative accommodation on the Austro-Polish formula was agreed upon.20 Inklings of the secret conversations in Berlin, including the prospective merger of most of occupied Poland and of Galicia and its connection to the Hapsburg Monarchy through the crown, leaked out in the press of Germany. A Viennese paper announced, "Emperor Charles, King of Poland, Emperor William, Grandduke of Lithuania," a prospect, coming precisely at the moment of the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd, that provoked lively excitement in Austria and in Polish areas. Enraged because he and his colleagues had been excluded from the deliberations, Ostrowski, in the name of the regents, repudiated this deviation from the November Declaration and called for an independent Polish state without dynastic ties with Austria. To placate Poles in the Vienna parliament, Prime Minister Seidler and the semi-official Fremdenblatt explained that only exploratory discussions with Berlin had been held; "Poland will herself decide her political future," commented the Fremdenblatt reassuringly. A loyalist Pole, Glombinski, expressed faith that the crown would bring forward a generous settlement, which would, among other things, ensure the legitimate rights of the Ukrainian minority in a Polish state, but Ukrainian deputies cried out against transfer of "our unhappy people to its hereditary enemy." "If Austria no longer desires to retain us," shouted Dr. Constantine Lewicki," we claim union with the Ukrainian Republic."21 Austrogerman Socialists put it about that the Austro-Polish formula 20 Résumé der Besprechungen in Berlin am 5. und 6. November, 1917, P.A., Geheim, XLV1I/3-21. 21 Prominent Ukrainians again asked Czernin to work for the merger of eastern Galicia, a section of the Bukowina, and of the Russian Ukraine in a separate Austrian crownland. Ukrainians to Czemin, Nov. 10, 1917, P.A., Krieg, 56 a/5.

508

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

would prolong the war solely to advance Hapsburg dynastic interests, and they pleaded for an independent Poland to include the Polish-peopled area of Galicia; Viktor Adler entered a proviso that arrangements "must only be effected by a treaty protecting Austrian economic interests and accepted by Austrian and Polish representatives alike." The idea of detaching Galicia from Austria evoked disquieting protestations from Die Zeit and from staunch Hapsburgophiles.22 In fact, the elimination of the Poles of Galicia from the Vienna parliament would have assured the ascendancy of the Austrogerman element. From Germany, Professor Otto Hoetzsch, respected expert on eastern Europe, decried union of Poland with the House of Hapsburg on the curious score that the Monarchy would then be exposed to Magyar domination; of all feasible alternatives, he preferred making the existing condominium of Austria and of Germany in Russian Poland permanent. Emperor Charles and Czernin were gready aggrieved over the leaks in Berlin on the Polish question and their wrath increased when Warsaw papers, subject to censorship by German officials, dashed cold water on the Austro-Polish formula. To balance matters up, the press in the Austro-Hungarian zone of occupation applauded the principle of Hapsburg dynastic union and published barbed comments on German territorial ambitions in the east; Polish leaders were dead-set against any large sacrifices of land to Germany or a heavy burden of war debt. Czernin fondly supposed that Charles could be crowned as Polish king in about six months after a peace treaty had been negotiated with Russia.23 Speaking to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Delegation on December 4, 1917, the Foreign 22 NFP, Nov. 8, 1917: Leopold von Chlumecky, "Polen," OR, LII (1917), 145-147. 2 3 Ugron to Czernin, Nov. 19, Dec. 19, 22, 25, 1917, and Czernin to Ugron, Dec. 8, 1917, P.A., Krieg, 56 a/3; Andrian to Czernin, Dec. 19, 1917, P.A., Geheim, XLVII/3-21.

Trials of Togetherness

509

Minister declared that, "for the duration of the war . . . the establishment of the Polish state can only be gradual," but when fighting ceased, "Poland will be able herself to decide her political future," he said, and he added that the Monarchy was seeking "no territorial extensions by force, nor economic exploitation" of enemy powers. Even after the January, 1918, pronouncements of Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson on independence for Poland, conservatively minded Poles, landed proprietors and others, alarmed by Bolshevik Russia, freely professed affection for Polish integration with Austria, usually with a reservation that none of occupied Poland, or very little, should be allocated to Germany. But a striking decline of Austrophilism accompanied Central Power peace negotiations with the Russian Bolsheviks and the Ukrainians; the regency and the Kucharzewski ministry not only resented their exclusion from the pourparlers but announced that they would not be bound by any settlements that might be reached. Worse followed. A treaty of February 9, 1918, with the Ukrainian Republic assigned the district of Cholm, coveted by Poles, to the Ukraine. At a crown council on January 22, 1918, Arz and Hungarian Premier Wekerle argued that this arrangement would kill the Austro-Polish formula, but the Emperor decided it must be accepted in order to get food from the Ukraine. Upon publication of the treaty, Polish patriots indulged in fiery public demonstrations, as is detailed farther along, demanded Czemin's head on a charger, and his resignation in April was welcomed with transports of delight. At about the same time, Emperor Charles reaffirmed his desire for the Austro-Polish formula, asserting in a letter to William II that it was "the best and perhaps the only realistic solution." But the German rejected that logic in favor of a small independent Polish state with a monarch of its own; whether Charles acquiesced, it is

510

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

not possible to determine in an absolute sense, though the probability is that he did. In the meantime, a new Polish ministry had been brought together by Jan K. Steczkowski, a Galician landlord and member of the Austrian house of lords; his colleagues exhibited pro-German leanings. Thereafter, another council of state, partly elected by units of local government, partly nominated by the regency, was organized and convened in June. It debated for more than a month on relations with the Central Empires, the formation of an army, economic rehabilitation, and related issues, but after adjourning, this body never again assembled. If Poland was in truth the "key to Europe," it had not yet managed to unlock its own door.24 5. To the already voluminous literature on Mitteleuropa, conceived, to be sure, in multicolored patterns, fresh contributions were steadily added, such as a weighty tome by the Heidelberg historian, Hermann Oncken, Das Alte und das Neue Mitteleuropa (Gotha, 1917), in which he argued that Mitteleuropa should include the Balkans and Russian Poland, and should form a military as well as an economic combination. A Berlin economist, Max Sering edited Westrussland in Seiner Bedeutung für die Entwicklung Mitteleuropas (Leipzig, 1917), recommending that territory in eastern Europe occupied by the Central Empires should be drawn into Mitteleuropa. From the Austrian side, Heinrich Friedjung, a militant and unwearying evangelist for central European unity, set forth the values of lasting integration in popular newspaper treatises; solid volumes on the same tneme were prepared by Gustav Stolper—for example, Das Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftsprobleme (Vienna, 1917)—and by ex24

Conze, op. cit., pp. 359-361.

511

Trials of Togetherness

minister of railways, Heinrich von Wittek, Die Mitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftsfragen (Wamsdorf, 1917). Opponents of Mitteleuropa kept their pens busy too. Professor Erich Brandenburg in a pamphlet, Deutschlands Kriegziele (Leipzig, 1917), attacked the Naumann scheme as "a dangerous Utopia," inasmuch as the proposed combination of countries lacked "anything like cultural unity." Distrusting the stability of Austria-Hungary, he favored nothing beyond the existing diplomatic and military relations; an economic alliance, he contended, would surely spell disaster for the weaker partner. Brandenburg recommended that the Danube Monarchy should erect a set of satellite states on her borders—Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Ukrainia. Berliner Tageblatt carried impassioned polemics by Prince Karl M. Lichnowsky, ex-German envoy to London, and Naumann on the bearing of the Mitteleuropa plan on the Monarchy, the former arguing that integration would condemn Austria-Hungary to everlasting vassalage. Countering that the Prince talked like an Englishman, Naumann insisted that the Monarchy would richly profit and that the advantages demonstrated in wartime cooperation would be perpetuated. 28 Emperor Charles spoke out strongly against economic consolidation with Germany on the grounds that it would reduce his Monarchy to the plane of Bavaria and would render impossible the negotiation of peace with the enemy. That viewpoint was not shared by Czernin—not fully, leastwise—and, besides, he imagined that a solid economic pact might serve as the forerunner to pressure upon the Germans to scale down their extravagant territorial pretensions. In defiance of explicit instructions of the crown, he kept talks on commercial coordination going.2* Impressive teams of trade experts from the Monarchy 28 28

Larisch to Czernin, Aug. 1, 1917, P.A., Preussen, Czernin, op. cit., pp. 285-287.

Berichte,

1917.

512

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

and from Germany conferred in nearly continuous sessions, and friends of integration convoked meetings in the principal cities of the allied empires and passed resolutions to the effect that a firm economic community would benefit all parties. Naumann fumed and fretted because statesmen would not adopt his program as their own, and bogey fears of Mitteleuropa cropped up repeatedly in western capitals. President Wilson, for instance, averred: The demands made by Austria upon Serbia were a mere single step in the plan which compassed Europe and Asia, from Berlin to Bagdad. They hoped these demands might not arouse Europe, but they meant to press them whether they did or not, for they thought themselves ready for the final issue of arms. Their plan was to throw a belt of German military power and political control across the very center of Europe and beyond the Mediterranean — into the heart of Asia; and Austria-Hungary was to be as much their tool and pawn as Serbia, or Bulgaria, or Turkey or the ponderous states of the East. Austria-Hungary, indeed, was to become a part of the Central German Empire, absorbed and dominated by the same forces and influences that had originally cemented the German states themselves. The dream had its heart at Berlin. It could have had its heart nowhere else . . . It contemplated binding together racial [sic] and political units which could be kept together only by force—Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Rumanians, Turks, Armenians—the proud states of Bohemia and Hungary. . . 27 British Lord Denbigh warned readers of the London Times (Jan. 10, 1918), "If Germany is allowed to maintain Mitteleuropa . . . she will have won what she made this war for, even to the murder of the Archduke"; other minds, however, begged to differ, ridiculing the whole 27 "This is a People's War," June 14, 1917, Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson (6 vols., New York, 1925-27), I, 63.

Trials of Togetherness

513

conception as nothing other than a fantastic phantom. Neither Austria nor Hungary, it was contended, would tolerate absorption by Germany, and Bulgaria and Turkey were chafing under wartime ties with Berlin; come what might, a central European combination could not possibly be economically self-sufficient.28 The chamber of commerce of Düsseldorf came out strongly for government consultation with representatives of the German business community before adopting economic integration of central Europe as a settled state policy. This body scouted the advantages prophesied by partisans of the scheme; only to a very small extent, it was urged, could the economies of the Central Empires complement each other, and integration would adversely affect German commerce with countries outside the bloc. Equally, the council of the Bulgarian Economic Society expressed hostility to a customs union for Central Europe; certain Bulgarian deputies and the press, in spite of the censorship, raised their voices against any sort of lasting unity with wartime allies. Besides, Tisza paid only lip-service to the idea, and insisted anew that the agricultural productions of Hungary would have to be protected by tariffs from competition by other members of any combination—especially if Rumania and Serbia, as well as Bulgaria, were drawn in. Hungarian Prime Minister Wekerle echoed essentially that point of view, which, according to the Arbeiter Zeitung, merely reflected the selfish interests of the large Magyar landowners, whose "boundless lust for gain" had contributed so significantly to the coming of the war. Whatever reality in the sphere of practical politics Mitteleuropa ever possessed, it was eclipsed for Ludendorff and Company, after the disintegration of Russian power of resistance, by the grandiose mirage of a Kontinentaleuropa extending from France straight into western Rus2 8 Anon., "The Menace of Mitteleuropa," Nation (U.S.), CV (1917), 445-446.

514

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

sia, and from that dream Austria-Hungary and the lesser Central allies were excluded. 6. In the management of diplomacy, notably with regard to war aims, the Ballplatz took cognizance of the thinking of the Socialists, influential among Austrian industrial workers, although still feeble in Hungary. Under the impact of the Russian revolution of March, Dutch and Scandinavian Socialists set plans in motion for an international conference which might speed along the return of peace. In May, 1917, a preparatory assembly met in Stockholm, Austria being represented by an able delegation of "patriotic" Socialists—Viktor Adler, Renner, Seitz, Ellenbogen, and the learned Vienna historian, Ludo Hartmann; Garami and Kunfi appeared for the Hungarian party and delegates came from the Czech and South Slav areas of the Monarchy as well. Czernin not only assented to participation by the Austrians, but induced the Budapest ministry to allow the Hungarians to attend. As conditions of peace, the Austrian Socialists prescribed no annexations or indemnities (as they did in the Vienna parliament on June 28); the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and Belgium; the formation of a Balkan federation of states; a large measure of home rule for the Poles living under the Austrian and German flags, and independence for Russian Poland—Finland, too. Their proposal that a compromise on Macedonia should be worked out to placate the Serbs, elicited fierce denunciations from Bulgar quarters. "Arheiter Zeitung . . . treats the Bulgar demands as exaggerated, if not as impudent," declared Sofia Kambana, "but the impudence is all on the side of the leaders of the Austrian Social Democrats," who were reviled as "contemptible, senseless, and criminal." Several times postponed, when what is styled the Stock-

Trials of Togetherness

515

holm conference actually convened, only representatives from Russia and the Central Empires among the warring nations attended; Entente cabinets and the United States denied passports to would-be delegates.29 Apart from reciting standard collectivist doctrines, the Austrian delegates took their stand on cultural autonomy for the national communities of the Monarchy, and stoutly argued for the maintenance of the realm, which was pure Renner gospel; similarly, the Hungarians spoke out for the preservation of the territorial integrity of their country. Czechs asked for a Czechoslovak state within a Danubian confederacy, but South Slavs talked of a Yugoslav republic in a Balkan federation. 30 Nothing concrete came of the Stockholm gathering, greatly to the regret of Renner, who somehow imagined that it provided the most promising opportunity for a compromise peace settlement. "Long live the international mass struggle against the war," the official manifesto proclaimed pathetically. A spate of articles appeared in 1917 in the Austrian press on the broad topic of peace and the role of Austrians, especially of the late Berta von Suttner (author of the extensively circulated Lay Dottm Your Arms) in the world-wide peace movement before 1914.31 An outstanding Austrian writer in the cause of peace, Alfred H. Fried, who had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (1911), had moved to Switzerland where he conducted an unrelenting propaganda for the restoration of peace and assailed German war objectives in shrill language. He wished the Ballplatz to take the lead in espousing an organization of the nations to preserve peace in the future, and he besought Czernin to advocate publicly a third 29

125. 30

Kent Forster, The Failures of Peace (Washington, 1941), pp. 115-

Jaksch, op. cit., pp. 163-166. Heinrich Lammasch, "Zur Geschichte der Friedensideen in Österreich," OR, LI (1917), 1—5; Alfred Fried, "Der Kampf um die Vermeidung des Weltkrieges," ibid., LÜI (1917), 172 ff.; Sigmund Münz, "Das Friedensvennächtnis Berta von Suttner," ibid., 59-64. 31

516

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Hague Conference to draft the constitution of a league for peace. By pursuing that idealistic war aim, the Monarchy, Fried believed, might purchase the good-will of the United States.32 Peace-lover, too, and something of an Anglophile, was the affluent Viennese food merchant, Julius Meinl. Reports from his network of shops furnished him with abundant evidence of the growing popular misery. More than once he conferred with Emperor Charles on ways of restoring peace, and he flitted about Europe seeking to open channels for the cessation of the war; unwittingly he assisted, too, in shaping the content of Wilson's "Fourteen Points" address. Meinl helped to found the interesting Austrian Politische Gesellschaft, composed of politicians, intellectuals, and a sprinkling of aristocrats to discuss problems thrown up by the war. Much consideration was devoted to the Polish and Adriatic questions and to ways of softening antipathies between the Hapsburg nationalities, notably in Bohemia. At meetings in July, 1917, when Germany was embroiled in the Reichstag Resolution crisis, the Austrian society resolved that the Monarchy must seek to satisfy the legitimate wishes of the national communities and energetically to push diplomacy for the restoration of peace.33 Presently Die Zeit boldly blurted out, "No prospect of peace negotiations exists, because the German government is unwilling to become a convert to democracy nor to specify its war aims." As if to answer critics, Czernin declared on July 28 that the Central Allies were of one mind on peace terms "to the very last details"; the En3 2 Musulin to Czernin June 7, 1917, P.A., Schweiz, Berichte, 1917; see also, Alfred H. Fried, Mein Kriegstagebuch ( 4 vols., Vienna, 191822), passim. 3 3 Heinrich Benedilct, Die Friedensahtion der Meinlgruppe 1917/18 (Graz, 1962), pp. 1-125; Mamatey, op. cit., pp. 174-175; Hohenlohe to Czemin, Dec. 10, 1917, P.A., Preussen, Varia, 1917.

Trials of Togetherness

517

tente "will never succeed in crushing us," and further sacrifices and suffering were useless, he said. A "peace by understanding" would stop the awful carnage and after that institutions should be devised to prevent a recurrence of the war.84 From Skyrzinski in Switzerland, the Ballplatz received a stream of communications on the general theme that Entente statecraft desired the preservation of the Monarchy as a counterpoise to Germany, and he believed this attitude had grown by reason of the revolutionary convulsions in Russia. Vienna should seize the initiative to end hostilities, he urged, and for its own salvation the Monarchy should break with the military masters of Germany.35 Curiosity was piqued in unofficial Entente quarters by the appearance in Switzerland of well-known Austro-Hungarians, such as the Polish patrician, Count Agenor Goluchowski, foreign minister of Francis Joseph for a decade, former Hungarian Premier Moritz Esterhazy, and Michael Karolyi. It was imagined in the west of Europe that these gentry were seeking either to spread the notion that Vienna desired to negotiate for peace independently or to stir up bad blood inside the Entente and to play upon the sympathies of pacifically inclined western statesmen. Kdrolyi, in fact, had his own special purposes for a mission to Switzerland. When he applied for a passport, ostensibly to take part in the deliberations of a peace society, the Ballplatz at first refused the request, but later relented, and toward the end of November, 1917, K&rolyi conferred in Switzerland with like-minded men from enemy and allied countries; Professor Oscar Jdszi was among those present, and like Kdrolyi he was branded by Scott, op. cit., pp. 120-122. Musulin to Czemin, May 22, 1917, P.A., Schweiz, Varia, 1917; ibid. July 13, 31, Aug. 7, Sept. 18, 21, 1917, P.A., Schweiz, Berichte, 1917. It was common practice to print memoranda from Skryzinslci for circulation among foreign office specialists. 34

35

518

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

pro-Entente Swiss newspapers as a wily and sinister Magyar propagandist. In complete secrecy the Count unveiled his thinking to the American chargé, Hugh R. Wilson. Kârolyi pictured himself as the coming man of the Monarchy, who before long would be installed as head of the Ballplatz, where his supreme preoccupation would be a diplomatic settlement of the war, without or with the cooperation of Berlin. His agenda for peace included restoration of Belgium, satisfaction of French claims upon Alsace-Lorraine and of legitimate Italian expectations, and the inclusion of Galicia in an independent Poland; but he would inflexibly resist any territorial subtractions from Hungary! Kârolyi observed that the Monarchy, on the brink of exhaustion, must find peace at once, though in public he repudiated that pessimistic line, and upon returning to Budapest he declared that peace was still distant, with Alsace-Lorraine as the principal obstacle, and that Austria-Hungary had no choice but to go on fighting.38 From Rome the ebullient Congressman Fiorello H. La Guardia, who was concerned with American propaganda in Italy and familiar with Hungary by virtue of a tour of duty as consul in Fiume, proposed to Washington that he should try to enlist Kârolyi in a revolutionary movement to detach Hungary from Austria. This scheme President Wilson flatly turned down shortly before his Fourteen Points address, as "very unwise and dangerous and quite contrary to the attitude of honor which it has been our pride to maintain in international affairs." The President felt that too many "irresponsible agents" were already in the field and that they might do a great deal of harm.37 3 6 Musulin to Czemin, Nov. 27. 1917, HHSA, Personalia, 11/445; Michael Kârolyi, Fighting the World (New York, 1925), pp. 212-225; Hugh R. Wilson, Diplomat Between Wars (New York, 1941), pp. 4 0 42. 3 7 Thomas N. Page to Lansing, Dec. 29, 1917, and Wilson to Lansing, Jan. 1, 1918, U.S., National Archives, 864.00/20.

Trials of Togetherness

519

Possibly Wilson had in mind Professor Frank E. Anderson, who in the autumn of 1917 went to Europe to make confidential investigations for the State Department and, in disregard of explicit instructions, crossed into AustriaHungary. Acquainted with Count Albert Apponyi, Anderson talked with him and Andrássy in December, 1917, and transmitted the gist of the conversations, along with personal observations on moods in the Monarchy, to the State Department. Harsh privations had produced a universal desire for the fighting to stop, Anderson reported, though he felt a revolution was very unlikely; the Magyar statesmen responded affirmatively, he said, to a suggestion for a conference with enemy powers, looking toward a general settlement, though they ruled out suggestions of an independent peace. Press stories to the effect that Anderson had gone to Europe as an authorized government representative were denied by Lansing.88 7. Among the agents of the Ballplatz in Switzerland engaged in exploring the chances for peace with Entente counterparts was Count Nicholas Reverterá, a relative of the Parma family, and attached to the Swiss Embassy. Under circumstances never adequately clarified, he entered into secret conversations at Freiburg, Switzerland, in the summer of 1917, with Count Abel Armand, an elderly French aristocrat, acquainted with the Parma clan and at the time attached to die intelligence service of the French general staff. On the authority of that body and with the acquiescence, at least, of War Minister Paul Painlevé, Armand initially suggested to Reverterá that if Vienna would withdraw from the fighting and observe strict neutrality, and, if it would consent to the cession 38 U.S. Foreign Relations, 1917, Supp. 2, vol. 1, 209, 458, 466-467, 478-482; Ludwig Széchényi to For. Office, Oct. 16, Nov. 6, 1917, P.A., Haag, Berichte, 1917; New York Times, Ap. 10, 1918.

520

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

of the Trentino and Trieste to Italy (or agree to convert Trieste into a free port), then the Monarchy would be rewarded with all of Poland, extending to the frontiers of 1772, and Bavaria and Prussian Silesia. "They have tailed only of dismembering us," responded the astounded Reverterá, "and now they want to make us into a great stats." Evidently Emperor Charles was still agreeable to relinquishing the Trentino, though not Trieste, and he aslced for information on French aspirations in the Rhinelanc.39 The British cabinet, but probably not other members of the western coalition, were aware of the Arm and adventure to detach the Monarchy from Germany. At a second meeting—August 22—the Frenchman added to his conditions for peace the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, with no strings attached, the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Rumania; in recompense the captured colonies of Germany might be returned. But the talks ran into a stonewall, since the Ballplatz consistently declined to consider a settlement without Germany, and the latter would not relinquish Alsace-Lorraine. Yet in February, 1918, the two Counts, on the initiative of Armand, got their heads together again; although he had been instructed by Premier Georges Clemenceau "to listen and say nothing," Armand endeavored to convince the Austrian that the Monarchy was racing toward total ruin simply because Germany wished to annex large areas in the east. Since the Frenchman insisted that the price of peace would be the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine and that Austria would have to cede territory to satisfy Entente wartime treaties, Reverterá abruptly broke off the exchange—the last opportunity, as matters turned out, to open the path to peace by diplomacy.40 3 9 Manteyer, op. cit., pp. 267-298—the interpretation offered is unconvincing. 4 0 Anon., "Die Friedensgesprache der Grafen Mensdorff und Reverrtera . . . nach Ihren Berichten . . . BM, X V ( 1 ) ( 1 9 3 7 ) , esp. 413-41S9.

Trials of Togetherness

521

8. In August, 1917, an ill-starred stroke to stop the prolonged carnage emanated from Pope Benedict XV, who offered himself as "the disinterested servant of the Prince of Peace," though maledictions were hurled at him from all sides as working for the opposing belligerent coalition.41 Aside from a genuine desire to see the fighting cease, the Vatican was animated by dread that if the war lasted much longer, new, diabolical perils might emerge to challenge the very foundations of western civilization. Before acting, emissaries of the Papacy had apprized Berlin and Vienna of its intentions; it was supposed by William II that the Vatican move must have been taken with the foreknowledge of the London ministry, and he fancied that the papal effort might yield fruit in the direction of a compromise settlement.42 In point of fact, Entente cabinets learned the precise content of the papal plan only when the note was formally presented. Disclosed to the world on August 15, the document provoked no inconsiderable stir. To halt "the useless massacre," the Vatican recommended a settlement without victory for either side. In essence, the agenda envisaged a return to the territorial arrangements prevailing in 1914; Belgium, it was definitely stated, would have to be compensated for damage inflicted, but otherwise no reparations would be exacted. It was suggested that patient diplomacy might solve territorial contentions involving the Hapsburg Monarchy and Italy and Germany and France, and it was proposed that the aspirations of the 4 1 Engel-Janosi, op. cit. II, 305-325: Humphrey J.T. Johnson, Vatican Diplomacy in the World War (London, 1933); Forster, op. cit., pp. 126-141; Friedrich von Lama, "Der Friedensvermittlungsversuch Papst Benedikts XV," BM, X ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 1 1 2 2 - 1 1 2 5 - a staunchly Vatican approach; "Foreign Views of the Pope's Peace Offer," Literary Digest, LV, (Sept. 1, 1917), 17-18. 4 2 Hohenlohe to Czemin, July 14, 1917, P.A., Geheim, L X V I I / 3 - 1 9 .

522

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Poles and of the Balkan nationalities should be examined through the lenses of equity. The Pope pleaded, too, that armaments should be restricted through international engagements and that arbitration should be invoked to resolve quarrels in the future. The cabinet of Vienna welcomed the papal initiative more cordially than any other belligerent government. Vatican silence on self-determination, together with the strong peace currents flowing in the Monarchy, explain the hearty response, though it was fully recognized that unless Germany was willing to withdraw unconditionally from Belgium, progress toward peace was out of the question. Since the Hapsburg realm was the most reliable daughter of the Church, imperial court and Catholic dignitaries lived on terms of close intimacy, and Catholicism cemented the loyalty of the diverse nationalities to the crown; to be sure, knots of priests had taken up with secessionist nationalisms.43 The possibility that Croats and Slovenes in the Double Monarchy might be incorporated in a South Slav state, dominated by Orthodox Serbs, was particularly repugnant to the Roman Curia. The mouthpiece of Austrian clericalism, the Reichspost, hailed the papal proposals as "in absolute harmony with the aims of the Monarchy," yet it denounced the suggestion that Italy possessed any rightful claim to Hapsburg territory. Praising Benedict XV for forcing the Entente powers "to face the question of peace," Neue Freie Presse discovered in the papal move an appropriate groundplan for conversations between the belligerents. Even the Socialist Nepszava of Budapest joined in the chorus of thanksgiving to the Vatican; members of the Czech emigration, in contrast, pilloried the Pope as the designing tool of the Ballplatz. 4 3 Friedrieh Engel-Janosi, "The Roman Question in the First Years of Benedict XV " Catholic Historical Review, XL (1954), 269-283-interesting sidelights.

Trials of Togetherness

523

After consultations with the Wilhelmstrasse, Czernin answered the papal initiative sympathetically, though in gossamer generalities. "We see in the proposals of your Holiness," he observed, "a suitable basis for initiating negotiations with a view to preparing a peace, just to all and lasting. . . ." Vatican attempts, however, to elicit concrete terms from Vienna that might have served as a point of departure for peace conversations among the belligerents came to naught. The reply from Berlin on the papal action approved the recommendations concerning armament limitation and arbitration, but on points of immediate significance the German note was too indefinite to have any meaning; the facile theory that Chancellor Michaelis spurned the papal overture out of Protestant prejudice lacks foundation. The reasoning in Berlin ran that revelation of war aims, not least on the Belgian issue, would deprive Germany of room for diplomatic bargaining. Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli, later Pope Pius XII, who had been dispatched to Germany to promote the peace effort, instinctively appreciated that the project was stillborn since Germany made no offer to quit Belgium. In Entente countries the papal initiative drew applause from peace-minded elements, but cabinets and the bourgeois press in general firmly rejected the proposal. "We look upon this war as a crusade," explained Le Temps of Paris in a typical commentary. "The Holy See treats it as a lawsuit." Given the issues at stake, the paper repudiated the notion of a neutral conscience as evu incarnate. Popolo dItalia, edited by Benito Mussolini, ran an article headed "His Holiness Pilate XV," and insinuated that the Vatican wished to save the Danube Monarchy from destruction and to undermine the Italian will to win the war. The New Europe, in whose opinion the Vatican bid was intended merely to preserve the Monarchy, lashed out against "an unneutral homily of which the pious accents scarcely avail to mask the unmoral substance"; it

524

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

detected the subtle hand of the pro-Hapsburg Jesuits in the whole affair. As the voice of Czech national extremism, Isador Zahradnik, a deputy and a Catholic priest, reproached the Pope for forgetting the Czechs, but no matter, for they would survive neglect and win their legitimate rights in due course. Although appreciative of the humanitarian spirit that prompted Benedict XV, President Wilson politely turned the papal appeal aside and delivered a blistering phillipic against the ruthless masters of Germany. While eschewing formal comment, Entente statecraft assented to the position taken by the White House, without wholly liking it. The President also asserted in his note that the dismemberment of empires would be "inexpedient and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace." That affirmation infuriated exponents of the destruction of the Monarchy, for, as La Serbie of Geneva remarked, Wilson, under the sway of American tradition, held to the false and pernicious hypothesis that Austria-Hungary could be transformed into a federal union, assuring equality of national rights to the member states.44 On the other side, Az Est of Budapest greeted the President's reply with joy "for we cannot doubt his sincerity. . . . We understand the note as opposing all disintegration and crippling of nations. That is why the note has made such a good impression on all Hungarians." Before long Magyarorszâg was saying on peace through mediation, "We must look to a country which the enemy is most likely to believe has no annexationist intentions. There is one such power and it is the Dual Monarchy, whose inner structure could not stand annexations. . . The response of the White House dealt the coup de grâce to the papal démarche, though on a longer view Benedict 44

137.

L. Marcovitch (éd.), Serbia and Europe

(New York, 1921), p.

Trials of Togetherness

525

XV by his effort for a compromise settlement enhanced the prestige of his high office. 9. Failure likewise befell independent explorations looking toward peace carried on in December, 1917, at Geneva by Premier Jan C. Smuts of South Africa for Great Britain, and Count Albert Mensdorff for Vienna. An individual of fine intellect, described by Lloyd George as "the ablest man that came to help us from the outside Empire," Smuts had been employed before on diplomatic errands and had been assigned a seat on the all-powerful British war cabinet of six men; his admiration for the wizard of Wales matched the latter's faith in him. The Boer statesman had little acquaintance with the complexities of the Hapsburg Monarchy nor was he schooled in the niceties of European diplomacy; Clemenceau remarked testily that the British Prime Minister was "an extra fool for sending Smuts who doesn't even know where Austria is." The South African statesman himself believed that application of the "knock-out" philosophy to the Danube Monarchy would be "damnable stupidity." Speaking at Sheffield, shortly before departing for Geneva, Smuts observed, "We do not wish to break up Germany or Austria. . . . If small nations cannot be independent, let them be autonomous," a viewpoint that was greedily pounced upon by British Austrophiles. Count Mensdorff ranked among the most polished .and accomplished diplomatists in the Hapsburg service; the last representative of Francis Joseph at the court of St. James's, he had earned golden opinions in London as a tactful, straightforward diplomatist. The proposal for a confidential exchange of views on conditions of peace came from Czemin, and Lloyd George seized it with customary avidity. The Prime Minister no-

526

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

toriously conducted a foreign policy of his own, with his own staff, which at this point, as at others, moved ahead without consulting the diplomatic hierarchy on the other side of Downing Street. Back in July, 1917, still under the glow of the Sixtus transaction, Lloyd George eagerly wished to continue peace talks with Vienna, though he believed that nothing effective would result unless Austro-Hungarian arms first suffered upsetting reversals. Instead of that, the Caporetto disaster had descended, which made the new Czernin overture the more welcome. Colonel Edward M. House and senior French and Italian officials—the last grudgingly—approved the Smuts mission. Thinly disguised as "Mr. Ashworth," Smuts set off for Switzerland, attended by several individuals in whom Lloyd George reposed confidence. In meetings with Mensdorff, Smuts did most of the talking, the Austrian making it plain, as instructed by Czernin, that his government would not entertain suggestions for a separate peace. 45 Smuts dangled an extremely alluring vision before Mensdorff, provided that the Dual Monarchy were transformed into a federal union along the lines of the British Commonwealth. "If Austria became a really liberal Empire," the South African remembered himself as remarking, "in which her subject peoples would, as far as possible, be satisfied and content, she would become for Central Europe very much what the British Empire had become for the rest of the world . . . a League of Free Nations . . . and she would have a mission in the future even greater than her mission in the past. . . ." The Monarchy, he insisted, would have to emancipate itself from the malign sway of Berlin and start off on a fresh path alone. Smuts proposed 4 5 For Smuts's version of the parley, see Lloyd George, War Memoirs, op. cit., V, 2461-2480; this revelation inspired an account by Mensdorff: "Die Friedensgesprache der Grafen MensdorfF und Reverterá . . . nach Ihren Berichten an den Grafen Czernin," BM, XV ( 1 ) (1937), 401-419. W. K. Hancock, Smuts (London, 1962), I, 466-468.

Trials of Togetherness

527

further that the South Slav districts of the realm should be merged with Serbia and Montenegro to make a Yugoslav state, that part of Transylvania and the Bukowina should be awarded to Rumania, and that Galicia should be handed over to an independent Poland; by one cord or another, these states—Yugoslavia, Rumania, and possibly Poland—should then be conjoined to the House of Hapsburg. As part and parcel of the whole gigantic rearrangement, the Italian-speaking section of the Tyrol should be transferred to Italy. The Austrian gained the impressions that the London cabinet was supremely concerned to forestall integration of the states of central Europe and that Smuts personally dreaded the sweep of revolutionary Bolshevism westward.46 Anxious though the Vienna policymakers were for peace, they would not consider a separate understanding, while the London policymakers were averse to direct negotiation with Berlin, and on that rock the Smuts-Mensdorff venture suffered shipwreck. Even so, highly placed authorities countenanced the hope that further talks might move out of the academic sphere. Early in 1918, Czernin proposed that he and Lloyd George get their heads together, but the London cabinet preferred again to use the Smuts team (though not Smuts himself), which held informal talks with Skrzyinski in Switzerland. Whatever promise this gambit may have possessed, it was blasted by a fresh and massive German offensive on the battlefields of France. "If Austria had made peace in the spring of 1918," it later seemed to Lloyd George, "the Austrian empire would have been preserved . . . perhaps half a dozen autonomous divisions all owing allegiance to the Austrian crown." 47 Isidor Singer, formerly editor of Die Zeit, tried to per4 6 Mensdorff to Foreign Office, June 22, 1918, P.A., Schweiz, Varia, 1918. 4 7 Lloyd George, op. cit., V, 2497-2503; cf. Forster, op. cit., pp. 104-105, and Hancock, op. cit., I, 473.

528

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

suade Wickham Steed of the desirability of maintaining the Monarchy—the two men had become well acquainted during Steed's service as Times correspondent in Vienna. Singer suggested that they should meet secretly in Switzerland and confer on the future of Austria-Hungary, but the Briton declined on the score that he was too busy; instead, he recommended that Singer state his views to the Times correspondent in Berne who would treat whatever was said confidentially and transmit the information with accuracy. The Austrian ambassador, Musulin frowned upon such a meeting as futile and likely to arouse German suspicion.48 10.

On several occasions late in 1917, Czemin proclaimed the Monarchy's desire for peace and set out his own thinking on conditions of settlement. At Budapest on October 2, for example, he reminded his audience that the Ballplatz had plainly disclosed its formula for peace in answering the Vatican overture—boundaries as of 1914, freedom of the seas, limitation on armaments. The Monarchy neither harbored designs of territorial aggrandizement, he said, nor would it engage in a commercial war with the enemy after the war of steel had closed. "This pacific, moderate program of ours," he concluded, "will not hold good forever. . . . I am absolutely convinced that our position in another year will be incomparably better than today. . . . If our enemies will not listen and compel us to continue this bloodshed, then we reserve the right to revise our program. . . ." 49 The Vienna Socialist daily enthusiastically hailed the Czernin utterance as evidence of "the dawn of reason," and emphasized the point that many in the Budapest 48 48

Musulin to Czemin, Mar. 3, 1918, P.A., Schweiz, Berichte, Scott, op. cit., pp. 152-156.

1918.

Trials of Togetherness

529

audience who had lately clamored for annexation of Rumanian territory, now applauded the appeal of the Foreign Minister for a moderate settlement.50 At a Christian Socialist rally in Vienna, Prince Alois Liechtenstein heartily seconded the speech of Czernin. "We want a peace by understanding," he cried, "general disarmament, and arbitration." On the other side, Budapesti Hirlap was calling for annexation of Moldavia to Hungary, holding that mastery of the mouths of the Danube was "a question of our prosperity and our existence." If Serbia were restored to her pre-war boundaries, "peace would be nothing but an armistice," thought Count Andrassy, and he now argued against a binding declaration disclaiming indemnities as well as annexations.51 Annoyed by Czernin's renunciation of annexations, the semi-official press of Bulgaria launched a methodical, if veiled, campaign against him, and criticisms in a similar vein issued from important political quarters in Germany and in Austria. For a brief spell, the dazzling Caporetto offensive, the Leninist coup in Russia, and a famous plea for peace by the British Conservative statesman, Lord Lansdowne revived hopes in official Vienna that the war would end favorably for the Danubian realm. On December 4, the Delegations of the Monarchy, committees really of the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments, met for the first time since the outbreak of war, and the Emperor told the Austrian group that if he could restore peace it would be the finest day of his life. To members of the Hungarian Delegation, Czernin presented a survey of the international situation, in which he reiterated that the Monarchy sought neither annexations nor indemnities and that the Central Powers were fighting simply for defensive aims; only French pretensions to Alsace-Lorraine barred the road to peace, he declared, and he added, "We are fighting «0 AZ, Oct. 3, 4, 1917. NFP, Oct. 14, 21, 1917.

530

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

for Alsace-Lorraine just as Germany has fought for Lemberg and Trieste. I know of no difference between Strassburg and Trieste. . . . If there are still people in the Entente who believe they can separate us from our ally, I can only say that they are poor politicians and childish in mind." Since for the time being, the menace to the frontiers of the Monarchy had been removed, some AustroHungarian troops would be transferred to the Western front, Czernin announced. Turning to the impending declaration of war upon Austria-Hungary by the United States, Czernin asserted that American action would not affect in the slightest the outcome of the conflict. And he pointed out that in the call for war upon the Monarchy, Wilson had remarked, We do not wish in any way to impair or re-arrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small.

That position, Czernin stressed, diverged radically from the aims of the Entente cabinets which, under the camouflage of self-determination, were bent upon destroying the Hapsburg realm. Changes in the constitutional framework of the Monarchy desired by the national communities could be effected, he commented, by orderly processes. Rejoicing over the dramatic sweep of events in Russia, he envisaged a prompt settlement in the east, which might prepare the way for a general peace.82 While most members of the Austrian Delegation applauded Czernin's handling of diplomacy, the Czech Frantisek Stanek pleaded for a committee made up of representatives of all Hapsburg national groupings to 52

Scott, op. tit., pp. 204-205.

Trials of Togetherness

531

carry on negotiations for peace. Kramar expounded the gospel of self-determination and alluded to Hungary in derogatory language for which he was rebuked by the presiding officer; fellow Czechs and South Slavs retorted captiously. While approving the Czernin exposition in general, Andrassy construed "no annexations" as permitting the retention of Mt. Lovcen, and the Foreign Secretary concurred; Tisza hinted at still wider border rectifications and at intimate association of a merged Serbia and Montenegro with the Monarchy. But Pester Lloyd spoke out against the latter arrangement, though it wanted a common frontier for Hungary and Bulgaria, and publicist-historian Heinrich Friedjung advocated that Serbia, deprived of territory promised to Bulgaria, should be given much the same relationship to the Dual Monarchy as Bavaria had in Germany. On Christmas Day of 1917 Czernin reaffirmed his attachment to peace without annexations.63 63

Scott, op.

cit.y

pp. 221-222.

15.

Itmt&mg ifbatf

UNTIL DEEP INTO THE SPRING OF 1 9 1 8 , THE WAR AIMS OF

the Entente cabinets and of the United States as they related to Austria-Hungary, were vacillating, inconsistent, and unclear. Yet in Great Britain, as in the forepart of the war, the democratic tradition of vigorous debate on the future of the Monarchy flourished. The same lines of cleavage, similar emphases and arguments, often the identical antagonists, held the field; one school pleaded for dissolution of the Monarchy more vehemently, if anything, than in the first years of the struggle, the other generally favored seeking a separate peace, leaving the Hapsburg realm much as it had been in 1914, though with assurances of autonomy to the larger national communities. Certain British advocates of dismemberment stressed anew that if the Austrogerman districts united with Germany, the international menace of the latter would be diminished, for states-rights particularism would be 532

The Unending Debate

533

accentuated in predominantly Catholic areas, while other thinkers envisaged a new Roman Catholic empire embracing sections of the Hapsburg Monarchy and of southern Germany.1 Partisans of "the New Europe" ceaselessly diffused the doctrine of Austria delenda; Wickham Steed in a characteristic pronouncement described a united south Slavdom as a chief cornerstone of any solid and lasting European peace and indispensable for "the destruction of the power of Prussian militarism." Unless a South Slav union were achieved, the Poles reunited, and the Czechoslovaks given independence, any settlement would be "halting and precarious"; somewhat enigmatically Steed alluded to Italy "as the elder sister of unredeemed Hapsburg peoples," with "a mission of liberation to accomplish." 2 Presenting the rationale of the anti-Hapsburg forces to the House of Commons, J. Annan Bryce, an intimate of Seton-Watson, charged the Danube Monarchy with primary guilt for the coming of the war and with heartless atrocities in waging compaigns. Not only would a separate peace condemn subject peoples in central Europe to slavery, but the very thought was sheer fantasy, since Germany, the military master, would never allow it. "It would be absolutely ruinous to our future in the East," Bryce declared, "if the Austrian Empire were allowed to continue to exist. . ." while, "if you break up the Austrian Empire, you will have Poland as a bulwark in the north . . . Czechoslovaks in the middle, in the south . . . Rumanians, Transylvanians [sic] and Jugo-slavs, and in the southwest, the Italians." Arrayed in the Austrophile ranks of Britain Bryce detected principally cosmopolitan financiers fearful for their investments, Roman Catholic clericals, men who 1 Anglo-Italian Review, I (1917), 8; A. H. E. Taylor, "The Indissolubility of Germany," Contemporary Review, CXII (1917), 423-427; Nineteenth Century and After, LXXXI (1917), 567. 2 H. W. Steed, "Austria and Europe," Edinburgh Review, CCXXV (1917), 1-22.

534

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

loved dynasties for their very own sake, and pacifists. Whether breakup of the Monarchy amounted to dismemberment or something else,depended upon the approach to the issue, as A. F. Whyte of the "New Europe" band pointed out. "Are you looking at it solely from the dynastic view of the Hapsburgs . . . from whose point of view it is dismemberment; or from the point of view of the Serbs, or of the Roumanians, or of the Italians from whose point of view it is the rescue of persons of their own race [sic] from alien rule . . .?" You cannot have a world of internationalism, except on a basis of satisfied nationalism . . Austria-Hungary, reasoned Halford J. Mackinder, "is merely a dynastic group of properties . . . It is idle to apply to any dismemberment of that monarchy the term 'imperialistic conquest.'" 3 Since the public mind of Britain was so heavily concentrated on Germany and the western front to the neglect of the rest of the Central Power bloc, partisans of dissolution of the Monarchy harped upon the theme that the Hapsburg state was only the merest marionette of her great northern ally. "We are often asked," wrote Steed, "whether it would not be wrong to dismember Austria, and whether Austria cannot become a counterpoise to Germany. The answer is that Austria is already a vassal and a possession of Germany . . . that her strategic railways have been built at German dictation, her commerce dominated, her ablest professors and scientists drawn away, her banks practically incorporated, and her very freedom impounded by Germany . . ." "The only question that arises for us is: Are we, in seeking the future peace of Europe, to follow dynasties— 3 H. of C.. Parliamentary Debates, May 14, 1917, XCIII (1917), 1368-1371; ibid., May 16, 1917, 1648-49, 1652. See also, Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality ( N e w York, 1919); in anticipation of the peace settlement to come this eminent authority on geopolitics contended, "It is a vital necessity that there should be a tier of independent states between Germany and Russia." pp. 185-186, 196, 199, 205.

The Unending Debate

535

degenerate, unscrupulous, incapable dynasties—or are we to support the peoples—the peoples who are struggling for liberty . . . and whose development will guarantee their security and ours. . . .?" "Either the Hapsburgs or free democratic Europe," proclaimed Thomas G. Masaryk from his London haven, "that is the question; any compromise between these two is bound to be an unstable condition." A Hapsburg monarchy could be none other than "the vanguard of Germany for pressure into Asia and Africa." * To kindle British sympathy and support for Czech national freedom, Benes composed a short Bohemias Case for Independence, for which Steed wrote a foreword castigating British Austrophiles, once proud of their liberalism, who now displayed "a sudden and touching solicitude for the preservation of the Hapsburg realms, in some federalized form." Approvingly, Steed quoted a bit of doggerel that had been current in 1866: But what is Austria? Is it fair To name among the nations Some Germans who have clutched the hair Of divers populations, And, having clutched, keep tugging there? Whether prophetically—or merely wishfully—Steed reiterated his conviction that the House of Hapsburg had chosen to commit suicide, and it fully deserved to be broken up so that the national communities might be freed and so that Germany would be deprived of a prime source of strength. Joining in the campaign for national fulfillment, Lewis B. Namier, son of a Galician landlord, who in time took rank with the leading British historians of his generation, brought out an influential pamphlet on The Case of Bohemia, in which he derided British Austro*New Europe,

V (1918), 396-397; ibid., Ill (1917), 77.

536

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

philes who advised the Czechs to seek contentment in a reconstructed Hapsburg Monarchy as victims of wishful thinking, unwarranted by the teaching of history. Patriotic, self-sacrificing endeavors by the Czechs were aiding Entente interests, Namier contended, and he recorded his faith in the eventual emergence of an independent Czechoslovakia.5 Out of the office of the Czech press bureau in London came a tract for the times warning against the "delusive simplicity" of federalism for the Monarchy, though sympathetic to a loose union of Slavic heirs of the Hapsburgs, once they had attained freedom. And the tireless pen of Masaryk never ceased to proclaim that an independent Czechoslovakia would be economically viable, would possess a corps of competent administrators, and would appease peasant hunger for land at the expense of large proprietors; common sense would dictate firm assurances of the rights of minorities in the Czech state, as Masaryk envisaged it, and the number of minorities might be reduced by the transfer of Bohemian districts heavily German in speech to a new Austria.6 Another Slav refugee who found asylum in Britain, the Slovene Professor Bogumil Vosnjak, vilified the Monarchy in A Dying Empire (London, 1918). For him it was keenly regrettable that British statecraft and the general public took little interest in the destruction of "a cancerous commonwealth threatened by ruin and internal collapse," a medieval relic as harsh as the despotism of Jengiz Khan, and "the valet of Germany in foreign politics." It seemed to Vosnjak fantastic to imagine that the realm 5 London, 1917. Namier thought so highly of a wartime essay on "The Downfall of the Habsburg Monarchy," that forty years later he recommended it as medicine for men who lamented the passing of the state. Vanished Supremacies (London, 1 9 5 8 ) , pp. 1 1 2 - 1 6 4 . See, Hanak, op. cit., pp. 132-134,^210-211. 6 Vladimir Nosek, "New Spirit in Austria," Contemporary Review CXII ( 1 9 1 7 ) , 4 2 9 - ^ 3 2 ; T. G. Masaryk, "The Future Status of Bohemia, New Europe, II ( 1 9 1 7 ) , 1 6 4 - 1 7 4 .

The Unending Debate

537

on the Danube could be peacefully converted into a democratically oriented commonwealth. If the Monarchy were spared, future generations of Britons, he predicted, would condemn the decision as criminal negligence. Readers of the Manchester Guardian were reminded by the Serb minister to London, Jovan M. Jovanovic, that Berlin intended to exploit Austria-Hungary to advance selfish German political and economic ambitions. Unless the realm was broken up, "the supremacy of Germany will remain, and the supremacy of Hungary within the Dual Monarchy to the disadvantage of other nationalities," he wrote. To preserve the Hapsburg state would inevitably invite a second ruinous war, and he poked fun at federalism as a "Utopian dream," which none of the nationalities in the Monarchy cared for.7 "Break Austria" served as the emotionally charged battle-cry of Canon William F. Barry, militant Roman Catholic theologian and prolific contributor to influential periodicals. Unless the Monarchy were smashed, he argued, "peace will be nothing more than a truce"; dissolution, moreover, would exorcise the Pan-German danger, safeguard British India, and set free a ring of captive peoples, who would "preserve and restore the balance of Europe, which the Central Empires have overthrown to the world's undoing." Retorting to criticisms of his argument, the Canon eloquently repudiated the notion of a separate peace, and pleaded for large transfers of Hapsburg territory to Italy, for the independence of Yugoslavia, for the restoration of Poland, and the creation of a northern Slav confederacy embracing Poland and Bohemia. "If we save the Hapsburgs," he cried, "from their well-deserved loss of dignity and dominion, we shall be preparing for ourselves an Iliad of woes."8 The President 7 8

Manchester Guardian, May 29, 1917. William Barry, "Break Austria," Nineteenth Century, LXXXII (1917), 441-453, 885-902; ibid., "The Chivalry of Austria," Nineteenth Century, LXXXIV (1918), 466-484.

538

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

of the Royal Geographical Society, Colonel Thomas H. Holdich, an expert of enviable reputation on frontier demarcation and the borderlands of India, contended for a united South Slavdom which would effectively thwart German ambitions in southeastern Europe; Dalmatia and Montenegro should enter the Yugoslav state, though he assumed that Fiume and Istria would pass under the flag of Italy.9 Austrophobes stressed that the inflexible opposition of the Magyar oligarchy would alone be sufficient to thwart federalization of the Monarchy and, in any case, they could discover no convincing evidence that the Emperor Charles and his senior counsellors sincerely desired to rebuild the House of Hapsburg on federal principles. At best, Barry proclaimed, a federal arrangement would be merely a "hollow pretence," organized hypocrisy, and Steed repeatedly returned to the charge that friends of the Monarchy were tools of international finance, or romantic pacifists, or well-wishers of Germany, or wrongheaded Roman Catholics.10 Many another British intellectual expatiated on the necessity of applying the democratic concept of self-determination to the realm on the Danube. A confirmed friend of the Yugoslavs, who early in the war had espoused federalism, came to believe such an arrangement would prove in fact an asset for Germany; so he wanted Hapsburg authority confined to territory peopled by Austrogermans and Magyars. Only thus could the war and the peace be won, and he recommended that the liberated nationalities should combine in a confederation for mutual well-being and security. For all their allegiance to the philosophy of dissolution, "New Europe" protagonists persistently hammered away at the » " A Jugoslav Federation," Fortnightly 195; see also, his Boundaries in Europe 1 9 1 8 ) , Chaps. I - I V , VI, VIII. 1 0 London Times, June 7, 1917.

Review, CVIII ( 1 9 1 7 ) , 1 8 5 and the Near East (London,

The Unending Debate

539

iniquitous Entente pledges of territory to Italy and to Rumania.11 H. G. Wells now felt that the Monarchy should be somewhat reduced, though not destroyed, for while he wanted Italy to acquire the Trentino and Trieste, he wished Poland, including Galicia, simply "freed from foreign oppression," Serbia and the Serb peoples liberated, Rumania evacuated and restored, and home rule conferred upon the Czechoslovaks.12 To show leniency to Vienna, if it cut loose from Berlin, seemed to another British writer as likely to turn out badly for minority peoples and, to point the moral, he recalled the colorful aphorism of Tom Paine about "pitying the plumage and forgetting the bird." "The blood-stained plumage of the Hapsburgs may be a pitiful and moving sight, but it cannot be compared with the long tortures suffered by the dying bird." Justice and expediency alike demanded that the various national communities in the Monarchy should be freed. "An absolutely independent Southern Slav kingdom, an independent Bohemia, or rather Czechoslovakia, a united Poland and a united Rumania are indispensable points for an enduring peace." 13 Speaking to the Petrograd Soviet, Arthur Henderson of the Labour Party and member of the inner British war cabinet declared vaguely for independence and freedom of nations, whether large or small, for the right of the Poles to settle their destiny themselves, and for constructive resolution of the perennial Balkan tangles. While independendy minded Ramsay MacDonald wanted a united Poland and deliverance of the South Slavs, he counselled his fellows, "We must not include in our war " A . H. E. Taylor, The Future of the Southern Slavs (London, 1917), pp. 174-176; Anon., "The Climax of the War," New Europe, IV (1917), 5-8. !2 Manchester Guardian, May 23, 1917. 13 Anon., "The Future of Austria-Hungary," Spectator, CXIX (1917), 482-483.

540

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

programmes all the liberations that we as democrats would like to see in Europe." 14 A sensational letter by Lord Lansdowne in the autumn of 1917, asserting that Europe was bleeding to death and asking the British ministry to disclose its minimum terms for peace, and Bolshevik revelations of secret Entente diplomatic engagements inspired a Labour party committee to formulate its position on the objectives of the war. It approved the general concept of self-determination, citing the Poles as an illustration, and expressed sympathy with the claims of Italy to parcels of the Danube Monarchy inhabited by Italian-speaking folk.15 2.

As has already been noted the Entente reply (January 10, 1917 ) to the Wilson peace démarche spoke equivocally on the dissolution of the Monarchy, though policymakers in Central Europe preferred the interpretation that the Entente intended to destroy Austria-Hungary. Yet Lord Robert Cecil, who in his indecisiveness of speech has been likened to Hamlet, suggested that liberation might be translated simply as home rule; he would one day write that he "first became conscious of the existence of Czechoslovakia," when he participated in preparing the reply to Wilson's peace overture, and the French government claimed "with our concurrence its independence as one of the objects for which we were fighting." 16 Opposition arose early in 1917 inside the British ministry to the general application of self-determination, as 14 H. of C., Parliamentary Debates, Nov. 6, 1917, XCVIII (1917), 2037. 15 Mary A. Hamilton, Arthur Henderson (London, 1938), pp. 171172. 16 Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, All the Way (London, 1949), p. 141. Cecil evidently overlooked his earlier associations with Masaryk.

The Unending Debate

541

recommended in a foreign office memorandum (PagetTyrrell) of 1916. It was decided that British opinion, not least in the overseas Dominions, was averse to the prolongation of the war in order to set free European nationalities that wished to be independent. To Lord Milner, minister without portfolio, clear-headed but apt to be passionate in his points of view, was entrusted the task of drafting a statement of territorial changes that would be acceptable alike in the United Kingdom and in the Dominions. Milner had just returned from a trip to Russia, keenly distressed because of the scanty military contribution the tsarist ally could render to the common cause, and he presently let it be known that he felt Entente arms could not possibly achieve the objectives so dear to the hearts of the Austria delenda school. Instead, he proposed trying to detach the Monarchy from Germany by offering attractive terms of peace "in due course." Milner gravely doubted whether the creation of a Czechoslovakia, or a Yugoslavia, or an expanded Rumania was either feasible or desirable, but even assuming that they were, he recommended that these thorny questions should be postponed until after the fighting was over. "We did not go to war for the Czechoslovaks, the Yugoslavs, the Rumanians or the Poles," he observed. "We ought not insist we will go on fighting till their aspirations are satisfied, that is, till Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria are disintegrated." So far as the Danube Monarchy was concerned, Milner was ready to call it quits in return for the evacuation of Serbia, Rumania, the occupied portions of Russia, and for the transfer of the Trentino to Italy. Had this "man of power," as he styled himself, learned a lesson from his experience with the Boers? In 1901 by attempting to impose harsh terms of settlement, Milner had prolonged the South African struggle for months. He probably had—or thought he had—Lloyd George's approval of his conditions for peace in Europe and apparently he wished his

542

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

thinking on a settlement circulated in the British press as a lever upon the cabinet. But when Sir Sidney Low offered a series of articles, reflecting Milner's thought, to the Daily Telegraph, he was turned down; thwarted in London, Low published an article on peace terms in the Atlantic Monthly. It was rather generally assumed, he wrote, because of the reply of January to Wilson, that the Entente was committed to the complete disruption of Austria-Hungary and would not lay down arms until that objective was attained. Yet the Entente note might also be construed, Low wrote, as contemplating freedom for the national communities by ways less revolutionary than "strewing central Europe with new or newly compounded kingdoms and republics." He questioned the wisdom of fighting until the realm of the Danube, wholly exhausted, "agreed to evisceration." If a Czechoslovak state were formed it would contain large German and Magyar minorities, he reminded readers, and by reason of geographical position Czechoslovakia could easily be economically strangled or conquered militarily by stronger and covetous neighbors. An enlarged Rumania, too, would have heavy minority problems to grapple with, while a Greater Serbia would be at daggers drawn with Italy. So Low believed it was improbable that the Entente cabinets would be anxious "to destroy political aggregates which have at least cohesion and firmness of texture, in order to set afloat a group of loosely built, experimental, small states swimming in the European whirlpool in dangerous proximity to the great, sharp-toothed empires . . His line of logic was pure Milner.17 During a mission to Washington toward the end of April, 1917, Foreign Minister Balfour set forth to Ameri17 Sidney Low, "Peace and Settlement," Atlantic Monthly, CXX (1917), 39-50, esp. 47—49; see also D. Chapman Huston, A Memoir of Sir Sidney Low (London, 1936), pp. 268-269.

The Unending Debate

543

can statesmen his thinking on the objectives of the fighting. He said that the London cabinet did not wish the Hapsburg Monarchy to be dissolved into national components, although Britain would faithfully adhere to secret territorial pledges given to Italy and to Rumania; Serbia might acquire Bosnia-Herzegovina and obtain unfettered access to the Adriatic. That much had been promised by the Entente on August 18, 1915, provided that Serbia appeased Bulgarian claims in the Macedonian region, but since an accommodation of that sort had failed of realization, it could be argued—and was indeed argued—that the Entente governments had no firm commitment to the Serbian ministry. Balfour rather wished that Bohemia would be converted into a third partner of the Hapsburg realm, and he seemed predisposed to favor an autonomous Poland under the Russians, which would encompass all of the province of Galicia. Speaking to the British Imperial War Council, the foreign secretary sounded a decidedly uncertain trumpet on home rule for Bohemia.18 Prime Minister Lloyd George, it has previously been indicated, assented to a confidential American peace feeler to Vienna, responded enthusiastically to the Sixtus errand, and publicly declared, "We have no quarrel with Austria." In a June, 1917, address at Glasgow on war aims, he referred casually to the interests of Serbia and stopped there, so far as the Danube Monarchy was concerned. This statement followed a searing blast at "fire-eating Austrophobes" in the Commons by Noel Buxton. Their arguments, he contended, were half sentimental, the emancipation of small nationalities, and half practical, the erection of a solid rampart in the shape of Yugoslavia to German pressure southeastwards. It was "pretty doctrinaire," Buxton insisted, to work for a Yugoslav state, since 18 U.S., Department of State, The Lansing Papers ( 2 vols., Washington, 1939-40), II, 23-28.

544

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

so many South Slavs utterly despised their Serb cousins; genuine home rule would satisfy the wishes of the Hapsburg national communities, he believed. Territorial adjustments in the Trentino and perhaps elsewhere would not be impracticable, but complete disruption of the realm on the Danube would turn out to be economically disastrous, create several "new Ulsters," and would require a great extension of the fighting. The Washington cabinet, Buxton pointed out, had given no indication that it regarded die Dual Empire as ramshackle or fated to crack up. Much the same line of thought was exposed by Lord Henry Cavendish-Bentinck; to the hypothesis that unless Austria-Hungary were broken up Britain would lose the war, he retorted that the stoutest barrier to the expansion of German power would be "a federated and democratised Austria . . On the other side, J. Annan Bryce called the attention of the Commons to the fact that Buxton had once emphatically advocated the dissolution of the Monarchy. All the Slavs, Bryce avowed, wished to be freed from Hapsburg tyranny—as was demonstrated in the case of the Yugoslavs by the recently signed Corfu pact, by the avidity with which Serbs and Croats in the United States had enrolled to fight the Monarchy, and by the large and continuing desertions of Serbs and Croats from the Hapsburg armed services; it appeared to Bryce that the American President might be in favor of destroying the Monarchy. Carrying the duel forward, Buxton poked fun at the Corfu pact whose contents, providing a "state to be called by three names," amply illustrated the division of mind and the irreconcilability of views prevailing in South Slav circles. Speeches in the Vienna parliament by Slav deputies he construed to mean support for the principle of a Danubian realm reorganized along lines of nationality. A sprightly champion of the "New Europe" in parliament, A. Frederick Whyte, reiterated standard themes of

The Unending Debate

545

his set. "We believe that the doctrine of freedom and nationality espoused by the British government," he stated, "means in practice the dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy." Not entirely sure of what the ministry was thinking, he asked the cabinet "to take the country more into its confidence" on the subject of peace terms and to undertake a campaign to educate the electorate on them. Winding up the spirited exchanges in parliament, Foreign Minister Balfour, on July 30, 1917, doubted whether it was judicious to discuss conditions of peace openly until the enemy had been vanquished; so much depended upon the fortunes of war and upon the situation that existed when a conference to make peace convened, he said. Concerning the Hapsburg Monarchy, Balfour explained, "What we desire . . . is that the nationalities composing that heterogeneous state should be allowed to develop on their own lines, to carry out their own civilisations . . . That is the broad principle . . ." But in the current stage of the war, he declared, it would be folly for a foreign minister to attempt "to deal with such a great and ancient monarchy as Austria" or to grapple with such specific questions as joining Croatia to Serbia or forming a Czechoslovak state. Several M.P.'s endorsed the fluid stand of the Foreign Secretary, one member hailing his utterance which, to be sure, touched on issues other than AustriaHungary, as the most significant speech by a cabinet member since the fighting started. 18 It appeared to Seton-Watson that the ministry was wise in not going "too far in definition at this time," though statesmen of the three western Entente powers at least ought to draft a "clear definition of concrete war aims for themselves," particularly as they affected Austria-Hungary. He regretted that it was very imperfectly understood in Britain that the fate of the Danube Monarchy 19 H. of C., Parliamentary Debates, July 24, 26, 30, 1917, XCVI (1917), 1175-1179, 1546-1547, 1819-1855.

546

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

was "the key to victory or defeat"; especially, Seton-Watson wished a frank exchange of views with Italy and clarification of common war aims, Britain acting as mediator between competing Italian and Yugoslav aspirations.20 The tenor of the debate in the House of Commons provoked alarm in Czech patriotic quarters and set off a lively discussion in the serious press of the Monarchy. A communiqué, which doubtless originated in the Ballplatz. appeared in Pester Lloyd pointing out that Cecil's indecisiveness on liberation of nationalities contrasted with the break-up doctrine previously ascribed in central Europe to the London ministry. If the British ministry imagined that a general peace of understanding could be achieved by way of Vienna, well and good, though any notion of separating the Central Allies was an optical illusion. The communiqué welcomed the non-commital British position on the South Slavs; on this subject and related ones, "Austria and Hungary have no need of foreign help and will not tolerate it," said this semi-official commentary. Essentially the same viewpoint was set forth in the authoritative Fremdenblatt; "the South Slav question concerns us solely and we will never admit that it has an international character . . . We are absolutely determined to remain masters in our own house." Budapesti Hirlap carried an article by ex-Premier Tisza taking violent issue with Balfour, described as a wolf in sheep's clothing, seeking to rend Austria-Hungary into fragments. After attributing the coming of war exclusively to the Entente powers, the Count remarked that the Central Empires had "again and again proposed an honorable peace and were met each time with scorn"; upon the island kingdom he laid chief responsibility for the continuance of the ghastly struggle.21 20 21

Memorandum, July 31, 1917. Seton-Watson Papers. Quoted in New Europe, IV ( 1 9 1 7 ) , 1 5 4 - 1 5 6 .

The Unending Debate

547

At a banquet on August 4, 1917, in honor of Premier Pasic, Lloyd George uttered stereotyped platitudes on the Serbs as the guardians of the gateway to the east and on Serbian independence as directly involved in the "security of civilization," but he was silent concerning South Slav political unity. Milner, meantime, had revised his springtime thinking and in a memorandum of October, 1917, on the general military situation he recommended, in view notably of the deadlock in the French theater of war, that the Entente should seek to force Austria or Turkey, preferably the latter, out of the struggle.22 3. In Britain, an impressive company broke lances for the preservation of the Hapsburg Monarchy nearly intact, as indispensable for a durable settlement in Europe. Clearly aligned in the Austrophile camp were the Manchester Guardian, the Daily News, and the Nation; and here were arrayed widely diverse political and religious elements and individuals who looked upon the Monarchy with the fond affection that William Wordsworth once cherished for Venice, "the safeguard of the West," and "men are we and we must grieve whenever the Shade of that which once was great has passed away." In the age of the French revolutionary wars, the Hapsburg realm had been a valiant British ally, so in the future, it was often urged, she could be, would be, an asset for Britain; to split the Monarchy into national states would invite the weaknesses and quarrels that had so balefully cursed the Balkan peninsula. The maintenance of Austria-Hungary, that is to say, was a necessity for a tranquil, orderly Europe. Aggrieved because the number of Britons who had spoken out for the disruption of the Monarchy was "infinitely small," La Serbie, a Yugoslav organ in Geneva, lamented 22 Evelyn Wrench, Alfred Lord Milner (London, 1958), p. 337.

548

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

that conservative British psychology was fundamentally hostile to the destruction of an ancient empire with an ancient dynasty. C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian remarked, "It is a large order to break up the Austrian Empire and to reconstruct its fragments . . . Would a Southern Slav State, I wonder, hold together? These small Slavonic nationalities seem to have a wonderful capacity for fighting each other." "We have always doubted," declared the Liberal Westminster Gazette (April 21, 1917), "the wisdom of making it appear that an Allied victory meant the destruction of Austria-Hungary, and we doubt it even more now." The Nation, edited by the superb stylist, Henry W. Massingham, vigorously flayed the philosophy of dissolution and somehow detected the long arm of Russian imperialism in the campaign for a Czechoslovak state. Conspicuous among the politically active British Austrophiles was Noel Buxton, veteran student of the problems of eastern Europe, and formerly a believer in the creed that the Monarchy "must come to an end if the causes of war in the future are to be effectively removed." But in January, 1917, he was writing, "To break AustriaHungary while the nations embodied in the Russian Empire remain unliberated would destroy the balance," and he repudiated the doctrine that Britain was called upon to sacrifice precious lives for the independence of the Czechs or of any other minority stock. "Who can prove that the disappearance of Austria would conduce to our safety?" Buxton inquired rhetorically. "There is no certainty at all that the gain held out to us is anything but problematical in the highest degree . . ." His attitude and "teacup agitation" profoundly disturbed the apostles of "New Europe." 23 2 3 Noel and Charles R. Buxton, The War and the Balkans (London, 1915), p. 110; New Statesman, Jan. 20, 1917; R. W. Seton-Watson to Ronald A. Burrows Feb. 22, 1917. Seton-Watson Papers; T. P. ConwellEvans, Foreign Policy From a Back Bench (London, 1932), pp. 140143; Mosa Anderson, Noel Buxton (London, 1952).

The Unending Debate

549

Before long, Buxton was dividing Britons concerned with the future of the Danube Monarchy into destructive "jingoes" and "moderates," who wanted the realm perpetuated. Unflaggingly, he supported the concepts of a separate peace with Vienna and the federal reconstruction of the Monarchy; he scouted the theory that the national communities of Austria-Hungary really desired independence, and he had boundless faith in the "keen and energetic" young Emperor Charles as the champion of constitutional reform. Far from promoting lasting peace, the dissolution of the Monarchy, Buxton argued, would produce further strife, but a rational, conciliatory posture on the part of Entente cabinets would encourage the forces of federalism in the Monarchy.24 At every turn, Charles R. Buxton agreed with the opinions of his older brother Noel. The Buxtons possessed a resourceful colleague in Henry N. Brailsford, also a recognized specialist on the tangled perplexities of eastern Europe. In the second half of the war he detected, or thought he detected, new currents at work in the Danubian Monarchy, with Austria trending toward federal institutions (which would placate the Slavspeaking peoples) and Hungary moving in the direction of democracy. He wrote, "Austria is no longer under a senile Emperor and a corrupt clique, the willing tool of Prussian ambitions. The Russian [March] Revolution, which destroyed her haunting fear of Panslavism has opened to her also a new career . . Although Brailsford desired the cession of the Trentino to Italy and of western Galicia to an independent Poland, he stoutly declaimed against the dissolution of the balance of the realm into national components. To achieve that objective would 2 4 Anderson, op. cit., pp. 80-83, 92-93, 125; Noel Buxton, "AustriaHungary and the Balkans," Atlantic Monthly, CXXI (1918), 370-374; ibid., "The Entente and the Allies of Germany," Contemporary Review, CXIII (1918), 22-28; a request by Seton-Watson to rebut Buxton was promptly granted, "Austria-Hungary and the Federal Solution," ibid., 257-264; Hanak, op. cit., 144-1«).

550

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

involve fighting until the Entente could impose the terms of a conqueror, he maintained; and if new states along national lines were created they would contain troublebreeding "Ulsters" and would be too weak for economic stability or to protect themselves. So the independence >romised these small states would prove illusory in fact, or they "would be forced to oscillate between the German and the Russian systems," Brailsford reasoned prophetically. "Dismemberment as a verbal formula has a delusive simplicity," he asserted, "which disappears when put to any concrete test." Vastly preferable would be "the tedious, slow and undramatic business" of reconstructing the Monarchy on federal principles with solid guarantees to the minorities in each autonomous unit. Whatever its faults and shortcomings, the Danubian realm, on balance, benefited Europe, he thought, and it possessed the supreme merit of being viable economically. The longer Brailsford pondered upon the future of Austria-Hungary the more sure he was of its virtue, since it provided "an economic system which enabled its mingled races [sic] to trade freely over its rivers, railways and roads and preserved for Germans, Magyars, and Slavs alike the common use of Trieste and Fiume. "The abler advocates of the policy of dismemberment," he went on, "realize the difficulty which confronts them," and, after tearing the Monarchy to shreds they wished to create a Utopian confederation of states in middle Europe.25 In his thoughtful book The Principle of Nationalities (1917), the British publicist Israel Zangwill argued that the rearrangement of Europe after the war ought not be effected in keeping with any abstract doctrines of nationality, but instead with as little mangling as possible

i

2 5 Henry N. Brailsford, "The New Spirit in Austria," Contemporary Review, CXIII (1917), 130-138; ibid., A League of Nations (New York, 1917), pp. 107-123, 327. See Hanak, op. cit., pp. 139-144.

The Unending Debate

551

and the maximum of healing. Even a Central Powers political combination, he ventured to suggest, might prove a step in the right direction if it were not for the military implications. After skillfully sketching the historical evolution of the several nationalities embraced in the Hapsburg Monarchy, Dr. G. P. Gooch sagely confessed that "every solution of this complex problem bristles with difficulties." Minor changes, he thought, "such as the cession of the Trentino to Italy and the opening of a Serbian window on the Adriatic, may be reasonably anticipated; but it is practically certain that the Emperor Karl will emerge from the war . . . as the ruler of a powerful polyglot state . . . The struggle with the Magyar oligarchy, if it is ever seriously undertaken, will be fierce and long." And, Gooch concluded, "If . . . the attempt to rule through two privileged and arrogant minorities is continued the centrifugal tendencies will pass beyond control and 'the ramshackle Empire' will drift irrevocably towards dismemberment and dissolution." 26 The Gooch brochure appeared under the imprint of the Union of Democratic Control, a set of British "neutralists" concerned with the achievement of a constructive and durable peace. Draft proposals for a settlement issued by the executive body of the Union in July, 1917, included denial of any part of Dalmatia to Italy; the invocation of plebiscites to decide the future status of other areas claimed by Rome; the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania; independence for Russian Poland, with which the Poles under the Hapsburg and Hohenzollern flags might unite if they so desired. The manifesto summoned the Entente cabinets to repudiate explicitly the theory that they were resolved to break up the Hapsburg Monarchy. "It must be made clear," it was flady asserted, "that freedom for the component populations of that 26 George P. Gooch, The Races of Austria-Hungary pp. 21-22; see ibid., Under Six Reigns, p. 174.

(London, 1917),

552

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Empire can be obtained by self-government within that Empire . . ," 27 Interesting judgments on the destiny of the Monarchy were advanced by a gifted British authority on the social and economic development of imperial Germany, William H. Dawson. Holding that Austria-Hungary filled "an essential place in the European state system," he urged the high importance of distinguishing between changes that might be "desirable and those that are practicable"; in the latter category it would be wise, he thought, to segregate alterations of a prudential character from those likely to provoke untoward international complications. The blueprints devised by "the more radical reorganizes of Eastern Europe" would almost surely bring disaster, he believed. Getting down to particulars, Dawson thought there was 'little likelihood" that if a plebiscite were conducted in Galicia, the Poles would express a desire to change their political status. The proposed Czechoslovakia would inescapably be a multinationality state suggesting "prospects of friction surpassing any yet experienced in these territories," and it would negate the very principle of nationality; far sounder would be the establishment of a third member in the Hapsburg realm confined almost exclusively to Czechs and Slovaks. On the other hand, Ukrainian-peopled districts should be permitted to unite with their kinsmen in Russia, if they wished to do so; the eastern district of the Bukowina and Rumanian-speaking portions of Hungary should be assigned to Rumania, and Italy should obtain the Trentino and be assured of commercial freedom in the port of Trieste. Dawson contended strongly for a South Slav state which would include Dal27 Helena M. Stanwick, Builders of Peace (London, 1924), pp. 81-82; Norman Angell, After AU (London, 1951), pp. 192-193; Hanak, op. cit., 151-160.

The Unending Debate

553

matia, Bosnia, Croatia, the Slovene region, and possibly Albania as well. These important changes he deemed necessary for stability in the east of Europe; he spoke out strongly against schemes to merge Austrogerman sections of the existing Monarchy with the states of southern Germany, and he wanted the renovated Hapsburg House freed from the influence or control of Germany.28 4.

As in the first half of the war, trends of thinking on Austria-Hungary in Entente countries on the Continent more or less faithfully duplicated viewpoints in the United Kingdom. Austrophilism in France brought together radicals and conservatives and appealed strongly to Roman Catholic circles, where the historian Jacques Bainville cogently contended for the preservation of the Monarchy as necessary for European tranquillity. Seeing eye-to-eye with him were Frenchmen who looked upon the Hapsburg realm as a potential diplomatic friend of tomorrow and once more a rival of Germany. French banking interests with a view to saving the Monarchy from dissolution, carried on clandestine conversations with financiers in Vienna. So far as the serious press of Paris was concerned, it was much more firmly anti-Hapsburg than its British counterpart. The influential Temps, the highly respected Journal des Débats, and the more popular Le Matin consistently called for the emancipation of the national communities; a Count de Fels in articles in L'Oeuvre pleaded for intensified propaganda to foment revolutions in the Monarchy. Learned French scholars never slackened in their labors on behalf of the Hapsburg Slavs, and many a French ad2 8 William H. Dawson, Problems pp. 147, 150, 154-156, 161-179.

of the Peace

(New York, 1917),

554

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

vocate of dissolution was in intimate touch with the British " N e w Europe" set.29 By reason of his influence upon opinion-makers in western countries, André Chéradame, who indulged in long and loud fulminations against Austria-Hungary, deserves special attention. T o his way of thinking, the Danubian Monarchy, far from being a state, was purely a regime of ultra-reactionary oppression, maintained to establish German-Magyar hegemony over Europe; and he derived sardonic pleasure from the claim that for a full generation he had uniquely predicted the war "in exactly the shape which it has assumed." A man who seemed to be in a perpetual state of excitement, Chéradame ceaselessly proclaimed in Europe and in the United States the necessity of liquidating the Monarchy in order to thwart malevolent German ambitions. T o block Pan-Germany, "the martyred peoples" of Central Europe, Magyars included, would have to be set free, he wrote, and after that a federation of some sort would need to be created in the area; economic integration would negate the contention that the break up of the Monarchy would have intolerable, disastrous material consequences. And Chéradame pleaded for a "scientifically organized uprising" of the Hapsburg nationalities to bring hostilities to a swift conclusion. Never did he cease to ridicule as a sophomoric illusion the notion of an independent peace with Vienna; dramatic maps in his publications reinforced the text of his argumentation. The steaming philosophy of Chéradame colored thinking from Petrograd to Washington.30 2 9 Publicists active in the Austria delenda agitation included Charles Loiseau, Pierre Bertrand, Etienne Foumol, and André Tardieu. 30 André Chéradame, The Pan-German Plot Unmasked (Eng. ed., London, 1916), with a foreword by the esteemed Lord Cromer; ibid., Pan-Germany: The Disease and Cure (Boston, 1918); ibid. The United States and Pangermania ( N e w York, 1918). These books are largely a rehash of articles published in The Atlantic Monthly (1917-18), and in other periodicals.

The Unending Debate

555

5. On January 12, 1917, Premier Briand privately defined French war aims involving Austria-Hungary as 'legitimate annexations" by Serbia and by Rumania, and autonomy for all the Poles, but he said nothing on the Entente commitments to Italy. Shortly, however, he officially indicated that Russia would have full freedom in fixing her frontiers with the Central Empires—in other words, he reaffirmed that the men on the Neva would unilaterally decide the fate of the Poles, among other things. French statesmen, as has been shown, blew hot and then cold on the Sixtus quest for peace. After the downfall of tsarism, the Paris cabinet continued to go along with the new Russian regime on the Polish problem; in June, 1917, Poincaré published a decree for the organization of a Polish army—to allow "the Poles to fight under their national banner"—yet on conditions calculated to satisfy the Kerensky government, which authorized raising Polish forces in Russia itself. The Bolshevik coup, however, frustrated the prospect of Polish armed collaboration against the Central Empires in the east, and Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon now wholly identified Polish freedom with the French national interest and spoke up for an independent and united Polish state. Already the Quai d'Orsay had recognized (September 20, 1917) the Polish National Committee in Paris, chaired by Roman Dmowski, as an "official Polish organization," and before the year was out Great Britain, Italy, and the United States imitated the French example. Not until October, 1918, however, did the National Committee secure unfettered authority over the Polish army in France. Whereas for the cabinets of London and Paris, the destiny of the Danubian Monarchy possessed distinctly

556

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

secondary importance and Germany was the central focus of concern, precisely the reverse held true in Rome. The Consulta stood immovably on the prescriptions enshrined in the London Treaty and any hint of deviation caused Foreign Minister Sonnino to flare up in furious anger, as, for example, in connection with the Sixtus transaction. On December 18, 1916, he let it be known in vague language that the only path to peace led "through the dismemberment of the present Hapsburg realms." Yet ten months later, he was telling the chamber of deputies that Italy did not desire the dissolution of the Monarchy; for herself, the kingdom coveted only territory that was necessary to complete national unity and to ensure the safety of the nation in the future—which meant, in fact, the London Treaty districts. But unofficial and chauvinistic voices included the Hungarian port of Fiume (Rijeka) in Italian national expectations; as one of them put the Fiume claim, "the whole aspect of the town, its air, its sky, its monuments, and its very stones" proclaimed that it belonged by right to Italy. Conceding that the population of Fiume was heavily Croat and Magyar, it was suggested that these folk might move away if the community were awarded to Italy. Unless the Double Monarchy were demolished, the writer argued, the Central Empires would emerge from the war as the virtual victor; he decried talk of a separate peace and reproached Britain and France for doing very litde in the hard fight against the Monarchy. In the brighter tomorrow that lay ahead for Europe there could be "no place for that organized machine of deceit, oppression and murder, the Danubian Monarchy—Delenda est Austria!"31 Relaxation of the Italian censorship in mid-summer of 3 1 Duke of Litta-Visconti-Arese, "Unredeemed Italy," North American Review, CCVI (1917), 561-574; ibid., "Delenda est Austria," ibid., CCVIII (1918), 72-81.

The Unending Debate

557

1917 enabled a section of the press to raise its voice against annexation of any part of Dalmatia and to seek to assure the South Slavs on that vital point. This issue aside, the Corriere della Sera, the most internationally respected newspaper in Italy, kept stridently clamoring for the destruction of the Monarchy and argued that if Austria-Hungary remained "strong, the Entente will have lost the war whatever else happens," for Germany would then enjoy "uncontested dominance from Hamburg to Constantinople!" Rather similar was the position taken by Profesor Gaetano Salvemini, historian at Pisa, a democrat, a convinced partisan of self-determination, and editor of a weekly review, Unita. Regarding the Monarchy as "a penitentiary of peoples," he had no faith in a federal reformation there, which, even if adopted, might later be canceled. Consequently, Salvemini entered the lists for the detachment of all areas not peopled by Austrogermans or Magyars, Italy dividing the eastern shore of the Adriatic with the South Slavs. In resolutions of August, 1917, the "patriotic" wing of Italian Socialism called for the acquisition of unredeemed Italy, independence for the Poles, and a reordering of the Balkans in conformity with nationality. As the revolutionary torrent rushed forward in Russia, thinking in that country on the treatment of the Monarchy diminished in international significance. It has previously been mentioned that the provisional government declared (March 29, 1917) for a unified Poland, attached to Russia in a voluntary military union, and also assented to the building of a Polish army on the soil of Russia. More than that Pavel Miliukov, foreign minister, openly supported the liberation of the Hapsburg national communities, including a Yugoslavia "solidly organized." A good friend of Masaryk, he wanted an independent Czechoslovakia, the transfer of Italians and Rumanians in the Monarchy to their respective national

558

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

states, and the merger of Ukrainian-inhabited districts with the Russian Ukraine. His program, if carried out, would have confined the dominions of the Hapsburgs to German Austria and Magyar Hungary. But, after May, 1917, when Miliukov was swept from the public stage, the Kerensky ministry displayed little interest in the Hapsburg nationalities, as was likewise true of the Bolsheviks when they took command in November.32 On the other hand, the Russian Provisional Government sanctioned the expansion of the Czech and Slovak military forces in Russia (the Druzhina); in the futile "Kerensky offensive" of the summer of 1917, this Slav legion covered itself with glory. To unify Czechs and Slovaks resident in Russia and to plan for the transfer of the soldiers to France, Masaryk arrived in Moscow in May, 1917, and he strove hard to arrange for the troops to leave for the west. When he left Russia in March, 1918, he was persuaded that the Bolshevik authorities would allow the Czechoslovaks to get away to western Europe.33 32 33

Mamatey, op. cit., pp. 9 5 - 9 9 . Zeman, op. cit., pp. 1 3 0 - 1 3 3 .

IB. ^Ptting % i^tag? W H A T , N E X T , O F ATTITUDES IN T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S , O F F I C I A L

and otherwise, concerning the Hapsburg realm? It is in order here to recapitulate the wartime relations of the trans-Atlantic Republic and the Monarchy on the Danube and to set out in particular the views of President Woodrow Wilson, who, far from desiring the disappearance of the multinationality state, toiled for its preservation into the spring of 1918.1 Contrary to a widely cherished myth, Wilson was not unfamiliar with the Dual Monarchy, whose complexities and frailties he had sketched in The State (doubtless the most learned of his books), first published in 1889. Until he entered the White House in 1913, little was known, however, or is known, of his thought on unfolding international developments in Europe. Certainly he assumed the presidency bent upon effecting reforms inside the United States, and his under1 Arthur J. May, "Woodrow Wilson and Austria-Hungary to the End of 1917," in Hugo Hantsch and Alexander Novotny (eds.), Festschrift fiir Heinrich Benedikt, (Vienna, 1957), pp. 213-242; Mamatey, op. cit., passim.

559

560

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

standing of the high politics of the Old World hardly exceeded that of any other broadly educated American; rather vaguely, though, Wilson felt that the United States should assert itself as a force for stability and for morality in the international sphere. His principal counsellors on foreign affairs were inexperienced in the techniques and manners of diplomacy and almost exclusively Anglophiles in their basic outlook. Regarding war as the acme of unreason and barbarity, Wilson was prone to ascribe the coming of the European struggle to the depravity of evil men; and, as early as December, 1914, he believed that the House of Hapsburg would collapse, or, in his own phrase, "ought to go to pieces for the welfare of Europe." Yet in the management of American foreign policy, Austria-Hungary represented a relatively inconsequential side-show compared with the German Empire. Administration and country were profoundly disturbed by espionage and related doings of the Central Powers' agents, which reached something of a peak when the ambassador of Francis Joseph, Constantin T. Dumba, was sent home in September, 1915, because of his involvement in plots to dislocate the production of munitions in America for Entente belligerents; the successor of Dumba in Washington was never formally accredited by the State Department. Before the glow of the Dumba dismissal had faded away, a white-hot submarine crisis had arisen. On November 7, 1915, a U-boat flying the Austrian colors sank an unarmed Italian liner, the Ancona, bound for New York, sending scores, Americans among them, to Mediterranean graves. After stern representations from Washington, the Vienna cabinet acknowledged responsibility for the terrible tragedy, promised financial atonement, though controverted issues over the employment of the submarine weapon were reserved for future discussion. The President and the press were gratified over the pacific settlement of the dispute.

Setting the Stage

561

Seeking solid foundations for international stability and enduring peace, Wilson declared, on May 27, 1916, as fundamental for these lofty purposes, that "every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they should live." This doctrine of self-determination was, of course, full of potential dynamite for the multinationality Danubian Monarchy. Shortly after the December, 1916, overture to the warring countries to discuss conditions of peace had come to grief, Wilson made a rather curious statement concerning the Poles, of whom once he had written in derogatory language, appealing to his countrymen and the heads of the belligerent governments to send help to this war stricken people.2 In his celebrated "peace without victory" speech of January 22, 1917, Wilson averred that "Statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland"—how he squared autonomy with independence was not disclosed. Although Austria-Hungary fully identified itself with Germany on the resumption of unrestricted U-boat warfare, Wilson, while reproaching Vienna for its stand and refusing to receive the Hapsburg ambassador-designate, tried, through London channels, to prepare the way for a separate peace with the Monarchy, but the men in the Ballplatz, however eager they were for hostilities to cease, would not consider parleys from which the other Central Empires were excluded. When on April 2, 1917, Wilson appealed to Congress to make war upon Germany, he bracketed the Danube Monarchy with her ally on the U-boat issue, but since the latter had not unloosed torpedoes against vessels flying the Stars and Stripes, he preferred to postpone consideration of future relations with Vienna. Deep down the President still cherished the belief that it would be possible to inveigle the Ballplatz into an independent settlement of the war. When officials in 2 Louis L. Gerson, Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland (New Haven, 1953), pp. 55-70.

562

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Washington learned from British statesmen of the pledges of Hapsburg territory secretly given to Italy, Rumania, and Serbia, and of the London opinion that Galicia should be assigned to a resurrected Poland, the Americans chose to disregard them. It was Wilson's fundamental, though unwarranted, judgment that financial and other necessities would oblige the Entente to acquiesce in the wishes of the White House in making the eventual peace. On instructions from Secretary of State Robert E. Lansing, meantime, subordinates had drafted a memorandum for the reordering of Austria-Hungary more or less in harmony with self-determination. A South Slav state should be formed of Serbs and Croats (though not Slovenes ); Trieste and Istria (and presumably the Trentino) should go to Italy; Poland should be resurrected, but without areas peopled by Ukrainians and Lithuanians; Bohemia should be set up as a free state (not however to include the Slovaks); lively doubts were cast upon the proposed inclusion in Rumania of all areas where her colinguists resided. This document has interest, not because it demonstrably influenced makers of American policy, but rather as reflecting what East European specialists in the State Department regarded as desirable and constructive.3 It is just possible that the State Department memorandum inspired Lansing to broach to the President a stillborn plan to further the cause of freedom for the Poles. In essence the Lansing proposal contemplated the establishment of a Polish provisional government in the United States, which would have its own military forces, financed by American money; the Entente nations would be requested to extend formal diplomatic recognition to this Poland in America. It appears that Wilson liked the blueprint, yet it was pigeonholed in favor of recognition of the Polish National Committee, a step hesitantly taken in 3

Mamatey, op. cit., pp. 91-93.

Setting the Stage

563

Washington (November 10, 1917), cautiously taken due alike to the unsympathetic posture of the Kerensky ministry and to the make-up of the National Committee, which by no means represented all the important shadings of Polish thought. Months before, Wilson, in a notable Flag Day speech expounded the thesis that the Dual Monarchy had been enslaved by Germany—a familiar interpretation—and that if Vienna were wise it would cast off the yoke of bondage; but the Ballplatz merely smiled at the President. Wilson was confronted with something of a dilemma by the papal peace initiative of August, 1917, which basically sang his own refrain of peace without victory; for Lansing, however, the Vatican effort was purely a delusive snare concocted out of compassion for the Hapsburg House. After hesitating whether to reply at all, the stern Covenanter in the White House tactfully brushed aside the papal bid as pointless, yet he also spoke out against the dismemberment of empires, holding that a policy of that nature would prove to be "worse than futile, no proper basis for an enduring peace." Could that Wilsonian phrase have been a gesture pointed at Vienna? 2. Nation of nations that it was, the United States contained immigrants from the principal national groupings of Austria-Hungary, newcomers largely, though some of them had already moved up the political and economic ladder. Naturally, the politically articulate among them responded to the wartime convulsions in the land of their birth and of their kin. Emissaries from Europe cooperated in raising funds to relieve the war-distressed, in recruitment for projected armies, and in soliciting the help of the American government and press for the interests of their national communities. The vigor of the political

564

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

and humanitarian activities reflected, in general, the vitality of immigrant societies, educational, religious, and fraternal, and the quality of the leadership, both in America and in Europe. Busy too, were Hapsburg agents, working individually or through foreign language newspapers, to rally support among immigrants for the Monarchy or to neutralize secessionist tendencies.4 By reason of some 2,000,000 Poles domiciled in the United States, America was sometimes spoken of as "the fourth part of Poland." Concerning the future status of their countrymen in Europe, politically active PolishAmericans were divided, though only a slim minority, apparently, backed the solution favored in Vienna. Polish national interests were furthered by the arrival late in 1915 of Ignace J. Paderewski, who had an established reputation in America as a concert pianist. Born of humble parentage in Russian Poland, this earnest, charming, eloquent virtuoso played upon the American heart with no less skill than he demonstrated at the piano; he won the sympathies of Colonel Edward M. House and through that friendship Paderewski secured access to President Wilson himself. Polish societies conducted lively publicity agitation on behalf of national independence.8 Substantially fewer in number than the Poles, the Czechs in the United States carried on a more diversified and possibly a more vigorous campaign during the war years. Concentrated mainly in the Middle West, with the largest contingent residing in Chicago, the Czech-Americans were split along religious lines in their lodges and newspapers, though many of them merged during the 4 Nuber to Dumba, Oct. 14, 28, 1914, Mar. 11, 26, 1915, P.A., Washington, Berichte, 1915; Donald W. Martin, "österreichisch-ungarische Propagandatätigkeit in den Vereinigten Staaten . . . " a. doctoral dissertation in typescript, University of Vienna, 1958. Austrian censorship barred from the mail two-score foreign-language papers published in America. 5 Gerson, op. cit., esp. pp. 48-54 and Chaps. 6 and 7.

Setting the Stage

565

war.6 From the hundreds of branches of the Bohemian National Alliance, founded in 1915, flowed cash to the tune of around a million dollars to finance the operations of the Czechoslovak National Council in Europe. To organize propaganda and to promote collection of funds, Vojta Benes (elder brother of Eduard), who had been in the United States on an educational mission before the war, returned in 1915. Hundreds of anti-Central Empires meetings were held, pamphlets in thousands were distributed, and books such as Bohemia Under Hamburg Misrule (New York, 1915), edited by Thomas Capek, were put in circulation; at the end of a hectic career, studded with ups and downs, Vojta Benes passed away in 1951 at Mishawaka, Indiana. Truly remarkable was the wartime record of Emanuel V. Voska, a Czech immigrant grown wealthy in the marble industry in the United States, who toiled as a confidential emissary of Masaryk, as builder of an astonishing Czech espionage service in America in collaboration with British agents, and in spreading literature sympathetic to Czechoslovak independence, including the writings of Steed and Namier.7 Helpful, too, in making Bohemia better known in the United States were books and articles by Count Francis Liitzow, son of an English mother, who had made useful contacts in the United States just before the war. Energetic educational work with tongue and pen was organized by the Slav press bureau, directed by lawyer-journalist Charles Pergler, whose bulletins in time reached the offices of about five-hundred American newspapers; Pergler enjoyed a ready entrée to State Depart6 Jaroslav F. Smetanka, "Bohemians and Slovaks—now Czechoslovaks," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, XCIII (1921), 149-153. 7 Emmanuel V. Voska and Will Irwin, Spy and Counterspy ( New York, 1940), a less than trustworthy document; Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England, pp. 96-100.

566

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

ment officers concerned with eastern Europe.8 Representative Adolph J. Sabath, Bohemian-born Chicago lawyer, who at his death in 1952 had served twenty-three consecutive terms in Congress, presented a resolution to the House in May, 1917, favoring the creation of a "Bohemian-Slovak" state and a bill of like content was offered in the Senate, but neither was ever put to a vote. Slovak-Americans claimed a constituency approaching a million all told, somewhat bigger in fact than the Czech element. Prior to the war the Slovaks tended to keep aloof from the Czechs in their organizations and publications, but in October, 1915, the president of the Slovak League, Albert P. Mamatey, and other prominent Slovak-Americans joined with representative Czechs in calling for a political confederation of their fellows in Europe, the Slovaks to have full home rule. A young Slovak, Stefan Osusky, who had earned his doctorate at the University of Chicago, went to Europe in 1916 as an emissary of the Slovak League, and organized information and intelligence agencies in Switzerland, where he served and in turn was served by politically influential Americans. On the other side of the shield, in mid-1917 Milan R. Stefanik, son of a Slovak Lutheran pastor, and vice-president of the Czechoslovak National Council, turned up in the United States to work through Czech and Slovak societies for an official American commitment on Czechoslovak independence and to enroll a military force to be attached to the French army. Eventually, with the blessing of the State and War Departments, around three thousand immigrants signed up; other men had previously volunteered for the Canadian army. Disappointed by the colorless posture of the Wilson administration on Czechoslovak freedom, Stefanik sought help from Theodore Roosevelt, an early convert to the Austria delenda 8 Charles Pergler, America in the Struggle for Czechoslovak pendence (Philadelphia, 1926).

Inde-

Setting the Stage

567

creed. The Rough Rider assured the Slovak of his warm attachment to the principle of national fulfillment and even promised to include Bohemia in a European lecture tour he was planning at the war's end. Far from happy over the official mood in Washington, Stefanik sailed back to Europe after four months in the New World; his role in the making of Czechoslovakia would one day be commemorated by a statue in Cleveland, Ohio, and in the Second World War an American Liberty ship proudly bore his name. South Slavs in the United States numbered about 750,000, more Croats probably than Slovenes and Serbs combined. In March of 1915, certain spokesmen of South Slav organizations in the United States and Canada declared for a Yugoslav state, formed around the nucleus of Serbia, and immigrant colonies in Latin America endorsed the resolution. South Slav emissaries from Europe visited Yugoslav groups in the Americas both before and after the formation of the South Slav Committee in London. With mixed results, these agents strove to smooth out differences between the Roman Catholic Croats and Slovenes and the Orthodox Serbs and to rally all in the common cause of Yugoslav freedom and unity. After the establishment of a Yugoslav National Council in America (November, 1916), the ties with the London Committee were reinforced. Though much disturbed by anti-Hapsburg activities among South Slavs in the New World, the Austro-Hungarian embassy in Washington lacked resources to counteract them. Indispensable funds for South Slav propaganda and money for Serbian war relief were raised in the New World and several thousand soldiers were recruited for an "Adriatic Legion" in the army of Serbia. Yet cleavages between Roman Catholic and Orthodox South Slav leaders and clubs in America persisted, the Catholics displaying no inconsiderable affection for the Monarchy and

568

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

no little detestation for the London Committee, which was falsely assumed to be purely an instrument of the Great Serb philosophy. That attitude caused acrimonious quarreling with Serbophiles, whose leading American personality, Columbia University scientist Michael Pupin, hailed from Hungary. At the end of 1917 an official Serbian war mission, headed by Milenko R. Vesnic, minister to Paris and a staunch lieutenant of Prime Minister PaSic, appeared in Washington. Coming to express gratitude for past help and to solicit aid for the future, Vesnic conferred with Wilson and his most trusted advisers, addressed both houses of Congress and public gatherings in the East and the Middle West. At a spacious banquet of the Society of the Genesee in New York City, Pupin, in Vesnic's presence, spoke in language designed to reconcile differences of view among politically active South Slavs in the New World. 9 Most of the Ukrainian immigrants in the United States originated in Galicia or in Hungary, and the nationality conscious among them were as divided in religious and political outlook as the Poles or the Czechs. In all, something like five hundred thousand Ukrainians lived in the United States and nearly as many more had found homes in Canada. Several federations of Ukrainians came into existence during the war years, but they were lamed by constant squabbling, inexperienced leadership, and shortage of money. An Ukrainian National Council expressed a strong preference for a united, independent Ukrainia, with autonomous status inside the Hapsburg realm as the most desirable alternative. A line of communication was established with the "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine" in Vienna, but pro-Austrian affections dwindled in Ukrainian-American circles after the United States became a belligerent. 10 9 Zeman, op. cit., pp. 69-72; Milivoy S. Stanoyevich, "The Serbian Mission in America," Current History, VII ( 2 ) (1917-18), 497-500. 1 0 Clarence A. Manning, "The Ukrainians and the United States in World War I," Ukrainian Quarterly, XIII (1957), 346-354.

Setting the Stage

569

Within the small Rumanian contingent in America, coming principally from Transylvania, a rather timid and ineffective agitation for Greater Rumania appeared. Under the patronage of Queen Marie, an American-Rumanian Relief Committee was organized, but appeals for help through the press to "great and generous hearts" in America produced only tiny sums of money. In time, a Rumanian National League, comprising several local societies, was created and a short-lived Rumanian paper was published in Chicago, with the cooperation of native Americans. Primarily to kindle public and official interest in Rumanian national dreams, a three-man delegation of Hungarian Rumanians, led by Vasil Stoica, came to the United States in the summer of 1917; yet attempts to convert the Wilson administration to the ideal of a united Rumania failed woefully—at any rate until the final weeks of the war.11 It may also be recalled that influential elements in the Magyar colonies in the United States, which contained about a million people, leaned toward the severance of the traditional bonds of Hungary with Austria. Independence, or, at least, anti-Tisza emotions had been quickened in Magyar-American circles in the months just before the war by two visits of Count Michael Karolyi, who wished to organize Magyar immigrants for national objectives on the pattern of the Irish in the New World. His agitation provoked a good deal of controversy in Magyar societies and yielded only modest amounts of cash to promote the political ambitions of Karolyi in Hungary. After American entry into the war, partisans of Karolyi aided in the formation of a Hungarian-American Loyalty League pledged "to get behind Uncle Sam"; sentiment for an independent Hungary grew more intense among Magyars in America as the fighting pro11 Gogu Negulesco, Rumania's Sacrifice (New York, 1918), passim; Mamatey, op. cit., pp. 121-127.

570

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

ceeded.12 Foreigners have been inclined to exaggerate, it may be interpolated, the importance of patriotic AustroHungarian immigrant groups in the United States and their friends in preparing the way for national freedom.13 3. Only slowly did President Wilson come to the conclusion that a declaration of war upon Austria-Hungary would be in the American interest. His thinking was directly affected by the Bolshevik coup d'etat in Russia and by the alarming impairment of Italian morale on the morrow of the Caporetto débâcle; anguished appeals to declare war on the Monarchy were dispatched to the White House from official quarters in Rome. Senior policymakers in Washington and sections of the American press supported the arguments that war upon the Monarchy would buoy up the drooping spirit of Italy and counteract widely diffused defeatist emotions. More than that, if a state of belligerency with Vienna were declared, military operations and the diplomatic strategy of the opponents of the Central Empires could be more effectively—or at least more tidily—coordinated. This line of logic was strongly pressed in Washington by London and more mildly by Paris.14 It is not surprising to learn that the bellicose Theodore Roosevelt, the most influential spokesman of the Republican party and probably better posted on the actualities of the Hapsburg Monarchy than any other outstanding public personality in America, thundered for war upon all the allies of Germany. His personal agenda for revision in the map of Europe embraced the satisfaction of 1 2 James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Words That Won the War (Princeton, 1939), pp. 2 2 1 - 2 3 1 . 1 3 Harriet G. Wanklyn, Czechoslovakia (New York, 1953), p. 416; Lloyd George, The Truth About the Treaties, II, 921. 1 4 Mamatey, op. cit., pp. 153-163.

Setting the Stage

571

Italian and Rumanian irredentist pretensions, the establishment of a Czechoslovak commonwealth, the integration of the South Slavs in a greater Serbia, an autonomous Poland inside the Russian state, and a Hungary wholly independent. Before the United States could make the world safe for democracy, Roosevelt jibed, the realm of the Hapsburg—and of the Turk, too—would have to be broken up. Other voices, however, questioned the advisability of going to war with the Danube Monarchy, which would entail diversion of military resources from the Western Front, involve the country directly in the internal tangles of Austria-Hungary, and create fresh problems in dealing with enemy aliens. On the eve of the opening of Congress in December, 1917, Senators of both the Democratic and Republican parties spoke out for war against all of Germany's allies. It was hinted, none too subtly, that if Wilson hung back, the Congress might assume the initiative for war. No "very strong case could be drawn up against the Vienna government so far as hostile acts are concerned," Lansing observed, yet he nonetheless favored a declaration of war. Whatever doubts the President may have had concerning the reception by the Congress of a recommendation for war upon the Monarchy had been dispelled, and his initial inclination was to ask for a declaration of war on Bulgaria and Turkey as well as on Austria-Hungary, but the first two were removed from the list on the entreaties of American missionary and other humanitarian interests. Wilson withheld his decision regarding the Dual Monarchy from the cabinet and even from Lansing until shortly before it was publicly divulged. The address to the Congress of December, 4, 1917, belongs among Wilson's more eloquent and trenchant utterances. After excoriating Berlin with a fervor befitting the occasion, he bracketed Vienna fully with her northern ally and asked for a declaration of war so as to remove

572

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

an embarrassing obstacle to the efficient management of military operations, and he promised Austria-Hungary that it would one day be freed "from the impudent and alien dominion of the Prussian military and commercial autocracy." Looking ahead, the President stated, " W e do not wish in any way to impair or to re-arrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. W e do not purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way. W e only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small." 15 What Wilson in effect was saying was that he had not abandoned the will-of-the-wisp strategy of detaching the Vienna cabinet from Berlin, and his disavowal of interference in the internal arrangements of the realm advertised that he had not been won over to the doctrine of dissolution. The position adopted by the conservative scholar in the White House, while applauded in Vienna, antagonized partisans of dismemberment in Austro-Hungarian immigrant colonies and their native-born wellwishers. The unheralded call for war upon the Dual Monarchy touched off a frenzied demonstration in the Congress, and press commentators on the decision duplicated the effervesence displayed in Washington. Unanimously, though without notable spirit, the Senate approved a war resolution (74-0), and discussion an the issue consumed little time in the House of Representatives. Announcing that he would vote against war as a manifestation of his fidelity to the international tenet of Marxism, Congressman Meyer London, Socialist from Manhattan, clung stubbornly to that position, and when the vote was counted, the tally stood 365 to London. A man from Mars, comparing the April vote in Senate and in House for war upon Germany—the ratio was eight to one—with the practically unanimous verdict to fight 15

Baker-Dodd, op. cit., IV, 132-136.

Setting the Stage

573

Austria-Hungary, might suppose that American hatred toward the Danubian power was far and away the more intense. In point of fact, however, the decision to fight the Monarchy resembled a technical action, not dictated by any rooted bitterness or resentment. 4. On the first of January, 1918, the London Times prophesied: "The whole civilized world must look forward with awe to the year which opens today. All men can foresee that it is pregnant with events which will shape the destinies of States and peoples for generations yet unborn." At that juncture the public mind of Britain was keenly disquieted by the heavy war casualties of 1917, the severe reverses suffered by Italian arms, the Lansdowne "peace letter," and Russian withdrawal from the war, accompanied by the Bolshevik revelation of Entente wartime treaties and understandings. Pessimism penetrated into the war cabinet, with Milner shrouded in gloom and Lloyd George so decidedly pacifist in mood that he even debated quitting as prime minister. Yet on January 5, in a formal address, he set forth the views on peace terms of the cabinet, of Liberals, and of Dominion and trade union leaders with whom he had consulted. In so doing the Prime Minister intended to inspirit the British public for the rocky road ahead, to counteract Entente pacifism, and to encourage sentiments for peace in the Central Empires—and he also wished to speak with national and imperial authority before the American President addressed himself to the same task. Concerning the Monarchy on the Danube, Lloyd George declared, "The break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims," yet, "we feel that unless genuine self-government on true democratic principles is granted to these Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it, it is impossible to hope for the re-

574

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

moval of those causes of unrest in that part of Europe which have so long threatened its general peace." Getting down to particulars, the Prime Minister felt it was vital to satisfy "the legitimate claims of the Italians for union with those of their own race [sic] and tongue"; he favored an independent Poland "comprising all the genuinely Polish elements who desire to form part of it," and he would press for justice to be done "to men of Roumanian blood and speech in their legitimate aspirations." The Central Empires would have to restore Serbia, Montenegro, and the occupied districts of Italy and Rumania. Not only were the ambitions of Czechoslovak and Yugoslav patriots ignored, but the passages on Italy and Rumania could scarcely be reconciled with the terms of the treaties under which these countries had become belligerents. Lloyd George's attitude on an international institution to maintain peace was neither clear-cut nor markedly enthusiastic. Yet, on the whole, the speech sounded moderate accents, and as such accomplished much of its purpose in Entente circles; the premier of France, Georges Clemenceau, curtly but without reservation, approved the British official statement. The Consulta preserved silence. Fully aware that the stand he had taken would disquiet British partisans of Austria delenda, Lloyd George called H. Wickham Steed, foreign editor of the Times, to his office and remarked that "he had not been able to go as far as you would like about Austria, but you will find that my speech goes a long way; and for tactical reasons it is important that it should not be opposed by the Press." The Prime Minister hoped that the Times would uphold his stand.16 Steed patriotically complied. Hailing the Lloyd George statement as the most important state document since fighting began, the Times (Steed) interpreted the terms for peace as the irreduci18

The History of the [London]

Times, IV, 347.

Setting the Stage

575

ble minimum; it should be evident to the Vienna cabinet, the editorial asserted, that Great Britain firmly backed the irredentist claims of Italy and Rumania and espoused "self-determination" for the Hapsburg realm as a whole. The acid test of any scheme of democratic selfgovernment would be the intentions of the Germans of Austria and of the Magyars, for it was their artificial hegemony, "built up in the interests of Prussian domination" that would be imperiled by any honest program of government by consent. Considering Steed's rooted conviction that Austria-Hungary ought to be broken into its national components, the editorial spoke a language of remarkable moderation and restraint. The British Labour party seconded the speech of the Prime Minister, adding, however, that the interests of dynasties should not be allowed to interfere with the application of self-determination. At a conference of Socialists from Entente countries, meeting in London from February 21 to 23, a memorandum on war aims was adopted which disavowed dismemberment of the Monarchy; yet, the document asserted that the clamor for independence by Czechoslovak and Yugoslav patriots could not be entirely dismissed. In fact, the memorandum neatly squared the circle by endorsing the concept of self-determination and saying that the national communities of the Monarchy, should they so desire, might substitute a "free federation of Danubian states for the Austro-Hungarian Empire." Sent to Socialists in enemy lands, the memorandum elicited cordial responses in Austria and Hungary, though the majority Socialists of Germany rejected general implementation of the self-determination principle for the nationalities of the Danube Monarchy, but approved independence for Russian Poland. Leading papers of Germany regarded the Lloyd George speech as another and ostentatious gesture to sep-

576

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

arate Vienna from Berlin and as proving beyond cavil a decline in the Entente will to win. Émigré national spokesmen from the Monarchy and their sympathizers reacted in a hostile manner to the Prime Minister's address. Yet, as interpreted by New Europe, Lloyd George wanted a Yugoslav state, including portions of Austria and Hungary, a Rumania incorporating Transylvania, a Polish state covering Russian Poland and western Galicia, an Ukrainia with eastern Galicia in it, and fulfillment of Italian national consolidation. This journal stridently demanded "an equal opportunity of self-determination for all adult peoples"; the Prime Minister's message would weaken Italian moderates, it believed, who were battling manfully against the extravagant territorial appetites of jingoistic extremists among their fellow countrymen. The London Spectator commented that the Czechoslovaks and the Yugoslavs deserved to be freed from "the yoke of the Hapsburgs" every whit as much as the Poles; it preferred to regard Lloyd George's pronouncement as purely preparatory and subject to drastic revision at a propitious time. Abroad, La Serbie of Geneva declaimed heatedly against the views on peace of "a man in whom the enslaved peoples place all their hopes." More explosive was the outcry in Austria delenda circles after Wilson offered his conditions for peace in the historic Fourteen Points address of January 8, 1918. 5. For some time the White House had under contemplation the enunciation of terms of settlement in concert with the Entente cabinets, but that formula found no favor abroad. After Lloyd George's message, the President momentarily felt that he should remain silent, but fuller reflection persuaded him the time had come to speak out. In composing his speech, Wilson drew heavily

Setting the Stage

577

upon materials assembled by the "House Inquiry," a specialist group of presidential advisers instructed to study problems relevant to the setdement of the war. The Inquiry had drafted a memorandum in which it proposed that discontent among the nationalities of the Danube Monarchy should be whipped up to the maximum, but when peace was made the Hapsburg state should be preserved virtually intact, since it was a natural and viable economic structure. Poland, undefined as to the frontiers, but with free access to the Baltic, should be given independence, though the report had nothing to say about the other Slav national groupings in the Monarchy. It approved Italian pretensions to the Trentino, denied the claim to a section of Dalmatia, and prescribed that Trieste should be converted into a free port. The memorandum regarded the prospects for federalization of the Monarchy as pleasing.17 However the Fourteen Points address is construed, as mere propaganda or as a genuine program for peace, it reflected profound convictions in the mind of Wilson. By speaking in the language that he did, he hoped he might move the cabinet of Vienna nearer to the point where it would cut loose from Berlin; he hoped, too, that the Bolshevik leaders would appreciate that the interests of Russia would best be served by breaking off peace parleys with the Central Empires (then under way) and by taking up arms against tnem; he hoped, finally, that ordinary Germans could yet be turned against their political and military masters and that Entente appetites for territory might be modified in a way that would hasten the end of the fighting. These purposes were noble indeed. Shown the statement Wilson intended to make on Austria-Hungary, Lansing thought it unwise, since the surest way to break the power of Germany, he 17

Mamatey, op. cit., pp. 177-179.

578

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

thought, would be to dissolve her ally into national states. Quite inaccurately the President, in his address, asserted that the adversaries of the Central Empires were not confused by "uncertainty of principle" or "vagueness of detail." In reference to the Hapsburg realm, he prescribed, first of all, that "The peoples of AustriaHungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." This phraseology, which copied the language of a communication from London on the recent Smuts-Mensdorff talks, implied merely that the countries at war with the Hapsburg Monarchy should take part in reordering her constitutional arrangements. The frontiers of Italy, second, should be readjusted "along clearly recognizable lines of nationality"—unmistakable evidence of Wilson's opinion that Italy should not obtain everything promised in the secret Treaty of London. In the third place, an independent Poland should be organized, made up of territory inhabited indisputably by Poles, and with assured access to the Baltic Sea—a point containing elements of ambiguity (permitting the Austro-Polish formula, arguably), yet more definite than anything Entente statesmen had yet pledged. Lastly, the occupied sections of Russia, Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, and Serbia should be granted an unrestricted outlet on the open sea. Not a syllable in the memorable Wilsonian pronouncement hinted at the creation of a Czechoslovakia, or a Yugoslavia, or a Greater Rumania.18 With impressive unanimity, major journals of opinion in the United States and public leaders praised the principles for peace set forth by the President. Waxing exuberant, the New York Tribune likened the address to " Baker-Dodd, op. cü., VI, 157-160.

Setting the Stage

579

a second Emancipation Proclamation with Wilson pledging to free the enslaved of Europe as Lincoln had emancipated the slaves of the New World. "For . . . Italia Irredenta the words of the President are a promise of freedom after a slavery worse a thousand times than that of the Negro." "Autonomy would deliver the peoples of Austria-Hungary," explained the New York Times, "from the blighting rule of the Hapsburg, a condition indispensable to their happiness and contentment. . . ." The writer supposed that Bosnia Herzegovina, "impudently seized" by the Monarchy in 1908, would be allotted to Serbia. It was highly creditable, as Theodore Roosevelt saw matters, that the President had departed from his former position that what happened inside the Danube Monarchy was of no concern to the United States; the value of home rule for the nationalities, he noted, would depend on the manner in which it was guaranteed. Former Ambassador Penfield laconically observed that the President's utterance was "bound to create deep thought in Vienna." By and large, the foreign language press of the United States catering to immigrants from the Monarchy responded in shrill accents to the failure of Wilson to recommend dissolution; some papers supposed, however, that the posture of the White House would have little bearing on ultimate arrangements, since AustriaHungary would inescapably suffer shipwreck at the close of hostilities.19 Patriotic émigré spokesmen in Europe passionately rejected the idea of mere autonomy for the nationalities in a Hapsburg federal union. Czechoslovak leaders called attention to the existence of their armed forces in France and Russia as proof that a Czechoslovak state was already in being; Masaryk vigorously protested to Wilson that home rule was not enough. Representatives of the 1» Literary

Digest,

LVI

( J a n . 26, 1 9 1 8 ) , 15 ff.

580

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Serbian ministry and of the South Slav Committee heaped scorn upon the autonomy formula and demanded unfettered political freedom for the South Slavs; "Serbia's mighty allies," cried a hotly indignant Yugoslav, "would allow the savages in Africa to choose the sovereignty to which they wish to submit, but not the Slavs under Austria's heel." 20 Cautiously shifting his ground, Wilson suggested in March, 1918, that Serbo-Croat aspirations should be met as far as possible, and the London cabinet concurred. Many a Pole was cut to the quick by Wilson's advocacy of a Poland confined to areas of Polish population, and Rumanian patriots resented the implicit repudiation of the national claims to the whole of Transylvania. For all practical purposes, Lloyd George set the official stamp of British approval on the Wilsonian conditions, but men of the New Europe reiterated that the idea of a federal regime for the Hapsburg Monarchy was sheer fantasy, since the Magyar ruling class would alone be able to prevent that; and, even if given home rule, the national communities would forthwith set about to win undiluted freedom, it was argued. Prudence, therefore, dictated recognizing the independence of the Hapsburg nationalities immediately. Objecting strongly to the terms of settlement pronounced by Lloyd George and Wilson, the Serbian Society of Britain petitioned the Prime Minister to come out flatly for national fulfillment and to abandon his stand against dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy.21 No important French statesman openly expressed himself on the Austro-Hungarian items in the Wilsonian declaration, but Slavophile publicists in France lamented that only autonomy, not full independence, was pro2 0 Woislav M. Petrovitch, "Serbia's History in the Light of the War," Current History, VIII (1918), 148. 2 1 See for instance, A. H. E. Taylor, "The Entente and Austria," Fortnightly Review, CIX (1918), 678-693.

Setting the Stage

581

posed for the multinationality realm. It was perceived in Rome, of course, that the Presidents position on Italian acquisitions diverged radically from the spoils of victory enshrined in the Treaty of London; it was nothing short of a frontal challenge to chauvinistic expansion along the Dalmatian coast. Apprehensive and exasperated, although not really surprised, Sonnino contemplated protesting publicly, but decided that course would cause more harm than good; speaking to the chamber of deputies he simply reasserted the Italian desire for security and an equilibrium of power. With no less ambiguity Premier Orlando declared, "Italy wants no more and no less than this: the completion of her national unity and the security of her frontiers on land and on sea." Sonnino's ebullient satellite in Washington, Ambassador Vincent Macchi di Cellere, who detected a sinister, Machiavellian strain in Wilson, protested against the denial of legitimate national aspirations. The Italians thought childish Wilson's view that the projected league of nations would protect their country from external danger. Even the moderate Corriere della Sera thought the President and the Prime Minister, also, too generous on the Dual Monarchy; if the Wilsonian agenda were actually applied, it was written, the Central Empires would remain masters of the Balkan peninsula and would exploit the area to their exclusive advantage. Somehow or other the President would have to be persuaded that any compromise with the Hapsburg dynasty would crudely violate the exalted ideals in world affairs to which America was morally committed. It would be sound policy, the Milan journal counseled, for Italy to assume the leadership of the subject peoples of the Monarchy, forge a united front, and press for unqualified independence; to that end, Italy would need to deal considerately with Yugoslav claims, though in such fashion as not to jeopar-

582

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

dize the future security of the kingdom. Writing in Unita, Professor Salvemini argued that the speeches of the Briton and the American had in effect canceled the Treaty of London, which was all to the good since "its implementation would have involved fierce struggles between Italians and Jugoslavs." 6. In the Danubian Monarchy, a large section of the serious press treated the Wilsonian conditions of setdement with undisguised repugnance. Acrid comment was made on the explicit demand for cessions of territory to Italy and perhaps to Poland. "Wilson must be made clearly to understand," thought the Neues Wiener Tageblatt, "that it is useless to try to win over the Central Powers for the Entente plans of disruption and disintegration. Austria-Hungary must be master of her own house. Our peoples do not need Mr. Wilson's proprietorship. If he is unable to appreciate the justice of the Central Powers' standpoint, we can only patiently wait, for it will not be much longer before our enemies learn to distinguish the impossible from the possible." In Budapest, Az Est interpreted hopefully the official declarations in London and Washington. "A new stage of the war begins," it commented, "where agreements and understandings can be initiated which will bring about peace." Socialist Nepszava, however, believed that if the fighting were to rage on until the aims set forth by Wilson could be realized, a very heavy toll of human life would have to be exacted. On January 24, 1918, in a declaration to the foreign affairs committee of the Austrian Delegation, Czernin presented the formal Vienna reply to the Fourteen Points address. The Foreign Secretary expressed general approval of the speech as a constructive step that might

Setting the Stage

583

bring a compromise peace nearer, though he questioned whether the President could bend the Entente cabinets to his viewpoints; Czemin politely turned aside the trans-Atlantic point envisaging autonomous development for the Monarchy, yet he intimated that a considerable parallelism concerning the road to peace existed in Vienna and Washington, and he proposed an exchange of views.22 From the German side, Chancellor Georg F. von Herding answered Wilson, and, in touching on the points of paramount importance to Austria-Hungary, he reaffirmed the "faithful comradeship" of the Central Empires and promised to cooperate to the full in securing for the Monarchy a peace settlement "which takes into account her justified claims." He expressly reserved to Berlin, Vienna, and the Poles the task of determining the future organization of Poland.23 Since the Czernin statement sounded a more conciliatory accent than the German, the assumption that the way to end the war led through Vienna was strengthened in the White House. The vision of a separate peace with the Monarchy persisted. 7. The cabinet of Vienna, meanwhile, was pleased over the appointment of Bavarians to key positions in the German Empire, Hertling as chancellor and Richard von Kiihlmann as foreign secretary; astute and farsighted, the latter shared the conviction of Czernin that a compromise settlement was the most the Central Empires could hope for. When in January, 1918, the story was put about that von Kiihlmann might be forced to give way to Biilow, the semi-official Fremdenblatt of 22 23

Scott, op. cit., pp. 246-249. Scott, op. cit., pp. 252-253.

584

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Vienna published a sensational onslaught upon the former chancellor, "We do not wish to tear open old wounds," it was said, "or to recall the period of acute diplomatic conflict with Italy" but, "the feeling exists that Prince Biilow at that time, with his offers of AustroHungarian territory to the Italian government" had played fast and loose with vital interests of the Monarchy; by contrast, von Kiihlmann enjoyed the complete confidence of Vienna. Certain newspapers of Germany took umbrage at the Fremdenblatt article, calling it insolent and arrogant intervention in affairs of concern to Germany exclusively. As part of an address to the Congress on February 11, in which the President drew telling contrasts between the stand of Vienna and of Berlin on war aims, Wilson applauded the "very friendly tone" of Czernin's speech and the hints of further discussion. Wilson somehow fancied that the cabinet of Vienna agreed with him in the matter of constitutional reorganization intended to satisfy the aspirations of the Hapsburg nationalities. He disclaimed any desire to interfere in European affairs or to arbitrate quarrels over territory, and he even acknowledged that the Fourteen Points might not represent the best of all possible foundations for a durable settlement of the war; in any event, they were only "a provisional sketch of principles . . ." The President supposed that Czernin would have walked farther along the road to peace, if he had not been embarrassed by dependence upon Germany—a less than subtle effort to accelerate the rising antipathy to the northern ally in the Monarchy. The Neue Freie Presse had recently declared that the entire Hapsburg realm was dejected and longed for peace. "We are the only belligerent whose views and feelings are unanimous in this respect." "If we are hated by all other nations," cried the Arbeiter Zeitung, "the

Setting the Stage

585

fault lies with Germany. She behaves with the insolence of a conqueror and wants to dictate a conqueror's peace, as though it were not sheer madness to pretend that peace by victory were possible under prevailing conditions." The shrill, small voice of Hungarian Socialism, Nepszava, recommended that Czernin should seek to induce Germany to accept the terms of peace which he had advocated, and if the attempt came to naught, the Monarchy should negotiate a settlement without Germany. Yet the Neue Freie Presse, commenting on Wilson's message of February 11, felt that the White House might just as well cease efforts to detach the Monarchy from Germany, however much it liked the calmer quality of the President's thinking; the world had advanced another notch toward peace, the Arbeiter Zeitung reflected, and it urged Czernin to keep discussions with Washington going. Like Wilson, Lloyd George was impressed by "the extraordinarily civil and friendly" approach of Czernin, though the speech, he remarked, lacked solid substance; "there was not a single definite question dealt with about which Count Czernin did not present a most resolute refusal to discuss any terms which might be regarded as any possible terms of peace . . . " As the starting point for further "comparison of views" with Vienna, Wilson expounded in the February 11 address four firm principles: each section of the peace settlement must rest solidly upon concepts of justice; areas should not be distributed as pawns in an up-to-date version of the traditional game of power balance, but arrangements must be attuned to the interests of the populations directly concerned; and "all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would

586

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world." 24 8.

On the heels of Czernin's address of January 24, another informal try at peacemaking of passing interest issued from Vienna with Professor Heinrich Lammasch as the central personality. Close to Emperor Charles, who had considered naming him prime minister of Austria, Lammasch enjoyed a world-wide reputation as an expert in international law; a veteran in the cause of peace, he spoke the language of a common humanity with vigor and singular eloquence, and he was known to favor a federal and democratic reconstruction of the Monarchy.25 At the end of January, 1918, he went to Switzerland for man-to-man talks with colorful, ex-Professor George D. Herron, an American who was assumed to be unusually influential with the ex-Professor in the White House, and who had previously conferred with a succession of exponents of peace from Austria-Hungary; it was Herron's practice to pass along information he picked up to the Legation of the United States in Berne.26 Representing himself as the voice and ears of his monarch, as assuredly up to a point he was, Lammasch indicated to Herron that the Emperor wanted the American President to recognize publicly that Czernin's recent statement demonstrated that Vienna was desirous of 2

< Baker-Dodd, op. cit., V, 182-183. Marga Lammasch und Hans Sperl (eds.) Heinrich Lammasch (Vienna, 1922); Benno Mayer, "Lammasch als Politiker" (Vienna, 1941), an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation—a thin production of the Nazi era. 28 Mitchell P. Briggs, George D. Herron and the European Settlement (Stanford, Calif., 1932); a shrewd American publicist, who knew Herron personally, sketched this incisive pen portrait: "a man in his early sixties, with a square French beard, a soft but almost tragically insistent voice, an overwhelming self-assurance . . . cloaked by a quiet, repressed and rather deadly manner and utterly humorless . . . He was a sort of super-spy . . . a solemn, one-gallused intellectual . . ." William A. White, Autobiography (New York, 1946), pp. 560-561. 25

Setting the Stage

587

peace in accordance with Wilsonian principles. If that were done, Lammasch appears to have explained, Charles would then promise autonomy to the national communities of his realm, and would enthusiastically endorse armament limitation and a league of nations to safeguard the peace. Besides, the Emperor would invite Berlin to stop the war by diplomacy, and if the Germans balked, Vienna would engage in conversations for peace independently; in pursuing such a course, the Austrian crown would probably have the cooperation of the Catholic states of southern Germany, Lammasch said.27 Herron listened attentively, but was not persuaded that the Austrians were candid and acting in good faith. He made it clear in a grim and final sort of way that the Emperor would first have to issue a declaration assuring home rule to the several national groupings; possibly on the advice of Czernin, Charles decided the time was not propitious for so drastic a step. The whole episode merely weakened the faith of the Wilson administration in the possibilities of effecting peace with Austria-Hungary alone. A few weeks after the Lammasch conversations, Herron told La Suisse that an effort should be undertaken to woo the allies of Germany away, and that in turn might induce the German nation to revolt against its monstrous government.28 2 7 Hugh R. Wilson to Lansing, Jan. 31, Feb. 8, 1918, Foreign Relations, 1918, Supp. I, vol. I, pp. 60-61, 82-105; Hugh R. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 36-39; Stephen Osusky, "The Secret Peace Negotiations Between Vienna and Washington," Slavonic Review, IV (1925-26), 657-668; ibid., to editor (London) Daily Telegraph, Tune 1, 1950; August von Cramon, "Kaiser Karl und Präsident Wilson,' BM, (1933), 1148-1156. 2 8 Musulin to Czemin, Mar. 15, 1918, P.A., Schweiz, Berichte, 1918. An inkling of the Herron-Lammasch talks reached the ears of the German authorities, Wedel to Ballplatz, Feb. 18, 1918, P.A., Preussen, Varia, 1918. After the war, Herron said that Lammasch wished him to tell the story of their exchanges as "a lesson of lost opportunity." He ascribed the failure to the treachery of Czemin, and started to write a book entitled, "The Peace That Was Never Made." Herron to R. W. Seton-Watson, Jan. 17, 26, 1920. Seton-Watson Papers. Cf. Benedikt, Meinlgruppe, pp. 230-245.

588

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Soon after Wilson's pronouncement of February 11, Emperor Charles made secret soundings for peace to Washington by way of Spain. Keen sympathy for the Hapsburg dynasty prevailed in Spanish royal circles, and in the summer of 1917, the Madrid ministry had served as intermediary for informal British feelers for peace to Vienna—stillborn, of course. 29 At the request of Vienna, King Alphonso informed Washington that the Ballplatz wished discussions on peace conditions preliminary to a conference of the belligerents. Wilson received the communication in a kindly spirit, but wanted to know explicitly what the cabinet in Vienna was thinking with regard to the Slavs in the Monarchy, cession of territory to Italy, and other major questions. The British Foreign Office warned Washington that the overture was a slick German stratagem, best swept aside at once. On March 23, the Vienna authorities reiterated their original bid for discussions, adding that South Slav aspirations could be satisfied within the framework of the Monarchy, but that Italian pretensions were preposterous. This communication never officially reached Washington; a tremendous German military lunge on the Western Front, stated on March 21, abruptly stopped peace-talking. 30 2« Furstenberg to Czemin, July 30, 1917, Sept. 21, 1917, and Czemin to Furstenberg, Aug. 16, 1917, P.A., Geheim, XLVII-13. 3 0 Thinking in policymaking circles of Vienna was doubtless affected by special reports on industrial unrest in the United States, and on dreaa of revolution or on war with Japan. Army Command to Czemin, Mar. 3, 24, 1918, P.A., Krieg 7, Amerika; Foreign Relations, 1918. Supp. I, vol. I, pp. 184-186.

17.

Sark anii

% Mntfit

T H E C O M P E T n T V E ASPIRATIONS OF YUGOSLAVS AND ITALIANS

to the Hapsburg patrimony on the Adriatic appeared, meanwhile, to be moving toward an amicable adjustment, to parcelling out the bearskin before the hunt was over. Preliminary thereto, a surface understanding was arrived at between the South Slav Committee, which desired a federal Yugoslavia, and Premier Pasic and his henchmen (quartered on the Greek isle of Corfu), proponents of the Greater Serbia philosophy. Disheartened by the march of events, Ante Trumbic, president of the Committee, had considered, in the winter of 1916-17, abandoning the nationalist campaign and emigrating to the Argentine where he would seek employment as a taxi-driver! But Pasic's image of a Greater Serbia was seriously disturbed by the overthrow of the tsarist regime in 1917, the strongest Entente supporter of the merger of the South Slav peoples under the rule of Bel589

590

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

grade. British friends of the Yugoslavs induced the stiffnecked Prime Minister to bend sufficiently to invite Trumbic and other important émigré politicians to Corfu for an exchange of views on the future of the South Slavs. The upshot of more than a month of acrimonious discussion was an understanding known as the Declaration of Corfu, published on July 20, 1917, which Masaryk tagged "the Magna Carta of Yugoslav liberty," and which represented in fact a kind of compromise between Pasic's vision of a unitarian Greater Serbia and the desire of the emigration politicians for a federation in which Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs would possess considerable autonomy. More precisely, the Corfu document prescribed that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes would form a united country under the scepter of the Serbian royal dynasty. Each of the three members of the projected Yugoslav state would be treated as an equal, but the decision between a federal union or a unitary kingdom would be postponed until after the war; freedom in religious affairs, to placate Roman Catholics, was promised to all citizens. In spite of glaring ambiguities, the Corfu Declaration enhanced the international stature of the South Slavs and rendered it less likely that the Entente cabinets would use their territory for diplomatic bargaining purposes; the South Slav Committee folk were elated, though Pasic thought of the pact purely as a tactical device to please Entente partisans of Yugoslavia. Subsequently, a Montenegrin faction, the Comité Monténégrin pour l'Union Nationale, seated in Geneva and headed by former Premier Radovic, endorsed the Corfu Declaration. Soon after the meeting on Corfu, Pasic visited London and was entertained by the Serbian Society. Members of the Society, afraid that the Serbian Prime Minister might enter into a negotiated peace with the Central Empires, had vainly appealed to the British cabinet and

The Dark and the Bright

591

lawmakers to grant material and moral assistance to the Serbian government in exile. At a luncheon for PaSic, Lord Robert Cecil spoke in guarded accents of a peace setdement to be grounded on principles of justice and national aspirations. Certain British newspapers took Cecil to task, insisting that a federal Hapsburg Monarchy, not its dissolution, would be the surest way to end tyranny in Central Europe.1 Sonnino and like-minded Italian expansionists resented the Corfu pact as a fresh manifestation of irreconcilable Yugoslav enmity and as wholly incompatible with the Treaty of London. Leading newspapers in the Italian peninsula reacted divergendy. Blatantly jingoistic sheets clamored for integral fulfillment of the London Treaty, as was true of the Idea Nazionale, which called upon the Consulta to prevent "the calamity of official Entente recognition of the Corfu Pact"; adding a flicker of embellishment, this paper contended, as did the Trihuna, that the very idea of a Yugoslav state was a fantasy conjured up by friends of the Hapsburg dynasty! On the opposite side, Corriere della Sera pointed to the historical roots of the Southern Slav unification movement, which had affinities with the Italian Risorgimento itself; far from being a menace to Italy, Yugoslavia would constitute a tower of strength against German pressure southward and thus would enhance Italian security, thought the great Milan daily; and essentially the same reasoning was expressed by Messagero. Ardent disciple of Giuseppe Mazzini that he was, and a congenital polemicist, Professor Gaetano Salvemini distinguished himself as a resourceful exponent of the general theory of Italian-Yugoslav harmony. Adriatic rivalries, he ceaselessly preached, could be amicably resolved; for Italy, the wisest diplomatic formula was "the best 1 Musulin to Czernin, Mar. 9, 1918, P.A., Schweiz, Berichte, 1918: Hanak, op. ext., pp. 199-201.

592

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

strategic boundary with the smallest number of Slavs." A slender volume by Salvemini, Questione Adriatico (1916), knocked the arguments of immoderate Italian chauvinism into a cocked hat; until late in 1917, censorship prohibited the circulation of the book, but with minor revisions it was reprinted after the Caporetto military disaster. In the spirit of the crusader, undeterrred by vitriolic denunciations in chauvinistic newspapers, Salvemini and his little group persisted in their campaign against Italian pretensions to Dalmatia. Yet the Pisan historian was aggrieved because no influential South Slav voices protested against extravagant Yugoslav territorial ambitions, and he sharply castigated British and French friends of the South Slavs for comparable sins of omission.2 After the Corfu document was published, Salvemini renewed his argument for a compromise settlement along the Adriatic, contending that if the South Slavs were turned against the Hapsburg Monarchy, it would soon collapse and that an independent Yugoslavia would become a permanent and valuable ally of the Italian kingdom. Save for particular ambivalences, Leonida Bissolati, broad-gauged Socialist and vice-premier in the ministry at Rome, shared the general viewpoint of Salvemini and pleaded for consultations with Yugoslav patriots. According to Arturo Labriola, a Socialist deputy from Naples, Italy had demanded part of Dalmatia in 1915, despite the predominantly Yugoslav quality of the population, in order to keep the province from falling under the control of tsarist Russia, but since the revolutionary upheaval there, the masses of Italy had no desire whatsoever to annex any of Dalmatia. Quite unofficially, knots of moderate Italians and Yugoslavs in Switzerland formed special committees to spread 2 Salvemini to Seton-Watson, Feb. 10, 1917. Seton-Watson Papers. Marcovitch, op. cit., pp. 258-265.

The Dark and the Bright

593

conciliatory propaganda, the Yugoslav members being mainly identified with the Trumbic committee, which wished to exercise a healing influence upon the bitterly anti-Italian elements among the Croats and Slovenes of the Monarchy. Salvemini belonged to the Italian committee, as did other intellectuals such as Guglielmo Ferrero, Luigi Einaudi, Giuseppe Prezzolini, and journalists writing for the Secolo.3 In "New Europe" quarters of London, it was urged that the British ministry should seek to iron out differences between the Adriatic competitors as the prelude to a grand revolutionary sweep of nationalisms which would set the whole Hapsburg Monarchy aflame. To that end, it was recommended that Yugoslav spokesmen, without renouncing an ell of soil peopled by their national fellows, should assure Italy of economic and strategic concessions, and that Great Britain "as a matter of far-seeing and wise generosity" should hold out economic advantages to Italy.4 The London cabinet received the Corfu Declaration "with great interest and sympathy," but decided that it would be injudicious to say anything positive about the content for the time being. Though given a copy of the document, the government of the United States paid no attention at all to it.5 Through the good offices of Count Carlo Sforza, Italian representative to the Serbian government in exile, Pasic and Sonnino met and conferred, but the latter repulsed suggestions for a compromise deal on the Adriatic question with withering negativism.6 Musulin to Burian, Ap. 22, 1918, P.A., Schweiz, Berichte, 1918. Memorandum of R. W. Seton-Watson, July 30, 1917. Seton-Watson Papers. 5 H. of C., Parliamentary Debates, Nov. 28, 1917, XCIX (1917), 1986; Mamatey, op. cit., p. 115. 6 Count Carlo Sforza, "Sonnino and His Foreign Policy," Contemporary Review, CXXXVI (1929), 721-732, esp. 728-729, ibid. "Italy and the Jugoslav Idea," Foreign Affairs, XVI ( 1 9 3 7 - 3 8 ) , 3 2 3 338. 3

4

594

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918 2.

For a brief interval, the Caporetto calamity tempered the fiercer passions of Italian cupidity and alarmed Yugoslavs in exile as well; "If Italy is smashed, we are smashed," remarked Trumbic. In that propitious climate, men of the "New Europe" quietly set about to effect a rapprochement between South Slav leaders and Italians, which might significantly affect official Entente and American thinking on Austria-Hungary. Under the talented guidance of Wickham Steed, responsible Yugoslavs and Italians met in London in mid-December, 1917, and some progress was achieved toward a mutual understanding; the conversations, it is of interest to note, were carried on in the Italian tongue.7 While Italy still smarted under the twin impact of Caporetto and the January, 1918, pronouncements of Lloyd George and Wilson on the fundamentals of a constructive and durable peace settlement, Trumbic disclosed his views on international affairs in the Secolo of Milan. He excoriated the Hapsburg Monarchy as a "despotic authority," an abnormal mechanism, war-worn and internally rotten, whose masses were tired of sacrificing themselves for the purposes of the dynasty and the ruling classes. To that analysis he linked the opinion that the Corfu Pact harmonized with the democratic principle of self-determination; it would be politic for the Yugoslavs and the Italians, victims of "a certain lack of understanding" fostered by the common enemy, to cooperate wholeheartedly against the House of Hapsburg. Commenting on the Trumbic statement, the Giornale cTItalia, which frequently spoke the mind of the Consulta, welcomed what the Yugoslav patriot had written, but believed the time had not yet come to fashion a specific agreement. Italy, 7

Steed, Through Thirty Years, II, 168 ff.

The Dark and the Bright

595

moreover, should not undertake leadership to break up the Monarchy, nor even call for its dissolution, which could only prolong the agonies of war. At about the same time the London Treaty of 1915, published by the Bolshevik revolutionaries, was publicly acknowledged to be authentic by the cabinet of Rome. That revelation furnished Senator Bevione a cue to tell his colleagues that the national communities of the Danube Monarchy, which hitherto had looked to Paris, London, and Washington for liberation and had distrusted Italy as overly ambitious, territorially speaking, were turning to Rome. The speeches of Lloyd George and Wilson, he stated, had disillusioned Hapsburg nationality leaders, who now were inclined to rely upon Italy to defend their interests, to uphold their right to freedom, and to coordinate propaganda against Austria-Hungary. Equally, Senator Francesco Ruffini summoned Italy to assume headship of the centrifugal political elements in the Monarchy and to negotiate a firm understanding with the Yugoslavs. Premier Vittorio E. Orlando responded kindly to these recommendations, observing that the removal of the regrettable misunderstanding which had risen between Italian aspirations and Slav sentiments constitutes an objective good and useful in itself." The indefatigable Steed, meantime, brought Orlando and Trumbic together in London for talks, which were marked by "great cordiality and frankness," the Italian Prime Minister conceding that European perspectives had changed since the signing of the London Treaty. With the consent of Orlando, Steed arranged in early March for a conference between moderately minded Italians, among them ex-Senator Andrea Torre and G. A. Borgese, a forward-looking publicist, and Yugoslav exiles. Out of protracted and sometimes heated discussions emerged a tentative agenda, which asserted that a united and independent Yugoslavia and a fully united Italy

596

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

would be advantageous for both nations; once boundaries had been demarcated, appropriate measures would be adopted to safeguard the rights of minorities in each country. Simultaneously, French adversaries of the Hapsburg Monarchy forged a united front of Czechoslovak, Polish, Yugoslav, and Rumanian national committees in Paris. 3. To define Italo-Yugoslav relations with something like precision and to galvanize all secessionist forces in a common campaign against the House of Hapsburg, a Congress of Oppressed Nationalities convened in April of 1918 at Rome, as Orlando requested, just when a Clemenceau-Czernin feud over the Sixtus affair erupted. Shortly before the Congress met, it seemed that it might have to be postponed or might not be convoked at all, for Trumbic set as the price of attendance explicit Italian renunciation of the London Treaty. But Seton-Watson brought the Yugoslav patriot around with assurances, based on information vouchsafed by Italian moderates, that "you can rely with absolute certainty on suitable declarations, and when the water once begins to flow, it will gain in volume." To refuse to take part in the Rome deliberations, Scotus Viator pointed out, would simply confirm the Italian theory of South Slav "intransigence and imperialistic aims."8 Because of his decided stand against the London Treaty, Italian officialdom protested furiously over the participation of Seton-Watson in the Rome parley, but he nonetheless attended and so did Steed, of course; Frenchmen of Austria delenda convictions likewise turned up. Heading the delegation of the South Slav Committee was Trumbic, flanked by a dozen deputies of the Serbian parliament; Benes and Stefanik led an able Czechoslovak contingent, Polish interests were represented by both 8

R. W. Seton-Watson to Trumbic, Ap. 1918. Seton-Watson Papers.

The Dark and the Bright

597

Austrian and Russian Poles and Rumanian by Senator Mironescu and two men from Transylvania. At the side of Senator Ruffini, the presiding officer, were followers of Salvemini, and a spokesman of the fascio deUa difensa nazionale, one Benito Mussolini, a passionate exponent of national liberty for the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs. As envisaged by the Corriere, the deliberations in Rome would delineate the ideals and interests of all the national communities of Austria-Hungary and demonstrate that they were not mutually conflicting. Managers of the gathering kept steadily in mind the impression which the Congress might exert upon the Wilson administration and upon opinion in America generally. Orlando stamped his august approval upon the Congress in an address of welcome, though his ministry as such had nothing whatsoever to do with the meeting. No substantial reason existed for controversy between Italy and the national communities of the Monarchy, the Premier explained, "if we sincerely examine the conditions of mutual existence. . . ." Likening the struggle of "the Bohemian people to revive their glorious kingdom" to the older labors to achieve freedom for Italy, Orlando also remarked benevolently upon the faith and work of the South Slavs and of the Rumanians for national fulfillment. Sonnino held conspicuously aloof from the gathering, and most of his fellow-ministers sided with him. The Congress met in the great hall of the Palazzo dei Conservatori at the Capitol, redolent with memories of Giuseppe Mazzini, whose spirit seemed to some observers to hover over the meeting. It was recalled that just before Italy made war upon the Hapsburg power in 1866, Mazzini had exhorted: Let Italy's alliances be with the peoples whom Austria has forcibly yoked to her car, with the peoples who in their turn seek to assert their liberty and independence. . . . Inscribe

598

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

upon your banner the sacred words, "For us and for you," and wave it . . . before the eyes of the Hungarians, the Bohemians, the Serbs, the Rumans, the South Slavs. . . . Oratory flowed in spate as representatives claiming to speak the mind of the several Hapsburg nationalities laid working foundations for cooperation. Chairman Ruffini in his opening remarks said that Italy, by backing the aspirations of the nationalities, intended to unify and intensify "the work of the disintegrating forces within the Austrian Empire." It was gratifying to Italian ears to hear Trumbic eloquently declare in their language that the common watchword was "Austria shall no longer exist in the world." Benes expatiated on the themes that the war was being fought against Budapest as well as against Vienna and that the House of Hapsburg was riding irrevocably to its fall. "If we should ever have an hour of discouragement and weariness," remarked the French politician, Henri Franklin-Bouillon, "the spectacle of the little martyred nations should be enough to recall us to our duty." It was deporable, Steed declared, that the real nature of Austria-Hungary was so generally misunderstood, for it was in reality an oppressive Asiatic sultanate, not a European state at all. Preaching a familiar doctrine, he said that "the destruction of this Dual Empire does not involve the dismemberment of a living body, but the release of many living and powerful bodies from a cruel thraldom." By way of retort to a recent denunciation of the "wretched Masaryk" by Foreign Minister Czemin, fraternal greetings were dispatched to the Czech savant, then on pilgrimage to Russia. Poles handed to the Congress a detailed memorandum in which it was charged that the Central Empires, public professions apart, wished to hold the Polish population in chains. By refusing to reveal fully its intentions concerning Galicia and by catering to Ukrainian cupidity,

The Dark and the Bright

599

the cabinet of Vienna intended to frustrate Polish national aspirations, it was stated. The memorandum made light of the Austro-Polish formula and asserted that only a free Poland reaching off to the Baltic would appease national appetites; a strong Poland together with an independent Bohemia, and a Greater Rumania could effectively throttle, it was contended, any future German attempts to expand. In the name of Rumania, a Dr. Lupu denounced both tsarist and revolutionary Russia for betraying his country, and he protested in shrill accents over the treaty which the Central Powers were about to impose upon Bucharest. 4.

Committees of the Congress, meeting in private, devised plans to coordinate psychological warfare against the Monarchy, to deal with the problem of Hapsburg prisoners captured by the Entente forces, and to hold a second conference. Tlie formal resolutions of the gathering scolded Vienna as the veriest cat's-paw of Berlin, demanded liberation for each nationality from the Hapsburg ball and chain, and pledged cooperation of all in the struggle against oppressors.9 On the side, Italians and Yugoslavs reaffirmed in essentials the program previously drawn up in London; territorial controversies, for instance, would be so adjusted as not to injure the legitimate ambitions of their respective countries. Yet by dodging basic disputes, the negotiators reduced the statement of purpose in fact to an inconsequential exercise in piety. An unpublished set of Congress resolutions begged the Entente and American governments to declare that political freedom for the national communities of the Dual Monarchy was an object for which the war was being 9 René Albrecht-Camé, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference ( NewYork, 1938), pp. 347-348.

600

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

fought and to take positive action which would encourage the Hapsburg nationalities in the struggle for independence. Surveying the doings in Rome, Benes believed that a capital stroke had been made for fruitful propaganda inside the Monarchy, while La Serbie of Geneva supposed that what had been accomplished would impel drastic revision in official Entente policies on Central Europe and that, in turn, would inspire ecstasies of resistance among the enslaved Hapsburg peoples. Seemingly pleased over the outcome of the deliberations, Trumbic exclaimed that the dissolution of the Monarchy "is not only our hope, but may soon be a fact," and he praised Orlando for pursuing a course that "commands our confidence." An appeal by him to South Slavs fighting in the Hapsburg armies against Italian forces to lay down their arms elicited a modest response, and he adjured Boroevic, Austro-Hungarian commander on the Isonzo front, not to repeat the blunder of another Croat, Jelacic, whose valiant military services in 1848-1849 to the Hapsburgs were rewarded by the "enslavement" of his countrymen. Nevertheless, South Slav soldiers, captured in the war, who volunteered to fight alongside of Italian troops, were bluntly informed that their services were not required, and an office of the South Slav Committee in Rome fell under the frown of the Italian cabinet and soon closed up. Nor was the Pasic ministry happy over the Rome Congress, for it was suspected that Trumbic had assented to territorial gains by Italy that were inimical to the image of Greater Serbia.10 Prime Minister Orlando said his cabinet sympathized wholeheartedly with the decisions of the Congress and described Italo-South Slav solidarity as a necessity of Entente military success. It io Musulin to Burian, May 10, 1918, P.A., Schweiz, 1918; Ostovic, The Truth About Yugoslavia, pp. 72-73; Croatian Studies, I ( 1 9 6 0 ) , 101-103.

Weisungen, Journal of

The Dark and the Bright

601

seemed to Bissolati that the Congress had clarified the fundamental points that the prerequisites of Entente victory were "Bohemian independence, the unity and independence of all South Slavs, and the dissolution of Austria-Hungary"; and the L'Unité prematurely pronounced a funeral oration upon the London Treaty. Even the Idea Naziorude acclaimed Italian championship of the unfree Slav peoples; yet it reproached French journalist Gauvain for "obstinate Italo-phobia" when the Journal des Débats invited the Consulta to identify itself officially with the Rome resolutions. For the purpose of consolidating the achievements of the Congress, a monthly review, La Voce dei Popoli, was launched, having as its battlecry the Mazzinian watchword, "Italy cannot live but by living for all"; apart from articles mainly on the Danubian Monarchy by Italian writers, the publication carried contributions by SetonWatson, Benes, and others. As a mark of fellow-feeling for Slav secessionists, Italian moderates commemorated the execution of John Hus at a mass meeting in Rome, at which Ruffini extolled the Czech national hero as a champion of freedom of thought and national independence; for his address the orator was severely upbraided by the Vatican mouthpiece, Osservatore Romano. Similarly, the great patriotic anniversary of the Serbs, Kossovo Day, was enthusiastically celebrated at a rally in Rome; Trumbic was present and so was the American Ambassador Thomas N. Page (the only member of the ambassadorial corps to appear). Premier Orlando sent a message lauding the Serbs as "worthy of the epic warriors of Kossovo," and Sonnino communicated his best wishes in a colorless note, for the inescapable fact was that the Foreign Minister had not at all altered his fundamental posture on the Adriatic question. Although the ministry authorized the formation of a Czechoslovak legion, Sonnino threatened to resign if Yugoslav prison-

602

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

ers of war were permitted to organize 011 Italian soil. In a later day, Lloyd George would describe the Rome Congress as "a hollow sham. Sonnino never softened his asperity [toward the Yugoslavs] nor did that gentler but equally fanatical Italian, Orlando"; the Welsh wizard was better than half right.11 Not surprisingly, the principal sponsors of the Rome Congress derived genuine satisfaction from the meeting; one Briton, a full generation afterwards, could write, "It may perhaps be claimed that our little trio [Steed, Arthur Evans, and Seton-Watson], in this sustained effort at conciliation, helped to set in motion the avalanche that was soon to overwhelm the Dual Monarchy." And again, "It was the moral effect of this [Rome] Congress upon the nationalities inside Austria-Hungary that did more than anything else to precipitate its final dissolution." Another Briton looked upon the Congress as an historical turningpoint, since Italians and Slavs found "their aspirations and ideals to be in essential harmony," heralding the dismemberment of "that parasitical growth," the Hapsburg Monarchy. Italy had laid the foundations, the writer thought, "for that association of free and equal nationalities of which Mazzini dreamed as one day constituting the United States of Europe." 12 Plans were set in train for a second conference of Austro-Hungarian nationalities in July, 1918, or in the autumn, but official Italian opposition and resounding developments on the battlefronts first postponed and then canceled the project. Commemorating in May, 1918 the third anniversary of the entry of Italy into the war, Lord Robert Cecil appeared to approve the dissolution of the Monarchy, as envisaged at the Rome parley, and after that, the reunion of the fragments in some form. The British Undersecretary 11 12

Lloyd George, The Truth About the Treaties, II, 784-785. R. W. Seton-Watson, Slavonic Review, XXIV (1946), 54; ibid., Masaryk in England, p. 24; Edmund G. Gardner, "The Congress on the Capitol," Anglo-Italian Review, I (1918), 56-61.

The Dark and the Bright

603

for Foreign Affairs lauded the "spirit of brotherhood" in evidence at the Congress and the manner in which Italy had shown itself "ready to extend to the Poles, to those gallant Czecho-slovaks, to the Rumanians, and last but not least to the Yugoslavs, the principles upon which her own 'Risorgimento' was founded . . ." 13 "People talk about the dismemberment of Austria," said he, "I have no weakness for Austria; but . . . the true way to regard this problem is . . . the liberation of the populations subject to her rule. We are anxious to see all these peoples in die enjoyment of full liberty and independence, able by some great federation to hold up in Central Europe the principles upon which European polity must be founded unless we are to face disasters too horrible to contemplate." Terming the Cecil pronouncement the most effective statement for psychological warfare yet made by a British public official, the New Europe prophesied that the British stand would accelerate the disintegration of the Hapsburg armies; for the London Times, the Cecil speech meant that the cabinet felt committed to aid the Austro-Hungarian national communities in their struggle for freedom. Still gripped by the emotionalism of his verbal duel with Czernin (explained later) Premier Clemenceau of France formally received a deputation from the Rome Congress and bestowed his blessing on what had been done. In Washington, members of the Wilson administration had intently followed the proceedings at Rome, and it was recommended by Ambassador Page that the United States should publicly endorse the work done there, which would strengthen, he believed, the propaganda potential of the meeting. These several developments helped to inspire a Lansing statement of earnest sympathy for the aspirations of the Yugoslavs and the Czechoslovaks—a different tune, indeed, from the Fourteen Points. For the 13

London Times, May 23, 1918.

604

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

benefit of senior statesmen in Washington, the Italian Ambassador di Cellere tried subtly to reconcile the Treaty of London and the resolutions of the Congress. Yet leading dailies in the United States almost ignored the meeting in Rome until weeks after it had adjourned. Then the New York Times, unmindful that the affair was a private enterprise, stated that the Italo-Yugoslav quarrel had been resolved, putting an "end to the long weakening division of the forces of freedom"; indeed, what had been agreed upon represented "one of the high water marks of Allied diplomacy in the war." 14 A bill in the Senate applauding the Rome meeting never came to a vote, but immigrant groups in the United States from the Monarchy passed resolutions replete with warm approbation for the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities. The attitude in the Central Empires on the proceedings at Rome was aptly summarized by the Kreuz Zeitung as "the traitors' congress." It was no surprise that Italy, which had stabbed her former allies in the back in 1915, now posed as the protector of a pack of "galley-birds"; the Rome episode, the paper said, was "a shameless piece of theatricals constituting only a new disgrace" for the House of Savoy. 5. What transpired at the Rome Congress dovetailed neatly into far-reaching Entente plans to summon Hapsburg nationalities to revolt and be free. Into 1918, psychological warfare against the Monarchy had not been energetically pushed, but a new chapter opened when the newspaper magnate, Lord Northcliffe, was entrusted with the British propaganda department for enemy countries; in poor health at the time, Northcliffe, as a name, possessed greater symbolic value than his actual services. 14

New York Times, June 8, Aug. 29, 1918.

T h e Dark and the Bright

605

Taking as his motto, "Policy is to propaganda, what news is to a newspaper," this veritable Napoleon of British journalism gathered around him a set of specialists in the arts of publicity and in the peoples and politics of the Central Empires; particular care was devoted by the Northcliffe agency to the Hapsburg Monarchy, with Steed, Seton-Watson, and exiled Danubian patriots bearing the heat and burden of the day. After lengthy deliberation on basic problems of antiHapsburg propaganda, Seton-Watson concluded that seven subjects should be stressed: the complicated and artificial character of the dualistic structure of government; the reign of absolutism in portions of the realm before 1914; the foreign policy of the Vienna cabinet, especially in the Balkans; the racist ideology and practices of the Magyar governing oligarchy; the wartime atrocities inflicted upon the smaller national communities; the growth of patriotic movements for freedom; and Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially the Yugoslav complexion of its population and the popular desire to amalgamate with Serbia. On these themes, Seton-Watson picked half a dozen books and essays in the English language suitable for distribution, selected as many more in French for translation, and he also chose British writers competent to compose effective propaganda pamphlets.15 Like Steed he appreciated the urgency of a definite ministerial policy vis-a-vis the Monarchy, if propaganda were not to be seed sown on stony ground. Without a firm British official directive it seemed "far safer and wiser to refrain from all propaganda," which would "raise false hopes whose realisation there is no intention of assisting." Secessionists in the Monarchy were discouraged, Scotus Viator thought, by British refusal to enunciate precise policies, and they were "gravely alarmed by constant Memorandum by R. W. Seton-Watson, July 20, 1917. Seton-Watson Papers.

606

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

subterranean intrigues and conversations in Switzerland" involving agents of Britain and Austria-Hungary. At which element in the Monarchy, Seton-Watson wondered, should appeals be addressed—the governing classes or "the submerged races"? If the former, then publicity should emphasize the interests of the dynasty, appeal to groups that were keenly concerned to preserve the realm, to the Catholic Church authorities, who wanted to retain their landed properties and to check the spread of Orthodoxy and Bolshevism, to the aristocracy, especially of Bohemia, which was paramount at the court in Vienna and at the Ballplatz, and to the landed magnates of Hungary. On the other hand, if the British cabinet should decide to rally separatist enthusiasms among the Hapsburg nationalities, then the accents in propaganda should be placed upon the practical implications of self-determination, the futility of expecting constitutional reform, and the idea that lasting peace depended upon the solution of the "burning questions" of the Yugoslavs, of Transylvania, Bohemia, Poland, and Italia Irredenta. Seton-Watson also enumerated certain fundamental features of the Monarchy which should be held in mind in shaping the content of propaganda: the increasingly bitter cleavage between social classes; the land hunger of the rustics; the anticlerical, a-religious outlook of the intellectuals; the dominance of Jews in finance and commerce; and the total subordination of Austria-Hungary in foreign affairs to Germany, which exploited the Monarchy for German gain. The prevalence of revolutionary currents, stimulated by the rigors and horrors of the war, could be further accentuated, he wrote, though admittedly, that weapon was "two-edged and increasingly dangerous." At one point, Seton-Watson hestitated to approve an incendiary propaganda proclamation addressed to land-hungry Magyar peasants, but

The Dark and the Bright

607

later he thought "simply written literature" of that character would produce a profound effect.1® For the instruction of Northcliffe, Steed drew up a memorandum in February, 1918, outlining the alternatives of an independent peace for the Monarchy, leaving the state much as it had been, or of dissolution. Steed argued for the latter policy and for concentration upon the larger national groupings with democratically oriented propaganda, the destruction of the House of Hapsburg, and one day the creation of a Danubian Confederation of non-German states; if possible, Italy should be persuaded to cancel the Treaty of London.17 Seeking a ministerial directive, Northcliffe transmitted the Steed memorandum to the British war cabinet, which, without committing itself to the principle that the Danubian Monarchy either could be or should be riven asunder, authorized propaganda operations to promote Germanophobe and pro-Entente tendencies and interests; in this wise, the cabinet of Vienna, it was imagined, might be compelled to sue for peace. Clearly, official London still nursed hopes of detaching AustriaHungary from Germany. Disappointed by the character of the ministerial response, Northcliffe sought a more positive statement, but when that was not forthcoming his team quickly set about with a war of words. Specifics of action were discussed at a conference in London in March, 1918, delegates from France, Italy, and the United States batting around ideas with Britons. As the emissary of this group, Steed conferred with military intelligence officers at Italian headquarters, who uniformly believed that only firm assurances of liberation to the Hapsburg nationalities could avert a dangerous renewal 1 6 Memoranda by R. W. Seton-Watson, Dec. 7, 1917, and probably of early February, 1918. Seton-Watson Papers. 1 7 Steed, op. cit., II, 186-189.

608

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

of the military offensive which had struck the Italians at Caporetto. When the German forces on March 21, 1918 cracked the British front in France, Clemenceau seconded the opinion of the Italian military men. In a fresh appraisal of the value of the Rome Congress for propaganda purposes, the points were made that Italy now accepted the principle of freedom for the small nations of the Dual Monarchy, that representatives of the Yugoslavs and of the Italians had come to an agreement (both judgments require a good deal of reservation), and that five nationalities of the Monarchy had for the first time collaborated on an anti-Hapsburg program. Separatist sentiments inside the Monarchy were fostered and propaganda reached Austro-Hungarian soldiers by means or pamphlets, a daily paper in four languages, and through undercover agents. Airplanes, balloons, and rockets showered masses of defeatist, revolutionary literature on Hapsburg troop concentration areas, and phonographs wafted snatches of Slav folk melodies into enemy trenches to prove that the soldiers on the other side of the battlefront were in fact friendly to the Slavs; over the signatures of Masaryk and Trumbic, patriotic manifestoes were addressed to Czech and South Slav troops and special appeals were directed to Magyars. Austro-Hungarian soldiers were carefully informed on military reverses suffered by the Central Powers and they were called upon to clasp hands with the democracies of the west; deserters were promised food, clothing, and safety. 18 As is related farther along, the policies of the Wilson administration and of the cabinets of Britain and France on Austria-Hungary sharpened in the spring and summer of 1918, which somewhat facilitated the labors of the warriors in words. Yet debilitating friction raged inside 1 8 William E. Daugherty, A Psychological more, 1958), pp. 351-358.

Warfare

Casebook

(Balti-

The Dark and the Bright

609

an Inter-Allied Propaganda Committee at Padua, Italy; at one point the Polish representative quit and his South Slav and Rumanian colleagues threatened to do likewise. This nasty situation and the desirability of codifying Entente and American official pronouncements on Austria-Hungary led to the calling of a general propaganda conference. Meeting in London on August 14, 1918, the delegates listened to an "eloquent and convincing" address by the Italian G. A. Borgese, pleading that disputes over Italo-Yugoslav claims should not be raised, but other representatives felt that the cabinet of Rome should come out unequivocally for a united, independent South Slavdom; it was not until September 9, however, that the Italian ministry issued the desired declaration. At the London meeting, the wisdom of exploiting the land hunger of the Magyar peasant and of fostering proletarian disturbances in cities of the Monarchy came under discussion, and it was agreed that more effective use should be made of immigrant colonies in the New World to carry forward psychological warfare in central Europe. 6. Through Swiss channels, Americans, official and other, endeavored to weaken the will to win in the Danube Monarchy by spreading Wilsonian doctrines on war aims, and through the inter-allied propaganda headquarters in Padua, Americans played a modest role in propaganda, stressing the futility of continuing the war in the face of the immense American resources, and they described the bright era of tranquillity and general well-being that awaited the return of peace. On the whole, though, American publicity energies were more heavily engaged in shoring up Italian morale than in undermining faith and hope or fostering desertion and revolt in Austria-Hun-

610

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

gary; experienced opinion-molders, not gifted amateurs, had charge of the activities.19 The significance of psychological warfare in bringing to pass the eventual break up of the Hapsburg Monarchy defies anything approaching exact computation. Entente managers of the campaigns and writers in the defeated country have undoubtedly exaggerated the importance of publicity operations in promoting defeatism and revotionary ferment inside the Monarchy.20 As early as March, 1918, Prime Minister Seidler assured the Austrian parliament that determined efforts were being made to counteract the corrosive influence of the Northcliffe offensive, and articles in the Neue Freie Presse implored politicians to guard their language, since Entente propagandists pounced upon statements likely to stimulate secessionist feelings. To the end of his long life, Steed believed that Entente defeatist literature imparted an immediate and important impulse to Hapsburg troop surrenders, without which the Italian armies might not have been successful in the June, 1918, offensive on the Piave; but the British Ambassador in Rome heavily discounted that assessment.21 As has been intimated, SetonWatson rated highly the effects of propaganda upon the citizens of the Monarchy. After the armistice, he told Northcliffe that if Britain had been blessed with more leaders like him "the war would have been won far sooner." Pleased by this tribute, Northcliffe answered in 1 9 Musulin to Czemin, Ap. 1, 1918, P.A., Krieg 7, Amerika; Charles E. Merriam, "American Publicity in Italy," Amer. Political Science Review, XIII (1919), 541-555; William Miller to Seton-Watson, July 9, 1918. Seton-Watson Papers. 2 0 Representative studies include several books by Hermann Wanderscheck, notably Weltkrieg und Propaganda (Berlin, 1936), esp., pp. 183-191, and Helmut Bickel, Englische Propaganda für das Recht der Kleinen Völker während des Weltkrieges (Jena, 1939). It is interesting that Benes, reviewing wartime propaganda in perspective, felt it had accomplished miracles—bad miracles. Compton Mackenzie, Dr. Benes (London, 1946), p. 278. 21 Sir Rennell Rodd, Memoirs (3 vols., London, 1922-35), III, 353-357.

The Dark and the Bright

611

a kindred vein, "My rule is simple and lazy. First find people who know their subject deep, deep down and then support them, irrespective of criticism and attempts at 'wobbling' . . . Your Italian friends make pilgrimages of remonstrance. All they get from me is some excellent Vermouth."22 On balance, Entente psychological warfare, directed as it was at spirits that were receptive, and appealing to leaders of Austro-Hungarian national communities as well as to the rank and file, helped to promote desertion and revolutionary insurgencies. 7. The March Revolution in Russia quickened popular hopes in the Hapsburg Monarchy that the struggle with the eastern colossus would swiftly come to a close. Happenings in the east crowded other news from the press and elicited optimistic predictions on the shape of things to come. "When the Hungarian public becomes aware that negotiations of some land are going on . . . it is apt to fall back upon its long cherished idea of a separate peace with Russia," reported the American Consul in Budapest. But Die Zeit cautioned that whether the Russian upheaval would "hasten the end of the war, as is generally assumed on our side, depends upon further developments" there.23 Vienna Socialists cordially saluted the Russian revolutionaries, but their printed statement of applause and a sympathetic speech by Viktor Adler fell under the ban of the censorship. From the Petrograd Soviet, on the other side, issued a ringing summons for unity among the working classes, "the brother proletariats of the Austrian-German coalition" being singled out in a special 22 R. W. Seton-Watson to Northcliffe, Jan. 21, 1919; Northcliffe to Seton-Watson, Feb. 17, 1919. Seton-Watson Papers. 2 3 William Coffin to Penfield, Mar. 10, 1917, American Embassy Papers, Vienna, vol. XLIII, (1916-17); Die Zeit, May 10, 1917.

612

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

appeal. But shortly, the Soviets, still controlled by moderate collectivists, rejected the idea of a peace treaty with the Central Empires alone, yet pleaded for a general settlement, free of annexations and indemnities, and implementing the principle of self-determination. At this point, Lenin cried, "To us a separate peace means entering into an agreement with the German robbers, who are quite as predatory as the others . . The foreign minister in the Provisional Government, Pavel N. Miliukov, demanded full speed ahead in the fighting and, as has been indicated earlier, the liberation of the Austro-Hungarian nationalities—positions which shortly forced his withdrawal from the cabinet. Official Vienna interpreted the revolutionary ferment in Russia either as the prelude to fresh vigor in prosecuting the war or as the preparation for a peace settlement. Czernin avowed that the Monarchy cherished no annexationist designs upon Russia, though the Ludendorff faction in Germany, as has ben explained, had very different ideas. During the spring of 1917, conversations, which are shrouded in considerable mystery, proceeded between politicians of the Central Empires and of Russia, but no terms of settlement that would have been satisfactory to the Germans would have been approved by the new regime in Petrograd, it may dogmatically be asserted. 24 8. On the morrow of the November, 1917 seizure of power, the Bolshevik chiefs called upon all the belligerent countries to lay down their arms, and when the western cabinets indignantly spurned the overture, Leon Trotsky, in his capacity of foreign commissar, applied to the Central Empires for an immediate cease-fire and for 24

Cf. Epstein, Erzberger, pp. 164-181.

The Dark and the Bright

613

negotiations on "a democratic peace" from which annexations of territory and indemnities would be excluded. As an earnest of good intentions, Russian commanders were ordered to stop shooting, and soldiers were instructed to fraternize with Hapsburg and German troops. With avidity the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin seized upon the chance to eliminate Russia wholly from the military arena. "Peace at the earliest possible moment is necessary for our salvation," Czernin wrote, "and we cannot obtain peace until the Germans get to Paris— and they cannot get to Paris unless the Eastern Front is free." Sensing the widespread feeling of relief in the Monarchy, due to the prospect of peace with Russia, Professor Redlich confided to his diary, "What a tremendous change! Decaying Europe saved by the Communists. Peace may be arranged in a couple of weeks." Andrdssy wrote in Budapesti Hirlap, " . . . I can very well imagine a peace by which Austria-Hungary would annex nothing and which would still be acceptable. . . ." When delegations of the Central Empires and of the Bolsheviks got their heads together on armistice conditions, the German Major-General Max Hoffmann dominated the scene, as indeed he did all transactions that culminated in the notorious Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Bull-headed and imperious, Hoffmann possessed detailed knowledge of eastern Europe, knew the Russian language, and spoke the mind of the German supreme command. The Bolshevik representatives demanded as the price of a truce that no Central Power regiments should be shunted to the west of Europe and that soldiers in the rival armies should be permitted to fraternize freely while discussions on a peace settlement were under way. Hoffmann blustered, but eventually yielded. Dated December 15, 1917, the cease-fire would remain in force for four weeks; conversations on the conditions of peace commenced on December 22, at German army headquarters

614

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

in the east, in Brest-Litovsk, a grim Polish community which had been terribly battered in the fighting.25 The deeper motives of the exultant, optimistic Bolsheviks in trafficking with the Central Empires were revealed by Trotsky in language of singular precision. "We began peace negotiations," he wrote, "in the hope of arousing the workmen's parties of Germany and Austria-Hungary as well as those of Entente countries. For this reason we were obliged to delay the negotiations as long as possible to give the European workmen time to understand the main fact of the Soviet revolution itself and particularly its peace policy." Before the war, Trotsky had resided in Vienna for a time and he expected Socialists there to lead the Monarchy in emulating the Bolshevik precedent. Throughout the Brest parleys, Czernin and his AustroHungarian colleagues, though in principle occupying a place at the center of the stage, in practice played the role of an unbrilliant second to the Germans. The Ballplatz ignored a resolution of the Austrian parliament asking that representatives of the national communities should have seats at the conference. Hapsburg makers of policy wanted a swift settlement with the Russians, which might hasten the coming of a general peace, exert a tonic effect upon morale at home, and, not least, would unlock the granaries of eastern Europe for the hard-beset Monarchy. While Czernin pursued a course of moderation and fought the soaring territorial pretensions of the Germans, he was repeatedly obliged to bow to the will of the powerful ally; in milder degree, the German Foreign Minister von Kiihlmann, likewise, knuckled under to the military masters. 2 5 The best study of Brest-Litovsk is John W . Wheeler-Bennett, The Forgotten Peace (London, 1 9 3 8 ) ; Max Hoffmann, Die Aufzeichnungen des Generalmajors Max Hoffmann ( 2 vols., Berlin, 1929); Czernin presented his version of the transactions in 7m Weltkriege, pp. 2 8 9 347; see Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch, " L a Paix de Brest-Litovsk, Revue d'Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale, VII ( 1 9 2 9 ) , 10-24.

The Dark and the Bright

615

It was a curious company that assembled at Brest to hammer out a peace treaty: professional Russian revolutionaries, novices in diplomatic negotiation, but adept in diffusing the Bolshevik faith and hope, pitted against hard-boiled German commanders and Central Power experts in the techniques of diplomacy, some of them scions of the proudest Hapsburg aristocratic houses. At the first plenary session, the Bolsheviks proposed that all armed forces should be withdrawn from foreign soil and that the inhabitants of Russian Poland, Lithuania, and Courland should themselves determine their political destiny. Not only did the Germans angrily repulse these points, but they demanded that the Bolsheviks should recognize that extensive sections of the Russia of 1914, peopled by non-Russian speaking folk, had in effect cut loose from their old moorings. A furious duel ensued, which threatened to disrupt the conference, and Czernin talked of entering into separate dealings with the Bolsheviks, if the Germans refused to consent to plebiscites in areas which they coveted. That threat, if threat it was, left Hoffmann cold. On Christmas Day, 1917, Czernin reiterated his fundamental objectives of a peace without forcible annexations or indemnities. Three days later he hastened to Vienna to report on the tragicomedy at Brest and was instructed by his Emperor not to come back from the conference without a treaty in his satchel; senior AustroHungarian personalities with whom Czernin conferred in Vienna seem to have approved his behavior at the peace parley. At Brest, on January 9, 1918, the negotiators of the Central Empires found themselves face to face with the formidable Trotsky, talented for procrastination. Although he had been briefed on Trotsky by Viktor Adler, Czernin was quite unprepared for the man he in fact encountered—"an interesting, clever fellow, and a very dangerous adversary," he tells us in his memoirs, "ex-

616

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

ceptíonally gifted as a speaker," and displaying "all the insolent boldness of his race." It was infuriating, too, that Trotsky had on his team the Galician-bom Karl Radek, technically an Austrian citizen, a spunky, little, hunchbacked chap, skillful in propaganda. Trotsky, on his side, summed up the performance of the Bohemian aristocrat at Brest as neither "impressive nor dignified." Yet both men were animated by a consuming passion for a quick settlement. Between Trotsky and the German annexationists an interminable and distinctly arid debate on self-determination raged on. Back in Vienna, the Socialist daily fretted over the slow pace of negotiations and warned that if a settlement were not come to promptly "a complete change of system would be necessary. . . ." Censors erased several lines and blotted out the entire lead editorial of two days later.26 Armed with hardly anything more than explosive ideas, Trotsky indulged in doctrinaire harangues, addressed to the proletariat of the world and especially of the Central Empires, a tack that heralded the beginning of the end in prized European traditions of sobriety and scrupulous courtesy in diplomatic transactions. On January 12, Hoffmann countered the Bolshevik's vituperation in a roughly phrased speech that made it pellucidly evident that Germany intended to cut away the Polish area of Russia, Lithuania, and Courland; while the Hapsburg delegation disliked Hoffmann's tone, it acquiesced in the purpose, but the press at home protested in chorus against the projected German territorial acquisitions. Ill in body, Czernin was rendered the more uneasy in mind because of reports of heightening physical distress in Austria-Hungary and of ominous outbreaks among industrial wageworkers. "If this unprecedented state of affairs continues," Czernin wrote the Emperor, "we shall unquestionably be confronted with a great collapse and 26

AZ, Jan. 9, 11, 1918.

The Dark and the Bright

617

revolution." Charles responded that "the whole fate of the Monarchy and dynasty depends on peace being concluded as quickly as possible." Since each side rejected the claims of the other, the Brest conference rapidly reached complete deadlock. On January 18, talks were suspended to allow consultations with policymakers at home. At a crown council four days later, Emperor Charles in the chair, Czemin voiced doubts concerning the making of a formal treaty with the Bolsheviks, but optimism on the chances for a separate arrangement with a contingent of Ukrainians, representing a revolutionary, national government. The Foreign Secretary insisted that concessions would need to be made if a deal were to be effected with the Ukraine, but Buriin and Hungarian Prime Minister Wekerle expressed dissent. Charles reiterated that treaties with both the Russians and the Ukrainians were imperative, and he observed sadly that the Austrian-Polish formula would have to be put in cold storage. Czemin also reviewed foreign relations before the Austrian Delegation, in a speech that partook of a reply to Wilson's Fourteen Points address. Once more he declared that the Monarchy sought neither territory nor financial payments from Russia. " . . . I ask not a single kreuzer, not a single square meter of land from Russia," he said, adding, "I shall never assent to the conclusion of a peace" on other terms. In flippant language, the Foreign Minister endeavored to minimize bellicose German outbursts at Brest, and he emphasized that a settlement with the Ukrainians would bring the Monarchy desperately needed foodstuffs. Whistling to keep up his courage in the dark, Czernin predicted that once treaties had been arranged in eastern Europe, it would only be a question of time, "to obtain a general and honorable peace." Eulogies of the peace-oriented foreign minister rang in the bourgeois press of Vienna, but the Socialist mouth-

618

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

piece admonished, "this is no longer a war of defense and Austria-Hungary is no longer available for a war of conquest; no matter for which of our allies." 27 The Bolshevik hierarchs at Brest, knowing of mass disturbances in the cities of the Monarchy (and of Germany), blandly assumed that a full-dress revolution would soon break loose. Adolf Joffe, a Bolshevik negotiator, who had first-hand acquaintance with Vienna, had remarked to Czernin, "We may yet be able to raise the revolution in your country too"; in his diary the Foreign Secretary noted, "We shall hardly need any assistance from the good Joffe, I fancy, in bringing about a revolution among ourselves; the peoples will manage that if the Entente persist in refusing to compromise." 28 Speaking to a Labour party meeting, the Bolshevik "ambassador" to Great Britain, Maxim Litvinov, declared, "We can already hear the rumblings of a storm in Austria," traceable to the diplomatic sparring at BrestLitovsk. A request by Trotsky to visit Vienna to confer on peace terms with Socialist leaders was curtly turned down. Upon returning to Brest on January 28, Czernin resumed his endeavors to bring the war of words between the Germans and the Bolsheviks to a firm agreement and to fashion an acceptable understanding with the Ukrainians. At a conference in Berlin he clashed acrimoniously with Ludendorff over the latter's annexationist designs and his interpretation of the alliance, the Bohemian aristocrat maintaining that Austria-Hungary was obligated to fight only for the pre-war domain of Germany. 29 Unable to budge the Germans on the annexationist issue, Czernin helped to conclude a deal with the Ukrainian NFP, Jan. 24, 1918; AZ, Jan. 25, 1918. Czernin. op. cit., p. 305. Protokoue iiber die Berliner Besprechungen vom S. Februar, 1918, and Czernin to Hohenlohe, Feb. 15, 22, 1918, P.A., Geheim, X L V I I / 3 22. 27

28

29

The Dark and the Bright

619

delegation; on the Hapsburg side, the burden of the conversations was borne by the seasoned diplomatist, Baron Friedrich von Wiesner, and by Nicholas Wassilko, an Ukrainian deputy in the Vienna parliament.30 The Ukrainian delegation spoke for a militant nationalist regime with headquarters at Kiev, which on January 22, 1918, had proclaimed independence from Russia. Recruiting its leadership from intellectuals, the Ukrainian national movement mustered few trappings of strength and never attracted mass backing. Patriotic pride proved a poor administrator and the negotiators at Brest lacked experience in high politics. While parleys proceeded, a Red army thrust into Kiev for a short interval; for survival, the Ukrainian adventure in independence was utterly dependent upon the arms of the Central Powers.81 Claiming all areas of Ukrainian speech, the Ukrainian diplomatic team sought eastern Galicia and the Bukowina from Austria, the Cholm district in the southwestern corner of Russian Poland, and lesser parcels. Mixed in language, Cholm was coveted on grounds of nationality both by Poles and Ukrainians; reluctantly the Austrians acquiesced in the Ukrainian demand on this point, and on February 9 a treaty was signed, the first peace settlement since the fighting began. A secret codicil stipulated that eastern Galicia and the Bukowina would be formed into a separate Austrian crownland.32 In exchange for manufactured goods, the Ukrainian Republic pledged 3 0 Hans Beyer, Die Mittelmächte und die Ukraine, 1918 (Munich, 1956). 3 1 John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920 (Princeton, 1952), a masterly guide through a fierce political and social jungle. 3 2 For contemporary analyses of the Cholm contentions, consult Alexander Barwinski, ' Der Vertrag von Brest-Litowsk und der Cholmerland," OR, LV (1918), 200-208, a learned presentation of the Ukrainian case; Anon., "Der Vertag von Brest-Litowsk und die Cholmer Frage," ibid., LVI (1918), 53-57, a statement of the Polish position; Anon., "La Protocole Secret de Brest-Litovsk sur la Galicie Orientale," Revue i' Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale, XV (1937), 274-278.

620

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

shipments of grain and rawstuffs to the Central Powers. Highly elated over the "bread peace," Emperor Charles wired his foreign minister that the day the treaty was signed was the happiest of his far from happy reign. Popular demonstrations occurred in leading cities of the Monarchy; jubilant Viennese celebrated the glad tidings for days, and a solemn service of thanksgiving was conducted in St. Stephen's. Men of widely divergent political outlooks hailed Czemin as a prince of peace, though he declined to accept Charles' offer that he should be raised in fact to the dignity of a prince. Yet a bitterly cacophonous protest was sounded by patriotic Austrian Poles because of the award of Cholm to the Ukraine. Houses in Galician cities flaunted banners of mourning, workmen laid down their tools for a day, and places of entertainment were closed; in Russian Poland, Governor Szeptyicki of the Austrian occupation zone and his staff resigned, as did the Kucharewski ministry, and the Regents issued an emotional blast over the "new partition" of Poland, and threatened to resign. Part of the Polish troops, Colonel Joseph Haller commanding, deserted, and they beat their way across Russia and eventually to France where Haller was given charge of the Polish army there; other Polish soldiers, after fights with Croatian troops, were imprisoned. During a stormy parliamentary uproar on February 19 in Vienna, Poles and allied Czech and South Slav deputies engaged in verbal battle with Austrogermans and Ukrainians, precipitating a ministerial crisis; altogether, it was a remarkable manifestation of Polish nationalism, which impelled the chastened cabinet of Vienna to declare that the verdict on the Cholm district was not final. No new arrangement, however, was worked out with the Ukraine Republic, and at war's end Hapsburg military authorities turned Cholm over to the Poles.

The Dark and the Bright

621

9.

The Bolsheviks not only denied the validity of the treaty with the Ukrainian Republic, but Trotsky declared that they would neither fight the Central Empires nor conclude peace with them. He and his colleagues straightway left Brest, believing or affecting to believe that the revolutionary Bolshevik trumpet would cause the Central Empires to collapse on the pattern of the walls of Jericho. Without meeting significant resistance, German armies, though not Hapsburg, thrust farther into Russia, pressing to within a hundred miles of Petrograd, which they could have occupied in a couple of days. What amounted to resumption of war provoked loud outcries in the Monarchy, both officially and in newspapers. "Bleeding from a thousand wounds, Russia today menaces nobody," cried the Arbeiter Zeitung, "What the German Empire does is its own affair. AustriaHungary can neither prevent nor resist it. But ninety per cent of the Austrians say, 'Germany's new war against Russia is not and shall not be our war.'" Only if necessary to keep open transportation routes to the Ukraine should a new offensive be mounted, the Netie Freie Presse counselled; the Fremdenblatt preserved an eloquent silence. Bolshevik leaders diverged radically on the question of war or of peace on the German terms, Lenin arguing that since the knees of the enemy are "on our chest" immediate capitulation was necessary for the survival of the revolutionary regime. If the German price was paid, the proletariat of Europe would be incited to rebel, contended Lenin, and any territory that might be signed away would before long be recovered; conjoining threats of resignation to his argumentation, Lenin managed to

622

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

persuade most of his senior colleagues that fighting the Germans would be absolutely unrealistic, futile, and disastrous. From the most serious challenge ever offered to his ascendancy, the new Red tsar emerged triumphant, thus saving the Soviet adventure from almost certain extinction. Formally, on February 24, the Bolsheviks tossed in the sponge and the armies of Germany ceased rolling; on a later day, Hoffmann regretted that he had cast away the opportunity to march straight into Moscow and crush the Communist heresy. On February 28, a Bolshevik deputation from which Trotsky, who had washed his hands of diplomacy, was conspicuously absent, arrived in Brest, and three days later the delegates affixed their signatures (protesting the while) to what unmistakably was an open covenant openly arrived at. 33 Czernin assigned the final stage of treatymaking to a Ballplatz specialist, Baron Kajetan von Merey, so that he could concentrate on a peace settlement with Rumania. Under the Brest Treaty, territorial clauses lopped off a third of the pre-war tsarist population and arable land, more than half of the industrial facilities, and almost all of the coal mines. The dimensions of the truncated Russia were essentially those prevailing before the advent of Peter I; and yet, if the Ukrainians are considered a distinct nationality, the lands lost by the Bolsheviks were inhabited very largely by non-Russian folk. Of immediate concern to Austria-Hungary, the Bolsheviks acknowledged the freedom of the Polish area and of the Ukraine, and the new dictators of Russia were committed to "refrain from all agitation or propaganda" directed at the governments or institutions of the Central Empires. This pledge, however, was not worth the parchment on which it was written, for 3 3 The Treaty is conveniently available in Cooke and Sticlcney, op. tit., pp. 561-564.

The Dark and the Bright

623

Bolshevik emissaries visited Austro-Hungarian prison 1 camps preaching thei ;d in the organizaBolsheviks never tion of Communist thought of the Brest-Litovsk document as anything more than a piece of paper presently to be scrapped. Lenin explained, "We have signed a Tilsit peace just as [once] the Prussians did, and just as the Prussians freed themselves from Napoleon, so we will get our freedom." By the November, 1918, armistices, the treaty with the Central Powers was canceled. In the making of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which grossly transgressed the moderate principles often avowed by the Ballplatz, Czernin was unable to affect German policy by even a little; the document incorporated essentially the aims of the German supreme command. Not inaccurately was it remarked that the Hapsburg foreign secretary "merely played the dulcet wood-wind in harmony with Hoffmann's blaring trumpet." Austrian Socialism violently condemned the Draconian character of the treaty, which the Arbeiter Zeitung pilloried as an instrument to protect the material interests of landed proprietors in central and eastern Europe from the peril of agrarian insurrection. "The Baltic barons and the Polish schlachta, the Prussian Junkers, the Magyar magnates, and the Rumanian boyars—all can enjoy the fruits of this peace"—and the censorship in Vienna allowed that interpretation to appear in print! For the outside world, the settlement at Brest-Litovsk and extensive amputations of pre-war Russian territory freshly confirmed the rapacity of the military masters of Germany. Entente psychological warfare harped upon the treaty as impeccable proof of what a "peace by understanding" meant in reality to Berlin, and the Entente made full use of the treaty in stimulating the popular will to fight on to total victory. Besides, die treaty con-

624

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

tributed to the conversion of President Wilson to the doctrine of total defeat of the enemy states.34 10. Under the agreements with the Ukrainian nationalists, troops of the Central Empires moved eastward, ousting Bolsheviks, and Austro-Hungarian regiments advanced into Odessa. Shortly, the Ukraine was divided into two loosely demarcated zones of occupation, one German, one Hapsburg, and the region became indistinguishable politically from a ward of the Central Empires.35 Vienna dispatched the veteran diplomatist, Count Johann Forgach to head the civilian administration in the Ukrainian zone and Field Marshal Alfred von Krauss was ultimately placed in command of the Hapsburg armed forces, totalling ten divisions. Food was relatively plentiful in the Ukraine and when the operatic star, Maria Jeritza appeared in Odessa to entertain the Austrian garrison, sne bought provisions and shipped them to relatives in Vienna. Yet the vision of the Ukraine as a veritable cornucopia of provisions was pardy frustrated by disputes between the Central Powers; bickering had become so acute that General Hoffmann noted in his dairy: The Austrians "are behaving with their usual meanness when the knife is not at their throat. . . . It is a pity the Italians do not attack. One can deal with the Austrians only when they are in difficulties." It was suspected in Hapsburg circles that the Germans wished to make themselves permanent masters of the entire Ukraine and even 3 4 The President manifested little interest in the precise content of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War (Princeton 1956), pp. 372-376. 3 5 Alfred von Dragoni, "Die österreichische-ungarische Operationen zur Besetzung der Ukraine, 1918," Militärwissenschaftliche und Technische Mitteilungen, LIX (1928), 267-288; Hugo Kerchnawe, Die Militärverwaltung in den von den österreichisch-ungarischen Truppen Besetzten Gebieten (Vienna, 1928), pp. 359-389.

The Dark and the Bright

625

to acquire for the new Republic, the Ukrainian-inhabited districts of the Monarchy; as if to forestall that possibility, Vienna, in July, annulled the promise to set up a distinct Ukrainian crownland in Austria. On the other side, the Germans and their Ukrainian puppets feared that Hapsburg agents were intriguing to combine all areas of Ukrainian speech in a state presided over by Archduke William of Hapsburg, who was familiar with the Ukrainian language and warmly sympathized with Ukrainian nationalism; matters came to such a pass that Emperor Charles ordered the Archduke to exercise maximum restraint, lest he seriously jeopardize the relations of Vienna with Berlin. Apart from disputations at the top, shipments of food from the Ukraine were hampered by peasant resistance and by transportation difficulties—railways were in very poor shape, as was shipping on the Black Sea and the Danube. In desperation, the Emperor, appalled by eyewitness evidences of cruel want and misery in Bonemia, wired his commander in the Ukraine (April 1, 1918), "the most important task of the troops . . . is the seizure and shipment of food. Provisioning of the army is not alone involved, but of first importance is the alleviation of hunger in the hinterland." For weeks, censorship kept citizens of the Monarchy ignorant regarding realities in the Ukraine, but in May stories trickled in of fighting between natives and soldiers of the Central Powers, who were collecting grain; "alleviation of our distress through the Ukraine has been insignificant," mourned Arbeiter Zeitung. An elaborate Austro-Hungarian organization to export grain and livestock was just starting to function well in the autumn of 1918 when the war ceased. From first to last, lawfully or by smuggling, the Central Empires secured somewhat more than 40,000 carloads of goods from the Ukraine of which less than a third reached Austria-Hungary, far, far less than had been

626

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

anticipated; about all that was exported from the straitened Monarchy to the Ukraine was mineral water! To obtain deliveries, almost forty Central Powers' divisions were locked up in the Ukraine, not the best fighting material, to be sure, but they would have been helpful in the 1918 chapters of the war in Italy and in France. When the panoply of Austrian and German authority in the Ukraine faded, troop discipline disintegrated in a manner not paralleled on the Italian front; soldiers looted property and even killed some of their officers. Ukrainian-speaking troops in the Hapsburg occupation forces formed the fluid nucleus of a post-war Ukrainian national army, under command of Archduke William. 11.

Though the Austrians failed to persuade the Germans to moderation in the settlement with the Bolsheviks, they secured more of their basic objectives in a treaty with Rumania. But in that settlement also, the Hapsburg power had to make compromises to appease allied governments.36 By reason of his special interest in Rumania, Czernin was personally and keenly concerned about this settlement; for him, the felon blow of the BrStianu cabinet in joining the Entente far transcended in turpitude the treacherous behavior of Italy. On December 9, 1917, the government of Rumania signed an armistice with the Central Empires. At that point, it was plain that no substantial assistance to Rumania would be rendered by the Entente or by the United States, that enemy forces were in a position to crush the remaining fragments of the heroic Rumanian 3 6 Czernin, op. cit., pp. 349-366; Buriin, op. cit., pp. 31&-323; for a contemporary Rumanian viewpoint, consult Nicolae Basilescu, La Roumanie dans la Guerre et darts la Paiz ( 2 vols., Paris, 1919), I.

The Dark and the Bright

627

army, and that Bolshevism in the form both of soldiers and ideas might invade the kingdom. For the explicit purpose of coming to terms with the Central Powers, popular General Alexander Averescu supplanted the discredited BrXtianu as prime minister. The January addresses of Lloyd George and Wilson on war aims had seemed to cancel the glittering territorial pledges made to Rumania when she unsheathed the sword. In a brief interview with King Ferdinand on February 27, Czernin assured him that the dynasty would not be deposed. "At this time," the Foreign Secretary explained later, "there was already a certain decline in the value of kings on the European market, and I was afraid that it might develop into a panic, if we put more kings off their thrones." Ferdinand complained that the peace terms proffered by Czernin were terribly hard, to which the Austrian retorted that Rumania, if its armies had captured Budapest, would have annexed extensive tracts of Hapsburg soil as was promised in the Entente treaty of August, 1916. Attempts of the king to explain away pre-war Rumanian diplomacy were brusquely swept aside; either Rumania would accept the proposed conditions or fighting would be resumed.87 Within the week, a preliminary treaty was drafted, providing border rectifications favorable to Hungary (which Czemin held were not incompatible with the formula of "no annexation"), detaching all of the Dobrudja, and extending commercial and transport privileges to the victors; Czernin contrived to effect revisions in the economic demands of the Germans. At this juncture, Averescu gave way to the Germanophile Alexander Marghiloman, who was prepared to meet most of the Central Powers' demands in order to save the dynasty and he was hopeful of compensation by acquiring Bessarabia from 3 7 Report of meeting, February 27, 1918 by Czemin, P.A., Geheim, XLVII/7g.

628

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

revolutionary Russia. Despite furious protestations from Budapest, Marghiloman obtained significant modification in the frontier areas which would accrue to Hungary. The definitive settlement was signed at Bucharest on May 7, Burian by then having succeeded Czemin as director of Hapsburg foreign policy. Thereby, Carpathian districts, containing about one hundred and seventy Rumanian villages, strategically valuable and rich in timberlands, were ceded to Hungary; Burian hailed the gains as making the Hungarian frontier fully and finally secure. Besides, all of the Dobrudja was taken away, the southern section going to Bulgaria and the remainder being assigned to the Central Powers jointly for future disposition, an arrangement that embittered Bulgar chauvinists who coveted the whole region. Have our allies, blurted out the Sofia Dvenik, "invited us to the feast merely that we should serve the guests?" Since Rumania was granted a free hand in Bessarabia, where a local assembly had already voted in overwhelming proportion for union with the Regat, the losses of land were not really onerous. If the territorial clauses of the Treaty of Bucharest were relatively mild, the economic provisions reduced the kingdom to a mere satrapy of the Central Empires. Not only were they given a controlling position in leading industrial establishments and in transportation facilities, but they were granted a long lease over the valuable oil-fields; it was fancied in Vienna that this "petrol peace" would profit the victors equally with the "bread peace" with the Ukraine. Surplus Rumanian grain and livestock, furthermore, were to be sold to the Central Empires exclusively, and Rumania agreed to the passage of troops of the Central Powers into Russia and to prohibit irredentist agitation. The bourgeois press of Vienna adopted a strikingly critical tone on the Bucharest Treaty. Hungary, it is true, had gained by annexing frontier fragments, but Austria had benefited very little, and it was

The Dark and the Bright

629

suggested that an indemnity should have been extracted from the wealthy Rumanian proprietor class. The Arbeiter Zeitung, on the other hand, boldly pointed out that land had been annexed in violation of principle; "Our children will have to pay," it lamented, "for the establishment of an Alsace on the shores of the Black Sea." 38 At a Socialist rally in Vienna, both the Bucharest and the Brest treaties were denounced, and a large part of the resolution managed to escape the censor's axe. The peace treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk wrote finis to formal fighting in the east, though the settlements turned out to be as fleeting as the vastly more grandiose structures erected by Napoleon earlier and by Hitler later. As a source of supplies, Rumania proved more helpful to the Hapsburg Monarchy than did the Ukraine; requisitioning of foodstuffs by the conquerors went to such lengths that the peasantry in places were deprived of seed for the next planting, and tne livestock population dropped to approximately one-fifth of the pre-war level. When Central Power controls came to an end, many a Rumanian peasant household, an American agent discovered, had turned vegetarian, subsisting on grass, leaves, and roots. And, by its share in the Rumanian peace and in the desolation of the country, the Hapsburg Monarchy forfeited nearly all of what remained of her capital of good-will in the high counsels of London and Washington. Lord Robert Cecil flayed Czernin for violation of his professed principles of no annexations and no indemnities, a piece of hyprocrisy that was more reprehensible, the Briton declared, than Prussian brutality. It seemed to many western watchers of the times that, in the language of the Philadelphia Press, "the bitter dose" Rumania had been "compelled to swallow is but a taste of what the whole world" would be forced to undergo 18

AZ, May 8, June 2, 1918.

630

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

if military victory should alight on the banners of the Central Empires. 12. Whatever lingering hope President Wilson may still have entertained that Emperor Charles was groping his way toward a separate peace was shattered as a sequel to an important address by Czernin on April 2, 1918 before the municipal council of Vienna. In a sweeping survey of the international panorama, the Foreign Minister remarked that Wilson's speech of February 11 recognized that Vienna and Berlin could not be split apart. "Whatever happens, we shall never abandon German interests, just as Germany will never leave us in the lurch," he stated. The formula for peace which the President had set out Czernin described as a suitable foundation for talks on a general settlement; he reasserted the necessity of armament limitation and harshly berated Hapsburg citizens who were not pulling their weight in the war effort and politicians who by their treasonable doings were lending aid and comfort to the enemy. "The wretched and miserable Masaryk," he shouted, "is not the only one of his kind. There are also other Masaryks within the borders of the Monarchy," even though the great bulk of the Czechs were devotedly loyal to the crown. Czernin also alluded incautiously to feelers for peace emanating from the French Premier, tempestuous Georges Clemenceau. Said the Foreign Minister, "Sometime before the offensive launched in the West, M. Clemenceau inquired of me whether and upon what basis I was prepared to negotiate. I immediately replied, in agreement with Berlin, that I was ready to negotiate, and that as regards France I saw no other obstacle to peace save France's desire for Alsace-Lorraine. The reply from

The Dark and the Bright

631

Paris was that France was unwilling to negotiate on that basis." Intending by this revelation to depress war morale in France and to furnish ammunition to French politicians who hated "the Old Tiger," and possibly to persuade Italians that the war raged on simply because of French insistence upon the recovery of the "lost provinces," Czernin committed in fact a gross ineptitude, which Clemenceau adroitly turned to his own advantage. Without equivocation die Premier branded the Czernin allegation concerning soundings for peace as a lie. Not Paris, he thundered, but Vienna had made entreaties for a separate peace and he said he possessed a letter written by Emperor Charles acknowledging that the French claims to Alsace-Lorraine were justified. The Ballplatz frigidly retorted that the Frenchman was playing fast and loose with the truth, and it published in summary form the Armand-Revertera consultations on which Czernin had based his remarks. Clemenceau dramatically put the cat among the pigeons by printing in the L'luustration the "Sixtus Lettter." While the Ballplatz in effect charged the Premier with brazen forgery, the Emperor wired Berlin that the passage in the document concerning Alsace-Lorraine was "completely false." More followed, Clemenceau insisting that the letter as printed was absolutely authentic, which was true, though the Frenchman erred in claiming that the Emperor sought an independent peace.89 Nonetheless, the affair robbed Charles of prestige in his own and in allied countries, which was never regained; his adventure in creative leadership in search of peace had redounded to his discomfiture. Apologists pointed out that the stand of the Emperor on Alsace-Lorraine was no more immoral, no 89 Scott, op. cit., pp. 299-322; René Pinon, "Clemenceau et l'Autriche," Revue Politique et Parìementaire, CXCIV (1948), 154-162; G. Lowes Dickinson, (ed.), Documents and Statements Relating to Peace Proposals . . . (London, 1919), pp. 30, 41, 173-184.

632

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

more reprehensible, than German support in 1914-15 of Italian pretensions to Hapsburg territory. The Clemenceau bombshell and the donnybrook of charges and counter-charges created an immense international sensation, climaxed by the resignation of Czemin. In the heat of the excitement the Foreign Secretary threatened to take his own life if the Emperor did not explicity repudiate the "Sixtus Letter" as a crass fabrication; he even proposed, alternatively, that Charles abdicate his thrones! Ignorant of the exact text of the "Sixtus Letter," unwilling to shield his monarch from the taint of treachery to the German ally, and wishing to be released from the gathering confusions, Czernin, whose relations with Charles had previously undergone severe strains, resigned from the Ballplatz. "J'ai été trompé par mon Empereur," he cried in agony of mind. In his post-war apologia, Czernin voiced keen regret that his labors for a compromise understanding through Washington were abruptly ruptured. Well before the Sixtus uproar, he wrote, highly placed personages had turned the Emperor against him; confident that he had been pursuing sound tactics and honorable policies, the former foreign secretary lamented that he lacked the cleverness and the patience to overcome the nefarious Hapsburg court entourage. Czernin had sufFused the fiction of independence from Berlin, commented the London Times, and of his personal yearning for peace, but the new helmsman at the Ballplatz would find it less easy "to spread this delusion." The whole unpretty spectacle, the odious accusations of perfidy by the Imperial House powerfully agitated the public mind of the Monarchy. Patriotic Austrians were inclined either to accept as established the charge of forgery in Paris or angrily to brand Empress Zita and her family as traitorous intriguers, who should be completely excluded from public business. "The blue sky smiles upon

The Dark and the Bright

633

Italy, all the world laughs at Austria," ran a wry Viennese witticism; but the censorship quickly silenced criticism. In a series of articles, the Neue Freie Presse tried to prove that Clemenceau either forged the "Sixtus Letter" or falsified the contents, and Czernin was applauded as "a political personality of commanding force and vigor, desirous of delivering the world from the horrors of war." The clerical Reichspost believed that Czernin had actually instigated the peace mission, chosen Prince Sixtus as liaison man, and approved the "Sixtus Letter"; Berlin, it averred, had given its consent to this maneuver. In remarkable speeches in parliament by the Czech Vlastimil Tusar, the Slovene VerstovS, and the Ukrainian Petrusevii, Charles was extolled, while Czernin was reviled for betraying "our popular young Emperor."40 Defending the crown, Prime Minister Wekerle told the Hungarian parliament that the king had consistently striven for the restoration of peace in conjunction with the other Central Powers. A personal examination of the "Sixtus Letter" had convinced Wekerle that it contained nothing but a search for a peace settlement in concert with Germany, and the resignation of Czernin he ascribed to the latter's feeling that some time before he had lost the full confidence of the king. Answering a query posed by Karolyi on Czernin's responsibility for the "Sixtus Letter," the Premier said that key portions of the document had been twisted and forged and that the Foreign Minister, even though he denied foreknowledge of the letter, was cognizant of the negotiations in general and therefore was responsible. Wekerle referred to "a certain unrest" aroused by the letter, especially in Germany. In fact, despite official German assertions of faith in the loyalty of the Emperor to 40 NFP, July 17-23, 1918; for a realistic portrait of the excitement in Vienna provoked by the Sixtus controversy, see the relevant entries in Redlich, Tagebuch, II, 264-270. Cf. Zeman, op. tit., p. 159.

634

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

the alliance, and despite Charles' gradiloquent rhetoric, "my guns in the West will give the answer," Germans, high and low, were profoundly shocked over the Sixtus business and Entente psychological warfare extracted the maximum propaganda value out of the affair. Under the caption "Discipline," a British magazine published a cartoon of a schoolroom in which William II, represented as a stern, angry teacher, held a switch behind his back. Before him cringed a terrified boy holding a piece of chalk which had been used to scribble on a blackboard, "France ought to have Alsace-Lorraine." To Carl Hapsburg's remark, "Please, sir, I didn't write it," Dr. Hohenzollern answered, "For the credit of the school I shall publicly accept your denial. All the same, my boy, you will now step into my room." 41 Intense distrust and enmity toward Vienna reigned in Berlin, Ambassador Hohenlohe reported, and it would be extremely hard, though not impossible, to restore confidence, he thought.42 It was slyly observed that Charles was a dual monarch in truth for he was allied to Berlin, yet dickered surreptitiously with Paris. Critical though the German press was of the Hapsburg House, it lauded the virtuous Czernin, who was presently decorated with an Iron Cross. Before long, Charles and his senior advisers set off on an appeasing Canossa-like pilgrimage to Spa, the German military headquarters. In another generation, Nazi partisans, out to destroy lingering affection for the Hapsburg dynasty in Austria, dwelt upon the Sixtus transaction as incontrovertible evidence that the former reigning family had stabbed a faithful ally in the back. London Punch, Ap. 24, 1918. Hohenlohe to Burian, Ap. 24, 1918, P.A., Preussen, Berichte, 1918; certain responsible Germans imagined that Sixtus had been seeking to win the crown of France for himself or for a relative. Wedel to Hertling, May 5, 1918, F.O. 553/330. Amusing likewise was a story that the French confessor of Zita in translating the damaging letter from German into French had inserted "just" before the word ' claims" on Alsace-Lorraine, and had thus falsified the intention of the Emperor. 41

42

The Dark and the Bright

635

The Sixtus eruption evoked more regret in official London and Washington than satisfaction. Critically minded British M.P.'s charged Entente statesmen with deliberately wrecking a promising chance to restore peace. Foreign Secretary Balfour first parried the accusation, then remarked that he personally had taken no part in the talks with Sixtus, and he dismissed the affair as a subtle "peace offensive" designed to divide the Entente and offering no firm basis for an honorable settlement.48 According to the New Europe the purpose of the Emperor had been to bring off a deal with France to the detriment of Italy; what the cabinet of Vienna really thought on the subject of peace, the journal said, had been all too plainly disclosed in the settlements with Russia, the Ukraine, and Rumania. The writer pointed anew the moral that it was folly and futility to seek an end to the war by diplomacy. For Italy, Sonnino announced that when informed of the Sixtus peace errand he had not objected, though he felt nothing would come of it, and that he had not participated in the conversations. With not a little acerbity, patriotic Italian newspapers assailed Anglo-French politicians who looked upon the Danube Monarchy with sympathetic eyes, and they dismissed the notion of splitting the Central Empire bloc as dangerously illusory. As in Britain, so in France a broad segment of opinion felt that Clemenceau by publishing the "Sixtus Letter" had ruined prospects of drawing Vienna into a separate peace, and that view prevailed widely in Washington as well. Clemenceau slammed shut the door—the chink of hope had never been anything but slight—on the Wilsonian dream of enticing Vienna away from Berlin. Intemperately, Secretary Lansing reproached the Frenchman for 'intemperate conduct" and "astonishing stupidity." Attributing Clemenceau's stroke to personal pride, Wilson 43 H . of C. Parliamentary 16-17, 175-176, 569-587.

Debates, CVI, May 13, 14, 16, 1918,

636

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

greatly deplored what had been done since it had "riveted" Austria-Hungary to Germany permanently and shattered any chance of a compromise settlement; in consequence, the United States must now strive to turn "the Austrian people against their own government by plots and intrigues," a procedure that was intensely repugnant to the President and alien, he was sure, to the genius of his country. Half-heartedly he resolved now to promote rebellion in the national communities of the Monarchy and to shiver that venerable complex into fragments.44 Czemin withdrew from the Ballplatz with the praise of Austrogerman admirers sounding in his ears. In the Austrian house of lords he repeatedly defended his handiwork at the Ballplatz and spoke handsomely of the faithfulness of Berlin; hostile deputies, on the other hand, such as the "Young Czech" enfant terrible Adolf Stránsky, reproached him as an ignoramus in the management of foreign relations, a pliant tool of German imperialism. Czemin conferred occasionally with the Emperor Charles which excited rumors that he might be appointed to an important public post again; in fact, the estrangement between the two men was too deep to be bridged, and Charles even spurned as amusing a post-war overture for reconciliation. The Emperor could not rid his mind of the conviction that the Bohemian aristocrat had served him badly. « Sir Arthur Willert, The Road to Safety (London, 1952), p. 158.

IB. Inaito Austria ON DECEMBER 2 0 ,

1 9 1 6 , THE EMPEROR CHARLES PICKED A

prominent, clerically inclined Bohemian aristocrat, Count Henry Clam-Martinic, for the office of Austrian prime minister. Supposedly, he would be able to rally important segments of Czech political opinion to the crown.1 Having had a good deal of experience in the Bohemian assembly and in the upper chamber of the Vienna parliament, Clam had served in the war with distinction and had briefly presided over the Austrian ministry of agriculture. A fluent speaker and gifted in reconciling divergent viewpoints, Clam held on as premier only to June 23, 1917. Among his colleagues, a second German Bohemian, Joseph M. Baernreither, stood out for ability and statesmanship; "Habsburgtreue" through and through, he had consistently advocated appeasement of the Czechs and South Slavs. 1 The Bohemian large landowners were about equally divided in political inclinations between Austrogermans and Czechophiles. See Wedel to Bethmann-Hollweg, Dec. 24, 1916, no. 364, F.O. 5 5 3 / 2 9 9 ; Consul in Prague to Bethmann-Hollweg, Dec. 24, 1916, no. 6885, F.O. 5 5 3 / 2 9 9 .

637

638

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Aside from grappling with formidable problems born of the war, the Clam ministry undertook office with the intention of revising the constitution 2 and of calling parliament into session. By way of preliminary, Clam wished to reach an understanding with leading deputies of the nationalities, which would rule out disreputable spectacles such as had so frequently upset parliamentary decorum before the war. Austrogerman bourgeois interests clamored for constitutional reform so devised as to ensure the ascendancy of their group; they asked, indeed, that changes of that sort should be arbitrarily ordained by the crown before parliament met, but Charles wisely turned thumbs down. In fact, the young ruler disliked the notorious Article XIV of the constitution which empowered the sovereign to issue decrees possessing full force of law. After the accession of Charles, agitation for the calling of parliament, never absent since the commencement of war, mounted in intensity. The torrent of complaints over the conduct of the war, over the dictatorial authority of the military, and over the increasing hardships laid upon civilians rose to tidal dimensions, and a cataract of momentous events—the March Revolution in Russia and the impending entry of the United States into the grim struggle—hastened the decision of the Emperor to revive parliamentary activity. The upheaval in the eastern colossus shook the Monarchy on the Danube far more violently than the abortive Russian Revolution of 1905. The Emperor apparently remarked that what had happened proved that the whole range of Austro-Hungarian public affairs had to be infused with a democratic flavor; appropriately, military authority in the Austrian civilian sphere was curtailed, army discipline in plants turning out military supplies was somewhat softened, and the war supervision 2 For wartime proposals on constitutional chance, see Wierer, op. cit., pp. 141-153.

Inside Austria

639

office was reduced to "the ministerial committee," without much power. Great slugs of confidence were ladled out to the Austrian public as the Russian capacity to fight sank lower and lower. But the ledger possessed another side, for since Russia no longer menaced the safety of the realm, popular desires for an early peace increased. "Patriotic" Socialists, for instance, had supported the war effort to save Central Europe from inundation by Muscovite barbarism, but any likelihood that Cossacks might march into Vienna had now disappeared! In an interesting analysis that appeared in Rabocaja Gazeta, the organ of the moderate, Menschevik branch of the Russian Marxists, we read: The position of Austria-Hungary is very abnormal and there is reason to think that a number of nationalities there are striving to free themselves from the yoke of Austro-Hungarian dualism. The Imperialists of the Entente make capital out of this aspiration, and also out of the aspiration of Poland towards unity. National self-determination . . . is . . . merely an empty sound on their lips. It was not in the name of national self-determination that they bought the participation of Italy . . . by the promise of a considerable part of the Adriatic coast inhabited by Slavs, or that they bought the participation of Roumania. . . . But let us allow that the various Austrian nationalities are beginning to demand independence. The Czechs . . . can form themselves into a separate state, but they will themselves be separated from the sea, and their economic development will be shaken to its foundations. On the other hand, the Serbo-Croats . . . by forming themselves into a separate state might cause serious harm to other nationalities of Austria-Hungary by separating them from the sea.3 The intervention of the United States in the war quickened the hopes of secessionist forces that Austria-Hungary 3 Quoted in The New Europe, i n (1917), 164.

640

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

would be broken into its national components; the Wilsonian evangel of self-determination emboldened exponents of Slav centrifugalism. To hold popular morale steady, bourgeois newspapers of the Monarchy kept repeating that the trans-Atlantic power would exert no substantial influence upon the ultimate outcome of the fighting and that it was improbable that the Monarchy and the United States would go to war with each other. 2. On March 12, 1917, an imperial rescript announced that the parliament of Austria would assemble at the end of May. The summons alluded to the urgent necessity of dealing with food and other wartime perplexities and promised that the censorship would be relaxed. The great Socialist daily of Vienna confessed that it did not know whether to rejoice or to weep over the announcement. "We in Austria ask ourselves sorrowfully," it remarked, "why it is that when everywhere new hopes are rising, nothing seems to improve in our country? . . . No parliament, no Delegations, no diets, in every direction the authority of the people is flouted."4 Privately, Emperor Charles gave instructions to prepare a manifesto on autonomy for the national communities and on manhood suffrage for Hungary, but the opposition of Clam and possibly of Czernin caused the manifesto to die in infancy. Proposals by Austrogerman bourgeois parties to exclude Galician and Dalmatian representation from the parliament, leaving the Germans with a commanding majority, likewise failed of realization; Czech deputies let it be known that if the Austrogerman plan was sanctioned, they would boycott the sessions. Clam went to great lengths to secure a firm pledge against anti-ministerial agitation by the Czech deputies, but without success. Yet, the same 4

AZ, Mar. 30, 1917.

Inside Austria

641

deputies spurned an appeal from Masaryk and his friends to boycott the Reichsrat and to sabotage the war effort. They were content to seek constitutional changes which would ensure the rights of nationalities. In the view of the influential German Bohemian deputy, Dr. Otto Lecher, the main tasks confronting parliament would be raising imperial prestige, making ready for peace, arranging economic relations with Hungary and Germany, adopting social welfare laws, and revising rules of parliamentary procedure so as to ensure orderliness in the transaction of business. Just before the parliament met, the Emperor appointed a long list of celebrities to the upper house; among those honored were Field Marshal Conrad and seven generals, Constantin Dumba, exambassador to the United States, Mayor Weiskirchner, Skoda, the cannon king, and Moritz Benedikt, proprietor of the Neue Freie Presse, the first newspaperman ever to sit in the Herrenhaus. The naming of Benedikt, the "plunderer," evoked a condemnatory editorial in the Arbeiter Zetfimg-"Benedikt als Erzieher" (June 7, 1917). On May 30, amidst torrid heat, parliament convened, many deputies wearing military uniforms; memorial wreaths were reverently placed on the seats of four members who had been killed in the war. Militant Czechs were irritated because deputies who had been convicted of offenses against the crown were barred from the hall and because Gustav Gross, a passionate Bohemian German, was chosen as presiding officer. In an elaborate speech from the throne, Emperor Charles (and the ministry) affectionately extolled the long career of Francis Joseph and appealed for faithful observance of the usages of parliamentary government. It was no little surprise to hear that Charles intended to postpone taking the oath to the Austrian constitution until "the foundations of a new, strong, and happy Austria" had been built. "The happy development of constitutional life," the Emperor

642

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

was convinced, "is not possible without expanding the Constitution and the administrative foundations of the whole of our public life. . . He expressed a desire for the creation of conditions "which will give scope, within the unity of the State . . . to the free national and cultural development of equally privileged peoples," an intimation of far-reaching liberalization in the constitutional framework, which, while vague, nonetheless suggested that a new spirit was in the ascendant. Deputies were reminded, after an expression of loyalty to Germany, that the constitution assigned responsibility for peacemaking to the crown, and the Central Empires, it was said, were ready at any time to make a settlement on terms equitable to both sets of belligerents. "The true peace formula," the speech explained, "is only to be found in a mutual recognition of a valiant defense, and in establishing conditions whereby the future life of peoples may remain free from anger and vengeance, so that for generations to come the appeal to arms may be unnecessary." Praise was lavished upon the Austrian population for its fortitude in the war—and in more restrained accents, upon the Hungarians; the inner strength of the realm, it was asserted, had been gratifyingly demonstrated by the success of a recent war loan. "May this be the beginning of an epoch of flourishing progress," ran the peroration, "a time of power and prestige for venerable Austria, and of happiness and blessing for my beloved peoples." Many a Slav deputy declared that he wished the dualistic regime with Hungary to be transformed and the central government of Austria drastically altered. Prominent Czech representatives, for example, appealed for an authentically federal system "of free and equal nationstates"; allusions by Czechs to a "Czecho-Slovak" nationality constituted a direct challenge to Hungary, since the Slovaks resided in the kingdom of St. Stephen. "Our

Inside Austria

643

aim," exclaimed the Czech Adolph Stransky, "is to transform the Monarchy into a community of free and equal states, which will exercise a natural . . . attraction upon both the Balkan Slavs and the great Polish nationality." On the subject of patriotism, Georg Striberfiy of the Czech National Socialist party, informed his colleagues, "I only know of a Czech, a Pole, a Ruthenian, an Italian, a Yugoslav patriotism, and so on. An Austrian patriotism is an artificially encouraged plant." Two Czech deputies, and only two, identified themselves with the Masaryk revolutionary crusade to destroy the Dual Monarchy. The Polish club asked for an independent Poland and passed into the ministerial opposition. In the name of restive Ukrainians, who wanted a separate crownland for their co-nationals, Deputy Petruszewycz stated that "if Austria does not wish to keep the Ukrainians, let her give them to the new Ukrainia, set free from the chains of the tsardom." Dr. Anton KoroSec, who presided over a Yugoslav parliamentary club, comprising seventeen of his Slovenes, eleven Croats, and two Serbs, called for a united South Slavdom within a Hapsburg federal union. On the other hand, Aurel von Onciul from the Bukowina declared that his Rumanian kinsfolk, if given a chance, would vote overwhelmingly for the Emperor Charles as sovereign of all Rumanians. Austrogerman deputies in the Reichsrat divided into three broad categories; first, the Socialists, whose ardor for the war had slackened notably and who were incensed over food shortages, other privations, and the long working day in industry; second, the Christian Socialists, unwaveringly faithful to the crown and the champion of the shopkeeper, the skilled artisan, and the little peasant; and third, an amorphous group, Hapsburg loyalists in the main, though an extremist wing was embittered by the refusal of the Emperor to safeguard Austrogerman interests by decree. This faction touched off angry disputes in

644

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

parliament by denouncing Czech defeatism and charging Slav soldiers with treachery; nevertheless, political exuberance was far more restrained than before the war. Socialists and Slavs joined forces in declining to approve imperial decrees abolishing jury trial and subjecting civilians to army courts. Following a devastating onslaught in the Arbeiter Zeitung against judicial murder by courts martial, the Reichsrat voted that citizens who had been sentenced by military tribunals might seek retrial in civilian courts; that measure involved further diminution in the arbitrary power of the army command and encouraged political dissidents to feel that they could engage in secessionist activity without fear of drastic punishment. Czech-Polish collaboration carried through a bill prescribing that speeches in parliament should be printed verbatim in the official parliamentary record in the language in which they had been delivered and in a German translation—an undisguised boon for deputies unfamiliar with the eight languages in which addresses were presented.5 Stransky paid a glowing tribute to Czech patriots who had been imprisoned on charges of subversion. Premier Clam flatly rejected Slav demands for constitutional reform, on the reasoning that they amounted to a Utopian brand of federalism; personally, he preferred "autonomous centralism" (whatever that might be) to either "one-sided centralism, or one-sided autonomy." He promised that an economic pact with Hungary would soon be concluded and that closer economic intimacy within the Central Powers confederacy would be fostered. Professor Josef Redlich, whom the Neue Freie Presse described as the ablest mind in the Reichsrat, spoke lengthily on the necessity of far-reaching constitutional changes, which should be effected by parliamentary decision, not 5

to

Wedel to Bethmann, June 17, 1917, no. 180, F.O. 553/288; 1, 1917, F.O. 553/329.

ibid., July

ibid.

Inside Austria

645

by imperial decree; many colleagues showered congratulations upon him.6 What Redlich said in parliament he expanded in richer detail to a gathering of moderate Austrogermans. "Either we shall leam to understand and bear with one another, or we shall cease to exist," he warned. "Austria can find salvation only by granting autonomy to its nationalities." The meeting resolved to launch agitation for constitutional reform assuring equal rights for the national communities. With a view to enlisting Slav backing for the ministry, Clam revealed that non-Germans would be appointed to new ministerial posts. Except for the more conservative Poles, the gesture failed to strike fire and the man who had grandiloquently proclaimed, "My program is Austria," felt obliged to hand over the seals of office on June 23, 1917, less than a month after parliament had assembled; Clam finished out his public career in the obscure post of military governor of Montenegro. 3. Naming Baron Ernst von Seidler, a professional civil servant who had once been his tutor in administrative law, as head of a caretaker cabinet, the Emperor cast about for a successor to Clam. "Mine is a terrible heritage," exclaimed Charles in anguish as the search proceeded. The times clamored unmistakably for a cabinet committed to a federal constitutional program calculated to satisfy all but confirmed secessionists in the national communities, and by steering on that tack the realm might yet have been saved from total dismemberment. Seidler announced on July 6 that an extra-constitutional committee representing the several nationalities would be set up to overhaul the constitution, but the plan stirred next to no enthusiasm and was soon forgotten. The semi-official ®iVFP, June 13, 14, 1917; Redlich, Tagebuch, II, 209.

646

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

government newspaper referred to the creation of a radically different constitutional structure "on the basis of national autonomy . . . within existing provincial frontiers," and Socialist papers pleaded for reconstruction on that basis. Czech Socialists adopted a resolution providing for a federal monarchy in which Bohemia would form a separate state, but that was utterly anathema to the Austrogermans since their co-nationals in Bohemia would then be subjected to the Czech majority.7 That federalism was the road to the salvation of the Monarchy many informed and far-sighted minds had long since come to agree, and not only in Austria. "Germany," declared the Berliner Tageblatt, "would welcome a federal Austria, which would remain, with a reconstituted Poland, a faithful ally of Germany. The Czechs and the South Slavs, even if given some autonomy, would be neutralized by the German-Magyar-Polish coalition." And the highly esteemed Vossische Zeitung of Berlin reminded its readers "that Austria is not a German state. . . . This state cannot be rendered healthy within, except by reorganization on the principle of nationality. . . . In such a future lies not only the strength of Austria, but also her chief value as an ally of Germany, both economically and politically. . . . The new, strong, many-peopled Austria will be our [Germany's] complement." One by one the Emperor sounded out candidates for the premiership; one by one they were put aside under one pressure or another in this extremely delicate hour in the destiny of the Monarchy. Count Arthur PolzerHoditz, an intimate of the crown, was considered, but he knew full well that his outlook on public questions made him unacceptable to the Austrogerman element, personified by Count Czernin, and to the rulers of Hungary. At one point Charles flirted with the notion of a dictatorship headed by a general, but quickly abandoned that 7 Fremdenblatt,

Aug. 3, 1917; AZ, Aug. 29, 1917; NFP, July 30, 1917.

Inside Austria

647

idea; nor could he bring himself to promote Coudenhove, governor of Bohemia, to the top Vienna office. Twice the Emperor conferred on the premiership with Redlich, outspoken advocate of federalization, who personally would have preferred the ministry of finance; yet he was willing to take office as prime minister, if the cabinet represented a broad range of political viewpoints, but he too was passed over.8 On the advice of Czernin, the Emperor talked the perilous situation over with Baron Max Vladimir Beck, an experienced and enlightened statesman, who a decade before had served as Austrian premier and who could count upon a good deal of support from deputies of all nationality groups. Beck made it clear that he would accept the thankless post of prime minister only if he were allowed to choose a representative ministry, but that, the Emperor, who had Utile personal liking for Beck, declined to concede.9 4

Dubbed the errand boy of Czernin, Seidler, an admirable specimen of the conventional Austrian bureaucrat, though not at home in managing politicians, felt no assurance that minor concessions to the national communities would guarantee domestic tranquility. Unable to create a "sacred union" coalition ministry, Seidler organized an alternative cabinet made up mostly of technicians, picked not for their political affiliations but for special competence in an area of administration; as novelties, a Slovene, Ivan Zolger, an expert on constitutional questions, and Johann Horbaczewski, an Ukrainian in the upper house of the legislature, were given places in the 8 Redlich, Tagebuch, I, xi-xix, II, 213-218, 273; Louis Eisenmann, "Joseph Redlich," Le Monde Slave, XIII (4) (1936), 386-392. 9 Wedel to Bethmann, July 8, 1917, no. 210 F.O. 553/293; Johann Christoph Allmayer-Beck, Ministerprasident Fremerr von Beck (Munich, 1955), pp. 269-276.

648

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

cabinet. It was an unexciting ministry, commented the Arbeiter Zeitung, which neither attracted nor repelled, merely left observers cold and unresponsive. In the meantime, the Emperor on July 2, 1917, published a decree of amnesty for civilians imprisoned by military courts, a gesture, he was persuaded, that would find high favor with Slav dissidents, Czechs especially. In one absurd instance of arbitrary action by a court-martial, an obscure Viennese clerk, Karl Langer, who had distributed a translation of the American pacifist song, "I didn't raise my boy to be a soldier," had been sentenced to death—but the punishment had been commuted to five years of penal servitude! Cursory examination of trial records horrified the Emperor, who found them "really worse than the Spanish Inquisition." After consultations with representative public personalities, Charles decided on his own responsibility to grant an amnesty, save for army deserters and émigré politicians. "I have chosen for this purpose," the imperial message explained, "the day on which my dearly beloved eldest son . . . is keeping the feast of the patron saint of his name. Thus the hand of a child who will be called one day to guide the destinies of my peoples leads those who have erred back to the Fatherland." 10 Several deputies were set free under the imperial order, which provoked an immense stir. While Socialist and Czech newspapers expressed ecstatic delight, the Neue Freie Presse adopted a reserved tone, though it suggested that the amnesty gave "the impression of wishing especially to produce a rapprochement" between Austrogermans and Czechs. Ardent Austrogermans and Magyars, however, protested indignantly over what they regarded as incredible softness in dealing with traitors, and when the Prime Minister read the decree in the Reichsrat, radi1 0 Lorenz, op. cit., pp. 370-378; AZ, July 3, 1917; Ludwig A. Windischgratz, My Memoirs (London, 1921), p. 174.

Inside Austria

649

cal Bohemian Germans interrupted him with shouts of "Long live high treason," and "Kramar for Premier!"; rabid Karl H. Wolf threatened to throw a table at his Czech colleagues. Even some moderate Austrogermans believed that an intolerable concession had been granted to dissenters and that Austrogerman loyalism had been flagrantly insulted. In disgust over the amnesty, Czernin, who apparently had no foreknowledge of the Emperor's intentions, contemplated quitting the Ballplatz, but changed his mind. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, in Vienna for conferences, and Ambassador Wedel, strongly disapproved of the amnesty, and conservative newspapers in Germany commented ironically upon the measure. Emil Ludwig in Vossische Zeitung attributed the act less to an impulse of clemency than to a prudent desire to resolve an ugly dilemma with a minimum of pain. Emperor William II, however, complimented Charles for a deed of authentic statesmanship and many a sober Austrogerman believed the amnesty would tone down internal controversies. Leaders of the Czech emigration were worried lest the amnesty might prove downright disastrous for the independence cause, since it would placate some malcontents, weaken allegiance to the Czech national ideal, and heighten the international prestige of the House of Hapsburg. 5. When parliament came together again on September 25, 1917, Seidler presented an agenda of work that emphasized economic and social tasks. It directed attention to the necessity of rearranging economic relations with Hungary—the dualistic regime itself was extolled as everlasting—and with Germany. A colorless passage referred to the possibility of home rule for the national communities to be achieved in such fashion as not to disturb exist-

650

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

ing provincial boundaries; that vague affirmation no more mollified Czech militants than a naive suggestion by Seidler that the Czechs would bridle their tongues if Emperor Charles was ceremonially crowned as king of Bohemia. The ministry saluted the recent papal peace bid with great warmth. "A strong Austria in which all nationalities feel happy," Seidler said, "is the best guarantee for lasting peace," and he promised post-war projects that would "make a paradise of Austria." The Prime Minister, wryly commented Die Zeit, had set forth "what will have to be done in the next ten years," without at all disclosing the path to be pursued in the next ten weeks. Although the Polish deputies were far from happy over the Seidler management of Austrian affairs, they bartered support of a provisional budget for pledges of rapid rehabilitation of Galicia, cessation of food requisitioning, and restoration of a civil administration in the province. Straightway Ukrainian spokesmen again demanded the establishment of a separate Austrian crownland embracing all Ukrainian peopled areas; never again, one declared, would the Ukrainians "wear the chains of Polish tyranny."11 The Czech Agrarian deputy, Karl PráSek avowed that his fellows had set as their price of cooperation the abolition of the dualistic system, the union of Czechs and Slovaks, and autonomy for the national communities. The appearance in the chamber of the recently amnestied Czecn, Francis Burival, unleashed a frenzied display of anger. Karl Wolf cried aloud against Czech disloyalty and the misguided generosity of the crown; "In a menagerie," said he, "one does not go to work with promises but with a whip." When Czechs retorted in kind, a second German Bohemian chauvinist barked, "Shut up or your ears will be boxed," and a Czech answered, "You, non-commissioned officer, come here and just try to box my ears, you blackguard." Shortly after that inH NFP, Sept. 28, Oct. 2, 6, 7, 1917.

Inside Austria

651

decent repartee, four Czech factions desirous of national autonomy merged in a coalition, and the Agrarian party, though it preferred to hold aloof, shared the general outlook of the others.12 Before long, about a hundred Austrogerman deputies organized a parliamentary bloc to protect Austrogerman interests and to increase solidarity with Germany. In a parliamentary debate of November 18, 1917, the Czech Agrarian, Frantisek Stanek, advised the deputies, "No peace, no recovery of Europe is possible . . . until on the ruins of the Monarchy flourishing national states blossom." Dualism must be destroyed, the Slovene leader Korosec chimed in, and the nationalities must be united in free states emancipated from alien control. Yet, no matter what intellectuals and patriotic politicians might say in Vienna, no one can determine to what degree the broad masses in the various national groupings were infected by an aggressive nationalism, by the spirit of separatism. For the first time since the onset of war, the Austrogerman Socialists, towards the end of October, 1917, met in formal congress. The problem of Austrian constitutional reformation, then and later, loomed large, with debate focused on two plans devised by the Socialist thinkers, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer; whereas Renner, in harmony with his traditional views, argued for sweeping away the boundaries of the historic crownlands and a federation of nationalities, each with a local parliament and all represented in a central legislature, Bauer, whose general orientation ran to the left, questioned whether the Monarchy could be preserved and tentatively leaned toward independence for all the national communities. Though the party congress endorsed the Renner program, as time marched on more and more Socialist leaders wheeled into line with Bauer. &NFP,

Sept. 23, 25, 26, 28, 1917.

652

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

During the meeting, Viktor Adler stoutly defended the pro-war posture of the Socialists in 1914, denying that they had credulously adopted the catchword of the "fight against tsarism." "If a house is on fire, the first thing is to extinguish the flame," he said once more. Formal resolutions saluted "the glorious victory over tsarism," and called for peace without annexations or indemnities, the restoration of Serbia and Rumania, an independent Poland, and an international discussion of armament limitation and arbitration. Subsequently a Socialist mass demonstration in Vienna with an estimated fifty thousand taking part, ratified these points and shouted for diplomatic recognition of the new Bolshevik regime.13 At just this time (November, 1917) a new biweekly publication, Revue d'Autriche, intended to diffuse understanding of the Monarchy internationally, made its début. Holding that Austria was a land that nobody knew, Professor Lammasch, a founder of the review, pointed out that the Austrian national communities enjoyed wider liberties and greater educational opportunities than in certain Entente countries. For better than a quarter century, he wrote, Czechs and Poles had filled ministries in nearly every cabinet; more debatable was his observation that "Austria had made most progress in the therapeutical treatment of nationalism." 6.

Three major developments in the last quarter of 1917 significantly touched Austrian minds and hearts: the sensational Caporetto offensive, the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia, and the declaration of war upon the Monarchy by the United States. Rather surprisingly, the censorship permitted the press broad latitude in re1 3 AZ, Oct. 24-28, 1917; NFP, Nov. 24, 1917; Kann, Empire, II, 175-178.

Multinational

Inside Austria

653

porting the epochal events and the growing chaos in the Slav colossus, and in so doing, journalism encouraged revolutionary sentiments inside Austria. Bolshevism appealed to Austrian Marxists in the urban proletariat, in the landless peasantry, and to the war-weary, attracted by the Communist watchword of an early peace. Revolutionary Marxist propaganda was systematically carried forward among Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war in Russia by means of study groups, leaflets, and newspapers; German readers, for instance, were furnished a daily Bolshevik sheet, Die Fackel (The Torch) later called Der Völkerfriede; materials similar in character appeared in the Magyar, Czech, Serbian, and Rumanian tongues. Sometimes, captured officers were physically coerced into professing the new faith.14 Among the converts, a Hungarian national, Béla Kun, stands out, for in 1919 he would assume direction of the first Hungarian adventure in Communism; upon his conversion, Kun adjured his fellows, "Return home and scorch the land from end to end." On January 4, 1918, the official mouthpiece of the Bolshevik party, Pravda, carried an "appeal to the proletariat of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the German Empire" signed by Socialist prisoners in Russia, and presently sections were formed in the Russian Communist party of nationality groupings from the Monarchy; members were expected to train as missionaries for revolutionary activity upon return to their homes. Said Kun again, "Let everyone of you be a teacher of revolution in his regiment"; parenthetically, efforts to enlist Hapsburg veterans in hastily improvised Red armies bore little fruit. It is impossible, of course, to evaluate the impact of returning ex-prisoners upon revolutionary currents in central Europe, but it seems to have been not inconsiderable. 1 4 Heinrich Raabl-Werner, "Der Einfluss der Propaganda den Kriegsgefangenen in Russland auf den Zusammenbruch Österreich-Ungarns," Militärwissenschaftliche und Technischen Mitteilungen, LIX (1928), 775-784.

654

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Most influential of the soldiers who came back to Austria was the Bohemian-born, Otto Bauer, educated in the University of Vienna. Before the war he had distinguished himself as a writer on nationality problems from a Socialist viewpoint and as a theoretician of "Austro-Marxism." In 1912, he had prophesied that social revolution would break out in the east of Europe and then race westward, "European capitalism carries social revolution to the East," he believed. "The war in the East comes out of the Eastern revolution. The Eastern war carries the social revolution back whence it come—into the world of European capitalism itself. It is the historical task of capitalism to produce the revolutions to which it will succumb." 15 A lieutenant in the Austrian army, Bauer had been captured early in the war and had been detained three years in a Russian prison camp; when he reappeared in Vienna, his thinking on basic propositions of Socialist thought had moved close to the convictions of Friedrich Adler.16 7. In January of 1918, Vienna and other substantial Austrian cities experienced the most serious civilian convulsions of the war era. Accumulated resentments among industrial workers due to war-borne hardships and to the trend of diplomatic negotiations at Brest-Litovsk combined with bitterness because of a sudden cut in the slim bread rations in Austria and with faint undertones of Bolshevism to produce concerted mass action. The harshest winter in a generation had hampered transport so severely that supplies of food and fuel, already short enough in all conscience, were further reduced. "We are faced with a catastrophe that will hit us in the next few 1 5 Otto Bauer, Der Balkankrieg und die Deutsche Weltpolitik (Berlin, 1912), p. 4. 1 6 Julius Deutsch, "Otto Bauer," Neue Österreichische Biographie, X (Vienna, 1957), 209-18.

Inside Austria

655

weeks, unless we receive foreign help," wrote Governor Coudenhove of Bohemia. Bleak as the prospects were in his province, he added, "the situation is much worse in other crownlands; there starvation has already begun." "The people are suffering from hunger," reported the Archbishop of Cracow; "bread rations have been cut down by half," wired the Governor of Trieste; "there is flour in Vienna," announced Mayor Richard Weiskirchner, "only till next Monday." Socialist-organized mass meetings on January 13, 1918 protested furiously against the sabre-rattling tactics of German General Hoffmann at Brest-Litovsk. "Without any warning or signal from the Socialists," Viktor Adler explained, "the idea had suddenly sprung up among the masses that if this hope [a peace settlement with the Russians] vanishes, and there is nothing to eat, we have nothing to lose." Starting spontaneously in a left-wing clique at the Daimler works at Wiener Neustadt, a strike movement spread to locomotive and munitions factories there and thence to other industrial centers. On the 16th, the Arbeiter Zeitung carried a flaming appeal to industrial wageworkers to put an end to the war; "the whole nation," it asserted two days later, "except a handful of greedy war profiteers, wishes for peace at last." In a militant manifesto, the executive body of the Austrian Social Democrats asserted that its followers refused to go on fighting "against Russia for the purpose of electing the Emperor of Austria king of Poland and of helping the king of Prussia to gain military and economic domination over Latvia and Lithuania." Workers should "raise their voices for . . . a peace without open or covert conquests, a peace based upon the genuine right of self-determination of the nations." In a parallel vein, Viktor Adler declared, "Peace must not be delayed by considerations of prestige or by questions of future plans. . . . We want a general peace, we want it unconditionally. We are not fighting for

656

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

annexation. . . . The Social Democrats would certainly be in favor of the annexation of Cracow by Warsaw, though not of Warsaw by Cracow." In the initial stages of the troubles, even the Neue Freie Presse sympathized with the strike movement and sharply censured the ministry once more for the food muddle. "The workmen are suffering and the middle classes are being destroyed; depression reigns throughout the realm," remarked this mirror of bourgeois respectability and dynastic loyalty. "Peace must be made with honor; it must not aggravate enmities, nor sow seeds of future quarrels." Yet the editor added, "Peace without annexations everyone wants, peace which would take away our territory, no one wants." 17 By January 17, about 200,000 wageworkers had downed their tools in Vienna alone, though the walkout was less widespread in the Czech provinces. Greatly alarmed, the Emperor that day wired Czernin, "The fate of the Monarchy and of the dynasty depends on how soon you will be able to arrange peace in Brest-Litovsk. . . . If peace is not concluded a revolution will break out here." To direct action, strikers elected shop councils on the pattern of the Russian soviets. For two days the only newspaper available in Vienna was a small sheet printed under the auspices of the striking workmen. Throughout this time of troubles, which up to a point resembled the course of events in Russia just before Nicholas II was forced to abdicate, Austrian workmen proved orderly and remarkably disciplined. Demands were set up for more food, the cancellation of military regulations in factories, broader suffrage in local government, and, not least, a prompt peace with the Bolsheviks. Monster rallies in the Hapsburg capital acclaimed resolutions demanding free discussion of peace terms in the press, negotiation at Brest 17

NFP, Jan. 17, 1918.

Inside Austria

657

in a spirit of reconciliation and without thought of territorial aggrandizement. Apprehensive of physical violence, the Hapsburg army command shunted several divisions of troops to the vicinity of Vienna, and plans were worked out for the establishment of a military dictatorship, if necessary, to maintain law and order; but breaches of the peace never approached the point of real danger. Moderate Socialists contributed effectively to the sobriety of mass demonstrations and to the speedy cessation of the uproar. The Seidler ministry, as instructed by Czernin, assured a deputation of influential Socialists that a reasonable settlement with the Bolsheviks would speedily be consummated, food supplies would be enlarged, and military controls in armament factories would be curtailed. A leftist faction that subsequently formed the nucleus of the Austrian Communist party, obdurately refused to accept these pledges. By January 21, almost all of the strikers were back at work, and, except for minor street disorders, the convulsion in Vienna had petered out; in Wiener Neustadt, disturbances stopped when strikers were threatened with machine-gun fire. Revolutionary elements lost whatever chance they had—and it was at best extremely slight—of imitating the Russian Bolsheviks. The clear-eyed Otto Bauer predicted that the sequel to an attempt to overthrow the prevailing regime would be the sweep of enemy and German armies into the Monarchy, which would be converted into "a battlefield on which the German and Entente forces would meet." Beyond doubt, however, the ferment among the wageworkers heightened the popularity of the left-wing of Austrian Socialism. It seemed to the Arbeiter Zeitung that the proletarian commotion had succeeded in the sense that it obliged Berlin to reduce its treaty demands upon the Bolsheviks. "The working classes of Austria," the Vienna correspond-

658

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

ent of the Frankfurter Zeitung reported, "are now aware of their power. Wisely a trial of strength was avoided; in view of the feeling of the whole population, including the troops, such a trial would not have ended in favor of state authority. . . . Austria is not in the camp of the Pan-German annexationists." The Vossische Zeitung believed that the strike movement had been engineered by Austrian Bolsheviks, "who in their weekly organ, Der Kampf and especially in their martyr Friedrich Adler possess increasing means of propaganda." The grave troubles in Austria became a major conversation piece in Germany, and when the Socialist paper Vorwärts of Berlin published accounts of the happenings, it was immediately suppressed, and the same fate befell the Berliner Tageblatt; nonetheless, the proletarian fever leaped across the German frontier. For Leon Trotsky the Austrian worker outbursts signified "the first recognition of our method of conducting the peace negotiations, the first recognition we received from the proletariat of the Central Powers anent the annexationist demands of German militarism." From Bolshevik headquarters in Russia came an appeal addressed "To all foreign countries," which read, in part, "The statesmen of Austria are appeasing their restless people with statements that the Central Powers are not trying to annex, but are striving for a democratic peace. . . ." Yet in reality, "the conditions of peace as proposed at Brest-Litovsk are nothing less than a demand for monstrous annexations. . . ." Cautiously, the London Times advanced the theory that the public authorities of Austria were privy to the popular demonstrations, intending thus to apply pressure on the German ally to release more food to Austria and to strengthen the diplomacy of Vienna in the talks at Brest. The writer of the editorial did not miss the opportunity to reiterate that the Entente could not accept a peace settle-

Inside Austria

659

ment which left unchanged the lot of "the subject Hapsburg races [sic]." 18 Echoes of the Austrian turmoil penetrated across the Atlantic and evoked from former Ambassador Penfield a statement that, "Every person in Austria-Hungary is heartily tired of the war. . . . The scarcity of food has reduced all classes, high and low, to a condition bordering on starvation." A notable cartoon on Austria in the New York World, entitled "Coming Through," showed a mound of broken military equipment through which was thrust the strong arm of "the common people," holding aloft a liberty cap. In Washington, Congressman Simeon D. Fess of Ohio, who imagined himself an authority on the Hapsburg Monarchy, scented revolution as the postlude to the industrial strikes and argued that the war must emancipate the nationalities "from the yoke of the Hapsburg oppressor." It was the view of Theodore Roosevelt that the strike movement had put the Monarchy in worse condition than Germany—not at all, to be sure, a novel thought. 8. Reconvening on January 22, the Austrian parliament remained in session for nearly two months.19 The larger questions that came under consideration were the annual budget, which, thanks to Polish votes, was accepted by a confortable majority, and the perennial nationality problem. Seidler wobbled uncertainly between denunciation of Czech untrustworthiness and approval of the idea of autonomy on a pattern akin to that espoused by the Renner school of Socialists. "In the great world-league of nations," warned the Arbeiter Zeitung, "there is no room for the old Austria; if Austria is to continue to exist, it London Times, Jan. 23, 1918. Erna Zellmayer, "Das österreichische Parlament im Jahre 1918"— a doctoral dissertation in typescript at the University of Vienna, 1951. 18 19

660

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

must be changed into a union of free nations. . . ." From the Czech side, Václav Klofác shouted in parliament, "Long live democracy, long live the new, free Europe, long live the free Bohemian-Slovak state, long live selfdetermination of peoples, which will end the present butchery and yield rich blessings to humanity," and certain South Slav deputies let it be known that they wanted nothing less than a united and independent Yugoslavia. Austrogerman loyalists flailed away at Slav separatism, usually with words, though on one occasion a round of fisticuffs broke loose, obliging the president to suspend the session. Tempers erupted again when Seidler promised to establish a district court at Trautenau, which Bohemian Germans had been demanding for two generations; Czech deputies denounced the pledge as an indefensible infringement on the interests of their conationals. No little controversy was aroused in parliament by the treaties of peace with the Ukraine and with Russia, the Polish Club precipitating a cabinet crisis over the cession of Cholm. The Prime Minister repeatedly stated that quantities of sorely needed food would presently be flowing from Ukrainian granaries, and he defended the dispatch of Hapsburg troops eastward, which Socialists had sharply criticized, as protection against Bolshevik inundation. Socialist deputy Karl Seitz bluntly declared, "the war has ceased to be a war of defense and has openly become a war of conquest." But bourgeois Austrogerman deputies and the bourgeois press of Vienna generally applauded the management of diplomacy by Czernin. Under the impact of the withdrawal of Russia from the fighting, an elderly and pugnacious Christian Socialist deputy, Robert Pattai, declared that Austria-Hungary should keep the war going until all its enemies had been defeated. Amidst tumultuous applause from Christian Socialist benches, Pattai exclaimed optimistically,

Inside Austria

661

"We are the victors, and we demand the palm of victory." Yet Lammasch, who, as a confidant of the Emperor, had just returned from the nebulous talks on peace with Herron in Switzerland, upbraided Czemin for stating that the Monarchy must fight on to assure German retention of Alsace-Lorraine, and he pleaded that the Ballplatz should grasp the olive branch held out by President Wilson, but should remain faithful at the same time to the German ally.20 His forthright advocacy of a compromise peace was drowned out by a storm of cries, "We want war and victory," and the historian Heinrich Friedjung censured Lammasch as "not merely naive, but positively dangerous," beguiled by the glittering rhetoric of the trans-Atlantic Chief Executive. Never happy in the premiership, Seidler more than once begged Emperor Charles to permit him to resign. Press comments, especially in the Vienna Socialist daily, scathingly assailed the do-nothing, uncreative ministry. Parliament adjourned on May 4. Seidler using the occasion to make lyrical predictions that the months just ahead would bring resounding military successes for the Central Empire and that the grave food crisis would be soon overcome. At the middle of May, Czech patriots and representatives of other Slav national groupings staged ominously anti-Hapsburg demonstrations in Prague, to be recounted farther along. Tacdessly, Seidler poured oil on the flame by announcing that Bohemia would be partitioned for administrative purposes into Czech and German areas; Czech patriotic sentiment firmly insisted upon a unified Bohemia in which Czechs would profit from a majority position. Yet it was believed by the moderate Illas Naroda that "the entire Czech opinion contemplates a Czech nation within the framework of Austria, under the Haps20 Heinrich Lammasch, Europas Elfte Stunde (Vienna, 1918), pp. 160-172; Benedikt, Meinlgruppe, pp. 246-248.

662

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

burg scepter." At a parliamentary session in June, a Czech Socialist, Vlastimil Tusar, who one day would serve as prime minister of Czechoslovakia, declared, "This war will end only with the foundation of a Czech state." "If Austria is to exist at all," thought the lukewarm Austrian Socialist, Wilhelm Ellenbogen, "it must be on the basis of a free union of its component nationalities." 9. While parliament pursued its tempestuous course, Austrian civilian authority had expanded in the economic sphere, and, under the aegis of the ministry of trade, a committee of specialists had set to work on plans for rehabilitation after the fighting had ceased.21 It was only too obvious that the Austro-Hungarian economy was increasingly unequal to the challenge of satisfying both army requirements and the needs of civilians. Yet, travelers to Vienna noted that cafes were crowded and luxury shops were thriving; the nouveau riches adorned their ladies with fashionable dresses and furs, elegant laces and jewels. In August, 1917, Die Zeit commented, "The war has put us on short rations . . . has forced our habits of life far behind those of former generations. . . . But there comes a time in which cutting down and tightening one's belt cannot be carried further, because the primitive necessities of life cannot be dispensed with. A man must eat and be clothed." Cotton thread and darning wool, moreover, to repair garments were unobtainable, and leather was ever harder to secure. Stocks of clothing were practically exhausted, yet official appeals went out for used undergarments to be forwarded to the troops; to save textile materials it was recommended that the deceased should be buried nude. Children of the industrial 2 1 Richard Riedl, (Vienna, 1932).

Die

Industrie

Österreich

während

des

Krieges

Inside Austria

663

working classes wore sandals fashioned out of wood, instead of shoes. Supplies of coal dropped so greatly that in the winter of 1917-18, only about 40 per cent of the requirements of munitions plants were met in Austria— in Hungary the figure ran a trifle higher; commanders on battle lines complained indignantly over the insufficient flow of military hardware. Due to fuel shortage, even hospitals were not properly heated, the University of Vienna closed its doors, law courts were moved to smaller quarters, and waste paper was rolled into balls and tossed into stoves for a little warmth; many areas had only intermittent electricity and gas services or none at all. During the severe winter of 1916-17, tram service in Vienna was drastically curtailed and equipages of the imperial court were pressed into use to haul civilian supplies; to mitigate the fodder crisis, nettle leaves were substituted for hay. Deterioration in railway transport proceeded apace, grievously affecting all aspects of the economy; facilities were crippled by improper care of rolling stock and the incompetence of youths and women who were drawn into employment, and pilfering of freight in transit became widespread. A worsening metal famine forced requisitioning of household utensils and even latches and locks on doors! 22 "When we look at passersby," said Viktor Adler, "the women exhausted and bowed under their burdens, though they have little to carry home—and when we look at the children, we confess that great faith is necessary to keep us from losing hope." To overcome the financial straits of the government, it was proposed that a levy upon capital should be made. A Rothschild banker was heard to remark, "England has won the war; Austria can only save her life at the price of her political independence. When [peace] negotiations 2 2 Wallace J. Young, Jan. 19, 1918, U.S., National Archives, 863. 50/46; Michael Sadler, Feb. 22, 1918, ibid., 863, 50/49.

664

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

begin, Austria must obtain a foreign loan . . . in return for political concessions. Otherwise, Austria cannot live." As matters stood, the Monarchy borrowed on a limited scale from Germany and printed oceans of paper currency which, among other consequences, encouraged wild speculation on the security markets. In December of 1917, the Arbeiter Zeitung alluded to the "difficulties under which the whole economic system is threatening to collapse," and likened the melancholy situation to conditions in urban Russia on the eve of the March Revolution. Since it eclipsed all other domestic perplexities in magnitude, the problem of food deserves special consideration, and it must be said that supplies varied a good deal across the Monarchy, city-dwellers being most deprived. Comparative plenty prevailed in central Hungary and in the Czech districts of Bohemia, but real misery stalked Dalmatia, Istria, Bosnia, and other less fertile areas; Korosec told parliament in November, 1917, that the food shortage was extremely bad in Dalmatia and that Bosnia was gripped by famine. Soulless or smart operators flourished on black market transactions, corruption ran rife among army contractors, as in other warring countries, and rationing and related regulations were flagrantly evaded. 23 Small wonder not only that popular war weariness mounted, but that resentment against the status quo increased. It is no surprise that the exhausted Monarchy on the Danube eventually collapsed—what is amazing is that the peoples fought as long as they did. In March, 1917, new machinery to control prices was devised and laws on profiteering were extended, which prevented costs of living from running absolutely wild. Appointed Austrian minister of food in January, 1917, General Anton Höfer held out hopes of supplies from con2 3 A. Langer, "Die Preistreiberei und Ihre Bekämpfung durch das Strafrecht," OR, LI ( 1 9 1 7 ) , 1 1 2 - 1 2 2 ; Michael Hainisch, "Krieg und Preissteigerung," ibid., 1 5 3 - 1 5 8 .

Inside Austria

665

quered Rumania, but in the spring scarcity of food, even of potatoes, the poor man's best friend, caused local rioting in sections of the Monarchy. "Potatoes belong, alas, to the treasures for which one walks miles," explained the Vienna Socialist paper, "Many of the rich pay any price for them. . . . If the cold continues they will be sought like gold pieces." Yet an American residing in Vienna offered a less somber picture, reporting that "the food is considerably better than in Germany—eggs, sugar, though no butter without cards—only two meatless days. On Wednesday one can have only mutton. Every morning [one eats] a chunk of black bread which has to do for the day. Bread is really the scarcest commodity." At precisely this point, of&cials in Germany were beseeching Hungary for shipments of meat, but Tisza felt that in fact Germany was able to alleviate the food shortages of Austria if it would.24 In the spring of 1917, it was later disclosed by the Austrian food administrator, "We hardly had supplies of wheat and flour for two to three days." When distribution of provisions had become thoroughly confused, the able General Ottokar Landwehr was put in charge of a joint Austro-Hungarian food commission. His reminiscences vividly recount the heart-breaking challenge that he faced and reveal the large and sustained interest of Emperor Charles in the crucial food problems.28 To shame shopkeepers caught transgressing regulations— and before the fighting ceased, rules filled two massive volumes—their names were printed in newspapers; flour was restricted solely to the making of bread, and in April, bread for the cities was baked almost exclusively from maize. Austrian officials suggested that Turkey might be tapped for food, but the thought was abandoned on the ground that the Germans would turn resentful. Sections 2 4 Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era (2 vols., Boston, 1952), I, 316; Lutz, The Fall of the German Empire, II, 186-187. 2 6 Landwehr, Hunger (Vienna, 1931).

666

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

of the cities, previously overlooked, such as Vienna's Prater, were used to raise vegetables, and goats were fetched to the capital to augment the meagre milk supply. Factory managers and trade union executives took a larger hand in obtaining and distributing food; one hundred and forty municipal kitchens cared for the extremely poor in Vienna, and communal kitchens looked after many skilled and "white collar" workers.26 It must have meant little to ordinary citizens to be reminded, as reminded they were, that food shortages in enemy countries were just as bad—which was not uniformly true. Peasants jacked up the prices of their products and would take payment only in goods, not in inflated paper money; even top-flight Austrian aristocrats were known to exchange feminine pretties and other luxury articles for a bag of grain. Butter and rice, oil and soap disappeared from legal trade. Meals consisted of a coarse variety of sausage, odds and ends of vegetables, extremely indigestible bread, oatmeal, and horseflesh. Some soldiers who were released from military service to work in mines found the food at home so intolerable that they begged permission to rejoin the army. Substitute products, for which chemists searched avidly, left very much to be desired; coffee, so dear to the Viennese palate, was compounded of burned barley, malt, and chicory. Properly, it was observed that civilian morale deteriorated in step with the decline in the quality of coffee substitutes. In the autumn of 1917, it was said that hardships in Vienna had become so unbearable that even if hated Italian troops had entered the city bringing food, they would have been welcomed enthusiastically. "For Austria," reported the correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung, "the war is finished. . . . People are annoyed at 26 Siegmund Koff, "Der Emáhrungsdienst fiir die Arbeiter Wiens," OR, LII (1917), 102-108.

Inside Austria

667

the privations which have to be borne. . . . For three years Vienna had shown a courage and good behavior which could be expected of this city of pleasure only by those who knew from history how bravely Vienna stood the Turkish siege. To bear the inevitable with indifference and if possible with a joke on the lips is good Vienna fashion," but now the population had grown completely weary of war. Circumstances of living in Prague, as a memorandum of the city council testified, were almost equally deplorable. Deputies in the Austrian parliament were prone to lay the food stringency at the door of Hungary for selfishly consuming surplus grain and meat, and the press focused its fire upon allegedly incompetent Hapsburg food administrators. To cap the tale of woe, harvests of 1917 in both Austria and Rumania dropped far below expectations. War-induced diseases exacted a heavy toll and prolonged privation impaired civilian health. According to Vienna's chief health officer, deaths from tuberculosis exceeded 10,000 in 1917, more than double the incidence of three years earlier. "The physical strength of the great part of the population," he stated, "is so undermined with insufficient nourishment that they are unable to withstand sickness and unless food conditions speedily improve the death rate from tuberculosis will run much higher." Increase in crimes upon persons and property reflected the decline in social habits and moral standards. In December, 1917, General Arz informed German Headquarters that "a number of armies had not even a single day's ration of flour"; only the greatest privations enabled Austria to go on fighting at all. Speaking for the Imperial War Ministry, Baron von Raberau said on January 20, 1918: "Whether Austria will be in a position to last out through February is questionable. Without

668

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

any kind of reserves people will be living day by day from hand to mouth." Germany would have to furnish provisions, he made clear, if the Monarchy were to continue to fight. Seidler and Landwehr reinforced that logic, warning that "without help from outside, masses of the people will be dying in a few weeks. . . ." Germany responded with shipments of flour. It was in this depressed environment that the urban proletarian outbreaks, already discussed, occurred. Emperor Charles assured a deputation of workmen that he was doing everything humanly possible to improve food supplies, adding that the restoration of peace is "my only care from early morning till late at night." While Czernin was at the Brest conference, piteous pleas for help on the food problem were sent to him from Vienna and other cities; he recommended that grain should be requisitioned in Hungary, and if necessary, physical coercion should be applied there until provisions started coming from the occupied lands to the east. It has previously been emphasized that for Austria the treaty with the Ukrainian republic was transcendantly a "bread" peace; but official promises of a large volume of food from the Ukraine were never realized. Riotous Viennese stormed markets once more, obliging the police to intervene to restore order. "Vienna is almost exhausted economically," cried Die Zeit, ". . . For some time we have been looking upon the disintegration of a great city, which has now assumed frightful proportions." When small quantities of Ukrainian flour became available, they passed to the capital of the Masaryks and the Kramars, protested a paper in the Tyrol. "Tyrolese Germans are only discovered when fresh sacrifices in blood have to be made." At the very time that Cracow stood on the brink of starvation, canny Galician peasants disposed of their crops to speculators who flocked in from Vienna and Budapest. "Trieste does not want to become a cemetery,"

Inside Austria

669

wailed the Lavoratsreg of that city. "Statistics of her sick and dead are terrifying. We demand that the city be saved." Almost in a jesting mood, Seidler asserted, "Our econnomy, especially our food situation is very serious, but not at all desperate." Not desperate? Yet Landwehr unhesitatingly commandeered food en route by ship to Germany from the east to feed hungry Austria; when Berlin protested angrily, Vienna apologized profusely. Not desperate? Yet Weiskirchner said, "The available food supplies are very scanty and it will require the greatest sacrifices . . . to hold out during the coming weeks. The organization of the official provisioning bureau has entirely broken down." He criticized the contradictory and unenforceable food regulations, and upbraided officials who had painted rosy pictures of grain from the Ukraine. "Austria's only hope," he concluded, "lies in obtaining further aid from Germany." Not desperate? Yet late in the spring of 1918 the bread ration for Vienna was again cut down; the daily food allowance included three ounces of flour, an ounce of meat, a quarter ounce of fat, two and a half ounces of potatoes, three-quarters of an ounce of jam, and, despite the new harvest about to be reaped, worse was yet to come. As earlier in the war, the cabinet in Budapest was castigated for failure to help Austria adequately with food. "It is not the English but the Hungarian blockade that is the cause of our misery; it is not the enemy but our ally that starves us," complained the Arbeiter Zeitung. Under the caption, "The Austrian Ferment," London Opinion published a cartoon depicting Emperors Charles and William II pushing against a door labelled Austria. A gaunt skeleton (symbol of want and despair) thrusts through the door. "Kaiser Bill" advises, "Shove like mad, Karl. Remember Nicky! We mustn't let our skeleton get out of the closet as Russia did."

670

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918 10.

Although the Austrian censorship was less stringent than in the first half of the war, it remained tight enough to provoke a running and vitriolic barrage of attack. So ruthlessly did the censors emasculate a searching critique of the Austrian constitution by Friedrick Austerlitz for the Socialist Der Kampf, that the editors suppressed the whole issue, and for merely printing, "If we do not win the war before summer [1918], we shall be lost," the Wiener Tageblatt was suspended; when the left-wing, Der Abend was banned, it reappeared under another name. Press criticism of Germany grew so caustic that Seidler, at the request of the German ambassador, ordered the censorship to prune away offensive materials.27 Die Zeit, long noted for the independent temper of its editorial leaders, passed into the possession of a financial syndicate, which included the peace-minded coffee king, Julius Meinl. It was forbidden to circulate the memoirs of Prince Karl M. Lichnowsky, last German ambassador at the court of St. James's or The South Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy by R. W. Seton-Watson; and it was prohibited to send abroad the collected essays of Socialist Karl Renner, published as Österreichs Erneuerung. On the other hand, a ban on importation of scientific journals from enemy countries was lifted, though few were actually brought in; rather thorough discussion of food and transport perplexities was permitted in newspapers. Viennese press proprietors complained constantly over the scarcity of newsprint, which was reduced by as much as thirty per cent so that more paper might be made available for newspapers in Hungary. Rigorous restraints were laid upon the printing of scandalous blood-andthunder romances—one had appeared with the title 27

Wedel to Hertling, Feb. 25, 1918, no. 80, F.O. 5 5 3 / 2 9 3 .

Inside Austria

671

Musolino. Even though costs of publication soared, a new organ of Austrogerman bourgeois interests was launched—the Neue Wiener Abendzeitung, and, as noted before, the Revue (TAutriche was founded to inform foreigners about Austria. It was now, too, that the Amalthea publishing house of Vienna started upon its notable career. Tastes in books shifted from once popular war novels to more solid fare in philosophy, science, and politics. In Schwarzgelb, Hermann Bahr movingly glorified the Austrian mission, and in 1917, he pleaded for a rebirth of patriotism. A poll of soldiers revealed that romances were the preferred reading matter, with humorous stories, picture magazines, newspapers, and books of a secular character trailing along. The imperial library in Vienna accumulated a vast quantity of materials on the war—soldiers' letters, newspaper clippings, pamphlets and books from all belligerent lands.28 Soldiers' songs, historical and contemporary, were presented in Vienna's famous Konzerthaus. The Raimund Prize in drama for 1918 was bestowed upon Julius Bittner for Der Liebe Augustin, an unmistakably Viennese production. Large and appreciative audiences witnessed centennial commemorations of Die Ahnfrau and Sappho by Francis Grillparzer, the most illustrious name in Austrian literary history. Paintings on war episodes by Karl Gsur ("Der Letzte") and by Hans Larwin were displayed in Vienna, as were sculptures by Hans Stalzer ("Graf Czernin") and by Egger-Lienz ("Den Namenlosen, 1914"), and lesser creative artists. 11. In spite of the turmoil created by the politically articulate among the national communities and the rising clamor for self-determination, the Austrian government 28 Wilhelm von Weckbecher, "Die Kriegssammlung der Wiener Hofbibliothek," OR, LIII (1917), 169-175.

672

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

controlled the many-tongued population with less physical force than Britain, for example, invoked after the First World War in Ireland or in India, and with far less bloodshed. "The Hapsburg Empire," commented a sanguine American publicist, "is not the creaking mechanism which many persons suppose. It is a true political organism with a living soul. . . . The Allies' sword may yet pierce its heart, but its death seems more unlikely with every passing day. Judging by all present omens Austria-Hungary has a future consonant with its imperial past." 29 More perceptive, more realistic were the musings of Georg Bemhard in the Vossische Zeitung. Austria-Hungary "cannot be rendered internally healthy save by reorganization on the basis of the principle of nationality. A strong Austria is only possible, if, under the Hapsburg scepter, the different peoples, each organized separately, live in happy community. In such a future lies not only the strength of Austria, but also her chief value as an ally for Germany, both politically and economically." 30 Upon the assembly of parliament in May of 1917, nationality leaders, while professing loyalty to the crown, as has been mentioned, had lodged demands for federalism and autonomy. Early in 1918, a group of Socialist deputies advocated a federation of seven states, based upon nationality, with firm guarantees on minority rights, and Czech and South Slav deputies announced that they must be represented in any discussions to revise the constitution. Properly measuring the climate of sentiment, the Neue Freie Presse remarked that only "the transformation of the whole monarchy from the foundations up is what the Yugoslavs and Bohemians [Czechs] want, and they count upon the Poles to assist them. . . ." But it did not seem that the time was propitious "to approach the 2 9 Lothrop Stoddard, "Austria Faces the Future," Review of Reviews (New York), LV ( 1 9 1 7 ) , 67. 3 0 Quoted in Literary Digest, L X (Sept. 8, 1917), 22.

Inside Austria

673

solution of nationality problems with any prospect of success." Patriotic Czechs had loyally saluted the Emperor Charles upon his accession and had repudiated the Entente assertion of January, 1917, that it was fighting for the freedom of the Czechs. Nevertheless, at the direction of Governor Coudenhove, revisions were made in books used in Czech schools, eliminating passages likely to foster separatist feelings.31 But soon after the March Revolution in Russia, over two hundred Czech authors signed an anti-Hapsburg manifesto, drafted by the poet and dramatist Jaroslav Kvapil, who was in close touch with the Czech emigration leaders. Addressed to the Czech deputies who would presently go to the Vienna parliament, the document adjured them to be "the true spokesmen of your nation . . . fulfill your sacred duty, by defending Czech rights and Czech claims with resolution . . . The destiny of the Czech nation is being decided for centuries to come." Concretely, the manifesto demanded restriction of the censorship to military affairs only and asked full immunity for deputies and amnesty for political prisoners. If the Czech deputies could not achieve these goals, they should resign "and appeal to your highest authority—to your nation." Oddly enough, the Austrian censorship permitted this radical document to be printed in newspapers, some of which praised the manifesto, while others condemned it as irresponsible or unsophisticated. Its principles stood in marked contrast to the course actually pursued by a large majority of the Czechs in the Vienna Reichsrat.32 Just as parliament convened, Prague was rocked by mass rioting caused directly by reduced food rations, but possessing political overtones as well; troops from HunGebsattel to Bethmann, Mar. 15, 1917, no. 1997, F.O. 553/299. ^Zeman op. ctt., pp. 122-125; Robert J. Kemer (ed.), Czechoslovakia (Berkeley, 1945), p. 56; see also, Hans SchurfF, et. al., Das Verhalten der Tschechen im Weltkrieg (Vienna, 1918). 31

674

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

gary were rushed in to maintain peace, and other outbreaks occurred in smaller Bohemian cities. News of the disorders was debarred from the press and emotional demonstrations by Czech students at installation ceremonies for a new rector of the German division of the University of Prague were equally veiled from the public.33 Before long, certain Czech deputies were saying that they would press for the resurrection of the kingdom of Bohemia and for independence. Ex-minister Karl Prasek warned the chamber (June 26, 1917) that the war would go on as long as the Hapsburg Monarchy remained in alliance with expansionist minded Germany. Hearty applause greeted his appeal to "break with Germany," and it was renewed when he affirmed Slav allegiance to the principle of federal reconstruction of the Austrian state; other Slav deputies expressed similar points of view. Yet the most influential Czech Socialist Bohumir Smeral, persuaded that the Monarchy was indestructible, held to an Austrophile posture. 1 r When the fiery Kramar was relr • - - 1 ,v imperial amnesty, he returned and was saluted by Czech patriots as the uncrowned king of Bohemia. "No monarch would be more enthusiastically welcomed in his country," an eye-witness recorded. Boisterous mass demonstrations welcomed other amnestied Czechs, all of whom became active in the cause of national independence. Kramáí resumed management of the Národni Listy, which boldly published a map of the Czechoslovakia of the future. 34 Czech patriots badgered Seidler because editors were obliged to print stories handed them by police officials, especially reports condemnatory of Masaryk and the doings of the emigration. They protested, too, that the Czech language press was forbidden to comment on diplomatic and military questions and that ninety 33 34

Gebsattel to Bethmann, June 28, 1917, no. 1415, F.O. 553/299. Gebsattel to Michaelis, Oct. 23, 1917, no. 5753, F.O. 553/299.

Inside Austria

675

papers had been suspended either temporarily or permanently, usually without any official explanation being offered. "We Czechs have only one program," proclaimed Narodni Listy (November 16, 1917), "an absolutely independent state of our own." But previous leanings which Kramar and others had toward political affiliation with Russia, in one shape or another, dried up after the Bolshevik coup detat, for whatever else Czech nationalism may have been, it was preponderantly petite bourgeois in spirit. In response to urgent appeals from the emigration, Czech politicians issued a celebrated "Epiphany Resolution" on January 6, 1918, demanding freedom and censuring Czernin's conduct of negotiations with the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk. "We ask," explained Deputy Frantisek Stanek, "for the union of the Czech nation with the Slovaks, in a state enjoying complete . . . independence and possessing all the attributes of sovereignty." Circulation of the Epiphany Resolution was narrowly restricted by the censorship, and Seidler assailed the objectives as "positively hostile to the [Austrian] state," which would be "resisted by the Austrian ministry with all the means at its disposal." He challenged the contention that the Resolution reflected the desires of Czechs as a whole— and he was right—and charged that such disloyal utterances prolonged the agonies of war by inspiriting enemy morale. On May 1, 1918, an estimated throng of 70,000 parading in Prague set up chants to "Hang the Kaiser," demanded more food, independence, and peace, and a fortnight later, Czech patriots converted the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the Bohemian National Theater into a gala patriotic demonstration. Representatives of other Hapsburg national communities attended the Prague celebration, which took on the quality of a version of the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities recently

676

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

held in Rome; spokesmen of Slav nationalities impressively demonstrated their solidarity with the Czechs. "In olden times knights went to war fastened together by iron chains," the mayor of the Slovene city of Laibach (Ljubljana) said, "Let such a chain bind the brave Czech nation to the Yugoslavs . . . unity will make our victory certain." Mutually vowing eternal friendship, Polish delegates and Czech politicians secretly agreed that if and when the Hapsburg Monarchy were rent asunder most of the Teschen district of Silesia should pass to Poland. As the high point of the Prague gathering, the "martyred" Kramar delivered an impassioned oration predicting Czechoslovak freedom, the Czech national anthem (containing bitterly anti-German lines) was sung, and rousing cheers ascended for Masaryk and Wilson. "Today we greet here representatives of all nationalities," declared Kramai, "who suffer as we do. Our victory is their victory and their victory is ours." In a joint resolution, the delegates asserted that they were "united in a common desire to do all in their power to assure full liberty and independence to their respective nations after this terrible war. . . . All the nations represented are determined to help each other. . . ." Guardians of the law dispersed the assembly and, to prevent a demonstration in spacious Wencelaus Square, imposed a nine o'clock curfew upon the city. Public meetings were banned, the wearing of the Slav tricolor was prohibited, the Narodni Listy was suspended, and Kramar was ordered to get out of Prague and stay out. 35 These exciting events in the chief community of the Czechs were noted by Entente statesmen and provoked genuine alarm in Vienna. "Only the tenacity and unity of those who desire the preservation of the state," thought the Neue Freie Presse, "can enable the Monarchy to survive this great crisis." 35 Gebsattel to Hertling, May 17, 1918, nos. 2158, 2159, F.O. 553/299.

Inside Austria

677

Reflecting on the Prague affair, the Vienna Socialist paper observed, "We have not one Ireland, but six Irelands." To the side of the Czechs had rallied "the Slovenes, always good Catholics, the Croats who had been loyal adherents of the Hapsburgs, the Poles who had never been Pan-Slavs, and even the Italians, who are not Slavs at all. . . . Austria will be compelled to grant home rule to each of her nationalities."36 12.

Even more meaningful than the growing intimacy between South Slav and Czech politicians was the increasing, if still superficial, solidarity between Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs. Aversion in Russia to Yugoslav unity because, in the quaint phrasing of Tsar Nicholas II, "the Croats have the misfortune of not being Orthodox," disappeared with the downfall of the Romanov dynasty. It has been indicated that the Slovene clerical leader, KoroSec organized a South Slav club of deputies, and the outstanding liberal among the Slovenes, Gregor Zerjav, worked hand-in-glove with the militant priest. Promoted by Roman Catholic churchmen, the ideal of Yugoslav unity gained headway among politically articulate Slovene peasants.37 "High Slovene ecclesiastics," an embittered Austrogerman deputy cried, "with all their fellows have attached themselves to the struggle which is being quite openly waged . . . against the State." The Yugoslav cause sustained a distinct loss, however, in October, 1917, when Monsignor Johann Krek, ally of Korosec, passed away; out of step with other South Slav Roman Catholic leaders, Archbishop Josef Stadler of Sarajevo clung steadfastly to Hapsburg traditionalism. The appointment of Ivan von Zolger, a veteran Austrian civil servant, to a place in the 38 AZ, May 23, 1918. Winckel to Michaelis, Sept. 25, 1917, no. 86. F.O. 553/328.

37

678

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Seidler ministry in August, 1917, elicited from the Slovenec of Laibach the observation that "the ice is broken . . . at last the government is aware of the importance of the South Slav Question." Authoritarian rule in Dalmatia and Istria effectively stiffled patriotic propaganda in those areas. In the preceding chapter, reference has been made to the Corfu Declaration of July, 1917, which seemed (no more than that) to set the seal upon Yugoslav political unity. Wholly aloof from that transaction, however, was a company of Hapsburgophile Croats, under the leadership of Joseph Frank, a clerically-oriented publicist, who dismissed the notion of South Slav unity as an iridescent dream. South Slavs suspected of allegiance to the Yugoslav ideal were roughly treated by Austrian authorities. Better than a hundred Serbs, for example, were sentenced to death; and the Slovene deputy Benkovic shouted in parliament that a hundred Bosnians had been shot in a single day; in a sensational phillipic, Dr. Ante Tresic-Pavicic, himself the victim of arbitrary arrest, denounced repressive outrages in his native Dalmatia and in Bosnia. "The Bohemians and South Slavs," he advised the Reichsrat, "are nations; they know what they want, and they know exacdy what they can do. . . . We South Slavs demand national union and absolute independence. On the question of national unity and liberty there is no difference whatever between the Slovene, the Croat, and the Serbian. . . ." Popular disorders dramatized the growing political unrest among South Slavs. At St. Jean, on the border of Carniola (Kranj) and Carinthia, KoroSec, addressing some two thousand Slovenes, delivered a ringing appeal for national freedom; Germans in the neighborhood tried to break up the meeting, cursing Korosec as a traitor. Battle royal ensued, in which the Germans were routed,

Inside Austria

679

and the priest resumed his patriotic harangue. Not only did Korosec cry out against purchase of war bonds and the requisitioning of foodstuffs, but he boldly declared that "a friend of the Hapsburgs is an enemy of his own country." At Laibach, Slovenes pillaged German-owned properties and the beloved Bishop Jeglic, once known as a Hapsburg partisan, was arrested for speaking out on behalf of Yugoslav unity; the Vatican refused to reprimand him. Readers of the Slovenec, the Jeglic organ, were informed that, "Never has our national idea been so strong —it is the principal motive in all public life. It has swept over our lands like a flood, reached the most remote village, and fired the heart of every Yugoslav. . . . Every day we encourage our deputies in Vienna, 'Do not yield a step. We are with you to the last man.'" 88 From Switzerland a band of Serbs carried on lusty patriotic propaganda in collaboration with the London South Slav Committee, and scores of Yugoslavs took part in the May, 1918, National Theater festivities in Prague. "We gladly associate ourselves," remarked the Pasic newspaper, "with the commemoration by the Czechs, our brothers by blood, our brothers in arms, and in the hopes which inspire us in our fight for liberty." In a survey of Slovene prospects, the Grazer Tagespost exclaimed, "All the Slovene areas have been won for this agitation. . . . The leaders of the Austrian Slovenes and the Serbians . . . agree in their desire for a single Yugoslav state. . . . In addition to the agitation in representative bodies, there is an insidious propaganda from man to man, woman to woman, and even from child to child. At church and at school, the creed of the Yugoslav state is taught and the credulous populace swears by its principles."39 Of political sentiments among Austrian Poles little needs 38 Quoted in Literary Digest, L (May 25, 1918), 15. 3» Ibid.

680

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

to be added to what has already been said. Among affluent Poles, support for a Polish state in partnership with the Hapsburg crown was strengthened by the radical currents that surged across Russia. The Austro-Polish theme formed the substance of remarkably perspicacious analyses dispatched to the Ballplatz by conservative Pole Count Skrzynski, attached to the Austrian embassy in Switzerland.40 Given assurances that Poles would continue to dominate the political affairs of Galicia, Polish deputies customarily placed their votes at the disposal of the Vienna ministry, not much affected apparently by such developments as the Wilsonian Fourteen Points utterance. But Poles in parliament, of all political persuasions, bitterly condemned the award of Cholm to the Ukrainian Republic in the February, 1918, treaty, as has been recounted; and they complained acridly over German troops in Galicia eating native-produced food and taking over hospital facilities. "The star of the Hapsburgs has been blotted from the Polish heaven," declared Socialist Daszynski, and before long he was teaching that the Poles must take their national destiny into their own hands. Any move in Vienna pleasing to Polish interests inescapably antagonized patriotic Ukrainians and vice versa. Released from Russian imprisonment along with thousands of other Ukrainians, the venerated Uniate churchman Szepticki expressed doubt whether a durable independent Ukrainian state could be created, though he scented an opportunity to spread the Uniate creed eastward owing to a pledge of religious liberty by the Provisional Government of Russia.41 It was gratifying to Ukrainian pride to know that Emperor Charles had decreed that 40 Von Gagem to Czemin, Feb. 15, 1917, and Musulin to Czemin, Mar. 14, 30, 1917, Aug. 21, 1917, Sept. 29, 1917, P.A., Schweiz, Berichte, 1917. 41 Musulin to Czemin, Aug. 14, 24, 1917, P.A., Schweiz, Berichte, 1917.

Inside Austria

681

all Uniate Christians of the realm should be officially called Ukrainians and that one of their own, Dr. Johann Horbaczewski had been named a minister in the Austrian cabinet. The Italian minority in the Empire figured little in the general history of the time. True enough, Alcide de Gasperi, who would emerge as prime minister of Italy after the Second World War, and five other Italian-speaking deputies from the Trentino struggled to safeguard the interests of Italians in Austria declaiming in parliament against persecution of suspected disloyalists and against indiscriminate requisitioning by military authorities.42 Nonetheless, an Innsbruck court condemned for treason a contingent of Italian soldiers who had come back from Russian prison camps; and Tyrolese Germans were sorely irritated by the participation of Italian-speaking Deputy Conci in the Prague festivities of May, 1918. 42

Guido Podaliri, "Deputati Italiani al Farlamento di Vienna," CCCLXXXV (1956), 363-370.

kntologia,

Nuova

10. Hungary tit (Uraitatl DESPITE THE CENSORSHIP, A MAGYAR INTELLECTUAL, LOUIS

Bir6, published in the democratically oriented Vildg on January 28, 1917, opinions which must have been shared by many of his countrymen. "The war is a horrible misery," Biro wrote, "But the disunion and decomposition which are spreading around us resemble a cancer of old growth. . . . The soldier dies, the official is hungry, the judge turns bootmaker, the banker allies himself with the Count, the army contractor makes millions of profit, all the barriers of morality crack and fall in ruins—discord, decomposition, the odor of the tomb." 1 Impending doom or not, the Hungarian political pot boiled furiously; never did the numerous adversaries of Tisza relent for a moment in trying to force him from the premiership. In January, 1917, one critic in parliament after the other assailed the man and his administration of affairs; Andrassy insisted vigorously that all public questions should freely be discussed by law-makers and 1

682

Quoted in The New Europe, II ( 1 9 1 6 - 7 ) , 204.

Hungary in Travail

683

the clerical leader Aladar Zichy excoriated followers of the Premier who were implicated in scandals in supplying the army. That curious oddment in the Karolyi camp, Count Theodor Batthyany, thundered that so long as Tisza remained at the helm the restoration of peace was an iridescent dream, and his rabid colleague, Lewis Hollo, attacked the German ally with such vehemence that Tisza felt obliged to remind all and sundry that Hungary was fighting, not for any German interest, but to preserve its very life. Small wonder in view of the heavy responsibilities which he carried that Tisza looked "somewhat worn and tired" to the American consul in Budapest. Friction between King Charles and the Magyar strong man led the ruler to remark, "Tisza's days as Hungarian prime minister are numbered. I am unable to agree with several phases of his policy." Initially, he considered reducing the political stature of Tisza by appointing popular Archduke Joseph as Palatinate, but instead he compelled him to yield on several relatively minor questions as the alternative to resignation.2 Convinced that the king had taken to heart the strictures of his critics, Tisza energetically defended his followers against charges of corruption, and, citing chapter and verse, endeavored to show that the accused were solid men of substance, reliable patriots in contrast to their doctrinaire opponents;8 yet the elaborate argumentation made little or no dent upon the thinking of the young monarch. When proponents of manhood suffrage raised that issue anew, Tisza made it clear that his own thinking had not altered one whit; for him the very proposal was accursed. "I shall employ my strength to save the nation from any thoughtless extension of the franchise," he exclaimed, "radical tendencies must be resisted, even if the wheel of universal history passes over the body of him who resists." Pober-Hoditz, op. ext., pp. 186-187. 3 Tisza to Karl, Feb. 19, 1917, OM, VI, 159-172. 2

684

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

In April, 1917, scandalous outbursts in the Hungarian chamber recalled the knockabout traditions of pre-war parliamentary life, which had the atmosphere less of a deliberative assembly than of a beargarden. Shouts of "Long live universal, equal and secret voting—nothing shall be discussed here but the franchise," greeted the appearance of Tisza in the House; pandemonium ceased only when the presiding officer suspended the session. Friends of suffrage reform besought the king for support. He in turn advised Tisza that the voting right should be granted to soldiers decorated for heroism and to certain categories of small landowners; and he also asked that social welfare measures should promptly be enacted. To strengthen his position, Tisza offered to invite two younger deputies of the Andrassy faction, Counts Maurice Esterhdzy and Stephen Bethlen, to enter the cabinet without portfolios; but Andrassy haughtily spurned this olive branch. Then, reluctantly, Tisza agreed to an extremely modest revision of the franchise law and to small social reforms; in an interesting communication to the monarch he combatted the Karolyist accusation that he was responsible for the prolongation of the war, pridefully recalling his stand against bellicose policies in July of 1914.4 It availed nothing, however, for Charles had decided that a change in the premiership must be made, in a manner reminiscent of the dismissal of Prince Otto von Bismarck by the young William II. Charles confidentially indicated to Hungarian politicians that manhood suffrage was an imperative necessity.® 2. On May 23, 1917, to the unfeigned delight of his pack of enemies, in Austria no less than in Hungary, Tisza quit the prime ministership, which he had held for nearly four 4 Furstenberg to Bethmann, no. 21, May 3, 1917, F.O. 553/287; Tisza to Karl, Ap. 29, 1917, OM, VI, 260-261. 5 Windischgratz, Ein Kaiser Kdmpft fitr die Freiheit, pp. 20-23.

Hungary in Travail

685

momentous years. His withdrawal was the most exciting incident in Hungarian domestic politics of the war years. Followers of the Calvinist strong man lauded him for sagacity and fortitude, but a mouthpiece of Andrdssy, the Alkotmany, likened the resignation to "the sound of the bell ringing in the resurrection. . . ." "The whole country breathes more freely," proclaimed the Magyarorszdg, "the knight of reactionary medievalism has fallen in the duel with the young champion of democracy." Formally accepting the resignation, King Charles praised Tisza warmly for services rendered, invited him to recommend a successor as premier, and to tender advice to the crown in the future.6 Across the Atlantic, an organ of Hungarian immigrants rejoiced over the departure of Tisza from the center of the political stage. "Many of us left the old sod," recalled the Amerkai Figyelo of Chicago, "on account of his reactionary politics. . . . Our old country at last is on the threshold of portentous times. . . . His name will not blacken any longer the prestige of our native land." After resigning, Tisza declared that any far-reaching reform in the suffrage would be perilous to the integrity of the kingdom and would unrelentingly be fought by him. Deeply wounded by what he conceived to be cavalier treatment on the part of the crown, Tisza, although fiftysix and half blind, took command of a regiment on the Russian front. He shared the rough facilities of the troops and identified himself fully with the soldiers, even writing letters for the illiterate. When a shell exploded near him, he inquired sardonically, "Am I not safe even at the front?" Three tense weeks elapsed before a new Hungarian premier was installed in office. Tisza recommended the «Karl to Tisza, June 11, 1917, OM, VI, 274, and also, 297-299; Louis Goldberger, "Un Entretien de 1'Archduc Joseph avec 1'Empereur Charles I / I V , Revue d'Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale, XI (1933), 240-249.

686

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

experienced statesman Alexander Wekerle, but he failed to strike fire with Charles, who dutifully considered other influential public men—Apponyi, the Archduke Joseph, Andrâssy; the last was backed by high aristocrats of Hungary and Austria, but he was disliked by Czernin, who apparently reasoned that Andrâssy would use the Hungarian premiership as a stepping-stone into the foreign secretaryship, the office he really coveted. The King even solicited the counsel of Kârolyi, thinking of him not for the top post, but as a member of a broadly based cabinet. 7 Ultimately, the choice fell upon a protégé of Andrâssy, the clever, thirty-seven year old, Count Maurice Esterhâzy, who had a distinguished war record; since he had studied at Oxford, Esterhâzy was reputed to be a progressive and an Anglophile, and in some Entente quarters his appointment was interpreted as a slap at Germany. Since his mother was a Schwarzenberg and his wife a Kârolyi, the new Prime Minister belonged in the upper tier of the Austro-Hungarian nobility. Around him Esterhâzy gathered a cabinet mainly of aristocratic conservatives, men more or less attuned to the viewpoints of Andrâssy; Apponyi was entrusted with the ministry of education, a post in which a decade earlier he had earned an evil reputation for systematic Magyarization. Rather unexpected was the inclusion in the ministry of Theodor Batthyâny, an ardent disciple of the revolutionary hero, Louis Kossuth and an ally of Kârolyi,8 and of William Vâzsonyi, a Jewish lawyer with a flair for demagogic oratory, who held a seat on the municipal council of Budapest. Trusted by the lower middle class and the wageworkers of the capital, Vâzsonyi was also a confidential consultant of the king, and his presence in the ministry Kârolyi, Fighting the World, pp. 169-176. Theodor Batthyâny, Für Ungarn gegen HohenzoUern ( Vienna 1930); Raoul Chelard, "Les Mémoires du Comte Théodore Bathyânyi," L'Europe Centrale, VI (1931), 167-169. 7

8

Hungary in Travail

687

advertised the royal intention to move forward on franchise reform. "I desire to work on democratic lines, but naturally democracy in Hungary can only be a Hungarian democracy," proclaimed Esterhàzy prudently—and enigmatically. Crowds in Budapest shouted for the right to vote; one mass demonstration got out of hand, looted shops and cafes and raided a clubhouse frequented by the henchmen of Tisza. To parliament the Prime Minister disclosed that he would present a new franchise law and bills for housing, school, and pension legislation, and he referred delphically to appeasing peasant land hunger at the expense of the large proprietorships. Upbraiding the new ministry for the statement on suffrage, Tisza likewise took Esterhàzy stiffly to task for not denouncing with sufficient force Czechs in the Vienna parliament who spoke of a "Czecho-Slovak" nationality. "Tell everyone," he advised, "who would impair the territorial integrity or the dualistic and equalitarian position of Hungary, 'Hands off!' " "When Tisza defends Magyar supremacy against the nationalities" [on the issue of franchise reform], retorted the Socialist Népszava, "he is really shielding the power of the Magyar Junkers from the Hungarian masses. He detests the people whether they happen to be Magyar or Rumanian, Croatian or Slovak." The standing quarrel with Austria over food shipments reasserted itself, and subordinates of Apponyi enflamed Rumanian Hungarians by closing their church-connected schools and hounding the teachers. Nervous, short on energy, and in poor health, Esterhàzy proved unequal to the heavy assignment he had undertaken. After two short months his ministry resigned, the Count threatening to commit suicide, it was reported, unless he was relieved of office.® Though Andràssy was 9 Esterhàzy suffered a breakdown, but turned up in 1919 as a minor functionary in the Communist ministry of Béla Kun, and later he allied witn Regent- Nicholas Horthy.

688

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

again talked of for the premiership, his well known opposition to broad suffrage reform and possibly his fervent espousal of the merger of Russian Poland with the Dual Monarchy defeated his prospects, and the mantle passed to Alexander Wekerle, almost seventy, twice before prime minister and without party allegiance. Taking office on August 20, 1917, his cabinet, several times altered in personnel, managed the government of Hungary well into October of the following year. Of Magyarized German ancestry, and noted for tact and finesse in parliamentary maneuvers, Wekerle wanted political and economic bonds with Germany drawn more tightly. Respected for sound judgment on complicated economic, especially financial problems, he was generally well-liked, not least by King Charles and Tisza. Independence party men, however, had not forgotten that eleven years before, Wekerle, as prime minister, had squelched their political insurgency. It was assumed by admirers that Wekerle would prepare the way for effective interparty cooperation and would inspirit popular confidence; yet the press response to his appointment, was, at best, reserved.10 A staunch Magyar, Wekerle had energetically championed Hungarian claims to Bosnia and to Dalmatia, and he yielded to none in hostility to schemes for the federal reconstruction of the Dual Monarchy.11 He had not indicated a clear position on the franchise question, but shortly after taking office he said that alterations in the suffrage law would form the beginning of a far-ranging program of economic improvement. Scarcely had Wekerle been installed than on motion of the redoubtable Tisza, the ministry was censured for treatment of local officials guilty of "cruel political persecution"; yet the ex-premier, still the most influential personality in the kingdom, 10 Furstenberg to Michaelis, Aug. 20, 1917, no. 16, F.O. 553/287; E. Treumund, "Der Neueste Wekerle," OR, LIII (1917), 150-156. 1 1 Furstenberg to Michaelis, Oct. 29, 1917, no. 92, F.O. 553/328.

Hungary in Travail

689

hastened to declare that the indictment should not be construed as lack of confidence in the Wekerle cabinet. Words aside, Wekerle opposed innovations in voting that might imperil the monopoly of the Magyar ruling oligarchy. On international policy, he stood foursquare with Czernin; he told parliament that he was ready for peace with honor at any time, and he heartily applauded the peace gesture put out by the Vatican. Vaszonyi, as minister of justice, busied himself with the provisions of a new suffrage law, spurred on by the king.12 Published in November, 1917, the bill enfranchised males over twenty-four, who could read and write (which automatically debarred a large proportion of the countryfolk), and women, astonishingly, who had passed through four grades of secondary school—women, in a word, of Magyar or German speech. The electorate would increase better than forty per cent above the existing 1,800,000, but Magyar supremacy would not be endangered, as Andrdssy pointed out in urging adoption of the measure. Although Vdszonyi claimed that the law would remove impurities from elections, the undemocratic tradition of oral voting would be perpetuated, except in about sixty cities and large towns. Straightway, opponents of government by discussion and consent unloosed their guns on the proposals. If adopted, contended the Az Ujsdg, which stood close to Tisza, the bill would make it possible for the Socialists, inspired by Bolshevik Russia, to dominate the public scene. "It may be said," Tisza, the tireless, argued, "that from 1848 to the present day, almost all Magyars have been unanimous in declaring that a radical franchise [reform] constitutes a great danger for our nation and party. All who desire our ruin seek to present us with a radical system. The intelligence standard is a great danger for the Magyars, since a large portion of the non-Magyars 12 Windischgraetz, Ein Kaiser . . . , pp. 37-39.

690

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

can learn to read and write and then there will be an end of Magyar supremacy." "In this country only one culture has any rights and that is the Magyar culture," chimed in a like-minded deputy. Speaking the mind of the great Magyar proprietors of Transylvania, apprehensive of the Rumanian-speaking element, Stephan Bethlen declared, "We must advance with democracy, but only so long as the Magyarism of Transylvania is not attacked." Austrian criticisms of the proposed bill because it fell short of manhood suffrage led the Az Est to write that "the chief aspiration of the Austrians is to break up the Hungarian state." 3. In the meantime, the inability of Premier Seidler to prevent caustic denunciations of Hungary in the Vienna Reichsrat rasped Magyar sensibilities. Parliament and press rang with abuse, in particular of the Czechs and their claims to unity with the Slovaks. "The Austrian government is playing with fire," warned the authoritative Pester Lloyd. "Is then everything possible in Austria?" asked Tisza captiously. Contending that Hungary had proved herself the stout bulwark of the Monarchy, Andrdssy branded Czech national ambitions as a deadly menace to dynasty and state alike. It seemed to Tiszaman Perenyi that Czech agitators were burglars bent on robbing Hungary of her Slovak property, while she was engaged in beating off highwaymen; unless Czech strictures ceased, Hungary would be well advised to break loose from Austria, he said, and he echoed the opinion of many another Magyar politician. Responding, Wekerle promised effective measures to prevent Czech political agitation among Slovak citizens, and he disclosed that he was seeking, with the help of King Charles, to have assaults upon the integrity of Hun-

Hungary in Travail

691

gary made a criminal offence in Austria. "I went so far," he reported, "as to declare that unless the ground was cut from under these intrigues, the process of dissolution would begin." Sections of the Vienna press and Czech newspapers treated the Magyar uproar as an inconsequential tempest in a teapot. In high dudgeon the Budapest municipal council went so far as to adopt a resolution whittling down the relationship with Austria to merely a common sovereign. "This has resulted," affirmed the resolution, "from the conflict between Hungary and the Czechs in which the Austrian ministry is content to remain as a silent spectator." Furious over Czech pretensions, the Az Est insisted that Austria had in fact declared war upon Hungary. T h a t country which owes it entirely to Hungary that her enemies have not torn it to pieces like an old rag, now hastens to express her gratitude . . . by demanding the disintegration of our country. Never have politicians made a graver mistake than those who said we could only live and prosper in union with Austria. . . . Kossuth was right when he said Austria was Hungary's evil spirit, the vampire that sucks our blood. . . . Tlie mask has fallen forever from this obstinate foe . . ." And the Hungarian censor allowed those sentiments to appear in print! Not content with that outburst the paper lambasted Austria for "greedy villainy," which had stifled the natural growth of the Hungarian economy. "Let us break with Austria. . . . We do not desire . . . to live in union or in any form of dualism with our worst foe." 13 "In the air of Vienna," the Az Est explained in another effusion, "which stinks with the impending dissolution of Austria, fly not birds, but curses and slanders. Every Czech blackguard and every Austrian ass spits at Hungary. . . Presently Wekerle was assuring the Hungarian deputies that the crown unswervingly supported the dualistic 13

Quoted in London Morning Post, Nov. 28, 1917.

692

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

regime and that the status of the kingdom of St. Stephen would in no wise be modified by any constitutional changes that might be effected in Austria. And the King authorized him to state that the authority of the crown would be invoked against "tendencies hostile to the independence or territorial integrity of the Hungarian state." That disclosure irritated spokesmen of the Austrian Slavs, who posed interpellations on the issue to Seidler; in reply he ridiculed, albeit somewhat perfunctorily, talk of dissolution and abruptly switched to questions of internal reform in Austria. 4. Inescapably, the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia and currents of unrest among the Austrian industrial working classes exerted an impact upon the ill-organized proletarian forces of Hungary. As matters stood, not a siftgle deputy represented Hungarian Socialism in parliament; the leadership of the workingclass movement, if it could be so dignified, was in the hands of a set of intellectuals, principally of the Jewish tradition and widely suspect by authentic Magyars. Backing came from wageworkers in the capital and in lesser industrial communities, many of them imbued with strong partiotic feelings. Under law, industrial workers might organize unions, though any land of political activity was forbidden; that prohibition was, however, evaded, and the Socialist organ, Nepszava adopted an increasingly more militant tone. The left-wing of Socialism was inclined to work along with the Kdrolyi faction on public questions, or, perhaps, it was the other way around. Strikes and demonstrations in Austrian cities in January, 1918, inspired similar disturbances in Budapest. Cries ascended for bread, peace—and manhood suffrage; on one occasion, some two hundred thousand citizens marched, shouting, "Enough of this life of slavery," "We want

Hungary in Travail

693

peace," and cheers sounded for revolutionary Russia. "On their faces," the Nepszava recorded, "often pale and drawn with hunger and suffering . . . was an expression that boded ill to those who would thwart their wishes." Street cars stopped operating, stores bolted their doors, and troops threw a protective cordon around the downtown area and posted guns on Danube bridges. Pamphlets distributed among workers and soldiers begged them to follow the trail of the Russian Bolsheviks; workers' councils, or soviets, actually popped up in a few factories. Before long, police arid military intervention and wholesale arrests caused the popular storm to peter out. Representatives of the demonstrators waited upon Wekerle and asked for fairer distribution of food, a quick peace settlement with Russia without annexations, and enactment of the franchise law. Soothing assurances from the Premier persuaded striking workmen to return to their jobs. To bolster its none too firm position, the Wekerle ministry came out in advocacy of an independent Hungarian army, an objective which, like the franchise issue, had been a hardy perennial of national politics earlier in the twentieth century. The army question, declared the stridently chauvinistic Az Ujsdg, should be decided without reference to Austria, "entirely between the Hungarian king and the Hungarian nation." At two crown councils in Vienna the problem was examined, and it was agreed to postpone a decision until the war was over. The very idea of a division of the Hapsburg military forces provoked a wave of protest in Austria, the Reichspost commenting that an independent Hungarian army would be a step toward complete separation, and a hot press feud on the army issue raged between the Neue Freie Presse, which customarily befriended Wekerle, and the nationalist Magyar Hirlap, reputedly financed by Andrdssy.14 1 4 Leopold von Chlumecky, "Unteilbar und Untrennbar," OR, LIII (1917), 241-245; E. Treumund, "Viribus Unitis," ibid., LIV ( 1 9 1 8 ) , 57-62.

694

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

In the opinion of the Az Est, Hungary had lost heavily in killed and in war prisoners because of Czech treachery and of skilless Austrian generals. "All these losses oblige us to bring into existence an independent Hungarian army, led by Hungarian officers and not by Austrian enemies." It contended that Hungary should no longer be yoked to Austria, for that would lead to certain destruction. More, "we regret every mouthful of bread we give them, every penny we pay for their miserable industrial products . . . with every mouthful we give them we are feeding our enemies." "The whole of Austria," the Az Est was prone to believe, "even including the Socialists, have joined hands to hinder us from coming into our own, so that we are compelled to go on fighting in a foreign army. . . . The desire for liberation is fermenting in the minds of our people, the desire of getting away forever from senile Austria."15 Radicalism in Russia caused conservative and comfortably fixed elements in Hungary to fear the spread of the Bolshevik plague westward. "We are a bourgeois ministry," declared the relatively leftist minister V&zsonyi, "and we shall prevent the seed of Bolshevism from ever being sown in Hungary. This faith I do not tolerate; I will trample it under foot." Apprehensive men wondered whether it would not be dangerous to allow Hungarian war prisoners, released by Bolshevik Russia, to come back to their homeland; the ominous peril from the east induced aristocrats to favor an alliance with the bourgeoisie and leaders in both classes appreciated that something would have to be done to meet the demands of urban workers for political and social reform. Late in January, 1918, Wekerle overhauled the ministry, dropping Batthyany, who refused to break with Karolyi in order to retain his cabinet post, and adding 1 5 Quoted in London Morning Post, Jan. 29, 1918, and Digest, LVI (Feb. 2, 1918) 14.

Literary

Hungary in Travail

695

Maurice Esterhâzy and Prince Ludwig Windischgrâtz, both Andrâssy followers. Belonging to the small, progressive wing of the high Magyar aristocracy and a confidential counsellor of King Charles, Windischgrâtz took charge of food administration and waged a resourceful battle on that difficult front.19 The reconstituted ministry brought out a comprehensive agenda, embracing social welfare legislation, a separate Hungarian army, redistribution of parliamentary seats, orderly and fair elections, and passage of the suffrage act. But when the bill came before parliament, it was defeated, and Vâszonyi resigned, obliging Wekerle to rebuild the ministry once more. A substitute franchise measure, to go into force after the war, raised somewhat the educational and property qualifications to vote, which would discriminate against the non-Magyar nationalities, Germans alone excepted; in final form the original provisions for female suffrage and the secret ballot were dropped, but a recommendation by Bethlen that ability to read and write the tough Magyar language should be a prerequisite of the voting right failed of acceptance.17 Kârolyi lampooned the bill as a foul betrayal and let it be known, as did Apponyi, that he would vote negatively. During the debate, Andrâssy derided the doctrine of self-determination of peoples as diabolical; its implementation, he said, would ruin the kingdom of St. Stephen. In spite of all criticism, on July 11, 1918, the emasculated version of franchise reform passed the first reading by parliament. 5. A so-called Radical party of Hungarian middle-class intellectuals actively propagated the democratic creed and worked for its application; in the vanguard stood Pro16 17

WindischgiStz, Ein Kaiser . . . , pp. 29-30. NFP. May 14, June 8, 1918.

696

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

fessor Oscar Jaszi, who in time teamed up with Karolyi. Son of a provincial physician, Jaszi had studied philosophy and political science to good purpose at the University of Budapest, served for a time in the ministry of agriculture, and then entered upon a professional career in Transylvania. Study of the writings of Joseph Eotvos and Louis Kossuth, fellow Hungarians, of Marx and Engels, of Nietzsche and Petofi, of Zola and Turgenev molded his outlook, and so did travel to western Europe where he became acquainted with the French philosopher, Henri Bergson, other men of learning, and adherents of the Fabian Society of Great Britain. Jdszi counted among his friends Thomas G. Masaryk and outstanding representatives of the national communities of Hungary, such as the Rumanian, Julius Maniu. Jaszi helped to found the Sociological Society of Budapest, which had much in common with the British Fabians, and he edited its journal Huszadik Szazad (The Twentieth Century)-, therein were circulated progressive ideas on agrarian reform, suffrage, social betterment, and enlightened treatment of nationalities. For Jaszi the mainspring of Hungary's ills was the large landed estates (the morbus Xatifundi of the kingdom), and extension of the franchise, which would cut the ground from under the governing oligarchy, was the first step he contended, toward removal of glaring inequities in landholding. On the nationalities problem, Jaszi had set forth his convictions in detail in a work of great integrity, The Development of National States and the Nationalities Question (1912), which evoked shrill outcries from the rabidly chauvinistic Magyar press. Together with farsighted and bold colleagues, Jaszi, on the pages of the Vilag learnedly expounded democratic ideals and realities and discussed the urgency of swift restoration of peace. "No country," he believed, "has been more free from war fever than Hungary . . . more especially the

Hungary in Travail

697

intellectuals. The leading Hungarian scholars, writers, and politicians have never forgotten that in our culture we are hardly less indebted to England and France than to Germany." In an article of May 25, 1917, devoted to the resignation of Tisza, Jaszi explained that conservative standpatters could not stop "the express train of progress"; middle class and working class elements should labor shoulder to shoulder to defeat Tisza and Company, who constituted "simply a tiny clique, which got and kept its majority by money and violence." However valid his thinking and his statesman-like understanding of the necessities of the time, Jaszi was believed less than he imagined he was believed, though he won the affection, even the reverence, of mentalities like unto his own. The abandonment of the principle of full manhood suffrage elicited from an enraged Vildg the observation that Vdszonyi had nonchalantly "thrown away suffrage as one throws away the end of a cigar." 18 In the forepart of the war, J4szi and his group had sympathetically viewed the Naumann vision for central Europe, but intensifying dislike of Germany switched them to a vision of a Danubian federation, patterned upon Switzerland and so devised as to keep Hungary together territorially. That program called forth fierce castigation from champions of national fulfillment, one of them tagging J4szi an amateur in political affairs whose outlook bore the stamp of his sociological theories. "To the oppressed peoples of Hungary, Professor J&szi says: 'national liberty is not of much value. What is essential is to live in a political and social democracy. That is why, instead of fighting the idea of the Magyar State, you should yield, remain Hungarian subjects and try to abolish the oligarchy 1 8 On the eightieth anniversary of the birth of Jiszi, Ldtdhatdr (Horizon), VI, Mar.-Ap. 1955, a magazine erf which Jiszi was "spiritual leader," published a set erf essays on his life and work; see also Bela Menczer, "Oscar Jaszi," Slavonic Review, XXIV (1946), 97-104.

698

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

of the great Magyar princes. . . . His whole creed lies in his ardent desire to preserve the territorial integrity of his country.'" 1 9 Comparing Jaszi with Masaryk, the historian Stephen Borsody, himself of Hungarian stock and a learned disciple of Jaszi, declared in a noble memorial address of February 23, 1957, at Oberlin College, Ohio: They both embodied the ideals of humanism and democracy. They both spent their lives in struggle against the dark forces of oppression and reaction. They both searched for the light of truth, human progress and decency. Their teachings may inspire all of us who have not lost hope that Central Europe will one day emerge in freedom, union and justice for all. . . . High morality, uncompromising truthfulness, incorruptibility were his [Jaszi's] greatest virtues. And these are not, as he himself suspected, necessarily the qualities which ensure success in practical politics. . . . Hungary's neighbors in the Danube Valley esteemed no Hungarian of our time higher than him—although they, too, failed to follow his teachings. But no Central European, be he Hungarian or Slav, Austrian or Rumanian, if mindful of the great tragedies of the 20th century, could serve his nation better than by dedicating himself now at last to Oscar Jdszi's idea of an "Eastern Switzerland." 2 0 On nationality policy, as indeed at many another point, Michael Karolyi came in time to see eye-to-eye with Jaszi, and would one day call him "my most valuable collaborator." For his part, Jaszi described the Count as "a noble and firm character . . . a sincere democrat and a true pacifist." Hungarian journalism breathed a sigh of relief when Tisza retired as premier, on the assumption that press liberty would profit. Yet, in fact, censorship turned La Serine, Dec. 2, 1917, quoted in Marcovitch, op. cit., p. 172. See Stephen Borsody, The Triumph of Tyranny (New York, 1960), passim, which is dedicated to "Oscar Jaszi, pioneer of federalism in the age of nationalism." 19

20

Hungary in Travail

699

sterner, if anything, and the successors of Tisza notoriously played favorites among newspapermen, handing out information to friendly writers on an unprecedented scale.21 Besides, the press continued to be grievously handicapped by the scarcity of newsprint, most of which before the war had been brought in from Austria. Exactly as Austrians protested that Hungary was eating better than its wedded partner, so Hungarians complained that Austria was getting much more to read. It was often and savagely charged that Vienna authorities deliberately restricted export of newsprint in the hope of coercing Hungary into releasing more food; the bitter controversy set each partner at the other's throat. Shortage of fuel forced paper mills in Hungary to curtail output, and, if newsprint could be purchased in Germany, which frequently was not the case, the price was very high. State regulations, moreover, strictly limited the number of pages that could be printed, so that altogether Hungarian press proprietors were in a decidedly unhappy frame of mind. Active though the censor's scissors were, the Az Est, extensively circulated, rarely slackened in its exhortations against Tisza and his techniques, and shrill excoriations of Austria, as has been seen, went unhampered; the Socialist Nepszava crusaded ceaselessly against the whole structure of the Hungarian status quo, and other sheets printed an uninhibited flow of criticism on the military masters of imperial Germany. As an example, Karolyi's paper Magyarorszag, with little subtlety, alluded to "the theories of violence," which ruled a country "controlled exclusively by a prejudiced military caste." "These baneful growths must be eradicated. . . . We still hear a death rattle incitement to fighting . . . raving and violent stupidity seeking to drown ideas of peace and humiliating human nature and intelligence. . . . All this we owe to Prussian militarism." 21

Neues Fester Journal, July 5, 1917.

700

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

From the vantage point of a later generation, it is plain that as the war progressed the links binding Hungary to Austria wore thinner and thinner. Whether the dualistic structure would much outlast the war was a not unreasonable speculation. Endless wrangling raged over such matters as Hungarian shipments of provisions to Austria, over recurrent clamor in Hungary for an independent army, and over Magyar pretensions to Dalmatia and Bosnia. Hungarian tempers were ruffled, as has been hinted, by agitation in Austria for reorganization of the Monarchy on federal principles, and Czech demands for political unity with the Slovaks kindled Magyar anger and resentment. Time and time again shrill Hungarian critics blamed Vienna officials for mismanagement of military affairs and for a disproportionate sacrifice of young Hungarian manhood.22 Austrians, on their part, never ceased to reproach Hungary for niggardliness on food, its unwillingness to accept equal (and lowly) standards of consumption. After the Arbeiter Zeitung had passionately protested that Hungary treated Austria as though she were an enemy and was seeking to starve her, Tisza complained belligerently to Premier Clam and requested that the censorship clamp down upon such utterances. 23 With the best will in the world, Hungary could not so much as satisfy the requirements of Austria for seed, Tisza protested. Yet, in point of fact, as the publicist Biro wrote, Hungarians high and low engaged in illicit trafficking in food, in smuggling, and in soulless, selfish profiteering. More than 2 2 Typical wartime discussions on the future of dualism are E. Tremund, "Österreich und Ungarn nach dem Kriege," ÖR, L ( 1 9 1 7 ) , 193-199; the same, "Grundprobleme des Dualismus," ibid., LH ( 1 9 1 7 ) , 97-102; Heinrich von Gutmann, "Österreich und Ungarn, " ibid., LIII (1917), 193-197; Emil Neugeboren, "Österreich und Ungarn," ibid., LIV (1918), 48. 23 Tisza to Clam-Martinic, Mar. 12, 1917, ÖM, VI, 198.

Hungary in Travail

701

once General Landwehr considered resigning due to Hungarian refusal to cooperate in mitigating the Austrian food crisis.2,1 It was unquestionably true that in the second half of the war the economy of Hungary staggered from bad to worse. Debate in parliament on food problems became as stale as the cornbread itself, and, due to fuel shortage, baths became a major event, restaurants closed at eleven, and places of entertainment never opened except for theaters and movie houses; illumination in the home, even with oil or candles, was forbidden after midnight,-and at night the streets of Budapest were plunged into darkness; on one occasion the capital had no fuel for a whole week. The American consul reported that since there was no heat in his apartment, he ate his meals in the bathroom where he had a small heating apparatus, and went to bed in order to keep warm; the consulate office remained open for only a couple hours a day. Similarly, a lordly Count Sz^chenyi lamented: "All my male servants are mobilized; all my female servants are in munitions factories. There is not a scrap of coal in my house; I have no gas, electric lights or lamps, and very little food; the condition of things compels me to spend all my time in bed. . . . " A series of articles in the Az Ujsdg vividly depicted the misery that had befallen important blocs of the Hungarian middle classes. A distinguished economist, Ede Palyi, writing in the Az Est, presented a doleful picture of national finance; the exchange rate of the Monarchy had fallen to half the pre-war level. Just before Tisza retired as premier he tried to enhearten national sentiment with the exhortation that "the flame which paints the Russian sky a glowing red is the sign of the approaching dawn," and he offered 24 Windischgratz, Ein Kaiser . . . . pp. 54-55; Landwehr, op. cit., pp. 131-145; Manchester Guardian, Feb. 10, 1917.

702

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

solemn assurances that the troubles over provisions would soon be reduced. "People at home are faced by the severest tests ever put upon them," he observed, 'let the knowledge that all this is being done for the Fatherland . . . give strength to them, as well as the fact that in a few months time, after the heroic endurance of bitter privations, the new harvest will arrive." 25 Actually, unseasonable frosts and a drought in April, 1917, worsened prospects for fuller rations, and food dictator Windischgratz announced that all of the next harvest would be requisitioned with thoroughness and vigilance so as to make concealment of produce next to impossible. For 1917, the wheat yield in fact, approached a normal pre-war level, though the rye crop was down, and the harvest of barley poor. Chicken and all kinds of game, on the other hand, were plentiful, and town dwellers with funds and the peasantry fared fairly well. "In all food matters," wrote the Vienna correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung, "Hungarian charity begins at home. . . . When travelers tell of the milk and honey of Hungary the Viennese feels his golden Vienna heart turn at the sight of the long queue before every fat, coal or soap shop, or, if he is himself in the queue, he gives still more drastic expression to his feelings. . . ." After Italian armies were hurled backward in the autumn of 1917, newspapers of Budapest insisted that Hungary should obtain a maximum of the booty in the form of foodstuffs; it was even proposed that captured provisions should be divided in keeping with the number of troops from each partner fighting against the Italians. Said the Az Est, "we claim a share in proportion to the blood we have shed." In reply to piteous Austrian pleas for greater food shipments, the same journal commented, "Hungarians are living for the most part in bitter want. In the matter of bread, meat, fats, and potatoes we are suffer25

Quoted in London Morning Post, Ap. 24, 1917.

Hungary in Travail

703

ing indescribably," and the editor implored the Hungarian ministry not to comply with the requests from Vienna. Under pressure from Austria, an important policymaker in the food administration, Count John Hadik, relinquished his office, which caused the Pesti Naplo to exclaim that "the food question is not a 'common affair,' however anxious Austria has always been 'to eat from a common dish,' but is a matter of agreement." It went on to argue that interference by Austria in the domestic concerns of Hungary was "more effective propaganda for Hungarian independence than a thousand orators." 26 Scarcely less than Austria, it must be confessed, Hungary was plagued by transportation perplexities. Freight cars, diverted to waging war upon Rumania, were unavailable to haul goods for civilian purposes; because of lack of rease and unskilled repairmen, rolling stock deteriorated adly and in the winter of 1916-17 little fuel other than inefficient brown coal could be had. Toward the end of 1917, it is true, in the afterglow of Caporetto, a superficial lull in Austrian and Hungarian antagonisms emerged. For Neue Freie Presse readers, Tisza painstakingly described the inability of Hungary to supply larger quantities of provisions and voiced genuine compassion for Austrians in their straitened circumstances; Seidler conveyed kindred sentiments to Hungarians in a contribution to Pester Lloyd. Serious journals of Vienna, moreover, protested strongly against Czech talk of union with the Slovaks, and Mayor Weiskirchner, an outspoken critic of Hungarian food policies, indicated that the Magyar language would be made a compulsory subject of study in the higher schools of the imperial capital; some unofficial voices in Austria even suggested that Hungarian aspirations to a separate national army might be pardy appeased. Yet manifestations of fraternal feeling lasted but a short while.

f

2« Quoted in Literary Digest, LVI (Mar. 9, 1918), 21.

704

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918 6.

Negotiations on the renewal of the decennial economic pact between Austria and Hungary, it has previously been seen, crashed into a stone wall, but experts of both countries resumed talks, and in February, 1917, a revised treaty was fashioned to run for twenty years. Concessions were granted Hungary on its share of the joint expenditures of the Monarchy, and also on agricultural tariffs, on the profits earned by the joint Austro-Hungarian bank, and on cheaper loans for farm producers. When the terms of the agreement were bruited about, Austrian and Hungarian interests both expressed keen dissatisfaction; the uproar in Vienna became so vociferous, in fact, that the ministry chose not to reveal the precise provisions, and in Hungary, partisans of independence fulminated violently against the twenty-year clause. Instead of seeking ratification of the treaty, the two ministries decided in November, 1917, that existing arrangements should remain in force until the end of 1919. At the close of the year, the fiftieth anniversary of the Ausgleich of 1867, which brought the Dual Monarchy into existence, was appropriately commemorated by large sections of the press in the two capitals, though on the Austrian side enthusiasm was tempered by resentment over Hungarian policies on food supply. Interwoven with bargaining on the economic treaty was the important issue of relations with Germany. Sentiments in Hungary toward the northern ally, as voiced especially in the press, tended to fluctuate in line with feelings concerning Austria. Affection for Germany bounded upward when Hungarian sensibilities were rasped by Czech agitation for unity with the Slovaks, for instance, and when the crown granted the political amnesty, which, parenthetically, did not extend to Hun-

Hungary in Travail

705

gary. Periodic protests, on the other hand, were registered over the German troops quartered in Hungary—how they ate much-needed local supplies, indulged in plunder, and in other manifestations of indiscipline. Now that Hungary was comparatively secure from conquest by Russia, it was easy to minimize the role of the German armies in saving the country in the first agonizing campaigns of the war and certainly there was little stomach to go on fighting to help Germany achieve expansionist ambitions.27 Suspicions in the Hungarian trading community that the German government intended to carry on a commercial war with enemy countries after the military struggje had ceased were dispelled somewhat by Foreign Minister von Kühlmann in an address at Budapest in November, 1917. To cultivate stronger sympathies between intellectuals of the two countries, a Hungarian Institute was organized in Berlin. In the meantime, representatives of Hungary joined their Austrian colleagues on discussions with Germany concerning post-war economic relationships. Wekerle personally believed that the Hungarian national interest required the maximum intimacy with the great northern ally, though he appreciated that was politically impracticable, inasmuch as traditional partisans of national independence, such as Apponyi and Károlyi, were stubbornly hostile to anything akin to a solid commercial alliance with Germany. On the crucial problem of federalism for the Hapsburg Monarchy the Magyar ruling class stood in unflinching, adamant opposition. Neither Austria nor the joint monarchical government, Tisza let it be known, would be allowed any voice in deciding the status of the nationalities in the kingdom of St. Stephen. Arguing along much the same line, Andrássy reminded the Neue Freie Presse that his revered father in 1871 had maneuvered to preOsterreith to Foreign Office, June 19, 1917, F.O. 553/288.

706

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

vent the Austrian half of the Monarchy from being converted into a federal union, and that precedent, he reasoned, "makes it certain that the Hungarian government possesses the right of interference against federalist tendencies in Austria." His stand, along with that of Tisza, advertised the point that all proposals on federalism would be fought, in the language of Andrassy, "as a life-or-death challenge by all those factors which are identified with the position" of the Monarchy as a great power. "A Hungary split up on a federal basis," explained the Pester Lloyd, "would infallibly mean the break-up of the Monarchy . . In the spring of 1918 a fresh spate of anti-Austrian pieces crowded the columns of Budapest papers. Calling for complete economic independence, the Pesti Naplo contended that both Hungarian agriculture and industry would profit; the Az Est resumed condemnation of the partner beyond the Leitha for siphoning off grain badly needed at home, and demanded manufactured wares in exchange; in parliament Urmancy raised the standard complaints that Austrian officers treated Hungarian soldiers harshly and that the German language was employed with Hungarian troops. For Magyar politicians, preservation of the integrity of kingdom of St. Stephen constituted the law and the prophets. No less than the others, the Karolyi faction cherished that creed, advocating though it did measures to conciliate the smaller national communities. Chance aristocrats, too, alert alike to the perils and to the secular currents of the day, rebelled against the tradition of rigorous Magyarization, as was true of Baron Julius Szilassy, who in a memorandum to King Charles IV pleaded for liberal concessions to the nationalities, and the sovereign apparently endorsed that piece of wisdom. Yet several Hungarian books of the war era, not to overlook innumerable utterances in parliament and in

Hungary in Travail

707

the press, bore witness to the prevalence and to the intensity of the Magyar chauvinistic mentality. For instance, The Rejuvenation of the Magyar Nation by Baron Victor Toroczkai deplored the failure of previous generations to assimilate non-Magyars completely, proposed that land ownership and participation in banking enterprises should be restricted to Magyars, and that the franchise right should be reserved to men familiar with the terrifying Magyar tongue; Dalmatia and Bosnia, it was also urged, should be incorporated in Hungary and their inhabitants should be subjected to Magyarization. In The Book of Magyar Names, Zolt&n Lengyel listed Magyar equivalents of names borne by Rumanians, Slovaks, and others and demanded that they should be adopted; and many examples of Magyar national intolerance could be culled from the parliamentary records. For illustration, on February 6, 1917, a Slovak deputy, Father Ferdinand Juriga requested permission to read out in his mother language a letter of gratitude to the minister of education for cancellation of a regulation prohibiting study of Slovak in certain secondary schools, but fierce shouts of "nothing but Magyar" quickly silenced the speaker. The return of Apponyi to the ministry of education quickened the impulses of partisans of Magyarization. It was urged that not only the schools but the churches of the national communities should be harnessed to the chariot of Magyar nationalism. In the same vein, voices called for the transfer of farms owned by Rumanian and Serb peasants to authentic Magyars, for, as the extremist Pesti Hirlap (November 28, 1917) believed, only Magyars constituted "the support of the state." Extravagant proposals were advanced to settle a solid wall of Magyars around the periphery of the state, which would isolate non-Magyars from their kinsmen across the frontiers; and Minister of the Interior Ugron revealed that in border

708

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

regions Magyars would supplant civil servants of other tongues and heritages. 7. So far as can be determined, political trends among articulate South Slavs in the kingdom remained highly confused, with the predominant flow in the direction of secession, part favorable to Yugoslav unity, part preferring an independent Croatia. To a hint from the Entente powers that the war was being fought partly to liberate the Croats, Dr. Alexander Horvat, of the Hapsburgoriented Right party, replied in February, 1917: "We will achieve our objectives through legal channels," but in the meanwhile the Croats would cooperate faithfully in the war effort. A coalition of Croats and Serbs, forming the largest bloc in the assembly at Agram (Zagreb), petitioned for the union of Dalmatia and Bosnia with Croatia inside the kingdom of St. Stephen and asked that a Croat should be appointed governor when Baron Ivan von Skerlecz resigned in June, 1917.28 His successor, Ante Mihalovic, a moderate conservative, brought forth a new local suffrage measure, broadening the franchise, increasing the number of deputies, and prescribing secrecy in voting; on the reasoning that the bill would curtail, if not wholly eliminate, manipulation of elections by Magyar officials, the Serbo-Croat group responded appreciatively. Slackness on the part of the governor in combatting secessionist sentiments provoked Foreign Secretary Czernin to protest, "The Croat papers write as if they were published in Paris or London. This is open enmity against the Monarchy." As the months passed, Mihalovic, who, whatever his reputation, seems to have been a friend of 28 Until 1420 when it was annexed by Venice, Dalmatia had been for centuries attached to Croatia. Although the province had been acquired in 1815 by Austria, Croatian and Hungarian law held it belonged of right to the crown of St. Stephen.

Hungary in Travail

709

Yugoslav independence, drew apart from Budapest and calmly brushed aside requests for his resignation. As minister for Croatia in the Budapest cabinet, Premier Esterhazy picked Count Aladar Zichy, a clerical leader, but when Croats remonstrated that he was unacquainted with their language, a Croat—Karl von Unkelshausser—was named instead.29 The South Slav Committee in London, headed by the Croat Ante Trumbic, kept in direct touch with Croatia through the rector of the University of Agram, Dr. Fran Barac, who made occasional visits to Switzerland, and through Dr. Svetozar Ritig, a Roman Catholic priest, who likewise managed to get away to Switzerland. From time to time, manifestoes on Yugoslav unity and independence, under the royal dynasty of Serbia, appeared, and this movement (if it was in fact that) was given an impetus by the Declaration of Corfu. The pro-Hapsburg paper Hrvatska reported that an overwhelming proportion of Croatian intellectuals keenly sympathized with the Yugoslav cause. In a sensational two-hour discourse, an unpredictable peasant leader, Stephan Radic called for the merger of the three branches of the Yugoslavs and ultimate union with the kingdom of Serbia. While the address elicited hearty applause in the Agram assembly, it provoked bitter denunciations in Budapest and demands that such outbursts should be prevented.30 Presently Radic, who possessed at least superficial acquaintance with the United States, was advocating a republican regime in which each of the South Slav areas would be endowed with an extensive measure of home rule. Before the war was over, Radic was persuaded that an independent Croatian republic would be the part of wisdom. On a visit in August, 1917, to Budapest, King Charles received 2 9 Jerome Jareb (ed.), "Leroy King's Reports from Croatia," Journal of Croatian Studies, I ( 1 9 6 0 ) , 101-103; Redlich, Tagebuch, II, 321. 3 0 Rossler to Michaelis, Aug. 6, 1917, F.O. 553/328.

710

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

the president of the Croatian assembly who handed him a resolution asking for a Greater Croatia under the crown of St. Stephen. In the autumn of 1917, the energetic Slovene priest, Korosec, visited Croatia and Bosnia to promote South Slav interests, and in an interview with the Az [//sag, he endorsed, among other things, the integration of Dalmatia with Croatia. This pilgrimage evoked loud protestations in the Magyar press and it was recommended that Austrian citizens who ventured into Hungary on treasonable errands should be swung from the gallows; undaunted, Korosec openly predicted that one day the South Slav question would be solved in a fashion unpalatable to the Hapsburg dynasty. Laginja, a South Slav deputy in the Austrian parliament, skillfully demonstrated that Dalmatia belonged of right to Croatia, "whose kings are buried there; whose language is spoken there . . . whose life is lived there." 31 As other straws in the wind, excerpts from a speech by the Dalmatian deputy Ante Tresic-Pavicic, a Croat, were allowed to circulate; arbitrary treatment of malcontents in Dalmatia and Bosnia was scathingly denounced. More and more, Croatian politicians identified themselves with the cause of South Slav unity, and early in 1918, three newspapers nailed the ideal of Yugoslavdom to their masthead; even the organ of the Archbishop of Agram (Zagreb), Novine, wrote that Prince Alexander of Serbia must cut the "gordian knot" of the South Slav question. "Yugoslav sentiments are spreading enormously throughout Croatia," commented the Pesti Hirlap of Budapest; papers "with the connivance of the censor are agitating furiously for the realization of Yugoslavia." On the occasion of the sixtieth birthday of Count Lujo Vojnovic, eminent Croatian man of letters, who had just 3 1 Fran Milobar, "Das Südslawische Problem—ein Kroatische Problem," ÖR, LIII ( 1 9 1 7 ) , 109-113.

Hungary in Travail

711

been released from prison in Spalato (Split) under the imperial decree of amnesty, patriotic Yugoslav demonstrations were staged in Agram; participants indulged in singing forbidden songs, and at banquets toasts were offered to the unity of South Slavs and of Czechoslovaks alike.32 Police broke up patriotic rallies and Magyar newspapers appealed time and again for sterner administrative control over Croatia. Smuggled into Croatia, the resolutions adopted at the Rome Congress of Nationalities in 1918 were construed to mean that Italy had abandoned pretensions to territory peopled by South Slavs; that assumption heightened enthusiasm for Entente victory, stimulated the growth of secret revolutionary societies of civilians, and modestly nourished disaffection among South Slav soldiers fighting in Hapsburg armies on the Italian front. Sections of Croatia were so seriously tormented by nomadic brigands, largely deserters from the army, that martial law was ordained in the troubled areas.33 Back in 1915, General Stephan Sarkotic, the enlightened governor of Bosnia and a man of Croat stock, advised Francis Joseph to combine Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia in a Greater Croatian state, in order to counteract the dangerous appeal of Yugoslavism, and he repeated the counsel to King Charles; the military governors of occupied Serbia and Montenegro agreed with Sarkotic that the South Slavs desired political unity, maybe inside the Monarchy. The possibility of a Greater Croatia as a third member of the Monarchy formed the subject of heated discussion at a Hapsburg crown council on May 30, 1918, the governors strongly supporting the idea and eventually the Emperor-King gave it his blessing. But Premier Wekerle, who wanted Bosnia to be attached directly to Hungary as a "corpus separatum," withheld his consent. 3 2 "Lettres de Guerre d'lvo Vojnovic," Le Monde Slave, VIII ( 3 ) (1931), 236-244. See also Furstenberg to Hertling, May 28, 1918, F.O. 553/328. 8 3 Jareb, op. cit., I 102-103.

712

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Foreign Secretary Burian vigorously argued that a prompt solution of the South Slav problem was a matter of prime urgency, and it was understood that the Austro-Hungarian cabinets would try to hammer out a settlement; yet to the infinite disgust of his senior colleagues, Seidler pursued the way of Fabius.34 In February of 1917, Burian, then the principal administrator of Bosnia, had revisited the region after an absence of six years, and he was greatly distressed by the sorry human conditions that he discovered. Military requirements had drained the able-bodied men away and a succession of short harvests had reduced provisions nearly to the starvation level; General Landwehr reported, after an inspection trip to Croatia, that no surplus food was available to succor Bosnia. Burian endeavored to improve agricultural output and to encourage small-scale manufacturing; it seemed to him that in spite of cruel hardships, physical and psychological, arising from the war, the citizenry of Bosnia were orderly, while soldiers from the province fought faithfully for crown and country. As Burian analyzed political inclinations, the division of sentiment followed closely upon religious traditions; while the Orthodox desired either extensive home rule or, alternatively, union with Serbia, the Roman Catholics leaned toward the Greater Croatia solution, and the Moslems preferred incorporation in Hungary.35 A segment of the articulate Slovaks of Hungary had meanwhile forsaken the passive or cooperative posture of the forepart of the war and had set about popularizing the Czechoslovak dream. Conspicuously effective in this effort was Monsignor Alois Kolisek, who lived in the eastern part of Moravia. In him religion and patriotism were indissolubly blended, and he was marvellously endowed for conducting political evangelism; he kindled 34 35

Kiszling, Die Kroaten, pp. 108-110; Burian, op. cit., pp. 364-366. Buri4n, op. cit., pp. 304-307, 367-368.

Hungary in Travail

713

sympathy for union with the Czechs among Slovaks of the Roman Catholic tradition. From Andreas Hlinka, the outstanding Slovak priest concerned with public affairs, came hesitant support for political unity with the Czechs. "Our relationship with the Czechs is to be brotherly," this sincere, rather naive man advised, "without compulsion, proceeding from the heart and blood." It was, however, highly distasteful to him that "the Czechs are radicals in religious matters. Soukup, Stransky and Kramir, all these are regular bugbears to the easy-going Magyarised Slovak priest. . . . The Czechs attribute all misfortune to Rome and Catholicism. Moreover, they are by nature more hot-headed and inclined for freedom. With regard to language, I have no fears, for we are almost identical, and we shall gradually merge together. . . . The only thing which can destroy us is atheism. . . . What guarantee shall we receive in this respect?" Yet, before very long, Hlinka was saying, "the Czechs are one people, the Slovaks another; the Czechs speak one language, the Slovaks another; the Czechs are Hussites, the Slovaks Catholics; the Czechs are industrial, the Slovaks agricultural—in every way different." He resented and resented passionately Czech scorn for the Slovaks because of their religious piety.36 By the spring of 1918, the Slovak elements favorable to separation from Hungary had increased a good deal. In the month of May, at a conference of the Slovak National Party, which had a small contingent in the Budapest parliament, the younger men tended to be Czechophile, while oldsters like Skultety disliked the prospect of Slovak submergence in an essentially Czech political community. After lengthy debate, the meeting ratified the principle of self-determination, which was hardly dif3 6 Quoted in Anton Kompinek, "The Catholic Church in Slovakia," Slavonic Review, XII ( 1 9 3 3 - 4 ) , 611; Robert Birkhill, pseud., Seeds of War (London, 1923), pp. 21-22.

714

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

ferent from endorsing the Ten Commandments. The predominant outlook of the delegates would soon be limned by a young Slovak lyricist, Martin Razus: We are one blood, one nation In us slumber a thousand powers: Slaves we were till now But never shall be again. Many a Rumanian in Hungary cooperated in the war era with his brethren over in the Regat, and when the armies of the Central Empires recovered Transylvania, thousands of Rumanians fled eastward; a substantial proportion of the refugees had evaded military service, or, though reservists in the Hapsburg army, had in fact fought under the flag of the kingdom of Rumania. Their traitorous behavior was advanced as an argument in Hungary for denying manhood suffrage to Rumanian-speaking citizens. Properties of refugees were declared forfeit, scores of Rumanians who had collaborated with the Regat armies were executed, and hundreds more were thrown into prison. Members of the Rumanian intellectual classes —clergymen and schoolmasters especially whose fidelity to the Hapsburg crown was suspect, were hustled into concentration camps, and denationalization policies were freshly applied. Clay in the hands of the Budapest potters was a repulsive Magyarone named Mangra, the newly installed Metropolitan of the Rumanian Orthodox Church; under his very nose, Magyar agents proselytized among adherents of Orthodoxy on behalf of the Uniate Church. On order of Minister Apponyi restrictions were imposed upon Rumanian teacher-training institutions and study of the Magyar language was made obligatory. It was the conviction of Tisza that the seminaries for Orthodox priests merited greater attention by Magyars than institutes

Hungary in Travail

715

preparing teachers, since, as he put it, "the influence of the clergy is incomparably greater than that of the schoolmasters." Remembering these things, Rumanian zealots would in a later day apply to Magyars the ancient rule of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.

2BL 0 % ÎEnù Approar^s THE GLITTERING SUCCESS OF IIAPSBURG AND GERMAN ARMS

over Italy in the autumn of 1917 persuaded Conrad, though not other senior Austrian generals, that the Latin foe, regardless of Anglo-French reinforcement, could speedily be brought to its knees. Field Marshal Svetozar Boroevic contended that the imperial interest required a passive, defensive stance, which would keep the AustroHungarian armies intact; offensive operations would cost the Monarchy men and matériel which could not be replaced, and, in any case, no victory over Italy could be decisive, he thought, unless German arms triumphed on the western front. Broadly speaking, Hapsburg troop morale held steady, despite the coarse and scanty diet, which for the soldiers consisted principally of dried vegetables, while horseflesh was reserved as a delicacy for the officers, and despite the shortage of munitions, 716

The End Approaches

717

and the corrosive influence of men shifted from the Russian front, who were infected with the Bolshevik virus. Growing defection among Slav soldiers was worrisome for Hapsburg commanders; a monetary reward and a generous furlough were promised for the capture of a Czech deserter fighting with the Italian army. Machine guns were unloosed upon a detachment of South Slavs, who mutinied when ordered to entrain for the Italian theater; other outbreaks were violently repressed and the instigators, if caught, suffered drastic punishment. But scores of insurgents managed to escape and to join the swelling ranks of brigands roving the southern portions of the Monarchy. After the German onslaught in France started on March 21, 1918, the Hapsburg high command, goaded on by Ludendorff, decided to strike afresh against Italy. Dreaming of a repetition of Caporetto, Padua and Venice were picked as the immediate targets; men and armaments no longer required in the Russian and Rumanian theaters had been concentrated in the southern battle areas. Ultimate responsibility for what must be appraised as a mistaken military gamble rested upon the Hapsburg Chief of Staff, Arz von Straussenburg. Preliminary to the offensive, enemy troops were subjected to a fresh barrage of propaganda asserting that leading Italian cities had been broken by air raids, that the total annihilation of the armies of King Victor Emmanuel impended, and that surrender alone could spare the country from devastation. Taking a page from the book of Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor-King Charles published a proclamation reminding his soldiers that beyond the Piave "glory awaits you, and also honor, good food, abundant spoils—and peace." On June 14, 1918, three Austro-Hungarian armies unleashed a formidable and intensive assault along a fiftymile front. It was the first occasion in the whole conflict when Hapsburg military resources had been concentrated

718

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

against one enemy alone, and no appreciable assistance was furnished by Germany. Across the battle front, the Italian troops, about equal in numbers to their opponents, had recovered remarkably well from the terrible setbacks of 1917, which had once seemed irretrievable. In the testing time that lay ahead, the Italians staged a "comeback," displaying courage, tenacity, and exemplary strength of will; undoubtedly, morale was lifted by the presence of British and French uniforms on the fighting lines and by the dispatch of artillery and other help from the West. In contrast to the warfare in France, tanks and aeroplanes played only an inconsequential part and there was little defense in depth. Entente propaganda, more systematized now and profiting somewhat from the Italo-Yugoslav understanding at the Rome Congress, gnawed away at the esprit de corps of the Austro-Hungarian regiments. Fighting desperately, one Austrian army, Boroevic commanding, hammered across the Piave River, and would unquestionably have driven much farther had not nature intervened. Heavy rains caused floods which swept away bridges over the river as fast as they could be built or rebuilt and even carried barges and their cargoes to destruction; with the chain of communications ruptured, Boroevic had no feasible alternative but to pull his forces back in order to escape complete disaster. The Austrian bag of captives approached fifty thousand, double that taken by the enemy. Equally unrewarding was an attempt by Conrad, ever the exponent of ambitious offensive operations, to thrust from the Asiago Plateau as far as Monte Grappa on Italian soil; after a modest advance, his troops were repulsed. In ten days of fighting, Hapsburg losses in killed, wounded, and missing exceeded 140,000 and no territory had been conquered. In Vienna anger and despair, intensified weariness with the prolonged struggle were manifested in mass rioting, which police managed to quell.

The End Approaches

719

What had happened on the Italian front strengthened the Emperor in his resolve to seek peace at almost any price, and it was maliciously rumored that he and EmpressQueen Zita had engaged in treasonable trafficking with the enemy. "Defeat cries aloud for an explanation," the American Alfred T. Mahan had once written—or, in this instance, for a scapegoat to save the dwindling prestige of the dynasty. Blame for the military calamity was pinned upon Conrad, and not for the first time, an able Hapsburg commander was abruptly dismissed; it was small consolation for the most competent of Austrian strategists to be awarded the dignity of a count. In spite of all that had transpired, Hapsburg troop morale did not crack; spirit seems in fact to have risen a trifle after the harvest improved the quality of food. Soldiers stationed back from the fighting lines rather casually drifted to the front where more food was available, yet even there the situation was austere, and undernourishment took a heavy toll. Disregarding the urgent requests of Marshal Ferdinand Foch, generalissimo now of the Entente armies, General Diaz chose not to press the counteroffensive with vigor. To thrust over the Piave, he reasoned, would be too risky and he clung to that logic almost to the end of September —after the German forces had been well-nigh broken in the west. Yielding to the importunities of Berlin, Emperor Charles consented to the transfer of four Hapsburg divisions, a scattering of Czech soldiers among them, to the battlefields of Picardy and Champagne. Hindenburg advised Arz on June 21, 1918, "the Austro-Hungarian army should discontinue its attacks on Italy and dispatch all forces which thereby became disengaged to the western theater of war . . . [it is] an iron military necessity." By complying with the German appeal for reinforcements, a decision of dubious wisdom at best, the Emperor-King hardened the heart of the Entente against the Monarchy; Austrian

720

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

troops were frigidly greeted by the Germans on the French fighting front, and appear to have been of little military assistance. In the estimation of Ludendorff, August 8, 1918, was "the black day" for the German army, leaving no doubt in his mind that victory could not be achieved and that an armistice should be immediately sought. The Austrian forces fell back in the general retreat on the western front. In the meanwhile, the picturesque, impulsive Major Gabriele D'Annunzio had directed an aeroplane raid upon Vienna on August 9, 1918, giving the capital a slight foretaste of the vengeance that would be rained upon it from the sky in the closing chapter of the Second World War. In this beau geste, which blossomed into something of a legend, eight Italian planes—one machine dropped out because of engine trouble—scattered thousands of pamphlets reading, in D'Annunzio's gaudy prose, "People of Vienna . . . the whole world has turned against you. . . . To continue the war is suicide for you. . . . A decisive victory is like bread from the Ukraine; one dies while waiting for it." The Viennese were reminded that annihilating bombs, instead of leaflets, might have been unloosed. Under pain of drastic penalties if they neglected to do so, citizens were ordered to turn over the pamphlets to public authorities; the aerial visitation aggravated the unbearable war weariness along the "blue" Danube. Fighting in the Adriatic, meantime, had slacked off considerably. Early in 1918, the Emperor had appointed as chief of the naval command Admiral Nicholas Horthy, promoting him over many senior officers. Noted for calculated audacity, Horthy believed that a repetition of the Cattaro (Kotor) mutiny could be avoided only if operations at sea were actively conducted. Although the Entente protective barrage at the Strait of Otranto had been rendered more mobile and tighter, Austrian submarines still contrived to pass through—more than fifty did so in

The End Approaches

721

April and May of 1918, with only a single casualty, and they destroyed several Entente troopships. On June 11, Horthy started to smash the barrage by large-scale attack, intending to open a clear passage to the Mediterranean. In an exploit of singular boldness, Italian motor boats penetrated a screen of destroyers surrounding two Hapsburg dreadnaughts, leaving the naval station at Pola (Pula). Both capital ships were hit, the proud Szent Istvan going to the bottom; after a running contest with the destroyers, the Italian ships returned safely to their base. Greatly alarmed by the loss of the dreadnaught, Horthy canceled the Otranto barrage project and held the fleet in ports, save for an occasional hit-and-run sortie. Austrian U-boats, however, darting in and out of Cattaro, never ceased to worry enemy admiralties. 2. It has previously been indicated that upon the resignation of Czernin, Burian on April 16, 1918, resumed the helm at the Ballplatz. It had been hoped in Berlin circles that the Hapsburg envoy at the court of William II, Gottfried von Hohenlohe, would be promoted to the foreign office. Backed by powerful voices at court, Andrdssy had confidently expected that he would be designated for the post and he angrily ascribed his frustration to his inveterate foe, Tisza.1 Charles had contemplated asking Tisza himself to undertake the assignment and also, among others, the nonagenarian Johann Pallavicini, ambassador to Turkey, but in the end he decided upon Burian, who had no hankering whatsoever for the office and begged the ruler to pick someone else. He yielded only after assurances that he would have a free hand in policymaking and that the supreme objective of diplomacy would be to seek an "honorable, moderate peace." 1

Windischgratz,

My Memoirs,

pp. 158-160.

722

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

It was Burian's conviction that the Monarchy must either keep on fighting or suffer total annihilation; Micawber-like, he seems to have hoped against hope that a good deal might yet be salvaged. His return to the Ballplatz was greeted coolly, the Neue Freie Presse listing his excellent qualities, but regretting that vigor of personality was not among them. What the Monarchy really required, the journal observed, was a foreign minister who would heed the mounting cry for bread and who would smooth out animosities between Austria and Hungary. But in Berlin Burian was thought of as thoroughly reliable and capable of exerting a healthier influence upon the mercurial, inexperienced Emperor than the discredited Czernin.2 The revelations by Clemenceau in the Sixtus episode severely strained the relations of the Monarchy with imperial Germany. Perhaps even more vital than the revulsion in official Berlin quarters was the growing conviction among German soldiers and ordinary German civilians that the Hapsburg ally was not only a military liability but guilty of gross treachery. It behooved Vienna, therefore, to pour oil on the troubled waters. Charles wired Emperor William II, "Clemenceau's accusations against me are so contemptible that I have decided not to continue the discussion with France any longer. Our answer will be spoken by my cannon in the West. In loyal friendship"—a bit of rhetoric that presently was confirmed in the dispatch of Hapsburg regiments to France. And Charles thought it politic to better relations by a "journey to Canossa"; early in May he and his principal policymakers conferred with their German opposite numbers in a "summit" meeting at Spa, headquarters of the German high command. Aside from Charles and Burian, Arz, Gottfried von Hohenlohe, and Count Thomas Erdody, 2 Buridn, op. cit., pp. 310-313, 419-421; Redlich, Tagebuch, II, 266-267; Wedel to Hertling, May 18, 1918, no. 160, F.O. 553/330.

The End Approaches

723

trusted adviser of the Emperor, represented the interests of Austria-Hungary; it was disquieting for the monarch to be told by Erdody on the way to the meeting that Viennese wits had nicknamed him "Karl der Letzte." For Germany there were William II, the kings of Bavaria and Saxony, Chancellor Hertling, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, von Kuhlmann, the foreign secretary, and the German envoy in Vienna, Count Botho Wedel. Instead of a bellicose eruption on the part of the Germans, which would not have been surprising, however undiplomatic, negotiations at Spa proceeded tranquilly. A broad range of topics passed in review—political, military, and commercial. Except for a memorandum signed on May 12, 1918, by both sovereigns and their principal ministers affirming the intention to prolong and broaden the existing alliance and to organize a customs-union quickly, nothing very concrete emerged from the Spa exchanges.3 It was understood that conversations to implement the points that had been ventilated at the meeting would get underway at once; for home consumption the German hierarchs reported that they were satisfied that the Vienna authorities would pursue a cooperative and honorable course; to a wire from Charles expressing gratitude over the harmonious conference, the German Emperor responded, "It is a great joy to me . . . to have again established in our detailed discussions our entire accord on the aims that guide us." 4 Echoing the sentiments of his master, Hertling informed the world: " . . . Clemenceau who indulged in the illusion that he would be able to sever our firm alliance will now 3 Fischer, op. cit., pp. 692-707. The thinking at the Ballplatz on the content of a new treaty and related matters is set out in a memorandum of May 12, 1918, P.A., Geheim, XLVII, 3/23. 4 In his reminiscences, William II otherwise appraised his counterpart in Vienna, who, he believed, constantly deceivea him; the Kaiser quoted Charles as explaining to his entourage. "When I go to the Germans, I agree to everything they say, and when I return home, I do whatever I please." William II, My Memoirs: 1878-1918 (London, 1922), p. 267.

724

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

be able to see in the results of the negotiations the fruits of his intrigues. The new Dual Alliance will comprise two important parts—economic and military agreements." An economic union, he went on, would not be pointed against any foreign country; rather the two allies would merely cooperate to safeguard their rightful places in the commercial sun. Far from having aggressive implications, the projected military pact would perpetuate the alignment between the Central Empires after hostilities had stopped and would promote the interests of European peace, it was proclaimed. Yet the Frankfurter Zeitung sagely observed that substantial elements among the Slavs of the Monarchy would react most unsympathetically to the extension of the alliance with Germany. Austrian statesmen openly rejoiced over the promising prospects for the future which the Spa conference heralded. For example, Burian expatiated on the purely defensive nature of commitments to Germany and insisted, tongue-in-cheek it may well be, that the renewal of the alliance would demonstrate that the Central Empires could not be beaten and "will convert our opponents to peace by the strength of our will to peace." What Entente psychological warfare described as "the German yoke" fastened upon the neck of Austria-Hungary, the Foreign Secretary interpreted as "a 'yoke' of mutual, rocklike friendship and complete consideration for the interests of both parties." In the estimate of Professor Josef Redlich, Austrogermans, apart from the Socialists, generally approved the prolongation of the alliance, though he had gnawing doubts on the attitude of the Slavs; the Czech secessionists he personally discounted as a political force. Neue Freie Presse saluted the prospective prolongation of the German alliance as a defense against the spirit of revanche by enemy countries in the future; "passions will

The End Approaches

725

outlast the war," it advised, "and the peace will scarcely be more than a long truce of exhaustion." But the thinking of the Arbeiter Zeitung ran into radically different channels, for it commented that since fighting in the east had ceased, continuance of the war depended upon the ambitions of Germany in the west; the Socialist paper summoned policymakers to declare whether the Central Empires cherished "imperialistic aims," and feared that the new alignment with Germany would induce the Entente to strengthen itself, with ominous consequences for everyone concerned. Under the caption, "The Road to Hell," the Socialist organ lamented that "the road we are treading leads to the permanent division of Europe into two coalitions of alliance . . . waiting to spring upon each other. The road that we are treading leads . . . to a peace that will be hell." Wekerle informed the Budapest parliament that while the alliance with Germany would be perpetuated, no treaty terms had yet been drafted and in no case would military arrangements imply surrender of Austro-Hungarian independence; closer economic bonds with Berlin he described as not only possible but desirable. Praising the German alliance, Tisza welcomed the promise of its extension and of more intimate commercial ties so contrived, to be sure, that Hungarian agriculture would be effectively protected. And Andrassy reasoned that a new version of the alliance with Germany would conform to the changing times in the high politics of Europe. Russia, against which the original treaty with Germany had been devised, had been removed as a danger to the integrity of the realm, but other enemies, Andrassy emphasized, were bent upon the dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy, and for preservation, the House of Hapsburg needed solid assurances of lasting German support. On the other side, Karolyi condemned a new deal with Ger-

726

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

many as a "real leap in the dark," and for his forthrightness he once more brought down on his head the maledictions of conservative newspapers.5 From the Entente angle of vision, the summit meeting at Spa confirmed dread of a powerful Mitteleuropa, which could only be forestalled by the destruction of the Monarchy, the vassal of Berlin. Many a doubting Thomas in the west was now persuaded that Austria-Hungary had been converted in fact from a necessity for the future peace of Europe into a menace, which must be removed by integral application of the principle of national fulfillment. What happened at Spa, in effect, furnished convincing testimony that the realm on the Danube could no longer be thought of as potential counterpoise to imperial Germany once the cannon had stopped booming. "Prussia has annexed Austria," declared the London Spectator (prematurely), and the New York Times envisaged the "crazy-quilt" Hapsburg state as on its last legs, which would soon collapse by virtue of internal explosions; Corriere delta Sera echoed that forecast. In the nature of a pendant to the Spa pilgrimage, Charles, his wife, and Buriän undertook a good-will mission late in May, 1918, to Bulgaria and Turkey, intending to buck up the drooping will to fight on to victory. While passing through southern Hungary, the imperial train was given special protection against a possible hold-up by roving army deserters. In the capital cities of both allies, the Hapsburg party received cordial receptions, more, it may be believed, because suffering civilians fancied that Charles would somehow manage to bring about a restoration of peace than for any other reason. In Constantinople, crowds lined the streets as the imperial couple drove to the Yildiz Palace, children tossed flowers in their path, and an arch of triumph adorned the Galata bridge. 5

E. Treumund, "Zur Vertiefung des Bündnisses der Mittelmächte,"

OR, LVI (1918), 145-152.

The End Approaches

727

At a gala dinner offered by the Sultan, Charles alluded happily to the alliance of the two countries, which "corresponds to very old traditions" (shades of 1529 and 1683!), and predicted that the common sacrifices would speedily be rewarded by a just and honorable peace. Departing from conventional etiquette, the ladies of the Sultan's harem extended an affectionate welcome to the Emperor and his lady. 9 During the visits, Burian vainly endeavored to settle a controversy between Turkey and Bulgaria concerning ownership of the Maritza district; he did, however, prepare the way for mediation of the quarrel by Berlin. Differences over other moot issues, such as Bulgarian pretensions to all of the Dobrudja, were not composed, and leading newspapers of Sofia flayed the Radoslavov ministry so vigorously that it was soon obliged to resign. 3. Consonant with the conversations at Spa, Buri£n had a revised version of the alliance treaty with Germany worked up. It provided, in essence, that if one signatory were attacked by two or more major powers, the other would rally to its assistance, and the pact would run for an undefined term; the fighting services of the two allies would remain separate. On June 11 and 12, 1918, Buridn, Herding, and von Kuhlmann exchanged views in Berlin on the draft treaty, the Austrian acceding to certain textual alterations desired by the Germans. At about the same time, Charles once more reminded the Germans of 6 Somewhat earlier, to knit bonds with Austria-Hungary, Turkish authors had written a set of fulsome, fraternal articles, and a delegation of Ottoman journalists had been enthusiastically received by Viennese societies of newspapermen. OR, X L V I (1916), 251-297; Neues Wiener Tagblatt, Aug. 3, 1917. Austrian professors and politicians visited Bulgaria periodically to address an Austro-Hungarian cultural society that had Deen organized in Sofia.

728

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

the worsening food peril in the Monarchy and piteously appealed for grain to feed civilian and soldier alike.7 Burian, moreover, tried to pin the German ally down to a firm definition of war aims. Like his predecessor, Czernin, he wished Berlin to state publicly that the war was not being fought for the purpose of acquiring territory that was not under the flag of an ally when hostilities commenced. Vienna recognized, however, that Germany must recover her pre-war overseas possessions or else obtain appropriate territorial compensation in Europe, and that steps must be taken to prevent an international trade war after the making of peace. Without commiting itself, the German foreign office promised careful, appreciative study of the proposals in collaboration with the military authorities; desultory discussions proceeded for weeks without achieving concrete results.8 At Salzburg, subsequently, technicians of the two countries conferred on a commercial union, the principal focus of interest being a program of preferential tariffs. On the whole, the Germans favored free trade between the two allies, but the Austrians were unwilling to consent, in the knowledge that sectors of the Hapsburg economy, both industrial and agricultural, would suffer; the conversations progressed in October, 1918, to an agreement, still-born and remote from the visions of Friedrich Naumann, which granted products of the Monarchy virtually unimpeded access to the German market, but retained tariff protection for a broad range of Austro-Hungarian goods. For the clarification of its own thinking on conditions of peace as well as for public enlightenment, the Ballplatz mapped out, under date of July 15, a long "statement on the position," in which the implications of a Wilsonian July Fourth pronouncement on peace were Charles to William II, June ?, 1918, P.A., Geheim, XLVII/3-24. Buridn to Larisch, June 27, 1918, no. 408, P.A., Geheim, XLVII/3-23. 7

8

The End Approaches

729

taken into account. What the enemy countries aimed at apparently was, first, freedom for all peoples, the foreign office statement read, and an international league for pacific accommodation of disputes in the future, second, the dismemberment of the Monarchy, and, finally, punishment of the Central Empires for the sufferings of the war. No one, the survey commented, would quarrel with the idea of a universal league to safeguard the peace, but the other two points were summarily dismissed; Austria-Hungary must go on fighting "until the enemy desists from his deceptive . . . ideology and from his arrogant determination to ruin us." Moreover, the Monarchy must broaden the diplomatic compact with Germany, develop more intimate economic and military bonds with her, and find a solution of the Polish question, which would be palatable to all concerned. Charging enemy statesmen, intent upon the dissolution of the Monarchy, with guilt for continuing the war, the Ballplatz document reasserted that Austria-Hungary was fighting a war of defense, though it was ever ready to come to an understanding which assured "the honor, the existence and the free development of our peoples." Sadly, Burian reported in his memoirs, press opinion in enemy countries, with a few notable exceptions, intransigeantly spurned a negotiated peace.9 From the newly appointed German Foreign Minister Paul von Hintze, however, came a reassuring message, expressing confidence that "a victorious, honorable peace" would yet crown the military exertions of the Central Empires; in his reply, Burian significantly refrained from endorsing the assumption that victory on the field of battle was the only road to peace. The Neue Freie Presse counselled that the time would be ripe for peacemaking only when the Central Empires had overpowered the 9

Buriin, op. cit., pp. 377, 449-455.

730

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

American military millions as they had humbled the hosts of Russia.10 On July 23, meantime, Burian had recommended to his monarch that all the belligerents should be invited to a preliminary consultation in a neutral capital to ascertain precisely the terms upon which peace might be restored. Charles readily consented to discuss the idea with Berlin and ex-foreign secretary Czernin substantially approved that procedure in a moving address to the Herrenhaus; he warned that if Germany insisted upon territorial aggrandizement, the very existence of the alliance would be imperilled. It seemed to Czernin that the two groups of belligerents should set out in writing the conditions on which they would lay down their arms, and the statements should then be examined by a neutral government to determine whether a basis for a peace by understanding actually existed. Reports reached Berlin that if the Central Powers did not bring off an armistice soon, Vienna would be obliged to make a separate settlement with the enemy. Such was the environment when Emperor Charles and his leading counsellors appeared at Spa on August 14 for another top-level parley on war and peace with the Germans. The Hapsburg armed services could not possibly carry on through another winter, the men from Vienna flatly asserted, and an armistice must be sought forthwith.11 Burian presented his plan for an informal, confidential meeting of representatives of the warring states to examine the fundamental considerations on which a settlement might be negotiated. Although Ludendorff had described August 8 as "the black day" for the German army, the Berlin policymakers recoiled in dismay at Burian's proposal, and insisted that no move for peace should be undertaken until the military situation in France had been stabilized. In the light of first-hand 10

Aug. 10, 1918. Windischgratz, Ein Kaiser . . . , pp. 67-70.

11 NFP,

The End Approaches

731

observations in Dresden and Munich, the Austrians were sure that ordinary Germans urgently desired an armistice, and the governments of Bulgaria and Turkey assented to a general conference of belligerents with alacrity. Austrian Socialists brought out a new manifesto demanding peace without annexations or indemnities and a league of nations which would undertake to limit armaments, to resolve international disputes by arbitral processes, and to ensure security collectively; proletarians of all lands were summoned to exercise their power "in favor of a compromise peace." The document likewise called for "the transformation of Austria-Hungary into a federation of autonomous nationalities . . . We will vote against any arrangement involving annexation or violence," the manifesto declared, and it wanted the principle of selfdetermination applied in zones of controversy involving Italians, Poles, and others.12 Protests over a meeting of the belligerents to consider peace terms sped from Berlin to Vienna, but anything beyond a brief delay was unacceptable to the Hapsburg authorities. Instead of approaching enemy governments directly, the Germans proposed that the Queen of the Netherlands should be asked to prepare the way for inter-belligerent talks, but Burian vetoed that procedure as cumbersome and he questioned whether tne Queen would in fact cooperate. Hoping to forestall precipitate Austrian action, von Hintze hastened to Vienna on September 3 for further consultations; in his pocket he carried a communication from Ludendorff predicting eventual military success on the Western front and advising that the time was not propitious for an armistice overture! Seconded by his Emperor, Buridn reiterated his objections to an approach to the Hague. Since joint collaboration was not in the cards, Vienna decided to sue for peace on its own. 12 Quoted in The New Europe, VIII (1918), 66 ff.

732

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918 4.

Raised anew at the May parleys in Spa, the Polish question continued for five months to be a subject of debate, acrimonious at times, between Central Power policymakers, and of pedestrian negotiations by experts of the two countries; divergencies, in the end, were ironed out to the point of mutual acceptability. In a comprehensive exposition of the dispute over the Poles, printed in the Neue Freie Presse, Count Andrassy lamented that relations between the Central Empires had been strained by the protracted controversy; only a definitive understanding would "destroy the illusion that we are divided against each other." Burian still believed that the best remedy for the Polish malady—the only policy indeed that he could approve—would be the merger of Galicia with Russian Poland, with possibly slight border rectifications to the advantage of Germany; this "new Poland," the foreign minister argued afresh, should be incorporated in the Hapsburg realm, and representative Poles must take part in the decision making; that plan was, of course, the familiar "Austro-Polish solution." But the men in Berlin, obedient to the imperious will of Ludendorff, stoutly resisted the scheme at conference after conference. At a June meeting in Berlin, German representatives repeated that the Austro-Polish formula would unduly enlarge the Hapsburg patrimony, and they registered anew their aversion to a preponderance of Slavs in the Danubian realm. With unaccustomed forcefulness, Burian combatted these stale arguments and he unhesitatingly rejected a German proposal for a separate Russian Poland intimately associated with Germany, which would choose its own king, who would reside in Warsaw. The most he would concede was guarantees on the economic and railway interests of Germany in an Austrian Poland, but since no meeting of minds was possible, the delibera-

The End Approaches

733

tions were broken off, the Germans promising to resume the negotiations soon, though they in fact neglected to do so.13 In a manner that infuriated Burian, the Berlin press printed tirades against the union of Russian Poland with the Monarchy, and German agents in the German zone of Poland toiled to the same purpose, as others worked on influential Austrogermans. Inescapably, the irreconcilable clash of opinion on the Poles bedeviled not only the relations between Vienna and Berlin, but churned up domestic politics in Austria; in general, Polish deputies supported Burian while Austrogermans lined up against him. The Polish Club in the parliament frankly stated that a tacit understanding with the crown looked to the integration of Russian and Austrian Poland under the House of Hapsburg; the Club was minded "in the spirit of these sentiments to influence the people further if the most worthy government consider that of value." To enlist Austrogerman backing for their dream, the Poles were ready to resist Czech claims for a Czechoslovak state and Slovene aspirations for inclusion in Yugoslavia. After a time, and stiff prodding from Vienna, the Germans brought forward a project for a royal election by the Poles, the winner to establish his residence in Warsaw.14 That way out, which would have excluded the Emperor Charles from consideration, Vienna spurned, and the Austrians equally vetoed requests that Germany should be permitted to annex coal districts of Russian Poland. For Vienna, participation of Polish representatives in ultimate decisions constituted a sine qua non, but before that the Central Empires must themselves reach an understanding. It appeared that the Austro-Polish solution was growing in favor with politicians of Russian Poland. At the Spa conference in August, the Germans proposed 1 3 Burian to Ugron, June 15, 1918, P.A., Geheim, X L V I I / 3 - 2 3 ; Conze, op. tit., pp. 367-378. 14 Burian to Hohenlohe, July 21, 1918, P.A., Geheim, X L V I I / 3 - 2 5 .

734

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

that the Hapsburg Archduke Charles Stephen should be designated as the ruler of a "free" Poland, but that gambit was unacceptable to Vienna, if for no other reason because agitation would ensue to incorporate Galicia in the "free" Polish state. 16 Burian doggedly countered that any Polish settlement must be plotted out with the consent of the Poles, who must freely choose their own sovereign and that the legitimate interests (an elastic phrase) of both of the Central Empires in any Polish state must be appropriately safeguarded. At Vienna early in September, German representatives resumed conversations on the question of Poland, and real progress was at last achieved; it was now agreed that a mixed commission should fashion a detailed Polish program in broad harmony with the wishes of Austria. The experts worked out a settlement, accepted by both governments, providing for a Polish kingdom including Galicia, over which Emperor Charles would preside; for the rest, the new Poland would stand on a footing of equality with Hungary, enjoying autonomy in internal matters and sharing in foreign affairs and in the common army. But the accord possessed only academic significance, since before it could be implemented, the Central Empires had surrendered, and the way was opened for a Polish state, radically different in complexion from the Austro-Polish scheme, to resume its place on the map of Europe. 5. While wranglings and intrigues envenomed feelings between Vienna and Berlin, conditions inside Austria moved downward rapidly. Added together, the June military setback in Italy, the German retreat in France, mocking material privations, and Slav disaffection ate away most of what remained of the will for war. Inflation of 15

Charles to William II, Aug. 23, 1918, P.A., Geheim, XLVII/3-25.

The End Approaches

735

the currency veered toward runaway dimensions, while industrial output, partly because of the alarming lack of fuel, dropped off sharply; stocks of wool ran so low that manufacturing was confined to the few plants that operated most efficiently. Due to deterioration of road-bed and rolling stock and to insufficiency of lubricating oil, railways required a third more coal to haul a given amount of freight than before the war. At mid-June the bread ration was cut in half, the reduction being somewhat smaller for manual workers; Vienna and some of the suburbs again witnessed mass rioting, and in sections of Bohemia famine prevailed. To overcome die scarcity of fats, ingenious Austrian scientists tried to squeeze substitutes from chestnuts and even from rats! Popular expectations of grain supplies from the Ukraine and Rumania turned to ashes in the mouth; remarked the Neue Freie Presse, "attractive romances were made out of statistics which proved how large the exports had been to Russia and the West. We all wallowed in such stories and thought that at least the most perilous condition of want. . . had passed. . . . What we actually got is neither bread nor peace." Before the summer was over placards were posted in Salzburg begging tourists to leave so that the local population might have enough food to keep body and soul together. Regulations to tighten price controls had been issued periodically, imposing jail terms up to three years for violators, both buyers and sellers—but to little purpose. No matter how vast the bureaucracy, illicit transactions of all kinds flourished among hungry and needy people, and respect for law in general dwindled. "A couple more months of confusion such as now prevails," the Arbeiter Zeitung thought, "and those who speculate on the collapse of the Monarchy will be jubilant." Disturbances in the Czech-peopled provinces assumed a more revolutionary tinge. In places, Czech regiments,

736

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

some of whose soldiers had taken up the Bolshevik heresy, fell upon their officers, and time and again Czech miners, railwaymen, employees in munitions plants, and postal workers walked off the job. Plundering and robbery, including the theft of weapons from the Skoda factories, obliged the authorities to proclaim martial law in the most troubled areas, and short rations fostered unrest among Hungarian troops stationed in Prague. Shouted Mayor Weislarchner of Vienna, "The shortcomings of our governments . . . are bitterly avenging themselves. High treason and boundless ingratitude are now rampant"; he appealed to the Austrogermans to close ranks in order to combat "Slav treachery." In fact, something of a cleavage developed among Czech patriots, whole-souled partisans of independence rallying around Kramar, while the opportunistic Vaclav Klofac leaned momentarily to compromise with Vienna; in Paris, Benes dreaded lest politicians at home might be placated with autonomy or a version of federalism. Beyond doubt, Czech separatism was most pronounced in Bohemia, yet in the estimate of the German consulate in Prague, revolutionary passions were in no sense general. Slovene politicians who desired a united Yugoslavia openly collaborated with Czech and Polish separatists, fraternization reaching a peak at a Pan-Slav congress convened on August 16 at Laibach (Ljubljana), attended by thousands. As features of the affairs, a monument to the memory of Dr. Johann Krek, courageous fighter for a united South Slavdom, was unveiled, and warmly PanSlav speeches were delivered; for instance, Count Skarbeck, a Pole, declared that Slav unity from Danzig (Gdansk) to Trieste would thwart the menacing BerlinBagdad proposition.16 Now Klofac boldly asserted that the Czechs would not traffic with Vienna, but would "struggle for complete independence," reinforced by fel16

Wedel to Hertling, Aug. 24, 1918, F.O. 553/328.

The End Approaches

737

low Slavs and by the knowledge that the Entente was dedicated to a free Czechoslovakia. "To-morrow is ours," announced Korosec prophetically. Scolding the Bishop of Laibach for the hearty reception extended to Slav secessionists, the Neue Freie Presse warned that separatism would invite heavy bloodshed. "With all due reverence may we say, 'More Christianity, Lord Bishop, and less politics; more Sermon on the Mount and less Pan-Slavism.'"17 Hapsburgophile Slovenes, guided by the clerical deputy Dr. Ivan Sustersic, struggled to offset evangelists of Yugoslavdom, "wretched creatures, political condottieri," in the language of the Vienna Reichspost, "who fill with passion and radicalism the simple mind of the peasant . . . and rob Slovenian rustics of loyalty to the Emperor. . . ." 6.

More than once, the Seidler ministry, borne down by crushing burdens of state, tendered its resignation, which the Emperor declined to accept. The Neue Freie Presse strongly urged patriotic Poles to uphold the cabinet in the face of the nefarious doings of "Masaryk agitating in America, Nosek in London, Trumbic in Rome, and Northcliffe everywhere." When parliament reassembled in midJuly, 1918, it was an open question whether Seidler could enlist enough votes to pass the military credits and budget bills. Before the deputies, Seidler extolled the alliance with Germany, made light of Entente propaganda, and declared himself agreeable to autonomy for the national communities; yet he added that the German-speaking population formed "the backbone of this multinationality state" and always would. Czech deputies, ever more assertive, ever more confident, indulged in exasperating exhibitions of patriotic unreason, jocosity, and rowdyism, «NFP,

Aug. 22, 1918.

738

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

and provoked a vulgar uproar by singing their national anthem; in a characteristic utterance Georg Striberny boasted that his fellows were resolved upon the destruction of the Monarchy, a monstrous enemy of human freedom in his words, and upon founding an independent Czechoslovakia. Austrogerman politicians, Socialists among them, drew up a tentative blueprint for the future which cast grave doubt on the possibility of holding the Monarchy together. Floundering in quicksands, Seidler on July 22 at last persuaded Emperor Charles to allow him to quit and Baron Max Hussarek took on the thankless assignment of ministerial leadership. Son of a field marshal, a clerical of Czech stock and sometime professor of canon law at Vienna University, the new premier had served in the ministry of education and as head of that department of state. Personal charm and a gift for smoothing out controversies had won him the esteem of the monarch; Christian Socialists admired Hussarek as much as other Austrogermans despised him. The penultimate Austrian prime minister entered office with the intention of finding a federal formula that would appease moderate Slavs; aside from that he would jog along somehow in the stereotyped Austrian tradition, Frantisek Stanek let it be known that "the Czechs cannot negotiate with the [Austro-] Germans or the Hungarians either . . . for today there is no longer a single Czech question, but . . . entirely a Czecho-Slovak question. . . ." 1 8 Next day, the Magyarorszag, Karolyi's sheet, admonished, . . If Hussarek wants to federalize Hungary as well as Austria, then he has gone mad, because Hungary is a united state which does not suffer from any kind of 'Austrian disease.' Hungary must not, may not, and cannot be federalized. . . . Hussarek has just as much to do 18

NFP, Aug. 15, 1918.

The End Approaches

739

with Hungary as with China—or not even that much." In spite of strong opposition, the Prime Minister contrived to secure the adoption of essential money bills but by only a slender majority; it was an inauspicious beginning. Presently, Hussarek revealed that the cabinet was considering constitutional alterations without in any wise impairing the integrity of the state, an ambiguous viewpoint that pleased neither press nor politicians. Klofàc indeed bluntly demanded the cancellation of the dualistic arrangement with Hungary, to which the Premier retorted that any changes effected in Austria would respect the constitution of Hungary. Intending to inspire faith and hope for the future of the realm, Roman Catholic bishops published a pastoral letter denigrating the principles of majority rule and self-determination, calling for loyalty to the House of Hapsburg as a bounden Christian duty, condemning criticism of the divinely designated monarch as an offense against God Himself, and reminding communicants of the solemn Austrian mission as a bulwark of Roman Catholicism in the heart of Europe. On the other hand, the Socialists contemptuously arraigned Austrian proponents of territorial annexations, demanded more equitable distribution of food supplies, and asked the hard-beset industrial workmen not to strike, but to steel themselves for decisive action when chances of success should be more promising. The theory that drastic constitutional reformation on federal lines could yet save the Monarchy was still widely cherished, debated in parliament and press, and commanded respect abroad.19 In the columns of the Swiss Journal de Genève, the eminent journalist, William Martin, espoused a federal solution of the Monarchy's perplexities without ignoring the obvious obstacles—the resistance of the Magyar oligarchy, hostility in Berlin to 19

Artur Skedl, "Zur Verfassungskrise," ÓR, LVII (1918), 49-53.

740

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

changes that would enhance the influence of the Slavs, and avowals of Entente cabinets to liberate the Hapsburg nationalities. Martin was convinced that the Emperor Charles was on the side of the angels, and he supposed that western statecraft would prefer federal reconstruction to the breakup of the Danubian realm. Picturing Charles as a champion of the European power equilibrium against the sinister ambitions of Berlin, Martin believed the Emperor to be a good European, yet the Entente had offered him nothing "but kicks and invective." Conceding that an independent Czech state would conform to ideals of justice and freedom, Martin, nonetheless, repudiated separation as unwise, for geography would condemn such a state to the mercy of stronger neighbors and confront it with "the danger of falling under the domination of those who control its communications." It appeared to Martin that the enemies of the Monarchy believed that the House of Hapsburg must first be destroyed as the prelude to a Danubian federation, freely entered, but to the Swiss publicist it seemed "more simple, more logical, surer and more rapid" to strive for the federal goal in collaboration with the Emperor Charles. Another respected Swiss journalist, Ludwig Bauer, inferred that Entente friendliness toward émigré nationality spokesmen did not necessarily imply that dissolution of Austria-Hungary was the price of peace. "Among the Czechs and South Slavs," Bauer wrote, "there are many who, though they want a transformed Austria, still want an Austria . . . a federal and liberal Austria would form a much greater obstacle to a revived German imperialism than the creation of mutually hostile independent states. This last would mean the conversion of internal Austrian quarrels into international quarrels, the oppression of minorities and consequent appeals to foreign protectors, whereas within the limits of a common Empire the var-

The End Approaches

741

ious antagonisms would be deprived of their deadliness, as has happened in the federal states of the German Empire. Economic considerations," he maintained, "speak even more strongly against dismemberment of the Monarchy." If the Entente supported Charles and federalism, Bauer thought (as did Martin), the prestige of the ruler would be greatly strengthened within his own dominions and in his dealings with Berlin. Given the benefit of hindsight, it is not hard to discover elements of prescience in the pleadings of these informed, relatively dispassionate Swiss neutrals. Yet in Entente circles, they seemed to be indulging in unworthy fallacies arising from doctrinaire thinking or' to resemble King Canute in pitting their frail pens against the onrushing tide. Retorted La Serbie of Geneva, "The Austro-Hungarian problem is a Gordian knot impossible to untie; therefore it must be cut. Mr. Wilson will cut it, as his speech at Washington's tomb, July 4, 1918 proves," an interpretation that reflected the viewpoint of many an opponent of the realm of the Hapsburgs. Hussarek stoutly defended the treatment of nationalities in Austria, drawing contrasts with the rigorous British policy in Ireland and with the denationalization tactics of imperial Russia. The Czechs possessed a mature educational structure, he pointed out, and literacy stood higher among the Italians of Austria than in the kingdom of Italy. Personally, he cherished the vision of a Greater Croatia, which one day would become the third unit in the Monarchy,30 and on October 1, he reiterated to parliament his attachment to federalism; spunky Slav deputies answered the statement with cries of "too late, too late." Already the surrender of Bulgaria had caused not merely alarm, but had spread dismay, confusion, and panic in the shrinking company of Hapsburg loyalists. 20

Wedel to Herding, Aug. 30, 1918, F.O. 553/328.

742

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918 7.

No less than in Austria, the June military fiasco in Italy provoked serious repercussions in Hungary. Standard charges freely circulated that Hungarian troops were stationed in the most risky battle areas, that the ruler grossly neglected his official duties, while Queen Zita was reproached for intervening in affairs of state—all of which furnished ammunition to Hungarian advocates of separation from Austria. Simultaneously, industrial workmen in Budapest, incensed over short rations, the delay in broadening the suffrage right, and spurred on by left-wing agitators, indulged in what approached a general strike. Hesitantly, parliament enacted a bill, attuned fundamentally to the viewpoint of Tisza, which extended the franchise a little—and was almost wholly overlooked in the swirling cataract of events. Deputies renewed protests against efforts of the food controller, Prince Winddischgratz, to meet the needs of the army and of Austria; while the Hungarian harvest as a whole turned out rather well, the yield of wheat fell far below estimates. "In the provinces," cried the Pesti Naplo, "the situation is the same as in the Middle Ages . . . the satisfaction of the most elementary wants has failed us. We must prepare for a terrible summer and an even more terrible winter." On all sides, clamor arose for the resignation of Prime Minister Wekerle. With old-time gusto, Tisza, whose faith in the invincibility of the German ally had not yet been shattered, shrilly reviled the forces within the Monarchy that were hampering the war effort. "We should perhaps already have ended the war," he declared, "if there had not been particularly in Austria, but also in Hungary, unscrupulous people who make capital out of their country's suffering for their own miserable aims. . . . We see the disgraceful

The End Approaches

743

treason of the Czechs surpassing all comprehension. They openly proclaim the destruction of 'their Austrian Fatherland' and have cast their eyes on thirteen counties of Hungary. Treasonable South Slavs are finding an ever greater echo in Croatia." That assessment did not range wide of the mark. Directed by Dr. Vavro Srobar, who worked hand-in-glove with the Czech Maffia, Slovak Socialists drew up a petition on "self-determination for all nationalities, including as well the branch of the Czechoslovaks dwelling in Hungary"; police tossed Srobar into jail. "Stand by your country," adjured the Catholic Primate of Hungary, adding, "If the Slovak people join the Czech state they will lose their language, the traditions of their forefathers, their valuable national virtues and expose themselves to serious danger, even the happy peace of their religious spirit." This clarion voice cried, however, in a wilderness. Croat dissidents felt the heavy hand of police repression, but representatives of Croat schoolmasters defiantly composed a black list of colleagues who were attached to the status quo; to stimulate disaffection, Italian planes dropped leaflets on populous South Slav centers—one of them written by the exiled Trumbic—urging cooperation in the building of a free and united Yugoslavia and promising the help of Italy in that purpose. Bishop Jeglic of Laibach (Ljubljana) apparently won over Archbishop Josef Stadler of Sarajevo to the general proposition of Yugoslav unity. Spasmodic exchanges between Budapest and Vienna produced no consensus on the South Slav question or even on the post-war status of Bosnia. With the sanction of the King, Tisza, in September of 1918, journeyed to Croatia, Bosnia, and Dalmatia in a bizarre effort to rally support for a Hungarian solution of the future of the South Slavs. It was a grossly disillusioning adventure, for, instead of welcoming him as the Israelites had once greeted the gift of manna from the

744

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

heavens, nearly all the public men with whom the Magyar conferred stonily repulsed his suggestions and expressed a decided preference for some form of union with the kingdom of Serbia. Hard though the morsel was to swallow, Tisza recoiled haughtily and predicted that after the war Serbia would merely provide breakfast for Bulgaria! "We may perish," he later exclaimed, "but before we do, we shall be sufficienty strong to crush you first." The Bosnian governor, General Sarkotic, loyalist to the end, promised Tisza that his troops, mostly from Galicia, would fight to protect the dynasty, if summoned—but a call never came. 8.

With not a little misgiving and without uniformity, the governments of the United States and of the Entente powers, meanwhile, pronounced for the total destruction of the realm on the Danube. Of all the converts to this program, the most potent in influence was the American President. Well before Wilson took up that position, Secretary Lansing, who was impressed by the effectiveness of German propaganda among Russian minorities in disrupting the tsardom, had come to the conclusion that formal commitments on freedom for the Hapsburg national communities would not only represent the triumph of immanent justice, but would shorten the war by encouraging disaffection, sabotage, and revolution inside the Dual Monarchy; he likewise came to believe that a bevy of independent Danubian states would comprise an insuperable obstacle to any German designs of European hegemony in the future. Less given to expediency, Colonel Edward M. House, the indispensable eminence grise of the President, steadfastly dissented from that reasoning. Washington policymakers, it has been earlier remarked, were profoundly annoyed by the notorious Clemenceau-

The End Approaches

745

Czernin imbroglio, which ruined any prospect of drawing Vienna into an independent peace settlement. In a stirring address of May 18, 1918, Wilson said, " . . . I have tested these intimations [peace feelers from the Central Empires] and found them insincere. . . . If they wish peace, let them come forward . . . and lay their terms on the table." Already Lansing had instructed Albert H. Putney, State Department specialist on the Near East, to draft a detailed statement on the nationalities of the Monarchy, and a memorandum on the subject, equalling in length a small-sized book, was handed to the Secretary on May 9, 1918.21 Allocating little attention to the Poles or to the Ukrainians, to the Rumanians or the Italians, the Putney report concentrated upon the national aspirations of the Czechoslovaks and the Yugoslavs and recommended that for military and ideological reasons, the United States should foster the freedom movements by all available means. Pertinent questions posed by the report were laid before Wilson by Lansing, who knew, of course, that the cabinet in Rome, while eager to promote Czech secession, had decidedly mixed feelings on South Slav unity. Evidently the normally cautious instincts of the President were influenced by the dramatic exploits of the Czechoslovak Legion battling in bleak Siberia,22 by advice tendered by American sympathizers with the Hapsburg national groupings, and possibly by A Dying Empire written by Bogumil Vosnjak, a Slovene on the South Slav Committee in London.23 Mamatey, op. cit., pp. 252 ff. George F. Kennan, The Decision to Intervene (Princeton, 1958), chaps. VI, XII, XIII, pp. 391—404; Gustav Becvar, The Lost Legion (London, 1939), an illuminating personal narrative; Zeman, op. cit., pp. 201-214. 2 3 Bogumil VoSnjak, "Yugoslavia and the United States," Current History, XVII (1949), 150-155. In the preface to A Dying Empire, T. P. O'Connor, M.P., asserted that ". . . 'An Austrian People' exists only in the imagination of certain English writers. There never has been an Austrian nation and there 21

22

746

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

However that may be, Wilson accepted the LansingPutney logic, authorized the Secretary to further Slav ambitions, openly and actively, and to compose a press release on the subject for general distribution. This momentous decision helped to sound the death knell of the venerable Monarchy on the Danube. On the elements of wisdom and common sense in the conversion of the President, animated controversy has persisted among historical scholars; arguably, if Wilson had adhered unflinchingly to the position on Austria-Hungary set out in the Fourteen Points, a large measure of political unity could have been maintained in the valley of the Danube, though only a dogmatist would uphold this interpretation with unqualified confidence. For the scroll of history, the decisive consideration is that the President now espoused full freedom for the Austro-Hungarian national communities, and by so doing he at once stimulated centrifugal forces and crippled the Austrian friends of federal reconstruction. Contrary to widely believed legend, Thomas G. Masaryk exercised no direct influence on Wilson's new course. True enough, the Czech savant reached America at precisely the time that the President approved the philosophy of dismemberment; Massaryk had gone to Japan from Russia, and proceeded by way of Canada and the United States to Washington, but he had not yet conferred with Wilson. Lingering in America until November 20, 1918, Masaryk spent himself in propagating the Austria delenda doctrine before public gatherings, in articles for the press, and in interviews. Four times he talked with never will be. There is only a large number of nations, differing absolutely from each other, each with its own distinct language ana glorious history, all hating their tyrannical masters, and detesting all community with them, even federation. . . . Perhaps the greatest problem of modem history is awaiting solution. The problem of the Hapsburg Empire cannot be solved by old methods of mediaeval diplomacy. . . ."

The End Approaches

747

Wilson and, shepherded by Charles R. Crane, wealthy Chicago manufacturer and a warm friend of Slavs, this "emblem of the new Slav spirit" made the acquaintance of House, Lansing, members of the House Inquiry, and other politically influential Americans. Furthermore, at the end of May, Masaryk came to an understanding with some leading Slovak-Americans, headed by Albert Mamatey. Known as the Pittsburgh Accord, this understanding implied, at least, that in the Czechoslovak state to be created, Slovaks would enjoy a generous measure of home rule, including a parliament of their own. Precise implementation of the Accord, it was agreed, should be worked out by Czechs and Slovaks in Europe. Masaryk confirmed these arrangements just before departing for home; since the Pittsburgh Accord was never in fact implemented, Slovak partisans of autonomy accused the Czech professor of base treachery—and worse. Similarly unfulfilled was a pledge of home rule for Ruthenia (or Carpatho-Ukraine) given by Masaryk to representative Ruthenian-Americans during his sojourn in the United States. Plans which Masaryk espoused for an effective working union of the disparate nationalities in the middle of Europe, and which prospered for a short interval, soon vanished into thin air. It was in Washington that the Czechoslovak declaration of independence was written and readied for world-wide dissemination.24 It is of passing interest that Communist writers of another generation laid their own peculiar interpretation upon Wilson's change of heart concerning the House of Hapsburg. For them, the decisive consideration was that the Bolshevik coup in Russia had unleashed revolutionary 2 4 Mamatey, op. cit., pp. 261-263, 281-287; Michael Yuhasz, Wilsons Principles in Czechoslovak Practice (Homestead, Pa., 1929), pp. 35 ff; Arthur J. May, "H. A. Miller and the mid-European Union of 1918," Amer. Slavic Review, XVI ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 473-488.

748 The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918 social forces in the Monarchy, and to dispel that menace the man in the White House, frustrated in his endeavor to preserve the anachronistic realm by means of a separate peace, adroitly bolstered up the secessionist-capitalistic elements in the national communities by advocating national independence. To save their own hides, the Czech and other national bourgeoisie eagerly seized upon the initiative from across the Atlantic, so Communist writers would have readers think. Before long it was known in Washington that the Central Empires at the Spa meeting in May, 1918, had taken steps to prolong their alliance. "Austria-Hungary must be practically blotted out as an empire," Lansing said explicitly, otherwise the Central Allies would prove more than ever a formidable menace to enduring peace. In a manner not without precedent, Colonel House washed his hands of the Hapsburg problem in its larger aspects. Obedient to the presidential directive, Lansing on May 29 publicly disclosed that "the nationalistic aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugoslavs for freedom have the earnest sympathy" of the Washington government. Standing alone, this pronouncement looked restrained, colorless, elusive, but in the hands of skillful Entente practitioners of psychological warfare, the Wilsonian position could be exploited effectively among national dissidents in Austria and in Hungary. Leading newspapers of Italy welcomed the American avowal. Reversing its previous tone and tune, the Giornale d'ltalia declared that "all the Allies recognize that the Danubian Monarchy . . . represents 'the negation of G o d ' i t was a galleyful of enslaved peoples forced to suffer and bleed for the benefit of Pan-Germanism." Naturally, the Lansing release enheartened American friends of a free Czechoslovakia and of a united Yugoslavdom. The policy of the White House possessed military value since it would accelerate revolutionary activity inside the

The End Approaches

749

Monarchy, one powerful American newspaper commented, yet the decision was "primarily a detail in the general democratic policy of freedom"; it was optimistically assumed that the cabinet of Rome had canceled the extravagant territorial pledges of the London Treaty and had ironed out differences with the South Slavs. Regrettably, the western governments, the argument went on, had delayed stoking the fires of insurrection in AustriaHungary, but at last it was appreciated that peace with freedom required "the erection of the subject nationalities into free states." Since the Dual Monarchy was "the second partner in the enemy firm," not the land of popular fancy "where pleasant waltzes grow," it should be broken up.25 In the Senate of the United States, William S. Kenyon of Iowa, who á year before had offered a resolution for an independent Bohemia, exposed a traditional tenet of American world policy. "It is America's right," he explained, "yes, its duty, to sympathize with every nation struggling for liberty." Dismissing federalization of Austria-Hungary as impracticable, Kenyon eloquently pleaded for the dissolution of "a festering cancer eating to the heart of civilization. The sooner it is ended and forgotten the better for the world." Senator J. Hamilton Lewis of Illinois, who prided himself on representing more immigrants of Danubian nationalities than any of his colleagues, strongly seconded the Kenyon demand. 9. Meeting at Versailles on June 3, the Supreme Allied Council, comprising Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando, expressed earnest sympathy with the national aspirations of Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs, and they declared for "a united and independent Polish state, with 25

New York Times, May 31, June 5, 8, 1918.

750

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

free access to the sea. . . Already the Entente ministries had recognized the existence of a Czechoslovak national army and had extended aid to South Slav troops fighting in Entente ranks. Not entirely satisfied with t i e Council statement, the London Times assumed "that the allied governments are individually free to supplement and amplify the Versailles declarations . . . and we trust that they will lose no time in making their several positions clear." Disappointed with "earnest sympathy" alone, Benes in Paris and Trumbic in Rome wanted a stronger expression of Entente intentions, which would inspire greater secessionist zeal in the Monarchy; yet it seemed to the French publicist, Jacques Bainville, that Entente statecraft had said to the national communities, "Help yourselves and so help us. . . . You will be rewarded in keeping with your part in the common effort." 26 Serious Vienna papers elected to look upon the Versailles declaration as a deviation from previously avowed Entente purposes. ". . . The descent from liberation to mere sympathy," soliloquized the Neue Freie Presse (June 11, 1918), "means a douche of cold water, a bitter disappointment for the Czechs and South Slavs"; the Fremdenblatt imagined that water had been poured "into the »wine which the Rome Congress of traitors had served up. To remove misunderstanding concerning the May 29 statement, to go beyond it indeed, the Wilson administration on June 28 declared that "all branches of the Slav race [sic] should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule"; but Washington scrupulously eschewed a joint pronouncement with the other opponents of the Central Empires, since, in Lansing's phrasing, "We can in that way avoid taking sides in the conflict of interests." Quite plainly, the makers of American policy were increasingly aware of the complications that would follow the dissolution of the Danubian realm, second-rate 26

London Times, June 7, 8, 1918; Action Française, June 6, 1918.

The End Approaches

751

though these questions would be compared with German problems. Wilson and Lansing objected to a Congressional resolution providing recognition of an independent Poland, holding that a move of this sort would invite parallel demands from Czechoslovak and Yugoslav partisans, which, if denied, might apply a brake upon revolutionary ferment in central Europe. But sentimental Austrophilism—the image of a suave and kindly Danubian land—had gone forever. The new course in Washington, one perspicacious observer thought, was traceable to astute Slav propagandists who did "not dilate on the gains we [the United States] may expect from the liberation but unfold the record of national strivings." 27 At the Mount Vernon tomb of George Washington on the Fourth of July, the President reasserted in opulent prose his determination to pursue the path to dismemberment of the Monarchy. . . There can be no compromise. No half way decision would be tolerable. . . Among the ends for which the "associated peoples" were fighting, Wilson cited the destruction of arbitrary governments, the settlement of political questions in the interests of the people directly concerned, and the establishment of an institution dedicated to the keeping of peace. Proudly, he hailed the spread of the revolution that had started in eighteenth century America "to the great stage of the world itself." 28 In a public letter, under the same date, the President assured his countrymen that centuries of subjugation had not blotted out the national aspirations of distinct peoples of eastern Europe, who now clamored for recognition of their legitimate claims to govern themselves. By way of reply to the Mount Vernon speech, Buri&n 27 New Republic, June 22, 1918; for an account of an anti-Hapsburg outburst in New York City, see New York Times, June 24, 1918. 2 8 Representatives of thirty-three European nationalities shared in the Mount Vernon exercises, each laying a wreath at the shrine of the first President.

752

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

paid Wilson a handsome tribute, without however, extending an olive branch, and he condemned further fighting "as senseless and purposeless bloodshed." For the restoration of peace, Buridn said, all that was needful was Entente abandonment of covetous designs upon AlsaceLorraine, the German colonies, and the Italian-speaking districts of the Monarchy; fight as they would the enemies could not conquer the Central Empires, so wisdom counselled a quest to end hostilities along the avenue of diplomacy. In the meanwhile, the most powerful personage in the Republican party, Theodore Roosevelt, declared anew his alignment with the advocates of Austro-Hungarian dismemberment. ". . . The crucial question to be determined by the war," he bluntly wrote, "is the/ dealing of the world with the dual empire of Austro-Hungary. . . . There can be no peace worth having unless AustroHungary is broken up . . . for . . . the Empire has become the chief pillar of Prussian militarism." Thinking thus, Roosevelt demanded that the United States "should encourage the subject peoples to revolt . . . and we should pledge ourselves never to desert them." 2 9 American friends of South Slav freedom joyously celebrated Kossovo Day with a service in the Cathedral of St. John the Divine and a rally at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York City. On the Fourth of July, in Washington, the flag of a united Yugoslavdom was unfurled, the Serbian minister, Ljubo Mihailovic remarking, "the heart of the PanGerman system is Austria-Hungary." But, "we have become united. . . . Proof of this union is our national flag . . . " 3 0 To mark the fourth anniversary of the outbreak of the war, Lansing summoned all religious faiths 2 9 Roosevelt to Lioubomir Michailovitch July 11, 1918, Elting E. Morison, et al. (eds.) The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt ( 8 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1952-54), VIII, 1349-1351; see also p. 1359. 30 New York Times, June 16, 17, 1918; Current History, VIII (II), 1918, 486-488.

The End Approaches

753

in America to express sympathy for the Yugoslavs. Despite public affirmations of solidarity, however, wrangling between exponents of a federal Yugoslavia and of a unitarian Great Serbia profoundly disturbed well-wishers of the South Slavs in the New World. As the next stage in the evolving American policy, Washington, on September 3, officially recognized the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris as a legitimate government. Press reports on the astonishing feats of Czech armies in Russia, to which the United States had dispatched assistance, impressed American public leaders, and the earnest entreaties of Masaryk and of influential organs of opinion in the United States played some small part in inclining the pendulum to official recognition. Urging that course, Charles Downer Hazen, historian of Europe at Columbia University, lauded the intellectual talents of the Czechs, their resourcefulness and patriotic instincts which eminently fitted them, he believed, for freedom. 81 For a time Lansing hesitated to recommend full recognition of Czechoslovakia, half on legal grounds, half because the Yugoslavs would ask for like status and thus aggravate tension with Italy. Two approaches to the problem presented themselves: by reason of the organized and disciplined Czech troops operating in Russia, it might be possible to consider the Czechoslovak Council as a government in being, or, alternatively, Washington might indicate willingness to establish diplomatic relations with any representative émigré body, striving to win liberty by force of arms. The latter policy, Lansing reasoned, would pour fresh oil on revolutionary flames in the Monarchy and hasten the day of victory; Wilson, on the other hand, thought it advisable to confine limited recognition 31 New York Times, August 4, Í5, 18, 1918; see also in the issue of the 18th a piece by Walter Littlefield, "Czechoslovaks, a New Belligerent Nation."

754

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

to the Czechs alone and authorized the Secretary to draft a statement to that effect. Masaryk laid before Lansing his views on the course the United States should follow, stressing Czech rights to independence deriving from medieval Bohemia; German-speaking folk in the projected Czechoslovakia, he stated, would be granted "constitutionally guaranteed national freedom"—whatever that in practice might mean.32 The Secretary of State pleaded with Wilson to act with dispatch because of press agitation and lest the Republican party might exploit delay for political advantage. An ardent Republican partisan, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, came out on August 23 for independence for both the South Slavs and the Czechoslovaks; "These states, together with Poland," Lodge declared, "would then stand across the pathway of Germany towards the East." Without significant alteration, the President assented to the text of the Lansing draft, which, issued on September 3, recognized "the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a tie facto belligerent government, clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks." To Wilson's way of thinking, the United States had "merely recognized an accomplished fact." 33 This declaration, unexampled in American history, carried no implication of backing for Czechoslovak territorial claims; the British foreign office informed Washington that no decisions had been come to in London on the boundaries of the new state. While the Louis3 2 The President, seemingly, had forgotten what once he had known about the Germans living in Bohemia. Charles Seymour, Geography and Justice (New York, 1951), p. 9. 3 3 Charles C. Hyde, "The Recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks as Belligerents," Amer. Journal of International Law, XIII (1919) , 93-95. As a sample of the reasoning that rallied some informed Americans to freedom for the Slavs, consult Louis E. Van Norman and George Peet, "The Czecho-Slovak Nation," North American Review, CCVIII (1918), 858-866; the authors seem to have diligently perused The New Europe of London.

The End Approaches

755

ville Courier Journal described recognition of Czechoslovakia as "eminently due," the New York Times hailed it as an "act of justice," and pleaded for the liberation of the Poles and Southern Slavs as well. Expressing gratitude for the recognition of "our national cause," Masaryk praised "public opinion in the United States and its representatives" for the contribution to the glorious end. 34 Spokesmen for the Yugoslavs immediately solicited recognition of the South Slav National Committee in London, as a competent international body, but the State Department refrained from making a commitment until February 7, 1919. Friends of Poland energetically promoted the interests of their favorite in the United States. Much against the wish of the Wilson administration, Gilbert M. Hitchcock presented a bill in the Senate for recognition of a free and independent Poland, but Wilson's negative attitude and division of mind among articulate Polish-Americans blocked a vote. In September, 1918, Roman Dmowski came to the United States and teamed up with Paderewski to obtain official recognition of the Polish National Committee as a. de facto government, yet the desired pledge was not forthcoming until January 22, 1919; Britain imitated the American precedent on February 26, 1919.35 Weeks before, France and Britain, and on November 1, 1918, Washington, urged on by Dmowski, had recognized Polish military forces as an autonomous, co-belligerent army, under the jurisdiction of the Polish National Committee, which implied, at any rate, that Poland had been formally initiated into the fraternity of victors. 10. In Entente countries the tide in favor of the destruction of the Danubian state surged upward in the spring 34 36

New York Times, Sept. 4, 1918. Gerson, op. cit., pp. 88-93.

756

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

of 1918. Defining the breakup of the Monarchy as an essential ingredient of British foreign policy, the London Spectator on May 18 insisted that dissolution was necessary not only to raise permanent bulwarks against the expansion of Germany but also to forestall restlessness in the national communities, which assuredly would bring on another armed conflict. On the third anniversary of the entry of Italy into the war, Lord Robert Cecil, speaking for the foreign office, extolled the cabinet of Rome for its willingness to apply the ideals of the Risorgimento to the peoples of central Europe; the ambitions of Italians and South Slavs, he said, did not clash. While Cecil advocated the dissolution of the House of Hapsburg, he thought of the process as in reality a liberation of subject populations, and he regarded a central European federation of nations as indispensable "unless we are to face disasters too horrible to contemplate." 38 It was sweet music to the ears of Benes, while on a visit to London in May, to receive assurances from Foreign Secretary Balfour of "absolute support for our cause." With the great LudendorfF offensive in France at high tempo, one school of thought in the foreign office felt it would be unwise to assume new and far-reaching political commitments. However, at the request of Sir William Tyrrell, a senior official in the foreign office, Lewis B. Namier, a leading light in the Austria delenda camp, prepared a memorandum on British official dealings with the Czech émigrés in which he urged recognition of the National Council. Apparently, this recommendation carried weight with policymakers.37 Be that as it may, the British cabinet hesitated until August 9 to recognize the Council formally as the trustee of the future Czechoslovak government, competent to 38 London Times, May 23, 1918. 3 7 Lewis B. Namier, "Richard von Kiihlmann," Quarterly Review, CCLXXXVIII (1950), 369-372; Zeman, op. cit., p. 220.

The End Approaches

757

administer Czech and Slovak troops. Gratified though the New Europe was over the foreign office declaration, it scolded makers of policy for tardiness, arguing that an earlier avowal of "the constructive liberation of the Austro-Hungarian subject peoples" might well have enabled Entente armies to occupy Vienna long since, compelling Germany to capitulate. On the other side, the Ballplatz berated the London authorities and poked fun at the interpretation that the Czechoslovak Council represented the wishes of Czechs and Slovaks or much less of a Czechoslovak nation, which was merely the figment of sanguine imaginations. Only a small portion of the self-styled Czechoslovak army was made up of citizens of the Monarchy, it was claimed; into October, the notion that Austrophilism still dominated Downing Street persisted in Hapsburg diplomatic circles.88 Under the guidance of Wickham Steed, a South Slav war aims committee was created in London, which adopted as its goals a united Yugoslavdom, reparation for war damage, and intimate economic and intellectual association with the Entente powers. "We are often told," Steed remarked, "that we must not dismember Austria, as though Austria were a tender young virgin body . . . in truth Austria is a carcass suffocating within the wrinkles of its parchment—like hide a number of young peoples striving to be borne." Once more he singled out nigh finance, the Roman Catholic Church, and international Socialism, as the trinity that was working to preserve the Hapsburg "sultanate." At a meeting to inaugurate the work of the South Slav committee, with the ambassador of Italy gracing the platform, Balfour described Serbia as the pivot on which the war turned, expressed sympathy for the Yugoslav idea, and excoriated the tarnished Hapsburg dynasty in stinging accents. Settlements in the 3 8 DeVaux to Foreign Office, Oct. 3, 1918, P.A., Schweiz, Berichte, 1918.

758

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Danube Valley would constitute, he sagely observed, the crucial chapter in peacemaking. A gleaming milestone on the highway to Czechoslovak freedom was French recognition on June 28 of the National Council as "the basis of a future government"; thereafter, international custom prescribed that Czechoslovak soldiers taken captive should be treated as prisoners of war, not as traitors. Two days later, Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon, formally recognized the right of Czechs and Slovaks to independence. Previously the astute Benes, whose most splendid diplomatic feat was to obtain formal Entente recognition of Czechoslovakia while the war proceeded, had arranged to place Czech and Slovak soldiers domiciled in France under the authority of his Council. It was cheering to have Premier Clemenceau promise, "I shall go with you to the end"— and the "Old Tiger" kept his word. On July 19, 1918, Pichon promised the London South Slav committee that French recognition would be forthcoming—an assurance that incensed Pasic and other partisans of Great Serbia, who wanted for themselves, not for the London set at all, exclusive credit for the liberation of the South Slavs. At this juncture, Pasic thought of incorporating most of Croatia in the kingdom of Serbia with the remaining fragment to be organized as a province of Serbia; the intransigeance of the Serbian prime minister further embittered Britons who were working for South Slav unity.39 Thinking in the cabinet at Rome on the fate of Austria-Hungary diverged from the positions taken in Washington, London, and Paris—radically diverged at points affecting the interests of the South Slavs. On April 21 Sonnino and Benes, it is true, signed a military convention, which marked an important step toward Czechoslovak independence; and about twenty thousand Czech 39

Ostovic, op. cit., pp. 86-88, 2 8 3 - 2 8 4 .

The End Approaches

759

prisoners of war were brigaded with the troops of Italy. Yet a month later, the Giornale d Italia, a mouthpiece for Sonnino, printed a veritable Austrophile sermon, asserting that Vienna would soon break away from Berlin, that Slav subjects of the Hapsburgs were not anti-dynastic, and quarreling with the vision of Yugoslavdom; by midJuly, however, the paper had completely reversed itself. For his hostility to a united South Slav state, the Corriere deUa Sera subjected Sonnino to unrelenting criticism, and Gaetano Salvemini continued to teach that a strong South Slav state would at once be a natural ally of Italy and would debar Germany from the Adriatic; while claiming Trieste and its environs for Italy, Salvemini wanted Fiume to become autonomous and Dalmatia, except for certain fringing islands, to go to Yugoslavia. "Istria is ours," the historian recalled Mazzini had written, "as necessary to Italy as the ports of Dalmatia are to the South Slavs." 40 Over the stubborn resistance of Sonnino, the Italian ministry, Bissolati leading, accepted in principle the unification of the South Slavs. A formal announcement of September 9 indicated that Italy considered Yugoslav liberation to be in harmony with Entente war aims and necessary for a just and lasting peace; though defeated, Sonnino jealously nursed his antipathy to a united state of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. In sum, then, the "associated" governments at war with Austria-Hungary extended official sanction to the Czechoslovaks, but denied recognition to the South Slavs. Whatever likelihood of a federal reformation of the Monarchy existed—slim at best—it was irreparably damaged by enemy promotion of the forces of revolt and secession. 40 Gaetano Salvemini, "Italy and the South Slavs," Quarterly Review, CCXXIX (1918), 176-204.

21. Atralanríj? "WE

STRIVE

FOR

AN HONORABLE

PEACE

BY

AGREEMENT,"

Foreign Minister Burián on August 21 told the Neue Freie Presse. While conceding that the Monarchy sorely needed internal reconstruction, he tagged enemy talk of tearing the realm to pieces "a crime against humanity." The Entente was fighting for "imaginary things," and no irreconciliable differences really separated the two belligerent camps, he said; the allusion to "imaginary things" ruffled many Entente feathers. In the Neue Freie Presse, Czernin argued afresh for a compromise peace and prophesied that the Entente hypothesis of a military decision was bound to be disappointed—"as certainly as the sun sinks in the evening." He discerned a new world order ripening with a league of nations to maintain peace. "From the banks of the Danube," he exclaimed, "the cry ought to go forth to the world, 'Wake up, wake up from the bad dreams of blood and force' "—prolongation of the fighting would surely be ruinous for both sets of belligerents. Andrássy chimed in that the Central Em-

760

Avalanche

761

pires had no war aim that could not be negotiated with the Entente. "We want only the status quo ante," he put it.1 Burian implored the Germans to draft a firm statement of war aims and to accept his project for an exploratory conference on neutral soil to bring hostilities to an end; but he intransigeantly resisted Berlin suggestions that a neutral government should serve as mediator.2 For his every move the Foreign Secretary possessed the unqualified backing of the Emperor, even though he was debating the installation of another chief at the Ballplatz. Count Botho Wedel, the German ambassador in Vienna, rightly judged that Charles coveted for himself the prestige of peacemaker so as to restore popular confidence in the dynasty and to stem revolutionary separatism. Heedless of warnings from Berlin that unilateral action would be traitorous, Buridn issued on September 14, a plaintive, rather rambling, appeal to all belligerents for confidential conversations in a neutral country on peace conditions; military operations would not be halted during the deliberations.8 How then did the warring peoples respond to this somewhat unorthodox and patently fluid overture? "The road is open to negotiation," remarked the Neue Freie Presse, "on principles which Britain daily professes, for Burian wishes to submit these principles to closer examination at a neutral meeting place. . . While the Berlin government acquiesced in the fait accompli* the German press revived accusations of Hapsburg perfidy, violently arraigned Emperor Charles, and contrasted the Vienna stroke with the Nibelung fidelity of Germany toward 1 NFP, Sept. 1, 1918. 2 Pro domo, no. 4228, Sept. 6, 1918, P.A., Geheim, XLVII/13. 3 Scott, Peace Proposals, pp. 386-389. 4 The German Emperor would have history believe that if "Charles had kept control of his nerves for three weeks longer many things would nave turned out differently." William II, op. cit., p. 267.

762

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

its ally. Coming at the same time as did evil tidings from the battlefronts in France, the Burian note further impaired the sagging German national morale; so much so, that Hindenburg deemed it necessary to remind his countrymen that Vienna had not proposed cessation of fighting, which would go on, he avowed, until the enemy was minded to call quits. Unofficial British and French voices interpreted the Austrian olive branch as merely a shrewd stratagem concocted in Berlin to gain time; for instance, Professor W. Alison Phillips of Trinity College, Dublin, warned that Germany had resorted to the sort of cajolery once employed by Frederick the Great, while The New Europe branded the Austrian proposal as redolent of the Metternich era, wholly unacceptable and untrustworthy. For Auguste Gauvain, Burian aimed to sow tares in the Entente field and to convince the Slav national communities that western promises of freedom possessed no value. "Reason and humanity demand that the Austrian invitation be accepted," the New York Times counselled. "The case for a conference is presented with extraordinary eloquence and force. We cannot imagine that it will be declined." Critics insinuated that the Times was being bribed by Vienna! The revered former president of Harvard University, Charles W. Eliot, believed a top-level meeting of the belligerents would do no harm and might accomplish great good. To help matters along, the Queen of the Netherlands offered her capital as the site for a conference. Policymakers in Entente lands tended to regard Burian's initiative as a wily "peace offensive," designed to save the Central Empires from a merited fate, and they adopted an uncompromisingly negative posture. Although disclaiming any intention of speaking for the whole British cabinet, Balfour derided the overture as a cynical effort to split the Allies, which offered nothing

Avalanche

763

calculated to bring peace a day nearer. In a vigorous Guildhall address of September 30, Balfour said that liquidation of the wrongs done to the Hapsburg minorities would form the prelude to an effective international league to preserve the peace. Until the enemy acknowledged that right could not do business with crime, Clemenceau remarked, hostilities must go on. The Consulta disclosed that Italy intended to keep on fighting for national unity by acquiring irredentist territory and areas needed for lasting security. Within half an hour after the Burian bid was presented, the government in Washington turned it down with scorn. The formal Wilson answer of September 17 asserted flatly and concisely that the United States had already revealed its peace terms and, consequently, could entertain no suggestion for a mutual exchange of views. In point of fact, the President—nicknamed "Herr Holzhausen" in Austria—still possessed only the foggiest notions of what should be done about the Dual Monarchy, Colonel House recorded. The man from Texas had advised strongly against turning down the Burian bid, on the score that rejection would be exploited to keep central Europe fighting through another winter, but a torrent of praise resounded for the presidential rejection. "The time to make peace with the Hun," exclaimed Missouri Senator James A. Reed in a typical comment, "is when he is on his knees." Washington had flatly notified Vienna that it intended to deal with the head of the German dachshund, not the tail, thought Congressman Nicholas Longworth. As if to take the curse off its original interpretation, the Times published a piece, "The Hohenzollern Cat's-paw," lambasting the Monarchy as "a tattered, filthy, foul smelling remnant of the Holy Roman Empire. . . ." which must be smashed. "When our victorious troops enter Vienna, the Hapsburgs and their regime will be as dead as that of the Pharaohs and the Bour-

764

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

bons." Editorially, it was supposed that if Austria-Hungary dissolved the alliance with Germany it would "stand a chance of a better hearing. . . . " 5 2.

Not improbably the Ballplatz expected the enemy cabinets to reply in about the manner that they did, though Buriân persisted in the belief that his proposal was wise and proper. Before another move could be matured, Bulgaria, feeblest link in the Central Empire chain, caved in, causing something akin to panic in Vienna and in Berlin, and sealing the outcome of the war, LudendorfF professed to believe. If anything, hardships were more acute in the cities of Bulgaria than in the Danube Monarchy. Harvests in 1918 fell below normal, and "many families in Sofia eat only once in 24 hours," the press reported. At mid-September, Entente armies long immobilized at Salonica mounted an offensive; though the Bulgarian forces about equalled the enemy, war-weariness, a sense of futility impaired fighting spirit and motivated a high rate of desertion. Four days after the Entente drive commenced, Bulgaria lay open to quick conquest; five more days, and mutinies in the army, which rapidly turned into insurrection, obliged the cabinet of Sofia to sue for peace; five days more and Bulgaria had signed an armistice, permitting Entente troops to garrison sections of the kingdom.6 By overpowering Bulgaria, the Entente had gained entry to the fortress of the Central Empires in a region of crucial strategic importance; it would be possible to strike into Turkey; it would be possible to strike into Serbia and cleanse that land of foreign troops; it would New York Times, Sept. 18, 25, 1918. Franchet d'Espèrey, "Les Armées Alliées en Orient," Revue des Deux Mondes, XLVII (1938), 5-33, 241-265, exceipts from the personal papers oi the Entente commander. 5

6

Avalanche

765

be possible to strike into southern Hungary, push thence into Rumania and cut off the flow of oil and of foodstuffs, or thrust forward toward Germany. What resources could be spared were rushed by the Central Allies in the direction of Bulgaria, but the odds were overwhelming and Entente divisions fanned out to all points of the compass. In the light of the Bulgarian collapse, a Hapsburg crown council of September 27 decided that a new southern battleline should be erected and then peace "at any price and by any means" must be sought. Again Vienna invited Berlin policymakers to proceed hand-in-hand and this time the Germans assented—assented on September 30 to a joint request for an armistice grounded upon the Fourteen Points. Buridn explained in his memoirs that the Wilsonian dicta "were but straws, yet we had to catch at them and make as much capital as possible out of Wilson's moral obligation . . . for that was the only way in which we could escape complete capitulation"; his consternation may have been heightened by authoritative information on the immensity of the war effort underway in America.7 Addressed to "His Lordship, the President of the United States," the Vienna communication, asking for an armistice on Wilsonian principles, went out on October 4, and Berlin dispatched a parallel note. The response in the United States varied from unsympathetic to tepid approval. "The war must go on," thought William E. Borah, Senator of Idaho. "There is no assurance that any peace terms can be effected through Austria's proposals." To give only autonomy to the subject peoples of Austria, Theodore Roosevelt told his audience in the Kansas City Star (October 13, 1918), "amounts to a betrayal of the Czecho-slovaks, Jugoslavs, Italians, and Rumanians. The first should be given their independence, 7 Buridn, op. cit., p. 399; Trauttmansdorff to Buridn, Oct. 5, 1918, P.A., Krieg 7, Amerika.

766

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

and the other three united to the nations to which they really belong. . . Ignoring Vienna for the time being, where statesmen fretted and the press fidgeted, Wilson chose to concentrate on negotiation with Berlin. In an attempt to open up direct conversations on peace with Entente and American diplomatists in Switzerland, Counts Andrassy and Adam Tamowski (the last ambassador-designate to Washington) hastened to Berne, but their labors were barren of result. To the Delegations, representing the parliaments of Austria and of Hungary, Burian presented on October 15 a survey of prospects. It was no light task that confronted him, for he felt he must speak with candor, yet in a way that would not enhearten the rising forces of separatism. Under the circumstances, the address was a masterly performance, containing assurances that the persistent search for peace by understanding would presently attain its goal and a pathetic plea to the national communities to cooperate for the preservation of the Monarchy; Burian praised Wilson and his declared ideals for a peace settlement and he eloquently subscribed in principle to a league of nations. His words, however, struck no fire; they evoked from Karolyi, who felt that his own hour was about to strike, an impassioned diatribe reproaching the Ballplatz for blundering diplomacy and caustically chiding the Foreign Secretary for neglecting to have the invitation to the Delegation session edged in funeral black! After a tart rejoinder to Karolyi by Tisza, the Hungarian Delegation ostentatiously withdrew; the Austrian Delegation briefly and languidly discussed the Burian report and adjourned. On October 16, Emperor Charles announced that Austria, though not Hungary, would be made over into a federal community of national states. In his tardy reply of October 20, Wilson said that com-

Avalanche

767

mitments to the Czechoslovaks and to the South Slavs, entered into after the enunciation of the Fourteen Points, had canceled Point Ten in that message; these nationalities, therefore, not the President, must be "the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian government will satisfy their aspirations. . . Unconvincingly, Burian claimed to be surprised at these accents, but he was on surer ground in believing that the utterance from Washington would impart a powerful impulse to centrifugal currents. If the Vienna authorities genuinely believed that their willingness to stop fighting on Wilsonian terms and the federalization maneuver would somehow rescue the foundering Hapsburg ship of state, they were rudely undeceived by the communication from Washington; and the language of the President disclosed again that the Fourteen Points, as the foundation of peacemaking, were subject to revision. Supporting Wilson, ex-president William H. Taft discovered in the dispatch to Vienna "how unsatisfactory it would be to take any of the Fourteen Points as an exact basis for peace." But the New York Times greeted the reply of the President as "a trumpet call to the victims of the Hapsburgs, a great document of free Europe and widening democracy." "The polygot empire . . . rims on the rocks," explained the Christian Science Monitor, "and begins [sic] to go to pieces like a ship pounded by a gale." Calling the answer of Wilson a "heartblow," the Neue Freie Presse described the ex-Princeton professor as the virtual prime minister of Austria! The Az Est of Budapest termed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk "an idyl compared with what Mr. Wilson now desires; it is insanity," and Kirolyi's Magyarorszag likened the President's note to a bolt from the blue, which forced Hungary to follow democratic paths in international dealings and in the treatment of the non-Magyar nationalities. For Masaryk,

768

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

who, in Washington, had just put the finishing flourishes on a declaration of Czechoslovak independence, the Wilsonian statement gained in effectiveness since the principle set out in Point Ten had been forthrightly abandoned; Masaryk applied himself in helping to block further American diplomatic dickerings with Vienna. Eligible for membership in the fraternity of perpetual hope, Buriin presented to a crown council the outlines of a rejoinder to Wilson as if to say that a debate might yet be carried on with the White House; the Foreign Secretary proposed that his answer should be initialled by representatives of Austria and Hungary. Still optimistic, Wekerle believed that Hungary could retain its nationalities, though more realistic statesmen begged to differ. A trip to Budapest convinced Buridn that the dualistic structure had broken irreparably, and on October 24 he resigned from the Ballplatz; for services to crown and country he was rewarded with the Order of the Golden Fleece. For some thoughtful Austrians the desirability of trying to save the Hapsburg realm by federal reformation had not even yet lost its allure. It was officially disclosed on August 29 that detailed studies on federalization were proceeding and that the net results would soon become available. Toward the end of the next month, an engaging blueprint appeared under the imprimatur of Professor Hans Kelsen, a Vienna expert on the science of government, which envisaged a special commission to work out a program of dissolution in collaboration with representatives of the national communities; thereafter, an effort would be made to reknit the several states in a confederation, presided over by Emperor Charles. The Emperor approved this scheme, and Professor Lammasch, who agreed to serve as chairman of the projected commission, secured a good deal of backing for the plan, but Czech politicians felt the author had taken leave of

Avalanche

769

his senses and spurned the project, book, bell, and candle.8 While Socialist papers consistently acclaimed the fundamental concept of federalization, the Neue Freie Presse argued that the federal cure would raise immense, perhaps insurmountable problems in finance and defense, would be disastrous for the Germans of Bohemia, and would alienate Hungary. As noted above, Prime Minister Hussarek pronounced for a federal Austria in October; Poland, a Bohemia partitioned into a German and a Czech autonomous areas, and a substantial southern Slav state (though not the Slovene districts) would become members of the Austrian federal union. Patriotic Slav deputies answered by converting the chamber once more into a mad house; Korosec, now a determined advocate of Yugoslav unity, declared the promise of home rule had come too late and that "through all the South Slav area arises a great cry 'full freedom or death.'" The Czechs, "habitually treated like Negroes of Central Africa," declared the Socialist Vlastimil Tusar, demanded unfettered freedom, and other Czechs echoed the same sentiment. FrantiSek Stan£k said, ". . . We wish the front of the Slav states to extend from Danzig by way of Prague to the Adriatic"; Germans in Bohemia would have to fend for themselves as best they could. A Polish deputy proclaimed that Poland should be resurrected and should embrace the province of Austrian Silesia, which elicited from the Ukrainian deputy Petruszewycz a demand for an antonomous eastern Galicia in a federalized Austria or in the Ukrainian Republic. "Rather war to the death than union with Poland," he declared. 8 The memorandum is printed in Charles A. Gulick, Austria From Habsburg to Hitler (2 vols.. Berkeley, Calif., 1948), I, 45-47; another interesting proposal for federal reconstruction was circulated by an able young scholar of Vienna, Dr. Friedrich Hertz. Mamatey, op. cit., pp. 329-330.

770

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

For the Italian minority the formerly Hapsburgtreue Alcide de Gaspari, called for union with Italy. After Hussarek denounced the treasonable utterances of all separatists, the Polish Socialist Ignaz Dasynski delivered a blistering phillipic against the Monarchy, closing with the observation that it was "high-time for Austria to imitate the example of Turkey." Only Christian Socialists rallied to the defense of the Monarchy, extolling the economic advantages it conferred upon all nationalities and prophesying that discord and anarchy would be the inescapable results of the formation of a bevy of small successor states. Secessionist speeches, Viktor Adler commented, removed whatever doubt there had been that the realm of the Hapsburgs was slithering into the spacious dust-bin of history. 3. A mere two months after the harvest, which yielded more than in 1917, terrible food shortages led to hunger riots in many sections of Austria. If the war went on, if no greater help were forthcoming from outside, widespread famine would prevail in the impending winter, and a heavy incidence of influenza deepened popular despair.9 Small wonder that groundless rumors of an armistice on October 5 set off frenzied demonstrations in Vienna. At Baden in the week following, Emperor Charles conferred with thirty-two nationality and party leaders on organizing a cabinet of all the talents, which would plan a federal state. Without equivocation, the Czechs reiterated that they were interested exclusively in a government of their own at Prague, which was sufficient to bury the notion of a coalition ministry. The theory that so late as this enough reliable troops could be 9 David F. Strong, Austria, Transition From (New York, 1939), passim.

Empire

to

Republic

Avalanche

771

counted on to subdue secessionist movements fails to carry conviction. The story gained credence in Berlin that the Monarchy would be refashioned with archdukes and princes as kings of Hungary, Poland, and Bohemia, leaving Charles supreme in the German-inhabited regions and head of a Danubian confederation; but like many pieces of gossip of similar import circulating at the time this one possessed no substance whatsoever.10 "Depend upon it, Sir," wrote crusty Samuel Johnson, "when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully." So it was with the Emperor Charles, oscillating uncertainly to and fro, who, on October 15, summoned a crown council to hear a manifesto promising a federal regime for Austria and cast into final form by Baron Johann von EichhofF, a veteran student of constitutional revision. It was a revolution from above, avowedly, to which senior statesmen of the realm consented, though Wekerle threatened to prohibit shipments of provisions to Vienna unless Hungary was specifically exempted from the plans. Published next day and addressed "to loyal Austrian peoples," the imperial manifesto enshrined rather vague proposals to transform Austria into a federal union of four components—German, Czech, South Slav, and Ukrainian; areas of Polish habitation would be permitted to join a free Poland and Trieste would have a status peculiar to itself. Since the integrity of the lands of the crown of St. Stephen would in no sense be disturbed by this "e pluribus unum" pronouncement, the tomorrow of Croatia, of the Slovak counties, as well as of Bosnia was left up in the air, so far as the Hapsburg House was concerned. Wishfully designed as it was to sway the thinking of the man in the White House and to arrest the forces of disintegration, the imperial manifesto betrayed its spon1» German Foreign Office to Wedel, Oct. 14, 1918, F.O. 553/329; Wedel to Foreign Office, Oct. 14, 1918, ibid.

772

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

sors, for it made no dent upon Wilson and it accelerated in fact centrifugal currents by conferring a semblance of legality upon separatism and by further depressing the esprit of the fighting services. As Andrassy sized up the situation, "to avoid being killed, we committed suicide." 11 "A worthy production in the home of musical comedy," jibed the New York Times. A cartoon in the St. Louis Star, under the caption, "Please pass the pie," graphically depicted the expectations, the appetites of die Hapsburg nationalities. Seated at a table, a glum Emperor Charles eyed a large pie, labelled Austria-Hungary; round about, boyish-looking Czechoslovaks, Yugoslavs, Poles, Ukrainians, Rumanians, and Italians grinned covetously as they prepared to devour their slices. It would be highly improper, however, to dogmatize on the political sentiments of the nationalities in the autumn of 1918, though such admissable evidence as is available points to the conclusion that separatism in the Monarchy commanded the active allegiance of only a fraction of any nationality, and may have been unrepresentative of the feelings of ordinary folk. And yet, the acid test is not whether citizens in the mass disliked the prospect of disruption, but whether they would raise a finger in the circumstances to help the Hapsburg authorities hold the realm together. The blunt fact is that many an ordinary citizen bedeviled by food shortage and kindred privations, utterly weary of the agonizing struggle, watched the swirl of events apathetically, and, amidst the glowing heat of nationalism, normal discussion of political affairs was burned away. The activity of the Roman Catholic clergy in the secessionist movements elicited from the Arbeiter Zeitung the observation that this traditionally potent source of Hapsburg loyalism had dried up, or as the paper color1 1 Eduard Lichtenstein, "Deutsch Österreich," ÖR, LVII 145-153.

(1918),

Avalanche

773

fully put it, "the black rats are leaving the ship just when she is in charge of a *black' steersman—the clerical Hussarek." During October, many a Czech clerical, hitherto Austrophile, switched into the independence camp, and Archbishop Count Paul Huyn, an Austrogerman aristocrat, was powerless to prevent his clergy from going along;12 Czech priests, like their South Slav fellows, carried special weight in rural areas. According to the Primorske Novine, a Catholic paper of Fiume, the dignitaries of the church who had taken up with the Yugoslav aspirations "have their clergy with them and the clergy have the people. . . . Especially in the Slovene districts, they have aroused great enthusiasm among the masses for the Yugoslav idea. . . . It is clear that the dignitaries of our Church will join the people in their struggle to realize a general union of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs." 18 With clouds of dissolution growing ever darker, representatives of the German minority of Bohemia talked of uniting the predominandy German-speaking districts of the province with Bavaria, or Saxony, or just plain "Germany," the position adopted on October 14 by an improvised German national council of Bohemia. But such voices were drowned out by intensified Czech clamor for the inclusion of Bohemia entire in an independent Czechoslovakia. Demonstrators in Prague, enflamed by reports of food exports to German-Austria and to the armies, protested vociferously and industrial workers went on strike; more than mere traces of social revolutionary ferment, encouraged by developments in Russia, underlay disturbances in Czech communities. A league of Socialist groups planned mass rallies for October 14, when independence would be declared. But whatever danger of social anarchy there may have been, 12 Gebsattel to Hertling, Sept. 17, 1918, F.O. 553/299. is Quoted in The New Europe, VIII (Oct. 10, 1918), 310-311.

774

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

it was frustrated largely by Socialist leaders of a democratic cast of mind and by Governor Max Coudenhove, who, though he had wearied of his office, managed to hold Hungarian regiments in Prague, ready if necessary to maintain public order by force.14 In Paris, the Czechoslovak National Council, which had by now organized a provisional government headed by Masaryk, published on October 21, the declaration of independence composed in Washington by the Professor with the assistance of American friends. "Our nation," it was explained, "elected the Hapsburgs to the throne of Bohemia of its own free will, and by the same right deposes them." While asserting freedom for Czechoslovakia, the declaration more than hinted that independence might form the prelude to a confederation in central Europe. A week later, the Ballplatz having just appealed again to President Wilson for an armistice on terms he had prescribed, ancient Prague witnessed a political revolution decorous, disciplined, and bloodless, though attended by no little anti-Catholic feeling in protest against the historic intimacy of the Hapsburg dynasty and the Church. Alongside of the white and red emblems of Czechoslovakia, the Stars and Stripes were hoisted as testimony that the new country considered itself the god-child of the United States. Working harmoniously with the Czech emigration, Antonin Svehla, an influential Agrarian deputy and no longer a reluctant warrior for national freedom, in his capacity as President of the National Council demanded the surrender of Austrian authority and assumed responsibility for feeding the Prague population. Aligned with him were worthies of other political groupings, Alois Rasin for the Young Czechs, the moder1 4 J. F. N. Bradley, "A Note on the Foundation erf the Czechoslovak Republic," Slavonic Review, XXXVIII (1959), 223-225; Zeman, op. cii., pp. 222-225.

Avalanche

775

ate Socialist Frantisek Soukup, and for the national Socialists, Georg Stribemy; the firmness and effective cooperation of this team, reinforced by the sokols, prevented the revolution from erupting in physical violence. Knowing that resistance would be futile, Austrian military officials on October 29 relinquished control of the garrisons; Coudenhove, who had unsuccessfully solicited instructions from distraught Vienna, was interned with his family in the governor's palace. A sharply cacophonous note was sounded by German-speaking folk of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, who, averse to membership in a Czechoslovak Republic, instituted provisional governments of their own. The embryonic regime of German-Austria which had emerged claimed authority over the "Sudeten Germans," but, unable to obtain military aid from Germany, the provisional governments speedily succumbed to Czech pressure. On October 30, a Slovak National Council, whose pretension to hold a popular mandate is a matter of debate, declared for the inclusion of the Slovak-peopled counties of Hungary in the Czechoslovak Republic. That same morning the Czech patriot Vlastimil Tusar presented himself in Vienna as the agent of the Czechoslovak Provisional Government. "I take pleasure in welcoming you as ambassador of the Czech-slovak state," remarked Austrian Prime Minister Lammasch; to which Tusar gleefully responded, "The pleasure is all mine." It was a proud moment in the hectic career of Eduard Benes when on November 8, he reviewed Czech and Slovak regiments that had been fighting the good fight for national fulfillment. In writing finis to the nearly four hundred year Hapsburg lordship over Bohemia and Moravia, Czech patriots had lagged somewhat behind Poles and South Slavs, half because they wanted to be absolutely certain that the armies of Germany would be unable to intervene and

776

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

half out of dread of a proletarian attempt to seize power. After issuing a call for a constitutional assembly, the strongly bourgeois Prague National Council soon folded up; at Geneva politicians from Bohemia and from the Czech emigration drafted a tentative constitution for the new state, Kramir, whose affections had been set upon a monarchical regime, reluctantly acquiescing in a republican type of government. From Italian battlefronts Czech soldiers trekked back to their homes as the imperial Hapsburg army fell apart. Until late in October, discipline in the military ranks had been preserved remarkably well, in spite of the retreat and poor food which consisted merely of a "little dark rye flour, cooked with salt and water into a land of brownish mush"; but as October ran its course, the armed forces spontaneously disintegrated, a Czech officer remembered, and soldiers drifting home discovered that they were heroes and as such the beneficiaries of popular acclaim and affection.1® 4. On December 21, President-designate Masaryk gloriously crowned his dramatic odyssey by returning to Prague in triumph. National prophet and national saint, the elderly savant, by far-seeing statesmanship, by the master-stroke of assuming supreme command of the Czechoslovak Legions, by winning support for independence in western capitals, by unwavering devotion tu government maintained by discussion and consent, had contributed vitally to the redemption of his countrymen from Hapsburg rule. "Without our propaganda abroad," Masaryk thought, "without our diplomatic work, and the blood of our Legions, we should not have achieved our 1 5 Joseph Z. Schneider, "How an Army Fell Apart," Harper's Magazine, CXC (1944—45), 280-285.

Avalanche

777

independence." Right away, the heroic statesman set to work laying solid foundations for the new state, quite aware that a task of herculean dimensions confronted him. As he put it, "To win was a problem, but it will be a still greater problem to maintain the results of the victory." It would be a real challenge to root out lingering vestiges of "Austrianism," which, Masaryk confessed, existed among his co-nationals and indeed within himself.16 Indicative of soaring hopes in America for the new state was the language of the Boston Transcript: "The truly great nation which will emerge from the AustroHungarian wreck will be Czecho-Slovakia, which will stand in Middle Europe as Mt. Zion stood in Judea, beautiful for situation, and crowned with her ancient and cultured capital, Prague. Czecho-Slovakia . . . will possess a moral and intellectual hegemony among the Slavic races... ." 1 7 That image of reason missed, alas, the salient point that the product of Czech nationalism constituted, like its Hapsburg ancestor, a multinationality community. After the Communist coup detat of 1948 in Czechoslovakia, the new rulers of the Republic launched a studied campaign to denigrate Masaryk and to efface the tradition of his successful labors. In particular he was assailed for trafficking with the "imperialist" West—the suborned lackey of Standard Oil it was specifically charged—and for hostility to the Russian Bolshevik regime, which was true. The Communist attack started in school history lessons in Czechoslovakia and led to the erasure of the name of Masaryk (Benes, too) from streets, hospitals, and schools, and to the removal of statues raised to his memory.18 1 9 Masaryk, The Making of a State (London, 1927), p. 287; Paul Selver, Masaryk (London, 1940), pp. 295-296. 1 7 Quoted in Literary Digest, LIX (Nov. 9, 1918), 9. 1 8 Karel Huliika, "The Communist Anti-Masaryk Propaganda in Czechoslovakia," Amer. Slavic and East European Review, XVI (1957), 160-174; Richard Hunt, "The Denigration of Masaryk," Yale Review. XLIII (1953-54), 414—426.

778

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

The centennial of Masaryk's birth in 1950 evoked varied reactions in the Communist bloc countries and in the free world. While Czech authorities laid a memorial wreath on the grave of Masaryk, and the Communist paper Rude Pravo observed that Czechoslovakia "honors Masaryk as scientist, humanitarian, and fighter for progress," it rebuked him "for his negative attitude to the great Russian revolution and its aspirations." The Czech Communist weekly Svet Prase reviled the "George Washington" of his country as "anti-worker, anti-Russian, and anti-Communist." Despite all the Communist press commentary on Masaryk, no reference was made to his political work in the United States or to American help in the founding of the Republic. In sharp contrast, newspaper editorials and public addresses in Britain and the United States extolled Masaryk and his magnificent achievements. "His faith and principles," wrote the old anti-Hapsburg war-horse Wickham Steed, "are still the essentials of democratic freedom everywhere." And the London Times remarked that the place of Masaryk in history depended in the ultimate upon one's judgment of the Hapsburg Monarchy, which the writer felt could probably not have been transformd into a tolerant and understanding confederation. Mass meetings and more sober university convocations on both sides of the Atlantic praised the accomplishments of the Czech savant; his birthday was proclaimed Masaryk Day by Governor Thomas E. Dewey in New York and in Washington a stamp bearing a likeness of the first Czechoslovak President was issued.19 5. With Entente armies sweeping up from Bulgaria, secessionist emotions among politically articulate South Slavs attained explosive proportions. The manifesto of 1 8 London Times, Jan. 18, Mar. 7, 8, 1950; New York Times, Mar. 5, 6, 7, ti, 1950.

Avalanche

779

the Emperor on federalism was scornfully dismissed by the London Yugoslav group as "a piece of audacious hyprocrisy" and they voiced convictions widely shared by their co-nationals. A South Slav Council in Agram (Zagreb), organized on October 6, 1918, proclaimed the independence of Croatia, and presently dispatched a delegation to Geneva to counsel with other Yugoslavs on the governmental institutions for a united South Slavdom. Totally reversing himself, on the very day that Yugoslavs rejoiced over the Wilsonian pronouncement that they should themselves decide their political destiny, Tisza professed conversion to the establishment of a Greater Croatia as a third partner in the Hapsburg Monarchy; other weight-carrying Hapsburg politicians clung tenaciously, wishfully, to one version of trialism or another. "Militarism is crushed. . . . Wilsonian principles are victorious all over the world," exulted Stephan Radic, whom American admirers lauded as the Patrick Henry of Croatia. 20 On October 23, Croatian officials assumed control of the port community of Fiume (Rijeka), hoisted the national flag over public buildings, and wrested arms away from Hungarian soldiers and local police; a few days before, an Italian-speaking deputy of Fiume in the Hungarian parliament, fearful lest Yugoslavs should seek mastery of the city, had appealed for the application of self-determination there. Events in the Yugoslav national community toward the end of October moved at an accelerated pace verging upon the chaotic. Hapsburg military authorities in Agram (Zagreb) resigned rneir responsibility to the National Council and the next day (October 29) renewed street eruptions, marked by frenzied hosannas for Wilson and for Masaryk, accompanied a resolution by the Agram assembly declaring that the constitutional connection with 2 0 Alexandre Spitzmiiller, "L'Automne 1918 en Autriche-Hongrie," Revue Historique, CCV (1951), 69-77; Stanko Guldescu, "The Background of the Croatian Independence Movement," South Atlantic Quarterly, LVI (1957), 314-328.

780

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Hungary had been severed and that Croatia and Dalmatia formed an independent state, which would unite with Serbia. Revolutionary changes proceeded smoothly; Governor Mihalovic quietly divested himself of his office and veteran civil servants placidly carried on administrative business as usual. Extra-constitutional committees of Slovenes and of citizens in Bosnia and Dalmatia repudiated existing political bonds and the union of Bosnia with Serbia was proclaimed. American armed forces prevented Italians from seizing the Dalmatian harbor of Spalato (Split), but Washington disregarded entreaties of the London South Slavs for American occupation of all of Dalmatia and of adjacent regions allocated to Italy in the 1915 Treaty of London. On the advice of Admiral Horthy, Emperor Charles ordered that the Hapsburg fleet, a tenth of whose officers and a third of whose crews were Croats, should be turned over to the Croatian revolutionary government. That gesture was intended either to exacerbate ill-will between Italians and South Slavs, or less probably, to win back the Croats to their historic Hapsburg mooring. Upon the signing of the convention of surrender, the Croatian tricolor was raised on the warships, but the Entente Supreme War Council, on representations by Italy, decreed that all the vessels should be concentrated at Corfu, for final disposition by the major victor powers, thus canceling the Yugoslav dream of possessing important power at sea. The famous Hapsburg flagship "Viribus Unitis," which had hauled the corpses of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife up the Adriatic in 1914, was blown up in Pola (Pula) narbor by daring Italian officers.21 Presently South Slav politicians, including representatives of the Pasic ministry of Serbia and of the London 2 1 The fate of the ships and planes of the Hapsburg navy is described minutely by Vice-Admiral Artur von Khuepack, 'Endschicksal der österreichisch-ungarischen Flotteneinheiten," Marine Rundschau, XLIII (1943), 750-766, 830-841, 920-934.

Avalanche

781

Committee, assembled in Geneva, reached an understanding that until a constitutional convention came together, governments in Belgrade and in Agram (Zagreb) should carry on; a joint committee would watch over affairs of common concern, not least Italian encroachment upon districts coveted by Yugoslavdom. On December 1, 1918, at a festive ceremony in Belgrade, the South Slav provinces of the former Monarchy were formally amalgamated with Serbia as the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes under the scepter of the Karageorgevic dynasty; an assembly of Montenegrin patriots had earlier saluted Prince-Regent Alexander of Serbia as ruler. South Slav believers in a federal pattern of government supposed that the several segments of the new nation would be accorded a broad degree of home rule, but partisans of a wholly integrated Yugoslav state, of a Greater Serbia, personified by Nikola Pasic, contended that security considerations necessitated a unitarian system of government, and they carried the day. Controversy over governmental institutions, which had cropped up continuously while the war was being waged, caused endless strife between the Yugoslav cousins; disillusioned by the turn of events, American Croats, who had planned to go back home, changed their minds. Thorough assimilation of three peoples of divergent historical and political traditions, divergent religious and social oudooks, and divergent mental habits required more tolerance and greater statesmanship than Yugoslav politicians could muster; a whole generation would elapse before it was adequately appreciated that the grim alternative to peaceful coexistence of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was coextinction by enemies from without. 6. Off to the northeast of the Hapsburg Monarchy, in the Polish and Ukrainian national communities, secessionist

782

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

movements traced special channels, though division of mind among politicians created at least as many grave tangles as in South Slav quarters.22 Early in October, 1918, Polish deputies in the Vienna parliament joined their counterparts in Berlin in demanding a united and fully independent Poland, and on October 7, the Regency in Warsaw called for a Polish national ministry and a representative assembly, chosen on broad democratic principles, to write a constitution. Polish politicians of Galicia journeyed to Warsaw to participate in setting up a provisional government and Polish soldiers disarmed loyalist Hapsburg troops in the province. Bit by bit, Poles acquired control of former Russian Poland expelling the administrators and soldiers of the Austrian and German occupation. On October 28, Cracow Poles dispatched a team to Vienna to work out the terms of separation for Galicia; Ukrainians had no share in these proceedings. Three days later the divorce was effected, the Poles claiming unqualified administrative authority over all of Galicia; Hapsburg emblems were joyously ripped down in ancient Cracow where the new political order was inaugurated easily and naturally. Another story was written, however, in the eastern reaches of Galicia. Upon the termination of Austrian rule, bloody clashes ensued between Ukrainians and Poles, the epilogue to a feud of long standing. On October 18, Ukrainian deputies in the Vienna parliament convoked an assembly of their co-nationals from all over the Double Monarchy; left-wingers agitated for the union of eastern Galicia with Bolshevik Russia, and, when defeated, abandoned the conference. Bourgeois Ukrainians set up a standard National Council, which declared for an independent state embracing all Ukrainians of the Monarchy, and promised constitutional protection of the rights of national and religious minorities; Poles and 22

Conze, op. cU., pp. 378-403.

Avalanche

783

Jews were proffered seats in the National Council. Steps would be taken to institute an Ukrainian parliament and a delegation would be sent to the Paris peace conference to look after Ukrainian interests. Calling itself "the peoples' government of the western Ukraine"—a conspicuous role in the movement was played by the Hapsburg Archduke William—the Council took upon itself the responsibilities of government. Ukrainian soldiers, wearing Austrian uniforms but distinguished by armlets of blue and yellow, seized sections of Lemberg (Lwow) and many nearby towns; victim of protracted underfeeding and of a frightful influenza epidemic, Lemberg was in sorry shape. To uphold the claims of Poland, a detachment of Pilsudsla's veterans concealed in the city combined with a contingent of Polish students, but they were overpowered by the Ukrainian forces. At the Uniate Cathedral, a thanksgiving mass joyfully celebrated "the return of the capital of the Ukrainians" to its rightful owners.28 The radiant Ukrainian glow, however, was short-lived, for Polish troops attacked in strength and captured the city on November 22, an achievement that added fuel to the lurid flames of Polish-Ukrainian antagonism. No better did Ukrainian national interests fare in the adjoining province of the Bukowina, theater of recurrent wartime invasions and depredations, where the last Austrian governor, Count Josef von Ezdorf, resigned his authority to a Ukrainian group. But on October 27, a company of local Rumanians voted for integration of the Bukowina with the kingdom of Rumania and besought Bucharest for help; forthwith soldiers of Rumania marched into the province, occupying Czernowitz (Cernau^i) on November ll. 2 4 To the west, Polish troops effectively occupied AusRosa Badly, Lw6w (London, 1956), pp. 49-141. Erich Prokopo witsch, Das Ende der österreichischen in der Bukowina (Munich, 1959). M

14

Heerschaft

784

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

trian Silesia, and on November 5, 1918, Polish and Czech negotiators provisionally divided the province, more or less along ethnic lines, the Poles retaining much the larger portion. Promptly the Teschen district of Silesia became an arena of fierce controversy between these two Slavic heirs of the Hapsburgs. In Warsaw, the Regency had already proclaimed Poland as a Republic, while at Lublin, capital of the Austrian occupation, the eloquent Socialist Daszynsla organized a "Republic of the People," and promised far-ranging social and land innovations, but this piece of radicalism attracted little popular support and soon vanished. On November 11, the Regency assigned military command to the fabled Pilsudsla, who, upon returning from prison in Magdeburg, Germany, had been welcomed in Warsaw with a hilarious hero's reception; three days later this man of legend assumed the title of "temporary chief of state," yet western governments preferred to regard the Polish National Council in Paris as the authoritative instrument of national interests. Seemingly irreconcilable differences between the Pilsudski moderately leftist faction and the Paris Poles, headed by Roman Dmowski, persisted into January of 1919, when Ignace Paderewski contrived to bring off a surface truce that enabled the Poles to present a united front at the Paris peace conference. 7. The dismemberment of Hungary marched hand-inhand with the break up of Austria. Someone may have recalled the remark of Hamlet's mother, "One woe doth tread upon another's heel." In a mid-October survey of central European ferment, a British specialist on the region, Sir Arthur Evans, concluded that the empire of Austria had disappeared by all practical tests, but the Magyar governing oligarchy, to whose chauvinism Evans

Avalanche

785

ascribed the principal "human cause" of the war, would not easily relinquish its grip upon the smaller nationalities of the kingdom. Yet he was sure that for enduring peace these folk would have to be freed from the Magyar yoke.25 In point of fact, historic political bonds in Hungary were snapping on every side. Day by day the star of Michael Kdrolyi mounted higher in the Hungarian firmament until he was saluted as president of the "People's Republic." From September onward, the Count, who has been exaggeratedly likened to Count Honore Mirabeau in the first flush of the great French Revolution, kept hammering away on his pet themes: severance of Hungarian links with Austria and Germany; a quick peace based on Wilsonian principles; the conversion of multinationality Hungary into an "eastern Switzerland"; a democratic franchise and the distribution of big estates among peasants. For this elaborate and dramatic agenda, the well-intentioned K4rolyi could reckon with assurance upon support from the democratically minded of the Hungarian middle classes, a slim scattering of aristocrats, and the small body of Socialists; to an endorsement of his program, the Socialist NSpszava conjoined government ownership of industry and social welfare measures. The withdrawal of Bulgaria from the war was manna from heaven for the purposes of Karolyi and Company. But the Magyar ruling class would not give up its power without a final, if despairing, struggle; that fervent exponent of Austro-Hungarian dualism and of the German alliance, Count Tisza, conceded on October 10 that these connections must be sundered. After the promulgation of the Austrian autonomy manifesto, Wekerle laid before the Budapest parliament his reflections on the general situation. Hungary must become an independent state, he said, freed from the incubus of dualism, and he re25

Arthur Evans to editor, London Times, Oct. 15, 1918.

786

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

vealed that King Charles had pledged that "after Austria has been organized on federal lines, Hungary's relationship will be a personal union (i.e., through a common ruler) and we shall organize our economy and our defense on that foundation." Deputies heard the lengthy disquisition without much emotion apparently one way or the other. Károlyi restated his radical creed and vehemendy castigated Wekerle and Tisza, implying once more that the latter bore a heavy burden of responsibility for the outbreak of the war; "Your time is over now and our time has come," he shouted jubilantly. An old-fashioned tumult rocked the chamber, until the presiding officer adjourned the session. Proud of his management of the food resources during the war, Windischgrátz showered Károlyi with a torrent of invective, who struck back at his critic as a supine Hapsburg puppet, who had done everything he could to benefit Austria.26 Upsetting in the extreme was a candid admission by Tisza that "We have lost the war." Even so, Wekerle spoke optimistically about the future, and promised rights to the nationalities, which, however, would not alter the fundamental integrity of the lands of the crown of St. Stephen. Fresh momentum to the onrushing avalanche of disruption was imparted by Wilson's answer to the Burián overture for an armistice. Once more, Károlyi recited his stereotyped litany to the deputies; Wekerle retorted with unaccustomed gusto. It was in truth his swansong, for on October 23 he submitted his resignation and Tisza recommended that either Andrássy or Apponyi, his traditional parliamentary opponents, should take over as first minister. Tempers flared high in parliament on word that the King, Queen, and the heirpresumptive Otto on a visit to Debreczen to open a new 26 King Charles meditated setting up a Hapsburgtreue ministry with Windischgrátz and Vászonyi as the key personalities. Windischgrátz, Ein Kaiser . . . , pp. 76-87, 90-100.

Avalanche

787

university had been greeted with the "Gott erhalte" anthem of the Hapsburgs; in that Kossuthist community, the royal guests were loyally welcomed and King Charles quickened enthusiasm by a cry of "Long live independent Hungary"; at a gaudy ceremony in the Calvinist church in which Louis Kossuth in 1849 had renounced allegiance to the Hapsburg dynasty, Bishop Balthasar blessed the King and Queen as builders of a new Hungary. But the Hungarian tide was running irresistibly against any connection with the Hapsburgs.27 Budapest university students on October 25, the day after the Italian armies resumed the offensive, demonstrated in front of the residence of Kdrolyi and clashed with the police, in a manner that would be repeated in the dread autumn of 1956. That evening Kdrolyi organized a national council composed of liberal bourgeoisie and democratically-oriented Socialists. The council named the Count as president, and King Charles, under circumstances best pictured by Kirolyi himself, consented to appoint him as premier. The King received me in the large comer salon of the [Godollo] castle. . . . It was already growing dark and the chandeliers were lit. Charles IV, in his field uniform and gaiters, was standing near his writing table, smoking a cigarette and seemed to be suffering from great nervous strain. I could not help feeling deep sympathy for him. The King said pointedly, 'I have always been warned that you want a republic. Is that true?" 'I do not want a republic, I want an independent democratic Hungary,' Then the ruler indicated that he approved of Karolyi's program and that he intended to make him prime minister. "He dismissed me with the air of a man whose heart had been relieved of a heavy burden." 28 2 7 Julius Miskolczy, "Zur Ungarischen Revolution von 1918," Der Donauraum, IV ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 24-33; Zoltin Szende, Die Ungam im Zusammenbruch (Oldenbourg, 1931). 2 8 Karolyi, Memoirs, pp. 107-109.

788

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

In Vienna for formal investiture, Kàrolyi discovered that the King had reconsidered his decision and had picked an inconsequential Andràssy man, Count John Hadik, for the premiership and had appointed the able, popular, patriotic, and democratic Archduke Joseph as Palatinate. An immense crowd accorded Kàrolyi an "ecstatic ovation" upon his return to Budapest, and during street disorders that ensued police killed three participants. Extreme revolutionaries, led by war prisoners fresh from Lenin's Russia, organized soviets and fomented strikes; a fortnight later the notorious Béla Kun arrived on the scene to direct and inspirit the Bolshevik forces. In the night of October 30, adherents of Kàrolyi seized control of the capital city without notable opposition and the Count took command of public affairs with the sanction of the Palatinate; as minister of nationalities, Kàrolyi chose Oscar Jàszi, on the assumption that he could persuade nationality leaders to keep their peoples in the Hungarian state, and two Socialists were given cabinet portfolios, Sigismund Kunfi and Ernst Garami, a doctrinaire Marxist journalist. Quixotically imagining that "there was no more need for an army," the minister of war, Béla Linder, instructed Hungarian soldiers on the various battlefronts to return to their homes. Good-hearted, tolerant, imbued with faith in reason and in humanity, and devoted to Hungarian interests though Kàrolyi was, he indulged in no little romantic dreaming, and he fancied that his talents to govern and to reform Hungary matched the false appraisals of his ability proferred by his colleagues. Yet he made a profound impression upon some liberal idealists of the west; for instance, British Professor A. J. P. Taylor, weighing up Kàrolyi's career, described him as "pure gold all through, the noblest man I have ever known. . . . If the pure Socialist state is ever achieved Michael Kàrolyi

Avalanche

789

will be numbered among its saints"—that opulent rhetoric rested upon something solid and endearing.29 Symbolical of the close of an era in the history of Hungary, Stephen Tisza, on the first day of KArolyi's rule, was brutally murdered. Waiving aside warnings that his life would be in jeopardy if he stayed in Budapest, the stern Calvinist lingered on, even after a young fanatic attempted to shoot him. Subsequently, an unruly mob converged upon his villa, four embittered soldiers pressed inside and briefly debated with the ex-premier on the coming of the war. Accusing the Count of responsibility for the war, one shouted, "The hour of reckoning has come." Pistols flashed and Tisza fell mortally wounded in the presence of his family; the last words of this granite character harmonized with his Calvinist creed, "I die. It had to be." 90 For K&rolyi the murder of Tisza meant "the first blood stain on our glorious revolution." Tisza's death, someone has written, "was in truth the quintessence of his whole life. He died as he had lived— true to himself. It was as though he wished to give his nation an example of how a loyal and fearless man must serve his Fatherland, and all that is sacred in life, to his last breath. The greatness of such a life and such a death endows a nation with a vast treasury of moral worth." A less partisan, more realistic judgment, while acknowledging die devotion of Tisza to the Magyar national interest and his parliamentary talents, would censure him for inability to understand the spirit of the times, the hallmark of the first-class statesman, and failure to act appropriately. "His fate befits his work," thought one contemporary, he was "one of the most sinister figures Kirolyi, op. cit„ pp. 9-10. Fester Lloyd, November 1, 1918; Ernest Ludwig, "The Martyrdom of Count Stephan Tisza," Current History, XXI (1925), 542-549. 29

30

790

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

of the war representing the worst elements of Magyar supremacy." 31 8. By the armistice of November 3, which was indistinguishable from surrender without qualification, amplified by a military convention of November 13, fighting in the First World War legally ended for Hungary. Since 1914, some three million, eight hundred thousand sons of the kingdom of St. Stephen had been drawn into the armed forces, and one out of six had perished or disappeared leaving no record. Without technically abdicating the throne, King Charles on November 13 renounced any part in public affairs. What the sixteenth century had joined together, diverse forces had now put asunder, and three days later Karolyi proclaimed a republic. "Fel1 1 to a crowd before the splenlow citizens," he did parliament Budapest, "the Hungarian nation has conquered"—that at a time when the larger part of the kingdom was garrisoned by foreign soldiers! "The government of the October Revolution," Jäszi would one day write, "was a last attempt at a reasonable adjustment of wildly excited social forces, but the spiritual and moral structure of Hungarian society was too weak to stave off the catastrophic methods of social upheaval." 32 Losing no time, the Karolyi ministry grappled with the thorny problem of the non-Magyar peoples in Hungary, a cauldron of deep-rooted feuds and passionate hatreds. K4rolyi worked out a plan with Matthew Dula of the Slovak National Party and others for Slovak autonomy inside Hungary, but that program the Slovak National 3 1 Oscar Wertheimer (ed.), Graf Stefan Tisza: Briefe (Berlin, 1928), p. 35; Westminster Gazette, Nov. 1, 1918. 3 2 Oskar Jäszi, Magyariens Schuld, Ungarns Sühne (Munich, 1923), pp. 65-66.

Avalanche

791

Council, meeting on October 30, repudiated in favor of unification with the Czechs; though scores of local Slovak meetings ratified the decision for a Czechoslovak state, it can never be determined whether the verdict constituted in fact an "authentic plebiscite" of politically articulate Slovaks. The best-known fighter for Slovak rights, Father Andreas Hlinka, putting aside the instructions of his ecclesiastical superiors, approved the Czechoslovak union, but by 1922 he was protesting that "in a thousand years of Hungarian rule, we have not suffered a tithe of the injustices of the last few years." 33 Present at the October 30 conference of Slovaks was Milan Hodia, the only Slovak ever to hold the premiership of Czechoslovakia, whose political behavior and thinking in the tumultuous revolutionary days of 1918 await precise definition. An intellectual in intimate touch with Czech secessionists, Hodia appeared in Budapest as the agent of the Slovak National Council to confer with the KArolyi cabinet. Unquestionably, Hodia at this stage wanted the Slovak counties incorporated in the Czech state, but he wished, it appears, the Slovaks to have the right to secede, if they so desired, after a period of experimentation. Upset, even astonished, over the verdict of the Slovak National Council and alarmed by the march of Czech soldiers into the Slovak region, K&rolyi posted an emissary to Prague to ask that Slovak troops exclusively should be stationed in the area and that administrative decisions should be taken jointly by the Slovak council and Jdszi, representing the Budapest government. When Prague scornfully rejected this overture, Hungarian forces drove the Czechs from the Slovak counties; and Karolyi asked that the Slovaks should be allowed by plebiscite to determine their future political alignment. By way of answer, a fairly large body of Czech troops 33

Zeman, op. cit., pp. 230-231; Robert Birkhill, op. cit., 21.

792

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

was thrown into the Slovak area and a provisional frontier was laid out between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which gave the former a somewhat smaller portion of pre-war Hungary than was eventually allotted in the Treaty of Trianon. "Ruthenia" likewise entered the evolving Czechoslovak Republic. Until the Bolshevik coup, Czech patriots manifested only marginal interest in this region, supposing that by reason of the large Ukrainian population there it would be absorbed by Russia. When local authority disintegrated, village councils, against the wishes of the small Magyarized intelligentsia, came out for separation from Hungary; the predominant opinion appears to have been that home rule inside the Czech state was more attractive than any alternative on the horizon, and it was on that basis that Ruthenia joined the new republic. Equally unavailing were the efforts of the KarolyiJaszi ministry to retain districts of Rumanian speech. As early as October 12, the Rumanian National Party, made up of Hungarian-Rumanian politicians and generally backed by the Orthodox clergy, resolved at Nagyvarad (Grosswardein) upon self-determination and denied Budapest the right to speak for their co-nationals at the impending peace deliberations; the respected Dr. Alexander Vaida-Voevod, sometime an adviser of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, handed these resolutions to the Budapest parliament, though personally he seems to have preferred the reconstruction of the whole Dual Monarchy as a league of autonomous states.34 In any case, an arrangement of that character fell outside the sphere of practical politics, and on November 9 Rumania resumed the war with the Central Empires, soldiers marching again into the promised land of Transylvania. Under duress, Hungary was obliged to relinquish twenty-three eastern counties and parts of three others; on December 1, a broad « Fiirstenberg to Foreign Office, Oct. 19, 1918, F.O., 553/330.

Avalanche

793

representation of the Rumanians of Hungary, meeting at dismal Alba Julia in Transylvania, voted for the union of that region and the Banat of Temesvar with the kingdom of Rumania; it was futile for Budapest to utter a pious protest against this declaration, but pugnacious Serbs at once challenged the pretensions of Bucharest to all of the Banat. Presently, Rumania rained harsher blows—military now—upon the unstable Karolyi adventure in government. Much of the popular backing for the Hungarian revolutionary regime rested on the faith that the Karolyi team could do better in preserving the integrity of the historical kingdom of St. Stephen than old-line Magyar politicians. What, in fact, had come to pass? The Slovak counties and Ruthenia had fallen away, Transylvania and the Banat had been lost, enemy garrisons had occupied southern Hungary, and Croatia had seceded. The lofty vision of an "eastern Switzerland," of a Danubian confederation of free nations, cherished by K&rolyi and Jaszi, had been swept away. Magyar patriotic grievances knew no bounds, and it is small wonder that the stock of the Kdrolyi ministry dropped precipitately. 9. The exhausted civilian population in "the peaceful hinterland" of German-speaking Austria nonchalantly took note of the departure of the national communities and of the dramatic upheaval in imperial Germany. In the second half of October, the Vienna press teemed with stories of impending starvation, unless provisions from outside were somehow obtained. "If we cannot find speedy and thorough relief," the Arbeiter Zeitung observed (October, 20), "we are threatened with catastrophe . . . every family lives in fear of grave social convulsions"—the piece finished by lashing out violently

794

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

against Czech and Hungarian authorities for imposing an embargo on food shipments. On October 21, Austrogerman politicians of all parties set up a provisional national assembly, which proclaimed a new Austrian state to embrace the German language areas of the former empire—the predominantly German-speaking districts of Bohemia among them. The assembly would manage public affairs until a constitution for truncated Austria was drafted. Nothing was decided concerning the Hapsburg dynasty, though no little support for the retention of Emperor Charles as the linch-pin and symbol of the new state was expressed in conservative and clerical quarters. To a "rump" parliament, Premier Hussarek presented a detailed exposition and defense of the autonomy scheme, which Charles had decreed, and then resigned. Deputies of Italian tongue calmly announced that the districts they represented had seceded from the Empire. On the other side, a small Austrian society that had been agitating for the annexation to Austria of west Hungary (later called the Burgenland), intensified its propaganda, arguing that the population was largely German in speech and that the area could supply Vienna with desperately needed foodstuffs. At the door of death, Viktor Adler pleaded for the creation of a Danubian federation or, if that were impossible, for the inclusion of all German-speaking areas of Austria as an autonomous state inside Germany—a program generally liked by Socialists and by many a bourgeois politician. The Berlin government, skillfully coached by Botho Wedel, ambassador in Vienna, came to favor union or Anschluss, though out of fear of Entente resentment, nothing was disclosed publicly and entreaties from Bohemian Germans for military protection against the Czechs went unanswered. Leading Socialist spokesmen called for an Austrian republic, grounded on collectivist principles, but Christian Socialists in large majority not only wished the

Avalanche

795

Monarchy perpetuated, but fought agitation for Anschluss with Germany.38 After no little devious maneuvering, the last imperial Austrian ministry was constructed with Professor Heinrich Lammasch at its head. He was generally respected in official circles, and neither the Socialists nor the Slavs disliked him; it was imagined that his international reputation would stand Austria in good stead in transactions with the victor powers, not least with the Americans, for he was personally acquainted with Lansing and was known as a fervent advocate of a league to preserve peace.38 Prominent Slavs courteously declined to enter the Lammasch ministry, but able Professor Josef Redlich, out of a keen sense of civic duty accepted the portfolio of finance, knowing full well that the main task would be to liquidate the empire in as orderly a fashion as possible, to transfer authority formally, that is, to the heirs of the Hapsburgs; appropriately the cabinet was tagged "the ministry of liquidation." 87 Scarcely had the ministry been organized than news reached Vienna of the proclamation of a Czechoslovak Republic, of the secession of Croatia and other areas of South Slav speech, and of the crack-up of the Hapsburg armies on the Italian battlefronts. On October 30, the provisional assembly in Vienna accepted a temporary constitution, asserting among other things, that German Austria formed an integral part of the German Republic, and Dr. Karl Renner assumed the chairmanship of a new ministry, containing men of all 3 5 Julius Sylvester, Vom Toten Parlament und Seinen hetzten Trägern (Vienna, 1928); Heribert Moritz, "Die Wiener Tagespresse, die Nationalversammlung und das Werden der Verfassimg, 1918-1920," Vienna, 1949—an unpublished doctoral dissertation; Arthur G. Kogan, "Genesis of the Anschluss Problem . . ." Journal of Central European Affairs, XX ( 1 9 6 0 - 1 ) , 24-50. 3 6 Heinrich Lammasch, "Der Sinn des Völkerbundes," ÖR, LVII (1918), 1-7. 3 7 The last days of the Monarchy are vividly recounted in Redlich, Tagebuch. II, 300-318; Redlich to Seton-Watson, Oct. 21, 1919. SetonWatson Papers.

796

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

political stripes. On the streets of Vienna, industrial workers and demobilized soldiers shouted for a republic and for the release from jail of Friedrich Adler, murderer of Premier Stiirgkh; mobs openly insulted officers of the imperial army, and strong separatist passions raced over the provinces of the Tyrol and Vorarlberg. What amounted to a revolution was a singularly undramatic affair. A Viennese wag, it is said, circulated a leaflet reading, "Tomorrow at eleven o'clock there will be a revolution; in case of rain the revolution will take place indoors." Events tumbled over one another at a dizzy pace: Hapsburg armies crumbled into memories; the fleet was handed over to the Croats; Károlyi became premier of Hungary; an armistice was signed with the Entente; and on November 11—armistice day for the rest of Europe—Emperor Charles renounced all part in the conduct of Austrian state business. What had been an Austrian republic in name became a republic in fact, and the authority of a dynasty with the longest record of uninterrupted rule in Europe's history ceased abruptly. Death having removed Viktor Adler on November 11, 1918, Otto Bauer emerged as the top-ranking Socialistas well as foreign minister—but his ardor for a collectivist society was tempered by appreciation that it would be stubbornly resisted by rural Austria and by the conviction that if revolutionary ferment went unchecked it would be extremely difficult, if not quite out of the question, to obtain indispensable foodstuffs from enemy sources. Bauer and like-minded Socialists preserved mass discipline in Vienna, effectively restraining the wilder expectations of proletarian extremists.38 The Socialists stood four-square for the union of German Austria with Germany, an arrangement that had often been recommended by many a relentless adversary of the Hapsburg 38 Otto Bauer, Die österreichische 74-110.

Revolution

(Vienna, 1923), DD.

Avalanche

797

Monarchy, such as the Britons Steed and Seton-Watson, the American Theodore Roosevelt, and the Czechs Masaryk and Benes. In the arena of high diplomacy, however, the voice of France boomed loudest, and a veto was eventually imposed upon Anschluss. To liquidate the war diplomatically, Count Julius Andrassy on October 24 supplanted Burian at the Ballplatz. Upon the surrender of Bulgaria, Andrdssy had acknowledged that further fighting would be suicidal, and he had hastened to Switzerland avowedly to orient himself more accurately on the intentions of the enemy governments, but the mission fell flat, and so did similar errands by other Austrian and Hungarian politicians hunting Entente support for some sort of a confederacy of the Danubian lands.39 As a Magyar magnate, Andrdssy was looked upon in Vienna with a good deal of misgiving and distrust. In a statement of purpose, he indicated that he would seek a separate peace settlement without delay; yet he still cherished the illusion that federalism would hold the realm together and even dusted off again the Austrian formula for Poland. Berlin was informed of Ballplatz intentions, which provoked such popular fury that the Hapsburg ambassador refrained from walking on the streets lest he should be the victim of personal indignities. German officials begged Andrdssy not to rupture the alliance, promised shipments of food, and urged that military operations should be kept going until snow blocked the Alpine passes; in the spring, German reinforcements would be dispatched to hold the southern redoubts. It was all fruitless, for on October 27 Andr&ssy, oblivious of Berlin, asked Wilson again for an immediate armistice and accepted a settlement of the war based on the Washington platform, including the revised version on the Czechoslovaks and the South Slavs; the President coldly agreed to communicate the request to the Entente 3» De Vaux to Buridn, Oct. 18, 1918, P.A., Schweiz, Berichte, 1918.

798

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

cabinets for decision. Thoroughly nettled by the action of Andrässy, the supreme command of Germany sent troops into the Tyrol as far as Innsbruck—precisely the sequel that almost certainly would have followed if earlier diplomatic exchanges pointed toward a separate peace had succeeded. 10. The dissolution of the Hapsburg fighting services marched along with—or in places anticipated—the national insurgencies and the overtures for an armistice; each chain of developments interacted upon the other in laying the venerable Monarchy away in a permanent sepulchre.40 Yet until the final break-down, segments of the armies on the Italian fronts fought with tenacity thanks to the almost universal obedience in the officers' corps and to fairly tight discipline. Many soldiers, it is true, felt that further fighting was senseless, suicidal; poorly fed, poorly clothed, poorly housed, poorly munitioned, many a man threw down his gun shouting, "Give us bread, give us clothes, we are tired of this slaughter." 41 The imperial manifesto on Austrian autonomy, the shocking confession of Tisza that the Central Empires had lost the war, and the wholesale departure of Hungarian soldiers for home contributed, each in its own way, to the disintegration of troop esprit. 42 It was a Utopian gesture for Charles to implore the Pope on October 23, in the name of humanity, to seek a 4 0 R. Moreigne, "L'Effrondrement Militaire de l'Autriche-Hongrie," Revue d'Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale, IX (1931), 234-256, 369-391; X, 140-164. 4 1 An eye-witness to the surrender of one Austrian division described the general condition of men, horses, and equipment as very good to excellent. E. S. Crosse, The Defeat of Austria As Seen by the Seventh Division (London, 1919), pp. 96-98. 4 2 Gustav Gratz and Richard Schüller, op. cit., pp. 145 ff.; Baroness von X, "A Red Cross Outpost, Memoirs of an Austrian Nurse," Fortnightly Review, CXLIII (1935), 341-355.

Avalanche

799

pledge from Italy not to start up military operations. On the succeeding day, the anniversary of the beginning of the battle of Caporetto, Diaz launched a vigorous thrust in the middle Piave theater. For five days, large bodies of disciplined Hapsburg soldiers, even Czechs of the Prague palace regiment, fought with spirit and courage; on the whole, troops in the battle lines were less affected than their fellows to the rear by the corrosive impact of defeatism and of national revolutions. Czechs stood up manfully to brother Czechs in Italian ranks, faithful to their military oath, and, if captured, they often balked at revealing information on the Austrian army to their Italian captors. At Monte Grappa, Hapsburg regiments, made up of a rainbow of nationalities, fought with desperate determination and gallantry; key positions changed hands as many as eight times in a couple days. Driving over the Piave, British troops ripped a wide gap in enemy ranks, which facilitated the inrush of Italians. On October 29, a Czech detachment, facing British foes, mutinied, and the fever spread even to the Tyrolese, who shouted, "Home to protect our villages." Swiftly the remaining Austrian divisions broke up as the retreat degenerated into a rout; explosives abandoned in fields caused many an injury. All semblance of effective resistance by Hapsburg troops ceased; in the judgment of Arz, an orderly retirement could have been achieved if Hungarian soldiers had not started for home as instructed by the revolutionary Kârolyi regime.43 Exhausted men hastened back to their towns and villages with maximum speed. "Trains left looking in the distance like bees swarming," someone observed. Homeward bound, troops 4 3 Ernst von Horsetsky, Die Vier Letzten Kriegswochen ( Vienna, 1920); General Bemdt, Letzter Kampf und Ende der 29. Division ( Reichenberg. 1928); Alberto Baldini, Diaz (Eng. trans., London, 1935), pp. 158-177. Zoltân Szende, "Les Derniers Jours de l'Armée Austro-hongroise en 1918," Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie, LX (1939), 88-96, 376-385; LXI, 181-192. Charles à C. Repington, The First World War (2 vols., London, 1921), II, 420.

800

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

slaughtered horses for food, indulged in wholesale larceny, but seldom assaulted the officers. As the disbanded regiments swept through Carinthia, an eye-witness noted, The trains were crowded with homecoming soldiers, who sat even on the roofs of the cars, so that many of them were decapitated while passing under railway-bridges, and the roads were choked by endless columns of horse-drawn vehicles or guns. Once safe in Carinthia, the troops . . . threw away their equipment and insulted their officers. . . . They left their horses standing, saddled and bridled, or harnessed to guns and carts, and made for their homes as fast as they could. Soon thousands of helpless animals, thirsty and starving, stood about. . . . When fodder could no longer be procured, the gates were opened and the horses let loose to fend for themselves. . . . Droves of them roamed the streets of Klagenfurt, eating bark off the trees. . . ,44 Italian patriots designated the military triumph over the northern foe as the battle of Vittorio Veneto, and accounted it fitting retribution for Caporetto. Vast throngs of Austro-Hungarian prisoners—some 300,000, and a good deal of war materiel were gathered up—when the Second World War came along certain Italian units were still equipped with Hapsburg cannon seized in 1918! Soldiers in other theaters of war duplicated the record of their comrades on the Italian front—out of southern Hungary, out of occupied Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania, out of Rumania and the Polish area, out of France, battle-scarred Hapsburg veterans streamed home to their families. The historic mainstay of the House of Hapsburg—the imperial armies—evaporated.45 4 4 Nora Purtscher, My Two Worlds (London, 1956), p. 125; for a moving description of the horrors of the retreat and a gripping portrayal of the way of life of war prisoners, see, Martin Freud, Parole d'honnevr (Paris, 1935). 4 5 Moritz von Auffenberg, "Die Osteireichische-ungarische Armee," OR, LVII (1918), 153-158—a tribute and an obituary; see, also,

Avalanche

801

11. Haunted by the specter of a wide-ranging Bolshevik upheaval, General Staff Chief Arz from Vienna, on October 28, authorized subordinates to commence direct consultations with the Italians for an immediate armistice, but the latter, while ready to offer terms for cessation of hostilities, would not so much as consider negotiation. Under the auspices of the Supreme War Council of the victor powers, the armistice conditions, essentially military in character, had been drafted and were waiting. The principal author of the document wished the fate of the Monarchy to be decided by the major allies, with the important proviso that settlements should not be left to a scramble by the land-hungry lesser powers, a recommendation, aJas, that was not implemented.46 Sonnino, afraid that Italy might have to fight on unaided, insisted that armistices should be concluded with Vienna and Berlin simultaneously; but the Austrian request for immediate suspension of hostilities speeded up the timetable and on October 31, the Supreme Council formally approved the broad bases of surrender. Considerable discretion in the execution of the provisions was allowed the Italians, who jealously advanced the interests of their own nationality to the detriment of South Slav ambitions. Although the Ballplatz had agreed to stop fighting on the basis of Point Ten of the Fourteen Points, as modified in favor of the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs, the armistice document contained no reference to the Wilsonian agenda for peace, and, inasmuch Raimund F. Kaindl, Oesterreich, Preussen^Deutscfdand (Vienna, 1926), pp. 270 ff. The elaborate official Austrian history of the war was written in the hope that "the young . . . may derive courage from the example of those who lived before them. . . . In spite oi the final disaster, Austria may still recall her efforts in the war with pride and future generations will know how their forefathers stood the great test." 4 6 L. S. Amery, My Political Life (3 vols., London, 1953), II, 170.

802 The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918 as the armistice was signed with Austria-Hungary as a dual monarchy, ticklish problems later emerged on whether the terms were legally applicable to Austria and to Hungary as separate republics. Concluded at Villa Giusti near Padua, Italy, and becoming fully operative on November 4, the conditions of Hapsburg surrender were as total as could be imagined for military forces that scarcely existed and for a Monarchy that was no more. During a crown council in Schonbrunn Palace on enemy armistice terms, an interesting exchange occured. "We did not make this war," observed the Socialist chieftain Viktor Adler, "Let the men who are responsible for the war reply to the armistice demands." "Neither did I make this war," chimed in the Emperor Charles plaintively, but Maier, a state functionary, recalled, "I remember how wildly everyone demanded war when it started. The whole nation is guilty for the war." By the armistice, Austro-Hungarian troops still under arms had to be demobilized and to evacuate foreign soil; Entente and American armies were given unfettered access to all sections of the broken Monarchy and might use railway facilities without hindrance—plans were maturing for an invasion of Germany, if necessary; German troops were to leave Austria and Hungary forthwith and war captives were to be released. Reading the armistice conditions, Clemenceau sardonically exclaimed, "There is one thing omitted. You have not demanded the Emperor's breeches." For the London Times, the arrangements were gratifying, since they left the former Monarchy "disarmed and helpless, and place her terrorities, her communications and many of her resources at our disposal for the prosecution of the war against her late ally . . ."; yet the terms were no "more severe than the inexorable necessities of the situation demand." "The spectacle of the Austrian Empire . . . vanishing without so much as a postal address," im-

Avalanche

Dresden Jena

803

POLAND Krakow

HEIRS OF T H E HAPSBURGS The Peace Settlements of 1919-1920 (Adapted from the Atlas of European History, edited by Edward W. Fox, Oxford University Press, 1957. By permission of the publishers.)

804 The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918 pressed the Westminister Gazette, as "a masterful stroke of Fate's irony." New York City serenaded the definitive withdrawal of the Hapsburg forces from the war with noisy bells and shrieking sirens, as an earnest of the more momentous surrender of Germany yet to come. Heaping praise upon Italian arms for delivering the coup de grace, the Times of New York called the armistice terms "more humiliating than were ever submitted to by a nation with any pretensions to greatness." President Wilson besought the leadership of the liberated national communities to effect the transition to the new scheme of things "with moderation, mercy, and firmness," and "to restrain every force that may threaten either to delay or discredit the noble processes of liberty."47 That was a counsel of perfection like unto that which Francis Bacon had in mind when he remarked, "as for the philosophers . . . their discourses are as the stars, which give little light because they are so high." The White House adjuration carried little weight among patriotic nationalists intoxicated by the champagne of success, thirsting for vengeance, tormented by the grim winter that was descending, and self-determined to grab the maximum of territory for their own nation. Liberation did not bring cessation of strife, and yet physical violence against individuals living in contested areas never reached the raw proportions that might have been expected. Bolshevik chiefs in Moscow welcomed the collapse of the Monarchy with transports of joy and enthusiasm. "Our isolation is over," someone was heard to remark. It seemed that world revolution was on the march.48 A military convention of sorts, supplementing in substance the armistice of Villa Giusti, which the Karolyi regime refused to acknowledge as valid, was signed at 47 4

U.S., Foreign Relations, 1918, Supp. I. vol. I, p. 470. * Soviet Studies, III (1951-2), 415.

Avalanche

805

Belgrade on November 13, by the Entente commander, General Franchet d'Esperey and Kârolyi. This document, which "desperate Frankie," as the British nicknamed him, dictated in disregard of explicit instructions from Paris, spelled out the Hungarian terms of surrender—except in the north. The young Republic might not possess more armed forces than were deemed essential for public order—eight divisions—and its southern boundary was tentatively fixed. No less than Austria, Hungary stood utterly defenseless. Reflecting on the universal triumph, The New Europe ecstatically rejoiced that "La Victoire Intégrale is ours. Swiftly, suddenly, the end has come, and with it the promise of a bright future. We have lived for four years in a world of clashing hopes and fears, and as we emerge from its turmoil into a serener air we hold our breath in awe. . . . Not only have nations been made anew, but they have to-day the golden opportunity of making their European home a true house of ease for all its peoples.... The world's great age begins anew. The golden years retimi. . . 12.

From beginning to end, approximately nine million men were mobilized in the Hapsburg fighting services of whom about one-seventh perished. While Austria manufactured much the higher share of the war matériel of the Monarchy, Hungary supplied proportionately more troops and suffered somewhat greater losses percentagewise; in war dead per thousand of population, Austroger49 The New Europe, IX (Nov. 14, 1918), 97. To the editor of this publication, a co-worker wrote: "My very heartiest congratulations on the splendid issue of the Czech and Jugoslav causes. You have deserved as well as any Czech or Jugoslav. I have so admired your fearless courage and patience and good humor in the hard times. Well, you have nelped to build a pretty considerable part of the New Europe and you will thoroughly enjoy your reward." Bernard Pares to R. W. Seton-Watson, Nov. 10, 1918. Seton-Watson Papers.

806

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

mans and Magyars sustained the heaviest casualties, Ukrainians the least. Of the order of three and a half million of Austro-Hungarian soldiers were wounded, something like fifteen per cent of them were disabled in part or wholly, and the war left about four hundred thousand widows in the former Monarchy and triple as many orphans. Soldiers taken captive in the titanic struggle approached the two million mark. 50 As the closing episode in the Hapsburg dynastic record in Austria, Emperor Charles relinquished his authority in affairs of state, as has been noted. The imperial family was disquieted by street rioting in Vienna and by the gathering agitation for a republic, though Viktor Adler tried to quiet alarm by assuring Charles of his personal safety whether as "ruler of Austria or as emperor of the United States of southeastern Europe." 5 1 Reminiscent of the last tsarina of Russia, Zita implored her husband not to withdraw, melodramatically exclaiming, "Rather than that, I will die here with you. Then Otto will succeed. And even if we all perish—there are still other Hapsburgs." But more sober counselors, with the recent murder of Tisza never out of their minds, advised Charles to renounce the throne and to seek a safer haven. After a dramatic scene at Schönbrunn, unexampled since the conquering Napoleon I had arrived, Charles waived his rights to exercise political authority; that formula he adopted, instead of abdication, on the recommendation of Professor Ignaz Seipel, who cherished the dream that one day the Hapsburgs might regain the crown. "Ever since my accession," read Charles' proclamation of 5 ° Leo Grebler and Wilhelm Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary (New Haven, 1940), pp. 143-150. F. M. Mayer, et. al., Geschichte und Kulturleben Deutschösterreichs (3 vols., Vienna, 1937), III, 304, 322; Hugo Schäfer, Österreichs Volksbuch vom Weltkrieg (Vienna, 1934). 5 1 On Charles' name day, November 5, 1918, Cardinal Piffl celebrated mass in honor of the sovereign in St. Stephen's Cathedral, as though unaware of the sweeping new order that had come to pass.

Avalanche

807

November 11, "I have incessantly tried to rescue my peoples from this tremendous war, for which I bear no responsibility. . . . I acknowledge in advance the decision to be taken by German-Austria to form a separate state. . . . I relinquish all part in the administration of the state. . . In the evening, the ex-emperor, his wife, and their golden-haired children motored through dark, deserted Vienna streets to an old baroque hunting lodge at Eckartsau, twenty miles distant and hard-by t i e site of the victory in 1278 of Rudolf, founder of the Hapsburg dynasty, over Bohemian King Ottokar. On the morrow, "rump" Austria joined the marching throng of democratic republics, and the provisional national assembly voted that the new Austria formed part of the new German Republic; that same day Charles renounced participation in the public business of Hungary. For four months the Hapsburg family resided at Eckartsau, under the surveillance of a British colonel, who was charged to prevent a repeat performance of the atrocious fate of the deposed imperial family of Russia. Since Charles declined to accede to the demand of the Republic of Austria that he abdicate the throne formally, he was obliged to take refuge in Switzerland, not far from the moldering ruins of Castle Habichtsburg on the bank of the Aar, principal southern tributary of the upper Rhine, whence his ancestors over six hundred years before had set off to rule Austria—the wheel of historical fortune had in truth turned full circle. Prudently, part of the Hapsburg family treasures had been forwarded to Switzerland.62 5 2 By an act of the new Republic, Hapsburg properties in Austria were nationalized, though whether the law covered file private family holdings as well as crown estates generated divisive and endless controversy. The private fortune consisted of about forty thousand acres, including very valuable timber lands, which had been set apart in the eighteenth century to provide for the rulers and for members of the House of Hapsburg; they were entailed so that they could neither be mortgaged nor sold. New York Times, July 29, 1960.

808

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Twice in 1921, in the spring and in the autumn, the harlequin monarch, grossly miscalculating political realities and badly advised, returned to Hungary hoping to reclaim the crown of St. Stephen; after the second adventure, Charles was hauled off under the aegis of the Entente and in the tradition of Napoleon I to the island of Madeira. Living in penury, amidst wretched and unhealthy surroundings at Funchal, the last sovereign of dualistic Austria-Hungary contracted influenza and succumbed on April 1, 1922, scarcely thirty-five years old. There in a little chapel rests his simple, metal coffin bearing a crown of thrones and the chaste inscription: FIAT VOLUNTAS TUA. Through all the tragic vicissitudes of his public career, Charles had been nourished and sustained by deep religious faith. At his death, legitimist newspapers of Budapest appeared with black borders and aged Count Albert Apponyi announced, "Otto is King of Hungary, although temporarily prevented from coronation."

22. ¿Epilogue MEASURED IN PERSPECTIVE, THE DISRUPTION OF

AUSTRIA-

Hungary represents a consequence of the First World War second in pregnancy only to the triumph of Bolshevism in Russia. Here was a strange realm of over fifty-two millions, almost bewildering in its linguistic complexity, lying in the heart of Europe, possessed of great armies and rich material resources. For generations the Hapsburg state had displayed qualities of toughness and powers of resilience that enabled it somehow to outride fierce storms from within and from without, which recurrently threatened its submergence. Sober writers have been known to compare the resounding break-up of the Danube Monarchy in 1918 to the disappearance of ancient Babylon or Assyria or even of imperial Rome.1 That the dissolution had direct bearing on the Second World War and subsequent European in1 Archibald C. Coolidge, Ten Years of War and Peace (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), pp. 241-268; cf., Edward Man, "Some Economic Aspects of the Nationality Conflict in the Hapsburg Empire," Journal of Central European Affairs, XIII ( 1 9 5 3 - 5 4 ) , 123-135.

809

810 The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918 stability, international tensions, and war alarms admits of no debate. Skepticism was expressed in the autumn of 1918 as to whether the crack-up of the Monarchy augured well for European security, even by perceptive Americans to whom a scant four years before the lands and peoples of the interior of Europe were hardly better known than the forests and tribes in the heart of Africa; apart, to be sure, from large companies of new Americans who had emigrated from the Hapsburg realm. "America is heartily for emancipation of subject peoples," the New York Globe affirmed, "but will emancipation make for durable peace? If from the Baltic to the Adriatic, from the Alps to the Dardanelles, come into being nearly a score of small nations, each one jealous of its place in the sun, it is not certain that pacifism will result. . . ." From the journalistic literature of Entente countries comparable speculations could readily be culled. A more optimistic refrain across the Atlantic was sung by the New York Times, which predicted that "if the newly-freed Slav states succeed in establishing a federation for which they hope, it is quite possible that the new center of gravity in Central Europe may be at Prague or Warsaw"; it appeared from the editor's chair of the New York Tribune that "the end of the war will see central Europe turned into a vast proving-ground for the democratic experiment." If the small Austrian republic should combine with Germany, thought the Times, "it is quite conceivable that she might be the center of anti-Prussian feeling around which other South German states could rally."2 "The Austrian Humpty-Dumpty . . . has fallen to earth," remarked a mirror of one variety of New World liberalism. "Not all the king's men can ever put him together again. For this let us rejoice . . . the dismemberment of Austria2 Quoted in Literary Digest, LIX (Nov. 9, 1918), 8, 9; ibid. 16, 1918), 11.

(Nov.

Epilogue

811

Hungary is an accomplished fact, not by decree of a peace conference, but because of internal disruption, aided, but not caused, by external pressure. . . . We have faith that the new structure to arise in its place will grace the world and make it a better and happier place to live in. . . . " 3 In a retrospective mood, an astute and knowledgeable Briton contended that the disruption of the Hapsburg Monarchy was "the work of tremendous natural forces and a long process of political unwisdom, but could almost to the very end have been averted, or indefinitely postponed, if those in authority had shown foresight and statesmanship, a sense of social justice, and a comprehension of racial [sic] aspirations."4 Commenting on an address by Count Albert Apponyi concerning the passing of Austria-Hungary, the New York Times philosophized that "nothing which is unnatural, nothing which contradicts the principles on which the making of nations is based can permanently last; nothing which is unbearable to permanent and indestructible feelings of great or small nations can last."5 2.

Except for men addicted to a philosophy of "inevitability," which offers a facile escape from thinking in historical contexts, except for believers in "inexorable fate" or crude irresistible determinism, any assessment of the tangled maze that encompassed the ruin of the Danubian Monarchy must take into reckoning multiple, intertwined domestic frictions and external interferences. Which set of forces exerted the more decisive impact may well engage the energies of detached historical investigators, not Nation, CVII (1918), 542. R. W. Seton-Watson, "Emperor Francis Joseph," History, XVII (1932), 111-120, 221-230, esp. 111. » October 5, 1923. 3 4

812

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy,. 1914-1918

to speak of partisan polemicists, until Doomsday, or, at any rate, until the day before Doomsday. It was a diverse combination of forces, no one cause alone, that produced the melancholy end result; simple, one-pronged explanations satisfy only simple minds. If the Bolshevik coup in Russia was incredible, though not inevitable, the disappearance of the realm of the Hapsburgs was not inevitable, though entirely credible. High priority in the break-up belongs to the legacy from the past, above all to the fermenting, explosive yeast of nationalisms, which well before 1914 had nourished centrifugal antagonisms that led many a contemporary to prophesy that the dissolution of the realm on the Danube was merely a matter of time. Once substantial articulate elements in a national community, especially of the intelligentsia, became emotionally imbued with translucent national pride and an intractable national faith, they could only be cured by a generous measure of home-rule or by complete freedom, regardless of the disadvantages that national fulfillment might entail; once a Czech, or a South Slav or whatnot decided he could not live contentedly under the supranational Hapsburg dynasty, rational arguments on the material losses or the insecurity or the cultural sacrifices that would follow were no more effective than speaking in the wind. Given the moods prevailing in the early twentieth century, an impressive body of opinion concluded that the Hapsburg Monarchy could hope to endure only by application of the fundamental formula that had enabled the British realm to hold together; that is, by bestowing autonomous status upon each important national grouping, but with adequate safeguards for the rights of minorities. Before the war and while it was being waged, prophetic voices in the Monarchy, impelled by a visionary and righteous zeal, pleaded for federal reconstruction, for a "monarchical Switzerland" on one pattern or

Epilogue

813

another; here were enrolled such fine and constructive intelligences as Professors Lammasch and Redlich, the Socialists Karl Renner and Viktor Adler, as well as Joseph M. Baernreither, Counts Charles Schwarzenberg and Heinrich Liitzow, enlightened German Bohemians all; the Slovak, Milan Hodia, the Hungarian, Oscar Jiszi, and the veteran spokesmen of the Rumanians and of the "Saxons," respectively, in Transylvania, Aurel Popovici and Edmund Steinacker, to recall only some of the more eminent personalities. Federalism for the whole Monarchy would have necessitated, of course, the abrogation of the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich or Compromise of 1867, the Siamese twinship of dualism and its institutions; but that objective could only have been contrived over the prostrate form of the myopic and stubborn Magyar ruling caste—or most of it. Count Stephen Tisza, it has been proposed, by obstinately blocking revision of the dualistic arrangements was "the grave-digger of the Monarchy," but that judgment misses the point that his intransigeance reflected the posture of the dominant spectrum of the Magyar oligarchy. A gravedigger the arrogant, granite-like Calvinist assuredly was, though only one among many. Like his ill-starred uncle, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, Emperor-King Charles understood that the constitutional framework would have to be drastically overhauled if the realm were to be saved; yet this tragic vacillator, unequal to the tremendous challenges that he faced, withheld public endorsement of federal reconstruction until the bells were tolling the demise of his patrimony, and even then the principle of partnership would not be applied in the lands of the crown of St. Stephen. Unflagging resistance to constitutional reordering forms only one count in the bill of indictment that must be drawn against the decision-takers of Budapest. Troglodytes in their social philosophy that the leisured Magyar

814

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

magnates were predominantly, decorative but parasitic, they passionately and wilfully stood out against a democratic franchise, concessions to the smaller nationalities on schools and churches, languages and the like, and reforms in land tenure in the name of social equity which might have placated important and articulate segments of the Hungarian minority populations. Besides, amidst the ordeal of war, the Budapest authorities played less than fair, on balance, in delivering provisions to the Austrian partner; up to a point, stupid stinginess advertised the rebellion of Magyar nationalism against the Hapsburg connection, which the enlarging Hungarian independence faction held responsible for the wartime hardships and losses that beset the country—and for the eventual defeat and territorial mutilation. As the war pushed to its finish, an Austrian Socialist voiced a common emotion when he exclaimed, "We can forgive the hunger blockade instituted by our enemies, never that by the Magyars. The economic partnership proved in practice to mean the starvation of Austria." On October 19, 1918, after Prime Minister Alexander Wekerle asserted for practical purposes the independence of Hungary and the sudden termination of the Ausgleich, the Arbeiter Zeitung of Vienna declared, "The Hungarians are parting from us with a light heart and we see them depart with a light heart." "Every kingdom divided against itself," the Gospels teach, "is brought to desolation; and a house divided against a house falleth." (Luke: xi, 17). 3. A share of the responsibility for the final doom of the House of Hapsburg must be borne by the last two Emperors and certain of their senior servitors. It is as plain as the proverbial pikestaff that Francis Joseph, who balked

Epilogue

815

at constitutional changes in Austria that would have at a minimum shored up the realm of which he was so proud, lived too long. Had the Emperor departed from this world after attaining the Biblically allotted span of seventy years, the course of human events would doubtless have flowed into different channels; "Ich bin mir seit langem bewusst, wie sehr wir in der heutigen Welt eine Anomalie sind," sighed the octogenarian monarch in the late evening of his prolonged reign, which would seem to indicate that Francis Joseph himself appreciated that he was in glaring disharmony with the needs of the time.® The unseasoned, youthful Emperor-King Charles, commanding general affection without matching respect, lacked the native gifts of leadership and strength of character to pursue paths in both domestic and foreign affairs that he believed deep down to be wise. Neither original nor profound, his vacillation on the issue of an independent peace, his Hamlet-like indecision on federalization, robbed him of prestige; and the supposition that at the Spa meeting of May, 1918, the Emperor had delivered himself over to the German ally "like a trussed chicken" undermined the hypothesis in the West that after the war the Danube Monarchy would be indispensable as a counterweight to the Hohenzollern Empire. When at last Charles openly advocated a federal structure for Austria, the hour was too late; the October 16, 1918, manifesto electrified secessionists and accelerated in fact internal disintegration nearly a fortnight before the Hapsburg military forces caved in. "Revolution is made legitimate by the manifesto," laconically reported the German ambassador in Vienna, Count Botho Wedel. Victim of misfortune at so many turns, it is impossible to suppress the suspicion that Charles had a dynastic liability in his wife, Zita. Because of her Italian antecedents, it was easy to imagine that she had betrayed mili6Adam

Wandruszka, Das Haus Habsburg (Vienna, 1956), p. 197.

816

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

tary secrets to the secular foe south of the Alps or had inspired and promoted the undercover (Sixtus) transaction for a peace settlement. Not a shred of admissable testimony sustains the first assumption, and the role of the Empress in the fiasco of Sixtus was in fact quite negligible. l l i a t Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold and his Ballplatz colleagues recklessly mismanaged foreign policy in the terrible July days of 1914 has been established beyond peradventure of a doubt, even when due and proper weight is assigned to the menacing Great Serb agitation, to the culpable negligence of the Pasic cabinet, and to the singularly provocative decisions taken by the men on the Neva. Among other top advisers of the Hapsburg crown to be specially censured is the last chief of the general staff, Arz, who, yielding to the pressures of the German high command and of Conrad, sanctioned, in June of 1918, a full-bodied offensive against the Italians. At that juncture, a verdict in the titantic European conflict could only be rendered on the western front, and even a second edition of dazzling Caporetto, which could not rationally have been expected in view of the condition of the Hapsburg armies and of the important reinforcement in men and armaments furnished to Italy by her western allies, would not have altered the basic outcome of the war. If Arz had deliberately held to defensive operations and had husbanded his resources, the Austro-Hungarian armed services would have been capable no doubt of overawing the secessionist movements and the swift disintegration of fighting power would have been avoided. 4. Considering the external factors in the splitting apart of the Monarchy, it has already been intimated that except for the exhausting war fought to the bitter end, it is

Epilogue

817

no more likely that the House of Hapsburg would have fallen asunder than that the Gideon's band of Bolsheviks could have brought off their world-shaking coup detat in Russia. Just here, the impact upon Austria-Hungary of the epochal eruptions to the east may be singled out for emphasis and interpretation. The March, 1917, upheaval, which tumbled Nicholas II from his pedestal and ushered in a species of political democracy and republicanism, had diverse implications for the Danubian realm. Not only did the Russian developments impart fresh impetus to the republican ideology in the Monarchy but tney emboldened certain partisans of secession to believe that the goal of national fulfillment was much more than an iridescent dream; from another angle, the collapse of the tsardom made the Dual Monarchy less essential as a protective shield for the rest of Europe—or thus at least it seemed to some Entente watchers of the times. Far weightier, to be sure, were the repercussions of the triumphant seizure of authority by Lenin and his henchmen; among other things, the Bolshevik regime freed Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war, many of whom carried home or into military camps visions of radical social change. Turmoil in Russia made possible, moreover, the glamorous Siberian exploits of die Czech and Slovak legionnaires, which significantly nourished the conviction in the West that the co-nafionals of these soldiers were fit to conduct their own political affairs. On every hand, the November Revolution intensified separatist agitations in the Monarchy, although the victorious Bolsheviks themselves paid only lip-service to national selfdetermination, except as they exploited the dogma in propaganda to weaken the feeble Russian provisional government and in discrediting the German and Austrian peacemakers at Brest-Litovsk. In the case of the Austrian Poles, the Bolshevik Revolution quickened conservative sympathies for a Polish state under the Haps-

818

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

burg scepter, yet at the same time strengthened the faith of believers in a united Poland, pursuing a wholly independent national existence; with the Communists in the ascendant in Russia, Entente foreign offices cast aside their former policy of permitting the Russians to handle the Polish question in their own way. Nibelungentreue or not, the lop-sided reliance of Austria-Hungary upon Hohenzollern Germany during the war produced a malign harvest. True enough, the rulers of Germany had time and time again dispatched troops to stiffen Hapsburg military resources and had responded to piteous calls for financial assistance and for foodstuffs. But, on the other side, Berlin rejected proposals from Vienna for a compromise peace and by insistence upon retaining Alsace-Lorraine, upon territorial aggrandizement to the east, and upon an indemnity which, in the celebrated language of Karl Helfferich "would have been a heavy ball of lead tied to future generations" of the enemy powers, the Germans frustrated any chance of ending the war by diplomatic action. Over the head of the Viennese decision-takers hung a veritable sword of Damocles in the shape of a German threat to invade the Monarchy, set fervently Pan-German zealots against the dynasty, and assume management of the realm. 5. From a variety of war-induced sources, almost universal economic distress and social misery gripped the Monarchy and chilled the will to fight on to victory. Agonies of mind and spirit provoked by the injury and death of so many able-bodied men fed revulsion against war; material exhaustion, most bitter, of course, in AustroHungarian cities, cruel privations in the necessities of day-to-day existence, and frightening prospects of worse to come if hostilities continued, were no longer endurable

Epilogue

819

for millions of people. In point of fact, mass suffering in Danubian Europe increased after the cessation of fighting. . . No household may use more than one cubic meter of gas a day," it was recorded, "all theaters, cinemas, places of amusement and lecture halls are closed . . . and this is but the beginning. . . . If coal can not be secured, our people will freeze to death. . . . During the four years of cruel war nothing has been endured by any people more terrible than that now threatening us" 7 The python-like embrace of the Entente blockade, twisted the tighter after the entry of the United States, converted the Danube Valley into something like a beleaguered city, except for driblets of food from occupied lands, a situation that gravely undermined morale in the armed services and among civilian populations, and intensified secessionist sentiments. Arguably, the blockade had more to do with the intricate process that carried the Monarchy to destruction than the guns of the enemy.8 More inspiriting to centrifugal forces than propaganda issuing from Russia, both before and after the Bolshevik enthronement, were the declared war aims of Entente cabinets and of the United States and the psychological warfare which they sponsored. First in line were the secret wartime treaties which purchased the intervention of Italy and Rumania and the imprecise pledges given to Serbia and to Ententeophile Poles prescribing extensive subtractions of territory, if Austria-Hungary were obliged to confess defeat. In the last year of the war, second, the western Entente powers and America renounced interest in preserving a truncated Monarchy, and, step by step, endorsed the revolutionary principle of self-determination, which, if integrally applied, would spell the doom of the House of Hapsburg. Of cardinal importance were AZ, Dec. 5, 1918. David Mitrany, The Effects of the War in Southeastern Europe (New Haven, 1936), p. vi; Grebler and Winkler, op. ctt., pp. 150-181. 7 8

820 The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918 the policies of the United States whose intervention in the gruelling struggle not only stimulated subversive intrigues and the ardor of revolutionaries in the Monarchy, but depressed spirits in ruling Hapsburg circles from the Emperor-King on down. Cautiously, even reluctantly, the Wilson administration abandoned the creed of federalization for Austria-Hungary, set out most firmly in Point Ten of the Fourteen Points, and wheeled to the side of dismemberment into national components, the "solution" that had been studiously advocated, for example, by the resourceful band of intellectuals associated with the British periodical, The New Europe.9 The gospel of liberation sent forth by the patently propagandists Rome Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in April of 1918, together with the conversion of the White House to the Austria delenda doctrine, exercised an immeasurable influence upon partisans of national fulfillment, whether émigré secessionists at work in western capitals, leaders of political sentiment at home, or men in the fighting ranks. Once President Wilson had embraced the idea of dissolution, however unclear he was on the detailed implications thereof, he held to it unwaveringly throughout diplomatic exchanges with Vienna in the gray autumn of 1918. Yet the potency of Wilsonian statecraft in striking at conventional political loyalties in Austria-Hungary, in spreading mingled confusion, despair and hope, in fanning revolutionary flames, and thus promoting disruption, has often been distorted or grossly exaggerated alike by Hapsburg apologists and by their foes.10 For the American President, his principal counIn the judgment of George Glasgow, associate editor of the journal, "It was the documented argument of The New Europe, working in league with Thomas Masaryk's famous war-time Odyssey around the world and Edward Benesh's work in Paris and London that persuaded the Allied Powers and the 'Associated' United States to carve new states out of the old Austria-Hungary." Contemporary Review, CLXXX ( 1 9 5 1 ) , 179-182. 1 0 See, for instance, Buriân, op. cit., p. 286, and Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England, p. 114.

Epilogue

821

sellors, and their counterparts in London and Paris what happened in mid-Europe seemed decidedly of secondary importance compared with the problem of Germany. Having said that much it must also be said that psychological warfare, not least the Wilsonian thunderbolts, contributed its meed to the passing of the Danubian realm. 6. In the final analysis, it was the verdict of the iron dice of war rolling against imperial Germany, and accompanied by the military humiliation of Bulgaria and the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian fighting services, that fatally destroyed the Hapsburg complex. And these spectacular climaxes raced onward at lightning speed. A sharp portrayal of what actually came to pass was etched by the eminent British editor, Charles P. Scott, who, under the caption, "The Great Day," wrote, . . . events of the last few days have moved with breathless rapidity, and the whole conditions of the problem as regards the Central Powers are changed. We have no longer to deal with two great and highly organised military autocracies, but with a whole series of States not merely democratic in form but in which the democratic forces have definitely assumed the upper hand. The process of change was as rapid as it was sudden, and even to the most careful observers unexpected. It has given us an Austria resolved into the elements of diverse nationality each now claiming complete independence of the rest, and all, including even the German districts, having renounced allegiance to the ancient ruling house; a Hungary freed from its powerful ruling caste and no longer claiming itself to exercise rule over the subject nationalities so long held down by force. . . Additional surprises dare not be overlooked. The dissolution of the Monarchy came about with remarkably »Manchester

Guardian, Nov. 2, 1918.

822 The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918 little physical violence, more in Hungary than in Austria, save in the eastern section of Galicia, and the machinery of government kept operating, as it did not in revolutionary Russia, plain testimony to the fundamentally solid character of the Hapsburg administrative system. Civil servants, generally loyal to the crown, and historically a bulwark of the dynasty, like the armed forces, calmly transferred allegiance to the secessionist regimes and faithfully performed their customary duties in the successor states; by so doing, the bureaucracies helped notably to stave off administrative chaos and political anarchy. Similarly, the railways, in seemingly impossible straits when the cannon stopped roaring, carried many soldiers promptly back to their families, and passed with astonishing smoothness into the service of the new states. Illustrative of the keen sense of duty that animated servants of the Monarchy to the very end is a conversation held, as the smash-up impended, between Karl Radek, a prominent Bolshevik born under the Hapsburg flag, and de Poteri, the ambassador of Emperor-King Charles at the court of Lenin. "I showed him on the map," Radek remembered, "the demands which Italy had presented to Austria. The old man, usually so correct, burst into tears, 'Oh come! I tried to calm him, 'it would be understandable if you were a German ambassador. But what does it matter to you, a Hungarian of Italian origin, if Austria is nibbled at or if she crumbles somewhat.'" "You see," rejoined de Poteri, "I have been in the diplomatic service for thirty-five years and patriotism is partly a habit and partly a diplomatic duty." 12 7. When the balances are weighed as rigorously and as judiciously as may be, when internal tensions and hatreds 12

Soviet Studies, III (1951-2), 414.

Epilogue

823

and external antagonisms are held steadily in view, the crowning astonishment is not that the multinationality realm of the Hapsburgs burst asunder, but that in an age of perfervid nationalism this heritage from an earlier historical era survived so long as it did. For beneficiaries of hindsight, though not them alone, the supreme tragedy lay in the inability or the unwillingness of the statesman upon whom devolved the responsibility for shaping the new Europe after the war to impose some sort of Danubian integration—a dream of reason—upon the heirs of the Hapsburgs in mid-Europe. Both unofficially and in governmental circles of the victor nations much talk (mostly obscure and inchoate) of a federal union in the valley of the Danube was heard before the war, during the war, and directly after hostilities had stopped.13 Although the area involved was in no sense too extensive for a federation (smaller than Texas), so diverse were the peoples, so keen the national emotions that a federal governmental structure would need to have been fairly loose and flexible. And the implementation of a midEuropean pattern of that quality would have required delicate and patient study, the exercise of very considerable powers of persuasion upon representatives of the emergent Danubian states, who wished nationalist wellbeing and security, not simply well-being and security, and in some places at least, the invocation of military coercion. For these things the western makers of the world settlement after the war and the nations in whose name they spoke possessed neither inclination nor stomach. It is a sad illusion, however, a living myth, sedulously cultivated in some quarters, that the Dual Monarchy was deliberately destroyed by vindictive statesmen of the 13 Paris Figaro, to cite only a specimen, envisaged a free association of individual states, a Danubia, as "an effective counterpoise to the Germany of today as to the Russia of to-morrow." Oct. 28, 29, 1918.

824

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

victor nations bent upon a punitive settlement. Myths seem never to die. In reality the eventual treaties of peace with Austria and Hungary, for all their catastrophic imperfections, did little more than modify in places frontiers that had been established when the armistices were accepted and sanctify legal commitments guaranteeing civil and religious rights to minorities. The Paris treaty settlements, that is to say, essentially confirmed and ratified the surgery of vivisection, the territorial situation existing when hostilities formally stopped. What the Paris peacemakers neglected to attempt—a confederacy "tied by the Danube's silver band," in the felicitous verse of Frances Grillparzer, would one day be brought to pass in a radically different guise by Adolf Hitler and his sadistic Nazis, and, upon the ignominious collapse of the Hitlerian empire, by Joseph Stalin and his tyrannous Communists on a slightly narrower geographical foundation. As effective master of the captive satellite countries after the Second World War, the Soviet Marshal blossomed out in a precise sense as the largest heir of the Hapsburgs! 8. In the fullness of time, when the menace of Soviet inundation loomed ominously over Europe, the merits of the "ramshackle" Danube Monarchy, whatever its faults and shortcomings, the blessings this state bestowed upon its multinationality peoples, its mission as the bastion of West against East and as the power balance between German and Slav attracted considerable approbation. "So long as the Austrian empire lasted," thought a reflective British historian, "Europe lasted, and . . . the struggle for the succession to the Hapsburgs—itself the sequel to the struggle for the succession to the Ottoman empireopened the great European civil war, in which Europe

Epilogue

825

crippled itself and destroyed its pre-eminence in the world." 14 Nostalgia for the historic Monarchy, the conviction that its passing was a major calamity of the twentieth century, was not at all confined to Winston Churchill and like-minded international realists in the west nor to confirmed clericals and case-hardened conservatives, cherishing a false and naive sentimentality for the departed Hapsburgs. Said the sturdy British Labourite, Ernest Bevin (1937), "The old Austro-Hungarian Empire was economically perhaps the soundest thing that existed in Europe." 15 That stout-hearted Croat advocate of South Slav integration, Ante Trumbi6, by 1929 thoroughly disenchanted, sorrowfully concluded that it was a mistake to have cut loose from the Hapsburg connection, and, in a kindred vein, Jan Masaryk, gifted son of Thomas, though not endowed to be a statesman of front rank, observed in 1946 (before the Communist coup) that Czechoslovakia had never been so happy as when the area lay inside the Danubian Monarchy.16 In the ripe wisdom of age, an implacable adversary of Austria-Hungary penned this arresting epitaph: . . . looking backward on the Hapsburg Monarchy from the perspective of the last thirty years even the staunchest opponents of the Hapsburgs (and I count myself among them) cannot deny that in their realm the rule of law was tolerably secure; individual liberties were more and more recognized; political rights continuously extended; the principle of na1 4 Geoffrey Barraclough, History in a Changing World (Oxford, 1956), p. 133: cf. Gordon Shepherd, The Austrian Odyssey (London, 1957); Arnold and Veronica M. Toynbee, The Eve of War, 1939 (London, 1958), p. 5. 18 Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston, 1948), pp. 10, 17; Alan J. P. Taylor, The Trouble Makers (London, 1957), p. 193; see also the obituary of H. Wickham Steed, London Times, Jan. 18 1956; Karl Renner, "Austria: Key for War and Peace," Foreign Affairs, XXVI (1947-8), 589-603. 1 8 Robert Ingrim, Von Talleyrand zu Molotov (Zurich, 1948), p. 219; Duff Cooper to editor, London Daily Telegraph, Ap. 18, 1950.

826

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

tional autonomy growingly respected. The free flow of persons and goods extended its benefits to the remotest part of the Monarchy. The German language became a land of lingua franca which made communication easy between the commercial and the intellectual classes of Germans, Magyars, Croats, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Rumanians, and Serbs. This contact was incomplete but a real one . . . Even the strongest nationalists recognized (though fighting it) the higher unity above the various nationalisms and some of the best scholars of the various national groups were devoted to the elaboration of plans through which the dynastic, clerical, militaristic, and bureaucratic empire could be remolded into a federation of free peoples. . . . An experiment is going on [1947] under the supreme power of Russia. . . . It is in a certain way the renewal of the allembracing Hapsburg empire with a diametrically opposite idealogy and methods. Instead of the divine monarchy of the Hapsburgs, a world state of proletarian nature is emphasized; instead of Catholicism the system of dialectic materialism is the Russian state religion; instead of aristocratic Austrian officers and officials a proletarian army and bureaucracy; instead of the conservative tradition of the Hapsburgs a radical dynamism driving towards world revolution. . . ,17 1 7 Oscar Jaszi, "Danubia: Old and New," Proceedings of the Philosophical Society, XCIII (1949), 1-31, esp. 2, 26.

American

übltograpfig A wide range of manuscript materials, as is indicated in the notes, in the Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv, in the Public Record Office of London, and in the U.S. National Archives has been of indispensable value, along with the published collections of pre-First World War documents from European foreign offices. Leading newspapers of the Hapsburg Monarchy, notably the Neue Freie Presse and the Arbeiter Zeitung, as well as influential foreign newspapers like the Times of London and the New York Times, have been examined scrupulously—and critically. Bibliographical guides for the war era are Walter Schinner, Bibliographie zur Geschichte Österreich-Ungarns im Weltkrieg ( Stuttgart: Weltkriegsbücherei, 1934 ) containing around 3,500 items to 1934, and a companion volume Anon., Bibliographie zur Geschichte Italiens in der Vorkriegszeit und im Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Weltkriegsbücherei, 1938). Othmar Spann, Bibliographie der Wirtschafts-und Sozialgeschichte des Weltkrieges (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1923), lists many excellent monographs. Karl and Mathilde Uhlirz, Hatxdbuch der Geschichte Österreichs und Seine Nachbarländer Böhmen und Ungarn (4 vols. Vienna: Leuschner and Lubensky, 1927-44), esp. vol. III. See also, Cyril Falls, War Books: a Critical Guide (London: Davies, 1930). 827

828

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

These resources render unnecessary an exhaustive bibliography in the present book on publications before the Second World War. The selections here largely exclude books and articles referred to in the notes on specific problems. More general works on bibliography are cited in Arthur J. May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914 (reprinted, Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1965), p. 513. Larger Works Adams, John C. Flight in Winter. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942. Dramatic and detailed account of Serbia's retreat in 1915. Adler, Friedrich, W. Die Erneuerung der Internationale, Vienna: Brand, 1918. Wartime meditations of a Socialist theoretician. . Vor dem Ausnahmsgericht. Berlin, 1919. Important for Social Democrats. Adler, Viktor. Briefwechsel mit August Bebel und Karl Kautsky. Vienna: Volksbuchhandlung, 1954. Some wartime correspondence. Ahmed, Djemal Pasha. Memories of a Turkish Statesman. New York: Doran, 1922. On Turkish diplomacy of 1914. Albertini, Luigi. The Origins of the War of 1914. Eng. trans., 3 vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953-57. Massive treatise. A rich reading experience with a slight Entente orientation. Allmayer-Beck, Johann Christoph. Ministerpräsident Max Vladimir Freiherr von Beck. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1955. Full of interest. Amiguet, Philip. La Vie du Prince Sixte de Bourbon. Paris: Les Éditions de France, 1934. A chaste portrait. Anderson, Mosa. Noel Buxton. London: Allen and Unwin, 1952. Brief, but illuminating. Andrâssy, Tulius. Diplomacy and the War. Eng. trans. London : Bale ana Danielson, 1921. Magyar viewpoints on Hapsburg diplomacy. Somewhat critical and detached. Antipa, Grigore. L'Occupation Ennemie de la Roumanie et Ses Conséquences Économiques et Sociales. New Haven : Yale University Press, 1929. Arnez, John A. Slovenia in European Affairs. Washington: League of CSA, 1958. Slight but interesting. Arz von Straussenburg, Artur. Kampf und Sturz der Mittel-

Bibliography

829

mächte. Vienna: Günther, 1935. Crisp reminiscences and portraits by Chief of Staff. , Zur Geschichte des Grossen Krieges. Vienna: Rikola, 1924. Auerbach, Bertrand. L'Autriche et la Hongrie pendant la Guerre. Paris: Alcan, 1925. Remarkably good at the time written. Auffenberg-Komaröw, Moritz von. Aus Österreichs Höhe und Niedergang. Munich: Drei Masken, 1921. Autobiographical. Baernreither, Joseph M. Der Verfall des Habsburgerreiches und die Deutschen. Vienna: Holzhausen, 1939. Useful memoirs. Baldini, Alberto. Diaz. Eng. trans., London: Toulmin, 1935. Military activity of an Italian chief of the general staff. Bardolff, Carl von. Soldat im Alien Österreich. Jena: Diedrichs, 1938. Staunch pro-German viewpoint. Basilescu, Nicolae. La Roumanie dans la Guerre et dans la Paix. 2 vols, Paris: Alcan, 1919. Vol. I. Contemporary reconstruction of war era. Batthyâny, Theodor. Für Ungarn gegen Hohenzollern. Vienna: Amalthea, 1930. By a defeatist of ministerial rank. Bauer, Otto. Die österreichische Revolution. Vienna: Volksbuchhandlung, 1923. By prominent Socialist. Composed in a hurry. Benedikt, Heinrich. Die Friedensaktion der Meirdgruppe 1917/ 18. Graz: Böhlaus, 1962. Thorough documentation on a little known activity. Benes, Eduard. Souvenirs de Guerre et de Révolution. 2 vols. Paris: Leroux, 1928. Fullest account in a western language. Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von. Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege. 2 vols. Berlin: Hobbing, 1919-1922. An appealing apologia. Bettelheim, Anton. Karl Schönherr. Leipzig: Staackmann, 1928. Beyer, Hans. Die Mittlemächte und die Ukraine. Munich: Isar, 1956. Solid and convincing. Bogicevic, Milos. Le Colonel Dragoutine Dimitrevic-Apis. Paris: Delpeuch, 1928. Must be read with discrimination. Boroviczény, Aladar von. Der König und Seine Reichsverweser. Munich: Kulturpolitik, 1924. An inside view by confidential secretary of Charles I.

830

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Brailsford, Henry N. A League of Nations. London: Headley, 1917. Opinions on destiny of the Danubian Monarchy. Brandl, Franz. Kaiser, Politiker, und Menschen. Leipzig: Günther, 1936. Recollections by Vienna police chief. Braunthal, Julius. In Search of the Millenium. London: Gollancz, 1945. Socialist report. Very readable. Breitner, Burghard. Unverwundet Gefangen. 4th ed. Vienna: Rikola, 1927. Colorful account by physician prisoner of war. Bruegel, Ludwig. Geschichte der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie. 5 vols. Vienna: Volksbuchhandler, 1922-25. Contains many original documents. Brusilov, Aleksei A. A Soldiers Notebook. London: Macmillan, 1930. By a Russian commander. Büler, Hermann. Kaiser Karl von Österreich. Freiburg: Päpstliche, 1933. Thin and not notably reliable. Bülow, Bernhard H. von. Denkwürdigkeiten. 4 vols. Berlin: Ullstein, 1930-31. The third volume gives a highly personal version of his Italian mission 1914—15. Burian, Stephan. Drei Jahre aus der Zeit Meiner Amtsführung im Kriege. Berlin: Ullstein, 1923. Invaluable record by a dedicated, though rather uninspired servant of the crown. Buxton, Noel and Lease, C. Leonard. Balkan Problems and European Peace. New York: Scribner's, 1919. Caracciolo, Mario. L'Italie dans le Guerre Mondiale. Rome: Roma, 1937. Polemical, but interesting survey. Charles-Roux, François. La Paix des Empires Centraux. Paris: SPID, 1947. On all the adventures for peace. Undocumented. Chatterton, Edward K. Seas of Adventure. London: Hurst and Blackett, 1936. On Adriatic warfare. Chéradame, André. Pan-Germany: the Disease and Cure. 2nd ed. Boston: Atlantic Monthly, 1918. Characteristic specimen of his war-time outpourings. Chlumeckv, Leopold von. Erzherzog Franz Ferdinands Wirken und Wollen. Berlin: Kulturpolitik, 1929. Important. By an intimate of the Archduke. Churchill, Winston S. The Unknown War. New York: Scribner's, 1931. Superficial. Conwell-Evans, Thomas P. Foreign Policy from a Back Bench. London: Oxford, 1932. Based upon the papers of Noel Buxton. Conze, Werner. Polnische Nation und Deutsche Politik im

Bibliography

831

Ersten Weltkrieg. Cologne: Böhlau, 1958. Indispensable. Rich detail. Conrad von Hötzendorf, Franz. Aus Meiner Dienstzeit. 5 vols. Vienna. Rikola, 1921-25. Frank, heavily documented memoirs to December, 1914. Corbett, Julian S. History of the Great War: Naval Operations. 5 vols. New York: Longmans, Green, 1920-31. Vols. II and IV have material on the Adriatic theater. Corti, Egon C. and Sokol, Hans. Der Alie Kaiser: Franz Joseph I, vom Berliner Kongress bis zu Seinem Tode. Graz: Styria, 1955. Important. Detailed narrative. Crabites, Pierre, Benes. New York: Coward-McCann, 1935. Somewhat superficial. Cramon, August von and Fleck, P. Deutschlands Schicksalsbund mit Österreich-Ungarn von Conrad von Hötzendorf zu Kaiser Karl. Berlin: Kulturpolitik, 1932. Competent analysis. Cramon, August von. Unser Österreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg. 2nd ed. Berlin: Mittler, 1921. Able account by German liaison officer at Austro-Hungarian general headquarters. Crankshaw, Edward. The Fall of the House of Habsburg. New York: Viking, 1963. Slight, and not particularly meaningful treatment of war years. Crosse, E. C. The Defeat of Austria As Seen by the Seventh Division. London: Deane, 1919. Attractively written. Cruttwell, Charles R. M. F. History of the Great War. Oxford: Clarendon, 1934. Good on Italian battlefront where the author served. Csokov, Franz T. 3. November 1918. Vienna: Danubia, 1949. Interesting. Czermak, Wilhelm. In Deinem Lager war Österreich. Breslau: Korn, 1938. Specialist on Italian front. Czernin, Ottokar. Im Weltkriege. Berlin: Ullstein, 1919. Mostly war-time memoirs. Must be read very critically. (Eng. trans., In the World War. New York: 1920.) Dallin, Alexander, et. al. Russian Diplomacy and Eastern Europe, 1914-17. New York: King's Crown, 1963. A set of authoritative essays, making use of fresh, original information. Danilov, Iuri M. Russland im Weltkriege. Jena: Frommann, 1925. Valuable. Dehn, Maria. Elsa Brandström, der Engel von Sibirien. Stutt-

832

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

gart: Junge Gemeinde, 1955. On war prisoners in the empire of the Tsar. Demblin, August. Czernin und die Sixtus-Affaire. Munich: Drei Masken, 1920. By a foreign office official. Denis, Ernest. La Question d'Autriche: les Slovaques. Paris: Delgrave, 1917. Reflects the wartime atmosphere in which it was written. Devine, Alexander. Montenegro in History, Politics, and War. New York: Stokes, 1918. Partisanship for King Nikita. Dickinson, G. Lowes ( ed. ). Documents and Statements Relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims. London: Allen and Unwin, 1919. A convenient compilation. Droz, Jacques. L'Europe Centrale: Évolution Historique de ïldée de "Mitteleuropa." Paris: Payot, 1960. Appraisal by first-class scholar. Dub, Moriz. Österreich-Ungarns Volkwirtschaft im Weltkriege. Stuttgart: Enke, 1917. Brief. Dugdale, Edgar T. S. Maurice de Bunsen. London: Murray, 1934. On the last British Ambassador at the court of Vienna. Dukobovitch, Niko. Les Relations Italo-Yougoslaves de 1914 à 1920. Lausanne, 1938. Favorable to Yugoslav interests. Dumba, Constantin. Memoirs of a Diplomat. Eng. trans. Boston: Little, Brown, 1932. Durham, Mary E. The Sarajevo Crime. London: Allen and Unwin, 1925. Anti-Serbian slant. Edmonds, James E. Military Operations, Italy 1915-1919. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1949. Accent on British forces. Eisenmenger, Anna. Blockade. New York: Long and Smith, 1932. Graphic record of family existence in Vienna. Enderes, Bruno, et al. Verkehrswesen im Kriege. Vienna: Holder . . . , 1931. Valuable data on rail transport. Engel-Janosi, Friedrich. Österreich und der Vatikan. 2 vols. Vienna: Styria, 1958, 1960. Vol. II. Fresh material by the Austro-American expert on the subject. Epstein, Klaus. Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy. Princeton: Princeton Press, 1959. Excellent. Erényi, Gustav. Graf Stefan Tisza. Vienna: Tal, 1935. Full, flattering portrait. Ermers, Max. Victor Adler. Vienna: Passer, 1932. Hagiographical.

Bibliography

833

Erzberger, Matthias. Erlebnisse im Weltkriege. Stuttgart: Deutscher Verlag, 1920. A partial personal defense. Exner, Franz. Krieg und Kriminalität in Österreich. Vienna: Holder . . . , 1927. Exhaustive. Fellner, Fritz (ed.). Schicksalsjahre Österreichs, 1908-1919. Das Politsche Tagebuch Josef Redlichs. 2 vols. Graz: Böhlaus, 1953-54. A rich quarry. Indispensable. Fester, Richard. Die Politischen Kämpfe um den Frieden (1916-1918) und das Deutschtum. Munich: Lehmann, 1938. German nationalist approach. Fischer, Fritz. Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegszielepolitik des Kaiserlichen Deutschland, 1914-1918. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1961. Monumental. Not every page carries conviction. Frantz, Gunther. Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1924. Somewhat outdated. Fried, Alfred H. Mein Kriegstagebuch. 4 vols. Zürich: Rascher, 1918-1922. The mirror of a sensitive pacifist. Fuhr, Christoph. Die Beziehungen des österreichisch-ungarischen Armee-Obercommanaos . . . 1914 . . . February 1917. Hamburg, 1957. Funder, Friedrich. Vom Gestern ins Heute. Vienna: Herold, 1952. Musings of Christian Socialist editor. Gallian, Otto. Der österreichische Deutsche im Weltkrieg. Berlin: Mittler, 1938. Geiss, Imanuel. Der Polnische Grenzstreifen 1914-1918. Lübeck: Mattheisen, 1960. To be read with Conze above for a divergent interpretation. Much study of official documents. Fine bibliography. Gelfland, Lawrence E. The Inquiry. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1963. Fresh synthesis on making of Fourteen Points and lesser matters bearing on the Monarchy. Gerson, Louis L. Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1953. To be used with caution. Glaise von Horstenau, Edmund. Die Katastrophe: die Zertrümmerung Österreich-Ungarns. Vienna: Amalthea, 1929. (The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Abridged Eng. trans. London: Dent, 1930.) Especially valuable on last years and months. , et al. Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg, 1914-1918.

834

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

15 vols. Vienna: 1930-38. Official. Substantial achievement. Golovine, Nicholas N. The Russian Campaign of 1914. London: Rees, 1934. Standard. Gomoll, W. C. Im Kampf gegen Russland und Serbien. Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1916. Absorbing narrative. Gottlieb, Wolfram W. Studies in Secret Diplomacy during the First World War. London: Allen and Unwin, 1957. First class. Grabmayr, Karl von. Errinnerungen eines Tiroler Politikers. Innsbruck: Wagner, 1955. Politician and judge. Grâtz, Gustav and Schüller, Richard. Die Äussere Wirtschaftspolitik Österreich-Ungarns. Vienna: Holder . . . ,1925. Exceptionally competent. (Eng. trans., The Economic Policy of Austria-Hungary During the War, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929). . Der Wirtschaftliche Zusammenbruch Österreich-Ungarns. Vienna: Holder . . . , 1930. Basic. Grebler, Leo and Winkler, Wilhelm. The Cost of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1940. Good survey. Günther, Fritz. Wir Jagen die Russen aus Galizien. Die Offensive . . . 1917. Serfhennersdorf: Berndt, 1936. Hahlweg, Werner. Der Diktatfrieden von Brest-Litowsk 1918 und aie Bolschewistische Weltrevolution. Münster: Aschendorff, 1960. An expanded lecture. Hanak, Harry. Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the First World War. London: Oxford, 1962. Painstaking. Fresh insights. Valuable. Handel-Mazetti u. Igalffy. Die Österreich-ungarische Kriegsmarine vor und im Weltkriege. Klagenfurt, 1925. Good. Handelsmann, Marcel, et. al. La Pologne, Sa Vie Économique et Sociale pendant la Guerre. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1933. By an eminent craftsman. Hantsch, Hugo. Österreichs Friedensbemühungen. Brixlegg: Hermat, 1935. Sympathetic to Emperor Charles. Hanusch, Ferdinand, et. al. Die Regelung der Arbeitsverhältnisse im Kriege. Vienna: Holder . . . , 1927. Useful on industrial wage earners. Hindenburg, Paul von. Aus Meinem Leben. Leipzig: Hirz], 1920. Hirschfeld, Magnus and Gasper, Andreas (eds.). Sittengeschichte des Weltkrieges. 2 vols. Vienna: Schneider, 1930. Hodza, Milan. Federation in Central Europe. London: Jar-

Bibliography

835

rolds, 1942. Reminiscences and reflections of a Slovak politician. Hoffmann, Max. War Diaries and Other Papers. Eng. trans. 2 vols. London: Seeker, 1929. To be used with caution. Homann-Herimberg, Erich. Die Kohlenversorgung in Österreich während des Krieges. Vienna: Holder . . . , 1925. Full of information. Horsetzsky, Ernst von. Die Vier Letzten Kriegswochen. Vienna: Harbauer, 1920. Detailed and vivid. Horthy, Nikolaus. Ein Leben für Ungarn. Bonn: Athenäum, 1953. Memoirs. Hubka, Gustav von, "Der Schwarzen Berge Letzter Gospodar' (manuscript in Staatsarchiv, Vienna). Jaksch, Wenzel. Europas Weg nach Potsdam. Stuttgart: Deutscher Verlag, 1959. Stimulating polemic by Sudeten German Socialist. Jiszi, Oscar. The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1929. Quantities of data, though not lucidly presented. Jedlicka, Ludwig (ed.). Unser Heer. Vienna: Fürlinger, 1963. Disappointingly short on 1914-18. Johnson, Douglas W. Battlefields of the World War. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1921. Fine maps. Johnson, Humphrey J. T. Vatican Diplomacy in the World War. London: Blackwell, 1933. Careful reconstruction. Eclipsed by Engel-Janosi, above. Kann, Robert A. The Multinational Empire . . . 1848-1918. 2 vols. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1950. Important, though in places hard reading. Kanner, Heinrich. Kaiserliche Katastrophenpolitik. Leipzig: Tal, 1922. Critical commentary by bourgeois publicist. Kdrolyi, Michael. Memoirs, trans, from Magyar. London: Cape, 1956. Inside information. Partly apologia. Kerchnawe, Hugo H., et. al. Die Militärverwaltung in den von den österreichisch-ungarischen Truppen Besetzten Gebieten. Vienna: Holder . . . , 1928. Full survey. Kiszling, Rudolph. Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand. Graz: Böhlau, 1953. The most satisfactory portrait. Thorough bibliography. . Österreich-Ungarns Anteil am Ersten Weltkrieg. Graz: Strasny, 1959. Would that it were longer.

836

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Komarnicki, Titus. The Rebirth of the Polish Republic. London: Heinemann, 1957. Admirably organized and effective. Kralik, Richard. Geschichte des Völkerkrieges. Graz: Styria, 1935. A chronicle accenting clerical points of view. Kratchounov, K. La Politique Extérieure de la Bulgarie. Sofia: La Bulgarie, 1932. A national approach. Kraus, Karl. Die Letzten Tage der Menschheit. Many editions. Zurich: Pegasus, 1945. Keen satire on war ana warriors. Krauss, Alfred. Die Ursachen Unserer Niederlage. 3rd ed. Munich: Lehmann, 1923. Shrill indictment of Hapsburg politicians and military chiefs, by one of the latter. Lama, Friedrich von. Die Friedensvermittlung Papst Benedikt XV. Munich: Kösel, 1932. Interesting. Lanyi, Ladislas. Le Comte Êtienne Tisza et la Guerre de 1914-1918. Paris: Lagny, 1946. A careful doctoral dissertation. Lederer, Ivo J. Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1963. Excellent. First three chapters have relevance for the dissolution of AustriàHungary. Lengyel, Emil. Siberia. New York: Random, 1943. Vivid description by Austrian war prisoner. Loewenfeld, Hans, et. al. Die Regelung der Volksernährung im Kriege. Vienna. Holder . . . , 1926. Authoritative. Lorenz, Reinhold. Kaiser Karl und der Untergang der Donau Monarchie. Graz: Styria, 1959. Sympathetic profile by an admirer. Rather limited on Charles as Emperor-King. Ludendorff, Erich von. Meine Kriegserinnerungen. Berlin: Mittler, 1919. Vigorous, but often distorted. Macartney, Carlisle A. Hungary and Her Successors. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1937. Learned and persuasive. Mamatey, Victor S. The United States ana East Central Europe, 1914-1918. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957. Destroys légends. Sympathetic to nationalities. A trail-blazing work. Masaryk, Thomas G. The Making of a State. London: Allen and Unwin, 1927. A moving narrative, marred in places by inaccuracies. Meyer, Henry C. Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action. Hague: Nijhoff, 1955. Admirable scholarship.

Bibliography

837

Michel, Paul-H., (ed.). La Question de TAdriatique. Paris: Costes, 1938. Valuable original material. Miskolczy, Julius. Ungarn in der Habsburger Monarchie. Vienna: Herold, 1959. Excellent perspective. Müller-Guttenbrunn, Adam, (ed.). Ruhmeshalle Deutscher Arbeit in der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie. Stuttgart: Deutscher Verlag, 1916. Lavishly illustrated. Muench, Hermann. Böhmische Tragödie. Brunswick: Westermann, 1949. An interpretative essay, basically on disruption of the Dual Monarchy. Naude, Kurt. Der Kampf um den Uneingeschränkten Ubootkrieg 1914-1917. Hamburg: Hanseatische, 1941. A Nazi product, but useful. Nowak, Karl F. Über der Lowtschen. Berlin: Fischer, 1917. . Chaos. Munich: Kulturpolitik, 1923. . Der Sturz der Mittelmächte. Munich: Callweg, 1921. Contemporary assessments. Ostovi6, P. D. The Truth about Yugoslavia. New York: Roy, 1952. By a Croat in the inner circle. Pilsudski, Joseph. The Memoirs of a Polish Revolutionary Soldier. London: Faber, 1931. Pingaud, Albert. Historie Diplomatique de la France pendant la Grande Guerre. 3 vols. Paris: Alsatia, 1938-40. Helpful, particularly on French side. Pirquet, Clemens, (ed.). Volkgesundheit im Kriege. 2 vols. Holder . . . , 1926. Competent exposition. Plaschka, Richard G. Cattaro-Prag. Revolte und Revolution. Graz: Böhlau, 1963. Meticulous scholarship. Best study on Cattaro mutiny. Plener, Ernest von. Erinnerungen. 3 vols. Stuttgart: Deutscher Verlag, 1911-21. Important vol. III. Polzer-Hoditz, Arthur C. Kaiser Karl. Vienna: Amalthea, 1928. By an intimate of Charles. Exceptionally frank. Prokopowitsch, Erich. Das Ende der österreichische Heerschaft in der Bukowina. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1959. Revealing sidelights. Read, James M. Atrocity Propaganda. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1941. Wide-ranging, well-written exposition.

838

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Redlich, Josef, österreichische Regierung und Verwaltung im Weltkriege. Vienna: Holder . . . , 1925. Invaluable. Regele, Oskar. Feldmarschall Conrad. Vienna: Herold, 1955. Best study. Remak, Joachim. Sarajevo. New York: Criterion, 1959. Gripping narrative. Thoroughly informed. Renner, Karl. Österreichs Erneuerung. 3 vols. Vienna: Brand, 1916-17. A collection of wartime pieces. Reshetar, John S., Jr. The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1952. Remarkable book. Rhodes, Anthony R. F. The Poet as Superman; A Life of Gabriele D'Annunzio. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959. Riedl, Richard. Die Industrie Österreichs während des Krieges. Vienna: Holder . . . , 1932. Much valuable material. Salandra, Antonio. L'Intervento. Milan: Mondadori, 1930. An apologia. . Italy and the Great War. London : Arnold, 1932. Contains translation of foregoing book. Scherer, André ( ed. ). L'AUemagne et les Problèmes de la Paix pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale. Vol. I. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1962. Diplomatic tidbits into January, 1917. Interesting embassy reports on domestic affairs in the MonNikolaus von Horthy. New ed. Hamburg: Toth, 1942. Schüssler, Wilhelm. Österreich und das Deutsche Schicksal. Leipzig: Quelle u. Meyer, 1925. Preliminary appraisal. Seipel, Ignaz. Nation und Staat. Vienna: Braumüller, 1916. Essay on nationality tangles. Seton-Watson, Robert W. History of the Czechs and Slovaks. London: Hutchinson, 1943. Comprehensive. A sample of his indispensable studies. . Masaryk in England. New York: Macmillan, 1943. Much original data. Seyfert, Gerhard. Die Militärischen Beziehungen . . . zwischen dem Deutschen und dem österreichischen Generalstab. . . . Leipzig: Moltzen, 1934. Good brief survey. Smith, C. Jay. The Russian Struggle for Power, 1914-1917. New York: Philosophical, 1956. Pioneer work of great value. Sokol, Hans H. (ed.). Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 19141918. 2 vols. Zürich: Amalthea, about 1933. Official.

Bibliography

839

Spector, Sherman D. Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference. New York: Bookman Associates, 1962. Original. Srbik, Heinrich von. Aus Österreichs Vergangenheit. Salzburg: Müller, 1949. Contains a notable portrait of Francis Joseph. Steglich, Wolfgang. Bündnissicherung oder Verständigungsfrieden. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1958. Excellent. Steinitz, Eduard (ed.). Erinnerungen an Franz Joseph I. . . . Berlin: Kulturpolitik, 1931. Sketches by intimates of the monarch. Stieve, Friedrich (ed.). Iswolski und der Weltkriege. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1925. Valuable memoranda. Strong, David F. Austria: Transition from Empire to Republic. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1939. Distinguished. Stürgkh, Josef M. Politische und Militärische Erinnerungen aus Meinem Leben. Leipzig: List, 1923. Sturzenegger, Anna C. Serbien im Europäischen Kriege. Zürich: Füssli, 1915. By a Red Cross worker. Szende, Zoltan. Die Ungarn im Zusammenbruch. Oldenbourg: Schulze, 1931. Exceptionally good for the time written. SziMssy, Julius von. Der Untergang der Donaumonarchie. Berlin: Neues Vaterland, 1921. Reminiscences by a Hapsburgophile Magyar diplomatist. Thomazi, A. La Guerre Navale dans VAdriatique. Paris: Payot, 1925. Tisza, Istvän. összes Munkai. 6 vols. Budapest: Franklin, 1924-1937. Many items in German. Toscano, Mario. II Patto di Londra. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1934. Commendably dispassionate. Uebersperger, Hans. Österreich zwischen Russland und Serbien. Cologne: Böhlaus, 1958. Revealing detail. Short on objectivity. . Der Saloniki Prozess. Berlin: Deutsche Verbände, 1933. Documents and interpretation. Wallich, Friedrich. Die Pforte zum Orient. Unser Friedenswerk in Serbien. Vienna: Brand, 1918. Wanderscheck, Hermann. Weltkrieg und Propaganda. Berlin: Mittler, 1936. Dramatic. Nazi slant. Weber, Fritz, Das Ende der Alten Armee. Salzburg: Bergland, 1959.

840

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Wendel, Hermann. Die Habsburger und die Südslawenfrage. Leipzig: Kohn, 1924. Competent and lively. Werkmann, Karl M. von. Deutschland als Verbündeter. Berlin: Kulturpolitik, 1931. Strong pro-Hapsburg convictions. Wheeler-Bennett, John W. The Forgotten Peace: BrestLitovsk. London: Macmillan, 1938. Thoroughgoing and very readable. Wichtl, Friedrich. Dr. Karl Kramarsch, der Anstifter des Weltkrieges. Munich: Lehmann, 1918. Bitter indictment. Windischgrätz, Ludwig A. Ein Kaiser Kämpft für die Freiheit. Vienna: Herold, 1957. A work of piety. Winkler, Wilhelm. Die Totenverluste der österreichischungarischen Monarchie nach Nationalitäten. Vienna: Seidel, 1919. Suggestive. . Die Einkommenverschiebungen in Österreich während des Weltkrieges. Vienna, Holder . . . , 1930. Full and authoritative. Zeman, Z. A. B. The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire. London: Oxford, 1961. Especially enlightening on Slavspeaking nationalities. z-enker, Vik tor. Ein Mann im Sterbenden Österreich. Reichenberg: Kraus, 1935. Uncritical admiration of the dynasty. Monographic Studies Abrash, Merritt G. "Entente Policy towards Austria-Hungary August, 1914—March, 1917. "Unpublished thesis. Columbia University, 1958. Much enlightening material and arresting judgments. See Dallin, above. Benes, Eduard. Bohemia's Case for Independence. London: Allen and Unwin, 1917. Spirited. Beyerhaus, Giobert. Einheitlicher Oberbefehl. Munich: Bruckmann, 1938. A careful analysis. Brzezovsky, Anton. "Der Zusammenbruch Österreich-Ungarns und die Frage des Anschlusses an das Deutsche Reich." Vienna, 1940. A doctoral dissertation in typescript at the University of Vienna. Burke, Eldon R. "The Polish Policy of the Central Powers during the World War." Chicago, 1939. A doctoral dissertation in typescript at the University of Chicago. Well documented.

Bibliography

841

Caukin, Esther. "The Peace Proposals of Germany and AustriaHungary, 1914-18." Stanford, 1927. A doctoral dissertation in typescript at Stanford University. Damborsky, Elmar. "Die Verlängerung des Ausgleiches österreich-Ungarn, 1867." Vienna, 1948. A doctoral dissertation in typescript at the University of Vienna. Daugherty, William E. A Psychological Warfare Casebook. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. Davis, Gerald H. "Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Austria-Hungary, 1913-1917." Nashville, 1958. A doctoral dissertation in typescript at Vanderbilt University. Dillon, Emile J . From the Triple to the Quadruple Alliance: Why Italy Went to War. London: Hodder ana Stoughton, 1915. Contemporary views of an experienced publicist. Glock, Robert J. "Die österreichische Sozialdemokratie und der Weltkriege." Vienna, 1952. A doctoral dissertation in typescript at the University of Vienna. Gollin, Friedrich. Ein Divisionintendant im Weltkrieg. Vienna: Staatsdruckerei, 1959. Technical study on service of supply. Harrer, Karl J. "Doktor Richard Weiskirchner." Vienna, 1950. A doctoral dissertation in typescript at the University of Vienna. Hartl, Inge. "Das Fremdenblatt." Vienna, 1948. A thin doctoral dissertation in typescript at the University of Vienna. Jâszi, Oszkâr. Der Zusammenbruch des Dualismus . . . Ger. trans. Vienna: Manz, 1918. Advocate of Danubian federation. Kirch, Paul. Krieg und Verwaltung in Serbien und Mazedonien. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1928. Doctoral dissertation. Koch, Heinrich. Die Friedensverhandlungen von BrestLitovsk im Spiegel der Wiener Presse. Hamburg, 1937. A doctoral study. Kossina, Margarete. "Die Rotbücher der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie." Vienna, 1946. A doctoral dissertation of quality in typescript at the University of Vienna. Lettgeb, Herwig. "Die Ministerpräsidentschaft Dr. Ernest

842

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

von Körbers . . ." Vienna, 1951. A doctoral dissertation in typescript at the University of Vienna. Lukinich, Imre. Die Ungarische Regierung und die Polnische Frage in den Ersten Jahren des Weltkrieges. Budapest: Stemmer, 1939. Mayer, Benno. "Lammasch als Politiker." Vienna, 1941. A disappointing doctoral dissertation in typescript at the University of Vienna. Molnâr, Ferencz. Kriegsfahrten eines Ungarn. Berlin: Fischer, 1916. The art of the playwright applied to wartime propaganda. Pfaffenberger, Gottfried. "Die Reichspost." Vienna, 1947. A preliminary study. Doctoral dissertation in typescript at the University of Vienna. Pokarny, Dagobert. "Die Wiener Tagespresse und Ihre Einflussfaktoren im Ersten Weltkrieg." Vienna, 1950. Doctoral dissertation in typescript at the University of Vienna. Lacking in depth, but useful material. Rebhann, Fritz M. "Die Zeit." Vienna, 1948. Another preliminary investigation. Doctoral dissertation in typescript at the University of Vienna. Reinprecht, Hansheinz. "Karl Kraus und die Presse." Vienna, 1948. Militant doctoral dissertation in typescript at the University of Vienna. Fine bibliography. Roznovsky, Karl. "Erinnerungsbücher an das Alte Österreich." Vienna, 1950. Doctoral dissertation in typescript at the University of Vienna. Deals with literary personalities. Schopf, Gertrude. "Die Österreich-ungarische Monarchie und Seton-Watson." Vienna, 1953. Doctoral dissertation in typescript at the University of Vienna. Rather thin. Sylvester, Julius. Vom Toten Parlament und Seinen Letzten Trägern. Vienna: Holzhausen, 1928. Walter, Ingrid G. "Moritz Benedikt und die Neue Freie Presse." Vienna, 1950. Doctoral dissertation in typescript at the University of Vienna. Skimpy on war period. Wierer, Rudolf. Der Föderalismus im Donauraum. Graz: Böhlaus, 1960. General.

Bibliography

843

Zellmayr, Erna. "Das österreichische Parlament im Jahre 1918." Vienna, 1951. Doctoral dissertation in typescript at the University of Vienna. Superior study. Articles Abbreviations: AQ —Army Quarterly BM — Berliner Monatshefte or Die Kriegschuldfrage FA — Foreign Affairs JCEA —Journal of Central European Affairs JMH — The Journal of Modern History MÖIG —Mitteilungen des österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung MS — Le Monde Slave MTM — Militärwissenschaftliche und Technische Mitteilungen PJ — Preussiche Jahrbücher RDM — Revue des Deux Mondes RHG — Revue tf Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale SD — Süddeutsche Monatshefte SR — Slavonic and East European Review Anon. "Gorlice-Tarnow : A German Breakthrough in 1915," AQ, XXII (1931), 116-122. ."The Lemberg Campaign," AÇ>, XXII (1931), 23-40, 260-280. . "Masaryk und Seine Aktion während des Weltkrieges," BM, XV (2), 1000-1020. . "The Military Importance of the Italian Theater of War," AQ, XXXVI (1938), 50-58. . "La Paix des Empires Centraux," RDM, LIII (1929), 42-80,( 304-342. . "La Russie Tsariste et la Question Tchécoslovaque," MS, I (1924), 124-138, 294-300. Appuhn, Charles. "Les Négociations Austro-Allemandes du Printemps de 1917 . . . ," RHG, XIII (1935), 209-223. . "Le Sentiment Nationaux Polonais et les Empires Centraux . . . " RHG, VII (1929), 98-124. Arens, F. "Die Tschechen und der Weltkrieg," PJ, CXCVIII (1924), 292-298. Artamonov, Victor A. "Erinnerungen an Meine Militärattachezeit in Belgrad," BM, XVI (2) (1938), 583-602.

844

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Baroness von X. "A Red Cross Outpost," Fortnightly Review, CXLIII (1935), 341-355. Bibl, Viktor. "Österreich-Ungarns Innenpolitische Lage bei Ausbruch des Weltkrieges," BM, XII (1934), 584-598. Bittner, Ludwig. "Zur Geschichte der Tschechischen Umstursbewegung in den Jahren 1914 und 1915," MÖIG, LII (1938), 417-429. . "Graf Johann Forgâch," BM, XIII (1935), 950-959. . "Die Veranwortlichkeit Österreich-Ungarns für den Weltkrieg." In Nadler, Josef, et. al. (eds.). Österreich. Erbe und Sendung im Deutschen Raum. Salzburg: Pustet, 1937, 183-206. Brunauer, Esther C. "Peace Proposals of December, 1916— January, 1917," JMH, IV (1932), 544-571. Cambon, Jules. "Bülow and the War," FA, X (1931-32), 402416. Chelard, Raoul. "Les Mémoires du Comte Théodore Batthyânyi," L'Europe Centrale, VI (1931), 167-169. Commission . . . "L'Histoire Militaire de la Guerre Mondiale en Hongrie," RHG, XIII (1935), 313-324. Cramon, August von. "Kaiser Karl und Präsident Wilson," BM, XI (1933), 1148-1156. Czeka, E. "Geschichte der österreichisch-ungarischen Truppenkörper," MTM, LXXI (1940), 156-166, 578-585. Diamandy, C. J. "La Grande Guerre Vue de Versant Oriental," RDM, XLIX (1929), 794-820, LX (1930), 421-432. Diner-Dénes, Joseph. "Fragments de Souvenir Politiques," MS, XIII (1936), 48-77, XIII (3) (1936), 365-395; XIII (4) (1936), 34-66. Dragoni, Alfred von. "Die österreichisch-ungarische Operation en zur Besetzung der Ukraine, 1918," MTM, LIX (1928), 267-288. Dresler, Adolf. "Der Times-Herausgeber und die Tschechen," SD, XXII (1924-5), 72-73. Eisenmann, Louis. "Joseph Redlich," MS, XIII (4) (1936), 386-392. Epstein, Klaus. "The Development of German-Austrian War Aims in the Spring of 1917," JCEA, XVII (1957), 24-47. Fischer, Fritz. "Kontinuät des Irrtums," Historische Zeitschrift, CXCI (1960), 83-101. Reply to Herzfeld, below.

Bibliography

845

Flotow, Hans von. "Um Bülows Römische Mission," SD, XXVIII (1930-1), 399-404. Frantz, Günther. "Die Wiederherstellung Polens im Rahmen der Russischen Kriegsziele," BM, VIII (1930), 1156-1163. Gasiorowski, Zygmunt J. "Polish-Czechoslovak Relations, 1918-1922," SR, XXXV (1956), 172-193. Gavrilovic, Stoyan. "New Evidence on the Sarajevo Assassination," JMH, XXVII (1955), 410-414. Glaise von Horstenau, Edmund. "Feldzeugmeister Potiorek," BM, XII (1934), 144-148. Gould, S. W. "Submarine Warf are in the Adriatic: the Otranto Barrage," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LXX (1944), 683-689. Grebing, Helga. "Österreich-Ungarn und die 'Ukrainische Aktion,' 1914-1918," Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, VII (1959), 270-296. Guldescu, Stanko. "The Background of the Croatian Independence Movement," South Atlantic Quarterly, LVI (1957), 314-328. Hanak, Harry. "A Lost Cause: The English Radicals and the Habsburg Empire, 1914-18," JCEA, XXIII (1963), 166189. Hantsch, Hugo. "Die Tagebücher und Memoiren des Grafen Leopold Berchtold," Südostforschungen, XIV (1955), 205-215. Herzfeld, Hans. "Zur Deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkriege," Historische Zeitschrift, CXCI (1960), 67-82. Hulicka, Karel. "The Communist Anti-Masaryk Propaganda in Czechoslovakia," American Slavic and East European Review, XVI (1957), 160-174. Jëlavich, Charles. "Serbian Nationalism and the Question of Union with Croatia," Balkan Studies (1962), 29-42. Jorga, Nicholas. "Le Problème Danubien et les Roumains de 1913 à 1918," RHG, XII (1934), 105-126. Kiszling, Rudolf. "Der Feldzug gegen Rumänien, 1916," MTM, LX (1929), 1-19, 317-330. . "Die österreichisch-ungarischen Kriegsvorbereitungen und die Mobilisierungsmassnahmen gegen Russland, 1914," BM, IV, (1926), 365-377.

846

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

Kuh], H. von. "Unity of Command among the Central Powers," FA, II (1923), 130-146. Lehmann, Hartmut. "Österreich-Ungarns Belgienpolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg," Historische Zeitschrift, CXCII (1961), 60-93. Lewin, J. "Erfolglose Friedensfühler im Weltkrieg," Osteuropa, II (1927), 507-517. Loiseau, Charles. "Frano Supilo à Rome," AÍS, V ( 1928 ), 161-178. Marghiloman, Alexander. "L'Intervention Roumaine," RHG, VI (1928), 157-166. Marz, Edward. "Some Economic Aspects of the Nationality Conflict in the Habsburg Empire," JCEA, XIII (1954), 123-135. May, Arthur J . "Woodrow Wilson and Austria-Hungary to the End of 1917." In Hantsch, Hugo and Novotny, A. (eds.). Festschrift für Heinrich Benedikt. Vienna: Notring, 1957, 213-244. Merriam, Charles E. "American Publicity in Italy," Amer. Political Science Review, XIII (1919), 514-555. Molisch, Paul. "Zur Kritik Kaiser Karls von Österreich," PJ, CCXXXI (1933), 4-23. Moreigne, R. "L'Effrondrement Militaire de l'Autriche-Hongrie," RHG, IX (1931), 234-256, 369-391; X (1932), 140164. Mühling, Carl. "Der Eintritt Bulgariens in den Weltkrieg," BM, XIII ( 2 ) , 829 ff. Neck, Rudolf. "Kriegszielpolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg," Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs, XV ( 1962 ),

565-576.

Novák, Arne. "Czech Literature during and after the War," SR, II (1923-24), 114-132. Novotny, F. "La Propagande Austro-allemande sur le Front Russe en 1917," RHG, III (1925), 4^-77. Pange, Jean de. "Pouvait-on Transformer l'Autriche-Hongrie sans la Detruire?" Nouvelle Revue Honsrie, LXI (1939), 15-21. Pelletier, René. "L'Attentat de Sarajevo Chanté par les Guslars Yougoslaves," MS, XIII ( 2 ) (1936), 161-205.

Bibliography

847

Pieri, Piero. "La Documentation de Guerre en Italie," RHG, XI (1933), 142-164. Raabl-Werner, Heinrich. "Der Einfluss der Propaganda unter den Kriegsgefangenen in Russland auf den Zusammenbruch Österreich-Ungarns," MTM, LIX (1928), 775-784. Rain, Pierre. "Nicolas II et Sa Diplomatie pendant la Guerre," Revue des Sciences Politiques, LH (1929), 105-127. Ratzenhofer, Emil. "Der Waffenstillstand von Villa Giusti . . . ," MTM, LXII (1930), 817-843. Redier, Antoine. "L'Impératrice Zita et l'Offre de Paix Séparée," RDM, LX (1930), 174-202. Renouvin, Pierre. "Le Governement Austro-hongrois et la Crise de Juillet, 1914," RHG, VIII (1930), 142-153. Ritter, Gerhard. "Der Anteil der Militärs an der Kriegskatastrophe von 1914," Historische Zeitschrift, CXCIII (1961), 72-91. Rohan, K. A. "Graf Leopold Berchtold," BM, XXI (1943), 31-34. Schmitt, Bernadotte E. "July, 1914; Thirty Years After," JMH, XVI (1944), 169-204. Schneider, Joseph Z. "How an Army Fell Apart," Harper's Magazine, CXC (1944-5), 280-285. Seton-Watson, Robert W. "Austro-German Peace Plans for the Future of Serbia, 1915," SR, VII (1929), 705-724. . "Italian Intervention and the Secret Treaty of London," SR, V^ ( 1926-27 ), 271-297. . "President Masaryk as I Knew Him," Review of Reviews (London), LXVIII (1923), 185-190. Sforza, Carlo. "Cadorna and Diaz," FA, VIII (1929-30), 282-293. Silberstein, Leopold. "Der Dreifrontenkampf des Jugoslavischen National Ausschusses," Europäische Gespräche, VI (1930), 335-353. Sixte de Bourbon, Prince. "Austria's Peace Offer: Afterthoughts," Dublin Review, CLXX (1922), 274-284. Sonevytsky, Leonid C. "Bukovina in the Diplomatic Negotiations of 1914," Annals of the Ukrainian Academy, VII (1959), 1586-1629. Spitzmüller, Alexandre. "L'Automne 1918 en Autriche-Hongrie," Revue Historique, CCV (1951), 69-77. Stadelmann, R. "Friedensversuche im Ersten Jahre des Welt-

848

The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918

krieges," Historische Zeitschrift, CLVI (1937), 485-545. Stoianoff, S. "L'Entrée en Guerre de la Bulgarie d'après les Documents Diplomatiques Bulgares," RHG, IX (1931), 257-298, 392-420. Sweet, Paul R. "Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Mitteleuropa." In Hantsch, Hugo and Novotny, A. (eds. ). Festschrift für Heinrich Benedikt. Vienna; Notring, 1957, 180212. Szâz, Zoltân. "The Transylvanian Question: Roumania and the Belligerents," JCEA, XIII (1954), 338-351. Toscano, Mario. "Italiens Eingreifen in den Weltkrieg," BM, XIII (2) (1935), 737 ff. Trumpener, Ulrich. "German Military Aid to Turkey in 1914,"' JMH, XXXII (1960), 145-149. . 'Turkey's Entry into World War I," JMH, XXXIV (1962), 369-380. Urban, Ernest. "Italiens Stellung im Dreibund und zum Heutigen Deutschland," PJ, CCIV (1926), 267-277. Weber, Arthur. "Graf Tisza und der Eintritt Italiens in den Weltkrieg," BM, V (1927), 608-632. Wedel, Botho von. "Fürst Bülow und Österreich," SD, XXVIII (1930-31), 405-410. Wegerer, Alfred von. "Graf Berchtolds Interview über den Kriegsausbruch," BM, XIII (1) (1935), 518-528. Wiesner, Friedrich R. von. "Der Verfälschte und der Echte Text der 'Dokument Wiesner,"' BM, III (1925), 641-657. Zeynek, Theodor R. von. "Über den österreichisch-ungarischen Generalstab," MTM, LXX (1939), 179-194. Zivanovic, Mil. Z. "The Salonika Trial and the Political Emigrants," Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), IV (June 16, 1953), 12-14.

ïttîteX Abend Der (Vienna), 308, 331, 670 Abnizzi, Duke of, 120 Action Française, 244, 245 Adams, George B., 243 Adams, John Q., 327 Addams, Jane, 387 Adler, Friedrich, 294, 295, 343345, 654, 796 Adler, Viktor, 288, 292, 295, 333, 344, 438, 464, 508, 514, 611, 615, 652, 655-656, 663, 794, 796, 802, 806 Adriatic, 114-120, 589-593, 720721 Ady, Andrew, 408-409 Agram (Zagreb), 378, 416, 443, 708, 710, 711, 779 Alba, Julia, 793 Albania (Albanians), 111-112, 116-117, 181, 419, 465, 497, 800 Alexander, Crown Prince of Serbia, 44, 239, 277, 781 Alsace-Lorraine, 488, 493, 506,

518, 520, 529, 630-631, 661, 818 Amalthea, 671 Amerkai Figyelo (Chicago), 685 Amnesty (1917), 648-649, 674 Ancona, sinking of, 560 Anderson, Frank E., 519 Andrdssy, Julius, 113, 157, 159, 175, 178, 204, 387-389, 395, 403, 446, 446-467, 479, 481, 519, 529, 531, 613, 682-683, 685, 686, 690, 693, 695, 705706, 725, 732, 760-761, 766, 772; as foreign minister, 797798 Andric, Ivo, 379 Anschluss, 794, 797 Anspacher, Louis K., 467 Apponyi, Albert, 150, 389, 397, 467, 479, 519, 686, 695, 705, 707, 714, 808, 811 Arbeiter Zeitung (Vienna), 46, 219, 288-289, 292, 307-308, 339, 342, 343, 346, 381, 397, 431, 460, 463, 469, 481, 513, 514, 528-529, 584-585, 616,

849

850

Index

618, 621, 623, 625, 629, 640, 641, 644, 648, 655, 658, 659660, 664, 665, 669, 677, 725, 735, 793-794, 814 Armand, Abel, 519-520, 631 Armistices (1918), 790, 801-805 Artamonov, Victor A., 50 Arz, Artur von Straussenburg, 124-125, 440, 449, 452, 509, 667, 717, 719, 722, 799, 801, 816 Asiago Plateau, 105 Asquith, Herbert H., 252 Auemheimer, Raoul, 320 Auffenberg, Moritz von, 92 Ausgleich, 346-347, 395, 404406, 649, 704, 813 Austerlitz, Friedrich, 292, 670 Austria (Austrogermans), 160, 166, 196, 239-240, 246, 253254, Chaps. 8, 9, 10, 18 passim, 508, 532, 632, 724, 734741; Bolshevism in, 657-658; collapse of, 775-784, 793-798; and Hungary, 398-406, 669, 687, 693-694, 699-700, 703706 Austria-Hungary, see Hapsburg Monarchy Avama, Giuseppe di, 179-180 Averescu, Alexander, 627 Az Est (Budapest), 401, 407, 481, 486, 524, 582, 690, 691, 694, 701, 702-703, 706, 767 Az Ujsdg, 407, 689, 693, 701, 710 Babits, Michael, 409 Baernreither, Joseph, 637, 813 Bahr, Hermann, 320, 671 Bainville, Jacques, 553, 750 Balfour, Arthur J., 252-253, 483, 542-543, 545, 635, 757-758, 762-763 Balthasar, Bishop, 787 Banat of Temesvar (Timisoara), 21, 207, 218, 411, 419, 793 Banjaluka, 379 Barac, Fran, 709

Barker, J. Ellis, 231-232 Barrés, Maurice, 244 Barry, William F., 537, 538 Bartok, Béla, 409-410 Bartulovic, Niko, 378 BatthySny, Theodor, 396, 683, 686, 694 Battisti, Cesare, 380-381 Bauer, Ludwig, 740-741 Bauer, Otto, 294, 651, 654, 657, 796 Beck, Max V., 647 Belgium, 77, 81, 488, 493, 521 Belgrade, 100, 112, 302 Below, Otto von, 453, 454 Benckendorff, Paul, 251-252 Benedict XV, Pope, 521-525, 563, 689 Benedikt, Moritz, 305-306, 641 Benes, Eduard, 234-235, 247, 260, 264, 268-273, 356, 471, 535, 596, 598, 600, 601, 736, 750, 756, 758, 775 Bene?, Vojta, 266, 565 Berchtold, Leopold von, and the 1914 crisis, 54 ff., 816; during the war, 156, 186-188, 435, 440 Beseler, Eric von, 167-168 Bessarabia, 207, 212, 627, 628 Bethlen, Stephen, 498, 684, 690, 695 Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald, 58, 74, 130, 152, 159-160, 352, 464-465, 501 Bevin, Emest, 825 Bevioije, Senator, 595 Bezruc, Petr (Vladimir Va^ek), 362 Biliiski, Léon R„ 35, 59, 156, 366-367, 371 Biro, Louis, 682 Bismarck, Otto von, 86, 136, 210, 489, 684 Bissolati, Leonida, 183, 198, 592, 601, 759 Bittner, Julius, 671 "Black Hand" Society, 30-32, 43-44, 49

Index Bobrinski, Vladimir A., 374, 375 Bohemia, 239, 253-254, 262, 264, 460, 483, 516, 543, 565, 625, 646, 650, 655, 664, 674, 735, 769, 773, 794. See also Czechoslovaks Borgese, G. A., 595, 609 Boroevic, Svetozar, 92, 355, 418, 600, 716, 718 Borsody, Stephen, 698 Bosnia (Bosnia Herzegovina), 18, 20, 23, 156, 231, 247, 252, 379-380, 417, 664, 678, 708, 712 Brailsford, Henry N„ 154, 225, 549-550 Brandenburg, Erich, 511 Britianu, Jon I. C., 209-219, 626-627 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 613624, 654, 656 Briand, Aristide, 260, 271, 468, 487-488, 555 Brooks, Sydney, 226 Brusilov, Alexei A., 100, 121123, 216, 352, 376, 427 Bryce, J. Annan, 533-534, 544 Bryce, James, 232-233, 239 Bucharest, Treaty of (1918), 628-630 Budapest, 107, 392, 393, 401, 444-445, 691, 692, 701, 742 Budapesti Hirlap, 407, 529, 546, 613 Bülow, Bernhard von, 185-201, 583-584 Bukowina, 96, 107, 121-122, 207, 212, 218, 252, 372, 619, 643, 783 Bulgaria, 419, 497, 499, 513, 514, 628, 727, diplomacy of in 1914-1916, 110, 202-206, 218; surrender of, 741, 764765, 821; at war, 110-111 Bunsen, Maurice de, 80-81, 287 Burgenland, 419, 794 Buriän, Stephan, as foreign minister (1915-16), 152, 157166, 187-194, 397, 398, 440,

851

459, 462-468; (1917-18), 628, 712, 721 ff„ 751-752, 760761; as joint minister of finance, 440, 617, 712 Burival, Francis, 650 Burrows, Ronald A., 242 Bussche, Hilmar von der, 211218 Buxton, Charles R., 225, 549 Buxton, Noel, 225, 543-544, 548-549 Cabrinovii, Nedjeljko, 30-31, 37 Cardoma, Luigi, 103-106, 451456 Cambon, Jules, 181 Capek, Thomas, 565 Caporetto (Karfreit), 439, 453456, 526, 570, 592, 652, 800 Carinthia, 246, 678, 800 Carniola (Kranj), 246, 678 Carol I, of Rumania, 26, 208213, 412 Carp, Peter, 209, 219 Cattaro (Kotor), 114, 118, 457; mutiny at, 458-459 Cavendish-Bentinck, Henry, 544 Cecil, Robert, 268, 279, 540, 591, 602-603, 629, 756 Charles I (IV), Emperor-King, career and character of, 433441, 461-462, 815; and collapse of the Monarchy, 780, 786-788, 790, 796, 802, 806807; coronation in Budapest, 442-447; death of, 807; as heir-apparent, 39, 45, 105, 117-118, 187, 307, 392, 426, 503; manifesto on federalism, 771-772, 778-779, 785, 794, 798, 813, 815; peace moves of, 468-469, 486-492, 586588, 631 ff.; as monarch, 346, 422, 427, 460, 476-477, 480481, 485, 498-499, 617, 640 ff., 656, 668, 680-681, 709710, 717, 722 ff., 770-771; and Tisza, 683-685, 721

852

Index

Charles Stephen, Archduke, 155-156, 167, 168, 734 Ch6radame, Andre, 242, 554 Chesterton, Gilbert K„ 224-225 Cholm, 509, 619, 620, 660, 680 Chotek, Sophie, 24, 37 Christian Socialists, 26, 296, 303, 529, 643, 660, 794-795 Churchill, Winston S„ 18 n.2, 84, 96, 251, 825 Ciganovi?, Milan, 32 Clam-Martinic, Heinrich. 345, 347, 439-440, 494, 503, 637645 Clemenceau, Georges, 53, 256, 520, 525, 603, 630-636, 749, 758, 763, 802 Coffin, William, 393, 398, 399400, 401, 611, 683, 701 Colard, Hermann von, 376 Colloredo, Ferdinand, 462 Concordia Society, 302 Congress of Oppressed Naionalities (1918), 596-604, 608, 711, 718, 820 Conrad von Hotzendorf, Franz, 29, 40, 55, 61, 71, 81, 90-91, 93, 96, 98, 104-105, 107, 110, 122, 139, 156, 162, 188, 192, 211, 214, 217, 282-283, 300, 427, 428, 440, 447, 449, 456, 474, 477, 641, 716, 718, 719, 816 Copeland, Fanny S., 279 Corfu, Declaration of (1917), 590-593, 594, 678, 709 Corriere della Sera (Milan), 183, 432, 557, 581, 591, 597, 726, 759 Coudenhove, Max, 357, 647, 654-655, 673, 774, 775 Cracow (Krak6w), 97, 367, 655, 782 Croatia (Croats), 21, 22, 200; 236, 246-247, 254, 377, 383, 392, 394, 401, 415-418, 443, 522, 567, 590, 678, 708-712, 741, 743, 758, 779-780. See also South Slavs

Croiner, Lord, 280-281 Csemoch, Cardinal Johann, 391392, 445, 743 Csokor, Franz J., 324 Cubrilovic, Vaso, 43 Curinaldi, Alois von, 41 Curzola (Kordula), 193 Cyprus, 110 Czechoslovaks (Czechs), 351, 483, 514-515; and Austrian politics, 342, 346, 640, 644, 650-651, 687, 690-691, 738; disaffection among, 88, 100, 648, 656, 734-735; émigré activities, 129-131, 262-273, 470-471, 522, 535-536, 558, 564-567, 579-580, 649; foreign support of, 235-236, 239, 242, 246-247, 253, 260, 745-749, 753-758; in Hapsburg army, 92, 353; nationalism of, 350, 352-365, 524, 660, 661-662, 673-677; revolt of (1918), 773-778, 791792 Czernin, Ottokar, as Hapsburg ambassador to Rumania, 208217, 398; as foreign minister, 440, 459-462, 467-471, 476478, 483-485, 489-496, 497498, 503 ff., 582-586, 598, 613 ff., 626-628, 630-636, 640, 647, 656, 668; out of office, 730, 761 Czernowitz (Cern^uti), 96, 109, 783 Dalmatia, 21, 29, 114, 118, 156, 172 ff., 200, 235, 247, 252, 274, 378, 417, 418, 557, 664, 678, 708, 780 Dankl, Victor, 92, 102, 300 D'Annunzio, Gabriele, 197, 720 Daszyfiski, Ignaz, 369, 680, 770, 784 Davis, Elmer, 243 Dawson, William H„ 552-553 Debreczen, 786-787

Index De Gasperi, Alcide, 179, 681, 770 Delcassé, Théophile, 196, 260, 274 Denis, Emest, 242, 246-247, 277 De Poteri, Ambassador, 822 Dewey, Thomas E., 778 Diaz, Armando, 455, 719, 799 Dickinson, G. Lowes, 228 Diller, Erich von, 158 Dilo (Vienna), 373 Dimitriyevié, Dimitri, 30, 43-45 Dmowski, Roman, 261, 367, 555, 755, 784 Dobrudja, 212, 497, 627, 628 Dohnânyi, Emo, 410 Diïrich, Josef, 270, 273 Dula, Matthew, 791 Dulles, Allen W., 347-348 Dumba, Constantin T., 470, 498, 560, 641 Durazzo (Durrës), 111 Durham, M. Edith, 281 Dyk, Victor, 361-362 Eckartsau, 807 Economist (London), 226 Edinburgh Review, 235 Eichhoff, Johann von, 771 Einaudi, Luigi, 593 Eiselsberg, Anton, 312 Eisenmann, Louis, 242, 247, 434 Endrici, Colestin, 381 Endrodi, Alexander, 408 Enver Pasha, 142-144^ "Epiphany Resolution" (1918), Epirus, 116 Erdôdy, Thomas, 487, 722-723 Erzberger, Matthias, 190-192, 413, 500-501 Esterhâzy, Moritz, 517, 684, 686-687, 695, 709 Eugene, Archduke, 91, 102 Eulogius, Archbishop, 374 Evans, Arthur J., 242, 281, 602, 784-785 Ezdorf, Josef von, 783

853

Falkenhayn, Erich von, 97, 105, 107, 123, 125, 194 Ferdinand I, of Bulgaria, 202203, 206, 422 Ferdinand I, of Rumania, 213220, 627 Fess, Simeon D., 659 Fiume (Rijeka), 118, 178, 399, 421, 556, 759, 779 Flotow, Ludwig von, 462, 476 Foch, Ferdinand, 719 Forgäch, Johann, 56, 398, 462, 624 "Fourteen Points" Address, 516, 576-583, 584, 603, 617, 627, 680, 746, 765, 767, 801-802, 820 France (French), and the 1914 crisis, 53, 63, 66, 76-77, 8384; Czechoslovaks and, 268270; and the Hapsburg Monarchy, 244-248, 260, 553-555, 630-636 Franchet d'Esperey, 805 Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, 117; character and views of, 24-28, 85; murder of, Chap. 1 passim Francis Joseph, 28, 36, 38, 4546, 58, 62, 71-72, 96, 98, 136, 150, 156, 187-188, 192, 194, 199, 247, 300-301, 311, 314, 343, 345, 404; character and death of, 422-433, 815816 Francis Salvator, Archduke, 314 Frank, Joseph, 678 Frank, KarC 326 Frankfurter Zeitung, 200, 657658, 666-667, 702, 724 Franklin-Bouillon, Henri, 598 Fremdenblatt (Vienna), 151, 217, 303, 325, 331, 482, 507, 546, 583-584, 621, 645-646, 750 Freud, Sigmund, 322-323, 332 Fried, Alfred H., 515-516 Friedjung, Heinrich, 149, 346, 510, S i l , 661

854

Index

Friedrich, Archduke, 91, 402, 427 Funder, Friedrich, 303 Galicia, 94-98, 107-108, 121123, 155-168, 224, 252, 255, 311, 329, 334, 366, 367, 369, 371, 374, 450, 493, 508, 619, 650, 680, 782 Garami, Ernst, 514, 788 Gauvain, Auguste, 242, 245246, 359, 601, 762 Germany, and Bulgaria, 202206; and Hapsburg Monarchy, Chap. 4 passim, 474480, Chap. 14 passim, 717718, 722-734, 761-762, 765, 818; and Italy, 185-201, 221222; and 1914 crisis, 51-52, 57-59, 67-68, 74-77; and Rumania, 208-218; and Turkey, 139-144 Glas Naroda, 353 Giesl, Baron Wilhelm, 51, 63, 69 Giolitti, Giovanni, 184-196 Giornale (TItalia (Rome), 594595, 748, 759 Girault, Arthur, 244 Globe (New York), 810 Goga, Octavian, 414 Goluchowski, Agenor, 169, 517 Gomperz, Heinrich, 299 Gooch, George P., 242, 551 Gorizia (Gorz), 106, 126, 193 Gorlice-Tamow, 107 Grabe?, Trifko, 30-31 Grabmayr, Karl, 359 Grabski, Stanislaw, 367 Gradisca (GradiSka), 193 Great Britain, and Czechoslovaks, 266-268; and the Hapsburg Monarchy, 223-244, 251-255, 532-553, 756-757, 762; and the 1914 crisis, 5253, 66-67, 72, 77-78, 80-81; and peace terms, 573-575 Greece, 110, 116 Grey, Edward, 53, 66-67, 72,

77-78, 250, 252, 254, 274, 277, 306 Grillparzer, Francis, 671, 824 Guyot, French publicist, 247248 Hadik, John, 788 Haeckel, Ernst, 137 Haller, Joseph, 370, 620 Halstead, U.S. Consul, 309-310, 315, 341 Hapsburg Monarchy, army of, 71, 83, 88-93, 805-806, 821; and Bulgaria, 202-206, 499; dissolution armies of, 798801; and France, 83-84, 244248, 553-555, 630-636, 762; and Germany, Chaps. 4 and 14 passim, 452-456, 474-482, 717-718, 722-734, 761-762, 765, 818; and Great Britain, 80-81, 223-244, 251-255, 532553, 573-575, 756-757, 762; historical role of, 824-826; and Italy; 170-199; Italians in, 380-381, 681, 794; and 1914 crisis, Chap. 2, passim; peace moves of, 462-474, 486-496, 518-528; and Poles, 154-169, 367-371, 493-494, 503-510, 650, 679-680, 781784; and Rumania, 206-222, 626-630; and tsarist Russia, 248-249, 255-260, 265-266, 282-286; and revolutionary Russia, 611-626, 638-639; seapower of, 117-120; sources of dissolution, 811-822; and South Slavs, 21-23, 377-380, 676-679, 736-737, 769; and Turkey, 139-144, 499, 726727; and Ukrainians, 371377, 617-621, 624-626, 650, 680-681, 782-784; and the United States, 476-482, 530, Chap. 16 passim, 554 ff., 576-586, 639-640, 652, 744755, 763-764, 766-767, 797798, 820-821; at war (1914-

Index 15), 80-81, Chap. 3 passim; (1916-17), 450-459; (1918), 716-721 Harrach, Francis, 37 Hartmann, Ludo M., 299, 514 Hartwig, Nicholas, 51 Hakk, Jaroslav, 363 Haus, Ante, 118-119, 457, 477 Hawel, Rudolf, 297-298 Hazen, Charles D., 753 Heinold, Karl von, 362 Helfferich, Karl, 476, 818 Henderson, Arthur, 539 Hengelmüller, Baron von, 475, 482 Herbette, Jean, 244 Herczeg, Francis, 409 Herron, George D., 586-587 Hertling, Georg F. von, 583, 723, 727 Hevesey, William de, 491-492 Hindenburg, Paul von, 94, 109, 110, 139, 398, 448, 476, 649, 719, 723 Hinkovii, Hinko, 276 Hintze, Paul von, 729, 731 Hitler, Adolf, 26, 629, 824 Hlinka, Andreas, 713, 791 HodXa, Milan, 421, 791, 813 Höfer, Anton, 664-665 Hoetzsch, Otto, 508 Hoffmann, Max, 613-615, 622, 623, 624, 655 Hofmannsthal, Hugo von, 317, 325 Hohenlohe, Conrad, 345, 346, 380, 440 Hohenlohe, Gottfried von, 135, 283, 499, 501, 634, 721, 722, 797 Holdich, Thomas H„ 538 Holló, Ludwig, 479, 683 Holtzendorff, Henning von, 442, 476-477 Hoover, Charles L., 353, 364365 Horbaczewski, Johann, 647, 681 Homik, Rudolf, 303

855

Horthy, Nicholas, 119-120, 458, 720, 780 Horvat, Alexander, 708 House, Edward M., 526, 564, 577, 745, 747, 748, 763 Hoyos, Alexander, 56, 157 Hrvatska, 709 Hughes, Charles E„ 470 Hungary, 21, 48, 97, 347-348, Chaps. 11, 16, 19 passim, 628, 742-744; collapse of, 784-793; coronation of King Charles, 442-447; Germans in, 419-420; Rumanians in, 39, 207-220, 235, 236, 246, 254, 392, 410-415, 569, 687, 714-715; Slovaks in, 420-421, 712-714; South Slavs in, 415418 Hussarek, Max, 738-741, 769, 770, 794 Huyn, Paul, 773 Hyndman, H. M., 242 Idea Nazionale (Rome), 601 Uid& 29 35 Isonzo, 104, 105-106, 361, 451, 600 Istria, 21, 193, 274, 378, 664, 678 Iswolsky, Alexander, 258, 261, 274 Italy, diplomacy of, 1914-15, 99, 170-199, 254; and Hapsburg Monarchy, 555-557, 758-759, 779-780, 799-802; and 1914 crisis, 53, 68, 79-80-82; and South Slavs, 273-274, 589604; at war (1915-16), 102107, 119-120; (1917), 451458; (1918), 717-721 J4szi, Oscar, 392, 408, 412, 414415, 469, 517-518, 695-698, 788, 790, 791, 793, 813, 815826 Jaworski, Ladislaus, L., 369 Jeglic, Bishop, 679, 743 Jeremii?, Jaroslav, 363

856

Index

Jeritza, Maria, 325, 624 Jesensk^, Janko, 421 Jews, 133, 301, 306, 311, 322, 354, 394, 692, 782 offe, Adolf, 618 ohnston, Harry H., 226-227 onescu, Take, 209, 212-213, 216-217 Jorga, Nicholas, 213 Joseph Augustin, Archduke, 91, 683, 686, 788 Joseph Ferdinand, Archduke, 91-92, 391, 448 Journal des Débats, Le (Paris), 245, 553, 601 Jovanovii, Ljuba, 33-34, 537 Joynson-Hicks, William, 132 Juriga, Ferdinand, 707 Kailer, Karl von, 59 Kakowski, Aleksander, 506 Kampf, Der (Vienna), 292, 295 Kanner, Heinrich, 307 Karinthy, Frederick, 409 Kirolyi, Michael, 389-391, 395396, 401, 402, 407-408, 414415, 447, 467-468, 473, 479, 517-518, 569, 686, 694, 695, 698, 705, 725-726, 766; and révolution (1918), 785-793, 799, 805 Kelsen, Hans, 768 Kerensky, Alexander, 450, 555, 558 Kienthal Conference, 294 Kiev, 373, 619 Kirchl, Adolf, 327 Klein, Franz, 345-346 KlofâS, Vâclav, 354, 360, 660, 736, 739 Koch, Ludwig, 327 Kodâly, Zoltân, 409-410 Koerber, Emest von, 192, 345347, 371, 406, 429 Kolisek, Alois, 712-713 Kolowrat, Sascha, 308-309 Koroiec, Anton, 377, 643, 651, 664, 677, 678-679, 710, 737, 769

Korytowski, Witold, 376 Kovanda, Czech agent, 362 Kralik, Richard von, 303 KramiK Karel, 272-273, 356360, 379, 531, 649, 674, 675, 676, 736, 776 Kraus, Karl, 305, 309, 321-322 Krauss, Alfred von, 102, 453, 624 Krek, Janez E., 378, 677, 736 Kreuz Zeitung, 604 Kreuznach Accords, 497-498, 501, 506 Krleza, Miroslav, 417 Krobatin, Alexander von, 59, 192, 440 Krofta, Kamil, 363 Kucharzewski, Jan, .506, 509, 620 Kühlmann, Richard von, 6, 583584, 614, 705, 723, 727 Kuk, Carl, 158, 504 Kun, Béla, 653, 788 Kunfì, Sigismund, 396, 788 Kunz, Gottfried, 357 Kuropatkin, Alexei N., 282 Kuschnir, Vladimir, 373 Kvapil, Jaroslav, 363, 673 La Guardia, Fiorello H., 518 Laibach (Ljubljana), 104, 676, 678, 679, 736 Lammasch, Heinrich, 298, 438, 482, 586-587, 652, 661, 768, 775, 795, 813 Landwehr, Ottokar, 665, 668, 669 Lansdowne, Lord, 529, 540, 573 Lansing, Robert E., 481, 484, 519, 562, 577-578, 603, 635, 744, 747, 748, 750, 751, 753754 Lapts£hevi6, Deputy, 101 Larwin, Hans, 327, 671 Lausanne, 351 Lecher, Otto, 641 L'Écho de Paris, 244 Leitner, Joseph, 312

857 Index Lemberg (Lvov), 95-96, 108, Mafia (Czech), 266, 356 167, 302, 367, 369, 372, 376, Magdií, Pero, 418 450, 504, 783 Magyarország (Budapest), 407, Lenin, Vladimir I, 95, 612, 621415, 433, 524, 685, 699, 738 Magyars, 92, 218, 229, 245622, 623 246, 253 - 254, 606 - 607, Lewicki, Constantine, 507 Chaps. 11, 18 passim, 569Lichnowsky, Karl M„ 511, 670 670, 813-814. See also HunLidove Noviny (Prague), 357 gary Liechtenstein, Alfred, 1Ì7 Liechtenstein, Alois, 303, 529 Mamatey, Albert P., 566, 747 Linder, Béla, 788 Manchester Guardian, 52, 72Lissauer, Emst, 301 73, 537, 547, 548 Litvinov, Maxim, 618 Mandii, Ante, 276 Lloyd George, David, 7, 451- Marghiloman, Alexander, 209, 452, 456, 468, 483-484, 489219, 413, 627-628 491, 509, 525-527, 543, 547, Maria Theresa, Archduchess, 573-575, 580, 602, 749 314 Lobkowitz, Ferdinand Z., 303 Marie, of Rumania, 213-214, Lodge, Henry C., 754 569 London, Meyer, 572 Marie Valerie, Archduchess, 314 London, Treaty of (1915), 181- Markovits, Rodion, 408 2, 194-196, 239, 276, 280, Marriott, J. A. R., 227 489, 556, 581, 582, 591, 595, Martin, William, 739-740 604, 607, 749, 780 Martini, Ferdinando, 183 Lónvay, Countess Elemer, 314 Marx, Karl, 288 Lovifen, Mt., 114, 497, 498, Masaryk, Alice, 360-361 531 Masaryk, Jan, 825 Low, Sidney, 542 Masaryk, Thomas G., 83, 233, Lublin, 158, 784 237, 238, 247, 269, 270-273, Lubomirski, Andrew, 506 353-355, 357, 362, 557, 590, Lucaciu, Vasil, 414 598, 608, 630, 643; career Ludendorff, Erich, 94, 98, 110, of, 263-267; in Great Britain, 162-163, 168, 452, 500, 501, 240, 242, 267-268, 356, 432506-507, 513-514, 612, 618, 433, 535, 536, 641; President 649, 717, 720, 723, 731 of Czechoslovakia, 285, 776Ludwig, Emil, 479, 649 778; in Russia, 558, 746; in Lützow, Francis, 565 the United States, 579, 746Lützow, Heinrich, 467, 813 747, 753, 754, 767-768, 774 Lutoslawski, Vincent, 504 Massingham, Henry W., 548 Matin, Le (Paris), 245, 271, Macchi di Cellere, Vincent, 581, 553 604 Macchio, Karl von, 176, 186, Maurras, Charles, 245 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 597-598, 194, 462 601 759 MacDonald, Ramsay, 539-540 Medek, Rudolf, 358 Machar, Josef S., 362 Mackensen, August von, 125, Meinl, Julius, 472, 516, 670 Mensdorff, Albert, 485, 492, 427 525-527 Mackinder, Haiford ]., 534

858

Index

Mérey, Kajetan von, 176, 189, 622 M&trovic, Ivan, 279 Metìanu, John, 412 Metternich, Pauline, 314 Michaelis. Georg, 501-502, 523 Mihalovic, Ante, 708-709, 780 Miliukov, Pavel N., 248, 285, 375-376, 557-558, 612 Milner, Lord, 541-542, 547, 573 Mir (Sofia), 203-204 Mirko, Prince, of Montenegro, 114 Mironescu, Senator, 597 Mitteleuropa, 145-154, 242, 2^3, 323, 439, 510-514, 726 Miuskovi£, Lazar, 114 Molden, Bertrand, 475 Molnâr, Francis, 108, 123, 409 Monde Slave, Le (Paris), 247 Montenegro, 81, 110, 238, 254, 497, 590, 645, 781, 800; conquest of, 113-115 Montenuovo, Alfred, 38, 423425, 440 Mòra, Francis, 408 Morawski, Casimir, 167 Móricz, Sigismund, 408 Morning Post (London), 200, 228-230 Moser, Friedrich, 424 Muir, Ramsay, 242 Musil, Robert, 300 Mussolini, Benito, 183-184, 197198, 199, 220-221, 523, 597 Musulin, Alexander, 56, 61, 63, 189, 199, 474, 528 Nagyvârad ( Grosswardein ), 792 Namier, Lewis B., 535-536, 565, 756 Ndrodni Listy (Prague), 346, 357, 674, 675, 676 Ndrodni Politika (Prague), 200 Nation (London), 224, 547, 548 Nation Tchèque, La (Paris), 247

Naumann, Friedrich, 146-154, 511, 512, 697, 728 Népszava (Budapest), 408, 522, 582, 585, 687, 692, 693, 699, 785 Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), 46, 64, 108, 114, 153, 166, 188, 267, 298, 302, 303-307, 341, 342, 346, 367, 404-405, 460, 472, 498, 522, 584, 585, 610, 621, 632, 648, 656, 672-673, 676, 693, 703, 705, 722, 724, 729-730, 735, 737, 750, 761, 767, 769, 772-773 Neues Wiener Tagblatt, 307, 346, 582, 670 Newbigin, Marion L., 227-228 New Europe, The (London), 8, 240-244, 523-524, 576, 580, 603, 635, 757, 762, 805, 820 New York Times, 243, 579, 604, 726, 755, 762, 763-764, 767, 772, 804, 810, 811 Nicholas (Kikita), of Montenegro, 81, 113-115 Nicholas, Grand Duke, of Russia, 109-110, 155, 255, 256257, 283, 374 Nicholas II, of Russia, 50, 65, 69, 73-74, 94, 109-110, 255, 258, 259, 271, 284, 367, 375 Nicolson, Sir Arthur, 53 Njegovan, Admiral, 457 Northcliffe, Lord, 604-605, 607, 610-611

Nosek, Vladimir, 268 Novoye Vremya ( Petrograd ), 249, 275 Noyes, Alfred, 229 Odessa, 624 Österreichisches Rundschau, 137 Onciul, Aurel von, 643 Oncken, Hermann, 510 Opinion (London), 669 Orlando, Vittorio, 581, 595, 597, 600, 601, 749

859

Index Osservatore Romano (Rome), 180, 601 Ostrowski, Joseph, 506, 507 Osusky, Stefan, 566 Otranto, Strait of, 119, 457458, 720 Otto, Crown Prince, 422, 447, 806, 808 Pacelli, Eugenio, 523 Paderewski, Ignace J., 262, 564, 755 784 Page, Thomas N., 601, 603 Paget, Walburga, 433 Painlevé, Paul, 519 Paléologue, Maurice, 66, 76, 96, 258-259 Pallavicini, Johann, 140-144, 721 Palmerston, Lord, 5, 223 Pàlyi, Edmund, 498 Pares, Bernard, 241 Paris Peace Conference, 823824 Pa?i6, Nikola, 30, 32-34, 43-44, 49-50, 68-69, 274-278; in exile, 111, 547, 589 ff., 600, 679, 758, 780-781 Pastor, Ludwig, 300 Pattai, Robert, 660-661 Pekafr, Josef, 433 Penfield, Frederick C., 71, 97, 101, 128-129, 188, 199, 290, 312, 313, 315, 316, 325-326, 331, 332, 338, 348-349, 434435, 446, 459-460, 466, 473, 483-485, 579, 659 Pergier, Charles, 565-566 Pernersdorf, Engelbert, 292 Pester Lbyd (Budapest), 65, 70, 407, 420, 472-473, 480, 498, 531, 546, 690, 703, 706 Pesti Hirlap, 707, 710 Pesti Napló, 401, 703, 706, 742 Petrograd, 621 Petrusevif, Deputy, 633, 643, 769 Petzhold, Alfons, 292-293 Philips, W. Alison, 242, 762

Pichon, Stephen, 555, 758 Piemont (Belgrade), 49 Piffl, Cardinal Gustav, 38, 87, 287 297 301 Pilsudski, Joseph, 168, 368-370, 504, 505, 784 Pittsburgh Accord, 747 Piusverein, 303 Poincaré, Raymond, 63, 66, 76, 83-84, 487-490, 555 Pola (Pula), 118, 780 Poland (Poles), 94, 224, 235, 253-256, 342, 366-371, 598599, 643-650, 660, 679-680, 769, 817-818; and the Central Powers, 154-169, 259, 285, 367-371, 388, 493-494, 503-510, 732-734; and collapse Hapsburg Monarchy, 781-785; Russian, 104, 107108, 255, 259, 261-262, 301, 330, 366 (504-505; and the United States, 561, 562-564, 751, 755 Polzer-Hoditz, Arthur C., 346, 440, 646 Popovii, Cvetko, 43 Popovici, Aurei, 413, 813 Potiorek, Oskar, 36, 40, 92, 99, 102

Potocki, Joseph, 366 Prague, 661, 667, 673-674, 675, 681, 736, 773 Pr&ek, Karl, 650, 674 Press (Philadelphia), 629-630 Pribram, Alfred F., 359 Princip, Gavrilo, 30, 37 ff. Prisoners of war, 128-131, 653654 Propaganda, 131-134, 297-301, 450, 453, 455, 604-611, 622623, 634, 653, 718, 820-821 Prothero, George W., 242 Przemyil, 97, 99, 108, 214 Pupin, Michael, 568 Putney, Albert H., 745 Putnik, Radomir, 71, 99, 111 Rabereau, Baron, 667-668 Radek, Karl, 616, 822

860

Index

Radie, Stjepan (Stephan), 416, 709, 779 Radoslavov, Vasil, 203-206 Radovic, Andrew, 115, 590 Raemaekers, Louis, 100-101 Rakovsky, Stephan, 395 RáSin, Alois, 358, 774 Rázus, Martin, 714 Redlich, Josef, 47, 122, 359, 472, 481, 613, 644-645, 724, 795, 813 Redlich, Oswald, 299 Reichspost (Vienna), 46, 64, 112, 296, 303, 486, 522, 633, 693, 737 Reichstag Peace Resolution, 500-502, 516 Reinhold, Georg, 299 Reiss, R. A., 131-132, 229 Renner, Karl, 149, 293-294, 486, 514-515, 651, 670, 795, 813 Repington, Charles A. C., 74 Reverterá, Nicholas, 519-520, 631 Revue (TAutriche (Vienna), 652, 671 Revue Yougoslave, Le (Paris), 247 Ribot, Alexandre, 488, 491 Rieger (Reinmichel), Sebastian, 320 Rienössl, Heinrich, 320 Riga, 109, 451 Rilke, Rainer M., 317-318 Ritig, Svetozar, 709 Robertson, William R., 230 Roda-Roda, Alexander, 304 Roman Catholicism, 20, 25, 87, 127, 158, 230, 244, 275, 281, 297, 368, 391, 445, 504, 521525, 533, 537, 553, 563, 567568, 590, 677, 712, 739, 772 Roosevelt, Theodore, 389, 567, 570-571, 579, 659, 752, 765766 Rose, J. Holland, 242 Rosegger, Peter, 318-319

Ruffini, Francesco, 595, 597, 598, 601 Rumania (Rumanians), 80, 493, 569, 643; diplomacy of (1914-16), 97, 206-222, 254, 397; peace treaty with Central Powers (1918), 622, 626630; resurgence of, 783, 792793; at war (1916-17), 123126 Russia, Bolshevik, 507,555, 570, 612-626, 652, 817; Czechoslovaks in, 271-273; and Hapsburg Monarchy, 248-249, 255 - 260, 265 - 266; March (1917) Revolution in, 129, 265, 273, 450, 482, 488, 611612, 638-639, 817; and 1914 crisis, 50-51, 63, 65-66, 7174; peace talk in, tsarist, 282-286; at war (1914-16), 94-99, 107-110, 120-123; (1917), 450-451 Sabath, Adolph J., 566 St. Jean de Maurienne, Conference at, 490 Salandra, Antonio, 106, 182-199 Salisbury, Lord, 223 Salonica, 43, 110, 125, 218 Salvemini, Gaetano, 557, 582, 591-593, 597, 759 Salzburg, 336, 728 Samouprava (Belgrade), 49 San Giuliano, Marquis Antonio y di, 79, 179-182 Santic, Aleksa, 379 Sarajevo, 18-19, 29; murders in, 17, 31, 45-46 Sarkotii, Stephan, 92, 418, 711, 744 Saseno, 116 Sazonov, Sergius D., 65-66, 73 257-259, 275, 284, 285, 375 Schalik, Alice, 304-305 Schnitzler, Arthur, 320 Schönherr, Karl, 321, 324 Schratt, Katharina, 314, 426427

Index Schreiner, Joseph, 358 Schwarzenberg, Charles, 813 Scott, Charles P., 548, 821 "Scotus Viator," see Seton-Watson, R. W. Scutari (Us kudar), 111 Secok (Milan), 183, 594 Seidler, Ernst von, 507, 610, 645 ff., 657, 659-662, 668, 669, 670, 674, 675, 690, 703, 712, 737-738 Seignobos, Charles, 242 Seipel, Ignaz, 806 Seitz, Karl, 294, 438, 514, 660 Serbia (Serbs), 20, 21, 29-30, 236, 246-247, 377, 497, 522, 547, 567, 590, 679, 780-781; and the 1914 crisis, 48-51, 68-70, 84-85; under occupation, 115-116, 800; at war, 93, 98-102, 110-113 Sering, Max, 510 Sesan, Antun, 458 Seton-Watson, Robert W., 8, 27, 34, 42, 229, 236-244, 262, 267-268, 275, 276-279, 280, 545, 546, 596, 601, 602, 605607, 610, 670 Sforza, Carlo, 593 Shakespeare, Commemoration of, 324-325, 363, 409 Siberia, 129 Sieghart, Rudolf, 307 Sienkiewicz, Henryk, 261-262 Sikorski, Wladyslaw (Ladislaus), 370-371 Silva-Tarouca, Ernst, 342 Singer, Isidor, 527-528 Sixtus Affair, 439, 483, 486-492, 526, 555, 556, 596, 631-636, 722 kerlecz, Ivan von, 708 koda, Emil, 149, 352, 641, 736 Skrbensky, Cardinal, 297, 354 Skryziiiski, Ladisias, 503, 517, 527, 680 Slovaks, 39, 236, 254, 262-273, 410, 420-421, 566-567, 642, 676, 690, 707, 712-714, 743,

t

861

775, 790-793. See also Czechoslovaks Slovenec (Laibach), 678, 679 Slovenes, 21, 200, 377-378, 380, 522, 567, 590, 647, 667, 678y 679, 736-737, 743, 769, 780 Smeral, Bohumir, 674 Smuts, Jan C., 525-527, 578 Social Democrats (Socialists), Austrian, 87, 88, 95, 288-289, 292-296, 343-345, 459, 464, 498, 506-507, 514-515, 611612, 614, 629, 639, 643-644, 651-652, 654, 655-658, 660, 731, 739, 794, 796; Hungarian, 396, 408, 514-515, 692, 788; Polish, 368-369 Sokols, 266, 358, 361, 775 Sonnino, Sidney, 182-199, 490, 556, 581, 591, 593, 601-602, 635, 758, 759, 801 Sorel, Albert, 7 Souchon, Wilhelm, 143 Soukop, Frant&ek, 360, 775 South Slav Bulletin (London), 277 South Slavs, 20, 49, 196, 218, 351; and Austrian politics, 643, 660, 677; émigré activities, 111-112, 264, 273-281, 378-379, 471, 514-515, 580, 757-759, 779; foreign support of, 235, 236, 238, 242, 557, 567-568, 752-753; in Hapsburg military forces, 104, 200, 458, 717; and Hungary, 443, 743, 779; nationalism of, 2123, 36, 377-380, 676-679, 708-712; revolt of (1918), 779-781 Spa, Conferences at (1918), 634, 722-724, 730, 733-734, 748 Spain, 588 Spalato (Split), 118, 378 Spectator (London), 53, 726, 756 Spitzmiiller, Alexander, 347 Srobâr, Vavro, 743

862

Index

Stadler, Joseph, 297, 743 Stalin, Joseph, 824 Stalzer, Hans, 671 Stanile, FrantiSek, 530-531, 651, 675, 738, 769 Steczkowski, Jan K., 510 Steed, H. Wickham, 27, 233236, 240, 242, 267, 275, 276277, 432, 528, 533, 534-535, 565, 574-575, 594, 595, 596, w 602, 605, 607-608, 757, 778 Stefinik, Milan R., 268-269, 270-271, 421, 566-567, 596 Steinacker, Edmund, 813 Stepanowsky, Ukrainian journalist, 351 Steyermiihl, 307 Steyr, 330 Stinnes, Hugo, 285 Stockholm, Conference at, 514515 Stòger-Steiner, Rudolf, 440 Stoica, Vasil, 569 Stolper, Gustav, 510 Stransky, Adolf, 357, 636, 643, 644 Strauss, Richard, 325, 326 Stresemann, Gustav, 501 StSberrfy, Georg, 643, 738, 775 Stubenberg, Countess M., 313 Stiirgkh, Karl, 59, 187, 192, 290-291, 307, 342-343, 352, 360, 376, 406, 428, 464 Stiirmer, Boris V., 285 Styria, 246, 312 upilo, Frano, 274-277, 379 u5tei¥i(?, Ivan, 377-378, 737 Svehla, Antonin, 356, 774 Sychrava, Lev, 269-270 Szebenyei, Joseph, 229-230 Székely, Béla, 480 Szeptycki, Andreas, 374-375, 504, 680 Szeptycki, Stanislaus, 504, 620 Szilassy, Julius, 706 Talleyrand, Charles M. de, 245 Tardieu, André, 242 Taylor, Alan J. P., 788-789

Temps, Le (Paris), 245, 523, 553 y Teschen (Cesky Té&n), 158, 676, 784 Thun, Francis, 353, 356-357, 359 Times (London), 52, 67, 108, 233, 240, 284, 432, 451, 512, 573, 603, 632, 658-659, 750, 778, 802 Tisza, Stephen, 97, 813; murder of, 789-790; and 1914 crisis, 47-48, 56, 58-59, 6061, 65, 385, 684; out of office, 684-685, 687-690, 697, 703, 705, 714-715, 721, 725, 742-744, 766, 779, 785, 786, 798; as prime minister, 112, 124, 138, 150, 156-159, 174, 187-193, 203, 211, 214-217, 221, 229, 236-237, 282, 305, 307, 384-387, 394-398, 402407, 410, 412-414, 416, 418, 421, 427, 440, 443, 445-446, 459, 462, 467, 469, 473, 477479, 493, 494, 503, 513, 531, 546, 665, 682-684, 701-702 Tormay, Cécile, 408 Toroczk ai, Victor, 707 Torre, Andrea, 595 Transcript (Boston), 777 Transylvania, 92, 124-125, 207, 215, 218, 221, 224, 252, 411, 413, 419, 569, 597, 690, 793 Trentino, 102, 106, 171, 186, 192-194, 224, 247, 252, 456, 490, 520 Tresic-Pavicic?; Ante, 378, 678, 710 Trevelyan, George M., 100, 131, 231 235 Tribune (New York), 578-579, 810 Trieste, 29, 38, 103, 104, 106, 118, 171-172, 186, 193, 246, 328, 333, 380 451, 520, 530, 655, 669 Trotsky, Leon, 6, 293, 612 ff., 622, 658

Index Trubetski, Gregory, 255 Trumbic, Ante, 274, 278, 379, 589-590, 593, 594, 596, 598, 600, 601, 608, 709, 743, 750, 825 Tschirschky, Heinrich L. von, 56-57, 75, 315-316, 462 Turkey, 499, 665, 726-727; diplomacy of in 1914, 139-144 Tusar, Vlastimil, 633, 662, 769, 775 Tyrol, 102, 105, 171, 380, 668, 681, 796 Tyrrell, William, 253-254, 541, 756 Uebersperger, Hans, 112, 298 Ukrainians (Ruthenes), 94, 156, 218, 249, 252, 257, 301, 342, 351, 366, 371-377, 410, 421, 504, 507, 509, 558, 568, 617, 618-621, 622, 624-626, 633, 643, 647, 650, 660, 668, 680681, 747, 769, 782-784, 792 Ukrainische Rundschau, 373 Uniate Church, 374-375, 714, 783 "Union or Death," see "Black Hand" Society United States, Czechoslovaks and, 266, 564-567, 746-747, 753-755; declaration of war on Hapsburg Monarchy, 455, 485, 530, 570-573; and Hapsburg Monarchy, Chap. 16 passim, 639-640, 744-755, 763-764, 766-767, 797-798, 819-821; and 1914 crisis, 71; peace activity of, 348-349, 463-464, 469-474, 483-485, 518-519, 561-562, 576-586; Poles and, 561-564, 751, 755; South Slavs and, 275-277, 567-568, 752-753, 755 Unkelshausser, Karl von, 709 Vaida-Voevod, Alexander, 411412, 792

863

Valone (Vlone), 116, 181, 190, 247 Vassilshikova, Marie, 283-284 Väzsonyi, William, 686-687, 689, 694, 695, 697 Velimirovic, Nicholas, 279 Vesnii, Milenko R., 568 Victor Emmanuel II, of Italy, 198, 490-491 Vienna (Viennese), 46-47, 272, 423-425, 529, 618, 720; civilian convulsions (1918), 654-659, 735; revolution in (1918), 796; war emotions of, 69-70, 96, 108, 170, 1992Ó0, 718; wartime conditions in, 302, 309-315, 330-336, 662-671, 770, 793-794 Vildg, 392, 408, 469-470, 682, 696, 697 Vittorio Veneto, 800 Voce dei Popoli, La (Rome), 601 Vojnovic, Ivo (Lujo), 378, 710711 Vorarlberg, 796 Vorwärts (Berlin), 68 Voska, Emanuel V., 267, 565 Vosnjak, Bogumil, 536-537, 745 Vossische Zeitung (Berlin), 646, 649, 658, 672 Wan|enheim, Hans von, 141Warsaw, 98, 109, 158, 167 369, 782 Washbum, Stanley, 284 Wassilko, Nicholas, 619 Wedel, Botho, 462, 649, 723 761, 794, 815 Weingartner, Felix, 325 Weiskirchner, Richard, 136 296, 310-311, 342, 403, 43o! 641, 655, 669, 703, 736 Weizl, Ernst F., 138 Wekerle, Alexander, 509, 513 617, 633, 686, 688 ff„ 705 711, 725, 771, 785-786, 814 Wells, H. G., 224, 539

864

Index

Werfel, Franz, 318 Werkmann, Karl, 307, 440 Westminster Gazette (London), 548 804 Whyte, Alexander F., 242, 534, 544.545

Wichtl, Friedrich, 360 Wiener Neustadt, 655, 657 Wiesner, Friedrich von, 40, 462, 619 Wilhelm, Archduke, 373, 625, 626, 783 William II, of Germany, 26, 51, 58, 74, 98, 123, 136, 141, 152, 187, 208, 422, 427, 501, 521, 649, 723 Williams, Harold, 241 Wilson, Henrv, 456 Wilson, Hugli R., 518 Wilson, Woodrow, 463-464, 469-485, 509, 512, 516, 518, 519, 524, 530, 540, 559 ff., 576-586, 624, 630, 728, 744748, 751-755, 797-798, 804 Windischgrätz, Ludwig, 695, 702, 786 Witte, Sergius, 249, 282 Wittek, Heinrich von, 511 Witzmann, Karl, 327

Wlassics, Julius, 480 Wolf, Julius, 341 Wolf, Karl H., 649, 650 World (New York), 659 Yugoslavia (Yugoslavs), 21, 22, 237, 239, 244, 246, 254, 589604, 749, 755. See also South Slavs Zahradnik, Isador, 524 Zangwill, Israel, 550-551 Zara (Zadär), 173 Zeit, Die (Vienna), 46, 64, 307, 346, 463, 508, 516, 527, 611, v 650, 662, 668, 670 Zeriav, Gregor, 677 Zichy, Aladar, 683, 709 Zimmerman, Arthur, 476, 477, 482 Zimmerwald Conference, 294295 Zita, Empress-Queen, 392, 422, 435, 440-442, 487, 491, 632, 719, 742, 806, 815-816 gu, Ahmed, 116-117 lger Ivan von, 647, 677-678 Zupancic, Oton, 378 Zweig, Stefan, 300, 319, 367